Amona the evils and dangers of our system of Parliamentary Government, the worst are probably those which arise from its tendency to encourage corrup-tion,-including, under the general name of corruption, all the various methods which may be used to bias men from the right exercise of their political power, and the honest discharge of their political duties, by appeals to their selfish interests. A tendency to corruption in this sense of the word is the common evil of all free Governments. No such Government, of which we possess a trustworthy account, has been exempt from the taint, nor do I see any reason for believing that it has prevailed to a greater degree in this country than elsewhere.
我们议会政府制度的恶劣和危险中，最糟糕的可能是它倾向于鼓励腐败——包括在腐败这一总称下，所有可能用来影响人们正确行使政治权力和诚实履行政治职责的方法，通过对他们自私利益的诉求。在这个意义上，腐败的倾向是所有自由政府的共同恶果。我们所掌握的任何可信的政府记录都没有免于这种污点，我也看不出有什么理由相信在这个国家的腐败程度比其他地方更严重。

Without going back to ancient times, if we turn to the United States, which stand next to ourselves in the list of nations possessing free Constitutions, we
不必追溯到古代，如果我们转向美国，这个在拥有自由宪法的国家名单中与我们并列的国家，我们
shall find symptoms of the existence of corruption, not less extensive, and of a worse kind than here.* We know, from the authentic evidence of the laws passed against bribery at elections, that corruption in this its most naked form is no more unknown in the United States than among ourselves. The distribution of places in the public service for party and personal objects, instead of with a view to the public interest, takes place there to an extent and with a total absence of any attempt at concealment, which throws quite into the shade any such abuses of which $\dot{\text{we}}$$\dot{\text{ we }}$" we "^(˙)\dot{\text { we }} have to complain. We are told that the accession to office of a new President, is habitually followed by the immediate transfer of some thousands of places from the former holders to his own adherents; and, what is yet worse, imputations have been freely made, not only of the abuse of their trust by public servants in the United States, for the purpose of enriching themselves by illicit gains, but also of such practices having been connived at for party purposes. Money also is notoriously much used, in gaining the support of the Press for measures calculated to promote the interests of individuals or of parties; and it has even been asserted, and believed, that attempts to obtain the passing of acts of legislation by directly pur-
将会发现腐败存在的症状，程度不亚于这里，且性质更为恶劣。我们从针对选举贿赂所通过的法律的确凿证据中知道，腐败在其最赤裸的形式上在美国并不比我们这里更为罕见。为了党派和个人目的而分配公共服务职位，而不是出于公共利益的考虑，这种现象在美国的程度之大以及完全没有任何掩饰的尝试，使得我们所抱怨的任何此类滥用行为都显得微不足道。我们被告知，新总统上任后，通常会立即将数千个职位从前任持有者转移到他自己的支持者手中；更糟糕的是，关于美国公共服务人员滥用信任以非法获利的指控被广泛提出，甚至还有关于这些行为出于党派目的而被默许的说法。金钱在获得媒体支持以促进个人或政党的利益方面也被广泛使用；甚至有人声称并相信，通过直接贿赂来获得立法通过的尝试是存在的

chasing the support of Members of inflaence in Congress, or in the State Legislatures, have neither been uncommon nor unsuccessful. No man believes that in this country the passing of an Act of Parliament could be obtained by the most profuse expenditure of money, in trying to gain the votes of Members of either House; and the attempt to carry a Bill by such means would be so dangerous, that it is not likely to be made.*
追求国会或州立法机构中有影响力的成员的支持，既不罕见也不失败。没有人相信在这个国家，通过最奢侈的金钱支出来获得任何一院成员的投票，能够通过一项议会法案；而通过这种手段推动一项法案的尝试将是如此危险，以至于不太可能被提出。

But there is this peculiarity about Parliamentary Government, as compared with other forms of free government, that in the latter, corruption is as it were an accident,-very probably an accident which may always attend them, but still an evil the entire extirpation of which, if it were possible, would have no tendency to derange their working; whereas Parliamentary Government derives its whole force and power of action from the exercise of an influence which is at
但是，与其他形式的自由政府相比，议会政府有一个特殊之处，即在后者中，腐败在某种程度上是一种偶然——很可能是一种可能始终伴随它们的偶然，但仍然是一个如果可能完全根除的话，对其运作没有任何干扰的恶；而议会政府的全部力量和行动能力则源于对一种影响的行使

least very much akin to corruption. The possession and exercise, by the Ministers of the Crown, of a large measure of authority in Parliament, is the foundation upon which our whole system of government rests; while this authority has from the first been maintained principally by means of the patronage of the Crown, and of the power vested in the Administration, of conferring favours of various kinds on its Parliamentary supporters. Sir Robert Walpole’s Administration has become almost proverbial for its extreme corruption, and there is no doubt that he retained the command of his majority in the House of Commons mainly by corrupt means, among which were included the habitual use of direct money bribes to Members of Parliament. But it seems pretty clear that, with respect to corruption, the chief difference between Sir Robert Walpole and the Ministers who preceded and followed him was, that he took less pains than others to conceal the methods he employed for obtaining Parliamentary support, and that the same methods continued long afterwards, to be as largely and systematically used for the same purpose.
至少在很大程度上与腐败相似。王室部长在议会中拥有和行使大量权力，是我们整个政府体系的基础；而这种权力从一开始主要是通过王室的赞助和行政部门赋予的权力来维持的，后者可以向其议会支持者提供各种形式的恩惠。罗伯特·沃波尔爵士的政府几乎因其极端腐败而成为众所周知的典范，毫无疑问，他主要通过腐败手段保持了在下议院的多数控制，其中包括对议员的直接金钱贿赂的习惯性使用。但很明显，就腐败而言，罗伯特·沃波尔爵士与他之前和之后的部长之间的主要区别在于，他比其他人更少费心去掩盖他为获得议会支持而采用的方法，而这些方法在很长一段时间后仍然被大量和系统地用于同样的目的。

By degrees corruption ceased to be practised in the coarse form of money bribes to Members of Parliament; but the same end was attained by jobs of all kinds, perpetrated for the benefit of those who had influence in returning Members of the House of
随着时间的推移，贿赂不再以金钱贿赂国会议员的粗俗形式进行；但通过各种工作，仍然达到了同样的目的，这些工作是为了那些在选举国会议员中有影响力的人谋取利益

Commons, and by the abuse of an enormous patronage, for their advantage. The arts by which this was accomplished, and by which votes in the House of Commons were obtained, in return for favours bestowed on Members themselves, their patrons, or constituents, were reduced to a regular system, and brought to a high pitch of perfection. This system continued in full force up to the time of passing the Reform Act, in 1832. By that measure, by the diffusion of education, and by the increasing power of opinion, a great improvement in political morality has been effected. No Minister would now dare to be guilty of the practices which were formerly common, and favour is become a far less potent instrument of government than it was. But it would be idle to deny, that it still continues to be one of the chief sources of the moving force by which the action of the political machine is maintained. The power which the Ministry of the day possesses of conciliating its Parliamentary supporters, by favours conferred upon them, either directly or indirectly, through their friends and constituents, is one of the principal means by which the necessary authority of the Government in both Houses of Parliament is supported. Parliamentary Government is essentially a government by party, and one of the bonds by which all parties are kept together is that of the selfish in-
通过对庞大赞助的滥用，来为他们谋取利益。实现这一目标的手段，以及通过这些手段在下议院获得选票的方式，作为对给予议员、他们的赞助人或选民的恩惠的回报，已经被简化为一个系统，并达到了高度的完善。这个系统一直持续到 1832 年通过改革法案为止。通过该法案、教育的普及以及舆论力量的增强，政治道德得到了极大的改善。现在没有任何部长敢于犯下以前常见的做法，恩惠已成为政府的一个远不如以前强大的工具。但否认它仍然是维持政治机器运作的主要动力来源之一是无益的。 当时的政府部门通过直接或间接地向其国会议员支持者提供恩惠，或通过他们的朋友和选民来调和这些支持者的权力，是支持政府在两院中必要权威的主要手段之一。议会政府本质上是由政党组成的政府，而将所有政党团结在一起的一个纽带是自私的利益
terests of their adherents. Among all classes of men who have any share of political power, whether they are Peers, Members of the House of Commons, or electors, there are too many who allow considerations of their private advantage, not those of the public good, to determine what party they shall support. Electors, we know, are influenced sometimes by actual bribes, or, what is much the same, by money’s worth, in the shape of land or houses let to them below their value, sometimes by a wish to secure the favour of those persons in their town or county who are most able to advance their interest. Others again, (often the local leaders of parties,) are led to take an active part in supporting this or that candidate for a seat in the House of Commons, by the hope that, if they are successful, and if the party they espouse is also successful in Parliament, they may expect, by the assistance of the Member to whose return they have contributed, to enjoy a share in the patronage of the Government.
他们的支持者的利益。在所有拥有政治权力的阶层中，无论是贵族、下议院成员还是选民，太多人让个人利益的考虑，而不是公共利益，决定他们支持哪个政党。我们知道，选民有时受到实际贿赂的影响，或者说是类似的，以低于其价值的土地或房屋的形式给予他们金钱的价值，有时则是希望获得他们所在城镇或县中最能促进他们利益的人的青睐。还有一些人（通常是政党的地方领导人）则因希望如果他们成功，而他们所支持的政党在议会中也成功，他们可以期待通过他们所支持的当选成员的帮助，享有政府的赞助份额，而积极参与支持某个候选人竞选下议院的席位。

Corruption is the more apt to prevail in this form, because it is difficult in many cases to distinguish conduct which deserves to be branded with such a reproach, from that which is free from blame. No just objection can be taken to a man’s seeking employment in the public service, for himself, his friends or relations, by honourable means; and he may fairly
腐败在这种形式下更容易盛行，因为在许多情况下，很难区分应当受到这种指责的行为与无可指责的行为。一个人通过正当手段为自己、朋友或亲属寻求公共服务的就业，没有正当的反对意见；他可以公平地
expect that his political as well as his personal friends will assist him in doing so. Nor can those to whom patronage is entrusted be reasonably censured for giving a preference to their own political friends, in the appointments they make, so long as they neither neglect any just claims to employment on the part of others, nor place it in unworthy hands. It is when men support measures or a party which their judgment condemns, for the sake of office, or when they make appointments, knowing them to be wrong, from favour, or to purchase political support, that their conduct is to be regarded as corrupt. The same actions therefore may be corrupt or not, according to the motives from which they spring; and thus men easily deceive themselves, not less than others, as to the true character of what they do.
期望他的政治朋友和个人朋友会帮助他做到这一点。那些被委托管理任命的人，合理地说，不能因为在他们的任命中偏向自己的政治朋友而受到指责，只要他们不忽视其他人合理的就业要求，也不将其交给不值得的人。因此，当人们为了职位支持他们判断所谴责的措施或政党，或者在知道任命是错误的情况下出于偏爱或为了购买政治支持而进行任命时，他们的行为才应被视为腐败。因此，同样的行为可能是腐败的，也可能不是，取决于其出发的动机；因此，人们很容易自欺欺人，和他人一样，对自己所做事情的真实性质产生误解。

This helps to account for the fact, of which I fear there can be no doubt, that the abuse of patronage for the sake of influence is both very common and very injurious to the public interest; and it is through their constituents that such influence is brought with most power to bear upon Members of the House of Commons. Owing to the love of power and distinction natural to men, there is so general a desire to have a seat in Parliament, and the competition for seats is so keen, that few men can obtain them, except as the adherents of some considerable party; and
这有助于解释一个我担心毫无疑问的事实，即为了影响而滥用赞助既非常普遍又对公众利益非常有害；而这种影响通过他们的选民以最强的力量施加在下议院的成员身上。由于人们天生对权力和地位的渴望，普遍存在着想要在议会中占有一席之地的愿望，竞争如此激烈，以至于除了作为某个重要政党的支持者外，很少有人能够获得席位；而
the candidates who can procure for their supporters the favours which the Government has to confer, have a decided advantage over their rivals. Thus there is established a chain of influence, from the elector to the Minister, which does not leave the latter at liberty to use the patronage of the Crown with a single eye to the public good, and which is apt to bias both voters and their representatives in the exercise of their respective political powers. The Minister cannot dispense with Parliamentary support: to secure it, he must keep those from whom be receives it in good humour ; he cannot therefore resist their urgent applications for favours for their constituents, when they come recommended to him by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury. The Ministerial Member, in his turn, must press on that important functionary the clamorous demands of those who have influence in the county or borough he represents; and that his applications may be favourably listened to, he must be ready to answer the calls which the same functionary, in his character of " Whip," makes for his vote on party questions.
能够为其支持者争取政府所能给予的恩惠的候选人，相较于其对手具有明显的优势。因此，从选民到部长之间建立了一条影响链，这使得后者无法单纯以公共利益为重来使用王室的恩惠，并且容易在行使各自的政治权力时影响选民及其代表。部长无法摆脱议会的支持：为了确保这一点，他必须让那些给予他支持的人保持良好的情绪；因此，当他们通过财政部的议会秘书向他推荐时，他无法拒绝他们对其选民的恩惠的紧急请求。部长成员反过来必须向这一重要职能官员施压，满足那些在他所代表的县或市有影响力的人的强烈要求；为了使他的申请能够得到积极的回应，他必须准备好回应同一职能官员作为“鞭子”在党派问题上对他投票的要求。

But though it is undoubtedly true, that there never has been a Parliamentary Administration which has not owed some part of its strength to the exercise of an influence more or less corrupt in its character, it is certain that in these days (and probably it was
但尽管毫无疑问，历来没有一个议会政府不曾在其力量的某些部分上依赖于某种程度上腐败的影响，但可以肯定的是，在这些日子里（可能在过去也是如此）
true even in the worst times,) no Minister can stand exclusively, or even principally, by such means; nor has corruption so large a share as some cynical writers would make us believe, in carrying on the government of this country. All Parliamentary parties have numbered in their ranks many unscrupulous and self-interested adherents; and if the motives of men’s public conduct were strictly scrutinized, they would seldom be found altogether free from some taint of selfishness. But admitting this to be true, it is not less true that a love for their country, and a sincere desire to promote what they believe to be its interests, have generally a very large share (commonly, I hope, a principal share) in determining men’s choice of a political party. And when great occasions have arisen, a generous contempt of their own individual interest, in competition with their public duty, has been repeatedly shown by all ranks of our countrymen, from the leaders of parties, to the humblest voter in some petty borough. It is when no great public questions have been at issue, and when politics have degenerated into a scramble among individuals for the honours and emoluments of office, that corruption has chiefly prevailed. If we were to judge of Parliamentary Government by its character in such times, as for instance, the earlier part of the reign of George III., it would be difficult to overcome the
即使在最糟糕的时刻，)没有任何部长可以仅仅依靠这样的手段站稳脚跟；也没有腐败像一些愤世嫉俗的作家所让我们相信的那样，在管理这个国家的过程中占有如此大的份额。所有的议会党派中都有许多不择手段和自私自利的支持者；如果严格审视人们的公共行为动机，通常会发现它们很少完全不受自私的影响。但承认这一点并不妨碍这样一个事实：对国家的热爱，以及真诚希望促进他们所相信的国家利益的愿望，通常在决定人们选择政治党派时占有很大份额（通常，我希望是主要份额）。而当重大时刻出现时，从党派领袖到某个小城镇中最卑微的选民，我们的国人都曾多次表现出对个人利益的慷慨蔑视，以此与他们的公共责任相竞争。 当没有重大的公共问题被提出，政治沦为个人之间争夺官职荣誉和报酬的混乱时，腐败主要盛行。如果我们要根据这样的时期来判断议会政府的性质，例如乔治三世统治早期。，克服这个将会很困难
feeling of disgust created by the general prevalence of corruption, and the low and sordid motives by which the conduct of politicians seems to have been almost universally governed. But whenever great political questions have arisen, on which men’s real opinions have been much divided, parties have been formed and bound together far more by agreement and sympathy on these subjects, than by the pursuit of selfish interests. Men have been found to adhere honourably to such parties, under circumstances of the greatest discouragement ; and the people have shown themselves superior to all base and mercenary motives, in the exercise of their political rights. The general election in which Mr. Pitt defeated the Coalition, and that of 1831, which secured the passing of the Reform Act, may be cited as cases in which this has happened.
对普遍存在的腐败感到厌恶，以及政治家行为几乎普遍受低劣和卑鄙动机支配的感觉。然而，每当出现重大的政治问题，关于人们真实意见分歧较大的时候，政党往往是基于对这些问题的共识和同情而形成和团结，而不是出于自私的利益。在极大的挫折情况下，人们发现仍然能够光荣地坚持这样的政党；而人民在行使他们的政治权利时，表现出超越所有卑鄙和唯利是图动机的品质。可以引用皮特先生击败联合政府的普选，以及 1831 年确保改革法案通过的选举作为这种情况的例子。

A tendency to encourage corruption, and especially that kind of corruption which consists in the misuse of patronage, must however be regarded as inherent in the system of Parliamentary Government. Nor can it be denied that this system of Government, even when most purely administered, is unfavourable to the selection of men for the subaltern employments in the public service with a single view to their fitness. Every Government which depends for its existence upon the support of a party, must neces-
然而，鼓励腐败的倾向，尤其是那种滥用恩惠的腐败，必须被视为议会政府制度固有的特征。即使在最纯粹的管理下，这种政府制度也不能否认对公共服务中下级职位的选拔不利于单纯考虑其适合性。每一个依赖于政党支持而存在的政府，必然要
sarily be influenced more or less by considerations of party interest, in making its appointments, and cannot therefore enjoy the same facilities as Governments of another character for bringing only the fittest persons into the service of the State.
在进行任命时，必然会或多或少受到党派利益的考虑影响，因此无法享有与其他性质的政府相同的便利，以便将最合适的人选引入国家服务。

The practice of giving the patronage of the State chiefly to the party in power, has also a tendency to increase the bitterness of party contests, and to excite a spirit of faction in the Nation. This must be admitted to be a serious drawback from the advantages of Parliamentary Government; and it is an evil which springs so directly from the same sources as the advantages of the system, as hardly to admit of being separated from them.
将国家的赞助主要给予执政党，往往会加剧党派竞争的激烈程度，并在国家中激发派系精神。这必须被承认是议会政府优势的一个严重缺陷；而且这是一个直接源于与该制度优势相同的根源的恶果，几乎无法与它们分开。

In the above remarks, I have adverted to the exercise of patronage only so far as it relates to subordinate offices in the public service; I have already* endeavoured to show that the manner in which the distribution of the highest is provided for, under the system of Parliamentary Government, possesses great advantages. But it would be a mistake to suppose that its rules upon this subject do not, in some respects, lead to inconvenience. The difficulties arising from party connections, and the necessity of conferring these offices on men who belong to the same party and can act together, must generally prevent them
在上述评论中，我提到了赞助的行使，仅限于与公共服务中的下级职位相关的部分；我已经努力表明，在议会政府制度下，最高职位的分配方式具有很大的优势。但认为这一主题的规则在某些方面不会导致不便是一个错误。由于党派关系所产生的困难，以及将这些职位授予属于同一党派并能够共同工作的人的必要性，通常会阻止他们。

from being all held, at any one time, by those most fit for them. A general change of Administration, even when most decidedly for the better on the whole, usually involves the transfer of some offices to worse hands; and the State has often lost services which could ill be spared in some department, because the person by whom it was well managed belonged to a Cabinet, of which the members, collectively, failed to satisfy Parliament and the Country. This is an inconvenience which obviously belongs to party government by its very nature ; but the difficulty goes further. Even within the ranks of the same party, it has occasionally happened, that an important department cannot be entrusted to the person who, from his knowledge and experience, is the fittest to conduct it, because he does not agree in opinion, upon matters entirely unconnected with the business of that department, with those who would be his colleagues if he accepted office. Thus, the man most capable of carrying on the business of the Exchequer, or of the Admiralty, might be excluded from either of these departments, because he differed from the Prime Minister, or other Members of the Government, upon Church questions, or questions of foreign policy.
由于那些最适合的人无法在任何一个时间内全部掌握权力。即使总体上是明显更好的行政管理的普遍变更，通常也会涉及将一些职位转移到更差的手中；而国家在某些部门常常失去了难以弥补的服务，因为管理得当的人属于一个内阁，而该内阁的成员集体未能让议会和国家满意。这显然是党派政府本质上固有的不便；但困难更进一步。即使在同一党的内部，有时也会发生一个重要部门无法委托给那个因其知识和经验而最适合管理它的人，因为他在与该部门业务完全无关的事务上与如果他接受职务的同事们意见不合。 因此，最有能力继续财政部或海军部工作的那个人，可能会因为在教会问题或外交政策问题上与首相或其他政府成员意见不合而被排除在这两个部门之外。

This has been regarded by some persons* as so serious an evil, that they have proposed to attempt its
这被一些人视为如此严重的恶行，以至于他们提议尝试解决它

removal by a change of the rule which makes all the Members of the Cabinet answerable for the measures adopted in every department of the Government. Instead of this, it has been suggested that each Minister should only be held responsible for his own acts; by which arrangenent, it has been argued, that far greater facilities than now exist would be afforded for obtaining the services of the ablest men in every branch of the Administration, with the further advantage of relieving those who conduct.the great departments of the State from being embarrassed by the necessity of obtaining the assent to their measures of colleagues who must be less perfectly acquainted than themselves with the matters to which they relate. It is urged, that the affairs of this country are now so complicated and diversified, that it would be difficult to find even two men entertaining the same views upon them in all points, and that it is absurd to suppose that such an agreement is possible among the larger number of persons composing a Cabinet. Besides its increasing the difficulty of filling the high offices of the Government in the best manner, the practice of making all the Members of the Cabinet jointly responsible for each other’s acts, must therefore, it is said, have the effect of compelling them to profess a concurrence of opinion with each other which cannot really exist, and must at the same time expose each Minister to be thwarted, in
通过改变规则来解除所有内阁成员对政府各部门所采取措施的责任。相反，有人建议每位部长只应对自己的行为负责；通过这种安排，有人认为将提供比现在更大的便利，以便在行政的每个领域获得最优秀人才的服务，并进一步减轻那些负责国家重大部门的人的负担，因为他们不必因获得同事的同意而感到困扰，而这些同事对相关事务的了解可能不如他们自己。有人认为，这个国家的事务现在如此复杂和多样化，以至于即使找到两个在所有方面持有相同观点的人也很困难，并且认为在组成内阁的更多人之间达成这样的共识是荒谬的。除了增加以最佳方式填补政府高层职位的难度外，要求内阁所有成员对彼此的行为共同负责的做法，必须会迫使他们表面上表现出彼此之间的意见一致，而这种一致实际上并不存在，同时也必然使每位部长面临被阻挠的风险
conducting his own department, by the conflicting views of his colleagues.
由于同事们的意见不合，他在管理自己的部门。

No doubt this is a plausible objection to the system of Parliamentary Government, and one which is by no means entirely without foundation. Under this system, as it now exists amongst us, it is true that able men, who might each manage his own department under an absolute Sovereign, cannot always combine to carry on together a Government, for all the acts of which they must be jointly responsible to Parliament; and that, when they do so, they must be prepared to make considerable concessions of their individual opinions to those of their colleagues, without avowing the difference in public. But the inconvenience arising from this cause is not found in practice to be so serious as might have been anticipated. A general concurrence of opinion among the Members of a Cabinet, as to the main objects to which the measures of the Government are to be directed, usually leads them to agree on the means by which these ends are to be pursued, so far as is necessary to enable them to act together. And, so long as no insurmountable differences arise on questions of importance to the welfare of the Nation, all those who have the honour of serving the Crown feel it to be their duty to waive some of their individual opinions, for the sake of ren-
毫无疑问，这是对议会政府制度一个合理的反对意见，而且这个意见并非完全没有基础。在这种制度下，正如它在我们之间现在存在的那样，确实有能力的人，可能在绝对主权者的统治下各自管理自己的部门，但并不总能联合起来共同进行一个政府，因为他们必须对议会共同负责所有的行为；而且，当他们这样做时，他们必须准备好在不公开承认分歧的情况下，做出相当大的让步，接受同事的意见。但是，由此产生的不便在实践中并没有被发现是如此严重，正如人们可能预期的那样。内阁成员在政府措施应指向的主要目标上通常达成普遍共识，这通常使他们在追求这些目标的手段上达成一致，以便能够共同行动。并且，只要在关乎国家福祉的重要问题上没有不可逾越的分歧，所有有幸为王室服务的人都觉得有责任为了国家的利益放弃一些个人意见
dering it possible for the Government to be carried on.
使政府能够继续运作。

Nor ought the common responsibility of the whole Cabinet, for the measures taken by the several Ministers in their own departments, to interfere injuriously with the vigour and despatch with which these departments are administered. It is only so far as regards the general line of policy pursued in each department, and as to important measures, that every Minister is to be considered liable to blame for what has been wrongly done by another. The amount of business to be transacted in the public offices of this Country is so great, that it is impossible its details should be submitted to the Cabinet; and it is clear that the Members of the Cabinet cannot be regarded as really answerable for measures taken without their concurrence, though it is very properly held that they are bound to support what has been done by a colleague, unless, on becoming aware of it, they have marked their disapproval by withdrawing from the Government. Among honourable men this can lead to no difficulty, since a Minister entitled to that character would never think of taking, without the knowledge of his colleagues, steps which he thinks they would disapprove; while they, on the other hand, feel that, in considering any question brought before them, much deference is due to the opinion of the
整个内阁对各部长在其各自部门采取的措施的共同责任，不应妨碍这些部门的有效和迅速管理。只有在涉及每个部门所追求的总体政策方向以及重要措施时，每位部长才应被视为对其他人错误所做的事情负有责任。这个国家公共办公室需要处理的事务量非常庞大，以至于不可能将其细节提交给内阁；而且显然，内阁成员不能被视为对未经他们同意而采取的措施真正负责，尽管很恰当地认为，他们有责任支持同事所做的事情，除非在得知此事后，他们通过退出政府来表示不满。在尊贵的人中，这不会导致任何困难，因为一位有资格担任该职务的部长绝不会在不知道同事的情况下采取他认为他们会反对的措施；而另一方面，他们在考虑任何提交给他们的问题时，认为应对意见给予很大的尊重

Head of the Government, and to that of the Chief of the department to which it relates.
政府首脑，以及与之相关的部门首席。

It is right, or rather it is absolutely necessary, that all the Members of a Ministry should be guided by this feeling, because, unless the measures adopted in any of the principal branches of the public service are allowed to take their main direction and colour from a single mind, they must necessarily become marked with that character of feebleness and uncertainty always attaching to any important course of action, the successive steps of which are decided upon by several persons entertaining views not perfectly identical. So long therefore as there is no such difference upon great questions of policy, as to make it necessary that the Members of a Cabinet should cease to act together, they best discharge their public duty by generally acquiescing in what may be recommended by each Minister in his own department, after he has fully heard the opinions of his colleagues. Every Minister presiding over a great department, ought to derive much assistance from the advice of his colleagues, and his own views must often be modified by theirs; and yet it ought seldom to happen, that the difficulty of obtaining their assent should prevent him from following the final dictates of his own judgment, when he has a decided opinion on any important question he may bring before the Cabinet.
这是正确的，或者说这是绝对必要的，所有内阁成员都应该受到这种感觉的指导，因为，除非在公共服务的任何主要领域采取的措施允许从一个单一的思想中获得主要方向和色彩，否则它们必然会带有那种软弱和不确定的特征，这种特征总是与任何重要的行动过程相关联，而这些行动的连续步骤是由几个持有不完全相同观点的人决定的。因此，只要在重大政策问题上没有这样的分歧，使得内阁成员必须停止共同行动，他们就最好通过普遍同意每位部长在自己部门中可能提出的建议来履行他们的公共职责，前提是他已经充分听取了同事们的意见。 每位主持大部门的部长都应该从同事的建议中获得很多帮助，他自己的观点也常常需要根据他们的意见进行调整；然而，获得他们的同意的困难不应常常阻止他在对任何重要问题有明确意见时，遵循自己最终的判断。

Injury to the public service is most apt to arise from the common responsibility of the Members of the Cabinet, when its Chief, or the Minister entrusted with any department, throws himself too much on the assistance of others, and does not recommend with sufficient decision what measures should be taken in pursuance of the policy he is charged with directing. The deliberations of a Cabinet seldom lead to a satisfactory result, when any question of difficulty is brought under its consideration by a Minister who is not prepared to lay before his colleagues some distinct opinion of his own. The true cause of questions being submitted to the Cabinet in this unsatisfactory manner, is sometimes to be found in the fact, that a difference of opinion on some great principle, or on some vital point of policy, really exists among the Members of an Administration, though it is concealed for a time by a reluctance on both sides to come to a clear understanding on the subject. In such cases both parties are generally wrong in seeking to avoid, or to defer, a separation which ought, for the public good, to take place at once. Of two lines of policy, it often happens that either might succeed if steadily pursued; but failure is certain, when the Members of an Administration, knowing that they could not agree, shrink from coming to a clear decision to adopt either, and are content to determine separately each step that has
对公共服务的伤害最容易出现在内阁成员的共同责任中，当内阁首脑或负责某个部门的部长过于依赖他人的帮助，而没有足够果断地推荐应采取的措施以执行他所负责的政策时。内阁的审议在任何困难问题由一位未准备向同事提出自己明确意见的部长提出时，往往不会导致令人满意的结果。以这种不令人满意的方式提交给内阁的问题的真正原因，有时可以在于，内阁成员之间确实存在对某个重大原则或某个重要政策点的意见分歧，尽管双方出于不愿意在该问题上达成明确共识而暂时掩盖了这一点。在这种情况下，双方通常都是错误的，试图避免或推迟应立即为公共利益而进行的分离。在两条政策中，通常会发生其中任何一条如果坚持不懈地追求都可能成功；但当一个政府的成员知道他们无法达成一致，退缩于明确决定采用其中任何一条，并满足于分别决定每一步时，失败是必然的
to be taken, so long as it is possible to stave off a rupture by abstaining from any decided measure on the one side or on the other.
只要能够通过在一方或另一方不采取任何明确措施来避免破裂，就可以采取。

Upon the whole, I do not believe the inconvenience that results from holding all the Members of an Administration jointly answerable for its acts, to be so serious as is sometimes supposed; but were it greater than it really is, the existing practice could not be altered without altering the whole character of our Government. Party connection must cease to be the mainspring of its movements, if every Member of the Administration could no longer depend upon the support of his colleagues, and if they did not all continue to act in strict union. But further ; those who have proposed that each Minister should be held responsible only for his own acts, seem to forget that the various departments of the Administration are but parts of a single machine, all the operations of which are directed to one commion end, and that the various branches of the Government have a close connection and mutual dependence on each other. Questions of foreign policy, for instance, have constantly to be considered with reference to those affecting our domestic and colonial interests; and in the administration of the Army and Navy, the nature of the demands upon these services, which are to be anticipated from the state of affairs both at home and
总体而言，我不认为将所有行政成员共同对其行为负责所带来的不便，如人们有时所认为的那样，严重到不可接受的地步；但即使它比实际情况更严重，现行做法也无法改变，而不改变我们政府的整体性质。如果每位行政成员不能再依赖同事的支持，并且他们不能继续严格团结地行动，那么党派关系就必须不再是其运作的主要动力。此外，那些提议每位部长只对自己的行为负责的人似乎忘记了，行政的各个部门只是一个整体机器的部分，其所有操作都指向一个共同的目标，而政府的各个分支之间有着紧密的联系和相互依赖。例如，外交政策的问题必须不断考虑与影响我们国内和殖民利益相关的因素；在陆军和海军的管理中，必须预见到来自国内和国际形势对这些服务的需求性质
abroad, as well as the extent to which it is proper to draw upon the resources of the Nation, must be taken into account in coming to every important decision. Instead of loosening the bonds that unite the different branches of the Government, it would rather be desirable to draw them tighter. The fault of being too departmental has been justly attributed to some Administrations, of which the Chiefs have not held the reins with firmness, and have failed to exercise the authority which properly belongs to their office, in order to secure that harmonious co-operation among the different departments on which the efficiency of the Government so much depends. Perhaps it would be for the advantage of the public service, if the hands of the Prine Minister were strengthened, and if a larger measure of authority were entrusted to him, in order to render this less likely to recur in future.
在做出每一个重要决定时，必须考虑到国外的情况以及动用国家资源的适当程度。与其放松不同政府部门之间的联系，不如更紧密地将它们结合在一起。某些政府的首脑未能坚定地掌握权力，并未能行使其职务所应有的权威，从而导致了过于部门化的错误，这种错误是有道理的，因为政府的效率在很大程度上依赖于不同部门之间的和谐合作。也许如果加强首相的权力，并赋予他更大的权威，以减少未来再次发生这种情况的可能性，将对公共服务有利。

To return, however, to the point more immediately under consideration, I would remark, that there is no form of Government in which evil influences of some kind are not brought to bear upon the choice of those who are to serve the State, either in high or in subordinate offices. These influences are different in each different kind of Government; and while I admit their existence and their injurious effects under our own, I believe that no other can be shown to have suffered less from them in some of their many various shapes.
然而，回到更直接考虑的问题，我想指出，在任何形式的政府中，都存在某种邪恶影响对那些将为国家服务的人（无论是高级还是低级职务）的选择产生影响。这些影响在不同类型的政府中各不相同；虽然我承认它们在我们自己的政府下的存在及其有害影响，但我相信没有其他政府能证明在其众多不同形式中受到的影响更少。

I have stated in the last Chapter, that one of the merits of this kind of government is, its tendency to make those contests for power which are inevitable amongst men, take the form of debates upon questions of policy, and upon the measures affecting the interest of the Nation which are brought before Parliament. These debates are thus rendered a valuable instrument for enlightening the public mind; but with this advantage is unfortunately united the great evil, that the same circumstance leads too often to questions deeply affecting the welfare of the People being decided, not on their merits, but according to their bearing on the interests of political parties. Measures are apt to be supported, or opposed, not because they are good or bad in themselves, but because they have been brought forward by this or that party; and nothing is more common than for a popular cry to be got up in favour of some mischievous scheme, or against some useful proposal, merely for the purpose of overturning or giving strength to a Ministry. Many examples are to be found in our history, of bad measures having been carried, and of good ones having been rejected or delayed, owing to this cause.
我在上一章中提到，这种政府形式的一个优点是，它倾向于使人们之间不可避免的权力争夺以对政策问题的辩论和影响国家利益的措施在议会中进行的形式出现。这些辩论因此成为启发公众思想的宝贵工具；但不幸的是，这一优势与一个重大弊端相结合，即同样的情况往往导致深刻影响人民福祉的问题的决定，不是基于其本身的优劣，而是根据其对政治党派利益的影响。措施往往被支持或反对，并不是因为它们本身是好是坏，而是因为它们是由这个或那个党提出的；而且，最常见的情况是，为了推翻或增强一个内阁，常常会出现支持某些有害计划或反对某些有益提案的民众呼声。在我们的历史中，有许多例子表明，由于这个原因，坏措施被通过，而好措施被拒绝或延迟。

So also there are drawbacks from the advantages which I have stated in the last Chapter, to arise from the practice of discussing questions of foreign policy
因此，我在上一章中提到的优势也存在缺点，这些缺点源于讨论外交政策问题的做法
in Parliament. The debates upon such subjects, instead of serving, as they ought, to enlighten the Na tion with respect to its duties and its true interests in its relations with foreign countries, have sometimes become the means of encouraging the most pernicious errors. Opponents of the Government, instead of condemning its errors, have occasionally been guilty of attacking it for having done right, or for not having gone far enough in a wrong policy, and in asserting unreasonable pretensions against other Powers. Public men have not always resisted the temptation of vying with each other in courting the favour of the People, by flattering their passions and prejudices, instead of enforcing the principles of justice and a high standard of political morality.
在议会中。关于这些主题的辩论，应该是为了启发国家对其在与外国关系中的职责和真正利益的认识，但有时却成为了鼓励最有害错误的手段。政府的反对者，有时并没有谴责其错误，而是攻击其做对了事情，或者在错误政策上没有走得足够远，并对其他大国提出不合理的要求。公众人物并不总是抵制与他人争相迎合人民的诱惑，而是迎合他们的激情和偏见，而不是坚持正义原则和高标准的政治道德。

An impartial consideration of the nature and effects of Parliamentary Government, leads to a recognition of the evils I have pointed out in this Chapter, as detracting in no small degree from its merits. At the same time, in admitting these faults, it is to be observed that, for the most part; they belong to it in common with every other form of free Government, since they arise mainly from the tendency of the People to misuse the power placed in their hands. And, granting that there is this tendency in all free Governments, we must not forget, either that power, wherever it is placed, must always be liable to abuse ;
对议会政府的性质和影响进行公正的考虑，会使人认识到我在本章中指出的缺陷，这些缺陷在很大程度上削弱了其优点。同时，在承认这些缺陷时，需要注意的是，大多数情况下，它们与其他所有形式的自由政府共同存在，因为这些缺陷主要源于人民滥用赋予他们的权力的倾向。而且，承认所有自由政府中存在这种倾向，我们也不能忘记，无论权力被放置在哪里，总是可能被滥用；
and that flatterers, for their own purposes, will try to mislead those to whom it is entrusted; or that a long experience has proved, that the abuses prevailing in despotic Governments have been far greater, and far more injurious to the welfare of the People, than those to which political liberty gives rise under a wellregulated Constitution. If we compare what has been the condition of the People under free and under arbitrary Governments, in all ages of the world, we can have no hesitation, in spite of their faults, in giving a preference to the former; and among these, we may assert with confidence, that there is none in which evil has been found to be mixed up with good in a smaller proportion than in our own system of Parliamentary Government.
而且，谄媚者出于自身目的，会试图误导那些被托付的人；或者说，长期的经验已经证明，专制政府中普遍存在的滥用现象，对人民福祉的伤害远远大于政治自由在良好规制的宪法下所引发的那些问题。如果我们比较在自由政府和专制政府下，人民在各个时代的状况，尽管它们有缺陷，我们毫不犹豫地会更倾向于前者；在这些政府中，我们可以自信地断言，没有一个政府的恶与善的比例比我们自己的议会政府系统更小。