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known findings of contemporary social science is that no democracies have ever fought a war against each other, given reasonably restrictive definitions of democracy and of war. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} This insight is now part of everyday public discourse and serves as a basis for American foreign policymaking. President Bill Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union address invoked the absence of war between democracies as a justification for promoting democratization around the globe. In the week following the U.S. military landing in Haiti, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake reiterated that “spreading democracy . . . serves our interests” because democracies “tend not to abuse their citizens’ rights or wage war on one another.” ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
当代社会科学的一个众所周知的发现是，如果对民主和战争的定义有合理的限制，那么民主国家之间从未发生过战争。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这一见解现已成为日常公共讨论的一部分，并成为美国外交政策制定的基础。比尔-克林顿总统在1994年的国情咨文中以民主国家之间没有战争为由在全球范围内推动民主化。在美军登陆海地之后的一周，国家安全顾问安东尼-莱克重申，"传播民主......符合我们的利益"，因为民主国家 "往往不会滥用公民权利或相互发动战争"。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. However, countries do not become mature democracies overnight. More typically, they go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratization suffers reversals. In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.
对美国来说，一个有更多国家成为成熟、稳定的民主国家的世界可能更安全、更可取。然而，国家并非一夜之间就能成为成熟的民主国家。更典型的情况是，它们会经历一个坎坷的过渡时期，在这一时期，民主对外交政策的控制是局部的，大众政治与专制精英政治以一种不稳定的方式交织在一起，民主化进程遭遇逆转。在这一民主化过渡阶段，各国的侵略性和战争倾向不是降低了，而是增强了。

The authors thank Sergei Tikhonov for assistance with computer programming; Liv Mansfield for preparing the figures; Richard Betts, Miriam Fendius Elman, David Lake, Bruce Russett, Randall Schweller, David Spiro, Randall Stone, Celeste Wallander, and participants at seminars at Harvard and Columbia for helpful comments; and the Pew Charitable Trusts for financial support.

The contemporary era shows that incipient or partial democratization can be an occasion for the rise of belligerent nationalism and war. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} Two pairs of states-Serbia and Croatia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan-have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of partial electoral democracy. Russia’s poorly institutionalized, partial democracy has tense relationships with many of its neighbors and has used military force brutally to reassert control in Chechnya; its electorate cast nearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
当代的情况表明，初期民主化或部分民主化可能成为好战民族主义和战争抬头的契机。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 有两对国家--塞尔维亚和克罗地亚、亚美尼亚和阿塞拜疆--在尝试不同程度的部分选举民主制的同时，发现自己处于战争状态。俄罗斯的部分民主制度化程度不高，与许多邻国关系紧张，曾野蛮使用军事力量重新控制车臣；其选民将近四分之一的选票投给了激进民族主义者弗拉基米尔-日里诺夫斯基（Vladimir Zhirinovsky）的政党。

This contemporary connection between democratization and conflict is no coincidence. Using the same databases that are typically used to study the democratic peace, we find considerable statistical evidence that democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than are mature democracies or stable autocracies. States like contemporary Russia that make the biggest leap in democratization-from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy-are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies. However, reversing the process of democratization, once it has begun, will not reduce this risk. Regimes that are changing toward autocracy, including states that revert to autocracy after failed experiments with democracy, are also more likely to fight wars than are states whose regime is unchanging.
民主化与冲突之间的这种当代联系并非巧合。利用通常用于研究民主和平的相同数据库，我们发现大量统计证据表明，民主化国家比成熟的民主国家或稳定的专制国家更有可能爆发战争。像当代俄罗斯这样在民主化进程中取得最大飞跃的国家--从完全的专制到广泛的大众民主--在民主化后的十年中发生战争的可能性大约是保持专制的国家的两倍。然而，民主化进程一旦开始，将其逆转并不会降低这种风险。正在向专制转变的政权，包括在民主试验失败后重新回到专制的国家，也比政权不变的国家更有可能爆发战争。

Moreover, virtually every great power has gone on the warpath during the initial phase of its entry into the era of mass politics. Mid-Victorian Britain, poised between the partial democracy of the First Reform Bill of 1832 and the full-fledged democracy of the later Gladstone era, was carried into the Crimean War by a groundswell of belligerent public opinion. Napoleon III’s France, drifting from plebiscitary toward parliamentary rule, fought a series of wars designed to establish its credentials as a liberal, popular, nationalist type of empire. The ruling elite of Wilhelmine Germany, facing universal suffrage but limited governmental accountability, was pushed toward World War I by its escalating competition with middle-class mass groups for the mantle of German nationalism. Japan’s “Taisho democracy” of the 1920s brought an era of mass politics that led the Japanese army to devise and sell an imperial ideology
此外，几乎每个大国在进入大众政治时代的最初阶段都会走上战争之路。维多利亚时代中期的英国，介于1832年《第一次改革法案》的部分民主与后来格莱斯顿时代的全面民主之间，被好战的民意浪潮带入了克里米亚战争。拿破仑三世的法国从全民公决走向议会统治，发动了一系列战争，旨在确立其作为自由、大众、民族主义型帝国的资格。威廉明德国的统治精英面临普选权但政府问责有限的问题，他们与中产阶级群众团体争夺德意志民族主义衣钵的竞争不断升级，从而被推向了第一次世界大战。日本 20 世纪 20 年代的 "大正民主 "带来了一个大众政治时代，导致日本军队设计并推销一种帝国意识形态。

with broad-based appeal. ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} In each case, the combination of incipient democratization and the material resources of a great power produced nationalism, truculence abroad, and major war.
具有广泛的吸引力。 ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} 在每一种情况下，初期民主化与大国物质资源的结合都会产生民族主义、海外暴乱和大规模战争。

Why should democratizing states be so belligerent? The pattern of the democratizing great powers suggests that the problem lies in the nature of domestic political competition after the breakup of the autocratic regime. Elite groups left over from the ruling circles of the old regime, many of whom have a particular interest in war and empire, vie for power and survival with each other and with new elites representing rising democratic forces. Both old and new elites use all the resources they can muster to mobilize mass allies, often through nationalist appeals, to defend their threatened positions and to stake out new ones. However, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, these elites typically find that their mass allies, once mobilized, are difficult to control. When this happens, war can result from nationalist prestige strategies that hard-pressed leaders use to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions. ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}
民主化国家为何如此好战？民主化大国的模式表明，问题在于专制政权解体后国内政治竞争的性质。旧政权统治集团遗留下来的精英群体，其中许多人对战争和帝国有着特殊的兴趣，他们相互之间以及与代表新兴民主力量的新精英之间争夺权力和生存空间。新旧精英都会动用一切资源来动员群众盟友，通常是通过民族主义的诉求来捍卫自己受到威胁的地位，并建立新的地位。然而，就像巫师的学徒一样，这些精英通常会发现，他们的群众盟友一旦动员起来，就很难控制。当这种情况发生时，民族主义声望战略就会导致战争，而这些战略正是困难重重的领导人用来维持其难以驾驭的政治联盟的手段。 ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}

The problem is not that mass public opinion in democratizing states demonstrates an unvarnished, persistent preference for military adventure. On the contrary, public opinion often starts off highly averse to war. Rather, elites exploit their power in the imperfect institutions of partial democracies to create faits accomplis, control political agendas, and shape the content of information media in ways that promote belligerent pressure-group lobbies or upwellings of militancy in the populace as a whole.
问题并不在于民主化国家的大众舆论表现出对军事冒险的赤裸裸的、持续的偏好。恰恰相反，公众舆论往往一开始就非常反感战争。相反，精英们利用他们在不完善的部分民主体制中的权力，制造既成事实，控制政治议程，并塑造信息媒体的内容，以促进好战压力集团的游说或全体民众好战情绪的高涨。

Once this ideological connection between militant elites and their mass constituents is forged, the state may jettison electoral democracy while retaining nationalistic, populist rhetoric. As in the failure of Weimar and Taisho democracy, the adverse effects of democratization on war-proneness may even heighten after democracy collapses. Thus, the aftershock of failed democratization is at least one of the factors explaining the link between autocratization and war.
一旦激进精英与其大众选民之间建立了这种意识形态联系，国家就可能放弃选举民主，同时保留民族主义和民粹主义言论。正如魏玛民主制和大正民主制的失败一样，民主化对战争倾向性的不利影响甚至会在民主崩溃后加剧。因此，民主化失败的余震至少是解释专制与战争之间联系的因素之一。

In developing these arguments, we first present our statistical findings showing that democratizing states have been disproportionately likely to fight wars. We then explain why democratizing states are so war-prone, drawing illustrations from the history of the great powers. Finally, we offer suggestions for reducing the risks of transitions to democracy.
在阐述这些论点时，我们首先介绍了我们的统计结果，这些结果表明民主化国家发生战争的可能性过高。然后，我们以大国历史为例来解释为什么民主化国家如此容易发生战争。最后，我们提出了降低向民主过渡风险的建议。

Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which indicate that democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but that by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other. Using similar methods and the same databases (covering the period from 1811 to 1980), we find that democratizing states-those that have recently undergone regime change in a democratic direction-are much more war-prone than states that have undergone no regime change, and are somewhat more war-prone than those that have undergone a change in an autocratic direction. In this section, we distinguish between democratic and democratizing regimes and explain how we set up our statistical tests. We then report our statistical findings.
关于民主和平的研究大多依赖于统计检验，结果表明民主国家卷入战争的频率与其他国家差不多，但根据合理的限制性定义，民主国家之间从未发生过战争。使用类似的方法和相同的数据库（涵盖 1811 年至 1980 年这一时期），我们发现，民主化国家--那些最近经历了政权向民主方向转变的国家--比那些没有经历政权转变的国家更容易发生战争，而且比那些经历了政权向专制方向转变的国家更容易发生战争。在本节中，我们将区分民主政权和民主化政权，并解释我们是如何建立统计检验的。然后，我们将报告统计结果。

Definitional issues have been central to the debate on the democratic peace. Even fairly minimal definitions of democracy require periodic elections between candidates who compete fairly for the votes of a substantial portion of the adult population, and whose outcome determines who makes state policy, including foreign and military policy. ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} Thus, the War of 1812 does not count as a war between democracies because Britain’s suffrage was too narrow. Conversely, although the German Reichstag of 1914 was elected by universal suffrage with voter turnout over 90 percent, the war between France and Germany is excluded because German cabinet officials were chosen by the Kaiser. Nonetheless, in light of the current enthusiasm about the prospects for promoting peace by encouraging democratization, it is important not simply to discard cases that are not yet mature democracies, but to analyze democratization as a significant category in its own right.
定义问题一直是民主和平辩论的核心。即使是相当低级的民主定义，也要求候选人之间定期举行选举，公平竞争相当一部分成年人的选票，选举结果决定由谁制定国家政策，包括外交和军事政策。 ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} 因此，1812 年战争不能算作民主国家之间的战争，因为英国的选举权过于狭窄。相反，尽管 1914 年的德国国会由普选产生，投票率超过 90%，但由于德国内阁官员由德皇挑选，因此法德战争被排除在外。尽管如此，鉴于当前人们热衷于通过鼓励民主化来促进和平的前景，重要的是不能简单地抛弃那些尚未成熟的民主国家，而是要将民主化作为一个重要的类别来分析。
Ted Robert Gurr’s Polity II database on regime characteristics is commonly used to study the democratic peace, and is especially well-suited to measuring
特德-罗伯特-古尔的 Polity II 政体特征数据库通常用于研究民主和平，尤其适合衡量
6. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: Harper, 1947); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5-13, esp. p. 6; see also Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 16-18, and Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” esp. p. 1164.
6.Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: Harper, 1947); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave：亨廷顿，《第三次浪潮：二十世纪后期的民主化》（诺曼：俄克拉荷马大学出版社，1991 年），第 5-13 页，尤其是第 6 页；另见 Russett，《把握民主和平》，第 16-18 页，以及 Michael Doyle，《自由主义与世界政治》，尤其是第 1164 页。
gradations of regime change toward or away from democracy. ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} Gurr created measures of democracy and autocracy (with values from 0 to 10) based on the competitiveness of political participation, the strength of the rules regulating participation in politics, the competitiveness of the process for selecting the chief executive, the openness of executive recruitment, and the strength of the constraints on the chief executive’s power. Bruce Russett has combined these measures to develop a composite index of a state’s regime type. ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} Based on this index and following Gurr, Russett distinguishes among democracies, autocracies, and “anocracies,” political systems in which democratic and autocratic features are mixed, or in which very little power is concentrated in the hands of public authorities. ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} Some of the anocracies discussed by Russett include Iran under Mossadegh, Indonesia after Sukarno’s first election, Goulart’s Brazil, and Allende’s Chile. ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} Victorian Britain is coded as close to fully democratic on some dimensions, but anocratic on others. ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11}
政权更迭向民主或脱离民主的分级。 ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} 古尔根据政治参与的竞争性、规范政治参与的规则的力度、行政长官遴选程序的竞争性、行政长官招聘的公开性以及对行政长官权力的制约力度，创建了民主和专制的衡量标准（数值从0到10）。布鲁斯-拉塞特（Bruce Russett）将这些指标综合起来，制定了一个国家政权类型的综合指数。 ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} 根据这一指数并效仿古尔，拉塞特区分了民主政体、专制政体和 "非民主政体"，即民主和专制特征混合的政治体制，或者权力很少集中在公共当局手中的政治体制。 ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 拉塞特讨论的一些无政体包括摩萨台统治下的伊朗、苏加诺首次当选后的印度尼西亚、古拉特统治下的巴西和阿连德统治下的智利。 ${}^{10}$${}^{10}$^(10){ }^{10} 维多利亚时期的英国在某些方面接近完全民主，但在另一些方面则是专制的。 ${}^{11}$${}^{11}$^(11){ }^{11}

We consider states to be democratizing if, during a given period of time, they change from autocracy to either anocracy or democracy, or if they change from anocracy to democracy. Conversely, states are autocratizing if they change from democracy to autocracy or anocracy, or from anocracy to autocracy.
我们认为，如果国家在一定时期内从专制转变为非专制或民主，或从非民主转变为民主，则国家正在民主化。反之，如果国家从民主变为专制或非民主，或从非民主变为专制，则属于专制化国家。

We conduct separate analyses based on the composite index of regime change and on three of its components, because we are interested in both their combined and their separate effects on war. The first of these components is the openness of executive recruitment. In Gurr’s definition, "recruitment of the chief executive is ‘open’ to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process."12 The second component, executive constraints, measures "the insti-
我们根据政权更迭综合指数及其三个组成部分分别进行分析，因为我们对它们对战争的综合影响和单独影响都感兴趣。其中第一个组成部分是行政人员招聘的公开性。根据 Gurr 的定义，"行政长官的招聘是'公开'的，因为所有政治活跃分子原则上都有机会通过正规程序获得这一职位"。

tutionalized constraints that exist on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities." ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} The greater these constraints, the more democratic is the polity. ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} The third component, the competitiveness of political participation, “refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.” ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} The greater the competitiveness, the more democratic is the polity. ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16}
对行政长官（无论是个人还是集体）决策权的制度化约束"。 ${}^{13}$${}^{13}$^(13){ }^{13} 这些约束越大，政体就越民主。 ${}^{14}$${}^{14}$^(14){ }^{14} 第三个组成部分是政治参与的竞争性，"指的是在政治舞台上可以追求其他政策和领导偏好的程度"。 ${}^{15}$${}^{15}$^(15){ }^{15} 竞争性越强，政体就越民主。 ${}^{16}$${}^{16}$^(16){ }^{16}

Although Gurr’s selection of indicators and his classification of cases are not beyond dispute, they are generally considered to be better documented and more discriminating than other compilations. ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} Moreover, by using Gurr’s data, we insure that none of the cases included in our analysis were coded with an eye toward confirming the hypothesis that democratization promotes war.
尽管古尔对指标的选择和对案例的分类并非无可争议，但人们普遍认为，与其他资料汇编相比，古尔的资料更详实、更有鉴别力。 ${}^{17}$${}^{17}$^(17){ }^{17} 此外，通过使用古尔的数据，我们确保了我们分析中的所有案例都不是为了证实民主化会促进战争的假设而进行编码的。

Like most research on the democratic peace, we rely on the Correlates of War (COW) Project data on war. ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} Most of these studies have focused on wars
与大多数关于民主和平的研究一样，我们依赖于战争相关因素（COW）项目的战争数据。 ${}^{18}$${}^{18}$^(18){ }^{18} 这些研究大多关注战争
is unregulated were coded autocratic; regimes characterized by hereditary succession and an executive chief minister chosen by either “executive or court selection” or “electoral selection” were coded anocratic; and open regimes were coded democratic. This sometimes leads to counterintuitive coding of cases. Partly for this reason, Britain’s composite score remains anocratic until 1922. However, recoding cases piecemeal would be fraught with dangers. Rather than dealing with possible validity problems through recoding, we checked for the impact of any particular coding quirks by running separate tests for the various component indices and for different time periods. The fact that we obtained roughly parallel results from these various tests suggests that possible biases in the coding of specific regimes or the measurement of specific indicators were not decisively influencing our findings.
没有监管的政权被定为专制政权；以世袭继承和通过 "行政或法院选拔 "或 "选举选拔 "选出行政首 长为特征的政权被定为民主政权；开放的政权被定为民主政权。这有时会导致对案例进行反直觉编码。部分由于这个原因，英国的综合得分在 1922 年之前一直是专制的。然而，对案例进行零敲碎打的重新编码将充满危险。我们没有通过重新编码来解决可能存在的有效性问题，而是通过对不同的构成指数和不同的时间段进行单独测试，来检查任何特定编码怪癖的影响。我们从这些不同的测试中得到了大致相同的结果，这表明在特定制度的编码或特定指标的测量方面可能存在的偏差并没有对我们的研究结果产生决定性的影响。
13. Gurr, Polity II, p. 15.
13.Gurr, Polity II, 第 15 页。
14. Regimes are coded using a seven-point scale. Polities in which executives are vested with unlimited authority and those classified as falling between these regimes and those in which limited constraints exist on the executive are coded autocratic. Polities in which “accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity” (Gurr, Polity II, p. 16), and those classified as falling between these regimes and those in which substantial constraints exist on executive authority, are coded democratic. All polities falling between these extremes are coded anocratic.
14.政权采用七分制编码。行政长官被赋予无限权力的政体，以及介于这些政体和行政长官受到有限制约的政体之间的政体，均被归为专制政体。如果政体中 "问责团体在大多数活动领域的有效权力等于或大于行政部门"（Gurr，《政体 II》，第 16 页），以及被归类为介于这些政体和对行政权力存在实质性制约的政体之间的政体，则被归类为民主政体。所有介于这两种极端政体之间的政体都被归类为民主政体。
15. Gurr, Polity II, p. 18.
15.Gurr, Polity II, 第 18 页。
16. The competitiveness of political participation is coded on a five-point scale ranging from “suppressed competition” to “competitive competition.” We code the former polities as autocratic, the latter polities as democratic, and all polities in between these extremes as anocratic.
16.政治参与的竞争性采用五级评分法，从 "压制性竞争 "到 "竞争性竞争 "不等。我们将前一种政体定为专制政体，后一种政体定为民主政体，而将介于这两种极端政体之间的所有政体定为非民主政体。
17. We are unaware of any data set that is better suited to our purposes. For example, Michael Doyle’s data on democracies emphasize normative features of a polity rather than the institutional features on which we focus. Further, since these data do not distinguish among the regime types of non-democracies, it is not possible to identify countries that underwent periods of democratization but failed to become mature democracies. Arthur Banks’s data do not tap the institutional factors emphasized in our analysis as well as the Polity II data developed by Gurr. And, as Russett points out, although measures of regime type based on Gurr’s and Banks’s data are moderately related to one another, Banks’s “simpler categorization, compiled earlier than that of Gurr et al. and less fully documented, is probably less discriminating.” See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 78; Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”; and Banks, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data (Binghamton: State University of New York, Center for Comparative Political Research, 1986).
17.我们不知道有哪一套数据更适合我们的目的。例如，迈克尔-多伊尔（Michael Doyle）关于民主政体的数据强调的是政体的规范特征，而不是我们所关注的制度特征。此外，由于这些数据没有区分非民主政体的制度类型，因此无法识别那些经历了民主化时期但未能成为成熟民主政体的国家。阿瑟-班克斯的数据与古尔开发的 Polity II 数据一样，都没有挖掘我们的分析中所强调的制度因素。而且，正如拉塞特所指出的，尽管基于古尔和班克斯数据的政权类型衡量标准彼此间有一定程度的关联，但班克斯的 "分类方法更简单，比古尔等人的分类方法编纂得更早，文献资料也更少，可能更难区分"。见 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 第 78 页；Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"；Banks, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data（宾汉姆顿，纽约州立大学，世界政治研究中心）：宾汉姆顿：纽约州立大学，比较政治研究中心，1986 年）。
18. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982).
18.见 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982)。
between states. However, we also assessed whether democratizating states fight non-state actors, as in a colonial war. ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} Consistent with the COW definition, we consider as a war any military conflict that led to at least 1,000 battle fatalities. ${}^{20}$${}^{20}$^(20){ }^{20}
国家之间的战争。不过，我们也评估了民主化国家是否会像殖民战争那样与非国家行为体作战。 ${}^{19}$${}^{19}$^(19){ }^{19} 根据COW的定义，我们将导致至少1000人阵亡的任何军事冲突都视为战争。 ${}^{20}$${}^{20}$^(20){ }^{20}

Because we view democratization as a gradual process, rather than a sudden change, we analyze whether democratization during periods of one, five, and ten years is associated with involvement in war over subsequent periods of one, five, and ten years, respectively. Insofar as the effects of democratization on domestic coalitions, interest groups, and ideologies might unfold gradually after the initial political opening, the likelihood of war might increase gradually over the following decade. We compare the first and last year of each time period to identify cases of democratization, autocratization, and no regime change. We then examine whether a war involving that state began in the subsequent period. We carry out this analysis for each measure of democratization discussed above, and for both interstate wars and all wars, during the period from 1811 to 1980, the only era common to Gurr’s Polity II data and the COW data. ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21}
由于我们认为民主化是一个渐进的过程，而不是突然发生的变化，因此我们分别分析了一年、五年和十年期间的民主化是否与随后一年、五年和十年期间的战争卷入有关。由于民主化对国内联盟、利益集团和意识形态的影响可能会在最初的政治开放后逐渐展开，因此战争的可能性可能会在随后的十年中逐渐增加。我们对每个时间段的第一年和最后一年进行比较，以确定民主化、专制化和未发生政权更迭的情况。然后，我们会研究在随后的时期内是否发生了涉及该国家的战争。我们对上文讨论的民主化程度、国家间战争和所有战争进行了分析，时间跨度从 1811 年到 1980 年，这是 Gurr 的 Polity II 数据和 COW 数据唯一的共同时代。 ${}^{21}$${}^{21}$^(21){ }^{21}

To assess the strength of the relationship between regime change and war, we construct contingency tables to determine whether democratization and autocratization are each statistically independent of a state’s subsequent involvement in war. The null hypothesis is that the probabilities are identical that a democratizing state, an autocratizing state, and a regime with no change will become involved in a war. To test this hypothesis, we calculate the expected frequency of each outcome (democratization and war, democratization and no war, autocratization and war, autocratization and no war, no regime change and war, no regime change and no war) assuming that the probability of war is the same, whether the regime changes or not. We then compare these expected frequencies to the corresponding observed frequencies. A Pearson chi-square statistic ( ${\chi }^2$${\chi }^2$chi^(2)\chi^{2} ) is calculated, the value of which indicates the extent of the difference between these frequencies. ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} The greater the value of this statistic, the lower is the probability that regime change and war are statistically independent. ${}^{23}$${}^{23}$^(23){ }^{23}
为了评估政权更迭与战争之间关系的强度，我们构建了或然率表，以确定民主化和专制化在统计上是否各自独立于一个国家随后卷入的战争。零假设是，民主化国家、专制化国家和未发生变化的政权卷入战争的概率相同。为了检验这一假设，我们计算了每种结果（民主化与战争、民主化与不发生战争、专制化与战争、专制化与不发生战争、不发生政权更迭与战争、不发生政权更迭与不发生战争）的预期频率，假定无论政权更迭与否，发生战争的概率都是相同的。然后，我们将这些预期频率与相应的观察频率进行比较。计算皮尔逊卡方统计量（ ${\chi }^2$${\chi }^2$chi^(2)\chi^{2} ），其值表示这些频率之间的差异程度。 ${}^{22}$${}^{22}$^(22){ }^{22} 该统计量的值越大，政权更迭和战争在统计上相互独立的可能性就越小。 ${}^{23}$${}^{23}$^(23){ }^{23}

We found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the probability of war for democratizing states always exceeds that for states undergoing no regime change. On average, democratizing states were about two-thirds more likely to go to war than were states that did not experience a regime change. For example, during any given ten-year period, a state that had not experienced a regime change during the previous decade had about one chance in six of fighting a war; in the decade following democratization, a state’s chance of fighting a war was about one in four. The relationship between
我们发现，民主化国家比没有发生政权更迭的国家更有可能发动战争。如图 1 和图 2 所示，民主化国家的战争概率总是高于未发生政权更迭的国家。平均而言，民主化国家发生战争的概率比未发生政权更迭的国家高出约三分之二。例如，在任何给定的十年期间，一个在前十年没有经历政权更迭的国家大约有六分之一的机会打仗；而在民主化之后的十年，一个国家打仗的机会大约是四分之一。民主化与战争之间的关系

Figure 1. Effect of Regime Change (or No Change) on the Probability of All Wars.
图 1.政权更迭（或不变）对所有战争概率的影响。
democratization and war was strongest for ten-year periods and weakest for one-year periods.
民主化与战争的关系在十年期中最为明显，在一年期中最为微弱。
These findings are not very sensitive to our decision to distinguish autocratizing regimes from those experiencing no change. When we compared the probability of war for democratizing states with that of all countries that were not democratizing (i.e., autocratizing countries and those experiencing no change), democratization gave rise to a higher probability of war than the absence of democratization in every instance. Democratizing states were, on average, about 60 percent more likely to go to war than states that were not democratizing.
这些发现对我们区分专制政权和无变化政权的决定并不十分敏感。当我们比较民主化国家与所有未民主化国家（即专制化国家和未发生变化的国家）的战争概率时，民主化国家的战争概率均高于未民主化国家。民主化国家发生战争的几率比非民主化国家平均高出约 60%。
Although our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that democratization promotes war, the strength of this relationship differs depending on the measure of democratization used and the length of time that is analyzed.
尽管我们的研究结果有力地支持了民主化会促进战争的假设，但这种关系的强度因所使用的民主化衡量标准和分析时间的长短而有所不同。

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Figure 2. Effect of Regime Change (or No Change) on the Probability of Interstate Wars.
图 2.政权更迭（或不变）对国家间战争概率的影响。

Based on the composite index, states undergoing democratization were, on average, about one-third more likely to go to war than states experiencing no regime change, regardless of whether all wars or interstate wars are considered. The effects of democratization were somewhat stronger when the three components of regime change (discussed earlier) are analyzed separately. Based on the openness of executive recruitment, the probability of both interstate wars and all wars was, on average, about twice as large for states in the process of democratization as for states undergoing no regime change. Based on the competitiveness of political participation, the probability that democratizing states would fight any type of war was, on average, about 75 percent greater than for states undergoing no regime change. The probability of interstate wars for countries in the process of democratization was, on average, about twice as large as for countries experiencing no regime change. Based on the con-
根据综合指数，无论考虑所有战争还是国家间战争，经历民主化的国家发生战争的可能性平均比未经历政权更迭的国家高出约三分之一。如果分别分析政权更迭的三个组成部分（前面已经讨论过），民主化的影响会更大一些。根据行政人员招募的开放程度，处于民主化进程中的国家发生国家间战争和所有战争的概率平均约为未发生政权更迭国家的两倍。根据政治参与的竞争性，民主化国家发动任何类型战争的概率平均比未发生政权更迭的国家高出约 75%。民主化国家发生国家间战争的概率平均约为未发生政权更迭国家的两倍。根据对
straints placed on a chief executive, states undergoing democratization were, on average, about 35 percent more likely to become engaged in both interstate wars and all wars than states experiencing no regime change.
与没有经历政权更迭的国家相比，经历民主化的国家卷入国家间战争和所有战争的可能性平均高出约 35%。
The strength of the relationship between democratization and war also varies depending on the length of time that is analyzed. Our results were statistically significant in three out of eight tests based on one-year periods; in four out of eight tests based on five-year periods; and in six out of eight tests based on ten-year periods. ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} (The latter results are presented in Table 1.) Further, based on the composite index, the percentage change in the probability of war associated with democratization and that associated with the absence of regime change increases as the period of time analyzed becomes longer: it is greatest based on ten-year periods and lowest based on one-year periods.
民主化与战争之间关系的强弱也因分析时间的长短而异。在基于一年期的八次检验中，我们的结果有三次具有统计意义；在基于五年期的八次检验中，我们的结果有四次具有统计意义；在基于十年期的八次检验中，我们的结果有六次具有统计意义。 ${}^{24}$${}^{24}$^(24){ }^{24} （后一项结果见表 1）此外，根据综合指数，随着分析时间的延长，与民主化相关的战争概率变化百分比和与不发生政权更迭相关的战争概率变化百分比都在增加：十年期的变化最大，一年期的变化最小。

These results are quite robust. Our findings about democratization and war did not change significantly when we excluded changes from autocracy to anocracy from the category of democratization; when we excluded changes from democracy to anocracy from the category of autocratization; when we excluded states that underwent transitions in both directions, toward democracy and autocracy, in a given five-year or ten-year period; when we analyzed the periods before and after World War I separately; nor when we analyzed great powers and other states separately. ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25}
这些结果相当稳健。当我们从民主化类别中剔除从专制到非专制的变化时，当我们从专制化类别中剔除从民主到非民主的变化时，当我们在给定的五年或十年期间剔除向民主和专制两个方向过渡的国家时，当我们分别分析第一次世界大战之前和之后的时期时，当我们分别分析大国和其他国家时，我们关于民主化和战争的研究结果都没有显著变化。 ${}^{25}$${}^{25}$^(25){ }^{25}

Table 1. Contingency Tables of the Relationships Between Regime Change and War, Based on Ten-Year Periods, 1811-1980.
表 1.基于 1811-1980 年十年期的政权更迭与战争之间关系的或然率表。

We also analyzed whether the relationship between democratization and war depends on either a state’s regime type prior to this transition or the magnitude of the regime change. To do this, we computed the probability of war separately for each of the three types of regime change in a democratic direction: that is, from anocracy to democracy, autocracy to democracy, and autocracy to anocracy. Likewise, we computed separately the probability of war for states that, during a given period of time, remained autocracies, anocracies, and democracies. Consistent with our other findings, democratization increased the probability of both interstate wars and all wars, especially based on five-year and ten-year periods. Consistent with the findings of other scholars, ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} stable democracies were, on average, no more and no less likely to go to war than other states. In addition, the probability of war for regimes that remained autocracies, anocracies, or democracies during a given period of time was roughly similar.
我们还分析了民主化与战争之间的关系是否取决于一个国家过渡前的政权类型或政权更迭的程度。为此，我们分别计算了三种朝民主方向发生政权更迭的国家的战争概率：即从非民主到民主、从专制到民主以及从专制到非民主。同样，我们也分别计算了在特定时期内仍然是专制、非专制和民主国家的战争概率。与我们的其他研究结果一致，民主化增加了国家间战争和所有战争的概率，尤其是以五年和十年为周期。与其他学者的研究结果一致， ${}^{26}$${}^{26}$^(26){ }^{26} 稳定的民主国家平均而言并不比其他国家更容易发生战争，也不比其他国家更不容易发生战争。此外，在特定时期内保持专制、无政府或民主的政权发生战争的概率大致相似。

Our findings based on ten-year periods are presented in Table 2. Depending on which index is used to measure democratization, a change from anocracy to democracy increased the probability of any type of war by roughly 15 to 100 percent, and of interstate war by roughly 35 to 115 percent, compared to a state that remained anocratic. A change from autocracy to democracy increased the probability of any type of war by approximately 30 to 105 percent, and of interstate war by approximately 50 to 135 percent, compared to a state that remained autocratic. A change from autocracy to anocracy increased the probability of war by about 70 percent compared to states that remained autocratic, based on the openness of executive recruitment, whereas it slightly decreased the likelihood of war based on the other three indices. Moreover, on average, the percentage increase in the probability of war was smallest for countries making transitions from autocracy to anocracy and greatest for countries making the dramatic leap from autocracy to democracy. More dramatic transitions toward democracy therefore seem more likely to promote wars than do less profound changes of this sort.
表 2 列出了我们基于十年期的研究结果。根据衡量民主化程度的不同指数，与保持专制的国家相比，从专制转变为民主的国家发生任何类型战争的概率大约增加 15%到 100%，发生国家间战争的概率大约增加 35%到 115%。与保持专制的国家相比，从专制变为民主的国家发生任何类型战争的概率增加了约 30%至 105%，国家间战争的概率增加了约 50%至 135%。与保持专制的国家相比，从专制转变为非专制的国家，根据行政人员招募的公开程度，战争的可能性增加了约 70%，而根据其他三个指数，战争的可能性略有下降。此外，平均而言，从专制向非专制过渡的国家发生战争的可能性增加的百分比最小，而从专制向民主急剧过渡的国家发生战争的可能性增加的百分比最大。因此，与这种不太深刻的变化相比，更剧烈的民主过渡似乎更有可能引发战争。

Table 2. Probability of War for Autocracies, Anocracies, Democracies, States Undergoing Democratization, and States Undergoing Autocratization, Based on Ten-Year Periods, 1811-1980.
表 2.基于 1811-1980 年十年期的专制国家、非专制国家、民主国家、民主化国家和专制化国家的战争概率。

Although democratization increases the probability of war, autocratization is also dangerous. Autocratizing states were more likely to go to war than countries experiencing no regime change, based on the results of 16 out of 24 tests, which are presented in Figures 1 and 2. However, autocratization tends to be a somewhat less combustible process than democratization. States in the process of democratization are more likely to go to war than those in the process of autocratization, based on the results of 17 out of 24 tests that we conducted.
虽然民主化增加了战争的可能性，但专制化也是危险的。在 24 次测试中，有 16 次测试结果显示，专制化国家比没有发生政权更迭的国家更有可能爆发战争，具体情况见图 1 和图 2。不过，与民主化相比，专制化进程的可燃性要低一些。根据我们进行的 24 次测试中 17 次测试的结果，处于民主化进程中的国家比处于专制化进程中的国家更有可能爆发战争。

Like the effects of democratization on war, the effects of autocratization vary across the different indices and periods of time that we analyzed. For example,
与民主化对战争的影响一样，在我们分析的不同指数和不同时期，专制化的影响也各不相同。例如
on average, autocratization yields about a 35 percent greater likelihood of war than does the absence of regime change, when we focus on a state’s competitiveness of participation, and about a 25 percent increase in the probability of war, when we focus on a polity’s constraints on its executive. In contrast, autocratization decreases the likelihood of war in many cases compared to a country that experienced no regime change, based on the composite index and on the openness of executive recruitment.
平均而言，当我们关注一个国家的参与竞争力时，专制化比没有政权更迭的国家发生战争的可能性要高出约 35%；当我们关注一个政体对其行政人员的限制时，发生战争的可能性要高出约 25%。相反，与没有经历政权更迭的国家相比，根据综合指数和行政人员招聘的开放程度，专制化在很多情况下会降低战争的可能性。

Our findings also indicate that autocratization is less likely to lead to war over the short run than in the long run. Regardless of whether all wars or interstate wars are analyzed, autocratization occurring over a one-year period substantially decreases the probability of war compared to states experiencing no regime change, based on every measure except the competitiveness of participation. In contrast, as the results in Table 1 show, autocratization over a ten-year period yields a marked percentage increase in the probability of war in every instance.
我们的研究结果还表明，与长期相比，专制化在短期引发战争的可能性较小。无论分析的是所有战争还是国家间战争，与没有发生政权更迭的国家相比，一年内发生的专制化会大大降低发生战争的概率。相反，正如表 1 中的结果所示，十年内发生的专制化在任何情况下都会使战争发生的概率明显增加。

The results in Table 2 likewise show that autocratization over a ten-year period is associated with an increased probability of war. States making the large change from democracy to autocracy were especially likely to fight in all wars, compared to countries that remained democratic. States changing from anocracy to autocracy were especially likely to fight interstate wars. However, states changing from democracy to anocracy were not especially war-prone at all. In combination with our earlier results, these findings suggest that the biggest leaps in democratization disproportionately increase the likelihood that a country will engage in an interstate war, whereas the most dramatic types of autocratization disproportionately increase the likelihood that a state will fight non-state opponents.
表 2 的结果同样表明，十年内的专制化与战争概率的增加有关。与保持民主的国家相比，从民主转变为专制的国家特别有可能参加所有战争。从非民主制转变为专制制的国家特别有可能参加国家间战争。然而，从民主制转变为非民主制的国家并不特别容易发生战争。结合我们之前的研究结果，这些发现表明，民主化的最大飞跃会不成比例地增加一个国家参与国家间战争的可能性，而最引人注目的专制类型则会不成比例地增加一个国家与非国家对手作战的可能性。

In short, although democratizing states are, on average, somewhat more likely to engage in war than their autocratizing counterparts, states experiencing either type of change run a greater risk of war than those experiencing no change.
简而言之，尽管民主化国家参与战争的平均可能性略高于专制化国家，但无论哪种类型的变革，都比没有变革的国家面临更大的战争风险。

Why are democratization and autocratization associated with an increased chance of war? What causal mechanism is at work? Based on case studies of four great powers during their initial phases of democratization, we argue that threatened elites from the collapsing autocratic regime, many of whom have parochial interests in war and empire, use nationalist appeals to compete for
为什么民主化和专制化与战争几率增加有关？是什么因果机制在起作用？基于对四个大国民主化初期阶段的案例研究，我们认为，来自崩溃的专制政权的受威胁精英（其中许多人在战争和帝国中拥有狭隘的利益）利用民族主义诉求来争夺
mass allies with each other and with new elites. In these circumstances, the likelihood of war increases due to the interests of some of the elite groups, the effectiveness of their propaganda, and the incentive for weak leaders to resort to prestige strategies in foreign affairs in an attempt to enhance their authority over diverse constituencies. Further, we speculate that transitional regimes, including both democratizing and autocratizing states, share some common institutional weaknesses that make war more likely. At least in some cases, the link between autocratization and war reflects the success of a ruling elite in using nationalist formulas developed during the period of democratization to cloak itself in populist legitimacy, while dismantling the substance of democracy. In explaining the logic behind these arguments, we draw on some standard theories about the consequences of different institutional arrangements for political outcomes.
群众相互结盟，并与新的精英结盟。在这种情况下，由于部分精英群体的利益、他们宣传的有效性，以及弱势领导人在外交事务中诉诸声望战略以试图提高其在不同选民中的权威的动机，战争的可能性会增加。此外，我们还推测，过渡政权，包括民主化国家和专制化国家，都有一些共同的制度弱点，这使得战争更有可能发生。至少在某些情况下，专制化与战争之间的联系反映了统治精英成功地利用民主化时期形成的民族主义公式为自己披上民粹主义合法性的外衣，同时瓦解了民主的实质。在解释这些论点背后的逻辑时，我们借鉴了一些关于不同制度安排对政治结果的影响的标准理论。

We illustrate these arguments with some contemporary examples and with cases drawn from four great powers at early stages in the expansion of mass political participation: mid-Victorian Britain, the France of Napoleon III, Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan. In each of these cases, elections were being held and political leaders were paying close attention to public opinion in the making of foreign policy, yet some key aspects of democratic control over policy were absent or distorted. We do not claim that these four cases constitute a systematic test of our hypotheses. Our definition of democratization is a broad one, and these are not the only instances of democratization among the great powers. France has been “democratizing” in fits and starts between 1789 and the Fifth Republic, sometimes fighting wars linked to surges of democratization and sometimes not. Moreover, there are cases where great powers democratized peacefully when circumstances were propitious: for example, West Germany and Japan after 1945. Though the qualitative part of our study does show that democratization and war have often been linked in the history of the great powers, its main task is less to test the strength of this relationship than to trace how democratization and war were linked in several important cases.
我们用一些当代的例子和四个大国在扩大群众政治参与早期阶段的案例来说明这些论点：维多利亚时代中期的英国、拿破仑三世时期的法国、俾斯麦和威廉时期的德国以及大正时期的日本。在这些案例中，每个国家都举行了选举，政治领导人在制定外交政策时都密切关注民意，但民主控制政策的某些关键方面却不存在或被扭曲了。我们并不声称这四个案例构成了对我们假设的系统检验。我们对 "民主化 "的定义是宽泛的，而且这些并不是大国中唯一的民主化案例。从 1789 年到第五共和国期间，法国的 "民主化 "进程时断时续，有时战争与民主化浪潮有关，有时则无关。此外，也有大国在环境有利的情况下和平实现民主化的例子：例如 1945 年后的西德和日本。尽管我们研究的定性部分确实表明，在大国历史上，民主化与战争经常是联系在一起的，但其主要任务与其说是检验这种关系的强度，不如说是追溯在几个重要案例中民主化与战争是如何联系在一起的。

Nor do we claim that these great powers are necessarily representative of all democratizing states. However, as mentioned earlier, in order to assess the robustness of our statistical results, we analyzed separately the relationship between democratization (and autocratization) and war for great powers, and for other states. We found few significant differences between the results based on great powers and those based on other states. Further, it is especially important to have a theory about democratizing great powers, because they
我们也不认为这些大国一定能代表所有民主化国家。不过，如前所述，为了评估统计结果的稳健性，我们分别分析了大国和其他国家的民主化（和专制化）与战争之间的关系。我们发现，基于大国的结果与基于其他国家的结果之间几乎没有明显差异。此外，掌握有关民主化大国的理论尤为重要，因为它们
have such a huge impact on world politics, and because Russia-and perhaps soon China-is in a democratizing phase.
对世界政治产生如此巨大的影响，还因为俄罗斯--也许很快中国--正处于民主化阶段。

The features of democratization captured in Gurr’s data are echoed in the arguments we derive from the case studies, but they do not correspond in every respect. In discussing the case studies, we used concepts that seemed most useful in illuminating the patterns we found, rather than strictly applying Gurr’s categories. Sometimes the fit between Gurr’s concepts and our own is quite close. For example, Gurr’s category of “factional competition,” which is the mid-point on his scale of the competitiveness of a country’s political participation, is similar to our concept of interest-group jockeying and logrolling in a democratizing setting. In contrast, however, elements such as ideology play a large role in our argument, but are ignored in Gurr’s data.
我们从案例研究中得出的论点与古尔数据中捕捉到的民主化特征不谋而合，但二者并非在所有方面都一致。在讨论案例研究时，我们使用了对阐明我们发现的模式最有用的概念，而不是严格套用古尔的分类。有时，古尔的概念与我们自己的概念非常接近。例如，古尔的 "派系竞争 "类别是他对一个国家政治参与竞争度量表的中间点，这与我们关于民主化背景下利益集团争夺和对数滚动的概念相似。相比之下，意识形态等因素在我们的论证中发挥着重要作用，但在古尔的数据中却被忽略了。

In the following sections, we first explain why the institutional structures of democratizing states produce a different pattern of policy outcomes than in fully democratic states. We then show how this affects the strategies of domestic interest groups, patterns of coalition politics, and foreign policy outcomes in the context of the collapse of an autocratic state.
在接下来的章节中，我们首先解释为什么民主化国家的制度结构会产生与完全民主国家不同的政策结果模式。然后，我们将说明在专制国家崩溃的背景下，这如何影响国内利益集团的战略、联盟政治的模式以及外交政策的结果。

Well-institutionalized democracies that reliably place ultimate authority in the hands of the average voter virtually never fight wars against each other. Moreover, although mature democracies do fight wars about as frequently as other types of states, they seem to be more prudent: they usually win their wars; they are quicker to abandon strategic overcommitments; and they do not fight gratuitous “preventive” wars. ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27} Explanations for these tendencies focus variously on the self-interest of the average voter who bears the costs of war, the norms of bargaining and conflict resolution inherent in democracy, the moderating impact of constitutional checks and balances, and the free marketplace of ideas. ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28}
制度完善的民主国家可靠地将最终权力交到普通选民手中，它们几乎从不互相打仗。此外，尽管成熟的民主国家与其他类型的国家一样频繁地发动战争，但它们似乎更加谨慎：它们通常会赢得战争；它们更快地放弃战略上的过度承诺；它们不打无谓的 "预防性 "战争。 ${}^{27}$${}^{27}$^(27){ }^{27} 对这些倾向的解释主要集中在承担战争成本的普通选民的自身利益、民主制度固有的讨价还价和解决冲突的准则、宪法制衡的调节作用以及自由的思想市场等方面。 ${}^{28}$${}^{28}$^(28){ }^{28}

However, these happy solutions typically emerge only in the very long run. In the initial stages of expanding political participation, strong barriers prevent the emergence of full-fledged democratic processes and the foreign policy outcomes associated with them. The two main barriers are the weakness of democratic institutions and the resistance of social groups who would be the losers in a process of full-fledged democratization.
然而，这些皆大欢喜的解决方案通常要到很长时间后才会出现。在扩大政治参与的初始阶段，强大的障碍阻碍了全面民主进程的出现以及与之相关的外交政策成果。这两大障碍是民主体制的薄弱和社会群体的抵制，而这些群体将是全面民主化进程中的输家。

Popular inputs into the policymaking process can have wildly different effects, depending on the way that political institutions structure and aggregate those inputs. ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} It is a staple of political science that different institutional rules -for example, proportional representation versus single-member districts, or congressional versus executive authority over tariffs-can produce different political outcomes, even holding constant the preferences of individual voters. In newly democratizing states, the institutions that structure political outcomes may allow for popular participation in the policy process, but the way they channel that input is often a parody of full-fledged democracy. As Samuel Huntington has put it, the typical problem of political development is the gap between high levels of political participation and weak integrative institutions to reconcile the multiplicity of contending claims. ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} In newly democratizing states without strong parties, independent courts, a free press, and untainted electoral procedures, there is no reason to expect that mass politics will produce the same impact on foreign policy as it does in mature democracies.
民众对决策过程的投入可能会产生截然不同的效果，这取决于政治体制如何构建和整合这些投入。 ${}^{29}$${}^{29}$^(29){ }^{29} 政治学的一个主要观点是，即使选民个人的偏好保持不变，不同的制度规则--例如，比例代表制与单议员选区，或国会与行政部门对关税的权力--也会产生不同的政治结果。在新近民主化的国家，构建政治结果的制度可能允许民众参与政策进程，但其引导意见的方式往往是对成熟民主的模仿。正如塞缪尔-亨廷顿（Samuel Huntington）所言，政治发展的典型问题是，政治参与程度高，而用于调和各种不同诉求的整合机构却很薄弱。 ${}^{30}$${}^{30}$^(30){ }^{30} 在没有强有力的政党、独立的法院、自由的新闻媒体和不受污染的选举程序的新兴民主化国家，我们没有理由期待大众政治会像在成熟的民主国家那样对外交政策产生影响。

In all of the democratizing great powers, public inputs were shaped and aggregated in ways that differed from those of mature democracies. In midVictorian Britain, rural areas had greater representation than urban areas, the ballot was not secret, and only propertied classes could vote. ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} In rural France under Napoleon III, the local prefect, appointed in Paris, stood at the ballot box and exercised control over voters’ choices. ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32} In Wilhelmine Germany, the parties that won the elections could not name governmental ministers; rather, they had to use their limited powers over the budget to bargain over policy with ministers named by the kaiser. ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33} In Taisho Japan, the electoral franchise
在所有民主化的大国中，公共投入的形成和聚集方式都与成熟民主国家不同。在维多利亚时代中期的英国，农村地区的代表权大于城市地区，投票不是无记名的，只有有产阶级才能投票。 ${}^{31}$${}^{31}$^(31){ }^{31} 在拿破仑三世时期的法国农村，由巴黎任命的地方长官站在投票箱前，对选民的选择进行控制。 ${}^{32}$${}^{32}$^(32){ }^{32} 在威廉明德国，赢得选举的政党不能任命政府部长；相反，他们必须利用有限的预算权力，与皇帝任命的部长就政策进行讨价还价。 ${}^{33}$${}^{33}$^(33){ }^{33} 在大正日本，选举权

was widened, but the choice of who would govern was left to the oligarchs who had founded the Meiji state. ${}^{34}$${}^{34}$^(34){ }^{34} And in Russia today almost none of the major institutions of representative government work in a reliable way: constitutional rules change to fit the needs of the moment; constitutional courts take sides on transparently political grounds; elections are postponed or announced on short notice; and political parties are transitory elite cliques, not stable organizations for mobilizing a mass coalition. Moreover, in all of these cases, the political press was to some degree bribed or censored by the government or had not yet institutionalized the objectivity, knowledge, and professionalism needed to create a full and fair public debate. ${}^{35}$${}^{35}$^(35){ }^{35}
虽然明治维新的范围扩大了，但谁来治理国家的选择权却留给了建立明治国家的寡头们。 ${}^{34}$${}^{34}$^(34){ }^{34} 而在今天的俄罗斯，几乎没有一个代议制政府的主要机构能以可靠的方式运作：宪法规则会根据当下的需要而改变；宪法法院会以透明的政治理由站队；选举会被推迟或临时宣布；政党是短暂的精英集团，而不是动员群众联盟的稳定组织。此外，在所有这些情况下，政治新闻媒体在某种程度上都受到了政府的收买或审查，或者尚未形成制度化的客观性、知识性和专业性，而这些都是开展全面、公正的公共辩论所必需的。 ${}^{35}$${}^{35}$^(35){ }^{35}

As a result of these institutional deformations, ruling circles in these democratizing great powers were only haphazardly accountable to the electorate. Typically, elite groups reached out intermittently and selectively for mass support but were able to buffer themselves from systematic accountability through the ballot box. In Britain both the Whig and Tory parties were still dominated by landed oligarchs, who refused to entertain the notion of anything more than issue-specific alignments with the parliamentary representatives of middle-class radical opinion. Similarly, in Wilhelmine Germany the ruling elite bargained with mass groups like the Catholic Center Party over specific horsetrades, for example, exchanging support on the naval budget for concessions on Catholic rights. The Center Party was not, however, offered ministerial portfolios.
由于这些制度上的畸形，这些民主化大国的统治集团只能草率地向选民负责。典型的情况是，精英集团断断续续、有选择性地争取群众支持，但却能通过投票箱缓冲自己，避免系统性的问责。在英国，辉格党和保守党仍由地主寡头主导，他们拒绝接受与中产阶级激进意见的议会代表结盟，而只是在特定问题上结盟。同样，在威廉明德国，统治精英与天主教中心党等群众团体就具体问题讨价还价，例如，以支持海军预算换取天主教权利上的让步。然而，中心党并没有获得部长职位。

As a consequence, public groups in all of these polities tended to organize as narrow pressure groups or single-issue lobbies, such as the Anti-Corn Law League in Britain in the 1840s, or the Navy and Agrarian Leagues in pre-1914 Germany. These groups often worked outside the electoral system, making direct demands on public authorities, since the democratic path to power was rigged against them. This tendency toward direct action in the streets or in smoke-filled back rooms rather than through the ballot box is typical of what Huntington calls the “praetorian society,” where pressures for participation are strong but institutions for effective participation are weak. ${}^{36}$${}^{36}$^(36){ }^{36}
因此，所有这些政体中的公共团体都倾向于组织成狭隘的压力团体或单一议题的游说团体，如 19 世纪 40 年代英国的反玉米法联盟，或 1914 年前德国的海军联盟和农业联盟。这些团体往往在选举制度之外开展工作，直接向政府当局提出要求，因为民主的执政途径对他们不利。这种倾向于在街头或烟雾弥漫的密室中采取直接行动，而不是通过投票箱，是亨廷顿所说的 "禁卫军社会 "的典型特征，在这种社会中，参与的压力很大，但有效参与的制度却很薄弱。 ${}^{36}$${}^{36}$^(36){ }^{36}

To some extent this weakness of democratic institutions simply reflects the difficulty of building effective structures from scratch. Well-developed organizations, skilled cadres to staff them, and habits of democratic action are not acquired overnight by journalists, parliamentarians, judicial officials, and party politicians. Nor is trust in the efficacy and objectivity of such institutions easily acquired. As rational-choice analysts of the creation of institutional structures have convincingly and repeatedly shown, “transaction costs” and dilemmas of collective action hinder the emergence of institutions to facilitate bargaining that would make everyone better off. ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37}
在某种程度上，民主机构的薄弱仅仅反映了从零开始建立有效机构的困难。记者、议员、司法官员和政党政治家并非一朝一夕就能获得完善的组织、熟练的干部配备以及民主行动的习惯。对这些机构的有效性和客观性的信任也不是轻而易举就能获得的。正如理性选择分析家对制度结构建立的分析一再令人信服地表明的那样，"交易成本 "和集体行动的困境阻碍了制度的建立，而制度的建立又促进了讨价还价，从而使每个人都过上更好的生活。 ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37} .

Of course, the development of efficient democratic institutions is hindered further by the fact that everyone is not made better off by effective democratic reforms. Many social groups, including many powerful ones, are likely to be losers from the strengthening of democratic institutions. ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38} These include the autocratic rulers themselves, state bureaucrats of the old regime who might fear that their function would lose its importance in a transformed polity, social and economic elites whose privileges might diminish in a more open system, or even mass special interest groups who would lose from reforms that the average voter might find attractive. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, constituencies having an interest in holding back full democratization typically included kings, nobles, landowners, owners of industrial capital, militaries that were closely tied to old elites or the old regime, and artisans and other middle-class groups that benefited from the guild-type economic restrictions backed by the old regime. ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} In contemporary post-communist states, the analogous cast of characters has, in one place or another, included national and local former Communist party officials, the military, ministries or firms controlling obsolete industrial capital, workers in such sectors, and people living and working in the regions where such sectors predominate.
当然，由于有效的民主改革并不能使每个人都过得更好，因此高效民主体制的发展会受到进一步阻碍。许多社会群体，包括许多有权势的群体，都可能成为民主制度强化的输家。 ${}^{38}$${}^{38}$^(38){ }^{38} 这些群体包括专制统治者本身、旧政权的国家官僚（他们可能会担心自己的职能会在转型后的政体中失去重要性）、社会和经济精英（他们的特权可能会在一个更加开放的制度中减少），甚至是大众特殊利益集团（他们可能会因为普通选民可能会觉得有吸引力的改革而遭受损失）。在19世纪和20世纪初，阻碍全面民主化的利益群体通常包括国王、贵族、地主、工业资本所有者、与旧精英或旧政权关系密切的军队，以及从旧政权支持的行会式经济限制中受益的工匠和其他中产阶级群体。 ${}^{39}$${}^{39}$^(39){ }^{39} 在当代后共产主义国家中，类似的人物在不同的地方包括国家和地方前共产党官员、军队、控制过时工业资本的部委或公司、这些部门的工人以及在这些部门占主导地位的地区生活和工作的人们。
The strength of these groups’ incentives to hold back democratic change depends in large part on the mobility of their assets and skills. British landowners were comparatively relaxed about the expansion of democratic rights: the relative mobility of their substantial commercial investments allowed many
这些集团阻碍民主变革的动机在很大程度上取决于其资产和技能的流动性。英国的土地所有者对扩大民主权利的态度相对宽松：他们大量的商业投资具有相对的流动性，这使许多人能够

of them to accept the end of agricultural protection and to profit from a liberalizing, free-trading political alliance with the commercial middle classes. In contrast, Germany’s Junker landowning elite, who largely staffed the Prussian state, had very few attractive economic prospects outside of their relatively inefficient agricultural holdings, and thus had a larger stake in using statebacked protectionism and political repression to maintain their social position. ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40} In Russia today, some former Communist elites have shown agility in adapting to a privatized economy, where they have devised ways to maintain control over or profit from the disposal of many of the elite’s economic assets. However, the military has suffered greatly in status and organizational cohesion from the opening of the political system. And even the elites who are doing well in the transition have a stake in making the transition a controlled, partial one, where profiteering is not too fettered by democratic scrutiny or rule of law.
他们接受农业保护的终结，并从与商业中产阶级建立的自由化、自由贸易的政治联盟中获利。相比之下，德国的容克地主精英（主要是普鲁士国家的工作人员）除了相对低效的农业生产之外，几乎没有其他有吸引力的经济前景，因此他们更愿意利用国家支持的保护主义和政治压迫来维持自己的社会地位。 ${}^{40}$${}^{40}$^(40){ }^{40} 在今天的俄罗斯，一些前共产主义精英在适应私有化经济方面表现出了灵活性，他们想出了各种办法来保持对许多精英经济资产的控制，或从这些资产的处置中获利。然而，由于政治体制的开放，军方在地位和组织凝聚力方面都受到了很大影响。而且，即使是在转型中表现出色的精英，也希望转型是可控的、局部的，在这种情况下，牟取暴利不会受到民主监督或法治的太多束缚。

Both in the nineteenth century cases and in the contemporary post-communist ones, it is striking that many of the groups with an interest in retarding democratization are also those with a parochial interest in war, military preparation, empire, and protectionism. This is not accidental. Most of the benefits of war, military preparations, imperial conquest, and protectionism-e.g., in career advancement or in protection from foreign economic competition-are disproportionately concentrated in specific groups. ${}^{41}$${}^{41}$^(41){ }^{41} Any special interest group, including the military, that derives parochial benefits from a public policy has to feel wary about opening up its affairs to the scrutiny and veto of the average voter, who pays for subsidies to special interests. Whenever the costs of a program are distributed widely, but the benefits are concentrated in a few hands, democratization may put the program at risk.
无论是在十九世纪的案例中，还是在当代的后共产主义案例中，令人震惊的是，许多对阻碍民主化感兴趣的团体也是那些对战争、军事准备、帝国和保护主义感兴趣的团体。这并非偶然。战争、军事准备、帝国征服和保护主义所带来的大多数好处--例如，在职业晋升或抵御外国经济竞争方面的好处--都不成比例地集中在特定群体身上。 ${}^{41}$${}^{41}$^(41){ }^{41} 任何特殊利益集团，包括军方，如果从某项公共政策中获得了狭隘的利益，就会对开放其事务接受普通选民的监督和否决感到警惕，因为普通选民要为特殊利益集团的补贴买单。每当一项计划的成本被广泛分配，而收益却集中在少数人手中时，民主化就会使该计划面临风险。

When autocratic states start to democratize, many of the interests threatened by democratization are military in nature. As Charles Tilly says, "war made the state and the state made war. ${}^{\prime \prime 2}$${}^{\prime \prime 2}$^(''2){ }^{\prime \prime 2} In early modern Europe, military organizations occupied a privileged position in the state, which was built to serve their needs. Moreover, ruling aristocracies were intertwined with military in-
当专制国家开始民主化时，许多受到民主化威胁的利益本质上都是军事利益。正如查尔斯-蒂利（Charles Tilly）所说，"战争造就了国家，国家造就了战争。 ${}^{\prime \prime 2}$${}^{\prime \prime 2}$^(''2){ }^{\prime \prime 2} 在近代早期的欧洲，军事组织在国家中占据着特权地位，国家的建立就是为了满足军事组织的需要。此外，统治贵族与军事组织相互交织。

stitutions, so democratization inherently challenged the vested social, economic, and bureaucratic interests of an old elite that was at its core a military elite. Joseph Schumpeter constructed a whole theory of imperialism on the atavistic interests of the military-feudal aristocracy. ${}^{43}$${}^{43}$^(43){ }^{43} It is true that middle-class reformers sometimes wanted to build up the state’s military power: this was a rallying cry of English radicals in the Crimean War, and of German middleclass officers before 1914. However, they wanted to replace aristocratic deadwood with middle-class rationalizers. Democratization led by proponents of military power was thus nearly as much of a threat to the old army as democratization led by pacifists like Richard Cobden. ${}^{44}$${}^{44}$^(44){ }^{44}
因此，民主化必然会对以军事精英为核心的旧精英阶层的既得社会、经济和官僚利益构成挑战。约瑟夫-熊彼特以军事封建贵族的既得利益为基础，构建了一整套帝国主义理论。 ${}^{43}$${}^{43}$^(43){ }^{43} 诚然，中产阶级改革者有时希望加强国家的军事力量：这是克里米亚战争中英国激进分子和1914年前德国中产阶级军官的呼声。然而，他们希望用中产阶级的理性主义者来取代贵族的死脑筋。因此，军权拥护者领导的民主化与理查德-科布登（Richard Cobden）等和平主义者领导的民主化一样，都是对旧军队的威胁。 ${}^{44}$${}^{44}$^(44){ }^{44}

This situation of social change, institutional weakness, and threatened interests tends to produce a political impasse along the route toward democracy: it becomes difficult to form stable political coalitions with coherent policy platforms and sufficient support to stay in power. This impasse, which breeds the kind of short-run thinking and reckless policymaking that lead to war, occurs for four reasons.
这种社会变革、制度薄弱、利益受到威胁的局面，往往会在通往民主的道路上产生政治僵局：很难形成具有一致政策纲领和足够支持的稳定政治联盟，从而继续执政。这种僵局滋生了导致战争的短期思维和鲁莽决策，其原因有四。
widening the political spectrum. First, the social changes impelling democratization create a wider spectrum of politically significant groups with diverse, incompatible interests. Kings, aristocrats, peasants, and artisans may share the historical stage with industrialists, an urban working class, and a middle-class intelligentsia. Or in the contemporary post-communist cases, former party apparatchiks, atavistic heavy industrialists, and downwardly mobile military officers may share the stage with populist demagogues, free-market entrepreneurs, disgruntled workers, and newly mobilized ethnic groups. In principle, a fully institutionalized democracy can integrate even the widest spectrum of interests through party competition for the favors of the median voter. But where democracy is only incipient and partial, the wide spread of politically mobilized social interests characteristic of a transition to democracy may make the formation of stable coalitions extremely difficult.
扩大政治光谱。首先，推动民主化的社会变革产生了更广泛的具有政治意义的群体，这些群体的利益各不相同，互不相容。国王、贵族、农民和工匠可能与工业家、城市工人阶级和中产阶级知识分子共享历史舞台。或者在当代后共产主义情况下，前党内官僚、顽固不化的重工业家和向下流动的军官可能会与民粹主义煽动者、自由市场企业家、心怀不满的工人和新动员起来的族群同台竞技。原则上，一个完全制度化的民主政体甚至可以通过政党竞争争取中位选民的青睐来整合最广泛的利益。但是，如果民主只是初步的、局部的，那么向民主过渡所特有的政治动员的社会利益的广泛分布可能会使形成稳定的联盟变得极其困难。

For example, in Britain during the period leading up to the Crimean War, neither Whigs nor Tories could form a governing coalition that was more than temporary, because so many groups refused to enter into stable political alli-
例如，在克里米亚战争爆发前的英国，辉格党和托利党都无法组成一个临时性的执政联盟，因为许多团体都拒绝结成稳定的政治联盟。

ances with each other. None of the old elites would coalesce with the parliamentary bloc of radicals elected by British urban middle-class and Irish voters. Moreover, protectionist Tories would not unite with free-trading Tories or Whigs. Thus, the social and political mid-Victorian “equipoise” between traditional and modern Britain created a temporary political stalemate, as groups found it impossible to compromise vital interests in the construction of a ruling coalition. ${}^{45}$${}^{45}$^(45){ }^{45}
他们之间的关系也是如此。没有一个老牌精英会与英国城市中产阶级和爱尔兰选民选出的激进派议会集团联合起来。此外，保护主义的托利党人也不会与自由贸易的托利党人或辉格党人联合起来。因此，维多利亚时代中期传统英国与现代英国在社会和政治上的 "等价交换 "造成了暂时的政治僵局，因为各团体发现在构建执政联盟时不可能损害重大利益。 ${}^{45}$${}^{45}$^(45){ }^{45}

An even more serious example is the stalemate in Wilhelmine-era electoral politics. In principle, coalitions of the left and the right might have formed to vie for the median voter, thus driving policy in a moderating direction. In fact, both the left and the right were too divided internally to mount effective coalitions with internally consistent policies. Progressives dreamed of a bloc extending “from Bassermann to Bebel,” from the liberal-democratic middle classes through the Marxist working classes, but the differences between labor and capital chronically barred this development. Conservatives had more success in forging a “marriage of iron and rye,” but fundamental differences between military-feudal Junkers and Ruhr industrialists, ranging from the distribution of tax burdens to military strategy, made their policies incoherent. Germany wound up with plans for a big army, a costly navy, and nobody willing to pay for it. ${}^{46}$${}^{46}$^(46){ }^{46}
一个更严重的例子是威廉时代选举政治的僵局。原则上，左派和右派可以结成联盟，争夺中位选民，从而推动政策朝着温和的方向发展。但事实上，左派和右派内部分歧过大，无法结成有效的联盟，制定内部一致的政策。进步人士梦想建立一个 "从巴塞尔曼到倍倍尔 "的集团，从自由民主的中产阶级到马克思主义的工人阶级，但劳资之间的分歧长期阻碍着这一发展。保守派在建立 "铁与黑麦的联姻 "方面取得了更大的成功，但军事封建的容克家族与鲁尔工业家之间从税负分配到军事战略的根本分歧使他们的政策缺乏一致性。德国最终制定了庞大的陆军和昂贵的海军计划，却没有人愿意为此买单。 ${}^{46}$${}^{46}$^(46){ }^{46}

In more recent times, incipient democratization has caused political impasse by widening the political spectrum to include too many irreconcilable political forces. In the final days of Yugoslavia, efforts by moderates like Ante Markovic to promote compromise on a federalist, democratic, economic reformist platform were hindered not only by ethnic divisions but also by the cleavage between market-oriented business interests, on the one hand, and party bosses and military officers, on the other. ${}^{47}$${}^{47}$^(47){ }^{47}
近代以来，民主化的萌芽扩大了政治光谱，纳入了太多不可调和的政治力量，从而造成了政治僵局。在南斯拉夫最后的日子里，安特-马尔科维奇等温和派为促进在联邦主义、民主和经济改革纲领上达成妥协所做的努力不仅受到了种族分歧的阻碍，而且还受到了以市场为导向的商业利益与党派老板和军官之间的分裂的阻碍。 ${}^{47}$${}^{47}$^(47){ }^{47}
inflexible INTERESTS AND SHORT TIME HORIzONS. Groups threatened by social change and democratization, including still-powerful elites, are often compelled to take a very inflexible view of their own interests, especially when their assets cannot be readily adapted to changing political and economic
僵化的利益和短暂的时间周期。受到社会变革和民主化威胁的群体，包括仍然掌权的精英，往往不得不对自身利益采取非常僵化的看法，尤其是当他们的资产不能随时适应不断变化的政治和经济形势时。

conditions. In extreme cases, there may be only one solution that will maintain the social position of the group. For the Prussian landowners, it was agricultural protection in a non-democratic state; for the Japanese military, organizational autonomy in an autarkic empire; for the Serbian military and party elites, a Serbian nationalist state. Compromises that may lead down the slippery slope toward social extinction or irrelevance have no appeal, despite the danger that taking an intransigent stance might provoke a hostile encirclement by greatpower opponents. This adds to the difficulty of finding an exit from the political impasse.
条件。在极端情况下，可能只有一种解决方案能维持该群体的社会地位。对普鲁士地主来说，这是非民主国家的农业保护；对日本军方来说，这是自在帝国的组织自治；对塞尔维亚军方和党派精英来说，这是塞民族主义国家。尽管采取顽固立场可能会招致大国对手的敌意包围，但可能导致走向社会灭亡或无关紧要的滑坡的妥协毫无吸引力。这增加了摆脱政治僵局的难度。

COMPEtitive mass mobilization. In a period of democratization, threatened elite groups have an overwhelming incentive to mobilize allies among the mass of people, but only on their own terms, using whatever special resources they still retain. These have included monopolies of information (e.g., the German Navy’s unique “expertise” in making strategic assessments); propaganda assets (the Japanese Army’s public relations blitz justifying the invasion of Manchuria); patronage (British Foreign Secretary Palmerston’s gifts of foreign service postings to the sons of cooperative journalists); wealth (Krupp steel’s bankrolling of mass nationalist and militarist leagues); organizational skills and networks (the Japanese army’s exploitation of rural reservist organizations to build a social base); and the ability to use the control of traditional political institutions to shape the political agenda and structure the terms of political bargains (the Wilhelmine ruling elite’s deal with the Center Party, eliminating anti-Catholic legislation in exchange for support in the Reichstag on the naval budget). ${}^{48}$${}^{48}$^(48){ }^{48}
积极的群众动员。在民主化时期，受到威胁的精英群体有极大的动力去动员人民大众中的盟友，但只能按照他们自己的条件，利用他们仍然保留的任何特殊资源。这些资源包括信息垄断（如德国海军在战略评估方面独一无二的 "专长"）；宣传资产（日本陆军的公关闪电战为入侵满洲提供了理由）；赞助（英国外交大臣帕默斯顿向合作记者的儿子赠送外交职位）；财富（克虏伯钢铁公司为大众民族主义和军国主义联盟提供资金）；组织技能和网络（日本军队利用农村预备役组织建立社会基础）；以及利用对传统政治机构的控制来制定政治议程和政治交易条件的能力（威廉统治精英与中心党达成交易，取消反天主教立法，以换取国会对海军预算的支持）。 ${}^{48}$${}^{48}$^(48){ }^{48}

This elite mobilization of mass groups takes place in a highly competitive setting. Elite groups mobilize mass support to neutralize mass threats (e.g., patriotic leagues to counter workers’ movements) and to counter other elite groups’ successful efforts at mass mobilization (e.g., the German Navy League, as a political counterweight to the Junker-backed Agrarian League). Thus, the elites’ resources allow them to influence the direction of mass political participation, but the imperative to compete for mass favor makes it difficult for a single elite group to control the outcome of this process. For example, mass groups that gain access to politics through elite-supported nationalist organizations often try to outbid their erstwhile elite sponsors. By 1911, German popular nationalist lobbies were in a position to claim that if Germany’s foreign
这种精英对群众团体的动员是在高度竞争的环境下进行的。精英团体动员群众支持，以化解群众的威胁（如对抗工人运动的爱国联盟），并对抗其他精英团体成功的群众动员努力（如作为容克支持的农业联盟的政治制衡力量的德国海军联盟）。因此，精英们的资源允许他们影响群众政治参与的方向，但由于必须争夺群众的支持，单一精英群体很难控制这一过程的结果。例如，通过精英支持的民族主义组织获得参政机会的群众团体往往会试图出价击败其昔日的精英赞助者。到 1911 年，德国的大众民族主义游说团体已经有能力声称，如果德国的外交

foes were really as threatening as the ruling elites had portrayed them, then the government had sold out German interests in reaching a compromise settlement of the Moroccan dispute with France. ${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} In this way, the process of elite mobilization of the masses adds to the ungovernability and political impasse of democratizing states.
${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} 如果敌人真的像统治精英所描述的那样具有威胁性，那么政府在与法国达成摩洛哥争端的折中解决方案时就已经出卖了德国的利益。 ${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49} 这样，精英动员群众的过程加剧了民主化国家的不可治理性和政治僵局。
Ideology takes on particular significance in the competition for mass support. New participants in the political process may be uncertain of where their political interests lie, because they lack established habits and good information, and are thus fertile ground for ideological appeals. Ideology can yield particularly big payoffs, moreover, when there is no efficient free marketplace of ideas to counter false claims with reliable facts. Elites try out all sorts of ideological appeals, depending on the social position that they need to defend, the nature of the mass group that they want to recruit, and the type of appeals that seem plausible in the given political setting. A nearly universal element in these ideological appeals is nationalism, which has the advantage of positing a community of interest that unites elites and masses, thus distracting attention from class cleavages.
在争取群众支持的竞争中，意识形态具有特别重要的意义。政治进程的新参与者可能不确定自己的政治利益何在，因为他们缺乏既定的习惯和良好的信息，因此是意识形态诉求的沃土。此外，如果没有高效自由的思想市场来用可靠的事实反驳虚假的主张，意识形态就会产生特别大的回报。精英们会尝试各种各样的意识形态诉求，这取决于他们需要捍卫的社会立场、他们想要拉拢的大众群体的性质，以及在特定政治环境下看似合理的诉求类型。民族主义几乎是这些意识形态诉求中的一个普遍元素，它的优势在于提出了一个将精英和大众团结在一起的利益共同体，从而转移了人们对阶级裂痕的注意力。
Nationalist appeals have often succeeded even though the average voter was not consistently pro-war or pro-empire. For example, the French public was not keen to enter the Crimean War when it began in January 1854, and after sustaining 100,000 war-related deaths by 1855, the public’s war-weariness led Napoleon to make concessions to Russia at the bargaining table. Likewise, the French public was initially opposed to participation in the Italian and AustroPrussian Wars, fearing a disruption of the economy. ${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} Mass opinion was similarly pacifist and anti-imperial in Britain during the high tide of Richard Cobden’s Anti-Corn Law League, which succeeded in linking foreign military intervention and military budgets to the popular issues of free trade and democracy. ${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51} In Japan, too, the Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1930 was initially popular with the public. ${}^{52}$${}^{52}$^(52){ }^{52} And even in Germany, where public opinion was more consistently bellicose, the two largest mass parties, the Social Democrats and the Catholic Center Party, had no interest in imperialism. Though the
即使普通选民并非始终如一地支持战争或支持帝国，民族主义的诉求也常常获得成功。例如，1854年1月克里米亚战争爆发时，法国民众并不热衷于参战，到1855年，法国因战争而死亡的人数达到10万，民众的厌战情绪导致拿破仑在谈判桌上对俄国做出让步。同样，法国公众起初也反对参加意大利战争和普奥战争，担心会破坏经济。 ${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} 在理查德-科登（Richard Cobden）的 "反玉米法联盟"（Anti-Corn Law League）高潮期间，英国的群众舆论同样是和平主义和反帝国主义的，该联盟成功地将外国军事干预和军事预算与自由贸易和民主等民众议题联系起来。 ${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51} 在日本，1930 年的《限制海军军备条约》最初也很受公众欢迎。 ${}^{52}$${}^{52}$^(52){ }^{52} 即使在德国，公众舆论也一直是好战的，但两个最大的群众党派--社会民主党和天主教中心党--对帝国主义毫无兴趣。虽然

German leaders’ strategy is often called “social” imperialism, its appeal was almost entirely to the middle classes, not the workers. And Catholics backed the fleet not out of conviction, but to get side-payments on domestic issues. ${}^{53}$${}^{53}$^(53){ }^{53}
德国领导人的战略通常被称为 "社会 "帝国主义，它的吸引力几乎完全来自中产阶级，而非工人。天主教徒支持舰队并非出于信念，而是为了在国内问题上获得附带利益。 ${}^{53}$${}^{53}$^(53){ }^{53}

Since mass opinion was typically mobilized into politics by elite interest groups rather than by broad-based parties competing for the median voter, mass voices tended to reinforce the pattern of elite interests, rather than to check them: in Germany, the Agrarian League clamored for grain tariffs, the Navy League for a fleet, the imperial groups for settler colonies abroad, and the Pan-German League for a bigger army. In cases where mass opinion has been articulated through different channels, such as the institutionalized twoparty competition in twentieth century Britain and the United States, its impact on foreign policy has been very different.
由于大众舆论通常是由精英利益集团而非基础广泛的政党为争夺中位选民而动员起来的，大众的声音往往会强化精英利益的格局，而非制衡它们：在德国，农业联盟要求征收谷物关税，海军联盟要求建立舰队，帝国集团要求在海外建立殖民地，泛德联盟则要求建立更强大的军队。在通过不同渠道表达群众意见的情况下，如 20 世纪英国和美国制度化的两党竞争，其对外交政策的影响就大不相同。
the WEAKENING of CENTRAl authority. The political impasse and recklessness of democratizing states is exacerbated further by the weakening of the state’s authority. Autocratic power is in decline vis-à-vis both the elite interest groups and mass groups, but democratic institutions lack the strength to integrate these contending interests and views. Parties are weak and lack mass loyalty. Elections are rigged or intermittent. Institutions of public political participation are distrusted, because they are subject to manipulation by elites and to arbitrary constraints imposed by the state, which fears the outcome of unfettered competition.
中央权威的削弱。国家权威的削弱进一步加剧了民主化国家的政治僵局和鲁莽行为。面对精英利益集团和大众群体，专制权力正在衰落，但民主体制却缺乏整合这些相互冲突的利益和观点的力量。政党软弱无力，缺乏群众忠诚度。选举被操纵或时断时续。公众政治参与机构受到不信任，因为它们受到精英的操纵和国家的任意限制，国家担心不自由竞争的结果。

In each of the historical great-power cases, the problem was not excessive authoritarian power at the center, but the opposite. The Aberdeen coalition that brought Britain into the Crimean War was a makeshift cabinet headed by a weak leader with no substantial constituency. Likewise, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, Napoleon III’s regime was in the process of caving in to its liberal opponents, who dominated the parliament elected in 1869. As Europe’s armies prepared to hurtle from their starting gates in late July 1914, Austrian leaders, perplexed by the contradictions between the German Chancellor’s policy and that of the German military, asked “Who rules in Berlin?” The 1931 Manchurian Incident was a fait accompli by the local Japanese military; Tokyo was not even informed. ${}^{54}$${}^{54}$^(54){ }^{54} Today, the return to imperial thinking in
在历史上的每一个大国案例中，问题并不在于中央的过度专制，而是恰恰相反。让英国卷入克里米亚战争的阿伯丁联盟是一个临时内阁，其领导人软弱无能，没有实质性的支持者。同样，在普法战争前夕，拿破仑三世的政权正在向其自由派反对者屈服，这些反对者在1869年选举产生的议会中占据了主导地位。1914 年 7 月下旬，当欧洲各国军队准备从起点出发时，奥地利领导人对德国总理的政策与德国军方的政策之间的矛盾感到困惑，他们问道："柏林的统治者是谁？1931 年满洲事变是日本地方军方造成的既成事实，东京甚至没有得到任何通知。 ${}^{54}$${}^{54}$^(54){ }^{54} 今天，在日本，帝国主义思维的回归

Moscow is the result of Yeltsin’s weakness, not his strength. As Sergei Karaganov has recently argued, the breakdown of the Leninist state "has created an environment where elite interests influence [foreign] policy directly."55 In each of these cases, the weak central political leadership resorts to the same strategies as do the more parochial elite interests, using nationalist ideological appeals and special-interest payoffs to maintain their short-run viability, despite the potential long-run risks associated with these strategies.
莫斯科是叶利钦软弱的结果，而不是他强大的结果。正如谢尔盖-卡拉加诺夫（Sergei Karaganov）最近所言，列宁主义国家的瓦解 "创造了精英利益直接影响（外交）政策的环境 "55。在上述每一种情况下，弱势的中央政治领导层都会采取与更加狭隘的精英利益集团相同的策略，利用民族主义意识形态诉求和特殊利益回报来维持其短期生存能力，尽管这些策略存在潜在的长期风险。

Political leaders in the great powers resorted to a typical syndrome of expedients in their attempts to deal with the political impasse of democratization. These tactics-logrolling, squaring the circle, and prestige strategies-tended to breed recklessness in foreign relations and the resort to war.
大国的政治领导人在试图应对民主化的政治僵局时，采用了典型的权宜之计。这些策略--"滚床单"、"摆平圈子 "和 "威望战略"--往往会滋生对外关系中的鲁莽和诉诸战争的倾向。
logrolling. In these democratizing states, the power of elite groups was strengthened relative to the weakened autocratic center, yet the power of mass groups was not yet institutionalized as in a mature democracy. This created the incentive to make policy by logrolling among elite interest groups. Elite logrolling often yielded policies of war, military preparation, and imperial expansion, in part because many of the interest groups created in the process of weakening and breaking up the autocratic state were its military-feudal detritus: the army, the navy, and the aristocratic elites that staffed them. Similar military interest groups also figure in some of the post-communist cases, especially Yugoslavia and Russia. Militaries do not necessarily favor war, especially when they feel unprepared to win quickly and decisively. However, because of militaries’ typically zero-sum view of security, they often recommend offensive military strategies that inadvertently lead the state down the path toward war. ${}^{56}$${}^{56}$^(56){ }^{56}
滚动。在这些民主化国家中，相对于被削弱的专制中心，精英群体的权力得到了加强，但大众群体的权力尚未像成熟的民主国家那样制度化。这就促使精英利益集团在制定政策时相互扯皮。精英利益集团之间的博弈往往产生战争、军事准备和帝国扩张政策，部分原因是在专制国家被削弱和瓦解的过程中产生的许多利益集团都是其军事封建残余：陆军、海军以及为其配备人员的贵族精英。类似的军事利益集团也出现在一些后共产主义国家，特别是南斯拉夫和俄罗斯。军方并不一定赞成战争，尤其是当他们觉得自己没有做好迅速取得决定性胜利的准备时。然而，由于军方对安全的看法通常是零和的，因此他们经常建议采取进攻性军事战略，无意中将国家引向战争之路。 ${}^{56}$${}^{56}$^(56){ }^{56}

Moreover, logrolling works by giving each group what it wants most, so that even if only some of the groups in the coalition favored policies leading to war
此外，"对数滚动 "的工作原理是让每个集团都得到自己最想要的东西，因此，即使联盟中只有部分集团赞成导致战争的政策

and expansion, that would be enough to make their adoption likely. The classic example is the Wilhelmine iron-and-rye logroll, where the navy and heavy industry insisted on a fleet that alienated Britain, the Junkers got grain tariffs that sowed discord with Russia, and the army got the offensive Schlieffen Plan, which threatened all of Germany’s neighbors. Another instance is the logroll between the Japanese imperial army and navy, which overtaxed the economy and embroiled Japan with enemies on all azimuths. ${}^{57}$${}^{57}$^(57){ }^{57}
在这样的情况下，如果我们能够在军事和经济扩张方面取得进展，就足以使其被采纳。典型的例子是威廉帝国的 "铁与油 "对簿公堂，海军和重工业坚持要建立一支疏远英国的舰队，容克家族得到了挑拨俄国关系的谷物关税，陆军得到了威胁德国所有邻国的进攻性 "施利芬计划"。另一个例子是日本帝国陆军和海军之间的对簿公堂，这给日本经济造成了过重的负担，并使日本在各个方位都与敌人为敌。 ${}^{57}$${}^{57}$^(57){ }^{57}

SQUARING THE CIRCle, OR INTEGRATING opposites. Since democratizing states typically comprise such a broad spectrum of social interests, would-be ruling coalitions must often be cobbled together from diverse or even contradictory bases of support. For this reason, one of the characteristic problems of the leadership of transitional, democratizing states is explaining away the self-contradictory aspects of a coalition or policy that must integrate antithetical elements. In foreign affairs, this often means sweeping tough trade-offs under the rug, pretending that contradictory policies actually make sense or cannot be avoided. As a consequence, the foreign policies of democratizing states are often overcommitted, provoking too many enemies at the same time, while claiming that the resulting conflicts are due to the others’ inherent hostility. For example, Wilhelmine iron-and-rye policies leading to a hostile encirclement of Germany were explained away in two ways: first, that the hostility was inherent in the nature of Germany’s opponents, and that German policy had done nothing to provoke it; and second, that the way to break apart the hostile coalition was to issue threats, rather than to make concessions that would have jeopardized the policies of the iron-and-rye coalition. ${}^{58}$${}^{58}$^(58){ }^{58}
方圆，或整合对立面。由于民主化国家通常包含如此广泛的社会利益，潜在的执政联盟往往必须从不同甚至相互矛盾的支持基础中拼凑而成。因此，转型期民主化国家领导层的一个典型问题就是如何解释必须整合对立因素的联盟或政策中自相矛盾的方面。在外交事务中，这往往意味着将艰难的取舍掩盖起来，假装相互矛盾的政策实际上是合理的或无法避免的。因此，民主化国家的外交政策往往投入过多，同时挑衅过多的敌人，却声称由此产生的冲突是由于其他国家与生俱来的敌意造成的。例如，威廉帝国的铁腕政策导致德国被敌国包围，对此德国有两种解释：第一，敌意是德国的对手与生俱来的，德国的政策没有做任何挑起敌意的事情；第二，瓦解敌国联盟的方法是发出威胁，而不是做出会危及铁腕联盟政策的让步。 ${}^{58}$${}^{58}$^(58){ }^{58}

Palmerston and Louis Napoleon faced a somewhat different problem of integrating opposites. Their strategies required winning over substantial middleclass backers to a strategy of social conservatism to safeguard the interests of old elites in an era of mass politics. In part, the rise of the working-class threat made this alliance possible. But in order to win converts from middle-class radicalism, Palmerston and Napoleon both had to show that their conservative policies were somehow actually liberal. The simplest way to do this was to back liberal goals abroad, such as national self-determination and the expansion of commercial opportunities, while fighting a rear-guard action against them at home. This was convenient because liberal goals abroad could easily
帕默斯顿和路易-拿破仑面临着一个略有不同的对立统一问题。他们的战略需要赢得大量中产阶级支持者的支持，采取社会保守主义战略，在大众政治时代维护旧精英的利益。在某种程度上，工人阶级威胁的崛起使这一联盟成为可能。但是，为了赢得中产阶级激进主义的皈依，帕麦斯顿和拿破仑都必须表明，他们的保守政策实际上是自由主义的。最简单的方法就是在国外支持自由主义目标，如民族自决和扩大商业机会，而在国内则对这些目标采取后卫行动。这样做很方便，因为国外的自由主义目标很容易

be made to dovetail with geopolitical goals that Palmerston and Napoleon wanted to pursue anyway. ${}^{59}$${}^{59}$^(59){ }^{59} However, liberals were not completely passive dupes of this strategy. In Britain, for example, they used the Crimean War to force an opening of the administration of the war office to middle-class rationalizers, a move that Palmerston could hardly prevent in light of the way he had justified his foreign policy. ${}^{60}$${}^{60}$^(60){ }^{60}
${}^{59}$${}^{59}$^(59){ }^{59} 然而，自由派并非完全被动地受骗于这一战略。 ${}^{59}$${}^{59}$^(59){ }^{59} 然而，自由派并非完全被动地受骗于这一战略。例如，在英国，他们利用克里米亚战争迫使陆军部向中产阶级理性主义者开放，鉴于帕默斯顿为其外交政策辩护的方式，他很难阻止这一举动。 ${}^{60}$${}^{60}$^(60){ }^{60}

In Russia today, foreign policy is likewise providing glue for an emerging “red-brown” coalition of nationalists and neo-communists. The Soviet system created organized vested interests in a particular pattern of industrial investment, a large military establishment, a working class protected from market forces, a local elite that served as a substitute for the market in administering the economy, and a division of labor on an imperial scale. The collapse of the Marxist-Leninist state took away the ideological underpinnings of this collection of interests, but many of these interests remain in place. The doctrines of nationalism and of the distinctiveness of Russia from the liberal West provide natural ideological justification for reasserting imperial control and retaining at least some of the strong-state, limited-market tendencies from Russia’s past. It may also help to justify a truncated approach to democratization, which would help secure these traditional elite interests.
在今天的俄罗斯，外交政策同样是民族主义者和新共产主义者组成的 "红棕 "联盟的粘合剂。苏联体制在特定的工业投资模式、庞大的军事机构、受市场力量保护的工人阶级、代替市场管理经济的地方精英以及帝国规模的分工中创造了有组织的既得利益。马克思列宁主义国家的崩溃夺走了这一系列利益的意识形态基础，但其中许多利益依然存在。民族主义和俄罗斯有别于西方自由主义的理论为重新确立帝国控制权和至少保留俄罗斯过去的一些强势国家、有限市场的倾向提供了天然的意识形态理由。这也有助于为截断民主化进程提供理由，从而有助于确保这些传统的精英利益。
prestige strategies. One of the simplest but most risky strategies for a hard-pressed regime in a democratizing country is to shore up its prestige at home by seeking victories abroad. Johannes Miquel, who revitalized the ironrye coalition at the turn of the century, argued that "successes in foreign policy would make a good impression in the Reichstag debates, and political divisions would thus be moderated."61 The domestic targets of such strategies often share this view. Cobden, for example, argued that military victories abroad would confer enough prestige on the military-feudal landed elite to allow them to raise food tariffs and snuff out democracy: “Let John Bull have a great military triumph, and we shall have to take off our hats as we pass the Horse Guards for the rest of our lives.” ${}^{62}$${}^{62}$^(62){ }^{62}
威望战略。对于一个民主化国家中处境艰难的政权来说，最简单但风险最大的策略之一就是通过在国外寻求胜利来巩固其在国内的威望。约翰内斯-米克尔（Johannes Miquel）在世纪之交重振了铁林联盟，他认为 "外交政策的成功会在国会辩论中给人留下好印象，政治分歧也会因此得到缓和 "61。例如，科布登认为，在国外取得军事胜利会给军事封建地主精英带来足够的威望，使他们能够提高粮食关税并扼杀民主："让约翰-布尔取得军事上的巨大胜利吧，这样我们在经过马卫队时就不得不脱帽致敬了。 ${}^{62}$${}^{62}$^(62){ }^{62}

Prestige strategies make the country hypersensitive to slights to its reputation. As the kaiser found out in the First and Second Moroccan Crises, stiff foreign resistance can produce not cheap victories but embarrassing defeats,
声誉战略使国家对其声誉受到的损害极为敏感。正如德皇在第一次和第二次摩洛哥危机中发现的那样，外国的顽强抵抗带来的不是廉价的胜利，而是令人尴尬的失败、

which further complicate domestic governance. In another instance, Napoleon III was easily goaded into a fateful declaration of war in 1870 by Bismarck’s insulting editorial work on a leaked telegram from the kaiser. ${}^{63}$${}^{63}$^(63){ }^{63}
这使得国内治理更加复杂。另一个例子是，1870 年，拿破仑三世被俾斯麦对一封泄露的德皇电报所做的侮辱性编辑工作轻而易举地诱导宣战。 ${}^{63}$${}^{63}$^(63){ }^{63}

If the public itself is wary of war, the prestige-enhancing venture may have to be mounted in the face of initial domestic opposition. Nonetheless, the gamble may be worth it. The Crimean victory created the conditions for what is acknowledged to be the high point of Napoleon III’s rule, despite the popular reluctance and war-weariness that accompanied it. ${}^{64}$${}^{64}$^(64){ }^{64} Napoleon learned this lesson well, and tried to recapitulate his success when he saw his popularity waning in January 1859. On the eve of French military intervention in the Italian struggle with Austria, Napoleon told his cabinet, “On the domestic front, the war will at first awaken great fears; traders and speculators of every stripe will shriek, but national sentiment will [banish] this domestic fright; the nation will be put to the test once more in a struggle that will stir many a heart, recall the memory of heroic times and bring together under the mantle of glory the parties that are steadily drifting away from one another day after day.” ${}^{65}$${}^{65}$^(65){ }^{65} Napoleon was trying to lead public opinion to become bellicose, not just to follow opinion, but in order to stir a national feeling that would enhance the state’s ability to govern a split and stalemated political arena.
如果公众本身对战争抱有戒心，那么这种提高声望的冒险行动可能不得不在最初遭到国内反对的情况下进行。然而，这场赌博可能是值得的。克里米亚战争的胜利为拿破仑三世统治时期的高潮创造了条件，尽管当时民众并不情愿，对战争也很厌倦。 ${}^{64}$${}^{64}$^(64){ }^{64} 拿破仑很好地吸取了这一教训，当他在1859年1月看到自己的声望在下降时，他试图重现自己的成功。在法国军事干预意大利与奥地利斗争的前夕，拿破仑对内阁说："在国内方面，战争一开始会引起极大的恐惧；各行各业的商人和投机者都会尖叫，但民族情绪会[驱散]这种国内的恐惧；民族将在一场斗争中再次经受考验，这场斗争将激起许多人的心，唤起人们对英雄时代的记忆，并将日复一日渐行渐远的各方汇聚到荣耀的旗帜下"。 ${}^{65}$${}^{65}$^(65){ }^{65} 拿破仑试图引导舆论变得好战，这不仅仅是为了顺应民意，而是为了激起一种民族情绪，以增强国家治理分裂和僵持的政治舞台的能力。

Though democratization has been a cause of great power war, reversing that process is not an effective antidote. At least four times, great powers have undergone sharp reversals of incipient democratization: France under Napoleons I and III, Nazi Germany, and Japan in the 1930s. Each then embarked on an aggressive foreign adventure. It is true that the reassertion of traditional autocracy under the Concert of Europe after 1815 produced a period of comparative peace. However, this merely postponed domestic and international conflicts, which returned with the democratizing trend after the revolutionary uprisings of $1848.{}^{66}$$1848.{}^{66}$1848.^(66)1848 .{ }^{66}
尽管民主化一直是大国战争的原因之一，但逆转这一进程并不是有效的解药。至少有四次，大国经历了民主化初期的急剧逆转：拿破仑一世和三世时期的法国、纳粹德国以及 20 世纪 30 年代的日本。随后，每个国家都开始了咄咄逼人的对外冒险。诚然，1815 年后，欧洲协约重新确立了传统专制政体，并创造了一个相对和平的时期。然而，这只是推迟了国内和国际冲突，随着 $1848.{}^{66}$$1848.{}^{66}$1848.^(66)1848 .{ }^{66} 革命起义后的民主化趋势，这些冲突又卷土重来。

How should the link between autocratization and war be interpreted? It is possible that any regime change increases the likelihood of war, whether it is on the dimension of democratization and autocratization, or on any other dimension. Regime change more generally may lead to some of the same war-causing pathologies that are present in democratizing states, including policy stalemates, threatened elites, and other social groups with shortened time horizons. Since political scientists have barely begun to address this question, this interpretation cannot be ruled out. ${}^{67}$${}^{67}$^(67){ }^{67}
如何解释专制与战争之间的联系？任何政权更迭都有可能增加战争的可能性，无论是在民主化和专制化层面，还是在任何其他层面。一般来说，政权更迭可能会导致一些与民主化国家相同的导致战争的病理现象，包括政策僵局、受到威胁的精英和其他时间跨度缩短的社会群体。由于政治学家尚未开始研究这一问题，因此不能排除这种解释。 ${}^{67}$${}^{67}$^(67){ }^{67}

However, at least some wars of autocratization can be best understood as wars of failed or perverted democratization. In each of these great power cases, the autocratizing ruler’s foreign policy was either a tool that helped him to overcome the political impasse of the democratizing regime, or else it grew out of ideas that had arisen in the political context of the preceding period of democratization. For example, explanations of Nazi foreign policy can be grouped into two general categories: “structuralist” ones that see Nazi policies as functional responses to the political impasse of Weimar society, and “intentionalist” ones that see such policies as the implementation of racist, nationalist ideas spawned in the coffeehouses of the late Wilhelmine and Weimar periods. ${}^{68}$${}^{68}$^(68){ }^{68} In either case, the warlike character of the new autocracy grew out of a flaw in the democratizing society that preceded it.
然而，至少有一些专制战争可以最好地理解为失败的或变态的民主化战争。在这些大国的每一个案例中，专制统治者的外交政策要么是帮助他克服民主化政权政治僵局的工具，要么是从前一个民主化时期的政治背景下产生的想法发展而来的。例如，对纳粹外交政策的解释可分为两大类：一种是 "结构主义 "的解释，认为纳粹政策是对魏玛社会政治僵局的功能性回应；另一种是 "意图主义 "的解释，认为纳粹政策是对威廉明末和魏玛时期咖啡馆中产生的种族主义和民族主义思想的实施。 ${}^{68}$${}^{68}$^(68){ }^{68} 无论哪种观点，新专制制度的好战性都源于它之前的民主化社会的缺陷。

These new autocrats, unlike traditional monarchs, all claimed to rule in the name of people, while shutting down democratic institutions. Napoleon I exploited the popular nationalism of the French Revolution, promising to spread its ideals throughout Europe even as he extinguished them in France. The Japanese army invented a populist ideology, rooted in the nation’s imperial myths, designed to solidify the army’s links to a rural mass constituency and to denigrate the commercially-oriented Taisho democrats. Thus, the foreign policy of these autocratizing states was at least partially shaped by the character of the democratic political system that they were escaping. In some cases, it was a means for accomplishing that escape. In this sense, the wars of re-autocratization can be seen as part of the larger phenomenon of wars of democratization.
这些新的专制君主与传统君主不同，都声称以人民的名义进行统治，同时关闭了民主机构。拿破仑一世利用了法国大革命中的民众民族主义，承诺将其理想传播到整个欧洲，即使他在法国消灭了这些理想。日本军队发明了一种植根于国家帝国神话的民粹主义意识形态，旨在巩固军队与农村大众选民的联系，并诋毁以商业为导向的大正民主主义者。因此，这些专制国家的外交政策至少有一部分是由它们所逃避的民主政治制度的特征所决定的。在某些情况下，外交政策是实现这种摆脱的一种手段。从这个意义上说，再民主化战争可以被视为民主化战争这一更大现象的一部分。

In light of these findings, it would be hard to maintain a naive enthusiasm for spreading peace by promoting democratization. Pushing nuclear-armed great powers like Russia or China toward democratization is like spinning a roulette wheel, where many of the potential outcomes are likely to be undesirable. However, in most cases the initial steps on the road to democratization will not be produced by the conscious policy of the United States, no matter what that policy may be. The roulette wheel is already spinning for Russia, and perhaps China, regardless of what the West does. Moreover, reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself. Consequently, the international community needs a strategy not so much for promoting or reversing democratization as for managing the process in ways that minimize its risks and facilitate smooth transitions.
有鉴于此，我们很难对通过推动民主化来传播和平保持天真的热情。推动俄罗斯或中国这样的有核大国走向民主化就像转动轮盘一样，许多潜在的结果都可能是不可取的。然而，在大多数情况下，民主化道路上的最初步骤不会由美国有意识的政策产生，无论该政策可能是什么。无论西方国家采取什么行动，轮盘都已经在俄罗斯，或许还有中国转动。此外，民主化的逆转与民主化本身的风险几乎一样大。因此，国际社会需要的战略与其说是促进或逆转民主化，不如说是管理民主化进程，最大限度地降低风险，促进平稳过渡。

What might be some of these mitigating conditions, and how might they be promoted? The association of democratization with war is probabilistic. Democratization can lead either to war or to peace, depending on a variety of factors, such as the incentives facing the old elites during the transition process, the structure of the marketplace of foreign policy ideas, the speed and thoroughness of the democratic transition, and the character of the international environment in which democratization occurs. Some of these features may be subject to manipulation by astute democratic reformers and their allies in the international community.
其中可能有哪些缓解条件，以及如何促进这些条件？民主化与战争的关联是概率性的。民主化既可能导致战争，也可能导致和平，这取决于多种因素，如转型过程中旧精英所面临的激励因素、外交政策思想市场的结构、民主转型的速度和彻底性，以及民主化所处的国际环境的特点。其中一些特征可能会被精明的民主改革者及其在国际社会中的盟友所操纵。

One of the major findings of scholarship on democratization in Latin America is that the process goes most smoothly when elites that are threatened by the transition, especially the military, are given a "golden parachute."69 Above all, they need a guarantee that if they relinquish power they will not wind up in jail. The history of the democratizing great powers broadens this insight. Democratization was least likely to lead to imprudent aggression in cases where the old elites saw a reasonably bright future for themselves in the new social order. British aristocrats, for example, had more of their wealth invested in commerce and industry than they did in agriculture, so they had many interests in common with the rising middle classes. They could face democratization with relative equanimity. In contrast, Prussia’s capital-starved, small-
拉美民主化研究的主要发现之一是，当受到转型威胁的精英（尤其是军方）获得 "金降落伞 "69 时，民主化进程最为顺利。民主化大国的历史拓宽了这一认识。如果旧的精英阶层在新的社会秩序中看到了相当光明的前景，那么民主化最不可能导致轻率的侵略。例如，英国贵族投资于工商业的财富多于投资于农业的财富，因此他们与崛起的中产阶级有许多共同利益。他们可以相对平静地面对民主化。与此相反，普鲁士的资本匮乏、小国寡民和中产阶级在面对民主化时却表现得相对平静。

scale Junker landholders had no choice but to rely on agricultural protection and military careers.
规模较大的容克地主别无选择，只能依靠农业保护和军事生涯。

In today’s context, finding benign, productive employment for the erstwhile Communist nomenklatura, military officer corps, nuclear scientists, and smokestack industrialists ought to rank high on the list of priorities. Policies aimed at giving them a stake in the privatization process and subsidizing the conversion of their skills to new, peaceful tasks in a market economy seem like a step in the right direction. According to some interpretations, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was eager to use force to solve the Chechen confrontation in order to show that Russian military power was still useful and that increased investment in the Russian army would pay big dividends. Instead of pursuing this reckless path, the Russian military elite needs to be convinced that its prestige, housing, pensions, and technical competence will rise if and only if it transforms itself into a western-style military, subordinate to civilian authority and resorting to force only in accordance with prevailing international norms. Moreover, though old elites need to be kept happy, they also need to be kept weak. Pacts should not prop up the remnants of the authoritarian system, but rather create a niche for them in the new system.
在今天的背景下，为昔日的共产党权贵、军官团、核科学家和烟囱工业家寻找良性的生产性就业机会，应该成为优先事项中的重中之重。让他们参与私有化进程，并为他们在市场经济中将技能转化为新的和平任务提供补贴的政策，似乎是朝着正确方向迈出的一步。根据一些解释，俄罗斯国防部长帕维尔-格拉切夫急于使用武力解决车臣对抗，以表明俄罗斯的军事力量仍然有用，增加对俄罗斯军队的投资将带来巨大回报。俄罗斯军事精英不应走这条鲁莽的道路，而应相信，只有将自己转变为一支西式军队，服从文职政府，只在符合现行国际准则的情况下才诉诸武力，其威望、住房、养老金和技术能力才会提高。此外，虽然需要让旧的精英们保持快乐，但也需要让他们保持软弱。条约不应支持专制制度的残余势力，而应在新制度中为他们创造有利条件。

A top priority must also be placed on creating a free, competitive, yet responsible marketplace of ideas in the newly democratizing states. Most of the war-prone democratizing great powers had pluralistic public debates, but the terms of these debates were skewed to favor groups with money, privileged access to the media of communication, and proprietary control over information, ranging from historical archives to intelligence about the military balance. Pluralism is not enough. Without an even playing field, pluralism simply creates the incentive and opportunity for privileged groups to propound selfserving myths, which historically have often taken a nationalist turn. One of the rays of hope in the Chechen affair was the alacrity with which Russian journalists exposed the true costs of the fighting and the lies of the government and the military about it. Though elites should get a golden parachute in terms of their pecuniary interests, they should be given no quarter on the battlefield of ideas. Mythmaking should be held up to the utmost scrutiny by aggressive journalists who maintain their credibility by scrupulously distinguishing fact from opinion and tirelessly verifying their sources. Promoting this kind of journalistic infrastructure is probably the most highly leveraged investment that the West can make in a peaceful democratic transition.
在新兴民主化国家建立一个自由、竞争但负责任的思想市场也是重中之重。大多数容易发生战争的民主化大国都曾进行过多元化的公开辩论，但这些辩论的条件却偏向于那些有钱、有权使用传播媒介、对从历史档案到军事平衡情报等各种信息拥有专有控制权的团体。仅有多元化是不够的。如果没有一个公平的竞争环境，多元化只会为特权团体提供动机和机会，让他们宣扬自以为是的神话，而这些神话在历史上往往带有民族主义色彩。车臣事件中的一线希望是俄罗斯记者迅速揭露了战斗的真实代价以及政府和军方的谎言。虽然精英们在金钱利益上应该得到金降落伞，但在思想战场上他们却不应该得到任何宽容。积极进取的新闻记者应通过严格区分事实与观点、不懈地核实消息来源来维护自身的公信力，从而使自己的言论受到最严格的审查。促进这种新闻基础设施的发展，可能是西方对和平民主过渡所能做出的最具杠杆作用的投资。

Our research offers inconclusive results about the wisdom of speed and thoroughness in transitions to democracy. On the one hand, we found that
关于向民主过渡的速度和彻底性是否明智的问题，我们的研究没有得出结论。一方面，我们发现
states making the big jump from autocracy to democracy were much more war-prone than those moving from autocracy to anocracy. This would seem to favor a strategy of limited goals. On the other hand, the experience of the former Communist states suggests that those that have gone farthest and fastest toward full democracy are less nationalistic and less involved in militarized quarrels. This is a question that needs more research.
从专制走向民主的国家比从专制走向民主的国家更容易发生战争。这似乎有利于采取目标有限的战略。另一方面，前共产主义国家的经验表明，那些在全面民主化道路上走得最远、最快的国家民族主义色彩较淡，卷入军事化争斗的程度也较低。这个问题需要更多的研究。

Finally, what kind of ruling coalition emerges in the course of democratization depends a great deal on the incentives that are created by the international environment. Both Germany and Japan started on the path toward liberal, stable democratization in the mid-1920s, encouraged in part by abundant opportunities for trade and investment from the advanced democracies and by credible security treaties that defused nationalist scare-mongering in domestic politics. But when the international supports for free trade and democracy were yanked out in the late 1920s, their liberal coalitions collapsed. Especially for the case of contemporary China, whose democratization may occur in the context of sharply expanding economic ties to the West, the steadiness of the Western commercial partnership and security presence is likely to play a major role in shaping the incentives of proto-democratic coalition politics.
最后，在民主化进程中出现什么样的执政联盟在很大程度上取决于国际环境所产生的激励机制。德国和日本都是在 20 世纪 20 年代中期开始走上自由、稳定的民主化道路的，这在一定程度上得益于先进民主国家提供的大量贸易和投资机会，以及可信的安全条约化解了国内政治中的民族主义恐慌。但是，当自由贸易和民主的国际支持在 20 世纪 20 年代末被取消时，这些国家的自由联盟也随之瓦解。尤其是当代中国，其民主化可能发生在与西方的经济联系急剧扩大的背景下，西方商业伙伴关系和安全存在的稳定性很可能在塑造原民主联盟政治的激励机制方面发挥重要作用。

In the long run, the enlargement of the zone of stable democracy will probably enhance the prospects for peace. But in the short run, there is a lot of work to be done to minimize the dangers of the turbulent transition.
从长远来看，扩大稳定的民主地区可能会改善和平的前景。但在短期内，要尽量减少动荡过渡时期的危险，还有许多工作要做。