Satyajit Das, a former banker, is the author of "Traders, Guns & Money," "Extreme Money" and "A Banquet of Consequences: Reloaded"
Satyajit Das，一位前银行家，是《交易者，枪支与金钱》和《极端金钱》和《后果的盛宴：重装上阵》的作者。
The yen carry trade involves borrowing yen at Japan's ultralow interest rates to invest in higher-yielding foreign assets. The recent unwinding of these trades, estimates of which range from $4 trillion to $20 trillion, has fueled market instability.
日元套利交易涉及以日本的超低利率借入日元以投资于高收益的外国资产。这些交易最近平仓，估计从 4 万亿美元到 20 万亿美元不等，加剧了市场的不稳定。
While profitable in stable conditions, these trades carry significant risks, and their scale presents complex policy challenges often overlooked by regulators.
虽然这些交易在稳定条件下有利可图，但存在重大风险，而且其规模带来了复杂的政策挑战，往往被监管机构忽视。
The roots of the yen carry trade trace back to the early 1990s, when the Bank of Japan responded to the bursting of Japan's economic bubble. To mitigate the risk of corporate and bank defaults, the BOJ implemented ultralow interest rates and injected liquidity into the system. The goals were to lower debt servicing costs, recapitalize banks by encouraging investments in higher-yielding government bonds, devalue the yen to boost industrial competitiveness, and generate inflation to reduce real debt levels. While these policies had mixed success, they led to a surge in capital outflows, making the yen the preferred currency for leveraged investments.
日元汇率贸易的根源可以追溯到 1990 年代初，当时日本央行对日本经济泡沫的破裂做出了反应。为了降低公司和银行违约的风险，日本央行实施了超低利率，并向系统注入了流动性。目标是降低偿债成本，通过鼓励投资高收益政府债券来重组银行资本，使日元贬值以提高工业竞争力，以及制造通货膨胀以降低实际债务水平。虽然这些政策的成功与否参半，但它们导致了资本外流的激增，使日元成为杠杆投资的首选货币。
Japanese investors sought better returns by purchasing foreign bonds, structured debt and equities. At the same time, foreign investors borrowed in yen to buy assets in advanced and emerging markets, profiting from the interest rate differential. Investors also faced currency risks, which made the carry trade even more complicated.
日本投资者通过购买外国债券、结构性债务和股票来寻求更好的回报。与此同时，外国投资者借入日元购买发达和新兴市场的资产，从利差中获利。投资者还面临货币风险，这使得套利交易变得更加复杂。
Then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's urging of the BOJ to massively loosen monetary policy from 2013 onward also helped the yen carry trade to flourish.
时任首相安倍晋三敦促日本央行从 2013 年起大幅放松货币政策，这也帮助日元贸易蓬勃发展。
When inflation reemerged in 2021 and higher interest rates in most advanced economies created a large interest differential with the Bank of Japan's rates around zero, the yen fell from around 100 to the dollar to over 160.
© Getty Images
当通货膨胀在 2021 年重新出现，大多数发达经济体的较高利率与日本央行的利率接近零产生了巨大的利差时，日元兑美元汇率从 100 左右跌至 160 以上。© 盖蒂图片社
When inflation reemerged in 2021 and higher interest rates in most advanced economies created a large interest differential with the BOJ's rates around zero, the yen fell from around 100 to the dollar to over 160. This boosted Japanese exporters' incomes, driving domestic and foreign purchases of their shares and allowing the stock market to finally recover to 1989 levels. Some foreign investors who purchased Japanese shares hedged their yen currency exposure.
当通货膨胀在 2021 年重新出现，大多数发达经济体的较高利率造成了巨大的利差，日本央行的利率接近零，日元兑美元从 100 左右跌至 160 以上。这增加了日本出口商的收入，推动了国内外购买他们的股票，并使股市最终恢复到 1989 年的水平。一些购买日本股票的外国投资者对冲了他们的日元货币风险。
Alarmed by the rapid and sometimes disorderly decline in the yen, Japanese authorities intervened in foreign exchange markets. When the Bank of Japan increased rates from around zero to 0.25% in July, the yen rallied sharply.
日本当局对日元的快速、有时是无序的贬值感到震惊，于是干预了外汇市场。当日本央行在 7 月份将利率从零左右上调至 0.25% 时，日元大幅上涨。
Foreign currency investments held by Japanese investors lost value in yen terms. Trillions of dollars invested in the carry trade were affected by the narrowing difference between income and cost of borrowing, as well as currency losses on the yen funding and hedges. Falling asset value triggered margin calls. Volatility increases flowed into risk models, driving often-substantial reductions in permitted leverage. Investors were forced to de-risk and liquidate positions to generate cash. In response to falling prices, quantitative and exchange-traded funds that follow momentum and trends sold.
日本投资者持有的外币投资以日元计算贬值。投资于套利交易的数万亿美元受到收入和借贷成本之间差距缩小以及日元融资和对冲货币损失的影响。资产价值下跌触发了追加保证金通知。波动性增加流入风险模型，导致允许的杠杆率经常大幅降低。投资者被迫降低风险并清算头寸以产生现金。为了应对价格下跌，跟随动量和趋势的量化和交易所交易基金卖出。
Successive waves of liquidation led to major market dislocations. Following the huge 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, Japanese stocks fell by 6%. But in August this year, softer-than-expected U.S. labor market data on the back of the BOJ's modest rate hike triggered a 12% fall, followed by a 10% rise the following day.
连续的清算浪潮导致了重大的市场混乱。在 2011 年东北大地震和海啸之后，日本股市下跌了 6%。但在今年 8 月，在日本央行小幅加息的背景下，美国劳动力市场数据弱于预期，引发 12% 的下跌，次日又上涨 10%。
This episode has several implications. First, asset values globally may be affected if low-cost yen-loan-funded purchases decrease and there are declines in the export of Japanese savings. Borrowing costs may rise, with the U.S. and other debtor nations having to spend more to finance their budgets and current account deficits.
这一集有几个含义。首先，如果低成本的日元贷款购买减少，而日本储蓄的出口下降，全球的资产价值可能会受到影响。借款成本可能会上升，美国和其他债务国不得不花费更多来为其预算和经常账户赤字筹集资金。
Second, Japanese banks that have intermediated these flows face lower earnings.
其次，为这些资金流动提供中介服务的日本银行面临较低的收益。
Third, Japanese investors who favor local markets will see reduced returns. In turn, this may perpetuate Japan's "zombie" enterprises -- indebted businesses that generate sufficient cash to cover costs and loan interest but not enough to invest in operations or repay the debt itself.
第三，青睐当地市场的日本投资者将看到回报下降。反过来，这可能会使日本的“僵尸”企业长期存在——负债累累的企业产生足够的现金来支付成本和贷款利息，但没有足够的现金来投资运营或偿还债务本身。
Finally, the BOJ will struggle to increase rates. It cannot reduce its balance sheet, as sales of its large bond (over 53% of outstanding Japanese government securities) and equity holdings (around 7% of the stock market) would push up rates and decrease asset values. Any resultant yen appreciation would lead to further losses, disadvantage Japanese exports and lower import costs. This could also lead to a renewal of disinflationary pressures.
最后，日本央行将难以加息。它不能缩减资产负债表，因为出售其大型债券（占已发行日本政府证券的 53% 以上）和持有的股票（约占股票市场的 7%）会推高利率并降低资产价值。任何由此产生的日元升值都会导致进一步的损失，不利于日本的出口并降低进口成本。这也可能导致通货紧缩压力的新一轮。
Addressing the problem will require major adjustments. Interest rates cannot be held artificially low forever. BOJ funding through bond purchases has bred excessive reliance on fiscal stimulus and unsound public finances (persistent deficits and government debt of, respectively, around 6% and more than 250% of gross domestic product). A gradual transfer of central bank holdings of bonds and shares to investors could be done via a tracker fund, a technique used by Hong Kong to liquidate shares acquired to stabilize markets after the 1997-98 crisis.
解决这个问题需要进行重大调整。利率不能永远人为地保持在低水平。日本央行通过购买债券筹集资金，导致了对财政刺激和不健全公共财政的过度依赖（持续赤字和政府债务分别占国内生产总值的6%左右和250%以上）。央行持有的债券和股票可以通过追踪基金逐步转移给投资者，追踪基金是香港在 1997-98 年危机后为稳定市场而收购的股票的一种技术。
Structural changes are needed, such as broadening investments available to retail investors, facilitating a shift away from bank deposits (over 50% of household assets) and reducing the prevailing domestic bias. Corporations should be incentivized to disgorge large corporate cash holdings and savings. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry guidelines now make mergers and takeovers easier. But complex corporate ownership structures, poison pills and other defense mechanisms remain barriers to non-Japanese ownership and the corporate restructuring needed to revitalize industry and reallocate capital.
需要进行结构性改革，例如扩大散户投资者的投资范围，促进从银行存款（占家庭资产的 50% 以上）转向，并减少普遍存在的国内偏见。应该激励公司交出大型企业现金持有和储蓄。经济产业省的指导方针现在使合并和收购变得更加容易。但复杂的公司所有权结构、毒丸和其他防御机制仍然是非日本所有权和振兴工业和重新分配资本所需的公司重组的障碍。
Because of the political challenges and short-term costs of needed actions, the yen carry trade could return, just as it did after the 2008 and 2011 crises.
由于政治挑战和所需行动的短期成本，日元套利交易可能会卷土重来，就像 2008 年和 2011 年危机之后一样。
The fundamental lesson is that emergency measures after the global financial crisis and the pandemic resulted in long-term deformation of the economic and financial system. These can unmoor markets from fundamentals and encourage addiction to risk and speculation.
从根本上讲，全球金融危机和疫情后的紧急措施导致了经济和金融体系的长期变形。这些可以使市场脱离基本面，并鼓励对风险和投机的沉迷。
The world has experienced a number of recent market breakdowns -- the 2022 U.K. government bond crisis and the 2023 U.S. regional and European banking problems. Given rising risks -- China's slowdown, unsustainable debt levels, trade and military wars, climate-change-driven extreme weather events, as well as excesses in investment markets -- more financial instability would be unsurprising.
世界最近经历了许多市场崩溃——2022 年英国政府债券危机和 2023 年美国地区和欧洲银行问题。考虑到不断上升的风险——中国经济放缓、不可持续的债务水平、贸易和军事战争、气候变化驱动的极端天气事件以及投资市场的过度扩张——金融不稳定的增加也就不足为奇了。
