分析这段英文文字对我的论文有什么帮助，不必拘泥于我提供的这四部分，可拓展其他利于论证论文的部分。Arizona was not the only state that balked at the compact and the Boulder Canyon bill, but she proved the most in-transigent. When she refused to join the other signatories in ratifying the Colorado River Compact she revealed her anxiety about getting a fair share of water. Many of her people rallied around the newly elected Democratic governor, hot-tempered George W. P. Hunt, who urged delay in ratification until completion of technical studies that would give Arizonans a better idea of irrigable acreage. "Arizona cannot afford to give away her greatest natural resource," the cautious Hunt warned the state legislature, " . . and she cannot afford to plunge blindly into a contract that may be unfair to her." 82
分析这段英文文字对我论文的帮助，不必局限于我提供的这四部分，可以拓展其他有助于论证论文的部分。亚利桑那州并不是唯一一个对水权分配感到焦虑而拒绝加入科罗拉多河水资源协定的州，但她是最顽固不化的。当她拒绝与其他签署方一起批准该协定时，她暴露了自己对获得公平份额的担忧。她的许多人支持新当选的民主党州长乔治·W·P·亨特，他敦促在完成技术研究以使亚利桑那人更好地了解可灌溉面积之前暂缓批准。亨特谨慎地警告州立法机构：“亚利桑那州不能放弃她最重要的自然资源，”“也不能盲目地签订可能对她不公平的合同。”82

When studies confirmed the state's need for a large volume of water, Hunt's position hardened and he succeeded in making opposition to the compact a test of state loyalty, He also made political capital out of the fact that Republicans had much to do with the pact. He accused Warren Harding. Herbert Hoover, and Arizona's former governor, Thomas Campbell--all Republi-cans_ of attempting to deprive Arizona of her birthright.
当研究证实该州需要大量的水时，亨特的立场变得更加坚定，并成功地将反对该协定视为检验州忠诚度的试金石。他还利用共和党人在该协定中扮演重要角色的事实为自己谋取政治资本。他指责沃伦·哈丁、赫伯特·胡佛以及亚利桑那州前州长托马斯·坎贝尔——所有都是共和党人——试图剥夺亚利桑那州的应得权益。

In the meantime, other objections were making ratification all but impossible. Strongly backing Hunt's position were some powerful Arizona economic interests which had special reasons for joining the fight. Private utility firms resisted the compact because it paved the way for the Boulder Canvon Act and the construction of competing publie power facilities. Similar opposition came from one of the state's most potent agricultura pressure groups, the Salt River Valley Water Users' AssociatiSA which had invested millions of dollars in power plants in centra Arizona. Mining interests were also hostile to a public power plant because it would operate tax free, At the time, mining companies were shouldering nearly half the Arizona tax load and their burden would not be lessened by a tax-free public power
在此期间，其他反对意见几乎使批准变得不可能。Hunt 的立场得到了一些强大的亚利桑那州经济利益的支持，这些利益集团有特别的理由加入这场斗争。私人电力公司反对该协议，因为它为博尔德运河法案和建设竞争性的公共电力设施铺平了道路。类似的反对意见来自该州最具影响力的农业压力集团之一——中央亚利桑那河谷用水者协会，该协会在亚利桑那州中部投资了数百万美元建设发电厂。矿业利益集团也反对公共电厂，因为该电厂可以免税运营。当时，矿业公司承担了亚利桑那州近一半的税收负担，而免税的公共电厂不会减轻它们的负担。

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Major opposition to the compact, however, sprang from the state's concern over its share of Colorado River water. Governor Hunt and his followers complained that the upper basin was given plenty of water, while the lower basin and Arizona were shortchanged. And, to make matters worse, the lower basin would not be compensated for evaporation losses from the reservoirs that would have to be constructed.
然而，该协议的重大反对意见来自该州对科罗拉多河水资源分配的担忧。亨特州长及其追随者抱怨说，上盆地得到了充足的水资源，而下盆地和亚利桑那州则被亏待了。更糟糕的是，下盆地还将因必须建造的水库中的蒸发损失而得不到补偿。

Also disturbing to many Arizonans was the status of the Gila, the largest Colorado River tributary in the lower basin. Since the Gila was primarily an Arizona stream and most of its water was already used there, Arizonans claimed it as their own. They demanded that it be excluded from the provisions of the compact and given to them in addition to any water gained from the mainstream.
让许多亚利桑那人感到不安的是，下盆地最大的科罗拉多河支流吉拉河的地位。由于吉拉河主要是亚利桑那州的河流，其大部分水资源已经被使用，亚利桑那人声称这是他们自己的河流。他们要求将吉拉河排除在协议条款之外，并将其与从干流获得的任何水资源一起分配给他们。

But the most disconcerting feature of the compact to Arizonans was its failure to divide the water supply among the states, an omission Governor Hunt considered the pact's "first fundamental error." # Since the compact had made allotments only to basins, the law of prior appropriation still prevailed within each basin. This system did not particularly bother two of the three lower basin states, Nevada and California. Nevada had only a few thousand acres that could be irrigated with Colorado River water, and the other basin states readily conceded the small amount of water she needed. California was unconcerned because once the Boulder Canyon bill was passed, authorizing construction of a dam and the All-American Canal, she would be able to expand rapidly her uses in the Imperial and Coachella valleys. But Arizona was not so fortunate. Her topography is such that dam in Boulder Canyon would not benefit many of her lands unless other expensive works were also constructed. California, in the meantime, would be establishing uses and rights to most of the lower basin's allotment.
但对亚利桑那州人来说，最令人不安的特点是该协议未能将水资源分配给各州，格兰特·亨特州长认为这是该协议的“首要根本错误”。# 由于该协议仅对盆地进行了分配，因此优先适用先占原则。这一制度对三个下盆地州中的两个——内华达州和加利福尼亚州来说，并不特别令人烦恼。内华达州只有几千英亩的土地可以通过科罗拉多河的水进行灌溉，而其他盆地州也轻易地承认了她所需的少量水资源。加利福尼亚州则不担心，因为一旦《布尔德峡谷法案》获得通过，授权建设大坝和全美运河，她就可以迅速扩大在帝国和科切拉山谷的用水量。但亚利桑那州就不那么幸运了。她的地形使得布尔德峡谷的大坝对她的许多土地没有多大益处，除非同时建设其他昂贵的工程。在此期间，加利福尼亚州将确立对下盆地分配量的主要用途和权利。

Instead of a dam as far down as Boulder Canyon, many Arizonans wanted one farther north in either Bridge or GIt Canyon. From there they wanted to build a canal system nearly 700 miles long to conduct water to the rich farmland in central Arizona near Phoenix. Estimates of the area capable of development ranged from 700,000 to 6,000,000 acres. When the compact had been drawn up, Arizona's delegates at the negotiations had not known about this possibility. But within a year after the compact had been signed, her engineers discovered irrigable acreage far in excess of expectations. Development of that acreage alone might consume nearly the entire lower-basin allot-ment..
与在布尔德峡谷下游修建大坝不同，许多亚利桑那人希望在桥或吉特峡谷更北的地方修建一个大坝。从那里，他们希望修建一条近 700 英里长的灌溉系统，将水输送到菲尼克斯附近的亚利桑那中部肥沃的农田。可开发的面积估计从 70 万到 600 万英亩不等。在达成协议时，亚利桑那代表团并不知道这种可能性。但在协议签署后的一年内，她的工程师们发现可灌溉的面积远超预期。仅开发这些土地就可能消耗掉整个下盆地配额的大部分。

Arizona's fear of California became even more pronounced as she watched plans evolve for an aqueduct to carry water from the Colorado to the southern California coastal plain.
随着亚利桑那州目睹从科罗拉多河向南加州沿海平原输送水的渠道计划的演变，她对加利福尼亚州的恐惧更加明显。

Leader of that movement was Los Angeles, which looked to the river for the water needed for her future growth. At the time Los Angeles had plenty of water, but many of the surrounding communities did not. These cities, scattered throughout the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego, joined with the city of Los Angeles in drawing up a blueprint for bringing water from the Colorado River to southern California.
那场运动的领导者是洛杉矶，洛杉矶依靠河流为其未来的发展提供所需的水资源。当时洛杉矶水资源充足，但周围的许多社区却不是这样。这些城市分布在洛杉矶县、橙县、河滨县、圣贝纳迪诺县和圣迭戈县内，与洛杉矶市一起制定了一个计划，从科罗拉多河引水到加利福尼亚南部。

By 1924 plans had been readied for creation of the Metropolitan Water District, an organization modeled on an irrigation district and consisting of the municipalities that together would finance an aqueduct to the Colorado. Less than three years later the project received the approval of the California state legis-lature.br
到 1924 年，已经准备好了建立大都市水区的计划，这是一个模仿灌溉区模式的组织，由将共同出资修建引水渠到科罗拉多河的市镇组成。不到三年后，该项目得到了加利福尼亚州立法机构的批准。

The plans to bring water to southern California's coastal plain and to the vast acreage in central Arizona made it clear to Arizonans that the compact's allocation to the lower basin was grossly insufficient. Even worse was the fact that California, with the aid of a dam on the lower river, the All-American Canal, and the aqueduct to the southern California coastal plain, could develop uses much more rapidly than Arizona could. This situation was bad enough. Yet there was also the threat from Mexico.
为将水引入南加州沿海平原以及中亚利桑那州的广大土地，亚利桑那人清楚地认识到，根据协定，下盆地的配额严重不足。更糟糕的是，借助于下河上的大坝、All-American 运河以及通往南加州沿海平原的输水渠，加利福尼亚可以比亚利桑那更快地开发水资源。这种情况已经很糟糕了。然而，还有来自墨西哥的威胁。

After the upper basin, California, and Mexico got their share, Arizona feared there might be little, if any, water remaining for
上盆地、加利福尼亚和墨西哥分得份额之后，亚利桑那担心可能几乎没有水剩余给

her.

IX

Arizona deftly used the Mexican threat as a powerful weapon against the compact and the Boulder Canyon bill. Neither meas-ure, she argued, would prevent Mexico from increasing her uses at the expense of American development. Indeed, they would prove a boon to Mexico and a detriment to the United States be-cause of the dam they would make possible on the Colorado.
亚利桑那巧妙地利用了墨西哥的威胁作为强有力的武器反对该协定和波尔德峡谷法案。她认为，这两项措施都无法阻止墨西哥在损害美国开发的情况下增加其用水量。事实上，由于这些措施将在科罗拉多河上修建大坝，它们将对墨西哥有利，而对美国不利。

The dam would generate hydroelectricity and, consequently, there would be regular year-round releases of water to turn the turbines. Some of the water released could be diverted onto lands in the United States, but for years much of it would run down in a regulated flow to Mexico where it could easily be put to use. It was fear of this possibility which prompted the Arizona House, in 1923, to insist that Mexico be limited to 2,000,000 acre-feet, the volume considered surplus and unapportioned by the compact.38 Within a short time, however, Arizonans considered this excessive and they significantly modified their attitude toward Mexico. By 1925 the state legislature was insisting that Americans had rights to "all waters of the Colorado River which may be stored or impounded within the United States." The legislature also urged the State Department to warn the Mexicans that they had "no right, legal or moral," to Colorado River water temporarily flowing into their country,3
大坝将产生水电，因此将有定期的全年放水以驱动涡轮机。其中一部分放水可以引至美国的土地上，但多年以来，大部分放水将按照规定流量流入墨西哥，在那里可以轻易加以利用。正是出于对这种可能性的担忧，亚利桑那州议会于 1923 年坚持要求墨西哥将水量限制在 200 万英亩英尺，这是根据协定被认为多余的未分配水量。然而，在短时间内，亚利桑那人认为这一限制过多，他们对墨西哥的态度发生了显著变化。到 1925 年，州议会坚持要求美国人对科罗拉多河的所有储水或拦截水拥有权利。议会还敦促国务院警告墨西哥人，他们“没有法律或道德上的权利”使用暂时流入他们国家的科罗拉多河水。

Arizona recognized that Mexico did not pose a threat for her alone. The rest of the basin as well might be affected by uses south of the border, and she used this possibility as part of her attack on the compact and the Boulder Canyon bill. The compact provided that, in the event of a treaty, Mexico's share was to come from surplus and, if that was insufficient, then each basin would have to contribute one-half the burden. Obviously, argued Arizonans, the dam authorized by the Boulder Canyon bill would enable Mexico to develop uses far in excess of the surplus.
亚利桑那州认识到墨西哥对她本身并不构成威胁，而整个盆地也可能受到边境以南地区使用水资源的影响，她利用这种可能性作为反对该协定和波尔德峡谷法案的一部分。协定规定，如果条约生效，墨西哥的份额将来自盈余，如果盈余不足，则每个盆地必须共同承担一半的负担。亚利桑那人显然认为，波尔德峡谷法案授权的大坝将使墨西哥能够开发远超过盈余的水资源。

A subsequent treaty might recognize those uses and for every acre irrigated in Mexico, one more acre would be condemned to desert in the United States. This possibility was also alarming, exclaimed prominent Arizonans, because it would foster the growth in Baja California of the Asiatic coolie population that had been brought in to handle the agricultural expansion.
后来的条约可能会承认这些使用情况，对于墨西哥每灌溉一英亩土地，美国就会有额外一英亩土地变成沙漠。亚利桑那州的知名人士对此表示担忧，因为这将促进下加利福尼亚州的亚洲苦力人口的增长，这些人口被引进来处理农业扩张。

The irony of this argument was lost on most observers. WhitA California racists favored the Boulder Canyon bill because it would frustrate the "yellow peril," Arizona racists opposed the bill for the same reason. Apparently nothing helps a cause so much as the right enemy.
这个论点的讽刺之处大多数观察者都没有察觉。加利福尼亚的种族主义者支持布尔德峡谷法案，因为这会阻碍所谓的“黄色威胁”，而亚利桑那的种族主义者则出于同样的原因反对该法案。显然，有一个合适的敌人对一个事业的帮助是最大的。

Arizona emphasized the Mexican threat in hopes of persuading Congress and the other basin states to abandon the Despite last-minute attempts to scuttle the Boulder Canyon bill, the measure rolled inexorably to a vote, first in the House, on May 25, 1928, and then in the Senate, on December 14, 1928.
亚利桑那州强调墨西哥的威胁，希望说服国会和其他流域州放弃尽管布尔德峡谷法案在最后一刻遭到一些人试图阻止，但该法案还是不可避免地在 1928 年 5 月 25 日众议院和 1928 年 12 月 14 日参议院进行了投票。

Passed by large majorities, the bill went to President Calvin Coolidge, who signed it into law while Phil Swing and Hiram Johnson happily looked on. A major step in the harnessing of the Colorado had been taken and the way had finally been cleared for talks with Mexico.
该法案以压倒性多数通过后，被提交给卡尔文·柯立芝总统，菲利普·斯 wing 和赫拉姆·约翰逊高兴地看着总统签署该法案。科罗拉多河的开发迈出了重要一步，与墨西哥的谈判终于可以开始了。

Once the necessary engineering studies had been completed, formal negotiations with Mexico began in August, 1929. Although delegates to the conference could only make recommendations, no one doubted that the recommendations would be formalized in a treaty if agreement was reached. But a settlement did not appear easy.
在完成必要的工程研究后，正式的谈判于 1929 年 8 月开始。尽管会议代表只能提出建议，但没有人怀疑如果达成协议，这些建议将被正式化为条约。但达成协议似乎并不容易。

Though the talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere, the ideas of the two countries were difficult to harmonize. This problem became apparent early when a Mexican official inquired
尽管会谈在友好的氛围中进行，但两国的想法难以调和。这个问题早在一位墨西哥官员询问时就变得明显。

"whether it would be satisfactory if Mexico paid part of the costs and likewise had its share of the benefits" of Colorado River de-velopment. Elwood Mead curtly dismissed the question and put an end to speculation about joint development of the river, explaining that "the subject had not been discussed" by Ameri cans.
如果墨西哥支付部分费用并同样分享 Colorado River 开发的利益是否令人满意？埃洛德·米德简洁地否定了这个问题，并终止了关于河流联合开发的猜测，解释说“该问题尚未在美国讨论过”。

Other evidence of disagreement was not long in coming.
其他表明存在分歧的证据不久便出现了。

Fortunato Dozal, chairman of the Mexican delegation, startled his conferees by claiming 4,500,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water. He based his claim on the assertion that there were 1,500,000 irrigable acres in Mexico that required a water duty of 3 acre-feet.
墨西哥代表团主席福图纳托·多扎尔突然声称拥有科罗拉多河 4,500,000 英亩-英尺的水量。他基于这样的主张：墨西哥有 1,500,000 英亩可灌溉的土地，需要 3 英亩-英尺的水权。

In replying for the United States, Mead rejected Doz proposal as excessive and countered by offering Mexico 750,0 acre-feet, the largest volume she had used in any one year up to that time and 20 percent more than her average uses during the preceding ten years. All the river's waters, he explained, could be used in the United States, and even the 750,000 acre-feet "will restrict [American] development." As added compensation, he was willing to provide Mexico with enough water to offset eva-poration losses in the main canal. Privately, he thought this gesture might mean giving Mexico a total of 1,000,000 acre-feet.13 Besides the generosity of this offer, declared Mead, Mexico would receive additional benefits in the way of flood and silt control as the Boulder Canyon dam and other storage facilities were constructed in the United States. These benefits represented one of Mead's strongest selling points and he emphasized them strongly.
美国方面，梅德拒绝了多兹的提议，认为该提议过于夸大，反而提出向墨西哥提供 75 万英亩-英尺的水量，这是她到目前为止在任何一年中使用的最大水量，比前十年平均使用量高出 20%。他解释说，这条河的所有水资源都可以在美国使用，即使 75 万英亩-英尺的水量也会限制美国的发展。作为额外的补偿，他愿意向墨西哥提供足够的水量来抵消主渠道中的蒸发损失。私下里，他认为这一提议可能意味着向墨西哥总共提供 100 万英亩-英尺的水量。梅德宣称，除了这一提议的慷慨之处，墨西哥还将从美国建造的博尔德峡谷大坝和其他蓄水设施中获得防洪和淤积控制的好处。这些好处是梅德最有力的销售点之一，他对此强调了很多。

The silt deposit," he noted, "is causing the bed of the river to rise land this requires a continual increase in the height of these levees.
他指出，淤积沉积物正在使河流河床升高，这需要不断增加这些堤坝的高度。

Within a few years protection by levees of these lands will become impracticable because of cost and risk." As the dikes were built higher, they would eventually reach a point where "the river would 'blow out' underneath them." But construction of an American dam, he predicted, *will solve this problem for many genera-tions, because it will catch and hold nearly all this silt."'it
几年内，由于成本和风险，这些土地依靠堤坝的保护将变得不切实际。“随着堤坝的增高，最终会达到一个点，河水会在它们下面‘冲出’。”但他预测，美国大坝的建设将为许多代人解决这个问题，因为它将拦截并保留几乎所有的这些淤泥。'

As further justification of his offer, Mead drew attention to its similarity to the treaty of 1906. Both aimed at recognizing Mexico's existing uses and both dealt with water "supplied. wholly from United States territory." Mead admitted that the Rio Grande treaty contained a clause stipulating that it established no precedent. But the United States, not Mexico, had insisted on that provision, he argued. Alluding to the Harmon opinion, he strongly implied that the United States was under no legal obligation to give Mexico anything. Only considerations of comity were responsible for this offer.
为了进一步证明他的提议，梅德注意到了它与 1906 年条约的相似之处。两者都旨在承认墨西哥现有的用途，都涉及来自美国领土的水的供应。梅德承认，《格兰德河条约》中有一条条款规定它不构成先例。但他辩称，是美国而不是墨西哥坚持了这一条款。梅德援引了霍尔姆的意见，强烈暗示美国没有法律义务向墨西哥提供任何东西。只有出于礼节的考虑才做出了这个提议。

Though Dozal heartily disagreed with Mead, he lowered Mexico's demand by nearly 1,000,000 acre-feet in an attempt to continue negotiations. He based his new request on two points: the Mexican concession of 1904, and the doctrine of "common-wealth." Dozal pointed out that the concession of 1904 allowed the Imperial Valley settlers to divert a maximum of 7,200,000 acre-feet through Mexican territory. Because of the uncontrolled river's low flow, however, they had never been able to divert anydA where near that amount. Nevertheless, Dozal claimed that Mexico was entitled to half that volume, or 3,600,000 acre-feet, because Mexico's benevolent consent in agreeing to the concession had made possible the development of "enormous wealth" in the Imperial Valley. The United States, he reasoned, should now recip-
虽然多扎尔坚决不同意梅德的观点，但他还是将墨西哥的需求降低了近 100 万英亩英尺，试图继续谈判。他基于两点提出了新的请求：1904 年的墨西哥让步以及“共同 wealth”原则。多扎尔指出，1904 年的让步允许帝国谷的定居者最多通过墨西哥领土引水 720 万英亩英尺。然而，由于河流流量不受控制且较低，他们从未接近过引水那么多。尽管如此，多扎尔声称，由于墨西哥善意地同意了这项让步，使得“巨大的财富”在帝国谷得以发展，因此墨西哥有权利获得其中的一半，即 360 万英亩英尺的水量。他认为，美国现在应该

rocate.

More important to Dozal's argument was his doctrine of "that there should be the assumption, on the part of Mexico and Mexican interests, of a far larger share of these costs in the fu-ture." * As a concession toward a settlement, however, Mead was willing to provide Mexico with hydroelectric power generated on the river in the United States, but he adamantly refused to increase his offer of water. To Dozal this proposal was completely unacceptable.
对多扎尔的论点来说，更重要的是他的“墨西哥和墨西哥利益方在未来应该承担更大比例的成本”的教义。*然而，作为达成协议的让步，梅德同意向墨西哥提供美国河流产生的水电，但他坚决拒绝增加水的供应。对多扎尔来说，这个提议完全不可接受。

Hopelessly deadlocked on the Colorado, the negotiators decided to turn their attention to the Rio Grande. But the failure to reach an agreement on the Colorado had a definite adverse af-fect. Mead wanted both countries to recognize the existing uses of about 1,000,000 acre-feet, nearly all of them consumed in the United States. Since Mexican tributaries contributed 70 percent of this water, Mead insisted that Mexico continue to supply that amount in perpetuity. As a result, Mexico would obligate herself to give the United States nearly 800,000 acre-feet of water from her tributaries. The remaining waters, captured by jointly financed dams, would be shared equally.
科罗拉多河谈判陷入僵局后，谈判者决定转向格兰德河。但未能就科罗拉多河达成协议确实产生了负面影响。梅德希望两国都承认大约 100 万英亩-英尺的现有用水量，几乎全部在美国使用。由于墨西哥支流贡献了其中的 70%，梅德坚持墨西哥必须继续无限期地提供这一数量的水。因此，墨西哥将承诺向美国提供近 80 万英亩-英尺的支流水资源。剩余的水，由联合融资的大坝捕获，将平分。

Unable to get what they wanted on the Colorado, the Mexican negotiators were in no mood to apply their liberal commonwealth doctrine to the Rio Grande. Though agreeing to an equal division of all the water reaching the mainstream, they neglected to say how much, if any, of Mexico's tributary water would be allowed to reach the river and they refused to recognize existing American uses.
由于无法在科罗拉多河获得他们想要的结果，墨西哥谈判者没有心情将他们的自由共和主义学说应用于格兰德河。尽管同意对所有流入主流的水量进行平等分配，但他们没有说明墨西哥的支流水量中有多少，如果有的话，可以流入河流，并且拒绝承认现有的美国用水。

Nor was a settlement reached on the little Tijuana. Though both sides agreed on the necessity for storage, they had not had time to collect important technical data. Until a joint investigation was conducted sometime in the future, the problem of water allocation was to be postponed.
对于小提华纳河，也没有达成协议。尽管双方都同意需要储存，但还没有来得及收集重要的技术数据。直到将来进行联合调查，水资源分配的问题将被推迟。

With negotiations on the two major streams now clearly deadlocked, the talks were recessed for several weeks. During
由于关于两大河流的谈判现在明显陷入僵局，会谈暂停了几周。在

oflicial to increase his offer of Colorado River water so that settlement could be reached. The official urged him to offer Mexico more water and then to buy back most of it until there remained "the amount which the Department considers she is entitled to." Mead refused, declaring that if the Secretary of State ordered him to make such a proposal he would resign. A treaty arranged on such a basis, he asserted, would never be ratified and furthermore his standing "with respect to western politicians would be made unbearable." Besides, he and his fellow negotiators were convinced that the Mexican people would never allow their government to sell back any Colorado River water once it had been obtained.s!
官方要求他增加对科罗拉多河水资源的报价，以便达成协议。官方敦促他向墨西哥提供更多的水资源，然后回购大部分，直到剩下“部门认为墨西哥应得的数量”。梅德拒绝了这一要求，宣称如果国务卿命令他提出这样的建议，他将辞职。梅德断言，基于这种基础安排的条约将永远不会获得批准，而且这还将使他在西部政界的地位变得难以忍受。此外，他和他的 fellow 协商者坚信，一旦墨西哥政府获得了科罗拉多河的水资源，墨西哥人民绝不会允许政府将其出售回。

Mead correctly gauged the sentiment of the Colorado Basin representatives. As rumors spread of the possible offer, they became indignant. Senator William King of Utah colorfully expressed the feelings of his colleagues when he promised "to raise Hell about it and to take it up with the President" if the rumors were true.* The rumors were not true, however, because Mead's refusal to make such an offer was approved by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, thus ending all hope for settlement.
米德正确地判断了科罗拉多盆地代表的情绪。随着有关可能提议的谣言传播，他们变得愤慨起来。犹他州参议员威廉·金生动地表达了他同事的感受，当他说如果这些谣言属实，“我们将大闹一番，并且会向总统提出此事”。然而，这些谣言并不属实，因为米德拒绝提出这样的提议得到了国务卿亨利·L·史汀生的批准，从而结束了所有关于解决争端的希望。

With no change in the United States position on the Colo-rado, the Mexican negotiators would not change their stand on the Rio Grande. They steadfastly refused to recognize existing American uses, insisting that "priority and prescription are not established in international law," a position that contradicted the stand Mexico had taken prior to the treaty of 1906. They went on to claim exclusive rights for Mexico to all the waters of her tributaries. In a statement very similar to Mead's declaration on the Colorado, they asserted that Mexico could "not admit a limitation on the future development of its tributaries to consolidate and even increase the present uses made in the United States." 83
在美国对科罗拉多河的立场没有变化的情况下，墨西哥谈判者也不会改变他们在里奥格兰德河上的立场。他们坚决拒绝承认现有的美国使用情况，坚持认为“优先权和时效性在国际法中并未确立”，这一立场与 1906 年条约之前墨西哥所持的立场相矛盾。他们进一步声称墨西哥对所有支流的水资源享有专属权利。在关于科罗拉多河的声明非常相似的情况下，他们断言墨西哥“不能承认对其支流未来开发的限制，从而巩固并甚至增加目前美国的使用情况”。

At this point the talks collapsed.
此时谈判破裂了。

Undoubtedly, if an agreement had been reached on the Col-orado, one would have followed on the Rio Grande. Pressures from Texas would probably have forced the State Department to lower its demands to a point acceptable to Mexico. Indeed, the United States could have gotten along without requiring Mexico to surrender any water. The runoff from Texas tributaries alone was sufficient to increase greatly the land under cultivation in Toast before that water could be unadio want could not be built without Mexican cooperation. But Mexico refused to cooperate unless she got what she wanted from the Colorado River, and so nothing was accomplished.
不言而喻，如果在科罗拉多河上达成了协议，那么在里奥格兰德河上也会达成协议。来自德克萨斯的压力可能会迫使国务院降低要求，使其对墨西哥来说可以接受。事实上，美国甚至不需要墨西哥放弃任何水资源。德克萨斯支流的径流本身足以在托斯塔斯地区大幅增加可耕种的土地。然而，如果墨西哥愿意，这条运河有严重的国际影响，因为墨西哥可以几乎完全截流河水，从而阻止德克萨斯河谷另一边的农民获得足够的水资源。但墨西哥拒绝合作，除非她从科罗拉多河获得她想要的东西，因此没有任何进展。

The negotiations of 1929 and 1930 had failed. After years of delay, owing to problems in both countries, the two govern-gravity canal, known as Retamal, that would tap the river north of the valley, and then bring the water onto the new lands. But the canal had serious international implications, for Mexico could, if she desired, divert virtually the entire flow, thus preventing farmers on the Texas side of the valley from getting sufficient water.
1929 年和 1930 年的谈判失败了。由于两国都存在拖延问题，经过多年的延误，两国政府最终达成了协议。计划修建一条名为 Retamal 的重力运河，从山谷北侧的河流取水，然后将水引入新开发的土地。然而，这条运河有严重的国际影响，因为如果墨西哥愿意，她可以几乎完全截流河水，从而阻止德克萨斯河谷另一边的农民获得足够的水资源。

These projects and rumors of others aroused the Texas farm-ers. Believing their livelihood now threatened more seriously than ever, they demanded help from Washington. Their agitation both in Congress and at the State Department finally met with some success in 1935, when Representative Milton West, a lower Rio Grande Valley resident, secured passage of a resolution urging President Franklin Roosevelt to negotiate a settlement.
这些项目和其它的传言引起了德克萨斯农民的注意。他们认为生计现在比以往任何时候都更受到威胁，于是要求华盛顿给予帮助。他们在国会和国务院的活动最终在 1935 年取得了一定的成功，当时来自下里奥格兰德河谷地区的代表米尔顿·韦斯特争取到了一项决议，敦促富兰克林·罗斯福总统进行谈判以达成一项解决办法。

Although Roosevelt was sympathetic with the Texan requests, the issue was complicated by Mexico's refusal to negotiate unless the Colorado water problem was considered at the same time. Mexico's reasons were simple enough. She was disturbed by the Boulder Canyon Act which represented a potential threat to her water supply, for by 1935 the All-American Canal was under construction and Hoover Dam was nearly completed." Secretary of State Cordell Hull, though ready to negotiate, would not attempt a settlement of water problems on both rivers until he had secured the approval of the Colorado Basin states.
尽管罗斯福同情德克萨斯人的请求，但由于墨西哥拒绝在同时考虑科罗拉多河水问题的情况下进行谈判，这一问题变得复杂起来。墨西哥的理由很简单。她对《巴尔的摩峡谷法案》感到担忧，因为该法案可能对她的水资源供应构成潜在威胁，到 1935 年，全美运河正在建设中，而胡佛大坝也已接近完工。国务卿科德尔·赫尔虽然愿意进行谈判，但在没有获得科罗拉多河流域各州批准的情况下，他不会尝试同时解决两条河流的水资源问题。

Without their support, a successful agreement would be practically impossible. Even with it, a settlement would be difficult to achieve because of each country's reluctance to compromise. Mexico had indicated no change in her demands for Colorado River water, and the basin states had settled on Mead's offer of 750,000 acre-feet as the maximum they would concede. Unless there was a softening of positions, a treaty was out of the question.
没有他们的支持，达成一项成功的协议几乎是不可能的。即使有他们的支持，达成一项和解也会因为每个国家不愿意妥协而非常困难。墨西哥表示对科罗拉多河水资源的要求没有变化，而流域各州已经决定将梅德提供的 75 万英亩-英尺作为他们愿意让出的最大额度。除非立场有所软化，否则条约是不可能的。

But the Colorado Basin states had no intention of backing down. They had made their attitude clear when West's resolution came up for debate in the Senate. Their initial reaction was? hostile. William King of Utah, for example, said he was speaks ing for all the Colorado states when he revealed his unwillingness "to support any measure that would weaken or jeopardize their rights or would afford any basis for Mexico's claiming any of the waters of the Colorado River." King's sentiments were echoed by other basin representatives, who were won over to the measure only after being assured that it would not jeopardize their position. Some, who had not heard of Mexico's desire to have both rivers discussed simultaneously, erroneously believed that the bill might permit the Rio Grande problem to be settled separately from that of the Colorado. This solution would relieve Texas pressure to trade Colorado River water to Mexico in exchange for Rio Grande water. Persuaded to support the resolu-tion, several could not resist the opportunity to state their attitude toward Mexico. Arizona's fiery Senator Henry Ashurst wanted *it distinctly understood that Mexico has no right to any waters in the Colorado River, by treaty or otherwise.. • . What she gets," he declared, "she gets by an act of grace on the part of the United States."
但科罗拉多河流域各州并没有打算退让。当韦斯特的决议在参议院讨论时，他们已经表明了自己的态度。他们的最初反应是敌对的。例如，犹他州的威廉·金表示，他代表所有科罗拉多河流域的州，表示不愿意“支持任何会削弱或危及他们权利的措施，或者为墨西哥声称科罗拉多河的任何水资源提供任何依据”。金的观点得到了其他流域代表的共鸣，这些代表在被保证该措施不会危及他们的地位后才同意支持这项措施。一些人由于不知道墨西哥希望同时讨论两条河流的愿望，错误地认为该法案可能会允许将格兰德河问题单独与科罗拉多河问题分开解决。这将缓解德克萨斯州的压力，使其不必用科罗拉多河水交换格兰德河水。被说服支持这项决议后，一些人无法抗拒表达他们对墨西哥的态度的机会。 亚利桑那州的参议员亨利·阿什 urst 希望明确理解，墨西哥没有权利通过条约或其他方式获得科罗拉多河的任何水资源。“她得到的，”他宣称，“是美国出于恩惠的行为。”

Faced with these resolute stands, Secretary Hull pondered ways of obtaining a treaty that would win basin-state approval.
面对这些坚定的立场，赫尔部长考虑了获得获得盆地州批准的条约方式。

He finally decided to ask the Colorado Basin senators to approve the creation of a three-man negotiating team to formulate a treaty for the United States. The team would consist of a representative from the Colorado Basin, another from Texas, and a third to be named by either the appointees or the State Depart. ment. Most Colorado River senators, however, refused to accept the State Department's plan, contending that the composition of the negotiating team was unfavorable to them, since Texas was given equal representation with the seven Colorado Basin states.
他最终决定请科罗拉多盆地的参议员批准成立一个三人谈判小组来制定美国的条约。该小组将由一名来自科罗拉多盆地的代表、一名来自德克萨斯州的代表以及由任命者或州务卿指定的第三名代表组成。然而，大多数科罗拉多河参议员拒绝接受国务院的计划，认为谈判小组的组成对他们不利，因为德克萨斯州与七个科罗拉多盆地州获得了平等的代表权。

In the proposal, moreover, it was assumed that the State Department would be neutral, but the basin senators thought such neutrality unlikely. They suspected that State Department offi cials might sacrifice water for an agreement, and fear of such an outcome prompted them to denounce any negotiation that would include both rivers. Arizona's Ashurst was partienlarly rhetorical on this point: *The waters of the Rio Grande and the waters of the Colorado River are not related by propinquity, topography, physical geography or otherwise. . . . [Even] a remote excu sion of the imagination," he continued, did not offer "a shredtA excuse" for considering them "as a single problem." But the basi of his primary concern was clearly revealed when he asserted that "the Colorado River Basin would be called upon only to give . . . water to Mexico whilst the Rio Grande Basin would be called upon only to receive water from Mexico."
在提案中，假设国务院会保持中立，但盆地参议员认为这种中立性不大可能。他们怀疑国务院官员可能会为了达成协议而牺牲水资源，这种结果的恐惧促使他们谴责任何包括两条河流的谈判。亚利桑那州的阿什莱特在这一点上特别直言不讳：*格兰德河的水和科罗拉多河的水在地理位置、地形、物理地理或其他方面都没有关联。……即使是最遥远的想象，“他继续说道，也不能提供‘一丝’理由将它们视为‘一个单一的问题’。”但他的主要担忧的基础显然体现在他断言的这一点上：“科罗拉多河盆地将被要求仅向墨西哥提供水，而格兰德河盆地将被要求仅从墨西哥接收水。”

Ashurst was joined in opposition by most of the other basin senators, who bluntly told the State Department that its plan was unacceptable. Nevada's Key Pittman was more restrained in his assessment of the plan. Rather than commenting directly on the proposal, he suggested that the basin states might agree to give Mexico 1,000,000 acre-feet, though he added ominously that "the seven Colorado River Basin states will examine any proposed treaty very critically and might express great opposition to any treaty." Despite the warning, Ambassador Josephus Daniels sounded out Mexico on the 1,000,000 acre-feet proposal, only to be rebuffed. Mexican officials felt they would have an adequate water supply for some time to come and, consequently, they decided to postpone a settlement, hoping the United States might be more generous later. Indeed, one of the officials announced that Mexico would have a sufficient water supply for twenty-five years.1°
Ashurst 的反对者包括其他大部分盆地参议员，他们直截了当地告诉国务院，其计划是不可接受的。内华达州的 Key Pittman 对该计划的评估较为克制。他没有直接评论提议，而是建议盆地各州可能会同意给墨西哥 1,000,000 万英亩-英尺的水量，但他补充说，“七个科罗拉多河流域州将非常严格地审查任何提议的条约，并可能强烈反对任何条约。”尽管有警告，大使 Josephus Daniels 还是试探墨西哥对 1,000,000 万英亩-英尺的提议，但遭到拒绝。墨西哥官员认为他们未来一段时间内会有足够的水资源供应，因此决定推迟解决，希望美国日后会更加慷慨。事实上，一位官员宣布墨西哥的水资源供应可以维持二十五年。1°

Despite Mexico's stubbornness and the strong opposition of the Colorado Basin states to talks on both rivers simultaneously, Washington decided to act. In 1937, plans were made to open negotiations on both rivers. Several considerations apparently prompted the decision. For one thing, it was felt that as long as the water problem remained unsettled relations between the two countries would be strained. A solution, moreover, would also popularize the president's Good Neighbor Policy. Then, too, the Texas situation on the Rio Grande had worsened as Mexico continued to push forward her reclamation program. Besides this serious problem, the State Department felt that time was working against the United States on the Colorado as well as the Rio Grande. With the completion of Hoover Dam and the intensification of Cárdenas' agrarian program, water uses would be drastically changed. The dam would aid cultivation of a vast acreage on the Mexican Delta, including land usually fooded and damaged by silt. While the dam could not prevent floods from rivers like the Gila, it still provided a measure of security unknown be
尽管墨西哥态度顽固，科罗拉多河流域各州强烈反对同时就两条河流进行谈判，华盛顿还是决定采取行动。1937 年，制定了就两条河流进行谈判的计划。显然，促使这一决定的原因有多个方面。首先，人们认为只要水资源问题悬而未决，两国关系就会紧张。此外，一项解决方案也会使总统的睦邻政策更加受欢迎。此外，随着墨西哥继续推进其灌溉计划，格兰德河上的德克萨斯州形势也变得越来越严峻。除了这个严重的问题，国务院还觉得时间对德克萨斯河和格兰德河上的美国都越来越不利。随着胡佛大坝的完工以及卡德纳斯的农业改革计划的加强，水资源的使用将会发生重大变化。大坝将有助于在墨西哥河三角洲上开发大片土地，包括通常被洪水和淤泥破坏的土地。虽然大坝不能防止吉拉河等河流的洪水，但它仍然提供了一种前所未有的安全保障。

fore. Egually important in fostering Nexican development wovlce
促进墨西哥发展同样重要的是

be the regulated flow of water released from Hoover Dam for the generation of hydroelectric power.!
是用于发电的从霍 over 大坝调控的水流。!

Phil Swing had earlier sought to counteract these fears of Mexican expansion by emphasizing the value of the All-American Canal. By draining off surplus water into the Salton Sea, the canal could be used to control Mexican expansion, Unfortunately,while Hoover Dam had already begun regulating the river, the canal still remained unfinished and Mexicans were racing to develop as much acreage as possible before completion of the aqueduct put them at a disadvantage.
菲尔·斯 wing 早些时候曾试图通过强调 all-American 运河的价值来抵消人们对墨西哥扩张的担忧。通过将多余的水排入萨尔顿湖，运河可以用来控制墨西哥的扩张。不幸的是，虽然霍 over 大坝已经开始调控河流，但运河仍然未完工，墨西哥人正竞相在渠道完工之前尽可能开发更多的土地。

The possibility of extensive development in the border region had already been considered by President Cardenas who, in 1936, had turned his attention from the Rio Grande valleys to the Colorado Delta. Taking families from the heavily settled areas of the interior of Mexico, he planned to settle them in the delta country and initiate a costly program of conservation.
边境地区的广泛开发已经在 1936 年被卡德纳斯总统考虑过，当时他将注意力从格兰德河谷转向了科罗拉多河三角洲。从墨西哥内地人口稠密的地区，他计划将家庭迁移到三角洲地区，并启动一项耗资巨大的保护计划。

In a speech of September, 1936, Cardenas had appealed to Mexican nationalism by exclaiming that Mexico either had to develop the peninsula or see it lost to the United States. In reminding his audience that he was speaking on the centennial of Texan independence, a date that marked a black period in Mexican his-tory, he asserted that "the loss of that vast Mexican territory" had been due "to isolation, lack of communications and development, and dearth of interest by the central government." Those mis-takes, he warned, must not be repeated in Baja California. The peninsula had already been isolated too long, and it must be brought into closer contact with the rest of the country with a colonization program, highways, railroads, schools, dams, and irrigation canals. These developments, he warned, would increase taxes, but Mexicans should shoulder the heavy burden as a patriotic duty.13
在 1936 年 9 月的一次演讲中，卡德纳斯曾通过宣称墨西哥要么开发下加利福尼亚半岛，要么眼睁睁地看着它被美国夺走，来唤起墨西哥的民族主义情绪。在提醒听众他正在庆祝德克萨斯独立百年纪念日——一个标志着墨西哥历史上黑暗时期的日期时，他断言“失去那片广阔的墨西哥领土”是由于“孤立、缺乏沟通和开发，以及中央政府缺乏兴趣”。他警告说，这些错误在下加利福尼亚半岛上绝不能重演。该半岛已经孤立得太久了，必须通过殖民计划、公路、铁路、学校、水坝和灌溉渠道，使其与国家其他地区更加紧密地联系起来。他警告说，这些发展将增加税收，但墨西哥人应该作为爱国责任来承担这一沉重的负担。13

The State Department, alarmed by Cárdenas plans for Baja California and by the grave Rio Grande situation, laid plans, in June, 1937, for a treaty by asking Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to prepare a report on the water supply of the Colorado River.1 It wanted to know how much surplus, if any, would remain after ultimate development in the United States. In the meantime, other events of far-reaching importance which would greatly infivence Hulls plans for an early treaty had been takingA place in the Colorado River Basin.
国务院对卡德纳斯在下加利福尼亚的计划以及格兰德河严峻的情况感到担忧，于 1937 年 6 月制定了一个条约计划，要求内政部长哈罗德·伊克斯准备一份关于科罗拉多河供水情况的报告。国务院想知道在最终开发美国境内之后，是否还会剩下任何多余的水量。与此同时，其他具有深远影响的事件正在科罗拉多河流域发生，这些事件将极大地影响赫尔的早些时候的条约计划。

TI

News of the Mexican activity in Baja California alarmed many water officials in the Colorado Basin states. They became even more anxious for their future as rumors of pending treaty negotiations spread. They suspected that the State Department, under the influence of the Good Neighbor Policy, might give Mexico more Colorado River water than she deserved. Arizonans, in particular, emphasized the danger with such force that the other basin states joined them to protect their interests.
关于墨西哥在下加利福尼亚的活动的消息让科罗拉多河流域各州的许多水资源官员感到担忧。随着即将进行条约谈判的消息传开，他们更加担心自己的未来。他们怀疑，在“睦邻政策”的影响下，国务院可能会给予墨西哥比她应得更多的科罗拉多河水。尤其是亚利桑那州的人们以如此强烈的措辞强调了这种危险，其他流域各州也加入了他们，以保护自己的利益。

Arizona's concern was only partly motivated by events in Mexico. She was already sensitive about the disposition of Colorado water as the result of a dispute with California over her share of the lower basin's allocation. That dispute centered around issues of major significance to negotiations with Mexico.
亚利桑那州的担忧只是部分受到墨西哥事件的影响。她已经对科罗拉多河水的分配问题感到敏感，这是由于与加利福尼亚州在下盆地配额分配方面的争端。这场争端围绕着与墨西哥谈判中至关重要的问题。

The story of the Arizona-California controversy began with Arizona's attitude toward the Colorado River Compact. Although her delegates to the Santa Fe conference in 1922 had signed the compact, their action had been promptly repudiated by state leaders. Governor Hunt and his cohorts roundly condemned the compact, claiming it deprived the state of its legitimate claims to water and failed to provide adequate protection against faster-developing California. When the compact was debated in Con-gress, as part of the Boulder Canyon bill, Arizona's representatives fought it doggedly, but they were unable to prevent its final passage.
亚利桑那州与加利福尼亚州争议的故事始于亚利桑那州对科罗拉多河协定的态度。尽管 1922 年圣达菲会议上的代表签署了协定，但州领导很快否定了这一行动。霍恩州长和他的同伙严厉谴责了协定，声称它剥夺了该州对水资源的合法要求，并未能提供足够的保护以防止加利福尼亚州更快的发展。当协定作为《胡佛峡谷法案》的一部分在国会讨论时，亚利桑那州的代表们坚决反对，但无法阻止其最终通过。

Initially, the Boulder Canyon bill required the ratification of all seven Colorado Basin states before it would take effect. Debate on the measure, however, revealed that Arizona would probably withhold her ratification in order to kill the bill. Con-sequently, Colorado's wily Delph Carpenter anticipated such an eventuality by persuading the other basin states to accept an amendment providing for a six- as well as a seven-state com-pact. Since California was anxious for a Boulder Canyon dam and the All-American Canal, she supported the provision for a six-state compact on condition that the dam impound enough water--at least 20,000,000 acre-feet-to satisfy her needs. The
最初， Boulder Canyon 法案要求科罗拉多河流域的七个州都批准后才能生效。然而，在对该措施的讨论中，发现亚利桑那州可能会拒绝批准以扼杀该法案。因此，科罗拉多州机智的 Delph Carpenter 预见到这种情况，说服其他流域州接受一项修正案，该修正案规定不仅有七个州的协议，还有六个州的协议。由于加利福尼亚州迫切需要 Boulder Canyon 大坝和全美运河，她同意在大坝蓄水量至少达到 20,000,000 万英亩英尺以满足其需求的条件下，支持六个州的协议。

that California agree to certain stipulations. For one thing, she would have to limit herself to a specific volume of the water allocated to the lower basin. The other states realized that fast-developing California, without some limitation, would appropriate virtually all the lower basin's mainstream water that was not given to Mexico. This might eventually be detrimental to the upper basin. Although Arizona would clearly develop more slowly than California, she would develop faster than the upper-basin states because of her nearly year-round growing season. And since California would have established prior use to most of the lower-basin allotment, Arizona would be forced to make appropriations that invaded the upper-basin allocation. There would be nothing to restrain Arizona from doing this, since she would not have ratified the compact and, therefore, would not be bound by its restrictions. 14
加利福尼亚同意遵守某些规定。首先，她必须限制自己使用分配给下盆地的特定水量。其他州意识到，如果没有一些限制，快速发展的加利福尼亚将几乎独占下盆地的主流水资源，而这部分水资源并未分配给墨西哥。这最终可能对上盆地造成不利影响。虽然亚利桑那州显然会比加利福尼亚发展得慢，但由于其几乎全年都可以种植作物，亚利桑那州的发展速度会比上盆地的州快。由于加利福尼亚将对下盆地的大部分配额拥有优先使用权，亚利桑那州将被迫进行分配，这些分配会侵入上盆地的配额。亚利桑那州不会受到这些限制的约束，因为她没有批准该协议。14

After much haggling, Congress set California's limitation at 4,400,000 acre-feet, and one-half of any unapportioned surplus.
经过长时间的讨价还价，国会将加利福尼亚的限制设定为 440 万英亩英尺，并且任何未分配的剩余水量的一半。

It also authorized, but did not require, the drafting of a lower-basin compact which would grant to Arizona 2,800,000 aere-feet, and the other half of the surplus, and to Nevada 300,000 acre-feet.1 These three allotments, exclusive of the surplus, totaled 7,500,000 acre-feet, the volume of water allocated by Article III (a) of the compact.
同时，该法案还授权但不要求制定一个下盆地协定，该协定将向亚利桑那州分配 280 万英亩英尺的水量，以及剩余水量的一半，向内华达州分配 30 万英亩英尺。这些三个分配，不包括剩余水量，总计 750 万英亩英尺，这是根据协定第三条（a）款分配的水量。

The Boulder Canyon bill was passed in December, 1925, but not before bitter intrabasin disputes had come within a hair's breadth of scuttling the measure. Even then, Arizona persisted in her refusal to ratify the compact, and so recourse to the six-state compact was the only alternative. In the following year, the California legislature agreed to the necessary limitation and the Boulder Canyon Project Act became effective,I
布尔德峡谷法案于 1925 年 12 月通过，但在法案通过之前，盆地内部的激烈争论几乎使该法案夭折。即使如此，亚利桑那州仍然拒绝批准该协定，因此只能求助于六州协定。次年，加利福尼亚州立法机构同意必要的限制，布尔德峡谷工程法案生效。

Soon after Arizona lost the congressional fight, she petitioned the United States Supreme Court to declare the Boulder Canyon Act unconstitutional, charging the act violated her "quasi-sov-ereignty" by authorizing the construction of a dam in her territory without her approval. She also alleged that the act invaded her "quasi-sovereign right to prohibit or to permit appropriation, under its (her] own laws, of the unappropriated water of the Colorado River flowing within the State." I As potent as these
亚利桑那州在失去国会斗争后，向美国最高法院申请宣布《波托奇诺法案》违宪，指控该法案未经她的同意就授权在她的领土上修建大坝，侵犯了她的“准主权”。她还声称，《波托奇诺法案》侵犯了她“准主权权利，即根据她自己的法律禁止或允许在该州境内科罗拉多河未被占用的水资源的分配和使用”。这些指控颇具威力。

argurnents were, they made litle impression upon the Supga
argurnents were, they made little impression upon the Supga

Court. The court upheld the act as coming clearly within Coi gress' power to improve navigation. Arizona had contended that the improvement of navigation was a subterfuge, but the court held its ground, refusing to inquire into the motives of Congress.
法院维持了该法案，认为这明显属于国会改善航道的权力范围。亚利桑那州曾声称改善航道只是一个幌子，但法院坚持了自己的立场，拒绝调查国会的动机。

The court also denied Arizona's allegation that the act violated her right to control the appropriation of waters within the state.
法院也驳回了亚利桑那州关于该法案侵犯其控制州内水资源分配权利的指控。

Arizona's argument had been based upon a future situation and not upon a present impairment of her right. "If by operations at the dam," the court reasoned, "any . . . perfected right of Arizona . . . should hereafter be interfered with, appropriate remedies will be available." But there was no reason "for determining now Arizona's rights to interstate or local waters which have not yet been, and which may never be, appropriated." 18
亚利桑那州的论点是基于未来的情况，而不是当前对其权利的损害。“如果由于大坝的工程操作，”法院认为，“亚利桑那州的任何……既得权利……在未来受到干扰时，将有适当的补救办法。”但“目前没有理由确定亚利桑那州对尚未被开发或可能永远不会被开发的州际或地方水资源的权利。”18

Although the Supreme Court's decision frustrated Arizona's hopes for nullifying the Boulder Canyon Act and the Colorado River Compact, she did not give up her attempts to obtain more water. She now changed her tactics, accepted the current water arrangements as the "law of the river," and tried to have them interpreted in her interest. Her new policy was evident when, in 1934, she asked the Supreme Court for an interpretation of Article III of the compact. Two provisions of the article were particularly important in the allocation of water. Section (a) apportioned 7,500,000 acre-feet to the lower-basin states. California had limited herself to 4,400,000 acre-feet of this allotment, and the Boulder Canyon Act had suggested that Arizona and Nevada be given 2,800,000 acre-feet and 300,000 acre-feet re-spectively. The dispute between California and Arizona now centered on section (b) which granted 1,000,000 acre-feet to the lower basin in addition to the 7,500,000 acre-feet. Arizona argued, in the face of strenuous objections from California, that all the water under section (b) should be given to her.
尽管最高法院的裁决挫败了亚利桑那州废除《布卢尔峡谷法案》和《科罗拉多河协定》的希望，她并未放弃获得更多水资源的努力。她现在改变了策略，接受了当前的水资源安排作为“河流法律”，并试图从这些安排中获得对自己有利的解释。当她在 1934 年请求最高法院对协定第三条进行解释时，这一点变得明显。协定中的两个条款特别重要，涉及水资源的分配。第(a)款分配了 7,500,000 英亩-英尺的水量给下流州。加利福尼亚州仅限于从这一分配中获得 4,400,000 英亩-英尺的水量，而《布卢尔峡谷法案》建议将 2,800,000 英亩-英尺的水量分配给亚利桑那州，300,000 英亩-英尺的水量分配给内华达州。现在，加利福尼亚州和亚利桑那州之间的争端集中在第(b)款上，该款额外分配了 1,000,000 英亩-英尺的水量给下流州。亚利桑那州在加利福尼亚州强烈反对的情况下，主张第(b)款下的所有水资源都应归她所有。

California was deeply concerned because she had contracted for water that Arizona's claims might jeopardize. While Arizona had been challenging the constitutionality of the Boulder Canyon Act, California had negotiated contracts with Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur for 5,362,000 aere-feet, some 962,000 acre-feet more than the volume of III(a) water to which she had limited herself. She hoped to obtain at least part of this needed water from the 1,000,000 acre-feet granted by section
加利福尼亚非常担心，因为她已经签订了与亚利桑那州争水的合同，这可能会危及其权益。尽管亚利桑那州正在质疑《布卢尔峡谷法案》的合宪性，加利福尼亚州仍与内政部长雷·兰姆·威尔伯谈判，签订了 5,362,000 亩英尺的供水合同，比她所限定的 III(a)水量多出 962,000 亩英尺。她希望至少能从根据法案授予的 1,000,000 亩英尺的水量中获得部分所需水量。

California's contracts for 962,00 acre-feet would depend on the availability of surplus--and the matter of surplus water was de-batable. Although streamflow records indicated a surplus, those records had been gathered with crude equipment and had not heen checked by experience. Then, too, there remained the uncertainty of what Mexico might receive. These doubts lent an urgency to the conflict between the two states.Arizona insisted that the framers of the compact had intended the section (b) water solely for her as compensation for her allowing the waters of the Gila River to be covered by the compact. The only reason, she contended, that the compact had not specifically granted this water to her was that it made allocations to basins, not states.? The framers had feared that a specific allocation would delay the completion of the compact.
加利福尼亚州的合同涉及 962,00 英亩-英尺的水量，这取决于是否有剩余——而剩余水量的问题是有争议的。虽然径流记录显示有剩余水量，但这些记录是用粗糙的设备收集的，并未经过经验验证。此外，墨西哥可能获得多少水量也存在不确定性。这些疑虑使两个州之间的冲突更加紧迫。亚利桑那州坚持认为，契约的制定者意图将第(b)节的水量仅用于她，作为她允许吉拉河的水流纳入契约的补偿。她认为，契约中没有明确规定将这部分水量分配给她，原因是在各盆地而非各州之间进行分配。制定者担心，具体分配可能会拖延契约的完成。

Armed with evidence surrounding the drafting of the com-pact, Arizona petitioned the Supreme Court to recognize her claims. But the court again refused to intervene, claiming, among other things, that it was not the motivation of negotiators which was important, but the intentions of Congress and the six states that had ratified the pact. "There is no allegation," the court re-plied, "that the alleged agreement between the negotiators made in 1922 was called to the attention of Congress in 1928 when enacting the Act; nor that it was called to the attention of the legislatures of the several States."
手握关于条约起草的证据，亚利桑那州向最高法院申请承认其主张。但法院再次拒绝干预，声称其中一个重要理由是并非谈判者的动机重要，而是国会和已批准该条约的六个州的意图。“”法院回应说，“在 1928 年制定该法案时，并无任何指控称 1922 年谈判者之间的所谓协议已向国会或各州立法机构通报过。”

Unable to induce the Supreme Court to uphold their con-tention, Arizona's representatives, in December, 1934, adopted another line of attack in their goal to win exclusive use of the Gila. They asked the Secretary of the Interior for a water contract that would give Arizona sole use of the Gila River, thus exempting it from the provisions of the compact. To Californians such exemption would be an obvious violation of the com-pact, which had been drawn up expressly to include "all of the drainage area" of the Colorado River and its tributaries. For this reason, California was joined by the other basin states, and together they succeeded in convincing the secretary to reject Arizona's petition.?
无法说服最高法院支持他们的主张，亚利桑那州的代表在 1934 年 12 月采取了另一种攻击方式，以实现他们对吉拉河独占使用的目标。他们请求内政部长签订一项水资源合同，使亚利桑那州独占吉拉河的使用权，从而使其免受协议条款的约束。加利福尼亚州人认为这种豁免显然是对协议的违反，该协议明确包括科罗拉多河及其支流的整个流域。因此，加利福尼亚州与其他盆地州联合起来，成功说服部长否决了亚利桑那州的请求。

Although frustrated, Arizona waited only about a year before turning once more to the Supreme Court. She wanted the court to divide the waters of the Colorado among the basi states and, in so doing, to accept her interpretation of the CoMA pact. Only this time she did not plan to base her claim on thi alleged intentions of the negotiators of the compact. Instead, she hoped to ground her case on section 4(a) of the Boulder Canyon Aet which required California to limit herself, in exchange for a six-state compact, to 4,100,000 acre-feet "plus not more than one-half of any excess or surplus waters unapportioned by said compact." According to the language of the compact, Arizona maintained, the III (b) water had been apportioned to the lower basin. Since California had been required to limit herself to one-half of the unapportioned surplus, she clearly had no right to the apportioned III(b) water. In addition, Arizona sought to free herself from the Mexican burden by insisting that "any right of the Republic of Mexico to an equitable share in any increased How of water in the Colorado River, made available by works being constructed by or for California, shall be supplied from California's equitable share of the water." a3
尽管感到沮丧，亚利桑那州大约一年后又一次向最高法院求助。她希望法院能够将科罗拉多河的水资源分配给基本州，并借此机会接受她对 CoMA 协议的解释。这一次，她并不打算基于该协议谈判者所声称的意图来提出她的主张。相反，她希望根据《大峡谷法案》第 4(a)款的要求，基于加利福尼亚州在六州协议中获得 4,100,000 英亩-英尺水以及“加上不超过未分配过剩水量的一半”的规定来建立她的案件。根据协议的语言，亚利桑那州坚持认为，III(b)水已经被分配给了下流域。既然加利福尼亚州被要求在获得六州协议的条件下限制自己，只能获得未分配过剩水量的一半，她显然没有权利获得分配的 III(b)水。 此外，亚利桑那州希望通过坚持认为“墨西哥共和国对科罗拉多河因加利福尼亚州或为加州建设的工程而增加的水量享有公平份额的权利，应由加利福尼亚州公平份额的水量提供。”来摆脱墨西哥的负担。

In dismissing Arizona's petition to file suit, the Supreme Court refused to hear the claims because the United States had not consented to be a party to the suit. Since the river was an international stream and also legally navigable, the federal government had to be a participant in the dispute. But the government refused to be drawn into the case unless Arizona first ratified the compact--which Arizona refused to do until her claims had been vindicated.
最高法院驳回亚利桑那州提起诉讼的请求，拒绝听取申诉，因为美国政府没有同意成为诉讼的一方。由于这条河是国际河流且具有法律上的可航行性，联邦政府必须参与这场纠纷。但政府除非亚利桑那州首先批准该协定，否则不会介入此案——而亚利桑那州直到其申诉得到伸张才同意批准该协定。

This defeat in 1936 caused Arizona great concern. While she had refused to ratify the compact and secure a contract for water with the federal government, California had secured her contracts and was busily developing uses for as much of the contracted water as possible. At the time she was using only about half of it, but Hoover Dam was now completed and the All-American Canal and the Metropolitan Water Distriet aqueduct were being readied.
1936 年的这场失败让亚利桑那州非常担忧。虽然她拒绝批准该协议并和联邦政府签订水资源合同，加利福尼亚州却成功签订了合同，并且正在积极开发所获水资源的各种用途。当时她只使用了其中的大约一半，但胡佛大坝现在已经完工，全美一号运河和大都会水区输水道也正在准备中。

Of equal concern to Arizona were the rumors of stepped-up activity in Baja California. It began to look as if Mexico might establish uses for much of the water that California would not obtain. If that happened, there would be little water left for Arizona. Unable so far to win a decision over California, Arizonans now prepared to do something about the Mexican develop-
亚利桑那州同样对下加利福尼亚州活动加强的消息感到担忧。这似乎表明墨西哥可能会利用加利福尼亚州无法获得的水资源。如果发生这种情况，亚利桑那州将几乎没有水资源可用。迄今为止未能赢得与加利福尼亚州的决定，亚利桑那人现在准备采取行动来应对墨西哥的开发。

ment.
意见。

き

In this state of frustration, Arizona's Colorado River commissioners sent an investigator, Hugo Farmer, into the Mexican Delta region in January and February, 1938, where he found an enormous area under cultivation. Farmer estimated that 424.000 acres were being farmed and that more than 900,000 additional acres could easily be reclaimed. He was alarmed, too, by the great increase in population, as thousands were colonizing the area, and by the government's construction of roads and irrigation ditches."
在这种沮丧的状态下，亚利桑那州的科罗拉多河委员会派调查员胡戈·法农在 1938 年 1 月和 2 月前往墨西哥三角洲地区，他发现那里有大面积的耕地。法农估计有 42.4 万英亩的土地正在被耕种，还有超过 90 万英亩的土地可以轻易地被重新利用。他同样对人口的急剧增长感到震惊，成千上万的人正在殖民这片地区，以及政府修建的道路和灌溉沟渠。

Though impressive, these border developments were not nearly so formidable as Farmer feared. There was much activity, but there was also considerable confusion. Many Mexicans were new at their jobs and often inefficient, and were hampered by a shortage of workable equipment. Moreover, at about this same time the efficient operations of Chandler and other Americans were disrupted by the Mexican government when it expropriated virtually all their developed lands. "5
尽管这些边境发展令人印象深刻，但并没有像法农所担心的那样强大。虽然有很多活动，但也存在相当多的混乱。许多墨西哥人刚开始工作，往往效率低下，并且受到可用设备不足的阻碍。此外，大约在同一时期，当墨西哥政府几乎没收了查德纳和其他美国人的所有开发土地时，查德纳和其他美国人的高效运营也被中断了。5

It is difficult to determine accurately the irrigated acreage in Mexico at this time, and the difficulty is compounded by the fact that the acreage varied significantly from year to year. But the evidence suggests that only about 180,000 acres were actually being irrigated in 1938. The errors in Arizona's reports are easily explained. The investigator was not an engineer, and his examination of ten days barely gave him time to see the area. Also, his estimates were supplied by Mexican officials, who had a natural desire to claim as much as possible."
目前很难准确确定墨西哥的灌溉面积，而这一困难又因每年的面积差异显著而加剧。但证据表明，1938 年实际进行灌溉的面积大约只有 18 万英亩。亚利桑那州报告中的错误很容易解释。调查人员不是工程师，他仅有的十天时间根本不够用来查看该地区。此外，他的估计是由墨西哥官员提供的，他们自然有夸大其词的倾向。

But even if Arizonans had been aware of these inadequacies, they would probably still have been sufficiently alarmed. As it was they roared their alarm in speeches, pamphlets, and letters in an attempt to arouse the other basin states to the seriousness of their findings. "Mexico has no moral or legal right," they ex-claimed, "to the benefits derived from the construction of Boulder [Hoover] Dam.* "The recent developments in the Mexican Delta," they observed, "are enjoying the safety provided by the construction of Boulder Dam by the American people, and at
但即使亚利桑那州的人们意识到这些不足，他们也可能会足够警觉。他们通过演讲、小册子和信件等方式发出警报，试图唤醒其他流域州认识到他们发现的严重性。“墨西哥没有道德或法律上的权利，”他们宣称，“从大坝[霍普金斯]的建设中获得利益。”他们观察到，“墨西哥三角洲的最近发展正在享受美国人民通过建造大坝提供的安全，而”

the expense of the American land owners." = Something would
代价是美国土地所有者的利益。 = 事情会

have to be done, and quickly. Mexico not only had no legal right to waters impounded by Hoover Dam, they insisted, but she leA no legal right to any Colorado River water. The Harmon opinion had made that clear. Nevertheless, they declared their willingness to grant Mexico in "comity" the 750,000 acre-feet used before completion of the dam.
必须迅速完成。墨西哥不仅没有哈罗德大坝拦截的水域的法律权利，他们坚持认为，她也没有科罗拉多河的任何水资源的法律权利。哈罗德意见已经明确指出这一点。然而，他们仍然表示愿意在“礼让”下授予墨西哥在大坝完工前使用的 75 万英亩-英尺的水量。

Arizona's allusion to the Mexican threat was a familiar one to the other basin states. Her representatives in Congress had often exaggerated the menace in attempts to win federal ap-propriations for reclamation projects which, they insisted, would employ water that would otherwise escape to Mexico because of the power and food releases at Hoover Dam. In short, Arizona tried to win support for her reclamation schemes without first ratifying the compact and agreeing to abide by its allocation to each basin. The attitude of the other basin states was echoed by Senator Abe Murdock of Utah, who labeled Arizona's latest fears as "absolutely 'bunk' and ridiculous." The declaration in the Boulder Canyon Act, reserving all water impounded on the river for use "exclusively within the United States," was, argued Murdock, adequate protection against Mexico.29
亚利桑那州对墨西哥威胁的提及是其他盆地州所熟悉的一个话题。她的国会议员经常夸大这种威胁，试图赢得联邦拨款以支持重新灌溉项目，他们坚持认为这些项目将使用原本会流向墨西哥的水资源，因为哈罗德大坝的发电和食物释放。简言之，亚利桑那州试图在没有首先批准契约并同意遵守每个盆地分配的情况下赢得支持她的重新灌溉计划。其他盆地州的态度得到了犹他州参议员埃比·墨多克的呼应，他将亚利桑那州最新的担忧称为“绝对的‘废话’和荒谬的”。布卢姆峡谷法案中的声明，保留了所有在河上拦截的水资源仅用于“美国境内使用”，墨多克认为这是足够的保护，以防墨西哥。

In spite of this exposure of the Arizonans' tacties, Murdock and the other Colorado River representatives saw some elements of truth in their words. They had witnessed the begining of Car-denas' program in Baja California, and they were aware of the State Department's eagerness for a treaty. When rumors spread that the department planned to open negotiations, many basin representatives suddenly realized the insecurity of their posi-tions. Most shared the concern of California's Senator Hiram Johnson, who ominously declared, "I fear the good-neighbor policy." a Because of this fear and the threat posed by Mexican expansion, the basin states answered the call of Arizona for an emergency conference.
尽管暴露了亚利桑那人的策略，默多克和其他科罗拉多河代表仍发现他们的话中有一些真实成分。他们目睹了卡德纳斯在下加利福尼亚州的计划的开端，并且他们知道国务院渴望达成一项条约。当谣传国务院计划开启谈判时，许多流域代表突然意识到他们位置的不安全性。大多数人都与加利福尼亚州参议员赫里姆·约翰逊的担忧一致，他警告说：“我担心睦邻政策。”由于这种恐惧以及墨西哥扩张带来的威胁，流域各州响应亚利桑那州的呼吁，召开了一次紧急会议。

IV
四

In an atmosphere of excitement the Colorado Basin representatives met at Phoenix in June, 1938. The crisis had brought a crowd of delegates from the basin states and even observers from the State Department and Texas. The Texans tried to calm fears by denying they wanted to give Mexico Colorado River water in exchange for a larger share of the Rio Grande. Indeed, they did not even insist that the two rivers be considered in the p same treaty. "We do not want to ride into heaven on your wings at all," they declared. "We think we have enough water to take care of the situation and all in the world we need is a treaty with Mexico" to provide for much-needed storage.™
在一片激动的气氛中，科罗拉多盆地的代表们于 1938 年 6 月在凤凰城会面。危机带来了来自盆地各州的代表，甚至还有来自国务院和德克萨斯州的观察员。德克萨斯人试图安抚人们的恐惧，否认他们想要用科罗拉多河水交换里奥格兰德河更大份额的水。事实上，他们甚至不坚持将这两条河放在同一个条约中。“我们根本不想依靠你们的翅膀进入天堂，”他们宣称。“我们认为我们有足够的水来处理这种情况，我们所需要的一切只是一个与墨西哥的条约，以提供急需的储存。”

Though the Texas disclaimer somewhat eased the tension, it did not remove the threat that had prompted the meeting in the first place. Particularly alarming to the delegates were thedisclosures of Don Scott, head of Arizona's Colorado River Com-mission. The annual releases for power and irrigation from Hoover Dam, Scott noted, would be 15,000,000 acre-feet. The present use of stored water by Arizona, California, and Nevada was only 3,100,000 acre-feet. Even allowing for evaporation losses and completion of several projects under construction, there would still be flowing down to Mexico about 9,600,000 acre-feet a year,
尽管德克萨斯州的免责声明在一定程度上缓解了紧张局势，但它并没有消除最初促使召开会议的威胁。特别是德克萨斯河委员会主席唐·斯科特的披露让代表们感到担忧。斯科特指出，胡佛大坝用于发电和灌溉的年供水量为 15000000 英亩-英尺。亚利桑那州、加利福尼亚州和内华达州目前使用储存的水量仅为 3100000 英亩-英尺。即使考虑到蒸发损失以及正在建设中的几个项目的完工，每年仍会有大约 9600000 英亩-英尺的水量流入墨西哥。

Many of Scott's fears and assertions were directly challenged by Mike Dowd, California's short, mild, and astute delegate from the Imperial Valley. Though a New Englander by birth, Dowd had come to California as a youngster and, after graduating from the California Institute of Technology, had joined the Imperial Irrigation District in 1922. Brilliant and loyal, he had so impressed his superiors that within four years he was chief engineer and general superintendent, in charge of all the ID's activities.
斯科特的许多担忧和断言直接被来自帝国谷的加州代表迈克·道德所挑战。道德出生在新英格兰，但年轻时就移居到了加州。1922 年，他从加州理工学院毕业后加入了帝国灌溉区。他聪明忠诚，给上级留下了深刻印象，四年后便成为首席工程师和总经理，负责帝国灌溉区的所有活动。

Because of his familiarity with the border region, he found a receptive, though nervous, audience in the delegates at Phoenix.
由于他对边境地区的熟悉，凤凰城的代表们虽然有些紧张，但对他持开放态度。

While Dowd did not oppose a treaty and did want Mexico's water allocation determined, he wanted most of all to have the basin states remain calm during the crisis and not rush into something that would jeopardize his state's interest in the river.
虽然道德没有反对条约，也希望确定墨西哥的水资源分配，但他最希望的是在危机期间让流域各州保持冷静，不要匆忙做出可能危及该河在他州利益的事情。

He denied that any great advances had been made by Mexico and he held that she was irrigating no more than 250,000 acres, not the 424,000 acres as claimed. It was a real "break for the United States," declared Dowd, "when Mexico adopted its Agrarian Policy." a If Chandler and the other Americans had remained, the situation would have been far more serious, since they operated much more efficiently and wisely than the Mexicans had. For somewhat the same reasons, Dowd did not consider the power releases from Hoover Dam a problem. The Mexicans simply were not intelligent farmers. "There isn't any need of any alarm," Dowd assured the delegates, "as to what is golf? to happen in the next few years." He felt certain that Mexican uses would not increase significantly before completion of the All-American Canal. By that time, the Imperial Valley would be relieved of its dependence upon the Alamo Canal, and then the United States could exert pressure on Mexico for a favorable treaty,Though Dowd's assurances tempered somewhat the fears of the other basin representatives, they still remained uneasy. If his assumptions were correct- and he seems to have overesti mated Mexican development by about 70,000 acres-the Mexicans would still be irrigating considerably more than they had before Hoover Dam had been built. Furthermore, it was pointed out that Mexico could obtain additional water to build up her uses by pumping from underground basins. These considerations were enough to warrant concern and the delegates decided to send several resolutions to the State Department. One urged Cordell Hull to warn Mexico that her increased use of water since Hoover Dam would "establish no right, legal or moral." They also condemned any treaty that would trade Colorado River water for that "in any other international stream"-ob-viously, the Rio Grande. 32
他否认墨西哥取得了任何重大进展，并坚持认为墨西哥仅灌溉了 250,000 英亩的土地，而不是如所声称的 424,000 英亩。道德宣称：“当墨西哥采纳其土地政策时，这对美国来说是一个真正的转折点。”如果钱德勒和其他美国人留在那里，情况将会严重得多，因为他们比墨西哥人更高效和明智地运作。由于同样的原因，道德并不认为胡佛大坝的水释放是一个问题。墨西哥人只是不够聪明的农民。“在未来几年里，不会有任何需要担心的事情，”道德向代表们保证，“至于高尔夫是什么，你们可以查一查。”他认为，在全美运河完工之前，墨西哥的用水量不会显著增加。到那时，帝国谷将不再依赖阿尔莫罗运河，然后美国可以对墨西哥施加压力，争取有利的条约。尽管道德的保证在一定程度上缓解了其他盆地代表的担忧，但他们仍然感到不安。 如果他的假设是正确的——并且他似乎高估了墨西哥的发展约 70,000 英亩——墨西哥人仍然会比 Hoover 大坝建成之前灌溉更多的土地。此外，有人指出，墨西哥可以通过抽取地下盆地的水来获得额外的水资源，以增加其用水量。这些考虑足以引起关注，代表们决定向国务院发送几项决议。其中一项敦促 Cordell Hull 警告墨西哥，自 Hoover 大坝建成以来其增加的用水量“不会建立任何合法或道德的权利”。他们还谴责任何将科罗拉多河的水资源与“任何其他国际河流”的水资源进行交换的条约——显然指的是格兰德河。32

But the delegates did much more than pass resolutions. To better protect their interests and to promote rapid development of the basin in the United States, they created the Committee of Fourteen, which consisted of two members from each of the seven basin states, and later they established the Committee of Sixteen. The basin membership of both groups was the same, except that the latter contained representatives from the hydroelectric power interests--the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California--and was primarily concerned with the problem of hydroelectricity. The power interests also became deeply interested in the Mexican problem since the volume of water allocated to Mexico might affect the production of electricity at Hoover Dam. Consequently, it was not long before, for all practical purposes, the two committees merged, although technically they continued as separate organizations.
但代表们所做的远不止通过决议。为了更好地保护自己的利益并促进美国盆地的快速开发，他们成立了十四人委员会，该委员会由七个盆地州的每州两名成员组成，后来他们又成立了十六人委员会。两个委员会的盆地成员相同，只是后者包含了水电利益代表——洛杉矶水务局和南加州 Metropolitan 水务区，并主要关注水电问题。水电利益方也对墨西哥问题产生了浓厚兴趣，因为分配给墨西哥的水量可能会影响胡佛大坝的电力生产。因此，不久之后，这两个委员会实际上合并了，尽管从技术上讲它们仍然是独立的组织。

роменнино в сови костри нас оне о и со боротив, і вос со натк,
他们用柴火烤了罗马尼亚人，并且与之搏斗，还用柴火烤。

States, asked permission to attend meetings. This request, like the one years before to participate in the deliberations of the Colorado River Commission, was denied. As Mexico was not informing the basin states of her activities in Baja California, argued the delegates, she should not be permitted to know what was happening in the United States.About the time that Arizona initiated the above series of events, Cordell Hull received the report he had requested from the Interior Department on the water supply of the Colorado River. The findings were so impressive that he felt the basin states might be persuaded to be more generous with Mexico," Before he could take this information to the delegates, however, action by the president of Mexico made it imperative that he obtain basin-state approval for any negotiations. In March, 1938, Cardenas expropriated all the American-owned oil properties.
各州请求获得参加会议的许可。这一请求，就像几年前请求参与科罗拉多河委员会的讨论一样，都被拒绝了。由于墨西哥没有向流域各州通报她在下加利福尼亚的活动情况，代表们认为墨西哥不应被允许知道美国正在发生的事情。就在亚利桑那州开始上述一系列事件的同时，科德尔·赫尔收到了内政部关于科罗拉多河供水情况的报告。这些发现如此令人印象深刻，以至于他认为流域各州可能会被说服对墨西哥更加慷慨，“但在他能够将这些信息带给代表们之前，墨西哥总统的行动使得他必须获得流域各州对任何谈判的批准变得至关重要。1938 年 3 月，卡德纳斯征用了所有美国拥有的石油财产。”

The hostile reaction on the part of many Americans was instan-taneous. Good Neighbor Policy or not, a treaty opposed by the seven Colorado River states would have little chance of success in the tense atmosphere created by expropriation.
许多美国人的敌对反应是即时的。无论是否是“睦邻政策”，如果七个科罗拉多河流域州反对的一项条约在因征用而产生的紧张气氛中几乎没有成功的希望。

More convinced than ever that he had to put the Interior Department's water report before the Colorado states, Hull turned first to the basin senators and them to the Committee of Fourteen, advising them to keep the report confidential.. The senators deferred to the committee, since their attitudes were usually a reflection of those of the committee's skilled lawyers and engineers. The study (known as the Jacobs-Stevens Report) outlined a deceptively easy solution for the Mexican problem and sparked a sharp reaction.
Hull 比以往任何时候都坚信必须将内政部的水资源报告提交给科罗拉多州的官员，于是首先向流域参议员们求助，并将他们引荐给十四人委员会，建议他们将报告保密。参议员们通常会听从委员会的意见，因为他们的态度往往反映了委员会中熟练律师和工程师的观点。这份研究报告（被称为雅各布斯-斯蒂文斯报告）提出了一个看似简单易行的解决方案来解决墨西哥问题，并引发了强烈的反应。

According to the report, projects in the United States would eventually use the river's entire flow, but there would still be much water left for Mexico. This water would be "return flow" or drainage from American reclamation projects. Particularly startling was the speculation over the amount of this drainage water. Two different estimates were offered, dependent on the kind of future water development in the United States, but both were considerably larger than the 750,000 acre-feet the Colorado Basin states had insisted should be Mexico's maximum allotment The largest estimate, and the one felt to be more nearly correct, indicated a return flow of 1,200,000 acre-feet. But this was not all Mexico would receive. In addition, there would be nearly 385,000 acre-feet of relatively fresh water used to remove silt from diversions made into the All-American Canal. This "de-silting water," plus the retur flow, guaranteed Mexico a total of 1,585,000 acre-feet, even under conditions of full development in the United States. Though much of the return flow could be reused in the United States by pumping operations near the border, Jacobs and Stevens considered such action unwise. The value of pumping would be "questionable," they argued, both
根据报告，美国的项目最终将利用河流的全部流量，但仍会有很多水留给墨西哥。这些水将是“回流”或美国整治项目中的排水水。特别是令人惊讶的是对这种排水水数量的推测。提供了两种不同的估计，取决于美国未来水资源开发的类型，但都远大于科罗拉多河流域各州坚持认为墨西哥的最大配额应为 75 万英亩-英尺。最大的估计，也被认为更接近实际情况，表明回流水量为 120 万英亩-英尺。但这并不是墨西哥将收到的所有水。此外，还将有近 38.5 万英亩-英尺相对新鲜的水用于清除引入全美运河的引水渠中的淤泥。这种“清淤水”加上回流，确保即使在美国完全开发的情况下，墨西哥也将获得总计 158.5 万英亩-英尺的水量。尽管大部分回流可以在美国边境附近的抽水操作中重复使用，但雅各布和斯蒂文斯认为这种做法不明智。 抽水的价值他们认为是“值得怀疑”的，这既从经济考虑，也……出于实际需要，因为这将剥夺墨西哥在最终时期唯一的可靠供应来源。

"from economic considerations, and . . . as a matter of expe-diency, as it would deprive Mexico of her only dependable source of supply in the ultimate period." 87
"从经济考虑，也……出于实际需要，因为这将剥夺墨西哥在最终时期唯一的可靠供应来源。”87

While the State Department waited anxiously for the expected go-ahead, the Committee of Fourteen spent several months studying the report and making field trips. Finally, in November, 1939, it submitted a critique that undermined Jacobs and Stevens conclusions.
虽然国务院焦急地等待着预期的批准，十四人委员会却花了几个月的时间研究这份报告并进行实地考察。最终，在 1939 年 11 月，它提交了一份批评意见，质疑了约克斯和斯蒂文斯的结论。

The committee seriously challenged the report's most important finding- the estimate of return flow. Most of the flow was believed to originate on the Gila project and the committee maintained that, if irrigation had not made the water too saline, it would be reused in the United States. Even though Jacobs and Stevens had admitted this possibility, they had felt that relations with Mexico would suffer further deterioration if some water were not allowed to flow downstream. Moreover, they believed that economic considerations would make the return flow too expensive to reclaim. The committee flatly rejected such assertions as incorrect and presumptuous. Pumping could recover the return How at reasonable cost and the declaration by Jacobs and Stevens that it would not be expedient to deprive Mexico of this flow was "beyond the directed scope of their investigation." The
委员会严肃质疑报告最重要的发现——回流水的估计。大多数人认为回流水主要源自吉拉项目，委员会坚持认为，如果灌溉没有使水变得过于咸，这些水将在美国被重新利用。尽管雅各布和斯蒂文斯承认了这种可能性，但他们认为如果不让一些水流入墨西哥，与墨西哥的关系将进一步恶化。此外，他们认为经济因素会使回流水的回收成本过高。委员会明确拒绝了这些说法，认为它们是错误且自以为是的。抽水可以在合理成本下回收回流水，雅各布和斯蒂文斯声明不让墨西哥获得这部分水流“超出了他们调查的范围。”

"matter of expediency is one which rests with the states and the Federal Government," observed the committee, and not with the two engineers hired to make a report on water supply.38
“是否有利时机是由各州和联邦政府决定的，”委员会指出，而不是由两名受雇调查水资源的工程师决定。

Even the estimate for desilting water was questioned. The need for desilting water, noted the committee, would gradually
甚至对清淤水的估计也受到质疑。委员会指出，需要清淤水的情况将逐渐

decrcaser as storage mereasedd on the river. In short, the com电
decrcaser 作为存储器在河岸上增加。简而言之，the com 电保持原样。

mittee believed that there was just not enough information avail- v able to forecast the supply ultimately available to Mexico and it concluded by urging the State and Interior departments to make further investigations. It knew that the Interior Department had been working on a comprehensive study which would show all possible developments in the Colorado Basin. Since many anticipated that the report would confirm the need of the United States for all the waters of the Colorado, the committee urged the State Department to put off treaty talks until the study was completed. But above all, it advised the State Department to find another basis for a treaty. 39
mittee 认为没有足够的信息来预测最终可供墨西哥的供应量，并建议州务卿和内政部进行进一步调查。mittee 知道内政部正在开展一项全面研究，该研究将展示科罗拉多盆地所有可能的发展情况。由于许多人预计该报告将证实美国需要科罗拉多河的所有水资源，mittee 建议州务卿推迟条约谈判，直到研究报告完成。但最重要的是，mittee 建议州务卿为条约找到另一个基础。39

During the hearings on the report, only one of its authors,
在审议该报告时，只有其作者之一，

J. G. Stevens, was present to bear the brunt of cross-examination.
J. G. 斯蒂文斯在场，以承受交叉询问的压力。

He unexpectedly congratulated the committee members on the thoroughness of their investigation and almost completely accepted their findings, though he lamely observed that the report did not "say that those supplemental waters must go to Mexico." Stevens was an extremely emotional man and the committee's attack on the report caused him to break down. Shaken and nearly in tears, he agreed that he and Jacobs had overstepped themselves in stating it would not be expedient to deprive Mexico of the surplus. In fact, he wished he could "tear the words out," for obviously such a declaration "was outside of our scope." 4 With such vigorous opposition from the Committee of Four-teen, the State Department shelved its plans for a treaty based on Jacobs' and Stevens' report. The committee's hostility, together with the swelling resentment against Mexico's expropriation of the oil properties, made it practically impossible for the Senate to approve a treaty without the endorsement of the basin states.
他意外地对委员会成员的调查彻底性表示祝贺，并几乎完全接受了他们的发现，尽管他无力地指出报告中没有说“这些补充水源必须给墨西哥”。斯蒂文斯是一个非常情绪化的人，委员会对报告的攻击使他崩溃。他情绪激动，几乎泪流满面，同意他和雅各布斯在声明不会剥夺墨西哥的过剩资源时越界了。事实上，他希望自己能“撕掉这些字”，因为显然这样的声明“超出了我们的范围”。4 在十四人委员会如此激烈的反对下，国务院搁置了基于雅各布斯和斯蒂文斯报告的条约计划。委员会的敌意，加上对墨西哥没收石油财产的日益加剧的不满，使参议院在没有盆地州的批准下几乎不可能批准一个条约。

In the meantime, the Colorado River states gained an even stronger position in October, 1940, when the All-American Canal came into partial use. Two years later, when the entire water supply of the Imperial Valley was funneled through the new aqueduct, American farmers were freed from their dependence upon the Alamo Canal in Mexico. Once that happened, the concession of 1904, which allowed Mexico up to one-half of the Alamit camp act i a s at an end. Then the imperial Valley set.
在此期间，科罗拉多河各州在 1940 年 10 月取得了更加稳固的地位，因为部分奥克拉荷马运河投入使用。两年后，当整个帝国谷的供水通过新的引水渠输送时，美国农民摆脱了对墨西哥阿尔马莫运河的依赖。一旦这种情况发生，1904 年的让步协议，允许墨西哥最多使用一半的阿尔马莫法案，便告结束。然后帝国谷开始发挥作用。

headwrorks in the United Staates and try. to limit Mexico's ase SA
在美国和尝试限制墨西哥的水供应

water to whatever amount they desired.
他们可以任意决定水供应的数量。

The Mexicans could theoretically forestall such an eventuality by building their own diversion works below the border.
墨西哥人可以通过在边境以下建造自己的引水工程来理论上防止这种情况的发生。

Several important obstacles, however, stood in the way of that move. Most important, it would be merely a temporary respite.
然而，有几个重要的障碍阻碍了这一举措。最重要的是，这将只是一个暂时的喘息。

For a while large quantities of water would continue flowing into Mexico, but Mexico's share would progressively decrease as uses increased in the United States. Furthermore, enough water could possibly be diverted into the All-American Canal at critical times of the year to limit Mexican crop expansion. In addition, if the United States felt strongly enough about the problem, it could arrange flash releases from Hoover Dam to frustrate Mexico's diversion operations. In short, the completion of the All-American Canal put the United States in a dominant position on the Colorado. Meanwhile, equally important developments were taking place on the Rio Grande.
一段时间内，大量水将继续流入墨西哥，但随着美国国内用水量增加，墨西哥的份额将逐渐减少。此外，在一年中的关键时期，可能有足够的水被引导到全美运河，以限制墨西哥作物的扩张。另外，如果美国对这个问题感到足够重视，它可以通过安排胡佛大坝的突发放水来干扰墨西哥的引水操作。总之，全美运河的完成使美国在科罗拉多河上占据了主导地位。与此同时，里奥格兰德河上同样发生了重要的发展。

VI

The State Department's inability to secure a treaty had disturbed Texans living on the lower Rio Grande. When Representative Milton West's resolution of 1935 which called for negotiations brought no results, their disappointment turned to bitterness and then to alarm as they watched the Mexicans constructing their Retamal Canal. Even before rejection of the Jacobs-Stevens Report, Texans were blaming the opposition of the Colorado Basin states for the lack of a peaceful settlement on the Rio Grande.
国务院无法达成条约让生活在里奥格兰德河下游的得克萨斯人感到不安。当代表米尔顿·韦斯特在 1935 年提出的呼吁谈判的决议没有结果时，他们的失望变成了苦涩，然后随着他们目睹墨西哥人修建雷塔马尔运河，这种苦涩转变为了恐慌。在雅各布斯-斯蒂文斯报告被否决之前，得克萨斯人已经开始指责科罗拉多河流域的各州反对达成里奥格兰德河上的和平协议。

Most outspoken in this criticism was Oscar Dancy, an energetic judge in Cameron County on the lower Rio Grande. Dancy accused the Colorado states, particularly California, of ingrati-tude. When the Boulder Canyon bill came up for a final vote, he declared, it was supported by "every member of the Texas delegation in Congress." * But when Texans needed help, they were deserted by their onetime friends.
在这些批评中最为直言不讳的是卡梅伦县里奥格兰德河下游的活跃法官奥塞·丹西。丹西指责科罗拉多河流域的各州，尤其是加利福尼亚州，忘恩负义。当《里弗峡谷法案》进行最终投票时，他宣称，“得克萨斯州国会代表团的每一位成员都支持该法案。” 但当得克萨斯人需要帮助时，他们被他们曾经的朋友抛弃了。

Actually, Dancy exaggerated the Texas support for the Boulder Canyon bill. The Texas congressional delegation had taken little part in the hearings or floor debates and not all of them had voted for the bill. Although it received the support OF the senators, only six of the eighteen Texans in the House voted
实际上，Dancy 夸大了德克萨斯州对《博尔德峡谷法案》的支持。德克萨斯州的国会代表团在听证会或 floor 讨论中几乎没有参与，也不是所有的议员都投票支持该法案。尽管该法案得到了参议员的支持，但只有十八名德克萨斯州众议员中的六人投了赞成票。

~

for it. Nevertheless, Dancy was apparently correct in his contention that many Texans, including the influential John Nance Garner, had supported the measure in anticipation of California help for their Rio Grande problems, 13
尽管如此，丹西显然正确地认为，许多德克萨斯人，包括有影响力的约翰·纳恩·加纳，都支持该措施，期望加利福尼亚会帮助解决他们的里奥格兰德河问题，13

Although angry with California, Dancy praised the state's tactics in securing passage of the Boulder Canyon Act and felt that Texans could learn something from California's strategy. In open letters to the political and business leaders of the lower Rio Grande Valley, he urged adoption of California's lobbying tactics in order to secure a treaty. "California," he lectured, has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on "Third House work in Washington on their Boulder Dam proposition. We have spent comparatively nothing--it is time to wake up."# Largely at Dancy's insistence, the valley woke up, raised money, and, in the summer of 1937, sent a three-man delegation to Washington, where it began badgering Secretary Hull for a Mexican treaty. 45
尽管对加利福尼亚州心怀不满，丹西仍赞扬该州在推动《博尔德峡谷法案》通过时的策略，并认为德克萨斯州可以从加利福尼亚州的策略中学到一些东西。他在致里奥格兰德河下游的政治和商业领袖的公开信中，敦促采用加利福尼亚州的游说策略以确保获得条约。“加利福尼亚州，”他讲道，“在华盛顿为他们的博尔德大坝提案上花费了数十万美元的‘第三屋’工作。我们几乎没有花什么钱——是时候醒过来了。”# 在丹西的坚持下，该地区开始行动起来，筹集资金，并在 1937 年夏天派了一个三人代表团前往华盛顿，开始向赫尔部长施压，要求签订与墨西哥的条约。45

Other developments spurred the Texans to work even harder for a treaty. The Mexicans, in announcing construction plans for the El Azucar Dam in September, 1937, candidly admitted they would use the dam to force the United States to trade Colorado River water for Rio Grande water.* Several months later the largest Rio Grande food on record emphasized the need for international control of the river's water. The costly floods were then followed by a severe drought which reduced water to the critical stage. In fact, at one point even water for domestic uses had to be shipped into Brownsville and Matamoros. Another problem was water quality. The small volume in the river was often so impregnated with salts that it killed the crops onto which it was diverted. Salts were brought into the river mostly by the return flow from irrigation projects upstream, both in the United States and on the Mexican tributaries. Storage reservoirs could relieve this problem by providing water for diluting the saline return flow as well as for bringing additional acreage under cultivation. It was estimated that the river wasted nearly 4,000,000 acre-feet of water annually into the Gulf of Mexico. But reservoirs on the mainstream, just like a division of water, required a treaty since half the dam would lie in Mexico.
其他发展促使德克萨斯人更加努力地争取条约。1937 年 9 月，墨西哥人在宣布埃尔阿苏卡尔大坝的建设计划时，坦率地承认他们将利用该大坝迫使美国用科罗拉多河的水交换格兰德河的水。*几个月后，格兰德河历史上最大的洪灾进一步强调了对河流水资源进行国际控制的必要性。随后的昂贵洪灾之后，又遭遇了严重的干旱，导致水资源降至关键阶段。事实上，在某个阶段，甚至生活用水都不得不被运进布朗斯维尔和马塔莫罗斯。另一个问题是水质。河中的水量很小，经常被盐分污染，导致被引水灌溉的作物死亡。盐分主要通过上游美国和墨西哥支流的灌溉项目回流进入河流。蓄水水库可以通过提供用于稀释盐分回流的水以及增加可耕种面积来缓解这一问题。据估计，该河每年有近 4000 万英亩-英尺的水流入墨西哥湾。 但主流上的水库，就像一道分水岭，需要一个条约，因为大坝的一半将位于墨西哥。

Faced with so many serious problemns, the Tesans redoub,PA
面对这么多严重的问题，特斯兰红堡，PA

their efforts, sending letters and delegations to Washington. In 1938 the Texas State Board of Water Engineers presented a resolution to the State Department; it was endorsed by 152 irrigation districts, service clubs, chambers of commerce, municipal governments, and individual water users from Fort Outman to the gulf. 'The resolution urged a treaty and the construction of new water facilities to offset the evils of Mexican development along the river. Without a treaty, Mexico would appropriate water "to the complete exclusion and utter disregard of the existing rights" of the Texas farmers. To permit such an "un-regulated scramble," the petition declared, would be to act
他们的努力，发送信件和代表团到华盛顿。1938 年，德克萨斯州水利工程委员会向国务院提交了一份决议；该决议得到了从福特奥特曼到海湾的 152 个灌溉区、服务俱乐部、商会、市政政府和个人用水户的支持。该决议敦促签订条约并建设新的水利设施以抵消墨西哥沿河开发的恶果。如果没有条约，墨西哥将独占水资源，“完全忽视和剥夺了德克萨斯农民现有的权利”。允许这种“无序竞争”，请愿书声明，将是采取

"against all principles of good morals, equity, and justice." as State Department officials had always been anxious to help the Texas farmers; they had initially ordered the Jacobs-Stevens Report prepared on the Colorado so that they might hasten negotiations with Mexico. But that plan had been thwarted by the opposition of the basin states. As Texas fears about the future heightened, Secretary of State Hull ordered a fact-finding study to determine methods of flood control and water conservation along the lower Rio Grande within the United States.
"违背了所有良好的道德、公平和正义的原则。”正如国务院官员一直希望帮助德克萨斯农民；他们最初要求对科罗拉多河进行雅各布斯-斯蒂文斯报告的准备，以便能够加快与墨西哥的谈判。但该计划因流域各州的反对而受阻。随着德克萨斯州对未来担忧的加剧，国务卿赫尔下令进行一项事实调查研究，以确定美国境内下拉里格兰德河区域的洪水控制和水资源保护方法。

By the end of 1939, the important study had been completed.
到 1939 年底，这项重要的研究已经完成。

It urged congressional action on what became known as the Valley Gravity Canal and Storage Project, a plan with major international implications calling for the construction of a 169-mile: long concrete canal that would parallel the Rio Grande on the Texas side, and the erection of two storage reservoirs along the canal. In this way over 400,000 acre-feet of water, usually lost in floods, could be diverted into the canal and impounded in the reservoirs until needed for irrigation. The canal's intake, near Zapata, Texas, would be above the Mexican Retamal diversion works, thus removing the threat they posed for American lands.* Obviously, in addition to its flood control and irrigation bene-fits, the project had the primary importance of offsetting Mexico's superior position on the lower Rio Grande. Mexico produced most of the water, but the Valley Gravity Project would represent a permanent menace to the fertile land on the Mexican side of the lower Rio Grande Valley. Much of the water released from the Mexican tributary dams for use on those lands and much of the river's low fow could be siphoned off by the Texas farmers A Consequently, the Texans would have it in their power to threaten nearly 1,000,000 acres of rich Mexican delta land.
它敦促国会采取行动，这后来被称为山谷重力运河和蓄水项目，这是一个具有重大国际影响的计划，要求建造一条 169 英里长的混凝土运河，该运河将平行于德克萨斯一侧的里奥格兰德河，并在运河沿线建立两个蓄水水库。这样，超过 40 万英亩·英尺的通常在洪水中流失的水可以被引入运河，并在需要用于灌溉时储存在水库中。运河的进水口位于德克萨斯州的扎帕塔附近，高于墨西哥的雷塔马尔引水工程，从而消除了它们对美国土地的威胁*。显然，除了其防洪和灌溉的好处外，该项目的主要重要性在于抵消墨西哥在里奥格兰德河下游的优越地位。墨西哥生产了大部分的水，但山谷重力项目将对里奥格兰德河下游墨西哥一侧的肥沃土地构成永久性威胁。 来自墨西哥支流大坝的大部分水资源用于那些土地上，以及河流中大部分的低流量水都可能被德克萨斯州的农民截流。因此，德克萨斯州人将有能力威胁到近 100 万英亩的墨西哥河口肥沃土地。

In 1941 Congress appropriated funds to begin work on the vital project. Though the outbreak of World War II postponed construction, the Mexicans fully realized the implications of the American plans. The United States already had an All-American Canal on the Colorado River; the construction of the Valley Gravity Project would amount to an All-American Canal on the Rio Grande.
1941 年，国会拨款开始这项至关重要的工程。尽管第二次世界大战爆发推迟了建设，但墨西哥人完全意识到了美国计划的含义。美国已经在科罗拉多河上建成了全美运河；格兰德河上的山谷重力项目将相当于又一条全美运河。

The thirteen years following the unsuccessful negotiations of 1929 were filled with feverish activity. Though the United States and Mexico did not sign a treaty, they had been made aware of its necessity. Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal intensified Mexico's interest in Colorado River water. In turn, Mexico's expanding irrigation projects on both the Rio Grande and the Colorado, together with Cárdenas' resettlement program, caused anxiety in the United States. Because of their more precarious positions, the Texans on the lower Rio Grande and the Mexicans on the Colorado desired a treaty, but the more slowly aroused Colorado Basin states stalled negotiations. As the danger to their interests mounted, however, they moved to organize the Committee of Fourteen. Even then they acted cautiously, preferring to await a more thorough study of potential uses which they knew would dramatize the need of the United States for all the water of the Colorado River. Others, especially Californians, urged delay until completion of the All-American Canal put the United States in a position of strength on the river.
1929 年失败的谈判之后的十三年里充满了紧张的活动。尽管美国和墨西哥没有签订条约，但他们已经意识到了条约的必要性。胡佛大坝和全美运河加剧了墨西哥对科罗拉多河水的兴趣。反过来，墨西哥在格兰德河和科罗拉多河上不断扩大的灌溉项目，以及卡德纳斯的再安置计划，引起了美国的担忧。由于他们的地位更为脆弱，格兰德河下游的得克萨斯人和科罗拉多河上的墨西哥人希望签订条约，但科罗拉多河流域的其他州则拖延了谈判。然而，随着他们利益受到的威胁日益加剧，他们组织了十四人委员会。即使如此，他们也谨慎行事，宁愿等待对潜在用途的更全面研究，这将凸显美国需要科罗拉多河全部水资源的必要性。其他人，尤其是加利福尼亚人，则建议等到全美运河完工后再签订条约，以使美国在河上处于更有利的地位。

Meanwhile, failure to obtain a treaty had caused the Texans to set up such a clamor that Washington sent out a team of engineers to find a solution to their problem. The result was the recommendation of a project that would neutralize Mexico's superior position on the lower Rio Grande.
同时，由于未能获得条约，得克萨斯人对这个问题的抗议声浪很大，华盛顿派出了一个工程团队来解决他们的问题。结果是推荐了一个项目，以消除墨西哥在下拉瑞恩河的优越地位。

By 1940, the United States had achieved, or could achieve,
到 1940 年，美国已经实现了，或者能够实现，

rosition of dlominanee. on the Colaral. ad a Poop at92
在科罗拉多河上的主导地位。谷物重力项目将相当于一条全美河上的格兰德河。

least equal power on the Rio Grande. The significance of the critical developments was not lost on Mexico,Canal on the Colorado River; the construction of the Valley Gravity Project would amount to an All-American Canal on the Rio Grande.
至少拥有里奥格兰德河的同等权力。墨西哥对这些关键发展的意义并没有忽视，科罗拉多河大谷地项目将相当于一条全美运河，用于里奥格兰德河。

The thirteen years following the unsuccessful negotiations of 1929 were filled with feverish activity. Though the United States and Mexico did not sign a treaty, they had been made aware of its necessity. Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal intensified Mexico's interest in Colorado River water. In turn, Mexico's expanding irrigation projects on both the Rio Grande and the Colorado, together with Cárdenas' resettlement program, caused anxiety in the United States. Because of their more precarious positions, the Texans on the lower Rio Grande and the Mexicans on the Colorado desired a treaty, but the more slowly aroused Colorado Basin states stalled negotiations. As the danger to their interests mounted, however, they moved to organize the Committee of Fourteen. Even then they acted cautiously, preferring to await a more thorough study of potential uses which they knew would dramatize the need of the United States for all the water of the Colorado River. Others, especially Californians, urged delay until completion of the All-American Canal put the United States in a position of strength on the river.
1929 年失败的谈判之后的十三年里充满了紧张的活动。尽管美国和墨西哥没有签订条约，但他们已经意识到了条约的必要性。胡佛大坝和全美运河加剧了墨西哥对科罗拉多河水的兴趣。反过来，墨西哥在格兰德河和科罗拉多河上不断扩大的灌溉项目，以及卡德纳斯的再安置计划，引起了美国的担忧。由于他们的地位更为脆弱，格兰德河下游的得克萨斯人和科罗拉多河上的墨西哥人希望签订条约，但科罗拉多河流域的其他州则拖延了谈判。然而，随着他们利益受到的威胁日益加剧，他们组织了十四人委员会。即使如此，他们也谨慎行事，宁愿等待对潜在用途的更全面研究，这将凸显美国需要科罗拉多河全部水资源的必要性。其他人，尤其是加利福尼亚人，则建议等到全美运河完工后再签订条约，以使美国在河上处于更有利的地位。

Meanwhile, failure to obtain a treaty had caused the Texans to set up such a clamor that Washington sent out a team of engineers to find a solution to their problem. The result was the recommendation of a project that would neutralize Mexico's superior position on the lower Rio Grande.
同时，由于未能获得条约，得克萨斯人对这个问题的抗议声浪很大，华盛顿派出了一个工程团队来解决他们的问题。结果是推荐了一个项目，以消除墨西哥在下拉瑞恩河的优越地位。

By 1940, the United States had achieved, or could achieve,
到 1940 年，美国已经实现了，或者能够实现，

rosition of dlominanee. on the Colaral. ad a Poop at92
在科罗拉多河上的主导地位。谷物重力项目将相当于一条全美河上的格兰德河。

least equal power on the Rio Grande. The significance of the critical developments was not lost on Mexico,Canal on the Colorado River; the construction of the Valley Gravity Project would amount to an All-American Canal on the Rio Grande.
至少在格兰德河上拥有相等的力量。关键发展的重要性并未被墨西哥忽视，科罗拉多河上的运河；谷物重力项目将相当于一条全美河上的格兰德河。

The thirteen years following the unsuccessful negotiations of 1929 were filled with feverish activity. Though the United States and Mexico did not sign a treaty, they had been made aware of its necessity. Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal intensified Mexico's interest in Colorado River water. In turn, Mexico's expanding irrigation projects on both the Rio Grande and the Colorado, together with Cárdenas' resettlement program, caused anxiety in the United States. Because of their more precarious positions, the Texans on the lower Rio Grande and the Mexicans on the Colorado desired a treaty, but the more slowly aroused Colorado Basin states stalled negotiations. As the danger to their interests mounted, however, they moved to organize the Committee of Fourteen. Even then they acted cautiously, preferring to await a more thorough study of potential uses which they knew would dramatize the need of the United States for all the water of the Colorado River. Others, especially Californians, urged delay until completion of the All-American Canal put the United States in a position of strength on the river.
1929 年失败的谈判之后的十三年里充满了紧张的活动。尽管美国和墨西哥没有签订条约，但他们已经意识到了条约的必要性。胡佛大坝和全美运河加剧了墨西哥对科罗拉多河水的兴趣。反过来，墨西哥在格兰德河和科罗拉多河上不断扩大的灌溉项目，以及卡德纳斯的再安置计划，引起了美国的担忧。由于他们的地位更为脆弱，格兰德河下游的得克萨斯人和科罗拉多河上的墨西哥人希望签订条约，但科罗拉多河流域的其他州则拖延了谈判。然而，随着他们利益受到的威胁日益加剧，他们组织了十四人委员会。即使如此，他们也谨慎行事，宁愿等待对潜在用途的更全面研究，这将凸显美国需要科罗拉多河全部水资源的必要性。其他人，尤其是加利福尼亚人，则建议等到全美运河完工后再签订条约，以使美国在河上处于更有利的地位。

Meanwhile, failure to obtain a treaty had caused the Texans to set up such a clamor that Washington sent out a team of engineers to find a solution to their problem. The result was the recommendation of a project that would neutralize Mexico's superior position on the lower Rio Grande.
同时，由于未能获得条约，得克萨斯人对这个问题的抗议声浪很大，华盛顿派出了一个工程团队来解决他们的问题。结果是推荐了一个项目，以消除墨西哥在下拉瑞恩河的优越地位。

By 1940, the United States had achieved, or could achieve,
到 1940 年，美国已经实现了，或者能够实现，

position of dominance. on the Colarado. ad a position of at least equal power on the Rio Grande. The significance of the critical developments was not lost on Mexico.
在科罗拉多河占据主导地位。至少在格兰德河占据与墨西哥同等的力量地位。这些关键发展的意义并未被墨西哥忽视。

第五章

When Mexicans learned of the Valley Gravity Project on the lower Rio Grande, they were immediately alarmed. They sensed the threat it held for their development in the lower Rio Grande Valley and realized that it would weaken their bargaining posi-tion. Though most of the water of the lower Rio Grande originated in Mexico, this would obviously no longer be an effective weapon in compelling the United States to come to favorable terms on the Colorado.
当墨西哥人得知下拉格朗德河谷重力项目时，他们立刻感到 alarm。他们意识到这个项目对下拉格朗德河谷的发展构成了威胁，并且会削弱他们的谈判地位。尽管下拉格朗德河的大部分水资源源自墨西哥，但显然这将不再是迫使美国在科罗拉多河问题上达成有利条件的有效武器。

Angered and worried, Mexico lashed out at the proposed Rio Grande project with a strong protest to the United States in January, 1940. Though State Department officials tried to assuage Mexican fears, claiming that the project would only divert floodwater and not jeopardize the flow of irrigation water, they admitted that it would offset the threat of Mexico's own Retamal Canal. But a policy of threats, observed Undersecretary of State Summer Welles ,would not bring a solution. The best thing for Mexico and the United States would be an agreement that would include both great rivers and recognize existing water uses.'
1940 年 1 月，墨西哥因愤怒和担忧，强烈抗议美国提出的里奥格兰德河项目，并向美国提出了强烈抗议。尽管国务院官员试图安抚墨西哥的恐惧，声称该项目只会分流洪水，不会危及灌溉用水的流量，但他们承认该项目会抵消墨西哥雷塔马尔运河的威胁。但国务院次长萨默·威尔斯观察到，威胁政策并不能解决问题。墨西哥和美国最好的办法是达成一项包括两大河流并承认现有用水用途的协议。

Welles said nothing about the amount of Colorado River water his offer entailed, but he thought it would be approximately 1,000,000 acre-fect.? While this was more than many Colorado Basin states would freely give Mexico, Welles and his advisers apparently hoped to persuade the westerners that it was a just figure. The principle of recognizing existing uses, he undoubtedly knew, had been followed by the United States on the upper Rio Grande with Mexico in 1906 and by Elwood Mead in the negotiations of 1929 and 1930. It had also been embodied in a treaty in 1909 with Canada on the Milk and St. Mary rivers, though that pact had also made provision for future uses in both countries. Because future development was a major concern of Mexico, she refused to accept the American offer unless she was guaranteed water for expansion. Welles rejected the demand, undoubtedly because he believed that the basin states would never consent to such a treaty,
威尔斯没有提到他的提议包括科罗拉多河多少水量，但他认为大约是 1,000,000 英亩-英尺。虽然这个数量比许多科罗拉多河流域的州愿意无偿给予墨西哥的多，威尔斯和他的顾问显然希望说服西部的州认为这是一个公正的数字。他无疑知道，美国在 1906 年与墨西哥在里奥格兰德上游地区以及 1929 年和 1930 年的谈判中，都遵循了承认现有用途的原则。该原则还体现在 1909 年与加拿大关于牛奶河和圣玛丽河的条约中，尽管该条约也为两国未来的使用做出了规定。由于墨西哥非常关注未来的开发，除非得到水资源扩张的保证，否则她拒绝接受美国的提议。威尔斯拒绝了这一要求，很可能是因为他相信流域各州永远不会同意这样的条约。

Faced with the resolute opposition of the United States and the threat of American control over both rivers, the Mexican government reexamined its position. Its Foreign Office turned for assistance to its Advisory Commission on International Wa-ters, a body consisting of lawyers and engineers which had been created for just such an eventuality. After several weeks delibera-tion, the commissioners reported that Mexico had the alternatives of either persuading the United States to come to terms or else demanding arbitration. Of the two, they believed persuasion was better. Though the problem could be arbitrated under provisions of the Inter-American Arbitration Treaty of 1929, the commissioners did not feel it would produce the desired results, as decisions of this kind were merely declarations and the culpable countries were not forced to comply."
面对美国的坚决反对和美国控制两条河流的威胁，墨西哥政府重新审视了自己的立场。外交部向国际河流咨询委员会求助，这是一个由律师和工程师组成的机构，专门为此类情况而设立。经过几周的讨论，委员们报告称，墨西哥可以选择说服美国达成协议，或者要求仲裁。在两者之间，他们认为说服更好。虽然这个问题可以在 1929 年美洲仲裁条约的规定下进行仲裁，但委员们并不认为这会产生预期的结果，因为这类决定只是声明，而责任方国家并不被迫遵守。

Undoubtedly influencing the thinking of the commissioners was the ontcome of an arbitration decision in 1911 over the Chamizal tract. Those 600 acres, once part of Mexico, had been relocated in the United States by a shift in the channel of the Rio Grande. In the dispute over ownership of the land, both countr agreed to submit the question to an arbitration tribunal, and EA bulk of the award -about two-thirds of the acreage--went even tually to Mexico. Unfortunately, the United States refused to abide by the decision and the dispute continued. By the 1940's most Americans had forgotten the controversy, but for Mexicans it remained a hot issue.' Because arbitration might again prove futile, the commissioners recommended that it be bypassed until the ordinary channels of diplomacy had been exhausted. "The practical, correct and proper solution," they reasoned, was a mutually satisfactory treaty. Failing that, Mexico should turn to arbitration. But if she did, she should secure a tribunal with not only judicial, but also executive powers a virtually impossible goal. In this way, they apparently felt, a repetition of the Chami-zal incident could be avoided.
无疑，委员会成员的思想受到了 1911 年关于查米扎尔地块仲裁裁决结果的影响。这片 600 英亩的土地曾属于墨西哥，由于格兰德河河床的改变，它被移至美国境内。在对该土地所有权的争端中，两国同意将问题提交给仲裁法庭，最终裁决中大约三分之二的土地归墨西哥所有。不幸的是，美国拒绝遵守这一裁决，争端持续了下去。到 20 世纪 40 年代，大多数美国人已经忘记了这场争议，但对墨西哥人来说，这仍然是一个热点问题。由于仲裁可能再次证明无效，委员会建议在普通外交渠道耗尽之前，应避免使用仲裁。他们认为，“实际、正确和适当的解决办法”是达成一项双方满意的条约。如果未能达成这样的条约，墨西哥可以转向仲裁。但如果这样做，她应该争取一个不仅有司法权，还有行政权的仲裁法庭——这是一个几乎不可能实现的目标。通过这种方式，他们显然认为，可以避免查米扎尔事件的重演。

The commissioners urged the government to act quickly, yet to remember that the problem of international rivers was one of the most serious issues facing the nation. "It represents a national interest superior to any other because on its . . . solution depends the possibility of . . . denser colonization of the frontier zone . . . and of construction . . . of centers of population and wealth. . .." Mexico, they urged, must vigorously strive to obtain the water needed "to benefit and make productive [many] lands presently useless and deserted" and "to develop electric energy, font of new industries." &
委员会敦促政府迅速采取行动，但也要记住国际河流的问题是国家面临的最严重问题之一。“它代表了高于其他任何利益的国家利益，因为其……的解决方案取决于……更密集地开发边疆地区……以及……建设人口和财富中心……。”他们敦促墨西哥必须积极努力获得所需的水资源“以使许多目前无用和荒废的土地受益和生产性使用”以及“发展电能，这是新工业的源泉。” &

Acting on the commission's report, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs mapped out his strategy. Though it would mean again following the course he had already tried, he would do his utmost to persuade the United States to settle on both rivers simultaneously and to provide for future Mexican uses on the Colorado.
根据委员会的报告，外交部长制定了他的策略。尽管这意味着再次遵循他已经尝试过的道路，他将尽最大努力说服美国同时解决两条河流的问题，并为科罗拉多河未来的墨西哥用途提供保障。

For the next several months, Mexico pressed the State Department for an agreement based on her proposals. "The passage of time works unfavorably for my country," complained Ambassador Francisco Castillo Nájera, "and the interests being created in the United States continually make an adequate solution more difficult." The United States, he declared, was behaving in a fashion that would impair "the right which international law gives Mexico to the use and enjoyment of the waters of the in ternational rivers." o
在接下来的几个月里，墨西哥不断向国务院争取基于其提案的协议。“时间的流逝对我国家不利，”大使弗朗西斯科·卡斯蒂略·纳亚拉抱怨说，“美国国内不断形成的利益使找到一个合适的解决方案变得更加困难。”他宣称，美国的行为正在损害“国际法赋予墨西哥使用和享受国际河流水资源的权利”。

Despite these urgent entreaties, Mexico was repeatedly re buffed by the State Department. Her Foreign Office, however, decided to make a final effort and announced in January, 1941, that it would soon submit a draft treaty." Since the United States had so far refused to discuss a treaty based on future uses, Mexico revealed her desperation by taking the initiative in offering to negotiate.gether with the All-American Canal on the Colorado, had put the United States in a favorable position. Moreover, "Mexico appears to be adopting a much more friendly attitude toward the United States, and desires to settle existing controversies." The basin states were adequately protected, he insisted, because the State Department "recognizes . . . that a treaty which is not acceptable to the Committee of Fourteen would not be ratified by the Senate." 10
尽管有这些急切的请求，墨西哥还是被国务院一再拒绝。然而，她的外交部决定再做一次努力，并于 1941 年 1 月宣布即将提交一份草案条约。“由于美国迄今拒绝讨论基于未来用途的条约，墨西哥主动提出谈判，以美国和墨西哥合众国运河共用科罗拉多河的提议，已经使美国处于有利地位。此外，“墨西哥似乎正在采取更加友好的态度对待美国，并希望解决现有的争议。”他坚持认为，盆地各州得到了充分的保护，因为国务院“认识到……一个不被十四人委员会接受的条约不会被参议院批准。”10

Almost all the conferees agreed on the need for negotia-tions, yet some, believing that more information was needed, counseled delay until the completion of the Interior Department's comprehensive survey on future Colorado River projects.
几乎所有的与会者都同意需要进行谈判，但是一些人认为需要更多的信息，建议在内政部完成对未来科罗拉多河项目的全面调查后再说。

But Tipton objected. Why wait for the survey, he exclaimed, when everyone knew "that all water in the Colorado River system can be used eventually in the United States. . . . The details of the individual projects, don't make much difference." 11
但是蒂普顿提出了反对意见。他大声说道，为什么要等待调查，既然大家都清楚“科罗拉多河系统的所有水资源最终都可以在美国使用…………各个项目的细节其实无关紧要。”

This remark was challenged by Don Scott of Arizona who wanted the allocation of water for Arizona and California to be settled before a treaty was negotiated with Mexico in order to decide "who takes the rap of the Mexican burden." California, he asserted, was maintaining that its contracts had priority and, consequently, "Arizona would have to guarantee the Mexican water out of her part of the surplus." Scott asked the cooperation of the upper-basin states, but they were unwilling to permit the Arizona-California dispute to endanger the negotiations. When Scott saw he had no support, he withdrew his objection, and the committee voted unanimously to approve negotiations with Mex-ico.
这一说法遭到了亚利桑那州的唐·斯科特的质疑，他认为应该在与墨西哥谈判之前先解决亚利桑那州和加利福尼亚州的水资源分配问题，以决定“谁来承担墨西哥负担”。斯科特坚称加利福尼亚州认为其合同具有优先权，因此“亚利桑那州必须用其剩余水量的一部分来保证墨西哥的用水”。斯科特请求上游各州的合作，但这些州不愿意让亚利桑那州与加利福尼亚州的争端危及谈判。当斯科特发现没有支持时，他撤回了反对意见，委员会一致投票批准与墨西哥进行谈判。

But committee endorsement did not end the matter, for California's delegates insisted that the basin states be kept informed of developments during the treaty talks. State Department of-ficials readily accepted the proposal ,and a special subcommittee of seven --consisting of one delegate from each state--was sent to Washington.
但委员会的批准并未结束此事，因为加利福尼亚的代表坚持要求在条约谈判期间，盆地各州能够获知进展情况。国务院官员欣然接受了这一提议，并派出了一个由七人组成的特别委员会——每个州指派一名代表——前往华盛顿。

Californians wanted the subcommittee to reflect their views of the water controversy, and they met in secret and plotted their strategy to direct the delegates to act according to their wishes. The three Californians in charge of this operation were Evan Hewes, blustery director of the Imperial Irrigation Dis-trict, Arvin Shaw, intelligent and respected assistant attorney vade the compact allocation of the basin states. If the State Department followed the principle of confirming existing uses, which it had done in the earlier treaties with Mexico and Canada, then development in the United States would be sharply cur-tailed. To prevent this, Stone was anxious to obtain a treaty as soon as possible. Another consideration that apparently led him to adopt his more liberal attitude toward Mexico was his belief that there was sufficient water. The average flow of the river since 1896 had been calculated at 18,000,000 acre-feet. This was enough to satisfy the compact allocation of 16,000,000 acre-feet and still leave a 2,000,000 acre-foot surplus--less evaporation losses--with which to satisfy the Mexican burden. This surplus also happened to be the exact amount of Mexico's demands.1 With Stone's approval, the State Department sent its offer to Mexico, only to have it rejected. The Mexicans held to their demand of 2,000,000 acre-feet, claiming a lesser volume would duplicate in Baja California the "permanently bad situation" cre. ated in the Juárez Valley by the treaty of 1906. Citing Mexican and American streamflow records, they insisted their request could be met "without any scarcity being felt in the United States even in periods of drought." 17
加利福尼亚人希望委员会能够反映他们对水资源争议的看法，并且他们秘密开会并策划策略，指示代表们按照他们的意愿行事。负责这一操作的三位加利福尼亚人是埃文·休斯，帝国灌溉区狂热的主任；阿文·肖，精明且受人尊敬的助理总检察长，负责盆地州的配额分配。如果国务院遵循确认现有用途的原则，就像它在与墨西哥和加拿大早期条约中所做的那样，那么美国的发展将会受到严重限制。为了防止这种情况发生，斯通急于尽快获得一项条约。另一个显然促使他采取更宽松态度对待墨西哥的考虑是，他认为有足够的水。自 1896 年以来，该河的平均流量被计算为 1.8 亿英亩英尺。这足以满足 1.6 亿英亩英尺的配额分配，并且还剩下 2000 万英亩英尺的盈余——扣除蒸发损失后——以满足墨西哥的负担。 这个剩余正好是墨西哥的要求数量。1 在斯通的批准下，国务院将其提议发送给墨西哥，但被拒绝了。墨西哥人坚持要求 2,000,000 英亩-英尺的水量，声称较小的流量会在下加利福尼亚州复制 1906 年条约在朱阿雷兹谷创造的“永久性不良状况”。他们引用了墨西哥和美国的径流记录，坚持认为他们的请求可以满足，在美国即使是干旱时期也不会感到水资源短缺。17

Stone was unwilling to back the State Department in making a larger offer, deciding it was wiser to call together the Subcommittee of Seven and to turn the problem over to them. In his report to the subcommittee in May, 1942, he tried to impress the basin states with Mexico's generosity, emphasizing how the Latin American nation had significantly reduced its demands to 2,000,000 aere-feet. But larger American offers, including one he authorized for 1,150,000 acre-feet, had failed to persuade Mexico to reduce her claims any further. Despite these setbacks an early treaty was necessary, he insisted, otherwise Mexico would go to arbitration and we might fare worse." I State Department rep
石头不愿意支持国务院提出更大的提议，他认为召集七人委员会并把问题交给他们处理更为明智。1942 年 5 月向委员会提交的报告中，他试图让盆地各州认识到墨西哥的慷慨，强调拉丁美洲国家已经将要求大幅减少至 200 万公亩英尺。但更大的美国提议，包括他授权的 115 万公亩英尺的提议，都没有说服墨西哥减少其要求。尽管如此，他坚持认为早期达成一项条约是必要的，否则墨西哥可能会诉诸仲裁，我们可能会处境更糟。“国务院代表

resentatives corroborated his fears. pointing to the rapid fnerea电不
代表们证实了他的担忧，指出过去一年中墨西哥的公亩英亩数量迅速增加，从 31 万公亩增加到超过 34 万。

in Mexican acreage during the past year from 310,000 acres to more than 340,000.
代表们证实了他的担忧，指出过去一年中墨西哥的公亩英亩数量迅速增加，从 31 万公亩增加到超过 34 万。

Regardless of these explanations, Stone's action in authorizing the State Department's proposal infuriated California's repre-sentatives, who thought that Washington should resist Mexico's demands. They believed that the United States could exercise physical control over the river, and they were convinced that The Harmon opinion put international law on their side. But the major reason for their anger sprang from anxiety over their state's interest in the river. In exchange for the Boulder Canyon Act, California had limited herself to one-half the surplus not apportioned by the compact; yet the amount of the surplus, if any, would depend on Mexico's share. Conceivably, Mexico's portion might be so large as to deprive California of any surplus whatsoever. If that occurred, then California's contracts for surplus water--which might total 962,000 acre-feet if she lost her dispute with Arizona-would go begging. Moreover, despite the restrictions of the Limitation Act, many Californians hoped to establish rights to more than half of any surplus. Their plan was to build up uses to as much of the surplus as possible and then, by invoking the principle of prior appropriation, have those uses confirmed as rights.
尽管如此，斯通授权国务院提案的行为仍激怒了加州的代表，他们认为华盛顿应该抵制墨西哥的要求。他们相信美国可以对河流行使物理控制权，并且他们确信《哈蒙意见》使国际法站在了他们这边。但他们的愤怒主要源自对州利益的担忧。作为《布卢塞尔峡谷法案》的交换，加州仅限于获得未按协议分配的剩余水量的一半；然而，剩余水量（如果有）将取决于墨西哥的份额。理论上，墨西哥的份额可能如此之大，以至于剥夺加州任何剩余水量。如果这种情况发生，那么加州与亚利桑那州纠纷中可能失去剩余水量合同——总数可能高达 962,000 英亩-英尺——将无法履行。此外，尽管有限制法案的限制，许多加州人仍希望确立对任何剩余水量超过一半的权利。 他们的计划是尽可能多地利用剩余的水资源，然后通过引用先占原则，将这些用途确认为权利。

Because of these weighty considerations, Californians were shocked and angered at what Stone had done. Evan Hewes and Arvin Shaw sharply denounced him, drawing attention to the resolution they had presented to the State Department in which all of them had expressed complete agreement in limiting Mexican water. In trying to defend himself, Stone explained that he had approved the additional water as an individual, not as a representative of the committee. His answer served merely to infuriate further California's delegates. Because of the higher offer, Shaw angrily exclaimed, "the United States had definitely been pegged, whether formal commitments had been made or not." 19
由于这些重要的考虑，加利福尼亚人对斯通所做的事情感到震惊和愤怒。埃文·休斯和阿文·肖严厉谴责了他，提到了他们提交给州务卿的决议，在该决议中他们一致同意限制墨西哥的用水量。斯通试图为自己辩护，解释说他批准额外的水量是作为个人，而不是作为委员会代表。他的回答反而进一步激怒了加州的代表们。由于更高的报价，肖愤怒地喊道，“无论是否正式作出承诺，美国已经确定无疑地被套牢了。”

In attacking Stone, Shaw sought to win the help of Arizona.
在攻击斯通时，肖试图赢得亚利桑那州的帮助。

That state, he noted, had, in the Boulder Canyon Act, been offered the other half of the surplus which had not been given to California. So far she had refused to ratify the compact and, therefore, had not contracted for any water. Nevertheless, Shaw, by emphasizing the importance of this provision, hoped Arizogy nans would realize its value to their state's future growth.
他指出，该州在《波德峡谷法案》中被提供了剩余水的一半，而另一半没有给加利福尼亚州。到目前为止，她还没有批准该协定，因此也没有为任何水资源签订合同。然而，沙通过强调这一条款的重要性，希望亚利桑那州意识到这对他们州的未来发展具有价值。

Though Arizonans were undoubtedly concerned about the distribution of the surplus water, they gave Shaw no support.
尽管亚利桑那州居民无疑对剩余水资源的分配感到担忧，但他们并未给予沙任何支持。

Their failure to do so can probably be explained in part by the fact that Arizona did not have the same financial interest in the surplus as California had; she had no contract for water and had built no expensive aqueducts. Moreover, Arizonans, remember-ing the bitter controversy over interpretation of the compact, were reluctant to support anything that California backed. "At
他们未能这样做，部分原因在于亚利桑那州不像加利福尼亚州那样对剩余水资源有相同的经济利益；她没有签订任何水资源合同，也没有建造昂贵的引水渠。此外，亚利桑那州居民还记得关于协定解释的激烈争议，因此不愿意支持加利福尼亚州支持的任何事情。“在

that time,
那段时间，

" says one contemporary, "if California had said something was white, Arizona immediately would have said it was black." a The reverse was undoubtedly true as well. But aside from these considerations, Arizona's delegates had been impressed by the image of a generous Mexico which Stone had sought to create. Alma Davis of Arizona thought that Stone *had done a fine job," since his increased offer had caused Mexico to lower her demands to an amount "which gives [us] something definite to work on." 1 The other subcommittee members heartily agreed with this. Nevertheless, Shaw's vehement disagreement forced a review of the question by the Committee of Fourteen.
"一位当代人说：“如果加利福尼亚宣称某物是白色，亚利桑那州会立刻宣称它是黑色的。”相反的情况也毫无疑问是真实的。但除此之外，亚利桑那州的代表被斯通试图创造的慷慨的墨西哥形象所打动。亚利桑那州的阿尔玛·戴维斯认为斯通“做得很好”，因为他的增加的提议使墨西哥降低了要求，达到了“我们能具体工作的数额”。其他分委员会成员对此表示完全赞同。然而，肖的强烈反对迫使十四人委员会重新审议这个问题。

The committee met in June, 1942, at El Paso and the conference opened with the reading of a letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Promising the members that no treaty would be finalized without the approval of most basin states, Secretary Hull urged them "to make every effort" to devise "a practical plan of allocation which we can present to Mexico with reasonable possibility of its acceptance." He tried to offset their fears by
委员会于 1942 年 6 月在埃尔帕索召开会议，会议开始时读取了国务卿科德尔·赫尔的一封信。赫尔向成员们保证，在没有大多数盆地国家批准的情况下不会最终确定任何条约，并敦促他们“尽一切努力”制定“一个切实可行的分配计划，我们可以向墨西哥提出，有合理的可能性被接受。”他试图通过

insisting his department had no intention of trading st Colorado
坚持认为他的部门无意交易科罗拉多

River water for any advantages in other matters. now to reach agreement with Mexico," he warned, "may result in greater eventual sacrifices." * The committee, with this admonition in mind, began searching for a satisfactory proposal, but it quickly became obvious that there was wide disagreement.
河里的水在其他方面可能也有优势。现在与墨西哥达成协议，可能会导致更大的最终牺牲。”他警告说，“委员会在这一警告下开始寻找一个令人满意的提案，但很快变得明显的是，存在广泛的分歧。

Clifford Stone and Royce Tipton were particularly anxious to find a solution. Tipton, who doubled as representative from Colorado and adviser to the International Boundary Commis-sion,announeed that his study of the water problem indicated it would be possible for the United States to ofer Mexico 1.500.(00-acre-feet. In dry years, such as those from 1931 to 1940, the release from Hoover Dam would be approximately 8,500,000 acre-feet. This release was based on the belief, corroborated at the time by the Reclamation Bureau, that the upper basin would not use its entire compact allotment. Since present projects along the mainstream in the lower basin were expected to use 7,600,-000 acre-feet, Tipton deduced that there would be 900,000 acre-feet available for Mexico. This amount, plus an estimated 600,000 acre-feet of return flow, mostly from Arizona's Yuma and Gila projects, would make up the 1,500,000 acre-feet for Mexico which Tipton felt was "the minimum possible to satisfy the situation." 28 Tipton's offer was based on several important assumptions:
Clifford Stone 和 Royce Tipton 特别急于找到一个解决方案。Tipton 既是科罗拉多州的代表，又是国际边界委员会的顾问，宣布他的研究显示，美国有可能向墨西哥提供 1,500,000 美亩-英尺的水量。在 1931 年到 1940 年这样的干旱年份，胡佛大坝的下泄量约为 8,500,000 美亩-英尺。这一下泄量基于这样一个信念，当时灌溉局也证实了这一点，即上盆地不会使用其全部配额。由于预计下盆地沿主流的现有项目将使用 7,600,000 美亩-英尺的水量，Tipton 推断将有 900,000 美亩-英尺的水量可供墨西哥使用。这一数量加上亚利桑那州尤马和吉拉项目估计的 600,000 美亩-英尺的回流，将构成 Tipton 认为“满足情况的最小可能数量”的 1,500,000 美亩-英尺的水量。Tipton 的提议基于几个重要的假设：

(1) that the upper basin would not use its entire allocation; (2) that there would be 600,000 acre-feet of return flow; (3) that the lower-basin states would want no water beyond that needed for their present projects. But these assumptions were quickly chal lenged. Both William Wallace of Utah and John O'Rourke of Colorado rejected Tipton's assumption that the upper basin would not use its allotment. Indeed, Tipton had contributed to the undermining of his own position when, just a few weeks ear-lier, he had insisted that "the Upper States would use all their allocated water and would go beyond it and go into [the] sur-plus." 24
(1) 上游流域不会使用其全部配额；(2) 将有 60 万英亩-英尺的回水；(3) 下游各州不需要超过其当前项目所需的水量。但这些假设很快受到了挑战。犹他州的威廉·沃克尔和科罗拉多州的约翰·奥鲁科均拒绝了蒂 pton 关于上游流域不会使用其配额的假设。事实上，蒂 pton 在几周前曾坚持认为“上游各州将使用其全部配额，并且会超出配额进入盈余。”

Wallace and O'Rourke were joined in opposition by Arizona's delegates, who were disturbed that the figures for lower-basin use did not include projects in the planning stage. They also objected to the return-flow estimate for the same reason they had disapproved the Jacobs-Stevens report four years earlier. If the return flow were usable, Arizona intended to use it. But the strongest dissent came from California's representatives who agreed with Arizona that the return-flow estimate was incorrect. They felt that conditions might develop where there would be little, if any, return fow for which the United States would get credit.
哈克利和奥’罗科尔与亚利桑那州的代表一道反对这一提议，亚利桑那州的代表们认为，下盆地用水的数字没有包括正在规划中的项目，这让他们感到不安。他们也因为同样的原因反对了四年前的雅各布斯-斯蒂文斯报告。如果回流水可以使用，亚利桑那州打算使用它。但最强的反对意见来自加利福尼亚州的代表，他们同意亚利桑那州的观点，认为回流水的估计是错误的。他们认为可能会出现一种情况，在这种情况下，美国将无法获得任何回流水的信用。

The entire Mexican burden, consequently, might have to come from Hoover Dam storage. And, if this were to happen, California's contracts for surplus water, to say nothing of her other contracts, might be impaired.
因此，整个墨西哥负担可能不得不从霍普金斯大坝的蓄水中承担。如果发生这种情况，加利福尼亚州的剩余水量合同，更不用说她的其他合同，可能会受到影响。

Although primarily concerned with getting as much surplus water as possible and protecting their contracts, California's #A delegates also objected to the proposal for several other reasons
尽管主要关注尽可能多地获取剩余水量并保护他们的合同，加利福尼亚州的代表们还因为其他几个原因反对这一提议

"We do not believe," argued Mike Dowd, that "it is within the realm of reason to expect the Lower Basin, or the Basin States, to furnish a supply of water to Mexico which is made available only by reason of works constructed in the United States." 25
迈克·道德认为：“我们不认为，在合理范围内期望下盆地或盆地各州提供仅通过美国境内建设的工程而得以利用的水资源供墨西哥使用是可能的。”25

Dowd was joined by E. F. Scattergood and James Howard, representatives of the power interests, who also championed California's position. Though concerned about any grant of water, they were also worried about subsidizing Mexico at the expense of American taxpayers. The revenue for the dam, they noted, was derived almost entirely from southern California sources, particularly from the city of Los Angeles, the Metropolitan Water District, and Southern California Edison Com-pany. While the federal government had financed the dam's construction, the users were required to refund that grant and to pay interest on part of the capital. The debt, in excess of $200,000,000, was amortized primarily by revenue from the sale of hydroelectricity. The contract, in obliging Californians to buy all the available power, provided that Arizona and Nevada could purchase up to 36 percent of the power if they should ask for it within fifty years. In the meantime, California concerns were obliged to buy all generated power so that the dam could be paid off.30
Dowd 被 E. F. Scattergood 和 James Howard 加入，后者是代表权力利益的代表，也支持加利福尼亚的立场。尽管他们担心任何水资源的分配，但也担心以美国纳税人的代价补贴墨西哥。他们指出，大坝的收入几乎完全来自南加州，特别是洛杉矶市、大都市水务区和南加州爱迪生公司。虽然联邦政府资助了大坝的建设，但用户必须退还这笔拨款，并支付部分资本的利息。债务超过 2 亿美元，主要通过水电销售的收入来偿还。合同要求加利福尼亚人购买所有可用的电力，并规定如果在五十年内提出要求，亚利桑那州和内华达州可以购买多达 36% 的电力。在此期间，加利福尼亚的利益相关者必须购买所有产生的电力，以便偿还大坝的债务。30

On principle, Scattergood and Howard were opposed to having Mexico benefit at California's expense, and they particularly feared that Mexico's share might interfere with power production at the dam. The American demand for power was greater in winter than in summer, while the demand for irrigation in Mexico was much greater in summer than in winter.
原则上，Scattergood 和 Howard 反对墨西哥以牺牲加利福尼亚为代价获益，并且他们特别担心墨西哥的份额可能会影响大坝的发电。美国在冬季对电力的需求大于夏季，而墨西哥在夏季对灌溉的需求则大大超过冬季。

Therefore, to supply Mexico with large quantities of water in summertime might jeopardize the power contracts by drawing down the reserves of water behind Hoover Dam. If, observed Scattergood, Mexico were by some chance given water made available by Hoover Dam, then she should pay for those benefits and help amortize the cost of the project.
因此，为了在夏季向墨西哥供应大量水资源，可能会危及电力合同，因为这会消耗胡佛大坝后面的水资源储备。如斯卡特戈德所观察到的，如果墨西哥有幸获得由胡佛大坝提供的水资源，那么她应该为此支付费用，并帮助偿还该项目的成本。

What California's delegates wanted most of all was a treaty based on releases from Hoover Dam which would limit Mexico to her uses before the construction of that reservoir. As long as the releases were adequate, then Mexico should receive her total
加利福尼亚的代表最希望的是一个基于胡佛大坝释放水量的条约，该条约将限制墨西哥在其那个水库建设之前所使用的水量。只要释放的水量充足，墨西哥就应该获得其全部份额。

allotment, but if drought decreased those releases, then Mexicsp
allotment，但如果干旱减少了这些释放，那么 Mexicsp

share should be reduced.
分享应被减少。

After considerable haggling and compromise, California won a tremendous victory by getting nearly everything she wanted. The committee decided to offer Mexico the return flow and 800.000 aere-feet, but only when the releases from Hoover Dam were more than 10,000,000 acre-feet. When releases varied from that amount, Mexico's share should be adjusted up or down by 15 percent of the difference between actual releases and 10,000,000 aere-feet. Moreover, all deliveries were to be made in such a way that they did not interfere with power production at Hoover Dam."7
经过长时间的讨价还价和妥协，加利福尼亚几乎得到了她想要的一切，赢得了巨大的胜利。委员会决定向墨西哥提供回流和 80 万 aere-feet，但只有当胡佛大坝的释放量超过 1 亿 aere-feet 时。当释放量与 1 亿 aere-feet 不同时，墨西哥的份额应根据实际释放量与 1 亿 aere-feet 之间的差额上下调整 15%。此外，所有交付都应以不干扰胡佛大坝发电的方式进行。“7

This proposal sharply reflected the shrewd maneuvering of California's delegates. On the surface, it did not differ measurably from Tipton's offer of 1,500,000 acre-feet. The offer of 1800,000 acre-feet, plus return fow-estimated conservatively by Tipton at 600,000 acre-feet-would provide Mexico a total of 1,400,000 acre-feet. But there were many important differences between the two proposals. For example, Mexico, not the basin states, would have to worry about the uncertain amount of return flow. Moreover, during dry years Mexico's share would be re-duced. Essentially, this proposal was about what the basin states had already offered Mexico.
该提案鲜明地反映了加利福尼亚代表们的精明操作。表面上，它与蒂顿提供的 150 万英亩·英尺并无显著差异。提供 180 万英亩·英尺，加上蒂顿保守估计的回流 60 万英亩·英尺，将为墨西哥提供总计 140 万英亩·英尺。但两个提案之间有许多重要的不同之处。例如，墨西哥而不是流域州需要担心不确定的回流数量。此外，在干旱年份，墨西哥的份额将会减少。本质上，该提案主要是关于流域州已经向墨西哥提供的内容。

The delegates promptly dispatched a copy of their resolution to the State Department. Included with it were memoranda explaining in detail some of the reasons for their action. They called attention to several international precedents, like the treaty of 1906 on the upper Rio Grande, which confirmed Mexican rights only to the water she had used from the river's natural flow. The same principle had been followed in the treaty of 1909 between Canada and the United States on the St. Mary and Milk rivers, and in the agreement of 1929 between Egypt and the Sudan on the Nile. Consequently, they argued, precedent indicated that Mexico should be limited to her uses from the natural flow before Hoover Dam regulated the river.
代表们迅速将他们的决议副本发送给了国务院。附带的备忘录详细解释了他们采取行动的一些原因。他们提到了几个国际先例，比如 1906 年关于上里奥格兰德河的条约，该条约确认了墨西哥对河流自然流量中所使用的水量的权利。同样的原则也体现在 1909 年加拿大与美国关于圣玛丽河和密尔河的条约以及 1929 年埃及与苏丹关于尼罗河的协议中。因此，他们认为，先例表明，墨西哥应该仅限于在胡佛大坝调节河流之前对自然流量的使用。

Furthermore, they noted that the United States, in the two treaties to which it had been a party, had insisted that provisions be included which upheld, at least in theory, the Harmon principle of absolute territorial sovereignty. Consequently, though Mexico might have an equitable claim to her uses before thetA construction of Hoover Dam, she had no legal right to any
此外，他们指出，在它参与的两个条约中，美国坚持要求包括条款以至少在理论上支持哈蒙原则，即绝对领土主权。因此，尽管墨西哥在胡佛大坝建设之前可能有公平的使用权利，但她没有法律权利要求任何

water.
水。

The delegates had an added argument, supplied primarily by California's representatives, which invoked geography. Mexico could not in equity, they insisted, claim more than her uses prior to Hoover Dam, because floodwaters and silt conditions below the border would have made it impossible for her to use any more than that amount. Because of these legal and geographic considerations, the Committee of Fourteen believed its latest offer a fair one,28
代表们还有一个额外的论点，主要由加利福尼亚的代表提供的，这个论点涉及地理因素。他们坚持认为，由于霍普金斯大坝以下的边界以下的洪水和淤泥条件，墨西哥在公平上不能声称使用超过她大坝之前使用的水量。由于这些法律和地理因素的考虑，十四人委员会认为其最新的提议是公平的。

IV
四

The committee's proposal met immediate opposition from Secretary Hull and his advisers, who were certain that Mexico would never accept it, and they made no attempt to submit it to the Mexican government. They felt that a settlement would have to be worked out which guaranteed Mexico a larger volume of water, and they were eager to find a solution since a measure of agreement had seemingly been reached on the Rio Grande.
委员会的提议立即遭到了赫尔部长及其顾问的反对，他们坚信墨西哥绝不会接受这个提议，他们也没有试图将这个提议提交给墨西哥政府。他们认为必须达成一个协议，确保墨西哥获得更大的水量，并且他们急于找到一个解决方案，因为似乎在格兰德河上已经达成了一定的共识。

Three months before, in March, 1942, they had asked Mexico for an allocation of lower Rio Grande water which would give the United States exclusive rights to the contributions of its own tributaries, plus 1,000,000 acre-feet of Mexican water and half the runoff from "springs, arroyo flows and other small tributaries difficult of individual measurement." Mexico had agreed to most of the American request, but she had felt she could not afford to surrender 1,000,000 acre-feet from her own tributaries because such a requirement, together with future droughts, might force curtailment of many Mexican projects.
1942 年 3 月之前，他们曾要求墨西哥为其下拉格朗德河的水资源分配提供配额，使美国独享其支流的贡献，以及 100 万英亩-英尺的墨西哥水资源，并且还要求获得墨西哥支流的“难以单独测量的泉水、溪流和其他小支流”的一半径流。墨西哥同意了大部分美国的要求，但她认为不能放弃自己支流的 100 万英亩-英尺水资源，因为这样的要求加上未来的干旱可能会迫使墨西哥许多项目缩减规模。

Instead, she had offered "a little more than a fourth" of the flow reaching the river from her tributaries. She believed that this volume, together with the runoff from smaller sources, would usually amount to the 1,000,000 acre-feet requested by the United States. In addition, she had sought an adjustment of the situation on the upper Rio Grande because the water delivery schedule, as set up by the treaty of 1906, did not correspond to current Mexican uses and the quality of water was deteriorat-ing,.?
相反，她提议提供“略多于四分之一”的从支流流入河流的流量。她认为，加上来自较小来源的径流，这一流量通常会达到美国所要求的 100 万英亩-英尺。此外，她还寻求调整上拉格朗德河的情况，因为 1906 年条约所规定的水分配时间表与当前墨西哥的用水情况不符，而且水质也在恶化。

The Nestcan proposal, though not allogether aeceptab只A
The Nestcan 提案虽然并不完全可接受只 A

revealed that the two countries were not far apart. With proper storage, the United States could collect enough water from its own tributaries to irrigate the lands then being eultivated in Texas.? Consequently, any water received from Mexico could be used to expand American acreage. For this reason, the Mexican offer pointed toward an carly settlement on the Rio Grande.
显示两国并不相去甚远。通过适当的储存，美国可以从自己的支流收集足够的水来灌溉当时正在德克萨斯州耕种的土地。因此，墨西哥提供的水可以用来扩大美国的耕地。因此，墨西哥的提议指向了在格兰德河早期达成协议。

Only on the Colorado did major disagreement remain, and State Department officials were convinced that accord there depended on giving Mexico more water than the basin states had author-zed. To acquaint the reluctant states with these views, the department sent Laurence Duggan, political adviser for Latin-American affairs, to talk with representatives from the Committees of Fourteen and Sixteen.
只有在科罗拉多河上仍然存在重大分歧，而国务院官员确信在那里达成协议取决于给予墨西哥比盆地州授权更多的水量。为了使这些观点让这些不情愿的州了解，该部门派出了劳伦斯·杜甘，拉丁美洲事务的政治顾问，与来自十四人委员会和十六人委员会的代表进行了交谈。

V

The meeting took place in October, 1942, and Duggan wasted no time getting to the point. The Colorado River states latest offer, he frankly told the delegates, was not "a satisfactory basis for a treaty, because we do not think it would be satisfactory to Mexico." Meanwhile, "we are trying to feel Mexico out" in order to arrive at an alternative proposal to be submitted to the basin states for approval. It would be virtually impossible, he added, to limit Mexico's uses to what they were before Hoover Dam, because she was now using more than that, though he did not say how much more. Besides, he noted, "we are trying to strike a fair bargain under international law, which we are advised by our legal staff takes into account increase of use in the lower country." Duggan also pointed out that "substantial agree-ment" with Mexico had been reached on nearly all other questions regarding the international streams, except Mexico's allocation from the Colorado River,31
会议于 1942 年 10 月举行，Duggan 没有浪费任何时间直接切入主题。他坦率地告诉代表们，科罗拉多河各州的最新提议“不是一个令人满意的条约基础，因为我们认为这对墨西哥来说也不满意。”同时，“我们正在试图了解墨西哥的态度”，以便提出一个替代方案提交给流域各州批准。他补充说，几乎不可能将墨西哥的使用限制在胡佛大坝建成前的水平，因为现在她使用的水量超过了那个水平，尽管他没有说明具体多了多少。此外，他还指出，“我们正在努力在国际法框架下达成公平的交易，我们的法律顾问建议这会考虑到下游用水量的增加。”Duggan 还指出，在国际河流的其他问题上，与墨西哥已经达成“实质性协议”，除了科罗拉多河的分配问题。

Duggan's announcement embittered California's small army of engineers and lawyers who fought for their state's interest in the Colorado River. It looked as if their battle to limit Mexico would be undermined by their own government. Nevertheless, they prepared to offer stiff resistance to the State Department's position and they believed their best hope lay in the All-Ameri can Canal. Less than a year away, in 1943, the canal would begin its first complete year of full-time operation, thus eliminating American dependence on the Alamo Canal. Californians then hoped to use their control of the Alamo diversion works to limit Mexico to her uses prior to Hoover Dam.
Duggan 的声明使加州的小规模工程师和律师队伍感到更加失望，他们曾为维护加州在科罗拉多河的利益而斗争。看起来，他们限制墨西哥的努力可能会被自己政府的行为削弱。然而，他们仍然准备对国务院的立场进行坚决抵抗，并且相信他们最大的希望在于全美运河。不到一年之后，即 1943 年，运河将开始其第一个全年运行，从而消除美国对阿尔莫罗运河的依赖。那时，加利福尼亚人希望通过控制阿尔莫罗引水工程来限制墨西哥仅使用胡佛大坝之前的情况。

Duggan sensed California's resentment and he was well aware of the significance of the All-American Canal, though he did not attribute the importance to it that Californians did. Like Clifford Stone, he believed that Mexico could cut her own intake below the border and maintain diversions without the aid of American facilities. Thus, until increased American development reduced the flow of water crossing the border, he thought that Mexico could greatly increase her uses and perhaps have them confirmed by future treaty or arbitration. In addition, he and his colleagues were extremely concerned with keeping Mexico happy and the Good Neighbor Policy intact.
Duggan 感受到了加利福尼亚的怨恨，并且很清楚全美运河的重要性，尽管他并不像加利福尼亚人那样赋予它如此重要的地位。就像克利福德·斯通一样，他认为墨西哥可以在边境以下自行减少用水量，并通过自身设施维持引水。因此，在美国开发增加导致跨境水量减少之前，他相信墨西哥可以大幅增加用水量，并且这些增加或许可以通过未来的条约或仲裁得到确认。此外，他和他的同事们非常担心保持墨西哥的满意和良好的邻国政策不变。

As Duggan later discovered, Californians sharply disagreed with his assumptions, insisting that Mexico could not successfully maintain a diversion below the border because of silt and scouring conditions. Regardless of who was right on this issue, however, it would undoubtedly have been possible for the United States to limit Mexican expansion simply by manipulating its reclamation works. Flash releases from Hoover Dam or diversions of surplus water into the Salton Sea at critical times of the year would have frustrated Mexico's attempts to get water. But the State Department anticipated no such drastic action. Rather, it desperately wanted to avoid putting Mexico "in a position of a martyr where she could cry to the world and to the other South American countries in particular, how that big, powerful United States was denying her the right to use Colorado River water by waving a big stick." as
Duggan 后来发现，加利福尼亚人对他的假设持有强烈异议，坚持认为墨西哥由于河床淤积和冲刷条件，无法成功在边境以下地区维持分水。然而，无论在这个问题上谁是对的，美国仅通过操控其水利设施，就完全可以限制墨西哥的扩张。霍普金斯大坝的突发泄洪或在一年的关键时期将多余的水引入萨尔托湖，都会阻碍墨西哥获取水资源的努力。但国务院并未预期采取如此激烈的行动。相反，它迫切希望避免让墨西哥处于一种“殉道者”的地位，使其能够向世界，尤其是南美其他国家宣称，强大的美国正在挥舞大棒，剥夺其使用科罗拉多河水资源的权利。

Yet State Department officials felt that something should be done to protect American interests during the period pending a treaty. They knew it would be unwise to stand idly by while Mexico gradually built up larger claims to water, And they undoubtedly anticipated some opposition from the Colorado Basin states which would take a dim view of such inaction.
然而，国务院官员们认为，在条约生效前的这段时期内，应该采取一些措施来保护美国的利益。他们知道，在墨西哥逐渐建立更大的水资源主张期间袖手旁观是不明智的，他们很可能预料到科罗拉多河流域各州会对此不以为然。

Faced with this dilemma, Duggan and his colleagues decided to chart a course between the two extremes by introducing another question into the October meeting. They would appease Mexico by permitting her to continue and even to increase her water uses,but they wouid also attampt to conciliate the basin。 states by notifying Mexico that this arrangement was temporary and that she was to receive only a specified volume of water.
面对这种困境，Duggan 和他的同事们决定在 10 月会议上采取一种介于两者之间的策略，通过引入另一个问题来解决。他们将允许墨西哥继续甚至增加其用水量，以取悦墨西哥，同时也会试图通过通知墨西哥这种安排是临时的，并且她只能获得指定的水量来安抚流域各州。

To gain the support of the Colorado states for this policy, Dug. gan asked them to suggest what the specific maximum to Mexico should be.
为了获得科罗拉多河流域各州对这一政策的支持，Duggan 要求他们建议对墨西哥的具体最大用水量是多少。

Californians did no soul-searching to find their answer, in-fisting that Mexico be given 750,000 acre-feet or at most 800,000 acre-feet. "It is not morally right," exclaimed Mike Dowd, to zive Mexico water made available by American storage works.33 Dowd also justified his conservative grant, in part, on the basis of superior position on the river. "Our main hope at this time," he confided to Phil Swing shortly before the meeting with Duggan, " ..should be to try to get the State Department to really get down to business and utilize the advantageous posi-ion we now have." » "With proper cooperation by interests in the United States," concluded Dowd, "we can most definitely put the 'squeeze on Mexico, but, I am very much afraid of our State Department."
加利福尼亚人没有进行深刻的反思来得出他们的答案，而是坚持墨西哥应获得 75 万英亩-英尺或最多 80 万英亩-英尺的水量。“这在道德上是不对的，”迈克·道德 exclaimed，要让墨西哥获得由美国蓄水工程提供的水资源。33 道德也部分基于在河流中的优越位置来为他保守的分配辩护。“目前我们最大的希望是，”他在与杜甘会面前对菲尔·斯 wing 透露，“应该设法让国务院真正开始工作，并充分利用我们现在所处的有利位置。”“只要美国的利益方给予适当的配合，”道德总结道，“我们完全可以对墨西哥施加压力，但我非常担心我们的国务院。”

Dowd's fear of the State Department, as well as his desire to "put the squeeze" on Mexico, was motivated by more than a desire to protect California's water and power contracts and to get as much of the surplus as possible. Strange as it may seem, he wanted Mexico limited to 750,000 acre-feet so that he could deliver 2,000,000 acre-feet to her without fear that she would establish rights to it. This apparent paradox is explained by circumstances concerning the All-American Canal and the Imperial Irrigation District.
多德对国务院的恐惧，以及他想“给墨西哥施加压力”的愿望，不仅仅是为了保护加利福尼亚的水资源和电力合同，还想尽可能多地获取多余的资源。这听起来似乎有些奇怪，但他希望墨西哥的用水量限制在 75 万英亩-英尺，这样他就可以向墨西哥输送 200 万英亩-英尺的水，而不必担心墨西哥会建立对该水的权利。这种看似矛盾的情况是由与全美运河和帝国灌溉区有关的情况解释的。

In exchange for construction of the All-American Canal, the IID had agreed to pay the government as much as $38,500,000. To help meet this huge expense, the district planned to sell hydroelectric power, generated by plants constructed along the canal's length. One of these, Pilot Knob plant, was to be located just north of the Mexican border. Water sent through this plant would be discharged into the Alamo, not back into the All-American Canal. Consequently, any water sent through Pilot Knob, the capacity of which was planned for 2,000,000 acre-feet, would automatically go to Mexico.
作为交换，IID 同意向政府支付高达 3850 万美元以建设全美运河。为了应对这一巨大开支，该地区计划出售沿运河长度建造的水电站所产生的电力。其中一个水电站，试点山电站，位于墨西哥边境以北。通过该电站的水将被排放到阿连河，而不是回到全美运河。因此，任何通过试点山电站的水，其设计容量为 200 万英亩英尺，将自动流向墨西哥。

The IID claimed the Pilot Knob plant would be temporary
IID 声称皮托诺布工厂将是临时的

As duveropmenes eeased i the Cnted Staces, thlere wods 邮
随着德乌罗普梅内斯在美国内部缓和，将不会有 2000000 英亩-英尺的水可用，但在那时之前——这可能要等五十年后——水可以用来发电。为了防止墨西哥日后通过条约认可其使用，ID 希望在通过发电厂输送水之前，墨西哥仅限于霍普金斯大坝建设前的用水。

not be 2,000,000 acre-feet to use, but until that time--which might not occur for fifty years--the water could be put to use generating electricity. To prevent Mexico from establishing uses that might later be recognized by treaty, the ID wanted Mexico limited to her uses prior to the construction of Hoover Dam before sending the water through the power plant.
不会有 2000000 英亩-英尺的水可用，但在那时之前——这可能要等五十年后——水可以用来发电。为了防止墨西哥日后通过条约认可其使用，ID 希望在通过发电厂输送水之前，墨西哥仅限于霍普金斯大坝建设前的用水。

But the ID wanted the United States to use its superior position on the river to force the Mexicans to do more than ccept a limitation. It also wanted the govemment to force Mexico to share certain irrigation expenses which, Californians in-sisted, she had so far refused to do. Until the completion of the All-American Canal, the Alamo had been used to deliver water to farmers of both countries. But the Mexicans, and, earlier, American landowners in Mexico, had refused to share the cost of the Alamo or of the levee system in Mexico, an investment the LID estimated at about $9,000,000. Over the years, the farmers in Mexico had been paying only their operating and maintenance costs. Under the terms of the contract of 1904, this rate was subject to the approval of the Mexican government which, according to Californians, had exercised its authority to the fullest by fixing the rate at a minimum.36
但 ID 希望美国利用其在河流上的优越地位，迫使墨西哥人做更多于接受限制的事情。它也希望政府迫使墨西哥分享某些灌溉费用，加利福尼亚人坚持认为，墨西哥迄今拒绝这样做。在全部美国运河建成之前，阿尔莫奥曾被用来向两国的农民供水。但墨西哥人，以及更早时候的墨西哥的美国土地所有者，拒绝分担阿尔莫奥的成本或墨西哥的堤坝系统的投资，据 LID 估计，这项投资约为 900 万美元。多年来，墨西哥的农民只支付了运营和维护费用。根据加利福尼亚人的说法，按照 1904 年的合同条款，这一费率受到墨西哥政府的批准，而墨西哥政府据称已充分利用其权力将费率定在最低水平。36

Now that the All-American Canal was completed, the Alamo would be operated exclusively for the Mexicans. Under these circumstances, the ID felt that Mexico should contribute directly to the cost of the canal and the levee system. Specifically, the ID asked Mexico to amortize one-half the cost by paying about $130,-000 for twenty years.
既然全美运河已经建成，阿尔莫就会专门用于墨西哥人。在这种情况下，ID 认为墨西哥应该直接承担运河和堤坝系统的费用。具体来说，ID 要求墨西哥在 20 年内支付大约 130,000 美元来偿还一半的成本。

There were other expenses the IID wanted Mexico to share as well. It demanded a service charge, amounting to about $290,-000 annually, for Mexican use of the All-American Canal down to Pilot Knob and for use of the All-American Canal headworks.
ID 还想让墨西哥分担其他费用。它要求墨西哥为从阿尔莫到飞行员岩使用全美运河支付大约每年 290,000 美元的服务费，以及为使用全美运河的进水口支付费用。

This cost, together with Mexico's payment for the Alamo Canal and levee system, would amount to $420,000 annually. But this was not all. Mexico would also be assessed for operating and maintenance expenses which would make the yearly total $470,-
这些费用加上墨西哥为阿尔莫运河和堤坝系统支付的费用，每年总计约为 420,000 美元。但这还不是全部。墨西哥还将被评估运营和维护费用，使年总额达到 470,000 美元。

000. After twenty years, when Mexico's share of the canal and the levee system had been paid, the rate would decrease to an annual rent of nearly $340,000.31
20 年后，当墨西哥承担的运河和堤坝系统的份额被支付后，费率将减少到每年近 340,000 美元。31

Through most of 1941 and 1942 the Imperial Irrigation Dis trict had negotiated with Mexicans on these rates, but had mad A no significant headway. The Mexicans did agree to take water through the All-American Canal, undoubtedly because it would be as good as any going to the Imperial Valley, but they rejected the rates the ID wanted to charge. Over the years, Mexico had been paying about $200,000 annually for water delivery. Now the IID would charge more than twice that amount, which, claimed the Mexicans, was unacceptable. They also objected to being charged for the use of the All-American Canal and the Alamo headworks in the United States. They felt that Mexico should be assessed a specific part of the cost of those facilities and, once that assessment was paid, then all charges, except those for operation and maintenance, should cease. Both sides refused to give in, and negotiations came to a standstill.a
1941 年和 1942 年的大部分时间里，帝国灌溉区都与墨西哥人就这些费率进行了谈判，但并没有取得显著进展。墨西哥人确实同意通过全美运河取水，这很可能是因为这条运河对帝国谷来说和其他运河一样好，但他们拒绝了帝国灌溉区想要收取的费率。多年来，墨西哥每年为水的输送支付约 20 万美元。现在，帝国灌溉区将收取超过这个数额两倍的费用，墨西哥人声称这是不可接受的。他们还反对为使用全美运河和美国的阿莱莫头工支付费用。他们认为墨西哥应该为这些设施的部分成本进行评估，一旦支付了这笔评估费用，除了运营和维护费用外，所有费用都应停止。双方都不肯让步，谈判因此陷入僵局。

This controversy between the ID and the Mexicans worried California's delegates. They feared that Mexico might achieve her goal through what they considered the soft policies of the State Department. Though Californians were angered at Washington's refusal "to put the squeeze" on Mexico, they believed that Duggan's desire to discuss temporary deliveries to Mexico provided them with a much-needed sounding board. They hoped to unite the other basin states and pressure the State Department into getting the kind of treaty they wanted.
这个关于 ID 和墨西哥人的争议让加利福尼亚的代表们感到担忧。他们担心墨西哥可能会通过他们认为国务院软弱的政策实现她的目标。尽管加利福尼亚人对华盛顿拒绝“施压”墨西哥感到愤怒，但他们认为杜甘希望讨论向墨西哥提供临时供应的愿望为他们提供了一个急需的平台。他们希望团结其他盆地州，并迫使国务院达成他们想要的条约。

When Duggan first met with delegates from the basin states to discuss his suggestion, only a few representatives were pres-ent. They decided to postpone a final recommendation until all members of the Committees of Fourteen and Sixteen had had an opportunity to express their views. This opportunity, scheduled for a meeting in November, 1942, had some unforeseen developments for California.
当杜甘首次与来自盆地州的代表讨论他的建议时，只有少数代表出席。他们决定推迟最终建议，直到十四人委员会和十六人委员会的所有成员都有机会表达他们的观点。原定于 1942 年 11 月举行的会议为加利福尼亚带来了意想不到的发展。

VI

In the weeks preceding the November meeting, California's lawyers and engineers worked diligently preparing a scheme for temporary delivery of water which, they hoped, would later become the basis for a permanent treaty. It was this plan that the formidable Arvin Shaw presented to the assembled delegates. He emphasized two points as primary considerations: first, the State Dupartment, before It agreed to continue deliveries to Mesic, must secure Mexico's written renunciation of all water claims S excess of her uses prior to the construction of Hoover Dam; and, second, the department must see that Mexico paid adequate compensation for the use of American facilities in receiving the water. Shaw also hinted that, if the temporary arrangement was accepted by Mexico, there would be no need for a permanent treaty because it could be extended indefinitely. He urged the committee to accept the proposal and to put up a "stout" front "Perhaps, perhaps not," replied Dowd.
在十一月会议前的几周里，加利福尼亚的律师和工程师们勤奋地准备了一份临时供水方案，他们希望这份方案日后能成为永久条约的基础。正是这份计划被强大的阿文·肖呈给了与会代表。他强调了两点作为主要考虑因素：首先，在州部门同意继续向梅西克供水之前，必须确保墨西哥书面放弃在胡佛大坝建设之前所有超出其使用量的水资源索赔；其次，部门必须确保墨西哥为使用美国设施接收水支付足够的补偿。肖还暗示，如果墨西哥接受临时安排，就无需签订永久条约，因为可以无限期延长。他敦促委员会接受该提议并保持强硬的立场。“也许，也许不会，”道德回答说。

"Well, it would seem to me," observed Giles sarcastically,
“在我看来，”吉尔斯讽刺地说，

"to be a useless ceremony for us to spend days in formulating recommendations here if you people have a veto power down there in assessing costs on them."
“如果我们在这里花几天时间制定建议，而你们在那里有否决权可以否决成本评估的话，这似乎对我们来说是一个无用的形式。”

But Dowd held fast. The financial affairs of the Imperial Irrigation District, he maintained, were not the concern of anyone at the meeting. He reminded the committee that the rates for water could be regulated by treaty. Moreover, the Secretary of the Interior had complete control over the volume of water sent to Mexico, as well as over the charge for its delivery. This had been stipulated in the Imperial Irrigation District's contract with the government for the construction of the All-American Canal.
但是道德坚持己见。他认为，帝国灌溉区的财务事务并非会议中任何人的关注点。他提醒委员会，水价可以通过条约来调节。此外，内政部长对送往墨西哥的水量以及其运送费用拥有完全的控制权。这一点在帝国灌溉区与政府签订的建造美国全部运河合同中已有明确规定。

Dowd also explained how the district had been unable to negotiate an agreement with Mexico on investments in that coun-try. Mexico, he asserted, thought she had "our State Department on the run", the department had refused to consider the "deal" offered by the committee because "Mexico might not like it." The Mexicans, he argued, were going to squeeze just as much out of the United States as they could and then "tell us to go sit on a rock." 44
道德还解释了为什么该区无法与墨西哥就投资事宜达成协议。他认为，墨西哥认为“我们州务卿部门被他们牵着鼻子走”，该部门拒绝考虑委员会提供的“交易”是因为“墨西哥可能不喜欢它”。他争辩说，墨西哥人会榨取美国能给的一切，然后“让我们去坐石头”。

Dowd's refusal to specify the charges for Mexican water delivery was bitterly received by most of the delegates, who believed that, in spite of his explanations, he was withholding information they should have. Most seemed to share William Wallace's estimate of the situation: "The quicker we get down to brass tacks, and we are fully advised about everything that goes on concerning this river, the better it will be for all concerned." « Shaw's proposal also brought a review of California's controversial Pilot Knob project. The plant was still in the blueprint stage,after years of planning,because the Interior Department and some basin states fought its construction.they believed that the 2,000,000 aere-feet going through the plant would give impetus to developments in Mexico which would seriously jeopardize the slower-developing states. Moreover, construction of the plant might lead Mexico to believe that the water would continue to flow indefinitely. Acting on that premise, she might build up communities it would be impossible to deprive of water later, when it would be needed in the United States, But the other basin states did not consider Mexico any more serious a threat than was California herself. The water going through Pilot Knob was not covered by any of California's contracts; indeed, argued Utah's William Wallace, it was "water allocated to states other than California." a But by using it, California would establish uses that might eventually be confirmed as rights, despite the limitations imposed on her by the compact, the Boulder Canyon Act, and her own Limitation Act.
Dowd 拒绝具体说明向墨西哥输送水资源的费用，这一行为遭到了大多数代表的强烈反对，他们认为尽管 Dowd 作了解释，但他还是在隐瞒他们本应知道的信息。大多数人都似乎认同 William Wallace 对情况的评估：“我们越快把重点放在关键问题上，全面了解与这条河有关的一切情况，对所有相关方来说都会更好。”Shaw 的提议也引发了对加利福尼亚有争议的 Pilot Knob 项目的重新审查。该发电站仍在蓝图阶段，经过多年的规划，但由于内政部和一些流域州反对其建设，该发电站的建设仍未开始。他们认为，通过该发电站的 200 万立方英尺的水资源将促进墨西哥的发展，这将严重威胁到发展较慢的州。此外，发电站的建设可能会让墨西哥认为水资源会无限期地持续流动。 依据这一前提，她可能会建立一些无法在后来美国需要水时剥夺的社区。但其他流域州并不比加利福尼亚更认为墨西哥是一个严重的威胁。流经飞行员尖峰的水并不在加利福尼亚的任何合同范围内；事实上，犹他州的威廉·沃勒认为，“这些水是分配给加利福尼亚以外的其他州的。”但是通过使用这些水，加利福尼亚可能会建立一些最终可能会被确认为权利的用途，尽管受到水权协定、布卢姆伯格峡谷法案和她自己的限制法案的限制。

Arizona was also deeply concerned about this possibility. Already locked in a bitter dispute with California over the waters of the Colorado, she was opposed to anything that might help strengthen her rival's claims.48
亚利桑那州也对这种可能性非常担忧。她已经与加利福尼亚州在科罗拉多河的水资源问题上陷入了一场激烈的争执，因此她反对任何可能帮助增强对手主张的事情。48

Shaw tried to persuade the other basin states that their fears were groundless, insisting that California's water rights were definitely subject to the compact and that the ID's actions were closely circumscribed. It could not divert water through the power plant into Mexico without the express consent of the Secretary of the Interior. Moreover, he argued, the plant was only
肖试图说服其他盆地州，让他们相信他们的担忧是毫无根据的，坚持认为加利福尼亚的水资源权利确实受制于该协定，并且 ID 的行为受到了严格限制。它不能未经内政部长的明确同意就将水通过发电厂输送到墨西哥。此外，他辩称，该电站仅用于临时使用。

"for temporary use." "That means," he insisted, "that for a period of 20, 30, 40 or 50 years, as long as there shall be any water, and diminishing gradually through the years, there might be value obtained for the All-American Canal Project." a
“这意味着，”他坚持认为，“在有水的任何时期，无论是 20 年、30 年、40 年还是 50 年，随着年份的推移逐渐减少，可能会为全美运河项目获得价值。”

Not everyone agreed with Shaw that California would be willing to surrender water in the future, particularly in view of the state's past aggressiveness where water was concerned.
并非所有人都同意肖的看法，认为加利福尼亚将来不会愿意放弃水资源，特别是考虑到该州过去在水资源问题上的侵略性。

The power plant, some noted, would require an enormous investment to build- money that would have to come from Con-gress-and they feared that the government would not be willing later to provide money for development elsewhere in the basin if it would mean taking water away from the power plant. The "cold-blooded facts," exclaimed Wallace, were simply that "if all of this water is put to the highest beneficial use in
一些人指出，发电厂的建设将需要巨大的投资——这笔钱必须来自国会——他们担心，如果为了给发电厂供水而减少其他地区在盆地内的开发资金，政府后来将不愿意提供资金进行其他开发。华莱士激动地宣称，“冷冰冰的事实”是，如果所有这些水都用于最有益的用途，那么“这意味着必须将水用于发电厂，而其他地区的开发将不得不因此受到影响。”

the Lower Basin and in Mexico, and it is backed by tremendoaz
下盆地和墨西哥，并且它有巨大的支持力

investments on the part of the United States, it will be extremely difficult for us to secure a provision that will permit us to develop ourselves. Now that is the milk in the coconut." so
美国的投资，我们才有可能发展自己。否则，我们将很难获得这样的规定。“这就像是椰子中的奶。”所以

The heated discussion that had followed the introduction of Shaw's proposal reflected the deep mistrust many delegates had of California. Nevertheless, they agreed to cooperate with her to the extent of approving some kind of temporary proposal as requested by the State Department. The upper-basin states, unr der the leadership of the indomitable Stone and Tipton, took the mitiative in recommending that Mexico be allowed all the water he needed for the coming year. This concession, they believed, would not establish the basis of a claim since "there is no danger If acquiring [a right] by use of water for merely one year." To be on the safe side, however, they asked the State Department o notify Mexico that any uses in excess of those prior to the construction of Hoover Dam "shall not create a claim of right." 51
Shaw 提出的提案引入后引发的激烈讨论反映了许多代表对加利福尼亚的深深不信任。尽管如此，他们还是同意在一定程度上与她合作，批准一个由国务院要求的临时提案。上游各州，在不可动摇的 Stone 和 Tipton 的领导下，主动建议允许墨西哥在来年使用其所需的全部水资源。他们认为，这一让步不会成为一项权利主张的基础，因为“使用水资源一年并不会产生权利主张的基础”。为了安全起见，他们要求国务院通知墨西哥，任何超过胡佛大坝建设前用水量的使用“不会产生权利主张”。51

The upper-basin proposal did not require the written consent of Mexico to the agreement. This modification of the Shaw recommendation irritated the California delegation, which now forced a slight change in the wording of the proposal that was finally sent to the State Department. In brief, it expressed the desire of the basin states for a written agreement, but left the question of obtaining it up to the State Department.
上游提案不需要墨西哥书面同意该协议。这一对肖推荐的修改让加利福尼亚代表团感到不满，他们现在迫使提案的措辞做了一点微小的修改，最终提交给国务院。简而言之，它表达了盆地各州希望达成书面协议的愿望，但将获得它的责任留给了国务院。

California was grasping for a straw. Though dissatisfied with the committee's resolution, her delegates dared not push the basin states further because the hostility to her water policies had reached a dangerous point. Her vital interests were at stake, but she realized that if a crisis later developed with the State Department she would need the support of the other states. In a bid for that support and in an attempt to soothe ruffled feelings, Californians supported the resolution.
加利福尼亚已经到了山穷水尽的地步。尽管对委员会的决议不满意，她的代表也不敢进一步激怒盆地各州，因为对她的水资源政策的敌意已经达到了危险的程度。她的根本利益受到了威胁，但她意识到，如果日后与国务院发生危机，她将需要其他州的支持。为了争取这种支持并试图安抚被激怒的情绪，加利福尼亚人支持了该决议。

VII

Whereas California felt the committee's proposal was not strong enough, State Department officials considered it too severe. Though they had requested the states to draw it up, and had indicated they would use it in the negotiations with Mexico, they decided against doing so. Just why they adopted this course is not certain, but it undoubtedly reflected the department A policy of avoiding a conflict with Mexico. Moreover, its own permanent treaty proposal was being formulated, and Hull may have wanted to keep the Mexicans as receptive as possible.
尽管加利福尼亚认为委员会的提议不够有力，国务院官员则认为该提议过于严厉。虽然他们曾要求各州起草该提议，并表示会在与墨西哥的谈判中使用它，但他们最终还是决定不这样做。他们采取这一做法的具体原因尚不明确，但无疑反映了国务院避免与墨西哥发生冲突的政策。此外，他们自己的永久条约提议也在制定中，霍尔可能希望尽可能让墨西哥保持开放的态度。

Whatever the reason for the department's inaction, Californians became alarmed and decided to force the issue two months later, in January, 1943. Phil Swing, again their spokesman, asked the State Department to apply pressure upon Mexico for a written agreement, and to assure himself of success he mobilized the help of senators Hiram Johnson and Sheridan Downey of California, James Serugham of Nevada, and Carl Hayden of Arizona. Though Swing was not allowed to discuss this problem with anyone, because the State Department had sworn the Committees of Fourteen and Sixteen to secrecy, he felt compelled by feelings of "duty" and "privilege" to keep the senators informed.
无论部门不作为的原因是什么，加利福尼亚人两个月后在 1943 年 1 月变得警觉，并决定强迫相关部门采取行动。他们的发言人菲利普·斯 wing 再次要求国务院对墨西哥施加压力，要求书面协议，并为了确保成功，他动员了来自加利福尼亚的参议员赫里姆·约翰逊和谢拉顿·唐尼，内华达州的詹姆斯·塞鲁格汉姆和亚利桑那州的卡尔·海登的帮助。尽管国务院要求委员会十四和十六保密，斯 wing 不得与任何人讨论这个问题，但他出于“责任”和“荣幸”的感觉，仍有必要向参议员们通报情况。

Besides, he wrote Evan Hewes, "I am in hopes that the pressure being applied from the Senators will result in the State Department making sure that it gets the 'assent of Mexico."" se While Swing was drumming up support in Washington, the Imperial Irrigation District began applying pressure of its own by asking the State Department what to do about deliveries to Mexico for the coming year. Should Mexico be limited to her uses prior to Hoover Dam? Should the deliveries be made upon certain conditions? "If so, what should be the conditions? ..
此外，他写给 Evan Hewes 说：“我希望参议员施加的压力能使国务院确保获得墨西哥的同意。”与此同时，当 Swing 在华盛顿拉拢支持时，帝国灌溉区也开始自行施压，询问国务院关于来年对墨西哥的交付事宜。墨西哥是否应该限制在胡佛大坝之前使用的用途？是否应该在某些条件下交付？如果是这样，应该是什么条件？...

How should they be made effective and by whom?" a
这些条件应该如何实施，由谁实施？"

Because of the State Department's earlier position, no Cal ifornian seriously thought that Secretary Hull would limit Mexican water consumption. But Californians did hope that he would obtain Mexico's assent, or at least notify her that she had no legitimate claim to an unrestricted use of water. However, Hull did neither of these things. In a brief note he told the ID to continue "its past practices" in making water deliveries; he gave no reasons for his decision, and he did not inform the ID whether he had sent the requested notice to Mexico.* But Californians suspected the worst. They looked on this as another of the bitter disappointments that were occurring with disturbing frequency.
由于国务院之前的立场，加利福尼亚人没有人认真认为赫尔部长会限制墨西哥的用水量。但是，加利福尼亚人确实希望他能够获得墨西哥的同意，或者至少通知她她没有使用水资源的正当权利。然而，赫尔既没有做这两件事。他在一封简短的信中告诉 ID 继续“过去的做法”进行水资源的输送；他没有给出任何理由，也没有通知 ID 他是否已经向墨西哥发送了请求的通知。*但是，加利福尼亚人怀疑最坏的情况。他们认为这是又一个令人不安的频繁发生的令人失望的事情。

VIII
八

In the meantime, hittle headway was breing made by Mewa
同时，梅瓦几乎没有取得什么进展

and the United States on the Colorado River question. American officials thought Mexico's request for 2,000,000 acre-feet excessive and believed that such an amount would not be available during an average year. Other considerations strengthened their resolve. "Expanded uses in Mexico since 1935," they told the Mexican ambassador in November, 1942, " . . . were due to, and made possible by, the construction of Boulder Dam and its appur-tenant works, thus controlling and regulating the theretofore erratic How of the stream. ... This is a factor," they concluded,
而在科罗拉多河问题上，美国官员认为墨西哥要求的 200 万英亩英尺水太多，相信在平均年份里这样的水量是不可用的。其他考虑进一步坚定了他们的决心。“自 1935 年以来，墨西哥的扩展用途，”他们在 1942 年 11 月告诉墨西哥大使，“……得益于并由布尔德大坝及其附属工程的建设，从而控制和调节了此前不稳定的河流流量。……这是一个不能忽视的因素，”他们总结道，在确定墨西哥已建立的有益用途时。

"that cannot be ignored in determining the beneficial uses to which Mexico has established a right." is
“这一点必须在确定墨西哥已建立的有益用途时予以考虑。”

Mexico disagreed. If she was to be limited to her uses prior to construction of the dam, then she felt that American uses on the lower Rio Grande should be limited to what they were prior to the construction of Mexican regulatory works, especially those on the Conchos. Those works, she contended in her memo of February, 1943, made possible the greater part of present uses in the American region," a
墨西哥不同意。如果她只能使用大坝建设前的水资源，那么她认为美国在下拉普拉塔河的使用量也应该限制在大坝建设前墨西哥监管工程，尤其是康 chos 河上的工程建成前的使用量。她在 1943 年 2 月的备忘录中声称，这些工程使得美国地区目前大部分的水资源使用成为可能，“这需要一整晚。能否保证提议给墨西哥的金额……不会削弱……美国履行其已有的义务的能力……P* 63”

Regardless of whether Mexico's contention was correct, her position on the Rio Grande was far from being as formidable as was that of the United States on the Colorado. If the United States desired, it could ultimately deprive Mexico of almost all Colorado River water, whereas Mexico would be unable to deprive the United States of much Rio Grande water once the proposed Valley Gravity Canal and Storage Project had been constructed.
无论墨西哥的主张是否正确，她在里奥格兰德河上的位置远没有美国在科罗拉多河上的位置那么有利。如果美国愿意，最终可以剥夺墨西哥几乎全部的科罗拉多河水，而一旦建成拟议中的山谷重力运河和蓄水项目，墨西哥将无法剥夺美国多少里奥格兰德河水。

But Mexico did not rest her case with her allusion to the Rio Grande situation, nor did she consider prior appropriation *a fundamental rule" to be followed in dividing the waters of international rivers. Instead she insisted, as she had in the negotiations of 1929, that the waters of such rivers be distributed "in proportion to the areas susceptible to irrigation" within each country. If the water supply proved insufficient, then each nation should eliminate those programs "which present the same characteristics of high cost and difficulty of realization." As as far as Mexico was concerned, these general principles confirmed her demand for 2,000,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water, "the lower limit of Mexican needs" and "a fair division of the waters This volume, she contended, would be are bable to hier in migr years (an assumption based in part on her belief that the ups basin would not use all its allotment) and, when it was not avail-able, she would be willing to accept a reduction in her share.
但墨西哥并未仅通过提及里奥格兰德的情况来结束她的论点，也未认为先占原则是划分国际河流水资源时必须遵循的“基本原则”。相反，她坚持认为，这些河流的水资源应按照“各国内可灌溉面积的比例”进行分配，这与 1929 年谈判中的立场一致。如果水资源供应不足，那么每个国家应取消那些“具有高成本和难以实现特点的项目”。就墨西哥而言，这些基本原则证实了她对科罗拉多河水资源的需求为 200 万英亩-英尺，“这是墨西哥最低的需求量”和“公平分配水资源的标准”。她认为，这一水量在移民年份（部分基于她认为上流域不会用完其配额的假设）是可以实现的，当无法获得时，她愿意接受份额的减少。

She also challenged one of the United States's most telling argu-ments- that Mexico had reached the physical limit of her devel opment before Hoover Dam regulation began in 1935 and, con-sequently, should be guaranteed only an amount equivalent to her uses at that time. Mexican officials sharply disagreed, con-Actually, both sides seem to have been somewhat confused.
她还挑战了美国的一个最具说服力的论点——即在胡佛大坝调节开始于 1935 年之前，墨西哥已经达到了开发的物理极限，因此应该仅被保证与其当时使用量相当的数量。墨西哥官员强烈反对，实际上，双方似乎都有些困惑。

Hackworth's belief that Mexico could claim the former floods as benefits seems inconsistent with the facts. Before Hoover Dam, the river often became a raging menace, threatening both the United States and Mexico with its floodwaters and enormous load of silt. Since the Mexicans had tried and failed to locate a dam site below the border, effective control was impossible without American reclamation works. On the other hand, California's contention that Mexico could never have used more than 750,000 acre-feet without Hoover Dam seems as doubtful as some of Hackworth's statements. Prior to Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal, water was brought into the Imperial and Mexicali valleys through the Alamo Canal. The concession of 1904 had given Mexico the right to one-half the Alamo's capac-ity, Since the canal had carried nearly 3,000,000 acre-feet during the decade preceding Hoover Dam, Mexico could have demanded half or 1,500,000 acre-feet. Mexicans attributed their failure to do so to adverse economic conditions and concentration on a single crop, cotton, which had curtailed their use of water. Though Hackworth failed to mention Mexico's position to the Californians
Hackworth 认为墨西哥可以将以前的洪水视为利益的观点似乎与事实不符。在 Hoover 大坝建成之前，这条河经常变成一个狂暴的威胁，洪水和巨大的淤泥负荷既威胁着美国，也威胁着墨西哥。由于墨西哥人在边境以下地区尝试寻找大坝位置但未能成功，因此没有美国的灌溉工程，有效的控制是不可能的。另一方面，加利福尼亚声称在 Hoover 大坝建成之前，墨西哥不可能使用超过 75 万英亩·英尺的水，这一说法似乎与 Hackworth 的某些陈述一样可疑。在 Hoover 大坝和 All-American 运河建成之前，水是通过 Alamo 运河引入帝国谷和墨西卡利谷的。1904 年的让渡协议赋予墨西哥 Alamo 运河容量的一半权利。由于运河在 Hoover 大坝建成前的十年中输送了近 300 万英亩·英尺的水量，墨西哥本可以要求其中一半或 150 万英亩·英尺的水量。墨西哥人将他们未能这样做归因于不利的经济条件和专注于单一作物——棉花，这限制了他们对水的使用。尽管 Hackworth 没有向加利福尼亚人提到墨西哥的这一立场，

-indeed, he seems to have been unaware of the volume of water diverted through the Alamo which the Mexicans might have demanded he still unnerved them with his fear of arbitration and desire for an early treaty. What the Californians did not know was that their severest blow lay just two weeks away.
-确实，他似乎没有意识到墨西哥可能会要求他仍然因害怕仲裁而感到不安，并希望尽快达成协议，通过阿尔莫洛莫的水量被转移的情况。加利福尼亚人不知道的是，他们最严重的打击就在两周后到来。

In mid-April, 1943, the State Department called a special meeting of the Committees of Fourteen and Sixteen at the plush La Fonda Hotel in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The occasion for this gathering was the consideration of an important document --the proposed treaty for dividing the water of the Colorado River. The treaty draft had been the work of representatives from the Bureau of Reclamation and of Colorado's ubiquitous Royce Tipton and Clifford Stone, who had consulted with the State Department during the weeks of preparation. At long last the State Department was hopeful of culminating what it considered its "missionary work" with the Colorado Basin states.terrogated Lawrence Lawson, the American boundary commissioner and State Department representative.
1943 年 4 月中旬，国务院在新墨西哥州圣达菲豪华的拉丰达酒店召开了十四人委员会和十六人委员会的特别会议。这次聚会的目的是考虑一份重要文件——拟议中的科罗拉多河水资源分配条约。该条约草案是由负责科罗拉多州事务的灌溉局代表以及无处不在的罗伊 ce·蒂 pton 和克利福德·斯通起草的，他们在准备期间与国务院进行了咨询。国务院终于对与科罗拉多盆地各州达成其所谓的“传教工作”抱有希望。国务院代表劳伦斯·劳森，美国边界专员，接受了质询。

"Is it the intention of the State Department . . . to encroach upon prior obligations of the United States government heretofore solemnly issued?"
美国国务院……是否有意图侵犯美国政府此前庄严发布的先前义务？

Lawson paused and then replied: "We figured there was sufficient surplus waters."
拉森停顿了一下，然后回答说：“我们认为有足够的余水。”

"I don't want to discuss that question now," snapped Swing.
"我现在不想讨论这个问题，"斯 wing 厉声说道。

"It would take all night. May we have your assurance that the amount here proposed to be given to Mexico . . . does not undermine . . . the ability of the United States to perform its already entered into obligations . . . P* 63
会花费一整晚。能否保证提议给墨西哥的金额……不会削弱……美国履行其已有的义务的能力……P* 63

Swing got no such assurance. Lawson steadfastly maintained that there would be enough water to protect the California con-tracts. But if for some reason there was not, then some of those contracts would be impaired. Mexico's share could not be made secondary to California's contracts.
斯 wing 没有得到这样的保证。劳森坚持认为有足够的水来保护加利福尼亚的合同。但如果因为某些原因没有足够的水，那么一些合同就会受到影响。墨西哥的权利不能次于加利福尼亚的合同。

It soon became obvious to the conferees that return flow was an important consideration in evaluating the treaty proposal. If the quantity should be as large as the State Department pre-dicted, then the treaty would, in effect, be an offer similar to that submitted by Mead in 1929, though of course neither this offer nor Mead's proposed to make Mexico's rights secondary to those in the United States.
与会者很快意识到，回流是评估条约提案时的一个重要因素。如果数量像国务院预测的那样大，那么条约实际上将是类似于梅德 1929 年提交的提议，尽管当然，这个提议和梅德的提议都不打算使墨西哥的权利次于美国的权利。

Californians labeled the government's estimates of return flow as exaggerations. Everyone recognized that most of the flow would originate in Arizona, yet, insisted California, Arizona's representatives had on numerous occasions declared their intention to reclaim all that was usable. E. B. Debler, a respected engineer for the Reclamation Bureau, directly challenged the California contention by arguing that there would be at least 750,-000 acre-feet of return flow. He also asserted that Arizona wor probably not use it because it would he too saline.
加利福尼亚人认为政府对回流水估计的数字是夸大的。大家都承认大部分的水流将源自亚利桑那州，但加利福尼亚坚持认为，亚利桑那州的代表们多次表示他们打算收回所有可利用的水。受尊敬的灌溉局工程师 E. B. Debler 直接反驳了加利福尼亚的观点，认为至少会有 750,000 英亩-英尺的回流水。他还声称亚利桑那州可能不会使用这些水，因为这些水的盐度过高。

SE

California's Mike Dowd immediately saw the implications of this statement and asked; "If it couldn't be used . . . would you expect Mexico to use it?"
加利福尼亚的迈克·道德立刻意识到了这句话的含义，并问道：“如果不能使用……你是否预期墨西哥会使用它？”

"Mexico might be able to use it," answered L. J. Foster, another Reclamation Bureau engineer,
“墨西哥可能能够使用它，”另一位灌溉局工程师 L.J.福斯特回答说，

*while the United States
而美国

could not." 6t
无法做到." 6t

Undoubtedly, Foster and Debler believed Mexico would a resolution urging the United States to control permanently all facilities of the Imperial Irrigation District which delivered water to Mexico. These facilities included the Alamo and All-American Canal diversion works, the stretch of the All-American Canal between the river and Pilot Knob, and the proposed Pilot Knob power plant. Wilson's move showed the deep mistrust he and other basin representatives harbored against California.
不言而喻，福斯特和德布勒认为墨西哥会要求美国永久控制向墨西哥输送水的帝国灌溉区的所有设施。这些设施包括阿连霍和美国运河的分流工程，美国运河从河口到飞行员岩的一段，以及拟建的飞行员岩水电站。威尔逊的举动显示了他对加利福尼亚及其他流域代表的深深不信任。

His resolution, in short, would prevent California from using the Pilot Knob power plant to establish uses to water claimed by other states and would, he explained, "aid in obtaining a minimum allocation of water to Mexico." 6T
简言之，他的决议将阻止加利福尼亚使用飞行员岩水电站来确定其他州所声称的用水权，并且他解释说，这将“有助于获得向墨西哥分配的最低水量。”6T

In backing the resolution, Arizona, in particular, revealed the intensity of her hostility to California. The Wilson proposal would allow the Reclamation Bureau to retain control of the All-American Canal and its principal diversion structure, Imperial Dam. By law the Reclamation Bureau held control of the projects until it issued a formal announcement that work had been completed; then the operation of the canal and dam could be turned over to the Imperial Irrigation District. Although construction had ended, the bureau had so far refused to make the necessary announcement, using as an excuse the current negotiations for a treaty with Mexico. This decision pleased Arizona, which wanted to have the projects left under the permanent control of the United States government. Her action was motivated by defensive considerations. Since the beginning of the All-American Canal project, Arizona had worried about its effect on her agricultural development. Her Gila and Yuma projects diverted their water directly from the river at Laguna Dam, a small reservoir operated by the Reclamation Bureau, but the All-American Canal's Imperial Dam, a short distance upstream, interfered with the diversions at Laguna. To offset this difficulty. Arizona had to agree to divert her water from Imperial Dam .The solution seemed an excellent one ,except that the Imperial Irrigation District could determine Arizona diversions I it gained control of the Imperial Dam and the All-American Canal. Although the ID was required by its contract with the Interior Department to deliver the required amount of water, the Arizonans did not think this provision was adequate protection against their bitter California rivals. If water was withheld, even temporarily, tremendous damage would be done. Resort to legal means would be too slow to prevent injury. Consequently, they sought to have all the necessary works left in the hands of an impartial government body. S
在支持这项决议时，亚利桑那州特别展现了其对加利福尼亚州的强烈敌意。威尔逊提议将允许灌溉局继续控制全美运河及其主要引水结构——帝国大坝。根据法律规定，灌溉局在正式宣布工程完工之前一直控制这些项目；之后，运河和大坝的操作可以移交给帝国灌溉区。尽管建设已经结束，但局方迄今仍未作出必要的公告，而是以与墨西哥正在进行条约谈判为由作为借口。这一决定让亚利桑那州感到满意，因为该州希望这些项目能够一直由美国政府的永久控制。她的行动出于防御性考虑。自全美运河项目开始以来，亚利桑那州就担心该项目对其农业发展的影响。 她的吉拉和尤马项目直接从拉古纳大坝获取河水，该大坝是灌溉局运营的一个小型水库。但是，位于上游不远处的美国全部灌溉运河的帝国大坝干扰了拉古纳的取水。为了克服这一困难，亚利桑那州不得不同意从帝国大坝取水。这一解决方案看似非常理想，但帝国灌溉区如果控制了帝国大坝和美国全部灌溉运河，就可以决定亚利桑那州的取水量。尽管根据与内政部的合同，ID 必须提供所需的水量，亚利桑那人认为这一条款不足以防止他们与苦涩的加利福尼亚对手之间的争端。如果水被扣留，即使只是暂时的，也会造成巨大损失。诉诸法律手段会太慢，无法防止损害。因此，他们寻求将所有必要的工程交给一个公正的政府机构手中。

To place these projects in federal hands seemed to Californians a crowning insult. Without control of the facilities, they could not force Mexico to share the cost of them or of the Alamo Canal system. Moreover, without the power plant, the ID would be denied power revenues with which to help pay the cost of the All-American Canal.
对这些项目交给联邦政府管理，加利福尼亚人觉得这是最后的侮辱。没有对这些设施的控制权，他们无法迫使墨西哥分担这些项目或阿科洛霍尔大运河系统的成本。此外，没有发电厂，该机构将无法获得电力收入来帮助支付全部美利坚大运河的成本。

"This is the final humiliation," exclaimed Phil Swing, "and adds to the indignity already done to California and its com-munities." He acidly denounced the committee members for "the steam-roller effect . . . with which you have rolled forward to your pre-determined goal. . . . It seems to me," he roared,
这是最后的羞辱，”菲尔·斯 wing 大声说道，“这使加利福尼亚及其社区已经受到的侮辱更加严重。”他酸酸地谴责委员会成员们“这种碾压效果……你们以预定的目标为由向前推进。在我看来，”他吼道，

"this exceeds the limit of human endurance, ...* a Despite his vehement objections, all the states deserted California and voted for the resolution.
尽管他极力反对，所有州都抛弃了加利福尼亚并投票通过了该决议。

Before Californians could regain their composure, they faced still another blow. This time it came from their sister state in the lower basin--Arizona. Throughout the debates over the treaty Arizona had posed something of a dilemma for Californians, be-cause, despite the problem of the diversion facilities at Imperial Dam, they believed that Arizona should have been just as anxious as they were to limit Mexico, since, according to the formula sug. gested by the Boulder Canyon Project Act, she was to share with California any surplus not given to Mexico. But there was one thing Arizona desired even more than rights to a large volume of surplus, which might or might not be available in the future.
在加州人重新平静下来之前，他们又遭受了另一击。这次来自下游盆地的姐妹州亚利桑那。在关于条约的辩论中，亚利桑那州对加州人来说一直是个难题，因为尽管有伊梅尔 dam 的引水设施问题，他们认为亚利桑那也应该像他们一样急于限制墨西哥，因为根据《布卢姆斯伯格峡谷项目法》提出的公式，亚利桑那应该与加州共同分享任何未分配给墨西哥的剩余水量。但亚利桑那州比获得大量剩余水量的权利更渴望一件事，这种剩余水量在未来是否可用尚不确定。

She wanted exclusive rights to the Gila River in addition to the 2,800,000 acre-feet the Boulder Canyon Act had suggested as her share. In effect, she wanted a contract with the Secretary of the Interior which excluded the Gila from the provisions of the rado River Compact, and thereby declared her the winner in & long controversy with California. To achieve this desire, she now introduced a resolution calling for a special meeting of the com-mittee, to be held the following month, to discuss the kind of contract she sought. As far as Californians were concerned, the painful obvious was taking place. Arizona had agreed to support the treaty in exchange for upper-basin help in her fight with California,™ Despite their vigorous objections, Californians had While these bitter debates were taking place in Santa Fe, Mexico had been anxiously trying to bring her negotiations with the United States to a successful conclusion. In February, 1943, she had suggested that the two governments turn the problem of the border streams over to their international boundary com-missioners, who might, in the informality of a conference room, break the deadlock. Secretary of State Hull withheld his reply until the conclusion of the Santa Fe meeting and then accepted the suggestion. The talks were scheduled to begin in September at the border cities of El Paso and Juárez.™
她希望获得吉拉河的独家使用权，而不仅仅是布卢德峡谷法案建议分配给她的 280 万英亩-英尺水量。实际上，她希望与内政部长签订一份合同，排除吉拉河受《拉多河协定》条款的约束，从而宣布自己在与加利福尼亚的长期争议中获胜。为了实现这一愿望，她现在提出了一项决议，要求在下个月召开特别委员会会议，讨论她所寻求的合同类型。对于加利福尼亚人来说，痛苦的现实显而易见。亚利桑那同意支持条约，以换取在与加利福尼亚的斗争中获得上流流域的支持，尽管他们强烈反对，加利福尼亚人仍被迫同意。与此同时，在圣达菲，墨西哥一直在焦急地试图将其与美国的谈判成功收尾。1943 年 2 月，她建议两国政府将边界河流的问题交给国际边界委员会处理，或许在会议室内非正式的讨论中，可以打破僵局。 赫尔国务卿直到圣达菲会议结束才回复，并接受了这一建议。会谈原定于九月在埃尔帕索和卢埃萨这两个边境城市开始。

The principal conferees of the United States were Lawrence Lawson, American boundary commissioner, and Laurence Dug. gan, the State Department's Adviser on Political Relations, who were aided by some half-dozen assistants, including Royce Tip-ton, the shrewd engineer from Colorado. Mexican spokesmen in-eluded such talented engineers and agricultural experts as Rafael Fernández MacGregor, who served as Mexico's international boundary commissioner, Adolfo Orive Alba, executive chairman of Mexico's National Irrigation Commission, and Marte Gómez, minister of agriculture. All three men possessed considerable knowledge about the border streams and were determined to obtain as good a bargain as possible for their country. Indeed, Orive Alba had recently announced publicly Mexicos hope to double her agricultural production by 1946.78
美国的主要与会者有劳伦斯·劳森，美国边界专员，以及劳伦斯·杜根，国务院政治关系顾问，他们得到了包括科罗拉多州精明的工程师罗伊塞·提顿在内的大约六名助手的支持。墨西哥方面的发言人包括像拉斐尔·费尔南德斯·麦克格戈尔这样的才华横溢的工程师和农业专家，他担任墨西哥国际边界专员，阿多尔福·奥里维·阿尔瓦，墨西哥国家灌溉委员会执行主席，以及马尔特·戈麦斯，农业部长。这三人都对边境河流有相当多的了解，并决心为自己的国家争取尽可能好的交易。事实上，奥里维·阿尔瓦最近公开宣布，墨西哥希望到 1946 年将农业产量翻一番。

As would be expected, negotiations concerning the Rio Grande proceeded relatively smoothly. Nevertheless, Mexico complicated matters at one point by attempting to reopen a subject considered closed by the United States. She demanded more of the upper Rio Grande water than the 60,000 acre-feet given her hy the treaty of 1906, insisting on one-half the runoff enterita the stream between El Paso and Fort Quitman.78 Lawson refused to consider this request, contending the earlier treaty had settled the question. Although disappointed, the Mexicans did not permit their defeat to end the conference.
如预期的那样，关于里奥格兰德河的谈判进行得相当顺利。然而，墨西哥在某个时候使事情变得复杂，试图重新开启美国认为已经关闭的话题。她要求获得的里奥格兰德河上游水量比 1906 年条约中规定的 6 万英亩-英尺还要多，坚持要求一半的径流进入埃尔帕索和福特克里特曼之间的河流。78 劳森拒绝考虑这一要求，认为之前的条约已经解决了这个问题。虽然感到失望，但墨西哥人并没有让失败阻止他们继续会议。

Talks on the lower Rio Grande proved more fruitful. The lack of information. Instead, they arranged for studies that would facilitate a future settlement. On the more important issues, however, a major step had finally been taken.
关于里奥格兰德河下游的谈判则更为富有成果。由于缺乏信息，他们安排了研究，以促进未来解决争端。然而，在更重要的问题上，终于迈出了重大一步。

By the end of 1943 the negotiators had already returned to their respective capitals to obtain formal approval of their work.
到 1943 年底，谈判人员已经返回各自的首都，以获得对其工作的正式批准。

Once that had been obtained, the treaty could be signed.
获得批准后，条约就可以签署。

XII

Before approving the pact, Secretary of State Hull sought the favorable assent of the Committees of Fourteen and Sixteen.
在国务卿赫尔批准条约之前，他寻求了十四人委员会和十六人委员会的赞同。

At a meeting in late January, 1944, nearly all the basin representatives commended the State Department for obtaining a settlement even better than they had anticipated. Only California's delegates found nothing to praise. The treaty, they be-lieved, gave too much water away and violated the property rights of the Imperial Irrigation District.
在 1944 年 1 月底的一次会议上，几乎所有的流域代表都称赞国务院取得了比他们预期更好的解决方案。只有加利福尼亚的代表没有找到值得赞扬的地方。他们认为，条约给了太多水，并侵犯了帝国灌溉区的财产权。

"We believe that the treaty is wrong." argued Arvin Shaw.
“我们认为条约是错误的。”阿文·肖争论道。

"It is unjust and it is unnecessarily unjust." Shaw was joined by Mike Dowd who was especially upset because the ID would not gain control of the Pilot Knob power site and because the district was not guaranteed compensation for its Alamo investment in Mexico. "Those works," angrily exclaimed Dowd in reference to the Alamo system, "weren't built by the so-called gold and silver of California. . . . Those works were built by money obtained by the sweat of the brows of farmers." 78
这是不公正的，而且是不必要的不公正。肖被迈克·道德所加入，道德对 ID 无法控制飞行员山口电站以及该地区无法保证对墨西哥阿拉莫投资的补偿特别不满。“这些工程，”道德愤怒地说道，“不是用所谓的加利福尼亚的金子和银子建造的……。这些工程是用农民的汗水换来的资金建造的。”78

Though Califorians acidly criticized the State Department, they received no sympathy from the other basin representatives.
尽管加利福尼亚人尖酸地批评了国务院，但他们却得不到其他盆地代表的同情。

Frank Delaney of Colorado summed up the general feelings when he declared that State Department officials "should be complimented for doing a good and effective job." to With such
科罗拉多州的弗兰克·德莱尼总结了大家的一般感受，他说国务院官员“应该被表扬，他们做了一项出色而有效的工作”。因此

warin approval the treaty was formally signed on February
在批准条约方面，该条约正式于二月签署。

1944. In the meantime, as the pact with its additional drain on the
1944 年，与此同时，由于条约带来的额外负担，

river neared approval, Arizona, under the leadership of Governor Sidney Osburn, stepped up her drive to win a Colorado River contract favorable to her interests. But her success was only par-tial. Though she secured the special meeting she had sought, she had to content herself with a contract that left in doubt her share of Colorado River water. (Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes had not wanted to assume responsibility for settling the Arizona-California controversy, but had preferred to let the Supreme Court handle that problem.) Despite the ambiguity of the contract, Arizonans decided they would have to accept it or forego all hope of developing the vast lands in the heart of the state. It was either act or be left behind by Mexico and Cal.
当格兰德河接近批准时，在州长西德尼·奥本的领导下，亚利桑那州加大了争取有利于其利益的科罗拉多河合同的努力。但她的成功是有限的。尽管她成功地召开了她所寻求的特别会议，但她只能满足于一个合同，该合同对她的科罗拉多河水资源份额存在疑问。（内政部长哈罗德·艾奇斯并不想承担解决亚利桑那州与加利福尼亚州争议的责任，而是希望让最高法院处理这个问题。）尽管合同存在模糊性，亚利桑那人还是决定他们必须接受它，否则就放弃开发该州中部广阔土地的所有希望。要么行动，要么被墨西哥和加利福尼亚州甩在后面。

¡fornia. Pressure was also being felt because of the state's enormous population growth, the resulting power shortage, and a severe drought.81 Since nearly all Arizona's water came from wells that were rapidly nearing exhaustion, she turned to "the last waterhole" the Colorado River-_for the water and electricity needed by her burgeoning population. After negotiating the necessary contracts with the Seeretary of the Interior, she next reversed her stand of twenty-two years and approved the Colorado River Compact on February 24, 1944-only three weeks after the Mexican treaty had been signed. All things considered, 1944 was a momentous year in the Colorado River Basin.
佛罗里达。由于该州人口激增导致的巨大人口压力，加之由此引发的电力短缺和严重干旱，也感受到了巨大的压力。81 由于亚利桑那州几乎所有的水资源都来自迅速枯竭的井水，她转向了“最后一片水源”——科罗拉多河，以满足其不断增长的人口所需的水资源和电力。在与内政部长协商好必要的合同后，她在 1944 年 2 月 24 日，即墨西哥条约签署后仅三周，批准了科罗拉多河协定。综合来看，1944 年是科罗拉多河流域具有重要意义的一年。

The treaty dividing the waters of the Colorado River and the lower Rio Grande ended a generation of agitation and three years of intense negotiation. When the State Department had informed the Colorado Basin states in 1941 about the pending negotiations, it had received their approval and a warning. Less than two years later, only California was still holding publicly to the original position as she desperately sought to protect her contracts and to secure as much surplus water as possible. Of the two states California and Arizona- having an interest in the surplus, only California's interest had reached fever pitch; only she had built expensive aqueducts with capacities to carry that surplus water to her cities and farms. In addition, California wanted Mario do and recite not on the At , into b canta, her past aggressive actions to obtain water and her refusal to discuss openly the delivery rates for Mexico- rates considered excessive by some--helped alienate many of her sister states.
《科罗拉多河和下拉格朗德河的分水条约》结束了数十年的动荡和三年的激烈谈判。当国务院在 1941 年向科罗拉多河流域各州通报即将进行的谈判时，各州表示同意并提出了警告。不到两年后，只有加利福尼亚州仍在公开坚持原来的立场，她正拼命保护自己的合同，并尽可能多地获取多余的水资源。在加利福尼亚州和亚利桑那州这两个对多余水资源有利益的州中，只有加利福尼亚州的利益达到了顶点；只有她建造了昂贵的引水渠，容量足以将多余的水资源输送到她的城市和农田。此外，加利福尼亚州过去为了获取水资源所采取的侵略性行动以及她拒绝公开讨论对墨西哥的供水费率（一些人认为这些费率过高）的行为，也使许多姐妹州疏远了她。

The other basin states, mostly out of fear, had modified their earlier stand. They were afraid that Mexican water uses would eventually threaten the compact allocations if a treaty were not that the treaty was fair to both nations. True enough, Mexico received a large amount of water, but her share had definitely been limited, thus permitting American interests to plan more intelligently for the future, Moreover, the Mexican allocation would not seriously impair American uses because some water could be taken from return flow. These benefits, however, could be considered as dividends, for the treaty settled a thorny problem of diplomacy that had plagued both countries for years. "I am convinced," Roosevelt concluded, "that the United States would stand to lose much more than it could reasonably hope to gain by any further delay in the negotiation of a water treaty with Mexico."
其他盆地州大多出于恐惧，已经修改了他们之前的立场。他们担心，如果没有条约，墨西哥的用水最终会威胁到协定中的分配。确实，墨西哥获得了大量的水，但她的份额已经被限制，从而允许美国在未来做出更明智的规划。此外，墨西哥的分配不会严重妨碍美国的用水，因为可以从回流中取水。然而，这些好处可以被视为红利，因为该条约解决了困扰两国多年的棘手外交问题。“我相信，”罗斯福总结道，“美国在进一步推迟与墨西哥签订水资源条约方面会失去比预期更多的东西。”

These plausible reasons hid Roosevelt's fundamental attitude toward the question. "The real problem about the Colorado wa-ter," he confided to an aide, "is the common law. This [law] for hundreds of years has held that the owner of land abutting a stream cannot divert the water from that stream without putting it back into the stream for the use of an abutting property owner further down." a
这些合理的理由掩盖了罗斯福对这个问题的基本态度。“科罗拉多州的真正问题，”他对助手透露，“是普通法。几百年的法律一直规定，靠河岸的土地所有者不能从河流中引水，除非将水重新引入河流供下游靠河岸的土地所有者使用。”

Roosevelt's concept of water law had not been accepted by the Colorado Basin states or by Mexico. In the humid East, where water shortages were rare, the doctrine made sense and had the force of statute law. But in the arid western United States, where irrigation was necessary for development, the law of prior appropriation for beneficial use-"first in time, first in right"-had legal sanction.* If the principle that Roosevelt had enunciated were actually practiced in the West, then the Colorado would have flowed uninterrupted to Mexico and little if any development could have been made in the United States. Though Downey was unaware of Roosevelt's legal confusion, he did feel that the president failed to "recognize the issues involved" or to
罗斯福关于水资源法的概念并未被科罗拉多河流域各州或墨西哥接受。在东部长雨地区，水资源短缺很少见，这一学说有法律效力。但在干旱的美国西部，灌溉是开发所必需的，因此“先占先用”的法律原则得到了法律认可——“先来先用，先来先有权利”。如果罗斯福提出的这一原则在西部真正得到实施，那么科罗拉多河将不间断地流向墨西哥，美国境内几乎不可能有任何开发。尽管邓尼没有意识到罗斯福在法律上的困惑，但他确实觉得总统未能“认识到问题的本质”或

"meet them." o 1

Despite dissenters like Downey, Roosevelt had the treaty signed and then, in anticipation of the 1944 election campaign, he moved quickly to win Senate approval before Congress ad-journed. But his plans ran into stiff opposition from many who wanted to avoid embarrassing preclection controversy. Particularly concerned were those Colorado Basin senators fávorable to the treaty who hoped to keep it out of politics. Coming from wa-ter-starved areas, they realized that their vote for the treaty ley County Water District, and the Imperial Irrigation District, Chairman of the board since its inception had been Evan Hewes, a tall, blustery man who was neither lawyer nor engineer but whose penetrating mind more than made up for his lack of formal education. Hewes was probably more determined to defeat the treaty than anyone else in California for, besides his job on the board, he was also head of the Imperial Irrigation District, which believed much of its property to be threatened by the treaty.
尽管有反对者如邓尼，罗斯福还是让条约签署，并且在预期的 1944 年选举活动中，他迅速采取行动，在国会休会前赢得了参议院的批准。但他的计划遭到了许多人的强烈反对，这些人希望避免在预选中引起尴尬的争议。特别是那些支持条约的科罗拉多河流域参议员，他们希望将条约排除在政治之外。来自缺水地区的他们意识到，他们为莱克县水资源区和帝国灌溉区委员会主席，自成立以来一直由埃文·休斯担任，他是一位高大、健谈的人，既不是律师也不是工程师，但其敏锐的思维弥补了他缺乏正规教育的不足。休斯可能是加州最想击败该条约的人，除了他在委员会的工作外，他还担任帝国灌溉区的负责人，该区认为其大部分财产都受到条约的威胁。

In planning California's attack, Hewes called upon many, including Arvin Shaw, the state's hard-bitten assistant attorney general; Mike Dowd, the engineer for the ID; and E. F. Scat-tergood and Clay Elder, engineers for the city of Los Angeles and the Metropolitan Water District. Overshadowing them all, however, was formidable Phil Swing, now chief counsel for the San Diego County Water Authority, California's leaders always turned to him whenever a serious situation arose concerning the Colorado. They fully appreciated his familiarity with the historical and legal complexities of the Colorado problem and they realized that Swing's years in Congress had given him a knowledge of polities which would greatly help the state in its battle.
在规划加利福尼亚的攻击时，海维斯召集了许多人，包括加利福尼亚州经验丰富的助理检察长阿文·肖；ID 的工程师迈克·道德；以及洛杉矶市和大都市水务区的工程师 E·F·斯卡特戈德和克莱·埃德勒。然而，所有这些人都被强大的菲尔·斯 wing 所超越，现在他是圣地亚哥县水务局的首席法律顾问。每当加利福尼亚出现与科罗拉多河相关的重要情况时，加利福尼亚的领导人总是会求助于他。他们充分认识到他对科罗拉多河问题的历史和法律复杂性的熟悉，并意识到斯 wing 在国会多年的经验使他具备了对政治问题的深刻理解，这对州政府在与科罗拉多河问题的斗争中将大有裨益。

California's leaders, however, did not launch their attack until the State Department removed the ban of secrecy from the treaty. When this occurred, on February 15, a special strategy meeting was held in Los Angeles, and within a short time the California legislature appropriated $75,000 for publicity and lobbying. Part of those funds financed trips east for envoys who pleaded California's cause among politicians and numerous private interest groups."
加利福尼亚的领导人直到国务院取消条约的保密禁令后才发动攻击。当这一事件于 2 月 15 日发生时，在洛杉矶举行了一次特别策略会议，并在短时间内，加利福尼亚议会拨款 75,000 美元用于宣传和游说。部分资金用于资助使者前往东部，向政治家和众多私人利益集团阐述加利福尼亚的诉求。

Quickly joining the state's political leaders in opposition
加利福尼亚的政治领导人迅速加入反对行列

California's press which roared its displeasure with the
加利福尼亚的媒体大声表达了对

キ

California had been "stabbed in the back" and "sold down river," screamed newspapers throughout the state, while Mexico was getting more water than she had "either a moral or an international right to demand." 19 Taking advantage of the nation's wartime sensitivity, Californians warned that the treaty would strike a "deadly blow" at the country's national security by tak ing water away from southern California's coastal plain-
加利福尼亚被形容为“背后被刺”和“被卖了”，全州的报纸都这样喊叫，而墨西哥获得的水量超过了她“无论是道德上还是国际法上都应要求的份额”。利用国家战时的敏感性，加利福尼亚人警告说，该条约将通过从南加州沿海平原夺取水资源对国家的国家安全造成“致命打击”。

-the na-tion's "front on the Pacific." "America's future security demands the strengthening, not the weakening of this area within the United States."
-该国“太平洋前沿”。“美国未来的安全需要加强而非削弱这一区域。”

These emotional attacks were aided by writers for the Metropolitan Water District and the California Colorado River Board who flooded the state with pamphlets denouncing the treaty. On the back cover of one brochure, containing elaborate colored maps and pictures, was depicted an immense hand, Jabeled "Mexican Treaty," in the act of reaching out to grab southern California homes, industries, and farms. Other publica-tions, though less expressive, warned of the adverse affect the treaty would have upon American farmers and returning veterans of World War II. Mexico's cheap labor, aided by "the excessive amount of water guaranteed by the treaty," would "undersell American farmers using American labor." Especially vulnerable, they declared, were American cotton grows who were already depressed by overproduction and who would be hurt even more by the greater volume of Mexican cotton on the market. Similarly endangered would be the interests of veterans. Thousands of acres had been set aside for homesteading in the Colorado Basin, and legislation was pending to extend those benefits to World War II soldiers. But the treaty would jeopardize the benefits by condemning much of the designated acreage "to remain forever a desert waste." 11
这些情感攻击得到了洛杉矶水区和加利福尼亚科罗拉多河委员会作家的支持，他们向该州散发了大量抨击条约的小册子。在一本小册子的封底，印有复杂的彩色地图和图片，描绘了一个巨大的手，标着“墨西哥条约”，正在伸手抓取南加州的住宅、工业和农场。其他出版物虽然表达得不那么直接，但也警告条约会对美国农民和二战退伍军人产生不利影响。墨西哥的廉价劳动力，加上“条约中保证的大量水资源”，将会“压倒使用美国劳动力的美国农民”。他们宣称，尤其是已经因过度生产而受挫的美国棉花种植者，将会受到更大的打击。同样受到影响的还有退伍军人的利益。在科罗拉多盆地已经划定了数千英亩的土地供移民定居，立法正在考虑将这些福利扩展到二战士兵。 但条约却通过将大量指定的面积“永远荒废下去”，破坏了这些利益。11

California's unrelenting attack on the treaty won converts.
加利福尼亚对条约的持续攻击赢得了支持者。

Many organizations, such as the American Federation of Labor, the Railway Labor Executives' Association, the National Grange, and several regional farm organizations accepted California's arguments almost completely and passed resolutions repeating them.13
许多组织，如美国劳工联合会、铁路劳动执行官协会、全国农会以及几个区域农业组织几乎完全接受了加利福尼亚的论点，并通过决议重申了这些论点。13

电

Alarmed at the vigorous campaign California was conduct-ing, the treaty advocates initiated their own propaganda offensive and soon won over top state officials from Texas and all the Colorado Basin states except California and Nevada. At a conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in July, 1944, they took an important step to buttress their position by creating the Six States Committee, which promptly passed a resolution condemn-ing "the aggressive and unrestrained activities of those whose opposition to the treaty appears to result from a selfish and misguided local action." The charge of selfishness proved to be most popular and was repeated across the country by the newspapers, which denounced Californians as being guilty of "high-pressure special pleading rather than of an objective and balanced weighing of the facts." 13
加州正在进行的积极运动令条约倡导者感到担忧，他们随即展开了自己的宣传攻势，并很快说服了来自德克萨斯州和科罗拉多河盆地除加利福尼亚州和内华达州之外的所有州的顶级官员。1944 年 7 月，在新墨西哥州圣达菲举行的一次会议上，他们为巩固自己的立场采取了重要步骤，成立了六州委员会，并迅速通过了一项谴责“那些反对条约的人的侵略性和不受约束的活动，其反对似乎源于自私和误导的地方行动”的决议。自私的指控证明是最受欢迎的，各地的报纸也纷纷谴责加利福尼亚人“进行高压特殊说辞，而不是客观和平衡地评估事实”。13

Though most critics accused California of "baseless selfish-ness," they gave conflicting and often erroneous reasons for their conclusions. According to Arizona's Governor Sidney Os-burn, "the real reason California is opposing the treaty . . . is the fact that it disrupts that State's carefully laid plans to sell out the entire Colorado River basin for the benefit of Los Angeles financial interests who own about 800,000 acres of land in Mexico that can be irrigated from the Colorado." # Osburn was referring to the Chandler syndicate, most of whose irrigable lands were confiscated by 1938 and the remainder disposed of in 1944.
尽管大多数批评者指责加利福尼亚“无理自私”，但他们给出的理由却相互矛盾且往往错误百出。亚利桑那州州长西德尼·奥伯恩称：“加利福尼亚反对该条约的真实原因……是该州精心策划的将整个科罗拉多河盆地出售给洛杉矶金融利益集团以获利的计划被打乱了。奥伯恩指的是查德纳财团，该财团大部分可灌溉土地在 1938 年被没收，剩余部分则在 1944 年被处置。”

Other critics attributed California's opposition to greed for money. It was not water, they said, but the desire to sell water to Mexico through the Imperial Irrigation District which was the real issue,I Californians, of course, were insistent upon Mexico's paying a delivery rate that would defray part of the expense of the Alamo facilities and the All-American Canal works, but they were also vigorously opposed to the amount of water given Mexico.
其他批评者则认为加利福尼亚反对的原因是贪图金钱。他们说，真正的问题不是水，而是通过帝国灌溉区向墨西哥出售水。当然，加利福尼亚人坚持要求墨西哥支付部分阿连德设施和全美运河工程的费用，但同时他们也强烈反对给墨西哥的水量。

While condemning California, treaty proponents praised the pact as "Fair and equitable." It settled "for all time" the problem with Mexico, but, even more important, it gave Mexico some 300,000 acre-feet less than her present uses and represented shrewd bargaining on the part of American negotiators.18
尽管谴责加利福尼亚，条约支持者们却称赞该条约是“公平和公正的”。它“永久地”解决了与墨西哥的问题，但更重要的是，它使墨西哥减少了大约 30 万英亩-英尺的用水量，并体现了美国谈判者的精明交易。18

Californians were disturbed by the concentrated attack upon their state. To combat this situation, they tried to find addition support in the Colorado Basin in order to show that widespread opposition did exist. The best tactic, reasoned Evan Hewes, would be to call a special meeting of everyone in the basin opposed to the treaty, and he persuaded Nevada's Governor E. P. Carville to issue the invitation. 17
加利福尼亚人对这次针对他们州的集中攻击感到不安。为了应对这种情况，他们试图在科罗拉多河流域寻找额外的支持，以表明广泛反对这一条约的情况确实存在。埃文·休斯认为，最好的策略是召集所有反对条约的流域内人员开会，并说服内华达州的州长 E.P. 卡维尔发出邀请。17

Las Vegas was selected as the site and the meeting convened on January 12, 1945, only ten days before the Senate opened hearings on the treaty. Delegates from all the basin states but New Mexico were in attendance, though upper-basin representation was spotty. Except for Nevada and California, however, no state government was officially represented. It is significant, too, that nearly all the lower basin's actual water users were in at-tendance, even those from Arizona. Several of Arizona's major irrigation districts were represented, including the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association and the Gila Valley Irrigation District, which were pledged to fight the treaty.
拉斯维加斯被选为会场，会议于 1945 年 1 月 12 日召开，距离参议院开始审议条约仅十天。除了新墨西哥州，流域内所有州的代表都出席了会议，但上流域的代表则参差不齐。然而，除了内华达州和加利福尼亚州，没有一个州政府正式代表出席。值得注意的是，几乎流域内所有实际用水者都出席了会议，包括亚利桑那州的几个主要灌溉区，如盐河谷用水者协会和希拉谷灌溉区，它们都承诺要反对该条约。

These Arizonans who opposed the treaty had their own interests at heart. Many simply considered the treaty a giveaway of water needed for their own parched lands. Others denounced it because it would permit Mexico, with her supply of cheap labor, to produce crops that undermined American agriculture.
这些反对条约的亚利桑那人是出于自身利益的考虑。许多人认为该条约是对自己干旱土地所需水资源的一种赠送。另一些人则认为该条约允许墨西哥利用其廉价劳动力生产农产品，从而对美国农业构成威胁，因此予以反对。

Particularly concerned were Gila River farmers, who felt the pact threatened their livelihood in a special way. Though their uses antedated those in Mexico, they were shocked to learn that the treaty "specifically provides that the water allocated to Mexico is the first right on the river ahead of American rights nearly a century old." This provision, they noted with alarm, had accomplished what had "never been done in the history of American jurisprudence, namely, the taking of property without due process of law." Is To overcome their objection they insisted that the Gila be exempted from the terms of the treaty, just as they had earlier urged its exemption from the provisions of the Colorado River Compact.
皮拉拉河农民尤其感到担忧，他们认为该协定以特殊的方式威胁到了他们的生计。尽管他们的用水权早于墨西哥，但他们震惊地得知，该条约“明确规定了墨西哥在河上的用水权优先于美国近一个世纪前的用水权”。他们注意到这一条款令人震惊地实现了“美国司法史上从未有过的事情，即未经正当法律程序剥夺财产”。为了克服这一反对意见，他们坚持要求将皮拉拉河从条约条款中豁免，就像他们之前曾要求将其从科罗拉多河协定条款中豁免一样。

One of the most outspoken of the Arizona dissenters was George E. P. Smith, a professor of agricultural engineering at the University of Arizona. Though he was not present at the Las Vegas meeting, his sentiments were clearly with the opposition and he did a great deal to raise doubts about the evidence on which the treaty was based. Smith questioned the figures on retur how which were published by the treaty advocates. Her also challenged the estimates of river flow before 1922, insisting that they were unreliable and that the actual volume was about 2,000,000 acre-feet less than the government's figures. The er-ror, he declared, was the result of crude stream-gauging equipment and too few gauging stations. I
亚利桑那州反对派中最直言不讳的是乔治·E·P·史密斯教授，他是亚利桑那大学农业工程学教授。尽管他没有出席拉斯维加斯会议，但他的观点显然与反对派一致，并且他做了很多工作来对条约所依据的证据提出质疑。史密斯质疑了条约倡导者公布的回水数据。他还质疑 1922 年之前的河流流量估计，坚持认为这些估计不可靠，实际体积比政府的数据少约 200 万英亩-英尺。他宣称，这种误差是由于粗陋的河流流量测量设备和测量站太少的结果。

With demands greatly in excess of supply, Smith predicted that the shortage would bring a court battle between Arizona and California which would assume epic proportions. In the end, Arizona would lose because no court would take water away from areas under cultivation. Indeed, Smith did not feel that Arizona had much of a case in the first place. "California," he argued, "has clinched its rights to water by means of con-tracts, concerning which there is no controversy. Arizona is in the position of 'remainder-man' and our contract for water is so debatable that the Bureau of Reclamation proposes that it be submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court for interpretations." 29 As Smith saw it, the treaty would completely dash Arizona's hopes of gaining sufficient water to develop the vast acreage in the heart of the state.
鉴于需求远远超过供应，史密斯预测短缺将导致亚利桑那州和加利福尼亚州之间的一场法庭大战，这场大战将具有史诗般的规模。最终，亚利桑那州会输，因为没有任何法庭会从正在耕种的地区夺走水资源。事实上，史密斯认为亚利桑那州一开始就没有多少胜算。“加利福尼亚州，”他争辩说，“通过合同获得了水资源的权利，而这些合同没有争议。亚利桑那州处于‘剩余人’的地位，我们的水资源合同如此有争议，以至于美国土地管理局提议将它提交给美国最高法院进行解释。”29 在史密斯看来，条约将彻底粉碎亚利桑那州获得足够水资源以开发该州中部大片土地的希望。

Though Smith raised some doubts about the wisdom of the treaty, he made no headway with Arizona's top elected officials.
尽管史密斯对条约的智慧提出了一些疑问，但他未能说服亚利桑那州的最高当选官员。

Nevertheless, those Arizonans at the Las Vegas meeting who shared his sentiments found a degree of consolation in the resolution engineered by California's aggressive Arvin Shaw. The mea-sure, which condemned the treaty for its excessive generosity to Mexico, was promptly and unanimously passed by the delegates, who them sent a copy to members of the United States Senate, noting proudly that their condemnation had special significance because it was sanctioned by more than 77 percent of the actual users of Colorado River water.? Although they undoubtedly did speak for many water users (California's presence alone assured that), they offered no convincing argument for why the percentage should be 77 instead of some other figure. Regardless of how representative the Las Vegas meeting was, however, Californians hoped this opposition would strengthen their hand when Senate deliberations began one and a half weeks later.
然而，在拉斯维加斯会议上持有相同看法的亚利桑那州代表在加利福尼亚的阿文·肖推动的决议中找到了一丝慰藉。这项措施谴责条约对墨西哥过于慷慨，决议迅速且一致地得到了代表们的通过，他们将副本发送给美国参议员，并自豪地指出，他们的谴责得到了超过 77%的科罗拉多河水资源实际使用者的批准。尽管他们无疑代表了许多水资源使用者（加利福尼亚的出席本身就保证了这一点），但他们并没有提供令人信服的理由说明为什么百分比应该是 77 而不是其他某个数字。然而，无论拉斯维加斯会议的代表性如何，加利福尼亚人希望这种反对意见能在参议院审议开始一周半后加强他们的立场。

TIT

Rapping slowly for order on January 22, 1945, in the orn Caucus Room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Tom nally announced it was time to consider the "so-called United States-Mexico Water Treaty." His announcement opened hearings that lasted for nearly a month, and during that time more than sixty witnesses appeared, giving testimony that swelled the transcript to more than 1,800 pages. Almost one-third of those appearing were Californians, who were determined to defeat the treaty, but it quickly became obvious that the number of witnesses would not alone turn the tide. A canvass of the Senate evealed overwhelming sympathy for the treaty and spurred Californians to renewed vigor.
1945 年 1 月 22 日，在参议院办公大楼的参议员奥尔纳斯厅宣布，是时候考虑所谓的“美墨水资源条约”了。他的宣布开启了持续近一个月的听证会，期间超过六十名证人出庭作证，使听证会记录膨胀至 1800 多页。几乎三分之一的出庭者是加利福尼亚人，他们决心反对该条约，但很明显，仅靠证人数量无法扭转局势。参议院的民意调查显示，对条约的支持极为广泛，这激发了加利福尼亚人的斗志。

More determined than ever, Evan Hewes and Phil Swing held almost daily strategy meetings with their followers to study the effectiveness of their lobbying. Some were assigned to handing press relations, others to distributing pamphlets and contacting congressmen, and still others to preparing speeches for nators. Little headway was made in writing speeches, however, since the senators considered themselves natural orators and
恩威斯和菲尔·辛格比以往更加坚定，他们几乎每天与支持者举行策略会议，研究游说的有效性。一些人负责处理媒体关系，另一些人负责分发传单和联系国会议员，还有一些人负责为参议员准备演讲稿。然而，在撰写演讲稿方面几乎没有取得进展，因为参议员们认为自己是天生的演说家。

"preferred to work up their own statements.* Not much more success was had by the lobbyists, who encountered much hostil-ity. Clay Elder, an engineer for the Metropolitan Water District and one of the most active agents, recalls that he was thrown out of more congressional offices "than I care to remember." 23 Despite these disappointments, the lobbyists kept up their dogged fight.
"更倾向于自己撰写声明。*说客们也未能取得更多成功，他们遇到了极大的敌意。Metropolitan Water District 的工程师 Clay Elder，作为最活跃的代表之一，回忆说他被赶出了比自己愿意记住的更多的国会办公室。“尽管遭遇了这些挫折，说客们仍然坚持不懈地进行斗争。”23

The going was also difficult for California's senators, particularly for Sheridan Downey on whom fell the burden of the work. Downey received little help from his fellow Californian, Hiram Johnson, an elderly, silver-headed man of seventy-eight who no longer possessed the catlike quickness at cross-examina-tion which had marked his younger days. His mind wandered and his health was so bad that only heroic effort brought him to the hearings. Even then he could barely speak, because a throat affliction had made his voice thin and squeaky. One ob-server, noting the change in the haggard old man, declared that
加州的参议员们也面临着艰难的处境，尤其是 Sheridan Downey，他承担了大部分工作。Downey 几乎没有得到来自同为加州人的 Hiram Johnson 的帮助，Johnson 是一位年近七十八岁的老人，银发飘飘，不再像年轻时那样在交叉询问中敏捷如猫。他的思绪飘忽不定，健康状况极差，只有英雄般的努力才能使他出席听证会。即便如此，他说话也几乎听不清楚，因为喉咙疾病使他的声音变得细弱沙哑。一位观察者注意到这位憔悴老人的变化后，宣称“十年前，Johnson 单枪匹马就能战胜这项条约。”23

"a dozen years ago Johnson would have licked this treaty single-handed. " 23
"十年前，Johnson 单枪匹马就能战胜这项条约。”23

It is doubtful that even a younger Johnson could have defeated the treaty "single-handed." Though California forces were well organized, their opponents were equally vocal and had the added advantage of numbers. The most vigorous supporters of A the treaty in the Senate were Eugene Millikin of Colorado and Thomas Connally of Texas. Millikin, a distinguished man, accepted the opinions of his fellow Coloradoans, Royce Tipton and Clifford Stone, and became a fierce foe of California. Even more formidable was Connally, the tall, handsome chairman of the Senate's powerful Foreign Relations Committee and a member of Congress since 1917. Connally threw his support behind the treaty, which he knew was good for his home state of Texas and which he knew the president had made an administrative meas
即使是年轻的约翰逊也很难单枪匹马地击败这项条约。尽管加利福尼亚的军队组织得很好，但他们的对手同样声势浩大，并且人数众多。参议院中最积极支持该条约的人是科罗拉多州的尤金·米利肯和德克萨斯州的托马斯·康纳利。米利肯是一位杰出的人物，接受了科罗拉多州同胞罗伊塞·蒂普顿和克利福德·斯通的意见，成为了加州的坚定反对者。而康纳利更为强大，他是参议院外交关系委员会的主席，自 1917 年以来一直是国会议员。康纳利全力支持该条约，他知道这对他的家乡德克萨斯州有利，也知道总统已经将其作为行政措施。

ure.
尿。

The heated debate in committee and on the Senate floor covered a wide variety of topics, but it centered primarily on what constituted a fair offer of Colorado River water to Mexico. At issue were four major points: international law, physical conditions on the river, California's contracts, and the meaning of several provisions of the treaty. At first, California and the other treaty opponents confined their remarks on international law to a defense of the Harmon opinion, which, they insisted, had never been formally repudiated. According to it, the United States would be justified in using every drop of Colorado River water.
委员会和参议院 floor 上的激烈辩论涵盖了广泛的话题，但主要集中在向墨西哥提供科罗拉多河水资源是否公平的问题上。争论的焦点有四个主要方面：国际法、河流上的物理条件、加利福尼亚的合同以及条约中若干条款的含义。最初，加利福尼亚和其他条约反对者仅在其关于国际法的评论中捍卫哈蒙的意见，他们坚持认为该意见从未被正式否定。根据该意见，美国有权使用科罗拉多河的每一滴水。

But they did not advocate such a policy; instead, they recom-mended, as they had so often before, that Mexico be given 750,-000 acre-feet, her maximum uses prior to the construction of Hoover Dam. Nor did arbitration pose a threat, they insisted, since the United States could simply refuse to arbitrate, or, if she did accept arbitration, she could reject an unfavorable decision just as she had years before in the Chamizal dispute."* As the pact stood, they argued, it was simply a giveaway, which might have been prevented if the United States had not foolishly consented to consider the Colorado in the same agreement with the Rio Grande.
但他们并没有提倡这样的政策；相反，他们像以前一样建议墨西哥获得 75 万英亩英尺的水量，这是在胡佛大坝建设之前墨西哥的最大用水量。他们坚持认为，仲裁也不会构成威胁，因为美国可以选择不进行仲裁，或者如果接受仲裁，她也可以像在查米扎尔争端中那样拒绝不利的裁决。“按照条约的规定，他们认为，这只是一个单方面给予，如果美国没有愚蠢地同意将科罗拉多河纳入与格兰德河的同一协议中，这种情况本来是可以避免的。”

Treaty advocates convincingly undermined California's reliance on the Harmon opinion, however, by producing more than forty water treaties that were at variance with it. Examples, other than treaties, were also cited. The writings of many Ameri-can, German, French, Italian, and English legal experts also repudiated the doctrine. It had even been rejected in 1907 by the United States Supreme Court when Colorado sought to invoke it against Kansas,3
然而，条约倡导者通过提供与哈蒙意见相矛盾的超过四十项水条约，有力地削弱了加利福尼亚对哈蒙意见的依赖。除了条约之外，还引用了其他例子。许多美国、德国、法国、意大利和英国的法律专家的著作也否定了这一学说。甚至在 1907 年，当科罗拉多州试图在与堪萨斯州的争端中引用这一学说时，美国最高法院就已经否决了这一学说。

Froponents of the treaty mest marde stiort work of CaltfornP2
条约的支持者必须做出更多努力来驳倒加利福尼亚的观点

stand on arbitration. Though State Department officials were careful not to say anything that might prove embarrassing if the treaty should be rejected, they strongly implied that American refusal to arbitrate or to abide by an arbitration decision would be inconceivable. Tom Connally voiced a similar senti-ment, shared by many senators, when he blasted California's position with a single question: "In view of our leadership in establishing international machinery for conciliation and arbitra-fion and a world peace organization, could we stand in the face the public opinion of the world and refuse to agree to some. kind of arbitration?" 20
坚持仲裁。尽管国务院官员在措辞上非常谨慎，以免如果条约被否决时显得尴尬，但他们强烈暗示美国拒绝仲裁或不遵守仲裁裁决是不可想象的。汤姆·康纳利表达了类似的观点，许多参议员都持这种看法，他用一个问题抨击加利福尼亚州的立场：“鉴于我们在建立国际调停和仲裁机制以及世界和平组织方面所扮演的领导角色，我们能否面对全世界的舆论而拒绝接受某种形式的仲裁？”

As an added argument, the treaty advocates maintained that least eleven of the treaties they had cited were similar to the Colorado situation and established a precedent that an arbitra-on tribunal would undoubtedly follow: the recognition of existing uses. Despite this well-established principle, the American negotiators had succeeded in obtaining a treaty that gave Mexico even less than her existing uses. The treaty granted Mexico 1,500,000 acre-feet, but in 1943, the year before the agreement was signed, Mexico had used more than 1,800,000 ace-feet. Consequently, they concluded, the pact represented a lesser amount than would be awarded Mexico in a future treaty ne-gotiation. For Mexico, in bringing her vast lands under cultiva-tion, might eventually establish uses for as much as 5,000,000 acre-feet. Obviously, if the Senate did not accept the treaty and limit Mexican water uses, the United States would be compelled to surrender even more water.?
作为额外的论据，条约倡导者认为他们所引用的至少十一项条约与科罗拉多的情况相似，并确立了一个先例：仲裁法庭肯定会遵循：承认现有用途的原则。尽管这一原则已经确立，美国谈判者还是成功地争取到了一项条约，该条约给予墨西哥的水量甚至少于她的现有用途。条约授予墨西哥 1,500,000 英亩-英尺，但 1943 年，在协议签署前一年，墨西哥的用水量已超过 1,800,000 英亩-英尺。因此，他们得出结论，该条约所规定的水量比未来条约谈判中给予墨西哥的水量要少。对于墨西哥来说，随着她广阔的土地被开垦，最终可能会为多达 5,000,000 英亩-英尺的用水量建立用途。显然，如果参议院不接受该条约并限制墨西哥的用水量，美国将被迫放弃更多的水资源。

These arguments and the State Department's array of evidence taught Californians the futility of relying on Harmon's opinion. They had to admit that even their willingness to give Mexico any water at all was not in strict adherence with Har-mon's principles. But, regardless of legal considerations, they insisted that equity was on their side, and they turned for support to geography and to the treaties cited by the State Depart.
这些论点和国务院提供的证据让加利福尼亚人认识到，依赖哈蒙的意见是徒劳的。他们不得不承认，即使他们愿意给墨西哥任何水量，也并未严格遵守哈蒙的原则。但无论从法律角度来看如何，他们坚持认为公平站在他们这边，并转向地理和国务院引用的条约寻求支持。

ment.
意见。

None of the treaties, they observed, had recognized water usage made possible by the money and facilities of another country, yet the present treaty would do just that. Before con-
他们指出，现有的条约都没有承认其他国家的资金和设施所可能带来的水资源使用，而现在的条约却会这样做。在此之前

struction of Hoover Darm, testitfed Cialformiais Alke Dowde2
Hoover Dam 的结构，测试 Cialformiais Alke Dowde

Mexico could not have used more than 750,000 acre-feet or irrigated more than 200,000 acres on a permanent basis because of the foods and enormous silt load. And, since geography had denied her any dam sites of her own to control the river, she should be given no more than what she could have used from the "natural flow" of the river prior to Hoover Dam. Moreover, continued Dowd, there was no reason to fear that Mexico would build up her uses if the treaty were rejected. Because of silt and scouring conditions it would be impossible for Mexico to maintain diversions without constructing a dam, or weir, along the Arizona-Mexico boundary. But no works could be constructed there without American permission, as they would be located partly in the United States and would also violate the navigation provisions of the boundary treaties. Obviously, concluded Dowd,
墨西哥不可能使用超过 75 万英亩-英尺的水量或永久性灌溉超过 20 万英亩的土地，因为有泥沙负荷。而且，由于地理条件没有给她提供自己的大坝位置来控制河流，她应该只能使用在霍普金斯大坝之前从“自然流量”中获得的水量。此外，道德继续说道，如果条约被否决，墨西哥没有理由增加其用水量。由于泥沙和冲刷条件，墨西哥在美墨边界修建水坝或拦水坝以维持引水是不可行的。但是，由于这些工程部分位于美国境内，也会违反边界条约中的航行条款，因此没有美国的许可，墨西哥无法在那里修建任何工程。显然，道德总结道，

"Mexico is the one requiring a treaty on the Colorado River, not the United States." 28
是墨西哥而不是美国需要与科罗拉多河相关的条约。28

Though Dowd's assessment seemed plausible, it was seriously weakened in the eyes of many by rebuttal testimony from Royce Tipton. Mexico could have irrigated more than 200,000 acres before Hoover Dam, argued Tipton, and to prove his point he turned some of Dowd's own testimony against him. He uncovered a statement made by Dowd to a Senate committee in 1925 in which the California engineer had expressed fear that Mexico could put more than 300,000 acres into crops.*
虽然道德的评估看似合理，但许多人的观点被罗伊塞·蒂普顿的反驳证词严重削弱。蒂普顿认为，在胡佛大坝之前，墨西哥可以灌溉超过 200,000 英亩的土地。为了证明这一点，他将道德自己的证词反过来用。他发现道德曾在 1925 年向参议院委员会发表的声明中表示担心墨西哥可以将超过 300,000 英亩的土地用于种植。

Though Tipton said nothing about it, there was other evidence that tended to discredit Dowd's position. None of the studies made by government engineers before construction of the dam supported Dowd's claims about Mexico's acreage limita-tions. Indeed, several estimated the irrigable area at close to 1,000,000 acres. Even the study conducted and participated in by Dowd prior to the futile 1929 negotiations with Mexico mentioned no such limitation. Though the 1929 study acknowledged the flood and silt threat to Mexico, it estimated the irrigable area at 340,000 acres. Moreover, if certain corrective measures were taken, then the estimate would increase to more than 500,-000 acres. But, even if Dowd were correct and Mexico could not have irrigated more than 200,000 acres on a permanent basis, she could have irrigated much more on a temporary basis. Considerable acreage could be cultivated -as was being done in areas where Alood or silt conditions might eventually force detA porary curtailment.» In this way, the Mexicans could have sig nificantly increased their uses. And this possibility constituted an important consideration, for, in the treaty of 1906 and in subsequent negotiations, the United States had offered Mexico her maximum, not her average or minimum, uses.
尽管蒂普顿对此只字未提，但其他证据却倾向于驳斥道德的观点。在大坝建设之前，政府工程师进行的任何研究都没有支持道德关于墨西哥土地限制的说法。事实上，有些研究估计可灌溉面积接近 100 万英亩。甚至在 1929 年与墨西哥无果的谈判之前，由道德进行并参与的研究也没有提到这样的限制。1929 年的研究虽然承认了洪水和淤泥对墨西哥的威胁，但估计可灌溉面积为 34 万英亩。而且，如果采取某些纠正措施，估计面积将增加到超过 50 万英亩。但即使道德的说法正确，墨西哥也不能永久灌溉超过 20 万英亩，她仍然可以在临时基础上灌溉更多。在可能因洪水或淤泥条件最终被迫暂停耕作的地区，可以耕种相当多的面积。通过这种方式，墨西哥人可以显著增加他们的使用量。 这种可能性构成了一个重要考虑，因为在 1906 年的条约以及随后的谈判中，美国向墨西哥提供的是一国的最大用水量，而不是平均用水量或最小用水量。

Tipton also challenged another of Dowd's arguments, that Mexico could not have used more than 750,000 acre-feet before Hoover Dam because there had been no more water than that available for Mexico from the "natural fow" until American reclamation works had regulated the river. Tipton deftly destroyed this argument by again drawing attention to some of California's own evidence. According to the ID's records, about 13,000,000 acre-feet had been diverted into the Alamo Canal dur-ling the thirteen-year period before Hoover Dam. Because the concession of 1904 was then in effect, Mexico could have demanded half, or 1,500,000 aere-feet-the same volume granted her by the treatv! 81 The concession may have been too generous to Mexico, and certainly the United States was not bound by it since the government had not contracted it. But the fact remained that individual Americans had agreed to it and, in gen-eral, had abided by it for more than forty years. This fact might have influenced an arbitration tribunal.
Tipton 还挑战了 Dowd 的另一个论点，即在 Hoover 大坝建成之前，墨西哥不可能使用超过 75 万英亩·英尺的水量，因为在此之前墨西哥从“自然流量”中获得的水量从未超过这个数量，直到美国的整治工程才调节了河流。Tipton 精妙地摧毁了这一论点，再次强调了加利福尼亚方面的一些证据。根据 ID 的记录，在 Hoover 大坝建成前的十三年期间，大约有 1.3 亿英亩·英尺的水量被引向了阿尔莫运河。由于 1904 年的让渡协议仍然有效，墨西哥可以要求获得一半，即 150 万英亩·英尺——与条约中授予她的水量相同！81 这个让渡协议可能对墨西哥过于慷慨，而且美国政府也没有签订这一协议，因此美国并不受其约束。但事实是，个人美国人已经同意了这一协议，并且在一般情况下已经遵守了它超过四十年。这一事实可能会影响仲裁法庭。

Tipton had touched a vital point and those Californians familiar with Colorado River history knew it. They shifted uneasily in their chairs as they recalled their crusade to free the Imperial Valley from the 1904 contract by building the All-American Canal. A major reason behind the agitation had been simply fear that Mexico might someday demand half the diverted water, thus depriving American lands. Only depressed economic conditions in agriculture, argued the Mexicans, and concentration on summer crops, like cotton, to the virtual exclusion of winter crops, prevented their country from exercising the option.
蒂 pton 触及到了一个关键点，那些熟悉科罗拉多河历史的加利福尼亚人对此深有体会。他们在椅子上不安地挪动，回忆起他们为了解除 1904 年的合同，将帝国谷从科罗拉多河中解放出来而修建全美运河的斗争。这场斗争的主要原因之一仅仅是担心墨西哥将来可能会要求分得分流的水量的一半，从而剥夺美国的土地。墨西哥人认为，只有农业经济条件的恶化，以及专注于夏季作物（如棉花）的种植，几乎完全忽略了冬季作物，才阻止了他们的国家行使这一权利。

In short, the only reason Mexico had not used more than 750,000 acre-feet before Hoover Dam, contended the treaty advocates, was economic conditions, not geographic obstacles over which she had no control. The dam may have aided Mexican agricultural expansion, but it was not the sine qua non of expansion.
简言之，条约倡导者认为，墨西哥在胡佛大坝之前没有使用超过 75 万英亩·英尺的唯一原因，是经济条件，而不是她无法控制的地理障碍。大坝可能有助于墨西哥农业的发展，但并不是其发展的必要条件。

Moreover, Mexico's claim that economic conditions had been
此外，墨西哥声称经济条件

Ніе поінт бови вин во солити оку дія четы об ст рно код
无点波伊在溶基欧克迪亚四特中发现这样的缺陷

the 1929 negotiations. Mexico's cultivated area, concluded that study, was "subject . . . primarily, to the price of cotton and general economic conditions." a To be sure, Mexico did benefit from Hoover Dam; more water was available during summer and floods were curbed. But she had not sought those benefits without offering something in return. She had tried to participate in the negotiations for the Colorado River Compact and, in 1929, she had inquired about sharing the expense of Hoover Dam, only to be rebuffed.
1929 年的谈判。该研究得出结论，墨西哥的耕种面积“主要受棉花价格和一般经济条件的影响。”确实，墨西哥确实受益于胡佛大坝；夏季有更多的水资源可用，洪水也被遏制。但她并非不付出代价就获得了这些好处。她曾试图参与科罗拉多河协定的谈判，并在 1929 年询问是否可以分担胡佛大坝的费用，但遭到拒绝。

Tipton also disagreed with Dowd's contention that physical conditions would make it impossible for Mexico to increase her uses if the treaty were rejected. "It would be perfectly practi-cable," Tipton declared, "for Mexico to make a cut in the bank of the river immediately below the upper boundary and to divert substantial quantities of water under present conditions." as Although such diversion attempts would be difficult because of scouring, which lowered the bed of the river, Tipton did not think this constituted a serious obstacle. "There might be a little area lost near the point of diversion," he admitted, but it would still be possible "to cover a very substantial area" because "the land slopes rapidly away from the river," thus facilitating a gravity diversion. Tipton also strongly suggested that Mexico's irrigation attempts would be aided by the All-American Canal desilting works. When those works went into full operation, they might cause a rise in the riverbed "opposite a practical point of diversion for Mexico," thereby offsetting the effects of scouring. Though the Senate could not know with certainty whether Tipton was correct- -only rejection of the treaty could reveal that--neither could it disprove his predictions.
Tipton 也不同意道德的观点，认为如果条约被拒绝，墨西哥增加用水将变得不可能。Tipton 声称：“在条约被拒绝的情况下，墨西哥完全可以在河口上方边界下方的河岸处挖渠，并在目前条件下分流大量水资源。”尽管由于冲刷作用，河床会降低，使得这种分流尝试变得困难，但 Tipton 并不认为这构成严重障碍。“可能会有一些区域在分流点附近损失一些土地，”他承认，但仍然可以“覆盖一个非常大的区域”，因为“土地从河流处迅速倾斜”，这有利于重力分流。Tipton 还强烈建议，墨西哥的灌溉尝试将得益于全美运河的清淤工程。当这些工程全面投入运行时，可能会在墨西哥实际的分流点处提高河床，从而抵消冲刷作用的影响。 尽管参议院无法确定提顿是否正确——只有否决条约才能证明这一点——但它也无法反驳他的预测。

IV
四

As Californians watched their opponents gain strength, they redoubled their efforts, singled out other areas for attack, and hoped to find a flaw serious enough to destroy the entire treaty.
当加利福尼亚人看到对手变得越来越强大时，他们加倍努力，针对其他领域进行攻击，并希望找到一个足以摧毁整个条约的重大缺陷。

Sheridan Downey believed he had found such a defect in the State Department's contention that Mexico was using 1,800,000
赖肖尔·唐尼认为他在国务院关于墨西哥使用 1,800,000 的说法中发现了一个缺陷

acre-fect. The assertion represented a strong psychological 包2
acre-fect。该断言代表了一个强烈的心理学影响。包 2

equitable argument in favor of the pact, and Downey did h best to undermine it by attacking the testimony of Lawrence Lawson, the principal American negotiator, who was responsible for it. At first Lawson maintained that his estimate was based on the work of several men, including an American engineer on the International Boundary Commission. But under Downey's sharp cross-examination he gave way and admitted that the information was supplied by an American engineer, who had consulted Mexican officials, and the Anderson, Clayton Company, an American concern dependent on Mexican cotton agriculture. This revela-ion made Downey lash out angrily: "It seems to me extraor-dinary, almost beyond characterization, that a representative of he . . . State Department would come in here on a crucial and highly disputed fact of this case and finally, after . . . cross examination . . . admit that all of his facts come from Mexican sources and none from sources in the United States." "Do we in California," he asked, "have to have our rights bartered away-bartered away by men who have no interest in our concern?* a Downey's bitter blast had little impact on the Senate. Un-doubtedly, the major reason was that Californians themselves estimated Mexico's uses at about 1,400,000 aere-feet, considerably less than the State Department's figure, but only 100,000 acre-feet less than the amount allocated by the treaty." Nevertheless, Californians pounced on Lawson's admission as a betrayal of American interests, a threat to their water contracts, and a major reason for the treaty's excessive drain on the river.
支持条约的公平论据，邓尼试图通过攻击主要美国谈判代表劳伦斯·劳森的证词来削弱这一论据，劳森负责该条约。起初，劳森坚称他的估计是基于几位人士的工作，包括国际边界委员会的一名美国工程师。但在邓尼尖锐的交叉询问下，他最终承认信息是由一名美国工程师提供的，该工程师咨询了墨西哥官员以及安德森-克雷顿公司，该公司依赖墨西哥棉花农业。这一揭露使邓尼愤怒地爆发：“在我看来，这几乎是无法描述的，一个……国务院的代表竟然在本案中一个至关重要的且争议极大的事实面前来到这里，经过……交叉询问……最终承认他的所有信息都来自墨西哥来源，而没有任何信息来自美国来源。”“加利福尼亚的我们，”他问道，“难道要让我们的权利被那些对我们毫无兴趣的人出卖吗？”*邓尼的猛烈抨击对参议院几乎没有影响。 毫无疑问，主要原因在于加利福尼亚人自己估计墨西哥的用水量约为 140 万英亩英尺，这比国务院的估计数字要少得多，但比条约中分配的水量只少了 10 万英亩英尺。“然而，加利福尼亚人抓住劳森的承认作为背叛美国利益、威胁他们水资源合同以及条约对河流过度榨取的主要原因。”

As California's concern about her contracts mounted, she intensified her attack. The treaty, her representatives contended,
当加利福尼亚对她的合同越来越担忧时，她加强了攻击。她的代表认为，

"would flatly violate" the Boulder Canyon Act, which had specified that the waters impounded by Hoover Dam were to be used
“将直接违反”布卢姆峡谷法案，该法案明确规定，由霍普金斯大坝拦截的水应“仅用于美国境内”。

"exclusively within the United States." Acting on this assumption, they had negotiated their contracts and undertaken costly investments to bring water to their coastal plain. It was also on this assumption, they declared, that California had agreed to limit her use of Colorado River water in order to obtain the six-state compact.36
基于这一假设，他们谈判了合同并进行了昂贵的投资以将水引入他们的沿海平原。他们还宣称，正是基于这一假设，加利福尼亚同意限制其对科罗拉多河水资源的使用，以换取六州协议。

These assertions were directly challenged by the treaty proponents who brushed them aside by pointing out that the act as wollas die contend , cartel it proving contine, bes), asserted, clearly "recognized the possibility, if not the probabil-ity, of the future allocation of water to Mexico." «7 It had provided that, in the event of a treaty, Mexico's burden would be supplied by the surplus water, not allocated by the compact, and, if that was not enough, then the remaining burden should be shared equally by each basin. Though Californians had to admit that their contracts were subject to this important provision,they continued to insist that the United States should first honor its obligations at home before helping Mexico.
这些断言直接被条约倡导者反驳，他们指出，该条约条款明确“承认未来向墨西哥分配水资源的可能性，尽管不是必然性”。【7】条约规定，在达成条约的情况下，墨西哥的负担将由剩余的水资源提供，而不是由协议分配，如果这还不够，剩余的负担应由每个流域平均分担。尽管加利福尼亚人不得不承认他们的合同受此重要条款的约束，他们仍然坚持认为，美国应该首先在国内履行其义务，然后再帮助墨西哥。

Heightening California's concern over her contracts was government testimony about the future water supply, which confirmed her worst fears. Bureau of Reclamation experts predicted that, during a future dry decade, such as that between 1931 and 1940, releases from Hoover Dam would be less than 7,000,000 acre-feet. This amount would not be enough to satisfy the lower-basin demands, totaling 8,462,000 acre-feet, much less the additional Mexican burden of 1,500,000 acre-feet. Though the shortage could be temporarily met by extra releases from Hoover Dam storage, there would be no water for California's contracts for surplus water. Moreover, the drawdown on storage would result in power losses and, if the drought lasted for fifteen years, the reservoir would be exhausted.? As a partial safeguard against such an eventuality, treaty opponents vainly urged that Mexico's share be made dependent on the river's average flow and not be an absolute grant.
加利福尼亚对她的合同越来越担心，因为政府关于未来供水的证词证实了她最坏的恐惧。美国灌溉局的专家预测，在未来的一个干旱十年，比如 1931 年至 1940 年期间，胡佛大坝的放水量将少于 7,000,000 英亩-英尺。这一数量不足以满足下盆地的需求，总计 8,462,000 英亩-英尺，更不用说额外的墨西哥负担 1,500,000 英亩-英尺。尽管短缺可以通过额外释放胡佛大坝的存储来暂时解决，但将没有水来满足加利福尼亚的过剩水合同。此外，存储的抽水会导致电力损失，如果干旱持续十五年，水库将耗尽。? 作为这种可能性的部分防范措施，条约反对者徒劳地建议墨西哥的份额应取决于河流的平均流量，而不是绝对的赠予。

While California was anxious about the effect of the treaty on her contracts, she knew that the exact amount of water available to her would depend on the outcome of her dispute with Arizona. Whatever the result, however, Californians felt they would be hit first and hardest, and settlement of the controversy would only determine the severity of the blow. Those Arizonans who opposed the treaty were also alarmed by the threat of future droughts. Many believed California would be able to secure water for all her contracts, in spite of her self-limitation act, if she increased her uses to the extent of the contracts.
加利福尼亚州对条约对她合同的影响感到焦虑，但她知道她可以获得的水资源量将取决于她与亚利桑那州的争端结果。无论结果如何，加利福尼亚人感觉他们将首先并且最严重地受到影响，而争议的解决只会确定打击的严重程度。反对条约的亚利桑那人也担心未来可能出现的干旱。许多人认为，如果加利福尼亚增加用水量以满足合同要求，即使她有自我限制法案，她也能确保所有合同的用水需求。

While opponents dwelt on the threat posed by future droughts, the advocates of the treaty emphasized the alleged future availability of water. They cited figures to show that the average flow since the late nineteenth century had been about 18,000,000 acre-feet.? Though this estimate was taken from un reliable data and ignored the significance of past droughts, the treaty advocates were clever enough to bolster their argument by focusing on two other considerations: the treaty provision for extraordinary drought and the return flow. In doing so, they ran into formidable opposition.State Department witnesses roundly insisted that there was adequate treaty protection against drought. An important clause had been provided, they contended, for circumstances, such as extraordinary drought and accidents, which made it "difficult" for the United States to deliver Mexico her water. During such critical times, Mexico's allotment would be decreased proportionately "as consumptive uses in the United States are reduced." At the Committee of Fourteen meetings, Californians had assailed the provision, claiming it was imprecise and impractical. Some treaty advocates had agreed with the Californians at that time, but now they claimed there was no uncertainty. The operation of the provision, similar to one in the 1906 treaty with Mexico, was simple. If a drought should occur in the United States, then Mexico's uses would be curtailed in the same proportion as those in the United States. The meaning and execution of the provision were in American hands, they explained. "Any actual determination will be made here in the United States, because here is where the records are kept and here is where the water is." More. over, they asserted, such a drought "does not have to occur simultaneously in all portions of the basin. It is sufficient if it occurs in any portion and results in the curtailment of usage." 19 Though the explanation was plausible, the treaty did not explicitly say what the State Department claimed it did. When asked about the lack of precision, department spokesmen did not have a good answer. Indeed, they eventually admitted that the treaty negotiators had made no attempt to agree on the meaning of "extraordinary drought" or on who was to decide when such a drought had occurred. They assumed that the United States could do these things. This naive approach to treaty making surprised many who had otherwise shown a favorable disposition toward the treaty. Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr., was particularly
尽管反对者强调未来干旱带来的威胁，条约的支持者则强调未来水资源的所谓可获得性。他们引用数据表明，自十九世纪末以来的平均流量约为 18000000 英亩英尺。虽然这一估计来自不可靠的数据，并且忽视了过去干旱的重要性，但条约的支持者通过关注两个其他因素巧妙地加强了他们的论点：条约中的非常干旱条款和回流。因此，他们在这一点上遇到了强大的反对。国务院的证人坚决认为条约提供了足够的干旱保护。他们声称，已经提供了一个重要条款，用于应对诸如非常干旱和事故等情形，这些情形使得“难以”向墨西哥交付美国的水资源。在十四人委员会会议上，加利福尼亚人抨击了这一条款，认为它不精确且不切实际。 当时一些条约倡导者曾同意加利福尼亚人的观点，但现在他们声称没有不确定性。该条款的运作方式类似于 1906 年与墨西哥签订的条约中的一项条款，非常简单。如果美国发生干旱，墨西哥的用水量将按照与美国相同的比例减少。他们解释说，该条款的意义和执行都在美国手中。“任何实际的决定将在美国作出，因为记录和水资源都保存在美国。”此外，他们还声称，这种干旱“不一定同时发生在盆地的所有部分。只要在任何部分发生并导致用水量减少，就足够了。”尽管解释听起来合理，但条约并没有明确说明国务院所声称的内容。当被问及缺乏精确性时，国务院发言人没有给出好的回答。事实上，他们最终承认，条约谈判者并没有试图就“异常干旱”的含义达成一致，也没有确定谁有权决定是否发生了这样的干旱。 他们认为美国能够做到这些事情。这种对待条约的态度让许多原本对条约持积极态度的人感到惊讶。罗伯特·拉福莱特 Jr. 参议员尤其

outspoken: “I cannot quite understand, frankly, why there W心A
直言不讳地说，我确实不太理解为什么会有这种情况

not a full meeting of the minds of the negotiators . . . or at least an understanding between those who did negotiate it on the part of the respective countries as to exactly how this drought clause would operate." a
谈判者之间并没有完全达成一致……或者说，至少各国参与谈判的人在这一点上并没有完全理解干旱条款将如何运作。

Attention was also focused on the important question of re-turn flow. The fow of this water into Mexico, treaty advocates maintained, would be so great that most Mexican water would be taken from it. For support they turned to impressive statistics from the Bureau of Reclamation, which estimated the return flow, together with smaller amounts of other drainage and waste waters, at about 1,000,000 acre-feet. Consequently, of the 1,500,-000 acre-feet allocated to Mexico, two-thirds would be primarily return flow-water already used at least once by the United States 48
也注意到了返流水流这一重要问题。条约倡导者认为，这种水流进入墨西哥的数量将会非常大，以至于大部分墨西哥的水都将来自这里。他们援引了灌溉局令人印象深刻的统计数据，该数据估计返流水流，加上其他排水和废水的较小数量，约为 100 万英亩-英尺。因此，在分配给墨西哥的 150 万英亩-英尺中，三分之二主要是已经至少被美国使用过一次的返流水。

Californians immediately realized the significance of this argument for, if true, it meant that the treaty was giving Mexico little more than she would receive in the natural course of events.
加利福尼亚人立刻意识到了这一论点的重要性，如果属实，这意味着条约实际上给予墨西哥的远没有她本应在自然进程中获得的多。

Clay Elder, an engineer for southern California's Metropolitan Water District, had withering scorn for the government's return-flow appraisal: "Never was so much baloney made out of a little bull. . . . The estimates by anyone,"
Clay Elder，南加州 Metropolitan Water District 的一名工程师，对政府的回用水评估充满了嘲讽：“从未有如此多的胡说八道出自一点事实。……任何人的估计”，

" explained Elder, "by me,
"由长老解释，"由我，

by Government witnesses, or by anyone else . . . are so specula-tive, so premature, before the projects that are counted on to produce such return flow are even well planned, that to approve this treaty on the basis of those speculative guesses is just fan-tastic." 43
无论政府证人，还是其他人……这些估计都是如此推测性的，如此不成熟的，在那些预计会产生回流水的项目甚至还没有周密规划之前，基于这些推测性的猜测批准这一条约简直是荒谬的。”43

Elder believed the return flow would never be very much, perhaps no more than 250,000 acre-feet, because Arizona, where most of it would originate, was too water-starved to permit much drainage water to escape. Elder found support for his belief in statements made by Arizona's Senator Ernest McFarland.
老德认为回流水不会很多，也许不会超过 25 万英亩英尺，因为大部分回流水源自的亚利桑那州水资源匮乏，无法允许太多排水水流出。老德在他的信念中得到了亚利桑那州参议员厄内斯特·麦克法兰所作声明的支持。

A former judge experienced in water suits, MeFarland believed that even the highly saline water might be turned onto the land.
一位有水讼经验的前法官梅法兰认为，即使盐分很高的水也可以被用于灌溉土地。

"Arizona will use that water," he asserted, "because we have so much more land that could be irrigated than we have water with which to irrigate."' To complete his argument, Elder couched upon a number of problems that would undoubtedly BR fect return fow. He noted, in passing, that water not used Arizona could be pumped into the All-American Canal for use in the Imperial Valley. Furthermore, in dry seasons, when water would become particularly dear, there would be less diverted onto American lands and, consequently, less drainage would reach Mexico.
“亚利桑那州会使用那水，”他断言，“因为我们有比可用的灌溉用水多得多的土地。”为了完成他的论点，老德列举了一些肯定会妨碍回流水的问题。他顺便指出，亚利桑那州未使用的水可以被泵入美国大河运河用于帝国谷的灌溉。此外，在干旱季节，当水变得特别昂贵时，流向美国土地的水量会减少，因此流入墨西哥的排水量也会减少。

Spearheading the Senate opposition to the government's re-turn-flow estimate was Sheridan Downey, who tried by relentless ross-examination to get the treaty advocates to modify their figure. He drew finally from Royce Tipton the concession that the United States would probably be able to reclaim all but 730,-000 acre-feet of the return fow. Tipton admitted further that the only thing that would prevent Amerieans from reclaiming even more would be the poor quality of the remainder. This wa-fer, because of heavy prior use for irrigation, would be too saline for most crops. Rather than use it, Tipton felt that it should be allowed to flow downstream, thus helping the United States fulfill its treaty obligation to Mexico. The United States, he and his cohorts insisted, "will get credit for any water" reaching Mexico so long as it conformed to the treaty schedules.
带头反对政府回流估计的参议院议员是舍琳·唐尼，他通过不懈的交叉询问试图让条约倡导者修改他们的数据。最终，他从罗伊塞·蒂普顿那里得到了承认，美国很可能能够收回除 73 万英亩-英尺之外的所有回流。蒂普顿还承认，唯一阻止美国人收回更多水的原因是剩余部分的质量较差。由于之前大量用于灌溉，这部分水的盐分过高，不适合大多数作物。蒂普顿认为，与其使用这部分水，不如让它顺流而下，这样有助于美国履行与墨西哥的条约义务。美国及其同僚坚持认为，“只要符合条约时间表，任何到达墨西哥的水都将获得信用。”

Downey, seriously doubting that the United States could get away with giving Mexico unusable water, questioned Tipton closely on this point.
Downey 对美国能否逃避向墨西哥提供无法使用的水的责任表示严重怀疑，因此详细询问了蒂普顿这一点。

"Is there any statement in the treaty as to the quality of water that must be delivered by the United States to Mexico?"
“条约中是否有关于美国必须向墨西哥提供的水质的规定？”

"We are protected on the quality, sir," quickly responded Tipton. Downey saw an opening and his next question came right to the point.
"我们保证质量，先生，"蒂普顿迅速回答道。唐尼发现了机会，他的下一个问题直接切中要害。

"You would mean by that statement that we could perform the terms of our treaty with Mexico by delivering to her water that would not be usable?"
“你这么说的意思是，我们可以通过交付无法使用的水来履行与墨西哥的条约条款吗？”

"Yes, sir," answered Tipton, without a moment's hesitation.
“是的，先生，”蒂普顿毫不犹豫地回答道。

"And you think," asked Downey, as he pressed his examina-tion, "that some court in the future would uphold that kind of interpretation, that we could satisfy in whole or in part our obligation to Mexico under this treaty of delivering 1,500,000 acre-feet of water, even though some or all of it were not usable for irrigation purposes?"
“而你认为，”唐尼继续追问，“未来的某个法庭会支持这样的解释，即我们可以通过交付 150 万英亩·英尺的水来履行与墨西哥的条约义务，即使其中一些或全部水无法用于灌溉？”

Tipton remained adamant. "That is my interpretation of
蒂顿坚持说道：“这是我对于条约的解释，先生。”

the treaty, sir. he replied. “During the negotiations, that question was argned stremuously. Nemoranda passed back and forP2
在谈判过程中，这个问题争论得很激烈。内莫兰达在谈判期间来回传递，表明意图。将语言加入条约是为了涵盖那种情况，并且仅涵盖那种情况。”43

during negotiations indicate what the intent was. Language was placed in the treaty to cover that situation and to cover only that situation." 43
在谈判期间的交流表明了意图。条约中加入了语言来涵盖那种情况，并且仅涵盖那种情况。”43

The language to which Tipton referred appeared in several provisions stipulating that Mexicos allotment would come "from any and all sources," would be "for any purpose whatsoever." and would be "made up of the waters of the said river, whatever their origin." 46 There is no evidence, however, other than Tip-ton's testimony, that the provisions were inserted "to cover only" the question of water quality. The memoranda to which he referred are now missing. Moreover, after additional questioning, he admitted that the Mexican negotiators had signed no such memoranda. Even so, Downey tried to have them entered into evidence, but his request served only to irritate the chairman, Connally, who replied sharply: "The Chair will consult with the [State Department. He does not care to be catechized about what he is going to do."* Connally may have consulted with the State Department, but he did not produce the documents.
Tipton 所指的语言出现在几项规定中，规定墨西哥的份额将来自“任何和所有来源”，用途为“任何目的”，并且将由“所述河流的水，无论其来源”组成。46 然而，除了 Tipton 的证词外，没有任何证据表明这些规定是为了“仅涵盖”水质问题而插入的。他所指的备忘录现在已丢失。此外，在进一步的询问后，他承认墨西哥谈判代表并未签署此类备忘录。即便如此，Downey 仍试图将它们作为证据提交，但他的请求仅使主席 Connally 感到不悦，Connally 烦躁地回应道：“主席将与国务院商议此事。他不想被问及他将要做什么。”Connally 可能与国务院进行了商议，但他并未提供这些文件。

The available evidence seems to suggest that the words
可用的证据似乎表明，这些词语

"from any and all sources" and "waters . . . whatever their ori-gin" were inserted primarily to give the United States maximum credit for the return flow and only indirectly, if at all, to cover the question of quality. Some return flow would enter the river above the boundary; some would enter below the California border along the 20-mile stretch where the river forms the common boundary between Arizona and Mexico; and some, the drainage water from the Yuma project, would never enter the river, but would flow instead across the land boundary into Sonora. To gain credit for this return flow and other drainage water would seem to have been the real reason for the provisions cited by Tipton.
“从任何来源”和“水流……无论其来源如何”主要是为了使美国在回流水方面获得最大程度的信用，而间接地，甚至根本未涉及水质问题。部分回流水会在边界以上进入河流；部分会在加利福尼亚州边界附近的 20 英里河段进入河流，这条河段是亚利桑那州和墨西哥的共同边界；还有一部分，即尤马项目区的排水水，永远不会进入河流，而是通过陆地边界流入索诺拉州。提 pton 引用的这些规定似乎是为了获得这部分回流水和排水水的信用。

Treaty advocates insisted that there was another provision that would compel Mexico to accept polluted water. Article 10 provided that the amount allocated to Mexico was "for any purpose whatsoever." The implication here was that Mexico would have to find another use for her water if it was too saline for ir-rigation. Though this provision might be construed to favor the United States, there was some doubt that an international tribunal would interpret it in such a fashion. Besides, if the dles ment was unusable, then there would be no "purpose" to whit Mexico could put the water unless it was treated in a desalinization plant. But the cost of such an operation was prohibitive.
条约倡导者坚持认为，还有一项条款会迫使墨西哥接受污染的水。第十条指出，分配给墨西哥的水量“可以用于任何目的。”这里的含义是，如果水太咸不能用于灌溉，墨西哥将不得不找到其他用途。虽然这项条款可能有利于美国，但不确定国际法庭是否会这样解释。此外，如果水无法使用，墨西哥除非通过脱盐厂处理，否则无法为水找到“用途”。但这种操作的成本是无法承受的。

Another event seems to corroborate the above conclusion.
另一个事件似乎支持上述结论。

In January, 1914, less than a month after the negotiations, Charles Timm, another adviser to the American negotiators, was questioned about the treaty. When he was asked if it contained anything about the quality of Mexico's allotment, Timm replied,"Not in the treaty. . .. There was frankly strenuous objection on the part of Mexico. They objected to the omission of the quality but we succeeded in evading it." 49 If the question of quality were evaded, it would certainly be stretching things for Tipton to say that both sides agreed to a provision that both understood settled the question. Also, it would seem highly foolish for the Mexicans to agree to accept unusable water.
1914 年 1 月，谈判后不到一个月，另一位美国谈判顾问查尔斯·蒂姆就条约的相关情况接受了询问。当被问及条约是否涉及墨西哥分配土地的质量时，蒂姆回答说：“条约中没有涉及这一点。……墨西哥方面坦率地表示反对。他们反对省略质量条款，但我们设法避开了这个问题。”如果质量条款被避开了，提 pton 说双方都同意的条款解决了这个问题，这显然是夸大其词。此外，墨西哥同意接受不可用的水似乎是非常愚蠢的。

Tipton, however, did not rest his case entirely on what he said took place during the negotiations, or on the treaty provi-sions. The return flow, he insisted, would be usable regardless of the circumstances. Even if it were highly saline, he argued, it could be made usable by mixing it with the fresher water Mexico was to receive. 19
然而，提 pton 并没有完全依赖他在谈判期间所称的事件，或条约条款。他坚持认为，回流无论在什么情况下都是可以使用的。即使它非常咸，他争辩说，可以通过将其与墨西哥将要收到的较新鲜的水混合来使其变得可用。

Downey disagreed and assailed Tipton's position. According to the government's own testimony, he pointed out, a schedule of deliveries had been inserted into the treaty to insure credit to the United States for its drainage and waste water. Mexico's small demands during the winter months, from October to Feb-ruary, corresponded closely with the return flow. Consequently, all Mexico could receive at such times would be return flow, containing about 2,700 parts of salt per 1,000,000 parts of water, which would not be mixed with fresher water. Though this was still considered "usable" by some, its value was poor. Downey pointed out that, according to a recognized expert in the field of water quality, Dr. Carl S. Scofield of the Department of Agricul-ture, water of such quality, though usable, was of questionable value in the long run. With water of even 2,200 parts per 1,000,-000, Scofield maintained, "it becomes necessary to allocate as much as half of the total irrigation input to the service of drain-age."s In other words, a farmer could not grow as much with such water as he could with an equal amount of better water.
丁尼不同意，并抨击提顿的观点。他指出，根据政府自己的证词，在条约中插入了一个交货时间表，以确保为美国的排水和废水提供信贷。墨西哥在冬季月份，即从 10 月到 2 月的较小需求，与回流水的返回量非常吻合。因此，在这种情况下，墨西哥所能收到的只有回流水，其中含有大约每百万份水中 27,000 份盐，这些水不会与更新鲜的水混合。尽管有些人仍然认为这“可用”，但其价值很低。丁尼指出，根据水质量领域的公认专家，农业部的卡尔·S·斯科菲尔德博士的说法，这种质量的水，虽然可用，但从长远来看其价值存疑。斯科菲尔德认为，即使在每百万份水中含有 22,000 份盐的情况下，“也需要将总灌溉输入量的至少一半用于排水服务。”换句话说，农民无法用这种水种植与同等量更好水质水相同数量的作物。

bombance . на вал табо шнь ров то 2 ско со вно рес я потвося.
bombance . на вал табо шнь ров то 2 ско со вно рес я потвося。

Mexico's entire share could probably be fulflled with retum Row. California could pump into the river the 1,000,000 acre-feet of drainage water from the Imperial Valley which was flowing annually into the Salton Sea.
墨西哥的份额可能完全可以通过回流渠来实现。加利福尼亚每年向萨尔托湖排放的帝国谷 100 万英亩英尺的排水水可以注入河流。

Connally was taken aback. "Do you seriously contemplate that California is going to do that?" he asked.
康纳利感到惊讶。“你真的认为加利福尼亚会这样做吗？”他问道。

Mr. Chairman, we do not only contemplate doing it; we certainly will do it," answered Downey. "It is probable we shall have to do it." s1
委员长，我们不仅打算去做，我们一定会去做，”唐尼回答说，“很可能我们不得不去做。”s1

Downey's statement made it clear that California was de. termined to protect her contracts. And as long as the treaty meant what the American negotiators said it meant, then California was determined to see that Mexico received no water that could be used in the United States.
唐尼的声明表明加利福尼亚决心保护她的合同。只要条约意味着美国谈判代表所说的那样，加利福尼亚决心确保墨西哥不得使用可用于美国的水。

Despite his statement, Downey feared that Mexico would never be compelled to accept such water. Even if the United States insisted on it, Mexico could take the question to an arbitration tribunal which would undoubtedly find in her favor. No tribunal, he believed, would force Mexico to take unusable water.
尽管如此，唐尼担心墨西哥永远不会被强迫接受这样的水。即使美国坚持要求这样做，墨西哥也可以将问题提交仲裁法庭，而仲裁法庭很可能会支持她。他认为，没有任何法庭会迫使墨西哥接受无法使用的水。

Indeed, the tribunal might grant Mexico water as good as that she was receiving at the time the treaty was negotiated. Under those conditions, Mexico would have to accept very little, if any, return fow from California or Arizona, since the water she was presently receiving was mostly virgin runoff. Downey's real pur-pose, in brief, was the rejection of the treaty or, at least, its modification. If it could be changed to give Mexico as much as 750,000 acre-feet of "first-class" water from Hoover Dam, plus any return flow reaching the border, he would be satisfied,?
确实，法庭可能会给予墨西哥与条约谈判时她所接收的水质相当的水。在这种情况下，墨西哥将不得不接受来自加利福尼亚或亚利桑那州的很少甚至没有返流，因为她目前接收的水主要是未经利用的径流。简而言之，唐尼的实际目的是拒绝该条约，或者至少对其进行修改。如果该条约可以修改，给予墨西哥来自霍普金斯大坝的 75 万英亩-英尺的“优质”水，以及任何到达边境的返流，他就满意了，？

But State Department witnesses were certain Mexico would reject such a proposal. They admitted that Downey's offer would give Mexico as much water as the pending treaty, but Mexico would reject it, they insisted, because it did not guarantee her 1,500,000 acre-feet.
但国务院的证人确信墨西哥会拒绝这样的提议。他们承认，唐尼的提议给予墨西哥的水量与即将签订的条约相当，但墨西哥会拒绝，因为他们坚持认为，这没有保证她 150 万英亩-英尺的水量。

In that event, reasoned Downey, why not insert the words
唐尼推理道，在这种情况下，为什么不加入这些词语呢

"regardless of quality" into the treaty? The meaning would then be expressly clear and the United States need not fear the decision of an arbitration tribunal. But the treaty advocates rejected this suggestion, insisting that the agreement was clear enough. "The language in the treaty is plain and it means one thing, and one thing only," contended Royce Tipton, "and the ones who negotiated this treaty for Mexico understand it.* 54
"无论质量如何"加入条约？这样意思就会明确，美国也不必担心仲裁法庭的裁决。但条约倡导者拒绝了这一建议，坚持认为协议已经足够清楚。“条约中的语言是明确的，只有一种解释，”罗伊塞·蒂普顿声称，“而墨西哥谈判条约的人也理解这一点。”*54

Nevertheless, Colorado's Senator Eugene Millikin realized that Downey had a telling argument. It was apparently this belief that led him to assert that the treaty would still be "an equitable allocation" even if the United States got no eredit for return flow. 55
然而，科罗拉多州参议员尤金·米利金意识到唐尼有一个有力的论点。显然正是这种信念促使他声称，即使美国得不到回流补偿，条约仍然会是“公平分配”。*55

Though greatly frustrated in their attack on the treaty, Cal-ffornians had succeeded in making several important points.
尽管加利福尼亚人在攻击条约方面遭受了重大挫折，但他们还是成功提出了几个重要观点。

They had demonstrated the unreliability of the State Department's estimate of Mexican water use, More important, they had pointed out the ambiguity of the "extraordinary drought" pro-vision, and had weakened the State Department's heavy reliance on return flow to satisfy the treaty requirement. But Downey and his supporters were faced with another argument which overshadowed the treaty's flaws. It proved more subtle, more difficult to combat, and more readily acceptable by the Senate than any other.
他们已经证明了国务院对墨西哥用水量估计的不可靠性。更重要的是，他们指出了“异常干旱”条款的模糊性，并削弱了国务院过分依赖回流来满足条约要求的做法。但邓尼和他的支持者们面临着另一个更为重要的论点，这掩盖了条约的缺陷。这一论点更为微妙，更难反驳，也更容易被参议院接受。

VI

On the last day of the hearings, at a psychologically opportune moment, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson sounded the keynote. "There is a much larger question involved in this matter than in the interpretation of existing arbitration treaties and legal precedents"-the question of maintaining the Good Neighbor Policy and world peace.S
在听证会的最后一天，心理上恰逢其时的时候，国务院助理秘书德安·阿奇森发出了关键性的讲话：“这个问题涉及的不仅仅是对现有仲裁条约和法律先例的解释——而是维护睦邻政策和世界和平的问题。”

Acheson's statement reflected the importance that Washington was giving to the United Nations organizational conference at San Francisco. The issues were so great that the United States wanted the friendship and cooperation of the Latin-American nations and was then removing outstanding issues that would endanger its policy. "The United States is now moving," Acheson gravely noted, "into an era of increasingly intimate contact with foreign nations in fields which run the gamut of military, political, economic, and social relations of the most complex variety." n Necessity demanded that we "exercise full leadership if our efforts and our hopes are to bear fruit. But what assurance can there be for anyone, in this country or out," he asked, "that we can even begin to measure up to these problems if we cannot
艾奇逊的声明反映了华盛顿对旧金山联合国组织会议的重视。由于问题如此重大，美国希望与拉丁美洲国家建立友谊和合作，并解决可能危及其政策的悬而未决的问题。“美国现在正进入一个与外国国家进行越来越密切接触的时代，”艾奇逊严肃地指出，“这些领域涵盖了军事、政治、经济和社会关系的最复杂领域。”他问道：“如果连最基本的双边问题都无法解决，我们如何能保证我们能够应对这些挑战呢？”

settle the mast rudiamentary type of bilateral problem that can电入
艾奇逊的声明反映了华盛顿对旧金山联合国组织会议的重视。由于问题如此重大，美国希望与拉丁美洲国家建立友谊和合作，并解决可能危及其政策的悬而未决的问题。“美国现在正进入一个与外国国家进行越来越密切接触的时代，”艾奇逊严肃地指出，“这些领域涵盖了军事、政治、经济和社会关系的最复杂领域。”他问道：“如果连最基本的双边问题都无法解决，我们如何能保证我们能够应对这些挑战呢？”电入

ever arise in the field of foreign relations, namely, a border problem arising from the fact of geographical propinquity?* The implications of Acheson's speech were clear--the United States's role in the postwar world was at stake in the ratification of the treaty. Its defeat might severely damage America's international position.
在外交领域是否曾因地理邻近而产生边界问题？*阿奇森的演讲含义明确——战后的美国角色在条约批准上 stake，其失败可能会严重损害美国的国际地位。

More sensitive to Acheson's plea than perhaps anyone in the Senate was the wily chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-mittee, Tom Connally. It was he who had secured passage of the famous Connally Resolution in 1913, calling for the "establish-ment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world." And it was he who was then preparing to go to Mexico City for the signing of the Act of Chapultepec, a mutual defense pact with the other American republics.
参议院中对阿奇森的恳求比任何人都更加敏感的可能是外交关系委员会的机智主席汤姆·康纳利。正是他于 1913 年推动通过了著名的康纳利决议，呼吁建立和维持具有防止侵略和维护世界和平权力的国际权威。而他当时正准备前往墨西哥城，与其他美洲共和国签署恰帕斯佩克法案，一项相互防御条约。

Like Acheson and Connally, the nation's press also believed the treaty vital to the success of American foreign policy. "This is a real test of the good neighbor policy," exclaimed the Salt Lake Deseret News in a declaration echoed by the influential Christian Science Monitor, and scores of other papers. Observed the St. Louis Star News: the "Senate must place a higher value on . . . international good will than on California's greediness."
就像阿奇森和康纳利一样，美国的新闻界也认为该条约对于美国外交政策的成功至关重要。“这是一次真正的好邻邦政策考验，”盐湖城《 deseret 信使报》宣称，这一说法得到了影响力巨大的《基督教科学监测报》以及其他许多报纸的呼应。圣路易斯《星新闻》指出：“参议院必须将国际友好置于加利福尼亚的贪婪之上。”

"Bothering the State Department as much as the threat to amicable Latin-American understanding . . . ," editorialized the Washington Star, "is the preview the controversy offers of the kind of opposition that may develop when the Senate comes to consider the proposed world security organization." Ratification of the treaty, declared the New York Times, "would probably do more to cement good feelings and reinforce our delegates' protestations of this country's good intentions toward its Latin-Ameri-can neighbors than any fine words spoken in the jewel room of Chapultepec Castle:" as This point was underscored in an article reprinted in several papers by former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who felt the treaty would "have a profoundly helpful effect in strengthening confidence throughout the other Americas -at a moment when it is much needed- in the . . policy of the Government of the United States to deal fairly and justly with all its American neighbors." a Newsweek, New Re-public, Commonteal, America, United States News, and numer ous other influential magazines urged immediate ratificatioN A Most Americans would probably have gone along with the new commentator who believed the treaty "would merit favorable action by the Senate even if it means a real sacrifice on our part." so
《华盛顿星报》评论道：“使国务院烦恼的威胁与对拉丁美洲友好关系的潜在挑战……相似的是，争议的预演为参议院审议提议的世界安全组织时可能产生的反对意见提供了一个预览。”《纽约时报》宣称，“批准条约可能会比在查普特佩克城堡的宝石室里说出的任何漂亮话，更有效地巩固我们与拉丁美洲邻国的良好感情，并加强我们国家对其良好意图的声明。”这一观点得到了前国务次卿萨默尔·威尔斯在多份报纸上转载的文章的强调，他认为该条约“将在一个非常需要增强信心的时刻，对整个美洲地区的信心产生深远的积极影响——这一点在其他美洲国家中尤为重要。” 美国政府对待所有美国邻国公平公正的政策。《新闻周刊》、《新共和》、《共同 weal》、美国新闻、以及许多其他有影响力的杂志都呼吁立即批准该条约。大多数美国人可能会同意那位新评论员的观点，即该条约“即使意味着我们自己做出真正的牺牲，也应获得参议院的积极行动。”

The Mexican press also looked on the treaty as a test of the Good Neighbor Policy. Most of the dispatches in the Mexican newspapers were reprints of articles appearing in the American press, though the captions indicated strong protreaty sentiment.
墨西哥的媒体也将该条约视为良邻政策的考验。墨西哥报纸上的大多数报道都是美国媒体文章的重印，尽管标题表明了强烈的支持条约的倾向。

Occasionally an editorial would appear which praised the treaty.
偶尔会有一篇社论对条约表示赞赏。

One Mexican editorialist, for example, drew nearly all his arguments from the article by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles.
例如，一位墨西哥社论作者几乎完全引用了国务院次长萨姆纳·韦尔斯的文章中的论点。

He referred time and again to the danger facing American leadership if the treaty should fail approval by the Senate, and he predicted a loss of friendship, disunity of the hemispheric nations, and failure of the Good Neighbor Policy. He also uttered a few disparaging remarks about those who controlled the Imperial Valley water, whom he labeled speculators, thieves, and imperi-alists.01
他一再提到如果条约未能获得参议院批准，美国领导层将面临的危险，并预测将会失去友谊、美洲国家的团结以及“睦邻政策”的失败。他还对控制帝国谷水资源的人发表了一些贬低的言论，称他们是投机者、窃贼和帝国主义者。

Primarily because of international considerations, pressure from the press, and a strong desire to settle an immediate prob-lem, the Foreign Relations Committee overlooked the treaty's flaws and, on February 23, recommended ratification. The overwhelming vote of 18 to 4 revealed no regional or party align-ments, as the minority consisted of both Republicans and Democrats who came from such diverse states as Florida, California, Minnesota, and Montana.
主要由于国际因素、媒体的压力以及迫切需要解决眼前问题的意愿，外交关系委员会忽视了条约的缺陷，并于 2 月 23 日推荐批准。压倒性的 18 票对 4 票的投票结果表明没有区域或党派的倾向，少数派包括来自佛罗里达州、加利福尼亚州、明尼苏达州和蒙大拿州的共和党和民主党议员。

VII

Debate on the Senate floor lasted off and on for about a month, from March 16 to April 18, but it was obvious that California and her supporters were fighting a losing battle. Several reservations were attached to the treaty and some of them improved it, but most were minor, and none went to the heart of the objections voiced by the opponents.
参议院辩论持续了一个多月，从 3 月 16 日到 4 月 18 日，但很明显加利福尼亚州及其支持者正在打一场输球的战斗。条约附有若干保留意见，其中一些意见改善了条约，但大多数都是小问题，没有触及反对者的反对核心。

A major reason for California's difficulties was Connally, who continued to be an imposing foe. Just after formal debates had begun, he sent his colleagues a 21-page digest of the hearings which endorsed the State Department's position, including
加利福尼亚面临困难的一个主要原因是康纳利，他继续成为一个强大的对手。正式辩论刚刚开始，他就向同事们发送了一份 21 页的听证会摘要，其中支持国务院的立场，包括

N opumitie eisdlmate of the future water rpel'y and is guerez
未来水资源政策的纲要和指导原则

tionable testimony concerning return flow, Mexico's current uses, and the "extraordinary drought" provision. Since the 1,800-page transcript of the hearings appeared late in the debates, Connally's digest was important in shaping Senate opinion, the more so because attendance had been extremely poor during the hearings, when an average of three of the twenty-three members attended the sessions and not more than twelve were present at any one time. Equally poor was attendance during debates on the Senate foor, when only five senators were usually present,"* California's lobbyists were busy, but they sensed defeat. At first, Downey and Johnson had planned to introduce major amendments in an attempt to kill the treaty, but they abandoned that tactic when they could not muster support. Next, they and their friends introduced reservations to clarify the ambiguous provisions, particularly those concerning water quality and "ex-traordinary drought." But these were also rebuffed.
有关返流、墨西哥当前使用情况以及“非常干旱”条款的可引用证词。由于听证会记录在辩论后期才公布，康奈利的摘要对塑造参议院意见非常重要，尤其是在听证会期间出席率极低的情况下，平均每次听证会只有三名参议员参加，最多时不超过十二人出席。在参议院辩论期间，出席人数同样很少，通常只有五名参议员在场。“加利福尼亚的游说者很忙，但他们感到了失败。最初，唐尼和约翰逊计划提出重大修正案以试图否决条约，但当他们无法获得支持时，放弃了这一策略。接下来，他们和他们的朋友提出了保留条款，以澄清含糊不清的规定，特别是关于水质和“非常干旱”的规定，但这些修正案也被否决了。”

Most senators seemed to agree with Wisconsin's clever Alexander Wiley, a leader in sidestepping the problem of quality.
大多数参议员似乎都同意来自威斯康星州的聪明的亚历山大·威利的观点，他在回避水质问题方面起到了领导作用。

Even if salinity did become an issue, ventured Wiley, it would not occur for perhaps fifty years, and by then "the ingenuity of man would find the answer."# Wiley's heady optimism led him to make other rosy forecasts. He felt there would always be enough water to satisfy the compact allocation and that the average runoff would continue to be about 15,000,000 acre-feet.
威利甚至认为，即使咸度问题真的出现，也至少要五十年后才会发生，到那时，“人类的智慧会找到解决办法。”威利充满乐观的头脑让他对其他前景也做出了乐观的预测。他认为水的数量总是足够满足契约分配的，平均径流量也将继续约为 1500 万英亩英尺。

As added reason for approving the pact, he pointed to obvious benefits gained by Texans on the Rio Grande and to the treaty's larger international implications.
他提出批准该条约的另一个理由是，该条约为 Rio Grande 河畔的德克萨斯州带来了显而易见的好处，并且该条约具有更大的国际意义。

Against such opposition, Downey and Johnson had no illusions about their inevitable defeat. With attendance extremely poor, with the president, State Department, and press of the country demanding ratification, they knew that the battle was lost. They might be able to postpone defeat through filibuster, but they were reluctant to increase the abuse already being heaped on California. Rather than risk being aceused of sabotag. ing world peace, they agreed to a final vote one week before the opening of the San Francisco Conference. Both Connally and Republican Arthur Vandenberg, the Senate's bipartisan delegation to the conference, were anxious to attend the meeting on time and with a ratified treaty in hand.a
面对这样的反对，邓尼和约翰逊对不可避免的失败毫无幻想。由于出席人数极其稀少，加上全国总统、国务院和媒体都要求批准，他们知道这场战斗已经输定了。他们或许可以通过拖延战术推迟失败，但并不愿意增加对加利福尼亚的更多侮辱。为了避免被指责破坏世界和平，他们同意在旧金山会议开幕前一周进行最终投票。康诺利和共和党人阿瑟·范登堡参议员，作为参议院的跨党派代表团，都急于按时参加会议并带着批准的条约前往。

On the day before the fimnal wote, Hiram Jolnson made
在最终投票的前一天，赫里姆·约翰逊做出了决定。

impassioned appeal in what was to be one of his last Senati speeches before his death. "There is no difference between the taking of land, as we all know it, and the taking of water," Johnson declared in his weak, barely audible voice. "An old man stands here now making a prophecy today. Let every man within the sound of my voice beware, beware, beware, because for the first time in the history of the United States it is proposed that employees of the people.
这是一次充满激情的演讲，也是他生前最后一次在元老院的演讲之一。“我们知道，土地的占有与水资源的占有并无区别，”约翰逊用虚弱而几乎听不见的声音宣布。“现在一位老人站在这里，作出预言。请在听到我声音的所有人注意，注意，注意，因为在美国历史上，首次提出要将人民的雇员纳入其中。”

do something which would
做某事

be I was about to term it an infamy. " Referring to the treaty's effect on the people of his native state, he cried: "I implore the Senate, I beg the Senate to give them a square deal, rather than to reach over into Mexico and give Mexico a square deal." o
这将是我即将称之为耻辱的。谈到条约对他的家乡人民的影响，他哭喊道：“我恳请参议院，我请求参议院给他们一个公道，而不是越过墨西哥给他们一个公道。”

Johnson's appeal was ignored. Even former President Herbert Hoover's last-minute indictment of the treaty did nothing to reverse the trend, which had been given greater impetus by Roosevelt's sudden death on April 12. The treaty now took on the appearance of a deathbed wish and Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, was determined that the wish be fulfilled." On April 18, the Senate voted an overwhelming 76 to 10 in favor of the treaty. Now it was up to Mexico.
约翰逊的上诉被忽视了。即使前总统赫伯特·胡佛在最后一分钟对条约的抨击也没有扭转这一趋势，而这一趋势在罗斯福于 4 月 12 日突然去世后得到了更大的推动。现在条约看起来像是临终遗愿，而罗斯福的继任者哈里·杜鲁门决心实现这一遗愿。“4 月 18 日，参议院以压倒性的 76 票对 10 票通过了条约。现在只剩下墨西哥了。”

VILI

Two days after Senate approval in the United States, the text of the treaty was released to the Mexican public. Before this time Mexican officials had refrained from public comment and had refused to answer questions raised during debate in the United States. Not until midsummer, however, did active concern with the treaty begin. A series of round-table discussions were then conducted under the auspices of the two foreign relations committees of the Mexican Senate. These meetings, from July 31 to September 13, were not confined to members of the Senate, but were open to interested engineers and lawyers throughout the country. Various professional and cultural associa-tions, including the Mexican Academy of Legislation and Juris-prudence, the Mexican Society of Geography and Statistics, the Cultural Association, and the Association of Juridical Investiga-tion, conducted studies of the treaty and sent representatives to the meetings.7
在美国参议院批准两天后，条约文本被公布给了墨西哥公众。在此之前，墨西哥官员一直未作公开评论，并拒绝回答美国辩论期间提出的问题。然而，直到盛夏时节，才开始对条约表现出积极的关注。随后，在墨西哥参议院两个外交关系委员会的主持下，举行了一系列圆桌讨论会。这些会议从 7 月 31 日持续到 9 月 13 日，并不限于参议员，而是向全国感兴趣的工程师和律师开放。墨西哥立法和司法学院、墨西哥地理与统计学会、文化协会和法律调查协会等各类专业和文化组织对条约进行了研究，并派代表参加了这些会议。7

The discussions showed that opinion in Mexico toward the treaty was as divided as that in the United States. Most witnesses, including those for the Mexican Department of Foreign Affairs, thought the agreement very favorable to Mexico. But some condemned it. Opposition was for a variety of reasons and, unlike that in the United States, was directed against provisions dealing with both major international rivers and not just the Colorado.Many Mexicans objected to the treaty for constitutional reasons. Article 27 of the Mexican constitution, they noted, prohibited the alienation of land or water. And, since the United States was given water from Mexican tributaries on the Rio Grande, the constitutional prohibition had been violated." Legal experts for the Mexican government challenged this charge of un-constitutionality, insisting that the Rio Grande water given the United States was international, since it had reached the boundary section of the river. Consequently, the constitution, which covered only domestic lands and water, was not violated by the treaty. But, even if it were "necessary to reform the constitution," they argued, then "it has to be done, since the treaty represents the interests of the country." 1a
讨论显示，墨西哥对条约的看法与美国一样分歧严重。大多数证人，包括墨西哥外交部的代表，认为该协议对墨西哥非常有利。但也有部分人予以谴责。反对意见的原因多种多样，与美国不同，反对意见不仅针对主要国际河流的规定，还包括科罗拉多河。许多墨西哥人反对该条约的理由是宪法上的。他们指出，墨西哥宪法第 27 条禁止土地和水资源的转让。由于美国从墨西哥里奥格兰德河支流获得了水资源，因此宪法禁止转让的规定已被违反。“墨西哥政府的法律专家反驳了这一违宪指控，坚持认为提供给美国的里奥格兰德河水是国际性的，因为这些水已经到达了河流边界部分。因此，仅涉及国内土地和水资源的宪法并未因条约而被违反。” 但是，即使需要“改革宪法”，他们也认为，“必须这样做，因为条约代表了国家的利益。”1a

Though temporarily checked, the Mexican opponents of the treaty attacked it on another score. They believed it would have a deleterious effect on their lands along the Rio Grande. By surrendering Rio Grande water, they pointed out, Mexico would impair the future development of her states, lying just south of the powerful United States. In short, reasoned the well-known law-yer, Toribio Esquivel Obregón, Mexico should have advanced a different doctrine on each river. On the Rio Grande, she should have insisted on keeping all the water she contributed; on the Colorado, she should have demanded all the water that could have possibly been put to use on her lands, Indeed, argued Esteban Manzera Campo, Mexico should never have made the mistake of allowing both rivers to be considered in the same treaty.
尽管暂时受挫，墨西哥反对条约的人士又从另一个角度攻击了该条约。他们认为，该条约会对他们在里奥格兰德河沿岸的土地产生不利影响。他们指出，通过放弃里奥格兰德河水，墨西哥将损害其南部紧邻强大美国的州的未来发展。著名律师托里比奥·埃斯奎维尔·奥布雷贡认为，墨西哥在每条河流上都应该坚持不同的原则。在里奥格兰德河上，墨西哥应该坚持保留其贡献的所有水资源；在科罗拉多河上，墨西哥应该要求所有可能在其土地上使用的水资源。事实上，埃斯泰班·曼塞拉·坎波认为，墨西哥本不应该犯下同时将两条河流纳入同一条约的错误。

"The problems of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande," he noted in an argument reminiscent of American protests to the same treaty, "are independent of one another and the rights of both countries are capable of being defined and agreed upon with respect to each of these rivers in different treaties." Ta Advocates of the treaty struck out at their opponents, trying
他指出，科罗拉多河和里奥格兰德河的问题“彼此独立，两国的权利可以在不同的条约中针对每一条河分别定义和达成一致。”反对条约的人们试图指出反对者的根本假设的不合理性，试图反驳反对者。

to point out the. untenability of the opposition 's basic assumptio电
试图指出反对者的根本假设的不合理性，试图反驳反对者。电

If Mexico should insist on all its Rio Grande contributions, then the United States could do the same on the Colorado, thus turning the delta region into a wasteland. And, asserted Adolfo Orive Alba, one of the Mexican negotiators, if either country rejected the treaty on the grounds that it could develop uses for all of the water in its rivers, "it would surely be the United States, which by its economic potentialities would sooner be able to carry out Those fantastic projects on the Colorado River, in order not to leave a drop to Mexico." ™ Obviously, explained Emesto En-riquez, an expert on international law, both countries had arrived at a workable solution: *If you take care of me on the Colorado, I will take care of you on the Rio Grande, and vice versa." 15
如果墨西哥坚持要求其里奥格兰德河的所有贡献，那么美国也可以在科罗拉多河上采取同样的做法，从而将三角洲地区变成荒地。正如墨西哥谈判代表阿多尔福·奥里维·阿尔巴所断言的，如果任一国家以可以开发其河流中所有水资源为由拒绝条约，“那么一定是美国，凭借其经济潜力，会更早能够实施科罗拉多河上的那些幻想项目，以不留下一滴水给墨西哥。” 显然，国际法专家埃梅斯托·恩里克雷解释说，两国已经达成一个可行的解决方案：*如果你在科罗拉多河上照顾我，我将在里奥格兰德河上照顾你，反之亦然。*

Nor did the Mexican government's engineers believe the treaty would restrict the development of their frontier states along the Rio Grande. It was physically impossible, maintained Orive Alba, for Mexico to use all her tributary water before it reached the mainstream. Even with maximum development on the tributaries there would still be an annual surplus of 1,153,600 acre-feet escaping to the Rio Grande. Of the surplus runoff, over which Mexico had no control, the United States, he noted, had been persuaded to limit itself to one-third, or about 385,000 acre-feet. In addition, the United States was given one-half the surplus Mexican water reaching the mainstream above Salineño, Texas, thus bringing the total to 735,000 aere-feet. But this grant, emphasized Orive Alba, meant no loss to Mexico's frontier states, since "our country could carry out exactly the same projects .. if there had been no treaty." Ta
墨西哥政府的工程师们也不相信条约会限制他们在 Rio Grande 河沿岸边疆州的发展。奥里维·阿尔巴认为，对墨西哥来说，在支流上使用所有支流水在流入干流之前是物理上不可能的。即使在支流上进行最大限度的发展，每年仍然会有 1,153,600 英亩-英尺的多余水量流入 Rio Grande 河。奥里维·阿尔巴指出，对于墨西哥无法控制的多余径流，美国被说服限制在三分之一，即大约 385,000 英亩-英尺。此外，美国还获得了来自 Salineño, Texas 以上干流的多余墨西哥水量的一半，因此总量为 735,000 英亩-英尺。但奥里维·阿尔巴强调，这一赠予对墨西哥边疆州来说意味着没有损失，因为“即使没有条约，我们国家也可以进行完全相同的工作。”

Several critics raised technical objections to Orive Alba's ex-planation. They cited reclamation projects, which then seemed impossible, but which eventually might be able to use all the water Mexico now considered as surplus. Orive Alba promptly reminded them that the treaty, though giving the United States one-third the runoff and one-half the surplus in the main channel, guaranteed that amount to be only 350,000 acre-feet. Thus, Mexico could retain all the surplus, except for that volume. Under those conditions, the United States, instead of receiving 735,000 acre-feet of Mexican water, would get less than half that amount.17
几位批评者对 Orive Alba 的解释提出了技术上的反对意见。他们提到了当时看似不可能的重新开垦项目，但最终可能利用墨西哥现在认为过剩的所有水资源。Orive Alba 随即提醒他们，尽管条约规定美国可获得主河道径流的三分之一和剩余水量的一半，但保证的水量仅为 35 万英亩-英尺。因此，墨西哥可以保留所有剩余水量，除了那部分体积。在这种情况下，美国将获得的墨西哥水资源量，而不是 73.5 万英亩-英尺，将少于这个数量的一半。17

Orive Alba and his colleagues succeeded in presenting con-
Orive Alba 和他的同事们成功地呈现了 con-

vincing evidence of the benetits for Mexico on the Rio Crande. 中2
vincing evidence of the benetits for Mexico on the Rio Crande. 中 2

The water granted to the United States was a small amount, it would not deprive Mexico of any anticipated development on her tributaries; and it was even less than the volume of Mexican water used under the current natural-flow conditions by the United States. But an even more important consideration was the fact that the treaty removed the threat posed by the Valley Gravity Project. That project would have made it impossible to irrigate the "extraordinary fertile lands" on the Mexican side of the lower Rio Grande Valley. If the treaty were rejected and the American project made operational, Mexico would not have resources nor physical possibilities" to develop the valley. 78
美国获得的水量很少，不会剥夺墨西哥在其支流上的预期开发；而且比当前自然流条件下美国使用的墨西哥水量还要少。但更为重要的是，条约消除了山谷重力项目带来的威胁。该项目本会使墨西哥河谷下游墨西哥一侧的“异常肥沃的土地”无法灌溉。如果条约被拒绝且美国项目投入运营，墨西哥将没有资源和物质条件来开发该地区。78

For the Colorado area, the Mexican government believed a treaty was absolutely necessary. The normal operations of Hoover Dam, noted Orive Alba, interfered with irrigation prac-lices by making heavy releases during the winter when agricul Stural needs in Mexico were minimal. Though there was still plenty of river water during the summer, there was not enough to offset scouring and to keep the water level high enough for diversions. Consequently, during the last two years Mexico had been compelled "to be constantly requesting the American Government that the discharges be now increased, that tomorrow they be diminished, [and] that part of the water be furnished through the All-American Canal." ™ The treaty, Orive Alba be-lieved, would rectify this practice and assure Mexico of a constant supply of water. Actually, Mexico's diversion difficulties were caused to some extent by the ID. According to an official of the Bureau of Reclamation, who was sent to the lower river in 1943, the ID had reduced the flow into the Alamo by placing
对于科罗拉多地区，墨西哥政府认为条约是绝对必要的。奥里维·阿尔巴指出，胡佛大坝的正常运行干扰了灌溉实践，因为它在冬季频繁放水，而此时墨西哥的农业需求几乎为零。尽管夏季河流中有足够的水量，但不足以抵消侵蚀并保持足够的水位以供引水。因此，在过去两年中，墨西哥不得不“不断请求美国政府增加放水，明天减少放水，[并且]通过全美运河提供部分水源。”奥里维·阿尔巴认为，条约将纠正这一做法，并确保墨西哥获得稳定的水源供应。实际上，根据 1943 年被派往下游河的灌溉局官员的说法，ID 通过在汉利昂头部的引水闸底部放置“哈什板”减少了流入阿拉莫的水流，从而在一定程度上导致了墨西哥的引水困难。

"Hash boards" at the bottom of the diversion gates at Hanion Heading.* In this way, the district had apparently hoped to force Mexico to come to terms.
在汉利昂头部的引水闸底部安装了“哈什板”，据灌溉局的一名官员称，1943 年被派往下游河的官员表示，该地区显然是希望通过这种方式迫使墨西哥达成协议。

But Mexican officials ignored the ID's activities in their arguments for the treaty. Convinced that the pact was a good one, they, like their American counterparts, went out of their way to present it in the best possible light. Indeed, Rafael Fernandez MacGregor, an engineer and principal Mexican negotiator of the treaty, contradicted a position held earlier by his country when he claimed that the amount granted by the treaty
但墨西哥官员在为该条约辩护时忽略了 ID 的活动。他们坚信这是一个很好的条约，像他们的美国同行一样，他们想方设法将其呈现得尽可能完美。事实上，作为该条约的主要墨西哥谈判代表，拉斐尔·费尔南德斯·麦克格戈尔甚至与他国家之前持有的立场相矛盾，声称该条约提供的金额足以让墨西哥进行更多的贸易。

ould perit Meaico to trgate mmore tand them. ste could torp

cultivated under natural conditions.* Actually, in his enthusiasm he seems to have ignored the same thing overlooked by Ameri cans who thought the treaty too generous. For, under "natural conditions" prior to construction of Hoover Dam and the All.
实际上，在霍普金斯大坝和全美建设之前，根据自然条件种植的作物实际上是在自然条件下种植的。* 事实上，在他的热情之下，他似乎忽略了与美国人认为条约过于慷慨相同的事情。因为，在霍普金斯大坝和全美建设之前，根据自然条件种植的作物实际上是在自然条件下种植的。

American Canal, Mexico could have demanded half the Alamo's capacity, which was about the same volume given her by the pact. Nevertheless, the agreement did provide the important advantage of guaranteeing Mexico a definite volume of water and,certainly, Mexico had obtained flood- and silt-control benefits from Hoover Dam. Moreover, though Mexico might have been able to develop uses for as much water as was granted by the treaty, she would not always have received the flow at the best lime, and this would undoubtedly have forced her to change her cropping patterns. Realizing this, the government's legal advisers recommended against international arbitration in place of the pact. A tribunal might award Mexico more water than was allotted by the treaty, declared Ernesto Enriquez, but Mexico vould not really benefit from it because the quantity would be governed by natural-fow conditions. "Consequently,"
美国运河，墨西哥本可以要求得阿拉莫水库容量的一半，这大约是协定给予她的水量。尽管如此，该协定确实为墨西哥提供了一个重要优势，即确保墨西哥获得一定的水量，并且，毫无疑问，墨西哥从胡佛大坝那里获得了防洪和泥沙控制的好处。此外，虽然墨西哥可能能够开发出与条约所授予的水量相匹配的用途，但她并不总是能在最佳时间收到水流，这无疑会迫使她改变种植模式。意识到这一点，政府的法律顾问建议反对以条约替代国际仲裁。埃内斯托·埃内雷兹宣称，一个法庭可能会裁定墨西哥获得比条约分配更多的水量，但墨西哥实际上并不会从中受益，因为水量将受自然流量条件的控制。“因此”，

* he con-

cluded, "if our country did get more water, it would receive it not in the months of low stage of the river, but divided according to the natural flow . . . and therefore in the summer, which is when water is really most valuable for irrigation, its portion would be much less than that which it can have available in accordance with the treaty." *3
包括：“如果我国确实能得到更多的水，它将不会在河流低水位的月份收到这些水，而是根据自然流量分配……因此，在夏季，这是灌溉最需要水的时期，它所能获得的份额将远远少于条约规定的份额。”*3

Of particular concern, also, to Mexicans was the operation of the "extraordinary drought" provision. The debate over this in the United States Senate had aroused considerable anxiety in Mexico. Many feared that the United States could use the drought provision to Mexico's disadvantage. During a dry period, the United States might decrease Mexico's share while continuing undiminished its own uses. The treaty, they insisted, "only promises to reduce" the American share, a promise that "would be very difficult to carry out in practice." 83
特别令人担忧的是，墨西哥人对“非常旱季”条款的运作也非常关注。美国参议院对此条款的辩论在墨西哥引起了极大的焦虑。许多人担心美国可以利用旱季条款对墨西哥不利。在干旱时期，美国可能会减少墨西哥的份额，而自己的使用量却保持不变。他们坚持认为，该条约“仅仅承诺减少”美国的份额，而这一承诺“在实践中很难实现”。83

In reply, Mexico's negotiators tried to calm fears, claiming the provision for extraordinary drought would help, not hinder, their country. Article 10 of the treaty, they contended, clearly provided that Mexico's allotment could be reduced only "in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the United States are reduced." A reduction, therefore, would have to oceur first in American uses before Mexico's share would be decreased. ButtA more important, argued Orive Alba, Mexico's allotment would' not be decreased unless "extraordinary drought" had caused "the reduction of all consumptions in the United States.* sI Ernesto Enriquez, likewise, insisted that the clause would go into effect only in the event of a "generalized drought*-an interpretation that contrasted sharply with that given by the American State Department, The question of water quality also worried many Mexicans who feared the United States might force Mexico to accept unusable water. But Mexican officials claimed the treaty provided sufficient safeguards. The quantity of silt, they insisted, was regulated by Hoover Dam and would become less of a problem as the United States constructed other reservoirs. Also, the silt problem, as well as the equally serious one of salinity, was covered by treaty provisions. Treaty interpretation by Orive Alba was particularly important here. The treaty, and especially Article 27, he contended, clearly indicated that the Mexican water was to be used for irrigation. "Therefore," he concluded, "in this treaty, as in any other of its kind, it is understood that the water must be of good quality."s He even went so far as to assert that Mexico could demand her share from the virgin flow, or, if she desired, she could demand water similar in quality to that which she was currently using.-water containing 750 parts of salt per million. But Orive Alba acknowledged that it would be physically impossible to fulfill such a demand as uses increased in the United States over the years. Consequently, he declared, Mexico would not object to receiving water similar to that used in the lower basin of the United States ( specifically, water similar to that diverted from Imperial Dam) so long as it was *of good quality for irrigation." This proviso posed a greater difficulty than it might seem, for neither country had defined "good qual. ity" water and scientists had not devised any hard-and-fast rule themselves.
墨西哥的谈判代表试图安抚担忧，声称关于极端干旱的规定将有助于而不是妨碍他们国家。他们认为，条约第 10 条明确规定，墨西哥的配额只能在“美国耗用水量减少相同比例”的情况下减少。因此，在墨西哥的份额减少之前，美国的使用量必须先减少。奥里韦·阿尔巴认为，除非“极端干旱”导致“美国所有耗用水量减少”，否则墨西哥的配额不会减少。同样，埃内斯托·埃内西也坚持认为，该条款只有在发生“普遍干旱”的情况下才会生效——这一解释与美国国务院的解释截然不同。许多墨西哥人还担心水质问题，担心美国可能会迫使墨西哥接受无法使用的水。但墨西哥官员声称，条约提供了足够的保障。他们坚持认为，淤泥的数量由胡佛大坝调节，随着美国建造其他水库，这个问题将变得不那么严重。 此外，泥沙问题以及同样严重的盐碱化问题也由条约条款进行了规定。Orive Alba 对条约的解释尤为重要。他认为，条约，尤其是第 27 条，明确指出墨西哥的水应用于灌溉。“因此，”他总结道，“在这一条约中，和其他类似条约一样，人们理解水必须是优质的。”他甚至进一步断言，墨西哥可以要求从原始流量中获得她的份额，或者如果她愿意，她可以要求水质与她目前使用的水相似的水——即每百万份含 750 份盐的水。但 Orive Alba 承认，随着美国用水量的逐年增加，满足这样的要求在物理上是不可能的。因此，他宣布，只要水质适合灌溉，墨西哥不会反对接收与美国下盆地（具体来说，是从帝国大坝分流的水）水质相似的水。这一条款带来的困难比看起来要大，因为两国都没有定义“优质”。 科学家们也没有自己制定任何严格的规则。

Like the negotiators for the United States, Orive Alba believed that the drainage water, if too saline, could be diluted with the fresher runoff sent to Mexico; yet he seemed to ignore the fact that, during the winter months at some future date, Mexico's share would be almost entirely return flow. And, if California pumped the Imperial Valley's return flow into the river
就像美国的谈判代表一样，Orive Alba 认为，如果排水水太咸，可以通过与墨西哥送来的较新鲜的径流水稀释；然而他似乎忽略了这样一个事实：在未来某年冬季，墨西哥的份额几乎完全会是返流。而且，如果加利福尼亚将帝国谷的返流注入河流，

then Nexico would receive poor quality water the year rounc电A
那么墨西哥将会在大约来年收到质量较差的水。

Despite the treaty's ambiguities, most Mexican senators favored its ratification. Though the provision for "extraordinary drought" might subsequently be interpreted in favor of the United States, the senators were positive that Mexico would get good irrigation water. They were virtually certain that no arbitration tribunal would permit the United States to give Mexico unusable water. Reservations could have been attached to the treaty making the Mexican position clear, but officials believed such action "would not be prudent." 8? They knew what the American negotiators had said and, consequently, anticipated that reservations might make the United States reject the treaty the second time around. Moreover, the Mexican Senate was convinced that the Rio Grande settlement was a good one. Without surrendering anything that was not already lost, Mexico would receive food control, hydroelectricity, and the assured development of thousands of acres in the lower Rio Grande Valley. These considerations made the action of the Mexican Senate a foregone conclusion and, on September 27, it voted unanimously for ratification.$$
尽管条约存在模糊之处，大多数墨西哥参议员仍支持其批准。虽然“异常干旱”的条款日后可能有利于美国，但参议员们坚信墨西哥将获得良好的灌溉用水。他们几乎可以肯定，仲裁法庭不会允许美国向墨西哥提供无法使用的水。可以附加保留条款使墨西哥立场明确，但官员们认为这样做“不切实际”。8 他们知道美国谈判代表说过的话，并因此预料保留条款可能会使美国在第二次审议时拒绝批准该条约。此外，墨西哥参议院坚信里约格兰德河的协议是很好的。在不放弃任何已经失去的东西的情况下，墨西哥将获得粮食控制权、水电以及里约格兰德河下游数千英亩土地的可靠开发。这些考虑使墨西哥参议院的行为成为既定事实，于 9 月 27 日以全票通过了批准决议。$$

IX

California officials followed the Mexican debates with great interest. They noted the wide divergence of opinion on many of the treaty's important points and had their senators, Sheridan Downey and William Knowland, who had succeeded the late Hiram Johnson, contact Secretary of State Tames Byrnes about the discrepancies.** But Byrnes was surprisingly undisturbed by the reports. Since Mexico had attached no reservations to the treaty, he believed there was "no basis for assuming that the two Governments entertain contrary views with respect to any of the provisions of the treaty."s Satisfied, Byrnes agreed to the exchange of ratifications and, on November 8, the treaty entered into force.
加利福尼亚官员对墨西哥的辩论非常关注。他们注意到许多条约重要条款意见分歧很大，并让他们的参议员谢拉顿·唐尼和威廉·诺兰德（接替了已故的赫拉姆·约翰逊）联系国务卿詹姆斯·伯恩斯，讨论这些分歧。但伯恩斯对这些报告表现得相当不以为意。由于墨西哥在条约中没有附加保留条款，他认为“没有理由假设两国对条约的任何条款持有不同的看法。”伯恩斯满意地同意交换批准文书，条约于 11 月 8 日正式生效。

Why Byrnes could take the position he did in view of the obvious disagreement over interpretation is not easy to explain.
伯恩斯为何能采取这样的立场，尽管显然存在对条约解释的分歧，这一点很难解释。

Perhaps the reason lay partly in ineptness and partly in his lack of good advice owing to several important shake-ups that had occurred in the State Department. While the treaty was being negotiated and signed ,Cordell Hull had been Secretary of State .In December ,1944,Edward Stettinius ,Jr.,had replaced Hull. Then in July, 1945, shortly after the Senate had approved the treaty, Byrnes had replaced Stettinius. Changes had also taken place on lower, but equally important, levels of leadership.
或许原因部分在于无能，部分在于他在国务院经历了几次重要变动后缺乏好的建议。在条约谈判和签署期间，科德尔·赫尔担任国务卿。1944 年 12 月，埃德温·斯坦丁尼兹接替赫尔。然后在 1945 年 7 月，参议院批准条约后不久，伯内斯又接替斯坦丁尼兹。领导层在较低层面也发生了变化，但同样重要。

For example, between 1943 and 1945 the policy-making position for Latin-American affairs changed hands four times and each new appointee adopted a different program. "The ship of state zig-zagged," wrote Laurence Duggan, a top official in the Latin American Division at the time, and "no one could tell with certainty where it was headed." o Then, too, the end of World War I brought the State Department heavy responsibilities, including the negotiations to launch the United Nations. Finally, most Americans and Mexicans had come to associate the treaty, regardless of its imperfections, with the Good Neighbor Policy.
例如，从 1943 年到 1945 年，拉丁美洲事务的政策制定职位四次易手，每个新任命的人都采取了不同的计划。“国家之船在曲折前行，”当时拉丁美洲部门的高级官员劳伦斯·杜甘写道，“没有人能确切地知道它将驶向何方。”此外，第一次世界大战结束带来了巨大的责任，包括启动联合国的谈判。最后，大多数美国人和墨西哥人都将条约（尽管有其不足之处）与睦邻政策联系在一起。

Though these were all weighty considerations, they should not have interfered with an attempt to reach a meeting of minds with Mexico.
尽管这些都是重要的考虑因素，它们不应该妨碍与墨西哥达成思想共识的尝试。

When the heat of treaty discussions had cooled, there were many advantages that were obvious to most people. The allocation of water on the lower Rio Grande had been settled, allowing for an orderly development of that vast international region, While the United States gained greater benefits there, Mexico won advantages in the Colorado Delta region. The guaranteed water allowed for the continued prosperity of that fertile area where Mexican farmers now began flocking in larger num-bers. Mexico may have obtained a lesser amount of water than she would have received had the controversy gone to arbitra-tion, but, if arbitration had been forced, both nations would probably have been the poorer for it. Nor to be forgotten were the treaty's significant implications for the Good Neighbor Policy and for United States postwar plans. Though rejection of the treaty would probably not have sidetracked the creation of the United Nations, it might have embittered relations between the United States and Mexico, thus adversely affecting the Good Neighbor Foliey and the subsequent role of the United States in the United Nations.
当条约谈判的热度消退后，许多优势变得显而易见。里奥格兰德河下游的水资源分配问题已经解决，这使得那个广阔的国际区域得以有序开发。美国在该区域获得了更大的利益，而墨西哥则在科罗拉多河三角洲地区获得了优势。保证的水资源使得那个肥沃的地区继续繁荣，墨西哥农民也开始以更大的数量涌入该地区。即使墨西哥获得的水量比仲裁裁决的情况下要少，但如果被迫进行仲裁，两国可能都会变得更穷。此外，条约对“睦邻政策”以及美国战后计划的重大意义也不容忽视。尽管拒绝条约可能不会妨碍联合国的建立，但它可能会使美国和墨西哥的关系恶化，从而对“睦邻政策”以及美国在联合国中的后续角色产生不利影响。

In its own ambiguous way, the treaty had perhaps even larger international implications, for it represented an importan
条约以它那含糊不清的方式，或许还具有更大的国际意义，因为它代表了一个重要的

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除了那个不断增长的先例列表之外，在其中更多 dh 吧 A

lip service was accorded a nation's claims to its existing use True enough, there was disagreement over just how much Colorado River water Mexico was using and, admittedly, there was a treaty provision proclaiming that the pact was based on considerations of "cordiality and friendly cooperation" and not on any legal principle growing out of earlier international water con-troversies. Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding the treaty -like those surrounding earlier water treaties and negotiations that involved the United States clearly indicate that the ques-ion of existing uses was a most important consideration.
对国家现有的用水权利表示了认同不错，确实存在关于墨西哥实际使用科罗拉多河水量的分歧，而且确实有一个条约条款宣称该协定是基于“友好合作和亲切友好”的考虑，而不是基于早期国际水资源争议的任何法律原则。然而，类似地，围绕该条约的情况——就像早期涉及美国的水资源条约和谈判的情况一样——清楚地表明，现有用水问题是一个非常重要的考虑因素。

Nor did Californians remain completely disappointed with some aspects of the treaty. For example, the failure to provide compensation for the Imperial Irrigation District's Alamo investment in Mexico had been considered a serious omission.
加利福尼亚人对条约的一些方面并没有完全失望。例如，未能为帝国灌溉区在墨西哥的阿拉莫投资提供补偿，被认为是一个严重的疏漏。

Subsequently, however, Mexico agreed to pay $350,000 as its share of the $8,000,000 investment. Although this recompense was rather paltry, certain considerations should be borne in mind: Americans, not Mexicans, had been major beneficaries of the levee system until after expropriation in 1938, and the levee system had protected, and was continuing to protect, land in both countries. Moreover, any injustice done the ID was softened considerably when Congress later gave the district a credit of $3,000,000-to be applied to the cost of the All-Ameri-can Canal for its Mexican levee system.??
然而，墨西哥随后同意支付 350,000 美元作为其对 800 万美元投资的份额。尽管这种补偿相当微薄，但仍需考虑一些因素：在 1938 年征用之前，美国人而非墨西哥人一直是堤防系统的最大受益者，而堤防系统不仅保护了两国的土地，而且仍在继续保护这些土地。此外，当国会后来给予该地区 3,000,000 美元的信用额度（用于抵消全美运河的成本，包括墨西哥堤防系统）时，对 ID 的任何不公也得到了极大的缓解。

But the fact remains that the treaty could have definitely been improved if the two nations had harmonized their interpretations of "extraordinary drought" and water quality. The United States, instead of putting its faith in the crudely measured river flow of 18,000,000 acre-feet, should have listened to the treaty's critics and emphasized the decades of more accurate measurement when the volume was considerably less. Observers were familiar with the river's past erratie flows. If they had taken them into consideration instead of giving Mexico a specific volume of water, subject only to an ambiguous "extraor-dinary drought" provision, their planning would have been more realistic. Perhaps the issues of drought and water quality represented areas on which no agreement could have been reached.
但事实 remains that the treaty could have definitely been improved if the two nations had harmonized their interpretations of "extraordinary drought" and water quality. 美国 instead of putting its faith in the crudely measured river flow of 18,000,000 acre-feet, should have listened to the treaty's critics and emphasized the decades of more accurate measurement when the volume was considerably less. 观察者们熟悉该河过去不规则的流量。如果他们考虑到这一点，而不是给墨西哥一个特定的水量，该水量仅受“异常干旱”条款的模糊规定，他们的规划将会更加现实。或许干旱和水质的问题代表了双方无法达成一致的领域。

Thoush that might te taue both coupties wisprouely dleniad 邮
尽管两国都 wisprously 地拖延了，但你可以将其翻译为： 尽管两国都 wisprously 地拖延了，但

any such deadlock. Obviously, a conflict with Mexico was in the making, and no one who was in a position to do so was trying to prevent it.
任何这样的僵局。显然，与墨西哥的冲突在所难免，而处于能够阻止这一局势的人却没有采取行动。