The IMF cannot solve Argentina‘s dysfunctionIMF 不能解决阿根廷的功能障碍

Editor′s note: On January 28th, after this story was published, the government of Argentina announced that it had reached an understanding with the IMF. The plan, which will be implemented over the next two and a half years, foresees a reduction in the fiscal deficit from 3% in 2021 to 0.9% by 2024, in part through more efficient tax collection. Any actual deal must be approved by Argentina′s Congress.编辑注：本文发布后的 1 月 28 日，阿根廷政府宣布已与 IMF 达成了谅解。根据这项计划，将在接下来的两年半内实施，预计财政赤字将从 2021 年的 3% 减少至 2024 年的 0.9%，部分通过更有效的税收征集来实现。任何实际协议必须经阿根廷国会批准。

IF YOU LEAVE Argentina for ten days, the joke goes, everything changes. Come back in 20 years, however, and everything seems the same. Two decades ago an IMF programme failed to stop an economic crisis in Argentina. Between 1998 and 2002 GDP tumbled by nearly 20%, and the government defaulted on its debt for the seventh time in its history. Today Argentina's future once again hinges on negotiations with the IMF. So far talks are not going well.如果你离开阿根廷十天，那就像个笑话，说一切都会变化。但是再过 20 年回来，似乎一切都没变。二十年前，国际货币基金组织的一项计划未能阻止阿根廷的经济危机。在 1998 年至 2002 年间，国内生产总值下降了将近 20％，政府第七次违约。今天，阿根廷的未来再次取决于与国际货币基金组织的谈判。到目前为止，谈判并不顺利。

In 2020 Argentina‘s government defaulted on its debt once again, leaving a $57bn loan provided by the IMF in 2018 in a state of limbo. The government is now negotiating with the fund, seeking an agreement which would revive the loan arrangement and delay repayments.2020 年，阿根廷政府再次违约，导致 2018 年 IMF 提供的 570 亿美元贷款陷入僵局。政府正在与基金进行谈判，寻求一项协议，以恢复贷款安排并延迟偿还。

Over the next two years, Argentina must make payments to the IMF totalling about $40bn or risk becoming a financial pariah (see chart 1). That is money the country does not have. And the backdrop to the negotiations is forbidding. The peso on the parallel exchange market is now worth half the official rate. Annual inflation is above 50%.在接下来的两年里，阿根廷必须向国际货币基金组织支付约 400 亿美元，否则将面临财务孤立的风险（见图表 1）。这是该国没有的钱。而谈判的背景也十分严峻。并行汇市上的比索现在价值仅为官方汇率的一半。年通货膨胀率超过 50%。

After a difficult start to the millennium, Argentina‘s economy enjoyed a decade of strong growth, powered by a global boom in trade and commodity prices. But from 2012 onwards the market for commodities softened. Frustration with economic stagnation contributed to the election, in 2015, of Mauricio Macri, a liberal-minded politician. His victory ended years of rule by Peronists, members of a populist movement that has dominated Argentina for decades.进入新千年以来，阿根廷经济经历了艰难的开端，但后来在全球贸易和大宗商品价格上涨的推动下，经济实现了十年来强劲增长。然而，从 2012 年开始，大宗商品市场逐渐趋缓。对经济停滞的不满促成了 2015 年选举中自由主义政治家毛里西奥・马克里的当选。他的胜利结束了由班派人掌权持续数十年的时代，班派是一个主导阿根廷政治多年的民粹主义运动。

Mr Macri‘s government pursued some reforms. But structural problems continued to impede growth. And the government’s gradual approach to fiscal consolidation meant that Argentina relied heavily on capital markets to fund a budget deficit which ran at over 5% of GDP through his first three years in office. In 2018, as rising interest rates in the United States contributed to a tightening of global financial conditions, markets grew wary of the state of Argentina‘s finances, and Mr Macri turned to the IMF for help.马克里先生的政府进行了一些改革。但是结构性问题继续阻碍着经济增长。政府对财政整顿采取逐步方式，这意味着阿根廷在他上任的头三年中严重依赖资本市场来资助预算赤字，该赤字占 GDP 的 5% 以上。2018 年，随着美国利率上升导致全球金融状况收紧，市场开始对阿根廷财政状况感到担忧，马克里先生求助于国际货币基金组织。

The loan the IMF agreed to provide—an initial $50bn, subsequently raised to $57bn, of which $44bn was ultimately disbursed—was the largest in the fund‘s history. It was intended to reassure markets and thus to restore the flow of private credit; the programme’s architects expected that much of the available money might never need to be handed over.IMF 同意提供的贷款一开始是 500 亿美元，随后增加至 570 亿美元，其中 440 亿最终被拨付，这是该基金历史上最大的贷款。它旨在安抚市场，从而恢复私人信贷的流动；该计划的设计者预期，很大一部分可用资金可能永远不会被支付。

But markets remained skittish. Signs of stabilisation evaporated with Mr Macri‘s loss to Alberto Fernández, a Peronist, in elections in 2019. The peso tumbled, inflation surged and in 2020 the new government began working to restructure nearly $100bn in privately held foreign-currency debt. It cancelled the deal with the IMF.但是市场仍然心神不宁。随着马克里先生在 2019 年的选举中败给佩罗尼斯派的阿尔贝托・费尔南德斯，市场的稳定迹象消失了。比索暴跌，通货膨胀飙升，2020 年新政府开始着手重组近 1000 亿美元的私人持有外币债务。该政府取消了与国际货币基金组织的协议。

The current negotiations come at a difficult time. A boom in commodity prices in early 2021 provided much-needed relief to the Argentine economy. But GDP remains about 8% below the level of 2017. A slowdown in global growth this year will weigh on commodity prices. As central banks around the world raise interest rates to tame inflation, financial conditions look ever less forgiving. And the government has continued to run hefty budget deficits, which it funds by printing money (see chart 2). In 2021 the central bank printed the equivalent of 4% of GDP.
目前的谈判正值困难时期。2021 年初大宗商品价格的飙升为阿根廷经济提供了急需的缓解。但 gdp 仍比 2017 年水平低 8% 左右。今年全球经济增长放缓将对大宗商品价格构成压力。随着世界各国央行提高利率以抑制通胀，金融状况看起来越来越不宽容。政府继续保持巨额预算赤字，通过印钞来筹集资金（见图表 2）。2021 年，央行印制了相当于 GDP 4% 的印制量。

A self-lacerating evaluation of the 2018 deal, published by the IMF in December, fuelled notions that the fund deserves most of the blame. The potential costs of failed negotiations to the IMF have further contributed to the government‘s recalcitrance. Because the fund stands to lose money and face, any attempt to drive a hard bargain will be less credible, the thinking goes.2018 年的一项自我批评评估报告于 12 月份由 IMF 发布，加剧了人们认为该基金应该为大部分责任负责的观念。谈判失败可能给 IMF 带来的成本进一步导致了政府的顽固态度。因为基金可能会损失资金和面子，所以任何试图强硬讨价还价的举动都将变得信誓旦旦，大家这么认为。

Although the current negotiations are important, Argentina‘s economic ills pre-date the loan in 2018. Populist politicians have long meddled in the markets. After the price of meat rose last year with inflation, beef exports were banned. When the ruling coalition lost a primary election in September, the government slapped price controls on more than 1,400 products, from shaving cream to cat food. Its budgets are distorted by sops to special interests. Public sector employment has ballooned over the past decade while the private sector has shrunk. Regressive utility subsidies amount to 1.5% of GDP for electricity alone.尽管当前的谈判很重要，但阿根廷在 2018 年贷款之前已经存在经济问题。民粹主义政治家长期干预市场。去年肉价随通货膨胀上涨后，牛肉出口被禁止。当执政联盟在 9 月的初选中失利时，政府对超过 1400 种产品实施了价格控制，从剃须膏到猫粮不一而足。政府的预算被特殊利益团体的红利所扭曲。公共部门就业在过去十年间大幅增长，而私营部门则在萎缩。对递延电费补贴中，以弱势为主的公共事业支出独占国内生产总值的 1.5%。

The IMF cannot simply demand reforms to address such problems. The more it asks of Argentina, the less confident it can feel that conditions will be met. However, the fund seems to have insisted on an improvement in the fiscal outlook. Last year‘s economic rebound helped to shrink Argentina’s primary budget deficit (ie, before interest costs) from more than 6% of GDP in 2020 down to 3%.IMF 不能简单地要求进行改革来解决这些问题。它要求阿根廷做得越多，就越难保证条件会得到满足。然而，基金似乎坚持改善财政前景。去年的经济反弹帮助缩减了阿根廷的主要预算赤字（即在利息成本之前）从 2020 年的国内生产总值超过 6% 降至 3%。

Martín Guzmán, the economy minister, insists that further reductions should occur at a slow pace, with the primary deficit closed by 2027. That is too slow for the fund‘s tastes, and involves too many years of government spending financed by the printing presses.马丁・古兹曼，经济部长，坚持认为进一步的削减应该缓慢进行，财政赤字应在 2027 年得到解决。这对于基金的口味来说太慢了，并涉及太多年份的政府支出由印钞机来融资。

On top of this, the political class appears too busy squabbling to deal with bigger issues. The government has failed to unite in negotiations. Mr Guzmán seems to spend more time trying to convince the powerful Peronist vice-president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, of the need for a deal than writing a credible programme. On January 18th Ms Kirchner wrote on her website that the “Macrista pandemic” (ie, the rule of Mr Macri) had been worse than covid-19. She blames the Peronists‘ loss in recent mid-terms—the worst defeat in 40 years—on spending cuts. The temptation to spend ahead of next year’s presidential election could mean that even if a deal is signed, it could quickly veer off track.此外，政治界貌似总是忙于争吵而无暇处理更大的问题。政府未能在谈判中团结一致。古兹曼先生似乎花费更多时间说服强大的佩罗尼斯党副总统克里斯蒂娜・费尔南德斯・德基什内尔，达成协议的必要性，而不是编写可靠的方案。1 月 18 日，基什内尔女士在她的网站上写道，“麦科里的瘟疫”（即麦克里的统治）比新冠疫情还要糟糕。她将佩罗尼斯党在最近的中期选举中遭受的 40 年来最惨痛的失败归咎于开支削减。在明年总统选举之前大举支出的诱惑可能意味着即使达成协议，也可能很快偏离轨道。

Meanwhile the centre-right opposition, whose leaders are fighting over who will be the presidential candidate, have refused to meet Mr Guzmán, arguing that he hasn‘t presented a credible economic plan. Even if they win the presidential race, it is not clear they would make serious changes. Federico Sturzenegger, a former central-bank chief, notes that the three non-Peronist administrations that have been in power since the return to democracy in 1983 have failed to stick to fiscal discipline or rein in interest groups.与此同时，中右翼反对派领袖们正在争夺总统候选人的位置，他们拒绝与古兹曼先生会面，理由是他并未提出可信的经济计划。即使他们赢得总统竞选，也不清楚他们是否会做出重大改变。前央行行长费德里科・斯图根内格尔指出，自 1983 年恢复民主以来，三届非佩罗尼主义政府未能遵守财政纪律或控制利益集团。

With deadlines looming, the government is flailing. On January 26th Clarín, an Argentine newspaper, reported that the government had warned that it may miss two payments to the IMF, due on January 28th and February 1st, totalling $1.1bn. It has reportedly asked China for an increase in the size of a standing arrangement with the Chinese government, by which Argentina swaps its currency for an equivalent amount of yuan—a globally accepted reserve currency—thus bolstering its foreign-exchange reserves. Mr Fernández is due to visit Beijing in February.随着最后期限的迫近，政府陷入了困境。阿根廷《克拉琳报》1 月 26 日报道，政府警告称可能无法按时支付两笔国际货币基金组织（IMF）于 1 月 28 日和 2 月 1 日到期的总额为 11 亿美元的款项。据报道，阿根廷已向中国寻求增加与中国政府的一项常设安排的规模，该安排使阿根廷可以将其货币置换为等值的人民币（一种全球公认的储备货币），从而增强其外汇储备。费尔南德斯先生预定在二月拜访北京。

Such shenanigans are no substitute for fiscal reform. Achieving a budget balance in a difficult post-pandemic environment will not be easy. High inflation is already eroding the real value of some social spending. A new IMF deal without a commitment to reform and near-term budget balance would buy a little time. But it would not do much to boost growth or to win the confidence of investors.这些诡计并不能替代财政改革。在疫情后期的困难环境中实现预算平衡绝非易事。高通胀已经侵蚀了部分社会支出的实际价值。一项新的 IMF 协议若没有改革承诺和近期预算平衡，只能暂时稳住局面。但这并不能大力促进经济增长或赢得投资者的信心。

Falling into arrears with the IMF, by contrast, would leave Argentina cut off from other multilateral lenders, who are one of its few remaining sources of credit. In the worst-case scenario, a default could trigger a panic similar to 2001. The outlook is grim. And carries a whiff of déjà vu. ■与 IMF 拖欠债务相比，会导致阿根廷与其他多边借款人的脱钩，而这些借款人是其仅存的信贷来源之一。在最糟糕的情况下，违约可能引发类似于 2001 年的恐慌。前景黯淡，带有一丝似曾相识的气息。 ■