ELI LILLY IN INDIA: RETHINKING THE JOINT VENTURE STRATEGY 印度的礼来公司：重新思考合资企业战略
Nikhil Celly prepared this case under the supervision of Professors Charles Dhanaraj and Paul W. Beamish solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. Nikhil Celly 在 Charles Dhanaraj 教授和 Paul W. Beamish 教授的指导下编写了本案例，旨在为课堂讨论提供素材。作者无意说明有效或无效的管理方法。为保密起见，作者可能对某些姓名和其他身份信息进行了伪装。
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In August 2001, Dr. Lorenzo Tallarigo, president of Intercontinental Operations, Eli Lilly and Company (Lilly), a leading pharmaceutical firm based in the United States, was getting ready for a meeting in New York with D. S. Brar, chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) of Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited (Ranbaxy), India. Lilly and Ranbaxy had started a joint venture (JV) in India, Eli Lilly-Ranbaxy Private Limited (ELR), that was incorporated in March 1993. The JV had steadily grown to a full-fledged organization employing more than 500 people in 2001. However, in recent months Lilly was re-evaluating the directions for the JV, with Ranbaxy signaling an intention to sell its stake. Tallarigo was scheduled to meet with Brar to decide on the next steps. 2001 年 8 月，总部设在美国的领先制药公司礼来公司（礼来）洲际业务总裁 Lorenzo Tallarigo 博士正准备在纽约与印度 Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited（Ranbaxy）董事长兼首席执行官 D. S. Brar 会晤。礼来和兰佰利于 1993 年 3 月在印度成立了一家合资企业，即礼来-兰佰利私人有限公司（ELR）。2001 年，该合资公司稳步发展成为一家拥有 500 多名员工的成熟企业。然而，最近几个月，礼来公司正在重新评估合资公司的发展方向，Ranbaxy 公司表示有意出售其股份。Tallarigo 计划与 Brar 会晤，以决定下一步的行动。
THE GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE 1990S 20 世纪 90 年代的全球制药业
The pharmaceutical industry had come about through both forward integration from the manufacture of organic chemicals and a backward integration from druggist-supply houses. The industry's rapid growth was aided by increasing worldwide incomes and a universal demand for better health care; however, most of the world market for pharmaceuticals was concentrated in North America, Europe and Japan. Typically, the largest four firms claimed 20 per cent of sales, the top 20 firms claimed 50 to 60 per cent, and the 50 largest companies accounted for 65 to 75 per cent of sales (see Exhibit 1). Drug discovery was an expensive process, with leading firms spending more than 20 per cent of their sales on research and development (R&D). Developing a drug, from discovery to launch in a major market, took 10 to 12 years and typically cost US$500 million to US$800 million (in 1992). Bulk production of active ingredients was the norm, along with the ability to decentralize manufacturing and packaging to adapt to particular market needs. Marketing was usually equally targeted to physicians and the paying customers. Increasingly, government agencies, such as Medicare, and health management organizations (HMOs) in the United States, were gaining influence in the buying processes. In most countries, all activities related to drug research and manufacturing were strictly controlled by government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States, the Committee on Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) in Europe, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) in Japan. 制药业是通过有机化学品生产的前向一体化和药品供应商的后向一体化发展起来的。该行业的快速发展得益于全球收入的增长和人们对更好的医疗保健的普遍需求；然而，世界医药市场的大部分集中在北美、欧洲和日本。通常情况下，最大的四家公司占销售额的 20%，前 20 家公司占 50%至 60%，最大的 50 家公司占销售额的 65%至 75%（见图 1）。药物研发是一个昂贵的过程，领先企业的研发支出占销售额的 20% 以上。开发一种药物，从发现到在主要市场上市，需要 10 到 12 年的时间，通常花费 5 到 8 亿美元（1992 年）。活性成分的批量生产是常态，同时还可以分散生产和包装，以适应特定的市场需求。市场营销通常同样针对医生和付费客户。越来越多的政府机构，如美国的医疗保险（Medicare）和健康管理组织（HMOs），在购买过程中发挥着越来越大的影响力。在大多数国家，所有与药品研究和生产相关的活动都受到政府机构的严格控制，如美国的食品药品管理局（FDA）、欧洲的中成药委员会（CPMP）和日本的厚生省（MHW）。
Patents were the essential means by which a firm protected its proprietary knowledge. The safety provided by the patents allowed firms to price their products appropriately in order to accumulate funds for future research. The basic reason to patent a new drug was to guarantee the exclusive legal right to profit from its innovation for a certain number of years, typically 20 years for a product patent. There was usually a time lag of about eight to 10 years from the time the patent was obtained and the time of regulatory approval to first launch in the United States or Europe. Time lags for emerging markets and in Japan were longer. The "product patent" covered the chemical substance itself, while a "process patent" covered the method of processing or manufacture. Both patents guaranteed the inventor a 20-year monopoly on the innovation, but the process patent offered much less protection, since it was fairly easy to modify a chemical process. It was also very difficult to legally prove that a process patent had been created to manufacture a product identical to that of a competitor. Most countries relied solely on process patents until the mid-1950s, although many countries had since recognized the product patent in law. While companies used the global market to amortize the huge investments required to produce a new drug, they were hesitant to invest in countries where the intellectual property regime was weak. 专利是企业保护其专有知识的重要手段。专利提供的安全性使企业能够对其产品进行适当定价，从而为未来的研究积累资金。为新药申请专利的根本原因是为了保证在一定年限内（产品专利一般为 20 年）从创新中获利的专有合法权利。从获得专利到获得监管部门批准，再到首次在美国或欧洲上市，通常会有 8 到 10 年的时间差。新兴市场和日本的时滞更长。产品专利 "涵盖化学物质本身，而 "工艺专利 "涵盖加工或制造方法。两种专利都保证发明者对创新享有 20 年的垄断权，但工艺专利提供的保护要少得多，因为修改化学工艺相当容易。此外，也很难从法律上证明工艺专利是为了制造与竞争对手相同的产品。直到 20 世纪 50 年代中期，尽管许多国家在法律上承认了产品专利，但大多数国家仍然只依赖于工艺专利。虽然公司利用全球市场来摊销生产新药所需的巨额投资，但他们对在知识产权制度薄弱的国家投资却犹豫不决。
As health care costs soared in the 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry in developed countries began coming under increased scrutiny. Although patent protection was strong in developed countries, there were various types of price controls. Prices for the same drugs varied between the United States and Canada by a factor of 1.2 to 2.5. Parallel trade or trade by independent firms taking advantage of such differentials represented a serious threat to pharmaceutical suppliers, especially in Europe. Also, the rise of generics, unbranded drugs of comparable efficacy in treating the disease but available at a fraction of the cost of the branded drugs, were challenging the pricing power of the pharmaceutical companies. Manufacturers of generic drugs had no expense for drug research and development of new compounds and only had limited budgets for popularizing the compound with the medical community. The generic companies made their money by copying what other pharmaceutical companies discovered, developed and created a market for. Health management organizations (HMOs) were growing and consolidating their drug purchases. In the United States, the administration under President Clinton, which took office in 1992, investigated the possibility of a comprehensive health plan, which, among other things, would have allowed an increased use of generics and laid down some form of regulatory pressure on pharmaceutical profits. 20 世纪 90 年代，随着医疗费用的飙升，发达国家的制药业开始受到越来越多的关注。虽然发达国家的专利保护力度很大，但也有各种类型的价格控制。美国和加拿大相同药品的价格相差 1.2 到 2.5 倍。 利用这种差异进行的平行贸易或独立公司的贸易对药品供应商构成了严重威胁，尤其是在欧洲。此外，非专利药的兴起也对制药公司的定价权提出了挑战。非专利药是指疗效相当的非品牌药品，其价格仅为品牌药品的一小部分。非专利药生产商没有研发新化合物的费用，只有有限的预算向医学界推广化合物。仿制药公司通过复制其他制药公司发现、开发并创造市场的产品来赚钱。健康管理组织（HMOs）不断发展壮大，并对药品采购进行整合。在美国，1992 年上任的克林顿总统领导的政府曾研究过制定一项综合医疗计划的可能性，该计划除其他事项外，将允许更多使用非专利药，并对制药利润施加某种形式的监管压力。
THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE 1990S 九十年代的印度制药业
Developing countries, such as India, although large by population, were characterized by low per capita gross domestic product (GDP). Typically, healthcare expenditures accounted for a very small share of GDP, and health insurance was not commonly available. The 1990 figures for per capita annual expenditure on drugs in India were estimated at US$3, compared to US$412 in Japan, US$222 in Germany and US$191 in the United Kingdom. Governments and large corporations extended health coverage, including prescription drug coverage, to their workers. 印度等发展中国家虽然人口众多，但人均国内生产总值（GDP）较低。通常情况下，医疗保健支出在国内生产总值中所占份额很小，而且医疗保险并不普遍。1990 年印度的人均年度药品支出估计为 3 美元，而日本为 412 美元，德国为 222 美元，英国为 191 美元。 政府和大公司向其员工提供医疗保险，包括处方药保险。
In the years before and following India's independence in 1947, the country had no indigenous capability to produce pharmaceuticals, and was dependent on imports. The Patent and Designs Act of 1911, an extension of the British colonial rule, enforced adherence to the international patent law, and gave rise to a number of multinational firms' subsidiaries in India, that wanted to import drugs from their respective countries of origin. Post-independence, the first public sector drug company, Hindustan Antibiotics 1947 年印度独立前后，印度没有本土生产药品的能力，只能依赖进口。1911 年颁布的《专利和工业品外观设计法》是英国殖民统治的延伸，它强制要求印度遵守国际专利法，并催生了许多跨国公司在印度的子公司，它们希望从各自的原产国进口药品。印度独立后，第一家公共部门药品公司--印度斯坦抗生素公司（Hindustan Antibiotics
Estimates of industry average wholesale price levels in Europe (with Spanish levels indexed at 100 in 1989) were: Spain 100; Portugal 107; France 113; Italy 118; Belgium 131: United Kingdom 201; The Netherlands 229; West Germany 251. Source: T. Malnight, Globalization of an Ethnocentric Firm: An Evolutionary Perspective, Strategic Management Journal, 1995, Vol. 16 p. 128. 欧洲工业平均批发价格水平估计值（1989 年西班牙的水平指数为 100）为：西班牙 100；葡萄牙 107；法国 113；意大利 118；比利时 131；英国 201；荷兰 229；西德 251：西班牙 100；葡萄牙 107；法国 113；意大利 118；比利时 131；英国 201；荷兰 229；西德 251。资料来源：T：资料来源：T. Malnight, Globalization of an Ethnocentric Firm：战略管理杂志》，1995 年，第 16 卷，第 128 页。
Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India Report. 印度药品生产商组织报告。
Limited (HAL), was established in 1954 with the help of the World Health Organization, and Indian Drugs and Pharmaceutical Limited (IDPL) was established in 1961 with the help of the then Soviet Union. 在世界卫生组织的帮助下，印度药品和制药有限公司（HAL）于 1954 年成立；在当时苏联的帮助下，印度药品和制药有限公司（IDPL）于 1961 年成立。
The 1970s saw several changes that would dramatically change the intellectual property regime and give rise to the emergence of local manufacturing companies. Two such key changes were the passage of the Patents Act 1970 (effective April 1972) and the Drug Price Control Order (DPCO). The Patents Act, in essence abolished the product patents for all pharmaceutical and agricultural products, and permitted process patents for five to seven years. The DPCO instituted price controls, by which a government body stipulated prices for all drugs. Subsequently, this list was revised in 1987 to 142 drugs (which accounted for 72 per cent of the turnover of the industry). Indian drug prices were estimated to be five per cent to 20 per cent of the U.S. prices and among the lowest in the world. The DPCO also limited profits pharmaceutical companies could earn to approximately six per cent of sales turnover. Also, the postmanufacturing expenses were limited to 100 per cent of the production costs. At the World Health Assembly in 1982, Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India, aptly captured the national sentiment on the issue in an often-quoted statement: 20 世纪 70 年代发生了几项变革，这些变革极大地改变了知识产权制度，并催生了本地制造公司的崛起。其中两项重要变革是 1970 年《专利法》（1972 年 4 月生效）和《药品价格管制令》（DPCO）的通过。专利法》实质上废除了所有药品和农产品的产品专利，并允许 5 至 7 年的工艺专利。药品价格管制令》实行价格管制，由政府机构规定所有药品的价格。随后，该清单于 1987 年修订为 142 种药品（占该行业营业额的 72%）。据估计，印度药品价格为美国价格的 5%至 20%，属于世界最低之列。 DPCO 还将制药公司的利润限制在销售额的 6%左右。此外，生产后的费用也被限制在生产成本的 100%。在 1982 年的世界卫生大会上，时任印度总理的英迪拉-甘地（Indira Gandhi）在一份经常被引用的声明中恰当地表达了印度国民对这一问题的看法：
The idea of a better-ordered world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents and there will be no profiteering from life and death. 一个秩序更好的世界的理念是，在这个世界里，医学发现将不受专利限制，也不会从生死中牟取暴利。
With the institution of both the DPCO and the 1970 Patent Act, drugs became available more cheaply, and local firms were encouraged to make copies of drugs by developing their own processes, leading to bulk drug production. The profitability was sharply reduced for multinational companies, many of which began opting out of the Indian market due to the disadvantages they faced from the local competition. Market share of multinational companies dropped from 80 per cent in 1970 to 35 per cent in the mid-1990s as those companies exited the market due to the lack of patent protection in India. 随着《药品生产管制法》和 1970 年《专利法》的颁布，药品的价格变得更加低廉，同时也鼓励当地企业通过开发自己的工艺来仿制药品，从而实现药品的批量生产。跨国公司的盈利能力急剧下降，其中许多公司开始选择退出印度市场，因为它们在当地竞争中处于不利地位。由于印度缺乏专利保护，跨国公司的市场份额从 1970 年的 80%下降到 1990 年代中期的 35%。
In November 1984, there were changes in the government leadership following Gandhi's assassination. The dawn of the 1990s saw India initiating economic reform and embracing globalization. Under the leadership of Dr. Manmohan Singh, then finance minister, the government began the process of liberalization and moving the economy away from import substitution to an export-driven economy. Foreign direct investment was encouraged by increasing the maximum limit of foreign ownership to 51 per cent (from 40 per cent) in the drugs and pharmaceutical industry (see Exhibit 2). It was in this environment that Eli Lilly was considering getting involved. 1984 年 11 月，甘地遇刺身亡，政府领导层发生变动。20 世纪 90 年代初，印度开始进行经济改革并拥抱全球化。在时任财政部长的曼莫汉-辛格博士的领导下，政府开始了自由化进程，并将经济从进口替代转向出口驱动型经济。政府鼓励外商直接投资，将药品和制药行业的外资持股比例上限从 40% 提高到 51%（见图 2）。礼来公司正是在这种环境下考虑参与其中的。
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY 礼来公司
Colonel Eli Lilly founded Eli Lilly and Company in 1876. The company would become one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the United States from the early 1940s until 1985, but it began with just $1,400 and four employees, including Lilly's 14-year-old son. This was accomplished with a company philosophy grounded in a commitment to scientific and managerial excellence. Over the years, Eli Lilly discovered, developed, manufactured and sold a broad line of human health and agricultural products. Research and development was crucial to Lilly's long-term success. 礼来上校于 1876 年创立了礼来公司。从 20 世纪 40 年代初到 1985 年，该公司已成为美国最大的制药公司之一，但起步时仅有 1400 美元和四名员工，其中包括礼来 14 岁的儿子。而这一切都得益于公司对科学和卓越管理的承诺。多年来，礼来发现、开发、生产和销售了一系列人类健康和农业产品。研发是礼来长期成功的关键。
Before 1950, most OUS (a company term for "Outside the United States") activities were export focused. Beginning in the 1950s, Lilly undertook systematic expansion of its OUS activities, setting up several affiliates overseas. In the mid-1980s, under the leadership of then chairman Dick Wood, Lilly began a significant move toward global markets. A separate division within the company, Eli Lilly International Corporation, with responsibility for worldwide marketing of all its products, took an active role in expanding the OUS operations. By 1992, Lilly's products were manufactured and distributed through 25 countries and sold in more than 130 countries. The company had emerged as a world leader in oral and injectable antibiotics and in supplying insulin and related diabetic care products. In 1992, Lilly International was headed by Sidney Taurel, an MBA from Columbia University with work experience in South America and Europe, and Gerhard Mayr, an MBA from Stanford with extensive experience in Europe. Mayr wanted to expand Lilly's operations in Asia, where several countries, including India, were opening up their markets for foreign investment. Lilly also saw opportunities to use the world for clinical testing, which would enable it to move forward faster, as well as shape opinion with leaders in the medical field around the world; something that would help in Lilly's marketing stage. 1950 年以前，大多数 OUS（公司术语，意为 "美国以外"）活动都以出口为主。从 20 世纪 50 年代开始，礼来开始有计划地扩展其 OUS 活动，在海外设立了多家分支机构。20 世纪 80 年代中期，在时任董事长迪克-伍德的领导下，礼来开始大举进军全球市场。公司内部成立了一个独立的部门--礼来国际公司，负责公司所有产品的全球营销，在扩大海外业务方面发挥了积极作用。到 1992 年，礼来公司的产品已在 25 个国家生产和销售，并销往 130 多个国家。该公司已成为口服和注射抗生素以及胰岛素和相关糖尿病护理产品供应领域的世界领导者。1992 年，礼来国际由西德尼-陶雷尔（Sidney Taurel）和格哈德-梅尔（Gerhard Mayr）领导。西德尼-陶雷尔是哥伦比亚大学的 MBA，拥有在南美和欧洲的工作经验；格哈德-梅尔是斯坦福大学的 MBA，拥有在欧洲的丰富经验。梅尔希望扩大礼来在亚洲的业务，因为包括印度在内的一些国家正在向外资开放市场。此外，礼来还看到了利用全球进行临床试验的机会，这将使礼来能够更快地向前发展，并与全球医学领域的领导者形成共识；这将有助于礼来进入市场营销阶段。
RANBAXY LABORATORIES RANBYAX 实验室
Ranbaxy began in the 1960s as a family business, but with a visionary management grew rapidly to emerge as the leading domestic pharmaceutical firm in India. Under the leadership of Dr. Parvinder Singh, who held a doctoral degree from the University of Michigan, the firm evolved into a serious research-oriented firm. Singh, who joined Ranbaxy to assist his father in 1967, rose to become the joint managing director in 1977, managing director in 1982, and vice-chairman and managing director in 1987. Singh's visionary management, along with the operational leadership provided by Brar, who joined the firm in 1977, was instrumental in turning the family business into a global corporation. In the early 1990s, when almost the entire domestic pharmaceutical industry was opposing a tough patent regime, Ranbaxy was accepting it as given. Singh's argument was unique within the industry in India: Ranbaxy 在 20 世纪 60 年代以家族企业起家，但凭借富有远见的管理迅速成长为印度国内领先的制药公司。在拥有密歇根大学博士学位的帕文德-辛格（Parvinder Singh）博士的领导下，公司发展成为一家以研究为导向的严肃企业。辛格于 1967 年加入 Ranbaxy，协助父亲工作，1977 年升任联合总经理，1982 年升任总经理，1987 年升任副董事长兼总经理。辛格高瞻远瞩的管理，加上 1977 年加入公司的布拉尔提供的运营领导，为将家族企业打造成一家全球性公司发挥了重要作用。20 世纪 90 年代初，当几乎整个国内制药业都在反对严格的专利制度时，Ranbaxy 却认为这是理所当然的。辛格的观点在印度业界独树一帜：
The global marketplace calls for a single set of rules; you cannot have one for the Indian market and the other for the export market. Tomorrow's global battles will be won by product leaders, not operationally excellent companies. Tomorrow's leaders must be visionaries, whether they belong to the family or not. Our mission at Ranbaxy is to become a research-based international pharmaceutical company. 全球市场需要一套统一的规则；不能一个适用于印度市场，另一个适用于出口市场。明天的全球战役将由产品领导者而非运营出色的公司获胜。明天的领导者必须是有远见的人，无论他们是否属于家族。我们 Ranbaxy 的使命是成为一家以研究为基础的国际制药公司。
By the early 1990s, Ranbaxy grew to become India's largest manufacturer of bulk drugs and generic drugs, with a domestic market share of 15 per cent (see Exhibit 3). 到 20 世纪 90 年代初，Ranbaxy 已发展成为印度最大的大宗药品 和非专利药品制造商，国内市场份额达到 15%（见图 3）。
One of Ranbaxy's core competencies was its chemical synthesis capability, but the company had begun to outsource some bulk drugs in limited quantities. The company produced pharmaceuticals in four locations in India. The company's capital costs were typically 50 per cent to 75 per cent lower than those of comparable U.S. plants and were meant to serve foreign markets in addition to the Indian market. Foreign markets, especially those in more developed countries, often had stricter quality control requirements, and such a difference meant that the manufacturing practices required to compete in those markets appeared to be costlier from the perspective of less developed markets. Higher prices in other countries provided the impetus for Ranbaxy to pursue international markets; the company had a presence in 47 markets outside India, mainly through exports handled through an international division. Ranbaxy's R&D efforts began at the end of the 1970s; in 1979, the company still had only 12 scientists. As Ranbaxy entered the international market in the 1980s, R&D was responsible for registering its products in foreign markets, most of which was directed to process R&D; R&D expenditures ranged from two per cent to five per cent of the annual sales with future targets of seven per cent to eight per cent. Ranbaxy 的核心竞争力之一是其化学合成能力，但该公司已开始将一些大宗药物限量外包。公司在印度的四个地点生产药品。公司的资本成本通常比美国同类工厂低 50%至 75%，除印度市场外，还服务于国外市场。国外市场，尤其是较发达国家的市场，往往有更严格的质量控制要求，这种差异意味着，从欠发达市场的角度来看，在这些市场上竞争所需的生产实践似乎成本更高。其他国家较高的价格为 Ranbaxy 公司开拓国际市场提供了动力；该公司在印度以外的 47 个市场都有业务，主要是通过国际部处理出口业务。Ranbaxy 的研发工作始于 20 世纪 70 年代末；1979 年，公司仍只有 12 名科学家。20 世纪 80 年代，随着 Ranbaxy 进入国际市场，研发部门负责其产品在国外市场的注册，其中大部分用于工艺研发；研发支出占年销售额的 2%至 5%，未来目标为 7%至 8%。
THE LILLY RANBAXY JV 礼来-兰axy合资公司
Ranbaxy approached Lilly in 1992 to investigate the possibility of supplying certain active ingredients or sourcing of intermediate products to Lilly in order to provide low-cost sources of intermediate pharmaceutical ingredients. Lilly had had earlier relationships with manufacturers in India to produce human or animal insulin and then export the products to the Soviet Union using the Russia/India trade route, but those had never developed into on-the-ground relationships within the Indian market. Ranbaxy was the second largest exporter of all products in India and the second largest pharmaceutical company in India after Glaxo (a subsidiary of the U.K.-based firm). 1992 年，Ranbaxy 公司与礼来公司接触，调查向礼来公司供应某些活性成分或采购中间产品的可能性，以提供低成本的中间药物成分来源。礼来公司早先曾与印度的制造商有过合作关系，生产人或动物胰岛素，然后通过俄罗斯/印度贸易路线将产品出口到苏联，但这些合作关系从未发展成为印度市场上的实地合作关系。Ranbaxy 是印度所有产品的第二大出口商，也是印度仅次于葛兰素（总部设在英国的公司的子公司）的第二大制药公司。
Rajiv Gulati, at that time a general manager of business development and marketing controller at Ranbaxy, who was instrumental in developing the strategy for Ranbaxy, recalled: 拉吉夫-古拉蒂（Rajiv Gulati）回忆说，他当时是 Ranbaxy 公司的业务发展总经理兼营销总监，在制定 Ranbaxy 战略方面发挥了重要作用：
In the 1980s, many multinational pharmaceutical companies had a presence in India. Lilly did not. As a result of both the sourcing of intermediate products as well as the fact that Lilly was one of the only players not yet in India, we felt that we could use Ranbaxy's knowledge of the market to get our feet on the ground in India. Ranbaxy would supply certain products to the joint venture from its own portfolio that were currently being manufactured in India and then formulate and finish some of Lilly's products locally. The joint venture would buy the active ingredients and Lilly would have Ranbaxy finish the package and allow the joint venture to sell and distribute those products. 20 世纪 80 年代，许多跨国制药公司都在印度开展业务。礼来公司却没有。由于需要采购中间产品，而且礼来是唯一一家尚未进入印度市场的公司，我们认为可以利用兰必喜对印度市场的了解，在印度站稳脚跟。Ranbaxy 将向合资企业提供其目前在印度生产的产品组合中的某些产品，然后在当地配制和完成礼来公司的某些产品。合资企业将购买有效成分，礼来公司将让 Ranbaxy 完成包装，并允许合资企业销售和分销这些产品。
The first meeting was held at Lilly's corporate center in Indianapolis in late 1990. Present were Ranbaxy's senior executives, Dr. Singh, vice-chairman, and D.S. Brar, chief operating officer (COO), and Lilly's senior executives, including Gene Step and Richard Wood, the CEO of Lilly. Rickey Pate, a corporate attorney at Eli Lilly who was present at the meeting, recalled: 第一次会议于 1990 年底在礼来公司位于印第安纳波利斯的公司中心举行。出席会议的有 Ranbaxy 的高级管理人员、副董事长辛格博士和首席运营官（COO）D.S. Brar，以及礼来的高级管理人员，包括 Gene Step 和礼来首席执行官 Richard Wood。礼来公司的公司律师里基-佩特（Rickey Pate）出席了这次会议，他回忆道：
It was a very smooth meeting. We had a lot in common. We both believed in high ethical standards, in technology and innovation, as well as in the future of patented products in India. Ranbaxy executives emphasized their desire to be a responsible corporate citizen and expressed their concerns for their employees. It was quite obvious Ranbaxy would be a compatible partner in India. 这次会面非常顺利。我们有很多共同点。我们都相信高道德标准、技术和创新，以及印度专利产品的未来。Ranbaxy 的高管强调，他们希望成为负责任的企业公民，并表达了对员工的关心。很显然，Ranbaxy 将是我们在印度的合作伙伴。
Lilly decided to form the joint venture in India to focus on the marketing of Lilly's drugs there, and a formal JV agreement was signed in November 1992. The newly created JV was to have an authorized capital of Rs200 million (equivalent of US$7.1 million), and an initial subscribed equity capital of Rs84 million (US$3 million), with equal contribution from Lilly and Ranbaxy, leading to an equity ownership of 50 per cent each. The board of directors for the JV would comprise six directors, three from each company. A management committee was also created comprising two directors, one from each company, and Lilly retained the right to appoint the CEO who would be responsible for the day-to-day operations. The agreement also provided for transfer of shares, in the event any one of the partners desired to dispose some or its entire share in the company. 礼来公司决定在印度成立合资企业，主要负责礼来公司药品在印度的销售，并于 1992 年 11 月签署了正式的合资企业协议。新成立的合资公司法定资本为 2 亿卢比（相当于 710 万美元），初始认购股本为 8,400 万卢比（300 万美元），礼来公司和兰巴希公司各出资一半，各占 50%的股份。合资公司董事会由六名董事组成，每家公司三名。礼来公司保留任命首席执行官的权利，首席执行官将负责日常运营。协议还对股份转让做出了规定，如果任何一个合伙人希望出售其在公司的部分或全部股份。
In the mid-1990s, Lilly was investigating the possibility of extending its operations to include generics. Following the launch of the Indian JV, Lilly and Ranbaxy entered into two other agreements related to 20 世纪 90 年代中期，礼来公司正在研究将其业务扩展到仿制药领域的可能性。在印度合资公司成立后，礼来公司与兰佰利公司签订了另外两项协议，内容涉及
generics, one in India to focus on manufacturing generics, and the other in the United States to focus on the marketing of generics. However, within less than a year, Lilly made a strategic decision not to enter the generics market and the two parties agreed to terminate the JV agreements related to the generics. Mayr recalled: 礼来公司在印度和美国分别成立了两家合资公司，一家在印度，主要生产仿制药，另一家在美国，主要营销仿制药。然而，在不到一年的时间里，礼来公司做出了不进入仿制药市场的战略决策，双方同意终止与仿制药有关的合资协议。梅尔回忆说：
At that time we were looking at the Indian market although we did not have any particular time frame for entry. We particularly liked Ranbaxy, as we saw an alignment of the broad values. Dr. Singh had a clear vision of leading Ranbaxy to become an innovation driven company. And we liked what we saw in them. Of course, for a time we were looking at the generic business and wondering if this was something we should be engaged in. Other companies had separate division for generics and we were evaluating such an idea. However, we had a pilot program in Holland and that taught us what it took to be competitive in generics and decided that business wasn't for us, and so we decided to get out of generics. 当时，虽然我们没有确定进入印度市场的具体时间，但我们一直在关注印度市场。我们特别看中了 Ranbaxy，因为我们看到了广泛价值观的一致性。辛格博士有一个清晰的愿景，那就是带领 Ranbaxy 成为一家创新驱动型公司。我们看中了他们。当然，有一段时间我们也在关注非专利药业务，想知道我们是否应该参与其中。其他公司都有独立的仿制药部门，我们也在评估这样的想法。不过，我们在荷兰开展了一个试点项目，这让我们了解到在非专利药领域具有竞争力需要具备哪些条件，并决定这项业务不适合我们，因此我们决定退出非专利药领域。
The Start-up 启动
By March 1993, Andrew Mascarenhas, an American citizen of Indian origin, who at the time was the general manager for Lilly's Caribbean basin, based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, was selected to become the managing director of the joint venture. Rajiv Gulati, who at the time spearheaded the business development and marketing efforts at Ranbaxy, was chosen as the director of marketing and sales at the JV. Mascarenhas recalled: 1993 年 3 月，印度裔美国公民安德鲁-马斯卡伦哈斯（Andrew Mascarenhas）被选为合资企业的总经理，他当时是礼来公司加勒比盆地（总部设在波多黎各的圣胡安）的总经理。拉吉夫-古拉蒂（Rajiv Gulati）被选为合资公司的营销和销售总监，他当时是 Ranbaxy 公司业务开发和营销工作的带头人。马斯卡连哈斯回忆说：
Lilly saw the joint venture as an investment the company needed to make. At the time, India was a country of 800 million people: 200 million to 300 million of them were considered to be within the country's middle class that represented the future of India. The concept of globalization was just taking hold at Lilly. India, along with China and Russia, were seen as markets where Lilly needed to build a greater presence. Some resistance was met due to the recognition that a lot of Lilly's products were already being sold by Indian manufacturers due to the lack of patent protection and intellectual property rights, so the question was what products should we put in there that could be competitive. The products that were already being manufactured had sufficient capacity; so it was an issue of trying to leverage the markets in which those products were sold into. 礼来公司认为合资企业是公司需要进行的一项投资。当时，印度是一个拥有 8 亿人口的国家：其中 2 亿到 3 亿人被认为是印度的中产阶级，他们代表着印度的未来。全球化的概念在礼来公司刚刚站稳脚跟。印度与中国和俄罗斯一样，都被视为礼来需要扩大业务的市场。由于缺乏专利保护和知识产权，礼来公司的许多产品已经由印度制造商销售，因此遇到了一些阻力，问题是我们应该在印度生产哪些具有竞争力的产品。已经在生产的产品有足够的生产能力，因此问题在于如何利用这些产品的销售市场。
Lilly was a name that most physicians in India did not recognize. Despite its leadership position in the United States, it did not have any recognition in India. Ranbaxy was the leader within India. When I was informed that the name of the joint venture was to be Lilly Ranbaxy, the first thing I did was to make sure that the name of the joint venture was Eli Lilly Ranbaxy and not just Lilly Ranbaxy. The reason for this was based on my earlier experience in India, where "good quality," rightly or wrongly, was associated with foreign imported goods. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy sounded foreign enough! 礼来是一个印度大多数医生都不认识的名字。尽管礼来在美国处于领先地位，但在印度却没有任何知名度。在印度，Ranbaxy 是领导者。当我得知合资企业的名称是礼来-兰柏西时，我做的第一件事就是确保合资企业的名称是礼来-兰柏西，而不仅仅是礼来-兰柏西。这样做的原因是基于我早先在印度的经验，在印度，"质量好 "无论对错，都与外国进口商品联系在一起。礼来-兰佰利听起来就很洋气！
Early on, Mascarenhas and Gulati worked on getting the venture up and running with office space and an employee base. Mascarenhas recalled: 创业初期，马斯卡连哈斯和古拉蒂努力使企业运转起来，拥有办公场所和员工基础。马斯卡连哈斯回忆道：
I got a small space within Ranbaxy's set-up. We had two tables, one for Rajiv and the other for me. We had to start from that infrastructure and move towards building up the organization from scratch. Rajiv was great to work with and we both were able to see eye- 我在 Ranbaxy 的办公室里找到了一个小地方。我们有两张桌子，一张给拉吉夫，另一张给我。我们必须从基础设施做起，从零开始建立组织。拉吉夫是个很好的合作者，我们都能看到
to-eye on most issues. Dr. Singh was a strong supporter and the whole of Ranbaxy senior management tried to assist us whenever we asked for help. 辛格博士是我们的坚强后盾。辛格博士是我们的坚定支持者，只要我们需要帮助，Ranbaxy 的所有高级管理层都会尽力提供帮助。
The duo immediately hired a financial analyst, and the team grew from there. Early on, they hired a medical director, a sales manager and a human resources manager. The initial team was a good one, but there was enormous pressure and the group worked seven days a week. Ranbaxy's help was used for getting government approvals, licenses, distribution and supplies. Recalled Gulati: 二人立即聘请了一名财务分析师，团队从此不断壮大。早期，他们还聘请了一位医疗总监、一位销售经理和一位人力资源经理。最初的团队是一支优秀的团队，但压力巨大，他们每周工作七天。在获得政府批准、许可证、分销和供应方面，他们都得到了 Ranbaxy 的帮助。古拉蒂回忆道：
We used Ranbaxy's name for everything. We were new and it was very difficult for us. We used their distribution network as we did not have one and Lilly did not want to invest heavily in setting up a distribution network. We paid Ranbaxy for the service. Ranbaxy was very helpful. 我们使用的都是 Ranbaxy 的名称。我们是新公司，这对我们来说非常困难。我们使用了他们的分销网络，因为我们没有分销网络，礼来公司也不想投入巨资建立分销网络。我们向 Ranbaxy 支付了服务费。Ranbaxy 提供了很多帮助。
By the end of 1993, the venture moved to an independent place, began launching products and employed more than 200 people. Within another year, Mascarenhas had hired a significant sales force and had recruited medical doctors and financial people for the regulatory group with assistance from Lilly's Geneva office. Mascarenhas, recalled: 到 1993 年底，该企业搬到了一个独立的地方，开始推出产品，并雇用了 200 多名员工。又过了一年，马斯卡连哈斯聘请了一支重要的销售队伍，并在礼来公司日内瓦办事处的协助下，为监管小组招募了医生和财务人员。马斯卡连哈斯回忆道：
Our recruiting theme was 'Opportunity of a Lifetime,' i.e., joining a new company, and to be part of its very foundation. Many who joined us, especially at senior level, were experienced executives. By entering this new and untested company, they were really taking a huge risk with their careers and the lives of their families. 我们的招聘主题是 "千载难逢的机会"，即加入一家新公司，并成为其基础的一部分。许多加入我们公司的人，尤其是高级管理人员，都是经验丰富的管理人员。进入这家未经考验的新公司，他们的职业生涯和家庭生活都面临着巨大的风险。
However, the employee turnover in the Indian pharmaceutical industry was very high. Sandeep Gupta, director of marketing recalled: 然而，印度制药业的员工流失率非常高。营销总监桑迪普-古普塔（Sandeep Gupta）回忆说：
Our biggest problem was our high turnover rate. A sales job in the pharmaceutical industry was not the most sought-after position. Any university graduate could be employed. The pharmaceutical industry in India is very unionized. Ranbaxy's HR practices were designed to work with unionized employees. From the very beginning, we did not want our recruits to join unions. Instead, we chose to show recruits that they had a career in ELR. When they joined us as sales graduates, they did not just remain at that level. We took a conscious decision to promote from within the company. The venture began investing in training and used Lilly's training programs. The programs were customized for Indian conditions, but retained Lilly's values (see Exhibit 4). 我们最大的问题是人员流动率高。医药行业的销售工作并不是最抢手的职位。任何大学毕业生都能找到工作。印度制药业的工会组织非常严密。Ranbaxy 的人力资源实践就是为了与工会员工合作而设计的。从一开始，我们就不希望新员工加入工会。相反，我们选择向新员工展示他们在ELR的职业前景。当他们作为销售毕业生加入我们时，他们不会仅仅停留在那个层次。我们有意识地决定在公司内部进行晋升。企业开始投资培训，并采用礼来公司的培训计划。这些计划是根据印度国情定制的，但保留了礼来公司的价值观（见图 4）。
Within a year, the venture team began gaining the trust and respect of doctors, due to the strong values adhered to by Lilly. Mascarenhas described how the venture fought the Indian stigma: 由于礼来公司坚持的价值观，创业团队在一年内开始赢得医生的信任和尊重。马斯卡连哈斯介绍了该企业如何与印度人的偏见作斗争：
Lilly has a code of ethical conduct called the Red Book, and the company did not want to go down the path where it might be associated with unethical behavior. But Lilly felt Ranbaxy knew how to do things the right way and that they respected their employees, which was a very important attribute. So following Lilly's Red Book values, the group told doctors the truth; both the positive and negative aspects of their drugs. If a salesperson didn't know the answer to something, they didn't lie or make up something; they told the doctor they didn't know. No bribes were given or taken, and it was found that honesty and integrity could actually be a competitive advantage. Sales people were trained to offer product information to doctors. The group gradually became distinguished by this "strange" behavior. 礼来公司有一本名为 "红皮书 "的道德行为守则，公司不希望自己走上不道德的道路。但礼来公司认为，Ranbaxy 知道如何以正确的方式做事，而且他们尊重员工，这是一个非常重要的品质。因此，该集团遵循礼来的红皮书价值观，告诉医生真相，包括药品的正面和负面影响。如果销售人员不知道答案，他们不会撒谎或编造，而是告诉医生他们不知道。他们没有行贿或受贿，而且发现诚实和正直实际上是一种竞争优势。销售人员接受了向医生提供产品信息的培训。通过这种 "奇怪 "的行为，该小组逐渐脱颖而出。
Recalled Sudhanshu Kamat, controller of finance at ELR: ELR 财务总监 Sudhanshu Kamat 回忆说：
Lilly, from the start, treated us as its employees, like all its other affiliates worldwide. We followed the same systems and processes that any Lilly affiliate would worldwide. 礼来公司从一开始就把我们当作它的员工对待，就像它在全球的其他分支机构一样。我们遵循礼来公司在全球范围内的所有分支机构所遵循的相同系统和流程。
Much of the success of the joint venture is attributed to the strong and cohesive working relationship of Mascarenhas and Gulati. Mascarenhas recalled: 合资企业的成功在很大程度上归功于 Mascarenhas 和 Gulati 强大而团结的工作关系。马斯卡连哈斯回忆说
We both wanted the venture to be successful. We both had our identities to the JV, and there was no Ranbaxy versus Lilly politics. From the very start when we had our office at Ranbaxy premises, I was invited to dine with their senior management. Even after moving to our own office, I continued the practice of having lunch at Ranbaxy HQ on a weekly basis. I think it helped a lot to be accessible at all times and to build on the personal relationship. 我们都希望合资企业取得成功。我们对合资企业都有自己的定位，不存在 "Ranbaxy "与 "礼来 "的政治对立。从一开始我们的办公室设在 Ranbaxy 总部时，我就受邀与他们的高级管理层共进晚餐。即使在搬到我们自己的办公室后，我仍然坚持每周在兰佰利总部共进午餐。我认为这对我们随时保持联系和建立个人关系有很大帮助。
The two companies had very different business focuses. Ranbaxy was a company driven by the generics business. Lilly, on the other hand, was driven by innovation and discovery. 两家公司的业务重点截然不同。Ranbaxy 是一家以仿制药业务为驱动力的公司。而礼来则以创新和发现为驱动力。
Mascarenhas focused his effort on communicating Eli Lilly's values to the new joint venture: 马斯卡连哈斯的工作重点是向新的合资企业传达礼来公司的价值观：
I spent a lot of time communicating Lilly's values to newly hired employees. In the early days, I interviewed our senior applicants personally. I was present in the two-day training sessions that we offered for the new employees, where I shared the values of the company. That was a critical task for me to make sure that the right foundations were laid down for growth. 我花了很多时间向新聘员工传达礼来的价值观。早期，我亲自面试资深应聘者。在我们为新员工提供的为期两天的培训课程中，我也参与其中，与他们分享公司的价值观。这对我来说是一项至关重要的任务，以确保为公司的发展奠定正确的基础。
The first products that came out of the joint venture were human insulin from Lilly and several Ranbaxy products; but the team faced constant challenges in dealing with government regulations on the one hand and financing the affiliate on the other. There were also cash flow constraints. 合资企业推出的首批产品是礼来公司的人胰岛素和 Ranbaxy 公司的几种产品；但团队一直面临着挑战，一方面要应对政府法规，另一方面要为联营公司融资。此外，现金流也很紧张。
The ministry of health provided limitations on Lilly's pricing, and even with the margin the Indian government allowed, most of it went to the wholesalers and the pharmacies, pursuant to formulas in the Indian ministry of health. Once those were factored out of the gross margin, achieving profitability was a real challenge, as some of the biggest obstacles faced were duties imposed by the Indian government on imports and other regulatory issues. Considering the weak intellectual property rights regime, Lilly did not want to launch some of its products, such as its top-seller, Prozac. Gulati recalled: 印度卫生部对礼来公司的定价进行了限制，即使是印度政府允许的利润，根据印度卫生部的公式，大部分也归批发商和药店所有。一旦将这些因素从毛利率中剔除，要实现盈利确实是一项挑战，因为面临的最大障碍是印度政府对进口产品征收的关税和其他监管问题。考虑到薄弱的知识产权制度，礼来公司不想推出一些产品，如最畅销的百忧解。 古拉蒂回忆道：
We focused only on those therapeutic areas where Lilly had a niche. We did not adopt a localization strategy, such as the ones adopted by Pfizer and Glaxo that manufactured locally and sold at local prices. India is a high-volume, low price, low profit market, but it was a conscious decision by us to operate the way we did. We wanted to be in the global price band. So, we did not launch several patented products because generics were selling at th the price. 我们只专注于礼来具有优势的治疗领域。我们没有采取本地化战略，如辉瑞和葛兰素 所采取的在当地生产、以当地价格销售的战略。印度是一个高产量、低价格、低利润的市场，但我们有意识地决定采用这种经营方式。我们希望在全球价格带中占有一席之地。因此，我们没有推出几种专利产品，因为仿制药的售价是我们的 倍。
Product and marketing strategies had to be adopted to suit the market conditions. ELR's strategy evolved over the years to focus on two groups of products: one was off-patent drugs, where Lilly could add substantial value (e.g. Ceclor), and two, patented drugs, where there existed a significant barrier to entry (e.g. Reopro and Gemzar). ELR marketed Ceclor, a Ranbaxy-manufactured product, but attempted to add significant value by providing medical information to the physicians and other unique marketing activities. By the end of 1996, the venture had reached the break-even and was becoming profitable. 必须采取适应市场条件的产品和营销战略。多年来，ELR 的战略不断演变，主要集中在两类产品上：一类是非专利药品，礼来公司可以在这些药品上增加大量价值（如 Ceclor）；另一类是专利药品，这些药品存在很大的进入壁垒（如 Reopro 和 Gemzar）。ELR 负责销售 Ranbaxy 生产的 Ceclor，但试图通过向医生提供医疗信息和其他独特的营销活动来增加价值。到 1996 年底，该企业已实现收支平衡并开始盈利。
The Mid-Term Organizational Changes 中期组织变革
Mascarenhas was promoted in 1996 to managing director of Eli Lilly Italy, and Chris Shaw, a British national who was then managing the operations in Taiwan, was assigned to the JV as the new managing director. Also, Gulati, who was formally a Ranbaxy employee, decided to join Eli Lilly as its employee and was assigned to Lilly's corporate office in Indianapolis in the Business Development - Infectious Diseases therapeutic division. Chris Shaw recalled: 1996 年，马斯卡连哈斯晋升为礼来意大利公司的总经理，而当时管理台湾业务的英国人克里斯-肖则被派往合资公司担任新的总经理。此外，原为 Ranbaxy 公司员工的 Gulati 决定加入礼来公司，成为礼来公司员工，并被派往礼来公司位于印第安纳波利斯的办事处，负责传染病治疗部门的业务发展。克里斯-肖回忆说：
When I went to India as a British national, I was not sure what sort of reception I would get, knowing its history. But my family and I were received very warmly. I found a dynamic team with a strong sense of values. 当我以英国公民的身份前往印度时，我不确定自己会受到什么样的接待，因为我了解印度的历史。但我和我的家人受到了非常热情的接待。我发现这是一个充满活力和强烈价值观的团队。
Shaw focused on building systems and processes to bring stability to the fast-growing organization; his own expertise in operations made a significant contribution during this phase. He hired a senior-level manager and created a team to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) for ensuring smooth operations. The product line also expanded. The JV continued to maintain a 50-50 distribution of products from Lilly and Ranbaxy, although there was no stipulation to maintain such a ratio. The clinical organization in India received top-ratings in internal audits by Lilly, making it suitable for a wider range of clinical trials. Shaw also streamlined the sales and marketing activities around therapeutic areas to emphasize and enrich the knowledge capabilities of the company's sales force. Seeing the rapid change in the environment in India, ELR, with the support of Mayr, hired the management consulting firm, McKinsey, to recommend growth options in India. ELR continued its steady performance with an annualized growth rate of about eight per cent during the late 1990s. Shaw 专注于建立系统和流程，为快速发展的组织带来稳定性；他本人在运营方面的专业知识在这一阶段做出了重大贡献。他聘请了一名高级经理，并成立了一个团队来制定标准操作程序 (SOP)，以确保顺利运营。产品线也得到了扩展。合资公司继续保持礼来和兰佰瑞各占一半的产品分配比例，尽管并没有规定必须保持这一比例。印度的临床机构在礼来公司的内部审计中获得了最高评级，使其适合进行更广泛的临床试验。肖还围绕治疗领域精简了销售和营销活动，以强调和丰富公司销售人员的知识能力。看到印度环境的快速变化，在梅尔的支持下，ELR 聘请了麦肯锡管理咨询公司，为公司在印度的发展提出建议。20 世纪 90 年代后期，ELR 继续保持稳定的业绩，年增长率约为 8%。
In 1999, Chris Shaw was assigned to Eli Lilly's Polish subsidiary, and Gulati returned to ELR as its managing director, following his three-year tenure at Lilly's U.S. operations. Recalled Gulati: 1999 年，克里斯-肖（Chris Shaw）被派往礼来公司的波兰子公司，而古拉蒂在礼来公司美国业务部任职三年后，回到 ELR 公司担任总经理。古拉蒂回忆道：
When I joined as MD in 1999, we were growing at eight per cent and had not added any new employees. I hired 150 people over the next two years and went about putting systems and processes in place. When we started in 1993, and during Andrew's time, we were like a grocery shop. Now we needed to be a company. We had to be a large durable organization and prepare ourselves to go from sales of US million to sales of US$100 million. 1999 年我加入公司担任总经理时，我们的增长率只有 8%，而且没有增加任何新员工。在接下来的两年里，我雇佣了 150 名员工，并着手建立系统和流程。1993 年创业之初，在安德鲁任职期间，我们就像一家杂货店。现在，我们需要成为一家公司。我们必须成为一个大型的持久性组织，为从 万美元的销售额到 1 亿美元的销售额做好准备。
ELR created a medical and regulatory unit, which handled the product approval processes with government. Das, the chief financial officer (CFO), commented: ELR 设立了一个医疗和监管部门，负责处理与政府的产品审批程序。首席财务官（CFO）Das 评论说：
We worked together with the government on the regulatory part. Actually, we did not take shelter under the Ranbaxy name but built a strong regulatory (medical and corporate affairs) foundation. 在监管方面，我们与政府合作。事实上，我们并没有以 Ranbaxy 的名义避难，而是建立了一个强大的监管（医疗和公司事务）基础。
By early 2001, the venture was recording an excellent growth rate (see Exhibit 5), surpassing the average growth rate in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. ELR had already become the 46th largest 到 2001 年初，该企业的增长率非常高（见图 5），超过了印度制药业的平均增长率。ELR 已经成为印度第 46 大
pharmaceutical company in India out of 10,000 companies. Several of the multinational subsidiaries, which were started at the same time as ELR, had either closed down or were in serious trouble. Das summarized the achievements: 在印度的 10,000 家公司中，ELR 是一家制药公司。与 ELR 同时成立的几家跨国子公司要么已经倒闭，要么陷入了严重的困境。达斯总结了取得的成就：
The JV did add some prestige to Ranbaxy's efforts as a global player as the Lilly name had enormous credibility, while Lilly gained the toehold in India. In 10 years, we did not have any cannibalization of each other's employees, quite a rare event if you compare with the other JVs. This helped us build a unique culture in India. 合资公司确实为 Ranbaxy 作为全球企业的努力增添了一些声望，因为礼来的名字具有巨大的可信度，而礼来则在印度站稳了脚跟。在 10 年的时间里，我们没有出现任何相互裁员的情况，如果与其他合资企业相比，这是非常罕见的。这有助于我们在印度建立独特的企业文化。
THE NEW WORLD, 2001 新世界，2001 年
The pharmaceutical industry continued to grow through the 1990s. In 2001, worldwide retail sales were expected to increase 10 per cent to about US$350 billion. The United States was expected to remain the largest and fastest growing country among the world's major drug markets over the next three years. There was a consolidation trend in the industry with ongoing mergers and acquisitions reshaping the industry. In 1990, the world's top 10 players accounted for just 28 per cent of the market, while in 2000, the number had risen to 45 per cent and continued to grow. There was also a trend among leading global pharmaceutical companies to get back to basics and concentrate on core high-margined prescription preparations and divest non-core businesses. In addition, the partnerships between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies were growing rapidly. There were a number of challenges, such as escalating R&D costs, lengthening development and approval times for new products, growing competition from generics and follow-on products, and rising cost-containment pressures, particularly with the growing clout of managed care organizations. 制药业在整个九十年代持续增长。2001 年，全球零售额预计将增长 10%，达到约 3 500 亿美元。预计在今后三年里，美国仍将是世界主要药品市场中规模最大、增长最快的国家。随着并购活动的不断进行，该行业出现了整合趋势。1990 年，世界前 10 强企业仅占市场的 28%，而到 2000 年，这一数字已上升到 45%，而且还在继续增长。全球领先的制药公司也出现了返璞归真的趋势，专注于高利润的核心处方制剂，剥离非核心业务。此外，制药公司与生物技术公司之间的合作关系也在迅速发展。目前面临着许多挑战，如研发成本不断攀升、新产品的开发和审批时间不断延长、仿制药和后续产品的竞争日益激烈、成本控制压力不断增加，特别是管理型医疗机构的影响力不断增强。
By 1995, Lilly had moved up to become the 12th leading pharmaceutical supplier in the world, sixth in the U.S. market, 17th in Europe and 77th in Japan. Much of Lilly's sales success through the mid-1990s came from its antidepressant drug, Prozac. But with the wonder drug due to go off patent in 2001, Lilly was aggressively working on a number of high-potential products. By the beginning of 2001, Lilly was doing business in 151 countries, with its international sales playing a significant role in the company's success (see Exhibits 6 and 7). Dr. Lorenzo Tallarigo recalled: 到 1995 年，礼来已跃升为全球第 12 大药品供应商，在美国市场排名第六，在欧洲市场排名第 17，在日本市场排名第 77。礼来公司在 20 世纪 90 年代中期的销售业绩主要来自抗抑郁药物百忧解。但由于这种神奇的药物将于 2001 年失去专利，礼来公司正在积极开发一些极具潜力的产品。到 2001 年初，礼来已在 151 个国家开展业务，国际销售对公司的成功起到了重要作用（见附表 6 和 7）。Lorenzo Tallarigo 博士回忆道：
When I started as the president of the intercontinental operations, I realized that the world was very different in the 2000s from the world of 1990s. Particularly, there were phenomenal changes in the markets in India and China. While I firmly believed that the partnership we had with Ranbaxy was really an excellent one, the fact that we were facing such a different market in the 21st century was reason enough to carefully evaluate our strategies in these markets. 当我开始担任洲际业务总裁时，我意识到 2000 年代的世界与 1990 年代的世界截然不同。尤其是印度和中国市场发生了巨大的变化。虽然我坚信我们与 Ranbaxy 的合作关系确实非常好，但在 21 世纪，我们面对的是如此不同的市场，这足以让我们仔细评估我们在这些市场的战略。
Ranbaxy, too, had witnessed changes through the 1990s. Dr. Singh became the new CEO in 1993 and formulated a new mission for the company: to become a research-based international pharmaceutical company with billion in sales by 2003. This vision saw Ranbaxy developing new drugs through basic research, earmarking 20 per cent of the R&D budget for such work. In addition to its joint venture with Lilly, Ranbaxy made three other manufacturing/marketing investments in developed markets: a joint venture with Genpharm in Canada ($1.1 million), and the acquisitions of Ohm Labs in the United States ($13.5 million) and Rima Pharmaceuticals ($8 million) in Ireland. With these deals, Ranbaxy had manufacturing facilities around the globe. While China and Russia were expected to remain key foreign markets, Ranbaxy was looking at the United States and the United Kingdom as its core international markets for the future. In 1999, Dr. Singh handed over the reins of the company to Brar, and later the same 20 世纪 90 年代，Ranbaxy 也经历了变革。辛格博士于 1993 年成为新的首席执行官，并为公司制定了新的使命：到 2003 年成为一家以研究为基础的国际制药公司，销售额达到 亿美元。在这一愿景的指引下，Ranbaxy 通过基础研究开发新药，并将 20% 的研发预算用于此类工作。除了与礼来公司建立合资企业外，Ranbaxy 还在发达市场进行了另外三项生产/销售投资：与加拿大 Genpharm 公司建立合资企业（110 万美元），收购美国 Ohm 实验室（1350 万美元）和爱尔兰 Rima 制药公司（800 万美元）。通过这些交易，Ranbaxy 在全球各地都拥有了生产设施。虽然预计中国和俄罗斯仍将是主要的国外市场，但 Ranbaxy 将美国和英国视为未来的核心国际市场。1999 年，辛格博士将公司的领导权移交给了布拉尔，随后在同一年，布拉尔又将公司的领导权移交给了辛格博士。
year, Ranbaxy lost this visionary leader due to an untimely death. Brar continued Singh's vision to keep Ranbaxy in a leadership position. However, the vast network of international sales that Ranbaxy had developed created a large financial burden, depressing the company's 2000 results, and was expected to significantly affect its cash flow in 2001 (see Exhibit 8). Vinay Kaul, vice-chairman of Ranbaxy in 2001 and chairman of the board of ELR since 2000, noted: 年，由于英年早逝，Ranbaxy 失去了这位富有远见的领导者。布拉尔继承了辛格的远见卓识，使 Ranbaxy 继续保持领先地位。然而，Ranbaxy 发展起来的庞大的国际销售网络造成了巨大的财务负担，使公司 2000 年的业绩受到影响，预计 2001 年的现金流也会受到严重影响（见图 8）。2001 年任 Ranbaxy 公司副董事长、自 2000 年起任 ELR 公司董事长的 Vinay Kaul 指出：
We have come a long way from where we started. Our role in the present JV is very limited. We had a smooth relationship and we have been of significant help to Lilly to establish a foothold in the market here in India. Also, we have opened up a number of opportunities for them to expand their network. However, we have also grown, and we are a global company with presence in a number of international markets, including the United States. We had to really think if this JV is central to our operations, given that we have closed down the other two JV agreements that we had with Lilly on the generics manufacturing. It is common knowledge that whether we continue as a JV or not, we have created a substantial value for Lilly. 我们从一开始就走了很长的路。我们在目前合资公司中的作用非常有限。我们之间的关系很融洽，我们为礼来在印度市场站稳脚跟提供了重要帮助。此外，我们还为他们拓展网络提供了许多机会。然而，我们也在成长，我们是一家全球性公司，在包括美国在内的许多国际市场都有业务。鉴于我们已经关闭了与礼来公司在仿制药生产方面签订的另外两份合资协议，我们不得不认真考虑这家合资公司是否对我们的运营至关重要。众所周知，无论我们是否继续作为合资企业，我们都为礼来创造了巨大的价值。
There were also significant changes in the Indian business environment. India signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in April 1994 and became a World Trade Organization (WTO) member in 1995. As per the WTO, from the year 2005, India would grant product patent recognition to all new chemical entities (NCEs) (i.e., bulk drugs developed from then onward). Also, the Indian government had made the decision to allow 100 per cent foreign direct investment into the drugs and pharmaceutical industry in The Indian pharmaceutical market had grown at an average of 15 per cent through the 1990s, but the trends indicated a slowdown in growth, partly due to intense price competition, a shift toward chronic therapies and the entry of large players into the generic market. India was seeing its own internal consolidation of major companies that were trying to bring in synergies through economies of scale. The industry would see more mergers and alliances. And with India's entry into the WTO and its agreement to begin patent protection in 2004-2005, competition on existing and new products was expected to intensify. Government guidelines were expected to include rationalization of price controls and the encouragement of more research and development. Recalled Gulati: 印度的商业环境也发生了重大变化。印度于 1994 年 4 月签署了《关税与贸易总协定》（GATT），并于 1995 年成为世界贸易组织（WTO）成员。根据世贸组织的规定，从 2005 年起，印度将对所有新化学实体（NCE）（即从那时起开发的散装药物）授予产品专利认可。此外，印度政府还决定在 年允许 100%的外国直接投资进入药品和制药行业。20 世纪 90 年代，印度医药市场的平均增长率为 15%，但趋势表明增长速度有所放缓，部分原因在于激烈的价格竞争、向慢性疗法的转变以及大型企业进入非专利药市场。印度的大公司正在进行内部整合，试图通过规模经济实现协同效应。该行业将出现更多的兼并和联盟。随着印度加入世贸组织并同意在 2004-2005 年开始专利保护，预计现有产品和新产品的竞争将会加剧。预计政府的指导方针将包括价格控制的合理化和鼓励更多的研究与开发。Gulati 回忆说：
The change of institutional environment brought a great promise for Lilly. India was emerging into a market that had patent protection and with tremendous potential for adding value in the clinical trials, an important component in the pharmaceutical industry. In Ranbaxy, we had a partner with whom we could work very well, and one which greatly respected Lilly. However, there were considerable signals from both sides that were forcing us to evaluate the strategy. 体制环境的变化给礼来带来了巨大的希望。印度正在成为一个拥有专利保护的市场，而且在临床试验这一制药业的重要组成部分方面具有巨大的增值潜力。在 Ranbaxy，我们有了一个可以很好合作的伙伴，而且这个伙伴非常尊重礼来。然而，双方都发出了许多信号，迫使我们对战略进行评估。
Dr. Vinod Mattoo, medical director of ELR, commented: ELR 医疗总监 Vinod Mattoo 博士评论说：
We have been able to achieve penetration in key therapeutic areas of diabetes and oncology. We have created a high caliber, non-unionized sales force with world-class sales processes. We have medical infrastructure and expertise to run clinical trials to international standards. We have been able to provide clinical trial data to support global registrations, and an organization in place to maximize returns post-2005. 我们已经在糖尿病和肿瘤等关键治疗领域实现了渗透。我们建立了一支高素质、非工会化的销售队伍，拥有世界一流的销售流程。我们拥有按照国际标准开展临床试验的医疗基础设施和专业知识。我们能够提供临床试验数据，支持全球注册，并建立了一个组织，以最大限度地提高 2005 年后的回报。
EVALUATING STRATEGIC OPTIONS 评估战略选择
Considering these several developments, Tallarigo suggested a joint task force comprising senior executives from both companies: 考虑到这几方面的发展，Tallarigo 建议成立一个由两家公司高级管理人员组成的联合工作组：
Soon after assuming this role, I visited India in early 2000, and had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Brar and the senior executives. It was clear to me that both Brar and I were in agreement that we needed to think carefully how we approached the future. It was there that I suggested that we create a joint task force to come up with some options that would help us make a final decision. 就职后不久，我于 2000 年初访问了印度，并有幸会见了布拉尔博士和高级管理人员。很明显，我和布拉尔都认为，我们需要仔细考虑如何应对未来。在那里，我建议我们成立一个联合工作组，提出一些有助于我们做出最终决定的方案。
A task force was set up with two senior executives from Lilly's Asia-Pacific regional office (based in Singapore) and two senior executives from Ranbaxy. The task force did not include senior executives of the ELR so as to not distract the running of the day-to-day operations. Suman Das, the chief financial officer of ELR, was assigned to support the task force with the needed financial data. The task force developed several scenarios and presented different options for the board to consider. 礼来公司亚太地区办事处（总部设在新加坡）的两名高级管理人员和 Ranbaxy 公司的两名高级管理人员组成了一个特别工作组。该工作组不包括 ELR 的高级管理人员，以免影响日常运作。ELR 的首席财务官 Suman Das 被指派向工作组提供所需的财务数据。特别工作组制定了几种方案，并提出了不同的选择供董事会考虑。
There were rumors within the industry that Ranbaxy expected to divest the JV and invest the cash in its growing portfolio of generics manufacturing business in international markets. There were also several other Indian companies that offered to buy Ranbaxy's stake in the JV. With India recognizing patent protection in 2005, several Indian pharmaceutical companies were keen to align with multinationals to ensure a pipeline of drugs. Although there were no formal offers from Ranbaxy, the company was expected to price its stakes as high as US$70 million. One of the industry observers in India commented: 业内有传言称，Ranbaxy 预计剥离合资公司，将现金投资于其在国际市场上不断增长的仿制药生产业务组合。此外，还有其他几家印度公司提出购买 Ranbaxy 在合资公司中的股份。随着印度于 2005 年承认专利保护，几家印度制药公司热衷于与跨国公司结盟，以确保药品管道。虽然 Ranbaxy 公司没有正式出价，但预计该公司对所持股份的定价将高达 7000 万美元。印度的一位行业观察家评论道：
I think it is fair for Ranbaxy to expect a reasonable return for its investment in the JV, not only the initial capital, but also so much of its intangibles in the JV. Ranbaxy's stock has grown significantly. Given the critical losses that Ranbaxy has had in some of its investments abroad, the revenue from this sale may be a significant boost for Ranbaxy's cash flow this year. 我认为，Ranbaxy 公司期望其在合资公司的投资获得合理回报是公平的，这不仅包括初始资本，还包括其在合资公司的大量无形资产。Ranbaxy 的股票已大幅上涨。鉴于 Ranbaxy 在海外的一些投资出现严重亏损，此次出售带来的收入可能会大大促进 Ranbaxy 今年的现金流。
Gerhard Mayr, who in 2001, was the executive vice-president and was responsible for Lilly's demand realization around the world, continued to emphasize the emerging markets in India, China and Eastern Europe. Mayr commented on Ranbaxy: Gerhard Mayr 在 2001 年担任执行副总裁，负责礼来在全球范围内实现需求，他继续强调印度、中国和东欧的新兴市场。梅尔这样评价兰佰利：
India is an important market for us, and especially after patent protection in 2005. Ranbaxy was a wonderful partner and our relationship with them was outstanding. The other two joint ventures we initiated with them in the generics did not make sense to us once we decided to get out of the generics business. We see India as a good market for Lilly. If a partner is what it takes to succeed, we should go with a partner. If it does not, we should have the flexibility to reconsider. 印度是我们的重要市场，尤其是在 2005 年获得专利保护之后。Ranbaxy 是一个很好的合作伙伴，我们与他们的关系非常融洽。一旦我们决定退出仿制药业务，我们与他们在仿制药领域发起的另外两家合资企业对我们来说就没有意义了。我们认为印度对礼来来说是一个很好的市场。如果合作伙伴是成功的必要条件，我们就应该选择合作伙伴。如果不是，我们应该有重新考虑的灵活性。
Tallarigo hoped that Brar would be able to provide a clear direction as to the venture's future. As he prepared for the meeting, he knew the decision was not an easy one, although he felt confident that the JV was in good shape. While the new regulations allowed Lilly to operate as a wholly-owned subsidiary in India, the partnership has been a very positive element in its strategy. Ranbaxy provided manufacturing and logistics support to the JV, and breaking up the partnership would require a significant amount of renegotiations. Also, it was not clear what the financial implications of such a move would be. Although Ranbaxy seemed to favor a sell-out, Tallarigo thought the price expectations might be beyond what Lilly was ready to accept. This meeting with Brar should provide clarity on all these issues. Tallarigo 希望 Brar 能够为合资企业的未来指明方向。在准备会议的过程中，他知道这个决定并不容易，尽管他对合资公司的良好状况充满信心。虽然新法规允许礼来在印度以全资子公司的形式运营，但合作关系一直是其战略中非常积极的因素。Ranbaxy 公司为合资公司提供生产和物流支持，解除合作关系需要进行大量的重新谈判。此外，此举的财务影响也不明确。虽然 Ranbaxy 公司似乎倾向于出售，但 Tallarigo 认为价格预期可能超出礼来公司的接受范围。这次与布拉尔的会面应该能澄清所有这些问题。
Exhibit 1 证据 1
WORLD PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLIERS 1992 AND 2001 1992 年和 2001 年世界药品供应商
** Pharmaceutical Executive, May 2002. ** 《医药经理人》，2002 年 5 月。
Exhibit 2 证据 2
INDIA'S ECONOMY AT A GLANCE 印度经济概览
Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market
prices in US$
244
323
386
414
481
Consumer price index (June 1982=100) in local
currency, period average
77.4
90.7
108.9
132.2
149.3
Recorded official unemployment as a percentage
of total labor force
9.7
9.3
9.1
9.2
9.2
Stock of foreign reserves plus gold (national
valuation), end-period
8,665
23,054
23,784
29,833
48,200
Foreign direct investment inflow
(in US millions)
252
974
2,525
2,633
2,319
Total exports
19,563
25,075
33,055
33,052
43,085
Total imports
23,580
26,846
37,376
42,318
49,907
Population (millions)
886
938
973
1,008
1,042
United Nations Commission on Trade and Development. 联合国贸易和发展会议。
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. 资料来源：《经济学家》资料处：资料来源：《经济学家》资料处。
Exhibit 3 证据 3
TOP 20 PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES IN INDIA BY SALES (Rs billions) 印度销售额排名前 20 位的医药公司（单位：十亿卢比）
Company
Company
Glaxo-Wellcome
4.97
Ranbaxy
20.00
Cipla
2.98
Cipla
12.00
Ranbaxy
2.67
Dr. Reddy's Labs
11.30
Hoechts-Roussel
2.60
Glaxo (India)
7.90
Knoll Pharmaceutical
1.76
Lupin Labs
7.80
Pfizer
1.73
Aurobindo Pharma
7.60
Alembic
1.68
Novartis
7.20
Torrent Pharma
1.60
Wockhardt Ltd.
6.80
Lupin Labs
1.56
Sun Pharma
6.70
Zydus-Cadila
1.51
Cadilla Healthcare
5.80
Ambalal Sarabhai
1.38
Nicholas Piramal
5.70
Smithkline Beecham
1.20
Aventis Pharma
5.30
Aristo Pharma
1.17
Alembic Ltd.
4.80
Parke Davis
1.15
Morepen Labs
4.70
Cadila Pharma
1.12
Torrent Pharma
4.40
E. Merck
1.11
IPCA Labs
4.20
Wockhardt
1.08
Knoll Pharma
3.70
John Wyeth
1.04
Orchid Chemicals
3.60
Alkem Laboratories
1.04
E Merck
3.50
Hindustan Ciba Geigy
1.03
Pfizer
3.40
1996 figures from ORG, Bombay in Lanjouw, J.O., www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0799.html, NBER working paper No. 6366. Source: "Report on Pharmaceutical Sector in India," Scope Magazine, September 2001, p.14. 来自孟买 ORG 的 1996 年数字，载于 Lanjouw, J.O., www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0799.html, NBER 工作文件第 6366 号。资料来源"印度制药业报告》，《范围》杂志，2001 年 9 月，第 14 页。
Exhibit 4 证据 4
VALUES AT ELI LILLY-RANBAXY LIMITED 礼来-兰axy 有限公司的价值观
PEOPLE 人
"The people who make up this company are its most valuable assets" "员工是公司最宝贵的财富
Respect for the individual 尊重个人
o Courtesy and politeness at all times o 时刻保持礼貌
o Sensitivity to other people's views o 对他人观点的敏感性
o Respect for ALL people regardless of caste, religion, sex or age o 尊重所有人，不分种姓、宗教、性别或年龄
Careers NOT jobs 职业不是工作
o Emphasis on individual's growth, personal and professional o 强调个人成长、个人和职业发展
o Broaden experience via cross-functional moves o 通过跨职能调动拓宽经验
"The first responsibility of our supervisors is to build men, then medicines" "我们监管人员的首要责任是培养人才，然后才是药品"
ATTITUDE 态度
"There is very little difference between people. But that difference makes a BIG difference. The little difference is attitude. The BIG difference is... Whether it is POSITIVE or NEGATIVE" "人与人之间的差别很小。但这种差异却能带来巨大的不同。小差别是态度。最大的区别在于...是积极的还是消极的"
"Are we part of the PROBLEM or part of the SOLUTION?" 我们是 "问题 "的一部分，还是 "解决方案 "的一部分？
TEAM 团队
"None of us is as smart as all of us" "我们中没有一个人像我们所有人一样聪明"
INTEGRITY 诚信
Integrity outside the company 公司外的诚信
a) "We should not do anything or be expected to take any action that we would be ashamed to explain to our family or close friends" a) "我们不应该做任何羞于向家人或亲友解释的事情，也不应该被期望采取任何行动"。
b) "The red-faced test" b) "红脸测试"
c) "Integrity can be our biggest competitive advantage" c) "诚信可以成为我们最大的竞争优势"
Integrity inside the company 公司内部的诚信
o With one another: openness, honesty o 彼此间：开放、诚实
EXCELLENCE 卓越
Serving our customers 为客户服务
"In whatever we do, we must ask ourselves: how does this serve my customer better?" "无论做什么，我们都必须扪心自问：这样做能更好地为客户服务吗？
Continuous improvement 持续改进
"Nothing is being done today that cannot be done better tomorrow" "今天所做的，没有明天不能做得更好的"
Become the Industry Standard 成为行业标准
"In whatever we do, we will do it so well that we become the Industry Standard" "无论我们做什么，我们都会做得非常好，成为行业标准"。
Exhibit 5 证据 5
ELI LILLY-RANBAXY INDIA FINANCIALS 1998 to 2001 ELI LILLY-RANBAXY INDIA FINANCIALS 1998 至 2001 年
(Rs'000s) (千卢比）
Sales
559,766
632,188
Marketing Expenses
37,302
61,366
96,854
Other Expenses
157,907
180,364
254,822
Profit after Tax
5,898
12,301
11,999
Current Assets
272,635
353,077
466,738
Current Liabilities
239,664
297,140
471,635
Total Assets
303,254
386,832
516,241
No. of Employees
358
419
460
Exchange Rate (Rupees/US$)
42.6
43.5
46.8
Note: Financial year runs from April 1 to March 31. 注：财政年度为 4 月 1 日至 3 月 31 日。
Research and development expenses Income from continuing operations before taxes and extraordinary items 研发费用 税前和非常项目前持续运营收入
Net income 净收入
Dividends per share* 每股股息*
Current assets 流动资产
Current liabilities 流动负债
Property and equipment 财产和设备
Total assets 总资产
Long-term debt 长期债务
Shareholder equity 股东权益
Number of employees* 员工人数*
1992
1994
1996
4,963
5,711
6,998
9,236
10,862
2,207
2,710
3,587
3,401
3,858
731
839
1,190
1,739
2,019
1,194
1,699
2,131
2,665
3,859
709
1,286
1,524
2,097
3,058
1.128
1.260
0.694
0.830
1.060
3,006
3,962
3,891
5,407
7,943
2,399
5,670
4,222
4,607
4,961
4,072
4,412
4,307
4,096
4,177
8,673
14,507
14,307
12,596
14,691
582
2,126
2,517
2,186
2,634
4,892
5,356
6,100
4,430
6,047
24,500
24,900
27,400
29,800
35,700
Actual value 实际价值
Source: Company files. 资料来源：公司档案：资料来源：公司档案。
Exhibit 7 证据 7
PRODUCT SEGMENT INFORMATION 产品分类信息
Lilly and Ranbaxy 1996 and 2000 礼来公司和兰巴希公司 1996 年和 2000 年
Eli Lilly in 1996 1996 年，礼来公司
Anti-infectives 抗感染药
Neurosciences 神经科学
Diabetes care 糖尿病护理
Animal health 动物健康
Gastrointestinal (GI) 胃肠道 (GI)
Other pharmaceutical 其他药品
Endocrinology 内分泌学
Cardiovascular 心血管
Oncology 肿瘤学
Ranbaxy in 1996 1996 年的 Ranbaxy
Anti-infectives 抗感染药
GI Tract 消化道
Nutritionals 营养品
NSAIDS 非甾体抗炎药
Central Nervous System 中枢神经系统
Cardiovascular 心血管
Others 其他
Orthopaedics/Pain management 骨科/疼痛管理
Dermatological 皮肤科
Eli Lilly in 2000 2000 年的礼来公司
Ranbaxy in 2000 2000 年的 Ranbaxy
-
-
-
Exhibit 8 证据 8
RANBAXY FINANCIALS ranbaxy 财务状况
1992 to 2000 1992 年至 2000 年
(Rs millions) (百万卢比）
Sales
4,607
7,122
11,482
10,641
Foreign sales
1,408
3,019
5,224
4,414
8,112
Profit before tax
358
1,304
1,869
1,240
1,945
Profit after tax
353
1,104
1,604
1,170
1,824
Equity dividend
66.50
199.80
379.10
560.10
869.20
Earnings per share (Rs)
16.21
25.59
32.47
13.46
15.74
Net current assets
1,737
5,790
9,335
8,321
8,258
Share capital
217.90
430.50
494.00
Reserves and surplus
1,028
6,000
11,056
12,849
16,448
Book value per share (Rs)
57.16
149.08
233.70
120.90
136.60
No. of employees
4,575
4,703
6,131
5,469
5,784
Exchange rate (US$1 = Rs)
29.00
31.40
35.90
42.60
46.80
The financial year for Ranbaxy changed from April 1 to March 31 to calendar year in 1998. Also, the company issued a 1:2 bonus issue (see the changes in share capital and book value per share). The 1998 figures are based on nine months April to December 1998. 1998 年，Ranbaxy 的财政年度从 4 月 1 日至 3 月 31 日改为日历年。此外，公司还发行了 1:2 的红股（见股本和每股账面价值的变化）。1998 年的数字基于 1998 年 4 月至 12 月的九个月。
Source: Company files. 资料来源：公司档案：资料来源：公司档案。
According to a study from Yale University, Ranitidine (300 tabs/10 pack) was priced at Rs18.53, whereas the U.S. price was 57 times more, and Ciprofloxacin (500 mg/4 pack) was at Rs28.40 in India, whereas the U.S. price was about 15 times more. 根据耶鲁大学的一项研究，雷尼替丁（300片/10包）在印度的售价为18.53卢比，而美国的售价是其57倍；环丙沙星（500毫克/4包）在印度的售价为28.40卢比，而美国的售价约为其15倍。
Quoted in Times of India, June 9, 1999. 引自《印度时报》，1999 年 6 月 9 日。
bulk drug is an intermediate product that goes into manufacturing of pharmaceutical products. 散装药物是用于制造药品的中间产品。
Used as an antidepressant medication. 用作抗抑郁药物。
An industry study by McKinsey found that Glaxo sold 50 per cent of its volume, received three per cent of revenues and one per cent of profit in India. 麦肯锡的一项行业研究发现，葛兰素公司在印度的销量占其总量的 50%，收入占 3%，利润占 1%。
8In order to regulate the parallel activities of a foreign company, which had an ongoing joint venture in India, the regulations stipulated that the foreign partner must get a "No objection letter" from its Indian partner, before setting up a wholly owned subsidiary. 8 为了规范在印度有合资企业的外国公司的并行活动，条例规定外国合作伙伴在设立全资子公司之前必须获得印度合作伙伴的 "无异议函"。