China'sPalestinianPolicy: A NewHegemonicChallengein theMiddle Eastor aPragmatic Mediator

1. Introduction: Overview of the-PalestinianConflict and China's Emergence as a New Mediator

The Palestinianissue has beenone of themostprotractedconflictsininternationalpoliticssince the20thcentury, turning theMiddle East into a"geopoliticalpowder keg"andremaining acore issue. 1948,Israel'sfounding andthesubsequentwarmarked the beginning of, the-Palestinianconflict, whichis not merelyaquestion ofa nation'sright toself-determination,but, a geopoliticalbattlegroundwheretheturbulentworld order ofimperialism andthe Cold War, andlaterthe interests ofmajor powers liketheUK, France,and eventuallythe US andthe Soviet Unionclashed. The United States has established itself as a steadfast supporter of Israel, while the Soviet Union historically provided some level of support to Palestinian nationalism and Arab socialist states.

In particular, Egypt played a central role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who championed Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. However, after Nasser's death and the decline of Soviet influence, the Anwar Sadat regime pursued improved relations with the United States. This led to the Camp David Accords in 1979, resulting in Egypt stepping back from its role as a mediator and becoming the first Arab country to officially recognize Israel.

In thisflow,Arabstatesmaintainedrhetoricandnationalistsentimentnominallysupportingthe Palestinian cause,butasrepeatednegotiationstoresolvetheIsraeli-Palestinianconflictcollapsedandgenerationschanged,thePalestinianissuenolongerfunctionedastheexplosivepoliticalcenterissueitoncewasintheimmediateaftermathofWorldWarII. Despitedecadesofinterventionbymajorpowersandregionalpowers, nosinglecountryhasbeenabletosubstantiallyresolvethisissue,anditpersiststothisday.

2020 marked the year when the Abraham Accords were signed, symbolizing the declining status of the Palestinian issue in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco normalized diplomatic relations with Israel, bypassing Palestine to realize economic and security cooperation with Israel. ThisshowsthatamongArabnations,pragmatismandeconomy-centereddiplomacyarestrengthening,whilethePalestinianissue,traditionallyacentralconcernoftheArabworld,isincreasinglybeingperceivedasapoliticalburden.

In this trend, Hamas felt a sense of crisis that the Palestinian issue would be permanently ignored by the international community if other Arab countries also normalized relations with Israel while the establishment of a Palestinian state remained incomplete. Accordingly, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel in October 2023, reigniting armed conflict. Thewar did notconcludein ashortperiod, but ratherbecameanopportunitytoredirecttheinternationalcommunity'sattentionbacktothePalestinianissue.

In particular,thiswarprovidedChina,whichhasbeenexpandingitsdiplomaticfootprintintheMiddleEastthroughmediationofIran-SaudidiplomaticnormalizationandsupportforSyria'sreturntotheinternationalcommunity,withanotheropportunitytohighlightitsroleasamediator. Arabcountries,disillusionedbytheUnited States'unilateralsupportforIsraelandthehypocrisyofWesternnations,foundinChinaamoreneutralandequaldiplomaticpartner.Leveragingitsnon-colonialhistoryandeconomy-focusedrelations,ChinawasabletoexpanditsdiplomaticpresenceandinfluenceintheMiddleEast.

2023 OctoberHamas-Israel war broke out since, China has consistently from the initial stage called for an immediate ceasefire and expressed its position as a mediator. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded restraint from both sides immediately after the outbreak of the war, and subsequently Beijing hosted related meetings with Middle Eastern countries. Recently,Chinahas beenprovidinghumanitarianaidtotheGazaStrip,demonstratingitsinternationalpresencenotonlythroughdiplomaticrhetoricbutalsoconcreteactions.WhileChinadiplomaticallyrecognizesbothIsraelandPalestine,ithastraditionallymaintainedamorefavorablestancetowardPalestine. In particular,Beijing hashosted a representative officeof the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)for many years,andChinahas consistentlymaintainedcommunicationwiththisrepresentative office.Chinaofficiallystrongly supportsthe'two-state solution,'whichisa positiongrounded inUN resolutionsandinternational law,advocating forpeaceful coexistencebetweenIsraelandPalestine.

Thisseries ofmeasures andcontinuousdiplomaticinterventionsdemonstrate thatChinais not merelya passivethirdpartyinMiddle Eastissues,butincreasinglyshowsa clearstanceandthewilltoplaya mediatingrole.Inresponse,the internationalcommunityhasraisedvariousinterpretationsaboutwhetherChina'ssupportforPalestineistrulybasedonhumanitarianprinciplesorpartofa geopoliticalstrategytoreplaceU.S.influenceintheMiddleEast. Particularly, China'srecentsuccessfulmediationinthenormalizationofdiplomaticrelationsbetweenIranandSaudiArabiasuggeststhatitsinvolvementintheMiddleEastisnotmerelyasymbolicgesturebutdemonstratesthepotentialtoexertrealinfluenceinreshapingtheregionalorder.

This paper, under such a background, aims to comprehensively examine the historical accumulation and diplomatic context of China-Palestine relations, the broader China-Middle East relations, and China's internal political environment. To this end,thisstudywillrefer toacademic papers,governmentdocuments,andreportsfromprivatethink tankstoanalyzeChina'sstanceonthePalestinianissue,itsstrategicintentions,andthepotentialandstructurallimitationsofChinesediplomacywithintheinternationalconflictoftheIsraeli-Palestiniandispute.

2. MainBody

(1) China'sSupportforPalestine–Solidarity and Rhetoric in the Anti-Colonial Struggle

China'sPalestinianpolicywas notformedrecently. Itsorigins date backto the1950sand1960s. At that time,Chinamaintainedcontactwith thePalestine Liberation Organization(PLO)andsupportediton the samelevelasnational liberation movementsin Africa and Asia. 1965, ChinawasamongtheearlierArabnationstoofficiallysupportthePLO. DuringtheMaoZedongera,Chinaextensivelysponsoredarmedliberationmovementsandanti-imperialiststruggles,viewingthePalestinianissueaspartoftheThirdWorld'santi-colonialfight. Duringthisperiod,supportwasalsoextendedtoarmedgroupssuchasthePopularFrontfortheLiberationofPalestine(PFLP)andFatah.⁽¹⁾

During the Cold War,Chinaconsistently criticized Israel at the UN,advocated forPalestinianself-determination,andin 1988,became one of the first countriesto recognizethe State of Palestinefollowingthe PLO'sdeclaration of statehood.In the late 1970s,Chinaestablished formal diplomatic relationswith the PLOandset up a representative officein Beijing,laying the diplomatic groundworkfor recognizing Palestineas a state.

However,during the Deng Xiaopingera,direct support for armedgroupswasdeemedirrational,andthepolicywaspartiallyadjustedtosupporttheCamp DavidAccordsin1978. Nevertheless,supportforthe Palestiniancausecontinuedtobemaintained.

1990s, during the eras of Jiang Zemin andHu Jintao, China maintained its support for the Middle East peace process, including theOsloAccords. AfterHamaswon the2006Palestinianelections, China recognized it as the democratically elected representative of thePalestinianpeople. During the2008-2009Gaza War, China also maintained a somewhat favorable stance toward thePalestinianside, includingHamas.

Xi Jinping's administration has further strengthened diplomatic rhetoric and practical cooperation with Palestine. In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the 'Four Principles for Middle East Peace,' explicitly stating China's support for the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. In 2017, this position was formalized as the "realization of international justice." 2021, during theGaza Striparmedconflict, Chinacriticized Israel'sairstrikesandled an emergencyUN Security Councilmeeting, while alsoadvocating for Palestine'sright to self-defenseandindirectlycriticizingthe U.S.for exercisingits veto power.

Recently,Palestinianpolicetraining, medical·educationsupport, and theChina-Palestinehospitalconstructionhavestrengthenedpracticaldevelopmentcooperation. Additionally,BeijinghostedamultilateralpeacetalkinvitingseniorPalestiniandiplomats. Thesediplomaticapproachesdemonstrateashiftfromideologicalsupporttopracticalandstrategicassistance.

Today,Chinaconsistently supportsthe'two-state solution'based oninternational lawandUN resolutionsregarding thePalestinian issue.In particular,it upholdsthe core principles ofa return to the 1967 bordersandthe establishment ofan independentPalestinian statewithEast Jerusalemas its capital.China has maintaineda critical stancetowardIsrael'ssettlement expansionandmilitary operations. Additionally,while maintainingdiplomaticcontactwithPalestinianarmed factions,includingHamas, ChinaadoptsadiplomaticstanceseparatefromitseconomiccooperationwithIsrael. ThisdualstrategysuperficiallyadvocatesneutralitybutinpracticedemonstratesapositionfavorabletothePalestinianside,describedas'biasedimpartiality.'

References

《China and the Middle East》

《Routledge Handbook on Palestine》 (2024)

(2) 21st Century China's Palestine Support – Economic Significance and Expanding Middle East Influence

In the 21st century, China's approach to Palestine has evolved beyond mere moral solidarity to a more clear strategic calculation. The Middle East isakeyregionwhereChina'sdiplomaticcoreinterestsareconcentrated.First, fromanenergysecurityperspective,ChinareliesontheMiddle EastforoverhalfofitsoilimportsandhassignedenergyagreementsandinvestmentprojectswithcountriessuchasSaudi Arabia,Iran,andIraq.⁽³⁾Second,asastrategichuboftheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI),theMiddle Eastisacriticalareawherelandandmaritimeroutesintersect,andinstabilityinthisregioncouldthreatenthesustainabilityoftheentireBRI.⁽⁴⁾Third,fromadomesticsecuritystandpoint,cooperationwiththeIslamicworldintheMiddle EastislinkedtoChina'sdiplomaticstrategyofpreventingtheinternationalizationoftheXinjiang(East Turkestan)issueandblockingthespreadofIslamicradicalismwithinChina.⁽⁵⁾

Within this strategic context, China's Palestine policy has three main directions. First, it challenges the U.S.-centric Middle East mediation structure, proposes a multilateral alternative centered on the UN and Arab states, and builds an image of a "responsible great power." Second, to strengthen its political foundation in the Middle East and ensure the stable advancement of the BRI, it enhances solidarity with the Islamic world and seeks to mitigate international criticism on sensitive domestic issues such as the Uyghur problem. Third, it pursues economic cooperation with Israel (technology, infrastructure, investment) while maintaining energy and financial partnerships with Arab states, thereby expanding its diplomatic foothold across the Middle East through multi-directional diplomacy.[Source: Evron 2015, pp. 12–17; Biased Impartiality, pp. 7–10]

Against thisbackground,Chinaviews thePalestinianissue not as a mereregionalconflict, but as acoreagendathatreflects itsglobalstrategyanddomesticstability. China has been strengthening political and economic ties with Middle Eastern countries through platforms such as the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At the same time, it maintains its 'principled support' for Palestine as a pillar of diplomatic symbolism.⁽⁶⁾

2023, , China successfully mediated the diplomatic normalization between Iran-Saudi Arabia, diplomatic normalization mediation, succeeding, in the Middle East 'symbolic neutral party' imagebreaking away from and active mediator as a diplomatic shift attempted. Inthesameyear, inOctober, afterHamas'sattack, ChinaurgedbothIsraelandPalestinetoexerciserestraint, whilerepeatedlyexpressingsupportforPalestinianrightsandthetwo-statesolutionontheinternationalstage, therebystrengtheningitsdiplomaticstance.⁽⁷⁾ ThisdiplomaticmoveisalsointerpretedasasignalthatChinaintendstointervenemoreactivelyinthereorganizationoftheMiddleEastorder.⁽⁸⁾

This trend was further solidified in May 2024 when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed China's official stance on the Palestinian issue. He stated that the Palestinian issue is the "core of Middle Eastern issues" and expressed China's support for the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Furthermore, "no matter how the international situation changes, China will firmly support Palestine's legitimate national rights and the establishment of an independent state", it declared, emphasizing its continuous support for Palestine as a permanent member of the UN. Heparticularlyreferred to thesituation inGazaas"anunsustainablesituation"andstatedthat"anunconditionalandimmediateceasefire"and"theresolutionofthehumanitariancrisis"arethetopprioritiesfor the international community.¹

In the same month, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a joint statement with Middle Eastern and Arab countries, reiterating support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and a comprehensive solution based on the two-state solution.² This reflects China's strategic approach of aligning with the mainstream diplomatic solutions of the international community while maintaining a clearer pro-Palestinian stance in its relations with the Arab world.

Chinaactively employshumanitarianrhetoricwhile, consistentlyavoidingexplicitcondemnationofarmedconflictsormilitaryintervention. This can beinterpreted asChina'seffort toadhere to itstraditionalprinciple ofnon-interferencewhileexpanding its'moral influence'as part of arhetoricalstrategy.³At the same time,Chinaemphasizes'reconciliation'regarding thepoliticaldivisionswithinPalestine,andseeks toposition itselfas amediatorin theconflict.

(3) TheLimits ofChina'sSupport forPalestine

However,China'ssupport for Palestinehasrepeatedrhetoricalstancesbutcompared to, practicalinfluenceexertionhaslimitations. Chinaconsistentlysupportsthe two-statesolutionand, international lawrespect andhumanitarianprincipleshas emphasized. For example, in May 2024, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that "the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is the restoration of international justice," emphasizing the need for an immediate ceasefire and improvement of the humanitarian situation.¹

However,despitesuchdiplomaticrhetoric,China'sactionsremainlimitedinmanyaspects.ThemostfundamentalconstraintliesinthebasicprincipleofChineseforeignpolicy:non-interferenceininternalaffairs.Inhigh-intensityconflictzonesliketheMiddleEast,activeinterventionisoftenrequired,butChinatendstorelymoreondiplomaticrhetoricthanconflictmediation.²

Furthermore,Chinaon one handdeclares its support for Palestine,while simultaneously continuingeconomiccooperationwithIsrael. Israel is considered an important partner in China's Belt and Road Initiative for advanced technology and port development, leading China to adopt an economically focused approach in the Middle East rather than military or security engagement.³ This dual-track strategy reveals a limitation: while Arab states acknowledge China as a principled supporter, they do not trust it as a substantive security partner.⁴

Moreover, recently, major European countries—such as Spain, Ireland, and Norway—have officially recognized the Palestinian state, and French President Macron has also expressed support, calling it a "moral obligation." Amid the spread of grassroots pro-Palestinian movements in the U.S. and the U.K., if this international trend continues to expand, China's stance may struggle to maintain diplomatic distinctiveness from other major powers. Although China has repeatedly raised the Palestinian issue on the international stage, if more Western countries begin to actively express support, China's "principled support" may no longer serve as a unique diplomatic asset.

In reality,Chinacontinues to avoid high-intensity measures such as military intervention or political pressure, and remains at the level of expressing support on multilateral platforms like the UN and providing humanitarian aid.⁶ While this approach may be advantageous for securing diplomatic legitimacy and neutrality, it remains uncertain whether China can exert substantial influence in the escalating situation of the Palestinian issue.

Additionally,China'sMiddle Eastpeacemediation proposalshaveIsrael-Palestineconflict orSyriancivil waramong others,beenproposedmultipletimes,but, mostofthemlackedconcreteimplementationmeasuresand, failedtoexertsubstantialpoliticalpressureontheconflictingparties. Thisgivestheimpressionthatwhilemaintaininganeutralimage,Chinaisreluctanttotake ontheroleofaresponsiblemediator.

Furthermore,Chinamaintainsa diplomaticallyfriendlystancetowardbothIsraelandPalestine,butthisdualdiplomaticstrategycontainsinherentstructuralcontradictions.Iftheconflictescalates,Chinawillinevitablylosethetrustofoneside. Especially,while maintainingcontact withHamas,the dual approach ofstrengtheningstrategiccooperationwithIsraelcouldraisequestionsaboutits credibilityasamediator.

Ultimately,China'sMiddle Eastdiplomacyfacesthe challenge ofbalancingbetweenthe contradictorystrategies of'non-interferenceandexpandinginfluence.'On the surface,it seeks tomaintainthe image of a'responsiblemajor power,'buttobuildsubstantialtrustinsecurityandmilitarydomains,moreconcreterolesandactionsmayberequired.[Source: Evron 2015, pp. 17–19; Biased Impartiality, pp. 10–13]

Conclusion

China'sPalestinianpolicyistheresultofseekingabalancebetweendiplomaticsymbolismandpracticalstrategywithinthecomplexterrainofMiddleEastdiplomacy.Historically,ChinahassupportedthePalestiniancausebasedonanti-colonialistlegitimacyandThirdWorldsolidarity.SincetheXiJinpingera,thishasbeenconcretizedintosupportforthe'two-statesolution',groundedininternationallawandUNresolutions. On one hand,Palestinemaintains diplomaticties withits internalaffairs andexpands humanitarianaid,while, on the otherhand,it pursueseconomiccooperationandstrategicpartnershipwithIsrael,conductinga dual-trackdiplomacy.

This approach challenges the U.S.-centered hegemonic order in the Middle East, while also attempting to avoid repeating past mediation failures and to build an image as a ‘responsible major power’. In particular, its emphasis on avoiding military intervention and focusing on multilateral cooperation and diplomatic rhetoric aligns with China’s distinctive principle of non-interference in internal affairs. However,the lack ofsubstantialpolitical pressureorsecurityintervention,the mediator'sinability to enforceits proposals, and the dualstrategy ofsimultaneouslyengagingbothIsrael andPalestineposestructurallimitationstoestablishingcredibilityas amediator.

China'sPalestinianpolicy isa strategicchoicethat seeksto balancesymbolism andpracticalitywithin thecomplexinternationalorder. Chinaleveragesits historicaltrust andmorallegitimacywithMiddle Easterncountriestoexpressdiplomaticsupport forPalestine,whilein practice,it maintainsa cautiousapproachthat prioritizeseconomicinterestsand theprinciple ofnon-interferencein domesticaffairs. As discussedin themainbody, Chinaseeks toestablishitspositionas a'responsiblemajorpower'on theinternationalstage,ratherthanengagingin directhegemoniccompetitionwith theUnited States.In thisprocess,ChinahasapproachedthePalestinianissuebyrefrainingfrommilitaryinterventionandfocusingondiplomaticrhetoricandmultilateralcooperation,whilealsopursuingeconomiccooperationwithIsraelas partof itsdual-trackstrategy. Thisbalancedstrategyhassucceededto some extentin gainingdiplomatictrustfromMiddle Easterncountries, but at the same time, it haslimitations infulfillingthe roleof apractical mediator.

In conclusion,Chinacurrently resemblesmoreofa‘cautiousmediator’thana‘newMiddleEasternhegemon,’pursuinganopportunisticandpragmaticforeignpolicyamidthereconfigurationoftheregionalorder.Goingforward,China’sactionswillbeevaluatedbasedonwhetheritcantranslateitsrhetoricalstanceintotangibleinfluenceinMiddleEasterndiplomacy,includingthePalestinianissue.