Enhanced Dissertation Outline
强化论文大纲

Title: Balancing National Security and Investment Protection: A Legal Assessment of the UK’s NSIA 2021 under the UK–China BIT and International Investment Law
题目：平衡国家安全与投资保护：根据中英双边投资协定和国际投资法对 2021 年英国 NSIA 的法律评估

1. Introduction (Approx. 1000 words)
1. 引言（约 1000 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
To what extent has the UK’s post-Brexit national security framework (NSIA 2021) created legal tensions with its international investment obligations, especially under the UK–China BIT?
英国脱欧后的国家安全框架 （NSIA 2021） 在多大程度上与其国际投资义务造成了法律紧张关系，尤其是在英中双边投资协定下？

Objective:
目的：
Establish the regulatory and geopolitical context (FDI securitization, Brexit). Clarify the legal gap addressed. Frame the central research question.
建立监管和地缘政治环境（FDI 证券化、英国脱欧）。澄清已解决的法律差距。构建中心研究问题。

Methodology:
方法论：
Legal doctrinal research, BIT treaty interpretation, case studies. Initial framing using VCLT and customary international law.
法律理论研究、双边投资条约解释、案例研究。使用 VCLT 和习惯国际法进行初始框架设计。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
UK–China BIT (1986, amended); NSIA 2021 text and Parliamentary Debates (Hansard); Huawei, TikTok, Newport Wafer Fab cases; Grosse Ruse-Khan (2021), Sornarajah (2017).
英中双边投资协定（1986 年，修订）;NSIA 2021 文本和议会辩论（议事录）;华为、TikTok、Newport Wafer Fab 案件;Grosse Ruse-Khan （2021）、Sornarajah （2017）。

2. NSIA as an Instrument of Sovereignty: Scope, Ambiguity, and Risk (Approx. 1500 words)
2. 作为主权工具的 NSIA：范围、模糊性和风险（约 1500 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
Does the NSIA’s vague definitions and discretionary scope violate internationally accepted standards of transparency and due process?
NSIA 模糊的定义和自由裁量范围是否违反了国际公认的透明度和正当程序标准？

Objective:
目的：
Clarify NSIA’s discretionary structure and its departure from norm-based regulation. Benchmark NSIA against CFIUS (US) and EU regimes.
澄清 NSIA 的自由裁量结构及其对基于规范的监管的背离。将 NSIA 与 CFIUS（美国）和欧盟制度进行基准测试。

Methodology:
方法论：
Statutory and institutional analysis of NSIA. Comparative study with CFIUS and EU Screening Regulation.
NSIA 的法定和制度分析。与 CFIUS 和欧盟筛查法规的比较研究。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
NSIA 2021; CFIUS Review Statutes, EU Regulation (EU) 2019/452; UK Parliamentary Select Committee reports; Belyi (2021), Echandi (2020).
NSIA 2021 年;CFIUS 审查法规，欧盟法规 （EU） 2019/452;英国议会特别委员会报告;Belyi （2021），Echandi （2020）。

3. International Investment Obligations under the UK–China BIT and VCLT (Approx. 1800 words)
3. 中英双边投资协定和 VCLT 下的国际投资义务（约 1800 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
Can the NSIA’s national security discretion be interpreted as violating the UK’s investment treaty obligations using VCLT principles?
NSIA 的国家安全自由裁量权是否可以被解释为违反了使用 VCLT 原则的英国投资条约义务？

Objective:
目的：
Interpret key BIT clauses (FET, expropriation, MFN) via VCLT rules. Set foundation for legality assessment in later chapters.
通过 VCLT 规则解释关键 BIT 子句（FET、征用、MFN）。为后面章节的合法性评估奠定基础。

Methodology:
方法论：
Article-by-article BIT analysis. VCLT-based interpretation (Art. 31–33). Scholarly debate incorporation.
逐篇 BIT 分析。基于 VCLT 的口译（第 31-33 条）。学术辩论合并。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
UK–China BIT; VCLT Articles 31–33; Maffezini v Spain, Plama v Bulgaria; Aust (2013), Reinisch (2008), UNCTAD BIT Handbook.
英中双边投资协定;VCLT 第 31-33 条;马菲齐尼 v 西班牙，普拉马 v 保加利亚;Aust （2013），Reinisch （2008），UNCTAD BIT 手册。

4. Testing Legal Tensions: Jurisprudential Standards of Review (Approx. 1800 words)
4. 测试法律紧张局势：法学审查标准（约 1800 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
Does NSIA meet the proportionality, foreseeability, and non-discrimination tests developed in investment treaty jurisprudence?
NSIA 是否符合投资条约判例中制定的相称性、可预见性和非歧视性测试？

Objective:
目的：
Apply arbitral standards of review to NSIA. Test legality of the UK’s discretion against international norms.
将仲裁审查标准应用于 NSIA。根据国际规范检验英国自由裁量权的合法性。

Methodology:
方法论：
Case law analysis. Proportionality test application (3-prong). Comparative tribunal reasoning evaluation.
判例法分析。相称性测试申请（3 管齐下）。比较法庭推理评估。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
EDF v Romania, Saluka v Czech Republic, Philip Morris v Uruguay; Schill (2010), Titi (2014), Wälde (2005).
EDF v 罗马尼亚，Saluka v 捷克，菲利普莫里斯 v 乌拉圭;席尔 （2010）、蒂蒂 （2014）、瓦尔德 （2005）。

5. Doctrinal Evaluation: NSIA Practice and BIT Compatibility (Approx. 1600 words)
5. 理论评价：NSIA 实践和 BIT 兼容性（约 1600 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
Do NSIA-triggered interventions amount to indirect expropriation or breach of FET standards under the UK–China BIT?
NSIA 触发的干预是否构成间接征用或违反英中双边投资协定下的 FET 标准？

Objective:
目的：
Analyze NSIA implementation outcomes. Doctrinally assess BIT compatibility of government measures.
分析 NSIA 实施结果。从理论上评估政府措施的 BIT 兼容性。

Methodology:
方法论：
Match NSIA outcomes to BIT standards. Apply ICSID and UNCITRAL jurisprudence on indirect expropriation and FET.
将 NSIA 结果与 BIT 标准相匹配。将国际投资争端解决中心（ICSID）和联合国国际贸易法委员会（UNCITRAL）的判例应用于间接征收和 FET。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
Newport Wafer Fab case; UNCTAD Indirect Expropriation Framework; Tecmed v Mexico, Metalclad v Mexico; Vandevelde (2009), Dolzer & Schreuer (2012).
Newport Wafer Fab 案;贸发会议间接征收框架;Tecmed v 墨西哥，Metalclad v 墨西哥;Vandevelde （2009）， Dolzer & Schreuer （2012）.

6. MFN Clauses and the Limits of Procedural Equality (Approx. 1000 words)
6. 最惠国条款和程序平等的限制（约 1000 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
Can Chinese investors use MFN clauses to gain procedural rights under other UK BITs (e.g. UK–Singapore), and what are the legal limits?
中国投资者是否可以使用最惠国待遇条款获得其他英国双边投资条约（例如英国-新加坡）下的程序权利，法律限制是什么？

Objective:
目的：
Clarify scope of MFN clauses in importing procedural rights. Examine risks of inconsistent procedural expansion.
明确进口程序权中最惠国待遇条款的范围。检查不一致的程序扩展的风险。

Methodology:
方法论：
Compare arbitral decisions (Maffezini line vs Plama line). Doctrinal analysis of MFN reach into procedure.
比较仲裁裁决（Maffezini 线与 Plama 线）。最惠国待遇的理论分析伸入程序。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
Maffezini v Spain, Plama v Bulgaria; UK–Singapore BIT, UK–Vietnam BIT; Schill (2011), UNCTAD MFN Working Paper.
马菲齐尼 v 西班牙，普拉马 v 保加利亚;英国-新加坡 BIT、英国-越南 BIT;Schill （2011），《贸发会议最惠国待遇工作文件》。

7. Beyond Treaty Text: The Role of Customary International Law (Approx. 1000 words)
7. 超越条约文本：习惯国际法的作用（约 1000 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
Do NSIA’s broad discretionary powers infringe minimum standards of treatment under customary international law?
NSIA 广泛的自由裁量权是否违反了习惯国际法规定的最低待遇标准？

Objective:
目的：
Assess relevance of CIL in the absence or limits of treaty text. Introduce transparency and good faith principles.
在条约文本缺失或限制的情况下评估 CIL 的相关性。引入透明度和诚信原则。

Methodology:
方法论：
Analyze CIL doctrines (MST, transparency, due process). Apply UNCTAD, OECD, and arbitral sources.
分析 CIL 原则（MST、透明度、正当程序）。应用 UNCTAD、OECD 和仲裁来源。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
Tecmed, Methanex, Loewen; UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” report; OECD FDI screening practices; Paparinskis (2014), Alford (2017).
Tecmed， Methanex， Loewen;联合国贸易和发展会议 （UNCTAD） “公平公正待遇”报告;经合组织 FDI 审查做法;帕帕林斯基斯 （2014），阿尔福德 （2017）。

8. The Way Forward: Legal Reform and Strategic Responses (Approx. 1000 words)
8. 前进之路：法律改革和战略对策（约 1000 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
What legal and strategic reforms can align NSIA practice with international investment obligations?
哪些法律和战略改革可以使 NSIA 的实践与国际投资义务保持一致？

Objective:
目的：
Propose policy and legal reforms. Suggest investor strategies for compliance and protection.
提出政策和法律改革。为投资者提供合规和保护策略。

Methodology:
方法论：
Derive reform benchmarks from CPTPP, EU model BITs. Develop investor tools (SPVs, early due diligence).
从 CPTPP、欧盟双边投资条约范本中得出改革基准。开发投资者工具（SPV、早期尽职调查）。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
CPTPP investment chapter; EU Model BIT 2020; UNCTAD FDI Screening Toolkit; Bungenberg & Reinisch (2022).
CPTPP 投资分会;欧盟 BIT 2020 型;贸发会议外国直接投资筛查工具包;Bungenberg & Reinisch （2022）。

9. Conclusion and Implications (Approx. 800 words)
9. 结论和意义（约 800 字）

Testable Question:
可测试问题：
What legal, strategic, and policy conclusions can be drawn from the NSIA–BIT conflict?
从 NSIA-BIT 冲突中可以得出哪些法律、战略和政策结论？

Objective:
目的：
Synthesize arguments. Offer forward-looking implications for UK, China, and FDI governance.
Synthesize 参数。为英国、中国和 FDI 治理提供前瞻性影响。

Methodology:
方法论：
Synthesis of findings. Comparative foresight (e.g., BIT renegotiations).
结果综合。比较远见（例如，BIT 重新谈判）。

Key References:
主要参考资料：
All prior chapters; UK FDI trends reports; Recent ICSID jurisprudence summary reports.
所有前面的章节;英国 FDI 趋势报告;最近的 ICSID 判例摘要报告。

Supplement: Expanded Section 2 Content from Original Proposal
补充：原始提案的扩展第 2 部分内容

Legal Sub-question: To what extent does the NSIA’s undefined concept of national security, procedural opacity, and concentrated ministerial discretion create legal uncertainty that may conflict with the UK’s Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) obligations under the UK–China BIT?
法律子问题：NSIA 未定义的国家安全概念、程序的不透明性和集中的部长自由裁量权在多大程度上造成了法律不确定性，这可能与英国在英中双边投资协定下的公平公正待遇 （FET） 义务相冲突？

Goal: Analyse the legal framework and procedural design of NSIA to evaluate its compatibility with FET standards under international investment law, focusing on proportionality, transparency, and foreseeability.
目标：分析 NSIA 的法律框架和程序设计，以评估其与国际投资法下的 FET 标准的兼容性，重点关注相称性、透明度和可预见性。

Introduction:
介绍：
The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSIA) represents a significant recalibration of the United Kingdom’s foreign investment review framework. Enacted in the wake of Brexit and amid heightened geopolitical competition, the NSIA grants expansive powers to the government to scrutinise and, if necessary, block or unwind foreign acquisitions of UK companies on the grounds of national security. While the legislation does not explicitly target any specific jurisdiction, enforcement patterns and political rhetoric suggest a heightened sensitivity toward Chinese investors, particularly in sectors such as semiconductors, data infrastructure, and defence-related technology.
2021 年国家安全与投资法案 （NSIA） 代表了对英国外国投资审查框架的重大重新调整。在英国脱欧和地缘政治竞争加剧的情况下颁布，NSIA 授予政府广泛的权力，以审查并在必要时以国家安全为由阻止或取消外国对英国公司的收购。虽然该立法没有明确针对任何特定的司法管辖区，但执法模式和政治言论表明，中国投资者对中国投资者高度敏感，尤其是在半导体、数据基础设施和国防相关技术等领域。

This chapter addresses the legal and structural ambiguities embedded in the NSIA, focusing on the undefined nature of “national security,” the discretionary powers granted to ministers, and the confidentiality surrounding the decision-making process. It seeks to evaluate whether such features undermine the principles of legal certainty and procedural fairness, especially as understood under international investment law. By comparing the UK regime with its counterparts in the United States (CFIUS) and the European Union, this chapter further contextualises the procedural design and transparency of the NSIA within the broader trend of securitised investment governance.
本章讨论了 NSIA 中嵌入的法律和结构模糊性，重点关注“国家安全”的未定义性质、授予部长的自由裁量权以及围绕决策过程的保密性。它旨在评估这些特征是否破坏了法律确定性和程序公平性原则，尤其是国际投资法所理解的原则。通过将英国的制度与美国 （CFIUS） 和欧盟的制度进行比较，本章进一步将 NSIA 的程序设计和透明度置于证券化投资治理的更广泛趋势中。

Section 2.1: The Legal Structure and Operational Scope of the NSIA
第 2.1 节：NSIA 的法律结构和作范围

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 introduces a hybrid regime of both mandatory and voluntary notification requirements, supplemented by a government “call-in” power that can be exercised retrospectively for transactions completed up to five years prior. Sections 1 to 9 of the NSIA establish the core jurisdictional triggers, such as the acquisition of control in qualifying entities or assets, especially in 17 sensitive sectors including advanced materials, artificial intelligence, communications, and military technologies. However, the statute notably omits any substantive definition of “national security.”
2021 年《国家安全与投资法》引入了强制性和自愿通知要求的混合制度，并辅以政府的“召集”权力，该权力可以追溯行使，适用于五年前完成的交易。NSIA 第 1 节至第 9 节确立了核心管辖触发因素，例如获得对合格实体或资产的控制权，尤其是在 17 个敏感行业，包括先进材料、人工智能、通信和军事技术。然而，该法规明显遗漏了“国家安全”的任何实质性定义。

This deliberate ambiguity, while politically expedient, generates significant uncertainty for foreign investors. The Investment Security Unit (ISU), which administers the NSIA, offers limited public guidance and operates with a high level of confidentiality. Decisions on whether to block or approve a transaction are issued by the Secretary of State without a legal obligation to disclose full reasoning or allow third-party participation.
这种刻意的模糊性虽然在政治上是权宜之计，但给外国投资者带来了巨大的不确定性。管理 NSIA 的投资安全部门 （ISU） 提供的公共指导有限，并以高度机密的方式运作。关于是否阻止或批准交易的决定由国务卿发布，没有披露完整理由或允许第三方参与的法律义务。

Such a framework, heavily reliant on executive discretion, raises structural concerns from a rule-of-law perspective. By failing to articulate the material thresholds that might trigger intervention, the NSIA does not provide investors with a foreseeable legal environment in which to plan transactions. In investment treaty jurisprudence, such legal opacity has been consistently scrutinised under the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard. For instance, in Tecmed v Mexico, the tribunal found that transparency and a stable regulatory framework are integral to respecting investors’ legitimate expectations.
这样一个严重依赖行政自由裁量权的框架，从法治的角度来看引发了结构性问题。由于未能阐明可能触发干预的重大门槛，NSIA 没有为投资者提供可预见的法律环境来规划交易。在投资条约判例中，这种法律的不透明性一直受到公平公正待遇 （FET） 标准的审查。例如，在 Tecmed 诉 Mexico 案中，仲裁庭认为透明度和稳定的监管框架是尊重投资者合法期望不可或缺的一部分。

Section 2.2: The Ambiguity of ‘National Security’ and Its Political Rationale
第 2.2 节：“国家安全”的歧义及其政治理由

One of the most controversial features of the NSIA is the absence of a statutory definition of “national security.” Unlike competition law, where harm is defined through economic indicators, the national security concept under the NSIA is left to ministerial interpretation. Government guidance has intentionally refrained from creating a checklist, asserting that the term must remain flexible and context-dependent to adapt to evolving threats. In parliamentary debates, ministers repeatedly emphasised that codifying the meaning of national security would “inhibit the government’s ability to act decisively in the national interest.”
NSIA 最具争议的特点之一是没有“国家安全”的法定定义。与竞争法不同，竞争法中的损害是通过经济指标来定义的，而 NSIA 下的国家安全概念则留给部长级解释。政府指南有意避免创建清单，声称该术语必须保持灵活性并依赖于上下文，以适应不断变化的威胁。在议会辩论中，部长们一再强调，将国家安全的含义编纂成文将“抑制政府为国家利益采取果断行动的能力”。

This strategic ambiguity serves a geopolitical function: it enables the UK to adopt a responsive, risk-based approach that can be tailored to different actors and scenarios—particularly where technology, critical infrastructure, or state-linked investors are involved. However, from a legal certainty standpoint, this lack of clarity becomes problematic. Foreign investors, especially from jurisdictions not classified as allied or friendly, such as China, face difficulty in assessing whether their investments fall within the scope of review or potential prohibition.
这种战略模糊性起到了地缘政治功能：它使英国能够采用一种响应迅速的、基于风险的方法，这种方法可以针对不同的参与者和场景进行定制，尤其是在涉及技术、关键基础设施或国家关联投资者的情况下。然而，从法律确定性的角度来看，这种缺乏明确性就成了问题。外国投资者，尤其是来自中国等非盟友或友好司法管辖区的外国投资者，在评估其投资是否属于审查范围或潜在禁令时面临困难。

The result is a legal environment in which risk is not objectively assessable, and legal outcomes may be contingent upon political dynamics. In international investment law, this is especially relevant to the doctrine of “foreseeability.” As the tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic observed, states may regulate in the public interest, but they must do so in a manner that is transparent, non-arbitrary, and does not amount to disguised discrimination. When national security becomes a blanket justification for discretionary treatment, it risks undermining these principles.
其结果是，在法律环境中，风险无法客观评估，法律结果可能取决于政治动态。在国际投资法中，这与“可预见性”原则尤其相关。正如 Saluka 诉 Czech Republic 案的仲裁庭所观察到的那样，各国可以出于公共利益进行监管，但必须以透明、非任意且不构成变相歧视的方式进行监管。当国家安全成为自由裁量处理的笼统理由时，它就有可能破坏这些原则。

Section 2.3: Procedural Opacity and the Absence of Legal Remedies
第 2.3 节：程序的不透明性和法律补救措施的缺失

Section 2.4: Comparative Perspectives – CFIUS and EU FDI Screening
第 2.4 节：比较观点 – CFIUS 和欧盟 FDI 筛查

To evaluate whether the NSIA aligns with international expectations for investment screening, it is instructive to examine comparable regimes—most notably, the United States’ Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and the European Union’s FDI Screening Regulation. CFIUS, though equally powerful in substance, has developed through decades of regulatory evolution with clearer statutory procedures and broader investor guidance. While its decisions are not publicly reasoned, the process includes defined timelines, risk assessment criteria, and multi-agency consultations, offering greater procedural predictability.
为了评估 NSIA 是否符合国际对投资审查的期望，研究可比的制度具有指导意义，其中最著名的是美国外国投资委员会 （CFIUS） 和欧盟的 FDI 审查条例。CFIUS 虽然在实质上同样强大，但经过数十年的监管演变，拥有更清晰的法定程序和更广泛的投资者指导。虽然其决定没有公开理由，但该过程包括明确的时间表、风险评估标准和多机构磋商，从而提供了更大的程序可预测性。

The European Union’s FDI Screening Regulation (EU Regulation 2019/452) takes a more coordinated and transparency-focused approach. It requires Member States to establish contact points, mandates annual reporting, and encourages information-sharing across jurisdictions. Although it does not create a centralised EU-level veto mechanism, the Regulation has contributed to standardising review processes and ensuring proportionality and non-discrimination in decision-making.
欧盟的《外国直接投资筛查条例》（欧盟第 2019/452 号法规）采取了更加协调和注重透明度的方法。它要求会员国建立联络点，强制要求每年提交报告，并鼓励跨司法管辖区共享信息。尽管该法规没有建立欧盟层面的中央否决机制，但该法规有助于标准化审查流程并确保决策中的相称性和非歧视性。

Compared to both systems, the UK’s NSIA stands out for its limited transparency and centralised executive discretion. Unlike the EU’s emphasis on cooperative governance and CFIUS’s evolving jurisprudence, the NSIA lacks independent oversight, investor participation rights, or access to appeal mechanisms. These features raise red flags when benchmarked against OECD and UNCTAD recommendations on good regulatory practices in investment screening.
与这两个系统相比，英国的 NSIA 因其有限的透明度和集中的行政自由裁量权而脱颖而出。与欧盟强调合作治理和 CFIUS 不断发展的判例不同，NSIA 缺乏独立监督、投资者参与权或上诉机制。当以经合组织和联合国贸易和发展会议 （UNCTAD） 关于投资筛选中良好监管实践的建议为基准时，这些特征会引发危险信号。

The lack of clear review standards and limited institutional accountability within the NSIA may therefore expose the UK to increased legal risks under international investment treaties. If challenged in an investment arbitration, the UK would likely face questions regarding the proportionality, non-discrimination, and procedural fairness of its FDI regime—standards clearly visible in the comparative models.
因此，NSIA 内部缺乏明确的审查标准和有限的机构问责制可能会使英国面临国际投资条约下增加的法律风险。如果在投资仲裁中受到质疑，英国可能会面临有关其 FDI 制度的相称性、非歧视性和程序公平性的问题——这些标准在比较模型中清晰可见。

Goal:
目标：
- Analyse how NSIA reconfigures the UK’s investment review regime in a sovereignty-first direction; - Examine the ambiguity of “national security” and its implications for investment predictability; - Evaluate whether the procedural design of the NSIA – including confidentiality, lack of appeal, and ministerial discretion – meets international standards of due process; - Compare NSIA’s structure with the more rule-bound models in the US (CFIUS) and EU to contextualise its relative transparency and proportionality; - Lay the foundation for subsequent doctrinal testing under BIT obligations (e.g., FET and non-discrimination).
- 分析 NSIA 如何以主权优先的方向重新配置英国的投资审查制度;- 研究“国家安全”的模糊性及其对投资可预测性的影响;- 评估 NSIA 的程序设计——包括保密性、无上诉和部长自由裁量权——是否符合正当程序的国际标准;- 将 NSIA 的结构与美国 （CFIUS） 和欧盟更受规则约束的模型进行比较，以说明其相对透明度和相称性;- 为 BIT 义务（例如 FET 和非歧视）下的后续理论测试奠定基础。

Doctrinal & Comparative Structure:
理论与比较结构：
- Step 1: Map the legal framework of the NSIA, including statutory triggers, sector sensitivity thresholds, and ISU procedural flow; - Step 2: Identify and critically assess the legislative and policy-level rationale for keeping “national security” undefined; - Step 3: Use the OECD and UNCTAD benchmarks on FDI review transparency to evaluate the UK’s approach; - Step 4: Juxtapose the NSIA with procedural safeguards in CFIUS and the EU framework, including third-party appeal and publication obligations; - Step 5: Use case law (e.g., Philip Morris, Saluka, Tecmed) to test whether NSIA meets the proportionality and foreseeability thresholds in FET jurisprudence.
- 第 1 步：绘制 NSIA 的法律框架，包括法定触发因素、行业敏感性阈值和 ISU 程序流程;- 第 2 步：确定并批判性地评估保持“国家安全”不定义的立法和政策层面的理由;- 第 3 步：使用经合组织和联合国贸易和发展会议 （UNCTAD） 关于外国直接投资审查透明度的基准来评估英国的方法;- 第 4 步：将 NSIA 与 CFIUS 和欧盟框架中的程序保障并列，包括第三方上诉和公布义务;- 第 5 步：使用判例法（例如，Philip Morris、Saluka、Tecmed）来测试 NSIA 是否符合 FET 判例中的相称性和可预见性阈值。

Key Legal Sources and References:
主要法律来源和参考资料：
- Legislation: National Security and Investment Act 2021 (UK), Sections 1–30 - Treaties: UK–China BIT (1986), esp. Article 2(2) on FET and procedural fairness - Cases: - Philip Morris v Uruguay (proportionality in regulatory intervention) - Saluka v Czech Republic (national security and discrimination) - Tecmed v Mexico (legitimate expectations and transparency) - Soft Law: - OECD (2020), FDI Screening and National Security: Transparency and Predictability - UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (2012) - Parliamentary and Policy Materials: - Hansard UK Parliamentary Debates on NSIA, 2020–2021 - UK Government NSIA Statutory Guidance and Practice Reports
- 立法：2021 年国家安全与投资法案（英国），第 1-30 节- 条约：英中双边投资协定（1986 年），特别是关于 FET 和程序公平性的第 2（2） 条 - 案例： - 菲利普莫里斯诉乌拉圭（监管干预的相称性） - 萨卢卡诉捷克共和国（国家安全和歧视） - Tecmed 诉墨西哥（合法期望和透明度） - 软法： - 经合组织（2020 年），外国直接投资筛查和国家安全：透明度和可预测性 - 联合国贸易和发展会议，公平公正待遇（2012 年） - 议会和政策材料： - 英国国会议事录关于 NSIA 的辩论， 2020–2021 年 - 英国政府 NSIA 法定指南和实践报告

Preliminary Sources: - National Security and Investment Act 2021 (UK) - UK Parliament Select Committee Reports (2021–2023) - Gazzini, Foreign Investment and the Public Interest (2022) - CFIUS and EU FDI screening comparison documents Goal: Analyse the legal framework of the NSIA, its discretionary powers, and the implications of its broad security criteria. Preliminary Sources: - National Security and Investment Act 2021 (UK) - UK Parliament Select Committee Reports (2021–2023) - Gazzini, Foreign Investment and the Public Interest (2022) - CFIUS and EU FDI screening comparison documents
初步来源： - 2021 年国家安全和投资法案（英国） - 英国议会特别委员会报告（2021-2023 年） - Gazzini，外国投资和公共利益（2022 年） - CFIUS 和欧盟外国直接投资筛选比较文件 目标：分析 NSIA 的法律框架、其自由裁量权及其广泛安全标准的影响。初步来源： - 2021 年国家安全和投资法案（英国） - 英国议会特别委员会报告（2021-2023 年） - Gazzini，外国投资和公共利益（2022 年） - CFIUS 和欧盟 FDI 筛选比较文件