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In this report: 本报告内容：
- 2024 Overview 2024 年概览
- Our 2025 outlook for Chinese assets
我们对 2025 年中国资产的展望 - Policies to continue to lead economic fundamentals Still robust growth potential that only Beijing could suppress
政策将继续引领经济基本面，仍具备只有北京才能抑制的强劲增长潜力 - A wide arc of a policy turn began in 2023 and will likely continue in 2025
2023 年开始的政策转向大势将在 2025 年可能继续 - New protectionist measures by the US may lead to more remedial domestic policies
美国的新保护主义措施可能导致更多补救性的国内政策 - An equities-led turn in the markets
市场将出现以股票为主导的转变 - Why the strange correlations between bonds and equities in Q4 2024?
为什么 2024 年第四季度债券与股票之间出现奇怪的相关性？ - Risks to our outlook
我们展望中的风险
2024 Overview 2024 年概述
RMB bonds were the best-performing major bond market in the world in 2024; please see the chart below. While this superior performance was due to China’s much lower inflation (0.1 percent in 2024 and 3.1 percent cumulatively since 2020, compared to 2.5 percent and 22 percent in the US, respectively), China’s troubled economics also played a role. In any case, investors buy bonds for various reasons, including holding bonds to guard against bad economic news. In this sense, the strategy of long RMB bonds worked very well in 2024.
2024 年，人民币债券是全球表现最好的主要债券市场；请参见下方图表。虽然这种优异表现归因于中国较低的通胀率（2024 年为 0.1%，自 2020 年以来累计为 3.1%，而美国分别为 2.5%和 22%），但中国经济的困境也起到了一定作用。无论如何，投资者购买债券有多种原因，包括持有债券以防范不利的经济消息。从这个意义上说，2024 年长期持有人民币债券的策略非常有效。
The bad news about China’s economy has translated into strong performances in Chinese bonds. Since the summer of 2021, when Beijing adopted a harshly hawkish regulatory stance, RMB bonds have rallied by a cumulative 22 percent (total return). While in most EM markets, bad economic news often leads to poor equity, bond, and currency performances, in China, the negative correlation between equities and bonds has been largely preserved. A positive way to view this strong bond performance is that much of the on-shore institutional money has shifted from equities (and property) markets to bonds without fleeing the Chinese market. The negative way to view this is that capital controls have trapped capital onshore, resulting in the bond market rally being exaggerated relative to the economic fundamentals because investors in China have been unable to shift their assets to alternative investments outside China.
关于中国经济的坏消息转化为中国债券的强劲表现。自 2021 年夏季北京采取严厉鹰派监管立场以来，人民币债券累计上涨了 22%（总回报）。在大多数新兴市场中，经济不佳的消息通常导致股票、债券和货币表现不佳，而在中国，股票与债券之间的负相关关系基本保持不变。对这种债券强劲表现的积极看法是，大量境内机构资金已从股票（和房地产）市场转向债券市场，而没有逃离中国市场。消极的看法是，资本管制将资金困在境内，导致债券市场的反弹相对于经济基本面被夸大，因为中国投资者无法将资产转移到境外的替代投资。
In any case, the annual return of 8.9 pecent on central government bonds (CGBs) in China marks the highest single-year return since 2014.
无论如何，中国中央政府债券（CGBs）8.9%的年回报率标志着自 2014 年以来的最高单年回报。
Not only have Chinese RMB bonds thrived in 2024, they have continued to be the best safe haven asset in the world in the past two decades. We have been tracking the performances of a wide range of assets during difficult times – either significant economic setbacks or financial fractures anywhere in the world. The chart below shows that Chinese RMB bonds consistently outperform most other assets across various negative scenarios. Cumulatively, over the eight episodes we have identified over the past two decades, Chinese RMB bonds have been the top performer by a significant margin. Chinese bonds, thus, remain the best safe haven ballast for risk asset exposures.
不仅中国人民币债券在 2024 年表现出色，过去二十年中它们一直是全球最佳的避险资产。我们一直在跟踪各种资产在困难时期——无论是重大经济挫折还是全球任何地方的金融危机——的表现。下图显示，中国人民币债券在各种负面情景中持续优于大多数其他资产。累计来看，在我们过去二十年识别的八个事件中，中国人民币债券以显著优势成为表现最佳的资产。因此，中国债券依然是风险资产敞口中最佳的避险支柱。
Chinese equities have struggled under the weight of the poor economic fundamentals, which were mostly policy-induced, in our opinion. While the macroeconomic misalignments that had existed in China before the regulatory tightening that began in mid-2021 were substantial, Beijing’s policies in correcting these imbalances were less than perfect. Many outside China might agree, even if few inside China would openly admit this. Privately owned enterprises (POEs) fought macroeconomic headwinds centred on a collapsing property market and a general perception that the government no longer trusted POEs. Not only was headline GDP and company revenues growth slower than in previous years, but the bottom line corporate earnings contracted in 2024.
中国股市在经济基本面疲弱的重压下表现不佳，我们认为这主要是政策引发的。尽管在 2021 年中期开始的监管收紧之前，中国存在的宏观经济失衡问题相当严重，但北京在纠正这些失衡方面的政策并不完美。许多中国以外的人可能会同意这一点，尽管很少有中国内部人士会公开承认。民营企业（POEs）面临着以房地产市场崩溃为中心的宏观经济逆风，以及普遍认为政府不再信任民营企业的看法。不仅名义 GDP 和公司收入增长比往年放缓，企业净利润在 2024 年也出现了收缩。
In 2024, while equity markets, at one time, had a maximum drawdown of 14 percent (as of September 2024), policy interventions triggered a rally from then that flattered the CY2024 performance to +25 percent towards the end of the year. The chart below shows how the China A Shares responded to the news.
2024 年，尽管股市一度最大回撤达到 14%（截至 2024 年 9 月），但政策干预引发了随后的一波反弹，使 2024 年全年表现美化至年底上涨 25%。下图显示了中国 A 股对该消息的反应。
Our 2025 outlook for Chinese assets
我们对 2025 年中国资产的展望
Based on a few important assumptions, below is our baseline forecast for Chinese assets in 2025.
基于几个重要假设，以下是我们对 2025 年中国资产的基线预测。
The economy's real growth is assumed to hover at around 4.5-5.0 percent in 2025, with no inflation or deflation. Consumer and producer confidence is expected to be incrementally nursed back into health by instalments of fiscal stimulus and regulatory easing on the POEs. Corporate earnings should finally start to recover.
预计 2025 年经济实际增长率将维持在 4.5%至 5.0%左右，通胀或通缩均无明显变化。消费者和生产者信心预计将通过分阶段的财政刺激和对民营企业的监管放松逐步恢复。企业盈利应最终开始回升。
Back in November 2024, the government finally announced large-sized fiscal transfers from the central government to help discharge some of the local government debt. To us, these measures are similar to the bailouts during the European Debt Crisis of 2011-12, with the key difference being that a communist regime is averse to acknowledging any write-off on the local government debt obligations. In contrast, in Europe, the size of the transfers and loans to the crisis-hit member countries were ‘real’ instead of ‘notional.’
早在 2024 年 11 月，政府终于宣布了中央政府的大规模财政转移支付，以帮助偿还部分地方政府债务。对我们来说，这些措施类似于 2011-12 年欧洲债务危机期间的救助，关键区别在于共产主义政权不愿承认对地方政府债务义务的任何减记。相比之下，在欧洲，向受危机影响的成员国提供的转移支付和贷款是“真实”的，而非“名义上的”。
In any case, the point is that Beijing’s tolerance threshold was breached last fall, provoking an acute but essentially defensive response to truncate the left tails for the financial markets and the economy. Because of what we witnessed in China last year, we assume that Beijing will continue to do what it takes to keep China growing above the ‘stall speed’ or just above 4.5 percent.
无论如何，关键是北京的容忍阈值在去年秋天被突破，促使其采取了急迫但本质上是防御性的反应，以截断金融市场和经济的左尾风险。鉴于我们去年在中国所见，我们假设北京将继续采取必要措施，保持中国经济增长在“停滞速度”之上，或略高于 4.5%。
Having said this, we also expect Beijing to continue to be parsimonious with its stimuli to minimise moral hazard problems that the super-sized 2009 bailout created. Our assumption is that the cumulative fiscal stimulus will ultimately be around 10-15 percent of GDP. For an economy with a nominal 2024 GDP of around RMB 130 trillion, this would be RMB13-20 trillion. The announcements so far suggest that we may only be at the halfway point in terms of the fiscal transfers needed. The additional stimulus will likely be announced in instalments.
话虽如此，我们也预计北京将继续谨慎使用刺激措施，以最大限度地减少 2009 年超大规模救助所带来的道德风险问题。我们的假设是，累计财政刺激最终将达到 GDP 的 10-15%左右。对于 2024 年名义 GDP 约为 130 万亿元人民币的经济体来说，这将是 13-20 万亿元人民币。迄今为止的公告表明，我们可能仅处于财政转移支付所需的一半左右。额外的刺激措施可能会分批宣布。
For sovereign bonds, the current 10Y CGB yield of around 1.6 percent is already too low, in our view, but will likely only rise very gradually. There is a debate on whether China is inevitably heading toward Japan’s debt-deflation spiral. Our position, for what it is worth, is that China won’t be a Japan. We will discuss this below. The equilibrium long-term interest rates might not be too far below China’s nominal GDP growth rate, which might be around 3.5-4.0 percent. For 2025, our target for the 10Y CGB yield is 1.75-2.00 percent.
对于主权债券而言，目前 10 年期中国国债收益率约为 1.6%，在我们看来已经偏低，但可能只会非常缓慢地上升。关于中国是否不可避免地走向日本的债务-通缩螺旋存在争论。就我们而言，我们认为中国不会成为日本。我们将在下文讨论这一点。长期均衡利率可能不会远低于中国的名义 GDP 增长率，预计约为 3.5-4.0%。2025 年，我们对 10 年期中国国债收益率的目标是 1.75-2.00%。
The yield spreads between the 10Y UST and the 10Y CGBs are important for investors to monitor. Capital controls in China have prevented the two biggest bond markets in the world from converging, as arbitrage opportunities are limited, and the two economies have been out of sync for several years now. Nevertheless, the two largest economies in the world that trade intensively – directly and indirectly – should not be out of sync with each other for so long unless the policies in the two countries are polar opposites. For context, until early-2024, the 15-year range of the spread between the 10Y sovereign yields of the US and China is +245 to -224 bps. We are, thus, at a fairly extreme level of spread. Currently, the spread is around -300 bps. A narrowing of the spread seems likely in the quarters ahead, i.e., the UST yields to fall while the CGB yields to rise. The speed with which this prospective yield convergence might occur will be a function of disinflation in the US and the PBOC’s monetary stance to support the Chinese economy. The equilibrium 10Y CGB yield of 3.5-4.0 percent, thus, implies a 0 bp spread between the US and China in the long run.
10 年期美国国债（UST）与 10 年期中国国债（CGB）之间的收益率利差对投资者来说非常重要。中国的资本管制阻止了全球两个最大债券市场的趋同，因为套利机会有限，且两国经济已经多年不同步。然而，作为全球两个最大的经济体，且贸易密切——无论是直接还是间接——两国经济不应长时间不同步，除非两国的政策截然相反。作为参考，截至 2024 年初，美国和中国 10 年期主权债券收益率利差在过去 15 年的区间为+245 至-224 个基点。因此，我们目前处于一个相当极端的利差水平。目前利差约为-300 个基点。未来几个季度利差缩小的可能性较大，即美国国债收益率下降，而中国国债收益率上升。利差收敛的速度将取决于美国的通胀下降情况以及中国人民银行支持中国经济的货币政策立场。由此，10 年期中国国债的均衡收益率在 3.5%-4.0%之间，意味着长期来看中美之间的利差为 0 个基点。
The credit spreads of policy banks relative to the CGBs have been compressed to only 5 bps now, from 38 bps in the summer of 2021 to an average of 65 bps over the five years ending in 2019. This is also abnormal, reflecting very large institutions' frantic search for yield. It may be premature to position in 2025 for normalisation in this credit spread, but the risks are clearly biased to the upside. For 2025, we expect the policy banks’ credit spread to widen modestly as the sovereign bond yield drifts higher.
政策性银行相对于中国国债的信用利差已被压缩至仅 5 个基点，而 2021 年夏季为 38 个基点，2015 年至 2019 年五年平均为 65 个基点。这也不正常，反映出大型机构对收益的疯狂追逐。现在为 2025 年信用利差正常化进行布局可能为时过早，但风险显然偏向上行。2025 年，我们预计随着主权债券收益率的上升，政策性银行的信用利差将适度扩大。
As mentioned above, we expect further defensive stimulative programs from Beijing. Without these prospective stimuli, Chinese equities might sag further because general investor sentiment remains poor. Countering this downward trend is the risk of more government interventions. Our judgment call is that bad news (lower equities and a weaker economy) will lead to good news (policy interventions). The left tails for companies and equities are effectively truncated, but the mean of the distribution of possible outcomes may not rise much. At 15x, China’s broad market PE is still relatively low, compared to 25 and 22 in the US and India, though it is not far from its long-term average of around 14-15x in the years before the Pandemic. As investors become more convinced that Beijing will not allow China to collapse, we believe China’s earnings growth should rise further in 2025.
如上所述，我们预计北京将推出更多防御性刺激计划。若没有这些潜在的刺激措施，中国股市可能会进一步下跌，因为整体投资者情绪依然低迷。抵消这一下行趋势的是更多政府干预的风险。我们的判断是，坏消息（股市下跌和经济疲软）将带来好消息（政策干预）。企业和股市的左尾风险实际上已被截断，但可能结果分布的均值可能不会有太大上升。以 15 倍的市盈率来看，中国的整体市场估值仍相对较低，较美国和印度的 25 倍和 22 倍而言，尽管这与疫情前几年约 14-15 倍的长期平均水平相差不远。随着投资者越来越相信北京不会允许中国崩溃，我们认为中国的盈利增长在 2025 年应会进一步提升。
The diagram above shows earnings growth (horizontal axis) versus the PE ratio (vertical axis). Most markets spread along a positively-sloped line: the higher the future earnings growth, the higher the PE ratio because the NPV (net present value of the discounted future stream of earnings) should be higher the fatter the earnings in the out-years. The red bubbles are the Chinese high-growth, the Chinese broad market, and the HK stock exchange. As shown in the diagram, they all trade at a discount from the rest of the world, i.e., below the hashed upward-sloping line. This risk premium, we are guessing, has a higher probability of shrinking further in 2025 than expanding. In 2025, we could see China’s PE rise to 15-17x. With some further recovery in earnings growth, this could mean a 10-20% percent upside in broad Chinese equities. This prospective rally will not be monotonic for the reasons explained above.
上图显示了收益增长（横轴）与市盈率（纵轴）的关系。大多数市场沿着一条正斜率线分布：未来收益增长越高，市盈率越高，因为未来收益流的贴现净现值（NPV）随着未来年份收益的增加而增加。红色气泡代表中国高增长市场、中国广义市场和香港证券交易所。如图所示，它们的交易价格均低于世界其他地区，即低于虚线向上倾斜的线。这种风险溢价，我们猜测，在 2025 年缩小的可能性大于扩大的可能性。2025 年，我们可能看到中国的市盈率上升至 15-17 倍。随着收益增长的进一步恢复，这可能意味着中国广义股票有 10-20%的上涨空间。正如上述原因所解释的，这一预期的反弹不会是单调的。
Trade-in subsidies may be broadened to entice consumers to spend on staples and, hopefully, some discretionary products. Buy-backs and SOE reforms could also boost the equity prices of certain sectors and companies. But we believe it would be prudent to remain defensive with high-yield names.
以旧换新补贴可能会扩大，以吸引消费者购买日用品，并希望购买一些非必需品。回购和国有企业改革也可能提振某些行业和公司的股价。但我们认为对高收益股票保持防御性是明智的。
As mentioned above, better economic growth should flatter corporate earnings, which have slowed to -8% in 2024, down from a 10-year average of 4%. By sector, similar to what we wrote for 2024, we retain a barbell strategy into the new year. Defensive sectors, like SOE banks, utilities, and energy, will continue to outperform before there are clear signals of improvement in economic fundamentals, like property, CPI and consumption, although we change the order of preference. We prefer SOE banks as their valuations are still very low, and they will benefit if the economy really improves in 2025. At the other end of the barbell, we still like the IT sector. In 2025, the adoption of AI will probably lead to significant changes in consumer electronics, like smartphones, PCs, AI glasses and earphones, and therefore, there may be a new round of consumer upgrades of their devices. The trade-in policies of China will expand to include smartphones, tablets, and smartwatches. Chinese companies play an important role in consumer electronics, so they will benefit from the new round of upgrades. In an optimistic scenario, if the Chinese economy improves and the property market stabilised, blue-chip large growth sectors, like consumption-related sectors and real-estate related sectors, could outperform as risk sentiment returns and expectations improve.
如上所述，更好的经济增长应有利于企业盈利，2024 年企业盈利已放缓至-8%，低于过去十年平均的 4%。按行业划分，与我们对 2024 年的观点类似，我们在新的一年中仍保持杠铃策略。防御性行业，如国有银行、公用事业和能源，在经济基本面出现明显改善信号（如房地产、CPI 和消费）之前，将继续表现优异，尽管我们调整了偏好顺序。我们更看好国有银行，因为其估值仍然很低，且如果经济在 2025 年真正改善，它们将受益。在杠铃的另一端，我们仍然看好 IT 行业。2025 年，人工智能的应用可能会带来消费电子产品的重大变化，如智能手机、个人电脑、AI 眼镜和耳机，因此，可能会出现新一轮的消费升级换代。中国的以旧换新政策将扩大至智能手机、平板电脑和智能手表。中国企业在消费电子领域扮演重要角色，因此将受益于新一轮的升级换代。 在乐观的情景下，如果中国经济改善且房地产市场稳定，蓝筹大成长板块，如消费相关板块和房地产相关板块，可能会随着风险偏好回升和预期改善而表现优异。
For the Chinese RMB, we were not correct last year in expecting USDCNY to trade lower due to disinflation in the US, lower interest rates in the US, and the heavy weight of an overhang of dollars held by Chinese exporters. Even though we were wrong on this market call, we believe that the dollar is grossly over-valued and the key fundamentals supporting the dollar were flattered by both the oversized fiscal posture and inflation – both of which need to reverse further in the coming years. For 2025, we are not making a strong call on USDCNY because getting the timing right on this prospective turn lower in this cross has proven difficult for us. Investors know our thinking; that’s what's important.
对于人民币，我们去年预测由于美国通胀下降、美国利率降低以及中国出口商持有大量美元的压力，USDCNY 汇率会走低，但这一判断并不正确。尽管我们在这一市场判断上失误，但我们认为美元被严重高估，支撑美元的关键基本面因素受到过度财政政策和通胀的影响——这两者在未来几年都需要进一步逆转。对于 2025 年，我们不会对 USDCNY 做出强烈预测，因为准确把握这一汇率可能下行的时机对我们来说一直很困难。投资者了解我们的观点；这才是最重要的。
In sum, for 2025, we are positive on Chinese equities, cautious on Chinese bonds, and agnostic on the currency with the view that a stronger CNY would make more sense to us than a weaker CNY. (More on this topic below.)
总的来说，2025 年我们对中国股票持积极态度，对中国债券持谨慎态度，对人民币汇率持中立态度，我们认为人民币走强比走弱更合理。（关于这一话题的更多内容见下文。）
Policies to continue to lead economic fundamentals
政策将继续引领经济基本面
Policies are usually important for every country but are not always the dominant factor to consider. In China, however, policies have absolutely dominated its economic trend in recent years. What Beijing has done since mid-2021 is highly unusual compared to its history over the past quarter of a century. In the pursuit of ‘equality’ or ‘equity’, Beijing has chosen to impose regulations to severely restrict the ability of certain sectors to thrive. The property market arguably could have been slowed through property taxes instead of the draconian sudden-stop mandates that severely disrupted the entire property ecosystem overnight.
政策通常对每个国家都很重要，但并不总是主要的考虑因素。然而，在中国，近年来政策绝对主导了经济趋势。自 2021 年中以来，北京所采取的措施与过去 25 年的历史相比极为不同。为了追求“平等”或“公平”，北京选择实施监管，严厉限制某些行业的发展能力。房地产市场本可以通过房产税来放缓，而不是通过严厉的突然停止令，导致整个房地产生态系统一夜之间严重受挫。
What happens to China in 2025 and beyond will likely continue to be dictated by policies out of Beijing.
2025 年及以后中国的走向很可能继续由北京的政策决定。
Still robust growth potential that only Beijing could suppress
仍然具有强劲的增长潜力，只有北京才能抑制
We still believe China has huge potential to achieve outsized economic growth if only its private sector could be allowed by Beijing to do so. Much of the foreign commentaries suggest that China's economic plight reflects its inability to grow. In contrast, we believe it is more of an ‘unwillingness’ question, or a question about the policy orientation of Beijing, whether it genuinely believes in maximising the overall prosperity of the nation as the primary goal and whether the government trusts that the private sector could be allowed to be the main propellant for such growth.
我们仍然相信，如果北京允许私营部门这样做，中国有巨大的潜力实现超常的经济增长。许多外国评论认为中国的经济困境反映了其无法增长。相反，我们认为这更多是一个“非意愿”问题，或者说是关于北京政策取向的问题，即政府是否真正相信以最大化国家整体繁荣为首要目标，以及政府是否信任私营部门能够被允许成为这种增长的主要推动力。
The potential growth rate of any nation tends to decline with the level of per capita income. As income rises with the development of an economy, the low-hanging fruits will have been picked, making it increasingly difficult to eke out incremental growth. This is witnessed in virtually every single country, a point we have made for the past decade about China’s inevitable growth deceleration. Having said this, we do not share the view that such a growth deceleration will need to be sharp and abrupt in China, like what Japan has experienced since the 1980s. Unless Beijing insists on yielding such an inferior outcome in exchange for equality or other objectives, we believe the private sector and the citizens in China remain sufficiently hungry for growth, wealth, and progress that China would not be content with what it now has. This hunger for more will help propel investment, risk-taking, hard work, and a virtuous circle of economic progress and confidence.
任何国家的潜在增长率往往随着人均收入水平的提高而下降。随着经济的发展，收入增加，低垂的果实已经被采摘，增量增长变得越来越困难。这在几乎所有国家都能看到，我们在过去十年中一直强调中国增长不可避免的放缓。话虽如此，我们并不认为这种增长放缓在中国会像日本自 1980 年代以来经历的那样急剧且突然。除非北京坚持以平等或其他目标为代价接受这种较差的结果，否则我们相信中国的私营部门和公民仍然对增长、财富和进步保持足够的渴望，中国不会满足于现状。这种对更多的渴望将推动投资、冒险、努力工作以及经济进步和信心的良性循环。
China’s demographics are indeed hostile. But we do not believe they will prove to be debilitating. Even Japan managed to ‘bend its demographic curve’ by a decade. China’s mandatory retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women. The scope for China to tweak its policies to counter the demographic trend is significant.
中国的人口结构确实不利。但我们不认为这会成为致命的障碍。即使是日本也成功地“扭转了其人口曲线”十年。中国的法定退休年龄是男性 60 岁，女性 55 岁。中国在政策调整以应对人口趋势方面有很大的空间。
A large educated class, trained and disciplined manufacturing workers, a docile populace, good infrastructure, and ample finances are assets China still has, just as it did before the Pandemic.
中国仍然拥有大量受过教育的阶层、训练有素且纪律严明的制造工人、温顺的民众、良好的基础设施和充足的资金，这些都是中国在疫情前就具备的优势。
China will thrive if it is permitted by Beijing to do so, we continue to believe, and the only country that can prevent China’s economic rise is China itself.
我们仍然相信，只要北京允许，中国将会繁荣，而唯一能阻止中国经济崛起的国家就是中国自己。
A wide arc of a policy turn began in 2023 and will likely continue in 2025
2023 年开始的政策转向大势将在 2025 年可能继续
It is difficult to turn around a super-tanker; it is especially difficult to do so against the captain’s prior declarations. This has happened in China in slow motion: the consequences of the regulatory tightening have proven so debilitating for the economy that many of these policies need to be reversed. However, this policy turn has been grudging and gradual to avoid openly admitting policy errors. Nevertheless, to avert a severe crisis, we believe Beijing will likely continue to trace out a wide arc of a policy turn that began in 2023 but will likely continue in 2025.
转变一艘超级油轮是困难的；尤其是在船长先前声明的情况下更是如此。这种情况在中国缓慢上演：监管收紧的后果对经济造成了极大损害，许多政策需要被逆转。然而，为了避免公开承认政策错误，这一政策转向是勉强且渐进的。尽管如此，为了避免严重危机，我们相信北京很可能会继续沿着 2023 年开始但可能持续到 2025 年的政策转向轨迹。
We will likely see new supportive measures for the property sector. Without underpinning this sector, it would be very difficult to restore consumer confidence and establish ‘Dual Circulation’ to shield the Chinese economy from external shocks.
我们很可能会看到对房地产行业的新支持措施。如果不支撑这一行业，将很难恢复消费者信心并建立“双循环”，以保护中国经济免受外部冲击。
New protectionist measures by the US may lead to more remedial domestic policies
美国的新保护主义措施可能导致更多补救性的国内政策
Investors are familiar with the adversarial economic policies the US has adopted against China, including the high import tariffs (close to 20 percent across the board now but will likely rise further under Trump 2.0) on Chinese goods and sanctions on higher technology parts and products that China could import from the US or its allies. These policies have been somewhat effective. However, China has partially circumvented some of these obstacles by diverting exports through Asian countries and Mexico that would re-export to the US and re-double China’s domestic efforts in developing its own technological advances.
投资者熟悉美国针对中国采取的对抗性经济政策，包括对中国商品征收的高额进口关税（目前大约为 20%，但在特朗普 2.0 执政下可能进一步上升）以及对中国可能从美国或其盟友进口的高科技零部件和产品的制裁。这些政策在一定程度上取得了效果。然而，中国部分绕过了这些障碍，通过将出口转移到亚洲国家和墨西哥，这些国家再将商品转出口到美国，同时中国也加大了自主技术发展的国内努力。
Indeed, total Chinese exports are extremely strong, registering some USD3.5 trillion in 2024, compared to an average of USD3.1 trillion over the prior five years and USD2.3 trillion over the five years ending in 2019. Even though China’s export market share in the US has slipped to number three, it has significantly increased its market shares in the rest of the world. The total trade surplus in China rose to an estimated USD969 billion in 2024, compared to USD421 billion in 2019 and an average USD678 billion in the prior five years.
事实上，中国的出口总额非常强劲，2024 年达到约 3.5 万亿美元，而过去五年的平均值为 3.1 万亿美元，2019 年及之前五年的平均值为 2.3 万亿美元。尽管中国在美国的出口市场份额已降至第三位，但其在世界其他地区的市场份额显著增加。2024 年中国的贸易顺差预计达到 9690 亿美元，而 2019 年为 4210 亿美元，过去五年的平均值为 6780 亿美元。
The Chinese economy may have struggled, but not in manufacturing or its exports.
中国经济可能遇到了困难，但制造业和出口并未受挫。
At this point, it is unclear how President Trump will prosecute its trade policy against China, and Beijing’s response is equally unclear. What we could state with a certain level of confidence is that (i) the sector in question happens to be China’s strongest sector and (ii) any external shock will likely be met by stimulative policies from Beijing to further support domestic demand, with logical consequences for China’s domestic assets.
目前尚不清楚特朗普总统将如何执行对华贸易政策，北京的回应也同样不明朗。我们可以较为自信地指出：(i) 相关行业恰好是中国最强的行业；(ii) 任何外部冲击很可能会促使北京出台刺激政策，以进一步支持国内需求，这对中国的国内资产将产生合理的影响。
In sum, we may very well have entered the zone whereby bad news is good news. And new bad news on China’s exports may lead to good news on the weakest sectors in China.
总之，我们很可能已经进入了“坏消息即好消息”的阶段。中国出口的新坏消息可能会带来中国最弱行业的好消息。
An equities-led turn in the markets
市场将出现以股票为主导的转变
Last year, we expected equities to lead a prospective turn in the Chinese financial markets. In 2024, while we saw a bounce in equities, no meaningful positive impact has been detected in Chinese bond yields or the RMB. 2025 might be a bit different: we may see a delayed response in the bond and currency markets if Chinese equities rise further in 2025.
去年，我们预计股市将引领中国金融市场的潜在转折。2024 年，虽然股市有所反弹，但中国债券收益率和人民币并未出现明显的积极影响。2025 年情况可能有所不同：如果中国股市在 2025 年进一步上涨，债券和货币市场可能会出现滞后的反应。
Chinese equities may be the most truthful barometer of the overall state of the economy; they are still quite cheap, with a trailing PE ratio of 15x for the CSI300 (up from a cycle-low of 12 in December 2023 and below the cycle-high of 22x in early-2021). Chinese companies in the CSI300 index had a CAGR of 5.9% in the decade before the Pandemic, compared to 5.7% and 2.4% in the US (S&P 500) and Germany (DAX), respectively. With such a high earnings growth rate, Chinese PE ought to be closer to that of the US (with a PE ratio of 25x now) and ahead of Germany (with a PE ratio of 14x now – the same as China’s). If China’s PE ratio recovers halfway to its cycle peak, it would mean a 40% rally in equity prices; a full recovery to its cycle peak would mean an 80% rally. These are obviously not our targets, but upside risks seem substantial.
中国股市可能是整体经济状况最真实的晴雨表；它们仍然相当便宜，CSI300 的滚动市盈率为 15 倍（高于 2023 年 12 月的周期低点 12 倍，低于 2021 年初的周期高点 22 倍）。疫情前十年，CSI300 指数中的中国公司复合年增长率为 5.9%，而美国（标普 500）和德国（DAX）分别为 5.7%和 2.4%。鉴于如此高的盈利增长率，中国的市盈率理应更接近美国（目前市盈率为 25 倍），并领先于德国（目前市盈率为 14 倍——与中国相同）。如果中国的市盈率恢复到周期高点的一半，这将意味着股价上涨 40%；完全恢复到周期高点则意味着股价上涨 80%。显然，这些并非我们的目标，但上涨风险似乎相当大。
Further, both foreign and domestic investors are still so bearish on and underweight in China as a country and Chinese companies that the risks to equity prices, we think, are heavily biased to the upside from here. All that’s needed is a policy excuse for such a prospective rally to materialise. How could the second-largest economy in the world remain uninvestible forever?
此外，国内外投资者对中国这个国家及中国企业依然持极度悲观态度且持仓偏低，我们认为股价的风险从这里起明显偏向上涨。所有需要的只是一个政策上的借口，让这种潜在的反弹得以实现。世界第二大经济体怎么可能永远无法投资？
While in the US, bonds will probably be the dominant asset that will drive other assets, in China, equities will likely dictate the trajectories of bond yields and the RMB, if not immediately, eventually. As argued above, much of this will be driven by Beijing’s policies. A more effective policy turn in support of the economy would mean much higher equity prices, marginally higher bond yields, and a stronger RMB.
在美国，债券可能是驱动其他资产的主导资产，而在中国，股票很可能会决定债券收益率和人民币的走势，虽然不一定是立刻，但最终会如此。如上所述，这在很大程度上将由北京的政策驱动。更有效的支持经济的政策转向将意味着股价大幅上涨，债券收益率略有上升，人民币走强。
Why the strange correlations between bonds and equities in Q4 2024?
为什么 2024 年第四季度债券与股票之间出现奇怪的相关性？
We mentioned above that, historically, Chinese bonds and equities have mostly been negatively correlated – uncharacteristic of EM markets. However, in Q4 2024, bond yields failed to rise with the bounce in equities. Why?
我们之前提到，历史上中国债券和股票大多呈负相关——这在新兴市场中是不典型的。然而，在 2024 年第四季度，债券收益率未能随着股票反弹而上升。为什么？
We have a few thoughts. One guess is that the property sector, which used to be the single-largest repository of household savings, is no longer an attractive asset to hold. Precautionary and other types of savings have flooded bank deposits, compelling banks to search for yield further down the yield curve. This tsunami of excess savings is so large, and the net flows into equities in H2 2024 were relatively modest that the correlation between bonds and equities was not perfectly negative. This line of argument, if correct, implies that bond yields would rise in earnest when the property market is again seen as a legitimate and viable investment option for households. This may take some time, which is also why we believe the prospective rise in the bond yields will likely be very gradual, being more of a function of the property market than the equity markets. In sum, in China, the arbitrage is between equities, properties, and bonds; investors need to think in terms of this triangular relationship.
我们有一些想法。一个猜测是，房地产行业曾经是家庭储蓄的最大存放地，但现在已不再是一个有吸引力的资产。预防性和其他类型的储蓄大量涌入银行存款，迫使银行在收益率曲线的更远端寻找收益。这股过剩储蓄的浪潮如此之大，而 2024 年下半年流入股票的净资金相对温和，以至于债券和股票之间的相关性并非完全负相关。如果这一论点正确，意味着当房地产市场再次被视为家庭合法且可行的投资选项时，债券收益率将真正上升。这可能需要一些时间，这也是我们认为债券收益率未来的上升可能非常缓慢的原因，这更多是房地产市场的功能，而非股票市场。总之，在中国，套利存在于股票、房地产和债券之间；投资者需要从这三角关系的角度思考。
A second hypothesis is that China still suffers from the ‘problem’ of excess savings, which allows such capital to be misappropriated, particularly into investments by the SOEs, which have had a lower return on capital than POEs. If a significant part of the investment in China is directed by the government and does not reflect investment returns, the sovereign bond yields should drift toward the actual return on capital rather than the overall nominal GDP growth rate, as is the case in the developed West.
第二个假设是中国仍然存在“过剩储蓄”的问题，这使得这部分资本被错误配置，特别是流向国有企业的投资，而国有企业的资本回报率低于民营企业。如果中国的大部分投资由政府主导，且不反映投资回报率，那么主权债券收益率应趋向于实际资本回报率，而非整体名义 GDP 增长率，这与发达西方国家的情况不同。
A third hypothesis is heavy bond purchases by the PBOC. This may or may not be considered as QE, but it is a fact that, after warning the market of a ‘bond bubble,’ the PBOC began buying long-term bonds in order to enhance the availability of liquidity in China. This has had a depressive effect on long bond yields in China, which are far below where they should be, given the economic growth rate. If bond yields are low because of the PBOC’s purchases, the correlation between bonds and equities should be disturbed, much like the period of the Fed’s QE driving up US equities while the US bond yields remained low.
第三个假设是中国人民银行大量购买债券。这是否被视为量化宽松尚无定论，但事实是，在警告市场存在“债券泡沫”后，人民银行开始购买长期债券，以增强中国的流动性供应。这对中国长期债券收益率产生了抑制作用，收益率远低于经济增长率所应有的水平。如果债券收益率因人民银行的购买而偏低，那么债券与股票之间的相关性应会被打破，就像美联储量化宽松推动美国股市上涨而美国债券收益率保持低位的时期一样。
A fourth hypothesis is that the reported GDP growth rate may have somehow exaggerated the true state of the economy.
第四个假设是报告的 GDP 增长率可能在某种程度上夸大了经济的真实状况。
All of these hypotheses point to bond yields staying below China’s nominal GDP growth rate. This is why we are assuming that China's long-term equilibrium 10Y sovereign bond yield may be similar to that of the 10Y UST yield, even though China should have a higher potential growth rate than the US.
所有这些假设都指向债券收益率将低于中国的名义 GDP 增长率。这就是为什么我们假设中国的长期均衡 10 年期国债收益率可能与 10 年期美国国债收益率相似，尽管中国的潜在增长率应高于美国。
Risks to our outlook
我们展望中的风险
In 2022, 2023, and 2024, the number one risk to our China market calls was sticky inflation and a resilient US economy, keeping US yields and the dollar high. That risk indeed materialised three years in a row. Given the likely disinflation trend, the 10Y UST yield at around 4.5 percent seems high to us. Historically, inflation has been more global than local, i.e., when the global inflation trend is clear, it is unlikely for any country to have sustained inflation exhibiting a different trend. With Asian inflation remaining low and inflation in Europe continuing to drift lower, it seems unlikely that inflation in the US does not fall further. The wildcard here is, of course, the US’ fiscal policy: if fiscal stimulus persists, it might make it difficult for services inflation to recede. Stubbornly high US services inflation may thwart the Fed’s rate cut program and help support the dollar relative to the RMB. High US interest rates remain our biggest risk for the new year, sapping the total return of our RMB strategy.
在 2022 年、2023 年和 2024 年，我们对中国市场的首要风险判断是顽固的通胀和强韧的美国经济，这使得美国收益率和美元保持高位。这个风险确实连续三年实现了。鉴于可能的通缩趋势，我们认为 10 年期美国国债收益率约为 4.5%偏高。历史上，通胀更多是全球性的而非局部性的，即当全球通胀趋势明确时，任何国家持续出现不同趋势的通胀都不太可能。随着亚洲通胀保持低位，欧洲通胀持续走低，美国通胀不进一步下降的可能性较小。当然，这里的不确定因素是美国的财政政策：如果财政刺激持续，可能会使服务业通胀难以回落。顽固高企的美国服务业通胀可能阻碍美联储的降息计划，并支持美元相对于人民币的走势。高美国利率仍是我们新年的最大风险，削弱了我们人民币策略的总回报。
The second risk is that Beijing will fail to rekindle risk-taking in China and restore a recovery in general confidence. After the recent stimulus programs, we believe this is not a particularly high risk in terms of the probability of it happening. However, the consequences of this risk materialising are very significant. The cyclical operation that will likely be necessary in 2025 is more than ‘mechanical’ because all the multipliers require synergy from the private sector, which acts on how confident they feel about spending and investing. Further, beyond the immediate challenge of restoring confidence, China faces a mixture of cyclical, structural (including demographic), and geopolitical headwinds, even more daunting than those confronting the UK after Brexit. Beijing should heed the example of the UK policymakers’ failure to address the multitude of issues. Having said this, the incremental U-turns in policies bode well for Beijing, halting harmful policies to its economy, social harmony, and international standing. More proactive policies are needed, and we believe they are coming.
第二个风险是北京未能重新激发中国的风险偏好并恢复整体信心的复苏。在近期的刺激计划之后，我们认为这一风险发生的概率并不特别高。然而，如果这一风险成真，其后果将非常严重。2025 年可能需要的周期性操作不仅仅是“机械式”的，因为所有的乘数效应都需要来自私营部门的协同作用，而私营部门的行为取决于其对消费和投资的信心。此外，除了恢复信心的直接挑战外，中国还面临周期性、结构性（包括人口结构）和地缘政治的多重逆风，这些挑战甚至比英国脱欧后所面临的更为严峻。北京应当吸取英国政策制定者未能解决众多问题的教训。话虽如此，政策上的渐进式转变对北京来说是个好兆头，阻止了对其经济、社会和国际地位有害的政策。需要更积极的政策，我们相信这些政策正在酝酿中。
The third risk is new tariffs from the US and possibly Europe. This is our third risk because we think it is largely priced-in, and Beijing likely has a strategy to deal with this policy risk. In fact, the remedial policies may include further stimulus packages to support domestic demand, which we stated above would be positive for China and Chinese equities and currency.
第三个风险是来自美国以及可能的欧洲的新关税。这是我们的第三个风险，因为我们认为这在很大程度上已经被市场消化，北京很可能有应对这一政策风险的策略。事实上，补救政策可能包括进一步的刺激方案以支持内需，正如我们上文所述，这将对中国、中国股市和人民币有积极影响。
Bottom line 底线
2024 indeed turned out to be a ‘glass-is-half-full’ year, thanks to the fiscal interventions by Beijing. We maintain a cautiously optimistic expectation of stronger policies from Beijing in 2025. In terms of pre-positioning, we will be restrained. New and powerful measures will need to be announced before we would contemplate adjusting our portfolios to align with such a scenario. However, we continue to believe that the logical outcome in 2025 remains a stronger economy, partially restored confidence, higher equities, modestly higher bond yields, and a stronger RMB.
2024 年确实是一个“杯子半满”的年份，这要归功于北京的财政干预。我们对 2025 年北京出台更强有力政策持谨慎乐观的预期。在预先布局方面，我们将保持克制。只有在宣布新的强有力措施后，我们才会考虑调整投资组合以适应这种情景。然而，我们仍然相信，2025 年的合理结果是经济更强劲，信心部分恢复，股市上涨，债券收益率适度上升，人民币走强。
Disclosure 披露声明
This communication is issued by Eurizon SLJ Capital Limited (“ESLJ”), a private limited company registered in England (company number: 09775525) having its registered office at 90 Queen Street, London EC4N 1SA, United Kingdom. ESLJ is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FRN: 736926). This communication is treated as a marketing communication intended for professional investors only and is provided only for information purposes. It has not been prepared in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research and is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research. It does not constitute research on investment matters and should not be construed as containing any recommendation, advice or suggestion, implicit or explicit, with respect to any investment strategy or financial instruments, or the issuers of any financial instruments, or a solicitation, offer or financial promotion relating to any securities or investments. ESLJ and its affiliates do not assume any liability whatsoever for the contents of this communication, save to the extent agreed in any written contract entered into between ESLJ and the recipient, and do not make any representation or warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of any information contained in this communication. Views are accurate as at the time of publication. Opinions expressed by individuals are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of ESLJ or any of its affiliates. The value of any investment may change and an investor may not get back the original amount invested. Past performance is not an indicator of future performance. This communication may not be reproduced, redistributed or copied in whole or in part for any purpose. It may not be distributed in any jurisdiction where its distribution may be restricted by law and persons into whose possession this communication comes should inform themselves about, and observe, any such restrictions.
本通讯由 Eurizon SLJ Capital Limited（“ESLJ”）发布，ESLJ 是一家在英格兰注册的私人有限公司（公司编号：09775525），注册地址为 90 Queen Street, London EC4N 1SA, United Kingdom。ESLJ 由金融行为监管局（FRN：736926）授权和监管。本通讯被视为面向专业投资者的营销通讯，仅供参考。其编制未遵循旨在促进投资研究独立性的法律和监管要求，且不受任何禁止在投资研究发布前进行交易的规定约束。本通讯不构成投资研究，不应被解释为包含任何关于投资策略或金融工具、金融工具发行人，或任何证券或投资的推荐、建议或暗示（无论明示或暗示），也不构成任何招揽、要约或金融推广。 ESLJ 及其附属机构对本次交流内容不承担任何责任，除非 ESLJ 与接收方之间签订的书面合同另有约定，并且不对本交流中所含信息的准确性或完整性作出任何陈述或保证。观点截至发布时准确。个人表达的意见为其本人观点，不一定反映 ESLJ 或其任何附属机构的立场。任何投资的价值可能会发生变化，投资者可能无法收回最初投资金额。过往表现不代表未来表现。本交流内容不得全部或部分复制、再分发或用于任何目的。不得在法律限制其分发的任何司法管辖区内分发，接收本交流内容的人士应了解并遵守相关限制。
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