－Г丁J刂乒 AND
NAASRA「J／E voumel
一個敘事與敘述的卷本

PAUL RICOEUR 保羅·利科

TRANSLATED BY Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer
凱瑟琳·麥克勞林和大衛·佩勞爾翻譯

TJTEAND
NARRATJ/E 時間與敘事

TJMEAND
NARRATJVE vuwe

PAUL RICOEUR
保羅·里科爾的敘事

PAUL RICOEUR

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Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer
凱瑟琳·麥克勞林和大衛·佩勒爾翻譯

Originally published as Temps et Récit,
最初出版為《時間與敘事》，
© Editions du Seuil, 1983
© 塞伊爾出版社，1983 年
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
芝加哥大學出版社，芝加哥 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
芝加哥大學出版社有限公司，倫敦
© 1984 by The University of Chicago
© 1984 芝加哥大學
Paperback edition 1990 平裝版 1990
All rights reserved. Published 1984
版權所有。1984 年出版
Printed in the United States of America
在美國印刷

14 13 12 11 11 12

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
國會圖書館出版資料
Ricoeur, Paul.  里科爾，保羅。
Time and narrative.  時間與敘事。
Translation of: Temps et récit.
翻譯自：時間與敘事。
Includes index.  包含索引。

Narration (Rhetoric) 2. Time in literature.
敘事（修辭）2. 文學中的時間。
Mimesis in literature. 4. Plots (Drama, novel, etc.)
文學中的模仿。4. 情節（戲劇、小說等）
History-Philosophy. I. Title.
歷史-哲學。I. 標題。

PN212.R5213 1984 809’.923 83-17995
PN212.R5213 1984 809'.923 83-17995
ISBN 0-226-71332-6 (v. 1, paper)
ISBN 0-226-71332-6（第 1 卷，平裝）
ISBN 0-226-71334-2 (v. 2, paper)
ISBN 0-226-71334-2（第 2 卷，紙本）
ISBN 0-226-71336-9 (v. 3, paper)
ISBN 0-226-71336-9（第 3 卷，紙本）
(a) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.
(a) 本出版物使用的紙張符合美國國家資訊科學標準中關於印刷圖書館材料紙張永久性的最低要求，ANSI Z39.48-1992。

In Memory of 紀念
Henri-Irénée Marrou 亨利-伊雷內·馬魯

Contents 目錄

Preface … ix 前言 … 第 ix 頁
Part I: The Circle of Narrative
第一部分：敘事圓圈
and Temporality … 3
時間性與暫時性 … 3

The Aporias of the Experience of Time: Book 11 of Augustine’s Confessions … 5
時間體驗的悖論：奧古斯丁《懺悔錄》第 11 卷 … 5
Emplotment: A Reading of Aristotle’s Poetics … 31
情節結構：阿里斯多德《詩學》的解讀 … 31
Time and Narrative: Threefold Mimesis … 52
時間與敘事：三重模擬 … 52
Part II: History and Narrative … 91
第二部分：歷史與敘事 … 91
The Eclipse of Narrative … 95
敘事的蝕沒 … 95
Defenses of Narrative … 121
敘事的辯護 … 121
Historical Intentionality … 175
歷史意向性 … 175
Conclusions … 226  結論 … 226
Notes … 231  注釋 … 231
Index … 269  索引 … 269

Preface 前言

The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative form a pair: published one after the other, these works were conceived together. Although metaphor has traditionally belonged to the theory of “tropes” (or figures of discourse) and narrative to the theory of literary “genres,” the meaning-effects produced by each of them belong to the same basic phenomenon of semantic innovation. In both cases this innovation is produced entirely on the level of discourse, that is, the level of acts of language equal to or greater than the sentence.
隱喻規則與時間和敘事形成一對：一前一後出版，這些作品是共同構思的。儘管隱喻傳統上屬於"修辭"（或話語的修辭手法）理論，而敘事屬於文學"體裁"理論，但它們所產生的意義效果屬於相同的基本語義創新現象。在這兩種情況下，這種創新完全發生在話語層面，即語言行為在句子層面或超越句子層面。

With metaphor, the innovation lies in the producing of a new semantic pertinence by means of an impertinent attribution: “Nature is a temple where living pillars. . . .” The metaphor is alive as long as we can perceive, through the new semantic pertinence-and so to speak in its denseness-the resistance of the words in their ordinary use and therefore their incompatibility at the level of a literal interpretation of the sentence. The displacement in meaning the words undergo in the metaphorical utterance, a displacement to which ancient rhetoric reduced metaphor, is not the whole of metaphor. It is just one means serving the process that takes place on the level of the entire sentence, whose function it is to save the new pertinence of the “odd” predication threatened by the literal incongruity of the attribution.
在隱喻中，創新在於通過不恰當的歸屬產生新的語義相關性："自然是一座有生命的柱廊……"。只要我們能夠通過新的語義相關性——可以說是在其密度中——感知到文字在其普通用法中的阻力，從而在字面解釋的句子層面上感知到其不相容性，隱喻就是活躍的。古代修辭學將隱喻歸結為文字在隱喻表述中意義的位移，但這並不是隱喻的全部。這只是一種服務於整個句子層面的過程的手段，其功能是在歸屬的字面不協調威脅下保存"奇特"謂語的新相關性。

With narrative, the semantic innovation lies in the inventing of another work of synthesis-a plot. By means of the plot, goals, causes, and chance are brought together within the temporal unity of a whole and complete action. It is this synthesis of the heterogeneous that brings narrative close to metaphor. In both cases, the new thing–the as yet unsaid, the unwrittensprings up in language. Here a living metaphor, that is, a new pertinence in the predication, there a feigned plot, that is, a new congruence in the organization of the events.
在敘事中，語義創新在於發明另一種綜合作品——情節。通過情節，目標、原因和機遇被統一在一個完整動作的時間整體中。正是這種異質的綜合使敘事接近隱喻。在這兩種情況下，新事物——尚未說出的、未寫的——在語言中湧現。這裡是一個生動的隱喻，即謂語中的新相關性，那裡是一個虛構的情節，即事件組織中的新一致性。

In both cases the semantic innovation can be carried back to the productive imagination and, more precisely, to the schematism that is its signifying matrix. In new metaphors the birth of a new semantic pertinence marvelously
在這兩種情況下，語義創新都可以追溯到富有成效的想像力，更準確地說，追溯到作為其意義矩陣的圖式。在新的隱喻中，新的語義相關性的誕生非常
demonstrates what an imagination can be that produces things according to rules: “being good at making metaphors,” said Aristotle, “is equivalent to being perceptive of resemblances.” But what is it to be perceptive of resemblance if not to inaugurate the similarity by bringing together terms that at first seem “distant,” then suddenly “close”? It is this change of distance in logical space that is the work of the productive imagination. This consists of schematizing the synthetic operation, of figuring the predicative assimilation from whence results the semantic innovation. The productive imagination at work in the metaphorical process is thus our competence for producing new logical species by predicative assimilation, in spite of the resistance of our current categorizations of language. The plot of a narrative is comparable to this predicative assimilation. It “grasps together” and integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing the intelligible signification attached to the narrative taken as a whole.
展示了一種根據規則產生事物的想像力：亞里士多德說，「善於製造隱喻」等同於「敏銳地察覺相似性」。但是，察覺相似性是什麼，如果不是通過將初看起來「遙遠」的術語，突然變得「接近」而開創相似性？正是這種邏輯空間中距離的變化，是富有成效的想像力的工作。這包括對綜合操作進行圖式化，描繪述語性同化，由此產生語義創新。在隱喻過程中運作的富有成效的想像力，是我們通過述語性同化，克服語言當前分類的阻力，生產新的邏輯類別的能力。敘事情節可以類比於這種述語性同化。它「攫取」並將多個分散的事件整合成一個完整的故事，從而對與整體敘事相關的可理解的意義進行圖式化。

Finally, in both cases the intelligibility brought to light by this process of schematization is to be distinguished from the combinatory rationality put into play by structural semantics, in the case of metaphor, and the legislating rationality at work in narratology and scholarly history, in the case of narrative. This rationality aims instead at simulating, at the higher level of a metalanguage, the kind of comprehension rooted in this schematization.
最後，在這兩種情況下，通過這一圖式化過程所揭示的可理解性，不同於結構語義學在隱喻中運用的組合理性，以及敘事學和學術歷史中運作的立法理性。相反，這種理性旨在在元語言的更高層次上模擬，植根於這種圖式化的理解方式。

As a result, whether it be a question of metaphor or of plot, to explain more is to understand better. Understanding, in the first case, is grasping the dynamism in virtue of which a metaphorical utterance, a new semantic pertinence, emerges from the ruins of the semantic pertinence as it appears in a literal reading of the sentence. Understanding, in the second case, is grasping the operation that unifies into one whole and complete action the miscellany constituted by the circumstances, ends and means, initiatives and interactions, the reversals of fortune, and all the unintended consequences issuing from human action. In large part, the epistemological problem posed by metaphor or by narrative consists in tying the explanation set to work by the semio-linguistic sciences to the prior understanding resulting from an acquired familiarity with the use of language, be it poetic or narrative use. In both cases it is a question of accounting at the same time for the autonomy of these rational disciplines and their direct or indirect, close or distant filiation, beginning from our poetic understanding.
因此，無論是比喻還是情節，解釋得更多就是理解得更好。理解，在第一種情況下，是把握一種動態性，憑藉這種動態性，從字面上閱讀句子時所呈現的語義相關性的廢墟中，產生出比喻性陳述和新的語義相關性。理解，在第二種情況下，是把握將由各種情況、目的和手段、倡議和互動、命運的逆轉以及源於人類行動的所有非意圖後果所構成的雜亂事物統一為一個完整的動作的運作。在很大程度上，比喻或敘事所提出的認識論問題，在於將符號語言學科所運用的解釋與源於對語言使用的熟悉程度的先前理解聯繫起來，無論是詩歌還是敘事使用。在這兩種情況下，都是要同時解釋這些理性學科的自主性及其從我們的詩意理解出發的直接或間接、近或遠的淵源。

The parallel between metaphor and narrative goes even further. The study of living metaphor led me to pose, beyond the problem of structure or sense, that of reference or of its truth claim. In the Rule of Metaphor I defended the thesis that the poetic function of language is not limited to the celebration of language for its own sake, at the expense of the referential function, which is predominant in descriptive language. I maintained that the suspension of this direct, descriptive referential function is only the reverse side, or the negative condition, of a more covered over referential function of discourse, which is,
比喻和敘事之間的平行關係更進一步。對生動比喻的研究使我超越了結構或意義的問題，提出了引用或其真理訴求的問題。在《比喻的規則》中，我捍衛了這樣一個論點：語言的詩意功能不僅限於為語言本身慶祝，而不顧描述性語言中佔主導地位的引用功能。我堅持認為，直接的描述性引用功能的暫停只是一種更為隱蔽的話語引用功能的反面或負面條件，即
so to speak, liberated by the suspending of the descriptive value of statements. In this way poetic discourse brings to language aspects, qualities, and values of reality that lack access to language that is directly descriptive and that can be spoken only by means of the complex interplay between the metaphorical utterance and the rule-governed transgression of the usual meanings of our words. I risked speaking not just of a metaphorical sense but also of a metaphorical reference in talking about this power of the metaphorical utterance to redescribe a reality inaccessible to direct description. I even suggested that “seeing-as,” which sums up the power of metaphor, could be the revealer of a “being-as” on the deepest ontological level.
可以說，通過懸置陳述的描述性價值而得到解放。這樣，詩意的話語以複雜的隱喻表達和對我們話語常用意義的規則性越界的相互作用，將現實的某些方面、品質和價值帶入語言。我冒險不僅談論隱喻意義，而且談論隱喻引用，討論隱喻表達重新描述不可直接描述的現實的能力。我甚至暗示，總結隱喻力量的「如此看」，可以在最深的本體論層面揭示一種「如此存在」。

The mimetic function of narrative poses a problem exactly parallel to the problem of metaphorical reference. It is, in fact, one particular application of the latter to the sphere of human action. Plot, says Aristotle, is the mimésis of an action. When the time comes, I shall distinguish at least three senses of this term mimésis: a reference back to the familiar pre-understanding we have of the order of action; an entry into the realm of poetic composition; and finally a new configuration by means of this poetic refiguring of the pre-understood order of action. It is through this last sense that the mimetic function of the plot rejoins metaphorical reference. And whereas metaphorical redescription reigns in the field of sensory, emotional, aesthetic, and axiological values, which make the world a habitable world, the mimetic function of plots takes place by preference in the field of action and of its temporal values.
敘事的模仿功能提出了一個與隱喻引用完全相同的問題。事實上，它是後者在人類行動領域的一個特定應用。亞里士多德說，情節是行動的模仿。當時機成熟時，我將至少區分這個詞模仿的三個意義：追溯到我們對行動秩序的熟悉預理解；進入詩意創作的領域；最後，通過這種詩意重塑對預先理解的行動秩序進行新的配置。正是通過這最後一個意義，情節的模仿功能重新結合了隱喻引用。而隱喻重新描述在感官、情感、美學和價值的領域中佔據主導，使世界成為一個可居住的世界，情節的模仿功能則優先在行動及其時間價值的領域中進行。

It is this latter feature that I dwell on in this work. I see in the plots we invent the privileged means by which we re-configure our confused, unformed, and at the limit mute temporal experience. “What, then, is time?” asks Augustine. “I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.” In the capacity of poetic composition to re-figure this temporal experience, which is prey to the aporias of philosophical speculation, resides the referential function of the plot.
我在這部作品中特別關注的正是這一後者特徵。我認為在我們發明的情節中，我們重新配置我們混亂、未成形、在極限中甚至是啞默的時間經驗的特權方式。奧古斯丁問道："那麼，什麼是時間？"我很清楚它是什麼，只要沒人問我；但如果被問及並試圖解釋，我就會困惑。詩歌創作重新塑造這種時間經驗的能力，在這個容易陷入哲學思辨困境的領域中，蘊含著情節的指涉功能。

The frontier between these two functions is unstable. In the first place, the plots that configure and transfigure the practical field encompass not just acting but also suffering, hence characters as agents and as victims. Lyric poetry thereby skirts dramatic poetry. Furthermore, the circumstances that, as the word indicates, encircle action, and the unintended consequences that make up one part of the tragic aspect of action, also consist of a dimension of passivity accessible through poetic discourse, in particular in the modes of elegy and of lamentation. In this way, metaphorical redescription and mimesis are closely bound up with each other, to the point that we can exchange the two vocabularies and speak of the mimetic value of poetic discourse and the redescriptive power of narrative fiction.
這兩種功能之間的界限是不穩定的。首先，配置和轉化實踐領域的情節不僅包括行動，還包括遭受，因此角色既是代理者又是受害者。抒情詩因此接近戲劇詩。此外，正如這個詞所指示的，環繞著行動的情境，以及構成行動悲劇方面的意外後果，也包含了一個可以通過詩歌話語接觸的被動維度，特別是在哀歌和輓歌的模式中。這樣，隱喻重描和模仿密切相連，以至於我們可以交換這兩種詞彙，並談論詩歌話語的模仿價值和敘事小說的重描力量。

What unfolds, then, is one vast poetic sphere that includes metaphorical utterance and narrative discourse.
因此，展開的是一個包含隱喻話語和敘事話語的龐大詩歌領域。

The core of this book was first formulated as the Brick Lectures, which I gave at the University of Missouri at Columbia, Missouri, in 1978. (The original French version of these lectures is printed as the first three chapters of

L a

Narrativité [Paris: Ed. du C.N.R.S., 1980].) Joined to this is my Zaharoff Lecture of 1978-79, given at the Taylor Institution, St. Giles College, Oxford: The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Various parts of the work were also developed schematically in two seminars given at the University of Toronto, when I held the Northrop Frye Chair in the Program in Comparative Literature. And several outlines of the whole project were the subject of my own seminars at the Centre d’Etudes Phénoménologiques et Herméneutiques in Paris and at the University of Chicago.
這本書的核心最初是作為在 1978 年密蘇里大學哥倫比亞分校所作的磚塊講座而形成的。（這些講座的原始法語版本印在《敘事性》[巴黎：國家科學研究中心出版社，1980 年]的前三章中。）與此同時，還有我在 1978-79 年於牛津聖吉爾斯學院泰勒機構所作的扎哈羅夫講座：法國史學對歷史理論的貢獻（牛津：克拉倫登出版社，1980 年）。這項工作的各個部分也在我擔任多倫多大學比較文學課程諾斯羅普·弗萊講座期間的兩次研討會上作了概略性的發展。此外，整個項目的幾個大綱是我在巴黎現象學與解釋學研究中心和芝加哥大學自己的研討會上的主題。

I wish to thank Professors Joseph Bien and Noble Cunningham of the University of Missouri at Columbia, G. P. V. Collyer of the Taylor Institution, and Northrop Frye and Mario Valdès of the University of Toronto for their kind invitations, as well as my colleagues and students at the University of Chicago for their gracious reception of me and this work, their inspiration, and their helpful criticism. My thanks, too, to the National Humanities Center for the opportunity to pursue my work there in 1979-80 and again in 1980-81. I must particularly acknowledge all the participants in my seminar at the Centre d’Etudes Phénoménologiques et Herméneutiques in Paris, who accompanied the whole course of research behind this work and who contributed to our collective volume, La Narrativité.
我要感謝密蘇里大學哥倫比亞分校的約瑟夫·比恩和諾布爾·坎寧安教授，泰勒機構的 G. P. V. 科利爾，以及多倫多大學的諾斯羅普·弗萊和馬里奧·瓦爾德斯，感謝他們的友好邀請，同時也感謝芝加哥大學的同事和學生對我和這項工作的熱情接待、靈感和有益的批評。我還要感謝國家人文中心，感謝他們在 1979-80 年和 1980-81 年給我機會在那裡進行研究。我尤其要感謝巴黎現象學與解釋學研究中心研討會的所有參與者，他們陪伴了這項工作背後的整個研究過程，並為我們的集體著作《敘事性》做出了貢獻。

I owe a particular debt of thanks to my two translators, Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. They have taken the original French text and have truly rethought and rewritten it in English. This arduous labor has strengthened our ties of friendship through the bond of our common work.
我特別要感謝我的兩位譯者凱思林·麥克勞林和大衛·佩勞爾。他們已經取得了原始的法語文本，並真正重新思考和重寫了英文版本。這艱鉅的勞動通過我們共同工作的紐帶，加深了我們的友誼。

Part 1 第 1 部分
The Circle of 敘事的圓圈
Narrative and Temporality
敘事性與時間性

The first part of this work is concerned with bringing to light the major presuppositions which in the following sections will be submitted to the scrutiny of the various disciplines dealing with either historical or fictional narrative. These presuppositions have a common core. Whether it is a question of affirming the structural identity of historiography, including the philosophy of history, and fictional narrative, as I shall attempt to prove in Part II of this volume and in volume 2 , or whether it is a matter of affirming the deep kinship between the truth claims of these two narrative modes, as I shall do in volume 2 , one presupposition commands all the others, namely, that what is ultimately at stake in the case of the structural identity of the narrative function as well as in that of the truth claim of every narrative work, is the temporal character of human experience. The world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world. Or, as will often be repeated in the course of this study: time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience. It is with this major presupposition that Part I of this work is concerned.
本著作的第一部分致力於揭示主要的預設，這些預設將在隨後的章節中接受各學科對歷史或虛構敘事的審查。這些預設有一個共同的核心。無論是肯定史學（包括歷史哲學）與虛構敘事的結構同一性，正如我將在本卷第二部分和第二卷中證明的，還是肯定這兩種敘事模式的真理聲索之間深刻的親和性，正如我將在第二卷中闡述的，一個預設主導著所有其他預設，即最終關鍵在於敘事功能的結構同一性以及每一部敘事作品的真理聲索，都是人類經驗的時間性特徵。每一部敘事作品展開的世界始終是一個時間的世界。或者，正如本研究中將反覆強調的：時間成為人類時間，是因為它以敘事的方式組織；敘事反過來又通過描繪時間經驗的特徵而具有意義。第一部分正是關注此一主要預設。

This thesis is undeniably circular. But such is the case, after all, in every hermeneutical assertion. Part I will examine this objection. In chapter 3, I shall strive to demonstrate that the circle of narrativity and temporality is not a vicious but a healthy circle, whose two halves mutually reinforce one another. To pave the way for this discussion, I thought it might be well to provide two independent historical introductions to the thesis of the reciprocity between narrativity and temporality. The first (chapter 1) deals with the theory of time in Augustine, the second (chapter 2) with the theory of plot in Aristotle.
這個論點無疑是循環的。然而，畢竟在每一個解釋學斷言中都是如此。第一部分將審視這一異議。在第三章中，我將努力證明敘事性和時間性的循環並非惡性循環，而是一個相互增強的良性循環。為鋪平這一討論的道路，我認為提供兩個獨立的歷史引言來闡述敘事性和時間性的互惠性可能會有所裨益。第一個（第一章）討論奧古斯丁的時間理論，第二個（第二章）討論亞里士多德的情節理論。

There is a twofold justification for the choice of these two authors.
選擇這兩位作者有兩方面的理由。
First, they offer us two independent ways of entering into the circle that constitutes our problem: one from the side of the paradoxes of time, the other from the side of the intelligible organization of a narrative. Their indepen-
首先，他們為我們提供了進入構成我們問題的圈子的兩種獨立方式：一種是從時間的悖論方面，另一種是從敘事的可理解組織方面。他們的獨立
dence does not lie solely in the fact that Augustine’s Confessions and Aristotle’s Poetics belong to two profoundly different cultural universes separated by several centuries and involving problematics that are not identical. What is even more important for my purpose is that the first author inquires into the nature of time without any apparent concern for grounding his inquiry on the narrative structure of the spiritual autobiography developed in the first nine books of the Confessions. And the second constructs his theory of dramatic plot without paying any attention to the temporal implications of his analysis, leaving to the Physics the problem of how to go about analyzing time. It is in this precise sense that the Confessions and the Poetics offer two points of access, independent of one another, to our circular problem.
這種差異並不僅僅在於奧古斯丁的《懺悔錄》和亞里士多德的《詩學》屬於相隔幾個世紀、涉及非完全相同問題的兩個截然不同的文化宇宙。對我的目的更為重要的是，第一位作者探究時間的本質，似乎並不關心將其探索建立在《懺悔錄》前九卷所發展的靈性自傳敘事結構之上。而第二位作者在建構戲劇情節理論時，並未對其分析的時間性意涵給予任何注意，將時間分析的問題留給了《物理學》。正是在這個精確意義上，《懺悔錄》和《詩學》提供了彼此獨立的兩個進入我們循環問題的途徑。

However, the independence of these two analyses is not what principally holds our attention. They do not simply converge upon the same interrogation after starting from two radically different philosophical horizons: each engenders the inverted image of the other. The Augustinian analysis gives a representation of time in which discordance never ceases to belie the desire for that concordance that forms the very essence of the animus. The Aristotelian analysis, on the other hand, establishes the dominance of concordance over discordance in the configuration of the plot. It is this inverse relationship between concordance and discordance that seemed to me to constitute the major interest of a confrontation between the Confessions and the Poetics-a confrontation that may seem all the more incongruous in that it goes from Augustine to Aristotle, contrary to the chronological order. But I thought that the meeting of the Confessions and the Poetics in the mind of one and the same reader would be all the more dramatic if it were to move from the work in which the perplexity created by the paradox of time predominates toward the work in which, on the contrary, confidence reigns in the power of the poet and the poem to make order triumph over disorder.
然而，這兩種分析的獨立性並非主要吸引我們的注意力。它們不僅僅是從兩個徹底不同的哲學視野出發，最終匯聚於同一個探詢：每一種分析都會生成另一種的顛倒映像。奧古斯丁的分析給出了一種時間表現，在這種表現中，不協調從未停止背離那種構成靈魂本質的和諧渴望。另一方面，亞里士多德的分析確立了和諧在情節配置中對不協調的主導地位。正是這種和諧與不協調之間的逆向關係，似乎構成了《懺悔錄》與《詩學》對峙的主要興趣所在——這種對峙看似荒謬，因為它違背了時間順序，從奧古斯丁到亞里士多德。但我認為，如果從充滿時間悖論困惑的作品，轉向另一部對詩人和詩歌使秩序戰勝混亂的力量充滿信心的作品，《懺悔錄》和《詩學》在同一讀者心中的相遇將更加戲劇性。

It is in chapter 3 of Part I that the reader will find the melodic line of which the rest of the work forms the development and sometimes the counterpoint. There I shall consider in and for itself-without any further concern for historical exegesis - the inverted interplay of concordance and discordance, bequeathed to us by the sovereign analyses of time by Augustine and of plot by Aristotle.

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在第一部分的第 3 章中，讀者將找到這部作品其餘部分的主旋律和有時的對比旋律。在那裡，我將不再考慮歷史解讀，而是純粹就其本身審視奧古斯丁對時間和亞里士多德對情節的至高無上的分析所遺留給我們的和諧與不協調的顛倒互動。

The Aporias of the Experience of Time Book II of Augustine's Confessions
時間經驗的困境：奧古斯丁《懺悔錄》第二卷

The major antithesis around which my reflection will revolve finds its sharpest expression toward the end of Book 11 of Augustine’s Confessions.

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Two features of the human soul are set in opposition to one another, features which the author, with his marked taste for sonorous antithesis, coins intentio and distentio animi. It is this contrast that I shall later compare with that of muthos and peripeteia in Aristotle.
我的思考將圍繞的主要對立面在奧古斯丁《懺悔錄》第 11 卷結尾處找到最尖銳的表達。

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人類靈魂的兩個特徵相互對立，作者用他標誌性的喜歡華麗對比的風格，特意創造了 intentio 和 distentio animi 這兩個詞。稍後我將把這種對比與亞里士多德的 muthos 和 peripeteia 進行比較。

Two prior remarks have to be made. First, I begin my reading of Book 11 of the Confessions at chapter 14:17 with the question: “What, then, is time?” I am not unaware that the analysis of time is set within a meditation on the relations between eternity and time, inspired by the first verse of Genesis, in principio fecit Deus. . . .

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In this sense, to isolate the analysis of time from this meditation is to do violence to the text, in a way that is not wholly justified by my intention to situate within the same sphere of reflection the Augustinian antithesis between intentio and distentio and the Aristotelian antithesis between muthos and peripeteia. Nevertheless, a certain justification can be found for this violence in Augustine’s own reasoning, which, when it is concerned with time, no longer refers to eternity except to more strongly emphasize the ontological deficiency characteristic of human time and to wrestle directly with the aporias afflicting the conception of time as such. In order to right somewhat this wrong done to Augustine’s text, I shall reintroduce the meditation on eternity at a later stage in the analysis with the intention of seeking in it an intensification of the experience of time.
首先需要做兩個預備性備注。第一，我從《懺悔錄》第 11 卷 14:17 章開始閱讀，提出問題："那麼，時間是什麼？"我清楚地知道，時間分析是建立在對永恆與時間關係的沉思基礎上的，靈感來自創世記的第一節經文，"起初，上帝創造……"

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在這個意義上，將時間分析與這種沉思隔離開來，是對文本的暴力對待，這種做法並不完全符合我意圖將奧古斯丁在 intentio 和 distentio 之間的對立，以及亞里士多德在 muthos 和 peripeteia 之間的對立置於同一反思領域的目的。然而，在奧古斯丁自身的推理中，可以找到某種對這種暴力的辯護，當他談論時間時，除了更強烈地強調人類時間的本體論缺陷外，幾乎不再提及永恆，並直接與困擾時間概念的邏輯困難搏鬥。為了稍微彌補對奧古斯丁文本的這種傷害，我將在分析的後期重新引入對永恆的沉思，意圖在其中尋求對時間體驗的深化。

Second, isolated from the meditation on eternity, due to the artifice in method to which I have just admitted, the Augustinian analysis of time offers a highly interrogative and even aporetical character which none of the ancient theories of time, from Plato to Plotinus, had carried to such a degree of acuteness. Not only does Augustine, like Aristotle, always proceed on the basis of aporias handed down by the tradition, but the resolution of each aporia gives rise to new difficulties which never cease to spur on his inquiry. This style,
其次，由於我剛剛承認的方法中的人為性，與永恆的沉思隔絕，奧古斯丁對時間的分析呈現出高度的質疑和甚至是難解的特徵，這是從柏拉圖到普羅提諾的所有古代時間理論都未曾達到的程度。奧古斯丁不僅像亞里士多德一樣，總是基於傳統所傳承的困難進行思考，而且每一個困難的解決都會引發新的難題，這些難題不斷推動他的探索。
where every advance in thinking gives rise to a new difficulty, places Augustine by turns in the camp of the skeptics, who do not know, and in that of the Platonists and Neoplatonists, who do know. Augustine is seeking (the verb quaerere, we shall see, appears repeatedly throughout the text). Perhaps one must go so far as to say that what is called the Augustinian thesis on time, and which I intentionally term a psychological thesis in order to distinguish it from that of Aristotle and even from that of Plotinus, is itself more aporetical than Augustine would admit. This, in any case, is what I shall attempt to show.
在這種思考的每一步進展都會引發新的困難的風格中，奧古斯丁時而處於懷疑論者的營地（他們不知道），時而處於柏拉圖主義者和新柏拉圖主義者的營地（他們知道）。奧古斯丁正在尋求（動詞"quaerere"，我們將看到，在文本中反覆出現）。也許必須進一步說，所謂的奧古斯丁關於時間的論點，我特意稱之為心理學論點，以區別於亞里士多德甚至普羅提諾的論點，本身比奧古斯丁承認的更加難解。無論如何，這是我將試圖證明的。

These two initial remarks have to be joined together. Inserting an analysis of time within a meditation on eternity gives the Augustinian search the peculiar tone of a “lamentation” full of hope, something which disappears in an analysis that isolates what is properly speaking the argument on time. But it is precisely in separating the analysis of time from its backdrop of eternity that its aporetical features can be brought out. Of course, this aporetical mode differs from that of the skeptics in that it does not disallow some sort of firm certitude. But it also differs from that of the Neoplatonists in that the assertive core can never be apprehended simply in itself outside of the aporias it engenders.

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這兩個初步的評論必須結合起來。將時間分析插入永恆沉思的背景中，賦予奧古斯丁的探索一種充滿希望的"哀嘆"特殊基調，這在一個孤立地討論時間論點的分析中消失了。但正是通過將時間分析從永恆的背景中分離出來，其難解的特徵才能被凸顯。當然，這種難解的模式不同於懷疑論者的模式，因為它並不否定某種堅定的確定性。但它也不同於新柏拉圖主義者的模式，因為其斷言的核心永遠無法純粹地脫離其所產生的難題而被把握。

This aporetical character of the pure reflection on time is of the utmost importance for all that follows in the present investigation. And this is so in two respects.
這種對時間純粹反思的阿波瑞特性質對於接下來的調查具有最重要的意義。這在兩個方面尤為重要。

First, it must be admitted that in Augustine there is no pure phenomenology of time. Perhaps there never will be one.

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Hence, the Augustinian “theory” of time is inseparable from the argumentative operation by which this thinker chops off, one after the other, the continually self-regenerating heads of the hydra of skepticism. As a result, there is no description without a discussion. This is why it is extremely difficult-and perhaps impossible-to isolate a phenomenological core from the mass of argumentation. The “psychological solution” attributed to Augustine is perhaps neither a “psychology” which could be isolated from the rhetoric of argumentation nor even a “solution” which could be removed once and for all from the aporetical domain.
首先，必須承認奧古斯丁對時間沒有純粹的現象學。或許永遠也不會有。因此，奧古斯丁的「時間理論」不可分割於這位思想家用來逐一斬斷懷疑論反覆生出的水蛇之頭的論證操作。因此，沒有描述不伴隨討論。這就是為什麼從論證的大量材料中隔離出一個現象學核心是極其困難的，甚至可能是不可能的。歸因於奧古斯丁的「心理學解決方案」可能既不是一種可以從論證修辭中分離出來的「心理學」，也不是一種可以徹底從阿波瑞特領域中移除的「解決方案」。

This aporetical style, in addition, takes on a special significance in the overall strategy of the present work. A constant thesis of this book will be that speculation on time is an inconclusive rumination to which narrative activity alone can respond. Not that this activity solves the aporias through substitution. If it does resolve them, it is in a poetical and not a theoretical sense of the word. Emplotment, I shall say below, replies to the speculative aporia with a poetic making of something capable, certainly, of clarifying the aporia (this will be the primary sense of Aristotelian catharsis), but not of resolving it theoretically. In one sense Augustine himself moves toward a resolution of this sort. The fusion of argument and hymn in Part I of Book 11-which I am
此外，這種阿波瑞特風格在本書的整體策略中具有特殊意義。本書的一個恆常論點是，對時間的思辯是一種不確定的沉思，唯有敘事活動才能回應。並非這種活動通過替代來解決阿波瑞特。如果它真的解決了，那是在詩性而非理論性的意義上。我將在下文說明，敘事情節以詩性的方式製造某種能夠澄清阿波瑞特的東西（這將是亞里士多德式悲劇淨化的首要意義），但不能從理論上解決它。從某種意義上說，奧古斯丁自己正朝著這種解決方向邁進。第 11 卷第 I 部分中論證與頌歌的融合
at first going to bracket-already leads us to understand that a poetical transfiguration alone, not only of the solution but of the question itself, will free the aporia from the meaninglessness it skirts.
我最初將擱置的部分——已經使我們理解，唯有詩性的蛻變，不僅是解決方案，甚至是問題本身，才能使阿波瑞特擺脫其徘徊的無意義。

The Aporia of the Being and the Nonbeing of Time
時間的存在與非存在之邏輯困境

The notion of distentio animi, coupled with that of intentio, is only slowly and painfully sifted out from the major aporia with which Augustine is struggling, that of the measurement of time. This aporia itself, however, is inscribed within the circle of an aporia that is even more fundamental, that of the being or the nonbeing of time. For what can be measured is only what, in some way, exists. We may deplore the fact if we like, but the phenomenology of time emerges out of an ontological question: quid est enim tempus? (“What, then, is time?” [11 14:17].). As soon as this question is posed, all the ancient difficulties regarding the being and the nonbeing of time surge forth. But it is noteworthy that, from the start, Augustine’s inquisitive style imposes itself. On the one hand, the skeptical argument leans toward nonbeing, while on the other hand a guarded confidence in the everyday use of language forces us to say that, in some way, which we do not yet know how to account for, time exists. The skeptical argument is well-known: time has no being since the future is not yet, the past is no longer, and the present does not remain. And yet we do speak of time as having being. We say that things to come will be, that things past were, and that things present are passing away. Even passing away is not nothing. It is remarkable that it is language usage that provisionally provides the resistance to the thesis of nonbeing. We speak of time and we speak meaningfully about it, and this shores up an assertion about the being of time. “We certainly understand what is meant by the word both when we use it ourselves and when we hear it used by others” (14:15).

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被意念伸展與意圖這個概念，從奧古斯丁所掙扎的主要邏輯困境中，即時間測量的困境，只是緩慢而痛苦地篩選出來。然而，這個邏輯困境本身又銘刻於一個更根本的邏輯困境之中，即時間的存在或非存在。因為只有存在的事物，才可以被測量。我們可能會為此感到遺憾，但時間的現象學源於本體論的問題：究竟甚麼是時間？一旦提出這個問題，所有關於時間存在與非存在的古老困難便湧現出來。值得注意的是，奧古斯丁獨特的探詢風格從一開始就顯現出來。一方面，懷疑論的論點傾向於非存在，而另一方面，對日常語言使用的謹慎信心又迫使我們以某種尚未解釋的方式說，時間存在。這個懷疑論的論點是眾所周知的：時間沒有存在，因為未來尚未到來，過去已不復存，現在也無法停留。然而，我們仍然談論時間好像它是存在的。我們說將來的事情將會發生，過去的事情曾經發生，而現在的事情正在消逝。即使消逝也不是虛無。值得注意的是，語言使用暫時性地抵抗了非存在的論點。我們談論時間，並且有意義地談論它，這支撐了關於時間存在的斷言。「當我們自己使用這個詞，或聽到別人使用時，我們確實理解它的意義。」

However, if it is true that we speak of time in a meaningful way and in positive terms (will be, was, is), our powerlessness to explain how this comes about arises precisely from this certitude. Talk about time certainly resists the skeptical argument, but language is itself put into question by the gap between the “that” and the “how.” We know by heart the cry uttered by Augustine on the threshold of his meditation: “What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled” (14:17). In this way the ontological paradox opposes language not only to the skeptical argument but to itself. How can the positive quality of the verbs “to have taken place,” “to occur,” “to be,” be reconciled with the negativity of the adverbs “no longer,” “not yet,” “not always”? The question is thus narrowed down. How can time exist if the past is no longer, if the future is not yet, and if the present is not always?
然而，如果我們以有意義且積極的詞語（將會是，曾經是，是）談論時間，我們無力解釋這一切如何發生，正是源於這種確定性。關於時間的談論確實抵制了懷疑論的論點，但語言本身卻因"那個"和"如何"之間的差距而受到質疑。我們牢記奧古斯丁在沉思門檻上發出的呼喊："那麼，什麼是時間？只要沒人問我，我就很清楚它是什麼；但如果被問及它是什麼並試圖解釋，我就會感到困惑"（14:17）。這樣，本體論的悖論不僅使語言與懷疑論論點對立，還使語言與自身對立。動詞"已發生"、"發生"、"存在"的積極品質如何能與副詞"不再"、"尚未"、"並非總是"的否定性相協調？問題因此被縮小。如果過去不再存在，未來尚未到來，現在也並非永遠存在，時間又如何能存在？

Onto this initial paradox is grafted the central paradox from which the
在這個最初的悖論之上，嫁接上中心悖論
theme of distension will emerge. How can we measure that which does not exist? The paradox of measurement is a direct result of the paradox of the being and nonbeing of time. Here again language is a relatively sure guide. We speak of a long time and a short time and in a certain way we observe its length and take its measurement (cf. the aside in

15 : 19

, where the soul addresses itself: “for we are gifted with the ability to feel and measure intervals [moras] of time. What is the answer to be?”). What is more, it is only of the past and of the future that we say that they are long or short. In anticipation of the “solution” of the aporia, it is indeed of the future that we say that it shortens and of the past that it lengthens. But language is limited to attesting to the fact of measuring. The how, once again, eludes him: “But how can anything which does not exist be either long or short [sed quo pacto]?” (

15 : 18

).
脹大的主題將會浮現。我們如何測量不存在的事物？測量的悖論是存在與不存在的時間悖論的直接結果。再次，語言是一個相對可靠的指南。我們說一段漫長的時間和短暫的時間，在某種程度上，我們觀察其長度並進行測量（參見

15 : 19

中的旁白，靈魂自問：「因為我們有能力感受和測量時間的間隔」）。更重要的是，只有過去和未來，我們才說它們是長或短。在預期「解決」難題之前，確實是未來縮短，過去延長。但語言僅限於證明測量的事實。至於如何測量，再次迴避：「但是如何能夠測量不存在的事物？」（

15 : 18

）

Augustine will at first appear to turn his back on this certainty that it is the past and the future that we measure. Later, by placing the past and the future within the present, by bringing in memory and expectation, he will be able to rescue this initial certainty from its apparent disaster by transferring onto expectation and onto memory the idea of a long future and a long past. But this certainty of language, of experience, and of action will only be recovered after it has been lost and profoundly transformed. In this regard, it is a feature of the Augustinian quest that the final response is anticipated several times in various ways that must first be submitted to criticism before their true meaning emerges.

^{7}

Indeed Augustine seems first to refuse a certitude based upon too weak an argument: “My Lord, my Light, does not your truth make us look foolish in this case too?”

(15 : 18) .^{8} He

therefore turns first to the present. Was it not when it “was still present” that the past was long? In this question, too, something of the final response is anticipated since memory and expectation will appear as modalities of the present. But at this stage in the argument the present is still opposed to the past and the future. The idea of a threefold present has not yet dawned. This is why the solution based on the present alone has to collapse. The failure of this solution results from a refining of the notion of the present, which is no longer characterized solely by that which does not remain but by that which has no extension.
奧古斯丁起初似乎要背棄這個確定性，即我們是測量過去和未來。後來，通過將過去和未來置於現在，藉助記憶和期待，他將能夠從表面的災難中拯救這個最初的確定性，將長遠的未來和長遠的過去的概念轉移到期待和記憶上。但是，這種語言、經驗和行動的確定性只有在經歷了喪失和深刻轉變之後才能恢復。在這方面，奧古斯丁的探索的特點是最終的回應已經多次以各種方式被預期，這些方式必須首先接受批評，然後其真正的意義才會浮現。確實，奧古斯丁似乎首先拒絕一個基於過於薄弱論點的確定性："我的主啊，我的光啊，您的真理不是使我們在這種情況下也顯得愚蠢嗎？"因此，他首先轉向現在。當它"仍然存在"的時候，過去豈不是很長？在這個問題中，最終的回應也已經預示，因為記憶和期待將作為現在的模態出現。但在論證的這個階段，現在仍然與過去和未來相對立。三重現在的概念尚未浮現。這就是為什麼僅基於現在的解決方案必須崩潰。這個解決方案的失敗源於對現在概念的精煉，現在不再僅僅以不停留的事物為特徵，而是以沒有延展性的事物為特徵。

This refinement, which carries the paradox to its height, is related to a well-known skeptical argument: can a hundred years be present at once (15:19)? (The argument, as we see, is directed solely at attributing length to the present.) Only the current year is present; and in the year, the month; and in the month, the day; and in the day, the hour: “Even that one hour consists of minutes which are continually passing. The minutes which have gone by are past and any part of the hour which remains is future”

(15 : 20) .^{9}

這種 refinement，它將悖論推向極致，與一個眾所周知的懷疑論論點有關：一百年可以同時存在嗎（15:19）？（這個論點，正如我們所見，純粹是針對賦予當下長度。）只有當前的年份是現在的；在這一年中，是月；在月中，是日；在日中，是小時："即使那一小時也由不斷流逝的分鐘組成。已經過去的分鐘是過去的，而這一小時剩餘的部分是未來的"

He must therefore conclude along with the skeptics: “In fact the only time [quid . . . temporis] that can be called present is an instant, if we can conceive [intelligitur] of such, that cannot be divided even into the most minute fractions . . . . when it is present it has no duration [spatium]” (ibid.).

^{10}

At a
因此他必須與懷疑論者一起得出結論："事實上，唯一可以稱為現在的時間（quid . . . temporis）是一個瞬間，如果我們可以想像（intelligitur）的話，這個瞬間甚至不能被分割成最微小的部分……當它存在時，它沒有持續時間（spatium）"（同上）。在稍後的
later stage of this discussion the definition of the present will be further narrowed down to the idea of the pointlike instant. Augustine first gives a dramatic turn to the merciless conclusion of the argumentative machine: “As we have already seen quite clearly, the present cannot possibly have duration” (ibid.).
討論階段，現在的定義將被進一步縮小到點狀瞬間的概念。奧古斯丁首先給出了論證機器殘酷結論的戲劇性轉折："正如我們已經清楚看到的，現在不可能有持續時間"（同上）。

What is it, then, that holds firm against the onslaughts of skepticism? As always, it is experience, articulated by language and enlightened by the intelligence: “Nevertheless, O Lord, we are aware of [sentimus] periods of time. We compare [comparamus] them with one another and say that some are longer and others shorter. We even calculate [metimur] how much longer or shorter one period is than another” (16:21). The protest conveyed by sentimus, comparamus, and metimur is that of our sensory, intellectual, and pragmatic activities in relation to the measuring of time. However, this obstinacy of what must indeed be termed experience does not take us any farther as concerns the question of “how.” False certainties are still mingled with genuine evidence.
那麼，是什麼東西堅定地抵擋住懷疑論的攻擊？一如既往，是經驗，由語言闡述並由智慧啟迪："然而，主啊，我們意識到（sentimus）時間的 periods。我們相互比較（comparamus）它們，並說有些更長，有些更短。我們甚至計算（metimur）一個 period 比另一個長或短多少"（16:21）。由 sentimus、comparamus 和 metimur 傳達的抗議，是我們在時間測量方面的感官、智力和實踐活動。然而，這種必須稱為經驗的固執，在"如何"的問題上並未帶我們更進一步。虛假的確定性仍然與真正的證據混雜在一起。

We may believe we take a decisive step forward by substituting for the notion of the present that of passing, of transition, following in the wake of the earlier statement: “If we measure them by our own awareness of time, we must do so while it is passing [praetereuntia]”(ibid.). This speculative formula seems to correspond to our practical certainty. It too, however, will have to be submitted to criticism before returning, precisely, as distentio, thanks to the dialectic of the threefold present. So long as we have not formed the idea of the distended relation between expectation, memory, and attention, we do not understand what we are actually saying when we repeat for the second time: “The conclusion is that we can be aware of time and measure it only while it is passing” (ibid.). The formula is at once an anticipation of the solution and a temporary impasse. It is thus not by chance that Augustine stops just when he seems most certain: “These are tentative theories, Father, not downright assertions”

(17 : 22) .^{11}

What is more, it is not due to the impetus of this passing idea that he continues to pursue his search, but by a return to the conclusion of the skeptical argument, “the present cannot possibly have duration.” For, in order to pave the way for the idea that what we measure is indeed the future, understood later as expectation, and the past, understood as memory, a case must be made for the being of the past and the future which had been too quickly denied, but it must be made in a way that we are not yet capable of articulating.

^{12}

我們可能相信，藉由替代現在的概念為流逝、轉換，追隨早期陳述："如果我們用自己對時間的意識來衡量它們，我們必須在它流逝時這樣做[praetereuntia]"（同上）。這個推測性的公式似乎符合我們的實踐確定性。然而，它也必須在返回時接受批評，正如延展性，感謝三重現在的辯證法。只要我們尚未形成對期望、記憶和注意力之間延展關係的想法，我們就不理解當我們第二次重複時實際在說什麼："結論是我們只能在時間流逝時意識到它並測量它"（同上）。這個公式同時是解決方案的預期和暫時的困境。因此，奧古斯丁在看似最確定的時候停下來並非偶然："這些是嘗試性的理論，神父，不是斷言"

(17 : 22) .^{11}

更重要的是，他繼續追尋並非由於這個流逝的想法的衝動，而是通過返回懷疑論論點的結論，"現在不可能有持續性。"因為，為了為我們所測量的東西確實是後來被理解為期望的未來，以及被理解為記憶的過去鋪平道路，必須為過去和未來的存在作出論證，這個存在曾被過於草率地否定，但必須以我們尚未能表達的方式進行。

^{12}

In the name of what can the past and the future be accorded the right to exist in some way or other? Once again, in the name of what we say and do with regard to them. What do we say and do in this respect? We recount things which we hold as true and we predict events which occur as we foresaw them.

^{13}

It is therefore still language, along with the experience and the action articulated by language, that holds firm in the face of the skeptics’ assault. To
以何種名義，過去和未來可以以某種方式存在？再次強調，以我們對它們所說和所做的名義。我們在這方面說什麼和做什麼？我們敘述我們認為真實的事情，並預測我們預見的事件。正是語言本身，連同語言所表達的經驗和行動，在面對懷疑論者的攻擊時仍堅定不移。
predict is to fore-see, and to recount is to “discern [cernere] by the mind.”

D e

Trinitate (XV 12:21) speaks in this sense of the twofold “testimony” (Meijering, p. 67) of history and of prediction. It is therefore in spite of the skeptical argument that Augustine concludes: “Therefore both the past and the future do exist [sunt ergo]” (17:22).
預測是預先看見，敘述是「用心靈辨別」。《論三位一體》（XV 12:21）在這種意義上談論歷史和預測的雙重「見證」。因此，儘管有懷疑論的論點，奧古斯丁仍得出結論：「因此，過去和未來確實存在」（17:22）。

This declaration is not the mere repetition of the affirmation that was rejected in the first pages, namely, that the future and the past exist. The terms for past and future henceforth appear as adjectives: futura and praeterita. This nearly imperceptible shift actually opens the way for the denouement of the initial paradox concerning being and nonbeing and, as a result, also for the central paradox of measurement. We are in fact prepared to consider as existing, not the past and the future as such, but the temporal qualities that can exist in the present, without the things of which we speak, when we recount them or predict them, still existing or already existing. We therefore cannot be too attentive to Augustine’s shifts in expression.
這一宣言不僅僅是重複最初幾頁被拒絕的斷言，即未來和過去存在。此後，過去和未來的術語出現為形容詞：futura 和 praeterita。這種幾乎難以察覺的轉變實際上為解開關於存在和非存在的最初矛盾，以及中心矛盾讓出了道路。事實上，我們已準備好考慮為存在的，不是過去和未來本身，而是可以在現在存在的時間品質，不論我們在敘述或預測時談論的事物是否已存在或將存在。因此，我們不能不謹慎對待奧古斯丁表達方式的細微變化。

Just when he is about to reply to the ontological paradox, he pauses once more: “O Lord, my Hope, allow me to explore further [amplius quaerere]” (18:23). This is said not simply for rhetorical effect or as a pious invocation. After this pause, in fact, there follows an audacious step that will lead to the affirmation I have just mentioned, the thesis of the threefold present. This step, however, as is often the case, takes the form of a question: “If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are” (ibid.). We began with the question “how?” We continue by way of the question “where?” The question is not naive. It consists in seeking a location for future and past things insofar as they are recounted and predicted. All of the argumentation that follows will be contained within the boundaries of this question, and will end up by situating “within” the soul the temporal qualities implied by narration and prediction. This transition by way of the question “where?” is essential if we are correctly to understand the first response: “So wherever they are and whatever they are [future and past things], it is only by being present that they are” (ibid.). We appear to be turning our back on the earlier assertion that what we measure is only the past and the future; even more, we seem to be denying our admission that the present has no duration. But what is in question here is an entirely different present, one that has also become a plural adjective (praesentia), in line with praeterita and futura, and one capable of admitting an internal multiplicity. We also appear to have forgotten the assertion that we “measure [time] only while it is passing”

(16 : 21)

. But we shall return to it later when we come back to the question of measuring.
就在他即將回應本體論悖論時，他再次停頓：「主啊，我的希望，請允許我進一步探索[amplius quaerere]」（18:23）。這不僅僅是出於修辭效果或虔誠的祈禱。在這次停頓之後，事實上，接著是一個大膽的步驟，這將導致我剛才提到的肯定，即三重現在的論點。然而，這一步驟，像往常一樣，以一個問題的形式出現：「如果未來和過去確實存在，我想知道它們在哪裡」（同上）。我們從「如何？」的問題開始。我們繼續通過「哪裡？」的問題。這個問題並不天真。它在於尋找未來和過去事物的位置，就其被敘述和預測而言。接下來的所有論證都將包含在這個問題的範圍內，並最終將時間性品質定位於「內在」於靈魂。通過「哪裡？」的問題進行這種過渡是正確理解第一個回應的 essential：「無論它們在哪裡，是什麼，（未來和過去事物）只有通過當下才存在」（同上）。我們似乎背離了早先的斷言，即我們衡量的只是過去和未來；更甚者，我們似乎否認了當下沒有持續時間的承認。但這裡所討論的是一個完全不同的當下，它已經成為一個複數形容詞（praesentia），與 praeterita 和 futura 保持一致，並且能夠承認內在的多樣性。我們似乎也遺忘了我們「只在其流逝時測量[時間]」的斷言

(16 : 21)

。但我們稍後會在重新討論測量問題時回到這一點。

It is therefore within the framework of the question “Where?” that we take up once more, in order to carry them further forward, the notions of narration and prediction. Narration, we say, implies memory and prediction implies expectation. Now, what is it to remember? It is to have an image of the past. How is this possible? Because this image is an impression left by events, an impression that remains in the mind.

^{14}

因此，我們在"何處？"的框架內重新提起敘事和預測的概念。我們說，敘事意味著記憶，而預測意味著期待。那麼，什麼是記憶？它是擁有過去的影像。這怎麼可能？因為這個影像是事件留下的印象，是留在心中的印象。

The reader will have observed that after the calculated delays that preceded, suddenly everything moves very quickly.
讀者會注意到，在前面計算好的延遲之後，突然一切都變得非常快。

Prediction is explained in a way that is scarcely more complex. It is thanks to a present expectation that future things are present to us as things to come. We have a “pre-perception” (praesensio) of this which enables us to “foretell” them (praenuntio). Expectation is thus the analogue to memory. It consists of an image that already exists, in the sense that it precedes the event that does not yet exist (nondum). However, this image is not an impression left by things past but a “sign” and a “cause” of future things which are, in this way, anticipated, foreseen, foretold, predicted, proclaimed beforehand (note the richness of the everyday vocabulary of expectation).
預測的解釋方式並不太複雜。正是由於當下的期待，未來的事物對我們來說是即將到來的事物。我們有一種"預感"（praesensio），使我們能夠"預告"它們（praenuntio）。期待因此類似於記憶。它由一個已經存在的影像組成，意味著它先於尚未存在的事件（nondum）。然而，這個影像不是過去事物留下的印象，而是未來事物的"符號"和"原因"，通過這種方式，它們被預期、預見、預告、預測、預先宣告（注意期待的日常詞彙的豐富性）。

The solution is elegant-but how laborious, how costly, and how fragile!
解決方案是優雅的——但是多麼勞煩，多麼昂貴，多麼脆弱！
An elegant solution: by entrusting to memory the fate of things past, and to expectation that of things to come, we can include memory and expectation in an extended and dialectical present which itself is none of the terms rejected previously: neither the past, nor the future, nor the pointlike present, nor even the passing of the present. We know the famous formula whose tie to the aporia it is supposed to resolve we too easily overlook: “It might be correct to say that there are three times, a present of [de] past things, a present of [de] present things, and a present of [de] future things. Some such different times do exist in [in] the mind, but nowhere else [alibi] that I can see” (20:26).
一個優雅的解決方案：通過將過去事物的命運委託給記憶，將未來事物的命運委託給期望，我們可以將記憶和期望納入一個延伸且辯證的當下，這個當下本身並不是之前被拒絕的任何一個術語：既不是過去，也不是未來，不是點狀的當下，甚至不是當下的流逝。我們知道這個著名的公式，它與它試圖解決的難題之間的聯繫我們太容易忽視：「可能正確的說法是，存在三種時間，過去事物的當下，現在事物的當下，以及未來事物的當下。這些不同的時間確實存在於心靈中，但我看不出它們存在於其他任何地方」（20:26）。

In saying this, Augustine is aware that he is moving away somewhat from ordinary language by which he has, nevertheless, supported his positionprudently, it is true-in his resistance to the argument of the skeptics: “it is not strictly correct [proprie] to say that there are three times, past, present, and future” (ibid.). But he adds as if in a marginal note: “Our use of words is generally inaccurate [non proprie] and seldom completely correct, but our meaning is recognized nonetheless” (ibid.). Nothing, however, prevents us from continuing to speak as we do of the present, past, and future: “I shall not object or argue, nor shall I rebuke anyone who speaks in these terms, provided that he understands what he is saying” (ibid.). Everyday language is thus simply reformulated in a more rigorous manner.
在這麼說時，奧古斯丁意識到他正在某種程度上遠離日常語言，儘管他一直在用日常語言支持自己的立場—— 誠然是審慎地——抵制懷疑論者的論點：「嚴格地說，不能說存在三種時間，即過去、現在和未來」（同上）。但他補充道，彷彿是在邊注中：「我們的用語通常不準確，很少完全正確，但我們的意思仍然被理解」（同上）。然而，沒有什麼能阻止我們繼續如常地談論現在、過去和未來：「我不會反對或爭論，也不會責備任何以這種方式說話的人，只要他知道自己在說什麼」（同上）。因此，日常語言只是以更嚴謹的方式重新表述。

In order to enable us to understand the meaning of this rectification, Augustine relies on a threefold equivalence which, it seems, is self-evident: “The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception [contuitus; later the term will be attentio, which better denotes the contrast with distentio]; and the present of future things is expectation” (

20 : 26

). How do we know this? Augustine replies laconically: “If we may speak in these terms, I can see [video] three times and I admit [fateorque] that they do exist” (ibid.). This seeing and this admission indeed constitute the phenomenological core of the entire analysis; but the fateor, joined to the video, bears witness to the sort of debate to which this seeing is the conclusion.
為了使我們能夠理解這種校正的意義，奧古斯丁依賴於一個看似自明的三重等價：「過去事物的現在是記憶；現在事物的現在是直接感知（contuitus；後來這個術語將是 attentio，更好地表示與 distentio 的對比）；未來事物的現在是期望」（

20 : 26

）。我們怎麼知道這一點？奧古斯丁簡潔地回答：「如果我們可以這樣說，我可以看到（video）三個時間，並且我承認（fateorque）它們確實存在」（同上）。這種看見和這種承認確實構成了整個分析的現象學核心；但是與 video 相連的 fateor 見證了這種看見所得出的辯論類型。

An elegant solution, but a laborious one.
一個優雅但勞煩的解決方案。
Consider the memory. Certain images must be accorded the power of refer-
思考記憶。某些形象必須被賦予指涉的能力。
ring to past things (cf. the Latin preposition

d e

)-a strange power indeed! On the one hand, the impression exists now, on the other it stands for past things which, as such, “still” (adhuc) exist (18:23) in the memory. This little word “still” (adhuc) is at once the solution to the aporia and the source of a new enigma: how is it possible that the impression-images, the vestigia, which are present things, engraved in the soul, are at the same time “about” the past? The image of the future presents a similar difficulty: the sign-images are said “to exist already” (jam sunt) (18:24). But “already” means two things: “whatever exists already is not future but present” (ibid.), and in this sense, we do not see future things themselves which are “not yet” (nomdum). However, “already” denotes, along with the present existence of the sign, its character of anticipation: to say that things “already exist” is to say that by the sign I announce things to come, that I can predict them, and in this way the future is “said in advance” (ante dicatur). The anticipatory image is thus no less enigmatic than the vestigial one.

^{15}

對過去事物的鈴聲（參照拉丁語介詞

d e

）是一種奇怪的力量！一方面，現在存在著印象，另一方面，它代表著過去的事物，這些事物作為過去，仍然（adhuc）存在於記憶中（18:23）。這個小詞"仍然"（adhuc）同時是解決悖論的方案和新謎題的源頭：印象意象、痕跡如何可能是當下的事物，卻又"關於"過去？未來的意象也呈現類似的困難：符號意象被說成"已經存在"（jam sunt）（18:24）。但"已經"意味著兩個事情：「凡已經存在的都不是未來而是現在」（同上），在這個意義上，我們並未看到那些"尚未"（nomdum）的未來事物。然而，"已經"不僅表示符號的當下存在，還指其預期性質：說事物"已經存在"，就是說我藉由符號預示將來的事物，可以預測它們，如此未來就是"預先被說出"（ante dicatur）。預期性意象因此不亞於痕跡性意象的謎樣性。

^{15}

What makes this an enigma lies in the very structure of an image, which sometimes stands as an impression of the past, sometimes as a sign of the future. It seems that for Augustine this structure is seen purely and simply as it presents itself.
造成這個謎題的，在於意象的結構本身，有時作為過去的印象，有時作為未來的符號。對奧古斯丁來說，似乎純粹簡單地看待這種呈現本身。

What is even more enigmatic is the quasi-spatial language in which the question and the response are couched: “If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are”

(18 : 23)

. To which comes the reply: “Some such different times do exist in [in] the mind, but nowhere else [alibi] that I can see”

(20 : 26)

. Is it because the question has been posed in terms of “place” (where are future and past things?) that we obtain a reply in terms of “place” (in the soul, in the memory)? Or is it not instead the quasi-spatiality of the impression-image and the sign-image, inscribed in the soul, that calls for the question of the location of the future and past things?

^{16}

This we are unable to state at this stage of our investigation.
更加神秘的是，問題和回答所使用的準空間語言："如果未來和過去確實存在，我想知道它們在哪裡"。對此，回覆是："某些如此不同的時間存在於心靈中，但在我所能看到的其他地方卻不存在"。是因為問題是以"地方"的術語提出的（未來和過去的事物在哪裡？）而獲得了以"地方"為基礎的回覆（在靈魂中，在記憶中）？還是恰恰相反，銘刻在靈魂中的印象意象和符號意象的準空間性，召喚了對未來和過去事物位置的質疑？在我們調查的這個階段，我們無法確定。

The solution of the aporia of the being and nonbeing of time through the notion of a threefold present continues to be fragile so long as the enigma of the measurement of time has not been resolved. The threefold present has not yet received the definitive seal of the distentio animi so long as we have not recognized in this very triplicity the slippage [la faille] that permits the soul itself to be accorded an extension of another sort than that which has been denied to the pointlike present. The quasi-spatial language, for its part, remains in suspension so long as this extension of the human soul, the ground of all measurement of time, has not been stripped of any cosmological basis. The inherence of time in the soul takes on its full meaning only when every thesis that would place time within the sphere of physical movement has been eliminated through argumentation. In this sense the “I see it, I admit it” of

20 : 26

is not firmly established so long as the notion of distentio animi has not been formed.
通過三重現在的概念解決時間的存在與非存在的難題，在時間測量的謎題尚未解決之前，仍然是脆弱的。只要我們尚未在這種三重性中識別出允許靈魂本身獲得與被否認的瞬點現在不同的另一種延伸的滑移，三重現在就尚未獲得精神延伸（distentio animi）的最終印記。就其本身而言，準空間語言仍懸而未決，直到這種人類靈魂的延伸——所有時間測量的基礎——已從任何宇宙論基礎中剝離。只有當通過論證消除了將時間置於物理運動領域的每一個命題時，時間內在於靈魂才能獲得其全部意義。在這個意義上，"我看到它，我承認它"的斷言，在精神延伸的概念尚未形成之前，尚未得到堅定的確立。

The Measurement of Time
時間的測量

It is in resolving the enigma of its measurement that Augustine reaches this ultimate characterization of human time (21-31).
通過解決其測量的謎題，奧古斯丁達到了人類時間的這種最終特徵（21-31）。

The question of measurement is taken up again just where we left it at 16:21: “I said just now that we measure time as it passes [praetereuntia]” (21:27). Now this assertion, which is forcefully repeated (“I know it because we do measure time. We could not measure a thing which did not exist” [ibid.]), is immediately transformed into an aporia. What passes away is, in fact, the present. Yet, we admitted, the present has no extension. The argument, which once again throws us back toward the skeptics, merits a detailed analysis. First of all, it neglects the difference between passing away and being present in the sense in which the present is the indivisible instant (or, as will be stated later, a “point”). Only the dialectic of the threefold present, interpreted as distension, will be able to save an assertion that must first lose its way in the labyrinth of the aporia. But, more important, the adverse argument is constructed precisely with the resources of the quasi-spatial imagery by means of which time is grasped as a threefold present. Passing, in effect, is being in transit. It is therefore legitimate to wonder: “Where is it coming from [unde], what is it passing through [qua], and where is it going [quo]?” (ibid.). As we see, it is the term “passing away” (transire) which necessitates dwelling in this way on quasi-spatiality. Now, if we follow the tendency of this figurative expression, we must say that passing is going from (ex) the future, through (per) the present, into (in) the past. This transit thus confirms that the measurement of time is done “in relation to some measurable period” (in aliquo spatio) and that all the relations between intervals or time are in relation to “a given period” (spatia temporum) (ibid.). This seems to lead to a total impasse: time is not extended in space-and “we cannot measure what has no duration” (ibid.).
測量的問題再次被提出，就在我們在 16:21 處停留的地方："我剛才說我們測量時間的流逝[praetereuntia]"(21:27)。現在這個斷言，被 forcefully 重複("我知道因為我們確實測量時間。我們無法測量不存在的事物"[同上])，立即被轉化成一個難題。消逝的是現在。然而，我們已承認，現在沒有延伸。這個論點，再次將我們拋向懷疑論者，值得詳細分析。首先，它忽略了消逝和作為不可分割的瞬間(或稍後將闡述的"點")意義上的現在之間的差異。只有三重現在的辯證法，被解釋為延伸，才能拯救這個必須先在難題的迷宮中迷失方向的斷言。但更重要的是，對立的論點正是用準空間意象的資源來構建，藉此時間被把握為三重現在。通過，實際上是在運 transit。因此，合理地會問："它從哪裡來[unde]，它通過哪裡[qua]，它要去哪裡[quo]?"(同上)。如我們所見，正是"消逝"(transire)這個詞使我們以這種方式停留在準空間性上。現在，如果我們遵循這種比喻性表達的傾向，必須說通過是從(ex)未來出發，穿過(per)現在，進入(in)過去。這種遷移因此確認時間的測量是"相對於某個可測量的週期"(in aliquo spatio)進行的，並且所有時間間隔或關係都是相對於"給定的週期"(spatia temporum)(同上)。這似乎導致了一個完全的僵局：時間在空間中不延伸，且"我們無法測量沒有持續時間的事物"(同上)。

At this point, Augustine pauses, as at every previous critical moment. It is also here that the word puzzle or enigma is pronounced: “My mind is burning to solve this intricate puzzle [aenigma]”

(22 : 28)

. Indeed it is our everyday notions that are abstruse, as we have known from the start of this investigation. But, once again, unlike in skepticism, the admission that there is an enigma is accompanied by an ardent desire which, for Augustine, is a figure of love: “Grant me what I love, for it was your gift that I should love it” (ibid.).

^{17}

Here the hymnic aspect of the quest becomes apparent, showing what the investigation of time owes to its inclusion within a meditation on the eternal Word. We shall return to this later. Let us limit ourselves for the moment to underscoring the guarded confidence that Augustine grants to ordinary language: “‘How long [quam diu] did he take to do that?’ ‘How long is it [quam longo tempore] since . . .!’ We use these words and hear others using them. They understand what we mean and we understand them”
此時，奧古斯丁停頓了下來，就像在每個先前的關鍵時刻一樣。正是在這裡，謎題或謎語被提出："我的心靈燃燒著要解開這個複雜的謎題[aenigma]"。確實，正如我們從調查開始就知道的那樣，我們的日常概念是深奧的。但是，再次強調，與懷疑主義不同，承認存在謎題是伴隨著一種熱烈的渴望，對奧古斯丁來說，這是愛的一種表現："賜予我我所愛的，因為是你的恩賜使我能夠愛它"。在此，探索的讚美詩般的方面變得明顯，顯示出時間的研究如何融入對永恆之道的沉思。我們稍後會回到這一點。此刻，讓我們強調奧古斯丁對普通語言的審慎信任：「他花了多久做那件事？」「那是多久以前...！」我們使用這些話，也聽到別人使用。他們理解我們的意思，我們也理解他們。
(22:28). This is why, I shall say, there is an enigma but not ignorance.
（22:28）。這就是為什麼，我要說，這是一個謎題，而不是無知。
In order to resolve the enigma, the cosmological solution must be rejected so that the investigation will be forced to search in the soul alone, and hence in the multiple structure of the threefold present, for the basis of extension and of measurement. The discussion concerning the relation of time to the movement of the heavenly bodies and to movement in general therefore constitutes neither a digression nor a detour.
為了解開謎題，必須拒絕宇宙論的解決方案，迫使調查僅在靈魂中尋找，並因此在三重當下的多重結構中，尋找延伸和測量的基礎。關於時間與天體運動及一般運動之間關係的討論，因此既不是離題，也不是迂迴。

Augustine’s vision can less than ever be said to be independent of the polemic whose long history stretches from Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Physics to Plotinus’s Enneads III 7. The distentio animi is conquered at great pains during the course of and at the end of a tightly reasoned argument that involves the biting rhetoric of the reductio ad absurdum.
奧古斯丁的視野絕不能被說成是獨立於從柏拉圖的《提邁歐斯篇》到亞里士多德的《物理學》，再到普羅提諾的《九章》III 7 的長期論爭。靈魂的張力（distentio animi）是在一場緊密論證過程中，通過尖銳的還原論修辭艱難地征服的。

First argument: if the movement of the heavenly bodies is time, why should this not also be said of the movement of all other bodies as well?

(23 : 29)

. This argument anticipates the thesis that the movement of the stars might vary, hence accelerate or slow down, something that is impossible for Aristotle. The stars are thus reduced to the level of other things in motion, whether this be the potter’s wheel or the flow of syllables uttered by the human voice.
第一個論點：如果天體的運動是時間，為什麼不能說所有其他物體的運動也是如此？

(23 : 29)

。這個論點預期天體運動可能會變化，因此可能加速或減速，這在亞里士多德看來是不可能的。因此，星體被降低到其他運動物體的水平，無論是陶工的轉盤，還是人類聲音發出的音節流。

Second argument: if the lights of the sky ceased to move and if the potter’s wheel continued to turn, then time would indeed have to be measured by something other than movement (ibid.). Once again the argument presumes that the thesis of the immutability of celestial movements has been undercut. A variant of this argument: speaking of the movement of the potter’s wheel itself takes time, time which is not measured by the astral movement presumed to have been altered or stopped altogether.
第二個論點：如果天空的光體停止運動，而陶工的轉盤繼續轉動，那麼時間必定要由其他事物來測量（同上）。這個論點再次假設天體運動不變性的論點已被削弱。另一種論點變體：說到陶工轉盤本身的運動需要時間，這個時間不是由假定已改變或完全停止的星體運動來測量的。

Third argument: underlying the earlier presuppositions is the conviction taught by Scripture that the stars are only lights intended to mark out time (ibid.). So disqualified, if we may put it this way, the stars cannot constitute time by their movement.
第三個論點：在早期的假設背後，是聖經教導的信念，即星體只是用來標記時間的光體（同上）。如此被取消資格，我們可以這麼說，星體無法通過其運動構成時間。

Fourth argument: if one asks what constitutes the measurement we call a “day” we spontaneously think that the twenty-four hours of the day are measured by the movement of the sun through one complete circuit. But if the sun were to turn faster and complete its circuit in an hour, the “day” would no longer be measured by the movement of the sun (

23 : 30

). Meijering stresses how, through the hypothesis of a variable speed attributed to the sun, Augustine moves away from all his predecessors. Neither Aristotle nor Plotinus, who do, however, distinguish between time and motion, ever used this argument. For Augustine, since God is the master of creation, he can change the speed of the stars, just as the potter can change that of his wheel, or the speaker the flow of his syllables (Joshua’s stopping the sun follows along the same lines as the hypothesis of the acceleration of its motion, which, as such, is independent of the argument from the miraculous). Augustine alone dares to allow that one might speak of a span of time-a day, an hour-without a
第四個論點：如果有人問什麼構成了我們所謂的"一天"，我們 spontaneously 想到一天的二十四小時是由太陽通過一個完整的圓周運動來測量。但如果太陽轉得更快，在一小時內完成其圓周運動，那麼"一天"將不再由太陽的運動來測量（

23 : 30

）。梅耶林強調，通過歸因於太陽的可變速度的假設，奧古斯丁遠離了他所有的前輩。亞里斯多德和普羅提諾斯，儘管區分了時間和運動，但從未使用過這個論點。對於奧古斯丁來說，既然上帝是創造的主宰，他可以改變星星的速度，就像陶工可以改變其轉輪的速度，或演講者改變其音節的流動（約書亞阻止太陽的事件沿著加速其運動的假設發展，而這種假設本身是獨立於神蹟的論點之外）。只有奧古斯丁敢於允許人們談論一個沒有宇宙學參考的時間跨度——一天、一小時。
cosmological reference. The notion of distentio animi will serve, precisely, as a substitute for this cosmological basis for the span of time.

^{18}

靈魂分散（distentio animi）的概念將恰恰作為這種宇宙學基礎的替代品。

^{18}

It is indeed of essential importance to observe that Augustine introduces the notion of distentio for the first time at the end of the argument that totally disassociates the notion of a “day” from that of celestial motion, and this is done without any further elaboration: “I see time, therefore, as an extension [distentio-distension] of some sort. But do I really see this or only seem to see it? You will make it clear to me, my Light and my Truth” (23:30).
值得注意的是，奧古斯丁第一次引入靈魂分散（distentio）的概念，是在完全將"一天"的概念與天體運動分離的論點結束時，並且沒有進一步闡述："我看到時間是某種延伸（分散-分散）。但我真的看到了嗎，還是只是看起來看到了？你將為我澄清，我的光明和真理"（23:30）。

Why this reticence just when the breakthrough appears about to be made? In fact, we have not yet finished with cosmology, despite the preceding arguments. We have only dismissed the extreme thesis that “time is constituted by the movement of a material body”

(24 : 31)

. But Aristotle had also refuted it by affirming that, without itself being movement, time was “something of movement,” namely that time is the measurement of movement inasmuch as the latter can be counted. Could not time be the measurement of movement without being movement? For time to exist, is it not enough that movement be potentially measurable? Augustine seems at first sight to make this major concession to Aristotle when he writes: “It is clear then that the movement of a body is not the same as the means by which we measure the duration of its movement. This being so, it must be obvious which of the two ought more properly to be called time” (ibid.).

^{19}

But if Augustine appears to grant that time is the measurement of movement rather than movement itself, this is not because, as was the case with Aristotle, he is thinking of the regular motion of celestial bodies but rather of measuring the movement of the human soul. In fact, if we admit that time is measured by means of a comparison between a longer time and a shorter time, then a fixed term of comparison is required. This cannot be the circular movement of the stars since it has been admitted that that movement could vary. Movement can stop, not time. Do we not in fact measure rest as well as motion? (ibid.).
為什麼在突破即將出現之際卻表現出如此沉默？事實上，儘管有前面的論點，我們尚未完全結束對宇宙學的探討。我們只是駁斥了「時間由物質身體的運動構成」這一極端論點。但亞里士多德也藉由肯定，時間不是運動本身，而是運動的「某種事物」，即時間是可被計算的運動的度量。時間豈不能作為運動的度量而不是運動本身？要讓時間存在，只要運動可能被測量不就足夠了？奧古斯丁起初似乎對亞里士多德做出重大讓步，當他寫道：「因此，身體的運動與我們測量其運動持續時間的方式不同。這樣看來，哪一個更恰當地被稱為時間，應該是顯而易見的。」但如果奧古斯丁似乎承認時間是運動的度量而非運動本身，這並非像亞里士多德那樣思考天體的規律運動，而是關於測量人類靈魂的運動。事實上，如果我們承認時間是通過較長時間與較短時間的比較來測量，那麼就需要一個固定的比較基準。這不能是星體的迴轉運動，因為已承認該運動可能有變化。運動可以停止，但時間不能。我們豈不是也同時測量靜止和運動？

Were it not for this hesitation, we would not understand why, after the apparently victorious argument against identifying time with movement, Augustine once again falls back into a confession of his utter ignorance: I know that my discourse on time is in time; so I know that time exists and that it is measured. But I know neither what time is nor how it is measured. “I am in a sorry state, for I do not even know what I do not know!”

(25 : 32)

.
若不是這種猶豫不決，我們就無法理解，在看似勝利的論證反對將時間等同於運動之後，奧古斯丁為何再次退回到對自己絕對無知的懺悔中：我知道我關於時間的論述是在時間中進行的；所以我知道時間存在，且可以被測量。但我既不知道時間是什麼，也不知道如何測量它。"我處於一個可悲的狀態，因為我甚至不知道我所不知道的是什麼！"

It is, nevertheless, on the following page that the decisive formula is uttered: “It seems to me, then [inde], that time is merely an extension [distentio -distention], though of what it is an extension I do not know. I begin to wonder whether it is an extension of the mind itself” (26:33). Why “then,”-as a result of what? And why this roundabout way (“I begin to wonder whether . . .”) of affirming the thesis? Once again, if there is a phenomenological core to this assertion, it is inseparable from the reductio ad absurdum that eliminated the other hypotheses: since I measure the movement of a body by time
然而，正是在下一頁，決定性的公式被說出：「因此，在我看來，時間僅僅是一種延伸（distentio），儘管我不知道它是什麼的延伸。我開始思考它是否是心靈本身的延伸」（26:33）。為什麼是「因此」—作為什麼結果？為什麼以這種迂迴的方式（"我開始思考是否..."）來肯定這個論點？再次地，如果這個斷言有現象學的核心，它與消除其他假設的歸謬法是不可分割的：因為我是用時間來測量物體的運動，而不是反之——因為只能用短時間來測量長時間——且由於沒有任何物理運動提供固定的比較測量單位，假設恆星的運動是可變的，那麼時間的延伸就是靈魂的緊張。
and not the other way around-since a long time can only be measured by a short time-and since no physical movement offers a fixed unit of measurement for comparison, the movement of the stars being assumed to be vari-able-it remains that the extension of time is a distension of the soul. Of course, Plotinus had said this before Augustine; but he was thinking of the soul of the world, not the human soul.

^{20}

This is why everything is resolved and everything is still left up in the air, even once the key phrase distentio animi has been pronounced. As long as we have not linked the distentio animi to the dialectic of the threefold present, we have not yet understood ourselves.
當然，普羅提諾在奧古斯丁之前就已經說過這一點；但他思考的是世界的靈魂，而非人類的靈魂。這就是為什麼一切都得到解決，卻又一切都懸而未決，即便已經提出了關鍵詞組「靈魂的緊張」（distentio animi）。只有當我們將「靈魂的緊張」與三重現在的辯證法聯繫起來，我們才真正理解自己。

The whole last part of Book 11 (26:33-28:37) is directed at establishing this connection between the two basic themes of the investigation: between the thesis of the threefold present, which solved the first enigma, that of a being that lacks being, and the thesis of the distension of the mind, summoned in order to resolve the enigma of the extension of a thing that has no extension. What remains, then, is to conceive of the threefold present as distension and distension as the distension of the threefold present. This is the stroke of genius of Book 11 of Augustine’s Confessions, in whose wake will follow Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.
《懺悔錄》第 11 卷的最後部分（26:33-28:37）旨在建立兩個基本研究主題之間的聯繫：三重現在的論點（解決了第一個謎題，即缺乏存在的存在）與心靈延展的論點（被召喚以解決沒有延展的事物的延展謎題）。剩下的是要將三重現在概念化為延展，並將延展概念化為三重現在的延展。這是《懺悔錄》第 11 卷的天才之處，胡塞爾、海德格爾和梅洛-龐蒂將在此基礎上繼續發展。

Intentio and Distentio 意向性與延展

In order to take this final step, Augustine turns back to an earlier assertion (

16 : 21

and

21 : 27

), which has not only remained in suspension but which seemed to have been bowled over by the the skeptics’ assault, namely, that we measure time when it is passing; not the future which is not, nor the past which is no longer, nor the present which has no extension, but “time passing.” It is in this very passing, in the transit, that both the multiplicity of the present and its tearing apart are to be sought.
為了邁出這最後一步，奧古斯丁回到了早前的斷言（

16 : 21

和

21 : 27

），這個斷言不僅一直處於懸置狀態，而且似乎已被懷疑論者的攻擊擊敗，即我們在時間流逝時測量時間；不是未來（尚未存在），也不是過去（已不復存在），也不是沒有延展的現在，而是"流逝的時間"。正是在這種流逝、在轉瞬之間，人們要尋找現在的多樣性及其撕裂。

The function of the three celebrated examples of a sound that is resonating, a sound that has resonated, and two sounds that resonate one after the other, is to make this tearing apart appear as that of the threefold present.
三個著名例子的功能——一個正在共鳴的聲音、一個已共鳴的聲音，以及連續共鳴的兩個聲音——是要顯示三重現在的撕裂。

These examples demand close attention, for the variation from one to the next is quite subtle.
這些範例需要仔細注意，因為從一個到另一個的變化是相當微妙的。

First example

(27 : 34)

: consider a sound that begins to resonate, that continues to resonate, and that ceases to resonate. How do we speak of it? In order to understand this passage it is important to note that it is written entirely in the past tense. We only speak of a sound’s resonance once it has stopped. The not yet (nondum) of the future is spoken of in the past tense (futura erat). The moment when it resonates, hence its present, is recounted as having disappeared-it could only be measured while it lasted: “but even then [sed et tunc], it was not static [non stabat], because it was transient [ibat], moving continuously [praeteribat]” (ibid.). It is thus in the past tense that we speak of the very passing of the present. Far from securing a comfort-
第一個例子

(27 : 34)

：考慮一個開始共鳴、持續共鳴，然後停止共鳴的聲音。我們如何談論它？為了理解這段話，重要的是要注意它完全是用過去時態寫的。我們只有在聲音的共鳴停止後才談論它。未來的「尚未」（nondum）是用過去時態（futura erat）講述的。當它共鳴的那一刻，即其現在，被敘述為已經消失 - 它只能在持續期間被測量：「但即便那時[sed et tunc]，它並不是靜止的[non stabat]，因為它是短暫的[ibat]，持續移動[praeteribat]」（同上）。因此，我們是用過去時態談論現在的流逝本身。遠非提供一個令人安慰的答覆。
ing reply to the enigma, the first example appears to deepen it. But, as always, the direction in which to search for the solution is in the enigma itself, just as the enigma is in the solution. One feature of the example enables us to steer in this direction: “indeed [enim], while it was transient it was gaining [tendebatur] some extent in time [in aliquod spatium temporis] by which it could be measured, but not in present time, for the present has no extent” (ibid.). The key is indeed to be sought in what passes, as this is distinct from the pointlike present.

^{21}

第一個例子似乎加深了這個謎題，而非提供安慰的回應。但是，一如既往，解決方案的方向就在謎題本身中，正如謎題存在於解決方案中。這個例子的一個特徵使我們能朝這個方向前進：「確實[enim]，當它短暫存在時，它正在獲得[tendebatur]某種時間範圍[in aliquod spatium temporis]，可以被測量，但不是在現在的時間，因為現在是沒有範圍的」（同上）。關鍵確實在於所經過的東西，這與點狀的現在是不同的。

^{21}

The second example exploits this breakthrough, but it does so by varying the hypothesis (

27 : 34 ff

.). The passage of time will be spoken of not in the past but in the present tense. Here another sound is resonating. Let us assume that it is still (adhuc) resonating: “If we are to measure it we must do so while [dum] it lasts.” It is now in the future perfect tense that we speak of its stopping, as if of a past future: “once the sound has ceased [cessaverit] it will be [jam] a thing of the past, and if it no longer exists [non erit], it cannot be measured” (ibid.). The question “how long” (quanta sit) is then raised in the present tense. Where, then, is the difficulty? It results from the impossibility of measuring the passage while it is “still” (adhuc) continuing. For something to stop, it is in fact necessary that there be a beginning and an end, hence a measurable interval.
第二個例子利用了這一突破，但是通過改變假設（

27 : 34 ff

）來實現。時間的流逝將不是用過去時態而是現在時態來描述。此處另一種聲音正在共鳴。讓我們假設它仍然（adhuc）在共鳴：「如果我們要測量它，我們必須在它持續存在的時候測量」。現在我們用未來完成時態來談論它的停止，彷彿是一個已逝的未來：「一旦聲音停止（cessaverit），它將（jam）成為過去，如果它不再存在（non erit），就無法測量」（同上）。然後用現在時態提出「有多長」（quanta sit）的問題。那麼，困難在哪裡？它源於在聲音仍在「持續」（adhuc）的同時無法測量其流逝。要使某物停止，必須有開始和結束，因此是可測量的間隔。

But if we only measure what has ceased to exist, we slip back into the earlier aporia. It has even deepened a bit more, if we can measure the time that passes neither when it has stopped nor while it continues. The very idea of the time that passes, set aside for this argument, seems to retreat into the same shadows as do the ideas of the future, the past, and the pointlike present: “Therefore we measure neither the future nor the past nor the present nor time that is passing” (ibid.).

^{22}

但是如果我們只測量已停止存在的東西，我們又回到了早期的難題。如果我們既不能在它停止時也不能在它持續時測量流逝的時間，那麼情況甚至更加複雜了。被擱置於這個論證的時間流逝的概念，似乎退入了與未來、過去和點狀現在相同的陰影中：「因此我們既不測量未來，也不測量過去，不測量現在，也不測量流逝的時間」（同上）。

^{22}

From whence then comes our assurance that we do measure (the protest: “yet we do measure time” appears twice in this dramatic paragraph), if we do not know how? Is there a way to measure time passing both when it has ceased and while it continues? It is indeed in this direction that the third example steers the inquiry.
那麼，既然我們不知道如何測量，我們的確能測量時間的把握從何而來？（「然而我們確實測量時間」這個抗議出現了兩次）。是否有一種方法可以在時間停止和持續的同時測量它的流逝？確實，第三個例子正是朝著這個方向引導探究。

The third example

(27 : 35)

, that of reciting a verse by heart-to be exact the Deus creator omnium, taken from a hymn by Saint Ambrose-offers a greater complexity than that of the continuous sound, namely, the alternation of four long syllables and of four short syllables within a single expression, a line of verse (versus). The complexity of this example necessitates the reintroduction of memory and retrospection that the analysis of the earlier two examples omitted. Thus it is in the third example alone that the connection is made between the question of measurement and that of the threefold present. The alternation of four short and four long syllables in fact introduces an element of comparison that immediately appeals to the senses: “I can tell this because, by pronouncing them, I find it to be the case, insofar as I can rely
第三個例子，即背誦一首詩的情況——更確切地說是聖安布羅斯讚美詩中的「上帝，萬物之創造者」——比持續的聲音更為複雜，即在單一表達中四個長音節和四個短音節的交替，一行詩（versus）。這個例子的複雜性需要重新引入記憶和回顧，而前兩個例子的分析中省略了這一點。因此，只有在第三個例子中，測量問題與三重現在的關係才得以建立。事實上，四個短音節和四個長音節的交替立即引入了一個吸引感官的比較元素：「我可以說出這一點，因為通過發音，我發現事實確實如此，只要我能依靠
upon the plain evidence of my own hearing [quantum sensitur sensu manifesto].”

^{23}

But Augustine introduces sensation only in order to sharpen the aporia and to move toward its resolution, not in order to cover it with the cloak of intuition. For if longs and shorts are such only by comparison, we are not able to superimpose them as we would superimpose two beats over one beat. We must be able to retain (tenere) the short and to apply it (applicare) to the long. But what is it to retain something that has ceased? The aporia fully remains if we speak of the syllables themselves, as we spoke earlier of the sound itself, that is, as past and future things. The aporia is resolved if we speak not of syllables that no longer exist or do not yet exist but of their impressions in the memory and of their signs in expectation: “So it cannot be the syllables themselves [ipsas] that I measure, since they no longer exist. I must be measuring something which remains fixed [in-fixum manet] in [in] my memory” (ibid.).
我自己聽覺的明顯證據【quantum sensitur sensu manifesto】。」但奧古斯丁引入感官的目的是為了加深困境，並朝著其解決方向邁進，而不是用直覺的外衣遮蓋它。因為如果長音和短音只是通過比較而存在，我們無法像疊加兩拍蓋過一拍那樣疊加它們。我們必須能夠保留（tenere）短音並將其應用（applicare）於長音。但是，如何保留已經消逝的東西呢？如果我們談論音節本身，就像之前談論聲音本身一樣，即作為過去和未來的事物，困境仍然完全存在。只有當我們談論記憶中的音節印象和期待中的符號時，困境才得以解決：「因此，我不能測量音節本身【ipsas】，因為它們不再存在。我必須測量在我記憶中保持固定【in-fixum manet】的某些事物」（同上）。

We again find the present of the past, inherited from the analysis that concluded the first enigma-and with this expression all the difficulties of the impression-image, of the vestigium. The advantage gained is, nevertheless, immense. We now know that the measurement of time owes nothing to that of external motion. In addition we have found in the mind itself the fixed element that allows us to compare long periods of time with short periods of time. With the impression-image, the important verb is no longer “to pass” (transire) but “to remain” (manet). In this sense the two enigmas-that of being/ nonbeing and that of measuring what has no extension-are resolved together. On the one hand, we have returned within ourselves: “It is in my own mind, then, that I measure things”

(27 : 36)

. And how is this? Inasmuch as, after they have passed, the impression (affectio) made on the mind by things as they pass remains there: “for everything which happens leaves an impression on it, and this impression remains [manet] after the thing itself has ceased to be. It is the impression that I measure, since it is present, not the thing itself, which makes the impression as it passes” (ibid.).
我們再次發現過去的現在，這是源自於解決第一個謎題的分析，並且伴隨著這個表達，所有印象-形象和痕跡的困難都浮現了。然而，獲得的優勢是巨大的。我們現在知道，時間的測量與外部運動的測量無關。此外，我們在心靈本身中找到了固定的元素，使我們能夠比較長時間和短時間。對於印象-形象而言，重要的動詞不再是"通過"（transire），而是"保持"（manet）。從這個意義上說，兩個謎題——存在/非存在的謎題，以及測量無延伸性之物的謎題——已經共同得到解決。一方面，我們回到了自身內部："那麼，是在我自己的心靈中，我測量事物"。這是如何發生的？因為在事物過去之後，它們在心靈中留下的印象（affectio）仍然存在："因為發生的一切都在心靈上留下印象，這個印象在事物本身不再存在後仍然保持。我測量的是這個印象，因為它是現在的，而不是事物本身，那只是在經過時留下印象"。

We must not think that this recourse to the impression terminates the inquiry.

^{24}

The notion of distentio animi has not been given its due so long as the passivity of the impression has not been contrasted with the activity of a mind stretched in opposite directions, between expectation, memory, and attention. Only a mind stretched in such different directions can be distended.
我們不應該認為訴諸印象就終結了這個探究。只要尚未將印象的被動性與心靈在期待、記憶和注意力之間向相反方向延伸的主動性相對比，心靈延伸（distentio animi）的概念就尚未得到應有的重視。只有一個在如此不同方向上被拉伸的心靈，才能被延伸。

This active side of the process calls for a new look at the earlier example of recitation, but this time in its dynamics. To compose beforehand, to entrust to memory, to begin, to run through-these are all active operations dependent upon the passivity of the sign-images and the impression-images. But it would be to mistake the role of these images if we failed to stress that reciting is an act that moves from an expectation turned first toward the entire poem, then toward what remains of the poem, until (donec) the operation is completed. In this new description of the act of reciting, the present changes its meaning. It
這個過程的主動面要求重新審視早期朗誦的例子，但這次著眼於其動態。預先創作、託付給記憶、開始、貫穿始末——這些都是依賴符號意象和印象意象的被動性的主動操作。但如果我們未能強調朗誦是一個從最初轉向整首詩，然後轉向詩的殘餘，直到（donec）操作完成的期待之行為，那麼就是誤解了這些意象的作用。在這個朗誦行為的新描述中，現在改變了其意義。
is no longer a point, not even a point of passage, it is a “present intention” (praesens intentio)

(27 : 36)

. If attention deserves in this way to be called intention, this is so inasmuch as the transit through the present has become an active transition. The present is not simply travelled through, but “man’s attentive mind, which is present, is relegating [traicit] the future to the past. The past increases in proportion as the future diminishes, until the future is entirely absorbed and the whole becomes past”

(27 : 36)

. Of course, the quasispatial imagery of a movement from the future toward the past through the present has not been eliminated. No doubt it has its ultimate justification in the passivity that accompanies the entire process. But we are no longer misled by the representation of two places, one of which is filled up as the other is emptied, as soon as we have ascribed a dynamic character to this representation and have discerned the interplay of action and passion that is concealed therein. For, in fact, there would be no future that diminishes, no past that increases, without “the mind, which regulates this process [animus qui illud agit]” (

28 : 37

). The shadow of passivity accompanies three actions, now expressed by three verbs. The mind “performs three functions, those of expectation [expectat], attention [adtendit; this verb recalls the intentio praesens], and memory [meminit]” (ibid.). The result is that “the future, which it expects, passes through [transeat] the present, to which it attends, into the past, which it remembers” (ibid.). To relegate is also to pass through. The vocabulary here continues to oscillate between activity and passivity. The mind expects and remembers, and yet expectation and memory are “in” the soul, as impression-images and as sign-images. The contrast appears in the present. On the one hand, inasmuch as it passes, it is reduced to a point (in puncto praeterit). This is the most extreme illustration of the present’s lack of extension. But, inasmuch as it relegates, inasmuch as through the attention that “which is to be passes towards [pergat] the state in which it is to be no more,” it must be said that “the mind’s attention persists [perdurat attentio].”
它不再是一個點，甚至不是通過的點，而是一個「當下意向」（praesens intentio）。如果以這種方式值得注意，那是因為通過當下的過程已成為一種主動轉換。當下不僅僅是被經過，而是「人的專注的心靈，現在存在，正在將未來移至過去。隨著未來減少，過去增加，直到未來完全被吸收，整體成為過去」。當然，從未來到過去通過當下的準空間意象尚未被消除。毋庸置疑，這最終是在伴隨整個過程的被動性中得到證明。但是，一旦我們賦予這種表徵一種動態的特徵，並且辨別其中隱藏的行動與被動的相互作用，我們就不再被兩個地方的表徵所誤導，一個被填滿，另一個被清空。因為事實上，如果沒有「調節這個過程的心靈」，就不會有減少的未來，也不會有增加的過去。被動性的陰影伴隨著三個行動，現在由三個動詞表達。心靈「執行三個功能：期待、注意和記憶」。結果是「它期待的未來通過它所關注的當下，進入它記憶的過去」。移置也意味著通過。這裡的詞彙繼續在活動與被動之間擺盪。心靈期待和記憶，然而期待和記憶「在」靈魂中，作為印象意象和符號意象。對比出現在當下。一方面，在它逝去時，它被縮減為一個點。這是現在缺乏延伸性的最極端例證。然而，就它降格而言，就通過「即將通過[pergat]進入不再存在的狀態」的注意力而言，必須說「心靈的注意力持續存在[perdurat attentio]」。

This interplay of action and affection in the complex expression a “long expectation of the future” must be distinguished from what Augustine makes it replace, the absurd notion of a long future, and the same applies to the expression a “long remembrance of the past,” which takes the place of the notion of a long past. It is in the soul, hence as an impression, that expectation and memory possess extension. But the impression is in the soul only inasmuch as the mind acts, that is, expects, attends, and remembers.
在複雜表達中，行動和情感的互動，「對未來的長期期待」必須與奧古斯丁使其取代的荒謬概念，即「漫長的未來」區分開來，同樣的情況也適用於「對過去的長期回憶」這一表達，它取代了「漫長的過去」的概念。期待和記憶在靈魂中具有延展性，但僅當心靈運作時，即期待、關注和回憶時，印象才存在於靈魂中。

In what, then, does distention consist? In the very contrast between the three tensions. If paragraphs 26:33-30:40 constitute the treasure of Book 11, paragraph

28 : 38

, apart from all else, is the crown jewel of this treasure. The example of the song, which includes that of the sound that continues and ceases and that of the long and short syllables, is here more than just a concrete application. It marks the point at which the theory of distentio is joined to that of the threefold present. The theory of the threefold present, reformu-
那麼，緊張感究竟由什麼組成？正是在三種張力之間的對比。如果第 26:33 至 30:40 段落構成第 11 卷的珍寶，那麼段落

28 : 38

，不論其他一切，都是這份珍寶的皇冠明珠。歌曲的例子，包含持續和停止的聲音，以及長短音節，在此不僅僅是一個具體應用。它標誌著延展理論與三重現在時的理論相交匯的關鍵點。三重現在時理論，重新闡述
lated in terms of the threefold intention, makes the distentio arise out of the intentio that has burst asunder. The entire paragraph must be quoted:
在三重意圖的層面上，使得張力源自於已經破裂的意向性。必須引用整段文字：

Suppose that I am going to recite a psalm that I know. Before I begin my faculty of expectation is engaged [tenditur] by the whole of it. But once I have begun, as much of the psalm as I have removed from the province of expectation and relegated to the past now engages [tenditur] my memory, and the scope of the action [actionis] which I am performing is divided [distenditur] between the two faculties of memory and expectation, the one looking back to the part which I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I have still to recite. But my faculty of attention [attentio] is present all the while, and through it passes [traicitur] what was the future in the process of becoming the past. As the process continues [agitur et agitur], the province of memory is extended in proportion as that of expectation is reduced, until the whole of my expectation is absorbed. This happens when I have finished my recitation and it has all passed into the province of memory. ( $28 : 38$ )
假設我要背誦一首我知道的詩篇。在我開始之前，我的期待能力已經被整首詩篇所佔據。但是一旦我開始了，已經從期待省份移除並歸入過去的詩篇部分現在佔據了我的記憶，而我正在執行的行動範圍被分割在記憶和期待這兩種能力之間，一個回顧已經背誦的部分，另一個期待尚未背誦的部分。但我的注意力能力始終存在，並且通過它，未來正在成為過去的部分被傳遞。隨著過程的持續，記憶的省份隨著期待省份的減少而擴大，直到我的整個期待被吸收。當我完成背誦，並且所有內容都已進入記憶省份時，這種情況就發生了。

The theme of this entire paragraph is the dialectic of expectation, memory, and attention, each considered no longer in isolation but in interaction with one another. It is thus no longer a question of either impression-images or anticipatory images but of an action that shortens expectation and extends memory. The term actio and the verbal expression agitur, which is repeated expressly, convey the impulse that governs the whole process. Expectation and memory are themselves both said to be “engaged,” the first by the whole of the poem before the start of the song, the second by the part of the song that has already gone by; as for attention, its engagement consists completely in the active “transit” of what was future in the direction of what becomes past. It is this combined action of expectation, memory, and attention that “continues.” The distentio is then nothing other than the shift in, the noncoincidence of the three modalities of action: “and the scope of the action which I am performing is divided [distenditur] between the two faculties of memory and expectation, the one looking back to the part which I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I have still to recite.”
這段文字的主題是期待、記憶和注意力的辯證法，不再是孤立地考慮，而是相互作用。因此，不再是純粹討論印象圖像或預期圖像，而是一種縮短期待並延伸記憶的行動。反覆使用的詞彙「actio」和「agitur」傳達了支配整個過程的衝動。期待和記憶本身都被認為是「投入」的，前者是由整首詩在歌曲開始之前，後者是由已經過去的歌曲部分；而注意力的投入則完全在於將未來轉變為過去的主動「過渡」。正是這種期待、記憶和注意力的綜合行動使其「持續」。因此，「distentio」無非是三種行動模式的位移、不一致：「我正在執行的行動範圍被分散在記憶和期待這兩種能力之間，一個回顧我已經背誦的部分，另一個則展望我尚未背誦的部分。」

Is the distentio related in any way to the passivity of the impression? It would seem so, if this beautiful text, from which the affectio seems to have disappeared, is compared to the first analytical sketch of the act of reciting

(27 : 36)

. There the impression appears to be still conceived of as the passive reverse side of the very “tension” of the act, even when silent, of reciting: something remains (manet) insofar as we “can go over [peragimus] poems and verses and speech of any sort in our minds.” It is “man’s attentive mind, which is present, [which] is relegating [traicit] the future to the past”

(27 : 36)

.
「distentio」是否以某種方式與印象的被動性有關？如果將這段美麗的文字與第一個關於背誦行為的分析草稿進行比較，似乎是如此，在那裡印象仍然被視為背誦行為（即使是沉默的）「張力」的被動反面：只要我們「在心中重複背誦詩歌、詩節和任何形式的言語」，某些東西就會留存（manet）。是「在場的人的專注心靈」將未來「轉移」到過去。

Thus, if we compare, as I believe we can, the passivity of the affectio to that of the distentio animi, we must say that the three temporal intentions are separate from one another to the extent that intentional activity has as its counterpart the passivity engendered by this very activity and that, for lack of a better name, we designate as impression-image or sign-image. It is not only these three acts that do not coincide, but also the activity and passivity which oppose one another, to say nothing of the discordance between the two passivities, the one related to expectation, the other to memory. Therefore, the more the mind makes itself intentio, the more it suffers distentio.
因此，如果我們比較，如我所相信的，意向情感的被動性與靈魂張力的被動性，我們必須說，這三種時間意向是彼此分離的，因為意向活動的對應物是由這種活動本身所產生的被動性，我們出於缺乏更好的名稱，將其指定為印象-意象或符號-意象。不僅這三個行為不重合，而且對立的活動和被動性也不重合，更不用說兩種被動性之間的不協調了，一種與期望有關，另一種與記憶有關。因此，心靈越是將自身變成意向，它就越受到張力的折磨。

Has the aporia of long or short time been resolved? Yes, if we admit: (1) that what is measured is neither future things nor past things, but their expectation and their memory; (2) that these are affections presenting a measurable spatiality of a unique kind; (3) that these affections are like the reverse side of the activity of the mind that continues; and, finally, (4) that this action is itself threefold and thus is distended whenever and wherever it is tensively engaged in.
長時間或短時間的困境是否已經解決？如果我們承認：（1）被測量的既不是未來的事物，也不是過去的事物，而是它們的期望和記憶；（2）這些是呈現獨特空間性的情感；（3）這些情感就像心靈持續活動的反面；最後，（4）這個行動本身是三重的，因此每當和無論在哪裡，它都以張力方式參與時都會被拉伸。

Yet to tell the truth, each stage in this solution itself constitutes an enigma.
然而，說實話，這個解決方案的每個階段本身就構成了一個謎。

How can we measure expectation or memory without taking support from the “points of reference” marking out the space traversed by a moving body, hence without taking into consideration the physical change that produces the trajectory of the moving body in space?
我們如何在不考慮移動物體在空間中 traversed 的"參考點"，以及不考慮產生移動物體在空間中軌跡的物理變化的情況下，測量期望或記憶？
What independent mode of access have we to the extension of the impression inasmuch as it is held to be purely “in” the mind?
我們對於印象的延伸有什麼獨立的存取模式，因為它被認為是純粹「存在於」心靈之中？
Have we any other means of expressing the connection between affectio and intentio, outside of a progressive dynamization of the metaphor of the spaces traversed by expectation, attention, and memory? In this respect, the metaphor of the transit of events through the present seems unsurpassable. It is a good metaphor, a living metaphor, in that it holds together the idea of “passing away,” in the sense of ceasing, and that of “passing through,” in the sense of relegating. There seems to be no concept that “surpasses” (aufhebt) this living metaphor. $^{25}$
除了通過期待、注意力和記憶所經過的空間的隱喻的漸進動態化之外，我們是否有其他方式來表達 affectio 和 intentio 之間的聯繫？在這方面，事件通過當下的 Transit 的隱喻似乎是無可替代的。這是一個好的隱喻，一個活生生的隱喻，因為它將「消逝」的概念（在停止的意義上）和「穿越」的概念（在轉移的意義上）緊密聯繫在一起。似乎沒有任何概念能夠「超越」（aufhebt）這個活生生的隱喻。
The last thesis, if it can still be termed one, constitutes the most impenetrable enigma, that at the price of which we can say that the aporia of measurement is “resolved” by Augustine: that the soul “distends” itself as it “engages” itself-this is the supreme enigma.
最後一個命題，如果它仍然可以被稱為命題，構成了最難以穿透的謎題，以此為代價我們可以說奧古斯丁解決了測量的難題：靈魂「延展」自身，因為它「投入」自身——這是至高無上的謎題。

But it is precisely as an enigma that the resolution of the aporia of measurement is valuable. Augustine’s inestimable discovery is, by reducing the extension of time to the distention of the soul, to have tied this distention to the slippage that never ceases to find its way into the heart of the threefold pres-ent–between the present of the future, the present of the past, and the present of the present. In this way he sees discordance emerge again and again out of the very concordance of the intentions of expectation, attention, and memory.
但正是作為一個謎題，測量難題的解決方案才具有價值。奧古斯丁不可估量的發現是，通過將時間的延伸歸結為靈魂的張力，將這種張力與不斷滲透至三重當下核心的滑動聯繫起來——在未來的當下、過去的當下和當下本身之間。這樣，他不斷看到不協調從期待、注意力和記憶的意向的和諧中再次浮現。

It is to this enigma of the speculation on time that the poetic act of emplot-
正是對於時間推測的這個謎題，詩歌的鋪敘行為作出回應。
ment replies. But Aristotle’s Poetics does not resolve the enigma on the speculative level. It does not really resolve it at all. It puts it to work-poeti-cally-by producing an inverted figure of discordance and concordance. For this new solution, Augustine does leave us one word of encouragement. The fragile example of the canticus recited by heart suddenly becomes, toward the end of the inquiry, a powerful paradigm for other actiones in which, through engaging itself, the soul suffers distension: “What is true of the whole psalm is also true of all its parts and each syllable. It is true of any longer action [in actione longiore] in which I may be engaged and of which the recitation of the psalm may only be a small part. It is true of a man’s whole life, of which all his actions [actiones] are parts. It is true of the whole history of mankind, of which each man’s life is a part” (

28 : 38

). The entire province of narrative is laid out here in its potentiality, from the simple poem, to the story of an entire life, to universal history. It is with these extrapolations, which are simply suggested here, that the present work is concerned.
但亞里士多德的《詩學》並未在思辨層面解決這個謎題。它實際上根本沒有解決它。它是通過產生一個顛倒的不和諧與和諧的形象來運作——詩意地。對於這個新的解決方案，奧古斯丁確實給了我們一句鼓勵的話。突然間，背誦的讚美詩成為一個脆弱的例子，在探究結束時，成為了其他行動的有力範式，在這些行動中，靈魂通過投入自身而遭受了擴張："整首詩篇如何，其每一個部分和每一個音節也是如此。對於我可能正在從事的任何更長的行動，其中讚美詩的吟誦可能只是很小的一部分，也是如此。對於人的整個生命，其中所有的行動都是部分，也是如此。對於整個人類歷史，其中每個人的生命都是一部分"（

28 : 38

）。敘事的整個領域在此被展開其潛在性，從簡單的詩歌，到一個人生的故事，再到普世歷史。正是這些初步推論，在此僅是被暗示，是本著作所關注的。

The Contrast with Eternity
與永恆的對比

I have yet to reply to the objection formulated at the beginning of this study. That objection contested a reading of Book 11 of the Confessions that artificially isolates sections

14 : 17 - 28 : 37

from the great meditation on eternity that frames them. I provided only a partial response to this objection when I stressed the autonomy that this investigation possesses owing to its repeated confrontations with the skeptical arguments that were essentially concerned with time. In this respect, the thesis that time is “in” the soul and finds “in” the soul the principle of measurement of time, is sufficient in itself inasmuch as it replies to the aporias found within the notion of time. In order to be understood, the notion of distentio animi requires no more than to be contrasted with the intentio immanent in the “action” of the mind.

^{26}

我尚未回覆在本研究開始時提出的異議。該異議質疑《懺悔錄》第 11 卷中的閱讀方式人為地將

14 : 17 - 28 : 37

部分從環繞其周圍的永恆大冥想中孤立出來。當我強調這項調查由於其反覆與基本關注於時間的懷疑論論證的對峙而具有自主性時，我僅對這一異議作出部分回應。在這方面，時間"在"靈魂中，並在靈魂中找到時間測量的原則的論點本身就足夠，因為它回應了時間概念中存在的難題。為了被理解，心靈寬展（distentio animi）概念只需與心靈"行動"中的內在意向（intentio）進行對比。

^{26}

And yet something is missing from the full sense of distentio animi, which the contrast with eternity alone can provide. But what is missing does not concern what I shall call the sufficient sense of the distentio animi. I mean the sense that suffices to reply to the aporias of nonbeing and of measurement. What is missing is of a different order. I discern three major ways in which the meditation on eternity affects the speculation concerning time.
然而，心靈寬展的完整意義中缺少某些東西，只有與永恆的對比才能提供。但缺少的並不涉及我所謂的心靈寬展的充分意義。我指的是足以回應非存在和測量難題的意義。缺少的是另一種秩序。我辨別出永恆冥想影響時間思考的三種主要方式。

Its first function is to place all speculation about time within the horizon of a limiting idea that forces us to think at once about time and about what is other than time. Its second function is to intensify the experience of distentio on the existential level. Its third function is to call upon this experience to surpass itself by moving in the direction of eternity, and hence to display an internal hierarchy in opposition to our fascination with the representation of a rectilinear time.
其第一個功能是將所有關於時間的思考置於一個限定性理念的視野中，迫使我們同時思考時間及超越時間的事物。其第二個功能是在存在層面上加強寬展的體驗。其第三個功能是呼喚這種體驗超越自身，朝向永恆的方向移動，從而顯示出一種與我們對直線時間表象的迷戀相對立的內在等級。

It is uncontestable that Augustine’s meditation is indivisibly concerned
奧古斯丁的冥想不可否認地同時關注
with eternity and time. Book 11 of the Confessions opens with the first verse of Genesis (in one of the Latin versions known in Africa during the period when the Confessions were written): “in principio fecit Deus. . . .” Moreover, the meditation that covers the first fourteen chapters of Book 11 joins together, indivisibly, the praise of the psalmist with a type of speculation that is, for the most part, Platonic and Neoplatonic.

^{27}

Such a meditation leaves no place for a derivation, in any conceivable sense of the word, of eternity from time. What is posited, confessed, thought, is in one stroke the contrast of eternity with time. The work of the intelligence bears in no way on the question of whether or not eternity exists. The anteriority of eternity with respect to time-in a sense of anteriority that remains to be determined-is given in the contrast between “something that exists that was not created” and something that has a before and an after that is subject to “change” and to “variation” (

4 : 6

). This contrast is given in an exclamation: “Earth and the heavens are before our eyes. The very fact that they are proclaims that they were created, for they are subject to change and variation” (ibid.). And Augustine stresses: “This we know” (ibid.).

^{28}

This said, we can see that the work of the intelligence results from the difficulties raised by this very confession of eternity: “Let me hear and understand the meaning of the words [quomodo]: In the Beginning you made heaven and earth” (3:5). (This question is repeated at the beginning of 5:7.) In this sense, eternity is just like time. That it exists causes no problem; how it exists and acts leaves us puzzled. It is out of this puzzlement that arises the first function of the assertion of eternity in relation to that of time: the function of the limiting idea.
與永恆和時間。《懺悔錄》第 11 卷以創世紀的第一節經文開篇（使用當時非洲所知的拉丁文版本）：「在最初，上帝創造了……」。此外，覆蓋第 11 卷前 14 章的沉思不可分割地將詩篇歌頌與大多為柏拉圖和新柏拉圖主義的思辨類型結合。

^{27}

這種沉思不給任何可想像的意義上從時間推導永恆留有餘地。以一擊之勢，被設定、懺悔、思考的是永恆與時間的對比。智慧的工作絲毫不觸及永恆是否存在的問題。永恆在時間之前的優先性（其優先性的意義有待確定）體現在「某些未被創造的存在」與「具有前後且受『變化』和『變異』支配」的事物之間的對比。

4 : 6

這種對比在一個感嘆中給出：「地球和天空就在我們眼前。它們存在的事實本身宣告它們是被創造的，因為它們受制於變化和變異」（同上）。奧古斯丁強調：「這是我們所知道的」（同上）。

^{28}

話雖如此，我們可以看到，智慧的工作源於這種永恆的懺悔所引發的困難：「讓我聽到並理解這些字詞的意義：在最初，你創造了天地」（3:5）。（這個問題在 5:7 的開頭重複出現。）從這個意義上說，永恆就像時間。它的存在不成問題；但它如何存在和運作卻令我們困惑。正是從這種困惑中，永恆與時間關係中的第一功能—限定性概念的功能—應運而生。

This function results from the linking together of confession and questioning throughout the first fourteen chapters of Book 11 of the Confessions. To the first question, “But by what means [quomodo] did you make heaven and earth?” (

5 : 7

) comes the answer, in the same spirit of praise, “In your Word alone you created them” (ibid.). But out of this reply a new question arises, “But how did you speak?” (6:8). This is answered, with the same confidence, by the eternity of the Verbum: “In your Word all [omnia] is uttered at one and the same time [simul], yet eternally [sempiterne]. If it were not so, your Word would be subject to time and change, and therefore would be neither truly eternal nor truly immortal” (7:9). And he confesses, “This I know, my God, and I thank you for the Knowledge” (7:9).
這個功能源於《懺悔錄》第 11 卷前 14 章中懺悔和質疑的連結。對第一個問題，"但你以何種方式[quomodo]創造了天地？"（

5 : 7

），回答是以同樣的讚美精神："你僅在你的話語中創造了它們"（同上）。但是，從這個回覆中又產生了新的問題："但你是如何說話的？"（6:8）這以聖言的永恆性自信地回答："在你的話語中，所有[omnia]同時[simul]且永恆[sempiterne]被表達。若非如此，你的話語將受制於時間和變化，因此既非真正永恆，也非真正不朽"（7:9）。他懺悔道："這我知道，我的上帝，並為這知識感謝你"（7:9）。

Let us, then, inquire into this eternity of the Word. A double contrast is examined here, which before becoming a source of new difficulties is a source of negativity with regard to time.
讓我們探究這聖言的永恆性。這裡被檢視的是一個雙重對比，在成為新難題之前，它首先是關於時間的負面來源。

In the first place, to say that things are made in the Word is to deny that God created in the same way as does an artisan, who makes things starting from something else: “Nor was it in the universe that you made the universe, because until [antequam] the universe was made there was no place [quia non erat] where it could be made”

(5 : 7)

. The creation ex nihilo is anticipated
首先，說事物是在聖言中被造，就是否定上帝以工匠的方式創造，即從其他事物開始創造："你也不是在宇宙中創造宇宙，因為在宇宙被造之前，並無地方[quia non erat]可以被造"

(5 : 7)

。這裡預示了從無中創造
here, and this original nothingness henceforth strikes time with an ontological deficiency.
，這種原初的虛無從此對時間帶來本體論的缺陷。

However, the decisive contrast, generating new negations-and new diffi-culties-is that which opposes the divine Verbum to the human vox. The creating Word is not like the human voice that “begins” and “ceases,” or like syllables that are “heard” and then “die away” (6:8). The Word and the voice are as irreducible to one another and at the same time as inseparable as are the internal ear that hears the Word and receives the teaching of the internal master and the external ear that allows the verba to enter and transmits them to the vigilant intelligence. The Verbum remains, the verba disappear. With this contrast (and the accompanying “comparison”), time is once again struck with a negative characteristic: if the Verbum remains, the verba “are not at all, because they die away and are lost”

(6 : 8) .^{29}

In this sense, the two functions of nonbeing overlap.
然而，產生新的否定和新困難的決定性對比，是將神聖的聖言與人類的聲音對立。創造的聖言不像人類的聲音那樣"開始"和"停止"，或像聽到然後消逝的音節。聖言和聲音之間既不可化約，又不可分割，就像內在的耳朵聽到聖言並接收內在導師的教導，而外在的耳朵允許詞語進入並傳遞給警覺的智慧。聖言永存，詞語消逝。通過這種對比（和隨之而來的"比較"），時間再次被賦予負面特徵：如果聖言永存，詞語"根本不存在，因為它們消逝並遺失"。在這個意義上，非存在的兩種功能重疊。

The progression of negation will henceforth never cease to accompany that of the questioning that itself is dependent upon the confession of eternity. Once again, in fact, the question emerges out of the preceding response: “You create them by your Word alone and in no other way. Yet [nec tamen] the things which you create by your Word do not all come into being at one and the same time, nor are they eternal” (7:9). In other words, how can a temporal creature be made in and through the eternal Word? “Why is this so, O Lord my God? In some degree I see why it is, but I do not know how to put it into words” (8:10). Eternity, in this sense, is no less a source of enigmas than is time.
否定的進程從此將不斷伴隨著質疑，而質疑本身取決於永恆的告白。事實上，問題再次從先前的回應中浮現："你僅通過你的聖言創造它們，別無他法。然而，你通過聖言創造的事物並非同時存在，也不是永恆的"。換句話說，暫時的生命如何能在永恆的聖言中和通過永恆的聖言被創造？"為什麼是這樣，我的上帝？在某種程度上，我明白為什麼是這樣，但我不知道如何用言語表達。"在這個意義上，永恆不亞於時間，同樣是謎題的源頭。

Augustine answers this difficulty by attributing to the Word an “eternal reason” which ascribes a beginning and an end to the being of created things.

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But this reply contains the seed of a major difficulty that will long occupy Augustine as he ponders what was before creation. Indeed, the way in which eternal reason ascribes a beginning and an end implies that it knows “the moment when” (quando) this thing had to begin or end. This quando leaves us once more at sea.
奧古斯丁通過歸因於聖言一個"永恆理性"來回答這個困難，這個理性賦予了被創造事物的存在開始和結束。但這個回應包含了一個主要困難的種子，這個困難將長期困擾奧古斯丁，因為他思考在創造之前是什麼。事實上，永恆理性賦予開始和結束的方式意味著它知道這個事物"何時"必須開始或結束。這個"何時"再次使我們陷入迷茫。

To begin, it makes both plausible and respectable the question raised by the Manicheans and by some Platonists, which other Christian thinkers had held to be ridiculous and had treated derisively.
首先，它使瑪尼教徒和一些柏拉圖主義者提出的問題變得既合理又值得尊重，而其他基督教思想家曾認為這個問題荒謬且予以嘲笑。

Here, then, Augustine is confronted with his adversary’s threefold argument : “What was God doing before [antequam] he made heaven and earth?” “If he was at rest . . . and doing nothing, why did he not continue to do nothing for ever more, just as he had always done in the past?” “But if God’s will that there should be a creation was there from all eternity, why is it that what he has created is not also eternal?” (

10 : 12

). We shall be concerned, as we consider Augustine’s responses, with the progress of the ontological negativity affecting the experience of the distentio animi, which is itself negative on the psychological level.
在此，奧古斯丁面對他對手的三重論點："在他創造天地之前，上帝在做什麼？""如果他當時處於休息狀態……什麼也不做，為什麼他不會永遠繼續什麼也不做，就像他過去一直做的那樣？""但如果上帝要創造的意願從永恆就存在，為什麼他所創造的東西不也是永恆的？"我們將在考慮奧古斯丁的回應時，關注影響心靈張力經驗的本體論負面性的進展，這種負面性在心理層面本身就是消極的。

Before proposing his personal response to these difficulties which, once again, result from the confession of eternity, Augustine refines his notion of eternity one last time. Eternity is “for ever still [semper stans]” in contrast to things that are “never still.” This stillness lies in the fact that “in eternity nothing moves into the past: all is present [totum esse praesens]. Time, on the other hand, is never all present at once” (11:13). Negativity reaches its highest pitch here. In order to push as far as possible the reflection on the distentio animi, that is, on the slippage of the threefold present, it must be “compared” to a present with neither past nor future.

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This extreme negation underlies his response to the apparently frivolous argument.
在再次面對永恆的告白所產生的這些困難之前，奧古斯丁最後一次精煉了他對永恆的概念。永恆是"永遠靜止的[semper stans]"，與那些"從未靜止"的事物形成對比。這種靜止在於"在永恆中，沒有什麼會進入過去：一切都是當下[totum esse praesens]。而時間，卻永遠不能同時都在當下"（11:13）。否定性在此達到了最高點。為了盡可能地深入反思 distentio animi，即三重當下的滑動，必須將其"比較"於一個既無過去也無未來的當下。

If Augustine takes such pains to refute the argument, it is because it constitutes an aporia produced by the very thesis of eternity.

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奧古斯丁之所以如此費力地反駁這個論點，是因為它構成了由永恆命題本身產生的一個難解之謎。

The reply to the first formulation of the argument is forthright: “before he made heaven and earth, God made nothing” (12:14). Certainly, the reply leaves intact the assumption that there was a “before,” but the important thing is that this before is struck with nothingness. The “nothing” of “making nothing” is the before that precedes creation. We must therefore think of “nothing” in order to think of time as beginning and ending. In this way, time is, as it were, surrounded by nothingness.
對第一種論點的回應是直截了當的："在他創造天地之前，上帝什麼也沒創造"（12:14）。當然，這個回應保留了存在一個"之前"的假設，但重要的是，這個之前被虛無所籠罩。"什麼也沒創造"中的"虛無"就是在創造之前的狀態。因此，我們必須思考"虛無"，以思考時間的開始和結束。這樣，時間彷彿被虛無所環繞。

The reply to the second formulation of the argument is even more remarkable. There is no before in relation to creation because in creating the world God created time: “You are the Maker of all time” (13:15). “You must have made that time, for time could not elapse before you made it” (ibid.). With one stroke, the response does away with the question: “If there was not time, there was no ‘then’ [non erat tunc]” (ibid.). This “no then” is negative to the same extent as is the “nothing” of making nothing. Thought is thus entrusted with the task of forming the idea of the absence of time in order to think time through as far as possible as that which passes. Time must be thought of as transitory in order to be fully experienced as transition.
對第二種論點的回應更加卓越。在創造世界時上帝創造了時間，所以在關係到創造時並沒有「之前」："你是所有時間的創造者"（13:15）。"你必須已經製造了那個時間，因為在你製造它之前時間不可能流逝"（同上）。這一回應一舉消除了問題："如果當時沒有時間，就不存在『那時』[non erat tunc]"（同上）。這個「沒有那時」與「無中生有」一樣消極。思想因此被委託了形成「時間缺失」的想法，以盡可能地思考時間，直到它被體驗為過渡。時間必須被思考為短暫的，才能充分體驗到其過渡性。

However, the thesis that time was created along with the world-a thesis that is already found in Plato, Timaeus 38d-leaves open the possibility that there were other times before time. (Confessions 11, 30:40-end, mentions this possibility, either as a speculative hypothesis or in order to preserve a temporal dimension peculiar to angelic beings.) Whatever the case, Augustine gives his thesis the extra twist of the reductio ad absurdum in order to confront this possibility. Even if there were a time before time, this time would still be a created thing since God is the maker of all time. A time before all creation is thus unthinkable. This argument suffices to dismiss the assumption of God’s idleness before creation. To say that God was idle is to say that there was a time in which he never did anything at all before he acted. The temporal categories, therefore, are not suited to characterizing a “before-theworld.”
然而，時間與世界一同被創造的論點——這一論點已見於柏拉圖的《蒂邁歐斯篇》38d——仍然留下了在時間之前可能存在其他時間的可能性。（《懺悔錄》11，30:40-end，提到了這種可能性，無論是作為一種推測性假設，還是為了保留天使存在特有的時間維度。）無論如何，奧古斯丁用 absurdum 歸謬法給他的論點增添了額外的轉折，以面對這種可能性。即使存在時間之前的時間，這個時間仍然是被創造的，因為上帝是所有時間的創造者。因此，早於所有創造的時間是不可思議的。這一論證足以駁斥上帝在創造之前處於閒置狀態的假設。說上帝處於閒置是指在他採取行動之前，曾有一個完全未做任何事的時間。因此，時間範疇不適合描述「世界之前」的狀態。

The reply to the third formulation of the adversary’s argument provides Au-
回應敵對者論點的第三種表述提供了奧古
gustine with the opportunity to add the final touch to his opposition between time and eternity. In order to dismiss any idea of “newness” in the will of God, the idea of a “before” preceding creation must be given a meaning that excludes all temporality. Antecedence must be thought of as superiority, as excellence, as the supreme height: “It is in eternity, which is supreme [celsitudine] over time because it is a never-ending present, that you are at once before all past time and after all future time” (13:16). The negations are sharpened even more: “Your years are completely present to you all at once, because they are at a permanent standstill [simul stant]” (ibid.). This simul stant as well as the “today” of which Exodus speaks assumes the atemporal meaning of that which surpasses without preceding. Passing away is less than surpassing.
奧古斯丁藉此機會為他關於時間與永恆的對比增添最後一筆。為了排除神意中「新」的任何想法，必須賦予「之前」這個前創造的概念一個排除所有時間性的意義。先前性必須被理解為優越性、卓越性，作為至高無上的高度：「在永恆中，永恆因其是無盡的現在而超越時間，你同時在所有過去時間之前，並在所有未來時間之後」（13:16）。否定更加尖銳：「你的年歲同時完全存在，因為它們處於永恆不變的狀態」（同上）。這個「同時存在」以及出埃及記所說的「今日」，都假設了超越而不是先於的無時間性意義。逝去遠不及超越。

If I have so insisted on the ontological negativity that the contrast between eternity and time brings to light in the psychological experience of the distentio animi, this is certainly not in order to lock up Augustine’s notion of eternity within the Kantian function of a limiting idea. The meeting of the Hebraic tradition and of Platonism in the interpretation of Exodus 3:20-ego sum qui sum in its Latin translation-does not allow us to interpret the thought of eternity as a thought lacking an object.

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Besides, the conjoining of praise and speculation attests to the fact that Augustine does not restrict himself to thinking of eternity. He addresses himself to the Eternal, he invokes the eternal using the form of the second person. The eternal present declares itself in the first person: sum, not esse.

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Here again, speculation is inseparable from the recognition of the one who declares himself. It is in this that it is inseparable from the hymn. In this sense, we can speak of an experience of eternity in Augustine, with the reservations that will be stated later. But it is precisely this experience of eternity that has the function of a limiting idea, when the intelligence “compares” time with eternity. It is the recoil effect of this “comparison” on the living experience of the distentio animi that makes the thought of eternity the limiting idea against the horizon of which the experience of the distentio animi receives, on the ontological level, the negative mark of a lack or a defect in being.

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如果我如此堅持本體論的負面性，這種永恆與時間之間的對比在心理經驗中的「靈魂分散」（distentio animi）中所呈現出來，這絕不是為了將奧古斯丁的永恆概念局限於康德的限定性概念功能。希伯來傳統與柏拉圖主義在對出埃及記 3:20 的解讀中—「我是我所是」的拉丁語譯文—不允許我們將永恆的思想解釋為缺乏對象的思想。

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此外，讚美與思辨的結合證明了奧古斯丁並不局限於思考永恆。他面向永恆，以第二人稱的形式祈請永恆。永恆的當下以第一人稱宣告自身：sum（我是），而非 esse（存在）。

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在此，思辨與承認宣告者不可分割。正是在這一點上，它與頌歌不可分割。在這個意義上，我們可以談論奧古斯丁的永恆經驗，當然會有後續的保留。但正是這種永恆經驗在智性「比較」時間與永恆時具有限定性概念的功能。正是這種「比較」對「靈魂分散」的生動經驗的回溯效果，使得永恆的思想成為一個限定性概念，在其視野下，「靈魂分散」的經驗在本體論層面上接受了作為存在缺陷或不足的負面標記。

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The reverberation-le retentissement, as Eugène Minkowski would have said-of this negation that is thought on the living experience of temporality will now convince us that the absence of eternity is not simply a limit that is thought, but a lack that is felt at the heart of temporal experience. The limiting idea then becomes the sorrow proper to the negative.
這種被思考的否定的迴響—正如歐仁·明可夫斯基（Eugène Minkowski）所說的「retentissement（餘震）」—將說服我們，永恆的缺席不僅僅是一個被思考的限制，而是在時間性經驗的核心所感受到的一種缺失。限定性概念於是成為負面性特有的悲傷。

The contrast between eternity and time is not limited to surrounding our experience of time with negativity, as we do when we link our thought of time to what is other than time. This experience is permeated through and through with negativity. Intensified in this way on the existential level, the experience of distension is raised to the level of a lamentation. The outline of this new
永恆與時間之間的對比，不僅限於用負面情緒包圍我們對時間的體驗，正如我們將思考與非時間的事物聯繫時所做的那樣。這種體驗始終充滿負面性。在存在層面上被如此強化，這種張力的體驗被提升到哀嘆的層次。這種新的對比的輪廓
contrast is contained in the admirable prayer of

2 : 3

already mentioned. The hymn includes the lamentation, and the confessio brings them both to the level of language.

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包含在已經提到的

2 : 3

令人欽佩的祈禱中。讚美詩包含了哀嘆，懺悔將它們都提升到語言的層次。

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Against the backdrop of the stillness of eternity, the lamentation unashamedly displays the author’s feelings. “What is that light whose gentle beams [interlucet] now and again strike through [percutit] to my heart, causing me to shudder in awe yet firing me with their warmth [et inhorresco et inardesco]? I shudder to feel how different I am from it: yet in so far as I am like it, I am aglow with its fire” (

9 : 11

). Already, in the course of the narration of the Confessions, as he recounts his vain efforts at Plotinian ecstasy, Augustine laments: “And I discovered that I was far from you in the region of dissimilarity [in regione dissimilitudinis]” (7 10:16). This expression, which comes from Plato (Statesman 273d) and which had been transported into the Christian milieu through the intermediary of Plotinus (Enneads I, 8:13, 16-17), becomes particularly striking here. It no longer refers, as it did in Plotinus, to the fall into the dark mire but marks instead the radical ontological difference that separates the creature from the creator, the difference that the soul discovers precisely in its movement of returning to its source and by its very effort to know its origin.

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在永恆寂靜的背景下，哀嘆毫不掩飾地展現作者的感受。「是什麼光，其柔和的光芒現在不時穿透[interlucet]到我的心中，使我在敬畏中顫抖，同時又用其溫暖點燃[et inhorresco et inardesco]？我顫抖於感受到我與它的不同：然而，在我與它相似的程度上，我正在燃燒著它的火焰」（

9 : 11

）。已經在《懺悔錄》的敘述過程中，當他敘述他對普羅提諾式狂喜的徒勞努力時，奧古斯丁哀嘆道：「我發現我在相異性的地域[in regione dissimilitudinis]遠離了你」（7 10:16）。這一表達源自柏拉圖（《政治家》273d），並通過普羅提諾（《九章》I, 8:13, 16-17）的中介被引入基督教環境，在此變得尤其醒目。它不再像在普羅提諾那樣指向墮入黑暗泥潭，而是標誌著創造物與創造者之間的根本本體論差異，這種差異正是靈魂在回歸其源頭的運動中，並通過其努力認識其起源而發現的。

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If, however, the ability to distinguish the similar from the dissimilar belongs to the intelligence that “compares” (6:8), its reverberation profoundly affects both the scope and the depth of feeling. It is remarkable in this respect that the final pages of Book 11, which complete the setting of the analysis of time into the meditation on the relationship between eternity and time (29:39-31:41), propose a final interpretation of the distentio animi, marked by the same tone of praise and lamentation as the first chapters of this book. Distentio animi no longer provides just the “solution” to the aporia of the measurement of time. It now expresses the way in which the soul, deprived of the stillness of the eternal present, is torn asunder: “But to win your favor is dearer than life itself. I see now that my life has been wasted in distractions [distentio est vita mea]” (29:39). It is in fact the entire dialectic of intentiodistentio, a dialectic within time itself, that is taken up again in terms of the contrast between eternity and time. While the distentio becomes synonymous with the dispersal into the many and with the wandering of the old Adam, the intentio tends to be identified with the fusion of the inner man (“until . . . I am fused into one with you” [ibid.]). So the intentio is no longer the anticipation of the entire poem before its recitation which makes it move from the future toward the past, but the hope of the last things, to the very extent that the past that is to be forgotten is not the storehouse of memory but the emblem of the old Adam according to Paul in Philippians 3:12-14: “forgetting what I have left behind, I look forward [non distentus sed extentus], not to what lies ahead of me in this life and will surely pass away, but to an eternal goal. I am intent [sed secundum intentionem] upon this one purpose, not distracted
然而，如果辨別相似與不相似的能力屬於"比較"的智慧（6:8），其迴響深刻地影響了感受的範圍和深度。在這方面值得注意的是，第 11 卷的最後幾頁完成了將時間分析置於永恆與時間關係的沉思（29:39-31:41），提出了一個最終對心靈張力的解釋，其基調與本書前幾章相同的讚美和悲嘆。心靈張力不再僅僅提供測量時間的困境的"解決方案"。現在它表達了靈魂如何在被剝奪永恆現在的寧靜中撕裂："但贏得你的恩寵比生命本身更珍貴。我現在看到我的生命已在分心中虛度【我的生命是張力】"（29:39）。事實上，意向-張力的整個辯證法，是在永恆與時間的對比中重新審視的。當張力成為眾多和舊亞當流浪的同義詞時，意向傾向於與內在的人融合（"直到……我與你融為一體"【同上】）。因此，意向不再是整首詩在朗誦前的預期，使其從未來移向過去，而是對末世的希望，正如保羅在腓立比書 3:12-14 中所說：遺忘已拋在身後，我展望（不是分散，而是伸展），不是面前在此生必將逝去的事物，而是朝向永恆的目標。我專注（按照意向）於這一目的，不分心。
[secundum distentionem] by other aims” (ibid.). The same words recur: distentio and intentio, but this is no longer in a purely speculative context of aporia and inquiry but rather in the dialectic of praise and lamentation.

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With this shift in meaning that affects the distentio animi, the borderline separating the condition of created beings from that of fallen beings is tacitly crossed: “I am divided [dissilui] between time gone by and time to come, and its course is a mystery to me” (ibid.). The “lamentations” in which our years pass are inseparably those of the sinner and the created being.
「根據心靈的擴張」被其他目的所影響（同上）。同樣的詞彙再次出現：distentio 和 intentio，但這已不再是純粹推測性的困境和探究，而是在讚美和悲嘆的辯證中。隨著影響心靈擴張的意義轉變，分隔受造生靈與墮落生靈的界限被默默地跨越：「我在逝去的時間和即將到來的時間之間分裂，其進程對我來說是一個謎」（同上）。我們年歲中的「悲嘆」不可分割地屬於罪人和受造生靈。

Again it is in relation to eternity that we can fully grasp the sense of all the expressions found in Augustine’s other works that lend their metaphorical resources to the central metaphor of the distentio.
再次，只有在關聯永恆時，我們才能充分把握奧古斯丁其他作品中所有表達的意義，這些表達為核心隱喻 distentio 提供了隱喻資源。

In an important essay on “Les Catégories de la temporalité chez saint Augustin,” in which he pays particular attention to the Enarrationes in Psalmos and the Sermones, Stanislas Boros arrives at four “synthetic images,” each of which joins together what I earlier termed the sorrow of the finite with the celebration of the absolute: to temporality as “dissolution” are linked the images of devastation, of swooning, of gradually sinking, of unfulfilled aim, of dispersal, of alteration, and of extreme indigence; to temporality as “agony” are related images of the deathwatch, of sickness and frailty, of civil warfare, of tearful captivity, of aging, and of sterility; temporality as “banishment” includes the images of tribulation, exile, vulnerability, wandering, nostalgia, and vain desire; and finally, the theme of the “night” governs the images of blindness, darkness, and opacity.

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There is not one of these four principal images or of their variants that does not receive the strength of its meaning

a

contrario in relation to the opposing symbolism of eternity, in the figures of recollection, living fullness, being at home, and light.
在斯坦尼斯拉斯·博羅斯關於「聖奧古斯丁的時間性範疇」的重要論文中，他特別關注《詩篇注釋》和《講道集》，提出了四種「綜合意象」，每一種都結合了我早先所稱的有限的悲傷與絕對的慶典：就「瓦解」的時間性而言，連結了毀壞、昏厥、逐漸下沉、未實現的目標、散佈、變化和極度匱乏的意象；就「苦 agony」的時間性而言，相關的意象有臨終、疾病和脆弱、內戰、含淚的俘虜、衰老和不孕；「放逐」的時間性包括磨難、流放、脆弱、漂泊、思鄉和徒勞的渴望；最後，「夜晚」主題統轄了失明、黑暗和不透明的意象。這四種主要意象或其變體中，沒有一個不是在與永恆的對立象徵中獲得其意義的力量，即回憶、生命的充實、家的感覺和光明的形象。

Separated from this branching symbolism, which is engendered by the dialectic of eternity and time, the distentio animi would be no more than the sketch of a speculative response brought to the aporias that are continuously produced by skeptical argumentation. Taken up within the dynamics of praise and lamentation, the distentio animi becomes a living experience which puts flesh on the skeleton of a counterargument.
與這種由永恆和時間之辯證法所生成的分支象徵主義分離，心靈的伸展（distentio animi）將不再是對懷疑論持續產生的難題的投機性回應的草圖。被讚美和哀嘆的動態所吸收，心靈的伸展成為一種活生生的體驗，為反駁的骨架賦予血肉。

The third way in which the dialectic of time and eternity affects the interpretation of the distentio animi is no less important. At the very heart of temporal experience, it produces a hierarchy of levels of temporalization, according to how close or how far a given experience approaches or moves away from the pole of eternity.
時間和永恆的辯證法影響心靈的伸展（distentio animi）解釋的第三種方式同樣重要。在時間體驗的核心，它根據特定體驗接近或遠離永恆極點的程度，產生了一種時間化的層次等級。

The accent here is placed less on the dissemblance than on the resemblance between eternity and time in the “comparison” made by the intelligence with regard to each of them (

6 : 8

). This resemblance is expressed in time’s capacity to approximate eternity, which Plato had included in the very definition of time and which the first Christian thinkers had begun to reinterpret in terms of
在智慧對它們的"比較"中，重點不在於差異，而在於永恆和時間之間的相似性。這種相似性表現在時間接近永恆的能力上，柏拉圖曾將其納入時間的定義，而第一批基督教思想家開始以創造、道成肉身和救贖的概念重新解釋。
the ideas of creation, incarnation, and salvation. Augustine gives a unique accent to this reinterpretation by connecting together the themes of the teaching by the inner Word and the return. Between the eternal Verbum and the human vox there is not only difference and distance but the relation of teaching and communication. The Word is that inner master, sought and heard “within” (intus) (8:10): “It is true that I hear [audio] your voice, O Lord, telling me that only a master who really teaches us [docet nos] really speaks to us.
奧古斯丁通過將內在言語教導和歸返的主題連結在一起，賦予這種重新解釋獨特的色彩。在永恆的道（Verbum）和人類的聲音（vox）之間，不僅存在差異和距離，還有教導和溝通的關係。這道是那位在"內心"（intus）尋找和聽到的內在導師：「確實，主啊，我聽到你的聲音告訴我，只有真正教導我們的導師才真正與我們交談。」
But who is our teacher except the Truth which never changes?” (ibid.). In this way, our first relationship to language is not the fact that we talk but that we listen and that, beyond the external verba, we hear the inner Verbum. The return is nothing other than this listening: for unless the principle “remained when we wandered in error, there would be none to whom we could return and restore ourselves. But when we return from error, we return by knowing the Truth; and in order that we may know the Truth he teaches us, because he is the Beginning and he also speaks to us” (ibid.). Thus are linked together teaching,

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recognition, and return. The teaching, we could say, bridges the abyss that opens up between the eternal Verbum and the temporal vox. It elevates time, moving it in the direction of eternity.
但是除了那永不改變的真理，誰是我們的老師呢？」（同上）。以這種方式，我們與語言的第一種關係不是我們說話，而是我們聽，並且超越外在的言語，我們聽到內在的聖言。回歸無非是這種聆聽：因為除非原則在我們流浪於錯誤中時仍然存在，否則就不會有我們可以返回並重建自己的對象。但當我們從錯誤中回歸時，我們通過認識真理而回歸；為了讓我們認識真理，他教導我們，因為他是開始，他也向我們說話」（同上）。這樣，教導、認知和回歸就聯繫在一起了。可以說，教導架起了永恆聖言和暫時言語之間開啟的深淵。它提升了時間，將其引向永恆。

This is the very movement that is narrated by the first nine books of the Confessions. And in this sense the narration actually accomplishes the itinerary whose conditions of possibility are reflected upon in Book 11. This book, indeed, attests to the fact that the attraction of the eternity of the Word felt by temporal experience is not such as to plunge the narration, which is still temporal, into a contemplation free from the constraints of time. In this respect, the failure of the efforts at Plotinian ecstasy, recounted in Book 7, is definitive. Neither the conversion recounted in Book 8, nor even the ecstasy of Ostia which marks the culmination of the narrative in Book 9, ever eliminate the temporal condition of the soul. These two culminating experiences only put an end to wandering, the fallen form of the distentio animi. But this is done in order to inspire a peregrination that sends the soul off again on the roads of time. Peregrination and narration are grounded in time’s approximation of eternity, which, far from abolishing their difference, never stops contributing to it. This is indeed why, when Augustine derides the frivolousness of those who attribute a new will to God at the moment of creation, and when he contrasts the way “their thoughts still twist and turn” to the “steady” mind of the one who listens to the Word (11:13), he refers to this steadiness, which is similar to that of the eternal present, only to reiterate the difference between time and eternity: “But if only their minds could be seized and held steady [ut paululum stet], they would be still for awhile and, for that short moment, they would glimpse the splendour of eternity which is forever still [semper stantis]. They would contrast it with time, which is never still, and see that it is not comparable” (ibid.). By opening this distance, proximity also reiterates the
這是《懺悔錄》前九卷所敘述的運動。而在這個意義上，敘事實際上完成了在第 11 卷中被反思其可能性條件的行程。這一卷確實證明，被時間經驗感受到的聖言永恆的吸引力，並不足以使仍然處於時間中的敘事陷入擺脫時間約束的沉思。在這方面，在第 7 卷中敘述的普羅提諾式狂喜的嘗試是徹底失敗的。無論是第 8 卷中敘述的皈依，還是標誌敘事高潮的奧斯蒂亞的狂喜，都從未消除靈魂的時間性條件。這兩種巔峰體驗僅僅終止了流浪，即靈魂擴散的墮落形式。但這是為了激發一種朝聖，再次將靈魂送上時間的道路。朝聖和敘事植根於時間對永恆的逼近，這種逼近非但不會消除它們的差異，反而不斷加劇這種差異。正是因為如此，當奧古斯丁嘲笑那些在創造之刻歸結於上帝一個新意志的人，當他將「他們的思想仍在扭轉」與聽從聖言者的「穩定」心智相對比時（11:13），他只是為了重申時間與永恆之間的差異而提及這種穩定性，這種穩定性類似於永恆的當下："但若他們的心智能被捕捉並保持穩定〔ut paululum stet〕，他們就會靜止片刻，在那短暫的瞬間，他們將瞥見永遠靜止〔semper stantis〕的永恆之輝煌。他們將把它與永不靜止的時間相對比，並看出兩者不可同日而語"（同上）。通過開闢這種距離，接近性也重申了
limiting function of eternity in relation to time: “If only men’s minds could be seized and held still! They would see how eternity, in which there is neither past nor future, determines [dictet] both past and future time” (ibid.)
如果只能夠掌握和靜止人們的思維！他們將看到永恆，在其中既無過去也無未來，決定了過去和未來的時間。

Of course, when the dialectic of intentio and distentio is definitively anchored in that of eternity and time, the timid question that has twice been uttered (“Who will hold still . . . ?”) is replaced by a more confident affirmation: “Then I shall be cast [stabo] and set firm [solidabor] in the mould of your truth” (

30 : 40

). But this firmness remains in the future, the time of hope. It is still in the midst of the experience of distension that the wish for permanence is uttered: “until [donec] I am purified and melted by the fire of your love and fused into one with you” (29:39).
當然，當意向性和擴展性的辯證法最終固定在永恆和時間的辯證法中，那個曾經兩次被提出的怯生生的問題（"誰能夠靜止……？"）被一個更有信心的肯定所取代："那麼我將被拋入並牢固地安置在你的真理模具中"。但這種堅定仍在未來，希望的時間。它仍然處於擴展的經驗之中，發出了對永恆的渴望："直到我被你愛的火燒淨、融化，並與你融為一體"。

In this way, without losing the autonomy that the discussion of the old aporias concerning time has conferred upon it, the theme of distension and intention acquires from its setting within the meditation on eternity and time an intensification that will be echoed in all that follows in the present work. This intensification does not just consist of the fact that time is thought of as abolished by the limiting idea of an eternity that strikes time with nothingness. Nor is this intensification reduced to transferring into the sphere of lamentation and wailing what had until then been only a speculative argument. It aims more fundamentally at extracting from the very experience of time the resources of an internal hierarchization, one whose advantage lies not in abolishing time but in deepening it.
這樣，不失去討論時間的舊難題所賦予的自主性，擴展性和意向性的主題從其在永恆和時間的沉思中獲得了一種強化，這種強化將在接下來的工作中回響。這種強化不僅僅在於用一個將時間歸於虛無的永恆極限概念來思考時間。也不僅僅是將原本只是理論性論證的內容轉移到哀嘆和哭泣的領域。它更根本的目標是從時間的經驗本身中提取一種內在的等級劃分，其優勢不在於消除時間，而在於加深對時間的理解。

The effect of this last remark on my entire undertaking is considerable. If it is true that the major tendency of modern theory of narrative-in historiography and the philosophy of history as well as in narratology-is to “dechronologize” narrative, the struggle against the linear representation of time does not necessarily have as its sole outcome the turning of narrative into “logic,” but rather may deepen its temporality. Chronology-or chronography - does not have just one contrary, the a-chronology of laws or models. Its true contrary is temporality itself. Indeed it was necessary to confess what is other than time in order to be in a position to give full justice to human temporality and to propose not to abolish it but to probe deeper into it, to hierarchize it, and to unfold it following levels of temporalization that are less and less “distended” and more and more “held firmly,” non secundum distentionem sed secundum intentionem (29:39).
這最後一個評論對我整個研究的影響是相當大的。如果現代敘事理論的主要傾向是在史學、歷史哲學以及敘事學中「去時間化」，那麼對抗線性時間表述的鬥爭不一定只是將敘事變成「邏輯」，而是可能深化其時間性。編年史或編年體並非只有一個反義詞，即法則或模型的非編年性。其真正的反義詞是時間性本身。確實，為了充分公正地對待人類時間性，並提議不是要廢除它，而是要更深入地探索它、階層化它、並根據越來越不「鬆散」且越來越「堅定」的時間化層次展開它，非 secundum distentionem sed secundum intentionem（29:39）。

2 Emplotment: A Reading of Aristotle's Poetics
情節結構：解讀亞里士多德的《詩學》

The second great text that animated my inquiry is Aristotle’s Poetics. There are two reasons for this choice.
推動我研究的第二個重要文本是亞里士多德的《詩學》。選擇這部作品有兩個原因。

In the first place, I found in his concept of emplotment (muthos)

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the opposite reply to Augustine’s distentio animi. Augustine groaned under the existential burden of discordance. Aristotle discerns in the poetic act par excel-lence-the composing of the tragic poem-the triumph of concordance over discordance. It goes without saying that it is I, the reader of Augustine and Aristotle, who establishes this relationship between a lived experience where discordance rends concordance and an eminently verbal experience where concordance mends discordance.
首先，我在他的情節結構（muthos）概念中找到了對奧古斯丁「心靈擴散」的相反回應。奧古斯丁在不和諧的存在負擔下呻吟。亞里士多德在最卓越的詩歌創作行為中——即悲劇詩的創作——洞察了和諧對不和諧的勝利。不用說，正是我，作為奧古斯丁和亞里士多德的讀者，建立了這種關係：一種不和諧撕裂和諧的生活經驗，與一種和諧修補不和諧的純粹語言經驗。

In the second place, the concept of mimetic activity (mimésis) started me on the way to a second problematic, that of the creative imitation, by means of the plot of lived temporal experience. This second theme is difficult to distinguish from the first one in Aristotle, inasmuch as for him mimetic activity tends to be confused with emplotment. It will only be unfolded to its full extent and will only get its full autonomy, therefore, in what follows in this work.

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Indeed, the Poetics is silent about the relationship between poetic activity and temporal experience. As poetic activity, it does not even have any marked temporal character. Aristotle’s total silence on this point is not without some advantage, however, insofar as from the beginning it protects our inquiry from the reproach of tautological circularity and thus sets up between the two problematics of time and narrative the most favorable distance for an investigation into the mediating operations between lived experience and discourse.
其次，模仿活動（mimésis）的概念使我開始邁向第二個問題，即通過敘事情節來創造性地模仿生活經驗的時間性。在亞里士多德那裡，這第二個主題很難與第一個主題區分開來，因為對他來說，模仿活動往往與情節敘事混淆。因此，它只有在接下來的工作中才會得到充分展開並獲得完全的自主性。事實上，《詩學》對於詩歌活動與時間經驗之間的關係保持沉默。作為詩歌活動，它甚至沒有任何明顯的時間特徵。然而，亞里士多德在這一點上的完全沉默並非沒有優勢，因為它從一開始就使我們的探究免於循環論證的指責，並在時間和敘事這兩個問題之間建立了最有利的距離，以便探索生活經驗和話語之間的中介操作。

These few remarks already make clear that I do not intend to use the Aristotelian model as an exclusive norm for the remainder of this work. Rather I am evoking from Aristotle the melodic theme of a twofold reflection whose development is as important as its initial statement. This development will affect both concepts borrowed from Aristotle, emplotment (muthos) and mimetic
這些簡單的備註已經清楚地表明，我並不打算將亞里士多德的模型作為本作品其餘部分的排他性規範。相反，我是從亞里士多德那裡喚起了一個雙重思考的旋律主題，其發展與其初始陳述同樣重要。這種發展將影響從亞里士多德借來的兩個概念：情節敘事（muthos）和模仿
activity (mimēsis). On the side of emplotment it will be necessary to remove a certain number of restrictions and prohibitions that are inherent in the privilege the Poetics accords to drama (tragedy and comedy) and to the epic. I concede there is something apparently paradoxical in making narrative activity the category encompassing drama, epic, and history, when, on the one hand, what Aristotle calls history (historia) in the context of the Poetics plays the role of a counterexample and when, on the other hand, narrative-or at least what he calls diegetic poetry-is opposed to drama within the single encompassing category of mimesis. Furthermore, it is not diegetic but tragic poetry that most bears the structural virtues of the art of composition. How can narrative become the encompassing term when at the beginning it is only one species among many? We shall have to say to what point Aristotle’s text authorizes us to dissociate this structural model from its statement in terms of tragedy, giving rise by degrees to a reorganization of the whole narrative field. Whatever the case as regards the latitude offered by Aristotle’s text, the Aristotelian concept of emplotment can be only the seed for us of a considerable development. To conserve its guiding role, it will have to undergo the test of other, more formidable counterexamples, whether provided by modern fictional narrative, as in the novel, or by contemporary history, which we might call non-narrative history.
活動（模仿）。在情節鋪排的方面，有必要消除一些在《詩學》賦予戲劇（悲劇和喜劇）和史詩的特權中固有的若干限制和禁忌。我承認，當敘事活動成為包含戲劇、史詩和歷史的類別時，看似有些自相矛盾，尤其是在一方面，亞里士多德在《詩學》中所稱的歷史（歷史學）扮演反例的角色，而另一方面，敘事——或至少他所稱的敘事詩——在模仿的單一包容類別中與戲劇相對立。此外，最具作曲藝術結構美德的並非敘事詩，而是悲劇詩。當敘事最初只是眾多類型中的一種時，如何使其成為包容性術語？我們將闡明亞里士多德的文本在多大程度上授權我們將這一結構模型從其悲劇表述中分離，並逐步重新組織整個敘事領域。無論如何，亞里士多德的情節鋪排概念對我們而言僅是一個重大發展的種子。為保持其指導作用，它將不得不經受其他更具挑戰性的反例的考驗，無論是現代小說敘事，還是我們可稱之為非敘事的當代歷史。

On the side of mimetic activity, the full unfolding of the concept of mimesis demands not just that action’s referential relation to the “real” be made less allusive, but also that this domain should receive other determinations besides the “ethical” ones-themselves considerable-that Aristotle assigns to it, if it is to rejoin the problematic set up by Augustine concerning our discordant experience of time. Our path beyond Aristotle will be a long one. It will not be possible to say how narrative is related to time until we have posed in its full scope the question of an interweaving reference [référence croisée]based upon our lived temporal experience-of fictional and historical narrative. If the concept of mimetic activity comes first in the Poetics, this concept of an interweaving reference-as the distant heir of Aristotelian mimesishas to come last and has to withdraw to the horizon of our whole enterprise. This is why it will not be treated systematically until volume 2 .
在模仿性活動的方面，概念的充分展開不僅要求動作對「現實」的指涉關係變得不那麼曖昧，還要求這個領域除了亞里士多德賦予的「倫理」的決定之外，還應接收其他決定，如果它要重新加入奧古斯丁關於我們時間不一致經驗的問題域。我們超越亞里士多德的道路將是漫長的。直到我們以其全部範圍提出基於我們的生活時間經驗的交叉指涉概念，並探討虛構和歷史敘事的關係，才有可能說明敘事與時間的關係。如果模仿性活動的概念在《詩學》中首先出現，那麼這個交叉指涉的概念作為亞里士多德模仿論的遙遠繼承者，必須最後出現，並退居於我們整個企業的視野。這就是為什麼它將不會在第一卷中系統性地處理。

The Melodic Line: The Pair Mimesis-Muthos
旋律線：模仿-故事對

I am not proposing to do a commentary on the Poetics. My reflection is a second-order one and assumes a certain familiarity with the great commentaries of Lucas, Else, Hardison, and, last but not least, Roselyne Dupont-Roc and Jean Lallot.

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Readers who have followed the same laborious course will easily recognize what my meditation owes to one or another of these works.
我並不打算對《詩學》進行評論。我的思考是二階的，並假設讀者已熟悉盧卡斯、埃爾斯、哈迪森，以及最後但並非最不重要的羅斯琳·杜邦-羅克和讓·拉洛的偉大評論。跟隨同樣艱難道路的讀者將很容易認出我的沉思對這些著作的借鑒。

It is not a matter of indifference that the pair mimesis-muthos is approached through the term that both launches and situates the whole analysis: the adjec-
通過啟動和定位整個分析的術語來處理模仿-故事對，這一點並非無關緊要：形容
tive “poetic” (with its implied noun, “art”). It alone puts the mark of production, construction, dynamism on all the analyses, and first of all on the two terms muthos and mimesis, which have to be taken as operations, not as structures. When Aristotle, substituting the definiens for the definiendum, says that the muthos is “the organization of the events [ē tōn pragmatōn sustasis]” (50a15), we must understand by sustasis (or by the equivalent term sunthesis [50a5]), not “system” (as Dupont-Roc and Lallot translate it [p. 55]), but the active sense of organizing the events into a system, so as to mark the operative character of all the concepts in the Poetics.

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This is why, from the first lines, muthos is presented as the complement of a verb that means “to compose.” Poetics is thereby identified, without further ado, as the art of “composing plots” (47a2). The same mark has to be preserved in the translation of mimesis. Whether we say “imitation” or “representation” (as do the most recent French translators), what has to be understood is the mimetic activity, the active process of imitating or representing something. Imitation or representation, therefore, must be understood in the dynamic sense of making a representation, of a transposition into representative works. Following this same requirement, when Aristotle comes to enumerate and define the six “parts” of tragedy in Chapter 6, we have to understand them not as parts of the poem but of the art of composition.

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「詩學」中的「詩意」（及其隱含的名詞「藝術」）。它獨特地為所有分析、首先是變數 muthos 和 mimesis 標記了生產、建構、動態性的印記，這些詞必須被視為操作，而非結構。當亞里士多德以定義項取代被定義項，說 muthos 是「事件的組織[ē tōn pragmatōn sustasis]」（50a15），我們必須理解 sustasis（或等效術語 sunthesis [50a5]）不是「系統」（如杜龐-洛克和拉洛特翻譯[第 55 頁]），而是主動地將事件組織成系統，以標記《詩學》中所有概念的操作性質。這就是為什麼從一開始，muthos 就被呈現為一個意味著「創作」的動詞的補語。因此，《詩學》不加遲疑地被確定為「創作情節」的藝術（47a2）。同樣的標記必須保留在 mimesis 的翻譯中。不論說「模仿」還是「再現」（如最近的法語譯者所做），必須理解的是模仿活動，模仿或再現某事物的主動過程。因此，模仿或再現必須以製作再現、轉置為代表性作品的動態意義理解。遵循這同樣的要求，當亞里士多德在第六章列舉和定義悲劇的六個「部分」時，我們必須將它們理解為作曲藝術的部分，而非詩歌的部分。

If I am so insistent about this dynamic aspect which the adjective “poetic” imposes on all of the subsequent analysis, it is by design. When, in the second part of this work and in volume 2, I shall speak in defence of the primacy of our narrative understanding, in relation to explanation (sociological or otherwise) in history and explanation (structural or otherwise) in narrative fiction, I shall be defending the primacy of the activity that produces plots in relation to every sort of static structure, achronological paradigm, or temporal invariant. I will say nothing more about this here. What follows will clarify what I mean.
如果我如此堅持這個形容詞"詩意"賦予所有後續分析的動態面向，這是出於設計。當在這部作品的第二部分和第二卷中，我將為我們敘事理解的首要地位辯護，關於歷史中的解釋（社會學或其他）和敘事小說中的解釋（結構或其他），我將為生成情節的活動在各種靜態結構、非時間範式或時間不變性中的首要地位辯護。在此我不會多說什麼。接下來將闡明我的意思。

We shall begin by considering the pair mimesis/muthos.
我們將從考慮模仿/情節這對概念開始。
Aristotle’s Poetics contains just one all-encompassing concept, that of mimesis. This concept is only defined contextually and through one of its uses, the one that interests us here, imitation or representation of action. Or still more precisely: the imitating or representing of action in the medium of metrical language, hence as accompanied by rhythms (to which are added, in the case of tragedy, the prime example, spectacle and melody).

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Still it is the imitation or representation of the action proper to tragedy, comedy, and epic that alone is taken into account. This is not yet defined in a form proper to its level of generality. Only the imitation or representation of action proper to tragedy is expressly defined.

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I shall not directly attack this powerful core of Aristotle’s definition of tragedy; instead I shall follow the guideline Aristotle himself offers in the same chapter when he provides the key to the construction of this definition. It is not done generically through some specific differ-
亞里士多德的《詩學》只包含一個全面的概念，即模仿。這個概念僅在特定語境中被定義，並通過其用途之一，即我們在此感興趣的模仿或行動再現。或者更精確地說：在韻律語言的媒介中模仿或再現行動，因此伴隨著節奏（在悲劇這個主要例子中，還加上了景觀和旋律）。然而，僅考慮悲劇、喜劇和史詩特有的行動模仿或再現。這尚未以其普遍性層次的適當形式被定義。只有悲劇特有的行動模仿或再現被明確定義。我不會直接攻擊亞里士多德悲劇定義的這個強大核心；相反，我將遵循亞里士多德在同一章節中提供的指導，即定義建構的關鍵。
ence, but rather by means of an articulation into “parts”: “Necessarily, therefore, there are in tragedy as a whole, considered as a special form, six constituent elements, viz. Plot, Character, Language, Thought, Spectacle, and Melody” (50a7-9).
它不是通過某些特定差異以泛化方式進行，而是通過"部分"的銜接："因此，在悲劇作為一個整體、作為一種特殊形式中，必然有六個構成要素，即情節、人物、語言、思想、景觀和旋律"（50a7-9）。

For what follows I shall retain this quasi-identification of the two expressions “imitation or representation of action” and “the organization of the events.” The second expression is, as I said, the definiens Aristotle substitutes for the definiendum, muthos, plot. This quasi-identification is warranted first by placing the six parts into a hierarchy that gives priority to the “what” or object of representation (plot, characters, thought) in relation to the “by which” or means (language and melody) and the “how” or mode (the spectacle); then by a second hierarchization internal to the “what” that sets the action above the characters and the thought. “Tragedy is an imitation of action [mimēsis praxeōs], and it is an imitation of the agents chiefly owing to the action” (50b3). At the conclusion of this double hierarchization, the plot appears as the “first principle,” “the end”, the “purpose,” and, if we may say so, the “soul” of tragedy. This quasi-identification is warranted by the formula: “The imitation of action is the Plot” (50a1).
在接下來的內容中，我將保留這種「模仿或表現行動」和「事件的組織」這兩種表達的準同一性。正如我所說，這第二種表達是亞里斯多德用來替代定義詞「神話」（情節）的定義詞。這種準同一性首先是通過將六個部分置於一個等級制度中，優先考慮表現的「是什麼」或對象（情節、角色、思想），而不是「用什麼」或手段（語言和旋律）以及「如何」或模式（景觀）；然後是在「是什麼」內部的第二層等級制度，將行動置於角色和思想之上。「悲劇是行動的模仿，主要是因為行動而模仿行動者」。在這種雙重等級制度的結論中，情節作為悲劇的「第一原則」、「目的」、「目標」，如果可以這麼說，是悲劇的「靈魂」。這種準同一性是通過公式來保證的：「行動的模仿是情節」。

This text will serve as our guide from here on. It imposes upon us the task of thinking about and defining in terms of each other the imitating or representing of action and the organizing of the events. This equivalence first of all excludes any interpretation of Aristotle’s mimesis in terms of a copy or identical replica. Imitating or representing is a mimetic activity inasmuch as it produces something, namely, the organization of events by emplotment. With one stroke we leave behind the Platonic use of mimesis, both in its metaphysical sense and its technical one in Book 3 of the Republic which opposes narrative “by mimesis” to “simple” narrative. Let me set aside this latter point for my discussion of the relation between narrative and drama, keeping for the time being the metaphysical sense of mimesis, associated with the concept of participation, by means of which things imitate ideas, and works of art imitate things. Platonic mimesis thereby distances the work of art by twice over from the ideal model which is its ultimate basis.

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Aristotle’s mimesis has just a single space wherein it is unfolded-human making [faire], the arts of composition.

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這段文字將成為我們今後的指南。它賦予我們思考和定義行動的模仿或呈現，以及事件組織的任務。這種等價首先排除了任何將亞里士多德的模仿概念解釋為複製或完全相同的複製品。模仿或呈現是一種模仿活動，因為它生產某種東西，即通過情節安排組織事件。一筆劃去，我們拋棄了柏拉圖在其形而上學意義和《共和國》第三卷中技術性意義上對模仿的使用，後者將敘事「通過模仿」與「簡單」敘事對立。讓我暫時擱置這一點，留待討論敘事與戲劇的關係，同時保留模仿的形而上學意義，與參與概念相關聯，通過這種概念，事物模仿理念，藝術作品模仿事物。如此，柏拉圖的模仿使藝術作品與其最終基礎的理想模型相距兩重。亞里士多德的模仿只有一個展開的空間——人類的製作，即作曲藝術。

If therefore we are to conserve the character of mimesis as being an activity which poiēsis confers on it, and if, moreover, we hold tightly to the guideline of defining mimesis by muthos, then we ought not to hesitate in understanding action-action as the object in the expression mimēsis praxeōs (50b3)—as the correlate of the mimetic activity governed by the organization of the events (into a system). I shall discuss below other ways of construing the relation of imitation to its “what” (the plot, the characters, and the thought). The strict correlation between mimesis and muthos suggests giving the genitive form praxeōs the dominant, although perhaps not the exclusive, sense of
因此，如果我們要保留模仿作為詩學賦予其的活動，並且緊緊遵循以情節定義模仿的指導方針，那麼我們不應猶豫地理解行動——行動作為表達式「模仿行動」(50b3)中的對象——作為由事件組織（系統）管理的模仿活動的相關物。我將在下文討論模仿與其「所模仿對象」（情節、人物和思想）的其他關聯方式。模仿與情節之間的嚴格相關性表明，應該給予生格形式「行動」支配性的，儘管可能不是唯一的意義。
being the noematic correlate of a practical noesis.

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The action is the “construct” of that construction that the mimetic activity consists of. I shall show below that this correlation, which tends to make the poetic text close in on itself, must not be pushed too far. And, as we shall see, this closure is in no way implied by the Poetics. This is all the more evident in that the only instruction Aristotle gives us is to construct the muthos, hence the organization of the events, as the “what” of the mimesis. The noematic correlation is therefore between mimésis praxeōs, taken as one syntagmatic expression, and the organization of the events, as another. To extend this relation of correlation within the first expression to include mimesis and praxis is thus plausible, fecund-and risky.
作為實踐性意識的意義相關物。

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行動是模仿活動所構成的建構。我將在下面證明，這種趨於使詩歌文本自我封閉的相關性不應被過分推崇。正如我們將看到的，這種封閉性並非《詩學》所暗示。這一點更加明顯，因為亞里士多德給我們的唯一指示是建構神話，即事件的組織，作為模仿的「what」。因此，意義相關性存在於作為一個 syntactic 表達的模仿-行動之間，以及事件的組織之間。將這種相關關係擴展到第一個表達式中的模仿和行動是可信的，富有成效的，但也是有風險的。

Let us not leave the pair mimesis/muthos without saying a word about the further constraints aimed at accounting for the already constituted genres of tragedy, comedy, and epic, and also at justifying Aristotle’s preference for tragedy. We must be very attentive to these additional constraints. For they have somehow to be removed if I am to extract from Aristotle’s Poetics the model of emplotment I am proposing to extend to every composition we call a narrative.
在不談論進一步的約束之前，我們不應該拋下模仿/神話這對概念。這些額外的約束旨在解釋已經形成的悲劇、喜劇和史詩等類型，並證明亞里士多德對悲劇的偏好。我們必須非常注意這些額外的約束。因為如果我要從亞里士多德的《詩學》中提取我所提出的情節模型，並將其擴展到我們稱之為敘事的每一種作品，這些約束必須以某種方式被移除。

The first limiting constraint is intended to account for the distinction between comedy, on the one hand, and tragedy and epic, on the other. It is not linked to the action as such but to the characters, whom Aristotle rigorously subordinates to the action, as I shall discuss below. It is, however, introduced as early as the second chapter of the Poetics. Indeed the first time that Aristotle has to give a definite correlate to what “the imitators represent,” he defines it as the “persons engaged in action” (48a1).

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If he does not go directly to the only canonical formula in the Poetics for mimesis-imitation or representation of action-it is because he needs to introduce early on into the field of representation articulated by rhythmic language an ethical criterion of nobleness or baseness, which applies to the persons represented insofar as they have this or that character. On the basis of this dichotomy, tragedy can be defined as representing a “higher moral type” and comedy a “lower” one.

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第一個限制性約束旨在解釋喜劇與悲劇和史詩之間的區別。它並不直接與行動本身相關，而是與角色有關，亞里士多德嚴格地將角色從屬於行動，這一點我將在下文討論。它在《詩學》的第二章就已經被提及。事實上，當亞里士多德第一次必須給出"模仿者再現"的明確對應物時，他將其定義為"參與行動的人"（48a1）。

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如果他沒有直接使用詩學中模仿或再現行動的規範公式，那是因為他需要在由韻律語言構成的再現領域中，儘早引入一個關於高尚或卑賤的倫理標準，這個標準適用於根據其特定性格被再現的人物。基於這種二分法，悲劇可以被定義為再現"更高尚的道德類型"，而喜劇則再現"較低的"類型。

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The second limiting constraint is the one that separates epic, on the one hand, from tragedy and comedy, on the other, which find themselves on the same side of the dividing line this time. This constraint merits the greatest attention since it runs counter to my plan to consider narrative as the common genus and epic as one species of narrative. Here the genus is the imitation or representation of action, of which narrative and drama are two coordinated species. What constraint requires us to oppose them? It is noteworthy, first, that it is not a constraint that divides the objects, the “what” of representation, but its “how” or mode.

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Yet if the three criteria of means, mode, and object are in principle equal, the whole weight of the subsequent analysis is on the “what.” The equivalence between mimesis and muthos is an equivalence by means of the “what.” And in terms of its plot, epic closely follows
第二個限制性約束是將史詩與悲劇和喜劇分開，這次悲劇和喜劇站在了同一邊。這個約束值得最大的關注，因為它與我考慮敘事為共同類別，而史詩為敘事的一個種類的計劃相矛盾。在這裡，共同類別是行動的模仿或再現，敘事和戲劇是兩個相互協調的種類。是什麼約束要求我們將它們對立？值得注意的是，首先，它並不是劃分再現對象的約束，而是劃分再現的"如何"或模式。

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然而，如果手段、模式和對象這三個標準原則上是相等的，那麼後續分析的全部重點在於"什麼"。模仿與情節的等價是通過"什麼"來實現的。在情節方面，史詩緊密地跟隨著
the rules of tragedy except for one variation, the “magnitude” which can be drawn from the composition alone and which in no way affects the basic rules for organizing the events. The essential thing is that the poet-whether narrator or dramatist-be a “maker of plots” (51b27). Next it is notable that the difference in mode, which is already relativized just in being a mode, continues to undergo, even within its field of application, a series of attenuations in the course of the subsequent analyses in the Poetics.
悲劇規則，除了一個變化，即可從作品本身中描繪的"規模"，這絲毫不影響組織事件的基本規則。關鍵是詩人—無論是敘述者還是劇作家—都是"情節製造者"（51b27）。接著值得注意的是，模式之間的差異，即使已經相對化，在波埃蒂卡隨後的分析中，即便在其應用領域內，也經歷了一系列的減弱。

In the beginning (Chapter 3), the difference is plainly drawn. It is one thing for whoever does the imitating, therefore for the author of the mimetic activity, no matter what the art form or what the quality of the characters in question, that this author acts as a “narrator” (apangelia, apangelionta). It is another thing to make the characters the authors of the representation in that they “are presented as functioning and in action” (48a23).

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Here there is a distinction taken from the poet’s attitude as regards his characters, which is why it constitutes a “mode” of representation. Either the poet speaks directly, and thus narrates what his characters do, or he allows them to speak and speaks indirectly through them, while they “do” the drama (48a29).
最初（第 3 章），差異被明確地劃分。對於模仿者，也就是模仿活動的作者而言，無論是何種藝術形式或角色的品質，這位作者都是以"敘述者"（apangelia, apangelionta）的身份行事。另一種情況是使角色成為表現的主體，讓他們"展現為運作和行動中"（48a23）。在此，區別來自詩人對其角色的態度，這就是為什麼它構成了一種表現"模式"。詩人要麼直接說話並敘述角色的行為，要麼讓角色說話，通過他們間接地說話，而角色則"進行"戲劇（48a29）。

Does this distinction prohibit us from reuniting epic and drama under the title “narrative”? Not at all. First, I am not characterizing narrative by its “mode,” that is, by the author’s attitude, but by its “object,” since I am calling narrative exactly what Aristotle calls muthos, the organization of the events. I do not differ from Aristotle, therefore, on the plane he places himself on, that of the “mode.” To avoid any confusion, I shall distinguish narrative in the broad sense, defined as the “what” of mimetic activity, and narrative in the narrow sense of the Aristotelian diēgēsis, which I shall henceforth call diegetic composition.

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Next, this transferring of terminology does proportionately less violence to Aristotle’s categories in that he continues to minimize the difference, whether he takes up the side of drama or that of epic. On the side of drama, it is said that everything epic has (plot, characters, thought, rhythm), tragedy has too. What tragedy has beyond these (spectacle and music) are not finally essential to it. Spectacle, in particular, is indeed one “part” of tragedy, but “is of all the parts the least technical in the sense of being least germane to the art of poetry. For tragedy fulfills its function even without a public performance and actors” (50b17-19). Further on in the Poetics, at the moment when he takes up the classic exercise of handing out prizes, Aristotle can credit tragedy for the fact that it can be seen, but he immediately takes this back again: “And again, tragedy succeeds in producing its proper effect even without any movement at all, just as epic poetry does, since when it is merely read the tragic force is manifested” (62a12).

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And on the side of epic, the relation of the poet to his characters in the act of narrating is not as direct as the definition would have it. A first attenuation is even incorporated into it right at the start. Aristotle adds a parenthesis to his definition of the poet as narrator: "whether the narrator speaks at times in an assumed role, which is
這個區別是否禁止我們將史詩和戲劇歸類於「敘事」之下？一點也不。首先，我並非以「模式」來刻畫敘事，即作者的態度，而是以「對象」，因為我稱敘事為亞里士多德所謂的「神話」，即事件的組織。因此，我在亞里士多德所處的平面上並無不同。為避免混淆，我將區分廣義的敘事，定義為模仿活動的「what」，以及狹義的亞里士多德式敘事（diēgēsis），我將其稱為敘事性組成。接下來，這種術語轉換對亞里士多德的範疇造成的影響相對較小，因為他繼續最小化差異，無論是從戲劇還是史詩的角度。在戲劇方面，史詩所擁有的一切（情節、角色、思想、節奏），悲劇也同樣擁有。悲劇除此之外所擁有的（景象和音樂）並非最終本質。特別是景象，確實是悲劇的一個「部分」，但「是所有部分中技術性最低的，最不與詩歌藝術相關。因為即使沒有公開表演和演員，悲劇也能完成其功能」。在《詩學》的後面部分，當談到頒獎這一經典環節時，亞里士多德可以讚揚悲劇可以被看到，但他立即又收回了這一點：「而且，悲劇即使沒有任何動作也能產生其應有的效果，就像史詩一樣，因為僅僅閱讀時悲劇力量就已彰顯」。在史詩方面，詩人在敘事過程中與其角色的關係並不如定義所描述的那麼直接。一開始就已經納入了第一個弱化。亞里士多德在他對詩人作為敘述者的定義中加入了一個括號："無論敘述者是否有時以假定的角色說話，這是荷馬的方式，還是始終以自己的身份不改變"（48a21-23）。

Homer’s way, or always in his own person without change" (48a21-23). More precisely, Homer is praised further on (Chapter 23) for his art of effacing himself behind his characters with their different qualities, letting them act and speak in their own name; in short, for letting them occupy the scene. Aristotle can write, without paradox, at the beginning of his chapter devoted to “the imitative art that . . . employs metrical language” (59a17): “it is evident that, just as in tragedies, its plots should be dramatic in structure, etc.” (59a19). Thus in the pair drama/narrative, the first laterally qualifies the second to the point of serving as its model. In various ways, therefore, Aristotle attenuates the “modal” opposition between diegetic imitation (or representation) and dramatic imitation (or representation), an opposition, in any case, that does not affect the object of imitation, the emplotment.
更準確地說，荷馬在（第 23 章）中因其藝術而受到進一步讚揚，即能夠在不同特質的角色背後隱藏自己，讓他們以自己的名義行動和說話；簡而言之，讓他們佔據場景。亞里士多德可以在他專門討論"使用韻律語言的模仿藝術"（59a17）的章節開頭不矛地寫道："顯而易見的是，就像在悲劇中一樣，其劇情應該具有戲劇性結構，等等"（59a19）。因此，在戲劇/敘事這對概念中，第一個側面地限定了第二個，甚至成為其模型。因此，亞里士多德以各種方式減輕了敘事模仿（或表現）與戲劇模仿（或表現）之間的"模態"對立，無論如何，這種對立並不影響模仿的對象，即情節。

A final constraint merits placement under the pair mimesis/muthos, because it gives an occasion to make more precise the Aristotelian usage of mimesis. It is the one that subordinates consideration of the characters to consideration of the action itself. This constraint seems too restrictive if we consider the modern development of the novel and Henry James’s thesis that gives character development an equal, if not higher, place than that of the plot.

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Yet as Frank Kermode comments, to develop a character means more narration, and to develop a plot means enriching a character.

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Aristotle is harder to please: “For tragedy is not an imitation of men but of actions and of life. It is in action that happiness and unhappiness are found, and the end we aim at is a kind of activity, not a quality. . . . What is more, without action there could not be a tragedy, but there could be without characterization” (50a16-24). We may of course attenuate the rigor of these hierarchies by observing that it is a question only of ordering the “parts” of tragedy. All the more so as the difference between tragedy and comedy is taken from the ethical differences affecting the characters. Assigning second place to the characters, therefore, does not disqualify the category of character. What is more, we shall encounter in contemporary narrative semiotics-stemming from Propp-attempts comparable to that of Aristotle to reconstruct narrative logic beginning not from characters but from “functions,” that is, from abstract segments of action.
最後一個限制值得放置在模仿/神話對之下，因為它提供了一個機會更精確地闡明亞里士多德對模仿的用法。這是將人物的考慮從屬於對行動本身的考慮的限制。如果我們考慮小說的現代發展和亨利·詹姆斯認為人物發展具有與情節同等甚至更高地位的論點，這個限制似乎太過嚴格。然而，正如弗蘭克·克默模德評論的，發展一個人物意味著更多的敘事，發展一個情節意味著豐富一個人物。亞里士多德更為嚴格："悲劇不是模仿人，而是模仿行動和生活。幸福和不幸都存在於行動中，我們追求的目標是一種活動，而非品質……更重要的是，沒有行動就不可能有悲劇，但可以沒有人物刻畫"。我們當然可以通過觀察這只是悲劇「部分」的排序來緩解這些層級的嚴格性。尤其是悲劇和喜劇之間的差異源於影響人物的倫理差異。因此，將人物置於第二位並不否定人物這一類別。更重要的是，我們將在當代敘事符號學中遇到類似亞里士多德的嘗試，從普羅普開始，從「功能」，即從抽象的行動片段重建敘事邏輯。

But what is essential lies elsewhere. By so giving action priority over character, Aristotle establishes the mimetic status of action. It is in ethics (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1105a30ff.) that the subject precedes the action in the order of ethical qualities. In poetics, the composition of the action by the poet governs the ethical quality of the characters. The subordination of character to action, therefore, is not a constraint of the same nature as the two preceding ones. It seals the equivalence between the two expressions “representation of action” and “organization of the events.” If the accent has to be placed on this organization, then the imitation or representation has to be of action rather than of human beings.
但是本質在別處。通過賦予行動優先於性格，亞里士多德確立了行動的模仿地位。在倫理學中（參見《尼各馬可倫理學》1105a30ff.），主體在倫理品質的順序中先於行動。在詩學中，詩人對行動的構成支配了角色的倫理品質。因此，將性格從屬於行動，並非與前兩種限制性質相同。它確立了"行動表現"和"事件組織"這兩種表達的等效性。如果重點要放在這種組織上，那麼模仿或表現必須是行動，而非人類。

The Plot: A Model of Concordance
情節：和諧的模型

Let me set the question of the status of mimesis between parentheses for a while, in that it is not uniquely defined by emplotment, and turn directly toward the theory of muthos so as to discern in it the starting point for my own theory of narrative composition.
暫且擱置模仿的地位這個問題，因為它並非僅由情節決定，直接轉向慕托斯理論，以便在其中辨析我自己的敘事構成理論的起點。

We should not forget that the theory of muthos is abstracted from the definition of tragedy we find in Chapter 6 of the Poetics, which was cited above. Aristotle first provides, therefore, the theory of the tragic muthos.
我們不應忘記，慕托斯理論是從《詩學》第 6 章中對悲劇的定義中抽象出來的，這已在上文引用過。因此，亞里士多德首先提供的是悲劇性慕托斯的理論。

The question that I shall continue to pursue until the end of this work is whether the paradigm of order, characteristic of tragedy, is capable of extension and transformation to the point where it can be applied to the whole narrative field. This difficulty ought not to stop us here, however. The rigor of the tragic model has the advantage of setting great store on the exigence for order at the very beginning of my investigation of our narrative understanding. Right away, the most extreme contrast is established with the Augustinian distentio animi. That is, the tragic muthos is set up as the poetic solution to the speculative paradox of time, inasmuch as the inventing of order is pursued to the exclusion of every temporal characteristic. It will be my task and my responsibility to draw the temporal implications of the model, in connection with the new deployment of the theory of mimesis I propose below. However the enterprise of thinking about Augustine’s distentio animi and Aristotle’s tragic muthos as one will at least appear plausible if we are willing to consider that the Aristotelian theory does not accentuate concordance alone but, in a highly subtle way, the play of discordance internal to concordance. It is this internal dialectic of poetic composition that makes the tragic muthos the inverted figure of the Augustinian paradox.
我將持續追求的問題是，悲劇中典型的秩序範式是否能夠延伸和轉化，以至於可以應用於整個敘事領域。然而，這種困難不應阻止我們。悲劇模型的嚴謹性的優勢在於，從我研究敘事理解的一開始就高度重視秩序的需求。立即建立了與奧古斯丁「靈魂擴張」的最極端對比。也就是說，悲劇的「情節」被設立為時間的思辨悖論的詩學解決方案，因為秩序的發明是被排除了每一個時間特徵而追求的。我的任務和責任將是闡明這個模型的時間內涵，並與我下面提出的模仿理論的新部署相連結。然而，如果我們願意考慮亞里士多德理論不僅強調和諧，還以非常微妙的方式強調和諧內部的不和諧，那麼思考奧古斯丁的「靈魂擴張」和亞里士多德的悲劇「情節」為一體的企圖至少看起來是合理的。正是這種詩歌創作的內在辯證法，使得悲劇「情節」成為奧古斯丁悖論的反向形態。

The definition of muthos as the organization of the events first emphasizes concordance. And this concordance is characterized by three features: completeness, wholeness, and an appropriate magnitude.

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「情節」作為事件組織的定義首先強調了和諧。這種和諧以三個特徵為特點：完整性、整體性和適當的規模。

The notion of a “whole” (holos) is the pivot of the analysis that follows. For, far from being oriented toward an investigation into the temporal character of the organization, this analysis is fixed on its logical character.

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And it is precisely at the moment when the definition skirts the problem of time that it most distances itself from time: “Now a thing is a whole if it has a beginning, a middle, and an end” (50b26). But it is only in virtue of poetic composition that something counts as a beginning, middle, or end. What defines the beginning is not the absence of some antecedent but the absence of necessity in the succession. As for the end, it is indeed what comes after something else, but “either as its necessary sequel or as its usual [and hence probable] sequel” (50b30). Only the middle seems to be defined just by succession: “A middle is that which both comes after something else and has another thing following
整體"（holos）的概念是接下來分析的樞紐。因為，遠非面向對組織的時間特性的調查，這個分析專注於其邏輯特性。

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正是在定義掠過時間問題的時刻，它最遠離時間："現在，一個事物若有開始、中間和結束，就是一個整體"（50b26）。但只有在詩意構成中，某物才算作開始、中間或結束。定義開始的不是某些先前事件的缺失，而是繼承中的非必然性。至於結束，它確實是在另一物之後，但"或作為其必然的後續，或作為其常見（因此可能）的後續"（50b30）。只有中間似乎僅由繼承定義："中間是既跟在其他事物之後，又有另一事物跟隨它"（50b31）。然而在悲劇模式中，它有其自身的邏輯，即從好轉壞的"逆轉"（metabolē、metaballein [51a14]；metabasis [52a16]）。"複雜"情節理論將包含具有悲劇效果的逆轉類型。因此，在這個"整體"的分析中，重點放在缺乏偶然性，以及服從於支配繼承的必然性或或然性的要求。如果繼承可以如此從屬於某種邏輯連結，那是因為開始、中間和結束的觀念並非來自經驗。它們不是某些真實行動的特徵，而是詩歌排序的效果。
it” (50b31). Yet in the tragic model it has its own logic, which is that of a “reversal” (metabolē, metaballein [51a14]; metabasis [52a16]) of fortune from good to bad. The theory of the “complex” plot will contain a typology of the reversals that have a properly tragic effect. The accent, in the analysis of this idea of a “whole,” is therefore put on the absence of chance and on conformity to the requirements of necessity or probability governing succession. If succession can be subordinated in this way to some logical connection, it is because the ideas of beginning, middle, and end are not taken from experience. They are not features of some real action but the effects of the ordering of the poem.
在悲劇模式中，它有其自身的邏輯，即從好轉壞的"逆轉"（metabolē、metaballein [51a14]；metabasis [52a16]）。"複雜"情節理論將包含具有悲劇效果的逆轉類型。在這個"整體"的分析中，重點放在缺乏偶然性，以及服從於支配繼承的必然性或或然性的要求。如果繼承可以如此從屬於某種邏輯連結，那是因為開始、中間和結束的觀念並非來自經驗。它們不是某些真實行動的特徵，而是詩歌排序的效果。

The same applies to the magnitude. It is only in the plot that action has a contour, a limit (horos) and, as a consequence, a magnitude. We shall return below, with regard to the aesthetics of reception whose seed is present in Aristotle, to the role of the attention or of memory in the definition of this criterion of perspicacity. Whatever can be said about the spectator’s capacity to take in the work in one view, this external criterion comes to terms with an exigency internal to the work which is the only thing important here. “If the length is sufficient to permit a change from bad fortune to good or from good fortune to bad to come about in an inevitable or probable sequence of events, this is a satisfactory limit [horos] of magnitude” (51a12-15). Certainly, this length must be temporal-a reversal takes time. But it is the work’s time, not the time of events in the world. The character of necessity applies to the events that the plot makes contiguous with each other (ephexes) (ibid.). Vacuous times are excluded. We do not ask what the hero did between two events that would have been separated in his life. In Oedipus Rex, notes Else, the messenger returns precisely at the moment the plot requires his presence, “no sooner and no later” (Else, p. 293). It is also for reasons internal to its composition that epic admits of a longer length. More tolerant about its episodic events, it requires greater amplitude, but without ever giving up the requirement for some limit.
同樣適用於篇幅。只有在情節中，行動才具有輪廓、限度（horos）以及因此的篇幅。我們將在下文回到亞里士多德中存在的接受美學之種子，探討注意力或記憶在這個明晰性標準定義中的角色。無論可以說什麼關於觀眾接收作品的能力，這個外部標準都符合作品內部的迫切需求，這是此處唯一重要的事情。「如果長度足以允許從禍運到福運，或從福運到禍運以不可避免或可能的事件順序發生，這是一個令人滿意的篇幅限度（horos）」（51a12-15）。當然，這個長度必須是時間性的——逆轉需要時間。但是這是作品的時間，而非世界中事件的時間。必然性特徵適用於情節使相互鄰近的事件（ephexes）（同上）。空洞的時間被排除。我們不去追問英雄在兩個在他生活中本應分開的事件之間做了什麼。在《伊底帕斯王》中，正如 Else 所指出的，使者正是在情節需要他出現的那一刻返回，「不早也不晚」（Else，第 293 頁）。同樣出於作品內部的原因，史詩允許更長的篇幅。對其插曲性事件更為寬容，它需要更大的幅度，但從未放棄對某種限度的要求。

Not only is time not considered, it is excluded. For example, in considering epic (Chapter 23), as submitted to the requirements of completeness and wholeness best illustrated by tragedy, Aristotle opposes two sorts of unity to each other: on the one hand, the temporal unity (henos khronou) that characterizes “a single period of time with all that happened therein to one or more persons, no matter how little relation one event may have had with another” (59a23-24), and, on the other hand, the dramatic unity that characterizes “a single action” (59a22) (which forms a whole, complete in itself, having a beginning, a middle, and an end). That numerous actions occur during a single period of time does not therefore make a “single action.” This is why Homer is praised for having chosen in the story of the Trojan War-even though this too has a beginning and an end-“one part” for which his art alone deter- ...
mined its beginning and its end. These remarks confirm that Aristotle shows no interest in the construction of a time capable of being implicated in the constructing of the plot. ...

If therefore the internal connection of the plot is logical rather than chronological, what logic is it? The truth is that the word “logic” never appears, although necessity and probability are familiar categories from the Organon. If the term “logic” is never used, it is probably because what is at issue is an intelligibility appropriate to the field of praxis, not that of theoria, and therefore one neighboring on phronésis, which is the intelligent use of action. Poetry is, in fact, a “doing” [faire] and a “doing” about “doing”-the “doers” of Aristotle’s Chapter 3. But it is not actual, ethical doing, rather fictive and poetic doing. Which is why it is so necessary to discern the specific features of this mimetic and mythic intelligence-in the Aristotelian sense of these two terms. ...

Aristotle makes clear that it really is a question of a kind of intelligence, beginning in Chapter 4, where he establishes his leading concepts by way of their genesis. Why, he asks, do we take pleasure in regarding the images of things that in themselves are repugnant-the basest animals or corpses? “For this again the reason is that the experience of learning things is highly enjoyable, not only for philosophers but for other people as well . . . when they enjoy seeing images, therefore, it is because as they look at them they have the experience of learning and reasoning out what each thing represents, for example, that ‘this figure is so and so’” (48b12-17). Learning, concluding, recognizing the form-here we have the skeleton of meaning for the pleasure found in imitation or representation.

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But if it is not a question of philosophical universals, what kind of universals are these “poetic” universals? That they are universals is beyond doubt since they can be characterized by the double opposition of the possible to the actual and the general to the particular. The first pair, we know, is illustrated by the famous opposition between poetry and history in the manner of Herodotus.

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“Thus the difference between the historian and the poet is not that the historian employs prose and the poet verse-the work of Herodotus could be put into verse, and it would be no less history with verses than without them; rather the difference is that the one tells of things that have been and the other of such things as might be. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history, in that poetry tends rather to express the universal, history rather the particular fact” (51b4-7).
亞里斯多德明確指出，這確實是一種智力的問題，從第 4 章開始，他通過其起源建立了他的主要概念。他問道，為什麼我們會喜歡觀察那些本身令人厭惡的事物的形象——最低劣的動物或屍體？「對此，原因又是學習事物的經驗是非常愉快的，不僅對哲學家，也對其他人一樣……當他們享受看到影像時，是因為當他們觀察它們時，有學習和推理出每件事物代表什麼的經驗，例如，『這個圖形是如此如此』」（48b12-17）。學習、推斷、認識形式——這是模仿或表現中找到快樂的意義骨架。但如果不是哲學的普遍性，那麼這些「詩意的」普遍性是什麼樣的？它們是普遍性是毫無疑問的，因為它們可以用可能與實際、一般與特定的雙重對立來描述。第一對，我們知道，是由詩歌與希羅多德方式的歷史之間著名的對立所說明的。「因此，歷史學家和詩人之間的差異不在於歷史學家使用散文而詩人使用詩歌——希羅多德的作品可以用詩歌形式寫成，它仍然是歷史，有詩歌與否無關；而是差異在於一個講述已發生的事情，另一個講述可能發生的事情。因此，詩歌是比歷史更具哲學性和更高等的東西，因為詩歌更傾向於表達普遍性，而歷史更傾向於表達特定事實」（51b4-7）。

What is at issue is not entirely elucidated, however, for Aristotle is careful to oppose “such things as might happen, things that are possibilities by virtue of being in themselves inevitable or probable” to “things that have happened” (51a37-38). And also a universal is: “The sort of thing that (in the circumstances) a certain kind of person will say or do either probably or necessarily” (51b9). In other words, the possible and the general are not to be sought else- ...
where than in the organization of the events, since it is this linkage that has to be necessary or probable. In short, it is the plot that has to be typical. We understand anew why the action takes precedence over the characters. It is the universalizing of the plot that universalizes the characters, even when they have specific names. Whence the precept: first conceive the plot, then add the names. ...

It might be objected that the argument is circular. The possible and the general characterize the necessary or the probable, but it is the necessary and the probable that qualify the possible and the general. Must we therefore assume that the organization as such, that is, as a connection akin to causality, makes the organized facts typical? For my own part, I lean in the direction of those narrativist theorists of history, such as Louis O. Mink, who put the whole weight of its intelligibility on the connection as such established between the events, or on the judicatory act of “grasping together.” To conceive of a causal connection, even among singular events, is already a kind of universalization. ...

That such is the case is confirmed by the opposition between simple and episodic plots (51b33-35). It is not episodes as such that Aristotle disapproves of; tragedy can forgo them only under the penalty of becoming monotonous, and epic makes the best use of them. What he condemns is disconnected episodes: “I call episodic a plot in which the episodes follow one another [met’allēla] in no probable or inevitable sequence” (ibid.). The key opposition is here: one thing after another and one thing because of another (“in a causal sequence” [di’allēla]) (52a4). One after the other is merely episodic and therefore improbable, one because of the other is a causal sequence and therefore probable. No doubt is allowed. The kind of universality that a plot calls for derives from its ordering, which brings about its completeness and its wholeness. The universals a plot engenders are not Platonic ideas. They are universals related to practical wisdom, hence to ethics and politics. A plot engenders such universals when the structure of its action rests on the connections internal to the action and not on external accidents. These internal connections as such are the beginning of the universalization.
亞里士多德通過簡單和情節性情節之間的對立確認了這一點（51b33-35）。他並非反對情節本身；悲劇若完全放棄情節會變得單調，而史詩則最好地利用了情節。他所譴責的是脫節的情節："我稱呼那些情節相互跟隨卻缺乏可能性或必然性的情節為情節性"（同上）。關鍵的對立在於：一件事接著另一件事，以及一件事因為另一件事（"在因果序列中"）（52a4）。單純的相繼是偶發性的且不太可能，而因果關聯是有可能的。不容置疑。情節所需的普遍性源於其排序，這帶來了情節的完整性和整體性。情節生成的普遍性不是柏拉圖式的理念。它們與實踐智慧相關，因此與倫理和政治相關。當一個情節的行動結構基於行動內在的聯繫，而非外部偶然事件時，它就會產生這種普遍性。這些內在聯繫本身就是普遍化的開端。

One feature of mimesis, then, is that it is directed more at the coherence of the muthos than at its particular story. Its making [faire] is immediately a universalizing “making.” The whole problem of narrative Verstehen is contained here in principle. To make up a plot is already to make the intelligible spring from the accidental, the universal from the singular, the necessary or the probable from the episodic. And is this not finally what Aristotle says in 51b29-32:
模仿的一個特徵是，它更關注神話的連貫性，而非其特定故事。它的製作立即就是一種普遍化的"製作"。敘事理解的整個問題原則上包含在此。編造一個情節本身就是使可理解的從偶發性中湧現，使普遍性從特殊性中產生，使必然或可能性從偶發性中生成。這難道不正是亞里士多德在 51b29-32 中所說的嗎：

It is clear then from the foregoing remarks that the poet should be a maker of plots more than a maker of verse, in that he is a poet by virtue of his imitation and he imitates actions. So even if on occasion he takes real events as the
從上述論述可以清楚看出，詩人應該更多是情節的製作者，而非詩句的製作者，因為他憑藉模仿成為詩人，他模仿的是行動。因此即便他偶爾取材於真實事件，

subject of a poem, he is none the less a poet, since nothing prevents some of the things that have actually happened from being of the sort that might probably or possibly happen, and it is in accordance with this that he is their poet. (5lb27-32) $^{23}$
作為一首詩的主題，他仍然是一個詩人，因為沒有什麼能阻止已經發生的事情中的某些事情，不是可能或可能發生的事情，正是根據這一點，他是他們的詩人。(5lb27-32)

The two sides of the equation balance each other: maker of plots, imitator of action-this is the poet.
方程的兩邊彼此平衡：情節製造者，動作模仿者——這就是詩人。

The difficulty is still only partially resolved. We can verify a causal connection in reality, but what about in a poetic composition? This is an embarrassing question. If mimetic activity “composes” action, it is what establishes what is necessary in composing it. It does not see the universal, it makes it spring forth. What then are its criteria? We have a partial answer in the expression referred to above: “it is because as they look at them they have the experience of learning and reasoning out what each thing represents, concluding, for example, that ‘this figure is so and so’” (48b16-17). This pleasure of recognition, as Dupont-Roc and Lallot put it, presupposes, I think, a prospective concept of truth, according to which to invent is to rediscover. But this prospective concept of truth has no place in a formal theory of the structure of the plot. It presupposes a more developed theory of mimesis than the one that simply equates mimesis with muthos. I shall return to this point at the end of this study.
困難仍然只是部分解決。我們可以驗證現實中的因果關係，但在詩歌作品中又如何？這是一個尷尬的問題。如果模仿活動"構成"行動，它就是建立了在構成它時的必然性。它不是看到普遍性，而是使其湧現。那麼它的標準是什麼？我們對上面提到的表達有部分答案："因為當他們看著它們時，他們體驗到學習和推理出每件事物代表的意義，例如得出'這個形象是如此如此'"(48b16-17)。正如杜邦-羅克和拉洛特所說的，這種識別的快樂，我認為，預設了一個前瞻性的真理概念，根據這個概念，發明就是重新發現。但是這種前瞻性的真理概念在情節結構的形式理論中是沒有位置的。它預設了比簡單地將模仿等同於神話更發達的模仿理論。我將在本研究結尾回到這一點。

Included Discordance 包含的不一致

The tragic model is not purely a model of concordance, but rather of discordant concordance. This is where it offers a counterpart to the distentio animi. Discordance is present at each stage of the Aristotelian analysis, even though it is only dealt with thematically in terms of the complex (versus the simple) plot. It is already manifest in the canonical definition of tragedy as an imitation of action that is serious and “complete” (teleios) (49b25).

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Completeness is not a negligible feature insofar as the end of action is happiness or unhappiness, and insofar as the ethical quality of the characters grounds the plausibility of either outcome. The action is not brought to its conclusion therefore until it produces one or the other. And the space for the “episodes” that bring action to its conclusion is thereby marked out. Aristotle says nothing against episodes as episodes. What he proscribes are not episodes but the episodic texture, the plot where the episodes follow one another by chance. The episodes, controlled by the plot, are what give amplitude to the work and thus a “magnitude.”
悲劇模型不僅僅是一致性的模型，而是不一致中的一致性模型。在這裡，它為「心靈擴張」提供了一個對應。不一致在亞里士多德分析的每個階段都存在，儘管它僅在複雜（相對於簡單）情節的層面上被主題性地處理。它已經在悲劇的標準定義中顯現，即嚴肅且「完整」（teleios）的行動模仿（49b25）。完整性不是一個可忽視的特徵，因為行動的結局是幸福或不幸，而角色的道德品質為任一結果提供了可信性。在產生這兩種結果之前，行動不會被完結。因此，促使行動達到結論的「插曲」的空間就此劃定。亞里士多德並不反對插曲本身。他禁止的是插曲的零散性，即情節中插曲偶然地相繼發生。由情節控制的插曲賦予作品廣度，從而形成「宏大」。

The definition of tragedy also contains another indication: “and effecting through pity and fear [what we call] the catharsis of such emotions” (49b2627). Let us leave aside the prickly question of catharsis for the moment and concentrate on its means (dia). In my opinion Else and Dupont-Roc and
悲劇的定義還包含另一個指示：「通過憐憫和恐懼[我們稱之為]淨化這些情感」（49b26-27）。暫時擱置關於淨化的棘手問題，讓我們集中精力於其方式（dia）。在我看來，埃爾澤和杜蓬-羅克

Lallot have well understood Aristotle’s intention, as it is reflected in the construction of this sentence. The spectator’s emotional response is constructed in the drama, in the quality of the destructive or painful incidents suffered by the characters themselves. The subsequent treatment of the term pathos, as the third component of a complex plot, will confirm this. Hence catharsis, whatever the term means, is brought about by the plot. And the first discordance is the fearful and pitiable incidents. They constitute the major threat to the plot’s coherence. This is why Aristotle speaks of them again in connection with the necessary and the probable and also in the context of his criticism of episodic examples (Chapter 9). There he no longer uses the nouns pity and fear but the adjectives pitiable and fearful (52a2), which qualify the incidents the poet represents by means of the plot.
拉洛特已經很好地理解了亞里士多德的意圖，正如這個句子的結構所反映的。觀眾的情感反應是在戲劇中構建的，在角色自身遭受的破壞性或痛苦事件的質量中。後續對"病態"一詞的處理，作為複雜情節的第三個組成部分，將證實這一點。因此，無論這個詞意味著什麼，淨化都是由情節帶來的。而第一個不協調之處是可怕和可憐的事件。它們構成了對情節一致性的主要威脅。這就是為什麼亞里士多德在談論必然性和或然性以及批評插曲性示例（第 9 章）時再次提到它們。在那裡，他不再使用同情和恐懼這些名詞，而是使用可憐和可怕的形容詞（52a2），這些形容詞描述了詩人通過情節所呈現的事件。

Discordant concordance is intended still more directly by the analysis of surprise. Aristotle characterizes it by an extraordinary expression in anacoluthic form, which is lost in the English translation: “when they come unexpectedly and yet occur in a causal sequence in which one thing leads to another [para tēn doxan di’allēla]” (52a4). The “marvelous” things (to thaumaston) (ibid.) - the height of the discordant-are those strokes of chance that seem to arrive by design.
不協調的一致性更直接地體現在對意外的分析中。亞里士多德用一種非常特別的非連貫形式來描述它："當它們出乎意料地出現，但又按照一個事物導致另一事物的因果順序發生[para tēn doxan di'allēla]"（52a4）。"奇妙的"事物（to thaumaston）（同上）——不協調的極致——是那些看似有意設計卻出現的偶然機遇。

We reach the heart of discordant concordance, still common to both simple and episodic plots, with the central phenomenon of the tragic action Aristotle calls “reversal” (metabolē) in Chapter 11. In tragedy, reversal turns good fortune into bad, but its direction may be reversed. Tragedy does not exploit this resource, owing no doubt to the role of the fearful or the pitiable incidents. It is this reversal, however, that takes time and governs the magnitude of the work. The art of composition consists in making this discordance appear concordant. The “one because of [dia] the other” thus wins out over “one after [meta] the other” (52a18-22).

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The discordant overthrows the concordant in life, but not in tragic art.
我們到達了不協調的一致性的核心，這對於簡單和片段性的情節都是共同的，即亞里士多德在第 11 章中稱之為「逆轉」（metabolē）的中心現象。在悲劇中，逆轉將好運轉變為壞運，但其方向可能被逆轉。悲劇並未利用這一資源，這無疑歸因於令人恐懼或令人憐憫的事件的角色。然而，正是這種逆轉需要時間，並支配作品的規模。作曲的藝術在於使這種不協調看起來是協調的。「因為（dia）另一個」因此勝過「之後（meta）另一個」（52a18-22）。在生活中，不協調顛覆了協調，但在悲劇藝術中卻不是如此。

The reversals characteristic of the complex plot are, as is well known, reversal (peripeteia) - coup de théâtre in Dupont-Roc and Lallot’s apt phraseand recognition (anagnōrisis), to which must be added suffering (pathos). The definitions of these modes of reversal are given in Chapter 11 and the commentary that goes with them is well known.

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What is important for us is that here Aristotle multiplies the constraints on the tragic plot and thereby makes his model both stronger and more limited at the same time. More limited, inasmuch as the theory of the muthos becomes more and more identified with that of the tragic plot. So the question will be whether what we are calling narrative can draw this surprising effect from other procedures than those Aristotle enumerates, and therefore give rise to other constraints than those of tragedy. Yet the model also becomes stronger, inasmuch as reversal, recognition, and suffering-particularly when they are joined together in one work, as in Sophocles’ Oedipus-bring to their highest degree of tension the fusion
複雜情節的特徵性逆轉是眾所周知的，即逆轉（peripeteia）——正如杜龐-羅克和拉洛特恰當表達的「劇情的突轉」，以及認知（anagnōrisis），還必須加上苦難（pathos）。這些逆轉模式的定義在第 11 章中給出，隨附的評論也是眾所周知的。對我們來說重要的是，亞里士多德在此增加了對悲劇情節的限制，從而使他的模型同時變得更強大且更有限。更有限，因為 muthos 的理論越來越等同於悲劇情節的理論。因此，問題將是我們所謂的敘事是否可以通過亞里士多德列舉的以外的程序獲得這種驚人的效果，從而產生不同於悲劇的限制。然而，這個模型也變得更強大，因為逆轉、認知和苦難——特別是當它們在一部作品中結合在一起，如索福克勒斯的《俄狄浦斯》——將融合推向最高程度的張力。
of the “paradoxical” and the “causal” sequence, of surprise and necessity.

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And it is the force of this model that every theory of narrativity tries to preserve by other means than those of the tragic model. In this regard, we might ask whether we do not move away from narrative if we abandon this major constraint constituted by reversal, taken in its broadest sense of “a change from one state of affairs to its exact opposite” (52a22). We shall rediscover this question when we inquire below “what makes a story (or stories) out of action,” to use the title of an essay by Hermann Lübbe.

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The question of unintended effects, as well as that of “perverse” ones, in the theory of history will raise an analogous question. Its implications are numerous: if reversal is essential to every story or history where meaninglessness threatens the meaningful, does not the conjunction of reversal and recognition preserve a universality that goes beyond the case of tragedy? Do not historians, too, seek to replace perplexity with lucidity? And is not our perplexity greatest where reversals of fortune were most unexpected? There is another even more constraining implication: must we not also preserve, along with reversal, the reference to happiness and unhappiness? Does not every narrated story finally have to do with reversals of fortune, whether for better or worse?

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It is not necessary to take suffering (pathos) as the poor cousin in this review of the modes of reversal. Aristotle, it is true, does give it a rather confining definition at the end of Chapter 11. Suffering is linked to the fearful and pitiable incidents inherent in the tragic plot, the leading generators of discordance. Suffering-“the thing suffered,” says Else, “l’effet violent,” according to Dupont-Roc and Lallot-just brings to their peak the fearful and the pitiable in the complex plot.
關於「矛盾」和「因果」序列，驚訝與必然性。

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正是這種模型的力量，每個敘事理論都試圖以不同於悲劇模型的方式來保留。在這方面，我們可能會問，如果我們放棄由逆轉所構成的主要限制，是否會遠離敘事，這裡的逆轉被廣義地理解為「從一種狀況轉變到其完全相反的狀態」。我們將在下文重新討論這個問題，當我們探究「甚麼使行動成為一個故事（或多個故事）」，借用赫爾曼·呂伯的一篇文章標題。

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非預期效果的問題，以及歷史理論中的「反常」效果，將提出類似的問題。其影響是多方面的：如果逆轉對於每個意義可能消失的故事或歷史都是必要的，那麼逆轉和認知的結合是否保留了超越悲劇的普遍性？歷史學家是否也試圖用清晰取代困惑？當命運逆轉最出人意料時，我們的困惑是否最為強烈？還有一個更為嚴格的含義：我們是否必須同時保留對幸福和不幸的引用？每個被敘述的故事最終是否都與命運的逆轉有關，無論是好是壞？

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在這次對逆轉模式的回顧中，沒有必要將苦難（病理）視為次等角色。誠然，亞里士多德在第 11 章末尾給了它一個相當侷限的定義。苦難與悲劇情節中固有的可怕和可憐的事件相連，這些是不和諧的主要生成器。埃爾斯說的苦難—「所遭受的事情」，根據杜邦-羅克和拉洛特的說法是「暴力效果」—只是將複雜情節中可怕和可憐的事物推向了頂峰。

Such consideration of the emotional quality of the incidents is not foreign to our inquiry, as though concern for the intelligibility proper to the search for completeness and wholeness were to imply an “intellectualism” that should be opposed to some sort of “emotionalism.” The pitiable and the fearful are qualities closely tied to the most unexpected changes of fortune oriented toward unhappiness. It is these discordant incidents the plot tends to make necessary and probable. And in so doing, it purifies them, or, better, purges them. We shall return again to this point. By including the discordant in the concordant, the plot includes the affecting within the intelligible. Aristotle thus comes to say that pathos is one ingredient of the imitating or representing of praxis. So poetry conjoins these terms that ethics opposes.

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對於事件的情感品質的這種考慮並非我們探究之外的事，好像追求完整性和整體性固有的理解意味著某種應該與某種「情感主義」對立的「理智主義」。悲慘和可怕是與朝向不幸的命運最意想不到的變化緊密相連的品質。正是這些不和諧的事件，情節傾向於使其成為必要且合理的。在這樣做的過程中，它淨化或者更確切地說是清除了它們。我們將再次回到這一點。通過將不和諧納入和諧，情節將令人動容的納入可理解的範疇。因此亞里士多德說，病理是模仿或呈現行動的一個成分。因此，詩歌將倫理學相對立的這些術語結合起來。

We must go even further. If the pitiable and the fearful can be incorporated into the plot, it is because these emotions have, as Else says (p. 375), their own rationale, which, in return, serves as a criterion for the tragic quality of each change in fortune. Two chapters ( 13 and 14) are devoted to this screening effect which pity and fear exercise with regard to the very structure of the plot. Indeed, to the extent that these emotions are incompatible with the repugnant and the monstrous, or the inhuman (a lack of “philanthropy” that makes us recognize someone like ourselves in the characters), they play the
我們必須更進一步。如果悲慘和可怕可以融入情節，那是因為正如埃爾斯所說（第 375 頁），這些情感有其自身的邏輯，反過來，這個邏輯也成為每次命運變化悲劇性的標準。第 13 和第 14 章專門討論了憐憫和恐懼對情節結構所產生的篩選效果。事實上，在這些情感與令人厭惡的、怪異的或非人性的（缺乏使我們在角色中認出自己的「仁愛」）不相容的程度上，它們在情節類型學中扮演著
principal role in the typology of plots. This is constructed in terms of two axes: whether the characters are good or evil, and whether their end is happy or unhappy. The two tragic emotions govern its hierarchy of possible combinations “since the first is felt for a person whose misfortune is undeserved and the second for someone like ourselves” (53a3-5).
主要角色。這是根據兩個軸線來構建的：角色是好是壞，以及他們的結局是幸福還是不幸。這兩種悲劇情感支配著可能組合的等級，「因為第一種是對遭受不應得的不幸的人感到的，第二種是對與我們相似的人感到的」（53a3-5）。

Finally, it is these tragic emotions that require that the hero be prevented by some “fault” from attaining excellence in the order of virtue and justice, without however vice or wickedness being responsible for his fall into misfortune: “We are left with the man whose place is between these extremes. Such is the man who on the one hand is not pre-eminent in virtue and justice, and yet on the other hand does not fall into misfortune through vice or depravity, but falls because of some mistake [hamartia]” (53a7f.).

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So even the discernment of the tragic fault is brought about by the emotional quality of pity, fear, and our sense for what is human.

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The relation therefore is a circular one. It is the composition of the plot that purges the emotions, by bringing to representation the pitiable and fearful incidents, and it is these purged emotions that govern our discernment of the tragic. It seems hardly possible to push any further the inclusion of the fearful and the pitiable in the dramatic texture. Aristotle can, however, conclude this theme in these terms: “And since the pleasure the poet is to provide is that which comes [apo] from pity and fear through [dia] an imitation, clearly this effect must be embodied [empoiēteon] in [en] the events of the plot” (53b12-13).

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最後，正是這些悲劇性的情感要求英雄被某種「缺陷」阻止獲得美德和正義的卓越，然而這種阻礙並非由邪惡或罪惡造成：「我們留下的是一個介於這些極端之間的人。這樣的人在美德和正義方面並不卓越，但又不是因為邪惡或墮落而陷入不幸，而是因為某種錯誤[哈馬爾蒂亞]而墜落」(53a7f.)。即使對悲劇性缺陷的辨識，也是由憐憫、恐懼的情感品質和我們對人性的感知所產生。因此這種關係是循環的。情節的構成通過呈現令人憐憫和恐懼的事件來淨化情感，而這些淨化的情感又支配我們對悲劇的理解。似乎幾乎不可能在戲劇結構中更進一步納入恐懼和憐憫。然而，亞里士多德可以用這些術語總結這個主題：「既然詩人要提供的快感是來自[源於]憐憫和恐懼的模仿，顯然這種效果必須[被創造]在情節的事件中」(53b12-13)。

These are the increasing constraints to which Aristotle submits his tragic model. We may ask then whether, in augmenting the constraints on the tragic plot, he has not made his model both stronger and more limited.

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這些是亞里士多德對悲劇模型施加的越來越多的限制。我們可能要問，在增加對悲劇情節的限制時，他是否已經使自己的模型既更強大又更有限。

The Two Sides of The Poetic Configuration
詩學配置的兩個側面

To conclude, I would like to return to the question of mimesis, the second focus of my interest in reading the Poetics. It does not seem to me to be governed by the equating of the two expressions “the imitation (or representation) of action” and “the organization of the events.” It is not that something has to be taken back from this equation. There is no doubt that the prevalent sense of mimesis is the one instituted by its being joined to muthos. If we continue to translate mimesis by “imitation,” we have to understand something completely contrary to a copy of some preexisting reality and speak instead of a creative imitation. And if we translate mimesis by “representation” (as do Dupont-Roc and Lallot), we must not understand by this word some redoubling of presence, as we could still do for Platonic mimesis, but rather the break that opens the space for fiction. Artisans who work with words produce not things but quasi-things; they invent the as-if. And in this sense, the Aristotelian mimesis is the emblem of the shift [décrochage] that, to use our vocabulary today, produces the “literariness” of the work of literature.
總之，我想回到模仿（模擬）的問題，這是我閱讀《詩學》時感興趣的第二個焦點。這似乎並不是由「行動的模仿（或再現）」和「事件的組織」這兩個表達方式等同起來。這並不是說必須收回這個等式。毫無疑問，模仿的主要意義是與情節（muthos）聯繫在一起的。如果我們繼續將模仿譯為「模仿」，我們必須理解一些與預先存在的現實的複製完全相反的東西，並轉而談論創造性的模仿。如果我們將模仿譯為「再現」（正如杜蓬-羅克和拉洛特所做的），我們不能理解為某種現前的重複，就像我們在柏拉圖式模仿中可能做的那樣，而是開闢虛構空間的斷裂。用文字工作的工匠不是製造事物，而是製造準事物；他們發明了猶如。在這個意義上，亞里士多德的模仿是象徵著一種轉變，用我們今天的詞彙來說，就是產生文學作品的「文學性」。

Still the equation of mimesis and muthos does not completely fill up the
然而，模仿和情節的等式並不完全填滿
meaning of the expression mimēsis praxeōs. We may of course-as we did above-construe the objective genitive as the noematic correlate of imitation or representation and equate this correlate to the whole expression “the organization of the events,” which Aristotle makes the “what”-the object-of mimesis. But that the praxis belongs at the same time to the real domain, covered by ethics, and the imaginary one, covered by poetics, suggests that mimesis functions not just as a break but also as a connection, one which establishes precisely the status of the “metaphorical” transposition of the practical field by the muthos. If such is the case, we have to preserve in the meaning of the term mimesis a reference to the first side of poetic composition. I call this reference mimesis

_{1}

to distinguish it from mimesis

_{2}

- the mimesis of cre-ation-which remains the pivot point. I hope to show that even in Aristotle’s text there are scattered references to this prior side of poetic composition. This is not all. Mimesis, we recall, as an activity, the mimetic activity, does not reach its intended term through the dynamism of the poetic text alone. It also requires a spectator or reader. So there is another side of poetic composition as well, which I call mimesis

_{3}

, whose indications I shall also look for in the text of the Poetics. By so framing the leap of imagination with the two operations that constitute the two sides of the mimesis of invention, I believe we enrich rather than weaken the meaning of the mimetic activity invested in the muthos. I hope to show that this activity draws its intelligibility from its mediating function, which leads us from one side of the text to the other through the power of refiguration.
模仿實踐的表達意義。我們當然可以—正如我們之前所做的—將客觀生成詞理解為模仿或再現的內容相關物，並將此相關物等同於亞里士多德稱為模仿"對象"的"事件組織"。但是，實踐同時屬於倫理學所涵蓋的現實領域和詩學所涵蓋的想像領域，這表明模仿不僅是一種斷裂，也是一種連接，它準確地建立了 muthos 對實踐領域的"隱喻"轉置的地位。如果情況如此，我們必須在模仿一詞的意義中保留對詩歌創作第一面向的引用。我稱這種引用為模仿

_{1}

，以將其與模仿

_{2}

區分開來—創作的模仿仍然是樞紐點。我希望表明，即使在亞里士多德的文本中，也散佈著對詩歌創作這一先前面向的引用。這還不是全部。回想一下，模仿作為一種活動，模仿活動並非僅通過詩歌文本的動力實現其預期目標。它還需要一個觀眾或讀者。因此，詩歌創作還有另一面向，我稱之為模仿

_{3}

，我也將在《詩學》文本中尋找其蛛絲馬迹。通過以構成發明模仿兩面向的兩種操作來框定想像力的飛躍，我相信我們豐富而非削弱了投射在 muthos 中的模仿活動的意義。我希望表明，這種活動從其中介功能中獲得其可理解性，通過重塑的力量，引導我們穿越文本的兩側。

References are not lacking, in the Poetics, to the understanding of actionand also the passions-which the Ethics articulates. These are tacit references, although the Rhetoric does include a veritable “treatise on the passions.” The difference is easy to understand. Rhetoric exploits these passions, while poetics transposes human action and suffering into a poem.
在《詩學》中，關於行動的理解以及《倫理學》所闡述的激情並不缺乏引用。這些是隱晦的引用，儘管《修辭學》確實包含了一個關於激情的真正"論述"。這種差異很容易理解。修辭學利用這些激情，而詩學則將人類的行動和苦難轉化為詩歌。

The following chapter will give a more complete idea of the understanding of the order of action implied by narrative activity. The tragic model, as a limited model of narrativity, makes use of borrowings themselves limited by this pre-understanding. The tragic muthos turning on reversals of fortune, and exclusively on those from happiness to unhappiness, is one exploration of the ways in which action throws good people, against all expectation, into unhappiness. It serves as a counterpoint to ethics, which teaches how action, through the exercise of virtue, leads to happiness. At the same time it borrows from the foreknowledge of action only its ethical features.

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下一章將更全面地闡述敘事活動所暗示的行動秩序的理解。悲劇模式作為敘事性的有限模型，使用了受此預先理解限制的借鑑。圍繞命運逆轉的悲劇情節，專門聚焦於從幸福到不幸的轉變，是探索行動如何出乎意料地將好人拋入不幸的方式之一。它為倫理學提供了一個對比，後者教導如何通過行使美德來達到幸福。同時，它僅借用了行動前知中的倫理特徵。

In the first place, poets have always known that the characters they represent are “persons engaged in action” (48a1). They have always known that “character is that in virtue of which we say that the personages are of such and such quality” (50a4). They have always known that “these persons will necessarily be persons of a higher or lower moral type” (48a2). The parenthesis that follows this last phrase is an ethical one: “for this is the one divi-
首先，詩人一直知道他們所描繪的人物是"參與行動的人"（48a1）。他們一直知道"性格是我們用來判斷角色品質的憑藉"（50a4）。他們一直知道"這些人必然會是道德水準高低不同的人"（48a2）。緊隨其後的括號是一個倫理性的括號："因為這是唯一的分
sion that characters submit to almost without exception, goodness or badness being universal criteria of character” (48a2-4). This expression “universal” (pantes) is the indication of mimesis in the text of the Poetics. In the chapter devoted to the characters (Chapter 15), “the person being imitated” (54a27) is a person according to ethics. And the ethical qualifications come from the real world. What stems from the imitation or representation is the logical requirement of coherence. In the same vein, it is said that tragedy and comedy differ in that “comedy prefers to imitate persons who are worse, tragedy persons who are better, than the present generation [tōn nun]” (48a15-18); this is the second indication of mimesis

_{1}

. Therefore, that the characters may be improved or harmed by the action is something the poet knows and takes for granted: “Character is that in virtue of which we say that the personages are of such and such a quality” (50a6).

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「在幾乎沒有例外的情況下，角色都服從於一種觀念，即善惡是評判人物的普遍標準」（48a2-4）。這個表達「普遍」（pantes）是《詩學》文本中模仿的指標。在描述角色的章節（第 15 章）中，「被模仿的人」（54a27）是一個具有倫理特性的人。而倫理資格來自現實世界。從模仿或代表中產生的是邏輯一致性的要求。同樣地，人們說悲劇和喜劇的不同在於「喜劇傾向於模仿比當代（tōn nun）更低劣的人，悲劇則模仿比當代更優秀的人」（48a15-18）；這是模仿的第二個指標。因此，角色可能因行動而得到改善或傷害，是詩人已知且視為理所當然的：「性格是我們用以判斷人物具有某種品質的依據」（50a6）。

In short, if we are to talk of a “mimetic displacement” or a quasi-metaphorical “transposition” from ethics to poetics, we have to conceive of mimetic activity as a connection and not just as a break. It is in fact the movement from mimesis

_{1}

to mimesis

_{2}

. If it is beyond doubt that the term muthos indicates discontinuity, the word praxis, by its double allegiance, assures continuity between the two realms of action-ethics and poetics.

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簡而言之，如果我們要談論「模仿置換」或近乎比喻性的「轉置」從倫理學到詩學，我們必須將模仿活動視為一種連結，而不僅僅是一種斷裂。事實上，這是從模仿

_{1}

到模仿

_{2}

的運動。如果毫無疑問地說 muthos 表示不連續，那麼 praxis 這個詞，通過其雙重效忠，確保了行動倫理學和詩學兩個領域之間的連續性。

A similar relationship of identity and difference could no doubt be recognized between the pathē of which The Rhetoric, Book II, gives an ample description and the pathos-the suffering-which tragic art makes one “part” of the plot (52b9ff.).
在《修辭學》第二卷詳細描述的 pathē與悲劇藝術中使人成為情節「一部分」的 pathos 之間，無疑可以認識到一種相同與差異的關係（52b9ff.）。

Perhaps we should push this reprise or recovery of ethics in poetics still further. Poets find not only an implicit categorization of the practical field in their cultural stock but also a first narrative organization [mise en forme] of this field. If tragic poets, unlike authors of comedy who allow themselves to support their plots with names chosen by chance, retain “historical names” (genomenōn) (51b15), that is, ones received from tradition, it is because the probable-an objective feature-must also be persuasive or credible (pithanon) (51b16)-a subjective feature. The logical connection of probability cannot therefore be detached from the cultural constraints of acceptability. Certainly art, here again, indicates a break: “So even if on occasion he takes real events [genomena] as the subject of a poem, he is none the less a poet” (51b29-30). Yet without myths that have been passed on there would be nothing to transform poetically. Who can fully put into words the inexhaustible source of violence received from the myths which the poet transforms into a tragic effect? And where is this tragic potential more dense than in the received stories about a few celebrated houses: that of the Atrides, that of Oedipus? It is not by chance therefore that Aristotle, so concerned elsewhere about the autonomy of the poetic act, advises poets to continue to draw upon the most frightful and pitiable matter in this treasury.

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...

As for the criterion of the probable or the possible by which poets distin- ...
guish their plots from the traditional stories-whether they really happened or exist only in the storehouse of tradition-we may doubt that it can be circumscribed by a pure poetic “logic.” The reference I made to its tie to the “persuasive” leads me to think it too is somehow received. But this problem relates instead to the problematic of mimesis

_{3}

, to which I shall now turn. ...

At first glance, there seems little to expect from the Poetics concerning the second side of poetic composition. Unlike the Rhetoric, which subordinates the order of discourse to its effects on its audience, the Poetics indicates no explicit interest in the communication of the work to the public. It even reveals in places an impatience regarding the constraints tied to the institution of the public contests (51a7) and even more so regarding the poor taste of the ordinary public (Chapter 25). The reception of the work is not therefore a major category of the Poetics. It is a treatise about composition, with almost no concern for anyone who receives the result.
乍看之下，《詩學》似乎對詩歌創作的另一面似乎沒有多少可期待的。不同於《修辭學》，後者將論述的順序從屬於其對聽眾的影響，《詩學》並未明確表現出對作品與公眾溝通的興趣。它甚至在某些地方顯示出對公眾比賽制度的約束（51a7）以及更多對普通大眾口味的不耐煩（第 25 章）。因此，作品的接受並非《詩學》的主要範疇。它是一部關於創作的論著，幾乎不關心誰接收最終成果。

Thus the references that I am now bringing together under the heading of mimesis

_{3}

are all the more valuable in that they are so rare. They testify to the impossibility, for a poetics that puts its principal accent on the internal structures of the text, of locking itself up within the closure of the text.
因此，我現在在模仿（mimesis）標題下彙集的這些參考文獻越發珍貴，因為它們如此罕見。它們證明了對於將主要重點放在文本內部結構上的詩學來說，不可能將自身封閉在文本的範圍內。

The line I am going to follow is this. The Poetics does not speak of structure but of structuration. Structuration is an oriented activity that is only completed in the spectator or the reader.
我將遵循的線索是：《詩學》不談論結構，而是談論結構化。結構化是一種定向的活動，只有在觀眾或讀者那裡才能完成。

From the beginning the term poiēsis puts the imprint of its dynamism on all the concepts in the Poetics and makes them concepts about operations. Mimesis is a representative activity; sustasis (or sunthēsis) is the operation of organizing the events into a system, not the system itself. Further, the dynamism (dunamis) of poiēsis is intended from the opening lines of the Poetics as an exigency for completeness

(47 a 8 - 10)

. It is what, in Chapter 6, requires that the action be brought to its conclusion (teleios). Yes, this completeness is the completeness of the work, of its muthos, but it is attested to only by the pleasure “which properly belongs to it” (53b11), which Aristotle calls its ergon, “the effect proper to tragedy” (52b30). All the indications of mimesis

_{3}

in Aristotle’s text are relative to this pleasure “which properly belongs to” tragedy and its conditions of production. I would like to show in what way this pleasure is both constructed in the work and made actual outside it. It joins inside to outside and requires us to treat in a dialectical fashion this relation of outside to inside, which modern poetics too quickly reduces to a simple disjunction, in the name of an alleged prohibition thrown up by semiotics against everything taken to be extralinguistic.

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As though language were not always already thrown beyond itself by its ontological vehemence! In the Ethics we have a good guide for articulating correctly the inside and the outside of the work. This is its theory of pleasure. If we apply to the work of literature what Aristotle says about pleasure in Books VII and X of the Nichomachean Eth-
從一開始，「詩學」這個術語就在《詩學》中的所有概念上印下了其動態性的印記，並使它們成為關於操作的概念。模仿是一種代表性活動；聚合（或合成）是將事件組織成系統的操作，而非系統本身。此外，詩學的動態性（動力）從《詩學》的開篇就被視為完整性的需求。正是這種完整性，在第 6 章中要求將行動帶到其結論（目的）。是的，這種完整性是作品本身、其神話（情節）的完整性，但只有通過"專屬於它的"快樂（53b11）才能證明，亞里士多德稱之為其 ergon，"悲劇特有的效果"（52b30）。亞里士多德文本中所有模仿的指示都與這種"專屬於"悲劇及其生產條件的快樂相關。我想展示這種快樂如何在作品內部構建並在外部實現。它將內部與外部連接起來，要求我們以辯證的方式處理內部與外部的關係，而現代詩學過於快速地將其歸結為一個簡單的分離，以所謂的符號學對一切被視為語言外的東西的禁令為名。彷彿語言並非已經被其本體論的激情拋向自身之外！在倫理學中，我們有一個很好的指南來正確地闡明作品的內部和外部。這是其關於快樂的理論。如果我們將亞里士多德在《尼各馬可倫理學》第 VII 和 X 卷中關於快樂的論述應用於文學作品，即它源於暢通無阻的行動並作為最高補充添加到已完成的行動中，我們應該以相同的方式闡述作品內部的最終目的和其接受的外部最終目的。
ics, namely, that it proceeds from unhindered action and is added to accomplished action as a crowning supplement, we ought to articulate in the same fashion the internal finality of the composition and the external finality of its reception.

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如果我們將亞里士多德在《尼各馬可倫理學》第 VII 和 X 卷中關於快樂的論述應用於文學作品，即它源於暢通無阻的行動並作為最高補充添加到已完成的行動中，我們應該以相同的方式闡述作品內部的最終目的和其接受的外部最終目的。

The pleasure of learning something is the first component of this pleasure of the text. Aristotle takes it as one corollary of the pleasure we take in imitations or representations, which is one of the natural causes of the poetic art, according to the genetic analysis in Chapter 4 . And he associates with the act of learning that of “concluding, for example, that ‘this figure is so and so’” (59b19). The pleasure of learning is therefore the pleasure of recognition. And this is what the spectators do when they recognize in Oedipus the universal that the plot engenders through its composition. The pleasure of recognition is therefore both constructed in the work and experienced by the reader.
學習某事物的快樂是文本快樂的首要成分。亞里斯多德將其視為我們在模仿或再現中所獲得快樂的一個推論，這是根據第 4 章中的基因分析，詩歌藝術的自然原因之一。他將學習的行為與「得出結論聯繫起來，例如'這個圖形是如此如此'」（59b19）。因此，學習的快樂是認知的快樂。當觀眾在伊底帕斯中認出情節通過其組成所產生的普遍性時，他們就是這樣做的。因此，認知的快樂既在作品中建構，又由讀者體驗。

This pleasure of recognition, in turn, is the fruit of the pleasure the spectator takes in the composition as necessary or probable. These “logical” criteria are themselves both constructed in the piece and exercised by the spectator. I have already made an allusion, in discussing extreme cases of dissonant consonance, to the connection Aristotle establishes between the probable and the acceptable-the “persuasive,” the major category in the Rhetoric. Such is the case as soon as the para-doxical has to be included in the causal sequence of “one by means of the other.” It is even more the case when epic accepts the alogon, the irrational, that tragedy has to avoid. The probable, under the pressure of the improbable, is thereby stretched to the breaking point. I have not forgotten the astonishing precept: “What is impossible yet probable should be preferred to that which is possible but incredible” (60a26-27). And when, in the following chapter (Chapter 25), Aristotle determines those norms that ought to guide criticism in resolving “problems,” he classes representable things under three rubrics: “things as they once were or now are; or things as people say or suppose they were or are; or things as they ought to be” (

60 b 10 - 11

). But what do present (and past) reality, opinion, and things as they ought to be designate if not the realm of the readily believable? We touch here on one of the more concealed sources of the pleasure of recognition, namely, the criterion of what is “persuasive,” whose contours are those of the social form of the imagination.

^{41}

It is true that Aristotle does explicitly make the persuasive an attribute of the probable, which is itself the measure of the possible in poetry-“possibility means credibility” (51b16). But whenever the impossible-the extreme figure of the discordant-threatens the structure, is it not the persuasive that becomes the measure of the acceptable impossibility? “Thus in reference to poetic effect, a convincing impossibility is preferable to that which, though possible, is unconvincing” (61b10-11). “Opinion” (ibid.) is the only guide here: “The improbable [or irrational] should be justified by ‘what men say’” (61b14).
這種認知的快樂，反過來說，是觀者對作品必然性或或然性的愉悅之果。這些「邏輯」標準既是在作品中建構，又由觀者行使。在討論不諧和的和諧的極端情況時，我已經暗示了亞里士多德在可能性與可接受性之間建立的聯繫——「具說服力」，這是修辭學中的主要範疇。只要將悖論納入「一種藉由另一種」的因果序列中，情況就是如此。當史詩接納非理性時，情況更是如此，而悲劇必須避免非理性。在非或然性的壓力下，可能性因此被拉伸到瀕臨斷裂的點。我沒有忘記這個驚人的箴言：「不可能但可能的事情應該優於可能但不可信的事情」。當亞里士多德在接下來的章節中確定應該指導批評解決「問題」的規範時，他將可呈現的事物劃分為三類：「事物如曾經發生或現在發生的；或人們所說或假設曾經或現在發生的；或事物應該如何發生的」。但如果不是指稱可輕易相信的領域，那麼當下（和過去）的現實、觀點和事物應該如何發生又意味著什麼？我們在此觸及了認知快樂更隱蔽的源頭之一，即「具說服力」的標準，其輪廓正是想像力的社會形式。誠然，亞里士多德明確地將具說服力作為可能性的屬性，而可能性本身是詩歌中的可能性尺度——「可能性意味著可信度」。但是，當不可能——不和諧的極端形式——威脅結構時，具說服力豈不是成為可接受的不可能性的衡量標準？ "因此，在詩的效果方面，一個令人信服的不可能性比看似可能但不令人信服的內容更可取"（61b10-11）。"意見"（同上）是唯一的指南："非理性的應該通過'人們所說的'來證明'"（61b14）。

Hence, by its very nature, the intelligibility characteristic of dissonant con-sonance-what Aristotle puts under the term “probable”-is the common product of the work and the public. The persuasive is born at their intersection.
因此，從其本質上來說，不和諧和諧（dissonant con-sonance）所具有的可理解性——亞里士多德用"或然"這個詞來描述——是作品和公眾共同的產物。說服力在他們的交集處誕生。

It is also in the spectator that the properly tragic emotions flower. For the pleasure proper to tragedy is one that engenders fear and pity. Nowhere better than here do we overtake the movement from the work to the spectator. On one side, in effect, the pitiable and the fearful-as adjectives-characterize the “events” themselves that the muthos composes into one. In this sense, the muthos imitates or represents the pitiable and the fearful. How does it bring them to representation? Precisely by making them leave

(e x)

the organization of the events. Here then fear and pity are inscribed in the events by the composition, insofar as it moves through the sieve of the representative activity (53b13). What is experienced by the spectator must first be constructed in the work. In this sense we could say that Aristotle’s ideal spectator is an “implied spectator” in the same sense Wolfgang Iser speaks of an "implied reader"but one of flesh and blood and capable of pleasure.

^{42}

悲劇性的情感也在觀眾身上綻放。因為悲劇特有的快感是產生恐懼和憐憫的快感。沒有比在這裡更能追溯從作品到觀眾的運動。一方面，可憐和可怕的——作為形容詞——描述了敘事（muthos）所構成的"事件"本身。在這個意義上，敘事模仿或代表可憐和可怕。它如何呈現它們？正是通過使它們離開

(e x)

事件的組織。因此，恐懼和憐憫通過作品的構成被銘刻在事件中，因為它通過代表性活動的篩子（53b13）。觀眾所經歷的必須首先在作品中構建。在這個意義上，我們可以說亞里士多德理想的觀眾是一個"暗示性觀眾"，與沃爾夫岡·伊瑟所說的"暗示性讀者"相同，但是一個有血有肉且能夠體驗快感的觀眾。

^{42}

In this regard I agree with the converging interpretations of catharsis in Else, Golden, Redfield, and Dupont-Roc and Lallot.

^{43}

Catharsis is a purifica-tion-or better, as Dupont-Roc and Lallot propose, a purgation-which has its seat in the spectator. It consists precisely in the fact that the pleasure proper to tragedy proceeds from pity and fear. It consists therefore in the transformation of the pain inherent in these emotions into pleasure. Yet this subjective alchemy is also constructed in the work by the mimetic activity. It results from the fact that the pitiable and fearful incidents are, as we have said, themselves brought to representation. And this poetic representation of these emotions results in turn from the composition itself. In this sense it is not too much to say, with recent commentators, that the purgation first of all is in the poetic construction. I myself have elsewhere suggested treating catharsis as the integrating part of the metaphorical process that conjoins cognition, imagination, and feeling.

^{44}

And in this sense, the dialectic of inside and outside reaches its highest point in catharsis. Experienced by the spectator, it is constructed in the work. This is why Aristotle could include it in his definition of tragedy, without devoting a separate analysis to it: “effecting through [dia] pity and fear [what we call] the catharsis of such emotions” (49b28).
在這方面，我同意 Else、Golden、Redfield 以及 Dupont-Roc 和 Lallot 對卡塔西斯的匯聚解釋。卡塔西斯是一種淨化——或者更好地說，如 Dupont-Roc 和 Lallot 所提出的，是一種淨化——其座落在觀眾身上。它正是在於悲劇固有的快感源於憐憫和恐懼。它因此在於將這些情感中固有的痛苦轉化為快感。然而，這種主觀的煉金術也透過模仿活動在作品中建構。它源於可憐和可怕的情節本身被呈現出來。而這些情感的詩意表現又源於作品本身的結構。從這個意義上說，正如近期評論家所言，淨化首先存在於詩意的建構中，這並不為過。我在其他地方曾建議將卡塔西斯視為一個將認知、想像力和感受相互聯繫的隱喻過程的整合部分。從這個意義上說，內在和外在的辯證達到了卡塔西斯的最高點。它由觀眾體驗，並在作品中建構。這就是為什麼亞里士多德可以將其納入悲劇的定義中，而不對其進行單獨分析："通過憐憫和恐懼，達到對此類情感的淨化"。

I willingly admit that the allusions the Poetics makes to pleasure taken as understanding and pleasure taken as experiencing fear and pity-which together, in the Poetics, form a single pleasure-constitute just the barest indication of a theory of mimesis

_{3}

. This only takes on its full scope when the work deploys a world that the reader appropriates. This world is a cultural world. The principal axis of a theory of reference on the second side of the work passes therefore through the relationship between poetry and culture. As James Redfield so forcefully puts it in his book Nature and Culture in the Iliad, the two relations, each the converse of the other, that we can establish
我坦誠地承認，《詩學》中所提及的關於理解之樂和體驗恐懼與憐憫之樂——這兩種在《詩學》中構成一種統一的快樂——僅僅是模仿理論的最基本指示。這只有在作品部署一個讀者可以佔有的世界時才能充分展現。這是一個文化世界。因此，作品參考理論的主要軸心通過詩歌與文化之間的關係來傳遞。正如詹姆斯·雷德菲爾德在他的《伊利亞德中的自然與文化》一書中如此有力地指出的，我們可以建立的這兩個相互對應的關係
between these two terms “must be interpreted . . . in light of a third relation: the poet as a maker of culture” (p. xi).

^{45}

Aristotle’s Poetics makes no incursion into this domain. It sets up the ideal spectator, and even more so the ideal reader, with his intelligence, his “purged” emotions, and his pleasure, at the junction of the work and the culture it creates. In this, Aristotle’s Poetics, despite its almost exclusive interest in mimesis as inventive, does offer some indication of an investigation of mimetic activity in all its aspects.
「必須在第三種關係的光照下進行解釋：詩人作為文化的創造者」（第 xi 頁）。亞里士多德的《詩學》並未涉足這一領域。它在作品和其創造的文化交匯處建立了理想的觀眾，更重要的是理想的讀者，以其智慧、「淨化」的情感和快樂。在這一點上，儘管亞里士多德的《詩學》幾乎專注於作為創新的模仿，但它確實提供了對模仿活動各個方面的調查的某些跡象。

Time and Narrative: Threefold Mimesis
《時間與敘事》：三重模仿

The moment has come to join together the two preceding independent studies and test my basic hypothesis that between the activity of narrating a story and the temporal character of human experience there exists a correlation that is not merely accidental but that presents a transcultural form of necessity. To put it another way, time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.
現在是時候將前兩個獨立研究結合起來，並檢驗我的基本假設：講述故事的活動與人類經驗的時間特性之間存在著一種不僅僅是偶然的相關性，而是呈現出一種跨文化的必然性形式。換句話說，時間是人性化的，因為它通過敘事模式被闡明，而敘事只有在成為時間存在的條件時才獲得其全部意義。

The cultural abyss that separates the Augustinian analysis of time in the Confessions and the Aristotelian analysis of plot in the Poetics compels me to construct at my own risk the intermediary links that articulate their correlation. Indeed, as has been said, Augustine’s paradoxes of the experience of time owe nothing to the activity of narrating a story. His key example of reciting a verse or a poem serves to sharpen the paradox rather than to resolve it. And on his side, Aristotle’s analysis of plot owes nothing to his theory of time, which is dealt with exclusively in his Physics. What is more, in his Poetics, the “logic” of emplotment discourages any consideration of time, even when it implies concepts such as beginning, middle, and end, or when it becomes involved in a discourse about the magnitude or the length of the plot.
《懺悔錄》中奧古斯丁對時間的分析與《詩學》中亞里士多德對情節的分析之間的文化鴻溝，迫使我冒險構建中介性連結，以闡明其相關性。誠如已經說過的，奧古斯丁對時間體驗的悖論與敘述故事的活動無關。他以吟誦詩句或詩歌為關鍵例子，是為了更加突顯悖論，而非解決它。同樣地，亞里士多德對情節的分析與他在《物理學》中專門探討的時間理論無關。更重要的是，在《詩學》中，情節邏輯排斥任何對時間的考慮，即便其中涉及開端、中間和結尾等概念，或者討論情節的規模和長度時也是如此。

The mediating construction I am about to propose deliberately bears the same title as does this work as a whole: Time and Narrative. At this stage of the investigation, however, it can only be a question of a sketch that will require further expansion, criticism, and revision. In fact, the present study will not take into consideration the fundamental bifurcation between historical and fictional narrative, which will give birth to the more technical studies of the succeeding parts of this work. From the separate investigation of these two fields will proceed the most serious questioning of my whole enterprise, as much on the level of the claim to truth as on that of the internal structure of discourse. What is sketched out here, therefore, is only a sort of reduced model of the thesis that the remainder of this work must attempt to prove.
我即將提出的中介性構建，特意採用與整部作品相同的標題：《時間與敘事》。然而，在研究的這個階段，這只能是一個需要進一步擴展、批評和修訂的草圖。事實上，本研究將不考慮歷史敘事和虛構敘事之間的根本分歧，這將在本作品後續部分的更為技術性的研究中呈現。從對這兩個領域的分別研究中，將對我整個研究企圖提出最嚴肅的質疑，無論是在真理主張的層面，還是在論述的內在結構方面。因此，在此勾勒的只是一個簡化的模型，餘下的工作將嘗試證明這一模型。

I am taking as my guideline for exploring the mediation between time and
我以探索時間與敘事之間中介性的指導方針為前提
narrative the articulation mentioned earlier, and already partially illustrated by my interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics, between the three moments of mimesis that, seriously and playfully, I named mimesis

_{1}

, mimesis

_{2}

, and mime

{sis}_{3}

. I take it as established that mimesis

_{2}

constitutes the pivot of this analysis. By serving as a turning point it opens up the world of the plot and institutes, as I have already suggested, the literariness of the work of literature. But my thesis is that the very meaning of the configurating operation constitutive of emplotment is a result of its intermediary position between the two operations I am calling mimesis

_{1}

and mimesis

_{3}

, which constitute the two sides [l’amont et l’aval] of mimesis

_{2}

. By saying this, I propose to show that mimesis

_{2}

draws its intelligibility from its faculty of mediation, which is to conduct us from the one side of the text to the other, transfiguring the one side into the other through its power of configuration. I am reserving for the part of this work devoted to fictional narrative the confrontation between this thesis and what I take to be characteristic of a semiotics of the text, namely, that a science of the text can be established only upon the abstraction of mimesis

_{2}

, and may consider only the internal laws of a work of literature, without any regard for the two sides of the text. It is the task of hermeneutics, in return, to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by an author to readers who receive it and thereby change their acting. For a semiotic theory, the only operative concept is that of the literary text. Hermeneutics, however, is concerned with reconstructing the entire arc of operations by which practical experience provides itself with works, authors, and readers. It does not confine itself to setting mimesis

_{2}

between mimesis

_{1}

and mimesis

_{3}

. It wants to characterize mimesis

_{2}

by its mediating function. What is at stake, therefore, is the concrete process by which the textual configuration mediates between the prefiguration of the practical field and its refiguration through the reception of the work. It will appear as a corollary, at the end of this analysis, that the reader is that operator par excellence who takes up through doing something-the act of reading - the unity of the traversal from mimesis

_{1}

to mimesis

_{3}

by way of mimesis

_{2}

.
敘述我之前提到並已部分闡釋的敘事邏輯，介於我命名為模仿

_{1}

、模仿

_{2}

和模仿

{sis}_{3}

的三個時刻之間。我認為模仿

_{2}

構成了這個分析的樞紐。通過作為轉折點，它開啟了情節世界，並如我已經暗示的，建立了文學作品的文學性。但我的論點是，情節化之配置操作的意義本身，是由於其在我稱為模仿

_{1}

和模仿

_{3}

兩種操作之間的中介位置，這兩種操作構成了模仿

_{2}

的兩側。藉此，我提出要證明模仿

_{2}

通過其調解能力獲得其可理解性，能夠引導我們穿越文本的一側到另一側，並憑其配置力量將一側轉化為另一側。我保留在本著作關於虛構敘事的部分，來對比這個論點與我認為文本符號學的特徵，即文本科學只能建立在模仿

_{2}

的抽象之上，並且僅能考慮文學作品的內部法則，不考慮文本的兩側。相反，詮釋學的任務是重建作品如何超越生活、行動和苦難的模糊深處，由作者給予讀者，並使讀者藉此改變其行動。對符號學理論而言，唯一可操作的概念是文學文本。然而，詮釋學關注重建實踐經驗如何為自身提供作品、作者和讀者的整個操作弧線。它不僅限於在模仿

_{2}

和模仿

_{1}

與模仿

_{3}

之間設置。它希望通過其中介功能來表徵模仿

_{2}

。因此，所涉及的是文本配置通過作品的接受來介於實踐領域的預配置和重新配置之間的具體過程。作為這一分析的必然結果，讀者是那個通過做某事——閱讀行為——來貫通模仿

_{1}

到模仿

_{3}

，並經由模仿

_{2}

的統一性的卓越運算者。

This highlighting of the dynamic of emplotment is to me the key to the problem of the relation between time and narrative. By moving from the initial question of the mediation between time and narrative to the new question of connecting the three stages of mimesis, I am basing the whole strategy of my work on the subordination of the second problem to the first one. In constructing the relationship between the three mimetic modes I constitute the mediation between time and narrative. Or to put it another way, to resolve the problem of the relation between time and narrative I must establish the mediating role of emplotment between a stage of practical experience that precedes it and a stage that succeeds it. In this sense my argument in this book consists of constructing the mediation between time and narrative by demon-
對情節動態的這種強調對我來說是時間與敘事關係問題的關鍵。通過從最初關於時間與敘事之間調解的問題轉向連接三個模仿階段的新問題，我將整個工作策略建立在將第二個問題從屬於第一個問題之上。在構建三種模仿模式之間的關係時，我建立了時間與敘事之間的調解。換句話說，為了解決時間與敘事之間的關係問題，我必須建立情節的中介角色，位於其前面的實踐經驗階段和其後的階段之間。從這個意義上說，本書的論點在於通過證明
strating emplotment’s mediating role in the mimetic process. Aristotle, we have seen, ignored the temporal aspects of emplotment. I propose to disentangle them from the act of textual configuration and to show the mediating role of the time of emplotment between the temporal aspects prefigured in the practical field and the refiguration of our temporal experience by this constructed time. We are following therefore the destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a configured time.
亞里士多德在模仿過程中忽略了敘事的調節作用中的時間面向。我建議將它們從文本配置的行為中分離出來，並展示敘事時間在實踐領域中被預先配置的時間面向與通過這種構建的時間重新配置我們的時間經驗之間的中介角色。因此，我們正在追隨一個被預先配置的時間，通過配置時間的中介，成為一個重新配置的時間。

On the horizon of this investigation looms the objection of a vicious circle between the act of narrating and temporal existence. Does this circle condemn my whole enterprise to being nothing more than one vast tautology? I seemed to avoid this objection by choosing two starting points as far apart from each other as possible-Augustine on time and Aristotle on emplotment. Still, in seeking a middle term for these two extremes and in assigning a mediating role to emplotment and the time of its structures, have I not given new strength to this objection? I do not intend to deny the circular character of my thesis that temporality is brought to language to the extent that language configures and refigures temporal experience. But I do hope to show, at the end of this chapter, that the circle can be something other than a dead tautology.
在這項調查的視野上，出現了敘事行為與時間存在之間形成惡性循環的異議。這個循環是否將我的整個企圖注定為一個龐大的同義反覆？我似乎通過選擇兩個盡可能遙遠的起點來避免這個異議——奧古斯丁論時間和亞里士多德論敘事。然而，在尋找這兩個極端的中間術語，並賦予敘事及其結構的時間以中介角色時，我是否不是又給這個異議增添了新的力量？我不打算否認我的論點的迴圈性質，即暫時性被帶入語言，語言在配置和重新配置時間經驗的程度上。但我希望在本章結尾處表明，這個迴圈可以是非死亡的同義反覆。

Mimesis, 模仿，

Whatever the innovative force of poetic composition within the field of our temporal experience may be, the composition of the plot is grounded in a preunderstanding of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal character. These features are described rather than deduced. But in this sense nothing requires their listing to be a closed one. And in any case their enumeration follows an easily established progression. First, if it is true that plot is an imitation of action, some preliminary competence is required: the capacity for identifying action in general by means of its structural features. A semantics of action makes explicit this competence. Next, if imitating is elaborating an articulated significance of some action, a supplementary competence is required: an aptitude for identifying what I call the symbolic mediations of action, in a sense of the word "symbol"that Cassirer made classic and that cultural anthropology, from which I shall draw several examples, adopted. Finally, these symbolic articulations of action are bearers of more precisely temporal elements, from which proceed more directly the very capacity of action to be narrated and perhaps the need to narrate it. A loan from Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology will accompany my description of this third feature.
無論在我們的時間經驗領域內，詩歌創作的創新力量可能是什麼，情節的構成都建立在對行動世界的預先理解之上，其有意義的結構、象徵性資源及其時間特性。這些特徵是被描述而非推導出來的。但在這個意義上，沒有什麼要求它們的列舉必須是封閉的。而且無論如何，它們的列舉遵循一個容易建立的進程。首先，如果情節是行動的模仿，某些初步能力是必需的：通過其結構特徵來識別行動的能力。行動的語義使這種能力明確化。其次，如果模仿是闡明某些行動的關節性意義，則需要額外的能力：識別我所謂的行動的象徵性中介，在卡西勒使之成為經典的「符號」意義上，並且文化人類學（我將從中舉幾個例子）採用了這一意義。最後，這些行動的象徵性關節承載著更加精確的時間元素，從這些元素直接產生出行動被敘述的能力，甚至可能是敘述它的需要。海德格爾的詮釋現象學借用將伴隨我描述這第三個特徵。

Let us consider these three features-structural, symbolic, and temporalin succession.
讓我們依次考慮這三個特徵——結構的、象徵的和時間的。

The intelligibility engendered by emplotment finds a first anchorage in our competence to utilize in a significant manner the conceptual network that
情節構建所產生的可理解性在我們運用概念網絡的能力中找到第一個錨定點
structurally distinguishes the domain of action from that of physical movement.

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I say “conceptual network” rather than “concept of action” in order to emphasize the fact that the very term “action,” taken in the narrow sense of what someone does, gets its distinct meaning from its capacity for being used in conjunction with other terms of the whole network. Actions imply goals, the anticipation of which is not confused with some foreseen or predicted result, but which commit the one on whom the action depends. Actions, moreover, refer to motives, which explain why someone does or did something, in a way that we clearly distinguish from the way one physical event leads to another. Actions also have agents, who do and can do things which are taken as their work, or their deed. As a result, these agents can be held responsible for certain consequences of their actions. In this network, the infinite regression opened by the question “Why?” is not incompatible with the finite regression opened by the question “Who?” To identify an agent and to recognize this agent’s motives are complementary operations. We also understand that these agents act and suffer in circumstances they did not make that nevertheless do belong to the practical field, precisely inasmuch as they circumscribe the intervention of historical agents in the course of physical events and offer favorable or unfavorable occasions for their action. This intervention, in turn, implies that acting makes what an agent can do-in terms of “basic ac-tions”-and what, without observation, he knows he is capable of doing, coincide with the initial state of a closed physical system.

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Moreover, to act is always to act “with” others. Interaction can take the form of cooperation or competition or struggle. The contingencies of this interaction then rejoin those of our circumstances through their character of helping or hindering us. Finally, the outcome of an action may be a change in fortune toward happiness or misfortune.
在結構上將行動領域與物理運動領域區分開來。我說「概念網絡」而非「行動概念」，目的是強調「行動」一詞在狹義上（某人所做的事）從與整個網絡中其他術語的搭配中獲得其獨特含義。行動意味著目標，這種預期並不會與某些預見或預測的結果混淆，而是承諾了行動所依賴的人。此外，行動涉及動機，解釋某人為什麼做或做了某事，我們明確地區分這種解釋與一個物理事件如何導致另一個事件的方式。行動還有行動者，他們做並能做被視為自己的工作或行為的事情。因此，這些行動者可以為其行動的某些後果負責。在這個網絡中，「為什麼？」這個問題所開啟的無限回溯與「誰？」這個問題所開啟的有限回溯並不矛盾。確定一個行動者並認識其動機是互補的操作。我們還理解，這些行動者在非自己創造的情境中行動和遭受，但這些情境確實屬於實踐領域，precisely 因為它們限定了歷史行動者在物理事件過程中的干預，並為其行動提供有利或不利的機會。反過來，這種干預意味著行動使行動者能做的事—就「基本行動」而言—以及在沒有觀察的情況下他知道自己能做的事，與封閉物理系統的初始狀態重合。此外，行動總是與他人一起行動。互動可以是合作、競爭或鬥爭的形式。這種互動的偶然性通過幫助或阻礙我們的特性，又與我們的情境偶然性重合。最後，一個行動的結果可能是命運轉向幸福或不幸。

In short, these terms or others akin to them occur in our answers to questions that can be classified as questions about “what,” “why,” “who,” “how,” “with whom,” or “against whom” in regard to any action. But the decisive fact is that to employ any one of these terms in a significant fashion, within a situation of questions and answers, is to be capable of linking that term to every other term of the same set. In this sense, all the members of the set are in a relation of intersignification. To master the conceptual network as a whole, and each term as one member of the set, is to have that competence we can call practical understanding.
簡而言之，這些術語或類似的術語出現在我們對可歸類為關於任何行動的"什麼"、"為什麼"、"誰"、"如何"、"與誰"或"反對誰"的問題的回答中。但決定性的事實是，以意義重大的方式在問題和回答的情境中使用任何一個術語，就是能夠將該術語與同一集合中的每個其他術語相互關聯。在這種意義上，該集合的所有成員都處於相互意義的關係中。掌握整個概念網絡，以及作為集合中一個成員的每個術語，就是擁有我們可以稱為實踐理解的能力。

What then is the relation of our narrative understanding to this practical understanding? The answer to this question governs the relationship that can be established between the theory of narrative and that of action, in the sense given this term by English-language analytic philosophy. This relationship, in my view, is a twofold one. It is a relation of presupposition and of transformation.
那麼，我們的敘事理解與這種實踐理解之間的關係是什麼？對這個問題的回答決定了敘事理論與行動理論之間可以建立的關係，按照英語分析哲學中賦予的意義。在我看來，這種關係是雙重的。它是一種預設和轉化的關係。

On the one hand, every narrative presupposes a familiarity with terms such as agent, goal, means, circumstance, help, hostility, cooperation, conflict, success, failure, etc., on the part of its narrator and any listener. In this sense,
一方面，每個敘事都預設敘述者和任何聽眾對諸如代理人、目標、手段、情境、幫助、敵意、合作、衝突、成功、失敗等術語都有熟悉度。在這個意義上，
the minimal narrative sentence is an action sentence of the form " X did A in such and such circumstances, taking into account the fact that Y does B in identical or different circumstances." In the final analysis, narratives have acting and suffering as their theme. We saw and said this in discussing Aristotle. We shall see in volume 2 to what point the structural analysis of narrative in terms of functions and actants, from Propp to Greimas, verifies this relation of presupposition which establishes narrative discourse on the basis of the action sentence. In this sense, there is no structural analysis of narrative that does not borrow from an explicit or an implicit phenomenology of “doing something.”

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最小敘事句是形式為「X 在某種情況下做了 A，同時考慮到 Y 在相同或不同的情況下做 B」的行動句。歸根結底，敘事的主題是行動和受苦。我們在討論亞里士多德時已經看到並且說過這一點。我們將在第二卷中探討，從普羅普到格雷馬斯的 narrative 結構分析，驗證這種以行動句為基礎建立敘事論述的預設關係。在這個意義上，沒有不借鑒「做某事」的明確或隱含現象學的敘事結構分析。

On the other hand, narrative is not limited to making use of our familiarity with the conceptual network of action. It adds to it discursive features that distinguish it from a simple sequence of action sentences. These features no longer belong to the conceptual network of the semantics of action. They are syntactic features, whose function is to engender the composing of modes of discourse worthy of being called narratives, whether it be a question of historical narrative or fictional narrative. We can account for the relation between the conceptual network of action and these rules for narrative composition through recourse to the distinction familiar to semiotics between the paradigmatic order and the syntagmatic one. With regard to the paradigmatic order, all terms relative to action are synchronic, in the sense that the relations of intersignification that exist between ends, means, agents, circumstances, and the rest are perfectly reversible. The syntagmatic order of discourse, on the contrary, implies the irreducibly diachronic character of every narrated story. Even if this diachrony does not prevent reading the narrative backwards, which is characteristic, as we shall see, of the act of retelling, this reading backwards from the end to the beginning does not abolish the narrative’s fundamental diachrony. In volume 2, I shall draw the consequences of this when I discuss the structuralist attempts to derive the logic of narrative from completely achronological models. For the time being, let us confine ourselves to saying that to understand a narrative is to master the rules that govern its syntagmatic order. Consequently, narrative understanding is not limited to presuppposing a familiarity with the conceptual network constitutive of the semantics of action. It further requires a familiarity with the rules of composition that govern the diachronic order of a story. Plot, understood broadly, as it was in the preceding chapter, that is, as the ordering of the events (and therefore as interconnecting the action sentences) into the total action constitutive of the narrated story, is the literary equivalent of the syntagmatic order that narrative introduces into the practical field.
另一方面，敘事不僅限於利用我們對行動概念網絡的熟悉性。它增添了一些論述特徵，使其區別於簡單的動作句序列。這些特徵不再屬於行動語義的概念網絡。它們是語法特徵，其功能是產生值得稱為敘事的論述模式，無論是歷史敘事還是虛構敘事。我們可以通過符號學中範式秩序和聚合秩序之間的區別來解釋行動的概念網絡與敘事組合規則之間的關係。就範式秩序而言，所有與行動相關的術語都是同步的，意味著終點、手段、行動者、情境等之間的互意關係是完全可逆的。相反，論述的聚合秩序意味著每個敘述故事都具有不可還原的共時性特徵。即使這種共時性並不妨礙倒敘敘事，但這種從結尾到開頭的閱讀並不消除敘事的基本共時性。在第二卷中，當我討論結構主義試圖從完全非時間的模型中推導敘事邏輯時，我將得出這一結論的後果。目前，我們只需說，理解一個敘事就是掌握支配其聚合秩序的規則。因此，敘事理解不僅限於預設對構成行動語義的概念網絡的熟悉性。它還需要熟悉支配故事共時性秩序的組合規則。情節，廣義地理解，如前一章所述，即是將事件的順序（因此是連接動作句子）組織成敘事故事的總體行動，是敘事引入實踐領域中的語法順序的文學等效物。

We may sum up this twofold relation between narrative understanding and practical understanding as follows. In passing from the paradigmatic order of action to the syntagmatic order of narrative, the terms of the semantics of action acquire integration and actuality. Actuality, because the terms, which had only a virtual signification in the paradigmatic order, that is, a pure capacity to
我們可以總結敘事理解和實踐理解之間的這種雙重關係如下。在從動作的範式秩序過渡到敘事的語法秩序時，動作語義的術語獲得了整合和現實性。現實性，因為這些術語在範式秩序中僅具有虛擬意義，即純粹的使用能力，
be used, receive an actual [effective] signification thanks to the sequential interconnections the plot confers on the agents, their deeds, and their sufferings. Integration, because terms as heterogeneous as agents, motives, and circumstances are rendered compatible and work together in actual temporal wholes. It is in this sense that the twofold relation between rules of emplotment and action-terms constitutes both a relation of presuppposition and one of transformation. To understand a story is to understand both the language of “doing something” and the cultural tradition from which proceeds the typology of plots.
由於情節賦予的順序性相互連接，代理人、他們的行為和遭受的事情獲得了實際的意義。整合性，因為代理人、動機和情境等異質的術語在實際的時間整體中變得相容並共同作用。在這種意義上，情節構建規則與動作術語之間的雙重關係構成了一種預設關係和轉化關係。理解一個故事意味著理解"做某事"的語言以及產生情節類型學的文化傳統。

The second anchorage that narrative composition finds in our practical understanding lies in the symbolic resources of the practical field. This second feature will govern those aspects of doing something, being able to do something, and knowing how to do something that stem from the poetic transposition.
敘事構成在我們的實踐理解中找到的第二個錨定在於實踐領域的象徵資源。這第二個特徵將統治源於詩意轉置的"做某事"、"能夠做某事"和"知道如何做某事"的這些方面。

If, in fact, human action can be narrated, it is because it is always already articulated by signs, rules, and norms. It is always already symbolically mediated. As stated earlier, I am drawing here on the work of anthropologists who in various ways make use of Verstehen sociology, including Clifford Geertz, the author of The Interpretation of Cultures.

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The word “symbol” in this work is taken in what we might call a middle sense, halfway between its being identified with a simple notation (I have in mind Leibniz’s opposition between intuitive knowledge based on direct insight and symbolic knowledge by way of abbreviated signs, substituted for a long chain of logical operations) and its being identified with double-meaning expressions following the model of metaphor, or even hidden meanings, accessible only to esoteric knowledge. Between too poor and too rich an acceptation I have opted for one close to that of Cassirer, in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, inasmuch as, for him, symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience. If I speak more precisely of symbolic mediation, it is to distinguish, among symbols of a cultural nature, the ones that underlie action and that constitute its first signification, before autonomous symbolic wholes dependent upon speaking or writing become detached from the practical level. In this sense we might speak of an implicit or immanent symbolism, in opposition to an explicit or autonomous one.

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...

For anthropologists and sociologists, the term “symbol” immediately accentuates the public character of any meaningful articulation. In Geertz’s words, “culture is public because meaning is” (p. 12). I readily adopt this initial characterization which clearly indicates that symbolism is not in the mind, not a psychological operation destined to guide action, but a meaning incorporated into action and decipherable from it by other actors in the social interplay ...

Next, the term “symbol”-or better, symbolic mediation-signals the ...
structured character of a symbolic system. Geertz speaks in this sense of “systems of interacting symbols,” of “patterns of interworking meanings” (p. 207). Before being a text, symbolic mediation has a texture. To understand a ritual act is to situate it within a ritual, set within a cultic system, and by degrees within the whole set of conventions, beliefs, and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture. ...

A symbolic system thus furnishes a descriptive context for particular actions. In other words, it is “as a function of” such a symbolic convention that we can interpret this gesture as meaning this or that. The same gesture of raising one’s arm, depending on the context, may be understood as a way of greeting someone, of hailing a taxi, or of voting. Before being submitted to interpretation, symbols are interpretants internally related to some action.

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...

In this way, symbolism confers an initial readability on action. In saying this we must not confuse the texture of action with the text the ethnologist writes, the ethno-graphic text which is written in categories, with concepts, using nomological principles that are the contribution of the discipline and that must not, consequently, be confused with those categories by which a culture understands itself. If we may nevertheless speak of action as a quasitext, it is insofar as the symbols, understood as interpretants, provide the rules of meaning as a function of which this or that behavior can be interpreted.

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...

The term “symbol” further introduces the idea of a rule, not only in the sense we have just spoken of about rules for description and interpretation of individual actions, but in the sense of a norm. Some authors such as Peter Winch emphasize this feature in particular, by characterizing meaningful action as “rule-governed behavior.”

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can clarify this function of social regulation by comparing cultural codes to genetic ones. Like the latter, the former are “programs” for behavior; they give form, order, and direction to life. Yet unlike genetic codes, cultural codes arise in zones not subject to genetic regulation and only prolong their efficacity at the price of a complete rearrangement of the encoding system. Manners and customs, along with everything Hegel put under the title “ethical substance,” the Sittlichkeit prior to any Moralität of a reflective order, thus take over from the genetic codes.
"符號"一詞進一步引入了規則的概念，不僅是我們剛剛談到的關於描述和解釋個別行為的規則，而且是一種規範。一些作者，如彼得·溫奇，特別強調了這一特徵，將有意義的行為描述為"受規則治理的行為"。

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可以通過將文化編碼與遺傳編碼進行比較來澄清這種社會調節功能。就像後者一樣，前者是行為的"程序"；它們賦予生活形式、秩序和方向。然而，與遺傳編碼不同，文化編碼產生於不受遺傳調節的區域，並且只有通過完全重新排列編碼系統才能延續其效力。因此，風俗和習慣，以及黑格爾在"倫理實質"（Sittlichkeit）標題下所包含的一切，在任何反思性秩序的道德（Moralität）之前，取代了遺傳編碼。

So we pass without difficulty, with the term “symbolic mediation,” from the idea of an immanent meaning to that of a rule, taken in the sense of a rule for description, then to that of a norm, which is equivalent to the idea of a rule taken in the prescriptive sense of this term.
這樣，我們憑藉"象徵性中介"一詞，毫不費力地從內在意義的概念，過渡到規則的概念，首先是作為描述的規則，然後是規範的概念，這相當於在詞的規範性意義上理解規則的想法。

As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences. They thereby receive a relative value, which says that this action is more valuable than that one. These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, can be extended to the agents themselves, who are held to be good or bad, better or worse.
根據文化中固有的規範，行動可以被估算或評估，即根據道德偏好的尺度進行判斷。因此，它們獲得相對的價值，表示這個行動比那個行動更有價值。首先歸因於行動的這些價值程度，可以延伸到行動者本身，他們被認為是好是壞，或是更好或更壞。

We thus rejoin, by way of cultural anthropology, some of the “ethical” pre-
這樣，我們通過文化人類學的途徑，重新聯繫了一些"倫理"的前提。
suppositions of Aristotle’s Poetics, which I can therefore attach to the level of mimesis

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. The Poetics presupposes not just “doers” but characters endowed with ethical qualities that make them noble or vile. If tragedy can represent them as “better” and comedy as “worse” than actual human beings, it is because the practical understanding authors share with their audiences necessarily involves an evaluation of the characters and their actions in terms of good and bad. There is no action that does not give rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a function of a hierarchy of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles. When the time comes, I shall discuss the question of whether a mode of reading that would entirely suspend all evaluation of an ethical character is possible. What, in particular, would remain of the pity Aristotle taught us to link to unmerited misfortune, if aesthetic pleasure were to be totally dissociated from any sympathy or antipathy for the characters’ ethical quality? We shall see that this possible ethical neutrality has to be conquered by force in an encounter with one originary and inherent feature of action: precisely that it can never be ethically neutral. One reason for thinking that this neutrality is neither possible nor desirable is that the actual order of action does not just offer the artist conventions and convictions to dissolve, but also ambiguities and perplexities to resolve in a hypothetical mode. Many contemporary critics, reflecting on the relation between art and culture, have emphasized the conflicting character of the norms that culture offers for poets’ mimetic activity.

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They were preceded on this score by Hegel in his famous meditation on Sophocles’ Antigone. But, at the same time, does not such ethical neutrality of the artist suppress one of the oldest functions of art, that it constitutes an ethical laboratory where the artist pursues through the mode of fiction experimentation with values? Whatever our response to these questions, poetics does not stop borrowing from ethics, even when it advocates the suspension of all ethical judgment or its ironic inversion. The very project of ethical neutrality presupposes the original ethical quality of action on the prior side of fiction. This ethical quality is itself only a corollary of the major characteristic of action, that it is always symbolically mediated.
亞里斯多德《詩學》的假設，我因此可以將其附加到模仿的層次上。《詩學》不僅預設了「作為者」，還預設了具有道德品質的角色，使其高尚或卑賤。如果悲劇可以將他們描繪得比實際人類「更好」，喜劇則描繪得「更差」，這是因為作者與觀眾共享的實踐理解必然涉及對角色及其行為的善惡評估。沒有一個行動不會引起讚揚或責備，哪怕程度很小，這是基於一種以善惡為極點的價值層級。當時機成熟時，我將討論是否可能完全中止對道德品格的任何評估的閱讀模式。特別是，如果美學愉悅完全脫離了對角色道德品質的任何同情或反感，亞里斯多德教導我們與非受之於己的不幸相連繫的憐憫感將會剩下什麼？我們將看到，這種可能的道德中立性必須在與行動的一個原初且固有特徵的遭遇中強行獲得：正是因為它永遠不可能是道德中立的。認為這種中立性既不可能也不可取的一個原因是，行動的實際秩序不僅為藝術家提供了可以解構的慣例和信念，還提供了需要以假設模式解決的模糊性和困惑。許多當代批評家，在反思藝術與文化的關係時，強調了文化為詩人的模仿活動提供的規範的衝突性。他們在這一點上的先驅是黑格爾，他在對索福克勒斯《安提戈涅》的著名沉思中已經做到了這一點。但是，同時，藝術家的這種倫理中立性是否壓制了藝術最古老的功能之一，即藝術作為一個倫理實驗室，藝術家通過虛構的方式來試驗價值？無論我們對這些問題的回應如何，詩學都不停地向倫理學借鑒，即使它主張暫停所有倫理判斷或其諷刺性顛倒。倫理中立性的項目本身預設了在虛構之前的行動的原始倫理品質。這種倫理品質本身只是行動的主要特徵的一個推論，即它總是符號性地中介。

The third feature of a preunderstanding of action which mimetic activity at level two presupposes is just what is at stake in our inquiry. It concerns the temporal elements onto which narrative time grafts its configurations. The understanding of action, in effect, is not limited to a familiarity with the conceptual network of action and with its symbolic mediations. It goes so far as to recognize in action temporal structures that call for narration. At this level, the equation between narrative and time remains implicit. In any case, I shall not push my analysis of the temporal elements of action to the point where we could rightfully speak of a narrative structure, or at least of a prenarrative structure of temporal experience, as suggested by our ordinary way of talking
敘事時間移接其配置的時間元素，正是我們探究中所涉及的第三個預理解特徵。事實上，行動的理解不限於對行動的概念網絡和其象徵性中介的熟悉。它甚至能識別出行動中呼喚敘事的時間結構。在這一層面上，敘事與時間之間的等式仍然是隱含的。無論如何，我不會深入分析行動的時間元素，以至於我們可以正當地談論敘事結構，或至少是時間經驗的前敘事結構，正如我們通常談論發生在我們身上或我們捲入其中的故事，或 simply 是某人生活的故事。
about stories that happen to us or which we are caught up in, or simply about the story of someone’s life. I am leaving to the end of this chapter the notion of a prenarrative structure of experience. There it will provide a good opportunity for facing the objection about a vicious circle that haunts my whole analysis. I limit myself here to examining the temporal features that remain implicit in symbolic mediations of action and that we may take as the inductors of narrative.
我將前敘事經驗結構的概念留到本章末尾。屆時，它將為面對困擾我整個分析的惡性循環的異議提供一個良好的機會。在這裡，我僅限於檢查那些隱含在行動的象徵性中介中的時間特徵，並可以將其視為敘事的誘導因素。

I shall not linger over the all too evident correlation that can be established, almost term for term, between this or that member of the conceptual network of action and this or that temporal dimension considered in isolation. It is easy to see that the project has to do with the future, in a very specific way that distinguishes the future from prevision or prediction. The close kinship between motivation and the ability to mobilize in the present experience inherited from the past is no less evident. Finally, “I can,” “I do,” and “I suffer” manifestly contribute to the sense we spontaneously give to the present.
我不會逗留於可以建立的那些顯而易見的關聯，幾乎逐字對應地，介於概念網絡中的某些行動與被孤立考慮的某些時間維度之間。很容易看出，項目與未來有關，以一種非常特定的方式，將未來與預見或預測區分開來。動機與在當下經驗中動員過去所繼承能力之間的密切親緣關係同樣顯而易見。最後，「我能」、「我做」和「我受苦」明顯地貢獻於我們 spontaneously 賦予現在的意義。

More important than this loose correlation between certain categories of action and temporal dimensions taken one by one, is the exchange that real action makes appear between the temporal dimensions. Augustine’s discor-dant-concordant structure of time develops some paradoxical features on the plane of reflective thought for which a phenomenology of action can sketch a first draft. By saying that there is not a future time, a past time, and a present time, but a threefold present, a present of future things, a present of past things, and a present of present things, Augustine set us on the path of an investigation into the most primitive temporal structure of action. It is easy to rewrite each of the three temporal structures of action in terms of this threefold present. The present of the future? Henceforth, that is, from now on, I commit myself to doing that tomorrow. The present of the past? Now I intend to do that because I just realized that. . . . The present of the present? Now I am doing it, because now I can do it. The actual present of doing something bears witness to the potential present of the capacity to do something and is constituted as the present of the present.
比起某些行動類別與單獨取出的時間維度之間的鬆散關聯更為重要的是，真正的行動所顯現的時間維度之間的交換。奧古斯丁時間的不協調-協調結構在反思思考的層面上展現了一些矛盾的特徵，對此行動的現象學可以勾勒出初步的草圖。通過說明沒有未來時間、過去時間和現在時間，而是三重現在，即未來事物的現在、過去事物的現在和現在事物的現在，奧古斯丁引領我們走上對行動最原始時間結構的調查之路。很容易用這三重現在重寫行動的每一種時間結構。未來的現在？自此，即從現在起，我承諾明天做那件事。過去的現在？現在我打算做那個，因為我剛剛意識到……。現在的現在？現在我正在做它，因為現在我能做它。做某事的實際現在證明了做某事的能力的潛在現在，並被構成為現在的現在。

However the phenomenology of action can advance even further than this term-by-term correlation along the way opened by Augustine’s meditation on the distentio animi. What counts here is the way in which everyday praxis orders the present of the future, the present of the past, and the present of the present in terms of one another. For it is this practical articulation that constitutes the most elementary inductor of narrative.
然而，行動的現象學可以更進一步發展，超越奧古斯丁關於「靈魂的延展」冥想中逐字逐句的關聯。重要的是日常實踐如何以相互關聯的方式安排未來的現在、過去的現在和現在的現在。正是這種實踐性的闡釋構成了敘事最基本的誘導器。

Here the relay station of Heidegger’s existential analysis can play a decisive role, but only under certain conditions that must be clearly laid out. I am well aware that a reading of Being and Time in a purely anthropological sense runs the risk of completely missing the meaning of the entire work inasmuch as its ontological aim may be misconceived. Dasein is the “place” where the being that we are is constituted through its capacity of posing the question of Being
海德格爾的存在性分析在此可以發揮決定性作用，但前提是必須清楚地闡明某些條件。我充分意識到，純粹人類學意義上對《存在與時間》的解讀，可能會完全誤解整部作品的意義，因為其本體論目標可能被誤解。此在是這樣一個「場所」，我們存在的存在通過提出存在問題而得以構成。
or the meaning of Being. To isolate the philosophical anthropology of Being and Time, therefore, is to overlook this major signification of the central existential category of that work. Yet in Being and Time, the question of Being is opened up precisely by an analysis that must first have some consistency as a philosophical anthropology, if it is to achieve the ontological breakthrough that is expected of it. What is more, this philosophical anthropology is organized on the basis of a thematic concept, Care (Sorge), that, without ever exhausting itself in a praxieology, draws from descriptions borrowed from the practical order the subversive force that allows it to overthrow the primacy of knowledge of objects and to uncover the structure of being-in-the-world that is more fundamental than any relation of a subject to an object. This is how, in Being and Time, the recourse to practice has an indirectly ontological import. In this regard, its analyses of tools and the toward-which, which furnish the first framework of meaningful relations, before any explicit cognitive process and any developed propositional expression, are well known.
或存在的意義。因此，孤立地看待《存在與時間》中的哲學人類學是忽略了這部作品中核心存在性範疇的主要意義。然而，在《存在與時間》中，存在的問題正是通過必須首先具有某種哲學人類學一致性的分析而開啟的，如果它要實現所期望的本體論突破。更重要的是，這種哲學人類學是以 Care（Sorge）這一主題概念為基礎組織的，它在不完全耗盡於實踐理論的情況下，從實踐秩序借用的描述中獲取顛覆性力量，以推翻對客體的知識的優先地位，並揭示作為主體與客體關係更根本的存在於世界之中的結構。這就是在《存在與時間》中，對實踐的訴諸具有間接的本體論意義。在這方面，其關於工具和朝向的分析眾所周知，這些分析在任何明確的認知過程和任何發展的命題表達之前，首先提供了有意義關係的框架。

I find the same powerful breakthrough in the analyses that conclude the study of temporality in the second division of Being and Time. These analyses are centered on our relation to time as that “within which” we ordinarily act. This structure of within-time-ness (Innerzeitigkeit) seems the best characterization of the temporality of action for my present analysis. It is also the one that accords best with a phenomenology of the voluntary and the involuntary, and with a semantics of action.
我在《存在與時間》第二部分研究時間性結束時的分析中發現了同樣強大的突破。這些分析集中在我們與時間的關係上，即我們通常行動的「其中」。這種「在時間內性」（Innerzeitigkeit）的結構似乎是我當前分析中行動的時間性最佳的描述。它也最符合意願和非意願的現象學，以及行動的語義學。

Someone may object that it is highly dangerous to enter Being and Time by way of its last chapter. What must be understood, however, is why it is the last one in the economy of this work. There are two reasons. First, the meditation on time, which occupies the second division of the book, is itself placed in a position that we may characterize as one of delay. The first division is recapitulated in it under the sign of a question that can be expressed as follows. What makes Dasein a unity? The meditation on time is supposed to respond to this problematic for reasons I shall return to in volume 2 of this work. In its turn, the study of within-time-ness, the only one that interests me at this stage of my own analysis, is itself slowed down by the hierarchical organization that Heidegger imposes on his meditation on time. This hierarchical organization follows a downward order of derivation and one of decreasing authenticity at the same time. As is well known, Heidegger reserves the term temporality (Zeitlichkeit) for the most originary form and the most authentic experience of time, that is, the dialectic of coming to be, having been, and making present. In this dialectic, time is entirely desubstantialized. The words “future,” “past,” and “present” disappear, and time itself figures as the exploded unity of the three temporal extases. This dialectic is the temporal constitution of Care. As is also well known, being-towards-death imposes, counter to Augustine, the primacy of the future over the present and the closure of this future by a limit internal to all anticipation and every project. Next
有人可能會反對，通過最後一章進入《存在與時間》是非常危險的。然而，必須理解的是，為什麼它是這部作品中的最後一章。原因有兩個。首先，關於時間的沉思，佔據了書中的第二部分，本身被置於一個可以描述為延遲的位置。第一部分在其中被重述，以一個可以表達如下的問題為標誌：是什麼使得此在成為統一體？關於時間的沉思應該回應這個問題，原因我將在本著作的第二卷中返回。反過來，關於在時間中的存在性的研究，在我自己分析的這個階段中唯一感興趣的，本身被海德格爾強加於其關於時間的沉思的等級組織所拖慢。這種等級組織同時遵循一個下降的推導順序和一個遞減的真實性。眾所周知，海德格爾將術語「暫時性」（Zeitlichkeit）保留給時間最原初的形式和最真實的體驗，即成為、曾經和當下的辯證法。在這個辯證法中，時間完全被去實體化。「未來」、「過去」和「當下」這些詞消失了，時間本身作為三種時間外延的爆炸性統一體。這個辯證法是關懷的時間構成。眾所周知，面向死亡與奧古斯丁相反，強加了未來對現在的優先性，並以對所有預期和每一個計劃內在的限制來封閉這個未來。

Heidegger reserves the term “historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit) for the immediately contiguous level of derivation. Here two features are emphasized: the extension of time between birth and death, and the displacement of accent from the future to the past. Heidegger tries to tie the historical disciplines to this level by means of a third feature-repetition-which indicates the derived character of this historicality with regard to deep temporality.

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海德格爾保留了「歷史性」（Geschichtlichkeit）一詞，用於緊密相連的推導層次。這裡強調了兩個特徵：從出生到死亡的時間延展，以及重音從未來轉移到過去。海德格爾試圖通過第三個特徵——重複——將歷史學科與這一層次聯繫起來，這表明了這種歷史性相對於深層時間性的衍生性質。

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It is only at the third level, therefore, that the within-time-ness occurs that I want to consider now.

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This temporal structure is put in last place because it is the one most likely to be flattened out by the linear representation of time as a simple succession of abstract “nows.” I am interested in it here precisely because of the features by which this structure is distinguished from the linear representation of time and by which it resists that flattening or leveling which Heidegger calls the “vulgar” conception of time.
因此，直到第三個層次，才會出現我現在想要考慮的「在時間之中」的狀態。

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這種時間結構被放在最後，是因為它最容易被線性時間表示所壓扁，即簡單的抽象「現在」的連續。我之所以在這裡對它感興趣，正是因為這種結構區別於線性時間表示的特徵，以及它抵抗海德格爾稱之為「庸俗」的時間概念的攤平或平庸化。

Within-time-ness is defined by a basic characteristic of Care, our being thrown among things, which tends to make our description of temporality dependent on the description of the things about which we care. This feature reduces Care to the dimensions of preoccupation (Besorgen) (p. 157). Yet however inauthentic this relation may be, it still presents some features that wrest it from the external domain of the objects of our Care and subterraneously reattach it to Care itself in its fundamental constitution. It is noteworthy that, to discern these properly existential characteristics, Heidegger willingly addresses himself to what we say and do with regard to time. This procedure is close to the one we meet in ordinary-language philosophy. This is not surprising. The plane we occupy, at this initial stage of our traversal, is precisely the one where ordinary language is truly what Austin and others have said it is, namely, the storehouse of those expressions that are most appropriate to what is properly human in our experience. It is language, therefore, with its store of meanings, that prevents the description of Care, in the mode of preoccupation, from becoming prey to the description of the things we care about.
在時間性中，照顧被定義為一種基本特徵，即我們被拋入事物之中，這種情況往往使我們對時間性的描述取決於我們所關心的事物的描述。這一特徵將照顧縮減為關切（Besorgen）的維度（第 157 頁）。然而，無論這種關係多麼不真實，它仍然呈現出一些特徵，這些特徵使其從照顧對象的外部領域中脫離，並潛移默化地重新連接到照顧本身的基本構成。值得注意的是，為了辨別這些真正的存在特徵，海德格爾樂意探討我們對時間的言說和行為。這一程序與日常語言哲學中的方法相近。這並不令人驚訝。在我們遍歷的初始階段所佔據的平面，恰恰是奧斯丁等人所說的日常語言真正所在，即那些最適合描述人類經驗本質的表達方式的寶庫。因此，語言及其意義儲存，阻止了對照顧的描述在關切模式下淪為被關心事物的描述的獵物。

In this way, within-time-ness or being-“within”-time deploys features irreducible to the representation of linear time. Being-“within”-time is already something other than measuring the intervals between limit-instants. Being-“within”-time is above all to reckon with time and, as a consequence of this, to calculate. It is because we do reckon with time and do make calculations that we must have recourse to measuring, not vice versa. It must be possible, therefore, to give an existential description of this “reckoning with” before the measuring it calls for. Here expressions such as “have the time to,” “take the time to,” “to lose time,” etc. are very revealing. A similar thing can be said about the grammatical network of the verbal tenses and the highly ramified network of temporal adverbs: then, after, later, earlier, since, until, so long as, during, all the while that, now that, etc. All these expressions,
以這種方式，在時間內或「在」時間中已經呈現出無法簡化為線性時間表徵的特徵。在「時間」中的存在首先不僅僅是測量極限瞬間之間的間隔。在「時間」中的存在，主要是與時間進行計算，因此，正是因為我們計算時間，我們必須求助於測量，而非相反。因此，必須在測量之前對這種「計算」進行存在性描述。像「有足夠時間」、「花時間」、「浪費時間」等表達方式都非常揭示。同樣的事情也可以說關於動詞時態的語法網絡和高度分支的時間副詞網絡：然後、之後、稍後、之前、自從、直到、只要、在期間、同時、現在等。所有這些表達方式，
with their extreme subtlety and fine differentiations, are oriented toward the datable and the public character of the time of preoccupation. Yet it is always preoccupation that determines the meaning of this time, not the things we care about. If being-“within”-time is nevertheless so easily interpreted as a function of the ordinary representation of time, it is because the first measurements of this time of our preoccupation are borrowed from the natural environment and first of all from the play of light and of the seasons. In this respect, a day is the most natural of measures.

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Yet a day is not an abstract measure; it is a length that corresponds to our Care and the world in which it is “time to” do something, where “now” signifies “now that. . . .” It is the time of works and days.
憑藉其極其微妙和精細的差異，都是面向可定位和公共性的關注時間。然而，始終是關注決定了這個時間的意義，而非我們所關心的事物。如果「在時間」中的存在卻很容易被解釋為普通時間表徵的功能，那是因為我們關注的時間的第一批測量是從自然環境借來的，首先是從光線和季節的變化中借來的。在這方面，一天是最自然的度量。然而，一天並非抽象的度量；它是一個與我們的關懷和世界相符的長度，在那裡是「做某事的時候」，「現在」意味著「現在……」。這是工作和日子的時間。

It is important, therefore, to see the difference in signifcation that distinguishes the “now” proper to this time of preoccupation from “now” in the sense of an abstract instant. The existential now is determined by the present of preoccupation, which is a “making-present,” inseparable from “awaiting” and “retaining” (p. 473). It is only because, in preoccupation, Care tends to get contracted into this making-present and its difference with respect to awaiting and retaining is obliterated, that the “now” so isolated can become prey to the representation of “now” as an abstract moment.
因此，重要的是要看出在這種掛念的時間中，「現在」本身的意義與作為抽象瞬間的「現在」之間的差異。存在性的「現在」由掛念的當下所決定，這是一種「使之現前」，不可分割於「等待」和「保留」（第 473 頁）。正是因為在掛念中，關懷傾向於收縮到這種使之現前，而其與等待和保留之間的差異被抹殺，所以被孤立的「現在」可以成為抽象時刻表徵的獵物。

In order to preserve the meaning of “now” from this reduction to an abstraction, it is important to note those occasions in which we say “now” in our everyday acting and suffering. “Saying ‘now,’” says Heidegger, “is the discursive articulation of a making present which temporalizes itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting” (p. 469). And again: “The making-present which interprets itself–in other words, that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the ‘now’ -is what we call ‘time’” (p. 460). It is understandable how, in certain practical circumstances, this interpretation can go adrift in the direction of the representation of linear time. Saying “now” becomes synonymous for us with reading the hour on the clock. But to the extent that the hour and the clock are perceived as derivations from the day, which itself links Care to the world’s light, saying-now retains its existential meaning, but when the machines that serve to measure time are divested of this primary reference to natural measures, that saying-now returns to the abstract representation of time.
為了保護「現在」不被簡化為抽象，重要的是要注意我們在日常行動和 suffering 中說「現在」的那些場合。海德格爾說：「說『現在』是一種話語性的闡釋，它在與保留性等待的統一中使自身暫時化」（第 469 頁）。又說：「解釋自身的使之現前——換句話說，在『現在』中被解釋和被指稱的東西——就是我們所說的『時間』」（第 460 頁）。可以理解，在某些實踐情境中，這種解釋可能會漂移到線性時間的表徵方向。對我們來說，說「現在」變得等同於在鐘上讀取時間。但是，只要小時和鐘錶被感知為源於白晝，而白晝又將關懷與世界的光連結，說「現在」就保留了其存在性意義；但當那些用於測量時間的機器被剝奪了這種對自然度量的原初參照時，這種說「現在」就回歸到時間的抽象表徵。

At first glance, the relation between this analysis of within-time-ness and narrative seems quite distant. Heidegger’s text, as we shall see in volume 2, even seems to leave no place for it, inasmuch as the tie between history and time occurs, in Being and Time, at the level of historicality, not at that of within-time-ness. The advantage of his analysis of within-time-ness lies elsewhere. It lies in the break this analysis makes with the linear representation of time, understood as a simple succession of nows. An initial threshold is thereby crossed with the primacy given to Care. With the recognition of this
乍看之下，這種時間性分析與敘事之間的關係似乎相當遙遠。正如我們將在第二卷中看到的，海德格爾的文本甚至似乎沒有為其留下空間，因為在《存在與時間》中，歷史與時間之間的聯繫發生在歷史性層面，而非時間性層面。其分析的優勢在於其他方面。它在於這種分析與以線性方式理解時間（作為當下的簡單 succession）的斷裂。通過賦予照顧首要地位，跨越了最初的門檻。
threshold, a bridge is constructed for the first time between the narrative order and Care. Narrative configurations and the most elaborated forms of temporality corresponding to them share the same foundation of within-time-ness.
通過認識這一門檻，首次在敘事秩序與照顧之間架起了一座橋樑。敘事配置及與之相應的最精緻的時間性形式，共享相同的時間性基礎。

We can see the richness in the meaning of mimesis. To imitate or represent action is first to preunderstand what human acting is, in its semantics, its symbolic system, its temporality. Upon this preunderstanding, common to both poets and their readers, emplotment is constructed and, with it, textual and literary mimetics.
我們可以看到模仿的豐富意義。模仿或表現行動，首先是預先理解人類行動是什麼，其語義、符號系統、時間性。基於這種詩人和讀者共同的預理解，情節被建構，繼而是文本和文學模仿。

It is true that, within the domain of the literary work, this preunderstanding of the world withdraws to the rank of the “repertoire,” to use the language of Wolfgang Iser, in his The Act of Reading,

^{13}

or to the rank of “mention,” to use a vocabulary more familiar to analytic philosophy. Yet despite the break it institutes, literature would be incomprehensible if it did not give a configuration to what was already a figure in human action.
誠然，在文學作品的領域中，這種對世界的預理解退居到沃爾夫岡·伊澤在《閱讀行為》中所說的「儲備」階層，或者用分析哲學更熟悉的術語說是「提及」階層。然而，儘管它製造了一種斷裂，但如果文學不能為人類行動中已經存在的形態賦予形態，它將是不可理解的。

Mimesis $_{2}$ 模仿 $_{2}$

With mimesis

_{2}

opens the kingdom of the as if. I might have said the kingdom of fiction, in accordance with current usage in literary criticism. I will not, however, allow myself the advantages of this expression so appropriate to the analysis of mimesis

_{2}

, in order to avoid the equivocation created by the use of this term in two different senses: first as a synonym for narrative configurations, second as an antonym to historical narrative’s claim to constitute a “true” narrative. Literary criticism can ignore this difficulty inasmuch as it does not take into account the division of narrative discourse into two large classes. It can thus also ignore the difference that affects the referential dimension of narrative and limit itself to the common structural characteristics of fictional and historical narrative. The word “fiction” is then available for designating the configuration of a narrative for which emplotment is the paradigm, without regard for the differences that concern the truth claims of the two classes of narrative. Whatever the scope of the revisions that the distinction between the fictive or “imaginary” and the “real” must undergo, a difference will remain between fictional and historical narrative that will have to be reformulated in volume 2 . While awaiting that clarification, I choose to preserve the term “fiction” for the second of the senses just considered and to oppose fictional to historical narrative. I shall speak of composition or of configuration for the other sense, which does not bring into play the problems of reference or of truth. This is the meaning of the Aristotelian muthos that the Poetics, as we saw, defines as the “organization of the events.”
隨著模仿

_{2}

，開啟了彷彿的王國。我可能會說是虛構的王國，符合當前文學批評的用法。然而，我不會利用這個表達方式，儘管它非常適合分析模仿

_{2}

，以避免使用這個術語在兩種不同意義上造成的歧義：首先作為敘事配置的同義詞，其次作為對歷史敘事聲稱構成「真實」敘事的反義詞。文學批評可以忽略這個困難，因為它不考慮敘事話語分為兩大類。因此，它也可以忽略影響敘事參考維度的差異，並限制在虛構和歷史敘事的共同結構特徵上。「虛構」一詞則可用於指定情節是範式的敘事配置，不考慮兩類敘事在真實性聲明上的差異。無論虛構或「想像」與「真實」之間的區分需要經歷多大的修訂，虛構和歷史敘事之間的差異將保持，並需要在第二卷中重新闡述。在等待那個澄清之前，我選擇為第二個剛才考慮的意義保留「虛構」一詞，並將虛構與歷史敘事對立。對於另一個意義，我將談論組成或配置，這不涉及參考或真實性的問題。這就是亞里士多德《詩學》中定義為「事件組織」的 muthos 的意義。

I now propose to disengage this configuring activity from the limiting constraints the paradigm of tragedy imposes upon the concept of emplotment for Aristotle. Further I want to complete my model by an analysis of its temporal
現在我提議將這種配置活動從悲劇範式對情節概念強加的限制性約束中解脫出來。此外，我想通過分析其時間性來完善我的模型
structures. This analysis, we have seen, had no place in the Poetics. I hope to demonstrate here and in volume 2 that, under the condition of a larger degree of abstraction and with the addition of appropriate temporal features, the Aristotelian model will not be radically altered by the amplifications and corrections that the theory of history and the theory of literary narrative will bring to it.
結構。我們已經看到，這種分析在《詩學》中沒有位置。我希望在這裡和第 2 卷中證明，在更高程度的抽象和添加適當的時間特徵的條件下，亞里士多德模型不會被歷史理論和文學敘事理論帶來的擴充和修正徹底改變。

The model of emplotment that will be tested in the remainder of this work responds to one fundamental requirement that was already referred to in the preceding chapter. By placing mimesis

_{2}

between an earlier and a later stage of mimesis in general, I am seeking not just to locate and frame it. I want to understand better its mediating function between what precedes fiction and what follows it. Mimesis

_{2}

has an intermediary position because it has a mediating function. This mediating function derives from the dynamic character of the configurating operation that has led us to prefer the term emplotment to that of plot and ordering to that of system. In fact all the concepts relative to this level designate operations. The dynamism lies in the fact that a plot already exercises, within its own textual field, an integrating and, in this sense, a mediating function, which allows it to bring about, beyond this field, a mediation of a larger amplitude between the preunderstanding and, if I may dare to put it this way, the postunderstanding of the order of action and its temporal features.
在本著作的剩餘部分中將測試的情節塑造模型，回應了前一章已經提到的一個基本要求。通過將模仿

_{2}

置於模仿一般的早期和晚期階段之間，我不僅是要定位和框定它。我想更好地理解它在虛構之前和之後的中介功能。模仿

_{2}

具有中介位置，因為它具有中介功能。這種中介功能源於配置操作的動態特徵，這使我們更喜歡使用「情節塑造」一詞而非「情節」，使用「排序」而非「系統」。事實上，在這一層面的所有概念都指代操作。其動態性在於，一個情節已經在其自身的文本領域內行使整合和中介功能，這使它能夠在這一領域之外，在行動及其時間特徵的預先理解和（如果我可以這麼說）後置理解之間進行更廣泛的中介。

Plot is mediating in at least three ways.
情節在至少三個方面是中介的。
First, it is a mediation between the individual events or incidents and a story taken as a whole. In this respect, we may say equivalently that it draws a meaningful story from a diversity of events or incidents (Aristotle’s pragmata) or that it transforms the events or incidents into a story. The two reciprocal relations expressed by from and into characterize the plot as mediating between events and a narrated story. As a consequence, an event must be more than just a singular occurrence. It gets its definition from its contribution to the development of the plot. A story, too, must be more than just an enumeration of events in serial order; it must organize them into an intelligible whole, of a sort such that we can always ask what is the “thought” of this story. In short, emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succession.
首先，這是一種在個別事件或事故與整體故事之間的調解。在這方面，我們可以同等地說，它從多樣性的事件或事故（亞里士多德的 pragmata）中提取了一個有意義的故事，或者它將事件或事故轉化為一個故事。由"from"和"into"表達的兩個互惠關係，將情節描繪為事件和敘事故事之間的調解者。因此，一個事件不僅僅是一個單一的事件。它從對情節發展的貢獻中獲得定義。一個故事也不能僅僅是按順序列舉的事件；它必須將它們組織成一個可理解的整體，以便我們總能詢問這個故事的"思想"。簡而言之，情節是將一個簡單的連續轉化為一個配置的操作。

Furthermore, emplotment brings together factors as heterogeneous as agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected results. Aristotle anticipates this mediating character in several ways. First, he makes a subset of the three “parts” of tragedy-plot, characters, and thought-with the title the “what” (of the imitation). Nothing therefore forbids extending the concept of plot to the whole triad. This first extension gives the concept of plot the initial scope that allows it to receive subsequent embellishments.
此外，情節將不同的因素集中在一起，如行為者、目標、手段、互動、環境、意外結果。亞里士多德以多種方式預示了這種調解特徵。首先，他用"what"（模仿的）標題將悲劇的三個"部分"中的一個子集——情節、角色和思想——進行分類。因此，沒有什麼可以阻止將情節概念擴展到整個三合體。這第一次擴展使情節概念獲得了初步範圍，以便接收後續的修飾。

The concept of plot allows an even greater extension. By including pitiable and fearful incidents, sudden reversals, recognitions, and violent effects
情節概念允許更大的擴展。通過包括可憐和可怕的事件、突然的逆轉、認知和暴力效果
within the complex plot, Aristotle equates plot with the configuring we have characterized as concordant discordance. This is the feature that, in the final analysis, constitutes the mediating function of the plot. I anticipated this feature in my previous section in saying that a narrative makes appear within a syntagmatic order all the components capable of figuring in the paradigmatic tableau established by the semantics of action. This passage from the paradigmatic to the syntagmatic constitutes the transition from mimesis

_{1}

to mimesis

_{2}

. It is the work of the configurating activity.
在複雜的情節中，亞里士多德將情節等同於我們所描述的協調不協調。這是最終分析中構成情節中介功能的特徵。我在之前的部分已經預見了這一特徵，當時我說敘事使所有能夠出現在行動語義所建立的範式表中的成分，在聚合序列中呈現出來。從範式到聚合的這種過渡構成了從模仿

_{1}

到模仿

_{2}

的轉變。這是配置活動的工作。

Plot is mediating in a third way, that of its temporal characteristics. These allow us to call plot, by means of generalization, a synthesis of the heterogeneous.

^{14}

情節以第三種方式起中介作用，即其時間特徵。這些特徵使我們可以通過概括，將情節稱為異質性的綜合。

^{14}

Aristotle did not consider these temporal characteristics. They are directly implied, however, in the constitutive dynamism of the narrative configuration. As such, they give the full meaning of the concept of concordant discordance from the preceding chapter. In this respect, we may say of the operation of emplotment both that it reflects the Augustinian paradox of time and that it resolves it, not in a speculative but rather in a poetic mode.
亞里士多德未考慮這些時間特徵。然而，它們直接暗示了敘事配置的構成動力。因此，它們賦予了前一章中協調不協調概念的全部意義。在這方面，我們可以說情節化操作既反映了奧古斯丁關於時間的悖論，又以詩意而非思辨的方式解決了它。

It reflects the paradox inasmuch as the act of emplotment combines in variable proportions two temporal dimensions, one chronological and the other not. The former constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the story insofar as it is made up of events. The second is the configurational dimension properly speaking, thanks to which the plot transforms the events into a story. This configurational act consists of “grasping together” the detailed actions or what I have called the story’s incidents.

^{15}

It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole. I cannot overemphasize the kinship between this “grasping together,” proper to the configurational act, and what Kant has to say about the operation of judging. It will be recalled that for Kant the transcendental meaning of judging consists not so much in joining a subject and a predicate as in placing an intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept. The kinship is greater still with the reflective judgment which Kant opposes to the determining one, in the sense that it reflects upon the work of thinking at work in the aesthetic judgment of taste and in the teleological judgment applied to organic wholes. The act of emplotment has a similar function inasmuch as it extracts a configuration from a succession.

^{16}

它反映了這樣一個悖論，即敘事情節的建構以可變的比例結合了兩個時間維度，一個是編年的，另一個不是。前者構成了敘事的片段性維度。它描述了故事，因為故事由事件組成。第二個是配置的維度，恰當地說，通過它，情節將事件轉化為故事。這種配置行為包括「綜合」詳細的動作或我所稱的故事的事件。它從這些事件中提取了一個時間整體的統一性。我不能過分強調這種「綜合」，即配置行為，與康德關於判斷操作的看法之間的親和性。回憶起來，對康德來說，判斷的先驗意義不太在於連接主語和謂語，而是在於將直觀的多樣性置於概念的規則之下。與康德所對立的反思性判斷的親和性更為明顯，它反思了美學品味判斷和應用於有機整體的目的論判斷中思考的工作。敘事情節的建構具有類似的功能，因為它從一個連續體中提取了一種配置。

Yet poiessis does more than reflect the paradox of temporality. By mediating between the two poles of event and story, emplotment brings to the paradox a solution that is the poetic act itself. This act, which I just said extracts a figure from a succession, reveals itself to the listener or the reader in the story’s capacity to be followed.

^{17}

然而，詩學不僅僅是反映時間性的悖論。通過調解事件和故事兩極，敘事情節的建構為這個悖論帶來了一個解決方案，這個解決方案就是詩學行為本身。這個我剛才說的從連續中提取一個形態的行為，在故事能夠被跟隨的能力中向聽者或讀者顯現出來。

To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfilment in the “conclusion” of the story. This conclusion is not logically implied by some previous premises. It gives the story an “end point,” which, in turn, furnishes
追隨一個故事，就是在意外事件和轉折中前進，在期望的指引下，最終在故事的「結論」中得到滿足。這個結論並不是由先前的某些前提邏輯性地暗示的。它賦予故事一個「終點」，反過來，這個終點提供了
the point of view from which the story can be perceived as forming a whole. To understand the story is to understand how and why the successive episodes led to this conclusion, which, far from being foreseeable, must finally be acceptable, as congruent with the episodes brought together by the story.
一個視角，從這個視角可以將故事視為一個整體。理解故事，就是理解為什麼以及如何連續的章節最終導向這個結論，這個結論並非可預見，但必須最終是可接受的，與故事匯集的章節相一致。

It is this “followability” of a story that constitutes the poetic solution to the paradox of distention and intention. The fact that the story can be followed converts the paradox into a living dialectic.
正是這種故事的「可追隨性」，構成了對時間延展和意圖悖論的詩意解決方案。故事可以被追隨的事實，將悖論轉化為一種生動的辯證。

On the one hand, the episodic dimension of a narrative draws narrative time in the direction of the linear representation of time. It does so in several ways. First, the “then, and then,” by which we answer the question “and then what?” suggests that the phases of action are in an external relation. Next, the episodes constitute an open series of events, which allows us to add to the “then, and then” a “and so forth.” Finally, the episodes follow upon one another in accord with the irreversible order of time common to physical and human events.
一方面，敘事的片段維度將敘事時間引向線性時間的表現。它以幾種方式做到這一點。首先，「然後，然後」，我們用這種方式回答「然後呢？」，暗示行動階段是外在關係。其次，章節構成了一系列開放的事件，允許我們在「然後，然後」後加上「等等」。最後，章節按照物理和人類事件共同的不可逆時間順序相繼而生。

The configurational dimension, in its turn, presents temporal features directly opposed to those of the episodic dimension. Again it does so in several ways.
配置維度反過來直接呈現出與情節維度相對立的時間特徵。它以多種方式這樣做。

First, the configurational arrangement transforms the succession of events into one meaningful whole which is the correlate of the act of assembling the events together and which makes the story followable. Thanks to this reflective act, the entire plot can be translated into one “thought,” which is nothing other than its “point” or “theme.” However, we would be completely mistaken if we took such a point as atemporal. The time of the “fable and theme,” to use Northrop Frye’s expression, is the narrative time that mediates between the episodic aspect and the configurational aspect.
首先，配置安排將事件的連續性轉化為一個有意義的整體，這是將事件組合在一起的反思性行為的對應物，使故事易於理解。通過這種反思性行為，整個情節可以被轉譯成一個「思想」，這無非是其「要點」或「主題」。然而，如果我們將這樣的要點視為非時間的，那將是完全錯誤的。用北羅普‧弗萊的表達方式，「故事與主題」的時間是調停情節方面與配置方面的敘事時間。

Second, the configuration of the plot imposes the “sense of an ending” (to use the title of Frank Kermode’s well-known book) on the indefinite succession of incidents. I just spoke of the “end point” as the point from where the story can be seen as a whole. I may now add that it is in the act of retelling rather than in that of telling that this structural function of closure can be discerned. As soon as a story is well known-and this is the case for most traditional or popular narratives, as well as for those national chronicles reporting the founding events of a given community-to follow the story is not so much to enclose its surprises or discoveries within our recognition of the meaning attached to the story, as to apprehend the episodes which are themselves well known as leading to this end. A new quality of time emerges from this understanding.
其次，情節的配置在無限的事件連續中強加了「結束的感覺」（借用弗蘭克‧克雷莫德著名書籍的標題）。我剛才談到「終點」是可以將故事視為整體的觀點。我現在可以補充，這種封閉的結構功能在重新講述而非講述的過程中更能被辨識。一旦一個故事已為人所熟知——這對於大多數傳統或流行的敘事，以及那些報告特定社群建立事件的國家編年史來說都是如此——追隨這個故事不再是將其驚喜或發現封閉在我們對故事附加的意義中，而是理解那些本身已為人所知的情節是如何引向這個結局。從這種理解中，一種新的時間品質浮現出來。

Finally, the repetition of a story, governed as a whole by its way of ending, constitutes an alternative to the representation of time as flowing from the past toward the future, following the well-known metaphor of the “arrow of time.” It is as though recollection inverted the so-called “natural” order of time. In reading the ending in the beginning and the beginning in the ending, we also
最後，由其結局整體控制的故事重複，構成了時間流動的另一種表現，不同於從過去流向未來的眾所周知的「時間之箭」隱喻。彷彿回憶顛倒了所謂的「自然」時間秩序。在閱讀結尾中的開始，以及開始中的結尾時，我們也
learn to read time itself backwards, as the recapitulation of the initial conditions of a course of action in its terminal consequences.
學會了反向閱讀時間本身，作為一個行動過程的初始條件在其終極後果中的重述。

In short, the act of narrating, reflected in the act of following a story, makes productive the paradoxes that disquieted Augustine to the point of reducing him to silence.
簡而言之，敘事的行為，反映在追隨一個故事的行為中，使得令奧古斯丁感到不安以至於使他陷入沉默的悖論變得富有成效。

Two complementary features that assure the continuity of the process that joins mimesis

_{3}

to mimesis

_{2}

remain to be added to our analysis of the configurational act. More visibly than the preceding ones, these two features require the support of reading if they are to be reactivated. It is a question of the schematization and the character of traditionality characteristic of the configurational act, each of which has a specific relation to time.
還有兩個互補的特徵，保證了連接模仿與模仿的過程的連續性，這些特徵需要被加入到我們對配置行為的分析中。比起前面的特徵，這兩個特徵更明顯地需要閱讀的支持才能被重新激活。這是關於模式化和配置行為的傳統性特徵，每一個都與時間有特定的關係。

It will be recalled that I compared the “grasping together” characteristic of the configurational act to judgment as understood by Kant. Remaining in a Kantian vein, we ought not to hesitate in comparing the production of the configurational act to the work of the productive imagination. This latter must be understood not as a psychologizing faculty but as a transcendental one. The productive imagination is not only rule-governed, it constitutes the generative matrix of rules. In Kant’s first Critique, the categories of the understanding are first schematized by the productive imagination. The schematism has this power because the productive imagination fundamentally has a synthetic function. It connects understanding and intuition by engendering syntheses that are intellectual and intuitive at the same time. Emplotment, too, engenders a mixed intelligibility between what has been called the point, theme, or thought of a story, and the intuitive presentation of circumstances, characters, episodes, and changes of fortune that make up the denouement. In this way, we may speak of a schematism of the narrative function. Like every schematism, this one lends itself to a typology of the sort that Northrop Frye, for example, elaborates in his Anatomy of Criticism.

^{18}

眾所周知，我將「共同把握」的特徵與康德理解的判斷相比較。保持康德式的風格，我們不應猶豫地將配置行為的生產比作生產性想像力的工作。後者不應被理解為心理學意義上的能力，而是先驗的能力。生產性想像力不僅僅是有規則的，它構成了規則的生成矩陣。在康德的第一批判中，理解的範疇首先由生產性想像力進行模式化。模式化具有這種力量，因為生產性想像力從根本上具有綜合功能。它通過生成同時具有知性和直觀的綜合來連接理解和直觀。敘事也會生成一種混合的可理解性，介於敘事的要點、主題或思想，以及構成結局的直觀呈現的情境、人物、情節和命運變遷之間。這樣，我們可以談論敘事功能的模式化。像每一種模式化一樣，這種模式化為諾斯羅普·弗萊在《批評的解剖》中闡述的類型學提供了可能。

This schematism, in turn, is constituted within a history that has all the characteristics of a tradition. Let us understand by this term not the inert transmission of some already dead deposit of material but the living transmission of an innovation always capable of being reactivated by a return to the most creative moments of poetic activity. So understood, traditionality enriches the relationship between plot and time with a new feature.
這種模式化反過來在一個具有傳統所有特徵的歷史中形成。我們應該理解這個詞不是某種已經死去的物質沉積的惰性傳遞，而是一種創新的生動傳遞，總是能夠通過返回詩歌活動最具創造性的時刻而被重新激活。在這種理解下，傳統性以一個新的特徵豐富了情節與時間之間的關係。

In fact, a tradition is constituted by the interplay of innovation and sedimentation. To sedimentation must be referred the paradigms that constitute the typology of emplotment. These paradigms have issued from a sedimented history whose genesis has been covered over.
事實上，傳統是由創新和沉澱的相互作用所構成。在沉澱中，必須追溯構成情節類型的範式。這些範式源自於一個被掩蓋其生成過程的沉澱歷史。

The sedimentation is produced on multiple levels, and this requires of us a broad discernment in our use of the term paradigmatic. Thus Aristotle seems to us today to have done two, if not three, things at once. On the one hand, he establishes the concept of plot in terms of its most formal features, those
沉澱發生在多個層面，這要求我們在使用「範式」一詞時須具有廣泛的洞察力。因此，亞里士多德今天看來似乎同時做了兩件，甚至三件事。一方面，他根據其最形式化的特徵建立了情節概念，
which I have identified as the discordant concordance. On the other hand, he describes the genre of Greek tragedy (and accessorily that of epic, but as measured by the criteria of the tragic model). This genre satisfies both the formal conditions which make it a muthos and the restrictive ones which make it a tragic muthos: the reversal of meaning from good to bad fortune, pitiable and frightening incidents, unmerited misfortune, the tragic fault of a character also marked by excellence and free of vice or wickedness. To a large extent, this genre dominated the subsequent development of dramatic literature in the West. It is no less true that our culture is the heir to several narrative traditions: Hebrew and Christian, but also Celtic, Germanic, Icelandic, and Slavic.

^{19}

我已經確定了這些特徵為「不協調的一致性」。另一方面，他描述了希臘悲劇的類型（附帶地也描述了史詩，但是以悲劇模式為衡量標準）。這種類型同時滿足了使其成為一個「muthos」的形式條件和使其成為悲劇性「muthos」的限制性條件：從好運轉向壞運，令人憐憫和可怕的事件，不應有的不幸，一個同時具有卓越品質且遠離邪惡的角色的悲劇性缺陷。在很大程度上，這種類型主導了西方戲劇文學的後續發展。同樣不容置疑的是，我們的文化是多種敘事傳統的繼承者：希伯來和基督教傳統，以及凱爾特、日耳曼、冰島和斯拉夫傳統。

This is not all. What makes a paradigm is not just the form of discordant concordance or the model that subsequent tradition identified as a stable literary genre; there are also the individual works - the Iliad and Oedipus Rex in Aristotle’s Poetics. To the extent that in the ordering of events the causal connection (one thing as a cause of another) prevails over pure succession (one thing after another), a universal emerges that is, as we have interpreted it, the ordering itself erected as a type. This is why the narrative tradition has been marked not just by the sedimentation of the form of discordant concordance and by that of the tragic genre (and the other models of the same level), but also by the types engendered at the level of individual works. If we encompass form, genre, and type under the heading “paradigm,” we shall say that the paradigms are born from the labor of the productive imagination on these various levels.
這並不是全部。構成一個範式的，不僅僅是不和諧的一致性形式，或是後來的傳統所認定的穩定文學體裁模式；還有個別作品 - 亞里士多德《詩學》中的《伊利亞特》和《俄狄浦斯王》。在事件的排序中，因果關係（一事作為另一事的原因）勝過純粹的繼承（一事接一事），一個普遍性由此浮現，正如我們所解釋的，這個排序本身被建立為一種類型。這就是為什麼敘事傳統不僅被不和諧的一致性形式的沉積，以及悲劇體裁（和其他同等級的模式）的沉積所標誌，還被個別作品層面上產生的類型所標誌。如果我們將形式、體裁和類型涵蓋在「範式」之下，我們將說，範式產生於生產性想像力在這些不同層次上的勞動。

These paradigms, themselves issuing from a previous innovation, furnish the rules for a subsequent experimentation within the narrative field. These rules change under the pressure of new inventions, but they change slowly and even resist change, in virtue of the very process of sedimentation.
這些範式，本身源於先前的創新，為敘事領域中的後續實驗提供了規則。這些規則在新發明的壓力下發生變化，但變化緩慢，甚至抵制變化，正是由於沉積過程本身的特性。

As for the other pole of tradition, innovation, its status is correlative to that of sedimentation. There is always a place for innovation inasmuch as what is produced, in the poiēsis of the poem, is always, in the last analysis, a singular work, this work. This is why the paradigms only constitute the grammar that governs the composition of new works-new before becoming typical. In the same way as the grammar of a language governs the production of wellformed sentences, whose number and content are unforeseeable, a work of art-a poem, play, novel-is an original production, a new existence in the linguistic [langagier] kingdom.

^{20}

Yet the reverse is no less true. Innovation remains a form of behavior governed by rules. The labor of imagination is not born from nothing. It is bound in one way or another to the tradition’s paradigms. But the range of solutions is vast. It is deployed between the two poles of servile application and calculated deviation, passing through every degree of “rule-governed deformation.” The folktale, the myth, and in general the traditional narrative stand closest to the first pole. But to the extent we distance ourselves from traditional narrative, deviation becomes the rule. Thus
至於傳統的另一極，創新，其地位與沉積相關。只要在詩歌的創作中所產生的東西，歸根結底始終是一個獨特的作品，這個作品。這就是為什麼範式僅構成了支配新作品創作的語法——在成為典型之前是新的。正如語言的語法支配著格式良好的句子的生產，其數量和內容是無法預測的，藝術作品——一首詩、一部戲劇、一部小說——是一種原創性的生產，是語言王國中的一種新的存在。然而，反面的情況同樣是真實的。創新仍然是一種受規則管治的行為。想像力的勞動不是憑空而生的。它以某種方式或另一種方式受制於傳統的範式。但解決方案的範圍是廣闊的。它在奴性應用和有意的偏離兩極之間展開，穿越每一個「受規則的變形」程度。民間故事、神話，以及通常的傳統敘事最接近第一極。但是，隨著我們遠離傳統敘事，偏離成為規則。
the contemporary novel, in large part, may be defined as an antinovel, to the extent that contestation wins out over the taste for simply varying the application of the paradigms.
因此，當代小說在很大程度上可以被定義為反小說，因為質疑勝過了僅僅變化範式應用的品味。

What is more, this deviation may come into play on every level, in relation to the types, the genres, even to the formal principle of concordant discordance. The first type of deviation, it would seem, is constitutive of every individual work. Each work stands apart from every other work. Less frequent is a change of genre. Such a change is equivalent to the creation of a new genre, the novel, for example, in relation to drama or the romance, or history in relation to chronicle. Still more radical is the contesting of the formal principle of discordant concordance. I shall inquire later about the room for variation allowed by this formal paradigm. I shall ask whether this contestation, made into a schism, does not signify the death of the narrative form itself. It remains, however, that the possibility of deviation is inscribed in the relation between sedimented paradigms and actual works. Short of the extreme case of schism, it is just the opposite of servile application. Rule-governed deformation constitutes the axis around which the various changes of paradigm through application are arranged. It is this variety of applications that confers a history on the productive imagination and that, in counterpoint to sedimentation, makes a narrative tradition possible. This is the final enrichment by which the relationship of narrative to time is augmented at the level of mimesis

_{2}

.
更重要的是，這種偏差可能在每個層面發生，關於類型、體裁，甚至 concordant discordance 的形式原則。第一種偏差，看起來似乎是每個個別作品的構成性特徵。每部作品都與其他作品不同。改變體裁的情況較少見。這種改變相當於創造一種新的體裁，例如小說相對於戲劇或羅曼史，或歷史相對於編年史。更為根本的是質疑 concordant discordance 的形式原則。我稍後將探討這種形式範式允許的變化空間。我將追問，這種被製造成分裂的質疑是否意味著敘事形式本身的死亡。然而，偏離的可能性是銘刻在沉澱的範式和實際作品之間的關係中。在極端分裂的情況之前，恰恰相反的是機械的應用。以規則為導向的變形構成了軸心，圍繞這個軸心排列著通過應用而進行的各種範式變化。正是這種應用的多樣性賦予了生產性想像力一種歷史，並且與沉澱相互呼應，使敘事傳統成為可能。這是最終的豐富，通過這種豐富，敘事與時間的關係在模仿

_{2}

層面得到了增強。

Mimesis $_{3}$ 模仿 $_{3}$

I want now to show how mimesis

_{2}

, brought back to its first level of intelligibility, requires a third representative stage as its complement, which also merits being called mimesis.
現在我想展示，將模仿追溯到其最初的可理解性層面，需要作為其補充的第三個代表階段，這個階段也值得被稱為模仿。

Allow me to recall once again that the interest brought to bear here on the unfolding of mimesis does not contain its end within itself. My explication of mimesis remains subordinated to my investigation of the mediation between time and narrative. It is only at the end of our traversal of mimesis that the thesis stated at the beginning of this chapter will receive a concrete content: narrative has its full meaning when it is restored to the time of action and of suffering in mimesis

_{3}

.
請允許我再次回顧，此處對模仿（mimesis）展開的興趣本身並不包含其終點。我對模仿的解釋仍然從屬於我對時間與敘事之間的中介的研究。只有在我們遍歷模仿的終點，本章開頭所陳述的論點才會獲得具體內容：當敘事被恢復到行動和 suffering 的時間中，它才具有完整的意義。

This stage corresponds to what H.-G. Gadamer, in his philosophical hermeneutics, calls “application.” Aristotle himself suggests this last sense of mimesis-praxeos in various passages of his Poetics, although he is less concerned about the audience there than he is in his Rhetoric, where the theory of persuasion is entirely governed by the hearer’s capacity for receiving the message. Still, when he says that poetry “teaches” the universal, that tragedy “in representing pity and fear . . . effects the purgation of these emotions,” or
這個階段對應於 H.-G. 伽達默爾在其哲學解釋學中所稱的"應用"。亞里士多德本人在其《詩學》的各個段落中暗示了模仿-praxeos 的這最後一個意義，儘管他在那裡比在《修辭學》中更少關注聽眾，在《修辭學》中，說服理論完全由聽者接收訊息的能力所支配。然而，當他說詩歌"教導"普遍性，悲劇"在表現憐憫和恐懼時......淨化這些情感"，或
even when he refers to the pleasure we get in seeing the frightening and pitiable events concur with the reversal of fortune that makes a tragedy, he does signify that it is in the hearer or the reader that the traversal of mimesis reaches its fulfilment.
甚至當他提及我們在看到可怕和可憐的事件與命運逆轉相吻合時所獲得的快感時，他確實表明模仿的遍歷在聽者或讀者那裡達到其完成。

Generalizing beyond Aristotle, I shall say that mimesis

_{3}

marks the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, therefore, of the world configured by the poem and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific temporality.
超越亞里士多德而概括地說，模仿標誌著文本世界與聽者或讀者世界的交叉；因此，也是由詩歌所配置的世界與真實行動發生並展開其特定時間性的世界的交叉。

I shall proceed in four steps.
我將分四個步驟進行。

If it is true that it is by linking together the three stages of mimesis that we institute the mediation between time and narrative, one preliminary question arises as to whether this linking together really marks a progression. I shall respond here to the objection of circularity raised at the beginning of this chapter.
如果說，通過連結模仿的三個階段，我們建立了時間與敘事之間的中介，那麼一個初步問題就是：這種連結是否真的標誌著一種進展。對此，我將回應在本章開頭提出的迴圈論證的異議。
If it is true that the act of reading is our connection to the capacity of a plot to model our experience, it has to be shown how this act is articulated by the dynamism belonging to the configuring act, prolonging it and bringing it to its end.
如果閱讀行為是我們與情節模塑經驗能力的連結，那麼必須證明這一行為如何被配置行為固有的動力所闡述，並延續和完成它。
Next, approaching head-on the thesis of the refiguration of temporal experience by emplotment, I shall show how the entry of the work, through reading, into the field of communication marks at the same time its entry into the field of reference. Taking up the problem where I left it in The Rule of Metaphor, I want to outline the particular difficulties attached to the notion of reference in the narrative order.
接著，直面敘事重塑時間經驗的論點，我將展示作品如何通過閱讀進入交流領域，同時也進入參考領域。在《隱喻的規則》中我擱置的問題上，我想概述敘事秩序中參考概念所附帶的特殊困難。
Insofar, finally, as the world that narrative refigures is a temporal world, the question arises of how much aid a hermeneutics of narrated time can expect from the phenomenology of Time. The answer to this question will make appear a much more radical circularity than the one that engenders the relation from mimesis $_{3}$ to mimesis across mimesis $_{2}$ . The study of the Augustinian theory of time with which I began this work has already provided an occasion for anticipating this. It concerns the relation between a phenomenology that does not stop engendering aporias and what I earlier called the poetic “solution” to these aporias. The question of the relationship between time and narrative culminates in this dialectic between an aporetics and a poetics.
就其作為敘事重塑的世界是一個時間世界而言，提出了這樣的問題：現象學的時間理論對於敘事時間的解釋學能提供多少幫助。對這個問題的回答，將會呈現出比從模仿 $_{3}$ 到模仿 $_{2}$ 之間關係所產生的循環更為根本的循環。我在此工作中開始研究奧古斯丁的時間理論，已經提供了預示這一點的機會。這涉及到一個不斷產生邏輯矛盾的現象學，與我之前所說的詩學「解決方案」之間的關係。時間與敘事之間的關係，最終歸結為這種邏輯矛盾與詩學之間的辯證。

The Circle of Mimesis
模仿的循環

Before taking on the central problematic of mimesis

_{3}

, I want to face the suspicion of a vicious circle which the traversal from mimesis to mimesis

_{3}

across mimesis

_{2}

must give rise to. Whether we consider the semantic structure of action, its resources for symbolization, or its temporal character, the end point seems to lead back to the starting point or, worse, the end point seems antici-
在處理模仿

_{3}

的核心問題之前，我想面對一個惡性循環的疑慮，這是從模仿到模仿

_{3}

橫穿模仿

_{2}

必然會引起的。無論我們考慮行動的語義結構、其象徵化的資源，還是其時間性特徵，終點似乎都會回到起點，或者更糟的是，終點似乎已在起點中被預示。
pated in the starting point. If such were the case, the hermeneutical circle of mimesis and temporality would resolve into the vicious circle of mimesis alone.
如果情況確實如此，模仿與時間性的解釋學循環將會淪為模仿本身的惡性循環。

That the analysis is circular is indisputable. But that the circle is a vicious one can be refuted. In this regard, I would rather speak of an endless spiral that would carry the meditation past the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes. The accusation about a vicious circle proceeds from the seduction of one or the other of two versions of circularity. The first emphasizes the violence of interpretation, the second its redundance.
這個分析是無可爭議的循環。但是，這個循環可以被駁斥為並非惡性的。在這方面，我寧願將其描述為一個無盡的螺旋，它會多次載著冥想經過同一個點，但卻在不同的高度。關於惡性循環的指控源於循環的兩種版本中的誘惑。第一種強調解釋的暴力，第二種則強調其冗餘。

In the first case we may be tempted to say that narrative puts consonance where there was only dissonance. In this way, narrative gives form to what is unformed. But then this formation by narrative may be suspected of treachery. At best, it furnishes the “as if” proper to any fiction we know to be just fiction, a literary artifice. This is how it consoles us in the face of death. But as soon as we no longer fool ourselves by having recourse to the consolation offered by the paradigms, we become aware of the violence and the lie. We are then at the point of succumbing to the fascination of the absolutely unformed and to the plea for that radical intellectual honesty Nietzsche called Redlichkeit. It is only through a kind of nostalgia for order that we resist this fascination and that we adhere desperately to the idea that order is our homeland despite everything. From then on, the narrative consonance imposed on temporal dissonance remains the work of what it is convenient to call a violence of interpretation. The narrative solution to the paradox is just the outgrowth of this violence.
在第一種情況下，我們可能會忍不住說敘事在原本只有不協調的地方製造了和諧。這樣，敘事給予了無形之物形式。但接著，敘事的這種形式可能會被懷疑存在背叛。充其量，它提供了我們所知的純粹虛構的「彷彿」，一種文學技巧。這正是它在死亡面前給予我們安慰的方式。但是一旦我們不再依靠範式的安慰欺騙自己，我們就會意識到暴力和謊言。我們即將屈服於徹底無形的魅力，以及尼采稱之為誠實（Redlichkeit）的那種根本性的知識誠實。只有通過對秩序的一種懷舊，我們才能抵制這種魅力，並絕望地堅持這樣的想法：儘管一切，秩序仍是我們的家園。從那時起，強加於時間不協調之上的敘事和諧，成為了所謂的解釋暴力的作品。敘事解決方案只是這種暴力的外延。

I in no way mean to deny that such a dramatization of the dialectic between narrativity and temporality reveals in a wholly appropriate fashion the characteristic of discordant concordance that is attached to the relationship between narrative and time. But so long as we place the consonance on the side of the narrative and the dissonance on the side of temporality in a unilateral fashion, as the argument suggests, we miss the properly dialectical character of their relationship.
我絕非意圖否認這種敘事性與時間性之間辯證的戲劇化方式，以恰當的方式揭示了附著於敘事與時間關係上的不協調一致性特徵。但只要我們以片面的方式將協調性置於敘事一邊，將不協調性置於時間性一邊，如論點所示，我們就會錯過它們關係中真正的辯證特性。

In the first place, our experience of temporality cannot be reduced to simple discordance. As we saw with Augustine, distentio and intentio mutually confront each other at the heart of our most authentic experience. We must preserve the paradox of time from the leveling out brought about by reducing it to simple discordance. We ought to ask instead whether the plea for a radically unformed temporal experience is not itself the product of a fascination for the unformed that is one of the features of modernity. In short, when thinkers or literary critics seem to yield to a nostalgia for order or, worse, to the horror of chaos, what really moves them, in the final analysis, may be a genuine recognition of the paradoxes of time beyond the loss of meaning characteristic of one particular culture-our own.
首先，我們對時間性的體驗不能簡化為單純的不協調。正如我們從奧古斯丁那裡看到的，延展（distentio）和意向（intentio）在我們最真實的體驗核心相互對峙。我們必須維護時間的矛盾，不讓它被簡化為單純的不協調所抹平。我們應該詢問，對於一種徹底無形的時間體驗的懇求，是否本身就是現代性特徵之一的對無形的迷戀的產物。簡而言之，當思想家或文學評論家似乎屈服於對秩序的懷舊，或更糟的是對混沌的恐懼時，在最終分析中真正驅使他們的，可能是對超越我們特定文化中意義喪失的時間矛盾的真誠認識。

In the second place, the consonance characteristic of narrative which we
其次，敘事所具有的協調性，我們
are tempted to oppose in a nondialectical fashion to the dissonance of our temporal experience, must itself also be tempered. Emplotment is never the simple triumph of “order.” Even the paradigm of Greek tragedy makes a place for the upsetting role of the peripeteia, those contingencies and reversals of fortune that solicit horror and pity. The plots themselves coordinate distention and intention. The same must be said for the other paradigm that, according to Frank Kermode, has governed the “sense of an ending” in our Western tradition. I am thinking of the apocalyptic model that so magnificently underscores the correspondence between beginning-Genesis-and end-the Apocalypse. Kermode himself does not fail to emphasize the innumerable tensions engendered by this model for everything touching those events that come “between times” and above all in the “end times.” Reversal is magnified by the apocalyptic model to the extent that the end is the catastrophe that abolishes time and prefigures “the terrors of the last days.” Yet the apocalyptic model, in spite of its persistence as attested to by its modern resurgence in the form of utopias or, better, uchronias, is only one paradigm among others, which in no way exhausts the dynamics of narrative.
必須以非辯證的方式對抗我們時間經驗的不協調性的誘惑，本身也必須得到調節。敘事建構絕不是「秩序」的簡單勝利。即使是希臘悲劇的典範也為突轉點（佩里佩特亞）留有位置，那些引發恐懼和同情的偶然性和命運的逆轉。情節本身協調了張力和意圖。對於弗蘭克·克爾莫德所稱的統治我們西方傳統「結局感」的另一個典範，必須也這麼說。我想的是啟示錄模式，它如此壯麗地強調了開端—創世紀—與終結—啟示錄之間的對應關係。克爾莫德本人不會忽視這一模式為「時間之間」和尤其是「末世」的一切事件所產生的無數張力。逆轉被啟示錄模式放大，以至於結局是那個廢除時間並預示「末日恐怖」的災難。然而，儘管啟示錄模式以其在烏托邦或更確切地說是異時症中的現代復甦而證明其持久性，但它只是眾多典範之一，絕不窮盡敘事的動態。

Other paradigms than those of Greek tragedy or the Apocalypse continue to be engendered by the same process of the formation of traditions that we earlier attached to the power of schematization proper to the productive imagination. In volume 2 I shall show that this rebirth of paradigms does not abolish the fundamental dialectic of discordant concordance. Even the rejection of any paradigm, illustrated today by the antinovel, stems from the paradoxical history of “concordance.” By means of the frustrations engendered by their ironic mistrust of any paradigm, and thanks to the more or less perverse pleasure the reader takes in being excited and gulled by them, these works satisfy both the tradition they leave behind and the disorganized experiences they finally end up imitating by dint of not imitating the received paradigms.
除了希臘悲劇或啟示錄之外的其他範式，仍然由我們早先歸因於富有成效的想像力固有的示意化能力的同一過程所產生。在第 2 卷中，我將展示這些範式的重生並不會廢除不一致和諧的基本辯證法。即使是當今反小說所體現的對任何範式的拒絕，也源於「和諧」的矛盾歷史。通過這些作品所引發的挫折感，以及讀者對被激發和愚弄時所獲得的或多或少的變態快感，這些作品同時滿足了他們拋棄的傳統和最終通過不模仿已接受的範式而模仿的零散經驗。

The suspicion of interpretative violence is no less legitimate in this extreme case. It is no longer “concordance” that is imposed by force on the “discordance” of our experience of time. Now it is the “discordance” engendered in discourse by the ironic distance in regard to any paradigm that undermines from within the view of “concordance” sustaining our temporal experience and that overthrows the intentio without which there would be no distentio animi. We can then legitimately suspect the alleged discordance of our temporal experience as being only a literary artifice.
在這種極端情況下，對詮釋暴力的懷疑同樣合理。不再是「和諧」被強加於我們時間經驗的「不一致」之上。現在是話語中由對任何範式的諷刺距離所產生的「不一致」從內部破壞了支撐我們時間經驗的「和諧」觀念，並顛覆了沒有它就不會有心靈張力的意圖。我們可以合理地懷疑，我們時間經驗中所謂的不一致可能只是一種文學技巧。

Reflection on the limits of concordance never loses its legitimacy. It applies to every instance of a “figure” of discordant concordance and to concordant discordance at the level of narrative as well as at the level of time. But in every instance the circle is inevitable without being vicious.
關於和諧的局限性的反思永遠不會失去其正當性。它適用於每一個不一致和諧的「形象」，以及敘事層面和時間層面上的和諧不一致。但在每一個實例中，這個圈子是不可避免的，但並非惡性循環。
2. The objection about a vicious circle can take on another form. Having confronted the violence of interpretation, we have also to face the opposite possibility-a redundancy of interpretation. This would be the case if mime-
2. 關於惡性循環的異議可以採取另一種形式。在面對詮釋的暴力之後，我們還必須面對相反的可能性——詮釋的冗餘。如果模仿
sis

_{1}

were itself a meaning effect of mimesis

_{3}

. Mimesis

s_{2}

would then only restore to mimesis

_{3}

what it had taken from mimesis, since mimesis, would already be a work of mimesis

_{3}

.
模仿

_{1}

本身就是模仿效果的意義

_{3}

。模仿

s_{2}

之後只會將其從模仿

_{3}

中取走的東西歸還，因為模仿本身已經是模仿的作品

_{3}

。

The objection of redundancy seems to be suggested by the analysis of mimesis. If there is no human experience that is not already mediated by symbolic systems and, among them, by narratives, it seems vain to say, as I have, that action is in quest of narrative. How, indeed, can we speak of a human life as a story in its nascent state, since we do not have access to the temporal dramas of existence outside of stories told about them by others or by ourselves?
冗餘的異議似乎由模仿的分析所建議。如果沒有一種人類經驗不是已經由符號系統所中介，尤其是敘事，那麼說生命正尋求敘事似乎是徒勞的。確實，我們如何將人類生命描述為一個正在形成的故事，既然我們無法在他人或自己講述的故事之外，接觸存在的時間戲劇？

I shall oppose to this objection a series of situations that in my opinion, constrain us to accord already to experience as such an inchoate narrativity that does not proceed from projecting, as some say, literature on life but that constitutes a genuine demand for narrative. To characterize these situations I shall not hesitate to speak of a prenarrative quality of experience.
對此異議，我將提出一系列情況，在我看來，這些情況迫使我們承認經驗本身就具有一種初步的敘事性，這並非將文學投射到生活中，而是構成了對敘事的真正需求。為了描述這些情況，我不會猶豫地談論經驗的前敘事性質。

My analysis of the temporal features of action on the level of mimesis, led to the threshold of this concept. If I did not cross it at that moment, it was with the thought that the objection of a vicious circle through redundancy would offer a more propitious occasion to indicate the strategic importance of the situations I am about to speak of in the circle of mimesis.
我對行動的時間特徵在模仿層面的分析，引領我接近這個概念的門檻。當時我沒有跨越它，是因為認為通過冗餘的惡性循環的異議，會提供一個更有利的機會來指出我即將談論的情況在模仿循環中的戰略重要性。

Without leaving everyday experience, are we not inclined to see in a given sequence of the episodes of our lives “(as yet) untold” stories, stories that demand to be told, stories that offer anchorage points for narrative? I am not unaware how incongruous the expression “(as yet) untold story” is. Are not stories told by definition? There is no argument if we are speaking of actual stories. Yet is the notion of a potential story unacceptable?
不離開日常生活體驗，我們是否傾向於在生活的一系列事件中看到「（尚未）講述」的故事，那些需要被講述的故事，提供敘事錨定點的故事？我並非不知道「（尚未）講述的故事」這個表達的不恰當之處。故事不是天生就被講述的嗎？如果我們談論的是實際的故事，那麼就沒有爭議。然而，潛在故事的概念是否不可接受？

I would like to point to two less common situations in which the expression “(as yet) untold story” imposes itself upon us with a surprising force. The patient who talks to a psychoanalyst presents bits and pieces of lived stories, of dreams, of “primitive scenes,” conflictual episodes. We may rightfully say of such analytic sessions that their goal and effect is for the analysand to draw from these bits and pieces a narrative that will be both more supportable and more intelligible. Roy Schafer has even taught us to consider Freud’s metapsychological theories as a system of rules for retelling our life stories and raising them to the rank of case histories.

^{2 t}

This narrative interpretation implies that a life story proceeds from untold and repressed stories in the direction of actual stories the subject can take up and hold as constitutive of his personal identity. It is the quest for this personal identity that assures the continuity between the potential or inchoate story and the actual story we assume responsibility for.
我想指出兩種不太常見的情況，在這些情況下，「（尚未）講述的故事」這個表達會以驚人的力量強加於我們。向心理分析師談話的病人呈現出生活故事的片段、夢境、「原始場景」、衝突性事件。我們完全可以說，這種分析會議的目標和效果是讓受分析者從這些片段中提煉出一個更能忍受且更可理解的敘事。羅伊·沙弗甚至教導我們將弗洛伊德的元心理學理論視為重新講述我們生活故事並將其提升至案例史的規則系統。這種敘事解釋意味著，生活故事從未講述和被壓抑的故事朝向病人可以接受並視為個人身份構成部分的實際故事發展。正是追尋這種個人身份確保了潛在或初步故事與我們承擔責任的實際故事之間的連續性。

There is also another situation which the notion of an untold story seems to fit. Wilhelm Schapp describes the case where a judge undertakes to under-
還有另一種情況，「未講述的故事」這個概念似乎很適合。威廉·沙普描述了一個法官著手
stand a course of actions, a character, by unraveling the tangle of plots the subject is caught up in.

^{22}

The accent here is on “being entangled” (verstricktsein) ( p .85 ), a verb whose passive voice emphasizes that the story “happens to” someone before anyone tells it. The entanglement seems more like the “prehistory” of the told story, whose beginning has to be chosen by the narrator. This “prehistory” of the story is what binds it to a larger whole and gives it a “background.” This background is made up of the “living imbrication” of every lived story with every other such story. Told stories therefore have to “emerge” (auftauchen) from this background. With this emergence also emerges the implied subject. We may thus say, “the story stands for the person” (die Geschichte steht für den Mann) (p. 100). The principal consequence of this existential analysis of human beings as “entangled in stories” is that narrating is a secondary process, that of “the story’s becoming known” (das Bekanntwerden der Geschichte) (p. 101). Telling, following, understanding stories is simply the “continuation” of these untold stories.
通過解開主體所纏繞的情節的糾纏，一個角色站在一系列行動的基礎上。

^{22}

重點在於"被纏繞"（verstricktsein）（第 85 頁），這個動詞的被動語態強調故事在被講述之前"發生在"某人身上。這種纏繞更像是被講述故事的"前史"，其開始必須由敘述者選擇。這個故事的"前史"將其與更大的整體聯繫起來，並賦予其"背景"。這個背景由每個被生活的故事與其他每個這樣的故事的"生動交織"組成。因此，被講述的故事必須從這個背景中"浮現"（auftauchen）。隨著這種浮現，潛在的主體也隨之浮現。因此，我們可以說，"故事代表了這個人"（die Geschichte steht für den Mann）（第 100 頁）。將人類存在理解為"纏繞在故事中"的這種本質分析的主要結果是，敘述是次要的過程，即"故事被知曉"（das Bekanntwerden der Geschichte）（第 101 頁）。講述、跟隨、理解故事只是這些未被講述的故事的"延續"。

Literary criticism shaped by the Aristotelian tradition, for which a story is an artifice created by a writer, will hardly be satisfied with this notion of a told story that would be in “continuity” with the passive entanglement of subjects in stories that disappear into a foggy horizon. Nevertheless, the priority given the as yet untold story can serve as a critical example for every emphasis on the artificial character of the art of narrating. We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative.
以亞里士多德傳統為導向的文學批評，對於作為作家人為創造的故事，很難滿足於這種被講述的故事會與主體在消失在朦朧地平線中的被動纏繞保持"連續性"的概念。然而，賦予尚未講述的故事優先權可以作為每一種強調敘事藝術人為特性的批評範例。我們講述故事，因為歸根結底，人類的生活需要且值得被敘述。當我們提到拯救被打敗者和遺失者的歷史的必要性時，這句話顯得尤其有力。整個苦難的歷史呼喚著復仇，並召喚敘事。

Literary criticism will experience less repugnance in accepting the notion of story as that within which we are entangled, if it pays attention to one recent suggestion stemming from its own domain. In The Genesis of Secrecy, Frank Kermode introduces the idea that certain narratives may aim not at illumination but at obscurity and dissimulation.

^{23}

This may be the case, among others, with Jesus’ parables which, according to the interpretation of the evangelist Mark, were told with the view of not being understood by “those outside” and which, according to Kermode, also rather severely expel those “inside” from their privileged position. But there are many other narratives that have this enigmatic power of “banishing interpreters from their secret places” (see pp. 33-34). Of course, these secret places are places in the text. They are the internal mark of its inexhaustibility. Yet can we not say that the “hermeneutic potential” (p. 40) of this kind of narrative finds, if not a consonance, at least a resonance in the untold stories of our lives? Is there not a hidden complicity between the “secrecy” engendered by the narrative itselfor at least by narratives like those of Mark or Kafka-and the as yet untold stories of our lives that constitute the prehistory, the background, the living
如果文學批評能注意到其領域中的一個最近建議，在接受我們被糾纏在故事之中的概念時將會經歷較少的厭惡感。在《秘密的起源》中，弗蘭克·克曼德提出某些敘事可能並非旨在闡明，而是在於模糊和掩飾。這可能適用於耶穌的比喻，根據馬可福音的解釋，這些比喻是為了不被"外人"理解，並且根據克曼德的觀點，它們也相當嚴厲地將"內部人"驅逐出其特權地位。但還有許多其他敘事具有這種"驅逐解釋者離開他們的秘密之地"的神秘力量。當然，這些秘密之地是文本中的位置。它們是文本無窮盡性的內在標誌。然而，我們能否說這種敘事的"解釋潛力"在我們生活中未曾訴說的故事中找到了某種共鳴？是否存在某種隱藏的默契，介於敘事本身（或至少是如馬可或卡夫卡等人的敘事）所產生的"秘密"與我們生活中尚未訴說的故事之間，這些未說的故事構成了作為背景、前史和生動
imbrication from which the told story emerges? In other words, is there not a hidden affinity between the secret of where the story emerges from and the secret to which it returns?
交織的背景？換句話說，故事出現的秘密與其最終回歸的秘密之間是否存在某種隱藏的親和力？

Whatever the constraining force of this last suggestion, we can find reinforcement in it for my principal argument, which says that the manifest circularity of every analysis of narrative, an analysis that does not stop interpreting in terms of each other the temporal form inherent in experience and the narrative structure, is not a lifeless tautology. We should see in it instead a “healthy circle” in which the arguments advanced about each side of the problem aid one another.
無論這最後一個建議的約束力如何，我們都可以在其中找到對我的主要論點的支持，該論點認為，在不停地用彼此解釋經驗中固有的時間形式和敘事結構的每一次敘事分析中所呈現的循環性，並非一個無生命的同義反復。相反，我們應該將其視為一個"健康的循環"，在這個循環中，關於問題每一側的論點相互輔助。

Configuration, Refiguration, and Reading
配置、重新配置和閱讀

Thus the hermeneutic circle of narrative and time never stops being reborn from the circle that the stages of mimesis form. The moment has come to concentrate our reflection on the transition between mimesis

_{2}

and mimesis

_{3}

brought about by the act of reading.
因此，敘事和時間的詮釋學圓圈不斷從模仿階段形成的圓圈中重生。現在是集中反思模仿

_{2}

和模仿

_{3}

之間的轉換，這種轉換由閱讀行為所帶來。

If this act may be taken, as stated earlier, as our connection to the plot’s capacity to model experience, it is because it takes up again and fulfills the configurational act, for which I emphasized the kinship with judgment that com-prehends, that “grasps together” the details of action into the unity of the plot.
如果可以如前所述，將此行為視為我們與情節建構經驗能力的連結，那是因為它重新接續並實現了配置性行為，我強調了它與判斷的親緣關係，即將行動的細節「全面理解」並統一到情節中。

Nothing bears witness to this better than the two features by means of which I characterized plot at the stage of mimesis

_{2}

, namely, schematization and traditionality. These features contribute particularly to breaking down the prejudice that opposes an “inside” and an “outside” of a text. Indeed, this opposition is closely knit to a static and closed conception of the structure of any text. The notion of a structuring activity, visible in the operation of emplotment, transcends this opposition. Schematization and traditionality are thus from the start categories of the interaction between the operations [operativité] of writing and of reading.
沒有什麼比我在模仿

_{2}

階段表徵情節的兩個特徵更能證明這一點，即示意化和傳統性。這些特徵特別有助於打破對文本「內部」和「外部」的偏見。事實上，這種對立與任何文本結構的靜態和封閉概念緊密相連。在情節構建操作中可見的結構性活動概念超越了這種對立。因此，示意化和傳統性從一開始就是寫作和閱讀操作之間互動的類別。

On the one hand, the received paradigms structure readers’ expectations and aid them in recognizing the formal rule, the genre, or the type exemplified by the narrated story. They furnish guidelines for the encounter between a text and its readers. In short, they govern the story’s capacity to be followed. On the other hand, it is the act of reading that accompanies the narrative’s configuration and actualizes its capacity to be followed. To follow a story is to actualize it by reading it.
一方面，接收到的範式結構讀者的期望，並幫助他們識別敘述故事所呈現的正式規則、流派或類型。它們為文本與讀者之間的接觸提供指南。簡而言之，它們支配著故事被理解的能力。另一方面，正是閱讀的行為伴隨著敘事的配置並實現其被理解的能力。追隨一個故事就是通過閱讀來實現它。

And if emplotment can be described as an act of judgment and of the productive imagination, it is so insofar as this act is the joint work of the text and reader, just as Aristotle said that sensation is the common work of sensing and what is sensed.
如果情節安排可以被描述為判斷和富有成效的想像力的行為，那麼這種行為之所以如此，正如亞里士多德所說感知是感知者和被感知事物的共同工作一樣，它是文本和讀者的聯合工作。

Furthermore, it is the act of reading that accompanies the interplay of the
此外，正是閱讀的行為伴隨著範式的創新和沉澱的相互作用，
innovation and sedimentation of paradigms that schematizes emplotment. In the act of reading, the receiver plays with the narrative constraints, brings about gaps, takes part in the combat between the novel and the antinovel, and enjoys the pleasure that Roland Barthes calls the pleasure of the text.
對情節安排進行圖式化。在閱讀的過程中，接收者玩弄敘事的限制，造成空白，參與小說與反小說之間的較量，並享受羅蘭·巴特所稱的文本的愉悅。

Finally, it is the reader who completes the work inasmuch as (if we follow Roman Ingarden in The Literary Work of Art, and Wolfgang Iser in The Act of Reading) the written work is a sketch for reading.

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Indeed, it consists of holes, lacunae, zones of indetermination, which, as in Joyce’s Ulysses, challenge the reader’s capacity to configure what the author seems to take malign delight in defiguring. In such an extreme case, it is the reader, almost abandoned by the work, who carries the burden of emplotment.
最後，正是讀者完成了作品，因為（如果我們遵循羅曼·英格登在《文學作品藝術》和沃爾夫岡·伊澤在《閱讀行為》中的觀點）書面作品是閱讀的草稿。

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確實，它由空白、缺漏、不確定的區域組成，就像在喬伊斯的《尤利西斯》中一樣，這些空白挑戰讀者重構作者似乎在惡意破壞的內容的能力。在這種極端情況下，幾乎被作品拋棄的讀者承擔了情節構建的重任。

The act of reading is thus the operator that joins mimesis

_{3}

to mimesis

_{2}

. It is the final indicator of the refiguring of the world of action under the sign of the plot. One of the critical problems that will occupy me in volume 2 will be to start from this point and to coordinate the relationships of a theory of reading, such as Wolfgang Iser’s, and a theory of reception, such as that of Robert Jauss. For the moment, let us say that what they both have in common is seeing in the effect the text produces on its receiver, whether individual or collective, an intrinsic component of the present or actual meaning of the text. For both, the text is a set of instructions that the individual reader or the reading public executes in a passive or a creative way. Their different approaches in The Act of Reading and Toward an Aesthetic of Reception start from this common base.
閱讀行為是連接模仿

_{3}

與模仿

_{2}

的操作者。它是在情節符號下重構行動世界的最終指標。在第 2 卷中，我將關注的一個關鍵問題是從這一點出發，協調沃爾夫岡·伊澤的閱讀理論和羅伯特·亞烏斯的接受理論之間的關係。目前，我們可以說他們共同之處在於將文本對其接收者（無論是個人還是集體）產生的效果視為文本當前或實際意義的內在組成部分。對他們來說，文本是一組指令，個別讀者或讀書公眾以被動或創造性的方式執行。他們在《閱讀行為》和《走向接受的美學》中的不同方法源於這個共同基礎。

Narrativity and Reference
敘事性與指涉

To complete a theory of writing with a theory of reading constitutes only the first step along the way of mimesis

_{3}

. An aesthetic of reception cannot take up the problem of communication without also taking up that of reference. What is communicated, in the final analysis, is, beyond the sense of a work, the world it projects and that constitutes its horizon. In this sense, the listeners or readers receive it according to their own receptive capacity, which itself is defined by a situation that is both limited and open to the world’s horizon. Thus the term “horizon” and its correlative, “world,” appeared twice in the definition of mimesis

_{3}

suggested earlier: the intersection of the world of the text and that of the listener or reader. This definition, close to H.-G. Gadamer’s notion of a “fusion of horizons,” rests upon three presuppositions which underlie, respectively, acts of discourse in general, literary works among these acts of discourse, and narratives among these literary works. The order that ties together these three presuppositions is thus one of increasing specification.
完成一個寫作理論與閱讀理論的結合，只是模仿

_{3}

道路上的第一步。接受美學不能不考慮通訊問題，同時也不能不考慮參考問題。最終被傳達的是一部作品的意義之外，還有它所投射的世界，這構成了其視野。在這個意義上，聽眾或讀者根據自身的接收能力來接收作品，而這種接收能力本身則由一個既有限且對世界視野開放的情境所定義。因此，"視野"這個詞及其相關詞"世界"，在此前建議的模仿

_{3}

定義中出現了兩次：文本世界與聽眾或讀者世界的交匯。這個定義，接近伽達默爾的"視野融合"概念，建立在三個基本假設之上，這些假設分別涉及話語行為的一般性、文學作品作為這些話語行為的一種、以及敘事作為這些文學作品的一種。連接這三個假設的順序，是一個逐步具體化的過程。

Concerning the first point, I shall limit myself to repeating the thesis argued at length in The Rule of Metaphor regarding the relationship between sense and reference in all discourse. According to this thesis, if (following Ben-
關於第一點，我將限於重複《比喻的規則》中關於所有話語中意義與參考之間關係的論點。根據這個論點，如果（按照本-
veniste rather than de Saussure) we take the sentence as the unit of discourse, then the intended of discourse ceases to be confused with the signified correlative to each signifier within the immanence of a system of signs. With the sentence, language is oriented beyond itself. It says something about something. This intending of a referent by discourse is completely contemporaneous with its event character and its dialogical functioning. It is the other side of the instance of discourse. The complete event is not only that someone speaks and addresses himself to an interlocuter, it is also the speaker’s ambition to bring a new experience to language and share it with someone else. It is this experience, in turn, that has the world for its horizon. Reference and horizon are correlative as are figure and ground. All experience both possesses a contour that circumscribes it and distinguishes it, and arises against a horizon of potentialities that constitutes at once an internal and an external horizon for experience: internal in the sense that it is always possible to give more details and be more precise about whatever is considered within some stable contour; external in the sense that the intended thing stands in potential relationships to everything else within the horizon of a total world, which itself never figures as the object of discourse. It is in this twofold sense of the word “horizon” that situation and horizon are correlative notions. This quite general presupposition implies that language does not constitute a world for itself. It is not even a world. Because we are in the world and are affected by situations, we try to orient ourselves in them by means of understanding; we also have something to say, an experience to bring to language and to share.
如果我們（就像來自薩烏爾而非韋尼斯特）以句子作為話語的單位，那麼話語的意圖就不再與符號系統內在性中每個指符相關的所指混淆。透過句子，語言導向其自身之外。它談論某事。話語對指涉對象的意圖與其事件特性和對話功能完全同時。它是話語實例的另一面。完整的事件不僅是某人說話並與對方交談，也是說話者將新經驗帶入語言並與他人分享的野心。反過來，正是這種經驗將世界作為其視野。指涉和視野如同圖像和背景一樣相關。所有經驗既有劃定並區分它的輪廓，又在可能性的視野中浮現，這構成了經驗的內在和外在視野：內在意義上是因為總是可以對穩定輪廓內的事物提供更多細節和更精確描述；外在意義上是因為意圖之物與整體世界視野中的一切事物存在潛在關係，而這個世界本身從未作為話語的對象出現。正是在"視野"一詞的這種雙重意義上，情境和視野是相關的概念。這種相當普遍的前提意味著語言並不構成一個獨立的世界。它甚至不是一個世界。因為我們身處世界，並受情境影響，我們嘗試通過理解來定位自己；我們也有所要說，有一種經驗要帶入語言並與人分享。

This is the ontological presupposition of reference, a presupposition reflected inside language itself as a postulate lacking any immanent justification. Language is for itself the order of the Same. The world is its Other. The attestation of this otherness arises from language’s reflexivity with regard to itself, whereby it knows itself as being in being in order to bear on being.
這是參考的本體論前提，一個在語言本身內部反映的前提，缺乏任何內在的正當性。語言本身就是同一性的秩序。世界是其他性。這種他性的證明源於語言對自身的反思性，通過它知道自己作為存在於存在之中，以便關注存在。
This presupposition does not stem from linguistics or semiotics. On the contrary, these disciplines reject as a postulate of their method the idea of an intention oriented toward the extralinguistic. What I have just called an ontological attestation must appear to them, once their methodological postulates are stated, as an unjustifiable and inadmissable leap. In fact, this ontological attestation would remain an irrational leap if the externalization it required were not the counterpart of a prior and more originary notion, starting from our experience of being in the world and in time, and proceeding from this ontological condition toward its expression in language.
這種前提並非源自語言學或符號學。相反，這些學科以其方法的前提拒絕面向語言外部的意圖。我剛才所稱的本體論證明，在其方法論前提陳述之後，對他們來說將是一個不可辯駁且不可接受的跳躍。事實上，如果這種外部化所需要的本體論證明不是源自我們在世界和時間中存在的經驗，並從這種本體論條件出發走向其在語言中的表達，那麼它將仍然是一個非理性的跳躍。

This first presupposition must be coordinated with my preceding reflections on the reception of a text. An ability to communicate and a capacity to refer must be simultaneously posited. All reference is co-reference-dialogical or dialogal reference. There is thus no need to choose between an aesthetic of reception and an ontology of the work of art. What a reader receives is not just
這第一個前提必須與我先前關於文本接受的思考相互協調。必須同時設定溝通的能力和指涉的能力。所有的指涉都是共同指涉——對話式或對話的指涉。因此，無需在接受美學和藝術作品本體論之間選擇。讀者所接收的不僅僅是
the sense of the work, but, through its sense, its reference, that is, the experience it brings to language and, in the last analysis, the world and the temporality it unfolds in the face of this experience.
作品的意義，而且通過其意義，其指涉，即它將經驗帶入語言的方式，最終是它在面對這種經驗時所展開的世界和時間性。

Consideration of “works of art,” among all acts of discourse, calls for a second presupposition which does not abolish the first one but does make it more complex. According to the thesis I presented in The Rule of Metaphor and that I shall recall here, literary works, too, bring an experience to language and thus come into the world, just as all discourse does. This second presupposition runs head-on into the dominant theory of contemporary poetics, which rejects any taking into account of reference, something it regards as extralinguistic, in the name of the strict immanence of literary language in relation to itself. When literary texts contain allegations concerning truth or falsity, lies, or secrets, which ineluctably bring back the dialectic of being and appearance,

^{25}

this poetics undertakes to consider as a simple meaning effect what it decides, by a methodological decree, to call a referential illusion. Yet the problem of the relation of literature to the reader’s world is not thereby abolished. It is simply set aside. “Referential illusions” are not just any textual meaning effect whatever. They require a detailed theory of the modes of “verediction.” These modes, in turn, stand out against the background of a horizon of the world that constitutes the world of the text. We may certainly include the very notion of a horizon within the immanence of the text and take the concept of the world of the text for an outgrowth of the referential illusion. But reading poses anew the problem of the fusion of two horizons, that of the text and that of the reader, and hence the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader.
在所有論述的行為中，對於「藝術作品」的考慮，需要第二個假設，這個假設並不否定第一個假設，但使其更加複雜。根據我在《隱喻的規則》中提出並在此重述的論點，文學作品也為語言帶來一種經驗，因此就像所有論述一樣進入世界。這第二個假設直接衝擊當代詩學的主導理論，後者以文學語言對自身的絕對內在性為名，拒絕考慮任何指涉。當文學文本包含關於真假、謊言或秘密的陳述，這些不可避免地帶回存在與表象的辯證法時，這種詩學試圖將其視為一種簡單的意義效果，並以方法論的命令將其稱為指涉性幻覺。然而，文學與讀者世界之間的關係問題並未因此而消失。它只是被擱置一旁。「指涉性幻覺」並非任何文本意義效果。它們需要一個關於「真實性模式」的詳細理論。這些模式反過來又以構成文本世界的世界視野為背景。我們當然可以將視野的概念納入文本的內在性，並將文本世界的概念視為指涉性幻覺的延伸。但閱讀重新提出了文本視野與讀者視野融合的問題，以及文本世界與讀者世界的交集。

We might try to deny the problem, and take the question of the impact of literature on everyday experience as not pertinent. But then we paradoxically ratify the positivism we generally fight against, namely, the prejudice that only a datum that is given in such a way that it can be empirically observed and scientifically described is real. We also enclose literature within a world of its own and break off the subversive point it turns against the moral and social orders. We forget that fiction is precisely what makes language that supreme danger which Walter Benjamin, following Hölderlin, speaks of with such awe and admiration.
我們可能會試圖否認這個問題，並認為文學對日常經驗的影響並不相關。但是，我們反而不經意地肯定了我們通常反對的實證主義，即只有以可以經驗性地觀察和科學地描述的方式給出的數據才是真實的這種偏見。我們還將文學封閉在自己的世界中，切斷了它針對道德和社會秩序的顛覆性要點。我們忘記了，正是虛構作品使語言成為沃爾特·本雅明（遵循赫爾德林）所說的那種令人敬畏和欽佩的至高無上的危險。

A whole range of cases is opened by this phenomenon of interaction: from ideological confirmation of the established order, as in official art or state chronicles, to social criticism and even derision for everything “real.” Even extreme alienation in relation to reality is still a case of intersection. And this conflictive fusion of horizons is not without some relation to the dynamics of the text, in particular the dialectic of sedimentation and innovation. The shock of the possible, which is no less than that of the real, is amplified by the internal interplay, in the works themselves, between the received paradigms and
這種互動現象開啟了一系列案例：從對既定秩序的意識形態確認，如官方藝術或國家編年史，到對一切「現實」的社會批評甚至嘲諷。即便是對現實的極端疏離，仍然是一種交叉的情況。這種衝突性的視野融合，與文本的動態不無關係，特別是沉澱和創新的辯證法。可能性的衝擊，不亞於現實的衝擊，通過作品內部在已接受的範式和
the proliferation of divergencies, through the deviation of individual works. Thus narrative literature, among all poetic works, is a model of practical actuality by its deviations as much as by its paradigms.
通過個別作品的偏離而產生的歧異的擴散之間的內部相互作用得到放大。因此，在所有詩歌作品中，敘事文學以其偏離和範式一樣，成為實踐現實性的模範。

If therefore we do not simply reject the problem of the fusion of the text’s and the reader’s horizons, or of the intersection between the world of the text and that of the reader, we have to find in the very functioning of poetic language the means to cross the abyss opened between these two worlds by the method of immanence characteristic of antipoetics. I tried to demonstrate in The Rule of Metaphor that language’s capacity for reference was not exhausted by descriptive discourse and that poetic works referred to the world in their own specific way, that of metaphorical reference.

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This thesis covers every nondescriptive use of language, and therefore every poetic text, whether it be lyrical or narrative. It implies that poetic texts, too, speak of the world, even though they may not do so in a descriptive fashion. Metaphorical reference, it will be recalled, consists in the fact that the effacement of descriptive reference-an effacement that, as a first approximation, makes language refer to itself-is revealed to be, in a second approximation, the negative condition for freeing a more radical power of reference to those aspects of our being-in-the-world that cannot be talked about directly. These aspects are intended, in an indirect but positively assertive way, by means of the new pertinence that the metaphorical utterance establishes at the level of sense, on the ruins of the literal sense abolished by its impertinence. This articulating of a metaphorical reference on the metaphorical sense cannot be clothed with a full ontological meaning unless we go so far as to metaphorize the verb “to be” itself and recognize in “being-as” the correlate of “seeing-as,” in which is summed up the work of metaphor. This “being-as” brings my second presupposition to the ontological level of my first presupposition. At the same time, it enriches it. The concept of horizon and world does not just concern descriptive references but also nondescriptive references, those of poetic diction. To take up again one of my earlier statements, I will say that, for me, the world is the whole set of references opened by every sort of descriptive or poetic text I have read, interpreted, and loved.

^{27}

To understand these texts is to interpolate among the predicates of our situation all those meanings that, from a simple environment (Umwelt), make a world (Welt). Indeed, we owe a large part of the enlarging of our horizon of existence to poetic works. Far from producing only weakened images of reality-shadows, as in the Platonic treatment of the eikōn in painting or writing (Phaedrus 274e-77e)-literary works depict reality by augmenting it with meanings that themselves depend upon the virtues of abbreviation, saturation, and culmination, so strikingly illustrated by emplotment. In Ecriture et Iconographie, François Dagognet, replying to Plato’s argument directed against writing and against every eikōn, characterizes as iconic augmentation the painter’s strategy of reconstructing reality on the basis of an optical alphabet that is limited and dense at the same
因此，如果我們不簡單地拒絕文本與讀者視域的融合問題，或文本世界與讀者世界的交叉，我們就必須在詩歌語言的運作方式中找到跨越這兩個世界之間的深淵的方法，即反詩學所特有的內在性方法。我曾在《比喻的規則》中試圖證明，語言的指涉能力並未被描述性話語所耗盡，詩歌作品以自身特定的方式指涉世界，即隱喻性指涉。這一論點涵蓋了每一種非描述性的語言使用，因此也包括每一種詩歌文本，無論是抒情的還是敘事的。這意味著詩歌文本也在談論世界，儘管可能不是以描述性的方式。隱喻性指涉，眾所周知，在於描述性指涉的消退——這種消退乍看之下使語言指向自身——在第二次近似中被揭示為釋放一種更根本的指涉力的消極條件，這種力量指向我們在世界中存在的那些無法直接談論的方面。這些方面通過隱喻性陳述在意義層面上建立的新 pertinence，以間接但肯定的方式被意圖，在被其不恰當性廢除的字面意義的廢墟上。除非我們將"是"這個動詞本身隱喻化，並在"作為"中認識到"視為"的相關物，這種隱喻性指涉對隱喻性意義的闡釋才能賦予完整的本體論意義，而"視為"總結了隱喻的工作。這個"作為"將我的第二個前提提升到第一個前提的本體論層面。同時，它豐富了第一個前提。地平線和世界的概念不僅僅關乎描述性參考，也關乎非描述性參考，即詩意語言。重提我早前的陳述，我要說，對我而言，世界是我閱讀、解讀和喜愛的每一種描述性或詩意文本所開啟的所有參考的整體集合。要理解這些文本，就是要在我們處境的謂詞間插入那些意義，使簡單的環境（Umwelt）成為世界（Welt）。事實上，我們對存在視野的擴大，很大程度上歸功於詩意作品。遠非僅僅生產出現實的弱化圖像—如柏拉圖在《斐德羅篇》中對繪畫或寫作中的意象（eikōn）的處理—文學作品通過增添意義來描繪現實，這些意義依賴於縮略、飽和和 culmination 的美德，這些正是情節塑造所生動呈現的。在《寫作與圖像》中，François Dagognet 對柏拉圖針對寫作和每一個 eikōn 的論點進行回應，將畫家重構現實的策略稱為圖像式增強，其基礎是一個有限且緊密的光學字母表。
time.

^{28}

This concept should be extended to every mode of iconicity, that is, to what we are here calling fiction. In a related sense, Eugen Fink compares Bild, which he distinguishes from simple, entirely perceived presentations of reality, to a “window” whose narrow opening looks out onto the immensity of a countryside. And from his side, Gadamer recognizes in Bild the power of bringing about an increase in being in our vision of the world which is impoverished by everyday affairs.

^{29}

這一概念應該擴展到每一種圖像性模式，即我們在此稱之為虛構的事物。在相關意義上，Eugen Fink 將 Bild（與單純完全感知的現實呈現相區別）比作一扇"窗戶"，其狹窄的開口俯瞰著鄉村的廣闊。而從另一角度，Gadamer 在 Bild 中認可了增加我們因日常事務而變得貧乏的世界視野之存在的能力。

The postulate underlying this recognition of the function of refiguration that belongs to the poetic work in general is part of a hermeneutics that aims less at restoring the author’s intention behind the text than at making explicit the movement by which the text unfolds, as it were, a world in front of itself. Elsewhere I have discussed this shift in focus of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics in relation to Romantic hermeneutics.

^{30}

For some years now I have maintained that what is interpreted in a text is the proposing of a world that I might inhabit and into which I might project my ownmost powers. In the Rule of Metaphor, I held that poetry, through its muthos, redescribes the world. In the same way, in this work I will say that making a narrative [le faire narratif] resignifies the world in its temporal dimension, to the extent that narrating, telling, reciting is to remake action following the poem’s invitation.

^{31}

這個對於詩作功能重構的認知所依據的假設，是一種詮釋學的一部分，其目的不在於還原作者的文本意圖，而是闡明文本展開的運動，猶如它在自身前面展開了一個世界。我曾在其他地方討論過後海德格爾詮釋學與浪漫主義詮釋學之間的這種轉變。近些年來，我一直堅持，在文本中被解讀的是一個我可能棲居其中並投射我最本真的力量的世界。在《隱喻的規則》中，我認為詩歌通過其神話敘事重新描述世界。同樣，在這部作品中，我將說明，製作敘事[le faire narratif]重新賦予世界其時間性維度，因為講述、敘說、背誦是按照詩歌的邀請重新塑造行動。

A third presupposition comes into play here, if the referential capacity of narrative works is to be subsumed under those of poetic works in general. The problem posed by narrativity is, in fact, both more simple and more complicated than the one posed by lyric poetry. More simple, because the world, here, is apprehended from the angle of human praxis rather than from that of cosmic pathos. What is resignified by narrative is what was already presignified at the level of human acting. It will be recalled that our preunderstanding of the world of action under the governance of mimesis

_{1}

is characterized by the mastering of a network of intersignifications constitutive of the semantics of action, by familiarity with the symbolic mediations and the prenarrative resources of human acting. Being-in-the-world according to narrativity is a being-in-the-world already marked by the linguistic [langagière] practice leading back to this preunderstanding. The iconic augmentation in question here depends upon the prior augmentation of readability that action owes to the interpretants already at work there. Human action can be oversignified, because it is already presignified by all the modes of its symbolic articulation. This is the sense in which the problem of reference is simpler in the case of the narrative mode than in that of the lyrical mode of poetry. Just as, in the Rule of Metaphor, it was by extrapolation from the tragic muthos that I elaborated the theory of poetic reference that joins muthos and redescription, it is the metaphorization of action and suffering that is easiest to decipher.
在這裡，如果敘事作品的指涉能力要被歸入詩歌作品的一般能力，另一個預設就會起作用。實際上，敘事性所提出的問題，既比抒情詩所提出的問題更簡單，也更複雜。更簡單，因為這裡的世界是從人類實踐的角度而非宇宙苦難的角度被理解。敘事重新賦予意義的是已經在人類行動層面上被預先賦予意義的事物。我們應該回想，在模仿的治理下對行動世界的預先理解，是由構成行動語義的互為意義的網絡的掌握所 characterize，是對人類行動的象徵性中介和預敘事性資源的熟悉。根據敘事性的存在是一種已經被引導回這種預先理解的語言實踐所標記的世界中的存在。這裡所討論的圖像增強取決於行動已經擁有的可讀性的先前增強。人類行動可以被過度賦予意義，因為它已經被其所有象徵性關節的模式所預先賦予意義。在這個意義上，在敘事模式中參考的問題比抒情詩模式中的更簡單。就像在《隱喻法則》中，我是通過對悲劇性的 muthos 進行外推來闡述將 muthos 和重新描述聯繫起來的詩歌指涉理論，行動和苦難的隱喻化是最容易解讀的。

The problem posed by narrativity, with respect to its referential intention and its truth claim, is in another sense more complicated than that posed by lyric poetry. The existence of two large classes of narrative discourse, fic-
就其指涉意圖和真理追索而言，敘事性所提出的問題在另一個意義上比抒情詩更為複雜。敘事性話語存在兩大類別，即虛構
tional and historical narrative, poses a series of specific problems that will be treated in volume 2 of this work. I limit myself here to listing a few of them. The most apparent, and perhaps also the most intractable one, proceeds from the undeniable asymmetry between the referential modes of historical and fictional narrative. Only history can claim a reference inscribed in empirical reality, inasmuch as historical intentionality aims at events that have actually occurred. Even if the past no longer exists and if, in Augustine’s expression, it can be reached only in the present of the past, that is, through the traces of the past that have become documents for the historian, still it did happen. The past event, however absent it may be from present perception, nonetheless governs the historical intentionality, conferring upon it a realistic note that literature will never equal, even if it makes a claim to be “realistic.” This reference through traces to a real past calls for a specific analysis to which one whole chapter of volume 2 will be devoted. I shall have to speak, on the one hand, about what this reference through traces borrows from the metaphorical reference common to every poetic work, inasmuch as the past can only be reconstructed by the imagination, and also what it adds to it, inasmuch as it is polarized by past reality. Conversely, the question will arise whether fictional narrative does not borrow, in turn, a part of its referential dynamics from this reference through traces. Is not every narrative told as though it had taken place, as is evident from the ordinary usage of verbal past tenses to narrate the unreal? In this sense, fiction would borrow as much from history as history borrows from fiction. It is this reciprocal borrowing that authorizes my posing the problem of the interweaving reference between history and narrative fiction. This problem can be avoided only by a positivist conception of history that would not recognize the aspect of fiction in its reference through traces, and by an antireferential conception of literature that would not recognize the importance of the metaphorical reference in all poetry. This problem of interweaving reference constitutes one of the major concerns of volume 2 of this work.
在敘事性和歷史性的敘述中，提出了一系列特定的問題，這些問題將在本書第 2 卷中探討。我在此僅列出其中幾個。最明顯，也可能是最棘手的問題，源於歷史和小說敘述之間參考模式的不對稱性。只有歷史可以聲稱其參考 inscribed 在經驗現實中，因為歷史意向性旨在描述實際發生的事件。即使過去不再存在，即使按照奧古斯丁的表達，它只能在過去的現在中被觸及，也就是通過已成為歷史學家文獻的過去痕跡，它仍然發生過。過去的事件，無論它多麼遠離當前感知，仍然支配著歷史意向性，賦予其一種寫實的特質，文學將永遠無法匹敵，即便它自稱是"寫實的"。這種通過痕跡對真實過去的參考需要特定的分析，第 2 卷的一整章將致力於此。我將不得不一方面談論這種通過痕跡的參考從每一種詩意作品共有的隱喻性參考中借用了什麼，因為過去只能通過想像力重建，另一方面又增添了什麼，因為它被過去的現實所極化。相反，問題將是：小說敘述是否反過來從這種通過痕跡的參考中借用了部分其參考動態。是否每一種敘述都講述得彷彿它已經發生，正如在敘述非現實時使用口語過去時態所顯示的那樣？在這個意義上，小說會像歷史借用小說一樣借用歷史。正是這種相互借用授權我提出歷史和小說敘事之間交織參考的問題。只有通過將歷史視為實證主義的概念，不承認其通過痕跡的引用中的虛構面向，以及將文學視為反引用的概念，不承認所有詩歌中隱喻性引用的重要性，才能避免這個問題。這種交織的引用問題構成了本作品第 2 卷的主要關注點之一。

But where [sur quoi] do the reference by traces and the metaphorical reference interweave if not through the temporality of human action? Is it not human time that history and literary fiction in common refigure, by this interweaving of their referential modes?
但是如果不是通過人類行動的時間性，痕跡引用和隱喻性引用在何處交織？難道不是人類時間重新塑造了歷史和文學虛構，通過它們引用模式的交織？

Narrated Time 敘事時間

To narrow the framework further in which the question of the interweaving reference between history and fictional narrative will be raised again in the final part of this work, I must sketch the temporal features of the world refigured by the configurational act.
為了進一步縮小框架，在這個框架中將在本作品的最後部分重新提出歷史和虛構敘事之間的交織引用問題，我必須勾勒出由配置行為重新塑造的世界的時間特徵。

I would like to begin from the notion of iconic augmentation introduced above. We may then take up once more each of the features by which the
我想從上面介紹的標誌性擴增概念開始。然後我們可以再次審視每一個
preunderstanding of action was characterized: the network of intersignifications between practical categories, the symbolism immanent to this preunderstanding, and above all its properly practical temporality. It can then said that each of these features is intensified, is iconically augmented.
行動的預先理解所具有的特徵：實踐類別之間的互相意義網絡、內在於這種預先理解的象徵主義，以及最重要的是其本質上的實踐時間性。可以說，這些特徵中的每一個都被強化，都經歷了標誌性的擴增。

I shall not say much about the first two features. The intersignifying of project, circumstances, and chance is exactly what plot, which I have described as a synthesis of the heterogeneous, orders. The narrative work is an invitation to see our praxis as it is ordered by this or that plot articulated in our literature. As for the symbolism internal to action, we may say that it is exactly what is resymbolized or desymbolized-or resymbolized through de-symbolization-by means of the schematism turn by turn traditionalized and subverted by the historicity of our paradigms. Lastly, it is the time of action that, more than anything, is refigured by the configurational act.
關於前兩個特徵，我不會多加贅述。計劃、環境和機遇的互相意義正是情節所體現，我將其描述為異質的綜合。敘事作品邀請我們以文學中這樣或那樣的情節所呈現的方式，觀察我們的實踐。至於行動內在的象徵主義，我們可以說，它正是通過模式化的輪替和我們範式的歷史性所顛覆的重新象徵化或去象徵化（或通過去象徵化進行重新象徵化）。最後，正是行動的時間，比任何事物都更多地被配置性行為重新塑造。

A long detour is required here. A theory of refigured time-or, we might say, narrated time-cannot be brought to term without the mediation of the third partner in the conversation already begun between the epistemology of history and literary criticism applied to narrativity, in the discussion of interweaving reference.
這裡需要一個漫長的迂迴。沒有已經開始的歷史認識論和應用於敘事性的文學批評之間對話的第三方的中介，一個重構時間或者我們可以說的敘述時間的理論是無法完成的，這牽涉到參考的交織討論。

This third partner is the phenomenology of time, only the initial phase of which was considered in our study of time in Augustine. The rest of this work, from Part II through volume 2, will be a long and difficult threeway conversation between history, literary criticism, and phenomenological philosophy. The dialectic of time and narrative is the ultimate stake of this confrontation, without precedent as far as I know, between three partners who usually ignore one another.
這第三個夥伴是時間現象學，我們在研究奧古斯丁的時間時，只考慮了其初始階段。這部作品的其餘部分，從第二部分到第二卷，將是歷史、文學批評和現象學哲學之間一場漫長而艱難的三方對話。時間與敘事的辯證法是這場前所未有的對抗的最終賭注，就我所知，這三個夥伴通常互不理會。

To give sufficient attention to the third partner’s words it will be important to set forth the phenomenology of time from Augustine to Husserl and Heidegger, not to write its history, but to give body to a remark tossed out without any further justification in the course of my study of Book 11 of the Confessions. There is, I said, no pure phenomenology of time in Augustine. And I added, perhaps there can never be one. This impossibility of a pure phenomenology of time is what has to be demonstrated. By a pure phenomenology I mean an intuitive apprehension of the structure of time, which not only can be isolated from the procedures of argumentation by which phenomenology undertakes to resolve the aporias received from an earlier tradition, but which would not pay for its discovery with new aporias bearing a higher price. My thesis is that the genuine discoveries of the phenomenology of time cannot be definitively removed from the aporetic realm that so strongly characterizes the Augustinian theory of time. We shall have to take up again therefore our examination of the aporias created by Augustine and demonstrate their exemplary character. In this regard, Husserl’s analysis and discussion in his lectures on the phenomenology of internal time consciousness will constitute the major counterexample to my thesis about the defini-
為了充分關注第三個夥伴的話語，重要的是要闡述從奧古斯丁到胡塞爾和海德格爾的時間現象學，不是要寫其歷史，而是要為我在《懺悔錄》第 11 卷研究中隨意拋出的一句話賦予實質。我曾說，奧古斯丁沒有純粹的時間現象學。我還補充道，也許永遠不會有。這種純粹時間現象學的不可能性是必須被證明的。所謂純粹現象學，我指的是對時間結構的直觀把握，不僅可以從現象學用以解決從早期傳統中繼承的難題的論證程序中隔離出來，而且不會為其發現付出更高代價的新難題。我的論點是，時間現象學的真正發現不能從奧古斯丁時間理論中所特徵的難題領域中徹底移除。因此，我們必須重新審視奧古斯丁所創造的難題，並證明其典型性。在這方面，胡塞爾關於內在時間意識現象學的分析和討論將構成對我關於定義的論點的主要反例。
tively aporetic character of the phenomenology of time. In an almost unexpected way, at least for me, we shall be brought back by our discussion to the very Kantian thesis that time cannot be directly observed, that it is properly invisible. In this sense, the endless aporias of the phenomenology of time will be the price we have to pay for each and every attempt to make time itself appear, the ambition that defines the phenomenology of time as pure phenomenology. One major step in volume 2 will be to prove this, in principle, aporetic character of the pure phenomenology of time.
關於時間現象學的先驗性蒼白本質。以一種幾乎出人意料的方式，至少對我來說，我們將通過這次討論回到康德的論點：時間不能直接被觀察，它本質上是隱形的。在這個意義上，時間現象學的無盡難題將是我們為每一次試圖使時間本身顯現所付出的代價，這也定義了作為純粹現象學的時間現象學。第二卷的一個重要步驟將證明時間純粹現象學的這種原則上難以解決的特性。

This proof is necessary if we are to hold as universally valid my thesis that the poetics of narrativity responds and corresponds to the aporetics of temporality. The rapprochement between Aristotle’s Poetics and Augustine’s Confessions provided only a partial and in a way a circumstantial verification of this thesis. If the aporetic character of every pure phenomenology of time may be augmented in at least a plausible way, the hermeneutic circle of narrativity and temporality will be enlarged well beyond the circle of mimesis, to which the discussion in this first part had to be limited, so long as historiography and the philosophy of history along with literary criticism have not had their say about historical time and the games fiction plays with time. It is only at the end of what I have called the three-way conversation, in which the phenomenology of time joins its voice to those of these other disciplines, that the hermeneutic circle can then be compared with the circle of a poetics of narrativity (itself culminating in the problem of interweaving reference referred to above) and an aporetics of temporality.
如果要使我的論點成為普遍有效的，即敘事詩學回應並對應於時間的難題，這個證明是必要的。亞里士多德《詩學》和奧古斯丁《懺悔錄》之間的對比只提供了一個部分的、某種程度上是偶然的驗證。如果每一種純粹時間現象學的難解性至少能以一種可信的方式得到增強，那麼敘事性和時間性的解釋學循環將遠遠超出模仿的範圍，這是本部分討論所不得不限定的範圍，直到史學、歷史哲學以及文學批評對歷史時間和小說中的時間遊戲發表意見。只有在我所謂的三方對話結束時，時間現象學加入其他學科的聲音，解釋學循環才能與敘事詩學的循環（最終達到上述交互引用的問題）和時間難題的循環相比較。

It might already be objected with respect to my thesis about the universally aporetic character of the pure phenomenology of time that Heidegger’s hermeneutics marks a decisive break with Augustine’s and Husserl’s subjectivist hermeneutics. By founding his phenomenology on an ontology of Dasein and of being-in-the-world, is Heidegger not correct in affirming that temporality, as he describes it, is “more subjective” than any subject and “more objective” than any object, inasmuch as his ontology is not bound by the subject/ object dichotomy? I do not deny this. The analyses I shall devote to Heidegger will do full justice to the originality that a phenomenology founded upon an ontology and that presents itself as a hermeneutics can boast of.
關於我關於純時間現象學之普遍矛盾性的論點，可能已經會受到質疑，即海德格爾的詮釋學標誌著與奧古斯丁和胡塞爾的主觀主義詮釋學的決定性斷裂。通過以此在場和世界中存在的本體論為基礎建立他的現象學，海德格爾在肯定他所描述的時間性是比任何主體更「主觀」，且比任何客體更「客觀」時，是否是正確的，因為他的本體論不受制於主體/客體的二元對立？我並不否認這一點。我將致力於海德格爾的分析將充分公正地對待以本體論為基礎且將自身呈現為詮釋學的現象學所能誇耀的原創性。

To say it already, the properly phenomenological originality of the Heideggerian analysis of time-an originality due entirely to its anchorage in an ontology of Care-consists in a hierarchization of the levels of temporality or rather of temporalization. Having shown this, we shall be able to rediscover a presentiment of this theme in Augustine. Indeed, by interpreting the extension of time in terms of distension and by describing human time as raised beyond its inside by the attraction of its polar opposite, eternity, Augustine gave credit in advance to the idea of a plurality of temporal levels. Intervals of time do not simply fit into one another according to their numerical quantities, days into years, years into centuries. In a general way, the problems relative to the
已經可以說，海德格爾時間分析的真正現象學原創性—完全歸功於其在照顧本體論中的錨定—在於對時間性或更確切地說時間化的層次進行層級化。在證明了這一點後，我們將能夠在奧古斯丁那裡重新發現這一主題的預感。確實，通過將時間的延伸解釋為張力，並描述人類時間如何被其極點對立面—永恆—的吸引而超越其內在，奧古斯丁提前為多重時間層次的概念提供了依據。時間間隔並非僅僅根據其數量順序排列，如天數進入年份，年份進入世紀。
extension of time do not exhaust the question of human time. In fact, insofar as extension reflects a dialectic of intention and distention, the extension of time does not have just a quantitative aspect in responding to the questions: for how long a time? during how much time? in how much time? It has a qualitative aspect of graduated tension.
總的來說，關於時間延伸的問題並不窮盡人類時間的問題。事實上，就延伸反映了意圖和張力的辯證法而言，時間的延伸不僅僅具有回答「多長時間？」「持續多久？」「多久內？」等問題的數量方面，還具有一種漸進緊張的質的方面。

In my study of time in Augustine I indicated the principal epistemological incidence of this notion of a temporal hierarchy: historiography, in its battle against the history of events, and narratology, in its ambition to dechronologize narrative, seem to leave only a single choice: either chronology or achronic systemic relations. Chronology, however, does have another contrary term: temporality itself, brought to its level of greatest tension.
在我研究奧古斯丁的時間時，我指出了這個時間階層概念的主要認識論影響：史學，在與事件史的對抗中，以及敘事學，在其去編年化敘事的野心中，似乎只留下了一個選擇：要麼是編年，要麼是非編年的系統關係。然而，編年本身確實有另一個對立詞：時間性本身，被帶到最緊張的層次。

In the Heideggerian analysis of temporality, in Being and Time, Augustine’s breakthrough is exploited in the most decisive way, even though this occurs, as we shall see, beginning from Heidegger’s meditation on being-towards-death and not, as in Augustine, from the structure of the threefold present. I take as one invaluable result of the Heideggerian analysis its having established, with the resources of a hermeneutic phenomenology, that our experience of temporality is capable of unfolding itself on several levels of radicality, and that it belongs to the analytic of Dasein to traverse them, whether from above to below, in the order followed in Being and Time, from authentic and mortal time toward everyday and public time where everything happens “in” time, or from below to above, as in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.

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The direction in which the range of temporalization is traversed is less important than the hierarchization of temporal experience.

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在海德格爾對時間性的分析中，在《存在與時間》中，奧古斯丁的突破以最決定性的方式被利用，儘管這是從海德格爾對死亡臨近的沉思開始，而不是像奧古斯丁那樣從三重當下的結構開始。我認為，海德格爾分析的一個無價的結果是，它通過解釋現象學的資源，建立了我們的時間性體驗能夠在幾個激進程度的層次上展開，並且屬於此在分析要遍歷這些層次，無論是從上到下，按照《存在與時間》中遵循的順序，從真實的和有限的時間走向日常和公共的時間，在那裡一切都發生在「時間中」，還是從下到上，就像在《現象學的基本問題》中一樣。遍歷時間化範圍的方向不如時間體驗的層級化重要。

Along the ascending or regressive path, a stop at the middle level, between within-time-ness and radical temporality, marked by being-towards-death, seems of greatest importance to me. For reasons I shall mention later, Heidegger distinguishes it by the title Geschichtlichkeit, historicality. Augustine’s and Heidegger’s two analyses are closest to each other at this level, before diverging radically-at least in appearance-as the one directs himself toward Pauline hope, the other toward quasi-Stoic resoluteness in the face of death. In volume 2 I shall set forth an intrinsic reason for returning to this analysis of Geschichtlichkeit. Indeed, my analysis of repetition-Wiederhol-ung-in which I shall seek an ontological answer to the epistemological problems posed by the interweaving reference between the truth claims of historical intentionality and literary fiction, leads back to it. This is why I am already indicating its point of insertion.
沿著上升或倒退的道路，在時間性與根本時間性之間的中間層次停留，被死亡所標記，對我來說似乎最為重要。出於我稍後將提到的原因，海德格爾以「歷史性」（Geschichtlichkeit）這一稱謂來區分它。奧古斯丁和海德格爾的兩種分析在此層次上最為接近，然後才徹底分道揚鑣——至少表面上是如此——因為一個轉向保羅的希望，另一個則面對死亡時呈現出近乎斯多葛式的堅定。在第 2 卷中，我將闡述返回這種「歷史性」分析的內在原因。事實上，我對重複（Wiederholung）的分析，在其中我將尋求對歷史意向性真理主張與文學虛構之間交織參考所提出的認識論問題的本體論回應，最終將回到這一點。這就是我已經指出其插入點的原因。

There is no question therefore of denying the properly phenomenological originality that the Heideggerian description of temporality owes to its anchorage in the ontology of Care. Nonetheless, on this side of the turn - the Kehre-from which proceed the works subsequent to Being and Time, it must be admitted that the ontology of Dasein remains tied up with a phenomenology that poses problems analogous to those raised by Augustine’s and Hus-
因此，不能否認海德格爾關於時間性的現象學描述所具有的原創性，這源於其植根於關懷本體論。然而，在轉向（Kehre）之前——從中產生了《存在與時間》之後的著作，必須承認達西（Dasein）的本體論仍然與一種現象學緊密相連，這種現象學提出了與奧古斯丁和胡
serl’s phenomenology. Here, too, the breakthrough on the phenomenological plane engenders difficulties of a new sort that again augment the aporetic character of pure phenomenology. This aggravation is in proportion to this phenomenology’s ambition, which is not just to owe nothing to an epistemology of the physical and the human sciences, but to serve as their foundation.
塞爾現象學類似的問題。在這裡，現象學平面上的突破也引發了新的困難，進一步增加了純現象學的難解性。這種惡化與這種現象學的野心成正比，其野心不僅不欠缺物理科學和人文科學的認識論，而且還要成為它們的基礎。

The paradox is that the aporia has to do precisely with the relations between the phenomenology of time and the human sciences-principally history, but also contemporary narratology. Yes, the paradox is that Heidegger has made more difficult the three-way conversation between history, literary criticism, and phenomenology. We may even doubt whether he might have succeeded in deriving the concept of history familiar to professional historians, as well as the general thematic of the human sciences received from Dilthey, from the historicality of Dasein, which, for hermeneutic phenomenology, constitutes the middle level in the hierarchy of degrees of temporality. More serious yet, if the most radical temporality bears the stamp of death, how, we might ask, do we pass from a temporality so privatized by being-towards-death to that common time that requires interaction among multiple characters in every narrative and, all the more, to the public time required by history?
弔詭的是，阿波里亞恰恰與時間現象學和人文科學之間的關係有關——主要是歷史，也包括當代敘事學。是的，弔詭的是海德格爾使得歷史、文學批評和現象學之間的三方對話變得更加困難。我們甚至可能懷疑，他是否成功地從此在的歷史性中推導出專業歷史學家熟悉的歷史概念，以及從狄爾泰那裡得到的人文科學的一般主題，這個此在的歷史性在詮釋現象學中構成了時間性等級中的中間層次。更嚴重的是，如果最根本的時間性印上了死亡的印記，我們可能會問：我們如何從如此被面向死亡的私有化的時間性，過渡到每個敘事中需要多個角色互動的共同時間，更不用說歷史所需要的公共時間了？

In this sense our passage through Heidegger’s phenomenology will require a supplementary effort, which sometimes will distance us from him, to maintain the dialectic of narrative and time. It will be one of the major concerns of volume 2 to show how, in spite of the abyss that seems to lie between the two poles, narrative and time simultaneously and mutually arrange themselves in hierarchies. At times it will be the hermeneutic phenomenology of time that provides the key to the hierarchizing of narrative, other times it will be the disciplines concerned with historical and fictional narrative that allow us to resolve poetically-to use an expression already employed - the most speculatively intractable aporias of the phenomenology of time.
在這個意義上，我們通過海德格爾的現象學的過程將需要一種額外的努力，有時將使我們與他保持距離，以維持敘事和時間的辯證法。第二卷的主要關注點之一將是展示，儘管兩極之間似乎存在深淵，敘事和時間卻同時並相互排列成等級。有時是時間的詮釋現象學為敘事的等級化提供關鍵，有時是與歷史和虛構敘事相關的學科，讓我們能夠以詩意的方式——使用已經使用過的表達方式——解決時間現象學中最具投機性的難題。

Hence the very difficulty of deriving the historical disciplines from the analysis of Dasein and the still more formidable difficulty of bringing together in our thought the mortal time of the phenomenology of time and the public time of the narrative disciplines, will spur us to think through more thoroughly the relationships of time and narrative. The preliminary reflection that constitutes the first part of this work has already brought us from a conception where the hermeneutic circle is identified with the circle of the stages of mimesis to one that inscribes this dialectic within the larger circle of a poetics of narrative and an aporetics of time.
因此，從此在的分析中衍生歷史學科的極大困難，以及更為艱鉅的將現象學時間的凡人時間與敘事學科的公共時間在思想中匯聚的困難，將促使我們更加徹底地思考時間和敘事的關係。已完成的初步反思，已將我們從一個將詮釋學循環等同於模仿階段循環的概念，轉向一個將這種辯證法銘刻於敘事詩學和時間難題更大循環中的概念。

A final problem appears: that of the upper limit to the process of the hierarchization of temporality. For Augustine and the whole Christian tradition, the internalizing of the purely extensive relations of time refers to an eternity where everything is present at the same time. The approximating of eternity by time thus lies in the stability of a soul in respose: “Then I shall be cast and set firm in the mould of your truth” (Confessions, Book 11, 30:40). Yet
最後一個問題出現了：關於時間性階層化過程的上限。對於奧古斯丁和整個基督教傳統而言，時間純粹外延關係的內在化指向一個永恆，在那裡一切同時存在。時間對永恆的逼近，因此在於一個靜止的靈魂的穩定性："那時我將被拋入並牢固地鑄造在你的真理模具中"（《懺悔錄》，第 11 卷，30:40）。然而

Heidegger’s philosophy of time, at least during the period of Being and Time, even while taking up again and developing with great rigor the theme of levels of temporality, orients its meditation not toward divine eternity but toward finitude sealed by being-towards-death. Are these two irreducible ways of guiding the most extensive duration back toward the most tensive duration? Or is this disjunction only apparent? Are we to think that only a mortal can form the plan of “giving the things of life a dignity that makes them eternal”? Can the eternity that works of art oppose to the fugacity of things be constituted only in a history? And does this history in turn remain historical only if, going beyond death, it guards against the forgetfulness of death and the dead, and remains a recollection of death and a remembrance of the dead? The most serious question this work may be able to pose is to what degree a philosophical reflection on narrativity and time may aid us in thinking about eternity and death at the same time.
海德格爾關於時間的哲學，至少在《存在與時間》時期，即便重新採用並以極大的嚴謹性發展了時間性層次的主題，其冥想並非指向神聖的永恆，而是指向由臨終所封印的有限性。這是否是兩種將最廣闊的持續時間導向最緊張的持續時間的不可化約的方式？還是這種分歧只是表面的？我們是否要認為只有必死的人才能計劃「賦予生命事物一種使其永恆的尊嚴」？藝術作品所對立的永恆是否只能在歷史中建立？而這種歷史是否只有在超越死亡，防止遺忘死亡和死者，並保持對死亡的回憶和對死者的紀念時，才保持歷史性？這部作品可能提出的最嚴肅的問題是，關於敘事性和時間的哲學反思在多大程度上可以幫助我們同時思考永恆和死亡。

Part II 第二部分

History and Narrative 歷史與敘事

In the first part of this work I attempted to characterize narrative discourse without taking into account the major bifurcation that today divides its field between historiography (including work in philosophy of history) and narrative fiction. By so doing, I tacitly admitted that historiography does genuinely belong to this field. Whether it does belong to this field is what now must be examined.
在本作品的第一部分，我試圖描述敘事話語，而不考慮當今分裂其領域的主要分歧，即史學（包括歷史哲學研究）和敘事小說。通過這樣做，我默認史學確實屬於這一領域。現在必須審查其是否真的屬於這一領域。

Two convictions of equal strength lie at the origin of this investigation. The first says that today it is a lost cause to bind the narrative character of history to one particular form of history, narrative history. In this regard, my thesis concerning the ultimately narrative character of history in no way is to be confused with a defense of narrative history. My second conviction is that if history were to break every connection to our basic competence for following a story and to the cognitive operations constitutive of our narrative understanding, as I described them in the first part of this work, it would lose its distinctive place in the chorus of social sciences. It would cease to be historical. What is the nature of this connection?
本次調查源於兩個同等強度的信念。第一個信念表示，今天將歷史的敘事特性束縛於某種特定的歷史形式是一個徒勞的事業。在這方面，我關於歷史最終具有敘事性的論點絕不應被誤解為為敘事史辯護。我的第二個信念是，如果歷史完全斷開與我們追隨故事的基本能力以及在本作品第一部分所描述的構成我們敘事理解的認知操作之間的聯繫，它將喪失在社會科學合唱團中的獨特位置。它將不再是歷史性的。這種聯繫的本質是什麼？

To resolve this problem I did not wish to surrender to the easy solution that would consist in saying that history is an ambiguous discipline, half literary, half scientific, and that the epistemology of history can only register this state of affairs with regret, ceasing to work toward a history that would no longer be a kind of narrative. This easy eclecticism is contrary to my ambition. My thesis is that history the most removed from the narrative form continues to be bound to our narrative understanding by a line of derivation that we can reconstruct step by step and degree by degree with an appropriate method. This method does not stem from the methodology of the historical sciences per se but from a second-order reflection upon the ultimate conditions of intelligibility of a discipline that, in virtue of its scientific ambition, tends to forget this line of derivation which continues nevertheless tacitly to preserve its specificity as a historical science.
為了解決這個問題，我不願投降於輕易的解決方案，即認為歷史是一個模稜兩可的學科，一半文學，一半科學，並且歷史的認識論只能遺憾地記錄這種情況，不再致力於不再是某種敘事的歷史。這種輕易的折衷主義與我的野心相悖。我的論點是，即使是最遠離敘事形式的歷史，仍然通過一條我們可以逐步、逐級以適當方法重建的派生線與我們的敘事理解相連。這種方法並非源自歷史科學的方法論本身，而是對一個學科的最終可理解性條件的二階反思，這個學科出於其科學野心，往往忘記了這條仍在默默保存其作為歷史科學的特殊性的派生線。

This thesis has one immediate implication concerning historical time. I do
這一論點對歷史時間有一個直接的含義。我做
not doubt that historians have the privilege of constructing temporal parameters appropriate to their object and their method. I do maintain, however, that the significance of these constructions is borrowed, that it derives indirectly from the significance of those narrative configurations I described in terms of mimesis

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and that, by way of these, it is rooted in the temporality characteristic of the world of action. So, construction of historical time will be one of the major stakes of my enterprise. A stake-that is, both a consequence and a touchstone.
我不懷疑歷史學家有權構建適合其對象和方法的時間參數。然而，我堅持，這些建構的意義是借來的，它間接地源自我用模仿

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描述的敘事配置的意義，並且通過這些，它植根於行動世界特有的時間性。因此，歷史時間的建構將是我企圖的主要賭注。一個賭注——即是一個結果，也是一個試金石。

My thesis, therefore, is equally distant from two others: the one that would see in the retreat of historical narrative the negation of any connection between history and narrative, making historical time a construction without any support from narrative time or the time of action; and the one that would establish between history and narrative a relation as direct as that, for example, between a species and a genus, along with a directly readable continuity between the time of action and historical time. My thesis rests on the assertion of an indirect connection of derivation, by which historical knowledge proceeds from our narrative understanding without losing anything of its scientific ambition. In this sense, it is not a thesis that seeks to stand in the middle of the road.

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因此，我的論點同樣遠離另外兩種觀點：一種認為歷史敘事的退卻意味著歷史與敘事之間的任何聯繫的否定，使歷史時間成為一個沒有敘事時間或行動時間支持的建構；另一種則在歷史和敘事之間建立一種如同物種與屬之間的直接關係，以及行動時間與歷史時間之間直接可讀的連續性。我的論點基於一種間接的派生連接，通過這種連接，歷史知識源於我們的敘事理解，同時不失其科學野心。在這個意義上，這不是一個試圖站在中間道路上的論點。

To reconstruct the indirect connections of history to narrative is finally to bring to light the intentionality of the historian’s thought by which history continues obliquely to intend the field of human action and its basic temporality.
最終，重建歷史與敘事的間接聯繫，是要揭示歷史學家思想的意向性，通過這種意向性，歷史以某種斜向的方式持續意圖人類行動的領域及其基本的時間性。

By means of this oblique intention, historiography comes to be inscribed within that great mimetic circle which we traversed in the first part of this study. It too, albeit in a derived way, is rooted in our pragmatic competence, with its handling of events that occur “in” time, as described in my discussion of mimesis

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. It too configures the field of praxis by means of temporal constructions of a higher rank which historiography grafts to the narrative time characteristic of mimesis

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. It too, finally, reaches its meaning in the refiguring of the field of praxis and contributes to recapitulating the existence wherein mimesis

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culminates.
通過這種間接意圖，史學寫作被銘刻在我們在本研究第一部分所遍歷的那個偉大的模仿圈中。它同樣，儘管以一種衍生的方式，植根於我們的實踐能力，以其處理在「時間」中發生的事件，如我在模仿

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的討論中所描述的。它同樣通過時間構建（更高階）配置實踐領域，這些構建由史學寫作移植到模仿

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所特有的敘事時間。它最終也在重新塑造實踐領域中獲得其意義，並有助於總結模仿

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所達到的存在。

Such is the farthest horizon of my enterprise. I shall not take it so far in this part. I must reserve for a separate investigation the final segment corresponding to mimesis

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. Indeed, the inserting of history into action and into life, its capacity for reconfigurating time, brings into play the question of truth in history. This question is inseparable from what I call the interweaving reference between history’s claim to truth and that of fiction. The investigation to which Part II of this work is devoted, therefore, does not cover the whole field of the problematic of history. To retain the vocabulary I used in The Rule of Metaphor, it separates the question of “sense” from that of “reference.” Or, remaining faithful to the vocabulary of Part I of this work, the present investiga-
這是我的企圖最遙遠的地平線。在這部分中，我不會走得太遠。我必須為對應於模仿

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的最後一個片段保留一個單獨的調查。事實上，將歷史插入行動和生活，其重新配置時間的能力，帶來了歷史真相的問題。這個問題與我所說的歷史聲稱的真相和虛構之間的交織參考不可分割。因此，本作品第二部分所致力的調查，並不涵蓋歷史問題的整個領域。保留我在《隱喻法則》中使用的詞彙，它將「意義」的問題與「指涉」的問題分開。或者，忠實於本作品第一部分的詞彙，當前的調查
tion undertakes to connect together again, in the mode of oratio obliqua, explanation and our narrative understanding described in terms of mimesis

_{2}

.
以間接話語的模式，重新連接解釋和我們以模仿

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術語描述的敘事理解。

The order of questions dealt with in this second part is governed by my argument for the thesis just sketched.
第二部分中處理的問題順序，受到我剛剛勾勒的論點的管轄。

In chapter 4, entitled “The Eclipse of Narrative,” I take my distance from modern history as related to an expressly narrative form. I try to establish a convergence, in the attack against narrative history, between two currents of thought largely independent of one another. The first, closer to historical practice, and therefore more methodological than epistemological, seemed to me best illustrated by contemporary French historiography. The second stems from logical positivism’s theses about the unity of science. It, therefore, is more epistemological than methodological.
在第 4 章，標題為「敘事的蝕沒」中，我與現代歷史的敘事形式保持距離。我試圖建立兩種在很大程度上相互獨立的思想流派之間的匯合點，以攻擊敘事史。第一種，更接近歷史實踐，因此比認識論更偏向方法論，似乎最好地由當代法國史學體現。第二種源於邏輯實證主義關於科學統一性的論點。因此，它更偏向認識論而非方法論。

In chapter 5, entitled “Defenses of Narrative,” I take account of the various attempts-borrowed for the most part, with one important exception, from English-speaking authors-to extend our narrative competence directly to historical discourse. Despite my great sympathy for these analyses, which I try to integrate into my own project, I must confess that they do not seem to me to have fully reached their goal inasmuch as they only account for those forms of historiography where the relation to narrative is direct, and therefore visible.
在第 5 章，標題為「敘事的防禦」中，我考慮了各種嘗試——大部分借鑒自英語系作者，只有一個重要例外——直接將我們的敘事能力擴展到歷史論述。儘管我對這些分析懷有極大的同情，並試圖將它們融入我自己的項目，但我必須承認，它們似乎尚未完全達到目標，因為它們只解釋了那些與敘事關係直接且可見的史學形式。

Chapter 6, entitled “Historical Intentionality,” contains the major thesis of this second part, namely my thesis of the indirect derivation of historical knowledge, beginning from narrative understanding. Within this framework I take up again the analysis I have already begun elsewhere concerning the relations between explanation and understanding.

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To conclude, I give a partial answer to the question that inaugurates chapter 4 , the question regarding the status of an event. This answer cannot be complete because the epistemological status of an event-the only thing at issue in this second part-is inseparable from its ontological status, which is one of the stakes in volume 2.
第 6 章，標題為「歷史意向性」，包含了這一部分的主要論點，即我從敘事理解間接衍生歷史知識的論點。在這個框架下，我重新探討了我已在其他地方開始的關於解釋與理解之間關係的分析。

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最後，我對第 4 章開篇的問題給出了部分答案，即關於事件地位的問題。這個答案不可能完整，因為事件的認識論地位——本部分唯一關注的問題——與其本體論地位不可分割，而這是第 2 卷的議題之一。

I must ask for my reader’s patience at this point. You need to know that you will find, in the three chapters that follow, only a preparatory analysis as regards my central question about time and narrative. It is necessary first of all to elucidate the relationship between historical explanation and narrative understanding if we are to be able to pose the question of the contribution of historical narrative to the refiguring of time in a worthwhile manner. And this elucidation itself requires a long analysis. The nomological theory and the narrativist one must, under the pressure of the appropriate arguments, reveal their respective insufficiency if the indirect relationship between historiography and narrative is, in its turn, to be restored step by step and degree by degree. This long epistemological preparation ought not, however, to cause us
在這一點上，我必須請讀者耐心。你需要知道，在接下來的三章中，你只會找到關於我的核心問題的初步分析，這個問題涉及時間和敘事。首先，必須闡明歷史解釋和敘事理解之間的關係，如果我們要以有意義的方式提出歷史敘事對重塑時間的貢獻的問題。而這種闡明本身需要一個漫長的分析。在適當的論證壓力下，法則理論和敘事理論必須揭示各自的不足，以便逐步、逐級恢復史學和敘事之間的間接關係。然而，這個漫長的認識論準備不應
to lose sight of the final ontological stake. One additional reason may be added to my plea for extending the lines of this battle. The refiguring of time by narrative is, I hold, the joint work of historical and fictional narrative. Only in the second volume of this work, devoted to fictional narrative, therefore, will we be able to take up as a whole the problematic of narrated time.
使我們忽視最終的本體論利害關係。對於延伸這場戰鬥的路線，我可以再加一個理由。我認為，敘事重塑時間是歷史敘事和虛構敘事的共同工作。因此，只有在本著作的第二卷，這一卷專門討論虛構敘事，我們才能作為一個整體來探討被敘述的時間問題。

The Eclipse of Narrative
敘事的蝕變

French historiography and neopositivist epistemology belong to two very different universes of discourse. The first is traditionally and unfailingly distrustful of philosophy, which it readily identifies with the philosophy of history in a Hegelian style, itself conveniently confused with the speculations of Spengler or Toynbee. As for the critical philosophy of history, inherited from Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel, and Max Weber, and continued by Raymond Aron and Henri Marrou, it has never truly been integrated into the main current of French historiography.

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This is why we do not find, in those works most concerned about methodology, a reflection comparable to that of the German school at the beginning of this century, or to that in English of contemporary logical positivism and its adversaries concerning the epistemological structure of explanation in history. Its strength lies elsewhere, in strict adherence to the profession of the historian. The best accomplishment of this French school of history is a methodology for those actually in the field. In this regard, it provides philosophers all the more to think about in that it borrows nothing from them. The superiority of the works arising out of neopositivism, on the contrary, stems from their constant concern to measure explanation in history against models presumed to define scientific knowledge, the profound unity of this project, and its successes. In this sense these works do stem more from epistemology than from methodology. But their strength is often their weakness, in that historians’ actual practice is absent from their discussion of the models of explanation. This fault is unfortunately shared by logical positivism’s adversaries. As we shall see later, in our examination of “narrativist” arguments, the examples which positivist as well as antipositivist epistemology borrows from historians are rarely at the level of complexity attained today in the historical disciplines.
法國史學史與新實證主義認識論屬於兩個截然不同的論述世界。第一個傳統且始終不信任哲學，它輕易地將哲學等同於黑格爾風格的歷史哲學，又將其方便地與斯賓格勒或湯因比的推測混淆。至於繼承自狄爾泰、里克特、齊美爾和韋伯，並由雷蒙·阿隆和亨利·馬魯繼續的歷史批判哲學，從未真正融入法國史學的主流。這就是為什麼在最關注方法論的作品中，我們找不到與本世紀初德國學派，或當代邏輯實證主義及其對手關於歷史解釋的認識論結構相媲美的思考。其力量在於對歷史學家職業的嚴格遵守。這所法國歷史學校最好的成就是為實際工作者提供方法論。在這方面，它提供了更多供哲學家思考的內容，因為它不從他們那裡借用任何東西。相反，新實證主義作品的優勢源於其不斷關注將歷史解釋與被假定定義科學知識的模型進行對比，以及這一項目的深層統一性及其成就。在這個意義上，這些作品更多地源於認識論而非方法論。但其力量往往也是其弱點，因為歷史學家的實際實踐在他們對解釋模型的討論中缺失。不幸的是，邏輯實證主義的對手也存在這一缺陷。正如我們稍後在審視「敘事主義」論點時將看到的，實證主義和反實證主義認識論從歷史學家那裡借用的例子很少達到當今歷史學科所取得的複雜程度。

As heterogeneous as these two currents of thought may be, they have at least in common, besides their denial of the philosophy of history (which does not concern us here), their denial of the narrative character of history as it is written today.
儘管這兩股思想流派可能如此異質，但除了否定歷史哲學（這裡不用關心）外，它們至少有一個共同點，那就是否定當今史學寫作的敘事性質。

This convergence in outcome is all the more striking in that the arguments are so different. For French historiography, the eclipse of narrative proceeds principally from a displacement of the object of history, which is no longer the active individual but the total social fact. For positivism, the eclipse of narrative proceeds instead from the epistemological break between historical explanation and our narrative understanding.
這種結果的匯聚更顯得引人注目，因為論點如此不同。對於法國史學，敘事的消逝主要源於歷史研究對象的位移，不再是主動的個人，而是總體社會事實。對於實證主義而言，敘事的消逝源於歷史解釋與我們敘事理解之間的認識論斷裂。

In this chapter I shall place the accent on the convergence of these two attacks, taking as my guideline the destiny of both what counts as an event and the historical time-span in each perspective.
在本章中，我將著重於這兩種攻擊的匯聚，以事件及其各自視角下的歷史時間範圍的命運作為指導。

The Eclipse of the Event in French Historiography
法國史學中事件的消逝

My choice of the concept of an event as a touchstone for my discussion is particularly appropriate for an examination of the contribution of French historiography to the theory of history, inasmuch as the criticism of the history of events [l’histoire événementielle] has its well-known place there and because this criticism is taken as equivalent to the rejection of the category “narrative.”

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我選擇事件的概念作為我討論的基石，特別適合於檢視法國史學對歷史理論的貢獻，因為對事件史[l'histoire événementielle]的批評在那裡是眾所周知的，並且這種批評被視為等同於拒絕「敘事」這一範疇。

Prior to reflection, the concept of a historical event shares the misleading assumptions of most common-sense notions. It implies two series of assertions which are not criticized: ontological ones and epistemological ones, the latter being built on the former.
在反思之前，歷史事件的概念與大多數常識性概念一樣存在誤導性的假設。它暗示了兩類未經批判的斷言：本體論的斷言和認識論的斷言，後者建立在前者之上。

In an ontological sense, we mean by historical event what actually happened in the past. This assertion itself has several aspects. First, we admit that the property of having already occurred differs radically from that of not yet having occurred. In this sense, the pastness of what has happened is taken as an absolute property, independent of our constructions and reconstructions. This first feature is common to physical events and to historical ones. A second feature delimits the field of the historical event. Of all the things that have happened, certain ones are the work of agents similar to ourselves. Historical events therefore are what these active beings make happen or undergo. The ordinary definition of history as knowledge of the actions of past human beings proceeds from this restricting of our interest to the sphere of events assignable to human agents. A third feature results from a delimitation within the practical field of the sphere of possible communication. To the notion of the human past is added, as a constitutive obstacle, the idea of an otherness or an absolute difference affecting our capacity for communication. It seems as though one implication of our competence to seek understanding and agreement, wherein Habermas sees the norm of a universal pragmatics, is that our competence to communicate encounters the strangeness of strangers as a challenge and an obstacle, and that we can hope to understand them only at the price of recognizing their irreducible otherness.
在本體論意義上，我們所謂的歷史事件是指過去實際發生的事情。這個斷言本身有幾個方面。首先，我們承認已經發生的性質與尚未發生的性質有根本的不同。在這個意義上，已發生之事的過去性被視為一種絕對屬性，獨立於我們的建構和重建。這第一個特徵對於物理事件和歷史事件都是共通的。第二個特徵界定了歷史事件的範圍。在所有發生的事情中，某些是由類似我們的行動者所作所為。因此，歷史事件是這些主動的存在者使其發生或經歷的事情。將歷史定義為對過去人類行動的認識，源於我們將興趣限定在可歸因於人類行動者的事件領域。第三個特徵源於在實踐領域中可能溝通的範圍內的劃分。在人類過去的概念中，作為一個構成性障礙，增加了對我們溝通能力造成絕對差異或絕對異質性的想法。似乎我們尋求理解和協議的能力的一個含義（哈貝馬斯在其中看到普遍語用學的規範）是，我們溝通的能力遇到陌生人的陌生性作為一種挑戰和障礙，我們只有通過認識他們不可化約的他性，才能希望理解他們。

To this threefold ontological presupposition-absolute having been, abso-
對於這三重本體論預設——絕對的已然、
lutely past human action, and absolute otherness-corresponds a threefold epistemological one. First, we oppose the unrepeatable singularity of a physical or a human event to the universality of a law. Whether it be a question of statistical frequency, causal connection, or functional relation, an event is what happens only once. Next, we oppose practical contingency to logical or physical necessity. An event is what could have been done differently. Finally, otherness has its epistemological counterpart in the notion of the gap between an event and any constructed model or any invariant.
絕對過去的人類行動和絕對他性—對應著一個三重的認識論問題。首先，我們將物理或人類事件的不可重複的獨特性，與法則的普遍性相對。無論是統計頻率、因果關係，還是功能關係，一個事件都是只發生一次的。接著，我們將實踐的偶然性與邏輯或物理必然性相對。一個事件是可以被不同方式處理的。最後，他性在認識論上的對應是事件與任何構建的模型或不變量之間的差距概念。

Broadly speaking, these are the tacit presuppositions of our uncritical use of the notion of a historical event. At the beginning of our investigation we do not know what stems from prejudice, what from philosophical or theological sedimentation, what from universally normative constraints. Sifting it all out can be accomplished only through criticism brought about by actual historical investigations. In the following pages I shall appraise French historiography in light of its contribution to this criticism of our presuppositions concerning events.
廣義地說，這些是我們對歷史事件概念未經批判性使用的隱含前提。在我們調查的開始，我們不知道什麼源於偏見，什麼源於哲學或神學沉澱，什麼源於普遍的規範性約束。只有通過實際的歷史研究所帶來的批判，才能篩選出這一切。在接下來的篇幅中，我將根據法國史學對批判我們關於事件的前提的貢獻來評估它。

I shall refer only briefly to Raymond Aron’s key work, Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectivity (1938),

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which appeared shortly before Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch founded Annales d’histoire économique et sociale in 1939, which after 1945 became Annales. Economiques, Sociétés, Civilisations. I shall return to Aron’s work below in my discussion of the dialectic between explanation and understanding. Still, this book is worth mentioning here for having greatly contributed to dissolving the first presupposition of common sense, that of the absolute character of events, events as what really happened. In setting out the limits of historical objectivity, Aron was led to proclaim what he called the “dissolution of the object” (p. 118). This famous thesis unfortunately gave rise to more than one misunderstanding. It was aimed more at the reigning positivism under the aegis of Langlois and Seignobos than at any ontological thesis.

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It meant no more than this: to the extent that historians are implicated in the understanding and explanation of past events, an absolute event cannot be attested to by historical discourse. Understanding-even the understanding of another person in everyday life-is never a direct intuition but always a reconstruction. Understanding is always more than simple empathy. In short, no “such thing as a historical reality exists ready made, so that science merely has to reproduce it faithfully” (p. 118). “Jean sans Terre was there” is a historical fact only in virtue of a whole bundle of intentions, motives, and values that incorporate this statement into some intelligible whole. Consequently, diverse reconstructions only accentuate the break separating the objectivity claimed by the work of understanding from lived nonrepeatable experience. If this “dissolution of the object” is already accomplished by the most humble forms of understanding, the disappearance of the object is even more complete on the level of causal thinking, to use the vocabulary Aron
我只簡要提及雷蒙·阿隆的關鍵著作《歷史哲學導論：關於歷史客觀性限度的隨筆》（1938 年），這本書在盧西安·弗弗爾和馬克·布洛克於 1939 年創立《經濟與社會史年鑑》之前不久就已出版，該雜誌 1945 年後改名為《經濟、社會、文明年鑑》。我將在下文討論解釋與理解的辯證關係時再次回到阿隆的著作。儘管如此，這本書值得在此提及，因為它極大地有助於消解常識的第一個前提，即事件的絕對性特徵，即真實發生的事件。在闡明歷史客觀性的限度時，阿隆被引導宣告他所謂的「對象消解」（第 118 頁）。不幸的是，這個著名的論點引起了不止一種誤解。它更多是針對朗格卓伊斯和塞尼奧波斯主導的實證主義，而非任何本體論命題。這意味著：在歷史學家參與理解和解釋過去事件的程度上，歷史論述無法證明絕對事件的存在。理解——即便是日常生活中對他人的理解——從來不是直接的直覺，而總是一種重建。理解永遠不僅僅是簡單的同理心。簡而言之，不存在「已經現成的歷史現實，科學只需忠實地重現它」（第 118 頁）。「無地王約翰曾在那裡」只有在一整套意圖、動機和價值將這個陳述納入某種可理解的整體時，才成為歷史事實。因此，不同的重建只會加劇分隔理解工作所聲稱的客觀性與不可重複的 lived 經驗之間的斷裂。如果這種「物體的溶解」已經由最卑微的理解形式完成，那麼在阿隆當時使用的詞彙中，物體的消失在因果思考層面上就更加徹底
employed at the time of this work. We shall come back to this point in chapter 6. For Aron, as for Max Weber, historical causality is a relation of one particular to another particular, through the medium of retrospective probability. On the scale of probabilities, the lowest degree defines what is accidental, the highest degree defines what Weber calls adequation. Just as such adequation differs from logical or physical necessity, the accidental is no longer equivalent to absolute singularity. “As for the probability born of the partial character of historical analyses and causal relations, it exists in our minds, not in things” (p. 165). In this respect, historical appraisal of probability differs from the logic of the scientist and is closer to that of the judge. For Aron, the philosophical stake in all this was the destruction of every retrospective illusion of fatality and the opening of the theory of history to the spontaneity of action oriented toward the future.
我們將在第 6 章回到這一點。對於阿隆和馬克斯·韋伯來說，歷史因果性是通過回溯性或然率的媒介，連結一個特定事件與另一個特定事件的關係。在或然率的尺度上，最低程度定義了偶然性，最高程度定義了韋伯所說的適當性。正如這種適當性不同於邏輯或物理必然性，偶然性也不再等同於絕對的特殊性。"至於源於歷史分析和因果關係的部分性的或然率，它存在於我們的思維中，而非事物本身"（第 165 頁）。在這方面，歷史對或然率的評估不同於科學家的邏輯，更接近於法官的邏輯。對阿隆來說，其中的哲學賭注在於破壞每一種回溯性的必然性幻想，並向面向未來的行動自發性開放歷史理論。

For our present investigation, the clear result of Aron’s book is that the past, conceived of as the sum of what has actually happened, is out of reach of the historian.
對於我們目前的研究來說，阿隆著作的明確結果是，作為已發生事件總和的過去，對於歷史學家來說是遙不可及的。

We find an argument similar to Aron’s in H. I. Marrou’s The Meaning of History (first published in 1954).

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There the practice of historians is even more evident. I shall set aside here one problem to which I shall return in volume 2, namely, the connection between understanding another person and knowing the human past.

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我們在 H. I. 馬魯的《歷史的意義》（首次出版於 1954 年）中找到了類似阿隆的論點。

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在那裡，歷史學家的實踐更為明顯。我在此擱置一個問題，稍後在第 2 卷中再詳細討論，即理解他人與認知人類過去之間的聯繫。

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The continuity between mortal time and public time, referred to at the end of Part I, is directly implied in this. Here I shall only retain the major methodological implications of this recourse to our understanding of others that link up with Aron’s axiom concerning the dissolution of the object.
在第一部分結尾提到的凡人時間和公共時間之間的連續性，在此直接暗示。在此，我僅保留與阿隆關於對象消解有關的理解他人的主要方法學意義。

First, historical knowledge, resting on the the testimony of others, is “not a science properly speaking, but only a knowedge by faith” (Marrou, p. 152). Understanding envelops the whoie work of the historian inasmuch as history “is a spiritual adventure wherein the historian’s personality is brought into play. History is thus endowed, for the historian, with an existential value, and from this existential value it receives its importance, its meaning and its value” (p. 204). And, Marrou adds, “this conception forms the very heart of our critical philosophy, and the focal point around which all else takes on order and clarity” (ibid.). Understanding is thereby incorporated into “The Truth of History” - the title of Marrou’s chapter 9; that is, into the truth that history is capable of. Understanding is not the subjective side and explanation the objective one. Subjectivity is not a prison and objectivity is not our liberation from this prison. Far from conflicting, subjectivity and objectivity reinforce each other. “Indeed once history is true, its truth is double, for it is composed of truth both about the past and about the testimony offered by the historian” (p. 238).
首先，基於他人證詞的歷史知識，"不是嚴格意義上的科學，而只是一種信仰知識"（馬魯，第 152 頁）。理解包含歷史學家的整個工作，因為歷史"是一場精神冒險，其中歷史學家的個性被帶入其中。因此，對於歷史學家來說，歷史具有存在價值，並從這種存在價值中獲得其重要性、意義和價值"（第 204 頁）。馬魯還補充說，"這種觀念構成了我們批判哲學的核心，也是所有其他事物圍繞著秩序和清晰度聚集的焦點"（同上）。理解因此被納入"歷史的真相" - 馬魯第 9 章的標題；即歷史所能達到的真相。理解不是主觀方面，解釋不是客觀方面。主觀性不是監獄，客觀性也不是我們從這個監獄中解放出來。主觀性和客觀性非但不衝突，反而相互加強。"事實上，一旦歷史是真實的，其真相是雙重的，因為它由關於過去的真相和歷史學家提供的證詞的真相組成"（第 238 頁）。

If historians are implicated in historical knowing, they cannot propose the
如果歷史學家參與歷史知識，他們就不能提議
impossible task for themselves of re-actualizing the past.

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It is impossible for two reasons. First, history is a form of knowledge only through the relation it establishes between the lived experience of people of other times and today’s historian. The set of procedures used in history is part of the equation for historical knowing. The result of this is that humanity’s lived past can only be postulated, like the Kantian noumena at the origin of all empirical phenomena. Further, if this lived past were accessible to us, it would not be so as an object of knowledge. For, when it was present, this past was like our present, confused, multiform, and unintelligible. Instead, history aims at knowledge, an organized vision, established upon chains of causal or teleological relations, on the basis of meanings and values. In essence, Marrou here links up with Aron, at the precise moment when Aron announces the dissolution of the object, in the sense we spoke of above.

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對於他們來說，重新實現過去是一項不可能的任務。這是不可能的，原因有二。首先，歷史是一種僅通過它與其他時代人們的生活經驗和今天的歷史學家之間建立的關係而成為知識的形式。歷史中使用的一系列程序是歷史認知方程式的一部分。其結果是，人類的已過生活只能被假設，就像康德主義的本體論是所有經驗現象的起源。此外，即使這個已過生活可以被我們觸及，它也不會作為一個知識的對象。因為當它存在時，這個過去就像我們的現在一樣，混亂、多形態且難以理解。相反，歷史旨在獲得知識，建立在因果關係或目的論關係的基礎上，基於意義和價值。本質上，馬魯在此與阿龍相呼應，正是在阿龍宣佈對象消解的那一刻。

The same argument that forbids us to conceive of history as reminiscence also condemns the positivism that the new French historiography takes as its bête noire. If history is the relationship of the historian to the past, we cannot treat the historian as some perturbing factor added to the past that must be eliminated. This methodological argument, we see, exactly repeats the argument drawn from understanding. If hypercriticism attaches more value to suspicion than to empathy, its moral tenor is quite in accord with the methodological illusion that the historical fact exists in some latent state in the documents and that the historian is a parasite on the historical equation. Against this methodological illusion it has to be affirmed that the initiative in history does not belong to the document (see ibid., chapter 3) but to the question posed by the historian. This question takes logical priority in historical inquiry.
禁止我們將歷史視為回憶的同一論點，也譴責了新法國史學以其難以對付的對象為特徵的實證主義。如果歷史是歷史學家與過去的關係，我們就不能將歷史學家視為必須被消除的加諸於過去的干擾因素。我們看到，這種方法論論點完全重複了理解所得出的論點。如果超批判主義更重視懷疑而非同理心，那麼其道德基調與歷史事實以某種潛在狀態存在於文獻中且歷史學家是歷史方程式的寄生蟲這種方法論幻想是非常一致的。針對這種方法論幻想，必須肯定歷史中的主動性並不屬於文獻（參見同上，第 3 章），而屬於歷史學家提出的問題。這個問題在歷史探究中具有邏輯優先性。

In this way Marrou’s work reinforces Aron’s in its battle against the prejudice about the past in-itself. At the same time, it assures a connection with the antipositivist orientation of the Annales school.
透過這種方式，馬魯的著作在對抗關於過去本身的偏見方面強化了阿隆的觀點。同時，它確保了與年鑑學派反實證主義取向的聯繫。

The contribution of the Annales school to our problem differs greatly from that of Aron, the philosopher, and even from that of Marrou, the philosopherhistorian, marked as they both are by the German problem of Verstehen. With this school, we have to deal with the methodology of professional historians, who for the most part are not concerned about the problem of “understanding.”

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The most theoretical essays by the historians of this school are treatises by artisans reflecting on their craft.
年鑑學派對我們這個問題的貢獻，與阿隆這位哲學家，甚至與馬魯這位哲學史家的貢獻大不相同，他們都受到德國「理解」問題的影響。對於這個學派，我們必須處理專業歷史學家的方法論，他們大多數並不關心「理解」的問題。這個學派歷史學家最具理論性的論文，是工匠反思其工藝的論述。

Their tone was set by Marc Bloch in The Historian’s Craft, a work written far from any library and interrupted two-thirds of the way through by a Nazi firing squad in

1942 .^{10}

This unfinished book means to be “the memorandum of a craftsman who has always liked to reflect over his daily task, the notebook of a journeyman who has long handled the ruler and the level, without imagin-
他們的基調由馬克·布洛克在《歷史學家的工藝》中設定，這是一部在遠離任何圖書館的地方撰寫，並被納粹槍決小隊在

1942 .^{10}

途中中斷的作品。這本未完成的書旨在成為"一位一直喜歡反思日常工作的工匠的備忘錄，一位長期使用直尺和水平儀的熟練工人的筆記本"，不曾想
ing himself to be a mathematician” (p. 19). Its hesitations, audacities, and prudences are still valuable today. This is all the more true in that it chooses to accentuate the “unresolvable” aspects of historiography."
"自稱為數學家"（第 19 頁）。其猶豫、大膽和審慎至今仍然很有價值。更重要的是，它選擇強調史學中的「無法解決的」方面。

Of course, narratives only constitute the class of “voluntary witnesses,” whose sway over history needs to be limited with the help of those “witnesses in spite of themselves” which are all the other tracks familiar to the archaeologist and the economic or social historian. But this endless enlarging of documentary sources does not mean that the notion of a witness does not encompass that of a document or does not remain the model for every observation of “tracks” (p. 64). The result is that “criticism” will essentially, if not exclusively, be a criticism of testimony, that is, a test of its veracity, a search for imposture, whether it be misleading information about an author or a date (misinformation in the juridical sense) or more fundamental deception (plagiarism, sheer invention, reshuffling the facts, or the hawking of prejudices and rumors). This considerable place given to criticism of testimony, at the expense of questions about causes or laws, which at this same time occupied English-language epistemology, is due essentially to the specifying of the notion of a track by the psychic character of historical phenomena.

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Social conditions are, “in their underlying nature, mental” (p. 194). The result is that criticism of testimony, “since it deals with psychic realities, will always remain a subtle art. . . . However, it is also a rational art, which depends on methodical use of certain basic mental processes” (p. 110). The prudences, perhaps the timidities, of this work are the counterpart of this submission of the notion of a document to that of testimony. In fact, even the subsection entitled “Toward a Logic of the Critical Method” (pp. 110-39) remains a prisoner of a psycho-sociological analysis of testimony, albeit a refined one. Even though this rational art compares testimonies, looking for mutual contradictions, and weighs the reasons for lies, it still remains the heir of the erudite methods forged by Richard Simon, the Bollandists, and the Benedictines. Not that Bloch did not glimpse, and in this sense anticipate, the role of statistical criticism, but he did not see that the logic of probability, treated twenty years earlier by Max Weber and then taken up again by Raymond Aron, no longer stemmed from the criticism of testimony but from the problem of causality in history.

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To use it just to disclose and explain the imperfections of testimony is inevitably to limit its import.

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當然，敘事只構成「自願證人」的類別，其對歷史的影響需要借助那些「不情願的證人」的幫助，這些證人是考古學家和經濟或社會史學家熟悉的所有其他軌跡。但是這種文獻來源的無盡擴大並不意味著證人的概念不包含文件的概念，或不再成為每個「軌跡」觀察的模型（第 64 頁）。結果是「批評」本質上（如果不是完全地）將成為對證詞的批評，即對其真實性的檢驗，對造假的搜尋，無論是關於作者或日期的誤導性信息（法律意義上的虛假信息），還是更根本的欺騙（抄襲、純粹的虛構、重組事實，或散佈偏見和謠言）。這種對證詞批評的巨大關注，犧牲了對原因或法則的問題，這在同一時期佔據了英語語系的認識論，主要是由於通過歷史現象的心理特徵來指定軌跡的概念。社會條件在其「潛在本質上是心理的」（第 194 頁）。結果是對證詞的批評，「因為它涉及心理現實，將永遠是一門微妙的藝術……然而，它也是一種理性的藝術，取決於某些基本心理過程的有方法的使用」（第 110 頁）。這部作品的審慎，甚至可能是膽怯，是將文件概念服從於證詞概念的對應物。事實上，即使是標題為「邁向批判方法邏輯」的小節（第 110-39 頁），仍然囚禁在對證詞的心理社會學分析中，儘管是一種精緻的分析。儘管這種理性的藝術比較證詞，尋找相互矛盾之處，並權衡謊言的原因，但它仍然是理查德·西蒙、波蘭丁會士和本篤會士所鍛造的博學方法的繼承者。並非布洛克未曾瞥見，並在這個意義上預示統計批評的角色，但他未看到機率邏輯（二十年前由馬克斯·韋伯討論，後來由雷蒙·阿隆再次提及）不再源於對證詞的批評，而是源於歷史中的因果問題。

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僅僅用它來揭示和解釋證詞的缺陷，不可避免地會限制其意義。

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The real breakthrough brought about by The Historian’s Craft is rather to be found in the remarks devoted to “historical analysis”-the title of chapter 4. Mare Bloch grasped perfectly that historical explanation essentially consists in the constituting of chains of similar phenomena and in establishing their interactions. This primacy of analysis over synthesis allowed him to set in place-under the cover of a quotation from Focillon, the author of the admirable Vie des Formes

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-the phenomenon of the discrepancy between the political, economic, and artistic aspects thereby distinguished within the over-
《歷史學家的工藝》帶來的真正突破更應該在第 4 章標題為"歷史分析"的評論中找到。馬克·布洛克完全把握住歷史解釋本質上在於建立相似現象的鏈條並建立它們的相互作用。這種分析優先於綜合的原則，使他得以在福西永的引用下——此人是《形式的生命》一書的作者——設置政治、經濟和藝術方面之間差異的現象，這些方面在整體歷史現象中被區分出來，我們將在下文中與喬治·杜比一起再次討論這一點。

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all historical phenomenon, to which we shall return below with George Duby.

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Above all, it gave him the occasion for a remarkable discussion of the problem of nomenclature (see pp. 156-89).
尤其是，它為術語問題提供了一個卓越的討論的機會（參見第 156-189 頁）。

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This problem is clearly bound up with that of classifying facts. However, it poses the specific problem of the propriety of our language. Ought we to name past entities with the terms already used by the documents to designate them, at the risk of forgetting that “the vocabulary of documents is, in its way, only another form of evidence. . . . hence subject to criticism” (p. 168)? Or ought we to project modern terms on them, at the risk of missing, through anachronism, the specificity of past phenomena and of arrogantly eternalizing our own categories? As can be seen, the dialectic of the similar and the dissimilar governs historical analysis as it does historical criticism.
這個問題明顯與事實分類問題密切相關。然而，它提出了我們語言適當性的特定問題。我們是否應該使用檔案中已經使用的術語來命名過去的實體，冒著遺忘「檔案的詞彙本身只是另一種形式的證據……因此需要批判」（第 168 頁）的風險？還是應該在其上投射現代術語，冒著通過時代錯誤而錯過過去現象的特殊性，並自大地永恆化我們自己的範疇的風險？可以看出，相似與不相似的辯證法支配著歷史分析，就像支配歷史批評一樣。

These insightful views make all the more regrettable the violent interruption of this work at the moment when it was beginning to discuss the formidable problem of causal relations in history. The final sentence is all the more precious in that it is left unfinished: “In a word, in history, as elsewhere, the causes cannot be assumed. They are to be looked for . . .” (p. 197).
這些富有洞察力的觀點使得在即將討論歷史中因果關係這個可怕問題的時刻被暴力中斷顯得更加遺憾。最後一句話因為未完成而顯得更加珍貴："總之，在歷史中，如同其他領域一樣，因果不能被假設。它們是需要被尋找的……"（第 197 頁）。

The real manifesto of the Annales school has to be Fernand Braudel’s chief work, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.

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年鑑學派的真正宣言必須是費爾南·布勞代爾的主要著作，《地中海和地中海世界──腓力二世時代》。

For the sake of didactic clarity, I shall concentrate upon what in Braudel’s essays and in those by historians of his school goes directly against the second of our initial presuppositions, namely, that events are what active agents make happen, and, that as a consequence, events share in the contingency proper to action. The model of action implied by the very notion of “making events happen” (along with its corollary of “undergoing them”) is what is called into question. Action, according to this implicit model, can always be attributed to some individual agents, authors, or victims of events. Even if we include the concept of interaction in that of action, we never escape the assumption that the author of an action must always be an identifiable agent.
為了教學上的清晰，我將集中討論布勞代爾的論文和該學派歷史學家的論文中，直接違背我們最初假設的第二個前提，即事件是積極行動者造成的，因此事件具有行動固有的偶然性。「造成事件發生」（及其附帶的「遭受事件」）這一概念所隱含的行動模式正在受到質疑。根據這個隱含模式，行動總是可以歸因於某些個人行動者、事件的作者或受害者。即使我們在行動概念中包含互動的概念，我們也從未擺脫這樣的假設：行動的作者必須始終是一個可識別的行動者。

This tacit assumption that events are what individuals make happen or undergo is overthrown by Braudel along with two other assumptions which are closely connected with each other-and which undergo the direct fire of Braudel’s and his successors’ criticism. They are that the individual is the ultimate bearer of historical change and that the most significant changes are pointlike ones, those in fact that affect individual lives due to their brevity and their suddenness. In fact, Braudel reserves the title “event” just for such changes.
布勞岱爾顛覆了這種對事件是由個人製造或經歷的默認假設，以及與之密切相關的兩個其他假設，這些假設直接遭到布勞岱爾及其後繼者的批評。它們是：個人是歷史變遷的最終承載者，以及最重要的變化是點狀的，那些由於其短暫性和突然性而影響個人生活的變化。事實上，布勞岱爾僅保留"事件"這一稱號給這類變化。

These two explicit corollaries entail a third one which is never discussed by itself, namely that a history of events, a histoire événementielle, can only be a narrative history. Political history, a history of events, and narrative history are taken consequently as almost synonymous expressions. Most surprising,
這兩個明確的推論引申出第三個從未被單獨討論的推論，即事件史（histoire événementielle）只能是敘事史。因此，政治史、事件史和敘事史被視為幾乎同義的表達。
for us who are inquiring precisely into the narrative status of history, this notion of narrative is never interrogated for itself, as the notions of primacy of political history and of events are. These historians are content to disown narrative history à la Ranke with a single sentence. (We have seen how narrative for Marc Bloch is one part of voluntary testimony, therefore a document.) Nor does it ever occur to Lucien Febvre, the co-founder of the Annales school with Marc Bloch, that his vehement criticism of the notion of a historical fact, conceived of as an atom of history completely given by the sources, and his plea for a historical reality constructed by the historian, fundamentally bring together historical reality, so created by history, and narrative fiction, created by the narrator.

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The criticism of narrative history, therefore, is done only by way of the criticism of political history, which emphasizes individuals and events. Only these two primary assumptions are attacked head-on.
對於我們正在精確探究歷史的敘事地位的人來說，這種敘事概念從未被自身獨立地質疑，就像政治史和事件的優先性概念一樣。這些歷史學家只是用一句話否定蘭克式的敘事史。（我們已經看到，對馬克·布洛克來說，敘事是自願證詞的一部分，因此是一份文件。）魯西安·費夫爾，作為與馬克·布洛克共同創立年鑑學派的人，從未意識到他對被視為完全由史料給定的歷史事實原子的強烈批評，以及他對由歷史學家建構的歷史現實的辯護，從根本上將由歷史創造的歷史現實與由敘事者創造的敘事虛構聯繫在一起。因此，對敘事史的批評只是通過批評強調個人和事件的政治史來進行。僅這兩個基本假設受到直接攻擊。

To methodological individualism in the social sciences, the new historians oppose the thesis that the object of history is not the individual but the “total social fact” (a term borrowed from Marcel Mauss) in every one of its human dimensions-economic, social, political, cultural, religious, etc. To the notion of an event as a temporal leap, they oppose that of a social time whose major categories-conjuncture, structure, trend, cycle, growth, crisis, etc.are borrowed from economics, demography, and sociology.
對於社會科學中的方法論個人主義，新歷史學家反對的是歷史的對象不是個人，而是每一個人類維度中的「總體社會事實」（借用馬塞爾·毛斯的術語）—經濟的、社會的、政治的、文化的、宗教的等。對於事件作為時間的飛躍的概念，他們提出社會時間的概念，其主要類別—景況、結構、趨勢、週期、增長、危機等—借鑒於經濟學、人口學和社會學。

The important thing to grasp is the connection between these two types of contestation, one directed against the primacy of the individual as the ultimate atom of historical investigation, and the other against the primacy of events, in the pointlike sense of this word, as the ultimate atom of social change.
重要的是要把握這兩種質疑之間的聯繫，一種是針對個人作為歷史研究的最終原子的優先地位，另一種是針對事件作為社會變遷的最終原子的優先地位。

These two rejections do not result from any speculation about action and time. Instead they are the direct consequence of the displacment of the principal axis of historical investigation from political history toward social history. Political history, including military, diplomatic, and ecclesiastical history, is where individuals-heads of state, generals, ministers, diplomats, prelatesare supposed to make history. It is also the realm where events go off like explosions. The “history of battles” and the “history of events” (to use an expression of Paul Lacombe’s taken up by François Simiand and Henri Berr) go hand in hand.

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The primacy of the individual and of the pointlike event are the two necessary corollaries of the preeminence of political history.
這兩種拒絕並非源於對行動和時間的任何推測。相反，它們是歷史研究主要軸心從政治史轉向社會史的直接後果。政治史，包括軍事、外交和教會史，是個人—國家元首、將軍、部長、外交官、教士—被認為是創造歷史的地方。這也是事件如爆炸般發生的領域。「戰爭史」和「事件史」（使用保羅·拉孔布的表達，被弗朗索瓦·西米安和亨利·貝爾採用）是攜手並進的。個人和點狀事件的優先地位是政治史卓越地位的兩個必然推論。

It is noteworthy that this criticism of the history of events in no way results from philosophical criticism of a conception, itself philosophical, of history in the Hegelian tradition. It results instead from a methodological fight against the positivist tradition that prevailed in historical studies in France during the first third of our century. For this tradition, major events are already deposited in archives, which themselves moreover are already instituted and constituted as a result of the vicissitudes and accidents affecting the distribution of power. This is why the twofold denunciation of the history of battles and that of events constitutes the polemical side of a plea for a history of the total human
值得注意的是，這種對事件歷史的批評，絕不是源於對黑格爾傳統中歷史觀念的哲學批評。相反，它源於對 20 世紀前三分之一時期在法國歷史研究中佔主導地位的實證主義傳統的方法論鬥爭。對於這一傳統而言，重大事件已經存檔，而這些檔案本身也是由影響權力分配的變遷和意外事件所形成的。這就是為什麼對戰爭史和事件史的雙重譴責，構成了為全面人類現象史的辯護，並始終強調其經濟和社會條件。
phenomenon, always with a strong emphasis on its economic and social conditions. In this regard, the most conspicuous and no doubt the most numerous works of this historical school are devoted to social history, in which groups, social categories and classes, cities and the country, the bourgeois, artisans, peasants, and workers become the collective heroes of history. For Braudel, history even becomes a geohistory whose hero is the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world, until this is succeeded, for Huguette and Pierre Chaunu, by the Atlantic between Seville and the New World.

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在這方面，這個歷史學派最顯著且可能是最多的作品致力於社會史，在其中，群體、社會階層和階級、城市和鄉村、資產階級、工匠、農民和工人成為歷史的集體英雄。對於布勞岱爾來說，歷史甚至成為一種地理歷史，其英雄是地中海及地中海世界，直到後來被上埃夫雷和皮埃爾·肖努的大西洋取代，連接塞維利亞和新世界。

The concept of a long time-span [la longue durée], opposed to the concept of event taken in the sense of a short time-span, was born in this critical context. In his Preface to The Mediterranean, then in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1950, and again in his Annales article on “The Longue Durée,” Braudel never stops driving home the same point. The most superficial history is history concerned with the dimension of individuals. The history of events is the history of short, sharp, and nervous vibrations. It is richest in humanity but also most dangerous. Under this history and its individual time unfolds “a history of gentle rhythms” (On History, p. 3) with its “long time span” (pp. 25ff.). This is social history, the history of groups and of deep-lying trends. It is the economist who teaches the historian about this long time-span, but it is also the time of political institutions and of mentalités. Finally, even deeper, reigns “a history that is almost changeless, the history of man in relation to his surroundings” (p. 3). With this history, we must speak of a “geographical time” (p. 4).
長時間跨度（la longue durée）的概念，與短時間跨度的事件概念相對，正是在這種批判性背景下誕生的。在他的《地中海》前言中，然後在 1950 年在法國高等師範學院的就職演講中，以及在他的《年鑑》雜誌上的〈長時間跨度〉一文中，布勞代爾始終不斷強調同一個觀點。最表層的歷史是關注個人維度的歷史。事件史是短暫、尖銳和緊張的振盪史。它在人性方面最為豐富，但也最為危險。在這種歷史及其個人時間之下，展開了「溫和節奏的歷史」（《論歷史》，第 3 頁），其中有「長時間跨度」（第 25 頁及以下）。這是社會史，是群體和深層趨勢的歷史。經濟學家教導歷史學家關於這種長時間跨度，但也是政治制度和心態的時間。最後，更深層次的是「幾乎不變的歷史，人與其環境的關係史」（第 3 頁）。面對這種歷史，我們必須談論「地理時間」（第 4 頁）。

This series of time-spans is one of the more noteworthy contributions of French historiography to the epistemology of history-given the lack of a more subtle discussion of the ideas of causes and laws.
這一系列時間跨度是法國史學對歷史認識論的更為顯著的貢獻，特別是考慮到對因果和規律概念缺乏更微妙的討論。

The idea that the individual and the event are to be simultaneously surpassed is the strong point of this school. For Braudel, the plea for history becomes a plea for “anonymous history, working in the depths, and most often in silence” (p.10), and thereby for social time that “goes at a thousand different paces, swift or slow” (p. 12). It is a plea and a credo: “Thus I believe in the reality of a particularly slow-paced history of civilizations” (ibid.). Still, it is the historian’s profession, not philosophical reflection, affirms Braudel, in “History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée,” that suggests the “living, intimate, infinitely repeated opposition,” close to the heart of social reality, “between the instant of time and that time which flows only slowly” (p. 26). Awareness of this plurality of social times must become a component of the common methodology of all the human sciences. Pushing this axiom close to the point of becoming a paradox, Braudel goes so far as to say, “Social science has almost what amounts to a horror of the event. And not without some justification, for the short time span is the most capricious and the most delusive of all” (p. 28).
對於布勞德爾來說，個人和事件同時被超越的觀念是這所學校的強項。布勞德爾為歷史辯護，實際上是為「匿名的歷史，在深處工作，且大多時候保持沉默」(第 10 頁)辯護，並為社會時間辯護，社會時間「以千種不同的步調前進，快或慢」(第 12 頁)。這是一個懇求和信仰：「因此，我相信文明緩慢發展的歷史的真實性」(同上)。然而，布勞德爾在《歷史與社會科學：長期持續》中斷言，是歷史學家的職業，而不是哲學反思，提出了社會現實核心的「時間瞬間與緩慢流動的時間之間活生生、親密、無限重複的對立」(第 26 頁)。對這種社會時間多樣性的意識必須成為所有人文科學共同方法論的組成部分。將這個公理推向近乎悖論的程度，布勞德爾甚至說，「社會科學幾乎對事件有一種恐懼。這並非毫無道理，因為短時間跨度是最善變和最具欺騙性的」(第 28 頁)。

A reader interested in epistemology may be surprised by the lack of rigor in
對於對認識論感興趣的讀者來說，可能會對描述時間多樣性的表達缺乏嚴謹性感到驚訝。
the expressions that characterize the plurality of temporalities. For example, Braudel not only speaks of short time and long time, that is, of quantitative differences, but also of rapid and slow time. Absolutely speaking, speed does not apply to intervals of time but to movements traversing them.
例如，布勞德爾不僅談論短時間和長時間，即量化的差異，還談論快速和緩慢的時間。嚴格來說，速度並不適用於時間間隔，而是適用於穿越它們的運動。

And, in the final analysis, the question has to do with these movements. Several metaphors, induced by the image of speed or slowness, confirm this. We can begin with those that deprecate events, a synonym for short timespans. A “surface disturbance, the waves stirred up by the powerful movement of tides. A history of short, sharp, nervous vibrations” (p. 3). “We must beware of that history which still simmers with the passions of the contemporaries who felt it, described it, lived it, to the rhythm of their brief lives, lives as brief as our own” (p. 4). “A world of vivid passions, certainly, but a blind world, as any living world must be, as ours is, oblivious of the deep currents of history, of those living waters on which our frail barks are tossed like Rimbaud’s drunken boat” (ibid.). A whole group of metaphors speak of the misleading character of the short time-span: sorcery, smoke, caprice, glimmers without clarity, the short term of our illusions, Ranke’s delusive fallacies. Others speak of its prating assumptions: “to react against a history arbitrarily reduced to the role of quintessential heroes,” “against Treitschke’s proud and unilateral declaration: ‘Men make history’” (p. 10). Traditional history, “the narrative history so dear to the heart of Ranke” offers us a “gleam but no illumination; facts but no humanity” (p. 11). Then there are the metaphors that speak of “the exceptional value of the long time span” (p. 27). Anonymous history, “working in the depths and most often in silence,” which makes human beings more than they make it (p. 10); “a ponderous history whose time cannot be measured by any of our long-established instruments” (p. 12); “that most silent but imperious history of civilizations” (p. 16).
而且，歸根結底，這個問題與這些運動有關。由速度或緩慢的意象所引發的幾個隱喻證實了這一點。我們可以從那些貶低事件的隱喻開始，這是短暫時間跨度的同義詞。「表面擾動，被潮汐強大運動攪動的波浪。一段短暫、尖銳、緊張的振動歷史」（第 3 頁）。「我們必須警惕那仍然充滿同時代人激情的歷史，那些感受、描述、生活它的人，以他們短暫生命的節奏，就像我們自己的生命一樣短暫」（第 4 頁）。「一個充滿生動激情的世界，當然，但是一個盲目的世界，正如任何生動的世界必定是的，就像我們的世界一樣，忽視歷史的深層洶湧，忽視那些我們如林波的醉船般搖晃的活水」（同上）。一整組隱喻談論短暫時間跨度的誤導性：巫術、煙霧、反覆無常、模糊不清的閃爍、我們幻想的短暫期限、蘭克的虛幻謬論。另一些隱喻談論其武斷的假設：「反對將歷史任意縮減為英雄的精髓角色」，「反對特雷契克驕傲而片面的宣言：『人創造歷史』」（第 10 頁）。傳統歷史，「蘭克如此鍾愛的敘事歷史」，為我們提供了「微光而非照明；事實而非人性」（第 11 頁）。然後是那些談論「長時間跨度的特殊價值」的隱喻（第 27 頁）。匿名的歷史，「在深處默默工作」，它塑造人類，而非人類塑造它（第 10 頁）；「一種無法用我們已建立的任何儀器測量的沉重歷史」（第 12 頁）；「那最寂靜卻又專制的文明史」（第 16 頁）。

What do these metaphors conceal? What do they reveal? First, a concern for veracity as much as for modesty, the admission that we do not make history, if by “we” we mean Hegel’s great world-historical figures. Hence a willingness to make visible and audible the pressure of a deep time which the clamorous drama of the short time-span has eclipsed and reduced to silence. If we now plumb this modesty, what do we find? Two contrary insights held in equilibrium.
這些隱喻隱藏了什麼？它們揭示了什麼？首先，是對真實性和審慎的關注，承認我們並不製造歷史，如果"我們"指的是黑格爾那些偉大的世界歷史人物。因此，願意使深層時間的壓力變得可見可聽，而這些壓力已被喧囂的短時段戲劇所遮蔽和化為沉默。如果我們現在深入探究這種謙遜，我們會發現什麼？兩種相反的洞察力保持著平衡。

On the one side, by means of the slowness, the weightiness, the silence of long-lasting time, history reaches an intelligibility that belongs only to the long time-span, a coherence that belongs only to durable equilibriums, in short, a kind of stability within change. “As realities of the inexhaustibly longue durée, civilizations, endlessly readapting themselves to their destiny, exceed in longevity any other collective reality; they outlive them all” (p. 210). In his discussion of civilizations, Braudel ends up designating them as “a reality that time makes poor use of and carries along very slowly.” Yes, “civilizations are realities of the extreme longue durée” (p. 209). Toynbee, in spite of everything that can be said against him, saw this perfectly. “He has
一方面，通過漫長、沉重、寂靜的時間，歷史達到了只屬於長時段的可理解性，一種只屬於持久平衡的連貫性，簡而言之，是變化中的一種穩定性。"作為無窮盡的長時段的現實，文明不斷適應自身的命運，在存活期上超越了任何其他集體現實；它們比所有其他現實壽命更長"（第 210 頁）。在討論文明時，布勞岱爾最終將它們描述為"時間運用不當且緩慢推進的現實"。是的，"文明是極其長時段的現實"（第 209 頁）。盡管有很多批評，湯因比卻完全看透了這一點。"他有
committed himself to ‘societies,’ to social realities, or at least to those social realities which persist forever. He has committed himself to events which continue to have violent repercussions whole centuries after they have occurred, or to men well above the general run of mankind, whether Jesus, Buddha, or Mahomet, men who are equally of the longue durée” (pp. 196-97). To the smoke of events is opposed the rock of endurance. Especially when time becomes inscribed in geography, when it is gathered up in the perenniality of landscapes. “A civilization is first of all a space, a ‘cultural area,’ . . . a locus” (p. 202). “The longue durée is the endless, inexhaustible history of structures and groups of structures” (p. 75). We might say that here Braudel reaches, by way of the notion of endurance, not so much what changes as what remains the same. The verb “to endure” says this better than does the substantive “endurance.” A discrete wisdom, opposed to the frenzy of events, can be discerned behind this respect for the extreme slowness of real changes.
他把自己獻身於「社會」、社會現實，或至少那些永遠存在的社會現實。他致力於那些即使在發生數百年後仍持續產生暴力影響的事件，或致力於遠高於普通人的偉人，無論是耶穌、佛陀或穆罕默德，這些人同樣屬於長期持續的範疇。對比事件的煙霧，是持久的巨石。尤其是當時間銘刻於地理，當它被匯集於景觀的永恆性中。「一個文明首先是一個空間，一個『文化區域』……一個地點」。「長期持續是結構及結構群的無盡、取之不竭的歷史」。我們可以說，布勞岱爾在這裡通過持久性的概念，觸及的不是變化，而是保持不變的東西。動詞「忍耐」比名詞「持久」更能表達這一點。在這種對真實變化極度緩慢的尊重背後，可以辨識出一種與事件狂熱相對的審慎智慧。

However the opposite perception also appears, as soon as social mathematics proposes to apply its achronological structures and its atemporal models to the long time-span. Against this pretension and this temptation historians stand as the guardians of change. They may oppose to traditional narrative an “account of conjunctures,” but far beyond “this second account we find a history capable of traversing even greater distances, a history to be measured in centuries this time: the history of the long, even of the very long time span, of the longue durée” (p. 27). But a time-span, even the very long time-span, is still a time-span. And it is there that historians stand guard, at the threshold where history might step over into sociology. We can see this in the section of the essay “History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée” devoted to social mathematics (see pp. 38-47), as well as in the essay “History and Sociology” (pp. 64-82). “In fact, as far as the language of history is concerned,” Braudel protests, “there can be no question of perfect synchrony” (p. 39). Mathematical sociologists may indeed construct almost timeless mod-els-almost timeless, that is, “in actual fact, traveling the dark, untended byways of the extreme longue durée” (p. 41). In fact, such models are of varying duration: “they are valid for as long as the reality with which they are dealing. . . . for even more significant than the deep-rooted structures of life are their points of rupture, their swift or slow deterioration under the effect of contradictory pressures” (pp. 44-45). What counts for the historian, in the end, is the range of a model. Here a marine metaphor is again in force: “The significant moment is when it can keep afloat no longer, and sinks” (p. 45). Qualitative mathematical models are ill-suited to voyages in time, “above all because they are committed to traveling along one of time’s many possible highways, that of the extreme longue durée, sheltered from all accidents, crises, and sudden breaks” (ibid.). Such is the case for the models constructed by Claude Lévi-Strauss. In each instance they are applied to “a phenomenon which develops only very slowly, almost timelessly” (ibid.). The prohibition
然而，相反的看法也會出現，當社會數學試圖將其非時間性結構和非時間性模型應用於長時間跨度時。面對這種假設和誘惑，歷史學家站在變化的守護者位置。他們可能會對傳統敘事提出「時機匯合的敘述」，但遠超過「這第二種敘述」，我們發現一種能夠跨越更遠距離的歷史，一種以世紀為測量單位的歷史：長期，甚至是非常長的時間跨度的歷史，即長期持續時間（p. 27）。然而，即使是非常長的時間跨度，仍然是一個時間跨度。正是在這裡，歷史學家把守著，在歷史可能跨入社會學的門檻處。我們可以在論文〈歷史與社會科學：長期持續時間〉中有關社會數學的部分（見 pp. 38-47）和論文〈歷史與社會學〉（pp. 64-82）中看到這一點。「事實上，就歷史語言而言」，布勞德爾抗議道，「不可能有完美的同步性」（p. 39）。數學社會學家確實可以構建幾乎無時間的模型——幾乎無時間，即「實際上，在極長時間持續的黑暗、未開闢的小路中行進」（p. 41）。事實上，此類模型持續時間不同：「它們在所處現實有效的時間內有效……甚至比生活的深層結構更重要的是它們的斷裂點，在相互矛盾的壓力作用下迅速或緩慢地惡化」（pp. 44-45）。對於歷史學家來說，最終重要的是模型的範圍。這裡再次使用海洋隱喻：「重要的時刻是當它不再能漂浮，並沉沒時」（p. 45）。定性的數學模型不適合時間旅行，「尤其是因為它們致力於沿著時間的多條可能道路之一行駛，即極長期（extreme longue durée）的道路，遠離所有意外、危機和突然的斷裂」（同上）。克勞德·李維-斯特勞斯（Claude Lévi-Strauss）構建的模型就是如此。在每個實例中，它們都應用於「僅以非常緩慢、幾乎不移動的方式發展的現象」（同上）。
of incest is one of these realities of the long time-span. Myths, which are slow to develop, also correspond to structures of an extreme longevity. Their mythemes, their atoms of intelligibility, conjoin the infinitely small and the very long time-span. But for the historian this extreme longue durée is the “excessive longue durée,” which makes us forget “the diversity of life-the movement, the different time spans, the rifts and variations” (p. 47).
亂倫禁忌是這些長時間跨度的現實之一。神話，發展緩慢，也對應於極其持久的結構。它們的神話元素（mythemes），作為理解的原子，將無限微小和極長的時間跨度聯繫在一起。但對於歷史學家來說，這種極長期是「過度的長期」，使我們忘記了「生活的多樣性—運動、不同的時間跨度、裂縫和變化」（第 47 頁）。

So we see the theoretician of the long time-span engaged in combat on two fronts, on the side of events and on the side of the excessively long time-span. I shall attempt to say in chapter 6 to what extent this apology for the long time-span with its twofold refusal is compatible with the narrative model of emplotment. If such were the case, the attack against the history of events would not be the historian’s last word about the notion of an event, inasmuch as it is more important that an event contribute to the progress of a plot than that it be short and nervous, like an explosion.

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因此，我們看到長時間跨度的理論家在兩個戰線上作戰，一邊是事件，另一邊是過度的長時間跨度。我將在第 6 章嘗試說明，這種對長時間跨度的辯護，兼具對兩者的拒絕，與敘事模式的情節安排是否相容。如果情況確實如此，對事件史的攻擊將不會是歷史學家關於事件概念的最後一句話，因為一個事件對情節進展的貢獻比其短暫而緊張，如同爆炸，更為重要。

Following Braudel, the whole of the Annales school was swallowed up into the breach of the long time-span. I would like next to dwell upon another of the more significant developments of contemporary French historiography, the large-scale introduction into history of quantitative procedures borrowed from economics and extended to demographic, social, cultural, and even spiritual history. With this development another major assumption about the nature of historical events was called into question, namely, that of their uniqueness, the fact that an event never repeats itself.
追隨布勞德爾，年鑑學派整體被長時段的缺口吞噬。我接下來想闡述當代法國史學另一個重要發展，即從經濟學借來的定量程序大規模引入歷史，並擴展到人口、社會、文化，甚至精神史。隨著這一發展，關於歷史事件本質的另一個主要假設被質疑，即其獨特性，即事件永遠不會重複自身的事實。

Quantitative history, in fact, is basically a “serial history”-to use the expresion that Pierre Chaunu made classic.

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It rests upon the constitution of a homogeneous series of “items,” hence of repeatable facts, eventually amenable to processing by a computer. All the major categories of historical time can be ever more closely redefined in terms of a “serial” basis. For example, conjuncture moves from economic history to social history, then to history in general, with the result that it can be conceived of as a method for integrating at some given moment the greatest possible number of correlations between remote series

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Similarly, the notion of a structure, understood by historians in the twofold sense of the static architectural relationships of a given set and the dynamics of a durable stability, only conserves its precision if it can be referred to the intersection of numerous variables which all presuppose that they can be put in a series. Hence conjuncture tends to refer to a short span of time and structure to a long one, but as set within the perspective of “serial” history. Taken together, the two notions thus tend to designate a polarity for historical inquiry, deperding whether the victory over the accidental and the event-like is carried so far as to absorb conjuncture into structure, or whether the long time-span-which is generally favored by French historiographyrefuses to be dissolved into the immobile time of “frozen societies” (p. 527).
事實上，定量歷史基本上是"系列歷史"——使用皮埃爾·肖努使之成為經典的表達。它建立在建立一系列同質的"項目"的基礎上，因此是可重複的事實，最終可以由電腦處理。歷史時間的所有主要類別都可以越來越精確地以"系列"為基礎來重新定義。例如，經濟史上的經濟週期移動到社會史，然後到整體歷史，其結果是可以被 conceived 為在某一特定時刻整合盡可能多的遠程系列之間的相關性的方法。同樣，歷史學家理解的結構概念，在靜態建築關係和持久穩定性的動態這兩個意義上，只有在可以參考眾多變量的交叉點時，才能保持其精確性，而這些變量都預設可以被置於一個系列中。因此，經濟週期往往指一個短暫的時間跨度，結構則指一個長時間跨度，但都置於"系列"歷史的視角中。總的來說，這兩個概念傾向於劃定歷史研究的兩極，取決於對偶然性和事件性的勝利是否進行到足以將經濟週期吸收到結構中，或者長時間跨度——通常受到法國史學的偏愛——是否拒絕被溶解到"凍結社會"的靜止時間中。

In a general way, historians-particularly specialists in economic historyare different from their economist or sociologist colleagues in that they tend to
從一般意義上說，歷史學家——尤其是經濟史專家——與他們的經濟學家或社會學家同事不同，在於他們傾向於
conserve a temporal connotation even for the notion of structure. The notion of the long time-span has helped them, in this battle on two fronts, to resist both the complete dechronologizing of their models and the fascination of the accidental and isolated event. But, since the first temptation comes from the neighboring social sciences and the second from the historical tradition itself, the battle has always been hottest on the front against events. In large measure the development of economic history was a response to the challenge posed by the great depression of 1929, as a means of long-term analysis that would divest that event of its catastrophic singularity. As for the battle on the front against atemporal structures, it has never been completely absent from the scene. In the face of the development of a purely quantitative economics by Simon Kuznets and Jean Marczewski, serial history was forced to distinguish itself from purely quantitative history, which was reproached for becoming locked into a nation-oriented framework by adopting national accounting as its model. What the quantitative history of the economists sacrifices on the altar of the exact sciences is precisely the long time-span, regained at such great price from the dramatic time of events. This is why a foothold in large geographic areas and an alliance with Braudel’s geopolitics were necessary if serial history was to remain faithful to the long time-span and, thanks to that mediation, stay grafted to the trunk of traditional history. It is also why conjuncture and structure, even when they are opposed to each other, imprint on diachrony the primacy of an immanent logic over the accidental, isolated event.
保守時間性的內涵，即便是對結構的概念而言。長時間跨度的概念幫助了他們，在這場雙面戰鬥中，抵抗了模型完全去時間性化和對偶然孤立事件的迷戀。然而，由於第一個誘惑來自鄰近的社會科學，第二個來自歷史傳統本身，這場戰鬥在對抗事件的前線一直最為激烈。在很大程度上，經濟史的發展是對 1929 年大蕭條所提出的挑戰的回應，作為一種長期分析的方式，將使該事件失去其災難性的特殊性。至於對抗非時間性結構的戰鬥，它從未完全缺席。面對西蒙·庫茲涅茨和讓·馬爾切夫斯基發展的純定量經濟學，系列史被迫區別於純定量史，後者被責備因採用國民核算作為其模型而陷入了國家導向的框架。經濟學家的定量史在精確科學的祭壇上犧牲的正是長時間跨度，這是從戲劇性事件時間中以如此大的代價重新獲得的。這就是為什麼在大的地理區域中站穩腳跟，並與布勞岱爾的地緣政治聯盟是必要的，如果系列史要忠於長時間跨度，並且通過這種中介，與傳統史的主幹保持接合。這也是為什麼即便互相對立，週期和結構都在共時性上印證了內在邏輯對偶然孤立事件的優先性。

With his history of prices, Ernest Labrousse, pursuing the trail opened by François Simiand, turned out to be the first historian to incorporate the notions of conjuncture and structure into his discipline.

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At the same time, he showed the way to an enlarging of the field opened to quantitative analysis, by guiding his discipline from economic history to social history based on socioprofessional inquiries. For Labrousse, structure is a social category. It has to do with human beings in their relationships to production and to other human beings, within those social circles that he calls classes. Since 1950, he has been engaged in calculating “social quantities,” thereby indicating the exodus of statistical apparatus toward regions ever more resistant to quantification. Social quantity represents the passage from the first level, that of economics, to the second, social, level, following Marx’s line but without any concern for Marxist orthodoxy. As an analytic model, economic history was thereby revealed to be capable of a branching development: on one side, demography, and even, as we shall see later, a sociocultural side, the side of mentalitésthe third level, according to Labrousse.
憑藉其物價歷史，埃爾內斯特·拉布魯斯，追隨弗朗索瓦·西米昂開闢的道路，成為第一位將景氣和結構概念納入其學科的歷史學家。

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與此同時，他為量化分析開闢了更廣闊的領域，引導學科從經濟史轉向基於社會職業調查的社會史。對於拉布魯斯來說，結構是一個社會範疇。它與人類在生產關係和人際關係中的互動有關，在他稱之為階級的社會圈子內。自 1950 年以來，他一直致力於計算"社會數量"，從而表明統計工具正朝著更難量化的領域遷移。社會數量代表從第一層次（經濟）到第二層次（社會）的轉變，遵循馬克思的思路，但不拘泥於馬克思主義正統。作為一種分析模式，經濟史被證明能夠發展出不同的分支：一方面是人口統計，另一方面，正如我們稍後將看到的，還有社會文化方面，即心態方面——根據拉布魯斯的說法，這是第三層次。

The methodology of economic history marked a continuity more than a break with Marc Bloch’s and Lucien Febvre’s antipositivist battle. In fact, what the founders of the Annales school had wanted to fight against in the first place was fascination with the unique, unrepeatable event, then the identification of
經濟史的方法論延續了馬克·布洛赫和呂西安·菲夫爾反實證主義鬥爭的連貫性，而非斷裂。事實上，年鑑學派的創始人首先要對抗的是對獨特的、不可重複事件的迷戀，然後是對
history with an improved chronology of the state, and finally-and perhaps above all-the absence of a criterion of choice, and therefore of any problem, in the elaboration of what counts as a “fact” in history. The facts, these historians never stop repeating, are not given in the documents, rather documents are selected as a function of a certain problem. Documents themselves are not just given. Official archives are institutions that reflect an implicit choice in favor of history conceived of as an anthology of events and as the chronicle of a state. Since this choice was not stated, the historical fact could appear to be governed by the document and historians could appear to receive their problems from these things as given.
具有改進的國家編年史的歷史，最後—也許最重要的是—缺乏選擇標準，因此在歷史中不存在任何問題，在確定什麼算作歷史「事實」的過程中。這些歷史學家不斷重複，事實並不是文件中給出的，而是文件是根據某個特定問題被選擇的。文件本身也不是直接給出的。官方檔案是反映了將歷史視為事件選集和國家年鑑的隱性選擇的機構。由於這種選擇未被明確表述，歷史事實似乎受文件支配，歷史學家似乎從這些給定的事物中獲得他們的問題。

In this conquest of the whole historical field by quantitative or serial history, special mention must be made of demographic history, particularly because of its temporal implications. For this discipline, what counts is first of all the number of people and then plotting these numbers in relation to the scale of the replacement of generations on this planet. Demographic history, which is to say demography in a temporal perspective, graphs the biological evolution of humanity considered as a whole.

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At the same time, it reveals the worldwide rhythms of populations that set the long time-span on a scale of half-millennia and call into question the periodization of traditional history. Demography, finally, as taken up by historians, brings to light the link between the size of populations and levels of culture and civilization.

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在這種由數量或連續歷史對整個歷史領域的征服中，必須特別提及人口史，特別是因為其時間性的影響。對於這一學科來說，首要考慮的是人口數量，然後將這些數字與地球上世代更替的規模聯繫起來。人口史，即時間視角下的人口學，描繪了被整體視為人類的生物進化。同時，它揭示了世界範圍內的人口節奏，將長時間跨度設定在半千年的尺度上，並質疑傳統歷史的週期性。最後，作為被歷史學家採納的人口學，揭示了人口規模與文化和文明水平之間的聯繫。

In this sense, historical demography assures the transition between serial history on the economic level and serial history on the social level, then to the cultural and spiritual level, to recall Labrousse’s three levels.
在這個意義上，歷史人口學確保了在經濟層面的連續歷史與社會層面的連續歷史之間的過渡，然後過渡到文化和精神層面，以回顧拉布魯斯的三個層次。

By social level we must understand a wide range of phenomena running from what Fernand Braudel in his other major work calls material civilization (or the structures of everyday life) to what others call the history of mentalites.

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Material civilization constitutes a veritable subset of this level due to its own wide-ranging character: gestures, housing, food, etc. This is why its arrangement into stages of temporality, following the model of The Mediterranean, is held by Braudel to be so appropriate, as are the pertinence of long time-spans and number series.

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就社會層面而言，我們必須理解從費爾南·布勞岱爾在其另一部重要著作中所稱的物質文明（或日常生活結構）到其他人所稱的心態史的廣泛現象。

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物質文明由於其本身廣泛的特性，構成了這一層面的一個真正子集：包括手勢、住房、食物等。這就是為什麼布勞岱爾認為按照《地中海》的模式將其安排成時間階段是如此恰當，長期時間跨度和數字序列的相關性也是如此。

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Our brief incursion into the field of quantitative history has had but one goal, to indicate the continuity in French historiography’s struggle against the history of events and, by implication, against a directly narrative way of writing history. In this regard it is noteworthy that the new history, in order to free itself from the clutch of events, had to join together with another discipline for which time is not a major preoccupation. We have seen the history of long time-spans born from this coupling with geography, and quantitative history, insofar as it too is a history of long time-spans, is born from a coupling with economics. Such coupling of history with another discipline makes all the more pointed the question to what extent history remains historical in this marriage of convenience. In each instance, the relationship to events furnishes an appropriate touchstone.
我們對定量歷史領域的短暫探索只有一個目標，即指出法國史學界反對事件史和（隱含地）反對直接敘事性歷史寫作的連續性。在這方面值得注意的是，新史學為了擺脫事件的束縛，不得不與另一個不以時間為主要關注點的學科結合。我們已經看到長期時間跨度的歷史是通過與地理學的結合而產生的，而定量歷史，就其也是長期時間跨度的歷史而言，是通過與經濟學的結合而產生的。歷史與另一學科的這種結合更加尖銳地提出了歷史在這種權宜之計的婚姻中還能在多大程度上保持其歷史本質的問題。在每一個實例中，與事件的關係都提供了一個恰當的試金石。

Such is the case with historical anthropology, which seeks to transfer to historical distance the kind of detachment which geographical distance gives to anthropologists, and thereby to recover beyond the official discourse of the scribes in the era under consideration, hence beyond the learned culture, costume, gesture, and imagination-in short, popular culture. The best example of this type of study is that of Jacques Le Goff in Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages.

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He proposes to constitute “a historical anthropology of the preindustrial West” (p. xiv).
歷史人類學即是如此，它試圖將地理距離賦予人類學家的那種超然態度轉移到歷史距離中，從而在所考察時代的官方文獻之外，超越學術文化、服飾、姿態和想像力，最終追溯民間文化。這類研究的最佳典範是雅克·勒高夫在《時間、工作與中世紀文化》中的著作。他提出要建立「前工業化西方的歷史人類學」（第 14 頁）。

But the philosopher cannot fail to be interested in what is said there precisely about time. Not the time of recounted events, but time as it is represented by people of the Middle Ages. It is amusing that it should be just this representation of time that, for the historian, makes up an event. “The conflict, then, between the Church’s time and the merchants’ time takes its place as one of the major events of the mental history of these centuries at the heart of the Middle Ages, when the ideology of the modern world was being formed under the pressure from deteriorating economic structures and practices” (p. 30). To reach this time of people, which has become an object for the anthropological historian, and in particular to spot the advance of the merchants’ time, we must interrogate the manuals of confession, where we can follow the changes in the definition and categorization of sins. To appraise this mental and spiritual unsettling of the chronological framework, we must take note of the birth and diffusion of clocks, which substitute an exact time for the rural workday and the canonical hours, punctuated by the sound of bells. It is especially when the opposition between learned and popular culture is taken as the axis of their problem that historians become anthropologists. The question then is whether such history remains historical. It does so in that the long time-span remains a time-span. And in this regard, Le Goff’s mistrust about a place for the vocabulary of diachrony, a vocabulary imported from semiology and structural anthropology, recalls that of Braudel about the place of LéviStrauss’s models.

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但是哲學家不可能對那裡所說的關於時間的內容漠不關心。不是敘述事件的時間，而是中世紀人們表徵的時間。有趣的是，對於歷史學家來說，恰恰是這種時間表徵構成了一個事件。「教會的時間和商人的時間之間的衝突，成為這些處於中世紀核心時期的精神史上的重大事件之一，在這個時期，現代世界的意識形態正在經濟結構和實踐惡化的壓力下形成」（第 30 頁）。為了觸及這個已成為人類學歷史學家研究對象的人們的時間，特別是要捕捉商人時間的推進，我們必須查問懺悔手冊，在那裡我們可以追隨罪惡定義和分類的變化。為了評估這種時間框架的心智和精神動盪，我們必須注意鐘錶的誕生和擴散，它們取代了以鐘聲為節奏的鄉村工作日和正規時辰。尤其是當學者和大眾文化之間的對立被視為他們問題的軸心時，歷史學家就成為了人類學家。問題是這樣的歷史是否仍然具有歷史性。它之所以具有歷史性，是因為長時段仍然是一個時間跨度。在這方面，勒·戈夫對二向性詞彙的不信任（這個詞彙從符號學和結構人類學中引入），令人想起布勞岱爾對李維-斯特勞斯模型的看法。

In truth, what interests the historian are not just “value systems” and their resistance to change, but also their mutations. I shall return, at the end of chapter 6, to a suggestion I will risk making now as a stepping-stone for our discussion. We may inquire whether, to remain historical, history must not elaborate as quasi-events the slow changes that it foreshortens in its memory by an effect similar to that of a speeded-up film. Does not Le Goff treat the major conflict concerning the appraisal of time itself as “one of the major events of the mental history of these centuries”? We can do justice to this expression only when we are capable of giving an appropriate epistemological framework to what I am calling here, provisionally, a quasi-event.

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事實上，歷史學家感興趣的不僅是「價值系統」及其對變化的抵制，還有這些系統的變異。我將在第 6 章末尾回到現在我冒險提出的建議。我們可以探究，為了保持歷史性，歷史是否必須將其在記憶中以快速播放電影效果縮短的緩慢變化製作成準事件。勒戈夫是否將關於時間本身評估的主要衝突視為「這些世紀精神史的主要事件之一」？只有當我們能夠為我在此暫時稱之為準事件的事物提供適當的認識論框架時，我們才能真正理解這種表述。

Another way of joining history together with disciplines for which time is not a major category is expressed in the history of mentalités. The main disciplines referred to here are the sociology of ideologies, with a Marxist origin,
將歷史與時間不是主要範疇的學科聯繫起來的另一種方式體現在心態史中。這裡提到的主要學科是具有馬克思主義起源的意識形態社會學，

Freudian (and sometimes, though rarely, Jungian) psychoanalysis, structural semantics, and the rhetoric of forms of discourse. The kinship to anthropological history is evident. Attending to ideologies, the collective unconscious, and unrehearsed speech confers on history a sense of strangeness, of distance and difference, comparable to that of the anthropologist’s gaze referred to a bit earlier. It is ordinary people, often denied the right to speak by the dominant form of discourse, who regain their voice through this type of history. Its type of rationality is also indicative of the most interesting attempt to carry quantitative analysis to the third level, that of attitudes regarding such things as sex, love, death, spoken or written discourse, ideology, and religion. If it is to remain serial history, this form of history has to find appropriate documents for establishing homogeneous series of statistically manipulatable facts. Here, as was already the case for economic history, historians are the inventors of their documents. In the earlier case these were market prices, then the required tithes. Here the emphasis is on written materials, lists of grievances, parish registers, ecclesiastical dispensations, and above all wills-“those old, sleeping documents” as someone has called them.

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精神分析（有時是榮格派，但很少），結構語義學和論述形式的修辭。與人類學歷史的親緣關係是顯而易見的。關注意識形態、集體無意識和未經排練的言論，賦予歷史一種陌生感，一種距離和差異感，類似於稍早提到的人類學家的目光。往往被主導論述剝奪發言權的普通人，通過這種歷史重獲聲音。其理性主義也是嘗試將定量分析推進到第三層次的最有趣嘗試，涉及性、愛、死亡、口頭或書面論述、意識形態和宗教等態度。如果要保持序列歷史，這種歷史形式必須找到適當的文件，以建立可統計操作的同質事實序列。在這裡，就像經濟史的情況一樣，歷史學家是他們文件的發明者。在早期案例中，這些文件是市場價格，然後是所需的什一稅。在這裡，重點放在書面材料上，包括申訴清單、教區登記冊、教會特許狀，尤其是遺囑——正如某人所說的那些"沉睡的舊文件"。

The question of historical time will henceforth appear in a new form. According to Chaunu, quantitative analysis is only a mediating device intended to bring to light a structure, at its best a mutation, that is, the end of some structure, the rhythm of whose breakup is closely scrutinized. In this way, quantitative analysis preserves something qualitative, but it is “carefully selected and homogenized.”

^{33}

Thus it is through their temporal aspect of stability or mutation or breaking up that structures come into the field of history.
歷史時間的問題將以新的形式出現。根據沃恩，定量分析只是一種中介設備，旨在揭示一個結構，最好是一個突變，也就是某個結構的終結，其瓦解節奏被仔細審視。這樣，定量分析保留了某種質性特徵，但是經過"精心選擇和同質化"。因此，通過其穩定性、突變或瓦解的時間方面，結構進入歷史領域。

Georges Duby, whose work is an excellent illustration of the history of mentalités, poses the problem in similar terms. On the one hand, he accepts Althusser’s definition of an ideology as “a system (possessing its own logic and rigor) of representations (images, myths, ideas, or concepts as the case may be) endowed with both existence and a historical role in some particular society.”

^{34}

Hence it is as a sociologist that he characterizes ideologies as allencompassing, distorting, in competition with one another, stabilizing, or a source of action. These features do not refer to either chronology or narration. Yet his sociology leaves a place for history inasmuch as value systems “have their own history, whose allure and phases do not coincide with the history of population or that of production” (p. 148). And in fact it is historians who are interested in the transformation of structures, whether under the pressure of changes in material conditions and social relations, or through protest and conflict.
喬治·杜比，他的工作是心態史的絕佳例證，以類似的方式提出問題。一方面，他接受阿爾都塞對意識形態的定義，即"一個在某個特定社會中具有存在和歷史角色的表徵系統（視情況可能是圖像、神話、觀念或概念），該系統擁有自身的邏輯和嚴謹性"。因此，作為一位社會學家，他將意識形態描述為全面的、扭曲的、相互競爭的、穩定的或行動的源頭。這些特徵並不涉及編年史或敘事。然而，他的社會學為歷史留有一席之地，因為價值體系"有其自身的歷史，其魅力和階段與人口史或生產史並不重合"（第 148 頁）。事實上，正是歷史學家對結構的轉變感興趣，無論是在物質條件和社會關係變化的壓力下，還是通過抗議和衝突。

I should like to end this review of the contributions of French historiography to the exploration of historical time by referring to some works devoted to the relationship of people to death. They provide the most significant and most fascinating example of the conquest by quantitative analysis of the qualitative dimension of history. What is more intimate to life, more a part of it
我想用一些關於人與死亡關係的著作來結束這篇關於法國史學對歷史時間探索的貢獻的回顧。它們提供了定量分析征服歷史定性維度的最重要、最迷人的例子。什麼是比生命更親密、更是生命的一部分？
than death, or rather dying? And what is more public than people’s attitudes in the face of death as inscribed in last wills and testaments? What more social than the anticipations excited by the thought of their own funerals? What more cultural than how people represent death? Hence it is easy to comprehend that the typology of death proposed by Philippe Aries, in his great book The Hour of Our Death, with its four models of death-the accepted death of the patriarch in the Old Testament, of the knight’s test in the Chansons de gestes, of Tolstoy’s peasant; the baroque death of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the intimate death of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and the forbidden and hidden-away death of postindustrial societies-should have both furnished a conceptual formulation for serial inquiries such as those of Vovelle and Chaunu, and received from them the only verification that history is capable of, given its inability to experiment with the past, namely, repeatable numerical frequencies.

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In this respect, the history of death may not be just the farthest point reached by serial history, but perhaps by all history, for reasons that I shall discuss in volume

2 .^{36}

比死亡更加可怕的是什麼，或者更確切地說是死亡？什麼比人們在面對死亡時的態度更加公開，這些態度如刻在遺囑中？想像自己的葬禮時所引發的期待又算是什麼？人們如何呈現死亡又有多麼文化？因此，我們很容易理解菲利普·阿里埃斯在其鉅著《我們死亡的時刻》中提出的死亡類型學，其中包含四種死亡模式：舊約中族長的被接受的死亡，詩歌敘事中騎士的試煉，托爾斯泰筆下的農民；十六和十七世紀的巴洛克式死亡；十八和十九世紀的親密死亡；以及後工業社會中被禁止和隱藏的死亡。這種類型學不僅為沃韋爾和肖恩的系列研究提供了概念性表述，而且從中獲得了歷史學所能提供的唯一驗證，即鑑於歷史無法對過去進行實驗，只能通過可重複的數值頻率來驗證。在這方面，死亡史可能不僅是系列史的最遠端，甚至可能是所有史學的最遠端，這些原因我將在第

2 .^{36}

卷中討論。

The Eclipse of Understanding: The Covering Law Model in Analytical Philosophy
理解的日蝕：分析哲學中的涵蓋法模型

In leaving the methodology of French historians for the epistemology of history issuing from logical positivism, we change thought-worlds (and sometimes, although not always, continents). It is not the practice of history that fuels the argument but a more normative than descriptive concern for affirming the unity of science in the tradition of the Vienna Circle. This plea for the unity of science is incompatible with the distinction established by Windelband between an “idiographic” method and a “nomothetic” one.

^{37}

Nor was the relation of history to narrative directly at issue in the first phase of the debate during the forties and fifties. Still, the very possibility of deriving history from narrative was directly undermined by an argument directed essentially against the thesis of the irreducibility of “understanding” to “explanation” which, in the critical philosophy of history in Germany at the beginning of the century, prolonged the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic methods.

^{38}

If I have thought it possible to put under the single title of “eclipse of narrative” two attacks coming from two horizons as different as the French historiography of the Annales school and the epistemology stemming from English-language analytic philosophy (which stands in continuity on this point with the epistemology inherited from the Vienna Circle), it is because both take the notion of event as their touchstone and take it as given that the fate of narrative is sealed at the same time as that of events, understood as the atomic elements of historical change. This is so true that the question of the narrative status of history, which was never at stake in the first phase of the epistemological discussion (the only one considered here), did not move to
在離開法國歷史學家的方法論，轉向源自邏輯實證主義的歷史認識論時，我們改變了思想世界（有時，雖然不總是，還會改變大陸）。推動論點的不是歷史實踐，而是一種比描述性更規範性的關切，即在維也納學派的傳統中肯定科學的統一性。這種對科學統一性的呼籲與溫德爾班在「描述性」方法和「規律性」方法之間建立的區分不相容。

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在四、五十年代辯論的第一階段，歷史與敘事的關係也並未直接成為議題。然而，從敘事中推導歷史的可能性卻直接被一個論點削弱，這個論點基本上是針對「理解」不可化約到「解釋」的論點，而這一論點在德國世紀初的歷史批判哲學中延續了描述性和規律性方法之間的區分。

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如果我認為可以用「敘事的蝕變」這個單一標題涵蓋兩種來自截然不同視野的攻擊──法國年鑑學派的史學和源自英語分析哲學的認識論（在這一點上與維也納學派繼承的認識論保持一致）──那是因為它們都以事件的概念為試金石，並視為理所當然的是，敘事的命運與事件的命運同時被封印，這裡的事件被理解為歷史變遷的原子性要素。這一點如此真實，以至於歷史的敘事地位這個問題，在認識論討論的第一階段（此處僅考慮這一階段）從未成為討論的焦點，未曾
the forefront, at least in the English-speaking world, until later, due to the battle over the covering law model, where it served as a counterexample opposed to this model. This diagnosis is confirmed by the case of the only French historian-Paul Veyne-who has pleaded for a return to the notion of plot in history. For him too, as we shall see, this return is tied to a vehement criticism of any claim to a scientific status that would be incompatible with the “sublunar” status of history-thereby imitating Aristotle at the same time that he rehabilitates Max Weber!
至少在英語世界，直到後來，由於對覆蓋法則模型的爭論，這個主題才成為前沿，其中它作為反對這個模型的反例。這個診斷由唯一的法國歷史學家保羅·維恩證實，他呼籲在歷史中重返情節概念。對他來說，正如我們將看到的，這種回歸與強烈批評任何聲稱具有科學地位的觀點有關，這種地位將與歷史的「亞月球」狀態不相容——同時模仿亞里士多德並重新評估馬克斯·韋伯！

As the subsequent discussion will confirm, the attack on understanding by the partisans of the covering law model has the same result, if not the same stake, as the attack against events does for the historians of the long timespan: the eclipse of narrative.
正如隨後的討論將確認的，覆蓋法則模型的支持者對理解的攻擊，其結果與長時段歷史學家對事件的攻擊相同，如果不是同樣的利害關係的話：敘事的遮蔽。

I will take as my starting point Karl Hempel’s famous article “The Function of General Laws in History.”

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我將以卡爾·漢普爾著名的文章《歷史中一般法則的功能》作為我的起點。

The central thesis of this article is that “general laws have quite analogous functions in history and in the natural sciences” (p. 345). Hempel is not unaware of history’s interest in particular past events. On the contrary, his thesis concerns precisely the status of an event. But it does not take it as important, not to say decisive, that in history events get their properly historical status from having been initially included in an official chronicle, eyewitness testimony, or a narrative based on personal memories. The specificity of this first level of discourse is completely ignored in favor of a direct relationship between an individual event and the assertion of a universal hypothesis, therefore of some form of regularity. It is only owing to the subsequent discussion of the covering law model by upholders of the narrativist thesis that we can underscore the fact that, from the beginning of this analysis, the notion of a historical event was divested of its narrative status and placed within the framework of an opposition between particular and universal. The historical event was subsumed under a general concept of event that included all physical events and every noteworthy occurrence, such as the bursting of a dam, a geological cataclysm, a change in some physical state, etc. Once this homogeneous conception of what counts as an event was posited, the argument unfolded as follows.
本文的中心論點是，「一般性法則在歷史和自然科學中具有相當類似的功能」（第 345 頁）。亨佩爾並非不知道歷史對特定過去事件的興趣。相反地，他的論點恰恰關乎事件的地位。但他並不認為事件在歷史中獲得其特定地位是重要的，更不用說決定性的，即最初被納入官方編年史、目擊者證詞或基於個人記憶的敘事中。這種話語的首要層次的特殊性完全被忽視，轉而關注個別事件與普遍假設，因此也是某種形式的規律性之間的直接關係。只有通過敘事主義者後續對涵蓋定律模型的討論，我們才能強調，從一開始，歷史事件的概念就被剝奪了其敘事地位，並置於特殊與普遍的對立框架中。歷史事件被歸入一個包含所有物理事件和每一個值得注意的發生的一般事件概念之下，如壩的潰決、地質災變、某些物理狀態的改變等。一旦確立了這種關於什麼算作事件的同質化概念，論證就展開如下。

The occurrence of an event of a specific type can be deduced from two premises. The first describes the initial conditions: prior events, prevailing conditions, and the like. The second states a regularity of a certain type, that is, a hypothesis of a universal form that, if verified, merits being called a law.

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特定類型事件的發生可以從兩個前提中推導出來。第一個描述初始條件：先前的事件、當前的環境條件等。第二個陳述某種規律性，即一個普遍形式的假設，如果經過驗證，則值得被稱為定律。

If these two premises can be established correctly, we can say that the occurrence of the event under consideration has been logically deduced and therefore it has been explained. This explanation can be vitiated in three ways: the empirical statements establishing the initial conditions may be
如果這兩個前提可以正確地建立，我們可以說所考慮的事件的發生已被邏輯推導，因此已得到解釋。這種解釋可能以三種方式受到影響：建立初始條件的經驗陳述可能
faulty; the alleged generalities may not be real laws; or the logical link between premises and conclusion may be vitiated by a sophistry or an error in reasoning.
有缺陷；所謂的普遍性可能不是真正的法則；或者前提和結論之間的邏輯聯繫可能因詭辯或推理錯誤而受到影響。

Three comments are called for concerning the structure of explanation in this model, which, since Dray’s criticism, is called the covering law model.
關於這個模型中解釋的結構，需要作出三點評論，自德雷的批評以來，這一模型被稱為覆蓋定律模型。

First, the three concepts of law, cause, and explanation overlap. An event is explained when it is “covered” by a law and when its antecedents are legitimately called its causes. The key idea is that of regularity. That is, every time an event of type

C

occurs at a certain place and time, an event of the specific type E will occur at a place and time related to those of the first event. The Humean idea of a cause is therefore unreservedly taken for granted. Hempel speaks indifferently of “causes” or of “determining conditions” (ibid.). This is why he attaches no importance to objections addressed to the terminology of causality, and the attempt, offered among others by Russell, to use only the terms “condition” and “function.”

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This dispute is not, however, a simple one of semantics. I shall ask below if a causal explanation-especially in his-tory-might be possible independently of, or prior to, the idea of a law in the sense of a verified regularity.

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首先，法則、因果和解釋這三個概念相互重疊。當一個事件被「覆蓋」by 一個法則，並且其前因被合理地稱為其原因時，該事件就得到了解釋。關鍵的想法是規律性。也就是說，每當某類型事件在某個特定的地點和時間發生時，特定類型 E 的事件將在與第一個事件相關的地點和時間發生。因此，休謨關於因果的想法被毫不保留地接受。亨佩爾不加區分地談論「原因」或「決定性條件」。這就是為什麼他不重視針對因果術語的異議，以及羅素等人提出的僅使用「條件」和「函數」這些術語的嘗試。

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然而，這個爭議並非僅僅是語義學問題。我將在下文探討因果解釋——尤其是在歷史中——是否可能獨立於或先於以驗證的規律性為意義的法則概念。

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Next it must be emphasized that, in a covering law model, explanation and prediction go hand in hand. We can expect any occurrence of type

C

to be followed by an occurrence of type E. Prediction is just the inverted statement of the explanation in terms of an if/then statement. One result is that the predictive value of a hypothesis becomes one criterion of the validity of an explanation, and the absence of a predictive value is a sign of the incomplete character of the explanation. This remark, too, has to apply to history.
接下來必須強調的是，在一個涵蓋法模型中，解釋和預測是攜手並進的。我們可以預期類型

C

的任何出現都將被類型 E 的出現所跟隨。預測只是以 if/then 陳述的形式對解釋的倒置陳述。其中一個結果是，假說的預測價值成為解釋有效性的一個標準，而缺乏預測價值是解釋不完整的跡象。這一點也必須適用於歷史。

Finally, it will have been noticed that it is a question of events of only one specific type-not singular events, but eminently repeatable ones (the drop in temperature under such and such a conditions, say). Hempel sees no difficulty in this. To express every property of some individual object is an impossible task, which no one, no more in physics than anywhere else, would propose. There could be no explanation of any individual event if the explanation had to account for every characteristic of the event. All we can ask of an explanation is that it be precise and specific, not that it be exhaustive. The unique character of any event, as a consequence, is a myth which must be put beyond the horizon of science. The discussion will again and again return to this traditional chopping block in the theory of history.
最後，人們會注意到這是關於僅一種特定類型的事件，不是單一事件，而是高度可重複的事件（例如在某某條件下的溫度下降）。赫普爾對此毫無困難。嘗試表達某個個體對象的每一個特性是不可能的任務，無論是在物理學還是其他任何領域，都不會提出這種要求。如果解釋必須解釋事件的每一個特徵，那麼任何個別事件都無法得到解釋。我們對解釋的要求是它要精確和具體，而不是窮盡無遺。因此，任何事件的獨特性是一個必須被科學排除的神話。討論將一再回到這個歷史理論中的傳統障礙。

If this is the universal structure of explanation applied to all events-whether natural or historical-the question is whether history satisfies this model.
如果這是適用於所有事件——無論是自然事件還是歷史事件——的普遍解釋結構，那麼問題是歷史是否符合這個模型。

Obviously, it is a highly prescriptive model. It says what an ideal explanation must be. Hempel does not think he is doing any injustice to history in so
顯然，這是一個高度規範性的模型。它規定了理想解釋應該是什麼。赫普爾認為他對歷史並未造成任何不公。
proceeding. On the contrary, assigning it such an elevated ideal is a way of acknowledging its ambition to be recognized as a science and not an art. Indeed history wants to demonstrate that events are not the result of chance, rather that they happen in conformity with the prediction we can give them, once we know about certain antecedents or certain simultaneous conditions, and once the universal hypotheses which form the major premise of the deduction of the event are stated and verified. Only at this price can prediction be distinguished from prophecy.
事實上，賦予歷史如此崇高的理想並非自相矛盾。相反，給予它這樣的高尚理想是承認其追求被認可為一門科學，而非藝術。事實上，歷史希望證明事件並非偶然發生，而是符合我們在了解某些前因或同時存在的條件，並闡明並驗證構成事件推論主要前提的普遍假設後，可以對其進行預測。只有以這種方式，預測才能與預言區分開來。

But the fact is that history is not yet a fully developed science, principally because the general propositions which ground its ambition to be explanatory do not merit the title of regularities. Either, as a first case, these generalities are not completely stated, as in the case of the incomplete explanations of daily life, where we take for granted tacit generalities drawn from individual or social psychology. Or, as a second case, the alleged regularities lack empirical confirmation. Apart from economics and demography, history contents itself with approximately universal hypotheses. We must place among such laws, whose verification is still too loose, all statements made in terms of probabilities, yet lacking any statistical framework. It is not their probabilistic status that is criticizable but their lack of statistical precision. In this respect, the boundary does not run between causal and probabilistic explanation but between levels of exactitude, whether this be empirical or statistical. Finally, as a third case, the alleged generalities may simply be pseudo-laws, borrowed from popular wisdom or unscientific psychology, when they are not obvious prejudices, the residue of magical or mythical “explanations” of human and cosmic realities. Therefore the line must be clearly drawn between genuine explanations and pseudo ones.
但事實是，歷史尚未成為一門完全成熟的科學，主要是因為支持其具有解釋性的普遍命題並不真正具有規律性。首先，這些普遍性要麼尚未完全闡述，就像日常生活中不完整的解釋，我們往往默認從個人或社會心理學中得出的默示普遍性。其次，所謂的規律缺乏經驗證實。除了經濟學和人口統計學外，歷史學滿足於近似普遍的假設。我們必須將這些法則歸類，這些法則的驗證仍然過於鬆散，包括所有以概率表述的陳述，但缺乏任何統計框架。可批評的不是其概率狀態，而是缺乏統計精確性。在這方面，界限不在於因果解釋和概率解釋之間，而在於精確程度的不同，無論是經驗上還是統計學上。最後，所謂的普遍性可能只是偽法則，要麼源自民間智慧或非科學心理學，要麼是明顯的偏見，是解釋人類和宇宙現實的魔法或神話的殘餘。因此，必須在真正的解釋和偽解釋之間劃清界限。

The only nuance Hempel allows to his uncompromising thesis is that, in the best case, history offers “explanation sketchs” (p. 351), resting upon regularities that, while not being explicit and verified laws, do neverthless point in the direction where precise regularities are to be discovered, and that, further, prescribe the steps that must be taken in order to satisfy the model of scientific explanation. In this sense, such explanatory sketchs stand on the side of genuine explanations, not on that of pseudo ones.
赫姆佩爾允許他不妥協論點的唯一微妙之處在於，在最好的情況下，歷史提供"解釋草圖"（第 351 頁），這些草圖基於一些規律，雖然不是明確和經驗證的法則，但仍然指向可以發現精確規律的方向，並且進一步規定了滿足科學解釋模型所必須採取的步驟。在這個意義上，這種解釋性草圖站在真正解釋的一邊，而不是偽解釋的一邊。

Apart from this one concession, Hempel vehemently refuses to accord any actual epistemological value to the procedures warranted by the terms empathy, understanding, or interpretation, which refer to such so-called distinctive features of the historical object as meaning, relevance, determination, or dependence. The alleged method of empathetic understanding is not a method. At most it is a heuristic procedure which is neither necessary nor sufficient, for it is possible to explain things in history without any empathetic understanding.
除了這一個讓步外，赫姆佩爾強烈拒絕賦予同情、理解或解釋等術語所指稱的所謂歷史對象的特徵，如意義、相關性、決定性或依賴性，任何實際的認識論價值。所謂的移情理解方法不是一種方法。充其量它是一種啟發性程序，既非必要也非充分，因為可以在不需要任何移情理解的情況下解釋歷史中的事情。

Nothing in the construction of this model, therefore, refers to the narrative nature of history, or to the narrative status of events, much less to the particu-
因此，這個模型的構建中，絲毫未涉及歷史的敘事性質，或事件的敘事地位，更不用說特定的
lar specificity of historical time in relation to cosmological time. As I said earlier, these distinctions are tacitly excluded as soon as no difference in principle is allowed between a historical event and a physical one which simply occurs, and as soon as it is not taken as pertinent to the historical status of an event that it was recounted in chronicles, or legendary narratives, or reports. Even an author such as Charles Frankel, who is, as we shall see, so attentive to the originality of the problematic of interpretation in history, does not incorporate within the notion of an event its contribution to the form of a narrative.

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The events treated by historians in their works are inscribed, as are physical ones, in “singular statements asserting the occurrence of unique events at specific places and times” (p. 411). Historians simply “give an account of individual events that have occurred once and only once” (p. 410). An explanation, because it is an explanation, abolishes this feature. The logical definition of event requires that of a singular occurrence, without any intrinsic relation to narrative. This identification is so tenacious that at first even the adversaries of the covering law model were themselves in agreement that an explanation would abolish the uniqueness, the unrepeatability of events.
關於歷史時間與宇宙時間的特定性。正如我之前所說，一旦不允許歷史事件和純粹發生的物理事件之間存在原則性差異，一旦一個事件被記載在編年史、傳奇敘事或報告中不被視為相關，這些區別就被默默地排除了。即使是像查爾斯·弗蘭克爾這樣的作者，他對歷史解釋問題的獨特性如此關注，卻不把敘事形式的貢獻納入事件的概念中。歷史學家在其作品中處理的事件，和物理事件一樣，被銘刻在"斷言特定地點和時間唯一事件發生的單一陳述"中。歷史學家只是"敘述曾經且僅曾發生一次的個別事件"。解釋，因為是解釋，就消除了這一特徵。事件的邏輯定義要求是單一事件，與敘事無內在關聯。這種認定如此根深蒂固，以至於起初即使是涵蓋性定律模型的反對者也同意解釋會消除事件的獨特性和不可重複性。

Following Hempel, and in his wake, the partisans of the covering law model in essence gave themselves over to the apologetic task of minimizing the discordances between the requirements of this “strong” model and the specific features of historical knowledge. The price was a “weakening” of the model so as to ensure its viability.

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繼赫姆佩爾之後，涵蓋性定律模型的支持者本質上致力於最小化這一"強"模型與歷史知識特定特徵之間的不一致。代價是模型的"弱化"，以確保其可行性。

It is not a question of depreciating the work produced by the Hempelian school when I qualify it as being apologetic. This is the case, first, because in weakening the model, these authors brought to light some features of historical knowledge that genuinely depend upon explanation and that any adverse theory must take into account.

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Weakening a model is a positive work if it augments its applicability. Further, the work of reformulation led to an encounter with the actual work of historians-which we have become familiar with through the example of French historiography-in seeking to resolve the real or alleged difficulties afflicting historical knowledge.
當我將霍姆佩爾學派的作品描述為具有辯護性質時，並非是貶低其工作。這是基於以下原因：首先，通過削弱模型，這些作者揭示了歷史知識中確實依賴解釋的一些特徵，任何相反的理論都必須考慮到這一點。削弱模型是一種積極的工作，如果它擴大了其適用性。此外，重新表述的工作導致了與歷史學家的實際工作的相遇，我們通過法國史學的例子已經熟悉了這一點，以試圖解決困擾歷史知識的真實或假定的困難。

The first major concession, which will be exploited in various ways by the adversaries of the model, is to allow that the explanations offered by historians do not function in history as they do in the natural sciences. History does not establish laws that figure in the major premise of the Hempelian model of deduction. It employs them.

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This is why they can remain implicit. It is also why they can depend upon heterogeneous levels of universality and regularity. For example, Gardiner, in his The Nature of Historical Explanation, admitted to the rank of regularities allowed in history what he calls “law-like explanations.”

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These are a matter principally of regularities of the “dispositional” type to which Gilbert Ryle, in The Concept of Mind, assigned a major role in the explanation of behavior. One of the functions of the connective “because”
第一個主要的讓步是允許歷史學家提供的解釋在歷史中的運作方式不同於自然科學。歷史並不建立出現在霍姆佩爾推理模型大前提中的法則。它使用這些法則。這就是為什麼它們可以保持隱含。這也是為什麼它們可以依賴於不同層次的普遍性和規律性。例如，加德納在《歷史解釋的本質》一書中，承認了歷史中允許的規律性中所謂的"類法則解釋"。這主要是關於吉爾伯特·賴爾在《心靈概念》中賦予解釋行為主要作用的"傾向性"類型的規律性。"因為"這個連接詞的功能之一
is to set an agent’s action within the framework of his “habitual” behavior. This case of explanation in terms of dispositions opens the way to reflection upon the diversity of levels of imprecision that the notion of regularity allows.
是將一個行為人的行動置於其"習慣性"行為的框架之中。這種以傾向性為基礎的解釋為反思規律性概念所允許的不同精確性層次開闢了道路。

This heterogeneity is completely accepted by the reader of historical works. Such a reader does not come to the text with a unique, unchanging, monolithic model of explanation in mind, but with a very broad range of expectations. This flexibility testifies that the question bearing on the structure of explanation must be completed by one bearing on its function. By function, we are to understand the correspondence between a certain type of answer and a certain type of question. For instance, the question “Why?” is one that opens the range of acceptable answers of the form “Because. . . .” In this regard, the strong model only accounts for a limited segment of the range of expectations opened by the question “Why?” and the range of acceptable answers of the form “Because. . . .” The problem, from here on, is to know what extension, and therefore what weakening, the covering law model is capable of, if we exclude any shameful return to an intuitionist or empathetic conception of historical “understanding,” or, in a more general fashion, to the pure and simple substitution of understanding for explanation.
歷史作品的讀者完全接受這種異質性。這樣的讀者並不會帶著一個獨特、unchanging、單一的解釋模型來閱讀文本，而是帶著非常廣泛的期望。這種靈活性證明了關於解釋結構的問題必須與其功能問題相輔相成。就功能而言，我們要理解某種類型的答案與某種類型的問題之間的對應關係。例如，「為什麼？」這個問題開啟了「因為……」形式的可接受答案的範圍。在這方面，強模型僅解釋了「為什麼？」問題所開啟的期望範圍以及「因為……」形式的可接受答案的有限部分。從現在開始，問題是要知道涵蓋法模型能夠具有什麼樣的延伸，因此能夠有什麼樣的削弱，如果我們排除任何對歷史「理解」的直觀或移情性概念的可恥回歸，或者更廣泛地說，pure and simple 地用理解替代解釋。

For the partisans of the covering law model, the only way to resist the dilution of explanation into more and more varied uses of “Why?” and “Because . . .” is always to refer the weak forms of the model to the strong one, and to assign the former the task of approximating the latter. In this sense, a liberal attitude with regard to the functioning of the model allows us to preserve great rigor concerning the structure of explanation. The strong model thereby remains the “logical marker” for every approximation of the same model by the weaker forms.
對於涵蓋法模型的支持者來說，抵制「為什麼？」和「因為……」的解釋越來越多樣化的唯一方法，就是始終將模型的弱形式轉化為強形式，並指派前者逐步接近後者。在這個意義上，對模型運作的自由態度使我們能夠在解釋的結構方面保持高度的嚴謹性。強模型因此仍然是每種模型近似形式的「邏輯標記」。

A second debate bears witness to the effort referred to earlier about meeting historians in their struggle to elevate their discipline to the rank of a thoroughgoing science. It has to do with the role of selection procedures in history. There is something exemplary about this debate inasmuch as it touches upon one of the difficulties most often referred to in the Verstehen tradition, which refuses to history an “objectivity” comparable to that of the natural sciences. In France, Raymond Aron’s book remains the unsurpassed witness to this thesis. Neopositivist epistemology responded to this attack by firmly tying the fate of objectivity in history to that of the covering law model. This is why, for this school of thought, defense of this model was equivalent to a plea for objectivity in history.
第二場辯論見證了之前提到的努力，即與歷史學家在將他們的學科提升到一個徹底的科學地位的鬥爭相遇。這與歷史中選擇程序的角色有關。這場辯論具有典範性，因為它觸及了維爾斯泰恩傳統中最常被提及的困難之一，該傳統拒絕歷史具有與自然科學相當的「客觀性」。在法國，雷蒙·阿朗的著作仍然是這一論點的無可替代的見證。邏輯實證主義認識論通過堅定地將歷史中的客觀性與涵蓋定律模型緊密聯繫起來來回應這一攻擊。這就是為什麼，對於這一思想流派來說，捍衛這一模型等同於為歷史中的客觀性進行辯護。

Ernst Nagel’s sharp reply is exemplary in this regard, for it demonstrates in practice what an analytic argument is and how it responds to the massiveness of the objection with a work of decomposition and distinctions.

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厄恩斯特·納蓋爾的尖銳回應在這方面是典範性的，因為它實踐性地展示了分析論證是什麼，以及它如何以分解和區分的工作來回應異議的龐大性。

Do we mean by selectivity the historian’s choice of a domain or a problem? No researcher escapes this. The only interesting question is whether, once a field of inquịry has been chosen, researchers are capable of taking their dis-
我們所指的選擇性是指歷史學家選擇一個領域還是一個問題？沒有研究者可以逃避這一點。唯一有趣的問題是，一旦選擇了一個研究領域，研究者是否能夠與他們對研究對象的價值觀或熱情保持距離。
tance with regard to the values or passions which they have for their object. This emancipation of one’s mind is not inaccessible to historians. It even defines history as “inquiry.”
這種精神的解放對歷史學家來說並非遙不可及。它甚至將歷史定義為「探究」。

Do we wish to speak of the limitation of the subject matter resulting from this choice? It need not be a necessary cause of distortion unless we presuppose that to know anything we must know everything. The underlying philosophical thesis, Hegelian in origin, of the “internal” character of every relation is refuted by scientific practice, which verifies the “analytic” character of discourse.
我們是否要討論因這種選擇而產生的主題範圍的局限性？除非我們預設要知道任何事情就必須知道一切，否則這不一定是扭曲的必然原因。源於黑格爾的潛在哲學論點，即每種關係的"內在"特性，被科學實踐所駁斥，這驗證了論述的"分析性"特徵。

What of selection of hypotheses? All inquiry is selective in this sense. The ending of inquiry at some point? The argument about an infinite regress is a sophism. To a definite problem there is a definite answer. The possibility of pushing the analysis further only bears witness to the progressive character of inquiry.
那麼假設的選擇呢？所有的探究在這個意義上都是選擇性的。探究在某一點結束？關於無限倒退的論點是詭辯。對於明確的問題，必有明確的答案。進一步推進分析的可能性只證明了探究的進步性質。

Finally, what if someone says that history cannot escape collective or personal prejudices? It is a truism to admit that the ideals of any inquiry are causally linked to other cultural, social, and political features. What is significant is that such prejudices can be detected and investigated. The single fact that we can distinguish what is assumed from what is not, proves that the ideal of objectivity is not a hopeless one. If not, the skeptical thesis would fall under its own claim and its validity would be limited to the circle of those who professed it. But if it escapes its own criterion, this attests that it is possible to formulate worthwhile statements about human affairs.

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最後，如果有人說歷史無法逃脫集體或個人的偏見？承認任何探究的理想在因果上與其他文化、社會和政治特徵相關聯是老生常談。重要的是，這些偏見是可以被發現和研究的。我們能夠區分被假定的和未被假定的事物這一事實，證明了客觀性的理想並非毫無希望。若非如此，懷疑論的論點將墮入自身的論斷，其有效性將僅限於那些宣稱它的人。但如果它逃脫了自身的標準，這證明了對人類事務發表有意義陳述是可能的。

A new obstacle to the realization of a “warranted” explanation results from the limiting of historical inquiry to what it takes as the “principal” cause of a course of events. This imputation of relative importance to causal variables appeals to a “weighing” of them which does not seem capable of being made objective. We may respond that the notion of importance is not inaccessible to analysis. Even if the truth of judgments of importance is subject to debate, it is still the case that we signify something in speaking of importance. Therefore we can set up a table of meanings associated with the assigning of degrees of importance (see Nagel, pp. 382-85).

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Only perfecting the statistical material involved can reconcile this logic of the “weighing” of degrees of importance and practice. Until this is achieved, limited skepticism is called for, but there is no reason to transform this into wholesale skepticism. There is “substantial agreement among men experienced in relevant matters on the relative probabilities to be assigned to many hypotheses” (p. 385).
從歷史探究被限制於其認為的「主要」事件原因，導致實現「有保證的」解釋的新障礙。這種對因果變量賦予相對重要性的歸因似乎無法客觀地「權衡」它們。我們可以回應，重要性的概念並非不可分析。即使重要性判斷的真實性存在爭議，我們在談論重要性時仍然表達了某些意義。因此，我們可以建立一個與賦予重要性程度相關的意義表（參見 Nagel，第 382-85 頁）。

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只有完善所涉及的統計資料才能調和這種「權衡」重要性程度的邏輯與實踐。在此之前，有限的懷疑是必要的，但沒有理由將其轉變為全面的懷疑。在「對於許多假設的相對可能性，有經驗的相關領域專家之間存在實質性共識」（第 385 頁）。

We can see that here this argument drawn from the practice of history rejoins that of the upholders of quantitative serial history in French historiography.
我們可以看出，這個源自歷史實踐的論點與法國史學中支持量化序列史的論點相呼應。

Let us follow this apology for the covering law model to the point where weakening the model leads to its abandonment. In this regard, the article I have already referred to by Charles Frankel is exemplary. The model is weak-
讓我們追隨這個涵蓋定律模型的辯護，直到模型的削弱導致其拋棄。在這方面，我已經提到的查爾斯·弗蘭克爾的文章是典型的。該模型是脆弱的-
ened in the sense that interpretation, taken in a sense close to that of Verstehen in the critical philosophy of history, is admitted as one necessary moment of historical knowing. The moment of interpretation is the one when historians appraise something, that is, when they attribute meaning and value to it. This moment must be distinguished from the moment of explanation, which establishes causal connections between events. Yet the effort to articulate these two moments stays within the realm of the covering law model inasmuch as, on the one hand, it is admitted that every good historian wants to distinguish between the two levels of operation and to justify epistemology in its ambition to isolate the explanatory kernel, and, on the other hand, interpretation itself is submitted to the limiting requirements of explanation.
在批判歷史哲學中，解釋被承認為歷史知識的一個必要環節，其意義接近於維爾斯滕（Verstehen）的概念。解釋的時刻是歷史學家評估某事物的時候，即賦予其意義和價值的時刻。這一時刻必須與解釋事件間因果關係的解釋時刻區分開來。然而，闡明這兩個時刻的努力仍然停留在覆蓋法則模型的範疇之內，因為一方面，每個優秀的歷史學家都希望區分這兩個運作層次，並證明認識論有隔離解釋核心的野心；另一方面，解釋本身也服從於解釋的限制性要求。

In truth, the weakening of the model starts with a reformulating of the explanatory stage, even though Frankel holds that, ideally, the historian does not proceed any differently than do other scientists. The discordances with the model characterize the current state of affairs in history, not its epistemological ideal. Are its generalizations, as Hempel said, explanation sketchs? This is a contingent feature which does not create a gap between history and other sciences. Instead, it points to “a need for filling in the details” (p. 411). Is the tie between explanation and prediction broken? Does the historian only succeed in giving the necessary but not the sufficient conditions of an event? What is important is not that the explanation is incomplete but that “on many occasions, it seems fully to satisfy our demand for an explanation” (p. 412). For example, we can accept a simple summary of the steps of a process as an explanation. We do so in embryology as well as in all the other sciences dealing with development or evolution. Such genetic explanation suggests that “not all satisfactory explanations supply us with exactly the same type of information, and that not all requests to have something explained are unequivocal requests for a single kind of answer” (ibid.).

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From here on, the boundary between scientific and commonsense explanations, and the type of prudential judgment we ordinarily make about human affairs, tends to become erased.
事實上，模型的弱化始於解釋階段的重新表述，儘管弗蘭克爾認為，理想情況下，歷史學家的進程與其他科學家並無不同。模型的不一致特徵描繪了當前歷史研究的現狀，而非其認識論理想。正如亨佩爾所說，其概括是否為解釋草圖？這是一種或然特徵，並不在歷史與其他科學間造成鴻溝。相反，它指向「填充細節的需要」（第 411 頁）。解釋與預測之間的聯繫是否已斷裂？歷史學家是否僅能提供事件的必要而非充分條件？重要的不是解釋的不完整性，而是「在許多情況下，它似乎完全滿足了我們對解釋的要求」（第 412 頁）。例如，我們可以接受一個過程步驟的簡單總結作為解釋。我們在胚胎學以及所有處理發展或演化的科學中都這麼做。這種遺傳解釋表明，「並非所有令人滿意的解釋都以完全相同的資訊類型為我們提供，而且並非所有要求解釋的請求都是對單一答案種類的明確要求」（同上）。從此，科學解釋與常識解釋之間的界限，以及我們通常對人類事務所做的審慎判斷，傾向於被抹去。

Now for the last distinctive feature about historical knowledge that is incompatible with the covering law model. In history, where generalities are highly frequent correlations rather than invariable relations, counterexamples do not invalidate general laws. It is not always true that power corrupts and it is impossible to verify that absolute power corrupts absolutely. What do historians do when they encounter exceptions to their explanations? They add restrictive clauses, thereby narrowing the applicable area of their generalizations. In this way, they disencumber themselves of proposed counterexamples.
現在講述歷史知識的最後一個與 covering law 模型不相容的特徵。在歷史中，普遍性更多是高頻相關性而非不變關係，反例並不會使一般定律無效。並非永遠權力都會腐蝕，也不可能確定絕對權力絕對會腐蝕。當歷史學家遇到對其解釋的例外情況時，他們會做什麼？他們會增加限制性子句，從而縮小其概括的適用範圍。通過這種方式，他們擺脫了被提出的反例。

Pushing his argument to the limits of the initial model’s tolerance, Frankel accepts the fact that explanation is articulated on the basis of interpretation. But, so as not to break with the model, he holds that, to be acceptable, the
將他的論點推向初始模型容忍的極限，弗蘭克爾接受解釋是基於解讀的事實。但是，為了不違背這個模型，他認為，要被接受，
more encompassing interpretations must rest upon rigorous partial explanations. How can we assign values if they are not set upon well-established causal connections? Someone may say that the opposite is equally true. Certainly in history a cause defines not just any condition but one we may act upon.

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And in this sense, the values of action do infiltrate every assigning of causes. So we must say that to assign a cause is to admit a fact and to stipulate a value. But then, once again, we must apply to the concept of interpretation the same analytic spirit we applied to judgments of importance. In interpreting, we do three things that are unequally compatible with the ideal of explanation. The least compatible undertaking consists in making pronouncements about the meaning of history in terms of ends, of goals, or of ideals. We then set into play an implicit philosophy of “internal” relations that are incompatible, as we said earlier, with the “analytic” spirit, and we impose from without a transcendent, secret project on the course of history. Less contestable is the designation of the most important cause, be it economic or something else. Interpretation here is compatible with explanation, to the extent that it is confined to providing inquiry with the guidance of some seminal idea and to indicating degrees of importance. It is no longer, as a consequence, the only worthwhile interpretation, to the exclusion of all others. But the most interesting interpretation is the one that assigns itself the task of evaluating a sequence of events or a set of institutions in terms of their “terminal consequences” (p. 421), themselves evaluated in terms of their value or lack thereof.

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The overall meaning of a process is these very terminal consequences, some of which coincide with variables in the present situation upon which we may act.

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Thus, for Marx, the emergence of the industrial proletariat is taken as the principal cause, because it is also what bears the “cause” to be defended. This does not prevent a close attention to the facts, if the choice of terminal consequences must itself be a responsible choice. We must therefore admit that two rival interpretations account for different facts, the same events being placed according to the perspective of the different terminal consequences. Either interpetation can be objective and true with regard to the causal sequences upon which it is elaborated. We do not rewrite the same history, we write another history. But we can always discuss the two. History is not condemned to remain a battlefield between irreconcilable points of view. There is a place for a critical pluralism, which, if it admits more than one point of view, does not take them all as equally legitimate.

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...

It is difficult to go any further in the acceptance of the adverse point of view without breaking with the basic hypothesis that explanation in history does not differ fundamentally from explanation in the rest of science. Here at last lies the critical point of the whole discussion. It is to save this essential stake that the upholders of the covering law model endeavor to refer the features of historical methodology that seem discordant with the explanatory model to ...
the present state of affairs of historical science. The declared motivation of their arguments is to defend history against skepticism and to justify its struggle for objectivity. This is why the plea for objectivity and that for the covering law model, having started hand in hand, tend to become indistinguishable. ...

5 Defenses of Narrative ...

The question of the narrative status of historical writing was not directly at stake for the epistemology of the historical sciences, neither for French historiography nor in the first phase of the discussion within the analytic school. Throughout this debate it was taken for granted that narrative is too elementary a form of discourse to satisfy, even from afar, the requirements for any science posed by the covering law model of explanation. The subsequent appearance of “narrativist” theses in the field of discussion was born from the conjunction of two currents of thought. On one side, the criticism of the covering law model had ended up in a breaking apart of the very concept of explanation, and this opened a breach for an approach to the problem from the opposite direction. On the other side, narrative became the object of a revaluation bearing essentially on its resources of intelligibility. Our narrative understanding thus found itself brought into prominence, while historical explanation lost some of its importance. This chapter is devoted to this conjunction of these two movements.
歷史寫作的敘事地位問題對於歷史科學的認識論來說，無論是對於法國史學還是分析學派討論的早期階段，都不是直接關切的問題。在整個這場辯論中，人們理所當然地認為，敘事是一種過於基礎的論述形式，遠未滿足涵蓋定律解釋模型對任何科學提出的要求。「敘事主義」論點在討論領域中的後續出現，源於兩股思潮的匯合。一方面，對涵蓋定律模型的批評最終導致解釋概念本身的瓦解，這為從相反方向切入問題開闢了一條道路。另一方面，敘事成為一種重新估值的對象，主要關注其理解資源。因此，我們的敘事理解被凸顯出來，而歷史解釋則失去了部分重要性。本章就專注於這兩種運動的交匯。

The Breaking up of the Covering Law Model
涵蓋定律模型的瓦解

An Explanation Lacking Legality: W. Dray
缺乏法則性的解釋：W. Dray

We saw at the end of the preceding chapter how the partisans of the covering law model tried to account for the gap between the model and the actual state of affairs in historical science by a double tactic, consisting on one side of weakening the model and on the other of taking a stand on historians’ efforts to elevate their discipline to the rank of science. The attitude of those who discern the symptom of a basic error in the construction of the model itself, in the gap between the covering law model and the actual methodology of history, is wholly different.
在前一章末尾，我們看到涵蓋定律模型的支持者嘗試通過一種雙重策略來解釋模型與歷史科學實際狀況之間的差距，這種策略一方面是削弱模型，另一方面是對歷史學家努力將其學科提升到科學地位的嘗試採取立場。那些在模型本身的建構中—即涵蓋定律模型與歷史實際方法論之間的差距中—看到基本錯誤症狀的人，則持完全不同的態度。

William H. Dray’s work, Laws and Explanations in History, is the best wit- ...
ness in this regard to the crisis in the covering law model.

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His book responds to a disjointed problematic with a mutlifaceted structure. Three fronts are opened which are relatively discontinuous with one another. On the first one, a purely negative criticism is carried out that concludes by disconnecting the concept of explanation from that of law. On the second front, he pleads for a type of causal analysis that cannot be reduced to subsumption under laws. The positive thesis underlying the first part, namely, that we can explain things in history without recourse to general laws, thereby receives an initial application, without it being affirmed that every explanation in history must assume causal language. Finally, Dray explores a type of “rational explanation” that covers only a part of the field emancipated by the criticism of explanation in terms of empirical laws. The plea for causal analysis and that for rational explanation are not derived logically from the negative thesis that explanation in history does not need a law to be an explanation, even though they do presuppose it. They must, therefore, be discussed on their own merits.

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Underlying the criticism of the covering law model is the conviction that it “is unlikely that we shall find any logical features according to which all historical explanations can be grasped together as historical. For the explanations found in history books are a logically miscellaneous lot” (p. 85, his emphasis). It is the recognition of this logical dispersion of explanation in history that opened the way to a reevaluation of our narrative understanding. ...

Beginning with the negative thesis that the idea of explanation in history does not imply the idea of law, Dray finds support for his criticism in the oscillations between the “strong” and the “weak” models of the partisans of the covering law model, which he was the first to call by this name. Already on a formal level, Dray notes, the formulation of the alleged tie between a law and the case it “covers” leaves room for hesitation. The term “because” does not commit us to any particular determinate logical structure, except perhaps in a dictionary written by the logicians of the covering law school. As for the relation of implication affirmed by the “deduced” character of the event, it is far from being univocal. And finally, the concept of explanation does not constrain us to affirm further a “covering” relation between laws and instances. ...

To these oscillations in the formulation of the bonds of implication are added variations in the formulation of the model itself. We have seen that some authors would rather weaken the model than call it into question. A scale of decreasing rigor can in this sense be traversed, from the most strict requirement for deduction to the idea of a lawlike form, passing through that of an assumed but not yet established law, one that is tacit rather than explicit, sketched out but not complete. ...

These oscillations are the symptom of a logical deficiency in the model itself. Indeed it can be shown that the covering law model is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the events explained. It is not a sufficient condition because the alleged explanation cannot be converted into a prediction. ...

Something is still missing. What? Let us consider the example of a mechanical accident, say, when an automobile motor seizes. To attribute the cause to an oil leak, it does not suffice that we know the various physical laws involved. We must also be able to consider a continuous series of incidents between the onset of the leak and the motor’s breakdown. In saying “continuous,” we are not commiting ourselves to some philosophical aporia concerning the infinite divisibility of space and time. We limit ourselves to identifying the lower order of events and to placing them in a series that does not allow any other events lower than those cited. This “reference to a series of facts constituting the story of what happened between the leakage of the oil and the seizure of the engine does explain the seizure” (p. 70).

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It is the same in history; the divisibility of time ends where the most detailed analysis does.
某些事情還是缺失。是什麼？讓我們考慮機械意外的例子，比如說，當汽車發動機卡住。要將原因歸咎於機油洩漏，僅僅知道涉及的各種物理定律是不夠的。我們還必須能夠考慮從洩漏開始到發動機故障之間的連續事件序列。在說「連續」時，我們並不是在承諾某些關於空間和時間無限可分性的哲學難題。我們將自己限制在識別較低階的事件，並將它們排列在不允許低於所引用事件的序列中。這種「參照構成發生在機油洩漏和發動機卡住之間的事實系列的做法確實解釋了這一卡住」（第 70 頁）。在歷史中也是如此；時間的可分性終止於最詳細的分析之處。

If not sufficient, explanation in terms of laws is also not necessary. Indeed, for what condition could it be necessary? Consider the example of an explanation a historian might give or has given: Louis XIV was unpopular when he died because he pursued a political program harmful to the national interests of France. Let us imagine a dialogue between this historian and a logician from the Hempelian school. How would this logician convince the historian that laws are in fact required by the preceding explanation? The logician will say, your explanation is valid due to some implicit law, such as “governments that pursue political programs harmful to the interests of their subjects become unpopular.” The historian will object that he had not just any political program in mind but one such that had really been followed in the particular case under consideration. The logician will then try to fill in the gap between the law and the historian’s explanation by making the law more precise through a series of additions, such as governments that commit their countries to foreign wars, that persecute religious minorities, that entertain parasites at their courts, become unpopular. Still other precisions can be added: that certain political measures failed, that they involved the king’s personal responsibility, and so on without mentioning the measures the king neglected to take. The logician must then allow that, to be complete, an explanation requires an indefinite process of specifications, for at no stage can it be proved that the case covered by the historian is the only one covered by the law.

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Just one law logically binds the historian: any government taking the same political measures, in exactly the same circumstances as those of Louis XIV, will become unpopular. But this formulation is no longer that of a law. It has to mention, in effect, all the particular circumstances of the case in question. (For example, it must not speak of war in general, but of the attack against the Jansenists, and so on.) It takes on an air of generality only by introducing the expression “exactly.” The result of this operation is the production of an empty limitcase, an empty one because the notion of “exactly the same policies and circumstances” (p. 36) cannot be given meaning for any conceivable inquiry. ...

In return, the historian will accept a general statement such as every people ...
similar to the French people “in the aspects specified” (p. 38) will detest a leader similar to Louis “in the respects specified” (ibid.). This law is not an empty one, since the dialectic between the logician and the historian will have furnished the means to “satisfy” the expressions in quotation marks. But this is no longer the sort of law required by the covering law model. For, far from being vague and general like implicit laws, it is so detailed a law that it is equivalent to a “law” for a single case. ...

In reality, such a law for a single case is not a law at all, but the reformulation, in the guise of an empirical law, of the historian’s process of reasoning. The historian says, “E because

c_{1} \dots c_{n}

,” where E designates the event to be explained and

c_{1} \dots c_{n}

are the factors listed by the historian in his explanation. The logician rewrites this as “if

c_{1} \dots c_{n}

, then E ,” where “if” is equivalent to “whenever.” But this equivalence is misleading, for the hypothetical form can express something other than an empirical law. It can express the principle of inference that, in similar cases, we can reasonably predict a result of this sort. Yet this principle is only an “inference license,” stated in hypothetical form. The logical phantom of a “law” thus proceeds from the confusion between an empirical law and a principle of inference. ...

Two provisional conclusions follow, which later I propose to incorporate into my own analysis of the relationships between explanation and understanding in history. ...

The first one concerns the notion of an event, which is also at stake in the discussion in French historiography. Rejecting the covering law model seems, in effect, to imply a return to the conception of an event as unique. This assertion is false if we attach to the idea of uniqueness the metaphysical thesis that the world is made up of radically dissimilar particulars. Explanation then becomes impossible. The assertion is true, though, if we mean that, in contrast to the practitioners of the nomological sciences, historians want to describe and explain what actually happened in all its concrete details. But then what historians understand by “unique” means that nothing exists exactly like their object of inquiry. Their concept of uniqueness, therefore, is relative to the level of precision chosen for their inquiries. What is more, this assertion does not prevent them from employing general terms such as revolution, conquest of one country by another, and the like. In fact, these general terms do not commit historians to the formulation of general laws, but rather to the search for those respects in which the events considered and their circumstances differ from those with which it would be natural to group them under one classificatory term. Historians are not interested in explaining the French Revolution insofar as it is a revolution but insofar as its course differed from those of other members of the class of revolutions. As the definite article indicates in the French Revolution, historians do not proceed from the classificatory term ...
toward the general law but from the classificatory term toward the explanation of differences.

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...

The second conclusion concerns this very explanation of differences. To the extent that it gathers together unique factors in the sense just mentioned, we can affirm that it stems from judgment rather than from deduction, where by judgment we are to understand the sort of operation undertaken by judges when they weigh opposing arguments and render a decision. In the same way, for historians to explain is to defend their conclusions against adversaries who would refer to another set of factors to uphold their own thesis. They justify their conclusions by bringing in new details to support their thesis. This way of judging about particular cases does not consist in placing a case under a law but in gathering together scattered factors and weighing their respective importance in producing the final result. Here historians follow the logic of practical choices instead of that of scientific deduction. In this exercise of judgment, another explanation different from that by laws is referred to as a “warrant”-which will be called causal explanation.
第二個結論與這種差異解釋有關。就其彙集獨特因素而言，我們可以肯定它源於判斷而非演繹，在此，判斷是指法官在權衡對立論點並作出決定時所進行的操作。同樣，對於歷史學家來說，解釋即是捍衛他們的結論，防止對手引用另一套因素來支持自己的論點。他們通過引入新細節來證明自己的結論。這種關於特定案例的判斷方式，不是將案例置於法律之下，而是彙集零散因素並權衡它們在產生最終結果中的相對重要性。在這種判斷的運用中，與法律解釋不同的另一種解釋被稱為「依據」，即所謂的因果解釋。

The plea for causal analysis which occupies chapter 4 of Dray’s book is relatively independent of his criticism of the covering law model of explanation. Causal analysis is just one of the alternatives to explanation by the covering law model. If Dray discusses it, it is first of all because the contested model has often been presented in terms of the language of causality, for example, by Karl Popper.

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In this sense, the causal version of the covering law model provides an appropriate transition from negative criticism to positive exploration of causal analysis. Aside from this connection offered by the polemical aspect of Dray’s book, however, the examining of causal analysis finds its own justification in the use of causal language in history. Dray takes this language to be inevitable and legitimate, in spite of all the equivocations and difficulties attached to its use. Historians, in fact and legitimately, do use expressions of the form " X is the cause of Y " (which we shall distinguish later from the causal law, “the cause of Y is X”). They use them in fact with numerous variations on “cause”: produces, leads to, sets in motion (or their contraries: prevented, omits, stops). They use them legitimately by assuming the explanatory force of a cause. This is what is at stake in this debate. The underlying thesis is that the polysemy of the word “cause” is no more an obstacle to the rule-governed usage of this term than is that of the term “to explain,” with which we began. The problem is to regulate this polysemy, not to conclude that the term must be rejected.

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...

If we set aside the case in which by a cause we mean a causal law, a discussion about causal analysis in history is interesting only if there are singular causal connections whose explanatory force does not depend on a law. ...

Dray is fighting here on two fronts: against those who link the fate of the ...
idea of a cause to that of the idea of a law, and against those who want to exclude all explanation from the field of historiography. Yes, historians do attempt to given causal explanations. No, causal analysis of some particular course of events cannot be reduced to the application of some causal law. Yes, historians do use expressions of the form " X causes Y " in a legitimate way; no, these explanations are not the application of a law of the form “if

X

, then Y.” ...

What then is a causal analysis? It is an essentially selective analysis, aimed at verifying the credentials of this or that candidate for the function of being a cause; that is, its credentials for occupying the place of “Because . . .” in response to the question “Why?” This selection process therefore takes on the character of a contest in which the candidates must pass a certain number of tests. Causal analysis, I would put it, is a causal criteriology. It consists essentially of two tests. The first is an inductive one. The factor in question must be a really necessary one. The second is a pragmatic test. There must be a reason for selecting the condition in question from among the conditions that as a whole constitute the sufficient condition for the phenomenon. ...

This pragmatic test corresponds in part to the considerations of manipulability by which Collingwood defines one of the senses of the idea of a cause, namely, that which human action “has a handle on.” In another way, it takes into account what ought to have been done, thus what can be blamed (as, for example, when we inquire as to the causes of a war). And in yet another way, the pragmatic criterion includes what precipitated the course of events, the spark or catalyst. In essence, such an inquiry is necessarily incomplete. It constitutes an eminently open inquiry. ...

The inductive test is the most difficult one to define correctly. It consists in justifying the assertion that “if not

X

, then not

Y

,” in the absence of any rule saying “whenever X, then Y.” A historian who is assumed to use similar formulas means that in this particular situation-everthing else otherwise being equal (or better, the situation being what it is)-if this X had not occurred, that Y which did occur would not have happened or would have been different. Such justification stems from a use of judgment as described earlier, which, we said, does not require a law with the form “only if.” The historian “thinks away” the suggested cause “in order to judge what difference its nonoccurrence would have made in the light of what else he knows about the situation studied” (p. 104, his emphasis). This inductive test is not equivalent to a sufficient explanation. At most it constitutes a necessary explanation, by eliminating from the list of candidates for the role of cause those factors whose absence would not have changed the course of events. To obtain a complete explanation-or one as complete as possible-the imputed cause must still be justified positively through the process described earlier, that of “filling in” the details.

^{8}

...

The important thing for causal analysis is that the imputation of a cause in ...
regard to some particular event does not derive from the application of a causal law. Often it is even the opposite case that is true. Many causal laws are in reality second-order generalizations based on some series of individual diagnoses of causality, established through a use of judgment and validated independently of one another. The alleged causal law, “tyranny causes revolution,” is undoubtedly of this order. The same may be said of “the cause of war is greed.” Such a law assumes that we have at our command particular explanations of particular wars, then that we observe a trend in the stated law. As useful as these generalizations may be for subsequent research, they are not what justify the individual explanations they rest upon.
關於某一特定事件的因果論述，並不源自於因果定律的應用。事實上，往往恰恰相反。許多因果定律實際上是基於一系列個別因果診斷的二階概括，這些診斷通過判斷力建立，並相互獨立驗證。所謂的因果定律，如「暴政引發革命」，無疑屬於這種類型。同樣可以說「戰爭的原因是貪婪」。這種定律假設我們已經掌握了特定戰爭的個別解釋，然後觀察到所述定律中的趨勢。儘管這些概括對後續研究很有用，但它們並不能證明它們所依據的個別解釋的正當性。

If there is therefore no need to give up the idea of cause in history, this is so to the extent that we respect its particular logic, such as I have outlined it.
因此，如果我們不必放棄歷史中的因果概念，這是因為我們尊重了它的特殊邏輯，正如我所概述的那樣。

I will conclude with several strictly conservative comments. First, as concerns explanation, it seems to me that we must apply to the theory of causal analysis-as well as to rational explanations, which I have not yet spoken of-the warning addressed to the partisans of the covering law model, namely, that the explanations encountered in works of history constitute “a logically miscellaneous lot.” This assertion holds against every claim to take one model of explanation as the exclusive one. This polysemy can also serve as an argument against Dray’s opposite claim to separate explanation in history from the covering law model. If we limit ourselves to saying that no explanation satisfies the covering law model and that there are causal analyses that are not explanations in terms of a law, we are in error. This is why, for my part, I would prefer to emphasize the fact that laws are interpolated into the narrative fabric instead of insisting upon their inappropriateness. This is all the more true in that Dray opens the way to a more subtle dialectic between explanation and understanding when he considers the procedures for justifying a causal attribution and links them to the procedures that occur in juridical cases. The search for warrants, the weighing and evaluating of causes, the testing of candidates for the role of cause, all these activities of judgment stem from an analogy between historical and juridical argumentation which needs to be made more explicit.

^{9}

And in this regard, the kinship among the reconstitution of a continuous series of events, the procedure of the elimination of candidates for singular causality, and the exercise of judgment needs to be shown more clearly. Hence the range must be left open from explanation by laws, to singular causal explanation, to judgment procedures, . . . to rational explanation.
我將以幾點非常保守的評論作為結論。首先，就解釋而言，我認為我們必須對因果分析理論以及我尚未談及的理性解釋，套用對覆蓋定律模型支持者的警告，即在歷史著作中遇到的解釋構成了「邏輯上雜亂的一堆」。這一斷言反對每一種將某一解釋模型視為唯一模型的主張。這種多義性也可以作為反對德雷（Dray）將歷史解釋與覆蓋定律模型分開的相反主張的論據。如果我們只是說沒有解釋滿足覆蓋定律模型，且存在不屬於定律範疇的因果分析，那麼我們就犯了錯誤。這就是為什麼我更傾向於強調定律被插入敘事結構，而不是堅持其不恰當性。更重要的是，當德雷考慮證明因果歸因的程序，並將其與司法案例中發生的程序聯繫起來時，他為解釋和理解之間開闢了一條更微妙的辯證路徑。尋找證據、權衡和評估原因、檢驗候選原因，所有這些判斷活動都源於歷史與司法論證之間的類比，這種類比需要更明確地闡明。在這方面，對連續事件序列的重建、排除單一因果關係候選者的程序以及判斷的行使之間的親緣關係需要更清楚地展示。因此，解釋的範圍必須從定律解釋、單一因果解釋、判斷程序，延伸到理性解釋。

On the other hand, despite the prefatory assertion of always drawing upon historians’ actual argumentation, the few examples considered by Dray seem borrowed from the sort of history the French historians struggle against. In the dialectic between the logician and the historian as well as in the description of the causal analysis of singular events, it seems taken for granted that
另一方面，儘管有預先的斷言總是要引用歷史學家的實際論證，但德雷所考慮的幾個例子似乎是從法國歷史學家所反對的那種歷史中借用的。在邏輯學家和歷史學家之間的辯證以及在對特定事件的因果分析描述中，似乎是理所當然地認為
explanation always has to do with singular events. Of course, I am ready to admit that particular causal analysis is valid for any short-term or long-term change, on the condition that historians do take into account the particularity of the changes they consider. In this respect, everything said about the relativity of the notion of a unique event to the scale of an inquiry must be retained. But the broadening of the notion of event to include other changes than the kind that is illustrated by the example of the death of Louis XIV remains to be done.

^{10}

解釋總是與特定事件有關。當然，我準備承認特定的因果分析對任何短期或長期變化都是有效的，但條件是歷史學家確實考慮了他們所考慮的變化的特殊性。在這方面，關於獨特事件概念相對性的一切論述，必須被保留。但是，將事件概念擴大到包括路易十四死亡這類例子以外的其他變化，還有待完成。

Most critics have seen his examination of the model of rational explanation as Dray’s positive contribution to our problem (see pp. 118-55). This is not wholly wrong inasmuch as this model constitutes one coherent alternative to the covering law model. But neither is it exact, inasmuch as causal analysis already constituted an alternative to explanation in terms of laws. What is more, rational explanation does not cover the whole field opened by Dray’s criticism. It is not even addressed to exactly the same examples of explanation. The previous discussion-including that of causal analysis-was applied “to explanations given of fairly large scale historical events or conditions” (p. 118). Rational explanation is applied “to a narrower range of cases,” namely, “the kind of explanations historians generally give of the actions of those individuals who are important enough to be mentioned in the course of historical narrative” (ibid., his emphasis).
大多數批評家都認為他對理性解釋模型的檢查是德雷對我們問題的積極貢獻（見第 118-155 頁）。這並非完全錯誤，因為這個模型構成了對覆蓋法模型的一個連貫替代方案。但這也不完全準確，因為因果分析已經構成了對法則解釋的另一種選擇。更重要的是，理性解釋並不涵蓋德雷批評所開闢的整個領域。它甚至不是針對完全相同的解釋示例。之前的討論——包括因果分析在內——是應用於"對相當大規模的歷史事件或條件的解釋"（第 118 頁）。理性解釋則應用於"一個更窄的案例範圍"，即"歷史敘事中值得一提的重要個人行為的解釋"（同上，強調）。

This is why, even though contesting the covering law model remains the negative central thread of Dray’s whole book, we must respect the relative autonomy of the three fronts upon which he fights: against the covering law model; for causal analysis; for rational explanation. The relative discontinuity in these analyses bears witness precisely to what I have called the breakdown of the covering law.
這就是為什麼，儘管質疑涵蓋定律模型仍然是德雷整本書的負面中心線索，但我們必須尊重他在三個戰線上的相對自主性：反對涵蓋定律模型；支持因果分析；支持理性解釋。這些分析中的相對不連續性，正是證明了我所稱的涵蓋定律的崩潰。

The name that Dray gives to this mode of explanation sums up his program. For one thing, it applies to actions done by agents similar to ourselves. It thereby marks the intersection of the theory of history with that of action, therefore with what I have called our competence for using a conceptual framework for action in a meaningful way. However, because of this, it runs the risk of confining historical explanation to the domain of the “history of events,” from which the new historians take their distance. This point must be kept in mind for our discussion in the next chapter. For another thing, the model still means to be a model of explanation. In this, Dray takes his stand equally distant from those for whom explaining something is to “cover” it with an empirical law, and those for whom understanding an action is to relive, reenact, or rethink the intentions, conceptions, and thoughts of agents. Once again Dray is fighting on two fronts, that of the positivists and that of the idealists, to the extent that these latter theorists lock themselves into a
德雷給這種解釋模式的名稱概括了他的研究方案。首先，它適用於由類似我們的行為者所做的行動。因此，它標誌著歷史理論與行動理論的交叉點，也就是我所說的我們以有意義的方式使用行動概念框架的能力。然而，正因如此，它有被局限於「事件史」領域的風險，而新的歷史學家正試圖與此保持距離。這一點必須在下一章的討論中牢記。其次，該模型仍然意圖成為一種解釋模型。在這一點上，德雷同時與兩個陣營保持距離：一是那些認為解釋某事就是用經驗定律「覆蓋」它的實證主義者，二是那些認為理解行動是重新體驗、重現或重新思考行為者的意圖、概念和思想的理想主義者。德雷再次在實證主義者和理想主義者兩個陣線上作戰，後者將自己鎖在
theory of empathy which the former thinkers denounce because of its nonscientific character. In truth, among the “idealists,” it is Collingwood whom Dray remains closest to. Relive, reenact, rethink, are Collingwood’s terms. What needs to be demonstrated is that these operations do have their own logic which distinguishes them from psychology or heuristics, and which sets them on the terrain of explanations. The stake is therefore really “a logical analysis of explanation as it is given in history” (p. 121, his emphasis)."
在前人的思想中，被 denounce 的移情理論，因為其非科學性質。事實上，在「理想主義者」中，Dray 與 Collingwood 最為接近。重新體驗、重新演繹、重新思考，這些都是 Collingwood 的術語。需要證明的是，這些操作確實有其獨特的邏輯，將它們與心理學或啟發法區分開來，並將它們置於解釋的領域。因此，真正的目標是「作為在歷史中呈現的解釋的邏輯分析」（第 121 頁，他的強調）。

To explain an individual’s action in terms of reasons is to provide “a reconstruction of the agent’s calculation of means to be adopted toward his chosen end in the light of the circumstances in which he found himself” (p. 122, his emphasis). In other words, to explain such actions “we need to know what considerations convinced him that he should act as he did” (ibid.).
用理由解釋個人的行動，就是提供「代理人根據他所處的環境，為實現選定目標而計算所採取手段的重建」（第 122 頁，他的強調）。換句話說，要解釋這些行動，「我們需要知道什麼考慮因素說服他要如此行動」（同上）。

Clearly we are involved here with an argument that leads directly back to the Aristotelian theory of deliberation. But let us not misunderstand the term “calculation.” It is not necessarily a question of strictly deductive reasoning “recited in propositional form” (p. 123). As soon as we have to do with an intentional action, every level of conscious deliberation is allowed, from the moment these levels permit the construction of such a calculation, “the one the agent would have gone through if he had the time, if he had not seen what to do in a flash, if he had been called upon to account for what he did after the event, etc.” (ibid.). To explain the action is to bring to light this calculation. It constitutes the agent’s “reasons” for acting as he did. Whence the term “rational explanation.”
很明顯，這裡的論點直接追溯到亞里斯多德的審議理論。但不要誤解「計算」一詞。這不 necessarily 是以命題形式「背誦」的嚴格演繹推理。只要是有意圖的行動，每一層次的意識審議都是被允許的，只要這些層次能夠建構出這樣的計算，「即使他有時間，若他沒有立即看出該做什麼，若被要求事後解釋他的行為等等」（同上）。解釋行動就是揭示這種計算。它構成了代理人行動的「理由」。由此而來「理性解釋」一詞。

Dray adds one important touch that goes beyond “logic.” To explain is to show that what was done was “the thing to have done for the reasons given” (p. 124). To explain, therefore, is to justify, with the nuance of “appraisal” attached to this term. It means to explain in what way the action was “appropriate.” Here again we need to be clear about the meaning of these words. To justify is not to ratify the choice following our moral criteria, so as to say, what the agent in question did is what I would have done too. It means “weighing” the action in terms of the agent’s goals, his beliefs (even if they were erroneous ones), the circumstances he was aware of. “Rational explanation may be regarded as an attempt to reach a kind of logical equilibrium at which point an action is matched with a calculation” (p. 125, his emphasis). We look for an explanation precisely when we do not see the relationship between what was done and what we think we know about the agents involved. When such logical equilibrium is lacking, we seek to reconstitute it.
德雷增添了一個超越"邏輯"的重要觸角。解釋就是表明所做的事情是"基於所給理由而做的事情"（第 124 頁）。因此，解釋就是證明，並附帶"評價"的細微差別。這意味著解釋該行動是以何種方式"恰當"的。在這裡，我們需要對這些詞語的含義保持清晰。證明並不是根據我們的道德標準追認選擇，即說，有關行為人所做的是我也會做的事情。而是以行為人的目標、他的信念（即使是錯誤的）、他所知的環境來"權衡"這一行動。"理性解釋可以被視為達到一種邏輯平衡的嘗試，在此點上，一個行動與一種計算相匹配"（第 125 頁，他的強調）。正是當我們看不到所做之事與我們對相關行為人的所知之間的關係時，我們尋求解釋。當缺乏這種邏輯平衡時，我們尋求重建它。
“Logical equilibrium” is the best term Dray could have chosen to distance himself from understanding through empathy, projection, or identification, and at the same time remove his explanation from Hempel’s criticism. For to reach this point of equilibrium, we must inductively gather the evidence that allows us to evaluate the problem as the agent saw it. Only work with the
"邏輯平衡"是德雷可以選擇的最佳術語，以使自己與通過同情、投射或認同來理解保持距離，同時也使他的解釋免於漢普爾的批評。為了達到這一平衡點，我們必須歸納性地收集證據，以便按照行為人看待問題的方式來評估問題。只有使用文件才能進行這種重建。
documents allows this reconstruction. There is nothing instantaneous or dogmatic about this procedure. It requires work and is open to corrections. It requires these features with causal analysis.
這一程序並非瞬時或教條的。它需要工作，並且對於更正是開放的。它對於因果分析同樣需要這些特徵。

Dray did not ask about the relations between his analysis and that of emplotment. The kinship between the two approaches is therefore all the more remarkable. It is particularly striking on one point. Dray observes that rational explanation involves a type of generality or universality that is not the same as for an empirical law: “If

y

is a good reason for

A

to do

x

, then

y

would be a good reason for anyone sufficiently like

A

to do

x

under sufficiently similar circumstances” (p. 132). We recognize here the notion of “probability” referred to by Aristotle: “What a man would necessarily or reasonably say or do.” Dray is too occupied with polemicizing against the covering law model and distinguishing a “principle of action” from an empirical generalization to take interest in this intersection of the theory of history with that of narrative, as he had done with the theory of action. Yet we cannot forget the Aristotelian distinction between “one because of another” and “one after the other” when Dray pleads for the polysemy of the term “because,” against any reduction to univocity in covering law terms.

^{12}

德雷沒有詢問他的分析與情節敘述之間的關係。因此，這兩種方法之間的親緣關係就更加引人注目。在一個特定的點上尤其明顯。德雷觀察到理性解釋涉及一種普遍性，不同於經驗法則的普遍性："如果

y

是

A

做

x

的一個好理由，那麼

y

對於任何足夠相似的

A

在 sufficiently 類似的情況下做

x

來說都是一個好理由"（第 132 頁）。我們在此辨認出亞里士多德提到的"或然性"概念："一個人會必然或合理地說或做什麼。"德雷太專注於與概括性法則模型爭論，並區分"行動原則"與經驗性概括，以至於無法對歷史理論與敘事理論的這種交叉點感興趣，儘管他曾對行動理論有過類似研究。然而，當德雷為"因為"一詞的多義性進行辯護，反對任何用概括性法則術語進行的單一化簡時，我們不能忘記亞里士多德關於"因為另一個"和"在另一個之後"的區別。

^{12}

There remains, to my eyes, the major difficulty, which is not the one Dray is arguing about. To the extent that the model of rational explanation makes the theory of history intersect with the theory of action, the problem is to account for those reasons for actions that cannot be attributed to individual agents. Here, we shall see, is the critical point for any “narrativist” theory.
在我看來，仍然存在一個主要難題，而這並非德雷所爭論的問題。就理性解釋模型使歷史理論與行動理論相交的程度而言，問題在於解釋那些不能歸因於個體行為者的行動理由。在這一點上，我們將看到，這是任何"敘事主義"理論的關鍵點。

Dray is not unaware of this difficulty and does devote a section to it (pp. 137-42). He proposes three responses which do not exactly correspond with one another. We can begin by saying that there is a presumption that a given action lends itself to rational explanation “if we study it closely enough” (p. 137). This presumption is the wager that it is always possible to “save the appearance” of rationality by discovering, through hard work, the distantand perhaps strange-beliefs allowing us to construct the presumed calculation and to reach the sought-for point of equilibrium between reasons and actions. This presumption of rationality has no limits. It includes recourse to unconscious motives, and even an “irrational” explanation is still a case of explanation by reasons.
德雷並不忽視這個困難，並確實對此專門討論了一個章節（第 137-42 頁）。他提出了三個並不完全一致的回應。我們可以首先說，如果我們仔細研究某一行為，就會有一種假設認為它可以得到理性解釋。這個假設是一個賭注，即總是可以通過艱苦的工作，發現遙遠且可能是奇怪的信念，從而建構出被推測的計算，並達到在理由和行動之間尋求的平衡點，來「拯救表象」。這種理性的假設是沒有限制的。它包括求助於潛意識動機，甚至一個「非理性」的解釋仍然是一種通過理由進行解釋的情況。

However, this first response only holds to the degree that we can identify the individual agents of an action. What happens when rational explanation is applied to groups? Dray suggests that by an elliptical process historians do find it legitimate to personify entities such as Germany and Russia and to apply a quasi-rational explanation to these super-agents. For example, Germany’s attack on Russia in 1941 can be explained by referring to Germany’s fear of being attacked from the rear by Russia-as though a calculation of this sort did hold for the actions of a super-agent named Germany (see p. 140).
然而，這第一個回應僅在我們能識別某一行動的個體行為者的情況下才成立。當理性解釋被應用於群體時會發生什麼？德雷建議，通過一種省略的過程，歷史學家確實認為可以將德國和俄羅斯等實體擬人化，並對這些超級行為者應用準理性解釋。例如，德國在 1941 年攻擊俄羅斯可以通過提及德國害怕被俄羅斯從背後攻擊來解釋——彷彿這種計算確實適用於名為德國的超級行為者的行動（見第 140 頁）。

This ellipsis itself is justified in two ways. We can, through very detailed studies, demonstrate that the calculation in question is in the final analysis one that applies to those individuals authorized to act “for Germany.” And in other cases, we extend by analogy a “typical” explanation for an individual to a group. (For example, the Puritans in the eighteenth century fought against the system of taxation in England.)
這種省略本身有兩種正當性。我們可以通過非常詳細的研究，證明所討論的計算最終是適用於那些被授權「代表德國」行動的個人。在其他情況下，我們通過類比將個人的「典型」解釋擴展到群體。（例如，18 世紀的清教徒反對英國的稅收制度。）

The third response is that with large-scale historical phenomena we run into what Whitehead called the “senseless side” of history, that is, that rationally explainable actions produce unintended and unwanted effects, even adverse ones. For example, Christopher Columbus’s voyage can be said to be the cause of the spread of European culture, in a sense of the word “cause” that has nothing to do with Columbus’s intentions. The same may be said for most large-scale social phenomena. At this point, an objection might be made that links up with French historiography’s considerations about the long time-span and social history. Dray grants that the result of such large-scale changes cannot be explained by the purposes of some individual “who stage-managed the whole thing.” In other words, there is no place here for referring to some equivalent or substitute for the Hegelian cunning of reason, which would still allow us to speak of unintended results of action in intentional terms. Yet this admission does not prevent more detailed inquiry into individuals’ or groups’ contribution to the final result and therefore into the calculations that presided over their activities. There is no one super-calculation but rather a batch of calculations to be treated in a “piecemeal” fashion.
第三種回應是，對於大規模的歷史現象，我們遇到了懷特海所說的歷史的「無意義面」，也就是理性可解釋的行動產生了非預期且不受歡迎的效果，甚至是負面的效果。例如，克里斯托弗·哥倫布的航行可以被說成是歐洲文化擴散的原因，在一種與哥倫布本身意圖無關的「原因」意義上。對於大多數大規模社會現象也可以這麼說。在這一點上，一個可能的異議可能與法國史學對於長時段和社會史的考慮有關。德雷承認，這種大規模變化的結果不能由某些「策劃整個事情」的個人目的來解釋。換句話說，在此沒有為黑格爾理性的狡黠找到等效或替代的空間，這原本還可以讓我們以意圖性的術語談論行動的非預期結果。然而，這種承認並不妨礙對個人或群體對最終結果的貢獻進行更詳細的探究，因此也不妨礙探究主導其活動的計算。這裡沒有一個超級計算，而是一批需要以「逐步」方式處理的計算。

As we see, the argument is valid only if we take the social process as equivalent to the sum of individual processes analyzed in intentional terms and if we take the gap that separates them as simply “meaningless.” This equivalence, however, is a problem. There is the question, in fact, whether what distinguishes historical explanation from rational explanations of action is not first of all the scale of phenomena it refers to, namely, entities with a societal character that are not reducible to the sum of their individual members. Next there is the appearance of effects not reducible to the sum of individual intentions, and hence to their calculations. Finally, there are those changes not reducible to variations in the time experienced by individuals taken one at a time.

^{13}

In short, how are we to tie social processes to the acts of individuals and their calculations without professing a “methodological individualism” that has yet to produce its credentials?
正如我們所看到的，這個論點只有在我們將社會過程等同於以意向性術語分析的個體過程之總和，並且將它們之間的差距視為純粹「無意義」時，才是有效的。然而，這種等值性本身就是一個問題。事實上，存在這樣一個問題：歷史解釋與行動的理性解釋的根本區別，是否首先在於其所指涉的現象規模，即具有社會性質且不可簡化為其個體成員總和的實體。接著是一些不可簡化為個體意圖及其計算之總和的效果。最後，還有那些無法歸結為逐一考慮的個體所經歷的時間變化的變化。簡而言之，我們如何將社會過程與個體的行為和計算聯繫起來，而不淪為一種尚未證明其可信性的「方法論個人主義」？

William Dray confines himself to the resources of a theory of action close to the one I developed in Part I under the title of mimesis

_{1}

. It remains to be seen whether a “narrativist” treatment of our historical understanding, which would draw upon the resources of the intelligibility of narrative stemming from mimesis

_{2}

, might span the gulf that remains between explanation in terms of an individual or quasi-individual agent’s reasons and explanation of largescale historical processes in terms of nonindividual social forces.
威廉·德雷（William Dray）局限於一種與我在第一部分以摹仿（mimesis）為標題所發展的行動理論相近的理論資源。現在有待探討的是，一種「敘事主義者」的歷史理解方法，它將借鑒源自摹仿的敘事可理解性資源，是否能跨越個體或準個體代理人的理性解釋與以非個體社會力量解釋大規模歷史過程之間的鴻溝。

Historical Explanation According to G. H. Von Wright
根據 G. H. 馮萊特（Von Wright）的歷史解釋

Criticism of the covering law model takes a decisive step with the work of Georg von Wright.

^{14}

It does not, as with Dray, consist in opposing causal explanation to explanation in terms of laws and constructing, as a partial alternative model, rational explanations. It aims instead at conjoining causal explanation and teleological inference within a “mixed” model, that of quasicausal explanation, intended to account for the most typical mode of explanation in the human sciences and in history.
對蓋亞法則模型的批評隨著喬治·馮·萊特的工作邁出決定性的一步。

^{14}

它不像德雷那樣，反對因果解釋與根據法則的解釋，並構建作為部分替代模型的理性解釋。相反，它旨在將因果解釋和目的論推論結合在一個「混合」模型中，即準因果解釋，意在解釋人文科學和歷史中最典型的解釋模式。

It is not insignificant that von Wright, a specialist in deontological logic,

^{15}

should recognize, at the threshold of his enterprise, the duality of traditions that have presided over theory-building in the “humanistic and social” disciplines. The first tradition, which goes back to Galileo, and even Plato, gives priority to causal and mechanistic explanation. The second, which goes back to Aristotle, pleads for the specificity of teleological or finalistic explanation. The former requires a unified scientific method. The latter defends a methodological pluralism. Von Wright rediscovers this ancient polarity in the opposition, familiar to the German tradition, between Verstehen (understanding) and Erklären (explanation).

^{16}

But even though the covering law model was forced to deny that understanding possessed any explanatory value, without for all that succeeding in accounting for the intellectual operations actually at work in the human sciences, von Wright proposes a sufficiently powerful model to get close to, through a series of successive extensions of the initial language of classical propositional logic, the domain of historical understanding, with regard to which he always recognizes an originary capacity of apprehension as regards the meaning of human action. What is interesting, for our investigation, lies exactly in this approximation without annexation of the domain of understanding through a model stemming from the enrichment of propositional logic by modal logic and the theory of dynamic systems.

^{17}

這並非微不足道，馮萊特（一位專門研究義務邏輯的學者）應該在其企業的門檻上認識到在「人文和社會」學科中主導理論建構的傳統的二元性。第一個傳統，追溯到伽利略，甚至柏拉圖，優先考慮因果和機械式解釋。第二個，追溯到亞里士多德，為目的論或目的性解釋的特殊性辯護。前者要求統一的科學方法。後者捍衛方法論的多元主義。馮萊特在德國傳統中熟悉的理解（Verstehen）和解釋（Erklären）的對立中重新發現了這種古老的兩極分化。儘管涵蓋定律模型被迫否認理解具有任何解釋性價值，而且未能解釋人文科學中實際運作的智力操作，馮萊特提出了一個足夠強大的模型，通過對經典命題邏輯初始語言的一系列連續擴展，接近歷史理解的領域，在這方面他始終承認對人類行動意義的原初把握能力。對於我們的研究來說，有趣的是通過模態邏輯和動態系統理論豐富命題邏輯而產生的模型，實現對理解領域的近似而非吞併。

Whoever speaks of approximation speaks at the same time of the construction through successive extensions of some initial language of a richer model, yet one that is coherent with the theoretical requirements of this language, and also of the polarization of the theoretical model due to the attraction exercised upon it of some originary apprehension of meaning, which in the end remains external to the purely internal process of enriching the model. The question will be whether this approximation goes as far as becoming a logical reformulation of the underlying concepts of historical understanding.
凡言逼近，即同時論及通過對某些初始語言的連續擴展來建構一個更豐富的模型，且該模型與該語言的理論要求保持一致，同時也論及由於某種意義原初把握對理論模型所施加的吸引力而導致的模型兩極化，最終仍然外於模型豐富過程的純內在性。問題將在於這種逼近是否能達到對歷史理解底層概念的邏輯重構。

Unlike the covering law model, which limits itself to superimposing a covering law upon what is given without any internal logical connection, von Wright’s model extends its empire to the conditional relations between earlier and later states implied in dynamic physical systems. This extension constitutes the underlying structure for his logical reformulation of the whole problem of understanding.
不同於覆蓋定律模型僅僅在無內在邏輯聯繫的情況下疊加一個覆蓋定律，馮萊特的模型將其範圍擴展至動態物理系統中隱含的前後狀態之間的條件關係。這種擴展構成了他對理解問題整體進行邏輯重構的底層結構。

There is no question here of reproducing the argumentation that governs
在此不擬重現支配論證的邏輯。
this passage from propositional logic to the logic of dynamic physical systems. I shall limit myself to a rapid presentation of the formal-logical apparatus that governs von Wright’s work.

^{18} He

makes the following assumptions: a set of logically independent generic states of affairs (that the sun is shining, that someone is opening a door, etc.);

^{19}

the occurrence of these states of affairs on given (spatial or temporal) occasions; the assumption that logically independent states of affairs combine with one another in a finite number of ways constituting a total state or world; the possibility of constructing a language that, through a conjunction of its sentences, describes those states that are the atoms or elements of this possible world; and, finally, the possibility of considering, among the set of states of affairs, “state-spaces” and, among these, finite state-spaces. This set of presuppositions can be summed up as follows. “Assume that the total state of the world on a given occasion can be completely described by stating for any given member of some state-space, whether or not this member obtains on that occasion. A world which satisfies this conditon might be called a Tractatus-world. It is the kind of world which Wittgenstein envisaged in the Tractatus. It is a species of a more general conception of how the world is constituted. We can call this general conception logical atomism” (p. 44, his emphasis).
從命題邏輯到動態物理系統邏輯的這段過程。我將僅限於快速呈現冯萊特工作的形式邏輯工具。

^{18} He

做出以下假設：一組在邏輯上相互獨立的通用事態（例如，太陽正在照射，有人正在開門等）；

^{19}

這些事態在給定的（空間或時間）場合中的發生；假設邏輯上相互獨立的事態以有限的方式組合，構成一個總體狀態或世界；構建一種語言的可能性，通過其句子的連接描述那些作為可能世界原子或元素的狀態；最後，可以在事態集合中考慮"狀態空間"，並在這些空間中考慮有限的狀態空間。這套預設可以總結如下："假設世界在某個特定場合的總體狀態可以通過陳述某些狀態空間的任何給定成員在該場合是否存在來完全描述。滿足此條件的世界可以稱為《邏輯哲學論》世界。這是維特根斯坦在《邏輯哲學論》中設想的世界類型。這是關於世界構成方式的更一般概念的一個分支。我們可以將這種一般概念稱為邏輯原子論"（第 44 頁，他的強調）。

As to saying whether the world in which we actually live satisfies this model, that remains “a deep and difficult metaphysical question, and I do not know how to answer it” (ibid.). The model indicates only that states of affairs are the sole “ontological building-bricks” of those worlds we are studying and that we do not attend to the internal structure of these bricks.
至於說我們實際生活的世界是否符合這個模型，那仍然是"一個深奧而困難的形而上學問題，我不知道如何回答"（同上）。該模型僅表明事態是我們研究的那些世界的唯一"本體論建築磚"，而我們不關注這些磚塊的內部結構。

At this stage of the analysis, it is difficult to see what step has been taken in the direction of practical and historical understanding. A first significant extension concerns the addition to this system of a principle of development. Von Wright does this in the simplest possible way, by adding a rudimentary “tense-logic” to his two-valued propositional logic. Using the vocabulary of this logic, we add a new symbol T which is reducible to a binary connector. “The expression ’ pTq ’ can be read: ‘(now) the state p obtains and next, viz., on the next occasion, the state q obtains’. . . . Of particular interest is the case when they are state-descriptions. The whole expression then says that the world is now in a certain state and on the next occasion in a certain total state, the same or a different one as the case may be” (p. 45). If we consider further that the p and q that frame the T can also themselves contain the symbol T , we can construct chains of states marked by succession which allow us to state fragments of the world’s history, where the term “history” indicates both the succession of total states of the world and the expressions depicting that succession. We must further enrich the calculus of the connective T, first with a temporal quantifier (“always” “never,” “sometimes”), then by a modal operator M . These successive additions govern the formalizing of the logic of conditions as well as what von Wright will later call causal analysis.
在分析的這個階段，很難看出朝著實踐和歷史理解已邁出了什麼步伐。第一個重要的擴展涉及向這個系統中添加發展原則。馮萊特以最簡單的方式做到這一點，通過向他的兩值命題邏輯中添加一個初步的「時態邏輯」。使用這種邏輯的詞彙，我們添加一個新的符號 T，它可以歸約為二元連接詞。「表達式『pTq』可以讀作：『（現在）狀態 p 成立，下一刻，即下一個機會，狀態 q 成立』。......特別有趣的是當它們是狀態描述的情況。整個表達式說明世界現在處於某種狀態，下一個機會將處於某種完整狀態，可能是相同的，也可能是不同的」（第 45 頁）。如果我們進一步考慮框定 T 的 p 和 q 本身也可以包含符號 T，我們可以構建由連續標記的狀態鏈，允許我們陳述世界歷史的片段，其中「歷史」一詞指世界完整狀態的連續以及描繪該連續的表達式。我們必須進一步豐富連接詞 T 的演算，首先加入時間量詞（「總是」「從不」「有時」），然後加入模態算子 M。這些連續的添加控制著條件邏輯的形式化，以及馮萊特後來所稱的因果分析。

Instead of developing this calculus further, he limits himself to a “quasi-
不是進一步發展這個演算，他把自己限制在一個「準
formal method of exposition and illustration” bringing into play simple topological figures (or “trees”) (p. 48). These figures consist only of total states of the world (made up of

n

elementary states of affairs), represented by small circles, a progression from left to right from one total state to another, hence a “history,” represented by the line connecting the circles, and finally alternate possible progressions, represented by branches of the tree.
以"對事物的正式闡述和說明方法"，運用簡單的拓撲圖形（或"樹狀圖"）（第 48 頁）。這些圖形僅由世界的總體狀態（由

n

個基本狀態組成）組成，以小圓圈表示，從左到右依次展示從一個總體狀態到另一個總體狀態的進程，即一個"歷史"，由連接圓圈的線表示，最後是以樹枝表示的可替代進程。

As formal as this model may be, it already bears the imprint of every subsequent development. The most fundamental condition of history is constituted by the “freedom of movement”-the theoretically unlimited indetermina-tion-the world has, or would have had, at each stage of the progression. We must never lose sight of the fact that, when we speak of a system, we have only to do with “a fragment of the history of the world.” “A system, in this sense, is defined through a state-space, an initial state, a number of stages of development, and a set of alternative moves for each stage” (p. 49). Far then from the idea of a system excluding the intervention of free and responsible subjects-whether it be a question of making a plan or a physical experi-ment-it fundamentally conserves this possibility and calls for it as its complement. How?
儘管這個模型看起來很正式，但它已經預示了後續的每一個發展。歷史最基本的條件是由世界在進程的每個階段所具有或本可具有的"移動自由"——理論上的無限不確定性所構成。我們必須始終牢記，當我們談論一個系統時，我們所討論的只是"世界歷史的一個片段"。"在這個意義上，一個系統是通過狀態空間、初始狀態、若干發展階段以及每個階段的一組可選移動來定義的"（第 49 頁）。因此，遠非排除自由且負責任的主體的介入——無論是規劃還是物理實驗——系統從根本上保留了這種可能性，並將其視為補充。如何？

A second addition is necessary here, if the logic of dynamic physical systems is to rejoin our originary understanding of action and history. It concerns the status of causal explanation in relation to causal analysis, it being understood that it is the former that is of interest to understanding.
為了使動態物理系統的邏輯重新連接到我們對行動和歷史的原初理解，這裡需要再進行一次補充。這涉及到因果解釋與因果分析的關係，理解是以前者為感興趣的對象。

Causal analysis is an activity that runs through systems in the form of topological trees. Considering some final state, it inquires into the “causes” of its coming into being and its composition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Let us briefly recall the distinction between these two types of condition. To say that

p

is a sufficient condition of

q

is to say that whenever

p

, then

q

(

p

suffices to assure the presence of

q

). To say that

p

is the necessary condition of

q

is to say that whenever

q

, then

p

(

q

suffices to assure the presence of

p

). The difference between these two types of conditions is illustrated by the asymmetry in how the system is considered, that is, whether it is approached retrogressively or progressively, due to the alternatives opened by the branches. Causal explanation differs from causal analysis in that in the latter a system is given and we explore the conditional relations internal to the system, whereas in causal explanation an individual occurrence of a generic phenomenon (an event, process, or state) is given and we look for a system wherein this generic phenomenon-the explanandum-can be linked to another one following some relation of conditionality.
因果分析是一種貫穿系統的活動，以拓撲樹的形式呈現。考慮某個最終狀態，它探究其產生和構成的「原因」，以必要和充分條件的角度來看。讓我們簡要回顧這兩種條件的區別。說

p

是

q

的充分條件，是指每當

p

，那麼

q

（

p

足以確保

q

的存在）。說

p

是

q

的必要條件，是指每當

q

，那麼

p

（

q

足以確保

p

的存在）。這兩種條件的差異通過系統考慮的不對稱性來說明，即系統是以逆向還是順向方式接近，這取決於分支所開啟的替代方案。因果解釋不同於因果分析，在因果分析中，一個系統是已知的，我們探索系統內部的條件關係；而在因果解釋中，一個通用現象（事件、過程或狀態）的特定發生是已知的，我們尋找一個系統，在該系統中這個通用現象（被解釋對象）可以根據某種條件關係與另一個現象相連。

The reader will recognize the step being taken in the direction of the human sciences by this passing from causal analysis to causal explanation, and by the application to the latter of the distinction between a necessary and a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition relation governs manipulation (in producing

p

we bring about

q

). The necessary condition relation governs prevention
讀者將通過從因果分析到因果解釋的這一步驟，以及將必要和充分條件的區別應用於後者，認識到通向人文科學的進展。充分條件關係支配操縱（通過產生

p

，我們帶來

q

）。必要條件關係支配預防。
(in setting aside p we prevent everything from happening for which p is a necessary condition). We respond to the question “Why did such a state necessarily happen?” in terms of a sufficient condition. On the other hand, we respond to the question “How was it possible for such a state to occur?” in terms of a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. In the explanation of the first kind, prediction is possible. Explanations of the second kind do not authorize prediction, but rather retrodiction, in the sense that, beginning from the fact that something has happened, we infer, backward through time, that the antecedent necessary condition must have occurred and we look for its traces in the present, as is the case in cosmology, geology, and biology, as well as, I shall say later, in certain historical explanations.
（在排除 p 時，我們阻止了所有 p 是必要條件的事情）。我們對「為什麼這種狀態必然發生？」這個問題的回應是基於充分條件。另一方面，我們對「這種狀態如何可能發生？」的問題的回應是基於必要但非充分的條件。在第一種解釋中，預測是可能的。第二種解釋不允許預測，而是逆向推斷，意味著從某事已經發生的事實出發，我們通過時間向後推斷，必須已經發生的前置必要條件，並在現在尋找其痕跡，就像在宇宙學、地質學、生物學中，以及我稍後將談到的某些歷史解釋中一樣。

We are now ready for the decisive step, the articulation of causal explanation on the basis of what we originally understand action as being. (Note that at this stage the theories of action and of history overlap.) The phenomenon of “interference,” which we anticipated in speaking of producing and bringing about, or of setting aside and preventing, requires such articulation, in the sense that it conjoins that ability to do something of which an agent has an immediate understanding, with the internal conditional relations of a system. The originality of Explanation and Understanding is that it seeks the condition of such interference in terms of the very structure of systems.
現在我們已準備好邁出決定性的一步，即根據我們最初對行動的理解來闡述因果解釋。（注意，在這個階段，行動理論和歷史理論重疊。）我們在談論生產、帶來或排除、阻止時預期的「干預」現象，需要這種闡述，意味著它將行動者對某事的直接理解能力，與系統的內部條件關係結合起來。《解釋與理解》的獨特之處在於，它從系統的結構本身尋求這種干預的條件。

The key concept is that of the closure of a system, which comes from causal analysis. In fact a system can be called closed only on some occasion, for a given exemplification. An occasion-or a sequence of occasions-is given, where its initial state occurs and the system unfolds following one of its possible courses of development over

n

given steps. Among the possible types of closure we can include isolating a system from external causal influences. No state, at any step of the system, has an antecedent causal condition outside the system. Action realizes another noteworthy type of closure, in that it is in doing something that an agent learns to “isolate” a closed system from its environment and to discover the possibilities of development inherent to this system. The agent learns this by setting the system in motion, beginning from some initial state the agent has “isolated.” It is this setting things in motion that constitutes interference, at the intersection between one of the agent’s abilities and the resources of the system.
系統封閉性的關鍵概念源自因果分析。事實上，一個系統只能在某些特定場合、對於特定的示例被稱為封閉。在給定的初始狀態下，系統展開其可能的發展路徑，並經過

n

給定的步驟。封閉的可能類型包括將系統與外部因果影響隔離。在系統的任何步驟中，沒有一個狀態具有系統外部的前因果條件。行動實現了另一種值得注意的封閉類型，即通過做某事，代理人學會"隔離"一個與環境隔絕的封閉系統，並發現該系統固有的發展可能性。代理人通過從其"隔離"的某個初始狀態開始啟動系統來學習這一點。正是這種使事物運轉的行為構成了干預，處於代理人能力之一與系統資源的交叉點。

How does this intersection occur? Von Wright’s argument runs as follows. Given

a

, the initial state of a system for a given occasion, assume “now there is a state

α

such that we feel confident, on the basis of past experience, that

α

will not change to a state

a

, unless we change it to

a

. And assume this is something (we know) we can do” (p. 60, his emphases). These sentences contain the whole theory of interference. Here we touch something irreducible. I am certain that I can. . . . No action would happen and, in particular, no scientific experiments would occur, without this confidence and this as-
這種交叉如何發生？冯·萊特的論點如下。給定

a

，對於特定場合的系統初始狀態，假設"現在存在一個狀態

α

，我們基於過去的經驗，有信心

α

不會變成狀態

a

，除非我們將其改變為

a

。並且假設這是我們（知道）可以做到的事情"（第 60 頁，他的強調）。這些句子包含了干預的整個理論。在此我們觸及了某些不可還原的事物。我確定我可以……沒有行動會發生，尤其是科學實驗不會發生，如果沒有這種信心和這種
surance that through our interference we can produce changes in the world. And this assurance does not depend upon a relation of conditionality. Instead

α

marks an interruption of the chain: "

α

, we assumed, will not change to

a

unless we change it" (p. 61, his emphasis). Conversely, we can simply let the world change without our interference. Thus we have “to isolate a fragment of the world’s history to a closed system and get to know the possibilities (and necessities) which govern the developments inside a system. . . . partly by repeatedly putting the system in motion through acts of producing its initial stage and then watching (‘passively’) the successive stages of its development, and partly by comparing these successive stages with developments in systems originating from different initial states” (pp. 63-64).
我們確信，通過我們的干預，我們可以在世界上產生變化。這種確信並不取決於條件關係。相反，

α

標誌著鏈條的中斷：「

α

，我們假設，除非我們改變它，否則不會變成

a

」（第 61 頁，其強調）。相反地，我們可以簡單地讓世界在沒有我們干預的情況下改變。因此，我們需要「將世界歷史的一個片段隔離成一個封閉系統，並了解在系統內部支配發展的可能性（和必然性）……部分通過反複通過製造其初始階段的行為使系統運動，然後（被動地）觀察其發展的連續階段，部分通過比較這些連續階段與源自不同初始狀態的系統的發展」（第 63-64 頁）。

Von Wright is correct when he states that “in the idea of putting systems in motion the ideas of action and causation meet” (p. 64). Here he renews a relationship with one of the oldest meanings of the idea of a cause, of which language has conserved a trace. Science may well struggle against analogical and abusive uses of the idea of a cause as some responsible agent, but this idea has its roots in the idea of doing something and of intentionally interfering with the course of nature.

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冯·賴特正確地指出，「在推動系統的想法中，行動和因果的概念相遇」（第 64 頁）。在這裡，他重新建立了與因果概念最古老意義之一的關係，語言已經保留了這一痕跡。科學可能會努力對抗因果概念的類比性和濫用的用法，將其視為某種負責任的代理，但這個概念的根源在於做某事和有意識地干預自然進程的想法。

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As for the logical structure of “doing something,” von Wright adopts the distinctions introduced by Arthur Danto.

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With Danto, he distinguishes between doing something (without having to do something else in the meantime) and bringing something about (by doing something else). We have to decide whether to say: “The thing done is the result of an action; the thing brought about is the consequence of an action” (p. 67). This distinction is important because interference in a system rests finally on the first type of actions, which Danto calls “basic actions.” The tie between a basic action and its result is intrinsic and logical, not causal (if we retain from the Humean model the idea that cause and effect are logically extrinsic to each other). Action is therefore not the cause of its result-the result is a part of the action. So in this sense, the action of putting a system in motion, reduced to a basic action, identifies the initial state of a system with the result of an action, in a noncausal sense of the word “result.”
就「做某事」的邏輯結構而言，馮萊特採用了阿瑟·丹托引入的區分。根據丹托，他區分了做某事（不必同時做其他事）和通過做其他事而使某事發生。我們必須決定要說：「所做之事是行動的結果；所帶來之事是行動的後果」（第 67 頁）。這個區分很重要，因為對系統的干預最終依賴於丹托稱之為「基本行動」的第一類行動。基本行動及其結果之間的聯繫是內在且邏輯性的，而非因果性的（如果我們保留休謨模型中因果關係在邏輯上互不相關的觀念）。因此，行動不是其結果的原因 - 結果是行動的一部分。所以在這種意義上，將系統置於運動狀態的行動，簡化為基本行動，以非因果意義上的「結果」一詞，將系統的初始狀態等同於行動的結果。

The metaphysical consequences of this concept of interference are important and indirectly concern history, inasmuch as it relates actions. Being able to do something, we say, is to be free: “In the ‘race’ between causation and agency, the latter will always win. It is a contradiction in terms to think that agency could be completely caught in the nets of causality” (p. 81). If we doubt this, it is first because we take as our models the phenomena of disabilities and incapacitations, rather than successful interferences, which rest upon the intimate certainty we have of being able to do something. This certitude is not derived from acquired knowledge bearing on our inabilities. If we doubt our freedom to do something, it is because we extrapolate to the whole world the regular sequences we have observed. We forget that causal relations
這個干預概念的形而上學後果是重要的，並間接涉及歷史，因為它關係到行動。我們說，能夠做某事就是自由：「在因果和行動的『競賽』中，後者將永遠獲勝。認為行動可能完全被因果網絡捕獲，這本身就是一個矛盾」（第 81 頁）。如果我們懷疑這一點，首先是因為我們以殘疾和無能的現象為模型，而不是以成功的干預為依據，而成功的干預建立在我們確定能夠做某事的內在確定性之上。這種確定性並非源於關於我們無能的已知知識。如果我們懷疑自己做某事的自由，那是因為我們將我們所觀察到的規律序列推廣到整個世界。我們忘記了因果關係
are relative to the fragments of the history of a world that has the characteristics of a closed system. But the capacity to put systems in motion by producing their initial states is a condition for their closure. Action is therefore implied in the discovery of causal relations.
這些是相對於一個具有封閉系統特徵的世界歷史片段。但是，通過產生其初始狀態而使系統運作的能力是其封閉的條件。因此，行動是在發現因果關係中隱含的。

Let us stop at this stage of the demonstration. Are we justified in saying that the theory of dynamic systems furnishes a logical reformulation of what we have already understood as being an action, in the strong sense of the term, that is, as implying an agent’s conviction of being able to do something? It does not seem so. Action’s lead over causality, suggested in the text just cited, is definitive. Causal explanation runs after our conviction of being able to do something but can never catch up. Approximation, in this sense, is not a logical reformulation without any remainder, but rather the progressive reduction of the interval that allows logical theory to explore the frontier it has in common with understanding.
讓我們在論證的這個階段停下來。我們是否有理由說，動態系統理論為我們已經理解的行動提供了邏輯重構，也就是在強烈的意義上，意味著一個行為者相信自己能做某事？似乎不是這樣。行動對因果關係的領先優勢，正如剛才引用的文本所暗示的，是明確的。因果解釋追趕不上我們相信能做某事的信念。在這個意義上，近似不是一個沒有任何餘地的邏輯重構，而是邏輯理論探索其與理解共同邊界的逐步縮小。

The reader will have noted that, in my analysis of the phenomenon of interference, I have not distinguished the theory of action and that of history. Or rather, the theory of history has been considered as only one mode of the theory of action.
讀者會注意到，在我分析干擾現象時，我並沒有區分行動理論和歷史理論。或者說，歷史理論被視為行動理論的一種模式。

The extension of the initial logical model is guided, in its approximation of the historical field, by another phenomenon of which we have an understanding just as originary as that of our ability to do something, namely, the understanding we have of the intentional character of action. This intentional character was in one sense implicitly contained in the earlier analysis of “doing something.” With Danto, we in effect distinguished basic actions, by which we do something without an intervening intermediary action, and those other actions, by means of which we do something so that something else hap-pens-that is, those things we bring about, and, among them, those which we bring about through other people. We are going to see what extending of the model this originary apprehension of meaning gives rise to, and we shall ask ourselves whether the new approximation this extension gives rise to can take advantage of a full logical reformulation of our understanding of the intentional character of action.
邏輯模型的擴展，在其對歷史領域的逼近中，由另一種現象引導，我們對這種現象的理解與我們做某事的能力一樣原初，即我們對行動意向性特徵的理解。這種意向性特徵在某種意義上已隱含在早期對「做某事」的分析中。與丹托一起，我們實際上區分了基本行動，即我們不經中間行動就做某事，以及那些我們做某事以使其他事情發生的行動——即我們帶來的事情，其中包括我們通過他人帶來的事情。我們將探討這種意義的原初把握會引起怎樣的模型擴展，並將詢問這種擴展所產生的新近似是否可以利用我們對行動意向性特徵理解的充分邏輯重構。

The adding of teleological explanation to causal explanation is called for by the logic of “in order that.” Let us set aside the case of quasi-teleological explanation which is only disguised causal explanation, as when we say a wild animal is attracted by its prey, or that a rocket is drawn to its target. The teleological language cannot conceal the fact that the validity of these explanations rests entirely on the truth of their nomic connections. Adaptive phenomena, and in general functional explanations in biology and history, arise from this type of explanation. (Conversely, we shall see later, history presents quasi-causal explanations which, in this instance, conceal in a causal vocabulary, in the nomic sense of this word, genuine segments of teleological expla-
將目的論解釋添加到因果解釋中是由「為了」的邏輯所要求的。讓我們擱置那種僅僅是偽裝的因果解釋的準目的論解釋，比如當我們說野生動物被獵物吸引，或火箭被引向目標。目的論語言無法掩蓋這些解釋的有效性完全依賴於其規律性連接的事實。適應性現象，以及生物學和歷史中的一般功能性解釋，源於這種解釋類型。（相反，我們稍後將看到，歷史呈現了準因果解釋，在這種情況下，以因果詞彙，在這個詞的規律性意義上，隱藏了真正的目的論解釋片段。
nation.) Teleological explanation bears on actionlike forms of behavior. The phases of an action, in its outer aspect, are not tied together here by a causal bond. Their unity is constituted by their being subsumed under the same intention, defined by what the agent intends to do (or to abstain from doing, or to neglect to do).
目的論的解釋關注行動類似的行為形式。從其外在方面來看，行動的各個階段並不是由因果關係緊密相連。它們的統一性是由於被納入同一意圖之下，這個意圖由行動者意欲做的（或不做的，或忽略做的）所定義。

Von Wright’s thesis is that intention cannot be treated as a Humean cause of behavior, if we define such causes by the distinctive feature that the cause and effect are logically independent of each other. Von Wright is here adopting the “logical connection argument,” which says that the tie between a reason for acting and the action itself is an intrinsic, not an extrinsic, one. “It is a motivational mechanism and, as such, not causal but teleological” (p. 69).
馮賴特的論點是，如果我們用其獨特特徵定義原因和效果在邏輯上是相互獨立的休謨因果，那麼意圖就不能被視為行為的原因。馮賴特在此採用「邏輯連接論證」，即行動理由與行動本身之間的聯繫是內在的，而非外在的。「它是一種動機機制，因此不是因果的，而是目的論的」（第 69 頁）。

The question posed here is knowing to what point the logic of teleological explanation accounts for what has already been understood as an intention. As previously in the analysis of interference, we discover a new relation between understanding and explaining. It is no longer a matter of incorporating an “I can” into a causal chain but an intention into a teleological explanation. To succeed at this, it suffices to take teleological explanation as an inverted practical inference, written as follows.
這裡提出的問題是，目的論解釋的邏輯能在多大程度上解釋已被理解的意圖。正如先前在干預分析中所發現的，我們再次發現理解和解釋之間的新關係。這不再是將一個「我能」納入因果鏈，而是將意圖納入目的論解釋。要成功做到這一點，只需將目的論解釋視為一種顛倒的實踐推理，可以寫成如下形式。

A intends to bring about

p

.
A 打算實現

p

。
A considers that he cannot bring about

p

unless he does

a

.
A 認為除非他做

p

，否則他無法實現

a

。
Therefore A sets himself to do

a

.
因此，A 決定要做

a

。
In a teleological explanation, the conclusion of the practical inference is both a premise and the major term of the conclusion: A sets himself to do

a

“because” A intends to bring about

p

. The practical inference, therefore, is what has to be considered. But in order “to become teleologically explicable. . . . behavior must first be intentionalistically understood” (p. 121, his emphasis). “Intentional” and “teleological” are thus terms that overlap without being identical with each other. The description in which the action to be explained is stated, von Wright calls intentional; the explanation itself which brings into play a practical inference, he calls teleological. The two terms overlap inasmuch as the intentional description is required in order to constitute the premise of a practical inference. They are distinct inasmuch as the teleological explanation is applied to objects distant from an intention, which are reached precisely at the end of the practical inference. On one side, therefore, the intentional description only constitutes the rudimentary form of a teleological explanation. Only the practical inference brings about the passage from the intentional description to the teleological explanation properly speaking. On the other side, there would be no need for a logic of the practical syllogism if an immediate apprehension of the meaning bearing on the intentional character of the action did not give rise to it. Just as in the movement between our lived experience of acting and causal explanation, action always won, must we not say that in the movement between intentional interpretation
在目的論解釋中，實踐推理的結論既是前提，也是結論的主要術語：A 決定做

a

「因為」A 打算實現

p

。因此，必須考慮實踐推理。但是，為了「在目的論上可以解釋……行為必須首先在意向論上被理解」（第 121 頁，其強調）。「意向性」和「目的論」因此是重疊但並不完全相同的術語。在解釋要被解釋的行動的描述中，冯·賴特稱之為意向性；而解釋本身運用實踐推理，他稱之為目的論。這兩個術語重疊，因為意向性描述是構成實踐推理前提所必需的。它們是不同的，因為目的論解釋適用於遠離意圖的對象，這些對象恰恰是在實踐推理結束時才達到。因此，一方面，意向性描述只構成目的論解釋的初步形式。只有實踐推理才能從意向性描述過渡到嚴格意義上的目的論解釋。另一方面，如果對行動意向性特徵的直接理解不會引發它，邏輯實踐三段論就沒有必要。就像在我們行動的生活經驗和因果解釋之間的移動中，行動總是佔上風，我們是否必須說，在意向解釋之間的移動中。
of action and teleological explanation, the former always wins? Von Wright comes close to admitting this in the passage already cited: “In order to become teleologically explicable. . . . behavior [mentioned in the conclusion of the practical syllogism] must first be intentionalistically understood.” And he also says: “a teleological explanation of action is normally preceded by an act of intentionalist understanding of some behavioral data” (p. 132, his emphasis).

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在行動和目的論解釋中，前者總是勝出嗎？冯·萊特在已引用的段落中幾乎承認這一點："為了變得具有目的論可解釋性……，（實踐三段論中結論提到的）行為必須首先被意向主義理解。"他還說："行動的目的論解釋通常是在意向主義理解某些行為數據之後進行的"（第 132 頁，他的強調）。

Let me make my point another way: in completing causal explanation with teleological explanation, have we reached that understanding of history that I tie to narrative understanding?

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In truth, we have not yet accounted for what distinguishes the theory of history from that of action. The practical syllogism as just described allowed me to lengthen, if I may put it this way, the range of the intentional aim of action. This is why teleological explanation by itself does not allow us to distinguish history from action. In fact, we have only spoken until now of history in an extremely formal sense. A system, we said, is “a fragment of the history of a world.” But this assertion is valid for every possible world satisfying the criteria for a “Tractatus-world.” The term “history,” in the concrete sense of a “story,” appears just once in the analysis of teleological explanation. It is introduced in the following way. We can observe with Wittgenstein that intentional behavior resembles the use of language. “It is a gesture whereby I mean something” (p. 114). The use and the understanding of language presuppose the context of a linguistic community, which is a life-community. “An intention,” we are told in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (section 337), “is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions.” One result is that we cannot understand or teleologically explain a form of behavior completely foreign to us. It is this reference to the context of an action that calls for the comment that “the behavior’s intentionality is its place in a story about the agent” (von Wright, p. 115 , his emphasis). It is not sufficient therefore to establish the equivalence between intentionality and teleological explanation to account for explanation in history. It is also necessary to give a logical equivalent for the relationship of an intention to its context, which, in history, is made up of all the circumstances and all the unintended effects of the action.
讓我以另一種方式闡明我的觀點：在用目的論解釋完善因果解釋時，我們是否已經達到了我與敘事理解聯繫起來的歷史理解？事實上，我們尚未解釋什麼區分了歷史理論與行動理論。實踐三段論正如我所描述的，讓我可以延長行動的意圖目標的範圍。這就是為什麼目的論解釋本身無法讓我們區分歷史與行動。事實上，到目前為止，我們只是在極其形式化的意義上談論歷史。一個系統，我們說，是「一個世界歷史的片段」。但這個斷言對於滿足「邏輯哲學論》世界」標準的每一個可能世界都是有效的。「歷史」一詞在目的論解釋分析中僅出現一次，以「故事」的具體意義出現。它是這樣被引入的。我們可以與維特根斯坦一起觀察，有意圖的行為類似於語言的使用。「這是一個我意指某事的姿態」。語言的使用和理解預設了語言共同體的背景，這是一個生活共同體。「一個意圖」，我們在維特根斯坦的《哲學研究》（第 337 節）中被告知，「嵌入在其情境中，在人類的習俗和制度中」。其結果是我們無法完全理解或目的論解釋一種對我們來說完全陌生的行為方式。正是對行動背景的這種引用，促使人們評論「行為的意圖性在於其在關於行為者的故事中的位置」。因此，僅僅建立意圖性與目的論解釋之間的等價性，不足以解釋歷史中的解釋。在歷史中，必須為意圖與其背景之間的關係提供邏輯等值，這個背景由行動的所有情境和所有非預期的效果組成。

It is to approach a degree closer to this particular status of explanation in history that von Wright introduces the concept of quasi-causal explanation.
正是為了更加接近這種在歷史中的解釋特殊狀態，冯·賴特引入了準因果解釋的概念。

In a general way, quasi-causal explanation takes the form: “this happened because. . . .” For example, a people rose up in rebellion because the government was corrupt. This explanation is said to be causal because the explanans refers to a factor that preceded the explanandum. But it is only quasicausal, for two reasons. The negative reason is that the validity of the two statements does not require-as is the case for causal explanation and for quasi-teleological explanation-the truth of a lawlike connection. The positive reason is that the second statement contains an implicitly teleological
總的來說，準因果解釋的形式是："這發生是因為……"。例如，一個人民起義是因為政府腐敗。這種解釋被認為是因果的，因為解釋因素指向了早於被解釋現象的因素。但它只是準因果的，原因有二：消極的原因是，這兩個陳述的有效性不要求（如因果解釋和準目的論解釋所需）法則性連接的真實性。積極的原因是，第二個陳述包含了一個隱含的目的論
structure. The goal of the uprising was to throw off the evil the people were suffering.
結構。起義的目標是推翻人民所遭受的邪惡。

What therefore is the relation between quasi-causal explanation and teleological explanation?
那麼 quasi-causal 解釋與目的論解釋之間的關係是什麼？

Let us say first of all that it is not the only mode of explanation in history. History seems rather, from an explanatory point of view, to constitute a mixed genre. Hence, if there is a place for explanations of a causal type, that place “is peculiar and in a characteristic sense subordinate to other types of explanation” (p. 135).

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首先讓我們說，這不是歷史中唯一的解釋模式。從解釋的角度來看，歷史似乎是一種混合體裁。因此，如果有因果型解釋的空間，那麼這個空間「是特殊的，並且在某種特徵性的意義上從屬於其他類型的解釋」（第 135 頁）。

Causal explanation occurs in two major forms: explanation in terms of sufficient conditions (why did this type of state of affairs necessarily occur?) and explanations in terms of necessary conditions (how was it possible that . . . ?). The subordination of these two forms of causal explanation to other types of explanation can be shown in the following way. Consider the ruins of a city. What was the cause of its destruction? A flood or an invasion? We have a Humean cause (a physical event) and a Humean effect (another physical event, the conquest being considered as a physical agent). But this fragment of causal explanation is not, as such, the province of history. It arises only indirectly from history, inasmuch as, behind the material cause, a background of political rivalries takes shape between cities and inasmuch as, beyond the material effect, political, economic, and cultural consequences of the disaster develop. It is this non-Humean cause and non-Humean effect that historical explanation wants to tie together. In this first type, therefore, the “role of the causal explanation proper is often to link the nonhumean causes of its explanans with the nonhumean effects of its explanandum” (p. 137).

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因果解釋發生在兩種主要形式中：充分條件的解釋（為什麼這種情況必然發生？）和必要條件的解釋（怎麼可能……？）。這兩種因果解釋形式對其他類型解釋的從屬可以通過以下方式顯示。考慮一個城市的廢墟。其毀滅的原因是什麼？是洪水還是入侵？我們有休謨因果（一個物理事件）和休謨效果（另一個物理事件，征服被視為物理代理）。但是，這段因果解釋本身並不是歷史的領域。它僅間接地源於歷史，因為在物理原因背後，城市間的政治對抗形成了背景，並且在物理效果之外，災難的政治、經濟和文化後果發展起來。這種非休謨因果和非休謨效果正是歷史解釋想要聯繫起來的。因此，在這第一種類型中，「因果解釋本身的角色往往是將其解釋項的非休謨原因與其被解釋項的非休謨效果聯繫起來」（第 137 頁）。

Here is an explanation in terms of necessary conditions. How could the inhabitants of this place have been able to construct such a colossal city wall! The explanandum is a Humean effect: the walls are still standing. The explanans is also a Humean cause: the material means used for their construction. But the explanation is only a historical one if it takes a detour through action (city planning, architecture, etc.). The explanandum is then the result of this action, in the sense that we said that a result of action is not a Humean effect. Once again the causal explanation is one segment of the historical explanation, which also includes a non-lawlike (causal) segment.

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這是以必要條件為基礎的解釋。居住在此地的人怎麼可能建造如此龐大的城牆！被解釋的現象是休謨式的效果：城牆仍然屹立。解釋也是休謨式的原因：用於建造的物質手段。但只有通過行動（城市規劃、建築等）的迴路，解釋才是歷史性的。被解釋的現象是此行動的結果，即我們所說的行動結果不是休謨式效果。再次強調，因果解釋是歷史解釋的一個片段，其中還包括一個非定律的（因果）片段。

As for quasi-causal explanation, it is significantly more complex than are the preceding forms. The answer to the question “Why?” is extraordinarily ramified in it. The example introduced earlier (that the people rose up because their government was corrupt) masks the real complexity of the historian’s work. Consider the thesis that the First World War broke out “because” the Austrian archduke was assassinated at Sarajevo in July 1914. What kind of explanation is this supposed to be? Concede for the sake of argument that the cause and effect are logically independent; in other words, that the two events are considered as different from each other.

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In this sense, the explanation
至於準因果解釋，它比前面的形式要複雜得多。在其中，對"為什麼？"的回答極其多樣化。之前介紹的例子（人民起義是因為他們的政府腐敗）掩蓋了歷史學家工作的真正複雜性。考慮這個論點：第一次世界大戰爆發是因為 1914 年 7 月在薩拉熱窩奧地利大公被暗殺。這究竟是什麼樣的解釋？為了論證，假設因果之間在邏輯上是獨立的；換句話說，這兩個事件被視為彼此不同。在這個意義上，解釋
clearly has a causal form. Yet true mediation is assured by the whole range of motivations affecting the parties involved. This range of motivations must be schematized by an equal number of practical inferences, which engender new facts (in virtue of the link we have spoken of between intention and action in a practical syllogism). These facts constitute new situations for all the agents, who evaluate their situation by incorporating the new fact into the premises of their new practical inferences, which in turn engender new facts which affect the premises of the practical inferences utilized by the various parties involved.

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明顯具有因果形式。然而，真正的中介是由涉及各方的整個動機範圍所保證。這個動機範圍必須由相等數量的實踐推論來圖式化，這些推論通過我們談論的意圖和行動之間的聯繫（在實踐三段論中）產生新的事實。這些事實為所有行動者構成新的情況，他們通過將新事實納入其新的實踐推論前提來評估自己的情況，而這些推論又會產生新的事實，這些事實影響了所涉及各方所使用的實踐推論的前提。

Quasi-causal explanation thus turns out to be more complex than rational explanation in Dray’s sense of this term. This latter form only overlaps the properly teleological segments of the “mixed” model-the causal-teleological aspects. These segments do derive from “a set of singular statements which constitute the premises of practical inferences” (p. 142). But, if it is true that these segments of a practical inference are not reducible to nomic connections, quasi-causal explanation, in turn, is not reducible to the reconstruction of a calculation, as in rational explanation.
準因果解釋因此被證明比德雷（Dray）意義上的理性解釋更加複雜。後者僅重疊了「混合」模型中的真正目的論性片段—因果目的論性方面。這些片段確實源於「構成實踐推論前提的一組單一陳述」（第 142 頁）。但是，如果這些實踐推論的片段不可還原為定律性連接，那麼準因果解釋反過來也不可還原為像理性解釋中那樣的計算重建。

In sum, quasi-causal explanation correctly restores several specific characteristics of explanation in history. First, the conjunction between causal explanation and the theory of action due to the phenomenon of interference allows us to include within the mixed model the reference of history to human actions, whose signification as action is attested to by the conviction the agent has that he is able to do what he does. Further, the teleological segments of the explanatory schema testify to the fact that it is reasonable for the historian to inquire about the intentions of actors in history in terms of a practical inference arising out of a specific logic, that which was inaugurated by the Aristotelian theory of the practical syllogism. Finally, the model expresses the necessity of coordinating these modes of an ability to do something and these segments of practical inference with nonpractical and nontelelogical segments of a properly causal type.
總的來說，準因果解釋正確地恢復了歷史解釋的幾個具體特徵。首先，由於干擾現象，因果解釋與行動理論的結合使我們能夠在混合模型中包含歷史對人類行為的引用，其作為行為的意義由行為者確信他能夠做他所做的事情來證明。進一步，解釋模式的目的論部分證明了歷史學家以實踐推理的特定邏輯——由亞里士多德實踐三段論理論開創的邏輯——詢問行為者意圖是合理的。最後，該模型表達了協調這些做某事的能力模式和這些實踐推理片段，以及具有純粹因果類型的非實踐和非目的論片段的必要性。

In return, we can ask whether, despite the extraordinary effort at attaching the various modes of explanation to a very powerful logical model, the types of explanation are not more scattered than ever.
作為回應，我們可以問：儘管在將各種解釋模式附加到一個非常強大的邏輯模型上做出了非凡努力，但解釋類型是否比以往更加分散？

We have, in fact, a proposal for three schemas of historical explanation, without having been shown how the first two are incorporated into the third one. Moreover, an important scattering factor appears on the causal level. In a properly analytic approach, we are led to distinguish between “external” factors (climate, technology, etc.) and “internal” ones (motives, reasons, etc.), without being able to say which are “causes” and which are “effects.” An integrating factor appears to be lacking here, whose importance and perhaps unavoidability are indicated by ideologies. From its side, the motivational field contains factors as disparate as commands, hindrances, normative pressures, badges of authority, sanctions, and the like which add to the scattering
事實上，我們提出了三種歷史解釋模式，但卻沒有被證明前兩種如何納入第三種。此外，在因果層面上出現了一個重要的分散因素。在一個純分析的方法中，我們被引導區分「外部」因素（氣候、技術等）和「內部」因素（動機、原因等），但無法說明哪些是「原因」，哪些是「效果」。這裡似乎缺少一個整合因素，其重要性和或許不可避免性由意識形態所指示。在動機領域，命令、阻礙、規範壓力、權威標誌、制裁等如此分散的因素加劇了這種分散性。
of explanation. It is difficult to see how all these heterogeneous causes are to be incorporated into the premises of a practical syllogism. Here we touch upon the claim of overall explanations such as those of historical materialism. Since it is equally impossible to prove them with a priori reasons or to refute them on the basis of experience alone, we have to admit that the “prime measure of their truth is their fertility for furthering our understanding of history or the social process” (p. 145). The boundary between scientific explanation and ideology is revealed as a fragile one, owing to the lack of an effort, which we shall only encounter in Hayden White, to integrate into historical explanation more numerous variables than those considered by von Wright and to confer on all these explanatory modes the unity of a style.
解釋的難題。要將這些異質性原因納入實踐三段論的前提中是很困難的。在此我們觸及了例如歷史唯物主義等整體性解釋的主張。由於無法用先驗理由證明，也無法僅憑經驗來反駁，我們不得不承認，「衡量其真理性的首要標準是它們促進我們理解歷史或社會進程的 fertility」（第 145 頁）。科學解釋與意識形態之間的界限顯得十分脆弱，這是因為缺乏像海登·懷特那樣的努力，將比冯·萊特所考慮的更多變數納入歷史解釋，並賦予所有這些解釋模式一種風格的統一性。

To stick with the model of quasi-causal explanation, in its most elementary presentation, however, we might ask what assures the unity of the nomic and the teleological segments inside the overall schema. This discontinuity inside the model, joined to the other scattering factors of explanation just referred to, leads us to ask whether a guideline from the order of understanding is not lacking for holding together the nomic and the teleological segments of a quasi-causal explanation. For me, this guideline is plot, insofar as it is a synthesis of the heterogeneous. Plot, in effect, “comprehends” in one intelligible whole, circumstances, goals, interactions, and unintended results. May we not say, therefore, that plot is to quasi-causal explanation what the assurance of our ability to do something was earlier to an agent’s interfering in a nomic system, and what intentionality was to teleological explanation? Must we not, in the same way, say that causal explanation must be preceded by our narrative understanding, in the sense that we could say with von Wright that a “teleological explanation of action is normally preceded by an act of intentionalist understanding of some behavioral data”? Is this not so because in understanding a plot, we take as a whole nomic and teleological segments, because we look for a model of explanation appropriate to that eminently heterogeneous concatenation that the diagram for quasi-causal explanation so well throws into relief?
為了堅持擬因果解釋模型，在其最基本的呈現中，我們可能會詢問是什麼確保了整體模式中定律性和目的論性片段的統一性。這個模型內部的不連續性，加上剛才提到的其他散佈因素，使我們質疑是否缺乏一個來自理解秩序的指導方針，以將定律性和目的論性片段結合在擬因果解釋中。對我來說，這個指導方針是情節，因為它是異質性的綜合。情節實際上在一個可理解的整體中「理解」環境、目標、互動和非預期的結果。我們是否可以說，情節之於擬因果解釋，就像我們做某事的能力保證曾經對於一個代理人干預定律系統，以及意圖之於目的論解釋一樣？我們是否必須以同樣的方式說，因果解釋必須以我們的敘事理解為先決條件，正如馮萊特所說，「行動的目的論解釋通常以對某些行為數據的意圖主義理解為前提」？這是否如此，因為在理解情節時，我們將定律性和目的論性片段視為一個整體，因為我們尋找一種適合這種極其異質的連結的解釋模型，而擬因果解釋的圖表如此清晰地突顯了這一點？

I find some justification for my interpretation in von Wright’s own analysis. Each result of a practical syllogism is said to create a new fact which changes the “motivation background” assignable to the action of different historical agents. Is not this change what we have constantly called the circumstances of an action, and what narrative incorporates into the unity of the plot? Is not the virtue of the explanatory schema, consequently, that it generalizes the notion of circumstances, to the point of making it designate not just an initial situation, but all the interpolated situations which, by their novelty, constitute a motivation background within the field of interactions? That a fact affects the premises of a practical inference, that a new fact emerges from the conclusion drawn from the premises, is what must be understood as a synthesis of the
我在冯萊特自身的分析中找到了對我的解讀的某種正當性。實踐三段論的每一個結果都被認為創造了一個新事實，該事實改變了可歸因於不同歷史行動者行動的"動機背景"。這種變化不正是我們一直稱之為行動的情境，並且敘事將其納入情節統一體的嗎？因此，解釋模式的優點豈不是將情境概念一般化，以至於它不僅指涉初始情境，還包括那些通過其新穎性在互動領域中構成動機背景的所有插入的情境？一個事實影響實踐推理的前提，從前提得出結論的新事實因此出現，這必須被理解為
heterogeneous, before the logic of explanation proposes a more adequate reformulation of it. But this reformulation, far from substituting itself for our narrative understanding, remains an approximation of a more original operation on the same level as our certitude of being able to do something and an intentional description of behavior.
異質性的綜合，在解釋邏輯提出更加恰當的重新表述之前。但這種重新表述，遠非取代我們的敘事理解，而是停留在與我們確信能夠做某事和行為的意向性描述同一水平的近似。

Narrativist Arguments 敘事論論點

The bringing together of history and narrative, I said at the beginning of this chapter, is born from the conjunction of two movements of thought. To the weakening and breaking up of the covering law model corresponded a reevaluation of narrative and its resources of intelligibility. The fact is that for the advocates of the covering law model, narrative was too elementary and too poor a mode of articulation to claim as explanatory. I shall say, using the vocabulary proposed in Part I of this work, that for these authors narrative has only an episodic character, not a configurational one.

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This is why they saw an epistemological break between history and narrative.
正如我在本章開頭所說，歷史與敘事的匯合源於兩種思想流動的交匯。覆蓋法則模型的削弱和瓦解，與對敘事及其可理解性資源的重新評估相對應。事實上，對於覆蓋法則模型的倡導者來說，敘事作為一種解釋模式太過簡單和貧乏。我將使用本著作第一部分提出的詞彙，說明對於這些作者而言，敘事僅具有片段性特徵，而非配置性特徵。這就是為什麼他們認為歷史與敘事之間存在認識論斷裂。

The question now is whether the reconquest of the configurational features of narrative justifies hope that our narrative understanding can take on an explanatory value, at the same time that historical explanation ceases to be measured by the standard of the covering law model. My own contribution to this problem will be born, in the next chapter, from the admission that a “narrativist” conception of history only partially answers this expectation. This conception does tell us what prior mode of understanding explanation is grafted to, but it does not give us a narrative equivalent or substitute for explanation. This is why I am looking for a more indirect tie between historical explanation and our narrative understanding. The present investigation will not have been in vain, however, inasmuch as it will have allowed us to isolate one necessary but not sufficient component of historical knowledge. A half failure remains a half success.
現在的問題是，敘事的配置特徵的再征服是否證明我們對敘事的理解可以具有解釋性價值，同時歷史解釋不再以覆蓋法模型為標準。我對這個問題的貢獻將在下一章中誕生，承認"敘事主義"的歷史觀僅部分回應了這一期望。這一觀念確實告訴我們解釋的先前理解模式，但它並未給出解釋的敘事等效或替代。這就是為什麼我正在尋找歷史解釋與我們的敘事理解之間更間接的聯繫。然而，這次調查並非徒勞，因為它將使我們能夠隔離出歷史知識中一個必要但非充分的組成部分。半次失敗仍然是半次成功。

"Narrative Sentences" According to Arthur Danto
根據阿瑟·丹托的"敘事句子"

It is noteworthy that the first plea in favor of a narrativist interpretation of history should have been formulated within the framework of analytic philosophy itself. It is found in Arthur C. Danto’s book, Analytic Philosophy of History.

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值得注意的是，支持歷史的敘事主義解釋的第一個陳詞，竟然是在分析哲學的框架內提出的。這可以在阿瑟·C·丹托的著作《歷史的分析哲學》中找到。

The guiding thread of his argument is not so much the epistemology of historiography, as it is practiced by historians, as it is the conceptual framework governing our use of a certain type of sentences called narrative sentences. This inquiry stems from analytic philosophy, if we mean by this term the description of our ways of thinking and talking about the world, and correla-
他論證的主線不太是史學家實踐的史學認識論，而是支配我們使用某種被稱為敘事句子的句子類型的概念框架。如果我們指的是描述我們思考和談論世界的方式，這一探究源於分析哲學，並且相關地-
tively the description of the world such as these ways of thinking and speaking oblige us to conceive it. Analytic philosophy, so understood, is in essence a theory of descriptions.
在本質上，這些思考和表達方式迫使我們以這種方式概念化世界。這樣理解的分析哲學本質上是一種描述理論。

Applied to history, this analytic conception of philosophy comes down to asking to what extent our ways of thinking and speaking about the world involve sentences using verbs in the past tense and irreducibly narrative statements. This type of question, according to Danto, is carefully avoided by empiricism, which only deals with present-tense verbs corresponding to statements about perception. Linguistic analysis in this way implies a metaphysical description of historical existence.

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By this quasi-Kantian turn, analytic philosophy of history excludes in principle and as a hypothesis what Danto calls “substantive philosophy of history.” Generally speaking, this is any Hegelian type of philosophy of history. Analytic philosophy of history rightly attributes to such philosophy the claim to grasp the whole of history, but it interprets this claim as follows. To talk about the whole of history is to compose a complete picture of the past and the future. But to pronounce on the future is to extrapolate from the configurations and concatenations of the past in the direction of what is still to come. This extrapolation, constitutive of prophecy, consists, in turn, of speaking about the future in terms appropriate to the past. But there is no history of the future (nor, as we shall see later, a history of the present) due to the nature of narrative sentences, which redescribe past events in light of subsequent ones unknown to the actors themselves. Such a meaning can be conferred on events “only in the context of a story” (p. 11, his emphasis). The vice of substantive philosophies of history, as a consequence, is that they write narrative sentences with regard to the future when they can only be written with regard to the past.
應用於歷史，這種分析的哲學概念歸結為探詢我們關於世界的思考和表達方式在多大程度上涉及使用過去時態動詞和不可約化的敘事陳述。根據丹托的說法，這種類型的問題是經驗主義精心避免的，它只處理對應於感知陳述的現在時態動詞。這樣，語言分析意味著對歷史存在的形而上學描述。通過這種準康德式的轉向，分析的歷史哲學原則上排除了丹托所稱的「實質性歷史哲學」作為假設。一般而言，這是任何黑格爾式的歷史哲學。分析的歷史哲學理所當然地歸因於這種哲學提出掌握歷史整體的主張，但它按照以下方式解釋這一主張。談論歷史整體是要構建過去和未來的完整圖景。但要對未來發表意見，就是要從過去的配置和連鎖中推測未來的方向。這種推測，預言的本質，又轉而以適合過去的術語來談論未來。但由於敘事句子的本質，未來沒有歷史（正如我們稍後將看到的，現在也沒有歷史），這些句子以後來當事人未知的後續事件的視角重新描述過去事件。這種意義只能在「故事的背景下」賦予事件（第 11 頁，他強調）。因此，實質性歷史哲學的缺陷在於，它們對未來撰寫敘事句子，而這些句子只能針對過去撰寫。

The argument is an impecable one so long as it is formulated in negative terms. If the philosophy of history is thought concerning the whole of history, it cannot be the expression of a narrative discourse appropriate to the past. But the argument cannot eliminate the hypothesis that discourse about the whole of history does not have a narrative nature and constitutes its meaning in another way. Hegelian philosophy of history is assuredly not narrative. Nor can we say that the anticipation of the future in a philosophy or theology of hope is narrative. On the contrary, narration is there reinterpreted beginning from hope, certain founding events-for example, the Exodus or the Resurrec-tion-being interpreted as marking out the path of hope.
只要以否定的術語提出論點，這個論點就是無可挑剔的。如果歷史哲學被視為關於歷史整體的思考，它就不能是適合過去的敘事性話語的表達。但是，這個論點無法排除這樣一種假設：關於歷史整體的話語並不具有敘事性，並以另一種方式構成其意義。黑格爾的歷史哲學無疑不是敘事性的。我們也不能說希望的哲學或神學中對未來的預期是敘事性的。相反，敘事在那裡是從希望重新解釋的，某些奠基的事件——例如出埃及記或復活——被解釋為劃出希望的道路。

As long as we keep the argument in its negative form it has the twofold virtue of delimiting in an almost Kantian way the space where narrative sentences are valid and imposing a limit on them. Not only, as Danto rightly says, is narrative discourse intrinsically incomplete, since every narrative sentence is subject to revision by a later historian, but also every intelligible thing we can say about history does not inevitably have a narrative character. This second implication is directed against what remains dogmatic in the analytic phi-
只要我們將論點保持在其負面形式，它就具有以近乎康德式的方式劃定敘事句子有效空間並對其施加限制的雙重美德。不僅，如丹托正確所言，敘事論述本質上是不完整的，因為每個敘事句子都可能被後來的歷史學家修訂，而且我們可以說的關於歷史的每一件可理解的事情並不必然具有敘事性質。這第二個隱含意義是針對分析哲學中仍然存在的教條主義
losophy of history, in spite of its deliberately critical turn when it sets out the internal limits of historical knowledge. It is not certain that “what the substantive philosophy of history attempts is to make the same kind of statement about the future that historians try to make about the past” (p.26).
歷史哲學，儘管在闡述歷史知識的內在限制時採取了刻意批判的轉向。不能確定「實質性的歷史哲學試圖對未來做出與歷史學家對過去所做的相同類型的陳述」（第 26 頁）。

The presuppositions for an analytic philosophy of history having been stated, the study of narrative sentences presents itself as the study of a class of sentences. It establishes the differentiating feature of historical knowledge and, in this sense, provides a minimal characterization of history. I am not saying, however, that it attains the core of historical understanding, inasmuch as the “context of history” is not defined by the structure of the narrative sentence. The properly discursive feature of history is missing, as we shall see later.
在闡述分析歷史哲學的預設之後，敘事句子的研究呈現出作為一類句子的研究。它建立了歷史知識的區分特徵，在這個意義上，提供了歷史的最小特徵。然而，我並不是說它達到了歷史理解的核心，因為歷史的「背景」並不是由敘事句子的結構所定義。正如我們稍後將看到的，歷史的恰當論述特徵是缺失的。

This study rests on the theory of descriptions as applied to one particular sector of reality, namely, the changes produced by human action. The same change stemming from human action can be variously described and a narrative sentence is one of the possible descriptions of such action. I shall speak later about what distinguishes these accounts that we give of action, within the framework of what is usually called the theory of action.
這項研究基於描述理論，應用於現實的特定領域，即由人類行動所產生的變化。源自人類行動的同一變化可以有多種描述，而敘事句子是這種行動的可能描述之一。我將稍後討論在通常稱為行動理論的框架內，我們對行動的敘述有何區別。

Danto’s ingenious idea is to approach the theory of narrative sentences by way of a detour: criticism of the prejudice that the past is determined, fixed, eternally standing still in its being, while the future is open and undecided (in the sense of Aristotle’s and the Stoics’ “future contigencies”). This presupposition rests upon the hypothesis that events fall into a receptacle where they accumulate without being able to be altered; neither their order of appearance can be changed, nor can anything be added to their content, except by adding to what follows them. A complete description of an event should therefore register everything that happened, in the order in which it happened. But who could do such a thing? Only an Ideal Chronicler could be such an absolutely faithful witness and absolutely sure about this entirely determined past. This Ideal Chronicler would be gifted with the faculty of being able to give an instantaneous transcription of whatever happens, augmenting his testimony in a purely additive and cumulative way as events are added to events. In relation to this ideal of a complete and definitive description, the historian’s task would be merely to eliminate false sentences, to reestablish any upset in the order of true sentences, and to add whatever is lacking in this testimony.
丹托的巧妙想法是透過繞道來接近敘事句子理論：批評過去是被決定的、固定的、永恆不變的偏見，而未來是開放且未決定的（按照亞里斯多德和斯多葛派的"未來或然性"）。這一預設基於這樣的假設：事件落入一個容器中累積，無法改變；它們出現的順序不能改變，也不能增加其內容，除非在其後添加內容。對事件的完整描述因此應該按照發生的順序記錄所有發生的事情。但誰能做到這一點？只有理想的編年史家才能成為如此絕對忠實的見證人，並對這個完全確定的過去絕對確定。這位理想的編年史家將具備能夠即時轉錄任何發生的事情的能力，隨著事件的增加，以純粹累加和累積的方式增強其證詞。相對於這種完整且最終的描述理想，歷史學家的任務僅僅是消除錯誤的句子，重新建立真實句子的順序，並添加此證詞中缺少的內容。

The refutation of this hypothesis is simple. One class of descriptions is missing from this absolute chronicle, the one precisely in terms of which an event cannot be witnessed; that is, the whole truth concerning this event cannot be known until after the fact and long after it has taken place. This is just the sort of story only a historian can tell. In short, we have neglected to equip the Ideal Chronicler with a knowledge of the future.
對這一假設的反駁很簡單。在這個絕對編年史中缺少一類描述，正是無法見證事件的描述；也就是說，關於此事件的全部真相直到事後很久才能被知曉。這恰恰是只有歷史學家能講述的故事。簡而言之，我們忽略了為理想的編年史家配備未來的知識。

We can now define narrative sentences: “they refer to at least two timeseparated events though they only describe (are only about) the earliest event
現在我們可以定義敘事句子："它們指的是至少兩個時間上分隔的事件，儘管它們僅描述（僅關於）最早的事件。"
to which they refer” (p. 143, his emphasis). Or more exactly, they “refer to two distinct and time-separated events,

E_{1}

and

E_{2}

.” And they “describe the earliest of the events referred to” (p. 152, his emphasis). It is also necessary to add that the two events must both be in the past as related to the time of the utterance. Three temporal positions are therefore implied in a narrative sentence: that of the event described, that of the event in terms of which the first event is described, and that of the narrator. The first two concern the statement, the third its being stated.
他們所指的是"兩個不同且時間相隔的事件，

E_{1}

和

E_{2}

"。並且他們"描述了所指事件中最早的事件"（第 152 頁，作者強調）。還必須補充的是，這兩個事件都必須是相對於敘述時刻的過去事件。因此，敘事句子中暗示了三個時間位置：被描述的事件、用以描述第一個事件的事件，以及敘述者的時間。前兩個涉及陳述，第三個涉及陳述的行為。

The paradigmatic example which this analysis rests upon is illustrated by the following sentence. In 1717, the author of Rameau’s Nephew was born. No one, at that time, could utter such a sentence, which redescribes the birth of a child in light of another event, the publication of Diderot’s famous book. In other words, writing Rameau’s Nephew is the event in terms of which the first event—Diderot’s birth—is redescribed. In a while I shall pose the question whether this type of sentence, by itself, is typical of historical narrative.
這種分析所依據的典型例子可以用以下句子來說明。1717 年，拉莫的侄子的作者出生了。當時，沒有人能夠說出這樣的句子，這句話以另一個事件——狄德羅的名著出版——的角度重新描述了一個孩子的出生。換句話說，寫作《拉莫的侄子》是用來重新描述第一個事件——狄德羅的出生的事件。稍後我將探討這種類型的句子是否典型於歷史敘事。

This analysis of narrative sentences has several implications. The first one takes the form of a paradox concerning causality. If an event is significant in light of future events, the characterization of one event as the cause of another one may occur subsequent to the event itself. It might seem, then, that a subsequent event transforms a prior one into a cause, therefore that a sufficient condition for the earlier event is produced later than the event. But this is a sophism, for what is determined after the fact is not some part of the event but the predicate “is the cause of. . . .” We must say therefore that

E_{2}

is a necessary condition for

E_{1}

to be a cause, given an appropriate description. We are simply repeating in another way that “is the cause of . . .” is not a predicate available to the Ideal Chronicler and only characterizes narrative sentences. Examples of such a retrospective use of the category “cause” are numerous. A historian will readily say, “Aristarchus, in 270 B.C., anticipated Copernicus’s theory published in A.D 1453.” Similar expressions-“anticipated,” “began,” “preceded,” “provoked,” “gave rise to”-appear only in narrative sentences. A large part of the concept of significance stems from this peculiarity of narrative sentences. For whoever visits the birthplace of a famous person, this site is meaningful or important only in light of subsequent events. In this sense, the category of significance lacks meaning for the Ideal Chronicler, even though he is a perfect witness.
這個敘事句子的分析具有幾個含義。第一個以因果關係的悖論形式出現。如果一個事件在未來事件的背景下具有重要性，將一個事件描述為另一個事件的原因可能發生在事件本身之後。看起來似乎是後來的事件將先前的事件轉變為原因，因此早期事件的充分條件是在事件之後產生的。但這是一個 sophism，因為事後確定的不是事件的某些部分，而是"是...的原因"這個謂語。因此我們必須說，

E_{2}

是

E_{1}

成為原因的必要條件，前提是有適當的描述。我們只是以另一種方式重複，"是...的原因"不是理想編年史家可用的謂語，只描述敘事句子。這種對"原因"類別的追溯使用的例子很多。歷史學家會很容易地說："阿里斯塔克斯在公元前 270 年預見了哥白尼在公元 1453 年出版的理論。"類似的表達方式——"預見"、"開始"、"preceded"、"provoked"、"引發"——只出現在敘事句子中。意義概念的很大一部分源於敘事句子的這種特殊性。對於任何參觀名人出生地的人來說，這個地點只有在後來的事件背景下才具有意義或重要性。從這個意義上說，意義類別對理想編年史家來說毫無意義，儘管他是一個完美的見證者。

A second epistemological implication is even more interesting, for it allows us to distinguish the properly narrative description of action from ordinary descriptions of it. Here Danto says something that Dray could not anticipate with his model of rational explanations, which takes into account only historical actors’ calculations at the moment when they occurred. Both descriptions, it is true, have in common their use of verbs that we may call “project verbs.” These verbs do more than simply describe a particular action. Expressions such as “make war” or “raise cattle,” or “write a book” contain verbs
第二個認識論的含義更加有趣，因為它使我們能夠區分行動的純敘事性描述與普通的描述。在這裡，丹托提出了一些德雷的理性解釋模型無法預見的觀點，該模型僅考慮歷史行動者發生當下的計算。誠然，這兩種描述有一個共同點，那就是使用了我們可以稱之為「計劃動詞」的動詞。這些動詞不僅僅是描述特定行動，如「開戰」、「養牛」或「寫書」等表達中包含的動詞
that cover many detailed actions, which may be totally discontinuous and implicate numerous individuals in a temporal structure for which the narrator carries the responsibility. In history we encounter innumerable uses of such project verbs, which organize numerous microactions into one unique overall action. But in ordinary discourse about action, the meaning of a project verb is not affected by the outcome of the action-whether it takes place or not, whether it succeeds or fails. So if history is characterized by statements that account for the truth of a particular occurrence in terms of its unintended consequences, the truth of the statements bearing on the subsequent events is important for the meaning of the narrative description.
這些動詞涵蓋許多詳細的行動，可能是完全不連續的，並且在一個敘事者負責的時間結構中涉及眾多個體。在歷史中，我們遇到無數這種專案動詞的使用，這些動詞將眾多微觀行動組織成一個獨特的整體行動。但在關於行動的日常討論中，專案動詞的意義不受行動結果的影響—無論其是否發生，是成功還是失敗。因此，如果歷史以敘述某個特定事件的真相來描述其非預期的後果，那麼關於後續事件的陳述的真實性對於敘事描述的意義至關重要。

The theory of narrative sentences thus is valuable in a discriminating way as regards discourse about action in ordinary language. The discriminating factor lies in the “retroactive re-alignment of the Past” (p. 168) brought about by the properly narrative description of action. This realignment is far-reaching. To the extent that the past is considered temporally in terms of unintended consequences, history tends to weaken the intentional accent in action: “frequently and almost typically, the actions of men are not intentional under those descriptions given of them by means of narrative sentences” (p. 182). This last feature accentuates the gap between the theory of action and that of history: “For the whole point of history is not to know about actions as witnesses might, but as historians do, in connection with later events and as parts of temporal wholes” (p. 183).

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This gap between the theory of action and narrative theory helps us better to understand in what sense narrative description is one kind of description among other kinds.
敘事句子的理論因此以一種具有辨別性的方式在普通語言中關於行動的論述中具有價值。辨別性因素在於「過去的追溯性重新調整」（第 168 頁），這是由對行動的恰當敘事描述所帶來的。這種重新調整是深遠的。就過去被暫時性地考慮為非預期後果的程度而言，歷史往往會削弱行動中的意圖重點：「頻繁且幾乎典型地，人們的行動在敘事句子所給出的描述下並不是有意圖的」（第 182 頁）。這最後一個特徵突顯了行動理論與歷史理論之間的差距：「歷史的要點不在於像證人那樣了解行動，而是像歷史學家那樣，與後來的事件相連，並作為時間整體的一部分」（第 183 頁）。行動理論與敘事理論之間的這種差距幫助我們更好地理解敘事描述在其他描述方式中的意義。

The final consequence is that there is no history of the present, in the strictly narrative sense of that term. Such a thing could be only an anticipation of what future historians might write about us. The symmetry between explanation and prediction, characteristic of the nomological sciences, is broken at the very level of historical statements. If such narration of the present could be written and known to us, we could in turn falsify it by doing the opposite of what it predicts. We do not know at all what future historians might write about us. Not only do we not know what events will occur, we do not know which ones will be taken as important. We would have to foresee the interests of future historians to foresee under what descriptions they will place our actions. Peirce’s assertion “the future is open” means “no one has written the history of the present.” This latter remark brings us back to our starting point, the internal limit of narrative statements.
最終的結果是，目前沒有一個嚴格敘事意義上的現在歷史。這只能是未來歷史學家可能會寫的預測。解釋與預測之間的對稱性，這種在規律科學中的特徵，在歷史陳述的層面上被打破。如果這種對現在的敘述可以被寫出並為我們所知，我們反過來可以通過做與其預測相反的事情來證偽它。我們完全不知道未來的歷史學家會怎麼寫我們。我們不僅不知道會發生什麼事件，也不知道哪些事件會被視為重要。我們必須預見未來歷史學家的興趣，才能預見他們會用什麼描述來描繪我們的行動。皮爾斯的斷言"未來是開放的"意味著"沒有人已經寫下了現在的歷史"。這最後的評論使我們回到起點，敘事陳述的內在限制。

In what measure does the analysis of narrative sentences clarify the problem of the relationships between our narrative understanding and historical explanation?
敘事句子的分析在多大程度上澄清了我們的敘事理解與歷史解釋之間的關係？

Danto nowhere declares that the theory of history is exhausted by his analysis of narrative sentences. Nowhere does he say that a historical text is reduci-
丹托 nowhere 宣稱歷史理論僅僅被他對敘事句子的分析所窮盡。他 nowhere 說歷史文本可以
ble to a succession of narrative sentences. The constraints imposed on the true description of an event by the temporal structure of a narrative sentence only constitute a “minimal characterization of historical activity” (p. 25).
簡化為一系列敘事句子。由敘事句子的時間結構所施加的對事件真實描述的約束，僅構成了歷史活動的"最小特徵"（第 25 頁）。

Still it is true that the very choice of narrative sentences as the minimal constraint might leave the impression that the statements describing pointlike events, or at least dated ones, in light of other pointlike or dated events constitute the logical atoms of historical discourse. In fact it is only a question, at least until Danto’s chapter 10, of “true descriptions of events in their past” (ibid.) (in opposition to the claim of philosophers of history also to describe events in their future). It almost seems presumed that historical events, taken one by one, are all of the form, What happened to X during such and such an interval of time? Nothing indicates that historical discourse requires connectives, themselves complex, distinct from the structure of the narrative sentence. This is why “explaining” and “describing”-in the narrative senseare for so long taken as indistinguishable. Danto wants nothing to do with Croce’s distinction between chronicle and history,

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nor with Walsh’s distinction between a pure, plain narrative, limited to reporting what happened, and a significant one which seeks to establish connections between facts. For a simple narrative already does more than report events in their order of appearance. A list of facts without any ties between them is not a narrative. This is why describing and explaining are not distinguished from each other; or, in Danto’s forceful expression, why “history is of a piece.” What we can distinguish is the narrative and the material evidence warranting it. A narrative does not reduce to a summary of its critical apparatus, whether we understand by this its conceptual or its documentary apparatus. Yet the distinction between a narrative and its conceptual or documentary support does not come down to distinguishing two levels of composition. To explain why something happened and to describe what happened coincide. A narrative that fails to explain is less than a narrative. A narrative that does explain is a pure, plain narrative.
儘管如此，選擇敘事句作為最小約束可能給人一種印象，即描述點狀事件或至少是有日期的事件的陳述，在其他點狀或有日期事件的光照下，構成了歷史論述的邏輯原子。事實上，直到丹托第 10 章，這僅是一個關於「以往事件的真實描述」的問題（同上）（與歷史哲學家也描述未來事件的說法相反）。幾乎可以認為，歷史事件逐一被視為「X 在某個時間間隔內發生了什麼」的形式。沒有跡象表明歷史論述需要連接詞，這些連接詞本身很複雜，不同於敘事句的結構。這就是為什麼「解釋」和「描述」在敘事意義上長期被視為不可區分的。丹托不想與克羅齊的編年史與歷史之間的區別有關，也不想與沃爾什關於純粹、平白的敘事（僅限於報告發生的事）與尋求建立事實之間聯繫的重要敘事之間的區別有關。因為簡單的敘事已經做了不僅僅是按出現順序報告事件的事。沒有任何聯繫的事實清單不是一個敘事。這就是為什麼描述和解釋彼此不區分；或者用丹托有力的表達，為什麼「歷史是一體的」。我們可以區分的是敘事及支持它的實際證據。敘事不歸結為其批判性裝置的摘要，無論我們是理解為其概念性還是文獻性裝置。然而，敘事及其概念性或文獻性支持之間的區別並不歸結為區分兩個組成層次。解釋為什麼某事發生和描述發生了什麼是一致的。未能解釋的敘事不完整。解釋性敘事是一種純粹、平白的敘事。

Nothing therefore indicates that the something more that a narrative has in relation to a simple enumeration of events is different from the twofold structure of reference in the narrative sentence, thanks to which the meaning or truth of one event is relative to the meaning and truth of another event. This is why the notion of plot or narrative structure does not seem to be missing in the logic of the narrative sentence. It is as though the description of an earlier event in terms of a later one were already a plot in miniature.
因此，沒有任何跡象表明敘事相對於簡單的事件列舉所具有的額外內容，與敘事句子中的雙重引用結構不同，後者使得一個事件的意義或真實性與另一個事件的意義和真實性相關。這就是為什麼敘事句子邏輯中似乎不缺少情節或敘事結構的概念。就好像用後來的事件來描述早期事件已經是一個微型情節。

In any case, we can ask whether the two notions are superimposed one on the other. For example, when Danto considers the unavoidably selective activity of historical narrative, he seems to invoke a more complex structural factor: “any narrative is a structure imposed on events, grouping some of them together with others, and ruling some out as lacking relevance” (p. 132). A narrative “mentions only the significant events” (ibid.). However, is
無論如何，我們可以詢問這兩個概念是否相互重疊。例如，當丹托考慮歷史敘事不可避免的選擇性活動時，他似乎引用了一個更複雜的結構因素："任何敘事都是加諸事件之上的結構，將某些事件歸類在一起，並排除一些不具相關性的事件"（第 132 頁）。敘事"僅提及重要事件"（同上）。
the narrative organization which confers on events a meaning or an importance (the two connotations of the term “significance”) simply an expansion of the narrative sentence?

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敘事組織是否僅僅是敘事句子的擴展，賦予事件意義或重要性（這個詞的兩層含義）？

In my opinion, if the question of the relationship between text and sentence is not posed as such, it is due to the excessive emphasis placed upon the quarrel Danto has with the phantom of a complete description, and the fact that this phantom is exorcised through the analysis of narrative sentences.
在我看來，如果沒有如此提出文本和句子之間的關係這個問題，這是由於對丹托與一個完整描述的幽靈之間的爭論過分強調，以及通過敘事句子的分析這個幽靈被驅逐了。

The problem arises again with the question whether explanation in terms of laws still has a place in history, that is, when “a narrative already is, in the nature of the case, a form of explanation” (p. 201, his emphasis). Danto, in effect, does not oppose Hempel head-on. He confines himself to observing that the partisans of the covering law model, concerned as they are for the strong structure of the explanans, do not see that this explanans functions in an explanandum that is already a narrative, hence that is already “covered” by a description that counts as an explanation. We can cover an event with a general law only if it figures in language as a phenomenon under a certain description, therefore as inscribed in a narrative sentence. Consequently, Danto can be much more liberal and ambivalent about the covering law model than Dray can.

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當「敘事本質上就是一種解釋的形式」（第 201 頁，他的強調）時，關於法則解釋是否仍在歷史中佔有一席之地的問題再次出現。事實上，丹托並沒有直接反對漢普。他僅僅是觀察到，覆蓋法則模型的支持者，他們對解釋者的強結構感到關切，沒有看到這個解釋者在已經是敘事的被解釋對象中運作，因此已經被被視為解釋的描述所「覆蓋」。只有當一個事件在語言中作為某種描述下的現象出現時，我們才能用一般法則覆蓋它，因此作為刻寫在敘事句子中。因此，丹托可以比德雷對覆蓋法則模型更加寬鬆和矛盾。

Following a Story 追隨一個故事

W. B. Gallie’s work, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, centered on the concept of the “followability” of a story, leads us a step further in the direction of a structural principle of narrative.

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This concept, in my opinion, fills a hole left by Danto’s analysis of narrative sentences. If the narrative sentence’s twofold reference to the event it describes and a later event in light of which the description is made constitutes a good discriminating factor in relation to other descriptions of action, for example, in terms of the agent’s own intentions and reasons, nevertheless the mentioning of a difference between two dates, or two temporal localizations, does not suffice to characterize a narrative as a connection between events. A gap remains between the narrative sentence and the narrative text. This is the gap the notion of the followability of a story tries to fill.
吳·彼·蓋利的著作《哲學與歷史理解》，以故事的「可追隨性」概念為中心，使我們朝敘事結構原則更進一步。這個概念，按我的看法，填補了丹托敘事句子分析中的空白。如果敘事句子對所描述的事件及後來用以解讀描述的事件的雙重引用，構成了與其他行動描述的良好辨別因素，例如從代理人的意圖和理由角度看，然而僅僅提及兩個日期或兩個時間定位之間的差異，並不足以將敘事描述為事件之間的連接。敘事句子與敘事文本之間仍存在一個缺口。這正是「故事可追隨性」概念試圖填補的缺口。

But it is really in terms of one fundamental hypothesis that Gallie sets forth his analysis, namely, “whatever understanding and whatever explanations a work of history contains must be assessed in relation to the narrative form from which they arise and whose development they subserve” (p. xi). This thesis is as prudent as it is resolute. It does not deny that explanation does something more than simply narrate. It just limits itself to affirming, first, that explanation is not born from nothing but “proceeds” in some way or another from some discourse that already has a narrative form. Second, it says that in some way or another, explanation remains “in the service of” the narrative
但是，伽利在根本假設上闡述了他的分析，即「任何歷史作品所包含的理解和解釋，都必須根據其產生的敘事形式及其發展來評估」（第 xi 頁）。這個論點既審慎又堅定。它並不否認解釋不僅僅是敘述。它只是限定自己首先確認，解釋並非憑空產生，而是以某種方式從已有敘事形式的論述中「產生」。其次，它表示解釋以某種方式或另一種方式，仍然「服務於」敘事。
form. This form therefore is both the matrix of explanation and its setting. In this sense, the narrativist thesis says nothing about the structure of explanation. The notion of followability therefore has the ambition of satisfying this twofold requirement.
表單。這個表單因此是解釋的矩陣和其設定。在這個意義上，敘事主義論題對解釋的結構沒有任何說明。因此，可追隨性的概念有滿足這兩重要求的野心。

What, then, is a story? And what does it mean “to follow” a story?
故事是什麼？而「跟隨」一個故事又意味著什麼？
A story describes a sequence of actions and experiences done or undergone by a certain number of people, whether real or imaginary. These people are presented either in situations that change or as reacting to such change. In turn, these changes reveal hidden aspects of the situation and the people involved, and engender a new predicament which calls for thought, action, or both. This response to the new situation leads the story toward its conclusion (p. 22).
故事描述了一定數量的人（無論是真實或虛構）所進行或經歷的一系列行動和經驗。這些人置身於不斷變化的情境中，或對這些變化做出反應。反過來，這些變化揭示了情境和相關人物的隱藏面向，並引發了一個需要思考、行動或兩者兼具的新難題。對這種新情況的回應引導故事走向結論（第 22 頁）。

As the reader will see, this sketch of the notion of a story is not far from what I have called emplotment. If Gallie did not find it useful to relate his concept of a story to that of plot, it was no doubt because he was less interested in the immanent structural constraints on narrative than in the subjective conditions under which a story is acceptable. These conditions of acceptability are what constitute a story’s aptitude for being followed.
正如讀者將看到的，這個故事概念的輪廓與我所稱的情節安排並無太大差異。如果蓋利（Gallie）未能找到將故事概念與情節概念聯繫起來的方法，那麼無疑是因為他對敘事的內在結構限制不太感興趣，而更關注一個故事被接受的主觀條件。這些可接受性的條件構成了一個故事被理解的能力。

To follow a story, in effect, is to understand the successive actions, thoughts, and feelings in the story inasmuch as they present a particular “directedness.” Let us understand by this that we are “pulled foward” by the development, as soon as we respond to this force with expectations concerning the completion and outcome of the whole process. The reader will immediately perceive how understanding and explanation are inextricably mixed together in this process. “Ideally, a story should be self-explanatory” (p. 23). It is only when the process is interrupted or blocked that we demand an explanation as a supplement.
要跟隨一個故事，實際上是理解故事中的連續行動、思想和感受，只要它們呈現出特定的「定向性」。讓我們理解為：當我們對整個過程的完成和結果產生期待時，我們就會被發展「推向前方」。讀者將立即察覺在這個過程中，理解和解釋是如何不可分割地交織在一起。「理想情況下，一個故事應該是自我解釋的」（第 23 頁）。只有當過程被中斷或阻塞時，我們才會要求作為補充的解釋。

To say that we are oriented in a certain direction is to recognize a teleological function in the “conclusion,” the same one I emphasized in my analysis of the “ending.”

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However, in response to the covering law model we need to add that a narrative “conclusion” is not something that can be deduced or predicted. A story that included no surprises or coincidences or encounters or recognition scenes would not hold our attention. This is why we have to follow a story to its conclusion, which is something completely different than following an argument whose conclusion is compelled to be what it is. Rather than being predictable, a narrative’s conclusion has to be acceptable. Looking back from the conclusion toward the intermediary episodes, we must be able to say that this end demanded those events and that chain of actions. Yet this backward look is itself made possible by the teleologically oriented movement of our expectations when we were following the story. An incompatibility, posited abstractly, between the contingency of the incidents and the acceptability of the conclusion is precisely what the followability of a story belies. Contingency is unacceptable only to a mind that attaches the idea of mastery to that of understanding. To follow a story is “to find [the events] intellectually acceptable after all” (p. 31, his emphasis). The intelligence ex-
說我們朝某個方向導向，是要認識「結論」中的目的論功能，這與我在分析「結尾」時強調的是同一個。然而，對於涵蓋法模型的回應是，敘事的「結論」不是可以推導或預測的東西。一個不包含任何驚喜、巧合、遭遇或認知場景的故事將無法吸引我們的注意力。這就是為什麼我們必須追隨一個故事直到其結論，這與追隨一個結論被迫是其所是的論點完全不同。敘事的結論不是可預測的，而是必須是可接受的。從結論回顧中間的情節，我們必須能說這個結局要求那些事件和那個行動鏈。然而，這種回溯本身是由我們追隨故事時的目的論期望所可能的。在抽象層面上假設的事件偶發性與結論可接受性之間的不相容，正是故事的可追隨性所揭示的。偶發性只對將精通與理解的想法聯繫在一起的心靈是不可接受的。追隨一個故事是「最終在智力上找到這些事件是可以接受的」。
ercised here is not the same as that connected with the lawfulness of a process but one that responds to the internal coherence of a story which conjoins contingency and acceptability.
這裡運用的智力與與過程的法則性無關，而是回應一個將偶發性和可接受性結合的故事的內在一致性。

The reader will not have failed to note the surprising kinship of this proposal with the notion of discordant concordance I extracted from the Aristotelian treatment of peripeteia within the framework of Aristotle’s theory of muthos. The major difference with regard to criticism stemming from Aristotle is certainly to be found on the side of the subjective factor introduced by the notion of expectation or attraction due to the end; in short, by the subjective teleology that takes the place of structural analysis. In this sense, the concept of “followability” is drawn more from a psychology of reception than from a logic of configuration.

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讀者不難注意到，這個建議與我從亞里士多德的神話理論中提取的不和諧協調的概念有著驚人的親緣關係。與源自亞里士多德的批評相比，其主要差異無疑在於主觀因素的引入，即由結局的期望或吸引力所引起的因素；簡而言之，由主觀目的論取代了結構分析。在這個意義上，"可追隨性"的概念更多地源於接收的心理學，而非配置邏輯。

If we now pass from the concept of “story” to that of “history,” the continuity between them must be underlined first of all. Gallie’s strategy is precisely to inscribe the epistemological discontinuity between them-which he in no way denies-in the framework of the continuity of narrative interest. This strategy, quite clearly, attacks head-on the problematic set forth in the previous chapter. The question will be whether the analysis that follows has any application outside of narrative history, which Gallie takes as exemplary. The object of such history is past actions that were recorded or that we can infer on the basis of records and reports. The history we write is the history of those actions whose projects or results can be seen as akin to our own action. And in this sense, all history is one fragment or segment of a unique world of communication. This is why we expect works of history, even if they are isolated works, to indicate in their margins the unique history which, however, no one can write.
現在，如果我們從"故事"的概念過渡到"歷史"的概念，首先必須強調它們之間的連續性。加利的策略正是將它們之間的認識論斷裂——他絲毫不否認這一點——銘記在敘事興趣的連續性框架之中。這一策略，顯然是直接攻擊了前一章節提出的問題。問題將是接下來的分析是否適用於敘事歷史之外的領域，加利將其視為典範。這種歷史的對象是已被記錄或可以根據記錄和報告推斷的過去行動。我們書寫的歷史是那些其計劃或結果可被視為與我們自身行動相似的行動的歷史。在這個意義上，所有歷史都是一個獨特的交流世界的一個片段或部分。這就是為什麼我們期待歷史著作，即便它們是孤立的作品，也能在其邊緣暗示那個獨特的歷史，然而，沒有人能夠完整書寫。

If this narrative continuity between story and history was little noticed in the past, it was because the problems posed by the epistemological break between fiction and history, or between myth and history, turned attention to the question of evidence, at the expense of the more fundamental question of what accounts for the interest of a work of history. It is this interest that assures the continuity between history based on historiography and ordinary narration.
如果在過去，這種敘事的連續性在故事和歷史之間鮮少被注意到，那是因為在虛構與歷史或神話與歷史之間的認識論斷裂所提出的問題，將注意力轉向了證據的問題，而忽略了更基本的問題：是什麼造就了一部歷史作品的興趣。正是這種興趣確保了基於史學的歷史與普通敘述之間的連續性。

As a narrative, all history has to do with “some major achievement or failure of men living and working together, in societies or nations or any other lastingly organized groups” (p.65). This is why, in spite of their critical relation to traditional narrative, histories that deal with the unification or the disintegration of an empire, with the rise or fall of a class, a social movement, a religious sect, or a literary style are narratives. In this regard, the difference between an individual and a group is not decisive. Sagas and ancient epics were already centered on groups, not just on isolated figures. “All history is, like saga, basically a narrative of events in which human thought and action play a predominant part” (p. 69). Even when history deals with currents, tendencies, or trends, it is the act of following the narrative that confers an or-
作為一種敘事，所有的歷史都與"生活和共同工作的人們在社會、國家或任何其他持久組織的群體中的某些重大成就或失敗"有關（第 65 頁）。這就是為什麼，儘管對傳統敘事持批判態度，但處理帝國的統一或瓦解、階級的興起或衰落、社會運動、宗教教派或文學流派的歷史仍然是敘事。在這方面，個人和群體之間的差異並不決定性。薩迦（Sagas）和古代史詩已經聚焦於群體，而不僅僅是孤立的個體。"所有歷史，如薩迦，基本上都是人類思想和行動佔主導地位的事件敘事"（第 69 頁）。即使歷史處理的是潮流、趨勢或潮流，追隨敘事的行為也賦予了或-
ganic unity on them. A trend only manifests itself in the succession of events we follow. It is “a pattern-quality of those particular events” (p. 70). This is why: (1) the reading of these historians’ stories derives from our competence to follow stories. We follow them from one end to the other, and we follow them in light of the issue promised or glimpsed through the succession of contingent events. (2) Correlatively, the theme of these stories is worth being recounted and their narratives are worth following, because this theme is superimposed on interests that are our own as human beings, however distant this theme might be from our present feelings. Through these two features, “history is a species of the genus story” (p. 66).
歷史統一性僅僅體現於我們所追蹤的事件連續中。它是「這些特定事件的模式品質」（第 70 頁）。這是因為：(1) 閱讀這些歷史學家的故事源於我們跟隨故事的能力。我們從頭到尾追蹤它們，並在連續的偶然事件中透過承諾或窺見的議題來追蹤它們。(2) 相應地，這些故事的主題值得被敘述，其敘事值得追隨，因為這個主題疊加在作為人類的我們自身的利益之上，儘管這個主題可能與我們當前的感受相距甚遠。通過這兩個特徵，「歷史是故事類型的一種」（第 66 頁）。

As we see, Gallie delays the moment when he has to take up the problem from the other side. Why do historians seek to explain things in a different way that that given by the contours of traditional stories, which they break away from? And how are we to articulate the discontinuity introduced by critical reason into history on the one hand, and fiction or traditional narratives on the other?
正如我們所見，蓋里延遲了從另一側解決問題的時刻。為什麼歷史學家試圖用不同於傳統故事輪廓的方式來解釋事情？我們如何將批判性理性對歷史的斷裂性與另一方面的虛構或傳統敘事聯繫起來？

Here the notion of followability offers another face. Every story, we have said, in principle explains itself. In other words, narrative answers the question “Why?” at the same time that it answers the question “What?” To tell what has happened is to tell why it happened. At the same time, following a story is a difficult, laborious process, which can be interrupted or blocked. A story, we also said, has to be acceptable after all (we could have said, in spite of everything). This, we have known since my interpretation of Aristotle, is true of every narrative. The “one because of the other” is not always easy to extract from the “one after the other.” Consequently, our most elementary narrative understanding already confronts our expectations governed by our interests and our sympathies with reasons that, to fulfill their meaning, have to correct our prejudices. In this way, critical discontinuity is even incorporated into narrative continuity. We thus see in what way the phenomenology applied to every story’s followability is capable of extension, to the point of inserting a critical moment into the very heart of the basic act of following a story.
在此，追隨性提供了另一種面向。我們曾說過，每個故事原則上都能自我解釋。換句話說，敘述同時回答了「為什麼？」和「什麼？」這兩個問題。講述所發生的事情，就是講述其發生的原因。同時，跟隨一個故事是一個困難且費力的過程，可能會被中斷或阻礙。我們還說過，一個故事畢竟必須是可以接受的（我們本可以說，儘管一切）。這一點，自我解讀亞里士多德以來，對每個敘事都是如此。「一個因為另一個」並非總是容易從「一個接一個」中提取出來。因此，我們最基本的敘事理解已經使我們由興趣和同情心主導的期望與必須糾正我們偏見的理由相對峙。這樣，批判性的不連續性甚至被納入敘事的連續性中。這樣我們就能看到，應用於每個故事的追隨性的現象學如何能夠延伸，以至於將批判性時刻插入跟隨故事這一基本行為的核心。

This interplay between expectations governed by interests and reasons governed by critical rationality provides an appropriate framework for attacking the two specifically epistemological problems set forth in chapter 4 above, namely, the change in scale of the entities treated by contemporary history, and the recourse to laws at the level of scientific history.
這種由興趣支配的期望與由批判性理性支配的理由之間的相互作用，為解決第 4 章中提出的兩個具體認識論問題提供了恰當的框架，即當代歷史所處理的實體的尺度變化，以及科學歷史層面上的法則運用。

The first problem seems to constrain the narrativist to take part in a quarrel between two schools of thought. For the first one, which we can call the “nominalist” school, general propositions that refer to collective entities and attribute predicates of action to them (we speak of a government’s politics,
第一個問題似乎迫使敘事主義者參與兩個思想流派之間的爭論。對於第一個流派，我們可以稱之為「名目論」學派，那些涉及集體實體的一般命題並向其歸屬行動的謂詞（我們談論政府的政策，
the progress of a reform, a change of constitution) have no autonomous meaning. Although these propositions, taken in a strict sense, do not refer to the identifiable actions of singular individuals, in the final analysis an institutional change is only an abbreviation for a multitude of ultimately individual facts. For the second school, which we can call the “realist” one, institutions and every comparable collective phenomenon are real entities, which have their own history, irreducible to goals, efforts, and enterprises attributable to individuals either acting alone or in concert, in their own name or in the name of groups which they represent. Conversely, to understand actions assignable to individuals, we have to refer to those institutional facts within which they act. And finally, we are not really interested in what individuals do as individuals.
改革的進程（或憲法的變革）本身並無自主意義。儘管從嚴格意義上說，這些命題並不指涉可識別的個人行動，但歸根結底，一種制度性變遷不過是大量最終性個人事實的簡稱。對於第二學派，我們可以稱之為「現實主義」學派，制度和每一種可比較的集體現象都是真實的實體，具有自身的歷史，不可化約為個人單獨或共同行動的目標、努力和企圖，無論他們是以自身名義還是以他們所代表群體的名義行事。相反地，要理解可歸屬於個人的行動，我們必須參照他們行動其中的制度性事實。最後，我們實際上並不關心個人作為個人做了什麼。

Against all expectations, Gallie is very careful not to take sides with the nominalist thesis. Nominalists, in fact, do not explain why it is in the historian’s interest to proceed to an abbreviation of individual facts which subordinates them to the abstraction of an institutional one, nor why historians are indifferent about enumerating every individual action and reaction in order to understand the evolution of an institution. Nominalists do not see the close tie between the use of abstractions and the eminently selective character of historical interest. Nor do they see, for the most part, that the actions attributable to individuals are done by them as individuals, but only insofar as they are filling some institutional role. Finally, nominalists do not see that to understand global phenomena such as “social discontent” or “economic institutions” requires use of “dummy variables,” some x that marks the place where all the as yet unexplored interactions capable of standing in the place of this

x

cross.

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In all these respects, the Weberian method of “ideal-types” turns out to be the best way to explain this sort of abstraction.
出乎意料的是，蓋利非常小心，不會站在唯名論的立場。事實上，唯名論者無法解釋為什麼歷史學家有興趣將個別事實縮寫並將其從屬於制度性抽象概念，也無法解釋為什麼歷史學家對於列舉每一個個人的行動和反應以理解制度演變漠不關心。唯名論者看不到抽象概念的使用與歷史興趣中高度選擇性特徵之間的密切關聯。他們大多看不到，可歸因於個人的行動是個人所為，但僅限於他們填補某種制度性角色的範圍。最後，唯名論者看不到，要理解諸如「社會不滿」或「經濟制度」等全球性現象，需要使用「虛擬變量」，即標記尚未探索的所有相互作用可能佔據的某個 x。在所有這些方面，韋伯的「理想型」方法最終被證明是解釋這種抽象的最佳方式。

Yet if the historian’s practice belies the extreme thesis that only individual things exist, including persons, it does not justify the realist thesis that all human action implies a tacit reference to some social institutional fact of a general character, and is sufficiently explained when we have made explicit this reference. The nominalist thesis, despite its epistemological inadequacy, indicates the goal of historical thought, which is to account for the social changes that interest us (because they depend upon the ideas, choices, places, efforts, successes and failures of individual men and women). However the realist does give a better account of the way in which history realizes this goal, namely, by appealing to all knowledge available having something to do with social life, “from traditional truisms to the theorems and abstract models of the social sciences” (p. 84).
然而，如果歷史學家的實踐否定了只有個體事物存在（包括人）的極端命題，它並不能證明所有人類行動都暗示某種社會制度事實的普遍性質，並且只有當我們明確這種關聯時才能充分解釋。儘管名詞主義在認識論上存在不足，但它指出了歷史思維的目標，即說明我們關心的社會變遷（因為它們取決於個人男性和女性的想法、選擇、地點、努力、成功和失敗）。然而，現實主義者卻更好地解釋了歷史實現這一目標的方式，即訴諸於與社會生活有關的所有可用知識，"從傳統的老生常談到社會科學的定理和抽象模型"（第 84 頁）。

Far from aligning his narrativist theory with the nominalist one, therefore, Gallie tries to seek a combination of the epistemology implied by the realist thesis and the fundamentally individualistic ontology implied by the nominalist one. This electicism would be a weak solution if it did not represent fairly well what professional historians do in practice when they come to the crucial
因此，加利遠非將他的敘事理論與名詞主義靠攏，而是試圖尋求現實主義命題所隱含的認識論與名詞主義所隱含的根本個人主義本體論的結合。如果這種折中主義並不很好地代表職業歷史學家在實踐中面對關鍵時刻時的做法，那麼它將是一個薄弱的解決方案。
moments of their work. Their whole effort then consists in determining as exactly as possible how this or that individual or group of individuals adopted, maintained, abandoned, or failed to hold on to certain institutional roles. In return, in between these crucial moments, they content themselves with general summaries, formulated in institutional terms, because during these intervals anonymity prevails until some rupture worth recounting happens to alter the course of the institutional or social phenomenon. Such is the case generally in economic and social history, where the massive anonymity of forces, currents, and structures reigns. Yet even this type of history which, at the limit, is written without dates or proper names, does not fail to account for initiatives, qualities of mind, courage, desperation, the flair of individual human beings, “even if their names have usually been forgotten” (p. 87).
在他們工作的關鍵時刻。他們的整體努力在於盡可能精確地確定某個個人或某群個人如何採用、維持、放棄或未能堅持某些制度性角色。作為回報，在這些關鍵時刻之間，他們滿足於用制度性術語制定的概括性總結，因為在這些間隔期間，匿名性佔據主導，直到某些值得記敘的斷裂發生，改變制度或社會現象的進程。這種情況通常出現在經濟史和社會史中，在那裡，力量、潮流和結構的龐大匿名性佔據主導。然而，即使是這種在極限情況下甚至不寫日期或專有名詞的歷史，也不會忽略個人的主動性、心智品質、勇氣、絕望，以及個體人類的洞察力，「即便他們的名字通常已被遺忘」（第 87 頁）。

As for our second problem, that of the function of laws in historical explanation, it is important to be on guard in this regard against a false interpretation of what historians expect from these laws. They do not expect them to eliminate contingencies, but rather to provide a better understanding of their contribution to the march of history. This is why their problem is not to deduce or to predict but to understand better the complexity of the intertwinings that have converged into the occurrence of this or that event. In this historians are different than physicists. They do not seek to increase the field of generalities at the price of a reduction in contingencies. Instead they want better to understand what has happened. The same point applies even to those areas where it is contingencies that hold their interest, whether it be a question of conflicts between nation-states, social struggles, scientific discoveries, or artistic innovations.

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Interest in these events, which I would compare with the Aristotelian peripeteia, does not signify that historians give in to the sensational. Their problem is precisely to incorporate these events into an acceptable narrative, therefore to inscribe contingency within an overall schema. This feature is essential to the followability of any fact capable of being narrated.
關於我們的第二個問題，即歷史解釋中法則的功能，在這方面重要的是要警惕對歷史學家對這些法則期望的錯誤解釋。他們並不期望這些法則消除偶然性，而是提供對其對歷史進程的貢獻的更好理解。這就是為什麼他們的問題不是推導或預測，而是更好地理解導致某一事件發生的複雜交織。在這一點上，歷史學家與物理學家不同。他們不尋求以減少偶然性為代價來擴大普遍性的領域。相反，他們想更好地理解所發生的事情。即使在那些偶然性本身引起他們興趣的領域，如民族國家之間的衝突、社會鬥爭、科學發現或藝術創新，情況也是如此。對這些事件的興趣，我會將其比作亞里士多德式的突轉，並不意味著歷史學家屈服於聳人聽聞。他們的問題恰恰是將這些事件納入一個可接受的敘事中，從而將偶然性銘刻在一個整體框架內。這一特徵對於任何可被敘述的事實的可追溯性至關重要。

One result of this primacy of the concept of followability is that the explanations, for which historians borrow laws from the sciences to which they link their discipline, have no other effect than to allow us better to follow the story, when our vision of its interconnections is obscured or when our capacity to accept the author’s vision is carried to the breaking point.
這種可追溯性概念的首要性導致的一個結果是，歷史學家從他們所連結的學科借用的法則，其解釋的唯一效果就是當我們對事件的相互聯繫的看法模糊，或我們接受作者觀點的能力達到極限時，幫助我們更好地追隨故事。

It would be completely erroneous therefore to see here the weakened forms of a strong covering law model. Explanations simply bring their help to our capacity for following a story. In this sense, their function in history is “an ancillary one” (p. 107).
因此，將此視為强覆蓋法則模型的弱化形式是完全錯誤的。解釋只是幫助我們追隨故事的能力。在這個意義上，它們在歷史中的功能是「輔助性的」（第 107 頁）。

Such a thesis would be unacceptable if we did not know that every narrative explains itself, in the sense that to narrate what has happened is already to explain why it happened. In this sense, the smallest story incorporates generalizations, whether of a classificatory, a causal, or a theoretical order. Con-
如果我們不知道每一個敘事都自我解釋，意即敘述已發生的事情就是解釋為什麼會發生，那麼這樣的論點是不可接受的。從這個意義上說，最小的故事都包含了分類、因果或理論層面的概括。
sequently, nothing prevents ever more complex generalizations and explanations from being grafted onto and in a way interpolated into historical narrative. However if every narrative so explains itself, in another sense no historical narrative does so. Every historical narrative is looking for an explanation to incorporate into itself, because it has failed to explain itself. It needs to be put back on the trail again. Hence the criterion of a good explanation is a pragmatic one. Its function is an eminently corrective one. Dray’s rational explanations satisfied this criterion. We reconstruct an agent’s calculations when a course of action surprises us, intrigues us, or leaves us perplexed.
因此，沒有什麼可以阻止越來越複雜的概括和解釋被植入或插入歷史敘事中。然而，雖然每個敘事在某種意義上都自我解釋，但在另一種意義上，沒有歷史敘事真正自我解釋。每個歷史敘事都在尋求一個可以納入自身的解釋，因為它未能自我解釋。它需要重新找回解釋的軌跡。因此，好的解釋的標準是實用的。其功能是極具糾正性的。德雷的理性解釋滿足了這個標準。當某個行動令我們驚訝、引起興趣或使我們困惑時，我們會重建行為者的計算。

In this regard, history does nothing different from what philology or textual criticism does. When the reading of some received text or interpretation appears to be discordant in relation to other accepted facts, the philologist or textual critic rearranges the details to make everything intelligible again. Writing is rewriting. For historians, everything enigmatic becomes a challenge to those criteria of what, in their eyes, makes a history followable and acceptable.
在這方面，歷史所做的與語言學或文本批評所做的並無二致。當某些已接受的文本或解釋的閱讀似乎與其他已接受的事實不符時，語言學家或文本批評家會重新安排細節，使一切再次變得可理解。寫作就是重寫。對於歷史學家來說，任何神秘的事物都成為對他們眼中使歷史可追溯和可接受的標準的挑戰。

In this work of recasting earlier ways of writing history, historians come closest to the Hempelian type of explanation. Confronted with a strange course of events, they will construct a model of a normal course of action, then ask how the behavior of the actors in question deviates from it. Every explanation of possible courses of action has recourse to such generalizations. The most frequent and most noteworthy case of such recasting is the one where a historian puts forth an explanation that not only was not accessible to the actors in question but that differs from the explanations offered by previous histories, which have become opaque and enigmatic to the new historian. In this case, to explain is to justify the reorientation of historical attention, which leads to a general re-vision of a whole course of history. The great historian is the one who succeeds in rendering acceptable a new way of following history.
在這項重新架構早期書寫歷史方式的工作中，歷史學家最接近漢姆佩爾式的解釋類型。面對一個奇怪的事件進程，他們將建構一個正常行動過程的模型，然後詢問有關行為者與之偏離的方式。每一種可能行動過程的解釋都求助於這種概括。最常見且最值得注意的重構案例是，歷史學家提出一個不僅對當事人不可及，且不同於先前歷史所提供的解釋（這些解釋已對新的歷史學家變得晦澀且謎樣）的解釋。在此情況下，解釋即是證明歷史注意力的重新導向，這導致整個歷史進程的總體重新審視。偉大的歷史學家是成功使新的歷史追溯方式變得可接受的人。

But in no case does explanation exceed its ancillary and corrective function as regards understanding applied to the followability of historical narrative.
但在任何情況下，解釋都不會超越其作為理解應用於歷史敘事可追溯性的輔助和糾正功能。

In the next chapter, we shall ask whether this “ancillary” function of explanation suffices to account for the “unleveling” brought about by historical inquiry in relation to the entities and procedures of narrative.
在下一章中，我們將探討這種解釋的「輔助」功能是否足以解釋歷史研究對敘事實體和程序所帶來的「不均衡」。

The Configurational Act 構型行為

With the work of Louis O. Mink, we come even closer to the main argument of the “narrativist” conception, that narratives are highly organized wholes, requiring a specific act of understanding that takes the nature of a judgment. This argument is all the more interesting in that it makes no use of the concept of plot from literary criticism. In turn, this lack of reference to the structural resources of fictional narrative may explain a certain shortcoming in Mink’s
隨著路易斯·O·明克的工作，我們更接近「敘事主義者」概念的主要論點，即敘事是高度組織的整體，需要一種特定的理解方式，其性質近似於判斷。這個論點更加有趣的是，它並未使用文學批評中的情節概念。反過來，這種未參考虛構敘事的結構資源可能解釋了明克的某種缺陷
analysis, which I shall discuss at the end of this section. Still nobody has gone as far as Mink has in recognizing the synthetic character of narrative activity.
分析，我將在本節末尾討論。然而，還沒有人像米克那樣，認識到敘事活動的綜合性質。

Already in an article published in 1965, his arguments against the covering law model pave the way for characterizing historical understanding as an act of judgment, in the twofold sense that Kant’s first and third Critiques assign to this term, namely, the synthetic function of “grasping together” along with the reflective function attached to every synoptic operation.

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In this article he reviews the main discrepancies, already emphasized by other critics, between the highly prescriptive requirements of the covering law model and the actual understanding displayed by current work in history. He shows that these discrepancies can be accounted for only if the autonomy of historical understanding is correctly established.
早在 1965 年發表的一篇文章中，他對涵蓋定律模型的論點為將歷史理解描繪為判斷的行為鋪平了道路，在康德第一和第三批判中指派給這個術語的雙重意義上，即「綜合性地把握在一起」的綜合功能，以及附加於每個綜覽操作的反思功能。在這篇文章中，他回顧了其他批評者已經強調的主要差異，即涵蓋定律模型高度規範性的要求與當前歷史工作中所顯示的實際理解之間的差異。他表明，只有正確確立歷史理解的自主性，才能解釋這些差異。

Why can historians aspire to explain things when they cannot predict them? Because explaining is not always equivalent to subsuming facts under laws. In history, to explain is often to make use of “colligations”-to use Whewell’s and Walsh’s term - which comes down to “explaining an event by tracing its intrinsic relations to other events and locating it in its historical context” (p. 171). This procedure is at least characteristic of sequential explanations. Why are hypotheses not falsifiable in history in the same way they are in science? Because hypotheses are not the goal of history, only landmarks for delineating a field of investigation, guides serving a mode of understanding which is fundamentally that of interpretative narrative, which is neither chronology nor “science.” Why do historians so willingly make recourse to imaginative reconstruction? Because the task of an overall view is “comprehending [the constitutive events] in an act of judgment which manages to hold them together rather than reviewing them seriatim” (p. 178). Consequently, this overall viewpoint is not a “method,” nor “a technique of proof nor an organon of discovery but a type of reflective judgment” (p. 179). Why are there no “detachable” conclusions in a historian’s argument or work? Because the narrative as a whole is what supports these conclusions. And they are exhibited by the narrative order rather than demonstrated. “The actual meanings are provided by the total context” (p. 181). The notion of a comprehensive synthesis, a synoptic judgment, similar to the operation that allows us to interpret a synthesis as a whole, clearly comes to the forefront with this argument. “The logic of confirmation is appropriate to the testing of detachable conclusions, but ingredient meanings require a theory of judgment” (p. 186). Why can historical events be both unique and similar to other events? Because similarity and uniqueness are alternately accentuated as a function of the contexts at hand. Once again historical understanding comes down to “comprehending a complex event by ‘seeing things together’ in a total and synoptic judgment which cannot be replaced by any analytic technique” (p. 184). Why do historians aspire to address a potentially universal audience and not simply a scientific forum? Because what they attempt to communicate is a kind of judgment closer to Aristotle’s phronēsis than to “science.” The historian’s problem “be-
為什麼歷史學家可以解釋事物，即使他們無法預測它們？因為解釋並不總是等同於將事實歸納在法則之下。在歷史中，解釋常常是運用「聯繫」——使用惠威爾和沃爾什的術語——這歸結為「通過追蹤事件與其他事件的內在關係並將其置於歷史背景中來解釋一個事件」。這個程序至少是序列解釋的特徵。為什麼歷史中的假說不像科學中那樣可被反證？因為假說不是歷史的目標，只是界定研究領域的里程碑，是服務於根本上是解釋性敘事的理解模式的指南，這種模式既不是編年史，也不是「科學」。為什麼歷史學家如此樂意進行想像性重建？因為整體視角的任務是「在一個判斷行為中 comprehending（構成性事件），設法將它們聯繫在一起，而非逐一審視」。因此，這種整體觀點不是「方法」，也不是「證明技術或發現的工具，而是一種反思性判斷」。為什麼歷史學家的論述或作品中沒有「可分離的」結論？因為整個敘事支撐這些結論。這些結論是由敘事秩序展示，而非被證明。「實際意義由整體語境提供」。顯然，綜合性的綜合判斷，類似於允許我們將綜合體作為整體解釋的運作，隨著這一論點浮現。「確認邏輯適用於測試可分離的結論，但內在意義需要判斷理論」。為什麼歷史事件既可以是獨特的，又可以類似其他事件？因為相似性和獨特性根據當前情境交替被強調。再次，歷史理解歸結為「通過『將事物一起看』來全面且概括性地理解複雜事件，這是無法被任何分析技術所取代的」（第 184 頁）。為什麼歷史學家追求面向一個可能的普遍受眾，而不僅僅是科學論壇？因為他們試圖傳達的是更接近亞里士多德的實踐智慧（phronēsis），而非「科學」。歷史學家的問題
comes intelligible . . . if it is seen as an attempt to communicate his experience of seeing-things-together in the necessarily narrative style of one-thing-after-another” (p. 188).
「如果被視為以一種按順序敘述的方式來傳達他看事物整體的經驗，就會變得可以理解」（第 188 頁）。

The conclusion of this article is especially worth quoting: the historian “cultivates the specialized habit of understanding which converts congeries of events into concatenations, and emphasizes and increases the scope of synoptic judgment in our reflection on experience” (p. 191). Mink readily admits that this identification of historical thought with “synoptic judgment” leaves open epistemological problems, such as “the questions whether ‘interpretative syntheses’ can be logically compared, whether there are general grounds for preferring one to another, and whether there are criteria of historical objectivity and truth” (ibid.). But these epistemological questions presuppose that we have identified “what distinguishes sophisticated historical thinking from both the everyday explanations of common sense and the theoretical explanations of natural science” (pp. 191-92).
這篇文章的結論尤其值得引用：歷史學家「培養了一種專業的理解習慣，將一堆事件轉化為相互連結的事件，並強調和擴大了我們對經驗反思中的概括性判斷的範圍」（第 191 頁）。明克（Mink）坦誠地承認，將歷史思考等同於「概括性判斷」，留下了認識論問題，例如「『解釋性綜合』是否可以邏輯地比較，是否有一般性理由優先考慮其中之一，以及是否存在歷史客觀性和真理的標準」（同上）。但是，這些認識論問題以我們已經識別出「什麼區分了複雜的歷史思考，與日常常識解釋和自然科學的理論解釋」（第 191-92 頁）為前提。

He makes his own approach to these questions more specific in an article published in 1968, on the basis of a criticism of Gallie’s book.

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The phenomenology applied to our capacity for following a story is not debatable as long as we have to do with stories whose outcomes are unknown to the listener or reader, as is the case when we are following a game. Here our knowing the rules of the game is of no help in predicting the outcome. We have to follow the series of incidents to its conclusion. The contingencies, for a phenomenological understanding, amount to surprising and unexpected incidents in the given circumstances. We expect some conclusion but we do not know which one, out of the several that are possible, will occur. This is why we have to follow the series from one end to the other. It is also why our feelings of sympathy or hostility should help support the dynamism of the whole process. But, argues Mink, this condition of ignorance and with it the unreflective activity that constitute the following of the story are not characteristic of the historian’s procedure. History “is not the writing, but the rewriting of stories” (p. 687). Its readers, in turn, apply themselves to a “reflective” following, corresponding to the situation of the historian as re-recounting and rewriting the story. History appears once the game is over.

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Its task is not to accentuate the accidents but to reduce them. The historian is always tracing the lines backwards, for “there are no contingencies going backwards” (ibid.). It is only when we tell the story that “we retrace forward what we have already traced backward” (ibid.). This does not mean that, knowing the outcome, readers could have predicted it. They follow in order “to see” the series of events as an intelligible “pattern of relationships” (p. 688). This retrospective intelligibility rests upon a construction that no witness could have put together when the events were occurring, since this backward way of proceeding would be unavailable to any contemporary witness.

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他在 1968 年發表的一篇文章中，根據對加利書籍的批評，使他對這些問題的方法更加具體。現象學應用於我們追隨故事的能力，只要我們面對的是聽眾或讀者未知結局的故事，就是不可爭辯的，就像我們在觀看一場比賽時一樣。在這裡，我們知道比賽規則對預測結果毫無幫助。我們必須追隨事件系列直到結論。就現象學理解而言，意外和意料之外的事件構成了特定情境中的偶發性。我們期待某種結論，但不知道可能出現的幾種結果中哪一種會發生。這就是為什麼我們必須從頭到尾追隨整個過程。這也是為什麼我們的同情或敵意感應該支持整個過程的動態。但是，明克認為，這種無知的狀態及其構成故事追隨的非反思性活動，並不是歷史學家的程序特徵。歷史「不是書寫，而是重新書寫故事」。讀者反過來應用「反思性」追隨，對應於歷史學家重新敘述和重寫故事的情況。歷史出現在比賽結束之後。其任務不是強調意外，而是減少意外。歷史學家始終在向後追溯線索，因為「向後看時沒有偶發性」。只有在我們講述故事時，「我們前進地重追已經向後追溯的內容」。這並不意味著讀者因為知道結果就可以預測結果。他們追隨是為了「看到」事件系列作為可理解的「關係模式」。這種回溯性的可理解性建立在一個任何在事件發生時的見證者都無法構建的建構之上，因為這種向後追溯的方式對於任何當代見證者來說都是不可用的。

Mink adds two further comments. In a phenomenology limited to the situa-
明克增加了兩個進一步的評論。在一個局限於首次跟隨故事的現象學中，
tion where a story is followed for the first time, the function of explanation runs the risk of being underemphasized and reduced to the act of filling in lacunae or of setting aside anything obscure that obstructs the narrative flow. Explanation appears less ancillary and as a result less theoretical, if the historian’s task is to proceed backwards and if, as Mink says, “there are no contingencies going backwards.” “The logic of explanation should have something to do with the phenomenology of understanding; the former, one hopes, should serve to correct the latter and the latter to enrich the former.”

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解釋的功能有被低估的風險，並被簡化為填補空白或擱置任何阻礙敘事流程的模糊事物。如果歷史學家的任務是向後推進，並且如明克所說，「向後追溯時沒有偶然性」，那麼解釋就會顯得不那麼附屬，因此也不太理論化。「解釋的邏輯應該與理解的現象學有關；前者，人們希望，應該用於糾正後者，而後者則豐富前者。」

His second argument is more debatable. Gallie, he says, “wishes to transfer the openness and contingency of our present future to the narrative of past events, since it seems to him that we can think of them in no other way than as once having been future” (p. 688). By doing so, Gallie follows an erroneous ontology of time, the leading feature of which is “the principle that the past and the future are not categorically different from each other: the past consists of past futures and the future of future pasts” (ibid.). This argument does not strike me as convincing. First, I do not think that past futures and future pasts are categorically similar to each other. On the contrary, the lack of symmetry between them nourishes what Mink quite rightly calls “the poignancy of the historical consciousness” (ibid.). Next, the determinate character of the past is not such as to exclude the sort of retroactive changes in meaning to which Danto has so successfully called attention. Third, the process of tracing forward anew the pathway we have already covered going backward may well reopen, if I can put it this way, the space of contingency that once belonged to the past when it was present. It may reinstate a sort of learned wonder, thanks to which “contingencies” recover a part of their initial surprising force. This power may well belong to the fictional character of historical understanding which I shall discuss later. More precisely, it may be tied to that aspect of fiction that Aristotle characterized as the mimesis of action. It is at the level of initial contingencies that some events enjoy the status of having been future with regard to the course of action that is retrospectively reconstructed. In this sense, there must be a place for past futures even in an ontology of time, to the extent that our existential time is shaped by the temporal configurations that history and fiction together establish. I shall return to this discussion in the second volume of this investigation.
他的第二個論點更具爭議性。蓋利說，「他希望將我們當前未來的開放性和或然性移轉到過去事件的敘述中，因為在他看來，我們只能以曾經是未來的方式思考它們」（第 688 頁）。通過這樣做，蓋利遵循了一種錯誤的時間本體論，其主要特徵是「過去和未來在本質上並無根本差異：過去由過去的未來組成，而未來由未來的過去組成」（同上）。這個論點對我來說並不令人信服。首先，我不認為過去的未來和未來的過去在本質上相似。相反，它們之間缺乏對稱性滋養了明克所稱的「歷史意識的哀愁」（同上）。接下來，過去的確定性並不排除丹托成功指出的那種意義的追溯性變化。第三，重新追溯我們已經向後走過的路徑，可能會重新開啟，如果我可以這麼說，曾經屬於現在的過去的或然性空間。它可能會重新建立一種學習到的驚奇，借此「或然性」重新獲得部分最初令人驚訝的力量。這種力量很可能屬於我稍後將討論的歷史理解的虛構性質。更準確地說，它可能與亞里士多德描述為行動模仿的虛構面向有關。在最初的或然性層面，某些事件以被追溯重構的行動過程中曾經是未來的狀態而享有地位。在這個意義上，即使在時間本體論中，也必須為過去的未來預留空間，因為我們的存在時間是由歷史和虛構共同建立的時間配置所塑造的。我將在這個研究的第二卷中重返此討論。

Here I would rather emphasize the kind of unilateralness that results from substituting a phenomenology of retrospective grasping for the direct grasping of a story followed for the first time. Does not Mink run the risk of abolishing, at the level of retelling, those features of the narrative operation that telling and retelling really have in common, because they stem from the same structure of narrative, namely, the dialectic between contingency and order, episode and configuration, discordance and concordance? Across this dialectic, is it not the specific temporality of narrative that runs the risk of being misunderstood? The fact is that we can observe in Mink’s analyses a tendency
在此，我更願意強調從追溯性把握的現象學中替代直接追隨故事的首次敘述所產生的片面性。米克是否冒著在重述層面上消除敘事操作中那些敘事真正共有的特徵的風險，因為這些特徵源於敘事的同一結構，即偶然性與秩序、情節與配置、不協調與協調之間的辯證關係？在這種辯證過程中，敘事的特定時間性是否不會被誤解？
to divest the very act of “grasping together,” characteristic of the configurational operation, of every temporal attribute. His refusal to attribute having once been future to narrated events already is indicative of this orientation. And it appears to be reinforced by his insistence on the act of retelling at the expense of the act of following a story for the first time. A third article by Mink clearly demonstrates this thesis.

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事實是，我們可以在米克的分析中觀察到一種傾向，即剝奪了配置操作中特徵性的「整體把握」的每一個時間屬性。他拒絕將曾經未來的屬性歸於敘述的事件，這已經表明了這種取向。而且，他強調重述的行為，而不是首次跟隨故事的行為，似乎更加強化了這一點。米克的第三篇文章清楚地證明了這一論點。

The strong point of this article is its construing of the configurational mode as one of three modes of “comprehension” in the broader sense, which also includes the theoretical and the categoreal modes. According to the theoretical mode, objects are comprehended in terms of a case or as examples of a general theory. The ideal type of this mode is represented by Laplace’s system. According to the categoreal mode, often confused with the preceding one, to comprehend an object is to determine what type of object we are dealing with, what system of a priori concepts organizes an experience that otherwise would remain chaotic. Plato aims at this categoreal comprehension, as do most systematic philosophers. The configurational mode puts its elements into a single, concrete complex of relations. It is the type of comprehension that characterizes the narrative operation. All three modes do have a common aim, which is no less implicit in the configurational mode than in the other two. Comprehension in the broad sense is defined as the act “of grasping together in a single mental act things which are not experienced together, or even capable of being so experienced, because they are separated by time, space, or logical kind. And the ability to do this is a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition of understanding” (p. 547, his emphasis). Comprehension, in this sense, is not limited to either historical knowledge or temporal acts. To understand a logical conclusion as resulting from its premises is a kind of comprehension without any narrative features, even though it does imply several temporal presuppositions, inasmuch as what we try to think of as a whole consists of “the complicated relationships of parts which can only be experienced seriatim” (p. 548). But this is just a way of saying with Kant that all experience occurs in time, even if it also occurs in space, since we have to trace, retain, and recognize all the components and steps of the related experience. In short, “comprehension is an individual act of seeing-things-together, and only that” (p. 553).
本文的強點在於將配置模式闡釋為「理解」更廣義的三種模式之一，其他兩種模式分別為理論模式和範疇模式。根據理論模式，對象被理解為一個案例或作為一般理論的範例。拉普拉斯系統代表了這種模式的理想類型。根據範疇模式，往往與前一種模式混淆，理解一個對象是確定我們所處理的對象類型，以及哪種先驗概念系統組織了原本混亂的經驗。柏拉圖以及大多數系統性哲學家都追求這種範疇理解。配置模式將其元素置於單一具體的關係複合體中。它是描述性操作的特徵性理解模式。這三種模式確實有一個共同目標，在配置模式中與其他兩種模式同樣隱含。廣義理解被定義為「在單一心理活動中把不同時空或邏輯類型的事物聚合在一起」。具備這種能力是理解的必要（但非充分）條件。這種意義上的理解不限於歷史知識或時間性行為。理解源自前提的邏輯結論是一種無敘事特徵的理解，儘管它涉及若干時間性預設，因為我們試圖思考的整體包含「只能依序經歷的複雜部分關係」。但這只是以康德的方式表示所有經驗都發生在時間中，即使它也發生在空間中，因為我們必須追蹤、保留並識別相關經驗的所有組成部分和步驟。簡而言之，「理解是一種將事物聚集在一起的個人行為」（第 553 頁）。

Furthermore, comprehension in the broad sense presents one fundamental feature that has important implications for the narrative mode of comprehension. All comprehension, Mink declares, has an ideal aim, even if it is unattainable, of comprehending the world as a totality. To put it another way, this goal is unattainable because it would amount to divine comprehension; yet it is significant because “the human project is to take God’s place” (p. 549). This sudden intrusion of a theological theme is in no way marginal. The alleged ultimate goal of the three modes of comprehension proceeds from a transposition into epistemology of Boethius’s definition of “God’s knowledge
此外，廣義上的理解呈現出一個具有對敘事理解模式重要影響的基本特徵。正如明克宣稱的，所有理解都有一個理想目標，即便無法實現，那就是全面 comprehend 這個世界。換句話說，這個目標是無法達成的，因為這將等同於神聖的理解；然而它很重要，因為「人類的計劃是要取代上帝」（第 549 頁）。這種神學主題的突然介入絕非邊緣。三種理解模式的最終目標源於對波愛修斯「上帝對世界的認知」的認識論轉置
of the world as a totum simul, in which the successive moments of all time are copresent in a single perception, as of a landscape of events” (ibid.).

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在這種模式中，所有時間的連續時刻都在單一感知中共存，猶如事件的全景」（同上）。

Mink does not hesitate to apply this goal of comprehension in the broad sense to the configurational mode. “The totum simul which Boethius regarded as God’s knowledge of the world would of course be the highest degree of configurational comprehension” (p. 551). In light of this declaration, the earlier criticism of a phenomenology confined to the act of following a story takes on a new aspect. What ultimately appears to be refused to narrative comprehension, in the name of the totum simul, is the sequential form of stories which this phenomenology had succeeded in preserving. I wonder if the argument, valuable in itself, that history consists more of having followed than of following is not pushed too far, and even weakened, by the subsequent thesis in which he holds that in the act of configurational understanding “actions and events, although represented as occurring in the order of time, can be surveyed as it were in a single glance as bound together in an order of significance, a representation of the totum simul which we can never more than partially achieve” (p. 554).
閔克毫不猶豫地將這種廣義的理解目標應用於配置模式。"波伊修斯所認為的上帝對世界的認知的整體同時性，當然是配置性理解的最高程度"（第 551 頁）。基於這一聲明，早先對僅限於追隨故事情節的現象學的批評呈現出新的面向。從整體同時性的角度看，敘事理解似乎被拒絕的是故事的序列形式，而這種現象學原本已成功地保留了這種形式。我懷疑這個論點本身雖然有價值，即歷史更多的是已經跟隨而非正在跟隨，但在後續的論點中被推得太遠，甚至被削弱，他認為在配置性理解的行為中，"動作和事件雖然被表現為按時間順序發生，但可以彷彿一目了然地被視為在意義的秩序中被綁定在一起，這是我們只能部分實現的整體同時性的表現"（第 554 頁）。

I also wonder whether what is held to be a superior degree of configurational comprehension is not rather the mark of its abolition. To avoid this troublesome consequence for narrative theory, must we not assign an opposite function to the idea of a totum simul, namely, precisely to limit comprehension’s ambition to abolish the sequential character of time underlying the episodic side of emplotment? The totum simul would then have to be recognized as an Idea in the Kantian sense of a limit-idea rather than as a goal or a guide. For the moment, it will suffice to ask ourselves whether this ideal goal is really the appropriate extrapolation of what is implied in the actual comprehension of narratives.
我也懷疑所謂的更高程度的配置性理解，是否不過是其廢除的標誌。為了避免這對敘事理論的麻煩後果，我們是否不應該給整體同時性的概念賦予相反的功能，即恰恰限制理解對消除情節側面 underlying 的時間序列性的野心？整體同時性必須被認識為康德意義上的一個限制性理念，而不是一個目標或指南。此刻，我們只需要問自己，這個理想目標是否真的是敘事實際理解所隱含的適當推論。

What is debatable, on simply the phenomenological level-the level where “having followed” is rightly opposed to “following”-is the assertion that “in the understanding of a narrative the thought of temporal succession as such vanishes-or perhaps, one might say, remains like the smile of the Cheshire Cat” (ibid.). I refuse to believe that “in the configurational comprehension of a story which one has followed . . . the necessity of the backward references cancels out, so to speak, the contingency of the forward references” (ibid., his emphasis). None of the arguments advanced for this conclusion are convincing.
在純現象學層面上——在「已跟隨」正確地與「跟隨」相對立的層面上——可以爭議的是，「在理解敘事時，時間序列本身彷彿消失——或者，可能可以說，如柴郡貓的微笑般留存」這個斷言。我拒絕相信「在已跟隨的故事的配置性理解中……向後引用的必要性，可以說，會抵銷向前引用的偶然性」。對此結論所提出的任何論點都不具說服力。

The argument that in current historiography chronology recedes-and along with it the concern for dates-is a perfectly reasonable one. But the question remains open to what point the surpassing of simple chronology implies the abolition of every mode of temporality. From Augustine to Heidegger, every ontology of time tries to disentangle from purely chronological time those temporal properties founded upon succession but not reducible to either simple succession or chronology. The argument that understanding is
當代史學編年史逐漸退居次要地位——連同日期的關注也是如此——這是一個完全合理的論點。但問題仍然懸而未決：超越簡單的編年史在多大程度上意味著廢除每種時間性模式。從奧古斯丁到海德格爾，每種時間本體論都試圖從純粹的編年時間中解開那些基於序列但不能簡化為單純序列或編年史的時間屬性。論點是理解
complete when we grasp a certain action as the response to an event (where “sending a telegram” responds to “receiving an offer”) is equally correct. But the link between sending a telegram and the reception of an offer is assured by a mediating term: acceptance of the offer, which engenders a change from the initial state of affairs to the terminal one. We do not have the right, consequently, to generalize on the basis of the “response,” and to say that “the actions and events of a story comprehended as a whole are connected by a network of overlapping descriptions” (p. 556, his emphasis). The abolition of sentences marked by verbal tenses in this network of overlapping descriptions is the sign that the narrative quality of history has disappeared along with the temporal ties. We may well say that, in retrospect, all the incidents that occur in the story of Oedipus can be grasped together in the portrait of Oedipus. But this portrait is equivalent to the “thought” of the tragedy Oedipus Rex. And the “thought,” or what Aristotle named the dianoia, is an aspect derived from the plot in the same way the characters are.
當我們將某個行動視為對事件的回應時（例如「發電報」是對「收到報價」的回應）是同樣正確的。但發送電報與收到報價之間的聯繫是由中介詞保證的：接受報價，這引發了從初始狀態到終結狀態的變化。因此，我們無權基於「回應」進行概括，並說「作為一個整體理解的故事中的行動和事件由重疊描述的網絡連接」（第 556 頁，強調）。在這個重疊描述的網絡中，消除了由動詞時態標記的句子，是敘事品質與時間聯繫已經消失的跡象。我們可以說，回顧起來，奧狄浦斯故事中發生的所有事件可以在奧狄浦斯的肖像中被把握。但這個肖像等同於悲劇《奧狄浦斯王》的「思想」。而「思想」，或亞里士多德所命名的 dianoia，是從情節中衍生出的一個方面，就像角色一樣。

It remains to be seen in what way a transferral of the concept of plot from literary criticism to the epistemology of history may illumine the concrete dialectic between discordance and concordance in narrative, a dialectic of narrative which has not been taken into account enough in the analysis of the configurational mode of understanding that tends to dissolve its temporal quality in the name of the goal given it of becoming equal to the totum simul of divine knowledge.
我們還需要看看，將情節概念從文學批評轉移到歷史認識論中，如何能夠闡明敘事中不和諧與和諧之間的具體辯證法，這是敘事辯證法在分析配置性理解模式時未充分考慮的，該模式傾向於消解其時間品質，以達到等同於神聖知識的全觀狀態。

Explanation by Emplotment
通過情節的解釋

The procedures of emplotment which I earlier set forth in terms of mimesis

_{2}

are for the first time assigned to the narrative structure of history writing in the work of Hayden White.

^{48}

However, they do not cover the whole field.
我早先以模仿的角度闡述的情節程序，首次在海登·懷特的作品中被分配到歷史書寫的敘事結構。然而，它們並不涵蓋整個領域。

The force of White’s analyses is due to the lucidity with which he makes explicit the presuppositions of his analyses of major historical texts and defines the universe of discourse in which these presuppositions in turn find their place.
懷特分析的力量在於他以清晰的方式闡明其對主要歷史文本分析的預設，並定義這些預設本身所在的論述領域。

His first presupposition runs as follows. Following in the wake of Mink’s work, White reorganizes the relationship between history and fiction along other lines than those of an epistemology for which the problematic of objectivity and proof determines the basic criterion of every classification of the modes of discourse. Whatever may be said about this problematic, the first presupposition of a “poetics” of historical discourse is that fiction and history belong to the same class as regards their narrative structure. The second presupposition is that this bringing together of history and fiction entails another one, this time bringing together history and literature. This overturning of the usual classifications requires that the characterization of history as writing be
他的第一個預設如下。跟隨明克的工作，懷特重新組織了歷史和小說之間的關係，而不是以客觀性和證據的認識論為基本分類標準的論述模式。無論對這種問題可以說些什麼，歷史論述「詩學」的第一個預設是，小說和歷史在敘事結構方面屬於同一類。第二個預設是，將歷史和小說結合起來，也意味著將歷史和文學結合起來。這種對傳統分類的顛覆要求將歷史定義為書寫
taken seriously. “The writing of history,” to use the title of a work by Michel de Certeau, is not external to the conceiving and composing of history.

^{49}

It does not constitute some second-order operation, stemming only from the rhetoric of communication, that we could neglect as belonging simply to the redactional order. It is constitutive of the historical mode of understanding. History is intrinsically historio-graphy-or to put it in a deliberately provocative way, a literary artifact.

^{50}

Hence the third presupposition is that the boundary drawn by epistemologists between historians’ history and the philosophy of history must also be called into question, inasmuch as, for one thing, every great historical work unfolds an overall vision of the historical world and, for another, philosophies of history have recourse to the same resources of articulation as do the great works of history. This is why in his own major work, Metahistory, White does not hesitate in placing Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce all within the same framework.
不能不被認真對待。引用米歇爾·德·塞杜的一部作品的標題，"歷史的書寫"並不是歷史的構思和編纂的外部事物。

^{49}

它不僅僅是源於交流修辭學的二階操作，不能被忽視為只屬於文字編輯層面。它是歷史理解模式的構成要素。歷史本質上是史學寫作—或者用一種故意挑釁的方式說，是一種文學作品。

^{50}

因此，第三個前提是，認識論者劃分的史學家的歷史與歷史哲學之間的界限也必須受到質疑，因為一方面，每一部偉大的歷史著作都展開了對歷史世界的整體性觀點，另一方面，歷史哲學同樣使用與偉大歷史作品相同的表達資源。這就是為什麼在他自己的主要著作《元歷史》中，懷特毫不猶豫地將米歇萊、蘭克、托克維爾、布爾克哈特、黑格爾、馬克思、尼采和克羅齊置於同一框架之下。

He calls this “poetics” of historiography “metahistory” to distinguish it from an epistemology oriented to the characteristics of inquiry in history, and therefore riveted on the conditions of objectivity and truth that ground the epistemological break between history as a science and traditional or mythical narrative.
他將這種史學的"詩學"稱為"元歷史"，以將其與面向歷史研究特徵的認識論區分開來，因此專注於構成歷史作為科學與傳統或神話敘事之間的認識論斷裂的客觀性和真理的條件。

His three presuppositions entail, in effect, a deplacement and a reclassification of this problematic, the exclusive attention given to the conditions for the scientific status of history being taken as responsible for the misapprehension of those structures that set history within the space of narrative fiction. Only a metahistory can dare to consider historical narratives as verbal fictions close to their literary counterparts because of their content and their form. Later, the question must arise whether it is possible to reclassify history as a literary artifact without declassifying it as knowledge which claims to be scientific.
他的三個預設，實際上意味著對這個問題的置換和重新分類，專注於歷史的科學地位條件被視為對那些將歷史置於敘事虛構空間的結構的誤解負責。只有元歷史才敢將歷史敘事視為因其內容和形式而接近文學對應物的語言虛構。之後，必須提出一個問題：是否可以將歷史重新歸類為文學製品，而不降低其作為聲稱具有科學性的知識的地位。

It is undeniable that this deplacement and reclassification of the problematic of history does imply a transferring to historiography of categories borrowed from literary criticism.
毫無疑問，這種問題的轉移和重新分類確實意味著將文學批評的範疇借用於史學。

The irony of this situation is that these loans are made from the very authors who are opposed to them. We have not forgotten the firmness with which Aristotle excludes historia from his problematic concerning muthos. To grasp the significance of White’s gesture that transgresses the Aristotelian interdiction, we need to understand the reasons for this prohibition. Aristotle does not confine himself just to asserting that history is too “episodic” to satisfy the requirements of his Poetics -after all, this judgment is easily revocable ever since the work of Thucydides. He also tells why history is episodic: because it reports what really happened. And the real, unlike the possible which the poet conceives, and which the peripeteia illustrate, implies a contingency that escapes the poet’s control. It is because poets are the authors of their plots that they can uproot themselves from the contingently real and raise themselves to
這種情況的諷刺之處在於，這些借貸來自反對它們的作者。我們不會忘記亞里士多德排除歷史從他關於神話的問題中的堅定態度。要理解懷特逾越亞里士多德禁令的舉動的意義，我們需要理解這種禁令的原因。亞里士多德並不僅僅斷言歷史太「片段性」而不能滿足他的《詩學》的要求 - 畢竟，自從修昔底德的工作以來，這種判斷很容易被推翻。他還解釋了為什麼歷史是片段性的：因為它報告了真實發生的事情。與詩人構思的可能性不同，真實性意味著一種詩人無法控制的偶然性。正是因為詩人是其情節的作者，他們才能擺脫現實的偶然性，提升到可能性的層面。
the level of probable possibility. Transferring history into the circle of poetics is not therefore an innocent act and cannot lack consequences as concerns the treatment of real contingencies.
因此，將歷史納入詩學的範疇並非無關緊要，並且在處理真實的偶然性方面必然會產生影響。

Transgressing the Aristotelian interdiction meets no less resistance from the side of literary criticism, to which White’s work is even closer. For Auerbach, Booth, and Scholes and Kellogg, the imaginary is defined in opposition to the “real” and history continues to be the model for realism of representation. The height of the irony is that Northrop Frye, whom White especially borrows from, is one of the most vigilant guardians of this boundary. Fiction, for Frye, concerns the possible, history has to do with the real. Following Aristotle, Frye will say that the poet works from a form of unification, the historian works toward it.

^{51}

For Frye, only philosophies of history, such as those of Spengler, Toynbee, or H. G. Wells, can seem to belong to the same “poetic” category as do drama and epic.
違反亞里斯多德的禁令，從文學批評的角度來看，遇到的阻力也不亞於此。對於奧爾巴赫、布斯、斯科爾斯和凱洛格來說，想像力是與「現實」相對立的，歷史仍然是表現寫實主義的模型。諷刺的是，懷特特別借鑑的諾斯羅普·弗萊恰恰是這一界限的最警惕的守護者之一。對弗萊來說，小說涉及可能性，而歷史與現實有關。追隨亞里斯多德，弗萊會說詩人從統一的形式出發，歷史學家則朝著統一的形式前進。對弗萊來說，只有像斯賓格勒、托因比或 H.G.韋爾斯這樣的歷史哲學，才似乎能與戲劇和史詩屬於同一「詩意」類別。

White’s metahistory must therefore break through two resistances: that of the historians who hold that the epistemological break between history and traditional and mythic narrative uproots the former from the circle of fiction, and that of the literary critics for whom the distinction between the imaginary and the real is beyond question.
因此，懷特的後設歷史必須突破兩種阻力：一是那些認為歷史與傳統和神話敘事之間的認識論斷裂將歷史從虛構的圈子中根除的歷史學家；另一是對於想像與現實之間的區別不容置疑的文學評論家。

I shall reserve for my second volume those aspects of verbal fiction that force us to return to the notion of the representation of the real in history, a problem I have chosen to consider in terms of what I have called mimesis

_{3}

. Here I shall remain within the limits of fiction understood as configuration, in the sense of mimesis

_{2}

. I am aware of the injustice I am doing to White’s work by separating his more formal analyses from those concerning historical real-ity-the dividing line passes between his considerations concerning emplotment and those that concern the prefiguring of the historical field which he assigns to a theory of tropes (metaphor, metonymy, etc.). The compensation for this loss, in my view, is the advantage gained in not tying the outcome of the formal analyses, which seem more solid to me, to that of the theory of tropes, which I think is more fragile.

^{52}

我將在第二卷中保留那些迫使我們回歸到在歷史中真實表徵的語言虛構面向，這是一個我選擇以我所謂的模仿

_{3}

來考慮的問題。在此，我將在作為配置的虛構範圍內保持，以模仿

_{2}

的意義。我意識到，通過將白氏作品的形式分析與涉及歷史真實性的分析分開，我對他的工作造成了不公。分界線介於他關於情節編排的考慮和他分配給論述隱喻的歷史領域預配置之間。在我看來，這種損失的補償是在不將形式分析的結果（在我看來更為穩固）與論述隱喻的理論（我認為更為脆弱）掛鉤的優勢。

^{52}

It is important to note that emplotment does not receive from White the large-scale treatment I am giving it except on the condition of not entirely identifying the notion of “historical narrative” with it. He is very careful, in his articles as well as in Metahistory, to situate emplotment among a number of other operations, whose enumeration varies from one work to another. This is why, for didactic purposes, I shall first consider all that is not “plot” in order then to concentrate the essential part of my remarks on it.
重要的是要注意，情節編排並未得到白氏那樣大規模的處理，除非不完全將「歷史敘事」的概念等同於它。在他的文章以及《元歷史》中，他非常謹慎地將情節編排置於其他多種操作之中，這些操作的列舉在不同作品中各不相同。因此，出於教學目的，我將首先考慮所有不是「情節」的內容，然後將我的主要評論集中在它上面。

In an article published in 1972, plot is placed between the story and the argument.

^{53}

Story is taken here in a limiting sense, that of “telling stories,” in the sense of an essentially sequential narrative, having a beginning, a middle, and an end. In truth, it is the concept of “story-line” rather than that of “story” that serves as a benchmark. White visibly wants to rid himself of the
在 1972 年發表的一篇文章中，情節被置於故事和論證之間。

^{53}

在此，故事被理解為一個限定的意義，即「講故事」，是一種本質上是序列性的敘事，有開頭、中間和結尾。事實上，作為參考的是「故事線」概念，而非「故事」概念。白氏明顯地想擺脫
argument that history, as it is written today, is no longer narrative. This objection only holds, he says, if we reduce story to story-line.
他認為，如今所寫的歷史不再是敘事的論點只有在我們將故事簡化為故事線時才成立。

This delineation of story from plot, which is disconcerting to many critics, seems to White to be more urgent in history than in literary criticism, because in history the events constituting the narrated story-line are not produced by the historian’s imagination but rather are submitted to proof procedures. For my part, I see in this argument one way of responding to Aristotle’s interdiction. The price for this exemption is the distinction between story and plot.
這種將故事與情節區分開來的劃分，對許多評論家來說是令人不安的，但在白氏看來，在歷史中比在文學批評中更為迫切，因為在歷史中，構成敘述故事線的事件並非由歷史學家的想像力產生，而是經過證明程序檢驗。就我而言，我認為這是回應亞里士多德禁令的一種方式。這種豁免的代價是區分故事與情節。

This distinction is not always easy to maintain, inasmuch as a story is already a mode of organization in that it is distinguished from a simple chronicle of events and organized in terms of “motifs” and “themes” which unify and delineate subsets within it.

^{54}

In this way, a story is already capable of an “explanatory effect.” It is precisely to do justice to this explanatory effect belonging to a story that Metahistory distinguishes story from chronicle, which then becomes the very first articulation of the historical field. As for this notion of the “historical field” (see Metahistory, p. 30), which we shall rediscover in the work of Paul Veyne, it poses the problem of a still earlier articulation. We can, in fact, speak from inside an already organized narrative only of an “unprocessed historical record” (p. 5), that is, of a preconceptual background open to processes of selection and arrangement.

^{55}

這種區分並不總是容易維持，因為故事本身已經是一種組織模式，它區別於簡單的事件編年史，並根據統一和劃定其中子集的「動機」和「主題」進行組織。

^{54}

如此，故事已經具備了「解釋效果」。正是為了公正地對待故事所具有的這種解釋效果，元歷史將故事與編年史區分開來，編年史隨即成為歷史領域的第一個闡釋。至於這個「歷史領域」的概念（見《元歷史》第 30 頁），我們將在保羅·韋恩的作品中重新發現，它提出了一個更早的闡釋問題。事實上，我們只能從已經組織好的敘事內部談論「未經處理的歷史記錄」（第 5 頁），即一個開放於選擇和安排過程的前概念背景。

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Emplotment conserves an explanatory effect distinct from that of the story, in the sense that it does not explain the events of the story but rather the story itself, by identifying the class to which it belongs. The story-line allows us to identify a unique configuration, while emplotment invites us to recognize a traditional class of configurations. These plot categories, as a function of which the story itself, not its events, is encoded, are akin to those “relational cryptograms” that, according to E. H. Gombrich, in Art and Illusion, govern our way of “reading a painting.” 56
移情佈局保存了一種不同於故事本身的解釋效果，意在於不解釋故事中的事件，而是通過識別其所屬的類別來解釋故事本身。故事情節使我們能夠識別一種獨特的配置，而移情佈局則邀請我們認識一種傳統的配置類別。這些情節類別，作為編碼故事本身（而非其事件）的功能，類似於 E. H. 貢布里希在《藝術與幻覺》中所說的那些「關係密碼」，支配著我們「閱讀繪畫」的方式。

In this way, White thinks he can escape the antinarrativist arguments of the partisans of Hempel’s theory by abandoning to them the organization of history in terms of causes and laws, while taking away from them the categorial explanation proper to emplotment. But he does so only at the price of disjoining the explanation of a story and the explanation of an event.
以這種方式，懷特認為他可以通過將歷史組織中的因果和法則留給赫佩爾理論的支持者，同時保留移情佈局特有的類別解釋，來逃避反敘事主義者的論點。但他只是以切斷故事解釋和事件解釋之間的聯繫為代價。

The boundary between plot and argument is no easier to trace. The argument designates “the point of it all” or “what it all adds up to” (Metahistory, p. 11), in short, the thesis of a narrative. Aristotle included the argument in the plot under the cloak of the plot’s probability and necessity. We might say, in any case, that it is history as different from epic, tragedy, and comedy that requires this distinction at the level of “explanatory effects.” It is precisely because explanation by argument can be distinguished from explanation by emplotment that logicians invented the covering law model. Historians do argue in a formal, explicit, discursive way. What the partisans of the covering law model failed to see, however, was that their field of argumentation is considerably vaster than that of general laws, borrowed from the sciences con-
情節和論點之間的界限也不容易劃分。論點指的是「全部意義」或「一切總結」（《元史學》，第 11 頁），簡而言之，就是敘事的主題。亞里士多德在情節的或然性和必然性的掩護下將論點納入情節。無論如何，正是歷史與史詩、悲劇和喜劇的不同，要求在「解釋效果」層面進行這種區分。正是因為論點解釋可以與移情佈局解釋區分開來，邏輯學家才發明了涵蓋定律模型。歷史學家確實以正式、明確、論述的方式進行論證。然而，涵蓋定律模型的支持者沒有看到的是，他們的論證領域遠遠超出了從科學借鑒的一般法則。
nected to history which are already constituted outside the historical field. Historians have their own modes of arguing, but these belong to the narrative domain. And these modes of arguing are so numerous as to call for a typology. If this is the case, it is because each such mode of arguing expresses at the same time a presupposition of a metahistorical character about the very nature of the historical field and about what we may expect from explanation in history. As for his typology, White borrows it from Stephen Pepper’s World Hypotheses. In this way he distinguishes four major paradigms: the formist, organist, mechanistic, and contextualist forms.

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He takes pleasure in emphasizing that if the first two are taken as more orthodox and the latter two as more heterodox and metaphysical (in spite of such masters of these genres as Ranke and Tocqueville), it is due to misapprehending the epistemological status of these global hypotheses. One forgets that “history is not a science, or is at best a protoscience with specifically determinable nonscientific elements in its constitution” (p. 21, his emphasis).
史學已經在歷史領域外被建構。歷史學家有自己的論證模式，但這些屬於敘事領域。這些論證模式如此多樣，以至於需要進行類型學研究。如果情況確實如此，那是因為每種論證模式同時表達了關於歷史領域本質和我們對歷史解釋期望的元歷史假設。就他的類型學而言，懷特從斯蒂芬·佩珀的《世界假說》中借鑒。通過這種方式，他區分了四種主要範式：形式主義、有機主義、機械主義和語境主義形式。他樂於強調，儘管第一種和第二種被視為更正統，後兩種被視為更異質和形而上（儘管蘭克和托克維爾等大師屬於這些類型），但這是由於誤解了這些全球性假說的認識論地位。人們忘記了"歷史不是一門科學，或者充其量只是一門具有可確定的非科學元素的原始科學"（第 21 頁，他的強調）。

In truth, explanation through these major paradigms is little short of the explanation by ideological implication that Metahistory puts in the fifth rank of narrative structures. White distinguishes this latter mode of explanation from the preceding one by the ethical stance inherent in a particular manner of writing history. The presuppositions of the preceding mode had to do rather with the nature of the historical field. The presuppositions of the ideological mode bear on the nature of historical consciousness, and therefore on the tie between explaining past facts and present practice.

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This is why the ideological mode of explanation, too, has a conflictual structure, which calls for an appropriate typology. White borrows it, although he reworks and simplifies it, from Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia. In this way, he postulates four basic ideological positions: anarchism, conservatism, radicalism, and liberalism. Whatever the case may be as regards the propriety of this typology for the great historical works of the nineteenth century, whose examination is precisely the major objective of Metahistory, it is important to underline the fact that, by adding the ideological mode, White satisfies two distinct, if not opposed, demands. On the one hand, he serves the cause of truth by reintroducing, by way of the post-Marxist concept of ideology, components of historical knowledge that the Verstehen tradition, represented in France by Aron and Marrou, has always emphasized, namely, the historian’s implication in historical work, the consideration of values, and history’s tie to action in the world of the present. Ideological preferences bearing in the final analysis on social change, on its desirable scope and its desirable rhythm, concern metahistory insofar as they are incorporated into the explanation of the historical field and the construction of the verbal model by which history orders events and processes in narratives. On the other hand, in distinguishing argument and ideology, White indicates the place for the critique of ideology, and submits ideology to the same rule of discussion that applies to the mode of explanation by formal arguments.
事實上，透過這些主要範式的解釋，幾乎等同於《元史學》（Metahistory）在敘事結構第五層級中通過意識形態隱含所做的解釋。懷特（White）將這種解釋模式與前一種解釋模式的區別在於寫作歷史的特定方式中固有的倫理立場。前一種模式的預設與歷史領域的本質有關。意識形態模式的預設關乎歷史意識的本質，因此與解釋過去事實和現在實踐之間的聯繫有關。這就是為什麼意識形態解釋模式也具有衝突性結構，需要一個適當的類型學。懷特從卡爾·曼海姆（Karl Mannheim）的《意識形態與烏托邦》中借用了這一類型學，儘管他對其進行了重新改造和簡化。這樣，他假定了四種基本意識形態立場：無政府主義、保守主義、激進主義和自由主義。無論這種類型學對於十九世紀偉大的歷史著作是否恰當（這正是《元史學》的主要目標），重要的是要強調，通過增加意識形態模式，懷特滿足了兩種不同的，甚至可能是相互對立的需求。一方面，他通過後馬克思主義的意識形態概念，重新引入了歷史知識的成分，這是法國的阿倫（Aron）和馬魯（Marrou）所代表的理解傳統一直強調的，即歷史學家在歷史工作中的涉入、對價值的考慮以及歷史與當前世界行動的聯繫。最終關乎社會變革的意識形態偏好，其理想範圍和節奏，只要被納入對歷史領域的解釋和敘事中事件和過程的語言模型的構建中，就與元史學相關。另一方面，在區分論證和意識形態方面，懷特指出了意識形態批判的位置，並將意識形態置於與形式論證解釋模式相同的討論規則之下。

So enframed by the story-line (a level itself split into chronicle and the chain of motifs) and the argument (split into formal arguments and ideological implications), explanation by emplotment for White takes on a strict and limited sense, which allows him to say both that it is not the whole narrative structure and yet is its pivot.

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如此被敘事線（本身又分為編年史和主題鏈）和論證（分為形式論證和意識形態影響）所框限，對於懷特而言，通過情節的解釋具有嚴格且有限的意義，這使他能夠說它既不是整個敘事結構，卻又是其樞紐。

By emplotment, he means much more than the simple combination of the linear aspect of the story and the argumentative aspect of the proposed thesis. He means the kind of story, therefore one of the configurative categories we have learned to distinguish in our culture. Let us say, to clarify this problem, that White appeals to the theme I developed at length in Part I, of the role of paradigms in emplotment, along with the constitution of a narrative tradition by the interplay of innovation and sedimentation. While I characterize the entire scale of exchanges between paradigms and individual stories by emplotment, White retains just their function of categorization for his notion of emplotment. This explains why he carries over to his notion of story the purely linear aspect. Emplotment so conceived constitutes a mode of explanation, “explanation by emplotment” (see Metahistory, pp. 7-11). Here, to explain is to provide a guide for progressively identifying the class of emplotment (“The Structure of Historical Narrative,” p. 9). “Providing the ‘meaning’ of a story by identifying the kind of story that has been told is called explanation by emplotment” (Metahistory, p. 7, his emphasis). A given historian “is forced to emplot the whole set of stories making up his narrative in one comprehensive or archetypal story form” (p. 8, his emphasis).
通過情節，他的意義遠不止於故事的線性方面與所提出論題的論證方面的簡單組合。他指的是一種故事，因此是我們在文化中已經學會區分的配置範疇之一。為了澄清這個問題，且說懷特援引了我在第一部分詳細闡述的主題，即範式在情節化中的角色，以及通過創新和沉澱的相互作用建立敘事傳統。雖然我通過情節化描繪範式和個別故事之間的整個交換尺度，但懷特僅保留了其分類功能，用於他對情節的概念。這解釋了他為何將純粹的線性方面移植到他的故事概念中。如此構思的情節化構成了一種解釋模式，即「情節化解釋」（參見《元歷史》，第 7-11 頁）。在此，解釋即提供一個逐步識別情節類別的指南（《歷史敘事的結構》，第 9 頁）。「通過識別所講述的故事類型來提供故事的『意義』，稱為情節化解釋」（《元歷史》，第 7 頁，強調為原文）。一位給定的歷史學家「被迫將構成其敘事的所有故事情節化為一個綜合性或原型性的故事形式」（第 8 頁，強調為原文）。

White borrows his typology of emplotment from Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism: romance, tragedy, comedy, satire. (Epic is left out, because it appears as the implicit form of the chronicle.) The genre of satire has an peculiar position in that, for Frye, stories constructed in the ironic mode draw their effect from the fact that they defraud their readers of the sort of resolution they expect of stories constructed in the romantic, comic, or tragic modes. Satire, in this sense, is diametrically opposed to the romantic genre, which demonstrates the final triumph of the hero, but it is also opposed, at least in part, to tragedy where, in lieu of celebrating humanity’s ultimate transcendence over the fallen world, a reconciliation is contrived for the spectators, who are led to perceive the law governing the outcome. Finally, satire also takes its distance from the mutual reconciliation of human beings, society, and the world brought about in comedy by its happy ending. In each case, this opposition is only partial. There can be a satirical tragedy or a satirical comedy. Satire starts from the ultimate inadequacy of the visions of the world dramatized in romance, comedy, and tragedy.
懷特從弗萊的《批評解剖》中借用了敘事類型學：羅曼史、悲劇、喜劇、諷刺。（史詩被排除在外，因為它似乎是編年史的隱性形式。）諷刺類型有一個特殊的位置，對於弗萊來說，以諷刺模式建構的故事其效果來自於它們剝奪了讀者在浪漫、喜劇或悲劇模式中對故事的預期解決方式。就此而言，諷刺與浪漫類型截然相反，後者展示了英雄的最終勝利，但它也在一定程度上與悲劇相對立，在悲劇中，不是頌揚人性對墮落世界的最終超越，而是為觀眾設計了一種和解，使他們能夠感知支配結果的法則。最後，諷刺還通過喜劇中人類、社會和世界之間的圓滿和解所帶來的大團圓結局，與之保持距離。在每種情況下，這種對立都只是部分的。可以有諷刺悲劇或諷刺喜劇。諷刺始於對浪漫、喜劇和悲劇所戲劇化的世界觀的最終不足。

What benefit can the epistemology of historical knowledge draw from this distinction between these “modes of explanation” (and their corresponding “explanatory effects”) and the three typologies proposed respectively at the
從這些「解釋模式」（及其相應的「解釋效果」）與在情節、論點和意識形態三個層面上分別提出的三種類型學中，歷史知識的認識論可以獲得什麼好處？
levels of plot, argument, and ideology? Essentially, what is gained is a theory of historiographical style, if we understand by style a remarkable intersecting of the possibilities opened by the diverse narrative categories involved (see pp. 29-31).
本質上，所獲得的是一種史學風格理論，如果我們將風格理解為所涉及的各種敘事類別所開啟的可能性的顯著交叉（參見第 29-31 頁）。

We can build up this theory of style degree by degree, by following the combinatory system’s order of complexity.
我們可以通過遵循組合系統的複雜性順序，逐步建立這種風格理論。

At a first level, the theory of style plays upon the basic trilogy: story, emplotment, argument. Thus, in his 1972 article, this tripartite division is illustrated by three works: explanation as a function of the story-line is illlustrated by Ranke’s History of Germany During the Age of the Reformation, explanation in terms of plot by Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, and explanation in terms of argument by Burckhardt’s Culture of the Renaissance in Italy. Each of these works includes, of course, a story-line, plot, and argument, but in varying proportions. Linear order prevails in Ranke. His history has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and has taken place before the present of the reader. His argument can be reduced to the changes that befall the entity Germany, which conserves its identity. And his plot is confined to showing “how one thing led to another” (p. 6). In this sense, everything for Ranke is a story that illustrates the “narrativist” type of historiography. Tocqueville also has a story, but one open on the end turned toward us, who bear the burden of giving it an end through our own action. Everything he narrates, if you will, is only the extended middle of his story. However the accent is placed on the type of structure binding together social classes, political democracy, culture, religion. With Burckhardt, on the contrary, we can say that everything is argument. His story only serves to illustrate his thesis about individualism in the Renaissance.
在第一層次上，風格理論圍繞著基本三元組：故事、情節安排、論點。因此，在他 1972 年的文章中，這種三部分劃分由三部作品闡明：以敘事線為解釋功能由蘭克的《德國宗教改革時代史》為代表，以情節解釋由托克維爾的《美國民主》為代表，以論點解釋由布克哈特的《義大利文藝復興文化》為代表。這些作品當然各自包含敘事線、情節和論點，但比例各異。線性順序在蘭克那裡佔主導。他的歷史有開頭、中段和結尾，並且發生在讀者當前之前。他的論點可以歸結為降臨於德國這一實體的變化，該實體保持其同一性。他的情節僅限於展示「一件事如何導致另一件事」。從這個意義上說，對蘭克來說，一切都是說明「敘事主義」historiography 類型的故事。托克維爾也有一個故事，但在面向我們的一端是開放的，我們通過自身行動賦予其結局。他敘述的一切，如果可以這麼說，只是其故事的延伸中段。然而重點放在社會階層、政治民主、文化、宗教之間的結構類型上。相比之下，對布克哈特來說，一切都是論點。他的故事僅用於闡明他關於文藝復興時期個人主義的論點。

Yet imperceptibly, White’s theory of historical style passes to a second level, by combining the tripartite division into story, plot, and argument with the typology of emplotment. If Burckhardt illustrates the primacy of argument over plot and story, he also illustrates the ironic mode of emplotment, for a story that does not go anywhere destroys our expectation of a moral or intellectual conclusion, such as it would have been forged by the other paradigms of emplotment: romance, comedy, and tragedy. Michelet, on the other hand, does construct his story in the romantic mode, Ranke in the comic one, and Tocqueville in the tragic one.
然而，白氏的歷史風格理論不知不覺地轉向第二層次，將三分法（故事、情節和論證）與敘事模式的類型學相結合。如果布爾克哈特說明了論證對情節和故事的主導性，他也展示了諷刺性的敘事模式，因為一個毫無進展的故事會破壞我們對道德或智識結論的期待，而這種結論本可以由其他敘事模式所塑造：浪漫、喜劇和悲劇。另一方面，米舍萊以浪漫模式構建他的故事，蘭克以喜劇模式，托克維爾以悲劇模式。

Finally, the theory of style passes to a third level by combining the three typologies corresponding to emplotment, argumentation, and ideological implication. We thus obtain a combinatory system that takes account of, if not all the combinations possible, at least those “elective affinities” that outline the network of compatibility from which emerge the identifiable historiographical styles: “In my view, a historiographical style represents a particular combination of modes of emplotment, argument, and ideological implication.”

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But we misapprehend things if we see in a style a necessary combina-
最後，風格理論進入第三層次，結合了與敘事模式、論證和意識形態涵義相對應的三種類型學。因此，我們獲得了一個組合系統，它至少考慮了那些"選擇性親和力"，這些親和力勾勒出了可識別的史學風格的兼容性網絡："在我看來，史學風格代表了敘事模式、論證和意識形態涵義的特定組合。"

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但如果我們將風格視為必然的解釋模式組合，那麼我們就誤解了事物：
tion of modes of explanation: “the dialectical tension which characterizes the work of every master historian usually arises from an effort to wed a mode of emplotment with a mode of argument or of ideological implication which is inconsonant with it” (p. 29).

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We are thus led by way of a long detour to my theme of dissonant consonance.

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One primary source for it proceeds from the opposition between the three modes, taken together, that confer an explanatory function on the narrative structures.

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Another source of consonance stems from the confrontation between several manners of emplotment, not only in the work of different historians, but at the heart of a major work.
"每位大師級歷史學家作品中特徵性的辯證張力，通常源於試圖將一種敘事模式與不協調的論證或意識形態涵義模式結合"（第 29 頁）。

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我們通過一條漫長的迂迴路線被引向我的不協調協調主題。

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其主要來源之一源於賦予敘事結構解釋功能的三種模式之間的對立。

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另一種協調性來源於不同史學家作品中，乃至一部主要作品內部的多種敘事模式之間的對抗。

In sum, the notion of narrative structure, with which we began, covers a larger terrain than what “narrativist” authors usually allow to it, while the notion of plot receives from its opposition to story and argument an uncommon precision.
總的來說，我們起初討論的敘事結構概念，其範圍遠大於「敘事派」作家通常允許的範圍，而情節概念從其與故事和論點的對立中獲得了不尋常的精確性。

Most of all, we must not lose sight of the fact that the threefold typology upon which this theory of historical style rests does not claim any “logical” authority. The modes of emplotment, in particular, are the products of a tradition of writing which has given them the configuration that the historian uses. This aspect of traditionality is in the end the most important thing. A historian, as a writer, addresses a public likely to recognize the traditional forms of the art of narration. These structures are not therefore inert rules. They are the forms of a cultural heritage. If we say that no event is in itself tragic and that the historian only makes it appear as such by encoding it in a certain way, it is because the arbitrariness of the encoding is limited, not by the narrated events, but by the reader’s expectation of encountering known forms of encoding: “the encodation of events in terms of such plot structures is one of the ways that a culture has of making sense of both personal and public pasts” (“The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” p. 85). The encoding is thus governed more by the expected meaning effects than by the material to be encoded.
最重要的是，我們不能忽視這樣一個事實：這種歷史風格理論所依據的三重類型學並不聲稱具有任何「邏輯」權威性。特別是，情節模式是寫作傳統的產物，賦予了歷史學家所使用的配置。傳統性這一方面最終是最重要的。作為一位作家，歷史學家面對的是可能會識別敘事藝術傳統形式的公眾。因此，這些結構不是無生命的規則。它們是文化遺產的形式。如果我們說沒有任何事件本身就是悲劇，而歷史學家只是通過以某種方式對其進行編碼來使其看似悲劇，那是因為編碼的任意性不是由敘述的事件限制，而是由讀者期待遇到已知的編碼形式所限制：「用這種情節結構對事件進行編碼是文化理解個人和公共過去的方式之一」（《作為文學製品的歷史文本》，第 85 頁）。因此，編碼更多地受到預期意義效果的支配，而非被編碼的材料。

Such meaning effects consist essentially of making the unfamiliar familiar. The encoding contributes to this to the extent that the historian shares with his public an understanding of the forms “that significant human situations must take by virtue of his participation in the specific processes of sense-making which identify him as a member of one cultural endowment rather than another” (ibid., his emphasis).

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這種意義效果本質上是將陌生的事物變得熟悉。在歷史學家與公眾共享對「重要的人類處境必須呈現的形式」的理解的程度上，編碼有助於此，這種理解源於他參與了識別他作為特定文化遺產成員的特定意義建構過程（同上，其強調）。

In this way, the dynamic character of emplotment is restored through its character of traditionality, even if its generic character is the only one considered. What is more, this trait is counterbalanced by the continuity that the notion of historiographical style reestablishes between chronicle, the chain of motifs, plot, argument, and ideological implication. This is why we maysomewhat counter to White, but thanks to his work-take emplotment as the operation that dynamizes every level of narrative articulation. Emplotment is much more than one level among many. It is what brings about the transition between narrating and explaining.
通過這種方式，即使只考慮其通用特徵，敘事的動態特性也通過其傳統性得到恢復。更重要的是，史學風格的概念在編年史、主題鏈、情節、論點和意識形態涵義之間重建了連續性。這就是為什麼我們可以—某種程度上與懷特相反，但感謝他的工作—將情節編排視為使敘事各個層面動態化的操作。情節編排不僅僅是眾多層面中的一個。它是連接敘述和解釋之間的橋樑。

How One Writes History
如何撰寫歷史

It struck me that it might be interesting to return at the end of this chapter to French historiography. The work of Paul Veyne, Comment on écrit l’histoire - which stands alone on the French landscape-has the noteworthy advantage of uniting a scientific abasement of history with an apology for the notion of plot.

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Veyne thus finds himself curiously situated at the confluence of the two currents of thought I have just described, even though he starts from Max Weber and not the English-language “narrativist” current, and even though he preserves a tie to logical positivism which that current has broken. Nevertheless, by placing him at this strategic crossroads I hope to add to the sting of a work that is already quite provocative.
我想到在本章末尾回顧法國史學可能會很有趣。保羅·韋納的作品《如何書寫歷史》—在法國學術領域獨樹一幟—具有將歷史科學化降低與為情節概念辯護相結合的顯著優勢。韋納因此奇妙地處於我剛才描述的兩股思想潮流的交匯點，儘管他是從馬克斯·韋伯而非英語系"敘事主義"思潮出發，並且仍然保留了邏輯實證主義的聯繫。然而，通過將他置於這個戰略性交叉點，我希望能增強已然十分挑釁的作品的銳氣。

His book can, in effect, be read as an expert performance intertwining two motifs: history is “nothing but a truthful narrative” (p. 13), and history is too “sublunar” a science to be explained in terms of laws. To abase the explanatory claim while elevating the narrative capacity - these two movements balance each other in an incessant seesawing.
他的書實際上可以被解讀為一場專業表演，交織著兩個主題：歷史只是"一個真實的敘事"（第 13 頁），而歷史是一門過於"亞月球"的科學，無法用法則來解釋。降低解釋的聲稱，同時提升敘事的能力—這兩種運動在不斷的搖擺中相互平衡。

The goal of elevating the narrative capacity is attained if we join together narrative and plot, something neither Marc Bloch, nor Lucien Febvre, nor Fernand Braudel, nor even Henri-Irénée Marrou ever tried to do, because for them the narrative is what the actors themselves bring about, being given over to the confusion and opacity of their own present. But, precisely because the narrative is a construct, it revives nothing. “History,” says Veyne, “is a bookish, not an existential, notion. It is the organization by the intelligence of givens that refer to a temporality other than that of my Dasein” (p. 90). “History is an intellectual activity that, through consecrated literary forms, serves the ends of simple curiosity” (p. 103). Nothing links this curiosity to some existential ground.

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如果我們將敘事和情節結合起來，就能達到提升敘事能力的目標，這是馬克·布洛克、盧西安·費弗爾、費爾南·布勞代爾，甚至亨利-伊雷內·馬魯從未嘗試過的，因為對他們來說，敘事是行動者自身帶來的，被交給了他們自身現在的混亂和不透明。但是，正是因為敘事是一種建構，它不會復甦任何東西。正如韋恩所說："歷史是一個書本性的，而非存在性的概念。它是通過智慧組織的資料，這些資料指向與我的此在不同的時間性"（第 90 頁）。"歷史是一種智力活動，通過特定的文學形式，服務於簡單的好奇心"（第 103 頁）。這種好奇心與任何存在性基礎都沒有關聯。

In one sense, Veyne is calling narrative what Aron and Marrou called reconstruction. But this change in terminology has its own importance. By linking historical understanding to narrative activity, he allows us to push even further the description of “the object of history” (the title of his first section). If, in fact, we cling to the intrinsic character of the notion of an event-that is, every individual and unrepeatable occurrence–nothing qualifies it as historical or as physical. “The true difference does not lie between historical facts and physical ones, but between history and the physical sciences” (p. 21). The latter subsume facts under laws, the former integrates them into plots. Emplotment is what qualifies an event as historical: “the facts only exist in and through plots wherein they take on the relative importance that the human logic of the drama imposes on them” (p. 70). And “since every event is as historical as any other, we can cut up the field of events as we like” (p. 83). Here Veyne rejoins those narrativist authors we have studied. A historical
在某種意義上，韋恩稱之為敘事的，阿龍和馬魯稱之為重建。但這個術語的變化本身就很重要。通過將歷史理解與敘事活動聯繫起來，他使我們能夠進一步描述"歷史的對象"（他第一節的標題）。事實上，如果我們堅持事件概念的內在特徵——即每一個獨特且不可重複的發生——沒有什麼能將其限定為歷史性或物理性的。"真正的區別不在於歷史事實和物理事實之間，而在於歷史和物理科學之間"（第 21 頁）。後者將事實歸納為定律，前者將事實整合到情節中。情節化是使事件具有歷史性的關鍵："事實只存在於並通過情節，在這些情節中，它們獲得了人類戲劇邏輯所賦予的相對重要性"（第 70 頁）。而且"由於每個事件都和其他事件一樣具有歷史性，我們可以按照自己的意願切割事件領域"（第 83 頁）。在這一點上，韋恩與我們研究過的那些敘事作者取得了共識。
event is not what happens but what can be narrated, or what has already been narrated in chronicles or legends. Furthermore, historians do not despair of having to work only with mutilated fragments. One makes a plot with what one knows, and a plot is by nature “mutilated knowledge.”
事件不是發生的事情，而是可以被敘述的事情，或者已經在編年史或傳說中被敘述的事情。此外，歷史學家並不絕望於僅僅處理殘缺的片段。人們用所知道的來製作情節，而情節本質上是「殘缺的知識」。

By so reconnecting event and plot, Paul Veyne can undramatize the argument over events and nonevents [l’événementiel et du non-événementiel], started by the Annales School. The long time-span is just as much about an event as is the short time-span, if plot is the only measure of an event. The nonevent marks the gap between the determined field of events and the already plowed region of plots. “What is not an event are those events not yet hailed as such: The history of terrors, of mentalités, of madness, or of the search for security across the ages. We shall therefore call the nonevent that historicity which as such we are not yet aware of” (p. 31).
通過重新連接事件和情節，保羅·維因可以非戲劇化地論證事件與非事件的爭論，這是由年鑑學派開始的。如果情節是衡量事件的唯一標準，那麼長時間跨度的事件與短時間跨度的事件同樣重要。非事件標誌著已確定的事件領域和已耕耘的情節區域之間的差距。「那些尚未被視為事件的事件就是非事件：跨越年代的恐懼、心態、瘋狂或尋求安全的歷史。因此，我們將尚未意識到的歷史性稱為非事件」（第 31 頁）。

What is more, if we define what counts as a plot broadly enough, even quantitative history reenters its orbit. There is a plot whenever history brings together a set of goals, material causes, and chance. A plot is “a very human and very unscientific mixture of material causes, ends, and chance events” (p. 46). Chronological order is not essential to it. In my opinion, this definition is completely compatible with the notion of the synthesis of the heterogeneous proposed above in Part I.
更重要的是，如果我們足夠廣泛地定義什麼算是情節，即使是量化的歷史也會重新進入其軌道。每當歷史將一組目標、物質原因和偶然性結合在一起時，就存在一個情節。情節是「物質原因、目的和偶然事件的非常人性化且非科學的混合」（第 46 頁）。時間順序對其並不必要。在我看來，這個定義完全符合上文第一部分提出的異質綜合的概念。

So long as we can recognize this disparate combination, there is a plot. And in this sense, nonchronological series, series of items for the quantitative historians, remain within the domain of history in virtue of their tie, however tenuous, to a plot. This tie between a plot and a series of items, which is not clearly explained by Veyne, seems to me assured by the notion he borrows from Cournot (to which Aron also referred at the beginning of his 1937 book), of the interweaving of causal series. “The field of events is an interweaving of series” (p.35). But is every interweaving of series a plot?
只要我們能夠識別這種不同的組合，就存在一個情節。在這個意義上，非按年代順序的系列，對於定量歷史學家來說的項目系列，由於其與情節的聯繫（儘管微弱），仍然存在於歷史的範疇中。這種情節與項目系列之間的聯繫，維納（Veyne）沒有清楚解釋，但在我看來，是由他從庫爾諾（Cournot）借來的因果系列交織概念得到保證的。「事件領域是一系列的交織」（第 35 頁）。但是，每一種系列的交織都是一個情節嗎？

Veyne thinks he can extend the notion of plot to the point where the notion of time is no longer indispensable to it. “What would become of a history that succeeded in ridding itself of all remaining singularities, of all units of time and place, so as to present itself completely as just the unity of the plot? This is what has appeared over the course of this book” (p. 84). Veyne thus wants to carry to the extreme one of the possibilities opened by the the Aristotelian notion of plot which, we have seen, also ignores time, even though it implies a beginning, a middle, and an end. This possible achronicity has also been worked out by various English-speaking authors (such as Louis O. Mink, whom I discussed above). This possibility is tied to the fundamental feature of a plot upon which Aristotle constructed his Poetics, namely, its capacity to teach the universal. We have also seen above how Hayden White exploits this generic or categorial resource of emplotment.
維納認為他可以將情節概念擴展到時間概念不再是不可或缺的地步。「一部成功擺脫所有殘餘的特殊性，所有時間和地點單位，完全呈現為純粹情節統一體的歷史將會變成什麼？這就是本書過程中出現的情況」（第 84 頁）。維納因此想把亞里士多德情節概念中的一種可能性推向極致，我們已經看到，這個概念即使暗示有開始、中間和結束，也忽略了時間。這種可能的非時間性也已被各種英語作者（如我上面討論過的路易斯·O·明克）闡述。這種可能性與亞里士多德在其《詩學》中建立的情節的基本特徵相關，即它教授普遍性的能力。我們也已經看到海登·懷特是如何利用這種類型或類別性的情節資源。

I find the same accent in Veyne when he develops the apparent paradox that the object of history is not the individual but the specific. Once again it is the
當維納發展出表面上的矛盾，即歷史的對象不是個人而是特定的，我在他身上找到了同樣的重點。再一次，
notion of plot that turns us away from any plea for history as the science of the concrete. To put an event in a plot is to state something intelligible and therefore something specific. “Everything we can state about an individual possesses a sort of generality” (p. 73). “History is the description of what is specific, that is, understandable, in human events” (p.75). This thesis blends with the one about description in terms of items and the one about the interweaving of series. The individual is an intersection for a series of items, on the condition that a set of items is still a plot.
這個情節概念使我們遠離對歷史作為具體科學的任何懇求。將一個事件置於情節中，就是陳述一些可理解的，因此也是特定的事物。「我們關於個人的所有陳述都具有某種普遍性」（第 73 頁）。「歷史是對人類事件中特定的、可理解的事物的描述」（第 75 頁）。這個論點與關於項目描述和系列交織的論點融合在一起。個人是一系列項目的交匯點，條件是一組項目仍然是一個情節。

With this intelligible component of a plot we pass over to the other side of Veyne’s work, that of reducing the explanatory claim.
通過這個情節的可理解成分，我們進入了維恩作品的另一側面，即減少解釋性聲明。

Here Veyne acts as a provocateur. History, he says, has a critique and a topic, but not a method. No method? Let us take him as meaning no rule for bringing about a synthesis of the facts. If the historical field, as we said, is completely undetermined, everything found there really happened, yet numerous itineraries can be traced through it. As for the art of tracing them out, it stems from the historical genre, with all the different ways that has been conceived across the centuries.
在這裡，維恩扮演挑釁者的角色。他說，歷史有批判和主題，但沒有方法。沒有方法？讓我們理解為他的意思是沒有整合事實的規則。如果歷史領域如我們所說是完全不確定的，那麼在那裡發現的一切確實都發生過，但可以追溯出無數路徑。至於追溯這些路徑的藝術，它源於歷史流派，這個流派在幾個世紀中有著不同的概念。

The only “logic” compatible with the notion of a plot is a logic of the probable, whose vocabulary Veyne borrows from Aristotle. Science and its laws do not rule in the sublunar order, for “the sublunar is the kingdom of the probable” (p. 44). To say that history stems from the sublunar order or that it proceeds by plots is the same thing. History “will always be a plot because it is human; sublunar, because it will not be a part of determinism” (p. 46). Probability is a corollary of the historian’s capacity freely to slice up the field of events.
與情節概念相容的唯一「邏輯」是或然論的邏輯，維恩從亞里斯多德那裡借用了這一詞彙。科學及其定律在亞月球領域中不起主導作用，因為「亞月球是或然的王國」（第 44 頁）。說歷史源於亞月球領域或者通過情節進行，這是同一回事。歷史「永遠將是一個情節，因為它是人類的；亞月球的，因為它不屬於決定論」（第 46 頁）。或然性是歷史學家自由切割事件領域的必然結果。

But since the probable is a characteristic of the plot itself, there are no grounds for distinguishing between narrative, understanding, and explanation. “What people call explanation is barely anything more than the way the narrative organizes itself into an understandable plot” (p. 111). From this we can expect that, in the sublunar order, explanation in the scientific sense of this word does not exist. “To explain, for a historian, means ‘to show the unfolding of the plot, to make it understood’” (p. 112). The explanation of the French Revolution “is the summary of it and nothing more” (p. 114, his emphasis). Thus sublunar explanation is not to be distinguished from understanding. With this stroke, the problem of the relationship between understanding and explanation, which had so bothered Raymond Aron, vanishes. As for the word “cause,” disconnected from the term “law,” Veyne uses it as does Maurice Mandelbaum.

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“The causes are the various episodes of the plot” (p. 115). And the narrative “is from the outset causal, understandable” (p. 118). In this sense, “to explain more is to narrate better” (p. 119). This is the only depth we can assign to history. If explanation seems to push beyond our immediate understanding, it is because it can explain the factors of a nar-
但是由於可能性是情節本身的特徵，因此沒有理由區分敘事、理解和解釋。「人們所稱的解釋，barely 僅僅是敘事組織成易於理解的情節的方式」（第 111 頁）。從這一點，我們可以預期在亞月球秩序中，科學意義上的解釋並不存在。「對於歷史學家來說，解釋意味著『展示情節的展開，使其被理解』」（第 112 頁）。法國大革命的解釋「是其總結，僅此而已」（第 114 頁，強調）。因此，亞月球解釋不能與理解區分開來。通過這一筆，困擾雷蒙·阿隆的理解和解釋之間的關係問題消失了。至於「原因」一詞，與「法則」一詞脫節，維納使用它的方式與莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆相同。「原因是情節的各種片段」（第 115 頁）。敘事「從一開始就是因果的、可理解的」（第 118 頁）。在這個意義上，「更多解釋就是更好地敘事」（第 119 頁）。這是我們可以賦予歷史的唯一深度。如果解釋似乎超越了我們的直接理解，那是因為它可以根據機遇、物質原因和自由這三條線來解釋敘事的因素。
rative according to all three lines of chance, material cause, and freedom. “The least historical ‘fact’ includes these three elements, if it is human” (p. 121). This is to say that history is not to be entirely explained by accidental encounters, or by economic causes, or by mentalités, projects, or ideas. And there is no rule for ordering these three aspects. This is another way of saying that history has no method.
「最小的歷史『事實』，如果是人為的，就包含這三個元素」（第 121 頁）。這是說，歷史不能完全由偶然的遭遇、經濟原因、心態、計劃或想法來解釋。而且，這三個方面的排序沒有規則。這是另一種說法，即歷史沒有方法。

One apparent exception to the thesis that, in history, to explain is to make understood is represented by retrodiction (see Veyne, pp. 176-209), that inductive operation by which historians fill in a lacuna in their narrative through an analogy with a similar concatentation in another series but one without a fault. Here explanation seems quite clearly to be distinguished from understanding, inasmuch as retrodiction brings into play a causal explanation. And it seems to intervene precisely when the documents do not furnish a plot. We then return through retrodiction to some presumed cause (we might say, for example, too many fiscal laws made Louis XIV unpopular). We reason here from something similar to something else similar, with no guarantee that in this particular circumstance our analogy may not betray us. This is a case for recalling that sublunar causality is irregular, confused, and only valid “most of the time” and “except for . . .”! Within these narrow limits of what is reasonable, retrodiction compensates for the lacunae in our documents. The kind of reasoning retrodiction most resembles is putting things into a series, as practiced by epigraphists, philologists, and iconographers. What provides the historian with the equivalent of a series is the resemblance that assures the relative stability of the customs, conventions, and types from one civilization or era to another. It is what allows us to know, broadly speaking, what to expect from the people of a given era.
歷史解釋的一個明顯例外是追溯（見韋恩，第 176-209 頁），這是一種歸納操作，歷史學家通過類比另一系列中類似的連結來填補敘事中的空白。在這裡，解釋似乎明確地與理解有所區別，因為追溯引入了因果解釋。它恰好在文件無法提供情節時介入。然後，我們通過追溯返回到某些假定的原因（我們可能會說，例如，太多的財政法令使路易十四不受歡迎）。我們在此從相似的事物推理到另一個相似的事物，並且沒有保證在特定情況下我們的類比不會背叛我們。這是一個提醒我們次月因果關係是不規則、混亂的，且僅在「大多數情況下」和「除了……」有效的情況！在這些合理的狹窄限制內，追溯彌補了我們文件中的空白。追溯最類似的推理方式是像銘文學家、語言學家和圖像學家所實踐的那樣將事物排成一個系列。對於歷史學家來說，確保從一個文明或時代到另一個文明或時代的習俗、慣例和類型相對穩定的相似性，提供了一種系列的等值。正是這種相似性使我們大致上能夠知道如何期待某個特定時代的人們。

Retrodiction, therefore, does not escape the conditions of sublunar knowledge. It has nothing in common with a law of subsumption. It is much closer to causal explanation in Dray’s and Mandelbaum’s sense. “Historical explanation is not nomological, it is causal” (p. 201). After all, this is what Aristotle said about plot. It makes “one because of another” prevail over “one after another.”
因此，追溯並不能逃脫次月知識的條件。它與歸納法則毫無共同之處。它更接近德雷和曼德爾鮑姆意義上的因果解釋。「歷史解釋不是合法的，而是因果的」（第 201 頁）。畢竟，這正是亞里士多德關於情節的看法。它使「一因為另一個」勝過「一個在另一個之後」。

We might ask, however, whether causal explanation and understanding through the plot always coincide. This point is not seriously discussed. When action displays nonintentional effects, which is the normal situation a historian encounters, as Danto and Lübbe emphasize, using different arguments, explanation does seem to indicate a defeat for the plot. Veyne even seems to concede this. “The interval between the intention and the effect is the place that we reserve for science, when we are writing history and when we are doing it” (p. 208). Perhaps we should reply that the plot, as not coinciding with the perspective of an agent but as expressing the narrator’s “point of view”-the “narrative voice,” so to speak-knows nothing of unintended effects.
我們可能會問，因果解釋和通過情節的理解是否總是一致。這一點沒有得到認真討論。當行動展示非意圖性效果時，這是歷史學家通常遇到的正常情況，正如丹托和呂布強調的，使用不同的論點，解釋似乎確實表明情節的失敗。維耶甚至似乎承認這一點。"意圖和效果之間的間隔是我們在撰寫歷史和實踐歷史時為科學保留的空間"（第 208 頁）。也許我們應該回應，情節，作為不與行為主體的視角一致，而是表達敘述者的"觀點"——所謂的"敘事聲音"——對非預期效果一無所知。

We must now do justice to the two complementary theses that history does not have a method but that it does have a critique and a topic.
現在我們必須公正地對待這兩個互補的論點：歷史沒有方法，但它確實有批判和主題。

What is its critique? It does not constitute the equivalent of a method, nor does it substitute for one. As the term—which is Kantian-indicates, it refers rather to the vigilance historians exercise with regard to the concepts they use. In this respect, Veyne professes a nominalism without any concessions. “Abstractions cannot be efficient causes, for they do not exist. . . . No more do forces of production exist; only human beings who produce things exist” (p. 138). This abrupt declaration ought not to be separated, I think, from the thesis mentioned earlier that history does not know the individual but rather the specific. Put simply, the generic is not the specific. Here Veyne has in mind something like Weber’s ideal-types whose heuristic and nonexplanatory character he underscores. Because they are heuristic, the historian is never finished with readjusting them in order to escape the countermeanings they give rise to. Concepts in history are instead composite representations, extracted from earlier designations, and extended in an exploratory fashion to analogous cases. However, the continuities they suggest are misleading and their genealogies are abusive. But such is the realm of sublunar concepts which are perpetually false and constantly somewhat out of focus. So the historian’s vigilance must be particularly severe whenever history enters, as it must, the way of a comparative approach. Marc Bloch was correct, in his Feudal Society, to compare serfdom in Europe and Japan. Yet comparison does not uncover a more general reality, nor does it provide for a more explanatory history. It is only a heuristic approach that leads to particular plots. “What do we do other than understand plots? And there are not two ways of understanding” (p. 157).
它的批評是什麼？它並不構成方法的等值，也不能替代方法。正如這個術語—— 其為康德式——表明的那樣，它指的毋寧是歷史學家對其所使用概念的警惕。在這方面，韋恩宣稱一種毫無讓步的名詞主義。「抽象概念不能成為有效的原因，因為它們不存在……生產力的力量也不存在；只有存在生產事物的人」（第 138 頁）。這個斷言不應該與之前提到的論點分開，我認為，即歷史不了解個人，而是了解具體的事物。簡單地說，通用的不是具體的。在這裡，韋恩心中想的是類似韋伯的理想型，他強調其啟發性和非解釋性的特點。因為它們是啟發性的，歷史學家永遠都在調整它們，以逃避它們所引起的反義。歷史中的概念是由先前的指稱提取出來的複合表示，並以探索的方式擴展到類似的情況。然而，它們暗示的連續性是誤導的，其系譜學是濫用的。但這就是亞月球概念的領域，它們永遠是虛假的，並且總是有些模糊。因此，每當歷史必然進入比較方法時，歷史學家的警惕必須特別嚴格。馬克·布洛克在其《封建社會》中正確地比較了歐洲和日本的農奴制。然而，比較並不揭示更普遍的現實，也不提供更具解釋性的歷史。它只是一種導向特定情節的啟發性方法。「我們除了理解情節外還能做什麼？而且理解的方式並非兩種」（第 157 頁）。

The topic of history remains to be considered. History does not have a method but it does have a critique and a topic (p. 267). The term “topic” is borrowed, following Vico’s example, from the Aristotelian theory of topoi or “commonplaces,” which itself is related to rhetoric. As is well known, these commonplaces constitute the stock of appropriate questions that an orator must possess to speak effectively before an assembly or a tribunal. What is the purpose of history’s topic? It has just one purpose: “to expand the questionnaire” (pp. 253ff.). This expanding of the questionnaire is the only progress history is capable of. How does it come about, if not through a parallel enrichment of the concepts involved? Veyne’s nominalism, so strongly associated with his theory of understanding, must therefore be counterbalanced by an apology for the conceptual progress thanks to which the modern historian’s vision is richer than that of a Thucydides. Veyne, of course, does not formally contradict himself, inasmuch as he assigns the topic of history to its heuristic aspect, hence to its art of asking questions, and not to explanation, if we take this to apply to the art of answering questions. But does this topic stay within the bounds of heuristics and not encroach upon explanation? In the most fre-
歷史主題仍需考慮。歷史沒有方法，但它有批判和主題（第 267 頁）。「主題」一詞是借用維科的例子，來自亞里士多德的論點或「普遍論點」理論，這本身與修辭學有關。眾所周知，這些普遍論點構成了演說者在集會或法庭上有效發言必須具備的適當問題庫。歷史主題的目的是什麼？它只有一個目的：「擴大問題清單」（第 253 頁及以下）。這種問題清單的擴大是歷史能夠達成的唯一進步。如果不是通過所涉及概念的平行豐富，它是如何發生的？維納的名義論，與他的理解理論密切相關，因此必須通過概念進步的辯護來平衡，正是這種進步使得現代歷史學家的視野比修昔底德更為豐富。當然，維納並不正式自相矛盾，因為他將歷史主題分配給其啟發性方面，即提問的藝術，而不是解釋，如果我們認為這適用於回答問題的藝術。但是，這個主題是否停留在啟發性範圍內，而不侵犯解釋？
quent case today, of nonevent-oriented history, what we can call “structural history” (p. 263), it is this topic that allows historians to uproot themselves from the perspective of their sources and to conceptualize events differently than the historical agents or their contemporaries would have done so, and therefore to rationalize their reading of the past. Veyne, in fact, puts this quite nicely: “This rationalization translates into a conceptualizing of the experienced world, through an expanding of the topic” (p. 268).
在當今最常見的非事件導向歷史，我們可以稱之為「結構性歷史」（第 263 頁），正是這個主題使歷史學家能夠擺脫其來源的觀點，並以與歷史行為者或其同時代人不同的方式概念化事件，從而合理化他們對過去的解讀。事實上，維納對此表述得很好：「這種合理化通過擴大主題，將經驗世界概念化」（第 268 頁）。

He is here asking us to accept together two theses that at first glance look quite disparate: that there is nothing to understand in history except plots, and that expanding our questionnaire is equivalent to a progressive conceptualization. It is true that the contrast between these two theses is not so strong if we correctly interpret the two assertions. On the one hand, we must admit that his notion of plot is not tied to the history of events. There is also a plot in structural history. So broadened, the understanding of a plot not only does not contradict but even calls for progress in conceptualization. On the other hand, we have to admit that conceptualization does not authorize any confusion between sublunar knowledge and a science in the strong sense of this term. This is the sense in which the topic remains something heuristic and does not change the fundamental character of understanding, which remains the understanding of plots.
他在這裡要求我們接受兩個乍看之下似乎相當不同的論點：在歷史中除了情節，別無可理解之事，以及擴大我們的問卷調查等同於逐步概念化。誠然，如果我們正確解讀這兩個斷言，這兩個論點之間的對比並不那麼強烈。一方面，我們必須承認他的情節概念並不局限於事件史。在結構性歷史中也存在情節。因此，擴大對情節的理解不僅不會與概念化的進步相矛盾，甚至還會呼喚它。另一方面，我們必須承認概念化不會授權混淆次月球知識和科學在這個詞的強意義。這是主題仍然保持啟發性的意義，並不改變理解的根本特徵，即對情節的理解。

To be totally convincing, however, Veyne should explain how history can still be a narrative when it stops being about events, whether it becomes structural, or comparative, or if it regroups into series items drawn from an atemporal continuum. In other words, the question Paul Veyne’s book raises is how far we can extend the notion of plot without its losing its discriminating ability. This question today must be addressed to all the upholders of a “narrativist” theory of history. English-speaking authors have been able to avoid it because their examples usually are naive and do not surpass the level of the history of events. Yet it is when history ceases to be the history of events that the narrativist theory is really called into question. The force of Paul Veyne’s book is to have brought to this critical point the idea that history is only the construction and understanding of plots.
然而，為了完全令人信服，維納（Veyne）應該解釋，當歷史停止關注事件，無論是變成結構性的、比較性的，或是從非時間連續體中匯集項目，歷史如何仍然可以是敘事。換句話說，保羅·維納的書提出的問題是，我們可以在多大程度上延伸情節的概念而不失去其區別能力。今天，這個問題必須提出給所有「敘事主義」歷史理論的支持者。英語系作者之所以能夠迴避它，是因為他們的例子通常是天真的，未能超越事件史的水平。然而，正是在歷史不再是事件史的時候，敘事主義理論真正受到質疑。保羅·維納的書的力量在於將歷史只是情節的建構和理解這一想法推進到了這個關鍵點。

Introduction 引言

The aim of the present chapter is to examine the indirect connection that must be maintained, in my opinion, between history and our narrative competence, as this has been analyzed in the third chapter of Part I. The fact that this connection must be maintained but that it cannot be a direct connection is the result of the confrontation presented in the two preceding chapters.
本章的目的是要檢查歷史與我們的敘事能力之間必須維持的間接聯繫，正如在第一部分第三章中已分析的那樣。這種聯繫必須維持，但不能直接連接，這是前兩章所呈現的對峙的結果。

The analyses in the first chapter establish the idea of an epistemological break between historical knowledge and our ability to follow a story. This break affects this ability on three levels: the level of procedures, the level of entities, and the level of temporality. On the level of procedures, history is born as inquiry-historia, Forschung, recherche-out of the specific use it makes of explanation. Even if admit, with W. B. Gallie, that a narrative is “self-explanatory,” history as a science removes the explanatory process from the fabric of the narrative and sets it up as a separate problematic. It is not that the narrative is oblivious to the forms “why” and “because,” but its connections remain immanent to the emplotment. For historians, the explanatory form is made autonomous; it becomes the distinct object of a process of authentification and justification. In this respect, historians are in the situation of a judge: placed in the real or potential situation of a dispute, they attempt to prove that one given explanation is better than another. They therefore seek “warrants,” the most important of which is documentary proof. Now it is one thing to explain by recounting. It is quite another to set up the explanation itself as a problem in order to submit it to discussion and to the judgment of an audience, which, if not universal, is at least reputed to be competent, and is composed first of all of the historian’s peers.
第一章的分析建立了歷史知識與我們追隨故事的能力之間存在認識論斷裂的觀念。這種斷裂在三個層面上影響這種能力：程序層面、實體層面和時間性層面。在程序層面上，歷史是通過解釋的特定使用而產生的探究—歷史，研究，調查。即使承認，如 W. B. Gallie 所言，一個敘事是「自我解釋的」，作為一門科學的歷史將解釋過程從敘事的織構中移除，並將其設置為一個獨立的問題。並非敘事對「為什麼」和「因為」的形式一無所知，但其聯繫仍然內在於情節中。對於歷史學家來說，解釋形式是被賦予自主性的；它成為一個真實性和正當性過程的獨特對象。在這方面，歷史學家處於法官的情況：置身於真實或潛在的爭議情境中，他們試圖證明某一解釋比另一個更好。因此，他們尋求「保證」，最重要的是文獻證據。現在，通過敘述來解釋是一回事。而將解釋本身設置為問題，以便提交給討論和判斷—即使不是普遍的，至少是被認為是勝任的受眾，首先由歷史學家的同行組成，則是另一回事。

Making historical explanation autonomous in this way in relation to the explanatory sketches immanent in the narrative has several corollaries, all of which accentuate the break between history and narrative. The first corollary is that tied to the work of explanation is a work of conceptualization, which some people even hold to be the principal criterion of history.

^{1}

This critical
以這種方式使歷史解釋在解釋性的敘事草圖中自主，有幾個推論，所有這些都強調了歷史與敘事之間的斷裂。第一個推論是，與解釋工作相繫的是概念化的工作，有些人甚至認為這是歷史的主要標準。

^{1}

這個
problem can belong only to a discipline which, if it has no method, according to Paul Veyne, does indeed possess a critique and a topic. There is no epistemology of history that does not at one time or another take a stand on the great quarrel over (historical) universals and that does not painfully retrace, following the medieval scholars, the back-and-forth movement between realism and nominalism (Gallie). This is of no concern to narrators. Certainly they use universals, but they are unaware of the question posed by “extending the questionnaire” (Veyne).
批判性問題只能屬於一個學科，根據保羅·維恩，如果這個學科沒有方法，那麼它確實擁有批判和主題。沒有不在某個時候對（歷史的）普遍性大爭論採取立場，並且不痛苦地追溯，跟隨中世紀學者，在現實主義和名義主義之間來回移動的歷史認識論（蓋利）。這與敘述者無關。他們當然使用普遍性，但他們並不知道「擴大問卷調查」（維恩）所提出的問題。

Another corollary of the critical status of history as inquiry is that whatever the limits of historical objectivity may be, there is a problem of objectivity in history. According to Maurice Mandelbaum, a judgment is termed “objective” “because we regard its truth as excluding the possibility that its denial can also be true.”

^{2}

This is a claim that is never made good but that is included in the very project of historical inquiry. The objectivity in question has two sides to it: first, we can expect that the facts dealt with in historical works, when they are taken one at a time, interlock with one another in the manner of geographical maps, if the same rules of projection and scale are respected, or, yet again, like the different facets of the same precious stone. Whereas there is no sense in placing stories, novels, and plays side by side, it is a legitimate and unavoidable question how the history of a given period interlocks with that of some other period, the history of France with that of England, for example, or how the political or military history of a given country at a given time dovetails with its economic history, with its social history, and its cultural history. A secret dream of emulating the cartographer or the diamond cutter animates the historical enterprise. Even if the idea of universal history must forever remain an Idea in Kant’s sense of this term, since it is incapable of constituting a Leibnizian geometral, the work of approximation that brings the concrete results attained by individual or collective inquiry ever closer to this idea is neither useless nor meaningless. To this desire to tie things together on the side of historical facts corresponds the hope that the results reached by different investigators can be combined, due to their complementarity, and that they can mutually correct one another. The credo of objectivity is nothing other than this twofold conviction that the facts related by different histories can be linked together and that the results of these histories can complete one another.
歷史作為探究的關鍵地位還有另一個推論，那就是無論歷史客觀性的極限是什麼，歷史中都存在一個客觀性問題。根據莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆的觀點，一個判斷被稱為「客觀」，是因為我們認為其真實性排除了其否定也可能是真實的可能性。這是一個從未真正實現但包含在歷史探究本身項目中的主張。所討論的客觀性有兩個方面：首先，我們可以預期在歷史著作中處理的事實，當逐一考慮時，如果遵守相同的投影和比例規則，它們會相互銜接，就像地理地圖一樣，或者像同一顆珍貴寶石的不同側面。雖然並列故事、小說和戲劇是沒有意義的，但探討某一特定時期的歷史如何與另一時期的歷史相互銜接是正當且不可避免的問題，例如法國歷史與英國歷史的關係，或者某個國家在某一特定時間的政治或軍事歷史如何與其經濟史、社會史和文化史相互契合。模仿地圖製作者或鑽石切割者是歷史事業的一個秘密夢想。即使普遍歷史的概念必將永遠停留在康德意義上的「理念」階段，因為它無法構成萊布尼茲式的幾何學，但通過個人或集體探究所獲得的具體成果越來越接近這一理念的近似工作並非毫無意義。在歷史事實方面追求事物聯繫的這種願望，與不同研究者的成果可以因其互補性而結合，並且可以相互糾正的希望相對應。客觀性信條無非是這種雙重信念：不同歷史敘述的事實可以被連結在一起，而這些歷史的結果可以彼此完善。

The final corollary is that, precisely because history has objectivity as a project, it can pose the limits of objectivity as a specific problem. This question is foreign to the innocence and naiveté of the narrator, who instead expects from the public, in Coleridge’s familiar expression, a “willing suspension of disbelief.” Historians address themselves to distrustful readers who expect from them not only that they narrate but that they authenticate their narrative. In this sense, to recognize an “ideological implication” (White) among explanatory modes of history is to be capable of recognizing an ideology as such, hence to pick it out from the properly argumentative modes,
最終的推論是，正因為歷史將客觀性視為一個目標，它可以將客觀性的界限作為一個特定問題提出。這個問題與敘述者的天真無邪無關，後者卻期待公眾按照柯爾律治熟悉的表達方式，給予"願意暫停懷疑"。歷史學家面對的是不信任的讀者，讀者期望他們不僅要敘述，還要驗證他們的敘述。從這個意義上說，認識到歷史解釋模式中的"意識形態陷阱"（懷特）是能夠識別意識形態本身，因此從論證模式中將其挑選出來，
hence also to place it within the scope of a critique of ideology. This final corollary might be called the critical reflection of historical inquiry.
同時也將其置於意識形態批判的範圍之內。這最後的推論可以稱為歷史探究的批判性反思。

Conceptualization, the search for objectivity, and critical reexamination thus mark the three steps in making explanation in history autonomous in relation to the “self-explanatory” character of narrative.
概念化、追求客觀性和批判性重新審視，標誌著使歷史解釋從"自我解釋"性質中獨立出來的三個步驟。

Corresponding to this process of making explanation autonomous is a similar process as regards the entities historians take as their sufficient object. Whereas in the traditional or mythical narrative, and also in the chronicle that precedes history, action is imputed to agents who can be identified, designated by a proper name, and held responsible for the actions imputed to them, history as a science refers to objects of a new type appropriate to its form of explanation. Whether these are nations, societies, civilizations, social classes, or mentalités, history replaces the subject of action with entities that are anonymous, in the strict sense of the term. This epistemological break on the level of entities reaches its culmination in the French Annales school, with its expunging of political history in favor of economic, social, and cultural history. The place formerly held by those heroes of historical action whom Hegel called the great figures of world history is henceforth held by social forces, whose action can no longer be ascribed in a distributive manner to individual agents. This new history thus seems to lack characters. And without characters, it could not continue to be narrative.
與這種使解釋自主化的過程相對應的是，關於歷史學家視為其充分對象的實體，存在著類似的過程。在傳統或神話敘事中，以及在前史的編年史中，行動被歸因於可以被識別、以專有名稱指定並對歸於其身的代理人；而作為一門科學的歷史，則指向適合其解釋形式的新型對象。無論這些是民族、社會、文明、社會階級，還是心態，歷史都用匿名的實體取代了行動的主體，在嚴格意義上如此。在實體層面上的這種認識論斷裂在法國年鑑學派達到了頂峰，其廢黜了政治史，轉而支持經濟、社會和文化史。昔日由黑格爾稱為世界歷史偉大人物的那些歷史行動英雄所佔據的位置，如今由社會力量所取代，其行動不再可以分配式地歸因於個體代理人。這種新史學似乎缺乏人物。沒有人物，它就無法繼續作為敘事。

The third break results from the preceding ones. It concerns the epistemological status of historical time. This appears to have no direct connection to the time of the memory, expectation, and circumspection of individual agents. It no longer seems to refer to the living present of a subjective consciousness. Its structure is exactly proportional to the procedures and the entities that history as a science deals with. On the one hand, historical time appears to resolve itself into a succession of homogeneous intervals, the bearers of causal or nomological explanation. On the other hand, it is scattered into a multiplicity of times, depending on the scale of entities considered: the short timespan of the event, the moderately long time-span of conjunctures, the long time-span of civilizations, the very long time-span of the symbol systems that found the social as such. These “times of history,” to use Braudel’s expression, seem to be without any apparent relation to the time of action, to that “intratemporality” of which we said, following Heidegger, that it is always a favorable or an unfavorable time, a time “for” something.
第三個斷裂源於前面的斷裂。它涉及歷史時間的認識論地位。這似乎與個體行動者的記憶、期待和審慎時間沒有直接聯繫。它不再似乎指向主觀意識的生動現在。其結構與歷史作為一門科學所處理的程序和實體完全成正比。一方面，歷史時間似乎解析為一系列同質的間隔，承載因果或定律解釋。另一方面，它分散為多元時間，取決於所考慮實體的尺度：事件的短時段，結構的中期時段，文明的長時段，奠定社會本身的符號系統的極長時段。這些布羅代爾所稱的"歷史時間"，似乎與行動的時間，與我們按海德格爾所說的那種"內在時間"沒有明顯關聯，那是總是有利或不利的時間，是"為了"某事的時間。

And yet, despite this triple epistemological break, history cannot, in my opinion, sever every connection with narrative without losing its historical character. Conversely, this connection cannot be so direct that history can simply be considered a species of the genus story (Gallie). By converging on one another without ever meeting, the two halves of chapter 5 have heightened the necessity for a new type of dialectic between historical inquiry and narrative competence.
然而，儘管有這三重認識論斷裂，在我看來，歷史不能切斷與敘事的每一種聯繫，否則就會失去其歷史特徵。反之，這種聯繫也不能如此直接，以至於歷史可以簡單地被視為故事類型的一個種類（加利）。通過相互趨近而又永遠不會相遇，第 5 章的兩個部分加深了歷史探究與敘事能力之間新型辯證關係的必要性。

On the one hand, the criticism of the covering law model with which we
一方面，對涵蓋定律模型的批評
began led to a diversification of explanation that makes it less foreign to narrative understanding, without thereby denying the explanatory vocation that keeps history within the circle of the human sciences. First we saw the covering law model weaken under the pressure of criticism. In this way it became less monolithic, allowing a greater diversity of scientific precision for alleged explanatory generalities, extending from laws worthy of the name to the common-sense generalities that history shares with ordinary language (Berlin), by way of the generalities of a dispositional nature mentioned by Ryle and Gardiner. Then we saw “rational” explanation demand its proper place, with the same requirements of conceptualization, authentification, and critical vigilance as any other mode of explanation. Finally, as we saw with G. H. von Wright, causal explanation was distinguished from causal analysis, and the form of quasi-causal explanation was separated from causal-nomological explanation and was seen to integrate within itself segments of teleological explanation. Following these three lines, the explanation peculiar to historical inquiry does indeed appear to move part of the way along the path separating it from the explanation immanent in a narrative.
這種解釋的多樣化使其對敘事理解不那麼陌生，同時不否認保持歷史在人文科學範圍內的解釋性使命。首先，我們看到涵蓋定律模型在批評壓力下削弱。通過這種方式，它變得不那麼單一，允許對所謂的解釋性概括性更大的科學精確性，從具有名稱的定律到歷史與普通語言共享的常識性概括（柏林），以及萊爾和加德納提到的傾向性質的概括。然後，我們看到「理性」解釋要求其固有位置，具有與任何其他解釋模式相同的概念化、真實性和批判性警惕要求。最後，正如我們在 G. H.冯萊特那裡看到的，因果解釋與因果分析有所區別，準因果解釋的形式與因果-定律解釋分開，並被視為在其內部整合了電話學解釋的片段。沿著這三條路徑，歷史研究特有的解釋確實似乎沿著使其遠離敘事內在解釋的路徑前進。

To this weakening and diversification of the models of explanation proposed by epistemology corresponds a symmetrical attempt in the analysis of narrative structures to hold up the explanatory resources of the narrative and to bring them, so to speak, to meet the return movement of explanation in the direction of narration.
這種由認識論提出的解釋模型的削弱和多樣化，在敘事結構分析中有對應的對稱嘗試，以支撐敘事的解釋資源，並使其在某種程度上朝著解釋回歸敘事的方向前進。

I stated above that the partial success of the narrativist theories was at the same time a partial failure. This admission must not lessen the acknowledgment of the partial success. The narrativist theses, in my opinion, are basically correct on two points.
我之前提到，敘事理論的部分成功同時也是部分失敗。這一承認不應減弱對部分成功的認可。在我看來，敘事理論基本上在兩個方面是正確的。

First, the narrativists have successfully demonstrated that to narrate is already to explain. The di’ allëla-the “one because of the other” that, according to Aristotle, forms the logical connection of the plot-is henceforth the necessary starting point for any discussion of historical narration. This basic thesis has a number of corollaries. If every narrative brings about a causal connection merely by reason of the operation of emplotment, this construction is already a victory over simple chronology and makes possible the distinction between history and chronicle. What is more, if plot construction is the work of judgment, it links narration to a narrator, and therefore allows the “point of view” of the latter to be disassociated from the understanding that the agents or the characters of the story may have of their contribution to the progress of the plot. Contrary to the classical objection, a narrative is in no way bound to the confused and limited perspective of the agents and the eyewitnesses of the events. On the contrary, the putting at a distance that constitutes a “point of view” makes possible the passage from the narrator to the historian (Scholes and Kellogg). Finally, if emplotment integrates into a meaningful unity components as heterogeneous as circumstances, calcula-
首先，敘事主義者已成功證明，敘述本身就是解釋。根據亞里斯多德所說的「一因於另一」，它形成情節的邏輯連結，從此成為任何歷史敘述討論的必要起點。這個基本論點有一些推論。如果每個敘事僅憑情節建構就帶來因果關聯，這種建構已經戰勝簡單的年代學，並使歷史與編年史得以區分。更重要的是，如果情節建構是判斷的工作，它將敘述與敘述者連結，因此允許後者的「觀點」可以與故事中代理人或角色對情節進展的理解分離。與古典反對意見相反，敘事並不受限於代理人和事件目擊者的模糊和有限視角。相反，構成「觀點」的距離感使從敘述者到歷史學家的轉變成為可能。最後，如果情節建構將如環境、計算等異質成分整合為一個有意義的統一體
tions, actions, aids and obstacles, and, lastly, results, then it is equally possible for history to take into account the unintended results of action and to produce descriptions of action distinct from its description in purely intentional terms (Danto).
在意圖、行動、援助和障礙，以及最後的結果中，歷史同樣可能考慮行動的非預期結果，並從純粹意圖性的術語之外，製作行動的描述（丹托）。

Second, the narrativist theses reply to a diversifying and hierarchizing of the explanatory models with a comparable diversifying and hierarchizing of the explanatory resources of narrative. The structure of the narrative sentence was, for example, seen to lend itself to a certain type of historical narrative based on documented dating (Danto). We then witnessed a certain diversification in the act of configuration (Mink), and we even saw, for the same author, how the configurational explanation itself becomes one explanatory mode among others, along with categoreal explanation and theoretical explanation. Finally with Hayden White, the “explanatory effect” characteristic of emplotment is situated halfway between that of the argumentation and that of the story-line, to the point that what occurs here is no longer a diversification but a breaking apart of the narrative function. Following this, explanation by emplotment, which had already been distinguished from the explanation inherent in the story-line, becomes part of a new explanatory configuration by linking up with explanation by argument and explanation by ideological implication. This redeploying of narrative structures is equivalent to a disavowal of the strictly “narrativist” theses, which are reassigned to the lower level of the story-line.
其次，敘事主義論點以一種相應的解釋資源的多樣化和等級化，回應了解釋模式的多樣化和等級化。例如，敘事句子的結構被視為適合於基於文件化日期的某種類型的歷史敘事（丹托）。然後，我們見證了配置行為的某種多樣化（明克），甚至看到，對於同一作者而言，配置性解釋本身成為眾多解釋模式之一，與類別解釋和理論解釋並列。最後，對於海登·懷特而言，情節化所特有的「解釋效果」位於論證和故事情節之間，以至於此處發生的不再是敘事功能的多樣化，而是分裂。其後，已經與故事情節的內在解釋區分開來的情節化解釋，通過與論證解釋和意識形態涵義解釋相連結，成為新的解釋配置的一部分。這種敘事結構的重新部署相當於對純粹「敘事主義」論點的否定，這些論點被重新歸類到故事情節的較低層次。

The simple narrativist thesis has thus suffered a fate comparable to that of the covering law model: to attain the level of properly historical explanation, the narrativist model has been diversified to the point of disintegrating altogether.
因此，簡單的敘事主義論點遭遇了與涵蓋法模型類似的命運：為了達到真正的歷史解釋層次，敘事主義模型已被多樣化到瓦解的地步。

This adventure brings us to the brink of the major difficulty: does a narrativist thesis, which has been reworked to the point of becoming antinarrativist, have any chance of replacing the explanatory model? This question must unreservedly be answered in the negative. A gap remains between narrative explanation and historical explanation, a gap that is inquiry as such. This gap prevents us from taking history, as Gallie does, as a species of the genus “story.”
這次探險將我們帶到了一個主要難點的邊緣：一個被重新闡釋至近乎反敘事主義的敘事論是否有機會取代解釋模型？這個問題必須毫不猶豫地以否定的答案回應。敘事解釋與歷史解釋之間存在一個 gap，這個 gap 本身就是一種探究。這個 gap 阻止我們像加利（Gallie）那樣，將歷史視為「故事」這一類型的一個種類。

And yet the intersections hinted at in the converging movement by the explanatory model toward narration and by the narrative structure toward historical explanation attest to the reality of the problem to which the narrativist thesis gives too brief a reply.
然而，解釋模型朝向敘事和敘事結構朝向歷史解釋的匯聚運動中所暗示的交叉點，證明了敘事論對此給出了過於簡短的回應的問題的現實性。

The solution to this problem depends on what could be called a method of “questioning back.” This method, practiced by Husserl in his Krisis, stems from what Husserl calls a genetic phenomenology - not in the sense of a psychological genesis but of a genesis of meaning.

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The questions that Husserl raised concerning Galilean and Newtonian science, I am raising concerning the historical sciences. I am asking in turn about what I shall henceforth call
對這個問題的解決方案取決於所謂的「向後追問」方法。這種由胡塞爾（Husserl）在其《危機》（Krisis）中實踐的方法源於胡塞爾所說的基因現象學 - 不是心理學意義上的基因，而是意義的基因。我對伽利略和牛頓科學所提出的問題，我現在同樣對歷史科學提出。我轉而詢問
the intentionality of historical knowledge or, by abbreviation, historical intentionality. By this I refer to the meaning of the noetic intention that forms the historical character of history and keeps it from dissolving into the other types of knowledge with which history is joined through its marriage of convenience with economics, geography, demography, ethnology, and the sociology of mentalités and of ideologies.
歷史知識的意向性，或簡稱為歷史意向性。通過這一點，我指的是形成歷史特性並使其不會融入與歷史通過便利婚姻結合的其他知識類型的示意意向的意義，這些知識類型包括經濟學、地理學、人口學、民族學，以及心態社會學和意識形態社會學。

The advantage we may have over Husserl in his investigation of the “lifeworld” to which, according to him, Galilean science refers, is that this questioning back, applied to historiographical knowledge, refers to a cultural world that is already structured and not at all to immediate experience. It refers to a world of action that has already received a configuration through narrative activity, which with regard to its meaning is prior to scientific history.
在胡塞爾對"生活世界"的研究中，我們可能擁有的優勢是，這種追溯性的質疑，當應用於史學知識時，是指一個已經被結構化的文化世界，而不是直接的經驗。它指的是一個已經通過敘事活動獲得配置的行動世界，就其意義而言，這種配置先於科學史。

Indeed, this narrative activity already has its own dialectic that makes it pass through the successive stages of mimesis, starting from the prefigurations inherent in the order of action, by way of the constitutive configurations of emplotment - in the broad sense of the Aristotelian muthos-to the refigurations that arise due to the collision of the world of the text with the life-world.
事實上，這種敘事活動已經有其自身的辯證法，使其通過模仿的連續階段，從行動秩序中固有的前構型開始，經過情節構形的構成性配置——在亞里士多德的寬廣的 muthos 意義上——到達由於文本世界與生活世界的碰撞而產生的重構。

From this, my working hypothesis becomes more specific. I propose to explore by which indirect paths the paradox of historical knowledge (in which the two preceding chapters culminate) transposes onto a higher level of complexity the paradox constitutive of the operation of narrative configuration. This paradox, we recall, arises from the median position of narrative configuration between that which comes before and that which comes after the poetic text. This narrative operation already presents the opposing features that are sharpened in historical knowledge. On the one hand, it emerges out of the break that sets up the kingdom of the plot and splits it off from the order of real action. On the other hand, it refers back to the understanding immanent in the order of action and to the prenarrative structures stemming from real action.

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基於此，我的工作假設更加具體。我建議探索歷史知識的矛盾（在前兩章達到頂峰）如何通過間接路徑，將敘事配置操作的構成性矛盾提升到更高的複雜層次。這個矛盾，我們回憶，源於敘事配置在詩意文本之前和之後的中間位置。這種敘事操作已經呈現出在歷史知識中被銳化的對立特徵。一方面，它從設立情節王國並將其與真實行動秩序分離的斷裂中浮現。另一方面，它又回溯到行動秩序中的內在理解，以及源自真實行動的前敘事結構。

The question, therefore, is as follows. Through what mediations does historical knowledge succeed in transposing into its own order the twofold constitution of the configuring operation of narrative? Or: by what indirect derivations does the triple epistemological break that makes history a form of inquiry proceed from the break established by the configurating operation on the level of mimesis

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? Does history nevertheless continue obliquely to intend the order of action on the level of mimesis, in accordance with its own resources of intelligibility, of symbolization, and of prenarrative organization?
因此，問題如下。歷史知識通過何種中介成功地將敘事配置操作的雙重構成轉置到其自身的秩序中？或者：通過何種間接衍生，使歷史成為一種探究形式的三重認識論斷裂，從模仿水平上由配置操作建立的斷裂出發？歷史是否仍然以斜向方式按照其自身的可理解性、符號化和前敘事組織資源，意圖在模仿水平上的行動秩序？

The task is all the more arduous in that the conquest of the scientific autonomy of history does seem to have as its corollary, if not as its precondition, a concerted forgetfulness of its indirect derivation, starting from the activity of narrative configuration, and of its referring back, through forms that are further and further removed from the narrative base, to the field of praxis and its prenarrative resources. This feature, once again, relates my enterprise to that
這項任務更為艱鉅，因為歷史的科學自主性的征服似乎確實以一種刻意的遺忘為其附帶結果，如果不是前提的話，這種遺忘源於敘事配置活動及其通過越來越遠離敘事基礎的形式，回溯到實踐領域及其前敘事資源。這一特徵再次使我的企圖與胡塞爾在《危機》中的企圖相關聯。
of Husserl in the Krisis. Galilean science, too, broke its ties with the prescientific world, to the point of making it almost impossible to reactivate the active and passive syntheses constituting the “life-world.” However, our inquiry may have a second advantage in relation to the Husserlian efforts at genetic phenomenology, directed primarily at “the constitution of the object” by way of perceptual phenomena, the advantage of finding at the very heart of historical knowledge a series of relay stations for our questioning back. In this sense, the derivation is never so completely forgotten that it cannot be reconstructed with some sureness and rigor.
伽利略科學也斷絕了與前科學世界的聯繫，以至於幾乎無法重新激活構成「生活世界」的主動和被動綜合。然而，我們的探究可能在關係到胡塞爾的遺傳現象學努力方面有第二個優勢，後者主要針對通過感知現象「物件的構成」，而我們的優勢在於在歷史知識的核心找到一系列中繼站，用於我們的追溯性質疑。在這個意義上，這種衍生從未被完全遺忘，以至於不能以某種確定性和嚴謹性加以重建。

This reconstruction will follow the order in which I presented above the different aspects of the epistemological break: the autonomy of explanatory procedures, the autonomy of the entities referred to, and the autonomy of the time-or rather of the times-of history.
這種重建將按照我上面所呈現的認識論斷裂的不同面向依次進行：解釋程序的自主性、所指涉實體的自主性，以及歷史的時間或時間的自主性。

Beginning with the explanatory procedures, I would like, in light of the encouragement provided by von Wright’s analyses, to return to the disputed question about causality in history or, more precisely, about singular causal attribution or imputation. I do so not in order to oppose it, in a polemical spirit, to explanation by laws but, on the contrary, in order to discern within it the transitional structure between explanation by laws, often identified with explanation as such, and explanation by emplotment, often identified with understanding. In this sense, singular causal imputation does not constitute one explanation among others, but is rather the nexus of all explanation in history. As such, it constitutes the requisite mediation between the opposing poles of explanation and understanding, to preserve a now obsolete vocabulary, or, better, between nomological explanation and explanation by emplotment. The affinity preserved between singular causal imputation and emplotment authorizes us to speak of the first form, by analogy, in terms of a quasi-plot.
從解釋程序開始，我希望在冯·賴特分析的鼓勵下，重新探討歷史中因果關係的爭議性問題，或更準確地說，是關於特定因果歸因或歸責的問題。我這麼做並非為了以對抗的態度反對法則解釋，相反，是為了在其中辨別從法則解釋（常常被等同於解釋本身）到情節化解釋（常常被等同於理解）之間的過渡性結構。在這個意義上，特定因果歸責並不構成眾多解釋中的一種，而是歷史中所有解釋的樞紐。作為這樣，它構成了解釋和理解對立兩極之間所需的中介，以保留已過時的詞彙，或者更好地說，介於法則解釋和情節化解釋之間。特定因果歸責與情節化之間保留的親和性，使我們能夠類比地用準情節的術語來談論第一種形式。

As for the entities set in place by historical discourse, I would like to show that they are not all of the same order but that they can be arranged along the lines of a strict hierarchy. History, in my opinion, remains historical to the extent that all of its objects refer back to first-order entities-peoples, nations, civilizations-that bear the indelible mark of concrete agents’ participatory belonging to the sphere of praxis and narrative. These first-order entities serve as the transitional object between all the artifacts produced by history and the characters of a possible narrative. They constitute quasicharacters, capable of guiding the intentional reference back from the level of the science of history to the level of narrative and, through this, to the agents of real action.
關於歷史論述中設置的實體，我想說明它們並非都是相同的，而是可以按照嚴格的層級排列。在我看來，歷史之所以仍然具有歷史性，是因為其所有對象都指向一級實體——人民、民族、文明——這些實體帶有具體行動者參與性歸屬於實踐和敘事領域的不可磨滅的印記。這些一級實體作為歷史所生產的所有工藝品與可能敘事中角色之間的過渡對象。它們構成準角色，能夠將意圖性引用從歷史科學層面引導至敘事層面，並通過這種方式，引導至真實行動的行動者。

Between the relaying by singular causal imputation and that by first-order entities-between the nexus of explanation and the transitional object of the description-there are tight interconnections. The distinction between these two lines of derivation-derivation of procedures, derivation of entitiespresents in this respect a purely didactic character, so closely knit are these two lines. It is important, nonetheless, to keep them distinct in order better to
在以特殊因果歸因和一級實體進行轉述之間——在解釋的聯繫和描述的過渡對象之間——存在緊密的相互聯繫。這兩種推導線索——程序推導和實體推導——在這方面呈現出純粹的教學性質，它們是如此緊密地交織在一起。儘管如此，為了更好地理解，仍然重要的是將它們區分開來。
understand their complementarity and, if I may put it this way, their reciprocal genesis. The reference back to primary entities, which I am calling “participatory belonging,” occurs principally by way of singular causal imputation. Reciprocally, the intention that runs through a causal imputation is guided by the interest the historian continues to have in the contribution made by historical agents to their fate, even though this fate slips out of their hands due to the perverse effects that, precisely, distinguish historical knowledge from the simple understanding of the meaning immanent to their action. In this sense, quasi-plot and quasi-characters belong to the same intermediary level and have a similar function, serving as a relay station for the movement of history’s questioning back toward narrative and, beyond the narrative, in the direction of actual practice.
理解它們的互補性和（如果我可以這麼說）它們的相互起源。對主要實體的追溯，我稱之為「參與歸屬」，主要是通過獨特的因果歸因方式發生。相互地，貫穿因果歸因的意圖，由歷史學家對歷史行動者對其命運所做貢獻的持續興趣所引導，儘管由於那些精確區分歷史知識與行動內在意義的簡單理解的顛倒效應，這種命運從其手中溜走。在這個意義上，準情節和準角色屬於同一中介層次，具有類似的功能，作為歷史追問回溯到敘事，並且越過敘事，走向實際實踐的中轉站。

A final test of my working hypothesis concerning historical knowledge is obviously necessary. It concerns the epistemological status of historical time in relation to the temporality of a narrative. Our inquiry about history must venture to this point if it is to remain faithful to the principal subject of this work: narrative and temporality. It is important to show two things: On the one hand, that the time constructed by the historian is constructed to the second, the third, the

n^{th}

level upon an already constructed temporality, the theory of which was expounded in Part I under the title of mimesis

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; and on the other hand, that this is constructed time, however artificial it may be, never ceases to refer back to the temporality of praxis described by mimesis

_{1}

. Constructed on . . . , referring back to . . . , these two intertwining relations also characterize the procedures and the entities built by history. The parallel with the other two mediations goes even further. Just as I am searching in historical causality and in first-order entities for the relay stations capable of guiding the reference of the structures of historical knowledge back to the work of narrative configuration, which itself refers back to the narrative prefigurations found in the field of praxis, in a similar way I should like to show, in the fate of the historical event, both the indication of the ever-increasing gap separating historical time from the time of narrative and from lived time and the indication of the ineffaceable reference of historical time back to the time of action by way of the time of narrative.
對我有關歷史知識的工作假設進行最終測試顯然是必要的。這涉及歷史時間的認識論地位與敘事的時間性的關係。如果我們的歷史探究要忠於這部作品的主要主題：敘事和時間性，就必須探究到這一點。重要的是要證明兩件事：一方面，歷史學家構建的時間在第二、第三、

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層級上建立在已經構建的時間性之上，其理論在第 I 部分 under the title of mimesis

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中已闡述；另一方面，這種構建的時間，儘管可能是人為的，卻從未停止回指由 mimesis

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描述的實踐時間性。建立於……，回指於……，這兩種交織的關係也 characterize 歷史的程序和實體。與其他兩種中介的平行性甚至更進一步。正如我在歷史因果關係和一階實體中尋找中繼站，以指引歷史知識結構的參照返回到敘事配置的工作，而敘事配置本身又回指在實踐領域中發現的敘事前配置，同樣地，我希望在歷史事件的命運中展示，既顯示歷史時間與敘事時間和 lived time 之間不斷擴大的差距，又顯示歷史時間通過敘事時間不可磨滅地回指行動時間。

In these three successive spheres I will call upon the testimony of history alone as it pursues to the very end its critical self-reflection.
在這三個連續的領域中，我將援引歷史本身的見證，因為它追求其批判性自我反思直至最終。

Singular Causal Imputation
單一因果歸因

Singular causal imputation is the explanatory procedure that accomplishes the transition between narrative causality-the structure of “one because of the other” which Aristotle distinguished from “one after the other”-and explanatory causality that, in the covering law model, is not distinguished from explanation by laws.
奇異的因果歸責是解釋性程序，它實現了敘事因果性之間的轉換——亞里士多德區分的「一件事因另一件事」的結構，以及在涵蓋定律模型中不區分於定律解釋的解釋性因果性。

The search for this transition finds support in the analyses of William Dray and G. H. von Wright presented at the beginning of the preceding chapter. Dray familiarized us with the thesis that the causal analysis of a particular course of events cannot be reduced to the application of a causal law. The double test, inductive and pragmatic, by which we verify the credentials of this or that candidate for the function of cause is not far from the logic of causal imputation offered by Max Weber and Raymond Aron. But a connection is lacking between the theory of causal analysis and that of analysis by reasons. This connection is forged by G. H. von Wright in his analysis of quasi-causal explanation. Rational explanation is identified with the segments of teleological inference linked together in this specific type of explanation. Teleological inference, in turn, rests on the prior understanding we have of the intentional character of action. And the latter, too, refers to the familiarity we have with the logical structure of doing something (making something happen, doing something so that something happens). Making something happen is interfering with the course of events by setting a system in motion and, by this, also ensuring that it is a closed system. By this series of connectionsteleological inference, intentional understanding, practical interfence-quasi-causal explanation, which as causal explanation applies only to individual occurrences of generic phenomena (events, processes, states), ultimately refers back to what I shall now designate by the term “singular causal imputation.”
對此轉換的搜尋在前一章開頭提出的威廉·德雷和 G. H. 馮·萊特的分析中找到支持。德雷使我們熟悉這樣一個論點：特定事件進程的因果分析不能簡化為因果定律的應用。我們通過歸納和實用的雙重檢驗來驗證某些候選因果的憑證，這與馬克斯·韋伯和雷蒙·阿隆提供的因果歸責邏輯非常接近。但是，因果分析理論和理由分析理論之間缺乏聯繫。G. H. 馮·萊特在他對準因果解釋的分析中建立了這種聯繫。理性解釋被識別為在這種特定解釋類型中連結在一起的目的論推論片段。目的論推論又基於我們對行動意向性的先前理解。而後者也指向我們對做某事的邏輯結構的熟悉（使某事發生，為了使某事發生而做某事）。使某事發生是通過啟動一個系統來干預事件進程，並藉此確保其為一個封閉系統。通過這一系列連接——目的論推論、意向性理解、實踐干預——準因果解釋（作為因果解釋，僅適用於泛型現象的個別發生，如事件、過程、狀態），最終追溯到我現在將稱之為「奇異因果歸責」的內容。

The most precise presentation of the logic of singular causal imputation is found in the critical study Max Weber devoted to Edward Meyer’s work Zur Theorie und Method der Geschichte,

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to which must be added the contributions made by Raymond Aron, in the third section of his Introduction to the Philosophy of History, which are decisive for our investigation.

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This kind of logic consists essentially of the constructing by our imagination of a different course of events, then of weighing the probable consequences of this unreal course of events, and, finally, in comparing these consequences with the real course of events. “In order to penetrate the real causal interrelationships, we construct unreal ones” (Weber, pp. 185-86, his emphasis). And Aron: “Every historian, to explain what did happen, asks himself what might have happened” (p. 160).
在馬克斯·韋伯專門研究愛德華·梅耶的著作《論歷史理論與方法》的批判性研究中，可以找到單一因果歸因邏輯最精確的呈現，

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必須補充雷蒙·阿倫在其《歷史哲學導論》第三部分所作出的貢獻，這些對我們的研究至關重要。這種邏輯本質上包括：首先由我們的想像力建構一個不同的事件進程，然後權衡這個虛構事件進程的可能後果，最後將這些後果與真實的事件進程進行比較。"為了穿透真實的因果關係，我們構建了虛構的關係"（韋伯，第 185-86 頁，重點為其原文）。阿倫也說："每個歷史學家為了解釋發生的事情，都會問自己可能發生的事情"（第 160 頁）。

This probabilist, imaginary construction presents a twofold similarity, on the one hand, with emplotment, which is itself a probable imaginary construction, and, on the other hand, with explanation in terms of laws.
這種概率性的想像性建構，一方面與情節構建（同樣是一種可能的想像性建構）相似，另一方面又與按照法則進行的解釋相似。

Let us examine Max Weber’s reasoning more closely.

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讓我們更仔細地研究馬克斯·韋伯的推理。

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Consider, as an example, Bismarck’s decision to declare war on AustriaHungary in 1866. As Weber observes, “And yet, despite all this, the problem: what might have happened if, for example, Bismarck had not decided to make war is by no means an ‘idle’ one” (p. 164). We need to understand this question. It consists in asking what “causal significance is properly to be at-
以比斯馬克在 1866 年對奧匈帝國宣戰為例。正如韋伯觀察到的，"儘管如此，問題仍然是：如果例如比斯馬克決定不發動戰爭，那麼可能會發生什麼，這絕不是一個'空洞'的問題"（第 164 頁）。我們需要理解這個問題。它在於詢問什麼是真正具有因果意義的
tributed to this individual decision in the context of the totality of infinitely numerous ‘factors,’ all of which had to be in such and such an arrangement and in no other if this result were to emerge, and what role it is therefore to be assigned in an historical explanation” (ibid., his emphases). It is the phrase “all of which had to be in such and such an arrangement and in no other” that marks the entrance on stage of the imagination. Reasoning, from this point on, moves in the arena of unreal past conditionals. But history shifts into the sphere of the unreal only in order better to discern there what is necessary. The question becomes “what consequences were to be anticipated had another decision been taken?” (p. 165). This then involves an exploration of the probable or necessary interconnections. If the historian in his thinking can affirm that, by the modification or omission of an individual event in a complex of historical conditions, there would have followed a different series of events “in certain historically important respects” (p. 166, his emphasis), then the historian can make a judgment of causal imputation that decides the historical significance of the event.
在這個個人決策的背景下，這是被歸因於無數"因素"的總體性，所有這些因素都必須以特定的方式排列，並且若要使這個結果出現，則不能以任何其他方式排列，因此需要在歷史解釋中分配其角色（同上，強調部分）。正是"所有這些因素都必須以特定方式排列，並且不能以任何其他方式"這句話標誌著想像力登上舞台。從這一點開始，推理在未實現的過去條件的領域中移動。但歷史轉向虛構領域，只是為了更好地辨別其中的必然性。問題變成了"如果採取另一個決策，可以預期會有什麼後果？"（第 165 頁）。這就涉及可能的或必然的相互聯繫的探索。如果歷史學家在思考中能夠斷言，通過修改或省略複雜歷史條件中的個別事件，在"某些歷史上重要的方面"（第 166 頁，強調部分）會導致不同的事件系列，那麼歷史學家就可以做出因果歸因的判斷，從而決定該事件的歷史意義。

This reasoning, in my opinion, runs in two different directions: on the one hand in the direction of emplotment, and on the other in the direction of scientific explanation.
在我看來，這種推理走向兩個不同的方向：一方面朝向情節，另一方面朝向科學解釋。

Nothing in Weber’s text, in fact, indicates that he perceived the first connection. We shall have to establish it, using the present-day resources of narratology. However, two of Weber’s remarks do tend in this direction. He says, first of all, that the historian is and is not in the position of the agent who, before acting, weighs the possible ways of acting, given this or that aim, this or that available means. It is indeed a question that Bismarck could have asked himself that we formulate, except that we know the outcome. This is why we raise it “with better chances of success” (p. 165) than he did. The expression “better chances of success” announces, of course, the logic of probability that will be referred to later. But does it not in the first place refer to that extraordinary laboratory of the probable constituted by the paradigms of emplotment? Max Weber also notes that historians both resemble criminologists and differ from them. By investigating guilt they also investigate causality, although to causal imputation they add ethical imputation. But what is this causal imputation divested of any ethical imputation if not the testing of different plot schemata?
事實上，韋伯的文本中沒有任何跡象表明他察覺到第一個連接。我們必須使用當今敘事學的資源來建立它。然而，韋伯的兩個備註確實朝這個方向發展。他首先說，歷史學家處於並非完全處於行動者的位置，在行動之前，衡量給定此目標、此可用手段的可能行動方式。這確實是比斯馬克可能會問的問題，只是我們知道結果。這就是為什麼我們提出它"更有成功機會"（第 165 頁）。"更有成功機會"的表達，當然宣告了稍後將提到的概率邏輯。但它是否首先指的是由情節安排範式構成的那個非凡的概率實驗室？馬克斯·韋伯還注意到，歷史學家既類似於犯罪學家，又不同於犯罪學家。通過調查罪責，他們也調查因果關係，儘管他們對因果歸責添加了倫理歸責。但是，如果不附帶任何倫理歸責的因果歸責不是測試不同的情節模式，又是什麼呢？

Causal imputation is also related at every stage to scientific explanation. First of all, explanation supposes a detailed analysis of factors, aiming at “the selection of the causal links to be incorporated into an historical exposition” (p. 168, n. 35). Certainly, this “thought process” is guided by our historical curiosity, that is, by our interest in a certain class of results. This is one of the senses of the term “importance.” In the murder of Caesar, historians are interested only in the notable consequences of the event for the development of world history, which they consider to be most significant. (In this respect, a
因果歸責在每個階段都與科學解釋有關。首先，解釋需要對因素進行詳細分析，目的是"選擇要納入歷史論述的因果鏈"（第 168 頁，腳註 35）。當然，這個"思考過程"由我們的歷史好奇心引導，即我們對某類結果的興趣。這是"重要性"一詞的意義之一。在凱撒被謀殺事件中，歷史學家只對對世界歷史發展具有顯著後果的事件感興趣，他們認為這些後果最為重要。（在這方面，
discussion that would get bogged down again in the quarrel opposing objectivity and subjectivity in history would miss the highly intellectual character of the operation of abstraction that precedes that of sorting out possibilities.) Next, to modify mentally in a specific way this or that factor, which first has been isolated, is to construct alternate courses of events among which the event whose importance is being weighed acts as the deciding factor. Weighing the consequences of eliminating the supposed event thus gives the causal argument its logical structure. Now, how do we construct the consequences that should have been expected if we assume a particular factor to be eliminated, if not by including in our reasoning what Weber calls “an empirical rule” (p. 173), that is, in the final analysis, a knowledge that must indeed be called “nomological” (p. 174)? Of course, these rules based on experience quite often do not go beyond the level of a dispositional knowledge, as Ryle and Gardiner would put it. Max Weber has specifically in mind those rules “relating to the ways in which human beings are prone to react under given situations” (ibid.). Nevertheless, they are sufficient to show, as we stated earlier, how laws can be used in history even though they are not established by history.
如果再次陷入客觀性和主觀性在歷史中對立的爭論，將會忽視了抽象運作之前的高度智性特徵。）接下來，以特定方式在心理上修改已被隔離的某個因素，就是建構各種可能的事件路徑，其中正被衡量重要性的事件作為決定性因素。通過消除假設事件的後果來衡量，從而賦予因果論證其邏輯結構。那麼，我們如何構建如果假設消除特定因素應該預期的後果？無非是通過在我們的推理中納入韋伯所說的「經驗法則」（第 173 頁），最終是必須被稱為「定律性」（第 174 頁）的知識。當然，這些基於經驗的規則往往僅停留在賴爾和加德納所說的「傾向性知識」水平。韋伯特別是指那些「關於人類在特定情況下傾向於如何反應」的規則（同上）。儘管如此，它們足以證明我們 earlier 所述，即使法則並非由歷史建立，也可以在歷史中使用。

These first two features-analysis into factors and recourse to rules based on experience-are not absolutely foreign to narrative “logic,” especially if this is shifted from the surface of the text to its deep grammar. The true mark of the scientific character of a construction, considered as both unreal and necessary, results from applying to the compared weight of different causes the theory of “objective possibility” that Weber borrows from the physiologist von Kries.

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It is this third feature that marks the true distance separating explanation by narration from explanation by causal imputation.
這前兩個特徵——因素分析和訴諸基於經驗的規則——與敘事「邏輯」並非絕對陌生，尤其是當這種邏輯從文本表面轉移到深層語法時。科學性建構的真正標誌，被視為既非現實又必然，源於將韋伯從生理學家冯·克里斯那裡借用的「客觀可能性」理論應用於不同原因的比較權重。正是這第三個特徵，標誌著敘事解釋與歸因因果解釋之間的真正距離。

The theory in question aims mainly at raising such unreal constructions to the level of judgments of objective possibility, which ascribe a degree of relative probability to the various causal factors and in this way allow them to be placed along a single scale, although the gradations resulting from this type of judgment cannot be quantified as is the case in what we call the “calculation of probabilities” in the strict sense. This idea of a graduated causality gives causal imputation an exactness that is lacking in the probability invoked by Aristotle in his theory of the plot. The various degrees of probability thus range in order from a low point, which defines accidental causality (as, for example, between the movement of a hand throwing dice and a particular number turning up), and a high point, which defines, in von Kries’ terms, adequate causality (as in the case of Bismarck’s decision). Between these two extremes we can speak of the more or less favorable influence of a certain factor. The danger is, obviously, that, by reason of an insidious anthropomorphism, we may materialize the degrees of relative probability ascribed to the various causes that our reasoning sets in competition with one another, in the form of antagonistic tendencies struggling to transform a possibility into a
有問題的理論主要旨在將這種不實在的建構提升到客觀可能性判斷的層次，這種判斷將各種因果因素的相對可能性歸屬於一個等級，儘管由此類判斷得出的漸變不能像我們在嚴格意義上所說的"概率計算"那樣量化。這種漸進因果的觀念賦予因果歸因了一種在亞里士多德的情節理論中被概率所缺失的精確性。各種可能性的程度從低點開始排序，這定義了偶然性因果（例如，擲骰子的手的運動和特定數字出現之間），到高點，用馮克里斯的術語定義的充分因果（如俾斯麥的決定）。在這兩個極端之間，我們可以談論某個因素的或多或少有利的影響。顯然，危險在於，由於一種陰險的人類中心主義，我們可能會將我們推理中相互競爭的各種原因所歸屬的相對可能性程度物質化，形成相互對抗的傾向，這些傾向試圖將一種可能性轉變為
reality. Ordinary language is conducive to this when it has us say that this or that event helped or thwarted the appearance of some other event. In order to rid ourselves of this misunderstanding, it is enough to remember that these possibilities are unreal causal relations that we have constructed mentally, and that the objectivity of the various “chances” belongs to the judgment of possibility.
現實。日常語言在說「這或那個事件幫助或阻礙了某些其他事件的出現」時，助長了這種理解。為了擺脫這種誤解，只需記住這些可能性是我們在心理上構建的不實在因果關係，而各種"機會"的客觀性屬於可能性的判斷。

It is only at the end of this testing process that a factor is attributed the status of a sufficient cause. This is an objective status, in the sense that the argument does not stem from a mere psychology of discovering hypotheses; rather, irrespective of genius, which is no more lacking in a great historian than in a great mathematician, it constitutes the logical structure of historical knowledge or, in Max Weber’s own words, a “firm skeletal structure of established causes” (p. 176).
只有在這個測試過程結束時，一個因素才被賦予充分原因的地位。這是一個客觀的狀態，意味著這個論點並非源自於僅僅發現假設的心理學；相反，不論天才的多寡，無論是偉大的歷史學家還是偉大的數學家，它構成了歷史知識的邏輯結構，或用馬克斯·韋伯自己的話說，是一個「確立原因的堅實骨架結構」（第 176 頁）。

We see where the continuity between emplotment and a singular causal imputation resides and where the discontinuity is to be found. The continuity resides at the level of the role played by the imagination. In this regard we might say of emplotment what Max Weber says of the mental construction of a different course of events: “In order to penetrate the real causal relationships, we construct unreal ones.” The discontinuity has to do with the analysis into factors, the insertion of rules from experience, and, especially, the assignment of degrees of probability that determine adequate causality.
我們看到情節安排和特定因果歸因之間的連續性和不連續性所在。連續性存在於想像力所扮演的角色層面。在這方面，我們可以說情節安排正如馬克斯·韋伯對不同事件進程的心理建構所說：「為了穿透真實的因果關係，我們建構非真實的關係。」不連續性與因素分析、從經驗中插入規則，以及尤其是確定充分因果性的或然率程度有關。

It is for this reason that historians are not simply narrators: they give reasons why they consider a particular factor rather than some other to be the sufficient cause of a given course of events. Poets also create plots that are held together by causal skeletons. But these latter are not the subject of a process of argumentation. Poets restrict themselves to producing the story and explaining by narrating. In this sense, Northrop Frye is right: poets begin with the form, historians move toward it.

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The former produce, the latter argue. And they argue because they know that we can explain in other ways. They know this because, like a judge, they are in a situation of contestation and of trial, and because their plea is never finished-for the test is more conclusive for eliminating candidates for causality, as William Dray would say, than for crowning any particular one once and for all.
正是出於這個原因，歷史學家不僅僅是敘事者：他們解釋為什麼認為某個特定因素而非其他因素是某一系列事件的充分原因。詩人也創造了由因果骨架支撐的情節。但這些骨架並不是論證的對象。詩人限制自己只是講述故事並通過敘述來解釋。在這個意義上，諾斯羅普·弗萊是正確的：詩人從形式開始，歷史學家朝著形式前進。前者創作，後者論證。他們論證是因為他們知道我們可以用其他方式解釋。他們知道這一點，因為就像法官一樣，他們處於爭議和審判的情境中，而且他們的辯詞永遠不會結束——正如威廉·德雷會說的，測試更有利於消除因果候選者，而不是一勞永逸地加冕任何特定者。

And yet, let me repeat, the filiation of historical explanation, starting from narrative explanation, is unbroken, inasmuch as adequate causality remains irreducible to logical necessity alone. The same relation of continuity and of discontinuity is found between singular causal explanation and explanation by laws as between the former and emplotment.
然而，讓我重複一遍，歷史解釋的血統，從敘事解釋開始，是連貫的，因為充分因果關係仍然不能僅僅歸結為邏輯必然性。在奇特的因果解釋與依據法則的解釋之間，以及前者與情節結構之間，存在著同樣的連續性和非連續性關係。

Let us first consider the discontinuity. It is more clearly stressed in Aron’s analysis than in Weber’s. In the section he devotes to the relation between causality and chance, Aron does not restrict himself to situating accidents at one end of the scale of retrospective probability, with adequate probability at the opposite end. The definition of an accident as possessing an objective pos-
我們首先考慮非連續性。在阿隆的分析中，這一點比在韋伯的分析中更清晰。在他論述因果關係與偶然性的章節中，阿隆並不僅限於在回溯概率的尺度上將事故定位於一端，而概率充分的情況在另一端。事故的定義是具有一個客觀的可
sibility of almost zero is valid only for isolated series. His consideration, borrowed from Cournot, of the notion of coincidences between series or between systems and series throws into relief more clearly the notion of accident and emphasizes the relative character of Weber’s probabilist theory: “An event may be said to be accidental with reference to one system of antecedents, adequate with reference to another. Chance, since many series have come together; rational, since at a higher level an ordered whole is found” (Aron, p. 175). We must reckon, in addition, with “the uncertainty which lies in the fixing of the limits of systems and series, with the plurality of fortuitous constructs which the scholar is free to set up or imagine” (p. 176). For all these reasons, a reflection on chance cannot restrict this notion to a simple opposition to adequate causality, within a process of reasoning based on retrospective probability.
幾乎為零的可能性僅對孤立的序列有效。他借鑒庫爾諾的考慮，對序列之間或系統與序列之間的巧合概念，更清晰地突顯了意外的概念，並強調了韋伯機率理論的相對特性：「一個事件可以說是相對於一個前因系統是偶然的，相對於另一個系統是充分的。自從許多序列匯集；在更高層面上找到有序的整體時，就是理性的」（阿隆，第 175 頁）。此外，我們還必須考慮「在確定系統和序列的界限時存在的不確定性，以及學者可以自由設置或想像的多種偶然構建」（第 176 頁）。基於這些原因，對機遇的思考不能將此概念簡單地限定為對充分因果性的對立，並且要基於追溯性概率的推理過程。

The continuity between singular causal explanation and explanation by laws is no less evident than their discontinuity. The relation between history and sociology is exemplary in this respect. Raymond Aron describes it in these words: “sociology is characterized by the attempt to set up laws (or at least regularities or generalities), whereas history is limited to narrating events in their peculiar sequence” (p. 187). In the same sense: “Historical research sticks to the antecedents of a singular fact, sociological research to the causes of a fact which may be repeated” (p.226). But then the word “cause” changes its meaning: “cause, as seen by sociologists, is the constant antecedent” (p. 188, his emphasis). Nevertheless, the points of intersection between the two kinds of causality-historical causality and sociological causality-are more noteworthy than their divergences. For example, when a historian establishes the relative probability of some historical constellation or other, this includes within it, as a nomological segment, empirical generalizations that provoke an inquiry into regularities by the person whom Aron calls the “scholar” in opposition to the “judge.” The entire study devoted to sociological causality in his book tends to show both the originality of this enterprise and its dependence with respect to historical causality, hence with respect to singular causal imputation. In this way historical causality has the strange status of being an investigation found lacking in relation to the search for regularities and laws, and yet deemed excessive in relation to the abstractions of sociology. It constitutes an internal limit on sociology’s claim to be a science, just when it borrows from the latter the regularities upon which its probabilism is founded.
單一因果解釋與法則解釋之間的連續性不亞於其不連續性。歷史與社會學之間的關係在這方面尤為典型。雷蒙·阿隆如此描述：「社會學的特徵是試圖建立法則（或至少是規律或普遍性），而歷史只限於敘述事件的特殊順序」。在同樣的意義上：「歷史研究堅持某一特定事實的前因，社會學研究則關注可能重複的事實之原因」。但此時「原因」一詞改變了其含義：「社會學家所看到的原因是恆定的前因」。然而，兩種因果關係之間的交叉點——歷史因果性和社會學因果性——比其分歧更值得注意。例如，當歷史學家確定某種歷史態勢的相對可能性時，這其中包含了一個規範性片段，即經驗概括，這促使阿隆所稱的「學者」（而非「法官」）對規律進行探究。他的著作中專門研究社會學因果性的部分，旨在展示這一企圖的獨特性及其對歷史因果性的依賴，因此也是對單一因果歸因的依賴。如此，歷史因果性具有一種奇特的地位：就規律和法則的搜尋而言，它被視為調查不足；而就社會學的抽象性而言，卻又被視為過度。它構成了社會學科學主張的內在限制，正當社會學借用後者作為其或然論的基礎時。

It is due to this epistemological ambivalence that historical determinism, which claims to be located at an even higher level than that of sociological explanation, is, in its turn, chipped away from inside by the contingency preserved in historical causality: “Causal relations are dispersed, they do not fall into a pattern, so that they do not explain each other as do the classified laws of a theory in physics” (p.205). In this sense, sociological causality refers
正是由於這種認識論上的模稜兩可，歷史決定論聲稱處於社會學解釋之上的更高層次，但在歷史因果關係中保留的偶然性又從內部侵蝕了它：「因果關係是分散的，它們不形成一種模式，因此無法像物理學理論中的分類定律那樣解釋彼此」（第 205 頁）。在這個意義上，社會學因果性
back to historical causality rather than absorbing it into itself: “the partial determinism develops regularly only in a single constellation which is never exactly reproduced” (p. 224). And again: “abstract relations never exhaust the unique constellation” (p. 230).
回溯到歷史因果性，而非將其吸收：「局部決定論只在一個從未完全重複的特定星座中規律發展」（第 224 頁）。又如：「抽象關係永遠無法窮盡獨特的星座」（第 230 頁）。

It must therefore be concluded that the same dialectic of continuity and discontinuity is observed on the second side of the mediation performed by singular causal imputation between the narrative level and the epistemological one as is found on the first side: “Both complementary and divergent at the same time, sociological and historical causality complement each other” (p. 187).
因此必須得出結論，在單一因果歸因所執行的中介的另一面上，觀察到的連續性和非連續性的辯證法，與第一面上的相同：「社會學和歷史因果性既互補又同時分歧」（第 187 頁）。

Here again, Aron’s originality in relation to Weber is confirmed. It results from the philosophical intention that animates his whole book. Thus the insistence with which the dependence of partial determinism on singular historical causality is stressed is in profound harmony with the “historical philosophy” (to use Gaston Fessard’s title) that directs the epistemology of Introduction to the Philosophy of History, namely, his struggle against the illusion of fatality created by historical retrospection and his plea for the contingency of the present required by political action. Set against the backdrop of this great philosophical design, the logic of retrospective probability bears a precise meaning, which is of direct interest to our investigation into historical temporality. “The investigation of cause by the historian,” says Aron, “is directed not so much at tracing the broad outlines of the relief of history as at preserving for or restoring to the past the uncertainty of the future” (p. 179). And again: “Unreal constructions must still remain an integral part of science, even if they do not go beyond an uncertain probability, for they offer the only means of escaping the retrospective illusion of fatality” (p. 183, his emphasis). How is this possible? We must understand that the imaginative operation by which the historian assumes in thought that one of the antecedents has disappeared or been modified, and then tries to construct what would have happened in accordance with this hypothesis, has a significance that goes beyond epistemology. The historian acts here as a narrator who redefines the three dimensions of time in relation to a fictive present. Dreaming of a different event, he opposes “uchronia” (a timeless time) to the fascination with what once was. The retrospective estimation of probabilities thus contains a moral and a political significance that exceeds its purely epistemological one. It recalls to the readers of history that the “historian’s past has been the future of the characters in history” (p. 184). Due to its probabilist character, causal explanation incorporates into the past the unpredictability that is the mark of the future and introduces into retrospection the uncertainty of the event. The final lines of the section entitled “Limits and Meaning of Historical Causality” (pp. 179-85), which concludes the analysis of historical causality, thus occupy a strategic position in the economy of this book: “Anticipatory calculation is a condition of reasonable conduct, as retrospective probabilities are of the true account. If decisions and moments are neglected, one substitutes for
在此，阿隆對韋伯的原創性再次得到確認。這源於貫穿其整本書的哲學意圖。因此，他強調局部決定論依賴於特定歷史因果關係，這與《歷史哲學導論》的認識論所體現的「歷史哲學」（使用加斯頓·費薩德的標題）深刻契合，即他反對由歷史回溯所造成的宿命幻覺，並為政治行動所需的現在的或然性辯護。在這個宏大的哲學設計背景下，回溯性或然性邏輯具有精確的意義，直接關乎我們對歷史時間性的研究。阿隆說：「歷史學家對因果的調查，不太在於追溯歷史的大致輪廓，而是為過去保留或恢復未來的不確定性」（第 179 頁）。又說：「即便不超越不確定的或然性，非真實的建構仍然必須是科學的一個不可或缺的部分，因為它們提供了逃避宿命的回溯性幻覺的唯一方法」（第 183 頁，強調為原文）。這怎麼可能？我們必須理解，歷史學家在思想中假設某個前因已消失或被修改，然後嘗試按照這個假設建構本應發生的事情，這種想像性操作的意義超越了認識論。歷史學家在此如同一個敘事者，重新定義相對於虛構現在的三個時間維度。想像不同的事件，他用「烏托邦時間」（一個無時間的時間）對抗對既往的迷戀。因此，回溯性或然性估算包含超越純粹認識論的道德和政治意義。它喚起歷史讀者的記憶，即「歷史學家的過去曾是歷史人物的未來」（第 184 頁）。由於其概率性特徵，因果解釋將未可預測性納入過去，並在回顧中引入事件的不確定性。在題為「歷史因果性的限度與意義」的章節的最後幾行（第 179-85 頁），結束了對歷史因果性的分析，在這本書的架構中佔據了策略性位置：「預期性計算是合理行為的條件，正如回溯性概率是真實敘述的條件。如果忽視了決策和時刻，一個人會代替
the living world a natural world or fatality. In this sense, historical science, the resurrection of politics, becomes contemporary with its heroes” (p. 184, trans. altered).
生活世界是一個自然世界或命運。在這個意義上，歷史科學，政治的復活，與其英雄同時代（第 184 頁，翻譯略有修改）。

I do not want to end this plea on behalf of the mediating role played by historical causality between emplotment and explanation by laws without replying to an objection that will link the current discussion to my discussion in the next section concerning the entities characteristic of historical knowledge.
我不想在沒有回覆一個將當前討論與我下一節關於歷史知識特徵實體的討論相聯繫的異議的情況下，結束這個關於歷史因果性在情節和法則解釋之間所扮演調解角色的陳情。

It may, in fact, be objected that if we are still able to perceive a connection between emplotment and singular causal imputation, this is due to the limitations of the example chosen by Max Weber: Bismarck’s decision to attack Austria-Hungary in 1866. Does not this choice confine the argument, from the very start, to the political sphere, hence to the plane of the history of events? Does this not condemn it to being only another version of “rational” explanation? No, not if the argument can be extended by analogy to largescale historical events in which the cause, while remaining singular, is no longer the individual.
也許，事實上，可以反對，如果我們仍然能夠察覺到情節建構與特定因果歸責之間的聯繫，這是由於馬克斯·韋伯所選擇的例子的局限性：俾斯麥決定在 1866 年攻擊奧匈帝國。這種選擇是否將論點從一開始就局限於政治領域，因此限定在事件史的平面？這是否不僅僅是另一種「理性」解釋？不，如果論點可以通過類比擴展到大規模的歷史事件，在這些事件中，原因雖然仍然是特定的，但不再是個人。

This analogical extension is made possible by the very nature of the question raised concerning the original example.

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Even when historians inquire into the responsibility an individual has in a course of events, they explicitly distinguish causal imputation from ethical responsibility, on the one hand, and from nomological explanation, on the other. With regard to the first point, we must say that “causal analysis provides absolutely no value judgment and a value judgment is absolutely not causal explanation” (Weber, p. 123). In the example chosen by Weber, following Meyer, causal imputation consists in asking “why the decision to go to war was at that moment the appropriate means to achieve the goal of the unification of Germany” (p. 121). We must not be misled by the use of such categories as means and ends. The argument does, of course, include a teleological segment, but overall it is causal. It concerns the causal value to be attributed to a certain decision in a course of events that includes factors other than the rational core of the decision considered, and among these the nonrational motivations of all the protagonists in this course of action and, in addition, “meaningless factors” stemming from physical nature. It is causal imputation alone that can say up to what point the outcome of an action failed to live up to or betrayed the intentions of the actors. The gap between the intention and the consequences is precisely one of the aspects of the causal value related to decision.
這個類比性的延伸之所以成為可能，是基於對原始範例所提出問題的本質。即使歷史學家追究個人在一系列事件中的責任，他們明確地將因果歸責與道德責任，一方面，以及與定律解釋，另一方面，區分開來。關於第一點，我們必須說，「因果分析絕對不提供任何價值判斷，而價值判斷絕對不是因果解釋」（韋伯，第 123 頁）。在韋伯選擇的例子中，按照邁耶的觀點，因果歸責在於詢問「為什麼在那個時刻決定發動戰爭是實現德國統一目標的恰當手段」（第 121 頁）。我們不應被諸如手段和目的等類別所誤導。論證當然包含一個目的論的片段，但整體上是因果的。它涉及在一個包含決策理性核心以外的其他因素的事件過程中，應歸屬於某個決定的因果價值，其中包括所有參與者的非理性動機，以及源自物理本性的「無意義因素」。只有因果歸責可以說明一個行動的結果未能實現或背離了行動者的意圖的程度。意圖與後果之間的差距正是與決策相關的因果價值的方面之一。

These remarks go along with the thesis I have stated several times, namely, that causal explanation, even when it concerns the historical role of an individual decision, is distinguished from a phenomenology of action inasmuch as it evaluates intentions not only in terms of aims but also in terms of results. In this sense, causal imputation, as presented by Weber, coincides with von Wright’s quasi-causal explanation, which contains teleological segments and epistemic segments.

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這些言論伴隨著我多次陳述的論點，即因果解釋，即使涉及個人決定的歷史角色，也區別於行動的現象學，因為它不僅根據目標，而且根據結果來評估意圖。從這個意義上講，韋伯所呈現的因果歸責，與馮·萊特的準因果解釋相符，後者包含目的論和認識論的片段。

If, then, the argument of singular causal imputation is rightfully extended
如果，那麼，單一因果歸責的論點合理地擴展
to series of events in which the cause is not of an individual but a collective nature, it is because already in the original example (the historical meaning of an individual decision) historical imputation is irreducible to moral imputation.
到事件系列，其中原因不是個人而是集體性質，這是因為即使在原始例子（個人決定的歷史意義）中，歷史歸責也不可簡化為道德歸責。

The objection, it is true, could return in another form. Why, someone might ask, continue to speak of imputation when moral responsibility is no longer in question? The notion of imputation, it would seem, preserves a diacritical function in that it provides a criterion for the distinction between causal explanation and nomothetic explanation. Even when the course of events offered for causal explanation involves nonindividual factors, as we shall see later on for other examples, this course of events is considered by the historian in its singularity. In this sense, I should say that the individual (the individual decision) is only the first analogue of singular causality. This is why the argument drawn from the study of the historical significance of an individual decision possesses exemplary value. Consider, for instance, Goethe’s letters to Madame de Stein (another example borrowed from Weber’s essay on Meyer’s theory of history). It is one thing to interpret them causally, that is, to show in what way the facts attested to in these letters are “real links in a causal chain” (p. 139), namely the development of the personality of Goethe’s work; it is something quite different to think of them as an example of one way of conceiving of life, or as a case for a psychology of eroticism. Causal explanation is not restricted to an individual point of view, although it remains singular, since this type of behavior can in its turn be integrated into a causal ensemble of the history of German culture. In this case, it is not the individual fact itself that enters into the historical causal series, instead it serves to “disclose the facts which are to be integrated into such causal sequences” (p. 142). These causal series, in their turn, are singular even though they do include typical facts. It is this singularity belonging to causal series that separates causal imputation from nomothetic explanation.

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It is because causal explanation is singular, and in this sense real, that the question of the importance of a given historical factor arises. The notion of importance enters in only on the level of causal explanation, not on that of nomothetic explanation.

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反對意見，誠然，可能以另一種形式再現。為何，有人可能會問，當道德責任不再是問題時，還要繼續談論歸責？歸責的概念，似乎在於提供一個判別因果解釋與定律解釋之間的標準。即使所提供的事件過程涉及非個人因素，正如我們稍後將看到的其他例子，這一事件過程仍被歷史學家視為獨特性。在這個意義上，我應該說個人（個人決定）僅是奇異因果性的第一個類比。這就是為什麼從個人決定的歷史意義研究中得出的論點具有典範價值。例如，考慮歌德致斯坦夫人的信件（另一個取自韋伯關於邁耶爾歷史理論的論文的例子）。解讀它們的因果關係是一回事，即展示這些信件中證實的事實如何成為「因果鏈中的真實環節」（第 139 頁），即歌德作品個性的發展；將它們視為理解生活的一種方式，或作為性心理學的一個案例，則是完全不同的事情。因果解釋並不局限於個人觀點，儘管它仍保持獨特性，因為這種行為方式可以被納入德國文化史的因果整體中。在這種情況下，並非個人事實本身進入歷史因果序列，而是用於「揭示將被整合到這類因果序列中的事實」（第 142 頁）。這些因果序列本身即便包含典型事實，也具有獨特性。正是這種屬於因果序列的獨特性，將因果歸責與定律解釋區分開來。

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正是因為因果解釋是單一的，在這種意義上是真實的，所以才會出現某個給定歷史因素的重要性問題。重要性的概念只在因果解釋的層面上才會出現，而不是在定律解釋的層面上。

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The thesis that the notion of singular causal imputation can, in principle, be extended beyond causal imputation to individuals receives confirmation from another example Weber borrows from Meyer. The historian can pose the question of the historical significance of the battle of Salamis without breaking this event up into a dust cloud of individual actions. The battle of Salamis is for the historian, in a particular discourse situation, a single event to the extent that it can as such constitute the object of a singular causal imputation. This is the case insofar as it can be shown that this event is the deciding factor between two possibilities, whose probability can be estimated without being quantified. On the one hand, there is the possibility of a religious-theocratic culture that would have been imposed on Greece if the battle had been lost, and that can be reconstructed on the basis of other known factors and in com-
韋伯從邁耶那裡借用的另一個例子証實了這一命題，即單一因果歸因的概念原則上可以延伸到個人之外。歷史學家可以探討薩拉米斯海戰的歷史意義，而不需要將這一事件分解為個別行動的塵埃雲。對於歷史學家來說，在特定的論述情境中，薩拉米斯海戰是一個單一事件，只要可以作為單一因果歸因的對象。只要可以證明這一事件是在兩種可能性之間做出決定性選擇，而這兩種可能性的概率可以估算但不能量化。一方面，如果這場戰役失敗，希臘將會被一種宗教神權文化所支配，這種文化可以根據其他已知因素進行重建。
parison with similar situations, in particular, that of the Persian protectorate as it concerned the Jews returning from Exile. On the other hand, there is the free Hellenic spirit as this actually developed. The victory of Salamis can be held to be the adequate cause of this development. Indeed, when the event is eliminated in thought, a whole series of factors is eliminated with it: the construction of the Attic fleet, the development of the struggles for freedom, curiosity about history-factors that are summed up under the heading of the “possibility” following upon this event. It is, no doubt, the price we attach to the irreplaceable cultural values of the free Hellenic spirit that creates our interest in the Greco-Persian wars. But it is the construction of the “imaginary tableau” produced by abstraction and the weighing of the consequences of the event assumed to be eliminated that constitutes the logical structure of the argument. In this way, the argument remains that of a singular causal imputation, even when it is no longer applied to an individual decision.
與類似情況的比較，特別是關於波斯保護國對返回流放的猶太人的影響。另一方面，是自由希臘精神的實際發展。薩拉米斯戰役可以被視為這種發展的充分原因。事實上，當這一事件在思想中被消除時，伴隨它的一系列因素也會被消除：雅典艦隊的建造、自由鬥爭的發展、對歷史的好奇心——這些因素匯總在這一事件之後的「可能性」標題下。毫無疑問，我們對自由希臘精神的不可替代的文化價值的重視，造就了我們對希臘-波斯戰爭的興趣。但是，通過抽象和權衡假設被消除事件的後果所產生的「想像畫面」的建構，構成了論證的邏輯結構。以這種方式，即使不再應用於個人決定，論證仍然是一種特殊的因果歸因。

Max Weber’s own work offers us an even more remarkable example of singular causal imputation outside of the sphere of individual decision and of politico-military history. The reasoning used in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism exactly satisfies the method of causal inference that has just been described.

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The alleged connection between certain features of the Protestant ethic and certain features of capitalism constitutes a singular causal chain, even though it does not concern individuals taken one at a time, but rather roles, attitudes, and institutions. What is more, the causal connection provides the structure for a single process that renders irrelevant the distinction between a pointlike event and a long time-span. The thesis upheld in Weber’s essay is, in this sense, a remarkable case of singular causal imputation.
馬克斯·韋伯自己的著作為我們提供了一個更加卓越的例子，展示了個人決定和政治軍事歷史領域之外的特殊因果歸因。《新教倫理與資本主義精神》中使用的推理完全符合剛才描述的因果推理方法。所謂的新教倫理某些特徵與資本主義某些特徵之間的聯繫，構成了一個特殊的因果鏈，儘管它並不關注逐一的個人，而是角色、態度和制度。更重要的是，因果聯繫為一個單一過程提供了結構，使得點狀事件和長時間跨度之間的區別變得無關緊要。韋伯論文中闡述的論點，在這個意義上是特殊因果歸因的一個出色案例。

How is this argument constructed? Faithful to the method of abstraction, Weber isolates the specific component of the work ethic on the side of the religious phenomenon and, on the side of the economic phenomenon, the spirit of acquisition characterized by rational calculation, the precise adaptation of available means to desired ends, and the value attached to labor as such. The problem is then precisely set out. It is not a question of explaining the birth of capitalism as an overall phenomenon but rather the particular vision of the world it implies. The religious conception of ascetic Protestantism is itself considered only in terms of the relation of adequate causality that it maintains in regard to the spirit of capitalism. When the problem is set out in this way, the question is that of the adequacy of the causal imputation in the absence of any regularity of a nomological type. Empirical generalizations are involved, of course-for example, the assertion that a doctrine such as predestination, which divests the individual of ultimate responsibility, was bearable only when it was compensated by other factors that increased selfassurance such as the belief in personal salvation, attested to by active involvement in work. However, empirical generalizations of this sort are only argumentative segments incorporated into the inductive inference that draws
這個論點是如何構建的？忠實於抽象方法，韋伯從宗教現象的角度隔離工作倫理的特定組成部分，並從經濟現象的角度，隔離以理性計算為特徵的獲取精神，精確地使用可用手段達到預期目標，並重視勞動本身。問題就這樣被精確地提出。這不是解釋資本主義作為整體現象的問題，而是它所暗示的特定世界觀。苦行的新教宗教觀念本身僅被視為它與資本主義精神之間適當因果關係的關聯。當問題以這種方式提出時，問題是在缺乏任何類型的規律性的情況下，因果歸因的適當性。當然，這涉及經驗性概括—例如，一種如預定論這樣的學說，它剝奪了個人的最終責任，只有在其他增加自我保證的因素（如通過積極參與工作所證明的個人得救信念）的補償下才是可以接受的。然而，這類經驗性概括只是納入歸納推論的論證片段
as its conclusion the imputation of the spirit of capitalism to the Protestant ethic, therefore a singular causal imputation, inasmuch as that these two configurations and their conjunction remain unique in history. In order to uphold this causal imputation, Weber does exactly what he recommends in his article on Edward Meyer. He imagines a historical course from which the spiritual factor considered would be absent and in which other factors would have played the hypothetical role assumed by the Protestant work ethic-among these other factors are the rationalization of law, the organization of commerce, the centralization of political power, technological inventions, the development of the scientific method. A probability calculation applied to these various factors suggests that in the absence of the spiritual factor under consideration these other factors would not have been sufficient to produce the effect in question. For example, the advent of the scientific method would have been capable of focusing energy on a specific goal, the precise organization of ends and means. But it would have lacked the emotional force and the power of dissemination that the Protestant ethic alone could contribute. In this sense, the probability that the scientific method might have transformed the traditional ethic into the bourgeois work ethic is slight. The same reasoning has to be repeated with respect to the other candidates for the role of cause before the Protestant ethic can be held to be the adequate cause of the development of the spirit of capitalism. This is why the adequacy of the causal imputation is not equivalent to an argument based on necessity but only to one based on probability.
韋伯作為其結論，將資本主義精神歸因於新教倫理，因此是一種獨特的因果歸責，因為這兩種配置及其結合在歷史上是唯一的。為了支持這種因果歸責，韋伯正是按照他在關於愛德華·邁耶的文章中所建議的去做。他想像了一個歷史進程，在這個進程中，所考慮的精神因素是缺失的，而其他因素會扮演新教工作倫理所假設的假設性角色——這些其他因素包括法律的理性化、商業組織、政治權力的集中、技術發明、科學方法的發展。對這些各種因素進行概率計算表明，在缺少所考慮的精神因素的情況下，這些其他因素不足以產生所討論的效果。例如，科學方法的出現本可能專注於特定目標，精確組織目的和手段。但它缺乏新教倫理所能貢獻的情感力量和傳播力量。從這個意義上說，科學方法可能將傳統倫理轉變為資產階級工作倫理的可能性很小。同樣的推理必須針對其他候選因果因素進行，然後新教倫理才能被視為資本主義精神發展的充分原因。這就是為什麼因果歸責的充分性不等同於基於必然性的論證，而只等同於基於或然性的論證。

With this extension of singular causal imputation to historical developments in which neither individual decisions nor pointlike events can any longer be discerned, we have reached the point where historical explanation appears to break its moorings to narrative. And yet the reconstruction of the various stages of filiation I have just made, in my free reading of Weber’s text, with the help of Aron’s Introduction to the Philosophy of History, authorizes us to apply the notion of plot by analogy to all singular causal imputation. This is, in my opinion, what justifies the use of the term “plot” by Paul Veyne, who designates by this all the singular configurations that satisfy the criterion that I have proposed for the notion of emplotment, namely, the synthesis of such heterogeneous factors as circumstances, intentions, interactions, adversity, good or bad fortune. This, moreover, as we have seen, approximates Veyne’s definition of plot: the conjoining of aims, causes, and chance occurrences. In keeping with my argument for the indirect relation of historical explanation to the structure of the narrative, I shall speak of a quasi-plot in order to indicate the analogous nature of the extension of singular causal imputation on the basis of its prime example, the causal explanation of the results of an individual decision.
隨著將單一因果推斷推廣到歷史發展的過程，在這個過程中既不能辨別個人決策，也不能辨別具體事件，我們已經達到了歷史解釋似乎與敘事脫離的程度。然而，我剛才以韋伯的文本為基礎，借助阿隆《歷史哲學導論》的幫助，對各個發展階段進行的重建，使我們能夠類比地將情節概念應用於所有單一因果推斷。在我看來，這正是保爾·韋恩使用「情節」一詞的理由，他用此術語指稱所有滿足我為情節構建提出的標準的獨特配置，即綜合如環境、意圖、互動、逆境、好運或壞運等異質因素。此外，正如我們所見，這與韋恩對情節的定義相近：目標、原因和偶然事件的結合。遵循我關於歷史解釋與敘事結構間間接關係的論點，我將使用「準情節」一詞，以表明在以個人決策因果解釋為首要範例的基礎上，單一因果推斷的延伸具有類比性質。

I shall take this analogy as my theme as I move from the question of explanatory procedures to that of the basic entities of historical knowledge.
我將以這種類比為主題，從解釋程序的問題轉向歷史知識的基本實體。

The First-Order Entities of History
歷史的一階實體

For didactic reasons, I have distinguished three paths along which we may question back: the one that leads from the explanatory procedures of scientific history back to the explanatory power contained in the emplotment of narrative; the one that leads from the entities constructed by the historian back to the characters in narrative; and, finally, the one that leads from the multiple times of history back to the temporal dialectic of narrative.
出於教學原因，我區分了三種可追溯的路徑：一種是從科學歷史的解釋程序追溯到敘事情節中包含的解釋力；另一種是從歷史學家建構的實體追溯到敘事中的角色；最後一種是從歷史的多重時間追溯到敘事的時間辯證法。

These three paths are inseparable, as were the three types of epistemological break described in the introduction to this chapter. They are characterized not only (1) by the same style of indirect filiation linking history to narrative understanding, but also (2) by the same recourse to certain relay stations that history itself provides for the task of reconstructing the historical intentionality.
這三個路徑是不可分割的，正如引言中描述的三種認識論斷裂一樣。它們不僅(1)以連結歷史與敘事理解的間接血緣關係為特徵，而且(2)也以歷史本身提供的某些中繼站來重建歷史意圖。

My emphasis will be placed first on the indirect character of the narrative filiation, a character that can be verified on the level of entities as well as on that of procedures. The epistemological break between historiographical entities and the characters in narratives is, as I see it, the presupposition with which we must start here. Characters can be identified, designated by proper names, and held to be responsible for the actions ascribed to them. They are their authors or their victims. And these actions make them happy or unhappy. Now, the entities to which history refers the changes it attempts to explain are not characters, if we limit ourselves to its explicit epistemology. The social forces that operate in the background of individual actions are, strictly speaking, anonymous. The force of this presupposition seems to me to be overlooked by every form of “epistemological individualism,” for which any social change can, in principle, be divided up into simple actions, ascribable to the individuals who are the authors of these actions and who bear the final responsibility for them. The error of methodological individualism lies in requiring in principle a reductive operation that can never actually be accomplished. In this I see the expression of a demand for a direct derivation that fails to grasp the specific nature of the questioning back, which alone is practicable in this domain. Only an indirect derivation can respect the epistemological break without shattering the intentional aim of historical knowledge.
我的重點將首先放在敘事血緣的間接性上，這種間接性可以在實體層面以及程序層面得到驗證。在我看來，史學實體與敘事人物之間的認識論斷裂，是我們必須從此處開始的前提。人物可以被識別、以專有名詞指定，並被認為對歸屬於他們的行為負責。他們是作者或受害者。這些行為使他們或幸福或不幸。然而，歷史所指涉的、試圖解釋的變化的實體，如果我們局限於其明確的認識論，並不是人物。在個人行動背景中運作的社會力量，嚴格來說是匿名的。這種前提的力量似乎被每一種「認識論個人主義」所忽視，在這種觀點中，任何社會變革原則上都可以被分解為可歸因於實施這些行動的個人並對之負最終責任的簡單行動。方法論個人主義的錯誤在於原則上要求一種可以永遠無法實際完成的還原操作。在此，我看到了對直接推導的需求，而這種需求未能把握追問的特定性質，而只有這種追問在此領域中是可行的。只有間接推導才能在不破壞歷史知識的意圖目標的情況下尊重認識論斷裂。

The question is, then, whether this intentional aim actually possesses, on the level of historiographical entities, a relay station similar to that of singular causal imputation on the level of explanatory procedures.
那麼問題是，這種有意的目的是否在史學實體層面上，擁有類似於解釋程序層面上的單一因果歸因的中繼站。

This relay station does exist in the form of the first-order entities of historical knowledge, that is, those societal entities that, while they are indecomposable into a dust cloud of individuals, nevertheless do refer, in their constitution and in their definition, to individuals capable of being considered as the characters in a narrative. In the introduction to this chapter I called these firstorder entities “entities of participatory belonging.” The following discussion should justify naming them in this way.
這個中繼站以歷史知識的一階實體的形式存在，也就是那些社會實體，它們雖然不可分解為個人的塵埃雲，但在其構成和定義中仍然指向那些可被視為敘事中角色的個人。在本章的引言中，我稱這些一階實體為「參與歸屬實體」。以下的討論應會證明以此命名的正當性。

The explanatory procedures that I classed under the heading of singular
我歸類在單一因果歸因標題下的解釋程序
causal imputation apply, in a privileged manner, to these first-order entities. In other words, to the mediation procedures operating between scientific explanation and explanation by emplotment correspond transitional objects that mediate between historiographical entities and the narrative entities I term the characters of a narrative. Participatory belonging is to entities what singular causal imputation is to the procedures of history.
優先地應用於這些一階實體。換句話說，在科學解釋和情節解釋之間運作的中介程序，對應於介於史學實體和我稱之為敘事角色的敘事實體之間的過渡性物件。參與歸屬對於實體就如同單一因果歸因對於歷史程序。

All historians-and the example of Braudel, to whom I shall return in the third section of this chapter, provides ample confirmation of this-are led at one time or another, even if they are wary of the epistemology conceived by philosophers, to order the entities put on stage in their discourse. This work of ordering is precisely what genetic phenomenology wants to follow through and make explicit. Whereas for professional historians the ordering of entities is thoroughly justified by its heuristic fecundity, genetic phenomenology seeks to carry this hierarchization of levels of discourse back to the intentionality of historical knowledge, to its constitutive noetic intention. To do this, it attempts to show that the ordering performed by historians is not reducible to a methodological expedient but contains its own intelligibility, which it is possible to account for reflectively. This intelligibility amounts to the possibility of traversing in both directions the hierarchy established by historical discourse among the entities it refers to. The first traversal-ascending, if one likes-must be able to indicate the ever-widening gap between the level of narrative and the level of history as science. The second-descending-must be able to indicate the series of references leading back from the anonymous entities of historical discourse to the characters in a possible narrative. The intelligibility of the ordering results from the reversibility of these two traversals.
所有的歷史學家——布勞岱爾的例子（我將在本章第三節再回到這一點）充分證實了這一點——在某個時刻，儘管他們對哲學家所構思的認識論持謹慎態度，但仍會對他們論述中的實體進行排序。這種排序工作正是遺傳現象學希望追蹤並闡明的。對於職業歷史學家來說，實體的排序完全是由其啟發性的豐富性所證明的，而遺傳現象學試圖將這種層次的層級化追溯到歷史知識的意向性，追溯到其構成性的直覺意圖。為此，它試圖表明歷史學家所進行的排序不僅僅是一種方法上的權宜之計，而是包含其自身的可理解性，這種可理解性可以被反思性地解釋。這種可理解性等同於在歷史論述所指涉的實體之間建立的層級中，能夠雙向遍歷的可能性。第一次遍歷——如果喜歡的話，可稱之為上升的遍歷——必須能夠指出敘事層次與科學作為歷史的層次之間不斷擴大的差距。第二次遍歷——下降的遍歷——必須能夠指出從歷史論述的匿名實體回溯到可能敘事中的角色的一系列引用。排序的可理解性源於這兩種遍歷的可逆性。

It is within this search for intelligibility that the basic entities of historical discourse are determined. These entities of participatory belonging are located at the intersection of the ascending itinerary and the descending one. It is this strategic position that makes their determination the pivot point of our questioning back.
正是在這種尋求可理解性的過程中，歷史論述的基本實體被確定。這些參與性歸屬的實體位於上升路徑和下降路徑的交叉點。正是這種戰略性位置使得它們的確定成為我們追問的樞紐點。

Some help for this attempt at indirect derivation can be found in Maurice Mandelbaum’s work, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge, despite the author’s hostility to the narrativist theses. From him I have learned a double lesson that I shall incorporate into my method of questioning back. The first concerns the ordering of the entities assumed by the historian’s discourse. The second concerns the correlation between what Mandelbaum takes as the firstorder entities of historical knowledge and the procedure of causal imputation, the theory of which was worked out above. This second lesson will enable us to tie together the two paths of questioning back, the path of entities and the path of procedures. But let us begin by reflecting on the basic entities.
在 Maurice Mandelbaum 的《歷史知識的解剖》一書中，儘管作者對敘事主義論點持有敵意，但仍可找到此次間接推導的一些幫助。我從他那裡學到了一個雙重的課題，我將把它納入我的追溯方法中。第一個涉及歷史論述所假設的實體排序。第二個涉及 Mandelbaum 認為的歷史知識一階實體與因果歸因程序之間的關聯，其理論已在上文闡述。這第二個課題將使我們能夠聯繫追溯的兩條路徑，即實體路徑和程序路徑。但讓我們先反思基本實體。

Maurice Mandelbaum’s epistemology places him at an equal distance from
Maurice Mandelbaum 的認識論使他與
the proponents of a subsumption model and from those of the narrativist version. In opposition to the former, he holds that, despite the typical character of the situations and events that history treats and despite its recourse to generalizations, history deals fundamentally with “what was characteristically true of some particular place over some particular span of time. . . . Thus, the familiar thesis that historians are concerned with the particular, rather than with establishing explanatory generalizations, appears to me sound” (p. 5). In other words, Mandelbaum takes into account Windelband’s distinction between idiographical and nomothetic sciences. In opposition to the latter, he holds that history is an investigation, that is, a discipline concerned with authenticating its statements, with accounting for the relations it establishes between events. This is why the interest it displays in singular constellations cannot at the same time exclude the interpolation of regularities into its chains of relations. I shall not discuss these presuppositions, which accord quite well with the conclusions of the preceding two chapters.
歸納模型的支持者和敘事主義版本的支持者保持等距。與前者相反，他認為，儘管歷史處理的情況和事件具有典型特徵，且運用了一般化，但歷史基本上處理的是「在某特定地方某特定時間段內具有特徵性的事物……因此，歷史學家關注特殊性而非建立解釋性一般化的熟悉論點，在我看來是合理的」（第 5 頁）。換言之，Mandelbaum 考慮了溫德爾班對於描述性和規範性科學的區分。與後者相反，他認為歷史是一種調查，即一個致力於驗證其陳述、解釋事件之間關係的學科。這就是為什麼它對特殊星系的興趣同時不能排除將規律插入其關係鏈的原因。我將不討論這些預設，它們與前兩章的結論相當一致。

Against this backdrop, the thesis I shall be attending to stands out clearly; the irreducible object of history is of a societal order. History sees the thoughts, feelings, and actions of individuals in the specific context of their social environment: “It is only insofar as individuals are viewed with reference to the nature and changes of a society existing at a particular time and place that they are of interest to historians” (Mandelbaum, p. 10). At first sight, this thesis, taken in isolation, confirms the discontinuity between the level of history and that of a narrative in which characters have to be identifiable as individuals responsible for their actions. A more precise determination of the term “society” sets us on the path of the problematic specific to these basic entities. It results from a distinction between two kinds of history: “general history” and “special histories” (p. 11). General history takes as its theme particular societies, such as peoples and nations, whose existence is continuous. Special histories takes as their theme abstract aspects of culture such as technology, art, science, religion, which lack continuous existence and which are linked together only through the initiative of the historian who is responsible for defining what counts as art, as science, as religion.
在這樣的背景下，我將要闡述的論點清晰可見；歷史的不可簡化對象是社會秩序。歷史以個人的思想、感受和行動置於特定社會環境的具體語境中：「只有當個人被視為與某特定時間和地點存在的社會之性質和變遷相關聯時，他們才會對歷史學家產生興趣」（曼德爾鮑姆，第 10 頁）。乍看之下，這個論點單獨提取時，似乎確認了歷史層面與敘事層面之間的斷裂，在敘事中，角色必須被識別為對自身行動負責的個體。對「社會」一詞的更精確界定，為我們指明了這些基本實體的特殊問題。這源於對兩種歷史的區分：「總體歷史」和「特殊歷史」（第 11 頁）。總體歷史以特定的社會，如民族和國家為主題，這些社會的存在是持續的。特殊歷史以文化的抽象面向為主題，如技術、藝術、科學、宗教，這些方面缺乏連續性，僅通過歷史學家的主動性聯繫起來，歷史學家負責界定何為藝術、科學、宗教。

The notion of society, as the ultimate reference of history, receives from its opposition to the notion of culture a determination that will later allow me to characterize it as a transitional object between the plane of narrative and the plane of explanatory history.
作為歷史的終極參照，社會的概念通過與文化概念的對立獲得了特定的界定，這將使我後來能夠將其描述為敘事平面與解釋性歷史平面之間的過渡性對象。

Let us specify further Mandelbaum’s notion of society in its opposition to that of culture: “A society, I shall hold, consists of individuals living in an organized community that controls a particular territory; the organization of such a community is provided by institutions that serve to define the status occupied by different individuals and ascribe to them the roles they are expected to play in perpetuating the continuing existence of the community” (ibid., his emphasis).
讓我們進一步闡述曼德爾鮑姆關於社會對立於文化的概念：「一個社會，我將堅持，由生活在組織有序的社區中的個人組成，該社區控制特定的領土；這樣一個社區的組織由機構提供，這些機構用於定義不同個人佔據的地位，並賦予他們在延續社區持續存在中預期扮演的角色」（同上，強調為其原文）。

All three components of this definition are important: the first ties the community, and hence its duration, to places; the second connects it to individuals by assigning to them an institutionalized role; the third characterizes the community in terms of its uninterrupted existence. This third component will later enable us to bridge the gap between the basic entities and the procedures of causal connection that correspond to them at this level.
這個定義的三個組成部分都很重要：第一個將社區及其持續性與地方聯繫起來；第二個通過為個人分配制度化的角色將社區與個人連接；第三個以社區的持續不斷的存在來描述社區。這第三個組成部分稍後將使我們能夠彌合基本實體與對應於此層次的因果連接程序之間的差距。

The notion of culture covers all of the achievements stemming from social creations and implicated in individual use that are transmitted by a tradition: language, techniques, arts, philosophical or religious attitudes and beliefs, insofar as these diverse functions are included in the social heritage of the various individuals living within a particular society.
文化的概念涵蓋了源自社會創造、涉及個人使用且由傳統傳播的所有成就：語言、技術、藝術、哲學或宗教態度和信仰，只要這些不同的功能被包含在特定社會中生活的各個個人的社會遺產中。

The difference between society and culture is, of course, difficult to maintain in all cases. Why, it will be asked, are institutions, which define the role of individuals and include kinship systems, the distribution of goods, and the organization of labor, placed on the side of society rather than on that of culture? The answer is provided by the third feature of society, namely, that it is particular and exists continuously. From this it follows that an institution belongs to society and not to culture inasmuch as it constitutes an integrating factor in a particular and continuously existing society. In return, the activities that define culture are abstracted from particular societies and their modes are gathered together under a single classificatory concept by the definition that historians give to them, a definition that can vary widely from one author to another.
社會與文化之間的差異，當然在所有情況下都很難維持。人們會問，定義個人角色並包括親屬系統、商品分配和勞動組織的機構，為什麼會被置於社會一側而非文化一側？答案由社會的第三個特徵提供，即它是特定的並持續存在。由此可見，一個機構屬於社會而非文化，因為它構成了特定且持續存在的社會中的整合性因素。相反，定義文化的活動是從特定社會中抽象出來，並且根據歷史學家對它們的定義，其模式被彙集在一個單一的分類概念下，這個定義可以在不同作者之間有很大的變化。

This distinction between the history of particular societies and that of classes of activities indicates the two poles at either end of a range of intermediary cases. For example, the societal phenomenon can be analyzed into various aspects-political, economic, social,-and the ways in which these aspects are cut up, defined, and put into relation stem from methodological choices that make them into artifacts in the same way as the activities classed under the heading of culture are made into artifacts. But as long as these aspects are thought of as the “facets” of a particular society, they provide its ultimate characterization. These facets can be referred back to the global societal phenomenon due to a noteworthy feature of the latter, namely, that it constitutes a network of institutions and powers, whose indefinite density lends itself to investigations on varying scales, after the manner of geographical maps. This capacity of the societal phenomenon of being analyzed into aspects, dimensions, or facets ensures the transition from general (I would prefer to say global) history to the special (or better, specialized) histories. But it is one thing to abstract these aspects and to group them together under the classes that then become the dominant subject matter of a specialized history; it is another thing altogether to relate these aspects to a particular society, to characterize it in an ever denser, ever more subtle manner, and in this way to restore its singular identity. The inverse argument can be made con-
這種對於特定社會歷史和活動類別歷史之間的區別，指出了一個範圍兩端的極點。例如，社會現象可以被分析為各種面向——政治、經濟、社會——而這些面向如何被切割、定義和建立關聯，源於方法論選擇，這些選擇以與將文化活動歸類的方式相同，使它們成為人為建構。但只要這些面向被視為特定社會的「面向」，它們就提供了其最終的特徵。這些面向可以追溯到全球社會現象，這是由於後者的一個值得注意的特徵，即它構成了一個機構和權力網絡，其無限的密度使其適合以不同尺度進行調查，就像地理地圖一樣。社會現象可以被分析為方面、維度或面向的這種能力，確保了從總體（我更願意說是全球）歷史到特殊（或更好地說是專門）歷史的轉變。但是，將這些面向抽象並將它們歸類，成為專門史的主要研究對象，這是一回事；將這些面向與特定社會相關聯，以越來越密集、越來越微妙的方式對其進行描繪，從而恢復其獨特身份，這又是另一回事。相反的論點也可以成立。
cerning specialized histories. In each case they take as their guiding theme a “class” of separate activities-techniques, sciences, arts, literature, philosophy, religion, or ideology. Now a class is not a concrete totality; it is an artifact of method. For example, art historians arrange discontinuous works into a collection following criteria that depend on the conception they may have of art. However, this manner of separating out a class by stipulating conditions is not left to the sole discretion of the art historians. The works themselves are set within traditions and within a framework of influences that mark their rootedness in the historical continuity of particular societies, from which the works receive a borrowed continuity. In this way, specialized histories refer back to general or global history.
關於專門的歷史。在每一種情況下，他們以"類別"的分離活動為指導主題——技術、科學、藝術、文學、哲學、宗教或意識形態。現在，一個類別不是具體的整體；它是方法的人為產物。例如，藝術史學家按照他們對藝術的概念所依賴的標準，將不連續的作品排列成一個集合。然而，通過規定條件來劃分一個類別的這種方式，並不完全取決於藝術史學家的自由裁量。這些作品本身是在傳統和影響的框架內，標誌著它們在特定社會的歷史連續性中的根源，從而使作品獲得了一種借來的連續性。這樣，專門的歷史回溯到一般或全球性的歷史。

Consequently, depending upon whether the accent is placed on the artificial character of the connections between cultural products or upon the traditions that allow them to participate in the temporal continuity of particular societies, the investigation leans to the side of specialized history or to the side of global history. It is the semi-autonomy of institutions and activities that allows us to relate them either to the singular constellations that define a societal phenomenon or to the classes of products and of works that define the cultural phenomenon.

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因此，根據是強調文化產品之間連接的人為性，還是強調使它們參與特定社會的時間連續性的傳統，研究會傾向於專門歷史或全球歷史的一側。正是機構和活動的半自主性，使我們能夠將它們關聯到定義社會現象的獨特星座，或關聯到定義文化現象的產品和作品的類別。

In what sense does the notion of society, in Mandelbaum’s sense, offer a relay station in the derivation of historical entities starting from the characters in a narrative? Just as singular causal imputation presents an affinity with emplotment that justifies our speaking with regard to it of a quasi-plot, and even of plot in the broad sense of the word, so too society, once it is considered a singular entity, appears in historical discourse as a quasi-character. And this analogical transfer is not reducible to a rhetorical effect. It is founded twice over, in the theory of narrative and in the structure of the societal phenomenon.
曼德爾鮑姆意義上的社會概念，在多大程度上為從敘事中的角色衍生歷史實體提供了一個中繼站？正如特殊的因果歸責與情節編排具有親和性，以致我們可以用廣義的情節概念來描述它，同樣地，當社會被視為一個特殊實體時，也在歷史論述中表現為一個準角色。這種類比轉移並非簡單的修辭效果。它在敘事理論和社會現象結構上都有雙重基礎。

On the one side, nothing in the notion of character, understood in the sense of someone who performs an action, requires that this character be an individual human being. As our literary analysis in volume 2 will amply confirm, the role of character can be held by whomever or whatever is designated in the narrative as the grammatical subject of an action predicate in the basic narrative sentence “X does R.” In this sense history only extends and amplifies the dissociation made between character and real actor in emplotment. It could even be said that history helps to give to the character his, her, or its full narrative dimension. In this sense, individual responsibility is just the first in a series of analogies, among which we find peoples, nations, classes, and all the communities that exemplify the notion of a singular society.
一方面，在理解「角色」的概念中，即作為執行行動的主體，並不要求這個角色必須是人類個體。正如我們在第二卷的文學分析將充分證實的，「角色」可以是敘事中被指定為基本敘事句「X 做 R」中動作謂語的語法主語的任何人或物。在這個意義上，歷史只是擴展和放大了敘事中角色與真實行動者之間的分離。甚至可以說，歷史有助於賦予角色其完整的敘事維度。在這個意義上，個人責任只是一系列類比中的第一環，其中包括民族、國家、階級，以及所有體現單一社會概念的共同體。

On the other side, the societal phenomenon itself contains a decisive feature that governs the analogical extension of the role of characters. The definition given by Mandelbaum of a singular society is incomplete without an oblique reference to the individuals who make it up. This oblique reference, in turn, allows us to deal with the society itself as one great individual, analo-
另一方面，社會現象本身包含一個決定性特徵，支配著角色角色的類比性擴展。曼德爾鮑姆對單一社會的定義若不提及組成它的個人，就是不完整的。這種間接引用反過來又使我們能夠將社會本身視為一個偉大的個體，類似於
gous to the individuals who make it up. It is in this sense that Plato spoke of the City as a soul writ large and that Husserl in his fifth Cartesian Meditation calls historical communities “personalities of a higher order.”
柏拉圖談到城邦如同放大的靈魂，胡塞爾在其第五笛卡爾默想中稱歷史社群為「更高階的人格」。這與構成城邦的個人密切相關。

Two things are to be pointed out in this argument.
在此論點中有兩點需要指出。
The first concerns the oblique reference in every definition of the societal phenomenon to the individuals who compose it. The second concerns the support this oblique reference provides for the analogical extension of the role of characters to the first-order entities of historical discourse.
第一點涉及每個社會現象定義中對組成其的個人的間接引用。第二點則關於這種間接引用如何支持將角色的作用類比延伸到歷史論述的一階實體。

This oblique reference to individuals is contained in the features by which Mandelbaum defines society: territorial organization, institutional structure, temporal continuity. All three refer back to individuals who inhabit the territory, who fill the roles assigned by the institutions, and who provide, as generation replaces generation, the historical continuity of the society in question. I call this an oblique reference because it is not part of the historian’s direct discourse, which can, without too many qualms, restrict itself to collective entities and make no explicit reference to their individual components. But if it is not up to history as a scientifically oriented discipline to thematize this oblique reference, it is, on the contrary, the task of a genetic phenomenology to discover in the phenomenon of the we-relation the origin of the connection between individuals and particular societies. It finds this connection in the phenomenon of participatory belonging that relates first-order historical entities to the sphere of action. This connection defines the bearers of action as members of. . . . It can be called a real, ontological connection insofar as it has precedence with respect to the consciousness the members have of it. Of course, it is characteristic of this connection that it be capable of being recognized as such, that it be capable of being experienced and stated; but this recognition is grounded in the connection itself, which it brings to the level of language. The same emphasis must be given to both the ontological anteriority of the connection of belonging and the role of symbolic mediationsnorms, customs, rites-by which the recognition of this connection is confirmed. As a result, neither varying degrees of consciousness nor the modes of its becoming conscious are actually constitutive of this connection. With this qualification in mind, let us consider for a moment the perspective of the varying degrees of consciousness. The connection of belonging can be experienced with great intensity of feeling, as in patriotism, class-consciousness, or prejudice, but it can also be forgotten, neglected, dissimulated, even vehemently denied by those whom the rest of society considers as outcasts or traitors or by those who consider themselves dissidents, exiles, or outlaws. It can then be the task of a critique of ideology to unmask their hidden allegiance. But this critique, in its turn, presupposes the anteriority of the connection in relation to consciousness (and to the possibility of bringing it into the sphere of explicit consciousness). As for the modes of explicit consciousness, the experience of participatory belonging can be tinged with the widest range of evaluations-
這種對個人的間接引用包含在曼德爾鮑姆定義社會的特徵中：領土組織、制度結構、時間連續性。這三個特徵都回溯到居住在該領土的個人、擔任機構指派角色的個人，以及代代相傳，提供該社會歷史連續性的個人。我稱之為間接引用，因為它不是歷史學家直接論述的一部分，後者可以不太猶豫地將自身限制在集體實體上，並不對其個別成分做明確引用。但是，如果作為一門科學導向的學科，歷史不應該主題化這種間接引用，那麼基因現象學的任務恰恰相反，是要在「我們」關係的現象中發現個人與特定社會之間連結的起源。它在參與性歸屬現象中找到這種連結，這種現象將一階歷史實體與行動領域聯繫起來。這種連結將行動承載者定義為成員。。。。只要它在成員意識之前就已存在，它就可以被稱為真實的、本體論的連結。當然，這種連結的特點是能夠被識別、被體驗和闡述；但這種識別是基於連結本身，並將其提升到語言層面。必須同等強調歸屬連結的本體論先驗性，以及通過象徵性中介（規範、習俗、儀式）來確認這種連結的角色。因此，意識的不同程度或意識形成的模式實際上並不構成這種連結。考慮到這一點，讓我們 momentarily 看看意識不同程度的視角。歸屬感可以以極高的情感強度被體驗，如在愛國主義、階級意識或偏見中，但它也可能被遺忘、被忽視、被掩飾，甚至被那些被社會其他部分視為流氓、叛徒或那些將自己視為異議者、流亡者或法外之徒的人激烈地否認。在這種情況下，意識形態批判的任務就是揭露他們隱藏的效忠。但這種批判本身又預設了連結在意識之前的存在（以及將其帶入明確意識領域的可能性）。至於明確意識的模式，參與性歸屬的體驗可能染上最廣泛範圍的評價-
even opposition. It spans the range between the poles of approbation and rejection, commemoration and abhorrence (to use François Furet’s expression in Interpreting the French Revolution, to which I shall return in the third section of this chapter).
甚至是對立。它跨越了贊同和拒絕、紀念和憎惡之間的極端（使用弗朗索瓦·富雷在《解讀法國大革命》中的表達，我將在本章第三節中再次提到）。

The threefold reference of the societal phenomenon to the individual, which I have extracted from Mandelbaum’s definition, clearly derives from this connection of participatory belonging brought to light by genetic phenomenology. To territorial organization corresponds the act of inhabiting, that is, of defining human space by means of a set of founding acts: constructing a shelter, marking out and passing over a threshold, living together, showing hospitality. Corresponding to the way in which individuals are assigned a status by institutions are the various manners in which the members of a group take on a given role, that is, the various ways of working, of performing a craft, of relating labor and leisure, of situating oneself within the relations of class, rank, and power. Corresponding to the perpetuation of societal existence is the connection between generations that intertwines life and death, and provides the living not only with contemporaries but also with predecessors and successors.

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我從曼德爾鮑姆的定義中提取的這個社會現象對個體的三重關聯，明顯源於遺傳現象學揭示的參與歸屬連結。對應於領土組織的是棲居的行為，即通過一系列奠基性行為來定義人類空間：建造庇護所、劃定並跨越門檻、共同生活、展現好客。對應於機構賦予個人地位的方式，是群體成員承擔特定角色的各種方式，即各種勞動、工藝、調節勞動與休閒、在階級、等級和權力關係中定位自身的方式。對應於社會存在的延續，是跨越世代的聯繫，交織生命與死亡，並為生者提供不僅是當代人，還有前輩和後繼者。

Then comes the second part of the argument: namely, that the oblique reference of the societal phenomenon to individuals justifies the analogical extension of the role of character to the first-order entities of history. By virtue of this analogy, first-order historical entities can be designated as the logical subjects of active and passive verbs. In return, the analogy requires nothing more than the oblique reference of the societal phenomenon to individuals. To say that France does this or suffers that by no means implies that the collective entity in question has to be reduced to the individuals who make it up and that its actions can be distributively ascribed to its members taken one by one. The transfer of the vocabulary of the individual to the first-order entities of history must be said at one and the same time to be only analogical (and therefore implying no reductionism) and to be well-founded in the phenomenon of participatory belonging.
接著是論證的第二部分：即社會現象對個體的側面引用，證明了將角色類比擴展到歷史的一階實體的合理性。憑藉這種類比，一階歷史實體可被指定為主動和被動動詞的邏輯主語。作為回報，這種類比僅需要社會現象對個體的側面引用。說法國做某事或遭受某事，絕不意味著該集體實體必須被簡化為組成它的個人，也不意味著其行為可以分配給其成員中的每一個。將個人的詞彙轉移到歷史的一階實體，必須同時被說成是純粹類比的（因此不暗示任何還原主義）且在參與歸屬現象中有充分的根據。

The recognition of this connection between the oblique character of the reference to the individual and the analogous character of the transfer of vocabulary is not without epistemological consequences. It enables history and the other social sciences to avoid the difficulties of methodological individualism. By giving equal weight to the ontological dimension and to the reflective dimension, the connection of participatory belonging accords equal weight to the group and the individual. It shows the individual to be situated from the outset in what Hannah Arendt liked to call “the public sphere of appearance.” In this sense, none of the three features that constitute the societal phenomenon can be derived from the isolated individual: not the organizing of a territory, not the instituting of roles, not the continuity of existence. On the other hand, none of these three features can be defined without referring to individ-
這種連接的認知，即參考個人的斜向性質和詞彙轉移的類比性質，並非沒有認識論上的後果。它使歷史學和其他社會科學能夠避免方法論個人主義的困難。通過對本體論維度和反思性維度給予同等的權重，參與性歸屬的連接對群體和個人都給予同等的重視。它表明個人從一開始就被置於漢娜·鄂蘭喜歡稱之為的「出現的公共領域」中。在這種意義上，構成社會現象的三個特徵都不能從孤立的個人中推導：不是領土的組織，不是角色的制定，也不是存在的連續性。另一方面，這三個特徵中的任何一個都不能在不參考個人的情況下被定義
ual action and to the interaction among individuals. It results from this that the transitional object of historical consciousness presents an unavoidable polarity, which is summed up in the expression “participatory belonging.”

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這種行動及個人之間的互動是一種歷史意識的過渡性對象，其中不可避免地呈現出一種兩極性，這總結在「參與性歸屬」的表達中。

The notion of a quasi-character, which I am adopting here in symmetry with that of a quasi-plot, owes an equal debt to each of the two arguments stated above. It is because each society is made up of individuals that it behaves like one great individual on the stage of history and that historians can attribute to these singular entities the initiative for certain courses of action and the historical responsibility-in Aron’s sense-for certain results, even when these were not intentionally aimed at. But it is because the technique of narrative has taught us to dissociate characters from individuals that historical discourse can perform this transfer on the syntactical level. In other words, first-order historiographical entities constitute a relay station between secondand even third-order entities only because the narrative idea of a character itself constitutes a relay station on the configurational level between those first-order entities which history deals with and the active individuals implied by real practice. The first-order entities of the historian refer to the entities belonging to the sphere of action–those which I spoke of in Part I under the heading of mimesis -only by means of the narrative category of character, which comes from mimesis

_{2}

.
我在這裡採用的準角色概念，在對稱性上與準情節概念同樣負有相等的債務。正是因為每個社會由個人組成，它在歷史舞台上表現得像一個偉大的個體，歷史學家可以將某些行動的主動性和某些結果的歷史責任（按阿隆的意義）歸因於這些獨特的實體，即使這些結果並非有意追求。但正是因為敘事技巧教導我們將角色與個人分離，歷史論述可以在語法層面上進行這種轉移。換句話說，一階史學實體之所以能夠成為二階甚至三階實體之間的中繼站，是因為敘事中的角色概念本身在配置層面上構成了中繼站，連接了歷史所處理的一階實體和現實實踐所 implied 的主動個人。歷史學家的一階實體通過敘事中的角色範疇（源自模仿）來指涉屬於行動領域的實體，這些實體是我在第一部分中提到的模仿範疇。
2. The symmetry between the theory of quasi-character and that of quasi-plot is reinforced by the fact that singular causal imputation, in which we saw the transitional procedure between historical explanation and narrative explanation, finds its privileged field of application precisely on the level of the firstorder entities of historical discourse. One essential function of causal attribution is, in effect, to reestablish the continuity of a process in which the unity of development appears, for one reason or another, to be interrupted, or even nonexistent. We recall that continuous existence is, in Mandelbaum’s vocabulary, a major feature in distinguishing society from culture.
2. 準角色理論與準情節理論之間的對稱性，因為在特定因果歸因中得到強化，我們在這一歸因中看到了歷史解釋與敘事解釋之間的過渡程序，其特權應用領域恰恰在於歷史論述的一階實體層面。因果歸屬的一個 essential 功能是重新建立一個過程的連續性，在這個過程中，發展的統一性因某些原因看似中斷，甚至不復存在。我們回顧曼德爾鮑姆的詞彙，連續存在是區分社會與文化的一個主要特徵。

This function of causal explanation is one of the primary theses of Mandelbaum’s work. This thesis deliberately breaks with the empiricist tradition stemming from Hume, for which causality expresses a regular connection between two types of logically distinct events. According to this tradition, the nomothetic character of the causal relation is rigorously tied to the atomist character of the notions of cause and effect. Mandelbaum attacks just this atomist character of causal connection when he defines the basic social phenomenon in terms of continuous existence.

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曼德爾鲍姆作品中因果解釋的這一功能是其主要論點之一。這一論點故意打破了源自休謨的經驗主義傳統，在該傳統中，因果性表達了兩種邏輯上截然不同的事件之間的規律性連接。根據這一傳統，因果關係的遊定法則特徵嚴格地與原子論性質的因果概念聯繫在一起。當曼德爾鲍姆在連續存在的術語中定義基本社會現象時，他攻擊的就是這種因果連接的原子論性質。

Starting from the perceptual level, causality expresses the continuity of a singular process. The cause is the whole process, the effect is its end point. For the observer, the fact that a ball is hit is the cause of its movement, and the cause is included within the complete event. It is only for the sake of convenience that we isolate from the whole process the most variable of its factors and make it a cause distinct from its effect-for example, bad weather for a
從感知層面開始，因果性表達了一個特定過程的連續性。原因是整個過程，效果是其終點。對觀察者來說，球被擊打是其運動的原因，而原因包含在完整事件之中。只是出於便利，我們從整個過程中分離出最可變的因素，並將其作為與其效果不同的原因——例如，惡劣的天氣導致
bad harvest. Against Hume it must be said that an “analysis of the cause of a particular occurrence involves tracing the various factors that are jointly responsible for the occurrence being what it was, and not being different” (p. 74).

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糟糕的收成。反對休謨，必須說：「分析某一特定事件的原因，涉及追蹤共同負責該事件呈現其特定樣貌，且不同於其他的各種因素」（第 74 頁）。

Causal explanation always involves linking a cause and its effect together “in such a way that they may be said to constitute aspects of a single ongoing process” (p. 76). Conversely, explanation in terms of one discrete antecedent is always the sign of an abbreviated and truncated explanation. The pragmatic advantage of these truncated explanations must not make us forget that the “cause is the whole set of actual ongoing occurrences or events that resulted in this, and no other, particular effect” (p. 93). In this sense there is a logical gap between causal explanation, which always concerns the factors responsible for a particular occurrence, and the statement of a law, which concerns the invariable connection between types of events or properties. Laws have an unlimited range of application, precisely “because they do not attempt to state connections between actual occurrences, but between properties characteristic of occurrences of given types” (p. 98), or, if one prefers, “between types of factors rather than between types of actual events” (p. 100).
因果解釋總是涉及將原因和結果以"這樣的方式連結在一起，使它們可以被視為單一持續過程的不同方面"（第 76 頁）。相反地，僅以一個離散的前因來解釋總是一個簡化和截斷的解釋的標誌。這些截斷解釋的實用優勢不應使我們忘記，"原因是導致這一特定結果的所有實際持續發生的事件或事件集"（第 93 頁）。從這個意義上說，因果解釋（它總是關注負責特定事件的因素）與法則陳述（關注事件或屬性類型之間的不變連接）之間存在邏輯上的差距。法則具有無限的適用範圍，正是因為它們"不試圖陳述實際事件之間的連接，而是陳述給定類型事件的特徵屬性之間的連接"（第 98 頁），或者，如果喜歡的話，"是類型的因素之間的連接，而非實際事件類型之間的連接"（第 100 頁）。

This has two consequences, whose importance for the theory of history must not be underestimated. The first concerns the insertion of regularities into a singular causal attribution. If, in the course of the explanation of a singular process, we make recourse to generalities, to laws, this generality characteristic of laws cannot be substituted for the singularity of causal explanation. If we say,

X

was killed by a bullet that passed through his heart, the physiological laws concerning blood circulation are linked to abstract factors, not to the concrete phases of the actual process. They provide the mortar, not the materials. Laws apply to the sequence of conditions only seriatim. Therefore the series of occurrences leading to the final result must be accounted for causally in order for the laws to be applied to this series.

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這有兩個後果，其對歷史理論的重要性不容忽視。第一個涉及將規律性插入特定因果歸因中。如果在解釋一個特定過程的過程中，我們訴諸於一般性、法則，這種法則的普遍性不能取代因果解釋的特殊性。如果我們說

X

被一顆穿過心臟的子彈殺死，那麼關於血液循環的生理學法則與抽象因素相關，而非實際過程的具體階段。它們提供的是水泥，而非材料。法則僅依序地應用於條件序列。因此，為了將法則應用於這個序列，導致最終結果的事件序列必須以因果方式進行解釋。

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Second consequence: the explanation makes the effect of a continuous process appear to be determined necessarily, once the initial state of the system is given; nothing other than this particular result could have occurred. But this does not mean that the event, as a whole, has been determined. For it is always in a closed system that a process can be said to be determined. The entire universe would have to be considered as a single system in order to identify the idea of causal determination with that of determinism. The initial conditions cannot be said to lead logically to their effect, since this effect results from the contingent fact that each of the occurrences taken at the start took place at a given moment and at a given place. Causal necessity is therefore a conditional necessity: given the complete set of causal conditions that took place (and not others) it was necessary that the effect that was actually produced occur. These two consequences confirm the irreducible but nonexclusive position of causal explanation.

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第二個結果：這個解釋使得連續過程的效果似乎必然地由系統的初始狀態決定；沒有其他結果本可能發生。但這並不意味著整個事件已被確定。因為只有在封閉系統中，才能說一個過程是被確定的。必須將整個宇宙視為單一系統，才能將因果決定的概念等同於決定論。初始條件不能被說成邏輯地導致其結果，因為這個結果源於偶然的事實，即在開始時的每個事件發生在特定的時刻和地點。因果必然性因此是一種條件性必然性：給定已發生的完整因果條件集（而非其他），必然會產生實際發生的效果。這兩個結果確認了因果解釋的不可簡化但非排他的地位。

The decisive feature-and to my knowledge without equivalent anywhere
決定性特徵—據我所知在任何地方都無與倫比
else-of Maurice Mandelbaum’s theory of causal explanation is, as has been stated, its close affinity with the analysis of first-order entities in history. Indeed, it is general history-in the sense defined above-that most fully illustrates his three-point thesis concerning causal explanation: namely, that causality is the internal linkage of a continuous process, that generalizations in the form of laws are to be inserted into singular causal explanation, and that causal necessity is conditional and does not imply a belief in determinism. Let us consider each of these three points further.
莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆因果解釋理論的關鍵特徵—如前所述—是其與歷史中一階實體分析的密切關聯。事實上，普遍歷史—按上述定義—最充分地闡明了他關於因果解釋的三點論點：即因果性是連續過程的內在聯繫，必須將以法則形式的概括納入特定因果解釋中，且因果必然性是條件性的，並不意味著相信決定論。讓我們進一步考慮這三點。

The affinity between causal reasoning and the continuous nature of social phenomena is easily explained. As was stated earlier, history passes from description to explanation as soon as the question “Why?” is freed from the question “What?” and becomes a separate theme of inquiry. And the question “Why?” becomes autonomous when the analysis into factors, phases, and structures is itself freed from the overall grasping of the total social phenomenon. Causal explanation must then reconstruct the continuity broken by the analysis. This reconstruction can take two forms, depending on whether it emphasizes temporal continuity or structural unity. In the first case, that of longitudinal analysis, if we may so call it, the social phenomenon calls for analysis and the work of reconstruction due to the fact that the web of events has the noteworthy property of constituting “an infinitely dense series” (p. 123). This property allows every possible change in scale. Any event can thus be analyzed into subevents or integrated into a larger-scale event. In this sense, the difference between short term, middle term, and long term is simply the temporal aspect of the relation of part to whole that predominates in historical explanation.

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因果推理與社會現象的連續性之間的親和力可以很容易解釋。如前所述，歷史從描述轉向解釋，只要「為什麼？」這個問題從「什麼？」中解放出來，並成為獨立的探究主題。而「為什麼？」這個問題在對因素、階段和結構進行分析本身從整體把握社會現象中解放出來時，就變得自主。因果解釋必須重建分析所破壞的連續性。這種重建可以採取兩種形式，取決於是強調時間連續性還是結構統一性。在第一種情況下，即所謂的縱向分析，社會現象需要分析和重建工作，因為事件網絡具有構成「無限密集序列」（第 123 頁）的顯著特性。這一特性允許在任何可能的規模上進行變化。因此，任何事件都可以分析成子事件，或整合到更大規模的事件中。從這個意義上說，短期、中期和長期之間的差異，只是歷史解釋中部分與整體關係的時間方面。

To these changes of scale in the longitudinal analysis correspond equally variable degrees in the structural analysis. A society is an institutional fabric of tighter or looser stitches that permits variable degrees of abstraction in the institutional topos. Thus, the end point of our analysis may lie in the distinction between economics and ideology on the whole, as in Marx, or between political, economic, social, and cultural phenomena, but we may also take each of these terms as a starting point for a functional analysis.
在縱向分析中的這些規模變化，在結構分析中也有相應的可變程度。一個社會是一種機構結構，其編織緊密程度不同，允許在機構拓撲中進行不同程度的抽象。因此，我們分析的終點可能在於整體上區分經濟和意識形態，如馬克思所做的，或者區分政治、經濟、社會和文化現象，但我們也可以將每一個術語作為功能分析的起點。

These two lines of analysis are largely autonomous, due to the fact that it “is unlikely that all aspects of societal life and all phases of culture will change in a synchronous fashion” (p. 142). These discordances encourage the splitting apart of general history into special histories. And in turn, this splitting apart renders the task of general history all the more urgent and specific: “the degree of unity to be found in any age becomes not an explanatory principle but something that is itself to be explained” (ibid.). This degree of unity is not to be sought anywhere but in the way in which the parts are related to one another: “the explanation of the whole will depend upon understanding the connections that exist in the patterning of its parts” (ibid.)
這兩行分析在很大程度上是自主的，原因在於"不太可能所有社會生活的各個方面和文化的所有階段會以同步的方式改變"（第 142 頁）。這些不一致鼓勵將總體歷史分割成特殊的歷史。反過來，這種分割使得總體歷史的任務更加緊迫和具體："在任何時代中可以找到的統一程度不再是一個解釋原則，而是本身需要被解釋的東西"（同上）。這種統一程度不應在任何其他地方尋找，而是在各部分之間的關聯方式中："整體的解釋將取決於理解其各部分模式中存在的聯繫"（同上）

The second thesis, the necessary insertion of generalities in singular causal
第二個論點，即在特定因果解釋中必須插入一般性概念
explanation, results from the analytical character of explanation: the historical field is a relational field in which no connection, whether longitudinal or transversal, is taken as given once and for all. This is why generalizations of every order, of every epistemological level, and of every scientific origin are required to “cement” causality together. They concern institutional structures no less than the dispositions that give human conduct a certain stability and make it relatively accessible to prediction. But these generalizations function historically only under the condition of accounting for temporal structures and sequences whose cohesiveness is due to the fact that they are parts of a continuous whole.
源於解釋的分析性質：歷史領域是一個關係性領域，其中無論是縱向還是橫向的任何聯繫都不被視為一成不變。這就是為什麼各種各樣的泛化，無論是在認識論水平、科學來源上，都需要"黏合"因果關係。它們同樣關注制度結構，以及賦予人類行為某種穩定性並使其相對可預測的傾向。但這些泛化只有在能夠說明時間結構和序列的連貫性時，才能在歷史上發揮作用，而這種連貫性是因為它們是連續整體的一部分。

Finally, the distinction between conditional causal necessity and universal determinism is perfectly homogeneous with the distinction between general history and special histories. Since the individual societies that constitute the ultimate term of reference for general history are ineluctably multiple, the necessity that historians may claim in reconstructing the continuity of their sequential or structural constitution remains fragmentary and somewhat regional. Mandelbaum’s reasoning here hooks up with that of G. H. von Wright concerning the closure of systems, the intervening role played by agents in this very operation of closure, and the impossibility for any subject to be at one and the same time the observer of systemic connections and the active operator who puts the system into motion. Mandelbaum also here links up with the distinction made by Max Weber between adequate causality and logical necessity. And lastly, he reinforces Raymond Aron’s argument against the retrospective illusion of fatality and Aron’s defense of a fragmentary determinism open to free political action.
最後，條件因果必然性與普遍決定論之間的區別與一般歷史和特殊歷史之間的區別完全同質。由於構成一般歷史參考的最終術語的個別社會不可避免地是多樣的，歷史學家在重建其順序或結構構成的連續性時所聲稱的必然性仍然是片段的，且相當地區性的。曼德爾鮑姆的推理在這裡與賴特關於系統封閉性的論點相連，以及行動者在這種封閉運作中所扮演的中介角色，以及任何主體不可能同時成為系統連接的觀察者和使系統運作的主動操作者。曼德爾鮑姆還在這裡與韋伯在充分因果性和邏輯必然性之間所做的區別聯繫起來。最後，他鞏固了阿龍反對命運的回溯性幻覺的論點，以及阿龍對開放于自由政治行動的片段決定論的辯護。

Yet the root of the distinction between conditional causal necessity and universal determinism is to be sought in the very nature of the first-order entities, which are always individual societies. Whatever lies behind this word, be it nation, class, people, community, or civilization, the participatory belonging that founds the societal bond engenders the quasi-characters who are as numerous as are the quasi-plots of which they are the heroes. Just as, for historians, there is no single plot that could encompass every possible plot, neither is there, for them, a single historical character who would be the superhero of history. The pluralism of peoples and civilizations is an unavoidable fact of every historian’s experience because it is an unavoidable fact of the experience of those who make or who suffer history. This is why singular causal attribution, which operates within the limits of this pluralism, can claim only a causal necessity conditioned by the hypothesis that a particular singular society is given in which there exist human beings who are acting in common.
然而，條件性因果必然性與普遍決定論之間的區別根源，應該在第一階實體的本質中尋找，而這些實體始終是個別社會。無論這個詞背後隱藏的是甚麼，是民族、階級、人民、社群還是文明，參與性歸屬感建立了社會紐帶，孕育出眾多的準角色，他們是眾多準情節的英雄。正如對於歷史學家而言，沒有一個單一情節能夠涵蓋所有可能的情節，同樣也沒有一個單一的歷史人物可以成為歷史的超級英雄。人民和文明的多元性是每一位歷史學家經驗中不可避免的事實，因為它是那些製造或遭受歷史的人們經驗中不可避免的事實。這就是為什麼特定因果歸因，在這種多元性的限制下運作，只能聲稱在給定特定獨特社會的假設下存在的因果必然性，而在這個社會中，存在著共同行動的人。
3. I shall only briefly discuss the second- and third-order entities constructed by historians and the correlation between their explanatory procedures and these derived entities.
3. 我將簡要討論歷史學家建構的二級和三級實體，以及他們的解釋程序與這些衍生實體之間的相關性。

The passage from general history to special histories in Maurice Mandelbaum is once again a good guide. Let us recall the characteristics he attributes to the cultural phenomena which special histories are concerned with, technology, the sciences, the arts, religion. They are (1) discontinuous phenomena (2) delimited by the historian, who establishes by stipulation what counts as a cultural phenomenon of this or that class, and, consequently, (3) are less inclined toward objectivity than is general history. Since my topic here is not the debate between objectivity and subjectivity in history but the epistemological status of the entities constructed by the historian, I am going to bracket everything that concerns the degree of arbitrariness allowed by special histories and will concentrate instead on the relation of derivation that connects special histories to general history.
在莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆的著作中，從一般歷史到特殊史的轉折再次成為一個很好的指引。讓我們回顧他歸因於特殊史所關注的文化現象（如技術、科學、藝術、宗教）的特徵：(1)是不連續的現象，(2)由歷史學家通過規定來界定什麼算是這或那類文化現象，因此(3)比一般歷史更不傾向於客觀性。由於我在此討論的主題不是歷史中的客觀性與主觀性之爭，而是歷史學家構建的實體的認識論地位，我將擱置關於特殊史所允許的任意性程度的一切討論，並專注於連接特殊史與一般史的推導關係。

This derivation is made possible by the analysis into phases and structures that already prevails on the level of general history, as well as by the recourse made to general terms in the course of causal explanation.
這種推導是通過已在一般歷史層面上佔主導地位的階段和結構分析，以及在因果解釋過程中使用一般術語而得以實現的。

Starting from this twofold work of abstraction the interest of the historian has no difficulty in shifting from the societal phenomenon, taken in its continuity and its singularity, to cultural and generic phenomena. New entities then occupy the stage of history that are simply correlates of the work of conceptualization characteristic of scholarly history. These entities are, we must admit, classes, generic beings, not singular entities. For the most part, they are borrowed from the social sciences with which history combines to form a pair: economics, demography, the sociology of organizations, the sociology of attitudes and of ideologies, political science. Historians will be all the more tempted to take these entities for historical realities if they are successful in dealing with them as invariants, for which singular societies are no more than variants or, better, variables.
從這種雙重抽象工作開始，歷史學家將毫不費力地將興趣從社會現象（被視為其連續性和獨特性）轉移到文化和普遍現象。屆時，新的實體佔據歷史舞台，這些實體只是學術歷史概念化工作的相關物。必須承認，這些實體是類別、普遍存在的事物，而非特定的實體。它們大多來自歷史學結合的社會科學：經濟學、人口學、組織社會學、態度和意識形態社會學、政治科學。如果歷史學家能夠將這些實體作為不變量處理，並將特定社會視為變體或更好地說是變數，他們就更容易將這些實體視為歷史現實。

This is what Paul Veyne does in L’Inventaire des Différences.

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constructs an invariant, imperialism, and among its variants the imperialism that consists in occupying all the available space in order to acquire a monopoly of power. Roman singularity is thus localized, without any consideration of space and time, on the specific axis defined by the invariant taken as the starting point. This conceptual mechanism is perfectly legitimate and of great heuristic and explanatory force. It becomes faulty only when it is forgotten that second-order entities, such as imperialism, are derived-with respect to their existence-from first-order entities, to which acting individuals have belonged and in which they have participated through their actions and interactions. Perhaps historians can only “believe” in these conceptual beings by forgetting and reversing the true order of derivation. The merit of Maurice Mandelbaum’s argument is that it combats this forgetfulness by reminding us that no history of art, of science, or of any other function of a given society preserves a historical significance unless, at least implicitly, historians keep in mind the concrete entities from which their histories were abstracted. In other
這是保羅·維恩在《差異清單》中所做的事。

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構建了一個不變量，帝國主義，以及其變體中包括佔據所有可用空間以獲得權力壟斷的帝國主義。羅馬的特殊性因此被定位，不考慮空間和時間，在以不變量為起點定義的特定軸上。這種概念機制是完全合理的，並具有極大的啟發性和解釋力。只有當忘記了二階實體（如帝國主義）是相對於其存在而從一階實體中派生出來的，而這些一階實體是個人行為者所屬並通過他們的行動和互動參與其中時，它才會變得有缺陷。也許歷史學家只能通過遺忘和顛倒真正的派生順序來"相信"這些概念性存在。莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆論點的優點是，它通過提醒我們，除非歷史學家至少隱含地牢記從中抽象出這些歷史的具體實體，否則任何給定社會的藝術史、科學史或任何其他功能的歷史都不會保留歷史意義。
words, these histories have no historical significance in themselves but only in reference to the continuously existing entities which are the bearers of these functions.
換句話說，這些歷史本身並無歷史意義，只有在參照持續存在的實體（這些實體承載著這些功能）時，才具有意義。

The derivation of second-order entities from first-order ones has as its corollary the derivation we have continuously observed of nomological explanation from singular causal explanation. I shall not return to this argument itself but rather to one of its aspects that more directly expresses the kinship between the two lines of derivation, that of procedures and that of entities. I have in mind the sort of quarrel over universals occasioned in the area of historical studies by the work of conceptualization, which, as I stated in the introduction to this chapter, is one of the corollaries of the epistemological break that gives rise to history as a scientific investigation. Mandelbaum’s thesis, that the objects proper to special histories are classes and not singular entities, helps to strengthen the moderate nominalism professed by many epistemologists concerning the status of the conceptual apparatus employed by the new historians.
從一階實體推導出二階實體，其必然結果是我們持續觀察到從單一因果解釋推導出規律性解釋。我將不再回到論點本身，而是轉向更直接表達這兩種推導路線親緣關係的一個面向，即程序和實體的面向。我心中思考的是在歷史研究領域中，由概念化工作引發的有關普遍概念的爭論，正如我在本章引言中所述，這是認識論斷裂產生科學性歷史調查的必然結果之一。曼德爾鮑姆的論點是，特定歷史的對象是類別而非單一實體，這有助於鞏固許多認識論學者對新史學所使用的概念工具之地位所持的溫和唯名論立場。

Henri-Irénée Marrou, in a chapter of his book, entitled “The Use of the Concept” (pp. 155-76), distinguishes five large categories of concepts. (1) History, he says, uses “concepts having a universal ambition” (p. 157), which are not so rare as the relativist critique would have them be, concerning that which is least variable in human beings. For my part, I would connect them to the conceptual network constituting the semantics of action (mimesis

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). (2) History, in addition, makes an “analogical or metaphorical use . . . of some special image” (p. 162); for example, the adjective “baroque” taken out of context and transposed on the basis of a reasoned comparison to periods other than the Baroque, strictly speaking. (3) Next comes the nomenclature of “special terms designating institutions, instruments or tools, manner of acting, thinking or feeling, in short, the facts of civilization” (p. 166). The limits of their validity are not always perceived, for example, when these terms are extrapolated from one specific sector of the past and applied to another-consul, Roman virtue, etc. (4) Of greater importance is Max Weber’s class of ideal-types, if by ideal-type we mean “a plan of relatively general value built up by the historian from rudiments observed in the study of special cases, an organic scheme of mutually dependent parts. . . . expressed with precision and severity by the historian in a definition which exhausts the contents” (p. 168). For example, the notion of the ancient City as it was set out by Fustel de Coulanges. However, Marrou observes, “(as Max Weber emphasizes with some insistence), it is only legitimate to use the Idealtypus as long as the historian remains fully conscious of its strictly nominalistic character” (p. 171). We cannot, then, be too much on guard against the temptation to reify ideal types. (5) Finally, there are names such as Classical Antiquity, Athens, the Renaissance, the Baroque, the French Revolution. “This time it is a matter of particular terms that are incapable of exhaustive definition. They
亨利-伊雷內·馬魯，在他的書的一章中，題為「概念的使用」（第 155-76 頁），將概念劃分為五大類別。(1) 他說，歷史使用具有「普遍野心」的概念（第 157 頁），這些概念並非如相對主義批評所言那麼罕見，關乎人類最不易改變的部分。就我而言，我會將它們與構成行動語義的概念網絡相連（模仿）。(2) 歷史此外還會對「某些特殊意象」進行類比或隱喻性使用（第 162 頁）；例如，「巴洛克」形容詞脫離原本語境，基於合理比較被轉置到巴洛克時期之外的其他時期。(3) 接下來是指稱機構、工具、行事、思考或感受方式的「特殊術語」的命名法，簡而言之，文明事實（第 166 頁）。它們的有效性邊界並非總是被察覺，例如當這些術語從過去某一特定領域被推廣到另一領域時——如執政官、羅馬美德等。(4) 更為重要的是韋伯的理想型類別，如果理想型意味著「由歷史學家從特殊案例研究中觀察到的基礎上建構的具有相對普遍價值的計劃，一個由相互依存部分組成的有機方案……由歷史學家以窮盡其內容的精確和嚴謹的定義表達」（第 168 頁）。例如，富斯特爾·德·庫朗熱闡述的古代城市概念。然而，馬魯指出，「（正如韋伯反覆強調的），只有當歷史學家完全意識到其純粹名義論性質時，才能合法使用理想型」（第 171 頁）。因此，我們必須警惕將理想型實體化的誘惑。(5) 最後，是諸如古典古代、雅典、文藝復興、巴洛克、法國大革命等名稱。 "這一次，這是關於無法窮盡定義的特定術語的問題。它們"
denote an ensemble, for example a more or less vast period of the history of a certain human milieu, or of the history of art or of thought: the totality of all that we are able to know of the object thus defined” (p. 174).
"描述了一個整體，例如某個人類環境的歷史或藝術史或思想史的或多或少廣闊的時期：我們能夠了解所定義的物件的全部總和"（第 174 頁）。

In my opinion, this last class is heterogeneous in relation to the preceding ones, because it designates third-order entities that combine the themes, procedures, and results of special histories into new holistic entities. These totalities are in no way comparable to the concrete totalities characteristic of first-order entities. They differ from them due to the complex procedures of special histories. Their synthetic character is the counterpart of the deliberately analytical spirit that governs the construction of second-order entities. In this sense, despite their appearance of being concrete, these entities are the most abstract of all. This is why the procedures that govern this level are as far removed as possible from the procedures of emplotment that can be analogously extended to the collective “heroes” of general history.

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在我看來，這最後一個類別與前面的類別是異質的，因為它指定了第三階實體，這些實體將特殊史的主題、程序和結果結合成新的整體。這些總體與第一階實體的具體總體絲毫不可相提並論。它們因特殊史的複雜程序而有所不同。它們的綜合性質是構建第二階實體的刻意分析精神的對應物。從這個意義上說，儘管它們看起來很具體，但這些實體是最抽象的。這就是為什麼支配這一層次的程序與可類比地延伸到一般歷史的集體「英雄」的情節化程序相去甚遠。

This nominalism of historical concepts is, in my opinion, the epistemological corollary of the derived nature of the second- and third-order entities. When we consider these entities, we are dealing with “constructs” whose basis in narrative and, all the more so, in experience, is less and less apparent. We can no longer discern in these constructs the equivalent of what we call project, goal, means, strategy, or even occasion and circumstance. In short, at this derived level we may no longer speak of a quasi-character. The language appropriate to second- and third-order entities is too far removed from that of narrative, and even more so from that of real action, to retain any trace of its indirect derivation. It is only by way of the relation of derivation of second-order entities starting from first-order ones that this filiation can be reactivated.
在我看來，這種歷史概念的唯名論是二階和三階實體派生性的認識論推論。當我們考慮這些實體時，我們處理的是越來越難以在敘事和經驗中辨別其基礎的"建構"。我們不再能在這些建構中辨別類似於項目、目標、手段、策略，甚至機會和情境的等效物。簡而言之，在這個派生層次上，我們可能不再能談論準角色。適用於二階和三階實體的語言已經遠離敘事語言，更遠離真實行動的語言，以至於無法保留其間接派生的任何痕跡。只有通過從一階實體出發的二階實體的派生關係，這種譜系才能被重新激活。

Only the highly refined method of questioning back can, therefore, reconstruct the channels by which not only the procedures but also the entities of historical investigation indirectly refer back to the plane of narrative understanding. Only this questioning back accounts for the intelligibility of history as a historical discipline.

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因此，只有高度精細的追溯質疑方法，才能重建歷史調查的程序以及實體間接指回敘事理解平面的渠道。只有這種追溯質疑才能解釋歷史作為一門歷史學科的可理解性。

Historical Time and the Fate of the Event
歷史時間與事件的命運

The reader will not be surprised if I conclude my inquiry into the epistemology of history with the question of historical time. This is, indeed, what is at stake throughout the whole of Part II of this work. The question of the epistemological status of historical time in relation to the temporality of narrative has been constantly anticipated in the two preceding sections. Singular causal imputation has been shown to be closely akin to the historian’s positing of first-order entities, one of whose distinctive features is, in its turn, continuous existence. Even if this feature cannot be reduced to temporal continuity, since it concerns all the structural aspects of the relations between the parts and the
如果我以歷史認識論研究結束時討論歷史時間的問題，讀者不會感到驚訝。這確實是本著作第二部分始終關注的核心。歷史時間在敘事時間性中的認識論地位，在前兩個部分中一直被預期。已經證明，特殊因果歸因與歷史學家對一階實體的確立密切相關，而後者的一個顯著特徵反過來是持續存在。即使這一特徵不能簡化為時間連續性，因為它關乎部分之間關係的所有結構方面。
whole, nevertheless the notion of change applied to structural relations unceasingly leads back to the question of historical time.
作為整體，儘管如此，應用於結構關係的變化概念不斷地將問題帶回歷史時間的問題。

Does my thesis, that both the procedures and the entities stemming from the epistemological break characteristic of history as science refer back by an indirect path to the procedures and entities of the narrative level, have an equivalent on this third level as well? Can it be demonstrated that the time constructed by the historian stems, through a succession of ever-widening gaps, from the temporality proper to the narrative? Here again I have sought an appropriate relay station. I thought this could be found in the extremely ambiguous use that historians make of the notion of event.
我的論點是，源自歷史作為科學的認識論斷裂特徵的程序和實體，是否通過間接途徑指向敘事層次的程序和實體？是否可以證明歷史學家構建的時間，是通過不斷擴大的差距，源自敘事本身的時間性？在這裡，我再次尋找適當的中繼站。我認為可以在歷史學家對事件概念的極其模糊的使用中找到。

For this demonstration I will once again rely on French historiography. Of course, I am taking as given what has been amply demonstrated above, namely, that the history of long time-spans has now carried the day and tends to occupy the entire field of historical studies.

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In taking up once more the plea for the long time-span from the viewpoint of the fate of the event, I will attempt to find in it an expansion-one characteristic of history-of the dialectic between the configuration of time by narrative composition and the temporal prefigurations of practical lived experience.
為了這個論證，我將再次依靠法國史學。當然，我已經接受了上面充分證明的內容，即長時段的歷史現在已經佔了上風，並傾向於佔據歷史研究的整個領域。在從事件的命運的角度重新提出長時段的論點時，我將嘗試在其中找到一種擴展——這是歷史的一個特徵——即敘事構成對時間的配置與實踐性生活經驗的時間前構形之間的辯證關係。

Let us first recall what the “mythic” configuration-in the Aristotelian sense of the term—makes of the event. We remember the epistemological and ontological postulates related to the notion of event. Let us leave aside for the moment the ontological postulates, which we shall return to in volume 2 when I discuss the reference of history to the past. Let us restrict ourselves to the epistemological postulates implicit in the current use of the term “event” -singularity, contingency, deviation-and let us attempt to reformulate them in terms of my theory of plot, as presented under the heading of mimesis

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. This reformulation proceeds from the major connection between event and narrative through the plot. As was shown above, the events themselves receive an intelligibility derived from their contribution to the development of the plot. As a result, the notions of singularity, contingency, and deviation have to be seriously modified.
讓我們首先回顧亞里士多德意義上的"神話"配置對事件的理解。我們記得與事件概念相關的認識論和本體論假設。現在暫且擱置本體論假設，我們將在第 2 卷中討論歷史對過去的指涉。讓我們專注於"事件"一詞當前使用中隱含的認識論假設——特殊性、偶然性、偏離——並嘗試用我在模仿（mimesis）項下提出的情節理論重新闡述這些假設。這種重新闡述源於事件與敘事通過情節的主要聯繫。如上所示，事件本身獲得的可理解性來自它們對情節發展的貢獻。因此，特殊性、偶然性和偏離的概念必須被嚴重修正。

Plots, in fact, are in themselves both singular and nonsingular. They speak of events that occur only in this particular plot, but there are types of plot that universalize the event.
事實上，情節本身既是特殊的又是非特殊的。它們講述僅在此特定情節中發生的事件，但也有能夠普遍化事件的情節類型。

In addition, plots combine contingency and probability, even necessity. Like the peripeteia in Arisotle’s Poetics, events occur by surprise, changing, for example, good fortune into bad. But the plot makes contingency itself a component of what Gallie rightly calls the followability of the story. And, as Louis O. Mink has noted, it is really in the case of re-telling a story-reading the story backward from its conclusion to its beginning-that we understand things had to “turn out” as they did.
此外，情節結合了偶然性和或然性，甚至必然性。就像亞里士多德《詩學》中的轉折點一樣，事件出人意料地發生，例如將好運轉變為厄運。但情節使偶然性本身成為加利（Gallie）稱之為故事可追隨性的組成部分。正如路易斯·O·明克（Louis O. Mink）指出的，真正理解事情不得不"如此發展"，是在重新講述故事時——從結局向開始倒推故事。

Plots, finally, combine submission to paradigms with deviation from the es-
最後，情節結合了對範式的服從和對已建立模式的偏離。
tablished models. The emplotment process oscillates between servile conformity with respect to the narrative tradition and rebellion with respect to any paradigm received from that tradition. Between these two extremes lies the entire range of combinations involving sedimentation and invention. Events, in this regard, follow the fate of the plot. They too follow the rule and break it, their genesis oscillating from side to side of the median point of “rulegoverned deformation.”
既定模型。就業過程在敘事傳統的奴性順從和對該傳統接收的任何範式的反叛之間擺盪。在這兩個極端之間，存在著涉及沉澱和發明的所有組合。就事件而言，它們遵循情節的命運。它們也遵循規則並打破規則，其生成在"規則支配的變形"的中位點的兩側擺盪。

Thus, due to the fact that they are narrated, events are singular and typical, contingent and expected, deviant and dependent on paradigms, even if this is in the ironic mode.
因此，由於被敘述，事件是奇特且典型的，偶然且預期的，異常且依賴於範式，即使這是以諷刺的方式。

My thesis is that historical events do not differ radically from the events framed by a plot. The indirect derivation of the structures of history starting from the basic structures of narrative, a derivation established in the preceding sections, allows us to think that it is possible, through the appropriate procedures of derivation, to extend to the notion of historical event the reformulation of the concepts of singularity, contingency, and absolute deviation imposed by the notion of emplotted event.
我的論點是，歷史事件與情節框架的事件並無根本不同。從敘事的基本結構開始間接推導歷史的結構，如前幾節所建立的，讓我們可以通過適當的推導程序，將情節事件概念所施加的奇特性、或然性和絕對偏差的重新表述擴展到歷史事件的概念。

I would like to return to Fernand Braudel’s work, despite-or even because of-the case made there against the history of events, in order to show in what sense the very notion of the history of a long time-span derives from the dramatic event in the sense just stated, that is, in the sense of the emplotted event.
儘管——或者正是因為——費爾南·布勞岱爾的作品中提出了反對事件史的論點，我仍想回到他的工作，以展示長時段史的概念本身如何源自戲劇性事件，也就是剛才所述的情節事件意義上的事件。

I will start from the indisputable achievement of the Braudelian methodology, namely, the idea of the plurality of social times. The “dissecting of history into various planes,” to employ the terms of the Preface to the The Mediterranean (p. 21), remains a major contribution to the theory of narrative time. The method of questioning back must therefore start from here. We must ask ourselves what enables us to make the very distinction between a “history whose passage is imperceptible,” a history “of slow but perceptible rhythms” (p. 20), and a history “on the scale . . . of individual men” (p. 21), namely, that history of events which the history of the long time-span is to dethrone.
我將從布勞德爾方法論的不可爭議成就開始，即社會時間的多元性思想。在《地中海》序言中使用的術語，即"將歷史解剖成不同層面"，仍然是敘事時間理論的重大貢獻。因此，追溯問題的方法必須從此處開始。我們必須問自己，是什麼使我們能夠區分"不可察覺的歷史"、"緩慢但可察覺的節奏的歷史"（第 20 頁）和"以個人尺度"（第 21 頁）的歷史，即那些長時段歷史要顛覆的事件史。

It seems to me that the answer is to be sought in the principle of unity which, despite the separation into different spans of time, holds the three parts of Braudel’s work together. The reader cannot be content with merely recognizing the right of each of these parts to exist by itself-each part, the Preface states, “is itself an essay in general explanation” (p. 20). This is all the more incumbent in that the title of the work, by its twofold reference-on the one hand to the Mediterranean, on the other to Philip II-invites its readers to ask themselves in what way the long span of time brings about the transition between structure and event. To understand this mediation performed by the long time-span is, in my opinion, to recognize the plot-like character of the whole that is constituted by the three parts of the work.
在我看來，答案應該在於統一原則，儘管被分成不同的時間跨度，但這仍然將布勞德爾作品的三個部分連結在一起。讀者不能僅僅承認每個部分獨立存在的權利——序言指出，每個部分"本身就是一個總體解釋的嘗試"（第 20 頁）。尤其是該作品的標題，通過其雙重引用——一方面是地中海，另一方面是腓力二世——邀請讀者思考長時段如何實現結構與事件之間的過渡。理解長時段所執行的中介，在我看來，就是認識作品三個部分所構成的整體的情節性特徵。

I would like to base my interpretation not on the declarations concerning method collected in the work On History, but on a patient reading of The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (in the 1976 French third edition).

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This reading reveals the important role of the transitional structures that ensure the overall coherence of the work. These structures, in turn, allow us to consider the arrangement of the entire work in terms of its quasi-plot.
我希望不是根據在《歷史》一書中收集的方法宣言，而是通過耐心閱讀《腓力二世時代的地中海及地中海世界》（1976 年法文第三版）來解讀。這種閱讀揭示了確保作品整體連貫性的過渡性結構的重要角色。這些結構反過來使我們能夠從準情節的角度考慮整部作品的安排。

By transitional structure, I mean all the procedures of analysis and exposition that result in a work’s having to be read both forward and backward. In this regard, I would be prepared to say that if the first part itself retains a historical character despite the predominance of geography, this is by virtue of all the elements that point to the second and third parts and set the stage upon which the characters and drama of the rest of the work will be played out. The second part is devoted to the long time-span, properly speaking, and serves to hold the two poles together: the Mediterranean, the referent of the first part, and Philip II, the referent of the third. In this sense it constitutes both a distinct object and a transitional structure. It is this last function that makes it interdependent with the two parts that frame it.
所謂過渡性結構，我指的是所有分析和闡述的程序，這些程序使作品必須正向和反向閱讀。在這方面，我準備說，如果第一部分儘管地理因素佔主導，但仍保留歷史特徵，這是因為所有指向第二和第三部分的元素，為作品其餘部分的角色和戲劇搭建了舞台。第二部分專門討論長時間跨度，恰當地將兩個極點連接在一起：第一部分的參照物是地中海，第三部分的參照物是腓力二世。在這個意義上，它既是一個獨特的對象，又是一個過渡性結構。正是這最後一個功能使其與框架它的兩部分相互依存。

Let me demonstrate this in some detail.
讓我詳細闡述這一點。
Consider the first level, whose theme seems to be space rather than time. What is immobile is the Inland Sea. And everything he writes about is already part of a history of the Mediterranean.

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For example, the first three chapters are devoted to this landlocked sea. They refer to inhabited or uninhabitable spaces, including watery plains. Humans are everywhere present and with them a swarm of symptomatic events. The mountains appear as a refuge and a shelter for free people. As for the coastal plains, they are not mentioned without a reference to colonization, to the work of draining them, of improving the soil, the dissemination of populations, displacements of all sorts: migrations, nomadism, invasions.

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Here, now, are the waters, their coastlines, and their islands. They, too, enter into this geohistory on the scale of human beings and their navigation. The waters are there to be discovered, explored, traveled. Even on this first level, it is not possible to speak of them without mentioning relations of economic and political dominance (Venice, Genoa). The great conflicts between the Spanish and Turkish empires already cast their shadows over the seascape. And with these power struggles, events are already taking shape.

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考慮第一層次，其主題似乎是空間而非時間。不動的是內海。他所寫的一切都已經是地中海歷史的一部分。

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例如，前三章專門論述這片封閉的海域。他們提到了居住或不可居住的空間，包括水域平原。人類無處不在，伴隨著大量的症狀性事件。山脈出現為自由人提供庇護所和避難所。至於沿海平原，提及時不會缺少對殖民化、排水、改良土壤、人口擴散、各種遷移的參考：遷徙、遊牧、入侵。

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現在，是水域、海岸線和島嶼。它們也進入了以人類及其航行為尺度的地理歷史。水域是用於被發現、探索、航行的。即使在這第一層次，談論它們時也無法不提及經濟和政治統治的關係（威尼斯、熱那亞）。西班牙和土耳其帝國之間的重大衝突已經在海景上投下陰影。隨著這些權力鬥爭，事件已經開始成形。

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Thus, the second level is not only implied but actually anticipated in the first: geohistory is rapidly transformed into geopolitics. In fact, the first part is essentially concerned with establishing the polarity between the Turkish and Spanish empires.

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Maritime zones are from the very beginning political zones.

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Our view may try to concentrate on the silent life of the islands, their slow rhythm of ancient and new. But global history never ceases to come ashore on these islands and to link the peninsulas,

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so “political supremacy passed from one peninsula to another and along with it supremacy in other
因此，第二層次不僅被暗示，而且實際上已在第一層次被預期：地理歷史迅速轉變為地緣政治。事實上，第一部分基本上致力於建立土耳其和西班牙帝國之間的極性。

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海域從一開始就是政治領域。

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我們的視角可能試圖集中於島嶼的寂靜生活，它們古老與新生的緩慢節奏。但全球歷史從未停止登陸這些島嶼，並連接半島，

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因此「政治統治從一個半島傳遞到另一個，同時也傳遞了其他方面的統治」
fields, economic and cultural” (p. 166). Geography has so little autonomy that the boundaries of the space considered are continually redrawn by history.

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The Mediterranean is measured by its sphere of influence. The phenomenon of trade is, in the same stroke, already implied. The Mediterranean space must be extended as far as the Sahara and to the European isthmuses. Braudel does not shy from stating right in the middle of his first part: “It is worth repeating that history is not made by geographical features, but by the men who control or discover them” (p. 225). Thus the final chapter of the first level openly leads from a physical unity to that human unity “with which this book is concerned” (p. 276). Consider human labor (“The different regions of the Mediterranean are connected not by the water, but by the peoples of the sea” [ibid.]), it produces a space-in-motion made of roads, markets, and trade. This is why it is necessary to speak of banks and of industrialism and trading families, and especially of cities, whose appearance changes the face of the land.

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地理不過是經濟和文化的「領域」（第 166 頁）。地理幾乎沒有自主性，因此被歷史不斷重新劃定空間的邊界。地中海是通過其影響範圍來衡量的。貿易現象在此已經隱含其中。地中海空間必須延伸至撒哈拉和歐洲地峽。布勞岱爾直率地在第一部分中陳述：「值得重複的是，歷史不是由地理特徵製成，而是由控制或發現它們的人製成」（第 225 頁）。因此，第一層的最後一章公開地從物理統一引向人類統一「這本書所關注的」（第 276 頁）。考慮人類勞動（「地中海不同地區並非由水相連，而是由海上人民相連」【同上】），它創造了一個由道路、市場和貿易組成的運動中的空間。這就是為什麼有必要談論銀行、工業主義和貿易家族，尤其是城市，它們的出現改變了土地的面貌。

The second level is, of course, the one where the historian of the long timespan finds himself most at home. But the extent to which this level, considered in itself, lacks coherence must be noted. Oscillating between the sphere of structure and the sphere of conjuncture, it places three competing systems of organization on stage: that of economic conjuncture, in overall expansion; that of the political implications of the physical and geographical relations, as observed in the mobile polarity of Spain and Turkey; and that of civilizations. These three systems do not correspond exactly, and this perhaps explains the increasing temptation, from one edition to the next, to give in to the unifying materialism of the economic conjuncture.
第二層當然是長時段歷史學家最感到自在的領域。但必須注意，這一層本身缺乏連貫性。在結構領域和短期波動領域之間擺盪，它將三種競爭的組織系統置於舞台：整體擴張的經濟短期波動系統；西班牙和土耳其的物理和地理關係的政治含義；以及文明系統。這三個系統並不完全對應，這也許解釋了從一個版本到下一個版本，越來越傾向於投降於經濟短期波動的統一唯物主義。

Already under the title of “economies” - the first system of organizationrelatively disparate problems are considered: the constraints of space and of the number of people with respect to the governing of the empires, the role of the influx of precious metals, monetary phenomena and the evolution of prices, and finally, trade and transportation. As he is setting up this first system, Braudel raises, with ever increasing emphasis, the question of the specific level at which the totalizing factor, if there is one, is to be located: “Can the model of the Mediterranean economy be constructed?” Yes, if a content can be given to the notion of a “world-economy,” considered as an “internally coherent zone” (p. 419) despite its uncertain and variable limits. But this is a risky endeavor, because of a lack of monetary standards by which to draw up an account of all the exchanges. In addition, a flurry of dated events concerning the four corners of the quadrilateral Genoa-Milan-Venice-Florence, as well as the history of the other marketplaces, confirms the fact that level three continually merges with level two. And the growth of states, joined to that of capitalism, makes the long history of economies repeatedly fall back upon the history of events.

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Discussing trade and transportation, Braudel reiterates his purpose: “My intention is . . . to discover a general pattern” (p. 542). But the
已經在"經濟"的標題下 - 首次考慮了相對分散的問題：帝國統治方面空間和人數的限制，貴金屬流入的作用，貨幣現象和物價演變，以及最後的貿易和運輸。在建立這個第一個系統時，布勞德爾越來越強調一個特定層次的問題，即如果存在一個全面性因素，它將位於何處："地中海經濟模型是否可以構建？"如果可以給"世界經濟"的概念一個內容，並將其視為一個"內部一致的區域"（第 419 頁），儘管其界限不確定且可變。但這是一個冒險的嘗試，因為缺乏可用於核算所有交易的貨幣標準。此外，關於四角形熱那亞-米蘭-威尼斯-佛羅倫斯的大量日期事件，以及其他市場的歷史，證實了第三層次不斷與第二層次融合。國家的成長，加上資本主義的發展，使經濟的長期歷史反覆回歸到事件的歷史。討論貿易和運輸時，布勞德爾重申他的目的："我的意圖是……發現一個普遍模式"（第 542 頁）。但是
pepper trade, the wheat crisis, the invasion of the Mediterranean by ships from the Atlantic, oblige him to cover a great number of events (the history of Portuguese pepper, the Welser and Fugger agreements, the struggle between competing routes) and at the same time to go beyond the appearances of the narrative.

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The balances and the crises touching Mediterranean wheat- “the vicissitudes of the grain trade” (p. 584) -the arrival of Atlantic sailing ships, which becomes an invasion-these are so many dates (“How the Dutch took Seville after 1570 without firing a shot” [p. 636]). The historian never manages to put events behind him as he moves in the direction of general economics, of the dynamic of world-economies, which are assigned the task of explaining events on the scale of the one I have just mentioned.
胡椒貿易、小麥危機、大西洋船隻入侵地中海，迫使他涵蓋大量事件（葡萄牙胡椒史、韋爾瑟和富格爾協議、競爭路線之爭）並同時超越敘事表象。地中海小麥的平衡與危機——「糧食貿易的變遷」（第 584 頁）——大西洋帆船的到來，逐漸發展成入侵——這些都是重要的日期（「荷蘭人如何在 1570 年後不費一槍一彈就佔領塞維爾」【第 636 頁】）。歷史學家永遠無法將事件拋在身後，因為他朝向總體經濟、世界經濟動態的方向前進，這些被賦予解釋我剛才提到的規模事件的任務。

And the second level must also make room for other principles of organization: empires, societies, civilizations. It sometimes seems that empires provide the fabric of history: “The story of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century is in the first place a story of dramatic political growth, with the leviathans taking their positions” (p. 660), the Ottomans to the east, the Hapsburgs to the west. The characters-Charles V, Sulaiman-are accidents, of course, but not their empires. Without denying individuals and circumstances, attention must instead be directed to the conjuncture persistently favorable to vast empires, with the economic ascendancy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and, more generally, to the factors favorable or unfavorable to the vast political formations which are seen to rise and to begin to decline in the sixteenth century.

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It can well be said that Iberian unity is in the air, implied by the very meaning of the conjuncture, and along with it the creation of an imperial mystique, one of conquest and expansion in the direction, first, of Africa and, then, of America. But, in the face of events on the scale of the conquest of Constantinople, then of Syria, and finally of Egypt by the Turks, how hard it is not to exclaim: “surely the major event!” (p. 667). How can one fail to give life to characters as imposing as Charles V and Philip II, even if it can be written that “Philip II’s withdrawal to Spain was a tactical withdrawal towards American silver” (p. 676). This does not keep the historian from expressing regret Philip II did not move his capital to Lisbon rather than shutting himself up in Madrid. If, despite everything, the long time-span wins out, this is inasmuch as the fates of states and of economies are mutually related. In opposition to Schumpeter, who overemphasizes the economy, one must place an equal weight on politics and on its institutions.

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But politics cannot be discussed without discussing the agents of its greatness, legislators and their venality, the financial difficulties of the state, fiscal wars. The political enterprise has its actors.
第二層級也必須為其他組織原則騰出空間：帝國、社會、文明。有時似乎帝國提供了歷史的織品：「16 世紀地中海的故事首先是戲劇性政治成長的故事，群獸正在佔據他們的位置」（第 660 頁），東方的鄂圖曼帝國，西方的哈布斯堡王朝。人物如查爾斯五世、蘇萊曼是意外，但他們的帝國不是。不否認個人和情況，注意力必須轉向持續有利於龐大帝國的契機，伴隨著 15 和 16 世紀的經濟優勢，更廣泛地說，對有利或不利於在 16 世紀興起和開始衰落的龐大政治形態的因素。可以說伊比利亞的統一已在空氣中，由契機的意義所暗示，連同帝國神秘感的創造，一種征服和擴張的感覺，首先朝向非洲，然後朝向美洲。但是，面對君士坦丁堡、敘利亞，最後是埃及被土耳其人征服的事件規模，怎能不驚呼：「這確實是重大事件！」（第 667 頁）如何不賦予查爾斯五世和菲利普二世等如此威嚴的人物生命，即使可以寫道「菲利普二世撤退到西班牙是朝向美洲白銀的策略性撤退」（第 676 頁）。這並不妨礙歷史學家表示遺憾菲利普二世沒有將首都遷至里斯本，而是將自己封閉在馬德里。儘管如此，長時段最終勝出，這是因為國家和經濟的命運是相互關聯的。與過分強調經濟的熊彼特相反，必須對政治及其制度給予同等的重視。

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但是不討論政治就無法討論其偉大的代理人、立法者及其貪污、國家的財政困難、財政戰爭。政治企業有其行動者。

Once again, neither economies nor empires occupy the entire stage of the second level. Civilizations are also to be considered: “Of all the complex and contradictory faces of the Mediterranean world, its civilizations are the most perplexing” (p. 757), so fraternal and so exclusive are they, mobile and per-
再次，無論是經濟還是帝國都不佔據第二層的整個舞台。文明也必須被考慮：「在地中海世界複雜而矛盾的各個面向中，其文明最令人困惑」（第 757 頁），它們是如此友愛卻又如此排他，流動且
manent, ready to spread their influence and determined not to borrow from the outside. Spain has its Baroque. The Counter-Reformation is its Reformation: “The refusal then was deliberate and categorical” (p. 768). In order to express these “areas of astonishing permanence,” Braudel has a magnificent description: “a civilization exists fundamentally in a geographical area which has been structured by men and history. That is why there are cultural frontiers and cultural zones of amazing permanence: all the cross-fertilization in the world will not alter them” (p. 770). Mortal? Of course, civilizations are mortal, but “their foundations remain. They are not indestructible, but they are many times more solid than one might imagine. They have withstood a thousand supposed deaths, their massive bulk unmoved by the monotonous pounding of the centuries” (pp. 775-76). However yet another factor intervenes. Civilizations are many, and it is out of their points of contact, of friction, and of conflict that once again events are born. Even if the Hispanic world’s refusal of any mixing is the cause, “the slow shipwreck of Islam on the Iberian Peninsula” (p. 781) has to be recounted, along with the “drama of Grenada,” and even the survivals and infiltrations that allow us to speak of “the aftermath of Grenada” (p. 792), until its destruction.

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Next, the fate of the Jews has to be dealt with by means of the same schema, with a parallel being drawn between the stubbornness of the Marranos and that of the Moriscos. But, here again, we must follow the train of events back until we grasp the hidden connection between Jewish martyrdom and the movement of the conjuncture: “The chief culprit was the general recession of the western world” (p. 820). The date 1492 thus loses a bit of its dark splendor when it is placed at the end of a period of slow regression. Even the moral condemnation is found to be, if not weakened, at least nuanced.

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The long conjunctures of civilizations are intertwined with those of economies. It remains that the rejection of Islam and of Judaism attests to the specificity of civilizations in relation to economies. Finally, and especially, without returning to the history of battles, forms of warfare have to be placed on the level of long time-span phenomena. And yet events must also be included if we are to appreciate the forms of war, to weigh the cost-the ruin of empires-and, in particular, to discern in war itself the very test of the longevity of civilizations. Opposing ideological conjunctures that present themselves and then are replaced allow us to give their relative weight to events such as the battle of Lepanto, which was grossly overestimated by its protagonists and eyewitnesses. These superimposed conjunctures, the bearers of events, mark on land and on sea the collision of economies, empires, societies, and civilizations. This competition between several principles of organization operating on the second level has not escaped Braudel. At the end of the second part - and in later editions-he weighs the pros and cons of a history governed by economic conjuncture alone or instead by a series of numerous conjunctures: for there is not one conjuncture but several. There is not even one economic conjuncture but a
永恆的，準備擴散其影響力，並決心不向外界借鑒。西班牙有其巴洛克風格。反宗教改革是其改革：「當時的拒絕是故意且絕對的」（第 768 頁）。為了表達這些「驚人的永恆區域」，布勞岱爾有一段精彩的描述：「文明基本上存在於被人類和歷史所構造的地理區域中。這就是為什麼有文化邊界和令人驚嘆的永恆文化區域：無論多少跨文化交融都不會改變它們」（第 770 頁）。必死的？當然，文明是必死的，但「其基礎仍然存在。它們並非不可摧毀，但比人們想像的更加堅固。它們已經經歷了無數次被認為的死亡，其龐大的體量不受數世紀單調的衝擊」（第 775-76 頁）。然而，另一個因素又介入了。文明是多樣的，正是從它們的接觸點、摩擦和衝突中再次孕育出事件。即使西班牙世界拒絕任何混合，「伊斯蘭教在伊比利亞半島的緩慢沉沒」（第 781 頁）也必須被追述，連同「格拉納達的戲劇」，甚至那些讓我們談論「格拉納達的餘波」（第 792 頁）的生存和滲透，直到其毀滅。接下來，猶太人的命運必須以相同的模式處理，在馬拉諾人的固執和摩里斯科人的固執之間畫一個平行線。但是，在這裡，我們必須追溯事件的軌跡，直到我們把握住猶太人受難與大勢變遷之間的隱藏聯繫：「主要罪魁禍首是西方世界的普遍衰退」（第 820 頁）。因此，1492 年這個日期失去了一些其黑暗的輝煌，當它被放置在一個緩慢衰退的時期末尾。即使是道德譴責，也發現不是被削弱，就是被稍微調和了。文明的長期連結與經濟的連結交織在一起。拒絕伊斯蘭教和猶太教證明了文明與經濟之間的特殊性。最後，特別是在不回顧戰爭歷史的情況下，戰爭形式必須放在長期現象的層面上。然而，為了評估戰爭形式，衡量成本——帝國的毀滅——尤其是為了辨別戰爭本身對文明的持久性的考驗，事件也必須被納入。呈現並被取代的對立意識形態連結，讓我們能夠衡量勒班陀海戰等事件的相對權重，這一戰役被其參與者和目擊者嚴重誇大。這些重疊的連結作為事件的載體，標誌著經濟、帝國、社會和文明在陸地和海洋上的碰撞。這種在第二層面運作的多種組織原則之間的競爭並未逃過布勞岱爾的眼睛。在第二部分結尾——以及後來的版本中——他權衡了僅由經濟連結或由眾多連結系列決定的歷史利弊：因為不僅有一種連結，甚至不僅有一種經濟連結，而是
secular “trend” (the limit of its ebb and flow has a different date from one edition to the next) and an entire hierarchy of long, semi-long, and short conjunctures. But, most of all, it must be admitted that cultural conjunctures can only with the greatest difficulty be superimposed on economic conjunctures, even on the secular “trend.” Did not the Spanish golden age continue to flower after the greatest secular upheaval? How can these late-season flowerings be explained? The historian hesitates. Despite the sirens of the economic conjuncture, he admits that history once again becomes multiple, uncertain; perhaps it is the whole that will slip through our fingers.
世俗的「趨勢」（其漲落的極限從一個版本到另一個版本都有不同的日期）以及一整個長期、中期和短期週期的層級。但是，最重要的是，必須承認文化週期只能以極大的困難被疊加在經濟週期之上，甚至是世俗的「趨勢」。西班牙的黃金時代豈不是在最大的世俗動盪之後仍繼續盛開？這些晚季節的開花如何解釋？歷史學家猶豫不決。儘管經濟週期的誘惑，他承認歷史再次變得多元、不確定；也許整體將從我們的手指間溜走。

Everything, then, in the first two parts conspires to crown the edifice with a history of events that puts on stage “politics and people.” This third part of the work is by no means a concession to traditional history. In a total history stable structures and slow evolutions perhaps constitute the essential part, but “they cannot provide the total picture” (p. 901). Why? First, because events provide testimony of the deep-seated, underlying movements of history. As we saw, the first two parts make frequent use of these “ephemera of history” (ibid.), which are at one and the same time symptoms and testimonies. The great historian is not afraid of stating here: “I am by no means the sworn enemy of the event” (ibid.). But there is another reason, namely, that events raise the problem of their coherence at their own level. Braudel himself gives a twofold justification for the inevitable selection that this level of explanation requires. On the one hand, the historian retains only important events, those that have been made important by their consequences. Without naming it, Braudel encounters here the problem of singular causal explanation as it was posed by Weber and Aron, with its logic of retrodiction and its search for “adequation.”

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On the other hand, the historian cannot ignore the judgment made by contemporaries concerning the importance of events, under pain of failing to take into account the way in which people of the past interpreted their history. (Braudel mentions in this regard the turning point that the Saint Bartholomew’s Eve massacre represents for the French.) These interpretations, too, are part of the historical object.
在前兩部分中，一切都旨在用一部描述「政治與人民」的事件史來頂峰建築。這部作品的第三部分絕非對傳統歷史的讓步。在總體歷史中，穩定的結構和緩慢的演變也許構成了本質部分，但「它們無法提供總體圖景」（第 901 頁）。為什麼？首先，因為事件提供了歷史深層、潛在運動的見證。正如我們所見，前兩部分頻繁使用這些「歷史的短暫之物」（同上），它們同時是症狀和見證。偉大的歷史學家毫不畏懼地說：「我絕非事件的死敵」（同上）。但還有另一個原因，即事件在自身層面提出了它們的連貫性問題。布勞岱爾自己對這一解釋層面不可避免的選擇給出了雙重理由。一方面，歷史學家只保留重要的事件，那些因其後果而變得重要的事件。不指名道姓地，布勞岱爾在此遇到了韋伯和阿倫提出的特殊因果解釋問題，其邏輯是追溯和尋求「適當性」。另一方面，歷史學家不能忽視當代人對事件重要性的判斷，否則將無法考慮過去的人們如何解讀自身歷史。（布勞岱爾在這方面提到了聖巴托羅繆屠殺對法國的轉折點。）這些解釋也是歷史對象的一部分。

It thus becomes impossible to make these two series coincide, the series of economic conjunctures and that of political events in the broad sense, the series of events that contemporaries chose to consider most significant, especially in a century in which, despite everything, politics led the way. These two series still leave great gaps between them that were, we saw, filled by the history of empires, of societies, of civilizations, and of war itself.

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因此，這兩個系列無法重合，經濟形勢的系列和政治事件的系列在廣義上，特別是在一個儘管如此仍以政治為主導的世紀中，同時代人選擇視為最重要的事件。這兩個系列仍然在之間留下很大的空白，正如我們所見，這些空白由帝國史、社會史、文明史，以及戰爭本身的歷史所填補。

Braudel’s art, here, is to structure his history of events-and his history is not lacking in dates, battles, and treaties-not by dividing them into periods, as all historians do, but by reanchoring them in structures and conjunctures, just as he had previously called upon events in order to attest to the structures and conjunctures. Here the event gathers up and draws together the conjunctures and structures: “In Philip II the strengths and weaknesses of the em-
布勞德爾的藝術在於，不是像所有歷史學家那樣將事件史劃分為不同時期，而是將它們重新定位於結構和形勢中，就像他之前曾呼籲事件來證明結構和形勢一樣。在這裡，事件匯集並聯繫起形勢和結構："在腓力二世身上，帝國的力量和弱點是具體體現的"（第 1023 頁）。
pire were incarnate” (p. 1023). What structures this political history is the sort of “physics of international relations which in the sixteenth century was busy establishing the necessary compensations between the major war fronts along which Turkish power impinged upon the outside world” (p. 1166). A vast shift of power occurs when Philip’s empire turns toward the Atlantic and America. Then “Spain leaves the Mediterranean” (p. 1184). At the same time, the Mediterranean steps outside the spotlight of global history.

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這種政治史的結構是一種在 16 世紀致力於建立土耳其力量在全球各大戰線上必要平衡的"國際關係物理學"（第 1166 頁）。當腓力的帝國轉向大西洋和美洲時，一個巨大的權力轉移發生了。然後"西班牙離開了地中海"（第 1184 頁）。同時，地中海退出了全球歷史的聚光燈。

If this is indeed the history that is being recounted, why was it necessary to conclude with such sumptuous pages on the death of Philip II on September 13, 1598? From the viewpoint of the total history of the Mediterranean, this death is not a great event.

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But it was an event of the greatest magnitude for all the protagonists “at the end of a long reign that to his adversaries had seemed interminable” (p. 1235). Have we not said that the perspective of contemporaries is also an object for history? Perhaps we ought to go even further-and this remark may well throw into question the beautiful balance of the three parts-and say that death reveals an individual destiny which does not fit exactly within the framework of an explanation that itself is not scaled to of the measurements of mortal time.

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And without death as it seals a destiny such as this, could we still know that history is human history?
如果這確實是正在被追述的歷史，為什麼要以如此華麗的篇幅結束描述菲利普二世在 1598 年 9 月 13 日的死亡？從地中海總體歷史的角度來看，這並不是一個重大事件。但對於所有的主角們來說，這是一個最重要的事件，"在一個對其敵人看似無盡的長期統治結束之際"（第 1235 頁）。我們豈不是說當代人的視角也是歷史的一個研究對象？也許我們應該更進一步——這個備註可能會質疑三部分的美麗平衡——說死亡揭示了一個無法完全融入解釋框架的個人命運，而這個解釋本身並不符合凡人時間的尺度。若沒有這樣封印命運的死亡，我們還能知道歷史是人類的歷史嗎？

I now come to my second thesis, namely, that it is together that the work’s three levels constitute a quasi-plot, a plot in the broad sense used by Paul Veyne.
現在我要闡述我的第二個論點，即這部作品的三個層次共同構成了一個準情節，一個保羅·維納所使用的廣義情節。

It would be a mistake to limit the kinship between this text and the narrative model of emplotment to just the third level. To do so would be to miss the major contribution of this work, which is to open up a new career for the very notion of plot, and, in this, for that of event.
將這段文字與敘事模型的情節關係僅限於第三層次，這將是一個錯誤。這樣做將會忽略這部作品的主要貢獻，即為情節概念本身開闢一個新的路徑，同時也為事件概念開闢了新的路徑。

Nor am I prepared to look for this new form of plot in the middle level alone, although certain statements by Braudel himself suggest doing this. Does he not speak of the récitatif de la conjuncture, the conjuncture narrative? What might serve as a plot in the economic history is its cyclical character and the role that is played by the notion of crisis.

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The double movement of growth and decline thus represents a complete intercycle, measured by the time of Europe and more or less by that of the entire world. The third, as yet untranslated, volume of Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century, entitled Le Temps du Monde, is built entirely upon this vision of the rise and decline of world economies, in accordance with the slow rhythms of conjuncture. The notion of a “trend” tends, then, to take the place of that of a plot.

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我並不準備僅在中間層面尋找這種新形式的情節，儘管布勞德爾本人的某些陳述建議這樣做。他不是談到了「共同運動的敘事」嗎？在經濟史中可以作為情節的是其週期性特徵和危機概念所扮演的角色。

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成長和衰退的雙重運動代表了一個完整的跨週期，以歐洲的時間和或多或少整個世界的時間來衡量。《文明與資本主義：15-18 世紀》的第三卷，尚未翻譯，題為《世界的時間》，完全建立在這種世界經濟興衰的願景之上，符合共同運動的緩慢節奏。因此，「趨勢」概念往往取代了情節概念。

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Nevertheless, I am not inclined to restrict myself to this equation, not only because it does just as much violence to the notion of cycle as to that of plot but also because it does not account for what occurs in the work at these three levels. Economic history lends itself to a plot when an initial term and a final
然而，我不傾向於局限於這個等式，不僅因為它對週期概念和情節概念同樣暴力，而且因為它無法解釋在這三個層面上作品中發生的事情。當選擇了初始項和最終項，並且這些項由共同運動史以外的類別提供時，經濟史就會呈現出一種情節。
term are chosen, and these are provided by categories other than conjunctural history itself, which, in principle, is endless, unlimited in the strict sense. A plot has to include not only an intelligible order but a magnitude that cannot be too vast, or it will be unable to be embraced by our eye, as Aristotle stresses in the Poetics (51a1). What frames the plot of the Mediterranean? We may say without hesitation: the decline of the Mediterranean as a collective hero on the stage of world history. The end of the plot, in this regard, is not the death of Philip II. It is the end of the conflict between the two political leviathans and the shift of history toward the Atlantic and Northern Europe.
共同運動史原則上是無止境的，是嚴格意義上的無限。一個情節必須包含不僅是一個可理解的秩序，還有一個不能過於龐大的規模，否則無法被我們的眼睛所把握，正如亞里士多德在《詩學》中強調的（51a1）。地中海的情節是什麼？我們可以毫不猶豫地說：作為世界歷史舞台上的集體主角的地中海的衰落。在這方面，情節的結束不是腓力二世的死亡。而是兩個政治利維坦之間衝突的結束，以及歷史向大西洋和北歐的轉移。

All three levels contribute to this overall plot. But whereas a novelistTolstoy in War and Peace-would have combined all three together in a single narrative, Braudel proceeds analytically, by separating planes, leaving to the interferences that occur between them the task of producing an implicit image of the whole. In this way a virtual quasi-plot is obtained, which itself is split into several subplots, and these, although explicit, remain partial and in this sense abstract.
所有這三個層次都為整體情節做出貢獻。但是，與托爾斯泰在《戰爭與和平》中會將所有三個層次融合在單一敘事中不同，布勞德爾採取分析的方式，通過分開各個平面，留給它們之間的相互作用產生一個隱含的整體圖像。這樣，一個虛擬的準情節就被獲得，它本身又被分割成幾個子情節，而這些子情節，儘管是明確的，但仍然是部分的，在這個意義上是抽象的。

The work is placed as a whole under the heading of the mimesis of action by the continual reminder that “history is not made by geographical features but by the men who control or discover them” (The Mediterranean, p. 225). In this respect, the history of conjunctures cannot by itself constitute a plot. Even on the plane of economics, several different economies-or, more precisely, the antagonisms of two economic worlds-have to be placed together. I have already quoted this passage from Part I: “Politics merely followed the outline of an underlying reality. These two Mediterraneans, commanded by warring rulers, were physically, economically, and culturally different from each other. Each was a separate historical zone” (p. 137). With one stroke, the fabric of the plot is already suggested: the great opposition between the two Mediterraneans and the decline of their conflict.

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If this is indeed the history Braudel is narrating, then it is understandable that its second level-which is supposed to be entirely devoted to the long time-span-requires beyond its overview of economies the addition of the physics of international relations that alone governs the subplot of the conflict between empires and the fate of this conflict. In its ascending phases, “The story of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century is in the first place a story of dramatic political growth, with the leviathans taking up their positions” (p. 660). In addition, high stakes are involved: will the Atlantic belong to the Reformation or to the Spanish? When Turks and Spaniards turn their backs on one another at the same time, the narrative voice inquires: in the Mediterranean, earlier than elsewhere, does not the hour toll for the decline of empires? The question is necessary, for, as in drama, reversal brings with it contingency, that is to say, events that could have turned out differently: “The decline of the Mediterranean, some will say: with reason. But it was more than that. For Spain had every opportunity to turn wholeheartedly towards the Atlantic. Why did
工作是作為整體放置在動作模仿的標題下，通過持續提醒「歷史不是由地理特徵製造，而是由控制或發現它們的人所製造」（《地中海》，第 225 頁）。在這方面，事件組合的歷史本身無法構成一個情節。即使在經濟層面，幾個不同的經濟體──或更準確地說，兩個經濟世界的對立──必須被放置在一起。我已經引用了第 I 部分的這段文字：「政治只是追隨底層現實的輪廓。這兩個地中海，由交戰的統治者指揮，在物理、經濟和文化上彼此不同。每一個都是一個獨立的歷史區域」（第 137 頁）。一筆畫，情節的結構已經被暗示：兩個地中海之間的重大對立及其衝突的衰落。

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如果這確實是布勞岱爾所敘述的歷史，那麼可以理解，其第二層次──本應完全致力於長時段──需要超越其經濟概述，增加國際關係的物理學，這才是帝國衝突及其命運的子情節的唯一支配者。在其上升階段，「16 世紀地中海的故事首先是一個戲劇性的政治成長故事，利維坦開始佔據其位置」（第 660 頁）。此外，賭注很高：大西洋將屬於改革運動還是西班牙？當土耳其人和西班牙人同時背對背轉身時，敘事聲音詢問：在地中海，是否早於其他地方，帝國衰落的時刻已經敲響？這個問題是必要的，因為正如在戲劇中，逆轉伴隨著或然性，即可能會有不同結果的事件：「地中海的衰落，有些人會說：有道理。但這不僅僅是如此。對於西班牙來說，有每一個機會全心全意地轉向大西洋。為什麼
she choose not to?” (p. 703). In turn, the subplot of the conflict between empires, and the retreat of this conflict from the Mediterranean area, demands to be linked up with the subplot of the collision of monolithic civilizations. We recall the statement, “Of all the complex and contradictory faces [personnages] of the Mediterranean world, its civilizations are the most perplexing” (p. 757).

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The reversals of these conflicts have been mentioned above: the fate of the Moriscos, the fate of the Jews, foreign wars. We must now speak of the contribution these subplots make to the overall plot. Referring to the alternation of foreign wars and internal wars as “plain to see” (p. 842), the dramatist writes: “it offers a new perspective on a confused period of history, illuminating it in a way which is neither artificial nor illusory. It is impossible to avoid the conviction that contrasting ideological patterns were first established and then replaced” (ibid.). Thus, just as Homer picked from the stories of the Trojan War the set he chose to tell in the Iliad, Braudel picks from the great conflict between civilizations in which the Occident and the Orient alternate the conflict whose protagonists are Spain and Turkey at the time of Philip II and whose framework is the decline of the Mediterranean as a historical zone.
她選擇不這樣做？"（第 703 頁）。反過來，帝國之間衝突的次要情節，以及這種衝突從地中海地區的退卻，需要與文明的單一體碰撞的次要情節聯繫起來。我們回想起這句話："在地中海世界所有複雜且矛盾的面孔中，其文明是最令人困惑的"（第 757 頁）。這些衝突的逆轉已在上文中提到：摩里斯科人的命運、猶太人的命運、外國戰爭。我們現在必須談論這些次要情節對整體情節的貢獻。提到外國戰爭和內部戰爭的交替是"一目了然的"（第 842 頁），戲劇家寫道："它為一個混亂的歷史時期提供了新的視角，以一種非人為且非虛假的方式照亮它。無法避免的是，相互衝突的意識形態模式首先被建立，然後被取代"（同上）。因此，正如荷馬在特洛伊戰爭的故事中選擇了他在《伊利亞德》中講述的一組故事，布羅岱爾從西方和東方交替的文明之間的大衝突中，選擇了以菲利普二世時代西班牙和土耳其為主角、框架為地中海作為歷史區域的衰落的衝突。

Having said this, we must admit that the overall plot that constitutes the unity of the work remains a virtual plot. Didactic reasons require that the “three different conceptions of time” (p.1238) remain disconnected, the aim being “to bring together in all their multiplicity the different measures of time past, to acquaint the reader with their coexistence, their conflicts and contradictions, and the richness of experience they hold” (ibid.).

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However, even if it is virtual, the plot is nonetheless effective. It could become real only if a total history were possible without doing violence to any of its parts.

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話雖如此，我們必須承認，構成作品統一性的整體情節仍然是一個虛擬情節。出於教學原因，"三種不同的時間概念"（第 1238 頁）必須保持分離，其目的是"匯集過去的不同時間尺度，使讀者了解它們的共存、衝突和矛盾，以及它們所蘊含的經驗豐富性"（同上）。

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然而，即使是虛擬的，這個情節仍然是有效的。只有在不對任何部分造成暴力的情況下，才能實現一部完整的歷史。

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Finally, by his analytical and disjunctive method, Braudel has invented a new type of plot. If it is true that the plot is always to some extent a synthesis of the heterogeneous, the virtual plot of Braudel’s book teaches us to unite structures, cycles, and events by joining together heterogeneous temporalities and contradictory chronicles.

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This virtual structure permits us nevertheless to judge between two opposite ways of reading The Mediterranean. The first subordinates the history of events to the history of the long time-span and the long time-span to geographical time–the main emphasis is then placed on the Mediterranean. But then geographical time is in danger of losing its historical character. For the second reading, history remains historical insofar as the first level itself is qualified as historical by its reference to the second level and, in turn, the second level derives its historical quality from its capacity to support the third level. The emphasis is then placed on Philip II. But the history of events lacks the principles of necessity and of probability that Aristotle attributed to a well-constructed plot. The plot that includes the three levels equally authorizes both readings and makes them intersect at the median posi-
最後，通過他分析性和分離的方法，布羅代爾發明了一種新型的情節。如果情節在某種程度上總是異質性的綜合，布羅代爾著作中的虛擬情節教導我們通過結合異質的時間性和矛盾的編年史來聯繫結構、週期和事件。

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然而，這種虛擬結構使我們能夠在《地中海》的兩種截然不同的閱讀方式之間做出判斷。第一種方式是將事件史從屬於長時段史，並將長時段史從屬於地理時間——重點因此放在地中海上。但此時地理時間危險地喪失了其歷史特性。對於第二種閱讀，歷史仍然具有歷史性，因為第一層次本身通過參考第二層次而具有歷史性，而第二層次又通過支撐第三層次而獲得其歷史品質。重點則轉向菲利普二世。但事件史缺乏亞里士多德歸因於一個結構良好的情節的必然性和或然性原則。包含三個層次的情節同等地授權這兩種閱讀，並使它們在中間位置相交。
tion of the history of the long time-span, which then becomes the unstable point of equilibrium between them.
長期歷史跨度的歷史敘述，然後成為它們之間不穩定的平衡點。

In my opinion, it is this long detour by way of the quasi-plot that finally allows us to question once more the notion of event that Braudel holds to be canonical.

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For me, the event is not necessarily brief and nervous, like some sort of explosion. It is a variable of the plot. As such, it does not belong only to the third level but to all the levels and their various functions. When it emerges on the third level, it appears with the sign of necessity or probability that it owes to having having crossed through the other levels. It is in this way that Lepanto loses its brilliance and falls lower on the scale of importance. The death of Philip II remains a major event only because of the subplot of “Politics and People.” This death tends to become a nonevent when it is placed within the overall plot of the struggle between political giants and on the trajectory of the decline of the Mediterranean, which comes to its relative conclusion only several decades later. After all, we have seen events proliferate also on the second and even on the first level; except that the event loses its explosive character there and acts rather as a symptom or a testimony.
在我看來，正是這種通過準情節的長繞路徑，最終使我們能再次質疑布勞岱爾認為是典型的事件概念。對我來說，事件不一定是短暫和緊張的，就像某種爆炸。它是情節的一個變量。因此，它不僅僅屬於第三層級，而是屬於所有層級及其各種功能。當它出現在第三層級時，它帶著從其他層級穿越而來的必然性或或然性的標誌。正是以這種方式，勒班托失去了其光彩，並在重要性的等級上降低。只有因為「政治與人民」的副情節，菲利普二世之死才成為一個重大事件。當它被放置在政治巨頭之間的鬥爭的整體情節中，並且在地中海衰落的軌跡上（這個軌跡直到幾十年後才相對結束）時，這個死亡往往會變成一個非事件。畢竟，我們也看到事件在第二層級，甚至第一層級上激增；只是事件在那裡失去了其爆發性的特徵，而是作為一種症狀或見證。

The truth is that the event is what distinguishes the historian’s concept of structure from that of the sociologist or the economist. For the historian, the event continually appears in the very midst of structures. And this occurs in two ways: on the one hand, all structures do not change at the same pace. It is when “these different time-spans” (On History, p. 48) no longer coincide that their dissonance becomes event-like. In the same way, the exchanges between numerous zones of civilization, the borrowings and rejections constitute quasi-pointlike phenomena which do not mark a civilization on all of its levels at the same time: “it is not so much time which is the creation of our own minds, as the way in which we break it up” (ibid.). On the other hand, in contrast to the sociologist, the historian in dealing with structures is attentive to their breaking points, their sudden or slow deterioration, in short, to the consideration that they die out. In this respect Braudel is no less preoccupied with the decay of empires than the traditional historian. In one sense, The Mediterranean is the gradual progress, the slowed-down march of the major event: the retreat of the Mediterranean from general history. Once again, the fragility of human works comes to the foreground and with it the dramatic dimension, from which the long time-span was supposed to free history.
真相是事件區分了歷史學家對結構的概念與社會學家或經濟學家的概念。對歷史學家來說，事件不斷出現在結構的正中間。這以兩種方式發生：一方面，並非所有結構都以相同的速度變化。當「這些不同的時間跨度」（《論歷史》，第 48 頁）不再一致時，它們的不協調性就變得像事件一樣。同樣地，文明眾多區域之間的交流、借鑒和拒絕構成了幾乎是點狀的現象，這些現象並不會同時在文明的所有層面上留下痕跡：「不是時間本身是我們思維的創造，而是我們如何劃分它」（同上）。另一方面，與社會學家不同，歷史學家在處理結構時會關注它們的破裂點、突然或緩慢的惡化，總之，關注它們的消逝。在這方面，布羅代爾對帝國的衰落與傳統歷史學家同樣關心。在某種意義上，《地中海》是重大事件的緩慢進程、放慢的步伐：地中海從總體歷史中的撤退。再一次，人類作品的脆弱性浮現在前台，與之俱來的還有戲劇性維度，而長時段本應使歷史擺脫這種維度。

I have found in other French historians who come within the sphere of influence of the Annales indications-often furtive ones-that betray this return to the event by means of the long time-span itself.
我在其他在年鑑學派影響範圍內的法國歷史學家那裡發現了一些跡象——往往是零星的——這些跡象通過長時段本身背叛了對事件的回歸。

For example, in the marriage between history and anthropology as it is advocated by Le Goff, and which has produced Time, Work, and Culture in the
例如，在勒·戈夫所倡導的歷史學與人類學之間的婚姻關係中，這種關係產生了《時間、勞動和文化》

Middle Ages, it is, of course, the long-the very long-time-span that occupies the foreground (“the long stretch of the Middle Ages,” “the long period relevant to our history,” “the history of preindustrial society” [p. x]). Yet, on the other hand, Le Goff, no less strongly than Braudel, resists the seductiveness of the atemporal models characteristic of a certain type of sociology. First of all, because this very span of time is not without events, but indeed is punctuated by repeated or expected events (festivals, ceremonies, rituals) which recall all that is liturgical in historical societies. Next, because this particular long time-span no longer exists: the name medieval civilization is well chosen, for it is a “transition” society. Of course, the attitudes emphasized by historical ethnology are those that “change least” in historical evolution (p. 229), but “mental systems are historically datable, even if they do carry a heavy freight of debris from archeo-civilizations, dear to André Varagnac” (ibid.). In particular, history, if it is to remain history in its union with anthropology, cannot convert itself into “an ethnology that stands outside time” ( p .236 ). This is why the historian cannot conform to the vocabulary of diachrony, as it is borrowed from linguistics. The latter, in fact, functions in accordance with “abstract systems of transformation very different from the evolutionary schemes used by the historian in attempting to apprehend the process of becoming in the concrete societies he studies” (p. 235).

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Instead, the historian has to try to go beyond “the false dilemma of structure versus conjuncture and, even more important, structure versus event” (ibid.).
中世紀，它是佔據前景的漫長——非常漫長——的時間跨度（「中世紀的漫長延展」，「與我們歷史相關的漫長時期」，「前工業社會的歷史」[第 x 頁]）。然而，另一方面，勒戈夫，絲毫不遜於布勞德爾，抗拒某種社會學特有的非時間性模型的誘惑。首先，因為這段時間並非沒有事件，而是充滿重複或預期的事件（節日、儀式、禮儀），這些事件回顧了歷史社會中的禮儀性質。接著，因為這個特定的長時間跨度已不復存在：中世紀文明之名恰如其分，因為它是一個「過渡」社會。當然，歷史民族學強調的態度是在歷史演變中「變化最小」的（第 229 頁），但「心智系統是可以追溯歷史的，儘管它們攜帶了大量來自考古文明的殘骸，正如安德烈·瓦拉尼亞克所珍視的」（同上）。尤其是，如果歷史要與人類學保持聯繫，就不能轉變為「站在時間之外的民族學」（第 236 頁）。這就是為什麼歷史學家不能遵從語言學借來的共時性詞彙。後者實際上是根據「與歷史學家用以把握具體社會成長進程的進化模式截然不同的抽象轉換系統」運作（第 235 頁）。相反，歷史學家必須嘗試超越「結構與偶發事件的虛假兩難，更重要的是結構與事件的對立」（同上）。

In fact, in Le Goff I find an intimation of the thesis that the past owes its historical quality to its capacity for being integrated in that memory that Augustine called “the present of the past.” Le Goff defines his “total,” “long” “Middle Ages of the depths” in the following terms. “It is the time of our grandparents” (p. xi); “the primordial past in which our collective identity, the quarry of that anguished search in which contemporary societies are engaged, acquired certain of its essential characteristics” (ibid.). Given this, it is not surprising if, in this constituting of our memory, the long time-span is shortened into the form of quasi-events. Does not Le Goff describe the conflict between the time of the church and the time of the tradesmen, symbolized by the confrontation between bells and clocks, “as one of the major events in the mental history of these centuries at the heart of the Middle Ages, when the ideology of the modern world was being formed under pressure from deteriorating economic structures and practices”? (p. 30). What, in fact, constitutes the event is “the essential separateness and the contingent encounter” (p.38, trans. altered) of these two times.
事實上，在勒戈夫那裡，我發現了一個關於過去的歷史品質源於其被整合到奧古斯丁所稱的「過去的當下」的記憶中的暗示。勒戈夫以以下術語定義他的「總體的」、「長期的」「深層中世紀」。「這是我們祖父輩的時代」（第 xi 頁）；「是我們集體身份的原始過去，當代社會在痛苦的搜尋中獲得了某些其基本特徵的礦場」（同上）。基於此，如果在構建我們的記憶過程中，長時間被縮短成類似事件的形式，這並不奇怪。勒戈夫豈不是描述了教會時間與商人時間之間的衝突，由鐘聲和鐘錶的對抗象徵，「作為中世紀核心時期精神史中的主要事件之一，當 deteriorating 經濟結構和實踐的壓力下，現代世界的意識形態正在形成」？（第 30 頁）實際上，構成事件的是這兩種時間的「本質性分離和偶然遭遇」（第 38 頁，譯文有所改動）。

The historian of mentalités encounters the same problem. For example, Georges Duby begins with an entirely nonnarrative sociological analysis of ideologies-he calls them total, deforming, competitive, stabilizing, action-generating-yet he sees the event infiltrate these structures due not only to
心性史學家遇到了同樣的問題。例如，喬治·杜比從一個完全非敘事的社會學分析開始，他稱這些意識形態為全面的、扭曲的、競爭的、穩定的、行動生成的，然而他看到事件滲透到這些結構中，不僅是因為
external borrowings, rejections, and internal conflicts but also to dissonances, “deviations of temporality” that appear at the point of intersection of objective situations, mental representations, and individual or collective behavior. The historian is thus brought to stress “critical periods in which the movement of material and political structures ends by reverberating on the level of ideological systems, thereby sharpening the conflict that opposes them.”

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Just as above, I am tempted to speak of a quasi-event to describe what Duby calls here “the burst of acceleration,” set off by polemics, “within the tendencies covering long spans of time which guide the evolution of the dominant ideology” (p. 157).
外部借鑒、排斥和內部衝突，不僅如此，還包括不協調、出現在客觀情況、心理表徵和個人或集體行為交叉點的「時間性偏差」。因此，歷史學家強調「關鍵時期，物質和政治結構的運動最終在意識形態系統層面產生迴響，從而加劇了它們之間的衝突。」正如上文所述，我想談論一種準事件，以描述杜比在此處稱之為「加速迸發」，由論戰引發，「在主導意識形態演變的長期趨勢中」（第 157 頁）。

And the vehicle of the quasi-event, as I tried to show in Braudel, is again the quasi-plot. I would like to demonstrate the same thing with regard to Georges Duby’s work by placing side by side the article on method just referred to, “Histoire sociale et idéologies des sociétés,” and the application of his working hypothesis in one of the works most representative of what he means by the history of ideologies. I have chosen The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined.

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I propose to show once again here how the author dramatizes an ideological structure by constructing a quasi-plot containing a beginning, a middle, and an end. The structure in question is the imaginary representation of the entire society in the form of a hierarchy of three orders: those who pray, those who fight, and those who by their labor feed the rest. The formulation of this imaginary representation is taken from a seventeenthcentury author, Charles Loyseau, in his Traité des Ordres et Simples Dignités, published in 1610. However, Duby does not simply consider a period of six centuries, as it is staked out by descriptions akin to Loyseau’s. Instead, renewing the art of the author of the Iliad, he picks from among all the vicissitudes of the trifunctional image a history that has a beginning -the initial formulations by Adalbero of Laon and Gerard of Cambrai-and an end-the battle of Bouvines in 1214. The middle is formed by the reversals that dramatize the historical role of this ideological representation. So Duby attacks a problem different from that posed by Georges Dumézil, the untiring advocate of the trifunctional image. Whereas the latter attempts to establish-by comparison and through its recurrence in different historical constellations-that this schema belongs to the latent structures of human thought, in order to lead up to the question of why and how “the human mind is constantly making choices among its latent riches,”

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Duby replies to Dumézil’s two questions with two other questions, the historian’s questions of where and when. He chooses to show how this trifunctional image “functions as a major cog in an ideological system” (p. 8). The ideological system in question is feudalism as it emerges and then triumphs. And to describe how it functions, he constructs what I am calling a quasi-plot in which the trifunctional image plays the role of, in his own terms, the “book’s central character” (ibid.).
而準事件的載體，正如我在布勞岱爾那裡試圖展示的，再次是準敘事。我希望通過並列一篇剛剛提到的方法論文章「社會史與社會意識形態」以及他在最具代表性的意識形態史著作中運用工作假設，對喬治·杜比的著作進行同樣的論證。我選擇了《三個階層：想像的封建社會》。我旨在再次展示作者如何通過構建一個具有開端、中間和結尾的準敘事來戲劇化一種意識形態結構。這個結構是整個社會的想像性表徵，形式是三個階層的等級制：祈禱者、戰鬥者，以及通過勞動養活其他人的人。這種想像性表徵的表述取自 17 世紀作家查爾斯·洛瓦佐在 1610 年出版的《論階層與簡單尊嚴》一書。然而，杜比並不僅僅考慮六個世紀的時期，而是如同荷馬史詩的作者，從三功能圖像的所有變遷中選取了一段具有開端（阿達爾貝羅和熱拉爾的初步表述）和結尾（1214 年布維訥戰役）的歷史。中間部分由戲劇化這一意識形態表徵歷史角色的逆轉組成。因此，杜比攻擊的是與喬治·杜梅齊爾（三功能圖像的不倦倡導者）提出的問題不同的問題。而後者試圖通過比較和在不同的歷史星系中的重現，建立這個模式屬於人類思想的潛在結構，以引出為什麼和如何"人類心靈不斷地在其潛在財富中做出選擇"的問題，

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杜比對杜梅齊爾的兩個問題以另外兩個問題作出回應，即歷史學家的"何地"和"何時"。他選擇展示這種三功能形象如何"作為意識形態系統中的一個主要齒輪"（第 8 頁）。所涉及的意識形態系統是封建主義，它的出現和勝利。為了描述其運作方式，他構建了我所稱的準敘事，其中三功能形象扮演著，用他自己的話說，"書中的中心人物"（同上）。

The outline Duby follows is very instructive in this respect. Since what is in
杜比遵循的大綱在這方面非常富有啟發性。
question is indeed a structure, that is, a mental representation that “has withstood all the pressures of history” (p.5), he entitles his first part “Revelation,” in order to indicate clearly the transcendence of the system in relation to its fragmentary representations. The system is already historicized to a great extent by the variations in the first formulations and by the reconstitution of their political framework, the decline of the Carolingian monarchy and of the power that went along with it, that of the bishops. It is only at the end of this first inquiry that the organization of the “system” can be described (pp. 56-69). This includes the postulate of a perfect coherence between heaven and earth; a concept of order which has become an attribute of the perfect city; the division into the order of bishops and the order of kings; the division into dominant groups-priests and nobles; the addition to this binary arrangement of a third order characterizing the dominant functions-the class of subjects; and, finally, the concept of mutuality, of reciprocity within hierarchy, which in structural terms calls for a ternary division. ...

The mere description of this system demonstrates how equivocal the notion of trifunctionality actually is and how very little it resembles a true system. First of all, the third function appears in the form of an addition to two binary oppositions (bishop/king, priest/noble). Next, the relation dominant/dominated is added, as another specific binary system, to the internal binarism of domination just mentioned, whence the extreme instability of the system. Finally, the system does not imply that the three parts be filled by roles as well specified as those in Dumézil. Order alone is the key word. We can thus understand why the system is so easily a prey to history.

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...

Before entering into the plot properly speaking, Duby attempts, under the title “Genesis,” to take a retrospective look at the formation of the system beginning with Gregory the Great, Augustine, and Dionysius the Areopagite. He then shows how the shift could occur from theological speculation on celestial hierarchies to political reflection on order and on orders, linking up in this way the celestial example and the ternary distribution of terrestrial functions.

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...

The quasi-plot really commences when the system is put to the test of “circumstances” (pp. 121-66), undergoes a long “eclipse” (pp. 167-268), and then finally reemerges, this “resurgence” (pp. 269-353) culminating in the system’s “adoption,” an adoption that is not merely symbolized but realized and finalized by the victory of the king-and hence the victory of the bishops as well-for whom the system had been intended, at Bouvines. ...

These are the three major reversals between which Duby divides his plot. It is noteworthy that the narrated story is set in motion by a crisis in which royalty appears to founder.

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This is, first of all, a political crisis. But, above all, on the symbolic level, there is a competition with rival systems, which are themselves tripartite: the heretical model, the model of God’s peace, the monastic model created at Cluny. The polemic engaged in by these competing systems is precisely what dramatizes the model. The triumph of Cluny an- ...
nounces the “eclipse.”

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Contributing to this is the feudal revolution which forces a reclassing of all the orders to make room for the third party, the peasants. And this places in competition, at the beginning of the eleventh century, not three but four ideological models (pp. 161-62): the model bound for victory and the three rival models just referred to. ...

The ideological model of Adalbero and Gerard is placed in the strange position of being not a reflection but an anticipation: an anticipation of the decline of monasticism, an anticipation of the restoration of the episcopate, an anticipation of the renaissance of the monarchic state.

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阿達伯羅和傑拉德的意識形態模型被置於一個奇怪的位置，不是反映，而是預示：預示修道院制度的衰落，預示主教制度的恢復，預示君主國家的復興。

This curious split between an apparent survival and a real anticipation governs the system’s “eclipse,” as it is told in Part IV. This is “the age of the monks,” who benefit from the waning of the Capetian royalty and, with it, of the episcopal institution. But an “eclipse” is by no means a disappearance. The time of eclipse is also the emergence of “new times”: the times of the Cistercians, of the merchants, of the clerks, of the schoolmasters and their students.
這種表面上生存與真實預示之間的奇特分裂主導了系統的「eclipse」，正如第四部分所述。這是「修道士的時代」，他們從卡佩王朝王權的衰落及其主教機構的衰落中獲益。但「eclipse」絕不意味著消失。Eclipse 的時代也是「新時代」的出現：修道院院士、商人、神職人員、學校教師和他們的學生的時代。

As for the “resurgence,” it is marked by the clerks’ reconquest of the first rank at the expense of the monks; the knights’ takeover of the second rank, the stronghold of the princes; and the takeover of the third rank by the laborers. But if the time of the eclipse was, for the trifunctional model, a time of anticipation, the time of resurgence is that of delay: “The obstacle,” Duby says, “was Royal France . . . , the obstacle was Paris, treasure and symbol of a kingdom allied with the pope, with the bishops, with the reformed Church, with the schools, with the communes, with the people” (p. 307). This is what makes the resurgence the final reversal. “The adoption” alone constitutes a conclusion, inasmuch as it ensures the reconciliation between the model dreamed of and the real institution. Bouvines is the instrument of this encounter. Capetian has taken the place of Carolingian. However, it is curious that, with regard to the systematizing spirit that seems to govern the work, the king is not part of the tripartite schema: “He himself sat enthroned above order, i.e., above the three orders that made up court society” (p. 346).
至於「復興」，它以神職人員重新奪回首要地位（犠牲修道士），騎士接管第二等級（王子的堡壘），勞動者接管第三等級為標誌。但如果 eclipse 的時代對三功能模型來說是一個預示的時代，那麼復興的時代就是延遲的時代：「障礙」，杜比說，「是皇家法國……，障礙是巴黎，一個與教皇、主教、改革教會、學校、公社、人民聯盟的王國的寶藏和象徵」（第 307 頁）。這就是使復興成為最終逆轉的原因。「採納」本身構成了一個結論，因為它確保了理想模型和真實制度之間的和解。布維納是這次相遇的工具。卡佩王朝已取代加洛林王朝。然而，奇怪的是，對於似乎支配這項工作的系統化精神而言，國王並不屬於三分模式：「他自己坐在王座上，高於秩序，即高於構成宮廷社會的三個等級」（第 346 頁）。

Regardless of the doubts we may have concerning the coherence of the trifunctional model,

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the plot ends when the symbol shifts from the dreamed imaginary to the constituting imaginary

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So it is indeed the “adoption” that at one and the same time provides an end to the story and confers a sense upon the “middle” represented by the triad: “circumstance,” “eclipse,” “resurgence.”
不管我們對三功能模型的連貫性有何疑慮，

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當符號從夢想的想像轉移到構成的想像時，情節就結束了

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因此，"收養"確實在同一時間為故事提供了結局，並賦予了由"環境"、"蝕"、"復興"這個三元組所代表的"中間"一種意義。

This is all I wanted to show: the quasi-events that indicate the critical periods of the ideological system are set within quasi-plots, which assure their narrative status.
這就是我想要展示的：表明意識形態系統關鍵時期的準事件被置於準情節之中，這些準情節確保了它們的敘事地位。

It is in the field of political history that the return to the event is most urgently felt. “How does one interpret such an event?” asks François Furet at the start of a work that is called, precisely, Interpreting the French Revolution.

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在政治史領域，回歸事件的緊迫感最為強烈。在名為《解讀法國大革命》的著作開篇，弗朗索瓦·傅雷問道："如何解讀這樣一個事件？"

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Interpreting-this the historian can do if he frees himself from the alterna-
解讀——如果歷史學家能夠擺脫兩者之間的選擇，他就可以這樣做
tive of commemoration or execration in which he is caught up as long as he continues to participate in “the obsession with origins, the underlying thread of all national history” (p. 2) since 1789. Then the historian is inspired by intellectual curiosity alone, in the same way as any other scholar. Thanks to this assumed distance, he can claim to conceptualize the event, without himself assuming the actors’ belief in the meaning of the event as a break with the past and as the origin of new times, in short, without sharing the French Revolution’s illusion about itself. But at what price does the historian arrive at interpreting the French Revolution as an event? It is noteworthy that he only partially succeeds by combining two explanations which, separately and perhaps even together, leave a remainder, and this remainder is the event itself. ...

To interpret the French Revolution with Tocqueville is to see it not as a break and an origin, but as the completion of the work of the monarchy, as the dissolution of the social body to the benefit of the state administration. There is an enormous gap here between historiography and the tyranny of the actors’ lived historical experience, with its myth of origin. What Furet is inquiring into is precisely the gap between the actors’ intentions and the role they play. In the same stroke, the event disappears, at least as a break, when the analysis proceeds by means of explicit concepts. This analysis actually breaks off the historical narrative: Tocqueville, Furet notes, “treats a problem rather than a period” (p. 17). ...

The event, however, has not been eliminated in every respect. If Tocqueville accounts well for the result of the Revolution (Furet says of “the revolu-tion-as-content”), the very process of the Revolution (what Furet calls “the revolution-as-mode”) remains to be explained, that is to say, the particular dynamics of collective action which were responsible for the fact that this result of the Revolution, according to Tocqueville, was not achieved by an English-style evolution but by a revolution. This is where the event resides: “the fact remains that the revolutionary event, from the very outset, transformed the existing situation and created a new mode of historical action that was not intrinsically a part of that situation” (p.22, his emphasis). ...

A second model must therefore be introduced in order to account for the appearance on the stage of history of a practical and ideological mode of social action that is nowhere inscribed in what preceded it. This second model must take into account what it is that makes the Revolution “one of the basic forms of historical consciousness of action” (p.24), namely, the way “it was ever ready to place ideas above actual history, as if it were called upon to restructure a fragmented society by means of its own concepts” (p.25). The Jacobin phenomenon is described in this way. ...

Augustin Cochin’s explanatory model then takes over from Tocqueville’s model in order to show how a new political sensibility was produced alongside the old, one which gives rise to a new world based on the individual and not on institutional groups, built upon the tie of opinion alone. Cochin indeed finds in the “philosophical societies [sociétés de pensée]” the matrix of a con- ...
ception of power that rests on the principle of equality, on the transformation of isolated individuals into a people-the sole imaginary actor of the Revolu-tion-and on the suppression of every sort of screen between the people and its self-designated spokesmen. ...

Jacobinism, however, is not just an ideology, it is an ideology that took power. Consequently, the revolution-as-event is totally accounted for neither by the historian’s dismantling of what he holds to be an “illusion of politics,” nor by identifying the channels through which this new power is exercised over society. The series of splits and conspiracies that ensue are indeed plots, in the most common sense of the word. Of course, it can be shown how the conspiracy mentality proceeds from the new political sociability that casts as an enemy anyone who has been unable to occupy the symbolic seat of power as the system defines it. In this respect, the pages on conspiracy as the consequence of the new political symbolism are quite brilliant and convincing. Nevertheless, it seems to me that taking power continues to be an event that is not deduced from the ideological system that defines power. Events, chronology, and great individuals come back in full force under the cloak of conspiracy. Even when it is deduced from the ideological system, I would say that conspiracy brings back the event with the plot. For even if conspiracy is a theater of madness, this madness is at work, generating events.
雅各賓主義不僅僅是一種意識形態，而是一種掌握權力的意識形態。因此，作為事件的革命，既不能僅由歷史學家拆解所謂的「政治幻想」來解釋，也不能僅通過識別這種新權力在社會中行使的管道來解釋。隨之而來的一系列分裂和陰謀確實是陰謀，用最常見的意義來說。當然，可以闡明陰謀心態是如何源於新的政治社交性，即將任何無法佔據系統定義的權力象徵性座位的人視為敵人。在這方面，關於陰謀作為新政治象徵主義結果的篇章相當精彩且令人信服。然而，在我看來，奪取權力仍然是一個不能從定義權力的意識形態系統中推導出的事件。事件、年表和偉大的個人在陰謀的掩護下全力回歸。即使是從意識形態系統中推導出來，我會說陰謀帶回了事件及其情節。因為即使陰謀是瘋狂的劇場，這種瘋狂也在運作，並正在產生事件。

This is why Thermidor is an event, for interpretation of course, but only up to a certain point. It “marked the end of the Revolution because it is the victory of representative over revolutionary legitimacy . . . , and as Marx said, the reassertion of real society on the illusion of politics” (p.58). But this “ideological coding” (p.59) of the Robespierre phenomenon, in turn, does not exhaust, it seems to me, its historical meaning. To say that it incarnates an ideology-the struggle for one imaginary system against another-is only, as in Greek tragedy, to name the theme that corresponds to a plot. For it is as a result of the plot that “he was the mouthpiece of [the Revolution’s] purest and most tragic discourse” (p.61). From the Jacobin ideology has been deduced “what is purest” but not “what is most tragic” in the event. ...

This is why I would not venture to say, with François Furet, that Thermidor, in that it represents “society’s revenge on ideology” (p. 74), leads from Cochin back to Tocqueville, for the continuation of the ancien régime passes not only by way of the ideological acceleration of Jacobinism but by the actions that this political illusion engendered. In this sense, the second schema of the French Revolution, that provided by Augustin Cochin, is no more capable of getting to the bottom of the event than is the first, provided by Tocqueville. No conceptual reconstruction will ever be able to make the continuity with the ancien régime pass by way of the rise to power of an imaginary order experienced as a break and as an origin. This rise to power is itself on the order of an event. And it results in the fact that the fantasy of an origin is itself an origin, to reverse François Furet’s formula.

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...

Has Furet then been successful in “interpreting” the event that is the French ...

Revolution? I would say, in line with my reflection on Braudel’s long timespan, that the event is restored at the end of each attempted explanation as a remainder left by every such attempt (in the way that the third part of Braudel’s The Mediterranean constitutes both a supplement and a complement), as a dissonance between explanatory structures, and finally, as the life and death of the structures themselves.
革命？我會說，根據我對布羅代爾長時段的思考，事件在每一次解釋嘗試結束時被恢復，作為每種嘗試留下的餘數（就像布羅代爾《地中海》的第三部分既是補充又是補足），作為解釋結構之間的不和諧，最後是結構本身的生命與死亡。

If the discovery of the long time-span did not lead us back to the event in accordance with one of these three modes, the long time-span would be in danger of severing historical time from the living dialectic of past, present, and future. A long time can be a time without any present and, so, without past or future as well. But then it is no longer a historical time, and the long time-span only leads back from human time to the time of nature. Evidence of this temptation can be seen in Braudel himself and results from the absence of a philosophical reflection on the relation between what he somewhat too hastily calls the subjective time of the philosophers and the long time of civilizations. For the discovery of the long time-span may simply express the fact that human time, which always requires the reference point of a present, is itself forgotten. If the brief event can act as a screen hiding our consciousness of the time that is not of our making, the long time-span can, likewise, act as a screen hiding the time that we are.
如果對長時段的發現沒有以這三種模式之一將我們帶回事件，那麼長時段就有危險切斷歷史時間與過去、現在和未來之間的生動辯證。一個長時間可能是沒有任何現在的時間，因此也沒有過去或未來。但那就不再是歷史時間了，長時段只是將人類時間帶回到自然的時間。布羅代爾自身的這種誘惑的證據，源於對他草率稱之為哲學家的主觀時間與文明的長時段之間關係的哲學反思的缺失。因為對長時段的發現可能僅僅表達了這樣一個事實：需要現在為參照點的人類時間本身被遺忘了。如果短暫的事件可以遮蔽我們對非我們所創造的時間的意識，那麼長時段同樣可以遮蔽我們正在經歷的時間。

This disastrous consequence can be avoided only if an analogy is preserved between the time of individuals and the time of civilizations: the analogy of growth and decline, of creation and death, the analogy of fate.
只有當個人時間與文明時間之間保持類比：生長與衰退、創造與死亡、命運的類比，這種災難性的後果才能避免。

This analogy on the level of temporality is of the same nature as the analogy I tried to maintain on the level of procedures between causal attribution and emplotment, and then on the level of entities between societies (or civilizations) and the characters in a drama. In this sense, all change enters the field of history as a quasi-event.
在時間性層面上，這個類比與我在因果歸因和情節建構層面上，以及在社會（或文明）與戲劇角色的實體層面上嘗試維持的類比性質相同。在這個意義上，所有的變化都以準事件的形式進入歷史領域。

This declaration is by no means equivalent to a cunning return to the brief event, which has been criticized by the history of the long time-span. When it was not the reflection of the actors’ confused consciousness and of their illusions, this brief event was just as much a methodological artifact, even the expression of a world view. In this respect, Braudel is perfectly justified in exclaiming: “I argue against Ranke or Karl Brande, that the narrative is not a method, or even the objective method par excellence, but quite simply a philosophy of history” (The Mediterranean, p. 21).
這個宣言絕不等同於對短暫事件的狡詐回歸，該短暫事件已被長期歷史所批評。當它不是行動者混亂意識和幻想的反映時，這種短暫事件同樣是一種方法論的人為構造，甚至是一種世界觀的表達。在這方面，布勞岱爾完全有理由驚呼：「我反對蘭克或卡爾·布蘭德，敘事不是一種方法，甚至不是最客觀的方法，而是一種歷史哲學」（《地中海》，第 21 頁）。

By quasi-event we signify that the extension of the notion of event, beyond short and brief time, remains correlative to a similar extending of the notions of plot and character. There is a quasi-event wherever we can discern, even if only very indirectly, very obliquely, a quasi-plot and quasi-characters. The event in history corresponds to what Arisotle called a change in fortune-metabole–in his formal theory of emplotment. An event, once again, is not
通過準事件，我們表示事件概念的延伸，超越短暫時間，仍然與情節和角色概念的類似延伸相關。無論何處我們能夠辨別，即使只是非常間接、非常側面地，一個準情節和準角色，那裡就存在一個準事件。歷史中的事件對應於亞里士多德在其情節形式理論中所稱的命運變化（代謝）。一個事件，再次強調，不僅是
only what contributes to the unfolding of a plot but what gives it the dramatic form of a change in fortune.
推進情節的內容，還賦予它戲劇性的命運變化形式。

It follows from this kinship between quasi-events and quasi-plots that the plurality of historical times extolled by Braudel is an expansion of the cardinal feature of narrative time, namely, its ability to combine in variable proportions the chronological component of the episode and the achronological component of the configuration. Every one of the temporal levels required by historical explanation may be seen as a duplication of this dialectic. It might perhaps even be said that with the brief event the episodic continues to dominate in plots that are nevertheless extremely complex, and that the long timespan gives precedence to the configuration. However, the emergence of a new event-like quality at the end of our effort to work out the historical structures echoes as a reminder. It reminds us that something happens to even the most stable structures. Something happens to them-in particular, they die out. This is why, despite his reticence, Braudel was unable to avoid ending his magnificent work with the description of a death, not, of course, the death of the Mediterranean but of Philip II.
從這種準事件和準情節之間的親緣關係可以看出，布勞岱爾所讚揚的歷史時間的多元性是敘事時間的基本特徵的擴展，即以可變比例組合事件的年代學成分和配置的非年代學成分。歷史解釋所需的每個時間層次都可以被視為這種辯證法的重複。或許可以說，在極其複雜的情節中，短暫事件仍然以事件性為主導，而長時段則優先考慮配置。然而，在我們努力梳理歷史結構的過程中，出現的新事件般的品質作為提醒回響。它提醒我們，即使是最穩定的結構也會發生某些事情。它們會消逝——特別是，它們會死去。這就是為什麼儘管布勞岱爾有所保留，但最終仍無法避免以對菲利普二世之死的描述來結束他這部宏偉的著作。

Conclusions 結論

I would now like to sum up the results attained at the end of this second part of my study. With respect to the aims advanced in chapter 3 of the first part, these results stand within precise limits.
我現在想總結研究第二部分所獲得的成果。就第一部分第 3 章提出的目標而言，這些成果是在明確的限度內的。

To begin with, only one of the two great narrative modes has been submitted to examination-history. I have excluded from the field of investigation all that will be placed, in volume 2, under the title of "Fictional Narrative"let us say, from the ancient epic to the modern novel. Therefore, only half of the ground to be covered by the inquiry has actually been traveled.
首先，只有兩種敘事模式中的一種接受了檢驗——歷史。我已經從調查範圍中排除了將在第二卷中被置於"虛構敘事"標題下的所有內容——從古代史詩到現代小說。因此，本次調查實際上只覆蓋了應該覆蓋的一半 ground。

The restriction of my analysis to historical narrative has not only resulted in leaving other narrative modes outside, it has resulted in an amputating of the internal problematic of history itself. In fact, the ambition of truth by which history, in Paul Veyne’s apt expression, claims the title “true” [véridique], displays its full meaning only when it can be opposed to the deliberate suspension of the true/false alternative, characteristic of the fictional narrative.

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I do not deny that this opposition between a “true” narrative and a “half true, half false” one rests on a naive notion of truth that will have to be thoroughly reexamined in volume 2. ...

This first limitation, in turn, leads to a second, more serious one that directly concerns the relation of narrative to time. As I have just said, by bracketing history’s ambition to attain the truth, I have set aside any attempt to thematize, in and of itself, the relation of history to the past. In fact, I have deliberately abstained from taking a stand on the ontological status of the historical past as having-been. In this way, when I have discussed the concept of event, I have carefully dissociated the epistemological criteria currently associated with this notion (unity, singularity, divergence) from the ontological criteria by which we distinguish what is only feigned from what actually took place (occur, make happen, differ in novelty from every reality that has already taken place). With this stroke, the relation between history, as the guardian of humanity’s past, and the whole set of attitudes by which we relate to the present and to the future, is left in abeyance. ...

Consequently the question of historical time has not been unfolded to its full extent. Only the aspects of time directly implied in the configurational operations that connect history to narrative have been taken into consideration. Even my discussion concerning the long time-span remained within the limits of an epistemology applied to the constructions characteristic of explanation in history. The relations between the long time-span and the event were discussed, but there was no attempt to find out what is actually involved in the relation between the multiple temporalities distinguished by historians and what they, casting a mistrustful eye, regard as the subjective time of the phi-losophers-whether by this is meant Bergsonian duration, the absolute flow of consciousness in Husserl, or Heidegger’s historicality. Once again, the contribution of history to this debate could not be clarified without that of fictional narrative. I implied this when, in chapter 3 of Part I, I subordinated the question of time as refigured by narrative to the resolution of the problem of the intertwining reference of true narrative and fictional narrative. It must even be suspected that, thanks to the greater freedom it has with respect to events that actually occurred in the past, fiction displays, concerning temporality, resources not allowed to the historian. As I shall say in volume 2, literary fiction can produce “fables about time” that are not merely “fables of time.” Hence it is not inconceivable that we must wait until after our long detour by way of the time of fiction before making any definite statement about the relation of history to time. ...

Admitting the limits of the analyses in my second part by no means forces me to minimize the importance of the results I think I have attained. It is just that these limits remind us that the investigation was placed on the level of mimesis

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and did not take into account the mediating function performed by this mimetic stage between prenarrative experience and an experience that is refigured by the work of narrative in all its forms. ...

The whole of my second part has been an investigation of the relations between the writing of history and the operation of emplotment, which Aristotle elevates to the rank of the dominant category in the art of composing works that imitate an action. If, indeed, the subsequent confrontation between historical narrative and fictional narrative is to make sense, I had first of all to be sure that history belongs to the narrative field defined by this configurating operation. And this relation, as it was progressively verified, revealed itself to be extraordinarily complex. ...

In order to circumscribe it, I first of all had to employ, in chapters 4 and 5, an antithetical strategy in which theses that were on the whole nomological were contrasted with wholly narrativist theses. In the course of this polemic, there was no thesis submitted to criticism that did not in some way contribute, at the cost of a series of rectifications, to an initial approximation of the relation between history and narrative. Some of these rectifications appeared only later. Thus, in part one of chapter 4 , the plea for a nonevent history, which is ...
held by French historians to be incompatible with a narrativist interpretation of history, was left without any immediate critical response, until a more sophisticated concept of historical plot, in the last part of chapter 6, permitted the reintegration of nonevent history into the narrative field. But, first, it was necessary, in setting aside a naive narrative reading of history, to pose the problem within the epistemological situation most unfavorable to a direct and immediate relation between history and narrative.
被法國歷史學家認為與歷史敘事解釋不相容，最初未受到任何直接的批評回應，直到在第六章的最後部分提出了一個更為複雜的歷史情節概念，使得非事件歷史得以重新納入敘事領域。但首先，必須在擱置對歷史的天真敘事閱讀的同時，在最不利於歷史與敘事之間直接和即時關係的認識論情境中提出問題。

If, in return, the covering law model was promptly submitted to rather strong criticism, first internally at the end of chapter 4 and then externally in chapter 5 , this double criticism was not purely negative. From examining the covering law model, I retained the idea of an epistemological break which distances historical explanation armed with generalizations in the form of laws, from simple narrative understanding.
如果說覆蓋定律模型很快就受到了相當強烈的批評，首先是在第四章末內部批評，然後在第五章外部批評，這種雙重批評並非純粹負面。從研究覆蓋定律模型中，我保留了一個認識論斷裂的觀念，這一斷裂使得運用法則形式的歷史解釋，與簡單的敘事理解保持距離。

Once this epistemological break was recognized, it was no longer possible to adopt the overly simple thesis that history must be held to be a species of the genus story. Even if, on the whole, a narrativist interpretation of history seemed to me more correct than a nomological one, the narrativist theses examined in chapter 5-even if they were reworked and refined-did not appear really to do justice to the specificity of history in the narrative field. Their main drawback is that they do not sufficiently take into account the transformations that have driven contemporary historiography further and further away from a naive narrative style of writing, and that they have not been successful in integrating explanation in terms of laws into the narrative fabric of history. And yet the narrativist interpretation is correct in its clear perception that the specifically historical property of history is preserved only by the ties, however tenuous and well-hidden they may be, which continue to connect historical explanation to our narrative understanding, despite the epistemological break separating the first from the second.
一旦認識到這種認識論的斷裂，就不再可能採用過於簡單的論點，認為歷史必須被視為故事類型的一個物種。即使從整體上看，對我來說，敘事主義對歷史的解釋似乎比法則主義更為正確，但第 5 章中檢視的敘事主義論點——即便經過重新加工和完善——似乎仍未真正對歷史在敘事領域中的特殊性做出公正的評價。它們的主要缺陷在於未充分考慮那些推動當代史學越來越遠離天真的敘事寫作方式的轉變，也未能成功地將法則解釋整合到歷史的敘事結構中。然而，敘事主義解釋在清晰地意識到歷史的特定屬性方面是正確的，這種屬性僅通過那些——儘管微弱且隱藏——繼續將歷史解釋與我們的敘事理解相連結的紐帶得以保存，儘管認識論的斷裂將兩者分隔開來。

This twofold requirement, doing justice to the specificity of historical explanation and maintaining history’s belonging within the narrative field, led me in the sixth chapter to join the antithetical strategy of chapters 4 and 5 to the method of questioning back, related to the genetic phenomenology of the later Husserl. This method aims at accounting for the indirect character of the filiation that connects history to our narrative understanding by reactivating the phases of the derivation by which this filiation is realized. To be precise, this questioning back is no longer epistemological, strictly speaking, nor does it correspond to a simple methodology adapted to the historian’s day-to-day work. It corresponds to a genesis of meaning, which is the responsibility of the philosopher. This genesis of meaning would not be possible if it were not supported by the epistemology and the methodology of the historical sciences. The latter provide the relay stations capable of guiding, in each of the three spheres under consideration, the reactivation of the narrative sources of scholarly history. For example, singular causal explanation provides the tran- ...
sitional structure between explanation in terms of laws and understanding by means of the plot. In their turn, the first-level entities to which the historian’s discourse ultimately refers make us look in the direction of the modes of participatory belonging that maintain the kinship between the object of history and the characters in a narrative. Finally, the discordant rhythms of the multiple temporalities, interwoven in the overall becoming of societies, reveal a profound kinship between the least pointlike historical changes and the sudden changes in fortune that, in narrative, are considered to be events. ...

Thus the historians’ profession, the epistemology of the historical sciences, and genetic phenomenology combine their resources to reactivate that fundamental noetic vision of history which, for the sake of brevity, I have called historical intentionality. ...

The most significant result of this critical examination of history has not yet been stressed. It results from the subsequent impact of the examination on the initial model proposed in chapter 3 of Part I. ...

Certainly, the essential features of the basic model have been preserved in the analyses of the second part. These include: the dynamic character of the configurational operation, the primacy of order over succession, the competition between concordance and discordance, the narration’s schematization of generalities in the form of laws, the conflict between sedimentation and innovation in the formation of traditions throughout the course of the development of the historical sciences. But, as I noted at the time, a study based on a simple confrontation between the Augustinian distentio animi and the Aristotelian muthos could only be expected to provide “a sketch, that will require further expansion, criticism, and revision.” ...

In fact, my examination of history was not limited to verifying the relevance of this model by applying it to a rather vast area of narrative composition. A good example of expanding the model was provided by the complexity of the discordant concordance offered by historical narration, which has no parallel in Aristotle’s Poetics. The idea of the synthesis of the heterogeneous, which was merely suggested in Part I, is completely freed from the limits imposed upon it by the literary “genres” and “types” with which it is still confused in the Poetics. ...

For this very reason, the expansion of the initial example tends toward a critique, if not of the model as such, at least of the interpretations of historical explanation that have remained too closely tied to this model. This is so whenever the theory of history is not clearly distinguished from a theory of action and does not give to the circumstances, the anonymous forces, and, especially, the unintended consequences the place that is due them. “What transforms actions into histories?” asks a philosopher. Precisely those factors that escape a simple reconstruction of the calculations made by the agents of the action. These factors give the emplotment a complexity unequaled in the ...
small-scale model that, in Aristotle, is still patterned on Greek tragedy (without forgetting, as well, epic and, to a lesser extent, comedy). The model of explanation proposed by von Wright, which combines teleological segments and law-like segments within a composite model, gives a good idea of the critique to which a model of historical explanation based purely on the concept of action must be submitted. ...

Would I go so far as to speak of a revision of the initial model by the theory of history? Yes, up to a certain point. This is attested to by the concepts of quasi-plot, quasi-character, and quasi-event that I had to construct in order to respect the very indirect form of filiation by which the history that is the least narrative in its style of writing nevertheless continues to rely on narrative understanding. ...

In speaking of quasi-plot, quasi-character, and quasi-event I wanted to bring the initial concepts worked out within the sphere of mimesis

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close to their breaking point. The reader will recall to what extent the plot that threads through Braudel’s great work, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, is deeply buried and difficult to reconstruct. Nor have I forgotten the care with which proper names have to be used when they are applied to the first-level entities of history. Finally, the notion of event had to lose its usual qualities of brevity and suddenness in order to measure up to the discordances and ruptures that punctuate the life of economic, social, and ideological structures of an individual society. The term “quasi” in the expressions “quasi-plot,” “quasi-character,” and “quasi-event” bears witness to the highly analogical nature of the use of narrative categories in scholarly history. In any event, this analogy expresses the tenuous and deeply hidden tie that holds history within the sphere of narrative and thereby preserves the historical dimension itself.
在討論擬情節、擬角色和擬事件時，我想將模仿的初始概念推向其極限。讀者會回想到布勞岱爾《地中海與腓力二世時代的地中海世界》中的情節是深深埋藏且難以重建的程度。我也未忘記在運用於歷史一級實體時，專有名詞必須謹慎使用。最後，事件的概念必須失去其通常的簡短和突然性，以衡量破壞和斷裂，這些破壞和斷裂穿插於一個社會的經濟、社會和意識型態結構的生活中。表達式「擬情節」、「擬角色」和「擬事件」中的「擬」一詞，見證了敘事類別在學術史學中高度類比的本質。無論如何，這種類比表達了將歷史緊密聯繫在敘事領域中的微妙而深藏的紐帶，從而保存了歷史本身的維度。

Notes 筆記

Part One 第一部分

My choice of vocabulary owes a great deal to Frank Kermode’s work, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), which will be the object of a separate analysis in volume 2 of the present work.
我的詞彙選擇很大程度上歸功於弗蘭克·克莫德的著作《結束的感覺：小說理論研究》（紐約：牛津大學出版社，1966 年），這將是本作第 2 卷中單獨分析的對象。

Chapter One 第一章

English quotations from the Confessions are taken from Saint Augustine, The Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin Books, 1961). My study owes a great deal to E. P. Meijering’s scholarly commentary, Augustin über Schöpfung, Ewigkeit und Zeit. Das elfte Buch des Bekenntnisse (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979). I place greater emphasis than he does on the aporetical character of the discussion and especially on the dialectic between distentio and intentio, which, however, is heavily stressed by A. Solignac in his “Notes Complémentaires” (pp. 572-91) to the French translation by E. Tréhorel and G. Bouissou, based on the text of M. Skutella (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1934), with an introduction and notes by Solignac, in the “Bibliothèque Augustinienne,” vol. 14 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962). Jean Guitton’s work, Le Temps et l’Eternité chez Plotin et saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1933), has lost none of its acuteness. For the references to Plotinus, I have made use of the introduction and commentary of Werner Beierwaltes, Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit: Enneade III 7 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967). Other works that will also be referred to are E. Gilson, “Notes sur l’être et le temps chez saint Augustin,” Recherches Augustiniennes 2 (1962): 204-23; and John C. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 149-204. On the history of the problem of the instant, see P. Duhem, Le Système du monde (Paris: A. Hermann, 1913), vol. 1, chap. 5.
《懺悔錄》的英文引文取自聖奧古斯丁，《懺悔錄》，譯者 R.S.派恩-科芬（紐約：企鵝書籍，1961 年）。我的研究很大程度上借鑑了 E.P.邁耶林的學術評論，《奧古斯丁論創造、永恆和時間：懺悔錄第十一卷》（萊頓：E.J.布里爾，1979 年）。我比他更強調討論的矛盾性，特別是關於 distentio 和 intentio 之間的辯證關係，這一點在 A.索林亞克為 E.特雷霍雷爾和 G.布瓦蘇根據 M.斯庫特拉的文本翻譯的法文版本（斯圖加特：特布納，1934 年）所撰寫的"補充注釋"（第 572-91 頁）中得到了充分強調，該法文版由索林亞克在"奧古斯丁文庫"第 14 卷（巴黎：德斯克雷，1962 年）中引入並附有注釋。讓·吉通的著作《普羅提諾和聖奧古斯丁的時間與永恆》（巴黎：弗林，1933 年）仍然如此敏銳。對於普羅提諾的引用，我使用了維爾納·貝爾瓦爾特斯的導論和評論，《普羅提諾論永恆與時間：恩涅阿德 III 7》（法蘭克福：克洛斯特曼，1967 年）。其他將被提及的著作包括 E.吉爾森，"論聖奧古斯丁的存在與時間"，《奧古斯丁研究》2（1962 年）：204-23；以及約翰·C·卡拉漢，《古代哲學中的四種時間觀》（劍橋：哈佛大學出版社，1948 年），第 149-204 頁。關於即時問題的歷史，參見 P.杜亨，《世界系統》（巴黎：A.赫曼，1913 年），第 1 卷，第 5 章。
This meditation extends from 1:1 to $14 : 17$ and is taken up again in $29 : 39$ and carried to the end, $31 : 41$ .
這段默想從 1:1 延伸到 $14 : 17$ ，並在 $29 : 39$ 中重新提起，並延伸到結尾， $31 : 41$ 。
J. Guitton, attentive to the tie between time and consciousness in Augustine, observes that the aporia of time is also the aporia of the self (Guitton, p. 224). He quotes Confessions 10, 16:25: “O Lord, I am working hard in this field, and the field of my labours is my own self. I have become a problem to myself, like land which a farmer only works with difficulty and at the cost of much sweat. For I am not now investigating the tracts of the heavens, or measuring the distance of the stars, or trying to discover how the earth hangs in space. I am investigating myself, my memory, my mind [ego sum, qui memini, ego animus].”
J. Guitton，對奧古斯丁時間與意識之間的聯繫保持警惕，觀察到時間的難題也是自我的難題（Guitton，第 224 頁）。他引用《懺悔錄》10，16:25 的話："主啊，我正在這片土地上辛勤勞作，我勞作的土地是我自己。我已成為自己的一個問題，就像一塊農夫只能費盡力氣、付出大量汗水才能耕種的土地。因為我現在不是在探索天空的疆域，或測量星辰之間的距離，或試圖發現地球如何懸在太空中。我是在探索自己，我的記憶，我的心靈【ego sum, qui memini, ego animus】。"
This audacious assertion, which is taken up again at the end of Part I, will be the object of a long discussion in volume 2 .
這個大膽的斷言，在第一部分結尾處重新提及，將在第二卷中成為長時間的討論對象。
I shall henceforth simply give the reference $14 : 17, 15 : 18$ , etc., whenever I am citing Book 11 of the Confessions.
今後，每當我引用《懺悔錄》第 11 卷時，我將簡單地給出引用 $14 : 17, 15 : 18$ 等。
Here the contrast with eternity is decisive: “As for the present, if it were always present and never moved on to become the past, it would not be time but eternity” ( $14 : 15$ ). We can, however, note in this respect that, regardless of the understanding we may have of eternity, the argument can be limited to appealing to our use of language involving the word “always.” The present is not always. In this way passing requires the contrast of remaining. (Meijering refers in this regard to Sermo 108 in which passing is opposed in a number of different ways to remaining.) As the argument continues we shall see the definition of the present become finer and finer.
在這裡，與永恆的對比是決定性的：「至於當下，如果它總是當下且從不移動到過去，它將不是時間而是永恆」（ $14 : 15$ ）。然而，在這方面我們可以注意到，無論我們對永恆的理解是什麼，這個論點可以限制在訴諸我們使用「總是」這個詞的語言上。現在不是「總是」的。這樣，流逝需要停留的對比。（梅耶林在這方面提到了講道 108，其中流逝以多種不同方式與停留相對立。）隨著論點的繼續，我們將看到當下的定義變得越來越精細。
This role of anticipation is well noted by Meijering in his commentary.
梅耶林在其評論中很好地注意到了這種預期的角色。
Regarding God’s laughter, see Meijering, pp. 60-61.
關於上帝的笑聲，請參見梅耶林，第 60-61 頁。
No more than did classical antiquity, Augustine has no word for units smaller than the hour. This does not change until the eighteenth century. Meijering (p. 64) refers in this regard to H. Michel, “La Notion de l’heure dans l’antiquité,” Janus 57 (1970): 115-24.
和古典古代一樣，奧古斯丁沒有比小時更小的時間單位。直到 18 世紀才發生變化。梅耶林（第 64 頁）在這方面提到了 H. 米歇爾，《古代小時概念》，《亞努斯》57（1970 年）：115-24。
Concerning the argument of the indivisible instant that has no extension, there is in Meijering (pp. 63-64) a reference to the texts of Sextus Empiricus and a fortunate reminder of the Stoic discussion presented by Victor Goldschmidt in Le Système stoïcien et le Temps, pp. 37 ff ., and pp. 184ff. It will have been noted that Augustine is perfectly aware of the dependence of his analysis on a speculative argumentation: si quid intelligitur temporis. . . . Here there can be no pretence of a pure phenomenology. In addition, the appearance of the notion of temporal extension should be noted, but this is not yet at the stage where it will take root: “For if its duration [that of the present] were prolonged, it could be divided into past and future [nam si extenditur, dividitur . . . ]” (15:20).
關於沒有延伸的不可分割瞬間的論點，在梅耶林（第 63-64 頁）中有塞克斯圖斯·恩皮里庫斯的文本引用，以及維克托·戈德施密特在《斯多亞系統與時間》（第 37 頁及以下，第 184 頁及以下）中對斯多亞派討論的幸運提醒。可以注意到奧古斯丁完全意識到他分析的依賴性是基於投機性論證：si quid intelligitur temporis......。在這裡不能假裝是純粹的現象學。此外，應該注意時間延伸概念的出現，但這還不是它將生根的階段："因為如果它的持續時間（現在的持續時間）被延長，它可以被劃分為過去和未來[nam si extenditur, dividitur...]"（15:20）。
Meijering ( p .66 ) recognizes in the Augustinian quaero the Greek Zetein which makes the difference between the Augustinian aporia and the complete ignorance of the skeptics. Jean Guitton discerns a non-Greek source for the Zetein in the Hebrew wisdom tradition which finds an echo in Acts 17:26.
梅耶林（第 66 頁）在奧古斯丁式的「quaero」中認出了希臘語「Zetein」，這使得奧古斯丁式的困境與懷疑論者的完全無知之間存在差異。讓·吉東在使徒行傳 17:26 中找到回響的希伯來智慧傳統中辨別出了 Zetein 的非希臘來源。
It is only after having resolved the first paradox of being and nonbeing that Augustine will be able to return to this assertion in more or less the same terms: “we measure time while it is passing” ( $21 : 27$ ). It is thus always in relation to the notion of measurement that the idea of passing imposes itself. But as yet we do not have the means at our disposal to understand the latter.
只有在解決存在與非存在的第一個悖論之後，奧古斯丁才能以或多或少相同的措辭返回這一斷言："我們在時間流逝時測量它"（ $21 : 27$ ）。因此，通過測量的概念，流逝的想法總是施加於此。但是，我們目前還沒有理解後者的手段。
The argument about prediction which concerns all human beings must be clearly distinguished from the argument about prophecy which concerns only the inspired prophets. This second argument presents a different problem, that of the way in which God (or the Word) “reveals” the future to the prophets (see 19:25). On this point, cf. Guitton, pp. 261-70. He stresses the liberating character of the Augustinian analysis of expectatio in relation to the entire pagan tradition of divination and manticism. To this extent, prophecy remains an exception and a gift.
關於預測的論點，這是涉及所有人類的問題，必須與關於先知靈感預言的論點明確區分。第二個論點提出了一個不同的問題，即上帝（或聖言）如何向先知"揭示"未來（參見 19:25）。在這一點上，參見吉通，第 261-70 頁。他強調了奧古斯丁對期待的分析在整個異教傳統的占卜和預言中具有解放性的特點。在這種程度上，預言仍然是一種例外和恩賜。
The entire paragraph must be cited: “When we describe the past correctly, it is not past facts which are drawn out of our memories but only words based on our memory-pictures of those facts, because when they happened they left an impression on our minds, by means of our sense-perception” $(18 : 23)$ . The number of prepositions concerning place or location is striking: it is out of $(e x)$ our memories that we draw words based on (ex) memories that leave an impression on (in) our minds. My “own childhood, which no longer exists, is in [in] past time, which also no longer exists. But when I remember those days . . . it is in [in] the present that I picture them to myself, because their picture is still present in [in] my memory” (ibid.). The question “where”
必須引用整段文字："當我們正確地描述過去時，從我們的記憶中提取的不是過去的事實，而是基於我們對這些事實的記憶圖像的文字，因為當它們發生時，它們通過我們的感知在我們的心靈中留下了印記" $(18 : 23)$ 。關於地點或位置的介詞數量令人驚訝：我們從記憶中提取的文字是基於（ex）在我們心靈中留下印記的（in）記憶。我"已不復存在的童年，現已不復存在的過去時間中。但當我回憶那些日子時……我在現在將它們呈現在腦海中，因為它們的圖像仍然存在於我的記憶中"（同上）。問題"在哪裡"
(“if the future and the past do exist, I want to know where [ubicumque] they are”) calls for the response, “in.”
（"如果未來和過去確實存在，我想知道它們在哪裡"）呼喚著回應："在。"
Perhaps it is even a little more so. Consider the premeditation of a future action. Like expectation, it is present, whereas the future action does not yet exist. But the “sign”-“cause” is here more complicated than mere prediction. For what I am anticipating is not only the beginning of an action but its completion. Carrying myself forward beyond its beginning, I see its beginning as the past of its future completion. We then use the future perfect: “Once we have set to work [aggressi fuerimus] and started to put our plans into action [agere coeperimus], that action exists, because it is not future but present” ( $18 : 23$ ). The future present is anticipated here through the use of the future perfect. The systematic study of verbal tenses by Harald Weinrich in his Tempus will pursue further this sort of investigation. See volume 2, chapter 3.
也許這甚至更是如此。考慮未來行動的預謀。像期待一樣，它是存在的，而未來的行動尚未存在。但是"符號"-"原因"在這裡比單純的預測更加複雜。我所預期的不僅僅是一個行動的開始，還有其完成。將自己推進到其開始之外，我看到其開始是未來完成的過去。然後我們使用將來完成時：「一旦我們開始工作[aggressi fuerimus]並開始實施我們的計劃[agere coeperimus]，那個行動就存在了，因為它不是未來，而是現在」（ $18 : 23$ ）。將來的現在在這裡通過使用將來完成時被預期。哈拉爾德·魏因里希在其《時態》一書中對動詞時態的系統性研究將進一步追究這種調查。參見第 2 卷，第 3 章。
The quasi-kinetic language of the transition from the future toward the past through the present (cf. below) will help to further consolidate this quasi-spatial language.
從未來通過現在走向過去的準動態語言將有助於進一步鞏固這種準空間語言。
Meijering stresses in this regard the role of concentration which, at the end of the book, will be related to the hope of stability which gives the human present a certain resemblance to God’s eternal present. We might also say that the narrative of Books 1-9 is the history of the quest for this concentration and this stability. On this point, see volume 2 of this study.
梅耶林在這方面強調了專注的作用，在書的結尾，這將與對穩定性的希望相關，這種希望使人類的現在與上帝的永恆現在有某種相似之處。我們也可以說，第 1-9 卷的敘事是對這種專注和穩定性的追尋史。關於這一點，請參見本研究的第 2 卷。
This substitution explains why Augustine no longer makes use of the distinction between motus and mora: “my question is whether a day is that movement [motus] itself, the time needed [mora] for its completion, or a combination of both” (23:30). Since all three hypotheses are discounted and the investigation into the very sense of the word “day” is abandoned, the distinction has no real consequences. With Guitton (p. 229), we can say that for Augustine “time is neither motus nor mora but more mora than motus.” The distentio animi has no more tie to mora than it does to motus.
這種替代解釋了為什麼奧古斯丁不再使用運動（motus）和延遲（mora）之間的區別："我的問題是，一天是否是運動（motus）本身，完成所需的時間（mora），或是兩者的結合"（23:30）。由於三種假設都被否定，對"天"這個詞的意義的調查被放棄，這種區別沒有實際後果。我們可以與吉頓（第 229 頁）一起說，對奧古斯丁來說，"時間既不是運動（motus）也不是延遲（mora），而是更多地是延遲（mora）而非運動（motus）"。心靈的張力（distentio animi）與延遲（mora）或運動（motus）都沒有更多的聯繫。
Augustine’s hesitation can be related to two other assertions: first, that the movement of the lights of the sky “marks out” time, then, in order to distinguish the moment when an interval of time begins and the moment when it stops, we must “mark” (notare) the place where the moving body starts out and the place where it arrives; if not, we are unable to say “how much time is needed for the body to complete its movement between the two points” (24:31). This notion of “marking” seems to be the only point of contact remaining between time and movement in Augustine. The question, then, is to know whether these spatial marks, in order to fulfill their role as points of reference for the length of time, do not make the measurement of time necessarily dependent on the regular motion of some moving body other than the soul. I shall return to this difficulty below.
奧古斯丁的猶豫可以與另外兩個斷言相關：首先，天空光源的移動「劃出」時間，然後，為了區分時間間隔開始的時刻和結束的時刻，我們必須「標記」（notare）移動物體出發的地方和到達的地方；如果不這樣做，我們就無法說「身體在兩點之間完成其移動所需的時間」（24:31）。這種「標記」的概念似乎是奧古斯丁中時間和運動之間剩餘的唯一接觸點。那麼問題是，這些空間標記為了履行作為時間長度的參考點的角色，是否不會使時間的測量必然依賴於某些靈魂以外的移動物體的規律運動。我將在下文中返回這個困難。
On this point, cf. Beierwaltes’s commentary on Enneads III 7, 11’, 41, diastasis zoes; A. Solignac, “Notes complémentaires,” pp. 588-91; and Meijering, pp. 90-93. The free adaptation of the Plotinian terms diastēma-diastasis by Christian writers goes back to Gregory of Nyssa, as has been established by J. Callahan, the author of Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy. See his essay “Gregory of Nyssa and the Psychological View of Time,” in Acts of the Twelfth International Congress of Philosophy (Florence: Sansoni, 1960), p. 59. Confirmation of this claim can be found in David L. Balas, “Eternity and Time in Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium,” in H. Dorrie, M. Altenburger, and U. Sinryhe, eds., Gregory von Nyssa und die Philosophie, The Second International Colloquy on Gregory of Nyssa, 1972 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), pp. 128-53. In the same collection, T. Paul Verghese establishes that the notion of diastēma is used esentially as a criterion for distinguishing the divine trinity from the creature. In God there is no diastëma between the Father and the Son, no interval, no distance. Consequently diastëma characterizes creation as such, partic-
在這一點上，參見 Beierwaltes 對《涅槃》III 7, 11', 41 的評論，生命的間隔；A. Solignac，"補充性注釋"，第 588-91 頁；以及 Meijering，第 90-93 頁。基督教作家對普羅提諾術語 diastēma-diastasis 的自由改編可追溯至尼撒的格雷戈里，正如 J. Callahan（《古代哲學中的四種時間觀》的作者）所確立的。參見他在《第十二屆國際哲學大會論文集》（佛羅倫薩：Sansoni，1960 年）中的論文"尼撒的格雷戈里與時間的心理學觀點"，第 59 頁。大衛·L·巴拉斯在《H. Dorrie、M. Altenburger 和 U. Sinryhe 編輯的格雷戈里對尼撒的哲學》（第二屆尼撒的格雷戈里國際討論會，1972 年，萊頓：E. J. Brill，1976 年）一書中的文章"尼撒的格雷戈里：永恆與時間對抗歐諾米烏斯"，第 128-53 頁，可以確認這一論點。在同一論文集中，T. 保羅·弗格瑟斯確立，diastēma 的概念基本上被用作區分神聖三位一體與受造物的標準。在上帝那裡，父與子之間沒有 diastëma，沒有間隔，沒有距離。因此，diastëma 特徵化了創造本身，特別是
ularly the interval between the Creator and the creature. See T. Paul Verghese, “Diastema and Diastasis in Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction to a Concept and the Posing of a Concept,” in ibid., pp. 243-58. Even assuming that this adaptation of the Plotinian terminology by the Greek fathers was known to Augustine, his originality remains. He is the only one to derive the distentio from just the extension of the soul.
創造者與受造物之間的間隔。參見 T. 保羅·弗格瑟斯在同一論文集中的文章"尼撒的格雷戈里中的 Diastema 和 Diastasis：概念的引入和概念的提出"，第 243-58 頁。即使假設希臘教父對普羅提諾術語的這種改編為奧古斯丁所知，他的原創性仍然存在。他是唯一從靈魂的延伸中推導出 distentio 的人。
Note the slight shift in the expression. A bit earlier Augustine rejected the possibility of measuring the pointlike present: quia nullo spatio tenditur, “because it has no extent” (26:33). In my opinion, tenditur announces the intentio of which the distentio is but the reverse side. In fact, the pointlike present has neither tension or distension; only the “time that passes” can admit these. This is why in the following paragraph it must be said of the present, inasmuch as it passes (praeteriens), that it “gains some extent” as a sort of lapse of time. This is no longer the present considered as a point but the living present, both under tension and distended.
注意表達的微妙變化。稍早前，奧古斯丁拒絕測量點狀現在的可能性：quia nullo spatio tenditur，"因為它沒有範圍"（26:33）。在我看來，tenditur 預示了 intentio，而 distentio 只是其反面。事實上，點狀現在既沒有張力也沒有延伸；只有"流逝的時間"才能接受這些。這就是為什麼在下一段中，必須說現在，就其流逝（praeteriens）而言，"獲得某種範圍"，如同時間的一種滲透。這不再是被視為點的現在，而是充滿張力和延伸的當下。
Solignac stresses the aporetical character of this page by giving as the subtitle of his translation of 27:34 “Deeper Analysis. New Aporias” (p. 329).
索利尼亞克強調這一頁的矛盾性，在他對 27:34 的翻譯副標題中寫道"更深入的分析。新的矛盾"（第 329 頁）。
If the sensitur confounds the skeptics, the quantum, notes Meijering (p. 95), indicates a certain reservation with respect to the Epicureans and their overconfidence in sensation. Here, Augustine is following the middle road of Platonism, that of a guarded confidence in the senses controlled by the intelligence.
如果 sensitur 使懷疑論者感到困惑，梅耶林（Meijering）指出，量子顯示了對伊壁鳩魯學派及其對感官過度自信的某種保留（第 95 頁）。在這裡，奧古斯丁遵循柏拉圖主義的中間路線，即對由智慧控制的感官保持謹慎的信心。
My analysis differs here from that of Meijering, who pays almost exclusive attention to the contrast between eternity and time and does not stress the internal dialectic of time itself, involving intention and distension. It is true, as will be stated later, that this contrast is accentuated by the striving for eternity that animates the intentio. However, Guitton strongly emphasizes this tension of the mind with respect to which distentio stands as the reverse side: “Saint Augustine, as his reflection progressed, was obliged to attribute opposing qualities to time. Its duration is an extensio, a distentio which includes within it an attentio, an intentio. As a result of this, time is closely related to actio, of which it is the spiritual form” (p. 232). Thus the instant is “an act of the mind” (p. 234).
我的分析在這裡與梅耶林的不同，他幾乎完全關注永恆與時間之間的對比，而不強調時間本身的內在辯證法，涉及意向和延伸。誠然，正如稍後將闡述的，這種對比由追求永恆的意向所加劇。然而，吉頓（Guitton）強烈強調了心靈的這種緊張，對此 distentio 是其反面："隨著奧古斯丁思考的深入，他不得不賦予時間相反的特質。它的持續是一種延伸（extensio），其中包含了一種專注（attentio）和意向（intentio）。因此，時間與行動（actio）密切相關，是其精神形式"（第 232 頁）。因此，瞬間是"心靈的一種行為"（第 234 頁）。
Kant will encounter the same enigma of a passivity that is actively produced with the idea of Selbstaffektion in the second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. See B67-69. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965], pp. 87-89.) I shall return to this point in volume 2 .
康德將在《純粹理性批判》第二版中遇到同樣的謎題，即通過自我感受（Selbstaffektion）的觀念，主動產生一種被動性。參見 B67-69。（伊曼紐爾·康德，《純粹理性批判》，諾曼·肯普·史密斯譯【紐約：聖馬丁出版社，1965 年】，第 87-89 頁）我將在第二卷中回到這一點。
Two other objections might also arise. First of all, what is the relation of the Augustinian distentio animi to Plotinus’s diastasis zoes? And what is the relation of the whole of Book 11 to the narration of the first nine books of the Confessions? To the first objection, I would reply that my purpose here does not allow me to treat the relation of Augustine to Plotinus in terms of the history of ideas. However I readily acknowledge that a good understanding of the mutation undergone by the Plotinian analysis of time can contribute to deepening the enigma that Augustine willed to posterity. A few footnotes obviously do not suffice in this regard. I would refer the reader to the commentaries of Solignac and Meijering on the Confessions to fill this gap, as well as to Beierwaltes’s study on Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit. With regard to the speculation on time and the narration of the first nine books, this is of particular interest to me. I shall return to it in the second volume of the present work within the framework of a reflection on repetition. Something in this regard can already be intimated here if we refer to the confessio within which Augustine’s entire work is cloaked.
可能還會出現另外兩個異議。首先，奧古斯丁的「心靈擴張」（distentio animi）與普羅提諾的「生命延展」（diastasis zoes）之間有何關係？《懺悔錄》前九卷的敘事與第 11 卷的整體又有何關係？對於第一個異議，我的目的並不允許我以思想史的角度處理奧古斯丁與普羅提諾之間的關係。然而，我欣然承認，對普羅提諾時間分析所經歷的變化有一個良好的理解，可以有助於深化奧古斯丁留給後世的謎題。顯然，幾個腳註是不足的。我想把讀者引導至索利尼亞克和梅耶林對《懺悔錄》的注釋，以填補這一空白，以及貝爾瓦爾特斯關於普羅提諾的永恆與時間的研究。至於關於時間的思考和前九卷的敘事，這對我特別感興趣。我將在本書的第二卷中，在對重複的反思框架內回到這一點。如果我們參考包裹著奧古斯丁整個作品的告白，這方面的某些事情已經可以在此被暗示。
In this respect, we cannot consider the great prayer of $2 : 3$ to be a mere rhetorical ornament. (The French translator has very judiciously chosen to give a version in verse.) It contains the melodic line that speculation, along with the hymn, will develop: “Yours is the day, Yours the night. No moment of time passes except by your
在這方面，我們不能將 $2 : 3$ 的偉大禱告視為純粹的修辭裝飾。（法語翻譯者非常明智地選擇以詩歌形式呈現。）它包含了思辨與讚美詩將發展的旋律線："日屬於你，夜也屬於你。除了通過你，沒有一刻時間流逝。"
will. Grant me some part of it for my meditations on the secrets of your law. Do not close your door to those who knock: do not close the book of your law to me.” Speculation and hymn are joined together in the “confession.” It is in a confessional tone that the principium of Genesis $1 : 1$ is invoked in the prayer of 2:3: “Let me acknowledge [confitear tibi] as yours whatever I find in your books. Let me listen to the sound of your praises. Let me drink you in and contemplate the wonders of your law from the very beginning, when you made heaven and earth, to the coming of your kingdom, when we shall be forever with you in your holy city.”
求您將部分授予我，讓我沉思您律法的奧秘。不要對叩門者關閉您的大門：不要向我關閉您律法的書卷。"推測和讚美詩在"懺悔"中結合在一起。以懺悔的語氣，創世紀的原理被祈禱 2:3 中援引：「讓我承認您的一切，無論我在您的書中找到什麼。讓我聆聽您讚美的聲音。讓我飲用並從一開始就沉思您律法的奇蹟，當您創造天地，直到您的王國來臨，我們將永遠與您同在您的聖城。」
In this knowledge is summed up both the affinity and the radical difference between Plotinus and Augustine. The theme of the creation constitutes this difference. Guitton takes the measure of this gap in a few pages (pp. 136-45). Augustine, he says, “poured into the mold provided by the Enneads an inspiration that was foreign to Plotinus, even opposed to his thinking, and such that its entire dialectic tended to deny it, to prevent it from emerging, or to dissolve it” (ibid., p. 140). From the idea of creation resulted a temporary cosmos, a temporal conversion, and a historical religion. In this way time is justified as well as founded. As for the anthropomorphism which Plotinian emanationism seems to avoid, we might wonder whether the metaphorical resources of Augustine’s material anthropomorphism are not more precious as regards the schema of creative causality than the Neoplatonic exemplarism which reposes in the identity of “the one” and which does not avoid a more subtle, because it is purely formal, anthropomorphism. The metaphor of creation keeps us attentive as well as on our guard, whereas exemplarism attracts us by its philosophical character. On this point, see Guitton, pp. 198-99. On the “eternal creator and temporal creation,” cf. Meijering’s exhaustive commentary, pp. 17-57. He gives all the pertinent references to the Timeaus and the Enneads.
在這段知識中，總結了普羅提諾和奧古斯丁之間的親和力和根本差異。創造的主題構成了這種差異。吉松在幾頁中（第 136-45 頁）衡量了這個差距。奧古斯丁，他說，「將一種對普羅提諾來說是陌生的，甚至是違背其思想的靈感，倒入了《九章集》提供的模具，其整個辯證法傾向於否定它，阻止它出現，或將其解散」（同上，第 140 頁）。從創造的概念產生了暫時的宇宙、暫時的轉化和歷史宗教。這樣，時間得到了辯護和確立。至於普羅提諾的流出論似乎避免的擬人化，我們可能會想知道奧古斯丁的物質擬人化的隱喻資源，在創造性因果關係的模式中是否比新柏拉圖主義的範例論更珍貴，後者停留在「至一」的同一性上，並且沒有避免一種更微妙的，因為它是純粹形式的擬人化。創造的隱喻使我們保持警惕和警醒，而範例論以其哲學特性吸引我們。關於這一點，請參見吉松，第 198-99 頁。關於「永恆的創造者和暫時的創造」，參見梅耶林的詳盡評論，第 17-57 頁。他提供了所有相關的《提邁歐斯篇》和《九章集》的引用。
If this ontological deficiency has a function in the argumentation other than that of the nonbeing of the skeptical argument about time, tied to the “not yet” of the future and the “no longer” of the past, nevertheless it stamps this nonbeing with the seal of the lack that is peculiar to created beings: “for we know, O Lord, that the extent to which something once was, but no longer is, is the measure of its death; and the extent to which something once was not, but now is, is the measure of its beginning” (7:9). Henceforth the two adjectives “eternal” (along with its synonym “immortal”) and “temporal” are opposed to each other. Temporal means not eternal. Later, we shall wonder if the negation does not work both ways. Already here, in 7:9, to be eternal implies not “giving place to the next.” With respect to the synonyms of eternity (immortalitas, incorruptibilitas, incommutabilitas), see Meijering, p. 32, who refers to Timaeus 29 c . Let us therefore retain these first two moments of the limiting function of the idea of eternity contained in the two negatives: it is not like an artisan working with some earlier material that the Word creates; it is not with a voice that sounds in time that the Word speaks.
如果這種本體論上的缺陷在論證中除了關於時間的懷疑論論點之外，還有其他功能，那麼它卻以創造生命特有的缺乏印記這種非存在：「因為我們知道，噢，主啊，某物曾經存在但不再存在的程度，就是其死亡的衡量；而某物曾經不存在但現在存在的程度，就是其開始的衡量」（7:9）。此後，「永恆的」（以及其同義詞「不朽的」）和「暫時的」這兩個形容詞相互對立。暫時意味著非永恆。稍後，我們將思考否定是否可以雙向運作。已經在 7:9 中，永恆意味著「不給予下一個位置」。關於永恆的同義詞（不朽性、不朽性、不變性），參見梅耶林，第 32 頁，他引用了柏拉圖的《提邁歐斯篇》29c。因此，讓我們保留永恆概念限制功能的這兩個初始時刻：不像工匠使用某些較早的材料，聖言創造；不是用在時間中響起的聲音，聖言說話。
The translators and the interpreter of the Confessions in the “Bibliothèque Augustinienne” indicate a caesura between 10:11 and 10:12, and divide Book 11 in the following way: I. The creation and the creating Word (3:5-10:12). II. The problem of time: (a) before the creation, 10:12-14:17; (b) the being of time and its measurement, $14 : 17 - 29 : 39$ . My own analysis leads me to group together I and II(a) under the simple heading: the intensification of the distentio animi by its contrast with eternity. In addition, the apparently preposterous question that begins at 10:12 possesses the same aporetical style characterized by the questions “How?” (5:7) and “Why?” (6:8), which appeared to us to be provoked by the very confession of eternity. Finally, the aporia and the responses to it will give rise to the same sort of deepening reflection concerning the negative discussion of temporality begun at $3 : 5$ .
《聖奧古斯丁懺悔錄》中的翻譯者和口譯員在 10:11 和 10:12 之間指出了一個斷點，並將第 11 卷劃分如下：I. 創造與創造之聖言（3:5-10:12）。II. 時間的問題：(a) 在創造之前，10:12-14:17；(b) 時間的存在及其測量， $14 : 17 - 29 : 39$ 。我的分析傾向於將 I 和 II(a)歸類在「通過與永恆的對比強化心靈的張力」這一簡單標題下。此外，從 10:12 開始的看似荒謬的問題具有相同的邏輯難題風格，特徵是「如何？」（5:7）和「為什麼？」（6:8）等問題，這些問題似乎是由永恆的懺悔本身所引發的。最後，這種邏輯難題及其回應將引發對在 $3 : 5$ 開始的時間性負面討論的深入反思。
Already in Timaeus 37e, Plato had excluded the past and the future from eter-
已在柏拉圖《蒂邁歐斯篇》37e 中，排除了過去和未來在永恆之外，但尚未談論永恆的當下。
nity without yet speaking of the eternal present. Meijering, p. 46, cites other texts of Augustine that interpret the stare and the manere of God as the eternal present. He strongly emphasizes (p. 43) that Augustine accepts the part of the argument of $10 : 12$ that says that “the will of God is not a created thing. It is there before any creation takes place. . . . The will of God, then, is part of his substance.” Meijering also likens this text to Plotinus’s Enneads VI 8:13 and 9:14. He identifies the first expression of the eternal present in the middle Platonism of Numenius before its formulation in Plotinus (he refers in this regard to Beierwaltes, pp. 170-73), then in Gregory of Nyssa and Athanasius.
Meijering 在第 46 頁引用了奧古斯丁其他文本，解釋上帝的「停留」和「存在」為永恆的當下。他強調（第 43 頁）奧古斯丁接受了論點的一部分，即「上帝的意志不是被創造的事物。它在任何創造發生之前就已存在……上帝的意志因此是其本質的一部分。」Meijering 還將此文本類比於普羅提諾《九子篇》VI 8:13 和 9:14。他認為永恆當下的首次表達出現在中期柏拉圖主義的努米尼烏斯那裡，早於普羅提諾的表述（他在此援引 Beierwaltes，第 170-73 頁），隨後在尼撒的格里高利和亞他那修的著作中也有體現。
Today we have trouble imagining how animated-not to say violent-were the quarrels to which the idea of a temporal creation gave rise. Guitton shows how they were exacerbated by the conflict between literal exegesis and allegorical exegesis incited by the biblical narrative of creation “in six days” and, more especially, by the sense to be given to the “three days” preceding the creation of the great heavenly lights. Cf. Guitton, pp. 177-91.
今天我們很難想像關於時間創造的爭論是多麼激烈。吉通展示了這些爭論是如何被文字直解和寓意解讀之間的衝突所加劇，尤其是聖經關於「六天」創造和「三天」在大天體被創造之前的意義。參見吉通，第 177-91 頁。
The question here is not that of the faithfulness of the Latin translation to the Hebrew, but that of its influence within the philosophical tradition.
這裡討論的不是拉丁文翻譯對希伯來文的忠實程度，而是其在哲學傳統中的影響。
A. Solignac (pp. 583-84) refers here to Etienne Gilson, Philosophie et Incarnation chez saint Augustin, in which he studies the principal texts of Augustine’s work concerning the famous verse from Exodus and other verses from the psalms, in particular Sermo 7. Solignac comments, “the transcendence of eternity in relation to time for Augustine is the transcendence of a personal God who created other persons and who converses with them. It is thus the transcendence of a being who possesses himself in an endless present in relation to the existence of beings whose contingency is manifestly within the vicissitudes of time” (ibid., p. 584).
A. 索利尼亞克（第 583-84 頁）在此提到伊蒂安·吉爾森《聖奧古斯丁的哲學與化身》，研究了奧古斯丁關於出埃及記著名經文和詩篇其他經文的主要文本，特別是第 7 講道。索利尼亞克評論道：「對奧古斯丁來說，永恆相對於時間的超越性是一位創造了其他人並與他們交談的位格上帝的超越性。因此，這是一個在無盡的當下完全擁有自我的存在，相對於那些明顯處於時間變遷中的存在的偶然性。」（同上，第 584 頁）
I am not discussing here the question whether the idea of eternity is itself entirely positive, as we are led to believe by the terms manere, stans, semper, totum esse praesens. To the extent that “beginning,” “ceasing,” and “passing” are themselves positive terms, eternity is also the negative of time, “the other” of time. Even the expression “completely present” denies that God’s present has a past and a future. Memory and expectation are positive experiences due to the presence of the vestige-images and sign-images. The eternal present does not appear to be a purely positive notion except by reason of its homonymy with the present that passes. To say that it is eternal, we must deny that it is the passive and active transit from the future toward the past. It is still insofar as it is not a present that is “passed through.” Eternity is also conceived of negatively, as that which does not include time, as that which is not temporal. In this sense, there is a double negation: I must be able to deny the features of my experience of time in order to perceive this experience as a lack with respect to that which denies it. It is this double and mutual negation whereby eternity is the other of time that, more than anything else, intensifies the experience of time.
在此我不討論永恆的概念本身是否完全是正面的，就像我們被"manere"、"stans"、"semper"、"totum esse praesens"這些詞所引導的那樣。在"開始"、"停止"和"逝去"本身是正面詞彙的範圍內，永恆也是時間的否定，是時間的"另一面"。即使是"完全當下"的表達也否定了上帝的當下有過去和未來。由於痕跡意象和符號意象的存在，記憶和期待是正面的體驗。永恆的當下似乎除了與逝去的當下的同音性外，並不是一個純粹正面的概念。要說它是永恆的，我們必須否定它是從未來向過去的被動和主動過渡。只要它不是一個"經歷過的"當下，它就是靜止的。永恆也被視為負面的，作為不包含時間的事物，作為非時間性的事物。在這個意義上，存在著雙重否定：我必須能夠否定我時間經驗的特徵，以便將這種經驗視為相對於否定它的事物的缺失。正是這種雙重且相互的否定，永恆是時間的另一面，比任何事物都更強化了時間的體驗。
Pierre Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin (Paris: de Boccard, 1950), chapter 1, emphasizes that the term “confession” in Augustine goes far beyond the confession of sins and includes the confession of faith and the confession of praise. The analysis of time and the elegia of the distentio animi are related to the second and third senses of the Augustinian confessio. Narrative, as I shall state below, is also included within it.
皮埃爾·庫塞爾在《關於聖奧古斯丁的懺悔錄的研究》（巴黎：德·博卡德，1950 年）第 1 章強調，在奧古斯丁那裡，"懺悔"一詞遠遠超出了對罪的懺悔，還包括信仰的懺悔和讚美的懺悔。時間的分析和"心靈的伸展"的挽歌與奧古斯丁懺悔的第二和第三層意義有關。正如我下面將陳述的，敘事也包含在其中。
The expression in regione dissimilitudinis has inspired a number of works which are recalled in a lengthy note, no. 16, in A. Solignac (pp. 689-93). The fortune of this expression from Plato to the Christian Middle Ages is particularly stressed in Etienne Gilson, “Regio dissimilitudinis de Platon à saint Bernard de Clairvaux,” Medieval Studies 9 (1947): 108-30, and Pierre Courcelle, “Traditions néo-platoniciennes et traditions chrétiennes de la région de dissemblance,” Archives d’Histoire Littéraire et
在《不相似之地》這個表達方式激發了許多作品，這些作品在 A. Solignac 的注釋中（第 689-93 頁）被詳細回顧。從柏拉圖到基督教中世紀，這一表達方式的流傳尤其在艾蒂安·吉爾森的《從柏拉圖到克萊爾沃的聖伯納德的不相似之地》（Medieval Studies 9，1947 年）和皮埃爾·庫塞爾的《新柏拉圖主義和基督教傳統中的不相似之地》（Archives d'Histoire Littéraire et

Doctrinale du Moyen Age 24 (1927): 5-33, reprinted as an appendix to his Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin.
Doctrinale du Moyen Age 24（1927 年）：5-33，收錄在他的《對聖奧古斯丁自白錄的研究》附錄中。
38. But must we go so far as to distinguish, as does Guitton, “two internal movements which can be distinguished by consciousness, although they are mutually interrelated, expectatio futurorum which bears us toward the future and extentio ad superiora which orientates us, once and for all, toward the eternal”? (p. 137). Do these constitute “two forms of time” (ibid.), where the ecstasy of Ostia would illustrate the second form? I do not think so, if we consider the third way in which eternity affects the experience of time, which I shall discuss below. Guitton himself is prepared to agree. What basically distinguishes Augustine from Plotinus and from Spinoza is the impossibility of “separating ontologically” (ibid., p. 243) the extensio ad superiora, which in Spinoza will be called amor intellectualis, from the expectatio futurorum, which in Spinoza becomes duratio. The ecstasy of Ostia confirms this. Unlike Neoplatonic ecstasy, it is a weakness as well as an ascension. I shall return to this in volume 2. Narration is possible wherever eternity attracts and elevates time, not where it abolishes it.
38. 但我們是否要像吉通那樣，區分意識中可以辨別的"兩種內在運動"：朝向未來的期待（expectatio futurorum）和朝向永恆的定向（extentio ad superiora）？（第 137 頁）。這些是否構成了"兩種時間形式"（同上），其中奧斯蒂亞的狂喜會說明第二種形式？我不這麼認為，如果我們考慮永恆影響時間經驗的第三種方式，我將在下文討論。吉通本人也準備同意。基本上，區分奧古斯丁與普羅提諾斯和斯賓諾莎的是，不可能"在本體論上"（同上，第 243 頁）將朝向更高的定向（在斯賓諾莎那裡稱為知性之愛）與朝向未來的期待（在斯賓諾莎那裡成為持續性）分開。奧斯蒂亞的狂喜證實了這一點。與新柏拉圖主義的狂喜不同，它既是一種軟弱，也是一種上升。我將在第 2 卷中再次討論這一點。只有當永恆吸引和提升時間時，敘事才成為可能，而不是當它消除時間時。
39. Stanislas Boros, “Les Catégories de la temporalité chez saint Augustin,” Archives de Philosophie 21 (1958): 323-85.
39. 斯坦尼斯拉斯·博羅斯，《聖奧古斯丁的時間性範疇》，Archives de Philosophie 21（1958 年）：323-85。
40. To which must be added admonition (admonitio), which is commented on by A. Solignac (p. 562).
40. 必須再加上告誡（admonitio），A. Solignac（第 562 頁）對此進行了評論。

Chapter Two 第二章

See below, n. 4.
參見下文，第 4 節。
We shall, nevertheless, be interested in, without overestimating, all the references in Aristotle’s text that suggest a referential relation between the “poetic” text and the real “ethical” world.
然而，我們將關注（但不會高估）亞里士多德文本中所有暗示詩歌文本與真實倫理世界之間存在參照關係的引用。
G. F. Else, Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Aristotle, Poetics, introduction, commentary, and appendices by Frank L. Lucas (Oxford University Press, 1968). L. Golden and O. B. Hardison, Aristotle’s Poetics: A Translation and Commentary for Students of Literature (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968). Aristotle, Poétique, texte établi et traduit par J. Hardy (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1969). Aristotle, La Poétique, texte, traduction, notes par Roselyne Dupont-Roc et Jean Lallot (Paris: Seuil, 1980). I must also acknowledge my indebtedness to James M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
G. F. Else，《亞里士多德的詩學：論證》（劍橋：哈佛大學出版社，1957 年）。亞里士多德，《詩學》，弗蘭克·L·盧卡斯的導言、評論和附錄（牛津大學出版社，1968 年）。L. 戈登和 O. B. 哈迪遜，《亞里士多德的詩學：文學學生譯本與評論》（新澤西州恩格爾伍德克利夫斯：普倫蒂斯霍爾，1968 年）。亞里士多德，《詩學》，J. 哈迪建立文本並翻譯（巴黎：貝爾萊特，1969 年）。亞里士多德，《詩學》，羅斯琳·杜邦-羅克和讓·拉洛特的文本、翻譯、注釋（巴黎：塞伊，1980 年）。我還必須承認我對詹姆斯·M·雷德菲爾德《伊利亞德中的自然與文化：赫克托的悲劇》（芝加哥：芝加哥大學出版社，1975 年）的債務。
In the French text of this work I adopted the translation by Dupont-Roc and Lallot, only replacing histoire by intrigue for the word muthos. I did so because of the importance of “history” in later chapters of this work. Here I will cite the recent translation by James Hutton: Aristotle’s Poetics, trans., with an introduction and notes by James Hutton (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982).
在這部作品的法文文本中，我採用了杜邦-羅克和拉洛特的譯本，僅將「histoire」替換為「intrigue」，用於表示「muthos」一詞。我這樣做是因為在本作品的後面章節中「歷史」的重要性。在此，我將引用詹姆斯·赫頓最近的譯本：詹姆斯·赫頓翻譯並附導言和注釋的《亞里士多德的詩學》（紐約：W. W. 諾頓公司，1982 年）。
Cf. G. Else ad 47a8-18. He even suggests translating the term mimésis when it appears in the plural by “imitatings” to make clear that the mimetic process expresses the poetic activity itself. The -sis ending common to poiēsis and sustasis as well as mimésis underlines the process-character of each of these terms.
參見 G. Else 對 47a8-18 的解讀。他甚至建議在複數形式出現時將「mimésis」一詞譯為「模仿行為」，以明確表達模仿過程本身就是詩歌創作活動。「poiēsis」、「sustasis」和「mimésis」共有的-sis 結尾強調了每個術語的過程特性。
The “representations in images” (47a19), referred to in Chapter 1-which is devoted to the “how” of representation, not to its “what” or its “mode” (see below)continue to provide illuminating parallels borrowed from painting.
第 1 章中提到的「圖像表現」（47a19）——該章節專注於表現的「如何」，而非其「是什麼」或「模式」（見下文）——繼續提供借鑒繪畫的 illuminating 平行例子。
“Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and possessing magnitude; in embellished language, each kind of which is used separately in the different parts; in the mode of action and not narrated [apangelia]; and effecting through pity and fear [what we call] the catharsis of such emotions” (49b24-28).
"悲劇是對一個嚴肅、完整且具有重大意義的行動的模仿；使用修飾過的語言，每種語言類型在不同部分分別使用；以行動模式而非敘述方式；通過憐憫和恐懼達到[我們稱之為]這類情感的淨化"（49b24-28）。
Aristotle here is replying to Plato who is replying to Gorgias. See Redfield, pp. 45f. Gorgias praises painters and artists for their skill in deceiving us (in his Dissoi Logoi and In Praise of Helen). Socrates draws from him an argument against art and the power it provides for manipulating opinions. The whole discussion of mimesis in Book 10 of the Republic is dominated by this distrust. The famous definition of art as the imitation of an imitation, twice removed from reality (596a-597b) and as moreover condemned to “imitating the pathos of others” (604e) is well known. The legislator therefore can only see in poetry the contradiction of philosophy. Aristotle’s Poetics thus is a reply to Book 10 of the Republic. For Aristotle, imitation is an activity and one that teaches us something.
亞里士多德在此回應柏拉圖，而柏拉圖是在回應高爾吉亞。參見雷德菲爾德，第 45 頁及以下。高爾吉亞讚揚畫家和藝術家在欺騙我們方面的技巧（在他的《異論》和《讚頌海倫》中）。蘇格拉底從他那裡引出了一個關於藝術及其操縱觀點能力的論點。共和國第 10 卷中關於模仿的整個討論都籠罩著這種不信任。藝術被定義為二度模仿，遠離現實（596a-597b），並且注定要"模仿他人的情感"（604e）的著名定義是眾所周知的。因此，立法者只能在詩歌中看到與哲學的矛盾。亞里士多德的《詩學》因此是對《共和國》第 10 卷的回應。對於亞里士多德來說，模仿是一種教導我們某些事物的活動。
The “means” of representation, which we have already alluded to, and which are much more numerous than those tragedy, comedy, and epic make use of, are always arts of composition.
我們已經提到的表現"方式"，比悲劇、喜劇和史詩所使用的更為多樣，始終是作曲藝術。
I prefer this Husserlian vocabulary to the more Saussurean one chosen by Dupont-Roc and Lallot, who take mimesis as the signifier and praxis as the signified, to the exclusion of any extralinguistic referent. See Dupont-Roc and Lallot, pp. 21920. First of all, the pair signifier/signified seems inappropriate to me, for reasons I explain in my Rule of Metaphor and which I borrow from Benveniste, for the semantic order of the sentence of discourse and a fortiori for that of the text, which is a composition of sentences. Furthermore, the noetic-noematic relation does not exclude a referential development, represented in Husserl by the problematic of “fulfillment.” I hope to show below that Aristotelian mimesis is not exhausted by the strict noematic correlation between representation and what is represented, but rather opens the way to an investigation of the referents of poetic activity intended by emplotment on the two sides [en amont et en aval] of mimesis/muthos.
我更喜歡這種胡塞爾的詞彙，而不是杜龐-洛克和拉洛特選擇的更具索緒爾風格的詞彙，他們將米美西斯作為能指，將實踐作為所指，排除任何語言外的指涉物。參見杜龐-洛克和拉洛特，第 219-20 頁。首先，能指/所指這對概念對我來說似乎不恰當，原因我已在《比喻的規則》中解釋，這些理由我借鑒於本韋尼斯特，這適用於話語句子的語義秩序，更不用說文本的語義秩序了，文本是由句子組成的。此外，知向-知性關係並不排除一種指涉性發展，在胡塞爾那裡以"履行"的問題得到體現。我希望在下文中表明，亞里士多德的米美西斯並不僅僅局限於表現與被表現之間的嚴格知性關聯，而是開闢了一條通往探索詩歌活動所指涉對象的道路，這些對象意圖通過情節安排在米美西斯/物語的兩側展開。
Dupont-Roc and Lallot: les aggissants.
杜龐-洛克和拉洛特：行動者。
Better or worse than what? The text says “better than we are” (48a18). Below I shall discuss this reference in the Poetics to a feature of ethical action in the “real” world. I shall attach this reference to a usage of the term mimesis less strictly governed by the noematic correlation to muthos. It should be noted that this reference to ethics rightly applies to the whole field of mimetic activity, in particular to painting. The distinction between comedy and tragedy is in this sense only one application of the criterion of “how” to the arts of versified language. Cf. 48al-18.
比什麼更好或更壞？文本說"比我們更好"（48a18）。在下文中，我將討論《詩學》中關於"現實"世界中倫理行動特徵的這一引用。我將把這一引用與米美西斯一詞的使用聯繫起來，這種使用不太受物語相關性的嚴格約束。應當注意的是，這種對倫理的引用恰當地適用於整個模仿活動領域，特別是繪畫。喜劇和悲劇之間的區別在這個意義上只是"如何"標準在韻文語言藝術中的一種應用。參見 48a1-18。
In his commentary on Chapter 3, devoted to the mode of mimesis, Else notes that the three modes-narrative, mixed, and dramatic-constitute a progression that makes the dramatic mode the imitation par excellence, thanks to the direct character of the expression of human truth, the characters themselves doing the represented or imitated action. See Else, p. 101.
在他對第 3 章的評論中，該章節專門討論米美西斯的模式，艾爾斯指出，敘事、混合和戲劇這三種模式構成了一個進程，使戲劇模式成為模仿的典範，這是由於其直接表達人類真理的特性，角色自身進行被表現或模仿的行動。參見艾爾斯，第 101 頁。
Aristotle uses both apangelia (chap. 3) and diēgēsis (chaps. 23 and 26): “in epic the narrative form [en de tē epopoiia dia to diēgēsin]” (59b26). This vocabulary comes from Plato, The Republic, 392c-394c. But while for Plato narrative “by mimesis” was opposed to “simple narrative,” as narrative delegated to a character versus direct narrative, with Aristotle mimesis becomes one large category encompassing both dramatic and diegetic composition.
亞里斯多德在《詩學》中同時使用了「apangelia」（第 3 章）和「diēgēsis」（第 23 和 26 章）："在史詩中的敘事形式[en de tē epopoiia dia to diēgēsin]"（59b26）。這個詞彙源自柏拉圖的《理想國》，392c-394c。但是，對於柏拉圖來說，通過模仿（mimesis）的敘事與「簡單的敘事」相對，即由角色敘事與直接敘事相對；而對於亞里斯多德，模仿成為一個包含戲劇性和敘事性作品的大類。
Dupont-Roc and Lallot, in their commentary (p. 370), do not hesitate to speak of récit diégétique and récit narratif in order to designate narrative as narrated by the narrator (following the definition in Chapter 3 of the Poetics). We may therefore also speak of dramatic narrative and thereby give the term “narrative” a generic character in relation to its two species, the dramatic and the diegetic.
杜邦-羅克和拉洛特在其評論（第 370 頁）中毫不猶豫地談到「敘事性敘述」和「敘事敘述」，以指定由敘述者敘述的敘事（根據《詩學》第 3 章的定義）。因此，我們也可以談論戲劇性敘事，從而賦予「敘事」一個更為普遍的性質，其兩個種類為戲劇性和敘事性。
We may attenuate the contradiction between his two judgments about the spectacle, and also his slight bad faith which wants to gain acceptance for his preference for tragedy without compromising his formal model that excludes the need for an ac-
我們可以緩解他對舞台表演的兩種判斷之間的矛盾，以及他想要接受對悲劇的偏好而不影響排除實際表演需要的形式模型的輕微不誠實之處。
tual performance, in the following way. We may say, with Dupont-Roc and Lallot (pp. 407-8), that the script contains all the constitutive features of the mimetic activity, without the existence of the spectacle, and also that the way the dramatic text is stated contains the requirement that it be seen. I would put it this way: the script, without the spectacle, is a prescription for the spectacle. The actual spectacle is not necessary for the existence of this prescription. This status also applies to the orchestral score.
我們可以這樣說，根據杜邦-羅克和拉洛特（第 407-8 頁），劇本包含模仿活動的所有構成要素，即使沒有舞台表演，同時劇本的陳述方式也包含了被觀看的要求。我會這樣表達：劇本，在沒有舞台表演的情況下，是舞台表演的處方。實際的舞台表演對於此種處方的存在並非必要。這種地位同樣適用於管弦樂總譜。
Henry James, “Preface to The Portrait of a Lady,” in R. P. Blackmur, ed., The Art of the Novel (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), pp. 42-48.
亨利·詹姆斯，《論《一位女士的肖像》的前言》，收錄於 R. P. 布萊克默編，《小說藝術》（紐約：查爾斯·斯克里布納的兒子出版社，1934 年），第 42-48 頁。
Frank Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 75-77. In the same way, Redfield observes that the Iliad is constructed around Achille’s anger as well as Hector’s tragic fate. But in an epic where the characters have no declared inwardness, only the interaction among them counts. Consequently a character only acquires significance by engendering a plot (Redfield, p. 22). There is no longer a quarrel over priority if we further understand by plot “that implicit conceptual unity which has given the work its actual form” (ibid., p. 23). This is the choice I have made throughout this work.
弗蘭克·科爾莫德，《祕密的起源》（劍橋：哈佛大學出版社，1979 年），第 75-77 頁。同樣地，雷德菲爾德觀察到，《伊利亞德》圍繞著阿基里斯的憤怒以及赫克托的悲劇命運構建。但在一部史詩中，角色沒有明確的內在世界，只有他們之間的互動才重要。因此，一個角色只有通過推動情節才獲得意義（雷德菲爾德，第 22 頁）。如果我們進一步理解情節為「賦予作品其實際形式的隱含概念統一性」，那麼優先順序的爭論就不復存在（同上，第 23 頁）。這是我在整個工作中做出的選擇。
“I have posited that tragedy is an imitation of an action that is whole [teleios] and complete in itself [holēs] and of a certain magnitude [megethos]” (50b23-25).
「我假定悲劇是對一個完整且自成一體、具有一定規模的行動的模仿」（50b23-25）。
Else is particularly firm about this disjunction between logic and chronology (see his commentary on 50b21-34). The only thing that counts is internal necessity that makes probability or necessity “the grand law of poetry” (ibid., p. 282). He goes so far as to see in this ideally dense temporal schema “a kind of Parmenidian ‘on’ in the realm of art” (ibid., p. 294). He bases his argument on the fact that, in speaking of epic in Chapter 23, Aristotle cautions that “its structure should not resemble histories, which necessarily present not a single action but a single period of time [henos khronou]” (59a22-23). To this “report of a single time” Aristotle will oppose his universals that are “timeless” (Else, p. 574). I do not believe it necessary to push the opposition between logic and chronology so far, at the price of having to renounce the kinship between the Poetics and the Ethics. For my part, I shall attempt in the following chapter to elaborate an achronological notion of narrative temporality. Does not Else himself speak of the events contained within a drama as “events which are not in time at least in the usual sense”? (ibid.). So dramatic time cannot be completely ignored as soon as we accord epic the privilege of representing “various parts [of the story] as being enacted simultaneously [hama]” (59b27). The unique temporal perspective imposed by an action performed by the characters themselves merits reflection about the time of the dramatic narrative as distinct from diegetic narrative and about the time of the plot that governs both of them.
埃爾斯對於邏輯和編年學之間的這種斷裂特別堅持（參見他對 50b21-34 的評論）。唯一重要的是內在必然性，使得或然率或必然性成為「詩歌的宏大法則」（同上，第 282 頁）。他甚至認為在這個理想密集的時間模式中，存在著「藝術領域中一種帕爾門尼德式的『存在』」（同上，第 294 頁）。他的論點基於在第 23 章談論史詩時，亞里士多德警告「其結構不應類似歷史，後者必然呈現的不是單一行動，而是單一時期」（59a22-23）。對於這種「單一時間的報告」，亞里士多德將對立「無時間性」的普遍性（埃爾斯，第 574 頁）。我不認為有必要將邏輯和編年學之間的對立推向如此極端，代價是必須放棄《詩學》與《倫理學》之間的親緣關係。就我而言，我將在下一章試圖闡述敘事時間性的非編年模式。埃爾斯本人不是也談到戲劇中的事件是「在時間中的事件，至少不是在通常意義上」嗎？（同上）因此，一旦我們賦予史詩「將故事的各個部分同時呈現」（59b27）的特權，戲劇時間就不能完全被忽視。由角色自身執行的行動所施加的獨特時間觀點，值得我們反思戲劇敘事的時間，與敘事體敘事的時間，以及支配它們兩者的情節時間有所不同。
Regarding our “intellectual response” to an artist’s imitations, see G. Else’s commentary on 48b4-24. James Redfield, too, strongly emphasizes that for this pedagogical function of imitation (see Redfield, pp. 52-55), the probable is universal in its own way (ibid., pp. 55-60). The plot gives rise to knowledge (ibid., pp. 60-67). In this, the Poetics remains close to fifth-century rhetoric and its emphasis on argumentation. Whereas in the law court the argument is added to the narrative, which is itself contingent, the drama includes its argument in its plot and constructs the conditions of the event on the basis of the plot: “we can then define fiction as the outcome of a hypothetical inquiry into the intermediate causes of action, an inquiry which has led the poet to the discovery and communication in a story of some universal pattern of human probability and necessity” (Redfield, pp. 59-60). So “fiction is the outcome of a kind of inquiry” (ibid., p. 79): how did it happen that . . . ? Who acted in such a way? Similarly, Golden says, “Through imitation, events are reduced to form and thus, however impure in themselves, the events portrayed are purified-clarifiedinto intelligibility” (Golden, p. 236).
關於我們對藝術家模仿的「知識回應」，請參見 G. Else 對 48b4-24 的評論。James Redfield 也強調這種模仿的教育功能（見 Redfield，第 52-55 頁），或然性在某種程度上是普遍的（同上，第 55-60 頁）。情節產生知識（同上，第 60-67 頁）。在此，《詩學》與五世紀修辭學及其對論證的強調密切相關。在法庭上，論證被添加到敘事中，而敘事本身是偶然的；戲劇則在其情節中包含其論證，並基於情節建構事件的條件：「因此我們可以將虛構定義為對行動中介原因的假設性探究的結果，這種探究使詩人發現並傳達了某種人類或然性和必然性的普遍模式」（Redfield，第 59-60 頁）。所以「虛構是一種探究的結果」（同上，第 79 頁）：它是如何發生的？誰以這種方式行動？同樣，Golden 說：「通過模仿，事件被還原為形式，因此，儘管事件本身不純，但所描繪的事件被淨化、澄清為可理解的」（Golden，第 236 頁）。
Dupont-Roc and Lallot say “chronicle” rather than “history,” which is their term for translating muthos. This choice does have the advantage of leaving room for a less negative judgment about the writing of history.
Dupont-Roc 和 Lallot 說「編年史」而非「歷史」，這是他們翻譯 muthos 的術語。這種選擇確實有利於對歷史寫作作出較少負面的判斷。
Else exclaims, “The maker of what happened! Not the maker of the actuality of events but of their logical structure, of their meaning: their having happened is accidental to their being composed.” Else, p. 321.
Else 驚呼：「發生事件的製造者！不是事件實際性的製造者，而是其邏輯結構、其意義的製造者：它們的發生是偶然的，而非被構成的。」Else，第 321 頁。
We gave the fuller quotation earlier: “an action that is serious, complete, and possessing magnitude” (50b24-25). In the immediate context of this passage Aristotle only comments on “complete” and “magnitude.”
我們之前給出了更完整的引文：「嚴肅、完整且具有規模的行動」（50b24-25）。在這段文字的直接語境中，亞里士多德只評論了「完整」和「規模」。
Redfield translates 52a1-4 as follows. “The imitation is not only of a complete action but of things pitiable and fearful; such things must happen when they happen contrary to expectation because of one another [di’allela].” Else has: “Contrary to experience but because of one another.” Leon Golden: “unexpectedly, yet because of one another.”
雷德菲爾德將 52a1-4 翻譯如下。「模仿不僅是一個完整的行動，還包括可憐和可怕的事情；這些事情必須在違背預期、彼此因果的情況下發生。」埃爾斯的譯文是：「違背經驗，但因為彼此。」里昂·戈爾登的譯文是：「出乎意料，但因為彼此。」
Does the tragedy of Oedipus preserve its character of peripeteia for us who know the framework of the story and its outcome? Yes, if we do not define surprise in terms of some external knowledge but in terms of the relationship of expectation created by the internal course of the plot. The reversal occurs in our expectation, but is created by the plot. See the discussion below of the relationship between this internal structure and the audience’s dispositions.
對於已經知道故事框架和結局的我們來說，伊底帕斯的悲劇是否仍然保持其突轉的特性？是的，如果我們不以外部知識定義驚訝，而是以情節內部進程所創造的期望關係為準。逆轉發生在我們的預期中，但是由情節本身創造。參見下文關於這種內部結構與觀眾心理之間關係的討論。
It is the role of recognition, as a change from ignorance to knowledge, within the limits I shall speak of in the following note, to compensate for the surprising effect contained in the peripeteia through the lucidity it brings about. In escaping selfdeception the hero enters into his truth and the spectator enters into knowledge of this truth. In this sense, Else is probably correct to tie together the problem of the tragic fault and that of recognition. The fault, at least insofar as it consists of ignorance and error, is truly the reverse side of recognition. It will be an important problem in volume 2 of this work to find a bridge between recognition in Aristotle’s sense and in Hegel’s sense, and repetition in Heidegger’s sense.
認知作為從無知到知識的轉變，在我將在接下來的注釋中闡述的限度內，其作用是通過其帶來的清晰度來彌補突轉中包含的驚訝效果。在擺脫自我欺騙的過程中，主角進入他的真相，而觀眾進入對這一真相的認知。在這個意義上，埃爾斯可能正確地將悲劇錯誤的問題與認知的問題聯繫起來。錯誤，至少就其由無知和錯誤所組成的部分而言，確實是認知的反面。在這部作品的第二卷中，尋找亞里士多德意義上的認知與黑格爾意義上的認知，以及海德格爾意義上的重複之間的橋樑，將是一個重要的問題。
Hermann Lübbe, “Was aus Handlungen Geschichten macht,” in Jürgen Mittelstrass and Manfred Riedel, eds., Vernünftiges Denken (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), pp. 237-50.
赫爾曼·呂貝，〈是什麼使行動成為故事〉，載於尤爾根·米特爾斯特拉斯和曼弗雷德·里德爾編，《理性思考》（柏林/紐約：沃爾特·德·格魯伊特出版社，1978 年），第 237-250 頁。
The model’s limits are perhaps more apparent in the case of recognition, where the changes from ignorance to knowledge take place within relationships “leading either to friendship or to hostility on the part of those persons who are marked for good fortune or bad” (52a31). Friendship certainly goes beyond blood relations, but it constitutes a very narrow constraint. We might inquire whether the modern novel, at least in the form it took with Richardson’s Pamela, making love the only outcome of action, does not reconstitute the equivalent of this constraint of friendship or hostility, as a labor of lucidity itself equivalent to Aristotelian recognition.
模型的局限性在識別過程中更為明顯，在這個過程中，從無知到知識的變化發生在關係中，"這些關係要麼導向友誼，要麼導向那些被標記為好運或壞運的人的敵意"（52a31）。友誼當然超越了血緣關係，但它構成了一個非常狹窄的約束。我們可能會探究現代小說，至少在理查森的《佩梅拉》中的形式，使愛情成為行動的唯一結果，是否不等同於重新建立了友誼或敵意的約束，作為一種本身等同於亞里士多德式認知的清晰勞動。
Redfield says, “pathe and learning together constitute the characteristic value to us of a well-made narrative. I suspect that Aristotle meant by katharsis exactly this combination of emotion and learning” (p. 67).
雷德菲爾德說："感受和學習共同構成了我們對一部精彩敘事的特徵價值。我懷疑亞里士多德所說的卡塔西斯正是指這種情感和學習的組合"（第 67 頁）。
The hamartia is not just an extreme case of discordance. It contributes much to the tragic work’s character of being an investigation. It makes the unmerited misfortune problematic. Interpreting the tragic error is the task of tragedy as “inquiry into the strengths and weaknesses of culture” (Redfield, p. 89). I shall return again to this role of the poetic work as revelatory of the “dysfunctions” (ibid., p. 111, n. 1) of a culture.
哈瑪提亞不僅僅是不和諧的極端情況。它對悲劇作品的調查性質有很大貢獻。它使無辜的不幸變得成為問題。解讀悲劇性錯誤是悲劇作為"對文化的優勢和弱點的調查"的任務（雷德菲爾德，第 89 頁）。我將再次回到詩歌作品揭示文化"功能障礙"（同上，第 111 頁，註 1）的這一角色。
Else notes correctly that this discernment makes us judges. However it is “as a court of fellow human beings,” not as ministers of the law, that we pass judgment. The
埃爾塞正確地指出，這種洞察力使我們成為法官。然而，我們是作為"同胞的法庭"，而不是作為法律的部長來判斷的。
catharsis of pity and fear thus takes the place of condemnation and execration. And it is not we who bring about this purification, but rather the plot. See Else, p. 437. We rediscover here the connection suggested above between the tragic fault and recognition. Catharsis is the whole process governed by its structure as culminating in recognition.
因此，憐憫和恐懼的淨化取代了譴責和詛咒。而這種淨化並非由我們所造成，而是由情節帶來。參見埃爾塞，第 437 頁。我們在此重新發現了悲劇性過失和認知之間的聯繫。淨化是由其結構支配的整個過程，以認知為最終目標。
Golden translates this as: “Since the poet should produce pleasure from [apo] pity and fear through [dia] imitation, it is apparent that this function must be worked into the incidents [en tois pragmasin empoiēteon]” (p. 23). Else comments, “the pleasure is derived from [apo] the pity and fear but by means of [dia] the imitation” (p. 411, his emphasis).
高登將其譯為："詩人應該通過模仿從憐憫和恐懼中產生快樂，顯然這種功能必須融入事件中"（第 23 頁）。埃爾塞評論道："快樂源於憐憫和恐懼，但通過模仿而產生"（第 411 頁，他的強調）。
It will have been noted that I have not discussed the distinction between “complication” (desis) and “denouement” (lusis) in Chapter 13. The fact that Aristotle includes the complication among the events “outside” the plot makes me think we ought not to place this distinction on the same plane as the other features of the complex plot, all of whose criteria are “inside” it. This is why a critique of the concept of narrative closure whose argument draws on the aporias of this analysis, only touches a peripheral and heterogeneous category and perhaps one added later by Aristotle (see Else, p. 520), not the core of his concept of plot.
需要注意的是，我在第 13 章中未討論"複雜"（desis）和"結局"（lusis）之間的區別。亞里士多德將複雜情節歸類為"外部"事件，這使我認為我們不應將此區別置於與複雜情節其他特徵相同的平面上，這些特徵都在情節"內部"。因此，批評敘事結局的論點若僅僅觸及這一分析的矛盾之處，只是觸及了一個邊緣和異質的類別，可能是亞里士多德後來添加的（參見埃爾塞，第 520 頁），而非其情節概念的核心。
James Redfield forcefully emphasizes this tie between ethics and poetics. It is visibly warranted by the common terms praxis, action, and èthos, character. More profoundly, both disciplines are concerned with the realization of happiness. Ethics, in effect, deals with happiness in its potential form. It considers its conditions, the virtues. But the connection between these virtues and the circumstances of happiness remains dependent upon contingencies. In constructing their plots, poets give intelligibility to this contingent connection. Whence the apparent paradox: “Fiction is about unreal happiness and unhappiness, but these in their actuality” (Redfield, p. 63). It is at this price that narration “teaches” about the happiness and life named in the definition of tragedy: “For tragedy is not an imitation of men but of actions and of life. It is in action that happiness and unhappiness are found” (50a17-18).
詹姆斯·雷德菲爾德強烈地強調倫理學和詩學之間的聯繫。這是由普拉克西斯、行動和埃托斯、性格等共同術語明顯證實的。更深層次地說，這兩個學科都關注幸福的實現。倫理學實際上處理幸福的潛在形式。它考慮其條件，即美德。但是，這些美德與幸福環境之間的聯繫仍然取決於偶然性。在構建情節時，詩人賦予了這種偶然性聯繫以可理解性。因此出現了明顯的悖論：「小說講述的是虛構的幸福和不幸，但這些在其實際性中」（雷德菲爾德，第 63 頁）。正是以這種方式，敘事「教導」了悲劇定義中所命名的幸福和生活：「因為悲劇不是模仿人，而是模仿行動和生活。在行動中找到幸福和不幸」（50a17-18）。
In volume 2, we shall see what use Claude Bremond makes of these notions of improvement and harm in his “logic of possible narratives.” We might follow DupontRoc and Lallot when they state that the Poetics inverts the relationship of priority ethics establishes between the action and the characters. In ethics, they say, the characters are first, in poetics they move to the second rank: “this inversion in the relationship of priority between agent and action results directly from the definition of dramatic poetry as the representation of action” (p. 196; see also pp. 202-4). Or we might note, with Else (on 48a1-9), that for ethics too it is action that confers moral quality on the characters. In any case, how would this alleged reversal be perceived if the order of precedence that the Poetics inverts were not preserved by the reversal? Dupont-Roc and Lallot would no doubt agree. For them, the object of mimetic activity conserves, not just in this chapter but perhaps to the end, the ambiguous meaning of being a model of the object (the natural object imitated) and a copy (the artifact created). They note, regarding 48a9: “the mimetic activity (of those who represent actions) establishes a complex relation between the two objects, model and copy. It implies at the same time resemblance and difference, identification and transformation, in one and the same movement” (ibid., p. 157).
在第 2 卷中，我們將看到克勞德·布雷蒙德如何利用這些改善和傷害的概念，在其「可能敘事的邏輯」中。我們可以跟隨杜邦-洛克和拉洛特，他們指出《詩學》顛倒了倫理學在行動和人物之間建立的優先順序關係。在倫理學中，他們說，人物排在第一位，而在詩學中，人物移至次要地位："這種行動者和行動之間優先順序關係的顛倒，直接源於戲劇詩歌被定義為行動的再現"（第 196 頁；另見第 202-4 頁）。或者我們可以注意到，正如埃爾塞（在 48a1-9）所述，即使在倫理學中，也是行動賦予人物道德品質。無論如何，如果被《詩學》顛倒的優先順序並未被顛倒所保留，這種所謂的顛倒將如何被感知？杜邦-洛克和拉洛特無疑會同意。對他們來說，模仿活動的對象不僅在本章中，而且可能直到最後，都保持著作為對象模型（被模仿的自然對象）和副本（被創造的人工製品）的模糊含義。他們注意到，關於 48a9："模仿活動（那些再現行動的人）在模型和副本兩個對象之間建立了一個複雜的關係。它同時意味著相似性和差異性，認同和轉化，在同一運動中"（同上，第 157 頁）。
51a16-20 is striking in this regard in that it speaks of actions one person performs “that do not go together to produce a single unified action.”
51a16-20 在這方面令人矚目，因為它談到一個人執行的行動"無法合併成一個統一的行動"。
Redfield (pp. 31-35) observes that the stories about heroes, received from the tradition, are, unlike the stories of the gods, stories about disasters and sufferings,
雷德菲爾德（第 31-35 頁）觀察到，從傳統中流傳下來的英雄故事，與眾神的故事不同，是關於災難和苦難的故事，
sometimes overcome, but more often endured. They do not talk of the founding of cities but of their destruction. The epic poet takes from them the “famous” person, the kleos, and writes his memorial. The tragic poet, too, draws on this source, with this reservation: “stories can be borrowed, plots cannot” (ibid., p. 58).
有時被克服，但更多是被忍受。他們不談論城市的建立，而是談論城市的毀滅。史詩詩人從中取出「著名」的人物，克勒斯（kleos），並寫下他的紀念碑。悲劇詩人也從這個來源中汲取素材，但有一個保留："故事可以借用，但情節不行"（同上，第 58 頁）。
My position, which I shall argue for in the next chapter, is close to that of Hans Robert Jauss, in Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 3-75, and also to his notion of amusement. See also Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 3-220.
我的立場，我將在下一章論證，接近漢斯·羅伯特·雅烏斯在《邁向接受美學》一書中的立場，由蒂莫西·巴蒂翻譯（明尼阿波利斯：明尼蘇達大學出版社，1982 年），第 3-75 頁，並且也接近他的娛樂概念。另請參見雅烏斯，《美學體驗與文學解釋學》，由邁克爾·肖翻譯（明尼阿波利斯：明尼蘇達大學出版社，1982 年），第 3-220 頁。
The mixed status of pleasure, at the interface of the work and the public, no doubt explains why spectacle has such a fluctuating place in the course of the Poetics. On the one hand, it is said to be “least germane to the art of poetry” for tragedy “fulfills its function even without a public performance and actors” (50b16). On the other, it is one of the “parts” of tragedy. So although inessential, it cannot in fact be excluded since the text gives us something to see, and when it does not give us something to see it gives us something to read. Reading, the theory of which Aristotle does not present, is always only a substitute for spectacle. For who, if not the spectator or his substitute the reader, can appreciate the “right length” of a work, if we define this so that “it should be possible to embrace the beginning and the end in one view”? (59b19). The pleasure of learning takes place through seeing.
快感的混合地位，位於作品和公眾的交界處，無疑解釋了為什麼在《詩學》中，景象有如此波動的地位。一方面，它被說成是「與詩歌藝術最不相關」，因為悲劇「即使沒有公開表演和演員也能完成其功能」（50b16）。另一方面，它又是悲劇的「部分」之一。所以儘管不是本質的，但事實上不能被排除，因為文本給我們某些東西可以看，當它不給我們某些東西看時，它給我們某些東西可以閱讀。閱讀，亞里士多德並未提出其理論，始終只是景象的替代品。因為誰，如果不是觀眾或其替代品讀者，能欣賞作品的「恰當長度」，如果我們這樣定義「應該可以一眼看到開頭和結尾」？（59b19）學習的樂趣通過觀看發生。
Dupont-Roc and Lallot rightly say, “the persuasive is only the probable considered in terms of its effect on the spectator, and, consequently, the ultimate criterion of mimesis” (p. 382).
杜龐-洛克和拉洛特正確地說："說服力僅僅是被視為對觀眾效果的可能性，因此是模仿的最終標準"（第 382 頁）。
See Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 274-94.
參見沃爾夫岡·伊瑟爾，《隱含讀者》（巴爾的摩：約翰霍普金斯大學出版社，1974 年），第 274-94 頁。
For Else, what brings about the purification is the very process of imitation. And since the plot is the imitation, purification is brought about by the plot. The allusion to catharsis in Chapter 6 does not therefore constitute an addition, but rather presupposes the entire theory of the plot. See also Leon Golden, “Catharsis,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 43 (1962): 51-60. For his part, James Redfield writes, “Art . . . insofar as it achieves form, is a purification. . . . As the work reaches closure, we come to see that everything is as it should be, that nothing could be added or taken away. Thus the work takes us through impurity to purity; impurity has been met and overcome by the power of formal art” (p. 161). Purification is a purgation, to the extent that the artist gives form through a “reduction,” to use an expression borrowed from Lévi-Strauss: “the mark of this reduction is artistic closure” (ibid., p. 165). It is because the work of fiction is “self-contained” (ibid.) that “art in imitating life can make intelligible (at the price of reduction) situations unintelligible in life” (ibid., p. 166). Dupont-Roc and Lallot are therefore fully justified in translating catharsis as épuration. Cf. their commentary, pp. 188-93.
對於艾爾斯來說，純化的過程是模仿本身。由於情節是模仿，純化是由情節帶來的。第 6 章中對卡塔西斯的提及因此並非附加，而是預設了整個情節理論。另請參見里昂·戈登，「卡塔西斯」，美國語言學會會報 43（1962 年）：51-60。詹姆斯·雷德菲爾德寫道："藝術……只要它達到形式，就是一種純化……當作品達到閉合時，我們會看到一切都是如其應該的，沒有什麼可以增加或刪除。因此，作品將我們從雜質引向純潔；雜質已被藝術形式的力量克服。"（第 161 頁）。純化是一種淨化，藝術家通過"縮減"給予形式，借用列維-斯特勞斯的表達："這種縮減的標誌是藝術的封閉性"（同上，第 165 頁）。正是因為小說是"自洽的"（同上），"藝術在模仿生活時，可以使生活中不可理解的情況變得可以理解（以縮減為代價）"（同上，第 166 頁）。杜蓬-羅克和拉洛特因此完全有理由將卡塔西斯翻譯為"épuration"。參見他們的評論，第 188-93 頁。
Paul Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” Critical Inquiry 5 (1978): 143-59.
保羅·利科爾，「作為認知、想像和感受的隱喻過程」，批判性探究 5（1978 年）：143-59。
Redfield’s whole work is oriented in terms of this theme of the effect of poetic thinking on culture, where culture is defined in the following terms: “Those things which can be made otherwise by choice, effort, and the application of knowledge constitute the sphere of culture” (ibid., p. 70). The opposition between nature and culture consists essentially in the opposition between constraint and contingency: “values and norms are . . . not constraints on action but (teleologically) the sources of action” (ibid.). “Constraints constitute the sphere of nature; they are things which cannot be made otherwise” (ibid., p. 71). As a result, the meaning of a work of art is only fulfilled in its effect on culture. For Redfield, this effect is principally a critical one. The drama is born out of the ambiguities of cultural values and norms. With his eyes fixed on the norm, the poet presents his audience a story that is problematic with a character
雷德菲爾德的整個工作圍繞著詩歌思維對文化的影響這一主題，其中文化被定義為："那些可以通過選擇、努力和知識應用而被改變的事物構成文化的範疇"（同上，第 70 頁）。自然與文化之間的對立本質上在於強制與或然性之間的對立："價值和規範不是對行動的約束，而是（目的論地）行動的源泉"（同上）。"約束構成自然的範疇；它們是不能被改變的事物"（同上，第 71 頁）。因此，藝術作品的意義只有在其對文化的影響中才得以實現。對於雷德菲爾德來說，這種影響主要是批判性的。戲劇源於文化價值和規範的模稜兩可之處。詩人目光專注於規範，向觀眾呈現一個有問題的故事和人物
that is deviant (ibid., p. 81). “The tragic poet thus tests the limits of culture. . . . In tragedy culture itself becomes problematic” (ibid., p. 84). Epic, before tragedy, already exercised this function by means of its “epic distance.” “Epic describes the heroic world to an audience which itself inhabits another, ordinary world” (ibid., p. 36). The poet exercises his teaching authority at first by disorienting his audience, then in offering it an ordered representation of the themes of ruin and disorder from its heroic songs. But he does not resolve life’s dilemmas. In the Iliad, for example, the funeral ceremony of reconciliation reveals no meaning, rather it makes manifest the absence of meaning in every warlike undertaking. “Dramatic art rises from the dilemmas and contradictions of life, but it makes no promise to resolve these dilemmas; on the contrary tragic art may well reach its highest formal perfection at the moment when it reveals to us these dilemmas as universal, pervasive, and necessary” (ibid., p. 219). “Poetry offers [humanity] not gratification but intelligibility” (ibid., p. 220). Such is the case, particularly, in the case of unmerited suffering, aggravated by the tragic fault. “Through the undeserved sufferings of the characters of tragedy the problem of culture is brought home to us” (ibid., p. 87). The hamartia, as the blind spot of discordance, is also the blind spot of “what tragedy teaches.” It is in this sense we can risk calling art “the negation of culture” (ibid., pp. 218-23). I shall return in volume 2, with Jauss’s help, to this function of the literary work where it makes problematic the lived experience of a culture.
這是變異的（同上，第 81 頁）。「悲劇詩人因此測試文化的極限……在悲劇中，文化本身變得有問題」（同上，第 84 頁）。史詩在悲劇之前，已經通過其「史詩距離」行使了這一功能。「史詩向居住在另一個普通世界的觀眾描述英雄世界」（同上，第 36 頁）。詩人首先通過使其觀眾迷向，然後提供一個從其英雄歌曲中有序呈現毀滅和混亂主題的方式來行使其教學權威。但他並不解決生活的兩難困境。例如在《伊利亞特》中，和解的葬禮儀式未揭示任何意義，相反，它展現了每一個好戰行動中意義的缺失。「戲劇藝術源於生活的兩難和矛盾，但它不承諾解決這些困境；相反，悲劇藝術可能在揭示這些兩難是普遍的、普遍存在的和必要的時候達到其最高的形式完美」（同上，第 219 頁）。「詩歌提供給（人類）的不是滿足，而是可理解性」（同上，第 220 頁）。特別是在非正義的苦難的情況下，被痛苦的悲劇性缺陷加劇。「通過悲劇中人物的不應得的苦難，文化問題被帶到我們面前」（同上，第 87 頁）。哈馬爾蒂亞（hamartia），作為不和諧的盲點，也是「悲劇教導的」盲點。在這個意義上，我們可以冒險地稱藝術為「文化的否定」（同上，第 218-23 頁）。在第二卷中，我我將在賈斯（Jauss）的幫助下，回到文學作品使文化的實際經驗成為問題的這一功能。

Chapter Three 第三章

See my contribution, “Le Discours de l’action,” in Paul Ricoeur et le Centre de Phénoménologie, La Sémantique de l’action (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1977), pp. 3-137, especially pp. 21-63.
參見我的貢獻，「行動的話語」，載於《保羅·里科爾與現象學中心》，《行動的語義學》（巴黎：法國國家科學研究中心出版社，1977 年），第 3-137 頁，特別是第 21-63 頁。
For the concept “basic action,” see Arthur Danto, “Basic Actions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 141-48; reprinted in Alan R. White, ed., The Philosophy of Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 43-58. Cf. E. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957). Finally, regarding the concept of interference in relation to the notion of a closed physical system, see G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).
關於「基本動作」的概念，請參見阿瑟·丹托（Arthur Danto）的文章〈基本動作〉，發表於《美國哲學季刊》第 2 期（1965 年），第 141-48 頁；收錄於艾倫·懷特（Alan R. White）編輯的《行動哲學》（紐約：牛津大學出版社，1968 年），第 43-58 頁。另可參見 E.安斯康（E. Anscombe）的《意圖》（牛津：巴西爾·布萊克威爾出版社，1957 年）。最後，關於干預概念與封閉物理系統概念的關係，請參見 G. H.馮萊特（von Wright）的《解釋與理解》（伊薩卡：康奈爾大學出版社，1971 年）。
See “Le Discours de l’action,” pp. 113-32.
請參見〈論行動的話語〉，第 113-32 頁。
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
克利福德·格爾茨（Clifford Geertz）的《文化的闡釋：精選論文》（紐約：基本書局，1973 年）。
In one essay where I first set forth most of the notations devoted to the symbolic mediation of action, I distinguished between a constitutive and a representative symbolism. (“La Structure symbolique de l’action,” in Symbolism, Acts of the 14th International Conference on Sociology of Religion, Strasbourg, 1977 [Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, n.d.], pp. 31-50.) Today this vocabulary seems inadequate to me. I also took up this topic in “L’Imagination dans le discours et dans l’action,” in Savoir, faire, espérer: les limites de la raison (Brussels: Publications des Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 207-28.
在一篇論文中，我首次闡述了大部分關於行動象徵性中介的符號，我區分了構成性和代表性符號主義。（〈行動的象徵結構〉，載於《符號學》，第 14 屆國際宗教社會學會議論文集，斯特拉斯堡，1977 年 [巴黎：法國國家科學研究中心出版社，出版日期不詳]，第 31-50 頁）。今天看來，這種術語對我來說似乎不太恰當。我還在〈論話語與行動中的想像〉一文中探討了這個主題，該文收錄於《知識、行動、希望：理性的局限》（布魯塞爾：聖路易斯大學出版社，1976 年），第 1 卷，第 207-28 頁。

6 . This is the point where the sense of the word “symbol” I am emphasizing comes closest to the other two senses I have distanced myself from. As an interpretant of behavior, any symbolism is also a notation system that abbreviates, as does mathematical symbolism, a great number of the details of action, and prescribes, as does musical symbolism, the course of executions or performances capable of actualizing it. However it is also as an interpretant governing what Geertz calls a “thick description” that the symbol introduces a twofold relation of meaning into the gesture or the behavior whose interpretation it governs. We may take the empirical configuration of a gesture as the literal meaning bearing a figurative one. At the limit, this meaning can appear, in certain conditions neighboring on secrecy, as a hidden meaning to be de-
6. 這是我強調的"符號"一詞意義最接近我所疏遠的另外兩個意義的地方。作為行為的解釋者，任何象徵主義也是一個縮寫的符號系統，就像數學符號一樣，簡化了行動的許多細節，並且如音樂象徵主義一樣，規定了可以實現它的執行或表演的過程。然而，作為管理吉爾茨所說的"厚描述"的解釋者，符號在其管理的姿態或行為中引入了意義的雙重關係。我們可以將手勢的經驗性配置視為承載比喻意義的字面意義。在極限情況下，在鄰近秘密的某些條件下，這種意義可以
coded. This is how any social ritual appears to strangers, without any need for turning their interpretation toward something esoteric or hermetic.
作為需要解碼的隱藏意義出現。這就是任何社會儀式對陌生人的呈現方式，無需將其解釋轉向某些深奧或神秘的東西。
7. See my article “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,” Social Research 38 (1971): 529-62.
7. 參見我的文章 "文本模型：作為文本的有意義行動"，《社會研究》38（1971）：529-62。
8. See Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 40-65.
8. 參見彼得·溫奇，《社會科學的概念及其與哲學的關係》（倫敦：羅特利奇和肯根保羅出版社，1958），第 40-65 頁。
9. I cited one example earlier: James Redfield’s treatment of the relation between art and culture in his Nature and Culture in the Iliad. See above, pp. 50-51.
9. 我之前引用了一個例子：詹姆斯·瑞德菲爾德在《伊利亞德中的自然與文化》中對藝術與文化之間關係的處理。見上文，第 50-51 頁。
10. I shall return at length to the role of “repetition” in my general discussion of the phenomenology of time in volume 2.
10. 我將在第 2 卷中詳細討論時間現象學中「重複」的角色。
11. See Being and Time, sections 78-83. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 456-88.
11. 參見《存在與時間》第 78-83 節。馬丁·海德格爾，《存在與時間》，約翰·麥克奎里和愛德華·羅賓遜譯（紐約：哈珀與羅出版社，1962 年），第 456-88 頁。
12. “Dasein historicizes from day to day by reason of its way of interpreting time by dating it. . . .” (ibid., p. 466). Recall Augustine’s reflections on the “day,” which he refuses to reduce purely and simply to one revolution of the sun. Heidegger does not follow him in this way. He puts the difference between the “most natural measure of time” (ibid., p. 465) and all artificial, instrumental ones. The time “within” which we are is world-time (Weltzeit) (ibid., p. 471)—“more objective” than any possible object and “more subjective” than any possible subject. Hence it is neither inside nor outside.
12. 「此在每天都通過對時間進行定日的方式來歷史化……」（同上，第 466 頁）。回想奧古斯丁關於「日」的思考，他拒絕將其簡單地歸結為太陽的一次轉動。海德格爾並未以這種方式追隨他。他強調了「最自然的時間度量」（同上，第 465 頁）與所有人為的、工具性的時間之間的差異。我們所處的時間是世界時間（Weltzeit）（同上，第 471 頁）——比任何可能的物件更「客觀」，比任何可能的主體更「主觀」。因此它既不在內部，也不在外部。
13. Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), chap. 3.
13. 沃夫岡·伊澤爾，《閱讀的行為：審美回應理論》（巴爾的摩：約翰·霍普金斯大學出版社，1978 年），第 3 章。
14. At the price of this generalization a historian such as Paul Veyne will be able to define plot as a combination in varying proportions of goals, causes, and chance, and make it the guideline for his historiography in Comment on écrit l’histoire. See below, pp. 169-74. In a complementary but not contradictory way, G. H. von Wright sees in historical reasoning a combination of practical syllogisms and chains of causality governed by systemic constraints. Again, see below, pp. 132-43. In numerous ways, therefore, plot composes heterogeneous series.
14. 以這種概括的代價，如保羅·維納這樣的歷史學家將能夠將情節定義為目標、原因和機遇以不同比例組合的結果，並在《如何書寫歷史》中將其作為史學指南。見下文，第 169-74 頁。以互補但並不矛盾的方式，G. H. 冯·賴特在歷史推理中看到了實踐三段論和由系統性約束管理的因果鏈。再次，見下文，第 132-43 頁。因此，在許多方面，情節都由異質系列組成。
15. I am borrowing the notion of a “configurational act” from Louis O. Mink. He applies it to historical comprehension and I am extending it to the whole field of narrative understanding. See below, pp. 155-61.
15. 我借用了路易斯·O·明克的"配置性行為"概念。他將其應用於歷史理解，而我將其擴展到敘事理解的整個領域。見下文，第 155-61 頁。
16. Below in chapter 6 , I shall consider some other implications of the reflective character of judgment in history.
16. 在第 6 章中，我將考慮歷史判斷反思性特徵的其他一些含義。
17. I borrow this concept of “followability” from W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York: Schocken Books, 1964). In Part II, I discuss the central thesis of Gallie’s book, namely, that history is a species of the genre story.
我從 W. B. Gallie 的《哲學與歷史理解》（紐約：Schocken 書店，1964 年）借用這個"可跟隨性"的概念。在第二部分，我討論加里的書的中心論點，即歷史是故事類型的一個物種。
18. This typology, however, does not abolish the eminently temporal character of the schematism. We ought not to forget the way Kant relates the constituting of the schematism to what he calls the a priori determinations of time: “The schemata are thus nothing but a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules. These rules relate in the order of categories to the time-series, the time-order and lastly to the scope of time in respect of all possible objects” (B184). (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965], p. 185.) However Kant only recognized those determinations of time that contribute to the objective constitution of the physical world. The schematism of the narrative function implies determinations of a new genre which are precisely the ones we have just designated by the dialectic of the episodic characteristics and the configuring of emplotment.
然而，這種類型學並不能廢除模式論的本質上的時間性質。我們不應忘記康德如何將模式論的構成與他所說的時間的先驗決定聯繫起來："因此模式不過是根據規則的時間的先驗決定。這些規則按照範疇的順序與時間系列、時間順序，最後是關於所有可能對象的時間範圍有關"（B184）。（伊曼紐爾·康德，《純粹理性批判》，諾曼·肯普·斯密譯，紐約：聖馬丁出版社，1965 年，第 185 頁。）然而康德只認識了那些對物理世界的客觀構成有貢獻的時間決定。敘事功能的模式論意味著新類型的決定，正是我們剛剛用事件特徵的辯證法和情節安排來指定的決定。
19. Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, in The Nature of Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), are correct in prefacing their analysis of the major cate-
羅伯特·斯科爾斯和羅伯特·凱洛格在《敘事的本質》（紐約：牛津大學出版社，1966 年）中，在分析敘事活動的主要類別之前，正確地進行了西方敘事史的充分回顧。
gories of narrative activity with an ample review of the history of narration in the West. What I am calling the schematization of emplotment exists only through this historical development. This is why Eric Auerbach, in his magnificent work Mimesis, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), chooses to graft his analysis and evaluation of the representation of reality in Western literature to a sample of numerous, yet strictly delimited, texts.
我稱之為情節安排的模式化只有通過這種歷史發展才存在。這就是為什麼埃裡克·奧爾巴赫在他宏偉的作品《摹仿》（威拉德·R·特拉斯克譯，普林斯頓：普林斯頓大學出版社，1953 年）中選擇將他對西方文學中現實表現的分析和評估嫁接到一系列數量眾多但嚴格限定的文本上。
20. Aristotle notes that we only know universals-the individual is ineffable. But we make individual things. Cf. G. G. Granger, Essai d’une Philosophie du Style (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968), pp. 5-16.
20. 亞里斯多德指出，我們只知道普遍性—個體是難以言喻的。但我們製造個別的事物。參見 G. G. 格朗熱，《風格哲學論文》（巴黎：阿爾芒·科林出版社，1968 年），第 5-16 頁。
21. See Roy Schafer, A New Language for Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Language and Insight (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); and “Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue,” Critical Inquiry 7 (1980): 29-53. Cf. my own “The Question of Proof in Freud’s Psychoanalytic Writings,” in Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart, eds., The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), pp. 184-210. This article was first published in a slightly different form as “The Question of Proof in Psychoanalysis,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 25 (1977): 835-72.
21. 參見羅伊·沙法，《精神分析的新語言》（紐海文：耶魯大學出版社，1976 年）；《語言與洞察》（紐海文：耶魯大學出版社，1978 年）；以及〈精神分析對話中的敘事〉，《批判性研究》7（1980 年）：29-53。對比拙作〈弗洛伊德精神分析著作中的證明問題〉，收錄於查爾斯·E·雷根和大衛·斯圖爾特編，《保羅·里科爾哲學》（波士頓：畢肯出版社，1978 年），第 184-210 頁。本文最初以略有不同的形式發表於〈精神分析中的證明問題〉，《美國精神分析協會期刊》25（1977 年）：835-72。
22. Wilhelm Schapp, In Geschichten Verstrickt (Wiesbaden: B. Heymann, 1976).
22. 威廉·沙普，《陷入故事》（威斯巴登：B. 海曼出版社，1976 年）。
23. Frank Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
23. 弗蘭克·克莫德，《秘密的起源：敘事解讀》（劍橋：哈佛大學出版社，1979 年）。
24. Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature, trans. George G. Grabowica (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
24. 羅曼·英伽登，《文學作品：邊界地帶的本體論、邏輯和文學理論研究》，喬治·G·格拉博維卡譯（埃文斯頓：西北大學出版社，1973 年）。
25. Greimas’s concept of verediction provides a noteworthy example of the return of this dialectic, even within a theory that excludes without any concession any recourse to an external referent. See the article “Verediction” in A.-J. Greimas and J. Courtés, Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary, trans. Larry Christ, Daniel Patte, et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 367-68.
25. 格雷馬斯的真實性概念提供了這種辯證法回歸的顯著例子，即便在一個不無保留地排除任何外部指涉的理論中。參見 A.-J. 格雷馬斯和 J. 庫爾特斯《符號學與語言：分析性詞典》，拉里·克里斯特、丹尼爾·帕特等譯（布盧明頓：印第安納大學出版社，1982 年），第 367-68 頁。
26. See The Rule of Metaphor, Study VII, pp. 216-56.
26. 參見《隱喻的規則》，研究七，第 216-256 頁。
27. Besides the previous reference to my Rule of Metaphor, see Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 36-37, 40-44, 80, 88.
27. 除了之前提到的《隱喻的規則》，另見保羅·利科爾《解釋理論：話語與意義剩餘》（沃斯堡：德克薩斯基督教大學出版社，1976 年），第 36-37、40-44、80、88 頁。
28. François Dagognet, Ecriture et Iconographie (Paris: Vrin, 1973).
28. 弗朗索瓦·達戈涅，《圖像與文字》（巴黎：維林出版社，1973 年）。
29. Eugen Fink, De la Phénoménologie, trans. Didier Frank (Paris: Minuit, 1975); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 119-26.
29. 歐根·芬克，《現象學》，狄迪爾·弗蘭克譯（巴黎：米努伊出版社，1975 年）；漢斯-格奧爾格·伽達默爾，《真理與方法》（紐約：西伯里出版社，1975 年），第 119-26 頁。
30. Paul Ricoeur, “The Task of Hermeneutics,” Philosophy Today 17 (1973): 112-28.
30. 保羅·利科爾，〈詮釋學的任務〉，《哲學今日》17 卷（1973 年）：第 112-28 頁。
31. Nelson Goodman’s saying, in Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), that literary works ceaslessly make and remake the world holds particularly for narrative works, to the extent that the poiësis of emplotment is a making that, also, bears on what is made. Nowhere is the formula of the title of Goodman’s opening chapter, “Reality Remade,” more appropriate, as is his maxim about “reorganizing the world in terms of works and works in terms of the world” (ibid., p. 241).
31. 納爾遜·古德曼在《藝術語言》（印第安納波利斯：黑克特出版社，1976 年）中提到，文學作品不斷地創造和重新創造世界，這一點對敘事作品尤其明顯，因為情節的詩學創作是一種創造，同時也影響了被創造的事物。古德曼開篇章節標題"重塑現實"以及他關於"以作品重組世界，以世界重組作品"的格言，在此處顯得尤為恰當（同前引書，第 241 頁）。
32. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), par. 19, “Time and Temporality,” pp. 229-74.
32. 馬丁·海德格爾，《現象學的基本問題》，艾伯特·霍夫斯塔特譯（布魯明頓：印第安納大學出版社，1982 年），第 19 段，「時間與暫時性」，第 229-74 頁。
33. In earlier establishing a homology between the praxic time of mimesis, and the last of the forms derived from temporality in Being and Time, “within-time-ness” or “being-‘within’-time,” I have in fact chosen the reverse order of Being and Time, that of the Basic Problems.
33. 在早前建立模仿的實踐時間與《存在與時間》中源自暫時性的最後一種形式「在時間之中」或「處於『時間』之中」之間的同源性，我事實上選擇了《存在與時間》相反的順序，即《基本問題》的順序。

Part Two 第二部分

This does not exclude that historical explanation can be described as “mixed.” In this regard I accept the thesis of Henrik von Wright to whom a part of chapter 5 is devoted. “Mixed,” however, means neither confused nor ambiguous. A “mixed” form of discourse is something wholly other than a compromise, if it is carefully constructed as “mixed” on the appropriate epistemological plane.
這並不排除歷史解釋可以被描述為「混合」。在這方面，我接受亨里克·冯·賴特的論點，第 5 章的部分內容專門討論了這一點。「混合」並不意味著混淆或模糊。如果在適當的認識論平面上仔細構建，「混合」形式的論述是與妥協完全不同的東西。
“Explanation and Understanding,” trans. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart, in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work, ed. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), pp. 149-66.
〈解釋與理解〉，譯者：查爾斯·E·里根和大衛·斯圖爾特，收錄於《保羅·里科爾的哲學：他作品選集》，編輯：查爾斯·E·里根和大衛·斯圖爾特（波士頓：信標出版社，1978 年），第 149-66 頁。

Chapter Four 第四章

Pierre Chaunu wrote in 1960, “epistemology is a temptation that we must resolutely resist. Does not the experience of these past years demonstrate that it can be a lazy solution for those who lose themselves in it with delight-one or two brilliant exceptions only serving to confirm the rule-the sign of an inquiry that marches in place and becomes increasingly sterile. At most it is opportune that some leading lights-which we do not in any way claim to be-devote themselves to it in order better to preserve the robust artisans of knowledge under construction-the only title we do claim-from the dangerous temptations of this morbid Capoue” (Histoire quantitative-Histoire sérielle [Paris: A. Colin, 1978], p. 10).
皮埃爾·肖努在 1960 年寫道：「認識論是一種我們必須堅決抵制的誘惑。過去這些年的經驗難道不是表明它可能是一個懶惰的解決方案，那些沉迷其中的人——只有一兩個出色的例外印證了這個規則——這是一種原地踏步且日益貧瘠的探究的跡象。頂多是一些領軍人物——我們絕不自詡為此——可以致力於此，以便更好地保護知識建構的堅實工匠——這是我們唯一聲稱的頭銜——免於這種病態的誘惑」（《定量史學——系列史學》，巴黎：柯林出版社，1978 年，第 10 頁）。
Certain analyses in this section are an abridgment of developments treated in greater detail in my essay The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History, the Zaharoff Lecture for 1978-79 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). In chapter 6 below I present some further analyses of works by French historians not treated in that lecture.
本節中的某些分析是對我在 1978-79 年的薩哈羅夫講座中更詳細闡述的《法國史學對歷史理論的貢獻》一文中發展的縮寫。在下面第 6 章中，我將對一些未在該講座中討論的法國歷史學家的作品進行進一步分析。
Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectivity, trans. George J. Irwin (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).
雷蒙·阿隆，《歷史哲學導論：關於歷史客觀性的限度的論文》，喬治·J·艾爾文譯（波士頓：信標出版社，1961 年）。
Charles Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos, Introduction to the Study of History, trans. G. G. Berry (New York: Henry Holt, 1898).
查爾斯·維克多·朗格拉和查爾斯·塞尼奧，《歷史研究導論》，G. G. 貝里譯（紐約：亨利·霍爾特，1898 年）。
Henri I. Marrou, The Meaning of History, trans. Robert J. Olson (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966).
亨利·I·馬魯，《歷史的意義》，羅伯特·J·奧爾森譯（巴爾的摩：赫利孔，1966 年）。
Logically speaking, “there is nothing unique in our understanding with regard to the past. It is definitely the same process that takes place in our understanding of other men in the present, and particularly in the understanding of articulated language. (Most frequently, and in the best examples, the document under consideration is a ‘text’ of some kind or another)” (ibid., pp. 91-92). For Marrou, the passage from individual memory to the historical past is not a problem, inasmuch as the real break is between an attachment to oneself and openness to others.
邏輯上講，「我們對過去的理解並無獨特之處。它確實是我們在現在理解其他人，尤其是在理解表達性語言時所發生的同一過程。（最常見的，也是最好的例子中，所考慮的文件是某種類型的『文本』）」（同上，第 91-92 頁）。對於馬魯來說，從個人記憶到歷史過去的過渡並非問題，因為真正的斷裂在於對自我的依戀和對他人的開放。
Here, Marrou takes his distance from one of the thinkers he most admires, Collingwood. But perhaps a rereading of Collingwood would put him closer to the thesis being defended here.
在此，馬魯從他最欽佩的思想家科靈伍德中保持距離。但也許重新閱讀科靈伍德會使他更接近這裡捍衛的論點。
Quoting the passage by Aron I have already cited, Marrou writes, “In any case, ‘there is no historical reality, ready-made, prior to knowledge, which need only be reproduced with fidelity.’ History is the result of the creative effort, by which the historian, as the conscious subject, establishes a relationship between the past which he evokes and the present which is his own” (ibid., pp. 56-57).
引用我已經引用的阿隆的段落，馬魯寫道：「無論如何，『沒有現成的歷史現實，只需以忠實的方式再現』。歷史是歷史學家作為有意識的主體，通過創造性的努力，建立他所喚起的過去與他自身現在之間關係的結果」（同前，第 56-57 頁）。
For a brief history of the founding, the antecedents, and the development of the Annales school, see Jacques Le Goff, “L’Histoire nouvelle,” in Jacques Le Goff, Roger Chartier, and Jacques Revel, eds., La Nouvelle Histoire (Paris: Retz-C.E.P.L., 1978), pp. 210-41.
關於年鑑學派的創立、前身和發展的簡要歷史，請參見雅克·勒·戈夫，「新史學」，收錄於雅克·勒·戈夫、羅傑·沙蒂葉和雅克·雷維爾編，《新史學》（巴黎：Retz-C.E.P.L.，1978 年），第 210-41 頁。
Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Knopf, 1953).
馬克·布洛克，《歷史學家的工藝》，彼得·普特南譯（紐約：克諾普夫，1953 年）。
I shall return, in volume 2 , to the question that occupies Bloch in his first chapter, the relationships among “history, men, and time.” That history knows the past only insofar as it is human and can be defined as the science of “men in time” (ibid., p. 27); that historical time is both continuous and dissimilar; that history must abstract itself from the obsession with origins; that our knowledge of the present would be impossible without our knowledge of the past and vice versa; all these themes will return when we raise the question of the referents of history. Here we shall limit ourselves to the few epistemological insights Bloch attaches to his rapid reflections about the object of history, and especially to the status of the notions of “track” $[$ trace $]$ and “testimony.” His audacity surely is to have linked his principal methodological notations to his definition of history as “knowledge of their tracks,” to use François Simiand’s apt expression. These tracks upon which we establish a science about human beings in time are essentially “the accounts of eye-witnesses” (p. 48). As a result, “historical observation”-the title of chapter 2-and “historical criticism”-the title of chapter 3 -are essentially devoted to a typology and a criteriology of evidence. It is noteworthy that in The Historian’s Craft narrative only appears as one species of testimony which the historian uses critically-namely, those intentional accounts destined to inform the reader-and never as the literary form the historian writes (see pp. 44, 61, 111, 177).
我將在第 2 卷中回到佈洛克在其第一章中探討的問題，即「歷史、人和時間」之間的關係。歷史只是在它具有人性且可被定義為「人在時間中」的科學時才認識過去（同上，第 27 頁）；歷史時間既連續又不同；歷史必須脫離對起源的執著；我們對現在的認識若沒有對過去的認識是不可能的，反之亦然；所有這些主題將在我們提出歷史的參照對象問題時再次出現。在此，我們將僅限於佈洛克對歷史對象所附加的少數認識論見解，尤其是「軌跡」和「證言」概念的地位。他的大膽之處無疑在於將其主要方法論註釋與將歷史定義為「對其軌跡的認知」相聯繫，採用弗朗索瓦·西米安的恰當表述。這些我們用以建立關於時間中人類的科學的軌跡本質上是「目擊者的敘述」（第 48 頁）。因此，「歷史觀察」（第 2 章標題）和「歷史批判」（第 3 章標題）基本上致力於證據的類型學和標準學。值得注意的是，在《歷史工匠》中，敘事僅作為歷史學家批判性使用的證言的一種形式出現，即那些旨在通知讀者的有意敘述，而從未作為歷史學家寫作的文學形式（見第 44、61、111、177 頁）。
The considerable role of falsehoods in medieval history also contingently explains the emphasis given to the criticism of testimony.
中世紀歷史中謊言的相當重要的角色也在某種程度上解釋了對證言批判的強調。
“To evaluate the probability of an event is to weigh its chances of taking place” (ibid., p. 124). Bloch is not far from Weber and Aron when he observes the singularity of this mode of reasoning, which appears to apply foresight to the past: “since the line of the present has somehow been moved back in the imagination, it is a future of bygone times built upon a fragment which, for us, is actually the past” (ibid., p. 125).
評估事件的概率是衡量其發生的機會」（同上，第 124 頁）。布洛赫在觀察這種推理模式的特殊性時，與韋伯和阿隆並無太大不同：「由於想像中的當下線已被移動，這是建立在一個對我們來說實際上是過去的碎片之上的往事未來」（同上，第 125 頁）。
“And so, to add it all up, the criticism of evidence relies upon an instinctive metaphysics of the similar and the dissimilar, of the one and the many” (ibid., p. 116). It is summed up therefore in the handling of the principle of “limited similarity” (ibid., p. 118).
「因此，歸根結底，證據的批判依賴於相似與不相似、一與多的本能形而上學」（同上，第 116 頁）。因此，它歸結為「有限相似性」原則的處理（同上，第 118 頁）。
Henri Focillon, The Life of Forms in Art, trans. Charles Beecher Hogan and George Keebler (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942).
亨利·福西永，《藝術中的形式生命》，查爾斯·比徹·霍根和喬治·基布勒譯（紐黑文：耶魯大學出版社，1942 年）。
Narrative is associated with this reconstructive phase just once, this time under the cover of a quotation from Michelet: “But a great vital movement was needed, because all these diverse elements gravitated together in the unity of the story [récit]” (ibid, p. 154). Perhaps the greatest lack in The Historian’s Craft, in its published part, is some reflection on the way the question of “historical analysis” (which implies the question of historical causation) is articulated in terms of “historical observation” (which includes the questions about historical facts and events). This is the point of articulation where a reflection on narrative and the connection between event and narrative could have been enlightening.
敘事僅在一次與此重建階段相關聯，這次是在米歇萊的引文下：「但需要一個偉大的生命運動，因為所有這些不同的元素都彙聚在故事的統一體中」（同上，第 154 頁）。也許《歷史工匠》中最大的缺陷在於其已出版部分對「歷史分析」（這意味著歷史因果關係的問題）如何以「歷史觀察」（包括歷史事實和事件的問題）的術語進行闡述缺乏反思。這是一個可以對敘事及事件與敘事之間的聯繫進行有啟發性反思的接合點。
Trans. Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972-74). First published in 1949, it underwent two important revisions leading up to the fourth edition published in 1979 (Paris: A. Colin). See also the pieces collected in Fernand Braudel, On History, trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), including an extract from the Preface to The Mediterranean . . . , Braudel’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, “The Situation of History in 1950,” his famous Annales article, from 1958, on the longue durée, and other essays dealing with the relationships between history and other human sciences.
譯者：西安·雷諾�tea，2 卷（紐約：哈珀和羅出版社，1972-74）。初版於 1949 年，經過兩次重要修訂，直至 1979 年出版第四版（巴黎：A. 科林出版社）。另請參見收錄在費爾南·布勞岱爾《論歷史》一書中的文章，譯者：莎拉·馬修斯（芝加哥：芝加哥大學出版社，1980），包括《地中海》前言的節錄，布勞岱爾在法國高等師範學校的就職演講，1958 年發表在《年鑑》雜誌上的關於長期歷史 duration 的著名文章，以及其他探討歷史與其他人文科學關係的論文。
See his “Leçon Inaugurale” at the Collège de France (1933), in Lucien Febvre,
參見他在法國高等師範學校的就職演講（1933），收錄在盧西安·費夫爾的

Combats pour l’Histoire (Paris: A. Colin, 1953), p. 7. There is no article titled récit or narratif in La Nouvelle Histoire.
《為歷史而戰》（巴黎：A. 科林出版社，1953），第 7 頁。在《新史學》中並無標題為「敘事」或「敘述」的文章。
19. Paul Lacombe, De l’histoire considérée comme une science (Paris: Hachette, 1894); François Simiand, “Méthode historique et science sociale,” Revue de synthèse historique 6 (1903):1-22, 129-57; Henri Berr, L’Histoire traditionelle et la Synthèse historique (Paris: Alcan, 1921).
19. 保羅·拉孔布，《作為一門科學的歷史》（巴黎：阿爾貝·哈契特出版社，1894）；弗朗索瓦·西米安，「歷史方法與社會科學」，《歷史綜合評論》6（1903）：1-22，129-57；亨利·貝爾，《傳統史學與歷史綜合》（巴黎：阿爾坎出版社，1921）。
20. Huguette and Pierre Chaunu, Séville et l’Atlantique: 1504-1650, 12 vols. (Paris: SEVPEN, 1955-60).
20. 雨格特和皮耶爾·肖努，《塞維利亞與大西洋：1504-1650 年》，12 卷（巴黎：SEVPEN，1955-60 年）。
21. Below, I shall compare Braudel’s practice in The Mediterranean to his theoretical declarations in On History, to which I have limited myself here.
21. 在下文中，我將比較布勞德爾在《地中海》中的做法與他在《論歷史》中的理論陳述，後者是我在此所限定的。
22. Pierre Chaunu, Histoire quantitative-Histoire sérielle.
22. 皮耶爾·肖努，《定量史學—系列史學》。
23. The concept of “conjuncture,” forged by economists, “expresses the desire to surpass the discontinuity between the various curves established by statisticians to grasp the interdependence of all the variables and factors isolated at a given moment, and to follow-hence predict-their evolution over time” (from the article “Structure/ Conjuncture,” in La Nouvelle Histoire, p. 525, emphasis in original).
23. "結構階段"這一概念是由經濟學家提出，"表達了超越統計學家在某一特定時刻所建立的各種曲線之間不連續性的願望，以把握所有被隔離的變量和因素的相互依存性，並追蹤—因此預測—它們隨時間的演變"（摘自《新史學》一書中"結構/階段"一文，第 525 頁，原文強調）。
24. His “General Introduction” to La Crise de l’économie française à la fin de l’Ancien Régime et au début de la Révolution française (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944), was economic history’s Discourse on Method. According to Pierre Chaunu, “Labrousse marked out the boundaries of meaning for a conjuncture that could speak only within a structure” (Histoire quantitative-Histoire sérielle, p. 125).
24. 他在《法國經濟在舊制度末期和法國大革命初期的危機》（巴黎：法國大學出版社，1944 年）中的「總論」，被視為經濟史學的《方法論》。根據皮埃爾·沙諾的說法，「拉布魯斯劃定了一個能夠僅在結構中言說的景況的意義邊界」（《量化歷史—系列歷史》，第 125 頁）。
25. “In the beginning was economics, but at the center of everything was man, man confronted with himself, hence with death, in the succession of generations, whence demography” (Pierre Chaunu, “La Voie démographique et ses dépassements,” in Histoire quantitative-Histoire sérielle, p. 169).
25. 「起初是經濟學，但一切的中心是人，面對自身，因此也面對死亡，在代代相傳中，由此而來人口統計學」（皮埃爾·沙諾，《人口統計學途徑及其超越》，收錄於《量化歷史—系列歷史》，第 169 頁）。
26. P. Goubert’s work, Beauvais et le Beauvaisis du 1600 à 1730 (Paris: SEVPEN, 1960), reprinted under the title Cent Mille Provinciaux au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Flammarion, 1968), in this regard marks the full integration of demographic history and economic history into the framework of the regional monograph. In this sense, it has been perhaps demographic history more than anything else that has allowed the idea of a system of civilization to be joined to that of a structure, and the delimiting of such a system from the turn of the thirteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, that is, to the end of rural Europe. The outline of this system of civilization only appears if demography does not confine itself to counting people, if it aims at extricating the cultural and nonnatural characteristics that govern the uneasy equilibrium of this system.
26. 普·古貝爾的作品《1600 至 1730 年的博瓦埃及博瓦埃地區》（巴黎：SEVPEN 出版社，1960 年），後以《17 世紀的十萬省民》為題再版（巴黎：弗拉馬里翁出版社，1968 年），在這方面標誌著人口統計史和經濟史完全融入地區專著的框架。從這個意義上說，正是人口統計史，甚於其他任何事物，使文明系統的概念得以與結構的概念結合，並界定了從 13 世紀轉折點到 20 世紀初，即農村歐洲結束的這一系統。只有當人口統計學不僅僅局限於計算人口，而是致力於提取支配這一系統不穩定平衡的文化和非自然特徵時，這一文明系統的輪廓才會呈現。
27. F. Braudel, Civilization matérielle. Economie et Capitalisme XV’—XVIII siècle: vol. 1, Les Sructures du quotidien; vol. 2, Les Jeux de l’échange; vol. 3, Le Temps du monde (Paris: A. Colin, 1967-79). To date the first two volumes have been translated into English: The Structures of Everyday Life, trans. Miriam Kochan, revised Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1981); The Wheels of Commerce, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1983).
27. 布勞代爾，《物質文明、經濟和資本主義十五至十八世紀》：第 1 卷《日常生活的結構》；第 2 卷《交易的遊戲》；第 3 卷《世界的時間》（巴黎：A. 科林出版社，1967-79 年）。到目前為止，前兩卷已被翻譯成英文：《日常生活的結構》，譯者：米麗亞姆·科漢，修訂：西安·雷諾茲（紐約：哈珀與羅出版社，1981 年）；《商業的輪子》，譯者：西安·雷諾茲（紐約：哈珀與羅出版社，1983 年）。
28. See below, chapter 6, pp. 208-14.
28. 參見下文，第 6 章，第 208-214 頁。
29. Jacques Le Goff, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). This work stems from a long time-span history: “the long period of the Middle Ages,” “the long period relevant to our history” (p. x). I shall return to some statements by Le Goff concerning the relationships between this “total,” “long,” “deep” Middle Ages and our present in volume 2 of my study.
29. 雅克·勒·戈夫，《中世紀的時間、工作和文化》，譯者：阿瑟·戈德漢默（芝加哥：芝加哥大學出版社，1980 年）。這部作品源自一個長時段的歷史：「中世紀的漫長時期」，「與我們歷史相關的長期」（第 x 頁）。我將在我研究的第 2 卷中回顧勒·戈夫關於這個「整體的」、「長期的」、「深入的」中世紀與我們現在之間關係的一些陳述。
30. Refusing to “give himself over to an ethnology that stands outside time” (ibid., p. 246), Le Goff sees diachrony as working according to “abstract systems of transformation very different from the evolutionary schemes used by the historian in attempt-
30. 拒絕「將自己交給站在時間之外的民族學」（同上，第 246 頁），勒·戈夫認為共時性根據「抽象的轉型系統運作，這些系統與歷史學家在嘗試中使用的進化方案非常不同。
ing to apprehend the process of becoming in the concrete societies he studies” (ibid., p. 235). The problem, he says, is to transcend the “false dilemma of structure versus conjuncture, and, even more important, structure versus event” (ibid.).
"他在研究的具體社會中理解成為的過程"（同上，第 235 頁）。他說，問題在於超越"結構與偶然性，更重要的是結構與事件"之間的"虛假兩難"（同上）。
31. See below, pp. 206-25.
31. 參見下文，第 206-25 頁。
32. See Michel Vovelle, Piété baroque et Déchristianisation en Provence au XVIII siècle: les attitudes devant la mort d’après les clauses des testaments (Paris: Plon, 1973); Pierre Chaunu, La mort à Paris, XVI

, X V I I^{e}, X V I I I^{e}

siècles (Paris: Fayard, 1978).
32. 參見米歇爾·沃韋爾，《18 世紀普羅旺斯的巴洛克虔誠與世俗化：根據遺囑條款看待死亡的態度》（巴黎：普隆出版社，1973 年）；皮埃爾·肖努，《巴黎的死亡，16-18 世紀》（巴黎：法雅出版社，1978 年）。
33. Pierre Chaunu, “Un Champ pour l’histoire sérielle, l’histoire au troisième niveau,” in La mort à Paris, p. 227.
33. 皮埃爾·肖努，《一個連續歷史的範疇：第三層次的歷史》，載於《巴黎的死亡》，第 227 頁。
34. Georges Duby, “Histoire sociale et idéologies des sociétés,” in Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora, eds., Faire de l’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), vol.1, p. 149.
34. 喬治·杜比，《社會史與社會意識形態》，收錄於雅克·勒·戈夫和皮埃爾·諾拉編，《做歷史》（巴黎：加利瑪出版社，1974 年），第 1 卷，第 149 頁。
35. Philippe Aries, The Hour of Our Death, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Knopf, 1981).
35. 菲利普·阿里埃斯，《我們死亡的時刻》，海倫·韋弗譯（紐約：克諾普夫出版社，1981 年）。
36. Michel Vovelle presents a critical summary of the results and the dead ends of twenty years of long time-span history, starting with Braudel’s celebrated article of 1958 (“History and the Social Sciences: the Longue Durée”), in La Nouvelle Histoire, pp. 316-43. Accepting that “the death of a certain historicizing history is today an accomplished fact” (p. 318), he asks whether the event struck down by Braudel has really disappeared from the historical field. He doubts that the model of embedded times, practiced by Braudel, can be transposed to other historical regions, especially social history. On the one hand, the heterogeneity of rhythms and correspondences between different time-spans tends to nullify the idea of a total history. On the other hand, the polarization between the quasi-immobility of the great mental structures and the return of the event, brought about by the recent interest in ideas about cut-off points, traumas, breaks, and revolutions, calls into question the very idea of a graduated scale of time-spans. For example, the most recent history seems to be seeking a new dialectic of short spans of time and long ones, a “concordance of times” (p. 341). I shall return in chapter 6 to this problem, which perhaps does not have a solution at the level of the historian’s profession but rather on the level of a more subtle reflection about historical intentionality. Aside from this reflection, the historians’ intellectual honesty undoubtedly lies in rejecting both immobile history and that of the event as an outburst and, within this wide interval, giving free reign to the multiplying of historical times, depending on the requirements of the object under consideration and the method chosen. Thus, for example, we can see the same author, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, illustrating in turn the short time-span and even the use of a narrative form in his famous Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error (trans. Barbara Bray [New York: G. Braziller, 1978]); the long time-span in The Peasants of Languedoc (trans. John Day [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974]); and the extreme long time-span in Times of Feast, Times of Famine: A History of Climate Since the Year 1000 (trans. Barbara Bray [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971]), and in Part IV of The Territory of the Historian, trans. Ben Reynolds and Siân Reynolds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979): “History without People: The Climate as a New Province of Research,” pp. 285-319.
36. 米歇爾·沃維爾在《新史學》中對二十年長時段史學的成果和死胡同進行了批判性總結，起始於布勞德爾 1958 年著名的文章（〈歷史與社會科學：長期持續期〉）。承認「某種歷史化歷史的死亡今天已是既成事實」，他質疑被布勞德爾打倒的事件是否真的已從歷史領域消失。他懷疑布勞德爾所實踐的嵌入式時間模型是否可以轉用於其他歷史領域，尤其是社會史。一方面，不同時段之間的節奏和對應關係的異質性，傾向於否定整體史的概念。另一方面，在最近對切入點、創傷、斷裂和革命的想法產生興趣的背景下，介乎於大心智結構的準靜止狀態和事件回歸之間的兩極化，質疑了時間尺度分級的概念。例如，最近的歷史似乎正尋求短時段和長時段的新辯證法，一種「時間的和諧」。我將在第六章回到這個問題，這個問題或許不在歷史學家職業層面上有解決方案，而是在關於歷史意圖的更為微妙的思考層面。除此反思外，歷史學家的知識誠信無疑在於拒絕靜止的歷史和作為爆發的事件史，並在這個寬廣區間內，根據所考察對象的要求和所選方法，自由多元歷史時間。例如，我們可以看到同一作者伊曼紐爾·勒羅伊·拉杜里在他著名的《蒙泰婁：錯誤的應許之地》中轉而闡明短時段，甚至運用敘事形式。布拉澤爾，1978]）；《朗格多克地區農民》（譯者：約翰·戴伊，[伊利諾大學出版社，烏爾巴納，1974]）中的長時間跨度；以及《盛宴與饑荒的時代：自 1000 年以來氣候的歷史》（譯者：芭芭拉·布雷，[花園城市，紐約：道布爾戴出版社，1971]）和《歷史學家的領域》（譯者：本·雷諾茲和西安·雷諾茲，[芝加哥：芝加哥大學出版社，1979]）第四部分中的極長時間跨度："沒有人的歷史：研究的新領域—氣候"，第 285-319 頁。
37. Wilhelm Windelband, “Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (Strassburger Rektorede, 1894),” in Präludien: Aufsätze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, vol. 2 (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1921), pp. 136-60.
37. 威爾海姆·溫德爾班，"歷史與自然科學"（斯特拉斯堡校長演講，1894），收錄於《序曲：哲學及其歷史的論文和演講》，第 2 卷（蒂賓根：J.C.B.莫爾出版社，1921），第 136-60 頁。
38. See Raymond Aron, La Philosophie Critique de l’histoire: essai sur une theorie allemande de l’histoire (Paris: Vrin, 1938, 4th. ed. 1969). See especially the footnote on the relationships between Windelband and Rickert, pp. 306-7.
38. 參見雷蒙·阿隆，《歷史的批判哲學：關於德國歷史理論的論文》（巴黎：維里恩出版社，1938，第 4 版 1969）。特別參見關於溫德爾班和里克特之間關係的腳注，第 306-7 頁。
39. The Journal of Philosophy 39 (1942): 35-48; reprinted in Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 344-56. I shall cite the latter.
39. 《哲學期刊》39 卷（1942）：第 35-48 頁；轉載於帕特里克·加丁納編輯，《歷史理論》（紐約：自由出版社，1959），第 344-56 頁。本文將引用後者。
40. “By a general law, we should here understand a statement of universal conditional form which is capable of being confirmed by suitable empirical findings” (ibid. p. 345).
40. "依照一般法則，我們應理解為一種具有普遍條件形式的陳述，其可以通過適當的經驗發現得到證實"（同上，第 345 頁）。
41. Bertrand Russell, “On the Notion of Cause,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13 (1912-13): 1-26.
41. 伯特蘭·羅素，《論因果概念》，《亞里士多德學會會刊》第 13 卷（1912-13 年）：1-26 頁。
42. Hempel’s refusal to give a distinct status to the causal relation is directed against Maurice Mandelbaum, who, in chapters 7 and 8 of his The Problem of Historical Knowledge (New York: Liveright, 1938), had attempted to distinguish the “causal explanation” practiced by historians from “causal analysis,” identical to explanation by causal laws. See Hempel, p. 347 n .1 . I shall return to Mandelbaum’s thesis, in its more recent form, in chapter 6.
42. 亨佩爾拒絕給予因果關係一個獨特的地位，是針對莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆，後者在其《歷史知識問題》（紐約：利夫萊特，1938 年）的第 7 和第 8 章中，試圖區分歷史學家所實踐的"因果解釋"和等同於因果定律解釋的"因果分析"。參見亨佩爾，第 347 頁註 1。我將在第 6 章回到曼德爾鮑姆的論點的更近期形式。
43. Charles Frankel, “Explanation and Interpretation in History,” Philosophy of Science 24 (1957): 137-55; reprinted in Theories of History, pp. 408-27. I shall cite the latter.
43. 查爾斯·弗蘭克爾，《歷史中的解釋與闡釋》，《科學哲學》第 24 卷（1957 年）：137-55 頁；收錄於《歷史理論》，第 408-27 頁。我將引用後者。
44. The way had been opened, in fact, by Hempel himself, with his notion of an “explanation sketch.” We need to understand this strategy if we are to fully comprehend the breakthrough created by Dray’s work, which we shall come to below.
44. 事實上，這條路是由亨佩爾本人開闢的，他提出了"解釋草圖"的概念。我們需要理解這種策略，才能充分理解下文將討論的德雷的工作所創造的突破。
45. Having to take a “weak” model of explanation into account will be a sufficient reason for us not to give in to a directly narrativist thesis and to appeal to a more indirect method of relating explanation to understanding.
45. 必須考慮一個"弱"的解釋模型，這就足以使我們不會屈服於直接的敘事主義論點，而是訴諸於一種更間接的方法來關聯解釋與理解。
46. The adversaries of the covering law model will see in this a sign that explanation in history is grafted to the prior intelligibility of narrative, which it reinforces, as it were, by interpolation.
46. 覆蓋定律模型的反對者將在此看到，歷史中的解釋是移接於敘事的先驗可理解性，它彷彿通過插值來強化這種可理解性。
47. Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
47. 帕特里克·加丁納，《歷史解釋的本質》（牛津：克拉倫登出版社，1952 年）。
48. Ernst Nagel, “Some Issues in the Logic of Historical Analysis,” Scientific Monthly 74 (1952): 162-69; reprinted in Gardiner, Theories of History, pp. 373-86. I cite the latter.
48. 歐內斯特·納格爾，《歷史分析邏輯的若干問題》，科學月刊 74 卷（1952 年）：162-69；收錄於加迪納，《歷史理論》，第 373-86 頁。我引用後者。
49. It is remarkable that the question of selectivity should never be related to one specific feature of history, namely, that historians belong to the field of their objects in a different way than physicists belong to the physical world. I shall return to this point in volume 2 .
49. 值得注意的是，選擇性問題從未被關聯到歷史的一個特定特徵，即歷史學家以與物理學家對待物理世界不同的方式屬於他們的研究領域。我將在第二卷中回到這一點。
50. Here again it is remarkable that the question of knowing why there is a question of importance in history is avoided. That the weighing of degrees of importance arises from a logic of relative guarantees is beyond question. On this point Nagel has added to the model in defending it. And a dialectic of explanation and understanding will have to take account of this. But, however indisputable it may be that such weighing concerns history as “inquiry,” the question remains of situating this inquiry within the total process of historical understanding.
50. 在此再次值得注意的是，為什麼會有歷史重要性問題這一問題被避而不談。重要程度的權衡源於相對保證的邏輯是毫無疑問的。在這一點上，納格爾為模型辯護並有所補充。解釋與理解的辯證法將不得不考慮這一點。然而，儘管這種權衡無疑涉及作為「探究」的歷史，但在歷史理解的整個過程中定位這一探究仍是一個未決問題。
51. We shall see later what other use may be made of this important concession. Frankel makes several others as well that weaken the model to the point of abandoning it. For example, he concedes to Isaiah Berlin (referring to Berlin’s “Historical Inevitability,” the Auguste Compte Memorial Lecture, 12 May 1953, in idem, Four Essays on Liberty [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], reprinted in Patrick Gardiner, ed., The Philosophy of History [London: Oxford University Press, 1974], pp. 16186), that if history is written in ordinary language, and if the reader does not expect specialized scientific language, it is because the success of an explanation is not measured in terms of a theory but “by the account he gives of concrete affairs.” Causal explanations, and even commonsensical ones, skirt the rules of wisdom-such as the adage that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. We are not far here from a narrativist theory: we want a historian “to tell a story and to make it come to life” (in Theories of History, p. 414).
51. 我們稍後將看到可能對這個重要讓步做出的其他用途。弗蘭克爾還提出了幾個使模型弱化到放棄它的例子。例如，他對以賽亞·伯林讓步（參考伯林的《歷史必然性》，奧古斯特·孔特紀念講座，1953 年 5 月 12 日，載於同上，《論自由的四篇論文》[倫敦：牛津大學出版社，1969 年]，在帕特里克·加丁納編輯的《歷史哲學》[倫敦：牛津大學出版社，1974 年]，第 16-186 頁），如果歷史是用普通語言書寫，如果讀者不期望專業的科學語言，這是因為解釋的成功不是用理論衡量，而是"他對具體事務的敘述"。因果解釋，甚至常識性的解釋，都迴避了智慧的規則，例如權力導致腐敗，絕對的權力絕對地導致腐敗。我們在這裡不遠於一種敘事理論：我們希望歷史學家"講述一個故事並使其生動起來"（在《歷史理論》第 414 頁）。
52. I shall return in chapter 6 below to the variety of meanings that adorn the notion of a cause in history.
52. 我將在下面第 6 章回到歷史中因果概念的各種含義。
53. Here again Frankel’s argument skirts the narrativist conception. The choice of terminal consequences by the historian is called “the frame of his story” (ibid., p. 421). In discussing the question of the “true” cause, Frankel, following Gardiner on this point, shows that when the disagreements have to do not with perspective but with connections, they are “about what . . should or should not be included in the historian’s story to make that story an adequate answer to the question that has been raised” (ibid., p. 427). When a historian proposes his interpretation of a period or an institution, “he is telling a story of a sequence of causally related events that have consequences of value or dis-value” (ibid., p. 421).
53. 在這裡，弗蘭克爾的論點再次迴避了敘事概念。歷史學家選擇終極後果被稱為"他故事的框架"（同上，第 421 頁）。在討論"真正"原因的問題時，弗蘭克爾遵循加丁納的觀點，表明當分歧不是關於觀點而是關於聯繫時，是"關於應該或不應該包含在歷史學家的故事中，以使該故事成為對所提出問題的充分回答"（同上，第 427 頁）。當歷史學家提出他對某一時期或機構的解釋時，"他正在講述一個因果相關事件的故事，這些事件具有價值或反價值的後果"（同上，第 421 頁）。
54. In volume 2 I shall return to this problem of the relationships between explaining the past and action in the present, which the theory of progress pushed to the front rank in the philosophy of history. At the present stage of our discussion, the only thing at stake is whether this choice of terminal consequences need not first satisfy a good causal connection on the factual level.
在第 2 卷中，我將回到這個關於解釋過去與當前行動之間關係的問題，這是進步理論在歷史哲學中推向前列的問題。在我們討論的當前階段，唯一的問題是這種終極結果的選擇是否首先需要在事實層面上滿足良好的因果關聯。
55. A fine passage of Frankel’s bears witness to this delicate equilibrium between a methodological pluralism and a noncomplacent attitude as regards skepticism. Having spoken favorably of interpretations in terms of terminal consequences, Frankel notes that if the scheme proposed for history does depend on the facts, the limited opportunities, and the possibilities raised by circumstances, and if also the historian is not sectarian and provincial, but open and generous, then “history which is lit by some clear and circumspect idea of what human life can be is generally preferred to the history that is impassive, that never commits itself, and that lacks a guiding ideal or the irony or tears that go with applying such an ideal to the record of human affairs” (ibid., p. 424). The whole of Charles Frankel’s liberalism and humanism is contained in these phrases.
弗蘭克爾的一段精彩文字見證了方法論多元主義與對懷疑主義不妥協態度之間的微妙平衡。在對終極結果的解釋表示贊同後，弗蘭克爾指出，如果為歷史提出的方案確實取決於事實、有限的機會和環境提出的可能性，並且如果歷史學家不是狹隘和省界的，而是開放和寬容的，那麼"被一些清晰和謹慎的人類生活理念照亮的歷史，通常比那些冷漠、從不承諾，缺乏指導性理想或對人類事務記錄應用這種理想時的諷刺或淚水的歷史更受歡迎"（同上，第 424 頁）。查爾斯·弗蘭克爾的自由主義和人文主義全都包含在這些片語中。

Chapter Five 第五章

W. H. Dray, Laws and Explanations in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).
W. H. 德雷，《歷史中的定律與解釋》（倫敦：牛津大學出版社，1957 年）。
I shall return to the notion of causal explanation in the next chapter.
我將在下一章回到因果解釋的概念。
To be entirely convincing, the argument must be stated as follows. The physical and mechanical laws set in play by the accident, which as such do not involve a temporal order, require reconstituting the accident phase by phase in order to apply the laws seriatim. It is this application ad seriatim that makes knowing the laws a necessary condition of the explanation. If Dray did not give his argument this form, it is because he takes as his model the mechanic who perfectly understands each phase of the accident without himself being a physicist. Does Dray thereby mean to situate the historian’s knowledge on the same plane as the mechanic’s? If so, we risk falling into a summarily pragmatic conception of explanation in history, substituted for a theoretical one. Dray’s work presents numerous traces of such a conception. See ibid., pp. 70-76.
要完全令人信服，論點必須如下陳述。事故所觸發的物理和機械定律，其本質不涉及時間順序，需要逐步重建事故，以便依序應用定律。正是這種逐步應用使得了解定律成為解釋的必要條件。如果德雷（Dray）沒有用這種形式提出他的論點，那是因為他以完全理解事故每個階段的機械師為模型。德雷是否意圖將歷史學家的知識置於與機械師相同的平面？如果是這樣，我們就有淪為對歷史解釋的簡單實用主義概念的風險，取代理論性解釋。德雷的著作中存在大量此類概念的痕跡。參見同前引，第 70-76 頁。
“No matter how complicated the expression with which we complete a statement of the form ’ E because . . .’, it is a fact of the ‘logic’ of such ‘because’ statements that additions to the explanatory clause are never ruled out by our acceptance of the original statement” (ibid., p. 35).
「無論我們用多麼複雜的表達方式來完成『E 因為……』這種形式的陳述，這是這種『因為』陳述的『邏輯』事實，即對原始陳述的接受不會被對解釋性子句的任何補充所排除」（同前引，第 35 頁）。
This argument, we shall see, can easily be incorporated into the thesis that an event, as what contributes to the progression of a plot, shares with this plot the property of being both singular and typical at the same time.
我們將看到，這個論點可以很容易地納入這樣一個命題：一個事件，作為推動情節進程的要素，與該情節共享既是特殊又是典型的特性。
Dray (ibid., p. 2) refers to Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies
Dray（同前引，第 2 頁）提到卡爾·波普爾，《開放社會及其敵人》
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952,) vol. 2, p. 262. For many authors, asking about causality in history is simply to repeat the discussion about the place of laws in history, given either that we take cause to mean exactly the same thing as does lawwhen it is better to avoid speaking of a cause since the term is so equivocal-or that we take causes as specific kinds of laws, “causal laws”-then we have just a causal version of the covering law model. Saying X causes Y is equivalent to saying whenever X, Y.
（倫敦：羅特利奇和凱根保羅出版社，1952 年），第 2 卷，第 262 頁。對於許多作者來說，詢問歷史中的因果關係，無非是重複討論歷史中法則的地位，要麼是因為我們認為「因」與「法」完全相同（當最好避免使用「因」這個詞時，因為這個詞如此模糊）；要麼是我們將因視為特定類型的法則，即「因果定律」——然後我們就得到了覆蓋定律模型的因果版本。說 X 導致 Y 等同於說每當 X 出現，Y 就出現。
Collingwood tried to do this in his An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), where he distinguished three senses of the term. According to the first sense, the only one he takes as proper to history, and also as the primitive one, a person makes another person act in a certain way by providing him with a motive for so acting. According to the second sense, the cause of something is “the handle” by means of which we control it. Therefore it is what is in our power to produce or prevent. (For example, the cause of malaria is the bite of a mosquito.) He derives this second sense from the first one by broadening the notion of an effect resulting from human actions on the behavior of anyone to anything in general. Collingwood excludes this second sense from history, reserving it for the practical natural sciences and the discovery of causal laws by experimentation. Dray retains something from it, however, in his pragmatic criterion for causal attribution, although he sets it within the framework of a specific activity of judging. The third sense establishes a one-to-one relation, thanks to logical necessity, between two events or states of affairs. It is equivalent to the notion of a sufficient condition.
科林伍德在其《形而上學論文》（牛津：克拉倫登出版社，1948 年）中試圖這樣做，他區分了該術語的三種意義。根據第一種意義，也是他認為對歷史最恰當且最原始的意義，一個人通過提供動機，使另一個人以特定方式行事。根據第二種意義，某事物的原因是我們用來控制它的「把手」。因此，它是我們能夠生產或防止的東西。（例如，瘧疾的原因是蚊子叮咬。）他通過將效果的概念從人類行為對他人的影響擴大到一般事物，從而推導出這第二種意義。科林伍德從歷史中排除了這第二種意義，將其保留給實踐性自然科學和通過實驗發現因果定律。然而，德雷在判斷的特定活動框架內，仍保留了其中的一些內容，用於因果歸因的實用標準。第三種意義通過邏輯必然性在兩個事件或事態之間建立一對一的關係。它等同於充分條件的概念。
Max Weber and Raymond Aron will help us in the next chapter to push this analysis even further.
馬克斯·韋伯和雷蒙·阿龍將在下一章幫助我們進一步推進這一分析。
Cf. here H. L. A. Hart, “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49 (1948): 171-94, and Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). Both authors invite us to bring together explanation and the justification of one “claim” against another “claim” by providing “warrants.”
參見 H. L. A. Hart，《歸責與權利的歸屬》，亞里士多德學會會報 49 (1948): 171-94，以及 Stephen Toulmin，《論證的使用》（劍橋：劍橋大學出版社，1958）。兩位作者邀請我們通過提供「保證」來綜合解釋和一個「主張」對另一個「主張」的辯護。
I am saving this apology for singular causal imputation for my own attempt to articulate historical explanation in terms of our narrative understanding. Particular causal imputation can constitute the intermediary link between levels, to the extent that, for one thing, it is already an explanation and, for another, that it is established upon a narrative base. However as regards this aspect of the problem, there is only one brief allusion in Dray’s book: “to give and defend a causal explanation in history is scarcely ever to bring what is explained under a law, and almost always involves a descriptive account, a narrative of the actual course of events, in order to justify the judgement that the condition indicated was indeed the cause” (ibid., pp. 113-14). Note also the allusion to diagnosis as the medical equivalent of individual causal imputation in history.
我將把這個關於特殊因果歸責的道歉留作我自己闡述以敘事理解為基礎的歷史解釋的嘗試。特殊因果歸責可以構成不同層次之間的中介聯繫，一方面它本身已經是一種解釋，另一方面它建立在敘事基礎之上。然而，就這個問題的這一方面而言，Dray 的書中只有一個簡短的暗示：「在歷史中給出並捍衛因果解釋幾乎從不是將所解釋的內容歸入某個定律，而幾乎總是需要一個描述性的敘述，一個事件實際過程的敘述，以證明所指出的條件確實是原因」（同上，第 113-14 頁）。另外注意診斷作為歷史中個別因果歸責的醫學對應。
In this sense, it is an attempt to “make sense,” but through arguments independent “of what Collingwood in particular has to say about historical understanding” (ibid., p. 122).
在這個意義上，這是一種「意義建構」的嘗試，但通過獨立於「柯林伍德特別談到的歷史理解」的論證（同上，第 122 頁）。
“Taken in isolation, it is very seldom beyond all doubt whether a given explanatory statement of the form 'He did $x$ because of $y$ ’ is to be taken in the rational sense or not. . . . The particular ‘because’ does not carry its language level on its face; this has to be determined by other means” (ibid., p. 133). The ambiguity of the term “because” increases if we take into account its use in explanations in terms of dispositions, which Gilbert Ryle distinguishes from explanations in terms of empirical laws and which Gardiner takes up again in The Nature of Historical Explanation, pp. 89-90 and 96-97.
孤立地看，很少能毫無疑問地判斷形如「他因為 $x$ 而 $y$ 」的解釋性陳述是否應該以理性意義理解。……特定的「因為」並不直接顯示其語言層次；這需要通過其他方式來確定。關於「因為」一詞的歧義性，若考慮其在傾向性解釋中的使用，會更加明顯，吉爾伯特·賴爾將此區別於經驗定律的解釋，加德納在《歷史解釋的本質》一書的 89-90 頁和 96-97 頁中再次闡述了這一點。
Regarding this point, cf. Hermann Lübbe; “Was aus Handlungen Geschichten macht: Handlungsinterferenz; Meterogonic der Zwecke; Widerfahrnis; Handlungsge-
關於這一點，參見赫爾曼·呂貝；「是什麼使行動成為故事：行動干擾；目的的隕落；遭遇；行動歷史
mengelagen; Zufall,” in J. Mittelstrass and M. Reidel, eds., Vernünftiges Denken. Studien zur praktischen Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1978), pp. 237-68.
在米特爾斯特拉斯和萊德爾編輯的《理性思考：實踐哲學和科學理論研究》（柏林/紐約：沃爾特·德·格魯伊特出版社，1978 年），第 237-68 頁。
G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971).
蓋‧赫‧馮‧賴特，《解釋與理解》（伊薩卡：康奈爾大學出版社，1971）。
See G. H. von Wright, Norm and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); idem, An Essay in Deontic Logic and the General Theory of Action (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1968).
參見 G. H. 馮萊特，《規範與行動》（倫敦：羅特萊奇和凱根保羅出版社，1963 年）；同作者，《論義務邏輯與行動的一般理論》（阿姆斯特丹：北荷蘭出版社，1968 年）。
He pays particular attention to the threefold criticism directed against this dichotomy that he finds in Dray’s Laws and Explanations in History, and in G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1957), Peter Winch, The Idea of A Social Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), and Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964). Also, he shows much interest in the convergence between developments he sees, on the European continent, in the hermeneutical or dialectical-hermeneutical current of philosophy. Given the perspective of these intersecting influences, von Wright expects Wittgenstein’s philosophy to have an impact on hermeneutical philosophy equal to the one it has had on analytic philosophy, thereby contributing to the drawing together of these two traditions. He interprets hermeneutics’ orientation toward questions of language as one favorable sign. In dissociating “understanding” and “empathy,” recent hermeneutical philosophy, that of Gadamer in particular, makes understanding “a semantic rather than a psychological category” (Explanation and Understanding, p. 30).
他特別關注對這種二分法的三重批評，這些批評出現在德雷的《歷史中的法則與解釋》，以及在 G. E. M. 安斯康姆的《意圖》（牛津：布萊克威爾出版社，1957 年）、彼得·溫奇的《社會科學的概念》（倫敦：羅特萊奇和凱根保羅出版社，1958 年）以及查爾斯·泰勒的《行為解釋》（倫敦：羅特萊奇和凱根保羅出版社，1964 年）中。此外，他對歐洲大陸哲學中解釋學或辯證-解釋學流派的發展表現出極大興趣。基於這些交叉影響的視角，馮萊特期望維特根斯坦的哲學對解釋學哲學的影響力，將等同於它對分析哲學的影響，從而有助於這兩種傳統的匯合。他將解釋學對語言問題的取向視為一個有利的跡象。在最近的解釋學哲學中，特別是伽達默爾的哲學，通過區分「理解」和「移情」，使理解成為「一個語義而非心理的範疇」（《解釋與理解》，第 30 頁）。
Cf. J. L. Petit, “La Narrativité et le concept de l’explication en histoire,” in Dorian Tiffeneau, ed., La Narrativité (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1980), pp. 187-201.
參見 J. L. 佩蒂，《敘事性與歷史解釋的概念》，收錄於多里安·蒂芬諾編，《敘事性》（巴黎：國家科學研究中心，1980 年），第 187-201 頁。
See Explanation and Understanding, pp. 43-50.
參見《解釋與理解》，第 43-50 頁。
Von Wright includes the concept of event within that of a state of affairs: “an event, one could say, is a pair of successive states” (ibid., p. 12). This definition is justified in his earlier work, Norm and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), chapter 2, section 6.
馮·萊特將事件的概念包含在事態的概念中：「一個事件，可以說，是一對連續的狀態」（同上，第 12 頁）。這個定義在他早期的著作《規範與行動》（倫敦：勞特利奇和凱根·保羅出版社，1963 年）中的第 2 章第 6 節得到了證明。
Furthermore, causality, even when divested of any anthropomorphic interpretation, preserves an implicit tie to human action in that we call a cause either what it is sufficient to produce to obtain an effect, or what it is necessary to suppress to make the effect disappear. In this sense, to conceive of a relation between events in terms of causality is to conceive it under the aspect of possible action. Von Wright thereby rejoins Collingwood’s description of a cause as a “handle.” I have already referred to this problem of non-Humean uses of the idea of a cause in speaking of Dray’s work. I shall return to it again in the next chapter with Max Weber, Raymond Aron, and Maurice Mandelbaum.
此外，因果關係，即使去除任何人類形態的解釋，仍然保留著與人類行動的隱性聯繫，因為我們稱為因果的，要麼是足以產生某種效果的事物，要麼是必須消除以使效果消失的事物。在這個意義上，以因果關係的觀點來理解事件之間的關係，就是以可能行動的角度來理解它。馮·萊特從而與柯林伍德將因果描述為「把手」的觀點相呼應。我已經在談論德雷的工作時提到過這個非休謨式因果觀念的問題。我將在下一章中討論馬克斯·韋伯、雷蒙·阿隆和莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆的相關內容。
Arthur C. Danto, “What Can We Do?” The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 435-45; idem, “Basic Actions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 141-48.
阿瑟·C·丹托，〈我們能做什麼？〉，《哲學雜誌》60 期（1963 年）：435-45；同上，〈基本行動〉，《美國哲學季刊》2 期（1965 年）：141-48。
I am leaving aside the long analysis by means of which he undertakes to ameliorate the theory of practical inference stemming from Aristotle and taken up again in the modern period by Anscombe, Taylor, and Malcolm. What von Wright calls the “Logical Connection Argument”-in opposition to the argument for a nonlogical, that is, extrinsic, causal connection-was not presented, he says, in a convincing way by his predecessors. He wants to pose the problem instead in terms of verification. The question is a twofold one. How, we will ask, do we assure ourself that an agent has a certain intention? And how do we discover that his behavior is of the kind for which the intention is taken to be the cause? The argument then runs as follows. If it seems as though we cannot answer the first question without answering the second one, then the intention and the action are not logically independent. “In this mutual dependence of the verification of premises and the verification of conclusions in practical syllogisms
我暫且擱置他為了改善源自亞里士多德並在現代由安斯康姆、泰勒和馬爾坎重新提出的實踐推理理論而進行的冗長分析。冯·賴特稱之為"邏輯連接論證"，與非邏輯的、即外在的因果關係論證相對，他說這一論證之前並未被他的前輩令人信服地呈現。他希望轉而以驗證的角度提出問題。這是一個雙重問題。我們將詢問：我們如何確保一個行為者具有某種意圖？又如何發現其行為是被視為意圖之原因的那種行為？論證如下。若似乎我們無法在未回答第二個問題的情況下回答第一個問題，那麼意圖與行動便非邏輯上獨立。
consists, as I see it, the truth of the Logical Connection Argument” (ibid., p. 116). I shall not pursue further the demonstration of this circular relationship, which is not necessary for my own proposal.
"在實踐三段論中，前提驗證與結論驗證的這種相互依存中，正如我所見，存在邏輯連接論證的真理"（同上，第 116 頁）。我不打算進一步追究這種循環關係的論證，因為這對我自己的提案並非必要。
I am also ignoring von Wright’s discussion of the compatibility between teleological and causal explanation. I will only speak of it insofar as his argument confirms the irreducibility of the first to the second. The argument essentially consists in saying that the two forms of explanation do not have the same explanandum. It is a question of different phenomena put into different descriptions: bodily movements on the side of causal explanation, intentional behavior on the other side. Not having the same explanandum, the two types of explanation are compatible. What is excluded is the possibility of adopting both explanations at the same time. Thus I cannot at the same time raise my arm and observe, on some screen, the changes taking place in my brain. When I am observing, I let things happen. When I am acting, I make them happen. It is a contradiction in terms therefore to let something happen and at the same time to make the same thing happen on the same occasion. No one, consequently, can observe the causes of the results of his own basic actions, in the sense of the word “result” adopted earlier. Causal and teleological explanation-irreducible to each other, and compatible-fuse in the meaning we attach to an action. “The conceptual basis of action, one could therefore say, is partly our ignorance (unawareness) of the operation of causes and partly our confidence that certain changes will happen only when we happen to be acting” (ibid., p. 130).
我也忽略了冯·赖特关于目的论和因果解释之间兼容性的讨论。我只会谈论他的论点是否确认了两者无法还原。这个论点本质上是说，这两种解释形式并没有相同的解释对象。这是关于用不同描述方式描述的不同现象：在因果解释方面是身体运动，在意图行为方面则是另一种情况。由于没有相同的解释对象，这两种解释是兼容的。被排除的是同时采用这两种解释的可能性。因此，我不能同时抬起手臂并在某个屏幕上观察我大脑中发生的变化。当我在观察时，我让事情发生。当我在行动时，我使事情发生。因此，在同一场合同时让某事发生并使同一件事发生是相互矛盾的。因此，没有人能够观察自己基本行为的结果的原因，用之前采用的"结果"一词的意义。因果和目的论解释——彼此不可还原，但又兼容——融合在我们赋予行为的意义中。"可以说，行为的概念基础部分源于我们对因果运作的无知（不察），部分源于我们相信只有在我们行动时才会发生某些变化"（同上，第 130 页）。
In an important note (ibid., pp. 200-201), remaining faithful to Wittgenstein, von Wright resists any linguistic reform that would exclude causal terminology from history, owing to the confusion possible between causal categories too exclusively dependent upon the Hempelian model. It is one thing to ask if causal terminology is appropriate to history, another to ask whether this or that causal category applies in this discipline.
在一个重要的注释中（同上，第 200-201 页），冯·赖特忠实于维特根斯坦，反对任何会排除历史中因果术语的语言改革，这是因为过于依赖赫普尔模型的因果类别可能造成混淆。询问因果术语是否适合历史是一回事，询问这或那个因果类别是否适用于这一学科是另一回事。
This first type can be schematized as follows (see ibid., p. 137).
这第一种类型可以如下图示（见同上，第 137 页）。
This second form of explanation can be schematized as follows (see ibid., p. 138).
這種解釋方式可以概括如下（見同上，第 138 頁）。
The independence of two events is debatable, von Wright notes, if the described event is that the First World War “broke out.” Is this not a “colligation,” whose complete description includes the incident at Sarajevo? The discussion never ends if we lose sight of the fact that it is always in terms of some description or another that an event is dependent or independent. In this sense, quasi-causal explanation is tributary to a particularly analytic description of events. Mandelbaum would certainly recall here that this atomistic use of causality derives from an overall grasp of an uninterrupted process, affecting continuous entities such as nations. See below, pp. 194-206.
兩個事件的獨立性是值得爭議的，冯·賴特指出，如果所描述的事件是第一次世界大戰"爆發"。這不是一種"集合"嗎？其完整描述包括薩拉熱窩事件？如果我們忽視了一個事件總是根據某種描述來判斷其相依性或獨立性的事實，討論就永遠不會結束。在這種意義上，準因果解釋依附於事件的特殊分析描述。曼德爾鮑姆肯定會在此回憶，這種因果關係的原子化用法源於對連續實體（如國家）的不間斷過程的整體把握。見下文，第 194-206 頁。
Quasi-causal explanation is thus schematized as follows (see ibid., p. 143).
準因果解釋因此可以概括如下（見同上，第 143 頁）。
See Part I, chap. 3, on the temporal implications of mimesis $_{2}$ .
參見第一部分，第 3 章，關於模仿的時間含義。
Arthur C. Danto, Analytic Philosophy of History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
阿瑟·C·丹托，《歷史分析哲學》（紐約：劍橋大學出版社，1965 年）。
This definition of the task of analytic philosophy is akin to the plea Peter Strawson makes, at the beginning of his Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen, 1959), in favor of a descriptive metaphysics, which he opposes to a revisionist metaphysics. In return, this implication of a descriptive metaphysics in an analysis of our conceptual and linguistic network is strongly opposed to French structuralism’s tendency to conceive of this network as closed in on itself, excluding any extralinguistic reference. Applied to history, this latter conception tends to make an event a simple “effect of discourse.” This linguistic idealism is completely foreign to analytic philosophy, for which the analysis of our ways of thinking and talking about the world and its descriptive metaphysics are mutually convertible. On this point analytic philosophy comes much closer to hermeneutic philosophy, although this latter form of philosophy proceeds more deliberately from an explication of historical existence in the direction of a language appropriate to it.
這個分析哲學任務的定義類似於彼得·斯特勞森在其《個人：描述性形而上學論文》（倫敦：梅休恩出版社，1959 年）一書開篇時提出的立場，支持描述性形而上學，並與修正主義形而上學相對立。相反，在對我們的概念和語言網絡進行分析時隱含的這種描述性形而上學，強烈地反對法國結構主義將這個網絡視為封閉自身、排除任何語言外部指涉的傾向。應用於歷史，後者的觀念往往將事件簡化為一個單純的「話語效果」。這種語言理想主義對於分析哲學來說是完全陌生的，在分析哲學中，對我們思考和談論世界的方式的分析以及其描述性形而上學是相互可轉換的。在這一點上，分析哲學更接近於解釋學哲學，儘管後者更有意識地從解釋歷史存在的角度出發，朝向一種適合它的語言。
I shall return in volume 2 to the question of testimony as an irreducible category of our relation to the past.
我將在第二卷中回到見證作為我們與過去關係的不可還原類別的問題。
I shall return to this distinction, which has no place here. It does not concern a difference in epistemological degree but a different relation to the past. For Croce, a chronicle is history cut off from the living present and, in this sense, applied to a dead past. History properly speaking is viscerally linked to the present and to action. This is the sense in which all history is contemporary history. The framework of this affirmation is not a conflict over method nor a conflict between method and truth, but the larger problem of the relationships between historical retrospection and the anticipation of the future tied to action.
我將回到這個在此並不適用的區別。這不涉及認識論程度上的差異，而是與過去的不同關係。對克羅齊來說，編年史是與活生生的現在切斷的歷史，在這個意義上是應用於一個死去的過去。嚴格意義上的歷史是與現在和行動密切相連的。這就是「所有歷史都是當代史」的意義。這一主張的框架不是方法上的衝突，也不是方法與真理之間的衝突，而是關於歷史回顧與與行動相關的未來預期之間關係的更大問題。
This seems so in the case of consequential significance: “If an earlier event is not significant with regard to a later event in a story, it does not belong to that story” (ibid., p. 134). But there are other modes of meaning or importance for which textual structure and the structure of the sentence are superimposed less easily: pragmatic, theoretical, or revelatory meaning or importance, and so on.
在具有重大意义的情況下似乎是這樣："如果一個早期事件對故事中的後期事件沒有意義，那麼它就不屬於該故事"（同上，第 134 頁）。但是，對於文本結構和句子結構不容易疊加的其他意義或重要性模式還有：實踐性、理論性或啟示性的意義或重要性等。
See Danto, chapter 10, “Historical Explanation: The Problem of General Laws,” pp. 201-32.
參見丹托，第 10 章，"歷史解釋：一般法則的問題"，第 201-32 頁。
W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).
W. B. 蓋里，《哲學與歷史理解》（紐約：舒肯書店，1968 年）。
See above, Part I, chapter 3 , on mimesis $_{2}$ .
參見上文，第一部分，第 3 章，關於模仿 $_{2}$ 。
The place given to sympathy in what I am calling subjective teleology confirms this diagnosis. What governs our expectation, Gallie says, is not some truth of an inductive kind but our sympathy or antipathy. Once embarked on a good story, “we are pulled along by it, and pulled by a far more compelling part of our human make-up than our intellectual presumptions and expectations” (ibid., p. 45). His concern to distinguish his analysis from the logic of the covering law model risks, then, swinging over to the side of a psychology based on our emotional response. Unfortunately this tipping toward psychology facilitated criticism of Gallie’s work by Hempel’s successors. For my part, I see nothing to condemn in such an interest in the psychological conditions of the reception of a work (whether narrative or not). It has its place for a hermeneutics in which the meaning of a work is fulfilled in reading. But, according to the analysis I proposed in Part I of the relationships between mimesis $_{2}$ and mimesis $_{3}$ , the rules for acceptability must be constructed at the same time inside and outside the work. Similarly, the notion of interest, which I shall return to in volume 2, cannot be eliminated from a theory of narrative. To accept or receive is to be interested.
在我所稱的主觀目的論中，同情所佔的位置證實了這一診斷。蓋利認為，支配我們期望的不是某種歸納性的真理，而是我們的同情或反感。一旦開始一個好故事，"我們被它拉著，被我們人性中比智力假設和期望更具說服力的部分所牽引"（同上，第 45 頁）。他試圖將自己的分析與覆蓋法則模型的邏輯區分開來，但風險是轉向基於我們情感反應的心理學。不幸的是，這種傾向於心理學的做法促使了赫普爾的繼承者對蓋利作品的批評。就我而言，我認為對作品接收的心理條件的興趣並無可非議（無論是敘事作品與否）。它在一種解釋學中佔有一席之地，在那裡作品的意義在閱讀中得到實現。但是，根據我在第一部分中提出的關於模仿 $_{2}$ 和模仿 $_{3}$ 之間關係的分析，可接受性的規則必須同時在作品內部和外部構建。同樣，我將在第二卷中重返的興趣概念，不能從敘事理論中刪除。接受或接收就是要有興趣。
In his criticism of nominalism, Gallie is not far from the major assumption of the historians of the Annales school: “Historical understanding therefore is not founded on individual Kings-or chaps-but on those changes in a given society which can be seen to make sense in the light of our general knowledge of how institutions work, or what can be and what cannot be done by means of them” (ibid., p. 83).
在批評名詞主義時，蓋利與年鑑學派的歷史學家的主要假設並無太大差異："歷史理解並非建立在個別國王或人物之上，而是建立在一個給定社會中那些在我們對機構運作的一般知識或可能和不可能做的事情的光照下可以理解的變化之上"（同上，第 83 頁）。
Gallie likes General de Gaulle’s statement in Le Fil de l’Epée, “c’est sur les contingencies qu’il faut construire l’action” (ibid., p. 98).
蓋利喜歡戴高樂將軍在《劍的線》中的陳述："必須在偶然性上構建行動"（同上，第 98 頁）。
Louis O. Mink, “The Autonomy of Historical Understanding,” History and Theory 5 (1965): 24-47; reprinted, with minor changes, in William H. Dray, ed., Philosophical Analysis and History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 160-92. I shall cite this latter version.
路易斯·奧·明克，《歷史理解的自主性》，《歷史與理論》5（1965 年）：24-47；經稍作修改後重印於威廉·H·德雷編，《哲學分析與歷史》（紐約：哈珀與羅出版社，1966 年），第 160-92 頁。我將引用後一版本。
Louis O. Mink, “Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding,” Review of Metaphysics 20 (1968): 667-98. He also considers Morton White’s Foundations of Historical Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), and Danto’s Analytic Philosophy of History.
路易斯·奧·明克，《哲學分析與歷史理解》，《形而上學評論》20（1968 年）：667-98。他還考察了莫頓·懷特的《歷史知識的基礎》（紐約：哈珀與羅出版社，1965 年）和丹托的《歷史分析哲學》。
This argument fits perfectly with Danto’s analysis of “narrative sentences” in terms of an original theory of descriptions. History, it will be recalled, is one description of human actions (or passions), namely, the description of earlier events in terms of later events unknown to the agents (or recipients) of the first occurrence. According to Mink, there is more to be said concerning historical understanding, not less. There is more to be said inasmuch as the redescription of the past implies recently acquired techniques of knowing (economic, psychoanalytic, etc.) and especially new tools of conceptual analysis (as, for example, when we talk about the “Roman proletariat”). Consequently, we need to add to the temporal asymmetry presented by Danto between the earlier event that is described and the later event whose descriptive terms are used for the first description, the conceptual asymmetry between the systems of thought available to the original agents and those introduced by later historians. This type of redescription, like Danto’s, is a description post eventum. However, it stresses the process of reconstruction at work here rather than the duality of events implied by narrative sentences. In this way, “historical judgment” says more than does “narrative sentence.”
這個論點完全符合丹托對「敘事句」的分析，其基礎是一個原創的描述理論。眾所周知，歷史是人類行為（或情感）的一種描述，即用尚未為行為主體（或接收者）所知的後來事件來描述早期事件。根據明克的觀點，關於歷史理解，有更多需要說明的，而非更少。之所以有更多可說，是因為對過去的重新描述意味著新近獲得的知識技術（經濟學、精神分析等）和特別是新的概念分析工具（例如，當我們談論「羅馬無產階級」時）。因此，我們需要在丹托所呈現的早期事件及其描述中使用後來事件的描述性術語之間的時間不對稱性之外，再添加原始行為主體可用的思想系統與後來的歷史學家引入的思想系統之間的概念不對稱性。這種重新描述，如同丹托的描述，是一種後事件描述。然而，它強調了這一過程中的重建工作，而非敘事句所暗示的事件二重性。這樣，「歷史判斷」說的更多於「敘事句」。
In another article, Louis O. Mink, “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,” New Literary History (1970): 541 -58, we read: “the difference between following a story and having followed a story is more than an incidental difference between present experience and past experience” (p.546, his emphasis). What the logic of narration neglects is “not what the structure of generic features of narratives
在另一篇文章中，路易斯·O·明克，《作為理解模式的歷史與小說》，《新文學史》（1970）：541-58，我們讀到："追隨一個故事和已經追隨一個故事之間的差異不僅僅是現在經驗和過去經驗之間的偶然差異"（第 546 頁，他的強調）。敘事邏輯忽略的是
are, not what it means to ‘follow,’ but what it means to have followed a story” (ibid., his emphasis).
"不是敘事的結構或一般特徵是什麼，不是'追隨'意味著什麼，而是已經追隨一個故事意味著什麼"（同上，他的強調）。
“Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding,” p. 686.
《哲學分析與歷史理解》，第 686 頁。
“History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension.”
《作為理解模式的歷史與小說》。
It is true that Mink does nuance in two ways his thesis that it is as a function of the ideal goal that all partial comprehension can be judged. First, there are different descriptions of this ideal goal of comprehension. Laplace’s model of a world predictable in its smallest detail does not coincide with Plato’s synopsis in Book VI of The Republic. Second, these descriptions are extrapolations of the three different and mutually exclusive modes of comprehension. However, these two corrections do not really affect the principal argument, namely, that the goal of comprehension is to abolish the seriatim character of experience in the totum simul of comprehension.
米克確實用兩種方式微妙地闡述了他的論點，即所有局部理解都可以被判斷是作為理想目標的功能。首先，對於這個理解的理想目標有不同的描述。拉普拉斯可預測世界的模型並不符合柏拉圖在《理想國》第六卷中的綜覽。其次，這些描述是對三種不同且相互排斥的理解模式的推測。然而，這兩點修正並不真正影響主要論點，即理解的目標是要消除經驗的連續性，轉化為理解的整體性。
Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). The Introduction (pp. 1-42) is entitled “The Poetics of History.”
海登·懷特，《元歷史：19 世紀歐洲的歷史想像》（巴爾的摩和倫敦：約翰·霍普金斯大學出版社，1973 年）。導論（第 1-42 頁）題為"歷史的詩學"。
Michel de Certeau, L’Ecriture de l’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).
米歇爾·德·塞托，《歷史的寫作》（巴黎：加利瑪出版社，1975 年）。
In an article entitled “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” Clio 3 (1974): 277-303, reprinted in idem, The Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 81-100 (I shall cite this version), White defines a verbal artifact as “a model of structures and processes that are long past and cannot therefore be subjected to either experimental or objectal controls” (ibid., p. 82). In this sense, historical narratives are “verbal fictions the contents of which are as much invented as found and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the sciences” (ibid., his emphasis).
在題為"作為文學文本的歷史文本"的文章中，發表於《克利奧》第 3 卷（1974 年）：277-303 頁，收錄於同一作者的《論述的修辭》（巴爾的摩和倫敦：約翰·霍普金斯大學出版社，1978 年），第 81-100 頁（我將引用此版本），懷特將口述文本定義為"一個長久過去且無法進行實驗或客觀控制的結構和過程的模型"（同前引，第 82 頁）。在這個意義上，歷史敘事是"口述虛構，其內容是被發現的同時也是被創造的，其形式與文學作品的形式有更多相似之處，而非科學作品"（同前引，強調為原文）。
See Northrop Frye, “New Directions from Old,” in his Fables of Identity: Studies in Poetic Mythology (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1963), p. 55.
請參見諾斯羅普·弗萊《從舊到新》，收錄於其《身份寓言：詩歌神話研究》（紐約：賀考特布雷斯與世界出版社，1963 年），第 55 頁。
“My method, in short, is formalist” (Metahistory, p. 3). We shall see in what sense his theory of emplotment distinguishes this formalism from French structuralism and puts it closer to that of Northrop Frye.
「我的方法，簡而言之，是形式主義」（《元歷史》，第 3 頁）。我們將看看在什麼意義上，他的敘事情節理論將這種形式主義與法國結構主義區分開來，並使其更接近諾斯羅普·弗萊的理論。
Hayden White, “The Structure of Historical Narrative,” Clio 1 (1972): 5-19.
海登·懷特，《歷史敘事結構》，《克利奧》第 1 卷（1972 年）：第 5-19 頁。
“Motific organization, then, is an aspect of story elaboration; it provides a kind of explanation, the kind which Mink may have in mind when he speaks of historians providing ‘comprehension’ of events in their stories by ‘configuring’ them” (“The Structure of Historical Narrative,” p. 15). Metahistory confirms this when it speaks of the transformation of chronicle into story as effected “by the characterization of some events in the chronicle in terms of inaugural motifs, of others in terms of terminating motifs, and of yet others in terms of transitional motifs” (ibid., p. 5). A story, in opposition to a chronicle, is “motifically encoded” (ibid., p. 6). I am not in agreement with this reduction of the field of what Mink calls the configurational act to just “story.” However, White believes there is a confirmation of his correlation between configurational act and explanation by story in the distribution Mink makes between configurational, categoreal, and theoretical comprehension. White thinks we can assign the categoreal mode to explanation by emplotment and the theoretical mode to explanation by argument. Aside from the fact that neither of these two divisionsMink’s and White’s-can be superimposed on the other, one hardly does justice to Mink’s analysis of the configurational act by reducing its field of applicabililty to the organization of a story, to the exclusion of both emplotment and argument. Like my concept of plot, Mink’s configurational act seems to me to cover all three fields that White distinguishes from one another. The key to this divergence between us lies, in my opinion, in the opposite reduction White imposes on explanation by emplotment, namely, identifying plot with a type, that is, the category of plot which a story belongs to. This reduction seems arbitrary to me.
發生學組織是故事闡述的一個面向；它提供一種解釋，米克可能在談到歷史學家通過「配置」在其故事中對事件進行「理解」時所指的那種解釋。元歷史學證實了這一點，當它談論編年史轉變為故事時，是通過用開創性意象描述編年史中的某些事件，用終結性意象描述其他事件，用過渡性意象描述其他事件。與編年史相反，故事是「意象編碼」的。我不同意將米克所說的配置行為領域僅縮減為「故事」。然而，懷特認為，在米克對配置性、範疇性和理論性理解的分類中，他的相關性得到了確認。懷特認為我們可以將範疇模式分配給情節敘述的解釋，將理論模式分配給論證的解釋。除了這兩種劃分——米克和懷特的劃分——無法疊加之外，通過將配置行為的適用範圍僅限於故事的組織，並排除情節敘述和論證，很難公正地對待米克對配置行為的分析。就像我的情節概念一樣，米克的配置行為似乎涵蓋了懷特所區分的所有三個領域。在我看來，我們之間的這種分歧的關鍵在於懷特對情節敘述解釋所強加的相反還原，即將情節等同於類型，即故事所屬的情節類別。這種還原在我看來是武斷的。
This regression from story to chronicle, then from chronicle to the historical field, in Metahistory, resembles the regression undertaken by Husserl in his genetic phenomenology from active syntheses to always prior passive syntheses. In both cases, the question arises about what precedes every active or passive synthesis. This heady question led Husserl to the problematic of the Lebenswelt. It leads White to a wholly different one, which we shall encounter again in volume 2 , namely, the tropological articulation that “prefigures” (ibid., p. 5) the historical field and opens it to narrative structures. The concept of the historical field does not, therefore, serve just as a limit underlying the classifying of the narrative structures, it more fundamentally marks the transition from studying “explanatory effects” of narrative to its “representative” function.
在《元歷史》中，從故事到編年史，再到歷史領域的這種回歸，類似於胡塞爾在他的遺傳現象學中從主動綜合到總是更早的被動綜合的回歸。在這兩種情況下，都出現了關於什麼在每一個主動或被動綜合之前的問題。這個深奧的問題引導胡塞爾走向生活世界的問題。它引導懷特走向一個完全不同的方向，我們將在第 2 卷中再次遇到，即通過「預配置」（同上，第 5 頁）歷史領域並向敘事結構開放的修辭學闡釋。歷史領域的概念不僅僅作為敘事結構分類的底層限制，更根本地標誌著從研究敘事的「解釋效果」轉向其「代表性」功能。
See White, “The Structure of Historical Narrative,” p. 17.
參見懷特，《歷史敘事的結構》，第 17 頁。
For the details of this construction and its illustration through the great historians of the nineteenth century, see Metahistory, pp. 13-21, and passim.
關於這種建構的細節及其通過十九世紀偉大歷史學家的闡釋，請參見《元歷史》第 13-21 頁，以及其他相關部分。
“By the term ‘ideology’ I mean a set of prescriptions for taking a position in the present world of social praxis and acting upon it . . . such prescriptions are attended by arguments that claim the authority of ‘science’ or ‘realism’” (ibid., p. 22). Here White links up with the attempts of the Frankfurt School philosophers, followed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, as well as by some anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz-and even some Marxists such as Gramsci and Althusser-to free the concept of ideology from the purely pejorative connotations which Marx saddled it with in The German Ideology.
「通過『意識形態』這個術語，我指的是在現今社會實踐世界中採取立場並對其採取行動的一套規定……這些規定伴隨著聲稱具有『科學』或『現實主義』權威的論點」（同上，第 22 頁）。在這裡，懷特與法蘭克福學派哲學家、卡爾-奧托·阿佩爾和尤爾根·哈貝馬斯，以及一些人類學家如克利福德·格爾茨，甚至一些馬克思主義者如葛蘭西和阿爾都塞的嘗試連接起來，試圖將意識形態的概念從馬克思在《德意志意識形態》中加諸其上的純粹貶義中解放出來。
We might ask what accounts for the unity of a narrative, its domain being apparently so dismembered. As usual, recourse to etymology (see White’s “The Structure of Historical Narrative,” pp. 12-13) is not very illuminating. The Roman narratio is too polysemic and too dependent upon its own contexts, and the root gna-said to be common to every mode of knowing and knowability-does not provide any further determining criterion. The following suggestion is more interesting. Behind every narration is a narrator. Is it not then on the side of the narrative voice that we should seek the unity and diversity of its explanatory effects? “We might say then that a narrative is any literary form in which the voice of the narrator rises against a background of ignorance, incomprehension, or forgetfulness to direct our attention, purposefully, to a segment of experience organized in a particular way” (ibid., p. 13). But then the unity of the narrative genre is not to be sought on the side of the narrative structures, or their utterance, but on the side of narration as utterance.
我們可能會問，是什麼造成了敘事的統一性，其領域看似如此支離破碎。像往常一樣，求助於詞源學（參見懷特的《歷史敘事的結構》，第 12-13 頁）並不是很有啟發性。羅馬的敘事（narratio）過於多義且過於依賴於其自身的語境，而根源 gna-（據說是每種知識和可知性模式的共同點）並不提供任何進一步的確定性標準。以下建議更有趣。在每一個敘事背後都有一個敘述者。那麼我們不是應該在敘事聲音的一側尋找其解釋效果的統一性和多樣性嗎？"我們可以說，敘事是任何文學形式，其中敘述者的聲音在無知、不理解或遺忘的背景下升起，有目的地將我們的注意力引導到以特定方式組織的經驗片段"（同上，第 13 頁）。但是，敘事類型的統一性不應在敘事結構或其陳述的一側尋找，而應在敘事作為陳述的一側尋找。
Metahistory, p. 29. On the same page White presents a table of the affinities that govern his reading of the four major historians and four philosophers of history to whom his work is principally devoted.
《元史學》，第 29 頁。在同一頁上，懷特提供了一個表格，展示了他在研究中主要關注的四位歷史學家和四位歷史哲學家之間的親和力。
Slipping from one configuration to another is always possible. The same set of events may lead to a tragic or a comic history, according to the choice of plot structure made by the historian, just as for one class, as Marx said, the eighteenth Brumaire of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte could be a tragedy, while for another class it was a farce. See White, “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” p. 84.
從一種配置滑向另一種配置總是可能的。同一組事件可能會導致悲劇性或喜劇性的歷史，這取決於歷史學家選擇的情節結構，就像馬克思所說，對於一個階級而言，路易-波拿巴的雾月十八日可能是一場悲劇，而對於另一個階級來說，卻是鬧劇。參見懷特，《作為文學人工製品的歷史文本》，第 84 頁。
White, too, acknowledges his debt in this regard to Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending (see his “The.Structure of Historical Narrative,” p. 20).
懷特也承認在這方面對柯爾曼《結束的意義》一書的借鑒（參見他的《歷史敘事的結構》，第 20 頁）。
White’s theory of tropes, which I shall not discuss here, adds a supplementary dimension to historical style. But it does not add anything to explanation properly speaking. See Metahistory, pp. 31-52, and “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” pp. 88-100, on the mimetic aspect of narrative. I shall return to it in volume 2 , in terms of my discussion of the relationships between the imaginary and the real in the notion of the past.
懷特的形式理論增加了歷史風格的一個補充維度。但它並不能為解釋本身增添任何內容。參見《元歷史》第 31-52 頁，以及《作為文學製品的歷史文本》第 88-100 頁，關於敘事的模仿方面。我將在第二卷中就過去概念中想像與現實之間的關係進行討論。
This rule of tradition in narrative encoding provides a response to the objection
這種敘事編碼的傳統規則為反對意見提供了回應
that the three typologies used by this theory of historiographical style are borrowed. We must say of the inherited forms of encoding what we have said about laws: historians do not establish them, they employ them. This is why recognition of a traditional form can take on in history the value of an explanation. In this regard, White compares the process of becoming familiar again with elements with which the subject has become unfamiliar with what happens in psychotherapy. (“The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” pp. 86-87.) The comparison works in both directions, inasmuch as the events that the historian seeks to make us familiar with have often been forgotten due to their traumatic character.
即這種史學風格理論中使用的三種類型學是借鑒的。我們必須對所繼承的編碼形式說出我們對法則所說的話：歷史學家並不建立它們，而是運用它們。這就是為什麼在歷史中重新認識傳統形式可以具有解釋的價值。在這方面，懷特將重新熟悉已經變得陌生的元素的過程比作心理治療中發生的情況。（《作為文學製品的歷史文本》第 86-87 頁）這種比較是雙向的，因為歷史學家試圖讓我們熟悉的事件往往因其創傷性特徵而被遺忘。
Paul Veyne, Comment on écrit l’histoire, augmented with “Foucault révolutionne l’histoire” (Paris: Seuil, 1971). A more complete examination of this work can be found in my essay The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History. See also Raymond Aron, “Comment l’historien écrit l’épistémologie: à propos du livre de Paul Veyne,” Annales no. 6 (November-December, 1971): 1319-54.
保羅·韋納，《如何書寫歷史》，增補了《福柯革命了歷史》（巴黎：Seuil 出版社，1971 年）。對此著作更全面的研究可以在我的論文《法國史學對歷史理論的貢獻》中找到。另請參見雷蒙·阿隆，〈歷史學家如何書寫認識論：關於保羅·韋納的著作〉，《年鑑》第 6 期（1971 年 11-12 月）：1319-54。
Neither Aron, nor above all Marrou, would have so cleanly cut the vital thread that still ties history to the understanding of others, hence to a certain aspect of lived experience.
無論是亞倫，還是更不用說馬魯，都不會如此乾淨利落地切斷仍然將歷史與他人的理解，因此與某種生活經驗的方面連接起來的關鍵線索。
See the next chapter.
請參見下一章。

Chapter Six 第六章

For example, Paul Veyne, in his essay “L’histoire conceptualisante,” in Faire de l’histoire, vol. 1, pp. 62-92. Recall also my reference to the lengthy analyses that Marc Bloch devotes to the problem of “nomenclature” in history. See above, p. 101.
例如，保羅·維尼在他的文章〈概念化的歷史〉中，收錄於《做歷史》第 1 卷，第 62-92 頁。另請回憶我對馬克·布洛克在歷史中"命名"問題所做的詳細分析的引用。參見上文，第 101 頁。
Maurice Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 150.
莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆，《歷史知識的解剖》（巴爾的摩和倫敦：約翰·霍普金斯大學出版社，1977 年），第 150 頁。
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
埃德蒙德·胡塞爾，《歐洲科學危機與先驗哲學》，大衛·卡爾譯（埃文斯頓：西北大學出版社，1970 年）。
I am keeping the other side of the paradox for volume 2: the return from poetic composition to the order of action, which contains the seed of the classical problem of the relation between history, the science of the past, and present action (principally political action) which is open to the future.
我將保留悖論的另一面留在第二卷：從詩歌創作回到行動秩序，其中包含了關於歷史（作為過去的科學）與面向未來的現在行動（主要是政治行動）之間關係的古典問題的種子。
Max Weber, “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences,” in idem, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. Edward Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 113-88.
馬克斯·韋伯，「文化科學邏輯的批判性研究」，載於同氏著，《社會科學研究方法》，愛德華·希爾斯和亨利·A·芬奇譯（格倫科，伊利諾伊州：自由出版社，1949 年），第 113-188 頁。
The place Aron ascribes to historical causality is important. Gaston Fessard, in La Philosophie historique de Raymond Aron (Paris: Julliard, 1980), makes us aware of the rational order of Aron’s book by means of a daring comparison with Ignatius Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises (see especially pp. 55-86, dealing with the reconstruction of the stages and the order of development of Aron’s work). Aron’s analysis of historical causality comes directly after the theory of understanding presented in section 2, in the conclusion of this section dealing with “The Limits of Understanding” (see Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, pp. 151-55). Placed at the start of section 3, entitled “Historical Determinism and Causal Thought,” this analysis begins a three-stage inquiry, placed in succession under the auspices of the judge, the scientist, and the philosopher. The first is devoted to “the causes of a single fact,” the second to “relations comparable to those of the physical sciences,” and the third to “the nature of historical determinism” (ibid., p. 158). This final stage leads in turn to part 4, which is the philosophical section properly speaking: “History and Truth.” The inquiry of causality is thus delineated in two ways: first by the place occupied by the third section, within the framework of the book as a whole, and then by the place within the third section, occupied by historical causality in relation to sociological
亞倫歸因於歷史因果性的地位是重要的。加斯頓·費薩德在《雷蒙·亞倫的歷史哲學》（巴黎：朱利亞德出版社，1980 年）中，通過與伊格納修斯·洛約拉的《神操》進行大膽的比較，使我們意識到亞倫著作的理性秩序（特別是第 55-86 頁，論述亞倫作品的發展階段和發展順序的重建）。亞倫對歷史因果性的分析直接來自第 2 節中提出的理解理論，在處理「理解的局限性」的結論部分（見亞倫，《歷史哲學導論》，第 151-155 頁）。置於第 3 節開頭，標題為「歷史決定論和因果思維」，這一分析開始了一個三階段的探究，依次在法官、科學家和哲學家的主持下進行。第一階段致力於「單一事實的原因」，第二階段探討「類似於物理科學的關係」，第三階段探討「歷史決定論的本質」（同上，第 158 頁）。這個最後階段又引向第 4 部分，即嚴格意義上的哲學部分：「歷史與真理」。因此，因果性的探究以兩種方式劃定：首先是通過第 3 節在整本書框架中的位置，然後是在第 3 節內部，歷史因果性相對於社會學
causality and to the alleged laws of history. There is no better way of emphasizing the transitional role ascribed to historical causality, set in this way between understanding, which possesses all the features of narrative understanding, and sociological causality, which has all the features of nomological explanation.
因果性和所謂的歷史法則的位置。強調歷史因果性的過渡角色再沒有比這更好的方式了，它被置於具有敘事理解所有特徵的理解和具有規律性解釋所有特徵的社會學因果性之間。
This is found in the second part of his essay, under the heading “Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation” (pp. 164-88). I shall return below to Part I of the essay. Raymond Aron begins his own study with a presentation of the “logical schema” of the argument he calls “retrospective probability” (pp. 158-66). We shall see what Aron adds to the strictly logical analysis.
這部分內容出現在他文章的第二部分，標題為「客觀可能性與歷史解釋中的充分因果」（第 164-188 頁）。我將在下文回到文章的第一部分。雷蒙·阿龍從他所稱的「追溯概率」的「邏輯模式」的介紹開始（第 158-166 頁）。我們將看看阿龍對嚴格的邏輯分析做出了什麼貢獻。
See the lengthy notes on pp. 167-68 concerning the use von Kries makes of the probabilist argument and its transposition into the sphere of criminology and jurisprudence.
請參見第 167-168 頁的詳細注釋，關於冯·克里斯對概率論證的使用及其在犯罪學和法學領域的轉置。
See above, p. 163.
見上文，第 163 頁。
The discussion that follows takes us back to the first part of Weber’s essay, entitled “A Critique of Edward Meyer’s Methodological Views” (“Critical Studies,” pp. 113-63).
接下來的討論將我們帶回韋伯文章的第一部分，標題為「對愛德華·邁耶爾的方法論觀點的批評」（「批判性研究」，第 113-163 頁）。
Aron distinguishes in the same way between moral responsibility, legal responsibility, and historical responsibility: “The moralist views the intentions, the historian the acts, the jurist compares intentions and acts and measures them with judicial concepts” (Introduction to the Philosophy of History, p. 166, his emphasis). “Historically responsible is the man who by his acts sets in motion the event the origins of which are being sought” (ibid., his emphasis). In so doing the historian contributes, I would say, to dissociating the notion of imputation from that of incrimination: “War . . . , as seen by the historian, is not a crime” (ibid., p. 173). If we add that causal imputation must also be distinguished from the psychological interpretation of intentions, then it must be admitted that these distinctions are subtle and even fragile. This explains Aron’s tone, which is quite different from Weber’s. The latter conducts his analysis with a great deal of self-assurance. Aron is more sensitive to all that complicates and, up to a certain point, blurs “the logical schema.” We have already observed this in connection with his analysis of chance.
阿隆以相同的方式區分道德責任、法律責任和歷史責任："道德家關注意圖，歷史學家關注行為，法律家比較意圖和行為，並用司法概念進行衡量"（《歷史哲學導論》，第 166 頁，強調為原文）。"在歷史上負責的是那個通過自己的行為推動被追溯起源的事件的人"（同上，強調為原文）。在此過程中，我認為歷史學家有助於將歸咎概念與指控概念分離："戰爭……在歷史學家眼中不是一種罪行"（同上，第 173 頁）。如果我們還認為必須將因果歸咎與意圖的心理解釋區分開來，那麼就必須承認這些區分是微妙且脆弱的。這解釋了阿隆的語氣，與韋伯的語氣截然不同。後者以高度自信的態度進行分析。阿隆對所有複雜化並在一定程度上模糊"邏輯模式"的事物更為敏感。我們已經在討論他對偶然性的分析時觀察到了這一點。
Weber is alluding here to the distinction made by Windelband in his Strasbourg lecture, which I referred to earlier, between the nomothetic procedure (peculiar to the sciences of nature) and idiographic procedure (peculiar to the sciences of culture).
韋伯在此暗指溫德爾班在他早先在斯特拉斯堡的講座中所做的區分，即在自然科學中特有的遵循定律的程序（遞歸性）和在文化科學中特有的描述性程序（個性化）。
Weber makes this distinction by opposing Real-Grund, ontological ground, and Erkenntnis-Grund, epistemological ground: “For the meaning of history as a science of reality can only be that it treats particular elements of reality not merely as heuristic instruments but as the objects of knowledge, and particular causal connections not as premises of knowledge but as real causal factors” (ibid., p. 135, his emphasis).
韋伯通過對立"實在基礎"（本體論基礎）和"認知基礎"（認識論基礎）來做出這一區分："因為作為現實科學的歷史的意義只能是，它不僅僅將現實的特定元素作為啟發性工具，而是作為知識的對象，不僅僅將特定的因果聯繫作為知識的前提，而是作為真實的因果因素"（同上，第 135 頁，強調為原文）。
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958).
馬克斯·韋伯，《新教倫理與資本主義精神》，塔爾科特·帕森斯譯（紐約：查爾斯·斯克里布納之子出版社，1958 年）。
There is no doubt that Maurice Mandelbaum introduced this distinction in order to minimize his concessions in the debate on objectivity in history that he himself provoked with his 1938 work The Problem of Historical Knowledge. Greater objectivity can, in fact, be attained in “general” history than in “special” history because the continuous existence of its object is given prior to historians’ efforts to delimit their subject and to make correlations. An “interlocking” is therefore possible here, in principle, between different viewpoints on the same events, or between various facets (political, economic, social, and cultural) of the same events. Specialized histories are much more clearly relative to the controversial conceptions of historians, so widely do their criteria for classification vary. This is why it is much more difficult to apply to them the procedures for corroboration, rectification, and refutation which the objectivity of general history is based upon. For my part, it is not the debate on objectivity
毫無疑問，莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆引入這一區別是為了在他自己在 1938 年的著作《歷史知識的問題》中引發的關於歷史客觀性的辯論中儘量減少他的讓步。事實上，在"一般"歷史中可以獲得更高的客觀性，而不是在"特殊"歷史中，因為其對象的連續存在是在歷史學家努力劃定其主題和建立關聯之前就已給定的。在原則上，在同一事件的不同觀點之間，或在同一事件的各個方面（政治、經濟、社會和文化）之間是可能存在"相互鎖定"的。專門的歷史與歷史學家的爭議性概念關係更加明確，因為他們的分類標準差異很大。這就是為什麼對它們應用基於一般歷史客觀性的驗證、修正和反駁程序要困難得多。就我而言，我在這裡關注的不是
that interests me here, but rather the resources offered by the distinction between the singular character of societies and the general nature of the phenomenon of culture for a genetic phenomenology applied to the entities of historical discourse.
客觀性的爭論，而是對於應用於歷史話語實體的基因現象學，社會的特殊性與文化現象的一般性之間的區別所提供的資源。
I shall return in volume 2 to this threefold temporal structure of the we-relation, as it is so masterfully analyzed by Alfred Schutz. In Mandelbaum, too, there is an argument in favor of this oblique reference. He grants that explanation, with its analytical and discontinuous style, could not propose to reconstruct the totalizing and continuous process of a particular society, if historians were not already familiar with global changes such as these in their own experience of life in society: “the original basis for our understanding of societal structures is, then, the experience of an individual in growing up in his society, and the enlargement of horizons that comes through a knowledge of other societies” (ibid., p. 116). History, he recalls, is not born out of nothing. It does not start from a dust cloud of facts that await history’s work of synthesis in order to receive a structure. History is always born out of an earlier history that it comes to correct. And behind this primordial history lies social practice, with its internal contradictions and its external challenges.
我將在第二卷中回到這個我們關係的三重時間結構，正如阿爾弗雷德·舒茨所做的精闢分析。在曼德爾鮑姆那裡，也有一個支持這種間接引用的論點。他承認，解釋憑藉其分析性和不連續的風格，若不是歷史學家已經熟悉社會生活中的全球性變遷，就無法重建特定社會的總體性和連續的進程：「我們理解社會結構的原始基礎，是一個人在其社會中成長的經驗，以及通過瞭解其他社會而擴大的視野」（同上，第 116 頁）。他回憶道，歷史並非憑空產生。它並不是從等待歷史綜合工作的事實灰塵中開始。歷史總是源自一個它將要修正的更早的歷史。而在這個原始歷史背後，是具有內在矛盾和外部挑戰的社會實踐。
I shall return in volume 2 to the ontology of the we-relation that is presupposed in the present argument. I shall ask whether Husserl, at the end of the Fifth Meditation, was successful in his attempt at deriving higher-order communities from intersubjectivity. I shall also ask if Max Weber’s definition of “social action,” at the beginning of Economics and Society, enables him to avoid the difficulties of methodological individualism. I wish to express here my debt to the thought and work of Alfred Schutz in his The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnhart (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Schutz did not, in fact, limit himself to reconciling Husserl and Weber. He integrated their concepts of intersubjectivity and social action with a concept of the we-relation borrowed from Heidegger, without losing the force of the first two thinkers’ analyses, and without limiting himself to a convenient eclecticism combining all these masters. Schutz’s phenomenology of social existence receives, in addition, a decisive assist from the anthropology of a George Herbert Mead, a Victor Turner, and a Clifford Geertz. My debt to them is no less than what I owe to Schutz.
我將在第二卷中回到我們關係的本體論，這是本論證中的預設。我將探討胡塞爾在第五沉思的結尾是否成功地從主體間性中推導出高階共同體。我還將探討韋伯在《經濟與社會》開篇對「社會行動」的定義是否使他避免了方法論個人主義的困難。我想在此表達對阿爾弗雷德·舒茨在其《社會世界的現象學》一書中（喬治·沃爾什和弗雷德里克·萊恩哈特譯，伊文斯頓：西北大學出版社，1967 年）思想和著作的感謝。事實上，舒茨並未僅限於調和胡塞爾和韋伯。他整合了他們的主體間性和社會行動概念，並借鑒了海德格爾的我們關係概念，同時不失前兩位思想家分析的力量，也不局限於一種便利的折衷主義以綜合所有這些大師的觀點。此外，舒茨的社會存在現象學還從喬治·赫伯特·米德、維克多·特納和克利福德·格爾茨的人類學中獲得決定性的幫助。我對他們的虧欠不亞於對舒茨的虧欠。
His thesis owes a great deal to the work by H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). “It is no exaggeration to say that since its appearance in 1959 the whole tenor of discussions of causation in AngloAmerican philosophy has changed” (Mandelbaum, p. 50). He does not, however, follow these authors in their claim that causal explanation and the formulation of general laws apply to two separate domains of knowledge-history and law, on the one hand, and the sciences, on the other. Adhering instead to J. L. Mackie’s analyses in The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), Mandelbaum perceives, rather than a dichotomy between two vast areas of explanation, a series of explanatory levels indifferent to their areas of application, starting with the perception of causality, moving through causal attribution at the level of judgment, and reaching the establishment of laws, as the “cement” of the causal connection. This thesis moves away from that of W. Dray, having first moved toward it. With Dray and against the proponents of the covering law model, Mandelbaum affirms the primacy and the irreducibility of singular causal attribution; against Dray, he refuses to oppose once and for all singular causality and regularity, and admits that explanation in terms of laws does “cement” causal attribution.
他的論文在很大程度上借鑒了 H. L. A. 哈特和 A. M. 霍諾雷《法律中的因果關係》（牛津：克拉倫登出版社，1959 年）一書。曼德爾堡指出，"不誇張地說，自 1959 年出版以來，英美哲學中關於因果關係的討論已經完全改變"（曼德爾堡，第 50 頁）。然而，他不同意這些作者的觀點，即因果解釋和一般規律的制定適用於兩個不同的知識領域——歷史和法律，以及科學。相反，他遵循 J. L. 麥基在《宇宙的水泥：因果關係研究》（牛津：克拉倫登出版社，1974 年）中的分析，曼德爾堡認為，不是兩個廣闊解釋領域之間的對立，而是一系列不分領域的解釋層次，從因果感知開始，通過判斷層面的因果歸因，最終達到建立作為因果聯繫"水泥"的法則。這個論點與德雷的觀點有所不同，起初是接近的。與德雷一起，並反對涵蓋定律模型的支持者，曼德爾堡肯定了單一因果歸因的首要性和不可還原性；但與德雷不同，他不完全對立單一因果關係和規律性，並承認基於法則的解釋確實"鞏固"了因果歸因。
In this regard, we can note that the occurrence “not being different” authorizes a comparison between this analysis and the constitution of unreal series in the reasoning of retrospective probability, as this is understood by Weber and Aron.
在這方面，我們可以注意到，"不同"的出現授權將這一分析與韋伯和阿隆理解的回溯概率的非現實序列構成的推理進行比較。
This argument holds for Hempel’s example of the explosion of a radiator filled
這一論點適用於漢普爾關於裝滿冷水的散熱器爆炸的例子
with cold water. The physical laws set into play do not apply all at once to the initial conditions. They apply to a series of occurrences. They are instruments for the causal explanation, not substitutes for that explanation (Mandelbaum, p. 104).
物理定律並不一次性地應用於初始條件。它們應用於一系列事件。它們是因果解釋的工具，而不是解釋的替代品（曼德爾堡，第 104 頁）。
This argument recalls that of von Wright concerning the explanation of closed systems. See above, p. 136.
這個論點回憶起馮萊特關於封閉系統解釋的論述。見上文，第 136 頁。
This concept of unlimited variable density will enable us in the following section to reconsider in a new light the question of nonevent history [histoire non-événementielle]. It already allows us to assert that the short term and the long term are always permutable in history. In this respect, Braudel’s The Mediterranean and Le Roy Ladurie’s Carnival in Romans (trans. Mary Feeney [New York: George Braziller, 1979]) provide a marvelous illustration of this permutation allowed by the degrees of density of the temporal fabric of history.
這種無限的變量密度概念將使我們在下一節中以新的視角重新審視非事件史[histoire non-événementielle]的問題。它已經允許我們斷言，在歷史中短期和長期總是可以互換的。在這方面，布勞岱爾的《地中海》和勒羅伊·拉杜里的《羅馬斯的狂歡節》（譯者：瑪麗·菲尼，紐約：喬治·布雷齊勒出版社，1979 年）提供了這種由歷史時間結構密度所允許的互換性的精彩例證。
Paul Veyne, L’Inventaire des Différences, “Leçon inaugurale” au Collège de France (Paris: Seuil, 1976). I discuss this work at greater length in The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History.
保羅·韋恩，《差異清單》，在法國學院的就職演講（巴黎：塞伊出版社，1976 年）。我在《法國史學對歷史理論的貢獻》中更詳細地討論了這部作品。
“In accordance with its formulation, historical knowledge reveals its radical nominalism, much more radical than Max Weber ever imagined it, in spite of his profession of faith” (ibid., p. 173). Speaking more specifically of the singular terms that occupy his fifth class of concepts, Marrou goes on to say, “The use of such ideas is perfectly legitimate if we are always careful to retain their strictly nominal character” (ibid., p. 174).
根據其表述，歷史知識揭示了其根本的名義論，比馬克斯·韋伯曾想像的更加根本，儘管他有著信仰宣言。"（同上，第 173 頁）。更具體地談到佔據他概念第五類的單數術語時，馬魯繼續說："如果我們始終小心保持這些想法的純粹名義性質，使用這類想法是完全合法的"（同上，第 174 頁）。
The reader may find it unfortunate that causal analysis in history has been discussed in three different contexts: first with William Dray, within the framework of the discussion of the covering law model; a second time with Max Weber and Raymond Aron, under the heading of the transitional procedures between narrative and explanation; and a third time with Maurice Mandelbaum, in connection with the status of the first-order entities. It did not seem to me that I could avoid this triple approach. For these are indeed three different problematics: the first is determined by the appearance in analytic philosophy of a subsumption model, with which neither Max Weber nor Raymond Aron had to come to terms; the second is determined by the question posed within the German tradition of Verstehen of the exact scientific status that can be claimed by the idiographic sciences, whose autonomy is in no way contested; the third is related to the new series of questions posed by the correspondence between the continuity of the final entities posited by history on the plane of existence and that of the causal process on the epistemological level.
讀者可能會發現，在歷史中的因果分析在三種不同的背景下已被討論：首先是與威廉·德雷一起，在覆蓋法模型的討論框架內；其次是與馬克斯·韋伯和雷蒙·阿隆一起，在敘事和解釋的過渡程序標題下；第三是與莫里斯·曼德爾鮑姆一起，關於一階實體的地位。我認為我無法避免這種三重方法。因為這確實是三種不同的問題：第一種是由分析哲學中的歸類模型的出現所決定，馬克斯·韋伯和雷蒙·阿隆都不得不面對；第二種是由德國理解傳統中提出的問題所決定，即可以為獨特科學主張的確切科學地位，其自主性絲毫不受質疑；第三種與歷史在存在層面上所設定的最終實體的連續性與因果過程在認識論層面上的對應之間提出的新系列問題有關。
In order to link up with the problems discussed in the two preceding sections, I will simply recall the close kinship between this major presupposition and the other innovations claimed by the Annales school: the documentary revolution, the extending of the questionnaire, the primacy of the problematic over the given historical “fact,” the deliberately conceptualizing cast of the investigation. In this sense the long timespan is only one component of the overall shift in direction in the field of historical research. Still it has its own peculiar criteria which do call for discussion.
為了與前兩節討論的問題聯繫起來，我將簡單回顧這一主要前提與阿納爾學派所聲稱的其他創新之間的密切關係：文獻革命、問卷的擴展、問題的優先性高於給定的歷史「事實」、調查的故意概念化傾向。在這種意義上，長時段只是歷史研究領域整體方向轉變的一個組成部分。然而，它確實有其特殊的標準，值得討論。
The English translation is of the the second edition of 1966. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 2 vols. I will cite from this edition, which contains all of the passages from the third edition that I refer to.
這是 1966 年第二版的英文翻譯。費爾南·布勞代爾，《地中海與菲利普二世時代的地中海世界》，譯者：西安·雷諾茲（紐約：哈珀與羅出版社，1972 年），2 卷。我將引用這個版本，其中包含我所提及的第三版的所有段落。
Placed under the heading of a certain type of geography that is especially attentive to human destinies, the first-level inquiry is “the attempt to convey a particular kind of history” (The Mediterranean, p. 23). A “history in slow motion from which permanent values can be detected” (ibid.), which therefore makes use of geography as one of its media. In this respect it is striking that the author waits until past page
被置於一種特別關注人類命運的地理類型下，第一層次的探究是"試圖傳達一種特定類型的歷史"（《地中海》，第 23 頁）。一種可以檢測出永恆價值的"慢動作歷史"（同上），因此利用地理作為其媒介之一。在這方面，作者等到超過 200 頁之後才對地中海的"物理統一性"進行任何反思，這一點令人矚目。

200 before making any reflections on the “physical unity” of the Mediterranean. We may readily admit that the “Mediterranean itself is not responsible for the sky that looks down on it” (ibid., p. 232), but the physical unity that is in question here is above all the permanence of certain constraints-the hostile sea, the harsh winters, the burning sun-and all that contributes to the identity of the Mediterranean people, as they make up for all that is lacking, and adjust their wars, their treaties, and their conspiracies to the rhythm of the seasons, under the sign of the eternal trinity: wheat, olive tree, and vine–“in other words an identical agrarian civilization, identical ways of dominating the environment” (ibid., p. 236).
我們可以很容易地承認"地中海本身不對俯視它的天空負責"（同上，第 232 頁），但這裡所指的物理統一性首先是某些約束的持久性——敵對的海洋、嚴酷的冬季、炎熱的陽光，以及所有有助於地中海人民特性的因素，他們彌補所有缺乏的東西，並根據季節的節奏調整他們的戰爭、條約和陰謀，在小麥、橄欖樹和葡萄樹的永恆三位一體之下——"換句話說，是一個相同的農業文明，相同的環境支配方式"（同上，第 236 頁）。
29. “Man has been the laborer of this long history” (ibid., p. 64). “Spain sent all her sons down to this southern region opening to the sea” (ibid., p. 84). “All of these movements require hundreds of years to complete” (ibid., p. 101). In short, “geographical observation of long term movements guides us towards history’s slowest processes” (ibid., p. 102).
29. "人一直是這段漫長歷史的勞作者"（同上，第 64 頁）。"西班牙將她的所有兒子都送到這個面向大海的南部地區"（同上，第 84 頁）。"所有這些運動需要數百年才能完成"（同上，第 101 頁）。總之，"長期運動的地理觀察引導我們走向歷史最緩慢的過程"（同上，第 102 頁）。
30. “The new element was the massive invasion by Northern Nordic ships, after the 1590 's” (ibid., p. 119). Nor is it possible not to mention the war of Grenada.
30. "新元素是 1590 年代後北歐北方船隻的大規模入侵"（同上，第 119 頁）。同樣不可能不提及格林納達戰爭。
31. “These two different Mediterraneans were vehicles, one might almost say they were responsible for the twin empires” (ibid., p. 136).
31. "這兩種不同的地中海是載體，人們幾乎可以說它們對雙重帝國負責"（同上，第 136 頁）。
32. “Politics merely followed the outline of an underlying reality. These two Mediterraneans, commanded by warring rulers, were physically, economically, and culturally different from each other. Each was a separate historical zone” (ibid., p. 137).
32. "政治只是遵循底層現實的輪廓。這兩個由交戰統治者指揮的地中海在物理、經濟和文化上彼此截然不同。每一個都是一個獨立的歷史區域"（同上，第 137 頁）。
33. “These liaisons and partnerships, successively created and destroyed, summarize the history of the sea” (ibid., pp. 165-66).
33. "這些反覆創建和銷毀的聯繫和夥伴關係，總結了海洋的歷史"（同上，第 165-66 頁）。
34. “The Mediterranean (and the accompanying Greater Mediterranean) is as man has made it. The wheel of human fortune has determined the destiny of the sea, expanding or contracting its area” (ibid., pp. 169-70).
34. 「地中海（及其附屬的大地中海）是人類所創造的。人類命運之輪已經決定了海洋的命運，擴大或縮小其範圍」（同上，第 169-70 頁）。
35. The city brings about, in the geographer-historian’s discourse, a flood of dates (see, for example, ibid., pp. 332-34), so pregnant is the history of cities, as they confront the designs of territorial states, expanding or dying out in the wake of economic conditions. Yes, cities speak “of evolution and changing conditions” (ibid., p. 352) against the backdrop of constancies, permanence, and repetitions that are established on the first level of analysis.
35. 在地理學家-歷史學家的論述中，城市帶來了大量的日期（例如，參見同上，第 332-34 頁），城市的歷史如此豐富，因為它們面對領土國家的設計，在經濟條件的影響下擴張或衰落。是的，城市在持續性、永恆和重複的背景下，說明了「進化和變化的條件」（同上，第 352 頁）。
36. In the chapter on precious metals, money, and prices (ibid., pp. 462-542), the changes in commercial practices, the influx and outflow of metals cannot help but be dated: “The advance of the Portuguese along the Atlantic coast of Africa was an event of major importance” (ibid., p. 469). And further on: “During the difficult war years, 1557-58, the arrival of the ships carrying bullion were the great events of the port of Antwerp” (ibid., p. 480). A profusion of dates accompanies the cycle of metals on the western routes. Royal bankruptcies are dated (1596, 1607). It is a question, of course, of grasping the stable factors in order to verify the explanatory schema. But this requires passing through the history of events with its dates, its proper names, naming Philip II and considering his decisions. In this way, level three casts a shadow on level two, due to the interferences between politics and war, on the one hand, and different economies, on the other.
36. 在談論貴金屬、貨幣和價格的章節中（同上，第 462-542 頁），商業實踐的變化、金屬的流入和流出不得不被追溯：「葡萄牙人沿非洲大西洋海岸的前進是一件重大事件」（同上，第 469 頁）。再往後：「在艱難的戰爭年份，1557-58 年，載運金銀的船隻到達是安特衛普港的重大事件」（同上，第 480 頁）。大量的日期伴隨著西方路線上的金屬週期。王室破產被記錄（1596 年，1607 年）。當然，這是為了掌握穩定的因素以驗證解釋模式。但這需要經過事件的歷史，連同其日期、專有名詞，提及腓力二世並考慮他的決定。這樣，第三層因政治和戰爭與不同經濟之間的干擾，為第二層投下陰影。
37. “All these explanations which are in fact so many events in the pepper and spice world, tend to obscure the problem in its entirety, a problem that is best appreciated when viewed in a world context-from the American silver mines to the Moluccas or the Western tip of Sumatra” (ibid., pp. 568-69, his emphasis).
37. 「所有這些解釋，實際上是胡椒和香料世界中的諸多事件，傾向於模糊問題的全貌，當從全球視角—從美洲銀礦到摩鹿加群島或蘇門答臘西端—觀察時，問題才能得到最佳理解」（同上，第 568-69 頁，強調為原文）。
38. “The life-span of empires cannot be plotted by events, only by careful diagnosis and auscultation-and as in medicine there is always room for error” (ibid., p. 661).
38. "帝國的壽命無法通過事件來描繪，只能通過仔細的診斷和聽診——就像在醫學中總是存在出錯的空間"（同上，第 661 頁）。
39. The state, “quite as much as capitalism, was the product of a complex evolu-
39. 國家，"與資本主義一樣，是一個複雜的演化過程的產物。
tionary process. The historical conjuncture, in the very widest sense of the term, carries within it the foundations of all political power; it breathes life or death into them” (ibid., p. 681).
在最廣泛意義上的歷史性契機，包含了所有政治權力的基礎；它賦予它們生命或死亡"（同上，第 681 頁）。
40. “Of all the possible solutions, Spain chose the most radical: deportation, the uprooting of a civilization from its native soil” (ibid., p. 796).
40. "在所有可能的解決方案中，西班牙選擇了最激進的：驅逐，將一個文明從其原生土壤中連根拔起"（同上，第 796 頁）。
41. “Has there been any civilization at any time in the past which has sacrificed its own existence to that of another? . . . the economic situation . . . must take its share of the blame” (ibid., p. 823).
41. "在過去的任何文明中，是否有任何一個文明會為了另一個文明而犧牲自身的存在？……經濟形勢……必須承擔部分責任"（同上，第 823 頁）。
42. It is in this way that Lepanto, which Voltaire ridiculed as being so unimportant, was, indeed, “the most spectacular military event in the Mediterranean during the sixteenth century. Daring triumph of courage and naval technique though it was, it is hard to place convincingly in a conventional historical perspective” (ibid., p. 1088). Lepanto would probably have had important consequences if Spain had been determined to pursue them. But on the whole, “Lepanto had not accomplished anything.” In this regard, we may note the fine pages devoted to Don John’s calculations, that “instrument of destiny” (ibid., p. 1101)-the explanatory reflection corresponds exactly to William Dray’s model of rational explanation, as well as to the Weberian model of explanation by means of contrary assumptions.
42. 雷潘托，這個伏爾泰曾嘲笑為微不足道的地方，確實是"16 世紀地中海地區最為壯觀的軍事事件。儘管它是一個勇氣和海軍技術的大膽勝利，但很難令人信服地將其置於傳統的歷史視角中"（同上，第 1088 頁）。如果西班牙決心追求，雷潘托可能會產生重要的後果。但總的來說，"雷潘托什麼也沒有完成"。在這方面，我們可以注意到唐胡安的計算被描述為"命運的工具"（同上，第 1101 頁）——解釋性的反思完全符合威廉·德雷的理性解釋模型，以及韋伯通過相反假設進行解釋的模型。
43. From time to time we see Braudel waging war against the history of events and allowing himself to be tempted by the history of conjunctures, not only with regard to Lepanto, as has been stated, but also when he is confronted with the sheer phenomenon of renunciation observed in the two political leviathans in conflict, and by the general decline of warfare. Did Spain, then, miss its geographical mission by deciding not to go into Africa? “But for what they are worth, these questions have yet to receive a proper hearing. Tomorrow’s historians of political change will have to reconsider them and perhaps make some sense of them” (ibid., p. 1142).
43. 時不時地，我們看到布勞德爾對事件史發起戰爭，並被突發事件史所吸引，不僅在雷潘托方面如此，當他面對兩個政治巨獸衝突中的純粹放棄現象，以及戰爭的整體衰退時也是如此。西班牙是否因決定不進入非洲而錯失了其地理使命？"但無論這些問題值不值得，它們尚未得到適當的聽取。明天的政治變遷歷史學家將不得不重新考慮它們，並可能對它們有所理解"（同上，第 1142 頁）。
44. Here is Braudel speaking of the chance missed in 1601: “In its own way, the degeneration of official war was a warning sign of the general decline of the Mediterranean, which, there can be no doubt, was becoming clearer and more apparent with the last years of the sixteenth century” (ibid., p. 1234).
44. 布勞德爾談到 1601 年錯過的機會："在某種程度上，官方戰爭的退化是地中海整體衰退的警示信號，毫無疑問，這在 16 世紀的最後幾年變得越來越清晰和明顯"（同上，第 1234 頁）。
45. “I do not believe that the word Mediterranean itself ever floated in his consciousness with the meaning we now give it, or that it conjured up for him the images of light and blue water it has for us; or even that it signified a precise area of major problems or the setting for a clearly conceived policy. Geography in the true sense of the word was not a part of a prince’s education. These are all sufficient reasons why the long agony which ended in September 1598 was not a great event in Mediterranean history; good reasons for us to reflect once more on the distance separating biographical history from the history of structures, and even more so from the history of geographical areas” (ibid., pp. 1236-37).
45. "我不相信'地中海'這個詞本身曾在他的意識中浮現出我們現在賦予它的意義，或者它為他喚起了我們所感受到的光明和藍色水域的意象；甚至不認為它標誌著一個精確的主要問題區域或一個明確構想的政策背景。地理學在真正的意義上並不是王子教育的一部分。這些都是充分的理由，說明在 1598 年 9 月結束的這段漫長痛苦並不是地中海歷史上的一件大事；這些都是我們再次反思生平史與結構史，乃至地理區域史之間距離的充分理由"（同上，第 1236-37 頁）。
46. This man “can only be understood in relation to a life of the purest religion, perhaps only in the atmosphere of the Carmelite revolution” (ibid. 1236).
46. 這個人"只有在最純粹的宗教生活中才能被理解，可能只有在加爾默羅革命的氛圍中才能被理解"（同上，第 1236 頁）。
47. In Braudel’s article “History and the Social Sciences,” we read: “A new kind of historical narrative has appeared, that of the conjuncture [le récitatif de la conjuncture], of the cycle, and even of the ‘intercycle,’ covering a decade, a quarter of a century, and, at the outside, the half-century of Kondratiev’s classic cycle” (On History, p. 29). In the Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, Braudel defines the cycle in the following way: “Because the word cycle might be applied to a seasonal movement we should not be misled. The term designates a double movement, a rise and fall with a peak in between which, in the strictest sense of the term, is called a crisis” (ibid., p. 430). I am indebted to M. Reep, in an unpublished essay, for the reference to this text, as well as for the suggestion that the notion of cycle shares with the Aristotelian muthos the twofold feature of constituting a mimesis of economic life
47. 在布勞岱爾的文章《歷史與社會科學》中，我們讀到："一種新的歷史敘事已經出現，即關於週期（le récitatif de la conjuncture）、循環，甚至'跨循環'的敘事，涵蓋了十年、四分之一世紀，最多半個康德拉捷夫的經典循環"（《論歷史》，第 29 頁）。在《歐洲經濟史》第 4 卷中，布勞岱爾這樣定義循環："不應該因為'循環'一詞可能適用於季節性運動而被誤導。這個術語指的是一個雙重運動，一個上升和下降，中間有一個峰值，嚴格意義上稱為危機"（同上，第 430 頁）。我感謝 M. Reep 在一篇未發表的論文中提供了這段文字的參考，以及提出循環概念與亞里士多德的 muthos 具有雙重特徵，即構成經濟生活的模仿（當然是在模仿的意義上）。
(in the sense of mimesis

_{2}

, of course) and of presenting a median structure, a reversalthat, precisely, which the notion of crisis introduces-between two intercycles.
並呈現一個中間結構，即在兩個跨循環之間發生的逆轉，正是危機概念所引入的。
48. The title itself, Le Temps du Monde, promises more than it can deliver, as the author admits (Avant-Propos, p. 8). If it is his ambition to grasp the history of the world “in its chronological developments and its diverse temporalities” (ibid.), he has the modesty not to hide the fact that this world time does not cover the totality of human history. “This exceptional time governs, depending on the place and the age, certain spaces and certain realities. But other realities, other spaces escape it and remain foreign to it. . . . even in advanced countries, economically and socially speaking, world time does not include everything” (ibid). The reason is that the book follows a particular line that privileges a certain sector of material and economic history. Within these avowed limits, the historian strives “to study by means of comparisons on a world-wide scale, the sole variable” (ibid., p. 9). From such a height, the historian can attempt “to dominate time, henceforth our principal, or even our only, adversary” (ibid., p. 10). It is again the long time-span that permits us to link together the successive experiences in Europe which deserve to be considered as world-economies (1) in a space that varies only slowly, (2) around a few dominant capital cities (Venice, Amsterdam, etc.) which one after the other come to predominate, and (3) finally’according to a principle of hierarchization concerning the zones of contact. The subject matter is therefore the division of time (and space) as a function of conjunctural rhythms, among which the secular trend-“the most neglected of all the cycles” (ibid., p. 61)–proves to be the most fruitful. For my own reflection on time, I take note that “the trend is a cumulative process. It adds on to itself; everything happens as if it raised the mass of prices and economic activities little by little until the moment when, in the opposite direction, with the same stubbornness, it began to work to lower them through a general, imperceptible, slow, and prolonged reduction. Year by year, it is barely noticeable; century by century, it proves to be an important actor” (ibid.). The image of a tide, with wave upon wave, intrigues us more than it explains anything to us: “the final word escapes us and, along with it, the exact meaning of these long cycles that seem to obey certain laws or rules governing tendencies unknown to us” (ibid., p. 65). Must we then say that what seems to explain the most is at the same time what helps us understand the least? In volume 2 , I shall take up the problem of giving a real meaning to what is here no more than an admission, even a truism, that “short time and long time exist together and are inseparable . . . for we live all at once in short time and in long time” (ibid., p. 68).
48. 《世界時間》這個標題本身，比其能提供的更加豐富，正如作者自己承認的（前言，第 8 頁）。如果他的野心是把世界歷史「在其年代發展和多元時間性中」把握，他也很謙遜地不隱瞞這個世界時間並不涵蓋人類歷史的全部。「這個特殊的時間，依據地點和年代，支配某些空間和某些現實。但其他現實、其他空間逃脫它並且與之無關……即使在經濟和社會上較為先進的國家，世界時間也不包含一切」（同上）。原因是這本書遵循了特定路線，特權化了某個物質和經濟史的領域。在這些已明確的限制範圍內，歷史學家努力「通過世界規模的比較來研究唯一的變數」（同上，第 9 頁）。從如此高度，歷史學家可以嘗試「支配時間，從此刻起是我們的主要，甚至是唯一的對手」（同上，第 10 頁）。正是這個長時段允許我們將歐洲的連續經驗聯繫起來，這些經驗值得被視為世界經濟（1）在一個變化緩慢的空間，（2）環繞著幾個主導的資本城市（威尼斯、阿姆斯特丹等），它們一個接一個地占據主導地位，（3）最後根據接觸區域的等級化原則。因此，主題是根據週期性節奏來劃分時間（和空間），其中世俗趨勢——「所有週期中最被忽視的」（同上，第 61 頁）——證明是最富有成果的。對於我自己對時間的思考，我注意到「趨勢是一個累積的過程。它累積於自身；一切都彷彿逐漸提高了物價和經濟活動的規模，直到相反方向上，以同樣的頑固，開始通過一個普遍的、難以察覺的、緩慢且持續的減少來降低它們。年復一年，幾乎難以察覺；世紀接世紀，它證明是一個重要的參與者」（同上）。潮汐的形象，一波波疊加，比起解釋任何事情，更令我們感到困惑：「最終的結論逃避了我們，連同它，這些看似遵循某些未知傾向法則或規則的長週期的確切意義也逃避了我們」（同上，第 65 頁）。那麼，我們必須說，看似解釋最多的東西，同時也是最不助於我們理解的東西嗎？在第 2 卷中，我將探討賦予這裡不過是一種承認，甚至是一個平凡真理的真正意義，即「短時間和長時間共存且不可分割……因為我們同時生活在短時間和長時間中」（同上，第 68 頁）。
49. “For it was the interaction of such pressing need, such disturbances and restorations of economic balance, such necessary exchanges, which guided and indirectly determined the course of Mediterranean History” (ibid., p. 138). Further on, Braudel speaks of the “general outline” (ibid., p. 230), the retreat of the Mediterranean from general history, a retreat delayed until the middle of the seventeenth century. Referring once more to the gradual replacement of city-states by capital cities, he writes: “Their message is one of evolution and changing conditions [conjuncture] which hints at their approaching destiny: that decline proclaimed by so many signs at the end of the sixteenth century and accentuated in the seventeenth century” (ibid., p. 352).
49. 「因為正是這種迫切需求的相互作用、如此的干擾和經濟平衡的恢復、必要的交換，間接引導並決定了地中海歷史的進程」（同上，第 138 頁）。在後面，布勞德爾談到「總體輪廓」（同上，第 230 頁），地中海從總體歷史中的退卻，這種退卻直到 17 世紀中葉才延遲。再次提到城邦逐漸被首都取代，他寫道：「他們的訊息是一種進化和變化條件[形勢]，暗示了他們即將到來的命運：那在 16 世紀末由如此多跡象宣告的衰落，並在 17 世紀進一步加劇」（同上，第 352 頁）。
50. Discussing forms of war, especially of foreign wars (the Crusades, jihads), Braudel mentions once again the role of civilizations, those “major participants [personnages]” (ibid., p. 842). These “characters,” like the events in question, are defined in classical terms by their contribution to the main plot.
布勞德爾在討論戰爭形式，特別是外國戰爭（十字軍東征，聖戰）時，再次提到文明的角色，那些"主要參與者"（同上，第 842 頁）。這些"角色"，就像所討論的事件一樣，以古典術語定義，在於對主要情節的貢獻。
51. I wonder if Braudel did not think he had avoided the problem of the overall unity of his work by letting the problem of reuniting the pieces of fragmented duration be taken care of by physical time. In On History we read: “These fragments are reunited at the end of all our labors. The longue durée, the conjuncture, the event all fit into
我懷疑布勞德爾是否認為通過讓物理時間來處理重新連接碎片化持續時間的問題，就可以避免其作品整體統一性的問題。在《論歷史》中，我們讀到："這些碎片最終會重新聚合。長期歷史、短期趨勢和事件都巧妙且毫無困難地相互契合，因為它們都在同一尺度上被測量"（《論歷史》，第 77 頁）。
each other neatly and without difficulty, for they are all measured on the same scale” (On History, p. 77). What scale, if not that of physical time? “For the historian everything begins and ends with time, a mathematical, godlike time, a notion easily mocked, time external to men, ‘exogenous,’ as economists would say, pushing men, forcing them, and painting their own individual times the same color: it is, indeed, the imperious time of the world” (ibid., p. 78). But then the long time-span becomes one of the paths by which historical time is led back to cosmic time, rather than one way of increasing the number of time spans and speeds. Of course, historical time builds its constructions against the backdrop of cosmic time. But it is within physical time that the unifying principle of “the diverse colors of individual times” is to be sought.
如果不是物理時間的尺度，又是什麼？"對於歷史學家來說，一切都始於和終於時間，一個數學的、類似上帝的時間，一個很容易被嘲笑的概念，一個外於人的時間，正如經濟學家所說的'外生的'，推動人們，迫使他們，並將他們自己的個人時間塗上同一種顏色：它確實是世界的專制時間"（同上，第 78 頁）。但是，長時段隨即成為將歷史時間引回宇宙時間的途徑之一，而不是增加時間跨度和速度的一種方式。當然，歷史時間在宇宙時間的背景下建構其結構。但是，"個人時間的不同色彩"的統一原則應該在物理時間中尋找。
52. The polyphony comes from dozens of measures of time, each of them attached to a particular history. “Only the sum of these measures, brought together by the human sciences (turned retrospectively to account on the historian’s behalf) can give us that total history whose image is so difficult to reconstitute in its rich entirety” (The Mediterranean, p. 1238). This total image would require the historian to have at once the geographer’s, the traveler’s, and the novelist’s eye. The following are mentioned at this point by Braudel: Gabriel Audisio, Jean Giono, Carlo Levi, Lawrence Durrell, and André Chamson (ibid., p. 1234).
52. 多聲部音樂來自於數十個時間的測量，每一個都附著於特定的歷史。「只有這些測量的總和，由人文科學（事後為歷史學家匯集起來）彙總，才能給我們那個總體歷史的影像，而這個影像要完整重構是如此困難」（《地中海》，第 1238 頁）。這個總體影像將要求歷史學家同時具備地理學家、旅行者和小說家的眼光。此時布勞岱爾提到了以下人物：加布里埃爾·奧迪西奧、讓·吉奧諾、卡洛·萊維、勞倫斯·杜雷爾和安德烈·尚松（同上，第 1234 頁）。
53. His frank statement on structure and structuralism should be taken into consideration: “I am by temperament a ‘structuralist,’ little tempted by the event, or even by the short-term conjuncture which is after all merely a grouping of events in the same area. But the historian’s ‘structuralism’ has nothing to do with the approach which under the same name is at present causing some confusion in the other human sciences. It does not tend towards the mathematical abstraction of relations expressed as functions, but instead towards the very sources of life in its most concrete, everyday, indestructible and anonymously human expression” (ibid. p. 1244).
53. 他對結構和結構主義的坦率陳述應該被納入考慮：「我生來就是一個'結構主義者'，很少被事件或甚至短期時勢所吸引，這畢竟不過是同一區域中事件的集合。但歷史學家的'結構主義'與當前在其他人文科學中造成一些混淆的同名方法無關。它不傾向於將關係表達為函數的數學抽象，而是朝向生活最具體、最日常、最不可摧毀和最匿名的人性表達」（同上，第 1244 頁）。
54. One last time, in the conclusion to his great work, the historian reasserts his suspicion concerning those “essentially ephemeral yet moving occurrences, the ‘headlines’ of the past” (ibid., p. 1243, his emphasis).
54. 在他偉大著作的結論中，歷史學家最後一次重申了對那些「本質上短暫卻感人的事件，即過去的'頭條新聞'」的懷疑（同上，第 1243 頁，其強調）。
55. “A specialist in change (by saying transformation, the historian places himself sooner or later on potentially common ground with the ethnologist, providing he does not revert to the notion of the diachronic), the historian should be aware of becoming insensitive to change” (ibid., p. 236, his emphasis).
55. 「作為變化的專家（通過說轉變，歷史學家遲早會置身於與民族學家可能的共同 ground，只要他不重返二元時間性概念），歷史學家應該警惕自己變得對變化麻木」（同上，第 236 頁，其強調）。
56. Georges Duby, “Histoire sociale et idéologies des sociétés,” in Faire de l’histoire, vol. 1, p. 157. As early as my first chapter I stated how this attention to the temporal models of change leads to a conceptual reconstruction of a chain of events such as the Crusades.
56. 喬治·杜比，《社會史與社會意識形態》，載於《做歷史》，第 1 卷，第 157 頁。早在我的第一章中，我就陳述了如何關注變化的時間模式導致對十字軍東征等事件鏈的概念性重構。
57. Georges Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
57. 喬治·杜比，《三個等級：想像中的封建社會》，亞瑟·戈德漢默譯（芝加哥：芝加哥大學出版社，1980 年）。
58. Georges Dumézil, Les Dieux souverains des Indo-Européens (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), p. 210, quoted by Duby, p. 6.
58. 喬治·迪美齊爾，《印歐語系統治神祇》（巴黎：加利瑪出版社，1977 年），第 210 頁，引自杜比，第 6 頁。
59. “The principle or necessary inequality accounts for the addition of a third function. This explains why the trifunctional schema came either before or after a treatise on submission and on the structure of a society in which the high reigned in perfection and the low grovelled in sin. Triplicity arose out of the conjunction of two kinds of dissimilarity, that instituted by the ordo–there were the priests and the others-conjoined with that instituted by natura-there were nobles and serfs” (Duby, p. 59).
59. "解釋或必要的不平等導致第三功能的加入。這解釋了為什麼三功能模式要麼在關於服從的論述之前或之後，要麼在一個高層統治得完美，低層在罪惡中卑躬屈膝的社會結構中。三元性源於兩種不同性的結合，一種是由等級制度建立的——即有祭司和其他人——另一種是由本質建立的——即貴族和農奴"（杜比，第 59 頁）。
60. “Establishing the system’s genealogy will aid in understanding its structure, and the place within it assigned to the trifunctional figure” (ibid., p. 65).
60. "建立系統的族譜將有助於理解其結構，以及在其中分配給三功能圖的位置"（同上，第 65 頁）。
61. “A crisis. Ideological formations reveal themselves to the historian in periods of tumultuous situation. In such grave times, the custodians of the word speak incessantly. The time has now come for us to step outside the cathedral workshop. Then
61. "一場危機。意識形態形態在動盪的時期向歷史學家揭示自己。在這種嚴重的時刻，話語的守護者不停地說話。現在是我們走出大教堂工作坊的時候了。
perhaps we may be able to gain a understanding of why tools and material were put to the uses we have seen as we followed the meanderings of memory and the hazards of action” (ibid., pp. 118-19).
也許我們可以理解為什麼工具和材料被用於我們在追隨記憶的迂迴和行動的偶然性中所看到的用途"（同上，第 118-19 頁）。
62. “Thus the postulate of social trifunctionality was also leveled at the monks, and specifically at monks fallen under Cluny’s spell. It was dredged up at the very moment of reformed monasticism’s triumphing” (ibid., p. 142).
62. "因此，社會三功能的假設也被針對修道士，特別是墮入克呂尼修道院魅力中的修道士。這個假設正是在改革修道主義勝利的時刻被挖掘出來" (同上，第 142 頁)。
63. “A bright future lay in store for it. Nevertheless, at the time it was set forth by the bishop of Adalbero and the bishop of Laon, it was rightly looked on as backwards. Thus for a considerable period it was not accepted” (ibid., p. 166).
63. "它有光明的未來。然而，當它由阿達爾貝羅主教和洛恩主教提出時，它被正確地視為落後的。因此，在相當長的一段時間內，它都未被接受" (同上，第 166 頁)。
64. In fact, what remains until 1789 is the binary principle of inequality. The functional tripartition now occurred in “the breach between the monarch and ‘plebs’ and helped hold the latter in check” (ibid., p. 355).
64. 事實上，直到 1789 年仍然存在的是不平等的二元原則。功能性的三分法現在發生在"君主與平民之間的斷層，並幫助控制後者" (同上，第 355 頁)。
65. “I have chosen to conclude this study with Bouvines: this was not a choice made out of force of habit, nor was it made because I overestimate the importance of the event. I am convinced that 1214 was the year in which the primitive history of the trifunctional figure came to an end. By that date-its form crystallized and superimposed upon the French kingdom as a whole-that figure was to emerge from the realm of the imaginary, ripe for embodiment in an institution” (ibid., p. 346). And further on: “I end here, because at this point the trifunctional postulate has come full circle back to its origins” (ibid., p. 354).
65. "我選擇以布維訥結束這項研究：這不是出於習慣，也不是因為我高估了這一事件的重要性。我堅信 1214 年是三功能圖像的原始歷史結束的年份。到那個日期——其形式已在整個法國王國上結晶並疊加——該圖像將從想像領域中脫穎而出，已準備好在制度中體現" (同上，第 346 頁)。更進一步："我在此結束，因為此時三功能假設已經回到了它的起源" (同上，第 354 頁)。
66. François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), p. ix.
66. 弗朗索瓦·福雷，《解讀法國大革命》，艾爾波格·福斯特譯（劍橋：劍橋大學出版社/巴黎：人文科學之家出版社，1981 年），第九頁。
67. Thus the final word of the beautiful chapter that synthesizes the various aspects of Furet’s work implicitly concedes: “What sets the French Revolution apart is that it was not a transition but a beginning and a haunting vision of that beginning. Its historical importance lies in one trait that was unique to it, especially since this ‘unique’ trait was to become universal: it was the first experiment with democracy” (ibid., p. 79). Does not this admission concerning the event contain within it another one concerning the relation between the explanation and the narrative, and, finally, concerning the very attitude of distanciation? If this unique trait has become universal-at least the universal of our present political reality-must it not be said that a little disinvolvement leads us away from commemoration but that a lot takes us back again?
67. 因此，總結福雷工作各個方面的精彩章節的最後一句話隱含地承認：「法國大革命與眾不同之處在於它不是一個過渡，而是一個開端和對這個開端的困擾性視野。其歷史重要性在於一個獨特的特徵，尤其是這個『獨特』的特徵後來成為普遍的：它是民主的第一次實驗。」（同上，第 79 頁）這個關於事件的承認是否包含了另一個關於解釋和敘事之間關係的承認，最終關於疏離態度的承認？如果這個獨特的特徵已經變得普遍——至少是我們當前政治現實的普遍性——難道不應該說，一點點的不介入會使我們遠離紀念，而大量的不介入又會帶我們回到紀念？

Conclusions 結論

In this regard, I would like to recall the terminological convention I am trying to respect. I do not take the term “fiction” as a general synonym for “imaginary configuration.” The latter is an operation common to history and to the fictional narrative, and as such it falls within the sphere of mimesis $_{2}$ . On the other hand, in my vocabulary the term “fiction” is defined entirely by the antithesis it forms with respect to true narrative. It is thus inscribed on one of the two trajectories of the reference of narrative and falls under the heading of mimesis $_{3}$ , which will be dealt with explicitly only in volume 2 . As I stated above, this choice is not without certain drawbacks. Many authors make no distinction between fiction and configuration, inasmuch as every configuration is feigned, that is to say, not given in the materials arranged by the narrative. These authors can legitimately take every narrative to be a fiction, insofar as they do not take into consideration the whole of the genre of narrative. Since they are not obliged to account for history’s claim to constitute a true narrative, they do not need a special term to distinguish between the two referential modalities into which narrative configurations are, on the whole, divided.
在這方面，我想回顧我試圖遵守的術語慣例。我不把「小說」一詞視為「想像性配置」的一般同義詞。後者是歷史和小說敘事所共有的一種操作，因此屬於模仿（mimesis） $_{2}$ 的範疇。另一方面，在我的詞彙中，「小說」一詞完全由其與真實敘事的對立來定義。因此，它被銘刻在敘事指涉的兩個軌跡之一，並歸屬於模仿（mimesis） $_{3}$ ，這一點將在第 2 卷中明確討論。正如我上面所述，這種選擇並非沒有某些缺陷。許多作者不區分小說和配置，因為每種配置都是虛構的，即不是敘事材料中給定的。這些作者可以正當地將每一種敘事視為小說，因為他們沒有考慮敘事的整個類型。由於他們不必解釋歷史聲稱構成真實敘事，所以他們不需要特別的術語來區分敘事配置所分成的兩種指涉模式。

Index 索引

Action, ix, x, xi, 8, 9, 22, 32, 33, 34, 40,

46, 47, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 64, 71, 76, 81

83, 92, 101, 119, 128, 132, 134, 135, 136

137, 140, 141, 145, 146, 149, 151, 158

172, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 189, 198

200, 206, 215, 222, 229, 230

; basic actions, 55, 136, 137, 254; intentional character of,

137, 138, 139, 147, 183

; semantics of, 54, 56, 61, 81, 205; theory of, 55, 130, 131, 135, 137, 147, 229
行動，ix, x, xi, 8, 9, 22, 32, 33, 34, 40,

46, 47, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 64, 71, 76, 81

，

83, 92, 101, 119, 128, 132, 134, 135, 136

，

137, 140, 141, 145, 146, 149, 151, 158

，

172, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 189, 198

，

200, 206, 215, 222, 229, 230

；基本行動，55, 136, 137, 254；意圖性特徵，

137, 138, 139, 147, 183

；行動語義學，54, 56, 61, 81, 205；行動理論，55, 130, 131, 135, 137, 147, 229
Adalbero of Laon, 219, 221
拉昂的阿達爾貝羅，219, 221
Althusser, Louis, 110, 258
阿爾都塞，路易，110，258
Ambrose, Saint, 17  安波羅修，聖人，17
Analogy, 189, 190, 192, 197, 198, 199, 205, 224, 230
類比，189，190，192，197，198，199，205，224，230
Anscombe, G. E. M., 243, 253
安斯康伯，G. E. M.，243，253
Anthropology, historical, 109, 110, 217-18
人類學，歷史，109、110、217-18
Apel, Karl-Otto, 258  阿佩爾，卡爾-奧托
Arendt, Hannah, 199  阿倫特，漢娜
Aries, Philippe, 111, 249
阿里斯，菲利普，111、249
Aristotle, x, xi, 3, 4, 6, 15, 22, 31-51, 52,
亞里士多德，x，xi，3，4，6，15，22，31-51，52

53, 54, 56, 59, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71

76, 84, 112, 129, 130, 132, 141, 145, 151

152, 154, 156, 158, 162, 164, 170, 171

172, 173, 178, 185, 207, 215, 216, 224

, 227, 229, 230, 238, 239, 240, 253
Aron, Raymond, 95, 97-98, 116, 165, 169, 170, 171, 183, 186-88, 192, 200, 203, 213, 246, 247, 249, 252, 253, 259, 260, 261, 262
艾隆，雷蒙，95，97-98，116，165，169，170，171，183，186-88，192，200，203，213，246，247，249，252，253，259，260，261，262
Athanasius, 236 亞他那修，236
Audisio, Gabriel, 266 奧迪西奧，加布里埃爾，266
Auerbach, Eric, 163, 245
奧爾巴赫，艾瑞克，163，245
Augustine, Saint, xi, 3, 4, 5-30, 31, 32, 52,

54, 60, 61, 68, 71, 72, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86

160, 220, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237

, 244
奧古斯丁，聖人，xi，3，4，5-30，31，32，52，

54, 60, 61, 68, 71, 72, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86

，

160, 220, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237

，244
Austin, J. L., 62
奧斯丁，J. L.，62

Balas, David, 233  巴拉斯，大衛，233
Barthes, Roland, 77  巴特斯，羅蘭，77
Beierwaltes, Werner, 231, 233, 234, 236
貝爾瓦爾特，維爾納，231，233，234，236
Benjamin, Walter, 79  本雅明，華特，79
Benveniste, Emile, 77-78, 238
本維尼斯特，埃米爾，77-78，238
Bergson, Henri, 227  柏格森，亨利，227
Berlin, Isaiah, 178, 250
柏林，以賽亞，178，250
Berr, Henri, 102, 248
貝爾，亨利，102，248
Bien, Joseph, xii  比恩，約瑟夫，第十二頁
Bismarck, Otto von, 183, 184, 185, 189
俾斯麥，奧托·馮，183、184、185、189
Bloch, Marc, 97, 99-101, 102, 107, 169, 173, 247, 259
布洛克，馬克，97、99-101、102、107、169、173、247、259
Boethius, 159-160  博伊修斯，159-160
Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon, 258
波拿巴，路易-拿破崙，258
Booth, Wayne, 163  布斯，韋恩，163
Boros, Stanislas, 28, 237
博羅斯，斯坦尼斯拉斯，28，237
Brande, Karl, 224  布蘭德，卡爾，224
Braudel, Fernand, 101-6, 108, 109, 169, 177, 194, 208-17, 219, 224, 225, 230, 247, 248, 262, 265
布勞德爾，費爾南，101-6，108，109，169，177，194，208-17，219，224，225，230，247，248，262，265
Bremond, Claude, 241  布雷蒙，克勞德，241
Burckhardt, Jacob, 162, 167
布爾克哈特，雅各布，162，167
Caesar, Julius, 184  凱撒，朱利葉斯，184
Callahan, John C., 231, 233
卡拉漢，約翰·C.，231，233
Cassirer, Ernst, 54, 57
卡西雷爾，恩斯特，54，57
Catharsis, 42, 43, 50
淨化作用，42，43，50
Causal analysis, 122, 125-27, 134, 178, 183
因果分析，122，125-27，134，178，183
Chamson, André, 266  尚蒙，安德烈，266
Character, in narrative, xi, 36, 37, 46-47, 59, 177, 178, 181, 193, 194, 197, 198, 199, 200, 224, 229, 239, 241, 265. See also Quasi-characters
敘事中的角色，在 xi、36、37、46-47、59、177、178、181、193、194、197、198、199、200、224、229、239、241、265。另請參見準角色
Charles V, 211  查理五世，211
Chaunu, Huguette, 102, 248
瓊，雨格特，102、248
Chaunu, Pierre, 102, 106, 110, 111, 246, 248, 249
瓊，皮耶爾，102、106、110、111、246、248、249

Chronology, 30, 38, 85, 108, 110, 160, 170, 178, 223, 225, 239
年表，30，38，85，108，110，160，170，178，223，225，239
Closure, 135 結束，135
Cochin, Augustin, 222 科欽，奧古斯丁，222
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 176
柯勒律治，塞繆爾·泰勒，176
Collingwood, R. G., 126, 129, 246, 252, 253
柯林伍德，R. G.，126、129、246、252、253
Collyer, G. P. V., xii
柯利爾，G. P. V.，第十二頁
Columbus, Christopher, 131
哥倫布，克里斯托弗，131
Comedy, 32, 33, 35, 37, 47, 164, 230
喜劇，32、33、35、37、47、164、230
Concordance/discordance,

4, 21, 31, 42, 43

49, 60, 69, 70, 72, 73, 151, 161, 168, 229

一致性/不一致性，

4, 21, 31, 42, 43

，

49, 60, 69, 70, 72, 73, 151, 161, 168, 229

Courcelle, Pierre, 236  庫塞勒，皮埃爾，236
Cournot, A. A., 170, 187
庫爾諾，A. A.，170，187
Courtés, J., 245  庫爾特斯，J.，245
Croce, Benedetto, 148, 162, 255 n. 25
克羅切，貝內代托，148，162，255 n. 25
Culture, 50-51, 58, 196
文化，50-51，58，196
Cunningham, Noble, xii  坎寧安，諾布爾，xii
Dagognet, François, 80, 245
達戈尼耶，弗朗索瓦，80，245
Danto, Arthur C., 136, 137, 143-49, 158, 172, 179, 243, 253, 255, 256
丹托，阿瑟·C.，136、137、143-49、158、172、179、243、253、255、256
Death, 86-87, 110-11, 214, 217, 224, 225
死亡，86-87、110-11、214、217、224、225
de Certeau, Michel, 162, 257
德塞爾托，米歇爾，162、257
de Coulanges, Fustel, 205
德庫朗日，富斯特爾，205
de Gaulle, Charles, 256
戴高樂，查爾斯，256
Dialectic,

48, 61, 71, 73, 124, 180, 188

207, 225, 234, 235, 249

; of being and appearance, 79; of distentio and intentio, 27, 30,85 ; of expectation, memory, and attention, 20; of explanation and understanding, 97, 127; of history and narrative, 177; of inside and outside, 50 ; of narrative, 158 ,

161, 193, 244

; of past, present, and future, 224; of praise and lamentation, 28; of similar and dissimilar, 101; of threefold present, 9 ; of time and narrative, 72,83
辯證法，

48, 61, 71, 73, 124, 180, 188

，

207, 225, 234, 235, 249

；關於存在和外表，79；關於擴展和意圖，27，30，85；關於期望、記憶和注意力，20；關於解釋和理解，97，127；關於歷史和敘事，177；關於內部和外部，50；關於敘事，158，

161, 193, 244

；關於過去、現在和未來，224；關於讚揚和哀歎，28；關於相似和不相似，101；關於三重現在，9；關於時間和敘事，72，83
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 86, 95
狄爾泰，威廉，86，95
Dionysius the Areopagite, 220
亞略巴古的狄奧尼修斯，220
Discordance. See Concordance
不一致。請參見一致性
Discourse, ix, x, 31, 52, 56, 77, 78, 79, 112,

121, 144, 149, 152, 190, 194, 238

; descriptive, 80 ; historical,

93, 148, 181, 198

, 200, 229, 260; narrative, 56,64 ; poetic,

x

論述，第 ix、x、31、52、56、77、78、79、112 頁，

121, 144, 149, 152, 190, 194, 238

；描述性的，第 80 頁；歷史性的，

93, 148, 181, 198

，200、229、260 頁；敘事性的，56、64 頁；詩意的，

x

Distentio animi, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22,

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 42, 60, 73

, 229, 233, 234, 235, 236
心靈的擴展，第 5、7、12、14、15、18、21、22、

24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 42, 60, 73

、229、233、234、235、236 頁
Dray, William H., 113, 121-31, 132, 146,

149, 155, 172, 183, 186, 250, 251, 252

, 253, 261, 262, 264
德雷，威廉·H.，第 113、121-131、132、146 頁，

149, 155, 172, 183, 186, 250, 251, 252

，253、261、262、264 頁
Duby, Georges, 101, 110, 249, 266
杜比，喬治，101，110，249，266
Duhem, P., 231 杜亨，P.，231
Dumézil, Georges, 219, 220, 266
杜梅齊爾，喬治，219，220，266
Dupont-Roc, Roselyne, 32, 33, 42-43, 44, 45, 50, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242
杜龐-羅克，羅塞琳，32，33，42-43，44，45，50，237，238，239，240，241，242
Durrell, Lawrence, 266 杜雷爾，勞倫斯，266

Else, G. F., 32, 43, 44, 50, 237, 239, 240, 241
艾爾斯，G. F.，32，43，44，50，237，239，240，241
Emplotment, 21-22, 31, 32, 34, 35, 52, 53,

54, 64, 65, 71, 73, 76, 106, 130 - 31, 150

, 161, 163, 164, 166, 168, 169, 178, 183, 184, 186, 192, 194, 197, 206, 208, 224, 227, 229
情節佈局，21-22，31，32，34，35，52，53，

54, 64, 65, 71, 73, 76, 106, 130 - 31, 150

，161，163，164，166，168，169，178，183，184，186，192，194，197，206，208，224，227，229
Epic, 32, 33, 35, 36, 41, 49, 69, 164, 166, 230, 239, 242
史詩，32，33，35，36，41，49，69，164，166，230，239，242
Epistemological break, 96, 143, 151, 152,

162, 163, 175 - 77, 180, 181, 187, 193

, 205, 207, 228
認識論斷裂，96，143，151，152，

162, 163, 175 - 77, 180, 181, 187, 193

，205，207，228
Epistemology, x, 85, 91, 93, 95, 97, 102,

109, 111, 154, 155, 157, 161, 162, 165

166, 188, 193, 194, 199, 202, 204, 206

, 207, 226, 227, 228, 229, 246, 247, 255, 260
認識論，x，85，91，93，95，97，102，

109, 111, 154, 155, 157, 161, 162, 165

，

166, 188, 193, 194, 199, 202, 204, 206

，207，226，227，228，229，246，247，255，260
Eternity, 5, 6, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 84, 86, 87 , 232, 234, 235, 236
永恆，5，6，22，23，25，28，29，84，86，87，232，234，235，236
Ethics, 32, 35, 37, 40, 42, 46, 47, 59, 165, 184, 189, 190, 212, 237, 241
倫理學，32，35，37，40，42，46，47，59，165，184，189，190，212，237，241
Event, ix, x, 50, 65, 82, 92, 93, 96, 97, 101,

104, 106, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114

115, 124, 145, 148, 154, 164, 168, 169

170, 182, 185, 186, 188, 190, 201, 202

, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 249, 251, 253, 265; historical, 208. See also Quasi-event
事件，ix，x，50，65，82，92，93，96，97，101，

104, 106, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114

，

115, 124, 145, 148, 154, 164, 168, 169

，

170, 182, 185, 186, 188, 190, 201, 202

，207，209，210，212，213，214，215，217，221，222，223，224，226，249，251，253，265；歷史性，208。另見準事件
Experience, 8, 9, 22, 25, 28, 31, 54, 60, 71,

73, 76, 78, 79, 99, 138, 142, 159, 180

, 185, 198, 203, 206, 216, 222, 227; practical, 53, 207; temporal, xi, 29, 32, 52, 72, 85 ; of time, 32,73
經驗，8，9，22，25，28，31，54，60，71，

73, 76, 78, 79, 99, 138, 142, 159, 180

，185，198，203，206，216，222，227；實踐性，53，207；時間性，xi，29，32，52，72，85；關於時間，32，73
Explanation,

x, 33, 93, 95, 112, 115, 116

118, 119, 121, 122, 128, 143, 149, 150

155, 158, 164, 171, 173, 177, 178, 179

181, 183, 184, 189, 201, 224, 229, 258

; by argument, 164, 179; causal, 113, 125,

134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 172, 178, 188

, 201, 202, 254; by causal imputation, 185, 189, 190; by emplotment, 164, 166, 179, 181, 194, 257; historical, 96, 100, 131,

140, 141, 143, 147, 154, 175, 179, 186

200, 228, 229, 230

; by ideological implication, 165, 179; logic of, 143; by narration,

185, 186, 200

; nomothetic, 190 ; quasicausal, 132, 137, 139-41, 142, 178, 183, 189; quasi-teleological, 137; rational, 122, 127, 128-30, 131, 141, 155, 178, 183, 189; scientific, 184, 194; sketch, 114, 118, 175; teleological, 137-38, 178, 254; and understanding,

93, 97, 111, 124, 127, 132

138, 149, 171, 181, 250

解釋，

x, 33, 93, 95, 112, 115, 116

，

118, 119, 121, 122, 128, 143, 149, 150

，

155, 158, 164, 171, 173, 177, 178, 179

，

181, 183, 184, 189, 201, 224, 229, 258

；通過論證，164，179；因果性，113，125，

134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 172, 178, 188

，201，202，254；通過因果歸因，185，189，190；通過敘事情節，164，166，179，181，194，257；歷史性，96，100，131，

140, 141, 143, 147, 154, 175, 179, 186

，

200, 228, 229, 230

；通過意識形態隱含，165，179；其邏輯，143；通過敘述，

185, 186, 200

；規範性，190；準因果，132，137，139-41，142，178，183，189；準目的論，137；理性，122，127，128-30，131，141，155，178，183，189；科學性，184，194；概要，114，118，175；目的論，137-38，178，254；與理解，

93, 97, 111, 124, 127, 132

，

138, 149, 171, 181, 250

Febvre, Lucien, 97, 102, 107, 169, 247
弗布爾，盧西安，97，102，107，169，247
Fessard, Gaston, 259 費薩爾德，加斯頓，259

Index 索引

Fiction, 45, 59, 64, 72, 79, 81, 82, 84, 85,

151, 152, 158, 161, 163, 227, 239, 267

小說，45，59，64，72，79，81，82，84，85，

151, 152, 158, 161, 163, 227, 239, 267

Fink, Eugen, 81, 245
芬克，歐根，81，245
Focillon, Henri, 100, 247
福西隆，亨利，100，247
Followability, 66, 67, 76, 91, 149-52, 207, 244
可跟隨性，66，67，76，91，149-52，207，244
Frankel, Charles, 115, 117-19, 250, 251
弗蘭克爾，查爾斯，115，117-19，250，251
Freud, Sigmund, 74  弗洛伊德，西格蒙，74
Frye, Northrop, xii, 67, 68, 163, 166, 186, 257
弗萊，諾斯特羅普，第 12 頁，第 67、68、163、166、186、257 頁
Furet, François, 199, 221-24, 267
富雷，弗朗索瓦，第 199 頁，第 221-24 頁，第 267 頁
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 70, 77, 81, 245, 253
伽達默爾，漢斯-格奧爾格，第 70、77、81、245、253 頁
Galileo, 132  伽利略，第 132 頁
Gallie, W. B., 149-55, 157, 158, 177, 179, 207, 244, 255, 256
蓋利，W. B.，149-55，157，158，177，179，207，244，255，256
Gardiner, Patrick, 115, 178, 185, 250, 251, 252
加迪納，帕特里克，115，178，185，250，251，252
Geertz, Clifford, 57, 58, 243, 258, 261
格爾茨，克利福德，57，58，243，258，261
Generation, 199  世代，199
Genre, 35, 69, 70, 76, 229
類型，35，69，70，76，229
Gerard of Cambrai, 219, 221
坎布雷的傑拉德，219，221
Gilson, Etienne, 231, 236
吉爾森，埃蒂安，231，236
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 190
歌德，約翰·沃爾夫岡·馮，190
Golden, L., 50, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242
戈爾登，L.，50，237，239，240，241，242
Goldschmidt, Victor, 232
歌德施密特，維克托，232
Gombrich, E. H., 164
岡布里希，E. H.，164
Goodman, Nelson, 245  古德曼，納爾遜，245
Gorgias, 238  高爾吉亞斯，238
Goubert, P., 248  古貝爾，P.，248
Gramsci, Antonio, 258  葛蘭西，安東尼奧，258
Granger, G. G., 245
葛朗傑，G. G.，245
Gregory of Nyssa, 233-34, 236
尼撒的格列高利，233-34，236
Gregory the Great, 220
教宗額我略，220
Greimas, A.-J., 56, 245
格雷馬斯，A.-J.，56，245
Guitton, Jean, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237
吉東，讓，231，232，233，234，235，236，237

Habermas, Jürgen, 96, 258
哈貝馬斯，尤爾根，96，258
Hardison, O. B., 32, 237
哈迪森，O. B.，32，237
Hardy, J., 237 哈代，J.，237
Hart, H. L. A., 252, 261
哈特，H. L. A.，252，261
Hegel, G. W. F., 58, 59, 95, 102, 104, 131, 144, 162, 177
黑格爾，G. W. F.，58，59，95，102，104，131，144，162，177
Heidegger, Martin, 16, 54, 60-64, 83, 84,

85, 86, 87, 160, 177, 227, 244, 245, 261

海德格，馬丁，16，54，60-64，83，84，

85, 86, 87, 160, 177, 227, 244, 245, 261

Hempel, Karl, 112-15, 118, 129, 149, 164, 250, 256, 261
亨佩爾，卡爾，112-15，118，129，149，164，250，256，261
Hermeneutical circle, 72, 76, 84, 86
解釋學迴圈，72，76，84，86
Hermeneutics, 53, 71, 81, 256
詮釋學，53，71，81，256
Herodotus, 40 希羅多德，40
Hierarchical structure, 22, 37, 86, 179, 213, 265 ; of discourse, 194; of entities in history, 181 ; of temporal experience, 85 ; of temporality,

28, 30, 84

; of time, 61 ; of tragedy, 34
層級結構，22，37，86，179，213，265；論述的，194；歷史中實體的，181；時間經驗的，85；時間性的，

28, 30, 84

；時間的，61；悲劇的，34

Historicality, 62, 63, 85
歷史性，62，63，85
Historiography,

30, 84, 85, 91, 92, 93, 100

史學史，

30, 84, 85, 91, 92, 93, 100

History, 32, 33, 40, 82, 85, 86, 91, 102, 106,

108, 109, 114, 133, 136, 139, 144, 151

157, 161, 162, 163, 173, 177, 178, 187

, 194, 195, 197, 206, 227, 228, 255, 267; of conjunctures, 264; demographic, 108, 248; economic, 106, 107, 110, 154, 214, 248; of events,

96, 101, 108, 174, 189, 208

, 210, 213, 216, 264; first-order entities, 193-206, 229, 230; general, 195, 203, 204; of long time-span, 208, 216, 217,

224, 248, 249

; of mentalités, 108, 109, 218 ; narrative,

91, 93, 101, 102, 151

; philosophy of,

3, 30, 84, 91, 95, 111, 118

144, 162, 224, 251

; political, 101, 102; quantitative, 108,170 ; second- and thirdorder entities, 203-4; serial, 106, 107, 108, 110; social, 102, 103, 106, 107, 131, 154; special, 195, 203, 204, 206; structural, 174; theory of, 44, 98, 113, 128,

130, 135, 137, 147, 201, 229, 230

歷史，32、33、40、82、85、86、91、102、106、

108, 109, 114, 133, 136, 139, 144, 151

、

157, 161, 162, 163, 173, 177, 178, 187

、194、195、197、206、227、228、255、267；共時性研究，264；人口統計學，108、248；經濟史，106、107、110、154、214、248；事件史，

96, 101, 108, 174, 189, 208

、210、213、216、264；一階實體，193-206、229、230；總體史，195、203、204；長時段史，208、216、217、

224, 248, 249

；心態史，108、109、218；敘事史，

91, 93, 101, 102, 151

；史學哲學，

3, 30, 84, 91, 95, 111, 118

、

144, 162, 224, 251

；政治史，101、102；定量史學，108、170；二、三階實體，203-4；序列史，106、107、108、110；社會史，102、103、106、107、131、154；專門史，195、203、204、206；結構史，174；史學理論，44、98、113、128、

130, 135, 137, 147, 201, 229, 230

Hölderin, F., 79 赫爾德林，F.，79
Homer, 37, 216, 219
荷馬，37、216、219
Honoré, A. M., 261
奧諾雷，A. M.，261
Hope, 30, 85, 144
霍普，30，85，144
Hume, David, 113, 136, 137, 140, 201, 202, 253
休謨，大衛，113，136，137，140，201，202，253
Husserl, Edmund, 16, 83, 84, 85-86, 179,

180, 181, 198, 227, 228, 238, 258, 259

, 261
胡塞爾，埃德蒙德，16，83，84，85-86，179，

180, 181, 198, 227, 228, 238, 258, 259

，261
Hutton, James, 237 赫頓，詹姆斯，237
Iconic augmentation, 80-81, 82
標誌性增強，80-81，82
Ideal-types, 153, 173, 205
理想型，153，173，205
Ideology, 79, 110, 141-42, 165, 176-77,

180, 197, 198, 202, 212, 218 - 21, 222

, 223, 258
意識形態，79，110，141-42，165，176-77，

180, 197, 198, 202, 212, 218 - 21, 222

，223，258
Imagination, ix, 46, 50, 69, 82, 183, 184, 186, 188, 192; productive, ix, x, 68, 69, 70, 73, 76; social, 49
想像力，ix，46，50，69，82，183，184，186，188，192；生產性的，ix，x，68，69，70，73，76；社會性的，49
Ingarden, Roman, 77, 245
英格登，羅曼，77，245
Innovation and sedimentation, 68, 69, 77, 79, 166, 208
創新與沉澱，68，69，77，79，166，208
Intentionality, historical, 82, 85, 92, 180, 193, 194, 229, 249
意向性，歷史的，82，85，92，180，193，194，229，249
Interpretation, 72, 73, 114, 115, 118, 119
詮釋，72，73，114，115，118，119
Iser, Wolfgang, 50, 64, 77, 242, 244
艾瑟，沃爾夫岡，50，64，77，242，244
James, Henry, 37, 239
詹姆斯，亨利，37，239
Jauss, Hans Robert, 77, 242, 243
豪斯，漢斯·羅伯特，77，242，243
Jesus, 75 耶穌，75 歲
Joyce, James, 77 喬伊斯，詹姆斯，77 歲
Judgment, 66, 68, 76, 125, 126, 127, 155,

156, 157, 176, 178, 185, 186, 216, 244

, 256
審判，66、68、76、125、126、127、155、

156, 157, 176, 178, 185, 186, 216, 244

、256

Kafka, Franz, 75 卡夫卡，弗朗茨，75 歲
Kant, Immanuel, 66, 68, 99, 156, 159, 160, 173, 176, 234, 244
康德, 伊曼紐爾, 66, 68, 99, 156, 159, 160, 173, 176, 234, 244
Kellogg, Robert, 163, 178, 244
凱洛格, 羅伯特, 163, 178, 244
Kermode, Frank, 37, 67, 73, 75, 231, 239, 245, 258
科莫德, 弗蘭克, 37, 67, 73, 75, 231, 239, 245, 258
Kuznets, Simon, 107 庫茲涅茨, 西蒙, 107
Labrousse, Ernest, 107, 248
拉布魯斯，埃爾內斯特，107，248
Lacombe, Paul, 102, 248
拉孔布，保羅，102，248
Ladurie, Emmanuel Le Roy, 249, 262
拉迪里，埃馬紐埃爾·勒羅伊，249，262
Lallot, Jean. See Dupont-Roc, Roselyne
拉洛，讓。參見杜龐-羅克，羅賽琳
Langlois, Charles Victor, 97, 246
朗卢瓦，查爾斯·維克多，97 歲，246 頁
Language,

ix, x, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 27, 29, 34

48, 54, 62, 69, 78, 79, 101, 139, 147

, 178, 232, 255
語言，

ix, x, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 27, 29, 34

，

48, 54, 62, 69, 78, 79, 101, 139, 147

－Г丁J刂乒 AND NAASRA「J／E voumel 一個敘事與敘述的卷本

PAUL RICOEUR 保羅·利科

TJTEAND NARRATJ/E 時間與敘事

TJMEAND NARRATJVE vuwe PAUL RICOEUR 保羅·里科爾的敘事

Contents 目錄

Preface 前言

The Aporias of the Experience of Time Book II of Augustine's Confessions 時間經驗的困境：奧古斯丁《懺悔錄》第二卷

The Aporia of the Being and the Nonbeing of Time時間的存在與非存在之邏輯困境

The Measurement of Time時間的測量

Intentio and Distentio 意向性與延展

The Contrast with Eternity與永恆的對比

2

Emplotment: A Reading of Aristotle's Poetics情節結構：解讀亞里士多德的《詩學》

The Melodic Line: The Pair Mimesis-Muthos旋律線：模仿-故事對

The Plot: A Model of Concordance情節：和諧的模型

Included Discordance 包含的不一致

The Two Sides of The Poetic Configuration詩學配置的兩個側面

Time and Narrative: Threefold Mimesis《時間與敘事》：三重模仿

Mimesis, 模仿，

Mimesis 2 2 _(2)_{2} 模仿 2 2 _(2)_{2}

Mimesis 3 3 _(3)_{3} 模仿 3 3 _(3)_{3}

The Circle of Mimesis模仿的循環

Configuration, Refiguration, and Reading配置、重新配置和閱讀

Narrativity and Reference敘事性與指涉

Narrated Time 敘事時間

Part II 第二部分

The Eclipse of Narrative敘事的蝕變

The Eclipse of the Event in French Historiography法國史學中事件的消逝

The Eclipse of Understanding: The Covering Law Model in Analytical Philosophy理解的日蝕：分析哲學中的涵蓋法模型

5

Defenses of Narrative ...

The Breaking up of the Covering Law Model涵蓋定律模型的瓦解

An Explanation Lacking Legality: W. Dray缺乏法則性的解釋：W. Dray

Historical Explanation According to G. H. Von Wright根據 G. H. 馮萊特（Von Wright）的歷史解釋

Narrativist Arguments 敘事論論點

"Narrative Sentences" According to Arthur Danto根據阿瑟·丹托的"敘事句子"

Following a Story 追隨一個故事

The Configurational Act 構型行為

Explanation by Emplotment通過情節的解釋

How One Writes History如何撰寫歷史

Introduction 引言

Singular Causal Imputation單一因果歸因

The First-Order Entities of History歷史的一階實體

Historical Time and the Fate of the Event歷史時間與事件的命運

Conclusions 結論

Notes 筆記

Part One 第一部分

Chapter One 第一章

Chapter Two 第二章

Chapter Three 第三章

Part Two 第二部分

Chapter Four 第四章

Chapter Five 第五章

Chapter Six 第六章

Conclusions 結論

－Г丁J刂乒 AND
NAASRA「J／E voumel
一個敘事與敘述的卷本

TJTEAND
NARRATJ/E 時間與敘事

TJMEAND
NARRATJVE vuwe

PAUL RICOEUR
保羅·里科爾的敘事

The Aporias of the Experience of Time Book II of Augustine's Confessions
時間經驗的困境：奧古斯丁《懺悔錄》第二卷

The Aporia of the Being and the Nonbeing of Time
時間的存在與非存在之邏輯困境

The Measurement of Time
時間的測量

The Contrast with Eternity
與永恆的對比

Emplotment: A Reading of Aristotle's Poetics
情節結構：解讀亞里士多德的《詩學》

The Melodic Line: The Pair Mimesis-Muthos
旋律線：模仿-故事對

The Plot: A Model of Concordance
情節：和諧的模型

The Two Sides of The Poetic Configuration
詩學配置的兩個側面

Time and Narrative: Threefold Mimesis
《時間與敘事》：三重模仿

Mimesis $_{2}$ 模仿 $_{2}$

Mimesis $_{3}$ 模仿 $_{3}$

The Circle of Mimesis
模仿的循環

Configuration, Refiguration, and Reading
配置、重新配置和閱讀

Narrativity and Reference
敘事性與指涉

The Eclipse of Narrative
敘事的蝕變

The Eclipse of the Event in French Historiography
法國史學中事件的消逝

The Eclipse of Understanding: The Covering Law Model in Analytical Philosophy
理解的日蝕：分析哲學中的涵蓋法模型

The Breaking up of the Covering Law Model
涵蓋定律模型的瓦解

An Explanation Lacking Legality: W. Dray
缺乏法則性的解釋：W. Dray

Historical Explanation According to G. H. Von Wright
根據 G. H. 馮萊特（Von Wright）的歷史解釋

"Narrative Sentences" According to Arthur Danto
根據阿瑟·丹托的"敘事句子"

Explanation by Emplotment
通過情節的解釋

How One Writes History
如何撰寫歷史

Singular Causal Imputation
單一因果歸因

The First-Order Entities of History
歷史的一階實體

Historical Time and the Fate of the Event
歷史時間與事件的命運