日本最有利可图的政策实验可以教给我们什么

Imagine a policy that adds 1 per cent of GDP a year to the fiscal resources of a large, advanced economy. This policy works like magic. The money appears out of nowhere, with no rise in taxes, no cuts in spending, no assets sold and no debt to pay back. Such a policy would have great appeal to cash-strapped governments around the world and is surely too good to exist. Nevertheless, exist it does. Any guesses? The answer is a 2014 reform to the Government Pension Investment Fund of Japan, the world’s largest pool of retirement savings, in which it took on some currency and equity risk.
想象一下，如果一项政策每年将GDP的1%用于大型发达经济体的财政资源。这项政策就像魔术一样有效。这些钱不知从何而来，没有增加税收，没有削减支出，没有出售资产，也没有债务需要偿还。这样的政策将对世界各地资金短缺的政府具有很大的吸引力，而且肯定好得不能存在。然而，它确实存在。有什么猜测吗？答案是2014年对日本政府养老投资基金（全球最大的退休储蓄池）进行改革，该基金承担了一些货币和股票风险。

Undertaken by former prime minister Shinzo Abe, the 2014 reform shifted the GPIF from a largely domestic portfolio, with 60 per cent held in Japanese government bonds, to one that is 50 per cent equity and 50 per cent international. According to Stephen Jen and Joana Freire of Eurizon SLJ Capital, the portfolio has grown from ¥137tn in 2014 to ¥226tn today, compared with the ¥168tn at which it would now stand if the fund had kept it unchanged. The extra return amounts to about 10 per cent of Japan’s GDP, or $370bn, which must make it the most lucrative asset allocation review in history.
在前首相安倍晋三（Shinzo Abe）的推动下，2014年的改革将GPIF从主要由国内投资组合（60%持有日本政府债券）转变为50%的股票和50%的国际投资组合。根据Eurizon SLJ Capital的Stephen Jen和Joana Freire的说法，该投资组合已从2014年的137万亿日元增长到今天的226万亿日元，而如果该基金保持不变，现在的投资组合为168万亿日元。额外回报约占日本GDP的10%，即3700亿美元，这必定会成为历史上最有利可图的资产配置审查。

The portfolio has benefited, of course, from the weakness of the yen, which fell from roughly ¥100 to the dollar to roughly ¥150 over this timeframe, but that is the point of taking currency risk, not a lucky accident. A period of bad asset returns could wipe out some of the gains. This is, however, a policy experiment that the world should study. Here are six lessons.
当然，该投资组合受益于日元的疲软，日元兑美元汇率在这段时间内从大约100日元跌至大约150日元，但这是承担货币风险的重点，而不是幸运的意外。一段时间的不良资产回报可能会抹去部分收益。然而，这是世界应该研究的政策实验。这里有六个教训。

First, Japan has reason to be grateful to Abe, who was prime minister from 2012 to 2020 before his assassination in 2022. Opponents attacked the GPIF reform as speculation with the public’s retirement savings but Abe and his advisers showed leadership, riding out periods of bad publicity when the fund’s value went down. The GPIF reform may not be his greatest legacy but it is one to be proud of.
首先，日本有理由感谢安倍晋三，安倍晋三在2022年遇刺前于2012年至2020年担任首相。反对者抨击GPIF改革是对公众退休储蓄的投机，但安倍晋三和他的顾问们表现出了领导力，在基金价值下跌时度过了负面宣传的时期。GPIF改革可能不是他最大的遗产，但却是值得骄傲的。

Second, it highlights the importance of looking at net rather than gross public debt. Japan famously has the world’s largest gross public debt at 252 per cent of GDP. Its net public debt stands at 158 per cent of GDP, with the assets in the GPIF making up a chunk of the difference. Imagine an alternative reform in 2014, which used the GPIF money to cancel government bonds. In that case gross debt would have fallen, but Japan would have missed out on the excess returns from the investment portfolio and net debt would now be 10 percentage points higher.
其次，它强调了关注净债务而不是公共债务总额的重要性。众所周知，日本拥有世界上最大的公共债务总额，占GDP的252%。其净公共债务占GDP的158%，GPIF中的资产占了差额的很大一部分。想象一下2014年的另一项改革，即使用GPIF资金取消政府债券。在这种情况下，总债务会下降，但日本将错过投资组合的超额回报，净债务现在将高出10个百分点。

Third, the GPIF’s shift shows a different way to think about public finances. In some sense, a government is like the ultimate university endowment fund or life insurance company: it is designed to exist forever, it has long-term obligations to future pensioners and a huge capacity to absorb risk.
第三，GPIF的转变显示了一种思考公共财政的不同方式。从某种意义上说，政府就像终极的大学捐赠基金或人寿保险公司：它被设计为永远存在，它对未来的养老金领取者负有长期义务，并具有巨大的吸收风险的能力。

The government can invest in public sector assets that will generate future tax returns, such as education and roads, but it can invest in private sector assets as well. In circumstances where the private sector is hungry for safe assets such as government bonds, and willing to buy them at very low interest rates, it may well make sense to issue more, increase the public sector’s leverage and invest for a higher return. Jen and Freire suggest that the US Social Security Trust Fund, which is currently an accounting entity that only invests in special US Treasury bonds, should follow the GPIF into other assets.
政府可以投资于将产生未来纳税回报的公共部门资产，例如教育和道路，但它也可以投资于私营部门资产。在私营部门渴望政府债券等安全资产并愿意以极低利率购买这些资产的情况下，发行更多债券、增加公共部门的杠杆率并投资以获得更高的回报可能是有意义的。Jen 和 Freire 建议，美国社会保障信托基金目前是一个只投资于美国特殊国债的会计实体，应该遵循 GPIF 进入其他资产。

Fourth, the GPIF reform was relatively conservative. The portfolio shift was made consciously, with careful attention to risk, asset management by professionals and politicians kept at arm’s length. That makes a depressing contrast with an economically similar scheme in the UK, whereby local governments sought to fix their lack of tax revenue by borrowing billions of pounds from the central government, and investing it in commercial property and other assets. A number, such as Thurrock, Woking and Warrington, have got themselves into deep financial trouble. It will always be easy to confuse prudent use of the state’s balance sheet to fund long-term liabilities using long-term assets, and speculation to keep short-term tax rates low.
第四，GPIF改革相对保守。投资组合的转变是有意识的，对风险的密切关注，专业人士和政治家的资产管理保持距离。这与英国经济上类似的计划形成了令人沮丧的对比，根据该计划，地方政府试图通过从中央政府借入数十亿英镑并将其投资于商业地产和其他资产来解决税收不足的问题。瑟罗克（Thurrock）、沃金（Woking）和沃灵顿（Warrington）等一些人已经陷入了严重的财务困境。人们总是很容易混淆谨慎地使用国家资产负债表来使用长期资产为长期负债提供资金，以及为了保持短期低税率而进行的投机。

Fifth, the GPIF’s shift could apply to other pools of assets. For example, Japan is one of a number of Asian countries that maintains foreign exchange reserves much greater than it needs. If Tokyo does not want to take advantage of the weak yen to sell some dollars and retire some debt — which would be quite sensible — then it could shift some of these reserves into equities too, or hand them over outright to the GPIF. The way Hong Kong handles the investment portion of its Exchange Fund is an interesting example.
第五，GPIF的转变可能适用于其他资产池。例如，日本是众多亚洲国家之一，其外汇储备远高于其需求。如果东京不想利用日元疲软的机会出售一些美元并偿还一些债务——这将是相当明智的——那么它也可以将其中一些储备转移到股票中，或者将它们直接交给GPIF。香港处理外汇基金投资部分的方式就是一个有趣的例子。

Finally, there is a case to make this kind of reform early. Not only are the benefits accrued and the risks best managed over time, but the world continues to age and the demand for pension-paying assets rises with it. The return of inflation has made everybody feel better about returns but there is little sign that real interest rates — after inflation — have moved sustainably higher.
最后，有理由尽早进行这种改革。随着时间的流逝，不仅收益累积，风险得到最好管理，而且世界继续老龄化，对养老金支付资产的需求也随之增加。通胀的回归让每个人都对回报感觉更好，但几乎没有迹象表明实际利率（扣除通胀后）会持续走高。

In finance there is never any free lunch. Return always comes with risk. But as ageing societies confront a rising fiscal burden, the success of Abe’s GPIF reform shows the merit, for governments, of thinking less like debtors struggling to pay the bills, and more like investors with large obligations, large balance sheets and a very long time horizon.
在金融领域，从来就没有免费的午餐。回报总是伴随着风险。但是，随着老龄化社会面临日益沉重的财政负担，安倍晋三的GPIF改革的成功表明，对政府来说，不要像债务人那样努力支付账单，而应该像投资者那样承担大量债务、庞大的资产负债表和很长的时间跨度。

robin.harding@ft.com