Case Summary and Outcome 病例总结和结局

The First division of the German Federal Constitutional Court held that the Court of Appeals’ decision violated the fundamental rights of the complainant under Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the German Constitution. The Constitutional Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision; granting an injunction on the broadcasting of a documentary that depicted the life and identity of a man involved in an armed robbery. The Court determined that the broadcasting of the documentary was a disproportionate interference since it included information that identified the applicant. The case arose after a German television channel commissioned a documentary about an armed robbery of an arsenal of the German armed forces where several soldiers were killed or severely wounded. The documentary referenced the petitioner’s name and homosexual tendencies. When the documentary was commissioned, the petitioner had already served two-thirds of his sentence for his involvement in the robbery. The Court held that the passage of time had eroded the newsworthy character of the original crime, thus heightening the complainant’s interest in his reputation and privacy. According to the Court, the human dignity and personality clauses guarantee the right “to be let alone” safeguarding the right to one’s possession of his image and spoken words.
德国联邦宪法法院第一庭认为，上诉法院的裁决侵犯了申诉人根据《德国宪法》第2条第（1）款连同第1条第（1）款享有的基本权利。宪法法院推翻了上诉法院的裁决，发布了禁止播放一部描述一名参与武装抢劫的男子的生活和身份的纪录片的禁令。法院裁定，播放该纪录片是一种不相称的干涉，因为其中包含了可确定申请人身份的信息。这起案件是在德国一家电视频道委托制作一部纪录片后发生的，该纪录片讲述了德国武装部队一个军火库遭到武装抢劫，几名士兵被打死或受重伤。纪录片提到了请愿人的名字和同性恋倾向。在委托制作这部纪录片时，请愿人已因参与抢劫服满三分之二的刑期。 法院认为，随着时间的推移，原有罪行的新闻价值已经降低，因此，申诉人更加关心他的名誉和隐私。法院认为，人的尊严和人格条款保障“不受打扰”的权利，维护个人拥有自己的形象和言论的权利。

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Facts 事实

In January 1969, the Petitioner planned a raid on a Bundeswehr ammunition depot, a German military storage facility for weapons. The petitioner with his friends carried out the robbery, killed four sleeping soldiers from the guards, seriously injured another and stole weapons and ammunition. The petitioner, along with the other robbers, was placed under arrest. On August 7, 1970, the Jury sentenced the two main perpetrators to life imprisonment and the Petitioner to a total of 6 years imprisonment for being an accessory. The jury found that the Petitioner had criminally abetted in the homicides when he explained to one of the main perpetrators how to use the pistol that he later used in the robbery. 
1969年1月，请愿人计划突袭德国联邦国防军的一个弹药库，这是一个德国军事武器储存设施。请愿人与他的朋友实施了抢劫，杀死了四名熟睡的警卫士兵，重伤了另一名士兵，并偷走了武器和弹药。请愿人与其他抢劫犯沿着被逮捕。1970年8月7日，陪审团以从犯的罪名判处两名主犯终身监禁，请愿人共6年监禁。陪审团认为，请愿人向一名主要肇事者解释如何使用他后来在抢劫中使用的手枪时，在杀人案中犯下了刑事教唆罪。

The petitioner had already served two-thirds of his imprisonment, and the execution of the remaining sentence was expected to be suspended on probation following Section 26 (1) of the Criminal Code. However, in 1972, a German television channel named “Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen” (ZDF) commissioned a documentary named “The Soldiers’ Murder of Lebach” about the armed robbery, planning, and detection and the background of the culprits. The documentary referenced the petitioner’s name and homosexual tendencies.
请愿人已服满三分之二刑期，根据《刑法》第26（1）条，剩余刑期预计将缓刑执行。然而，在1972年，一个名为“Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen”（ZDF）的德国电视频道委托制作了一部名为“士兵谋杀Lebach”的纪录片，讲述了武装抢劫，计划和侦查以及罪犯的背景。纪录片提到了请愿人的名字和同性恋倾向。

The Petitioner filed an action seeking an injunction to prohibit the German television channel from broadcasting the documentary on the ground that the documentary violated his personality rights, ownership rights, and his right to his image. On June 8, 1972, the District Court of Mainz dismissed the Petitioner’s request for an injunction on the rationale that the Petitioner was “relatively a personality of contemporary history” and could not rely on the right to protect his personality. The District Court held that the act was of fundamental socio-political importance, mainly due to the formation of the group, and had aroused a great deal of public interest in the psychological and sociological background of the perpetrators. 
请愿人提起诉讼，寻求禁止德国电视频道播放该纪录片，理由是该纪录片侵犯了他的人格权、所有权和他的形象权。1972年6月8日，美因茨地区法院驳回了请愿人的禁令请求，理由是请愿人“相对而言是当代历史上的一个人物”，不能依赖保护其人格的权利。地方法院认为，该行为具有根本的社会政治重要性，主要是由于该团体的形成，并引起了公众对肇事者心理和社会学背景的极大兴趣。nbsp;你好！

On October 5, 1972 Koblenz Higher Regional Court (Court of Appeal) upheld the District Court’s ruling by considering the respective interests of a person to be protected from the unauthorised dissemination of his likeness concerning Section 22 and 23 of the Act on the Protection of the Copyright in Works of Art and Photographs (APCWAP). The Court reasoned its dismissal on the projection of the right to the petitioner’s personality covered under Article 1 (Human dignity) and 2(1) (Personal freedoms) of the German  Constitution (i.e, Basic  Law) on the one hand. On the other hand, the Court pointed to the need for objective pictorial information concerning persons in public life. That is recognised in Section 23 APCWAP with the interpretation of the freedom to express opinions and the liberty of broadcasting stations to provide information, protected by Article 5(1) (Freedom of expression, arts and sciences) of the Constitution. 
1972年10月5日，科布伦茨高等地区法院（上诉法院）维持了地区法院的裁决，认为应保护个人的各自利益，使其肖像不被未经授权的传播，涉及《保护艺术作品和摄影作品版权法》第22和23条。法院驳回上诉的理由是，一方面根据《德国宪法》（即《基本法》）第1条（人的尊严）和第2条第（1）款（个人自由）规定的请愿人的人格权。另一方面，法院指出，有必要提供有关公众人物的客观图片资料。这一点在APCWAP第23条中得到承认，并解释了《宪法》第5条第1款（表达自由、艺术和科学）保护的表达意见的自由和广播电台提供信息的自由。

The Court of Appeal held that in this conflict the right to provide information must prevail, especially since the trial had been concluded and because the petitioner was relatively a personality of contemporary history. Thus, the Court considered the plaintiff’s interest in the social reintegration gave way to the general public’s interest to receive a truthful account of the facts and the persons involved in the crime. The Petitioner filed a constitutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court on the ground that lower court decisions violated his fundamental rights under Article 1(1 )and Article 2(1) of the Constitution. 
上诉法院认为，在这一冲突中，提供信息的权利必须优先，特别是因为审判已经结束，而且请愿人相对而言是当代历史上的一个人物。因此，法院认为，原告重新融入社会的利益让位于公众的利益，即获得对犯罪事实和所涉人员的真实陈述。请愿人向联邦宪法法院提出了宪法申诉，理由是下级法院的裁决侵犯了《宪法》第1条第（1）款和第2条第（1）款规定的他的基本权利。

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Decision Overview 决策概述

The eight-judge bench of the Federal Constitutional Court delivered the judgment. The central issue for the Federal Constitutional Court to examine was which of two constitutional values would take priority, freedom of the media under Article 5 of the Constitution or personality rights of the convicted criminal under Article 2 of the Constitution. Further, the Court had to examine whether the contested decisions were based on a fundamentally incorrect view of the scope and effectiveness of one of the fundamental rights asserted or whether the result of the decision itself violates such a fundamental right [para. 42]. 
由八名法官组成的联邦宪法法院作出了判决。联邦宪法法院审查的核心问题是，两个宪法价值观中哪一个优先，是《宪法》第5条规定的媒体自由，还是《宪法》第2条规定的被定罪罪犯的人格权。此外，法院必须审查有争议的决定是否基于对所主张的一项基本权利的范围和效力的根本错误的看法，或者决定本身的结果是否侵犯了这种基本权利[第42段]。

The Constitutional Court highlighted that the Court of Appeal took no consideration of how the broadcasting of the documentary violated the most personal, intimate area, exposed the Complainant in a shameful, degrading manner and created a climate that made it impossible for the Complainant to gain a foothold in society again. The Constitutional Court observed that the concept of man in the Constitution leaves no room for the view that criminals, even after serving the sentence imposed on them by law, would have to accept an additional degradation in such a way that they could be put in a “modern pillory” in front of millions of television viewers. The Constitutional Court held that the public’s legitimate interest in finding out the truth in the trial and restoring legal peace ceased to exist once the complainant was finally sentenced, or at least shortly thereafter [para. 14]. 
宪法法院强调指出，上诉法院没有考虑到纪录片的播放如何侵犯了最私人和最私密的领域，以可耻和有辱人格的方式暴露了肇事者，并创造了一种使肇事者无法再次在社会上立足的气氛。宪法法院指出，宪法中的人的概念没有为这样的观点留下任何空间：罪犯即使在服完法律判处的刑期后，也必须接受额外的降级，以至于他们可能会被置于“现代”之中。在数百万电视观众面前戴上耻辱柱。宪法法院认为，一旦申诉人最终被判刑，或至少在判刑后不久，公众对查明审判真相和恢复法律的和平的合法利益就不复存在[第14段]。

Federal Minister of Justice (FMJ) on behalf of the Federal Government contended, that the circumstances of the present case are decisive, considering the offender’s general personality rights weighed against the freedom to form public opinion, with the idea of ​​social rehabilitation also being given high value (Para 15). FMJ further contended that the documentary takes into account a legitimate need for information even a long time after the criminal ruling has become final because it includes a very realistic portrayal of the offender’s personality which would resonate with the public. FMJ concluded that the complainant ought to tolerate the depiction of the attack and its history. A complete ban on broadcasting cannot be justified, even taking into account the social rehabilitation aspect. The general right of personality, which is decisive for the consideration, does not primarily have the function of facilitating resocialization [paras. 16-17].
联邦司法部长代表联邦政府争辩说，本案的情况是决定性的，因为考虑到罪犯的一般人格权与形成公众舆论的自由相权衡， 社会康复也受到高度重视（帕拉）。斐济法学家论坛还说，这部纪录片考虑到了即使在刑事裁决成为最终裁决很长时间之后对信息的合法需要，因为它包括了对罪犯人格的非常现实的描绘，这将引起公众的共鸣。FMJ的结论是，申诉人应当容忍对袭击及其历史的描述。完全禁止广播是没有道理的，即使考虑到社会康复方面也是如此。一般的人格权对这种考虑具有决定性作用，但其主要功能并不是促进重新融入社会[第16-17段]。

Ministry of Justice of Rhineland-Palatinate (MJR), on behalf of the State government, remarked on how the presentation of the documentary would probably affect the complainant’s rehabilitation and the citizens’ perceptions of the complainant’s home town. MJR stated that a man with a homosexual inclination would face significant rejection and derision from the residents in the applicant’s hometown. The claimant would endure absolute social isolation following his release if he were to be classified as homosexual as a consequence of the documentary [para. 18]. 
莱茵兰-腭骨的司法部代表州政府评论了该纪录片的放映可能如何影响申诉人的康复以及公民对申诉人家乡的看法。司法改革运动指出，有同性恋倾向的男子将面临申请人家乡居民的严重拒绝和嘲笑。如果申诉人因该纪录片而被列为同性恋者，他在获释后将遭受绝对的社会孤立[第18段]。

ZDF contended that a television channel is particularly entitled to satisfy the public’s legitimate interest in proper, comprehensive information about a contemporary event, such as the Lebach case, through a documentary presentation. ZDF further stated that the documentary serves to deter future perpetrators and to strengthen public morals and social responsibility preventively. The documentary game indirectly serves to protect legal interests within the meaning of Article 1 of the Constitution. ZDF concluded that the fundamental rights of potential victims and potential perpetrators who have not yet committed an offence are no less important than the personal rights of the complainant who has already been convicted [paras. 19-20].
津巴布韦人权论坛争辩说，电视频道特别有权通过纪录片播放满足公众对诸如Lebach案等当代事件的适当、全面信息的合法利益。津巴布韦捍卫人权基金会还指出，这部纪录片起到了威慑未来肇事者的作用，并加强了公共道德和社会责任。纪录片游戏间接地起到了宪法第一条意义上的保护法律的利益的作用。津巴布韦人权论坛得出结论认为，尚未犯罪的潜在受害者和潜在犯罪者的基本权利与已被定罪的申诉人的个人权利同等重要[第19-20段]。

The Court accurately found that several fundamental rights affected private law applications and led in opposite directions. Specifically, it noted that the right to one’s personality under Article 2 in conjunction with Article 1 of the Constitution conflicted with the freedom of broadcasting stations to provide information under Article 5. 
法院准确地发现，几项基本权利影响了私法的适用，并导致相反的方向。具体而言，委员会指出，《宪法》第2条连同第1条规定的个人人格权与第5条规定的广播电台提供信息的自由相冲突。

The Court explained that in the instant case, the televised broadcast concerning the origins, execution, and detection of a crime mentioning the name of the criminal and containing a representation of his likeness touched the area of the plaintiff’s fundamental right to one’s personality. It also noted that the right to the free development of one’s personality and human dignity sought to protect individuals’ sphere of autonomy, “which includes the right to be left alone and ‘to be oneself,’ excluding the intrusion of others.” [Microcensus 1969; and Right to refuse to testify for social workers 1972] This includes the right to one’s likeness and to one’s utterances and even more to the right to dispose of pictures of oneself. The Court emphasized that such right entailed, in principle, the possibility for individuals to determine themselves and whether and to what extent others may publicly represent an account of their life. (Para 44) 
法院解释说，在本案中，关于一项罪行的起源、执行和侦查的电视广播提到了罪犯的名字，并载有他的肖像，触及了原告的基本人格权领域。它还指出，自由发展个人个性和人的尊严的权利寻求保护个人的自主范围，“其中包括不受打扰和'做自己'的权利，不受他人的侵扰”。[1969年微型人口普查;1972年拒绝为社会工作者作证的权利]这包括一个人的肖像权和一个人的言论权，甚至更多的权利处理自己的照片。 法院强调，这种权利原则上意味着个人有可能决定自己，以及其他人是否以及在何种程度上可以公开讲述自己的生活。 (Para第四十四章） 

Further, the Constitutional Court relied on Günther R. (1957); Microcensus (1969); Lord (1970); and Gustav (1972) to hold that the sphere of private life did not enjoy absolute protection. The Constitutional Court clarified that when individuals, in their capacity as citizens living within a community, affect the personal sphere of others or the interests of the community, “their rights to be masters of their private sphere may become subject to restrictions unless their sacrosanct innermost sphere of life is concerned.” Subsequently, the Court relied on Gustav H (1972) to observe that it neither justifies the state interest in the up clarification of criminal offences, nor another public interest from the outset access to the personal area, however, the high priority of the right to free development and respect for personality, arising from the close relationship to the highest value of the constitution, human dignity, requires that the protection of Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) is countered as a corrective [para. 45].
此外，宪法法院依据Günther R. （1957）;微观人口普查（1969）;洛德（1970）;古斯塔夫（1972）认为，私人生活领域不享有绝对保护。宪法法院澄清说，当个人以生活在一个社区内的公民身份影响他人的个人领域或社区利益时，“他们作为其私人领域主人的权利可能受到限制，除非涉及到他们神圣不可侵犯的最深处的生活领域。“随后，法院依据Gustav H（1972年）指出，它既不能证明澄清刑事犯罪的国家利益是正当的，也不能证明从一开始就进入个人领域的另一个公共利益是正当的，但是，自由发展和尊重人格的权利的高度优先地位，产生于与宪法的最高价值、人的尊严的密切关系，要求将第2条第（1）款的保护与第1条第（1）款一并作为一种纠正措施予以反驳[第45段]。

The Constitutional Court again relied on Lord (1970), and Gustav (1972) to observe that it must be determined by weighing interests in the specific case whether the public interest being pursued deserves priority in general and according to the design of the individual case, whether the intended interference with privacy is required by this interest in terms of type and scope and reasonable proportion to the importance of the matter stands [para. 45].
宪法法院再次依据Lord（1970年）和Gustav（1972年）的意见认为，必须通过权衡具体案件中的利益来确定，所追求的公共利益是否应在一般情况下得到优先考虑，并根据个别案件的设计，从类型和范围上看，对隐私的有意干涉是否是这种利益所要求的，是否与问题的重要性成合理比例[第45段]。

The Court then explained the scope of the right to freedom of information by broadcasts and its applicability in the instant case. It noted that only when this right conflicted with other protected legal interests the purpose of individual broadcast, the manner of its presentation, and its actual foreseeable effect became relevant. The Court remarked that Article 5 of the Constitution established the possible conflicts between the freedom to broadcast and the interests of individuals and the community. (Para 48) However, the Court noted that this provision contemplated that when assessing other protected legal claims, the right to freedom to broadcast should not be a relative interest. Instead, the Court relied on Schmid mirror (1961) and Broadcasting decision (1960) to hold that, the constant practice of the Federal Constitutional Court the need expressed by this provision to take other protected legal interests into account must not render the freedom to broadcast a relative one; instead, the laws which restrict the freedom to broadcast must, in turn, be interpreted in the light of the constitutional guarantee and must, if necessary, be equally restricted to ensure that the freedom of broadcasting is safeguarded adequately” (Broadcasting decision 1971) [para. 51].
法院随后解释了广播新闻自由权的范围及其在本案中的适用性。法院指出，只有当这项权利与其他受保护的法律的利益发生冲突时，个人广播的目的、广播的方式及其实际可预见的影响才具有相关性。法院指出，《宪法》第5条规定了广播自由与个人和社区利益之间可能存在的冲突。(Para（48）然而，法院指出，这一规定考虑到，在评估其他受保护的法律的要求时，广播自由权不应是一种相对利益。 相反，法院依据施密德镜像案（1961年）和广播案判决（1960年）认为，联邦宪法法院的一贯做法-该条款所表达的考虑其他受保护的法律的利益的必要性-不应使广播自由成为相对的自由;相反，限制广播自由的法律必须根据宪法保障来解释，必要时，同样受到限制，以确保广播自由得到充分保障”（第1971号广播决定） [第51段]。

The Court stressed that since both the right to personality and freedom to broadcast were essential aspects of the liberal-democratic order of the Constitution, neither could claim precedence in principle. The Court pointed out that while the right to freedom to broadcast could restrict any claims based on the right of personality, the damage to an individual’s personality resulting from a public representation could not be disproportionate to the publication’s relevance. The Court observed that the answer to this conflict must be based on the fact that, according to the will of the Constitution, both constitutional values ​​form essential components of the free democratic order of the Constitution, so that neither of them can claim fundamental priority. The portrayal of man contained in the Constitution and the structure of the state community that responds to it requires both the recognition of the independence of the individual personality and the safeguarding of a free-living climate, which is unthinkable today without free communication (Mirror (1966) and Senate Director Erich L. (1958)) [para. 53].
法院强调，由于人格权和广播自由都是《宪法》自由民主秩序的基本方面，原则上两者都不能要求优先。法院指出，虽然广播自由权可以限制基于人格权的任何主张，但公开陈述对个人人格造成的损害与出版物的相关性不成比例。法院认为，对这一冲突的回答必须基于这样一个事实，即根据《宪法》的意愿， 这两者都是《宪法》自由民主秩序的基本组成部分，因此，两者都不能声称具有根本的优先地位。 《宪法》中对人的描述以及与之相适应的国家共同体结构，既要求承认个人人格的独立性，也要求保障自由生活的环境，而在今天，如果没有自由交流，这是不可想象的。（1958））[para. 53]。

To unravel whether the prevalence of one right was excessive to the other, the Court explained that it required necessary consideration must, on the one hand, take into account the intensity of the interference in the personality sphere by a broadcast of the type in question; on the other hand, the specific interest that the broadcast serves and is likely to serve must be assessed and examined as to whether and to what extent this interest can also be satisfied without an impairment – or such an extensive impairment – of the protection of the personality [para. 53]. 
为了确定一项权利的普遍性是否超过另一项权利，法院解释说，它需要进行必要的审议，一方面必须考虑到有关类型的广播对人格领域的干扰程度;另一方面，在一个实施例中，必须评估和审查广播所服务和可能服务的特定利益，以确定是否以及在多大程度上也可以满足这种利益而不损害-或如此广泛地损害-人格保护[第53段]。

The Court considered that there were four relevant criteria from the point of view of constitutional law when assessing the televised broadcast in dispute. First, it noted that a public report of a crime in which the name, a likeness, or a representation of the culprit was provided always constituted a severe intrusion of the plaintiff’s private sphere since publishing his misdeeds showed a negative slant to his person. However, the Court noted that the reasoning could be different if the report were designed to create sympathy for the culprit [para 55]. Second, regardless of whether the representation report was controversial, contained false allegations, or even if it sought to be objective and factual, the Court deemed that being televised would typically constitute a much greater invasion of the plaintiff’s private sphere than an oral or written report published in the press or over the radio. First of all, from the greater intensity of the visual impression and the combination of image and sound, but above all of the much greater range, which also gives the television a special position concerning film and theatre. There is therefore particular reason “to ensure that the limits set by law are observed and to prevent abuse of personal rights, which have become more easily violated. The law must not bow to technical developments in this respect” [para. 56].
法院认为，从宪法的角度来看，在评估有争议的电视广播时有四个相关标准。首先，法院指出，公开报道一项犯罪，其中提供了罪犯的姓名、肖像或代表，这总是构成对原告私人领域的严重侵犯，因为公布他的罪行表明了对他本人的负面倾向。然而，法院指出，如果报告的目的是为了引起对罪犯的同情，那么推理就可能不同[第55段]。第二，无论陈述报告是否有争议，是否包含虚假指控，或者即使它力求客观和真实，法院认为，与在报纸或广播中发表的口头或书面报告相比，电视转播通常构成对原告私人领域的更大侵犯。 首先，从更大的视觉印象强度和图像与声音的结合，但首先是更大的范围，这也使电视在电影和戏剧中具有特殊的地位。因此，特别有理由“确保法律规定的限制得到遵守，并防止滥用个人权利，因为这些权利已变得更容易受到侵犯。法律决不能屈从于这方面的技术发展”[第56段]。

Third, the Court determined that if the first two reasons served a particular need exists for protection against violations of the right of personality by televised broadcasts reaching such a broad audience, the broadcast had to emphasize that the documentary play entails specific dangers.  Such an intense reliving with an emphasis on emotion. When depicting a serious criminal offence, the component will normally evoke stronger and more lasting reactions from the viewer against the depicted criminals than pure word and picture reporting. The Court finally, deliberated on the issue of “selective perception”, on which the Court stated that it could be observed with other means of communication, which occurred more frequently with television. Viewers tend to unconsciously select and perceive only those statements that correspond to their views or prejudices from the communication offer [paras 56, 61].
第三，法院裁定，如果前两个理由满足了保护如此广泛的观众免受电视广播侵犯人格权的特殊需要，则广播必须强调纪录片会带来具体的危险。如此强烈的重温，强调情感。当描述一个严重的刑事罪行时，该部分通常会引起观众对所描述的罪犯的更强烈和更持久的反应，而不是纯粹的文字和图片报道。最后，法院审议了“选择性认知”问题，对此，法院指出，可以通过其他传播手段观察到这一点，电视更经常出现这种情况。观众倾向于无意识地选择和感知那些与他们的观点或偏见相对应的陈述。

In conclusion, the Court that television reporting of a criminal offense by naming, depicting or depicting the perpetrator, especially in the form of a documentary, will regularly mean a serious intrusion into his or her sphere. The Court underscored that on the other side of the equation was the argument that the public should be fully informed of the commission of crimes, including the persons involved and the facts leading to the offence. It stressed that when balancing, the interest in receiving information by televised reporting within these limits against the invasion of the sphere of the personality of the culprit was inevitably followed by the interest in receiving information [para. 63].
最后，法院认为，电视报道刑事犯罪，特别是以纪录片的形式，通过命名，描绘或描绘犯罪者，通常意味着严重侵犯他或她的领域。法院强调，等式的另一面是这样一种论点，即公众应充分了解犯罪行为，包括所涉人员和导致犯罪的事实。它强调，在权衡在这些限制范围内通过电视报道获得信息的利益与侵犯罪犯人格领域的利益时，不可避免地会出现获得信息的利益[第63段]。

In the Court’s view, it was obvious that the right of personality would only be postponed if the reporting was objective and the interpretation was severe. It considered that the actual question of where the limits should be drawn, given that, in principle, the interest to receive information by reports of contemporary events should prevail, could only be determined by considering the circumstances of each case. For the Court, “the reflex effect of the constitutional guarantee of personality does not allow the media of communication, apart from contemporary reporting, to deal indefinitely with the person of the criminal and his private sphere. Instead, when the interest in receiving the information has been satisfied, his ‘right to be left alone’ gains increasing importance in principle and limits the desire of the mass media and the wish of the public to make the individual sphere of his life the object of discussion or even of entertainment”. [Gustav H (1972)] In the Court’s opinion, even a culprit, who attracted public attention by his serious crime, and gained general disapproval, remained a member of this community and retained his constitutional right to protect his individuality. Additionally, it noted that “if with the prosecution and conviction by a criminal court the act attracting the public interest has met with the just reaction, of the community demanded by the public interest, any additional continued or repeated invasions of the personal sphere of the culprit cannot normally be justified” [para. 64].
法院认为，很明显，只有在报告客观和解释严厉的情况下，人格权才会被推迟。委员会认为，鉴于原则上应优先考虑通过报告当代事件获得信息的利益，因此，只有考虑到每个案件的情况，才能确定在何处划定界限的实际问题。法院认为，“宪法保障人格的反射作用不允许传播媒介，除了当代报道外，无限期地处理罪犯的个人及其私人领域。相反，当接受信息的兴趣得到满足时，他的'不受打扰的权利'在原则上越来越重要，并限制了大众媒体的愿望和公众将其生活的个人领域作为讨论甚至娱乐对象的愿望”。 [古斯塔夫·H（1972）]法院认为，即使一个罪犯因其严重的罪行而引起公众的注意，并得到普遍的反对，他仍然是这个社区的一员，并保留了他保护自己个性的宪法权利。此外，它还指出，“如果引起公众利益的行为在刑事法院的起诉和定罪后，引起了公众利益所要求的社会的公正反应，则对罪犯个人领域的任何进一步的持续或反复侵犯通常都是没有理由的”[第64段]。

On the consideration of the time limit when reporting current events would be permissible, the Court stated that the decisive criterion relied upon whether the report concerned was likely to cause the culprit considerable new or additional harm compared with the information already available. Moreover, to determine the time limit more clearly, the Court held that the interest in reintegrating the criminal into society and restoring his social position should be considered the decisive point of reference. Therefore, the Court concluded that a repeated televised report concerning a severe crime that was no longer justified by the interest to receive information about current events was undoubtedly inadmissible when it endangered the social rehabilitation of the culprit. Further, the Court emphasized that the important change necessary for the culprit’s existence and the community’s interest in restoring his social position must prevail in principle over the interest in discussing the crime [paras 65-67].
在审议允许报道时事的时限时，法院指出，决定性的标准取决于与现有信息相比，有关报道是否可能对罪犯造成相当大的新的或额外的伤害。此外，为了更明确地确定时限，法院认为，应将罪犯重新融入社会和恢复其社会地位的利益视为决定性的参考点。因此，法院得出结论，电视反复报道一起严重犯罪事件，而接收时事信息的兴趣不再是合理的，当它危及罪犯的社会康复时，无疑是不可接受的。 此外，法院强调，罪犯生存所需的重要变化和社区恢复其社会地位的利益原则上必须优先于讨论犯罪的利益[2006 - 2007]。

In light of the above, the Court deemed that the decisions appealed against could not be maintained. It noted that the lower instance courts had sought to balance the interests of the petitioner and the broadcasting station exclusively by reference to Section 22, 23 APCWAP without attending to the reflex effect of the fundamental rights contained in Article 2 in conjunction with Articles 1 and 5 of the Constitution. 
鉴于上述情况，法院认为不能维持上诉所针对的裁决。它注意到，下级法院试图平衡请愿人和广播电台的利益，只是援引了《防止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》第22、23条，而没有考虑到《宪法》第2条以及第1和第5条所载基本权利的反映作用。

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