Visions and Revisions: Village Policies of the Ming Founder in Seven Phases 远景与修订：明朝开国者的七阶段乡村政策
Author(s): Sarah Schneewind 作者：萨拉·施尼温德
Source: T’oung Pao, 2001, Second Series, Vol. 87, Fasc. 4/5 (2001), pp. 317-359 来源：《通报》，2001 年，第二系列，第 87 卷，第 4/5 期（2001 年），第 317-359 页
Published by: Brill 出版社：布里尔
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4528880 稳定链接：https://www.jstor.org/stable/4528880
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VISIONS AND REVISIONS： VILLAGE POLICIES OF THE MING FOUNDER IN SEVEN PHASES ^(1){ }^{1} 远景与修订：明朝开国者的七阶段乡村政策 ^(1){ }^{1}
BY 作者SARAH SCHNEEWIND 莎拉·施尼温德（Southern Methodist University，Dallas） （南方卫理公会大学，达拉斯）
且上古。。。法不更令In high antiquity．．．laws were not ordered revised． 在远古时代……法律没有被有序地修订。Zhu Yuanzhang，＂Youwu guishen＂ 朱元璋，“诱吴归神”
Pursuing a vision of an ideal social order，the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang（r．1368－1398 as the Hongwu emperor）created a new state that aimed at controlling and shaping society．But society also shaped the state－building policies．A chronological account of how the early Ming regime built village institutions shows，first，that many policies initially accommodated existing social formations，and second， that Zhu frequently revised his stance．Discussions of Zhu＇s creation of the Ming state often consider the reign as a whole，or split it in two at 1380．But such analyses gloss over the details of village policies that are confusing，complex，and self－contradictory．Different laws described the same institution differently，and local leaders with various titles were charged with overlapping functions．Institutions were proposed，rejected，and then established anyway；or were established and then abolished，sometimes to be re－established later．Surveyed year by year，the contradictions make sense：the laws fall into definite phases．The revisions took account of resistance to the laws．As John Dardess has shown，Zhu understood that resistance as individual recalcitrance，stupidity and wickedness，but his own texts also suggest that it was the product of working social networks．Zhu＇s response to resistance echoed its disruption of the hierarchy，solidarity and immobility he hoped to impose，thereby undercutting his own origi－ nal blueprint for state and society．Resistance，therefore，revised the autocrat＇s vision from the beginning． 追求理想社会秩序的愿景，明朝开国皇帝朱元璋（洪武皇帝，1368－1398 年在位）创建了一个旨在控制和塑造社会的新国家。但社会也影响了国家建设政策。对早期明朝政权如何建立村庄制度的时间顺序叙述表明，首先，许多政策最初是适应现有的社会结构；其次，朱元璋经常修正他的立场。关于朱元璋创建明朝国家的讨论通常将其统治时期整体考虑，或在 1380 年将其分为两个阶段。但这种分析忽略了村庄政策中那些令人困惑、复杂且自相矛盾的细节。不同的法律对同一制度有不同的描述，地方领导人拥有各种头衔，承担着重叠的职能。制度被提议、被否决，但最终还是建立了；或者先建立后废除，有时又重新建立。逐年调查，这些矛盾变得有意义：法律分为明确的几个阶段。修订考虑到了对法律的抵抗。正如约翰·达德斯所示，朱元璋将这种抵抗理解为个人的顽固、愚昧和邪恶，但他自己.. 文本还表明它是工作社会网络的产物。朱对抵抗的回应呼应了他希望施加的等级、团结和不动性的破坏，从而削弱了他最初对国家和社会的蓝图。因此，抵抗从一开始就修正了专制者的愿景
Village administrative policies changed considerably over the course of the first reign, both in specifics and in overall approach. Tax collection, population registration, religious institutions, community rituals, indoctrination, commendation of virtuous people, and surveillance were all aimed at assuring the dynasty material, social and spiritual support. The new dynasty implemented policies to reconstruct and control the tax base; tap into the social resources of local communities to enhance its own prestige and keep the peace; and coordinate with, and when necessary control, deities and their followers. The first section of this essay shows that these policies came in seven phases. Considered within each phase, the whole set of regulations makes sense together, and each phase differs coherently from the others. The second section shows that other kinds of regulations, such as those governing the Buddhist clergy and institutions, can also be understood within the seven-phase framework. From one phase to the next, whole systems were created and dismantled: for instance, the lijia system superseded Assemblies; official community schools were turned over to civilians; the Community Elder system replaced the Senior system for settling local disputes. 在第一任期内，村庄行政政策在具体内容和整体方法上都发生了显著变化。税收征集、人口登记、宗教机构、社区仪式、灌输教育、表彰德行人士以及监控，所有这些措施都旨在确保朝代获得物质、社会和精神上的支持。新朝代实施了重建和控制税基的政策；利用地方社区的社会资源以提升自身声望并维持和平；并与神祇及其信徒协调，必要时加以控制。本文的第一部分展示了这些政策经历了七个阶段。将其置于每个阶段内考察，整套规章制度相互呼应，每个阶段又与其他阶段有条理的区别。第二部分表明，其他类型的规章，如管理佛教僧侣和机构的规定，也可以在这七阶段框架内得到理解。 从一个阶段到下一个阶段，整个系统被创建又被拆除：例如，里甲制取代了乡会；官方社区学校交由平民管理；社区长老制度取代了长老制度来解决地方纠纷。
Specific policies changed; but the basic approach also changed. Zhu Yuanzhang and his advisors initially constructed a bureaucratic hierarchy incorporating both officials and deities and fostered cooperation in the promotion of moral values among clergy, officials and subjects. By the end of his reign, Zhu Yuanzhang had promulgated laws that undercut family, administrative and spiritual hierarchies and may have fostered dissension. He had had to sacrifice elements of what Edward Farmer has called the largely successful “Ming constitution,” which “strongly influenced the development of Chinese government and society for the next six centuries”: a system of rituals, regulations, and laws meant to shape society and culture into a unified, hierarchical whole, embodied in institutions resistant to decay and change. ^(2){ }^{2} 具体政策发生了变化；但基本方法也发生了变化。朱元璋和他的顾问最初构建了一个包含官员和神祇的官僚等级体系，并促进了神职人员、官员与臣民之间在道德价值推广上的合作。在他统治结束时，朱元璋颁布了削弱家庭、行政和精神等级的法律，可能助长了纷争。他不得不牺牲爱德华·法默所称的“明朝宪法”的部分内容，这一“在很大程度上成功的‘明朝宪法’”强烈影响了中国政府和社会未来六个世纪的发展：这是一套旨在将社会和文化塑造成统一的等级整体的礼仪、规章和法律体系，体现在抵抗腐朽和变革的制度中。 ^(2){ }^{2}
The changes were made in a battle against corruption and disobedience that Zhu saw, as John Dardess has shown, as essential to the survival of the dynasty. ^(3){ }^{3} He understood the forces facing him as, in Dardess’s words, “stupidly criminal” examples of "recalcitrance 这些变革是在朱元璋所见的反腐败和反抗命令的斗争中进行的，正如约翰·达德斯所展示的，他认为这是王朝生存的关键。 ^(3){ }^{3} 他理解自己所面临的力量，正如达德斯所言，是“愚蠢犯罪”的“顽抗”典型。
and villainy [that] mocked every sagely aspiration, frustrated every good intention, and transmuted every corrective policy into one more opportunity for fraud and wrong-doing." ^(4){ }^{4} As Zhu became increasingly frustrated, his approach to local communities became more intrusive and punitive, but he never got to the heart of the problem. It was not only personal wickedness that opposed Zhu’s policies, but social networks serving social needs. Like team and brigade cadres in the People’s Republic of China, resident administrators (prefects, subprefects and county magistrates), ^(5){ }^{5} yamen personnel, and village authorities (lijia leaders, Seniors, Elders), were not merely greedy. In order to do their jobs they had to balance demands from the capital with the demands of the local residents, who exerted their power through social networks. ^(6){ }^{6} The frequent revisions of village policies, and Zhu’s own records of cases he judged, indirectly reflect the power of social networks, as our final section will show. “和恶行嘲弄了所有贤明的志向，挫败了所有良好的意图，并将每一项纠正政策转化为更多欺诈和不法行为的机会。” ^(4){ }^{4} 随着朱越来越感到沮丧，他对地方社区的态度变得更加干涉和惩罚性，但他从未触及问题的核心。反对朱政策的，不仅仅是个人的邪恶，还有满足社会需求的社会网络。像中华人民共和国的团队和大队干部一样，居民管理者（知府、知州和县令）， ^(5){ }^{5} 衙门人员，以及村级权威（里甲长、长老、贤达），不仅仅是贪婪。为了完成他们的工作，他们必须在中央的要求与通过社会网络施加权力的地方居民的要求之间取得平衡。 ^(6){ }^{6} 频繁修订的村庄政策，以及朱本人对他所审理案件的记录，间接反映了社会网络的力量，正如我们最后一节将展示的那样。
Zhu’s texts reflect society only indirectly. This essay does not argue that institutions, once mandated, were immediately and ubiquitously implemented to the letter, although I do believe that enough steps were taken towards implementation for Zhu to become dissatisfied with the successive systems. ^(7){ }^{7} It is true to a certain extent that "without knowing something about Chinese society, [China historians] do not 朱氏文本仅间接反映社会。本文并不主张制度一旦被规定，便立即且普遍地严格执行，尽管我确实认为为实施这些制度采取了足够的步骤，以至于朱对连续的制度感到不满。 ^(7){ }^{7} 在某种程度上，“不了解中国社会，[中国历史学家]甚至无法很好地理解这些宣言本身”这一点是正确的。
even understand very much [about] the pronouncements themselves." ^(8){ }^{8} Zhu Yuanzhang’s revisions of his vision are comprehensible only when we imagine a “push back” from the society he was trying to shape. The laws will, of course, be understood even better when more is known about early Ming society; but I suspect that the society will not be fully understood without some reference to Zhu Yuanzhang. This essay provides a more precise chronology of early Ming policies, explains their seeming contradictions in terms of a postulated social resistance, proposes to settle a debate about Zhu’s approach to Buddhism, and suggests some directions for research on early Ming society itself. ^(8){ }^{8} 只有当我们设想他所试图塑造的社会对他的愿景产生“反推”时，朱元璋对其愿景的修订才是可以理解的。当然，当对明初社会了解更多时，这些法律将被更好地理解；但我怀疑如果不参考朱元璋，社会本身将无法被完全理解。本文提供了明初政策更精确的时间顺序，解释了其表面矛盾的社会抵抗假设，提出解决关于朱元璋对佛教态度的争论，并建议对明初社会本身的研究方向。
The Seven Phases of Early Ming Village Policies 明初乡村政策的七个阶段
Unlike the sage kings of high antiquity, Zhu Yuanzhang frequently revised laws. His close personal engagement with the process of ruling meant that the laws reflected his thinking, and his rapid response to systems he perceived as not working means that shifts in policy could be as frequent as those of a modern government. The local social and institutional policies of the first reign, as noted above, came in seven phases. In Hongwu 1-2 (1368-1369), the new dynasty first established contact with communities outside the Nanjing region. In Hongwu 3-8 (1370-1375), Zhu Yuanzhang and his advisors set up a system of local administration centered on resident administrators posted to prefectures, subprefectures and counties. From Hongwu 9 to Hongwu 13 (1376-1380), no innovations were made as the local system was tested, but because of a corruption scandal at court Zhu centralized control over the government in his own hands. From Hongwu 13 to Hongwu 17 (1380-1384), in keeping with his increasing distrust of bureaucrats, he shifted local control away from resident administrators by creating the lijia system and Senior system below the county level. From Hongwu 18 to Hongwu 20 (1385-1387), limiting the power of administrators gave way to outright attack, as Zhu appealed directly to ordinary subjects and Seniors, through the Great Warning, to watch and even arrest corrupt officials. From Hongwu 21 to Hongwu 26 (1388-1393), having abolished the Senior system, Zhu urged subjects to monitor and arrest one another. In the last phase, from Hongwu 27 to Hongwu 31 (1394-1398), Zhu tried to 与远古圣王不同，朱元璋经常修订法律。他亲自参与统治过程，意味着法律反映了他的思想，他对认为不起作用的制度迅速作出反应，这使得政策的变动频率可以与现代政府相当。如上所述，第一任期的地方社会和制度政策分为七个阶段。在洪武元年至二年（1368-1369 年），新朝首次与南京地区以外的社区建立联系。在洪武三年至八年（1370-1375 年），朱元璋及其顾问建立了以驻守州、府、县的行政官员为中心的地方行政体系。从洪武九年至十三年（1376-1380 年），地方制度处于试验阶段，未有创新，但由于朝廷发生贪污丑闻，朱元璋将政府控制权集中于自己手中。从洪武十三年至十七年（1380-1384 年），随着他对官僚的不信任加深，他通过在县以下设立里甲制和高级制度，将地方控制权从驻守官员手中转移。 从洪武十八年到洪武二十年（1385-1387 年），限制管理者权力的措施转变为公开攻击，朱元璋通过《大诫》直接呼吁普通臣民和长老监督甚至逮捕腐败官员。从洪武二十一年到洪武二十六年（1388-1393 年），废除长老制度后，朱元璋鼓励臣民相互监督和逮捕。在最后阶段，从洪武二十七年到洪武三十一年（1394-1398 年），朱元璋试图
leave a stable legacy, pulling many of the contradictory village institutions of the reign into one document (the Placard of the People’s Instructions), and constructing yet another system of village self-management, the Community Elder system. 留下一个稳定的遗产，将统治期间许多矛盾的乡村制度整合成一份文件（《民训告示》），并构建了另一套乡村自治体系——社区长老制度。
First Phase: Alliance with Local Society (1368-1369) 第一阶段：与地方社会的联盟（1368-1369）
Once Zhu Yuanzhang and his advisors had defeated their military rivals, their task was to win support from the war-torn rural communities who would feed the government. They first extended the tax base developed in the previously-conquered area. They returned displaced people to their native places for registration or registered them where they were. ^(9){ }^{9} Households were registered in hereditary professions, to assure supplies of tax grain from farmers and services from scholarly, military, medical, artisan, and divining families. ^(10){ }^{10} Edicts rewarded the cultivation of abandoned land and limited the size of landholdings, so that everyone would have land to cultivate. Some big estates were confiscated and broken up, and some landlord families were forcibly moved to the capital; but most landlords were left in place. These policies were aimed at increasing food production and creating a society of smallholders who would pay their taxes and not challenge the new dynasty. 一旦朱元璋和他的顾问击败了他们的军事对手，他们的任务就是赢得战乱农村社区的支持，这些社区将为政府提供粮食。他们首先扩大了先前征服地区的发展税基。他们将流离失所的人口送回原籍登记，或在他们所在之地登记。 ^(9){ }^{9} 户籍按世袭职业登记，以确保农民提供税粮，学者、军人、医务人员、工匠和占卜家庭提供服务。 ^(10){ }^{10} 诏令奖励开垦荒地，限制土地持有规模，以确保人人都有土地耕种。一些大庄园被没收并分割，一些地主家庭被强制迁往首都；但大多数地主仍留在原地。这些政策旨在增加粮食产量，创造一个由小农组成的社会，他们会缴纳税款且不会挑战新王朝。
To secure his material base, Zhu Yuanzhang also had to establish the legitimacy of his claims to resources. Rhetoric about legitimacy was tied both to the well-being of the people and to spiritual forces. The new government told a traditional story with an ethnic twist: the barbarian Yuan rulers had become corrupt, had exposed their subjects to harm, and had lost Heaven’s mandate; Zhu Yuanzhang in turn received Heaven’s mandate and with it the duty to care for his subjects and restore Chinese civilization. ^(11){ }^{11} Proclamations of this legitimating tale were backed by elaborate accession ceremonies at the capital, Nanjing. Zhu claimed for himself the emperor’s prerogative to sacrifice to Heaven and Earth. ^(12)He{ }^{12} \mathrm{He} ordered Confucian schools 为了巩固他的物质基础，朱元璋还必须确立他对资源的合法权利。关于合法性的论述既与人民的福祉相关，也与精神力量相连。新政府讲述了一个带有民族色彩的传统故事：蛮族元朝统治者已经腐败，危害了他们的臣民，失去了天命；而朱元璋则获得了天命，承担起关爱臣民和恢复中华文明的责任。 ^(11){ }^{11} 这一合法化故事的宣告得到了在首都南京举行的隆重登基仪式的支持。朱元璋自称拥有皇帝祭天祭地的特权。 ^(12)He{ }^{12} \mathrm{He} 设立了儒学学校
and official deities established in every prefecture and county, ^(13){ }^{13} and reinstated the examination system for bureaucratic recruitment. ^(14)He{ }^{14} \mathrm{He} adopted Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals as a guide to marriage. ^(15){ }^{15} Through these measures, Zhu courted both high-level deities and educated, upper-class families. ^(16){ }^{16} 并在每个府县设立官方神祇， ^(13){ }^{13} 恢复了科举制度以选拔官员。 ^(14)He{ }^{14} \mathrm{He} 采用朱熹的《家礼》作为婚姻指导。 ^(15){ }^{15} 通过这些措施，朱元璋既讨好高级神祇，也赢得了受过教育的上层家庭的支持。 ^(16){ }^{16}
Besides elite deities and families, in 1368 Zhu and his advisors sought support from a broader group of subjects and gods through two measures prescribed for every village. First, officials were instructed to report “filial sons, obedient grandsons, virtuous husbands and chaste wives, and those whose will and behavior are especially meritorious.” The call cannot be considered indoctrination: except for the age provisions for chaste widows, it gave no definition of filial piety, obedience or virtue. ^(17){ }^{17} The edict does not instruct officials to seek out, for example, sons who had mourned at their fathers’ graves for three years, or mothers who had put their sons through school by weaving. Local traditions about what constituted virtue might vary, and the order does not threaten them by imposing uniform requirements. ^(18){ }^{18} The editors of the Collected Statutes summarized the order as calling for the inspection and commendation of "all those who were highly respected 除了精英神祇和家族外，1368 年朱元璋及其顾问通过对每个村庄规定的两项措施，寻求更广泛的臣民和神灵的支持。首先，官员被指示报告“孝顺的儿子、顺从的孙子、有德的丈夫和贞洁的妻子，以及那些意志和行为特别有功的人。”这一号召不能被视为灌输：除了对贞洁寡妇的年龄规定外，并未对孝顺、顺从或美德作出定义。 ^(17){ }^{17} 诏令并未指示官员去寻找例如在父亲坟墓前守丧三年的儿子，或通过织布供养儿子上学的母亲。关于什么构成美德的地方传统可能各不相同，该命令并未通过强加统一要求来威胁这些传统。 ^(18){ }^{18} 《大明会典》的编辑将该命令总结为要求“检查和表彰所有备受尊敬的人”。
and esteemed in the villages for their filial piety, obedience, virtue and chastity." ^(19){ }^{19} The phrase I have italicized is significant. The court did not care about virtuous, unknown hermits; rather, the call was for those already “famed” for their virtue. The court, in agreeing to honor prestigious local people, might share their prestige by association. “在乡村中因孝顺、顺从、美德和贞洁而受到尊敬。” ^(19){ }^{19} 我斜体的短语很重要。朝廷并不关心那些美德高尚但默默无闻的隐士；相反，朝廷呼唤的是那些已经“因美德而闻名”的人。朝廷同意尊崇有声望的地方人士，可能会通过这种关联分享他们的声望。
Second, the court sought out not just locally honored humans, but also local deities. Resident administrators were to identify deserving local spirits, who would be investigated and then added to the schedule of sacrifices. Candidates could include mountains and rivers, former emperors and officials, men who had died in the service of their dynasty, and “all who had made contributions to king and country or shown benevolence to the people.” ^(20){ }^{20} As with elite families and deities, spiritual and popular approval of the new dynasty among the populace were equally real forces, and they were closely linked. By approving local deities, the new regime could earn both their support and the good opinion of their worshipers. ^(21){ }^{21} 其次，朝廷不仅寻求本地受尊敬的人物，还寻求本地神灵。驻地官员应识别有资格的地方神灵，这些神灵将被调查并列入祭祀名册。候选者可以包括山川、历代皇帝和官员、为朝代效力而死的人，以及“所有为国王和国家做出贡献或对人民表现出仁慈的人。” ^(20){ }^{20} 与精英家族和神灵一样，新朝在民众中的精神和民间认可同样是真实的力量，而且两者紧密相连。通过认可地方神灵，新政权既能赢得他们的支持，也能获得信徒的好感。 ^(21){ }^{21}
There are two reasons why this move did not entail indoctrination or imperial imposition of values upon the locality. First, local subjects vouched for a local deity’s efficacy and goodness; their conception of the good might not agree with that of the court or the resident administrator. Second, the policy established no monopoly of cult approval. In 1369, although the court ordered officials to sacrifice only to deities already on the roster, it also forbade the destruction 这一举措没有导致对地方的灌输或帝国价值观的强加，原因有二。首先，当地民众为本地神祇的功效和善良作证；他们对善的理解可能与朝廷或驻地官员的看法不一致。其次，该政策未建立祭祀认可的垄断。1369 年，尽管朝廷命令官员只向已列名的神祇献祭，但也禁止毁坏那些未列名但曾帮助过人们且事迹广为人知的神祇的神社。
of shrines to other, unlisted deities who had helped people and whose exploits were well known. ^(22){ }^{22} Recognition and toleration together, rather than the imposition of new values, would lead subjects and spirits to accept the dynasty. In fact, in 1369 Zhu rejected a suggestion that he impose values through the community libation ceremony, because he did not want to rely on uniform laws for social transformation. ^(23){ }^{23} As discussed below, he later reversed himself, prescribing the community libation ceremony in each active phase of local policy-making. 认可与宽容并存，而非强加新价值观，将使臣民和神灵接受王朝。事实上，1369 年朱元璋拒绝了通过社区祭祀仪式强加价值观的建议，因为他不希望依赖统一的法律来实现社会转型。如下面所述，他后来改变了主意，规定在地方政策制定的每个活跃阶段举行社区祭祀仪式。
In their initial contacts with local society, the new monarch and ministers were circumspect. They did not hesitate to execute, relocate, or confiscate the property of individuals who commanded sufficient resources to compete with the new regime directly, but they were careful not to destroy existing forces for stability. The initial construction of a new order meant, first, taking stock, sorting out, documenting and labelling, putting people and deities into various lists and records; and second, inserting the new dynasty and its representatives into existing social processes of agricultural production and collection, study, worship, and honor. At the village level that insertion included an alliance with existing forces who in exchange for imperial recognition might implicitly or explicitly back the new emperor, but whose prestige did not depend on him and whose values were left intact. 在与当地社会的最初接触中，新君主和大臣们表现得十分谨慎。他们毫不犹豫地处决、迁移或没收那些拥有足够资源以直接与新政权竞争的个人的财产，但他们小心翼翼地避免破坏现有的稳定力量。新秩序的初步构建首先意味着盘点、整理、记录和标注，将人和神明纳入各种名单和档案；其次，将新王朝及其代表插入现有的农业生产与收集、学习、崇拜和尊荣的社会过程。在村庄层面，这种插入包括与现有势力结盟，这些势力为了换取帝国的认可，可能明示或暗示支持新皇帝，但其声望并不依赖于他，其价值观也保持不变。
Second Phase: Establishing Bureaucratic Administration (1370-1375) 第二阶段：建立官僚行政体系（1370-1375）
Toleration was a wise policy for a fledgling regime in an old society. Acceptance could not immediately be commanded; it had to be earned. One way to earn it was to tap into the prestige of local people and deities, through recognition and toleration. That was Zhu’s first strategy, as we saw. But now he wanted to extend to the local communities the moral rejuvenation and stable, multi-faceted hierarchical order embodied in the institutions that Edward Farmer has illuminated. Farmer shows how the many tasks Zhu and his advisors set them- 宽容对于一个在古老社会中新兴的政权来说是一项明智的政策。接受不能立即被强制要求；它必须被赢得。赢得接受的一种方式是通过认可和宽容，利用当地人物和神祇的威望。正如我们所见，那是朱的第一个策略。但现在他希望将爱德华·法默所阐明的制度中所体现的道德复兴和稳定、多层次的等级秩序扩展到地方社区。法默展示了朱及其顾问们为他们设定的众多任务——
selves-restoring Chinese culture, assuring the continuance of the dynasty, controlling the bureaucracy, lessening the burdens of commoners, strengthening social order, regenerating morality-all called for new institutions and the application of laws that encoded rituals and personal relations. ^(24){ }^{24} The institutions Zhu created, according to Farmer, placed the emperor at the top of five hierarchies: he had the highest rank in the social hierarchy; he headed the civil and military administrative hierarchy; he was figuratively the father and mother of his subjects, thus topping the familial hierarchy; he was the final authority for village leaders and thus headed the communal hierarchy; and he was the one who worshiped Heaven, the highest deity, and was the final authority on religious matters. ^(25){ }^{25} Farmer’s descriptions of Zhu’s aims and his establishment of hierarchies fit village policies in the second phase well. In addition, the new emperor still tolerated and used existing social formations, and he affirmed the solidarity of the village. 自我恢复的中华文化，确保王朝的延续，控制官僚体系，减轻百姓负担，加强社会秩序，重振道德——所有这些都需要新的制度和将礼仪及人际关系编码的法律的应用。 ^(24){ }^{24} 根据 Farmer 的说法，朱所创建的制度将皇帝置于五个等级体系的顶端：他在社会等级中拥有最高地位；他领导文武行政等级；他象征性地是臣民的父母，因此位居家庭等级之首；他是村庄领导者的最终权威，因此领导社区等级；他是祭天者，最高神灵的崇拜者，也是宗教事务的最终权威。 ^(25){ }^{25} Farmer 对朱的目标及其建立等级体系的描述与第二阶段的村庄政策非常契合。此外，新皇帝仍然容忍并利用现有的社会结构，并且他肯定了村庄的团结。
In the arena of material support, administration was extended below the county level. In 1371 the court designated some big landlords as tax captains, who in return for certain privileges relied on their local prestige to collect taxes from about 80 villages each. ^(26){ }^{26} The fixing of the empire in documents continued as every household listed its members, the number of taxable males and its native place on doors and in registers stored by the Ministry of Revenue. ^(27){ }^{27} Registration of the whole population was accompanied by rules about surnames. ^(28){ }^{28} 在物资支持方面，行政管理延伸到了县以下层级。1371 年，朝廷指定一些大地主为税务队长，他们凭借一定的特权，依靠当地声望从大约 80 个村庄征收税款。 ^(26){ }^{26} 帝国的固定化体现在文件中，每户人家在门上和由户部保存的登记册中列出其成员、应税男性人数及其籍贯。 ^(27){ }^{27} 全人口的登记伴随着关于姓氏的规定。 ^(28){ }^{28}
Men were supposed to stay where they were，following the hereditary professions of their fathers，providing material goods and labor ser－ vices for the government． 男人应该留在原地，从事父辈的世袭职业，为政府提供物质财富和劳动服务。
In this phase，rituals for officials and commoners were further regulated．Regulations of 1370 followed Zhu Xi＇s Family Rituals，with changes that supported a state－centered hierarchy and incorporated more people into the ritual system．Descent line was subordinated to generational seniority and government rank in determining who presided at family ceremonies，and all officials were allowed to set up offering halls，regardless of their position within their families． The Ming ritual codes further incorporated commoners，declaring that they could conduct approximately the same ancestral rituals－the same offerings and prayers－as those laid out in detail for officials； hierarchy was preserved by forbidding commoners to build offering halls and allowing them to worship only two generations back．^(29){ }^{29} 在此阶段，官员和平民的礼仪进一步规范。1370 年的规章遵循朱熹的《家礼》，但进行了调整，以支持以国家为中心的等级制度，并将更多人纳入礼仪体系。家族谱系在确定谁主持家庭仪式时，服从于世代长幼和官职等级，所有官员无论在家族中的地位如何，都被允许设立供奉堂。明代礼仪规范进一步纳入平民，规定他们可以进行与官员详细规定的祖先礼仪大致相同的祭祀——相同的供品和祈祷；等级制度通过禁止平民建造供奉堂并仅允许他们祭拜至祖父母两代来维持
Spiritual support was also further systematized．The names of deities were determined in 1370，including the five sacred marchmounts， five guardian mountains，four seas and four rivers，and the city gods of walls and moats．The same edict defined as＂improper＂（yin淫） cults that did not help the people or respond to sacrificial rites．^(30){ }^{30} Although the authorities were forbidden to sacrifice to improper shrines，the people were not．^(31){ }^{31} This conciliatory move still put a premium on concrete results；if the gods were helpful，people could continue to worship them．But another edict of the same year defined ＂improper shrines＂differently：as those that violated hierarchy．Deities and humans were organized hierarchically，and so were religious ritual and sacrifice．^(32){ }^{32} The emperor sacrificed to Heaven and Earth，the marchmounts and other major cults．Provincial officials sacrificed to the gods of wind，cloud，thunder and rain，and the mountains and rivers of their jurisdictions．Prefects，subprefects，and magistrates sacrificed to their respective city gods，other minor deities，and local mountains and rivers．The common people should rely primarily on their ancestors，but also sacrifice to local gods of soil and grain and 1370 年确定了神灵的名称，包括五行山、五岳、四海、四 川以及城墙和护城河的城隍等。 ^(30){ }^{30} 虽然禁止官府祭祀不正当的祠庙，但百姓却不能祭祀不正当的祠庙．但同年的另一道诏书却对 "祠 "做出了不同的定义："祠 "是指违反等级制度的祠堂。"神 "和 "人 "是有等级之分的，宗教仪式和祭祀也是如此。皇帝祭祀天地、行军司马等主要神灵． 省级官员祭祀风、云、雷、雨等神灵和辖区内的山川． 县令、郡守和地方官祭祀各自辖区内的山川．老百姓主要依靠祖先，但也要祭祀当地的土神和水神。 谷物和
the kitchen god．^(33){ }^{33} Zhu complained that instead of recognizing his monopoly，commoners had been troubling Heaven and Earth with their prayers，and he banned images of Heaven and Earth，along with certain dangerous sects．The second edict on＂improper shrines＂ intruded more than the first；it interfered with popular worship，instead of just designating worship appropriate to state personnel． 灶神。朱抱怨说，百姓非但没有承认他的垄断地位，反而用祈祷来打扰天地，于是他禁止了天地的画像以及某些危险的教派。第二道关于“不当神龛”的诏令比第一道更为干涉；它干预了民间崇拜，而不仅仅是规定国家人员应有的崇拜方式
Local society was more actively reorganized in other ways．＂Ex－ hibition kiosks＂（shenming ting 申明亭）were prescribed for every vil－ lage in 1371．The kiosks both promulgated the law and invoked the existing power of the community to back it．They displayed government regulations，and the names of immoral people or criminals were posted there to shame them into mending their ways．^(34){ }^{34} The practice recog－ nized that the community was stronger than the law：the shame of having one＇s name posted for the neighbors to see might reform even criminals who had already suffered official punishment without re－ penting．At the same time or later，complementary＂display virtue kiosks＂（jingshan ting 旌善亭）were also established．^(35){ }^{35} 地方社会以其他方式更积极地重组。1371 年，规定每个村庄设立“申明亭”（shenming ting 申明亭）。这些亭子既宣传法律，又借助社区现有的权力来支持法律。它们展示政府规章，并张贴不道德者或罪犯的名字，以羞辱他们改过自新。 ^(34){ }^{34} 这一做法承认社区的力量强于法律：名字被张贴让邻居看到的羞耻感，可能促使那些已经受到官方惩罚但未悔改的罪犯改过自新。与此同时或稍后，还设立了互补的“旌善亭”（jingshan ting 旌善亭）。 ^(35){ }^{35}
In addition to the adaptation of Zhu Xi＇s rituals，a long edict of 1372 gives some examples of what Zhu meant by＂virtue．＂In the ＂Edict Encouraging the Elevation of Rites and Customs，＂Zhu freed many slaves；urged villagers to help one another to survive household crises；mandated welfare for the solitary and old or disabled；called for frugal weddings and funerals and criticized improper mixing of the sexes at religious ceremonies；ordered Mongols to intermarry with Chinese and stipulated that Mongol clothing and jewelry be replaced by Chinese；and cracked down on the castration of servants for private employment．The demands of maximum productivity and the wish to enlist existing social formations seem to clash：the emperor reiterated that one household might occupy only as much land as its members could cultivate，yet he ordered that in daily meetings youth should bow to age，unless the younger was the landlord，unless，again，they were kin，in which case precedent was decided by generation．Com－ munity solidarity was promoted，and for each violation the edict noted 除了采纳朱熹的礼仪外，1372 年一份长诏还举例说明了朱熹所说的“德”的含义。在《兴礼倡俗诏》中，朱熹解放了许多奴隶；敦促村民互助以度过家庭危机；规定对孤寡老人和残疾人的福利；倡导节俭的婚丧礼仪，批评宗教仪式中男女混杂的不当行为；命令蒙古人与汉人通婚，并规定蒙古服饰和首饰应被汉服取代；严厉打击为私人雇佣而进行的阉割仆人行为。对最大生产力的要求与利用现有社会结构的愿望似乎存在冲突：皇帝重申一家户只能占有其成员能够耕种的土地，但他又命令在日常会议中，年轻人应向年长者行礼，除非年轻人是地主，或者他们是亲属，在这种情况下则按辈分决定先后。倡导社区团结，对于每次违规，诏书都指出
simply, “the authorities shall investigate” or “he shall be sentenced according to the law.” ^(36){ }^{36} 简单地说，“当局应予以调查”或“应依法判刑。” ^(36){ }^{36}
The edict is worth quoting from, because it differs greatly in tone from documents issued later, when Zhu had lost both his illusions and his editors: 这道诏书值得引用，因为它的语气与后来发布的文件大不相同，那时朱已经失去了他的幻想和编辑：
We, favored with the grace of Imperial Heaven and the Goddess of Earth, were ordered to unify the subcelestia. With the spiritual efficacy of our ancestors and the blessed protection of the hundred spirits, We were able to attain the proper position of Emperor… We were originally a man of modest background, who neglected study of the classics to overthrow the strong and cherish the obedient. For more than twenty years, [We] had no fixed abode. To sum it up: uncouth, [We] had not attained the moral principle (dao li) and the people were not transformed… To set in order again the eternal relationships, we must respect the laws of former kings. To sympathize with and remember the lone and orphaned is truly the priority in good government… The granaries and coffers are not yet overflowing. The six armies and four frontiers are still plotting. [We] have not yet gladdened the people’s hearts below. [We] are afraid of bringing down Heaven’s wrath… Alas! You ministers and commoners, understand our deep feelings. [We] hope to attain the universalization of the rites and righteousness and always rest in the transformed rulership of peace. And therefore: be perfectly acquainted with this edict; think about it properly and get it by heart! 37 我等受皇天后土之恩，奉命统一亚细亚。我等祖先灵验，百灵护佑，方得帝位......我等本是一介书生，不读经书，锄强扶弱。二十多年来，居无定所。......要重新整理永恒的关系，就必须尊重先王的法律。......仓廪实而知礼节，衣食足而知荣辱。六军四境，仍在谋划。[我们]还没有让下面的人心悦诚服。[我们]害怕天怒人怨......唉！各位大臣和百姓，请理解我们的深情。[我们]希望实现礼义的普及，永远安于和平的统治变革。 因此：要完全熟悉这道法令；认真思考并牢记于心！37
The emperor is still defining himself, almost introducing himself; still making an explicit claim to the Mandate; still asking for material support for his dynasty. The tone is firm but stately, and Zhu expresses humility and sympathy with people based on his own experiences. He accepts the blame for the imperfections of popular customs and focuses attention on the timeless order of the sage-kings. The communities are asked to stand together, the authorities over them dealing with any violations. Specific crimes are delineated; they are to be dealt with according to the law. But all of this was to change in later phases. 皇帝仍在定义自己，几乎是在自我介绍；仍在明确宣示天命；仍在寻求对其王朝的物质支持。语气坚定而庄重，朱基于自身经历表达谦逊和对人民的同情。他承担了民俗不完善的责任，并将注意力集中在圣王的永恒秩序上。社区被要求团结一致，管理当局负责处理任何违规行为。具体罪行被划定；应依法处理。但所有这些在后期阶段将发生变化。
As part of the construction of the second phase, Zhu now reversed his earlier rejection of the community libation ceremony, and in 1372 ordered the formation of hundred-family Assemblies (hui 會) to practice this and other rituals. The libation ceremony was ordered held in villages and in the county seats twice annually, to promulgate the law. The dynasty extended its claims cautiously-Zhu mandated the ceremony only in the capital area, but other counties were to do their 作为第二阶段建设的一部分，朱棣改变了之前对社区祭酒仪式的否定，于 1372 年下令成立百户大会（会），以举行祭酒仪式和其他仪式。为了颁布法律，朝廷下令在乡村和县城每年举行两次祭酒仪式。王朝谨慎地扩大了它的要求--朱棣只规定在首都地区举行这种仪式，但其他郡县也要举行。
best to carry it out．^(38){ }^{38} In 1375，the Ministry of Rites also instructed the Assemblies to build and maintain two altars for performing sa－ crifices to two kinds of entities analogous to the two kinds of people posted in the kiosks－pariahs and pillars of the community．The sa－ crifices to hungry ghosts and to the soil and grain gods had been mentioned before as proper to the people collectively，but now the hundred－family Assemblies were to sacrifice to them regularly twice a year． 最好执行它。 ^(38){ }^{38} 1375 年，礼部还指示各会馆建造并维护两个祭坛，用于向两类类似于亭子中两类人员——贱民和社区支柱——的实体献祭。之前曾提到过向饿鬼和土地谷神献祭是适合集体进行的，但现在百户会馆要每年定期向他们献祭两次
Assembly members were to pray only for good weather and a good harvest of food and tax grain．While sacrificing a sheep and a pig to the spirits of the five types of soil and five grains at their altars（lishe tan 里社壇），they were to drink together and swear to observe propriety，assist one another with farming，weddings and funerals， and expel from the Assembly those who after three years of help still could not support themselves，the immoral and criminal，and＂those who do not accord with the group．＂^(39){ }^{39} This ceremony，though required by the center，barely addressed local values；its purpose was to consolidate a society of independent but mutally supportive tax－paying families．The court＇s access to resources depended on the solidarity of the community，both indirectly－Assemblies had to come together so that the deities could be asked for their help with the harvest－and directly－the community members helped one another become pro－ ductive subjects，form families to produce future taxpayers，and settle their dead as helpful ancestors rather than neglecting them as hungry ghosts． 在祭坛上用一只羊和一头猪祭祀五谷和五种土壤的神灵（里社坛），他们要一起喝酒，发誓遵守礼仪。他们要一起喝酒，发誓遵守礼仪，互相帮助农活、婚丧嫁娶，并把那些经过三年帮助仍不能养活自己的人，不道德的人和罪犯，以及 "不合群的人 "驱逐出大会。这种仪式虽然是中央政府要求的，但它只涉及当地的价值观；其目的是巩固一个由独立但相互支持的纳税家庭组成的社会。社区成员互相帮助，成为具有亲和力的主体，组建家庭以培养未来的纳税人，并将死者安葬为乐于助人的祖先，而不是将他们视为饿鬼而置之不理。
Hungry ghosts were the spirits of those who had died young， violently，or without offspring．Because they had not received the proper funeral rites，they wandered around uncared for．They could both harm people and protect the community from outsiders，as young thugs would do．^(40){ }^{40} So the second altar that the Assemblies built， complementing the soil and grain altar，was designed to feed hungry ghosts and pray to them for peace，prosperity，and abundant domestic animals．^(41){ }^{41} Like the evil－doers posted in the exhibition kiosks，hungry ghosts could be tamed by attention from the community；like the poor of the village，they could be supported and become useful．Just 饿鬼是那些早逝、暴死或无后代者的灵魂。因为他们没有接受适当的丧葬仪式，所以四处游荡，无人照料。他们既能伤害人，也能像年轻恶棍那样保护社区免受外来者侵害。 ^(40){ }^{40} 因此，集会所建造的第二个祭坛，作为土谷祭坛的补充，旨在供养饿鬼并祈求他们带来和平、繁荣和丰富的家畜。 ^(41){ }^{41} 就像展览亭中设置的恶徒一样，饿鬼可以通过社区的关注而被驯服；就像村里的穷人一样，他们可以得到支持并变得有用。正如
as each level of official and commoner was assigned to sacrifice to certain deities，so each kind of spirit had limited duties．The altars may also have been intended to supplant individual sacrifices or worship of other local deities． 每个官员和平民等级都被分配祭祀特定神灵一样，每种灵魂也有其有限的职责。祭坛也可能旨在取代对其他地方神灵的个人祭祀或崇拜
Like hungry ghosts，another marginal group was both contained and protected in 1373：Government Students．In times of＂big trou－ ble，＂they and their families were permitted to shelter in government buildings，but they were uniquely forbidden to submit opinions on the affairs of the country（jian yan 建言）．By contrast，other groups were specifically permitted to do so：the appropriate authorities，worthy men not serving in office，aspiring or ambitious heroes，simple farmers， merchants and artisans．^(42){ }^{42} Zhu still thought of most of his subjects as good－＂my good subjects＂（wu liang min 吾良民），he called them—and expected them to contribute to the realm． 像饿鬼一样，另一个边缘群体在 1373 年既被控制又受到保护：政府学生。在“大难临头”时，他们和他们的家人被允许在政府建筑中避难，但他们被特别禁止对国家事务提出意见（jian yan 建言）。相比之下，其他群体则被明确允许这样做：有关当局、未任职的贤人、有抱负或雄心的英雄、普通农民、商人和工匠。 ^(42){ }^{42} 朱仍然认为他的大多数臣民是好人——他称他们为“吾良民”（wu liang min 吾良民）——并期望他们为国家做出贡献
In 1375，the court took a final step in establishing a positive local presence．Primary schools，called＂community schools＂（shexue 社學）， were to be built in every village．Community schools had first been mandated under the Yuan，and some early Ming administrators had established them before the imperial order came down．^(43){ }^{43} The schools were the final building block in the hierarchical state structure that would create cooperative subjects．Referring to the success of the schools of the early Zhou in transforming people through education and beautifying customs，the order read in part：＂The authorities shall immediately establish community schools and hire Confucian （ rur u 儒）teachers to teach the commoners＇sons and younger brothers， so as to guide the people to good habits．＂It promised that boys in every tiny hamlet would be allowed to learn to read，but stipulated that they had to stick to their fathers＇occupations；the schools were not to be a route up and out of the village．^(44){ }^{44} A regulation further refining the school system specified that the names of teachers and pupils would be reported to resident administrators，who were to inspect the schools regularly．^(45){ }^{45} The community schools were intended to be the capstone of a stable society，teaching morality to young 1375 年，朝廷在建立积极的地方存在方面迈出了最后一步。"小学"，即 "社学"，将在每个村庄建立。诏书提到了周初学校在通过教育和美化风俗来改造人民方面的成功经验，其部分内容是："当局应立即建立社区学校，并聘请儒（ rur u 。它承诺让每个小村庄的男孩都能学习读书，但规定他们必须坚守父亲的职业；学校不能成为进出村庄的通道。一项进一步完善学校制度的条例规定，教师和学生的姓名将上报给居民管理员，他们将定期检查学校。社区学校 旨在成为稳定社会的基石，向年轻人传授道德
people who would stay put in harmonious communities, counted and watched by centrally-appointed officials. 这些年轻人将留在和谐的社区中，由中央任命的官员进行统计和监督。
By the end of the second phase, bureaucratic administrative systems were in place. Households had designated professions and native places. They were registered for taxation, and organized for state-approved worship and community activities. Deities and religious institutions had been sorted out; some were forbidden, some tolerated, others approved for official, community, or family worship. Key social groups-including wealthy landlords and literate men-were treated carefully, with a balance of restrictions, privileges, and requests for their assistance in collecting taxes, governing, or conducting ceremonies. The kiosks, ritual Assemblies, and community schools encouraged people to submit to authority, pay taxes, work hard and live frugally, worship altars at the base of the spiritual hierarchy and help one another stay productive. The regime recognized the power of the community, and shored it up as the base of a hierarchical system. The system of local administration was settled, and for several years it was left alone. 到第二阶段结束时，官僚行政系统已经建立。家庭有了指定的职业和籍贯。他们被登记纳税，并组织进行国家批准的崇拜和社区活动。神祇和宗教机构已被分类；有些被禁止，有些被容忍，另一些被批准用于官方、社区或家庭崇拜。关键的社会群体——包括富有的地主和有文化的男性——被谨慎对待，既有限制，也有特权，并请求他们协助征税、治理或举行仪式。亭子、仪式集会和社区学校鼓励人们服从权威、缴纳税款、努力工作和节俭生活，崇拜处于精神等级底层的祭坛，并互相帮助保持生产力。政权认识到社区的力量，并将其作为等级制度的基础加以巩固。地方行政系统已稳定下来，并在数年内未被干扰。
Third Phase: Testing the System (1376-1380) 第三阶段：系统测试（1376-1380）
During the third phase there were no new local institutional measures, since basic tax collection and related systems were in place, and were expected to work. At court, however, Zhu’s relationships with the bureaucracy and with military leaders deteriorated. Initially, Zhu had acquiesced in his advisors’ demand for separate imperial sacrifices to Heaven and Earth. In 1377, to enhance his own ritual status, he instituted a unified ceremony of which they deeply disapproved. The unified ceremony was “a microcosmic recreation” of the hierarchy of all spirits and natural forces, ruled by Heaven and Earth. It constituted the annual meeting of the two head deities, and emphasized the emperor’s pivotal position in the universe as the medium of that meeting. ^(46){ }^{46} 在第三阶段，没有新的地方制度措施，因为基本的税收征管及相关系统已经建立并预期能够正常运作。然而，在朝廷上，朱元璋与官僚体系及军事领导人的关系恶化。起初，朱元璋默许了他的顾问们要求分别向天地进行皇帝祭祀的主张。1377 年，为了提升自己的礼仪地位，他设立了一个统一的祭祀仪式，顾问们对此深表不满。这个统一的仪式是对所有神灵和自然力量等级体系的“微观再现”，由天地主宰。它构成了两位主神的年度会面，强调皇帝作为该会面媒介的宇宙核心地位。 ^(46){ }^{46}
In 1380, Zhu executed Prime Minister Hu Weiyong and abolished the post of Prime Minister, taking on personal management of the six ministries that handled the administration of the empire. Hu was executed because, faced with the task of staffing the bureaucracy without the aid of the examination system, which Zhu had suspended 1380 年，朱元璋处死了丞相胡惟庸，废除了丞相职位，亲自管理处理帝国行政的六部。胡惟庸被处死的原因是，在朱元璋暂停科举制度后，面临着没有考试系统辅助而需为官僚体系配备人员的任务。
in 1373，he had built up a vast network of＂relatives，friends and followers＂who，once appointed to office，repaid Hu with personal loyalty．Along with Hu ，more than thirty thousand lower－ranking officials and family members were killed．^(47){ }^{47} The abolition of the Prime Ministership is often taken as the demarcation between two halves of the Hongwu reign，and indeed this case and other central purges do mark the beginnings of revisions of the system established in the first and second phases of the reign． 1373 年，他已经建立了一个庞大的“亲戚、朋友和追随者”网络，这些人在被任命为官员后，以个人忠诚回报胡。与胡一起，三万多名低级官员和家庭成员被杀。 ^(47){ }^{47} 丞相职位的废除通常被视为洪武统治两个阶段的分界线，事实上，这一事件以及其他中央清洗标志着对统治初期和第二阶段建立的制度进行修订的开始。
Fourth Phase：The Lijia System Limits Administrators（1380－1384） 第四阶段：里甲制度限制行政人员（1380－1384 年）
When Zhu Yuanzhang turned his attention back to local society， he altered the system completed only a few years earlier．The chan－ ges shifted some authority away from the resident administrators： some tasks were transferred to local men，others were to be done jointly by resident administrators and locals．Zhu distrusted bureau－ crats，but still had faith in most of his subjects；while weakening official power，he still affirmed the solidarity and virtue of the local com－ munities．The two key local institutional innovations of the phase relied on local people：the lijia system for taxation and security and the Senior system for dispute resolution． 当朱元璋将注意力重新转向地方社会时，他改变了几年前刚刚完成的制度。这些变化将部分权力从常驻管理者手中转移：一些任务交由当地人负责，另一些则由常驻管理者和当地人共同完成。朱元璋不信任官僚，但仍然信任大多数臣民；在削弱官方权力的同时，他仍然肯定地方社区的团结和美德。这一阶段的两个关键地方制度创新依赖于当地人：用于税收和治安的里甲制，以及用于纠纷解决的长老制
In the same year that Zhu abolished the Prime Ministership，he abolished the youngest of the village institutions：the community schools．As one gazetteer comments，the school policy had stood＂not long＂－only five years．^(48){ }^{48} Zhu＇s reason for abolishing the schools reveals why he undertook many of the revisions that characterize this period； as he explained later（in 1385），resident administrators and yamen personnel were using the schools for bribery and blackmail．Mandatory， officially－run schools were replaced with schools run in the winter months by virtuous local volunteers，and Zhu forbade officials to interfere with them．The measure was reaffirmed in 1383，in 1385 in the Great Warning，and in 1398 in the Placard of the People＇s Instruc－ tions．^(49){ }^{49} Officials had been misusing the kiosks，too，by listing every 在朱元璋废除丞相职位的同一年，他也废除了村庄中最年轻的机构——社区学校。正如一部地方志所评论的，学校政策“持续时间不长”——只有五年。 ^(48){ }^{48} 朱元璋废除学校的原因揭示了他为何进行许多此时期特征性的改革；正如他后来（1385 年）所解释的，驻地官员和衙门人员利用学校进行贿赂和敲诈。强制性的官方学校被改为由品德高尚的地方志愿者在冬季开办的学校，朱元璋禁止官员干预这些学校。此措施在 1383 年、1385 年的《大诰》和 1398 年的《民训告示》中得到了重申。 ^(49){ }^{49} 官员们也滥用了公告栏，列出了所有
misdemeanor so that＂good people guilty only of some momentary error have become indelibly marked for life．＂The posting of minor crimes was forbidden．^(50){ }^{50} Resident administrators had been overstepping the bounds and were reined in． 轻罪，以致“仅因一时过失而有过的好人终身被污名化。”禁止张贴轻微犯罪记录。 ^(50){ }^{50} 驻地官员越权行为被制止
Not only did subjects replace officials in managing community schools，they also took over some administrative duties． 1381 saw the creation of a whole new system，the lijia system，which combined the registration of population with the ritual Assemblies of 1372．The system lasted on paper until the end of the dynasty．Like community schools，it may have begun with measures taken by a few resident administrators．^(51){ }^{51} One hundred and ten households were registered together as one Community（ lil i 里），divided into ten tithings（ jiaj i a 甲） of ten common households plus one household that provided the tithing chief and in rotation the Community Head．^(52){ }^{52} The Community Heads and tithing chiefs－the lijia leaders－were to oversee the registration process and＂administer the affairs of the Community．＂What that meant is not entirely clear，but certainly their duties encroached on official tasks．At first the lijia leaders either assisted the tax captains， who covered much larger areas，in pressuring people to pay taxes， or temporarily replaced the tax captains in that capacity；in 1383 the lijia leaders were made wholly responsible for collecting taxes．^(53){ }^{53} 1381 年，一种全新的制度--里甲制度--诞生了，它将人口登记与 1372 年的祭祀大会结合在一起。与社区学校一样，它可能始于少数居民管理者采取的措施。 ^(51){ }^{51} 一百一十户人家被登记为一个社区（ lil i 里），十户人家被登记为一个社区（ jiaj i a 里），十户人家被登记为一个社区（ ^(52){ }^{52} 里）。里），分为十个什一户（ jiaj i a 甲）十个共同户加上一个提供什一税首领的户，并轮流提供族长．族长和什一族长--里甲长--负责监督登记过程并 "管理社区事务"。起初，里甲长要么协助征税官（他们的管辖范围更大）迫使人们交税，要么暂时取代征税官的职责；1383 年，里甲长完全负责征税。
The lijia leaders were immediately（in 1381）charged with chairing the village－level community libation ceremony．During this period， the function of the ceremony was said to be to＂honor the elderly， 里甲长立即被指派（1381 年）主持村级社区祭酒仪式。在此期间，该仪式的功能据说是“尊敬老人，
esteem the virtuous, and elevate courtesy." The Ministry of Rites issued a liturgy and seating arrangement, with detailed instructions for the county-level ceremony carried out by officials, and more details for the village ceremony headed by the lijia leaders. Both ceremonies featured honored guests, a reading of the laws, eating and drinking, and ceremonial bows. They also shared an invocation that began: “All respect to the Dynasty!” and ended: 尊崇贤德，提升礼仪。”礼部发布了礼仪和座次安排，详细说明了由官员主持的县级仪式，以及由里甲长主持的村级仪式的更多细节。两种仪式均设有贵宾，宣读法律，饮食和礼节性鞠躬。它们还共有一段祈词，开头是：“敬奉朝代！”结尾是：
Older and younger have their order; The elder brother friendly, the younger respectful. At home, a harmonious clan; Outside, a peaceful village. No one is neglected or let sink, That living beings may increase. ^(54){ }^{54} 长幼有序；兄长友善，弟弟恭敬。家中族群和谐；外有村庄安宁。无人被忽视或遗弃，愿众生繁衍增多。 ^(54){ }^{54}
Seating was by age, except that criminals were seated at the back. The ceremony promulgated laws in a positive community setting that would encourage people to accept them. 座次按年龄排列，罪犯则坐在后排。该仪式在积极的社区环境中颁布法律，旨在鼓励人们接受法律。
In addition to the lijia system and conceivably as a check on its leaders, in phase four Zhu also called for the designation of local elders as “Seniors” (qisu 耆宿), probably in 1382. The Seniors were to settle local disputes. ^(55){ }^{55} Later, a disillusioned Zhu explained what he had hoped for from the Seniors: 除了里甲制度，作为对其领导者的某种制衡，第四阶段的朱也可能在 1382 年左右呼吁指定地方长者为“耆宿”（qisu 耆宿）。耆宿负责解决地方纠纷。 ^(55){ }^{55} 后来，一位心灰意冷的朱解释了他对耆宿的期望：
From antiquity until today, all the appointed authorities have had their hands full in dealing with public affairs. Unless there are elders of venerable age, [affairs] cannot be completed. Therefore in antiquity the elders were established. They had to show virtuous behavior surpassing that of the crowd. City and village called them good, and therefore they were pulled up and set above the mass of people and were called ‘Seniors.’ If any public official in a certain place found a public matter doubtful or difficult, he could meet with the seniors and ask them to suggest a resolution. If [the officials] only did this, affairs would be taken care of. Because of their venerable age, the matters [the Seniors] have experienced are many and the events they have heard of are broad. Of matters good and evil, easy and difficult, there is none of which they lack a thorough knowledge. What they decide must be appropriate. All officials who make use of these Seniors will succeed. ^(56){ }^{56} 自古至今，所有被任命的权威机构在处理公共事务时都忙得不可开交。除非有德高望重的长者，否则事务无法完成。因此，在古代设立了长者。他们必须表现出超越群众的德行。城镇和乡村称他们为善人，因此他们被拔擢并置于大众之上，被称为“长者”。如果某地的任何公职人员发现公共事务有疑难之处，他可以与长者会面，请他们提出解决方案。如果[官员们]仅此而已，事务便能得到处理。由于他们德高望重，长者经历的事务繁多，听闻的事件广泛。无论善恶、易难之事，无一不具备透彻的了解。他们的决定必然恰当。所有利用这些长者的官员都会成功。 ^(56){ }^{56}
The magistrates who selected the Seniors chose from among those the community had nominated as “good”; though factions within the village might disagree, each Senior already had a following when 选拔长者的官员从社区提名的“善人”中挑选；尽管村内派系可能存在分歧，但每位长者在被选中时已有自己的支持者。
he was tapped by the magistrate．As with the deities and virtuous people honored in the first phase，that was precisely where his utility lay．Moreover，though the magistrate＇s selection meant that the state reached into the community，the center did not have control over individual cases．As with selection for commendation and seats of honor in the community libation ceremony，no concrete standards for selection were provided；the standard was the man＇s＂virtue＂in the eyes of those he would help govern．Rather than simply extending state power，Seniors also reduced the duties and authority of resident administrators． 他被县官选中。正如第一阶段中被尊崇的神祇和贤人一样，这正是他的作用所在。此外，尽管县官的选拔意味着国家介入社区，但中心并不控制具体个案。与社区祭酒仪式中表彰和荣誉席位的选拔一样，没有提供具体的选拔标准；标准是该人在他将协助治理者眼中的“德行”。老年人不仅仅是扩展国家权力，还减少了驻地管理者的职责和权威
In 1384 the new village authorities－the lijia leaders and Seniors －were incorporated into the commendation process．Subprefects and county magistrates were instructed to cooperate with the Seniors to seek out villagers famed for virtuous behavior，obtaining and checking recommendations from fellow villagers．After the administrator wrote a decision，the candidate would be presented to the emperor．If he was no good（bu xing 不行），both he and those who had recommended him would be punished．^(57){ }^{57} This was more bureaucratic than earlier searches，but values still were not imposed；instead，the dynasty recognized locally prominent people so that it could share in their prestige．Similarly，when Minister of Rites Ren Ang 任昂memo－ rialized，probably in 1383，that the dynasty should＂destroy all the improper shrines of the empire and rectify the titles in the ritual statutes，＂Zhu approved the good cults he listed，but there is no clear evidence that he authorized the mass destruction of improper cults．^(58){ }^{58} The villages were apparently spared an attack on their local deities． 1384 年，新的乡镇政权--里甲长和耆老--被纳入褒奖程序。县令和郡守奉命与耆老合作，寻找品行优良的村民，获得并核实同乡的推荐。如果他不合格（不肖），他和推荐他的人都会受到惩罚。 ^(57){ }^{57} 这比以前的选拔更加官僚化。同样，当礼部侍郎任昂被封为翰林学士时，可能是在 1383 年。1383 年，朱棣批准了他所列举的好的邪教，但没有明确的证据表明他授权大规模摧毁不正当的邪教。显然，这些村庄的神灵没有受到攻击．
In 1384，the Community Heads were entrusted with yet more tasks． They were now responsible for keeping the peace．They were to hold everyone to his hereditary profession and report any changes to resident administrators，to whom they were also instructed to bring any idlers． As well as carrying out the village libation ceremony，the Community Heads were to exhort people to be good，filial，industrious，and law－ abiding．They were to evaluate morally the villagers，who were all to cooperate in keeping an eye on one another．^(59){ }^{59} 1384 年，社区负责人被赋予了更多任务。他们现在负责维持治安。他们要确保每个人从事其世袭职业，并将任何变动报告给驻地管理员，同时还被指示将任何游手好闲者带给管理员。除了执行村庄的祭酒仪式外，社区负责人还要劝诫人们要善良、孝顺、勤劳和守法。他们要对村民进行道德评估，所有村民都应合作互相监督。 ^(59){ }^{59}
In the fourth phase of his reign，then，suspicious of resident ad－ ministrators who were part of a bureaucracy he saw as corrupt，Zhu revised the system of village administration laid out only a few years 因此，在其统治的第四阶段，朱元璋对他所认为腐败的官僚体系中的驻地管理员产生了怀疑，修订了仅在数年前制定的村庄管理制度
earlier. New local authorities-the lijia leaders and Seniors-both assisted the resident administrators and limited their business in the villages. While most rulers in imperial China encouraged administrators to become familiar with their jurisdictions, by 1384 Zhu Yuanzhang, convinced that most administrators were dishonest, forbade them on pain of death to leave their county or prefectural seats, and at least six officials were executed for doing so. ^(60){ }^{60} Administrators were to communicate with the people through popular representatives like the Seniors, so they could not form corrupt relationships with local people. The emperor still trusted the common people themselves, and he gave them even more responsibilities in the next phase, as his opinion of officials deteriorated. 早期。新的地方当局——里甲长和长老——既协助居民管理者，又限制他们在村庄中的事务。虽然中国帝国时期的大多数统治者鼓励管理者熟悉其管辖区，但到 1384 年，朱元璋确信大多数管理者不诚实，严令他们不得离开县或府衙，违者处死，至少有六名官员因此被处决。 ^(60){ }^{60} 管理者应通过像长老这样的民众代表与人民沟通，以防止他们与当地人形成腐败关系。皇帝仍然信任普通百姓，并在下一阶段赋予他们更多责任，因为他对官员的看法日益恶化。
We have established prefectural, subprefectural and county officials, who from ancient times until today are basically the shepherds of the people. Recently, the officials in office have all been scoundrelly, shiftless fellows. As soon as they take up their posts, they immediately intrigue and commit fraud with clerical staff, petty functionaries, scoundrelly Seniors and every sort of villainous wicked rascals, and do great harm to my good people. How can the greed of this kind of shiftless rascal be sated and their wickedness ended? If it is not prohibited, how can the people endure it? 我们已经设立了府、州、县官员，他们自古至今基本上是人民的牧者。最近，现任官员全是无赖、游手好闲之辈。他们一上任，便立刻与文吏、小吏、无赖的长辈以及各种恶棍奸徒勾结欺诈，给我的良民带来极大伤害。这种游手好闲的无赖的贪婪如何才能得到满足，他们的邪恶如何才能终止？如果不加以禁止，百姓又怎能忍受？
As soon as this warning is issued, you venerable virtuous commoners and those who are of vigorous age or powerful and influential, help Us bring peace to your good people. If We depend on the authorities to explain crooked and straight to the people-in nineteen years I have not seen such a person!.. 警告一发出，尊敬的贤良百姓以及那些正值壮年或有权势有影响力的人，请帮助我们为你们的良民带来和平。如果我们依赖当局向百姓解释曲直——十九年来我未见过这样的人！…
If good people themselves distinguish right and wrong, then it will be difficult for evil people to tyrannize. In this way [ We ] can force the authorities to become good officials. Those chief officials, leading officials and all the people who stand in the way of this-their families and clans will all be wiped out. ^(61){ }^{61} 如果好人自己能分辨是非，那么恶人就难以专横霸道。通过这种方式，我们可以迫使当权者成为好官。那些首长、领导官员以及所有阻碍此事的人——他们的家族和宗族都将被铲除。 ^(61){ }^{61}
In 1385, another major scandal shook the central government. ViceMinister of Revenue Guo Huan was accused of peculation on a grand scale, and he and at least seven thousand people connected with him-the Ministers of Rites and Justice, other officials and their families, and commoners-were executed in a bloodbath that even 1385 年，另一场重大丑闻震动了中央政府。户部侍郎郭桓被控大规模贪污，他和至少七千名与他有关联的人——礼部尚书、刑部尚书、其他官员及其家属，以及平民——在一场血腥清洗中被处决，甚至...
the emperor，perhaps under public pressure，admitted was excessive．^(62){ }^{62} Zhu found corruption rampant among resident administrators as well as central officials．He had first placed officials over society，then tried to minimize their role；now he tried to use subjects to oversee officials．What Edward Farmer identifies as the third theme of the reign now came to be reflected in policies of local administration： that is，Zhu＇s obsession with＂rooting out evil＂in the bureaucracy and among the people，although in this phase the stress was still on officials．Zhu himself acted as chief prosecutor，cutting out the legal procedures of trial and punishment．^(63){ }^{63} Circumventing administrators， he communicated directly with subjects through a revealing series of short texts（about 300 pages in all）called the Great Warning．^(64){ }^{64} To root out evil，Zhu released forces that contradicted his planned social order． 皇帝，或许在公众压力下，承认了过度的行为。 ^(62){ }^{62} 朱发现驻地管理者以及中央官员中腐败猖獗。他最初将官员置于社会之上，然后试图减少他们的作用；现在他试图利用臣民来监督官员。爱德华·法默所指出的统治的第三个主题现在反映在地方行政政策中：即朱对“根除官僚机构和人民中的邪恶”的痴迷，尽管在这一阶段重点仍然放在官员身上。朱本人充当首席检察官，省略了审判和惩罚的法律程序。 ^(63){ }^{63} 绕过管理者，他通过一系列揭示性的短文（共约 300 页）直接与臣民沟通，这些短文被称为《大警告》。 ^(64){ }^{64} 为了根除邪恶，朱释放了与他计划的社会秩序相矛盾的力量
The Great Warning excoriates corrupt officials and yamen person－ nel and urges the＂good people＂to help the emperor bring them to justice．The texts promulgated and revised previous laws，enacted new ones，and reported cases of corruption and punishment．The Great Warning was intended as material for mass indoctrination in good， law－abiding behavior；as educational material in schools at all levels； as substitute travel permits for commoners going to present petitions in the capital；as a legal statute equal in status to the Ming Code； and as a kind of talisman：criminals who owned a copy would be punished one degree less severely，and those who did not，one degree more severely．^(65){ }^{65} Zhu issued the first compilation in the tenth moon of Hongwu 18 （1385），the second and third installments the following year，and the year after that a special version for military families． Two years later，youthful commoners were ordered to study the Great Warning，and their teachers－perhaps in the unofficial community schools－were to bring them to the capital to recite it．The following year，Zhu ordered the sons and younger brothers of military officials to become thoroughly familiar with the military compilation．^(66){ }^{66} 《大警示》严厉谴责腐败官员和衙门人员，敦促“好人”协助皇帝将其绳之以法。该文本公布并修订了先前的法律，制定了新法，并报告了腐败案件及其惩罚。《大警示》旨在作为群众灌输守法行为的材料；作为各级学校的教育教材；作为普通百姓前往京城上奏折的替代通行证；作为与《明律》地位相等的法律法规；以及作为一种护身符：持有该书的罪犯可减轻一级处罚，未持有者则加重一级处罚。 ^(65){ }^{65} 朱元璋于洪武十八年十月（1385 年）颁布第一版汇编，次年颁布第二、第三版，随后一年为军户制定特别版本。两年后，命令年轻百姓学习《大警示》，其教师——可能是非官方的社区学校教师——须带领他们到京城朗诵。次年，朱元璋命令军官的儿子和弟弟熟读军事汇编 ^(66){ }^{66}
As noted, the Great Warning was a license to travel: to fight corruption, Zhu contravened earlier restrictions on popular movement. He also further confused the administrative hierarchy. By 1385, in addition to resident administrators and yamen personnel, at least three kinds of local authorities had overlapping duties in the villages. There were the Seniors, whom in 1385 Zhu instructed to report disasters, not trusting resident administrators to carry out even this most basic function. ^(67)He{ }^{67} \mathrm{He} also revived the system of Tax Captains, ^(68){ }^{68} without relieving Community Heads of their tax-collecting duties. And the Great Warning often calls for action by “venerable, virtuous elders,” as well as other ordinary subjects. 如前所述，大警告是一种旅行许可：为了打击腐败，朱违反了早期对民众流动的限制。他还进一步混淆了行政层级。到 1385 年，除了常驻管理人员和衙门人员外，至少有三种地方权力在村庄中职责重叠。有长老，1385 年朱指示他们报告灾害，不信任常驻管理人员甚至执行这一最基本的职能。 ^(67)He{ }^{67} \mathrm{He} 还恢复了税务队长制度， ^(68){ }^{68} 但并未解除社区负责人征税的职责。大警告常常呼吁“尊贵、有德的长者”以及其他普通百姓采取行动。
Even the fundamental principle of administrative hierarchy-that officials ruled commoners-was compromised. The twin kiosks in towns and villages were now to post the names of good and bad officials, not just local residents. ^(69){ }^{69} The Great Warning provided for surveillance of resident administrators and yamen clerks by commoners. Zhu suggested that 50 to 300 venerable, virtuous village people meet at the beginning of the year and go together to the capital to report on the good and bad officials in their area. ^(70){ }^{70} Petitions against bad clerks, pettifoggers and other local government hangers-on required only two or three signatures. ^(71){ }^{71} Commoners could also submit petitions protecting officials who had been unjustly accused. Zhu promised to investigate all reports and to promote, cashier, punish, or “wipe out” miscreants. Commoners were even allowed to arrest bad clerks and collaborators and bring them to their superiors or to the capital for investigation, using a copy of the Great Warning as a passport. Magistrates who illegally left the county seats and had contact with local people were specifically made subject to this kind of arrest. ^(72){ }^{72} Zhu’s attempts to eliminate social phenomena that ran counter to his vision mirrored those phenomena and themselves undercut the vision: in this case, the solution to illegal movement between yamen and village involves more movement between yamen and village, with local residents overseeing, chastising and even arresting the authorities set over them. 即使是行政等级制度的基本原则——官员统治百姓——也受到了破坏。城镇和村庄中的双亭现在不仅要张贴当地居民的名字，还要张贴好官和坏官的名字。 ^(69){ }^{69} 《大警示》规定由百姓监督驻地官员和衙役。朱建议每年年初由 50 至 300 名德高望重的村民聚会，一同前往京城举报本地区的好坏官员。 ^(70){ }^{70} 针对坏衙役、讼棍及其他地方政府附庸的请愿书只需两三人签名。 ^(71){ }^{71} 百姓也可以提交请愿书，保护被冤枉的官员。朱承诺调查所有举报，提拔、免职、惩罚或“铲除”恶徒。百姓甚至被允许逮捕坏衙役和同谋者，并带到上级或京城接受调查，使用《大警示》副本作为通行证。非法离开县城并与当地人接触的知县，特别被列为此类逮捕的对象。 朱试图消除与他愿景相悖的社会现象，这些现象本身也反映并削弱了他的愿景：在这种情况下，解决衙门与乡村之间非法流动的问题，反而需要更多衙门与乡村之间的流动，由当地居民监督、责备甚至逮捕对他们行使权力的官员。
Although Zhu’s focus in this phase was on mobilizing subjects to 尽管朱在这一阶段的重点是动员臣民
oversee officials，he also moved against subjects who，like those who died with Guo Huan，were implicated in official corruption．The li－ bation ceremony，which earlier had stressed honoring the old and worthy in community solidarity and promulgating the law in a basically positive environment，now reflected Zhu＇s obsession with corruption． In its new form， 监督官员，他也对那些像与郭桓一同死去的臣民一样，牵涉到官员腐败的人采取了行动。祭酒仪式，早先强调在社区团结中尊敬老人和贤者并在基本积极的环境中颁布法律，现在反映了朱对腐败的痴迷。在其新形式中，
the community libation ceremony ranks old and young，grades the worthy and good，separates the wicked and corrupt，and alienates criminals through its seating arrangements．^(73){ }^{73} 社区祭酒仪式对老少进行排序，评定贤良，区分邪恶腐败者，并通过座位安排疏远罪犯。 ^(73){ }^{73}
In the fight against corruption，Zhu was willing to threaten community solidarity as well as administrative hierarchy． 在反腐斗争中，朱愿意威胁社区团结以及行政等级制度。
For additional troops in his war on corruption，Zhu turned to the spirit world，invoking unnamed deities and ghosts．A passage in the Great Warning cautions：＂Although people do not see them，yet there in the utter darkness，the gods and ghosts are always watching．Do good or do evil；every deed is requited．＂Lowly ghosts，like subjects， had initially been settled down；the sacrifices to them at the community altars were to pacify them．Now Zhu invoked them as watchmen， helping Seniors and ordinary subjects to supervise and punish officials． One might almost fancy that Zhu was purposely producing，through his massacres，hordes of hungry，lawless，masterless ghosts－not clearly fitted into any hierarchy－who，＂nursing their hatred，＂were always watching，waiting to requite good or evil deeds．^(74){ }^{74} 为了在反腐战争中获得更多兵力，朱求助于灵界，祈求未具名的神灵和鬼魂。《大警告》中的一段话警示道：“虽然人们看不见他们，但在那无尽的黑暗中，神灵和鬼魂始终在注视着。行善或作恶，每一行为都将得到报应。”卑微的鬼魂，像臣民一样，最初被安抚下来；社区祭坛上的祭祀是为了安抚他们。现在朱将他们召唤为守望者，帮助长者和普通臣民监督并惩罚官员。人们几乎可以想象，朱通过他的屠杀，故意制造出一群饥饿、无法无天、无主的鬼魂——这些鬼魂未明确归入任何等级体系——“怀着仇恨”，始终在注视着，等待对善恶行为进行报复。
Sixth Phase：Distrust of Everyone（1388－1393） 第六阶段：对所有人不信任（1388－1393）
In 1388，Zhu abolished the Senior system．He complained that even good officials were not good at selecting Seniors，and that the Seniors had become corrupt，falsely reporting officials against whom they nourished grudges，and collaborating with others to cover up wrongdoing．Rather than being the wise and experienced farmers he had hoped for in phase four， 1388 年，朱元璋废除了长老制度。他抱怨说，即使是好官员也不擅长选拔长老，而长老们已经腐败，虚假举报他们怀恨在心的官员，并与他人勾结掩盖不法行为。长老们并非他在第四阶段所期望的那种聪明且有经验的农民，
those who fill the position of Seniors are all shiftless mean people who have improperly extended their own lives until they reached venerable years．In this class there are those who in the past were petty functionaries，those who kept the records，those who repeatedly committed crimes and errors，those who were archers，and those who brought suits to earn money．All of such 担任长老职位的全是些无所事事的卑鄙之人，他们不正当地延长了自己的寿命，直到年迈高寿。在这一阶层中，有过去的小职员、记录员、屡次犯罪和犯错者、弓箭手，以及通过打官司赚钱的人。这些
types are today’s Seniors … Shiftless fellows, take note! You should quickly withdraw. [If you do not withdraw, but instead continue] bad plotting to sink good officials and do harm to the good ones among Heaven’s people, then if there is not some heavenly punishment, you will inevitably be turned over to the authorities. There will come a day when you yourselves will be wiped out and your families broken, if not by judicial action then by heavenly punishment. ^(75){ }^{75} 类型的人就是今天的长老……无所事事的家伙们，请注意！你们应当迅速退出。[如果你们不退出，反而继续]阴谋陷害好官员，伤害天理之中的善良之人，那么如果没有天罚，你们必然会被交给当局处理。终有一天，你们自己将被消灭，家破人亡，无论是司法制裁还是天罚。 ^(75){ }^{75}
How different in tone this is from the hopeful, dignified edict of Hongwu 5, with its careful delineations of specific crimes to be punished by law! 这与洪武五年的希望满满、庄严的诏书在语气上有多么不同啊，后者对应受法律惩处的具体罪行进行了细致的划分！
Not only Seniors, but also the lijia leaders were no longer innocent in Zhu’s eyes. In 1390, an edict deploring the misdeeds of officials at all levels included Community Heads and tithing chiefs among the miscreants. ^(76){ }^{76} At the capital the same year, cases linked to the Hu Weiyong scandal of 1380 were re-opened, and at least thirty thousand low-ranking officials and commoners were executed. ^(77){ }^{77} Zhu Yuanzhang no longer trusted military or civil officials, or even local leaders. He had already reduced the military officers’ local roles, and in 1390 he began to transfer high military command to his sons. Commoners and officials were now watching and arresting one another, and Zhu’s faith even in the common people had been shaken. In this phase, local institutions took on a more punitive tinge, and Zhu continued to attempt to administer local affairs through different groups of people simultaneously and to frighten them all into obedience with the Great Warning. 在朱元璋眼中，不仅是长者，连里甲长也不再是无辜的。1390 年，一道谴责各级官员不法行为的诏书将社区头目和丁长列为罪魁祸首。同年在京城，与 1380 年胡惟庸案相关的案件被重新审理，至少三万名低级官员和平民被处决。朱元璋不再信任军政官员，甚至不信任地方领导。他已经削弱了军官的地方职能，1390 年开始将高级军事指挥权转交给他的儿子们。平民和官员相互监视和逮捕，朱元璋对普通百姓的信任也动摇了。在这一阶段，地方机构带有更多惩罚性质，朱元璋继续试图通过不同群体同时管理地方事务，并用“大警告”恐吓他们服从。
The suspicion characteristic of this phase is apparent in new orders about commendation of the virtuous and about the community libation ceremony. Officials were ordered again to investigate the filial, obedient, virtuous and chaste; but now nominees for court commendation had to be guaranteed by their Community Heads, tithing chiefs, kinfolk and neighbors. ^(78)A{ }^{78} \mathrm{~A} new prescription of the village libation ceremony in 1389 separated people into three grades: the venerable and virtuous, those who had cheated on their taxes or been lightly punished for some other crime, and criminals, including adulterers and robbers, middlemen, pettifoggers, corrupt yamen per- 这一阶段的怀疑特征在关于表彰贤德和社区祭酒仪式的新命令中显而易见。官员们再次被命令调查孝顺、顺从、贤德和贞洁者；但现在朝廷表彰的候选人必须由其社区首领、十户长、亲属和邻居担保。1389 年新的村祭酒仪式规定将人们分为三等：尊敬且贤德者、曾逃税或因其他轻微罪行受轻罚者，以及罪犯，包括通奸者和强盗、中间人、小律师、腐败的衙门人员，以及所有被判处重刑者。
sonnel, and all of those who had been sentenced to severe punishment. ^(79){ }^{79} The new format of the ceremony ranked villagers according to their adherence to the law, rather than using standards of honor from within the village to promote acceptance of the law. The kiosks for posting crimes were also ordered to be reinstated in 1390.^(80)1390 .{ }^{80} All of these measures show Zhu’s widening distrust. 新的仪式形式根据村民遵守法律的情况进行排名，而不是使用村内的荣誉标准来促进法律的接受。张贴罪行的亭子也被命令在 1390.^(80)1390 .{ }^{80} 恢复。所有这些措施都显示了朱氏日益加深的不信任。
Not only were lijia leaders and many villagers corrupt or criminal, but the preliminary investigations for the second empire-wide registration also showed that many households had absconded, undermining the tax base. Trusting neither administrators and clerks nor the Communities themselves to clear up the matter, Zhu ordered that administrators and National University Students (jiansheng) gather the people of every Community and tithing to investigate them. ^(81){ }^{81} In 1393 resident administrators were ordered to cooperate laterally-a practice normally prohibited to prevent coalitions - to return and punish households that had absconded. ^(82){ }^{82} 不仅里甲长和许多村民腐败或犯罪，第二次全国登记的初步调查还显示许多户主逃亡，破坏了税基。朱元璋既不信任官员和文书，也不信任社区本身来解决此事，命令官员和国子监学生（监生）召集每个社区和甲组的居民进行调查。 ^(81){ }^{81} 1393 年，驻地官员被命令横向合作——这通常是被禁止的，以防止结盟——以追回并惩罚逃亡的户主。 ^(82){ }^{82}
Repeating a pattern of turning to a new group when one failed him, Zhu may have hoped to employ more Government Students; in preparation he ordered in 1391 that they all study the Great Warning and the laws. As of 1392, they were also to teach it to their juniors, and would be rewarded if they recited parts of it in examinations. The order also reflected the use of the Great Warning as a scripture or text for all subjects to learn virtue. Supplementing the 1387 and 1388 orders that commoner and military youths should memorize the texts, when, in 1392, Zhu ordered that all official and commoner families recite the three installments of the Great Warning, the community libation ceremony was pressed into service as a venue for lecturing on and explaining the texts. In 1393 the authorities were ordered to see that the Great Warning was read and explained to all commoners. ^(83){ }^{83} This emphasis on uniformity represented a great change for Zhu Yuanzhang, who in phase one had expressed distaste for moral transformation through uniform law. 朱元璋可能希望通过不断转向新的群体来使用更多的政府学生；为此，他在 1391 年下令所有政府学生学习《大诰》和法律。到 1392 年，他们还要将其教授给低年级学生，并且如果在考试中背诵其中部分内容，将获得奖励。该命令还反映了《大诰》作为所有科目学习德行的经典或教材的用途。补充 1387 年和 1388 年关于平民和军人青年应背诵这些文本的命令，1392 年朱元璋下令所有官员和平民家庭诵读《大诰》的三部分，社区祭酒仪式被用作讲解和解释文本的场所。1393 年，当局被命令确保《大诰》被朗读并向所有平民解释。 ^(83){ }^{83} 这种对统一性的强调代表了朱元璋的重大转变，在第一阶段他曾表达过对通过统一法律实现道德转化的反感。
In 1393 the last major case of the reign erupted-an attack on the military men whom Zhu had ennobled in gratitude for their bringing him to power. Fifteen thousand people were executed and Zhu 1393 年，朱元璋统治期间爆发了最后一次重大案件——对那些因帮助他登上权力巅峰而被封爵的军人发动的攻击。共有一万五千人被处决，朱元璋
completed the transfer of military command to his sons to prevent a military coup．^(84){ }^{84} The case exemplifies Zhu＇s turning against people he had relied on，and systems he had put in place to deal with specific concerns：in this case the worry that his sons would become powerful and fight among themselves，which is precisely what happened after his death．The Lan Yu case marks the end of Zhu＇s crescendo of paranoia and harshness；in the last phase of his reign he tried to organize a legacy for his descendants．At the village level，that legacy was the Elder system，as laid out in the Placard of the People＇s Instruc－ tions． 完成了军事指挥权向其子嗣的转移，以防止军事政变。 ^(84){ }^{84} 该案件体现了朱元璋对曾依赖之人及其为应对特定问题而设立的制度的反转：在此案中，担忧其子嗣会变得强大并相互争斗，而这正是他去世后发生的事情。蓝玉案标志着朱元璋偏执和严厉达到顶峰的终结；在其统治的最后阶段，他试图为后代组织遗产。在村级层面，这一遗产即为长老制度，如《民训榜》所述。
Seventh Phase：The Community Elder System（1394－1398） 第七阶段：社区长老制度（1394－1398）
Aware，finally，that all his harshness had proved counterproductive， in the last two years of his life Zhu forbade his descendents to employ harsh punishments and extra－legal prosecutions．^(85){ }^{85} For the local level， Zhu now pulled together the contradictory policies of his reign，issuing a sort of constitution for village administration．The Placard of the People＇s Instructions（Fiaomin bangwen教民榜文），initially issued in 1394 and made final in 1398，reiterated and revised past policies and set up yet another system of local administration，this time with some checks and balances：the Community Elder（li lao ren 里老人）system． The Placard is a complex，self－contradictory document，a grab－bag of 41 articles including earlier laws，prayers，sermons on the necessity of mutual aid in village life，castigations of corrupt officials and greedy neighbors，and so on．The Placard both valorizes the local community and provides for more direct government intervention in local society． It reconfirms the removal of community schools from official hands， and promises that carrying out the libation ceremony，in accordance with the regulations and forms already promulgated，will make every－ one into a good subject．^(86){ }^{86} Zhu probably repeated earlier laws because he wished to incorporate everything into one document－his last word on village administration． ^(85){ }^{85} 在地方上，朱棣将他在位时的矛盾政策整合在一起，颁布了一部乡村管理宪法。1394 年颁布、1398 年定稿的《抚民榜文》，重申并修订了过去的政策，建立了另一套地方管理制度，这一次有了一些制衡：社区长老（li 牌匾是一份复杂的、自相矛盾的文件，共有 41 条，包括早期的法律、祈祷文、关于乡村生活中互助必要性的说教、对腐败官员和贪婪邻居的谴责等等。它再次确认社区学校已从官方手中接管，并承诺按照已颁布的规定和形式举行敬酒仪式，将使每个人都成为良好的臣民。 朱可能重复了早期的法律，因为他希望将所有内容整合到一份文件中——这是他对村庄管理的最终定论
The Elder system of village administration replaced the disgraced 村庄管理的长老制度取代了声名狼藉的制度
Senior system, but operated alongside county and prefectural administrations, the lijia system, and tax captaincies. The duties of the Elders, as laid out by the Placard, fall into three categories. Some develop an orderly community-where official corruption can get no toehold-by managing relations among villagers and teaching morality; mutual aid for ritual purposes props up the family and promotes solidarity in the village. Other duties control official corruption indirectly, by supplanting official authority in the villages: encouraging agriculture, establishing schools, settling disputes at the village exhibition kiosk, and managing water resources. And a third type controls official corruption directly: Elders report and even arrest clerks and officials, as Seniors did in the Great Warning. But Zhu now knew that no group could be trusted completely, and set up checks on the Elders’ power as well. 高级系统，但与县级和府级行政机构、里甲制度及税务队伍并行运作。根据告示，长老的职责分为三类。一类是通过管理村民关系和教导道德，营造一个有序的社区——防止官员腐败的滋生；为礼仪目的提供互助，支撑家庭并促进村庄的团结。另一类职责是间接控制官员腐败，通过取代村庄中的官方权威：鼓励农业，设立学校，在村展亭调解纠纷，管理水资源。第三类职责则是直接控制官员腐败：长老举报甚至逮捕文书和官员，正如高级官员在“大警告”中所做的那样。但朱现在知道，没有任何群体可以完全信任，因此也对长老的权力设立了制衡。
In 1394, an order to post in the Display Virtue Kiosk the names of all approved filial and chaste commoners and to investigate, guarantee and report new paragons, ^(87){ }^{87} specified the components of filial piety more carefully than earlier calls had done: obeying the law (so that one can remain alive and intact), showing respect, making offerings after death, obeying instructions and not “illicitly using savings” (#2). The specifications show that Zhu distrusted even commoners by this point. They could not even get virtue right, nor could officials, as shown in a case in which a Shandong commoner had been commended by resident administrators for killing his own toddler as a sacrifice to pray for his sick mother’s recovery. An edict forbade such extreme acts of filial piety and their commendation. ^(88){ }^{88} The Placard reflects Zhu’s low opinion of people in its call for the Elders to report for commendation all “filial sons, obedient descendants, virtuous husbands, chaste wives or even persons having a single praiseworthy virtue” (#17). 1394 年，下令在“彰孝坊”张贴所有被认可的孝顺和贞洁平民的姓名，并调查、保证和报告新的模范人物， ^(87){ }^{87} 比早期的呼吁更仔细地规定了孝道的组成部分：遵守法律（以便能够活着且完整无损）、表示尊敬、死后供奉、服从指示以及不“擅自动用积蓄”（#2）。这些规定表明朱元璋此时甚至不信任平民。他们连美德都做不好，官员们也不行，比如山东一名平民因杀死自己幼儿作为祭祀以祈祷病母康复而被驻地官员表扬的案例。诏令禁止这种极端的孝行及其表彰。 ^(88){ }^{88} 该告示反映了朱元璋对民众的低评价，要求长辈们报告所有“孝子、顺孙、贤夫、贞妇，甚至具有单一可赞美美德的人”以供表彰（#17）。
In addition to their role in commendation, the Elders were to persuade villagers to keep an eye on their neighbors (#16) and settle family disputes among themselves (#23). They were to remonstrate with local troublemakers (#18) and greedy officials (#22); make children study the Great Warning (#26); and have a child lead a blind 除了在表彰中的作用外，长老们还要劝说村民留意邻居（#16），并自行解决家庭纠纷（#23）。他们要劝诫当地的捣乱者（#18）和贪婪的官员（#22）；让孩子们学习《大警戒》（#26）；并让一个孩子带领盲人或残疾人
or disabled person with a bell around the village six times a month, proclaiming what became known as the Six Injunctions and developed into the Sacred Edict of Qing times (#19): 戴着铃铛绕村六次，宣读后来被称为六条训令并发展成清代《圣谕》的内容（#19）：
“Perform your filial duties to your parents, honor and respect your elders and superiors, maintain harmonious relationships with your neighbors, instruct and discipline your sons and grandsons, let each work peacefully for his own livelihood, do not commit wrongful deeds.” 89 “尽孝于父母，尊敬长辈和上级，与邻里保持和谐关系，教导和管教子孙，让每个人安分守己谋生，不做不义之事。” 89
The Placard incorporated some of the contradictions that had been developing in the village institutions Zhu mandated. As these injunctions and other passages in the Placard suggest (#33, #35), Zhu still hoped for family and village solidarity. But he perceived that village and families were not in fact peaceful and harmonious. The Placard’s long list of causes of village disputes includes 该告示包含了朱规定的村庄制度中逐渐显现的一些矛盾。正如这些训令和告示中的其他段落所示（#33，#35），朱仍然希望家庭和村庄能够团结一致。但他认为村庄和家庭实际上并不和平和谐。告示中列举了导致村庄纠纷的众多原因，包括
marriages, land, assault and battery, disputes of ownership, fires, burglaries, abusive language, debts, gambling, illegal consumption of the fruits of field and orchard, private butchering of plowing oxen, abandoning or destroying farming implements… 婚姻、土地、殴打和伤害、所有权纠纷、火灾、入室盗窃、辱骂语言、债务、赌博、非法采摘田地和果园的果实、私自屠宰耕牛、遗弃或毁坏农具……
To promote solidarity, Zhu both called on people to act harmoniously and risked aggravating quarrels by threatening punishment of those whom their family members and neighbors reported as troublemakers. ^(90){ }^{90} 为了促进团结，朱既呼吁人们和谐相处，又冒着激化争吵的风险，威胁要惩罚那些被家人和邻居举报为麻烦制造者的人。 ^(90){ }^{90}
The whole Elder system was an attack on disharmony: a major purpose was to reduce the number of lawsuits taken to the county magistrates. According to the Placard, magistrates were overwhelmed by the number of lawsuits, which led to case overloads and corrupt judgements (#38). The Community Elders were to settle minor disputes within the village. ^(91){ }^{91} They were to hold court in the kiosks. ^(92){ }^{92} Yet the number of overlapping authorities and of measures to control them risked increasing the number of lawsuits. Absurd situations were now possible: in theory, an Elder with the aid of neighbors could arrest and take to the magistrate’s tribunal a person accused of attempting to take a dispute to the magistrate’s tribunal; and that 整个长老制度是对不和谐的攻击：其主要目的是减少上诉到县令的诉讼数量。根据告示，县令因诉讼数量过多而不堪重负，导致案件积压和腐败判决（#38）。社区长老负责在村内调解小纠纷。 ^(91){ }^{91} 他们应在亭子里开庭。 ^(92){ }^{92} 然而，重叠的权力和控制措施的数量可能会增加诉讼数量。现在出现了荒谬的情况：理论上，长老可以在邻居的协助下逮捕并送交县令法庭一个被指控试图将纠纷提交县令法庭的人；并且那人
neighbor could in turn accuse the Elder in the magistrate’s tribunal of mishandling disputes (#2, #12). 邻居反过来可以在地方法官的法庭上指控长老处理纠纷不当（#2，#12）。
The Elder system, Zhu’s final word on village governance, continued his efforts to immobilize the population and keep them away from corrupt administrators, create solidarity within the family and village, prevent disputes or solve them locally, and shore up the hierarchies of state and society. It did so by filling the roads with petitioners, encouraging family members and fellow villagers to report on one another to resident administrators and to the court, multiplying disputes, and confusing and undercutting hierarchies. Resident administrators, tax captains, tithing chiefs and Community Heads, Community Elders, and subjects with no official standing all were assigned overlapping duties and stood in surveillance over one another. The bureaucracy and the community-the two bulwarks of the early Ming constitution-were both mistrusted: the one circumvented, the other bombarded with warnings. 长老制度是朱氏对村庄治理的最终定论，继续他的努力，旨在使人口无法流动，远离腐败的管理者，促进家庭和村庄内部的团结，防止纠纷或在本地解决纠纷，并巩固国家和社会的等级制度。它通过让上访者充斥道路，鼓励家庭成员和村民相互举报给驻地管理者和法庭，增加纠纷，混淆并削弱等级制度来实现这一点。驻地管理者、税务队长、十户长和社区头目、社区长老以及没有官方身份的居民都被分配了重叠的职责，彼此相互监视。官僚机构和社区——明初宪制的两大支柱——都被怀疑：一个被规避，另一个则被警告轰炸。
The contradictions in the Placard, Zhu’s final constitution for village society, were the result of thirty years of attempts to cajole, coopt and coerce competitors for material, spiritual and social resources. I have described seven phases of village administrative policies, with repeated retractions and revisions of earlier institutions. The phases show shifts in approach and tone, and sometimes relate to events at the court. In each phase, the institutions mandated hang together. Other local social and institutional policies not discussed here would probably fit into the same framework. 《告示》中存在的矛盾，即朱元璋对村庄社会的最终宪制，是三十年来试图劝诱、收编和强制争夺物质、精神及社会资源的竞争者所导致的结果。我已经描述了村庄行政政策的七个阶段，这些阶段中早期制度反复被收回和修订。这些阶段显示了方法和语气的转变，有时还与朝廷的事件相关。在每个阶段，所规定的制度是相互关联的。其他未在此讨论的地方社会和制度政策很可能也符合同一框架。
Zhu Yuanzhang's Policies on Buddhism 朱元璋的佛教政策
To give but one example, a debate about the nature and purpose of Zhu’s regulations on Buddhist clergy and institutions can be settled using the framework of the seven phases of early Ming local policy outlined above. Did Zhu Yuanzhang-once a lowly novice, then a general of a sectarian rebellion, then the Son of Heaven-support or attack Buddhism? Chün-fang Yü has characterized Zhu’s laws on Buddhism as, on the one hand, promoting the reform of a debased clergy in whose utility Zhu deeply believed, and, on the other hand, controlling clergy and conserving resources - productive labor, building materials, money-much as other dynasties had done. “The primary motive,…” she writes, “was to purify the sangha by subjecting it to 举一个例子，关于朱元璋对佛教僧侣和机构的规章性质及目的的争论，可以通过上述早期明代地方政策的七个阶段框架来解决。朱元璋——曾是一个卑微的初学者，后来成为宗派起义的将军，再后来成为天子——是支持还是反对佛教？余春芳将朱元璋关于佛教的法律描述为一方面推动对堕落僧侣的改革，朱元璋深信其效用；另一方面则是控制僧侣和节约资源——包括生产劳动、建筑材料、资金——这与其他朝代所做的类似。她写道：“主要动机是通过使僧团服从来净化僧团……”
tight control.” ^(93){ }^{93} Timothy Brook, by contrast, believes that after 1380 Zhu tried to suppress Buddhism. Early in the reign, according to him, Zhu had recognized the strength of devotional networks and he thought that monks could aid in reviving popular morale and morality. He sponsored ordinations and rebuilt temples. But after 1380, and particularly in 1391, Zhu reversed course, completely subordinating Buddhism to the state; his attack “altered institutional Buddhism more thoroughly than any previous suppression, and there would be nothing like it again until the 1950s.” The suppression, Brook writes, has been unrecognized because it was couched in the language of bureaucratic rationalization, rather than of battling heterodoxy. ^(94){ }^{94} “严格控制。” ^(93){ }^{93} 相比之下，Timothy Brook 认为在 1380 年之后，朱试图镇压佛教。据他所说，在统治初期，朱认识到信仰网络的力量，认为僧侣可以帮助振兴民众的士气和道德。他资助了受戒仪式并重建了寺庙。但在 1380 年之后，尤其是 1391 年，朱改变了方向，完全将佛教置于国家的控制之下；他的打击“比以往任何镇压都更彻底地改变了制度化佛教，直到 1950 年代才再出现类似情况。”Brook 写道，这次镇压之所以未被认识，是因为它采用了官僚理性化的语言，而非与异端作斗争的语言。 ^(94){ }^{94}
If we look at Zhu’s policies toward Buddhism as part of his changing program for local society, the two views can be reconciled. Policies toward Buddhism changed in step with other local institutional policies. Zhu treated the clergy no more consistently than he did any other social group. Like landlords, bureaucrats, students and military men, clergy were both useful and dangerous. Like all subjects, they were registered and assigned duties; like other potentially influential people, clergy were both employed and controlled. The clergy may have been the new dynasty’s most significant competitor for resources; Zhu’s policies toward them seem to reflect his recognition of their power in society, his efforts to ally with that power for his own ends, his attempts to limit that power, and his failure to do so. 如果我们将朱对佛教的政策视为其地方社会变革计划的一部分，这两种观点是可以调和的。对佛教的政策随着其他地方制度政策的变化而变化。朱对僧侣的态度并不比对其他社会群体更为一致。像地主、官僚、学生和军人一样，僧侣既有用又危险。像所有臣民一样，他们被登记并分配职责；像其他可能有影响力的人一样，僧侣既被雇用又被控制。僧侣可能是新朝代在资源争夺中最重要的竞争者；朱对他们的政策似乎反映了他对他们在社会中权力的认识，他为自己的目的与这种权力结盟的努力，他限制这种权力的尝试，以及他未能成功的事实。
In the first phase of his reign, Zhu, who believed that Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism were compatible, supported Buddhism in hopes that the clergy would help renew the moral order. Based on his perception that people honored the clergy, this approach paralleled commendation of the locally honored and employment of landlords as tax captains. In 1368, clergy were briefly placed under the supervision of national agencies, but these were quickly dissolved. ^(95){ }^{95} Perhaps they had been opposed by powerful clergy whose support Zhu still desperately needed. Instead, he restored a Yuan-period Commission for the Buddhist Patriarchs to improve popular morality by spreading 在其统治的第一阶段，朱元璋认为儒教、佛教和道教是相容的，他支持佛教，希望僧侣能够帮助恢复道德秩序。基于他认为人们尊敬僧侣的看法，这种做法类似于对地方受尊敬者的表彰以及任用地主作为税务队长。1368 年，僧侣曾短暂地被置于国家机构的监督之下，但这些机构很快被解散。 ^(95){ }^{95} 也许他们遭到了强大僧侣势力的反对，而朱元璋仍然迫切需要他们的支持。相反，他恢复了元代的佛教祖师委员会，以通过传播佛教来改善民众道德。
Buddhism. ^(96){ }^{96} In this phase and the next, Zhu interviewed and employed leading monks, commissioned huge masses for the war dead, rebuilt temples, and endowed temples with tax-exempt land. ^(97)He{ }^{97} \mathrm{He} abolished a tax on religious institutions. ^(98){ }^{98} As when local deities were included on rosters of worship, these activities were meant to strengthen support for the new dynasty both directly-Buddhist moral teachings would make subjects good-and indirectly-by demonstrating the worthiness of a regime that shared popular piety. 佛教。 ^(96){ }^{96} 在这一阶段及下一阶段，朱元璋采访并任用了一些著名僧侣，委托为战争死难者举行大规模法会，重建寺庙，并赋予寺庙免税土地。 ^(97)He{ }^{97} \mathrm{He} 废除了对宗教机构的税收。 ^(98){ }^{98} 就像将地方神祇列入崇拜名册一样，这些活动旨在直接通过佛教道德教义使臣民成为善良之人，间接通过展示一个与民间虔诚信仰相契合的政权的价值，来加强对新朝的支持。
The second phase of Zhu’s reign set up local administration. People and deities were registered and their duties were delimited. Clergy, too, were registered; in 1372, in accord with the practice of preceding dynasties, clergy were certified by a central agency in the capital. ^(99){ }^{99} Clergy were encouraged to get back to work, like other subjects recovering from the war, and the sphere of that work was limited. In 1373, candidates for ordination were also required to take exams to prove their proficiency in scripture, just as candidates for office and military officials had been tested. ^(100){ }^{100} In 1370 the professional duties of Buddhist and Daoist clergy were clarified; they were barred from assisting in the local state-sponsored sacrifices. ^(101){ }^{101} In 1372 an edict voiced Confucian disapproval of funerals presided over by clergy, but such funerals were not forbidden. ^(102){ }^{102} In the same year, Zhu instituted the community libation ceremony, a community rite that may have been intended to direct attention away from clerical rites. In 1375, worship by village Assemblies supplanted the usual clerical ceremonies for hungry ghosts. ^(103){ }^{103} 朱元璋统治的第二阶段建立了地方行政。人和神灵被登记，职责被划定。僧侣也被登记；1372 年，按照前代的惯例，僧侣由首都的中央机构颁发证书。僧侣被鼓励像其他从战争中恢复的臣民一样重新工作，且其工作范围受到限制。1373 年，受戒候选人也被要求参加考试，以证明他们对经典的熟练掌握，就像官员和军官候选人一样接受测试。1370 年，佛教和道教僧侣的职业职责被明确；他们被禁止协助地方国家主办的祭祀活动。1372 年，一道诏书表达了儒家对僧侣主持葬礼的反对，但并未禁止此类葬礼。同年，朱元璋设立了社区献酒仪式，这是一种社区仪式，可能旨在将注意力从僧侣仪式转移开。1375 年，村民大会的祭祀取代了通常的僧侣为饿鬼举行的仪式。
Perhaps because he himself had joined a monastery to avoid starvation rather than out of religious conviction, Zhu was keenly aware of the possibility for abuse of and by temples. Monastic property, like newly-opened lands exempt from taxation, was protected. In 1372, 也许是因为他自己加入寺院是为了避免饥饿而非出于宗教信仰，朱敏锐地意识到寺庙可能被滥用以及寺庙滥用的可能性。寺院财产，如新开垦的免税土地，受到保护。1372 年，
Zhu called for a list of all certified monks that would be distributed to every monastery, to prevent other travellers from using monastic facilities. Just as Zhu tried to provide enough land for every farming family, he tried to make sure that there would be the right number and quality of monks for society’s needs, and that temples would not become burdensome. He approved the ordination of more than 150,000 clergy in 1372-73, ^(104){ }^{104} but in 1373 he limited clerical residences to one Buddhist and one Daoist temple in every prefectural, subprefectural and county seat, each with a set number of monks or priests. ^(105){ }^{105} Like the initial call for the community libation ceremony, which was mandatory only for the capital area, the regulation limiting the number of temples applied only to the six prefectures nearest the capital. Since the regulation was accompanied by tax relief measures for these places, which had funded Zhu’s early military campaigns, Chün-fang Yü has suggested that limiting the number of temples was similarly intended to relieve the burden on the local population; the edict complains in time-worn language that “monks and priests… eat without labor and there is nothing more wasteful to the national economy than this.” ^(106){ }^{106} Certainly the preoccupation of the period was with production and economy. 朱要求编制一份所有认证僧侣的名单，并分发到每个寺院，以防止其他旅客使用寺院设施。正如朱试图为每个农户提供足够的土地一样，他也试图确保社会所需的僧侣数量和质量合适，且寺庙不会成为负担。他批准了 1372-73 年间超过 15 万名僧侣的受戒， ^(104){ }^{104} 但在 1373 年，他限制每个府、州、县城仅设一座佛寺和一座道观，每座寺庙有固定数量的僧侣或道士。 ^(105){ }^{105} 就像最初要求的社区献酒仪式仅对首都地区强制执行一样，限制寺庙数量的规定仅适用于距离首都最近的六个府。 由于该法规伴随着对这些地方的税收减免措施，而这些地方资助了朱氏早期的军事行动，余君芳提出，限制寺庙数量同样旨在减轻当地居民的负担；诏书用陈词滥调抱怨道：“僧尼不劳而食，国计最为浪费。” ^(106){ }^{106} 毫无疑问，当时的关注点在于生产和经济。
During the third phase of his reign, while Zhu was strengthening his control at the center, he chose three sutras as the “core curriculum for scriptural study,” commissioned commentaries on them, and had them promulgated. ^(107){ }^{107} The move fits with Zhu’s assertion of spiritual primacy and simplification of spiritual matters, such as combining the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth. 在其统治的第三阶段，当朱加强对中央的控制时，他选择了三部经文作为“经学核心课程”，委托撰写注释，并将其颁布。 ^(107){ }^{107} 此举符合朱对精神至高无上的主张及精神事务简化的理念，例如合并天地祭祀。
In phase four, while inventing ways to circumscribe the duties and powers of local administrators, Zhu treated clergy much the same way. In 1382 all monks were given quite specific duties that kept many of them from contact with the public. They were to specialize in doctrinal study, meditation, or ritual performance; each group took different examinations and wore different garb. In 1381, as part of Zhu’s phase four restructuring of the central government and weakening of resident administrators through the creation of the lijia system, 在第四阶段，朱元璋在发明限制地方官员职责和权力的方法时，对僧侣的处理方式大致相同。1382 年，所有僧侣被赋予了相当具体的职责，这些职责使许多僧侣避免与公众接触。他们专注于教义研究、冥想或仪式表演；每个群体参加不同的考试，穿着不同的服装。1381 年，作为朱元璋第四阶段中央政府重组和通过创建里甲制削弱驻地官员的一部分，
Buddhist and Daoist clergy were placed under the control of a central bureau that was part of the Ministry of Rites, and of supervisory offices in each prefecture, subprefecture and county. The bureau and registries competed with the authority of abbots and head priests over Buddhist and Daoist affairs, just as lijia duties cut into the magistrate’s power. The registrars’ duties were like those of the lijia leaders in the same period: to report clerical wrongdoers to the civil authorities, propagate correct teachings, report on landholdings for tax purposes, and conduct public rites. ^(108){ }^{108} Zhu had promulgated standard prayer texts for community rituals; now, in 1383, he standardized the rituals and mantras to be used in services. ^(109)He{ }^{109} \mathrm{He} also tried to stabilize monastic landholdings, like those of farmers, to protect monastic livelihood from avaricious abbots and acquisitive landlords. ^(110){ }^{110} 佛教和道教僧侣被置于礼部下属的中央局以及各府、州、县的监督机构的控制之下。该局和登记处在佛教和道教事务上与方丈和首席僧侣的权威相竞争，就如同里甲职责削弱了县令的权力一样。登记员的职责类似于同期里甲长官的职责：向民政当局报告僧侣的不当行为，传播正确教义，报告土地所有权以便征税，并主持公共仪式。 ^(108){ }^{108} 朱元璋曾颁布社区仪式的标准祈祷文；现在，在 1383 年，他规范了服务中使用的仪式和咒语。 ^(109)He{ }^{109} \mathrm{He} 还试图稳定寺院的土地所有权，类似于农民的土地，以保护寺院的生计免受贪婪的方丈和贪婪的地主的侵害。 ^(110){ }^{110}
The fifth phase of the reign saw no innovations in clerical regulation. In the sixth phase, when Zhu’s distrust of everyone found institutional expression, he further restricted clergy, in step with his treatment of the rest of the population. In 1391, perhaps to make up for households who had absconded or to prevent monasteries from providing tax shelters, clergy were deprived of their traditional exemption from corvée labor and instructed to register in the Yellow Registers as everyone else did, and, if their institutions were wealthy, to take their turns as Tithing Chiefs or Community Heads. ^(111){ }^{111} The amounts of compensation for monks performing rituals such as funerals were stipulated; ^(112){ }^{112} it is unclear whether the aim was that they not demand too much or that they not be paid too little. Ordination was further controlled, and the universal registers were mandated again. ^(113){ }^{113} Typically for the sixth phase, severe punishments were prescribed: monks who had wives faced decapitation and anyone who sheltered them was to be exiled the maximum distance. ^(114){ }^{114} Zhu was no harsher on criminal monks than on other criminals, however, and in the same year, 1391, he actively encouraged one category of monk to go to peoples’ homes to perform rituals, because they would "teach the people to be filial sons who remember to repay the kindness of their 第五阶段的统治期间，教士管理没有创新。到了第六阶段，当朱元璋对所有人产生不信任并将其制度化时，他进一步限制了教士，与他对待其他人口的方式一致。1391 年，或许是为了弥补逃户，或防止寺庙成为避税场所，教士被剥夺了传统的徭役免除权，被指示像其他人一样在黄册中登记，如果其机构富裕，还需轮流担任丁长或里长。 ^(111){ }^{111} 对僧侣执行如丧葬等仪式的报酬金额进行了规定； ^(112){ }^{112} 目的不明确，是为了防止他们索取过多还是避免报酬过低。戒律进一步受到控制，普查册再次被强制执行。 ^(113){ }^{113} 典型的第六阶段措施是严厉的惩罚：有妻的僧侣处以斩首，庇护他们的人则被流放至最远之地。 朱对犯罪僧侣并不比对其他罪犯更严厉，然而在同一年，即 1391 年，他积极鼓励一类僧侣前往民宅进行仪式，因为他们会“教导百姓成为孝顺的子孙，记得报答祖先的恩情并考虑自己的未来。”
ancestors and think of their own futures." ^(115){ }^{115} Monks were thus enlisted in Zhu’s campaign to connect obedience of the law with filial piety: the filial child would not risk dismemberment. 因此，僧侣被招募参与朱的运动，将守法与孝道联系起来：孝顺的子女不会冒着被肢解的风险。
Most significantly, in Timothy Brook’s view, in 1391 Zhu ordered again that only one, large Buddhist temple, called an abbey (conglin叢林), be permitted in every prefectural or county seat. The abbey would be certified with an imperially-issued name plaque. The other temples were all to disband, and they were forbidden to simply move out to the countryside to evade the edict. ^(116){ }^{116} What did the order mean? In the context of other local policies, we can see it not as anti-Buddhist per se, but as an expression of the distrust that in the same period robbed military leaders of their commands, turned subjects against one another and against their resident administrators, raged against corrupt local leaders and revoked the Seniors’ duties, and increased ideological instrusion into the villages. Implementation of the amalgamation will be discussed below. 在蒂莫西-布鲁克看来，最重要的是，1391 年朱棣再次下令，每个府或县城只允许有一座大型佛教寺庙，称为 "叢林"。寺院将获得朝廷颁发的匾额。其他寺院一律解散，不得以迁往郊外为由逃避诏令。{这项命令意味着什么？从其他地方政策的角度来看，我们可以认为它本身并不是反佛教的，而是不信任的一种表现，在同一时期，这种不信任夺走了军事领导人的指挥权，使臣民之间和他们的驻地行政长官之间相互对立，肆意抨击腐败的地方领导人并取消了元老的职务，并加强了对乡村的意识形态灌输。下文将讨论合并的实施情况。
In the last phase of his reign, Zhu complained about the quality of the clergy, just as he did about officials, clerks, Seniors and even the new Elders, and he issued regulations to clean up the Buddhist establishment, which is in keeping with Chün-fang Yü’s interpretation. In 1394, he also ordered Government Students (shengyuan) and gentry to keep away from monasteries, and forbade monks to beg in public, form secular friendships, or enter a magistrate’s office. Ostensibly this would protect the monks from interference, ^(117){ }^{117} but the measure also follows the pattern of keeping resident administrators out of the villages. And, just as it was impossible to separate people from the resident administrators who managed their public affairs, monks could not be neatly separated from the population. The previously established categories of clerical activity, under which the ritual duties of some monks brought them into people’s homes, were not revoked. ^(118){ }^{118} 在他统治的最后阶段，朱皇帝抱怨僧侣的素质，就像他对官员、文书、长辈甚至新任长老所做的抱怨一样，他颁布了整顿佛教机构的规定，这与郡方余的解释是一致的。1394 年，他还命令贡生和士绅远离寺庙，禁止僧侣在公共场合乞讨、结交俗人朋友或进入县官衙门。表面上这是为了保护僧侣免受干扰， ^(117){ }^{117} 但这一措施也遵循了将驻地管理者排除在村庄之外的模式。正如人们无法与管理其公共事务的驻地管理者分开一样，僧侣也无法与民众完全分离。此前确立的僧侣活动类别，其中一些僧侣因履行仪式职责而进入民宅的情况，并未被废止。 ^(118){ }^{118}
Possibly reflecting a failure of the earlier order that monks be tested in scripture before receiving their certificates, in 1395 Zhu ordered all clergy to take examinations in scripture at the capital; those who 可能反映了早期命令僧侣在领取证书前必须通过经文考试的失败，1395 年朱皇帝命令所有僧侣在京城参加经文考试；那些...
failed would be defrocked．^(119){ }^{119} In 1394，yet another edict aimed at clerical corruption ordered monks to appear in government offices only in lay clothing，so as not to jeopardize the honor of the clergy． As with many of Zhu＇s measures，his perception that monks were not going to stay out of court forced him to undermine earlier laws that made them visibly different from laymen．The 1394 edict also limited the number of worshippers in market－town temples to thirty at one time，^(120){ }^{120} presumably to prevent rowdy temple festivals．It also cracked down on married monks： 失败者将被剥夺僧籍。 ^(119){ }^{119} 1394 年，另一项针对僧侣腐败的法令规定，僧侣只能穿着俗服出现在政府机关，以免损害僧侣的名誉。与朱氏的许多措施一样，他认为僧侣不会远离法庭，这迫使他削弱了早期使僧侣在外观上与俗人区别开来的法律。1394 年的法令还限制市场城镇寺庙同时礼拜者人数不得超过三十人， ^(120){ }^{120} 可能是为了防止寺庙节日的喧闹。它还严厉打击已婚僧侣：
It is permissible for anyone to insult and abuse a monk who has a wife．He can demand 50 ting of silver from the monk．If the monk does not have the money，the person may kill him without blame．A married monk who desires to return to lay life is permitted to do so．If he wants to leave his wife in order to practice his religion，he is permitted to do so as well．However，if he neither returns to lay life nor leaves his wife，then the neighbors of the［lijia］unit must capture him and hand him over to the government office．Anyone trying to shelter him because of personal friendship will be sent far away on military exile．^(121){ }^{121} 任何人侮辱和虐待有妻子的僧侣是允许的。他可以向该僧侣索要五十两银子。如果僧侣没有钱，该人可以无责杀死他。已婚僧侣若想还俗，是被允许的。如果他想离开妻子以修行宗教，也被允许。然而，如果他既不还俗也不离开妻子，那么［里甲］单位的邻居必须将他抓获并交给政府机关。任何因私人友谊而试图庇护他的人将被流放至远方服军役。 ^(121){ }^{121}
In keeping with the principle of social policing to keep disputes away from the courts，as in the Elder system，married monks were to be disciplined first not by the local Buddhist registry，but by the people．Only if their intervention failed were his neighbors to arrest him and bring him to the resident administrator．The harsh punish－ ment for sheltering a married monk was the same as for sheltering draft dodgers and other criminals．The procedure and punishments were harsh，but not out of line with the general policies of the Elder system in phase seven，namely，policies that tried to circumvent the bureaucratic system established in phases one and two，in part to ease the burden of resident administrators apparently swamped by civil suits and criminal activities，in part because Zhu himself did not trust the officials． 遵循社会治安原则以避免纠纷进入法庭，如长老制度中所示，已婚僧侣首先应由民众而非当地佛教登记机关进行管教。只有当他们的干预失败时，邻居才会逮捕该僧侣并将其送交驻地管理官。庇护已婚僧侣的严厉惩罚与庇护逃兵及其他罪犯的惩罚相同。程序和惩罚虽严厉，但并未偏离第七阶段长老制度的一般政策，即试图规避第一和第二阶段建立的官僚体系的政策，部分原因是为了减轻显然被民事诉讼和刑事活动淹没的驻地管理官的负担，部分原因是朱本人不信任官员。
Did Zhu intend a severe suppression of Buddhism？Looking at the policies in the chronological context clarifies，I think，the disagreement mentioned above between Chün－fang Yü and Timothy Brook．Yü is right in that Zhu took some measures to use and protect monks and temples，and to renovate them morally；Brook is right in that he also 朱是否意图严厉镇压佛教？从时间顺序的政策来看，我认为这有助于澄清上述郁春芳与蒂莫西·布鲁克之间的分歧。郁春芳认为朱采取了一些措施来利用和保护僧侣及寺庙，并对其进行道德上的整顿；布鲁克则认为他也..
tried to limit their influence and deny them a power base that might threaten his own authority. His policies toward clergy paralleled his policies toward other subjects. This resolution of the disagreement on Zhu’s intentions, it seems to me, shows the utility of the sevenphase analysis of Zhu’s local policies. 试图限制他们的影响力，剥夺他们可能威胁到他自身权威的权力基础。他对神职人员的政策与他对其他臣民的政策相似。在我看来，对朱意图分歧的这一解决，显示了对朱地方政策七阶段分析的实用性。
Although this essay does not pretend to examine the conditions of Ming society, a cursory look at the question of whether Zhu’s policies on Buddhism were implemented-an issue that Brook and Yü both address-allows further consideration of the motive force behind the changing phases of policy. Was Zhu simply changing his mind, or did society force him into altering his approach? 虽然本文并不打算审视明代社会的状况，但对朱关于佛教政策是否得以实施这一问题的粗略考察——布鲁克和余都曾涉及此问题——使我们能够进一步考虑政策变化阶段背后的动力。朱是单纯改变了主意，还是社会迫使他改变了方法？
Overall, as we saw, Chün-fang Yü thinks that Zhu Yuanzhang’s intervention in Buddhism revived it for a time, while Timothy Brook believes his suppression dealt Buddhism a crushing blow. Brook reports that the 1372 system of registering monks nationally for travel facilities was apparently not implemented, since it was mandated again in 1394.^(122)Yu1394 .{ }^{122} \mathrm{Yu} thinks that the initial law limiting the number of temples in each county, subprefecture and prefecture was ineffectual, for many monasteries were reestablished as early as 1374.123^(123)1374.123^{123} The decree complained that monks hurt the national economy: they lived on contributions and fees from the people and were exempt from corvée labor, both factors that bit into the material resources available to the state. But the failure of the decree suggests that either the people were willing to continue supporting the monasteries, or the clergy commanded enough power to insist on their maintenance, since the temples were revived. Yü further reports that the phase four distinctions among different categories of monk with different duties did not last long into the Ming, and may not have been strictly implemented even under Zhu Yuanzhang. ^(124){ }^{124} Many Ming gazetteers do record the existence of the Buddhist (and Daoist) registry offices mandated in phase four, but whether and how long they operated is not clear: Brook holds that most counties set them up, but Yü concludes that they were “never formally implemented” below the prefectural level. ^(125){ }^{125} In phase seven, Zhu issued what Brook calls the “seclusion edict,” limiting monastic contact with laymen and government in specific ways. Yü concludes that "these rules surely existed 总体来看，正如我们所见，余春芳认为朱元璋对佛教的干预使其得以短暂复兴，而蒂莫西·布鲁克则认为他的镇压给佛教带来了沉重打击。布鲁克报告称，1372 年全国登记僧侣以便旅行的制度显然未被实施，因为该制度在 1394.^(122)Yu1394 .{ }^{122} \mathrm{Yu} 年再次被要求执行。 1394.^(122)Yu1394 .{ }^{122} \mathrm{Yu} 认为，最初限制每个县、州、府寺庙数量的法律无效，因为许多寺庙早在 1374.123^(123)1374.123^{123} 年就已重新建立。该法令抱怨僧侣损害了国家经济：他们依靠民众的供养和费用生活，并免除徭役劳动，这两者都削弱了国家的物质资源。但该法令的失败表明，要么民众愿意继续支持寺庙，要么僧侣拥有足够的权力坚持维持寺庙，因为寺庙得以复兴。余春芳进一步报告称，明代第四阶段对不同类别僧侣及其职责的区分并未持续太久，甚至在朱元璋统治期间也可能未被严格执行。 ^(124){ }^{124} 许多明代地方志确实记录了第四阶段所规定的佛教（及道教）登记处的存在，但它们是否以及运营了多久尚不清楚：布鲁克认为大多数县设立了这些机构，但余则认为它们“在府以下从未正式实施”。 ^(125){ }^{125} 在第七阶段，朱颁布了布鲁克所称的“隐居诏”，以特定方式限制僧侣与俗人及政府的接触。余认为“这些规定很可能只是名义上的”，而布鲁克本人最近也已放弃了对该诏令效力的早期信念。
in name only," and Brook himself has recently retreated from an earlier belief in the efficacy of the edict. ^(126){ }^{126} Whatever the case may have been, evidence for effective implementation or definitive failure of the measures is sparse. 名义上的”，而布鲁克本人最近也已放弃了对该诏令效力的早期信念。 ^(126){ }^{126} 无论情况如何，有效实施或明确失败的证据都很稀少。
The picture is no clearer for the 1391 amalgamation of temples into abbeys. Yü thinks it was largely ineffectual; Brook sees it as a major and rapid suppression that spared only nunneries and tiny chapels and “amounted to a complete reorganization of the institutional life of Chinese Buddhism.” Only a few monasteries, he writes, evaded the suppression. ^(127)He{ }^{127} \mathrm{He} gives a few isolated examples, one of them an exception to the rule, and a striking quotation from Wen Zhenming, dating from 1548. The trouble with relying on isolated examples is that they can support either side of the argument. In some places, the amalgamation was apparently immediately effective and remained so. For instance, in Guishan county, four other monasteries were joined to the Eternal Blessing Monastery in 1391. Some kept their landholdings, but others had to turn their lands over to state institutions like granaries. At the same time, a Daoist hermitage also absorbed various local religious institutions. The amalgamation was still in effect in 1556.^(128)1556 .{ }^{128} In other places, by contrast, gazetteers show that the amalgamation was short-lived: thus, the Jiangle county gazetteer reports that many amalgamated temples were restored to independence as early as the Hongwu period. ^(129){ }^{129} 关于 1391 年寺庙合并为修道院的情况也并不清晰。于认为这在很大程度上无效；布鲁克则认为这是一次重大且迅速的镇压，仅保留了尼姑庵和小型礼拜堂，“相当于对中国佛教制度生活的彻底重组。”他写道，只有少数寺庙逃过了镇压。 ^(127)He{ }^{127} \mathrm{He} 给出了一些零星的例子，其中一个是规则的例外，还有一段来自 1548 年文震亨的引人注目的引文。依赖零星例子的麻烦在于它们可以支持论点的任何一方。在某些地方，合并显然立即生效并持续有效。例如，在归善县，1391 年有另外四座寺庙并入永福寺。有些寺庙保留了他们的土地，但其他寺庙不得不将土地交给粮仓等国家机构。与此同时，一个道教隐居地也吸收了各种地方宗教机构。 合并在 1556.^(128)1556 .{ }^{128} 仍然有效。相比之下，在其他地方，地方志显示合并是短暂的：例如，建乐县志报告称，许多合并的寺庙早在洪武时期就恢复了独立。 ^(129){ }^{129}
Beyond fragments, Brook’s belief in the efficacy of the amalgamation appears to be based on a misunderstanding. He cites Matsumoto Yoshimi as reporting that 95%95 \% of all the early Ming community schools “were housed in converted monasteries… Most of these monasteries were closed in the amalgamation campaign.” In fact, Matsumoto’s figure of 95%95 \% is drawn directly from Wang Lanyin’s 1936 article on community schools, and, as Matsumoto explains, Wang’s figure of 95%95 \% was based only on the 314 schools he counted that were known to have been converted from other buildings. In other words, all the figure shows is that when community schools were housed in converted buildings, the buildings had usually been religious institutions. These 300 or so schools, moreover, are irrelevant to Brook’s argument, 除了零星的例子外，布鲁克对合并有效性的信念似乎基于误解。他引用松本良美的说法，称“所有早期明代社区学校中有 95%95 \% 设在改建的寺庙中……大多数这些寺庙在合并运动中被关闭。”事实上，松本的 95%95 \% 数字直接取自王兰荫 1936 年关于社区学校的文章，正如松本所解释，王的 95%95 \% 数字仅基于他统计的 314 所已知由其他建筑改建而成的学校。换句话说，这个数字仅表明，当社区学校设在改建建筑中时，这些建筑通常是宗教机构。此外，这大约 300 所学校与布鲁克的论点无关，
because they were not early Ming schools; rather, they were converted beginning in the late fifteenth century. ^(130){ }^{130} In short, a solid assessment of the efficacy of temple amalgamation in the early Ming and after awaits a thorough survey of gazetteers and other materials, along the lines of Romeyn Taylor’s study of officially mandated temples and altars. ^(131){ }^{131} 因为它们不是早期明代的学校；相反，它们是在十五世纪晚期开始被改造的。 ^(130){ }^{130} 简而言之，对早期明代及其之后寺庙合并效能的全面评估，需要对地方志及其他资料进行彻底调查，类似于罗曼·泰勒对官方指定寺庙和祭坛的研究。 ^(131){ }^{131}
To sum up this section we may say that, on the one side, Zhu’s regulations for local society treated Buddhist clergy much as he did other social groups. Monks were certified, registered, supervised and assigned specific tasks. Their livelihoods, privileges and estates were both protected and circumscribed. They were not allowed to move at will through the land, but when they did travel, they were provided for. Like everyone else, they were subject to punishment by their own superiors, by officials, and even by commoners. They were treated as both dangerous and necessary, just like bureaucrats, landlords, soldiers, and the farming people themselves. Buddhist doctrines were not condemned, but they were focused, like Confucian doctrines, through a selection of texts and commentaries for promulgation, examination, and ritual use. 总结本节内容，我们可以说，一方面，朱元璋对地方社会的规制对待佛教僧侣的方式与对待其他社会群体类似。僧侣被认证、登记、监督并分配具体任务。他们的生计、特权和产业既受到保护，也受到限制。他们不允许随意在土地上移动，但当他们旅行时，会得到照顾。像其他人一样，他们会受到上级、官员甚至平民的惩罚。他们被视为既危险又必要，就像官僚、地主、士兵和农民一样。佛教教义并未被谴责，但像儒家教义一样，通过选定的文本和注释进行聚焦，用于传播、考试和仪式使用。
On the other side, through its regulations the new dynasty did compete with institutional religion, directly by trying to limit the numbers of temples and clergy, and indirectly by displacement. The Great Warning can be seen as a new “state” scripture, whose memorization and recitation earned merit in this world, and in the next if it helped one avoid a nasty judicial death. Farmer suggests that Zhu Yuanzhang was aiming at world salvation, and the Great Warning may have been a “sutra” in this sense too-an instrument for the salvation of all, by teaching goodness. According to regulations, communities would worship at the altars of soil and grain and feed hungry ghosts themselves, rather than hiring clergy. Pharmacies and medical schools replaced faith healers, including monks. Community schools took on 另一方面，通过其法规，新王朝确实与制度化宗教竞争，直接通过限制寺庙和僧侣的数量，间接通过取代。大警策可以被视为一种新的“国家”经典，其背诵和默记在今世积德，如果帮助人们避免残酷的司法死刑，在来世也能积德。Farmer 认为朱元璋的目标是世界救赎，大警策在这个意义上也可能是一部“经文”——通过教导善行来实现普救的工具。根据规定，社区会在社稷坛上祭祀并自行供养饿鬼，而不是雇佣僧侣。药房和医学院取代了包括僧侣在内的信仰治疗者。社区学校承担起了...
the job of primary education traditionally associated with monasteries. Community Elders and the community libation ceremony carried out moral instruction. State granaries obviated monastic charity. But none of these substitutions held by the mid-Ming, and they may have failed even in Zhu’s lifetime. They were apparently neither widely accepted by the populace, nor consistently supported by resident administrators and the central state. 初等教育的工作传统上与修道院相关联。社区长老和社区敬酒仪式承担道德教育。国家粮仓取代了修道院的慈善功能。但到了明中期，这些替代措施都未能持续，甚至可能在朱元璋在世时就已失败。显然，这些措施既未被民众广泛接受，也未得到驻地管理者和中央政府的一致支持。
The failures of imperial policy reflected in the emperor’s own writings lead to the realization that, even if many temples prove indeed to have been permanently amalgamated and imperial policy was effectively implemented for some periods, the force of imperial edicts is not a sufficient explanation. We must look to the society at large. In the case of the policy of amalgamation, for instance, were monastic estates snapped up like juicy plums by local landlords and/or officials, as happened later in the Ming period? Did taxpayers resent unproductive monks and cooperate in the cutbacks in their numbers? ^(132){ }^{132} These questions have yet to be answered, but it is clear that the emperor’s commands could not take effect without cooperation from others in Ming society. 帝国政策的失败反映在皇帝自己的著作中，这使人们意识到，即使许多寺庙确实被永久合并，且帝国政策在某些时期得到了有效实施，帝国诏令的力量也不足以完全解释这一现象。我们必须关注整个社会。例如，在合并政策的情况下，寺院地产是否像明代后期那样被地方地主和/或官员抢购一空？纳税人是否对无所作为的僧侣心生怨恨，并配合减少他们的人数？这些问题尚未得到解答，但显然，没有明代社会其他人的合作，皇帝的命令无法生效。
Conclusion: Resistance and Revision 结论：抵抗与修正
If your Majesty says “Let a thing be done,” it’s as good as done-practically, it is done-because your Majesty’s word is law… and if [it is done], why not say so? “陛下若言‘令其为之’，则几乎等同于已成事实——实际上，它已成事实——因为陛下的话就是法律……既然如此，何不直言不讳？”
W. S. Gilbert, "The Mikado" W. S. 吉尔伯特，《御前歌舞伎》
Despite my exhaustive efforts, I am unable to transform bad people, whether they are smart or stupid. What I mean is, I set up some law to get rid of villainy and corruption, always for the sake of preserving the subject people… Yet even after a long time, nothing produces any results. Alas, how hard it is! 尽管我付出了极大的努力，但我无法改变坏人，无论他们是聪明还是愚蠢。我的意思是，我制定了一些法律来铲除恶行和腐败，始终是为了保护百姓……然而即使过了很长时间，也没有任何成效。唉，真是难啊！
Zhu Yuanzhang ^(133){ }^{133} 朱元璋 ^(133){ }^{133}
If society had obeyed Zhu’s commands, he would not have had to repeat and revise his policies so many times. Gazetteers attest occa- 如果社会遵守了朱元璋的命令，他就不必反复修改和重申他的政策。地方志对此有所记载——
sionally to the force of community resistance to his measures．^(134){ }^{134} Romeyn Taylor＇s study of altars，temples and shrines likewise concludes that resident administrators often neglected the mandated altars：he states that although＂the Ming founder took great pains to reform the religious life of the empire．．．the gazetteers do not encourage the view＂that the state could impose or destroy cults at will．Religious institutions，Taylor holds，survived or throve because they met so－ cial needs．^(135){ }^{135} This insight can be extended，I think，to suggest that Zhu＇s frequent revisions of local institutional policies were a response to social resistance．Since this essay is based only on the emperor＇s own writings，rather than being a systematic study of early Ming society， what follows is mainly hypothetical． 社区对其措施的抵抗力量。 ^(134){ }^{134} Romeyn Taylor 对祭坛、庙宇和神龛的研究同样得出结论，常驻管理者经常忽视规定的祭坛：他指出，尽管“明朝开国皇帝极力改革帝国的宗教生活……地方志并不支持”国家可以随意强加或摧毁崇拜的观点。Taylor 认为，宗教机构之所以存续或兴盛，是因为它们满足了社会需求。 ^(135){ }^{135} 我认为，这一见解可以进一步扩展，表明朱元璋频繁修订地方制度政策是对社会抵抗的回应。由于本文仅基于皇帝本人的著作，而非对早期明代社会的系统研究，以下内容主要是推测性的
How should we understand the backtracking and contradictory edicts of the preeminent despot of late imperial China？Dardess says that＂a lack of confidence in fixed institutions generally．．．helps account for the constant revamping and rearranging of institutions that went on throughout his reign．＂^(136){ }^{136} Farmer describes Zhu Yuanzhang as＂a shrewd and farsighted legislator，a constitutional architect．．．［who］ proposed，reviewed，modified and reissued［law codes and regulations］ over a period of three decades．＂^(137){ }^{137} These characterizations leave all the agency in Zhu Yuanzhang＇s hands and understate the extent to which，as I see it，he was forced by social resistance into making the changes－changes that were not minor modifications but alterations that dramatically undercut his original vision of a stable，tiered society， minimally managed by a bureaucracy carefully coordinated with a spiritual hierarchy．Examples in the first section have shown how measures targeting corruption undercut both family and community solidarity and hierarchy．Here I will argue further that what Zhu considered corruption included elements of what we might valorize as social resistance． 我们应如何理解晚期帝制中国最显赫的专制者的反复无常和自相矛盾的敕令？Dardess 认为“对固定制度缺乏信心……大体上有助于解释他统治期间不断对制度进行改组和调整的现象。” ^(136){ }^{136} Farmer 将朱元璋描述为“一位精明且有远见的立法者，一位宪法设计师……［他］在三十年间提出、审议、修改并重新颁布［法律法规］。” ^(137){ }^{137} 这些描述将所有主动权都归于朱元璋本人，却低估了他在我看来被社会阻力所迫而做出的改变——这些改变并非小幅调整，而是大幅削弱了他最初关于一个稳定的、分层的社会的设想，这个社会由一个与精神等级体系精心协调的官僚机构进行最小化管理。第一部分的例子已经展示了针对腐败的措施如何削弱了家庭和社区的团结与等级。在此，我将进一步论证，朱元璋所认为的腐败中包含了我们可能赞赏为社会抵抗的元素
Dardess＇s Confucianism and Autocracy has described how Zhu＇s under－ standing of the human mind was shaped by his advisors，leading to great injustices： Dardess 的《儒家思想与专制主义》描述了朱元璋对人类心灵的理解如何受到其顾问的影响，导致了巨大的不公正：
The emperor was best prepared to argue that evil was ultimately an affair of the individual mind, and… might be studied as an isolate, without regard for the larger social environment… The bonds of implicit trust that might ordinarily tie masses to elites, elites to government, professionals to clients, or one man to another could be taken to exist as ties of corruption if they existed at all. 138 皇帝最善于论证邪恶最终是个体心灵的问题，……可以作为孤立的个体来研究，而不考虑更大的社会环境……通常将群众与精英、精英与政府、专业人士与客户或人与人之间联系起来的隐性信任纽带，如果存在的话，也可能被视为腐败的纽带。138
Taking my cue from these words, I would like to suggest an alternative interpretation of the cases of corruption and wickedness that the emperor recorded in the Great Warning. Even if he misunderstood individual psychology and interpersonal “bonds of implicit trust,” paranoiacally seeing evil everywhere he looked, we can, nonetheless, draw on his records to see the outlines of active, organized and valid objections to his plans. 借用这些话作为启示，我想提出对皇帝在《大诫》中记载的腐败和邪恶案件的另一种解释。即使他误解了个体心理和人际“隐性信任纽带”，偏执地在所见之处都看到邪恶，我们仍然可以借助他的记录，看到对其计划的积极、有组织且合理的反对轮廓。
Zhu’s own writings attest to the complex social forces he was fighting in building a new state. For instance, he felt forced to abolish community schools because rich families had their sons excused from attending by bribing administrators, who then apparently forced poor children to attend in order to fill the quotas. Farmer sees the abolition of the community schools as a voluntary state retreat from some local administrative functions in order to “check excesses by government agents.” ^(139){ }^{139} But corruption was not only the personal immorality of administrators; it was also a response to central policy. Rich families did not wish to send their children to government schools; they arranged with administrators to avoid it. In other words, Zhu’s hand was forced by resistance from society and his own bureaucracy. 朱自身的著作证明了他在建设新国家过程中所面对的复杂社会力量。例如，他感到被迫废除社区学校，因为富裕家庭通过贿赂管理者使其子弟免于上学，而这些管理者显然又强迫贫困儿童上学以填补名额。法默认为废除社区学校是国家自愿放弃某些地方行政职能，以“制约政府代理人的过度行为”。 ^(139){ }^{139} 但腐败不仅仅是管理者的个人道德败坏；它也是对中央政策的反应。富裕家庭不愿将子女送入公立学校；他们与管理者达成安排以避免此事。换句话说，朱的手被社会和他自己的官僚体系的抵抗所迫。
Other examples are clearer yet. The Great Warning calls for commoners to arrest corrupt prefectural, subprefectural and county administrators (all “shiftless scoundrels”) and clerks who “harm the people.” Two crimes the “scoundrels” might commit are as follows: 其他例子则更加清晰。《大警告》呼吁平民逮捕腐败的府、州、县级官员（全是“无赖恶棍”）和“伤害百姓”的文书。“恶棍”可能犯的两种罪行如下：
If taxes and corvée labor are unfair, selecting the poor and selling [exemptions] to the rich, then arrest and turn in the relevant clerks of the revenue office… 如果税收和徭役不公平，选择穷人并将[豁免权]卖给富人，那么逮捕并举报相关的税务局职员……
If in the collection of tribute manufactured goods they release for a bribe those artisans whose turn it is [to supply items], arrest and turn in those clerks of the public works office. ^(140){ }^{140} 如果在征收贡品手工业品时，收受贿赂放行那些轮到供应物品的工匠，逮捕并举报那些公工局的职员。 ^(140){ }^{140}
We may choose to join the emperor in condemning attempts by the unrepresented wealthy to avoid taxation and labor, but what about attempts by artisans who lost months of work-time? Whether we label them “good” or “bad,” social networks were serving people’s interests in the face of tyranny: the interests of subjects, as well as those of government personnel. Other examples of “corrupt” people whom Zhu tried to suppress were unofficial scribes at county yamens who assisted people with lawsuits, and tax-payment undertakers who transported tax grain to the capital so that people could avoid making the journey themselves: professionals offering useful services. ^(141){ }^{141} 我们可以选择与皇帝一道谴责无代表的富人逃避税收和劳役的行为，但那些失去数月工作时间的工匠的尝试又如何呢？无论我们称他们为“好”还是“坏”，社会网络在暴政面前为人民的利益服务：既包括臣民的利益，也包括政府人员的利益。朱试图镇压的其他“腐败”人物例子还有县衙的非官方书记，他们协助民众打官司，以及负责将税粮运送到京城以便民众免去亲自前往的税务承办人：这些都是提供有用服务的专业人士。 ^(141){ }^{141}
Cases reported by Zhu himself hint at the strength of networks we can barely discern. For instance, a magistrate who had been ordered to collect again taxes embezzled by a superior flagrantly disobeyed the command forty-eight times, going so far as to beat up and imprison the official messenger. Was he protecting the locals, who had already paid these taxes once? Did locals pressure him into disobeying his superior? ^(142){ }^{142} In another case, which resulted in three hundred and seven executions, hundreds of people hid and defended a clerk fleeing the law across seven counties, even fighting pitched battles with the police. ^(143){ }^{143} What networks was the clerk drawing on that made people risk death for him? What debts did people owe him? How could a mere clerk even be recognized across seven counties? Was there a general presumption that one should harbor criminals? Why did the clerk’s defenders think they could defeat a police force-was that common? Were people simply unimpressed by Zhu’s brutality, which he himself advertised in the Great Warning, or was it worth the risk? Such questions suggest that connections pervaded state and society and were used to resist central demands. 朱本人报告的案例暗示了我们几乎无法察觉的网络的强大力量。例如，一位被命令重新征收上级贪污的税款的县官，公然违抗命令达四十八次，甚至殴打并监禁了官方信使。他是在保护已经缴纳过这些税款的当地人吗？当地人是否施压他违抗上级？ ^(142){ }^{142} 另一个案件导致三百零七人被处决，数百人在七个县内藏匿并保护一名逃避法律的文书，甚至与警察展开激烈战斗。 ^(143){ }^{143} 这名文书依靠了什么样的网络，使人们愿意冒死保护他？人们欠他什么人情？一个普通文书怎么可能在七个县内被认出？是否普遍认为应该庇护罪犯？文书的保护者为何认为他们能击败警察部队——这常见吗？人们是对朱的残暴不以为然（他自己在《大警告》中宣传的），还是认为冒险是值得的？这些问题表明，关系网络渗透于国家与社会，并被用来抵抗中央的要求。
In some ways, Zhu recognized his limits. In the early phases of the reign, rather than radically restructuring local society, he drew on precedents and allied himself with powerful people and deities in the local communities, balancing that strategy against the need to reapportion land to assure a tax base of smallholders. When moderate 在某些方面，朱元璋认识到了自己的局限。在统治的早期阶段，他没有激进地重组地方社会，而是借鉴先例，与地方社区中的有权势人物和神灵结盟，将这一策略与重新分配土地以确保小农税基的需要相平衡。当温和的
policies failed, he tried more actively to reshape local society, but admitted that administrators were not implementing or maintaining local institutions such as the kiosks and the libation ceremony. ^(144){ }^{144} Still later he raged against the intransigence and stupidity of corrupt subjects and officials who thwarted his plans, forcing him to revise and abolish old institutions and create new ones. He saw and deplored the fact that society consisted of webs of relationships that cut across hierarchies, and he responded to “corruption” on its own terms. In short, the Ming founder’s frequent revisions of village policies appear to have responded to active resistance to his vision. As he put it: “Ah! The ancients said it is difficult to be a ruler. Truly, that is so…” 145 政策失败时，他尝试更积极地重塑地方社会，但承认行政人员未能实施或维护地方制度，如亭子和祭酒仪式。 ^(144){ }^{144} 更晚些时候，他愤怒地谴责那些顽固愚昧、腐败的臣民和官员阻挠他的计划，迫使他修订和废除旧制度，创建新制度。他看到了并痛惜社会由跨越等级的关系网络组成，并且他以“腐败”的自身条件作出回应。简言之，明朝开国皇帝频繁修订村庄政策，似乎是对其愿景遭遇积极抵抗的回应。正如他所言：“啊！古人说做君主难，确实如此……”145
^(1){ }^{1} I would like to thank Madeleine Zelin，Robert Hymes，and Katherine Carlitz for commenting on earlier versions of this paper． ^(1){ }^{1} 我想感谢 Madeleine Zelin、Robert Hymes 和 Katherine Carlitz 对本文早期版本的评论。
^(2){ }^{2} Edward Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and Early Ming Legislation (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 4, 9, 17. ^(2){ }^{2} Edward Farmer，《朱元璋与明初立法》（莱顿：E.J. Brill，1995 年），第 4、9、17 页。 ^(3){ }^{3} John Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), especially chapter 4. ^(3){ }^{3} John Dardess，《儒家思想与专制：明朝开国时期的专业精英》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1983 年），特别是第 4 章。
^(4){ }^{4} Ibid., 229. ^(4){ }^{4} 同上，第 229 页。 ^(5){ }^{5} I use the term “resident administrators” (or “administrators” for short) to refer to prefects, subprefects and county magistrates. The three are often, but not always, mentioned together in the sources. The term “local officials” is unsatisfactory because using the adjective “local” to refer to non-locals appointed by the center to serve briefly in a place makes it more difficult for the reader to distinguish these men from “local leaders” or “local authorities,” that is, leading men native to the place who could take positions as lijia leaders, Seniors, etc., or might serve as officials elsewhere. The distinction between locals and men temporarily serving in a locality is, of course, critical when one is examining the impact of the state on society or vice versa. Unless the original does not specify prefects, subprefects and county magistrates, or unless the referent is clear from the context, “officials” alone will not do either, because it does not exclude censors, provincial officials, and others whose position vis-a-vis the local people was quite different. 我使用“驻地官员”（或简称“官员”）一词来指代知府、知州和县令。这三者在史料中常常但并非总是一起提及。“地方官员”一词不够准确，因为用“地方”这个形容词来指代由中央任命、在某地短期任职的非本地官员，会使读者难以区分这些人与“地方领导”或“地方权威”，即本地出身的领导人物，他们可能担任里甲长、长老等职务，或可能在其他地方任职。区分本地人与暂时在某地任职的人，当然在考察国家对社会的影响或反之时至关重要。除非原文未具体指明知府、知州和县令，或语境中指代明确，否则单用“官员”也不合适，因为这不能排除监察官、省级官员及其他与地方民众关系截然不同的职位。 ^(6){ }^{6} Richard Madsen, Morality and Power in a Chinese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Jiang Yonglin, “Defending the Dynastic Order at the Local Level: Central-Local Relations as Seen in a Late-Ming Magistrate’s Enforcement of the Law,” Ming Studies 43 (2000): 25. ^(6){ }^{6} 理查德·马德森，《中国乡村的道德与权力》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1984）；蒋永林，“在地方层面维护朝代秩序：晚明知县执法中所见的中央与地方关系”，《明代研究》43 期（2000）：25。 ^(7){ }^{7} My dissertation argues to the contrary with regard to community schools: namely, that they were not widely built in the Hongwu period in response to imperial commands. Sarah Schneewind, “Community Schools and Improper Shrines: Local Institutions and the Chinese State in the Ming Period (1368-1644)” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1999), chapter 2. ^(7){ }^{7} 我的论文对社区学校的看法相反：即它们并非在洪武时期因皇帝命令而广泛建设。莎拉·施尼温德，《社区学校与不当祠堂：明代（1368-1644）地方机构与中国国家》（博士论文，哥伦比亚大学，1999），第二章。
^(8){ }^{8} Anonymous review of this essay. ^(8){ }^{8} 本文的匿名评审。
^(9){ }^{9} Da Ming huidian (1587; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989) [hereafter Huidian], 19/ 129. See also Mingshi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), 77/1878. ^(9){ }^{9} 《大明会典》（1587；北京：中华书局，1989）[以下简称《会典》]，第 19 卷第 129 页。另见《明史》（北京：中华书局，1976），第 77 卷第 1878 页。 ^(10){ }^{10} Mingshi, 77/1878. ^(10){ }^{10} 《明史》，77/1878。 ^(11){ }^{11} For a translation of the 1367 declaration of the changing of the mandate, as it appears in Ming Taizu shilu (Taipei: Academica Sinica, 1962), 26/10b-1 la, see Daniel Overmyer, Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 147. For extended discussion of early Ming legitimation see Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang. ^(11){ }^{11} 关于 1367 年更替天命宣言的翻译，见《明太祖实录》（台北：中央研究院，1962 年），26/10b-1 la，参见 Daniel Overmyer，《民间佛教宗教：晚期帝国中国的异端教派》（剑桥，马萨诸塞州：哈佛大学出版社，1976 年），147 页。关于早期明朝合法性的详细讨论见 Farmer，朱元璋。 ^(12){ }^{12} For discussion see John Langlois, “The Hung-wu Reign, 1368-1398,” in The ^(12){ }^{12} 讨论见 John Langlois，“洪武年间，1368-1398，”载于
Cambridge History of China, vol. 7, ed. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 108-10. 《剑桥中国史》，第 7 卷，主编 Frederick W. Mote 和 Denis Twitchett（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1988 年），108-110 页。 ^(13){ }^{13} In Hongwu 2: Mingshi, 75/1851; undated reference: Huidian, 78/452. Deities for each administrative level: Huidian, 93/532. ^(13){ }^{13} 洪武二年：《明史》，75/1851；无日期参考：《会典》，78/452。各级行政区的神祇：《会典》，93/532。 ^(14){ }^{14} The examination system was suspended again from 1372 to 1384. ^(14){ }^{14} 科举制度于 1372 年至 1384 年再次中止。 ^(15){ }^{15} Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Confucianism and Family Rituals in Imperial China: A Social History of Writing about Rites (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 151. ^(15){ }^{15} Patricia Buckley Ebrey，《儒家与帝国中国的家庭礼仪：关于礼仪书写的社会史》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1991 年），151 页。 ^(16){ }^{16} Sometimes the deities took precedence; in certain disputes about ritual Zhu flouted scholarly advice from the start. Ming huiyao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1956), 103. ^(16){ }^{16} 有时神祇优先；在某些关于礼仪的争议中，朱元璋从一开始就无视学者的建议。《明会要》（北京：中华书局，1956 年），103 页。 ^(17){ }^{17} There were other indications to people of what these virtues meant. For example, the Ming adopted Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals for use by all classes, incorporating its instructions into the Ming code in the first year of the dynasty. Perhaps to enhance family solidarity and the authority of the family head, the Ming state did not follow Zhu Xi in stressing that rituals were to be carried out by descent line heirs only. See Ebrey, Family Rituals, 151. Allowing more people to support a given ancestor was perhaps another way of gaining more support from the spirit world. ^(17){ }^{17} 还有其他迹象向人们表明这些美德的含义。例如，明朝采纳了朱熹的《家礼》供各阶层使用，并在朝代元年将其指示纳入明律。也许为了增强家庭团结和家长的权威，明朝并未像朱熹那样强调仪式只能由嫡系继承人执行。参见 Ebrey，《家礼》，第 151 页。允许更多人祭祀某位祖先，或许是从灵界获得更多支持的另一种方式。
18 As one example of how local values might vary, Janet Theiss has shown that even in the mid-Qing, when ideals of female chastity had been vigorously promoted for centuries, different villages understood them quite differently. In one place, “villagers considered it taboo for a man even to enter the gates of a neighbor’s house if the man was not at home. In the second, the women did not consider it improper for a male friend of the husband to spend the night in his absence.” Janet Theiss, “Boundaries of Body and Mind: the Meaning of Violation in Law, Ethics and Experience,” paper presented at the 1997 AAS conference, 6. Cited by permission. 18 作为地方价值观可能存在差异的一个例子，Janet Theiss 证明即使在清中期，女性贞洁的理想已经被大力倡导了几个世纪，不同村庄对其的理解却大相径庭。在一个地方，“村民们认为如果男人不在家，男人甚至进入邻居家的大门都是禁忌。在另一个地方，妇女们并不认为丈夫的男性朋友在丈夫不在时过夜是不妥的。” Janet Theiss，《身体与心灵的界限：法律、伦理与经验中侵犯的意义》，1997 年美国亚洲研究协会会议论文，第 6 页。经许可引用。
19 Huidian, 79/457. 19 汇典，79/457。 ^(20){ }^{20} Huidian 93/532. See Daniel Overmyer, “Attitudes toward Popular Religion in Ritual Texts of the Chinese State: The Collected Statutes of the Great Ming,” Cahiers d’Extrème-Asie 5 (1989-1990): 206. My thanks to Professor Overmyer for sending me this article. According to Romeyn Taylor, the local cults certified with imperial plaques were mostly for officials or literati, not commoners or natural spirits-cults that served the interests of resident administrators and local gentry. Taylor further comments, “The procedure for incorporating local cults into the official religion that had originated outside it was a tacit acknowledgement that it … had to come to terms with the diffuse popular religion that was lodged everywhere in homes, neighborhoods, villages, and towns.” Romeyn Taylor, “Official Religion in the Ming,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 8, ed. Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 880. ^(20){ }^{20} 会典 93/532。参见 Daniel Overmyer，《中国国家礼仪文本中对民间宗教的态度：〈大明会典〉》，《极东亚洲杂志》5（1989-1990）：206。感谢 Overmyer 教授寄给我这篇文章。根据 Romeyn Taylor 的说法，获得皇帝匾额认证的地方崇拜大多是为官员或文人设立的，而非为普通百姓或服务于驻地官员和地方士绅利益的自然神崇拜。Taylor 进一步评论道：“将起源于官方宗教之外的地方崇拜纳入官方宗教的程序，是对遍布家庭、邻里、村庄和城镇的广泛民间宗教的一种默许承认，表明官方宗教必须与之妥协。” Romeyn Taylor，《明代的官方宗教》，载于《剑桥中国史》第 8 卷，主编 Denis Twitchett 和 Frederick W. Mote（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1998），880 页。 ^(21){ }^{21} It was an old strategy. As Valerie Hansen neatly puts it, “By awarding titles to deities who commanded the allegiance of local elites, the Song government was able to keep its finger on the pulse of local society. Magistrates, sheriffs, and registrars depended on local elites to keep order, but they had little to offer in return. What they could, and what they did, offer was recognition of local deities.” Valerie Hansen, Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127-1276 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 104. ^(21){ }^{21} 这是一个古老的策略。正如瓦莱丽·汉森（Valerie Hansen）恰当地指出：“通过授予掌控地方精英效忠的神祇以头衔，宋政府能够掌握地方社会的脉搏。地方官员、治安官和登记员依赖地方精英维持秩序，但他们几乎无以回报。他们能够且确实提供的是对地方神祇的认可。” 瓦莱丽·汉森，《中古中国的变神：1127-1276》（普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1990 年），104 页。
^(22){ }^{22} Huidian, 93/532; Overmyer, “Attitudes,” 206. See also Ming Taizu shilu, 35/ 3b. Romeyn Taylor, “Ming T’ai-tsu and the Gods of the Walls and Moats,” Ming Studies 3 (1977): 31-49, cites this place for his statement that along with the imperial endorsement and regulation of worthy cults, “others were to be proscribed” ( 37 and note 36). But the passage contains no such provision. ^(22){ }^{22} 《会典》，93/532；欧弗迈尔，“态度”，206 页。另见《明太祖实录》，35/3b。罗曼·泰勒，“明太祖与城墙壕沟之神”，《明代研究》3（1977）：31-49，引用此处以支持他的观点，即随着皇帝对有价值的崇拜的认可和规范，“其他的则应被禁止”（37 页及注 36）。但该段落并无此类规定。 ^(23){ }^{23} George Jer-lang Chang, “Local Control in the Early Ming” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1979), 157. ^(23){ }^{23} 张吉郎，《早期明代的地方控制》（博士论文，明尼苏达大学，1979 年），157 页。
^(24){ }^{24} Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang, 16, 32-3, 37. For the influence of the Jinhua scholars on Zhu Yuanzhang, see Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy. Zhu drew heavily on Yuanperiod institutions, though he seldom admitted it. Farmer discusses this, as does Edward L. Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History, 1355-1435 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). ^(24){ }^{24} 农民，朱元璋，16，32-3，37。关于金华学者对朱元璋的影响，见 Dardess，《儒学与专制》。朱元璋大量借鉴了元代制度，尽管他很少承认这一点。Farmer 对此有所讨论，Edward L. Dreyer 的《早期明代中国：政治史，1355-1435》（斯坦福：斯坦福大学出版社，1982 年）也有涉及。 ^(25){ }^{25} Edward Farmer, “Social Regulations of the First Ming Emperor: Orthodoxy and the Transmission of Orthodox Values,” in Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China, ed. Kwang-ching Liu (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 105, 112-3. Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang, 14, points to elements of society-the market system, heterodox religious sects, ethnic minorities - that were incompatible with hierarchy or directly challenged the dominant system. ^(25){ }^{25} Edward Farmer，“明太祖的社会规制：正统性与正统价值的传承”，载于刘光清主编《晚清正统观念》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1990 年），第 105、112-3 页。Farmer，《朱元璋》，14 页，指出社会中的一些元素——市场体系、异端宗教教派、少数民族——与等级制度不兼容或直接挑战了主导体系。
26 Ming Taizu shilu, 6/1279; Ming huiyao, 953; see also Mingshi, 78/1899. Liang Fangzhong, Mingdai liangzhang zhidu (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1957), 10, 63. Similar semi-bureaucratic posts had been created as early as 1361 . 26 《明太祖实录》，6/1279；《明会要》，953；另见《明史》，78/1899。梁方仲，《明代两账制度》（上海：上海人民出版社，1957 年），10，63 页。类似的半官僚职位早在 1361 年就已设立。
27 Huidian, 19/129. 27 《会典》，19/129。
28 Those who had been adopted young, or had switched into a military or other specialized household, could not revert to their old surnames. Mongols and other foreigners who had adopted Chinese names and had been living in China and raising families did not have to revert to their original names. Huidian, 11/69. The point was not abstract ideals of lineage, but settling the country down to work. 28 那些年幼时被收养，或转入军队或其他专门户籍的人，不能恢复原来的姓氏。蒙古人和其他采用汉姓、在中国生活并成家的外国人，也不必恢复原名。《会典》，11/69。重点不是抽象的血统理念，而是让国家安定下来以便工作。
^(29){ }^{29} Ebrey，Family Rituals， 151. ^(29){ }^{29} Ebrey，《家礼》，151。
30 ＂Bu gong yu min，bu ying si dian zhe＂不功于民不應祀典者．The second clause could also mean＂those who are not in the ritual statutes．＂ 30 “不功于民，不应祀典者。”第二句也可以理解为“那些不在祭祀典章中的人。” ^(31){ }^{31} Ming Taizu shilu，53／1035；Huang Ming zhaoling（Taipei：Chengwen chubanshe， 1967），66；see also Taylor，＂Gods of Walls and Moats．＂For this edict，but dated Hongwu 2，see Huguang Hengshan xianzhi（1488，1499），5／1－2． ^(31){ }^{31} 《明太祖实录》，53／1035；《皇明诏令》（台北：成文出版社，1967），66；另见 Taylor，“城墙与壕沟之神。”关于此诏令，但标注为洪武二年，见《湖广衡山县志》（1488，1499），5／1－2。 ^(32){ }^{32} Farmer，Zhu Yuanzhang，90．Also Taylor，＂Gods of Walls and Moats，＂36－7． ^(32){ }^{32} Farmer，朱元璋，90．另见 Taylor，“城墙与壕沟之神”，36－7．
33 Taylor＂Gods of Walls and Moats，＂39．Ming huiyao，117．I refer to the branch secretariats as provinces for convenience． 33 Taylor“城墙与壕沟之神”，39．《明会要》，117．为方便起见，我将分司称为省。 ^(34){ }^{34} Da Ming lü jijie fuli 大明律集解附例（Taipei：Taiwan xuesheng shuju，1970）， 26. On the kiosks see also Dardess，Confucianism and Autocracy， 241. ^(34){ }^{34} 《大明律集解附例》（台北：台湾学生书局，1970），26。关于亭子另见 Dardess，《儒家与专制》，241。
35 Chang，＂Local Control，＂163；Leif Littrup，＂The Yellow Registers of the Ming Dynasty－Translation from the Wan－li Da－Ming Hui－dian，＂Papers on Far Eastern History 16 （1977）：73．In gazetteers，the kiosks appear in pairs，usually with a note that they are defunct． 35 Chang，“地方控制”，163；Leif Littrup，“明代黄册——《万历大明会典》译文”，《远东历史论文集》16（1977）：73。在地方志中，亭子成对出现，通常附有已废止的注释。
38 Chang，＂Local Control，＂157；Huidian，79／456；Ming huiyao， 238. 38 张，“地方控制，”157；会典，79/456；明会要，238。
39 Overmyer，＂Attitudes，＂207；Huidian，94／536．For another translation see Chang， ＂Local Control，＂ 109. 39 Overmyer，“态度，”207；会典，94/536。另见张，“地方控制，”109 的译文。 ^(40){ }^{40} Stephan Feuchtwang，The Imperial Metaphor：Popular Religion in China（London： Routledge，1992），55ff． ^(40){ }^{40} 斯特凡·福伊希旺，《帝国隐喻：中国的民间宗教》（伦敦：劳特利奇，1992），55 页及以下。
＊1 Overmyer，＂Attitudes，＂ 212. ＊1 奥弗迈耶，“态度”，212 页。
^(42){ }^{42} Huidian，78；Huang Ming zhi shu（Taipei：Chengwen chubanshe，1969），3／1533． The first three categories parallel categories of deities． ^(42){ }^{42} 《会典》，78 页；《皇明之书》（台北：诚文出版社，1969），3/1533。前三类与神祇类别相对应。
43 Mingshi，130／2a and 281／3；Nanzhili Fiangyin xianzhi（1520），9／28a；Ming huiyao， 411. 43 《明史》，130/2a 和 281/3；《南直隶方隐县志》（1520），9/28a；《明会要》，411 页。 ^(44){ }^{44} Ming Taizu shilu，96／1655；Jiangxi Dongxiang xianzhi（1524），1／55；and many other gazetteers． ^(44){ }^{44} 《明太祖实录》，96／1655；《江西东乡县志》（1524），1／55；以及许多其他地方志。 ^(45){ }^{45} Henan Lanyang xianzhi（1545），4／19－20． ^(45){ }^{45} 《河南兰阳县志》（1545），4／19－20。
^(46){ }^{46} Ho Yün-yi, “Ideological Implications of Major Sacrifices in Early Ming,” Ming Studies 6 (1978): 62. For the date, see Taylor, “Official Religion,” 854. ^(46){ }^{46} 何云仪，“明初重大祭祀的意识形态含义，”《明代研究》6（1978）：62。关于日期，见泰勒，“官方宗教，”854。
47 Dreyer，Early Ming China， 104. 47 德雷尔，《明初中国》，104。
48 Nanzhili Shanghai xianzhi（1588），5／28a． 48 南直隶 上海县志（1588），5／28a ^(49){ }^{49} Since the original attendance policy has not survived，this is a guess about what exactly was going on．The first abolition order survives only in gazetteers，and Wang Lanyin determined its date from these sources．See Wang Lanyin 王蘭䔄，＂Mingdai zhi shexue＂明代之社學，Shida yuekan 21 （1935）：42－102 and 25 （1936）：62－129；this reference，1／50．See also the 16th－century Guangdong Dongli zhi；Ming Taizu shilu， 157／2436；Great Warning，1．44；Huidian，78／455．Zhu＇s explanation appears in the Great Warning，1．44，that is，Zhu Yuanzhang，Yuzhi Da Gao（Imperially Written Great ^(49){ }^{49} 由于原始的出勤政策未能保存下来，这只是对当时具体情况的猜测。第一次废止令仅存于地方志中，王兰䔄根据这些资料确定了其日期。参见王兰䔄，《明代之社学》，《师大月刊》21（1935）：42－102 和 25（1936）：62－129；此处引用，1／50。另见十六世纪广东《东里志》；《明太祖实录》，157／2436；《大诰》，1．44；《会典》，78／455。朱元璋的解释见《大诰》，1．44，即朱元璋《御制大诰》
Warning，or Grand Pronouncement）．I refer to the numbered sections in the four compilations that constitute the text as given in the full reprint by Yang Yifan 楊一凡，Ming Dagao yanjiu 明大誥研究（Nanjing：Jiangsu sheng renmin chubanshe，1988）． Also reprinted in Ming kaiguo wenxian 明開國文獻，vol． 1. 警告，或称重大宣言）。我所指的是由杨一凡编纂的四部汇编中编号的章节，文本见杨一凡《明大诰研究》（南京：江苏省人民出版社，1988 年）完整再版。也收录于《明开国文献》第一卷。 ^(50){ }^{50} The kiosks were also protected by penalties for tampering with them．Dardess， Confucianism and Autocracy，241，citing Ming Taizu shilu，III：1332－3；IV：2302－3． ^(50){ }^{50} 这些售货亭也受到了篡改处罚的保护。Dardess，《儒家思想与专制》，241 页，引用《明太祖实录》，第三卷：1332－3；第四卷：2302－3 ^(51){ }^{51} In 1370 Huzhou，Zhejiang，had already had hundred－family organizations for collecting taxes and drafting soldiers，with the names and divisions recorded in＂small yellow registers．＂Littrup，＂Yellow Registers，＂ 73. 1370 年，浙江湖州已经有了百户组织，负责征税和征兵，其姓名和分工记录在“小黄册”中。Littrup，《黄册》，73 页。
52 The professional households were included in the regular yellow registers as well as in special ones．Small or female－headed households were not counted in the tithings，but were appended in the records．Every ten years，registers of the tithings were to be prepared anew in the Community，incorporating information from the previous survey to catch discrepancies．The registers were prepared in duplicate，with a yellow－covered copy sent to the Ministry of Revenue．Littrup，＂Yellow Registers，＂ 70ff．；Wei Qingyuan 韋慶遠，Mingdai huangce zhidu 明代黃册制度（Beijing：Zhonghua shuju，1961）． 每十年，社区要重新编制一次什一税登记簿，将上次调查的信息纳入其中。登记册一式两份，一份黄色封面的副本送往税收部。Littrup，"Yellow Registers，" 70ff．；Wei Qingyuan 韋慶遠，Mingdai huangce zhidu 明代黃冊制度（北京：中華書局，1961 年）． ^(53){ }^{53} Littrup，＂Yellow Registers，＂71；Ming huiyao，953；Meng Sen 孟森，Mingdai shi明代史（Taipei：Zhonghua congshu weiyuanhui，1957），28；Chang，Local Control， 129. ^(53){ }^{53} Littrup，“Yellow Registers”，71；明会要，953；孟森，明代史（台北：中华丛书委员会，1957），28；Chang，Local Control，129。
^(54){ }^{54} Ming huiyao, 239; Huidian, 79/456-7. ^(54){ }^{54} 《明会要》，239；《会典》，79/456-7。
55 Littrup, “Yellow Registers,” n. 58; George Jer-lang Chang, “The Village Elder System of the Early Ming Dynasty,” Ming Studies 7 (1978): 53. 55 Littrup，“黄册”，注 58；张格朗，〈明初村长制度〉，《明代研究》7（1978）：53。
^(60){ }^{60} Ray Huang, “The Ming Fiscal Administration,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 8, 106. Executions reported in the Great Warning, according to Lin Tai-yung, see his “Ming T’ai-tsu and His Administration of Justice” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1979), 115, 128-9. ^(60){ }^{60} 黄仁宇，“明代财政管理，”载《剑桥中国史》第八卷，106 页。根据林泰庸的《明太祖与其司法管理》（明尼苏达大学博士论文，1979 年），115 页，128-129 页，报道了《大警告》中的处决事件。
61 Great Warning, 3.34. 61《大警告》，3.34。
^(62){ }^{62} Wu Han 吳唅，Zhu Yuanzhang zhuan 朱元璋傳（Beijing：Sanlian shudian，1965）， 256；Lin，＂Administration of Justice，＂71－2， 247. ^(62){ }^{62} 吴晗，朱元璋传（北京：三联书店，1965），256 页；林，“司法管理，”71－72，247 页。 ^(63){ }^{63} Farmer，Zhu Yuanzhang，16．On Zhu＇s battle against corruption，see Dardess， Confucianism and Autocracy． ^(63){ }^{63} Farmer，朱元璋，16．关于朱元璋反腐败的斗争，参见 Dardess，《儒家思想与专制》。 ^(64){ }^{64} See among others Farmer，＂Social Regulations，＂121；and Anita Andrew，＂The Local Community in Early Ming Social Legislation：Ming Taizu＇s Approach to Trans－ formation and Control in the＇Great Warning＇，＂Ming Studies 20 （1985）：57－68． ^(64){ }^{64} 参见包括 Farmer，《社会规制》，121；以及 Anita Andrew，《早期明代社会立法中的地方社区：明太祖在〈大诫〉中的转型与控制方法》，《明代研究》20（1985）：57－68。 ^(65){ }^{65} Lin，＂Administration of Justice，＂10－16．Lin also sees the Great Warning as a plea for legitimacy．Lin，71－2． ^(65){ }^{65} 林，《司法管理》，10－16。林还将《大诫》视为对合法性的呼吁。林，71－72。 ^(66){ }^{66} Huidian，20／135． ^(66){ }^{66} 会典，20／135
^(73){ }^{73} Great Warning，1．58；Ming huiyao，239；Huidian，79／456． ^(73){ }^{73} 大警示，1.58；明会要，239；会典，79／456。 ^(74){ }^{74} Zhu Yuanzhang，＂Youwu guishen＂有無鬼神，in Ming Taizu yuzhi wenji（Taipei： Taiwan xuesheng shuju，1965），359－62；Great Warning， 1.44 et passim． ^(74){ }^{74} 朱元璋，“有无鬼神”，载于《明太祖语录文集》（台北：台湾学生书局，1965），359－62；大警示，1.44 及其他。
^(75){ }^{75} Great Warning, 2.8; also Ming Taizu shilu, 193/2894, cited in Chang “Village Elder System,” 54. ^(75){ }^{75} 《大警告》，2.8；另见《明太祖实录》，193/2894，载于张《村长制度》，54。 ^(76){ }^{76} Huidian, 12/77. ^(76){ }^{76} 《会典》，12/77。
77 Dreyer, Early Ming China, 104 and note, 145-7; Albert Chan, The Glory and Fall of the Ming Dynasty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 16. 77 德雷尔，《早期明代中国》，104 及注释，145-147；陈铎，《明朝的辉煌与衰落》（诺曼：俄克拉荷马大学出版社，1982），16。 ^(78){ }^{78} Huidian, 79/457, and Zhuse zhizhang, 699. ^(78){ }^{78} 《会典》，79/457，及《朱色志章》，699。
84 Dreyer，Early Ming China，145－6． 84 Dreyer，《早期明代中国》，145－146。
85 Lin ，＂Administration of Justice，＂221， 249. 85 Lin，《司法管理》，221，249。
86 Chang，＂Village Elder System，＂includes a complete translation of the Pla－ card．I refer to the articles of the Placard as Chang numbers them and use his trans－ lation．Any revisions have been made on the basis of＂Jiaomin Bangwen，＂in Huang Ming zhi shu，1419ff．Farmer，Zhu Yuanzhang，197ff．，also provides a translation． 86 Chang，《村长制度》，包括完整的告示翻译。我引用了 Chang 编号的告示条款并使用了他的翻译。任何修订均基于《黄明志书》中的《教民榜文》，1419 页及以后。Farmer，《朱元璋》，197 页及以后，也提供了翻译。
87 Huidian, 79/457. 87 会典，79/457。
88 Ming huiyao, 242. Extreme acts of filial piety were described in conventional terms as “cutting one’s flesh [to cure a sick parent] to the point of harming one’s life or lying on the ice [to thaw it to catch a fish for a sick parent] to the point of freezing to death.” Huidian, 79/457. 88 明会要，242。极端的孝行用传统术语描述为“割肉疗亲，至伤及性命；卧冰求鲤，至冻死。” 会典，79/457。
89 Chang, “Village Elder System” #19, translation slightly revised. Chang notes that the injunctions were taken from Zhu Xi’s popular maxims, so loyalty to the emperor was not included. Chang, 166. 89 常，“乡长制度”#19，译文略有修订。常指出这些训诫取自朱熹的流行格言，因此未包含对皇帝的忠诚。常，166。 ^(90){ }^{90} Lin, “Administration of Justice,” 104. ^(90){ }^{90} 林，“司法管理”，104。 ^(91){ }^{91} Chang, “Village Elder System,” 56. ^(91){ }^{91} 张，“村长制度，”56。
92 A memorial of 1432 called for the revival of the kiosks and the Community Elder system together. Ming Xuanzong shilu, 86/1990. 92 一份 1432 年的奏折呼吁恢复亭子和社区长老制度。明宣宗实录，86/1990。
^(93){ }^{93} Chün-fang Yü, The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-hung and the Late Ming Synthesis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 144-7; Chün-fang Yü, “Ming Buddhism,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 8, 909. ^(93){ }^{93} 余君芳，《中国佛教的复兴：朱洪与晚明综合》（纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社，1981），144-147；余君芳，“明代佛教，”载《剑桥中国史》第 8 卷，909 页。
94 Timothy Brook, “At the Margin of Public Authority: The Ming State and Buddhism,” in Culture and State in Chinese History: Conventions, Accommodations, and Critiques, ed. Theodore Huters, R. Bin Wong, and Pauline Yu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 164-5, 168. 94 蒂莫西·布鲁克，“公共权威的边缘：明代国家与佛教，”载于《中华历史中的文化与国家：惯例、适应与批评》，编辑：西奥多·胡特斯、黄宾虹、余宝琳（斯坦福：斯坦福大学出版社，1997），164-165，168 页。
95 Yü, Renewal, 166. 95 余，《更新》，166。
96 Yü, “Buddhism,” 904-5. 96 余，“佛教”，904-5。
97 Brook, “Public Authority,” 164. 97 布鲁克，“公共权威”，164。
98 Yü, “Buddhism,” 894. 98 余，“佛教”，894。
99 Yü, Renewal, 157. As Brook points out, ordination was not limited; this was not a “scheme to restrict the size of the clerical population.” Brook, “Public Authority,” 165. 99 于，更新，157。如布鲁克所指出，授职并不限于此；这并不是“限制神职人员数量的计划。”布鲁克，“公共权威”，165。
100 Yü, Renewal, 157, 147; Brook, “Public Authority,” 166-7. 100 于，更新，157，147；布鲁克，“公共权威”，166-7。 _(101){ }_{101} Ming Taizu shilu, 53/1037; Langlois, “Hung-wu Reign,” 122. _(101){ }_{101} 明太祖实录，53/1037；朗卢瓦，“洪武年间”，122。
102 Huang Ming zhaoling, 88ff. Like the destruction of unofficial shrines, that move was avoided as highly unpopular and probably unenforceable. 102 皇明诏令，88 及以下。像摧毁非官方祠庙一样，这一举措因极不受欢迎且可能难以执行而被避免。
103 This interpretation of hungry ghost worship was suggested by Robert Hymes, personal communication. 103 这种对饿鬼崇拜的解释是由罗伯特·海姆斯提出的，个人通讯。
104 Yü, “Buddhism,” 894. 104 余，“佛教”，894。
105 Prefectures were limited to 40 monks, subprefectures to 30 , and counties to 20, although small temples called an (庵) may have been exempted, as they were later. Huidian, 226/1110; Brook, “Public Authority,” 168; Ming Taizu shilu, 86/1537, cited in Yü, Renewal, 145. 105 州府限制为 40 名僧侣，县府限制为 30 名，县限制为 20 名，尽管称为庵的小寺庙可能被豁免，正如后来一样。汇典，226/1110；布鲁克，“公共权威”，168；明太祖实录，86/1537，见余，《更新》，145。
108 Brook, “Public Authority,” 165-6. The last item suggests that the effort to keep the clergy out of official sacrifices had been abandoned. 108 布鲁克，“公共权威”，165-6。最后一项表明，试图将神职人员排除在官方祭祀之外的努力已被放弃。
115 Ibid., 907. 115 同上，907。
116 Huidian, 226/1110; Brook, “Public Authority,” 168. See also Yü, Renewal, 1467. 116 《会典》，226/1110；布鲁克，“公共权力”，168。另见余，《更新》，1467。
117 Yü, “Buddhism,” 911; Brook, “Public Authority,” 169; Timothy Brook, Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, 1993), 93. 117 余，“佛教”，911；布鲁克，“公共权力”，169；蒂莫西·布鲁克，《祈求权力：佛教与晚明士绅社会的形成》（剑桥，马萨诸塞州：东亚研究委员会，1993），93。
118 Yü, “Buddhism,” 907. 118 余，“佛教”，907。
^(119){ }^{119} Yü，Renewal，157．Reducing the number of monks was not necessarily the aim； the regulations of 1394 specifically permitted men to leave their wives to practice religion．Yü，＂Buddhism，＂ 909. ^(119){ }^{119} 余，《更新》，157。减少僧侣人数并非必然目标；1394 年的规定明确允许男子离开妻子修行。余，“佛教”，909。
130 See Brook, “Public Authority,” 168, note 26; Matsumoto Yoshimi, Chûgoku sonraku seido no shiteki kenkyû (Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, 1977); Wang Lanyin, “Mingdai zhi shexue”, 2/86. Moreover, Brook himself points out that the restoration of temples established before 1382 was approved by the Yongle emperor in 1402; so, what the amalgamation accomplished in effect was a return to mid-Hongwu levels, not a drastic cutback (Brook, loc. cit.). See also Sarah Schneewind, “Competing Institutions: Community Schools and ‘Improper Shrines’ in Sixteenth Century China,” Late Imperial China 20.1 (June 1999): 85-106. 130 参见布鲁克，“公共权威”，168 页，注释 26；松本良美，《中国村落制度的史的研究》（东京，岩波书店，1977 年）；王兰音，“明代之社学”，2/86 页。此外，布鲁克本人指出，1402 年永乐皇帝批准恢复 1382 年前建立的寺庙；因此，合并实际上实现的是回归洪武中期水平，而非大幅削减（布鲁克，同上）。另见莎拉·施尼温德，“竞争机构：十六世纪中国的社区学校与‘不当祠堂’”，《晚期帝国中国》20 卷 1 期（1999 年 6 月）：85-106 页。
131 Romeyn Taylor, “Official Altars, Temples and Shrines Mandated for All Counties in Ming and Qing,” T’oung Pao 83 (1997), 93-125. 131 Romeyn Taylor，“明清时期所有县城规定的官方祭坛、庙宇和神龛”，《通报》83（1997），93-125。
132 One scholar comments that in the early Hongwu era “priests were not enjoying very high prestige among the people and, because temples and monasteries in the impoverished parts of the country were very much isolated and there were many mendicant monks, people even despised them, referring to them derisively as k^(')k^{\prime} uangt’ou or the 'bald-headed ones.” Liu Ts’un-yan, “On the Art of Ruling a Big Country -Views of Three Chinese Emperors,” East Asian History 11 (1996): 83. 132 一位学者评论说，在洪武初年，“僧侣在民间并不享有很高的威望，而且由于贫困地区的寺庙和寺院非常孤立，且有许多乞讨的僧人，人们甚至鄙视他们，讥讽地称他们为 k^(')k^{\prime} uangt’ou 或‘秃头的家伙’。”刘存仁，《论治大国之术——三位中国皇帝的观点》，《东亚历史》11（1996）：83。 ^(133){ }^{133} Great Warning, 2.52, translated in Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy, 245-6. ^(133){ }^{133} 《大警告》，2.52，载于 Dardess 著《儒家思想与专制主义》，第 245-246 页。
134 The 1747 Jiangsu Wujiang county gazetteer reports a Hongwu order to destroy ＂improper shrines，temples and hermitages＂（yin ci si guan 滛祠寺觀）－perhaps this is the amalgamation order？－－and put up altars to soil and grain．According to the gazetteer，as the authorities did not dare to destroy the old shrines and temples few new altars were put up． 134 1747 年《江苏吴江县志》记载了洪武年间的一道 "毁祠寺观 "令。据地名词典记载，由于当局不敢毁坏旧的祠庙，所以很少设立新的祭坛。 ^(135){ }^{135} Romeyn Taylor，＂Official Altars，Temples and Shrines，＂117－8． 罗梅因·泰勒，《官方祭坛、庙宇与神龛》，117-118。
136 Dardess，Confucianism and Autocracy， 220. 136 达德斯，《儒家思想与专制主义》，220。
137 Farmer，Zhu Yuanzhang， 10. 137 法默，《朱元璋》，10。
138 Dardess further comments: “The regime explicitly worked to achieve public security as an abstract, collective goal at the same time that, as a matter of principle, it held every single individual under suspicion of subversion, power-seeking, personal profiteering, or some other evil intention. The result could not have been other than the mass miscarriages of justice that convulsed China in the early Ming. The tragedy of T’ai-tsu’s reign was his too thorough agreement with the best high-level professional advice of his time.” Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy, 234, 253. 138 达德斯进一步评论道：“政权明确致力于实现公共安全这一抽象的集体目标，同时原则上将每一个人都视为颠覆、权力寻求、个人牟利或其他恶意意图的嫌疑对象。其结果只能是明初中国发生的大规模冤案。太祖统治的悲剧在于他过于彻底地同意了当时最高层专业建议的观点。” 达德斯，《儒家思想与专制主义》，234，253。
139 Edward Farmer, “Social Order in Early Ming China: Some Norms Codified in the Hung-wu Period,” in Law and State in Traditional East Asia: Six Studies on the Sources of East Asian Law, ed. Brian McKnight (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 22. 139 爱德华·法默，“明初中国的社会秩序：洪武时期的一些规范”，载于布赖恩·麦克奈特主编，《传统东亚的法律与国家：东亚法律渊源的六项研究》（檀香山：夏威夷大学出版社，1987 年），第 22 页。
^(140){ }^{140} Great Warning, 3.34. ^(140){ }^{140} 《大警示》，3.34。 ^(141){ }^{141} Lin, “Administration of Justice,” 116-19, 49-50. ^(141){ }^{141} 林，“司法管理”，116-119，49-50。
142 Lin, “Administration of Justice,” 59, citing Great Warning, 3.1. 142 林，“司法管理”，59，引用《大警示》，3.1。 ^(143){ }^{143} Lin, “Administration of Justice,” 125, citing Great Warning, 2.73 and 3.18. ^(143){ }^{143} 林，“司法管理，”125 页，引用《大警示》，2.73 和 3.18。
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