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CitiPoint Asia: Trump China Retaliation Threat - Financial Equivalent Of The Cuban Missile Crisis?
花旗亚洲观察：特朗普对华报复威胁——金融界的古巴导弹危机？

Markets Mohammed Apabhai  市场动态 穆罕默德·阿帕巴海
3 hours ago
NOT A PRODUCT OF CITI RESEARCH - INTENDED FOR INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS ONLY.
非花旗研究报告产品——仅面向机构客户。

MACRO: TRUMP RETALIATION THREAT TO CHINA - FINANCIAL EQUIVALENT OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?
宏观视角：特朗普对华报复威胁——金融领域的古巴导弹危机重演？

Last Friday we suggested that the China’s announcement of a 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% tariff on all US imports into China starting from 10 April was a mistake from a Game Theory perspective in this Game of Trade Wars. The US has imposed 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% tariffs on all Chinese imports to the US in addition to the 20 % 20 % 20%20 \% fentanyl tariffs.
上周五我们指出，从博弈论角度看，中国宣布自 4 月 10 日起对所有美国进口商品加征 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% 关税在贸易战博弈中是步错棋。美国除已对华加征 20 % 20 % 20%20 \% 芬太尼关税外，现又对所有中国输美商品加征 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% 关税。
(The earlier Section 301 tariffs announced on 27 Sep 2024 could also be applicable with the effective rate around 11 % 11 % 11%11 \%. Tariffs on these additional products and increases in certain tariffs from the September 27 list will enter effect on January 1, 2025 and January 1, 2026 but for now we will exclude these from our calculations.)
（2024 年 9 月 27 日宣布的 301 条款关税也可能适用，实际税率约为 11 % 11 % 11%11 \% 。新增商品关税及部分 9 月 27 日清单商品的关税上调将于 2025 年 1 月 1 日和 2026 年 1 月 1 日生效，但当前测算暂不纳入这些因素。）
On Friday we suggested that the objective function of the US remains “the elimination of the trade deficit” and suggested that the Trump administration would raise tariffs by a a further 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% on all Chinese imports from 54 % 54 % 54%54 \% to 79 % 79 % 79%79 \% and that this would be announced as early as the weekend.
上周五我们分析称，美国的核心目标仍是"消除贸易逆差"，并预测特朗普政府会将所有中国商品关税从 54 % 54 % 54%54 \% 进一步提高 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% 至 79 % 79 % 79%79 \% ，相关声明最早可能于周末发布。
President Trump has now threatened to apply an additional 50 % 50 % 50%50 \% tariff on all Chinese imports starting on 9 Apr if China does not withdraw its 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% tariffs by today ( 8 Apr ) taking tariffs on Chinese exports to the US to a prohibitive 104 % 104 % 104%104 \%.
特朗普总统最新威胁称，若中国不在今日（4 月 8 日）撤销其 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% 关税，将于 4 月 9 日起对所有中国商品额外加征 50 % 50 % 50%50 \% 关税，使中国输美商品关税达到令人却步的 104 % 104 % 104%104 \% 。
We believe that these additional tariffs have at least four objectives:
我们认为这些额外关税至少有以下四个目的：
  1. To punish China for their imposition of retaliatory tariffs - the 50 % 50 % 50%50 \% retaliation is even higher than what we had expected but it does make some sense as we shall see
    惩罚中国实施报复性关税—— 50 % 50 % 50%50 \% 的报复力度甚至超出我们预期，但正如我们将看到的，这确实有其合理性
  2. To raise even more money to fund the US fiscal debt - the US will be raising $ 446.7 bn $ 446.7 bn $446.7bn\$ 446.7 \mathrm{bn} of tariffs from Chinese imports which is nearly ten times the $ 47.5 b $ 47.5 b $47.5 b\$ 47.5 b b of tariffs that China will be raising from US imports. It will be very difficult for China to out-tariff the US.
    为美国财政债务筹集更多资金——美国将从中国进口商品中征收 $ 446.7 bn $ 446.7 bn $446.7bn\$ 446.7 \mathrm{bn} 的关税，这几乎是中国对美进口商品征收 $ 47.5 b $ 47.5 b $47.5 b\$ 47.5 b 亿美元关税的十倍。中国很难在关税战上超越美国。
  3. To fire a warning shot to the EU to show them what they can expect if they decide to impose significant retaliatory tariffs - EU trade ministers were meeting on Monday to decide their response to the Trump “reciprocal” tariffs.
    向欧盟发出警告信号，展示若其决定实施重大报复性关税将面临的后果——欧盟贸易部长周一召开会议，商讨如何回应特朗普的"对等"关税政策。
  4. To draw a demarcation between “enemies” and “friends” allowing for favorable treatments for those who agree to US demands
    在“敌人”与“朋友”之间划清界限，以便对那些同意美国要求的人给予优惠待遇
With the new tariffs threatened on China, the US will be raising a total of $ 1.04 $ 1.04 $1.04\$ 1.04 tn from tariffs, eliminating 79.5 % 79.5 % 79.5%79.5 \% of the trade deficit. It also eliminates around 40 % 40 % 40%40 \% of the fiscal debt for this year taking the US fiscal debt to GDP ratio down from an estimated 6.6 % 6.6 % 6.6%6.6 \% to 3.8 % 3.8 % 3.8%3.8 \% - with other budget cuts and expiry of some tax relief measures, the 3 % 3 % 3%\mathbf{3 \%} fiscal debt to GDP target appears to be within sight.
随着对华新关税的威胁，美国将通过关税总计增加 $ 1.04 $ 1.04 $1.04\$ 1.04 万亿美元收入，消除 79.5 % 79.5 % 79.5%79.5 \% 的贸易逆差。此举还将削减今年约 40 % 40 % 40%40 \% 的财政债务，使美国财政债务占 GDP 比重从预估的 6.6 % 6.6 % 6.6%6.6 \% 降至 3.8 % 3.8 % 3.8%3.8 \% ——结合其他预算削减措施及部分税收减免政策到期， 3 % 3 % 3%\mathbf{3 \%} 的财政债务与 GDP 比率目标似乎触手可及。
The objective function of the Trump administration also appears to have hardened. Not only do they now want to eliminate the trade deficit it seems they now want to establish a trade surplus that will only grow as bilateral trade shrinks. With these new tariffs the US is aiming for a 55.1 % 55.1 % 55.1%55.1 \% share of bilateral trade, which is still below the 63.1 % 63.1 % 63.1%63.1 \% share we thought was optimal from our multi-stage bargaining problem described
特朗普政府的目标函数也明显趋于强硬。他们不仅希望消除贸易逆差，如今更意图建立一种随着双边贸易萎缩而持续扩大的贸易顺差。通过新关税措施，美国正谋求 55.1 % 55.1 % 55.1%55.1 \% 的双边贸易份额，这仍低于我们此前通过多阶段谈判问题分析得出的最优份额 63.1 % 63.1 % 63.1%63.1 \% 。
below. Using that framework it suggests that the US is factoring a hit by bilateral trade which impacts the exports of China and the US equally - this is a conservative assumption from the US. It is likely though that within a few years, with such punitive tariffs, the fall in bilateral trade will see the US moving towards that optimal 63.1 % 63.1 % 63.1%63.1 \% target.
根据该框架分析，美国正将双边贸易受冲击的因素纳入考量，这种冲击对中美两国出口的影响均等——这是美方采取的保守假设。然而可以预见的是，在如此惩罚性关税实施后的几年内，双边贸易的萎缩将促使美国逐步逼近最优的 63.1 % 63.1 % 63.1%63.1 \% 目标值。

We do not expect the Chinese side to back down - but from a Game Theory what should China do?
我们预计中方不会让步——但从博弈论角度，中国应当采取何种策略？

If the Chinese objective function is to maximize a) Chinese exports to the US and b) their share of bilateral trade then they should accept the Trump proposal and abolish their 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% retaliatory tariffs. Even with the 54% tariffs China would be running a $ 57.9 bn $ 57.9 bn $57.9bn\$ 57.9 \mathrm{bn} trade surplus with the US assuming no Chinese retaliatory tariffs and enjoy 53.6 % 53.6 % 53.6%53.6 \% of bilateral trade (down from the current pre-tariff 75.5 % 75.5 % 75.5%75.5 \% ). With the Chinese 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% retaliatory tariffs that surplus increases to $ 105.4 bn $ 105.4 bn $105.4bn\$ 105.4 \mathrm{bn} and China’s share of bilateral trade increases to 56.2 % 56.2 % 56.2%56.2 \%.
若中国的目标函数旨在最大化：a)对美出口规模，及 b)双边贸易份额，则应当接受特朗普提案并取消其 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% 报复性关税。即便面临 54%的关税，假设中国不实施报复性关税，仍将保持 $ 57.9 bn $ 57.9 bn $57.9bn\$ 57.9 \mathrm{bn} 的对美贸易顺差，并占据 53.6 % 53.6 % 53.6%53.6 \% 的双边贸易份额（低于当前实施关税前的 75.5 % 75.5 % 75.5%75.5 \% ）。而若中国实施 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% 报复性关税，该顺差将扩大至 $ 105.4 bn $ 105.4 bn $105.4bn\$ 105.4 \mathrm{bn} ，中国在双边贸易中的份额也将升至 56.2 % 56.2 % 56.2%56.2 \% 。
To best meet these Chinese objectives, the optimal route for China to take would be to abolish the 3 4 % 3 4 % 34%\mathbf{3 4 \%} retaliatory tariffs and enter into “cooperative” trade negotiations with the US - pay the 5 4 % 5 4 % 54%\mathbf{5 4 \%} tariffs for now and then look to negotiate them down. For China the best outcome is to maintain a situation as close to the pre-tariff status quo as far as possible - that was a state where China was “winning”.
为实现这些中国目标的最佳路径，中国应取消 3 4 % 3 4 % 34%\mathbf{3 4 \%} 报复性关税并与美国展开"合作性"贸易谈判——暂时支付 5 4 % 5 4 % 54%\mathbf{5 4 \%} 关税，随后寻求通过谈判降低关税。对中国而言，最理想的结果是尽可能维持接近加税前现状的局面——那种状态下中国处于"赢家"地位。
We do not expect them to do this as from a domestic political perspective as it would make the Chinese administration look politically weak to their domestic audience.
我们预计中方不会采取这一策略，因为从国内政治角度看，这会让中国政府在国内民众面前显得政治软弱。
However there is another possibility that we have been thinking about and which comes into play. Our multistage bargaining problem below focuses on bilateral trade and the impact that retaliatory tariffs can have.
但我们正在考虑另一种可能性。下文的多阶段谈判问题将聚焦双边贸易及报复性关税可能产生的影响。
What China could do, and maybe already have realized, is that the damage that they can do to the US extends beyond trade to the whole US economic system. With the Keyrate already at 60 and threatening to rise further, it threatens the whole economic system by posing systemic risk - we estimate that global systemic risk is at its highest level since the Mar 2023 SVB events.
中国可能已经意识到，其能对美国造成的损害不仅限于贸易领域，而是波及整个美国经济体系。随着关键利率已达 60 并可能继续上升，这种系统性风险正威胁着整个经济体系——我们估计当前全球系统性风险已达到自 2023 年 3 月硅谷银行事件以来的最高水平。
In this framework, China raises the stakes and goes for a much higher reward - the total abolition of the tariffs altogether. If Chinese actions can force markets much lower and generate systemic risk through their actions, their hope would be that it would force the Trump administration to the negotiating table and the suspension of all tariffs (against them). It is likely that they will be able to succeed in this objective. Although press reports of a 90 -day delay in the implementation of tariffs have been delayed by the White House, it does show (and the market reaction shows) the potential for what could be announced if markets sold off.
在这一框架下，中国提高了赌注，追求更高的回报——彻底取消所有关税。如果中国的行动能够迫使市场大幅下跌，并通过其行为引发系统性风险，他们的希望是这将迫使特朗普政府回到谈判桌前，并暂停所有（针对中国的）关税。他们很可能实现这一目标。尽管白宫推迟了关于关税实施延迟 90 天的新闻报道，但这确实表明（市场反应也显示），如果市场出现抛售，可能会宣布什么样的措施。
This would mean that the Game would not be just one of trade wars but for the whole economic system. It would be a game that would threaten Mutually Assured Destruction - from that perspective if China decides to go down this route, and we believe that they will, what we are about to face in the next few days is the financial equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis - a tense standoff that will threaten the whole integrity of the global financial system in a way not seen since covid.
这意味着这场博弈将不仅仅是贸易战，而是关乎整个经济体系。这将是一场威胁到“相互确保毁灭”的博弈——从这个角度来看，如果中国决定走这条路，而我们相信他们会这样做，那么我们在未来几天将面临的是金融领域的古巴导弹危机——一场紧张的僵局，将以自新冠疫情以来未见的方式威胁全球金融体系的完整性。
We do not believe that the Fed is getting ready to cut interest rates yet so any US policy action is going to have to come from the White House.
我们并不认为美联储已准备降息，因此任何美国政策行动都必须来自白宫。
For this to happen, equity and risk assets need to fall much more. Clearly the Trump administration is still playing the Game of Trade War - it is not playing the bigger Game of Mutually Assured Destruction Global Systemic Risk. The Trump administration still clearly believes that it can win the Trade War Game while avoiding having to play the bigger game.
要实现这一点，股市和风险资产需要进一步大幅下跌。显然，特朗普政府仍在玩贸易战游戏——而非涉及全球系统性风险、相互确保摧毁的更大博弈。特朗普政府仍坚信能在贸易战中取胜，同时避免卷入更宏大的较量。
The gamble that China faces is whether to raise their 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% retaliatory tariffs further or not - we believe it is not optimal to do so in the Trade War Game but it may be optimal to do so in the bigger Game. If China retaliates with increased tariffs it suggests that China is playing a Game bigger than the Trade War Game.
中国面临的抉择是是否进一步提高报复性关税——我们认为这在贸易战博弈中并非最优策略，但在更宏大的博弈中可能是明智之举。若中国以加征关税反击，则表明其正在下一盘超越贸易战的大棋。
The optimal outcome for China and for markets which broadly do not like the trade war is to force the US to come to the negotiating table by threatening a systemic event - China and the markets need to raise the cost to the US not only in terms of bilateral trade but much broader and bigger than that.
对中国及普遍厌恶贸易战的市场而言，最优解是通过威胁引发系统性事件，迫使美国回到谈判桌前——中国与市场需要让美国付出的代价不仅限于双边贸易领域，而应拓展至更广泛、更重大的层面。
The hope would be that by taking them to the brink, China would be able to force the US to postpone all tariffs on them and restore status quo ante. Big stakes - it is up to President Xi to decide which game he wants to play and how much he wants to gamble.
希望在于，通过将局势推向边缘，中国能够迫使美国推迟所有对华关税并恢复原状。赌注巨大——这取决于总统Xi决定他想玩哪种游戏以及愿意冒多大的风险。
To measure this threat to the Trump administration we would use our Keyrate indicator, CGUSKRTE. In Mar 2023, it reached 66 forcing the US Federal Reserve and the Biden administration to orchestrate a bailout and provide liquidity to the banking system. We are currently at 60 on the Keyrate. We note that the Fed and the Trump administration has still not made any commitment to the USD swap lines to the ECB and other major Central Banks.
为衡量这一对特朗普政府的威胁，我们将使用我们的关键利率指标 CGUSKRTE。2023 年 3 月，该指标达到 66，迫使美联储和拜登政府策划了一场救助行动，为银行体系提供流动性。目前关键利率为 60。我们注意到，美联储和特朗普政府尚未对向欧洲央行及其他主要央行提供美元互换额度做出任何承诺。
Chart 1: Keyrate Rises Above 60, Getting Closer To 66 Level During SVB, Covid Was 98
图表 1：关键利率突破 60，逼近硅谷银行危机时的 66 水平，新冠疫情期间曾达 98
Source: Citi Trading Strategies
来源：花旗交易策略部
To measure the risk to China, we use our CGCHRISK indicator which estimates the probability of the US applying sanctions on China as it did to Russia and which appears to be a major driver of the equity market.
为衡量中国面临的风险，我们采用 CGCHRISK 指标来估算美国像对俄罗斯那样对中国实施制裁的概率，这似乎是股市的主要驱动因素。
Chart 2: CGCHRISK Seen As Proxy For Threat To China
图表 2：CGCHRISK 被视为对华威胁的替代指标
In an attempt to understand the minds of the Trump and Xi administrations we are currently updating our work on Catastrophe Theory that we used in 2018 to analyse the Trump-Kim nuclear standoff. In that situation as well, the Trump administration dramatically raised the threat to the opponent but failed to realize that it also resulted in a dramatic rise in a cost to itself (the threat of a nuclear attack from North Korea). At the moment both leaders see a bigger threat than cost and so are on the “attack” path. Markets need to remind them of the cost and push them towards the Neutral zone that will open up room for negotiation. More details on our 2018 piece are available at this link. We will be updating this work for this trade war shortly but we see both Presidents Trump and Xi currently on the attack plane so without the market reminding them of the cost the trade war will continue to escalate.
为了理解特朗普及Xi政府的意图，我们正在更新曾用于分析 2018 年特朗普与金正恩核僵局的“灾难理论”研究。在那场对峙中，特朗普政府大幅提升了对对手的威胁，却未意识到这也导致自身代价急剧上升（来自朝鲜核打击的威胁）。当前两位领导人皆认为威胁大于代价，因而处于“进攻”路径。市场需提醒他们代价所在，推动双方进入中立区，为谈判创造空间。关于我们 2018 年研究的更多细节可查阅此链接。我们将针对此次贸易战更新该研究，但目前观察到特朗普与Xi总统均处于进攻态势，若市场不提醒其代价，贸易战将持续升级。

Chart 3: Analyzing The 2018 North Korea Standoff Using A Cusp Catastrophe - Both Presidents Trump And Xi Are Currently In A High Threat - Low Cost "Attack " State
图表 3：运用尖点突变模型分析 2018 年朝鲜对峙局势——特朗普总统与Xi当前均处于“高威胁-低成本”的“攻击”状态

Source: Citi Trading Strategies
来源：花旗交易策略部
If this formulation is correct then it means that there is no immediate de-escalation of the trade war, the stakes are going to be raised and another leg of the selloff is about to begin. The dead cat bounce over the past 12 hours is therefore an opportunity to sell and to hedge. We believe we might be about 48 hours away from a major inflexion point in markets - but as we have seen in the past few days, a lot can happen in 48 hours. The selloff is not yet over and is likely to get worse before it gets better.
若此分析成立，则意味着贸易战不会立即缓和，博弈筹码将继续加码，新一轮抛售浪潮即将开始。过去 12 小时内的死猫反弹行情实为卖出和对冲良机。我们判断距离市场重大转折点或仅剩 48 小时——但正如近日所见，48 小时内仍可能风云变幻。抛售尚未结束，市场在好转前或将进一步恶化。
Hedges remain difficult to find but NKY risk reversals are still potentially available.
对冲工具仍难觅得，但日经指数风险逆转策略或仍存操作空间
3m NKY 90-110 bearish risk reversals (buy 9 0 % 9 0 % 90%\mathbf{9 0 \%} put - sell 1 1 0 % 1 1 0 % 110%\mathbf{1 1 0 \%} call) for 1 . 1 5 % 1 . 1 5 % 1.15%\mathbf{1 . 1 5 \%} premium.
3 个月期日经指数 90-110 看跌风险反转（以 9 0 % 9 0 % 90%\mathbf{9 0 \%} 价格买入看跌期权 - 以 1 1 0 % 1 1 0 % 110%\mathbf{1 1 0 \%} 价格卖出看涨期权），权利金为 1 . 1 5 % 1 . 1 5 % 1.15%\mathbf{1 . 1 5 \%} 。

MACRO: CHINA TARIFF MISTAKE - WHERE THE US WILL NOW RAISE TARIFFS ON CHINA
宏观：中国关税误判——美国将在哪些领域对中国加征关税

Equity markets sold off after China announced that it would apply a 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% tariff on all US imports into China starting from 10 April matching the “reciprocal” tariffs imposed by the US on Thursday. We estimate this will raise approximately $ 47.5 bn $ 47.5 bn $47.5bn\$ 47.5 \mathrm{bn}.
中国宣布自 4 月 10 日起对所有美国进口商品加征 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% 关税，以匹配美国周四实施的"对等"关税措施，股市随后下跌。我们估计这将增加约 $ 47.5 bn $ 47.5 bn $47.5bn\$ 47.5 \mathrm{bn} 。
The US has imposed 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% tariffs on all Chinese imports to the US in addition to the 20 % 20 % 20%20 \% fentanyl tariffs.
美国已对所有中国进口商品加征 34 % 34 % 34%34 \% 关税，此外还包括 20 % 20 % 20%20 \% 的芬太尼关税。
The earlier Section 301 tariffs announced on 27 Sep 2024 could also be applicable with the effective rate around 11 % 11 % 11%11 \%. Tariffs on these additional products (and increases in certain tariffs from the September 27 list) will enter effect on January 1, 2025 and January 1, 2026 but for now we will exclude these from our calculations. The Trump administration has vowed to increase tariffs further if there were any retaliatory tariffs announced by trading competitors.
2024 年 9 月 27 日宣布的早期 301 条款关税也可能适用，有效税率约为 11 % 11 % 11%11 \% 。这些额外产品的关税（以及 9 月 27 日清单中部分关税的上调）将于 2025 年 1 月 1 日和 2026 年 1 月 1 日生效，但现阶段我们暂不将其纳入计算。特朗普政府誓言，若贸易竞争对手宣布报复性关税，将进一步提高关税。
Assuming that the US objective function continues to be the elimination of the trade deficit we would now expect the Trump administration to raise tariffs on all Chinese imports from 5 4 % 5 4 % 54%\mathbf{5 4 \%}, by a further 2 5 % 2 5 % 25%\mathbf{2 5 \%}, to 7 9 % 7 9 % 79%\mathbf{7 9 \%}. This would raise a further $ 107.4 bn $ 107.4 bn $107.4bn\$ 107.4 \mathrm{bn} in addition to the $ 232 bn $ 232 bn $232bn\$ 232 \mathrm{bn} previously announced, taking total tariffs from China to $ 339.4 bn $ 339.4 bn $339.4bn\$ 339.4 \mathrm{bn}. We would expect Mr Trump to end his “kind” attitude towards tariffs and ask to be fully “compensated”.
假设美国的目标函数仍是消除贸易逆差，我们预计特朗普政府会将所有中国进口商品的关税从当前的 5 4 % 5 4 % 54%\mathbf{5 4 \%} 进一步提高 2 5 % 2 5 % 25%\mathbf{2 5 \%} ，至 7 9 % 7 9 % 79%\mathbf{7 9 \%} 。这将额外增加 $ 107.4 bn $ 107.4 bn $107.4bn\$ 107.4 \mathrm{bn} 税收，加上此前宣布的 $ 232 bn $ 232 bn $232bn\$ 232 \mathrm{bn} ，对华关税总额将达 $ 339.4 bn $ 339.4 bn $339.4bn\$ 339.4 \mathrm{bn} 。我们预计特朗普将结束其关税“温和”态度，要求获得全额“补偿”。
Any attempts by the EU to impose retaliatory tariffs is likely to be met with similar harsh countermeasures. Our numbers show that retaliatory tariffs would be a mistake and that countries should look to negotiate with the US and reach a negotiated solution.
欧盟任何实施报复性关税的企图都可能招致同样严厉的反制措施。我们的数据显示，报复性关税将是错误选择，各国应寻求与美国谈判达成协商解决方案。
China should retaliate by weakening the currency rather than retaliating via tariffs. This would China to reflate and force the US towards deflation which would then force the Trump administration towards negotiations.
中国应通过货币贬值而非加征关税进行反制。此举将助力中国实现通货再膨胀，同时迫使美国陷入通缩，进而推动特朗普政府重回谈判桌。
The total tariffs raised for the US from all trading partners now is expected to be in excess of $ 934.2 bn $ 934.2 bn $934.2bn\$ 934.2 \mathrm{bn}. This will now take the US fiscal debt to GDP for CY2025 from the pre-tariff 6.6 % 6.6 % 6.6%6.6 \% to 4.4 % 4.4 % 4.4%4.4 \% pre-retaliation to 4.1 % 4.1 % 4.1%4.1 \% before the impact of any GDP or trade reduction is taken into account.
美国从所有贸易伙伴处征收的关税总额预计将超过 $ 934.2 bn $ 934.2 bn $934.2bn\$ 934.2 \mathrm{bn} 。这将使美国 2025 财年的财政债务占 GDP 比重从加税前 6.6 % 6.6 % 6.6%6.6 \% 升至反制前 4.4 % 4.4 % 4.4%4.4 \% ，若考虑 GDP 或贸易缩减的影响，该数值将进一步升至 4.1 % 4.1 % 4.1%4.1 \% 。
The 54 % 54 % 54%54 \% tariff is expected to negatively impact Chinese GDP growth by − 2.4 % − 2.4 % -2.4%-2.4 \% - we would expect 79 % 79 % 79%79 \% tariffs to negatively impact Chinese GDP growth by over 3 % 3 % 3%3 \%. Credit markets should pay attention to companies whose profits are reliant on exports - it is one of the reasons the TPNBNK to have sold off as Japanese banks have lent significant amounts to Asian exporters.
54 % 54 % 54%54 \% 关税预计将对中国 GDP 增速造成 − 2.4 % − 2.4 % -2.4%-2.4 \% 的负面影响——若关税升至 79 % 79 % 79%79 \% ，对中国 GDP 增速的拖累可能超过 3 % 3 % 3%3 \% 。信贷市场需重点关注依赖出口盈利的企业，这也是 TPNBNK 遭抛售的原因之一，因日本银行向亚洲出口商提供了大量贷款。
There is no exceptionalism for either Europe or China - we would expect those markets also to be impacted. The HSTECH is indicating down 10.7 % 10.7 % 10.7%10.7 \% on Monday while the FXI has fallen 8.5 % 8.5 % 8.5%8.5 \% and the Nasdaq Golden Dragons index has fallen 8.8 % 8.8 % 8.8%8.8 \% with nearly half the members of the index dropping more than 10 % 10 % 10%10 \%.
欧洲和中国均无例外——我们预计这些市场同样将受冲击。恒生科技指数预示周一开盘下跌 10.7 % 10.7 % 10.7%10.7 \% ，FXI 指数已下跌 8.5 % 8.5 % 8.5%8.5 \% ，纳斯达克金龙指数下跌 8.8 % 8.8 % 8.8%8.8 \% ，其中近半数成分股跌幅超过 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 。
HSCEI gamma is likely to finally pay off.
恒生中国企业指数期权的 Gamma 策略终于有望见效。

MACRO: HOW FAR THE US SHOULD PUSH CHINA TO REACH AGREEMENT - WHAT MINIMUM TARIFFS SHOULD BE
宏观视角：美国应在对华施压达成协议上走多远——最低关税门槛探讨

In a piece earlier today we argued that tariffs of 15 % 15 % 15%15 \% which were being suggested by press reports were suboptimal and that the Trump administration would be better served by “going big” on tariffs and then negotiating them later (link). We now look at where that optimum could potentially be - this would then help guide the size of the tariffs.
在今日早前的一篇分析中，我们指出媒体报道中提及的@0%关税方案并非最优选择，并建议特朗普政府应采取"先大幅加征后谈判削减"的策略（附链接）。现我们将进一步探讨这一最优关税水平可能的位置，以此为关税规模提供参考依据。

Chart 1: US-China Absolute Bilateral Trade Since Global Financial Crisis
图表 1：全球金融危机以来中美双边贸易绝对规模走势

Source: Citi Trading Strategies
来源：花旗交易策略
(Click image to enlarge)
（点击图片放大）
To understand this, we need to play another game. X and Y need to split an amount of money between them, call it $ 100 $ 100 $100\$ 100. X makes an offer to Y Y YY, which can be accepted or rejected. If the offer is accepted, then X gets x while Y gets (1-x) - we write this as ( x , 1 − x x , 1 − x x,1-x\mathrm{x}, 1-\mathrm{x} ). If the offer gets rejected in the next round, Y offers y to X and keeps ( 1 − y 1 − y 1-y1-\mathrm{y} ) for himself - we write this as ( y , 1 − y y , 1 − y y,1-y\mathrm{y}, 1-\mathrm{y} ).
要理解这一点，我们需要玩另一个游戏。X 和 Y 需要分割一笔钱，称之为 $ 100 $ 100 $100\$ 100 。X 向 Y Y YY 提出分配方案，对方可以选择接受或拒绝。若方案被接受，则 X 得 x，Y 得(1-x)——我们记为( x , 1 − x x , 1 − x x,1-x\mathrm{x}, 1-\mathrm{x} )。若方案在下一轮被拒绝，则由 Y 提出分配比例 y 给 X，自己保留( 1 − y 1 − y 1-y1-\mathrm{y} )——记为( y , 1 − y y , 1 − y y,1-y\mathrm{y}, 1-\mathrm{y} )。
There is a cost to not reaching an agreement, which is that the amount of money available to X drops to δ 1 X δ 1 X delta_(1)X\delta_{1} \mathrm{X} each time there is no agreement, while the amount of money available to Y drops to δ 2 y δ 2 y delta_(2)y\delta_{2} \mathrm{y} each time there is no agreement, where δ 1 δ 1 delta_(1)\delta_{1} and δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\delta_{2} can be seen as “discount factors”. The game gets repeated until there is an agreement and each time the amount of money available to each player and the total amount of money to be shared keeps dropping. Clearly, it is in the interests of both players to reach an agreement as soon as possible to prevent the total pie going to zero - but what is the optimal level for that agreement?
未能达成协议存在代价：每次谈判破裂，X 可分配金额降至 δ 1 X δ 1 X delta_(1)X\delta_{1} \mathrm{X} ，Y 可分配金额降至 δ 2 y δ 2 y delta_(2)y\delta_{2} \mathrm{y} ，其中 δ 1 δ 1 delta_(1)\delta_{1} 和 δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\delta_{2} 可视为“折扣因子”。游戏将重复进行直至达成协议，而每次玩家可分配金额及待分割总额都会递减。显然，为避免总收益归零，双方都有动机尽快达成协议——但最优的协议点在哪里？
Given the discount factor, Y should clearly accept the offer from X if:
考虑到折扣因子，Y 显然应该接受 X 的报价，如果：
( 1 − x ) ≥ δ 2 ( 1 − y ) ( 1 − x ) ≥ δ 2 ( 1 − y ) (1-x) >= delta_(2)(1-y)(1-x) \geq \delta_{2}(1-y)
Getting (1-x) now is better than rejecting it and getting (1-y) in the next round discounted by δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\delta_{2}.
现在获得(1-x)比拒绝并在下一轮以 δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\delta_{2} 的折扣获得(1-y)更有利。
Similarly, X should accept the offer from Y if y ≥ δ 1 ( x ) y ≥ δ 1 ( x ) y >= delta_(1)(x)\mathrm{y} \geq \delta_{1}(\mathrm{x}).
同理，X 应该接受 Y 的报价，如果 y ≥ δ 1 ( x ) y ≥ δ 1 ( x ) y >= delta_(1)(x)\mathrm{y} \geq \delta_{1}(\mathrm{x}) 。
At the point of indifference, we can replace the inequalities by equal signs and then solve to find that the optimal offer for each player is:
在无差异点上，我们可以将不等式替换为等号，然后求解得出每位玩家的最优报价为：
x ∗ = ( 1 − δ 2 ) 1 − δ 1 δ 2 y ∗ = δ 1 ( 1 − δ 2 ) 1 − δ 1 δ 2 x ∗ = 1 − δ 2 1 − δ 1 δ 2 y ∗ = δ 1 1 − δ 2 1 − δ 1 δ 2 {:[x^(**)=((1-delta_(2)))/(1-delta_(1)delta_(2))],[y^(**)=(delta_(1)(1-delta_(2)))/(1-delta_(1)delta_(2))]:}\begin{gathered} x^{*}=\frac{\left(1-\delta_{2}\right)}{1-\delta_{1} \delta_{2}} \\ y^{*}=\frac{\delta_{1}\left(1-\delta_{2}\right)}{1-\delta_{1} \delta_{2}} \end{gathered}
How does this relate to the trade war? The US and China are trying to share bilateral trade, but each time there is a disagreement and tariffs go on or stay on, there is a drop in the amount of bilateral trade or exports. The amount that the US exports drop by is given by δ 1 δ 1 delta_(1)\delta_{1}, while the amount that Chinese exports drop by is given by δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\delta_{2}.
这与贸易战有何关联？美国和中国正试图进行双边贸易，但每次出现分歧，关税增加或维持时，双边贸易或出口量就会下降。美国出口下降的幅度由 δ 1 δ 1 delta_(1)\delta_{1} 表示，而中国出口下降的幅度则由 δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\delta_{2} 表示。
How do we understand the discount factor, δ δ delta\delta ? It can be interpreted as the percentage of exports remaining after each year (or trading period) that the trade war is fought. Clearly, the closer the δ δ delta\delta is to 1 , the more patience that player has as the trade war has a smaller impact on their exports. The closer that δ δ delta\boldsymbol{\delta} is to 1 1 1\mathbf{1} for each player, the larger the share of the pie they will end up with because they can hold out longer for a better deal without suffering as much damage as the opponent. When the δ δ delta\delta is close to 1 for both players, the optimal share of bilateral trade for each player approaches 50 % 50 % 50%50 \%.
我们如何理解折扣因子 δ δ delta\delta ？它可以解释为贸易战每持续一年（或一个交易周期）后剩余的出口百分比。显然， δ δ delta\delta 越接近 1，表明该参与方越有耐心，因为贸易战对其出口的影响越小。对于每个参与方而言， δ δ delta\boldsymbol{\delta} 越接近 1 1 1\mathbf{1} ，他们最终获得的贸易份额就越大，因为他们能坚持更长时间以争取更有利的交易条件，而承受的损失比对手更小。当双方的 δ δ delta\delta 都接近 1 时，每位参与方的最优双边贸易份额将趋近于 50 % 50 % 50%50 \% 。
In 2018, the trade war resulted in an 11.4 % 11.4 % 11.4%11.4 \% drop in US exports to China, so δ 1 = 0.886 δ 1 = 0.886 delta_(1)=0.886\delta_{1}=0.886 while it resulted in a 16.8 % 16.8 % 16.8%16.8 \% drop in Chinese exports to the US so δ 2 i = 0.832 δ 2 i = 0.832 delta_(2)i=0.832\delta_{2} \mathrm{i}=0.832. The US had more “patience” than China and should therefore get a larger share of the bilateral pie. This means that the optimal US share of bilateral trade should be 6 3 . 1 % 6 3 . 1 % 63.1%\mathbf{6 3 . 1 \%} while the optimal Chinese share of bilateral trade would be 3 6 . 9 % 3 6 . 9 % 36.9%\mathbf{3 6 . 9 \%}. The US has never come close to 30 % 30 % 30%30 \% of the bilateral trade, let alone 63 % 63 % 63%63 \%. Why not?
2018 年，贸易战导致美国对华出口下降 11.4 % 11.4 % 11.4%11.4 \% ，因此 δ 1 = 0.886 δ 1 = 0.886 delta_(1)=0.886\delta_{1}=0.886 ；同时中国对美出口也下降 16.8 % 16.8 % 16.8%16.8 \% ，故而 δ 2 i = 0.832 δ 2 i = 0.832 delta_(2)i=0.832\delta_{2} \mathrm{i}=0.832 。美国比中国更有“耐心”，因此应在双边贸易中分得更大份额。这意味着美国在双边贸易中的最优份额应为 6 3 . 1 % 6 3 . 1 % 63.1%\mathbf{6 3 . 1 \%} ，而中国的最优份额则为 3 6 . 9 % 3 6 . 9 % 36.9%\mathbf{3 6 . 9 \%} 。美国从未接近过双边贸易的 30 % 30 % 30%30 \% ，更不用说 63 % 63 % 63%63 \% 。为何如此？
Chart 2: US And China Share Of Bilateral Trade Since The Global Financial Crisis
图表 2：全球金融危机以来美中双边贸易份额对比
For all of Mr. Trump’s trumpeted skills as a negotiator, it appears that his willingness to do a deal rather than holding out and being patient while the exports of his opponents are decimated, leads the US into sub-optimal trade deals, which means that the US loses the trade war despite being in a position of strength. This is the reason why the US share of bilateral trade increased during the Biden years - President Biden simply applied the tariffs and kept them there. Admittedly they were not in the size and scale now being threatened but the US share of bilateral trade did go up during his presidency. At each point it seems that the US has fought and lost the trade war by either being too willing to do a deal at sub-optimal conditions (Trump) or not being prepared to step up the trade war in the size that was needed (Biden).
尽管特朗普先生自诩为谈判高手，但他倾向于迅速达成协议而非保持耐心等待对手出口受挫的做法，似乎导致美国签署了次优的贸易协定，这意味着美国在占据优势地位的情况下仍输掉了贸易战。这正是为何在拜登执政期间美国双边贸易份额有所上升——拜登总统只是简单地实施并维持了关税。诚然，当时关税的规模和力度不及当前所威胁的水平，但美国双边贸易份额在其任内确实有所增长。纵观整个过程，美国似乎因在条件不利时过于急于达成协议（特朗普时期），或未能准备好以必要规模升级贸易战（拜登时期），而屡屡在贸易战中落败。
Chart 3: US Trade Deficit With China - Trump Years Shown In Red
图表 3：美国对华贸易逆差——特朗普任期数据以红色标示
Source: Citi Trading Strategies
来源：花旗交易策略部
(Click image to enlarge)
（点击图片放大）
In 2019, 25% tariffs on $250bn of Chinese goods resulted in a 16.8 % 16.8 % 16.8%16.8 \% drop in Chinese exports to the US while blended tariffs of 16.8 % 16.8 % 16.8%16.8 \% of $ 110 bn $ 110 bn $110bn\$ 110 \mathrm{bn} of US exports to China resulted in a 11.4 % 11.4 % 11.4%11.4 \% decline. With tariffs expected to be higher than this, it can be seen how the advantage is currently sitting with the US. If we assume that as a result of 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% tariffs on all Chinese exports, Chinese exports drop by 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% to the US, so that δ 2 = 0.75 δ 2 = 0.75 delta_(2)=0.75\delta_{2}=0.75 and Chinese retaliatory tariffs result in a 15 % 15 % 15%15 \% drop in US exports to China, so that δ 1 = 0.85 δ 1 = 0.85 delta_(1)=0.85\delta_{1}=0.85, then the US can hold out for 69.0 % 69.0 % 69.0%69.0 \% of bilateral trade completing reversing the current state of affairs. It may be that the tariffs play a large part of that rebalancing, but it will require the US to play the game properly, with patience, and not be too keen to reach a deal. Whether Mr Trump has that patience remains to be seen.
2019 年，美国对 2500 亿美元中国商品加征 25%关税导致中国对美出口下降 16.8 % 16.8 % 16.8%16.8 \% ，而美国对华出口商品综合关税达 16.8 % 16.8 % 16.8%16.8 \% （涉及 $ 110 bn $ 110 bn $110bn\$ 110 \mathrm{bn} 商品）造成其对华出口下滑 11.4 % 11.4 % 11.4%11.4 \% 。鉴于预期关税将高于当前水平，可见优势目前在美国一方。假设美国对所有中国输美商品加征 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% 关税，将导致中国对美出口减少 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% （即 δ 2 = 0.75 δ 2 = 0.75 delta_(2)=0.75\delta_{2}=0.75 ），而中国的报复性关税使美国对华出口下降 15 % 15 % 15%15 \% （即 δ 1 = 0.85 δ 1 = 0.85 delta_(1)=0.85\delta_{1}=0.85 ），那么美国只需承受双边贸易额 69.0 % 69.0 % 69.0%69.0 \% 的损失就能彻底扭转当前局面。关税可能在再平衡过程中发挥重要作用，但这要求美国保持战略耐心、规范行事，而非急于达成协议。至于特朗普先生是否具备这种耐心，仍有待观察。
It is optimal for the US to push the tariffs as high as possible to push δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\boldsymbol{\delta}_{\mathbf{2}} to as low as possible. That means tariffs need to be much higher than the 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% applied in 2019 and to a much broader swathe of Chinese exports to the USA. By knowing the economic damage that tariffs on bilateral exports are causing we can work out what the optimal levels should be. This is not a game of mutually assured destruction, although there is clearly destruction of demand - it is a calculated game designed to decimate the opponent’s exports in
对美国而言，将关税推至尽可能高的水平以将 δ 2 δ 2 delta_(2)\boldsymbol{\delta}_{\mathbf{2}} 压至最低是最优策略。这意味着关税需远高于 201 年实施的 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% ，并覆盖更广泛的中国对美出口商品。通过了解双边出口关税造成的经济损害，我们可以计算出最优关税水平。这并非一场确保相互摧毁的游戏，尽管明显存在需求破坏——而是一场旨在重创对手出口的精心算计的游戏。
an attempt to win the game. It is a non-cooperative game that aims to achieve full and outright victory. In President Trump’s current state of mind, it may be an approach that has appeal.
以试图赢得比赛。这是一场非合作博弈，旨在实现彻底而完全的胜利。在特朗普总统当前的心态下，这可能是一种具有吸引力的策略。
This game can be played with all the different trading partners of the USA. Once the tariffs are known overnight and the hit to bilateral exports is known we will be able to know what the optimal share of bilateral trade should be and whether or not the USA should continue fighting a trade war with that partner or quickly reach an agreement.
这种博弈可适用于美国所有不同的贸易伙伴。一旦关税在一夜之间确定且双边出口所受冲击明朗，我们就能判断双边贸易的最优份额，以及美国是否应继续与该伙伴进行贸易战，或是迅速达成协议。
What this does though is present a framework for looking at the trade war in a multi-stage bargaining game which is what trade negotiations represent - this also explains why China was so quick to agree to the deal offered to it by President Trump in 2019.
然而，这确实提出了一个框架，用于将贸易战视为多阶段博弈——这正是贸易谈判所体现的。这也解释了为何中国在 2019 年迅速接受了特朗普总统提出的协议。
Again what it argues is that the tariffs of 15 % 15 % 15%15 \% reported in the press are too low and that the market should brace itself for tariffs higher than that which is currently priced into the market.
该观点再次强调，媒体报道中提到的 15 % 15 % 15%15 \% 关税水平过低，市场应做好迎接高于当前定价水平的关税准备。

Mohammed Apabhai  穆罕默德·阿帕巴海

Asia Pacific Trading Strategies
亚太交易策略
+852 25018310
mohammed.apabhai@citi.com
Michel Chlela  米歇尔·克莱拉
Asia Pacific Trading Strategies
亚太交易策略
+852 25018314
michel.chlela@citi.com

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本文件仅供信息参考之用，并非条款的正式确认。其基于公开可得信息编制，对于所载信息的准确性/完整性或所示回报能否实现不作任何保证。假设条件的变更可能对回报产生重大影响，且过往表现不代表未来结果。价格/供应情况可能随时变更，恕不另行通知。本文档既非购买或出售任何证券的要约，亦不构成相关建议。详情请咨询您的花旗销售代表。本通讯可能包含基于当前市场状况评估的交易构想及/或交易策略描述，而市场状况可能快速变化。包括互换在内的衍生品交易风险重大，并非适合所有投资者及/或市场参与者。此外，任何拟议交易均可能涉及会计、税务、法律或其他影响。 在参与任何交易之前，您应自行判断（而非依赖花旗）该交易的经济风险或收益，以及法律、税务和会计特征与后果，并确认自身具备承担这些风险的能力。由于市场不可预测性、错误假设和/或其他因素，无法保证本文讨论的任何交易或交易策略不会导致亏损。请访问（
https://www.citivelocity.com/cv-content-web/geo/disclaimer/disclaimer.html
) for other important disclosures.
）查看其他重要披露信息。
Please refer to  请参阅
https://www.citivelocity.com/cv2/go/DoddFrankMaterialDisclosures
for additional disclosures if you are entering or may enter into transactions with Citibank, N.A.*, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Citigroup Energy Inc. or Citigroup Global Markets Limited.
若您正与花旗银行（Citibank, N.A.*）、花旗环球金融有限公司（Citigroup Global Markets Inc.）、花旗能源公司（Citigroup Energy Inc.）或花旗环球市场有限公司（Citigroup Global Markets Limited）进行或可能进行交易，以获取额外披露信息。
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本电子消息及任何附件（以下简称“消息”）所含信息仅供特定个人或实体接收，可能涉及机密、专有、特权或其他受法律保护内容。若非指定收件人，请立即通知发件人，删除该消息，切勿向任何第三方披露、分发、复制或以其他方式使用。花旗集团及其附属机构保留监控、记录及保留电子消息的权利。除非在消息发送前以书面形式单独确认，任何消息均不得解释为(i)要约
or invitation to any offer, or assumption of any obligation, by Citigroup or any of its affiliates, or (ii) commitment of, or binding on, Citigroup or any of its affiliates, to make any investment, financial or any other transaction. Electronic messages are not secure or error free and can contain viruses or may be delayed. The sender, Citigroup and its affiliates have no responsibility or liability for interception, alteration, unauthorized access and/or misuse of any information and for any resultant breach of confidentiality including due to any of the circumstances listed above, and further shall not be held responsible or liable for any error, or delays arising out of systems failures, disruptions, and other events or circumstances that are not within our control.
或由花旗集团或其任何附属公司发出的任何要约邀请或承担任何义务，或(ii)花旗集团或其任何附属公司承诺或约束进行任何投资、金融或其他交易。电子消息并不安全且可能存在错误，可能包含病毒或延迟。发送方、花旗集团及其附属公司对任何信息的拦截、篡改、未经授权访问和/或滥用以及由此导致的保密性破坏（包括上述任何情况）不承担任何责任或义务，并且对于因系统故障、中断及其他非我们控制范围内的事件或情况导致的任何错误或延迟亦不承担任何责任或义务。
Please be advised that pursuant to Executive Order 13959, as amended (the “Order”), U.S. persons are prohibited from investing in securities of any company determined by the United States Government to be a Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Company, or otherwise targeted by the Order. This written commentary / trade idea is not intended to be used or relied upon in any way that could result in a violation of the Order. Investors are encouraged to rely upon their own legal counsel for advice on compliance with the Order and other economic sanctions programs administered and enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Treasury Department.
请注意，根据经修订的第 13959 号行政命令（以下简称“该命令”），美国政府认定为中国军事工业复合体公司或该命令另行指定的公司，其证券禁止美国人士投资。本书面评论/交易观点无意以任何可能导致违反该命令的方式被使用或依赖。投资者应自行咨询法律顾问，以获取关于遵守该命令及美国财政部外国资产控制办公室管理和执行的其他经济制裁计划的建议。
*Citibank, N.A., organized under the laws of the U.S.A. with limited liability
*花旗银行，N.A.，依据美国法律成立，承担有限责任
  1. Source: Citi Trading Strategies
    来源：花旗交易策略
  2. Source: Citi Trading Strategies
    来源：花旗交易策略