这是用户在 2025-4-8 16:03 为 https://app.immersivetranslate.com/pdf-pro/58892672-6b0b-4463-95ce-721a58bbfbe8 保存的双语快照页面,由 沉浸式翻译 提供双语支持。了解如何保存?

Road to Power  权力之路

STEVEN G. MARKS  史蒂文·G·马克斯

Road to Power   权力之路

The Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonization of Asian Russia 1850-1917
西伯利亚大铁路与亚洲俄罗斯的殖民化(1850-1917)

Cornell University Press
康奈尔大学出版社

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.
版权所有。未经出版社书面许可,不得以任何形式复制本书或其部分内容,除评论中的简短引用外。如需相关信息,请联系康奈尔大学出版社,地址:纽约州伊萨卡市罗伯茨广场 124 号,邮编 14850。
First published 1991 by Cornell University Press.
本书初版于 1991 年由康奈尔大学出版社出版。
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
美国国会图书馆编目出版数据

Marks, Steven G. (Steven Gary). 1958-
马克斯,史蒂文·G(史蒂文·加里),1958 年生

Road to power : the Trans-Siberian railroad and the colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917 / Steven G. Marks.
权力之路:西伯利亚大铁路与亚洲俄罗斯的殖民化,1850-1917 年 / 史蒂文·G·马克斯 著。

p. cm cm quadcm\quad \mathrm{cm}.   cm cm quadcm\quad \mathrm{cm} 页。
Includes bibliographical references and index.
包括参考文献和索引。

ISBN 0-8014-2533-6 (alk. paper)
ISBN 0-8014-2533-6(碱性纸印刷)
  1. Siberia (R.S.F.S.R.)—History. 2. Velikaia Sibirskaia magistral’—History.
    西伯利亚(俄罗斯苏维埃联邦社会主义共和国)——历史。2. 大西伯利亚干线——历史。
  2. Soviet Union—Economic conditions-1861-1917. 4. Vitte, S. IU. (Sergeǐ IUl’evich), graf, 1849-1915. I. Title.
    苏联——经济状况-1861-1917 年。4. 维特,S.YU.(谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇),伯爵,1849-1915 年。I. 标题。

    DK766.M36 1991  DK766.M36 1991(此为索书号,保留原格式)
    957.08 -dc20  957.08 -dc20(此为分类号,保留原格式)
90-55734
Printed in the United States of America
美国印刷
The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information SciencesPermanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
本书用纸符合美国国家信息标准协会关于印刷图书馆材料的纸张耐久性最低要求(ANSI Z39.48-1984)。

TO CINDY  献给辛迪

Contents  目录

Illustrations … ix  插图目录……ix
Preface … xi  前言……xi
Abbreviations … XV  缩写表… XV
Note on Transliteration and Dates … xvii
关于音译与日期的说明……xvii

Russian Measurements … xviii
俄制计量单位… xviii

Cast of Major Characters … xix
主要人物表… xix

Introduction … 1PART I. IMPETUS
引言……1 第一部分:动力
  1. A Weak and Distant Domain … 13
    薄弱而遥远的统治……13
  2. An Appetite for Asia … 28
    对亚洲的渴望……28
  3. Siberia Is for Russia … 46
    西伯利亚属于俄罗斯……46

    PART II. DEBATE AND DECISION
    第二部分. 辩论与决策
  4. Divergent Visions … 57
    分歧的愿景……57
  5. The Vital Nerve and the Tail End … 74
    生命线与末端……74
  6. Bureaucracy Prolix … 94  官僚机构的冗长……94
    PART III. CREATION  第三部分 创建
  7. A State within a State … 117
    国中之国……117
  8. Witte and the Taming of the Wild East … 141
    维特与驯服远东……141
  9. Monument to Bungling … 170
    拙劣工程的纪念碑……170
  10. The Limits of Railroad Colonization … 196
    铁路殖民的界限…196

    Conclusion … 220  结论……220
    Bibliography of Primary Sources … 227
    主要参考文献目录…227

    Index … 237  索引……237

Illustrations  插图

Alexander III … 5  亚历山大三世 … 5
Konstantin Pos’et … 65
康斯坦丁·波谢特 … 65

Ivan Vyshnegradskii … 97
伊万·维什涅格拉茨基 … 97

Adol’f Giubbenet … 103
阿道夫·吉本内特…103

Sergei Witte … 121
谢尔盖·维特…121

Nicholas II … 137
尼古拉二世…137

Peasant migrants at railroad way station … 155
铁路小站上的农民移民…155

New village in the taiga, Tobol’sk province … 163
新村庄在针叶林中,托博尔斯克省……163

Schoolhouse in new village, Tobol’sk province … 168
托博尔斯克省新村庄的校舍……168

Wooden bridge, Central Siberian Railroad … 178
木桥,中西伯利亚铁路……178

Unmechanized earthworks, Western Siberian line … 185
非机械化土方工程,西西伯利亚线路……185

Taiga station, Central Siberian Railroad … 198
泰加站,中西伯利亚铁路…198 页

Maps  地图
Asian Russia and its major railroads, 1916 … 8-9
亚洲俄罗斯及其主要铁路线,1916 年…8-9

The Russian Far East, 1916 … 40
俄罗斯远东地区,1916 年…40

The Volga and Trans-Ural regions, 1862 … 60
伏尔加河与跨乌拉尔地区,1862 年…60 页

Preface  前言

The road to power for nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries lay along the path of technological advance. By the late nineteenth century the Industrial Revolution had transformed western Europe and endowed it with the machine superiority that enabled it to gain control over previously unyielding territories in distant corners of the globe. The age was marked by grandiose undertakings in the quest for wealth, glory, and power-Cecil Rhodes in the Cape Colony, Leopold II in the Congo, Ferdinand de Lesseps in the Suez and Panama, and large-scale railroad building everywhere.
十九世纪至二十世纪,民族国家通往权力之路沿着技术进步的道路延伸。至十九世纪末,工业革命已彻底改变了西欧,并赋予其机器优势,使其得以掌控全球遥远角落那些先前难以征服的领土。那个时代以追求财富、荣耀与权力的宏大事业为标志——塞西尔·罗德斯在开普殖民地,利奥波德二世在刚果,费迪南·德·雷赛布在苏伊士与巴拿马,以及遍地开花的铁路建设。
Railroads were tangible symbols of prestige, progress, and power. Along with many other nations, Russia admired the transcontinental railroads of the United States and Canada and kept abreast of plans for railroads that would cut swaths through Brazil and Africa and span Eurasia from England to India. It seemed that nothing less than Russia’s strength at home and standing in the world depended on the successful completion of its own transcontinental, the Siberian Railroad.
铁路是威望、进步与力量的有形象征。与众多国家一样,俄罗斯艳羡美国和加拿大的横贯大陆铁路,并密切关注着那些计划穿越巴西与非洲、从英格兰延伸至印度横跨欧亚的铁路蓝图。似乎俄罗斯国内的强盛及其在世界上的地位,无不取决于其自身横贯西伯利亚铁路的成功建成。
The construction of the Trans-Siberian was the most ambitious venture of late imperial Russia and one of the most extensive peaceful projects ever undertaken in the history of the world. This is the biography of that railroad, whose history tells us something about the era in which it was born. It also adds a new dimension to our understanding of the great statesman of turn-of-the-century Russia, Minister of Finance Sergei Witte, the individual most responsible for bringing the railroad into existence.
西伯利亚大铁路的建设是俄罗斯帝国晚期最雄心勃勃的工程,也是世界历史上规模最宏大的和平项目之一。本书讲述了这条铁路的传记,其历史向我们揭示了它诞生时代的某些特征。同时,它也为我们理解世纪之交俄罗斯的伟大政治家、财政部长谢尔盖·维特(Sergei Witte)增添了新的维度,正是他个人对这条铁路的建成负有最大责任。
The book has its origins in my desire to understand the place of
这本书的创作源于我希望了解
Siberia in Russian political and economic life. As a glance at the map will show, Siberia was (and still is) the largest territorial entity of the Russian empire; yet relatively little is known about it or its role in Russian history. The book’s second purpose is to contribute to an understanding of the characteristics of Russian economic development, which in many respects seem to diverge from those apparent in Europe and America. The two goals are conjoined, for Siberia was the experimental ground for the first comprehensive economic development scheme in Russian history. The key to the scheme was the Siberian Railroad, one of the major undertakings of the state in the process of modernization.
西伯利亚在俄罗斯政治与经济生活中的地位。从地图上不难看出,西伯利亚曾是(至今仍是)俄罗斯帝国版图中最广袤的疆域,然而关于这片土地及其在俄国历史中的作用却鲜为人知。本书的第二个目标在于帮助读者理解俄罗斯经济发展的特性——这些特性在许多方面似乎与欧美国家的发展轨迹大相径庭。这两个目标相互关联,因为西伯利亚是俄罗斯历史上首个综合性经济发展计划的试验场。该计划的核心便是西伯利亚大铁路,这是国家现代化进程中最重要的工程之一。
This volume is the only history of an individual tsarist industrial enterprise. A narrative case study of this sort seems better able to reveal the nature and quality of Russian economic activity than a statistical work that infers from Russia’s high growth rates and other indices a pattern of development similar to that of the West. Rather than look at an impressively stocked display case, as quantitative studies tend to do, I have stepped inside the store-and found it barren.
本书是唯一一部关于沙皇时期单个工业企业的历史专著。此类叙事性个案研究似乎比那些从俄罗斯高增长率等数据指标推断其发展模式与西方相似的统计著作,更能揭示俄罗斯经济活动的本质与特质。与量化研究倾向于展示琳琅满目的陈列柜不同,我选择走进商店内部——却发现里面空空如也。
Despite Witte’s propaganda, this railroad in the Siberian frontier was surrounded by none of the romance that still clings to the transcontinentals in the United States. The Trans-Siberian was a shabby bureaucratic affair, and its cost, for a poor country, was staggering. Historians have often portrayed the Russian state as vigorous and singularly effective in developing the country. But I have found the opposite to be closer to the truth. The findings of this investigation compel us to reassess the performance of both the state and Witte in the drive to modernize Russia.
尽管维特大肆宣传,这条穿越西伯利亚边疆的铁路却丝毫未沾染美国横贯大陆铁路的浪漫色彩。它只是一项寒酸的官僚工程,对一个贫穷国家而言,其造价更是令人咋舌。历史学者常将俄罗斯国家描绘成充满活力且在推动国家发展方面异常高效的形象。但我的研究发现,事实恰恰相反。这项调查的结论迫使我们重新评估国家及维特本人在推动俄国现代化进程中的实际表现。
The story of the railroad reveals that economic development was to serve first and foremost a political purpose: it was intended to maintain the external and internal power of Russia’s autocracy. Commerce, industry, and economic growth were not ends in themselves; they were subordinated to the necessities of state. The reason had to do with the weight of historical tradition, but also with the particular task at hand-the necessity of filling the vacuum of vast Siberia.
铁路的故事揭示出,经济发展首先且首要服务于政治目的:旨在维护俄国专制政权的对外强权与内部统治。商业、工业与经济增长本身并非终极目标,它们都被置于国家需求的从属地位。这既源于历史传统的沉重包袱,也与当时面临的特殊任务有关——即填补广袤西伯利亚的权力真空这一必然使命。
Because of Russia’s distinctive geography, its economic history was cast in a different mold from that of densely populated western Europe. Economic development fulfilled a more rudimentary function in Russia than it did in the West. Its purpose, in Asian Russia especially, was to colonize, to settle “empty” territory, something that Europe
由于俄罗斯独特的地理环境,其经济史的发展轨迹与人口稠密的西欧截然不同。在俄罗斯,尤其是亚洲部分,经济发展的作用更为基础——它旨在殖民、开拓“无人”疆域,而这些是欧洲早在几个世纪前就已完成的进程。

had accomplished centuries earlier. In this sense the Trans-Siberian project was a continuation of the colonizing process that the prerevolutionary historian V.O. Kliuchevskii portrayed as the main thrust of Russian history.
从这个意义上说,西伯利亚大铁路项目延续了革命前历史学家克柳切夫斯基所描述的俄罗斯历史主线——殖民扩张进程。
The files pertaining to the Committee of the Siberian Railroad are located in the Central State Historical Archive (TsGIA) in Leningrad and remain off limits to Western scholars, despite glasnost. Fortunately, many of the sources in these files are located in other repositories, which willingly made their holdings available to me. For providing me with crucial unpublished sources I thank the Institute for Scientific Information in the Social Sciences (INION) in Moscow and the Scientific-Technical Library of the Leningrad Institute of Transport Engineers (LIIZhT), where I had the pleasure of working for six weeks. I also found valuable materials in Moscow in the Central State Historical Archive of the October Revolution (TsGAOR) and the Lenin Library, and in Leningrad in the Library of the Academy of Sciences (BAN) and the Saltykov-Shchedrin Library. I am grateful to the staffs of all these institutions for their assistance.
有关西伯利亚铁路委员会的文件保存在列宁格勒的中央国家历史档案馆(TsGIA),尽管实行了公开性政策,但仍不对西方学者开放。所幸的是,这些文件中的许多资料也收藏于其他机构,它们很乐意让我查阅其馆藏。我要感谢莫斯科的社会科学科学信息研究所(INION)和列宁格勒交通工程师学院(LIIZhT)的科技图书馆,在那里我有幸工作了六周,为我提供了关键的未公开资料。此外,我在莫斯科的十月革命中央国家历史档案馆(TsGAOR)和列宁图书馆,以及列宁格勒的科学学院图书馆(BAN)和萨尔蒂科夫-谢德林图书馆也发现了有价值的材料。我对所有这些机构的工作人员提供的帮助表示衷心感谢。
American institutions also deserve credit for their significant contributions to the book. I was fortunate to be able to make use of the outstanding collections at Harvard’s Widener Library, the Harvard Law Library, the Library of Congress, and the University of Illinois Library in Urbana. The efficient interlibrary loan office of Clemson University helped to lessen the distance between the Blue Ridge foothills and the major libraries of the country. My research could not have been done without the financial support of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX).
美国的多家机构也为本书的完成做出了重要贡献,值得特别致谢。我有幸利用了哈佛大学怀德纳图书馆、哈佛法学院图书馆、美国国会图书馆以及伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳分校图书馆的珍贵馆藏资源。克莱姆森大学高效的馆际互借服务缩短了蓝岭山脉脚下与全美各大图书馆之间的距离。若没有国际研究与交流委员会(IREX)的资金支持,我的研究将难以开展。
My work benefited greatly from the advice and assistance of Harley and Marjorie Balzer, Jane Burbank, Lawrence Estaville, Loren Graham, Paul Vladimir Gregory, Patricia and David Herlihy, Sergei Lebedev (Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, Leningrad), Michael Ochs, Patricia Polansky, and A. I. Solov’eva (Institute of History, Academy of Sciences, Moscow). Susan Mefferd drew the maps.
我的研究深受以下人士的建议与帮助:哈利与玛乔丽·巴尔泽、简·伯班克、劳伦斯·埃斯塔维尔、洛伦·格雷厄姆、保罗·弗拉基米尔·格雷戈里、帕特里夏与大卫·赫利希、谢尔盖·列别杰夫(列宁格勒科学院历史研究所)、迈克尔·奥克斯、帕特里夏·波兰斯基以及 A.I.索洛维约娃(莫斯科科学院历史研究所)。苏珊·梅菲尔德绘制了地图。

I am deeply indebted to the people who read the manuscript in its various guises and gave me constructive criticism: Richard M. Haywood, Frederick Suppe, David Nicholas, Aviel Roshwald, Robert N. North, Walter M. Pintner, John J. Stephan, and Robert Valliant. John G. Ackerman and his staff at Cornell University Press, especially Barbara Salazar, strengthened the book considerably.
我深深感激那些以不同形式审阅手稿并给予建设性批评的人们:理查德·M·海伍德、弗雷德里克·苏佩、大卫·尼古拉斯、阿维尔·罗什瓦尔德、罗伯特·N·诺斯、沃尔特·M·平特纳、约翰·J·斯蒂芬和罗伯特·瓦利安特。康奈尔大学出版社的约翰·G·阿克曼及其团队,尤其是芭芭拉·萨拉萨尔,极大地提升了本书的质量。
Finally, I thank my colleagues in the Department of History at Clemson University for their encouragement, and Richard Pipes for the unfailing guidance he has given me over the past ten years.
最后,我要感谢克莱姆森大学历史系的同事们给予的鼓励,以及理查德·派普斯在过去十年里对我始终如一的指导。
Steven G. Marks  史蒂文·G·马克斯
Seneca, South Carolina  南卡罗来纳州塞尼卡

Abbreviations  缩写

BAM Baikal-Amur Main Line  贝加尔-阿穆尔铁路干线
BAN Biblioteka Akademii Nauk
科学院图书馆
Barabash  巴拉巴什 "Zapiska o Man'chzhurii General'nogo Shtaba Polkovnika Barabasha," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii, vol. 1 (1883)
"总参谋部巴拉萨夫上校《关于满洲的札记》,载于总参谋部《亚洲地理、地形及统计资料汇编》第 1 卷(1883 年)"
Evtiugin  叶夫秋金 "Zapiska o poezdke G. Sh. Shtabs-Kapitana Evtiugina iz Blagoveshchenska v Tsitsikar v 1884 g.," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 14 (1885)
"总参谋部《亚洲资料汇编》第 14 卷(1885 年)所载 G·Sh·叶夫秋金上尉《1884 年从布拉戈维申斯克至齐齐哈尔行程札记》"
Grulev  格鲁列夫 "Izvlechenie iz otcheta Gener. Shtaba Sht.-Kap. Gruleva o rekognostsirovke magistral'nogo sibirskogo puti v predelakh Zabaikal'skoi oblasti," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 50 (1892)
"《总参谋部亚洲文集》第 50 卷(1892 年)所载总参谋部上尉格鲁廖夫关于西伯利亚干线在外贝加尔地区勘测报告的摘要"
IIRGO Izvestiia imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva
俄罗斯帝国地理学会通报
INION Institut Nauchnoi Informatsii Obshchestvennykh Nauk
社会科学科学信息研究所
ISIPS Izvestiia sobraniia inzhenerov putei soobshcheniia
交通工程师协会通报
LIIZhT  列宁格勒铁路运输工程学院 Leningradskii Institut Inzhenerov Zheleznodorozhnogo Transporta
列宁格勒铁路运输工程师学院
Medem  梅德姆 "Vsepoddaneishii otchet o proizvedennoi s 30 maia 1910 goda po 29 fevralia 1912 goda po vysochaishemu poveleniiu senatorom grafom Medem revizii material'noi sluzhby i khoziaistva sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi"
"关于根据最高指示由参议员梅德姆伯爵于 1910 年 5 月 30 日至 1912 年 2 月 29 日期间对西伯利亚铁路物资服务及经济状况进行审查的最谦卑报告"
MPS Ministerstvo Putei Soobshcheniia
交通部
BAM Baikal-Amur Main Line BAN Biblioteka Akademii Nauk Barabash "Zapiska o Man'chzhurii General'nogo Shtaba Polkovnika Barabasha," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii, vol. 1 (1883) Evtiugin "Zapiska o poezdke G. Sh. Shtabs-Kapitana Evtiugina iz Blagoveshchenska v Tsitsikar v 1884 g.," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 14 (1885) Grulev "Izvlechenie iz otcheta Gener. Shtaba Sht.-Kap. Gruleva o rekognostsirovke magistral'nogo sibirskogo puti v predelakh Zabaikal'skoi oblasti," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 50 (1892) IIRGO Izvestiia imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva INION Institut Nauchnoi Informatsii Obshchestvennykh Nauk ISIPS Izvestiia sobraniia inzhenerov putei soobshcheniia LIIZhT Leningradskii Institut Inzhenerov Zheleznodorozhnogo Transporta Medem "Vsepoddaneishii otchet o proizvedennoi s 30 maia 1910 goda po 29 fevralia 1912 goda po vysochaishemu poveleniiu senatorom grafom Medem revizii material'noi sluzhby i khoziaistva sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi" MPS Ministerstvo Putei Soobshcheniia| BAM | Baikal-Amur Main Line | | :---: | :---: | | BAN | Biblioteka Akademii Nauk | | Barabash | "Zapiska o Man'chzhurii General'nogo Shtaba Polkovnika Barabasha," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii, vol. 1 (1883) | | Evtiugin | "Zapiska o poezdke G. Sh. Shtabs-Kapitana Evtiugina iz Blagoveshchenska v Tsitsikar v 1884 g.," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 14 (1885) | | Grulev | "Izvlechenie iz otcheta Gener. Shtaba Sht.-Kap. Gruleva o rekognostsirovke magistral'nogo sibirskogo puti v predelakh Zabaikal'skoi oblasti," in General'nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 50 (1892) | | IIRGO | Izvestiia imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva | | INION | Institut Nauchnoi Informatsii Obshchestvennykh Nauk | | ISIPS | Izvestiia sobraniia inzhenerov putei soobshcheniia | | LIIZhT | Leningradskii Institut Inzhenerov Zheleznodorozhnogo Transporta | | Medem | "Vsepoddaneishii otchet o proizvedennoi s 30 maia 1910 goda po 29 fevralia 1912 goda po vysochaishemu poveleniiu senatorom grafom Medem revizii material'noi sluzhby i khoziaistva sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi" | | MPS | Ministerstvo Putei Soobshcheniia |
OKIPP

"最高委员会关于西伯利亚及彼尔姆-科特拉斯克铁路建设超支原因调查报告"
"Otchet vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia
prichin pereraskhodov po sooruzheniiu sibirskoi i perm'-kot-
lasskoi zheleznykh dorog"
"Otchet vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia prichin pereraskhodov po sooruzheniiu sibirskoi i perm'-kot- lasskoi zheleznykh dorog"| "Otchet vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia | | :--- | | prichin pereraskhodov po sooruzheniiu sibirskoi i perm'-kot- | | lasskoi zheleznykh dorog" |
PSZRI
Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii
俄罗斯帝国法律全集
Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii| Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii | | :--- |
SP
Soedinennoe Prisutstvie  联合会议
Soedinennoe Prisutstvie| Soedinennoe Prisutstvie | | :--- |
TIRTO

《帝国俄罗斯技术协会关于横贯西伯利亚铁路问题委员会论文集》,1889-1890 年
Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo
obshchestva po voprosu o zheleznoi doroge cherez vsiu Sibir',
1889-1890 gg.
Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo obshchestva po voprosu o zheleznoi doroge cherez vsiu Sibir', 1889-1890 gg.| Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo | | :--- | | obshchestva po voprosu o zheleznoi doroge cherez vsiu Sibir', | | 1889-1890 gg. |

"由最高当局设立的西伯利亚铁路建设实地调查委员会工作报告"
"Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia
na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi"
"Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi"| "Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia | | :--- | | na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi" |
TKIM

"由最高当局设立的西伯利亚铁路建设实地调查东方分委员会工作报告"
"Trudy vostochnoi podkomissii vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi
komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi
zheleznoi dorogi"
"Trudy vostochnoi podkomissii vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi"| "Trudy vostochnoi podkomissii vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi | | :--- | | komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi | | zheleznoi dorogi" |
TOSRPT

Trudyobshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle
Trudyobshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i tor-
govle
Trudyobshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i tor- govle| Trudyobshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i tor- | | :--- | | govle |
TsGAOR  中央国家十月革命档案馆
Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii
中央国家十月革命档案馆
Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii| Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii | | :--- |
zas.  会议
zasedanie  会议
zasedanie| zasedanie | | :--- |
ZhdD  铁路事务

西伯利亚铁路委员会期刊
Zheleznodorozhnoe delo
ZhKSZhD
Zheleznodorozhnoe delo ZhKSZhD| Zheleznodorozhnoe delo | | :--- | | ZhKSZhD |
"Zhurnaly komiteta sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi"
"西伯利亚铁路委员会杂志"
OKIPP ""Otchet vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia prichin pereraskhodov po sooruzheniiu sibirskoi i perm'-kot- lasskoi zheleznykh dorog"" PSZRI "Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii" SP "Soedinennoe Prisutstvie" TIRTO "Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo obshchestva po voprosu o zheleznoi doroge cherez vsiu Sibir', 1889-1890 gg." ""Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi"" TKIM ""Trudy vostochnoi podkomissii vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi"" TOSRPT "Trudyobshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i tor- govle" TsGAOR "Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii" zas. "zasedanie" ZhdD "Zheleznodorozhnoe delo ZhKSZhD" "Zhurnaly komiteta sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi" | OKIPP | "Otchet vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia <br> prichin pereraskhodov po sooruzheniiu sibirskoi i perm'-kot- <br> lasskoi zheleznykh dorog" | | :--- | :--- | | PSZRI | Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii | | SP | Soedinennoe Prisutstvie | | TIRTO | Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo <br> obshchestva po voprosu o zheleznoi doroge cherez vsiu Sibir', <br> 1889-1890 gg. | | | "Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia <br> na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi" | | TKIM | "Trudy vostochnoi podkomissii vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi <br> komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi <br> zheleznoi dorogi" | | TOSRPT | Trudyobshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i tor- <br> govle | | TsGAOR | Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii | | zas. | zasedanie | | ZhdD | Zheleznodorozhnoe delo <br> ZhKSZhD | | "Zhurnaly komiteta sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi" | |

Note on Transliteration and Dates
关于音译与日期的说明

In transliterating Russian words I have sacrificed consistency for familiarity by using the Library of Congress system (without diacritical marks) in general but spelling well-known names and terms (such as Reutern, Witte, and oblast) in accordance with popular usage.
在转写俄语词汇时,我为了便于读者理解而牺牲了一致性:总体上采用美国国会图书馆的转写系统(不含变音符号),但对广为人知的人名和术语(如 Reutern、Witte 及 oblast 等)则沿用通用译法。
Dates given in the text conform to the Julian or old-style calendar in use before February 1918, when the Soviet government adopted the Gregorian calendar. The Russian calendar lagged twelve days behind that of the West in the nineteenth century, thirteen days by 1917.
本书日期均采用 1918 年 2 月前通行的儒略历(旧历)。当时俄国历法比西方公历晚 12 天,到 1917 年时差距扩大至 13 天。苏联政府后改用格里高利历。

Russian Measurements  俄制计量单位

1 desiatin = 2.7 = 2.7 =2.7=2.7 acres  1 俄亩≈0#英亩1 pud = 36.11 = 36.11 =36.11=36.11 pounds  1 普特 = 36.11 = 36.11 =36.11=36.111 ruble = 50 = 50 =50=50 U.S. cents in 1900
1900 年 1 卢布约合 0#美分
1 verst = 0.66 = 0.66 =0.66=0.66 mile  1 俄里 = 0.66 = 0.66 =0.66=0.66 英里

Cast of  演员表

Major Characters  主要人物

Only relevant offices and dates of tenure are given.
仅列出相关职位及任期时间。

A. A. Abaza State Comptroller, 1871-1874; chairman of State Coun-
A·A·阿巴扎 国家审计长,1871-1874 年;国务会议主席

cil’s Department of the State Economy, 1874-1880 and 1884-1892;
财政部的国家经济部门,1874-1880 年及 1884-1892 年;

Minister of Finance, 1880-1881.
财政大臣,1880-1881 年。
Alexander I Emperor, 1801-1825.
亚历山大一世皇帝,1801-1825 年在位

Alexander II Emperor, 1855-1881.
亚历山大二世皇帝,1855-1881 年在位。

Alexander III Emperor, 1881-1894.
亚历山大三世皇帝,1881-1894 年在位。

M. N. Annenkov Chief of War Ministry’s Department for Rail Transport of Troops and Military Freight; administrator of Baranov Commission, 1876-1884; chief of construction, Transcaspian Railroad, 1880-1888.
M·N·安年科夫:1876-1884 年任陆军部部队及军事物资铁路运输部门主管,巴拉诺夫委员会行政官员;1880-1888 年任外里海铁路建设总指挥。

D. G. Anuchin Governor General of Eastern Siberia, 1879-1885.
D·G·阿努钦:1879-1885 年任东西伯利亚总督。

N. Kh. Bunge Minister of Finance, 1881-1887; chairman of Committee of Ministers, 1887-1895; vice chairman of Committee of Siberian Railroad, 1893-1895.
尼古拉·赫里斯季安诺维奇·本格(N. Kh. Bunge),1881-1887 年任财政大臣;1887-1895 年任大臣委员会主席;1893-1895 年任西伯利亚铁路委员会副主席。

Catherine II (the Great) Empress, 1762-1796.
叶卡捷琳娜二世(大帝):1762-1796 年在位女皇。

N. M. Chikhachev Minister of the Navy, 1888-1896.
海军大臣 N·M·奇哈乔夫,1888-1896 年在任。

I. N. Durnovo Minister of the Interior, 1889-1895; chairman of Committee of Ministers, 1895-1903.
内务大臣 I·N·杜尔诺沃,1889-1895 年在任;大臣委员会主席,1895-1903 年在任。

A. S. Ermolov Minister of State Domains (after 1894 Agriculture), 1893-1905.
国家产业大臣(1894 年后改称农业大臣)A·S·叶尔莫洛夫,1893-1905 年在任。

T. I. Filippov State Comptroller, 1889-1899.
季米特里·伊万诺维奇·菲利波夫(T. I. Filippov),1889-1899 年任国家审计长。

N. K. Giers Director of Foreign Ministry’s Asian Department, 18751882; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1882-1895.
尼·卡·吉尔斯,外交部亚洲司司长,1875-1882 年;外交大臣,1882-1895 年。

A. I. Giubbenet Deputy Minister of Transport, 1880-1885; Minister of Transport, 1889-1892.
阿·伊·久边涅特,交通部副部长,1880-1885 年;交通大臣,1889-1892 年。
x i x x i x xix\mathbf{x i x}
P. D. Gorchakov Governor General of Western Siberia, 1836-1851.
彼得·德米特里耶维奇·戈尔恰科夫(P. D. Gorchakov),1836-1851 年任西西伯利亚总督。

I. L. Goremykin Minister of the Interior, 1895-1899.
伊·洛·戈列梅金,内务大臣,1895-1899 年。

S. A. Greig State Comptroller, 1874-1878; Minister of Finance, 18781880.
S·A·格雷格,1874-1878 年任国家审计长;1878-1880 年任财政部长。

A. P. Ignat’ev Governor General of Eastern Siberia (renamed Irkutsk after 1887), 1885-1889.
阿列克谢·帕夫洛维奇·伊格纳季耶夫(A. P. Ignat’ev),1885-1889 年任东西伯利亚总督(1887 年后改称伊尔库茨克总督)。

A. P. Izvol’skii Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1906-1910.
A·P·伊兹沃尔斯基,1906-1910 年任外交大臣。

E. F. Kankrin Minister of Finance, 1823-1844.
E·F·坎克林,1823-1844 年任财政大臣。

K. P. Kaufman Governor General of Turkestan, 1867-1882.
K·P·考夫曼,1867-1882 年任突厥斯坦总督。

M. I. Khilkov Minister of Transport, 1895-1905.
M·I·希尔科夫,1895-1905 年任交通大臣。

V. N. Kokovtsov Minister of Finance, 1904-1905, 1906-1914.
V·N·科科夫佐夫,财政大臣,1904-1905 年、1906-1914 年在任。

A. N. Kori Governor General of Priamur’e, 1884-1893.
A·N·科里,阿穆尔边疆区总督,1884-1893 年在任。

A. K. Krivoshein Minister of Transport, 1892-1894.
A·K·克里沃舍因,交通大臣,1892-1894 年在任。

A. N. Kulomzin Administrator of Committee of Ministers, 18831902; administrator of Committee of Siberian Railroad, 1893-1902; chairman of Committee of Siberian Railroad’s Auxiliary Enterprises Commission.
A·N·库洛姆津,1883-1902 年任大臣委员会行政官;1893-1902 年任西伯利亚铁路委员会行政官;西伯利亚铁路辅助企业委员会主席。

A. N. Kuropatkin Minister of War, 1898-1904.
阿·尼·库罗帕特金,陆军大臣,1898-1904 年。

V. N. Lamzdorf Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1900-1906.
V·N·拉姆斯多夫,1900-1906 年任外交大臣。

M. T. Loris-Melikov Minister of the Interior, 1880-1881.
内务大臣 M. T. 洛里斯-梅利科夫,1880-1881 年。

P. P. Mel’nikov Minister of Transport, 1865-1869.
彼·彼·梅利尼科夫,交通大臣,1865-1869 年。

D. A. Miliutin Minister of War, 1861-1881.
德·阿·米柳京,1861-1881 年任陆军大臣。

M. N. Murav’ev Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1897-1900.
姆·恩·穆拉维约夫,1897-1900 年任外交大臣。

N. N. Murav’ev (-Amurskii) Governor General of Eastern Siberia, 1847-1861.
恩·恩·穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基,1847-1861 年任东西伯利亚总督。

N. V. Murav’ev Minister of Justice, 1894-1905.
恩·维·穆拉维约夫,1894-1905 年任司法大臣。
Nicholas I Emperor, 1825-1855.
尼古拉一世皇帝,1825-1855 年在位。

Nicholas II Chairman of Committee of Siberian Railroad, 18931905; Emperor, 1894-1917.
尼古拉二世,西伯利亚铁路委员会主席,1893-1905 年;皇帝,1894-1917 年在位。

M. N. Ostrovskii Minister of State Domains, 1881-1893.
M·N·奥斯特洛夫斯基,国有财产大臣,1881-1893 年。

G. E. Pauker Minister of Transport, 1888-1889.
G·E·保克尔,交通大臣,1888-1889 年在任。

V. K. Plehve Minister of the Interior, 1902-1904.
V·K·普列韦,内务大臣,1902-1904 年。

K. P. Pobedonostsev Procurator of the Holy Synod, 1880-1905.
K·P·波别多诺斯采夫,圣议会检察官,1880-1905 年。

A. A. Polovtsov State Secretary (State Council), 1883-1892.
A·A·波洛夫佐夫,国务秘书(国务会议),1883-1892 年。

K. N. Pos’et Minister of Transport, 1874-1888.
K·N·波谢特,交通大臣,1874-1888 年。

G. A. Potemkin Viceroy of New Russia, 1775-1791.
新俄罗斯总督 G·A·波将金,1775-1791 年。

M. Kh. Reutern Minister of Finance, 1862-1878; chairman of Committee of Ministers, 1881-1887.
M. Kh. 罗伊特恩,1862-1878 年任财政大臣;1881-1887 年任大臣委员会主席。

N. K. Schaffhausen Minister of Transport, 1906-1909.
N·K·沙夫豪森,1906-1909 年任交通部长。

J. J. Sievers Viceroy of Novgorod province, 1776-1781; Viceroy of Pskov province, 1777-1781.
J·J·西韦尔斯,1776-1781 年任诺夫哥罗德省总督;1777-1781 年任普斯科夫省总督。

D. S. Sipiagin Minister of the Interior, 1899-1902.
D. S. 西皮亚金,1899-1902 年任内务大臣。

D. M. Sol’skii State Comptroller, 1878-1889; chairman of State Council’s Department of the State Economy, 1893-1905.
D·M·索利斯基,1878-1889 年任国家审计长;1893-1905 年任国家经济部国务会议主席。

M. M. Speranskii State Secretary (State Council), 1810-1812; Governor General of Siberia, 1819-1821.
M·M·斯佩兰斯基,1810-1812 年任国务秘书(国务会议);1819-1821 年任西伯利亚总督。

D. I. Subbotich Army Chief of Staff in Kwantung region, 1899-1901; Governor General of Priamur’e, 1902-1903.
D·I·苏博季奇,1899-1901 年任关东地区陆军参谋长;1902-1903 年任滨海边疆区总督。

F. G. Terner Deputy Minister of Finance, 1887-1892.
财政部副部长 F·G·特纳,1887-1892 年。

D. A. Tolstoi Minister of the Interior, 1882-1889.
德·阿·托尔斯泰,1882-1889 年任内务大臣。

P. F. Unterberger Governor General of Priamur’e, 1905-1910.
普里阿穆尔边疆区总督 P.F.翁特尔贝格尔,1905-1910 年。

P. A. Valuev Minister of the Interior, 1861-1868; chairman of Committee of Ministers, 1879-1881.
彼·阿·瓦卢耶夫,1861-1868 年任内务大臣;1879-1881 年任大臣委员会主席。

P. S. Vannovskii Minister of War, 1881-1898.
陆军大臣 P.S.万诺夫斯基,1881-1898 年。

I. A. Vyshnegradskii Minister of Finance, 1887-1892.
财政大臣 I.A.维什涅格拉茨基,1887-1892 年。

S. Iu. Witte Director of Ministry of Finance’s Department of Railroad Affairs, 1889-1892; Minister of Transport, 1892; Minister of Finance, 1892-1903.
谢·尤·维特,1889-1892 年任财政部铁路事务司司长;1892 年任交通大臣;1892-1903 年任财政大臣。

Road to Power  权力之路

Introduction  引言

Alexander III devoted his reign to strengthening the presence of the state within its own territory by acting to counter both revolutionary activity and the empire’s centrifugal tendency. His remedies for what conservatives had diagnosed as a national illness were large doses of Russification and curtailment of the Great Reforms. Essential for the nation’s recovery was the construction of a railroad through Siberia. Although Alexander did not live to see its completion, that railroad came to symbolize his reign: incised on his monument was the epithet “Builder of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
亚历山大三世将其统治重心放在强化国家在其领土内的存在感上,通过采取行动对抗革命活动及帝国的离心倾向。针对保守派所诊断出的国家病症,他开出的药方是大规模的俄罗斯化政策及对"大改革"的削减。而贯穿西伯利亚的铁路建设,则被视为国家复兴的关键。尽管亚历山大未能亲眼见证其竣工,这条铁路却成为其统治时期的象征:他的纪念碑上镌刻着"西伯利亚大铁路建造者"的铭文。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}

As a political railroad, the Trans-Siberian was a product of its times. Other nations dreamed up whole railroad networks to serve political purposes. Railroads were essential to the organization and unification of the territories of the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} The colonial masters of India and Africa turned to railroads
作为一条政治铁路,西伯利亚大铁路是时代的产物。其他国家也曾构想出服务于政治目的的完整铁路网络。铁路对于美国、加拿大、德国、意大利和土耳其等国的领土组织与统一至关重要。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 印度和非洲的殖民统治者们同样求助于铁路建设
  1. V. V. Shulgin, The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 1906-1917, trans. Tanya Davis (New York, 1984), 84.
    V·V·舒利金,《岁月:一位俄国杜马成员的回忆录,1906-1917》,塔尼娅·戴维斯译(纽约,1984 年),第 84 页。
  2. On the United States and Canada, see L. Girard, “Transport,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 6, pt. 1, ed. H. J. Habakkuk and M. Postan (Cambridge, 1965), 231-232, 254; Leonard Bertram Irwin, Pacific Railways and Nationalism in the Canadian-American Northwest, 1845-1873 (Philadelphia, 1939). On railroads and German unification, see S. Iu. Witte, Printsipy zheleznodorozhnykh tarifov po perevozke gruzov, 3d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1910), 83-84, 219. On Cavour’s nationalism and Italian railroads, see Andrew Wingate, Railway Building in Italy before Unification, Centre for the Advanced Study of Italian Society, Occasional Papers no. 3 (Reading, 1970), 5-6, 12-
    关于美国和加拿大,参见 L·吉拉尔《交通》,载于《剑桥欧洲经济史》第 6 卷第 1 分册,H·J·哈巴谷与 M·波斯坦编(剑桥,1965 年),231-232 页、254 页;伦纳德·伯特伦·欧文《太平洋铁路与加拿大-美国西北部的民族主义,1845-1873》(费城,1939 年)。关于铁路与德国统一,参见 S·尤·维特《货物运输铁路费率原则》第 3 版(圣彼得堡,1910 年),83-84 页、219 页。关于加富尔的民族主义与意大利铁路,参见安德鲁·温盖特《统一前意大利的铁路建设》,意大利社会高级研究中心临时论文第 3 号(雷丁,1970 年),5-6 页、12 页。
  3. On Turkey, see Orhan Conker, Les Chemins de fer en Turquie et la politique ferroviaire turque (Paris, 1935). That Russians viewed the Canadian-Pacific Railway in purely political terms is obvious from the sources. See, e.g., TIRTO 6:11.
    关于土耳其,参见奥尔罕·琼克《土耳其铁路与土耳其铁路政策》(巴黎,1935 年)。俄国人将加拿大太平洋铁路纯粹视为政治工具的观点在史料中显而易见,例如参见 TIRTO 第 6 卷第 11 期。

    partially to consolidate their political control. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} In none of these cases, however, was the nonpolitical or “private-industrial character of railroads,” to quote Sergei Witte, subordinated to state purposes as it was in Russia by the time of Alexander III. The Siberian Railroad in particular was built for “military-political reasons.” 4 In Alexander’s reign economic policy was characterized by the increasing intervention of the state in the nation’s economy, which the tsar came to consider almost exclusively in political terms. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
    部分是为了巩固其政治控制。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 然而,在这些案例中,铁路的非政治性或“私营工业性质”——引用谢尔盖·维特的话——从未像亚历山大三世时期的俄国那样被国家目的所主导。尤其是西伯利亚铁路,其建设纯粹出于“军事政治考量”。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 在亚历山大统治时期,经济政策的特点是国家对国民经济的干预日益加深,沙皇几乎完全从政治角度来考量经济问题。
The predominance of the state in Russian economic life had historical roots. Russia was endowed with a large but inaccessible and unproviding terrain, whose resources were scattered on the periphery. The needs of the military thwarted the development of autonomous social forces that might have competed for these scarce resources. Serfdom strengthened the state’s hand in the economy, limiting as it did the internal market and requiring the state to stimulate market demand and create an industrial labor supply. As a long-
国家在俄国经济生活中的主导地位有着深厚的历史根源。俄罗斯幅员辽阔但地形闭塞、资源匮乏,且资源多分布于边缘地带。军事需求阻碍了可能争夺这些稀缺资源的自主社会力量的发展。农奴制强化了国家对经济的掌控,它不仅限制了国内市场的发展,还要求国家刺激市场需求并创造工业劳动力供给。作为一个历史悠久的——

3. See Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1981), chaps. 13 and 14. See also J. N. Westwood, Railways of India (London, 1974), and Charles Miller, The Lunatic Express: An Entertainment in Imperialism (New York, 1971).
3. 参见丹尼尔·R·黑德里克,《帝国的工具:十九世纪技术与欧洲帝国主义》(纽约,1981 年),第 13、14 章。另见 J·N·韦斯特伍德,《印度铁路》(伦敦,1974 年),以及查尔斯·米勒,《疯狂快车:帝国主义娱乐录》(纽约,1971 年)。

4. S. Iu. Witte, “Nekotorye soobrazheniia o prichinakh defitsitnosti russkoi zheleznodorozhnoi seti,” ZhdD, 1910, nos. 17-18: 90, 92. As Robert William Fogel points out, although political motives were important in the creation of the American transcontinentals, economic considerations were primary (The Union Pacific Railroad: A Case in Premature Enterprise [Baltimore, 1960], 232-235).
4. S·尤·维特,《关于俄罗斯铁路网络亏损原因的若干思考》,《铁路杂志》,1910 年,第 17-18 期:90、92 页。正如罗伯特·威廉·福格尔所指出的,尽管政治动机在美国横贯大陆铁路的修建中很重要,但经济考量才是首要因素(《联合太平洋铁路:过早企业的案例》[巴尔的摩,1960 年],232-235 页)。

5. Surprisingly, the Trans-Siberian has received little attention from historians. In the West the only previous historical work on the subject is Harmon Tupper’s To the Great Ocean: Siberia and the Trans-Siberian Railway (Boston, 1965), an indiscriminate, if entertaining, ramble through Siberian history. Where the railroad is concerned, Tupper uncritically accepts the word of official sources. For my purposes, his book was most valuable for its assimilation of a great deal of the literature on the construction of the railroad. An earlier article by P. E. Garbutt devotes but a few pages to the railroad before the revolution, based on one official source (“The Trans-Siberian Railway,” Journal of Transport History 1 [November 1954]: 238-249). The Trans-Siberian does have a Soviet historian, V. F. Borzunov, who has published his research on the early projects for the railroad, its economic impact, and its work force. He has also written a massive threevolume doctoral dissertation that is more comprehensive (“Istoriia sozdaniia transsibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali XIX-nachala XX wv.,” 3 vols. [Tomskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1972]). Fully half of the dissertation is devoted to the “struggle” for building and supply contracts on the railroad, which he details in apocalyptic tones; I see in this conflict the more mundane bidding that normally accompanies a construction job in the capitalist world. His world view does not permit him to see how capitalist enterprise works or what is unique about this railroad. He has made some valuable comments, which I do not hesitate to accept, and he brings to light important archival materials. But his dissertation, like his other works, is clothed in an ungainly suit of Marxism-Leninism, which does not do justice to the actual dimensions of the subject.
5. 令人惊讶的是,西伯利亚大铁路很少受到历史学家的关注。在西方,此前唯一关于该主题的历史著作是哈蒙·塔珀的《通往大洋:西伯利亚与西伯利亚大铁路》(波士顿,1965 年),这是一部虽有趣但内容芜杂的西伯利亚历史漫谈。在涉及铁路的部分,塔珀不加批判地采纳了官方资料的说法。就我的研究目的而言,该书最有价值之处在于汇集了大量关于铁路建设的文献。P·E·加巴特早先的一篇文章仅基于一份官方资料,用寥寥数页篇幅论述了革命前的铁路(《西伯利亚大铁路》,《交通史杂志》第 1 期[1954 年 11 月]:238-249 页)。苏联历史学家 V·F·博尔祖诺夫确实对西伯利亚大铁路进行了研究,发表了关于铁路早期规划、经济影响及劳动力的论著,还撰写了一部更为全面的三卷本博士论文(《19 世纪至 20 世纪初西伯利亚大铁路干线建设史》,3 卷本[托木斯克国立大学出版社,1972 年])。 该论文近半篇幅以近乎末日审判的笔调详述了围绕铁路建设与供应合同的“斗争”,而我从中看到的不过是资本主义世界建筑工程中司空见惯的投标竞争。他的世界观使其无法理解资本主义企业的运作方式,也看不清这条铁路的独特之处。尽管他提出了一些有价值的观点(我欣然采纳),并披露了重要的档案材料,但其论文与其他著作一样,始终裹着不合身的马列主义外衣,未能客观呈现课题的真实维度。

term result, the state’s active involvement in industrialization was essential to make up for the lack of capital available in the country. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
从长期来看,国家积极参与工业化对弥补国内资本匮乏至关重要。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
With Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War by a coalition of European powers, a crisis of confidence struck the Russian polity, and major changes were called for in its political and economic life. With the emancipation of the serfs and the Great Reforms introduced by Alexander II, Russia entered a period of economic ferment and growth, fueled by a new, if short-lived, laissez-faire attitude toward the economy. The economic life of the country in this period was presided over by the liberal ministers of finance M. Kh. Reutern, S. A. Greig, and A. A. Abaza, who believed that government ought to stabilize the currency, improve the balance of payments, and maintain strict budgetary rules, but otherwise should interfere only minimally with private enterprise to avoid stifling it. These ministers ran the Ministry o. Finance cautiously rather than aggressively, in accordance with their temperaments as political moderates. Their policies found expression in the establishment of the State Bank, in their encouragement or private railroad building in the 1860 s and 1870 s, and in low import tariffs-all intended to create conditions in which private initiative could flourish. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
随着俄国在克里米亚战争中被欧洲列强联盟击败,一场信心危机冲击了俄罗斯政体,其政治经济生活亟需重大变革。随着农奴解放和亚历山大二世推行的大改革,俄国进入了经济动荡与增长期,这一时期虽短暂却受自由放任经济态度的推动。此阶段国家经济生活由财政大臣 M.H.罗伊特恩、S.A.格雷格和 A.A.阿巴扎等自由派官员主导,他们认为政府应稳定货币、改善国际收支并严守预算规则,除此之外应尽量减少对私营企业的干预以免扼杀其活力。这些大臣以政治温和派的性格谨慎而非激进地执掌财政部,其政策体现在国家银行的建立、1860 至 1870 年代对私营铁路建设的鼓励以及低进口关税上——这些举措旨在为私营经济创造繁荣发展的条件。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
Doubts about the new liberal policies of the government began tc surface almost as soon as they were announced. Events within the country - the attempted assassination of the tsar, the growth of revolutionary activism in the universities, peasant unrest, and the Polish revolt-brought out the instinctive conservatism of Russian officials, who reacted by watering down the reforms and attempting to curb the autonomous political life of the country. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
政府新自由主义政策的疑虑几乎在宣布之初就浮出水面。国内事件——针对沙皇的未遂刺杀、大学里革命活动的增长、农民骚动以及波兰起义——激发了俄国官员本能的保守主义反应,他们通过淡化改革和试图遏制国家自主政治生活来应对。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
From Europe, too, came a shock that affected Russia almost as profoundly as had the Crimean War. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878
同样来自欧洲的冲击对俄国的影响几乎与克里米亚战争一样深远。1878 年的柏林会议上

6. Olga Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914 (London, 1976), 7-12; W. O. Henderson, The Industrial Revolution in Europe: Germany, France, Russia, 1815-191. (Chicago, 1961), 2, 229.
6. 奥尔加·克里斯普,《1914 年前俄国经济研究》(伦敦,1976 年),7-12 页;W·O·亨德森,《欧洲工业革命:德国、法国、俄国,1815-191 年》(芝加哥,1961 年),第 2 卷,229 页。

7. Crisp, Studies, 22-23; Gerhart von Schulze-Gävernitz, Volkswirtschaftliche Studien aus Rußland (Leipzig, 1899), 175; L. E. Shepelev, Tsarizm i burzhuaziia vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka: Problemy torgovo-promyshlennoi politiki (Leningrad, 1981), 68-133; P. A Zaionchkovskii, The Russian Autocracy in Crisis, 1878-1882, trans. Gary M. Hamburg (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1979), 159.
7. 克里斯普,《研究》,22-23 页;格哈特·冯·舒尔策-格弗尼茨,《俄国经济研究》(莱比锡,1899 年),175 页;L·E·舍佩列夫,《19 世纪下半叶沙皇制度与资产阶级:工商业政策问题》(列宁格勒,1981 年),68-133 页;P·A·扎伊翁奇科夫斯基,《危机中的俄国专制制度,1878-1882》,加里·M·汉堡译(佛罗里达州格尔夫布雷兹,1979 年),159 页。

8. Zaionchkovskii, Russian Autocracy, 304-305; Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven, 1987), 22-23. The extent to which the doctrine of free trade ever actually informed policy has been questioned by I. F. Gindin in his Gosudarstvennyi bank i ekonomicheskaia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva (1861-1892 goda) (Moscow, 1960), 4748, 73.
8. 扎昂奇科夫斯基,《俄国专制制度》,304-305 页;迪特里希·盖尔,《俄罗斯帝国主义:1860-1914 年国内外政策的互动》,布鲁斯·利特尔译(纽黑文,1987 年),22-23 页。关于自由贸易学说是否真正影响过政策的问题,I·F·金丁在其著作《国家银行与沙皇政府的经济政策(1861-1892 年)》(莫斯科,1960 年)第 4748、73 页中提出了质疑。
Russia was forced to renounce the advantageous Treaty of San Stefano, which it had imposed on the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish War. Humiliation and isolation followed, breeding resentment of Europe in general and of Germany in particular. The tsar described the congress as “a European coalition against Russia under the leadership of Prince Bismarck.” 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} Russia seemed to have lost control at home and abroad. As Minister of the Interior P. A. Valuev wrote, “the organism of the state either develops or decays; there is no middle course.” 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} In other words, if order and authority were not restored, the realm would soon fall apart.
俄罗斯被迫放弃在俄土战争后强加给奥斯曼帝国的《圣斯特凡诺条约》这一有利条约。随之而来的是屈辱与孤立,滋生出对欧洲尤其是德国的普遍怨恨。沙皇将此次会议描述为"在俾斯麦亲王领导下的欧洲反俄联盟"。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} 俄罗斯似乎在国内国外都失去了控制力。正如内务部长 P·A·瓦卢耶夫所写:"国家机体要么发展,要么衰败;没有中间道路。" 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 换言之,若不恢复秩序与权威,帝国很快就会分崩离析。
The assassination of Alexander II in 1881 only confirmed what was already in process: the rejection of the liberal, Westernizing ethos of the Great Reforms. Under Alexander III, bureaucratic Russia would attempt to return to the conservative, centralizing principles of governance that had been at the heart of Nicholas I’s reign. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} Nationalism became the official direction of policy after the war. The government and its conservative ideologues rejected liberal, European values for the supposedly less atomistic, more communal and authority-based values that they saw as specifically Russian. They repudiated economic individualism and unhindered competition on the same grounds. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
1881 年亚历山大二世遇刺只是印证了早已开始的进程:对自由主义、西化的大改革精神的摒弃。在亚历山大三世统治下,官僚主义的俄国试图回归保守、中央集权的治理原则,这些原则曾是尼古拉一世统治的核心。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 战争结束后,民族主义成为政策的官方方向。政府及其保守理论家们摒弃了自由主义的欧洲价值观,转而推崇他们认为更具俄罗斯特色的、不那么原子化、更注重集体与权威的价值观。基于同样的理由,他们也否定了经济个人主义和无限制竞争。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
Like Nicholas I after the Decembrist revolt, Alexander III was determined to assert his absolute personal control over every aspect of his country’s life. One by one, Alexander III removed members of his father’s cabinet and replaced them with extreme conservatives. The only credential required was approval by the quartet of K. P. Pobedonostsev, V. P. Meshcherskii, M. N. Katkov, and D. A. Tolstoi. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} These were no Slavophile conservatives with a romantic yearning for a return to the ways of pre-Petrine Muscovy; the reactionaries of Alex-
如同十二月党人起义后的尼古拉一世,亚历山大三世决心对国家的方方面面实施绝对的个人掌控。他逐一撤换了父亲内阁的成员,代之以极端保守派人士。唯一的任职标准就是获得 K·P·波别多诺斯采夫、V·P·梅谢尔斯基、M·N·卡特科夫和 D·A·托尔斯泰这四人组的首肯。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 这些人并非怀着对前彼得时代莫斯科公国生活方式浪漫向往的斯拉夫派保守分子;亚历山大时代的反动分子们——
Alexander III. From Ministerstvo Finansov, Ministerstvo finansov, 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902).
亚历山大三世。引自《财政部,1802-1902》(圣彼得堡,1902 年)。

ander’s reign demanded rigid adherence to the principles of Sergei Uvarov, the ideologist of Nicholas I: orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. Their aim was to integrate the borderlands with Russia by imposing cultural and political uniformity. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} Gone was the late tsar’s emphasis on public participation, private initiative, and a loosening of the grip of the state; his son aimed to tighten the state’s hold over society, in economics as well as in politics.
亚历山大统治时期的反动派要求严格遵守谢尔盖·乌瓦罗夫——尼古拉一世的意识形态家——的原则:东正教、专制制度和民族性。他们的目标是通过强加文化和政治的一致性,将边疆地区与俄罗斯整合。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 先皇强调公众参与、私人主动性和放松国家控制的时代一去不复返;他的儿子旨在加强对社会的国家控制,无论是在经济还是政治上。
In the realm of economic policy, a trend in this direction had already started earlier, most notably in railroad affairs. The Gründerzeit of the 1860s and 1870s had not been satisfactory. The state had given generous guarantees to private railroad companies in an effort to attract investment at a time when the state’s financial resources were straitened. As long as the state stood ready to bail out unprofitable ventures, companies had no need to concern themselves with profit and loss. The resulting waste and abuse imposed serious strains on the Treasury when the Russo-Turkish War was already draining its resources. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} The state’s role in this period of “private” railroad construction was thus preeminent if not apparent.
在经济政策领域,这一趋势早已显现,尤以铁路事务为甚。1860 至 1870 年代的"创业热潮"(Gründerzeit)成效不尽如人意。当国家财政捉襟见肘之际,政府为吸引投资向私营铁路公司提供了慷慨担保。只要政府随时准备救助亏损企业,公司就无需关注盈亏问题。这种浪费和滥用行为给国库造成了沉重压力——尤其是在俄土战争持续消耗资源的背景下 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 。因此,国家在这段"私营"铁路建设时期的作用虽不显见却至关重要。
Once he realized that the Treasury was paying for the railroads while private builders profited, even the liberal Abaza called for more regulation. The policy of vykup, or Treasury purchase of private railroad lines, was initiated during his administration. The state began systematic construction of railroad lines soon thereafter. By the end of the 1880 s, a quarter of all railroads, including the most important lines, belonged to the state, and by 1900 more than 60 percent were state enterprises. Under Alexander III and Nicholas II a process that initially was viewed as a necessary evil came to be a deeply held principle: the state would shape economic affairs toward its political ends, if necessary in opposition to the interests of free enterprise. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
当自由派阿巴扎意识到国库在为铁路建设买单而私营建造商却从中获利时,他也呼吁加强监管。在其任期内,政府启动了"vykup"政策,即由国库收购私营铁路线。此后不久,国家便开始了铁路线的系统性建设。至 1880 年代末,包括最重要线路在内的四分之一铁路已归国有;到 1900 年,国有铁路企业占比超过 60%。在亚历山大三世和尼古拉二世统治时期,这个最初被视为必要之恶的过程逐渐演变为根深蒂固的原则:国家将按照政治目标塑造经济事务,必要时不惜与自由企业利益相悖。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}

14. On the development and implementation of these policies, see Edward C. Thaden, ed., Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton, 1981), and Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie, 117-138. Rabid Russian chauvinism first reared its head in the 1860s and 1870s. See Geyer, Russian Imperialism, 49-63.
14. 关于这些政策的制定与实施,参见爱德华·C·撒登主编《波罗的海省份与芬兰的俄罗斯化,1855-1914》(普林斯顿,1981 年),以及扎伊翁奇科夫斯基《俄罗斯专制制度》第 117-138 页。狂热的俄罗斯沙文主义最早在 1860 至 1870 年代抬头,详见盖尔《俄罗斯帝国主义》第 49-63 页。

15. A. P. Pogrebinskii, “Stroitel’stvo zheleznykh dorog v poreformennoi Rossii i finansovaia politika tsarizma (60-90-e gody XIX v.),” Istoricheskie zapiski 47 (1954): 156-161, 173-175, 179. The debt of private railroads to the state reached 1.1 billion rubles by 1880. With nationalization, by the end of the 1890s, 1.5 billion rubles of railroad-company debts to the state had simply been written off.
15. A·P·波格列宾斯基,《改革后俄国铁路建设与沙皇政府的财政政策(19 世纪 60-90 年代)》,《历史笔记》47 期(1954 年):156-161 页,173-175 页,179 页。截至 1880 年,私营铁路对国家的债务已达 11 亿卢布。随着国有化进程,到 19 世纪 90 年代末,铁路公司欠国家的 15 亿卢布债务直接被核销。

16. Pogrebinskii, “Stroitel’stvo,” 156-157, 173-176; J. N. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways (London, 1964), 75-78; A. M. Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. (Moscow, 1975), 178-179; see also chaps. 4-6 below for the conflict between the ministries of transport and finance over this issue and the resulting limitations on coordinated policy. According to one scholar, the government’s assertion of its right to inspect the accounts of private railroad companies over the
16. 波格列宾斯基,《铁路建设》,156-157 页,173-176 页;J·N·韦斯特伍德,《俄国铁路史》(伦敦,1964 年),75-78 页;A·M·索洛维约娃,《19 世纪下半叶俄国铁路运输》(莫斯科,1975 年),178-179 页;另见下文第 4-6 章关于交通部与财政部在此问题上的冲突及由此导致的政策协调限制。据一位学者所述,政府坚持其有权检查私营铁路公司账目,这一主张在……
The process can be seen clearly in the reorganization of the nation’s railroad administration. In 1885, after years of ministerial bickering, the Committee of Ministers resolved to enact the “General Statute for Russian Railroads” and to form the Council for Railroad Affairs under the Ministry of Transport, with the goal of standardizing railroad operations. In the same spirit, the government took actions to regulate railroad tariffs. Until 1886, tariffs were in a chaotic state, each railroad firm attempting to undercut the competition by lowering its rates. These rate wars caused traffic flows to take unnatural routes and interfered with the distribution of goods. In 1887 the state took up the issue and in 1888-1889 gave the Ministry of Finance exclusive power to set tariffs by enacting the “Temporary Regulation on Railroad Tariffs and Tariff Institutions” and by creating several new departments, including the Department of Railroad Affairs. To force down the rates for long-distance transport, a unified tariff was introduced on all railroads. Poor harvests in 1881-1882 and again in 1884-1885 demonstrated the wisdom of encouraging grain shipments from the borderlands to the center. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
这一进程在国家铁路管理重组中体现得尤为明显。1885 年,经过多年部委争执后,大臣委员会决议颁布《俄国铁路总章程》,并在交通部下设立铁路事务委员会,旨在实现铁路运营标准化。秉持同样理念,政府着手规范铁路运价。直至 1886 年,运价体系仍处于混乱状态,各铁路公司竞相通过降价打压对手。这种价格战导致货流偏离自然路径,扰乱了商品流通。1887 年国家介入此事,于 1888-1889 年间通过颁布《铁路运价及运价机构临时条例》并设立包括铁路事务司在内的多个新部门,赋予财政部制定运价的专属权力。为压低长途运输费用,所有铁路线开始实行统一运价。1881-1882 年及 1884-1885 年接连发生的歉收,印证了鼓励边疆地区向中央运送粮食的决策之明智。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
Sergei Witte-the “Speranskii of railroad legislation,” as one newspaper called him 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}-was appointed chief of the new department. Witte’s pioneering work on the subject of railroad tariffs, Printsipy zheleznodorozhnykh tarifov po perevozke gruzov (Principles of railroad tariffs for freight transport), first published in 1883, expressed the political aspect of Treasury-sponsored railroad purchases and tariff regulation. Reflecting the era’s wariness of free enterprise, Witte justified state intervention in the economy as a means to counter the vagaries of supply and demand and to harmonize the interests of the individual with those of the community. By protecting the “interests of the weak,” the state served its own needs.
谢尔盖·维特——正如某家报纸所称的“铁路立法界的斯佩兰斯基” 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} ——被任命为新部门的负责人。维特关于铁路运价的开创性著作《货物运输铁路运价原则》(1883 年首次出版)阐述了财政部主导的铁路收购与运价监管背后的政治考量。反映了当时对自由企业的警惕态度,维特将国家干预经济视为应对供需无常、协调个人利益与集体利益的手段。通过保护“弱势群体的利益”,国家实现了自身诉求。
It is beyond any doubt that state operation of Russian railroads is in principle highly desirable, for in the operation of railroads, the Russian
毫无疑问,原则上由国家运营俄罗斯铁路是极为可取的,因为在铁路运营中,俄罗斯...
Asian Russia and its major railroads, 1916
1916 年的亚洲俄罗斯及其主要铁路线


state, in principle, can pursue no other goal than the common good of Russia. In the hands of the government of the tsar, who belongs to all social classes and to none, railroads cannot and will not ever consciously serve as the tool of estate or propertied privilege, or for the conscious maintenance or establishment of inequality; in a word, they can serve the interests of the Russian people alone, as a means of giving the people access to the highest blessings of culture.
原则上,国家追求的目标只能是俄罗斯的共同福祉。在属于所有社会阶层又不专属任何阶层的沙皇政府手中,铁路不能也永远不会有意成为阶级或财产特权的工具,或有意维持或制造不平等;简言之,它只能服务于俄罗斯人民的利益,作为让民众接触最高文化福祉的途径。
Witte repeatedly expressed his admiration for Bismarck’s economic policy, in particular for his nationalization of the German railroad network. He opposed Manchester liberalism and called himself a “realist” whose ideas were suited to Russian circumstances. He aimed to unify the nation and to end Russia’s domination by European ideology and industry. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} The new railroad policies would embody these political ideals.
维特屡次表达对俾斯麦经济政策的钦佩,尤其是其对德国铁路网络的国有化举措。他反对曼彻斯特自由主义,自称"现实主义者",其理念符合俄罗斯国情。他致力于国家统一,终结欧洲意识形态与工业对俄国的支配。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 新的铁路政策将体现这些政治理想。
The motives behind the protective import tariffs enacted under Alexander III were similarly political. As distinct from I. A. Vyshnegradskii, who recommended higher customs duties for fiscal reasons, most supporters of high tariffs wanted to preserve and expand Russia’s dominance of its empire’s industry and agriculture. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} Influenced by the nationalism of the 1860 s and 1870 s, conservative intellectuals led by Katkov teamed up with Slavophile Russian merchants to lobby for limitations on business competition from abroad and from the non-Russian peoples of the borderlands-Poles, Jews, Tatars, and Greeks-who under Alexander II had begun to control a large percentage of Russia’s trade. Alexander III was so swayed by their arguments that he continuously raised tariffs higher than the Ministry of Finance suggested. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} Alexander’s economic policy had become a means of implementing the ruling principle of his reign, “Russia for the Russians.” It is only in this context that the decision to construct the Trans-Siberian Railroad can be understood.
亚历山大三世时期实施的保护性进口关税背后动机同样具有政治性。与出于财政考虑建议提高关税的 I·A·维什涅格拉茨基不同,大多数高关税支持者旨在维护并扩大俄罗斯对其帝国工农业的主导权。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 受 1860 至 1870 年代民族主义思潮影响,以卡特科夫为首的保守派知识分子联合斯拉夫派俄国商人,共同游说限制来自国外及边疆非俄罗斯民族——波兰人、犹太人、鞑靼人和希腊人——的商业竞争,这些民族在亚历山大二世时期已开始掌控俄国贸易的很大份额。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 亚历山大三世被这些论点深深说服,以致将关税提高到连财政部建议水平之上。其经济政策已成为贯彻其统治原则"俄罗斯属于俄罗斯人"的工具。唯有在此语境下,才能理解修建西伯利亚大铁路的决策。

CHAPTERONE  第一章

A Weak and Distant Domain
脆弱而遥远的疆域

In 1874 the future minister of transport K. N. Pos’et wrote that the stagnant and “semidesert” borderlands of Siberia and the Russian Far East stood in stark contrast to Japan and China, with their “millions-strong, compact population.” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} In the coming decades many others would echo the sentiment as the Orient showed signs of pulling out of the morass of inertia, leaving Asian Russia behind. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} The most immediate reason for the government’s decision to build a railroad through Siberia lay in the region’s debility.
1874 年,未来的交通部长 K·N·波谢特写道,西伯利亚和俄罗斯远东地区停滞不前、“半荒漠化”的边疆地带,与拥有“数百万密集人口”的日本和中国形成鲜明对比。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 在接下来的几十年里,随着东方显示出摆脱停滞泥潭的迹象,而亚洲俄罗斯地区却落后了,许多人会重复这一观点。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 政府决定修建横贯西伯利亚铁路的最直接原因在于该地区的衰弱状况。
The state of affairs in the Russian territories east of the Urals-and especially beyond Lake Baikal-was indeed bleak. The quality of life there was so poor that visitors found the region demoralized. The railroad engineer L . N . Liubimov reported that
乌拉尔山脉以东的俄罗斯领土——尤其是贝加尔湖以东地区——的现状确实令人沮丧。那里的生活质量极差,以至于访客们感到这片区域士气低落。铁路工程师 L·N·柳比莫夫报告称

the growth of Vladivostok would have been far more significant, according to the general opinion of its inhabitants, had the conditions of life been somewhat different: here there is no beneficial climate, no splendid, poetic environment as in other borderlands of Russia, for instance in the Caucasus or Turkestan, no low cost of living; all is severe, and everywhere there are shortages and difficulties. The expenses are incredible. The reigning spirit of hard labor and exile crowns the oppres-
根据当地居民的普遍看法,倘若生活条件稍有不同,符拉迪沃斯托克的发展本应更为显著:这里既没有宜人的气候,也不像俄罗斯其他边疆地区——例如高加索或突厥斯坦——那样拥有壮丽而富有诗意的环境,生活成本也不低廉;一切都显得严酷,处处是匮乏与困境。开销之大令人难以置信。苦役与流放的压抑氛围笼罩着这里,许多人强烈渴望逃离,只为从对人类灵魂阴暗面的日常凝视中解脱出来。
sion, and many long intensely to get out of here simply to liberate themselves from the daily contemplation of the dark side of the human soul.
这种压迫感达到极致,许多人深切地渴望离开此地,仅仅是为了摆脱每日目睹人性阴暗面的折磨。
The conditions of life wear especially hard on people of the “educated class” arriving here from European Russia, who yearn for their distant homeland. The oppressive feeling of solitude and dissatisfied spiritual needs, in conjunction with an unfamiliar climate, ruins the nervous system and engenders an irresistible desire to escape from the region once and for all. Add to that the almost daily murders, committed for the most part by fugitive hard-labor convicts, . . . and . . . the frequent funeral processions; . . . one can easily imagine that life for the Vladivostok resident is not sweet. For this reason, nowhere else, it seems, do they seek to drown their sorrows in spirits in such measure as in this dreary city. Here they drink to the utmost from morning until late at night and end up either suicides or insane.
生活条件对从欧俄地区来到此地的"知识阶层"尤为严酷,他们深深思念着遥远的故乡。孤独的压抑感与精神需求得不到满足,再加上陌生的气候,摧残着人们的神经系统,催生出一种无法抗拒的、想要永远逃离此地的渴望。更不用说几乎每天发生的谋杀案,大多是由逃亡的苦役犯所为,……以及……频繁的送葬队伍;……不难想象,符拉迪沃斯托克居民的生活并不甜蜜。正因如此,似乎没有其他地方的人像这座阴郁城市里的居民那样,试图借酒消愁到如此程度。他们从早到晚酗酒无度,最终要么自杀,要么精神失常。
Liubimov added that no butter was to be had in Vladivostok, only margarine, and that the meat was bad and expensive, as were vegetables, which had to be imported; “to make up for it all, there is an abundance of drinking houses, taverns, and houses of pleasure.” 3
柳比莫夫补充说,符拉迪沃斯托克根本买不到黄油,只有人造黄油,而且肉类质量差且价格昂贵,蔬菜也是如此,必须从外地运来;"作为补偿,这里有的是酒馆、小饭馆和娱乐场所。"
The precariousness of life in Siberia and the Far East was brought about by a combination of interrelated factors, including a meager population, harsh climate, terrain unsuitable for agriculture, and poor means of communication.
西伯利亚和远东地区生活的脆弱性是由一系列相互关联的因素共同造成的,包括人口稀少、气候严酷、地形不适合农业以及交通通讯手段落后。

Population  人口

Anton Chekhov wrote that even in the comparatively densely settled region of Siberia between Tiumen’ and Tomsk, "as you travel, the only thing that reminds you of man are mileposts and telegraph wires humming in the wind. 4 4 4 4 ^(4)4{ }^{4} 4 Whereas the population density of the Russian Empire as a whole in 1888 was 5.7 people per square verst, the average for all of Siberia was 0.6 per square verst. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} The Far East fell significantly below this average: Amur oblast had 61,000 Russian residents Amur oblast in 1888, and the Maritime oblast had fewer than
安东·契诃夫曾写道,即使在相对人口密集的西伯利亚地区,从秋明到托木斯克之间,"旅途中唯一能提醒人类存在的只有里程标和在风中嗡嗡作响的电报线。 4 4 4 4 ^(4)4{ }^{4} 4 1888 年,整个俄罗斯帝国的人口密度为每平方俄里 5.7 人,而西伯利亚的平均值仅为每平方俄里 0.6 人。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 远东地区远低于这一平均值:1888 年阿穆尔州仅有 61,000 名俄罗斯居民,滨海州的人数更少
20 , 000 . 6 20 , 000 . 6 20,000.^(6)20,000 .{ }^{6} In the Far East the population was largely restricted to the main river arteries and roadways, usually on the most productive soil. Aside from Vladivostok and the town of Pos’et, the few tiny villages of the South Ussuri uezds were located along the post road between Vladivostok and Lake Khanka. Settlers bypassed the North Ussuri region altogether until the late 1890s. In Amur oblast, settlement was restricted to the left bank of the Amur River and to the fertile valleys of the Zeia and Bureia rivers. There were only three insignificant settlements on the Bureia in 1884 . 7 1884 . 7 1884.^(7)1884 .{ }^{7}
在远东地区,人口主要集中分布在主要河流干道及公路沿线,这些区域通常拥有最肥沃的土壤。除符拉迪沃斯托克(海参崴)和波谢特镇外,南乌苏里边区的零星小村落均坐落于符拉迪沃斯托克至兴凯湖之间的驿路旁。直至 19 世纪 90 年代末,移民始终绕开北乌苏里地区。在阿穆尔州,定居点仅局限于阿穆尔河左岸以及结雅河、布列亚河肥沃的河谷地带。布列亚河沿岸仅有三个微不足道的定居点见于 1884 . 7 1884 . 7 1884.^(7)1884 .{ }^{7}
The few people who did live in the Far East did not form a stable community. Roughly one-quarter of the population, and in some areas a large majority, consisted of soldiers-a non-productive element. Settlers from China and Korea made up a quarter of the urban population of both the Amur and Maritime oblasts by 1900, but most Russians regarded the Chinese as disloyal. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
远东地区的少数居民并未形成稳定的社区。约四分之一人口(某些地区甚至占绝大多数)由士兵构成——这一非生产性群体。截至 1900 年,来自中国和朝鲜的移民已占阿穆尔州及滨海州城市人口的四分之一,但大多数俄罗斯人视中国移民为不忠分子。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
Siberia had long been the destination of criminal exiles, and approximately 20,000 escaped convicts and vagrants roamed across the land, living in utter poverty. From within Siberia it was reported that "the exiles themselves, remaining idle and useless and with no means to make an honest living, lead disreputable lives, accompanied by drunkenness, debauchery, thievery, and other crimes, which, because of their large numbers in the towns, are almost impossible for the police to look after and prevent.'9 The exiles had a corrupting influence on the life of the region. They may not be fully responsible for the
西伯利亚长期以来一直是罪犯流放的目的地,约有 2 万名逃犯和流浪者在这片土地上四处游荡,生活极度贫困。来自西伯利亚内部的报告称:"这些流放者本身无所事事、毫无用处,且无法通过正当手段谋生,过着声名狼藉的生活,伴随着酗酒、放荡、偷窃和其他犯罪行为。由于他们在城镇中人数众多,警方几乎无法监管和预防。"9 这些流放者对当地的生活产生了腐化影响。他们或许不能完全为...
high incidence of drunkenness throughout Siberia, but they surely contributed to the “dirty, slovenly, and poverty-stricken appearance of the peasant villages” which George Kennan found so striking. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
西伯利亚地区酗酒现象普遍,这些情况无疑加剧了乔治·凯南所描述的“农民村庄肮脏、邋遢且贫困不堪”的触目景象。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}

Cossacks of the Far East
远东哥萨克

The hardships of the population of Transbaikalia and Priamur’e were epitomized by the experience of the Cossack settlers. As a military force, they faced the same problems that a regular army would face in the Far East. Cossacks had spearheaded the Russian exploration and conquest of Siberia and from the first they had played an important role in its defense. Before N. N. Murav’ev’s appointment as governor general of Eastern Siberia, 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} few Cossack formations were located east of Lake Baikal. With an eye to their dual military and colonizing potential, Murav’ev ordered the formation of the Transbaikal Cossack host in 1851. Extreme measures were needed to augment their ranks. Murav’ev freed ex-convicts and enlisted them as serfs in the mines or enrolled them as Transbaikal Cossacks. He tried the same scheme with a few thousand soldiers from disciplinary battalions, but it was not successful: inscribed as “adopted sons” in Cossack and other households, they deserted their settlements and became drunken transients. In 1854 English activities in China led Murav’ev to propose the strengthening of the Transbaikal host and the transfer of some contingents to the Amur and Maritime oblasts. Out of these groups the separate Amur and Ussuri Cossack hosts were eventually formed. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
外贝加尔和阿穆尔地区居民的艰辛,在哥萨克移民的经历中得到了集中体现。作为一支军事力量,他们面临着与远东正规军相同的困境。哥萨克人曾是俄罗斯探索和征服西伯利亚的先锋,从一开始就在防御中扮演着重要角色。在 N·N·穆拉维约夫被任命为东西伯利亚总督之前,贝加尔湖以东几乎没有哥萨克部队驻扎。出于对其军事与殖民双重潜力的考量,穆拉维约夫于 1851 年下令组建外贝加尔哥萨克军团。为扩充兵员,当局采取了极端手段:穆拉维约夫释放前科犯,将其编为矿场农奴或吸收为外贝加尔哥萨克。他还尝试将数千名惩戒营士兵如法炮制,但这一方案未能奏效——这些以"养子"名义登记在哥萨克及其他家庭名下的士兵,最终逃离定居点沦为酗酒的流浪者。 1854 年,英国在中国的活动促使穆拉维约夫提议加强外贝加尔哥萨克军,并将部分部队调往阿穆尔州和滨海州。这些部队最终分别组建了独立的阿穆尔哥萨克军和乌苏里哥萨克军。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
In the early years of colonization, their numbers were significant. From 1852 to 1897 Cossacks made up 30 percent of the population of Transbaikalia. In 1859 they formed between 60 and 85 percent of the
在殖民初期,他们的人数相当可观。从 1852 年到 1897 年,哥萨克人占外贝加尔地区人口的 30%。1859 年,他们占该地区人口的 60%至 85%。
population of the Far East, depending on the region. By 1869 they accounted for 43 percent. Even though new Cossack settlements were not created after 1862, Cossack settlers predominated among immigrants to the region throughout the years from 1858 to 1882 , outnumbering peasants by 5,401 to 3,892 in the Maritime oblast, and in Amur oblast by 10,576 to 8,088 . 13 13 ^(13)^{13} With such percentages, clearly the quality of Cossack settlement would play a large role in forming the character of Russian colonization of the area.
远东地区的人口比例因地区而异。到 1869 年,哥萨克人占比达到 43%。尽管 1862 年后未再新建哥萨克定居点,但在 1858 至 1882 年间,哥萨克移民始终是该地区移民的主体——滨海州以 5,401 人对 3,892 人超过农民移民,阿穆尔州则以 10,576 人对 8,088 人占据优势。 13 13 ^(13)^{13} 如此高的占比决定了哥萨克定居点的质量将对俄国在该地区殖民开发的特征产生重要影响。
Unfortunately, the combined use of the Cossacks for military duty and colonization of the province was a failure. In the eighteenth century it was difficult to provision Russian military personnel in eastern Siberia. Cossacks were given land and turned into farmersoldiers so that they could support themselves, but they could not devote full time to either farming or soldiering and their circumstances were known to be difficult. Strapped with military and postal duties and given land inferior to that of the peasants, the Cossacks did not succeed at agriculture and many families were miserably poor. D. I. Subbotich, governor general of Priamur’e from 1902 to 1903, wrote that the Cossacks of the region had given up on agriculture. Some were engaged in fishing and hunting, “but mostly they lounge about near the steamship wharfs and postal stations.” In defense, too, their success was minimal. The presence of the Ussuri host did not ease Russian military concerns about China during the Ili crisis (18711881); it seems that their greatest contribution was in chasing the Manchurian bandits who penetrated the Suchan area. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
遗憾的是,将哥萨克人同时用于军事任务和该省殖民化的尝试以失败告终。十八世纪时,为东西伯利亚的俄罗斯军人提供补给十分困难。哥萨克人虽被授予土地并转变为农耕士兵以自给自足,但他们既无法全力投入耕作也无法专注军事,其生存状况众所周知地艰难。由于承担着军事与邮政职责,且分得的土地质量逊于农民,哥萨克人在农业上未能取得成功,许多家庭陷入赤贫。1902 至 1903 年间担任普里阿穆尔总督的 D.I.苏博季奇写道,该地区的哥萨克人已放弃农耕,部分人从事渔猎活动,"但多数人只是在轮船码头和邮站附近游荡"。在防御方面,他们的作用同样微乎其微。乌苏里哥萨克军团的存在并未缓解俄罗斯在伊犁危机(1871-1881 年)期间对中国的军事忧虑;似乎他们最大的贡献仅限于追捕渗入苏昌地区的满洲土匪。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
The Cossacks were simply not equipped to cope with the environment:
哥萨克人根本无力应对这样的环境:
The motley crowd of Transbaikalian Cossacks, … settled in a hurry and often haphazardly along the banks of the Amur, certainly did not attain prosperity, especially in the lower parts of the river and on the Usurí
这群混杂的外贝加尔哥萨克人……仓促定居在阿穆尔河沿岸,往往选址随意,显然未能实现繁荣,尤其是在河流下游及乌苏里地区,
[sic], where almost every square yard of land had to be won from a virgin . . . forest, . . . reducing whole populations to sheer despair and apathy. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
[原文如此],那里几乎每一寸土地都需从原始森林中艰难开垦……导致整个群体陷入彻底的绝望与麻木。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
Others would have extricated themselves from such difficulties, but the Transbaikalians, Cossacks created by administrative order out of peasants, to a significant degree had lost the unyielding industriousness and the skills peculiar to those of their former calling. . . . Laziness and crime became ubiquitous (under the influence of the criminals settled among them), with the result that the government was forced to spend large sums to keep the Cossack settlements going. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
换作他人或许能摆脱此般困境,但这些由农民经行政命令改造而来的外贝加尔哥萨克人,很大程度上已丧失了原有职业特有的坚韧勤勉与技能……在定居罪犯的影响下,懒惰与犯罪现象泛滥,政府不得不耗费巨资以维持哥萨克聚居地的运转。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}

Climate and Agriculture  气候与农业

The travails of the Cossacks mirrored those of the rest of the Russian population in the Far East. Their plight showed the deficiencies of Russia’s system of colonization and defense as it existed before the construction of the Siberian Railroad. The problem was largely one of provisionment, an age-old challenge to the Russian administration of Eastern Siberia. If the settled population could barely eke out an existence, stationing the number of troops needed to guarantee defense of the region would be all the more difficult. For this reason Andrew Malozemoff alludes to the "failure of the original settlement.’ 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
哥萨克人的艰辛映射出远东地区全体俄罗斯人的困境。他们的处境揭示了西伯利亚铁路修建前俄国殖民与防御体系的缺陷。问题主要在于物资供给——这是俄罗斯管理东西伯利亚长期面临的挑战。如果定居人口尚且难以维持生计,那么驻扎足够兵力以确保该地区防御将更为困难。正因如此,安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫提到了“最初殖民的失败”。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
Agricultural self-sufficiency in the Russian Far East could not be achieved under the adverse climatic conditions. The region’s climate is more continental than maritime, and although Vladivostok is farther south than Nice, its winters are colder than Leningrad’s. Winters are very dry with little snowfall, spring and autumn are dry, and summers are hot. Summer brings the monsoon season, with its perpetual and often torrential rains, thick fog, and unbearable humidity. Cyclones are frequent in summer and winter, when precipitation can yield in twenty-four hours as much moisture as Moscow receives in six months. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
在恶劣的气候条件下,俄罗斯远东地区无法实现农业自给自足。该地区的气候更偏向大陆性而非海洋性,尽管符拉迪沃斯托克(海参崴)的纬度比尼斯更靠南,但其冬季却比列宁格勒更为寒冷。冬季非常干燥且降雪稀少,春秋两季干旱,夏季则炎热难耐。夏季还伴随着季风季节,持续不断的暴雨、浓雾和令人难以忍受的湿度成为常态。无论冬夏,气旋活动频繁,有时 24 小时内的降水量甚至相当于莫斯科半年的降雨量。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}

15. Kropotkin, Memoirs, 186.
15. 克鲁泡特金,《回忆录》,第 186 页。

  1. Chikhachev, “Kaliforniia,” 561.
    奇哈切夫,《加利福尼亚》,第 561 页。
  2. Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904: With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (Berkeley, 1958), 1 and passim. For the historical context, see also James R. Gibson, Feeding the Russian Fur Trade: Provisionment of the Okhotsk Seaboard and the Kamchatka Peninsula, 1639-1856 (Madison, 1969).
    安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫,《1881-1904 年俄国远东政策:特别关注日俄战争成因》(伯克利,1958 年),第 1 页及散见各处。历史背景可另参阅詹姆斯·R·吉布森,《滋养俄罗斯毛皮贸易:1639-1856 年鄂霍次克海沿岸与堪察加半岛的物资供应》(麦迪逊,1969 年)。
  3. S. P. Suslov, Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia, trans. Noah D. Gershevsky (San
    S·P·苏斯洛夫,《亚洲俄罗斯自然地理》,诺亚·D·格舍夫斯基译(旧金山
The climate wreaked havoc on agriculture. In the north the hardiest grains would not flourish. Rice and soybeans might have grown in the south, but Russian settlers were unaccustomed to them. Grain planted in the valleys suffered from drought in the spring and from dampness and fungus disease in the summer. The rains turned the plains into swamps. The soil became unworkable and the flooding brought on by typhoons destroyed crops year after year. To avoid inundation, settlement was restricted to the elevated ridges, but the region’s mountain ranges imposed obvious limitations on expansion. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
气候对农业造成了严重破坏。在北方,最耐寒的谷物也难以生长。南部本可种植水稻和大豆,但俄罗斯移民对此并不习惯。山谷中播种的谷物春季遭受干旱,夏季又因潮湿和真菌病害而受损。降雨将平原变为沼泽,土壤变得无法耕作,台风引发的洪水年复一年摧毁庄稼。为避免被淹,居民点只能局限于地势较高的山脊,但该地区的山脉明显限制了扩张空间。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
The early hopes entertained for both Transbaikalia and Priamur’e as the region’s breadbaskets were soon dashed. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} Local agriculture could not satisfy local food needs. According to the historical demographer V. M. Kabuzan, the small Russian population of Priamur’e had managed to provide the region with enough food by the late 1860s, but with the steady influx over the years of a disproportionate number of nonagricultural settlers, in particular gold miners and soldiers, peasants could no longer satisfy the demand for their products. With the exception of the South Ussuri region, which was somewhat more suited to agriculture, the Maritime oblast had always found itself in this desperate situation. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
人们对作为该地区粮仓的外贝加尔地区和黑龙江沿岸地区早期所抱有的希望很快就破灭了。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 当地的农业无法满足当地的粮食需求。历史人口统计学家 V. M.卡布赞指出,到 1860 年代末,黑龙江沿岸地区为数不多的俄罗斯人口曾设法为该地区提供足够的粮食,但随着多年来非农业移民(尤其是淘金者和士兵)不成比例地持续涌入,农民再也无法满足对其产品的需求。除了农业条件稍好的南乌苏里地区外,滨海边疆区一直处于这种绝望的境地。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
In 1892 approximately 3.6 million puds of grain were required to feed the population of Priamur’e, including troops, civilians, prisoners, and gold miners, but only 2.75 million puds were harvested locally. In neighboring Transbaikalia, only one good harvest interrupted six years of hunger between 1884 and 1891. In both North and South Ussuri uezds, cultivation was minimal and local grains were scarce at the Khabarovsk and Vladivostok markets. The shortage of grain prevented the development of livestock husbandry, so meat was
1892 年,阿穆尔沿岸地区(包括驻军、平民、囚犯及淘金者在内)的人口约需 360 万普特粮食,但当地仅收获 275 万普特。邻近的外贝加尔地区在 1884 至 1891 年间,仅有 1 次丰收,其余 6 年皆陷于饥荒。南北乌苏里县耕地稀少,伯力与海参崴市场上本地谷物匮乏。粮食短缺阻碍了畜牧业发展,导致肉类价格
expensive. Nor did the availability of grain guarantee that it could be used, for flour mills were scarce in the region. Similarly, although fish were plentiful in the rivers, a lack of both initiative and salt prevented all but local use of this food source. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
高昂。即便有谷物储备,也因该地区面粉厂稀缺而难以加工利用。同样,尽管河流中鱼类资源丰富,但由于缺乏经营动力和食盐,这些食物资源仅能供应当地消费。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
The government tried to alleviate the hardship first by providing supplies from European Russia to the army and settlers, then by taking measures to encourage local production. For a time it annually supplied salt, flour, and meat, carried on barges floated at high water from Chita through mountainous Transbaikalia. After 1880 the Volunteer Fleet carried Russian goods from Odessa. This overseas supply route shortened the journey from 320 to 65 days, lowered costs, and took some trade out of the hands of foreigners, a consistent ambition of the government. To save money and encourage local production, the military administration of eastern Siberia provided a limited number of agricultural implements to peasants in the Far East and constructed flour mills. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
政府最初试图通过从欧俄地区向军队和移民提供物资来缓解困境,随后采取措施鼓励当地生产。一段时间内,政府每年都会供应盐、面粉和肉类,这些物资由驳船在高水位期从赤塔穿越多山的后贝加尔地区运输。1880 年后,志愿船队开始从敖德萨运送俄罗斯货物。这条海外供应路线将旅程从 320 天缩短至 65 天,降低了成本,并从外国人手中夺回部分贸易权,这始终是政府的目标之一。为节省开支并促进本地生产,东西伯利亚军事当局向远东农民提供了有限数量的农具,并建造了面粉厂。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
The efforts of the military had little impact on the whole. The region remained dependent on imports, and foreigners dominated its trade. In the late 1880 s the total volume of imports through Vladivostok was double that of exports. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} Imports from China in the period 1863-1892 were five times as great as exports. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} Russian peasants simply could
军方的努力总体上收效甚微。该地区仍依赖进口,且贸易被外国人所主导。19 世纪 80 年代末,符拉迪沃斯托克的进口总量是出口的两倍。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 1863 至 1892 年间,来自中国的进口量是出口量的五倍。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 俄国农民根本无法……
not compete with the Chinese farmers of Manchuria, whose grain was grown at less expense and was of better quality; the Chinese were familiar with working in such conditions, but Russian immigrants were not. Since the 1870 s Manchuria had been a vital source of grain to the region. It made up for local shortages and flooded the market, leading many people to doubt that local Russian agriculture had a future. The Chinese were the exclusive suppliers of fresh fruits and vegetables in Blagoveshchensk, and Koreans controlled the economy in the South Ussuri town of Pos’et. Cattle were also imported from Manchuria and Korea, for cattle raising was undeveloped in the Far East and erratic in Transbaikalia because of the poor harvests. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
无法与中国满洲的农民竞争,他们的粮食生产成本更低且质量更优;中国人熟悉在这种条件下耕作,而俄罗斯移民则不然。自 19 世纪 70 年代以来,满洲一直是该地区重要的粮食来源。它弥补了当地的短缺并充斥市场,导致许多人怀疑当地俄罗斯农业的未来。在布拉戈维申斯克,中国人是新鲜水果和蔬菜的独家供应商,而朝鲜人则控制了南乌苏里城镇波谢特的经济。牲畜也从满洲和朝鲜进口,因为远东地区的畜牧业不发达,而外贝加尔地区由于收成不稳定,畜牧业也时好时坏。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
Under Alexander III, such a predominance of non-Russians was considered a threat in and of itself; it was all the more dangerous because it had a bearing on an important military issue: the inability of the region to feed the army in case of war. The Russian settlement of Priamur’e was so small and its agriculture so unstable that production was less than satisfactory in normal circumstances; how could the army be fed in wartime, especially if an enemy navy were to blockade the Amur? 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
在亚历山大三世统治时期,非俄罗斯人占据多数本身就被视为一种威胁;这一情况因涉及重大军事问题而显得尤为危险:该地区无法在战时为军队提供粮食补给。阿穆尔地区的俄罗斯移民数量稀少,农业极不稳定,正常年景下产量尚且不尽如人意;若战时遭遇敌军海军封锁阿穆尔河,军队粮草又将从何而来? 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
Transbaikalia could offer no relief. In the rare times of good harvest, peasants immediately sold their stocks of grain rather than build up reserves. At such a time, soldiers might still be able to depend on local sources, but the lack of mills and the small size of domestic stoves impeded their use of grain. The meat supply for approximately five hundred men would last one to two days, and not even that if the harvest was weak. Fodder, fuel, and water were also frequently unavailable. During the famine of 1888 , the starving population of Transbaikalia refused to feed troops stationed there. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
外贝加尔地区同样无力解困。即便在罕见的丰收年份,农民也会立即售空存粮而非建立储备。此时士兵或可暂时依赖当地粮源,但磨坊的匮乏与家用炉灶的狭小阻碍了谷物利用。约五百名士兵的肉类供给仅能维持一至两天,若遇歉收则更短。饲料、燃料与饮用水也时常短缺。1888 年饥荒期间,濒临饿毙的外贝加尔居民甚至拒绝向驻军提供食物。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}

Transport  运输

If natural causes were largely responsible for the deficiencies of the Far East, there was universal agreement that the condition of the roads hindered any progress that could be made. Mountainous Transbaikalia remained a barrier separating the Far East from the relative abundance of central Siberia. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} K. A. Skal’kovskii stressed that "the reason for the weakness of the Russian population is remoteness and the difficulty of travel.’ 3 0 3 0 ^(3)0{ }^{3} 0
如果说远东地区的不足主要归咎于自然原因,那么人们普遍认为道路状况阻碍了任何可能取得的进展。多山的后贝加尔地区仍然是阻隔远东与相对富庶的西伯利亚中部的一道屏障。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} K. A. 斯卡利科夫斯基强调:"俄罗斯人口稀少的原因在于偏远和交通不便。" 3 0 3 0 ^(3)0{ }^{3} 0

“Remoteness and the difficulty of travel” were at the heart of the problem of defending the Far Eastern regions, and they were central features of the economic and political relations between Siberia and European Russia. The conditions of transport throughout Siberia had changed little since the eighteenth century. One writer considered Siberia to be poorer in overland routes than Mongolia. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} The Treasury had built cart roads over the course of the eighteenth century, and with completion of the Moscow-Ekaterinburg highway in 1763 began construction of the Siberian highway. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} Siberian peasants provided construction labor as part of their service obligation to the state. Villages of peasants and exiles were then settled along the road to maintain it and provide needed services; the government also encouraged this settlement as a means of establishing Russian control of the territory. The highway played a major role in developing the centers of Siberian economic and cultural life. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
“偏远与交通不便”是保卫远东地区问题的核心,也是西伯利亚与欧俄之间经济政治关系的显著特征。整个西伯利亚的运输条件自 18 世纪以来鲜有改变。一位作者认为西伯利亚的陆路交通甚至比蒙古更为匮乏。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 财政部在 18 世纪修建了马车道路,随着 1763 年莫斯科-叶卡捷琳堡公路的竣工,西伯利亚大道开始建设。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 西伯利亚农民以履行国家劳役的形式参与筑路工程。随后,农民和流放者的村落沿路建立,负责道路维护与基础服务;政府也通过这种殖民方式强化对领土的控制权。这条主干道对西伯利亚经济文化中心的发展起到了关键作用。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}

29. Sil’nitskii, Kul’turnoe vliianie, passim; Valliant, “Japan,” 9; Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 20, 22.
29. 西利尼茨基,《文化影响》,散见各处;瓦利安特,《日本》,第 9 页;沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 20、22 页。

30. Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 2.
30. 斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,第 2 页。

31. M. N. Selikhov, “Sibir’ pod vliianiem velikogo rel’sovogo puti,” Sibirskii torgovopromyshlennyi i spravochnyi kalendar’ na 1902 god, otdel 2 (Tomsk, 1902), 17.
31. M. N. 谢利霍夫,《西伯利亚在伟大铁路干线影响下》,载于《1902 年西伯利亚工商业及参考年鉴》第二部分(托木斯克,1902 年),第 17 页。

32. Its western route shifted southward as its capacity expanded over the next half century. In western and central Siberia it took the following path by 1838: Tiumen’-Ialutorovsk-Ishim-Tiukalinsk-Kainsk-Kolyvan’-Tomsk-Mariinsk-Krasnoiarsk-Nizhne-udinsk-Irkutsk. From there it branched off in two directions, one toward Lake Baikal, the other to Kiakhta. A post road also ran north to Iakutsk. See Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, vol. 3, map between pp. 60 and 61; Selikhov, “Sibir’ pod vliianiem,” 17; Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, Handbook of Siberia, 1:319; Robert N. North, Transport in Western Siberia: Tsarist and Soviet Development (Vancouver, 1979), 17, 28; M. I. Pomus, Zapadnaia Sibir’ (Ekonomiko-geograficheskaia kharakteristika) (Moscow, 1956), 106-107, 115; Slavinskii, “Russia and the Pacific to 1917,” in Stephan and Chichkanov, Soviet-American Horizons, 36; Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 196. Highway is a translation of the Russian trakt, and refers to a major but unpaved road. I will use it interchangeably with post road. This particular road was also known as the “Great Siberian highway” and the “Moscow-Siberian highway.”
32. 随着运力的提升,其西线在接下来的半个世纪里逐渐南移。至 1838 年,西西伯利亚与中西伯利亚的路线如下:秋明-亚卢托罗夫斯克-伊希姆-秋卡林斯克-卡因斯克-科雷万-托木斯克-马里因斯克-克拉斯诺亚尔斯克-下乌金斯克-伊尔库茨克。由此分岔为两条支线:一条通往贝加尔湖,另一条指向恰克图。另有一条驿道向北延伸至雅库茨克。参见 Okladnikov 等所著《西伯利亚史》第三卷 60 至 61 页间地图;Selikhov《西伯利亚受...影响》第 17 页;英国海军情报局《西伯利亚手册》第一卷 319 页;Robert N. North《西西伯利亚运输:沙俄与苏联时期发展》(温哥华,1979 年)第 17、28 页;M. I. Pomus《西西伯利亚(经济地理特征)》(莫斯科,1956 年)106-107、115 页;Slavinskii《1917 年前的俄国与太平洋》,载于 Stephan 与 Chichkanov 合编《苏美视野》第 36 页;Iadrintsev《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》第 196 页。Highway 系俄语 trakt 的英译,指未经铺砌的主干道,本文中与 post road(驿道)混用。该道路亦称"西伯利亚大干道"与"莫斯科-西伯利亚干道"。

33. Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, 2:191, 273, 315. Road repairs were a heavy burden on the population: after two or three rains, the highway would be impassable and, their
33. 奥克拉德尼科夫等,《西伯利亚史》,第 2 卷:191、273、315 页。道路维修对民众来说是一项沉重的负担:经过两三次降雨后,公路就会变得无法通行,而他们
The Moscow-Siberian highway west of Lake Baikal sufficed for the cartage of more than 2 million puds of freight per year, and approximately one-fifth of the population along the route was engaged in servicing it as innkeepers, coachmen, carters, and craftsmen. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} Yet it was a very bad, primitive road. In its western portions the highway was all of twenty-one feet wide. Alongside were stretches of clearing intended for grazing and telegraph lines, but they often became the main thoroughfare when the road itself was impassable for normal traffic. Coachmen frequently took their own routes, too, off the road along paths cutting through the taiga. Although some of the roads in Enisei province were hard-surfaced and were considered good, they were the exception. Everywhere else the highway was a sea of mud or clouded with dust in the spring and summer, and full of potholes in the winter. Its deep ruts made travel hazardous. Thousands upon thousands of carts dug the ruts deeper and deeper every day. In winter, according to Colonel N. A. Voloshinov of the General Staff, horses and carts would plunge into the potholes and literally disappear from view. During the summer rains travel was impossible. Bridges were of flimsy construction and often collapsed. Ferries carried travelers across the wider rivers. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
贝加尔湖以西的莫斯科-西伯利亚公路每年足以运输超过 200 万普特的货物,沿线约五分之一的人口从事客栈经营、车夫、货运及手工艺等配套服务。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 然而这条路状况极差,原始简陋。其西段路面仅 21 英尺宽,路旁虽有预留放牧区和电报线路的空地,但当主路无法通行时,这些空地常成为主要通道。车夫们也经常自行开辟路线,离开主道穿越针叶林的小径。尽管叶尼塞省部分路段铺设了硬质路面且路况良好,但这只是例外。其他路段在春夏季节不是泥泞不堪就是尘土飞扬,冬季则布满坑洼。深深的车辙使通行险象环生——据总参谋部 N.A.沃洛希诺夫上校描述,冬季时马车陷入坑洞后甚至会完全消失在视野中。 夏季雨季时,出行几乎不可能。桥梁结构脆弱,经常坍塌。渡船载着旅客穿越较宽的河流。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
Kennan journeyed on the Siberian highway in a tarantass, and described it as an exhausting ordeal. The horses could barely make it up steep hills of liquid clay, across the often swamped road, or along its unrepaired corduroy sections. Sleep was impossible for days on end because of the jolting of the tarantass, the cold in winter, and the hordes of mosquitoes in summer. Frequently the only food available at way stations was bread and water. Meat and hot meals were unavailable. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} Chekhov, too, made his way across Siberia by this route, and called it the “longest and . . ugliest road in the whole world.” He told of overflowing rivers that flooded the roads and described ending
肯南乘坐塔兰塔斯马车在西伯利亚公路上旅行,形容这是一场令人筋疲力尽的磨难。马匹几乎无法爬上液态黏土的陡坡,穿越经常被淹没的道路,或沿着未经修复的木板路段前行。由于塔兰塔斯的颠簸、冬季的寒冷和夏季成群的蚊子,连续数日无法入睡。沿途驿站通常只有面包和水可供食用,肉类和热食无处可寻。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} 契诃夫也曾沿着这条路线穿越西伯利亚,称其为"全世界最长也……最丑陋的道路"。他讲述了泛滥的河流淹没道路的情形,并描述了最终...
up in pools of mud when, inevitably, the carriage tipped over. “The going is hard, very hard,” he wrote,
当马车不可避免地翻倒时,他们陷入了泥潭中。“行进艰难,非常艰难,”他写道,
but what makes it worse is the thought that this foul strip of earth, this pock-marked horror, is practically the only artery connecting Europe with Siberia. And along this artery, we say, civilization flows into Siberia. So we say, we say a lot. If we were overheard by the drivers, the mailmen, or those wet, muddied peasants walking knee-deep in ooze beside their carts, which are loaded with tea for Europe, what would they think of Europe’s candor? 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37}
但更糟的是想到这条污秽的土地、布满坑洼的恐怖地带,几乎是连接欧洲与西伯利亚的唯一动脉。而我们却说,文明正是通过这条动脉流入西伯利亚。我们如此宣称,说得天花乱坠。倘若被那些车夫、邮差,或是那些在齐膝泥泞中跋涉、为欧洲运送茶叶的湿漉漉农民听见,他们对欧洲的坦诚会作何感想? 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37}
As if the physical features of the road were not bad enough, travelers also had to beware of nighttime attacks by escaped convicts. Iu. Ia. Solov’ev, a diplomat who returned from China along the highway, described the wooden crosses at the side of the road as “memorials to murdered travelers.” 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} Under the circumstances, a cart on the Mos-cow-Kiakhta section of the road covered roughly fifty versts a day if conditions were favorable, thirty-five or less when the road was bad. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
如果说道路的物理状况已足够恶劣,旅人还需提防夜间逃犯的袭击。外交官尤·雅·索洛维约夫从中国沿此路返回时,将路旁的木制十字架描述为“遇害旅人的纪念碑”。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} 在这种情况下,若条件有利,马车在莫斯科-恰克图路段每日约行进 50 俄里;路况恶劣时,则只能走 35 俄里或更少。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
River travel was perhaps a bit more reliable, but not by much. Although steamer traffic continued to grow throughout western and central Siberia, it was ill supplied: 73 steamships plied a fraction of the 8,000 versts of water routes in western Siberia. Personnel were scarce, too. Until the 1890s there were no passenger steamers: travel in Siberia was by tug or barge. Furthermore, the major rivers flowed from north to south. Although there was supposed to be a continuous east-west river route once the Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime}-Enisei canal was completed, it was too shallow to be of use. Frozen waters, fast-moving ice, floods, and rapids all limited navigation to only four months of the year, and even then to the middle stretches of most rivers. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
河运或许稍显可靠,但也有限。尽管蒸汽船在东西伯利亚和西西伯利亚的运输量持续增长,但供给严重不足:73 艘蒸汽船仅覆盖了西西伯利亚 8000 俄里水路中的一小部分。人员同样匮乏。直至 19 世纪 90 年代,西伯利亚仍无客运蒸汽船,出行只能依赖拖船或驳船。此外,主要河流均为南北走向。虽然理论上在 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 叶尼塞运河竣工后将形成连贯的东西向河运路线,但因水深不足而无法通航。冰冻期、湍急的浮冰、洪水与急流使得全年仅有四个月可通航,且仅限于各大河流的中游河段。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
Siberian transportation west of Lake Baikal was bad, and east of the lake it got worse. That was the major reason that migration to the Far East (with the exception of the South Ussuri region, which was reached by the overseas route) remained insignificant. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} Lake Baikal itself was a large part of the problem. The navigation period on the lake lasts eight months, from May through December; the rest of the
贝加尔湖以西的西伯利亚交通状况已然糟糕,湖以东地区更是每况愈下。这正是远东移民(除通过海路抵达的南乌苏里地区外)始终规模渺小的主因。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} 贝加尔湖本身便是症结所在。该湖的通航期每年仅维持八个月,从五月延续至十二月;其余时段则
year the water is frozen. The lake is subject to violent storms, and ice in spring and fall often puts a halt to navigation. In good weather it took seven hours to cross from Listvianichnaia on the western shore to Mysovskaia on the eastern shore. An alternative was the Circumbaikal post road, winding from Irkutsk along the south shore of the lake to Verkhneudinsk, but it ran through wild terrain that was perilous for travelers and would have made the transport of troops more impractical than it already was. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42}
一年中湖水会结冰。该湖常遭遇猛烈风暴,春秋季节的冰层常使航行中断。天气良好时,从西岸的 Listvianichnaia 到东岸的 Mysovskaia 需要七小时航程。另一条路线是环贝加尔邮路,从伊尔库茨克沿湖南岸蜿蜒至 Verkhneudinsk,但这条路线穿越荒芜地带,对旅行者而言危机四伏,使得军队运输比原本更加不切实际。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42}
The post road built under Murav’ev-Amurskii through Transbaikalia and Priamur’e could not be relied on as a commercial route, and in general it too was avoided because of the arduous terrain and severe weather. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} The road along the shore of the Shilka and upper Amur became a narrow trail high in the cliffs. The last seven stations were so dangerous that they were known as the “Seven Mortal Sins.” 44 Summer monsoons turned roads into impassable “slush” (rasputitsa)… 45 45 ^(45)^{45} The South Ussuri region had only one road to speak of, running from Kamen’-Rybolov on Lake Khanka to the village of Razdol’noe, 140 versts to the south. It was often flooded year round. N. A. Voloshinov found the region east of Lake Khanka too swampy for travel by horse or foot; he suggested that freight haulers reroute from Vladivostok to the Amur by sea to Nikolaevsk. He was not optimistic about developing a local carrying trade. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基时期修建的穿越外贝加尔和阿穆尔地区的驿路无法作为可靠的商业路线,且由于地形险峻和气候恶劣,人们通常也会避开这条道路。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} 沿着石勒喀河岸和上游阿穆尔河的道路变成了悬崖峭壁间狭窄的小径。最后七个驿站危险至极,被称为"七大死罪"。44 夏季季风将道路变成无法通行的"泥泞期"(rasputitsa)... 45 45 ^(45)^{45} 南乌苏里地区仅有一条值得一提的道路,从兴凯湖畔的卡缅-雷博洛夫向南延伸 140 俄里至拉兹多利诺耶村。这条路全年常遭水淹。N·A·沃洛希诺夫发现兴凯湖以东区域沼泽遍布,难以通行马匹或徒步;他建议货运商改走海路,从符拉迪沃斯托克经尼古拉耶夫斯克转运至阿穆尔河。他对发展当地运输业并不乐观。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
Travel by river was the preferred method east of Lake Baikal. The system consisting of the Selenga, Khilok, Ingoda, and Shilka rivers linked Baikal with the Amur River and placed all of Transbaikalia within reach by way of their branches. Several steamer lines carried passengers along the whole length of the Amur from Sretensk to Nikolaevsk, with service down the Ussuri River and up the Zeia and Bureia rivers to the gold camps. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} Navigation in the region was not dependable, however. The Amur is frozen five to six months of the year, and sandbars blocked its mouth at that time. The Shilka was
在贝加尔湖以东地区,河运是首选的交通方式。由色楞格河、希洛克河、英戈达河和石勒喀河组成的河道系统将贝加尔湖与阿穆尔河相连,并通过其支流覆盖了整个外贝加尔地区。多条蒸汽船航线运送乘客沿阿穆尔河全程从斯列坚斯克至尼古拉耶夫斯克,并延伸至乌苏里江下游,以及溯结雅河和布列亚河而上抵达金矿营地。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} 然而,该地区的航运并不稳定。阿穆尔河每年有五到六个月的冰封期,且河口处常有沙洲阻塞。石勒喀河则

42. Grulev, 131-132, 134; Volpicelli, Russia on the Pacific, 274; Suslov, Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia, 305-306.
42. 格鲁列夫,131-132 页,134 页;沃尔皮切利,《太平洋上的俄罗斯》,274 页;苏斯洛夫,《亚洲俄罗斯的自然地理》,305-306 页。

43. Volpicelli, Russia on the Pacific, 274-275; Selikhov, “Sibir’ pod vliianiem,” 17. This despite the fact that, according to Grulev, the local inhabitants of Transbaikalia had a wealth of good horses and were eager to do carting (Grulev, 143).
43. 沃尔皮切利,《太平洋上的俄罗斯》,274-275 页;谢利霍夫,“西伯利亚的影响下”,17 页。尽管根据格鲁列夫的说法,外贝加尔地区的当地居民拥有大量良马且热衷于马车运输(格鲁列夫,143 页)。

44. Kropotkin, Memoirs, 189.
44. 克鲁泡特金,《回忆录》,第 189 页。

45. Suslov, Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia, 337.
45. 苏斯洛夫,《亚洲俄罗斯自然地理》,337 页。

46. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 24-25; Barabash, 165-166; Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 56 . Horses were quite expensive in the region and had to be imported from Tomsk or Transbaikalia (Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy,” 83).
46. 沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 24-25 页;巴拉巴什,第 165-166 页;斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,第 56 页。该地区的马匹相当昂贵,需从托木斯克或外贝加尔地区进口(马秋宁,《我们的邻居》,第 83 页)。

47. Grulev, 132-133; Volpicelli, Russia on the Pacific, 283. Along the Bureia were three widely separated small settlements, linked only by water (Evtiugin, 214n11).
47. 格鲁列夫,132-133 页;沃尔皮切利,《太平洋上的俄罗斯》,283 页。布列亚河沿岸散布着三个彼此孤立的小型定居点,仅靠水路相连(叶夫秋金,214 页注释 11)。

clear of ice from mid-May to early October, but shallow water often made navigation treacherous after the first two months. Flooding from the hills made the waters even more unpredictable. The anarchist and geographer Prince Peter Kropotkin described the Amur during the monsoon season as swollen to a width of two to five miles in places, with waves of destructive height. The Amur, Ussuri, and Sungacha rivers, as well as Lake Khanka, became extremely shallow during the dry season, so that running aground on sandbars or in rapids was a frequent occurrence. At such times, Vladivostok could be reached only by sea. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
每年五月中旬至十月初为无冰期,但前两个月过后,浅水区常使航行变得危险。山洪暴发更让水流难以预测。无政府主义者兼地理学家彼得·克鲁泡特金亲王描述,季风季节的阿穆尔河某些河段会暴涨至两到五英里宽,掀起破坏性巨浪。阿穆尔河、乌苏里江、松阿察河及兴凯湖在旱季水位极浅,船只频繁搁浅于沙洲或急流中。此时唯有海路可抵达符拉迪沃斯托克。 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
As the major commercial and naval port in the Russian Far East, Vladivostok was of vital importance to the communications of the region. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49} Whatever benefits it may have had as a commercial port, as a naval base it suffered from serious deficiencies, and still does. In this region the cold coastal seas cause the port to freeze over three months of the year. The sheer cliffs of the Sikhote-Alin Mountains line the coast of the Ussuri region, making Vladivostok inaccessible from this direction, and the straits guarding the Sea of Japan made open access to or from the Pacific Ocean doubtful in wartime. Vladivostok’s location on a peninsula jutting into the bay opened it to attack from two sides, so that its defense was all the more difficult. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
作为俄罗斯远东地区主要的商业和海军港口,符拉迪沃斯托克对该地区的交通至关重要。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49} 尽管作为商业港口可能具备诸多优势,但作为海军基地却存在严重缺陷,且至今仍未改善。该地区寒冷的沿海海域导致港口每年有三个月处于封冻期。锡霍特山脉的陡峭悬崖沿乌苏里地区海岸线延伸,使得符拉迪沃斯托克从这个方向难以接近,而守卫日本海的狭窄海峡也使得战时能否自由进出太平洋存疑。符拉迪沃斯托克位于伸入海湾的半岛上,使其易受两侧夹击,防御难度倍增。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
Obviously transportation in all of Siberia was less than ideal. In the Far East all communications came to a halt for several months of the year, and except for an occasional caravan of camels over the frozen rivers, the region was cut off from the rest of Russia. The telegraph was unreliable, too, since repairs in remote flooded regions could not be made. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
显然整个西伯利亚的交通状况都不尽如人意。在远东地区,每年有数月时间所有交通完全中断,除了偶尔有骆驼商队穿越冰封的河流外,该地区与俄罗斯其他部分完全隔绝。电报通讯同样不可靠,因为偏远洪涝地区的线路损坏无法及时修复。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
51. Selikhov, “Sibir’ pod vliianiem,” 18; Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 60. On the use
51. 谢利霍夫,《西伯利亚的影响下》,18 页;斯卡利科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,60 页。关于使用
The implications did not bode well for Russia’s prospects of winning a war in the Far East. Of the 24,000 soldiers in 1891 under the command of Baron A. N. Korf, governor general of Priamur’e and ex officio commander of the Amur military okrug, only 60 percent were a viable force, and they were required to defend the border with China. 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} The British engineer Arthur John Barry estimated that Russia would need to put 100 , 000 men 100 , 000 men 100,000men100,000 \mathrm{men} in the field if a serious war broke out; he did not think they could be supplied. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} The General Staff was aware that the Chinese could interdict existing Russian lines of communication at any number of points, easily cutting off the rest of the Russian Far East. If the Chinese attacked the South Ussuri uezds in March, during the rasputitsa, it would take one and a half to two months for reinforcements from the Khabarovsk battalion to arrive; and Transbaikal Cossack units could not be mobilized for departure from Sretensk before May 1. Chinese troops could reach Pos’et from some points in Manchuria in as little as twelve to fifteen days. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
这一局势对俄国在远东战争中获胜的前景并不乐观。1891 年,在普里阿穆尔总督兼阿穆尔军区当然指挥官科尔夫男爵麾下的 24,000 名士兵中,仅有 60%具备有效战斗力,且他们还需负责中俄边境的防御。 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} 英国工程师亚瑟·约翰·巴里估算,若爆发大规模战争,俄军需投入 100 , 000 men 100 , 000 men 100,000men100,000 \mathrm{men} 的兵力,但他认为后勤补给无法保障。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} 总参谋部清楚,中国军队可在多处切断俄军现有交通线,轻易孤立俄远东其他地区。若中方选择在春季泥泞期(三月)进攻南乌苏里边区,哈巴罗夫斯克营的增援需耗时一个半至两个月才能抵达;而外贝加尔哥萨克部队最早也要到 5 月 1 日才能从斯列坚斯克完成动员开拔。中国军队从满洲某些据点出发,最短仅需十二至十五天即可抵达波西耶特港。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
Officials in St. Petersburg and in Siberia understood as early as 1875 that poor communications were at the root of Russia’s strategic weakness in the Far East. As a corrective measure, throughout the 1880’s they discussed construction of a railroad across Siberia or at least from Vladivostok to the Amur River, especially as the race for territory in the Pacific heated up and war seemed increasingly likely.
早在 1875 年,圣彼得堡和西伯利亚的官员们就意识到,远东地区通信不畅是俄罗斯战略弱势的根源。作为补救措施,整个 1880 年代,他们都在讨论修建一条横跨西伯利亚或至少从符拉迪沃斯托克至阿穆尔河的铁路,尤其是在太平洋地区领土争夺战愈演愈烈、战争似乎一触即发之际。

CHAPTERTWO  第二章

An Appetite for Asia
对亚洲的渴望

The dire deficiencies of the Russian settlement in the Far East forced the imperial government to face its vulnerability to foreign aggression in the Pacific region. The defensive strategy it developed was to rely on a vigorous offense; the construction of a Siberian railroad was seen as a means to that end.
俄罗斯在远东地区殖民地的严重缺陷迫使帝国政府直面其在太平洋区域易受外国侵略的脆弱性。其制定的防御策略是以攻为守;而西伯利亚铁路的建设被视为实现这一目标的手段。

Russia in the Pacific Rim
俄罗斯在环太平洋地区

Russia’s strategic position in the Far East had a dual dimension insofar as it was concerned with the extension of European rivalries in the area as well as local relationships, including the defense of the immense frontier with China. England and China were the two major threats to Russian interests and security in the region; the presence of other powers was slightly less worrisome until the mid-1890s.
俄国在远东的战略地位具有双重维度,既涉及欧洲列强在该地区竞争的延伸,也关乎包括与中国漫长边境防御在内的本地关系。英国和中国是该地区对俄罗斯利益与安全的两大主要威胁;直至 19 世纪 90 年代中期,其他列强的存在尚不构成太大忧虑。
Up till then the Russian government was not disturbed about the potential strength of its future antagonist, Japan. Russo-Japanese relations were by and large good, and St. Petersburg did not perceive Tokyo’s activities as threatening. In the mid-1880s, Russian and Japanese interests in Korea even tended to complement each other: Russian specialists were of the opinion that Japan might act in Korea to block English gains. The only fear was that Japan would acquire ports on the mainland; but as long as Japan was confined to its islands, the Russian government did not consider it a problem. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} One gets the
直到那时,俄国政府对其未来对手日本的潜在实力并不感到困扰。俄日关系总体良好,圣彼得堡并未将东京的行动视为威胁。19 世纪 80 年代中期,俄日在朝鲜的利益甚至呈现互补态势:俄国专家认为日本可能在朝鲜采取行动以遏制英国势力的扩张。唯一的担忧是日本可能获取大陆港口;但只要日本局限于其列岛,俄国政府便不视其为问题。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 人们可以感受到
sense that the Russian government, and even the military, viewed Japan’s development with equanimity -at least for the time being. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
俄国政府乃至军方对日本的发展持平静态度——至少在当时如此。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
European and American activity in the northern Pacific, however, had distressed Siberian officials as early as the 1780 s . 3 1780 s . 3 1780s.^(3)1780 \mathrm{~s} .^{3} By the midnineteenth century, the fiercely competitive intervention of the Western powers in the affairs of East Asia had commenced. Britain had annexed territory throughout Southeast Asia in the eighteenth century, and in 1842 , with the Treaty of Nanking and the end of the Opium Wars, it secured a foothold in China. France, Germany, and the United States were also active in the Pacific, either acquiring territories or working to open the region to their trade. By the treaties of Tientsin (1858), Chinese ports were opened to other European powers as well, including Russia.
早在 19 世纪中叶,欧美列强在北大平洋的活动就已令西伯利亚官员深感不安。当时西方列强对东亚事务的激烈竞争性干预已然开始。英国在 18 世纪吞并了东南亚大片领土,并于 1842 年通过《南京条约》和鸦片战争结束,在中国站稳了脚跟。法国、德国和美国也活跃于太平洋地区,或攫取领土,或致力于为该地区贸易打开门户。根据 1858 年《天津条约》,中国港口也向包括俄国在内的其他欧洲列强开放。
Established on the Pacific since the seventeenth century, Russia began in the mid-nineteenth century to acquire new territories in the Far East: the Amur oblast by the treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Maritime oblast by the treaty of Peking in 1860. Russia signed a trade treaty with Japan in 1855 immediately after Commodore Matthew Perry did so for the United States, and in 1875 Japan ceded Sakhalin Island to Russia in exchange for recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the central and northern Kurile Islands.
自十七世纪起便在太平洋沿岸立足的俄罗斯,于十九世纪中叶开始获取远东新领土:1858 年通过《瑷珲条约》获得阿穆尔州,1860 年通过《北京条约》获得滨海边疆区。紧随美国海军准将马修·佩里之后,俄罗斯于 1855 年与日本签订贸易条约,1875 年日本将萨哈林岛割让给俄罗斯,以换取俄方承认日本对千岛群岛中部及北部的主权。

Technological developments sped the process and gave the advantage in communications with the Far East to Western Europe and America, despite Russia’s geographical proximity. The development of efficient steamships in the 1840s and the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 directed trade more rapidly through the Indian Ocean than the previous overseas route. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Along with the American transcon-
技术发展加速了这一进程,并使西欧和美国在远东通讯方面占据优势,尽管俄罗斯在地理上更为接近。1840 年代高效蒸汽船的发展及 1869 年苏伊士运河的通航,使得贸易路线比以往的海上通道更快速地经由印度洋进行。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 随着美国横贯大陆...
Eastern Policy, 1881-1904 (Berkeley, 1958), 16-18. For more detailed background information on this period, see the introduction to George Alexander Lensen, Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884-1899 (Tallahassee, 1982), vol. 1.
东方政策,1881-1904 年(伯克利,1958 年),16-18 页。关于该时期更详细的背景信息,参见乔治·亚历山大·伦森《阴谋的平衡:朝鲜与满洲的国际竞争,1884-1899 年》(塔拉哈西,1982 年)第一卷的引言部分。

2. Malozemoff speculates that Japanese naval expansion may have been a factor in the decision to build the Siberian Railroad, but notes that there is no direct evidence to that effect (Russian Far Eastern Policy, 34-35). For this period in Russo-Japanese relations in general, see also George Alexander Lensen, “Japan and Tsarist Russia-the Changing Relationships, 1875-1917,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 10, no. 3 (October 1962): 337-338. Two Soviet sources incorrectly claim that the growth of Japanese power compelled the Russian government to build the Trans-Siberian Railroad: A. V. Pataleev, Istoriia stroitel’stva velikogo sibirskogo zheleznodorozhnogo puti (Khabarovsk, 1951), 9, and “Zheleznye dorogi,” in Sibirskaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 1 (Novosibirsk, 1929), 909.
2. 马洛泽莫夫推测日本海军扩张可能是决定修建西伯利亚铁路的一个因素,但指出没有直接证据支持这一观点(《俄罗斯远东政策》,34-35 页)。关于这一时期俄日关系的总体情况,另见乔治·亚历山大·伦森,《日本与沙俄——变化中的关系,1875-1917》,《东欧历史年鉴》10 卷 3 期(1962 年 10 月):337-338 页。两份苏联资料错误地宣称日本实力增长迫使俄国政府修建西伯利亚大铁路:A·V·帕塔列耶夫,《伟大西伯利亚铁路建设史》(哈巴罗夫斯克,1951 年),第 9 页;以及《铁路》,载《西伯利亚苏维埃百科全书》第 1 卷(新西伯利亚,1929 年),909 页。

3. E. L. Besprozvannykh, Priamur’e v sisteme russko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii XVIIseredina XIX v. (Moscow, 1983), 119.
3. E·L·别斯普罗兹万内赫,《17 世纪至 19 世纪中叶俄中关系体系中的阿穆尔地区》(莫斯科,1983 年),第 119 页。

4. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1981), 142-156; "Budushchie zheleznye dorogi iz
4. 丹尼尔·R·黑德里克,《帝国的工具:十九世纪技术与欧洲帝国主义》(纽约,1981 年),第 142-156 页;"未来通往……的铁路"

tinental railroads and talk of a Central American canal, these advances were a source of great concern to members of the Imperial Russian Technological Society. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} Russian trade and transport to Asia seemed insignificant, and the realization was made all the more galling by the fact that the greater part of Russian territory was in Asia.
大陆铁路的建设和中美洲运河的讨论,这些进展令俄罗斯帝国技术协会的成员深感忧虑。俄罗斯与亚洲的贸易和运输显得微不足道,而更令人恼火的是,俄罗斯的大部分领土实际上位于亚洲。
Russia’s trade position in the Pacific was decidedly weak. Germany, France, and England had all established rapid steamship service between their home ports and China and expanded their commercial representation there. By 1892 Hong Kong was almost as busy a port as London. English and German manufactures dominated the China market, and the United States was the main source of imported fish in China. Russia’s trade with China soon made up less than 6 percent of the total. Foreigners dominated trade not only in China but in the Russian Far East itself. Russia’s coastal trade virtually ceased to exist after the sale of Alaska, and the Chinese controlled the commerce in seaweed, the major export product from Vladivostok. Commercial fishing in Russia’s Pacific waters was in the hands of the Japanese and Americans. German ships carried 70 percent of the freight arriving at Nikolaevsk-na-Amure. Foreigners, most of them from San Francisco, conducted an overwhelming proportion of the trade in Nikolaevsk. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
俄罗斯在太平洋地区的贸易地位明显薄弱。德国、法国和英国均已开通本国港口与中国之间的快速汽船航线,并扩大了在华商业代表机构。到 1892 年,香港已成为与伦敦不相上下的繁忙港口。英国和德国的工业品主导着中国市场,美国则是中国进口鱼类产品的主要来源地。俄罗斯对华贸易额很快降至不足总量的 6%。不仅在中国,就连在俄远东本土,外国人也主导着贸易活动。阿拉斯加出售后,俄罗斯的沿海贸易几乎不复存在,而中国人掌控着海藻贸易——海藻是符拉迪沃斯托克的主要出口商品。俄罗斯太平洋水域的商业捕捞则由日本人和美国人掌控。德国船只承担了抵达尼古拉耶夫斯克(庙街)70%的货运量。在尼古拉耶夫斯克的贸易中,绝大多数由外国人(主要来自旧金山)经营。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
Russians could not help feeling that events were overtaking them. "The diverse interests of almost all European states, both Americas, China, and Japan are currently concentrated in the Pacific Ocean; the political center of gravity has shifted here from the Atlantic Ocean.’ 7 7 ^(')7{ }^{\prime} 7 Russians did not intend to let their position in the area deteriorate further:
俄罗斯人不禁感到事态发展已超出掌控。"几乎所有欧洲国家、南北美洲、中国和日本的多元利益如今都聚焦于太平洋;政治重心已从大西洋转移至此。" 7 7 ^(')7{ }^{\prime} 7 俄罗斯人决不允许自己在该地区的地位进一步恶化:
In the Pacific Ocean a feast of industry and trade is taking place. Among the European, American, and Asian guests, we have been assigned one of
太平洋上正上演着工业与贸易的盛宴。在欧洲、美洲和亚洲的宾客中,我们被分派到了
the prominent places. If at the moment we are sitting at the table but are not satisfying our appetites like the others, it does not necessarily imply that we are ready to excuse ourselves from the table. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
一个显要席位。即便此刻我们虽列席却未能像他人那样大快朵颐,但这绝不意味着我们准备主动离席。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
Asian experts on the General Staff clearly saw that the Russian position was precarious. The “promised land of European commerce” that was the Russian Far East was situated in so valuable a location that as foreign activity in the area expanded, the European countries gazed upon it with envy. “Because of its location on the Pacific Ocean, where the vital interests of many nations are concentrated, Priamur’e has great value in their eyes.” 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} Russia’s interests in the region were therefore at risk: “For Russia it is all the more important in that it has no [access to the] open seas in Europe.” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
总参谋部的亚洲专家们清醒地意识到,俄国的处境岌岌可危。作为"欧洲贸易的应许之地",俄罗斯远东地区因其战略位置极具价值,随着外国势力在该区域的扩张,欧洲列强无不投以觊觎的目光。"由于毗邻太平洋——多国核心利益的交汇点,阿穆尔沿岸地区在他们眼中意义重大。" 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 因此俄国在该地区的利益面临威胁:"对俄罗斯而言,这里尤为重要,因为它在欧洲没有出海口。" 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
Paradoxically, at the same time that the Russian General Staff saw Priamur’e as the source of Russia’s weakness and ineffectiveness in the Far East, its members were under the impression that it gave Russia preeminence in the Pacific and made the rest of the world envious enough to plan its joint conquest.
矛盾的是,当俄国总参谋部将阿穆尔沿岸地区视为俄国在远东软弱无力的根源时,其成员却同时认为该地区赋予了俄国在太平洋的霸主地位,并引来了世界各国联合征服的嫉妒图谋。

Russo-British Rivalry  俄英竞争

England emerged as Russia’s bete noire in the Pacific in the course of several incidents between 1850 and 1890, years of difficult, often hostile relations between the two powers in Europe and Asia. The threat was not limited to Russian interests in Asia; it was understood that if Russia found itself at war in Europe, its Far Eastern possessions would come under attack. Strength on the Pacific, therefore, meant strength in Europe. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
在 1850 至 1890 年间的一系列事件中,英格兰逐渐成为俄国在太平洋地区的眼中钉,这段时期两国在欧洲和亚洲的关系时常陷入紧张甚至敌对状态。威胁不仅限于俄国在亚洲的利益;人们意识到,若俄国在欧洲卷入战争,其远东领地也将遭受攻击。因此,太平洋地区的实力即意味着欧洲的实力。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
During the Crimean War, for instance, an Anglo-French naval force bombarded the Russian port of Petropavlovsk-na-Kamchatke and kept a presence afterward in the Sea of Okhotsk. The attack provided one motive for Murav’ev’s annexation of the Amur territory: to defend the coast from the interior. Murav’ev recognized the importance of overland communications, and as part of his strategy against the
例如克里米亚战争期间,一支英法联合舰队炮击了俄国堪察加半岛的彼得罗巴甫洛夫斯克港,并持续在鄂霍次克海保持军事存在。这次袭击成为穆拉维约夫吞并阿穆尔地区(即外东北)的动机之一:通过内陆来防卫海岸线。穆拉维约夫认识到陆路交通的重要性,并将其作为对抗...

8. Barabash, 103-104.  8. 巴拉巴什,第 103-104 页。
9. Ibid., 103; N. A. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” IIRGO 27 (1891): 26.
9. 同上,第 103 页;N·A·沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,IIRGO 27(1891 年):第 26 页。

10. Barabash, 106  10. 巴拉巴什,第 106 页
11. Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy,” 80 .
11. 马秋宁,《我们的邻居》,第 80 页。

12. Barabash, 106.  12. 巴拉巴什,第 106 页。
English he backed the proposal put forth in 1857-1858 by an American entrepreneur, P. M. Collins, for a railroad through Priamur’e. He lent his name to many other railroad schemes too, in the expectation that “for the naval powers it will be more threatening than one million troops and more dreadful than the unification of all the navies of Europe,” as one of the engineers devising a railroad on the Pacific put it. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
他支持了美国企业家 P·M·柯林斯在 1857-1858 年间提出的修建穿越阿穆尔地区铁路的提案。他还为众多其他铁路计划站台,正如一位设计太平洋铁路的工程师所言,他期待这条铁路"对海上强国构成的威胁将超过百万大军,其威慑力更甚于欧洲所有海军的联合"。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
From this point on, Russia and England were in constant competition for territory in Central Asia and the Far East. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} During the RussoTurkish War (1877-1878) they neared the brink of conflict. One element of England’s proposed strategy was to blockade Russia’s Pacific coast and strike at Vladivostok, using Chinese and Japanese ports as bases of operations. The Russians planned to counter with cruiser attacks on British merchant vessels, and for this purpose created the Volunteer Fleet in May 1878.15 The Volunteer Fleet was to serve as a merchant fleet, a means of conveyance for settlers, and an auxiliary naval force; in the eyes of Alexander III it was the “main weapon in our struggle with England.” 16 Once again the link between European relations and the Russian position in the Far East was made clear: “In 1877-1878, while clashing with Turkey, we had to prepare ourselves for war in Priamur’e.” 7 7 ^(')7{ }^{\prime} 7 The Volunteer Fleet was expected to foster military readiness, step up Russian activity in the area, and expedite Russian settlement of the territory.
从那时起,俄国与英国在中亚和远东地区持续展开领土争夺。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 1877-1878 年俄土战争期间,两国几乎濒临冲突边缘。英国拟定的战略之一是以中国和日本港口为作战基地,封锁俄国太平洋海岸并袭击符拉迪沃斯托克。俄国则计划通过袭击英国商船的巡洋舰行动进行反击,为此于 1878 年 5 月组建了志愿船队。这支船队兼具商船队、移民运输工具和海军辅助力量三重职能,在亚历山大三世眼中是"我们对抗英国的主要武器"。 7 7 ^(')7{ }^{\prime} 7 欧洲局势与俄国远东地位的关联再次凸显:"1877-1878 年与土耳其交锋时,我们不得不在阿穆尔地区备战"。志愿船队被寄予厚望:既能提升战备水平,又可加速俄国在该区域的军事活动并促进领土殖民进程。
The English threat continued to loom large in the next decade. Further Russian annexations in Central Asia, in particular the seizure of Merv in 1884, brought Russia threateningly close to Afghanistan, set up by the British in 1878-1879 as a protectorate to provide a buffer between India and an approaching Russia. Attempts to begin boundary negotiations failed and by February 1885 the two countries were again on the verge of war. The British especially feared Russian ac-
在接下来的十年里,英国的威胁依然如影随形。俄国在中亚的进一步扩张,尤其是 1884 年占领梅尔夫(Merv),使其逼近阿富汗——这个英国于 1878-1879 年建立的保护国,旨在为印度与步步紧逼的俄国之间提供缓冲地带。双方启动边界谈判的尝试均告失败,到 1885 年 2 月,两国再次濒临战争边缘。英国尤为担忧俄国的...
tions against Herat, which they considered the key to India. Russian and Afghan troops, the latter led by British officers, fought in the Penjdeh region.
他们对赫拉特的行动,视其为通往印度的关键。俄国和阿富汗军队在彭杰德地区交战,后者由英国军官指挥。
Britain was limited, however, in its ability to respond militarily against Russia if a war were to break out: British ships were prevented from entering the Black Sea by the collusion of Germany and Turkey, the former acting as an adherent of the Three Emperors’ League, the latter indignant at England’s seizure of Egypt. Britain’s only alternative was, again, to strike at Russia in the Far East. In April 1885 the order was given to occupy Port Hamilton off the coast of Korea, from which Vladivostok and Russia’s Pacific coast could be attacked in the event of war. Russian forces were nominal and British ships were in position to destroy Russian ships before the latter could begin operations against British trade. In September 1884 England had already planned to offer Korea protectorate status and occupy Port Hamilton, and by April 1885 it was a de facto British coaling station. Totally unprepared for any military activities in the Far East, Russia turned to diplomacy in a desperate quest to remove the British from Korea. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
然而,英国在军事上应对俄罗斯的能力受到限制:由于德国与土耳其的暗中勾结,英国舰船无法进入黑海——前者作为三皇同盟的拥护者,后者则因英国强占埃及而愤懑。英国唯一的替代方案仍是向远东的俄罗斯发起攻击。1885 年 4 月,英国下令占领朝鲜海岸外的汉密尔顿港,一旦战争爆发,便可从此处攻击符拉迪沃斯托克及俄罗斯太平洋沿岸。俄军兵力薄弱,英国舰队更可先发制人摧毁俄方舰船,使其无法威胁英国贸易。早在 1884 年 9 月,英国已计划将朝鲜变为保护国并占领汉密尔顿港,至 1885 年 4 月该港已成为事实上的英国加煤站。俄罗斯对远东军事行动毫无准备,只得转向外交手段,竭力试图将英国逐出朝鲜。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
The situation was aggravated by the imminent completion of the Canadian-Pacific Railroad, which would cut the journey between England and Japan from the fifty-two days it took through the Suez Canal to thirty-seven days, and London expected to make use of it to concentrate its forces against Vladivostok. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} Voloshinov wrote (distorting the truth) that England built and financed the Canadian-Pacific Railroad and in addition was subsidizing steamer transport on the Pacific Ocean. He and others regarded the Siberian Railroad as a means of countering these seemingly ominous developments. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} It
局势因加拿大太平洋铁路即将竣工而进一步恶化,该铁路将使英国至日本的旅程从经苏伊士运河所需的 52 天缩短至 37 天。伦敦方面预期利用这条铁路集结兵力对抗符拉迪沃斯托克(海参崴)。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 沃洛希诺夫写道(歪曲事实地称),英国不仅出资修建了加拿大太平洋铁路,还补贴太平洋上的汽船运输。他与其他人都将西伯利亚铁路视为应对这些看似不祥事态发展的手段。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
was soon after the Afghan affair that the Committee of Ministers accepted the indispensability of the project. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
就在阿富汗事件后不久,大臣委员会承认了该项目的不可或缺性。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
A strategy based on railroad construction had a recent precedent. In connection with the Afghan crisis, the tsar ordered General M. N. Annenkov in June 1885 to extend construction of the Transcaspian Railroad along the Afghan border, from Kizyl-Arvat through Merv to Chardzhou. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} His hope was that the railroad, besides aiding in the subjugation of the native tribes, would also enable Russia to put pressure on English interests in India through Afghanistan. As A. G. Jomini, a chief aid to the Russian foreign minister, stated, the Transcaspian Railroad would “furnish [Russia] with a base of operations against England . . should the British government, by the occupation of Herat, threaten our present position in Central Asia.” 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
以铁路建设为基础的战略已有先例可循。在阿富汗危机期间,沙皇于 1885 年 6 月下令 M. N. 安年科夫将军将外里海铁路沿阿富汗边境从克孜勒-阿尔瓦特经梅尔夫延伸至查尔朱。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 他期望这条铁路不仅能协助征服当地部落,还能让俄罗斯通过阿富汗对英国在印度的利益施压。正如俄罗斯外交部长首席助理 A. G. 乔米尼所言,外里海铁路将为俄国提供"对抗英国的作战基地……倘若英国政府通过占领赫拉特威胁我国在中亚的现有地位"。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
Still another dimension to relations with the British involved China. Russia sensed that England and other Western powers were attempting to turn China against it. At the time of the Afghan crisis, British representatives in China actively sought to rally Chinese and Japanese diplomatic and military support against Russia. In exchange for acquiescence in the occupation of Port Hamilton, England offered China assistance in regaining from Russia the strategically important slice of territory fronting on Pos’et Bay, which gave Russia its border with Korea. There was also evidence that English and German influence was behind Chinese plans to build a strategic railroad through Manchuria to a point on the border of Russia’s Ussuri region. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} In Voloshinov’s mind, the Chinese thus far seemed to have remained indifferent to foreign press reports that Russia was vulnerable in the Far East and that possession of the South Ussuri region would be advantageous to China. But he was certain that they would not resist temptation much longer. The Siberian Railroad, he asserted, was necessary to preserve the centuries-old friendship between China and Russia: Russian strength would give China the sense not to heed the “malicious counsels” of the Europeans. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
与英国关系的另一个层面涉及中国。俄罗斯察觉到英国和其他西方列强正试图挑拨中国与其对立。在阿富汗危机期间,英国驻华代表积极寻求中日在外交和军事上支持对抗俄罗斯。作为默许英国占领汉密尔顿港的交换条件,英国向中国提供协助,帮助其从俄罗斯手中夺回面向波谢特湾的战略要地,该地区是俄罗斯与朝鲜的边界。还有证据表明,英国和德国的影响推动了中国计划修建一条穿越满洲的战略铁路,直达俄罗斯乌苏里地区的边境。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 在沃洛希诺夫看来,迄今为止,中国似乎对外国媒体报道俄罗斯在远东地区脆弱以及中国控制南乌苏里地区将有利可图的消息保持冷漠。但他确信,中国不会长久抵制这种诱惑。 他坚称,西伯利亚铁路对于维系中俄之间延续数世纪的友谊至关重要:俄国的实力将让中国有足够的判断力不去听从欧洲人的“恶意挑唆”。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}

Beyond the Chinese Border
中国边界之外

To a large extent it was the presence of China that brought about the clamor for the Siberian Railroad within Russian military circles. For two centuries, from the beginning of Russo-Chinese relations, despite thousands of miles of shared border, relations between the two countries had remained peaceful and without major incident. Military demands elsewhere minimized the attention given Siberia by the Russian military. The number of troops was insignificant, only a few battalions in all of Siberia. Russia had given little thought to the defense of its border with China. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
很大程度上正是中国的存在,引发了俄罗斯军界内部对西伯利亚铁路的强烈呼声。两个世纪以来,自俄中关系伊始,尽管两国共享数千英里的边界,双方关系始终和平无重大冲突。由于军事力量分散于其他地区,俄国军方对西伯利亚的关注微乎其微。驻军数量极少,整个西伯利亚仅寥寥几个营。俄国几乎未曾考虑过中俄边境的防御问题。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
Benign neglect was no longer possible after the Ili (or Kuldja) crisis. In 1864 a Muslim revolt in Sinkiang against Chinese rule came under the leadership of Yakub Beg, who, backed by the British, hoped to reunite Russian Turkestan with his newly proclaimed emirate. In 1871, when his troops threatened Kuldja, near the Russian border, Russian forces moved in and took control of the town and the surrounding Ili valley, assuring the Chinese government that the occupation would be only temporary. By 1878, after Yakub Beg was dead and the Chinese had repressed the rebellion, the territory still remained in the hands of the Russians, who in the unequal treaty of Livadia (1879) offered to return some of it for a huge payment and various trade concessions. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
伊犁(或固尔扎)危机之后,再也不能袖手旁观了。1864 年,新疆爆发了反对中国统治的穆斯林起义,由雅各布·贝格领导,他在英国的支持下,希望将俄罗斯突厥斯坦与他新宣布的埃米尔国重新统一。1871 年,当他的军队威胁到靠近俄罗斯边境的固尔扎时,俄军进驻并控制了该镇及周边的伊犁河谷,向中国政府保证占领只是暂时的。到了 1878 年,雅各布·贝格已死,中国镇压了叛乱,但该地区仍掌握在俄罗斯人手中。在《里瓦几亚条约》(1879 年)这一不平等条约中,俄罗斯提出归还部分领土,但要求巨额赔款和各种贸易特许权。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
The issue was eventually resolved through diplomacy to China’s benefit, but only because the insulting treaty had led to an outcry for war against Russia in a China overly confident in the wake of its reforms and recent successes against internal rebellion. The Russians decided it would be in their best interest to accept the Chinese demands because, besides having their own domestic troubles, they viewed the prospect of victory over China as uncertain: the Russians exaggerated China’s military strength, as did the rest of the world at the time. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} Potential conflict was averted with the signing of the Treaty
这一问题最终通过外交途径以有利于中国的方式得到解决,但这只是因为那份侮辱性条约在中国引发了对俄宣战的强烈呼声——彼时的中国因改革及近期平定内乱的胜利而信心高涨。俄国人判定接受中方要求最符合自身利益,一方面由于国内困境,另一方面他们认为战胜中国的前景并不明朗:与当时世界各国一样,俄国高估了中国的军事实力。随着《条约》的签署,潜在冲突得以避免。
of St. Petersburg in 1881 and the transfer of Ili to China in 1882. But the threat by China’s war party stunned Russia’s leaders into a sudden awareness of the strategic sensitivity of their border with China.
1881 年圣彼得堡的刺杀事件和 1882 年伊犁归还中国。但中国主战派的威胁令俄国领导人猛然意识到与中国接壤边境的战略敏感性。
During the Ili crisis itself there was apprehension at the highest level that Vladivostok and the Maritime oblast were vulnerable to Chinese attack. The State Council, under its chairman, Grand Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich, discussed moving the naval base from Vladivostok further north to Ol Ol Ol^(')\mathrm{Ol}^{\prime} ga for security reasons, but War Minister D. A. Miliutin rejected the idea on the grounds that it would imply the abandonment of Vladivostok, which would have to be defended in any case. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} In the wake of the crisis, the Russian military steadily increased the number of troops in the Far East, beginning a process that continued until 1917. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} Still, the financial resources of the Treasury were overstretched and the military authorities felt the increased numbers were insufficient. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
在伊犁危机期间,高层曾担忧符拉迪沃斯托克(海参崴)及滨海边疆区易受中国攻击。国务会议主席康斯坦丁·尼古拉耶维奇大公曾以安全为由提议将海军基地从符拉迪沃斯托克北迁至 Ol Ol Ol^(')\mathrm{Ol}^{\prime} ga,但陆军大臣 D.A.米柳京以"无论如何都必须保卫符拉迪沃斯托克"为由否决了该方案。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 危机结束后,俄军持续增派远东驻军,这一进程一直延续至 1917 年。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} 尽管如此,国库财政捉襟见肘,军方仍认为增兵规模不足。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
Throughout the next decade events in China added to the concern of Russian officials, who theorized that even a weak power such as China could become a strong military threat in a short time. In the war between France and China (1884-1885) French naval victories forced the Chinese to recognize French control over Tonkin and Annam in Indochina. The defeat was humiliating for the overconfident Chinese, and the government drifted into torpor, leaving the nation unprepared to face the Japanese in 1894-1895. At the time, though, China’s weakness was not apparent, and the fact that the Chinese forces had defeated the French on land distressed the Russians. The backers of reform in China, spearheaded by Li Hung-chang since the 1860s, saw the Franco-Chinese conflict as further justification of their desire to revamp the navy and reorganize the army on Prussian lines, as re-
在接下来的十年里,中国发生的事件加剧了俄国官员的忧虑,他们认为即便像中国这样孱弱的国家也可能在短期内成为强大的军事威胁。中法战争(1884-1885 年)期间,法国海军的胜利迫使清政府承认其对印度支那东京(北圻)和安南的统治权。这场惨败让过度自信的清廷蒙受耻辱,政府陷入昏聩无为的状态,导致 1894-1895 年面对日本时毫无准备。不过当时中国的颓势尚未完全显现,清军曾在陆战击败法军的事实更令俄国人深感不安。自 1860 年代李鸿章主导的洋务派,将中法冲突视为其按普鲁士模式重整海军、改革陆军的进一步理据。
ported by the Russian General Staff. Reform of the military was soon well under way. The Chinese brought in European instructors, set up military arsenals, established defense industries, and put up telegraph lines. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} These endeavors troubled the governor general of Priamur’e, Baron Korf. In 1887 he cited the evidence of Chinese modernization as justifying construction of the Siberian Railroad, so that large numbers of troops could be sent to the Russian Far East. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
由俄国总参谋部引进。军事改革随即迅速展开。中国人聘请了欧洲教官,建立了军火库,设立了国防工业,并架设了电报线路。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 这些举措令普里阿穆尔总督科尔夫男爵深感忧虑。1887 年,他以中国现代化的迹象为由,论证了修建西伯利亚铁路的必要性,以便向俄国远东地区大规模调遣军队。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
Chinese activity in Manchuria gathered steam at the same time, still further pressuring Russian defenses. The Chinese organized steamship traffic on the Sungari and Amur rivers as part of their program to settle the border region as rapidly as possible. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} Contrary to longstanding policy, which was to leave Manchuria relatively unsettled to serve as an empty buffer between China and Russia, the government now promoted migration there. The Chinese were literally moving masses of settlers opposite Russian settlements in both oblasts of Priamur’e. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} By 1890, according to one alarming (if embellished) military estimate, "in Manchuria there are more than 10 million while in all of the Maritime oblast there are fewer than 100,000 ."36 It seemed that the Chinese right bank of the Amur would not long remain underpopulated. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37}
中国在满洲的活动也同时加速,进一步对俄国的防御构成压力。中国组织松花江和阿穆尔河上的轮船运输,作为其尽快定居边境地区计划的一部分。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 与长期政策相反,即让满洲相对无人居住,作为中俄之间的空旷缓冲地带,政府现在鼓励向那里移民。中国人实际上正在向滨海边疆区的两个州对面的俄罗斯定居点大规模迁移。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 到 1890 年,根据一项令人担忧(如果有所夸大)的军事估计,“满洲有超过 1000 万人,而整个滨海边疆区不到 10 万人。”36 看来,阿穆尔河的中国一侧不会长期人烟稀少。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37}
Colonel Ia. F. Barabash interpreted the situation to mean that the Chinese considered themselves strong and ready to confront Russia. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} Hand in hand with the Manchurian settlers, he asserted, would come the Chinese military; as indeed they did. The Chinese reorganized and reinforced their Manchurian forces to the number of 85,000 men. They created the North China fleet and established the naval base soon to be named Port Arthur. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} The newspaper Novoe vremia also reported that the Chinese government was directing the Chinese
亚·F·巴拉巴什上校解读局势认为,这表明中国人自视强大且准备与俄罗斯对抗。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} 他断言,紧随满洲移民而来的将是中国军队;事实也的确如此。中国人重组并加强了满洲驻军,兵力达 8.5 万人。他们创建了北洋舰队,并建立了不久后被命名为旅顺港的海军基地。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} 《新时代报》还报道称,中国政府正在指挥中国...

32. Voloshinov, Neskol’ko slov, 18-19; Hsü, Ili Crisis, 192-193; Skal’kovskii, Vneshniaia politika, 559; “Reorganizatsiia kitaiskoi armii i flota,” in General’nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 24 (1886), 251, 254.
32. 沃洛希诺夫,《几句话》,18-19 页;徐中约,《伊犁危机》,192-193 页;斯卡利科夫斯基,《对外政策》,559 页;《中国陆军和海军的重组》,载总参谋部《亚洲文集》第 24 卷(1886 年),251、254 页。

33. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no, comp. V. M. Verkhovskii (St. Petersburg, 1899), 460.
33. 交通部,《俄罗斯铁路发展历史概述(自铁路兴建至 1897 年)》,维·姆·维尔霍夫斯基编(圣彼得堡,1899 年),460 页。

34. Ibid.  34. 同上。
35. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 22.
35. 马洛泽莫夫,《俄罗斯远东政策》,第 22 页。

36. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 15. In the two provinces of northern Manchuria bordering on Russia, the estimated population in 1900 was more likely between 2 and 4 million, according to both David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia (New Haven, 1949), 13-14, and a contemporary source, E. I. Martynov, Rabota nashikh zheleznodorozhnykh del’tsov v Manchzhurii (Moscow, 1914), 7.
36. 沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 15 页。根据大卫·J·达林《亚洲的俄罗斯崛起》(纽黑文,1949 年)第 13-14 页和同时代资料 E·I·马尔蒂诺夫《我国铁路投机者在满洲的活动》(莫斯科,1914 年)第 7 页的记载,1900 年与俄罗斯接壤的北满两省人口估计更可能在 200 万至 400 万之间。

37. Evtiugin, 214.  37. 叶夫秋金,第 214 页。
38. Barabash, 107-109.  38. 巴拉巴什,第 107-109 页。
39. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 22-23.
39. 马洛泽莫夫,《俄国远东政策》,第 22-23 页。

robber bands known as the hung hu tze against Russian settlements to destabilize the region before troops were sent in to seize it. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
被称为"红胡子"的土匪团伙袭扰俄国居民点以动摇该地区,随后俄军便出兵占领。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
But if there was one thing that symbolized the multifarious Chinese threat to the Russians, it was plans to construct a railroad in Manchuria, which, as we have seen, had European backing. The Chinese began to build railroads in earnest in 1886. The Manchurian Railroad was conceived largely in response to Russia’s deliberation over the Siberian Railroad and was planned to run in several branches through Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar to points on the Russian border near Blagoveshchensk and Pos’et. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} The Russian General Staff paid careful attention to the progress of these plans. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} Foreign Minister N. K. Giers, in a letter of May 1891 to the finance minister, I. A. Vyshnegradskii, in which he stressed the importance of the Siberian Railroad for reasons of defense, expressed Russian sentiment about the Manchurian railroads: in collusion with a foreign power, China could conceivably use them to annex Russian Priamur’e. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
但如果说有什么最能体现中国人对俄国人构成的复杂威胁,那就是在满洲修建铁路的计划——正如我们所见,该计划获得了欧洲支持。中国自 1886 年开始大力兴建铁路。满洲铁路的构想很大程度上是对俄国筹建西伯利亚铁路的回应,其规划线路包括多条支线,经奉天、吉林和齐齐哈尔延伸至布拉戈维申斯克与波西耶特附近的俄边境地带。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} 俄军总参谋部密切关注着这些计划的进展。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} 外交部长 N·K·吉尔斯在 1891 年 5 月致财政部长 I·A·维什涅格拉茨基的信中强调西伯利亚铁路对国防的重要性时,表达了俄国对满洲铁路的忧虑:中国可能与外国势力勾结,利用这些铁路吞并俄国的阿穆尔沿岸地区。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
Giers’s letter reflected the Russian attitude not only toward the Chinese railroads but toward China as a whole by the late 1880s and early 1890s. Northern Manchuria was blocked from the sea by Russian territory, and it would be senseless for the Chinese government to develop it without access to the oceans. Hence the logical conclusion, perhaps projected from Russian tactics onto the Chinese, was that the Chinese government would attempt to seize Pos’et and Vladivostok, then all of the territory gained by Russia in the Treaty of Peking; that is, everything “that constitutes the whole value of our Priamur possessions.” Barabash wrote in 1883 that Chinese revanchism was a “black cloud on the horizon of relations with China.” 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} Captain Evtiugin, writing in 1885, was of the "deep conviction that military conflict with
格尔斯的信件反映了 19 世纪 80 年代末至 90 年代初俄国不仅对中国铁路的态度,也体现了其对中国的整体看法。北满地区被俄国领土阻隔,无法通往海洋,中国政府若无法获得出海口,开发该地区便毫无意义。因此,俄国人从自身策略出发,推演出一个合乎逻辑的结论:中国政府可能会试图夺取波谢特和海参崴,进而夺回《北京条约》中俄国获得的所有领土——即"构成我们阿穆尔领地全部价值的"一切。巴拉巴什在 1883 年写道,中国的复仇主义是"中俄关系地平线上的一朵乌云"。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} 叶夫秋金上尉在 1885 年撰文时"深信与中国的军事冲突"
China is inevitable and, what’s more, in the not too distant future. We will be forced to this by necessity and, it goes without saying, we should always be prepared." 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} For Voloshinov, Chinese revanchism placed Russo-Chinese relations on unstable ground: “Just one spark is needed to blow up the whole powder magazine.” "46
中国是不可避免的,而且在不远的将来更是如此。我们将被迫出于必要性采取行动,不言而喻,我们应当时刻做好准备。" 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} 对沃洛希诺夫而言,中国的复仇主义使俄中关系处于不稳定基础之上:"只需一点火星就能引爆整个火药库。" "46
There was some evidence to back such claims. The British had offered the Chinese support in seizing Russian territory, and the Russian ambassador to China, S. I. Popov, was told by a Chinese general that for reasons of security it was essential for Russia to cede the area around Pos’et to China. Nevertheless, Li Hung-chang’s military reforms made only cosmetic improvements, and Chinese activities in Manchuria were aimed largely at gaining control of events in Korea rather than against Russia. On the whole, China tended to support Russia while mistrusting England and Japan. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} It seems that Russian perceptions of a Chinese threat had little empirical foundation and were based on an unrealistic fear of numbers. In an era of heightened great-power rivalry, the presence of 300 million Chinese on the other side of Russia’s unguarded Far Eastern frontier was difficult to disregard. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
有证据支持这类说法。英国人曾支持中国夺取俄国领土,俄国驻华大使 S.I.波波夫从一位中国将领处获悉,出于安全考虑,俄国必须将波谢特周边地区割让给中国。然而李鸿章的军事改革仅流于表面,中国在满洲的行动主要旨在控制朝鲜局势而非对抗俄国。总体而言,中国倾向于支持俄国,同时对英国和日本心存戒备。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} 可见俄国对华威胁的认知缺乏实证基础,更多源于对人口数量的非理性恐惧。在列强角逐加剧的时代,三亿中国人紧邻俄国毫无设防的远东边境,这一事实令人难以忽视。 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}

A Russian Railroad in the Far East
远东的俄国铁路

As military strategists throughout the 1880s discussed construction of a railroad across Siberia, or at the very least from Vladivostok to the Amur River, their ostensible intent was to enhance the defense of Russian territory; but official perceptions of the railroad presupposed that it would also be the means to an offensive, “forward” policy in China.
19 世纪 80 年代,军事战略家们讨论建设横跨西伯利亚的铁路,或至少从符拉迪沃斯托克延伸至阿穆尔河时,其表面目的是加强俄国领土的防御;但官方对这条铁路的预期还包含将其作为对中国实施“前进”攻势政策的工具。

Some officers opposed construction of a railroad as wasteful or feared that it would benefit the military and economic activities of foreigners. Reflecting, for the time being, a lack of concern about Tokyo and its potential ability to restrict access to the Sea of Japan, they argued that a strong Pacific fleet based in Vladivostok, having free exit to the seas, would serve well to counter foreign threats and
部分军官反对修建铁路,认为这是浪费资源,或担心它会助长外国人的军事和经济活动。他们当时对东京及其可能限制日本海通道的能力并不担忧,主张以符拉迪沃斯托克为基地的强大太平洋舰队若能自由出入海洋,便足以应对外来威胁。

45. Evtiugin, 218.  45. 叶夫秋金,第 218 页。
46. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 26-27.
46. 沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,26-27 页。

47. Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 386, 391, 421-422; Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 23.
47. 纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,386、391、421-422 页;马洛泽莫夫,《俄国远东政策》,23 页。

48. “‘O narodonaselenii Sibiri i o velikoi vostochnoi zheleznoi doroge,’ (Doklad professora E. Iu. Petri i beseda v VIII otdele IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 33-34: 278.
48. “关于西伯利亚人口与东方大铁路的报告”(E. Iu. 彼得里教授在 IRTO 第八分部的演讲及讨论),《铁路杂志》,1888 年,第 33-34 期:278 页。


provision the troops. As for transport within Siberia, General I. I. Filipenko suggested that improvements in the existing water routes would be sufficient. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
为部队提供补给。至于西伯利亚境内的运输,I. I. 菲利片科将军认为改善现有水路即可满足需求。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}

The opponents of the railroad thus favored expansion of Russian naval power in the Pacific. They were in the minority, though, and the land-based strategy first implemented by Murav’ev-Amurskii predominated. The Russian military had learned from experience. The usefulness of Russian railroads in battle against Afghan troops in Central Asia proved their importance for the Far East. Past mistakes were also not forgotten. Inadequacies of the railroad network during the Russo-Turkish War had hindered the transport of troops and supplies. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} Voloshinov repeated over and over that Russia should show it had learned the lesson of the Crimean War; lacking railroads, Vladivostok would be as exposed as Sevastopol’ had been. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
铁路的反对者因此主张扩大俄国在太平洋的海军力量。但他们属于少数派,而由穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基首倡的陆基战略仍占据主导。俄国军方从经验中汲取教训——在中亚对抗阿富汗军队时,俄铁在实战中的价值证明了其对远东的重要性。过去的失误亦未被遗忘:俄土战争期间铁路网络的缺陷曾阻碍部队与物资运输。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} 沃洛希诺夫反复强调,俄国应展现其已从克里米亚战争中吸取教训;若无铁路,符拉迪沃斯托克将如塞瓦斯托波尔般暴露无援。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
By the mid-1880s, many government officials were clamoring for the Siberian Railroad as vital to the nation’s strategic interests. Proponents of the railroad were well aware of the contemporary axiom that success in war comes to the side that most quickly concentrates the largest numbers in the field. Russia’s inferiority in numbers could be corrected by construction of the Ussuri and Transbaikal railroads. Inextricably bound to the transport of troops was the need to provision them locally and end the region’s dependence on Manchuria for grain. Only as part of a longer railroad stretching across the length of Siberia would the sections east of Lake Baikal accomplish these strategic tasks. 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
到 19 世纪 80 年代中期,许多政府官员疾呼西伯利亚铁路对国家战略利益至关重要。铁路的支持者们深谙当时的一条军事公理:战争中的胜利往往属于能最快在战场集结最多兵力的一方。俄罗斯在兵力数量上的劣势可以通过建设乌苏里和外贝加尔铁路来弥补。与军队运输密不可分的是就地补给的需求,以结束该地区对满洲谷物的依赖。只有作为横贯西伯利亚全境的更长铁路线的一部分,贝加尔湖以东的铁路段才能完成这些战略任务。 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
Because the railroad would enable Russia to secure a firm foothold on the Pacific coast, the future foreign minister V. N. Lamzdorf was convinced of its necessity by 1890 :
由于这条铁路将使俄罗斯能够在太平洋沿岸站稳脚跟,未来的外交部长 V·N·拉姆斯多夫在 1890 年便确信其必要性:
Instead of colonies, which all other powers search for at the antipodes, we have one alongside us and do not know how to make use of it; . . if the conviction that we are weak spreads and takes root on the distant borders [of the Far East], in the near future we will witness the rise of
与其他列强在遥远彼岸寻找殖民地不同,我们身边就有一个却不知如何利用;……如果关于我们实力薄弱的认知在远东边境扩散并扎根,不久的将来我们将目睹……
  1. Ibid., 281; “‘O naivygodneishem napravlenii magistral’noi i nepreryvnoi vserossiiskoi velikoi vostochnoi zheleznoi dorogi’ (Soobshchenie kontr-admirala N. V. Kopytova na tekhnicheskoi besede v IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 2-4: 28. See also Barabash, 104.
    同上,第 281 页;《关于全俄大东方铁路干线最有利方向及连续性的讨论》(海军少将 N·V·科佩托夫在俄国技术协会技术座谈会上的报告),《铁路杂志》1888 年第 2-4 期:第 28 页。另见巴拉巴什,第 104 页。
  2. Kuropatkin, Russian Army, 1:27, 29, 86.
    库罗帕特金,《俄罗斯军队》,第 1 卷:27、29、86 页。
  3. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 27, 36, and Neskol’ko slov, 4; TIRTO, 2:11-12.
    沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 27、36 页,及《简论》,第 4 页;《俄国技术协会会刊》,第 2 卷:第 11-12 页。
  4. S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i i ii nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903), 34, 68-71, 73; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 316, 443, 452-453, 457, 461, 464-467, 501; ZhMPS, official section, 1893, no. 2: 9, 12-13.
    S·V·萨布勒与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基合著,《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概览》,A·N·库洛姆津编(圣彼得堡,1903 年),第 34、68-71、73 页;《交通部历史概览》,第 316、443、452-453、457、461、464-467、501 页;《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:第 9、12-13 页。

    immense problems in the Orient, like waves in the ocean which engulf everything in their way. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
    东方世界面临的巨大难题,如同海洋中的波涛,吞噬沿途的一切。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
If the railroad was to bring strength to the Russian Far East, it was to do so by enhancing the region’s defensive capabilities. It was a purely precautionary measure, according to Giers:
若铁路旨在增强俄罗斯远东地区的实力,其途径便是通过提升该地区的防御能力。据吉尔所言,这纯粹是一项预防性措施:
The Chinese may not now have any hostile intentions against Russia, but Russia can never be certain that such ideas may not hereafter enter their heads, especially if we are brought into collision with any of the European naval powers. In this event the possessions of Russia in Eastern Siberia, cut off as they now are seven months out of the twelve every year, would be in an exceedingly precarious position. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
中国人目前或许对俄罗斯并无敌意,但俄罗斯永远无法确定他们日后不会产生此类念头,尤其是当我们与欧洲海上强国发生冲突时。在这种情况下,俄罗斯东西伯利亚的属地,如今每年有七个月处于隔绝状态,将处于极其危险的境地。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
The railroad would create a strong defense but was not expected to alarm the Chinese. General D. G. Anuchin, governor general of Eastern Siberia from 1879 to 1885, explained that during the war scare in 1880, it became apparent that transporting troops to the Far East and maintaining them there would be difficult and expensive. At the same time, no one wanted a large contingent of Russian troops permanently stationed in the region, lest it intimidate the Chinese and threaten the peace. This reasoning led to the idea of building a railroad and improving water routes so that troops could be transported to the area on a temporary, emergency basis. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}
这条铁路将提供强大的防御,但预计不会惊动中国。1879 至 1885 年间担任东西伯利亚总督的 D·G·阿努钦将军解释道,在 1880 年的战争恐慌期间,人们清楚地认识到向远东运送并维持军队既困难又昂贵。与此同时,没有人希望在该地区永久驻扎大批俄国军队,以免威吓中国并威胁和平。这一思路促成了修建铁路并改善水路的构想,以便能在紧急情况下临时向该地区调遣部队。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}
If Anuchin’s desire to preserve China’s friendship had been sincere, within a few years the proclamations to this effect rang false. The reactionary newspaper Grazhdanin (Citizen) wrote that the Siberian Railroad would guarantee quiet with Russia’s “menacing neighbor.” 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} In the view of Admiral N. V. Kopytov, China’s great and peaceful civilization was based on the family unit, which encouraged cooperation rather than hostility between individuals. Conversion to Christianity could make it an even greater nation, and to help bestow this benefit upon China he proposed the construction of a railroad through Chinese territory linking Abagaityi, on the Russo-MongolianManchurian border, with Vladivostok. Manchuria was the most direct
如果阿努钦维护中俄友谊的愿望是真诚的,那么几年后这类声明就显得虚伪了。反动报纸《公民报》写道,西伯利亚铁路将确保与俄罗斯"咄咄逼人的邻国"相安无事。 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} 海军上将 N·V·科佩托夫认为,中国伟大而和平的文明建立在家庭单位之上,这促进了个体间的合作而非敌对。皈依基督教可能使其成为一个更伟大的国家,为了帮助中国获得这一福祉,他提议修建一条穿越中国领土的铁路,将俄蒙满边境的阿巴盖图与符拉迪沃斯托克连接起来。满洲是最直接的

53. V. N. Lamzdorf, Dnevnik V. N. Lamzdorfa (1886-1890) (Moscow/Leningrad, 1926), 182.
53. V·N·拉姆斯多夫,《V·N·拉姆斯多夫日记(1886-1890)》(莫斯科/列宁格勒,1926 年),第 182 页。

54. Times, May 30, 1891, p. 7.
54. 《泰晤士报》,1891 年 5 月 30 日,第 7 版。

55. TIRTO, 2:6.  55. TIRTO,第 2 卷第 6 页。
56. Quoted in Novoe vremia, July 20, 1890, p. 1.
56. 引自《新时代报》,1890 年 7 月 20 日,第 1 版。

route, and, as he proclaimed, “great deeds befit great nations!” 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} His proposal is the direct forerunner of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad.
路线,正如他所宣称的,“伟大的国家当有伟大的作为!” 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} 他的提议直接催生了中东铁路的构想。
The idea that the Siberian Railroad should be built through Chinese territory was the logical culmination of strategic thinking about the Far East in the 1880s: the railroad was a key part of the vigorous offense that was the best defense. To thwart Chinese designs on the Russian Far East and preserve Russian political influence in Asia, Russia should get the upper hand by preparing to invade Manchuria. 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} Barabash, who had been promoted to general major and named commander of local forces and military governor of Transbaikal oblast, asserted that Manchuria’s geographical location made it “our natural property.” 59 Accordingly, he had studied in detail all potential operational lines for a Russian invasion of Manchuria. 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60} Evtiugin advanced a similar proposal for the occupation of Mongolia. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} The pro-government paper Novoe vremia suggested that when the Siberian Railroad was built, Russia could, if necessary, encourage the revolt of China’s Mongol and Muslim populations. 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}
西伯利亚铁路应穿越中国领土而建的想法,是 19 世纪 80 年代远东战略思维的必然结果:铁路作为积极防御的核心,是最佳防御手段。为遏制中国对俄远东的图谋并维持俄国在亚洲的政治影响力,俄国应通过准备入侵满洲取得先机。 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} 已晋升为少将并被任命为外贝加尔州地方部队指挥官兼军事总督的巴拉巴什声称,满洲的地理位置使其成为“我们天然的领土”。59 因此,他详细研究了俄军入侵满洲的所有可能作战路线。 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60} 叶夫秋金则提出了占领蒙古的类似方案。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} 亲政府报纸《新时代报》暗示,西伯利亚铁路建成后,俄国必要时可煽动中国蒙古族与穆斯林民众起义。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}
The advantages of using Chinese territory for Russian nonmilitary transport needs were also cited. To outdo Europe’s advantage on the seas, a writer in Zheleznodorozhnoe delo (Railroad affairs) proposed
利用中国领土满足俄罗斯非军事运输需求的优势也被提及。为了超越欧洲在海上的优势,《铁路事务》杂志的一位撰稿人提出

57. “O naivygodneishem napravlenii,” Z h d D , 1888 Z h d D , 1888 ZhdD,1888Z h d D, 1888, nos. 2-4:13-27. Kopytov put forth his plan for a Siberian railroad as an alternative to the official route developed in the Ministry of Transport. Its eastern portion would run through China (the route eventually adopted by the government); its western portion was to take a more southerly route. The major station stops, from west to east, were to be Orenburg, Orsk, Atbassar, Akmolinsk, Pavlodar, Biisk, Minusinsk, Nizhneudinsk, Irkutsk, Troitskosavsk, Abagaityi, Hailar, Tsitsihar, Kirin, Ningguta, Nikol’skoe, and Vladivostok. Kopytov’s intention was to build a railroad not purely for the limited use of Siberia, but to serve all of northern Asia. This region, he asserted, had a far brighter future than did Siberia with its tundra, where even potatoes could not grow and for whose needs the rivers and post road would suffice.
57. “关于最有利的路线方向”, Z h d D , 1888 Z h d D , 1888 ZhdD,1888Z h d D, 1888 ,第 2-4 期:13-27 页。科佩托夫提出了他的西伯利亚铁路计划,作为交通部官方路线的替代方案。其东段将穿越中国(政府最终采纳的路线);西段则采取更偏南的路径。从西到东的主要站点包括奥伦堡、奥尔斯克、阿特巴萨尔、阿克莫林斯克、巴甫洛达尔、比斯克、米努辛斯克、下乌金斯克、伊尔库茨克、特罗伊茨科萨夫斯克、阿巴盖特、海拉尔、齐齐哈尔、吉林、宁古塔、尼古尔斯科耶和符拉迪沃斯托克。科佩托夫的意图不仅是建设一条仅服务于西伯利亚的铁路,而是要服务于整个北亚地区。他断言,与拥有冻土带、连土豆都无法种植、仅靠河流和驿道就能满足需求的西伯利亚相比,这一地区的前景要光明得多。

58. Barabash, 115, 135, 169; Evtiugin, 216-217. Judging from the correspondence between the railroad magnate Poliakov and Pobedonostsev regarding a Russian railroad in Persia, it is clear that many people at the time saw railroad construction in neighboring countries as bringing foreign policy advantages. See K. Pobedonostsev, L’Autocratie russe: Mémoires politiques, correspondance officielle et documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire du règne de l’empereur Alexandre III de Russie (Paris, 1927), 364-369, 477-479.
58. 巴拉巴什,第 115、135、169 页;叶夫秋金,第 216-217 页。从铁路大亨波利亚科夫与波别多诺斯采夫关于在波斯修建俄国铁路的往来信件中可以明显看出,当时许多人认为在邻国修建铁路能带来外交政策上的优势。参见 K. 波别多诺斯采夫,《俄罗斯专制:与沙皇亚历山大三世统治时期历史相关的政治回忆录、官方通信及未公开文件》(巴黎,1927 年),第 364-369、477-479 页。

59. “O naivygodneishem napravlenii,” Z h d D , 1888 Z h d D , 1888 ZhdD,1888Z h d D, 1888, nos. 2-4: 28.
59. “关于最有利的方向”, Z h d D , 1888 Z h d D , 1888 ZhdD,1888Z h d D, 1888 ,第 2-4 期:第 28 页。

60. Barabash, 136-160.  60. 巴拉巴什,136-160 页。
61. Evtiugin, 217 218 217 218 217-218217-218. His rationale would stand the test of time: “The Mongols are friendly toward us and await their liberation from Chinese rule, counting on being accepted as Russian citizens.”
61. 叶夫秋金, 217 218 217 218 217-218217-218 。他的理由经受住了时间的考验:"蒙古人对我们友好,期待从中国统治下获得解放,并指望成为俄罗斯公民。"

62. Novoe vremia, May 6,1889 , p. 2. This proposal is strikingly similar to the early Comintern strategy for Asia.
《新时代报》,1889 年 5 月 6 日,第 2 版。该提议与早期共产国际的亚洲战略惊人相似。

that Russia build a railroad from Moscow to Omsk to Kokpetinsk and from there through China to Shanghai. 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} K. A. Skal’kovskii, meanwhile, wrote that the best way to link the South Ussuri region with the Amur River by rail was across Chinese territory. 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} A Nerchinsk merchant named Butin saw annexation of a strip of Chinese territory as a means to facilitate travel on the Amur. 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
俄国应修建一条从莫斯科经鄂木斯克至科克佩京斯克,再穿越中国抵达上海的铁路。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} 与此同时,K·A·斯卡利科夫斯基撰文称,将南乌苏里地区与阿穆尔河铁路连接的最佳方案是取道中国领土。 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} 一位名为布京的涅尔琴斯克商人则认为,吞并中国部分领土的狭长地带将便利阿穆尔河流域的交通。 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
Not all who endorsed a railroad through Siberia wanted to see it also go through China. Barabash felt that such a route would help England more than Russia. Anuchin argued that it would benefit Vladivostok to the detriment of the rest of the Russian Far East, and that it would require the Russians to fight the Chinese and turn their emperor into something akin to the emir of Bukhara. 66 N 66 N ^(66)N{ }^{66} \mathrm{~N}. Matiunin, border commissar in the Ussuri region, preferred to preserve the peace by forming an alliance with China. 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} Regardless of these voices of disapproval, the development of an offensive strategy made such a railroad all but inevitable, as did its obvious benefits for Russian communications. The only objection a high official in the Ministry of Transport had was that it could present diplomatic complications, but he accepted the principle. 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68}
并非所有支持修建穿越西伯利亚铁路的人都希望它同时穿越中国。巴拉巴什认为,这样的路线对英国的帮助大于对俄罗斯的益处。阿努钦则主张,这条铁路将使符拉迪沃斯托克受益,却损害俄罗斯远东其他地区,并迫使俄国人与中国交战,将其皇帝变成类似布哈拉埃米尔的角色。 66 N 66 N ^(66)N{ }^{66} \mathrm{~N} 。乌苏里地区边境专员马秋宁更倾向于通过与中国结盟来维护和平。 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} 尽管存在这些反对声音,进攻性战略的发展使得这样一条铁路几乎不可避免,其对俄国交通的显著优势同样如此。交通部一位高级官员唯一的异议是它可能引发外交纠纷,但他接受了这一原则。 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68}

The consensus behind the construction of a Russian railroad through Chinese territory calls into question the passivity and moderation of Russian policy in the Far East in the mid- to late 1880s. 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} It must be taken into account in any assessment of the nature of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and Russian involvement in Manchuria in the 1890s. Whatever the rhetoric about “peaceful penetration,” the principle of taking Chinese territory for various strategic (and, to a lesser extent, economic) objectives had become an essential, if im-
关于修建一条穿越中国领土的俄罗斯铁路的共识,引发了对 19 世纪 80 年代中后期俄国远东政策被动性与温和性的质疑。 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} 在评估中东铁路性质及 19 世纪 90 年代俄国在满洲介入程度时,必须将这一因素纳入考量。尽管存在“和平渗透”的修辞,但为实现各种战略目标(以及较小程度上的经济目的)而占据中国领土的原则已成为一个本质特征,尽管尚不——

63. “Budushchie zheleznye dorogi,” ZhdD, 1885, no. 1: 4; no. 2: 9. Railroads to Kabul and Peshawar and through Central Asia were also proposed.
63. “未来的铁路”,《铁路杂志》,1885 年,第 1 期:第 4 页;第 2 期:第 9 页。还提出了通往喀布尔和白沙瓦以及穿越中亚的铁路计划。

64. Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 56-57.
64. 斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,56-57 页。

65. TIRTO, 10:9-10, 12.
65. TIRTO,第 10 卷:9-10、12 页。

66. Ibid., 6:6-7.  66. 同上,第 6 卷第 6-7 页。
67. Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy,” 83; Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 393.
67. 马秋宁,《我们的邻居》,第 83 页;纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,第 393 页。

68. “O velikom sibirskom puti,” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 22-24:176-177. Others in the Russian Technical Society felt that the book should not be closed on the topic simply because of the diplomatic obstacle: a similar arrangement existed in the Balkans (presumably they were referring to the Berlin-Baghdad Railroad) and should be examined. See TIRTO, 21:4.
68. 《关于伟大的西伯利亚之路》,《铁路杂志》1888 年第 22-24 期,第 176-177 页。俄罗斯技术学会的其他成员认为,不能仅因外交障碍就对此话题盖棺定论:巴尔干地区也存在类似安排(推测他们指的是柏林-巴格达铁路),值得研究。见《俄罗斯技术学会会刊》第 21 卷第 4 页。

69. As portrayed by Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 16-19, 324. While this chapter serves as a contribution to the prehistory of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad, I shall not deal with this subject further except indirectly, as it is tangential to the development of Siberia per se and is currently receiving separate treatment by other scholars.
69. 如马洛泽莫夫在《俄国远东政策》第 16-19 页、324 页所述。本章虽涉及中东铁路的前史研究,但除非间接相关,否则不再深入探讨该主题——因其与西伯利亚本土发展关联有限,且已有其他学者正进行专项研究。

plicit, component of the Siberian Railroad project. 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70} Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Russian officials favored a cautious approach in the Far East only as a temporary expedient. When the Siberian Railroad was completed, Russia could then confront Chinese, British, and, later, Japanese forces from a position of strength. The government put its initiatives in Persia and the Bosphorous on hold as well so as not to risk entanglements that might jeopardize the Siberian Railroad project. 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71}
西伯利亚铁路项目的一个隐含组成部分。 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70} 确实,有证据表明俄国官员在远东地区采取谨慎态度仅是权宜之计。待西伯利亚铁路竣工后,俄国便能以强势姿态应对中国、英国及后来的日本势力。政府还暂停了在波斯和博斯普鲁斯海峡的行动,以免卷入可能危及西伯利亚铁路项目的纠纷。 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71}

The Siberian Railroad would enable the government to follow the unwritten formula it had applied from the earliest moments of the Russian presence across the Urals: lacking soldiers and colonists, the Russian empire would absorb the territory of a hostile race on its border as the best means of defense. Murav’ev realized immediately after he had annexed the territory on the left bank of the Amur River that it would be defenseless without the breastplate of the Ussuri region, so it too was taken. Similarly, Russia soon expanded to fill the power vacuum in Central Asia, in part as a means of defending Russia’s adjacent territories. 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72} The same traditional forms of expansionism were once again being set in motion with the Siberian Railroad.
西伯利亚铁路将使政府能够遵循俄罗斯跨越乌拉尔山脉存在之初便采用的不成文法则:由于缺乏士兵和殖民者,俄罗斯帝国将吞并边境敌对种族的领土作为最佳防御手段。穆拉维约夫在兼并阿穆尔河左岸地区后立即意识到,若无乌苏里地区的屏障,该地将毫无防御能力,因此该地区也被占领。同样,俄罗斯很快填补了中亚的权力真空,部分原因是为了保护其邻近领土。 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72} 西伯利亚铁路再次推动了这种传统的扩张主义形式。
But before advancing farther into Asia, in a departure from past practices, under Minister of Finance Sergei Witte’s inspiration and guidance the state would attempt to strengthen its grip on Siberia and the Far East by systematically colonizing the area and stimulating its economy. For Russia’s weakness in Siberia and the Far East was not only a factor in foreign policy; it also had threatening domestic implications for the government of Alexander III.
但在进一步深入亚洲之前,与以往做法不同,在财政部长谢尔盖·维特的启发和指导下,国家将试图通过系统性地殖民该地区并刺激其经济来加强对西伯利亚和远东的控制。因为俄罗斯在西伯利亚和远东的弱点不仅影响外交政策,还对亚历山大三世的政府构成了威胁性的国内影响。

70. The Siberian regionalist newspaper Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1890, no. 39, pp. 1-2, opposing construction of the Siberian Railroad, pointed out that inevitably it would be used in an offensive war: each step Russia took to protect itself against its nonexistent enemy would be matched by China until the principles of Moltke would have to prevail and a preventive war launched.
70. 西伯利亚地方主义报纸《东方评论》1890 年第 39 期第 1-2 页反对修建西伯利亚铁路,指出它不可避免地会被用于进攻性战争:俄罗斯为防范其并不存在的敌人所采取的每一步行动,都将引发中国的对等反应,直至必须遵循毛奇的原则,发动一场预防性战争。

71. “Proekt zakhvata Bosfora v 1896 g.,” Krasnyi arkhiv 47-48 (1931): 51; “Pervye shagi russkogo imperializma na Dal’nem Vostoke (1888-1903 gg.),” ibid. 52 (1932): 79; Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 39; Valliant, “Japan,” 13.
71. "1896 年夺取博斯普鲁斯海峡计划",《红色档案》47-48(1931 年):51;"俄罗斯帝国主义在远东的最初步骤(1888-1903 年)",同上 52(1932 年):79;马洛泽莫夫,《俄罗斯远东政策》,39 页;瓦利安特,"日本",13 页。

72. Krausse, Russia in Asia, 130; Besprozvannykh, Priamur’e, 175-176; and Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (New York, 1964), 64.
72. 克劳斯,《俄国在亚洲》,130 页;别斯普罗兹万内赫,《外阿穆尔地区》,175-176 页;杰弗里·惠勒,《苏联中亚现代史》(纽约,1964 年),64 页。

CHAPTER THREE  第三章

Siberia Is for Russia
西伯利亚属于俄罗斯

Mlany writers have portrayed the Siberian Railroad as serving exclusively the defense of Russia’s Pacific shore and Far Eastern border, but they have overlooked the domestic concerns that affected the security of the empire and were ultimately as important as the menace of foreign powers. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} Economic policy as it evolved under Alexander III was in part a response to internal threats to the order of the realm, and it promoted a unified Russian polity through strong government intervention, centralization, and Russification. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} For these reasons, too, the state embarked on the construction of this railroad across some of the most uninviting terrain on the face of the earth.
许多作者将西伯利亚铁路描绘为仅服务于俄罗斯太平洋沿岸及远东边境的防御,但他们忽视了影响帝国安全的国内因素,这些因素最终与外部列强的威胁同等重要。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 亚历山大三世时期演变的经济政策部分是对国内威胁王国秩序的反应,它通过强有力的政府干预、中央集权和俄罗斯化政策推动了一个统一的俄罗斯政体。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 出于这些原因,国家也着手在世界上一些最不适宜的地形上修建这条铁路。

Siberia and the Empire before Alexander III
亚历山大三世之前的西伯利亚与帝国

In the time of Catherine the Great, Siberia was viewed, accurately or not, less as Russian territory than as part of a colonial empire. Cath-
在叶卡捷琳娜大帝时代,西伯利亚被视作——无论准确与否——更像是殖民帝国的一部分而非俄罗斯领土。叶卡捷琳娜-
  1. Georg Cleinow, “Eisenbahnbauten und -pläne in Russisch-Asien,” Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen 51 (January-February 1928): 75; A. V. Pataleev, Istoriia stroitel’stva velikogo sibirskogo zheleznodorozhnogo puti (Khabarovsk, 1951), 9; “Zheleznye dorogi,” in Sibirskaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 1 (Novosibirsk, 1929), 909-910; Robert Britton Valliant, “Japan and the Trans-Siberian Railroad, 1885-1905” (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 1974), iv. Other writers saw-and worried about-the railroad’s military potential, but recognized a variety of motives in its construction: e.g., G. Krahmer, Sibirien und die große sibirische Eisenbahn (Leipzig, 1897); and Arthur John Barry, Lecture on the Great Siberian Railway (London, 1900).
    格奥尔格·克莱诺,《俄属亚洲的铁路建设与规划》,《铁路学档案》51 期(1928 年 1-2 月):75 页;A·V·帕塔列耶夫,《西伯利亚大铁路建设史》(哈巴罗夫斯克,1951 年),9 页;《铁路》,载《西伯利亚苏维埃百科全书》第 1 卷(新西伯利亚,1929 年),909-910 页;罗伯特·布里顿·瓦利安特,《日本与西伯利亚大铁路,1885-1905 年》(博士论文,夏威夷大学,1974 年),iv 页。其他作者也注意到——并担忧——该铁路的军事潜力,但认识到其建设存在多种动机:例如 G·克拉默,《西伯利亚与西伯利亚大铁路》(莱比锡,1897 年);以及亚瑟·约翰·巴里,《关于西伯利亚大铁路的演讲》(伦敦,1900 年)。
  2. This book uses the words Russification and Russify in accordance with the definitions found in Edward C. Thaden, ed., Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton, 1981), 7-9.
    本书使用"俄罗斯化"及"使俄罗斯化"等术语,其定义依据爱德华·C·塔登主编的《波罗的海省份与芬兰的俄罗斯化,1855-1914 年》(普林斯顿,1981 年)第 7-9 页的界定。

    erine’s lack of sclid knowledge regarding Siberian conditions notwithstanding, she decreed a Siberian administration with forms adopted from European Russia, and then made efforts to colonize the territory and develop its economy. These measures were in keeping with her general policy in the borderlands, one component of which was economic development and colonization for the sake of the consolidation and expansion of imperial power. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} Catherine’s heirs reversed her strategy, but it would be revived under Alexander III.
    尽管叶卡捷琳娜对西伯利亚的情况缺乏深入了解,她还是下令按照欧洲俄罗斯的模式建立西伯利亚行政机构,并努力殖民该地区和发展经济。这些措施与她对待边疆地区的总体政策一致,其中一部分是为了巩固和扩张帝国权力而进行经济发展和殖民。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 叶卡捷琳娜的继任者们改变了她的策略,但在亚历山大三世时期这一策略会再次复兴。
During Catherine’s reign a sense of Siberia’s potential began to emerge. Catherine called it “our India, Mexico, or Peru,” and such publicists as the radical A. N. Radishchev spoke of its wealth. This attitude was shared by Mikhail Speranskii, whose reform of 1822 aimed to “protect Siberia” by correcting persistent administrative abuses and preventing the possible separation of this “colony” from Russia. Siberia was to have essentially the same administrative structure as Russia proper, with some local forms retained. Speranskii rejected a federalist solution in favor of uniformity and centralization, disallowing local participation in decision making. His reform was bureaucratic and its goal was to Russify Siberia. This was the legacy he handed down to future central authorities. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
在叶卡捷琳娜统治时期,西伯利亚的潜力开始显现。叶卡捷琳娜称其为"我们的印度、墨西哥或秘鲁",而激进派宣传家 A·N·拉季舍夫等人也谈及它的富饶。这种态度得到了米哈伊尔·斯佩兰斯基的认同,他在 1822 年的改革旨在通过纠正长期存在的行政弊端、防止这个"殖民地"脱离俄罗斯来"保护西伯利亚"。西伯利亚基本上采用与俄罗斯本土相同的行政结构,同时保留某些地方形式。斯佩兰斯基拒绝联邦制解决方案,主张统一和中央集权,不允许地方参与决策。他的改革是官僚主义的,其目标是使西伯利亚俄罗斯化。这就是他留给未来中央当局的遗产。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
Soon comparisons between Siberia and the United States became popular, eventually to be expressed with a disconcerting enthusiasm by the revolutionaries Alexander Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} Despite almost three hundred years of Russian possession and a predominantly Russian population, a fear grew that the “colony” of Siberia would inevitably attempt to declare its independence, just as the American colonies had done.
很快,西伯利亚与美国之间的比较变得流行起来,最终被革命者亚历山大·赫尔岑和米哈伊尔·巴枯宁以一种令人不安的热情表达出来。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 尽管俄罗斯拥有西伯利亚近三百年,且当地人口以俄罗斯人为主,但一种担忧逐渐增长,即西伯利亚这个“殖民地”将不可避免地试图宣布独立,就像美洲殖民地曾经所做的那样。

During the reign of Nicholas I this concern became acute, for by
在尼古拉一世统治期间,这种担忧变得尤为强烈,因为到了

3. S. G. Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’ (K istorii sibirskogo oblastnichestva v XIX v.) (Prague, 1930), 6; Marc Raeff, Siberia and the Reforms of 1822 (Seattle, 1956), 5-8, 17; idem, Imperial Russia, 1682-1825: The Coming of Age of Modern Russia (New York, 1971), 64; idem, “In the Imperial Manner,” in Catherine the Great: A Profile, ed. Raeff, 197-246 (New York, 1972). On the administration of Siberia under Catherine the Great, see also John P. LeDonne, Ruling Russia: Politics and Administration in the Age of Absolutism, 1762-1796 (Princeton, 1984), 277-283.
3. S. G. 斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》(关于 19 世纪西伯利亚地方主义的历史)(布拉格,1930 年),6 页;马克·拉夫,《西伯利亚与 1822 年改革》(西雅图,1956 年),5-8 页,17 页;同作者,《帝俄时期,1682-1825 年:现代俄罗斯的成熟》(纽约,1971 年),64 页;同作者,“以帝国的方式”,收录于《叶卡捷琳娜大帝:人物评传》,拉夫编,197-246 页(纽约,1972 年)。关于叶卡捷琳娜大帝统治下西伯利亚的行政管理,另见约翰·P·勒唐,《统治俄罗斯:专制时代的政治与行政,1762-1796 年》(普林斯顿,1984 年),277-283 页。

4. Raeff, Siberia, xiv-xv, 6, 42-44, 46, 84, 114-115, 131, 133-134, and Imperial Russia, 65-67; Pataleev, Istoriia stroitel’stva, 2d ed. (Khabarovsk, 1962), 32; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 10, 12; N. M. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia v geograficheskom, etnograficheskom i istoricheskom otnoshenii, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1892), 508-509.
4. 拉埃夫,《西伯利亚》,xiv-xv 页,6 页,42-44 页,46 页,84 页,114-115 页,131 页,133-134 页,以及《帝俄时期》,65-67 页;帕塔列耶夫,《建设史》,第二版(哈巴罗夫斯克,1962 年),32 页;斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,10 页,12 页;亚德林采夫,《西伯利亚作为殖民地在地理、民族和历史方面的考察》,第二版(圣彼得堡,1892 年),508-509 页。

5. A. S. Kuznetsov, “Sibirskaia programma tsarizma 1852 g.,” in Irkutskii Gosudarstvennyi Pedagogicheskii Institut, no. 2, Ocherki istorii Sibiri, ed. V. G. Tiukavkin (Irkutsk, 1971), 11-12, 14, 25. On the attitudes of Herzen and Bakunin toward Siberia, see Stephen Digby Watrous, “Russia’s ‘Land of the Future’: Regionalism and the Awakening of Siberia, 1819-1894” (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1970), 1:202-207, 214-215.
5. A·S·库兹涅佐夫,《1852 年沙皇政府的西伯利亚计划》,载于《伊尔库茨克国立师范学院学报》第 2 期,《西伯利亚历史纲要》,V·G·秋卡夫金编(伊尔库茨克,1971 年),11-12 页,14 页,25 页。关于赫尔岑和巴枯宁对西伯利亚的态度,参见斯蒂芬·迪格比·沃特鲁斯,《俄罗斯的“未来之地”:地方主义与西伯利亚的觉醒,1819-1894 年》(华盛顿大学博士论文,1970 年),1:202-207 页,214-215 页。

mid-century Siberia’s real value was apparent. The Altai region ranked second to the Urals in Russian mining and metallurgy, producing 95 percent of Russia’s silver and 80 percent of its lead. It held second place in copper production and fourth in gold, yielding 40 percent of the empire’s total by 1850 . Gold, discovered in Eastern Siberia in the 1830s, brought in settlers and stimulated an expansion of agriculture in the Enisei region as well as in Western Siberia. And as fur-bearing animals grew scarce in Western Siberia, the fur trade of Eastern Siberia grew in importance. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
19 世纪中叶,西伯利亚的真正价值已显而易见。阿尔泰地区在俄罗斯的采矿和冶金业中仅次于乌拉尔地区,生产了俄罗斯 95%的白银和 80%的铅。在铜产量方面位居第二,黄金产量排名第四,到 1850 年时占帝国总产量的 40%。19 世纪 30 年代在东西伯利亚发现的黄金吸引了移民,并刺激了叶尼塞地区以及西西伯利亚农业的扩张。随着西西伯利亚的毛皮动物日益稀少,东西伯利亚的毛皮贸易变得愈发重要。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
Russia’s interest in Siberia began to grow after 1830, somewhat in parallel with the discovery and increasing production of gold. Leading aristocratic families were represented among the owners of Siberian gold mines, and, according to a Soviet historian, their financial stake in Siberia was influential in the formation of government policy. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} Nicholas I’s finance minister, E. F. Kankrin, echoed Catherine when he called Siberia the Russian “Mexico and Peru.” Others described it as “El Dorado,” “California,” or, less poetically, “a gold mine.” 8 Hopes for Siberia began to soar in mid-century, not least with Murav’ev’s annexations in the Far East. But this enthusiasum only heightened the fear of losing Siberia, compounded by an exaggerated suspicion of religious heretics, criminals, and political exiles, all of whom seemed to have the potential to spark a revolt. Even more disconcerting was the growing influence of foreign powers in Eastern Siberia, especially Britain and America. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
1830 年后,俄国对西伯利亚的兴趣开始增长,某种程度上与黄金的发现及产量提升同步。西伯利亚金矿的所有者中不乏显赫贵族家族,据一位苏联历史学家所述,他们在西伯利亚的经济利益对政府政策的制定产生了重要影响。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 尼古拉一世的财政大臣 E.F.坎克林呼应了叶卡捷琳娜女皇的说法,称西伯利亚是俄国的"墨西哥和秘鲁"。其他人则将其描述为"黄金国"、"加利福尼亚",或更直白地称为"金矿"。8 世纪中叶,对西伯利亚的期望开始高涨,特别是随着穆拉维约夫在远东的扩张行动。但这种热情反而加剧了失去西伯利亚的恐惧,加之对宗教异端、罪犯和政治流放者的过度猜疑——这些人似乎都有可能引发叛乱。更令人不安的是外国势力(尤其是英国和美国)在东西伯利亚日益增长的影响力。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
To grapple with such problems Nicholas I reconstituted the Siberian Committee in 1852. Its proposed solution, reflecting the outlook of the tsar, was to encourage gentry landholding in Siberia as a pillar of the Russian state and to maintain Siberia as an agricultural terri-
为解决这些问题,尼古拉一世于 1852 年重组了西伯利亚委员会。该委员会提出的解决方案反映了沙皇的立场,即鼓励贵族在西伯利亚拥有土地作为俄罗斯国家的支柱,并将西伯利亚维持为一个农业地区。
tory. Murav’ev, then governor general of Eastern Siberia, had proposed that Chinese territory in the Amur region be seized to ensure Russian dominance over Siberia. P. D. Gorchakov, governor general of Western Siberia, contended that Russian control over the mouth of the Amur would only bring Siberia into greater contact with foreigners, a dangerous proposition. Better, he argued, to maintain eastern Siberia as a “forest cordon,” behind which Russian territory would be safe. Gorchakov’s outlook prevailed in Nicholas I’s Siberian Committee, which made a conscious decision to keep Siberia backward and underdeveloped as the best way of bringing about the “firm unification” and “complete amalgamation” of Siberia with central Russia. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
时任东西伯利亚总督的穆拉维约夫曾提议夺取阿穆尔地区的中国领土,以确保俄罗斯对西伯利亚的统治。而西西伯利亚总督 P·D·戈尔恰科夫则认为,控制阿穆尔河口只会让西伯利亚更多地接触外国人,这是危险的。他主张将东西伯利亚保留为“森林屏障”,以保障俄罗斯领土的安全。戈尔恰科夫的观点在尼古拉一世的西伯利亚委员会中占据上风,该委员会有意决定保持西伯利亚的落后与欠发达状态,以此作为实现西伯利亚与俄罗斯中部“牢固统一”和“完全融合”的最佳途径。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}

Siberian Regionalism  西伯利亚地方主义

The state of affairs had changed by the time Alexander III came to the throne in 1881. At this point, developments in Siberia clashed with the strident nationalism and repressive inclinations of the regime. The government’s Siberian policy shifted in a direction that in many ways it continued to follow until the most recent times.
到 1881 年亚历山大三世即位时,局势已发生变化。此时,西伯利亚的发展与政权强烈的民族主义倾向和压制性政策产生了冲突。政府的西伯利亚政策转向了一个在许多方面延续至近代的方向。
The beginning of Alexander’s reign coincided with the celebration of the tercentenary of Ermak’s invasion of Siberia. Literature on Siberia poured forth, Siberian regionalism was in full blossom, and the question of Siberia took on national importance. Siberian regionalism was a heterogeneous, amorphous movement of Siberian intellectuals who stood in the broadest sense for the interests of their region. Their thinking owed much to the Polish and Decembrist exiles, who had written of Siberia’s freedom, glorified its peasants, and compared the region with America. The regionalists broadened the already prevalent view of the “separateness” of Siberia, based on its geography and history. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
亚历山大统治初期恰逢庆祝叶尔马克入侵西伯利亚三百周年。关于西伯利亚的文献大量涌现,西伯利亚地方主义运动蓬勃发展,西伯利亚问题引起了全国性的关注。西伯利亚地方主义是一场由西伯利亚知识分子发起的多元化、无定形的运动,广义上代表了该地区的利益。他们的思想深受波兰和十二月党人流放者的影响,这些人曾书写西伯利亚的自由,颂扬其农民,并将该地区与美国相提并论。地方主义者进一步拓宽了基于地理和历史已普遍存在的西伯利亚“独特性”观点。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}

10. Kuznetsov, “Sibirskaia programma,” 10-11, 13, 16-18, 25-26; Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 708 n 1 . “Forest cordon” is Kuznetsov’s phrase. Fear of foreign influence led to the rejection of the proposals for a Siberian railroad backed by Murav’ev, as well as later proposals by foreigners. See Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 31; V. F. Borzunov, “Proekty stroitel’stva sibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali pervoi poloviny XIX v. kak istoricheskii istochnik,” in Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Sibirskoe Otdelenie, Dal’nevostochnyi Filial, Trudy, seriia istoricheskaia, vol. 5, ed. V. M. Vishnevskii et al. (Blagoveshchensk, 1963), passim.
10. 库兹涅佐夫,《西伯利亚计划》,10-11、13、16-18、25-26 页;亚德里采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,708 页注 1。“森林警戒线”是库兹涅佐夫的表述。对外国影响的恐惧导致拒绝了穆拉维约夫支持的西伯利亚铁路提案,以及后来外国人提出的其他提案。参见斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,31 页;V·F·博尔祖诺夫,《19 世纪上半叶西伯利亚铁路干线建设方案作为历史资料》,载于苏联科学院西伯利亚分院远东分院历史系列论文集第 5 卷,V·M·维什涅夫斯基等编(布拉戈维申斯克,1963 年),散见各处。

11. Wolfgang Faust, Rußlands goldener Boden: Der sibirische Regionalismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Cologne, 1980), 414, 421; Watrous, "Russia’s ‘Land of the Future,’ " 2:434; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 3-5, 24-26.
11. 沃尔夫冈·福斯特,《俄罗斯的金色土地:19 世纪下半叶的西伯利亚地方主义》(科隆,1980 年),414、421 页;沃特鲁斯,《俄罗斯的“未来之地”》,2:434;斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,3-5、24-26 页。
The most important spokesman of Siberian regionalism was Nikolai Iadrintsev. Ethnographer, geographer, historian, archaeologist, journalist, and editor, he was the leading authority on Siberia. His Sibir’ kak koloniia (Siberia as a colony), first published in 1882, was the bible of regionalism. Here he writes that Siberia is a colony, with interests opposed to those of European Russia, the “metropolis,” and he asserts the existence of a Siberian population without reference to nationality. He posits the Siberian as a “unique ethnic type” born of the intermingling of Slavic and native populations. Iadrintsev dwells on the Siberians’ special qualities, including adaptation to severe climate and a unique intestinal structure. He idealizes the Siberians’ pristine primitivism in the taiga, which has endowed them with great potential and promise. Unlike the Russians, Siberians are individualists who know freedom. The Siberians have, in fact, already forgotten that they are ethnically and historically Russian: they regard European Russians as foreigners. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
尼古拉-亚德林采夫是西伯利亚地方主义最重要的代言人。他集人种学家、地理学家、历史学家、考古学家、记者和编辑于一身,是研究西伯利亚的权威。他的《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》(Sibir' kak koloniia)于 1882 年首次出版,是地区主义的圣经。他在书中写道,西伯利亚是一个殖民地,其利益与 "大都市 "欧洲俄罗斯的利益相对立,他断言西伯利亚人口的存在不分民族。他认为,西伯利亚人是斯拉夫人和本地人混合产生的一种 "独特的民族类型"。Iadrintsev 详细描述了西伯利亚人的特质,包括对恶劣气候的适应性和独特的肠道结构。他理想化了西伯利亚人在泰加针叶林区的原始原生态,这赋予了他们巨大的潜力和希望。与俄罗斯人不同,西伯利亚人是崇尚自由的个人主义者。事实上,西伯利亚人已经忘记了他们在民族和历史上是俄罗斯人:他们把欧洲俄罗斯人视为外国人。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
After describing the uniqueness and purity of Siberia, Iadrintsev asserts that Siberia, as an agricultural colony, will become settled and a new nation will arise, an “independent branch” of the metropolis, as he euphemistically expresses it. Isolated from Russia but close to America, China, Japan, and the Pacific, Siberia will have an enlightened and prosperous future. But Siberia’s potential has not been realized. Far from following the paths of America and Australia to prosperity, Siberia has been left in the tundra, the miserable result of arbitrary administration, dependence on the metropolis, and the central government’s exploitive self-interest in Siberia as a penal colony and source of furs and minerals. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
在描述了西伯利亚的独特与纯净之后,亚德林采夫断言,作为农业殖民地的西伯利亚终将被开垦,一个新的民族将在此崛起——他委婉地称之为宗主国的“独立分支”。虽与俄罗斯隔绝,却邻近美国、中国、日本及太平洋地区,西伯利亚必将迎来开明而繁荣的未来。然而这一潜力尚未实现。远未如美国和澳大利亚般走向繁荣,西伯利亚仍困于冻土带中,沦为专制行政、对宗主国的依附以及中央政府将其作为流放地及毛皮矿产掠夺对象的剥削性自利政策所导致的悲惨结果。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
Iadrintsev’s views were common at the time, repeated in the established press and by authors as respected as Chekhov; there was a consensus that the distant Siberian “colony” would naturally sepa-
亚德林采夫的观点在当时颇为普遍,主流媒体乃至契诃夫等备受尊敬的作家都反复提及;人们普遍认为,遥远的西伯利亚“殖民地”终将自然分离——
rate from the “metropolis.” 14 The 14 The ^(14)The{ }^{14} \mathrm{The} reaction of conservatives to Siberian regionalism and its sympathizers was sometimes frenzied. Iadrintsev saw Siberia as an “emerging society in which . . . the bones and muscles of a living organism are forming.” 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} If it was, defenders of a strong state viewed it as a limb attached to the Russian organism, and intended to ensure that it remained attached.
来自“大都市”的比率。 14 The 14 The ^(14)The{ }^{14} \mathrm{The} 保守派对西伯利亚地区主义及其同情者的反应有时近乎疯狂。亚德林采夫将西伯利亚视为“一个正在形成的社会,其中……活体生物的骨骼与肌肉正在成形。” 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 倘若如此,一个强大国家的捍卫者则视其为依附于俄罗斯有机体的肢体,并决心确保其永不分离。
The influential reactionary journalist M. N. Katkov led the opposition. He vehemently resurrected the notion that Siberia’s regionalists were striving for independence. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the “ideologist” of the regime, warned Alexander III of the “bad element” in Siberia and, together with State Secretary A. A. Polovtsov, opposed the opening of a university in Tomsk, long on the regionalist agenda. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} Grand Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich denounced the central assertion of regionalism: “Siberia is not a colony, and the movement of Russians from European Russia to Siberia is only the settlement of the Russian tribe within the borders of its state.” In Siberia itself a centralist camp around the Tomsk newspaper Sibirskii vestnik (Siberian herald) arose in opposition to regionalism. Its editor, V. P. Kartamyshev, announced its platform:
颇具影响力的反动记者 M·N·卡特科夫领导了反对阵营。他激烈地重提西伯利亚地方主义者正谋求独立的论调。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 作为政权的“意识形态家”,康斯坦丁·波别多诺斯采夫向亚历山大三世警告西伯利亚存在“不良分子”,并与国务秘书 A·A·波洛夫佐夫联手反对在托木斯克开设大学——这一直是地方主义者的议程之一。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 康斯坦丁·尼古拉耶维奇大公驳斥了地方主义的核心主张:“西伯利亚不是殖民地,俄罗斯人从欧俄迁往西伯利亚只是俄罗斯民族在其国家疆界内的迁徙。”在西伯利亚当地,围绕托木斯克报纸《西伯利亚先驱报》形成了一个反对地方主义的中央集权派阵营。该报编辑 V·P·卡尔塔梅舍夫宣布了其立场:
Siberia is for Russia, for the Russian people; the whole future of Siberia consists in its close unity with the rest of Russia. … The wealth of Siberia is the wealth of Russia. Siberia is not a colony of Russia, but is Russia itself; not Russian America, but a Russian province, and should develop
西伯利亚属于俄罗斯,属于俄罗斯人民;其全部未来在于与俄罗斯其他地区的紧密统一。……西伯利亚的财富就是俄罗斯的财富。西伯利亚不是俄罗斯的殖民地,而是俄罗斯本身;不是俄属美洲,而是俄罗斯的一个省份,应当以此为基础发展

14. Ibid., 698-699; Chekhov told Kuprin that “as soon as I get a little better, I will certainly travel to Siberia once again. I have been there before, when I went to Sakhalin. You simply cannot imagine, old fellow, what a wonderful land it is. It’s a state completely unto itself. You know, I am convinced that Siberia will someday totally separate from Russia, just as America separated from its metropolis” (A. I. Kuprin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 7 [St. Petersburg, 1912], 127).
14. 同上,698-699 页;契诃夫曾对库普林说:“等我身体稍好些,一定要再去西伯利亚一趟。我曾去过那里,当时是前往萨哈林岛。老兄,你简直无法想象那是多么神奇的土地。那完全是一个自成体系的世界。要知道,我深信西伯利亚终有一天会彻底脱离俄罗斯,就像美洲脱离其宗主国一样。”(A. I. 库普林,《作品全集》第 7 卷 [圣彼得堡,1912 年],127 页)

15. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, x.
15. 亚德林采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,序言第 x 页。

16. I. I. Popov, Minuvshee i perezhitoe: Vospominaniia za 50 let: Sibir’ i emigratsiia (Leningrad, 1924), 97; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 78; Watrous, “Russia’s ‘Land of the Future,’” 2 : 546 , 606 , 620 2 : 546 , 606 , 620 2:546,606,6202: 546,606,620.
16. I. I. 波波夫,《过往与经历:五十载回忆录:西伯利亚与流亡岁月》(列宁格勒,1924 年),97 页;斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,78 页;沃特鲁斯,《俄罗斯的‘未来之地’》, 2 : 546 , 606 , 620 2 : 546 , 606 , 620 2:546,606,6202: 546,606,620

17. K. P. Pobedonostsev, Pis’ma Pobedonostseva k k kk Aleksandru III, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1926), 99-100. Polovtsov wrote: “Au lieu d’ouvrir une université en Sibérie, je proposerais de faire construire une maison de glace sur la Néva, comme au temps de l’impératrice Anna Ioannovna. Cette bouffounerie froide coûterait moins cher et serait moins dangereuse.” He did not, however, object to a technical school (K. P. Pobedonostsev, L’Autocratie russe: Mémoires politiques, correspondance officielle et documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire du règne de l’empereur Alexandre III de Russie [Paris, 1927], 352-353). Despite the opposition to it, the Imperial University of Tomsk was opened in 1888.
17. K·P·波别多诺斯采夫,《波别多诺斯采夫致亚历山大三世书信集》第二卷(莫斯科,1926 年),第 99-100 页。波洛夫佐夫写道:“与其在西伯利亚开办一所大学,我更建议在涅瓦河上建造一座冰屋,就像安娜·伊凡诺芙娜女皇时代那样。这种冰冷的荒唐事花费更少且危害更小。”然而,他并不反对建立一所技术学校(K·P·波别多诺斯采夫,《俄罗斯专制制度:关于亚历山大三世统治时期的政治回忆、官方通信及未公开文件》[巴黎,1927 年],第 352-353 页)。尽管遭到反对,托木斯克帝国大学仍于 1888 年成立。

in the same way that the other borderlands of the “Russian state” have developed. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
正如“俄罗斯国家”其他边疆地区的发展方式一样。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
The centralists and the authorities considered Iadrintsev’s newspaper, Vostochnoe obozrenie (Eastern review), which was the organ of Siberian regionalism, to be the mouthpiece of separatism and revolution. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} The police harassed Siberian circles and censors would not permit “Siberia” to be set in contradistinction to “Russia.” 20 Even the tsar’s rescript of March 17, 1891, announcing that Tsarevich Nicholas would take part in ground-breaking ceremonies for the Siberian Railroad at Vladivostok, was reworded to avoid reference to Siberia’s “distance from the capital.” 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
中央集权派和当局认为亚德林采夫的报纸《东方评论》(Vostochnoe obozrenie)——西伯利亚地方主义的喉舌——是分离主义和革命的代言人。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 警方不断骚扰西伯利亚的圈子,审查官不允许将“西伯利亚”与“俄罗斯”对立起来。20 甚至沙皇在 1891 年 3 月 17 日宣布皇太子尼古拉将参加符拉迪沃斯托克西伯利亚铁路奠基仪式的诏书,也被重新措辞,以避免提及西伯利亚“远离首都”。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
The separatist threat combined with the ever-present danger of foreigners dominating eastern Siberia. Pobedonostsev wrote to the future Alexander III in 1879 that "the natives [of northeastern Siberia] will forget that they belong to Russia. And already now many Chukchi speak English.’ 22 To make matters worse, in their isolation the Russian peasants of Siberia seemed to be taking on native ways and losing consciousness of their ethnic identity. “The Russian Siberian,” one disconcerted Russian observed, "is even beginning to eat like an Eskimo.’ 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} General A. N. Kuropatkin later clarified these attitudes when he expressed the fear that if Russia annexed Manchuria, “eastern Siberia would become quite un-Russian, and it must be remembered that it is the Russians alone who form, and will form in the future, the reliable element of the population”; eastern Siberia was for their sole benefit. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
分裂主义的威胁与外国势力主宰东西伯利亚的长期隐患交织在一起。波别多诺斯采夫在 1879 年写给未来的亚历山大三世信中称"东北西伯利亚的原住民将忘记自己属于俄罗斯。如今许多楚科奇人已开始讲英语。"22 更糟的是,处于孤立状态的西伯利亚俄罗斯农民似乎正在接受土著生活方式,逐渐丧失民族认同意识。一位不安的俄罗斯人观察到:"西伯利亚的俄罗斯人甚至开始像爱斯基摩人那样进食。" 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 后来 A·N·库罗帕特金将军明确表达了这种忧虑,他担心若俄国吞并满洲,"东西伯利亚将彻底非俄罗斯化,必须记住只有俄罗斯人才是现在和未来可靠的人口基础";东西伯利亚理应专属于他们的利益。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
One part of Alexander III’s solution was to accelerate the “gradual
亚历山大三世解决方案的一部分是加速"渐进

18. Quoted in Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 52, 89.
18. 引自斯瓦季科夫《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,第 52、89 页。

19. Popov, Minuvshee i perezhitoe, 239 . Not all the authorities viewed it this way. Count A. P. Ignat’ev, governor general of Eastern Siberia (1885-1889), denied that regionalism was separatist and advocated full implementation of the Great Reforms in Siberia (Watrous, “Russia’s 'Land of the Future, '” 2:622; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 78).
19. 波波夫,《往事与经历》,239 页。并非所有当局都持此观点。东西伯利亚总督(1885-1889)A·P·伊格纳季耶夫伯爵否认地方主义具有分裂倾向,并主张在西伯利亚全面实施大改革(沃特鲁斯,《俄罗斯的“未来之地”》第 2 卷 622 页;斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,78 页)。

20. Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 87-88, 91-92; Popov, Minuvshee i perezhitoe, 239.
20. 斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,87-88 页、91-92 页;波波夫,《往事与经历》,239 页。

21. Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa: Dnevnik A. V. Bogdanovich (Moscow/Leningrad, 1924), 137 (Mar. 30, 1891). For the final text of the manifesto, see S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903), 105-106.
21. 《末代三专制君主:A·V·波格丹诺维奇日记》(莫斯科/列宁格勒,1924 年),137 页(1891 年 3 月 30 日)。宣言最终文本参见 S·V·萨布列尔与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基合著,《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概览》,A·N·库洛姆津编(圣彼得堡,1903 年),105-106 页。

22. Pobedonostsev, Pis’ma Pobedonostseva k Aleksandru III, 1:184. There may have been some grounds for concern: American whalers were introducing the natives of the coast to American popular music and selling them liquor, tobacco, and firearms (Stephan, “Russian-American Economic Relations,” 67).
22. 波别多诺斯采夫,《波别多诺斯采夫致亚历山大三世书信集》第 1 卷 184 页。这种担忧或许不无道理:美国捕鲸者正向沿海原住民传播美国流行音乐,并向他们兜售烈酒、烟草和火器(斯蒂芬,《俄美经济关系》,67 页)。

23. “‘O narodonaselenii Sibiri i o velikoi vostochnoi zheleznoi doroge’ (Doklad professora E. Iu. Petri i beseda v VII otdele IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 33-34: 278.
23. “关于西伯利亚人口与东方大铁路的论述”(E·尤·彼得里教授在 IRTO 第七分部的报告及讨论),《铁路杂志》,1888 年,第 33-34 期:278 页。

24. A. N. Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War, vol. 1 (London, 1909), 71.
24. A·N·库罗帕特金,《俄军与日俄战争》第一卷(伦敦,1909 年),第 71 页。

abolition of any sign of the administrative separateness of Siberia and the destruction of its internal administrative unity,” a process begun under Alexander II. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} In 1882 the Western Siberian general governorship was divided into Tomsk and Tobol’sk provinces and the Steppe general governorship, the latter comprising Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Semirech’e oblasts. Likewise in 1884 the Priamur’e general governorship was formed, including Transbaikal, Amur, and Maritime oblasts and Sakhalin Island, split off from the Eastern Siberian general governorship. The latter was itself replaced in 1887 by the Irkutsk general governorship, consisting of Irkutsk and Enisei provinces and Iakutsk oblast. By 1887 the very name Siberia was no longer used as an administrative term. The region’s partial reorganization along European Russian lines and the proliferation of the general governorships on its borders were to provide a framework for the Russification and integration of Siberia. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
废除西伯利亚行政独立的任何迹象并破坏其内部行政统一”,这一进程始于亚历山大二世时期。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 1882 年,西西伯利亚总督辖区被划分为托木斯克省、托博尔斯克省和草原总督辖区,后者包括阿克莫林斯克州、塞米巴拉金斯克州和谢米列奇耶州。同样在 1884 年,阿穆尔总督辖区成立,包括外贝加尔州、阿穆尔州、滨海州和萨哈林岛,从东西伯利亚总督辖区分离出来。后者本身在 1887 年被伊尔库茨克总督辖区取代,由伊尔库茨克省、叶尼塞省和雅库茨克州组成。到 1887 年,“西伯利亚”这一名称不再作为行政术语使用。该地区按照欧洲俄罗斯模式的部分重组以及边境总督辖区的激增,为西伯利亚的俄罗斯化和整合提供了框架。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
Alexander intended to facilitate the assertion of central authority through the economic development of Siberia. The idea derived in part from a “memorandum on the discontinuance of the Siberian exile system” which Pos’et had written immediately before he became minister of transport in 1874. In it he urged the abolition of the exile system and the implementation of more humane forms of punishment, so that Siberia would not continue to be a “land of criminals.” Throughout he stressed that this system was at the root of
亚历山大旨在通过西伯利亚的经济发展来加强中央权威的行使。这一想法部分源自波谢特在 1874 年就任交通大臣前夕所写的《关于废止西伯利亚流放制度的备忘录》。他在文中力主废除流放制度,推行更人道的刑罚形式,以使西伯利亚不再继续成为"罪犯之地"。通篇他强调这一制度是

25. Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 76.
25. 斯瓦季科夫《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,第 76 页。

26. On the reorganizations, see PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 2, 1882, no. 886; vol. 4, 1884, nos. 2233, 2324; vol. 7, 1887, no. 4517; vol. 11, 1891, no. 7574; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 76 78; Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 535-538; Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Rußlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917 (Leiden, 1966), 408. It must be noted that the elimination of Siberia’s administrative unity was not the only object of these changes. The tremendous size of Siberia had made administration difficult:Enisei province alone was larger than all of the United States east of the Mississippi, and Priamur’e was more than six times the size of France (George Kennan, Siberia and the Exile System, vol. 1 [New York, 1891], 57; Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 57). That smaller administrative units were clearly necessary and to the benefit of Siberia was recognized by K. A. Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia v Tikhom okeane (St. Petersburg, 1883), 63, and N. Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy na Krainem Vostoke,” Vestnik Evropy, July 1887, no. 7: 80, 82. Concern about Russia’s defensive capability also provided a motive for reorganization, in particular in the Far East. See Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy 18811904, (Berkeley, 1958), 25; O. I. Sergeev, Kazachestvo na russkom Dal’nem Vostoke v XVIIXIX v. (Moscow, 1983), 61-62; D. A. Miliutin, Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1950), 239-240. For this purpose a separate administration was eventually created (see PSZRI, vol. 17, 1897, no. 14818, and vol. 19, 1899, no. 17214). These factors were probably as important in the administrative reorganization of Siberia as those the regionalists emphasized. But the latter factors did have the intention and effect stated and are therefore more relevant to our discussion.
26. 关于重组情况,参见《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》第三辑,第 2 卷,1882 年,第 886 号;第 4 卷,1884 年,第 2233、2324 号;第 7 卷,1887 年,第 4517 号;第 11 卷,1891 年,第 7574 号;斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,76-78 页;亚德林采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,535-538 页;埃里克·安伯格,《从彼得大帝到 1917 年俄罗斯行政机关史》(莱顿,1966 年),408 页。必须指出,消除西伯利亚的行政统一性并非这些改革的唯一目的。西伯利亚的广袤疆域导致管理困难:仅叶尼塞省就比密西西比河以东的整个美国还要大,而阿穆尔河沿岸地区更是法国的六倍多(乔治·凯南,《西伯利亚与流放制度》第 1 卷[纽约,1891 年],57 页;亚德林采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,57 页)。缩小行政单位显然必要且有利于西伯利亚发展,这一观点得到 K.A.斯卡利科夫斯基《俄国在太平洋的贸易》(圣彼得堡,1883 年)63 页及 N.马秋宁《远东邻国》(《欧洲通报》1887 年 7 月第 7 期:80、82 页)的认同。对俄罗斯国防能力的担忧同样是重组动因,尤其在远东地区。 参见安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫,《1881-1904 年俄国远东政策》(伯克利,1958 年),第 25 页;O·I·谢尔盖耶夫,《17-19 世纪俄国远东的哥萨克》(莫斯科,1983 年),第 61-62 页;D·A·米留京,《D·A·米留京日记》第 3 卷(莫斯科,1950 年),第 239-240 页。为此最终设立了专门的管理机构(参见《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》第 17 卷,1897 年,第 14818 号,及第 19 卷,1899 年,第 17214 号)。这些因素对西伯利亚行政重组的推动力或许不亚于地方主义者所强调的那些因素。但后者的确具有所述意图及效果,因而与我们的讨论更为相关。
Russia’s weakness there; to change course, he asserted, “it is now necessary to give Siberia too the chance to embark on the path of development.” 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
俄国在该地区的弱势;他主张改变方针,"现在必须给予西伯利亚同样踏上发展道路的机会。" 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}

Alexander III adopted a similar attitude: he regretted “the government’s neglect of such an immense and wealthy region,” which he held “close to [his] heart.” He desired the “peaceful prosperity” of Siberia and would build the Siberian Railroad, a “veritable affair of the people,” to “assist in [its] settlement and industrial development.” Repeatedly stating that Siberia was an “indivisible part of Russia,” he expected his actions to link the region to the empire by rail and bring “glory to our dear Fatherland.” 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} Thus Russification and the extension of political control to the region were to be gained through the construction of a railroad and economic development. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} Alexander’s brand of conservatism anticipated that of the twentieth century. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
亚历山大三世持相似态度:他痛惜“政府对这片广袤富饶之地的忽视”,并视西伯利亚为“心之所系”。他渴望实现西伯利亚的“和平繁荣”,将通过修建西伯利亚铁路这一“真正的人民事业”来“助力其移民安置与工业发展”。他多次强调西伯利亚是“俄罗斯不可分割的一部分”,期待以铁路将这片土地与帝国紧密相连,为“我们亲爱的祖国带来荣光”。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} 由此可见,俄罗斯化进程及对该地区政治控制的强化,将通过铁路建设与经济发展来实现。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 亚历山大的保守主义理念预示了二十世纪的发展方向。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}

27. K. N. Pos’et, “Prekrashchenie ssylki v Sibir’,” Russkaia starina, 99 (July 1899): 54-59. As Kennan pointed out, the call to eliminate the exile system was also motivated by a twofold desire: to end widespread criticism of the system and to increase the productivity and hence the taxpaying capacity of the Siberian population (Siberia and the Exile System, 2:467).
27. K·N·波谢特,《废除向西伯利亚流放制度》,载《俄罗斯旧事》第 99 期(1899 年 7 月):54-59 页。正如肯南所指出的,废除流放制度的呼声还源于双重诉求:既要平息对该制度的广泛批评,又要提升西伯利亚居民的生产力从而增加其纳税能力(《西伯利亚与流放制度》第 2 卷:467 页)。

28. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 69, 106, 130; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 76-78.
28. Sabler and Sosnovskii, 《Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga》, 69, 106, 130; Svatikov, 《Rossiia i Sibir’》, 76-78.

29. The Kazan’ Railroad was to be built primarily for a similar purpose. According to the minister of the interior and the chief of the General Staff, “Kazan’ province and the adjacent region constitute the main political center of the Tatar population, which not only has not yet become closely tied to the Russian population of the empire but, on the contrary, has in recent times begun to display the manifest aspiration of alienating itself from the Russian nationality and of drawing closer to the Muslim world. Such a state of affairs necessitates . . . that the government take appropriate measures to eliminate such harmful tendencies in this part of the population. One of the most effective measures in this regard would be the rapid establishment of a close link between the Kazan’ region and the internal, Russian oblasts of the empire” (MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no, comp. V. M. Verkhovskii, pt. 2 [St. Petersburg, 1899], 450-451). The intention to construct railroads in Finland was similarly motivated: they would bind the Finns to the empire. See Tuomo Polvinen, Die finnischen Eisenbahnen in den militärischen und politischen Plänen Rußlands vor dem ersten Weltkrieg (Helsinki, 1962).
29. 喀山铁路的修建主要出于类似目的。根据内政部长和总参谋长的说法,“喀山省及邻近地区是鞑靼人口的主要政治中心,他们不仅尚未与帝国的俄罗斯人口紧密联系,相反,最近开始表现出明显的倾向,即疏远俄罗斯民族并接近穆斯林世界。这种状况要求……政府采取适当措施消除这部分人口中的有害倾向。在这方面最有效的措施之一将是迅速建立喀山地区与帝国内部俄罗斯省份之间的紧密联系”(MPS,《俄罗斯铁路发展历史概述(自建立至 1897 年)》,V. M. 维尔霍夫斯基编,第 2 部分[圣彼得堡,1899 年],第 450-451 页)。在芬兰修建铁路的意图同样出于此动机:它们将使芬兰人更紧密地依附于帝国。 参见图奥莫·波尔维宁,《第一次世界大战前俄国军事与政治计划中的芬兰铁路》(赫尔辛基,1962 年)。

30. Cf. Richard Pipes, “Russian Conservatism in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century,” Slavic Review, March 1971, no. 1: 121-128.
30. 参见理查德·派普斯,《十九世纪后半叶的俄罗斯保守主义》,《斯拉夫评论》,1971 年 3 月,第 1 期:121-128 页。

CHAPTER FOUR  第四章

Divergent Visions  分歧的愿景

The compelling strategic and political reasons for the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad only gradually became apparent. There was strong opposition to the very notion of a Siberian railroad, not to mention fierce contention over the route, and various elements in the government were slow to consent to either the railroad or the development of Siberia. Much later than has been thought, the bureaucracy remained largely traditionalist in economics, as it had been before the Crimean War, and was not convinced of the possibility of extensive state-inspired economic expansion, which would become the hallmark of the 1890s.
修建西伯利亚大铁路的战略和政治理由起初并不明显。当时不仅对修建西伯利亚铁路的构想存在强烈反对,关于路线的争论也十分激烈,政府内部各派系迟迟未能就铁路建设或西伯利亚开发达成共识。与普遍认知不同,直到很晚时期,官僚体系在经济政策上仍保持着克里米亚战争前的传统主义倾向,他们不相信国家主导的大规模经济扩张的可能性——而这种模式将成为 1890 年代的标志性特征。
Traditionally the Crimean fiasco has been portrayed as a watershed in Russian economic policy, awakening the state to the need to develop the economy if it was not to lose its claim to great-power status. Yet long after the Crimean War the bureaucracy vigorously opposed the minority in the government that did advocate something along these lines, the technocrats in the Ministry of Transport. Even in a period of autocratic reaction, ideological dissension within the upper bureaucracy shaped the political landscape. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} Along with the endemic ministerial conflict that it exacerbated, the battle of ideas was a determining factor in economic policy during the reigns of both Alexander
传统上,克里米亚的惨败被视为俄罗斯经济政策的分水岭,它唤醒了国家,使其认识到如果不发展经济,就会失去其大国地位的诉求。然而,克里米亚战争结束很久之后,官僚体系仍然强烈反对政府中少数派的主张,即交通部的技术官僚们所倡导的类似发展路线。即使在专制反动时期,上层官僚体系内部的思想分歧也塑造了政治格局。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 加上由此加剧的长期部门冲突,这场思想斗争在亚历山大二世和亚历山大三世统治期间成为经济政策的决定性因素。
II and Alexander III. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} Its contours can be charted through the debate over the Siberian Railroad.
2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 其轮廓可以通过围绕西伯利亚铁路的辩论来描绘。
The first stage of debate, from 1861 to 1875, was concerned with railroads that were limited in function and relatively small in scale. The Trans-Siberian was an afterthought lodged somewhere in the back of the public mind until the reign of Alexander III, when, for political reasons, such a thing became expedient. The debates surrounding the smaller railroads ultimately gave rise to mention of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and defined the parameters for discussion of its route and function. The issues and tone of the debate over the Trans-Siberian itself first became clear here, prefiguring the issues to be fought at the highest levels of bureaucracy for years to come. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
辩论的第一阶段,从 1861 年到 1875 年,关注的是功能有限且规模相对较小的铁路。在亚历山大三世统治之前,西伯利亚大铁路只是公众脑海中的一个次要想法,直到出于政治原因,这样一条铁路变得势在必行。围绕较小铁路的辩论最终引发了对西伯利亚大铁路的提及,并为其路线和功能的讨论设定了框架。关于西伯利亚大铁路本身的辩论议题和基调在此首次明确,预示了未来多年将在最高官僚层面争论的问题。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}

The First Trans-Ural Projects
首批跨乌拉尔铁路项目

Initially many “Siberian” railroads were discussed, one for the Far East and several Ural-Siberian railroads in the west, each to have a distinct function. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Proposals for the railroad in the Russian Far East were a by-product of the recent annexations along the Amur and Ussuri rivers and included many put forward by foreigners in search of profit and glory. The strategic component of the Siberian Railroad was central to these projects. But while strategic concerns may have impelled the government to begin construction in 1891, in previous
最初,人们讨论了许多“西伯利亚”铁路方案,一条通往远东,几条乌拉尔-西伯利亚铁路位于西部,每条铁路都有其特定功能。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 关于在俄罗斯远东地区修建铁路的提议,是近期在阿穆尔河和乌苏里江沿岸进行领土兼并的副产品,其中包括许多由外国人为追求利润和荣耀而提出的方案。西伯利亚铁路的战略成分是这些项目的核心。虽然战略考量可能促使政府于 1891 年开始建设,但在之前的
decades the appearance of a railroad in the Amur lands would have undermined the state’s policy of maintaining Siberia as a “forest cordon.” The fear that a railroad would introduce foreign influence was also widespread and continued into the 1880s, so the government discouraged thoughts of building a railroad there.
几十年里,阿穆尔地区出现铁路会破坏国家将西伯利亚作为“森林屏障”的政策。人们普遍担心铁路会带来外国影响,这种担忧一直持续到 1880 年代,因此政府不鼓励在那里修建铁路的想法。
As for the Ural-Siberian lines, they were to accomplish three separate, narrow objectives: to bring the European Russian network to the border of Siberia; to boost the stagnant mining and metallurgy of the Urals; and to expedite trade between Siberia and central Russia. Three alternative railroad projects competed for acceptance. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
至于乌拉尔-西伯利亚铁路线,它们旨在实现三个独立而具体的目标:将欧洲俄罗斯铁路网延伸至西伯利亚边界;振兴乌拉尔地区停滞不前的采矿和冶金业;以及加速西伯利亚与俄罗斯中部之间的贸易。当时有三个备选铁路项目在角逐立项资格。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
The first line was conceived in 1861 by V. K. Rashet, the long-time director of the Demidovs’ Nizhnii-Tagil factories, then director of the state Mining Department (1862-1873). 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} He planned his “northern route,” as it was known, to link the Ural mining region with the Kama and Tobol rivers, on either side of the mountains dividing Europe and Asia. The route he proposed, from Perm’ through Nizhnii-Tagil Zavod to Irbit and Tiumen’ (on the Tura River, a branch of the Tobol), would bring coal to Ural iron factories from the deposits of the north-central Urals and give them access to navigable rivers, thus benefiting local industry.
第一条线路构想于 1861 年,由长期担任杰米多夫家族下塔吉尔工厂厂长、后任国家矿业部(1862-1873 年)主任的 V·K·拉舍特提出。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 他规划的这条被称为"北方路线"的铁路,旨在连接乌拉尔矿区与卡马河及托博尔河——这两条河流分别位于欧亚分界山脉的两侧。他提议的路线从彼尔姆经下塔吉尔扎沃德至伊尔比特和秋明(位于托博尔河支流图拉河畔),可将中北部乌拉尔的煤炭运往当地炼铁厂,并通过通航河流为当地工业提供便利。
The next line was drawn up for consideration in 1866 by E. V. Bogdanovich, an official whom Minister of the Interior P. A. Valuev had sent on special assignment to investigate the causes of famine in Viatka and Perm’ provinces. He concluded that a transit railroad was the answer to grain shortages and suggested a more southerly route from Nizhnii-Novgorod to Kazan’, Sarapul, and Ekaterinburg, with a terminus at Tiumen’. His railroad, he argued, would additionally stimulate trade with Siberia and Central Asia. Because of its topography and proximity to Moscow, he deemed it preferable to Rashet’s route. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
1866 年,内政部长 P·A·瓦卢耶夫特派官员 E·V·博格丹诺维奇考察维亚特卡和彼尔姆省饥荒成因后,提出了下一条铁路线的构想。他认为解决粮食短缺的关键在于修建一条过境铁路,并建议采用更偏南的路线:从下诺夫哥罗德经喀山、萨拉普尔至叶卡捷琳堡,终点设在秋明。他论证称,该铁路还将促进与西伯利亚及中亚的贸易。鉴于其地形优势及靠近莫斯科的地理位置,他认为该路线优于拉舍特的方案。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}

5. For details on these proposals see E. M. Mil’man, Istoriia pervoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali Urala (70-90-e gody XIX v.) (Perm’, 1975), 42-87; S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, comps., Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903), 9-23; Steven G. Marks, “The Trans-Siberian Railroad: State Enterprise and Economic Development in Imperial Russia” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988), 156-167.
5. 关于这些提案的详细内容,参见 E·M·米尔曼所著《乌拉尔首条铁路干线史(19 世纪 70-90 年代)》(彼尔姆,1975 年)第 42-87 页;S·V·萨布勒与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基合编、A·N·库洛姆津主编的《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概述》(圣彼得堡,1903 年)第 9-23 页;史蒂文·G·马克斯《西伯利亚大铁路:帝俄时期的国有企业与经济发展》(哈佛大学博士论文,1988 年)第 156-167 页。

6. Mil’man, Istoriia, 42; Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Rußlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917 (Leiden, 1966), 234.
6. 米尔曼,《历史》,42 页;埃里克·安伯格,《从彼得大帝到 1917 年俄罗斯行政机构史》(莱顿,1966 年),234 页。

7. On Bogdanovich’s route and its vocal supporters in this period, see Materialy k k kk istorii voprosa o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge, suppl., ZhdD, 1891, no. 16: 1-10. Bogdanovich was an adventurer and swindler who pocketed government money earmarked for surveys of his route. His actions anticipated the corruption of the future contractors, employees, and officials of the completed Siberian Railroad. On the allega-
7. 关于博格丹诺维奇的路线及这一时期其支持者的声音,参见《西伯利亚铁路问题历史资料》补编,《铁路杂志》1891 年第 16 期:1-10 页。博格丹诺夫是个冒险家和骗子,他侵吞了政府拨付用于其路线勘测的资金。他的行为预示着未来西伯利亚铁路承包商、雇员及官员的腐败现象。关于这些指控-

The Volga and Trans-Ural regions, 1862
伏尔加河与跨乌拉尔地区,1862 年

I. Liubimov, an entrepreneur and mayor of Perm’, was the originator of the third major route of this period. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} After conducting his own surveys, he asserted in 1869 that to satisfy the needs of both the Siberian trade and the mining industry (but not to compete with his own steamer company on the Kama) a railroad should be built from Perm’ to Kungur to Ekaterinburg and from there to Shadrinsk and Belozerskaia Sloboda (now Belozerskoe), north of Kurgan on the Tobol River.
企业家兼彼尔姆市长 I·柳比莫夫是这一时期第三条主要铁路线的倡议者。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 在自行勘测后,他于 1869 年提出,为满足西伯利亚贸易和矿业需求(同时避免与自家卡马河上的汽船公司竞争),应修建一条从彼尔姆经昆古尔至叶卡捷琳堡的铁路,再延伸至沙德林斯克及托博尔河畔库尔干以北的别洛泽尔斯卡亚斯洛博达(今别洛泽尔斯科耶)。
Simultaneous with a flurry of activity along the intended routesformation of committees, collection of statistics, surveying, publication of brochures, lobbying of regional officials-in 1870 both the Imperial Russian Geographical Society and the Society for the Encouragement of Russian Industry and Trade convened lengthy sessions at which government officials, businessmen, engineers, and representatives of the interested locales debated the issue. The preponderance of support was for Bogdanovich, because of the mercantile stature of Moscow and Nizhnii-Novgorod. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
在拟议铁路沿线活动密集展开的同时——包括委员会组建、数据收集、勘测、宣传册出版、游说地方官员——1870 年俄罗斯帝国地理学会和俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会均召开了冗长会议。政府官员、商人、工程师及相关地区代表就此议题展开辩论。由于莫斯科和下诺夫哥罗德的商业地位,博格丹诺维奇方案获得了压倒性支持。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
The government, though, had made its decision before the public debates in the professional organizations even took place. Government commissions had found that both trade and mining needs could not be satisfied by the same railroad; one required a winding route between factories along the mountain range, the other the shortest east-west crossing. Konstantin Skal’kovskii, then a representative of the Mining Department, expressed the government’s point of view: Russia could survive without Siberia’s livestock but not without metals. The United States and western European nations became major powers thanks in large measure to their mining industries; “without the Ural Mountains, Russia cannot maintain its current position in Asia and in Europe, in the West and in the East.” 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} Thus the government adopted a shortened, altered version of Rashet’s line with its terminus at Ekaterinburg, in the Ural Mountains (that is, without its transit link to Siberia), as the blueprint for a Ural Mining Railroad. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
然而,在专业组织展开公开辩论之前,政府就已作出决定。政府委员会发现,同一条铁路无法同时满足贸易和采矿需求:前者需要沿山脉蜿蜒穿行工厂区,后者则要求最短的东西向横贯线。时任矿业部代表的康斯坦丁·斯卡利科夫斯基表达了政府观点:俄罗斯可以没有西伯利亚的牲畜,但不能没有金属。美国和西欧国家能成为强国,很大程度上得益于它们的采矿业;"没有乌拉尔山脉,俄罗斯就无法维持在亚洲和欧洲、西方和东方的现有地位。" 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 因此政府采用了拉舍特线路的缩短修改版——以乌拉尔山脉的叶卡捷琳堡为终点(即不包含通往西伯利亚的过境连接段),作为乌拉尔采矿铁路的蓝图。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}

tions of Bogdanovich’s character and corruption, see Mil’man, Istoriia, 52, 60, and P. A. Zaionchkovskii, The Russian Autocracy in Crisis, 1878-1882, trans. G. M. Hamburg (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1979), 119. On Siberian Railroad personnel, see chap. 9 below.
关于博格丹诺维奇性格与腐败的指控,参见米尔曼《历史》第 52、60 页,以及 P·A·扎昂奇科夫斯基《危机中的俄国专制制度(1878-1882)》(G·M·汉堡译,佛罗里达州格尔夫布瑞兹,1979 年)第 119 页。关于西伯利亚铁路人员情况,见下文第 9 章。

8. O napravlenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi (Publichnye preniia v obshchestve dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle) (St. Petersburg, 1870), 19.
8. 《论西伯利亚铁路走向问题》(俄国工商业促进协会公开辩论会记录)(圣彼得堡,1870 年),第 19 页。

9. See ibid., passim; IIRGO 6, no. 2 (1870): 61-63.
9. 参见同上各处;《俄罗斯帝国地理学会会刊》第 6 卷第 2 期(1870 年):61-63 页。

10. O napravlenii, 85-87.
10. 《论方向》,85-87 页。

11. Mil’man, Istoriia, 80, 82-84; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 20-21, MPS, ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 1. By 1870 Rashet also agreed that Ekaterinburg was too important to bypass, as he had originally suggested, and that it should be
米尔曼,《历史》,第 80、82-84 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 20-21 页;交通部,《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:第 1 页。至 1870 年,拉舍特也认同叶卡捷琳堡的重要性不容忽视,不应如他最初提议的那样绕行,而应将其纳入路线。
The question of a transit route was still open. The two lines in contest were Bogdanovich’s “southern” route and Liubimov’s “northern” route, the former focused on Moscow, the latter having been expanded to include construction to Viatka, Kostroma, Iaroslavl’, and Rybinsk-in other words, to bring the Siberian line within reach of St. Petersburg. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
关于过境路线的问题仍未解决。当时竞争的两条线路分别是博格丹诺维奇的“南线”和柳比莫夫的“北线”,前者以莫斯科为中心,后者则扩展至包括维亚特卡、科斯特罗马、雅罗斯拉夫尔和雷宾斯克的建设——换言之,旨在使西伯利亚铁路线延伸至圣彼得堡的辐射范围内。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
The backers of both routes wanted a railroad up to the border of Siberia rather than through it, for the purpose of reviving the trade with Siberia and Central Asia which had declined as transport costs rose. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} Otherwise, from the same premises they reached different conclusions. The “southerners” claimed that Nizhnii-Novgorod and Kazan’ provinces, through which their route ran, were both populous and productive, whereas the north was neither, and therefore a railroad there would not turn a profit. “Northerners” argued that for these very reasons they were in dire need of a railroad. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
两条路线的支持者都希望铁路修至西伯利亚边境而非贯穿其境,旨在重振因运输成本上升而衰落的西伯利亚与中亚贸易。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 否则,基于相同前提,他们得出了不同结论。"南方派"声称其线路途经的下诺夫哥罗德省与喀山省人口稠密且物产丰富,而北方则两者皆无,因此在那里修建铁路将无利可图。"北方派"则辩称,正因如此,这些地区才亟需铁路。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
The regional debate over northern and southern routes was overshadowed by rivalry between the interests of St. Petersburg and Moscow. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} The major portion of the arguments was over the relative importance of these two cities in the Siberian trade. The defenders of St. Petersburg, potential beneficiary of the northern route, declared that the capital was the center of Russian life and civilization and must not be bypassed. Despite this plea, a direct route to St. Petersburg does not seem to have been absolutely necessary and would
关于南北线路的区域争论被圣彼得堡与莫斯科的利益之争所掩盖。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 大部分论点聚焦于这两座城市在西伯利亚贸易中的相对重要性。作为北方线路潜在受益者的圣彼得堡捍卫者宣称,首都乃俄罗斯生活与文明的中心,绝不能被绕行。尽管有此呼吁,但直达圣彼得堡的线路似乎并非绝对必要,且将
do little more than boost its prestige: since Moscow and St. Petersburg were themselves tied by rail, in either case the capital would be the final destination of a Siberian railroad.
除了提升其声望外几乎别无他用:既然莫斯科和圣彼得堡本身已通过铁路相连,无论哪种情况,首都都将是西伯利亚铁路的最终目的地。
The economist and railroad expert A. I. Chuprov, writing for Russkie vedomosti (Russian gazette), expressed the pro-Muscovite view: St. Petersburg might be important for the export trade, but its direct commercial dealings with Siberia were minimal and would not suffer if the railroad went to Moscow. The total amount of freight Siberia shipped to Petersburg in the late 1870s amounted to a meager 500,000 puds of tallow and lesser amounts of linseed, wool, and other animal hairs. Siberia’s trade with the Moscow region was vastly greater in volume and importance; Siberian goods traffic “instinctively” flowed to Moscow via Kazan’ and Nizhnii-Novgorod. Chuprov supported the southern route because it would create conditions for better internal and external markets and thereby stimulate manufacturing. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
经济学家兼铁路专家 A. I. 丘普罗夫在《俄罗斯公报》上撰文表达了亲莫斯科派的观点:圣彼得堡或许对出口贸易至关重要,但其与西伯利亚的直接商业往来微乎其微,即便铁路通往莫斯科也不会受到影响。19 世纪 70 年代末,西伯利亚运往彼得堡的货物总量仅为微不足道的 50 万普特油脂,以及少量亚麻籽、羊毛和其他动物毛发。西伯利亚与莫斯科地区的贸易在规模和重要性上都要大得多;西伯利亚的货物运输"本能地"通过喀山和下诺夫哥罗德流向莫斯科。丘普罗夫支持南线方案,因为这将为更好的国内外市场创造条件,从而刺激制造业发展。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}

The Moscow-St. Petersburg rift extended to the lobbying of other cities too. The Nizhnii-Novgorod fair committee was the most vocal supporter of the route from that city. It was dominated by representatives of high-value manufacturing, haberdashery, chandlery, and grocery interests, big merchants who came from Moscow and its allied towns along the Nizhnii-Novgorod route-Kazan’, Chistopol’, Elabuga, and Sarapul-to the exclusion of the providers of bulky, lowvalue metals and grain, livestock, and wood products, who were from less settled areas. Their petitions were therefore a biased extension of the Muscovite cause. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
莫斯科与圣彼得堡之间的分歧也延伸到了对其他城市的游说活动中。下诺夫哥罗德集市委员会是支持从该市出发路线的最积极拥护者。该委员会主要由高价值制造业、服饰杂货、蜡烛杂货及食品杂货行业的利益代表主导,这些来自莫斯科及其沿下诺夫哥罗德路线(喀山、奇斯托波尔、叶拉布加和萨拉普尔)的同盟城镇的大商人,排挤了那些来自较偏远地区、提供大宗低价值金属、谷物、牲畜和木材产品的供应商。因此,他们的请愿书是莫斯科派立场带有偏见的延伸。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
Aside from these vested interests, the southern line continued to receive overwhelming support because of the importance of Moscow and the central industrial region. Contemporary theory held that along a given route all major industrial and commercial centers should be linked directly by rail. The understanding was that any alternative would break up this centuries-old trade route. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} By way of contrast, the north was seen as barren. Even with construction of a railroad there, as one “southerner” had it, " 0 × 0 = 0 0 × 0 = 0 0xx0=00 \times 0=0." 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} A majority in the Committee of Ministers held these opinions too: as we shall see, in
除了这些既得利益外,南部线路因莫斯科及中央工业区的重要性而持续获得压倒性支持。当时的理论认为,铁路应直接连接沿途所有主要工商业中心。人们普遍理解,任何替代方案都将破坏这条延续数世纪的贸易路线。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 相比之下,北方被视为贫瘠之地。即便在那里修建铁路,正如一位“南方派”所言,“ 0 × 0 = 0 0 × 0 = 0 0xx0=00 \times 0=0 ”。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 委员会多数部长也持相同观点:如后文所示,1875 年他们否决了交通部长提出的北线方案,决议修建从莫斯科经下诺夫哥罗德、喀山至叶卡捷琳堡的铁路。
1875 they rejected the minister of transport’s plans for the northern route and resolved to build the railroad from Moscow to NizhniiNovgorod, Kazan’, and Ekaterinburg.
1875 年,他们否决了交通部长提出的北线规划,决定修建从莫斯科通往下诺夫哥罗德、喀山和叶卡捷琳堡的铁路。

Pos'et's Proposal of 1875
1875 年波谢特的提案

On May 2-3, 1875, Admiral Konstantin Nikolaevich Pos’et, who had served as minister of transport for less than a year, presented his plans for a Siberian transit railroad before the Committee of Ministers. In many ways his arguments determined its nature when the state finally began construction.
1875 年 5 月 2 日至 3 日,上任不足一年的交通部长康斯坦丁·尼古拉耶维奇·波谢特海军上将向部长委员会提交了西伯利亚铁路过境方案。他的论证在很大程度上决定了国家最终启动建设时的铁路走向。
After reviewing the alternative routes, Pos’et backed a version of the northern route-from Rybinsk (with its link to St. Petersburg) to Iaroslavl’, Kostroma (with a branch to Kineshma), Makar’ev, Kotel’nich (with a branch to Viatka), Perm’, Nizhnii Tagil, Irbit, and finally Artamanov pier on the Tobol River. He examined the length and contour of each line and from this survey estimated the total cost. In the final analysis, he calculated that the northern route could be shortened to 1,623 versts, which would cost approximately 63 million rubles. The most reduced version of the southern route, at 1,427 versts, would be no less expensive. And if a connection to St . Pe Pe Pe-\mathrm{Pe}- tersburg and Arkhangel’sk were added, the length and cost of the southern route would be even greater. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
在审查了各条备选路线后,波谢特支持北线方案——从雷宾斯克(连接圣彼得堡)经雅罗斯拉夫尔、科斯特罗马(分支至基涅什马)、马卡里耶夫、科捷利尼奇(分支至维亚特卡)、彼尔姆、下塔吉尔、伊尔比特,最终抵达托博尔河畔的阿尔塔马诺夫码头。他详细测量了每条线路的长度与地形轮廓,据此估算出总成本。最终分析显示,北线可缩短至 1,623 俄里,造价约 6,300 万卢布。而最精简的南线方案虽仅 1,427 俄里,造价却不相上下。若再增加连接圣彼得堡和阿尔汉格尔斯克的支线,南线的里程与成本将更为高昂。
On these financial grounds alone, perhaps, he could have made his case, but Pos’et took a different tack. Looking beyond the narrow reason for the construction of this railroad-the eventual linkage of the Kama and Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} river basins (that is, western Siberia and central Russia) - Pos’et proposed for the first time that this route serve as the starting point of a railroad from the Volga River to the Amur, running through Irkutsk to a possible terminus at Sretensk in Transbaikalia. The cost would exceed 250 million rubles and it could be managed only in the “distant future.” This new trade route would bring Europe and Asia closer together and, he dreamed, compete with the Suez Canal. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
仅从这些财政理由出发,或许他本可以论证自己的观点,但波谢特采取了不同的策略。他超越了修建这条铁路的狭隘初衷——即最终连通卡马河与 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 河流域(也就是西伯利亚西部与俄罗斯中部)——首次提出将这条路线作为从伏尔加河延伸至阿穆尔河铁路的起点,途经伊尔库茨克,最终可能抵达外贝加尔的斯列坚斯克。该工程耗资将超过 2.5 亿卢布,且"遥远的未来"才可能实现。这条新贸易路线将拉近欧亚距离,他梦想着有朝一日能与苏伊士运河一较高下。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
Pos’et rehearsed the advantages of the northern route, as its sup-
波谢特重申了北线方案的优越性,正如其支
Konstantin Pos’et. From MPS, Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia i deiatel’nosti vedomstva putei soobshcheniia (St. Petersburg, 1898).
康斯坦丁·波谢特。引自《交通部简史:交通部门发展与活动概述》(圣彼得堡,1898 年)。

porters set them forth: unlike the area between Nizhnii-Novgorod and Kazan’, which had good means of communication roughly seven months out of the year, the Russian north was virtually isolated all the time, and a railroad would stimulate this neglected region. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} He then
搬运工们提出了理由:与下诺夫哥罗德和喀山之间每年约有七个月交通便利的情况不同,俄罗斯北部地区常年处于隔绝状态,铁路将激活这片被忽视的区域。

22. As Richard Mowbray Haywood has shown in “The Development of Steamboats on the Volga River and Its Tributaries,” Research in Economic History 6 (1981), water routes between the Volga and the Baltic had been greatly improved in the 1840 s and 1850 s , and by 1872 railroads had been built to Rybinsk, Iaroslavl’, and Vologda. This development detracts somewhat from Pos’et’s argument that the north had no means of communications. Certainly, as will be seen, proponents of a given route were none too concerned about the accuracy of their claims regarding a given region. Nonetheless, in this case, except for the Northern Dvina River, water and rail routes largely skirted the edges of
22. 正如理查德·莫布雷·海伍德在《伏尔加河及其支流蒸汽船的发展》(《经济史研究》第 6 卷,1981 年)中所展示的,1840 至 1850 年代,伏尔加河与波罗的海之间的水路交通已得到显著改善,到 1872 年,铁路已延伸至雷宾斯克、雅罗斯拉夫尔和沃洛格达。这一发展在一定程度上削弱了波谢特关于北方缺乏交通手段的论点。诚然,后续可见,特定路线的支持者们对其所涉区域相关主张的准确性并不十分在意。尽管如此,在此案例中,除北德维纳河外,水运与铁路线路大多仅环绕该地区边缘分布。

stressed the relevance of the railroad across Siberia: “It is necessary to give Siberia too the chance to embark on the path of development; if it is justified [to say] that convenient means of transport are the foremost bearers of enlightenment and . . . development, then in Siberia this axiom should prove correct in the very largest measure.” Furthermore, the railroad was bound to enhance Russia’s position in the Far East, where political and trade relations were undergoing fast-paced change. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
强调了横贯西伯利亚铁路的重要性:"必须给予西伯利亚同样踏上发展道路的机会;如果说便捷的交通方式是启蒙与发展的首要载体这一论断成立,那么在西伯利亚,这条公理将以最宏大的尺度得到验证。"此外,该铁路必将提升俄国在远东的地位——那里的政治与贸易关系正经历快速变革。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
Pos’et’s proposition was far-reaching and innovative, involving the development of both northern Russia and Siberia. Above all, Pos’et intended to use railroads creatively, as a tool of progress, to bring prosperity to vast regions of Russia untouched by civilization; he had a nineteenth-century faith in technical progress unshared by many of his fellow bureaucrats. This veteran Far Eastern explorer’s perception of unfolding events in Asia was prescient, while most of his contemporaries were indifferent to the region or just becoming aware of it. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
波谢特的提议具有深远且创新的意义,涉及俄罗斯北部及西伯利亚的开发。尤为关键的是,他意图以铁路作为推动进步的工具,创造性地将繁荣带到俄罗斯广袤未受文明触及的地区;这种对技术进步的十九世纪式信念,在其同僚官僚中并不多见。这位远东探险老手对亚洲局势发展的洞察极具先见之明,而当时多数人要么对该地区漠不关心,要么才刚刚开始有所察觉。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}

The Rejection of Pos'et's Plan
波谢特计划的否决

The Committee of Ministers deliberated the matter on May 6 and 13, 1875, and the Council of Ministers did so the following December 18. Only three members of the Committee of Ministers supported Pos’et-significantly, former minister of transport General P. P. Mel’nikov and the engineers General E. I. Gerstfeld and K. I. Shernval’. The remaining twenty members came out for the southern route. As
1875 年 5 月 6 日及 13 日,大臣委员会对此事进行了审议,同年 12 月 18 日部长会议亦展开讨论。委员会中仅有三位成员支持波谢特——值得注意的是,前交通部长 P·P·梅利尼科夫将军、工程师 E·I·格斯特费尔德将军和 K·I·舍恩瓦尔。其余二十名成员均倾向于南线方案。正如
War Minister Miliutin put it, with satisfaction, Pos’et’s proposal “failed in the face of attack by almost the whole committee.” 25
陆军部长米柳京满意地指出的那样,波谢特的提案"几乎遭到委员会全体反对而失败"。25

A. A. Abaza, at the time chairman of the State Council’s Department of the State Economy, led the attack, in what Miliutin described as a “long and magnificent speech” that so "destroyed [Pos’et’s] strange line of thought that the other members were left with little to add.’ 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} Abaza rejected the northern route on the grounds that it would fulfill a secondary objective rather than the primary one of constructing a transit route linking Siberia and central Russia: it would serve such secondary considerations as mining affairs, the needs of which were already satisfied by the Ural Mining Railroad; Arkhangel’sk port, which had been in steady decline since the eighteenth century; and the interests of St. Petersburg, at the sacrifice of those of the central industrial region. The southern route, on the other hand, would ease the transit trade between Siberia and its main markets, NizhniiNovgorod, Kazan’, and Ekaterinburg. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
当时担任国家经济部主席的 A. A. 阿巴扎发起了抨击,米留廷形容这是一场“漫长而精彩的演讲”,彻底“摧毁了[波谢特的]怪异思路,以至于其他成员几乎无话可补充”。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 阿巴扎反对北方路线,理由是这条路线只能实现次要目标,而非连接西伯利亚与俄罗斯中部的主要交通要道建设:它将服务于诸如矿业事务等次要考量——乌拉尔矿业铁路已满足其需求;自 18 世纪以来持续衰落的阿尔汉格尔斯克港口;以及牺牲中央工业区利益来迎合圣彼得堡的利益。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 相比之下,南方路线将促进西伯利亚与其主要市场——下诺夫哥罗德、喀山和叶卡捷琳堡之间的过境贸易。
Underneath Abaza’s support for the southern route lay his view of economics, one far different from Pos’et’s. Abaza asserted that it was “impossible to expect improved living conditions for the population [of the northern region] with the construction of but one railroad in such a vast, sparsely populated area.” Strongly (if subconsciously) echoing the Russian populists and Siberian regionalists, he suggested instead a reduction in the tax burden and other benefits. He saw advantage only in the building of a railroad through the more productive regions of the south, according to “that general economic law, that railroads are not able to create new sources of economic wealth, but rather can develop and strengthen agricultural and industrial activity to a significant degree only where it already exists.” 2 2 ^('2){ }^{\prime 2} With further populist overtones, Abaza held that “in the case of commerce, more than in other social realms, the success of artificial measures … is on the whole extremely dubious.” Hence, since the southern route corresponded to the existing trade route, it should be the one selected. One could not alter trade ties and habits established for cen-
阿巴扎支持南部路线的基础是他对经济学的看法,这与波谢特的截然不同。阿巴扎坚称,“在如此广袤而人烟稀少的北部地区,仅修建一条铁路不可能指望改善当地居民的生活条件。”他强烈(或许是无意识地)呼应了俄国民粹派和西伯利亚地方主义者的观点,主张应减轻税收负担并提供其他福利。他认为,只有在南部更富饶的地区修建铁路才具有优势,因为“根据普遍的经济规律,铁路无法创造新的经济财富来源,而只能大幅发展和强化那些已有农业和工业活动的地区”。 2 2 ^('2){ }^{\prime 2} 带着更浓厚的民粹主义色彩,阿巴扎提出“在商业领域,相较于其他社会领域,人为措施的成功……总体上极其值得怀疑”。因此,既然南部路线与现有贸易路线吻合,就应当选择它。人们无法改变已延续数个世纪的贸易联系和习惯——
turies and disrupt the attraction of local centers to one another without great shock. Experience in Russia and abroad showed that such disruptions resulted in significant trade crises, which should be strenuously avoided. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
几个世纪以来,若不造成巨大冲击,便难以打破当地中心之间的相互吸引力。俄国国内外的经验表明,此类中断会导致严重的贸易危机,应竭力避免。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
On the basis of these arguments, the Committee of Ministers voted down Pos’et’s proposal. On December 19, 1875, Tsar Alexander II approved the committee’s decision to build the Siberian Railroad from Nizhnii-Novgorod along the right bank of the Volga to Kazan’, thence to Ekaterinburg, Kamyshlov, and Tiumen’.
基于这些论点,大臣委员会否决了波谢特的提案。1875 年 12 月 19 日,沙皇亚历山大二世批准了委员会关于西伯利亚铁路建设路线的决定:从下诺夫哥罗德沿伏尔加河右岸至喀山,再经叶卡捷琳堡、卡梅什洛夫至秋明。

The Contenders  竞争者

The dispute between Abaza and Pos’et adumbrates the future course of the governmental controversy over the Siberian Railroad. In 1875, as in the following decade and a half, ideological, personal, and ministerial divisions, as well as financial exigencies, would keep the issue from being resolved one way or the other.
阿巴扎与波谢特之间的争论预示了未来西伯利亚铁路政府争议的发展方向。1875 年及此后十余年间,意识形态分歧、个人及部门对立,加之财政困境,使得这一问题始终悬而未决。
A primary distinction between the two antagonists was in outlook. Abaza, a former railroad concessioner, was minister of finance in the last months of Alexander II’s reign (1880-1881), state comptroller from 1871 to 1874, and chairman of the Department of State Economy from 1874 to 1880 and again from 1884 to 1892. In these positions he wielded enormous influence, especially in the State Council, and if he opposed a budget request, there was little chance it would be approved. Abaza was one of the leading “liberals” of the period and would reject much of the course of policy in the 1880s, in particular the direct involvement of the government in the economy. Like other finance ministers of this period, he was mildly protectionist, and he was one of the few high government officials to show a concern for the lower classes by attempting to reduce their onerous tax burden. Abaza did favor government intervention in the nation’s railroad affairs and as minister of finance initiated the purchase of private lines by the Treasury. His concern here, though, was not to fulfill his ideological conviction but rather to eliminate the waste of Treasury funds which the concessionary system of railroad building had occasioned. He acted, therefore, for practical reasons of fiscal economy. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
两位对手之间的主要区别在于观念。阿巴扎(Abaza)曾是一名铁路特许权持有者,在亚历山大二世统治的最后几个月(1880-1881 年)担任财政大臣,1871 年至 1874 年担任国家审计长,1874 年至 1880 年以及 1884 年至 1892 年再次担任国家经济部门主席。在这些职位上,他拥有巨大的影响力,尤其是在国务委员会中,如果他反对某项预算请求,那么该请求获批的可能性就微乎其微。阿巴扎是当时主要的“自由派”之一,他会反对 19 世纪 80 年代的大部分政策路线,特别是政府直接干预经济的做法。与这一时期的其他财政大臣一样,他持温和的保护主义立场,并且是为数不多关注下层阶级的高级政府官员之一,试图减轻他们沉重的税收负担。阿巴扎确实支持政府干预国家的铁路事务,并在担任财政大臣期间推动了财政部收购私营铁路线。 然而,他此刻的关切并非出于意识形态信念的践行,而是旨在消除因铁路建设的特许权制度造成的国库资金浪费。因此,他的行动是基于财政节约的实际考量。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
It was this opposition to excessive state spending, along with an aversion to “social engineering” by the government, that motivated his opposition to Pos’et’s projected northern route. Abaza’s attitude harks back to Mikhail Speranskii’s cautious approach to railroads in the 1830s. Like Speranskii, the great statesman of the early nineteenth century, he urged only the construction of lines that seemed certain to be financially successful, lest Russia’s standing in public opinion and government credit suffer. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} More interesting, in his belief that the national wealth was a fixed quantity and that new sources of it could not be created he is reminiscent of E. F. Kankrin, finance minister under Nicholas I. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} Later Abaza was to rail against the theory that deficit spending could spur Russia’s productive forces. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} His caution and his desire to let events take their natural course indicates the persistence of the conservative economic views normally attributed to Nicholas I’s reign.
正是这种对政府过度开支的反对,以及对政府“社会工程”的厌恶,促使他反对波谢特规划的北部路线。阿巴扎的态度让人回想起 19 世纪 30 年代米哈伊尔·斯佩兰斯基对铁路建设的谨慎态度。与 19 世纪初的伟大政治家斯佩兰斯基一样,他只主张修建那些几乎肯定能在财务上取得成功的线路,以免俄罗斯的公众形象和政府信用受损。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 更有趣的是,他认为国家财富是一个固定量,无法创造新的财富来源,这种观点让人联想到尼古拉一世时期的财政部长 E.F.坎克林。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 后来,阿巴扎还猛烈抨击了赤字开支可以刺激俄罗斯生产力的理论。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 他的谨慎态度以及让事物顺其自然发展的愿望,表明通常归因于尼古拉一世统治时期的保守经济观点仍然存在。
Whereas Abaza was a traditionalist in economics, Pos’et represented a technocratic point of view that at the time had few adherents in the Russian government. In his disparate functions as admiral, bureaucrat, and head of the nation’s engineers, he had assimilated the idea that it was part of his function actively to administer and organize society. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} His outlook was voluntaristic, presupposing government intervention for the creation of progress from above. His aspiration to develop the provinces had its roots in the reign of Catherine the Great. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} But he also echoed the cry of the eminent scientist D. I.
阿巴扎在经济上是个传统主义者,而波谢特则代表了当时在俄国政府中鲜有追随者的技术官僚观点。作为海军上将、官僚和国家工程师负责人,他在不同的职能中吸收了这样一种观念:积极管理和组织社会是他职责的一部分。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 他的观点是唯意志论的,预设了政府自上而下干预以创造进步。他发展各省的抱负源于叶卡捷琳娜大帝统治时期。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 但他也响应了著名科学家 D.I.
Mendeleev that attention be given to Russia’s distant regions with their untapped sources of natural wealth. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
门捷列夫呼吁关注俄罗斯遥远地区未开发的自然资源财富。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
As minister of transport, Pos’et had imbibed the spirit of the French utopian Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, whose philosophy of development through great engineering works was taught at the Institute of Transport Engineers in St. Petersburg. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} Pos’et followed in Mel’nikov’s footsteps as a strong supporter of state railroad building, and like his predecessor he posited the capital-creating role of railroads, taken from the American view that expenditures on railroads would eventually be repaid in the form of revenues and an increase in national wealth. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
作为交通部长,波谢特深受法国空想家克劳德·亨利·德·圣西门思想的影响,后者关于通过大型工程推动发展的哲学在圣彼得堡交通工程师学院教授。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 波谢特追随梅利尼科夫的步伐,成为国家铁路建设的坚定支持者,并与其前任一样,采纳了美国观点,认为铁路投资终将以收入增长和国家财富增加的形式得到回报。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
Pos’et, therefore did not consider that the decision to build the Siberian Railroad should be made on purely fiscal grounds. In contrast to his opponents, especially within the Ministry of Finance and the state comptroller’s office, he asserted that the “socio-political and economic advantages” to be expected from the project “related mainly to a future time” and could not be justified or denied by any statistical data. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} If state interest necessitated the construction of such a railroad, then it should be done regardless of normal economic considerations or private local interests. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} It was on such a basis that Siberia and the remote territories of the country would eventually be developed. In his vision Pos’et was a forerunner of Sergei Witte and the Soviet devotees of large-scale development projects.
因此,波谢特并不认为西伯利亚铁路的建设决策应仅基于财政考量。与他的反对者(尤其是财政部和国家审计署内部人士)不同,他坚称该项目带来的"社会政治与经济利益主要体现在未来时期",任何统计数据都无法证实或否定其价值。若国家利益需要修建这条铁路,就应不计常规经济考量或地方私利推进工程。正是在此基础上,西伯利亚和边远疆域终将得到开发。波谢特的远见使他成为谢尔盖·维特与苏联大型开发项目拥护者的先驱。
Further hampering progress in Russian railroad affairs and playing a large role in thwarting the Siberian Railroad project for more than a decade was a bitter rivalry between the ministries of finance and transport for control over the latter’s area of responsibility. Abaza could not tolerate the outlook of the minister of transport and tried to rein him in. He demanded adherence to strict budgetary rules, with expenditures adjusted to the resources of the Treasury. Upon appointment as minister of finance, he laid down the following condition, referring to the ministries of both state domains and transport: "It is essential for the harmonious economic development of the
进一步阻碍俄国铁路事务进展,并在长达十余年间对西伯利亚铁路项目造成重大阻力的,是财政部与交通部之间为争夺后者职权范围而爆发的激烈对立。阿巴扎无法容忍交通部长的观点,试图对其加以约束。他要求严格遵守预算规则,支出须根据国库资源进行调整。在就任财政部长时,他针对国家产业部和交通部提出了以下条件:"为了国家经济的协调发展,不仅需要所有部门与财政部保持完全一致,在财政关系上也必须确立某种从属关系。"
nation that there be not only full unanimity of all departments with the Ministry of Finance, but a certain dependence in financial relations as well." 41
"国家经济的和谐发展,不仅要求所有部门与财政部保持完全一致,在财政关系上也必须确立某种从属关系。"41
The feud centered on control of large amounts of state funds. But it also grew out of the competition between the two ministries. Both considered themselves to be responsible for the nation’s economic well-being and development, and they offered radically different and mutually exclusive solutions. Both struggled for years to dominate Russian railroad affairs, the keystone of economic development. This overlap of authority contributed to inefficient management of the state transport system.
这场纷争的核心在于对国家巨额资金的控制权争夺。但更深层次上,它源于两个部门之间的竞争。双方都自认为肩负着国家经济繁荣与发展的责任,却提出了截然不同且互不相容的解决方案。多年来,双方为掌控被视为经济发展关键环节的俄国铁路事务而持续角力。这种职权重叠导致了国家运输系统的管理效率低下。
The Baranov Commission (1876-1884) brought the dispute out in the open. Inspired in part by Minister of War Miliutin’s criticism, it was created to examine insufficiencies in the railroad network which had come to light during the Russo-Turkish War. Pos’et naturally opposed many of the commission’s proposals, because they would have limited his ministry’s freedom of movement and because they were critical of his performance as minister. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} His responsibility for the state of affairs within the Ministry of Transport has probably been exaggerated. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} There is no doubt that problems plagued the ministry, but they should not be blamed on Pos’et. Skal’kovskii, a contemporary observer of officialdom, found that there was a huge difference between Pos’et’s administration and those of previous ministers: there were abuses, but under Pos’et the ministry could no longer be called a bazaar. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
巴拉诺夫委员会(1876-1884 年)将争议公开化。部分受陆军部长米柳京批评的启发,该委员会成立以审查俄土战争期间暴露出的铁路网络不足。波谢特自然反对委员会的许多提议,因为这些提议会限制其部门的行动自由,并且批评了他作为部长的表现。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} 他对交通部现状的责任可能被夸大了。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} 毫无疑问,该部存在诸多问题,但不应归咎于波谢特。官方观察家斯卡尔科夫斯基发现,波谢特的管理与前任部长们有巨大差异:虽然存在弊端,但在波谢特领导下,该部已不能被称作"集市"了。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
Individual hostility greatly amplified the interministerial conflict and affected the Siberian Railroad issue. Deputy Finance Minister F. G. Terner’s opinion of Pos’et was typical. He considered the admiral a
个人敌意极大加剧了部际冲突,并影响了西伯利亚铁路问题。财政部副部长 F·G·特纳对波谢特的看法颇具代表性。他认为这位海军上将是个

41. Zaionchkovskii, Autocracy, 159.
41. 扎昂奇科夫斯基,《专制制度》,第 159 页。

42. Solov’ eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport, 153-154, 156-157; Westwood, History of Russian Railways, 81-82; A. P. Pogrebinskii, “Stroitel’stvo zheleznykh dorog v poreformennoi Rossii i finansovaia politika tsarizma (60-90-e gody XIX v.),” Istoricheskie zapiski 47 (1954): 165-166.
42. 索洛维约娃,《铁路运输》,153-154、156-157 页;韦斯特伍德,《俄罗斯铁路史》,81-82 页;A·P·波格列宾斯基,“改革后俄罗斯铁路建设与沙皇政府的财政政策(19 世纪 60-90 年代)”,《历史笔记》47(1954 年):165-166 页。

43. For a characteristic view, see Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport, 156. Solov’eva relies on the testimony of Witte, who was involved with the Baranov Commission.
43. 代表性观点可参见索洛维约娃,《铁路运输》,156 页。索洛维约娃引用了参与巴拉诺夫委员会的维特的证词。

44. As K. A. Skal’kovskii pointed out, “under Pos’et, although the Augean stables were not fully cleaned-this being a task beyond the strength of an ordinary individual and even a whole generation-in many respects, order was achieved” (Nashi gosudarstvennye i obshchestvennye deiateli [St. Petersburg, 1890], 278-279). He mentions as Pos’et’s other contributions the significant expansion and rationalization of railroad construction and a host of beneficial measures taken to improve water routes and ports. On these contributions see also the introduction to Pos’et, “Prekrashchenie ssylki,” 53.
44. 正如 K·A·斯卡利科夫斯基所指出的,“在波谢特任内,尽管奥吉亚斯王的马厩并未完全清扫干净——这项任务超出了个人乃至一代人的能力范围——但在许多方面建立了秩序”(《我国国家与社会活动家》[圣彼得堡,1890 年],278-279 页)。他提到波谢特的其他贡献包括大幅扩展并合理化铁路建设,以及采取一系列改善水路和港口的有效措施。关于这些贡献另见波谢特《停止流放》导言,53 页。

good “sailor” and of good personal character, but, apparently along with most of his contemporaries, he felt that Pos’et was an incompetent minister who “understood little of railroad affairs,” with the result that Russia’s railroad economy suffered and the Baranov Commission had to be called into being. 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} The evidence Skal’kovskii presented belies Terner’s assertions. There is certainly little to justify A. A. Polovtsov’s claim that Pos’et was “stupid” or Miliutin’s that he was “obtuse”; these judgments reflect the vicious personal dislikes rife among the upper bureaucracy. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
作为一位优秀的“水手”且品行端正之人,他与当时多数同僚一样,认为波谢特是个无能的部长,“对铁路事务知之甚少”,导致俄国铁路经济受损,最终不得不成立巴拉诺夫委员会。 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} 斯卡尔科夫斯基提供的证据与特纳的断言相矛盾。显然,波洛夫佐夫称波谢特“愚钝”或米柳京评价其“迟钝”的说法几乎站不住脚;这些评判反映了高层官僚间盛行的恶意人身攻击。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
Perhaps some of the scorn can additionally be attributed to the general low esteem in which engineers were held at the time. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} Pos’et represented the interests of the engineers, many of whom were unemployed. There can be no doubt that the Siberian Railroad would put many of them back to work, and Pos’et’s enthusiasm cannot be separated from this consideration. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
或许部分蔑视还可归因于当时工程师普遍遭受的轻视。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} 波谢特代表着众多失业工程师的利益。西伯利亚铁路无疑将使其中许多人重获工作,而波谢特的热情正源于此考量。 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
More certainly, the name-calling stemmed from a deep political division within the elite. In politics, as in economics, Abaza and Pos’et were on opposite sides, and the hostility between the two sides grew in the first few months of Alexander III’s reign. Abaza belonged to a “democratic” faction that rallied around Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich and included, among others, Minister of Finance Reutern, Miliutin (who was related by marriage to Abaza), and, tentatively, former minister of the interior Valuev. Abaza had close ties with the liberal general M. T. Loris-Melikov, who arranged his appointment as minister of finance. All of them advocated further reforms. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
更确切地说,这种相互攻讦源于精英阶层内部深刻的政治分歧。无论在政治还是经济领域,阿巴扎与波谢特都分属对立阵营,双方敌意在亚历山大三世即位初期愈演愈烈。阿巴扎所属的"民主派"阵营以康斯坦丁·尼古拉耶维奇大公为核心,成员包括财政大臣罗伊特恩、米留京(与阿巴扎有姻亲关系)以及态度摇摆的前内务大臣瓦卢耶夫等人。阿巴扎与主张自由主义的洛里斯-梅利科夫将军关系密切,正是后者促成其财政大臣的任命。该派系均力主推进改革。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
Pos’et was a conservative Russian nationalist who opposed the aims of Loris-Melikov and his associates. He sided with Pobedonostsev and the new tsar at the meeting of the Council of Ministers called by Alexander III on March 7, 1881, to discuss Loris-Melikov’s
波谢特则是反对洛里斯-梅利科夫及其同僚目标的保守派俄罗斯民族主义者。在 1881 年 3 月 7 日亚历山大三世召开的讨论洛里斯-梅利科夫方案的部长会议上,他与波别多诺斯采夫共同站在新沙皇一方。
“constitution.” He was clearly opposed to political change and even to limited participation by society in government, as advocated by Abaza, Loris-Melikov, and Miliutin. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} Tellingly, Pos’et was one of the few ministers who remained in office under both Alexander II and Alexander III.
“宪法。”他显然反对政治变革,甚至反对阿巴扎、洛里斯-梅利科夫和米柳京所倡导的社会有限参与政府。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} 具有启示性的是,波谢特是少数几位在亚历山大二世和亚历山大三世两朝都留任的大臣之一。
The many divisions reflected in the government’s debate over the Siberian railroad plagued the project for more than a decade and a half. At bottom, the division was one of different world views: different approaches to government within the context of autocracy and different approaches to the economic development and well-being of Russia. Fed by personal and interministerial rivalry, the question of the Siberian Railroad, and, indeed, the general direction of Russian economic policy, would continue to be fervently contested along these lines.
政府内部关于西伯利亚铁路的辩论中暴露出的诸多分歧,困扰了这个项目长达十五年以上。从根本上说,这种分歧源于不同的世界观:在专制制度背景下对政府治理的不同态度,以及对俄罗斯经济发展和福祉的不同策略。由于个人及部门间的竞争加剧,西伯利亚铁路问题乃至俄罗斯经济政策的总体方向,将持续沿着这些路线激烈争论。

The Vital Nerve and the Tail End
生命线与末端

The railroads that gave rise to the Committee of Ministers’ decision of 1875 acted as foils to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Those railroads were limited in scope and motive, projects conceived in civil society to serve the needs of trade and industry. The Trans-Siberian, by contrast, was an ambitious creation of the central government. The distinction is not only between railroad projects but between reigns-the momentary centrality of commercial interests and society under Alexander II and their loss of vitality under Alexander III. The spirit of the new reign would infuse Pos’et’s Trans-Siberian proposals of the 1880 s.
那些促使 1875 年大臣委员会做出决定的铁路,与西伯利亚大铁路形成了鲜明对比。这些铁路在范围和动机上都较为局限,是民间社会为满足贸易与工业需求而构想出的项目。而西伯利亚大铁路则是中央政府雄心勃勃的创举。这种差异不仅体现在铁路项目本身,更折射出两个统治时期的特征——亚历山大二世时期商业利益与社会活力的短暂核心地位,到了亚历山大三世时期便黯然消退。新时代的精神将贯穿 19 世纪 80 年代波谢特提出的西伯利亚大铁路提案。
Pos’et’s Project of 1884  波谢特 1884 年方案
A crisis that might have worked against Pos’et’s initial proposal of the northern route, had it been approved, instead knocked the wind out of the alternative. The Treasury’s financial condition grew so grave that construction of the Siberian Railroad from Nizhnii-Novgorod to Tiumen’ became impossible. Famine in Russia’s southern provinces in 1875 and poor harvests in 1881-1882 and 1884-1885, combined with the lessening world demand for Russian grain and the consequent decline in export earnings, sent the ruble’s exchange rate plummeting on international markets. Russian railroad indebtedness pushed the Treasury further into the red. In the mid-1870s, difficulties
一场本可能对波谢特最初提出的北方路线方案不利的危机,倘若该方案获得批准的话,反而使替代方案失去了动力。财政部的财务状况变得如此严峻,以至于从下诺夫哥罗德到秋明的西伯利亚铁路建设变得不可能。1875 年俄罗斯南部省份的饥荒,以及 1881-1882 年和 1884-1885 年的歉收,加上全球对俄罗斯谷物需求的减少及随之而来的出口收入下降,导致卢布在国际市场上的汇率暴跌。俄罗斯铁路的债务进一步加剧了财政部的赤字。19 世纪 70 年代中期,困难

on foreign money markets made it so hard to place loans that the Treasury could no longer issue guaranteed railroad concessions. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
外国货币市场的状况使得贷款变得极为困难,以至于财政部无法再发放有担保的铁路特许权。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
More damaging to the state’s finances was the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878). Before this war, between 1868 and 1875, Minister of Finance Reutern had stopped the downward fall of the ruble brought on in the late 1850 s by the Crimean War, strengthened the currency, and largely brought its fluctuation under control. But the more recent conflict, during which the government spent more than a billion paper rubles, undid his accomplishment. By 1881 the country’s deficit reached 80.5 million rubles, forcing the new government to proceed with the utmost caution in its spending. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
对俄国财政造成更大损害的是俄土战争(1877-1878)。在这场战争之前,1868 至 1875 年间,财政大臣路透成功遏制了克里米亚战争导致 19 世纪 50 年代末卢布持续贬值的趋势,稳定了货币价值,并基本控制了汇率波动。但这场新近的冲突使政府耗费了超过 10 亿纸卢布,令其功亏一篑。到 1881 年,国家赤字达到 8050 万卢布,迫使新政府在开支上不得不极度谨慎。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
Because of the weakening of the Treasury’s resources, Reutern had urged the Committee of Ministers as early as 1876 and 1877 to limit expenditures to the upkeep of existing railroads. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} On similar grounds N. Kh. Bunge, minister of finance from 1881 to 1887 , would justify delaying construction of the Siberian route approved by the Committee of Ministers in 1 8 7 5 1 8 7 5 1875\mathbf{1 8 7 5}. Russia’s difficult financial condition led him to the conclusion that the finance minister’s primary concern should be “balancing receipts with expenditures, by observing the strictest and most prudent economy.” He laid down a railroad policy that followed suit. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} In response to local petitions from interested parties in June 1880 he declared that "construction [of the Siberian Railroad] will be commenced when the means at the disposal of the State Treasury allow it; when existing railroads are finally put in order; and when those railroad lines that are truly necessary for the trade, industry, and agriculture of the Motherland are completed."5 Bunge was clearly skeptical of the need for a Siberian railroad, whatever its location.
由于财政部资源的削弱,鲁特恩早在 1876 年和 1877 年就敦促部长委员会限制支出,仅用于维护现有铁路。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 基于类似理由,1881 年至 1887 年担任财政部长的 N·Kh·邦格也主张推迟建设部长委员会在 1 8 7 5 1 8 7 5 1875\mathbf{1 8 7 5} 批准的西伯利亚铁路线。俄罗斯艰难的财政状况使他得出结论,财政部长的首要任务应是“通过实行最严格和最审慎的经济政策,平衡收支”。他据此制定了相应的铁路政策。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 针对 1880 年 6 月利益相关方的地方请愿,他声明“(西伯利亚铁路的)建设将在国家财政允许时启动;待现有铁路最终整顿完毕;且那些对祖国贸易、工业和农业真正必要的铁路线完工之后。”5 显然,邦格对西伯利亚铁路的必要性持怀疑态度,无论其选址如何。
The victor of 1875 had lost momentum and the turn of events soon proved auspicious for Pos’et. By 1884, state finances, if not the econ-
1875 年的胜利者已失去势头,事态发展很快对波西特变得有利。到 1884 年,国家财政(即便经济尚未)
omy, seemed to be improving gradually; the ruble’s exchange rate was higher and foreign markets seemed to regain confidence in Russia. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
经济似乎正在逐步改善;卢布汇率上升,国际市场似乎对俄罗斯重拾信心。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
As the Russian transport network steadily advanced toward Siberia, the question of the Siberian Railroad became ineluctable. In 1877 the railroad system of European Russia reached Orenburg, at the southwestern border of Siberia. In 1878 the Ural Mining Railroad commenced operation. In 1880 the immense bridge called Imperator Aleksandr II, spanning the Volga near Syzran’, opened, bringing central Russia even closer to Orenburg and the Siberian steppe. In 1882 work began on the Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime}-Enisei Canal, which would permit uninterrupted travel by river from Tiumen’ to Irkutsk. Finally, between 1880 and 1882 the government decided to proceed with construction, at the Treasury’s expense, of the Ekaterinburg-Tiumen’ Railroad, running between the Volga and Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} basins; work on it began in 1884. This road threatened to become the western section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and this prospect goaded Pos’et into action. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
随着俄罗斯交通网络稳步向亚洲西伯利亚推进,西伯利亚铁路问题变得无法回避。1877 年,俄罗斯欧洲部分的铁路系统延伸至西伯利亚西南边境的奥伦堡。1878 年,乌拉尔矿业铁路投入运营。1880 年,横跨伏尔加河、位于瑟兹兰附近的巨型桥梁"亚历山大二世皇帝桥"通车,使俄罗斯中部与奥伦堡及西伯利亚草原的联系更为紧密。1882 年, Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} -叶尼塞运河工程启动,该运河将实现从秋明到伊尔库茨克的河流不间断通航。最终在 1880 至 1882 年间,政府决定由国库出资修建连接伏尔加河与 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 流域的叶卡捷琳堡-秋明铁路,工程于 1884 年动工。这条铁路极可能成为跨西伯利亚铁路的西段,这一前景促使波谢特采取了行动。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
After conducting new surveys and wrangling with the Committee of Ministers for several years, Pos’et presented his next proposal before that body on June 1, 1884. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} For the first time he detailed his ambitious notion of a railroad through Siberia itself. The railroad would be built from Samara on the Volga to Ufa, then to Zlatoust in the Urals, whence it would emerge at Cheliabinsk and continue through western Siberia to Omsk. From there it was roughly to follow the existing post road through central Siberia-from Omsk to Kansk, Krasnoiarsk, Nizhneudinsk, and Irkutsk. East of Baikal the route was less certain, but until more detailed surveys were available, there too the best location for the railroad seemed to be close to the post road that went from Verkhneudinsk to Chita and Sretensk, then paralleled the Shilka and Amur rivers. Near Khabarovsk the railroad would turn south along the Ussuri River to Vladivostok.
经过数年新的勘测并与大臣委员会反复磋商后,波谢特于 1884 年 6 月 1 日向该机构提交了他的下一项提案。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 这是他首次详细阐述穿越西伯利亚腹地的宏大铁路构想。这条铁路将从伏尔加河畔的萨马拉修建至乌法,再延伸至乌拉尔山脉的兹拉托乌斯特,由此在车里雅宾斯克出山后继续穿越西西伯利亚抵达鄂木斯克。此后线路大致沿现有的驿道贯穿中西伯利亚——从鄂木斯克经坎斯克、克拉斯诺亚尔斯克、下乌金斯克直至伊尔库茨克。贝加尔湖以东的路线尚不明确,但在更详细勘测完成前,铁路最佳走向似乎仍应贴近驿道——从上乌金斯克经赤塔、斯列坚斯克,继而沿石勒喀河与阿穆尔河并行。在哈巴罗夫斯克附近,铁路将转向南沿乌苏里江抵达符拉迪沃斯托克。
The Samara-Ufa route was a rejection of both the previous routes,
萨马拉-乌法线路的选定意味着对先前两条提案路线的全盘否定。
northern and southern. Pos’et castigated the “personal or local interests” behind the old southern route as not being of "decisive significance in so important a question as the joining of the two halves of the Empire. 9 9 ^('9){ }^{\prime 9} He portrayed the 1875 route, with its terminus in Tiumen’, as heading toward a nonproductive region of Siberia and as parallel to rivers that might compete with the railroad. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
南北两线。波谢特谴责旧南线背后的“个人或地方利益”,认为这些利益在“连接帝国两半如此重要的问题上”不具有“决定性意义”。 9 9 ^('9){ }^{\prime 9} 他将 1875 年线路的终点设在秋明,描绘为通往西伯利亚一个非生产性区域,并与可能与铁路竞争的河流平行。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
Pos’et reiterated the pioneer function of the railroad. Reflecting the “turn inward” of Alexander III’s reign, he had turned his attention to the development of Siberia, where “all sides of life … were stagnant for the almost exclusive reason of lack of convenient means of communication.” It was clear that “under such conditions the population of Siberia was developing separately and slowly, [and] that most of the region’s natural riches remained unproductive.” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} The railroad, he said, would counteract this trend. He also provided a concrete example of the major changes in the economy that could be wrought by the railroad if it were to follow the direction he had detailed. Linking the grain-producing Cheliabinsk and Troitsk uezds with Orenburg province, it would take the grain trade out of the hands of the Kama grain dealers, who, centered on the limited existing transit routes, forced grain away from its natural destination to Ekaterinburg, where prices were high. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} Thus interventionist elements continued to be prominent in Pos’et’s conception of railroads.
波谢特重申了铁路的开拓作用。在亚历山大三世统治时期“向内转”的背景下,他将注意力转向西伯利亚的发展,那里“生活的方方面面……几乎完全因缺乏便利的交通方式而停滞不前”。显然,“在这种条件下,西伯利亚的人口发展孤立而缓慢,该地区大部分自然资源仍未得到开发。” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 他表示,铁路将扭转这一趋势。他还举了一个具体例子,说明如果铁路按照他详细规划的方向建设,将给经济带来重大变革:通过连接产粮的切利亚宾斯克和特罗伊茨克县与奥伦堡省,铁路将使粮食贸易摆脱卡马河粮食商人的控制——这些商人以有限的现有运输路线为中心,迫使粮食偏离其天然目的地,转而流向价格高昂的叶卡捷琳堡。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 由此可见,干预主义元素在波谢特的铁路构想中依然占据重要地位。
The Trans-Siberian Railroad was to serve a predominantly political purpose. This is not to deny that there were good economic reasons for Pos’et’s choice of the Samara-Ufa route, but they were by no means compelling. The established trade routes of western Siberia tended north toward Tiumen’ and Ekaterinburg in the central Urals, over the land route from Central Asia, the Kazakh steppe, Petropavlovsk and the grain-producing okrugs of Ishim, Kurgan, and Shadrinsk, and by water via the O b O b Ob^(')\mathbf{O b}^{\prime}, Irtysh, Tobol, and Tura rivers. This northward movement had been the natural tendency given the hostility of populations to the south, but circumstances had changed over the century. Now only tradition and a monopoly on river traffic by four steamship firms maintained the flow. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
西伯利亚大铁路主要服务于政治目的。这并非否认波谢特选择萨马拉-乌法路线有充分的经济理由,但这些理由绝非决定性因素。西西伯利亚既有的贸易路线倾向于向北通往乌拉尔中部的秋明和叶卡捷琳堡,途经中亚陆路、哈萨克草原、彼得罗巴甫洛夫斯克以及伊希姆、库尔干和沙德林斯克等产粮区,或通过水路经额尔齐斯河、托博尔河和图拉河运输。这种向北的流动原本是鉴于南方居民的敌意而形成的自然趋势,但一个世纪以来情况已发生变化。如今,只有传统和四家轮船公司对河运的垄断维持着这一流向。
The post road had slowly moved south since the mid-eighteenth century, with the expansion of agriculture and Russian settlement. The recently completed Orenburg Railroad was attracting freight in this direction from the Ekaterinburg-Tiumen’ highway, perhaps an indication of a new trend. Nizhnii-Novgorod, Ekaterinburg, and Tiumen’ were once favorably located, but with a railroad line, freight originating in the south could be shipped along a better path. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} And despite the arguments of the manufacturers who dominated the Nizhnii-Novgorod fair committee, it was obvious that the profitability of the Siberian Railroad would depend not on the transport of manufactures or clothing but on low-priced agricultural goods, for which savings on shipping costs would be considerable if the railroad were built between Omsk and Samara. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
自 18 世纪中叶以来,随着农业发展和俄罗斯移民的扩张,驿道逐渐南移。新近竣工的奥伦堡铁路正吸引着来自叶卡捷琳堡-秋明公路的货运朝此方向转移,这或许预示着一个新趋势。下诺夫哥罗德、叶卡捷琳堡和秋明曾占据有利位置,但有了铁路线后,南方始发的货物便能通过更优路径运输。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 尽管主导下诺夫哥罗德集市委员会的制造商们提出种种理由,但显而易见的是,西伯利亚铁路的盈利能力将不依赖于制成品或服装的运输,而在于低价农产品——若在鄂木斯克与萨马拉之间修建铁路,这类货物的运输成本将大幅节省。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
The lands in this vicinity formed the center of the most productive agricultural and livestock region of Siberia and the trans-Urals: tallow was produced in Akmolinsk oblast and Shadrinsk, Kurgan, Ialutorovsk, Ishim, and Tiukalinsk uezds; cattle and their by-productsmeat, hides, and butter-were brought all summer long from Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts to the fair at Ozero Tainchi-Kul’, near Petropavlovsk; grain was abundant in Cheliabinsk, Troitsk, Kurgan, Ialutorovsk, and Ishim uezds. The natural markets for these products were not only the Urals, Moscow, and St. Petersburg; the Samara-Ufa line would provide the shortest journeys to the southern Russian towns of Khar’kov, Odessa, and Rostov-na-Donu as well. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
这一带地区是西伯利亚和外乌拉尔最富饶的农牧业中心:阿克莫林斯克省及沙德林斯克、库尔干、亚卢托罗夫斯克、伊希姆、秋卡林斯克诸县盛产动物油脂;整个夏季,阿克莫林斯克与塞米巴拉金斯克两省的牲畜及其副产品——肉类、皮革与黄油——源源不断运往彼得罗巴甫洛夫斯克附近的泰恩奇-库尔湖集市;车里雅宾斯克、特罗伊茨克、库尔干、亚卢托罗夫斯克和伊希姆诸县则谷物丰盈。这些物产的自然市场不仅包括乌拉尔、莫斯科和圣彼得堡;经由萨马拉-乌法铁路线,还能以最短路径抵达俄罗斯南部城镇哈尔科夫、敖德萨与顿河畔罗斯托夫。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
For these reasons of trade and economics, the Samara-Ufa variant made sense. But there was a limit to the influence of such factors on the choice of the Ministry of Transport and, ultimately, the Russian state. On the whole, the commercial contribution of Siberia was not considered significant or vital, and there was little or no justification on economic grounds either for a railroad across Siberia or for the selection of Samara-Ufa as its initial section. In spite of the recent growth and obvious potential of Siberian agriculture, the government
出于贸易与经济考量,萨马拉-乌法线路方案显得合理。然而,此类因素对交通部乃至俄罗斯国家最终决策的影响力存在限度。总体而言,西伯利亚的商业贡献并未被视为举足轻重,无论是建设横贯西伯利亚的铁路,还是选择萨马拉-乌法段作为起始路段,都缺乏充分的经济依据。尽管西伯利亚农业近期发展显著且潜力明显,政府
as yet gave no thought to exporting its products, either abroad or to European Russia: southern European Russia was the largest exporter of grain in the world at the time and the Urals were already receiving Siberian grain. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
当时尚未考虑将其产品出口至海外或欧俄地区——彼时南欧俄地区已是全球最大粮食出口地,而乌拉尔地区早已开始接收西伯利亚粮食。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
The state of mining affairs also did not absolutely necessitate a railroad across Siberia. For various reasons mining and metallurgy in general declined on the Cabinet lands of Siberia after emancipation, with a 40 to 50 percent drop in the production of silver and nonferrous metals. Mining of gold, iron, and coal was stable or grew, but the strength of this sector seems to have fostered complacency, since the value of the mines, at least in the case of gold, compensated for the cost of extraction in remote areas. Nor was Siberian metallurgy deemed vital to European Russian industry: Russia began to be aware of Siberia’s real reserve of metals only after construction of the railroad commenced, when geological research was first seriously undertaken. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} Thus, while a railroad for these purposes would have been useful, it was not at all considered a necessity for economic reasons.
矿业状况也并非绝对需要一条横贯西伯利亚的铁路。解放后,由于种种原因,西伯利亚内阁领地上的采矿和冶金业普遍衰退,银和有色金属的产量下降了 40%至 50%。黄金、铁和煤的开采保持稳定或有所增长,但这一行业的强劲似乎助长了自满情绪,因为矿藏的价值(至少就黄金而言)足以弥补偏远地区开采的成本。西伯利亚的冶金业也不被视为对俄罗斯欧洲部分的工业至关重要:直到铁路建设开始后,俄罗斯才首次认真进行地质研究,从而意识到西伯利亚真正的金属储量。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 因此,虽然出于这些目的修建铁路会很有用,但人们并不认为这是出于经济原因的必要之举。
The idea of a railroad running through Siberia-a Trans-Siberian railroad-beginning with a stretch from Ufa to Omsk, did not originate within the government. Pos’et’s adaptation of earlier private projects reveals the political function attributed to the Trans-Siberian by the state. The proposal of the Ministry of Transport had its roots in the work of V. I. Vagin and N. Ostrovskii. Vagin, a predecessor of the Siberian regionalists, had formulated his plan in 1858-1859 in the Tomskie gubernskie vedomosti (Tomsk provincial gazette). 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} Ostrovskii, a member of the Perm’ statistical committee, published his in a lengthy pamphlet in 1880, which outlined a “South or Trans-Siberian railroad” from Ufa to Irkutsk along the route almost identical to the one eventually built. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
关于修建一条穿越西伯利亚的铁路——即西伯利亚大铁路——的构想,最初从乌法延伸至鄂木斯克的一段并非源自政府内部。波谢特对早期私人项目的改编揭示了国家赋予西伯利亚大铁路的政治功能。交通部的提案源于 V·I·瓦金和 N·奥斯特洛夫斯基的工作。瓦金作为西伯利亚地区主义者的先驱,早在 1858 至 1859 年间就在《托木斯克省公报》上阐述了他的计划。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 奥斯特洛夫斯基,彼尔姆统计委员会成员,则于 1880 年在一本详细的小册子中发表了他的方案,其中勾勒了一条“南线或西伯利亚大铁路”,从乌法至伊尔库茨克,其路线与最终建成的几乎完全一致。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}

17. North, Transport, 45, 48, 68. As North also shows (p. 72), this underestimation of potential agricultural freight was a cause of the overload and inefficiency of the Siberian Railroad after operation began, so productive was Siberia in grain. See chap. 10 below.
17. 诺斯,《运输》,45、48、68 页。正如诺斯同样指出的(第 72 页),对潜在农业货运量的低估是西伯利亚铁路运营开始后超载和效率低下的原因之一,西伯利亚的粮食产量如此之高。详见下文第 10 章。

18. Ibid., 42-44, 51. Gold mining in Enisei province declined precipitously between 1860 and 1890, according to V. Iu. Grigor’ev, Peremeny v usloviiakh ekonomicheskoi zhizni naseleniia Sibiri (Eniseiskii krai) (Krasnoiarsk, 1904), 62, but this loss was balanced by gains elsewhere in eastern Siberia and the Far East (Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, 3:43-46).
18. 同上,42-44 页、51 页。根据 V. Iu.格里戈里耶夫《西伯利亚(叶尼塞边疆区)居民经济生活条件的变化》(克拉斯诺亚尔斯克,1904 年)第 62 页记载,1860 至 1890 年间叶尼塞省的黄金开采量急剧下降,但这一损失被东西伯利亚和远东其他地区的增长所抵消(奥克拉德尼科夫等,《西伯利亚史》第 3 卷:43-46 页)。

19. V. F. Borzunov, “Proekty stroitel’stva sibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali pervoi poloviny XIX v. kak istoricheskii istochnik,” in Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Sibirskoe Otdelenie, Dal’nevostochnyi Filial, Trudy, seriia istoricheskaia, vol. 5, ed. V. M. Vishnevskii et al. (Blagoveshchensk, 1963), 51-52. The route he proposed was Ufa-Troitsk-Shadrinsk-Tomsk.
19. V. F.博尔祖诺夫,《19 世纪上半叶西伯利亚铁路干线建设方案作为历史资料》,载苏联科学院西伯利亚分院远东分所《历史丛刊》第 5 卷(布拉戈维申斯克,1963 年),51-52 页。他提议的路线是乌法-特罗伊茨克-沙德林斯克-托木斯克。

20. Ostrovskii, K voprosu, 96-108.
20. 奥斯特洛夫斯基,《论问题》,96-108 页。
Both Ostrovskii and Vagin had in mind the gradual settlement and development of the region and a series of complementary measures that would improve the territory over a period of many years before construction of a cross-country railroad. A Trans-Siberian railroad was to appear only in the very distant future, once Siberia had gradually developed to a level sufficient to ensure the railroad’s income. To achieve this level of development Ostrovskii suggested improving the means of communication in the short term by building three smaller railroads that would provide a lateral connection between Siberia’s internal waterways. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
奥斯特洛夫斯基和瓦金都考虑到了逐步对该地区进行定居和开发,以及一系列配套措施,这些措施将在跨西伯利亚铁路建设之前的许多年里逐步改善该地区。一条横贯西伯利亚的铁路只有在非常遥远的未来才会出现,即西伯利亚逐步发展到足以确保铁路收入的水平。为了实现这一发展水平,奥斯特洛夫斯基建议短期内通过修建三条较小的铁路来改善交通方式,这些铁路将在西伯利亚的内陆水道之间提供横向连接。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
While these proposals may have laid some of the groundwork for the Ministry of Transport, its main recommendations were ignored: the ministry could not wait for Siberia’s gradual development, given its desire to tether Siberia to European Russia as quickly as possible. The ministry (and it would soon have the full backing of the Russian state) was interested in economic development not for its own sake but rather to achieve its political objectives. To the enthusiastic editor of the Zhurnal ministerstva putei soobshcheniia (Journal of the Ministry of Transport), N. A. Sytenko, once the Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed “the ancient routes of the Huns and Mongols to Europe will be opened anew, but this time not for them; along these paths steam engines and railroad cars will whistle and dart, bringing life and culture to the land of bears, sable, and gold!” 22 “Life and culture” meant economic development to Russify this territory. As another writer put it, Russia needed to give Siberia a railroad, “this vital nerve of every nation,” so that it would be “closely tied” to the motherland and to keep it from "completely alienating itself from the metropolis.’ 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} Pos’et clearly expressed this position before the Committee of Ministers in 1882:
尽管这些提议可能为交通部奠定了一些基础,但其主要建议却被忽视了:鉴于迫切希望将西伯利亚尽快与欧洲俄罗斯紧密联系,该部门无法等待西伯利亚的渐进发展。交通部(并很快得到俄罗斯国家的全力支持)对经济发展的兴趣并非出于其本身,而是为了实现其政治目标。对《交通部杂志》充满热情的编辑 N. A. 西坚科而言,一旦西伯利亚大铁路建成,“匈奴人和蒙古人通往欧洲的古老路线将重新开启,但这次主角不再是他们;蒸汽机车和铁路车厢将沿着这些路径呼啸飞驰,为熊、紫貂和黄金之地带来生命与文化!”22 这里的“生命与文化”意味着通过经济发展使这片领土俄罗斯化。 正如另一位作家所言,俄罗斯需要给西伯利亚一条铁路——“这个每个国家的生命线”,以便它能够“紧密地”与祖国相连,防止其“完全疏离于宗主国”。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 1882 年,波谢特在部长委员会上明确表达了这一立场:
The task of unifying Siberia with European Russia by reorganizing its civil and social structure and granting it those improved administrative and juridical forms that are enjoyed in Russia will become feasible only when communications are rapid and unbroken, if possible, between all parts of the distant and vast borderlands and the center of government;
只有通过快速且不间断的交通连接,尽可能地将这片遥远广袤边疆的各个部分与政府中心联系起来,重组西伯利亚的民事和社会结构,并赋予其在俄罗斯享有的先进行政与司法形式,才能实现将其与欧洲俄罗斯统一的任务;
and until there is a railroad across all of Siberia, it will be estranged from the general system and political life of the state. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
而在横贯西伯利亚的铁路建成之前,这片土地将始终游离于国家的整体体系和政治生活之外。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
Ironically, Pos’et recommended construction of a railroad through the geographical region that best suited commercial development, but for political reasons. To ensure the political success of this venture, the railroad would have to bring Russian settlers to colonize Siberia. The most suitable area for colonization would therefore determine the direction of the Siberian Railroad. West of Lake Baikal Pos’et chose the route Samara-Ufa-Zlatoust-Cheliabinsk-Kurgan-Petropav-lovsk-Omsk-Kansk-Krasnoiarsk-Nizhneudinsk-Irkutsk over both the more northerly Tiumen’ options and the more southerly variant from Orenburg to Omsk, which at the time some of the professional societies were actively promoting. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} Samara-Ufa offered the most direct route to the European Russian rail network, it ran through the center of the Siberian Black Earth Zone, and it was close to coal and livestock regions. The potential for “cultural development” was greater along its path than in either the tundra, swamps, and taiga of the north, the uninhabited, desiccated Kazakh steppe to the south, or the impassable mountains to the southeast, along the Chinese border. “Omsk has national significance, and a railroad to it political importance”: settlers went not north to Tobol’sk, but south to Biisk and Kuznetsk
讽刺的是,波谢特出于政治原因,建议铁路穿过最适合商业发展的地理区域。为确保这一事业的政治成功,铁路必须将俄罗斯移民带到西伯利亚进行殖民。因此,最适合殖民的地区将决定西伯利亚铁路的走向。在贝加尔湖以西,波谢特选择了萨马拉-乌法-兹拉托乌斯特-车里雅宾斯克-库尔干-彼得罗巴甫洛夫斯克-鄂木斯克-坎斯克-克拉斯诺亚尔斯克-下乌金斯克-伊尔库茨克路线,而非更北部的秋明选项或当时一些专业团体积极推动的从奥伦堡到鄂木斯克的南部路线。萨马拉-乌法提供了通往俄罗斯欧洲铁路网的最直接路径,它穿过西伯利亚黑土带中心,靠近煤炭和畜牧区。沿此路线的“文化发展”潜力远大于北部的苔原、沼泽和针叶林,南部无人居住、干旱的哈萨克草原,或东南部沿中国边境的险峻山脉。 “鄂木斯克具有国家层面的重要性,通往它的铁路则具有政治意义”:移民们并未向北前往托博尔斯克,而是南下至比斯克和库兹涅茨克

24. ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 3. See also MPS, “Predstavlenie,” no. 4751, pp.2-3, where Pos’et states that “no other tool in the development of contemporary human societies may be compared with the power of the railroads in unifying the thoughts, mores, and affairs of people.”
24. 交通部公共事务司,1893 年,第 2 号:3 页。另见交通部《呈文》,第 4751 号,第 2-3 页,其中波谢特指出:“在当代人类社会的发展中,没有任何工具能与铁路在统一人们思想、习俗及事务方面的力量相提并论。”

25. On the Orenburg proposal, see TOSRPT, vol. 12, otdel 1 (1881), 87-99; Neskol’ko slov po voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1882), 127-144; Imperatorskoe Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo, Orenburgskii Otdel, O preimushchestvakh orenburgo-omskogo napravleniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi (Orenburg, 1883). Two routes passing north of Lake Baikal, bypassing Irkutsk, were eventually surveyed and discussed, but on reexamination by an opponent they were shown to be longer and in more difficult terrain than the route through Irkutsk, near the south end of the lake (“O velikom sibirskom puti,” 174; Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo obshchestva po voprosu o zheleznoi doroge cherez vsiu Sibir’, vol. 21 [St. Petersburg, 1890], 1; N. A. Voloshinov, “Zhelezno-dorozhnaia razvedka mezhdu Angaroi i severnoiu okonechnost’iu Baikala,” Izvestiia vostochno-sibirskogo otdela imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva 20, no. 5 [1889]: 1-14). The alternate routes were put forth by General Protsenko, governor of Turgai oblast, and N. P. Mezheninov, then chief of surveys for the Tomsk-Irkutsk section of the railroad. In its western reaches the route was to cross the Chuna River and head east for Bratskii Ostrog; it would cross the Angara, Lena, and Kirenga rivers, pass close to Lake Baikal, continue along the Verkhniaia Angara, and cross the Muia, Vitim, and Olekma rivers. Here are the unacknowledged origins of the recently completed Baikal-Amur Main Line (BAM).
25. 关于奥伦堡提案,参见《TOSRPT》第 12 卷第 1 分册(1881 年),87-99 页;《关于西伯利亚铁路问题的若干意见》第二版(莫斯科,1882 年),127-144 页;帝俄地理学会奥伦堡分会,《论西伯利亚铁路奥伦堡-鄂木斯克方向的优越性》(奥伦堡,1883 年)。两条绕行伊尔库茨克以北、途经贝加尔湖北部的路线最终被勘测并讨论,但经反对者重新审查后表明,相较于靠近湖南端的伊尔库茨克路线,这两条路线更长且地形更为复杂(《论伟大的西伯利亚之路》,174 页;《帝俄技术学会西伯利亚全线铁路问题委员会学报》第 21 卷[圣彼得堡,1890 年],1 页;N·A·沃洛希诺夫,《安加拉河与贝加尔湖北端之间的铁路勘测》,《帝俄地理学会东西伯利亚分会学报》第 20 卷第 5 期[1889 年]:1-14 页)。替代路线由图尔盖州总督普罗岑科将军及当时负责托木斯克-伊尔库茨克铁路段勘测工作的 N·P·梅热尼诺夫提出。 在西段,线路计划穿越丘纳河后向东延伸至布拉茨克堡;它将跨过安加拉河、勒拿河和基廉加河,途经贝加尔湖附近,沿上安加拉河继续前行,并横渡穆亚河、维季姆河和奥廖克马河。这里隐藏着近期竣工的贝阿铁路(BAM)未被承认的起源。

okrug, by way of Omsk. Here is where four of the six million Siberian inhabitants lived, on either side of the post road, in a belt two to three hundred versts wide. Pos’et planned the railroad to go through the center of this population, following the line of the post road. He applied similar criteria in selecting the route east of Baikal. According to him, any other option was unthinkable. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
州,途径鄂木斯克。这里居住着六百万西伯利亚居民中的四百万,他们分布在驿道两侧,形成一个宽约两三百俄里的带状区域。波谢特规划铁路穿过这一人口中心地带,沿驿道走向铺设。他在选择贝加尔湖以东路线时也采用了类似标准。在他看来,其他任何方案都是不可想象的。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}

Regional Bickering  地区间的争执

The choice of Samara-Ufa-Cheliabinsk implied the rejection of the 1875 decision and would have bypassed Nizhnii-Novgorod, Kazan’, Ekaterinburg, and Tiumen’. As soon as word was out that Pos’et was considering such an option, a new public debate began, more passionate and bitter than before. A vote in the Society for the Encouragement of Russian Industry and Trade showed that the membership was evenly divided on regional lines over the question. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} Arguments on each side followed a familiar pattern: their route was objectively more important and more suited for the railroad; they were more in need of it; theirs was for the general good; the alternative would be wasteful.
选择萨马拉-乌法-车里雅宾斯克路线意味着推翻了 1875 年的决定,并将绕开下诺夫哥罗德、喀山、叶卡捷琳堡和秋明等地。一旦波谢特考虑这一方案的消息传出,新一轮的公众辩论便开始了,比以往更加激烈和尖锐。俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会的投票显示,会员们在地域立场上对该问题意见均等分裂。双方论点遵循了熟悉的模式:各自宣称其路线客观上更重要、更适合铁路建设;他们更迫切需要铁路;自己的方案是为了整体利益;而对方方案则会造成浪费。
Representatives of towns lying on the 1875 route asked which was better for Siberia, a railroad through the Bashkir steppe or through Kazan’, Nizhnii-Novgorod, and Moscow? The latter was a populated region, the center of industry, the source of all Siberia’s import needs, and the shortest route between European Russia and Siberian markets. Its proponents downplayed possible competition by the Volga by stressing the river’s navigational difficulties, at the same time that they cited its heavy traffic as proof of the region’s importance. Using arguments of the old northern route’s supporters (which they had rejected when they themselves were the southern route), proponents of the Nizhnii-Novgorod line asserted the importance of the Baltic ports for Siberian export, as opposed to the Black Sea ports, more easily
1875 年铁路沿线城镇的代表们提出疑问:对西伯利亚而言,穿越巴什基尔草原的铁路与途经喀山、下诺夫哥罗德和莫斯科的线路,哪一条更为优越?后者作为人口稠密区、工业中心及西伯利亚进口需求的供应源头,是连接欧俄与西伯利亚市场的最短路径。支持者通过强调伏尔加河通航困难来淡化其竞争威胁,同时以该河道繁忙的运输量佐证该地区的重要性。他们援引昔日北方路线支持者的论据(尽管这些支持者曾反对南方路线),主张下诺夫哥罗德线路对于西伯利亚出口经由波罗的海港口的重要性,而非更易通过萨马拉抵达的黑海港口。
reached via Samara. The difficulty of settlement in the south, its isolation, its lack of fuels, and its low level of development were reasons enough, according to them, not to put a railroad there. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
南方地区移民垦殖的困难性、地理隔绝性、燃料匮乏以及发展水平低下,在他们看来,已构成不在该区域修建铁路的充分理由。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
Katkov also defended the 1875 route, but on a loftier plane. Writing as editor of Moskovskie vedomosti (Moscow gazette), he had criticized the indecision of the government and the competition among regional interests. Yet he himself was a vocal opponent of the SamaraUfa choice. For him, Moscow was the center of Russia, the heart of the state organism, and the “arteries of rail” should flow from there to provide a “living tie” to the “important parts of the state body.” “There can be no justification for quarreling with history”; it would be dangerous to deviate from the established trade routes. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} Moscow represented Russia to Katkov, and his justification of the 1875 route was a reflection of his nationalism as well as a mundane defense of Moscow’s commercial interests. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
卡特科夫也为 1875 年的路线辩护,但站在更高的层面。作为《莫斯科公报》的编辑,他曾批评政府的优柔寡断和地方利益间的竞争。然而,他本人却是萨马拉-乌法方案的高调反对者。对他而言,莫斯科是俄罗斯的中心,国家有机体的心脏,铁路"动脉"应由此延伸,为"国家躯体的重要部分"提供"生命纽带"。"与历史争辩毫无道理";偏离既定商路将十分危险。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 在卡特科夫眼中,莫斯科代表着俄罗斯,他为 1875 年路线辩护既体现了民族主义情怀,也是对莫斯科商业利益的世俗维护。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
Petitioning for the new southern route were representatives from the zemstvos and towns of Ufa and Samara provinces, led by Mayor Volkov of Ufa. The “southerners” stressed the abundance of rich land in their region and the potential of their factories. From Samara and Ufa the Black Sea trade would benefit, as would all of southern Russia. The lower Volga for the first time would be supplied in times of famine; the north already had a source of grain, whereas here there was none because of the lack of proper transport. Why should Russia’s interests revolve around Nizhnii-Novgorod and Kazan’? Kazan’ had no ties to Siberia whatsoever and Nizhnii-Novgorod was not dependent on Siberian goods, which yielded only 7 percent of the fair’s total. A railroad to the south would actually benefit Nizhnii-Novgorod, they
为这条新南方路线请愿的是乌法和萨马拉省地方自治局及城镇代表,由乌法市长沃尔科夫牵头。"南方派"强调该地区富饶土地的丰沛及其工厂的潜力。萨马拉和乌法将受益于黑海贸易,整个南俄地区亦然。伏尔加河下游将首次在饥荒时期获得补给;北方已有粮食来源,而这里由于缺乏适当运输手段却一无所有。为何俄罗斯的利益要围绕下诺夫哥罗德和喀山打转?喀山与西伯利亚毫无联系,下诺夫哥罗德也不依赖仅占集市总量 7%的西伯利亚商品。一条通往南方的铁路实际上会让下诺夫哥罗德受益。

28. Kanun desiatiletiia vysochaishe utverzhdennoi sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi i agitatsiia protiv neia (Kazan’, 1884), passim; Otchet o zasedaniiakh, 19-21, 42, 44-45, 48-50, 52-53, 65-66, 80-82, 139-140; TOSRPT, vol. 15, otdel 1 (1885), 14-24.
28. 西伯利亚铁路十周年纪念前夕及其反对声浪(喀山,1884 年),散见各处;会议报告,19-21、42、44-45、48-50、52-53、65-66、80-82、139-140 页;《俄国皇家技术学会会刊》第 15 卷第 1 分册(1885 年),14-24 页。

29. M. N. Katkov, Sobranie peredovykh statei moskovskikh vedomostei (Moscow, 1898), 1882 god, 625 (Nov. 25); 1884 god, 127-128 (Mar. 6). See also 1882 god, 623-624 (Nov. 25); 1884 god, 125-126 (Mar. 5); 144-147 (Mar. 14); 168 (Mar. 23); 207-208 (Apr. 14); 622 (Dec. 1); 668-670 (Dec. 29).
29. M·N·卡特科夫,《莫斯科新闻社论集》(莫斯科,1898 年),1882 年卷,625 页(11 月 25 日);1884 年卷,127-128 页(3 月 6 日)。另见 1882 年卷,623-624 页(11 月 25 日);1884 年卷,125-126 页(3 月 5 日);144-147 页(3 月 14 日);168 页(3 月 23 日);207-208 页(4 月 14 日);622 页(12 月 1 日);668-670 页(12 月 29 日)。

30. See Martin Katz, Mikhail N. Katkov: A Political Biography, 1818-1887 (The Hague, 1966), 14. For a similar attitude on the part of Moscow entrepreneurs, see Alfred J. Rieber, “The Moscow Entrepreneurial Group: The Emergence of a New Form in Autocratic Politics,” pt. 2, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 25, no. 2 (1977): 191. It should also be noted that close personal and political ties between Katkov and Bogdanovich may have influenced Katkov’s attitude toward the Moscow route. See George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 18751890 (Princeton, 1979), 279, and P.A. Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie v kontse XIX stoletiia (Politicheskaia reaktsiia 80-kh—nachala 90-kh godov) (Moscow, 1970), 278.
30. 参见马丁·卡茨,《米哈伊尔·N·卡特科夫政治传记:1818-1887》(海牙,1966 年),第 14 页。关于莫斯科企业家类似的立场,参见阿尔弗雷德·J·里伯,《莫斯科企业家集团:专制政治中新形式的出现》,第二部分,《东欧历史年鉴》第 25 卷第 2 期(1977 年):191 页。还应注意到,卡特科夫与波格丹诺维奇之间密切的个人和政治关系可能影响了卡特科夫对莫斯科路线的态度。参见乔治·F·凯南,《俾斯麦欧洲秩序的衰落:1875-1890 年法俄关系》(普林斯顿,1979 年),279 页,以及 P·A·扎伊翁奇科夫斯基,《十九世纪末的俄罗斯专制制度(80 年代至 90 年代初的政治反动)》(莫斯科,1970 年),278 页。

explained, by preventing Moscow from exempting its entrepôt function. In any case, if its fair were so important, it would not collapse without this railroad, as the “northerners” feared. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
正如解释的那样,通过阻止莫斯科免除其转口贸易功能。无论如何,如果它的集市如此重要,就不会像“北方人”所担心的那样,在没有这条铁路的情况下崩溃。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
Meanwhile St. Petersburg commercial interests continued to speak out on their city’s behalf, and Orenburgers were busy attempting to sell the extension of their railroad to Omsk as the most beneficial of the various possibilities. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}
与此同时,圣彼得堡的商业利益集团继续为他们的城市发声,而奥伦堡人则忙于试图将他们铁路延伸至鄂木斯克的计划宣传为各种可能性中最有利的一个。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}

The Reluctant Bureaucracy
不情愿的官僚体系

The reaction of the Ministry of Transport to the resurgence of local competition over the route was negative, as was to be expected in a period when the government looked upon lobbying by regional interests with suspicion and regretted autonomous public participation in national decision making:
交通部对路线之争再度兴起的反应是消极的,这在一个政府对地区利益游说持怀疑态度、并对公众自主参与国家决策感到遗憾的时期是可以预见的:
The urgent solicitations of very opposing character arriving in great numbers for consideration by the government only impeded the calm and collected discussion of the important question of the Siberian road by the state institutions. And the nearer this question came to a final settlement, the stronger and more persistent became the concern expressed by the various interested parties. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
大量性质截然相反的紧急请愿书如潮水般涌来,要求政府审议,这只会阻碍国家机构对西伯利亚铁路这一重要问题进行冷静而集中的讨论。而随着该问题临近最终解决,各利益相关方表达的关切愈发强烈且持久。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
The government saw in the various petitions nothing more than the “egoism” of local European Russian trade interests and speculators. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} Pos’et, by contrast, was envisioning a railroad that would serve the state’s interests. Its route would not be determined by the commercial and financial considerations that governed other state and private railroads. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} The problem of Siberia had fused with the temperament of
政府认为这些形形色色的请愿不过是欧洲俄罗斯本土贸易利益集团和投机者的“自私”表现。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 与此相反,波谢特设想的是服务于国家利益的铁路。其路线不会像其他国有及私营铁路那样受商业和金融因素支配。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 西伯利亚问题与
Alexander III and the conviction of Pos’et to animate the traditional indisposition of the Russian government toward the private realm.
亚历山大三世的性格及波谢特的信念相融合,激发了俄国政府对私人领域一贯的抵触情绪。
Many members of the bureaucratic elite continued to resist Pos’et, however, along the same lines as in 1875 . The first to speak against his scheme in the Committee of Ministers, where the issue appeared on the agenda on December 18, 1884, and January 2, 1885, was the minister of state domains, M. N. Ostrovskii. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} Ostrovskii was the “very closest confederate” of Katkov and one of the archreactionaries of Alexander III’s reign, along with Pobedonostsev, Minister of the Interior Count D. A. Tolstoi, and Prince V. P. Meshcherskii. His allegiance had not always been with the right, though; he had been an ally of Loris-Melikov’s when liberal ideas were in the ascendancy. Ostrovskii’s shift of loyalties has been cited as evidence of his opportunism. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} In economics, certainly, if no longer in politics, his outlook still reflected that of the liberal era and he remained close to Abaza. His views on railroad development were nonvoluntaristic, orthodox, and cautious.
然而,官僚精英中的许多成员仍像 1875 年那样抵制波谢特。在 1884 年 12 月 18 日和 1885 年 1 月 2 日的部长委员会会议上,第一个站出来反对他计划的是国家财产部长 M. N. 奥斯特洛夫斯基。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} 奥斯特洛夫斯基是卡特科夫的“最亲密盟友”,也是亚历山大三世统治时期与波别多诺斯采夫、内务大臣 D. A. 托尔斯泰伯爵以及 V. P. 梅谢尔斯基亲王齐名的极端反动分子。不过,他的忠诚并非始终属于右翼;在自由主义思想占上风时,他曾是洛里斯-梅利科夫的盟友。奥斯特洛夫斯基的立场转变常被引为其机会主义的例证。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 在经济领域(即便政治立场已变),他的观点仍折射出自由主义时代的底色,且与阿巴扎关系密切。他对铁路发展的看法是非意志论的、正统且谨慎的。
Ostrovskii found Pos’et’s reasoning fallacious and alien. “Siberia,” Ostrovskii explained before the committee, “is not abundant in those very local products on whose sale in European Russia the various railroad projects so greatly pin their hopes; it is so unproductive that even the local market price of these products precludes any thought of their having large sales in Russia.” Obviously ignorant of actual Siberian conditions, he rejected the “creative” or “pioneer” function of the railroad which Pos’et felt would develop Siberia’s economy and modify its culture. Ostrovskii’s doubts were seconded by the state comptroller, D. M. Sol’skii, and the then deputy comptroller, T. E. Filippov, a Pobedonostsev-style reactionary and ally of Ostrovskii’s who produced a memorandum critical of Pos’et’s plan. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
奥斯特洛夫斯基认为波谢特的推理既荒谬又陌生。“西伯利亚,”奥斯特洛夫斯基在委员会面前解释道,“并不盛产那些各种铁路项目寄予厚望、指望在欧洲俄罗斯销售的地方产品;它如此贫瘠,以至于这些产品在当地市场的价格就已经排除了它们在俄罗斯大规模销售的任何可能性。”显然对西伯利亚的实际状况一无所知,他拒绝了波谢特认为铁路将发展西伯利亚经济并改变其文化的“创造性”或“开拓性”功能。奥斯特洛夫斯基的疑虑得到了国家审计长 D·M·索利斯基和当时的副审计长 T·E·菲利波夫的支持,后者是一位波别多诺斯采夫式的反动分子,也是奥斯特洛夫斯基的盟友,他撰写了一份批评波谢特计划的备忘录。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
As an alternative to a Siberian trunk line, Ostrovskii suggested reliance on the Ekaterinburg-Tiumen’ Railroad and several branch railroads to link the Volga and Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} basins, as well as the possible extension of the Ural Mining Railroad south from Ekaterinburg to Ufa. He convinced the committee that this configuration, with the Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime}-Enisei Canal, would satisfy the low-level needs of the region for years to come.
作为西伯利亚干线的替代方案,奥斯特洛夫斯基提议依赖叶卡捷琳堡-秋明铁路及几条支线铁路连接伏尔加河与 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 流域,并可能将乌拉尔采矿铁路从叶卡捷琳堡向南延伸至乌法。他说服委员会相信,这一布局加上 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} -叶尼塞运河,将在未来多年满足该地区的低层次需求。
If it was hesitant about the route through Siberia, however, the committee on the whole did make some movement in Pos’et’s favor. Both Bunge and Abaza now agreed with Pos’et that of all the proposed routes up to Siberia, Samara-Ufa seemed to have the advantage over the 1875 line in its probable lower construction cost and potential long-term profitability. But the committee also felt that choosing Cheliabinsk as the terminus of this section would predetermine the route in Siberia itself, and this, again, was something it was not prepared to do. It ordered surveys for the Samara-Ufa branch, but in a location favorable to the construction of a connector from it to the Ekaterinburg-Tiumen’ Railroad. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
然而,即便对穿越西伯利亚的路线心存犹豫,委员会整体上还是向波谢特的立场有所倾斜。本格和阿巴扎均认同波谢特的看法:在通往西伯利亚的所有拟议路线中,萨马拉-乌法线在建设成本可能更低及长期盈利潜力方面优于 1875 年线路。但委员会也认为,选择车里雅宾斯克作为该段终点将预先决定西伯利亚境内的路线走向——这又是他们尚未准备好决断的事项。委员会下令对萨马拉-乌法支线进行勘测,但选址需有利于未来与叶卡捷琳堡-秋明铁路的连接线建设。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}

Regionalists and Reactionaries
地方主义者与反动派

On matters of fundamentals, the committee remained opposed to Pos’et and gave short shrift to economic development and the Far East, the issues at the heart of his project. But its hesitation did not last long. The perceived opposition to the railroad on the part of the Siberian intelligentsia extinguished the hostility of its detractors in both government and society and won most of them over to the side of the minister of transport.
在基本原则问题上,委员会仍持反对波谢特的立场,对其项目核心的经济发展与远东议题轻描淡写。但这种犹豫并未持续太久。西伯利亚知识分子群体对铁路的反对态度,反而消弭了政府和社会中反对者的敌意,使多数人转而支持交通部长的立场。
The Siberian regionalists had qualms about the Trans-Siberian Railroad because of its political nature, and they expressed their feelings on the question with passion. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} Though they are often categorized
西伯利亚地方主义者因跨西伯利亚铁路的政治属性而心存疑虑,并激烈地表达了他们的观点。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} 尽管他们常被归类为俄国民粹主义者,其政治信仰实则截然不同:他们追求的是政治自由。
with the Russian populists, they held quite contrary political beliefs: their aim was political freedom. Their views were derived from the federalism of A. Shchapov, who described the Russian commune not as a bastion of socialism against capitalism, as the radicals saw it, but as a stronghold of local autonomy that stood in the way of Russian state centralization. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} Economic issues-such as railroad construc-tion-thus became for them issues of political importance.
其思想源自 A.沙波夫的联邦主义理论——他将俄国村社视为地方自治的堡垒(而非激进派眼中对抗资本主义的社会主义阵地),认为这阻碍了俄罗斯国家的中央集权化进程。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} 因此,铁路建设等经济问题对他们而言具有重大政治意义。
Iadrintsev and G. N. Potanin, the “brains and heart” of Siberian regionalism, expanded Shchapov’s theoretical, academic conceptions into the practical task of preserving the unity of Siberia as the sine qua non of their political existence. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} The regionalists measured political and economic issues against concrete standards: Would they help or hurt Siberia? Would they facilitate or diminish “colonial” domination by the European Russian metropolis? Would they be a step toward or away from either political freedom or centralization? It was in accordance with this gauge of exploitation that the regionalists opposed the Siberian Railroad, both in its early conception to ward off the voraciousness of Moscow manufacturers and later to prevent the central government from putting a stranglehold on Siberia. In both cases, E. V. Bogdanovich’s words regarding the Siberian Railroad seemed ominous: “Siberia is no longer. Henceforth this is Russia.” 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
作为西伯利亚地区主义"头脑与心脏"的亚德林采夫和 G·N·波塔宁,将沙波夫的理论学术构想拓展为一项实际任务——维护西伯利亚的统一是他们政治生存的必要条件。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} 地区主义者以具体标准衡量政治经济问题:这些举措对西伯利亚有利还是有害?会助长还是削弱欧洲俄罗斯大都会的"殖民"统治?是迈向政治自由或中央集权的进步还是倒退?正是基于这种剥削尺度,地区主义者反对西伯利亚铁路——早期是为抵御莫斯科制造商的无餍掠夺,后期则为防止中央政府扼住西伯利亚的咽喉。在这两种情况下,E·V·波格丹诺维奇关于西伯利亚铁路的预言都显得不祥:"西伯利亚已不复存在。从今往后,这里就是俄罗斯。" 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
The regionalists were afraid of the changes a railroad would bring to Siberia:
地区主义者担忧铁路将给西伯利亚带来的变革:
With the construction of the railroad, the old familiar Siberia will disappear forever and this will occur very quickly. A new Siberia will be formed
随着铁路建设,古老而熟悉的西伯利亚将永远消失,且这一过程会非常迅速。一个新的西伯利亚即将形成
and it will unite those scattered and already weakened elements that make up Siberian society. Settlers and exiles, people of easy money, shady characters, swindlers-all of these types will find themselves new dealings just as soon as the first trains pass through. They and the mass of their kind will crop up from both ends of the empire, grabbing all trade and industry into their hands. The railroad will give birth to a period of speculation of the most roguish type ever to have a place in society. In contemporary Siberian society there is much confusion and disorder, but essentially it is vigorous. The healthy traits of Siberian life will be destroyed by the industrial fever of railroad promoters and other speculators. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
它将团结起那些分散且已然衰弱的西伯利亚社会成分。移民与流放者、投机取巧之徒、形迹可疑之辈、诈骗犯——所有这些类型的人物,一旦首批列车驶过,便会立即找到新的营生。他们及其同类将从帝国的两端涌现,将一切贸易与工业攫取在手。铁路将催生一个前所未有的、最无赖的投机时代。当代西伯利亚社会虽混乱无序,但本质上充满活力。铁路推动者与其他投机客带来的工业狂热,将摧毁西伯利亚生活的健康特质。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
They dreaded the “invasion of a railroad civilization, grasping and greedy,” and the dawn of “the rule of the Antichrist.” To withstand the onslaught, the old Siberia would need to marshal all its civic strength. 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
他们惧怕“贪婪攫取的铁路文明的入侵”,畏惧“敌基督统治时代”的降临。为抵御这场冲击,古老的西伯利亚需要凝聚其全部公民力量。 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
The regionalists lamented the probable end of Siberia’s uniqueness because to them Siberia represented something pure and pristine, a hope and model for the future, which a railroad introducing alien Russian forms would destroy. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} They were convinced that as Siberia’s soul was destroyed, Russia would consolidate its position as exploiter. Absentee mining firms would ship Siberia’s raw materials at low cost to European Russia and expensive manufactured goods would flood Siberian markets. The railroad would thus strengthen Siberia’s dependence and worsen the oppression. There would be no one to protect its interests because of the continued lack of local participation in the administration of Siberia and because the Russian intelligentsia who would arrive with the railroad would soon outnumber Siberians. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
地方主义者哀叹西伯利亚独特性的可能终结,因为对他们而言,西伯利亚象征着一种纯净无暇的理想,是未来的希望与典范,而铁路引入的外来俄罗斯模式将摧毁这一切。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} 他们深信,随着西伯利亚的灵魂被扼杀,俄罗斯将巩固其剥削者的地位。 absentee 矿业公司会以低廉成本将西伯利亚的原材料运往俄罗斯欧洲部分,而昂贵的工业制成品将充斥西伯利亚市场。铁路因此会强化西伯利亚的依附性,加剧压迫。由于西伯利亚行政管理中持续缺乏本地参与,且随铁路而来的俄罗斯知识分子很快将在数量上超过西伯利亚人,将无人能捍卫其利益。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}

44. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1890, no. 30:2. See also “‘O narodonaselenii Sibiri i o velikoi vostochnoi zheleznoi doroge’ (Doklad professora E. Iu. Petri i beseda v VIII otdele IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 33-34: 269.
44. 《东方评论》,1890 年第 30 期第 2 页。另参见《关于西伯利亚人口与东方大铁路的报告》(E·尤·彼得里教授在帝国俄罗斯技术协会第八分部的演讲及讨论),《铁路通报》1888 年第 33-34 期合刊:269 页。

45. Stephen Digby Watrous, “Russia’s ‘Land of the Future’: Regionalism and the Awakening of Siberia, 1819-1894” (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1970), 2:678; Wolfgang Faust, Rußlands goldener Boden: Der sibirische Regionalismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Cologne, 1980), 486-487.
45. 斯蒂芬·迪格比·沃特鲁斯,《俄罗斯的“未来之地”:地方主义与西伯利亚的觉醒,1819-1894》(博士论文,华盛顿大学,1970 年),2:678;沃尔夫冈·福斯特,《俄罗斯的金色土地:19 世纪下半叶的西伯利亚地方主义》(科隆,1980 年),486-487 页。

46. Faust finds this attitude analogous to D. Pisarev’s and N. Shelgunov’s opposition to competition from European industry in Russia (Rußlands goldener Boden, 396). Cf. also the attitude expressed by V. Vorontsov, N. G. Chernyshevskii, and Alexander Herzen, that the “latecomer” Russia had an advantage in its backwardness and would soon surpass Europe (Walicki, Controversy over Capitalism, 116-117). The regionalists had similar expectations of Siberia vis-à-vis Russia.
46. 福斯特认为这种态度类似于 D.皮萨列夫和 N.谢尔古诺夫对欧洲工业在俄罗斯竞争的反对(《俄罗斯的金色土地》,第 396 页)。另见 V.沃龙佐夫、N.G.车尔尼雪夫斯基和亚历山大·赫尔岑所表达的态度,即“后来者”俄罗斯因其落后而具有优势,并将很快超越欧洲(瓦利茨基,《关于资本主义的争议》,第 116-117 页)。地方主义者对西伯利亚相对于俄罗斯也有类似的期望。

47. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1884, no. 48: 3; N. M. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia v geograficheskom, etnograficheskom i istoricheskom otnoshenii, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1892), 364, 465; Faust, Rußlands goldener Boden, 341-342, 396-397.
47. 《东方评论》,1884 年,第 48 期:第 3 页;N.M.亚德林采夫,《西伯利亚作为殖民地在地理、民族和历史方面的关系》,第二版(圣彼得堡,1892 年),第 364、465 页;福斯特,《俄罗斯的金色土地》,第 341-342、396-397 页。
The regionalists criticized what they viewed as the anti-Siberian bias in the public debates over the Siberian Railroad. As there were no zemstvos or other organs of local self-government in Siberia, its people had not been given a fair chance to participate in any of the discussions of the railroad. Siberian interests were secondary, although Kazan’, Ufa, Orenburg, and the towns of the Urals all seemed to speak in Siberia’s behalf. Though Siberia’s agricultural and mineral wealth were the topics at hand, “there was not a single public discussion of this question” in Siberia itself. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
地方主义者批评了他们在西伯利亚铁路公开辩论中所看到的反西伯利亚偏见。由于西伯利亚没有地方自治机构(zemstvos)或其他形式的自治组织,当地人民未能公平参与任何关于铁路的讨论。尽管喀山、乌法、奥伦堡及乌拉尔地区的城镇似乎都在为西伯利亚发声,但西伯利亚的利益却被置于次要地位。尽管西伯利亚的农业和矿产资源是讨论的核心议题,但在西伯利亚本土,“却没有任何公开讨论此问题的机会”。 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
They found confirmation that non-Siberian interests alone were being served in the type of railroad favored by the government: though rapid construction with low technical standards might reduce the Treasury’s initial outlay, it would require higher operating costs, which they predicted would be covered by taxes levied on the Siberian population. And who would bear the initial costs? Like the populists, they criticized the use of millions of the “people’s means” when immediate returns were not guaranteed. There would be indirect costs too, but they would not be invisible: the railroad would almost surely eliminate innkeeping and cartage, which occupied up to onequarter of the Siberian population in some provinces. This was too high a price to pay 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
他们发现政府青睐的铁路类型仅服务于非西伯利亚利益:尽管低技术标准的快速建设可能减少国库的初期支出,但会导致更高的运营成本,而这些成本他们预计将通过向西伯利亚居民征税来覆盖。那么,谁来承担初期成本?与民粹主义者一样,他们批评在无法确保即时回报的情况下动用数百万“人民的资金”。此外还存在间接成本,但这些并非不可见:铁路几乎肯定会淘汰客栈业和马车运输业,而这两者在某些省份占据了西伯利亚近四分之一人口的生计。这样的代价实在过高。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}

It must be borne in mind that the regionalists’ opposition to the railroad did not stem from a broad anticapitalist, anti-Western, or antiurban perspective; on a visit to the United States in 1893, Iadrintsev remarked with admiration, "This is Siberia in a thousand years. " 50 " 50 ^("50){ }^{" 50} Nor were they dogmatic revolutionaries unconditionally and irretrievably repudiating the government: they appreciated the state’s efforts to break up monopolies and cartels in Siberia and praised highly those “enlightened” governors general of Siberia-all of whom were appointees of the central government and advocates of the Siberian Railroad-who had tried to improve conditions in Siberia. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
必须认识到,地方主义者对铁路的反对并非源于广泛的反资本主义、反西方或反城市立场;1893 年访问美国时,亚德林采夫曾赞叹道:"这就是一千年后的西伯利亚。" " 50 " 50 ^("50){ }^{" 50} 他们也不是教条的革命者,无条件且不可挽回地否定政府:他们赞赏国家为打破西伯利亚的垄断和卡特尔所做的努力,并高度评价那些"开明"的西伯利亚总督——他们都是中央政府的任命者及西伯利亚铁路的倡导者——为改善西伯利亚条件所做的尝试。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
In fact, their opposition to the railroad was ambiguous and they never doubted its inevitability. Iadrintsev had at first, in the early 1870s, applauded the idea as a benefit to Siberian material life and as a means to ending its isolation. 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} Even later they saw much good in it.
事实上,他们对铁路的反对态度是模糊的,且从未怀疑过其必然性。早在 1870 年代初期,亚德林采夫最初曾赞扬这一构想,认为它将有益于西伯利亚的物质生活并结束其孤立状态。 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} 即便后来,他们仍从中看到诸多益处。

48. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1882, no. 5: 9; 1883, no. 9: 3; 1884, no. 18: 3.
48. 《东方评论》,1882 年第 5 期:9 页;1883 年第 9 期:3 页;1884 年第 18 期:3 页。

49. Ibid., 1884, no. 28: 2; 1885, no. 4: 4; 1892, no. 39: 2; “Po povodu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” ZhdD, 1893, nos. 27-28: 297.
49. 同上,1884 年第 28 期:2 页;1885 年第 4 期:4 页;1892 年第 39 期:2 页;《关于西伯利亚铁路》,《铁路杂志》,1893 年第 27-28 期:297 页。

50. Quoted in Faust, Rußlands goldener Boden, 547. Faust overstates the anticapitalist element in their thought (cf. pp. 117, 381-382, 395, 487).
50. 引自福斯特《俄罗斯的金色土地》第 547 页。福斯特夸大了他们思想中的反资本主义成分(参见第 117、381-382、395、487 页)。

51. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 417, 538-542, 587, 660-661, 687.
51. 亚德林采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,417 页,538-542 页,587 页,660-661 页,687 页。

52. Faust, Rußlands goldener Boden, 338-339.
52. 福斯特,《俄罗斯的金色土地》,338-339 页。
Unlike Nikolai Chernyshevskii, who despised the Asian element in Russian culture, their task was to show Europe that Asia was not moribund but vital. Because of its location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Siberia would help to unify the two worlds. The Siberian Railroad, with branches to Turkestan and Peking, would bring the peoples of the world closer together. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} With all the enthusiasm of the railroad age, Iadrintsev went further: when the Atlantic and Pacific oceans were linked by rail across Siberia, it would be the heir to the prosperity of Venice and the Cape of Good Hope; it would rival Egypt. Each in its time had served as way station between Europe and Asia; now it was Siberia’s turn, and “the consequences of such a world event are really incalculable.” 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
与憎恶俄罗斯文化中亚洲元素的尼古拉·车尔尼雪夫斯基不同,他们的任务是向欧洲证明亚洲并非垂死而是充满活力。由于地处欧亚交汇处,西伯利亚将有助于统一两个世界。西伯利亚大铁路及其通往突厥斯坦和北京的支线将使世界各民族更加紧密相连。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} 带着铁路时代的全部热情,亚德林采夫更进一步预言:当大西洋与太平洋通过横跨西伯利亚的铁路相连时,这里将继承威尼斯与好望角的繁荣,与埃及比肩。每个地区都曾在其时代充当过欧亚之间的中转站;如今轮到西伯利亚了,"如此世界性事件带来的后果确实无法估量。" 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
The regionalists were therefore opposed not to a railroad per se, but rather to one that did not match their concept of it. They asserted that to prevent further exploitation by European Russian interests, Siberia’s industry itself should be developed pending the introduction of a railroad. Siberia’s raw material, rather than being stripped for export, should be worked locally, and an interregional trade serving local needs should be stimulated; the region would not otherwise give up its wealth. They called for the well-rounded, gradual, and full development of Siberia’s productive forces, with a central role being given to cottage industries. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}
因此,地方主义者反对的并非铁路本身,而是不符合他们理念的铁路规划。他们主张,在铁路引入之前,应先发展西伯利亚本土工业,以防止俄罗斯欧洲部分的利益集团进一步剥削。西伯利亚的原材料不应被掠夺出口,而应在当地加工,并促进服务于本地需求的区域间贸易;否则该地区不会放弃其财富。他们呼吁全面、渐进且充分地发展西伯利亚的生产力,尤其重视家庭手工业的核心作用。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}
Here again, on the face of it, we see some similarity to the outlook of contemporary populist economics: railroads should not be considered ends in themselves; they should not be built if they would not improve the lives of the people in a concrete way. 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} As Potanin wrote, “building a railway into Siberia means beginning the matter from the tail end first.” 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} Siberia needed colonists, a denser population, and many factories before it needed the railroad. When it had the people and the factories, the railroad should serve them; they should not be introduced later solely to serve the railroad. 58 A 58 A ^(58)A{ }^{58} \mathrm{~A} railroad is one means
在这里,我们再次从表面上看,与当代民粹主义经济学的观点有些相似:铁路本身不应被视为目的;如果它们不能以具体方式改善人们的生活,就不应该修建。正如波塔宁所写,“修建一条通往西伯利亚的铁路意味着从末端开始着手。”西伯利亚需要的是殖民者、更密集的人口和许多工厂,而不是铁路。当有了人和工厂,铁路应该为他们服务;而不应仅仅为了铁路而引入人和工厂。铁路只是一种手段。
of introducing civilization, but only one-it is not a panacea for all evils:
虽能引入文明,却非包治百病的万灵药:
Why is it that people who want to do good for Siberia and raise its cultural level, and who speak so heatedly of billions for a railroad, do not apply themselves to other equivalent and maybe more significant tools of civilization? Why is it not said: Strew people’s schools and technical institutions across this region without sparing billions [of rubles] . . ? But not a word is said about this. Why is it that nothing is said about raising the people’s culture, developing education, etc. . . , to which Europe and other parts of the world are indebted no less, and maybe more, [than to railroads] for the luster of civilization and prosperity? Raise the culture and industry of the region, give full range to the development of life and to education with all its blessings, and railroads will appear by themselves as a result of this higher level. 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59}
为何那些声称要为西伯利亚谋福祉、提升其文化水平,并慷慨激昂地谈论为铁路投入数十亿卢布的人,却不愿投身于其他或许更具深远意义的文明工具?为何无人疾呼:不惜耗费数十亿卢布,在这片土地上广建民众学校与技术院校……?对此却只字未提。为何无人提及提升民众文化水平、发展教育等事业——欧洲与世界其他地区的文明光辉与繁荣,对这些事业的依赖程度不亚于(甚至可能超过)铁路?提升该地区的文化与产业水平,让生活与教育充分发展并释放其全部福祉,铁路自会随着这种更高层次的发展应运而生。 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59}
What the regionalists stood for was the protection of their autonomy and culture. Their attitude toward the Siberian Railroad was integral to their clearly elucidated and pragmatic political program, which called for the introduction of full civil rights at least to the extent that European Russia enjoyed them, including the introduction of the courts, zemstvos, and other innovations of the Great Reforms which had been denied to Siberia, and the abolition of the exile system. 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60} This is hardly a program of utopians, as one historian calls them; they are the demands of Siberian patriots, as they called themselves. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} Their pragmatic, limited, realistic aims, unlike the goals of the populists, anticipated those of the liberals of the Duma period. 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} Then, too, the call to strengthen the country through education and the granting of political rights would fall largely on deaf ears.
区域主义者所主张的是保护他们的自治权和文化。他们对西伯利亚铁路的态度与其明确阐述且务实的政治纲领密不可分,该纲领呼吁至少在欧俄享有的范围内引入完整的公民权利,包括引入法院、地方自治机构及其他被西伯利亚所拒绝的大改革时期的创新举措,并废除流放制度。 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60} 这很难被称为一位历史学家口中的乌托邦主义者纲领;正如他们自称的那样,这些是西伯利亚爱国者的诉求。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} 与民粹主义者的目标不同,他们务实、有限且现实的目标预示了杜马时期自由主义者的诉求。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} 此外,通过教育和赋予政治权利来强化国家的呼吁,在很大程度上将无人理会。
However ambivalent regionalist opposition to the Siberian Railroad may have been, it seemed firm and threatening to conservatives. The conservatives had themselves been less than enthusiastic about the
无论区域主义者对西伯利亚铁路的反对态度多么矛盾,在保守派看来,这种立场显得坚定且具有威胁性。保守派自身对铁路的热情也一直不高。

59. Ibid., 1884, no. 28: 2. See also 1883, no. 9: 3; 1884, no. 48: 3; 1886, no. 13: 4
59. 同上,1884 年,第 28 期:2 页。另见 1883 年,第 9 期:3 页;1884 年,第 48 期:3 页;1886 年,第 13 期:4 页。

60. See Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 225, 242, 296, 317, 349-351, 387, 432, 443, 463, 465-468, 709, 711-712, 715-716.
60. 参见亚德林采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,第 225、242、296、317、349-351、387、432、443、463、465-468、709、711-712、715-716 页。

61. Faust, Rußlands goldener Boden, 590; Mikhail Lemke, Nikolai Mikhailovich Iadrintsev: Biograficheskii ocherk: K desiatiletiiu so dnia konchiny (St. Petersburg, 1904), 197-198; Popov, Minuvshee, 207.
61. 福斯特,《俄罗斯的金色土地》,第 590 页;米哈伊尔·列姆克,《尼古拉·米哈伊洛维奇·亚德林采夫:传记概略:逝世十周年纪念》(圣彼得堡,1904 年),第 197-198 页;波波夫,《往事》,第 207 页。

62. Indeed, a majority of regionalists joined the Kadet party after its formation in 1905, and only a minority joined the S.R.s. Potanin himself ran for the First Duma-unsuc-cessfully-as a Kadet in 1906, although he had hoped that the Kadets and S.R.s would form one party (Gary Hanson, "Grigory Potanin, Siberian Regionalism, and the Russian Revolution of 1905 " [paper read at AAASS conference, Boston, Nov. 8, 1987], 16-17).
事实上,1905 年卡德党成立后,大多数地方主义者加入了该党,只有少数人加入了社会革命党。波塔宁本人在 1906 年作为卡德党成员参选第一届杜马——但未成功——尽管他曾希望卡德党和社会革命党能合并为一个政党(加里·汉森,《格里戈里·波塔宁、西伯利亚地方主义与 1905 年俄国革命》[1987 年 11 月 8 日在波士顿 AAASS 会议上宣读的论文],第 16-17 页)。

railroad; but when its political potential against the specter of a separatist Siberia dawned on them, they began to promote it.
铁路;但当他们意识到其对抗西伯利亚分离主义幽灵的政治潜力时,便开始大力推动它。
Aside from regional loyalties, conservative opposition to the railroad was rooted in the traditional distrust of capitalist economic innovation as a disruptive force. Katkov warned against the use of the Siberian Railroad for the resettlement of landless peasants, in accord with his gentry-oriented conservatism. Russia was not Belgium, he argued; it was underpopulated, and the colonization of Siberia would lead to serious dislocations. 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} The reactionary editor of the newspaper Grazhdanin, Prince Meshcherskii, agreed with Katkov on these points and expressed his distaste for the fruits of modern technology: “civilization” and “progress” were not desirable for Russia, where they would confront “Russian sensibility” and “Russian integrity.” Better to spend the Treasury’s money on the spiritual realm to bolster Russia against the forces of modernity, represented by the Jews. “Today permit the construction of the Siberian Railroad-tomorrow Siberia will be given up forever to the Jews of the whole world, and in ten years it will be lost forever to Russia.” 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64}
除了地区忠诚度外,保守派对铁路的反对源于对资本主义经济创新作为破坏性力量的传统不信任。卡特科夫警告不要利用西伯利亚铁路重新安置无地农民,这符合其以贵族为导向的保守主义。他认为,俄罗斯不是比利时;这里人口稀少,对西伯利亚的殖民将导致严重的混乱。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} 《公民报》的反动编辑梅谢尔斯基亲王在这些问题上与卡特科夫意见一致,并表达了他对现代技术成果的厌恶:“文明”和“进步”对俄罗斯来说并不可取,它们将与“俄罗斯的感性”和“俄罗斯的完整性”相冲突。最好将国库的钱花在精神领域,以增强俄罗斯对抗由犹太人代表的现代性力量。“今天允许修建西伯利亚铁路——明天西伯利亚将永远被拱手让给全世界的犹太人,十年后它将永远从俄罗斯手中失去。” 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64}
Meshcherskii’s “apocalyptic fear,” as Novoe vremia put it, was not uncommon among tsarist officials in Siberia. One wrote that the railroad would unleash fierce competition between foreign and Russian merchants for control of Siberia’s trade, ultimately bringing ruin on the Siberian peasant. The result would be chaos and the impossibility of “preserving order in the region.” 65
正如《新时代》所言,梅谢尔斯基的“末日恐惧”在西伯利亚的沙皇官员中并不罕见。一位官员写道,铁路将引发外国与俄国商人之间为控制西伯利亚贸易的激烈竞争,最终导致西伯利亚农民的破产。其结果将是混乱和“无法维持该地区秩序”。65
Soon enough this very concern for the authority of the state led conservatives to reverse themselves on the issue and enthusiastically champion the Siberian Railroad as a means of loosening what they perceived to be the grip of separatism or revolution on Siberia. Voloshinov pondered whether, after three hundred years of Russian rule, Siberia was truly under Russia’s control. He could not answer in the affirmative. 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} For this reason, too, Meshcherskii shifted his ground suddenly: he saw taking place in Siberia
很快,这种对国家权威的担忧促使保守派在议题上彻底转向,转而热情拥护西伯利亚铁路,视其为打破他们眼中西伯利亚分离主义或革命势力束缚的手段。沃洛希诺夫沉思:经过三百年俄国统治,西伯利亚是否真的处于俄罗斯掌控之下?他无法给出肯定答案。 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} 正因如此,梅谢尔斯基也突然转变立场:他观察到西伯利亚正在发生

an unspoken, cerebral process of alienation from all things Russian, which one finds in the mother’s milk as it nurtures the infant, in the
一种无声的、思想上的疏离俄罗斯一切事物的过程,这种疏离如同渗透在哺育婴儿的母乳中,根植于
mental attitude of the official, in the instincts of the popular masses, and in the world contemplations of the intellectual; [it is] in the air, so to speak, of all Siberia. 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67}
官员的心理态度、民众的本能反应以及知识分子的世界观;可以说,这种氛围弥漫在整个西伯利亚。 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67}
The Siberian Railroad, they began to realize, would dissipate this miasma and was necessary for reasons of state.
他们逐渐意识到,西伯利亚铁路将驱散这片阴霾,且出于国家利益的考量,其建设势在必行。
Regionalist opposition only reaffirmed the widely held perception that the railroad would bind Siberia to Russia and, through development, Russify it. 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} Concerned with the preservation of Russian sovereignty over Siberia, many people overcame their doubts regarding the railroad, to confirm the insight of Albert Beveridge that “Russia considers nothing hers which she does not control in a visible, tangible, material way.” 69 Many, that is, but not all overcame their doubts; though support was growing, the project still faced major obstacles.
地方主义者的反对反而强化了普遍认知:铁路将把西伯利亚与俄罗斯紧密联结,并通过开发实现俄罗斯化。 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} 出于维护俄罗斯对西伯利亚主权的考量,许多人克服了对铁路项目的疑虑,印证了阿尔伯特·贝弗里奇的洞见——“俄罗斯认为,唯有以可见、可触、物质化的方式掌控之物,方属其所有。”69 然而并非所有人都消除了疑虑;尽管支持声浪渐涨,该项目仍面临重大阻碍。

67. Quoted in Novoe vremia, July 20, 1890, p. 1.
67. 引自《新时代报》,1890 年 7 月 20 日,第 1 版。

68. That the reactionaries were brought around to the government’s point of view, rather than vice versa, is an indication that their power over decision making was not so great as it is often described. This conclusion supports the general contentions of Heidi W. Whelan, Alexander III and the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counter-reform in Late Imperial Russia (New Brunswick, NJ., 1982), and Theodore Taranovski, “The Politics of Counter-reform: Autocracy and Bureaucracy in the Reign of Alexander III, 1881-1894” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1976), regarding Katkov, Pobedonostsev, and Meshcherskii.
68. 反动派最终被说服接受政府的观点,而非相反,这表明他们对决策的影响力并不像常被描述的那般巨大。这一结论支持了海蒂·W·惠兰在《亚历山大三世与国务会议:晚期帝俄的官僚体制与反改革》(新泽西州新不伦瑞克,1982 年)以及西奥多·塔拉诺夫斯基在《反改革的政治:亚历山大三世统治下的专制与官僚体制,1881-1894 年》(哈佛大学博士论文,1976 年)中关于卡特科夫、波别多诺斯采夫和梅谢尔斯基的核心论点。

69. Quoted in Albert J. Beveridge, The Russian Advance (New York, 1904), 76.
69. 引自阿尔伯特·J·贝弗里奇所著《俄国的扩张》(纽约,1904 年)第 76 页。

CHAPTERSIX  第六章

Bureaucracy Prolix  官僚冗繁

In the last few years of Pos’et’s ministry the Siberian Railroad project took on a new urgency within the government, but with its advancement came continuing dissension over both its financing and its supervision. In all its aspects, this discord was part of the broader conflict among ministries over prestige, distribution of funds, and ultimately predominance in the nation’s economic policy making.
在波谢特部长任期的最后几年里,西伯利亚铁路项目在政府内部获得了新的紧迫性,但随着项目的推进,关于其资金筹措和监管的争议持续不断。从各方面来看,这种分歧是各部委之间更广泛冲突的一部分,涉及声望、资金分配,最终是国家经济政策制定主导权的争夺。

Hostility of the Finance Ministry
财政部的敌意

Coming on the heels of growing apprehension about separatists in Siberia-real and imagined-the railroad issue was pushed to the fore by the “most humble reports” sent to the tsar in 1886 by two governors general, A. P. Ignat’ev of Irkutsk and Baron Korf of Priamur’e. Emphasizing the desperation of the provinces on the Chinese border and the strategic significance of the railroad, they had enormous impact, for they elicited the direct support of Alexander III. At the bottom of Ignat’ev’s report the tsar commented: “I have already read so many reports of the governors general of Siberia, and it must be confessed with sadness and shame that up to now the government has done almost nothing to satisfy the needs of this rich but neglected region. And it is time, long since time.” His message expressed his desire to prod the slow-moving, quibbling bureaucracy to action. Both the report and his resolution were read before the Committee of
随着对西伯利亚分离主义者——无论是真实存在还是臆想中的——日益增长的忧虑,铁路问题因 1886 年两位总督——伊尔库茨克的 A·P·伊格纳季耶夫和阿穆尔边疆区的科尔夫男爵——呈递给沙皇的“最谦卑报告”而被推至风口浪尖。他们强调与中国接壤各省的绝望处境及铁路的战略重要性,这些论述产生了巨大影响,因为它们直接获得了亚历山大三世的支持。在伊格纳季耶夫报告的页边,沙皇批注道:“我已阅读过太多西伯利亚总督的报告,不得不遗憾且羞愧地承认,迄今为止政府几乎未采取任何措施来满足这片富饶却遭忽视之地的需求。是时候了,早该行动了。”这番批示表达了沙皇意图推动行动迟缓、争论不休的官僚体系采取行动的决心。该报告及其御批于 1886 年 12 月 16 日在
Ministers on December 16, 1886; the tsar’s backing made it a certainty that the railroad would be built. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
大臣委员会上宣读;有了沙皇的支持,铁路建设已成定局。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
To resolve the issue rapidly the tsar formed four special conferences between late 1886 and mid-1887, at which ministers and other invited officials affirmed in principle the strategic necessity of a Siberian railroad. The conferences approved technical conditions worked out by the Ministry of Transport and ordered initial surveys for central-eastern Siberia between Tomsk and Sretensk, and for the Far East in the vicinity of Vladivostok. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
为迅速解决问题,沙皇在 1886 年末至 1887 年中期间召开了四次特别会议,与会大臣及其他受邀官员原则上确认了西伯利亚铁路的战略必要性。会议通过了交通部制定的技术条件,并下令对托木斯克至斯列坚斯克的中东部西伯利亚地区及符拉迪沃斯托克附近的远东地区进行初步勘测。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
In spite of the tsar’s resolution and the decisions of the special conferences, the minister of finance remained steadfastly opposed. The new minister was Ivan Alekseevich Vyshnegradskii. A former professor of mechanics, he was brought into office because of his practical business experience. While he served on the boards of two railroad companies, he reduced their expenses by millions of rubles. Although he had made many enemies in the process, he performed this difficult operation steadfastly and without favoritism. It was widely hoped that he would do the same for the administration of Russian state finances. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
尽管沙皇已作出决议且特别会议已通过决定,财政大臣仍坚决反对。新任财政大臣伊万·阿列克谢耶维奇·维什涅格拉茨基曾任力学教授,因其丰富的商业实践经验被任命此职。在两家铁路公司董事会任职期间,他成功削减了数百万卢布开支。虽因此树敌众多,但他始终坚定不移且不偏不倚地完成了这项艰巨任务。人们普遍期望他能以同样方式改革俄国国家财政管理体系。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
Vyshnegradskii was given the position at the urging of Katkov and Pobedonostsev, who had waged a campaign against the more liberal Bunge. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Nonetheless, Vyshnegradskii did not represent a significant break from the traditionalism of his predecessors. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} He enacted a
维什涅格拉茨基是在卡特科夫和波别多诺斯采夫的极力推荐下获得这一职位的,他们曾发起一场反对更为自由派的邦格的运动。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 尽管如此,维什涅格拉茨基并未与其前任们的传统主义立场形成显著决裂。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 他推行了
  1. S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, comps., Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903), 69-70; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no, comp. V. M. Verkhovskii, pt. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1899), 451.
    S·V·萨布勒与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基合编,《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概览》,A·N·库洛姆津主编(圣彼得堡,1903 年),69-70 页;俄国交通部,《俄罗斯铁路发展历史概览:自铁路奠基至 1897 年(含)》,V·M·维尔霍夫斯基编,第 2 部(圣彼得堡,1899 年),451 页。
  2. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 71-78; MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti ministerstva putei soobshcheniia po stroitel’stvu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi za vremia s 30 marta 1889 g. po 17 ianvaria 1892 g.” (TsGAOR, fond 677, opis’ 1, delo 629), 5-7; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 8-12; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 451-459.
    萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,71-78 页;俄国交通部,《1889 年 3 月 30 日至 1892 年 1 月 17 日西伯利亚铁路建设活动报告》(中央国家十月革命档案馆,全宗 677,目录 1,案卷 629),5-7 页;《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:8-12 页;俄国交通部,《历史概览》,451-459 页。
  3. K. A. Skal’kovskii, Les Ministres des finances de la Russie, 1802-1890 (Paris, 1891), 273-274; Brokgauz-Efron, Novyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, vol. 12 (St. Petersburg, n.d.), 116. Vyshnegradskii sat on the boards of the Rybinsk-Bologoe and Southwestern railroads.
    K·A·斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯财政大臣,1802-1890》(巴黎,1891 年),273-274 页;布罗克豪斯-埃夫隆,《新百科辞典》第 12 卷(圣彼得堡,无日期),116 页。维什涅格拉茨基曾担任雷宾斯克-博洛戈耶铁路和西南铁路的董事会成员。
  4. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie v kontse XIX stoletiia (Politicheskaia reaktsiia 80-kh—nachala 90-kh godov) (Moscow, 1970), 142; B. V. Anan’ich, “The Economic Policy of the Tsarist Government and Enterprise in Russia from the End of the Nineteenth through the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” in Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, ed. Gregory Guroff and Fred V. Carstensen (Princeton, 1983), 130; L. E. Shepelev, Tsarizm i burzhuaziia vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka: Problemy torgovo-promyshlennoi politiki (Leningrad, 1981), 146-149.
    P·A·扎昂奇科夫斯基,《十九世纪末俄罗斯专制制度(80 年代至 90 年代初的政治反动)》(莫斯科,1970 年),第 142 页;B·V·阿纳尼奇,“十九世纪末至二十世纪初沙皇政府的经济政策与俄罗斯企业”,收录于《帝俄与苏联的企业家精神》,Gregory Guroff 与 Fred V. Carstensen 编(普林斯顿,1983 年),第 130 页;L·E·舍佩列夫,《十九世纪下半叶的沙皇制度与资产阶级:工商业政策问题》(列宁格勒,1981 年),第 146-149 页。
  5. Here I disagree with Anan’ich, who argues that Vyshnegradskii’s policies were not directly inherited from Bunge, but were closely tied to Alexander III’s politics ("Eco-
    在此我不同意阿纳尼奇的观点,他认为维什涅格拉茨基的政策并非直接继承自本格,而是与亚历山大三世的政治紧密相关("经济...

    protective-tariff policy less to create a national, Russian-dominated industry than to bring money into the Treasury. He saw that putting Russia’s monetary situation in order was a prerequisite for improving the health of the economic system. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} At the very top of his agenda was the budget deficit, which he intended to eliminate by increasing state revenues and cutting expenditures. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} He kept state disbursements for railroads to a minimum and “in principle” preferred that railroad construction be financed by private concessioners rather than the Treasury. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} Concentrating solely on finances, he left development of the nation’s resources to the side. Polovtsov declared with dismay, "This is a cashier, not a minister caring for the future development of the economic forces of the country."9 It is not a coincidence that almost the identical comment had been made about Kankrin, Nicholas I’s finance minister. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
    保护性关税政策与其说是为了建立一个由俄罗斯主导的民族工业,不如说是为了充实国库。他认为,整顿俄罗斯的货币状况是改善经济体系健康的前提条件。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 他议程的首要任务是消除预算赤字,他计划通过增加国家收入和削减支出来实现这一目标。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 他将国家对铁路的拨款控制在最低限度,并“原则上”倾向于由私人特许经营者而非国库来资助铁路建设。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 他只专注于财政问题,而将国家资源的发展置于一旁。波洛夫佐夫沮丧地宣称:“这是一个出纳员,而不是一个关心国家经济力量未来发展的部长。”9 这并非巧合,几乎相同的评论也曾针对尼古拉一世的财政部长坎克林提出过。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
Thus Vyshnegradskii’s aversion to the Trans-Siberian Railroad was founded on fiscal and intellectual grounds. Primarily under his influence, the Committee of Ministers in 1887 repeatedly rejected or scaled down Pos’et’s requests for funding of the railroad. In early 1887 Vyshnegradskii, then acting minister of finance, claimed that “extrabudgetary” expenditures could not be granted for surveys because he would be hard-pressed to find funds in the Treasury and foreign loans were not available. In reaction to Korf’s continued messages of alarm from the Far East, however, the committee did accept the importance
因此,维什涅格拉茨基对西伯利亚大铁路的反对基于财政和理念的双重考量。在他的主要影响下,1887 年大臣委员会多次拒绝或削减了波谢特关于铁路拨款的请求。1887 年初,时任代理财政部长的维什涅格拉茨基声称无法批准“预算外”勘测经费,因为国库资金吃紧且无法获得外国贷款。然而,面对科尔夫从远东持续传来的警报信息,委员会确实承认了从符拉迪沃斯托克到哈巴罗夫斯克的乌苏里铁路提案的重要性,并将其单独拆分出来加速审议。
Ivan Vyshnegradskii. From Ministerstvo Finansov, Ministerstvo finansov, 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902).
伊万·维什涅格拉茨基。引自《财政部 1802-1902》(圣彼得堡,1902 年)。

of the proposed Ussuri Railroad from Vladivostok to Khabarovsk and split it off from the rest for more rapid consideration. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
拟建的乌苏里铁路从符拉迪沃斯托克延伸至哈巴罗夫斯克,委员会将其从整体规划中剥离以加快审批进程。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
Ostensibly Vyshnegradskii’s opposition was based on his tight spending policy. But there were other reasons too. As he was closely tied to Katkov, especially while he was still acting minister, and a long time friend of Filippov’s, it is likely that his personal connections played a role in his resistance to Pos’et’s scheme. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
表面上维什涅格拉茨基的反对源于其紧缩开支政策,但还有其他原因。由于他与卡特科夫关系密切(尤其在代理部长期间),且与菲利波夫交好多年,很可能这些人脉关系也影响了他对波谢特方案的抵制态度。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}

11. MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti,” 6-7, and Istoricheskii ocherk, 452, 460-461; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 71-72, 78-80; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 13 .
11. 交通部,《活动报告》,6-7 页,及《历史概览》,452、460-461 页;萨布列尔与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,71-72、78-80 页;《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:13 页。

12. On his relationship with Filippov, see K. A. Skal’kovskii, Nashi gosudarstvennye i obshchestvennye deiateli (St. Petersburg, 1890), 310.
12. 关于他与菲利波夫的关系,参见 K·A·斯卡利科夫斯基,《我们的国家与社会活动家》(圣彼得堡,1890 年),310 页。
The ongoing rivalry between the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Finance was definitely a central factor. Simultaneous conflict between the War Ministry and the Ministry of Finance arose out of their competition for limited fiscal resources, and this circumstance also explains much of the persistent difficulty between the two ministries. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} In addition, they were grappling over the division of responsibilities in railroad affairs, which had traditionally been the exclusive realm of the Transport Ministry.
交通部与财政部之间的持续竞争无疑是核心因素。与此同时,陆军部与财政部的冲突源于对有限财政资源的争夺,这一情况也解释了两部门间长期存在的诸多矛盾。此外,双方还在争夺铁路事务的职责划分权——这一领域传统上由交通部专属管辖。
The conflict grew increasingly sharp as they struggled for control of both the extensive state railroad network and the new system of unified railroad tariffs. In 1887 the State Council asked the ministries of finance, transport, and state domains and the state comptroller to work together on a tariff law that would permit the state to regulate this critical economic ingredient in its own interest. Because of bitter disagreement between Vyshnegradskii and Pos’et, the issue would not be resolved until Pos’et resigned. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} Vyshnegradskii apparently felt that if the unified tariff were left up to the engineers, it would never get done. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} Pos’et, meanwhile, wanted tariff affairs centralized in his ministry rather than in the Ministry of Finance. According to N. N. Iznar, an official in the tariff institutions, "the controversy arose . . . because of individuals, i.e., . . . on the one side, Minister of Finance Vyshnegradskii with S. Iu. Witte behind him, and on the other K. N. Pos’et. Thus this reform . . . of great state importance was delayed as a result of a completely fortuitous circumstance.’. 16
随着双方对国家庞大铁路网络及新建立的统一铁路运价体系控制权的争夺,冲突日益尖锐。1887 年,国务会议要求财政部、交通部、国有财产部及国家审计署共同制定一项运价法律,以使国家能够出于自身利益调控这一关键经济要素。由于维什涅格拉茨基与波谢特之间的激烈分歧,该问题直到波谢特辞职才得以解决。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 维什涅格拉茨基显然认为,若将统一运价权交给工程师们处理,此事将永无完成之日。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 与此同时,波谢特希望将运价事务集中归其所在部门管辖,而非财政部。据关税机构官员 N.N.伊兹纳尔所述:"这场争议的起因……在于个人因素,即一方是财政部长维什涅格拉茨基及其背后的 S.Iu.维特,另一方则是 K.N.波谢特。因此这项具有重大国家意义的改革……由于完全偶然的情况而被延误了。"16

The War Ministry's Desires
陆军部的诉求

If Pos’et’s responsibility for railroad affairs and the independent existence of his ministry were threatened by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport’s control over the Siberian Railroad project was threatened by the War Ministry, itself locked in struggle with the Ministry of Finance. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
如果波谢特对铁路事务的职责及其部门的独立存在受到财政部的威胁,那么交通部对西伯利亚铁路项目的控制权则受到陆军部的威胁,而后者本身正与财政部陷入角力。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
“Because of the chiefly strategic character” of the Siberian Railroad, in June 1887 the special conferences had ordered the Siberian governors general to take charge of surveys for the railroad. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} In effect the government was in the process of placing the project in the hands of the Ministry of War. Heading it would be General M. N. Annenkov, renowned for his rapid railroad building in Central Asia. Pos’et was so outraged that he threatened to resign. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
“鉴于西伯利亚铁路主要具有战略特性”,1887 年 6 月特别会议已下令西伯利亚总督负责铁路勘测工作。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 实际上,政府正逐步将该项目移交陆军部掌管。领导这一项目的将是因在中亚快速修建铁路而闻名的 M·N·安年科夫将军。波谢特对此极为愤慨,甚至威胁要辞职。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}

Again a personal element was present, Annenkov having been the originator of the idea to create the Baranov Commission, then its chief administrator. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} In this capacity he was already a direct threat to Pos’et, and his strategic railroad building redounded to the credit of the War Ministry and detracted from the image of the Ministry of Transport. The London Times called Annenkov the “enemy” of Pos’et. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
其中再次涉及个人因素——安年科夫不仅是创建巴拉诺夫委员会的构想者,还曾担任该委员会的首席行政官。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 在此身份下,他已然对波谢特构成直接威胁,其战略铁路建设成就既为陆军部增光,又削弱了交通部的形象。《伦敦时报》称安年科夫是波谢特的“敌人”。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
Pos’et fought back. In his “most humble report” of June 12, 1887, to the tsar, he called attention to shortcomings in public works undertaken by the War Ministry and maintained that “construction of railroads could be accomplished with the most guaranteed success solely by that department within the governmental structure which was called into existence to direct the creation of state means of communication.” 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} Both he and War Minister P. S. Vannovskii then went to the tsar at Peterhof to settle their dispute. The tsar refused to accept Pos’et’s offer of resignation and “to give some satisfaction to the offended minister” ordered the governors general, who normally answered to the war minister, to be responsible to the minister of transport in the case of the Siberian Railroad. After the meeting, General Vannovskii departed for a leave of absence in the Caucasus; fortunately for Pos’et, illness made Vannovskii an ineffective minister. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} For the time being, at least, the project was safe in the hands of Pos’et, but Annenkov was disappointed and more problems would occur later, when he and Vyshnegradskii would find common ground against a later minister of transport.
波谢特进行了反击。在 1887 年 6 月 12 日呈递给沙皇的"最谦卑报告"中,他指出了由战争部负责的公共工程存在的缺陷,并坚称"铁路建设只有在政府机构中专门负责国家交通建设的部门领导下,才能取得最可靠的成果"。随后,他与战争部长 P·S·万诺夫斯基一同前往彼得宫向沙皇调解争端。沙皇拒绝了波谢特的辞职请求,并"为了给这位受辱的部长一些安抚",下令西伯利亚铁路相关事务上,原本隶属战争部长管辖的总督们改由交通部长负责。会后,万诺夫斯基将军前往高加索休假;对波谢特而言幸运的是,疾病使万诺夫斯基无法有效履行部长职责。至少在当时,这个项目在波谢特手中是安全的,但安年科夫感到失望,后续当他和维什涅格拉茨基联合反对继任交通部长时,更多问题将会浮现。

Pos’et resigned as minister on November 7, 1888, after a railroad
波谢特于 1888 年 11 月 7 日辞去部长职务,此前在博尔基发生了一起铁路事故,沙皇及其家人侥幸未受伤。
accident at Borki, in which the tsar and his family were lucky to escape injury. The incident worked to the advantage of Vyshnegradskii, who intrigued to have Lieutenant General G. E. Pauker appointed as transport minister. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} Pauker died in March 1889 after only a few months in office. During his short, weak-willed tenure, Vyshnegradskii refused to release any funds for new railroads. 25 He 25 He ^(25)He{ }^{25} \mathrm{He} and Witte now had an opportunity to cement the Ministry of Finance’s position in railroad affairs, something Pos’et had fought to prevent. Pauker attended the meeting at which the new tariff administration was discussed and, according to Witte, he “agreed to everything. Of course, he agreed because of his close friendship with Vyshnegradskii.” 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} In this way Vyshnegradskii and the Ministry of Finance gained the advantage over the Ministry of Transport, making things very difficult for the next minister, Giubbenet, and his attempts to build the Siberian Railroad.
这一事件对维什涅格拉茨基有利,他暗中策划让 G·E·保克尔中将出任交通部长。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 保克尔上任仅数月便于 1889 年 3 月去世。在他短暂而优柔寡断的任期内,维什涅格拉茨基拒绝为新建铁路拨款。 25 He 25 He ^(25)He{ }^{25} \mathrm{He} 这为维特提供了巩固财政部在铁路事务中地位的机会,而这正是波谢特曾竭力阻止的。保克尔参加了讨论新关税管理制度的会议,据维特所述,他"对一切提议都表示同意。当然,这种顺从源于他与维什涅格拉茨基的密切私交。" 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 通过这种方式,维什涅格拉茨基和财政部取得了对交通部的优势地位,给继任部长久本内特及其西伯利亚铁路建设计划制造了巨大障碍。

Giubbenet  吉本内特

Adol’f Iakovlevich Giubbenet had served for many years as an official of the State Treasury in various provinces and from 1880 to 1885 had been Pos’et’s deputy minister. For four years (1854-1858) he had traveled throughout Western Siberia on special assignment for the province’s governor general, and he considered himself especially well qualified to head the Siberian Railroad project. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} In spite of his experience (as deputy minister of transport he had had more preparation for the position than any previous transport minister), he has been portrayed as an “illiterate” in railroad affairs. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} Polovtsov, characteristically, called him stupid, as he had Pos’et. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} These opinions, passed down to posterity by Giubbenet’s opponents, are inaccurate. Indeed, one Soviet scholar has shown that it was Giubbenet who
阿道夫·雅科夫列维奇·久边内特曾多年在各省担任国家财政部的官员,并于 1880 年至 1885 年间担任波谢特的副手部长。在 1854 年至 1858 年的四年间,他受西伯利亚总督的特别派遣,走遍了西西伯利亚,因此他认为自己特别有资格领导西伯利亚铁路项目。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 尽管他经验丰富(作为交通部副部长,他比任何前任交通部长都更有准备担任这一职位),但他被描绘成铁路事务中的“文盲”。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} 波洛夫佐夫一如既往地称他为愚蠢,就像他对波谢特所做的那样。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 这些由久边内特的对手传给后世的观点并不准确。事实上,一位苏联学者已经证明,正是久边内特
developed the plan for the realization of the Siberian Railroad which Witte adopted as his own. 30 A 30 A ^(30)A{ }^{30} \mathrm{~A} more balanced judgment is provided by a relatively impartial observer, the future Russian foreign minister V . N . Lamzdorf, who, commenting on the occasion of Giubbenet’s resignation, admitted that his abilities did not match his intentions, but nonetheless described him as “honest” and “impartial,” with “personal convictions” that he upheld “resolutely” in opposition to Vyshnegradskii and his associates. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} He would certainly have plenty of occasion to disagree with Vyshnegradskii.
制定了西伯利亚铁路建设计划,该计划被维特采纳为己用。 30 A 30 A ^(30)A{ }^{30} \mathrm{~A} 一位相对公正的旁观者——未来的俄罗斯外交部长 V·N·拉姆斯多夫提供了更为平衡的评价,他在评论久边涅特辞职一事时承认,其能力与抱负并不匹配,但仍称其为"诚实"且"公正"之人,并指出他坚守"个人信念",在与维什涅格拉德斯基及其同僚的对立中表现得"坚定不移"。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 他确实有很多机会与维什涅格拉德斯基意见相左。

What separated Vyshnegradskii and Giubbenet from the start was the unabating rivalry between their respective ministries and an intense personal hatred that was fuel to the fire. Compromise on policy issues, let alone implementation, was well-nigh impossible under these circumstances.
维什涅格拉德斯基与久边涅特从一开始就因各自部门间无休止的竞争和强烈的个人憎恶而势同水火,这种敌意犹如火上浇油。在此情形下,政策妥协几无可能,更遑论实际执行了。

The adversarial relationship had much to do with the reorganization of railroad affairs in 1889. Genuine state intervention in railroad tariffs began in that year, with the promulgation of the “Temporary Regulation for Railroad Tariffs and Tariff Institutions.” 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} While Pauker was minister of transport, Vyshnegradskii had been able to form the Department of Railroad Affairs in the Ministry of Finance and on March 8, 1889, named Witte, head of the Southwestern Railroad Company and participant in the preparation of the legislation, as its director. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} The purpose of the new department was to reduce the state railroad deficit. Witte essentially tried to take control of Russian railroad finances and leave only technical responsibility to the Ministry of Transport. His ploy was largely successful, and his department’s encroachment on the Transport Ministry’s territory angered Giubbenet. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} Witte’s brazenness was compounded by the fact that he was not an engineer and had been promoted seven ranks at one step when he became head of the new department. In the Ministry of Transport he was seen as an outsider and an upstart. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
敌对关系与 1889 年铁路事务的重组有很大关联。真正的国家干预铁路运价始于当年,随着《铁路运价及运价机构临时条例》的颁布。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 在保克担任交通大臣期间,维什涅格拉茨基得以在财政部内设立铁路事务司,并于 1889 年 3 月 8 日任命西南铁路公司负责人、参与立法准备的维特为该司司长。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 新部门旨在减少国家铁路赤字。维特实质上试图掌控俄国铁路财政,仅将技术责任留给交通部。他的策略大体成功,其部门对交通部领地的蚕食激怒了久本内特。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 维特的厚颜因他并非工程师出身且在新部门任职时连升七级而更显突出。在交通部眼中,他是个外来者与暴发户。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
Moreover, along with his spending policy Vyshnegradskii encour-
此外,维什涅格拉茨基通过其支出政策还鼓励了……

30. V. F. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia transsibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali XIX-nachala XX vv.” (Ph.D. diss., Tomskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1972), 515-517.
30. V·F·博尔祖诺夫,“跨西伯利亚铁路干线建设史(十九世纪至二十世纪初)”(博士论文,托木斯克国立大学,1972 年),第 515-517 页。

31. V. N. Lamzdorf, Dnevnik, 1891-1892 (Moscow/Leningrad, 1934), 239 (Jan. 18, 1892).
31. V·N·兰兹多夫,《日记,1891-1892》(莫斯科/列宁格勒,1934 年),239 页(1892 年 1 月 18 日)。

32. PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 9, 1889, nos. 5831 and 6236; Brokgauz-Efron, Novyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, 12:119-120.
32. 《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》,第三辑,第 9 卷,1889 年,第 5831 号和第 6236 号;布罗克豪斯-埃弗龙,《新百科词典》,第 12 卷:119-120 页。

33. Shepelev, Tsarizm, 171.
33. 舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,171 页。

34. Robbins, Famine, 78.
34. 罗宾斯,《饥荒》,78 页。

35. S. M. von Propper, Was nicht in die Zeitung kam: Erinnerungen des Chef-redakteurs der “Birschewyja Wedomosti” (Frankfurt am Main, 1929), 160-161.
35. S·M·冯·普罗佩尔,《未刊报章:〈交易所新闻〉主编回忆录》(法兰克福,1929 年),第 160-161 页。

aged a new trend in railroad building, with private, as opposed to state, construction getting the edge. 36 He 36 He ^(36)He{ }^{36} \mathrm{He} expected the new tariff rules to be sufficient to prevent the earlier abuses of the private railroad barons. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} Giubbenet was firmly opposed to this limitation of railroad building by the Treasury, in principle and because it further reduced the role of his ministry.
标志着铁路建设的新趋势,私营建设而非国家建设占据了优势。 36 He 36 He ^(36)He{ }^{36} \mathrm{He} 预期新的关税规则足以防止早期私营铁路大亨的滥用行为。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 吉本内特坚决反对财政部对铁路建设的这种限制,无论是原则上还是因为这进一步削弱了他所在部门的角色。
The upshot was an intense animosity between Giubbenet on the one side and Vyshnegradskii and Witte on the other. The hatred reached such heights that it almost came to a duel between Witte and Giubbenet. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} With Vyshnegradskii’s backing, Witte attacked Giubbenet’s performance in the pages of Moskovskie vedomosti, at the same time boasting of his own department’s importance. Their campaign against Giubbenet was a major factor in his resignation. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} Giubbenet expressed his resentment to Polovtsov, "calling [Vyshnegradskii] and Witte thieves and contending that in all aspects of railroad affairs there was no longer [concern for] the national interest, but the exclusive pursuit of private advantage. 40 40 ^(')40{ }^{\prime} 40
结果导致久边涅特与维什涅格拉茨基和维特之间产生了强烈的敌意。这种仇恨甚至升级到维特与久边涅特几乎要决斗的地步。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} 在维什涅格拉茨基的支持下,维特在《莫斯科新闻》上抨击久边涅特的表现,同时吹嘘自己部门的重要性。他们针对久边涅特的攻势是导致其辞职的主要原因。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} 久边涅特向波洛夫佐夫表达了他的愤懑,称[维什涅格拉茨基]和维特为窃贼,并坚称在铁路事务的各个方面已不再考虑国家利益,而是纯粹追求私人利益。 40 40 ^(')40{ }^{\prime} 40
Giubbenet’s end in government came with the famine of 1891-1892 and the ensuing crisis in railroad affairs, which had been made worse by the lack of cooperation between the ministries of finance and transport. Giubbenet resented the intrusion on his ministry’s area of responsibility by those in charge of implementing the relief effort on the railroads. The incident gave Meshcherskii and Vyshnegradskii an opportunity to induce the tsar to remove him. Along with the subsequent appointment of Witte as minister of transport, this coup seems to indicate that Vyshnegradskii aimed to expand his ministry’s control over the Transport Ministry. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} Although the official history attributes Giubbenet’s resignation to illness, the interministerial conflict was in fact responsible. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42}
久本内特在政府中的终结源于 1891-1892 年的饥荒及随之而来的铁路事务危机,这一危机因财政与交通两部缺乏协作而加剧。久本内特对负责铁路赈灾事务者越权干预其部门职权范围深感不满。这一事件为梅谢尔斯基和维什涅格拉茨基提供了促使沙皇将其免职的机会。随着维特随后被任命为交通部长,这场政变似乎表明维什涅格拉茨基意图扩大其部门对交通部的控制权。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} 尽管官方历史将久本内特的辞职归因于健康问题,但实际原因在于部际冲突。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42}
Adol’f Giubbenet. From MPS, Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia i deiatel’nosti vedomstva putei soobshcheniia (St. Petersburg, 1898).
阿道夫·久本内特。引自《交通部历史发展及活动简史》(圣彼得堡,1898 年),俄罗斯交通部编。
The antithetical ideological viewpoints of the two ministries join with the personal and political factors to explain the never-ending maneuvering over the Siberian Railroad issue. Throughout 1889 Vyshnegradskii tightened his fiscal stranglehold on the project. At the behest of the finance minister and with the backing of Abaza, the tsar decreed that for the five-year period 1890-1894 the government would put a ceiling on its total extraordinary expenses at 300 million rubles, or 60 million rubles per year. For 1890 the Ministry of Transport was to receive 49.5 million rubles, of which only 2.5 million were allocated for the construction of new lines; the rest was to go for improvements on existing lines. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} This insignificant sum contrasted
两大部门意识形态立场的对立,加之个人与政治因素,共同解释了西伯利亚铁路议题上永无休止的角力。1889 年间,维什涅格拉茨基持续收紧对该项目的财政钳制。在财政大臣的强烈要求及阿巴扎的支持下,沙皇颁布敕令:1890-1894 五年间,政府特别支出总额上限设定为 3 亿卢布,即年均 6000 万卢布。1890 年度,交通部将获得 4950 万卢布拨款,其中仅 250 万用于新线建设,余款皆用于既有线路改造。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} 这一微不足道的拨款数额
with the 34 million rubles Giubbenet had requested for the construction of new state railroads. In May 1890 Giubbenet drastically reduced his requests, but once again the Committee of Ministers refused to release any additional funds. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
与久别涅特申请用于国家新铁路建设的 3400 万卢布形成鲜明对比。1890 年 5 月,久别涅特大幅缩减了申请额度,但大臣委员会再次拒绝追加任何资金。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
The committee’s decisions brought urgent warnings in July 1890 from the Priamur governor general that the government must not delay construction of at least the Ussuri Railroad any longer. Alexander III agreed that “it is necessary to commence construction of this road very soon.” 45 The tsar’s demand left no alternative, even for Vyshnegradskii: the railroad could be blocked no longer.
1890 年 7 月,滨海边疆区总督向委员会发出紧急警告,指出政府必须立即启动乌苏里铁路的建设,不能再拖延。亚历山大三世对此表示赞同,认为“这条铁路的修建工作亟需尽快展开”。沙皇的命令让维什涅格拉茨基别无选择:铁路建设已无法再被阻挠。
Vyshnegradskii did attempt to reduce the damage as much as possible by asking the tsar to convene a special conference under Abaza to concentrate solely on the Siberian Railroad. The conference met on December 12, 1890, and discussed Vyshnegradskii’s memorandum of August 16 and Giubbenet’s memorandum of November 15 in rebuttal. The memoranda show the continuation of the ideational conflict that had been apparent since at least 1875. They represent the cautious traditionalism of the Ministry of Finance, obsessed by the state budget, and the grandiose strategy of development put forth by the Ministry of Transport.
维什涅格拉茨基仍试图通过请求沙皇召开由阿巴扎主持的西伯利亚铁路专项会议来尽可能减少损失。会议于 1890 年 12 月 12 日召开,讨论了维什涅格拉茨基 8 月 16 日的备忘录及久边内特 11 月 15 日提出的反驳备忘录。这些文件展现了至少自 1875 年以来就存在的理念冲突——财政部对国库收支的谨慎保守传统主义,与交通部提出的宏伟发展战略形成了鲜明对比。
Vyshnegradskii recommended that the Siberian Railroad be started in the west rather than at Vladivostok in the Far East and in sections across the portages between river routes rather than as a transit or through route, thereby reducing its length from 7,000 to 3,000 versts. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} The income needed to pay for construction of the road and prevent the accumulation of debt once it was operational could be assured in no other way. He saw the Tomsk-Irkutsk section as being of first importance, whereas the Ussuri Railroad simply did not merit the expense. He warned that if the Ussuri road were built first, eastern Siberia would fall under the influence of North America, and the “stagnation” of the Chinese led him to discount the possibility that they would build a strategic railroad in Manchuria. He concluded that
维什涅格拉茨基建议西伯利亚铁路应从西部而非远东的符拉迪沃斯托克开始修建,并分段跨越河流路线之间的陆路运输段,而非作为一条直达线路,从而将其长度从 7000 俄里缩减至 3000 俄里。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} 要确保铁路建设资金并避免运营后债务累积,这是唯一可行的方式。他认为托木斯克至伊尔库茨克段最为关键,而乌苏里铁路根本不值得如此巨额投入。他警告称,若优先修建乌苏里铁路,东西伯利亚将受北美势力渗透,且中国人"停滞不前"的状态使其不可能在满洲修建战略铁路。最终他得出结论:
“the construction of this road must proceed gradually . . . so that the local population, as well as the state, may derive some benefit from the matter.” His criterion was the amount of income generated by each section, and the only possibility he admitted was construction of the central Siberian section. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
"这条铁路的建设必须循序渐进……以便当地居民和国家都能从中获益。"他的衡量标准是各段线路产生的收益,唯一认可的方案是优先建设中西伯利亚段。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
Giubbenet offered a plan characteristic for his ministry. Rather than decide the question on the basis of hypothetical cost estimates for the various sections of the railroad, he said, the government should “evaluate the enormous political, economic, and national significance of a continuous Siberian Railroad in the future.” He roundly opposed the finance minister’s proposal to build individual “portage lines” beginning from the west: without a direct line to the European Russian rail network, each section would be of little significance. Only a transit route built from both ends would benefit Russia. He estimated the total cost, which he compared with that of the Canadian-Pacific Railroad, at 362 , 479 , 258 362 , 479 , 258 362,479,258362,479,258 rubles for 7,474 versts, including branch lines and bridges across major rivers. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
久别内特提出了一个极具其部门特色的计划。他主张政府不应基于铁路各段假想成本估算来决定方案,而应"评估未来一条连贯的西伯利亚铁路所蕴含的巨大政治、经济与国家意义"。他断然反对财政部长提出的从西部开始分段修建"转运线"的提议:若不能与俄罗斯欧洲铁路网直连,每个区段都将失去意义。只有从两端同时施工的贯通线路才能让俄国受益。他参照加拿大太平洋铁路的造价,估算包括支线及跨大河桥梁在内的 7,474 俄里铁路总成本为 362 , 479 , 258 362 , 479 , 258 362,479,258362,479,258 卢布。 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
Giubbenet’s opposition to Vyshnegradskii’s mixed water-rail route was supported by the majority of engineers and businessmen in the professional societies, who argued that the cost of rail portages in time alone was high: trains would have to load and unload eight times, even those carrying soldiers to battle, and the line could operate only when the rivers were free of ice. They agreed with Giubbenet that the railroad was of more than economic importance: these distant, inseparable parts of the empire could be linked to “native Russia” only by a through route. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
久别涅特对维什涅格拉茨基提出的水铁混合路线的反对意见得到了专业协会中大多数工程师和商人的支持。他们认为,仅铁路转运的时间成本就很高:列车需要装卸八次,即使是运送士兵参战的列车也不例外,而且这条线路只能在河流无冰期运营。他们赞同久别涅特的观点,认为这条铁路的经济意义之外更为重要:只有通过直达路线,这些遥远而不可分割的帝国领土才能与"本土俄罗斯"连接起来。

47. Emphasis mine. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 86-87; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 17-18; MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti,” 12, and Istoricheskii ocherk, 468-469. For the exact route of Vyshnegradskii’s portage railroad see TOSRPT, vol. 21, otdel 1 (St. Petersburg, 1892), 10. The minister of finance’s proposal had its origins in Ostrovskii’s project of 1880 , as we saw in chap. 5 , although the earliest proponent of a mixed water-rail route across Siberia appears to have been the minister of transport, P. P. Mel’nikov, in 1866. See M. I. Voronin and M. M. Voronina, Pavel Petrovich Mel’nikov, 1804-1880 (Leningrad, 1977), 94.
47. 着重标记为笔者所加。萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,86-87 页;《交通部公报》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:17-18 页;交通部,《活动报告》,12 页,及《历史概述》,468-469 页。关于维什涅格拉茨基所提议的转运铁路具体路线,参见《俄国铁路运输协会会刊》第 21 卷第 1 分册(圣彼得堡,1892 年),10 页。财政大臣的提案源于 1880 年奥斯特洛夫斯基的项目(如第五章所述),而最早主张采用水陆混合方式横跨西伯利亚的似乎是 1866 年的交通大臣 P·P·梅利尼科夫。见 M·I·沃罗宁与 M·M·沃罗尼娜,《帕维尔·彼得罗维奇·梅利尼科夫,1804-1880》(列宁格勒,1977 年),94 页。

48. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 467-470, and “Otchet o deiatel’ nosti,” 13-19; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 87-90.
48. 交通部,《历史概述》,467-470 页,及《活动报告》,13-19 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,87-90 页。

49. See TIRTO, 2 : 8 , 38 : 5 2 : 8 , 38 : 5 2:8,38:52: 8,38: 5; Sovet moskovskogo otdeleniia OSRPT, Otkuda nachat’ postroiku sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi i v vide-li nepreryvnoi linii ili pereryvchatoi? (Moscow, 1891), 4-5; TOSRPT, vol. 21, otdel 1 (1892), 9-14; “Zasedanie OSRPT po dokladu P. E. Gronskogo: ‘Kak stroit’ sibirskuiu dorogu?’ '” TOSRPT, vol. 21, otdel 2 (1892), 9, 23; “Tikhookeanskaia-kanadskaia i sibirskaia zheleznye dorogi,” ZhdD, 1887, nos. 2526: 192; “‘O velikom sibirskom puti v sviazi s pravitel’stvennnymi izyskaniiami’ (Doklad N. A. Sytenko i beseda v VIII ot dele IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 22-24: 180; N. A. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” IIRGO 27 (1891): 32-33; A. I. Chuprov, Iz proshlogo russkikh zheleznykh dorog: Stat’i 1874-1895 godov (Moscow, 1909), 179-184.
49. 参见 TIRTO, 2 : 8 , 38 : 5 2 : 8 , 38 : 5 2:8,38:52: 8,38: 5 ;莫斯科 OSRPT 分会委员会,《西伯利亚铁路应从何处开始修建,是作为连续线路还是间断线路?》(莫斯科,1891 年),4-5 页;TOSRPT,第 21 卷,第 1 部分(1892 年),9-14 页;“OSRPT 会议关于 P.E.格龙斯基报告《如何建设西伯利亚铁路?》的讨论”,TOSRPT,第 21 卷,第 2 部分(1892 年),9、23 页;“太平洋-加拿大与西伯利亚铁路”,《铁路杂志》,1887 年,第 2526 期:192 页;“‘关于伟大的西伯利亚通道与政府勘测的关系’(N.A.瑟坚科报告及 IRTO 第八部门讨论)”,《铁路杂志》,1888 年,第 22-24 期:180 页;N.A.沃洛希诺夫,“西伯利亚铁路”,《俄国皇家地理学会会刊》27(1891 年):32-33 页;A.I.丘普罗夫,《俄国铁路往事:1874-1895 年论文集》(莫斯科,1909 年),179-184 页。
In the end the conference decided nothing. It found that it could not exceed the 7 -million-ruble limit for new railroads set for 1891 and that it was up to the Committee of Ministers to decide which new railroads should be built. Giubbenet accordingly took his memorandum there.
最终会议未作出任何决议。会议认为无法突破 1891 年设定的 700 万卢布新建铁路资金上限,且决定权在于大臣委员会,由其裁定应修建哪些新铁路线路。因此,久边内特将备忘录提交至该委员会。
In its session of February 12, 1891, the committee acknowledged the primary importance to the government of building a transit route through Siberia. On February 15, 1891, the tsar approved the committee’s resolution to build the Ussuri Railroad and in the near future the Trans-Siberian Railroad. For political and strategic reasons, the Committee of Ministers no longer concurred with the minister of finance. After seventeen years of discussion, it decided that the time was right for the railroad conceived by the Ministry of Transport and that it would be built by the state. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
在 1891 年 2 月 12 日的会议上,委员会承认了修建一条穿越西伯利亚的交通路线对政府具有首要重要性。1891 年 2 月 15 日,沙皇批准了委员会关于修建乌苏里铁路及在不久的将来建设西伯利亚大铁路的决议。出于政治和战略原因,部长委员会不再认同财政大臣的意见。经过十七年的讨论,委员会认为交通部构想的铁路建设时机已经成熟,并将由国家负责建造。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
Vyshnegradskii could not oppose the resolution, but he repeated his concern that construction of a railroad up to 7,500 versts in length at a cost of more than 300 million rubles would have an adverse effect on Russian securities and become a serious burden on the Treasury once it opened to traffic. He urged the state to proceed with the utmost caution. Abaza, wary as ever, stood behind him. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
维什涅格拉茨基无法反对这项决议,但他重申了自己的担忧:修建一条长达 7500 俄里、耗资超过 3 亿卢布的铁路将对俄国证券产生不利影响,并在通车后成为国库的沉重负担。他敦促国家以极其谨慎的态度推进此事。一贯谨慎的阿巴扎站在他身后表示支持。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
Vyshnegradskii continued to stall the project by passing the buck to Abaza. Once the State Council approved credits for the Ussuri Railroad, Giubbenet felt confident enough to draw up a schedule for completion of the whole through route, in the form of a memorandum to Vyshnegradskii dated August 9, 1891. His plan extended over a twelve-year period, envisaging completion of the whole road from Cheliabinsk to Vladivostok by 1903. He inquired as to the source of the 350 million rubles he estimated construction would cost. Vyshnegradskii responded on September 13, 1891, that the transport minister’s estimate of 47,000 rubles per verst seemed “very high.” In any case, the assignment of credits for the Siberian Railroad would be up to the special conference under Abaza which would review extraordinary expenses for 1892 . 52 1892 . 52 1892.^(52)1892 .{ }^{52}
维什涅格拉茨基继续通过将责任推给阿巴扎来拖延项目。一旦国务会议批准了乌苏里铁路的贷款,久边内特便信心十足地制定了全线贯通的时间表,并于 1891 年 8 月 9 日向维什涅格拉茨基提交了一份备忘录。他的计划跨越十二年,预计到 1903 年完成从车里雅宾斯克到符拉迪沃斯托克的整条铁路。他询问了预计建设成本 3.5 亿卢布的资金来源。维什涅格拉茨基于 1891 年 9 月 13 日回应称,交通部长对每俄里 47,000 卢布的估算“过高”。无论如何,西伯利亚铁路的贷款分配将由阿巴扎主持的特别会议审议,该会议将审查 1892 . 52 1892 . 52 1892.^(52)1892 .{ }^{52} 的额外支出。
Abaza fixed the amount of credits for new railroad construction in 1892 at a mere 5.9 million rubles. After reviewing the proceedings of
阿巴扎将 1892 年新铁路建设的贷款额度定为仅 590 万卢布。在审查了相关会议记录后
the special conference, the tsar augmented the sum by 1.1 million rubles to permit the extension of the Siberian line to Cheliabinsk and provide additional funds for the Ussuri Railroad, if nothing else. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} Only with the tsar’s intervention was the level of credits assigned to the project increased.
在特别会议上,沙皇额外拨款 110 万卢布,以便将西伯利亚铁路线延伸至车里雅宾斯克,并为乌苏里铁路提供额外资金,至少做到这一点。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} 正是在沙皇的干预下,该项目获得的信贷额度才得以提高。
Again, though, Vyshnegradskii attempted to circumvent Giub-benet-and the Committee of Ministers-so that Treasury funds would not be used for railroad construction, in particular for the Siberian Railroad. Allied with him was Annenkov, who, in seeking French financing for the railroad, still aimed to win the project away from the Transport Ministry and place himself in charge.
然而,维什涅格拉茨基再次试图绕过久本内特和部长委员会,以避免将国库资金用于铁路建设,尤其是西伯利亚铁路。与他结盟的是安年科夫,后者在寻求法国融资修建铁路的过程中,仍试图将项目从交通部手中夺走,由自己掌控。

Financial Desperation  财政困境

By late 1888 the Russian government’s fiscal outlook had improved (at least on paper) to the point where it was possible for Vyshnegradskii to persuade French banking houses to convert the onerous German loans made during the Russo-Turkish War. This was the beginning of the financial relationship between France and Russia which became so extensive over the next two decades and preceded the formation of the Franco-Russian military alliance. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
到 1888 年底,俄国政府的财政状况(至少在账面上)有所改善,维什涅格拉茨基得以说服法国银行财团转换俄土战争期间沉重的德国贷款。这标志着法俄金融关系的开端,此后二十年这一关系日益紧密,并最终促成了法俄军事同盟的形成。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
The tsar was interested in using the French financial connection to make a political statement against Germany, but also, it seems, to secure financing for the Trans-Siberian Railroad. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} Indeed, although Vyshnegradskii wanted to shift Russian borrowing from foreign to domestic sources, especially for railroad construction, for the Siberian Railroad he favored the use of French capital to prevent a drain on his ever-fragile budget.
沙皇有意利用法国金融关系来向德国发出政治声明,同时也似乎是为了确保西伯利亚大铁路的资金来源。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} 事实上,尽管维什涅格拉茨基希望将俄国的借贷从国外转向国内,特别是铁路建设方面,但对于西伯利亚铁路,他倾向于使用法国资本,以避免对其本就脆弱的预算造成压力。
The idea was proposed by General Annenkov, still angling for the lead role in building the railroad, and Vyshnegradskii found himself allied with him against the minister of transport. 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} Annenkov knew he
这一提议由安年科夫将军提出,他仍在争取铁路建设的主导权,而维什涅格拉茨基发现自己与他结盟,共同对抗交通部长。 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} 安年科夫明白
would get Vyshnegradskii’s support if he found funding outside of state coffers. Vyshnegradskii supported Annenkov out of concern for his budget and as a way of dealing another blow to Giubbenet. As the London Times reported, the issue of who would be in charge of the project, Annenkov or the minister of transport, still had not been settled decisively, regardless of the tsar’s decisions of 1887. Giubbenet recognized the threat and insisted that he supervise construction of the railroad for the “prestige and raison d’être” of his ministry. 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57}
如果能从国家财政之外找到资金,他将得到维什涅格拉茨基的支持。维什涅格拉茨基支持安年科夫,既是出于对预算的担忧,也是借此打击久边内特。正如《伦敦时报》所报道的,尽管沙皇在 1887 年做出了决定,但由谁来主导这个项目——安年科夫还是交通部长——仍未最终敲定。久边内特意识到了威胁,坚持要求由其部门监督铁路建设,以维护其“威望和存在意义”。 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57}
But Annenkov was persistent. His initiative and drive alone had been responsible for surmounting the immense geographical and political obstacles in the way of the Transcaspian Railroad and for bringing it to completion. For this accomplishment he was awarded one of the highest honors of the Russian government, the Order of Alexander Nevskii with diamonds. 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} One is under the impression that Annenkov-like Ferdinand de Lesseps, with whom he shared many personal characteristics-was motivated by a quest for personal glory (and certainly financial gain) in attempting to take charge of what was at the time one of the greatest engineering projects ever attempted. 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59}
但安年科夫坚持不懈。正是他的主动性和干劲克服了外里海铁路面临的巨大地理和政治障碍,并促成了它的完工。由于这一成就,他被授予俄罗斯政府最高荣誉之一——镶钻的亚历山大·涅夫斯基勋章。 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} 给人的印象是,安年科夫——与费迪南德·德·雷赛布有许多共同个人特质——在试图负责当时有史以来最伟大的工程项目之一时,是出于对个人荣耀(当然还有经济利益)的追求。 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59}
Annenkov’s energy and international recognition for the Transcaspian Railroad would help him in France, as would his personal French connection: his daughter was married to Viscount Eugène Melchior de Vogüé, former member of the French embassy in St. Petersburg, an authority on Russian affairs and literature, and habitué of the highest French political circles. Annenkov would use his acquaintance with French financiers and politicians to the fullest over the next few years. For their part, French capitalists were very interested in the Siberian Railroad project because of the expected expansion of industry it would bring, which promised a higher return on their other Russian investments. 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
安年科夫充沛的精力及因外里海铁路获得的国际声誉将在法国为他助力,其个人与法国的联姻关系同样功不可没——他的女儿嫁给了曾任法国驻圣彼得堡使馆成员、俄罗斯事务与文学权威的尤金·梅尔基奥尔·德·沃居埃子爵,后者更是法国高层政治圈子的常客。未来几年里,安年科夫将充分利用他与法国金融家及政要的人脉关系。对法国资本家而言,西伯利亚铁路项目因其将带来的工业扩张前景而极具吸引力,这预示着他们在俄其他投资将获得更高回报。 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
In early 1890, one of the French Rothschilds went with Annenkov to Merv in Turkestan. Annenkov received a promise of full financial support for the Siberian Railroad, but, according to Annenkov, only if he were placed in charge of the project. Vyshnegradskii pledged his support, but only after he inspected the Transcaspian Railroad to
1890 年初,一位法国罗斯柴尔德家族成员与安年科夫同赴突厥斯坦的梅尔夫。安年科夫获得了西伯利亚铁路项目的全额资金支持承诺,但据其所述,条件是他必须全权负责该项目。维什涅格拉茨基虽承诺支持,但需在实地考察外里海铁路后才作最终决定。
assess Annenkov’s performance. Annenkov went to Paris for talks with the Rothschilds on the Siberian Railroad, and it was widely thought that financing was guaranteed. By August 1890, as he left Paris, Annenkov felt confident that French bankers, in particular the Rothschilds, were ready to offer their financial support to his railroad project. With the blessing of Vyshnegradskii, the Rothschild firm seemed ready to play a leading role in the construction of the Siberian Railroad, as well as to gain dominance over Baku oil exporting. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
评估安年科夫的表现。安年科夫前往巴黎与罗斯柴尔德家族就西伯利亚铁路进行谈判,外界普遍认为融资已得到保障。到 1890 年 8 月离开巴黎时,安年科夫确信法国银行家,尤其是罗斯柴尔德家族,已准备好为他的铁路项目提供资金支持。在维什涅格拉茨基的支持下,罗斯柴尔德公司似乎准备在西伯利亚铁路的建设中发挥主导作用,同时获得对巴库石油出口的主导权。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
The Rothschilds offered 300 million rubles. Annenkov could work with this sum: he proposed to build the 7,000-verst railroad for 40,000 rubles per verst and still gain 20 million rubles for himself. He then assured the Committee of Ministers in January 1891 that he could complete the road across Siberia to Vladivostok in just three years. 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}
罗斯柴尔德家族提供了 3 亿卢布的资金。安年科夫可以运用这笔款项:他提议以每俄里 4 万卢布的成本修建 7000 俄里的铁路,并为自己净赚 2000 万卢布。随后,他在 1891 年 1 月向部长委员会保证,能在短短三年内完成横跨西伯利亚至符拉迪沃斯托克的铁路建设。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}

But it was not to be. Annenkov immediately suffered a string of setbacks in his quest for foreign funding. First, Vyshnegradskii came out against his proposals, perhaps because he foresaw that such rapid construction could not be accomplished without financial loss, which the Treasury would ultimately have to cover, or because of the unsatisfactory condition of the Transcaspian Railroad, for which Annenkov was responsible. 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63}
然而事与愿违。安年科夫在寻求外国资金的过程中接连遭遇挫折。首先,维什涅格拉茨基公开反对他的提案,或许是因为预见到如此快速的施工难免会造成财政亏损,最终需由国库承担;亦或是对安年科夫负责的外里海铁路状况不满所致。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63}
Next, in February 1891 the Committee of Ministers announced that the Treasury would finance the building of the Siberian Railroad. Behind this decision had been Giubbenet, of course, but also Witte, who had argued strongly against any foreign involvement in the railroad as potentially harmful to the national interest, even if French financing should be solicited for the infrastructure necessary to complete the project. Finally, the Rothschilds withdrew from the picture altogether, severing financial ties with the Russian government largely to protest the expulsion of the Jews from Moscow in March 1891. 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64}
紧接着在 1891 年 2 月,大臣委员会宣布西伯利亚铁路的建设资金将由国库拨付。这一决定背后既有久本内的推动,更得益于维特的极力主张——他坚决反对任何外国资本参与铁路建设,认为这会损害国家利益,即便为完成项目所需基础设施而寻求法国融资也不例外。最终罗斯柴尔德家族全面退出,切断了与俄国政府的金融联系,主要为了抗议 1891 年 3 月驱逐莫斯科犹太人的事件。 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64}
Seemingly desperate for the job, Annenkov turned to an unnamed acquaintance who promised him that if he loaned 50,000 rubles to Duchess Zina, whose husband, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, was a relative of the tsar, he would be assured of getting his wish. Annenkov did so, borrowing the money from Polovtsov, who could not refuse because he wanted Annenkov to build a railroad of personal interest to himself, but nothing came of it. 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
看似迫切想要这份工作的安年科夫转而求助一位不愿透露姓名的熟人,此人向他承诺,只要他借给齐娜公爵夫人 5 万卢布(其丈夫洛伊希滕贝格公爵是沙皇的亲戚),就能确保他如愿以偿。安年科夫照做了,从波洛夫佐夫那里借了这笔钱——波洛夫佐夫无法拒绝,因为他希望安年科夫修建一条对自己有利的铁路,但最终此事无果而终。 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
At the same time, Annenkov was approaching still more French financiers. In August 1890 Senator Charles Lesueur had formed a company to survey the possible conditions under which the Siberian Railroad might be constructed. Included in its membership were M. Duportal, director of French state railroads; Senator P. Decauville, director of the Decauville works and administrator of the Banque d’Escompte; and other prominent engineers who had been involved in the management of large enterprises, including the Suez and Panama canals. In August 1890 Duportal went to St. Petersburg to set up a branch of the company. 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} According to one source, Annenkov had attracted the group to St. Petersburg by promising to get them the construction contract if they would give him 200 million francs to bribe the relevant officials. 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} In March 1891, Giubbenet, with the implicit backing of Witte and the Committee of Ministers, turned down the company’s proposal, on the grounds that "the government has not expressed any intention of turning to private enterprise in this matter.’"68
与此同时,安年科夫正接触更多法国金融家。1890 年 8 月,参议员查尔斯·勒苏厄尔组建了一家公司,旨在勘察西伯利亚铁路可能的建设条件。公司成员包括法国国营铁路总监杜波塔尔、德科维尔工厂总监兼巴黎贴现银行董事参议员 P·德科维尔,以及其他曾参与苏伊士运河和巴拿马运河等大型企业管理项目的知名工程师。1890 年 8 月,杜波塔尔前往圣彼得堡设立分公司。 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} 据消息称,安年科夫以承诺获取工程合同为条件,吸引该集团前往圣彼得堡,前提是他们需提供 2 亿法郎用于贿赂相关官员。 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} 1891 年 3 月,在维特和部长会议暗中支持下,久本内特以"政府尚未表达在此事上求助于私营企业的意向"为由拒绝了该公司的提案。68
Annenkov still refused to quit, and when circumstances changed, he and the French financiers were given one final opportunity. The devastating harvests of 1890 and 1891 and the milestone famine of 1891-1892, whatever their causes, paralyzed the Russian economy and shattered the image of financial solidity the government wanted to present to the world. 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} When the fragility of state income was thus
安年科夫依然拒绝退出,当形势发生变化时,他和法国金融家们获得了最后一次机会。1890 年和 1891 年的毁灭性歉收以及 1891-1892 年的重大饥荒,无论其原因为何,都使俄国经济陷入瘫痪,粉碎了政府试图向世界展示的财政稳健形象。 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} 当国家收入的脆弱性如此
revealed, the governing elite panicked. 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70} The demands on the Treasury were enormous, and to avoid excessive reliance on the printing press to supply the needed funds, Vyshnegradskii sent out feelers to reestablish ties with the Rothschilds and even German financial sources. Now even Witte, named minister of transport on February 27, 1892 , realized that if the Siberian Railroad were to be started that year, foreign financing in some direct form would be essential. 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71}
暴露无遗时,统治阶层陷入恐慌。 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70} 国库面临的支出需求巨大,为避免过度依赖印钞机来筹措所需资金,维什涅格拉茨基向外试探,试图与罗斯柴尔德家族甚至德国金融渠道重建联系。此时,就连 1892 年 2 月 27 日被任命为交通部长的维特也意识到,若要在当年启动西伯利亚铁路建设,某种形式的外国直接投资将至关重要。 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71}
With this knowledge, Lesueur and Decauville renewed their proposal to the tsar, who received them at Tsarevich Nicholas’s urging. Alexander explained the state’s policy, but said he would review the matter and consult with Vyshnegradskii. At Polovtsov’s suggestion they offered to place on the French market the 200 million rubles that Vyshnegradskii had hoped but failed to get through the Rothschilds. Vyshnegradskii agreed “avec joie,” confident that the loan would go through. Decauville returned to Paris in March to organize the loan, but found no interest there. After one more bid by Lesueur in April, their attempts-and those of Annenkov-had reached an end. 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72}
凭借这一信息,勒叙厄尔和德科维尔在皇太子尼古拉的敦促下,向沙皇重新提交了提案。亚历山大解释了国家政策,但表示将重新审议此事并与维什涅格拉茨基商议。根据波洛夫佐夫的建议,他们提出在法国市场投放维什涅格拉茨基此前希望通过罗斯柴尔德家族筹集但未成功的 2 亿卢布贷款。维什涅格拉茨基欣然同意("avec joie"),确信贷款能够顺利推进。德科维尔于三月返回巴黎组织贷款,却发现当地市场毫无兴趣。在勒叙厄尔四月再次尝试后,他们与安年科夫的共同努力就此终结。 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72}
With the foreign money markets unwilling to assist, Witte and Vyshnegradskii had to come up with a solution. Witte “resigned himself” to proposing a domestic loan of 75 million rubles at 4.5 percent to finance the Siberian project. The public refused to come to the government’s assistance, however, and subscriptions were not forthcoming: of 75 million rubles offered, only 15 million were placed. 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73}
由于国际金融市场拒绝施以援手,维特和维什涅格拉茨基必须另寻出路。维特"无奈"提议在国内发行利率 4.5%的 7500 万卢布国债以支持西伯利亚铁路项目。然而公众并未响应政府号召,认购情况惨淡:7500 万卢布的发行额度中,仅 1500 万卢布被认购。 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73}

Vyshnegradskii despaired of finding financing at home or abroad. 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74}
维什涅格拉茨基对在国内外筹措资金彻底绝望。 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74}
He learned, as S. M. von Propper put it, that “for Russia, as of old, it remains valid to claim that the only finance minister is Mother Harvest.” Illness overtook him as he worked through the night during the crisis. 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75} He went so far as to propose that Russia adopt a progressive income tax, then in the summer departed for a long leave in the Crimea. 76 76 ^(76){ }^{76} In August Witte replaced him as finance minister.
正如 S.M.冯·普罗珀所言,他领悟到"对俄罗斯而言,亘古不变的真理仍是——唯一的财政部长就是丰收女神"。危机期间,他彻夜工作以致病倒。 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75} 他甚至提议俄罗斯实行累进所得税制,随后于夏季启程前往克里米亚长期休假。 76 76 ^(76){ }^{76} 同年八月,维特接替他出任财政部长。
This, then, was the situation Witte inherited, with the question of financing the Siberian Railroad still unresolved.
这就是维特接手时的局面——西伯利亚大铁路的融资问题仍悬而未决。

The Divisive Government  分裂的政府

It had taken more than a decade and a half for the imperial Russian government to decide to build the Siberian Railroad. The circumstances required for quick action did not exist, a fact that requires a reassessment of the notion of the state’s preeminent ability to develop the country’s economy. Tsarist economic policy, which has generally been portrayed as coherent and vigorous, in truth lacked consensus. The internecine conflicts among ministries and ministers made it virtually impossible for the various branches of the bureaucracy to work as one on economic issues, let alone compromise or accomplish anything. 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
沙俄政府耗时逾十五年才最终决定修建西伯利亚大铁路。当时并不具备迅速行动的客观条件,这一事实需要我们重新审视关于国家主导经济发展能力的固有认知。历来被描述为连贯有力的沙皇经济政策,实则缺乏共识。各部委与大臣间的内斗使得官僚体系几乎无法在经济议题上协同作战,遑论达成妥协或取得实质成果。 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
The autocratic system was responsible for much of the problem. As the supreme authority, the tsar was the ultimate arbiter of disputes within the bureaucracy. 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78} Ministers thus competed to influence him in their favor, with the natural result that government was highly fractious. 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79} As we have seen, the tsar’s was the final word on the
专制制度是造成诸多问题的根源。作为最高权威,沙皇是官僚体系内部纠纷的最终裁决者。 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78} 因此,大臣们竞相争取沙皇的支持以谋取私利,政府自然陷入高度分裂。 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79} 如前所述,沙皇的意志具有

75. Propper, Was nicht in die Zeitung kam, 138, 151.
75. 普罗佩尔,《未刊报章的内容》,138 页,151 页。

  1. Girault, Emprunts russes, 232.
    吉罗,《俄国借款》,232 页。
  2. This conclusion meshes with the findings of John P. McKay, who shows that the government’s prevarication, bureaucratic rivalry, and inertia left the transportation problems of the Baku oil industry unsolved (“Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883-1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy,” Slavic Review 43 [1984]: 604-623). On this basis he disputes the assumption of “dynamic state leadership in Russian industrialization.”
    这一结论与约翰·P·麦凯的研究发现相吻合。麦凯指出,政府的推诿、官僚倾轧与惰性导致巴库石油产业的运输问题长期悬而未决(《1883-1891 年巴库石油与外高加索输油管道:沙皇经济政策研究》,《斯拉夫评论》43 卷[1984 年]:604-623 页)。基于此,他对"俄国工业化进程中政府主导作用显著"的假设提出质疑。
  3. Contrary to the assertion of George L. Yaney that the tsar was a tool in his ministers’ hands (The Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711-1905 [Urbana, Ill., 1973], 281-282). At the same time, Yaney (p. 299) somewhat contradictorily and equally incorrectly implies that Alexander III had improved coordination among ministries.
    与乔治·L·亚尼(George L. Yaney)所声称的沙皇只是其大臣们手中的工具这一观点相反(《俄国政府的系统化:帝俄国内行政管理的社会演变,1711-1905》[厄巴纳,伊利诺伊州,1973 年],281-282 页)。同时,亚尼(第 299 页)有些矛盾且同样错误地暗示亚历山大三世改善了各部委之间的协调。
  4. See Jacob W. Kipp and W. Bruce Lincoln, “Autocracy and Reform: Bureaucratic Absolutism and Political Modernization in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” Russian History 6, pt. 1 (1979): 16; also Donald W. Green, "Industrialization and the Engineering
    参见雅各布·W·基普(Jacob W. Kipp)和 W·布鲁斯·林肯(W. Bruce Lincoln)的《专制与改革:十九世纪俄国的官僚专制与政治现代化》,《俄国历史》第 6 卷第 1 部分(1979 年):16 页;另见唐纳德·W·格林(Donald W. Green)的《工业化与工程》

    decision to build the Trans-Siberian, on who would control the project, and on the amount of funding to be devoted to it.
    关于修建跨西伯利亚铁路的决定,由谁来控制该项目,以及将投入多少资金的问题。
The government was hamstrung by ministerial strife. In economic policy, bitter disputes arose over how best to create a strong, viable nation out of weakness, and the solutions offered were mutually exclusive. Fiscal conservatism held sway in the Ministry of Finance as it trod softly on the thin ice of Russian finances. Such a solution was not solely a matter of exigency; it also reflected the ministry’s basic distrust of innovation, a long-standing characteristic antedating the Crimean War. Before Witte’s appointment as its head, the Ministry of Finance had little interest in economic development. 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80}
政府因部门间的争斗而束手无策。在经济政策上,围绕如何从虚弱中打造一个强大、自立的国度爆发了激烈争论,各方提出的解决方案互不相容。财政部奉行财政保守主义,在俄罗斯财政的薄冰上谨慎行事。这种解决方案不仅是权宜之计,也反映了该部门对创新的根本性不信任——这一由来已久的特质可追溯至克里米亚战争之前。在维特被任命为部长之前,财政部对经济发展几乎毫无兴趣。 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80}
Opposed to the pinchpenny complacency of the Ministry of Finance was the technocratic vision of the Ministry of Transport, which advocated active government intervention in the economy, in particular the development of the empire’s vast unsettled territories. This was the only element in the government to have what Alexander Gerschenkron posited as the precondition for overcoming backwardness: a powerful, almost spiritual faith in economic development. 81 As 81 As ^(81)As{ }^{81} \mathrm{As} such, it encountered only hostility and found itself isolated, even by those who may have shared its political views. The Transport Ministry’s troubles with the Ministry of Finance over the Siberian Railroad were a symptom of the disagreements between them over these fundamental issues, one side preoccupied with the practical problem of balancing the budget, the other willing to risk deficit spending to realize its hopes for the future.
与财政部那种吝啬自满的态度相对立的是交通部的技术官僚愿景,该部主张政府积极干预经济,特别是开发帝国广袤的未开垦领土。这是政府中唯一具备亚历山大·格申克龙所提出的克服落后先决条件的部门:一种对经济发展近乎精神信仰般的坚定信念。正因如此,它遭遇的只有敌意,并发现自己孤立无援,甚至那些可能与其政治观点相同的人也疏远它。交通部与财政部在西伯利亚铁路问题上的争执,正是双方在这些根本议题上分歧的表现——一方执着于平衡预算的实际问题,另一方则甘愿冒险赤字开支以实现其对未来的期望。
The Russian bureaucracy was not yet sure which road to follow until Witte took the decisive steps on the path first plotted by the Ministry of Transport. He would resolve, or perhaps circumvent, the
俄国官僚体系在维特采取交通部最初规划道路上的决定性步骤之前,尚未确定应遵循哪条道路。他将解决,或者说绕过这些
disputes over the Siberian Railroad by removing his opponents and creating his own policy-making agency, the Committee of the Siberian Railroad. He therefore imposed consensus and, for several years at least, the state seemed to be of a single mind and perhaps capable of operating with verve. Yet this new modus operandi generated its own set of problems, and the subsequent history of the Siberian Railroad would vindicate Vyshnegradskii and its earlier opponents.
通过清除反对者并建立自己的决策机构——西伯利亚铁路委员会,解决了围绕西伯利亚铁路的争议。因此,他强加了共识,至少在几年内,国家似乎达成了统一意见,或许能够充满活力地运作。然而,这种新的运作方式又引发了一系列问题,西伯利亚铁路的后续历史将证明维什涅格拉茨基及其早期反对者的正确性。

CHAPTERSEVEN  第七章

A State  一个国家

within a State  在一个国家内部

Thhe leading spirit and force behind the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad was Sergei Witte (1849-1915). 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} After his death, many people remembered him above all for this railroad, which they considered among his greatest accomplishments. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} Yet its importance in his career has been given short shrift in the historical literature.
谢尔盖·维特(1849-1915)是西伯利亚大铁路建设背后的核心推动力。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 他去世后,许多人首先铭记的正是这条铁路,认为这是他最伟大的成就之一。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 然而,这条铁路在他职业生涯中的重要性在历史文献中却被轻描淡写。
Upon becoming minister of finance, Witte saw the completion of the Siberian Railroad as his first priority. After Tsarevich Nicholas’s trip to the Far East, it had become a very popular idea in Russia. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} Immediately after Witte’s appointment, Alexander III told him that he wanted more than anything else to see the railroad built, after ten years of bureaucratic delay. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
维特就任财政大臣后,将完成西伯利亚铁路视为首要任务。在皇太子尼古拉远东之行后,这一构想已在俄国广受欢迎。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 维特上任伊始,亚历山大三世就告诉他,自己最迫切的心愿就是看到这条因官僚拖延而搁置十年的铁路得以建成。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
The tsar’s backing contributed to Witte’s success against the odds in bringing the Siberian Railroad to fruition. But he would still need to devote all his formidable energy and means to it. The methods he
沙皇的支持助力维特克服重重困难,最终实现了西伯利亚铁路的贯通。但他仍需倾注全部非凡的精力与资源。他所采用的方法
  1. He claimed so himself in S. Iu. Witte, Vospominaniia, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1960), 432433: “I assiduously adhered to the idea of building the Great Siberian way; as much as previous ministers hindered the undertaking, I bore in mind the behests of Emperor Alexander III and tried as quickly as possible to accomplish it. . . . I would not be exaggerating if I were to say that this great undertaking was totally a result of my energy, of course backed up first by Emperor Alexander III and later by Emperor Nicholas II.”
    他在 S. Iu. Witte 的回忆录第一卷(莫斯科,1960 年)第 432-433 页中亲自宣称:“我始终坚定地致力于建设西伯利亚大铁路的理念;尽管前任部长们对此多有阻挠,我始终铭记亚历山大三世皇帝的遗志,并竭尽全力加速推进这项工程……毫不夸张地说,这一伟大事业完全是我个人倾注全力的成果,当然首先得益于亚历山大三世皇帝的支持,其后又得到尼古拉二世陛下的鼎力相助。”
  2. See the comments of contemporaries in B. B. Glinskii, “Graf Sergei Iul’evich Witte (Materialy dlia biografii),” Istoricheskii vestnik 140 (April 1915): 232-279.
    参见同时代人的评论,载于 B. B. Glinskii 所著《谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇·维特伯爵(传记资料)》,《历史通报》第 140 期(1915 年 4 月):232-279 页。
  3. F. G. Terner, Vospominaniia zhizni, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1911), 222n1. The Soviet historian B. A. Romanov points out that until 1892, when he became transport minister, Witte showed no interest in the Far East, but from then on the Siberian Railroad was one of his main concerns (Russia in Manchuria [1892-1906], trans. Susan Wilbur Jones [New York, 1974], 38).
    F. G. Terner 在《生活回忆录》第二卷(圣彼得堡,1911 年)第 222 页注释 1 中提到。苏联历史学家 B. A. Romanov 指出,在 1892 年担任交通大臣之前,维特对远东事务毫无兴趣,但此后西伯利亚铁路便成为其核心关切之一(参见《俄国在满洲(1892-1906)》,Susan Wilbur Jones 英译本[纽约,1974 年],第 38 页)。
  4. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:382, 432-433.
    维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:382 页,432-433 页。

    used were the same ones he would use throughout his career; his performance brings into focus both his successes and his failures over the long term of his public life, as well as the direction of Russian economic policy as a whole at the end of the nineteenth century.
    他所采用的手段贯穿其职业生涯始终;这一表现既凸显了他在漫长公共生涯中的成功与失败,也折射出十九世纪末俄罗斯整体经济政策的走向。

An Adventurer's Career  一位冒险家的职业生涯

Witte’s career was head-spinning. As one eulogist wrote, it was not out of the ordinary that in democratic America Abraham Lincoln had become president. But in imperial Russia it was unheard of for a railroad man with low official rank to achieve the political prominence Witte did. It is testimony to his extraordinary character and talents. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
维特的仕途令人目眩神迷。正如一位悼词作者所言,在民主的美国,亚伯拉罕·林肯当选总统不足为奇。但在帝制俄国,一位低阶铁路官员能取得维特这般政治地位实属空前。这印证了他非凡的品格与才华。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
Peter Struve pointed out that although Witte was an official most of his life, born and bred in that milieu, “he was not a functionary.” His nature was through and through entrepreneurial; he was “an ‘adventurer’ in an official’s uniform.” In other centuries, in other places, he would have been a Spanish conquistador, an English or Dutch explorer. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} Indeed, by virtue of his role in the development of Siberia, Witte should be considered one of the greatest colonizers in Russian history, in the tradition of Jakob Sievers, Grigorii Potemkin, Mikhail Speranskii, Murav’ev-Amurskii, and Konstantin Kaufman. He was active at a time when new empires were founded, continents settled, and nations unified. As he saw it, his life’s task was similar in the vast, unsettled wilderness of Siberia, the largest land mass of the Russian empire. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
彼得·司徒卢威指出,尽管维特一生大部分时间都是官员,生于斯长于斯,但他“并非官僚”。他的天性彻头彻尾是企业家式的;他是“穿着官服的‘冒险家’”。若在其他世纪、其他地方,他本会成为西班牙征服者、英国或荷兰探险家。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 事实上,鉴于他在西伯利亚开发中的角色,维特应被视为俄罗斯历史上最伟大的殖民者之一,与雅各布·西维尔斯、格里戈里·波将金、米哈伊尔·斯佩兰斯基、穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基和康斯坦丁·考夫曼一脉相承。他活跃于新帝国建立、大陆移民定居和国家统一的时代。在他看来,自己毕生的使命与俄罗斯帝国最大疆域——广袤未开发的西伯利亚荒野——上的这些先驱者如出一辙。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
Witte’s childhood and early professional career shaped his conception of the Siberian Railroad. His family was involved in the Russian colonization of the Caucasus, where his father and grandfather were colonial administrators. Here he was raised, and the frontier spirit of
维特的童年及早期职业生涯塑造了他对西伯利亚铁路的构想。他的家族参与了俄罗斯对高加索地区的殖民活动,其父辈与祖辈都曾担任殖民官员。他在这种边疆精神中成长,
the region left a strong impression on him. It is no wonder that Witte turned to the colonization of Siberia: his fondest childhood memories, he wrote, were of the colonizers of the Caucasus. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
该地区给他留下了深刻的印象。难怪维特会转向西伯利亚的殖民事业:他写道,童年最美好的回忆都与高加索的殖民者有关。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
After receiving a degree in mathematics from Novorossiisk University, Witte entered railroad administration with the Odessa State Railroad, later reorganized into the Southwestern Railroad Company. He became its business manager and in 1886 its executive director. To increase the railroad’s traffic, he strove to stimulate the economic activity of the region it served. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} He took a position unique within Russia: that railroads could create wealth and have an impact on a wide geographical region, and he would apply these principles when he built the Siberian Railroad.
维特在诺沃罗西斯克大学获得数学学位后,进入敖德萨国有铁路公司(后改组为西南铁路公司)从事铁路管理工作。他先后担任业务经理及 1886 年的执行董事。为提升铁路运输量,他致力于刺激铁路沿线地区的经济活动。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} 他持有一个在俄国独树一帜的观点:铁路能创造财富并对广阔地域产生深远影响,后来修建西伯利亚大铁路时他便践行了这些理念。
Witte’s talent and energy overcame all obstacles to advancement. His contemporaries attested to his driving ambition, fighting spirit, and tireless capacity for work. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} According to Struve, Witte possessed not so much insight as a supreme will to achieve. The Trans-Siberian Railroad, the gold standard, and the state spirits monopoly were not his ideas, but he accomplished them. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
维特的才华与精力扫清了晋升路上的一切障碍。同时代人都证实他抱负远大、斗志昂扬且工作不知疲倦。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 据斯特鲁韦所言,维特与其说是洞察先机,不如说是具备实现目标的强大意志。西伯利亚大铁路、金本位制和国家酒类专卖制度虽非他的创意,却都由他一手促成。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
His rapid and formidable leap from a local office to the highest level of government were also no doubt expedited by his flair for scheming. Witte made use of personal contacts, whatever their reputation, to form political alliances of convenience. He funded Grazhdanin, the paper of the reactionary Meshcherskii, with whom he lunched several times a week; he curried favor with Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolaevich; and, in an attempt late in life to stage a political comeback, he established contact with the empress’s confidant, the debauched pseudo holy man Grigorii Rasputin. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} He did not hesitate to ally himself with former antagonists, such as Bunge, if it was in his interest to do so.
他从地方职位迅速跃升至政府最高层的惊人飞跃,无疑也因其精于权谋而加速。维特善于利用人脉,无论对方名声如何,只为构建权宜的政治联盟。他资助反动分子梅谢尔斯基主办的《公民报》,并与之每周共进午餐数次;他刻意讨好尼古拉·尼古拉耶维奇大公;甚至在晚年试图政治复出时,还与皇后心腹——那位放荡的伪圣人格里高利·拉斯普京建立了联系。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 只要符合自身利益,他毫不迟疑地与昔日政敌如本格等人结盟。
At the same time, Witte was not scrupulous about turning on erstwhile benefactors, such as Vyshnegradskii. They first became acquainted while Vyshnegradskii was a director of the Southwestern
与此同时,维特对背叛昔日恩人(如维什涅格拉茨基)也毫无顾忌。他们初次相识时,维什涅格拉茨基正担任西南铁路公司董事。
Railroad Company in St. Petersburg. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} They campaigned together against their enemies in government, and the alliance brought its rewards. As soon as Witte entered government, though, he began to intrigue against his mentor. After he became transport minister and Vyshnegradskii refused funds for the Siberian Railroad, their rivalry flared up. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} To predispose Alexander III against Vyshnegradskii, Witte fed him untoward information about the finance minister’s mental condition after he fell ill, hoping to have Vyshnegradskii removed from office and receive the appointment himself. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
圣彼得堡的铁路公司。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 他们联手对抗政府中的政敌,这一联盟带来了回报。然而维特一进入政府,就开始暗中算计他的导师。在他成为交通部长而维什涅格拉茨基拒绝为西伯利亚铁路拨款后,两人的矛盾激化。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 为了让亚历山大三世对维什涅格拉茨基产生偏见,维特在后者生病期间向沙皇透露了有关财政部长精神状况的不利信息,企图使其被免职并自己接任该职位。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
Witte was also adroit at promoting himself and his various policies and projects in the press. He surreptitiously advertised himself for the position as head of the new Department of Railroad Affairs in Moskovskie vedomosti, just as later he propagandized on behalf of the Siberian Railroad. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} His extensive use of domestic and foreign newspapers was brilliant, if manipulative, and showed that he acted as a truly modern political figure. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} All of his tactics would be put to good effect in the Ministry of Finance as well as in the Committee of the Siberian Railroad.
维特还善于通过媒体宣传自己和其各项政策计划。他曾在《莫斯科新闻报》上暗中为自己造势,谋求新设立的铁路事务部门负责人职位,后来又如法炮制地为西伯利亚铁路进行舆论宣传。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 他对国内外报纸的娴熟运用虽带有操控性质,却堪称高明,展现出其现代政治人物的本色。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 这些策略在财政部和西伯利亚铁路委员会中都发挥了显著成效。

Political Beliefs  政治信仰

If Witte was ambitious personally, he was no less so for his country and its autocratic form of government. He was a conservative bureaucrat whose Slavophilism, although it underwent permutation, remained with him his whole life. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} Raised in a religious family as a
如果维特个人野心勃勃,那么他对国家及其专制政体的抱负同样不小。他是一位保守的官僚,其斯拉夫主义尽管经历了转变,却伴随了他的一生。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 他成长于一个宗教家庭,

13. Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 45-46.
13. 冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特》,45-46 页。

14. According to Witte, this was the reason for their estrangement (Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:283).
14. 据维特所述,这正是他们疏远的原因(维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:283 页)。

15. On Witte’s intrigues against Vyshnegradskii see Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie, 146-147. According to Polovtsov, in Dnevnik gosudarstvennogo sekretaria A. A. Polovtsova, vol. 2, ed. P. A. Zaionchkovskii (Moscow, 1966), 448 (Apr. 17, 1892), Witte said that Vyshnegradskii was not trustworthy.
15. 关于维特针对维什涅格拉茨基的阴谋,见扎伊翁奇科夫斯基,《俄罗斯专制制度》,146-147 页。据波洛夫佐夫在《国家秘书 A.A.波洛夫佐夫日记》第 2 卷(P.A.扎伊翁奇科夫斯基编,莫斯科,1966 年)448 页(1892 年 4 月 17 日)记载,维特曾表示维什涅格拉茨基不可信赖。

16. B. V. Anan’ich and R. Sh. Ganelin, “I. A. Vyshnegradskii i S. Iu. Witte-korrespondenty ‘Moskovskikh vedomostei,’” in Problemy obshchestvennoi mysli i ekonomicheskaia politika Rossii XIX-XX vekov: Pamiati prof. S. B. Okunia, ed. N. G. Sladkevich (Leningrad, 1972), 21-22.
16. B·V·阿纳尼奇与 R·Sh·加涅林,《I·A·维什涅格拉茨基与 S·Yu·维特——〈莫斯科新闻〉的通信者》,载《19-20 世纪俄国社会思想与经济政策问题:纪念 S·B·奥库尼教授》,N·G·斯拉德克维奇编(列宁格勒,1972 年),第 21-22 页。

17. See, e.g., Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa: Dnevnik A. B. Bogdanovich (Moscow/ Leningrad, 1924), 179 (Apr. 23, 1894); Anan’ich and Ganelin, “Vyshnegradskii i Witte.”
17. 参见例如《末代三君主:A·B·波格丹诺维奇日记》(莫斯科/列宁格勒,1924 年),第 179 页(1894 年 4 月 23 日);阿纳尼奇与加涅林,《维什涅格拉茨基与维特》。

18. Theodore Taranovski, “The Politics of Counter-reform: Autocracy and Bureaucracy in the Reign of Alexander III, 1881-1894” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1976), 681-682; cf. Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 5, where he is portrayed as enlightened, liberal, and pro-Western. On Witte’s ideological affection for the Slavophilism of his uncle R. A. Fadeev, see B. V. Anan’ich and R. Sh. Ganelin, “R. A. Fadeev, S. Iu. Witte i ideologicheskie iskaniia ‘okhranitelei’ v 1881-1883 gg.,” in Issledovaniia po sotsial’no-
18. 西奥多·塔拉诺夫斯基,《反改革的政治:亚历山大三世统治时期的专制与官僚体制(1881-1894)》(哈佛大学博士论文,1976 年),第 681-682 页;对比冯·劳厄《谢尔盖·维特》第 5 页中将其描绘为开明、自由且亲西方的形象。关于维特对其叔父 R·A·法捷耶夫斯拉夫主义的思想情感,参见 B·V·阿纳尼奇与 R·Sh·加涅林,《R·A·法捷耶夫、S·Yu·维特与 1881-1883 年“保守派”的思想探索》,载《社会-政治史研究》...

Sergei Witte. From Ministerstvo Finansov, Ministerstvo finansov, 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902).
谢尔盖·维特。摘自《财政部 1802-1902》(圣彼得堡,1902 年)。

monarchist, he was a right-wing student who opposed his leftist peers. 19 He 19 He ^(19)He{ }^{19} \mathrm{He} remained a fervent supporter of the autocracy throughout his career, as evidenced by his memorandum Samoderzhavie i i ii zemstvo (Autocracy and zemstvo), written at a time when he is reputed to have been most liberal. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} In it he writes of the necessity of centralized, bureaucratic government in Russia, urging the curtailment of local self-government. He echoed Pobedonostsev, calling con-
作为君主主义者,他是一名右翼学生,反对其左翼同辈。 19 He 19 He ^(19)He{ }^{19} \mathrm{He} 在其职业生涯中始终是专制制度的狂热支持者,这一点从他撰写《专制与地方自治》备忘录时可见一斑——尽管据传那时他正处于思想最开明的阶段。 i i ii 文中他论述了俄罗斯实行中央集权官僚统治的必要性,主张削弱地方自治权。他附和波别多诺斯采夫的观点,将宪法称为"我们时代最大的谎言"。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
stitutions the “great lie of our times.” Autocracy and administrative centralization, in his view, formed the essential basis of Russian government and unity. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
在他看来,专制政体与行政集权构成了俄罗斯政府运作和国家统一的根本基础。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
His devotion to the person of the monarch also remained strong, although Nicholas soon put it to the test. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} His preferred form of government was one in which the tsar chose talented, qualified ministers and allowed them to do their work as they saw fit. Ideal for Russia was an autocrat like Alexander III, who supported the policies of his ministers. For Witte, bureaucracy was the guiding force of the government, and Nicholas II’s interference frustrated him. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
尽管尼古拉二世很快就使这份忠诚经受考验, 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 但他对君主个人的效忠始终坚定不移。他理想的政府模式是沙皇选拔有才干的合格大臣,并放手让他们按自己的判断施政。对维特而言,亚历山大三世这样的专制君主才是俄罗斯的理想统治者——因其全力支持大臣们的政策。官僚体系应是政府的指导力量,而尼古拉二世的干预屡屡令他感到挫败。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
Beyond these constants it is difficult to categorize Witte’s political beliefs. Struve found that he had never been consistently liberal or conservative-at times he was reactionary, at other times progressive. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} Far from being a doctrinaire political ideologue, he was above all a pragmatist. If there was a common denominator, it was that all his activities, however progressive they may have seemed, were devoted to strengthening the realm, preserving the autocratic system, and bringing glory to the monarch. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
除了这些不变的特质外,很难对维特的政治信仰进行归类。斯特鲁夫发现他从未一贯地持自由主义或保守主义立场——时而反动,时而进步。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 远非教条主义的政治理论家,他首先是个实用主义者。若说有何共通之处,那就是他所有的活动,无论看似多么进步,都致力于巩固帝国、维护专制制度并为君主增光添彩。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}

Economic Nationalism  经济民族主义

His economic policies, like his political views, seemed to comprise several contradictory strains (nothing unusual, perhaps, in imperial
他的经济政策,如同其政治观点一样,似乎包含了几种相互矛盾的倾向(这在帝国时期或许并不罕见)

21. S. Iu. Witte, Samoderzhavie i zemstvo: Konfidentsial’naia zapiska ministra finansov stats-sekretaria S. Iu. Witte (1899 g.), 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1903). The constitution quote is on p. 211.
21. S·尤·维特,《专制与地方自治:财政大臣、国务秘书 S·尤·维特的机密备忘录(1899 年)》,第二版(斯图加特,1903 年)。关于宪法的引述见第 211 页。

22. Witte wrote in his financial report for 1900, “To a Russian no obstacle is insurmountable when his Czar commands” (quoted in Albert J. Beveridge, The Russian Advance (New York, 1904], 451n1). While Witte was addressing the tsar and the public, he was not necessarily mouthing platitudes. Attacks on his industrial policies by reactionaries, however, along with Nicholas I’s indecisive leadership and bad treatment of him, caused his views to evolve somewhat (Taranovski, “Politics,” 681-683; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 128-129).
22. 维特在其 1900 年的财政报告中写道:“对俄罗斯人而言,只要沙皇下令,就没有克服不了的障碍”(引自阿尔伯特·J·贝弗里奇,《俄罗斯的崛起》(纽约,1904 年],451 页注 1)。尽管维特这番话是对沙皇和公众说的,但他未必只是在说客套话。然而,反动分子对其工业政策的攻击,加上尼古拉二世的优柔寡断和对他的恶劣对待,使他的观点有所转变(塔拉诺夫斯基,《政治》,681-683 页;冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特》,128-129 页)。

23. Howard D. Mehlinger and John M. Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution (Bloomington, Ind., 1972), 24-25; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 197; Stuart R. Tompkins, “Witte as Finance Minister, 1892-1903,” Slavonic and East European Review 11 (April 1933): 601, 603-604; M. N. de Enden, “The Roots of Witte’s Thought,” Russian Review 29 (January 1970): 6, 12-13, 16-20. Enden is wrong to say that Witte was interested in the efficient running of the government but not in its form.
23. 霍华德·D·梅林格和约翰·M·汤普森,《维特伯爵与 1905 年革命中的沙皇政府》(布卢明顿,印第安纳州,1972 年),24-25 页;谢佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,197 页;斯图尔特·R·汤普金斯,《作为财政部长的维特,1892-1903 年》,《斯拉夫与东欧评论》11(1933 年 4 月):601 页,603-604 页;M·N·德恩登,《维特思想的根源》,《俄罗斯评论》29(1970 年 1 月):6 页,12-13 页,16-20 页。恩登错误地认为维特只关心政府的高效运作而不关心其形式。

24. Peter Struve, “Graf S. Iu. Witte: Opyt’ kharakteristiki,” Russkaia mysl’ 36 (March 1915): 130.
24. 彼得·司徒卢威,《谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇·维特伯爵:性格特征尝试》,《俄罗斯思想》第 36 期(1915 年 3 月):130 页。

25. Cf. the similar impulse behind the modernization and reform efforts in nine-teenth-century Japan and Germany, in David Landes, “Japan and Europe: Contrasts in Industrialization,” in The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan: Essays in the Political Economy of Growth, ed. William W. Lockwood (Princeton, 1965), 133-136, 139.
25. 参见十九世纪日本和德国现代化与改革背后相似的驱动力,载于 David Landes 的《日本与欧洲:工业化对比》,收录于 William W. Lockwood 主编的《日本的国家与经济企业:经济增长的政治经济学论文集》(普林斯顿,1965 年),第 133-136 页、139 页。
Russia), but overall were just as firmly committed to bolstering the autocracy and preserving the distinctiveness of Russia. The Siberian Railroad was integral to the execution of his policies.
俄罗斯),但总体上同样坚定致力于巩固专制统治并保持俄罗斯的独特性。西伯利亚铁路是其政策实施的关键组成部分。
At first glance Witte seems, as B. H. Sumner and others describe him, to have been a westernizer, a “representative of the new financial, commercial, and industrial interests which were transforming Russia.” 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} Another historian likewise asserts that Witte was a firm believer in private industry and an opponent of economic nationalism, as shown by his reliance on foreign capital. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
乍看之下,维特似乎如 B. H. 萨姆纳等人所述,是个西化派,是“正在改变俄罗斯的新金融、商业和工业利益的代表”。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 另一位历史学家同样断言,维特坚信私营工业并反对经济民族主义,这体现在他对外国资本的依赖上。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27}
This characterization is disputable. Witte’s policies may have strengthened capitalism and private industry in Russia, but he was not sympathetic to private enterprise or entrepreneurs and the interests he aspired to benefit were not theirs but the state’s. 28 He 28 He ^(28)He{ }^{28} \mathrm{He} did desire to stimulate private enterprise and initiative, which he knew were for the good of the economy, but, ever the Russian official, he saw limits and controls on them as mandatory. The representative organs of businessmen that he encouraged, for instance, were to have no more than an advisory function. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} Late in his life Witte attacked the private railroad barons of the 1870 s, whose strength “was incompatible with the historically formed state traditions of the great Russian empire,” and to the very end he vociferously opposed the reestablishment of a private railroad network on a par with that of the state system. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
这一描述存在争议。维特的政策或许强化了俄国资本主义和私营工业,但他对私营企业或企业家并无同情,他所谋求的利益并非他们的利益,而是国家的利益。 28 He 28 He ^(28)He{ }^{28} \mathrm{He} 他确实希望激发私营企业的积极性——他明白这对经济有利——但作为典型的俄国官员,他认为必须对其加以限制和管控。例如,他鼓励建立的商人代表机构只能发挥咨询功能。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 晚年时,维特抨击 19 世纪 70 年代的私营铁路巨头,认为他们的势力"与伟大的俄罗斯帝国历史形成的国家传统不相容",直至生命终结,他都激烈反对建立与国家铁路系统平起平坐的私营铁路网络。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}

An early work of Witte’s provides a key to his opinions: for historical reasons, Germans were economical and “meticulous,” and Americans entrepreneurial, inquisitive, and individualistic. These qualities were lacking in the Russian character, which was based on spiritual faith, and the corresponding Western forms of economic development would not thrive on Russian soil. According to his “realist” outlook, as
维特早期的一部著作为理解其观点提供了关键:由于历史原因,德国人精于经济且“一丝不苟”,美国人则富有创业精神、求知欲强且个性鲜明。这些特质在基于精神信仰的俄罗斯民族性格中有所缺失,相应的西方经济发展模式在俄罗斯土壤上难以繁荣。根据他的“现实主义”观点,

26. B. H. Sumner, Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 18801914 (1940; rpt. n.p., 1968), 8. The Marxist economist M. Tugan-Baranovskii remembered him for bringing Russia closer to the West. (See Glinskii, “Graf Sergei Iul’evich Witte,” 270. ) ) ))
26. B·H·萨姆纳,《远东与中东的沙皇制度与帝国主义,1880-1914》(1940 年;重印无地点,1968 年),第 8 页。马克思主义经济学家 M·图甘-巴拉诺夫斯基铭记他使俄罗斯更接近西方。(参见格林斯基,《伯爵谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇·维特》,270 页。 ) ) ))

27. John P. McKay, Pioneers for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization, 1885-1913 (Chicago, 1970), 8, 10, 25-27. McKay makes these assertions to dispute Von Laue’s suggestion that Witte was a precursor of Stalin.
27. 约翰·P·麦凯,《利润的先驱:外国企业家精神与俄罗斯工业化,1885-1913》(芝加哥,1970 年),第 8、10、25-27 页。麦凯提出这些论断是为了反驳冯·劳厄认为维特是斯大林先驱的暗示。

28. Gregory Guroff, “The Red-Expert Debate: Continuities in the State-Entrepreneur Tension,” in Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, ed. Gregory Guroff and Fred V. Carstensen (Princeton, 1983), 206.
28. 格雷戈里·古罗夫,《“红色专家”之争:国家与企业家紧张关系的延续》,载《帝俄与苏联的企业家精神》,格雷戈里·古罗夫与弗雷德·V·卡斯滕森编(普林斯顿,1983 年),第 206 页。

29. Boris V.Anan’ich, “The Economic Policy of the Tsarist Government and Enterprise in Russia from the End of the Nineteenth through the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” in Guroff and Carstensen, Entrepreneurship, 135-136.
29. 鲍里斯·V·阿纳尼奇,《沙皇政府的经济政策与十九世纪末至二十世纪初俄罗斯的企业活动》,载于古罗夫与卡斯滕森合编《企业家精神》,第 135-136 页。

30. S. Iu. Witte, “Nekotorye soobrazheniia o prichinakh defitsitnosti russkoi zheleznodorozhnoi seti,” ZhdD, 1910, nos. 17-18: 89-91.
30. S·尤·维特,《关于俄罗斯铁路网亏损原因的若干思考》,《铁路杂志》1910 年第 17-18 期,第 89-91 页。

he classified it, government intervention and centralization were more appropriate for Russian conditions. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
据其分类,政府干预和集权更符合俄罗斯的国情。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
Witte was no more comfortable with Russian integration into the European economy than he was with the introduction of European forms of capitalism. In a frequently cited document, he spoke of a choice for Russia: industrialize or be dominated by the advanced European powers. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} As for foreign capital, although he would be obliged to make extensive use of it, his wariness of its dangers, expressed in 1893, never waned. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} His goal was to maintain Russia’s integrity vis-à-vis the West. Witte encouraged the creation of a Russian merchant fleet for this reason: to take Russia’s overseas transport from foreign carriers and place it in Russian hands. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} And yet he intended to borrow foreign capital to build the vessels for the new fleet. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} Russia’s reliance on foreign capital, as on foreign know-how, was for the short term only.
维特对俄罗斯融入欧洲经济的不适感,与他引入欧洲资本主义形式时如出一辙。在一份常被引用的文件中,他谈到俄罗斯面临的选择:要么工业化,要么被欧洲先进列强所主宰。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 至于外国资本,尽管他不得不大量利用,但他在 1893 年表达的对资本危险的警惕从未减弱。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 他的目标是保持俄罗斯相对于西方的独立性。为此,维特鼓励建立俄罗斯商船队:将俄罗斯的海外运输从外国承运人手中夺回,交由俄罗斯人掌控。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 然而,他却打算借用外国资本来建造新船队的船只。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 俄罗斯对外国资本和外国技术的依赖只是短期的。

Witte was skeptical of free enterprise and he sought to achieve a modicum of economic self-sufficiency. His policies were imbued with nationalism and statism, in the Russian bureaucratic and historical tradition. Russia’s strength and the preservation of state power and the autocracy were the desired ends; as Witte made clear in his secret memorandum of March 1899, Russia was in many ways like a colony of Europe, the metropolis. But there was a difference: Russia
维特对自由企业持怀疑态度,他力求实现一定程度的经济自给自足。他的政策充满了民族主义和国家主义色彩,符合俄罗斯官僚和历史传统。增强国力、维护国家权力和专制统治是其所追求的终极目标;正如维特在 1899 年 3 月的秘密备忘录中明确指出的,俄罗斯在许多方面如同欧洲大都会的殖民地。但不同之处在于:俄罗斯

has the right and the strength not to want to be the eternal handmaiden of states that are more developed economically . . . she is proud of her great might, by which she jealously guards not only the political but also the economic independence of her empire. She wants to be a metropolis herself. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
有权且有实力不甘永远充当经济更发达国家的附庸……她以自身强大的国力为傲,并以此警惕地捍卫着帝国政治与经济的双重独立。她渴望成为大都会本身。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}

31. Sergei Witte, Printsipy zheleznodorozhnykh tarifov po perevozke gruzov, 3d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1910), 123-126, 128-129, 236.
31. 谢尔盖·维特,《铁路货运费率原则》第三版(圣彼得堡,1910 年),第 123-126 页,128-129 页,236 页。

32. His February 1900 report to Nicholas II, “On the Condition of Our Industry,” quoted in Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 1-4.
32. 其 1900 年 2 月呈递给尼古拉二世的报告《论我国工业状况》,引自冯·劳厄《谢尔盖·维特》第 1-4 页。

33. Anan’ich, “Economic Policy,” 133. This is a paradox of Russian economic thought of the period. Russian businessmen held the like view that Russia needed foreign investment in order to become a “self-sufficient organism.” See Ruth Amende Roosa, “Russian Industrialists Look to the Future: Thoughts on Economic Development, 190617,” in Essays in Russian and Soviet History: In Honor of Geroid Tanquary Robinson, ed. John Shelton Curtiss (New York, 1963), 201-202.
33. Anan’ich, “Economic Policy,” 133. 这是当时俄罗斯经济思想中的一个悖论。俄罗斯商界人士同样认为,俄罗斯需要外国投资才能成为一个“自给自足的有机体”。参见 Ruth Amende Roosa, “Russian Industrialists Look to the Future: Thoughts on Economic Development, 190617,” in Essays in Russian and Soviet History: In Honor of Geroid Tanquary Robinson, ed. John Shelton Curtiss (New York, 1963), 201-202.

34. See the identical reasoning of Pobedonostsev in M. Poggenpol, Ocherk vozniknoveniia i deiatel’nosti dobrovol’nogo flota za vremia XXV-ti letniago ego sushchestvovaniia (St. Petersburg, 1903), 29-32.
34. 参见波别多诺斯采夫在 M.波根波尔《志愿舰队成立及二十五年活动概述》(圣彼得堡,1903 年)第 29-32 页中的相同论述。

35. “Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina,” Krasnyi arkhiv 2 (1922): 22-23 (Jan. 12, 1903).
35. “克鲁帕特金日记”,《红色档案》第 2 期(1922 年):22-23 页(1903 年 1 月 12 日)。

36. “A Secret Memorandum of Sergei Witte on the Industrialization of Russia,” trans. and ed. Theodore H. Von Laue, Journal of Modern History 26 (March 1954): 66.
36. “谢尔盖·维特关于俄罗斯工业化的秘密备忘录”,西奥多·H.冯·劳厄编译,《现代历史杂志》第 26 卷(1954 年 3 月):第 66 页。

The Siberian Railroad  西伯利亚铁路

One of the cornerstones of Witte’s economic policy throughout the 1890s was the Siberian Railroad, which not only served the obvious political needs of the state but also provided a foundation on which to build devotion and respect at home and abroad. Witte took great pains to promote the railroad abroad for the multiple purpose of attracting international traffic and impressing Europe and the world with Russia’s abilities. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} Aside from luring revenues and investment, Witte wanted to show that Russia was the equal of the great powers of Europe, in a quest to satisfy the amour-propre of his nation. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} This explanation is more fruitful than the superficial notion that Witte’s goal was to establish a Russian trade monopoly in the Far East, and much more accurate than the idea that in Siberia "S. Iu. Witte reflected the material interests of the gentry landlords and bourgeoisie . . in the capitalist development of the country.’ 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
维特在 19 世纪 90 年代经济政策的重要基石之一是西伯利亚铁路,它不仅服务于国家明显的政治需求,还为国内外树立忠诚与尊重奠定了基础。维特不遗余力地在海外推广这条铁路,目的多重:吸引国际运输,同时向欧洲和世界展示俄罗斯的能力。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 除了吸引收入和投资外,维特还想证明俄罗斯与欧洲列强平起平坐,以满足国家的自尊心。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} 这种解释比肤浅的观点更有价值,即维特的目标是在远东建立俄罗斯的贸易垄断,也比认为在西伯利亚“S·尤·维特反映了贵族地主和资产阶级的物质利益……在国家资本主义发展中的角色”这一说法准确得多。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}

37. For this purpose the Ministry of Finance, Committee of Ministers, and Committee of the Siberian Railroad funded a number of publications, including several to be issued simultaneously in Russian, French, English, and German editions, in conjunction with international exhibitions. The Committee of Ministers’ Great Siberian Railway (St. Petersburg, 1900), published for the Universal Exposition at Paris, portrayed Siberia as virtually free of convicts and natives (pp. 4, 6). The Committee of the Siberian Railroad took part in that exhibition, and in the ones held in Chicago in 1893 and Glasgow in 1901. On the committee’s publications and their funding, see ZhKSZhD, zas. 37, SP, June 27, 1901, pp. 8-9, cols. 1-2; p. 14, col. 1; zas. 31, SP, Apr. 29, 1898, p. 32, col. 1. For other official publications, see also P. P. Migulin, Nasha noveishaia zheleznodorozhnaia politika i zheleznodorozhnye zaimy (1893-1902) (Khar’kov, 1903), 306-307.
37. 为此,财政部、大臣委员会和西伯利亚铁路委员会资助了多份出版物,其中包括几种同时以俄语、法语、英语和德语版本发行的刊物,并与国际展览会同步推出。大臣委员会的《伟大的西伯利亚铁路》(圣彼得堡,1900 年)为巴黎世界博览会出版,将西伯利亚描绘为几乎没有罪犯和原住民的地方(第 4、6 页)。西伯利亚铁路委员会参与了该展览,以及 1893 年在芝加哥和 1901 年在格拉斯哥举办的展览。关于委员会的出版物及其资金情况,参见 ZhKSZhD,第 37 次会议记录,1901 年 6 月 27 日,第 8-9 页,第 1-2 栏;第 14 页,第 1 栏;第 31 次会议记录,1898 年 4 月 29 日,第 32 页,第 1 栏。其他官方出版物另见 P. P. Migulin 的《我们最新的铁路政策与铁路借款(1893-1902)》(哈尔科夫,1903 年),第 306-307 页。

38. Cf. David Landes’s suggestion that the amour propre of nations stimulated economic imperialism (“Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism,” Journal of Economic History 21, no. 4 [1961]: 505). See also Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven, 1987), 147, for a similar understanding of Witte’s Asian strategy.
38. 参见 David Landes 的观点,即民族自尊心刺激了经济帝国主义(《关于经济帝国主义本质的一些思考》,《经济史杂志》第 21 卷第 4 期[1961 年]:505 页)。另见 Dietrich Geyer 的《俄罗斯帝国主义:国内与外交政策的互动,1860-1914》(Bruce Little 译,纽黑文,1987 年)第 147 页,其中对维特的亚洲战略有类似理解。

39. For the trade monopoly assertion, see V. G. Malekhon’kov, “Ekonomicheskaia politika tsarizma na Dal’nem Vostoke v kontse XIX nachale XX v.,” in Kustanaiskii Gosudarstvennyi Pedagogicheskii Institut, Uchenye zapiski, vol. 3, vypusk istoricheskii (Kustanai, 1959), 60-61; for the quote, see V. F. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia transsibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali XIX-nachala XX vv.” (Ph.D. diss., Tomskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1972), 494. The public and professional debates did show a rising interest in selling Russian manufactures in Far Eastern markets, as well as in the idea that Russia had a civilizing mission in Asia. In both cases, though, Russia’s sense of inferiority vis-à-vis Europe was a central consideration: Russia was behind Europe in Asia and could now attempt to catch up; with its historical and geographical links to Asia, Russia would have the advantage over Europe; with the Siberian Railroad, Russia could turn its back on Europe and live off its Asian trade. One gets the sense that the desire for markets was on the whole less important than the need to compensate for a felt deficiency. See, e.g., “Doklad N. Shavrova o kitaiskoi i indiiskoi zheleznykh dorogakh,” TOSRPT, vol. 9, otdel 2 (1876), 99-102; Otchet o zasedaniiakh obshchestva dlia
39. 关于贸易垄断的主张,参见 V. G. 马列洪科夫,《19 世纪末 20 世纪初沙皇政府在远东的经济政策》,载于库斯塔奈国立师范学院《学术笔记》第 3 卷历史分册(库斯塔奈,1959 年),第 60-61 页;引文参见 V. F. 博尔祖诺夫,《19 世纪末至 20 世纪初跨西伯利亚铁路干线建设史》(博士论文,托木斯克国立大学,1972 年),第 494 页。公众与专业界的辩论确实显示出对在远东市场销售俄国工业品日益增长的兴趣,以及俄国在亚洲负有文明使命的观念。然而在这两种情况下,俄国相对于欧洲的自卑感都是核心考量:俄国在亚洲落后于欧洲,如今可以试图追赶;凭借其与亚洲的历史和地理联系,俄国将拥有超越欧洲的优势;借助西伯利亚铁路,俄国可以背弃欧洲,依靠亚洲贸易为生。人们普遍感到,对市场的渴望总体上不如弥补自卑心理的需求重要。例如,参见“N.的报告”。 沙夫罗娃关于中国和印度铁路的报告》,《TOSRPT》,第 9 卷,第 2 部分(1876 年),99-102 页;关于协会会议的记录
The optimism of the railroad age suffused Witte’s conception of the Siberian Railroad, and he projected it, as he did Russia’s industrial development, onto the world stage. As he explained, as if in response to Alfred T. Mahan, although the seas were important in world history, naval supremacy was not everything. Russia was poorly situated to become a naval power, but railroads would compensate for its inability to float a great navy. The Siberian Railroad would give Russia a great future by developing its economy and settling its remote border areas. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} The Siberian Railroad, he declared, deserved "to occupy one of the first places in the ranks of the largest and most important undertakings of the nineteenth century, not only in our Motherland, but also in the whole world. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}
铁路时代的乐观主义渗透在维特对西伯利亚铁路的构想中,他将其与俄罗斯的工业发展一道投射到世界舞台上。正如他所解释的那样,仿佛是在回应阿尔弗雷德·T·马汉的观点,尽管海洋在世界历史中很重要,但海军霸权并非一切。俄罗斯的地理位置不利于其成为海军强国,但铁路将弥补其无法建立强大海军的不足。西伯利亚铁路将通过发展经济和定居偏远边境地区,为俄罗斯带来一个伟大的未来。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} 他宣称,西伯利亚铁路“值得在十九世纪最大和最重要的工程中占据首位,不仅在我们的祖国,而且在全世界范围内”。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}
The Siberian Railroad would add luster to the image of Russia by providing a direct link between Europe and the Pacific. Russia would gain new sources of wealth as it became an intermediary in the trade between the Asian East and European West and its role in the world market grew. The railroad would end the isolation of the East, with Russia acting as cultural mediator between Europe and Asia, regulating their relations to its own advantage. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} The Trans-Siberian Railroad would open new horizons for world trade and Moscow would become the center of that trade:
西伯利亚铁路将通过提供一条连接欧洲与太平洋的直接通道,为俄罗斯的形象增添光彩。随着俄罗斯成为亚洲东方与欧洲西方贸易的中介,并在世界市场中的角色日益重要,它将获得新的财富来源。这条铁路将终结东方的孤立状态,俄罗斯作为欧洲与亚洲之间的文化调解者,调节它们的关系以谋取自身利益。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} 跨西伯利亚铁路将为世界贸易开辟新视野,莫斯科将成为这一贸易的中心:
If Moscow is currently more of a Russian than a world market, in the future an exceedingly bigger role will probably fall upon it, made certain by the Great Siberian transit route. The silk, tea, and fur trade for Europe, and the manufacturing and other trade for the Far East, will likely be concentrated in Moscow, which will become the hub of the world’s transit movement. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
如果说莫斯科目前更多是一个俄罗斯市场而非世界市场,那么未来,由于伟大的西伯利亚过境路线,它极有可能承担起更为重大的角色。对欧洲的丝绸、茶叶和皮毛贸易,以及对远东的制造业和其他贸易,很可能都将集中在莫斯科,使其成为全球过境运输的枢纽。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
Witte described the Trans-Siberian Railroad as placing Russia at the center of world trade and culture, in a modern equivalent of the medieval religious doctrine that proclaimed Moscow the “Third Rome.” In a paradoxical twist, Witte had the modern symbol of materialism and industry, the railroad, achieving the most glorious of
维特将西伯利亚大铁路描述为将俄罗斯置于世界贸易与文化的中心,这一现代象征堪比中世纪宣称莫斯科为“第三罗马”的宗教教义。颇具悖论意味的是,维特让这条代表物质主义与工业化的现代铁路,实现了最为辉煌的
Slavophile spiritual dreams. At the very least, we see in autocratic Russia’s attempt to modernize its economic structure its desire for a prominent place in the sun.
斯拉夫派精神梦想。至少,我们从中可以看到专制俄国试图通过现代化其经济结构,来谋求在阳光下的显赫地位。

Windfall Budgets  意外之财预算

To turn his utopian ideal into reality, Witte used every means at his disposal, first overcoming the tremendous obstacles to financing the railroad and then creating a manipulable administrative structure to orchestrate its construction. In both realms his genius was clearly evident.
为实现这一乌托邦理想,维特动用了一切可用手段,先是克服了铁路融资的巨大障碍,继而建立了一个可操控的行政体系来统筹建设。在这两个领域,他的才智都展现得淋漓尽致。
The financing of a project as vast as the Siberian Railroad would not be simple to arrange in financially strapped imperial Russia and it had already aroused much acrimony within the upper bureaucracy. Witte’s solution, which later became a regular characteristic of his budgetary practices, entailed massive spending to create national wealth and impress foreign audiences.
在财政拮据的帝俄时代,为西伯利亚铁路这样庞大的项目筹措资金绝非易事,这一计划早已在高层官僚中引发激烈争议。维特的解决方案后来成为其预算惯例的典型特征——通过巨额支出来创造国家财富并震慑外国观察家。
As Witte embarked on his spending program, his relationship with Vyshnegradskii deteriorated. Early in his tenure as finance minister, Vyshnegradskii had told the tsar that Witte would be the best choice eventually to succeed him in the position. The tight-spending Vyshnegradskii soon regretted his recommendation. He was afraid that Witte would “make use of credit too widely and carelessly,” and suggested that Witte would make a better minister of trade than minister of finance. Alexander III was not at all receptive to the idea. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} For his part, Witte felt Vyshnegradskii was “small-minded,” and “always interested . . . more in petty things than in large-scale, important ones.” He himself was less cautious, “much broader and bolder.” 45 Witte’s description captures the differences between them in all matters, not least in that of the budget, the central preoccupation of the minister of finance.
随着维特开始实施他的支出计划,他与维什涅格拉茨基的关系恶化。维什涅格拉茨基在担任财政大臣初期曾告诉沙皇,维特最终将是接替他职位的最佳人选。但崇尚紧缩开支的维什涅格拉茨基很快就后悔了自己的推荐。他担心维特会“过于广泛且轻率地利用信贷”,并建议维特更适合担任贸易大臣而非财政大臣。亚历山大三世对此建议完全不以为然。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} 在维特看来,维什涅格拉茨基“心胸狭隘”,且“总是对琐事而非重大事务更感兴趣”。而他自己则更为大胆,“视野更开阔,行事更果决”。45 维特的描述精准体现了二人在所有事务上的分歧,尤其在财政大臣的核心关切——预算问题上更是如此。
The crux of the problem was that Vyshnegradskii stood in adamant opposition to Witte’s plans for financing the Siberian Railroad. As acting minister of finance, in November 1892 Witte toyed with the idea of resorting to the printing press to cover the costs of construction by issuing special “Siberian credit rubles.” 46 According to V. I. Gurko,
问题的关键在于维什涅格拉茨基坚决反对维特为西伯利亚铁路融资的计划。作为代理财政部长,维特在 1892 年 11 月曾考虑通过印刷机发行特殊的“西伯利亚信用卢布”来支付建设费用。据 V·I·古尔科所述,

44. Terner, Vospominaniia zhizni, 2:178, 220-222; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 195-196.
44. 捷尔纳,《生活回忆录》,第 2 卷:178 页,220-222 页;舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,195-196 页。

45. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:222, 284.
45. 维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:222 页,284 页。

46. S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, comps., Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903),
46. S·V·萨布勒与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基合编,《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概览》,A·N·库洛姆津主编(圣彼得堡,1903 年),
Witte was appointed finance minister precisely because he intended to speed up the economy by issuing new banknotes to build the railroad; Alexander III expected him to get the job done quickly 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
维特被任命为财政大臣,正是因为他打算通过发行新纸币来建设铁路以加速经济发展;亚历山大三世期望他能迅速完成任务。
Under the tutelage of Bunge, who began to instruct Witte in currency matters, he revised his plans, but in a way that was just as inflationary. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48} Rather than issue new money, Witte now proposed the recovery of currency that the Treasury by law had retired but not yet destroyed. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49} In a special conference on the matter Bunge and Vyshnegradskii argued that his scheme would destabilize the ruble and threaten monetary reform, but the majority voted in favor of Witte and the tsar concurred. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} Witte had just taken his first step toward making the State Bank an arm of the Ministry of Finance, an indication that his talent for fiscal legerdemain was already well developed. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
在本格的指导下,维特开始学习货币事务并修改了他的计划,但修改后的方案同样具有通胀性质。他不再提议发行新货币,而是建议回收财政部依法已退出流通但尚未销毁的旧币。在一次专门会议上,本格和维什涅格拉茨基辩称他的方案会动摇卢布币值并威胁货币改革,但多数人投票支持维特,沙皇也予以认可。这标志着维特在将国家银行变为财政部附属工具的道路上迈出了第一步,也表明他在财政魔术上的才能已相当成熟。
In the event, this plan also fell by the wayside, and the Siberian Railroad was financed out of the surpluses of the ordinary budget which supposedly had accumulated, thanks to its “favorable implementation” in 1894 and yearly thereafter. 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
最终,这一计划同样未能实施,西伯利亚铁路的建设资金转而来自常规预算的盈余——据称这些盈余得益于 1894 年及之后每年预算的"顺利执行"。
111; Glinskii, Prolog, 9; B. V. Anan’ich, Rossiia i mezhdunarodnyi kapital, 1897-1914 (Leningrad, 1970), 14-16; Terner, Vospominaniia, 2:222n1; P. P. Migulin, Nasha bankovaia politika (1729-1903) (Khar’kov, 1904), 245. The Siberian credit rubles were to be issued by the Treasury gradually as the work proceeded, and canceled over twenty-three years beginning in 1894 (MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no, comp. V. M. Verkhovskii, pt. 2 [St. Petersburg, 1898, 1899], 484).
111;格林斯基,《序幕》,第 9 页;B·V·阿纳尼奇,《俄国与国际资本,1897-1914》(列宁格勒,1970 年),第 14-16 页;特纳,《回忆录》,第 2 卷第 222 页注 1;P·P·米古林,《我们的银行政策(1729-1903)》(哈尔科夫,1904 年),第 245 页。西伯利亚信用卢布将由财政部根据工程进度逐步发行,并从 1894 年起分二十三年逐步注销(交通部,《俄国铁路发展历史概述(自建立至 1897 年)》,V·M·维尔霍夫斯基编,第 2 部分[圣彼得堡,1898、1899 年],第 484 页)。

47. V. I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II, ed. J. E. W. Sterling et al., trans. L. Matveev (Stanford, 1939), 55; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 198.
47. V·I·古尔科,《过往的特征与人物:尼古拉二世统治时期的政府与舆论》,J·E·W·斯特林等编,L·马特维耶夫译(斯坦福,1939 年),第 55 页;舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,第 198 页。

48. On Bunge’s role, see Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:361-364; Anan’ich, Kapital, 15. On Witte’s revised plan, intended for the special conference of Nov. 21, 1892, see MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 485; Glinskii, Prolog, 10.
48. 关于本格的角色,参见维特《回忆录》第 1 卷 361-364 页;阿纳尼奇《资本》第 15 页。关于维特修订后的计划(为 1892 年 11 月 21 日特别会议准备),参见交通部《历史概述》第 485 页;格林斯基《序幕》第 10 页。

49. For a more detailed elucidation of the 1881 ukaz requiring the reduction of paper money in circulation and Witte’s circumvention of it, see PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 12, 1892, nos. 9139 and 9140; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 117-119; A. N. Kulomzin, Le Transsibérien, trans. Jules Legras (Paris, 1904), 46-48; Glinskii, Prolog, 15-16; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1893, no. 1: 2-3; Anan’ich, Kapital, 11-12; and I. F. Gindin, Gosudarstvennyi bank i ekonomicheskaia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva (1861-1892 goda) (Moscow, 1960), 96-99.
49. 关于 1881 年要求减少纸币流通的谕令及维特规避该政策的详细阐释,参见《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》第三辑第 12 卷(1892 年)第 9139 和 9140 号;萨布列尔与索斯诺夫斯基《西伯利亚铁路》117-119 页;A·N·库洛姆津《西伯利亚大铁路》(朱尔·勒格拉法译本,巴黎,1904 年)46-48 页;格林斯基《序幕》15-16 页;《交通部杂志》官方版块:"西伯利亚铁路"1893 年第 1 期 2-3 页;阿纳尼奇《资本》11-12 页;I·F·金丁《国家银行与沙皇政府的经济政策(1861-1892 年)》(莫斯科,1960 年)96-99 页。

50. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 119-120, 122; Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:460, 517-518n63.
50. 萨布列尔与索斯诺夫斯基《西伯利亚铁路》119-120、122 页;波洛夫佐夫《日记》第 2 卷 460 页,517-518 页注释 63。

51. On the development of this relationship, see Gindin, Pravitel’stvennyi bank, 123, and Anan’ich, “Economic Policy,” 134.
51. 关于这一关系的发展,参见金丁《政府银行》第 123 页,及阿纳尼奇《经济政策》第 134 页。

52. “Iz dnevnika A. A. Polovtseva [sic],” Krasnyi arkhiv 46 (1931): 128 (Apr. 14, 1900); Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 122-123; Glinskii, Prolog, 22; Ministerstvo Finansov, Departament Zheleznodorozhnykh Del, Kratkii otchet o deiatel’nosti tarifnykh uchrezhdenii i departamenta zheleznodorozhnykh del za 1889-1913 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1914), 94. The latter source states that it was difficult for the state to build any other railroads in the 1890s, as "all the residual, nondesignated funds [svobodnaia
52. “摘自 A. A. 波洛夫采夫日记”,《红色档案》第 46 期(1931 年):128 页(1900 年 4 月 14 日);萨布列尔与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,122-123 页;格林斯基,《序幕》,22 页;财政部铁路司,《1889-1913 年关税机构及铁路司活动简要报告》(圣彼得堡,1914 年),94 页。后一资料指出,19 世纪 90 年代国家难以修建其他铁路,因为“所有剩余的、非指定资金[自由
It is difficult to determine exactly what form of income contributed to the construction of the Siberian Railroad (or for that matter any item of expenditure) because of the feature of the “common till” (edinaia kassa) in which all government revenues were pooled. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} The steady improvement in Franco-Russian relations certainly placed the financing of the railroad on a more secure footing for Witte than for Vyshnegradskii. Paradoxically, foreign loans contributed to the “surplus” of the budget: because Witte considered loans a form of income, he could claim, after making other adjustments, that his budget was balanced and provided a surplus. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} In fact, expenditures on railroads, largely on the Siberian, helped to keep the budget as a whole in deficit for most of the 1890s. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} But it was important for foreign creditors, the stability of the ruble, and national prestige to keep the fiction of a surplus alive.
由于“统一国库”(edinaia kassa)将所有政府收入合并管理的特性,很难确切判断西伯利亚铁路建设资金(或其他任何支出项目)具体来自哪种收入形式。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} 法俄关系的稳步改善无疑使维特时期的铁路融资比维什涅格拉茨基时期更为稳固。具有讽刺意味的是,外国贷款反而为预算带来了"盈余":由于维特将贷款视为收入形式,他能在进行其他调整后宣称预算平衡且实现盈余。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} 实际上,整个 1890 年代,主要用于西伯利亚铁路的巨额支出使得国家预算整体处于赤字状态。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} 但为了维持外国债权人的信心、卢布汇率稳定及国家声誉,保持预算盈余的假象至关重要。
Witte’s fiscal techniques became more sophisticated, but in essence there was little to distinguish them from his earlier “inflationist” strategy. This strategy was consistent with his views of government finance as they evolved over the 1890s, even after the country went on the gold standard: in both periods he intended to spend money in large amounts whether it was available or not. 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} He felt that Vyshne-
维特的财政手段日趋成熟,但从本质上说,与他早先的"通胀主义"策略并无二致。这一策略与他整个 1890 年代不断演变的政府财政理念一脉相承,即便在国家实行金本位制后依然如此:在这两个时期,他都打算无论资金是否充足都要进行大规模支出。 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} 他认为维什涅-

nalichnost’] of the State Treasury" were being used for the Siberian Railroad. For the yearly amounts of svobodnaia nalichnost’ in the Treasury from 1891 through 1904, see N. Petrov, Finansovoe polozhenie russkoi zheleznodorozhnoi seti i glavneishie prichiny ukhudsheniia ego v poslednie gody (St. Petersburg, 1909), vol. 5 of Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi osoboi komissii dlia vsestoronnego issledovaniia zheleznodorozhnogo dela v Rossii, 157.
国家财政部的"自由现金流"正被用于西伯利亚铁路建设。关于 1891 至 1904 年间财政部年度自由现金流数据,参见 N.彼得罗夫《俄国铁路网财政状况及近年恶化主因》(圣彼得堡,1909 年),《俄国铁路事务全面调查特别委员会著作集》第五卷,第 157 页。

53. Migulin, Nasha noveishaia zheleznodorozhnaia politika, 54-55.
53. 米古林,《我国最新铁路政策》,54-55 页。

54. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, 41. On Witte and the French loans of the 1890s, see Anan’ich, Kapital, 12-14; B. V. Anan’ich et al., Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii: 1895-1917 (Leningrad, 1984), 35. According to the Committee of the Siberian Railroad, though, by 1900 only 100 million rubles of Siberian Railroad expenditures had been covered by “extraordinary sources” (i.e., loans), the rest by “ordinary budget revenues” (ZhKSZhD, zas. 34, SP, Dec. 8, 1899, p. 22, col. 2). “Other adjustments” included placing ordinary expenditures in the extraordinary budget, which was always in deficit, and ignoring state payments on the railroad debt.
54. Romanov,《俄国在满洲》,第 41 页。关于维特和 19 世纪 90 年代的法国贷款,参见 Anan’ich,《资本》,第 12-14 页;B·V·Anan’ich 等,《俄国专制制度的危机:1895-1917》(列宁格勒,1984 年),第 35 页。然而,根据西伯利亚铁路委员会的统计,截至 1900 年,西伯利亚铁路的支出中仅有 1 亿卢布由“非常规来源”(即贷款)覆盖,其余部分由“常规预算收入”支付(《西伯利亚铁路委员会会议记录》,第 34 次会议,1899 年 12 月 8 日,第 22 页,第 2 栏)。“其他调整”包括将常规支出列入总是赤字的非常规预算,以及忽略国家对铁路债务的支付。

55. A. P. Pogrebinskii, Ocherki istorii finansov dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii (Moscow, 1954), 86-92, and “Stroitel’stvo zheleznykh dorog v poreformennoi Rossii i finansovaia politika tsarizma (60-90-e gody XIX v.),” Istoricheskie zapiski 47 (1954): 176-178; W. O. Henderson, The Industrial Revolution in Europe: Germany, France, Russia, 1815-1914 (Chicago, 1968), 228; Peter I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution, trans. L. M. Herman (New York, 1949), 554-555; M. I. Bogolepov, “Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo (1892-1903),” in Istoriia Rossii v XIX veke, vol. 8 (St. Petersburg, n.d.), 3, 8-9.
55. A·P·波格列宾斯基,《革命前俄国财政史概论》(莫斯科,1954 年),86-92 页,以及《改革后俄国铁路建设与沙皇政府的财政政策(19 世纪 60-90 年代)》,《历史笔记》47 期(1954 年):176-178 页;W·O·亨德森,《欧洲工业革命:德国、法国、俄国,1815-1914》(芝加哥,1968 年),228 页;彼得·I·利亚申科,《1917 年革命前俄国国民经济史》,L·M·赫尔曼译(纽约,1949 年),554-555 页;M·I·博戈列波夫,《国家经济(1892-1903)》,载《十九世纪俄国史》第 8 卷(圣彼得堡,无日期),3、8-9 页。

56. Polovtsov’s words, written in 1892, are just as valid for 1899: “The essence of his financial program [was] thus: no matter what the needs of the government, they should be satisfied” (Dnevnik, 2:463 [Dec. 28, 1892]).
56. 波洛夫佐夫 1892 年的论断在 1899 年同样适用:"其财政计划的实质就是:无论政府有何需求,都必须予以满足"(《日记》,第 2 卷 463 页[1892 年 12 月 28 日])。

gradskii’s kind of thrift was foolish, and he told Princess Catherine Radziwill that “a minister cannot practice economy in the administration of a state; money can only be found by spending it lavishly.” 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
格拉茨基式的节俭是愚蠢的,他曾对叶卡捷琳娜·拉济维尔公主说:"大臣治国不能锱铢必较,唯有挥金如土才能开辟财源。" 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
From this perspective Witte justified expenditures on the Siberian Railroad: it would bring “numerous benefits that were not subject to direct arithmetical calculation;” its significance should not be judged from a “narrow financial point of view.” 58 In his first budget report to Alexander III as minister of finance, for 1893, Witte "held that for historic reasons Russian financial administration must overstep the conventional boundaries of public finance.’ 59 He 59 He ^(59)He{ }^{59} \mathrm{He} downplayed the effect of the famine on the state budget and argued that the Siberian Railroad was too important to be delayed by haggling over its cost. 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60} Still in 1900 he felt it was “better to lose money than prestige.” 61 And for him the Siberian Railroad was above all a matter of prestige.
从这个角度出发,维特为西伯利亚铁路的开支辩护道:它将带来“无法直接进行算术计算的诸多益处”;其意义不应从“狭隘的财政视角”来评判。58 在他作为财政大臣向亚历山大三世提交的首份预算报告(1893 年)中,维特“认为出于历史原因,俄国的财政管理必须超越公共财政的传统界限。” 59 He 59 He ^(59)He{ }^{59} \mathrm{He} 他淡化了饥荒对国家预算的影响,并主张西伯利亚铁路的重要性不容因成本争议而延误。 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60} 直至 1900 年,他仍坚持认为“宁可损失金钱,也不可丧失威望”。61 对他而言,西伯利亚铁路首先关乎国家威望。
Witte’s spending pushed the budget into deficit, forcing him to overtax the internal market and export to the maximum. All of these measures imposed a heavy burden on the population. 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} The Siberian Railroad certainly required large sacrifices on the part of the Russian population, a sad fact Witte more than once acknowledged. 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63}
维特的支出政策导致预算赤字,迫使他不得不对内需市场课以重税并最大化出口。所有这些措施都给民众带来了沉重负担。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} 西伯利亚铁路无疑需要俄国人民作出巨大牺牲,这一令人痛心的事实维特曾多次承认。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63}

The Committee of the Siberian Railroad
西伯利亚铁路委员会

Once he had overcome the financial hurdles, Witte could concentrate on organizing what became one of the major development projects in the history of the world. In forming the Committee of the Siberian Railroad Witte imposed consensus on a bureaucracy bitterly divided over the economic policy of the nation. The episode throws considerable light on the way politics functioned in late imperial Russia.
维特在克服了财政障碍后,得以集中精力组织这项后来成为世界历史上重大发展项目之一的工程。通过组建西伯利亚铁路委员会,他在一个因国家经济政策而严重分裂的官僚体系中强加了共识。这一事件深刻揭示了晚期帝俄政治运作的方式。
Heide Whelan refers to the Committee of the Siberian Railroad as one of the “temporary supreme organs” that the government established to circumvent opposition toward certain policies and to ensure their speedy execution. 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} As Witte explained:
海德·惠兰将西伯利亚铁路委员会称为政府为规避对特定政策的反对并确保其迅速执行而设立的“临时最高机构”之一。 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} 正如维特所解释的那样:
In order to move along the matter of the Siberian road, when I became minister of finance I decided that it was necessary to form a special Committee of the Siberian Railroad. This committee would have significant powers, in order to avoid any delays in its various dealings with the ministers and to avoid various difficulties in both the Committee of Ministers and the State Council. . . The committee would be given powers not only in the administration of the road’s construction but also in decisions … of a legislative nature. 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
为了推进西伯利亚铁路事宜,在我担任财政大臣时,我认为有必要成立一个专门的西伯利亚铁路委员会。该委员会将被赋予重大权力,以避免在与各部大臣交涉时出现任何延误,并避免在部长会议和国务委员会中遇到各种困难……委员会不仅拥有铁路建设管理权,还可在立法性质的事务上作出决策。 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
The idea of creating a “special, central managerial body for the construction of the Siberian Railroad” lay with Minister of Transport Giubbenet rather than Witte. 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} But he hardly inherited the project “as a going concern and in almost final form.” 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} The assessment of the railroad’s Soviet historian is more accurate: “Witte concretized and developed the idea of a centralized administration for this grandiose state enterprise.”'68 The scope and competence of the committee, as Witte intended, were to extend far beyond construction questions alone.
关于设立“西伯利亚铁路建设的特殊中央管理机构”这一构想源自交通部长久本内特,而非维特。 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} 但他几乎并未接手一个“已成规模且近乎完工的项目”。 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} 苏联历史学家对铁路的评价更为准确:“维特将这一宏大国家工程的集中管理理念具体化并加以发展。”'68 正如维特所设想,该委员会的职权范围远不止于建设问题本身。
Witte’s original formulation of the statute of the Committee of the
维特最初拟定的委员会章程草案

64. Heide W. Whelan, Alexander III and the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counterreform in Late Imperial Russia (New Brunswick, N.J., 1982), 40-41.
64. 海德·W·惠兰,《亚历山大三世与国务院:晚期帝俄的官僚体系与反改革》(新泽西州新不伦瑞克,1982 年),40-41 页。

65. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:434.
65. 维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:434 页。

66. See MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti ministerstva putei soobshcheniia po stroitel’stvu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi za vremia s 30 marta 1889 g. po 17 ianvaria 1892 g.” (TsGAOR, fond 677, opis’ 1 , delo 629), 21.
66. 参见交通部,《西伯利亚铁路建设活动报告(1889 年 3 月 30 日至 1892 年 1 月 17 日期间)》(TsGAOR,档案 677,目录 1,案卷 629),第 21 页。

67. As claimed in Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, 38.
67. 如罗曼诺夫在《俄国在满洲》第 38 页所声称。

68. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 513.
68. 博尔祖诺夫,《创建史》,第 513 页。
Siberian Railroad was approved by a special conference on November 21, 1892. The committee was to be chaired by an appointee of the tsar and include the state comptroller and ministers of finance, interior, state domains, and transport. It was to be responsible for the construction of the railroad, the auxiliary enterprises that were to help stimulate the Siberian economy, and financial estimates and oversight. Expenditures for auxiliary enterprises were not subject to review by the State Council, and were therefore to be discussed by the committee alone, then sent for approval directly to the tsar. Other matters were to be handled according to normal ministerial procedure: resolutions were to be passed on, when necessary, to either the State Council or the Committee of Ministers for discussion and approval before being sent to the tsar. The special conference voted to approve these arrangements, but left it up to the committee itself to work out its own functions with greater specificity 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69}
西伯利亚铁路于 1892 年 11 月 21 日经特别会议批准开建。该委员会将由沙皇任命的官员担任主席,成员包括国家审计长以及财政、内政、国家产业和交通大臣。委员会负责铁路建设、旨在刺激西伯利亚经济的附属企业,以及财务预算与监管工作。附属企业的开支不受国务院审查,因此仅由委员会讨论后直接呈报沙皇批准。其他事项则按常规部委程序处理:决议必要时需提交国务院或大臣委员会讨论通过,再呈递沙皇。特别会议投票通过了这些安排,但具体职能细则交由委员会自行拟定 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69}

Witte used this opportunity, with the help of his new ally Bunge, vice chairman of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad, to expand the committee’s authority further. At its first session, on February 10, 1893, Witte and Bunge jointly urged the revision of the statute to allow for more rapid, efficient, and unified action by the committee. As it stood, without executive authority and dependent on the State Council and Committee of Ministers in matters of finance and the route (including land use), the committee would be severely restricted. So as not to narrow the responsibilities of the ministers or infringe on the principles of government, but to allow for the utmost speed of execution on important matters, they suggested a compromise arrangement, the establishment of a “special order” for the committee. Rather than refer new legislation to the State Council for deliberation, the committee would vote on it immediately in joint session with the relevant department of the State Council, or with the Committee of Ministers on questions pertaining to the route. Resolutions were then to be referred immediately to the tsar for approval, or for resolution if unanimous agreement was not reached. The committee did not have executive authority; ministers carried out decrees according to their responsibilities. 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70}
维特借此机会,在其新盟友、西伯利亚铁路委员会副主席本格协助下,进一步扩大了该委员会的权限。在 1893 年 2 月 10 日的首次会议上,维特与本格共同敦促修订章程,以使委员会能够采取更迅速、高效且统一的行动。当时,由于缺乏行政权力,且在财政和路线(包括土地使用)问题上依赖国务会议和部长委员会,该委员会的权力受到严重限制。为避免缩小部长们的职责或侵犯政府原则,同时又能以最快速度执行重要事务,他们提出了一项折衷安排,即为委员会设立"特别程序"。新立法不再提交国务会议审议,而是由委员会与国务会议相关部门联合会议立即表决,或就路线相关问题与部长委员会共同表决。 决议随后将立即呈交沙皇批准,或在无法达成一致意见时由其裁决。该委员会并无行政权力;部长们根据各自职责执行法令。 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70}
The precedents for such an institution included the Committee for
这种机构的先例包括
the Construction of the St. Petersburg-Moscow Railroad, established by Nicholas I in 1842 under the heir to the throne, the future Alexander II. It was created because of the opposition to railroads that existed in the Committee of Ministers, although its membership was largely drawn from that body. 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71} But the scope of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad was far greater than that of its ancestor, for it was not limited to railroad construction. Its purview and ambitions continued to expand with Witte at the helm; through it he gained control of the Asian policy of the empire, at least for a time. 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72}
圣彼得堡-莫斯科铁路的建设,由尼古拉一世于 1842 年在皇位继承人、未来的亚历山大二世领导下确立。该铁路的设立源于当时大臣委员会对铁路建设的反对,尽管委员会成员大多来自该机构。 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71} 但西伯利亚铁路委员会的职权范围远超其前身,因为它不仅限于铁路建设。在维特的领导下,其管辖范围和野心不断扩大;通过这个委员会,他一度掌控了帝国的亚洲政策。 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72}

Mobilizing the Ministers
动员部长们

Witte ensured his own predominance in the committee, as in government on the whole, by manipulating official appointees. 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73} Throughout his career he almost systematically maneuvered to remove his opponents, or those who might pose a threat, and replace them with weak, pliant, often inferior ministers who would be obedient to his will. He continued to do so until 1900, when his position in government deteriorated.
维特通过操纵官方任命,确保了他在委员会乃至整个政府中的主导地位。 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73} 在他的职业生涯中,他几乎系统地策划排除对手或潜在威胁者,代之以软弱顺从、往往能力平庸且会服从其意志的大臣。这一做法一直持续到 1900 年,当时他在政府中的地位开始恶化。
Indicative was his recommendation of A. S. Ermolov for the post of minister of state domains after the death of Ostrovskii. Although an intelligent man and a trained agronomist, Ermolov was a weak and ineffective minister. Witte, whose assistant he had been, knew that he was a “person without character,” as he described him, and it was probably this feature that best qualified him for the post in Witte’s eyes. 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74} It was certainly important to Witte’s plans for the Committee of the Siberian Railroad that he have some measure of control over the activities of the Ministry of State Domains, given its central importance in peasant resettlement.
最具代表性的是他在奥斯特洛夫斯基去世后推荐 A·S·叶尔莫洛夫担任国家财产大臣。尽管叶尔莫洛夫是个聪明人且受过农学训练,但作为大臣却软弱无能。曾担任其助理的维特深知他是个"没有主见的人"(维特原话),而这一特质在维特眼中恰恰是其胜任该职的最佳资质。 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74} 鉴于国家财产部在农民迁移中的核心作用,维特要实现对西伯利亚铁路委员会计划的掌控,对该部门活动的某种程度控制显然至关重要。
Even more crucial was the selection of the minister of transport, whose jurisdiction Witte had been encroaching on from the begin-
更为关键的是交通大臣的人选,从一开始维特就在不断蚕食该部门的管辖权——

71. See Richard M. Haywood, The Beginnings of Railway Development in Russia in the Reign of Nicholas I, 1835-1842 (Durham, N.C., 1969), 227-228; Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Rußlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917 (Leiden, 1966), 124. The committee was dissolved in 1858.
71. 参见理查德·M·海伍德,《尼古拉一世时期俄国铁路发展的开端,1835-1842》(北卡罗来纳州达勒姆,1969 年),227-228 页;埃里克·安伯格,《从彼得大帝到 1917 年俄罗斯行政机关史》(莱顿,1966 年),124 页。该委员会于 1858 年解散。

72. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 537.
72. 博尔祖诺夫,《创建史》,537 页。

73. Witte’s string-pulling in appointments was complemented by the finance minister’s control of the imperial purse strings.
73. 维特在人事任命上的暗中操纵,辅之以财政部长对帝国财政大权的掌控。

74. On Ermolov, see Shepelev, Tsarizm, 204; Donald W. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War (Princeton, 1957), 111-112; Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:347-349.
74. 关于叶尔莫洛夫,参见舍佩列夫《沙皇制度》第 204 页;唐纳德·W·特雷德戈尔德《西伯利亚大迁徙:从农奴解放到第一次世界大战期间的政府与农民移民》(普林斯顿,1957 年),第 111-112 页;维特《回忆录》第 1 卷,第 347-349 页。

ning of his official career. Witte helped expose the corruption of A. K. Krivoshein, who had been appointed minister at the behest of both Prince Meshcherskii and the minister of the interior, I. N. Durnovo. Krivoshein was unfamiliar with railroad affairs and proved to be incompetent. 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75} Witte induced the tsar to replace Krivoshein with a transport minister he could dominate. His choice was Prince M. I. Khilkov, whose mediocrity Witte noted before nominating him. Khilkov had been a jack-of-all-trades on railroads in the United States, worked under Annenkov, and served briefly as minister of railroads in Bulgaria. In his official post he put in a nine-to-five day; Witte characterized him as a better “chief locomotive engineer” than minister. These were the qualities Witte, who worked sixteen-hour days, demanded in the committee members, and Khilkov remained in office for a good ten years, from 1895 to 1905 . 76 1905 . 76 1905.^(76)1905 .{ }^{76}
维特在其职业生涯初期,曾协助揭露了 A. K. 克里沃舍因的腐败行为。克里沃舍因是在梅谢尔斯基亲王和内政大臣 I. N. 杜尔诺沃的共同授意下被任命为部长的。他对铁路事务一窍不通,事实证明他并不称职。 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75} 维特说服沙皇用一位他能掌控的交通大臣取代克里沃舍因。他选中了 M. I. 希尔科夫亲王,维特在提名前就注意到此人资质平庸。希尔科夫曾在美国铁路部门担任过杂务工,在安年科夫手下工作过,并短暂担任过保加利亚的铁路大臣。在任期间,他每天朝九晚五;维特评价他更适合当“首席机车工程师”而非部长。这些正是每天工作 16 小时的维特对委员会成员的要求,希尔科夫在这个职位上稳坐了整整十年,从 1895 年到 1905 . 76 1905 . 76 1905.^(76)1905 .{ }^{76}
Perhaps no position posed a greater threat to Witte’s domination of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad than that of chairman of the State Council’s Department of State Economy. This department almost solely represented the State Council on the committee, and its chairman was therefore very influential. In forcing the selection of his candidate as its chairman, Witte for all practical purposes was able to bypass the State Council in matters concerning the Siberian Railroad. Its chairman since 1884 was the skillful and powerful Abaza, who was likely to remain independent of Witte. Witte therefore lost no time in pressing for Abaza’s removal from office in 1892, in connection with a stock-market scandal. The tsar considered appointing Vyshnegradskii to the post, but Witte persuaded him not to do so, for fear of his continued opposition to the financial arrangements for the Siberian Railroad. He persuaded the tsar instead to appoint D. M. Sol’skii, a
或许对维特在西伯利亚铁路委员会中的支配地位构成最大威胁的职位,莫过于国家经济部门的主席一职。该部门几乎独力代表国务会议参与委员会事务,其主席因而极具影响力。通过推动自己提名的候选人当选主席,维特实际上得以在涉及西伯利亚铁路的事务上绕过国务会议。自 1884 年起担任此职的是精明强干的阿巴扎,他很可能保持独立于维特的立场。因此,维特在 1892 年借一起股市丑闻之机,迅速施压迫使阿巴扎去职。沙皇曾考虑任命维什涅格拉茨基接任,但维特说服他放弃这一想法,唯恐其继续反对西伯利亚铁路的财政安排。最终维特成功劝说沙皇改任前国家审计长 D·M·索利斯基——
former state comptroller. An ally of the liberal Loris-Melikov, he was an intelligent man and a reformer in spirit. But he was indecisive and uncommitted to any position. He was the perfect choice for Witte. 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
这位自由派洛里斯-梅利科夫的盟友才智过人,骨子里是个改革者,但性格优柔寡断且立场摇摆不定。对维特而言,他是再完美不过的人选。 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
Witte was less successful with other ministries. He had been in conflict with Durnovo, the incapable minister of the interior. When Bunge died in 1895 and Durnovo was named to his post as chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Durnovo wanted V. K. Plehve, Witte’s antagonist, to succeed him. The tsar’s doubts about Plehve’s conservative colors (he had gotten his start under Loris-Melikov) gave Witte the opportunity to have the reputed moderate I. L. Goremykin placed in the position. Witte expected the new interior minister to be grateful to him and therefore manageable. As it turned out, although incomparably lazy, he was no more loyal to Witte than Durnovo had been. In 1899 Witte arranged his removal and had him replaced with his loyal and intellectually limited friend D. S. Sipiagin. Sipiagin, however, was assassinated in 1902 and replaced by Plehve, who contributed to Witte’s downfall. 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78}
维特在其他部门则不那么成功。他与无能的内务大臣杜尔诺沃长期不和。1895 年邦格去世后,杜尔诺沃被任命为大臣委员会主席,他本想推举维特的政敌普列韦接任内务大臣一职。由于沙皇对普列韦的保守倾向心存疑虑(此人最初受洛里斯-梅利科夫提拔),维特趁机让公认的温和派戈列梅金出任该职。维特原以为新任内务大臣会对他感恩戴德从而便于掌控,但事实证明,尽管戈列梅金懒散至极,其对维特的忠诚度却不比杜尔诺沃高多少。1899 年维特策划将其撤换,安排自己那位忠诚但才智有限的朋友西皮亚金接任。然而西皮亚金于 1902 年遇刺身亡,最终由普列韦接掌内务部,此人后来成为导致维特下台的关键人物。 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78}
Witte was also unsuccessful in his competition with the military over the Committee of the Siberian Railroad. According to its original statute, prepared by Witte, the committee would completely exclude the war and naval ministers from its ranks. The tsar recognized the attempt to deny them a part in the project and at his intervention they were included as full members of the committee. 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79} These were setbacks for Witte, albeit minor ones.
维特在与军方争夺西伯利亚铁路委员会控制权的较量中也未能成功。根据他最初拟定的章程,战争大臣和海军大臣将被完全排除在委员会成员之外。沙皇察觉了这一试图剥夺他们参与权的企图,经其干预后,两位大臣作为正式成员加入了委员会。 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79} 这些对维特而言虽是小挫,但仍是挫折。

Nicholas II  尼古拉二世

Witte’s most important and fateful manipulation was to have the Grand Duke Nicholas Alexandrovich, twenty-three years old in 1891 and heir to the throne, appointed chairman of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad. Nicholas’s chairmanship all but guaranteed the completion of the Siberian Railroad: the tsarevich would eventually
维特最具影响力且影响深远的操作是让时年 23 岁(1891 年)的皇位继承人尼古拉·亚历山德罗维奇大公担任西伯利亚铁路委员会主席。尼古拉的任职几乎确保了西伯利亚铁路的完工:这位皇储最终将...

77. See Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:240-242; 2:16-17; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 203; Taranovski, “Politics,” 701; Terner, Vospominaniia zhizni, 2:222n1; K. A. Skal’kovskii, Nashi gosudarstvennye i obshchestvennye deiateli (St. Petersburg, 1890), 296-300.
77. 参见维特《回忆录》第 1 卷 240-242 页;第 2 卷 16-17 页;舍佩列夫《沙皇制度》203 页;塔拉诺夫斯基《政治》701 页;特尔纳《生活回忆录》第 2 卷 222 页注 1;K·A·斯卡利科夫斯基《我国国家与社会活动家》(圣彼得堡,1890 年)296-300 页。

78. See Shepelev, Tsarizm, 203-204; Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie, 151152; Anan’ich et al., Krizis, 28; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 157, 162, 167, 201.
78. 参见 Shepelev,《Tsarizm》,203-204 页;Zaionchkovskii,《俄罗斯专制制度》,151-152 页;Anan’ich 等,《危机》,28 页;Von Laue,《谢尔盖·维特》,157、162、167、201 页。

79. ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1893, no. 1:4; ZhKSZhD, zas. 1, Feb. 10, 1893, p.3, col. 1; PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 12, 1892, no. 9174. For the context of this conflict see William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia: 18811914 (Princeton, 1985).
79. 《交通部杂志》官方版:"西伯利亚铁路",1893 年第 1 期第 4 页;《铁路事务委员会公报》第 1 次会议,1893 年 2 月 10 日,第 3 页第 1 栏;《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》第三辑第 12 卷,1892 年,第 9174 号。关于此冲突的背景,参见小威廉·C·富勒《帝俄时期的军民冲突:1881-1914》(普林斯顿,1985 年)。

become the unlimited autocrat whose decisions in the committee would automatically become law. 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80}
成为委员会中决策自动成为法律的无限专制君主。 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80}
The idea was clever, because Witte knew that he would need the backing of the new tsar if he were to achieve his goals; the appointment was a way of ingratiating himself with Nicholas. 81 81 ^(81){ }^{81} Witte also proposed Nicholas’s appointment as chairman to Alexander III to prevent him from naming Abaza, whom Durnovo was busy promoting. According to Witte, Alexander’s initial reaction was astonishment. “After all,” said the tsar, “he is still a boy; he has a child’s judgment: how on earth can he be the chairman of a committee?” Witte explained that “this will be his first elementary school for the conduct of state affairs.” He suggested that Nicholas’s tutor, Bunge, be made vice chairman so that he could assist the tsarevich. Alexander was convinced and a week later agreed. 82 82 ^(82){ }^{82}
这个主意很巧妙,因为维特知道,要实现自己的目标,他需要新沙皇的支持;这一任命是他讨好尼古拉的一种方式。 81 81 ^(81){ }^{81} 维特还向亚历山大三世提议任命尼古拉为主席,以防止他任命阿巴扎,而杜尔诺沃正忙于提拔阿巴扎。据维特说,亚历山大最初的反应是惊讶。“毕竟,”沙皇说,“他还是个孩子;他的判断力还像个孩子:他怎么能当委员会的主席呢?”维特解释说:“这将是他处理国家事务的第一所基础学校。”他建议让尼古拉的导师本格担任副主席,以便他能协助皇太子。亚历山大被说服了,一周后同意了。 82 82 ^(82){ }^{82}
There was justification on other grounds for appointing Nicholas to the chair, and they are worth examining for the clue they give to both the future of the railroad and the fate of Witte. Nicholas had traveled throughout Asia in 1890-1891; no other tsar had been there before, and Gurko called him a pioneer. On the return trip through Siberia, Nicholas participated in ground-breaking ceremonies at Vladivostok for the Ussuri section of the Siberian Railroad. The journey had a lasting influence on him, and in the first decade of his reign he dwelt on thoughts of Russian development in the Far East. 83 83 ^(83){ }^{83}
任命尼古拉斯担任该职位还有其他理由,这些理由值得探究,因为它们为铁路的未来和维特的命运提供了线索。1890 年至 1891 年间,尼古拉斯曾游历亚洲各地;此前没有其他沙皇到过那里,古尔科称他为先驱者。在返回西伯利亚的途中,尼古拉斯参加了西伯利亚铁路乌苏里段在海参崴的奠基仪式。这次旅程对他产生了深远影响,在他统治的头十年里,他一直思考着俄罗斯在远东的发展。 83 83 ^(83){ }^{83}
For the young and impressionable crown prince, the idea of Russia’s mission and glory in the Far East was strong liquor. He absorbed the ideology of the “Orientalists” (Vostochniki), who justified Russian expansion in Asia on historical and cultural grounds. He was especially influenced by Prince E. E. Ukhtomskii, who accompanied him to Asia and whose account of the journey, the classic expression of this
对于年轻且易受影响的皇太子来说,俄罗斯在远东的使命与荣耀是烈酒般强烈的观念。他吸收了“东方主义者”(Vostochniki)的意识形态,这些人从历史和文化角度为俄罗斯在亚洲的扩张辩护。他尤其受到陪同他前往亚洲的 E·E·乌赫托姆斯基亲王的影响,后者关于此次旅程的记述是这一思想的经典表达。
Nicholas II. From Ministerstvo Finansov, Ministerstvo finansov, 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902).
尼古拉二世。摘自《财政部,1802-1902 年》(圣彼得堡,1902 年)。

ideology, Nicholas personally revised before publication. 84 84 ^(84){ }^{84} Although a central element of this school of thought was the kinship of Russia and Asia as distinct from Europe, it amounted to little more than a justification of Russian chauvinism. The Orientalists condescended toward the Asian nations they intended to “civilize,” and fear of the “yellow peril” played no little role in their thinking; they shared these elements with the European ideologists of imperialism from whom they dissociated themselves. 85 85 ^(85){ }^{85} The Trans-Siberian Railroad would allow Russia to begin its work: “great Siberia is our vanguard.” 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
意识形态,尼古拉斯在出版前亲自进行了修订。 84 84 ^(84){ }^{84} 尽管这一思想流派的核心要素是俄罗斯与亚洲的亲缘关系,以区别于欧洲,但这不过是对俄罗斯沙文主义的辩护。东方学家们对他们打算“开化”的亚洲国家表现出居高临下的态度,对“黄祸”的恐惧在他们的思想中占据了不小的地位;这些元素与那些他们试图与之划清界限的欧洲帝国主义理论家们如出一辙。 85 85 ^(85){ }^{85} 西伯利亚大铁路将使俄罗斯开始其工作:“伟大的西伯利亚是我们的先锋。” 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
The ideology of the Orientalists had a European perspective and was a function of Russia’s inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West. Even in their most extreme proclamations of oneness with Asia, they were expressing not the fact that Russia and Asia were equals, but resentment at Europe’s humiliation of Russia. 87 87 ^(87){ }^{87} This inferiority was at the psychological core of Witte’s world view too, and he exulted with Nicholas over Russia’s mission in Asia, which he felt was to export the basic autocratic and Orthodox Christian principles of the Russian world. Like contemporary French and British imperialists, Witte failed to see the inherent contradiction in making such an exclusivist ideology the basis for a civilizing mission. He understood Russia’s mission to be “cultural-enlightening,” as opposed to western Europe’s alleged economic exploitation and injustice. 88 88 ^(88){ }^{88} Witte’s critique of European
东方主义者的意识形态带有欧洲视角,是俄罗斯面对西方时自卑情结的体现。即便在他们最极端地宣称与亚洲同为一体时,他们所表达的并非俄罗斯与亚洲地位平等的事实,而是对欧洲羞辱俄罗斯的愤懑。 87 87 ^(87){ }^{87} 这种自卑感也是维特世界观的心理核心,他与尼古拉一同为俄罗斯在亚洲的使命欢欣鼓舞,他认为这一使命是输出俄罗斯世界专制和东正教的基本原则。与同时代的法国和英国帝国主义者一样,维特未能认识到将这种排他性意识形态作为文明使命基础的内在矛盾。他将俄罗斯的使命理解为“文化启蒙”,以区别于西欧所谓的经济剥削和不公正。 88 88 ^(88){ }^{88} 维特对欧洲的批评

84. Gurko, Features and Figures, 256-257; Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:438-440. According to Witte, after the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 revolution, it was popularly thought to have been a mistake for Nicholas to travel to the Far East rather than through Europe and European Russia, from whose affairs he remained aloof. On the ideology of the Vostochniki, see Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904 (Berkeley, 1958), 41-50; Gerhart von Schulze-Gävernitz, Volkswirtschaftliche Studien aus Rußland (Leipzig, 1899), 193, 234-236. On the almost religious zeal to make Asia Russian, see Beveridge, Russian Advance, 367-373.
84. 古尔科,《特征与人物》,256-257 页;维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:438-440 页。据维特所述,在经历日俄战争灾难和 1905 年革命后,民众普遍认为尼古拉选择前往远东而非途经欧洲及欧俄地区是一大失策,这使他始终疏离于欧洲事务。关于东方派意识形态,参见安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫《1881-1904 年俄国远东政策》(伯克利,1958 年),41-50 页;格哈特·冯·舒尔策-格弗尼茨《俄国经济研究》(莱比锡,1899 年),193、234-236 页。关于使亚洲俄罗斯化的近乎宗教般的狂热,参见贝弗里奇《俄国的推进》,367-373 页。

85. See Ukhtomskii, Puteshestvie. See also Heinz Gollwitzer, Europe in the Age of Imperialism, 1880-1914, trans. David Adam and Stanley Baron (New York, 1969).
85. 参见乌赫托姆斯基《旅行记》。另见海因茨·戈尔维策《帝国主义时代的欧洲(1880-1914)》,大卫·亚当与斯坦利·巴伦英译本(纽约,1969 年)。

86. Ukhtomskii, Puteshestvie, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 206.
86. 乌赫托姆斯基,《旅行记》,第 2 卷,第 4 部分,第 206 页。

87. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, “Asia through Russian Eyes,” in Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, 1972).
87. 尼古拉·V·梁赞诺夫斯基,《"俄罗斯人眼中的亚洲"》,载《俄国与亚洲:俄国对亚洲民族影响论文集》,韦恩·S·武西尼奇编(斯坦福,1972 年)。

88. Witte expressed his views on these matters in a memorandum to Alexander III which explained his support for a proposal of P. A. Badmaev (the Buriat medicine man, linguist, intriguer at the St. Petersburg court, and advocate of the Russian conquest of Mongolia, Tibet, and China) for construction of a branch of the Siberian Railroad through Mongolia to Lanzhou in western China. Alexander rejected the idea as “extraordinary and fanciful,” but Nicholas, and Witte, would soon embrace it in the form of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad. See Za kulisami tsarizma: Arkhiv tibetskogo vracha Badmaeva, ed. V. P. Semennikov (Leningrad, 1925), 78-79. On Badmaev, see also Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 48-49. Geyer, in Russian Imperialism, 189, asserts that Witte used Badmaev’s words to justify construction of the Siberian Railroad, but that com-
88. 维特在给亚历山大三世的备忘录中表达了他对这些问题的看法,解释了他为何支持 P·A·巴德玛耶夫(布里亚特族的巫医、语言学家、圣彼得堡宫廷的阴谋家,以及主张俄国征服蒙古、西藏和中国的鼓吹者)提出的修建一条西伯利亚铁路支线经蒙古至中国西部兰州的提议。亚历山大认为这个想法“异想天开”而予以否决,但尼古拉和维特很快以中东铁路的形式采纳了这一构想。参见《沙皇制度幕后:西藏医生巴德玛耶夫档案》,V·P·谢苗尼科夫编(列宁格勒,1925 年),78-79 页。关于巴德玛耶夫,另见马洛泽莫夫《俄国远东政策》48-49 页。盖尔在《俄国帝国主义》189 页中声称,维特借用巴德玛耶夫的言论为西伯利亚铁路建设辩护,但这一说...

colonialism bears similarities to that of Marx and Lenin. But his conviction that Russia’s machinery-especially the railroad-would be the salvation of China is identical to the attitudes of western Europe. 89 89 ^(89){ }^{89}
殖民主义与马克思和列宁的观点有相似之处。但他坚信俄国的机械——尤其是铁路——将成为中国的救赎,这种态度与西欧如出一辙。 89 89 ^(89){ }^{89}
Nicholas became absorbed in the affairs of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad and chose to retain the post of chairman after he became tsar. A quick learner, unlike his father, after the first few sessions he began to act as a true chairman. According to Witte, he was “not bad” and attentive, always aware of the issues at hand. 90 He 90 He ^(90)He{ }^{90} \mathrm{He} was certainly not, as Gurko calls him, an “honorary” head of the committee, without influence on its decisions; his involvement in the minute details of the sessions and his informed decisions are reflected in the sources. 91 91 ^(91){ }^{91}
尼古拉全神贯注于西伯利亚铁路委员会的事务,并在成为沙皇之后选择继续担任主席一职。与他父亲不同,尼古拉学得很快,在最初的几次会议后,他开始真正履行主席的职责。根据维特的说法,他“还不错”,也很专注,总是能意识到当前的问题。 90 He 90 He ^(90)He{ }^{90} \mathrm{He} 正如古尔科所言,他绝不是委员会的“名誉”主席,对决策毫无影响力;他对会议细节的深入参与以及他基于充分信息的决策都在资料中有所体现。 91 91 ^(91){ }^{91}
Witte and Nicholas worked well together at first, the new tsar expressing confidence in his minister of finance. 92 92 ^(92){ }^{92} But the relationship did not last long. Witte noted that the tsar was so involved in the Committee of the Siberian Railroad that Russian Far Eastern policy became, fatefully, an expression of his personality. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} The same can be said of Witte, and their two unlike temperaments proved inharmonious. Struve found Witte’s nature to have been more suited to that of an autocrat, whereas Nicholas was weak willed. 94 94 ^(94){ }^{94} Witte had been compatible with Alexander III and respected his character and leadership. He felt he remained in office for eight years under Nicholas solely because Alexander III had approved of him. 95 95 ^(95){ }^{95} In all other respects, Witte’s relationship with Nicholas and his father paralleled that of Bismarck with Kaisers Wilhelm I and II. Nicholas felt he was a spectator at Witte’s performance, especially in the Far East, where the minister’s powerful presence seemed to thwart Nicholas’s own ambi-
维特与尼古拉二世起初合作无间,新沙皇对这位财政大臣表现出充分信任。 92 92 ^(92){ }^{92} 但这段关系未能持久。维特指出,沙皇过度介入西伯利亚铁路委员会事务,导致俄国远东政策可悲地成为其个人意志的体现。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 维特本人亦是如此,两人迥异的性格最终水火不容。斯特鲁夫认为维特的强势本性更适合独裁君主,而尼古拉二世却优柔寡断。 94 94 ^(94){ }^{94} 维特曾与亚历山大三世相处融洽,敬重其品格与领导力。他觉得自己能在尼古拉二世麾下任职八年,纯粹因先皇亚历山大三世对他的赏识。 95 95 ^(95){ }^{95} 总体而言,维特与尼古拉父子的关系,恰如俾斯麦与威廉一世、二世的关系。沙皇自觉像是维特远东政策表演的旁观者,这位大臣的强势作风似乎总在阻挠尼古拉施展抱负——
tions. Witte surpassed everyone, and Nicholas grew jealous and resentful. 96 96 ^(96){ }^{96}
维特的光芒盖过所有人,引得沙皇妒火中烧。 96 96 ^(96){ }^{96}

The committee was so closely associated with Witte that it did not long survive his fall from power. Witte was relieved of office on August 16, 1903. The Committee of the Siberian Railroad was formally abolished in 1905, ostensibly because the major portion of the railroad work was completed and the government had to be restructured after the October Manifesto was issued. 97 97 ^(97){ }^{97} But its real demise had come two years earlier, with the downfall of Witte. According to A. N. Kulomzin’s memoirs, it had succumbed to a power struggle with the Committee of the Far East, whose supporters in government had been in the forefront of the assault on Witte. 98 98 ^(98){ }^{98}
该委员会与维特关系如此密切,以至于在他失势后不久便难以为继。1903 年 8 月 16 日,维特被解除职务。西伯利亚铁路委员会于 1905 年正式撤销,表面理由是铁路主体工程已完工且《十月宣言》颁布后政府需重组。 97 97 ^(97){ }^{97} 但其实际消亡早在两年前维特倒台时就已注定。根据 A·N·库洛姆津的回忆录记载,该委员会在与远东委员会的权力斗争中落败,后者在政府中的支持者正是扳倒维特的急先锋。 98 98 ^(98){ }^{98}
In the meantime, though, the Committee of the Siberian Railroad was active with Witte at the helm. The extent of his activities in the committee is evidence of his far-reaching authority. In no other realm is Alexander Izvol’skii’s claim that Witte was “de facto, if not de jure, the real head of the Russian Government” so apparent; he had created a “State within a State.” 99
在此期间,西伯利亚铁路委员会在维特领导下积极开展工作。他在委员会中的广泛活动印证了其权力的深远影响。正如亚历山大·伊兹沃尔斯基所言,维特"虽非法定但实为俄罗斯政府的真正首脑",这一点在其他领域都未能如此明显;他已然创建了一个"国中之国"。99

96. Gurko, Features and Figures, 259. As the tsar said of Witte in 1903, “he is a very gifted person, but he gets easily carried away” (“Dnevnik A. N. Kuropatkina,” Krasnyi arkhiv 2 [1922]: 37 (Mar. 8, 1903]).
96. 古尔科,《特征与人物》,第 259 页。正如沙皇在 1903 年评价维特时所说:“他是个非常有才华的人,但容易头脑发热”(“A.N.库罗帕特金日记”,《红色档案》第 2 期[1922 年]:37[1903 年 3 月 8 日])。

97. See PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 25, 1905, no. 27044.
97. 参见《俄罗斯帝国法律全书》,第三辑,第 25 卷,1905 年,第 27044 号。

98. A. V. Remnev, “Komitet sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi v vospominaniiakh A. N. Kulomzina,” unpublished manuscript (Leningrad, n.d.), 19.
98. A.V.列姆涅夫,《西伯利亚铁路委员会在 A.N.库洛姆津回忆录中》,未出版手稿(列宁格勒,无日期),第 19 页。

99. Izvol’skii, Recollections of a Foreign Minister, 112-113.
99. 伊兹沃尔斯基,《一位外交部长的回忆》,第 112-113 页。

CHAPTER EIGHT  第八章

Witte and the Taming of the Wild East
维特与驯服狂野的东方

The colonization of Siberia at the end of the nineteenth century has been portrayed as analogous to the American westward movement. Russian peasants are said to have set out for Siberia to make themselves a new life, mutatis mutandis, much the way their pioneer counterparts had done on the American frontier, spontaneously and with minimal supervision by the central government. The Russian state failed to halt the migration, and formulated its policy in reflex to the overwhelming force of numbers. The society the peasants created in Siberia was said to be freer and more prosperous than the one they left behind. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
十九世纪末西伯利亚的殖民常被描绘成与美国西进运动类似。据说俄罗斯农民前往西伯利亚开辟新生活,尽管存在差异,但大体上与美国拓荒者自发且受中央政府监管极少的边疆开拓如出一辙。俄罗斯政府未能阻止这场迁徙,其政策制定是对人口洪流的被动反应。农民们在西伯利亚建立的社会据称比他们离开的原生社会更为自由与繁荣。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
There is an element of truth to this characterization: the movement did press on regardless of the government’s efforts to decelerate it, and the living standards of the migrants were eventually higher than they had been in European Russia. But it leaves much out of the picture by implying that the role of the government was negligible. Peasant resettlement was but one, albeit a central, facet of a larger program intended to colonize-and thereby Russify-Siberia through economic development. For this reason the Committee of the Siberian Railroad in St. Petersburg planned, coordinated, and controlled colonization and development. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
这种描述有一定道理:移民运动确实不顾政府减缓其步伐的努力持续推进,且移民的生活水平最终高于他们在俄罗斯欧洲部分的原居地。但它遗漏了重要背景,暗示政府作用微乎其微。农民迁移只是西伯利亚殖民计划——通过经济发展实现俄罗斯化——的一个方面,尽管是核心部分。正因如此,圣彼得堡的西伯利亚铁路委员会才对殖民与发展进行规划、协调和控制。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}

Guiding Principles  指导原则

The guiding principles of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad were set forth by Witte, whose outlook they reflected. The common understanding of Witte holds that by 1889 he had abandoned his Slavophile antipathy to modern capitalism. In its place stood a new devotion to the theory of national industrialization expounded by Friedrich List. Soon thereafter, Vyshnegradskii’s policies were discredited in the wake of famine and the “industrializer” Witte was to try to implement a new “system.” 3 According to this view, Witte quickly shelved agricultural reform in spite of the famine and, preoccupied with industrialization and the Siberian Railroad, left the wounds of the countryside to fester. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
西伯利亚铁路委员会的指导原则由维特提出,这些原则反映了他的观点。普遍认为,到 1889 年,维特已摒弃了斯拉夫派对现代资本主义的敌视态度,转而信奉弗里德里希·李斯特提出的国家工业化理论。不久之后,维什涅格拉茨基的政策因饥荒而信誉扫地,作为“工业化推动者”的维特开始尝试推行一套新的“体系”。根据这一观点,尽管饥荒肆虐,维特迅速搁置了农业改革,全身心投入工业化和西伯利亚铁路建设,任由农村的创伤恶化。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
Such a picture does not, however, correspond to the reality of Witte’s attitude or actions. As we have seen, Witte’s Slavophilism remained intact until his death, and it applied to his economic views as well as his political convictions. There is no evidence that he had elaborated his so-called system at this time, and his acceptance of List does not represent a departure from Slavophilism. He stressed the power and nationalist dimensions of industry, not political liberalism or capitalism. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
然而,这样的描绘并不符合维特态度或行动的真实情况。正如我们所看到的,维特的斯拉夫主义信仰直至他去世都未曾动摇,这一理念既体现在他的经济观点中也贯穿于其政治信念。没有证据表明他在此时已完善了所谓的体系,而他接受李斯特的理论也并不意味着背离斯拉夫主义。他强调的是工业的力量与民族主义维度,而非政治自由主义或资本主义。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
The Siberian Railroad, the major component of Witte’s economic policy in his first years as minister of finance, combined both Slavophile and Listian economic ideas, in a manner Witte thought suitable for Russian conditions. Desiring to achieve economic self-reliance and impress the world with Russia’s ability, Witte established the principle that the construction of the Siberian Railroad, this “great pursuit of the Russian nation,” should rely solely on a Russian work force and use exclusively Russian materials and equipment. 6 He 6 He ^(6)He{ }^{6} \mathrm{He} also
西伯利亚铁路作为维特担任财政大臣初期经济政策的核心组成部分,融合了斯拉夫主义和李斯特经济学思想,维特认为这种结合适合俄罗斯国情。为了实现经济自给自足并向世界展示俄罗斯的实力,维特确立了这样一条原则:西伯利亚铁路这一"俄罗斯民族的伟大事业"的建设,应完全依赖俄罗斯的劳动力,并仅使用俄罗斯的原材料和设备。 6 He 6 He ^(6)He{ }^{6} \mathrm{He} 同样
called for the well-rounded development of Siberia, indicating that heavy industry would not be favored to the exclusion of cottage industry or farming, as might be supposed. Agriculture was not just an incidental responsibility-it was one of his top priorities. Witte consciously attempted to solve the Russian agricultural crisis by promoting peasant resettlement in Siberia. The assertion that he ignored the plight of the Russian peasantry is therefore unjust, although his solution did not prove to be sufficient in the end. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
主张西伯利亚的全面发展,表明重工业不会以牺牲家庭手工业或农业为代价而受到偏袒,这或许出乎意料。农业并非附带责任——而是他的首要任务之一。维特有意通过推动农民向西伯利亚迁移来解决俄罗斯的农业危机。因此,认为他忽视俄罗斯农民困境的说法并不公正,尽管他的解决方案最终未能彻底解决问题。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
Even the regionalist paper Vostochnoe obozrenie was impressed by the range of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad’s activities: it admitted that they would “have an effect on the essential economic interests of Siberia.” 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} But the approval was only grudging, for Witte’s motives were antipathetic to the regionalists’. As Witte said,
即便是地方主义报刊《东方评论》也对西伯利亚铁路委员会的活动范围印象深刻:它承认这些活动“将对西伯利亚的核心经济利益产生影响”。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 但这种认可是勉强的,因为维特的动机与地方主义者背道而驰。正如维特所言,
Up to now Siberia has not made significant progress in its economic growth, despite the abundance of its natural riches. After more than three hundred years of possession by the Russian state it remains at a low level of civil development and is sparsely inhabited, even in the regions with the most auspicious natural conditions. It has not yet succeeded in imparting to its aborigines the basic traits of Russian nationality, or even the least inclination to culture. Such an unfortunate situation has doubtless been brought about primarily by its disconnection from European Russia. Siberia, although a part of Russia, has not participated in the latter’s civil, cultural, and economic progress, but somehow has hardened in its centuries-old immobility. To connect Siberia by means of the railroad with the European Russian rail network, in such a way as to bring it closer to European Russia-this is to give it access to Russian life and to bring about those very conditions of existence and development that are prevalent in the other parts of Russia, which are linked among themselves by the railroads, as well as with the vital centers of the country. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
迄今为止,尽管自然资源丰富,西伯利亚在经济增长方面并未取得显著进展。在被俄罗斯国家统治三百多年后,其文明发展水平仍处于低位,人口稀少,即使在自然条件最为优越的地区也是如此。它尚未成功将其原住民同化为具备俄罗斯民族的基本特征,甚至未能培养出最起码的文化倾向。这种不幸的状况无疑主要是由于它与欧洲俄罗斯的隔绝造成的。西伯利亚虽然是俄罗斯的一部分,却未能参与后者的文明、文化和经济进步,反而在数百年的停滞中固步自封。通过铁路将西伯利亚与欧洲俄罗斯的铁路网连接起来,从而使其更接近欧洲俄罗斯——这意味着让它融入俄罗斯的生活,并创造那些在俄罗斯其他地区普遍存在的生存和发展条件,这些地区通过铁路彼此相连,也与国家的活力中心紧密联系。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
Witte’s words express a desire for centralization and Russification, and imply the destruction of the autonomy and uniqueness of Siberia which the regionalists so cherished. Their dictum was that “colonists
维特的话语流露出对中央集权与俄罗斯化的渴望,暗示着西伯利亚地区主义者所珍视的自治与独特性将遭到破坏。他们的信条是“殖民者

moskovskogo universiteta, 1946, no. 2: 116-117. The quote is from ZhKSZhD, zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, p. 14, col. 2
莫斯科大学学报,1946 年第 2 期:116-117 页。引文出自《全俄铁路事务委员会会议记录》,第 10 次会议,1893 年 11 月 10 日,第 14 页,第 2 栏

7. According to Geroid Tanquary Robinson, “the natural increase of the rural population of the fifty guberniias [of European Russia] was nearly fourteen times as great as the net loss which these guberniias incurred through emigration to Siberia” from 1861 to 1905 (Rural Russia under the Old Regime [Berkeley, 1960], 109-110).
7. 根据杰罗伊德·坦夸里·罗宾逊的研究,“从 1861 到 1905 年,欧洲俄罗斯五十省的农村人口自然增长量,几乎是这些省份因向西伯利亚移民而净损失人口的十四倍”(《旧制度下的俄罗斯农村》[伯克利,1960 年],109-110 页)。

8. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1893, nos. 13-14:2
8. 《东方观察》,1893 年,第 13-14 期:第 2 页

9. B. B. Glinskii, ed., Prolog russko-iaponskoi voiny: Materialy iz arkhiva grafa S. Iu. Witte (Petrograd, 1916), 11.
9. B·B·格林斯基编,《日俄战争序幕:谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇·维特伯爵档案材料》(彼得格勒,1916 年),第 11 页。

are not necessary for the railroad, but the other way around: the railroad is [solely] a convenient means of conveyance for them.” 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} The state viewed the matter from the opposite perspective, and although the railroad committee seemed to be fulfilling the economic prescription of the regionalists with its concern for local needs and its program of comprehensive development, its priority was to serve the interests of state in building and operating the railroad.
并非铁路需要它们,恰恰相反:铁路只是为它们提供便利的运输工具。” 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 国家则持相反立场,尽管铁路委员会看似通过关注地方需求及实施综合发展规划来践行区域主义的经济主张,但其首要任务仍是服务于国家建设和运营铁路的利益。
Contrary to his portrayal by historians as a representative of commercial interests, Witte intended the Siberian Railroad to be built by the state and for the state. His skepticism toward private enterprise is evident in all aspects of the project. As he said, “the Siberian Railroad has an important advantage . . . [in being] built and operated by the government rather than by a private company. This circumstance allows for the application of measures that closely correspond to the state’s interests and are necessary for the achievement of its . . . goals.” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
与历史学家将其描绘为商业利益代表不同,维特主张西伯利亚铁路应由国家修建并为国家服务。他对私营企业的怀疑态度贯穿项目始终。正如他所言:“西伯利亚铁路具有一项重要优势……[即]由政府而非私营公司建造运营。这一特性使得我们能够采取最符合国家利益、且为实现其……目标所必需的措施。” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
To assist the railroad’s construction and ensure its viability during operation, Witte had the committee establish a special fund for what were known as “auxiliary enterprises.” As head of the special preparatory commission that administered it, Anatolii Kulomzin came to wield influence over all matters of colonization in Siberia. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} The auxiliary enterprises were part of Witte’s “detailed plan for the realization of the Siberian line,” which he had inherited from Giubbenet and then refined. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} The auxiliary enterprises included the improvement of Siberian water transport, the expansion of Siberian industry, and the
为协助铁路建设并确保其运营可行性,维特让委员会设立了一项专门基金,用于所谓的“辅助事业”。作为管理该基金的特殊筹备委员会负责人,阿纳托利·库洛姆津逐渐掌握了西伯利亚殖民化事务的所有决策权。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 这些辅助事业是维特“西伯利亚铁路线实施详细计划”的一部分,该计划继承自久边内特并经他进一步完善。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 辅助事业包括改善西伯利亚水路运输、发展西伯利亚工业以及
coordination of peasant resettlement. Taken together, they compose Witte’s effort to colonize the lands beyond the Urals.
协调农民迁移安置。综合来看,它们构成了维特对乌拉尔山脉以外地区进行殖民化的整体举措。

Waterways  水路

After the Siberian Railroad was constructed, the region’s rivers played an increasingly important role in its economic life. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} Their importance was due to the geographical fact that, unlike the railroad, they extended throughout Siberia, but it was just as much a result of the program of improvements implemented by the Committee of the Siberian Railroad. Witte spoke of connecting the great rivers of Sibe-ria-the Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime}, Enisei, Lena, and Amur-by rail, to encourage development of wide regions of Siberia beyond the direct range of the railroad. The committee thus recognized and sought to meet the demands of local transport independent of the railroad. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
西伯利亚铁路建成后,该地区的河流在经济生活中扮演着越来越重要的角色。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 它们的重要性源于一个地理事实:与铁路不同,河流遍布西伯利亚各地,但西伯利亚铁路委员会实施的改善计划同样功不可没。维特曾谈到通过铁路连接西伯利亚的几条大河—— Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 、叶尼塞河、勒拿河和阿穆尔河(黑龙江),以促进铁路直接覆盖范围之外的西伯利亚广大地区的发展。因此,委员会认识到并试图满足独立于铁路的地方运输需求。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
But assistance to local river transport was also in the direct interest of the Siberian Railroad. When up to 40,000 kilometers of important rivers had access to the railroad, they would be natural feeders that could sustain its operation. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} Furthermore, the immediate needs of rapid railroad construction, as opposed to the future use of the rivers, focused attention on the waterways as potential avenues for the supply of building materials, fuels, and food, all of which were either unavailable or difficult to transport overland in most of Siberia, and especially in Transbaikalia, accessible only by the often unnavigable Amur and Shilka rivers. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} Railroad construction in Siberia was
但对当地河运的援助也直接符合西伯利亚铁路的利益。当长达 4 万公里的重要河流能够连接铁路时,它们将成为支撑铁路运营的天然支线。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 此外,与河流未来用途不同,铁路快速建设的迫切需求使人们将注意力集中在这些水道作为潜在运输通道的可能性上,用于运送建筑材料、燃料和食物——在西伯利亚大部分地区,尤其是只能通过经常无法通航的阿穆尔河和石勒喀河进入的外贝加尔地区,这些物资要么匮乏,要么难以通过陆路运输。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 西伯利亚的铁路建设

14. Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, A Handbook of Siberia and Arctic Russia, vol. 1 (London, n.d.), 25-26.
14. 英国海军情报部,《西伯利亚与俄罗斯北极地区手册》第一卷(伦敦,无日期),25-26 页。

15. Vestnik finansov, promyshlennosti i torgovli, no. 2, Jan. 10, 1893: 86; Glinskii, Prolog, 10-11; ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, June 14, 1893 (Ministr putei soobshcheniia), pp. 3-4, col. 1; osobyi zhurnal, Mar. 10, 1893, pp. 14-15, col. 1.
15. 《财政、工业与贸易通讯》第 2 期,1893 年 1 月 10 日:86 页;格林斯基,《序幕》,10-11 页;《铁路建设特别期刊》,1893 年 6 月 14 日(交通部长报告),3-4 栏第 1 列;1893 年 3 月 10 日特别期刊,14-15 栏第 1 列。

16. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, p. 11, col. 2; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god (n.d., n.p.), 5-6. Cf. the equivalent of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad’s river-improvement scheme: the construction of additional track throughout the American Great Plains by the Union Pacific Company. The Union Pacific’s auxiliary and branch lines were four times longer than the core system. If the railroad hoped to do anything but carry through traffic, it had to stimulate a wide territory beyond the reach of the trunk line. See Robert G. Athearn, Union Pacific Country (Lincoln, Neb., 1976), 1618.
16. 中东铁路特别日志,1893 年 2 月 10 日与 24 日,第 11 页第 2 栏;《1894 年中东铁路年度报告》(无日期,无出版地),5-6 页。对比西伯利亚铁路委员会河道改善计划的等效方案:联合太平洋公司在美国大平原地区修建的附加轨道。联合太平洋的辅助线与支线长度是主干系统的四倍。若铁路不仅希望承担过境运输,就必须在干线覆盖范围之外刺激更广阔区域的经济发展。参见罗伯特·G·阿西恩《联合太平洋地区》(内布拉斯加林肯,1976 年),1618 页。

17. See ZhKSZhD, zas. 5, Mar. 15, 1893, SP, pp. 1-3, col. 1; osobyi zhurnal, SP, May 26, 1893 (Ministr putei soobshcheniia), pp. 2-3, col. 1; zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 2, SP, pp. 1112; zas. 25, Nov. 29, 1895, SP, p. 4, col. 1; TIRTO, 14:6-8, 32:7; A. Pushechnikov, “O nedochetakh v v vv dele postroiki zheleznykh dorog neposredstvennym rasporiazheniem kazny,” Inzhener, April 1909, no. 4: 104; P. P. Migulin, Nasha noveishaia zhelezno-
17. 参见中东铁路日志,第 5 次会议,1893 年 3 月 15 日,圣彼得堡,第 1-3 页第 1 栏;特别日志,圣彼得堡,1893 年 5 月 26 日(交通部长),第 2-3 页第 1 栏;第 22 次会议,1895 年 3 月 8 日,第二部分,圣彼得堡,第 11-12 页;第 25 次会议,1895 年 11 月 29 日,圣彼得堡,第 4 页第 1 栏;《俄国铁路运输统计》14:6-8, 32:7;A·普谢奇尼科夫,《论国家直接管辖铁路建设中的不足》,《工程师》杂志 1909 年 4 月第 4 期:104 页;P·P·米古林,《我国最新铁路...

dependent on water routes as the only means of supply despite their short navigation season.
尽管通航季节短暂,仍依赖水路作为唯一补给方式。
Since most rivers were hazardous, the committee sought to implement an extensive program of improvements and initiated the systematic exploration of the vast Siberian water system. The auxiliary enterprises fund provided support for work on approximately 10,000 versts of major rivers in Siberia. The Water Routes Administration of the Ministry of Transport dredged and dammed rivers, deepening their navigation channels and strengthening their banks. It set up buoys and flood markers, established meteorological stations, prepared maps, studied navigational conditions, and surveyed the regions along the rivers. To ease the conveyance of materials to the railroad, the Ministry of Transport organized docking facilities at points where the railroad and rivers intersected and built numerous temporary lines from the main line to the river harbors. Rails could now be delivered to all sections. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
由于大多数河流都存在危险,委员会试图实施一项广泛的改善计划,并启动了对广袤西伯利亚水系系统的系统性勘探。辅助企业基金为西伯利亚约 1 万俄里主要河流的治理工作提供了支持。交通部的水路管理局疏浚并筑坝河流,加深其航道并加固河岸。他们设置了浮标和洪水标记,建立了气象站,绘制了地图,研究了航行条件,并对沿河地区进行了勘测。为了便于向铁路运送材料,交通部在铁路与河流交汇处组织了码头设施,并从主线修建了许多通往河港的临时线路。现在,铁轨可以运送到所有路段。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
Lake Baikal received special attention to make it suitable for temporary steamer transport of supplies and, eventually, passengers. The Naval Ministry undertook surveys for port facilities and studied weather conditions, in particular ice formation. Of less immediate use, it commenced hydrographic surveys of the entire lake and the cataloging of the region’s flora and fauna. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
贝加尔湖受到了特别关注,以确保其适合临时通过轮船运输物资及未来的乘客。海军部负责对港口设施进行勘测,并研究天气条件,尤其是冰层形成情况。此外,还启动了全湖的水文测量及该地区动植物的编目工作,尽管这些在当时并非紧迫需求。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
Most ambitious of the committee’s activities in improving water transport, if least fruitful at the time, was its attempt to use the Northern Sea route to supply rails to the heart of Siberia. Naval Minister N. M. Chikhachev proposed chartering steamers and barges in England to carry English rails to Krasnoiarsk in central Siberia. Although this arrangement violated the principle that construction materials be of Russian provenance, Witte lent his support because it would familiarize Russian sailors with the route and help them dis-
委员会在改善水路运输方面最为雄心勃勃却收效甚微的尝试,是利用北海航线将铁轨运送至西伯利亚腹地。海军部长 N·M·奇哈乔夫提议从英国租用蒸汽船和驳船,将英国铁轨运往中西伯利亚的克拉斯诺亚尔斯克。尽管这一安排违背了建筑材料须源自俄罗斯的原则,维特仍予以支持,因为这能让俄罗斯水手熟悉航线,并帮助他们取代外国人——尤其是挪威人——后者当时是该航线的主要航行者和探索者。
place the foreigners, in particular the Norwegians, who were until then its primary navigators and explorers.
最终取代那些外国人,特别是挪威人,他们在此之前一直是该航线的主要航海者和探险家。
In the summer of 1893 the operation was carried out. Barges carried 1,500 tons of rails ( 6,000 individual pieces, or enough for 25 versts) from English factories through the Kara Sea to the mouth of the Enisei River and from there to the port of Krasnoiarsk. Several of the barges sank under the weight of their cargo, but most of the rails were retrieved. Improvements on internal waterways, the eventual construction of the railroad to Krasnoiarsk, and the reluctance to turn to foreign suppliers severely restricted demand for shipments via the Northern Sea route. The railroad committee was optimistic about its future, however, and the Naval Ministry continued to conduct studies of the Kara Sea and the rivers emptying into it. It had the full backing of Vostochnoe obozrenie. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
1893 年夏,运输行动付诸实施。驳船将 1500 吨铁轨(共 6000 根,足以铺设 25 俄里)从英国工厂经喀拉海运至叶尼塞河口,再转运至克拉斯诺亚尔斯克港。部分驳船因超载沉没,但大部分铁轨得以打捞。内河航道的改善、通往克拉斯诺亚尔斯克铁路的最终建成以及对国外供应商的排斥,极大限制了北海航线的货运需求。然而铁路委员会对其前景持乐观态度,海军部仍持续开展对喀拉海及注入该海域河流的勘测工作,并获得了《东方评论》的全力支持。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
The same wariness of foreigners motivated Witte and the committee to create a Russian merchant marine. It was an opportune time to do so, with tens of millions of puds of railroad supplies requiring overseas transport to construction sites. After completion of the railroad Witte expected it to survive for general use and put an end to Russia’s dependence on foreign merchant vessels. The committee expanded the Volunteer Fleet for this purpose and Witte gave it preferential treatment over competing private Russian shipping firms, another reflection of his ambivalence toward private enterprise. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} To accommodate future expansion, the committee supervised the upgrading and expansion of the commercial port at Vladivostok and took over its administration. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
同样的对外国人的警惕促使维特和委员会创建了俄罗斯商船队。当时正值良机,数千万普特的铁路物资需要通过海运运往建设工地。铁路建成后,维特期望这支船队能继续服务于一般用途,并终结俄罗斯对外国商船的依赖。为此,委员会扩大了志愿船队的规模,维特还给予其优于俄罗斯其他私营航运公司的优待,这再次反映了他对私营企业的矛盾态度。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 为了适应未来的扩张需求,委员会监督了符拉迪沃斯托克商业港口的升级和扩建工作,并接管了其管理权。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}

20. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, p. 11, col. 2; osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 24, 1893, pp. 1-4, cols. 1-2; osobyi zhurnal, Mar. 10, 1893, pp. 11-12, col. 1; zas. 7, June 2, 1893, pp. 8-9, col. 1, and p. 8, col. 2; zas. 8, June 14, 1893, p.5, col. 1; zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, pp. 8-10, cols. 1-2; zas. 23, May 3, 1895, pt. 1, SP, pp. 23-24; zas. 25, Nov. 29, 1895, SP, pp. 19-20; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god, 43-44; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1894, no. 4:45-47; Constantine Krypton, The Northern Sea Route: Its Place in Russian Economic History before 1917 (New York, 1953), 79-92; Witte, Vospominaniia, 2:569-572; Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1894, no. 78: 2-3.
20. ZhKSZhD,特别期刊,1893 年 2 月 10 日和 24 日,第 11 页,第 2 栏;特别期刊,1893 年 2 月 24 日,第 1-4 页,第 1-2 栏;特别期刊,1893 年 3 月 10 日,第 11-12 页,第 1 栏;会议 7,1893 年 6 月 2 日,第 8-9 页,第 1 栏,及第 8 页,第 2 栏;会议 8,1893 年 6 月 14 日,第 5 页,第 1 栏;会议 10,1893 年 11 月 10 日,第 8-10 页,第 1-2 栏;会议 23,1895 年 5 月 3 日,第 1 部分,SP,第 23-24 页;会议 25,1895 年 11 月 29 日,SP,第 19-20 页;KSZhD 1894 年度报告,43-44;ZhMPS,官方部分:“西伯利亚铁路”,1894 年,第 4 期:45-47;Constantine Krypton,《北方海路:1917 年前在俄国经济史中的地位》(纽约,1953 年),79-92;Witte,《回忆录》,2:569-572;《东方观察》,1894 年,第 78 期:2-3。

21. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 1429-1430, and “Bor’ba parokhodnykh kompanii za perevozki passazhirov i gruzov sibirskoi magistrali v kontse XIX v.,” in Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Sibirskoe Otdelenie, Dal’nevostochnyi Filial, vol. 7, seriia istoricheskaia, Trudy: Istoriia, arkheologiia i etnografiia Dal’nego Vostoka (Vladivostok, 1967), 73, 79-80; ZhKSZhD, zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 2, SP, pp. 13-15. Even with higher shipping prices, the Volunteer Fleet was given twice as many orders as its largest competitor.
21. 博尔祖诺夫,《创建史》,1429-1430 页,以及《19 世纪末西伯利亚干线客货运输的轮船公司竞争》,载于苏联科学院西伯利亚分院远东分所,《历史系列论文集:远东历史、考古与民族志》(海参崴,1967 年)第 7 卷,73、79-80 页;《全俄铁路事务委员会会议记录》,1895 年 3 月 8 日第 22 次会议,第二部分,圣彼得堡版,13-15 页。即便运费更高,志愿船队获得的订单量仍是其最大竞争对手的两倍。

22. ZhKSZhD, passim; Otchet po KSZhD za 1893 god (n.d., n.p.), 43-46; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god, 44-46; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1894, no. 4: 18-19; Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 1261; V. E. Timonov, “O glavneishikh vodnykh putiakh priamurskogo kraia v sviazi s voprosom ob izbranii mesta dlia tikhookeanskogo kommercheskogo porta sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” IIRGO 34, no. 3 (1898): 317-366.
22. 《全俄铁路事务委员会会议记录》,散见各处;《1893 年西伯利亚铁路委员会年度报告》(无日期,无出版地),43-46 页;《1894 年西伯利亚铁路委员会年度报告》,44-46 页;《交通部公报》官方版:《西伯利亚铁路》,1894 年第 4 期,18-19 页;博尔祖诺夫,《创建史》,1261 页;V·E·季莫诺夫,《论阿穆尔边区主要水路与西伯利亚铁路太平洋商港选址问题》,载于《俄国皇家地理学会通报》第 34 卷第 3 期(1898 年),317-366 页。
The activities of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad in improving navigation on Siberian waterways, though initiated for the purpose of railroad construction, went beyond the task at hand and contributed to the exploration of Russian territory and waters. But the state’s interests were primary, and local wants were satisfied only insofar as they contributed to the construction or operation of the railroad. In this way Russian sovereignty would be strengthened and the role and potential claims of foreigners reduced.
西伯利亚铁路委员会为改善西伯利亚水道航行所开展的活动,虽最初旨在服务于铁路建设,但其影响已超越这一直接目标,为俄国领土及水域的勘探作出了贡献。然而国家利益始终居于首位,地方需求只有在有助于铁路建设或运营时才会得到满足。通过这种方式,俄国的主权得以强化,外国势力的角色及其潜在领土主张被削弱。

Industrial Development  工业发展

As part of its concern with the upgrading of Siberia’s economic infrastructure, at least in principle the committee recognized the needs of the region independent of the railroad and hoped to serve them by stimulating Siberian industry. In accordance with the regionalists’ program for the Siberian economy, as well as Witte’s Slavophilism, heavy industry by no means monopolized the attention of the railroad committee; cottage industries and artels were also supported in the interests of the local economy. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} To satisfy the future demand of the Siberian population for technical and commercial education, as well as the requirements of the railroad, the committee sponsored the opening of technical colleges in Tomsk and Khabarovsk. Vostochnoe obozrenie applauded this expansion of local educational opportunities. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
作为对西伯利亚经济基础设施升级关注的一部分,委员会至少在原则上承认了该地区独立于铁路的需求,并希望通过刺激西伯利亚工业来满足这些需求。根据区域主义者对西伯利亚经济的规划,以及维特的斯拉夫主义,重工业绝非铁路委员会关注的唯一焦点;家庭手工业与劳动组合也因地方经济利益而得到支持。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 为满足西伯利亚居民未来对技术和商业教育的需求,以及铁路运营的要求,委员会资助了在托木斯克和哈巴罗夫斯克开设技术学院。《东方评论》对这一扩大地方教育机会的举措表示赞赏。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
But despite the committee’s talk of raising the cultural level of Siberia and introducing a high level of “technical perfection” to enliven its stagnant industry, its industrial policy was largely adapted to the priority of supplying the railroad with construction materials and fuels. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} Although for the most part it intended to rely on private industry, it granted state subsidies in the form of loans and orders, and deemed factories and mines within Siberia worthy of support only if they were located close to the railroad. Once again the interests of the state set the course of Siberian industrial development. Indeed, the committee
尽管委员会高谈阔论要提升西伯利亚的文化水平,引入高度的“技术完美”以激活其停滞的工业,但其工业政策主要调整为优先为铁路建设提供材料和燃料。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 虽然大部分情况下它打算依赖私营工业,但仍以贷款和订单形式提供国家补贴,并认为只有靠近铁路的工厂和矿山才值得支持。国家的利益再次决定了西伯利亚工业发展的方向。事实上,委员会
regarded Peter the Great’s creation of the Ural iron industry as a successful precedent for its stimulation of Siberian industry. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
将彼得大帝创建乌拉尔钢铁工业视为其刺激西伯利亚工业的成功先例。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
The committee conducted research into the viability of creating brick factories, sawmills, and cement factories for both long-term local uses and railroad construction, but most vital was the production of iron for rails, spikes, and bridges. The quantities needed would be enormous (more than 23 million puds for rails and spikes alone, making up two-thirds of the total production of pig iron in all of Russia for the years 1885-1889 and one-third for the years 18901894). 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} It was originally expected that the railroad would rely on the Siberian iron industry, so hopes for its expansion rose, but none of the three existing iron works in Siberia-the Gur’ev factory in Kuznetsk okrug, the Nikolaev factory near Bratskii Ostrog on the Angara, or the Abakan factory in the southwest of Enisei province-was capable of adapting to rail production, even with heavy state subsidies and large orders. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
委员会对建立砖厂、锯木厂和水泥厂的可行性进行了研究,这些工厂既可用于当地长期需求,也可用于铁路建设,但最关键的是生产铁轨、道钉和桥梁所需的铁材。所需数量将非常巨大(仅铁轨和道钉就需要超过 2300 万普特,占 1885-1889 年全俄生铁总产量的三分之二,1890-1894 年的三分之一)。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 最初预计铁路将依赖西伯利亚的钢铁工业,因此对其扩张的期望上升,但西伯利亚现有的三家铁厂——库兹涅茨克区的古里耶夫工厂、安加拉河布拉茨克奥斯特罗格附近的尼古拉耶夫工厂,或叶尼塞省西南部的阿巴坎工厂——都无法适应铁轨生产,即使有大量国家补贴和大额订单。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
Witte and his colleagues soon recognized that the Siberian Railroad would have to rely on the production of European Russia, in particular the Urals, for its rails and rolling stock. Thus the railroad would “raise the productive forces of our Motherland” and hold to the principle of building with Russian materials to the greatest extent possible. It would also keep to its construction schedule; Witte insisted that the schedule be kept, even though it would require the diversion of a very large part of the nation’s rail production to Siberia. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
维特及其同僚很快意识到,西伯利亚铁路必须依赖欧俄地区的生产,尤其是乌拉尔地区,来供应铁轨和机车车辆。因此,这条铁路将“提升我们祖国的生产力”,并尽可能坚持使用俄国本土材料进行建设的原则。同时,工程也将严格遵循施工进度;维特坚持要求按计划推进,即便这意味着需要将国家铁路生产的很大一部分资源调拨至西伯利亚。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
Eventually twenty-five Russian factories produced rails, joints, and spikes for the railroad, exceeding 23 million puds at a cost of more than 39 million rubles. Twelve European Russian and Polish factories contributed an additional 4 million puds of bridge iron. The Putilov Company and the Briansk Ironworks supplied the railroad with much
最终,共有二十五家俄国工厂为铁路生产了铁轨、接头和道钉,总量超过 2300 万普特,耗资逾 3900 万卢布。另有十二家欧俄及波兰工厂额外提供了 400 万普特的桥梁用铁。普梯洛夫公司与布良斯克铁厂为铁路供应了大量——

26. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, pp. 5-6, col. 1; pp. 7-9, col. 2. For the reference to Peter the Great, see TKIM 25:59.
26. 俄国铁路建设委员会特别会议记录,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 5-6 页第 1 栏;第 7-9 页第 2 栏。关于彼得大帝的引述,参见《俄国工业史资料》第 25 卷第 59 页。

27. ZhKSZhD, zas. 12, Dec. 22, 1893, pp. 14-15, cols. 1-2; zas. 23, May 3, 1895, pt. 1, SP, pp. 22-23; TKIM, vol. 10; A. V. Pataleev, Istoriia stroitel’stva velikogo sibirskogo zheleznodorozhnogo puti (Khabarovsk, 1951), 12. For the requirements of the Siberian Railroad, see Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 817. For total Russian production figures, see M. E. Falkus, The Industrialisation of Russia, 1700-1914 (London, 1972), 52.
27. 俄国铁路建设委员会会议记录(ZhKSZhD),第 12 次会议,1893 年 12 月 22 日,第 14-15 页,第 1-2 栏;第 23 次会议,1895 年 5 月 3 日,第一部分,特别报告,第 22-23 页;《俄国铁路建设史料汇编》(TKIM)第 10 卷;A·V·帕塔列耶夫,《西伯利亚大铁路建设史》(哈巴罗夫斯克,1951 年),第 12 页。关于西伯利亚铁路的需求,参见博尔祖诺夫《创建史》,第 817 页。俄国总产量数据参见 M·E·福尔库斯,《俄国工业化:1700-1914》(伦敦,1972 年),第 52 页。

28. TOSRPT, vol. 22, otdel 1 (1893), 38-40; TKIM, vol. 19; vol. 23, p. 1; ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, p. 8, col. 2; osobyi zhurnal, June 14, 1893 (Ministr putei soobshcheniia, po delu dogovora s Polovtsovoi), pp. 1-2, col. 1; zas. 24, June 28, 1895, SP, pp. 14-15; zas. 26, Mar. 6, 1896, SP, pp. 13-14, cols. 1-2.
28. 《俄国铁路技术协会会刊》(TOSRPT)第 22 卷,第 1 分册(1893 年),第 38-40 页;《俄国铁路建设史料汇编》第 19 卷;第 23 卷第 1 页;俄国铁路建设委员会特别会议记录,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 8 页第 2 栏;1893 年 6 月 14 日特别会议记录(交通部长关于波洛夫佐娃合同事宜),第 1-2 页第 1 栏;第 24 次会议,1895 年 6 月 28 日,特别报告第 14-15 页;第 26 次会议,1896 年 3 月 6 日,特别报告第 13-14 页第 1-2 栏。

29. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, May 26, 1893 (Ministr putei soobshcheniia), pp. 2-3, col. 1; zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, p. 12, col. 2; Vestnik finansov, no. 2, Jan. 10, 1893: 89. The quote is in Glinskii, Prolog, 190-191.
29. 俄国铁路建设委员会特别会议记录,1893 年 5 月 26 日(交通部长报告),第 2-3 页第 1 栏;第 10 次会议,1893 年 11 月 10 日,第 12 页第 2 栏;《财政通报》1893 年 1 月 10 日第 2 期:第 89 页。引文出自格林斯基《序幕》第 190-191 页。

of its rolling stock. In 1893 alone, orders were placed for 148 eightwheeled steam locomotives and 1,811 railroad cars and flatcars. By 1903, Russian factories had delivered 1,514 locomotives and 30,197 railroad cars. The cost of rolling stock made up one-sixth of the total construction expenditures of the railroad. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
其机车车辆的投入。仅 1893 年一年,就订购了 148 台八轮蒸汽机车和 1,811 节铁路货车及平板车。至 1903 年,俄国工厂已交付 1,514 台机车和 30,197 节铁路车辆。机车车辆的花费占铁路总建设成本的六分之一。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
One of the most important suppliers of rails was the Nadezhdinsk Iron and Steel Works in the Bogoslovskii mining district of the northern Urals, erected with a loan of 2.5 million rubles provided by the Committee of the Siberian Railroad in return for the shipment of 5 million puds of steel rails, and sustained thereafter by government subsidies. The factory’s owner (and namesake) was Nadezhda Mikhailovna Polovtsova, the wife of A. A. Polovtsov, a state secretary and member of the State Council. Polovtsova was the daughter of the millionaire Baron M. Stieglitz, and she had made Polovtsov one of the wealthiest men in Russia.
最重要的铁轨供应商之一是位于北乌拉尔博戈斯洛夫斯克矿区的纳德日金斯克钢铁厂,该厂由西伯利亚铁路委员会提供 250 万卢布贷款兴建,条件是交付 500 万普特钢轨,此后依靠政府补贴维持运营。工厂所有者(以其命名)是娜杰日达·米哈伊洛芙娜·波洛夫措娃,她是国务秘书兼国务会议成员 A.A.波洛夫措夫的妻子。波洛夫措娃是百万富翁男爵 M.施蒂格利茨的女儿,她使波洛夫措夫成为俄国最富有的人之一。

The Bogoslovskii factories were of the first importance for Polovtsov, and he spared no effort to advance their cause. There can be no doubt that he used his influence at court and his position in the State Council to win the contract to supply rails to the Siberian Railroad. Witte was the most vocal defender of the contract in the Committee of the Siberian Railroad (against those who insisted on giving preference to Siberian industry) because he hoped Polovtsov would become a powerful ally on the State Council, which still regarded Witte with skepticism. The subsidy was the price of Polovtsov’s support for Witte in the State Council. Supporting the Bogoslovskii factories with loans and contracts would tie Polovtsov to him and help grease the wheels of the bureaucracy in St. Petersburg, especially in regard to the Siberian Railroad. This consideration, as much as any other, determined the resolution of the problem of iron supplies for the railroad; the political customs of St. Petersburg molded the construction of the Siberian Railroad and Siberian economic development. The incident illuminates an important dimension of the state’s stimulation of industry in Russia and calls into further question the quality of state-led industrialization under Witte. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
博戈斯洛夫斯基工厂对波洛夫佐夫至关重要,他不遗余力地推动其发展。毫无疑问,他利用自己在宫廷的影响力和在国家委员会中的职位,赢得了为西伯利亚铁路供应铁轨的合同。维特在西伯利亚铁路委员会中(反对那些坚持优先考虑西伯利亚工业的人)为合同辩护最为积极,因为他希望波洛夫佐夫能在国家委员会中成为他的有力盟友,而国家委员会对维特仍持怀疑态度。补贴是波洛夫佐夫在国家委员会中支持维特的代价。通过贷款和合同支持博戈斯洛夫斯基工厂,将使波洛夫佐夫与他紧密联系,并有助于润滑圣彼得堡官僚机构的运作,特别是在西伯利亚铁路方面。这一考虑,与其他因素一样,决定了铁路铁轨供应问题的解决方案;圣彼得堡的政治惯例塑造了西伯利亚铁路的建设和西伯利亚的经济发展。 这一事件揭示了俄国政府刺激工业发展的一个重要层面,并进一步引发了对维特领导下国家主导工业化质量的质疑。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
In the interests of rapid construction, it was often found convenient as well to turn to foreign manufacturers, if reluctantly. Some contractors on the Western Siberian Railroad made use of American-made steam shovels, and because of the relative proximity of the United States and the low cost of overseas shipping, American steel was imported to the Far Eastern sections of the railroad for twelve bridges. Other American contributions included an indeterminate number of steel rails and Baldwin locomotives. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} None of these statistics justifies the claim that Witte ignored the principle of relying on Russian equipment or materials, or the assertion that the Trans-Siberian and Chinese-Eastern Railroads were “in all essentials” Americanequipped. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
出于快速建设的考虑,即便不情愿,转向外国制造商往往也被视为便利之举。西西伯利亚铁路的部分承包商使用了美国制造的蒸汽铲,且由于美国地理位置相对较近及海运成本低廉,远东铁路段的十二座桥梁采用了进口的美国钢材。其他美国贡献还包括数量不详的钢轨和鲍德温机车。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 这些数据无一能支撑维特忽视依赖俄国设备或材料原则的说法,也无法断言跨西伯利亚铁路和中东铁路"本质上完全"依赖美国装备。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
The committee gave preference to European Russian iron works, but it did not completely abandon its faith in a future for Siberian metallurgy. In 1888 the Kuznetsk basin had barely received mention in the Russian Technical Society debates as a potential source of coal. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} By the mid-1890s, research had shown that iron deposits ex-
委员会更倾向于欧洲俄罗斯的钢铁厂,但并未完全放弃对西伯利亚冶金业未来的信心。1888 年,库兹涅茨克盆地在俄罗斯技术学会的辩论中仅被略微提及作为潜在的煤炭来源地。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 到了 19 世纪 90 年代中期,研究表明该地区铁矿床与富含焦炭品质的煤层和无烟煤紧密相邻,这一组合条件使得在西伯利亚铁路相对邻近处建立西伯利亚钢铁工业成为可能。为规划其发展,需对该区域进行广泛的地质勘探。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34}
isted there close to rich veins of coking-quality coals and anthracite, a combination that would allow for the establishment of a Siberian iron industry in relative proximity to the Siberian Railroad. To plan its development, extensive geological research of the region was required. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
那里蕴藏着铁矿层,且邻近具有焦炭品质的丰富煤层和无烟煤,这一组合条件为在西伯利亚铁路附近相对便利地建立西伯利亚钢铁工业提供了可能。为推进开发计划,必须对该地区展开全面的地质调查。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
The desire to tap the apparent mineral wealth of the Kuznetsk basin pointed up the necessity of conducting geological surveys in all of Siberia. As one writer put it, the Committee of the Siberian Railroad made Siberia “a fashionable place for all types of research.” In the two years 1894-1896 alone, according to his count, fifty-eight geological expeditions were sent to western Siberia and the Altai Mountains and forty-four to eastern Siberia and the Far East. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} Before this time, surveying and exploration of Siberia had been desultory, limited to established mining regions and populated settlements. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37}
开发库兹涅茨克盆地明显矿产资源的愿望凸显了在整个西伯利亚进行地质调查的必要性。正如一位作家所说,西伯利亚铁路委员会使西伯利亚成为“各类研究的时尚之地”。据他统计,仅在 1894-1896 的两年间,就有 58 支地质考察队被派往西西伯利亚和阿尔泰山脉,44 支前往东西伯利亚和远东地区。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} 在此之前,西伯利亚的勘测和勘探工作一直零散进行,仅限于已开发的矿区和人居聚落。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37}
Characteristically, the committee limited geological expeditions to a zone bisected by the Siberian Railroad, for the purpose of charting the location of fuel and ore sources that would be of direct use to the railroad during construction and operation, or of indirect benefit through their exploitation by local industry. The Ministry of State Domains sent survey teams out yearly along the projected route in both eastern and western Siberia to catalog and map their resources. They discovered extensive deposits of coal, iron ore, copper ore, nephrite, graphite, lead, granite, and silver, as well as unidentified ores. They examined peat bogs for their fuel potential, conducted hydrographic studies in the Steppe oblast to find sources of water for the railroad, and sought salt in Priamur’e to permit the growth of a fishing industry, which it was felt might better sustain local settlement. They also searched for oil, but with very minimal success. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
委员会通常将地质勘探活动限制在西伯利亚铁路穿过的区域,目的是绘制可直接用于铁路建设和运营的燃料和矿石资源分布图,或通过当地工业开发间接获益。国家产业部每年都会沿规划路线向东、西西伯利亚派遣勘察队,对资源进行编目和测绘。他们发现了大量煤炭、铁矿、铜矿、软玉、石墨、铅矿、花岗岩和银矿,以及一些未鉴定的矿石。考察队评估了泥炭沼的燃料潜力,在草原省份开展水文调查以寻找铁路水源,并在阿穆尔河沿岸勘探盐矿以促进渔业发展——人们认为渔业可能更有利于维持当地定居点。此外,他们还勘探石油,但收效甚微。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}

35. “‘O sposobakh obezpecheniia stroiushcheisia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi rel’sami i zheleznodorozhnymi prinadlezhnostiami’ (Doklad A. A. Bogdanova),” TOSRPT, vol. 22, otdel 2 (1893), 458; ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, pp. 5-6, col. 1, and pp. 8-9, col. 2; osobyi zhurnal, June 14, 1893 (Ministr putei soobshcheniia, po delu dogovora s Polovtsovoi), p. 2, col. 1; p. 3, col. 2; pp. 8-9, col. 2; zas. 10, pp. 11-12, col. 2; TKIM 23:17.
35. “关于保障西伯利亚铁路建设所需铁轨及铁路附属设备方法的报告(A·A·波格丹诺夫提交)”,《交通部铁路技术委员会会刊》第 22 卷第 2 分册(1893 年),第 458 页;《铁路建设委员会特别日志》,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 5-6 页第 1 栏,第 8-9 页第 2 栏;1893 年 6 月 14 日特别日志(交通部长关于波洛夫佐娃合同事宜),第 2 页第 1 栏;第 3 页第 2 栏;第 8-9 页第 2 栏;第 10 次会议记录,第 11-12 页第 2 栏;《铁路史料汇编》第 23 卷第 17 页。

36. S. Nikitin, “Uspekhi geologicheskikh znanii za 1892-1893 goda,” Ezhegodnik imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva 6 (1896): 61-62.
36. S·尼基京,《1892-1893 年地质学知识进展》,《帝俄地理学会年鉴》第 6 卷(1896 年),第 61-62 页。

37. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Mar. 10, 1893, pp. 4-6, col. 1.
37. 俄国铁路建设特别期刊,1893 年 3 月 10 日,第 4-6 页,第 1 栏。

38. See ibid., passim; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god, 39-41; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1894, no. 4: 53, 55-58; “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” Inzhener 20 (April 1896): 192. For the practical results of this research as regards coal, see E. Morskii, “Kachestvo sibirskikh uglei po dannym laboratorii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” Zhurnal obshchestva sibirskikh inzhenerov 3 (March 1911): 79-86. According to Morskii, the Siberian Railroad was using more than 50 million puds of coal a year. The railroad’s laboratories analyzed the output of each mine.
38. 参见同上各处;《1894 年西伯利亚铁路年度报告》,39-41 页;《交通部杂志》官方版:“西伯利亚铁路”,1894 年第 4 期:53, 55-58 页;“西伯利亚铁路”,《工程师》杂志 20 卷(1896 年 4 月):192 页。关于此项研究在煤炭方面的实际成果,见 E.莫尔斯基《根据西伯利亚铁路实验室数据的西伯利亚煤炭质量分析》,《西伯利亚工程师协会杂志》第 3 期(1911 年 3 月):79-86 页。据莫尔斯基所述,西伯利亚铁路每年消耗超过 5000 万普特煤炭。铁路实验室对各矿产出进行了分析。
The committee’s interest in gold mining is evidence of the prominent place held by the Siberian Railroad in Witte’s economic policy. Witte was gradually won over to the idea of putting Russia on the gold standard; Siberia might provide the gold reserves this move required. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} An increase in gold production would also bring revenues to the Siberian Railroad and was expected to enliven vast regions of Siberia and inject much-needed capital into the economy as a whole.
委员会对金矿开采的关注证明了西伯利亚铁路在维特经济政策中的重要地位。维特逐渐接受了将俄罗斯转向金本位制的构想;西伯利亚可能为此提供所需的黄金储备。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} 黄金产量的增长还将为西伯利亚铁路带来收入,并有望激活西伯利亚广大地区,为整体经济注入急需的资本。
Witte called for a wide-ranging study of gold mining, financed by the auxiliary enterprises. For the first time, the potential for gold mining in the Far East and the Okhotsk-Kamchatka region was explored, with results that were greater than expected. The mining expeditions discovered and mapped rich gold fields throughout northeastern Siberia, in an area destined to be first worked on a large scale by forced labor in the Stalin period, under the administration of Dal’stroi (Far Eastern Construction Trust). The tsar ordered the government to open the new gold fields to private industry, but with close supervision to safeguard the interests of the state. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
维特呼吁对金矿开采进行广泛研究,资金由附属企业提供。这是首次对远东及鄂霍次克-堪察加地区的金矿开采潜力进行勘探,结果超出预期。采矿探险队在东北西伯利亚发现并绘制了丰富的金矿田,该地区后来在斯大林时期由远东建设信托(Dal’stroi)管理下首次大规模使用强制劳动力进行开采。沙皇下令政府向私营工业开放这些新金矿,但需严密监管以保障国家利益。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
As in all the auxiliary enterprises, the contours of the committee’s work in the stimulation of mining and industry were shaped to fit the specific demands of the state in completing the railroad. But in its scope the committee contributed to the exploration and opening of the empire’s distant Siberian lands, initiating a process of development that is still ongoing.
与所有附属企业一样,该委员会在促进采矿和工业方面的工作轮廓是根据国家完成铁路建设的具体需求而设计的。但就其范围而言,委员会为探索和开发帝国遥远的西伯利亚土地做出了贡献,开启了一个至今仍在持续的发展进程。

Peasant Resettlement  农民迁移

The committee’s promotion of the state’s interests was most obvious in its detailed direction of the peasant colonization movement. This was the broad and diverse field of activity within the auxiliary enterprises which, next to railroad construction itself, received the bulk of the committee’s attention and funding. Witte and others thought of it as their basic task and the most important of the auxiliary enterprises. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}
委员会对国家利益的推动在其对农民殖民运动的细致指导中最为明显。这是辅助企业活动中广泛而多样的领域,仅次于铁路建设本身,占据了委员会大部分关注和资金。维特等人将其视为基本任务,也是最重要的辅助事业。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}
Colonization would benefit the government in its efforts to build and operate the railroad. The committee intended to settle the region along either side of the railroad to provide a ready supply of passengers, freight, and repairmen. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42}
殖民化将有助于政府建设和运营铁路。委员会计划在铁路两侧定居移民,以提供稳定的乘客、货物和维修人员来源。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42}
But the major reason for the controlled distribution of plots to immigrants was Russification. The specter of the “yellow peril” loomed before the committee and provided a compelling justification for state control of the migration: “For the sole purpose of strengthening the Russians’ bulwark against the [inflowing] waves of the yellow race, all measures possible must be taken to increase the supply of lands where [Russian] peasants can be settled.” 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} Rapid settlement by Russian peasants would secure the border.
但控制性地分配土地给移民的主要原因是俄罗斯化。"黄祸"的幽灵在委员会面前若隐若现,为国家控制移民提供了强有力的理由:"为了唯一目的——加强俄罗斯人抵御[涌入的]黄种人浪潮的堡垒,必须采取一切可能的措施增加可供[俄罗斯]农民定居的土地供应。" 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 俄罗斯农民的快速定居将巩固边境安全。
In the interior the peril was no less strong. A survey undertaken by the committee showed that in the Amur region, many natives, in particular the Orochi and Manegry, still considered themselves subjects of the Chinese emperor rather than of the tsar. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} Bunge counseled the reinforcement of the Russian element in Siberia and to this end Kulomzin commissioned a study of Bismarck’s attempt to Germanize Prussia’s Polish provinces through colonization. His methods became a model for the organized settlement of Siberia. 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
在内陆地区,危险同样严峻。委员会进行的一项调查显示,在阿穆尔地区,许多原住民,尤其是奥罗奇人和曼涅格里人,仍自视为中国皇帝的臣民而非沙皇的子民。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} 本格建议加强西伯利亚的俄罗斯元素,为此库洛姆津委托研究俾斯麦通过殖民手段使普鲁士波兰省份德意志化的尝试。其方法成为西伯利亚有组织移民的范本。 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
The committee’s program of resettlement was nothing short of demographic engineering on a mass scale. According to Witte, “landlessness” existed not because the empire was lacking in land but because its population was unevenly distributed. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} The answer was to
委员会的移民计划无异于大规模的人口结构重塑。据维特所言,“土地匮乏”并非因为帝国土地不足,而是人口分布不均所致。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} 解决之道在于
Peasant migrants at railroad way station. From Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie, Aziatskaia Rossiia (St. Petersburg, 1914).
铁路小站上的农民移民。摘自移民管理局《亚洲俄罗斯》(圣彼得堡,1914 年)。

distribute it more evenly where it would satisfy the needs of the state. In his words, “The settlement of open lands . . accords with the basic economic task of the state, namely, the colonization of its entire territory.” Population density, he continued, “constitutes . . . an important condition of political power: the size of the army is determined by it, and on that depends the nation’s internal and external security and the achievement of its political goals.” 47 This statement explains the purpose of colonization. As a Ministry of Finance publication announced, the government was taking charge of the historic eastward movement of the Great Russian “tribe.” 48 Between 1891 and 1914, approximately 5 million Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians settled in Siberia. Of this total, illegal migration from 1895 to 1910 fluctuated between 25 and 50 percent, although it climbed much
将其更均匀地分配到能够满足国家需求的地区。用他的话来说,“开拓空旷土地……与国家的基本经济任务相符,即对整个领土的殖民。”他进一步阐述道,“人口密度……构成了政治力量的重要条件:军队规模由此决定,而这又关乎国家的内外安全及其政治目标的实现。”47 这一声明阐明了殖民的目的。正如财政部的一份出版物所宣布的,政府正在主导历史上大俄罗斯“部族”向东迁移的运动。48 在 1891 年至 1914 年间,约 500 万俄罗斯人、乌克兰人和白俄罗斯人定居西伯利亚。其中,1895 年至 1910 年间的非法移民比例在 25%至 50%之间波动,但在日俄战争期间,由于军队垄断了铁路运输,这一比例大幅上升。

47. S. Iu. Witte, Vorlesungen über Volks- und Staatswirtschaft, trans. Josef Melnik, vol. 1 (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1913), 90, 99.
47. S·尤·维特,《国民经济与国家经济讲义》,约瑟夫·梅尔尼克译,第一卷(斯图加特/柏林,1913 年),第 90、99 页。

48. Vestnik finansov, no. 2, Jan. 10, 1893: 87-89.
48. 《财政通报》,第 2 期,1893 年 1 月 10 日:87-89 页。

higher during the Russo-Japanese War, when the military monopolized the railroad. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
在日俄战争期间,由于军队垄断了铁路运输,这一比例上升得更高。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
When Western historians discuss the government’s efforts to control the settlement of Siberia between 1861 and 1904, they emphasize its inability to stop the flow of migrants and portray it as legalizing its own broken rules in the wake of the fait accompli of illegal migration. Soviet historians, on the other hand, emphasize the restraints the government placed in the way of the peasants and its unwillingness to lend them more than minimal assistance. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} While there is much truth to both of these interpretations, they fail to recognize how wholeheartedly the Committee of the Siberian Railroad promoted resettlement and concerned itself with the welfare of all the peasant migrants, all to channel the movement according to the state’s requirements.
当西方历史学家讨论 1861 至 1904 年间政府对西伯利亚移民控制的努力时,他们强调政府无力阻止移民潮,并将其描述为在非法移民既成事实后,政府不得不将自身被破坏的规则合法化。而苏联历史学家则着重强调政府对农民设置的种种限制,以及不愿提供超出最低限度的援助。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} 尽管这两种解释都有其真实之处,但它们未能认识到西伯利亚铁路委员会如何全心全意地推动移民安置,并关心所有农民移民的福祉,这一切都是为了按照国家的要求引导移民运动。
This is not to claim that there was unanimous agreement on the issue; there was not. At both the special conference of November 21, 1892, and the first session of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad, Witte broached the topic of resettling landless peasants in Siberia. The resettlement, according to him, would solve two problems simultaneously: the peopling of Siberia and the overpopulation of rural Russia, which had become a financial burden to the government. Especially the peasants of the western provinces who had not received land allotments would benefit from resettlement. The committee’s task was to ascertain who should go, how to get them to Siberia, how to distribute lands, and how to administer the program. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
这并非声称在此议题上存在全体一致的意见;事实并非如此。在 1892 年 11 月 21 日的特别会议及西伯利亚铁路委员会的首次会议上,维特提出了将无地农民迁移至西伯利亚的议题。据他所述,此举能同时解决两大问题:西伯利亚的人口填充与俄罗斯农村因人口过剩而给政府造成的财政负担。特别是那些未获得土地分配的西部省份农民,将从迁移中受益。委员会的任务是确定迁移对象、迁移方式、土地分配方案以及该计划的行政管理措施。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}

Minister of the Interior Durnovo initially expressed reservations as to details of Witte’s proposal. He was concerned about the impact of
内政部长杜尔诺沃最初对维特提案的具体细节表达了保留意见。他担忧该计划对
migration on the agriculture of the “old settler” peasants of Siberia. To safeguard their interests, he argued, surveys must determine the exact amount of land available. Not until all land was surveyed (and millions of acres were still unsurveyed) should it be opened to settlement. The government should then hold a lottery to distribute lands to a very limited number of European Russian peasants, specifically those with means; settlement of the poorest elements in the Ussuri region had been a costly failure. Furthermore, the western provinces should not be depopulated of their Russian peasants, so as not to take a step backward in the Russification of that region, and “foreign elements” that is, non-Russians-must be prohibited from settling in Siberia. 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
为了保护西伯利亚“老定居者”农民在农业上的利益,他认为必须通过勘测确定可用土地的确切数量。在所有土地完成勘测前(当时仍有数百万英亩未勘测),不得开放定居。政府应通过抽签方式,将土地分配给数量极有限的欧俄农民,特别是那些有经济能力的群体;此前在乌苏里地区安置最贫困群体的尝试代价高昂且以失败告终。此外,西部省份不应流失俄罗斯农民人口,以免该地区的俄罗斯化进程倒退,同时必须禁止“外来元素”——即非俄罗斯人——在西伯利亚定居。 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
Ministers of the Interior Durnovo, Goremykin, Plehve, and even Sipiagin also continued to oppose Witte on the major issue of the peasant commune, which had a bearing on resettlement. Initially Witte was a staunch supporter of the commune as a bulwark of order and conservatism in the countryside. Under the influence of Bunge, he gradually came to understand that in stifling individual enterprise and the internal market, the commune was injurious to the health of the Treasury. Its responsibility for rural poverty contributed to political instability too. He advocated the reform of passport restrictions and joint responsibility for taxes, those features of the commune that most retarded initiative and acted to restrict the departure of peasants for Siberia. After many years of Interior Ministry resistance and obstruction, Witte eventually succeeded in bringing the issue before the government for discussion and achieved these limited changes, to the benefit of peasant mobility. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
内政大臣杜尔诺沃、戈列梅金、普列韦,甚至西皮亚金也继续在农民公社这一重大问题上反对维特,而这一问题与移民安置息息相关。起初,维特是公社制度的坚定支持者,认为它是农村秩序与保守主义的堡垒。在邦格的影响下,他逐渐认识到公社制度扼杀个人进取心与国内市场,损害国库健康。其对农村贫困的责任也加剧了政治动荡。维特主张改革护照限制和税收连带责任——这些公社制度中最抑制主动性、阻碍农民迁往西伯利亚的特征。经过内务部多年的阻挠后,维特最终成功推动政府讨论该议题,并实现了这些有限的变革,从而促进了农民流动。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
The opposition of the ministers of the interior can be attributed more to their bureaucratic caution, suspicion of change, and wariness of individual initiative than to anything else. And although their resistance to the weakening of the commune is linked to the migration question, it was mostly a symptom of the growing incompatibility of
内政部长们的反对更多可归因于他们的官僚式谨慎、对变革的怀疑以及对个人主动性的警惕,而非其他因素。尽管他们对削弱村社制度的抵制与移民问题相关,但这主要是日益凸显的

52. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, pp. 1-2, col. 2, and pp. 4-5, col. 2; osobyi zhurnal, June 2, 1893, pp. 4-7, col. 2.
52. 铁路建设委员会特别日志,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 1-2 页第二栏,第 4-5 页第二栏;特别日志,1893 年 6 月 2 日,第 4-7 页第二栏。

53. For various aspects of this issue, see Boris V. Anan’ich, “The Economic Policy of the Tsarist Government and Enterprise in Russia from the End of the Nineteenth through the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” in Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, ed. Gregory Guroff and Fred V. Carstensen (Princeton, 1983), 131-133; Anan’ich et al., Krizis, 49-60; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 222-229; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 199-200; M. S. Simonova, “Bor’ba techenii v pravitel’stvennom lagere po voprosam agrarnoi politiki v kontse XIX v.,” Istoriia SSSR, January-February 1963, no. 1: 74-78.
53. 关于这一问题的多个方面,参见鲍里斯·V·阿纳尼奇,《沙皇政府的经济政策与十九世纪末至二十世纪初俄罗斯的企业活动》,收录于《帝俄与苏联的企业家精神》,格雷戈里·古罗夫与弗雷德·V·卡斯滕森编(普林斯顿,1983 年),131-133 页;阿纳尼奇等,《危机》,49-60 页;冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特》,222-229 页;舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,199-200 页;M·S·西蒙诺娃,《十九世纪末政府内部关于农业政策问题的派系斗争》,《苏联历史》,1963 年 1-2 月第 1 期:74-78 页。

their ministry with the Ministry of Finance, as well as personal conflict between Witte and themselves. Before open hostility set in at the turn of the century, the two ministries were in general agreement on most matters. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} In regard to the problem of the Siberian migration, the objections of the Ministry of the Interior were only to minutiae.
他们所在的部门与财政部之间,以及维特本人与他们之间的个人冲突。在世纪之交公开敌对之前,这两个部门在大多数问题上基本保持一致。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} 关于西伯利亚移民问题,内务部的反对仅针对细枝末节。
Witte’s memoirs contribute to the perception of an Interior Ministry in stubborn opposition to Siberian resettlement by deliberately misrepresenting its position. According to Witte, Durnovo led the resistance on behalf of the gentry landlords. The landlords opposed the migration for fear that it would hold land prices down, deplete the supply of cheap labor, and disrupt order and state authority. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} Witte’s account is deceptive, however, rooted as it is in the bad feelings of many years between the two ministries.
维特的回忆录通过故意曲解内政部的立场,强化了内政部顽固反对西伯利亚移民的印象。据维特所述,杜尔诺沃代表贵族地主领导了这场抵制。地主们反对移民,担心这会压低土地价格,耗尽廉价劳动力供应,并扰乱秩序和国家权威。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} 然而,维特的叙述具有欺骗性,其根源在于两部门之间多年的恶劣关系。
The truth is that by 1894, Durnovo accepted the committee’s statistics showing that there was a surplus of agricultural labor in the European Russian Black Earth Zone, so that even if many peasants migrated, the gentry would suffer no shortage of laborers. 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} The following year, on the basis of the committee’s study of peasant land holding, Durnovo acknowledged the poverty of the rural population and the virtues of resettlement: “To deny them the chance to improve their economic condition by migrating to provinces where land is plentiful can hardly be considered the government’s aim.” 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} He was in perfect agreement with Witte and the rest of the committee on the question.
事实上,到 1894 年,杜尔诺沃接受了委员会的数据,这些数据显示俄罗斯欧洲黑土带的农业劳动力过剩,因此即使许多农民迁移,贵族也不会缺乏劳动力。 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} 次年,根据委员会对农民土地持有的研究,杜尔诺沃承认农村人口的贫困以及重新安置的好处:“剥夺他们通过迁移到土地丰富的省份来改善经济状况的机会,很难被认为是政府的目标。” 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} 在这个问题上,他与维特和委员会的其他成员完全一致。
Witte misrepresented his own position too. He wrote that the idea of resettlement was “extremely liberal and almost revolutionary,” and that St. Petersburg regarded it as a dangerous heresy. But his plan was not in the least liberal or revolutionary, as the encouragement and support given it by both Alexander III and Nicholas II attest. 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} Witte never envisaged totally free settlement. Although he knew the Russian peasant was not an “adventure seeker,” he agreed with Durnovo that in the interests of “social tranquility and order,” the spontaneous (samovol’noe) migration of peasants was “highly undesirable from the government’s point of view,” and that the movement should be orga-
维特同样歪曲了自己的立场。他写道,移民的想法“极其自由,近乎革命”,而圣彼得堡视其为危险的异端邪说。但他的计划丝毫谈不上自由或革命,这一点从亚历山大三世和尼古拉二世都给予其鼓励和支持便可得到印证。 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} 维特从未设想过完全自由的移民。尽管他知道俄国农民并非“冒险家”,但他赞同杜尔诺沃的观点,即为了“社会稳定与秩序”,农民自发的(самовольное)迁移“从政府角度来看极不可取”,这一运动应当被组-
nized and kept “in conformity with the law.” Witte warned the committee against exciting the peasants to the point where they would get “carried away with dreams of new lands.” 59
织起来并保持“符合法律”。维特警告委员会不要过度刺激农民,以免他们“沉迷于对新土地的幻想中”。59
Until the poor harvest of 1901 and the peasant revolts of 1902 forced some rethinking of Russian agricultural policy, only Bunge advocated the removal of restrictions and the opening of Siberia to all comers. And even this proposition was part of a formula Bunge had developed to combat socialism in Russia, not advocacy of a liberal migration policy for its own sake. 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
直到 1901 年的歉收和 1902 年的农民起义迫使俄国重新思考农业政策之前,只有邦格主张取消限制并向所有人开放西伯利亚。即便如此,这一主张也是邦格为对抗俄国社会主义而制定的方案的一部分,并非出于自由主义移民政策本身的倡导。 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
Witte and the committee accepted the fact that large numbers of irregular settlers would join those who had received permission to leave Russia for Siberia according to law. The minister of the interior’s initial inclination to take “repressive measures” and force their return to their villages was roundly opposed, not least by Nicholas. Having broken their ties to the commune, he argued, they were not likely to be welcomed back to the fold. Ermolov opined that it would be disruptive to allow them back into European Russia once their property had been liquidated. Certain that dislocation and disorder would follow their forcible return to European Russia, the committee found it preferable to settle them on state lands in Siberia. By 1896, Minister of the Interior Goremykin had come around to this point of view and expressed his willingness to extend loans to the irregulars on the same basis as for legal settlers. At the same time, he would work to discourage peasants from leaving their communes in the first place. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
维特与委员会接受了这一事实:大量非正规移民将加入那些依法获准离开俄罗斯前往西伯利亚的人群。内政部长最初倾向于采取“镇压措施”并强制他们返回村庄的提议遭到了强烈反对,尤其是尼古拉的反对。他认为,既然这些人已经与村社断绝了联系,他们不太可能被欢迎回归。埃尔莫洛夫表示,一旦他们的财产被清算,允许他们返回欧洲俄罗斯地区将会引发混乱。委员会确信,强制遣返欧洲俄罗斯会导致社会动荡与混乱,因此认为将他们安置在西伯利亚的国有土地上更为可取。到 1896 年,内政部长戈列梅金已转而支持这一观点,并表示愿意以与合法移民相同的条件向非正规移民提供贷款。与此同时,他将努力劝阻农民首先离开他们的村社。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
Rather than struggle in vain to prevent the movement of peasants, the members of the committee opted to bring it under government control and direct it in such a way that it would assist their remaking
委员会成员并未徒劳地试图阻止农民迁徙,而是选择将其纳入政府管控之下,并引导这一迁移行为,使其有助于他们的改造计划。

59. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, pp. 3-4, col. 1; zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 1, pp. 3-6; Glinskii, Prolog, 12.
59. 铁路建设委员会特别日志,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 3-4 页第一栏;第 22 次会议,1895 年 3 月 8 日,第一部分,第 3-6 页;格林斯基,《序幕》,第 12 页。

60. ZhKSZhD, zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 1, pp. 7-8; Snow, “Years 1881-1894 in Russia.” On June 6, 1904, a new resettlement law originally written in the Committee of the Siberian Railroad and backed by Plehve went into effect, which no longer required peasants to seek special permission to emigrate to Siberia. See Treadgold, Great Siberian Migration, 128-129; Anan’ich et al., Krizis, 65-66.
60. 俄国铁路建设特别委员会会议记录,1895 年 3 月 8 日第 22 次会议,第一部分,第 7-8 页;斯诺,《俄国 1881-1894 年》。1904 年 6 月 6 日,一项最初由西伯利亚铁路委员会起草并得到普列韦支持的新移民法生效,该法案不再要求农民必须获得特别许可才能迁往西伯利亚。参见特雷德戈尔德,《西伯利亚大迁徙》,第 128-129 页;阿纳尼奇等,《危机》,第 65-66 页。

61. ZhKSZhD, zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 1, pp. 4-7; zas. 27, Apr. 27, 1896, pt. 1, pp. 7-8, col. 1. In a series of laws promulgated in 1896 , illegal migrants were granted the right to settle on plots and receive state loans; by order of the tsar, the temporary laws of 1894 pertaining to regular migrants were extended for their benefit. Exemptions from military service were not given, however, and at the end of the year the committee, still hesitant to encourage spontaneous resettlement, discontinued transport loans to illegal settlers. The minister of the interior also had second thoughts about distributing state lands to irregulars. See ZhKSZhD, zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 1, p. 11; zas. 28, Nov. 27, 1896, SP, pp. 25-26, col. 1; Tikhonov, “Pereselencheskaia politika,” 113-115, 117; Treadgold, Great Siberian Migration, 126-127.
61. 中东铁路公司会议记录,第 22 次会议,1895 年 3 月 8 日,第一部分,第 4-7 页;第 27 次会议,1896 年 4 月 27 日,第一部分,第 7-8 页,第一栏。在 1896 年颁布的一系列法律中,非法移民被授予定居地块并获得国家贷款的权利;根据沙皇的命令,1894 年关于常规移民的临时法律被延长以惠及他们。然而,并未免除兵役义务,且到年底时,委员会仍对鼓励自发移民持犹豫态度,停止向非法移民提供运输贷款。内政部长也对向非正规移民分配国有土地一事有所顾虑。参见中东铁路公司会议记录,第 22 次会议,1895 年 3 月 8 日,第一部分,第 11 页;第 28 次会议,1896 年 11 月 27 日,特别附录,第 25-26 页,第一栏;Tikhonov,《移民政策》,第 113-115 页,第 117 页;Treadgold,《西伯利亚大迁徙》,第 126-127 页。

of Siberia. To ensure state control the committee promulgated a series of regulations. Plots were to be distributed “with a view to satisfying the multifarious state needs in the land which might arise in the future.” 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} It consciously avoided the land speculation that accompanied the settlement of the American West by limiting authorization for the sale of lands to local governors. 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} The government reserved full rights without exception, on both public and private land, to all minerals and precious stones in the soil. This policy too led to the opposite of the American western experience, where miners had the right to trespass on public lands. 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64}
关于西伯利亚。为确保国家控制,该委员会颁布了一系列法规。地块分配需“着眼于满足国家未来可能在该地区出现的多样化土地需求”。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} 通过将土地出售的审批权限限定于地方总督,委员会有意避免了美国西部开发中伴随的土地投机现象。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} 政府保留了对土壤中所有矿物和宝石的完全权利,无论是公有还是私有土地,无一例外。这一政策也与美国西部的经验截然相反——在那里,矿工有权进入公共土地进行勘探。 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64}
To watch over the lower classes, Witte envisioned the formation of private estates in Siberia on which to settle state officials and members of the gentry, many of whom were impoverished and landless themselves. In the end, however, few of this class showed any interest in resettlement to Siberia. 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
为监管底层民众,维特设想在西伯利亚建立私有庄园,安置国家官员和贵族成员,其中许多人自身也处于贫困无地的境地。然而最终,这一阶层中鲜有人表现出迁居西伯利亚的兴趣。 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
The Committee of the Siberian Railroad attempted to organize basic
西伯利亚铁路委员会曾试图组织基础

Abstract  摘要

62. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, June 2, 1893, p. 6, col. 1. 63. ZhKSZhD, zas. 23, May 3, 1895, SP, pt. 1, pp. 18-20. Voloshinov’s fears, which led him to speak out against private landownership in Siberia, may have been reflected in this decision: “Our peasant, arriving . . . [in Siberia], is so inexperienced, so unfamiliar with local conditions, that it is impossible to think that he will be able to compete with the Jews, who are already picking their way to Transbaikal oblast.” Within a few years, he predicted, if land were permitted to be sold or leased, the migrants would fall into the grip of the Jews, who would then be the ones to gain the benefits of colonization, at the railroad’s expense (TIRTO 10:3). On the United States, see Frederick Merk, History of the Westward Movement (New York, 1978). The distinctions between land use in Siberia and in the United States bolster my argument that the two types of settlement were more dissimilar than alike. 64. ZhKSZhD, zas. 35, June 14, 1900, SP, pp. 11-12, col. 2; Merk, History of the Westward Movement, 414-417. 65. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, p.3, col. 1, and p. 5, col. 1; zas. 27, Apr. 27, 1896, pt. 2, SP, pp. 13-14, cols. 1-2. This measure would have entailed the introduction of the private estate, a form of landholding alien to Siberia, with a few rare exceptions. To ensure that the gentry did not lose their Siberian lands as they were doing in European Russia, the conference on gentry affairs and the State Council advocated special privileges and exemptions that would maintain their agricultural competitiveness. However, the Committee of the Siberian Railroad, including Sipiagin, though in favor of granting lands to the gentry, preferred to establish private landholding on a nonestate basis, in order to raise productivity and encourage development by merchants. In the interests of peasant colonizers, furthermore, they wanted to restrict the size of plots designated for use by nonpeasants to between 60 and 100 desiatins (162 to 270 acres) per family, compared to 60 desiatins of land maximum for peasant homesteads. The committee in this case was overruled by the more conservative State Council, which, in the law of June 8, 1901, allowed for gentry estates of up to 3,000 desiatins ( 8,100 acres) and permitted the gentry alone to lease lands. See ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, p. 7, col. 2; zas. 35, June 14, 1900, SP, p. 10, col. 1, and pp. 10-15, col. 2; PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 21, 1901, no. 20338; Iu. B. Solov’ev, Samoderzhavie i dvorianstvo v kontse XIX veka (Leningrad, 1973), 328-342.
62. 中东铁路特别会议记录,1893 年 6 月 2 日,第 6 页,第 1 栏。63. 中东铁路第 23 次会议,1895 年 5 月 3 日,会议纪要第一部分,第 18-20 页。沃洛希诺夫的担忧可能影响了这一决定,他反对西伯利亚的私有土地所有权,并指出:“我们的农民来到……[西伯利亚]时如此缺乏经验,对当地条件如此陌生,难以想象他们能与已渗透至外贝加尔州的犹太人竞争。”他预言,若允许土地买卖或租赁,不出几年移民将陷入犹太人的掌控,后者将以铁路为代价攫取殖民利益(《俄国移民评论》第 10 卷第 3 期)。关于美国的情况,参见弗雷德里克·默克《西进运动史》(纽约,1978 年)。西伯利亚与美国土地利用方式的差异进一步印证了我的观点:这两种殖民模式差异大于相似。64. 中东铁路第 35 次会议,1900 年 6 月 14 日,会议纪要第 11-12 页,第 2 栏;默克《西进运动史》第 414-417 页。65. 中东铁路特别会议记录,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 3 页第 1 栏,第 5 页第 1 栏;第 27 次会议,1896 年 4 月 27 日,会议纪要第二部分,第 13-14 页,第 1-2 栏。这一措施本将引入私有庄园制——一种在西伯利亚几乎不存在(除极少数例外)的土地占有形式。为避免贵族像在欧洲俄罗斯那样丧失其西伯利亚土地,贵族事务会议和国务会议主张通过特殊优待政策维持其农业竞争力。然而西伯利亚铁路委员会(包括西皮亚金在内)虽支持向贵族授予土地,却倾向于建立非庄园性质的私有土地制度,以提高生产力并促进商人开发。此外,为保护农民垦殖者利益,该委员会主张将非农民家庭的土地分配规模限制在每户 60 至 100 俄亩(162 至 270 英亩),而农民宅地最高仅为 60 俄亩。但在此案中,更为保守的国务会议推翻了委员会意见——1901 年 6 月 8 日颁布的法律允许贵族庄园面积高达 3,000 俄亩(8,100 英亩),并独家授予贵族土地租赁权。参见《铁路委员会特别期刊》,2 月号。 1893 年 10 月 24 日,第 7 页第 2 栏;1900 年 6 月 14 日第 35 次会议,SP 第 10 页第 1 栏及第 10-15 页第 2 栏;《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》第三辑第 21 卷,1901 年,第 20338 号;尤·B·索洛维约夫,《十九世纪末的专制制度与贵族》(列宁格勒,1973 年),第 328-342 页。

aspects of the peasant migrants’ lives, involving itself before their arrival in Siberia and continuing to do so long after they were settled. The state’s active guidance of the peasant resettlement far exceeded Iadrintsev’s call for the establishment of local peasant agencies and the extension of subsidies to migrants. 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} According to one authority, “the quality of systematization [planomernost’] was imparted to the very matter of resettlement and colonization.” 67 67 ^(')67{ }^{\prime} 67
国家深入干预农民移民生活的方方面面,从他们抵达西伯利亚之前就开始介入,并在他们定居后长期持续。政府对农民迁移的积极引导远超亚德林采夫关于建立地方农民机构和向移民提供补贴的呼吁。 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} 据一位权威人士称,“迁移与殖民事务本身被赋予了系统性规划[planomernost’]的特性。” 67 67 ^(')67{ }^{\prime} 67
The administration of the migration received constant bureaucratic attention, and the number of officials in Siberia concerned with the resettlement increased dramatically. 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} Foreshadowing the creation of new urban complexes along the Baikal-Amur Main Line in the 1970s and 1980s, the committee hired an architect to determine where new towns might arise along the railroad and to work with local authorities to establish planned settlements on the sites. 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69}
移民管理工作始终受到官僚机构的高度关注,西伯利亚负责迁移事务的官员数量急剧增加。 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} 作为 1970-1980 年代贝阿大铁路沿线新兴城市群的先声,委员会聘请建筑师规划铁路沿线可能兴起的新城镇,并与地方当局合作在这些地点建立规划定居点。 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69}
Surveyors attempted to keep pace with the migration. The Ministry of Agriculture (formerly the Ministry of State Domains) conducted surveys on arable land normally 200 versts on each side of the railroad. The War Ministry undertook a search for habitable land in Transbaikal oblast. As migrants continued to press into Siberia, plots in the Black Earth Zone grew scarce, and survey teams went to work preparing plots in the taiga of Tobol’sk and Tomsk provinces and the Irkutsk general governorship. The cost of this work increased tenfold from 1885 to 1901, from 40,000 to 400,000 rubles per year. 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70} By 1899, the total amount of surveyed land exceeded 21 million acres. 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71}
测量员试图跟上移民的步伐。农业部(原国家财产部)对铁路两侧通常 200 俄里的可耕地进行了勘测。战争部在外贝加尔州寻找宜居土地。随着移民不断涌入西伯利亚,黑土带的土地变得稀缺,测量队开始在托博尔斯克省、托木斯克省的针叶林地带以及伊尔库茨克总督辖区准备地块。这项工作从 1885 年到 1901 年的成本增加了十倍,从每年 4 万卢布增至 40 万卢布。 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70} 到 1899 年,已勘测土地总量超过 2100 万英亩。 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71}
The norm for a plot destined for one family was approximately 15 desiatins ( 40.5 acres), with access to forest and pasturage. As a rule, 100 individual plots were formed into one enclosure (otrub). Buildings in an enclosure were generally close together and formed a village. Although most settlers preferred this arrangement, many in the Tara region of Tobol’sk province, originally from western Russia, preferred individual homesteads (khutora). The committee established special survey teams for this purpose, too, and was preparing legislation to regularize this form of settlement. To attract skilled technical employees to work on the railroad, special plots along the right of way were formed. At a quarter desiatin ( 0.725 acres), they were large enough for a kitchen garden. 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72}
分配给一户家庭的土地标准面积约为 15 俄亩(40.5 英亩),并附带森林和牧场使用权。通常情况下,100 块个人地块会组成一个围垦区(otrub)。围垦区内的建筑通常密集分布,形成村落。尽管大多数移民倾向这种布局,但托博尔斯克省塔拉地区许多来自俄罗斯西部的移民更偏爱独立农庄(khutora)。为此委员会专门成立了测绘小组,并着手制定法规以规范此类定居形式。为吸引技术工人参与铁路建设,铁路沿线还划拨了特殊地块——每块四分之一俄亩(0.725 英亩),足以开辟家庭菜园。 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72}
To bring still more land under settlement, hydrotechnical teams drained swamps in Tomsk province and the Ussuri region and irrigated portions of the arid steppelands of Akmolinsk oblast, where existing sources of water were saline. 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73} The committee designated more than 18 million acres of land belonging to the nomadic Kazakhs of Akmolinsk oblast as “superfluous” and made them available for distribution to peasants. 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74} It also eyed for peasant resettlement the 42.4 million acres held by 10,000 Cossacks of the Ussuri host. 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75}
为了进一步扩大可定居土地范围,水利工程队在托木斯克省和乌苏里地区排干沼泽,并在阿克莫林斯克州干旱草原的部分区域实施灌溉,因为这些地区现有的水源含盐量过高。 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73} 委员会将阿克莫林斯克州游牧哈萨克人拥有的超过 1800 万英亩土地划定为“过剩土地”,并分配给农民使用。 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74} 委员会还计划将乌苏里哥萨克军团 1 万名成员持有的 4240 万英亩土地用于农民重新安置。 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75}
The committee arranged and directed the transport of settlers well into Siberia. By the laws of April 15, 1896, family scouts (khodoki)
委员会负责安排并指导移民深入西伯利亚的运输工作。根据 1896 年 4 月 15 日颁布的法律,家庭先遣队员(khodoki)
New village in the taiga, Tobol’sk province. From Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie, Aziatskaia Rossiia (St. Petersburg, 1914).
托博尔斯克省针叶林地带的新村庄。来源:移民管理局,《亚洲俄罗斯》(圣彼得堡,1914 年)。

received cut-rate train fares to encourage them to travel to Siberia alone to select and reserve sites for their families. Advance preparations, it was hoped, would ease the transition of the family and eliminate some of the hazards of spontaneous migration. To familiarize prospective settlers with Siberian conditions and migration procedures, the committee printed and distributed hundreds of thousands of pamphlets. It subsidized travel to the Cheliabinsk resettlement point and into Siberia by making each family eligible for a loan of up to 50 rubles, or more if they intended to travel beyond Lake Baikal. The cost of a train ticket once the railroad opened was reduced
为鼓励他们独自前往西伯利亚选址并为家人预留定居点,移民们获得了优惠火车票价。政府希望通过提前准备,能减轻家庭迁移的适应负担,并消除自发迁徙中的部分风险。为了让潜在移民了解西伯利亚的生存条件和迁移流程,委员会印制并分发了数十万册宣传手册。通过提供每户最高 50 卢布的贷款(若计划前往贝加尔湖以外地区则额度更高),委员会还资助移民前往车里雅宾斯克中转站及深入西伯利亚的旅途。铁路开通后,移民火车票价降至

for migrants to 25 percent of the regular third-class fare. Irregular migrants were offered free train tickets back to European Russia. 76 76 ^(76){ }^{76}
普通三等座票价的 25%。非正规渠道移民则获赠返回欧洲俄罗斯的免费返程车票。 76 76 ^(76){ }^{76}
Before the railroad was completed, migrants congregated at Tiumen’ to await river transport to the interior. To ease the bottleneck of peasants that developed, the committee directed the sale of horses, wagons, and rafts, giving peasants the means to transport themselves by river or overland. For migration into the heart of the Amur oblast, the committee both subsidized the Volunteer Fleet to bring settlers overseas and provided migrants coming from the west with rafts on which to float their horses, cattle, and belongings down the Shilka and Amur rivers. 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
在铁路建成之前,移民们聚集在秋明,等待内河运输前往内陆。为了缓解农民形成的交通瓶颈,委员会指导销售马匹、马车和木筏,为农民提供了通过水路或陆路自行运输的手段。对于迁入阿穆尔州腹地的移民,委员会既补贴志愿船队运送定居者跨海而来,又为从西部来的移民提供木筏,让他们可以顺流而下,沿石勒喀河和阿穆尔河运送马匹、牛群及财物。 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
Along the route of the railroad, on barges and steamers carrying migrants, on post roads, and in towns, stations were set up to dispense free medical assistance and hot tea to settlers. Food was available at low cost and free to children. In the Ussuri region, large barracks were put up (though not enough) to shelter peasants awaiting plots and to curtail the spread of disease. 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78}
沿着铁路沿线,在运送移民的驳船和蒸汽船上,在驿道和城镇中,设立了站点为定居者提供免费医疗援助和热茶。食物以低价供应,儿童可免费获取。在乌苏里地区,搭建了大型营房(尽管数量不足)以收容等待分配土地的农民,并遏制疾病传播。 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78}
Once migrants arrived at their new settlements, the state gave a wide array of material assistance to help them establish themselves on the land. Special state stores provided lumber and other building materials and in Amur oblast sold livestock and grain to new arrivals. Interest-free loans were available for construction of a house, sowing, raising crops (on as much as two desiatins, or 5.4 acres), and general economic needs. Settlers could apply up to three years after their arrival. The loan ceiling per family was set in 1896 at 150 rubles in the Far East and 100 rubles elsewhere; later the ceiling was lowered, perhaps to limit peasant indebtedness. The same loans were available to migrants who chose to settle in the taiga; in addition, they were exempt from all taxation for ten years. By 1898, 88.2 percent of settler families in the regions west of Baikal had received loans, averaging 71.2 rubles per family. This amount often did not suffice, however, and
移民一旦抵达新定居点,国家便提供多种物质援助以助其安家落户。国有专营商店供应木材等建筑材料,在阿穆尔州还向新来者出售牲畜和谷物。政府提供无息贷款用于建房、播种、种植作物(最多可达两俄亩,约合 5.4 英亩)及满足一般经济需求。移民可在抵达后三年内申请贷款。1896 年规定,远东地区每户贷款上限为 150 卢布,其他地区为 100 卢布;后因可能为避免农民负债过重,上限有所降低。选择定居泰加林带的移民同样享有贷款资格,并额外享受十年免税政策。截至 1898 年,贝加尔湖以西地区 88.2%的移民家庭获得了贷款,户均 71.2 卢布。然而这笔资金往往不敷使用,
applicants frequently had to wait up to a year for the money to come through. 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79}
申请人通常还需等待长达一年才能拿到贷款。 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79}
Once peasants were settled, the committee continued, directly and indirectly, to try to ensure them a livelihood. Its measures aimed at the creation, expansion, and sustenance of economic life in Siberia and the Far East, the precondition of permanent colonization.
农民定居后,委员会继续直接或间接地努力确保他们的生计。其措施旨在创建、扩展和维持西伯利亚及远东地区的经济生活,这是永久殖民的先决条件。
The committee attempted to provide the infrastructure of daily life lacking in an unsettled region. It established a police administration for the western Siberian region, regulated water use, and steadily expanded postal services in the region of new settlement. It planned and constructed roads between villages, in the settled forest zone, to the gold mines of the Vitim region, and in Amur oblast and the Ussuri region. A pack road for the caravan trade between Biisk in the Altais and Mongolia and western China was also planned, which would have additional strategic utility by allowing Russian settlement on the Russo-Mongolian-Chinese border. 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80} Witte surreptitiously subsidized Russian steamer transport on the Sungari River in Manchuria, also important for its dual commercial and military purpose, but prohibited by Chinese law. 81 81 ^(81){ }^{81}
委员会试图为这片未开发地区提供日常生活所需的基础设施。它为西西伯利亚地区建立了警察行政机构,规范了水资源使用,并稳步扩大了新定居区的邮政服务。委员会规划并修建了村庄间的道路,包括已定居的森林地带、维季姆地区的金矿区,以及阿穆尔州和乌苏里地区。此外,还规划了一条从阿尔泰的比斯克通往蒙古和中国西部的商队驮运道路,这条道路还具有额外的战略价值,可促进俄罗斯在俄蒙中边境的定居。 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80} 维特秘密资助了俄罗斯在满洲松花江上的轮船运输,这一举措同样因其商业与军事双重目的而重要,但为中国法律所禁止。 81 81 ^(81){ }^{81}
The survival of Russian settlement in the strategically vital but vastly underdeveloped Far East required special measures. The committee wanted to arrange the settlement of only the strongest elements by bringing to the Amur oblast 300 Cossack families of the Don and Orenburg hosts, which it considered the sturdiest and most purely Russian of the various hosts. In addition, 150 families of the Transbaikal host were to be transferred to the Ussuri region and enlisted in its host. 82 82 ^(82){ }^{82}
为保障俄罗斯在战略地位关键但极度欠发达的远东地区定居点的存续,必须采取特殊措施。委员会计划仅安置最强壮的移民群体,拟将 300 户顿河与奥伦堡哥萨克家庭迁至阿穆尔州,认为这些哥萨克群体是最健壮且血统最纯正的俄罗斯人。此外,还计划将 150 户外贝加尔哥萨克家庭转移至乌苏里地区并编入当地哥萨克军团。 82 82 ^(82){ }^{82}
The committee looked to introduce cottage industry to the Ussuri region, which was lacking in the essential elements of economic life. It brought scouts from the seafaring Baltic provinces to consider settling
委员会试图在缺乏基本经济生活要素的乌苏里地区发展家庭手工业,为此从航海业发达的波罗的海省份引进了考察人员以评估定居可行性

79. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, June 2, 1893, p. 7, col. 1, and pp.9-10, col. 1; zas. 25, Nov. 29, 1895, SP, pp.20-21; zas. 26, Mar. 6, 1896, SP, app., pp. 51-55; zas. 27, Apr. 27, 1896, pt.1, pp. 8-13, col. 1; zas. 36, Feb. 21, 1901, SP, p. 18, col. 1, and pp. 18-19, col. 2; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god, 27-28; Coquin, La Sibérie, 477-479; Brusnikin, “Pereselencheskaia politika,” 35.
79. 俄国铁路建设特别委员会会议记录,1893 年 6 月 2 日,第 7 页第 1 栏,及第 9-10 页第 1 栏;1895 年 11 月 29 日第 25 次会议,会议纪要第 20-21 页;1896 年 3 月 6 日第 26 次会议,纪要附录第 51-55 页;1896 年 4 月 27 日第 27 次会议,第一部分第 8-13 页第 1 栏;1901 年 2 月 21 日第 36 次会议,纪要第 18 页第 1 栏及第 18-19 页第 2 栏;《1894 年铁路建设年度报告》,27-28 页;Coquin,《西伯利亚》,477-479 页;布鲁斯尼金,《移民政策研究》,35 页。

80. ZhKSZhD, passim.  80. 俄国铁路建设特别委员会会议记录,散见各处。
81. Ibid., osobyi zhurnal, Dec. 1, 1893 (Podgotovitel’ naia komissiia), pp.3-5, col.2; zas. 26, Mar. 6, 1896, SP, pp. 17-18, col. 1, and pp. 18-19, col. 2. The farther a steamer was taken down the Sungari, the larger the subsidy to its owner.
81. 同上,特别会议记录,1893 年 12 月 1 日(筹备委员会),第 3-5 页,第 2 栏;1896 年 3 月 6 日第 26 次会议,SP,第 17-18 页,第 1 栏,以及第 18-19 页,第 2 栏。蒸汽船沿松花江下行越远,船主获得的补贴就越多。

82. Ibid., zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, pp. 19-21, cols. 1-2; osobyi zhurnal, June 14, 1893 (Ministr vnutrennykh del), p. 5, col. 1; Otchet po K S Z h D K S Z h D KSZhDK S Z h D za 1894 god , 35 36 1894 god , 35 36 1894god,35-361894 \mathrm{god}, 35-36. See also O. I. Sergeev, Kazachestvo na russkom Dal’nem Vostoke v XVII-XIX vv. (Moscow, 1983), 72-73.
82. 同上,1893 年 11 月 10 日第 10 次会议,第 19-21 页,第 1-2 栏;1893 年 6 月 14 日特别会议记录(内务大臣),第 5 页,第 1 栏;关于 K S Z h D K S Z h D KSZhDK S Z h D 1894 god , 35 36 1894 god , 35 36 1894god,35-361894 \mathrm{god}, 35-36 期间的报告。另见 O. I. 谢尔盖耶夫,《17-19 世纪俄罗斯远东地区的哥萨克》(莫斯科,1983 年),第 72-73 页。

on the Tartary Strait and developing regional cabotage and a local fishing industry. Peasant craftsmen and peasant women were also encouraged to go. The government even offered North American Slavs immediate citizenship if they would immigrate to the Far East-but only those who were not “infected with socialist teachings.” 83
在鞑靼海峡发展区域沿海贸易及当地渔业。政府还鼓励农民工匠和农妇前往。甚至向北美斯拉夫人提供即时公民身份,只要他们愿意移民远东——但前提是这些人“未受社会主义思想侵蚀”。83
The committee took innovative measures to assist Siberian agriculture. Veterinarians were dispatched to inoculate cattle against Siberian anthrax and other epidemic diseases. Studs were sold for improved cattle breeding, and beekeeping and tobacco raising were encouraged and supported. Granaries went up along the railroad to store grain for transport and newly built state warehouses dispensed lumber and agricultural implements at low set prices. Their employees introduced the peasants to new implements and explained their use. The warehouses were a great financial success, and the tsar urged their introduction into European Russia. 84 84 ^(84){ }^{84}
委员会采取了创新措施来支持西伯利亚农业的发展。兽医被派往各地为牛群接种疫苗,预防西伯利亚炭疽等流行疾病。优质种畜被出售以改良牲畜品种,养蜂和烟草种植也得到鼓励和支持。铁路沿线建起了粮仓,用于储存待运粮食;新建的国营仓库以固定低价供应木材和农具。仓库员工向农民介绍新式农具并讲解使用方法。这些仓库在财务上取得了巨大成功,沙皇还敦促将其推广至俄罗斯欧洲部分。 84 84 ^(84){ }^{84}
In a vivid example of the state intervention that characterized the project, the committee set the patterns of agricultural export. In June 1894, on Alexander III’s command, Witte led an expedition to Arkhangel’sk and Murmansk in the Russian north to explore the possibilities of establishing an icefree naval base and creating an alternative to the Baltic ports. He found the proposition feasible, but since a port could be sustained only with the colonization of the northern provinces, and this was agriculturally unproductive territory, an outside source of grain was essential. At the same time, Siberian grain production was beginning to look like a threat to the gentry farmers of the Russian Black Earth Zone, where foreign competition was already forcing grain prices down. To avoid flooding the central Russian market and to provision the northern provinces of Olonets, Vologda, and Arkhangel’sk, Witte propounded the idea of building an extension of the Trans-Siberian in the old north, the Perm’-Kotlas Railroad. The Perm’-Kotlas would link Siberia with Arkhangel’sk via the
在国家干预这一项目的一个生动例证中,委员会制定了农产品出口的模式。1894 年 6 月,根据亚历山大三世的命令,维特率领一支考察队前往俄罗斯北部的阿尔汉格尔斯克和摩尔曼斯克,探索建立不冻海军基地并替代波罗的海港口的可能性。他认为这一提议可行,但由于只有通过殖民北部省份才能维持港口运营,而该地区农业产出低下,外部粮食来源至关重要。与此同时,西伯利亚的粮食生产开始对俄罗斯黑土区的贵族农场主构成威胁,那里外国竞争已迫使粮价下跌。为避免冲击俄罗斯中部市场并为奥洛涅茨、沃洛格达和阿尔汉格尔斯克等北部省份提供补给,维特提出了修建跨西伯利亚铁路北延线——彼尔姆-科特拉斯铁路的构想。这条铁路将通过彼尔姆-科特拉斯线将西伯利亚与阿尔汉格尔斯克连接起来。
Ekaterinburg-Cheliabinsk Railroad, the Ural Mining Railroad, and the Northern Dvina basin. Construction under the auspices of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad was completed in 1899 . 85 1899 . 85 1899.^(85)1899 .{ }^{85}
叶卡捷琳堡-车里雅宾斯克铁路、乌拉尔矿业铁路以及北德维纳河流域的工程在西伯利亚铁路委员会的监督下于 1899 . 85 1899 . 85 1899.^(85)1899 .{ }^{85} 年竣工。
The market for grain within Siberia was limited because of its relatively small urban population. It was clear that if Siberia was to prosper, it would have to export the bulk of its production, and the likeliest markets were in European Russia and the Baltic ports. To shift the flow of grain along the Perm’-Kotlas Railroad, either for sale in the Russian north or abroad via the port of Arkhangel’sk, the committee erected the Cheliabinsk tariff break in 1896 . This measure raised the rate for the transport of a pud of grain along the Samara-Zlatoust section of the Siberian Railroad (and hence into central Russia or to the Baltic ports) by 5 to 9 kopecks, depending on its point of origin. Freight traveling on the Perm’-Kotlas Railroad was exempt from this additional charge. In 1900 a preferential rate lowered the cost of shipping grain from western Siberia to London via Arkhangel’sk by an additional 3 or 4 kopecks per pud.
由于西伯利亚城市人口相对较少,其内部粮食市场有限。显然,若要使西伯利亚繁荣起来,必须将大部分产出用于出口,而最有可能的市场位于俄罗斯欧洲部分及波罗的海港口。为了引导粮食沿彼尔姆-科特拉斯铁路运输(或销往俄罗斯北部,或通过阿尔汉格尔斯克港出口国外),委员会于 1896 年设立了车里雅宾斯克关税壁垒。这一措施将每普特粮食经西伯利亚铁路萨马拉-兹拉托乌斯特段(进而进入俄罗斯中部或波罗的海港口)的运费提高了 5 至 9 戈比(视起运地而定)。而经彼尔姆-科特拉斯铁路运输的货物则免除此附加费用。1900 年,一项优惠费率进一步将西伯利亚西部粮食经阿尔汉格尔斯克运往伦敦的每普特运费降低了 3 至 4 戈比。
Both contemporary observers and some Soviet historians have criticized the Cheliabinsk tariff break for isolating Siberia and retarding its full agricultural potential, in the class interests of the European Russian gentry. 86 86 ^(86){ }^{86} More accurately, as T. M. Kitanina has shown, while protection of central Russian grain producers and the concern for Russia’s foreign trade balance were components of the scheme, its main intentions were to colonize the old Russian north and to find domestic and foreign markets for Siberian grain. 87 87 ^(87){ }^{87} It neither isolated
无论是当时的观察者还是部分苏联历史学家,都曾批评车里雅宾斯克关税壁垒将西伯利亚孤立起来,阻碍了其农业潜力的充分发展,认为这体现了欧洲俄罗斯贵族阶级的利益。 86 86 ^(86){ }^{86} 但更准确地说,正如 T.M.基塔尼娜所揭示的,虽然保护俄罗斯中部粮食生产者和关注外贸收支平衡是该政策的部分考量,但其主要目的在于殖民俄罗斯古老的北部地区,并为西伯利亚粮食开拓国内外市场。 87 87 ^(87){ }^{87} 该政策既未孤立
Schoolhouse in new village, Tobol’sk province. From Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie, Aziatskaia Rossiia (St. Petersburg, 1914).
托博尔斯克省新村庄的校舍。图片来源:移民管理局《亚洲俄罗斯》(圣彼得堡,1914 年)。
Siberia nor hindered its development. The strategic and political motives underlying it are clear, and Witte’s manipulation of the internal economy in this fashion was unprecedented.
西伯利亚,也未阻碍其发展。其背后的战略和政治动机显而易见,而维特以这种方式对国内经济进行的调控是史无前例的。
The state not only provided certain basic material needs to the settlers; the committee also ministered to their spiritual needs, through the Emperor Alexander III Fund, supervised by Procurator of the Holy Synod Pobedonostsev. The fund received support from the auxiliary enterprises, and also from the charitable contributions of military officers, gentry assemblies, clerics, and members of the Chancery of the Committee of Ministers. The purpose of the fund, as Pobedonostsev pontificated before the Committee of the Siberian Railroad, was to care for the spiritual and moral needs of railroad workers, who would be bored and far from the constraints of civilization. Special railroad-car chapels, staffed by priests jointly appointed by the Holy Synod and the Ministry of Transport, would follow workers as construction progressed. The fund also supported the
国家不仅为移民提供了某些基本物质需求;委员会还通过由神圣宗教会议检察官波别多诺斯采夫监督的亚历山大三世皇帝基金,满足了他们的精神需求。该基金得到了附属企业的支持,以及来自军官、贵族议会、神职人员和部长会议办公厅成员的慈善捐助。正如波别多诺斯采夫在西伯利亚铁路委员会上所宣扬的那样,该基金的目的是照顾铁路工人的精神和道德需求,这些工人可能会感到无聊且远离文明的约束。随着工程进展,由神圣宗教会议和交通部共同任命的牧师负责的特殊铁路车厢教堂将跟随工人。该基金还支持

construction of churches and schools near railroad stations and, to reduce costs, built combined church-schools elsewhere. It established charities and opened several orphanages. 88 88 ^(88){ }^{88} These religious works were intended to lay the foundation of cultural life for the growing peasant population and to be a positive force in preventing “Iakutization” or “Buriatization,” the Russian peasant’s tendency to take on native ways and values. As part of this effort, the committee actively encouraged the conversion of Siberian natives. 89 89 ^(89){ }^{89}
在火车站附近建造教堂和学校,并在其他地方为降低成本而建造教堂与学校合用的建筑。它设立了慈善机构并开办了几所孤儿院。这些宗教工作的目的是为不断增长的农民人口奠定文化生活的基础,并成为防止“雅库特化”或“布里亚特化”的积极力量,即俄罗斯农民倾向于接受当地生活方式和价值观的现象。作为这一努力的一部分,委员会积极鼓励西伯利亚原住民的皈依。

The use of religion to Russify and preserve social order is analogous to-indeed, is an antecedent of-Soviet ideological propaganda. It confirms the active, primary role of the state in directing the course of Siberian development. The extensive involvement of the government, its central planning, and the vast scope of its activity in water transport, industrial development, and agriculture gave the colonization of Siberia its unique color. There is no analogy in the American experience. 90 90 ^(90){ }^{90} The colonization of Siberia is solidly in the Russian tradition; the Committee of the Siberian Railroad harks back to the Siberian prikaz of the Muscovite period and is a direct predecessor of Soviet development agencies. 91 91 ^(91){ }^{91}
利用宗教进行俄罗斯化及维持社会秩序的做法,与苏联时期的意识形态宣传如出一辙——甚至可以说是其前身。这证实了国家在指导西伯利亚发展进程中扮演着积极主导的角色。政府在水路运输、工业发展和农业等领域的深度介入、中央集权式的规划以及大规模活动,为西伯利亚的殖民化赋予了独特色彩。这在美洲的殖民经验中找不到对应案例。 90 90 ^(90){ }^{90} 西伯利亚的殖民化深深植根于俄罗斯传统;西伯利亚铁路委员会可追溯至莫斯科公国时期的西伯利亚衙门,并直接成为苏联发展机构的前身。 91 91 ^(91){ }^{91}

The settlement of Siberia was similar to a Soviet venture in still another respect. The success of colonization and development depended on the success of the railroad. But the performance of the state in railroad construction and management was less than impressive. The failings of this overly centralized bureaucratic operation cast a dark shadow over Witte’s reputation.
西伯利亚的拓殖在另一个方面也与苏联的工程相似:殖民与开发的成败取决于铁路建设的成效。但国家在铁路建设与管理上的表现却不尽如人意。这种过度集权的官僚运作模式的缺陷,给维特的声誉蒙上了阴影。

88. ZhKSZhD, Feb. 16, 1893, SP, pp. 11-12, col. 2; zas. 24, June 28, 1895, SP, pp. 22-23 and passim; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god, 30-33. For descriptions, photographs, lists of churches and schools built by the fund, and contributors to it, see Polozhenie tserkovnogo i shkol’nogo stroitel’stva v v vv raione sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi na sredstva fonda imeni imperatora Aleksandra III k 1 ianvaria 1900 goda (St. Petersburg, 1900).
88. 中东铁路委员会,1893 年 2 月 16 日会议记录,SP,第 11-12 页,第 2 栏;1895 年 6 月 28 日第 24 次会议,SP,第 22-23 页及散见各处;《1894 年中东铁路年度报告》,第 30-33 页。关于该基金建造的教堂、学校的描述、照片、清单及捐助者信息,参见《截至 1900 年 1 月 1 日亚历山大三世皇帝基金在西伯利亚铁路区域的教堂与学校建设状况》(圣彼得堡,1900 年)。

89. See M. A. Miropiev, O polozhenii russkikh inorodtsev (St. Petersburg, 1901), 343344, a publication of the Holy Synod on the problem of the threateningly easy assimilation of Russians in Siberia to surrounding native cultures. See also Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 1167-1168.
89. 参见 M.A.米罗皮耶夫《论俄罗斯异族人的处境》(圣彼得堡,1901 年)第 343-344 页,该书为圣主教公会关于西伯利亚俄罗斯人极易被周边土著文化同化这一威胁性问题的出版物。另见博尔祖诺夫《创建史》第 1167-1168 页。

90. The role played by the U.S. government in the construction of the American transcontinental railroads cannot be denied (see Robert William Fogel, The Union Pacific Railroad: A Case in Premature Enterprise [Baltimore, 1960]). But the degree of government involvement in the United States was far less than that of the Russian government in Siberia.
90. 美国政府在美国横贯大陆铁路建设中发挥的作用不容否认(参见罗伯特·威廉·福格尔《联合太平洋铁路:过早企业的案例》[巴尔的摩,1960 年])。但美国政府的参与程度远低于俄国政府在西伯利亚的介入力度。

91. The Siberian prikaz managed Siberia in the seventeenth century as a “huge business enterprise on the part of the Muscovite government,” according to George V . Lantzeff, Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration (Berkeley, 1943), 200.
91. 根据乔治·V·兰采夫在《十七世纪的西伯利亚:殖民行政研究》(伯克利,1943 年)第 200 页所述,西伯利亚衙门在十七世纪将西伯利亚作为“莫斯科政府的一项庞大商业企业”进行管理。

CHAPTERNINE  第九章

Monument to Bungling  拙劣行为的纪念碑

InIn the second half of the nineteenth century, American stockholders expected their railroad companies to generate a profit, and the continual quest for profits led management to devise innovative, modern forms of business organization and administration. The result, at least in the western and plains states, was an efficient, inexpensive railroad network that benefited the public, if not initial investors. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} By contrast, the Russian government built and operated the Siberian Railroad in the political interests of the state, without being answerable to a multitude of owners concerned with profit and loss. Thus although the rugged and uninhabited terrain lay behind many of the setbacks that plagued the construction and operation of the railroad (as was the case, to a lesser degree, in the United States), they were exacerbated by human error resulting from the faulty organization of construction and inefficient management. Joseph Berliner’s explanation for the lack of dynamism in Soviet industry applies equally to the Trans-Siberian Railroad: “Social ownership of productive property diminishes entrepreneurial effort by reducing the risk borne by entrepreneurs.” 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} The very features of the project that were intended to bolster the state’s control over Siberia-its centralization
19 世纪下半叶,美国股东期望他们的铁路公司能够盈利,这种对利润的持续追求促使管理层设计出创新、现代的商业组织和行政管理形式。至少在西部和平原各州,其结果是一个高效、廉价的铁路网络,即使最初投资者未必受益,公众却从中获益。相比之下,俄国政府出于国家政治利益建造并运营西伯利亚铁路,无需对众多关心盈亏的所有者负责。因此,尽管崎岖且无人居住的地形是困扰铁路建设和运营的诸多挫折背后的原因(在美国情况类似但程度较轻),但由于建设和管理的组织不当以及效率低下所导致的人为错误,这些问题被进一步加剧。 约瑟夫·柏林对苏联工业缺乏活力的解释同样适用于西伯利亚大铁路:“生产资料的社会所有制通过降低企业家承担的风险,削弱了其创业动力。” 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 该项目旨在加强国家对西伯利亚控制的那些核心特征——其集中化
and planning-jeopardized its control and sullied the reputation of state-led economic development. Both natural and manmade difficulties beset the project and imposed serious limitations on the railroad colonization of Siberia.
与计划性——反而危及了控制力,并玷污了国家主导经济发展的声誉。自然与人为的双重困境困扰着该项目,给西伯利亚的铁路殖民化带来了严重限制。

Geographical Obstacles and the Engineering Response
地理障碍与工程应对

The severe geographical conditions of Siberia and the Russian Far East presented the greatest challenge that Russian engineers had ever faced. The terrain was varied, extreme, and little conducive to the type of light construction envisaged by the railroad’s designers.
西伯利亚及俄罗斯远东地区严酷的地理环境,成为俄国工程师面临过的最大挑战。这里地形复杂多变、条件极端,几乎不适合铁路设计者设想的那种轻型建筑工程。
The conditions under which construction proceeded on the Western Siberian Railroad (from Cheliabinsk to Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} ) were most suitable, the terrain being level or undulating. Except when the tracks approached the region’s many rivers, cuttings were not required, and embankments were shallow ( 3.5 feet maximum). Difficulties there were, however. The subsoil remained frozen until midsummer and for the most part navvies had access only to primitive tools. In the bogs of the steppe, the low level of the roadbed hindered proper drainage. Ditches were dug alongside the roadbed, but in effect they formed ponds that served as expanded breeding grounds for the swarms of mosquitoes and gnats that menaced railroad workers, employees, and settlers. All in all, the progress of construction was decidedly uneven. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
西西伯利亚铁路(从车里雅宾斯克到 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} )的建设条件最为适宜,地形平坦或略有起伏。除了轨道接近该地区众多河流时,一般无需开挖路堑,路堤也较浅(最大 3.5 英尺)。然而困难依然存在:冻土层直到仲夏才会解冻,且工人大多只能使用原始工具。在草原沼泽地带,路基高度不足影响了正常排水。虽然沿路基挖掘了排水沟,但这些沟渠实际上形成了水塘,成为滋扰铁路工人、雇员和移民的蚊虫大规模繁殖的温床。总体而言,工程建设进度明显参差不齐。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
Leaving the low-lying, alluvial plains of western Siberia behind, the railroad progressed eastward in central Siberia, on the stretch between Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} and Lake Baikal. Here work became more trying. Passing Krasnoiarsk, one enters the foothills of the Saian Mountains. Interspersed with level meadows and bogs, the hills were high, with steep, forested slopes whose trees had to be felled. Earthworks were delayed by the taiga’s surface, which remained frozen until mid-July, two months longer than in western Siberia. Once thawed, the soil became a swamp, and laborers had to work in up to two feet of water. To avoid tunneling in the more mountainous sections approaching Lake
离开西西伯利亚低洼的冲积平原后,铁路向东延伸至中西伯利亚,即 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 与贝加尔湖之间的路段。此处的工程变得更为艰巨。越过克拉斯诺亚尔斯克后,便进入了萨彦岭的丘陵地带。这里既有平坦的草地与沼泽,也有高耸的山丘,陡峭的森林坡地上树木必须被砍伐。由于苔原表层直到七月中旬仍处于冻结状态——比西西伯利亚多出两个月,土方工程被迫延迟。解冻后的土壤化为沼泽,工人们不得不在深达两英尺的水中作业。为避免在接近贝加尔湖的崇山峻岭段开凿隧道,

3. Arthur John Barry, Lecture on the Great Siberian Railway (London, 1900), 12; P. P. Migulin, Nasha noveishaia zheleznodorozhnaia politika i zheleznodorozhnye zaimy (1893-1902) (Khar’kov, 1903), 284; A. V. Pataleev, Istoriia stroitel’stva velikogo sibirskogo zheleznodorozhnogo puti (Khabarovsk, 1951), 11-12; Railroad Gazette, Feb. 17, 1893, p. 132; Harmon Tupper, To the Great Ocean: Siberia and the Trans-Siberian Railway (Boston, 1965), 106-107, 112.
3. 亚瑟·约翰·巴里,《大西伯利亚铁路讲座》(伦敦,1900 年),12 页;P·P·米古林,《我国最新铁路政策与铁路借款(1893-1902)》(哈尔科夫,1903 年),284 页;A·V·帕塔列耶夫,《大西伯利亚铁路建设史》(哈巴罗夫斯克,1951 年),11-12 页;《铁路公报》,1893 年 2 月 17 日,132 页;哈蒙·塔珀,《通往大洋:西伯利亚与西伯利亚大铁路》(波士顿,1965 年),106-107 页,112 页。
Baikal, the railroad was built into the sides of the hills, with cuttings in rock, sharp curves, and heavy gradients. The embankments were steep and of substandard width. Each of the region’s numerous wide, deep river valleys required the construction of a bridge; fifty wooden bridges went up across the various tributaries of the Angara alone, and the steel bridge across the Enisei was more than half a mile long. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
在贝加尔湖地区,铁路沿着山坡修建,穿过岩石切割的陡峭弯道和陡坡。路基陡峭且宽度不达标。该地区众多宽阔深邃的河谷均需架设桥梁;仅安加拉河各支流上就搭建了五十座木桥,而横跨叶尼塞河的钢桥长度超过半英里。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
Lake Baikal presented a most extreme environmental challenge. The lake is a deep basin surrounded by steep, rugged mountains. The Committee of the Siberian Railroad had decided to postpone construction of the railroad on the southern shore of Baikal in view of the formidable difficulties it would entail. In its place, it made preparations for a steamer link to connect the two ends of the railroad being built to opposite shores. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} Roughly equal to the length of the English Channel between Dover and Calais, the 66 -verst crossing between Listvianichnaia on the western shore and Mysovskaia on the eastern was expected to save time over the 200 -verst route round the lake. The committee then had to contend with winter conditions on the lake, which freezes to an average thickness of more than three and a half feet from mid-December to the end of April. The committee bought an English-made icebreaker, the Baikal, which could break through thirty-eight inches of ice with five inches of snow on top at a speed of 13 knots while carrying up to twenty-eight loaded freightcars. Unfortunately, at Mysovskaia harbor the lake freezes to a greater thickness than elsewhere and one of the icebreaker’s propellers was disabled almost immediately, slowing its speed by half. A smaller steamer, the Angara, transported passengers, but it had to follow the Baikal as it broke the ice and was frequently in need of repairs itself. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
贝加尔湖带来了极其严峻的环境挑战。这片湖泊被陡峭崎岖的山脉环绕,形成一个深邃的盆地。西伯利亚铁路委员会考虑到修建南岸铁路将面临的巨大困难,决定推迟该路段的建设,转而筹备建立轮渡连接,以衔接正在湖对岸修建的铁路两端。这段 66 俄里的航程(大致相当于多佛与加莱之间的英吉利海峡长度)连接西岸的利斯特维扬卡与东岸的梅索夫斯卡亚,预计比绕湖 200 俄里的陆路节省时间。委员会随后还需应对湖面冬季封冻的难题——每年 12 月中旬至 4 月底,湖冰平均厚度超过 3.5 英尺。为此,委员会购置了英国制造的破冰船"贝加尔号",该船能以 13 节航速冲破 38 英寸冰层(覆雪 5 英寸),并运载 28 节满载货车车厢。 遗憾的是,在梅索夫斯卡亚港口,湖面结冰厚度远超其他区域,导致破冰船的一只螺旋桨几乎立即损坏,航速减半。较小的蒸汽船"安加拉号"承担了乘客运输任务,但它必须跟随"贝加尔号"破冰前行,且自身也频繁需要维修。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
The problems of the steamer crossing, compounded by its rising cost, led to the eventual recommendation to undertake construction of the Circumbaikal Railroad; the transport of Russian troops to Manchuria during the Boxer Rebellion had confirmed the strategic impor-
蒸汽船渡运问题日益严重,加之成本不断攀升,最终促使当局建议修建环贝加尔铁路;而俄军在义和团运动期间向满洲里调兵的行动,证实了通往远东地区铁路运输保持畅通的战略重要性。@0#
tance of uninterrupted rail transport to the Far East. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} Work on the Circumbaikal section began in 1899 and it was completed for provisional use in August 1904, months after the outbreak of war with Japan. The difficulties were immense, as there were no natural terraces on which to build. The roadbed was hewn into the steep rock cliffs, often on the breast walls of the lake itself. Vaulted viaducts and two hundred bridges held the railroad over steep gorges and valleys, and the construction of thirty-three tunnels was unavoidable. Falling rock and landslides were common. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
环贝加尔铁路段于 1899 年动工,在日俄战争爆发数月后的 1904 年 8 月临时通车。施工面临巨大挑战——沿线缺乏天然台地可供铺设路基,工人们不得不在陡峭的岩壁上开凿道路,许多路段直接悬于湖面峭壁。为跨越深谷幽壑,工程建造了拱形高架桥和两百座桥梁,并被迫开凿三十三条隧道。岩崩与滑坡更是家常便饭。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
The least forgiving region was Transbaikalia, whose fierceness was vastly underestimated. Following the Khilok, Ingoda, and Shilka rivers, the railroad crossed the thickly forested Iablonovyi Mountains, whose cliffs rose directly from the riverbeds. Here the Trans-Siberian was a mountain railroad on a narrow roadbed. Its curves were severe and gradients dangerously steep, the slopes dropping precipitously to the streams below. Earthworks in Transbaikalia were heavier than on any other section of the railroad, because of the region’s permafrost, which was blasted away with dynamite. Water pipes froze and had to be installed in heated enclosures. The inexperience of engineers in building in this terrain was soon apparent: the irregular heaving and melting of the permafrost provided an unsure foundation for railroad track and buildings, not a few of which sank into the earth. The region was also visited by periodic droughts that destroyed the crops on which both laborers and draft horses depended. Regular outbreaks of Siberian boil plagues occurred, in one year destroying a great number of cattle and more than thirty men. The most serious danger to construction, though, was flooding. Fast-rising water and strong currents were characteristic of the rivers of Transbaikalia after torrential rains. In 1897 a flood washed away a 200 -mile stretch of completed railroad west of Sretensk, taking with it fifteen bridges and stocks of lumber, and unleashing landslides that piled tons of earth on the remaining track. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
最严酷的地区当属外贝加尔,其恶劣程度被大大低估。铁路沿希洛克河、音果达河和石勒喀河穿行,跨越了森林茂密的雅布洛诺夫山脉,这里的悬崖峭壁直接从河床拔地而起。西伯利亚大铁路在此段成为一条修筑在狭窄路基上的山区铁路,弯道急峻、坡度陡峭得危险,山坡近乎垂直地坠入下方溪流。由于该地区存在永久冻土层(需用炸药爆破清除),外贝加尔的土方工程量比铁路其他任何区段都要繁重。输水管道冻结,不得不安装在加热的围护结构中。工程师们缺乏在这种地形施工的经验很快显现:冻土层的反复不规则隆起和融化使得铁路轨道和建筑物的地基极不稳定,不少设施因此陷入地下。该地区还周期性遭遇旱灾,摧毁了劳工和役马赖以生存的庄稼。西伯利亚疖疮瘟疫频繁爆发,某一年就导致大量牲畜死亡和三十多人丧生。然而对工程建设最严重的威胁,还是洪水泛滥。 外贝加尔地区的河流在暴雨后以水位暴涨和湍急水流为特征。1897 年的一场洪水冲毁了斯列坚斯克以西 200 英里已完工的铁路路段,卷走十五座桥梁及大量木材储备,并引发山体滑坡,将数吨泥土倾覆在剩余轨道上。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}

7. ZhKSZhD, zas. 25, Nov. 29, 1895, SP, pp. 7-8; zas. 36, Feb. 21, 1901, SP, pp.4-6, col. 2; Migulin, Nasha noveishaia zheleznodorozhnaia politika, 291-292; V. F. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia transsibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali XIX-nachala XX vv.” (Ph.D. diss., Tomskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1972), 1362-1363.
7. 中东铁路公司会议记录第 25 次,1895 年 11 月 29 日,SP,第 7-8 页;第 36 次会议,1901 年 2 月 21 日,SP,第 4-6 页,第 2 栏;米古林,《我国最新铁路政策》,291-292 页;V·F·博尔祖诺夫,《19-20 世纪初跨西伯利亚铁路干线建设史》(博士论文,托木斯克国立大学,1972 年),1362-1363 页。

8. Pataleev, Istoriia, 14-15; Tupper, To the Great Ocean, 338; S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903), 216.
8. 帕塔列耶夫,《历史》,14-15 页;塔珀,《通往大洋》,338 页;S·V·萨布勒与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基合著,《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概览》,A·N·库洛姆津编(圣彼得堡,1903 年),216 页。

9. Barry, Lecture, 16-17; Brokgauz-Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ 29:733; Tupper, To the Great Ocean, 188-191, 250; Pataleev, Istoriia, 13-14; Erich Thiel, The Soviet Far
9. 巴里,《讲座》,16-17 页;布罗克豪斯-埃夫隆,《百科词典》第 29 卷:733 页;塔珀,《通往大洋》,188-191 页,250 页;帕塔列耶夫,《历史》,13-14 页;埃里希·蒂尔,《苏联远东》
The easternmost section of the Trans-Siberian was the Ussuri Railroad. Originally the Maritime region was to be linked with Transbaikalia and the center of Russia by the Amur Railroad, but for technical and political reasons the government refrained from building this line and in its place substituted the Chinese-Eastern Railroad, which ran through Manchuria. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} Stretching between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, the Ussuri Railroad was thus a stump end, at least until the Amur Railroad was completed in 1916. The Ussuri section faced critical problems peculiar to its geography. Cholera struck in 1895, and other epidemic diseases broke out almost yearly. So did the Manchurian bandits who periodically infested the province. Work became bogged down as the region’s heavy rains turned the land into a vast swamp and reduced the already short working season by fifty-five days per year on the average. It was not known during the first season of construction that the level of the Ussuri River rose thirty-five feet annually, although engineers became aware of it soon enough, and they were forced to re-lay the track on higher ground. The Iman River swelled to a width of three miles, also requiring an appropriate adjustment. Even without the flooding problem, the multitudinous tributaries of the Ussuri River called for extensive bridge building. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
西伯利亚大铁路的最东段是乌苏里铁路。最初,滨海地区计划通过阿穆尔铁路与后贝加尔和俄罗斯中心地带相连,但由于技术和政治原因,政府放弃了修建这条线路,转而修建了穿过满洲的中国东省铁路(中东铁路)。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 乌苏里铁路从符拉迪沃斯托克(海参崴)延伸至哈巴罗夫斯克(伯力),因此在 1916 年阿穆尔铁路完工前,它只是一条断头路。乌苏里段面临着其地理环境特有的严峻问题。1895 年霍乱爆发,其他流行病几乎每年都会发生。满洲土匪也定期侵扰该省。该地区的大雨将土地变成了一片广阔的沼泽,平均每年使本已短暂的工作季节减少了 55 天,工程因此陷入停滞。在施工的第一个季节,人们并不知道乌苏里河的水位每年上涨 35 英尺,尽管工程师们很快就意识到了这一点,他们被迫在更高的地方重新铺设轨道。 伊曼河宽度暴涨至三英里,同样需要进行相应调整。即便没有洪水问题,乌苏里江众多的支流也需要建造大量桥梁。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}

Design Flaws  设计缺陷

Geographical severity was exacerbated by the light technical standards of the railroad. As a political railroad, the Trans-Siberian was not expected to yield positive financial results for many years of operation. For this reason and because the government saw its com-
地理环境的严酷性因铁路的低技术标准而加剧。作为一条政治性铁路,西伯利亚大铁路在运营多年内并未预期产生积极的财务回报。出于这一原因,加之政府认为其建设……
pletion as a pressing matter, both construction time and costs were to be reduced by building to light standards in the shortest possible direction. This decision had its critics in the professional societies, who asserted-reasonably-that future operating costs would be inversely proportional to the amount spent on construction; but the government’s desire for speed of completion ensured that they were overruled. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
将完工视为紧迫事项,政府决定通过采用最低标准、沿最短路线施工来缩短建设时间和降低成本。这一决定在专业领域内引发了批评,反对者合理指出——未来的运营成本将与建设投入成反比;但政府对快速完工的渴望使得这些反对意见被否决。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
Government specifications called for a railroad of the simplest type, allowing for traffic of three pairs of trains between stations per twenty-four-hour period, with conversion possible to seven pairs of trains in wartime. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} It would be single-tracked with light rails ( 18 pounds per foot on flat stretches, 20 on hilly sections); light ballast; wooden bridges over all but major rivers; a relatively narrow permanent way without provision in the width of the roadbed for double-tracking at a later date; a distance of fifty versts between stations; and on mountainous stretches very steep gradients and small, sharp curves. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} These standards were lower than those prevailing on the Transcaspian Railroad, itself built with no frills and for a restricted purpose; indeed, it was pointed out later that such standards were justifiable only on spur tracks. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
政府规定要求建造一条最简单的铁路,允许每 24 小时在车站之间通行三对列车,战时可能增加到七对列车。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 铁路为单轨,使用轻轨(平地段每英尺 18 磅,丘陵段 20 磅);轻型道砟;除主要河流外均采用木桥;路基宽度较窄,未预留日后铺设双轨的空间;车站间距为五十俄里;山区路段坡度极陡且弯道小而急。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 这些标准低于当时的外里海铁路(该铁路本身也是简朴建造且用途有限);后来有人指出,这样的标准仅适用于支线轨道才合理。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
Surveying was of a similar order. Expedition teams under instructions from the Ministry of Transport surveyed rapidly and superficially along a narrow four-verst belt straddling the future railroad line. Instead of a detailed examination of several potential routes, the ministry required only topographical surveys and leveling, to ensure that the railroad could be built along the path that was arbitrarily
勘测工作也遵循类似原则。交通部指示下的勘探团队沿着未来铁路线两侧狭窄的四俄里地带进行了快速而粗略的勘测。与对多条潜在路线进行详细考察不同,该部仅要求进行地形测量和水平校准,以确保铁路能沿着随意选定的路径修建。
determined in St. Petersburg as being the shortest and most direct between points. Some members of the Russian Technical Society suspected that even after construction had begun as much as half of the route had not been surveyed in any fashion. In Transbaikalia, surveys were inadequate at best, conducted with out-of-date instruments by a nonengineer accompanied by his two sons and a Mongo-lian-speaking guide. Needless to say, like much of the route, they were found to be unsatisfactory and required complete revision, at great expense, at the time of construction.
在圣彼得堡被确定为两点之间最短且最直接的路线。俄罗斯技术协会的一些成员怀疑,即使在施工开始后,仍有近一半的路线未经任何形式的勘测。在外贝加尔地区,勘测工作充其量也只是敷衍了事,由一名非工程师带着他的两个儿子和一名会说蒙古语的向导,使用过时的仪器进行。不用说,与大部分路线一样,这些勘测结果被认为不尽如人意,施工时不得不以高昂代价进行全面修改。
The Technical Society urged the government to undertake a wider and more detailed examination of the region, taking into account topographical, geographical, economic, hydrological, and climatic factors. Some members tried to disprove the claim of Transport Ministry engineers that the Canadian-Pacific Railway was built in similar conditions and could serve as a model for rapid, light construction. Nongovernmental experts pointed out that the Trans-Siberian would be the first railroad to have large sections built on permafrost, which was an unknown factor and needed a great deal more study than it had received. But their warnings were in vain: government engineers denied the incompleteness of their surveys and investigations. To build a perfect railroad, they asserted, would take one hundred years; its completion in ten was of the utmost importance. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
技术协会敦促政府对这一地区进行更广泛、更细致的考察,需综合考虑地形、地理、经济、水文和气候因素。部分成员试图反驳交通部工程师的观点,即加拿大太平洋铁路是在类似条件下建造的,可作为快速轻型建设的典范。非政府专家指出,西伯利亚大铁路将是首条在永久冻土上大规模修建的铁路,这是一个未知因素,需要比现有研究更深入的调查。但他们的警告徒劳无功:政府工程师否认其勘测调查存在不足。他们坚称,建造一条完美的铁路需要一百年,而十年内完工才是重中之重。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
The fastest and most direct way to link Siberia with Russia was the prescription for fulfilling the state’s political and military goals in the region. This desideratum determined the route and technical conditions of the Siberian Railroad. Little consideration was given to local interests, and many technical factors were disregarded. These charac-
连接西伯利亚与俄罗斯最快捷、最直接的途径,是实现国家在该地区政治与军事目标的既定方案。这一核心诉求决定了西伯利亚铁路的路线与技术标准。地方利益鲜被顾及,诸多技术因素亦遭忽视。这些特
teristics accord with the authoritarian, centralizing purpose of the railroad. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
质与铁路集权化的专制目的高度吻合。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
The government’s strategy proved to be no match for the forces of nature. Construction was dangerously inadequate, and the attitude of the authorities encouraged further skimping. Embankments on the whole line, for instance, were often from four to six feet narrower than the already circumscribed width of sixteen and a half feet called for in the designs. As a consequence, they were insecure and susceptible to being washed away in storms. Many were sinking.
政府的策略终究无法与自然力量抗衡。施工质量严重不达标,而当局的态度更助长了偷工减料之风。例如全线路基普遍比设计图纸中本已缩水的 16.5 英尺标准宽度还要窄 4 至 6 英尺,导致路基结构不稳,暴雨中极易被冲毁,许多路段已出现沉降现象。
The permanent way was flimsy. Where ballast was not altogether lacking, it was so meager that the track often shifted to the side. Crossties were widely spaced and secured with a less than adequate number of spikes and bolts. They were made of untreated green wood, so that many began to rot after their first year of use, even on the sections that did not lie directly in marshes. The lightweight rails, made of poor-quality steel, were laid on the rounded side of the tie, fixed in notches and attached by spikes to the wood through holes in the flange without chairs. To stretch the iron supply, the rail joints were made exceedingly thin, but were placed so tightly that rail ends had no room to contract or expand, as they naturally did in reaction to changes in temperature. Coupled with the flimsiness of the rails, the placement of the joints led to ubiquitous buckling, which required constant adjustments to the rails en route.
铁路的基础设施十分脆弱。道砟要么完全缺失,要么数量稀少,导致轨道经常发生侧移。枕木间距过大,且固定用的道钉和螺栓数量不足。这些枕木由未经处理的生材制成,即便不在沼泽地带,使用一年后许多便开始腐烂。轻质铁轨由劣质钢材制成,铺设时直接放在枕木的圆面上,通过凹槽固定,并用道钉穿过轨底边缘的孔洞直接钉入木枕,没有使用轨座。为了节省铁料,铁轨接头的部分被做得极薄,但接缝过于紧密,使得铁轨两端无法随温度变化自然伸缩。再加上铁轨本身强度不足,接缝的布置方式导致铁轨普遍出现翘曲变形,列车运行途中需要不断进行调整。
The railroad also suffered from the sharp curves and steep inclines. Within one and a half months of initial use, the front and rear wheel flanges of a train would wear out from grating against the rails and joints, which themselves weakened. Engineers noted that this friction
铁路还饱受急弯和陡坡的困扰。投入使用仅一个半月,列车前后轮缘就会因与轨道和接缝摩擦而磨损,轨道本身也因此变得脆弱。工程师们指出,这种摩擦

17. To avoid deviation from this procedure, in 1892 Witte decided to bypass Tomsk, one of the major Siberian cities. Tomsk was situated in the taiga, surrounded by swamplands, at a wide stretch of the Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} River which would have required an expensive bridge, and too far from the agricultural regions where most peasant migrants would head (“O velikom sibirskom puti,” 173-174; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 35-36; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 109; A. Pushechnikov, “O nedochetakh v dele izyskanii i postroiki zheleznykh dorog v Sibiri,” ZhdD, 1907, nos. 46-47: 524. For Tomsk’s opposition, see V. P. Kartamyshev, Doklad obshchemu sobraniiu chlenov OSRPT “O napravlenii magistral’noi linii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi na g. Tomsk ili v obkhod ego” [n.p., 1892]). It was rumored at the time (and is accepted as fact by many Russians today) that Tomsk was bypassed because local worthies refused to pay the engineers the bribes they demanded. See Tupper, To the Great Ocean, 97-98. Tupper also accepts the rumor, but in light of the above explanation, there seems to be no truth to it. It should be noted that a branch line was eventually built to Tomsk, which became the headquarters of the Siberian Railroad administration.
17. 为避免偏离这一程序,1892 年维特决定绕开西伯利亚主要城市之一托木斯克。托木斯克位于泰加林地带,四周沼泽环绕,横跨宽阔的 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 河段需建造昂贵桥梁,且距离大多数农民移民前往的农业区过远(参见《论伟大的西伯利亚之路》173-174 页;《交通部公报》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:35-36 页;萨布列尔与索斯诺夫斯基《西伯利亚铁路》109 页;A·普谢奇尼科夫《论西伯利亚铁路勘测与建设中的缺陷》,《铁路杂志》1907 年第 46-47 期:524 页。关于托木斯克的反对意见,见 V·P·卡尔塔梅舍夫《呈西伯利亚铁路促进总会报告:论西伯利亚铁路干线经托木斯克或绕行该城问题》[无出版地,1892 年])。当时有传言称(至今仍被许多俄罗斯人信以为真),绕行托木斯克是因当地显贵拒绝向工程师支付索贿款项。见塔珀《驶向大洋》97-98 页。塔珀亦采信此传言,但根据上述解释,该说法显然不实。 值得注意的是,最终修建了一条通往托木斯克的支线,该地成为西伯利亚铁路管理局的总部所在地。

Wooden bridge, Central Siberian Railroad. From Velikii put’: Vidy Sibiri i eia zheleznykh dorog (Krasnoiarsk, 1899).
木质桥梁,中西伯利亚铁路。选自《伟大之路:西伯利亚及其铁路风光》(克拉斯诺亚尔斯克,1899 年)。

produced a significant layer of metallic dust along the tracks, and blamed it for innumerable derailments.
在轨道沿线形成了显著的金属粉尘层,并被认为是导致无数脱轨事故的元凶。
Sturdiness was to be found only on the large bridges, whose iron and steel girders and masonry piers were regarded as outstanding works of engineering; most were still standing in the 1960s. The vast majority of bridges, however, were ramshackle structures of soft pine, which rotted easily. The rapid and extreme fluctuations in temperature (in one twenty-four-hour period in Tomsk in the winter of 19021903, for instance, the thermometer went from 46 C 46 C -46^(@)C-46^{\circ} \mathrm{C} to 8 C 8 C -8^(@)C-8^{\circ} \mathrm{C} )
坚固性仅见于大型桥梁,其钢铁桁架与石砌桥墩被视为杰出的工程典范;其中多数直至 20 世纪 60 年代仍屹立不倒。然而绝大多数桥梁是由易腐烂的松木搭建的简陋结构。温度骤变极为剧烈(例如 1902-1903 年冬季在托木斯克,24 小时内气温从 46 C 46 C -46^(@)C-46^{\circ} \mathrm{C} 骤升至 8 C 8 C -8^(@)C-8^{\circ} \mathrm{C} )。

caused the wooden bridges to distend and sag, not to mention their effect on other features of the track. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
导致木制桥梁膨胀下垂,更不用说它们对轨道其他部分的影响了。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
The standards set for the railroad were patently unequal to the task at hand; better planning and design by St. Petersburg would have prevented many of the difficulties and saved time and money in the end. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
为铁路设定的标准显然无法应对手头的任务;如果圣彼得堡方面能进行更好的规划和设计,本可以避免许多困难,最终节省时间和资金。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}

Labor Force  劳动力

The recruitment of a labor force for the Siberian Railroad demonstrated the geographical and demographic constraints on colonization and Russification. The Committee of the Siberian Railroad expected that the Western and Central Siberian lines, from Cheliabinsk to Irkutsk, would require 30,000 navvies for earthworks in the first three years and 50,000 skilled and unskilled laborers for all other types of work 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} Siberia’s low population, the unfamiliarity with railroad work, and the utter lack of skilled labor forced the committee to take extraordinary measures.
西伯利亚铁路的劳动力招募过程凸显了殖民与俄罗斯化进程中面临的地理和人口限制。西伯利亚铁路委员会预计,在最初的三年里,从车里雅宾斯克到伊尔库茨克的西西伯利亚和中西伯利亚线路需要 3 万名土方工人进行地基工程,以及 5 万名熟练与非熟练工人承担其他各类工作 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 。由于西伯利亚人口稀少、当地人对铁路工作陌生且完全缺乏熟练劳动力,委员会不得不采取非常规措施。
The problem did not actually exist in relatively populous western Siberia. There, 80 percent of unskilled heavy labor was provided by local peasants from the Cheliabinsk and Tobol’sk areas, with minimal reliance on contract laborers from European Russia. Local residents also supplied cartage, horses, and food, and a small number of local Kazakhs performed light work. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
这一问题在人口相对稠密的西西伯利亚并不实际存在。当地 80%的非技术性重体力劳动由来自车里雅宾斯克和托博尔斯克地区的农民承担,对来自欧俄地区的合同工依赖极低。当地居民还提供了运输、马匹和食物,少量本地哈萨克人则从事轻体力劳动。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
Once construction reached the forest of the Central Siberian line, however, the difficulties became increasingly apparent. The sources
然而当工程推进至中西伯利亚线路的森林地带时,困难开始日益显现。史料记载

18. The preceding four paragraphs are based on Barry, Lecture, 11, 13-14; Tupper, To the Great Ocean, 107, 113-114, 246, 250; Krausse, Russia in Asia, 210-211; Times, June 8, 1900, p. 8, and Oct. 18, 1904, p. 9; “Obshchii vzgliad na postroiku,” 254; L. N. Liubimov, “Vspuchivanie dereviannykh mostov na sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” Inzhener 27 (July 1903): 235-237; H. Claus, “Die klimatischen Verhältnisse Sibiriens und deren Einfluß auf die dort geplanten Eisenbahnen,” Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen, 1889, no. 12: 901-904; A. N. Bukhman et al., Doklad ob eksploatatsionnykh raskhodakh sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi (St. Petersburg, 1912), 7; Richardson L. Wright and Bassett Digby, Through Siberia, an Empire in the Making (New York, 1913), 15; J. N. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways (London, 1964), 118; Railroad Gazette, Feb. 17, 1893, p. 132, and Jan. 19, 1900, p. 41.
18. 前四段基于 Barry 的《Lecture》第 11、13-14 页;Tupper 的《To the Great Ocean》第 107、113-114、246、250 页;Krausse 的《Russia in Asia》第 210-211 页;《Times》1900 年 6 月 8 日第 8 版及 1904 年 10 月 18 日第 9 版;“Obshchii vzgliad na postroiku”第 254 页;L. N. Liubimov 的《Vspuchivanie dereviannykh mostov na sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi》,《Inzhener》第 27 卷(1903 年 7 月)第 235-237 页;H. Claus 的《Die klimatischen Verhältnisse Sibiriens und deren Einfluß auf die dort geplanten Eisenbahnen》,《Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen》1889 年第 12 期第 901-904 页;A. N. Bukhman 等人的《Doklad ob eksploatatsionnykh raskhodakh sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi》(圣彼得堡,1912 年)第 7 页;Richardson L. Wright 与 Bassett Digby 的《Through Siberia, an Empire in the Making》(纽约,1913 年)第 15 页;J. N. Westwood 的《A History of Russian Railways》(伦敦,1964 年)第 118 页;《Railroad Gazette》1893 年 2 月 17 日第 132 页及 1900 年 1 月 19 日第 41 页。

19. Cf. technical standards on the Union Pacific Railroad. From an engineering (if not financial) point of view this was a first-rate railroad, solidly built despite the speed of construction and the terrain over which it crossed. See Robert William Fogel, The Union Pacific Railroad: A Case in Premature Enterprise (Baltimore, 1960), 263-264.
19. 参见联合太平洋铁路的技术标准。从工程(即便非财务)角度看,这是一条一流的铁路线,尽管建设速度极快且穿越复杂地形,仍建造得十分稳固。详见罗伯特·威廉·福格尔《联合太平洋铁路:超前企业的案例》(巴尔的摩,1960 年),第 263-264 页。

20. ZhKSZhD, SP, Feb. 16, 1893, p. 8, col. 1.
20. 俄国铁路建设委员会会议记录,圣彼得堡,1893 年 2 月 16 日,第 8 页,第 1 栏。

21. Ibid., osobyi zhurnal, May 26, 1893, p. 2, col. 1; TKIM, 1:17-18.
21. 同上,特别会议记录,1893 年 5 月 26 日,第 2 页,第 1 栏;《西伯利亚铁路建设史料汇编》第 1 卷,第 17-18 页。

of food and fodder were becoming more distant and, in spite of higher wages, workers resisted being transferred into the taiga, which they found dull and gloomy. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} The local labor supply was smaller and less reliable. Drawing mostly from the peasantry, the railroad lost a large contingent of its workers during the harvest season. Except for carpenters, which were found locally, almost all skilled workers had to be imported, at great cost, from European Russia. They included in their ranks Kazan’ Tatars. Of more than 2,000 stonemasons, 60 percent came from European Russia. An additional quarter were Italians. Few of these workers had anticipated local conditions, and found that they could not work up to their standards. Local natives and Cossacks were better equipped to deal with forest conditions, and they appeared more frequently, although there were few skilled craftsmen among them and their presence did little to alleviate the shortage of labor. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
粮食和饲料的供应地变得越来越远,尽管工资有所提高,工人们仍不愿被调往他们认为沉闷阴郁的泰加林地区。当地的劳动力供应不仅数量较少,而且可靠性更低。铁路工人主要来自农民阶层,因此在收获季节会流失大量劳动力。除了能在当地找到的木匠外,几乎所有技术工人都不得不以高昂成本从俄罗斯欧洲部分引进,其中包括喀山鞑靼人。在 2000 多名石匠中,60%来自俄罗斯欧洲部分,另有四分之一是意大利人。这些工人大多对当地条件预估不足,发现自己难以达到预期的工作标准。当地原住民和哥萨克人更适应森林环境,虽然他们中熟练工匠稀少,且对缓解劳动力短缺作用有限,但其出现频率逐渐增加。
In the distant and forbidding territories east of Lake Baikal, Russian settlement was still embryonic and could not supply even seasonal labor. Engineers on the Transbaikal section considered themselves fortunate in that it was still feasible to import some craftsmen from European Russia, Finland, and Italy, but they were few and it was a costly option. Local old settlers, many of whom were sober, industrious sectarians displaced from jobs in the goldfields, provided more than half the unskilled labor force. Local Cossacks were relied on for hauling, and, regardless of Russian suspicions about their loyalty, Buriat natives were found to be experienced and willing carpenters. For construction of the Ussuri Railroad, regional battalions assigned soldiers in great numbers from the start; they provided up to 3,300 men, or approximately one-fourth of the contingent of workers. Many of them-up to 2,800 -also worked on the Transbaikal section after the Boxer Rebellion necessitated its early completion. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
在贝加尔湖以东遥远而严酷的疆域,俄罗斯移民尚处于萌芽阶段,连季节性劳动力都无法提供。外贝加尔段的工程师们庆幸还能从欧俄、芬兰和意大利引进少量工匠,但人数稀少且成本高昂。当地老住户——其中许多是被金矿解雇的清醒勤勉的教派信徒——构成了过半的非技术劳动力。哥萨克人负责运输,而尽管俄国人对布里亚特原住民的忠诚心存疑虑,却发现他们是经验丰富且乐意的木匠。乌苏里铁路建设初期便大量调派地方营士兵,多达 3300 人(约占工人总数的四分之一),其中 2800 人在义和团运动迫使外贝加尔段提前竣工后也参与了该段建设。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
The basic labor supply for the Ussuri section, and an important element on the Transbaikal Railroad, consisted of Japanese and Chinese migrant workers and the settled Korean population of the Ussuri region. The committee was at first reluctant to tap this source because officials regarded these people as physically unsuited for construction work and expected that they would spend their earnings on the Chinese market rather than in Russia. Moreover, except for the Koreans, they were not a resident work force; many did have to return to their homes to fight in the Sino-Japanese War. Nonetheless, 8,000 Asians were employed on the Ussuri Railroad, making up more than 60 percent of its work force (of 14,500 ) in 1897 and 14 percent of the entire railroad’s work force in the same year. Their productivity, lower than that of any other category of laborers, only confirmed the impression that they were incapable, although this may well have been the result of the policy of paying them less than the others. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
乌苏里段的基本劳动力供应,以及外贝加尔铁路上的重要组成部分,由日本和中国移民工人以及乌苏里地区定居的朝鲜族人口构成。委员会起初不愿利用这一来源,因为官员们认为这些人在体力上不适合建筑工作,并预计他们会将收入花在中国市场而非俄罗斯。此外,除了朝鲜族,他们并非常住劳动力;许多人确实不得不返回家乡参加中日战争。尽管如此,1897 年仍有 8000 名亚洲人受雇于乌苏里铁路,占其劳动力(14500 人)的 60%以上,占同年整个铁路劳动力的 14%。他们的生产力低于其他任何类别的工人,这似乎印证了他们能力不足的印象,尽管这很可能是由于对他们支付低于其他人的政策所致。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
Despite the recruitment of all these workers, still more were needed. Many could not be counted on to stay with the job till it was done. So the Committee of the Siberian Railroad turned to prison labor, solving Siberia’s labor problem by decree.
尽管招募了所有这些工人,仍需要更多人手。许多人无法保证会坚持工作直至完工。因此,西伯利亚铁路委员会转而利用监狱劳动力,通过法令解决了西伯利亚的劳动力问题。
The government had drafted prisoners for railroad construction since the 1860 s, after Kulomzin suggested that it would be a convenient means of reducing costs, but never before on such a large scale 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} In the spring of 1891 a shipload of 600 hard-labor convicts was rerouted from Odessa to Vladivostok for work on the Ussuri Railroad, rather than to Sakhalin Island, their original destination. Their work on the railroad was satisfactory, but their military guards were inexperienced. A number of violent criminals escaped into Vladivostok and other South Ussuri locales, where they raised havoc and were
自 19 世纪 60 年代库洛姆津提出这将是降低成本的便捷手段后,政府便开始征调囚犯参与铁路建设,但从未达到如此大规模。1891 年春,一艘载有 600 名苦役犯的船只从敖德萨改道前往符拉迪沃斯托克,参与乌苏里铁路建设,而非原定的萨哈林岛。囚犯们在铁路上的表现令人满意,但看守他们的军事警卫缺乏经验。一些暴力罪犯逃窜至符拉迪沃斯托克及乌苏里南部其他地区,在当地制造混乱并引发了一系列抢劫案。
responsible for a rash of robberies. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} The committee ironed out the wrinkles as it barred recidivists and long-term prisoners from working on the railroad.
委员会在禁止累犯和长期服刑人员参与铁路建设的同时,逐步解决了这些问题。
The laws governing the use of prison labor on the Ussuri, Transbaikal, Circumbaikal, and Central Siberian lines gave local governors general charge of the prisoners, with power to determine their numbers and working conditions. Prisoners would either work directly for government engineers or be farmed out to contractors. They were to be compensated for their labor by a reduction in their sentence: one day of labor equaled two of prison time; one year equaled two years. Exiles received a reduction in the time of mandatory exile at the same ratio. Shackles were to be removed. Initially their wage was to be approximately 30 percent of the norm for free hired laborers, to be paid to the prison administration. Out of this sum came the costs of their transport, clothing, food, and military convoy; little or nothing was left over for the prisoners themselves. Eventually, in an effort to encourage “conscientious labor,” they were paid at the same rate as free workers; after expenses were taken out, they were then left with between 8 and 18 rubles per month. Their productivity rose accordingly. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
管理乌苏里、外贝加尔、环贝加尔和中西伯利亚铁路线上使用囚犯劳动的法律规定,由地方总督全权负责囚犯事务,包括决定囚犯数量和工作条件。囚犯要么直接为政府工程师工作,要么被外包给承包商。他们的劳动报酬是刑期减免:劳动一天抵两天监禁;劳动一年抵两年。流放者的强制流放时间也按相同比例缩减。脚镣应当被移除。最初,他们的工资约为自由雇佣劳工标准的 30%,这笔钱支付给监狱管理部门。从中扣除运输、衣物、食物和军事护送的费用后,囚犯自己几乎得不到任何剩余。最终,为了鼓励“认真劳动”,他们的工资提高到与自由工人相同的标准;扣除开支后,他们每月可获得 8 至 18 卢布。相应地,他们的生产率也随之提高。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
The government was highly satisfied with the results. Several thousand prisoners and exiles worked on the railroad each year as a small but permanent and reliable labor force; their total numbers reached 9,000 prisoners and 4,500 exiles. By all accounts, the prisoners conducted themselves well, and there was little evidence of disobedience after the fitful start in the South Ussuri region. Disciplinary measures were rarely needed. Only 1 percent of prisoners escaped or attempted to do so. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} The tsar was so pleased by the success of prison labor on
政府对成果极为满意。每年有数千名囚犯和流放者在铁路上劳作,形成了一支规模虽小但稳定可靠的劳动力队伍;囚犯总数达到 9000 人,流放者 4500 人。各方报告显示,囚犯表现良好,除南乌苏里地区初期偶有动荡外,几乎未见反抗迹象。鲜少需要采取惩戒措施,仅 1%的囚犯曾试图逃跑或成功脱逃。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 沙皇对西伯利亚铁路上囚犯劳役制度的成功深感欣慰,以至于
the Siberian Railroad that he proposed that it serve as a model for its organization in the rest of the empire. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} Insofar as prison labor was viewed as a solution to a manpower shortage, its use on the Siberian Railroad was a direct antecedent of Soviet practices. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
提议将其作为全帝国范围内劳役组织的典范。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} 就解决劳动力短缺而言,西伯利亚铁路的囚犯劳役制度直接影响了后来的苏联实践。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31}
The condition of prison laborers on the Siberian Railroad, however, was far better than the squalid and brutal slavery they were subjected to in Stalin’s concentration camps. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} Prisoners and exiles slept in wooden barracks, tents, or thatched huts much like those of other workers (not that these shelters were adequately ventilated or effectively shielded against the torrential rains or cold weather); those within a reasonable distance were returned to the prisons each night. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} Prisoners’ wages paid for clothing, regular breaks for tea or kvas, and two meals a day. The menu was listed in Tiuremnyi vestnik (Prison herald): lunch consisted of a hot dish with fish or meat flavored with pepper and bay leaf, and a vegetable portion; dinner was thin gruel with butter or lard and bread. A small amount of wine was dispensed on holidays. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} The workday usually lasted more than
然而,西伯利亚铁路上的监狱劳工条件,远比他们在斯大林集中营里遭受的肮脏与残酷奴役要好得多。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 囚犯和流放者睡在木制营房、帐篷或茅草屋里,与其他工人的住所相似(尽管这些栖身之所通风不良,也无法有效抵御暴雨或寒冷天气);那些距离合理的人每晚会被送回监狱。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 囚犯的工资用于购买衣物、定期休息时饮茶或格瓦斯,以及每日两餐。菜单刊登在《监狱通讯》上:午餐包括一道用胡椒和月桂叶调味的鱼肉或肉类热菜,外加一份蔬菜;晚餐则是掺有黄油或猪油的稀粥和面包。节假日还会分发少量葡萄酒。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 工作日通常持续超过

30. ZhKSZhD, zas. 38, Dec. 5, 1901, SP, p. 9, col. 2.
30. 俄国铁路建设委员会会议,第 38 次会议,1901 年 12 月 5 日,圣彼得堡,第 9 页,第 2 栏。

31. When the Committee of the Siberian Railroad discussed prison labor, F. G. Terner castigated the system for not fulfilling the humanitarian function of “correction and raising the moral standards . . . of the criminals.” Minister of Justice N. V. Murav’ev responded that its purpose was economic, not corrective, and the tsar agreed that, with the desire to complete the railroad as rapidly as possible, rehabilitation had to be left to the side for the time being (ZhKSZhD, zas. 29, Apr. 2, 1897, SP, pp. 25-27, col. 1; pp. 2425 , col. 2). On the economic determinants of prison labor in the Soviet period, see S S SS. Swianiewicz, Forced Labor and Economic Development: An Enquiry into the Experience of Soviet Industrialization (London, 1965).
31. 当西伯利亚铁路委员会讨论监狱劳动时,F. G. 特纳谴责该系统未能实现“矫正和提升罪犯道德水平”的人道主义功能。司法部长 N. V. 穆拉维约夫回应称,其目的是经济性的而非矫正性的,沙皇也同意,在尽快完成铁路建设的迫切需求下,改造工作暂时不得不搁置(《西伯利亚铁路委员会会议记录》,第 29 次会议,1897 年 4 月 2 日,SP,第 25-27 页,第 1 栏;第 2425 页,第 2 栏)。关于苏联时期监狱劳动的经济决定因素,参见 S S SS 。斯维亚尼维奇,《强制劳动与经济发展:苏联工业化历程探究》(伦敦,1965 年)。

32. See David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia (New Haven, 1947), and Robert Conquest, Kolyma: The Arctic Death Camps (Oxford, 1979). The basic distinction between tsarist and Soviet prison labor, aside from living and working conditions, was that the Committee of the Siberian Railroad developed an incentive system whereby prisoners’ wages were raised to encourage greater productivity. In Stalin’s camps the reverse practice prevailed: threats of violence and deprivation of food were expected to induce more work. In the post-Stalin era, the terms of prison labor reverted to those employed on the Siberian Railroad. Prisoners employed by the Soviet authorities to make up for the shortage of labor in the Tiumen’ oil fields were paid a wage and given a reduced sentence. See Violet Conolly, Beyond the Urals (Oxford, 1967), 261.
32. 参见 David J. Dallin 与 Boris I. Nicolaevsky 合著的《苏联的强迫劳动》(纽黑文,1947 年),以及 Robert Conquest 所著《科雷马:北极死亡营》(牛津,1979 年)。沙皇时期与苏联时期监狱劳动的根本区别(除生活和工作条件外)在于,西伯利亚铁路委员会开发了一套激励制度,通过提高囚犯工资来刺激生产效率。而在斯大林集中营中盛行相反的做法:以暴力威胁和剥夺食物来迫使囚犯劳动。后斯大林时代,监狱劳动条款又回归到西伯利亚铁路时期的模式。苏联当局为弥补秋明油田劳动力短缺而雇佣的囚犯可获得工资并减刑。参见 Violet Conolly《乌拉尔以东》(牛津,1967 年),第 261 页。

33. TKIM, 3:4; TKIM(VP), 15:2; Tiuremnyi vestnik, 1895, no. 3: 121. For the living arrangements of nonconvict laborers, see TKIM, 1:17, 51 (according to this source, some workers on the Western Siberian section also lived in railroad cars that moved with construction), and TKIM(VP), 15:1-2.
33. 参见 TKIM 第 3 卷第 4 章;TKIM(VP)第 15 卷第 2 章;《监狱通报》1895 年第 3 期第 121 页。关于非囚犯劳工的生活安排,参见 TKIM 第 1 卷第 17、51 页(据该资料记载,西西伯利亚段部分工人也住在随工程移动的铁路车厢中),以及 TKIM(VP)第 15 卷第 1-2 章。

34. See Tiuremnyi vestnik, 1895, no. 3: 119, 121; 1897, no. 3: 130. Construction contractors sold food to free contract laborers at a set price (TKIM[VP], 15:4-5). According to TKIM(VP), an official source that did not hesitate to criticize the government’s handling of the construction of the railroad, there were few complaints about the quality of the food on the Ussuri line. This was not the case, though, in the first season of con-
34. 参见《监狱通报》,1895 年第 3 期:119、121 页;1897 年第 3 期:130 页。建筑承包商以固定价格向自由合同工出售食物(TKIM[VP],15:4-5)。根据 TKIM(VP)——一份不惮于批评政府铁路建设管理问题的官方资料,乌苏里铁路线上关于食品质量的投诉较少。然而,在施工的第一个季节情况并非如此。

twelve hours, but construction was halted during rain and holidays. Sundays were days off. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
十二小时工作制,但遇雨天及节假日停工。星期日为休息日。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
There is no denying that the work was hard, uncomfortable, and hazardous for prisoners and free laborers alike-construction was, of course, largely unmechanized, and horses were often unavailable for carting away rock and earth. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} But sanitary conditions were considered good in general and work in the open air, with reasonable wages and inducements, was beneficial. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} The sickness rate for prisoners was lower than in the central prisons of European Russia, at the Nerchinsk labor camp, or on Sakhalin Island, and only 1 percent of worktime was spent in the hospital. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} The 2 percent death rate for both prisoners and free laborers certainly compared favorably with that of other large-scale construction projects around the world, such as the Panama Canal, where the death toll reached 25,000 and the sickness level more than 30 percent. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} These facts contradict the claims of Soviet historians, following Lenin, that labor conditions were
不可否认,无论对囚犯还是自由劳工而言,这项工作都艰苦、不适且危险——施工过程基本未实现机械化,搬运土石时常常连马匹都难以调用。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} 但总体而言,卫生条件被认为良好,露天作业配合合理的工资与激励措施反而有益健康。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 囚犯的患病率低于俄罗斯欧洲部分的中央监狱、涅尔琴斯克劳改营或萨哈林岛,住院治疗时间仅占工时的 1%。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} 囚犯与自由劳工 2%的死亡率,相比巴拿马运河等全球其他大型工程(该工程死亡人数达 2.5 万,患病率超 30%)显然更为乐观。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} 这些事实驳斥了苏联历史学家追随列宁所称的劳动条件"极其恶劣"、存在"空前残酷"的剥削和劳动力"军事化"的说法。
Unmechanized earthworks, Western Siberian line. From Velikii put’ ^('){ }^{\prime} Vidy Sibiri i eia zheleznykh dorog (Krasnoiarsk, 1899).
西伯利亚西部线路的非机械化土方工程。选自《伟大之路:西伯利亚及其铁路风光》(克拉斯诺亚尔斯克,1899 年)。

“terrible” and constituted the “unprecedentedly harsh” exploitation and “militarization” of the work force. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
"“骇人听闻”且构成对劳动力“空前严酷”的剥削与“军事化”。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} "

Personnel  人员编制

If recruitment of a labor force proved difficult, staffing for the critical tasks of operation and management proved even more so. It was difficult to find skilled or even unskilled employees after the road was
若劳动力招募已属不易,那么运营与管理等关键岗位的人员配备则更为困难。铁路建成后,连熟练工甚至普通工人都难以寻觅,且鲜有职位能长期由同一人担任。

40. Borzunov, “Rabochie,” 118-119, and Proletariat, 147; V. N. Kazimirov, Velikii sibirskii put’ (Irkutsk, 1970), 25.
40. 博尔祖诺夫,《工人》,118-119 页,及《无产阶级》,147 页;V·N·卡济米罗夫,《伟大的西伯利亚之路》(伊尔库茨克,1970 年),25 页。

completed, and it was rare for a post to remain occupied for long by anyone. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} The turnover rate was at least 35 percent a year on some sections and up to 87 percent on others. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} Partly responsible was the tedium of life in Siberia, with its hard work, low pay, high cost of living, scarcity of consumer goods, and unavailability of schooling. And its mercilessness-the extreme cold of winter and heat of summer, the swarms of infectious insects, the prevalence of disease, and the bad drinking water-did not contribute to permanence or stability. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
某些区段的年流动率至少达 35%,甚至高达 87%。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} 部分原因在于西伯利亚生活的单调乏味——高强度劳动、微薄薪资、高昂生活成本、消费品匮乏以及教育资源短缺。加之严酷环境的摧残——冬季极寒、夏季酷热、成群传染性昆虫肆虐、疾病流行及劣质饮用水——无一不阻碍着人员的长期稳定驻留。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}

The railroad was unable to attract anything but the poorest-quality personnel. From European Russia came transients whose railroad careers had been wrecked and who could not be trusted in positions of responsibility. From its own small population Siberia offered a contingent of illiterate or half-educated exiles and former convicts whose criminal lives had not yet faded into the past. Almost 80 percent of personnel were in this category in 1904, among them 600 men who had been sentenced at one time for the gamut of violent crimes. A large percentage of night watchmen, responsible for the security of railroad freight, had been sent into Siberian exile for robbery. Murderers and rapists were employed as track security guards. In spite of rules restricting the employment of exiles after 1904, by 1912 they were still heavily represented. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} As one authority described it, this milieu was not conducive to good work. Even the best
这条铁路只能吸引到最劣质的人员。来自欧洲俄罗斯的是一些铁路职业生涯已经毁掉的流动人员,他们无法被委以责任职位。西伯利亚本地人口稀少,提供的是一群文盲或半文盲的流放者和前罪犯,他们的犯罪生涯尚未成为过去。1904 年,近 80%的员工属于这一类,其中包括 600 名曾因各种暴力犯罪被判刑的人。负责铁路货运安全的夜班看守中,很大比例是因抢劫被流放到西伯利亚的。杀人犯和强奸犯被雇来担任轨道保安。尽管 1904 年后有规定限制雇用流放者,但到 1912 年,他们仍占很大比例。正如一位权威人士所描述的,这种环境不利于良好工作。即使是最好的
master road builders deteriorate amazingly quickly, begin to get lazy, conduct their affairs carelessly, [and] become hard drinkers. . . The more respectable ones quit, begging to be allowed back to Russia at much lower rates of pay than those they had received before their departure for Siberia; occasionally they leave on a moment’s notice, without the hope of a new position. 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
技艺精湛的筑路工人们迅速堕落,开始变得懒散,做事马虎,[并且]沉溺于酗酒……较为体面的人选择辞职,恳求以远低于赴西伯利亚前薪资水平的报酬返回俄国;偶尔他们会不告而别,丝毫不考虑新工作的着落。 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
Here was fertile soil for corruption and crime, which seems to have been the rule rather than the exception. In the two years from 1910 to
这里滋生了腐败与犯罪的沃土,此类行径似乎已成常态而非例外。仅在 1910 年至
1912 alone the number of criminal prosecutions of railroad personnel approached 1,000, and few posts were immune. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} Officials commonly stole railroad materials for their personal use. Over several months a telegraph chief named Leitneker, his assistant, Kats, and a shop steward named Liutynskii took shop materials to refurbish furniture, install a doorbell, and build casement windows and bookcases in Leitneker’s home; to repaire furniture and install indoor plumbing and window sashes in Kats’s home; and to do a variety of work in the local cinema jointly owned by Kats’s wife and Liutynskii. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
1912 这两年期间,针对铁路员工的刑事诉讼就接近 1000 起,几乎无一岗位幸免。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} 官员们惯常盗取铁路材料私用。数月间,电报主管莱特内克与其助手卡茨、工头柳廷斯基联手盗用车间材料:为莱特内克家翻新家具、安装门铃、制作凸窗和书架;为卡茨家修理家具、加装室内管道和窗框;还为卡茨妻子与柳廷斯基合开的当地影院进行各类装修。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
Employees in charge of storing and dispensing materials for the railroad-coal, firewood, cross-ties-stole or bought and sold them at cut-rate prices, then pocketed the proceeds. It was estimated that only 20 percent of the coal stored at the Omsk fuel depot of the Siberian Railroad found its way into use on the railroad; the rest was sold on the sly by railroad personnel in Omsk. The former locomotive engineer Prokofii Kulikov, who had contacts at the fuel depot, arranged a private contract for the delivery of 18,000 to 20,000 puds of the railroad’s coal to the Women’s School of the Omsk Eparchy. The city’s government buildings were also heated with coal belonging to the railroad. During the revolution of 1905, the railroad, and thereby the State Treasury, lost hundreds of thousands of rubles in the organized “liberation” of freight and materials, an activity in which railroad personnel took part. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
负责为铁路存储和分发物资(如煤炭、柴火、枕木)的员工们以低价偷窃或买卖这些物资,并将所得收入私吞。据估计,西伯利亚铁路鄂木斯克燃料仓库中存储的煤炭仅有 20%真正用于铁路运营;其余部分被鄂木斯克的铁路员工暗中出售。前机车工程师普罗科菲·库利科夫在燃料仓库有熟人,他私下安排了一份合同,将铁路的 18,000 至 20,000 普特煤炭运送到鄂木斯克教区的女子学校。该市的政府建筑也使用了属于铁路的煤炭供暖。在 1905 年革命期间,铁路部门(进而国库)因有组织地“解放”货物和物资而损失了数十万卢布,铁路员工也参与了这一活动。 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
The most common form of corruption was bribery, considered the only lubricant necessary for the operation of the Trans-Siberian. The railroad contractor I. N. Nikol’skii found that he had to pay off stationmasters to get anything accomplished. Bribes were demanded and given openly, usually with receipts indicating they had been paid. They were mandatory for hiring, for transfers, for raises, to prevent imposition of penalties, and for hauling freight. The testimony of Pavel Komarov, a small coal supplier, was typical. In 1909 he received an order for an amount of coal. Inspector Vladimir Teliatnikov delayed
最常见的腐败形式是贿赂,这被视为西伯利亚大铁路运营中唯一必要的润滑剂。铁路承包商 I. N. 尼古拉斯基发现,他必须贿赂站长才能办成任何事情。贿赂被公开索要和给予,通常还会出具收据证明款项已付。无论是雇佣、调动、加薪、避免处罚还是运输货物,贿赂都是强制性的。小型煤炭供应商帕维尔·科马罗夫的证词颇具代表性。1909 年他收到一份煤炭订单,但检查员弗拉基米尔·捷利亚特尼科夫却迟迟不批。

46. Medem, 11-16. Stationmasters and track overseers figured prominently as targets of corruption proceedings. These were middle-level managers, who were responsible on American railroads for the efficient operation of the system. As the London Times put it, they did find an El Dorado in Siberia-and were quick to vanish with their fortunes (Times, Apr. 8, 1902, p. 3). One is tempted to compare them with Muscovite officials in Siberia, who saw their post as a way to make quick money, exploited it for what they could get, then left. See George V. Lantzeff, Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration (Berkeley, 1943), 32.
46. 梅德姆,11-16 页。车站站长和轨道监督员是腐败诉讼的主要目标。这些中层管理者在美国铁路上负责系统的高效运作。正如《伦敦时报》所言,他们在西伯利亚确实发现了黄金国——并迅速携财富消失(《泰晤士报》,1902 年 4 月 8 日,第 3 版)。人们不禁将他们与莫斯科派驻西伯利亚的官员相类比,后者将职位视为快速敛财的途径,竭尽所能榨取利益后便离开。参见乔治·V·兰采夫《十七世纪的西伯利亚:殖民行政研究》(伯克利,1943 年),第 32 页。

47. Medem, 36.  47. 梅德姆,第 36 页。
48. Ibid., 37-38, 40-42, 67-68, 84-86, 96-97.
48. 同上,第 37-38、40-42、67-68、84-86、96-97 页。

the first shipment, but sent it off after six visits by Komarov. To speed the second shipment, though, he demanded “thanks” for the first. Komarov protested that he had no money at the time; Teliatnikov replied by pointing at his palm. Each time Komarov returned, he got the same answer: “When there is a payment, then there will be a shipment.” Finally in July 1910 Komarov’s coal was sent off while Teliatnikov was on vacation. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
第一批货物,但在科马罗夫六次拜访后才发运。为加速第二批货物运输,他却要求为第一批货物支付"感谢费"。科马罗夫抗议称当时无钱支付;捷利亚特尼科夫闻言摊开手掌。每次科马罗夫再来,都得到同样答复:"付款到位,即刻发货"。最终在 1910 年 7 月,趁捷利亚特尼科夫休假期间,科马罗夫的煤炭才得以运出。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
The attitude that these methods were acceptable had deep roots. As an indicted siding chief named Bogdanovich explained to investigators, he “would take bribes even now if someone offered; . . . why not if they are given? There are two Russian proverbs on this: ( 1 ) ( 1 ) (1)(\mathbf{1}) if they give, take; if they beat, flee [daiut-beri, b b b^(')b^{\prime} iut-begi] and (2) a fool gives, a clever one takes [durak daet, umnyi beret].” Engineer Khachatriants explained that he “took himself to Siberia to live on more than one income.” 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} Inadequately supervised and inculcated with no sense of responsibility, personnel thus contributed significantly to the railroad’s problems. Their corruption represented one more obstruction in the way of the state as it strove to build the railroad and control its distant territories.
这种认为此类手段可取的观念根深蒂固。正如一位名叫波格丹诺维奇的路段主管在调查中供述的那样,他“现在如果有人行贿照样会收;……既然有人给,为何不收?俄罗斯有两句谚语说得好: ( 1 ) ( 1 ) (1)(\mathbf{1}) 给就拿,打就跑 [人家送礼就收下,人家动手就逃跑] 以及 (2) 傻子才给,聪明人只拿 [愚者施舍,智者取之]。”工程师哈恰特良茨解释称,他“来西伯利亚就是为了多挣几份收入”。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} 由于监管缺位且缺乏责任感,这些人员对铁路问题负有重大责任。他们的腐败行为为国家修建铁路和控制遥远疆土的目标又增添了一道阻碍。

Contractors  承包商

The natural problems of geography and demography called for extraordinary expertise, but the organization of construction was so inadequate to the task that efficiency and cost control were virtually impossible.
地理与人口的自然条件需要非凡的专业技术,但施工组织却严重不足,几乎无法实现效率与成本控制。
Construction was organized in two ways. Chief engineers could either supervise their works directly or farm out the various tasks to contractors, depending on which method, in their opinion, would get the railroad finished most quickly. Most of the construction was done by private contractors. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51} In spite of rules to the contrary, as well as the admonishments of Vostochnoe obozrenie, large contractors or a few syndicates of contractors monopolized the contract work. Govern-
工程建设采用两种组织方式。总工程师可直接监督施工,或将各项任务分包给承包商,具体取决于哪种方式在他们看来能更快完成铁路建设。大部分工程由私营承包商承建。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51} 尽管存在相反的规定以及《东方评论》的告诫,大型承包商或少数承包商联合体仍垄断了承包工程。政府工程师常将某段铁路上的各类任务统一打包给单一承包商……
ment engineers often gave them control of all the various tasks on a given section of the railroad in one contract… 52 52 ^(52)^{52} Any contract worth more than 5,000 rubles required authorization, but that was no problem. One chief engineer who wanted to grant a monopoly on the supply of wood for a section of the Western Siberian Railroad to a single contractor, the merchant Brisker of Novgorod-Severskii, signed thirty-six separate contracts with him for a total value of 180,000 rubles. Since wood was freely available in Ufa, he also violated the stipulation that Siberian producers receive first preference. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
任何价值超过 5000 卢布的合同均需审批,但这并非难事。有位总工程师为将西西伯利亚铁路某段木材供应权独家授予诺夫哥罗德-谢韦尔斯基商人布里斯克,与其签署了 36 份独立合同,总价达 18 万卢布。由于乌法地区木材可自由采购,此举也违反了优先考虑西伯利亚生产商的规定。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
Regardless of the abuses associated with it, all the involved parties preferred this arrangement. For the state comptroller a lesser number of contractors eased the task of supervision. Construction chiefs were partial to it because it gave less opportunity for conflict with comptrollers and reduced burdensome correspondence. It got the job done quickly (regardless of costs) and relieved them of additional expenditures of time, direct responsibility for the labor force, and the detailed supervision of works (for which they often lacked the requisite specialized knowledge). The central administration in St. Petersburg was sympathetic because, in reducing the conflict between the builders and the comptrollers, the arrangement gave rise to fewer cases requiring time-consuming review and resolution. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
尽管存在种种弊端,所有相关方都更倾向于这种安排。对国家审计官而言,承包商数量减少简化了监管工作;工程主管们偏爱该制度,因为它减少了与审计部门冲突的可能性,并减轻了繁冗的文书负担。这种安排能快速推进工程(不计成本),使他们免于额外的时间投入、对劳动力的直接管理责任以及对施工细节的监督(他们往往缺乏必要的专业知识)。圣彼得堡的中央行政部门对此表示支持,因为该制度减少了建设者与审计官之间的摩擦,从而减少了需要耗时审查和裁决的纠纷案件。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
This form of construction led to widespread abuse. Their work essentially uncontrolled, contractors flouted all the rules. State engineers rarely publicized competitive bidding for contracts, as the Ministry of Transport had stipulated; contractors were chosen for arbitrary reasons. Estimates for a particular stretch of track were frequently based on the price asked by an individual contractor, who knew the government had not previously drawn up estimates. Having set his own high price, the contractor then called for even larger payments, and to keep him on the job the construction chief often approved the requests without higher authorization. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}
这种建设方式导致了普遍的滥用行为。由于工作基本不受监管,承包商公然违反所有规定。国家工程师很少按照交通部规定公开竞标合同;承包商的选择往往出于随意原因。某段铁路的造价估算常常基于个别承包商提出的价格,而承包商清楚政府此前并未制定估算。在自行设定高价后,承包商还会要求更多款项,而为了留住他们,工程主管经常未经上级批准就同意这些请求。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55}

52. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1894, no. 75: 1; Borzunov, “Iz istorii formirovaniia,” 90; Pushechnikov, “O nedochetakh v dele postroiki,” Inzhener, no. 4 (Apr. 1909): 101. Borzunov shows that large contractors, with capital of from 50,000 to 500,000 rubles, did 98 % 98 % 98%98 \% of contract works. It is significant, as he also points out, that more than one-third of all contractors were of peasant origin. And judging by their low bankruptcy rate in comparison with other classes, they did comparatively well (pp. 90, 95).
52. 《东方评论》,1894 年,第 75 期:1 页;博尔祖诺夫,《关于建设事业中不足之处的形成史》,90 页;普谢奇尼科夫,《关于铁路建设中的缺陷》,《工程师》杂志,1909 年 4 月第 4 期:101 页。博尔祖诺夫指出,拥有 5 万至 50 万卢布资本的大承包商完成了 98 % 98 % 98%98 \% 的合同工程。值得注意的是,正如他所指出的,超过三分之一的承包商出身农民。且与其他阶层相比,他们的破产率较低,表明他们相对经营得更好(第 90、95 页)。

53. TKIM, 11:4-5.  53. TKIM,第 11 卷第 4-5 页。
54. Pushechnikov, “O nedochetakh v dele postroiki,” Inzhener, Apr. 1909, no. 4: 101; May 1909, no. 5: 133, 136-137, 139; ZhKSZhD, zas. 31, Apr. 29, 1898, SP, p. 3, col. 2; Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie otchety, tretii sozyv, vol. 2, sessiia pervaia, zas. 46, Apr. 1, 1908, col. 1522 (all further references are to this session).
54. 普谢奇尼科夫,《关于建设中的不足问题》,《工程师》杂志,1909 年 4 月第 4 期:101 页;1909 年 5 月第 5 期:133、136-137、139 页;《铁路建设委员会会议记录》,第 31 次会议,1898 年 4 月 29 日,圣彼得堡,第 3 页第 2 栏;《国家杜马速记报告》,第三届,第 2 卷,第一次会议,第 46 次会议,1908 年 4 月 1 日,第 1522 栏(后续引用均指本次会议)。

55. Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie otchety, col. 1521; TKIM, 11:1-6, 21; 12:1-2, 4-5.
55. 《国家杜马速记报告》,第 1521 栏;《交通与公共工程部技术委员会材料》,第 11 卷:1-6、21 页;第 12 卷:1-2、4-5 页。
A particularly common, and costly, practice was to offer inducements and subsidies to contractors. A large proportion of their work was done without vouchers and they were given railroad equipment for their use at no cost, as well as, in many cases, tools, horses, food, forage, shelters, and a work force. Completion dates were delayed upon request. Most significant were advance payments. Such payments were lawful when they enabled the contractor to finish his work on schedule. Frequently, though, advances took the form of interest-free loans. Often in the tens or hundreds of thousands of rubles, they were paid to contractors and employees of the construction administration alike. Not surprisingly, the rate of repayment was low. In 1896 the amount of illegal advances exceeded 2.5 million rubles, and the practice showed no sign of contraction thereafter. 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56}
一种特别常见且代价高昂的做法是向承包商提供激励和补贴。他们的大部分工作都是在没有凭证的情况下完成的,而且他们可以免费使用铁路设备,在许多情况下还包括工具、马匹、食物、饲料、住所和劳动力。完工日期可根据要求推迟。最重要的是预付款。当这些款项能使承包商按时完成工作时,它们是合法的。然而,预付款往往以无息贷款的形式出现。这些款项通常高达数万或数十万卢布,既支付给承包商,也支付给建设管理部门的雇员。不出所料,还款率很低。1896 年,非法预付款的金额超过了 250 万卢布,此后这种做法丝毫没有减少的迹象。 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56}
Once a contract was in hand, the contractor sought to widen his profit margin by reducing construction costs. The technical standards established by the government were already low, and the contractor lowered them further. If regulations called for a formation of sixteen feet, for instance, it might be built at eleven feet. Or, since large contractors did not have the qualifications to undertake all forms of construction on a given route (several contractors on the Ussuri section were reputedly unqualified for any railroad work whatsoever), they would themselves farm out much of the work to subcontractors at the lowest price possible, the difference between the state contract and their own subcontracts forming their profit. The contractor thereby earned a handsome sum without risk or labor. Authorities estimated that while contractors made profits of 30 percent on the average, costs of construction and railroad supplies were inflated, with wide variation, up to 60 percent or more. 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} One peasant contractor from Smolensk province told A. Pushechnikov, chief construction engineer for the Transbaikal Railroad, “By recommending me for contract work on the Circumbaikal line, you have made me rich.” 58
一旦合同到手,承包商便试图通过降低建设成本来扩大利润空间。政府制定的技术标准本已偏低,承包商却进一步降低标准。例如,若规定路基需达十六英尺,实际可能只建十一英尺。又因大型承包商往往不具备承建某条线路全部工程的能力(乌苏里段的几个承包商据称根本不具备任何铁路施工资质),他们便以最低价格将大量工程转包给分包商,国家合同与分包合同之间的差价即构成其利润。如此一来,承包商无需承担风险或付出劳动即可获得可观收益。当局估算承包商平均获利达 30%,而铁路建设及材料成本却被大幅抬高,浮动范围甚至高达 60%以上。 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} 斯摩棱斯克省一位农民承包商曾向 A. 普谢什尼科夫,外贝加尔铁路总工程师,“通过推荐我参与环贝加尔铁路线的合同工程,您让我变得富有。”58

Management  管理

A contemporary Russian railroad engineer called the project " a a aa monument to Russian official bungling and laxity of administration." 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59} The management of the Siberian Railroad during both construction and operation was bureaucratic and overly centralized, and the functions of its components were ill defined.
一位当时的俄罗斯铁路工程师称该项目为“ a a aa 俄罗斯官方拙劣管理和行政松懈的纪念碑 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59} ”。西伯利亚铁路在建设和运营期间的管理都过于官僚和集中,其各部门职能界定不清。
The Trans-Siberian was initially subdivided for purposes of construction and administration into four separate railroads corresponding to geographical divisions: the Western Siberian, Central Siberian, Transbaikal, and Ussuri railroads. In 1900 the Western Siberian and Central Siberian lines were unified into the “Siberian Railroad,” with headquarters in Tomsk, a sop to that city for its location on a branch line. In 1906 the Siberian Railroad absorbed the Transbaikal Railroad and in the same year the Chinese-Eastern Railroad was given control of the Ussuri Railroad. Even before their amalgamation, the length of each section had made it difficult to supervise; afterward it was more so. It was impossible to carry out inspections more than twice a year, so that many problems were left undiscovered. 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
西伯利亚大铁路最初在建设和行政管理上被划分为四条独立的铁路,分别对应不同的地理区域:西西伯利亚铁路、中西伯利亚铁路、外贝加尔铁路和乌苏里铁路。1900 年,西西伯利亚铁路和中西伯利亚铁路合并为“西伯利亚铁路”,总部设在托木斯克,这是对该市位于支线上的一个安抚。1906 年,西伯利亚铁路接管了外贝加尔铁路,同年,中东铁路获得了对乌苏里铁路的控制权。即使在合并之前,各段的长度已经使得监管变得困难;合并后情况更加严重。每年最多只能进行两次检查,因此许多问题未被发现。 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
Real authority over construction and operation lay not in Tomsk or Khabarovsk (headquarters of the Ussuri Railroad) but in distant St. Petersburg, in the Committee of the Siberian Railroad and the central organs of the Ministry of Transport-the Administration for the Construction of the Siberian Railroad and the Council for the Administration of the Siberian Railroad. A local administration would have been able to resolve problems effectively, without time-consuming correspondence with the capital. But St. Petersburg refused to delegate any of the authority it wielded so inefficiently. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
真正的建设与运营实权并不掌握在托木斯克或哈巴罗夫斯克(乌苏里铁路总部),而是远在圣彼得堡的西伯利亚铁路委员会及交通部中央机构——西伯利亚铁路建设管理局与西伯利亚铁路管理委员会手中。地方管理机构本可以高效解决问题,无需耗时与首都进行文书往来。但圣彼得堡却拒绝下放其低效行使的任何权力。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61}
The railroad’s management was centralized to an absurd degree.
铁路管理呈现出荒谬的集权化特征。
The tsar and his ministers reviewed each request for a grant of temporary monetary assistance made by an injured employee or a survivor of an employee who had died in railroad service. Among numerous others, the peasant Fedor Koniakin, permanently disabled while on the Okhotsk-Kamchatka expedition, received 500 rubles after the Committee of the Siberian Railroad considered his plight. 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} That the tsar and his ministers, rather than local authorities, were responsible for these decisions indicates the paternalism of “modern” economic development in Russia and the persistence of a pattern developed in the Muscovite period, when virtually every action of officials in Siberia required written approval from Moscow. 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63}
沙皇及其大臣们逐一审查了由受伤员工或在铁路服务中死亡的员工遗属提出的临时经济援助申请。在众多案例中,农民费奥多尔·科尼亚金在鄂霍次克-堪察加考察期间永久伤残后,西伯利亚铁路委员会审议了他的困境,最终他获得了 500 卢布。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62} 这些决策由沙皇及其大臣而非地方官员负责,表明了俄罗斯“现代化”经济发展中的家长式作风,以及莫斯科时期形成的模式的延续——当时西伯利亚官员的几乎每项行动都需要莫斯科的书面批准。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63}
Muscovy did not always succeed in imposing its control over remote regions, and the knowledge of this failure engendered a lack of responsibility on the part of officials. The state of affairs was no different on the Siberian Railroad. Despite a centralized administrative structure, the state’s instructions to the building administration and construction chiefs were insufficiently detailed and unclearly split responsibility among central authorities, local political authorities, and local railroad officials. Site managers and construction chiefs bore no personal responsibility for a task entrusted to them, whether they succeeded or failed. On the one hand, they were encouraged to sidestep the law in order not to delay construction or implementation of a policy that would improve operation. On the other hand, breaking the rules would bring censure that was worse than the penalties for allowing deficiencies in railroad operation; better, therefore, to leave them uncorrected. Many questions that required speedy resolution or could have best been resolved locally were up to central authorities to deal with. Yet, at the same time that the central administration could impose punitive measures on local railroad officials, it itself was not answerable for the results of operation or construction, because of the ambiguity of the instructions and the fact that it was not its task to accomplish actual construction or operate the trains. In addition, for the enormous amount of difficult work required, all officials involved with the Siberian Railroad, from its central administrators to local managers, were grossly underpaid. 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} The uncompromising central-
莫斯科公国并非总能成功控制偏远地区,而这种失败的认知导致官员缺乏责任感。西伯利亚铁路的情况亦无二致。尽管存在集中化的行政结构,国家下达给建设管理部门和施工负责人的指令不够详尽,且中央当局、地方政治当局与地方铁路官员之间的责任划分模糊不清。工地经理和施工负责人无论成败,均无需对受托任务承担个人责任。一方面,他们被鼓励规避法律,以免延误建设或影响改善运营政策的实施;另一方面,违规行为将招致比放任铁路运营缺陷更严厉的谴责——因此不如对问题置之不理。许多需要快速解决或本可在当地妥善处理的问题,最终都推给了中央当局决断。 然而,就在中央政府能够对地方铁路官员实施惩罚性措施的同时,由于其指令的模糊性以及实际建设和运营列车并非其职责所在,中央行政机构本身无需对运营或建设结果负责。此外,面对所需完成的艰巨工作量,所有参与西伯利亚铁路事务的官员,从中央管理者到地方经理,薪酬都严重不足。 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} 这种毫不妥协的中央集权——
ism of formal control led to ambiguities and imperfections in actual administration that hampered the progress of the project no end.
形式控制导致了实际行政管理中的模糊与缺陷,极大地阻碍了项目的进展。
The defects of managerial procedure were nowhere more apparent than in the procedures for financial control and accounting employed on the railroad. According to Witte, in a memorandum to Kulomzin, “in essence . . . the construction of the Siberian Railroad, an undertaking of such enormous importance requiring expenditures in the hundreds of millions of rubles, is virtually being carried out without any record of its costs.” Faced with the fait accompli of overexpenditures, he continued, the Committee of the Siberian Railroad could do nothing; its approval of financing had been reduced to a formality. 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
管理程序上的缺陷在铁路的财务控制和会计程序中表现得最为明显。维特在给库洛姆津的备忘录中指出:“实际上……西伯利亚铁路的建设,这一耗资数亿卢布、具有重大意义的工程,几乎是在没有任何成本记录的情况下进行的。”面对超支的既成事实,他继续写道,西伯利亚铁路委员会无能为力;其对资金的批准已沦为一种形式。 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
But in word and deed Witte and the committee had condoned the lack of financial discipline, in spite of some attempt to establish stricter standards and strengthen the authority of the state comptroller. 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} The Siberian Railroad was not held to the strict standards of financial reporting required of private railroads. Funding was never adequate for the preparation of such reports (or for administration on the whole), and the Ministry of Transport was permitted to postpone compilation of reports on construction for years after the railroad’s completion. 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} The state comptroller, T. I. Filippov, was reputedly more absorbed in theological questions than in financial control, and many of his local representatives were incompetent and unfamiliar with railroad matters. 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} Prince Meshcherskii’s opinion that the financial control of construction work would lead to higher costs and retard completion was shared by the Committee of the Siberian Railroad; especially after the Boxer Rebellion, it shunted financial control aside
但在言行上,维特和委员会纵容了财政纪律的缺失,尽管他们曾试图建立更严格的标准并加强国家审计长的权威。 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} 西伯利亚铁路并未遵守私营铁路所要求的严格财务报告标准。编制此类报告(或整体管理)的资金从未充足,交通部还被允许在铁路完工多年后推迟编制建设报告。 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67} 国家审计长 T.I.菲利波夫据说更专注于神学问题而非财务监督,他的许多地方代表能力不足且不熟悉铁路事务。 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} 梅谢尔斯基亲王认为对建设工作的财务监督会导致成本上升并延误完工,这一观点得到了西伯利亚铁路委员会的认同;特别是在义和团运动之后,委员会将财务监督搁置一旁。
and ordered engineers to finish the railroad at any cost. 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} The urgency of completing the railroad and the indifference of the state to matters of economy can ultimately be held responsible for many of the features of railroad management.
并命令工程师不惜一切代价完成铁路建设。 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} 铁路完工的紧迫性以及国家对经济问题的漠视,最终可归咎于铁路管理诸多特点的形成。
The establishment of cost estimates for the railroad was also faulty, so that adherence to formal procedure was almost impossible. Estimates were compiled in St. Petersburg before the building plans were completed, on the basis of surveys that were likely to be inaccurate. Anticipated costs were derived from the statistical assessment of previous European Russian railroad building, rather than of the very different conditions in Siberia. Representatives of the minister of finance and state comptroller often met in literal bargaining sessions to lower the cost estimates for various works, regardless of financial reality, so as to claim that they had made an attempt to reduce expenditures. The result was estimates that bore no relation to the actual costs of construction. 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70}
铁路成本估算的制定同样存在缺陷,导致几乎无法遵循正式程序。估算是在圣彼得堡编制的,当时建设规划尚未完成,基于可能不准确的勘测数据。预期成本源自对欧洲俄罗斯地区以往铁路建设的统计评估,而非西伯利亚截然不同的实际情况。财政部长与国家审计长的代表们经常举行实质上的议价会议,不顾财务现实压低各项工程的成本估算,只为宣称已尽力削减开支。其结果是估算与实际建设成本严重脱节。 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70}
The low priority given to cost considerations by almost everyone involved affected accounting on the railroad. Of course, the state of bookkeeping in Russia at large was primitive at the time: although merchants were legally obliged to keep books, many did not understand the reasons for doing so. Even some of the wealthiest kept no records at all and were unsure of the exact amounts involved in their current operations. 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71} These attitudes were mirrored in the management of the Siberian Railroad.
几乎所有参与者对成本考量的轻视影响了铁路的会计工作。当然,当时整个俄罗斯的簿记状况都很原始:尽管法律要求商人必须记账,但许多人并不理解这样做的原因。甚至一些最富有的人也完全不记录账目,对自己当前业务涉及的确切金额也不清楚。 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71} 这种态度在西伯利亚铁路的管理中得到了反映。
The railroad’s bookkeeping was in disarray. Accounting departments were underfunded and understaffed. 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72} Accounting procedures varied with the section of the line: some were centralized under a chief bookkeeper; other sections maintained a separate bookkeeping department for each operating division. The form of books was distinct for each section and often varied from one division to the next within the same section. With rare exceptions, Italian double-entry
铁路的账目管理一片混乱。会计部门资金不足且人手短缺。 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72} 不同路段的会计程序各异:有些路段由总会计师集中管理;其他路段则为每个运营部门单独设立会计部门。账簿形式因路段不同而各异,甚至同一路段内不同部门之间也常常不一致。除极少数例外,意大利式复式记账法……
bookkeeping, a standard technique that originated in the late thirteenth century, was not employed on the Siberian Railroad. Often books were no more than a collection of receipts and other documents, in contradiction of the very notion of systematized bookkeeping. Data were imprecise, inconsistent, entered repeatedly, or missing altogether. The appearance of satisfactory performance was more important than a record reflecting the true position of the railroad. Management did not heed the standards set by the state comptroller for establishing an accounting system, so the data the railroad provided were often insufficient to permit the railroad’s condition to be judged. The construction and operating administrations themselves often had no way to assess the financial position of the railroads under their control. An official investigative body noted the haphazard, chaotic bookkeeping of the Siberian Railroad during construction in the mid-1890s, but by the outbreak of World War I it had still not been corrected, and no figures concerning the railroad’s operation could be regarded as wholly reliable. 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73}
簿记,这一起源于 13 世纪末的标准技术,并未在西伯利亚铁路上得到应用。账本往往仅是一堆收据和其他文件的集合,与系统化簿记的概念背道而驰。数据不精确、前后矛盾、重复录入或完全缺失。表面上的良好表现比反映铁路真实状况的记录更为重要。管理层无视国家审计长制定的会计制度标准,因此铁路提供的数据往往不足以判断其状况。建设和运营管理部门自身也常常无法评估其管辖下铁路的财务状况。一个官方调查机构在 19 世纪 90 年代中期就指出了西伯利亚铁路建设期间簿记的随意和混乱,但直到第一次世界大战爆发时仍未得到纠正,关于铁路运营的任何数据都无法被视为完全可靠。 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73}
An infinite number of problems can be attributed to these deficiencies. The smallest details are important to the management of an enterprise as large and dynamic as a railroad. Inaccurate records and analysis hinder efficiency of operation and permit costs to skyrocket. American railroads devised new forms of accounting to cope with the complexities of operation and to digest the large flow of data that they generated. Furthermore, in the United States the lines of managerial responsibility were clearly drawn and authority was delegated to autonomous divisional managers to decentralize operations. Strict standards of control and evaluation were established as well. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} But Russian attitudes and traditions, the bureaucratic approach to railroad management, and the political motivation of the Siberian Railroad brought about a very different configuration that jeopardized the whole venture.
这些问题可归咎于无数缺陷。对于像铁路这样庞大且动态的企业管理而言,最微小的细节都至关重要。记录和分析的不准确会阻碍运营效率,导致成本飙升。美国铁路公司设计了新的会计形式以应对运营的复杂性,并消化其产生的大量数据。此外,在美国,管理责任界限分明,权力下放给自主的分区经理以实现运营分散化。同时,还建立了严格的控制和评估标准。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} 然而,俄罗斯的态度和传统、官僚主义的铁路管理方式以及西伯利亚铁路的政治动机,导致了截然不同的格局,危及了整个项目。

CHAPTERTEN  第十章

The Limits of Railroad Colonization
铁路殖民化的局限

IImproperly designed and poorly managed, the Trans-Siberian had inadequate capacity and its operation left much to be desired. It was not suited to accomplish the government’s long-range goals in Siberia and the Russian Far East: it could not perform satisfactorily when it was called on for military service, it helped to strengthen the revolutionary element in Siberia, and its effectiveness in developing the Siberian economy was limited.
设计不当且管理不善的跨西伯利亚铁路运力不足,运营状况令人失望。它无法实现政府在东西伯利亚和远东地区的长远目标:军事运输时表现欠佳,助长了西伯利亚的革命势力,对西伯利亚经济发展的推动作用也极为有限。

Slow Motion  慢动作

The condition of the track and roadbed did nothing to enhance the railroad’s performance. The start of operation on the new stretch of road between Mariinsk and Achinsk was emblematic: the first locomotive to be driven on the line fell into a river below the tracks. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} The Trans-Siberian had more accidents per verst traveled than the European Russian network. In 1901 alone, 93 people were killed and more than 500 injured in 924 wrecks. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
轨道和路基的状况无助于提升铁路性能。马林斯克至阿钦斯克新路段开通时的情景颇具象征意义:首列行驶在该线路上的机车坠入轨道下方的河流。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 跨西伯利亚铁路每俄里事故率高于俄罗斯欧洲铁路网。仅 1901 年就发生 924 起事故,造成 93 人死亡、500 余人受伤。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
Technical problems forced trains to reduce their speed on the average to 20 versts per hour for passenger trains and 12 versts for
技术故障导致列车平均时速被迫降低——客运列车 20 俄里,货运列车 12 俄里
freight trains-a rate that was below the norm for spurs. On some unsafe sections the trains were reduced to a crawl; if nothing else, the slow pace made “shaving . . . quite easy,” according to a British newspaper correspondent. The trip by passenger train from Moscow to Port Arthur or Vladivostok, touted to take seven days, took twentyeight days in the best of conditions, and for six months of the year the administration could not guarantee arrival in less than a month and a half. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
货运列车的运费低于支线铁路的标准费率。在某些危险路段,列车被迫减速至爬行状态;据一位英国报社记者描述,这种缓慢速度至少让“刮胡子……变得相当容易”。从莫斯科到旅顺港或符拉迪沃斯托克的客运列车旅程,原本宣传只需七天,但在最佳条件下实际耗时二十八天,而在一年中有六个月的时间里,铁路管理局甚至无法保证能在一个半月内抵达。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
The railroad was capable of handling no more than three pairs of trains a day (that is, six trains, three in each direction) between stations, the size of trains varying with the terrain-conditions allowed for thirty-six cars per train on flat sections, sixteen in the hilliest regions. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Operating procedures were far from conducive to efficiency and contributed to the railroad’s inability to provide good service:
该铁路每天在站点间最多只能处理三对列车(即六个车次,双向各三班),列车长度随地形变化——平坦路段允许每列挂载三十六节车厢,而多山区域仅能挂载十六节。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 运营流程远未达到高效标准,这加剧了铁路系统无法提供优质服务的问题:
Trains were not dispatched but were handled on a station-to-station basis by the station masters. Timetables and printed train rules were non-existent while even watches were rare among the trainmen. Fueling was slow and handled in a primitive fashion. A given locomotive was driven exclusively by one engineer and went back and forth with him as he made his round-trip runs. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
列车并非统一调度,而是由各站站长进行站间协调管理。时刻表和印刷版列车规章尚不存在,甚至连列车员都鲜少佩戴怀表。燃料补给过程缓慢且方式原始。每台机车固定由一名工程师驾驶,随其往返执行循环运输任务。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
The railroad’s capacity was severely overtaxed by the growing demand of freight traffic. When the Western Siberian section opened in 1897, 3,000 cars were immediately backlogged. The situation worsened over the next few years, as tens of thousands of tons of goods awaited shipment for over three and a half months. Grain rotted on open platforms outside the stations. By 1901 the railroad administration gave notice that it could no longer be responsible for on-time delivery of freight. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
铁路运力被日益增长的货运需求严重透支。西西伯利亚段于 1897 年开通时,立即积压了 3000 节车厢的货物。随后几年情况持续恶化,数万吨货物滞留待运超过三个半月。粮食在车站外的露天站台上腐烂变质。至 1901 年,铁路管理局正式通告无法再保证货运的准时交付。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
Shortages and deficiencies of rolling stock were both causes and effects of the overloaded system. The original orders for cars and
机车车辆短缺与系统超负荷运转互为因果。最初订购的车厢和
Taiga station, Central Siberian Railroad. From Velikii put’: Vidy Sibiri i eia zheleznykh dorog (Krasnoiarsk, 1899).
中西伯利亚铁路泰加站。选自《伟大之路:西伯利亚及其铁路景观》(克拉斯诺亚尔斯克,1899 年)。

engines were placed before the extent of traffic was known. Even then, orders far exceeded what Russian firms could produce, and the new equipment was often of poor quality because of the low technical level of the factories. Secondhand trains from the European Russian network provided the bulk of the railroad’s rolling stock. In 1900, 20 percent of the rolling stock belonging to the Siberian Railroad was out of service because of defects brought about by age, overuse, and poor surface conditions. By 1914, the only reliable form of freight service
机车设备在交通流量尚未明确前就已部署到位。即便如此,订单量仍远超俄国工厂的生产能力,且因工厂技术水平低下,新设备质量往往低劣。西伯利亚铁路的运营车辆主要依赖从欧洲俄罗斯铁路网调拨的二手列车。至 1900 年,该铁路 20%的车辆因老化、过度使用及路面状况恶劣导致的故障而停运。到 1914 年时,唯一可靠的货运服务

was that provided for the export of fresh Siberian butter on special refrigerated cars. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
其中包括为出口新鲜西伯利亚黄油提供的专用冷藏车厢。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
Passenger service suffered along with freight traffic. Station stops absorbed a large portion of running time, seemingly without rhyme or reason. An American passenger reported a seventeen-hour delay at one stop, irregular departures elsewhere, and travel in filthy, graffiticovered cars. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} Another traveler wrote:
客运服务与货运一样饱受困扰。车站停靠消耗了大量运行时间,且似乎毫无规律可循。一位美国乘客报告称在某站遭遇了长达十七小时的延误,其他站点发车时间也混乱不堪,车厢内污秽不堪且涂满 graffiti。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 另一位旅客写道:
Our train would draw up at a wood pile and a log-house. The peasants would scramble out of the train, build their fires, cook their soup, boil their tea, and still the train would wait. There was usually no baggage to be taken on or put off, no passengers to join us, no passing train to wait for. … At last, for no particular reason, apparently, the station-master would ring a big dinner-bell. Five minutes later he would ring another. Then, soon after, the guard would blow his whistle, the engineer would respond with the engine whistle, the guard would blow again, the engineer would answer him once more, and, after this exchange of compliments, the train would move leisurely along, only to repeat the process two hours later at the next station. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
我们的列车会停靠在柴堆和木屋旁。农民们争先恐后地下车生火、煮汤、泡茶,而列车仍原地等待。通常既没有装卸的行李,也没有上下车的旅客,更无需等待交会列车……最终,站长会莫名其妙地摇响大餐铃。五分钟后再次摇铃。接着不久,列车员吹响哨子,司机以汽笛回应,列车员又吹哨,司机再次应答——这番礼节性互动后,列车才慢悠悠启动,两小时后在下一站重复这套流程。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
Improvements that increased the speed to 37 versts per hour and reduced travel time between St. Petersburg and Vladivostok to nine days were still not sufficient to attract foreigners to the express service, as the administration intended. There were other factors as well. Train agents rarely spoke a foreign language, and tourists were strictly forbidden to photograph even the most innocuous sights from the train or stations. The railroad’s restaurant cars served meals by St. Petersburg time, oblivious of the seven time zones between the capital and Vladivostok. Despite the dearth of passengers, three express
尽管提速至每小时 37 俄里、将圣彼得堡至符拉迪沃斯托克的行程缩短至九天,这些改进仍不足以如当局所愿吸引外国人使用特快服务。其他因素同样存在:列车员鲜少会说外语,游客甚至被严禁从火车或车站拍摄最寻常的风景。铁路餐车按圣彼得堡时间供餐,全然无视首都与符拉迪沃斯托克之间横跨七个时区的事实。尽管乘客稀少,三列特快
trains ran throughout the year, often virtually empty and at great expense. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
列车仍全年运行,常常空载且耗费巨大。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}

Nor did the Siberian Railroad live up to expectations as a transit route shuttling trade between Western Europe and the Orient. Its international freight was insignificant (less than 10 percent), and it could not offer the competitive rates or service needed to lure passengers or freight from the sea routes. Although there was some growth in trade with Japan and China, it was of little importance. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
西伯利亚铁路也未能实现成为欧亚贸易中转通道的预期。其国际货运量微不足道(不足 10%),既无法提供有竞争力的费率,也缺乏从海运路线吸引客货流的服务能力。尽管对日对华贸易有所增长,但影响微乎其微。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}

The Russo-Japanese War  日俄战争

In its military capacity, too, the Siberian Railroad was deficient. After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan’s involvement on the Asian continent for the first time became a factor in Russian Far Eastern policy. In the face of this menace, in 1896 the Committee of the Siberian Railroad increased the budgetary allocation to the railroad by 65 percent to speed its completion. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} The operational defects of the railroad adversely affected Russia’s ability to defend the region. In 1897 Kulomzin wrote in distress, "When the necessity of urgently transferring any significant number of troops to the Far East presents itself, complete disappointment will ensue and [the Trans-Siberian] will prove to be a toy railroad. 13 13 ^(')13{ }^{\prime} 13
西伯利亚铁路在军事功能方面同样表现不足。中日甲午战争(1894-1895 年)后,日本首次在亚洲大陆的介入成为俄罗斯远东政策中的一个考量因素。面对这一威胁,1896 年,西伯利亚铁路委员会将铁路预算拨款增加了 65%,以加速其完工。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 铁路的运行缺陷对俄罗斯保卫该地区的能力产生了负面影响。1897 年,库洛姆津忧心忡忡地写道:"当需要紧急向远东调遣大量部队时,将会遭遇彻底的失望,(西伯利亚大铁路)将被证明不过是一条玩具铁路。" 13 13 ^(')13{ }^{\prime} 13
The committee made an effort in January 1899 to increase the railroad’s carrying capacity to seven pairs of trains per day by adopting the following measures, to be implemented over the next eight years at a cost of 84 million rubles: addition of sidings to shunt off trains, construction of new stations, replacement of light 18-pound
委员会于 1899 年 1 月努力通过以下措施,在接下来的八年内以 8400 万卢布的成本,将铁路的运输能力提升至每日七对列车:增设避让线以分流列车、建造新车站、更换轻型的 18 磅轨道
(per foot) rails with 24-pound rails, thickening of ballast, widening of the roadbed, replacement of wooden bridges with steel ones, and a vast supplement of rolling stock, including new, larger locomotives, each with twelve (0-6-6-0) instead of eight wheels. The committee also attempted to improve commercial freight haulage, creating a trunk line from St. Petersburg to Siberia by building a branch off the Perm’Kotlas Railroad from Viatka to Vologda and thence to the capital. This alternative route would allow a certain amount of traffic to bypass the western stretch of the Siberian Railroad (Samara-Zlatoust), which was congested because it had to share the only bridge over the Volga with the Orenburg Railroad. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
(每英尺)铁轨由 24 磅重的铁轨替换,加厚道砟,拓宽路基,用钢桥替代木桥,并大量补充机车车辆,包括新型、更大的机车,每台机车采用十二轮(0-6-6-0)而非八轮设计。委员会还试图改善商业货运,通过修建一条从维亚特卡经沃洛格达至首都的彼尔姆-科特拉斯铁路支线,打造一条从圣彼得堡通往西伯利亚的干线。这条替代路线可使部分交通避开西伯利亚铁路西段(萨马拉-兹拉托乌斯特),该路段因需与奥伦堡铁路共用伏尔加河上唯一的桥梁而拥堵不堪。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
The events of the next few years should have confirmed the need for reconstruction. The backlog during the winter of 1898-1899 reached 7,000 carloads. In 1900, 120,000 soldiers were mobilized and transported on the Siberian Railroad to suppress the Boxer Rebellion and occupy Manchuria. For hundreds of versts, trains were slowed to 10 versts per hour. More than forty new Sormovo locomotives and tens of cars and flatcars were wrecked on the way. The railroad had failed its first real test, foreshadowing its performance in the Russo-Japanese War. Khilkov recommended a further increase in capacity to fourteen pairs of trains per day, and War Minister Kuropatkin urged that construction be completed on the Circumbaikal route so as to remove the impediment to troop transport presented by the lake. To relieve traffic, Admiral Chikhachev advised consideration of a railroad running either from Orenburg to Tashkent or through the southern Siberian steppe. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
接下来几年的事件本应证实重建的必要性。1898-1899 年冬季的积压货物达到了 7000 车皮。1900 年,为镇压义和团运动并占领满洲,12 万士兵通过西伯利亚铁路被动员和运输。数百俄里的路段上,列车时速降至 10 俄里。40 多辆新的索尔莫沃机车以及数十节车厢和平板车在途中损毁。铁路未能通过首次真正考验,预示了其在日俄战争中的表现。希尔科夫建议将运力进一步提升至每日 14 对列车,陆军大臣库罗帕特金则敦促完成环贝加尔线路的建设,以消除湖泊对军队运输造成的阻碍。为缓解交通压力,海军上将奇哈乔夫建议考虑修建一条从奥伦堡至塔什干或穿越南西伯利亚草原的铁路。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
Witte, who was personally identified with the railroad as it stood, at first adamantly opposed improvements, especially when they were urged by military officials, and he hesitated to approve the requested credits. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} By 1903, however, after his own inspection tour to Siberia and the Far East, he reluctantly agreed. According to Polovtsov, Witte
维特最初坚决反对改进铁路,尤其是当军方官员强烈要求时,他迟迟不愿批准所请求的信贷,因为这条铁路与他个人声誉息息相关。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 然而到了 1903 年,在他亲自视察西伯利亚和远东之后,他勉强同意了。据波洛夫佐夫所述,维特
announced to several members of the State Council that "a 780-verst section between Tomsk and Irkutsk is built in such a way that it must be entirely rebuilt, and that now even traveling on it presents a serious danger. 17 He 17 He ^(17)He{ }^{17} \mathrm{He} told Kuropatkin that in his opinion the eastern sections of the railroad were so “badly traced it would have been better to stick with the centuries-old post road.” 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
向国务会议几位成员宣布,“托木斯克至伊尔库茨克之间 780 俄里的路段修建得如此糟糕,必须全部重建,如今甚至在上面通行都面临严重危险。 17 He 17 He ^(17)He{ }^{17} \mathrm{He} 他告诉库罗帕特金,在他看来铁路东段‘线路规划极差,还不如沿用已有数百年历史的驿道’。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
By this time, it was too late to make a difference in war. Kuropatkin worked out his strategy for the Far Eastern theater in 1903, presupposing a carrying capacity of ten pairs of trains per day on the Siberian Railroad to allow for the accumulation of an overwhelming number of Russian troops against the Japanese. On January 18, 1904, just days before Admiral Togo’s surprise attack on Port Arthur, a special conference convened at the war minister’s demand, to discuss the capacity of the railroad. Kuropatkin asked the government to do everything it could to delay the inevitable war until the Siberian and ChineseEastern railroads were strengthened. Despite initial efforts to carry out the earlier recommendations and to smooth gradients by reconstructing mountainous sections of track, at the outbreak of war capacity stood at under four pairs of military trains per day. Adding an additional pair of trains would have meant closing the line to civilian traffic altogether. Japanese agents had informed their general staff of the railroad’s capacity, and this information was used to calculate Russian strength in the region. Japanese divisions were increased proportionately and the war was initiated at the very moment when Russia was most vulnerable-when the ice on Lake Baikal had reached the depth at which the icebreakers could no longer function. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
此时,铁路运力已无法改变战局。1903 年,库罗帕特金制定了远东战区战略,其前提是西伯利亚铁路需具备每日通行 10 对军列的能力,以便集结压倒性数量的俄军对抗日军。1904 年 1 月 18 日——就在东乡平八郎突袭旅顺港的几天前——应陆军大臣要求召开特别会议讨论铁路运力问题。库罗帕特金请求政府竭尽所能推迟这场不可避免的战争,直至西伯利亚铁路和中东铁路完成强化。尽管初期曾努力落实早前建议,通过改造山区路段来减缓坡度,但开战时铁路每日军列通行量仍不足 4 对。若要增加一对军列,就意味着必须完全中断民用运输。日本间谍早已将铁路运力情报汇报给参谋本部,这些数据被用于计算俄军在该地区的兵力部署。 日本军队按比例增兵,并在俄罗斯最为脆弱的时刻——当贝加尔湖冰层厚度达到破冰船无法作业的程度时——发动了战争。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
During hostilities the efforts made to improve the railroad were impressive. The first priority was to organize transport across Baikal. Icebreakers could not operate on the lake for three and a half months, from late December to mid-April. Aside from expediting construction on the Circumbaikal Railroad, Khilkov devised and personally supervised a temporary way around this natural obstacle. Five hundred laborers laid more than 30,000 rails, or 42 versts of track, on the ice.
战争期间,改善铁路运输的努力令人瞩目。首要任务是组织贝加尔湖的运输。破冰船在每年十二月底至四月中旬的三个半月内无法在湖上作业。除了加速环贝加尔铁路的建设外,希尔科夫设计并亲自监督了一项临时解决方案来克服这一自然障碍。五百名劳工在冰面上铺设了超过三万根铁轨,即 42 俄里的轨道。
Railroad cars were decoupled and pulled across the lake by horses, more than 3,000 of them. On either side of the track were sleigh routes for the transport of passengers. Soldiers marched across, guided at night by the electric lights and telephone wires set up parallel to the track; in severe weather they would march along the shore of the lake. Every six versts heated barracks were erected, and halfway across stood the station Seredina (Middle), with separate first-, second-, and third-class buffets. To service the track, which was subject to disturbance by cracking ice, the Ministry of Transport organized special artels. Construction of the route began on February 2, 1904, and it was opened to traffic on the 27 th. In early March it was dismantled in time for navigation to recommence in April. Five military trains per day were able to cross in this fashion, with more than 16,000 passengers and 500,000 puds of freight. This total was comparable to the full capacity of steamers in summertime and exceeded that of the icebreakers. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
火车车厢被拆解后,由三千多匹马牵引着穿越湖面。轨道两侧设有雪橇路线用于运送乘客。士兵们在夜间沿着与轨道平行的电灯和电话线指引前行;在恶劣天气下,他们则沿湖岸行军。每隔六俄里便搭建起供暖的营房,而湖中央的塞列季纳(意为“中点”)车站则设有独立的一、二、三等餐室。为维护因冰层开裂而易受影响的轨道,交通部专门组织了劳动组合。该线路于 1904 年 2 月 2 日动工,当月 27 日即开通运营。三月初,轨道被及时拆除以确保四月恢复通航。每日有五列军列以此方式通行,运送超过 1.6 万名乘客和 50 万普特货物——这一运量堪比夏季轮船的总运力,更远超破冰船的运输能力。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
By late 1904 the capacity of the remainder of the line was increased twofold and by the end of the war to twelve pairs of trains, although the goal had been sixteen pairs or more. The authorities accomplished these improvements, at a cost of more than 46 million rubles, by upgrading the track, building additional sidings, improving the water supply (particularly crucial in Transbaikalia, where the rivers froze solid in winter), completing the Circumbaikal Railroad, transferring thousands of pieces of rolling stock from other railroads, and constructing additional depots and repair stations. Traffic control was improved and the eastern sections of the line were placed under martial law. Furthermore, plans now existed to double-track the whole route from Cheliabinsk to Irkutsk, which the tsar considered vital, but the work was not undertaken during the war. As a result of the improvements, by late 1904 over 200,000 soldiers were transported to the war zone and eventually over a million. Freight turnover, mostly connected with the military, increased by 75 percent over prewar figures. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
到 1904 年底,线路剩余部分的运力提升了两倍,战争结束时达到每日 12 对列车,尽管原定目标是 16 对或更多。当局通过升级轨道、增建侧线、改善供水系统(这在冬季河流完全封冻的外贝加尔地区尤为关键)、完成环贝加尔铁路、从其他铁路调拨数千节车厢,并增设仓库和维修站,以超过 4600 万卢布的代价实现了这些改进。交通管制得到加强,线路东段被置于军事管制之下。此外,当时已计划将车里雅宾斯克至伊尔库茨克全线改为复线,沙皇视其为要务,但战时未能动工。得益于这些改进,截至 1904 年底,逾 20 万士兵被运往战区,最终输送兵力超百万。与军需相关的货运周转量较战前增长了 75%。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
Remarkable as they were, the improvements were too little too late; the statistics mask the serious shortcomings that remained. The effort to bolster the Siberian Railroad’s performance in war interfered with the normal operation of the whole Russian railroad network. The diversion of rolling stock from southern Russia interrupted grain exports from that region in their peak period. Civilian passenger service and freight transport were virtually curtailed on the Siberian line. Troops were still transported at the slow commercial speed of 12 versts per hour. The increasing number of wounded soldiers were evacuated on trains moving westward, which, along with empty cars, clogged the line. Had Russian soldiers not had access to local food sources in Manchuria (as would have been the case if fighting had shifted onto Russian territory), the railroad, which carried almost exclusively men, horses, and ammunition, simply would not have been able to cope. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
尽管这些改进措施令人瞩目,但力度太小且为时已晚;统计数据掩盖了依然存在的严重缺陷。提升西伯利亚铁路战时运输能力的举措干扰了整个俄国铁路网的正常运转。从俄国南部调拨车辆导致该地区粮食出口在高峰期中断。西伯利亚铁路线上的民用客运和货运几乎完全停滞。部队运输仍维持每小时 12 俄里的商业低速标准。越来越多的伤兵搭乘西行列车后撤,这些列车与空车厢共同造成了线路拥堵。若非俄军能在满洲就地获取粮源(若战事移至俄国本土则无法实现),这条几乎只运输兵员、马匹和弹药的铁路根本无力支撑战局。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
As it was, by the time the railroad’s capacity was augmented, the important battles had been lost. Although Japan’s mobilization took four months longer than expected, Russia’s was eight months behind schedule. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} Kuropatkin pointed out that the transport of reinforcements took twice as long as was required in the first five months of the war, when their presence was most vital. And he was dissatisfied with the transport of supplies. As he reported to the tsar from the front in November 1904, “the inability of the [Siberian] line to cope with the necessities of war is the main reason for the slow and indecisive nature of the campaign. Our reinforcements arrive in driblets. Supplies dispatched in spring are still on the Siberian line.” He wrote that the slowness of the railroad led to “paralysis” and estimated that to salvage the Russian army’s position in the war, the railroad would need to be double-tracked and brought up to a capacity of forty-eight trains. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
事实上,等到铁路运力提升时,关键战役早已失利。尽管日本的动员比预期多花了四个月,但俄方的进度却滞后了八个月。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 库罗帕特金指出,在战争前五个月最需要增援时,部队运输耗时竟是预期的两倍。他对物资运输也极为不满。1904 年 11 月他在前线向沙皇汇报:"西伯利亚铁路无力满足战争需求,是导致战役进展迟缓、决策犹豫的主因。我方援军如涓滴般零星抵达。春季发出的补给至今仍滞留在西伯利亚铁路上。"他写道铁路的低效造成了"瘫痪状态",并估算若要挽救俄军战局,必须将铁路改造成双轨并实现每日 48 列火车的运力。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
After the war, Kuropatkin laid much of the blame for the Russian defeat on the Siberian Railroad: “Next to the absence of a Russian fleet, the most important factor to assist the Japanese in their offensive strategy and to impede us was the condition of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese railways.” 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} Admittedly Kuropatkin was trying to shift responsiblity for defeat from his own failings, but he was not alone in his view: most railroad experts, and eventually even its creator, Witte, assumed that if the capacity of the Trans-Siberian had not been so low, the outcome of the war would have been different. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
战后,库罗帕特金将俄军战败的很大一部分责任归咎于西伯利亚铁路:“除了俄国舰队的缺失外,对日本进攻战略最为有利、对我们阻碍最大的因素就是西伯利亚铁路和东清铁路的状况。” 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 诚然,库罗帕特金试图将战败的责任从自己的失误上转移开,但他的观点并非孤例:大多数铁路专家,甚至最终包括其创建者维特都认为,如果西伯利亚大铁路的运力没有那么低,战争的结果可能会有所不同。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
After the war, the government continued to take steps to improve the operation of the railroad. It reconstructed most of the line and built new branches. Gradients were further reduced and the railroad was double-tracked except for the Cheliabinsk-Omsk section and the Circumbaikal Railroad. For the latter, ferry traffic on the lake was expanded. On the former, traffic was heavy enough to warrant construction of an additional single-tracked railroad from Tiumen’ to Omsk, linking the Siberian Railroad directly with the Perm’ Railroad and the northern ports. This line was completed in 1913. Moreover, construction of the Amur Railroad, which had originally been abandoned for the Chinese-Eastern Railroad, began in 1908 and was completed in 1916, linking the Ussuri region with the Transbaikal Railroad through Russian territory. Improvements to internal waterways, the Northern Sea route, and the Moscow-Siberian highway were also discussed as ways to relieve the overtaxed Siberian Railroad. Construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad began in this period partially for this reason, having received the backing of Witte in 1903 . 27 1903 . 27 1903.^(27)1903 .{ }^{27}
战后,政府继续采取措施改善铁路运营。它重建了大部分线路并新建了支线。除车里雅宾斯克-鄂木斯克段和环贝加尔铁路外,全线坡度进一步降低并实现了双轨化。对于后者,湖上轮渡运输得到了扩展。在前者路段,由于运输量巨大,政府批准修建了一条从秋明至鄂木斯克的单线铁路,将西伯利亚铁路直接与彼尔姆铁路及北方港口相连。该线路于 1913 年竣工。此外,曾因中东铁路而被搁置的阿穆尔铁路于 1908 年动工,1916 年建成,通过俄罗斯领土将乌苏里地区与外贝加尔铁路连接起来。为缓解西伯利亚铁路的超负荷状况,政府还讨论了改善内河航道、北海航线及莫斯科-西伯利亚公路的方案。奥伦堡-塔什干铁路的修建也在此期间启动,部分出于这一原因,该项目获得了维特的支持。
Plans for new railroads in all parts of Siberia proliferated after the war, including several predecessors of the Baikal-Amur Main Line, branches running throughout the steppe and mountains of southern
战后西伯利亚各地的新铁路规划激增,包括贝加尔-阿穆尔干线的前身线路,以及贯穿南部草原和山区的多条支线

25. Kuropatkin, Russian Army, 1:242.
25. 库罗帕特金,《俄罗斯军队》,第 1 卷,第 242 页。

26. S. Iu. Witte, “Nekotorye soobrazheniia o prichinakh defitsitnosti russkoi zheleznodorozhnoi seti,” ZhdD, 1910, nos. 17-18: 91; N. Petrov, Doklad o razvitii russkoi zheleznodorozhnoi seti (St. Petersburg, 1912), 6, cited in L. G. Beskrovnyi, Armiia iflot Rossii v v vv nachale XX v.: Ocherki voenno-ekonomicheskogo potentsiala (Moscow, 1986), 116. This interpretation contradicts that put forth by, Allen S. Whiting, in Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise? (Stanford, 1981), 99, who views the Siberian Railroad as having performed successfully in the war.
26. S·尤·维特,《关于俄国铁路网赤字原因的一些思考》,《铁路杂志》,1910 年第 17-18 期:91 页;N·彼得罗夫,《关于俄国铁路网发展的报告》(圣彼得堡,1912 年),第 6 页,转引自 L·G·别斯科罗夫内,《二十世纪初俄国的陆军与海军:军事经济潜力概述》(莫斯科,1986 年),116 页。此解读与艾伦·S·惠廷在《西伯利亚开发与东亚:威胁还是承诺?》(斯坦福,1981 年)第 99 页提出的观点相矛盾,后者认为西伯利亚铁路在战争中表现成功。

27. Struk, “Zheleznye dorogi,” 38-40; Beskromnyi, Armiia, 117; Pushechnikov, “K voprosu o novykh dorogakh v Sibiri,” ZhdD, 1908, no. 13: 91; “Izvlechenie iz vsepoddanneishego doklada ministra finansov o poezdke na Dal’nii Vostok,” Vestnik finansov, no. 8, Feb. 23, 1903:312;Medem, 423;Sibirskaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, vol. 1 (Novosibirsk, 1929), s.v. “Zheleznye dorogi”; Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Prilozheniia k k kk stenograficheskim otchetam, 1907-1908 gg., vol. 2, no. 401, cols. 414-419.
27. 斯特鲁克,《铁路》,38-40 页;别斯科罗姆内,《军队》,117 页;普谢奇尼科夫,《关于西伯利亚新铁路问题》,《铁路杂志》,1908 年第 13 期:91 页;《财政大臣远东之行奏折摘要》,《财政通报》,1903 年 2 月 23 日第 8 期:312 页;梅德姆,423 页;《西伯利亚苏维埃百科全书》第 1 卷(新西伯利亚,1929 年),"铁路"词条;国家杜马,《1907-1908 年速记报告附录》,第 2 卷,第 401 号,栏 414-419。
Siberia, and a series of lines linking Central Asia with Siberia. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} The government also gave its attention to a project for a railroad or combined highway-railroad to be built by an American-French consortium from some point on the Central Siberian Railroad northeastward to the Chukotsk Peninsula and, via a tunnel under the Bering Strait, through Alaska. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} The so-called Siberia-Alaska Railroad never appeared because of its impracticality; many of the other proposed lines were eventually built by the Soviet government.
西伯利亚,以及一系列连接中亚与西伯利亚的铁路线。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} 政府还关注了一个由美法财团承建的项目,计划从中西伯利亚铁路某点向东北延伸至楚科奇半岛,并通过白令海峡隧道穿越阿拉斯加。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29} 这条所谓的"西伯利亚-阿拉斯加铁路"因不切实际而未能实现;其他许多规划线路最终由苏联政府建成。
These measures notwithstanding, by World War I the Siberian Railroad still could not keep up with the ever-increasing demand thrust upon it by peasant migrants and the expanding production of Siberian grain. Light rails had not been replaced along the whole length of the road, and after reconstruction the Transbaikal section was no less hazardous than before. In the words of a member of the State Council, it continued “from time to time to give highly unpleasant surprises.” 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} The system was overloaded and operating well beyond capacity. In 1905 one railroad authority found that the Nikolaevsk Railroad between St. Petersburg and Moscow-the first major railroad in Russia, built sixty years earlier-was capable of handling thirty times more traffic than the Trans-Siberian, which had just been completed. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} The ratio was barely changed by 1917 .
尽管采取了这些措施,到第一次世界大战时,西伯利亚铁路仍无法满足农民移民和西伯利亚粮食产量扩张带来的日益增长的需求。轻轨尚未全线更换,而改造后的外贝加尔段危险程度丝毫未减。用一位国务会议成员的话说,它仍"时不时带来极不愉快的意外"。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 整个系统超负荷运转,远超其承载能力。1905 年一位铁路官员发现,连接圣彼得堡和莫斯科的尼古拉耶夫铁路——俄罗斯六十年前建成的第一条主要铁路——其运力是刚竣工的西伯利亚大铁路的三十倍。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 这一比例到 1917 年几乎未有改观。

Economic Impact  经济影响

The Trans-Siberian’s efficacy as an instrument of political consolidation was no greater than its strategic utility. The railroad had been intended to spur the Siberian economy, but though it did induce certain changes in the form of Siberian economic life, by and large it was unsuited to effect major transformations, and its overall impact was restricted. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}
作为政治整合工具,西伯利亚大铁路的效力并不比其战略效用更高。这条铁路本意是刺激西伯利亚经济,尽管它确实以某种形式改变了西伯利亚的经济生活,但总体上并不足以引发重大变革,其整体影响有限。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}
On the surface, the Siberian economy seems to have made important advances after the railroad was built. Its agriculture and its exploitation of natural resources were expanding. In the two decades 1897 to 1917, the amount of land under cultivation increased by 122 percent, from 14 million to 31 million acres. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} The wheat harvest in the
表面看来,铁路建成后西伯利亚经济似乎取得了重要进展。其农业与自然资源开发规模持续扩大。在 1897 至 1917 的二十年间,耕地面积从 1400 万英亩增至 3100 万英亩,增幅达 122%。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} 小麦收成

32. This section cannot survey comprehensively the economic significance of the Siberian Railroad, a subject that merits a full-scale study of its own. There is already a significant body of literature on various aspects of the topic. Interestingly, in both of the phases through which this work has passed, Soviet and Western interpretations are in full agreement, once ideological wrappings are stripped away from the former. In the earlier phase, for different reasons, historians on both sides stressed the remarkable percentage increase in all sectors of the Siberian economy after construction of the Siberian Railroad. See Anatole Baikalov, “Siberia since 1894,” Slavonic and East European Review 11 (Jan. 1933): 328-340, and G. K. Tsvetkov, “Ekonomicheskoe znachenie sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta, 1946, no. 2: 113-118. In both cases, these works follow, consciously or unconsciously, the optimistic account established by such official publications as Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, and A. N. Kulomzin, Le Transsibérien, trans. Jules Legras (Paris, 1904). The second, more recent phase in the historiography adds depth and detail and corrects the earlier interpretation by emphasizing the uneven, limited impact of the railroad. Historians have recently resurrected the views of critical observers who wrote between 1905 and 1921, including local and national government officials, railroad experts, and regionalists, many of whose works are cited in this book. The major secondary works in this category are Elena A. Baranov, “The Trans-Siberian and Urban Change in a TimeSpace Framework, 1885-1913” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1987); G. A. Bochanova, Obrabatyvaiushchaia promyshlennost’ zapadnoi Sibiri, konets XIX-nachalo XX v. (Novosibirsk, 1978); V. F. Borzunov, “K voprosu ob ekonomicheskom znachenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi v kontse XIX-nachale XX vv.,” in Voprosy istorii Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka, ed. V. I. Shunkov et al. (Novosibirsk, 1961), 97-107, and “Vliianie transsibirskoi magistrali na razvitie sel’skogo khoziaistva Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka v nachale XX v. (1900-1914 gg.),” in Osobennosti agrarnogo stroia Rossii v period imperializma, ed. S. M. Dubrovskii et al. (Moscow, 1962), 160-186; L. M. Goriushkin, Agrarnye otnosheniia v Sibiri perioda imperializma (1900-1917 gg.) (Novosibirsk, 1976); A. A. Mukhin, “Vliianie sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi na sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie vostochnoi Sibiri (1897-1917 gg.),” in Shunkov et al., Voprosy istorii Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka, 109-118; North, Transport; Nikolaus Poppe, “The Economic and Cultural Development of Siberia,” in Russia Enters the Twentieth Century: 1894-1917, ed. E. Oberländer et al. (New York, 1971), 138-151.
32. 本节无法全面探讨西伯利亚铁路的经济意义,这一主题本身值得进行一项全面研究。已有大量文献从不同角度探讨该议题。有趣的是,无论在本研究经历的苏联时期还是西方阶段,只要剥去前者的意识形态外衣,双方解释完全一致。在早期阶段,尽管出于不同原因,两派历史学家都强调西伯利亚铁路建成后当地各经济领域的显著百分比增长。参见 Anatole Baikalov《1894 年以来的西伯利亚》(《斯拉夫与东欧评论》1933 年 1 月第 11 期:328-340 页)与 G·K·茨韦特科夫《西伯利亚铁路的经济意义》(《莫斯科大学学报》1946 年第 2 期:113-118 页)。这些著作无论有意无意,都延续了萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基《西伯利亚铁路》、以及 A·N·库洛姆津《西伯利亚大铁路》(朱尔·勒格拉法译本,巴黎,1904 年)等官方出版物奠定的乐观论述基调。 历史学研究的第二个、更为近期的阶段通过强调铁路所产生的不均衡且有限的影响,为早期解读增添了深度与细节,并进行了修正。近期,历史学家们重新审视了 1905 年至 1921 年间批评观察者的观点,这些观察者包括地方和国家政府官员、铁路专家以及区域主义者,其中许多人的著作在本书中被引用。这一类别中重要的二手文献包括:叶莲娜·A·巴拉诺夫的《西伯利亚大铁路与时空框架下的城市变迁,1885-1913》(博士论文,堪萨斯大学,1987 年);G·A·博恰诺娃的《西伯利亚西部的加工工业,19 世纪末至 20 世纪初》(新西伯利亚,1978 年);V·F·博尔祖诺夫的《论西伯利亚铁路在 19 世纪末 20 世纪初的经济意义问题》,载于《西伯利亚与远东历史问题》,V·I·顺科夫等编(新西伯利亚,1961 年),第 97-107 页,以及《西伯利亚大铁路对 20 世纪初西伯利亚与远东农业发展的影响(1900-1914 年)》,载于《帝国主义时期俄国农业结构的特点》,S·M·杜布罗夫斯基等编(莫斯科,1962 年),第 160-186 页;L·M·…… 戈留什金,《帝国主义时期西伯利亚的农业关系(1900-1917 年)》(新西伯利亚,1976 年);A·A·穆欣,“西伯利亚铁路对东西伯利亚社会经济发展的影响(1897-1917 年)”,收录于顺科夫等编,《西伯利亚与远东历史问题》,109-118 页;诺斯,《运输》;尼古拉斯·波普,“西伯利亚的经济与文化发展”,收录于《俄罗斯进入二十世纪:1894-1917》,E·奥伯伦德尔等编(纽约,1971 年),138-151 页。

33. Baikalov, “Siberia since 1894,” 331.
33. 拜卡洛夫,《1894 年以来的西伯利亚》,第 331 页。

period 1910-1914 exceeded 3.2 million tons and the rye harvest 800,000 tons. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} To an American consular representative, the heavy demand for agricultural machinery in Siberia was evidence of its vitality and economic growth. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} Animal husbandry was growing even more vigorously; the total amount of livestock in Siberia more than tripled between 1904 and 1916, to over 38 million head. Cooperative creameries produced one of the most successful Siberian products, fresh butter. The creation of this industry was possible only with the rapid refrigerated transport offered by the railroad. The first cooperative was opened in 1896 ; by 1911 there were 1,318 , out of a total of 3,102 creameries. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} Grain exports exceeded 70 million puds per year. Siberian butter, which had represented less than 9 percent of Russian exports of that product in 1896, by 1907 made up 94 percent of the total export figures. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} Between 1896 and 1913 freight traffic on the Siberian Railroad grew fivefold by weight, the major items being wheat, coal, and wood. Butter deserves to belong in this category by value. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
1910 至 1914 年间,粮食产量超过 320 万吨,黑麦收成达 80 万吨。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 在美国领事代表看来,西伯利亚对农业机械的巨大需求正是其活力与经济增长的明证。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 畜牧业发展更为迅猛:1904 至 1916 年间,西伯利亚牲畜存栏总数增长逾三倍,突破 3800 万头。合作社乳品厂生产的新鲜黄油成为西伯利亚最成功的产品之一,这一产业的兴起完全得益于铁路提供的快速冷藏运输服务。首家合作社于 1896 年成立;到 1911 年,在 3102 家乳品厂中已有 1318 家采用合作模式。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} 粮食年出口量突破 7000 万普特。西伯利亚黄油在 1896 年仅占俄国黄油出口总量的 9%,至 1907 年已飙升至出口总量的 94%。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 1896 至 1913 年间,西伯利亚铁路货运量按重量计增长五倍,主要货品为小麦、煤炭和木材。若按货值计算,黄油理应位列其中。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
Urban life showed development too. In 1897 Sretensk, in Transbaikal oblast, had 1,700 residents; by 1900 it had 8,000. Novonikolaevsk, lying at the junction of the railroad and the Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} River, grew from a tiny village to a major town of 16,000 by 1900 . 39 1900 . 39 1900.^(39)1900 .{ }^{39} Such growth rates were common in many of the towns through which the Trans-Siberian passed. They experienced a corresponding growth of trade and, on average for the period 1904-1910, a 100 percent increase in their budgets (compared to a 50 percent average increase for the empire as a whole). 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
城市生活也展现出发展态势。1897 年,外贝加尔州的斯列坚斯克仅有 1700 名居民;到 1900 年,人口增至 8000 人。位于铁路与 Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime} 河交汇处的新尼古拉耶夫斯克,从一个小村庄发展为拥有 16000 人口的大城镇,这一过程在 1900 . 39 1900 . 39 1900.^(39)1900 .{ }^{39} 年完成。此类增长率在西伯利亚大铁路沿线城镇中十分普遍。这些城镇的贸易随之增长,1904 至 1910 年间预算平均增长 100%(同期整个帝国的平均增幅仅为 50%)。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
Finally, trade patterns were being transformed within Siberia, in many ways for the broader good of the region. Two developments suggest the benefits that the railroad brought to the region. First, large
最后,西伯利亚内部的贸易模式正在发生转变,从多方面来看,这对该地区整体有利。有两项发展体现了铁路为当地带来的益处。首先,大型
wholesale merchants were forced to release their monopolistic grip on Siberia’s commerce. Before the advent of the railroad, it had been difficult for small tradesmen to survive in business. Every year they had to journey to the fairs at Nizhnii-Novgorod and Irbit, and often as far as Moscow, to order their wares a year in advance. The cost of a year’s worth of goods was high even before transport costs were calculated. Muscovite manufacturers, for their part, risked heavy losses in extending credit for goods to small Siberian merchants. The procedure was so complicated and costly that a few large wholesale firms came to monopolize most imports from European Russia, taking on the responsibility for credit and transport. They dispensed their goods from warehouses, most of them in Tomsk and Irkutsk. Their dominance of the market allowed them to dictate prices, and the regionalists portrayed them as the bane of Siberia’s existence. The construction of the railroad put Moscow and the small traders in direct contact. There was no more risk of long-term credit, as creditors easily controlled their debtors by cutting off their supply of manufactures. Local merchants no longer needed large amounts of capital to buy and ship goods. The middlemen’s reason for existence had disappeared and their operations collapsed. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}
批发商被迫放弃对西伯利亚商业的垄断控制。在铁路出现之前,小商贩很难在商业中生存。每年他们不得不前往下诺夫哥罗德和伊尔比特的集市,甚至常常远赴莫斯科,提前一年订购货物。即便在计算运输成本之前,一年的货物成本已经很高。莫斯科的制造商在向西伯利亚小商人提供货物信贷时也面临巨大损失的风险。这一过程如此复杂且昂贵,以至于少数大型批发公司垄断了从欧俄地区进口的大部分商品,承担了信贷和运输的责任。他们从仓库分发货物,这些仓库大多位于托木斯克和伊尔库茨克。他们对市场的支配地位使他们能够操纵价格,地方主义者将他们描绘成西伯利亚生存的祸害。铁路的建设使莫斯科与小商人直接联系。不再有长期信贷的风险,因为债权人通过切断制造品的供应很容易控制债务人。 当地商人不再需要大量资金来购买和运输货物。中间商存在的理由消失了,他们的业务也随之崩溃。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}

The second development was the appearance of patterns of interregional trade within the overall movement of freight on the railroad line. Initially exports constituted the bulk of Siberian Railroad freight traffic. By 1900, and increasingly by 1910, the trend was for local transport within Siberia to predominate at the expense of exports. The most significant items in this trade were grain, shipped to eastern Siberia and beyond, and coal, going in the opposite direction. 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} This movement signals a certain regional specialization within Siberia and, faintly, the region’s increasing economic self-sufficiency. The importance of this trend should not be overemphasized, however, because the sum of Siberian exports and imports continued to exceed its local traffic.
第二个发展是铁路货运中出现了跨区域贸易模式。最初西伯利亚铁路的货运以出口为主。到 1900 年,尤其是 1910 年后,趋势转变为西伯利亚本地运输逐渐占据主导,出口比重下降。这类贸易中最主要的货物是运往东西伯利亚及更远地区的粮食,以及反向运输的煤炭。 42 42 ^(42){ }^{42} 这种流动标志着西伯利亚内部出现了一定的区域专业化分工,并隐约显示出该地区经济自给能力的提升。但不应过度强调这一趋势的重要性,因为西伯利亚进出口总量仍超过其区域内运输量。

In some respects the economic impact of the railroad was detrimental. Enisei and Irkutsk provinces did not benefit from rail communications as western Siberia did. These regions in the geographical center of Siberia lost their foreign and domestic markets as a result of
在某些方面,铁路的经济影响具有负面效应。叶尼塞省和伊尔库茨克省并未像西西伯利亚那样从铁路联通中获益。这些位于西伯利亚地理中心的地区,其国内外市场反而因铁路而丧失。
the railroad. Their livestock industries, particularly buttermaking, could not compete with western Siberia’s, which enjoyed lower shipping costs to western Europe. Foreign imports became more competitive than the products of these industries in Transbaikalia and the Ussuri region, which had formerly been their primary markets. Cheap, high-quality western Siberian agricultural goods were also making inroads into their local markets. Agricultural decline was the result in central and eastern Siberia. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
铁路。他们的畜牧业,尤其是黄油制造业,无法与西伯利亚西部竞争,后者享有较低的运输成本至西欧。在曾是其主要市场的后贝加尔地区和乌苏里地区,外国进口商品变得比这些产业的商品更具竞争力。廉价且优质的西伯利亚西部农产品也开始侵入他们的本地市场。这导致了中西伯利亚和东西伯利亚的农业衰退。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
Specific industries and towns were affected similarly. The railroad made highway cartage redundant in its path, and whole villages lost their primary means of employment. Many haulers attempted to return to agriculture, but with the competition of new settlers and depressed conditions in all but western Siberia, it could not absorb most of them. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} Cottage industries suffered somewhat from the influx of cheap European Russian manufactures, as did Siberia’s ironworks. Most of the ironworks shut down after the railroad was built. Finally, the majority of the towns that the Trans-Siberian bypassed slid into torpor as their merchants shifted operations to locations on the railroad. 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} The regionalists had feared these developments. In one branch of industry, however, their predictions turned out to be false: the railroad gave a boost to hostelry and tavernkeeping. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
特定行业和城镇也受到了类似的影响。铁路沿线的公路货运变得多余,整个村庄失去了主要的就业来源。许多运输者试图回归农业,但面对新移民的竞争以及除西西伯利亚外各地经济低迷的状况,农业无法吸纳他们中的大多数人。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44} 家庭手工业因欧洲俄罗斯廉价制品的涌入而受到一定冲击,西伯利亚的铁厂也是如此。大多数铁厂在铁路建成后关闭。最后,由于商人将业务转移到铁路沿线,大多数被西伯利亚大铁路绕过的城镇陷入了萧条。 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} 地方主义者曾担忧这些发展。然而,在一个工业分支中,他们的预测被证明是错误的:铁路促进了旅馆和酒馆业的繁荣。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
The railroad had an adverse effect on one of Siberia’s most valuable natural resources as well-its forests. Whole oblasts of the Urals were deforested to supply the railroad with fuel and construction materials. In Siberia the process was exacerbated by colonists, who were also in need of lumber. Both the railroad and the settlers were blamed for frequent forest fires. Witte had mentioned the problem in 1903, but by 1915 little had been done to confront it, as the shortage of firewood in Tomsk, in the taiga zone, attests. 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
铁路对西伯利亚最宝贵的自然资源之一——森林也产生了不利影响。为了给铁路提供燃料和建筑材料,乌拉尔地区的整片整片森林被砍伐殆尽。在西伯利亚,这一过程因同样需要木材的殖民者而加剧。铁路和定居者都被指责为频繁森林火灾的罪魁祸首。维特曾在 1903 年提到过这个问题,但到 1915 年为止几乎未采取任何应对措施,这一点从针叶林带的托木斯克市木柴短缺现象中可见一斑。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47}
It can be argued that the railroad, far from stimulating the European Russian iron industry, as Witte and the Committee of the Siberian Railroad had expected, had a deleterious effect here, too. The committee’s orders for rails and rolling stock tripled the production of the iron industry in the Urals and southern Russia, but with the completion of the main portions of the railroad and equivocation over the replacement of light rails, the boom came to a sudden end and output declined after 1899. By 1902, prices had fallen so low that production was often not possible… 4 4 ^(4)^{4} The industry’s reliance on government contracts also had an effect on the quality of the expansion. As the economist P. P. Migulin noted, rail mills and rolling stock factories grew like mushrooms after the rain, with fictitious capital and expectations of huge profits from the high prices they knew the state would pay to supply the Trans-Siberian. The factories were poorly but expensively equipped, and their employees were overpaid. Since the State Treasury was the buyer, they forced prices up to twice the market rate and collectively set artificially high rates when demand collapsed. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49} None of the developments that occurred in the Russian iron industry in connection with the Siberian Railroad can be considered desirable.
可以说,这条铁路非但未能如维特和西伯利亚铁路委员会所预期的那样刺激俄国欧洲地区的钢铁工业,反而在此也产生了有害影响。该委员会的钢轨和机车车辆订单使乌拉尔及俄国南部的钢铁产量增长了两倍,但随着铁路主体工程的完工以及对更换轻型钢轨的犹豫不决,繁荣景象戛然而止,1899 年后产量开始下滑。到 1902 年,价格暴跌至常使生产难以为继的程度…… 4 4 ^(4)^{4} 该行业对政府合同的依赖也影响了扩张的质量。正如经济学家 P·P·米古林所指出的,钢轨轧制和机车车辆工厂如雨后春笋般涌现,它们凭借虚增资本以及对国家必将高价采购西伯利亚大铁路物资的巨额利润预期盲目扩张。这些工厂设备简陋却造价高昂,员工薪资畸高。由于国家财政是唯一买家,它们将价格哄抬至市场价的两倍,并在需求崩溃时联手维持人为高价。 与西伯利亚铁路相关的俄国钢铁工业发展无一可称得上令人满意。
Many sectors of the Siberian economy were simply unaffected by the railroad. Siberian industry, for instance, by all accounts remained backward and undeveloped. Factory production was virtually nonexistent before the coming of the railroad and there was little change afterward. Most of the factories that found their way into the statistics were small cottage industries that employed family members to process the products of plants and domesticated animals for local consumption. Turnover was small and quality was poor. Distilleries, flour mills, and creameries were the most numerous “factories.” East of Lake Baikal industries were few and far between; the Ussuri region did not see the founding of its first creameries until 1911. Towns grew along the Siberian line not as industrial centers but as distribution centers for Siberian raw materials. The scant business of the Omsk
西伯利亚经济的许多领域根本未受铁路影响。例如,各方记录均显示西伯利亚工业仍处于落后未开发状态。铁路到来前工厂生产几乎不存在,之后也鲜有改变。统计中所谓工厂多为家庭作坊,雇佣亲属加工植物和家畜产品供本地消费。营业额微薄,质量低劣。蒸馏厂、面粉厂和乳品厂是最常见的"工厂"。贝加尔湖以东工业寥若晨星,乌苏里地区直到 1911 年才出现首批乳品厂。西伯利亚铁路沿线城镇的发展并非作为工业中心,而是作为西伯利亚原材料的集散地。鄂木斯克微薄的商业活动...
stock market, located in a thriving commercial center of Siberia, is telling. A report blamed not only restrictive laws but also the fact that the conditions for the expansion of industry were not to be found in Siberia. Still lacking were capital, population density, and, despite the wishful thinking of Soviet historians, an industrial proletariat. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
股票市场位于西伯利亚繁荣的商业中心,这一事实颇具启示性。报告不仅归咎于限制性法律,还指出西伯利亚缺乏工业扩张的条件:资本不足、人口密度低,且尽管苏联历史学家一厢情愿,这里仍未形成工业无产阶级。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50}
The exploitation of natural resources was also largely unchanged by the railroad. The forest industry was still embryonic in 1912, although in the next five years it did experience some growth. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51} Despite publicity about Siberia’s mineral wealth and the railroad’s contribution to its discovery, mining was weakly developed. Gold was the most valuable commodity produced in all of Siberia, but it contributed little to the economy. As for coal, as late as 1915 coking coals from Kuznetsk were not yet being transported for use in the Ural iron industry. In the same year, of the more than 200 million puds of coal carried on the Siberian Railroad, 75 percent or more was for use on the railroad alone. Not long before, it had been 95 percent. Almost no other metal deposits were worked before World War I, and Russia continued to import iron, copper, zinc, lead, tin, and other minerals. 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52}
铁路对自然资源的开发也基本没有改变。1912 年时,森林工业仍处于萌芽状态,尽管在接下来的五年里确实有所增长。尽管西伯利亚矿产资源丰富且铁路对其发现有所贡献,但采矿业发展薄弱。黄金是整个西伯利亚最有价值的商品,但对经济贡献甚微。至于煤炭,直到 1915 年,库兹涅茨克的焦煤仍未运输用于乌拉尔钢铁工业。同年,西伯利亚铁路运输的超过 2 亿普特煤炭中,75%或更多仅用于铁路自身。不久之前,这一比例还是 95%。第一次世界大战前,几乎没有其他金属矿床得到开采,俄罗斯仍需进口铁、铜、锌、铅、锡和其他矿物。
Nor was Siberian agriculture as lustrous as its most successful branches made it seem. One must adjust calculations of the income from grain production to take into account the fact that much of the grain was consumed by its producers. And gains from the large amounts exported were somewhat diminished by the continued import of grain and other foodstuffs into the Far East from Manchuria, America, and Australia. Although there was a trend toward mechanization, for the most part Siberian farming was not advanced in its techniques. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
西伯利亚农业的繁荣景象也并非如其最成功的分支所展现的那般耀眼。在计算粮食生产收入时,必须考虑到大部分粮食被生产者自身消耗的事实。而大量出口带来的收益,也因远东地区持续从满洲、美国和澳大利亚进口粮食及其他食品而有所减损。尽管机械化趋势初现,但西伯利亚农业在技术层面整体仍较为落后。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
Such observations must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the bulk of peasants enjoyed a higher standard of living in Siberia than
但此类观察不应掩盖一个事实:绝大多数农民在西伯利亚的生活水平高于
they had in European Russia. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} But it was probably not the railroad that was responsible for this prosperity. As Paul Cootner has argued, the natural ability of the land to produce has a greater effect on economic development than the introduction of transport innovations. 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} Indeed, Siberia outstripped the capacity of the railroad and was producing thousands of carloads of grain before it was even completed. For this reason Witte and the Committee of the Siberian Railroad still deserve a great deal of the credit for whatever development there was in the Siberian economy. 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} But to accomplish what they did it was not necessary to build the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
他们在欧洲俄罗斯所拥有的。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} 但很可能并非铁路带来了这种繁荣。正如保罗·库特纳所言,土地的自然生产能力对经济发展的影响,比引入交通创新更大。 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} 事实上,西伯利亚的产出已经超出了铁路的运力,甚至在铁路完工前就已经生产了数千车皮的粮食。因此,无论西伯利亚经济有何发展,维特和西伯利亚铁路委员会仍值得高度赞誉。 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56} 但要实现他们的成就,并非必须修建西伯利亚大铁路。
The economic development of Siberia was nonexistent or negligible beyond a swath of territory running 50 to 75 versts on either side of the tracks. The economic impact of the railroad was greatest in western Siberia and diminished as it continued eastward. 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} Against the original intentions of its planners, the Siberian Railroad did not achieve what the geographer Robert N . North refers to as “areal coverage”: beyond the belt of the railroad’s influence, life continued much as it had before. 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} More than ten years after the completion of the railroad, Transbaikalia and Priamur’e were as dependent as ever on foreign imports of meat, bread, flour, salt, sugar, coal, wood, iron, and bricks. 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59} The words of Minister of Transport N. K. Schaffhausen in the State Duma in 1907 are reminiscent of observations from the 1880s: “The extreme poverty of communications in Siberia is sharply evident.” 60
西伯利亚的经济发展在铁路两侧 50 至 75 俄里以外的地区几乎不存在或微不足道。铁路对西西伯利亚的经济影响最大,随着铁路向东延伸,其影响逐渐减弱。 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} 与规划者的初衷相反,西伯利亚铁路并未实现地理学家罗伯特·N·诺斯所说的“区域覆盖”:在铁路影响带之外,生活一如既往。 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} 铁路建成十多年后,外贝加尔地区和黑龙江沿岸地区仍像过去一样依赖外国进口的肉类、面包、面粉、盐、糖、煤炭、木材、铁和砖块。 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59} 1907 年,交通部长 N·K·沙夫豪森在国家杜马中的言论让人想起 19 世纪 80 年代的观察:“西伯利亚交通极度匮乏的状况依然显著。”60

54. See Poppe, “Economic and Cultural Development,” 145-146; Lazar Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 108-109. This comparison may not be valid, however, if Enisei and Irkutsk provinces and Transbaikal oblast are considered separately: the area of land cultivated in these regions by each household was, at 3.5 to 4 desiatins, smaller than in the “land-hungry” provinces of European Russia. See Alexis N. Antsiferov et al., Russian Agriculture during the War (1930; rpt. New York, 1968), 43.
54. 参见 Poppe,《经济与文化发展》,145-146 页;Lazar Volin,《俄罗斯农业百年:从亚历山大二世到赫鲁晓夫》(马萨诸塞州剑桥,1970 年),108-109 页。然而,若单独考察叶尼塞省、伊尔库茨克省及外贝加尔州,这一比较可能并不成立:这些地区每户家庭耕种的土地面积为 3.5 至 4 俄亩,小于欧洲俄罗斯“土地匮乏”省份的水平。参见 Alexis N. Antsiferov 等,《战争期间的俄罗斯农业》(1930 年;纽约重印,1968 年),43 页。

55. Paul H. Cootner, “The Economic Impact of the Railroad Innovation,” in The Railroad and the Space Program: An Exploration in Historical Analogy, ed. Bruce Mazlish (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 109-110.
55. Paul H. Cootner,《铁路创新的经济影响》,载于《铁路与太空计划:历史类比探索》,Bruce Mazlish 编(马萨诸塞州剑桥,1965 年),109-110 页。

56. Most observers considered the auxiliary enterprises, administered by Kulomzin, to have been beneficial and reasonably priced at 32 million rubles. See Migulin, Nasha noveishaia zheleznodorozhnaia politika, 303-305.
56. 多数观察者认为,由库洛姆津管理的附属企业效益良好且定价合理,耗资 3200 万卢布。参见 Migulin,《我们最新的铁路政策》,303-305 页。

57. Pushechnikov, “O nedochetakh v dele izyskanii,” ZhdD, 1907, nos. 46-47: 527; Borzunov, “K voprosu ob ekonomicheskom znachenii,” 100, 106; Fedorov, Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie, 61; Grigor’ev, Peremeny, pp. I-II.
57. Pushechnikov,《勘察工作中的不足问题》,《铁路杂志》,1907 年,第 46-47 期:527 页;Borzunov,《关于经济意义的问题》,100、106 页;Fedorov,《经济状况》,61 页;Grigor’ev,《变迁》,I-II 页。

58. North, Transport, 80-81.
58. 诺斯,《运输》,80-81 页。

59. Gr. P——n (Potanin), Ocherk proektov, 34-35; Fedorov, Ekonomicheskaia polozhenie, 28. The best description of conditions in Amur oblast is to be found in G.-M. Valuev, “Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska voennogo gubernatora G.-M. Valueva o sostoianii i nuzhdakh amurskoi oblasti za 1911 god” [Blagoveshchensk, 1912].
59. 格里·P——n(波塔宁),《方案概述》,34-35 页;费多罗夫,《经济状况》,28 页。关于阿穆尔州状况的最佳描述见于 G.-M.瓦卢耶夫《1911 年阿穆尔州军事总督 G.-M.瓦卢耶夫关于该地区现状与需求的最高报告》[布拉戈维申斯克,1912 年]。

60. Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie otchety, vtoroi sozyv, sessiia vtoraia, zas. May 18, 1907, col. 851.
60. 国家杜马,《速记记录》,第二届会议,第二次会议,1907 年 5 月 18 日会议,第 851 栏。
The mixed results of economic development in Siberia speak to the nonachievement of the state’s political goals there, to which the events of the 1905 revolution testify. The Trans-Siberian was a manmade conductor of revolutionary energy: its construction gave rise to the formation of a politically conscious work force and facilitated communication among revolutionaries operating in the urban centers of Siberia. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} In view of the outcome, many people considered the tremendous cost of the railroad unjustified.
西伯利亚经济发展的复杂结果反映了国家在该地区政治目标的未达成,1905 年革命事件即为明证。西伯利亚大铁路是人为传导革命能量的导体:其建设催生了具有政治觉悟的工人阶级的形成,并促进了活跃在西伯利亚各城市中心的革命者之间的联络。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} 鉴于这一结果,许多人认为该铁路的巨大成本得不偿失。

The Cost  成本

The relentless adversities of geography and climate, the imperfect managerial structure and organization of construction, and the state’s nonchalant attitude toward economy and accountability all conspired to raise the cost of the Siberian Railroad far above original estimates. 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}
地理与气候的无情阻碍、施工管理结构与组织的不完善,以及国家对经济与问责制的漠然态度,共同导致西伯利亚铁路的造价远超最初预算。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}
The state originally estimated that the Trans-Siberian Railroad, including all building materials and equipment, the EkaterinburgCheliabinsk branch, the Amur section, and major bridges, would be constructed at a cost between 339 , 399 , 434 339 , 399 , 434 339,399,434339,399,434 and 357 , 949 , 434 357 , 949 , 434 357,949,434357,949,434 rubles, or between approximately 46,000 and 49,000 rubles per verst. 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} By early 1901, including cost overruns on construction, initial expenditures on inconsequential capacity improvements, and the deficits of its first three years of operation, the cost of the railroad, including the Chi-nese-Eastern Railroad (which was built in lieu of the longer Amur section), had reached 855 , 282 , 153 855 , 282 , 153 855,282,153855,282,153 rubles, or, for a total length of 9,125 versts, 93,730 rubles per verst. 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} When the Chinese-Eastern Railroad is
国家最初估算,包括所有建筑材料与设备、叶卡捷琳堡-车里雅宾斯克支线、阿穆尔段及主要桥梁在内的跨西伯利亚铁路,建设成本将在 339 , 399 , 434 339 , 399 , 434 339,399,434339,399,434 357 , 949 , 434 357 , 949 , 434 357,949,434357,949,434 卢布之间,约合每俄里 46,000 至 49,000 卢布。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} 截至 1901 年初,计入施工超支、初期无关紧要的运力提升投入及运营前三年的亏损后,铁路总成本(含替代更长阿穆尔段修建的中东铁路)已攀升至 855 , 282 , 153 855 , 282 , 153 855,282,153855,282,153 卢布,按全长 9,125 俄里计算,每俄里成本达 93,730 卢布。 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} 当中东铁路
excluded from consideration, the cost of the as-yet uncompleted Trans-Siberian exceeded 100,000 rubles per verst. This amount surpassed the original estimate of 357 million by almost 500 million rubles; in other words, the cost overrun at this time, before completion, amounted to almost 150 percent. 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
被排除在考量之外时,尚未完工的西伯利亚大铁路每俄里造价已超过 10 万卢布。这一数字比最初 3.57 亿卢布的预算高出近 5 亿卢布;换言之,在竣工前的此刻,成本超支幅度已达近 150%。 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}

According to Migulin, no previous railroad built in Russia by either the state or a private company had been as expensive as this one was. The Transcaspian Railroad had cost the Treasury less, and so had even the abuses of the railroad barons, which had initially motivated the state’s intervention in railroad affairs. The per-verst cost of the Nikolaevsk Railroad from St. Petersburg to Moscow had been commensurate with that of the Siberian Railroad, but the Nikolaevsk was one of the first railroads in the world, it was built at a time when construction materials were not commonly manufactured, and the very highest technical standards were upheld in its construction. 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} The costs of construction were never widely publicized, of course, for the government had to take into account the sensitivities of foreign investors and an overtaxed populace. 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67}
据米古林所述,无论是国家还是私营公司此前在俄罗斯建造的任何铁路,其造价都无法与这条铁路相提并论。横跨里海的铁路花费国库更少,甚至最初促使国家干预铁路事务的铁路大亨们的滥用行为也是如此。从圣彼得堡到莫斯科的尼古拉耶夫铁路每俄里成本与西伯利亚铁路相当,但尼古拉耶夫铁路是世界上最早的铁路之一,其建造时期建筑材料尚未普遍生产,且施工过程中始终坚持最高技术标准。 66 66 ^(66){ }^{66} 当然,建设成本从未广泛公开,因为政府必须考虑到外国投资者的敏感性和税负过重的民众情绪。 67 67 ^(67){ }^{67}
The cost of the railroad composed a significant proportion of the total state expenditures on railroads under Witte, which, according to A. P. Pogrebinskii, stood at 1.7 billion rubles. 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} If one accepts Arcadius Kahan’s lower figure of 1 billion rubles for the 1880s and 1890s, the percentage was even larger. 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} In either case, the controversial assertion that government spending on the railroads had an insignificant effect on Russian economic development seems amply justified. 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70}
铁路建设成本占据了维特时期国家铁路总支出的很大比例,据 A·P·波格列宾斯基统计,这一数字达到 17 亿卢布。 68 68 ^(68){ }^{68} 如果采用阿尔卡季·卡汉提出的较低估值(即 19 世纪 80 至 90 年代间 10 亿卢布),这一占比则更为显著。 69 69 ^(69){ }^{69} 无论采用哪种数据,关于政府对铁路的投入对俄国经济发展影响微弱的争议性论断似乎都得到了充分印证。 70 70 ^(70){ }^{70}

zheleznaia doroga," ZhMPS, 1906, no. 4: 117-118). According to Borzunov, this figure had been reached by 1903 ; that is, before the additional expenditures on improvements during the Russo-Japanese War could have been figured in (Borzunov, “K voprosu ob ekonomicheskom znachenii,” 102).
铁路》(《交通部期刊》1906 年第 4 期:117-118 页)。据博尔祖诺夫所述,该数字在 1903 年已达到;这意味着日俄战争期间追加的线路改良费用尚未计入(博尔祖诺夫《关于经济意义问题的探讨》第 102 页)。

65. Migulin, Nasha noveishaia zheleznodorozhnaia politika, 295, 299.
65. 米古林,《我国最新铁路政策》,295 页,299 页。

66. Ibid., 295-296.  66. 同上,第 295-296 页。
67. When Witte did publish the cost of the railroad, he understated it by up to 300 million rubles and emphasized the continued need of the nation to sacrifice for its completion. See “Izvlechenie iz vsepoddanneishego doklada ministra finansov,” Vestnik finansov, no. 8, Feb. 23, 1903: 310.
67. 当维特公布铁路建设成本时,他少报了高达 3 亿卢布,并强调国家仍需为完成铁路建设作出牺牲。参见《财政大臣最高报告摘要》,《财政通讯》第 8 期,1903 年 2 月 23 日:第 310 页。

68. Pogrebinskii, “Stroitel’stvo,” 178.
68. 波格列宾斯基,《建设》,第 178 页。

69. Arcadius Kahan, “Government Policies and the Industrialization of Russia,” Journal of Economic History 27 (December 1967): 466-467.
69. 阿卡迪乌斯·卡汉,《政府政策与俄罗斯工业化》,《经济史杂志》第 27 卷(1967 年 12 月):第 466-467 页。

70. This contention appears to dovetail with the econometric studies of Jacob Metzer, who concludes that the direct impact of railroads on the Russian economy was insignificant. See Jacob Metzer, “Railroads in Tsarist Russia: Direct Gains and Implications,” Explorations in Economic History 13, no. 1 (1976): 85-111, and Some Economic Aspects of Railroad Development in Tsarist Russia (New York, 1977). But circumstances were different in Siberia than in European Russia, where Metzer focuses his attention, and, as
70. 这一观点似乎与雅各布·梅策尔的计量经济学研究相吻合,他得出结论认为铁路对俄罗斯经济的直接影响微不足道。参见雅各布·梅策尔,《沙皇俄国铁路:直接收益与影响》,《经济史探索》第 13 卷第 1 期(1976 年):第 85-111 页,以及《沙皇俄国铁路发展的若干经济问题》(纽约,1977 年)。但西伯利亚的情况与梅策尔主要关注的欧洲俄罗斯不同,而且,正如
The amounts indicated for construction of the Siberian Railroad were unprecedented in the annals of Russian railroad affairs. Yet the tale cannot be considered complete unless we take into account the outlays from 1901 to 1914, which include the cost of the Amur Railroad (more than 390.5 million rubles) and the cost of additional reconstruction, double-tracking, and other improvements (between 117 million and 148.7 million rubles). 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71} Investment costs must also be included: official calculations for the Siberian Railroad excluded interest charges, as did government statistics for the state railroad network at large (though private railroad companies were required by law to include them in their accounts). 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72} The total amount the state expended in this category has been estimated at 378 million rubles by 1914, exclusive of operating deficits of 432 million rubles; thanks to the way it was constructed, the railroad was very much a steady drain on the state’s finances. 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73} Finally, although no figures are available, it
西伯利亚铁路的建设资金数额在俄罗斯铁路事务史上是前所未有的。然而,若未计入 1901 至 1914 年间包括阿穆尔铁路造价(超过 3.905 亿卢布)及额外重建、双线改造和其他改进工程费用(1.17 亿至 1.487 亿卢布)的支出,这一叙述便不算完整。 71 71 ^(71){ }^{71} 投资成本亦需纳入考量:官方对西伯利亚铁路的统计未包含利息支出,这与政府对国有铁路网络的整体统计方式一致(尽管法律要求私营铁路公司将其计入账目)。 72 72 ^(72){ }^{72} 截至 1914 年,国家在这方面的总支出估计达 3.78 亿卢布,这还不包括运营亏损的 4.32 亿卢布;由于其建设方式,该铁路对国家财政造成了持续的巨大消耗。 73 73 ^(73){ }^{73} 最后,尽管缺乏具体数据,但
should not be forgotten that millions of acres of land were alienated and state-owned forests exploited for the Trans-Siberian. The prices of such resources, normally computed in the costs of private railroads, were ignored in this case; they were enormous.
不应忘记的是,为了建设西伯利亚大铁路,数百万英亩的土地被征用,国有森林资源遭到大规模开发。这些资源的价值在私营铁路的成本核算中通常会被计入,但在此项目中却被忽略;其数额之巨,难以估量。
The total cost of the Siberian Railroad by the outbreak of World War I (exclusive of the value of forests and alienated land) exceeded 1.47 billion rubles and may have reached higher than 2.06 billion rubles. 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74} By contrast, the gross output of all Siberian industry in 1914 has been valued at roughly 90 million rubles. 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75} To put the cost in clearer perspective, remember that the total yearly disbursements of the Russian state budget exceeded 3 billion rubles for the first time only in 1912. In 1903 it was 2.05 billion rubles, or roughly double the cost of the TransSiberian by that date. 76 76 ^(76){ }^{76} As a percentage of the state debt, which according to one estimate was 8.8 billion at the end of 1913 , it was also significant. 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
截至第一次世界大战爆发时,西伯利亚大铁路的总成本(不含森林资源及被征用土地的价值)已超过 14.7 亿卢布,甚至可能高达 20.6 亿卢布。 74 74 ^(74){ }^{74} 作为对比,1914 年西伯利亚地区全部工业的总产值仅约为 9000 万卢布。 75 75 ^(75){ }^{75} 为更直观体现其耗资规模,需知俄罗斯国家财政年度总支出在 1912 年才首次突破 30 亿卢布。而 1903 年的财政支出为 20.5 亿卢布,约相当于当时西伯利亚大铁路造价的两倍。 76 76 ^(76){ }^{76} 若以国家债务为参照(据估算 1913 年底达 88 亿卢布),该项目的支出占比同样惊人。 77 77 ^(77){ }^{77}
The Trans-Siberian Railroad was the most expensive peaceful undertaking in modern history up to that time. 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78} Mitigating its enormous costs somewhat was the immense amount of work involved in distant regions with severe terrain and climate: before 1903, 70,000 laborers were employed; among other feats, they raised 77 million cubic feet of
西伯利亚大铁路是当时现代历史上耗资最巨的和平工程。 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78} 一定程度上缓解其巨额成本的是在遥远地区、恶劣地形与气候条件下投入的巨量人力:1903 年前雇用了 7 万名劳工;他们完成的壮举包括挖掘搬运了 7700 万立方英尺的土方。

had far exceeded what the government earned by attracting tea to the railroad. (See Fedorov, Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie, 18-20.) In any case, despite the large amount of grain carried on the railroad, traffic was still below an economical level (Westwood, History, 139).
已远超政府通过吸引茶叶经铁路运输所获收益。(参见费多罗夫《经济状况》第 18-20 页)无论如何,尽管铁路运输了大量粮食,其货运量仍低于经济盈利水平(韦斯特伍德《历史》第 139 页)。

74. The first number is from Borzunov, “K voprosu ob ekonomicheskom znachenii,” 102, and either excludes the cost of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad or, more likely, does not comprise investment costs and operating expenditures; Borzunov’s text is unclear on these points. The second figure is from Braikevitch and Afonin, “Railways,” 1513, and includes the Chinese-Eastern Railroad.
74. 前一个数字引自博尔祖诺夫《论经济意义问题》第 102 页,可能未包含中东铁路成本,或更可能未计入投资成本与运营支出;博尔祖诺夫的文本对此表述不清。后一数字引自布拉伊克维奇与阿福宁《铁路》第 1513 页,包含中东铁路费用。

75. Borzunov, “K voprosu ob ekonomicheskom znachenii,” 102. According to Borzunov, in 1904 the value of industrial output was only 50 million rubles.
75. 博尔祖诺夫《论经济意义问题》第 102 页。据其所述,1904 年工业产值仅 5000 万卢布。

76. Pasvolsky and Moulton, Russian Debts, 50.
76. 帕斯沃尔斯基与莫尔顿,《俄国债务》,第 50 页。

77. This point is made in Braikevitch and Afonin, “Railways,” 1514. For the state debt, see Pasvolsky and Moulton, Russian Debts, 177. According to Iu. N. Shebaldin, the total amount of state indebtedness on Jan. 1, 1914, was 12.745 billion rubles; see his “Gosudarstvennyi biudzhet tsarskoi Rossii v nachale XX v. (do mirovoi voiny),” Istoricheskie zapiski 65 (1959): 179.
77. 这一观点由 Braikevitch 和 Afonin 在《铁路》第 1514 页提出。关于国家债务,参见 Pasvolsky 和 Moulton 的《俄国债务》第 177 页。根据尤·N·舍巴尔丁的研究,截至 1914 年 1 月 1 日,国家债务总额为 127.45 亿卢布;详见其《20 世纪初沙皇俄国的国家预算(至世界大战前)》,载于《历史笔记》第 65 期(1959 年),第 179 页。

78. My assertion is based on David McCullough’s claim of the same honor for France’s expenditure on its failed attempt to build the Panama Canal, which amounted to 1.435 billion francs, or $ 287 $ 287 $287\$ 287 million. Even after the American contribution is added in, bringing the final cost of the canal in 1914 to $ 639 $ 639 $639\$ 639 million at contemporary exchange rates (approximately 50 cents to the ruble in 1900), the Trans-Siberian was more expensive, although certainly not on a per-mile basis. It should also be kept in mind that the Panama Canal was technically “a masterpiece in design and construction” that has never required major repair. See David McCullough, The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (New York, 1977), 235, 610-611.
78. 我的论断基于 David McCullough 对法国在巴拿马运河失败尝试中耗资的相同评价,该金额达 14.35 亿法郎,约合 $ 287 $ 287 $287\$ 287 百万。即使加上美国的投入,按当时汇率(1900 年约 50 美分兑 1 卢布)计算,1914 年运河总成本升至 $ 639 $ 639 $639\$ 639 百万美元,西伯利亚大铁路的造价仍更高,尽管单位里程成本未必如此。需注意的是,巴拿马运河在技术上堪称"设计与施工的杰作",至今未需重大修缮。参见 David McCullough《两洋之间:巴拿马运河的创建 1870-1914》(纽约,1977 年),第 235、610-611 页。

earthworks and cut down for railroad construction alone 108,000 acres of forest. 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79} But these circumstances cannot have provided solace to those who knew, as one government authority wrote in 1912, that the railroad continued to be a drain on the nation’s resources and would “for a long time yet require heavy sacrifices from the tax resources of the country.” 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80} A special conference under D. M. Sol’skii attributed the ultimate expense of the railroad to poor organization and management and least of all to the distant, difficult setting. 81 81 ^(81){ }^{81} Economy had never been more than a secondary concern to the government builders and managers of the railroad. At the same time that its real cost dimensions were beginning to come to light, the Committee of the Siberian Railroad preened itself for the speed of the road’s construction-faster than that of any other railroad in the world. The image and prestige of the Russian government in the nation and the world were always more important considerations. 82 82 ^(82){ }^{82}
仅铁路建设就进行了土方工程并砍伐了 108,000 英亩的森林。 79 79 ^(79){ }^{79} 但这些情况并不能给那些知情者带来安慰,正如一位政府官员在 1912 年所写的那样,铁路仍然是国家资源的消耗品,并将“在很长一段时间内继续需要国家税收资源的巨大牺牲”。 80 80 ^(80){ }^{80} 由 D·M·索尔斯基主持的特别会议将铁路的最终高昂费用归因于组织和管理不善,而地理偏远和施工环境艰难则是最次要的原因。 81 81 ^(81){ }^{81} 对铁路的政府建设者和运营者而言,经济效益从来都不是首要考虑。当铁路的真实成本开始显现时,西伯利亚铁路委员会却为铁路的建设速度沾沾自喜——比世界上任何其他铁路的建设速度都要快。俄罗斯政府在国内外的形象和威望始终是更重要的考量因素。 82 82 ^(82){ }^{82}

An Explanation  一种解释

How can we explain the failure of the Siberian Railroad to “tame the East”? Witte provided an answer in 1910:
我们该如何解释西伯利亚铁路未能“驯服东方”的失败?维特在 1910 年给出了答案:
One can say without any exaggeration that if strategic and political considerations had not played such an enormous role in the configuration of our railroad network and in its management; if the development of railroad affairs in general in Russia had been subordinated solely to commercial and economic considerations, as is the case in America, for instance, then of course there would be no deficit, or at least the deficit would be moderate and incidental. 83 83 ^(83){ }^{83}
可以毫不夸张地说,如果战略和政治因素没有在我们的铁路网络配置及其管理中发挥如此巨大的作用;如果俄国铁路事业的发展总体上仅服从于商业和经济考量,就像美国那样,那么当然就不会出现赤字,或者至少赤字会是适度且偶然的。 83 83 ^(83){ }^{83}
Witte’s assessment is applicable not only to the railroad’s finances but to every aspect of the project, including the state’s efforts to develop the Siberian economy. Political inspiration and bureaucratic intervention were the dominant genes of Russian economic life as it evolved over the centuries. The Trans-Siberian, like many sectors of the Russian economy, was endowed with characteristics that were not conducive to efficient enterprise and that allowed the distortion of economic inputs. Both the Russian taxpayer and the government’s own ability to attain its policy goals suffered accordingly. These characteristics go a long way toward explaining the uneven nature of imperial Russian industrial development, with its simultaneous advanced and backward features and the persistence of premodern techniques in modern forms. 84 84 ^(84){ }^{84}
维特的评价不仅适用于铁路的财务状况,也适用于该项目的方方面面,包括国家发展西伯利亚经济的努力。政治激励与官僚干预是几个世纪以来俄罗斯经济生活演进的主导基因。西伯利亚大铁路如同俄罗斯经济的许多领域一样,被赋予了不利于高效企业经营的特质,这些特质导致经济投入被扭曲。无论是俄罗斯纳税人还是政府自身实现政策目标的能力,都因此遭受损失。这些特质在很大程度上解释了帝俄工业发展不均衡的现象——先进与落后特征并存,现代形式中顽固保留着前现代技术。 84 84 ^(84){ }^{84}

84. Cf. Olga Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914 (London, 1976), 40; Peter I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution, trans. L. M. Herman (New York, 1949), 421-422.
84. 参见奥尔加·克里斯普,《1914 年前俄罗斯经济研究》(伦敦,1976 年),40 页;彼得·I·利亚申科,《1917 年革命前俄罗斯国民经济史》,L·M·赫尔曼译(纽约,1949 年),421-422 页。

Conclusion  结论

The Trans-Siberian Railroad was an outgrowth of the historical urge of the Russian government to control its border territories through centralization and Russification. This urge had manifested itself continuously in Siberia since the time of Catherine II, and it became more forceful in the period of reaction under Alexander III and Nicholas II. The Siberian Railroad also represented a stage in the progression of Russian economic policy toward increasing state intervention. Most apparent in the vital railroad sector, this trend reflected the centralizing and chauvinistic proclivity of the last two tsars.
西伯利亚大铁路是俄罗斯政府通过中央集权和俄罗斯化控制其边疆地区的历史性冲动的产物。自叶卡捷琳娜二世时代以来,这种冲动在西伯利亚持续显现,并在亚历山大三世和尼古拉二世的反动时期变得更为强烈。西伯利亚铁路也代表了俄罗斯经济政策向加强国家干预方向发展的一个阶段。这一趋势在至关重要的铁路部门最为明显,反映了最后两位沙皇的中央集权倾向和沙文主义倾向。
High-level bureaucrats, especially the ministers of finance before Witte, opposed the construction of the Trans-Siberian. Their views were formed in a wholly uncommon phase of Russian history, during which the government committed itself to a laissez-faire economic policy. Often (though not always) aligned with the politically liberal elements in the bureaucracy, they were skeptical of the efficacy of government involvement in the economy. Fiscally conservative and wary of risk-taking, they denied that the empire could be united through economic development. For all their political liberalism, their economic ideas were identical in their caution to those prevalent under Nicholas I. They refused to accept the argument that a nation’s wealth was not static, but might expand, or that Russia’s remote, hitherto unproductive borderlands could be made to bear fruit. They were especially hostile toward the technologists in the Ministry of Transport, where the vision of large-scale economic development first
高级官僚,尤其是维特之前的财政部长们,反对修建西伯利亚大铁路。他们的观点形成于俄罗斯历史上一个极不寻常的时期,当时政府奉行自由放任的经济政策。这些人通常(尽管并非总是)与官僚体系中的政治自由派结盟,对政府干预经济的有效性持怀疑态度。他们财政保守,不愿冒险,否认帝国可以通过经济发展实现统一。尽管他们在政治上持自由主义立场,但其经济思想与尼古拉一世时期盛行的谨慎理念如出一辙。他们拒绝接受国家财富并非静态、而是可能增长的观点,也不相信俄罗斯遥远且迄今未开发的边疆地区能够变得丰饶。他们对交通部的技术专家尤其敌视,正是在该部门,大规模经济发展的构想首次

germinated. As the ministries of finance and transport battled for control of railroad affairs, the lines of ideological division hardened.
萌芽。随着财政部与交通部就铁路事务控制权展开激烈斗争,意识形态的分歧线变得愈发清晰。
Many political conservatives also opposed the railroad, on the grounds that the new technology would introduce elements of modern industrial society that were alien to Russian traditions. Conscious of the declining position of the nobility in Russian life, they feared that the railroad would open Siberia to colonization and deplete the cheap labor force on which gentry agriculture in central Russia depended.
许多政治保守派同样反对修建铁路,理由是这项新技术将引入与俄罗斯传统格格不入的现代工业社会元素。意识到贵族在俄国社会地位日渐衰落,他们担忧铁路会打开西伯利亚殖民的大门,耗尽中央俄罗斯地区贵族农业赖以生存的廉价劳动力。
Opposition began to falter as strategic anxiety intensified in reaction to both the intrusion of the West in Asia and the supposed awakening of China. It was all too apparent that Russia’s dominion in eastern Siberia and the Far East was made precarious by the poor means of communication and a population that had been unable to make a go of farming. The Trans-Siberian Railroad was proffered as a solution that would at a single stroke compensate for the lack of a Russian infrastructure in the region. The railroad would also implement the forward policy that Russian strategists believed would be the best defense on their Asian flank. The culmination of this belief was the construction of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad through northern Manchuria.
随着西方势力渗入亚洲及所谓"中国觉醒"引发的战略焦虑加剧,反对声浪开始消退。人们清楚地看到,东西伯利亚和远东地区的俄罗斯统治因交通手段落后、居民农耕难以维生而岌岌可危。西伯利亚大铁路被提出作为一举弥补该地区俄罗斯基础设施匮乏的解决方案。这条铁路还将落实俄国战略家们认为能在亚洲侧翼形成最佳防御的前进政策。这一信念的巅峰,便是贯穿中国东北北部的中东铁路的修建。
The sociopolitical situation in Siberia itself combined with strategic concerns to breach the wall of opposition to the railroad. Russian bureaucrats suspected the loyalty of the native population, saw the assimilation of local Russians to native ways as diluting Russian authority, and interpreted the development of a regionalist consciousness as the expression of revolutionary and secessionist sentiment. The government sought to cut away at Nicholas I’s “forest cordon,” the policy that had kept Siberia purposely undeveloped to inhibit social unrest and the influence of foreign powers. As Japan and Prussia had done, Russia embraced economic modernization and innovation not only to maintain its rank among the great powers but also to shore up the autocracy at home. This motive has too long been neglected by historians of imperial Russia.
西伯利亚当地的社会政治状况与战略考量共同作用,冲破了反对修建铁路的阻力。俄国官僚们怀疑原住民的忠诚度,认为当地俄罗斯人被同化为原住民生活方式削弱了俄罗斯的权威,并将地区主义意识的发展解读为革命和分裂情绪的表达。政府试图打破尼古拉一世的"森林防线"政策——该政策故意让西伯利亚保持不发达状态,以抑制社会动荡和外国势力的影响。如同日本和普鲁士所做的那样,俄罗斯拥抱经济现代化与创新,不仅是为了维持其大国地位,也是为了巩固国内的专制统治。这一动机长期以来被帝俄历史学者们所忽视。
Even then, the apprehension of many officials for the state of Russian finances and their hostility toward the schemes of the Ministry of Transport led them to support a more gradual pattern of development for Siberia. Along with some members of the professional societies, they proposed the construction of local railroads and the improvement of Siberian rivers to promote trade and industry until each region could provide enough revenue to sustain and make prof-
即便如此,许多官员对俄国财政状况的忧虑以及对交通部计划的抵触,使他们倾向于支持西伯利亚采取更为渐进的发展模式。他们与部分专业学会成员一道,提议先修建地方铁路并改善西伯利亚河流航运,以促进贸易和工业发展,直至各地区能够创造足够收入来维持并使其境内的跨西伯利亚干线铁路段实现盈利。

itable its section of a Trans-Siberian trunk line. These views were shared by the regionalist intelligentsia, who voiced the hope that Siberia would thereby be able to withstand the onslaught of the centralizing metropolis against its unique culture.
这些观点得到了地方主义知识分子的认同,他们寄望于通过这种方式,西伯利亚能够抵御中央集权大都市对其独特文化的冲击。
In the end, although the bureaucratic opponents of the Siberian Railroad underrated the productive potential of Siberia, their objections seem to have been justified and their alternative blueprint more appropriate for Russian and Siberian conditions. The tracing, construction, and operation of the railroad were managed by the state along bureaucratic, centralized lines, which in many ways proved counterproductive. The economic advantages the railroad brought to Siberia were questionable and its cost was indefensible under the circumstances. In the strategic realm, the construction of a railroad theoretically capable of transporting troops to the Pacific and effecting the de facto annexation of northern Manchuria was a major contributing factor in the outbreak of war with Japan. In this conflict that its construction helped provoke, the railroad then failed to provide adequate logistical support to the Russian war effort. In the wake of its humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese, Russia was hurled into the turmoil of the 1905 revolution. In Siberia the artery of the revolution was the Trans-Siberian Railroad, whose appearance had energized the forces that wanted to destroy the regime.
最终,尽管西伯利亚铁路的官僚反对者低估了西伯利亚的生产潜力,但他们的反对意见似乎是有道理的,他们的替代蓝图更适合俄罗斯和西伯利亚的实际情况。铁路的勘测、建设和运营由国家按照官僚、集中的方式进行管理,这在许多方面被证明适得其反。铁路给西伯利亚带来的经济优势值得怀疑,其成本在当时的情况下也是站不住脚的。在战略领域,修建一条理论上能够向太平洋运送军队并事实上吞并中国东北北部的铁路,是与日本爆发战争的主要因素之一。在这场因其建设而引发的冲突中,铁路未能为俄罗斯的战争努力提供足够的后勤支持。在遭受日本人的羞辱性失败后,俄罗斯陷入了 1905 年革命的动荡之中。 在西伯利亚,革命的命脉是西伯利亚大铁路,它的出现激发了那些想要摧毁政权势力的活力。
In one area, the auxiliary enterprises of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad, the government was more successful. The state channeled the peasant resettlement movement, dispatched geological expeditions, improved water transport, and tried to stimulate local industry. Advancement was by and large limited to western Siberia, and to agriculture and water transport more than industrial development. But the systematic planning of the committee’s activities made this pioneer venture unlike any other in the history of the world.
在一个领域,即西伯利亚铁路委员会的附属企业中,政府取得了更大的成功。国家引导了农民迁移运动,派遣地质勘探队,改善了水路运输,并试图刺激地方工业发展。进步主要集中在西西伯利亚地区,且更多体现在农业和水路运输而非工业发展上。但委员会活动的系统性规划使这一开创性事业在世界历史上独树一帜。
The unsatisfactory performance of the Siberian Railroad and the mixed results of the state-led economic reconstruction of Siberia can be attributed above all to the fact that these undertakings were motivated by politics. Considerations of profit and loss were given a relatively low priority. For the sake of reducing costs or completing the work rapidly the government often disregarded inefficiency and widespread corruption. It paid no heed to optimal economic or commercial conditions, and the folly of its policy became apparent soon after the trains began to run.
西伯利亚铁路不尽如人意的表现以及国家主导的西伯利亚经济重建所取得的混合成果,首要原因在于这些举措是出于政治动机。对盈亏的考量被置于相对次要的位置。为了降低成本或快速完工,政府常常无视效率低下和普遍存在的腐败现象。它毫不关注最优的经济或商业条件,其政策的愚蠢性在火车开始运行后不久便暴露无遗。
These factors lead me to conclusions that differ from those of other economic historians, who attempt to show that Russian moderniza-
这些因素使我的结论与其他经济史学家不同,后者试图证明俄罗斯的现代化进程遵循了一条欧洲的老路,仅有轻微偏离。

tion followed a well-trod European path with only slight deviation. I refer to the works of Alexander Gerschenkron and more recently Paul R. Gregory, who asserts that “Russia had begun to experience modern economic growth after 1880.” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} Statistical indices that demonstrate tremendous progress disguise the motivation and quality, indeed the very nature, of Russian economic development in the late imperial period.
我指的是亚历山大·格申克龙以及最近的保罗·R·格雷戈里的著作,后者断言“俄罗斯在 1880 年后已开始经历现代经济增长”。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 那些显示巨大进步的统计指标掩盖了俄罗斯帝国晚期经济发展的动机、质量乃至本质。
The role of the state, substituting for a weakly developed bourgeoisie, appears in the historiography as vigorous and singularly effective in industrializing and developing the country. I do agree with Gerschenkron that the state was preeminent in the attempt to move the nation forward, although spontaneous or autonomous sources of growth probably would have sunk deeper roots given enough time after the 1905 revolution. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} Nonetheless, this investigation of the Siberian Railroad affirms the conclusions of Arcadius Kahan that the state’s economic policy hindered development even as it was trying to bring it about. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
国家在工业化与发展中扮演的角色,作为资产阶级发展薄弱时的替代者,在史学叙述中显得活力充沛且成效卓著。我虽认同格申克龙的观点,即国家在推动国家前进方面占据主导地位,但若给予 1905 年革命后足够的时间,自发性或自主性的增长源泉或许能扎下更深根基。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 然而,这项对西伯利亚铁路的研究印证了阿尔卡季·卡汉的结论:即便国家试图促进发展,其经济政策实际上阻碍了这一进程。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
All told, the results of the state’s railroad construction program, as exemplified by the Siberian Railroad, were lackluster, not dynamic. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} We must question the belief that in Russia “railroadization” was the most successful component of the state’s industrialization drive and
总体而言,以西伯利亚铁路为代表的国家铁路建设计划成果平平,缺乏活力。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 我们必须质疑那种认为在俄国“铁路化”是国家工业化推进中最成功要素的观点,以及
the precondition of its modernization. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} The expanded transport network’s very utility for efficient economic advancement was undermined by the government’s motives for developing the economy.
其现代化的先决条件。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 运输网络扩张对经济高效发展的实际效用,被政府发展经济的动机所削弱。
Perhaps equally at fault was Witte, whom historians generally portray as having given a virtuoso performance. Witte provided the leadership that was needed to accomplish the project, but his methods also contributed to its distortions. He excluded dissension and debate both by having weak, compliant individuals appointed to ministerial posts and by creating the Committee of the Siberian Railroad. As one critic put it, his was a “personal regime,” standing above government and society. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} His actions are symptomatic of the broader insufficiencies inherent in an autocratic system that attempts to modernize from above largely to preserve and enhance the political power of the state.
或许同样难辞其咎的是维特,历史学家通常将他描绘成一位表现出色的能手。维特提供了完成该项目所需的领导力,但他的方法也导致了项目的扭曲。他通过任命软弱顺从的人担任部长职务,以及成立西伯利亚铁路委员会,排除了异议和争论。正如一位批评者所言,他的统治是一种“个人政权”,凌驾于政府和社会之上。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 他的行为象征着一个专制制度在试图自上而下实现现代化时更广泛的不足,这种现代化主要是为了维护和增强国家的政治权力。
The Russian economy at this time was by no means totally dependent on the state. The Witte “system” was discredited by the depression at the turn of the century, and private enterprise continued to flourish until it was uprooted by the Bolshevik Revolution. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} But we have seen that salient characteristics of tsarist enterprise anticipated familiar traits of a later era. The Olympian emphasis on speeding the railroad’s construction; its gargantuan scale; the contempt for financial control; the publicity given the railroad based on partial truths; and Witte’s attachment of millenarian hopes to it-all came to be typical features of Soviet industrial enterprise, from Magnitogorsk in the 1930s to the Baikal-Amur Main Line in the 1980s. These projects also share the Trans-Siberian’s technical and economic shortcomings, because they too were launched to achieve political objectives and were overseen by a central bureaucracy that acted at the behest of the political leadership. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
此时的俄国经济绝非完全依赖国家。维特的“体系”因世纪之交的经济萧条而信誉扫地,私营企业继续蓬勃发展,直到被布尔什维克革命连根拔起。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 但我们已经看到,沙皇时期企业的显著特征预示了后来时代的熟悉特质。对加快铁路建设的至高重视;其庞大的规模;对财务控制的漠视;基于部分事实对铁路的宣传;以及维特对其寄托的千禧年希望——这些都成为苏联工业企业的典型特征,从 1930 年代的马格尼托戈尔斯克到 1980 年代的贝加尔-阿穆尔铁路干线。这些项目也继承了西伯利亚大铁路的技术和经济缺陷,因为它们同样是为了实现政治目标而启动,并由一个听命于政治领导层的中央官僚机构监督。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
The Trans-Siberian project almost seems to belong more to the Soviet period than to the tsarist. Many of the projects the Soviets took up were first devised in the Committee of the Siberian Railroad, most notably the Ural-Kuznetsk combine, gold mining in the far northeast, the active use of the Northern Sea route, the creation of a merchant marine, and the promotion of mass Slavic resettlement in Asian Russia. The committee was also a pioneer in the governmental direction of applied scientific research and exploration of natural resources. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
西伯利亚大铁路项目似乎更应属于苏联时期而非沙皇时代。苏联接手的许多项目最初都是由西伯利亚铁路委员会规划的,其中最著名的包括乌拉尔-库兹涅茨克联合企业、远东东北部的金矿开采、北海航线的积极利用、商船队的建立,以及推动斯拉夫人大规模移民至亚洲俄罗斯地区。该委员会还是政府主导应用科学研究和自然资源勘探的先驱。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
One might say that the Soviet leadership (before Gorbachev) looked on the all-union economy as a field for development and political binding in the same way that Witte looked on Siberia. Both, of course, were motivated by political goals and dedicated to maintaining the state’s power over its territory. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} Although Witte’s planning in the Committee of the Siberian Railroad was not nearly so comprehensive, did not rely at all on coercion, and did not forsake light industry, it was nonetheless akin to the Soviet five-year plans insofar as it embodied an act of will to remold the economy on lines deemed desirable by the state. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} The Trans-Siberian “taught” Russia not managerial capitalism, as railroads did the United States, but rather the possibility of perfecting a centralized economy. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} Although less centralized paths
可以说,苏联领导层(在戈尔巴乔夫之前)将全联盟经济视为发展与政治捆绑的领域,正如维特看待西伯利亚一样。当然,两者都出于政治目标,致力于维持国家对领土的控制力。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 尽管维特在西伯利亚铁路委员会中的规划远非如此全面,完全不依赖强制手段,也未放弃轻工业,但在国家按照其认为理想的路线重塑经济的意志行动方面,它与苏联的五年计划有相似之处。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 横贯西伯利亚的铁路并未像美国铁路那样“教会”俄罗斯管理资本主义,而是展示了完善中央集权经济的可能性。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 尽管在 1917 年前后,俄罗斯仍有其他非中央集权的发展路径可选,
of development still lay open to Russia before and after 1917, the Bolsheviks did find a ready-made tradition of state planning at their disposal when they came to power.
但布尔什维克夺取政权时,确实发现了一套现成的国家规划传统可供利用。
The Russian state’s attempt to assert its control over a sprawling geographical realm through colonization has been a leitmotif of its history from the Muscovite grand princes to the Politburo. Through those centuries all Russian rulers have had to contend with their immense, often harsh, and seemingly threatened Asian territories. Similar complications resulting from the consequent reliance on overcentralization arose before and after October 1917. The revolution changed the face of Russia, but the continuity of certain patterns of economic development and economic enterprise is not difficult to see. And in both imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, the same complex of attitudes existed vis-à-vis the nation’s territory. The history of the Trans-Siberian Railroad exemplifies the predilections of Russian rulers in the age of industrialization.
俄罗斯国家试图通过殖民化手段对其广袤地理疆域实施控制,这一主题自莫斯科大公国时期延续至政治局时代,贯穿其历史始终。数世纪以来,所有俄国统治者都不得不应对其辽阔、严酷且看似危机四伏的亚洲领土。由此产生的过度集权依赖所引发的类似困境,在 1917 年十月革命前后均有显现。这场革命改变了俄国的面貌,但经济发展模式与经济事业中某些延续性脉络仍清晰可辨。无论是沙俄还是苏联时期,国家对领土的态度始终包含着同样的复杂情结。西伯利亚大铁路的历史,正是工业化时代俄国统治者这种倾向的典型例证。

Bibliography of Primary Sources
原始资料目录

Periodicals  期刊

Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen
铁路学档案

Inzhener  工程师
Izvestiia imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva
俄罗斯帝国地理学会通报

Izvestiia sobraniia inzhenerov putei soobshcheniia
《道路工程师协会通报》

Krasnyi arkhiv  红色档案
Novoe vremia  新时代
The Railroad Gazette  《铁路公报》
Sibirskii torgovo-promyshlennyi i spravochnyi kalendar’
西伯利亚的托尔戈沃--宣传和活动日历

The Times  泰晤士报
Tiuremnyi vestnik  监狱通报
Vestnik finansov, promyshlennosti i torgovli
财政、工业与商业通报

Vostochnoe obozrenie  东方观察
Zheleznodorozhnoe delo  铁路事业
Zhurnal ministerstva putei soobshcheniia
Zhurnal obshchestva sibirskikh inzhenerov
西伯利亚工程师协会杂志

Unpublished Works  未发表作品

Filippov, T. I. “Zapiska gosudarstvennogo kontrolera upravliaiushchemu delami komiteta ministrov o proektirovavshemsia napravlenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi.” TsGAOR, Moscow, fond 1099, opis’ 1, delo 463.
菲利波夫,T.I. “国家监察员致部长委员会事务主管关于西伯利亚铁路规划线路的备忘录。” 中央国家十月革命档案馆,莫斯科,全宗号 1099,目录 1,案卷 463。

Golokhvastov, A. D. “Zapiska A. D. Golokhvastova o torgovom znachenii obskoi zheleznoi dorogi.” TsGAOR, Moscow, fond 677, opis’ 1, delo 589.
戈洛赫瓦斯托夫,A.D. 《关于鄂毕铁路商业意义的备忘录》。俄罗斯国家历史档案馆,莫斯科,全宗 677,目录 1,案卷 589。

“Otchet vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia prichin pere-
“钦定委员会关于调查西伯利亚及彼尔姆-科特拉斯铁路建设费用超支原因的报告。” [1900 年。] 萨尔蒂科夫-谢德林图书馆,列宁格勒。

raskhodov po sooruzheniiu sibirskoi i perm’-kotlasskoi zheleznykh dorog.” [1900.] Saltykov-Shchedrin Library, Leningrad.
俄罗斯,西伯利亚铁路委员会。“西伯利亚铁路委员会日志。” [1893 年、1895-1902 年。] 莫斯科社会科学信息研究所。

Russia, Komitet Sibirskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi. “Zhurnaly komiteta sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi.” [1893, 1895-1902.] INION, Moscow.
俄罗斯,西伯利亚铁路委员会。“西伯利亚铁路委员会日志。” [1893 年、1895-1902 年。] 莫斯科社会科学信息研究所。

Russia, Ministerstvo Putei Soobshcheniia, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti ministerstva putei soobshcheniia po stroitel’stvu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi za vremia s 30 marta 1889 g. po 17 ianvaria 1892 g.” TsGAOR, Moscow, fond 677, opis’ 1, delo 629.
俄罗斯交通部,《西伯利亚铁路建设活动报告(1889 年 3 月 30 日至 1892 年 1 月 17 日)》,莫斯科中央国家十月革命档案馆,全宗 677,目录 1,案卷 629。

-, Departament Zheleznykh Dorog. "O sposobe postroiki sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi i o neotlagatel’nom pristupe k k kk sooruzheniiu pervogo eia uchastka Samara-Ufa.’ K. N. Pos’et, January 11, 1885, no. 266. LIIZhT, Leningrad.
铁道部,《关于西伯利亚铁路修建方式及立即启动首段萨马拉-乌法建设的紧急通告》,K·N·波谢特,1885 年 1 月 11 日,第 266 号,列宁格勒铁道运输历史研究所藏。

-, Upravlenie Zheleznykh Dorog, Tekhnichesko-Inspektorskii Komitet. "Predstavlenie v komitet ministrov MPS K. N. Pos’eta: ‘O napravlenii tranzitnoi sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi.’ " May 2, 1875, no. 2319. LIIZhT, Leningrad.
铁道管理局技术监察委员会,《交通大臣 K·N·波谢特提交部长会议的报告:关于西伯利亚铁路干线走向问题》,1875 年 5 月 2 日,第 2319 号,列宁格勒铁道运输历史研究所藏。

-
. “Predstavlenie v komitet ministrov MPS K. N. Pos’eta.” June 1, 1884, no. 4751. LIIZhT, Leningrad.
《交通大臣 K·N·波谢特提交部长会议的报告》,1884 年 6 月 1 日,第 4751 号,列宁格勒铁道运输历史研究所藏。

“Trudy vostochnoi podkomissii vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi.” 22 vols. [1895-1896.] LIIZhT, Leningrad.
“东方分委员会关于西伯利亚铁路建设实地调查工作的最高委员会报告集。”22 卷。[1895-1896 年。]列宁格勒铁路运输工程学院。

“Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia na meste dela sooruzheniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi.” 25 vols. [1895-1896.] LIIZhT, Leningrad.
“西伯利亚铁路建设实地调查最高委员会报告集。”25 卷。[1895-1896 年。]列宁格勒铁路运输工程学院。

Valuev, G.-M. “Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska voennogo gubernatora G.-M. Valueva o sostoianii i nuzhdakh amurskoi oblasti za 1911 god.” [1912.] Salty-kov-Shchedrin Library, Leningrad.
瓦卢耶夫,G.-M.“阿穆尔州 1911 年度状况与需求的军事总督 G.-M.瓦卢耶夫最高级别备忘录。”[1912 年。]列宁格勒萨尔蒂科夫-谢德林图书馆。

“Vsepoddanneishii otchet o proizvedennoi s 30 maia 1910 goda po 29 fevralia 1912 goda po vysochaishemu poveleniiu senatorom grafom Medem revizii material’noi sluzhby i khoziaistva sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi.” [1912.] Saltykov-Shchedrin Library, Leningrad.
“根据最高命令由参议员梅德姆伯爵于 1910 年 5 月 30 日至 1912 年 2 月 29 日对西伯利亚铁路物资服务及经济状况进行审查的最高级别报告。”[1912 年。]列宁格勒萨尔蒂科夫-谢德林图书馆。

Published Works  已发表作品

“A. A. Auerbakh.” Russkaia starina 156, no. 11 (1913): 396-418.
“A. A. 奥尔巴赫。”《俄罗斯旧事》156 卷,第 11 期(1913 年):396-418 页。

Barry, Arthur John. Lecture on the Great Siberian Railway. London, 1900.
巴里,亚瑟·约翰。《西伯利亚大铁路讲座》。伦敦,1900 年。

Beveridge, Albert J. The Russian Advance. New York, 1904.
阿尔伯特·J·贝弗里奇。《俄国的推进》。纽约,1904 年。

Bloch, Jan Gotlib [I. S. Bliokh]. Vliianie zheleznykh dorog na ekonomicheskoe sostoianie Rossii. 5 vols. St. Petersburg, 1878.
布洛赫,扬·戈特利布 [I. S. 布廖赫]。《铁路对俄国经济状况的影响》。5 卷。圣彼得堡,1878 年。

Bublikov, A. A. K voprosu o spriamlenii peterburgo-sibirskoi tranzitnoi magistrali. St. Petersburg, 1905.
布勃利科夫,A. A.。《关于彼得堡-西伯利亚干线取直问题的探讨》。圣彼得堡,1905 年。

Budagov, G. M. O propusknoi sposobnosti sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi. Moscow, 1905.
布达戈夫,G. M.。《论西伯利亚铁路的通行能力》。莫斯科,1905 年。
Bukhman, A. N., et al. Doklad ob eksploatatsionnykh raskhodakh sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi. St. Petersburg, 1912.
布赫曼,A. N. 等。《西伯利亚铁路运营支出报告》。圣彼得堡,1912 年。
Chekhov, Anton. The Unknown Chekhov: Stories and Other Writings Hitherto Untranslated. Trans. Avrahm Yarmolinsky. New York: Noonday Press, 1954.
契诃夫,安东。《未被发现的契诃夫:此前未翻译的故事及其他作品》。亚伯拉罕·亚莫林斯基译。纽约:正午出版社,1954 年。

Chikhachev, P. “Kaliforniia i ussuriiskii krai.” Vestnik Evropy, June 1890, no. 6: 545-568.
奇哈切夫,P. 《加利福尼亚与乌苏里边疆》。《欧洲通报》,1890 年 6 月,第 6 期:545-568 页。

Chuprov, A. I. Iz proshlogo russkikh zheleznykh dorog: Stat’i 1874-1895 godov. Moscow, 1909.
丘普罗夫,A. I.。《俄国铁路往事:1874-1895 年论文集》。莫斯科,1909 年。

Dement’ev, G. D. Dokhody kazennykh zheleznykh dorog. St. Petersburg, 1913.
杰缅季耶夫,G. D.。《国有铁路收入》。圣彼得堡,1913 年。

Denisov, V. I. Rossiia na Dal’nem Vostoke. N.p., 1913.
杰尼索夫,V. I. 《俄国在远东》。出版地不详,1913 年。

Dmitriev-Mamonov, A. I., and A. F. Zdziarski, comps. Guide to the Great Siberian Railway. St. Petersburg, 1900.
德米特里耶夫-马莫诺夫,A. I. 与兹贾尔斯基,A. F. 合编。《西伯利亚大铁路指南》。圣彼得堡,1900 年。

-_. Wegweiser auf der großen sibirischen Eisenbahn. St. Petersburg, 1901.
《大西伯利亚铁路导览》。圣彼得堡,1901 年。

Fedorov, M. L. Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie sibirskoi magistrali. Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi osoboi vysshei komissii dlia vsestoronnego issledovaniia zheleznodorozhnogo dela v Rossii, vol. 76. St. Petersburg, 1912.
费多罗夫,M. L. 《西伯利亚铁路干线经济状况》。俄国铁路事业全面研究最高特别委员会著作集,第 76 卷。圣彼得堡,1912 年。

Fedorov, M. P., ed. Doklady biudzhetnoi komissii vtoroi gosudarstvennoi dumy (ne razsmotrennye dumoi vsledstvie eia rospuska). St. Petersburg, 1907.
费多罗夫,M. P. 编。《第二届国家杜马预算委员会报告(因杜马解散未审议部分)》。圣彼得堡,1907 年。

G., M. Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo obshchestva po voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge i vopros o dal’neishikh izyskaniiakh i issledovaniiakh v Sibiri. St. Petersburg, 1891.
G., M. 《西伯利亚铁路问题及西伯利亚进一步勘探与研究问题:俄罗斯帝国技术学会委员会论文集》[sic]。圣彼得堡,1891 年。

Glinskii, B. B. “Graf Sergei Iulevich Witte (Materialy dlia biografii).” Istoricheskii vestnik 140 (April 1915): 232-279.
格林斯基,B. B. 《谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇·维特伯爵(传记资料)》。《历史通报》140 期(1915 年 4 月):232-279 页。

_一, ed. Prolog russko-iaponskoi voiny: Materialy iz arkhiva grafa S. Iu. Witte. Petrograd, 1916.
《日俄战争序幕:维特伯爵档案资料汇编》,彼得格勒,1916 年。(编者:_一)

Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division. A Handbook of Siberia and Arctic Russia. Vol. 1. London, n.d.
英国海军情报部。《西伯利亚与俄罗斯北极地区手册》第 1 卷。伦敦,出版日期不详。

Grigor’ev, V. Iu. Peremeny v usloviiakh ekonomicheskoi zhizni naseleniia Sibiri (Eniseiskii krai). Krasnoiarsk, 1904.
格里戈里耶夫,V. Iu. 《西伯利亚(叶尼塞边疆区)居民经济生活条件的变化》。克拉斯诺亚尔斯克,1904 年。

Grinevetskii, V. I. Poslevoennye perspektivy russkoi promyshlennosti. 2d ed. Moscow, 1922.
格里涅韦茨基,V. I. 《战后俄国工业前景》。第二版。莫斯科,1922 年。

Gurko, V. I. Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II. Ed. J. E. W. Sterling et al. Trans. L. Matveev. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1939.
古尔科,V. I. 《过往的特征与人物:尼古拉二世统治时期的政府与舆论》。J. E. W. 斯特林等编,L. 马特维耶夫译。斯坦福:斯坦福大学出版社,1939 年。

Iadrintsev, N. M. Sibir’ kak koloniia v geograficheskom, etnograficheskom i istoricheskom otnoshenii. 2d ed. St. Petersburg, 1892.
亚德林采夫,N.M.《西伯利亚作为殖民地在地理、民族与历史关系上的研究》第二版。圣彼得堡,1892 年。

Iavorovskii, P. K. Gornaia promyshlennost’ Sibiri i sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga. St. Petersburg, 1895.
亚沃罗夫斯基,P.K.《西伯利亚的矿业与西伯利亚铁路》。圣彼得堡,1895 年。

Imperatorskoe Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo, Orenburgskii Otdel. O preimushchestvakh orenburgo-omskogo napravleniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi. Orenburg, 1883.
俄罗斯帝国地理学会奥伦堡分会。《论西伯利亚铁路奥伦堡-鄂木斯克方向的优越性》。奥伦堡,1883 年。

Itogi mnenii po povodu napravleniia sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi, podvedennye chlenom i korrespondentom raznykh sel’skokhoziaistvennykh obshchestv i i ii komitetov. St. Petersburg, 1875.
关于西伯利亚铁路走向意见的总结,由不同农业协会和委员会成员兼通讯员 i i ii 汇总。圣彼得堡,1875 年。

Ivashchenkov, A., comp. Kratkii obzor ispolneniia gosudarstvennykh rospisei (v sviazi s prochimi oborotami gosudarstvennogo kaznacheistva) za 18811899 gg. St. Petersburg, 1901.
伊瓦先科夫,A. 编。《1881-1899 年间国家预算执行情况简要概览(结合国家财政部其他收支)》。圣彼得堡,1901 年。
Izvol’skii, Aleksandr. Recollections of a Foreign Minister (Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky). Trans. Charles Louis Seeger. Garden City, N.Y., 1921.
伊兹沃尔斯基,亚历山大。《一位外交部长的回忆录(亚历山大·伊兹沃尔斯基回忆录)》。查尔斯·路易斯·西格译。纽约州花园城,1921 年。

Kalmykow, Andrew D. Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917. Ed. Alexandra Kalmykow. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
卡尔梅科夫,安德鲁·D.《一位俄国外交官的回忆录:帝国的边陲,1893-1917》。亚历山德拉·卡尔梅科夫编。纽黑文:耶鲁大学出版社,1971 年。

Kanun desiatiletie vysochaishe utverzhdennoi sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi i agitatsiia protiv neia. Kazan’, 1884.
《西伯利亚铁路十年章程及反对该铁路的煽动活动》。喀山,1884 年。

Kartamyshev, V. P. Doklad obshchemu sobraniiu chlenov obshchestva sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle: “O napravlenii magistral’noi linii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi na g. Tomsk ili v obkhod ego.” N.p., 1892.
卡尔塔梅舍夫,V.P.《致俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会全体成员报告:关于西伯利亚铁路干线经托木斯克城或绕行该城的路线问题》。无出版地,1892 年。

Katkov, M. N. Sobranie peredovykh statei moskovskikh vedomostei 1863-1887 gg. 29 vols. Moscow, 1897-1898.
卡特科夫,M.N.《莫斯科新闻社 1863-1887 年间社论集》。29 卷。莫斯科,1897-1898 年。

Kenge, V. I., and N. D. Nakhtman. Kratkii ocherk linii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi. St. Petersburg, 1908.
肯格,V.I.与纳赫特曼,N.D.《西伯利亚铁路线路简论》。圣彼得堡,1908 年。

Kennan, George. Siberia and the Exile System. New York, 1891.
乔治·凯南。《西伯利亚与流放制度》。纽约,1891 年。

Kislinskii, N. A. Nasha zheleznodorozhnaia politika po dokumentam arkhiva komiteta ministrov. Ed. A. N. Kulomzin. 4 vols. St. Petersburg, 1902.
基斯林斯基,N.A.《从部长委员会档案看我们的铁路政策》。A.N.库洛姆津编。4 卷。圣彼得堡,1902 年。

Kitaiskaia vostochnaia zheleznaia doroga: Istoricheskii ocherk. Vol. 1, 18961905 gg. St. Petersburg, 1914.
《中国东方铁路:历史概览》。第 1 卷,1896-1905 年。圣彼得堡,1914 年。

Kleinbort, L. Russkii imperializm v Azii. St. Petersburg, 1906.
克莱因博特,L. 《俄国在亚洲的帝国主义》。圣彼得堡,1906 年。

Kokovtsov, V. N. Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov. Ed. H. H. Fisher. Trans. Laura Matveev. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935.
科科夫佐夫,V.N.《我的过去:科科夫佐夫伯爵回忆录》。H.H.费希尔编,劳拉·马特维耶夫译。斯坦福:斯坦福大学出版社,1935 年。

Korol’kov, K. Zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie imperatora Aleksandra III (1881-1894 gg.). Kiev, 1901.
科罗利科夫,K.《亚历山大三世皇帝的生平与统治(1881-1894 年)》。基辅,1901 年。

Kraevskii, G. Mirovaia-tranzitnaia sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga. Irkutsk, 1898.
克拉耶夫斯基,G.《世界性西伯利亚大铁路》。伊尔库茨克,1898 年。

Krahmer, G. Sibirien und die große sibirische Eisenbahn. Leipzig, 1897.
克拉默,G.《西伯利亚与大西伯利亚铁路》。莱比锡,1897 年。

Kropotkin, Peter. Memoirs of a Revolutionist. Cambridge, Mass., 1930.
克鲁泡特金,彼得。《一个革命者的回忆录》。马萨诸塞州剑桥,1930 年。

Krzhizhanovskii, G. M., and P. S. Osadchii, eds. Problema sibirskoi sverkhmagistrali. Moscow, 1929.
克日扎诺夫斯基,G. M. 与 P. S. 奥萨奇合编。《西伯利亚超级干线问题》。莫斯科,1929 年。

Kulomzin, A. N. [A.-N. de Koulomzine]. Le Transsibérien. Trans. Jules Legras. Paris, 1904.
库洛姆津,A. N. [A.-N. 德·库洛姆津]。《西伯利亚大铁路》。朱尔·勒格拉译。巴黎,1904 年。

Kuprin, A. I. “Pamiati Chekhova.” In Polnoe sobranie sochinenii A. I. Kuprina, vol. 7. St. Petersburg, 1912.
库普林,A. I. 《纪念契诃夫》。收录于《A. I. 库普林全集》第 7 卷。圣彼得堡,1912 年。

Kuropatkin, A. N. The Russian Army and the Japanese War. Ed. E. D. Swinton. Trans. A. B. Lindsay. Vol. 1. London, 1909.
库罗帕特金,A. N. 《俄国军队与日俄战争》。E. D. 斯温顿编。A. B. 林赛译。第 1 卷。伦敦,1909 年。

Lamzdorf, V. N. Dnevnik, 1891-1892. Moscow/Leningrad, 1934.
拉姆兹多夫,V.N.《日记,1891-1892 年》。莫斯科/列宁格勒,1934 年。

——. Dnevnik V. N. Lamzdorfa (1886-1890). Moscow/Leningrad, 1926.
——.《V.N.拉姆兹多夫日记(1886-1890 年)》。莫斯科/列宁格勒,1926 年。

Lansdell, Henry. Through Siberia. Vol. 1. Boston, 1882.
兰斯德尔,亨利。《穿越西伯利亚》第 1 卷。波士顿,1882 年。

Legras, Jules. En Sibérie. Paris, 1899.
勒格拉,朱尔。《在西伯利亚》。巴黎,1899 年。

Lindener, B. A. Raboty rossiiskoi akademii nauk v oblasti issledovaniia prirodnykh bogatstv Rossii: Obzor deiatel’nosti KEPS za 1915-1921 gg. Petrograd, 1922.
林德纳,B. A. 《俄罗斯科学院关于俄罗斯自然资源研究的工作:1915-1921 年 KEPS 活动概览》。彼得格勒,1922 年。
Liubimov, L. N. “Iz zhizni inzhenera putei soobshcheniia.” Russkaia starina 156 (September and December 1913): 448-463, 651-679.
柳比莫夫,L. N. 《交通工程师生活片段》。俄罗斯古迹 156(1913 年 9 月及 12 月):448-463,651-679。

Lugovskii, L. “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga.” In Kalendar’ tobol’skoi gubernii na 1892 god. Tobol’sk, 1892.
卢戈夫斯基,L. 《西伯利亚铁路》。载于《1892 年托博尔斯克省年鉴》。托博尔斯克,1892 年。
Martynov, E. I. Rabota nashikh zheleznodorozhnykh del’tsov v Manchzhurii. Moscow, 1914.
马尔蒂诺夫,E.I. 《我国铁路企业家在满洲的活动》。莫斯科,1914 年。

Materialy k k kk istorii voprosa o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge. Supplement to Zheleznodorozhnoe delo, 1891, no. 16.
《西伯利亚铁路问题历史资料》。《铁路事业》增刊,1891 年,第 16 期。

Matiunin, N. “Nashi sosedy na krainem Vostoke.” Vestnik Evropy, July 1887, no. 7: 64-88.
马秋宁,N. 《我们在远东的邻居》.《欧洲导报》,1887 年 7 月,第 7 期:64-88 页。

Mel’nik, I. S., ed. Sibir’: Eia sovremennoe sostoianie i eia nuzhdy: Sbornik statei. St. Petersburg, 1908.
梅利尼克,I.S. 编。《西伯利亚:其当代状况与需求:文章汇编》。圣彼得堡,1908 年。

Mendeleev, D. I. Problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiia Rossii. Ed. V. P. Kirichenko. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1960.
门捷列夫,D.I. 《俄国经济发展问题》。V.P.基里琴科编。莫斯科:社会经济文献出版社,1960 年。

——, ed. Ural’skaia zheleznaia promyshlennost’ v 1899 g. St. Petersburg, 1900.
《乌拉尔钢铁工业 1899 年》,圣彼得堡,1900 年。(编者不详)

Miliutin, D. A. Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina. 4 vols. Moscow, 1947-1950.
米柳京,D. A. 《D. A. 米柳京日记》. 共 4 卷. 莫斯科,1947-1950 年。

Miropiev, M. A. O polozhenii russkikh inorodtsev. St. Petersburg: Sinodal’naia Tipografiia, 1901.
米罗皮耶夫,M. A. 《论俄罗斯异族人的处境》. 圣彼得堡:教会印刷局,1901 年。

Neskol’ko slov po voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge. 2d ed. Moscow, 1882.
《关于西伯利亚铁路问题的几点意见》(第二版),莫斯科,1882 年。

Nikitin, S. “Uspekhi geologicheskikh znanii za 1892-1893 goda.” Ezhegodnik imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, 1896, no. 6: 1-68.
尼基京,S. 《1892-1893 年间地质学知识的进展》。俄罗斯帝国地理学会年鉴,1896 年,第 6 期:1-68 页。

O napravlenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi (Publichnye preniia v obshchestve dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle). St. Petersburg, 1870.
《关于西伯利亚铁路走向的讨论(俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会公开辩论会)》。圣彼得堡,1870 年。

Ostrovskii, N. K voprosu o zheleznykh dorogakh v Sibiri. Perm’, 1880.
奥斯特洛夫斯基,N. 《关于西伯利亚铁路问题的探讨》。彼尔姆,1880 年。

Otchet o zasedaniiakh obshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle, po voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge. St. Petersburg, 1884.
《俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会关于西伯利亚铁路问题会议记录报告》。圣彼得堡,1884 年。

Petrov, N. Finansovoe polozhenie russkoi zheleznodorozhnoi seti i glavneishie prichiny ukhudsheniia ego v poslednie gody. Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi osoboi vysshei komissii dlia vsestoronnego issledovaniia zheleznodorozhnogo dela v Rossii, vol. 5. St. Petersburg, 1909.
彼得罗夫,N.《俄国铁路网财政状况及近年恶化的主要原因》。俄国铁路事务全面调查最高特别委员会著作集,第 5 卷。圣彼得堡,1909 年。

Pobedonostsev, K. P. L’Autocratie russe: Mémoires politiques, correspondance officielle et documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire du règne de l’empereur Alexandre III de Russie. Paris, 1927.
波别多诺斯采夫,K. P. 《俄罗斯专制制度:政治回忆录、官方通信及与沙皇亚历山大三世统治历史相关的未公开文件》. 巴黎,1927 年。

_-. Pis’ma Pobedonostseva k Aleksandru III. 2 vols. Moscow, 1925, 1926.
佚名。《波别多诺斯采夫致亚历山大三世书信集》。2 卷。莫斯科,1925 年、1926 年。

Poggenpol, M. Ocherk vozniknoveniia i deiatel’nosti dobrovol’nogo flota za vremia XXV-ti letniago ego sushchestvovaniia. St. Petersburg, 1903.
波格根波尔,M.《志愿舰队成立二十五年活动概况》。圣彼得堡,1903 年。

Polovtsov, A. A. Dnevnik gosudarstvennogo sekretaria A. A. Polovtsova. 2 vols. Moscow: Nauka, 1966.
波洛夫措夫,A.A.《国家秘书 A.A.波洛夫措夫日记》两卷本。莫斯科:科学出版社,1966 年。

Polozhenie tserkovnogo i shkol’nogo stroitel’stva v raione sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi na sredstva fonda imeni imperatora Aleksandra III k 1 ianvaria 1900 goda. St. Petersburg, 1900.
关于西伯利亚铁路沿线地区利用亚历山大三世基金进行教堂与学校建设情况的报告(截至 1900 年 1 月 1 日)。圣彼得堡,1900 年。

Popov, I. I. Minuvshee i perezhitoe: Vospominaniia za 50 let:Sibir’ i emigratsiia. Leningrad: Kolos, 1924.
波波夫,I. I.《往事与经历:五十年回忆录:西伯利亚与流亡岁月》。列宁格勒:科洛斯出版社,1924 年。

Po povodu prenii o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge v obshchestvakh sodeistviia russkoi torgovle i promyshlennosti [sic] i geograficheskom (Peredovye stat’i S.-Peterburgskikh vedomostei). St. Petersburg, 1870.
关于俄罗斯贸易与工业促进协会及地理学会中西伯利亚铁路辩论的若干意见(摘自《圣彼得堡新闻》社论)。圣彼得堡,1870 年。
Pos’et, K. N. “Prekrashchenie ssylki v Sibir’ (Zapiska K. N. Pos’eta).” Russkaia starina 99 (July 1899): 51-59.
波谢特,K.N. 《停止向西伯利亚流放(K.N.波谢特笔记)》. 《俄罗斯古风》第 99 期(1899 年 7 月):51-59 页。

Potanin, G. N. [Gr. P——n]. Ocherk proektov zheleznodorozhnogo stroitel’stva v v vv Sibiri. St. Petersburg, 1910.
波塔宁,G.N. [笔名 Gr. P——n]. 《西伯利亚铁路建设方案概述》. 圣彼得堡,1910 年。
Propper, S. M. von. Was nicht in die Zeitung kam: Erinnerungen des Chefredakteurs der “Birszhewyja Wedomosti.” Frankfurt am Main, 1929.
普罗佩尔,S. M. 冯.《未刊报章:〈交易所新闻〉主编回忆录》。美因河畔法兰克福,1929 年。

Radziwill, Catherine. Memories of Forty Years. London, 1914.
拉齐维尔,凯瑟琳。《四十年的回忆》。伦敦,1914 年。

Razumov, N. I. Zabaikal’e: Svod materialov vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi komissii dlia issledovaniia mestnogo zemlevladeniia i zemlepol’zovaniia, pod predsedatel’stvom stats-sekretaria Kulomzina. St. Petersburg, 1899.
拉祖莫夫,N.I.《外贝加尔地区:由国务秘书库洛姆津主持的本地土地占有与土地使用调查委员会材料汇编》。圣彼得堡,1899 年。

Russia. Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii. Sobranie tret’e, 1881-1913. St. Petersburg, 1885-1916.
俄罗斯帝国。《俄罗斯帝国法律全集·第三辑(1881-1913 年)》。圣彼得堡,1885-1916 年。

Russia, General’nyi Shtab. Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii. 64 vols. Moscow/St. Petersburg, 1883-1896.
俄罗斯,总参谋部。《亚洲地理、地形及统计资料汇编》。64 卷。莫斯科/圣彼得堡,1883-1896 年。

Russia, Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Prilozheniia k k kk stenograficheskim otchetam. Tretii sozyv. Sessiia 1-4. St. Petersburg, 1908-1911.
俄罗斯帝国国家杜马。《第三届会议速记报告附件(第 1-4 次会议)》。圣彼得堡,1908-1911 年。

-. Stenograficheskie otchety. Vtoroi sozyv. 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1907.
《速记报告·第二届杜马》第 2 卷,圣彼得堡,1907 年。

-. Stenograficheskie otchety. Tretii sozyv. Sessiia pervaia. 3 vols. St. Petersburg, 1908.
《速记报告·第三届杜马第一次会议》第 3 卷,圣彼得堡,1908 年。

Russia, Komitet Ministrov. Aperçu de l’histoire de la colonisation en Sibérie. Paris, 1900.
俄罗斯,部长委员会。《西伯利亚殖民史概览》。巴黎,1900 年。

_-. The Great Siberian Railway. St. Petersburg, 1900.
佚名。《伟大的西伯利亚铁路》。圣彼得堡,1900 年。

Russia, Komitet Sibirskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi. Otchety po komitetu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi. [St. Petersburg, 1893-1897.] BAN, Leningrad.
俄罗斯,西伯利亚铁路委员会。《西伯利亚铁路委员会报告》。[圣彼得堡,1893-1897 年]。列宁格勒,BAN。

Russia, Ministerstvo Finansov. Ministerstvo finansov, 1802-1902. 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1902.
俄罗斯,财政部。《财政部,1802-1902》。2 卷。圣彼得堡,1902 年。

_-, Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur. Sibir’ i velikaia sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga. Ed. V. I. Kovalevskii and P. P. Semenov. 2d ed. St. Petersburg, 1896.
俄罗斯,贸易与制造业部。《西伯利亚与伟大的西伯利亚铁路》。由 V. I. 科瓦列夫斯基和 P. P. 谢苗诺夫编辑。第 2 版。圣彼得堡,1896 年。

-, Departament Zheleznodorozhnykh Del. Kratkii otchet o deiatel’nosti tarifnykh uchrezhdenii i departamenta zheleznodorozhnykh del za 18891913 gg. St. Petersburg, 1914.
俄罗斯,铁路事务部。《1889-1913 年间关税机构与铁路事务部活动简况报告》。圣彼得堡,1914 年。

Russia, Ministerstvo Putei Soobshcheniia. Istoricheskii ocherk raznykh otraslei zheleznodorozhnogo dela i razvitiia finansovo-ekonomicheskoi storony zheleznykh dorog v Rossii po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no. Comp. V. M. Verkhovskii. St. Petersburg, 1901.
俄罗斯,交通部。《铁路事务各领域及俄国铁路财务经济发展历史概述(截至 1897 年)》。编者:V·M·维尔霍夫斯基。圣彼得堡,1901 年。

_-. Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no. Comp. V. M. Verkhovskii. 2 pts. St. Petersburg, 1898, 1899.
《俄国铁路自建立至 1897 年发展历史概述》。编者:V·M·维尔霍夫斯基。两卷本。圣彼得堡,1898 年、1899 年。

_-. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia i deiatel’nosti vedomstva putei soobshcheniia za sto let ego sushchestvovaniia (1798-1898 gg.). St. Petersburg, 1898.
《交通部百年(1798-1898 年)存续期间发展及活动简史》。圣彼得堡,1898 年。

——. Sooruzhenie sredne-sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi, 1893-1898 g.: Sbornik tekhnicheskikh uslovii, instruktsii i poiasnitel’nykh zapisok. St. Petersburg, 1901. LIIZhT, Leningrad.
《中西伯利亚铁路建设(1893-1898 年):技术条件、施工说明及解释性备忘录汇编》。圣彼得堡,1901 年。藏于列宁格勒铁道运输学院图书馆。

-, Otdel Statistiki i Kartografii. Rechnoi flot (parovoi i neparovoi) aziatskoi Rossii. St. Petersburg, 1901.
-, 统计与制图部。《亚洲俄罗斯的河运船队(蒸汽与非蒸汽)》。圣彼得堡,1901 年。

-, Upravlenie Sibirskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi, Kommercheskaia Chast’ . Obzor kommercheskoi deiatel’nosti sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi (za 1909 god po
-, 西伯利亚铁路管理局,商业部。《西伯利亚铁路商业活动概览(1909 年度报告)》

sravneniiu s predydushchimi godami desiatiletiia 1900-1909 gg.). Tomsk, 1910.
与 1900-1909 十年间的前几年相比)。托木斯克,1910 年。
Russia, Narodnyi Komissariat Putei Soobshcheniia, Postoiannoe Soveshchanie po Nadzoru i Otsenke Rabot Zheleznodorozhnogo, Vodnogo i Mestnogo Transporta. Zheleznye dorogi sibirskogo okruga putei soobshcheniia. Moscow, 1923.
俄罗斯,人民交通委员会,铁路、水路及地方运输工作监督与评估常设会议。《西伯利亚交通区铁路》。莫斯科,1923 年。

Russia, Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie.Aziatskaia Rossiia. 3 vols. St. Petersburg, 1914.
俄罗斯,移民管理局。《亚洲俄罗斯》。三卷本。圣彼得堡,1914 年。
The Russian Government’s Plan of Future Railroad Construction. New York: Youroveta Home & Foreign Trade Co., 1918.
俄国政府未来铁路建设计划。纽约:尤罗维塔国内外贸易公司,1918 年。

Russkie vedomosti. No. 2 (January 3, 1893).
《俄罗斯公报》。第 2 期(1893 年 1 月 3 日)。

Sabler, S. V., and I. V. Sosnovskii, comps. Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk. Ed. A. N. Kulomzin. St. Petersburg, 1903.
萨布勒,S.V.与索斯诺夫斯基,I.V.合编。《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概述》。库洛姆津,A.N.主编。圣彼得堡,1903 年。

S.-Peterburgskii Birzhevyi Komitet. Zametka k k kk voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge. St. Petersburg, 1884.
圣彼得堡交易所委员会。《关于西伯利亚铁路问题的札记》。圣彼得堡,1884 年。

Scott, John. Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia’s City of Steel. Cambridge, Mass., 1942.
斯科特,约翰。《乌拉尔山背后:一位美国工人在俄罗斯钢铁之城的岁月》。马萨诸塞州剑桥,1942 年。

Semennikov, V. P., ed. Za kulisami tsarizma: Arkhiv tibetskogo vracha Badmaeva. Leningrad, 1925.
谢苗尼科夫,V.P.编。《沙皇制度的幕后:藏医巴德玛耶夫档案》。列宁格勒,1925 年。

Shmukker, M. M. Finansy kazennoi seti zheleznykh dorog Rossii v sviazi s biudzhetom (1890-1913 g.) Vol’sk, 1918.
什穆克尔,M.M.《俄罗斯国有铁路财政与预算关系研究(1890-1913 年)》。沃尔斯克,1918 年。

. Ocherki finansov i ekonomiki zheleznodorozhnogo transporta Rossii za 1913-1922 gody. Moscow, 1923.
《1913-1922 年俄罗斯铁路运输经济与财政概览》。莫斯科,1923 年。

Shul’gin, V. V. The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 19061917. Trans. Tanya Davis. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984.
舒利金,V.V.《岁月:一位俄罗斯杜马成员的回忆录,1906-1917》。谭雅·戴维斯译。纽约:河马出版社,1984 年。
Sibirskoe Biuro pri Sovete S"ezdov Predstavitelei Birzhevoi Torgovli i Sel’skogo Khoziaistva. Plan zheleznodorozhnogo stroitel’stva v Sibiri na blizhaishee desiatiletie. Petrograd, January 1917.
西伯利亚交易所贸易与农业代表大会代表委员会西伯利亚分会。《西伯利亚近期十年铁路建设计划》。彼得格勒,1917 年 1 月。

Sil’nitskii, A. Kul’turnoe vliianie ussuriiskoi zheleznoi dorogi na iuzhnoussuriiskii krai. Khabarovsk, 1901.
西尔尼茨基,A. 《乌苏里铁路对南乌苏里边疆区的文化影响》。哈巴罗夫斯克,1901 年。

Skal’kovskii, K. A. Les Ministres des finances de la Russie, 1802-1890. Paris, 1891.
斯卡利科夫斯基,K.A.《俄罗斯财政大臣,1802-1890》。巴黎,1891 年。

-. Nashi gosudarstvennye i obshchestvennye deiateli. St. Petersburg, 1890.
《我国国家与社会活动家》。圣彼得堡,1890 年。

_-. Russkaia torgovlia v Tikhom okeane. St. Petersburg, 1883.
《俄罗斯在太平洋的贸易》。圣彼得堡,1883 年。

_-. Vneshniaia politika Rossii i polozhenie inostrannykh derzhav. 2d ed. St. Petersburg, 1901.
《俄罗斯的外交政策与外国列强地位》(第二版)。圣彼得堡,1901 年。

Snodgrass, John H. Russia: A Handbook on Commercial and Industrial Conditions. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Special Consular Reports, no. 61. Washington, D.C., 1913.
斯诺德格拉斯,约翰·H.《俄罗斯:商业与工业状况手册》。美国商务部,国内外贸易局,特别领事报告,第 61 号。华盛顿特区,1913 年。

Snow, George E., ed. and trans. “The Years 1881-1894 in Russia: A Memorandum Found in the Papers of N. Kh. Bunge. A Translation and Commentary.” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 71, pt. 6 (1981).
斯诺,乔治·E. 编译。“1881-1894 年的俄罗斯:在 N·Kh·本格文件中发现的备忘录。译文与评论。”《美国哲学学会会刊》第 71 卷第 6 部分(1981 年)。

Sobolev, M. N. Ekonomicheskoe znachenie sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi. Tomsk, 1900.
索博列夫,M·N.《西伯利亚铁路的经济意义》。托木斯克,1900 年。
Sovet Moskovskogo Otdeleniia Obshchestva dlia Sodeistviia Russkoi Promyshlennosti i Torgovle. Otkuda nachat’ postroiku sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi iv vide-li nepreryvnoi linii ili pereryvchatoi? Moscow, 1891.
莫斯科分会促进俄罗斯工业与贸易协会理事会。《西伯利亚铁路应从哪里开始修建?是作为连续线路还是间断线路?》。莫斯科,1891 年。

The Status of the Private Railroad Business in Russia. New York: Youroveta Home & Foreign Trade Co., 1918.
俄国私营铁路业现状。纽约:尤罗维塔国内外贸易公司,1918 年。

Subbotich, D. I. Amurskaia zheleznaia doroga i nasha politika na Dal’nem Vostoke. St. Petersburg, 1908.
苏博季奇,D.I. 《阿穆尔铁路与我们在远东的政策》。圣彼得堡,1908 年。

Tanera, Karl. Zur Kriegszeit auf der sibirischen Bahn und durch Rußland. Berlin, 1905.
塔内拉,卡尔.《战时西伯利亚铁路与穿越俄罗斯之旅》。柏林,1905 年。

Terner, F. G. Vospominaniia zhizni. 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1910, 1911.
特纳,F.G. 《生活回忆录》(两卷本)。圣彼得堡,1910 年、1911 年。

Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa: Dnevnik A. V. Bogdanovich. Moscow/Leningrad, 1924.
末代三沙皇:A·V·波格丹诺维奇日记。莫斯科/列宁格勒,1924 年。
Trotsky, L. D. “O Sibiri.” Severnaia Aziia 3 (1927): 5-17.
托洛茨基,L.D. 《关于西伯利亚》。北亚 3 (1927): 5-17.

Trudy kommissii [sic] imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo obshchestva po voprosu o zheleznoi doroge cherez vsiu Sibir’, 1889-1890 gg. 41 vols. St. Petersburg, 1890.
俄罗斯帝国技术学会西伯利亚大铁路问题委员会论文集,1889-1890 年。共 41 卷。圣彼得堡,1890 年。

Trudy obshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle.
俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会论文集。

Ukhtomskii, Esper Esperovich. Puteshestvie na Vostok ego imperatorskogo vysochestva gosudaria naslednika tsesarevicha, 1890-1891. 3 vols., 6 pts. St. Petersburg, 1893-1897.
乌赫托姆斯基,埃斯佩尔·埃斯佩罗维奇。《1890-1891 年皇太子殿下东方之旅》。3 卷 6 册。圣彼得堡,1893-1897 年。

United States, Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Statistics. The Russian Empire and the Trans-Siberian Railway. Washington, D.C., 1899.
美国财政部统计局。《俄罗斯帝国与西伯利亚大铁路》。华盛顿特区,1899 年。

Unterberger, P. F. Primorskaia oblast’, 1856-1898 g.g. Zapiski imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki, vol. 8, no. 2. St. Petersburg, 1900.
翁特尔贝格,P.F.。《滨海边疆区,1856-1898 年》。俄罗斯帝国地理学会统计部笔记,第 8 卷第 2 期。圣彼得堡,1900 年。

Velikii put’: Vidy Sibiri i eia zheleznykh dorog. Krasnoiarsk, 1899.
《伟大之路:西伯利亚及其铁路风貌》。克拉斯诺亚尔斯克,1899 年。

Volkov, O napravlenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi: Zapiska upolnomochennogo ot ufimskogo gubernskogo zemstva i goroda Ufy, ufimskogo gorodskogo golovy Volkova. St. Petersburg, 1884.
沃尔科夫,《论西伯利亚铁路走向:乌法省地方自治局及乌法市全权代表、乌法市市长沃尔科夫备忘录》。圣彼得堡,1884 年。

-. Zapiska upolnomochennogo ot ufimskogo gubernskogo zemstva i g. Ufy, ufimskogo gorodskogo golovy Volkova: K voprosu o napravlenii sibirskoi dorogi. N.p., 1882.
- 《乌法省地方自治局及乌法市全权代表、乌法市市长沃尔科夫备忘录:关于西伯利亚铁路走向问题》。无出版地,1882 年。

Voloshinov, N. A. [M. V-"], Neskol’ko slov o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge. St. Petersburg, 1890.
沃洛希诺夫,N.A. [M.V-"],《关于西伯利亚铁路的几点意见》。圣彼得堡,1890 年。

. “Zhelezno-dorozhnaia razvedka mezhdu Angaroi i severnoiu okonechnost’iu Baikala.” Izvestiia vostochno-sibirskogo otdela imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva 20, no. 5 (1889): 1-14.
《安加拉河与贝加尔湖北端之间的铁路勘探》。《帝俄地理学会东西伯利亚分会学报》第 20 卷第 5 期(1889 年):1-14 页。

Volpicelli, Zenone [Vladimir]. Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway. London, 1899.
沃尔皮切利,泽诺内 [弗拉基米尔]。《太平洋上的俄罗斯与西伯利亚铁路》。伦敦,1899 年。

Vostrotin, S. V. Severnyi morskoi put’ i cheliabinskii tarifnyi perelom v sviazi s kolonizatsiei Sibiri. St. Petersburg, 1908.
沃斯特罗京,S. V.。《北方海路与车里雅宾斯克关税转折点及西伯利亚殖民》。圣彼得堡,1908 年。

Wallace, Donald Mackenzie. Russia on the Eve of War and Revolution. Ed. Cyril E. Black. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
华莱士,唐纳德·麦肯齐。《战争与革命前夕的俄罗斯》。西里尔·E·布莱克编。普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,1984 年。
Wellington, Arthur M. The Economic Theory of the Location of Railways. New York, 1877.
威灵顿,亚瑟·M.。《铁路选址的经济理论》。纽约,1877 年。
Witte, S. Iu. Printsipy zheleznodorozhnykh tarifov po perevozke gruzov. 3d ed.
维特,S. Yu.《铁路货运费率原则》。第三版。

St. Petersburg, 1910.  圣彼得堡,1910 年。
. Samoderzhavie i zemstvo: Konfidentsial’ naia zapiska ministra finansov stats-sekretaria S. Iu. Witte (1899 g.). 2d ed. Stuttgart, 1903.
《专制与地方自治:财政大臣国务秘书 S. Yu. 维特机密备忘录(1899 年)》。第二版。斯图加特,1903 年。

“A Secret Memorandum of Sergei Witte on the Industrialization of Russia.” Ed. and trans. Theodore H. Von Laue. Journal of Modern History 26 (March 1954): 60-74.
“谢尔盖·维特关于俄罗斯工业化的秘密备忘录”,由西奥多·H·冯·劳厄编辑并翻译。《现代史杂志》第 26 期(1954 年 3 月):60-74 页。

. Vorlesungen über Volks- und Staatswirtschaft. Trans. Josef Melnik. 2 vols. Stuttgart/Berlin, 1913.
《国民经济学与国家经济学讲义》。约瑟夫·梅尔尼克译。2 卷本。斯图加特/柏林,1913 年。

_-. Vospominaniia. 3 vols. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1960.
《回忆录》(三卷本)。莫斯科:社会经济文献出版社,1960 年。

Wright, Richardson C., and Bassett Digby. Through Siberia, an Empire in the Making. New York, 1913.
赖特,理查森·C.与巴西特·迪格比。《穿越西伯利亚:一个正在形成的帝国》。纽约,1913 年。

Index  索引

Abaza, А. А., 3, 6, 67-69, 72-73, 85-86, 103, 106, 134
阿巴扎,А. А.,第 3、6、67-69、72-73、85-86、103、106、134 页

Afghan crisis, 32-34  阿富汗危机,第 32-34 页
Agriculture, Ministry of, 133, 152, 161
农业部,第 133、152、161 页

Agriculture and livestock, 18-21, 63, 78, 207-8, 210, 212-13
农业与畜牧业,第 18-21、63、78、207-8、210、212-13 页

Akmolinsk oblast, 53, 162
阿克莫林斯克州,第 53、162 页

Alexander II, 4, 6, 133
亚历山大二世,第 4、6、133 页

Alexander III, 1, 4, 21, 72-74, 85, 94-95, 99 , 104 , 106 7 , 111 12 , 117 , 120 , 122 99 , 104 , 106 7 , 111 12 , 117 , 120 , 122 99,104,106-7,111-12,117,120,12299,104,106-7,111-12,117,120,122, 135-36, 138n, 139, 158, 166, 220; economic policy of, 10 , 46 , 53 54 10 , 46 , 53 54 10,46,53-5410,46,53-54; Siberian policy of, 52-54
亚历山大三世,1, 4, 21, 72-74, 85, 94-95, 99 , 104 , 106 7 , 111 12 , 117 , 120 , 122 99 , 104 , 106 7 , 111 12 , 117 , 120 , 122 99,104,106-7,111-12,117,120,12299,104,106-7,111-12,117,120,122 , 135-36, 138n, 139, 158, 166, 220;其经济政策, 10 , 46 , 53 54 10 , 46 , 53 54 10,46,53-5410,46,53-54 ;其西伯利亚政策,52-54

American West, 145n, 160, 170
美国西部,第 145n、160、170 页

Amur oblast, 14-16, 53, 154, 164-65
阿穆尔州,第 14-16、53、154、164-65 页

Amur Railroad, 174, 205, 216
阿穆尔铁路,第 174、205、216 页

Amur River, 25-26, 37, 64, 145
阿穆尔河,25-26、37、64、145 页

Annenkov, M. N., 34, 99, 107-11, 134
安年科夫,M.N.,34、99、107-11、134 页

Anuchin, D. G., 42, 44
阿努钦,D.G.,42、44 页

Badmaev, P. A., 138n
巴德玛耶夫,P.A.,138 页注

Baikal, Lake, 24-25, 146, 171-72, 202-3
贝加尔湖,24-25 页,146 页,171-72 页,202-3 页

Baikal-Amur Main Line (BAM), 27n, 81n, 161, 205-6, 224
贝加尔-阿穆尔铁路干线(BAM),27 页注,81 页注,161 页,205-6 页,224 页

Bakunin, M. A., 47
巴枯宁,M. A.,47 页

Barabash, Ia. F., 37, 43
巴拉巴什,Ia. F.,37 页,43 页

Baranov Commission, 71-72, 99
巴拉诺夫委员会,71-72, 99

Beg, Yakub, 35  伯克,雅库布,35
Beveridge, Albert, 93  贝弗里奇,阿尔伯特,93
Bismarck, Otto von, 4, 10, 154
奥托·冯·俾斯麦,4, 10, 154

Bogdanovich, E. V., 59, 61, 87
E·V·波格丹诺维奇,59, 61, 87

Borzunov, V. F., 2n
博尔祖诺夫,V. F.,2n

Boxer Rebellion, 172-73, 201
义和团运动,172-73, 201

Briansk Ironworks, 149-50
布良斯克钢铁厂,149-50
Bunge, V. Kh., 75, 86, 95, 119, 128, 132, 135-36, 154, 159
本格,V. Kh.,75 页,86 页,95 页,119 页,128 页,132 页,135-36 页,154 页,159 页
Canadian-Pacific Railroad, 33, 176. See also Railroads: foreign
加拿大太平洋铁路,33, 176。另见铁路:外国

Catherine II (the Great), 46-47, 69, 220
叶卡捷琳娜二世(大帝),46-47 页,69 页,220 页

Central Siberian Railroad, 171-72, 17980
中西伯利亚铁路,171-72 页,17980 年

Chekhov, Anton, 14, 23-24, 50, 51n
契诃夫,安东,14, 23-24, 50, 51n

Cheliabinsk tariff break, 166-68
车里雅宾斯克关税优惠,166-68 页

Chikhachev, N. M., 146, 201
奇哈乔夫,N. M.,第 146、201 页

China: and England, 16, 34; and Russia, 28, 35-39, 42-45, 221; trade with, 2021, 30, 213
中国:与英格兰的关系,16, 34;与俄罗斯的关系,28, 35-39, 42-45, 221;贸易往来,2021, 30, 213

Chinese-Eastern Railroad, 42-45, 138n, 174, 205, 214-15, 221
中东铁路,第 42-45、138n、174、205、214-15、221 页

Chuprov, A. I., 63
丘普罗夫,A. I.,第 63 页

Circumbaikal Railroad, 172-73, 201-3, 205
环贝加尔铁路,172-73 页,201-3 页,205 页

Collins, P. M., 32
柯林斯,P. M.,32 页

Committee for Construction of St. Petersburg-Moscow Railroad, 132-33
圣彼得堡-莫斯科铁路建设委员会,132-33

Committee of Ministers, 34, 66, 85, 96, 104, 106-7, 109-10, 132
大臣委员会,34, 66, 85, 96, 104, 106-7, 109-10, 132

Committee of the Far East, 140
远东委员会,第 140 页

Committee of the Siberian Railroad, 114, 140-69, 193, 200, 213, 218, 222, 225; formation of, 131-33, 136; and Nicholas II, 135-36, 139, 153, 158, 159
西伯利亚铁路委员会,第 114、140-69、193、200、213、218、222、225 页;其成立,第 131-33、136 页;与尼古拉二世的关系,第 135-36、139、153、158、159 页

Congress of Berlin, 3-4
柏林会议,3-4 页

Construction contractors, 188-90
建筑承包商,188-90 页

Cossacks, 16-18, 162, 165
哥萨克人,16-18 页,162 页,165 页

Council for Railroad Affairs, 7
铁路事务委员会,7

Crimean War, 3, 31, 41, 57
克里米亚战争,3 页,31 页,41 页,57 页
Dal’stroi, 153  达利斯特洛伊,153 页
Decauville, P., 110-11  德科维尔,P.,110-11 页
Duportal, M., 110  杜波塔尔,M.,110 页
Durnovo, I. N., 134-35, 156-58
杜尔诺沃,I. N.,134-35 页,156-58 页

Eastern Siberian general governorship, 16 , 16 n , 48 , 53 16 , 16 n , 48 , 53 16,16 n,48,5316,16 n, 48,53
东西伯利亚总督府, 16 , 16 n , 48 , 53 16 , 16 n , 48 , 53 16,16 n,48,5316,16 n, 48,53

Ekaterinburg-Tiumen’ Railroad, 76, 86
叶卡捷琳堡-秋明铁路,76, 86 页

Emperor Alexander III Fund, 168-69
亚历山大三世皇帝基金,168-69 页

England: and China, 16, 34; and Russia, 28, 31-34
英格兰:与中国的关系,16, 34;与俄罗斯的关系,28, 31-34

Enisei province, 53, 209-10
叶尼塞省,53, 209-10 页

Ermolov, A. S., 133, 159
叶尔莫洛夫,A. S.,第 133、159 页

Evtiugin, Capt., 38-39  叶夫秋金上尉,第 38-39 页
Exiles, 15-16, 182, 186
流放者,第 15-16、182、186 页
Famine (1891-1892), 102, 110, 112, 130
饥荒(1891-1892 年),第 102、110、112、130 页

Filippov, T. E., 85, 97, 193
菲利波夫,T. E.,85, 97, 193

Finance, Ministry of, 3, 194, 220; vs. Ministry of Transport, 70-71, 98, 100-102, 113. See also Abaza, A. A.; Bunge, V. Kh.; Greig, S. A.; Kankrin, E. F.; Reutern, M. Kh.; Vyshnegradskii, I. A.; Witte, S. Iu.
财政部,3, 194, 220;与交通部之争,70-71, 98, 100-102, 113。另见阿巴扎,A. A.;本格,V. Kh.;格雷格,S. A.;坎克林,E. F.;罗伊特恩,M. Kh.;维什涅格拉茨基,I. A.;维特,S. Iu.

France, 107-12, 129  法国,107-12, 129
Garbutt, P. E., 2n  加伯特,P. E.,2n
General Staff, 27, 31, 36-37. See also Barabash, Ia. F.; Evtiugin, Capt.; Manchuria; Voloshinov, N. A.
总参谋部,第 27、31、36-37 页。另见巴拉巴什,雅·F.;叶夫秋金上尉;满洲;沃洛希诺夫,N·A.

Gerschenkron, Alexander, 113, 223
格申克龙,亚历山大,第 113、223 页

Giers, N. K., 38, 42
吉尔斯,N·K.,第 38、42 页

Giubbenet, A. I., 100-102, 104-6, 109-10, 131, 144
久边涅特,A·I.,第 100-102、104-6、109-10、131、144 页

Gold mining. See Siberia: metallurgy in
金矿开采。参见西伯利亚:冶金业

Gorchakov, P. D., 49
戈尔恰科夫,P. D.,49

Goremykin, I. L., 135, 157, 159
戈列梅金,I. L.,135, 157, 159

Grange movement, 86n  格兰其运动,86n
Gregory, Paul R., 223
格雷戈里,保罗·R.,223

Greig, S. A., 3
格雷格,S. A.,3

Grinevetskii, V. I., 225-26n
格里涅韦茨基,V. I.,225-26n

Gurko, V. I., 127-28, 139
古尔科,V. I.,127-28, 139

Herzen, A. I., 47
赫尔岑,A. I.,第 47 页
Iadrintsev, N. M., 50-52, 87, 89-90
亚德林采夫,N. M.,第 50-52、87、89-90 页

Ignat’ev, A. P., 94
伊格纳季耶夫,A. P.,第 94 页

Ili (Kuldja) crisis, 35-36
伊犁(固尔扎)危机,第 35-36 页

Imperial Russian Geographical Society, 61, 105
俄罗斯帝国地理学会,61, 105

Imperial Russian Technological Society, 30 , 105 , 130 , 151 , 175 76 30 , 105 , 130 , 151 , 175 76 30,105,130,151,175-7630,105,130,151,175-76
俄罗斯帝国技术学会, 30 , 105 , 130 , 151 , 175 76 30 , 105 , 130 , 151 , 175 76 30,105,130,151,175-7630,105,130,151,175-76

Interior, Ministry of, 156-59
内政部,156-59

Irkutsk general governorship, 53, 94, 161
伊尔库茨克总督辖区,53、94、161 页
Irkutsk province, 53, 209-10
伊尔库茨克省,第 53、209-10 页

Iron industry, 149-51, 197-98, 211
钢铁工业,第 149-51、197-98、211 页

Izvol’skii, Alexander, 140
亚历山大·伊兹沃尔斯基,第 140 页
Japan, 28-29, 39, 173, 200, 202, 205, 222. See also Russo-Japanese War
日本,28-29, 39, 173, 200, 202, 205, 222。另见俄日战争
Kahan, Arcadius, 215, 223
卡汉,阿卡迪乌斯,215, 223

Kankrin, E. F., 48, 69, 96
坎克林,E. F.,48, 69, 96

Kartamyshev, V. P., 51-52
卡尔塔梅舍夫,V. P.,51-52

Katkov, M. N., 10, 51, 83, 85, 92, 95, 97
卡特科夫,M. N.,10, 51, 83, 85, 92, 95, 97

Kaufman, K. P., 118
考夫曼,K. P.,第 118 页

Kazakhs, 162  哈萨克人,第 162 页
Kazan’ Railroad, 54n  喀山铁路,第 54 页注
Kennan, George, 16, 23
乔治·凯南,第 16、23 页

KEPS, 225n  KEPS,第 225 页注释
Khilkov, M. I., 134, 202-3
希尔科夫,M. I.,第 134 页,第 202-203 页

Konstantin Nikolaevich, Grand Prince, 36, 51, 72
康斯坦丁·尼古拉耶维奇大公,第 36 页,第 51 页,第 72 页

Kopytov, N. V., 42-43
科佩托夫,N. V.,第 42-43 页

Korf, A. N., 27, 37, 94, 96
科尔夫,A. N.,27、37、94、96 页

Krivoshein, A. K., 134
克里沃舍因,A. K.,134 页

Kropotkin, P. A., 26
克鲁泡特金,P. A.,26 页

Kulomzin, A. N., 140, 144, 181
库洛姆津,A. N.,140、144、181 页

Kuropatkin, A. N., 52, 201-2, 204-5
库罗帕特金,A. N.,52,201-2,204-5

Kuznetsk basin, 151-52  库兹涅茨克盆地,151-52
Lamzdorf, V. N., 41-42  拉姆兹多夫,V. N.,41-42
Lenin, V. I., 184-85, 225-26n
列宁,V. I.,184-85,225-26n

Lesueur, C., 110-11  勒苏尔,C.,第 110-11 页
Leuchtenberg, Duke and Duchess of, 110
洛伊希滕贝格公爵及公爵夫人,第 110 页

Li Hung-chang, 36, 39
李鸿章,第 36、39 页

List, Friedrich, 142  弗里德里希·李斯特,第 142 页
Liubimov, I., 61  柳比莫夫,I.,61
Liubimov, L. N., 13-14
柳比莫夫,L. N.,13-14

Loris-Melikov, M. T., 72-73, 85, 135
洛里斯-梅利科夫,M. T.,72-73, 85, 135
Magnitogorsk, 224  马格尼托哥尔斯克,224
Malozemoff, Andrew, 18  安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫,18
Manchuria, 37-38, 42-45  满洲,37-38, 42-45
Manchurian Railroad, 38  满洲铁路,38
Maritime oblast, 14-16, 27, 34, 36-37, 44, 53, 162, 165, 174, 205
滨海边疆区,14-16, 27, 34, 36-37, 44, 53, 162, 165, 174, 205

Matiunin, N., 44  马秋宁,N.,44
Mel’nikov, P. P., 70, 105n
梅利尼科夫,P. P.,70, 105n

Mendeleev, D. I., 69-70
门捷列夫,D. I.,69-70

Merchants, 62n, 125n  商人,62n, 125n
Meshcherskii, V. P., 4, 85, 92-93, 102, 119, 134, 193
梅谢尔斯基,V. P.,第 4、85、92-93、102、119、134、193 页

Migulin, P. P., 211, 215
米古林,P. P.,第 211、215 页

Miliutin, D. A., 36, 71, 72-73
米柳京,D. A.,第 36、71、72-73 页

Moscow, 61-64, 82-83  莫斯科,61-64 页,82-83 页
Moscow-Siberian highway. See Siberia: transport conditions in
莫斯科-西伯利亚公路。参见西伯利亚:交通状况

Murav’ev(-Amurskii), N. N., 16, 25, 31-32, 45 , 48 , 49 45 , 48 , 49 45,48,4945,48,49
穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基,N. N.,16, 25, 31-32, 45 , 48 , 49 45 , 48 , 49 45,48,4945,48,49
Nadezhdinsk Iron and Steel Works, 150
纳杰日金钢铁厂,150

Navy, Ministry of, 135, 146-47
海军部,135、146-47 页

Nicholas I, 47-49, 133, 220-21
尼古拉一世,47-49 页,133 页,220-21 页

Nicholas II, 52, 111, 220; and Asia, 117, 136, 138; and Committee of Siberian Railroad, 135-36, 139, 153, 158, 159; and Witte, 122, 139-40
尼古拉二世,52 页,111 页,220 页;与亚洲的关系,117 页,136 页,138 页;与西伯利亚铁路委员会,135-36 页,139 页,153 页,158 页,159 页;与维特,122 页,139-40 页

Nikolaevsk Railroad, 206, 215
尼古拉耶夫斯克铁路,206 页,215 页

Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Prince, 119
尼古拉·尼古拉耶维奇大公,119 页

Nizhnii-Novgorod, 59-64, 67-68, 74, 78, 82-84
下诺夫哥罗德,59-64 页,67-68 页,74 页,78 页,82-84 页

Northern Sea route, 146-47, 225
北海航线,146-47 页,225 页

Novonikolaevsk, 208  新尼古拉耶夫斯克,208 页
Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime}-Enisei Canal, 24, 76
叶尼塞运河,24 页,76 页

Orenburg, 84  奥伦堡,84
Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad, 205
奥伦堡-塔什干铁路,205

Orientalists (Vostochniki), 136-38
东方学家(东方派),136-38

Ostrovskii, M. N., 85-86, 133
奥斯特洛夫斯基,M. N.,85-86, 133

Ostrovskii, N., 79-80  奥斯特洛夫斯基,N.,第 79-80 页
Panama Canal, 184, 217n
巴拿马运河,第 184 页,第 217 页注释 n

Pauker, G. E., 100-101
保克尔,G. E.,第 100-101 页

Perm’-Kotlas Railroad, 166-67
彼尔姆-科特拉斯铁路,第 166-67 页

Plehve, V. K., 135, 157
普列韦,V.K.,135,157

Pobedonostsev, K. P., 4, 51-52, 72-73, 85, 95, 168
波别多诺斯采夫,K.P.,4,51-52,72-73,85,95,168

Polovtsov, A. A., 51, 72, 96, 100, 102, 110, 150, 201
波洛夫措夫,A.A.,51,72,96,100,102,110,150,201

Polovtsova, N. M., 150
波洛夫措娃,N.M.,150

Pos’et (town), 15, 21, 38-39
波西耶特(城镇),15, 21, 38-39

Pos’et, K. N., 66n, 69-74, 98-100; on Siberia and Siberian Railroad, 13, 53–54, 64-66, 76-77, 80-82, 84, 86
波西耶特,K. N.,66n, 69-74, 98-100;关于西伯利亚及西伯利亚铁路的论述,13, 53–54, 64-66, 76-77, 80-82, 84, 86

Potanin, G. N., 87, 90
波塔宁,G. N.,87, 90

Potemkin, G. A., 118
波将金,G. A.,118

Priamur’e, 15n, 16-17, 19, 31-32, 45, 49, 53, 58-59, 94, 152
阿穆尔地区,15n,16-17,19,31-32,45,49,53,58-59,94,152

Prison labor, 181-84  监狱劳动,181-84
Putilov Co., 149-50  普梯洛夫公司,149-50
Radishchev, A. N., 47
拉季舍夫,A. N.,47

Railroad Affairs, Department of, 7, 101
铁路事务部,7, 101

Railroads: foreign, 1-2, 29-30, 33, 170, 179n, 195, 218; government regulation of, 6 7 , 10 , 98 , 101 6 7 , 10 , 98 , 101 6-7,10,98,1016-7,10,98,101. See also Cheliabinsk tariff break; Finance, Ministry of; Transport, Ministry of; entries for individual railroads
铁路:外资修建,1-2 页,29-30 页,33 页,170 页,179 页注释 n,195 页,218 页;政府监管, 6 7 , 10 , 98 , 101 6 7 , 10 , 98 , 101 6-7,10,98,1016-7,10,98,101 。另见车里雅宾斯克关税优惠;财政部;交通部;各铁路专条
Rashet, V. K., 59, 61
拉谢特,V. K.,59, 61

Rasputin, G. E., 119
拉斯普京,G. E.,119

Reutern, M. Kh., 3, 72, 75
罗伊特恩,M.Kh.,第 3、72、75 页

Revolution of 1905, 214, 222
1905 年革命,第 214、222 页

Rothschilds (bank and family), 108-9, 111
罗斯柴尔德家族(银行及家族),108-9 页,111 页

Russian Far East. See Amur oblast; Maritime oblast; Priamur’e; Transbaikal oblast
俄罗斯远东地区。参见阿穆尔州;滨海州;外阿穆尔;外贝加尔州

Russo-Japanese War, 202-5
日俄战争,202-5 页

Russo-Turkish War, 33, 41, 71
俄土战争,33、41、71 页

St. Petersburg, 62-63, 84
圣彼得堡,62-63、84 页

Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de, 70
克劳德·亨利·德·圣西门,70 页

Samara-Ufa, 76-78, 81-83, 86
萨马拉-乌法,76-78 页,81-83 页,86 页

Schaffhausen, N. K., 213
沙夫豪森,N·K·,213 页

Shchapov, A. P., 87
谢切波夫,A·P·,87 页

Shilka River, 25-26, 145
石勒喀河,25-26 页,145 页

Siberia: administration of, 47, 49, 52-53; climate of, 18-19; gentry estates in, 160 ; industry of, 149 , 153 , 210 , 211 12 149 , 153 , 210 , 211 12 149,153,210,211-12149,153,210,211-12; metallurgy in, 48, 79, 149-53, 212; peasant colonization of, 153-66, 21213; population of, 14 16 , 83 , 155 56 14 16 , 83 , 155 56 14-16,83,155-5614-16,83,155-56; religious affairs in, 168-69; technical education in, 148; transport conditions in, 22-27, 145-48, 213; urban growth in, 208, 210. See also Agriculture and livestock; Exiles; Trade;
西伯利亚:行政管理,47、49、52-53 页;气候,18-19 页;贵族庄园,160 页;工业, 149 , 153 , 210 , 211 12 149 , 153 , 210 , 211 12 149,153,210,211-12149,153,210,211-12 ;冶金业,48、79、149-53、212 页;农民殖民,153-66、21213 页;人口, 14 16 , 83 , 155 56 14 16 , 83 , 155 56 14-16,83,155-5614-16,83,155-56 ;宗教事务,168-69 页;技术教育,148 页;运输条件,22-27、145-48、213 页;城市发展,208、210 页。另见农业与畜牧业;流放者;贸易;

Trans-Siberian Railroad  西伯利亚大铁路
Siberia-Alaska Railroad, 206
西伯利亚-阿拉斯加铁路,206 页

Siberian Committee (1852), 48-49
西伯利亚委员会(1852 年),48-49 页

Siberian credit ruble scheme, 127-28
西伯利亚信用卢布计划,127-28

Siberian regionalism, 49-50, 93, 221; on
西伯利亚区域主义,49-50, 93, 221;关于

Siberian Railroad, 86-91, 143-44, 22122. See also Iadrintsev, N. M.; Vostochnoe obozrenie
西伯利亚铁路,86-91, 143-44, 22122。另见 Iadrintsev, N. M.; 《东方观察》

Sievers, Jakob, 118  雅各布·西弗斯,118
Sipiagin, D. S., 135, 157
西皮亚金,D. S.,第 135、157 页

Skal’kovskii, K. A., 22, 44, 61, 71
斯卡利科夫斯基,K. A.,22、44、61、71 页

Society for the Encouragement of Russian Industry and Trade, 61, 82, 105, 130n, 175
俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会,61、82、105、130n、175 页

Sol’skii, D. M., 85, 134-35, 218
索利斯基,D. M.,85、134-35、218 页

Speranskii, M. M., 47
斯佩兰斯基,M.M.,47 页

Sretensk, 208  斯列坚斯克,208 页
State budget, 128-30, 217
国家预算,128-30、217 页

State comptroller, 193-94
国家审计长,193-94 页

State Council, 132, 150
国务会议,第 132、150 页

State Domains, Ministry of. See Agriculture, Ministry of
国有地产部。参见农业部

State Economy, Department of, 134
国家经济司,第 134 页

State Treasury, 6, 70, 74-75, 96, 100, 106, 109, 128, 211, 215
国库,6、70、74-75、96、100、106、109、128、211、215 页
Struve, P. B., 118-19, 122, 139
斯特鲁韦,P. B.,118-19,122,139

Subbotich, D. I., 17
苏博季奇,D. I.,17

Sungari River, 37, 165
松花江,37,165

Terner, F. G., 71-72
特尔纳,F. G.,71-72

Tobol’sk province, 53, 161-62
托博尔斯克省,第 53、161-62 页

Tolstoi, D. A., 4, 85
托尔斯泰,D.A.,第 4、85 页

Tomsk (city), 177n, 191
托木斯克(城市),第 177 页注释、191 页

Tomsk province, 53, 161-62
托木斯克省,第 53、161-62 页

Trade: of European Russia with Siberia, 63, 78; with Far East, 20-21, 30, 213; Siberian interregional, 209-10; Siberian wholesale, 208-9; and TransSiberian Railroad, 200, 208-10. See also Merchants; Witte, S. Iu.: on
贸易:欧俄与西伯利亚的贸易,63、78 页;与远东的贸易,20-21、30、213 页;西伯利亚区域间贸易,209-10 页;西伯利亚批发贸易,208-9 页;与西伯利亚大铁路的关系,200、208-10 页。另见商人;维特,S. Iu.:关于

Trans-Siberian Railroad  西伯利亚大铁路
Transbaikal oblast, 15n, 16, 19-22, 53, 145, 161, 173
外贝加尔州,15n, 16, 19-22, 53, 145, 161, 173

Transbaikal Railroad, 173, 180-81
外贝加尔铁路,173, 180-81

Transcaspian Railroad, 34, 108, 175, 215
外里海铁路,34, 108, 175, 215

Transport, Ministry of, 57, 84, 146, 191, 220; and railroad affairs, 70-71, 100102, 113. See also Giubbenet, A. I.;
交通部,57, 84, 146, 191, 220;与铁路事务相关,70-71, 100102, 113。另见吉本内特,A. I.;

Khilkov, M. I.; Krivoshein, A. K.;
希尔科夫,M.I.;克里沃舍因,A.K.;

Mel’nikov, P. P.; Pauker, G. E.; Pos’et, K. N.; Witte, S. Iu.
梅利尼科夫,P.P.;保克尔,G.E.;波谢特,K.N.;维特,S.Iu.
Trans-Siberian Railroad: administration of, 191-93; carrying capacity of, 197, 202-3, 206, 213; corruption on, 18590; costs of, 194, 214-18; financial operation of, 193-95; improvements to, 200-206, 214, 216; labor on, 181-85; passenger service on, 197, 199-200; rails and rolling stock on, 149-51, 197-98, 211; technical conditions on, 175-79, 190
西伯利亚大铁路:行政管理,191-93 页;运输能力,197、202-3、206、213 页;腐败问题,18590 页;建设成本,194、214-18 页;财务运营,193-95 页;线路改进,200-206、214、216 页;劳工状况,181-85 页;客运服务,197、199-200 页;轨道与机车车辆,149-51、197-98、211 页;技术条件,175-79、190 页

Trotsky, L. D., 225n
托洛茨基,L. D.,第 225 页注释

Tupper, Harmon, 2 n 2 n 2n2 n  塔珀,哈蒙, 2 n 2 n 2n2 n
Ukhtomskii, E. E., 136, 138
乌赫托姆斯基,E. E.,第 136、138 页

Union Pacific Co., 145n. See also American West; Railroads: foreign
联合太平洋公司,145n。另见美国西部;铁路:外国

Union Pacific Railroad, 2n, 179n. See also Railroads: foreign
联合太平洋铁路,2n,179n。另见铁路:外国
Ural-Kuznetsk combine, 225
乌拉尔-库兹涅茨克联合体,225

Ural Mining Railroad, 61, 76
乌拉尔矿业铁路,61, 76

Ussuri Railroad, 97, 174, 180-81
乌苏里铁路,97, 174, 180-81

Ussuri region. See Maritime oblast
乌苏里地区。参见滨海州

Ussuri River, 26  乌苏里江,26
Vagin, V. I., 79-80  瓦金,V. I.,第 79-80 页
Valuev, P. A., 4, 72
瓦卢耶夫,P. A.,第 4、72 页

Vannovskii, P. S., 99
万诺夫斯基,P. S.,第 99 页

Vladivostok, 13-14, 18-20, 26, 36, 39, 147
符拉迪沃斯托克(海参崴),第 13-14、18-20、26、36、39、147 页

Vogüé, Eugène Melchior de, 108
沃居埃,欧仁·梅尔基奥尔·德,108

Volkov, Mayor, 83-84  沃尔科夫市长,83-84
Voloshinov, N. A., 23, 33-34, 39, 41, 160n
沃洛希诺夫,N·A·,23,33-34,39,41,160n

Volunteer Fleet, 20, 32, 147, 164
志愿舰队,第 20、32、147、164 页

Vostochniki. See Orientalists
东方派。参见:东方学家

Vostochnoe obozrenie, 52, 143, 148
《东方评论》,52, 143, 148

Vyshnegradskii, I. A.: alternative Siberian Railroad proposal of, 104-5; fiscal policies of, 10, 95-96, 103, 109, 111-12; and Minister of Transport, 98, 100102, 108; opposes Trans-Siberian Railroad, 96-98, 106-7, 114; and Witte, 102, 119-20, 127
维什涅格拉茨基,I.A.:关于西伯利亚铁路的替代提案,104-5 页;其财政政策,10、95-96、103、109、111-12 页;与交通部长关系,98、100102、108 页;反对跨西伯利亚铁路,96-98、106-7、114 页;与维特的关系,102、119-20、127 页
War, Ministry of, 99, 135, 161
战争部,99、135、161 页

Western Siberian general governorship, 16n, 48, 53
西西伯利亚总督辖区,16n、48、53 页

Western Siberian Railroad, 171, 179
西西伯利亚铁路,171,179 页

Western Siberian trade routes, 77-78
西西伯利亚贸易路线,77-78 页

Witte, S. Iu., 70, 98, 100-102, 109-10, 112-13, 117-18, 140, 145-47, 165, 169, 193, 213, 224-25; background of, 11819; and Committee of Siberian Railroad, 131-33; economic views and policies of, 7 , 10 , 122 24 , 142 45 , 148 7 , 10 , 122 24 , 142 45 , 148 7,10,122-24,142-45,148-7,10,122-24,142-45,148- 51,153 ; and financing of Siberian Railroad, 111, 127-30; monarchism of, 120-22; Murmansk expedition of, 166-68; and Nicholas II, 139-40; and peasant resettlement, 142-43, 153-59; political tactics of, 119-20, 133-35, 150; on Trans-Siberian Railroad, 12527, 130, 138-39, 142-45, 201-2, 205, 218-19
维特,S. Iu.,第 70、98、100-102、109-10、112-13、117-18、140、145-47、165、169、193、213、224-25 页;其背景,11819 页;与西伯利亚铁路委员会,131-33 页;其经济观点与政策, 7 , 10 , 122 24 , 142 45 , 148 7 , 10 , 122 24 , 142 45 , 148 7,10,122-24,142-45,148-7,10,122-24,142-45,148- 51,153 页;西伯利亚铁路融资,111、127-30 页;其君主主义立场,120-22 页;摩尔曼斯克远征,166-68 页;与尼古拉二世关系,139-40 页;农民迁移政策,142-43、153-59 页;政治策略,119-20、133-35、150 页;关于西伯利亚大铁路的论述,12527、130、138-39、142-45、201-2、205、218-19 页

    1. Quoted in C. J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900 (New York, 1941), 34.
      引自 C. J. H. Hayes 所著《物质主义的一代,1871-1900》(纽约,1941 年),第 34 页。
    2. Quoted in S. Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-government in Russia, 1830-1870 (Princeton, 1972), 341.
      引自 S.弗雷德里克·斯塔尔,《俄罗斯的分权与自治,1830-1870》(普林斯顿,1972 年),第 341 页。
    3. Starr contends that this development was influenced by Bismarck’s unification of Germany, which had its admirers in the Russian government, and by the contemporary perception, best expressed by the philosopher Nikolai Danilevskii and the Pan-Slavs, that unification and internal strength were necessary if Russia was to prevail in the fierce competition between nation-states (ibid., 340-342).
      斯塔尔认为,这一发展受到俾斯麦统一德国的影响——在俄国政府中有其仰慕者,同时也受到当时观念的驱动,这种观念以哲学家尼古拉·丹尼列夫斯基和泛斯拉夫主义者为代表,认为若要在激烈的民族国家竞争中胜出,统一与内部实力是必要的(同上,第 340-342 页)。
    4. Schulze-Gävernitz, Volkswirtschaftliche Studien, 174-191.
      舒尔策-格弗尼茨,《国民经济研究》,174-191 页
    5. Zaionchkovskii, Russian Autocracy, 190-240, and Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie v v vv kontse XIX stoletiia (Moscow, 1970), passim. Zaionchkovskii shows that if these four men did not exert the direct influence they are reputed to have had, they at least set the tone for the era of reaction and developed its program.
      扎昂奇科夫斯基,《俄国专制制度》,第 190-240 页,及《19 世纪末的俄罗斯专制》(莫斯科,1970 年),散见各处。扎昂奇科夫斯基指出,即便这四人未能发挥传闻中的直接影响,他们至少为反动时代定下基调并制定了其纲领。
  1. course of the 1880s marked the real beginning of railroad nationalization (Everett Bruce Hurt, “Russian Economic Development, 1881-1914, with Special Reference to the Railways and the Role of the Government” [Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1963], 145146).
    19 世纪 80 年代标志着铁路国有化的真正开端(Everett Bruce Hurt,《俄罗斯经济发展,1881-1914,特别关注铁路及政府角色》[博士论文,伦敦大学,1963 年],第 145-146 页)。

    17. Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport, 153-158; Pogrebinskii, “Stroitel’stvo,” 166-168, 179; Westwood, History, 83-86; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 134.
    17. 索洛维约娃,《铁路运输》,第 153-158 页;波格列宾斯基,《建设》,第 166-168 页,179 页;韦斯特伍德,《历史》,第 83-86 页;舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,第 134 页。

    18. The paper Kievlianin in 1888; quoted in B. V. Anan’ich and R. Sh. Ganelin, “I. A. Vyshnegradskii i S. Iu. Witte-korrespondenty ‘moskovskikh vedomostei,’” in Problemy obshchestvennoi mysli i ekonomicheskaia politika Rossii XIX-XX vekov: Pamiati prof. S. B. Okunia, ed. N. G. Sladkevich (Leningrad, 1972), 22.
    18. 1888 年《基辅人报》引述于 B·V·阿纳尼奇与 R·Sh·加涅林,《I·A·维什涅格拉茨基与 S·Iu·维特——〈莫斯科新闻〉的通信者》,载《19-20 世纪俄国社会思想与经济政策问题:纪念 S·B·奥库尼亚教授》,N·G·斯拉德克维奇编(列宁格勒,1972 年),第 22 页。
    1. S. Iu. Witte, Printsipy, ii, 83-84, 121-124, 126-127, 132-133, 219, 225-226, 234-236, 259. Witte proposed that the railroad network be nationalized only gradually, however, for he considered the tsarist bureaucracy not up to the task of running the system without help from private industry.
      S·Iu·维特,《原则》,第二卷,第 83-84 页,121-124 页,126-127 页,132-133 页,219 页,225-226 页,234-236 页,259 页。维特提议铁路网络应逐步国有化,因为他认为沙皇官僚体系尚无法独立运营该系统,需依赖私营行业的协助。
    2. Shepelev, Tsarizm, 156; Anan’ich and Ganelin, “Vyshnegradskii i Witte,” 31.
      谢佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,第 156 页;阿纳尼奇与加涅林,“维什涅格拉茨基与维特”,第 31 页。
    3. Alfred J. Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), 74-75, 77, 115-116, 118, 182-183, 197-198; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 143-144; Thomas C. Owen, Capitalism and Politics in Russia: A Social History of the Moscow Merchants, 1855-1905 (Cambridge, 1981), passim.
      阿尔弗雷德·J·里伯,《帝俄时期的商人与企业家》(北卡罗来纳州教堂山,1982 年),第 74-75、77、115-116、118、182-183、197-198 页;谢佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,第 143-144 页;托马斯·C·欧文,《俄罗斯的资本主义与政治:莫斯科商人的社会史,1855-1905》(剑桥,1981 年),散见各处。
    1. K. N. Pos’et, “Prekrashchenie ssylki v Sibir’ (Zapiska K. N. Pos’eta),” Russkaia starina 99 (July 1899): 54.
      K·N·波谢特,“停止向西伯利亚流放(K·N·波谢特笔记)”,《俄罗斯古风》第 99 期(1899 年 7 月):第 54 页。
    2. See, for instance, “O velikom sibirskom puti,” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 22-24: 170. The prospect of war with China during the Ili crisis in the late 1870s and early 1880s caused considerable uneasiness in St. Petersburg, especially after Eastern Siberian officials reported that Russia’s military preparation in the region was plainly inadequate. See D. A. Miliutin, Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1950), 239-240.
      例如,参见“关于伟大的西伯利亚之路”,《铁路杂志》,1888 年,第 22-24 期:第 170 页。19 世纪 70 年代末至 80 年代初伊犁危机期间与中国爆发战争的可能性在圣彼得堡引起了极大不安,尤其是在东西伯利亚官员报告称俄国在该地区的军事准备明显不足之后。参见 D·A·米柳京,《D·A·米柳京日记》第 3 卷(莫斯科,1950 年),第 239-240 页。
    1. L. N. Liubimov, “Iz zhizni inzhenera putei soobshcheniia,” Russkaia starina 156 (September 1913): 451-452, 454-455.
      柳比莫夫,《一位交通工程师的生活片段》,载《俄罗斯旧事》第 156 期(1913 年 9 月),第 451-452 页,454-455 页。
    2. Anton Chekhov, “Across Siberia,” in The Unknown Chekhov: Stories and Other Writings Hitherto Untranslated, trans. Avrahm Yarmolinsky (New York, 1954), 276.
      安东·契诃夫,《穿越西伯利亚》,收录于《未知的契诃夫:未译故事及其他作品》,亚伯拉罕·亚莫林斯基译(纽约,1954 年),第 276 页。
    3. “‘O narodonaselenii Sibiri i o velikoi vostochnoi zheleznoi doroge’ (Doklad professora E. Iu. Petri i beseda v VIII otdele IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 33-34: 269. At that time Petersburg province had 42 people per square verst, Moscow province 74.7 , and Warsaw province 108.
      “关于西伯利亚人口及东方大铁路的报告(E. Iu. 彼得里教授在 IRTO 第八分部的演讲与讨论)”,《铁路杂志》,1888 年,第 33-34 期:269 页。当时,圣彼得堡省每平方俄里 42 人,莫斯科省 74.7 人,华沙省 108 人。
    1. I shall use “Priamur’e,” as the Russians do, to refer to the Maritime and Amur oblasts together, which formed the Priamur general governorship. The term oblast may be translated as region, but so might krai be; to avoid confusion, I have not translated oblast. In imperial Russia, the krai was not an official administrative unit; when I refer to the North Ussuri, South Ussuri, or Ussuri region, I am replacing the word krai, which designates a geographical entity encompassing the territory of several uezds (districts) of an oblast. Krai can also refer to a broader region, such as the entire Russian Far East. “Transbaikal oblast” (Zabaikal’skaia oblast’) is used interchangeably with “Transbaikalia” (Zabaikal’e), as in Russian sources. After mid-1884 Transbaikalia was an administrative division of the Priamur general governorship, so it may justifiably be referred to as part of the Russian Far East.
      我将像俄罗斯人那样使用“Priamur’e”一词,统指滨海州和阿穆尔州,这两个地区共同构成了滨海总督辖区。Oblast 可译为“地区”,但 krai 同样如此;为避免混淆,我未对 oblast 进行翻译。在帝俄时期,krai 并非官方行政单位;当我提及北乌苏里、南乌苏里或乌苏里地区时,实际是用 krai 这一地理概念替代,它指代包含某州内若干县(uezd)领土的区域。Krai 亦可指更广阔的地域,例如整个俄罗斯远东地区。“外贝加尔州”(Zabaikal’skaia oblast’)与“外贝加尔”(Zabaikal’e)在俄文资料中可互换使用。1884 年中期后,外贝加尔成为滨海总督辖区的行政区划,因此将其称为俄罗斯远东的一部分是合理的。
    2. V. M. Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai v XVII-nachale XX w. (1640-1917): Istorikodemograficheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1985), 99, 162 (table 3), 222 (table 12); A. Sil’nitskii, Kul’turnoe vliianie ussuriiskoi zheleznoi dorogi na iuzhno-ussuriiskii krai (Khabarovsk, 1901), 24; Robert Britton Valliant, “Japan and the Trans-Siberian Railroad, 1885-1905” (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 1974), 8; Evtiugin, 213-214.
      V·M·卡布赞,《17 世纪至 20 世纪初的远东地区(1640-1917):历史人口学概述》(莫斯科,1985 年),第 99 页、162 页(表 3)、222 页(表 12);A·西利尼茨基,《乌苏里铁路对南乌苏里边疆区的文化影响》(哈巴罗夫斯克,1901 年),第 24 页;罗伯特·布里顿·瓦利安特,《日本与西伯利亚大铁路,1885-1905》(博士论文,夏威夷大学,1974 年),第 8 页;叶夫秋金,第 213-214 页。
    3. P. Chikhachev, “Kaliforniia i ussuriiskii krai,” Vestnik Evropy, June 1890, no. 6: 561; Valliant, “Japan,” 7-9; Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai, 127. In contrast to the migrant Chinese, Korean settlers came with their families, settled, converted to Orthodoxy, and attempted to assimilate (Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai, 93-95).
      P·奇哈乔夫,《加利福尼亚与乌苏里边疆区》,《欧洲导报》,1890 年 6 月第 6 期:561 页;瓦利安特,《日本》,第 7-9 页;卡布赞,《远东地区》,第 127 页。与流动的中国移民不同,朝鲜移民携家带口定居,皈依东正教并试图融入当地社会(卡布赞,《远东地区》,第 93-95 页)。
    4. N. M. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia v geograficheskom, etnograficheskom i istoricheskom otnoshenii, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1892), 125, 300.
      N·M·亚德林采夫,《从地理、民族与历史角度看作为殖民地的西伯利亚》第二版(圣彼得堡,1892 年),第 125 页、300 页。
    1. George Kennan, Siberia and the Exile System, vol. 1 (New York, 1891), 352-353. According to this American authority on Siberia, for every school there were thirty “rum shops” in Western Siberia and thirty-five in Eastern Siberia.
      乔治·凯南,《西伯利亚与流放制度》第一卷(纽约,1891 年),第 352-353 页。据这位研究西伯利亚的美国权威所述,西西伯利亚每有一所学校就有三十家“酒馆”,东西伯利亚则达到三十五家。
    2. The general governorships of Eastern and Western Siberia are not to be confused with the more loosely delimited geographical regions of eastern and western Siberia.
      东西伯利亚总督区与西西伯利亚总督区不可混为一谈,后者所指的地理区域划分更为宽泛。
    3. O. I. Sergeev, Kazachestvo na russkom Dal’nem Vostoke v XVII-XIX vv. (Moscow, 1983), 46-47, 50, 55-56, 58-59, 62-63, 70; Peter Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), 185-187. See also N. I. Razumov, Zabaikal’e (St. Petersburg, 1899), 63-69. Kropotkin was attaché to the Eastern Siberian governor general for Cossack affairs. He writes that Murav’ev so desperately wanted to settle the region that he released 1 , 0 0 0 1 , 0 0 0 1,000\mathbf{1 , 0 0 0} male hard-labor convicts, most of them robbers and murderers, and gave them land on the Amur. One hundred hard-labor women were then freed and married to the men of their choice.
      奥·伊·谢尔盖耶夫,《17-19 世纪俄国远东地区的哥萨克》(莫斯科,1983 年),46-47、50、55-56、58-59、62-63、70 页;彼得·克鲁泡特金,《一个革命者的回忆录》(马萨诸塞州剑桥,1930 年),185-187 页。另见 N·I·拉祖莫夫,《外贝加尔地区》(圣彼得堡,1899 年),63-69 页。克鲁泡特金曾任东西伯利亚总督哥萨克事务专员。他写道,穆拉维约夫迫切想要开发该地区,甚至释放了 1 , 0 0 0 1 , 0 0 0 1,000\mathbf{1 , 0 0 0} 名男性苦役犯(多为强盗和杀人犯),并给予他们在阿穆尔河沿岸的土地。随后又释放了一百名女性苦役犯,让她们自主选择与这些男性结婚。
    1. Sergeev, Kazachestvo, 79-80; Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai, 67. By 1897 Cossacks formed only 10.3 % 10.3 % 10.3%10.3 \% of the Far East’s population.
      谢尔盖耶夫,《哥萨克》,79-80 页;卡布赞,《远东边区》,67 页。截至 1897 年,哥萨克仅占远东地区人口的 10.3 % 10.3 % 10.3%10.3 \%
    2. Sergeev, Kazachestvo, 36-37, 76-79, 90; Chikhachev, “Kaliforniia,” 560; Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai, 74, 79. The picture painted by Sergeev is distorted. He cites the many economic activities undertaken by the Cossacks, implying that this Russian underclass made a positive contribution to the settlement of the region. This view is contradicted by all other sources. See, e.g., Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, Handbook of Siberia and Arctic Russia, vol. 1 (London, n.d.), 81; D. I. Subbotich, Amurskaia zheleznaia doroga i nasha politika na Dal’nem Vostoke (St. Petersburg, 1908), 7. There were some pockets of prosperity in the Cossack settlements of the Far East, in particular among the “enterprising and sharp-witted” Cossacks of the Transbaikal host who were engaged in cattle breeding. See Grulev, 141; Kropotkin, Memoirs, 199.
      谢尔盖耶夫,《哥萨克》,第 36-37、76-79、90 页;奇哈乔夫,《加利福尼亚》,第 560 页;卡布赞,《远东边疆》,第 74、79 页。谢尔盖耶夫描绘的图景存在扭曲。他列举了哥萨克人从事的多种经济活动,暗示这个俄罗斯底层阶级对该地区的开发做出了积极贡献。这一观点与其他所有资料相矛盾。参见例如:英国海军情报部,《西伯利亚与北极俄罗斯手册》第一卷(伦敦,无日期),第 81 页;D·I·苏博季奇,《阿穆尔铁路与我们在远东的政策》(圣彼得堡,1908 年),第 7 页。远东哥萨克聚居地确实存在一些繁荣的角落,特别是那些从事畜牧业的“富有进取心且机敏”的外贝加尔哥萨克群体。参见格鲁列夫,第 141 页;克鲁泡特金,《回忆录》,第 199 页。
  2. Francisco, 1961), 333-336, 342-343; L. S. Berg, Natural Regions of the USSR, trans. Olga A. Titelbaum (New York, 1950), 60-61; E. B. Kovrigin, “The Soviet Far East,” in SovietAmerican Horizons on the Pacific, ed. John J. Stephan and V. P. Chichkanov (Honolulu, 1986), 7.
    弗朗西斯科,1961 年,333-336 页,342-343 页;L·S·伯格,《苏联自然地理区划》,奥尔加·A·蒂特尔鲍姆译(纽约,1950 年),60-61 页;E·B·科夫里金,“苏联远东”,载于《太平洋上的苏美视野》,约翰·J·斯蒂芬与 V·P·奇奇卡诺夫编(檀香山,1986 年),7 页。

    19. Suslov, Physical Geography, 334-337, 359, 363; Berg, Natural Regions, 62; Kropotkin, Memoirs, 186, and “The Great Siberian Railway,” Geographical Journal, no. 5 (February, 1895): 153.
    19. 苏斯洛夫,《自然地理》,334-337 页,359 页,363 页;伯格,《自然区域》,62 页;克鲁泡特金,《回忆录》,186 页,以及《西伯利亚大铁路》,《地理杂志》,1895 年 2 月第 5 期:153 页。

    20. For an example of the exaggerated hopes, see N. Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy na Krainem Vostoke,” Vestnik Evropy, July 1887, no. 7: 80, 82.
    20. 关于夸大期望的一个例子,参见 N. 马秋宁,《我们在远东的邻居》,《欧洲导报》,1887 年 7 月第 7 期:80 页,82 页。

    21. Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai, 73-76, 80-81, 90-92, 127-128. By 1890 enough new peasant immigrants had arrived to reestablish a tenuous equilibrium, but it was short-lived. Kabuzan stresses this success of local agriculture in order to glorify the role of the Russian peasant settlers, and glosses over their inability to cope with the dire insufficiencies of the region, so vividly portrayed in most other sources.
    21. 卡布赞,《远东边疆》,73-76 页,80-81 页,90-92 页,127-128 页。到 1890 年,足够的新农民移民到来,重新建立了一种脆弱的平衡,但这一平衡并未持久。卡布赞强调当地农业的这一成功是为了颂扬俄罗斯农民定居者的作用,并掩盖了他们无法应对该地区严重不足的事实,而这一点在其他大多数资料中都有生动描述。
    1. “Vopros o plavanii po r. Sungari,” in General’nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 55 (1894), 125; Grulev, 143; Sil’nitskii, Kul’turnoe vliianie, 1, 25; Valliant, “Japan,” 8; K. A. Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia v Tikhom okeane (St. Petersburg, 1883), 30, 33; Chikhachev, “Kaliforniia,” 562. Kennan mentions the high cost of forage and food in Eastern Siberia, in Siberia and the Exile System, 1:355. Still today the Russian Far East can supply only its own potatoes and eggs; the rest of its food must be imported. See V. P. Chichkanov and P. A. Minakir, “Economic Development of the Soviet Far East,” in Stephan and Chichkanov, Soviet-American Horizons, 104.
      “关于松花江航行问题的探讨”,载于总参谋部《亚洲文集》第 55 卷(1894 年),第 125 页;格鲁列夫,第 143 页;西利尼茨基,《文化影响》,第 1、25 页;瓦利安特,“日本”,第 8 页;K·A·斯卡利科夫斯基,《俄国在太平洋的贸易》(圣彼得堡,1883 年),第 30、33 页;奇哈切夫,“加利福尼亚”,第 562 页。肯南在《西伯利亚与流放制度》第 1 卷第 355 页中提到东西伯利亚饲料和食品的高昂成本。直至今日,俄罗斯远东地区仍只能自给土豆和鸡蛋;其余食品均需进口。参见 V·P·奇奇卡诺夫与 P·A·米纳基尔,“苏联远东的经济发展”,载于斯蒂芬与奇奇卡诺夫合编《苏美视野》,第 104 页。
    2. Kropotkin, Memoirs, 186; Sil’nitskii, Kul’turnoe vliianie, 26-28; Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 31-32, 474.
      克鲁泡特金,《回忆录》,186 页;西利尼茨基,《文化影响》,26-28 页;斯卡利科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,31-32 页,474 页。
    3. A. P. Okladnikov et al., eds., Istoriia Sibiri s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, vol. 3 (Leningrad, 1968), 67. See also N. L. Shlyk, “The Soviet Far East and the International Economy,” in Stephan and Chichkanov, Soviet-American Horizons, 115. Approximately 30 % 30 % 30%30 \% of Vladivostok’s imports came from Germany, 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% from European Russia, 13% from England, 12 % 12 % 12%12 \% from China, 13 % 13 % 13%13 \% from Japan, 5 % 5 % 5%5 \% from the United States, and the remaining 2 % 2 % 2%2 \% from other nations, presumably Korea, Australia, France, and perhaps Belgium (Ministerstvo Finansov, Departament Torgovli i Manufaktur, Sibir’ i velikaia sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, ed. V. I. Kovalevskii and P. P. Semenov, 2d ed. [St. Petersburg, 1896], 222-223).
      A. P. 奥克拉德尼科夫等编,《西伯利亚史:从远古至当代》第 3 卷(列宁格勒,1968 年),第 67 页。另见 N. L. 什里克,《苏联远东与国际经济》,载于斯蒂芬与奇奇卡诺夫合编《苏美视野》,第 115 页。符拉迪沃斯托克的进口商品中约 30 % 30 % 30%30 \% 来自德国, 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% 来自欧俄地区,13%来自英国, 12 % 12 % 12%12 \% 来自中国, 13 % 13 % 13%13 \% 来自日本, 5 % 5 % 5%5 \% 来自美国,其余 2 % 2 % 2%2 \% 来自其他国家,可能包括朝鲜、澳大利亚、法国及比利时(财政部贸易与制造业司,《西伯利亚与西伯利亚大铁路》,V. I. 科瓦列夫斯基与 P. P. 谢苗诺夫主编,第二版[圣彼得堡,1896 年],第 222-223 页)。
    4. Value of imports: 415.5 million rubles; exports: 83.5 million rubles (Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, 3:66). The treaty of Tientsin (1862) gave the Chinese the right to conduct duty-free trade in Transbaikalia and Priamur’e in a region extending fifty versts from the border with China, and gave Vladivostok and Nikolaevsk porto-franco status. The intention was to help feed the local population. Since it was not properly policed,
      进口额:4.155 亿卢布;出口额:8350 万卢布(奥克拉德尼科夫等,《西伯利亚史》第 3 卷第 66 页)。《天津条约》(1862 年)赋予中国人在外贝加尔与阿穆尔河沿岸地区边境线五十俄里范围内免税贸易的权利,并授予符拉迪沃斯托克与尼古拉耶夫斯克自由港地位。此举旨在保障当地居民粮食供应。由于监管不力,
  3. the whole region was essentially a free-trade zone up to Lake Baikal, where the Russian tariff border began (M. I. Sladkovskii, History of Economic Relations between Russia and China, trans. M. Roublev [Jerusalem, 1966], 85; B. B. Glinskii, ed., Prolog russko-iaponskoi voiny: Materialy iz arkhiva grafa S. Iu. Witte [Petrograd, 1916], 236-237). These arrangements were apparently first suggested by Murav’ev-Amurskii. See E.L. Besprozvannykh, Priamur’e v sisteme russko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii, XVII-seredina XIX v. (Moscow, 1983), 166.
    整个地区实质上是一个自由贸易区,直至贝加尔湖,那里是俄罗斯关税边界的起点(M. I. 斯拉德科夫斯基,《俄中经济关系史》,M. 鲁布廖夫译 [耶路撒冷,1966 年],85 页;B. B. 格林斯基编,《日俄战争序幕:S. Iu. 维特伯爵档案材料》 [彼得格勒,1916 年],236-237 页)。这些安排据称最初是由穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基提出的。参见 E.L. 别斯普罗兹万内赫,《17 世纪至 19 世纪中叶俄中关系体系中的阿穆尔地区》 [莫斯科,1983 年],166 页。

    26. “Vopros o splavanii po r. Sungari,” 125-126; Valliant, “Japan,” 8-9; Charles and Barbara Jelavich, Russia in the East, 1876-1880 (Leiden, 1959), 91n1; Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 66; Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy,” 83.
    26. “松花江通航问题”,125-126 页;瓦利安特,“日本”,8-9 页;查尔斯与芭芭拉·杰拉维奇,《俄国在东方,1876-1880》(莱顿,1959 年),91 页注释 1;斯卡利科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,66 页;马秋宁,“我们的邻居”,83 页。

    27. Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy,” 82; Evtiugin, 214.
    27. 马秋宁,“我们的邻居”,82 页;叶夫秋金,214 页。

    28. Grulev, 143-145, 147-148; N. A. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” IIRGO 27 (1891): 21-22.
    28. 格鲁列夫,143-145 页,147-148 页;N. A. 沃洛希诺夫,“西伯利亚铁路”,《俄国皇家地理学会会刊》27 卷(1891 年):21-22 页。
  4. work, valued by the state in the millions of rubles, would be undone (TOSRPT, vol. 18, otdel 1 [1887], 11).
    国家估价数百万卢布的工作将付诸东流(《西伯利亚铁路建设报告》,第 18 卷,第 1 部分[1887 年],第 11 页)。

    34. TOSRPT, vol. 18, otdel 1 (1887), 14; Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 20; Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, 3:62-63. Kennan described passing caravans of 100 freight wagons at a time and counted 1,400 in one day on the western section of the tract (Siberia and the Exile System, 1:49). Freight consisted of grain, Altai metals, and Chinese goods, the latter including tea (North, Transport, 28).
    34. 《西伯利亚铁路建设报告》第 18 卷第 1 部分(1887 年),第 14 页;沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 20 页;奥克拉德尼科夫等,《西伯利亚史》,第 3 卷,第 62-63 页。肯南描述道,他曾目睹由 100 辆货运马车组成的商队同时通过,并在西段驿路一天内数到 1400 辆(《西伯利亚与流放制度》,第 1 卷,第 49 页)。货物包括谷物、阿尔泰金属和中国商品,后者主要有茶叶(诺斯,《运输》,第 28 页)。

    35. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 19-20; Henry Lansdell, Through Siberia, vol. 1 (Boston, 1882), 139; M. Sobolev, “Puti soobshcheniia v Sibiri,” Sibir’: Eia sovremennoe sostoianie i eia nuzhdy: Sbornik statei, ed. I. S. Mel’nik (St. Petersburg, 1908), 36; Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, Handbook of Siberia, 1:323-326.
    35. 沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 19-20 页;亨利·兰斯德尔,《穿越西伯利亚》,第 1 卷(波士顿,1882 年),第 139 页;M.索博列夫,《西伯利亚的交通路线》,载于《西伯利亚:现状与需求》论文集,I.S.梅利尼克编(圣彼得堡,1908 年),第 36 页;英国海军情报部,《西伯利亚手册》,第 1 卷,第 323-326 页。

    36. Kennan, Siberia and the Exile System, 1:73, 138-139, 356-357, 364.
    36. 肯南,《西伯利亚与流放制度》,第 1 卷,第 73、138-139、356-357、364 页。
    1. Chekhov, Unknown Chekhov, 284, 295-303.
      契诃夫,《未知的契诃夫》,284 页,295-303 页。
    2. Quoted in V. N. Kazimirov, Velikii sibirskii put’ (Irkutsk, 1970), 6.
      引自 V·N·卡济米罗夫,《伟大的西伯利亚之路》(伊尔库茨克,1970 年),第 6 页。
    3. Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, 3:62-63.
      奥克拉德尼科夫等,《西伯利亚史》,第 3 卷,62-63 页。
    4. Zenone Volpicelli [Vladimir], Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway (London, 1899), 277-283; Kropotkin, “Great Siberian Railway,” 149; Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, 3:64; North, Transport, 36, 38-39. For the estimated amounts needed to improve the Ob Ob Ob^(')\mathrm{Ob}^{\prime}-Enisei canal, see TOSRPT, vol. 18, otdel 1 (1887), 11-12.
      泽诺内·沃尔皮切利(弗拉基米尔),《太平洋上的俄罗斯与西伯利亚铁路》(伦敦,1899 年),277-283 页;克鲁泡特金,《伟大的西伯利亚铁路》,149 页;奥克拉德尼科夫等,《西伯利亚史》,第 3 卷:64 页;诺斯,《运输》,36 页,38-39 页。关于改善叶尼塞运河所需资金的估算,参见《西伯利亚铁路建设技术委员会报告》,第 18 卷,第 1 部分(1887 年),11-12 页。
    5. Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai, 99.
      卡布赞,《远东边区》,99 页。
    1. Suslov, Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia, 338; Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 74-75; Grulev, 132, 138; John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, 1964), 26; Kropotkin, Memoirs, 190-191; Barabash, 166; Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 24; Arthur John Barry, Lecture on the Great Siberian Railway (London, 1900), 18.
      苏斯洛夫,《亚洲俄罗斯自然地理》,338 页;斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,74-75 页;格鲁列夫,132、138 页;约翰·阿尔伯特·怀特,《西伯利亚干预》(普林斯顿,1964 年),26 页;克鲁泡特金,《回忆录》,190-191 页;巴拉巴什,166 页;沃洛希诺夫,“西伯利亚铁路”,24 页;亚瑟·约翰·巴里,《大西伯利亚铁路讲座》(伦敦,1900 年),18 页。
    2. Vladivostok was a Russian military post in 1860 before the territory was officially ceded to Russia and in 1872-1873 became the main naval port on the Pacific, in place of Nikolaevsk-na-Amure. In 1880 Vladivostok became a separate administrative entity under a military governor; in 1888 it was reunified with the Maritime oblast, and in 1890 replaced Khabarovsk as its administrative center (Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 10; Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Rußlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917 [Leiden, 1966], 366, 407).
      符拉迪沃斯托克在 1860 年时是俄罗斯的一个军事前哨,当时该地区尚未正式割让给俄国。1872-1873 年间,它取代尼古拉耶夫斯克-阿穆尔斯基成为太平洋上的主要海军港口。1880 年,符拉迪沃斯托克成为由军事总督直辖的独立行政区;1888 年重新并入滨海州,并于 1890 年代替代哈巴罗夫斯克成为该州的行政中心(斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,10 页;埃里克·安布格尔,《从彼得大帝到 1917 年俄罗斯行政机构史》[莱顿,1966 年],366、407 页)。
    3. Suslov, Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia, 327, 333; Skal’kovskii, Russkaia torgovlia, 13-14; Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy,” 81-82; Allen S. Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise? (Stanford, 1981), 76. Matiunin suggested Pos’et, icefree and in a guarded location, as a more reasonable choice for a naval base. Whiting points out that the access problem still detracts from the Soviet naval base in Vladivostok.
      苏斯洛夫,《亚洲俄罗斯自然地理》,327、333 页;斯卡利科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,13-14 页;马秋宁,《我们的邻居》,81-82 页;艾伦·S·怀廷,《西伯利亚发展与东亚:威胁还是承诺?》(斯坦福,1981 年),76 页。马秋宁建议将波西耶特(常年不冻且地处隐蔽位置)作为海军基地更为合理。怀廷指出,出入问题至今仍制约着苏联在符拉迪沃斯托克的海军基地。
  5. of camels for transport and haulage, see Richardson Wright and Bassett Digby, Through Siberia, an Empire in the Making (New York, 1913), 187, and Kennan, Siberia and the Exile System, 2:418.
    关于骆驼用于运输和拖曳的记载,参见理查森·赖特与巴塞特·迪格比,《穿越西伯利亚:一个正在形成的帝国》(纽约,1913 年),187 页,以及肯南,《西伯利亚与流放制度》第 2 卷,418 页。

    52. Valliant, “Japan,” 10.
    53. Barry, Lecture, 22. This figure was for Russian territories; significant additional numbers would also be needed to defend the Chinese-Eastern Railroad when it was built.
    53. 巴里,《讲座》,22 页。该数字针对俄国领土;修建中东铁路时还需额外增派大量兵力进行防御。

    54. Barabash, 128, 134-135, 165-167; Evtiugin, 215. Whiting shows that the threat of interdiction remains alive today for the Siberian Railroad and restricts the military utility of the Baikal-Amur Main Line (BAM) (Whiting, Siberian Development, 92-93, 100102, 108).
    54. 巴拉巴什,第 128、134-135、165-167 页;叶夫秋金,第 215 页。怀廷指出,西伯利亚铁路至今仍面临阻断威胁,这限制了贝加尔-阿穆尔干线(BAM)的军事效用(怀廷,《西伯利亚发展》,第 92-93、100-102、108 页)。
    1. A. L. Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika kapitalisticheskikh derzhav na Dal’nem Vostoke, 1860-1895 (Moscow, 1956), 371, 373, 549-550; Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far
      A·L·纳罗奇尼茨基,《资本主义列强在远东的殖民政策,1860-1895》(莫斯科,1956 年),第 371、373、549-550 页;安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫,《俄国远东》
  6. Evropeiskoi Rossii v Aziiu," ZhdD, 1885, no. 1: 2. According to Headrick, when electric lights were installed on ships after 1887, travel time was further reduced by half.
    欧洲俄罗斯向亚洲的扩张,《铁路杂志》,1885 年第 1 期:第 2 页。据黑德里克所述,1887 年后船舶安装电灯,航行时间进一步缩短了一半。

    5. See, for instance, “‘O velikom sibirskom puti v sviazi s pravitel’stvennymi izyskaniiami’ (Doklad N. A. Sytenko i beseda v VIII otdele IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 22-24: 170.
    5. 例如参见《关于西伯利亚大铁路与政府勘察工作的关联》(N·A·瑟坚科报告及 IRTO 第八部门讨论),《铁路杂志》,1888 年第 22-24 期:第 170 页。

    6. N. Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy na Krainem Vostoke,” Vestnik Evropy, July 1887, no. 7: 79; Headrick, Tools of Empire, 168; K. A. Skal’kovskii, Vneshniaia politika Rossii i polozhenie inostrannykh derzhav (St. Petersburg, 1901), 545-546, and Russkaia torgovlia v v vv Tikhom okeane (St. Petersburg, 1883), 17, 35, 71-72, 229, 237-240; P. Chikhachev, “Kaliforniia i ussuriiskii krai,” Vestnik Evropy, June 1890, no. 6: 563; Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, A Handbook of Siberia and Arctic Russia, vol. 1 (London, n.d.), 7879.
    6. N. 马秋宁,《我们在远东的邻居》,《欧洲导报》,1887 年 7 月,第 7 期:79 页;黑德里克,《帝国的工具》,168 页;K. A. 斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯的外交政策与外国列强的地位》(圣彼得堡,1901 年),545-546 页,以及《俄罗斯在太平洋的贸易》(圣彼得堡,1883 年),17、35、71-72、229、237-240 页;P. 奇哈乔夫,《加利福尼亚与乌苏里边疆区》,《欧洲导报》,1890 年 6 月,第 6 期:563 页;英国海军情报部,《西伯利亚与北极俄罗斯手册》第 1 卷(伦敦,无日期),7879 页。

    7. Matiunin, “Nashi sosedy,” 80.
    7. 马秋宁,《我们的邻居》,80 页。
    1. V. F. Borzunov, “Proekty stroitel’stva sibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali pervoi poloviny XIX v. kak istoricheskii istochnik,” in Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Sibirskoe Otdelenie, Dal’nevostochnyi Filial, Trudy, seriia istoricheskaia, vol. 5, ed. V. M. Vishnevskii et al. (Blagoveshchensk, 1963), 53, 58-62; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914 (New York, 1966), 83. For details of the attack on Petropavlovsk, see John Shelton Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (Durham, N.C., 1979), 421-423.
      V. F. 博尔祖诺夫,《19 世纪上半叶西伯利亚铁路建设方案作为历史资料》,载于苏联科学院西伯利亚分院远东分院历史系列论文集第 5 卷,V. M. 维什涅夫斯基等编(布拉戈维申斯克,1963 年),53、58-62 页;休·塞顿-沃森,《俄罗斯帝国的衰落,1855-1914》(纽约,1966 年),83 页。关于彼得罗巴甫洛夫斯克袭击的详情,参见约翰·谢尔顿·柯蒂斯,《俄罗斯的克里米亚战争》(北卡罗来纳州达勒姆,1979 年),421-423 页。
    2. C. J. H. Hayes portrays Russian expansion there as a major stimulus to British imperialism in Asia (A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900 [New York, 1941], 231).
      C. J. H. 海斯将俄国在该地区的扩张描绘为刺激英国在亚洲帝国主义的重要因素(《唯物主义的一代,1871-1900》[纽约,1941 年],第 231 页)。
    3. Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 221-223, 225; Skal’kovskii, Russkaia, torgovlia, 466. The ships of the Volunteer Fleet were converted German mail boats.
      纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,221-223 页,225 页;斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯贸易》,466 页。志愿船队的船只由德国邮轮改装而成。
    4. D. A. Miliutin, Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1950), 236-237.
      D·A·米留京,《D·A·米留京日记》,第 3 卷(莫斯科,1950 年),236-237 页。
    5. Barabash, 106.  巴拉巴什,106 页。
    1. Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974 (Bloomington, Ind., 1975), 199-200; Michael Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation, vol. 2 (New York, 1960), 1128-1129; Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914, trans. Bruce Little (New Haven, 1987), 114; Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 370-371, 373, 376-381, 389.
      芭芭拉·杰拉维奇,《圣彼得堡与莫斯科:沙皇与苏联的外交政策,1814-1974》(布鲁明顿,印第安纳州,1975 年),第 199-200 页;迈克尔·弗洛林斯基,《俄罗斯:历史与诠释》第二卷(纽约,1960 年),第 1128-1129 页;迪特里希·盖尔,《俄罗斯帝国主义:国内与外交政策的互动,1860-1914》,布鲁斯·利特尔译(纽黑文,1987 年),第 114 页;纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,第 370-371、373、376-381、389 页。
    2. “Tikhookeanskaia-kanadskaia i sibirskaia zheleznye dorogi,” ZhdD, 1887, no. 19: 157; Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 380.
      “太平洋-加拿大与西伯利亚铁路”,《铁路杂志》,1887 年第 19 期:157 页;纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,第 380 页。
    3. N. A. Voloshinov [M. V-""], Neskol’ko slov o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge (St. Petersburg, 1890), 20; TIRTO, 10:12. Voloshinov was incorrect about the financing of the Canadian-Pacific Railroad, which was paid for by a combination of Canadian government subsidies, the sale of land held by the Canadian Pacific Land Grant, and stocks issued in Canada, the United States, England, and France. See John Murray Gibbon, Steel of Empire: The Romantic History of the Canadian Pacific (New York, 1935), passim. While the British did plan to use the Canadian-Pacific for the rapid transfer of troops to Asia, it was Russia’s talk of a trans-Siberian railroad that confirmed this need in the first place. Moreover, steamer service across the Pacific was intended primarily to supplement the railroad’s income (Gibbon, Steel, 209-212, 300, 311-313).
      N·A·沃洛希诺夫 [M·V-""],《关于西伯利亚铁路的几句话》(圣彼得堡,1890 年),第 20 页;TIRTO,10:12。沃洛希诺夫关于加拿大太平洋铁路融资的说法是错误的,该铁路的资金来源包括加拿大政府补贴、加拿大太平洋土地赠予公司持有的土地销售,以及在加拿大、美国、英国和法国发行的股票。参见约翰·默里·吉本,《帝国之钢:加拿大太平洋铁路的浪漫史》(纽约,1935 年),散见各处。虽然英国确实计划利用加拿大太平洋铁路快速向亚洲调遣部队,但最初正是俄罗斯关于跨西伯利亚铁路的讨论确认了这一需求。此外,横跨太平洋的轮船服务主要旨在补充铁路的收入(吉本,《帝国之钢》,第 209-212、300、311-313 页)。
    1. V. P. Potemkin, Istoriia diplomatii, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1945), 112; V. M. Khvostov, Istoriia diplomatii, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1963), 223-225.
      V·P·波将金,《外交史》第 2 卷(莫斯科,1945 年),112 页;V·M·赫沃斯托夫,《外交史》第 2 卷(莫斯科,1963 年),223-225 页。
    2. This section was completed in 1887, and a further extension to Samarkand in 1888 (W. E. Wheeler, “The Control of Land Routes: Russian Railways in Central Asia,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 21 [October 1934]: 592-593;A. M. Solov’ eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. [Moscow, 1975], 196-197).
      该段铁路于 1887 年竣工,并于 1888 年进一步延伸至撒马尔罕(W. E. 惠勒,《陆路交通控制:俄国在中亚的铁路》,载《皇家中亚学会会刊》第 21 卷[1934 年 10 月],第 592-593 页;A. M. 索洛维约娃,《19 世纪下半叶俄国的铁路运输》[莫斯科,1975 年],第 196-197 页)。
    3. Quoted in Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia: A Record and a Study, 1558-1899 (New York, 1899), 204-205.
      引自阿列克西斯·克劳斯,《俄国在亚洲:1558-1899 年的记录与研究》(纽约,1899 年),第 204-205 页。
    4. Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 381-382, 391; “Man’chzhurskaia zheleznaia doroga,” in General’nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 53 (1893), 4.
      纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,第 381-382 页,391 页;《满洲铁路》,载总参谋部《亚洲汇编》第 53 卷(1893 年),第 4 页。
    5. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 26-27.
      沃洛希诺夫,《西伯利亚铁路》,26-27 页。
    1. A. N. Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War, trans. A. B. Lindsay, vol. 1 (London, 1909), 5, 68-69, 114-115; Skal’kovskii, Vneshniaia politika, 559.
      A·N·库罗帕特金,《俄军与日俄战争》,A·B·林赛译,第 1 卷(伦敦,1909 年),5 页,68-69 页,114-115 页;斯卡尔科夫斯基,《对外政策》,559 页。
    2. Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations (New York, 1973), 55-58. It is worthy of note that in 1878 A. N. Kuropatkin, then head of the Asian section of the General Staff, suggested that the Chinese pay 10 million pounds in gold as compensation for Russia’s eight-year occupation of Ili, which the government could then put toward construction of the Siberian Railroad. Foreign Minister Giers and Minister of Finance Greig rejected this idea, though, and only 500,000 pounds was eventually demanded (Kuropatkin, Russian Army, 1:92-93).
      哈里·施瓦茨,《沙皇、官僚与政委:中俄关系史》(纽约,1973 年),55-58 页。值得注意的是,1878 年时任总参谋部亚洲司司长的 A·N·库罗帕特金曾建议中国支付 1000 万英镑黄金作为俄罗斯八年占领伊犁的补偿,政府可将这笔资金用于西伯利亚铁路的建设。然而,外交部长吉尔斯和财政部长格雷格否决了这一提议,最终仅索要了 50 万英镑(库罗帕特金,《俄罗斯军队》,第 1 卷:92-93 页)。
    3. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881 (Oxford, 1965), 155-158, 189-191; Kuropatkin, Russian Army, 1:94. At least until the Sino-
      徐中约,《伊犁危机:中俄外交研究,1871-1881》(牛津,1965 年),第 155-158 页,第 189-191 页;库罗帕特金,《俄罗斯军队》,第 1 卷,第 94 页。至少直到中俄...
  7. Japanese War of 1894-1895, most observers in the United States and Great Britain considered the Chinese army to be superior to Japan’s (Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 421-422; A. Gal’perin, Anglo-iaponskii soiuz, 1902-1921 gody [Moscow, 1947], 26).
    1894-1895 年的中日甲午战争期间,美国和英国的大多数观察家认为中国军队强于日本(纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,421-422 页;A.加尔佩林,《英日同盟,1902-1921 年》[莫斯科,1947 年],26 页)。

    29. Miliutin, Dnevnik, 3:237.
    29. 米柳京,《日记》,第 3 卷,第 237 页。

    30. Whereas in 1862 there were 6,900 regular troops in the Russian Far East, making up less than 1 % 1 % 1%1 \% of the total number of such troops in the Russian army, by 1882 there were 16,700, in 1891-24,800, and in 1895-32,100 (O. I. Sergeev, Kazachestvo na russkom Dal’nem Vostoke vXVII-XIX v v vv. [Moscow, 1983], 81-82). In the Maritime oblast, the number of troops increased from 6,813 in 1881 to 12,583 in 1892. In the South Ussuri region, the number rose from 1,753 in 1871 to 4,073 in 1881 (V. M. Kabuzan, Dal’nevostochnyi krai v XVII-nachale XX w. (1640-1917): Istoriko-demograficheskii ocherk [Moscow, 1985], 127; 164, table 5).
    30. 1862 年,俄罗斯远东地区仅有 6900 名正规军,占当时俄军正规部队总数的不到 1 % 1 % 1%1 \% ;而到了 1882 年,这一数字增至 16,700 人,1891 年达 24,800 人,1895 年更攀升至 32,100 人(O. I. Sergeev,《17-19 世纪俄罗斯远东地区的哥萨克》[莫斯科,1983 年],第 81-82 页)。在滨海州,驻军数量从 1881 年的 6,813 人增长到 1892 年的 12,583 人。南乌苏里地区则从 1871 年的 1,753 人增至 1881 年的 4,073 人(V. M. Kabuzan,《1640-1917 年远东边疆区历史人口概况》[莫斯科,1985 年],第 127 页;第 164 页表 5)。

    31. Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 357, 529.
    31. 纳罗奇尼茨基,《殖民政策》,357 页,529 页。
    1. Novoe vremia, May 6, 1889, p. 2. The hung hu tze had their origins in both Manchuria and the Chinese settlements of Siberia. Robbers and murderers, they terrorized isolated Russian settlements and the Chinese population of the Ussuri region by gruesomely torturing their victims. See V. K. Arsen’ev (Wladimir K. Arsenjew), Russen und Chinesen in Ostsibirien, trans. Franz Daniel (Berlin, n.d.), 149-151, and John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, 1950), 46.
      《新时代报》,1889 年 5 月 6 日,第 2 版。红胡子(Hung Hu Tze)既源自满洲,也来自西伯利亚的中国移民聚居区。这些强盗与杀人犯通过残忍折磨受害者,使孤立的俄罗斯定居点及乌苏里地区的中国居民陷入恐怖之中。详见 V.K.阿尔谢尼耶夫(弗拉基米尔·K·阿尔谢尼耶夫)《俄国人与中国人在东西伯利亚》,弗朗茨·丹尼尔译(柏林,无出版日期),第 149-151 页;以及约翰·阿尔伯特·怀特《西伯利亚干涉》(普林斯顿,1950 年),第 46 页。
    2. Robert Britton Valliant, “Japan and the Trans-Siberian Railroad, 1885-1905” (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 1974), 14-15; Skal’kovskii, Vneshniaia politika, 542; B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906), trans. Susan Wilbur Jones (New York, 1974), 40.
      罗伯特·布里顿·瓦利安特,《日本与西伯利亚大铁路(1885-1905)》(博士论文,夏威夷大学,1974 年),14-15 页;斯卡利科夫斯基,《对外政策》,542 页;B.A.罗曼诺夫,《俄国在满洲(1892-1906)》,苏珊·威尔伯·琼斯译(纽约,1974 年),40 页。
    3. See, for example, Putiat, “Zapreshchenie kitaitsam selit’sia na man’chzhurskikh zemliakh: Zheleznye dorogi Tian’tszin-Tundzheo i Man’chzhurskaia,” in General’nyi Shtab, Sbornik po Azii, vol. 42 (1890) (hereafter cited as Putiat), and “Man’chzhurskaia zheleznaia doroga,” in ibid., vol. 53 (1893).
      例如参见普佳特《禁止中国人在满洲土地上定居:天津—通州铁路与满洲铁路》,载总参谋部《亚洲文集》第 42 卷(1890 年)(下称普佳特),以及同书第 53 卷(1893 年)《满洲铁路》。
    4. Times, May 30, 1891, p. 7.
      《泰晤士报》,1891 年 5 月 30 日,第 7 版。
    5. Barabash, 111-116, 140.  巴拉巴什,第 111-116 页,第 140 页。
    1. Robert N. North, Transport in Western Siberia: Tsarist and Soviet Development (Vancouver, 1979), 23, 27; A. P. Okladnikov et al., eds., Istoriia Sibiri s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, vol. 2 (Leningrad, 1968), 385-389, 393-404; V. Iu. Grigor’ev, Peremeny v usloviiakh ekonomicheskoi zhizni naseleniia Sibiri (Eniseiskii krai) (Krasnoiarsk, 1904), 25-26, 29-30, 34-35.
      罗伯特·N·诺斯,《西西伯利亚的交通运输:沙皇与苏联时期的发展》(温哥华,1979 年),第 23、27 页;A·P·奥克拉德尼科夫等编,《西伯利亚史:从远古至今》第 2 卷(列宁格勒,1968 年),第 385-389、393-404 页;V·尤·格里戈里耶夫,《西伯利亚居民经济生活条件的变化(叶尼塞边区)》(克拉斯诺亚尔斯克,1904 年),第 25-26、29-30、34-35 页。
    2. Kuznetsov, “Sibirskaia programma,” 4-5.
      库兹涅佐夫,《西伯利亚计划》,第 4-5 页。
    3. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 710; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 27. Paradoxically, many people, including Siberian regionalists and reformers, portrayed it as a pitiable land crushed by the burden of the exile system and its use as a penal colony. Still others saw it as an empty and worthless territory, of no benefit to Russia (Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 533). Siberia is still described with hyperbole, positive and negative, today. See Allen S. Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise? (Stanford, 1981), 19-21.
      亚德林采夫,《西伯利亚作为殖民地》,第 710 页;斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,第 27 页。矛盾的是,包括西伯利亚地方主义者和改革者在内的许多人将其描绘成一个被流放制度及其作为刑罚殖民地使用所压垮的可怜之地。还有其他人视其为一片空旷无价值的领土,对俄罗斯毫无益处(亚德林采夫,《西伯利亚作为殖民地》,第 533 页)。时至今日,西伯利亚仍被用夸张的言辞描述,无论是正面还是负面。参见艾伦·S·怀廷,《西伯利亚发展与东亚:威胁还是承诺?》(斯坦福,1981 年),第 19-21 页。
    4. Kuznetsov, “Sibirskaia programma,” 5-10; John J. Stephan, “Russian-American Economic Relations in the Pacific: A Historical Perspective,” in Soviet-American Horizons on the Pacific, ed. John J. Stephan and V. P. Chichkanov (Honolulu, 1986), 67-70.
      库兹涅佐夫,“西伯利亚计划”,第 5-10 页;约翰·J·斯蒂芬,“太平洋地区的俄美经济关系:历史视角”,载于《苏联与美国的太平洋视野》,约翰·J·斯蒂芬和 V·P·奇奇卡诺夫编(檀香山,1986 年),第 67-70 页。
    1. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 3-4, 67, 83, 91-92, 94-101, 103-108, 111-112, 115, 117-118, 127, 129. Iadrintsev is critical of certain by-products of Siberia’s individualism, especially such business practices as monopoly and profiteering (pp. 118-119, 122), but he believes that with proper institutions these faults would be corrected. Here an ambivalence about capitalist enterprise becomes apparent. Later the individualism he has praised as distinct from European Russian collectivism he denigrates as a largely. urban-commercial phenomenon alien to the true Siberians-peasants-who put selfhelp and the interests of the commune above private property (pp. 143-145). This contradiction is also found in the thought of the legal populists, to which regionalism was close intellectually. See Arthur P. Mendel, Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia: Legal Marxism and Legal Populism (Cambridge, Mass., 1961).
      亚德林采夫,《西伯利亚作为殖民地》,3-4、67、83、91-92、94-101、103-108、111-112、115、117-118、127、129 页。亚德林采夫对西伯利亚个人主义的某些副产品持批评态度,尤其是垄断和投机倒把等商业行为(第 118-119、122 页),但他认为通过建立适当的制度可以纠正这些弊端。这里体现出对资本主义企业的矛盾态度。后来,他将曾赞誉为有别于欧俄集体主义的个人主义贬低为一种主要属于城市商业的现象,与真正的西伯利亚人——农民——格格不入,后者将自助和村社利益置于私有财产之上(第 143-145 页)。这种矛盾也存在于与地方主义在思想上相近的合法民粹派思想中。参见阿瑟·P·门德尔,《沙俄进步的两难:合法马克思主义与合法民粹主义》(马萨诸塞州剑桥,1961 年)。
    2. Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 432, 523, 526-527, 700, 707-712.
      亚德林采夫,《西伯利亚作为殖民地》,432、523、526-527、700、707-712 页。
    1. See Heide W. Whelan, Alexander III and the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counter-reform in Late Imperial Russia (New Brunswick, 1982), and Theodore Taranovski, “The Politics of Counter-reform: Autocracy and Bureaucracy in the Reign of Alexander III, 1881-1894” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1976).
      参见海德·W·惠兰《亚历山大三世与国家议会:沙俄晚期的官僚体制与反改革》(新不伦瑞克,1982 年),以及西奥多·塔拉诺夫斯基《反改革的政治:亚历山大三世统治时期的专制与官僚体制(1881-1894)》(哈佛大学博士论文,1976 年)。
    1. On ministerial rivalry, see George L. Yaney, The Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711-1905 (Urbana, Ill., 1973), 281-282, 299, 310; William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914 (Princeton, 1985), xxii. Yaney and Fuller explain the phenomenon by a variety of factors: as a by-product of the administrative growth that took place after 1860 and the resulting loss of a certain amount of control by the tsar over his ministers; as a consequence of the belief that each ministry fulfilled a distinct function unrelated to that of any other; and because responsibility to the tsar was stressed over coordination of policy.
      关于部际竞争,参见乔治·L·亚尼,《俄国政府系统化:帝俄国内行政管理的社会演变,1711-1905》(伊利诺伊州厄巴纳,1973 年),第 281-282 页、299 页、310 页;小威廉·C·富勒,《帝俄时期的军民冲突,1881-1914》(普林斯顿,1985 年),序言第 xxii 页。亚尼和富勒从多种因素解释这一现象:1860 年后行政扩张的副产品导致沙皇对大臣们的控制有所削弱;各部认为各自职能独立互不关联的信念;以及强调对沙皇负责而非政策协调的体制。
    2. Many of the early proposals did include vague notions of railroads across Siberia, likely inspired by the American transcontinental. But little knowledge of or interest in Siberia was evinced, and the goal was by and large to reach Peking. See, e.g., Sofronov’s proposal (1858-1859) in V. F. Borzunov, “Proekty stroitel’stva sibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali pervoi poloviny XIX v. kak istoricheskii istochnik,” in Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Sibirskoe Otdelenie, Dal’nevostochnyi Filial, Trudy, seriia istoricheskaia, vol. 5, ed. V. M. Vishnevskii et al. (Blagoveshchensk, 1963), 53-54. See also the critical survey of several of these projects, including one for a horse-drawn railroad enclosed in a covered gallery, in “Doklad A. K. Sidensnera ‘O zheleznoi doroge v Sibiri,’” in TOSRPT, vol. 17, otdel 2 (1886), 158-162, 171.
      许多早期提案确实包含了横跨西伯利亚铁路的模糊构想,这很可能是受到美国横贯大陆铁路的启发。但对西伯利亚的了解和兴趣普遍匮乏,且目标大体上是通往北京。例如,可参见索夫罗诺夫提案(1858-1859 年),载于 V.F.博尔祖诺夫《19 世纪上半叶西伯利亚铁路干线建设方案作为历史资料》,收录于苏联科学院西伯利亚分院远东分院历史系列丛书第 5 卷,V.M.维什涅夫斯基等编(布拉戈维申斯克,1963 年),53-54 页。另见对若干此类项目的批判性综述,包括一项关于在封闭廊道内运行马匹牵引铁路的方案,载于《A.K.西登斯纳"关于西伯利亚铁路"的报告》,收录于《TOSRPT》第 17 卷第 2 分册(1886 年),158-162 页,171 页。
    3. V. F. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia transsibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali XIX-nachala XX w.” (Ph.D. diss., Tomskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1972), 206.
      V.F.博尔祖诺夫,《19 世纪至 20 世纪初跨西伯利亚铁路干线建设史》(博士学位论文,托木斯克国立大学,1972 年),206 页。
  8. the terminus of the Ural Mining Railroad (O napravlenii, 8-9). The railroad from Perm’ to Ekaterinburg was not completed until 1878 (J. N. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways [London, 1964], 302).
    乌拉尔矿业铁路的终点站(参见《论方向》第 8-9 页)。彼尔姆至叶卡捷琳堡的铁路直到 1878 年才竣工(J.N.韦斯特伍德,《俄罗斯铁路史》[伦敦,1964 年],302 页)。

    12. Mil’man, Istoriia, 65, 68; O napravlenii, 15. Rybinsk was connected to St. Petersburg by rail via the Rybinsk-Bologoe Railroad, completed in 1870 (A. M. Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. [Moscow, 1975], 296).
    12. 米尔曼,《历史》,65,68;《论方向》,15。雷宾斯克通过 1870 年建成的雷宾斯克-博洛戈耶铁路与圣彼得堡相连(A. M. 索洛维约娃,《19 世纪下半叶俄罗斯铁路运输》[莫斯科,1975 年],296 页)。

    13. O napravlenii, 55-56, 69-70, 108; Po povodu prenii o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge v obshchestvakh sodeistviia russkoi torgovle i promyshlennosti [sic] i geograficheskom (Peredovye stat’i S.-Peterburgskikh vedomostei) (St. Petersburg, 1870), 10; “Zaiavlenie chlena Obshchestva Gryf [sic] Iaksa Bykovskogo o zheleznoi doroge iz Rossii v Indiiu,” TOSRPT, vol. 5, otdel 2 (1874), 6-14; “Doklad N. Shavrova o kitaiskoi i indiiskoi zheleznykh dorogakh,” TOSRPT, vol. 9, otdel 2 (1876), 95-120; Materialy k k kk istorii, 7; A. I. Chuprov, Iz proshlogo russkikh zheleznykh dorog: Stat’i 1874-1895 godov (Moscow, 1909), 158-160. In this period the sources show little interest in Far Eastern markets, a fact Pobedonostsev lamented, according to Robert F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought (Bloomington, Ind., 1968), 134. The interest in Central Asia accords with the support among entrepreneurs for an annexationist policy there at the time. See Alfred J. Rieber, “The Moscow Entrepreneurial Group: The Emergence of a New Form in Autocratic Politics,” pt. 2, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 25, no. 2 (1977): 192-193.
    13. 关于方向,55-56,69-70,108;《关于西伯利亚铁路在促进俄罗斯贸易与工业协会及地理协会中的讨论(圣彼得堡新闻报前沿文章)》(圣彼得堡,1870 年),10;"格瑞夫协会成员雅克萨·贝科夫斯基关于从俄罗斯至印度铁路的声明",《TOSRPT》,第 5 卷,第 2 部分(1874 年),6-14;"N.沙夫罗夫关于中国及印度铁路的报告",《TOSRPT》,第 9 卷,第 2 部分(1876 年),95-120;历史材料 k k kk ,7;A. I. 丘普罗夫,《俄罗斯铁路的过去:1874-1895 年文章集》(莫斯科,1909 年),158-160。这一时期资料显示对远东市场兴趣不大,这一事实据罗伯特·F.伯恩斯在《波别多诺斯采夫:生平与思想》(布卢明顿,印第安纳州,1968 年)第 134 页所述,令波别多诺斯采夫感到遗憾。对中亚的兴趣与当时企业家对当地兼并政策的支持相吻合。参见阿尔弗雷德·J.里伯,《莫斯科企业家集团:专制政治中新形式的出现》,第 2 部分,《东欧历史年鉴》第 25 卷第 2 期(1977 年):192-193。

    14. O napravlenii, 19-21, 59, 136; Po povodu prenii, 6-8; Chuprov, Iz proshlogo, 168170.
    14. 关于方向,19-21 页,59 页,136 页;关于争议,6-8 页;丘普罗夫,《往事追忆》,168-170 页。

    15. Chuprov, Iz proshlogo, 166.
    15. 丘普罗夫,《往事录》,第 166 页。
    1. For both sides of the argument, see ibid., 159-162, 166-167; O napravlenii, 11, 17, 53; Po povodu prenii, passim.
      关于双方论点,参见同上,159-162 页,166-167 页;关于方向,11 页,17 页,53 页;关于争议,各处。
    2. Chuprov, Iz proshlogo, 175-176.
      丘普罗夫,《往事录》,第 175-176 页。
    3. Richard Mowbray Haywood, “The ‘Ruler Legend’: Tsar Nicholas I and the Route of the St. Petersburg-Moscow Railway, 1842-1843,” Slavic Review, December 1978, no. 4: 641; Chuprov, Iz proshlogo, 167.
      理查德·莫布雷·海伍德,《“统治者传说”:沙皇尼古拉一世与圣彼得堡-莫斯科铁路线路,1842-1843》,《斯拉夫评论》,1978 年 12 月,第 4 期:641;丘普罗夫,《往事》,167 页。
    4. O napravlenii, 157.  《论方向》,第 157 页。
    1. MPS, Upravlenie Zheleznykh Dorog, Tekhnichesko-Inspektorskii Komitet, “Predstavlenie v v vv komitet ministrov MPS K. N. Pos’eta: ‘O napravlenii tranzitnoi sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,’” May 2, 1875, no. 2319, pp. 1-5, 18-25, 42-43; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 24-25, 28-30.
      俄罗斯帝国交通部铁路管理局技术监察委员会,“交通部长 K·N·波谢特向部长会议提交的《关于西伯利亚干线铁路走向的报告》”,1875 年 5 月 2 日,编号 2319,第 1-5、18-25、42-43 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,24-25、28-30 页。
    2. MPS, “Predstavlenie,” no. 2319, pp. 25-27.
      交通部,“呈文”,编号 2319,第 25-27 页。
  9. the northern provinces, and navigational conditions hindered the use of steamers. As a result, the region remained isolated and undeveloped, a condition that Pos’et was hoping to overcome.
    北部各省,航运条件限制了蒸汽船的使用。因此,该地区仍然处于孤立和未开发状态,波谢特希望改变这一状况。

    23. MPS, “Predstavlenie,” no. 2319, pp. 35-36, 41-42.
    23. 交通部,“呈文”,编号 2319,第 35-36 页,41-42 页。

    24. Pos’et had many years of personal experience in Asia as explorer of the coastal waters of Russia’s future Maritime oblast (for which activity a bay and town were given his name), as one of the negotiators of the first Russo-Japanese trade treaty, and as naval officer in the defense of Petropavlovsk-na-Kamchatke during the Crimean War. He played a role in Murav’ev-Amurskii’s acquisition of Amur oblast and visited Siberia, China, Japan, the United States, and Canada. See A. I. Krushanov, “Nekotorye voprosy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi istorii Vladivostoka (1860-1916),” in Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Sibirskoe Otdelenie, Dal’nevostochnyi Filial, vol. 3, seriia istoricheskaia, Trudy: Materialy po istorii Vladivostoka, ed. V. G. Shcheben’kov et al. [Vladivostok, 1960], 21n16; K. N. Pos’et, “Prekrashchenie ssylki v Sibir’ (Zapiska K. N. Pos’eta),” Russkaia starina 99 (July 1899): 52-53; G. I. Nevel’skoi, Podvigi russkikh ofitserov na krainem vostoke Rossii, 18491855 (Moscow, 1947), 292, 321, 336, 341, 384n175; Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904 (Berkeley, 1958), 15; Brokgauz-Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, vol. 48 (St. Petersburg, 1898), 718.
    24. 波谢特在亚洲拥有多年的个人经历:他曾作为俄罗斯未来滨海边疆区沿海水域的探险者(为此活动,一个海湾和城镇以他的名字命名)、首份俄日贸易条约的谈判代表之一,以及在克里米亚战争期间担任彼得罗巴甫洛夫斯克-堪察加的海军军官参与防御。他在穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基获取阿穆尔边疆区的过程中发挥了作用,并曾到访西伯利亚、中国、日本、美国和加拿大。参见 A. I. 克鲁沙诺夫,《符拉迪沃斯托克社会经济史若干问题(1860-1916)》,载于苏联科学院西伯利亚分院远东分院历史系列第 3 卷《符拉迪沃斯托克历史资料集》,V. G. 谢边科夫等编[符拉迪沃斯托克,1960 年],第 21 页注 16;K. N. 波谢特,《停止向西伯利亚流放(K. N. 波谢特笔记)》,《俄罗斯旧事》第 99 期(1899 年 7 月):52-53 页;G. I. 涅韦利斯科伊,《1849-1855 年俄罗斯军官在俄国远东的功绩》(莫斯科,1947 年),第 292、321、336、341、384 页注 175;安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫,《1881-1904 年俄国远东政策》(伯克利,1958 年),第 15 页;布罗克豪斯-埃夫隆,《百科词典》第 48 卷(圣彼得堡,1898 年),第 718 页。
    1. D. A. Miliutin, Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1947), 196; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 31. Those opposed included the chairman, P. N. Ignat’ev; Grand Prince Konstantin Nikolaevich; War Minister Miliutin; the former minister of the interior P. A. Valuev; Minister of Finance M. Kh. Reutern; S. A. Greig; the governor general of Western Siberia, N. G. Kaznakov; A. A. Abaza; and the engineer General S. V. Kerbedz.
      D·A·米留京,《D·A·米留京日记》第一卷(莫斯科,1947 年),第 196 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 31 页。反对者包括委员会主席 P·N·伊格纳季耶夫、大公康斯坦丁·尼古拉耶维奇、陆军大臣米留京、前内政大臣 P·A·瓦卢耶夫、财政大臣 M·Kh·罗伊特恩、S·A·格雷格、西西伯利亚总督 N·G·卡兹纳科夫、A·A·阿巴扎以及工程师将军 S·V·克尔贝兹。
    2. Miliutin, Dnevnik, 1:196.
      米柳京,《日记》,第 1 卷,第 196 页。
    3. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 31-32.
      萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 31-32 页。
    4. Ibid., 32.  同上,第 32 页。
    1. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no, comp. V. M. Verkhovskii, pt. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1899), 442.
      俄罗斯交通部,《俄罗斯铁路发展历史概述:自建立至 1897 年(含)》,V·M·维尔霍夫斯基编,第 2 部(圣彼得堡,1899 年),442 页。
    2. K. A. Skal’kovskii, Les Ministres des finances de la Russie, 1802-1890 (Paris, 1891),
      K·A·斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯财政大臣,1802-1890》(巴黎,1891 年),
  10. 209-210, 228; Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport, 105, 107; Amburger, Geschichte, 69, 208, 221; L. E. Shepelev, Tsarizm i burzhuaziia vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka: Problemy torgovo-promyshlennoi politiki (Leningrad, 1981), 81, 116; Richard G. Robbins, Jr., Famine in Russia, 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis (New York, 1975), 66; Taranovski, “Politics of Counter-reform,” 688; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 293.
    209-210 页,228 页;索洛维约娃,《铁路运输》,105 页,107 页;安伯格,《历史》,69 页,208 页,221 页;L·E·舍佩列夫,《19 世纪下半叶沙皇制度与资产阶级:工商业政策问题》(列宁格勒,1981 年),81 页,116 页;小理查德·G·罗宾斯,《俄罗斯饥荒:1891-1892 年帝国政府对危机的应对》(纽约,1975 年),66 页;塔拉诺夫斯基,“反改革的政治”,688 页;俄罗斯交通部,《历史概述》,293 页。

    31. Richard M. Haywood, The Beginnings of Railway Development in Russia in the Reign of Nicholas I, 1835-1842 (Durham, N.C., 1969), 84.
    31. 理查德·M·海伍德,《尼古拉一世时期俄罗斯铁路发展的开端:1835-1842 年》(北卡罗来纳州达勒姆,1969 年),84 页。

    32. Walter M. Pintner, Russian Economic Policy under Nicholas I (Ithaca, N.Y., 1967), 6, 7, 21-22.
    32. 沃尔特·M·平特纳,《尼古拉一世统治下的俄罗斯经济政策》(纽约州伊萨卡,1967 年),第 6、7、21-22 页。

    33. A. A. Polovtsov, Dnevnik gosudarstvennogo sekretaria A. A. Polovtsova, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1966), 253 (Dec. 28, 1889).
    33. A·A·波洛夫佐夫,《国家秘书 A·A·波洛夫佐夫日记》第二卷(莫斯科,1966 年),253 页(1889 年 12 月 28 日)。

    34. On engineers, see Donald W. Green, “Industrialization and the Engineering Ascendancy: A Comparative Study of American and Russian Engineering Elites, 1870-1920” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1972), 418-419. On bureaucratic attitudes, see Marc Raeff, Michael Speransky:Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772-1839 (The Hague, 1969), 362-365; also Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Russia on the Eve of War and Revolution, ed. Cyril E. Black (Princeton, 1984), 12.
    34. 关于工程师群体,参见唐纳德·W·格林《工业化与工程精英的崛起:美俄工程精英比较研究(1870-1920)》(博士论文,加州大学伯克利分校,1972 年),第 418-419 页;关于官僚态度,参阅马克·拉伊夫《米哈伊尔·斯佩兰斯基:1772-1839 年俄罗斯帝国的政治家》(海牙,1969 年),第 362-365 页;另见唐纳德·麦肯齐·华莱士《战争与革命前夕的俄罗斯》,西里尔·E·布莱克编(普林斯顿,1984 年),第 12 页。

    35. Robert E. Jones, Provincial Development in Russia: Catherine II and Jakob Sievers (New Brunswick, 1984), 1, 3, 8; Marc Raeff, “In the Imperial Manner,” in Catherine the Great: A Profile, ed. Raeff (New York, 1972), 199-200.
    35. 罗伯特·E·琼斯《俄罗斯的地方发展:叶卡捷琳娜二世与雅各布·西弗斯》(新不伦瑞克,1984 年),第 1、3、8 页;马克·拉伊夫《帝国风范》,载《叶卡捷琳娜大帝评传》,拉伊夫编(纽约,1972 年),第 199-200 页。
    1. D. I. Mendeleev, “Ob issledovanii okrain Rossii,” in Problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiia Rossii, ed. V. P. Kirichenko (Moscow, 1960), 102-103.
      门捷列夫,《论俄罗斯边疆研究》,载《俄罗斯经济发展问题》,V.P.基里琴科编(莫斯科,1960 年),第 102-103 页。
    2. W. H. G. Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrats: A Social History (London, 1965), 148. The Institut Inzhenerov Putei Soobshcheniia Imperatora Aleksandra I is today the Leningradskii Institut Inzhenerov Zheleznodorozhnogo Transporta imeni Obraztsova. 38. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 291; Haywood, Beginnings of Railway Development, 203.
      W. H. G. 阿米蒂奇,《技术官僚的崛起:一部社会史》(伦敦,1965 年),第 148 页。亚历山大一世交通工程师学院现为奥布拉兹佐夫命名的列宁格勒铁路运输工程师学院。38. 交通部,《历史概述》,第 291 页;海伍德,《铁路发展的开端》,第 203 页。
    3. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 59.
      萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 59 页。
    4. MPS, Upravlenie Zheleznykh Dorog, Tekhnichesko-Inspektorskii Komitet, “Predstavlenie v komitet ministrov MPS K. N. Pos’eta,” June 1, 1884, no. 4751, p. 1.
      交通部铁路管理局技术监察委员会,“交通部长 K. N. 波谢特提交部长会议的报告”,1884 年 6 月 1 日,编号 4751,第 1 页。
    1. F. G. Terner, Vospominaniia zhizni, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1911), 78, 80.
      F. G. 特尔纳,《生活回忆录》,第 2 卷(圣彼得堡,1911 年),第 78、80 页。
    2. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 1:200 (Mar. 19, 1884); Miliutin, Dnevnik, 4:34-35.
      波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,1:200(1884 年 3 月 19 日);米柳京,《日记》,4:34-35。
    3. For one example of this disdain, see Terner, Vospominaniia zhizni, 2:178. To some degree even American engineers had the same problem in the 1870 s. See Judith A. Merkle, Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement (Berkeley, 1980), 38.
      关于这种蔑视的一个例子,参见特纳《生活回忆录》第 2 卷第 178 页。某种程度上,甚至美国工程师在 1870 年代也面临同样问题。见朱迪斯·A·默克尔,《管理与意识形态:国际科学管理运动的遗产》(伯克利,1980 年),第 38 页。
    4. Times, May 16, 1883, p. 5. On Feb. 26, 1891, the Times reported that the Siberian Railroad “will be a great boon to thousands of engineers wanting employment, and great excitement prevails among this class.”
      《泰晤士报》,1883 年 5 月 16 日,第 5 版。1891 年 2 月 26 日,《泰晤士报》报道称西伯利亚铁路“将为成千上万寻求就业的工程师带来巨大福音,这一群体中正弥漫着极大的兴奋情绪”。
    5. Edward C. Thaden, ed., Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 18551914 (Princeton, 1981), 26; Skal’kovskii, Ministres des finances, 212; Zaionchkovskii, Russian Autocracy in Crisis, 16, 135, 145, 147, 159. On Konstantin and Reutern, see Jacob W. Kipp, “M. Kh. Reutern on the Russian State and Economy: A Liberal Bureaucrat during the Crimean Era, 1854-60,” Journal of Modern History. 47 (September 1975): 438.
      爱德华·C·撒登编,《波罗的海省份与芬兰的俄罗斯化,1855-1914》(普林斯顿,1981 年),第 26 页;斯卡尔科夫斯基,《财政大臣》,第 212 页;扎昂奇科夫斯基,《危机中的俄罗斯专制制度》,第 16、135、145、147、159 页。关于康斯坦丁与罗伊特恩,参见雅各布·W·基普,《克里米亚时期的俄罗斯国家与经济:自由派官僚 M·Kh·罗伊特恩(1854-60 年)》,《现代史杂志》第 47 卷(1975 年 9 月),第 438 页。
    1. Zaionchkovskii, Russian Autocracy in Crisis, 206-211; Miliutin, Dnevnik, 4:34-35.
      扎昂奇科夫斯基,《危机中的俄罗斯专制制度》,206-211 页;米柳京,《日记》,4:34-35。
    1. K. A. Skal’kovskii, Les Ministres des finances de la Russie, 1802-1890 (Paris, 1891), 247; L. E. Shepelev, Tsarizm i burzhuaziia vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka: Problemy torgovopromyshlennoi politiki (Leningrad, 1981), 134; A. N. Kulomzin, Le Transsibérien, trans. Jules Legras (Paris, 1904), 18; S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, comps., Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903), 34-35; A. M. Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. (Moscow, 1975), 117-118.
      K·A·斯卡尔科夫斯基,《俄罗斯财政大臣,1802-1890》(巴黎,1891 年),第 247 页;L·E·舍佩列夫,《19 世纪下半叶沙皇制度与资产阶级:工商业政策问题》(列宁格勒,1981 年),第 134 页;A·N·库洛姆津,《西伯利亚大铁路》,朱尔·勒格拉译(巴黎,1904 年),第 18 页;S·V·萨布勒与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基编,《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概览》,A·N·库洛姆津主编(圣彼得堡,1903 年),第 34-35 页;A·M·索洛维约娃,《19 世纪下半叶俄罗斯铁路运输》(莫斯科,1975 年),第 117-118 页。
    2. Olga Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914 (London, 1976), 96-97; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 35.
      奥尔加·克里斯普,《1914 年前俄国经济研究》(伦敦,1976 年),第 96-97 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 35 页。
    3. Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport, 116.
      索洛维约娃,《铁路运输》,第 116 页。
    4. Skal’kovskii, Ministres des finances, 235-236, 263.
      斯卡利科夫斯基,《财政部长》,第 235-236 页,第 263 页。
    5. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 36.
      萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 36 页。
    1. Skal’kovskii, Ministres des finances, 252; Kulomzin, Le Transsibérien, 21.
      斯卡尔科夫斯基,《财政大臣》,第 252 页;库洛姆津,《西伯利亚大铁路》,第 21 页。
    2. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 g. vkliuchitel’no, comp. V. M. Verkhovskii, pt. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1899), 303-309, 443; Robert J. Kerner, The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History: The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs, Monasteries, and Furs (Berkeley, 1942), 96-97; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 39-42; P. I. Roshchevskii, “K istorii proektirovaniia zheleznoi dorogi Ekaterinburg-Tiumen’,” in Tiumenskii Gosudarstvennyi Pedagogicheskii Institut, Uchenye zapiski 5, no. 2 (1958): 179-202.
      交通部,《俄罗斯铁路发展历史概述(自建立至 1897 年)》,维尔霍夫斯基编,第 2 部分(圣彼得堡,1899 年),第 303-309 页、443 页;罗伯特·J·克纳,《向海之欲:俄罗斯历史进程中的河流、连水陆路、城堡、修道院与毛皮角色》(伯克利,1942 年),第 96-97 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 39-42 页;P·I·罗什切夫斯基,《叶卡捷琳堡-秋明铁路设计史》,载《秋明国立师范学院学术笔记》第 5 卷第 2 期(1958 年),第 179-202 页。
    3. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 318; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 3; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 42, 47-49. For routes surveyed, see MPS, Upravlenie Zheleznykh Dorog, Tekhnichesko-Inspektorskii Komitet, “Predstavlenie v komitet ministrov MPS K. N. Pos’eta,” June 1, 1884, no. 4751, p. 1.
      交通部,《历史概述》,第 318 页;《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:第 3 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 42、47-49 页。关于勘测路线,参见交通部铁路管理局技术监察委员会《交通部长 K·N·波谢特提交部长会议的报告》,1884 年 6 月 1 日,编号 4751,第 1 页。
    1. MPS, “Predstavlenie,” no. 4751, p. 14.
      交通部,“呈文”,编号 4751,第 14 页。
    2. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 44, 46-47.
      萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,44 页,46-47 页。
    3. Ibid., 43.  同上,43 页。
    4. MPS, “Predstavlenie,” no. 4751, p. 14.
      交通部,“呈文”,编号 4751,第 14 页。
    5. O napravlenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi (Publichnye preniia v obshchestve dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle) (St. Petersburg, 1884), 25-26; M. Sobolev, “Puti soobshcheniia v Sibiri,” in Sibir’: Eia sovremennoe sostoianie i eia nuzhdy: Sbornik
      关于西伯利亚铁路的走向(俄罗斯工商业促进协会公开辩论会)(圣彼得堡,1884 年),25-26 页;M.索博列夫,“西伯利亚的交通路线”,载于《西伯利亚:现状与需求》论文集,I.S.梅利尼克编(圣彼得堡,1908 年),33 页。
  11. statei, ed. I. S. Mel’nik (St. Petersburg, 1908), 33; Robert N. North, Transport in Western Siberia: Tsarist and Soviet Development (Vancouver, 1979), 20, 47.
    罗伯特·N·诺斯,《西西伯利亚的交通:沙皇时期与苏联时期的发展》(温哥华,1979 年),20、47 页。

    14. North, Transport, 28, 34; M. I. Pomus, Zapadnaia Sibir’ (Ekonomiko-geograficheskaia kharakteristika) (Moscow, 1956), 115; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 2; N. Ostrovskii, K voprosu o zheleznykh dorogakh v Sibiri (Perm’, 1880), 60-74, 83.
    14. 诺斯,《交通》,28、34 页;M.I.波穆斯,《西西伯利亚(经济地理特征)》(莫斯科,1956 年),115 页;《交通部杂志》,官方版,1893 年第 2 期:2 页;N.奥斯特洛夫斯基,《关于西伯利亚铁路问题》(彼尔姆,1880 年),60-74、83 页。

    15. A. I. Chuprov, Iz proshlogo russkikh zheleznykh dorog: Stat’i 1874-1895 godov (Moscow, 1909), 178.
    15. A.I.丘普罗夫,《俄罗斯铁路往事:1874-1895 年论文集》(莫斯科,1909 年),178 页。

    16. Ostrovskii, K K KK voprosu, 12, 76-82; Chuprov, Iz proshlogo, 177. On the growth of agriculture and livestock husbandry in Siberia in this period, see also A. P. Okladnikov et al., eds., Istoriia Sibiri s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, vol. 3 (Leningrad, 1968), 27-32.
    16. 奥斯特洛夫斯基,《关于问题》,12,76-82 页;丘普罗夫,《往事》,177 页。关于这一时期西伯利亚农业和畜牧业的发展,另见 A.P.奥克拉德尼科夫等编,《西伯利亚史:从远古至今》第 3 卷(列宁格勒,1968 年),27-32 页。
    1. The lines he suggested were (1) Perm’-Tobol’sk (Kama-Irtysh railroad); (2) TomskKrasnoiarsk (Ob’-Enisei railroad); and (3) Omsk-Barnaul (Irtysh-Ob’ and future RussoChinese railroad).
      他建议的线路是:(1)彼尔姆-托博尔斯克(卡马-额尔齐斯铁路);(2)托木斯克-克拉斯诺亚尔斯克(鄂毕-叶尼塞铁路);(3)鄂木斯克-巴尔瑙尔(额尔齐斯-鄂毕及未来的中俄铁路)。
    2. “‘O velikom sibirskom puti v sviazi s pravitel’stvennymi izyskaniiami’: Doklad N.A. Sytenko i beseda v VIII otdele IRTO,” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 22-24: 177.
      “《关于伟大的西伯利亚之路与政府勘测的关系》:N.A.瑟坚科的报告及在 IRTO 第八部门的讨论”,《铁路杂志》,1888 年,第 22-24 期:177 页。
    3. “Zheleznye dorogi v Sibir’,” ZhdD, 1883, no. 9: 101-102.
      《西伯利亚铁路》,《铁路杂志》1883 年第 9 期:第 101-102 页。
    1. Inzhener B., “K voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge,” Inzhener 11 (July 1887): 295; MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti ministerstva putei soobshcheniia po stroitel’stvu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi za vremia s 30 marta 1889 g. po 17 ianvaria 1892 g.” (TsGAOR, fond 677 , opis’ 1, delo 629), 23; Otchet o zasedaniiakh obshchestva dlia sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle, po voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge (St. Petersburg, 1884), 63; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2:3-6; North, Transport, 69; TOSRPT, vol. 18, otdel 1 (1887), 11-13. See also Georg Cleinow, “Eisenbahnbauten und -pläne in Russisch-Asien,” Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen 51 (January-February 1928): 77.
      工程师 B.,“论西伯利亚铁路问题”,《工程师》第 11 期(1887 年 7 月):295 页;交通部,“交通部关于西伯利亚铁路建设活动的报告(1889 年 3 月 30 日至 1892 年 1 月 17 日)”(中央国家历史档案馆,全宗 677,目录 1,案卷 629),23 页;《关于促进俄国工业与贸易协会就西伯利亚铁路问题会议记录》(圣彼得堡,1884 年),63 页;《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年,第 2 期:3-6 页;诺斯,《运输》,69 页;《全俄工商业代表大会记录》第 18 卷,第 1 部分(1887 年),11-13 页。另见格奥尔格·克莱瑙,“俄属亚洲的铁路建设与规划”,《铁路档案》第 51 期(1928 年 1-2 月):77 页。
    2. Otchet o zasedaniiakh, 216.
      会议记录报告,第 216 页。
    1. Volkov, Zapiska upolnomochennogo ot ufimskogo gubernskogo zemstva i g. Ufy, ufimskogo gorodskogo golovy Volkova: K voprosu o napravlenii sibirskoi dorogi (n.p., 1882), and O napravlenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi: Zapiska upolnomochennogo ot ufimskogo gubernskogo zemstva i goroda Ufy, ufimskogo gorodskogo golovy Volkova (St. Petersburg, 1884); Neskol’ko slov po voprosu, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1882); Otchet o zasedaniiakh, 20-21, 24-25, 58-59, 63, 72-73, 76, 84-90, 140-144, 152, 164; TOSRPT, vol. 15, otdel 1 (1885), pp. 5-14, 23.
      沃尔科夫,《乌法省地方自治局及乌法市全权代表、乌法市长沃尔科夫关于西伯利亚铁路走向问题的备忘录》(无出版地,1882 年),以及《关于西伯利亚铁路走向:乌法省地方自治局及乌法市全权代表、乌法市长沃尔科夫备忘录》(圣彼得堡,1884 年);《关于该问题的几点意见》第二版(莫斯科,1882 年);《会议记录报告》,第 20-21、24-25、58-59、63、72-73、76、84-90、140-144、152、164 页;《俄国技术协会会刊》第 15 卷第 1 分册(1885 年),第 5-14、23 页。
    2. See, for instance, S.-Peterburgskii Birzhevyi Komitet, Zametka k k kk voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge (St. Petersburg, 1884), and above for the Orenburg-Omsk proposal.
      例如参见《圣彼得堡交易所委员会关于西伯利亚铁路问题的意见》(圣彼得堡,1884 年),以及前文关于奥伦堡-鄂木斯克方案的论述。
    3. ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 2.
      《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:第 2 页。
    4. As expressed by Chuprov, Iz proshlogo, 155.
      如丘普罗夫在《Iz proshlogo》第 155 页所述。
    5. According to Pos’et, "the answer to the question of unifying the two halves of the Empire [by means of a railroad] should not depend on whether the transport of various
      据波谢特所言,“关于通过铁路统一帝国两半的问题,其答案不应取决于运输各类物资是否便利廉价或能否满足地方私人利益;而首要的是必须满足中央政府的需要”(交通部,《呈文》,编号 4751,第 1 页)。
  12. goods is convenient and cheap or whether it satisfies private local interests; rather, it must satisfy, above all, the needs of the central government" (MPS, “Predstavlenie,” no. 4751, p. 1).
    货物运输是否便利廉价或能否满足地方私人利益;而首要的是必须满足中央政府的需要”(交通部,《呈文》,编号 4751,第 1 页)。

    36. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 55.
    36. 萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,55 页。

    37. Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie, 83-84. The quote is Polovtsov’s (p. 244).
    37. 扎伊翁奇科夫斯基,《俄罗斯专制制度》,83-84 页。引文出自波洛夫佐夫著作(第 244 页)。

    38. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 56-60; T. I. Filippov, “Zapiska gosudarstvennogo kontrolera upravliaiushchemu delami komiteta ministrov o proektirovavshemsia napravlenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” TsGAOR, fond 1099, opis’ 1 , delo 463; Brokgauz-Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, vol. 70 (St. Petersburg, 1902), 759. Filippov was “invited” to work at the office of the state comptroller by Ostrovskii (K. A. Skal’kovskii, Nashi gosudarstvennye i obshchestvennye deiateli [St. Petersburg, 1890], 310). He would replace Sol’skii in 1889.
    38. 萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,56-60 页;T·I·菲利波夫,“国家审计长致部长会议办公厅主任关于西伯利亚铁路规划线路的备忘录”,中央国家十月革命档案馆,全宗号 1099,目录 1,案卷 463;《布罗克豪斯-埃弗龙百科词典》,第 70 卷(圣彼得堡,1902 年),759 页。菲利波夫是被奥斯特洛夫斯基“邀请”至国家审计局工作的(参见 K·A·斯卡利科夫斯基,《我国国家与社会活动家》[圣彼得堡,1890 年],310 页)。他将于 1889 年接替索利斯基的职位。
    1. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 59-65; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 7; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 449-451.
      萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,59-65 页;《交通部公报》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:7 页;交通部,《历史概览》,449-451 页。
    2. Siberian regionalism can be compared with the Grange movement in the United States. The Grangers viewed the American South and West as colonial appendages of the industrial northeast and England, both of which they referred to as the “metropolis.” Unlike the Siberians, they supported construction of a transcontinental railroad because they reasoned that it would, among other things, expand their potential markets, bring the country dominance in the world trading system, and rid it of its dependence on England. Their strategy was soon adopted by society at large., See Howard B. Schonberger, Transportation to the Seaboard: The “Communication Revolution” and American Foreign Policy, 1860-1900 (Westport, Conn., 1971), xi-xii.
      西伯利亚地区主义可与美国的格兰其运动相提并论。格兰其成员将美国南部和西部视为工业化的东北部及英格兰的殖民附属地,二者均被他们称为"大都会"。与西伯利亚人不同,他们支持修建横贯大陆的铁路,因为他们认为这条铁路将扩大潜在市场、使美国在世界贸易体系中占据主导地位,并摆脱对英格兰的依赖。这一策略很快被全社会采纳。(参见霍华德·B·舍恩伯格《通往海岸的运输:"交通革命"与美国外交政策(1860-1900)》(康涅狄格州韦斯特波特,1971 年),序言第 11-12 页)
    1. I. A. Iakushev, “Gr. N. Potanin (Ego politicheskie vzgliady i obshchestvennopoliticheskaia deiatel’nost’),” in Vol’naia Sibir’, vol. 1 (Prague, 1927), 18-19; A. Walicki, The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists (Oxford, 1969), 92-93n4. In this respect, the Siberian regionalists were more akin to Herzen or Bakunin than to the populists who were their contemporaries. Iadrintsev was suspicious that the populists were not committed to federalism, and there was a deep division between “centralist-Jacobins” and regionalists on the staff of the newspaper Vostochnoe obozrenie (S. G. Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’ (K istorii sibirskogo oblastnichestva v XIX v.] [Prague, 1930], 73-74; I. I. Popov, Minuvshee i perezhitoe: Vospominaniia za 50 let:Sibir’ i emigratsiia [Leningrad, 1924], 232). On the divergence between Siberian regionalism and populism, see also Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth-Century Russia, trans. Francis Haskell (Chicago, 1960), 320-321, and Abbott Gleason, Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s (Chicago, 1980), 207, 223. Especially after Iadrintsev’s death, Vostochnoe obozrenie came to be dominated by populists and featured Marxist writers, too, including Trotsky.
      I. A. 雅库舍夫,《格里高利·尼古拉耶维奇·波塔宁(他的政治观点与社会政治活动)》,载于《自由西伯利亚》第 1 卷(布拉格,1927 年),18-19 页;A. 瓦利茨基,《关于资本主义的争论:俄国民粹派社会哲学研究》(牛津,1969 年),92-93 页注 4。在这方面,西伯利亚地方主义者更接近赫尔岑或巴枯宁,而非与他们同时代的民粹派。亚德林采夫怀疑民粹派并不真正支持联邦制,且在《东方评论报》编辑部内部,“中央集权派-雅各宾派”与地方主义者之间存在深刻分歧(S. G. 斯瓦季科夫,《俄国与西伯利亚:19 世纪西伯利亚地方主义运动史》[布拉格,1930 年],73-74 页;I. I. 波波夫,《逝去与经历:五十年代回忆录:西伯利亚与流亡》[列宁格勒,1924 年],232 页)。关于西伯利亚地方主义与民粹派的分歧,另见弗朗科·文图里《革命的根源:19 世纪俄国民粹派与社会主义运动史》,弗朗西斯·哈斯克尔译(芝加哥,1960 年),320-321 页;以及阿博特·格里森《年轻的俄罗斯:1860 年代俄国激进主义的起源》(芝加哥,1980 年),207 页,223 页。 尤其在亚德林采夫去世后,《东方评论》逐渐由民粹主义者主导,并开始刊登包括托洛茨基在内的马克思主义者的文章。
    2. Iakushev, “Gr. N. Potanin,” 17-18, 32.
      雅库舍夫,《格里高利·波塔宁》,17-18 页,32 页。
    3. Materialy k k kk istorii voprosa o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge, suppl. to ZhdD, no. 16 (1891): 98.
      《西伯利亚铁路问题历史资料》,《铁路杂志》第 16 期增刊(1891 年):98 页。
    1. P. E. Skachkov, Ocherki istorii russkogo kitaevedeniia (Moscow, 1977), 239; Svatikov, Rossiia i Sibir’, 85; Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 719. On Chernyshevskii’s attitude, see Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, 1979), 201.
      斯恰奇科夫,《俄罗斯汉学史纲》(莫斯科,1977 年),239 页;斯瓦季科夫,《俄罗斯与西伯利亚》,85 页;亚德林采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,719 页。关于车尔尼雪夫斯基的观点,参见安杰伊·瓦利茨基,《俄罗斯思想史:从启蒙运动到马克思主义》(斯坦福,1979 年),201 页。
    2. “‘Kul’turnoe i promyshlennoe sostoianie Sibiri,’ (Doklad N. M. Iadrintseva),” in TOSRPT, vol. 14, (1884), 28-29.
      “‘西伯利亚的文化与工业状况’(N·M·亚德林采夫报告)”,载《托木斯克省地方自治局会刊》第 14 卷(1884 年),第 28-29 页。
    3. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1882, no. 5: 9-10; 1883, no. 9: 3; 1884, no. 20: 3; Iadrintsev, Sibir’ kak koloniia, 350-351, 364, 373, 444-468; Iakushev, “Gr. N. Potanin,” 35.
      《东方评论》,1882 年第 5 期:9-10 页;1883 年第 9 期:3 页;1884 年第 20 期:3 页;亚德林采夫,《作为殖民地的西伯利亚》,第 350-351 页、364 页、373 页、444-468 页;雅库舍夫,“格里戈里·波塔宁伯爵”,35 页。
    4. See Arthur P. Mendel, Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia: Legal Marxism and Legal Populism (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 38-40.
      参见阿瑟·门德尔,《沙俄进步的两难困境:合法马克思主义与合法民粹主义》(马萨诸塞州剑桥,1961 年),38-40 页。
    5. Quoted in Watrous, "Russia’s ‘Land of the Future’ " 2:675.
      引自 Watrous,《俄罗斯的“未来之地”》第 2 卷第 675 页。
    6. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1892, no. 39: 2.
      《东方评论》,1892 年,第 39 期:第 2 页。
    1. Katkov, Sobranie: 1882 god, 669 (Dec. 22).
      卡特科夫,《文集》:1882 年卷,第 669 页(12 月 22 日)。
    2. Quoted in Novoe vremia, July 9, 1889, p. 1, and July 15, 1889, p. 1. See also July 5, 1889, p. 1.
      引自《新时代报》,1889 年 7 月 9 日第 1 版,以及 1889 年 7 月 15 日第 1 版。另见 1889 年 7 月 5 日第 1 版。
    3. Quoted in A. V. Pataleev, Istoriia stroitel’stva velikogo sibirskogo zheleznodorozhnogo puti (Khabarovsk, 1951), 8.
      引自 A·V·帕塔列耶夫,《伟大的西伯利亚铁路建设史》(哈巴罗夫斯克,1951 年),第 8 页。
    4. N. A. Voloshinov [M. V-_"], Neskol’ko slov o sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogé (St. Petersburg, 1890), 20.
      N·A·沃洛希诺夫 [M·V-_"],《关于西伯利亚铁路的几句话》(圣彼得堡,1890 年),第 20 页。
  13. nomic Policy," 130-132). See below and A. A. Polovtsov, Dnevnik gosudarstvennogo sekretaria A. A. Polovtsova, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1966), 209 (June 17, 1889), where Abaza is quoted as saying that Vyshnegradskii “simply continued the policies of his predecessors.”
    经济政策》,130-132 页)。参见下文及 A·A·波洛夫佐夫,《国家秘书 A·A·波洛夫佐夫日记》第 2 卷(莫斯科,1966 年),209 页(1889 年 6 月 17 日),其中引述阿巴扎的话称维什涅格拉茨基“不过是延续了前任的政策”。

    6. Shepelev, Tsarizm, 156, 166-167; Olga Crisp, Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914 (London, 1976), 99-100.
    6. 谢佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,第 156、166-167 页;奥尔加·克里斯普,《1914 年前俄国经济研究》(伦敦,1976 年),第 99-100 页。

    7. I. F. Gindin, Gosudarstvennyi bank i ekonomicheskaia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva (1861-1892 god) (Moscow, 1960), 62. The total state debt (foreign and domestic) had risen under Bunge from 6,046 million rubles in 1881 to 6,488 million in 1886; interest on the debt consumed more than a quarter of the state budget, more even than military expenditures. Thirty percent of the debt was owed to foreigners (George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bispmarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890 [Princeton, 1979], 225).
    7. I·F·金丁,《国家银行与沙皇政府的经济政策(1861-1892 年)》(莫斯科,1960 年),62 页。邦格任期内,国家债务总额(外债与内债)从 1881 年的 60.46 亿卢布增至 1886 年的 64.88 亿卢布;债务利息占国家预算四分之一以上,甚至超过军费开支。其中 30%债务为外债(乔治·F·凯南,《俾斯麦欧洲秩序的衰落:1875-1890 年法俄关系》[普林斯顿,1979 年],225 页)。

    8. N. A. Kislinskii, comp., Nasha zheleznodorozhnaia politika po dokumentam arkhiva komiteta ministrov, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1902), 246; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 99-100. During his administration, approximately 51.6 million rubles were spent on railroads annually (Crisp, Studies, 25-26).
    8. N·A·基斯林斯基编,《我国铁路政策依据部长委员会档案文件》,第 3 卷(圣彼得堡,1902 年),第 246 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 99-100 页。在其执政期间,年均铁路建设支出约 5160 万卢布(克里斯普,《研究》,第 25-26 页)。

    9. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:343 (Jan. 15, 1891); Crisp, Studies, 103-104
    9. 波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,第 2 卷:343 页(1891 年 1 月 15 日);克里斯普,《研究》,第 103-104 页。

    10. By Prince Drutskii-Liubetskii, finance minister of Poland (1821-1830) and member of the Russian State Council (from 1832). Quoted in Walter McKenzie Pintner, Russian Economic Policy under Nicholas I (Ithaca, N.Y., 1967), 126.
    10. 出自波兰财政大臣(1821-1830 年)及俄罗斯国务会议成员(自 1832 年起)德鲁茨基-柳别茨基亲王。转引自沃尔特·麦肯齐·平特纳,《尼古拉一世统治下的俄国经济政策》(纽约州伊萨卡,1967 年),第 126 页。
    1. See William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914 (Princeton, 1985), xxii, 59, 61.
      参见小威廉·C·富勒,《帝俄时期的军民冲突,1881-1914 年》(普林斯顿,1985 年),序言第 22 页、正文第 59 页、第 61 页。
    2. J. N. Westwood, A History of Russian Railways (London, 1964), 84; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 170. According to Polovtsov, their dispute over the question in the State Council reached the level of “rudeness” (Dnevnik, 2:96 [Mar. 26, 1888]).
      J·N·韦斯特伍德,《俄罗斯铁路史》(伦敦,1964 年),第 84 页;舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,第 170 页。据波洛夫佐夫所述,他们在国务会议中就该问题的争执已升级至“粗鲁”程度(《日记》,第 2 卷,第 96 页[1888 年 3 月 26 日])。
    3. F. G. Terner, Vospominaniia zhizni, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1911), 178.
      F·G·特尔纳,《生活回忆录》,第 2 卷(圣彼得堡,1911 年),第 178 页。
    4. Quoted in Shepelev, Tsarizm, 162-163.
      转引自舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,第 162-163 页。
    5. On the dispute between the finance and war ministries see Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, 47-74.
      关于财政部与战争部之间的争议,参见富勒,《军民冲突》,第 47-74 页。
    1. A. N. Kulomzin, Le Transsibérien, trans. Jules Legras (Paris, 1904), 31; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 73, 75; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 453, 455-456.
      A·N·库洛姆津,《西伯利亚大铁路》,朱尔·勒格拉译(巴黎,1904 年),第 31 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 73、75 页;俄罗斯交通部,《历史概览》,第 453、455-456 页。
    2. Times, June 25, 1887, p. 9.
      《泰晤士报》,1887 年 6 月 25 日,第 9 版。
    3. Skal’kovskii, Deiateli, 74; Terner, Vospominaniia zhizni, 2:78. At the time, Annenkov was chief of the administration of military transport in the War Ministry (A. M. Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. [Moscow, 1975], 155).
      斯卡尔科夫斯基,《活动家》,第 74 页;特尔纳,《生活回忆录》,第 2 卷:78 页。当时,安年科夫担任陆军部军事运输管理局局长(A·M·索洛维约娃,《19 世纪下半叶俄国铁路运输》[莫斯科,1975 年],第 155 页)。
    4. Times, July 1, 1887, p. 5.
      《泰晤士报》,1887 年 7 月 1 日,第 5 版。
    5. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 455-456.
      交通部,《历史概述》,第 455-456 页。
    6. Times, June 29, 1887, p. 5; July 1, 1887, p. 5; Fuller, Civil-Military Conflict, 66.
      《泰晤士报》,1887 年 6 月 29 日,第 5 版;1887 年 7 月 1 日,第 5 版;富勒,《军民冲突》,第 66 页。
    1. According to Vannovskii, who had his own candidate for the spot (Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:124 [Dec. 8, 1888]).
      据万诺夫斯基所言,他心中已有该职位的人选(波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,第 2 卷,第 124 页[1888 年 12 月 8 日])。
    2. Even an official railroad history complained of Pauker’s lack of initiative (MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 342).
      甚至一份官方铁路史也对保克尔缺乏主动性表示不满(《交通部历史概述》,第 342 页)。
    3. Shepelev, Tsarizm, 163, quoting S. Iu. Witte, Vospominaniia, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1960), 252-253.
      谢佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,163 页,引自 S·尤·维特,《回忆录》第一卷(莫斯科,1960 年),252-253 页。
    4. Brokgauz-Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, vol. 18 (St. Petersburg, 1893), 954; Erik Amburger, Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Rußlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917 (Leiden, 1966), 266; MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti,” 23.
      布罗克豪斯-埃夫隆,《百科词典》第 18 卷(圣彼得堡,1893 年),954 页;埃里克·安伯格,《从彼得大帝到 1917 年俄罗斯行政机构史》(莱顿,1966 年),266 页;交通部,《活动报告》,23 页。
    5. Richard G. Robbins, Jr., Famine in Russia, 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis (New York, 1975), 8-9, 77-78, 212n9, quoting Witte.
      小理查德·G·罗宾斯,《俄国饥荒,1891-1892:帝国政府对危机的应对》(纽约,1975 年),第 8-9 页,第 77-78 页,第 212 页注释 9,引述维特之言。
    6. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:351 (Mar. 19, 1891).
      波洛夫措夫,《日记》第 2 卷,351 页(1891 年 3 月 19 日)。
    1. Brokgauz-Efron, Novyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, 12:120. Vyshnegradskii’s intentions were not, apparently, carried out: state railroad building continued to be on a par with private construction in this period. See Solov’eva, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport, 297-298.
      《布罗克豪斯-叶夫龙新百科词典》第 12 卷第 120 页。显然,维什涅格拉茨基的意图并未实现:这一时期国家铁路建设仍与私人建设并驾齐驱。参见索洛维约娃《铁路运输》第 297-298 页。
    2. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 361.
      交通部,《历史概述》,361 页。
    3. Propper, Was nicht in die Zeitung kam, 162. Propper reported that Witte asked Minister of the Interior I. N. Durnovo and Prince Meshcherskii to be his seconds.
      普罗珀尔《未刊报章的事》第 162 页。普罗珀尔报道称,维特曾邀请内务大臣 I·N·杜尔诺沃和梅谢尔斯基亲王担任其决斗副手。
    4. B. V. Anan’ich and R. Sh. Ganelin, “I. A. Vyshnegradskii i S. Iu. Witte-korrespondenty ‘moskovskikh vedomostei,’” in Problemy obshchestvennoi mysli i ekonomicheskaia politika Rossii XIX-XX vekov: Pamiati prof. S. B. Okunia, ed. N. G. Sladkevich (Leningrad, 1972), 27-30, 33-34.
      B·V·阿纳尼奇与 R·Sh·加涅林合著《维什涅格拉茨基与维特——<莫斯科新闻>的通信者》,载《19-20 世纪俄国社会思想与经济政策问题:纪念 S·B·奥库尼教授论文集》,N·G·斯拉德克维奇编(列宁格勒,1972 年),第 27-30 页,33-34 页。
    5. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2 : 351 2 : 351 2:3512: 351 (Mar. 19, 1891).
      波洛夫佐夫,《日记》, 2 : 351 2 : 351 2:3512: 351 (1891 年 3 月 19 日)。
    6. Robbins, Famine in Russia, 78-79, 90-91.
      罗宾斯,《俄罗斯的饥荒》,78-79 页,90-91 页。
    7. MPS, Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia i deiatel’nosti vedomstva putei soobshcheniia (St. Petersburg, 1898), 183.
      交通部,《交通部门发展及活动简史概述》(圣彼得堡,1898 年),183 页。
    1. To preclude the construction of pioneer railroads such as the Trans-Siberian this sum was designated solely for railroads “of economic significance” (MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 349).
      为防止西伯利亚大铁路等先驱性铁路的建设,这笔资金被专门指定用于具有“经济意义”的铁路项目(交通部,《历史概述》,349 页)。
    1. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 348-350, 464, and “Otchet o deiatel’nosti” 8-10; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 83-85; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 1415.
      交通部,《历史概览》,348-350 页,464 页,及《活动报告》8-10 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,83-85 页;《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:1415 页。
    2. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 466, and “Otchet o deiatel’nosti,” 12; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 86.
      交通部,《历史概览》,466 页,及《活动报告》12 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,86 页。
    3. Vyshnegradskii insisted on the same requirements for the proposed TransPersian Railroad, in a report of 1888 to Foreign Minister Giers. See Konstantin Pobedonostsev, L’Autocratie russe: Mémoires politiques, correspondance officielle et documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire du règne de l’empereur Alexandre III de Russie (Paris, 1927), 543-545.
      维什涅格拉茨基在 1888 年提交给外交部长吉尔斯的一份报告中,对拟议中的跨波斯铁路提出了同样的要求。参见康斯坦丁·波别多诺斯采夫,《俄罗斯专制制度:与沙皇亚历山大三世统治时期历史相关的政治回忆录、官方通信及未公开文件》(巴黎,1927 年),543-545 页。
    1. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 90-93; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 356-357, 470-472, and “Otchet o deiatel’nosti,” 22-24.
      萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,90-93 页;交通部,《历史概览》,356-357 页,470-472 页,及《活动报告》22-24 页。
    2. Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 92; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 357.
      萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,92 页;交通部,《历史概述》,357 页。
    3. MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 472, 479-482, and “Otchet o deiatel’nosti,” 30-33; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 92.
      交通部,《历史概述》,472 页,479-482 页,及《活动报告》,30-33 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,92 页。
    1. Kulomzin, Le Transsibérien, 40.
      库洛姆津,《穿越西伯利亚》,第 40 页。
    2. Skal’kovskii, Ministres des finances, 281; Kennan, Decline, 380-382, 387, 389. The condition of the Russian state budget was in fact tenuous at best at the moment, as it depended largely on the fortuitous circumstance of good harvests in 1887 and 1888 (Skal’kovskii, Ministres des finances, 283, 286, 289-292). On the conversion operations, see A. L. Sidorov, “Konversii vneshnikh zaimov Rossii v 1888-1890 gg.,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1959, no. 3: 99-125. In Dnevnik, 2:344 (Jan. 24, 1891), Polovtsov claims that Vyshnegradskii profited personally from commissions on the renegotiated loans.
      斯卡尔科夫斯基,《财政部长》,281 页;肯南,《衰落》,380-382 页,387 页,389 页。实际上,当时俄国国家预算的状况充其量是岌岌可危的,因为它很大程度上依赖于 1887 年和 1888 年丰收的偶然情况(斯卡尔科夫斯基,《财政部长》,283 页,286 页,289-292 页)。关于债务转换操作,参见 A·L·西多罗夫,《1888-1890 年俄国外债转换》,《历史档案》,1959 年第 3 期:99-125 页。在《日记》第 2 卷 344 页(1891 年 1 月 24 日)中,波洛夫佐夫声称维什涅格拉茨基通过重新谈判贷款的回扣中饱私囊。
    3. Herbert Feis, Europe the World’s Banker, 1870-1914 (New Haven, 1930), 214-215.
      赫伯特·费斯,《欧洲:世界的银行家,1870-1914》(纽黑文,1930 年),第 214-215 页。
    4. Times, Mar. 5, 1891, p. 5; Poloutsov, Dnevnik, 2:312 (Aug. 14, 1890).
      《泰晤士报》,1891 年 3 月 5 日,第 5 版;波洛乌佐夫,《日记》,第 2 卷:312 页(1890 年 8 月 14 日)。
    1. Times, Sept. 6, 1889, p. 3; Feb. 26, 1891, p. 5.
      《泰晤士报》,1889 年 9 月 6 日,第 3 版;1891 年 2 月 26 日,第 5 版。
    2. Skal’kovskii, Deiateli, 73, 75-76.
      斯卡尔科夫斯基,《活动家》,第 73、75-76 页。
    3. On Lesseps, see David McCullough, The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (New York, 1977).
      关于雷赛布,参见大卫·麦卡洛所著《两洋之间的道路:巴拿马运河的创建,1870-1914》(纽约,1977 年)。
    4. Kennan, Decline, 283-284; René Girault, “Les Relations économiques et financières entre la France et la Russie de 1887 à 1914” (Ph.D. diss., Université de Paris, 1971), 1:367. According to Girault, Vogüé was Annenkov’s brother-in-law (Emprunts russes et investissements français en Russie, 1887-1914 [Paris, 1973], 190).
      肯南,《衰落》,第 283-284 页;勒内·吉罗,“1887 至 1914 年间法国与俄罗斯的经济与金融关系”(博士论文,巴黎大学,1971 年),第 1 卷第 367 页。据吉罗所述,沃居埃是安年科夫的内弟(《1887-1914 年俄国借款与法国在俄投资》[巴黎,1973 年],第 190 页)。
    1. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:280 (May 3, 1890); Girault, Emprunts russes, 184, 190. In Paris Annenkov discussed a memorandum he had drawn up earlier that year for the war minister in which he suggested that foreign capital underwrite the company constructing the Siberian Railroad (Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 103; Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:499n26; V. F. Borzunov and A. N. Kalinin, “Bor’ba amerikanskogo i frantsuzskogo kapitala za zheleznodorozhnye kontsessii v Sibiri i na Dal’nem Vostoke v kontse XIX veka,” in Bakhrushinskie chteniia 1966 g., no. 2, Sibir’ perioda feodalizma i kapitalizma, ed. A. P. Okladnikov et al. [Novosibirsk, 1968], 131-133).
      波洛夫措夫,《日记》,2:280(1890 年 5 月 3 日);吉罗,《俄国借款》,184、190 页。在巴黎,安年科夫讨论了他当年早些时候为战争部长起草的一份备忘录,其中建议由外国资本资助建设西伯利亚铁路的公司(萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,103 页;波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,2:499 注 26;V·F·博尔祖诺夫与 A·N·卡利宁,“19 世纪末美法资本争夺西伯利亚及远东铁路特许权的斗争”,载《1966 年巴赫鲁申学术会议文集》第 2 辑,《封建主义与资本主义时期的西伯利亚》,A·P·奥克拉德尼科夫等编[新西伯利亚,1968 年],131-133 页)。
    2. Girault, “Relations économiques,” 1:360-361; Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:343 (Jan. 15, 1891).
      吉罗,《经济关系》,第 1 卷,第 360-361 页;波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,第 2 卷,第 343 页(1891 年 1 月 15 日)。
    3. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:343 (Jan. 15, 1891). On the condition of the Transcaspian Railroad, see Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa: Dnevnik A. V. Bogdanovich (Moscow/ Leningrad, 1924), 139 (July 4, 1891); and Westwood, Russian Railways, 125-127.
      波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,第 2 卷第 343 页(1891 年 1 月 15 日)。关于外里海铁路的状况,参见《最后三位专制君主:A·V·波格丹诺维奇日记》(莫斯科/列宁格勒,1924 年),第 139 页(1891 年 7 月 4 日);以及韦斯特伍德,《俄罗斯铁路》,第 125-127 页。
    4. Girault, Emprunts russes, 180-190; Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:499n26.
      吉罗,《俄国借款》,第 180-190 页;波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,第 2 卷,第 499 页注释 26。
    1. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:343 (Jan. 15, 1891). Polovtsov wanted Annenkov to build the Bogoslovskii Railroad in the Urals. Polovtsov’s industrial interests in the northern Urals are discussed in chap. 8.
      波洛夫佐夫,《日记》,第 2 卷第 343 页(1891 年 1 月 15 日)。波洛夫佐夫希望安年科夫负责修建乌拉尔地区的博戈斯洛夫斯基铁路。波洛夫佐夫在乌拉尔北部的工业利益将在第 8 章中讨论。
    2. Girault, Emprunts russes, 231; Borzunov and Kalinin, “Bor’ba,” 122; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 102; Kulomzin Le Transsibérien, 38; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 477.
      吉罗,《俄国债券》,231 页;博尔祖诺夫与卡利宁,《斗争》,122 页;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,102 页;库洛姆津《跨西伯利亚铁路》,38 页;交通部,《历史概述》,477 页。
    3. Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa, 227 (Jan. 12, 1899). Two days before this entry was written, Annenkov had swallowed poison and committed suicide to avoid court proceedings initiated by War Minister A. N. Kuropatkin for misappropriating 50,000 rubles from his ministry (Borzunov and Kalinin, “Bor ba,” 135).
      最后三位专制君主,227(1899 年 1 月 12 日)。在撰写此条目两天前,安年科夫为逃避陆军部长 A·N·库罗帕特金因其挪用部里 5 万卢布而发起的诉讼程序,吞毒自杀(博尔祖诺夫和卡利宁,《斗争》,135 页)。
    4. Times, Apr. 6, 1891, p. 6; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 102103; Kulomzin, Le Transsibérien, 38; MPS, Istoricheskii ocherk, 477-478.
      《泰晤士报》,1891 年 4 月 6 日,第 6 版;萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,102-103 页;库洛姆津,《跨西伯利亚铁路》,38 页;交通部,《历史概述》,477-478 页。
    5. On the famine, see Robbins, Famine in Russia. For the traditional interpretationi.e., that Vyshnegradskii’s policies bore primary responsibility for the famine-see
      关于饥荒,参见罗宾斯《俄罗斯的饥荒》。传统观点认为维什涅格拉茨基的政策是造成饥荒的主因,相关论述见
  14. Theodore H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1973), 30-31.
    西奥多·H·冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特与俄国的工业化》(纽约,1973 年),第 30-31 页。

    70. Brokgauz-Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, 12:122; Skal’kovskii, Ministres des finances, 294.
    70. 布罗克豪斯-埃夫隆,《百科词典》,第 12 卷:122 页;斯卡利科夫斯基,《财政大臣》,第 294 页。

    71. Girault, Emprunts russes, 220, 229-233.
    71. 吉罗,《俄国借款》,第 220 页,229-233 页。

    72. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:421-424 (Feb. 15, 16, 18, 1892), 449 (Apr. 20, 1892); Girault, Emprunts russes, 230-231. In July 1892 Annenkov was apparently still soliciting foreign financiers. He contacted an American banker whom he had met in Paris in 1888 Wharton Barker of Philadelphia, and implied that the tsar desired to grant a concession for the Siberian Railroad to an American because of the difficulties experienced with the French. Annenkov hinted that for Barker, the guarantee offered by the government might be " 1 to 1.5 percent more than to a Jew." See George Sherman Queen, The United States and the Material Advance in Russia, 1881-1906 (New York, 1976), 180-183.
    72. 波洛夫措夫,《日记》,第 2 卷:421-424 页(1892 年 2 月 15 日、16 日、18 日),449 页(1892 年 4 月 20 日);吉罗,《俄国借款》,230-231 页。1892 年 7 月,安年科夫显然仍在游说外国金融家。他联系了 1888 年在巴黎结识的一位美国银行家——费城的沃顿·巴克,并暗示沙皇因与法国合作困难,希望将西伯利亚铁路特许权授予美国人。安年科夫向巴克透露,政府提供的担保可能比给"犹太人高出 1 至 1.5 个百分点"。参见乔治·谢尔曼·奎恩《美国与俄国的物质进步,1881-1906 年》(纽约,1976 年),180-183 页。

    73. Girault, Emprunts russes, 231, 234. Other railroad loans issued by the government in 1891 and 1892 received little response as well because of the poor state credit. See Brokgauz-Efron, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’, 12:120-121, and A. Ivashchenkov, Kratkii obzor ispolneniia gosudarstvennykh rospisei (v sviazi s prochimi oborotami gosudarstvennogo kaznacheistva) za 1881-1899 g.g. (St. Petersburg, 1901), table XXV.
    73. 吉罗,《俄国借款》,231、234 页。由于国家信用状况不佳,1891 年和 1892 年由政府发行的其他铁路贷款同样反响寥寥。参见《布罗克豪斯-埃夫隆百科辞典》第 12 卷:120-121 页,以及 A·伊瓦先科夫,《1881-1899 年国家预算执行概况(附国家金库其他收支)》(圣彼得堡,1901 年),表格 XXV。

    74. Polovtsov, Dnevnik, 2:435 (Mar. 16, 1892). For the drastic drop in funding provided by loans between 1890 and 1891, see P. A. Khromov, Ekonomicheskoe razvitie Rossii s drevneishikh vremen do velikoi oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii (Moscow, 1967), table 25-b.
    74. 波洛夫措夫,《日记》,第 2 卷 435 页(1892 年 3 月 16 日)。关于 1890 至 1891 年间贷款资金急剧减少的情况,参见 P·A·赫罗莫夫,《从远古至伟大十月革命的俄国经济发展》(莫斯科,1967 年),表 25-b。
  15. Ascendancy: A Comparative Study of American and Russian Engineering Elites, 18701920" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1972), 97-98.
    《崛起:1870-1920 年美俄工程精英比较研究》(博士论文,加州大学伯克利分校,1972 年),97-98 页。

    80. Shepelev, Tsarizm, passim. This analysis refutes assertions that Reutern, Bunge, and Vyshnegradskii held the same views and were of the same mold as Witte. Cf. I. F. Gindin, “Russia’s Industrialization under Capitalism as Seen by Theodor [sic] von Laue,” Soviet Studies in History 11, no. 1 (1972): 6; Jacob W. Kipp, “M. Kh. Reutern on the Russian State and Economy: A Liberal Bureaucrat during the Crimean Era, 1854-60,” Journal of Modern History 47 (September 1975).
    80. 谢佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,散见各处。此分析驳斥了关于罗伊特恩、本格和维什涅格拉茨基与维特观点相同、属于同一类型的断言。参见 I.F.金丁,《西奥多·冯·劳厄眼中的俄罗斯资本主义工业化》,《苏联历史研究》第 11 卷第 1 期(1972 年):6 页;雅各布·W.基普,《克里米亚时期自由派官僚 M.Kh.罗伊特恩论俄罗斯国家与经济:1854-60 年》,《现代历史杂志》47 卷(1975 年 9 月)。

    81. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, 1970), 24-25. Gerschenkron also argued that this element was central to Russian Marxism; Thomas C. Owen has asserted that a similar attitude developed among a small group of Moscow business leaders, in “Entrepreneurship and the Structure of Enterprise in Russia, 1800 1880 1800 1880 1800-18801800-1880,” in Guroff and Carstensen, Entrepreneurship, 81.
    81. 亚历山大·格申克龙,《历史视角下的经济落后性:论文集》(剑桥,1970 年),24-25 页。格申克龙还认为这一要素是俄罗斯马克思主义的核心;托马斯·C.欧文指出莫斯科一小部分商界领袖也形成了类似态度,见《俄罗斯的企业家精神与企业结构, 1800 1880 1800 1880 1800-18801800-1880 》,载于古罗夫和卡斯滕森,《企业家精神》,81 页。
    1. A. E. Kaufman, “Cherty iz zhizni gr. S. Iu. Witte,” Istoricheskii vestnik 140 (April 1915): 220. On the social obstacles he faced and Alexander III’s steadfast confidence in him, see V. V. Shulgin, The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 1906-1917, trans. Tanya Davis (New York, 1984), 82.
      A.E.考夫曼,《维特伯爵生平片段》,《历史通报》140 卷(1915 年 4 月):220 页。关于他面临的社会障碍及亚历山大三世对其坚定不移的信任,参见 V.V.舒尔金,《岁月:一位俄国杜马成员的回忆录,1906-1917》,塔尼娅·戴维斯英译(纽约,1984 年),82 页。
    2. Peter Struve, “Witte und Stolypin,” in Menschen die Geschichte Machten, vol. 3, ed. Peter Richard Rohden and Georg Ostrogorsky (Vienna, 1931), 264.
      彼得·司徒卢威,《维特与斯托雷平》,收录于《缔造历史的人物》第三卷,彼得·理查德·罗登与乔治·奥斯特洛戈尔斯基编(维也纳,1931 年),第 264 页。
    3. According to Izvol’skii, Russian foreign minister from 1906 to 1910, Witte took Cecil Rhodes, the “empire builder,” as his model. This account may have some relevance for Siberia, although strictly speaking Izvol’skii refers to Witte’s activities in Manchuria (Recollections of a Foreign Minister: Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky, trans. Charles Louis Seeger [New York, 1921], 121).
      据 1906 至 1910 年任俄国外交大臣的伊兹沃尔斯基所述,维特以"帝国建造者"塞西尔·罗兹为楷模。这一说法或许与西伯利亚有一定关联,尽管严格来说伊兹沃尔斯基指的是维特在满洲的活动(《一位外交大臣的回忆:亚历山大·伊兹沃尔斯基回忆录》,查尔斯·路易斯·西格译[纽约,1921 年],第 121 页)。
    1. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:48-58; Theodore H. Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1973), 39-43.
      维特,《回忆录》第 1 卷,第 48-58 页;西奥多·H·冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特与俄国工业化》(纽约,1973 年),第 39-43 页。
    2. Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 43-47.
      冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特》,第 43-47 页。
    3. See, for instance, V. I. Kovalevskii on Witte in L. E. Shepelev, Tsarizm i burzhuaziia vo vtoroi polovine XIX veke: Problemy torgovo-promyshlennoi politiki (Leningrad, 1981), 196.
      参见例如 L·E·舍佩列夫《19 世纪下半叶沙皇制度与资产阶级:工商业政策问题》(列宁格勒,1981 年)中 V·I·科瓦列夫斯基关于维特的论述,第 196 页。
    4. Struve, “Witte und Stolypin,” 265.
      斯特鲁韦,《维特与斯托雷平》,第 265 页。
    5. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie v kontse XIX stoletiia: Politicheskaia reaktsiia 80-kh-nachala 90-kh godov (Moscow, 1970), 146; Ernst Seraphim, “Zar Nikolaus II. und Graf Witte: Eine historisch-psychologische Studie,” Historische Zeitschrift 161, no. 2 (1940): 282.
      P·A·扎伊翁奇科夫斯基,《十九世纪末的俄国专制制度:80 年代至 90 年代初的政治反动》(莫斯科,1970 年),第 146 页;恩斯特·塞拉芬,《沙皇尼古拉二世与维特伯爵:一项历史心理学研究》,《历史杂志》第 161 卷第 2 期(1940 年):第 282 页。
  16. politicheskoi istorii Rossii: Sbornik statei pamiati Borisa Aleksandrovicha Romanova, ed. N. E. Nosov et al. (Leningrad, 1971), 326.
    《俄罗斯政治史:纪念鲍里斯·亚历山德罗维奇·罗曼诺夫论文集》,N·E·诺索夫等编(列宁格勒,1971 年),第 326 页。

    19. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:68.
    19. 维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷,第 68 页。

    20. He was quoted as saying in 1894 that “Russia requires to be governed in a truly Russian sense” (Princess Catherine Radziwill, Memories of Forty Years [London, 1914], 243-244).
    20. 据 1894 年引述,他曾表示“俄罗斯需要以真正符合俄国国情的方式治理”(凯瑟琳·拉齐维尔公主,《四十年回忆录》[伦敦,1914 年],第 243-244 页)。
  17. sodeistviia russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle, po voprosu o sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge (St. Petersburg, 1884), 55-56; TIRTO, 10:10-11.
    促进俄国工业与商业,关于西伯利亚铁路问题的讨论(圣彼得堡,1884 年),第 55-56 页;TIRTO,第 10 卷第 10-11 页。

    40. S. Iu. Witte, Vorlesungen über Volks- und Staatswirtschaft, trans. Josef Melnik, vol. 1 (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1913), 69-71.
    40. S·尤·维特,《国民与国家经济讲义》,约瑟夫·梅尔尼克译,第 1 卷(斯图加特/柏林,1913 年),第 69-71 页。

    41. B. B. Glinskii, ed., Prolog russko-iaponskoi voiny: Materialy iz arkhiva grafa S. Iu. Witte (Petrograd, 1916), 10.
    41. B·B·格林斯基编,《日俄战争序幕:谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇·维特伯爵档案材料》(彼得格勒,1916 年),第 10 页。

    42. Ibid., 13, 190.
    42. 同上,第 13、190 页。

    43. Witte, Vorlesungen, 1:176.
    43. 维特,《讲义集》,第 1 卷第 176 页。
    1. Radziwill, Memories, 244; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 34-35, 76.
      拉济维尔,《回忆录》,第 244 页;冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特》,第 34-35 页、76 页。
    2. Quoted in L. Kleinbort, Russkii imperializm v Azii (St. Petersburg, 1906), 15; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 112.
      引自 L. Kleinbort《俄国在亚洲的帝国主义》(圣彼得堡,1906 年),第 15 页;Sabler 与 Sosnovskii 合著《西伯利亚铁路》,第 112 页。
    3. Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation, vol. 2 (New York, 1960), 1111
      迈克尔·T·弗洛林斯基,《俄罗斯:历史与诠释》第二卷(纽约,1960 年),第 1111 页。
    4. Russkie vedomosti, no. 2 (Jan. 3, 1893), p. 5. The overwhelming majority of participants in the debates over the Siberian Railroad in the Russian Technical Society, the Society for the Encouragement of Russian Industry and Trade, and the periodical press held the like view that expense was of no concern and explicitly urged the government to build the railroad whatever the cost. See Steven G. Marks, “The Trans-Siberian Railroad: State Enterprise and Economic Development in Imperial Russia” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988), 185-187.
      《俄罗斯公报》第 2 期(1893 年 1 月 3 日),第 5 页。绝大多数参与西伯利亚铁路辩论的俄罗斯技术协会、俄罗斯工业与贸易促进协会成员及报刊舆论均持类似观点,认为费用无需顾虑,并明确敦促政府不计成本修建铁路。详见史蒂文·G·马克斯,《跨西伯利亚铁路:帝俄时期的国有企业与经济发展》(哈佛大学博士论文,1988 年),第 185-187 页。
    5. “Pis’ma S. Iu. Witte k D. S. Sipiagin,” Krasnyi arkhiv 18 (1926): 32 (July 7, 1900).
      《维特致西皮亚金书信集》,《红色档案》第 18 期(1926 年):第 32 页(1900 年 7 月 7 日)。
    6. Leo Pasvolsky and Harold G. Moulton, Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction (New York, 1924), 47-51, 57-58, 102-103. Under Witte more than 37 % 37 % 37%37 \% of the whole Russian railroad network-state and private-was completed; i.e., more than half as much as in the previous fifty years (Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy, 533). According to A. M. Solov’eva, 68 % 68 % 68%68 \% of railroad construction in the 1890 s was in Asian Russia, mostly at Treasury expense (Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v. [Moscow, 1975], 254). According to Olga Crisp, 78 % 78 % 78%78 \% of state revenues were from indirect taxes (Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914 [London, 1976], 27).
      利奥·帕斯沃尔斯基与哈罗德·G·莫尔顿,《俄国债务与俄国重建》(纽约,1924 年),第 47-51 页、57-58 页、102-103 页。维特任内,俄罗斯铁路网络(包括国有和私营)完成了超过 37 % 37 % 37%37 \% 的建设,相当于此前五十年建设总量的一半以上(利亚申科,《国民经济史》,第 533 页)。根据 A·M·索洛维约娃的研究,19 世纪 90 年代 68 % 68 % 68%68 \% 的铁路建设位于亚洲俄罗斯地区,且主要由国库出资(《19 世纪下半叶俄罗斯铁路运输》[莫斯科,1975 年],第 254 页)。奥尔加·克里斯普指出, 78 % 78 % 78%78 \% 的国家财政收入来自间接税(《1914 年前俄国经济研究》[伦敦,1976 年],第 27 页)。
    7. See Witte, Samoderzhavie i zemstvo, 219; Glinskii, Prolog, 191; Vestnik finansov, promyshlennosti i torgovli, no. 1 (Jan. 2, 1900): 4, 7; ZhKSZhD, zas. 34, SP, Dec. 8, 1899, p. 22, col. 2.
      参见维特,《专制与地方自治》,第 219 页;格林斯基,《序幕》,第 191 页;《财政、工业与贸易通报》,1900 年 1 月 2 日第 1 期:第 4 页、第 7 页;《铁路建设特别会议记录》,第 34 次会议,1899 年 12 月 8 日,第 22 页第 2 栏。
    1. PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 12, 1892, no. 9140; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1893, no. 1: 3-5.
      《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》,第三辑,第 12 卷,1892 年,第 9140 号;《交通部杂志》官方版块:《西伯利亚铁路》,1893 年第 1 期:第 3-5 页。
    2. ZhKSZhD, zas. 1, Feb. 10, 1893, pp. 4-5, col. 2; PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 13, 1893, no. 9248; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1893, no. 1: 5-7; Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 536-537.
      《铁路建设特别会议记录》,第 1 次会议,1893 年 2 月 10 日,第 4-5 页第 2 栏;《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》,第三辑,第 13 卷,1893 年,第 9248 号;《交通部杂志》官方版:“西伯利亚铁路”,1893 年第 1 期:第 5-7 页;博尔祖诺夫,“创建史”,第 536-537 页。
    1. On Krivoshein, see Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 200; Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:290-291; 2:19-21. For Witte’s further successful attempts to expand his own ministry’s influence at the expense of the Transport Ministry in the newly created Administration for the Construction of the Siberian Railroad (1893), see ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, SP, May 26, 1893; PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 13, 1893, no. 9728; Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 538544.
      关于克里沃舍因,参见冯·劳厄《谢尔盖·维特》第 200 页;维特《回忆录》第 1 卷 290-291 页,第 2 卷 19-21 页。维特进一步成功扩张其部门影响力、削弱交通部在新成立的西伯利亚铁路建设管理局(1893 年)中的权力,参见《铁路建设委员会特别日志》,1893 年 5 月 26 日;《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》第三辑第 13 卷,1893 年,第 9728 号;博尔祖诺夫《创建史》第 538-544 页。
    2. See “Iz dnevnika A. A. Polovtseva [sic],” Krasnyi arkhiv 67 (1934): 183 (Dec. 27, 1894); Witte, Vospominaniia, 2:24-27; Henry Reichman, “Tsarist Labor Policy and the Railroads, 1885-1914,” Russian Review 42 (1983): 57; Harmon Tupper, To the Great Ocean: Siberia and the Trans-Siberian Railway (Boston, 1965), 192. For his various positions on American railroads, see Railroad Gazette, Sept. 4, 1896, p. 616. As chap. 10 will show, Khilkov’s tireless efforts while he was ill to improve the carrying capacity of the Siberian Railroad during the Russo-Japanese War seem to belie the characterization of him here. But Witte’s perception is as important as reality; furthermore, Khilkov was clearly subservient to Witte.
      参见《A.A.波洛夫采夫日记摘录》,《红色档案》第 67 期(1934 年)第 183 页(1894 年 12 月 27 日);维特《回忆录》第 2 卷 24-27 页;亨利·赖克曼《沙皇劳动政策与铁路,1885-1914》,《俄罗斯评论》第 42 期(1983 年)第 57 页;哈蒙·塔珀《通往大洋:西伯利亚与西伯利亚大铁路》(波士顿,1965 年)第 192 页。关于他对美国铁路的各种立场,参见《铁路公报》1896 年 9 月 4 日第 616 页。如第 10 章所示,希尔科夫在病中仍不遗余力提升日俄战争期间西伯利亚铁路运力的努力,似乎与此处对他的描述相矛盾。但维特的认知与现实同等重要;此外,希尔科夫显然对维特唯命是从。
    1. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:436-437.
      维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:436-437 页。
    2. The suggestion that Witte sought to ingratiate himself with Nicholas by involving him in the Far East is made by Gurko, Features and Figures, 259.
      古尔科在《特征与人物》第 259 页提出,维特试图通过让尼古拉参与远东事务来讨好他。
    3. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:434-436. For the creation of the post of vice chairman, see PSZRI, sobranie tret’e, vol. 13, 1893, no. 9248 . Polovtsov claimed that it was his idea that Nicholas should be made chairman of the Committee of the Siberian Railroad (at the time not yet formed), “because the tsarevich feels burdened with inactivity” (Dnevnik, 2: 424 [Feb. 18, 1892]).
      维特,《回忆录》,1:434-436。关于设立副主席职位一事,参见《俄罗斯帝国法律全集》,第三辑,第 13 卷,1893 年,第 9248 号。波洛夫佐夫声称是他建议让尼古拉担任西伯利亚铁路委员会主席(当时该委员会尚未成立),“因为皇太子对无所事事感到负担”(《日记》,2:424 [1892 年 2 月 18 日])。
    4. See Gurko, Features and Figures, 256. For the official account of the trip, see Prince Esper Esperovich Ukhtomskii, Puteshestvie na Vostok ego imperatorskogo vysochestva gosudaria naslednika tsesarevicha, 1890-1891, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1893-1897). On ground-breaking ceremonies at Vladivostok, see MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti,” 27; K. Korol’kov, Zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie imperatora Aleksandra III (1881-1894 gg.) (Kiev, 1901), 194-195; Times, Feb. 26, 1891, p. 5; Tupper, To the Great Ocean, 84-85.
      参见古尔科,《特征与人物》,256 页。关于此次旅行的官方记载,见埃斯佩尔·埃斯佩罗维奇·乌赫托姆斯基亲王,《皇太子殿下东方之旅,1890-1891》,三卷本(圣彼得堡,1893-1897 年)。关于海参崴的奠基仪式,参见交通部,《活动报告》,27 页;K.科罗利科夫,《亚历山大三世皇帝的生平与统治(1881-1894 年)》(基辅,1901 年),194-195 页;《泰晤士报》,1891 年 2 月 26 日,第 5 版;塔珀,《通往大洋》,84-85 页。
  18. mercial considerations were closer to his heart. There is no reason to doubt, however, that he expressed his convictions in this private memorandum to Alexander III, for he must have known that the tsar would not be receptive to such ideas.
    商业考量更贴近他的本心。然而,没有理由怀疑他在给亚历山大三世的这份私人备忘录中表达了自己的信念,因为他必然清楚沙皇不会接受这类观点。

    89. For a penetrating analysis of Europe’s understanding of its civilizing mission in Africa and Asia, see Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca, N.Y., 1989), chap. 4.
    89. 关于欧洲对其在非洲和亚洲文明使命认知的深刻分析,参见迈克尔·阿达斯《机器作为人类的尺度:科学、技术与西方霸权的意识形态》(纽约州伊萨卡,1989 年)第 4 章。

    90. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:435-436, 440-441; “Iz dnevnika A. A. Polovtseva [sic],” Krasnyi arkhiv 67 (1934): 174 (Nov. 13, 1894).
    90. 维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:435-436 页,440-441 页;"摘自 A.A.波洛夫采夫日记",《红色档案》67 期(1934 年):174 页(1894 年 11 月 13 日)。

    91. Gurko, Features and Figures, 13; see ZhKSZhD, passim.
    91. 古尔科,《特征与人物》,13 页;参见 ZhKSZhD 各处。

    92. See, e.g., Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa: Dnevnik A. V. Bogdanovich (Moscow/ Leningrad, 1924), 175 (Jan. 2, 1894).
    92. 参见,例如,《最后三位专制君主:A·V·波格丹诺维奇日记》(莫斯科/列宁格勒,1924 年),第 175 页(1894 年 1 月 2 日)。

    93. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:437.
    93. 维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷:437 页。

    94. Struve, “Witte und Stolypin,” 267.
    94. 斯特鲁夫,《维特与斯托雷平》,267 页。

    95. Witte, Vospominaniia, vol. 1, passim; Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 67; Shepelev, Tsarizm, 195.
    95. 维特,《回忆录》,第 1 卷各处;冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特》,67 页;舍佩列夫,《沙皇制度》,195 页。
    1. See Donald W. Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War (Princeton, 1957). FrançoisXavier Coquin, La Sibérie: Peuplement et immigration paysanne au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1969), 687-746 and passim, finds the peasant migrants to have been much less successful than Treadgold does, and he rejects the comparison between farmers on the American frontier and Russian peasants in Siberia.
      参见唐纳德·W·特雷德戈尔德所著《西伯利亚大迁徙:从农奴解放到第一次世界大战期间的政府与农民移民》(普林斯顿,1957 年)。弗朗索瓦-格扎维埃·科坎在《西伯利亚:19 世纪农民移民与拓殖》(巴黎,1969 年)第 687-746 页及散见各处提出,农民移民的成功程度远低于特雷德戈尔德的描述,并反对将美国边疆农民与俄罗斯西伯利亚农民进行类比。
    2. The comprehensive planning undertaken by the Committee of the Siberian Railroad in the development of Siberia has been pointed out by J. N. Westwood, A A AA
      西伯利亚铁路委员会在西伯利亚开发过程中实施的全面规划,已由 J·N·韦斯特伍德指出, A A AA
  19. History of Russian Railways (London, 1964), 124, and Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-1986, 3d ed. (Oxford, 1987), 138-139; and M. R. Sigalov and V. A. Lamin, Zheleznodorozhnoe stroitel’stvo v praktike khoziaistvennogo osvoeniia Sibiri (Novosibirsk, 1988), 16. Michael T. Florinsky’s assessment, in Russia: A History and Interpretation, vol. 2 (New York, 1960), 1104, that the committee was “modelled after the boards of American railroad companies,” is inaccurate, as this chapter and the next will show.
    《俄罗斯铁路史》(伦敦,1964 年)第 124 页,以及《坚韧与奋进:俄罗斯历史,1812-1986》第三版(牛津,1987 年)第 138-139 页;另见 M·R·西加洛夫与 V·A·拉明合著《铁路建设在西伯利亚经济开发实践中的运用》(新西伯利亚,1988 年)第 16 页。迈克尔·T·弗洛林斯基在《俄罗斯:历史与诠释》第二卷(纽约,1960 年)第 1104 页的评价——该委员会"仿效美国铁路公司董事会模式"——并不准确,本章及后续章节将予以说明。

    3. See Theodore Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1973), 33, 54-63, 114-115; L. E. Shepelev, Tsarizm i burzhuaziia vo vtoroi polovine XIX veke: Problemy torgovo-promyshlennoi politiki (Leningrad, 1981), 193-194.
    3. 参见西奥多·冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特与俄国工业化》(纽约,1973 年),第 33、54-63、114-115 页;L·E·舍佩列夫,《19 世纪下半叶沙皇制度与资产阶级:工商业政策问题》(列宁格勒,1981 年),第 193-194 页。

    4. Richard Robbins, Jr., Famine in Russia, 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis (New York, 1975), 180.
    4. 小理查德·罗宾斯,《1891-1892 年俄国饥荒:帝国政府对危机的应对》(纽约,1975 年),第 180 页。

    5. See Von Laue, Sergei Witte, 62-63. Von Laue ignores the implications of this characterization in his own interpretation.
    5. 参见冯·劳厄,《谢尔盖·维特》,第 62-63 页。冯·劳厄在其自身解读中忽略了这一特征的含义。

    6. Otchet po komitetu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi za 1893-1897 gg. (n.p., n.d.), 19-20; G. K. Tsvetkov, “Ekonomicheskoe znachenie sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” Vestnik
    6. 《西伯利亚铁路委员会 1893-1897 年报告》(无出版地,无日期),第 19-20 页;G·K·茨韦特科夫,“西伯利亚铁路的经济意义”,《通报》
    1. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1892, no. 39: 2.
      《东方评论》,1892 年,第 39 期:第 2 页。
    2. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, p. 3, col. 1.
      《西伯利亚铁路委员会特别期刊》,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 3 页,第 1 栏。
    3. V. F. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia transsibirskoi zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali XIX-nachala XX wv.” (Ph.D. diss., Tomskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 1972), 759; Glinskii, Prolog, 19-20. The fund was initially set at 14 million rubles but was enlarged in 1897 to 21.7 million. According to Borzunov, more than 32 million rubles were eventually spent on the auxiliary enterprises. Borzunov devotes little more than two pages (out of more than 1,800 ) directly to the topic of the auxiliary enterprises. Because of this major shortcoming his work fails to convey the nature and full significance of the Siberian Railroad project.
      V·F·博尔祖诺夫,《跨西伯利亚铁路干线建设史(19 世纪至 20 世纪初)》(博士论文,托木斯克国立大学,1972 年),759 页;格林斯基,《序幕》,19-20 页。该基金最初设定为 1400 万卢布,但在 1897 年增至 2170 万卢布。据博尔祖诺夫称,辅助企业最终耗资超过 3200 万卢布。博尔祖诺夫在其 1800 多页的著作中仅用两页多篇幅直接论述辅助企业问题。由于这一重大缺陷,他的著作未能充分展现西伯利亚铁路项目的本质及其全部重要意义。
    4. S. V. Sabler and I. V. Sosnovskii, comps., Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga v eia proshlom i nastoiashchem: Istoricheskii ocherk, ed. A. N. Kulomzin (St. Petersburg, 1903), 111; Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 517. Witte himself referred to the “planned construction of the Siberian road” in his Vospominaniia, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1960), 441. For Giubbenet’s plan, see MPS, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti ministerstva putei soobshcheniia po stroitel’stvu sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi za vremia s 30 marta 1889 g. po 17 ianvaria 1892 g.” (TsGAOR, fond 677, opis’ 1, delo 629), 19-21; ZhMPS, official sec., 1893, no. 2: 20-21. Aside from the auxiliary enterprises and the funding of construction, the “detailed plan” established a construction schedule for the railroad. See Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 116-117.
      S·V·萨布勒与 I·V·索斯诺夫斯基合编,《西伯利亚铁路的过去与现在:历史概览》,A·N·库洛姆津主编(圣彼得堡,1903 年),第 111 页;博尔祖诺夫,《创建史》,第 517 页。维特本人在其《回忆录》第一卷(莫斯科,1960 年)第 441 页提及“西伯利亚铁路的规划建设”。关于久边内的计划,参见交通部《1889 年 3 月 30 日至 1892 年 1 月 17 日西伯利亚铁路建设活动报告》(中央国家十月革命档案馆,全宗 677,目录 1,案卷 629),第 19-21 页;《交通部杂志》官方版,1893 年第 2 期:第 20-21 页。除附属企业及建设资金外,“详细规划”还制定了铁路建设进度表。见萨布勒与索斯诺夫斯基,《西伯利亚铁路》,第 116-117 页。
  20. dorozhnaia politika i zheleznodorozhnye zaimy (1893-1902) (Khar’kov, 1903), 284; M. V. Braikevitch and I. R. Afonin, “The Railways of Siberia,” Russian Economist: Journal of the Russian Economic Association 2 (October-December 1921): 1491.
    道路政策与铁路借款(1893-1902 年)(哈尔科夫,1903 年),第 284 页;M·V·布赖克维奇与 I·R·阿福宁,《西伯利亚铁路》,《俄罗斯经济学家:俄罗斯经济协会杂志》第 2 卷(1921 年 10-12 月):第 1491 页。

    18. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, June 14, 1893 (Ministr putei soobshcheniia), p. 1-5, col. 1; zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, p. 6, col. 2; zas. 24, June 28, 1895, SP, pp. 21-22; zas. 26, Mar. 6, 1896, SP, pp. 6-7, col. 1; zas. 30, Dec. 10, 1897, SP, pp. 28-29, col. 1; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1894, no. 4: 10; TKIM, 3 : 16 3 : 16 3:163: 16 and vols. 15-17; TIRTO, vols. 17 and 19; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894, 8-10; Braikevitch and Afonin, “Railways of Siberia,” 1493.
    18. 俄国铁路建设特别委员会会议记录,1893 年 6 月 14 日(交通部长),第 1-5 页,第 1 栏;1893 年 11 月 10 日第 10 次会议,第 6 页第 2 栏;1895 年 6 月 28 日第 24 次会议,特别附录第 21-22 页;1896 年 3 月 6 日第 26 次会议,特别附录第 6-7 页第 1 栏;1897 年 12 月 10 日第 30 次会议,特别附录第 28-29 页第 1 栏;《交通部公报》官方版:“西伯利亚铁路”,1894 年第 4 期:10 页;TKIM, 3 : 16 3 : 16 3:163: 16 及第 15-17 卷;TIRTO 第 17 和 19 卷;《1894 年西伯利亚铁路建设报告》,8-10 页;布拉伊克维奇与阿福宁,《西伯利亚铁路》,1493 页。

    19. ZhKsZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, pp. 6-7, col. 1; zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, p. 4, col. 1, and pp. 4-5, col. 2; zas. 11, Dec. 1, 1893, p. 7, cols. 1-2; zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 2, SP, pp. 9-11; zas. 28, Nov. 27, 1896, SP, p. 14, col. 1; zas. 30, Dec. 10, 1897, SP, p. 42, col. 1, and p. 31, col. 2; zas. 35, June 14, 1900, SP, p. 26, cols. 1-2. See also F. K. Drizhenko, “Rekognostsirovka Baikal’skogo ozera v 1896 godu,” IIRGO 33, no. 2 (1897): 210-241.
    19. 俄国铁路建设特别委员会会议记录,1893 年 2 月 10 日与 24 日,第 6-7 页第 1 栏;1893 年 11 月 10 日第 10 次会议,第 4 页第 1 栏及第 4-5 页第 2 栏;1893 年 12 月 1 日第 11 次会议,第 7 页第 1-2 栏;1895 年 3 月 8 日第 22 次会议,第二部分特别附录第 9-11 页;1896 年 11 月 27 日第 28 次会议,特别附录第 14 页第 1 栏;1897 年 12 月 10 日第 30 次会议,特别附录第 42 页第 1 栏及第 31 页第 2 栏;1900 年 6 月 14 日第 35 次会议,特别附录第 26 页第 1-2 栏。另见 F·K·德里任科,《1896 年贝加尔湖勘测报告》,《俄国皇家地理学会通报》第 33 卷第 2 期(1897 年):210-241 页。
    1. Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1894, no. 75, p. 1; Vestnik finansov, no. 7, Feb. 16, 1897:341343, and no. 30, July 27, 1897: 139.
      《东方评论》,1894 年第 75 期,第 1 页;《财政通报》,1897 年 2 月 16 日第 7 期:341-343 页,1897 年 7 月 27 日第 30 期:139 页。
    2. Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 g., 13-14; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1894, no. 4: 44; Harley David Balzer, “Educating Engineers: Economic Politics and Technical Training in Tsarist Russia” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1980), 388-390; Vostochnoe obozrenie, 1894, no. 102: 1.
      《1894 年 KSZhD 报告》,13-14 页;《交通部公报》官方版:“西伯利亚铁路”,1894 年第 4 期:44 页;Harley David Balzer,《工程师教育:沙俄时期的经济政策与技术培训》(博士论文,宾夕法尼亚大学,1980 年),388-390 页;《东方观察》,1894 年第 102 期:1 页。
    3. For an example of the committee’s’high aspirations, see Vestnik finansov, no. 2, Jan. 10, 1893: 92.
      关于委员会崇高抱负的例证,参见《财政通报》1893 年 1 月 10 日第 2 期:92 页。
    1. Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 817, 980-981, 1068, 1069, 1143, 1145-1147, and “K voprosu ob ekonomicheskom znachenii sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi v kontse XIXnachale XX vv.,” in Voprosy istorii Sibiri i Dal’nego Vostoka, ed. V. I. Shunkov et al. (Novosibirsk, 1961), 101; Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, 275; ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Mar. 15, 1893, pp. 3-4, col. 1. Wheel arrangements on these locomotives were either 2-4-4-0 or 00-8-0 (Westwood, History, 119).
      Borzunov,《创建史》,817、980-981、1068、1069、1143、1145-1147 页,以及《论西伯利亚铁路在 19 世纪末 20 世纪初的经济意义》,载《西伯利亚与远东历史问题》,V. I. Shunkov 等编(新西伯利亚,1961 年),101 页;Sabler 与 Sosnovskii,《西伯利亚铁路》,275 页;《KSZhD 特别日志》,1893 年 3 月 15 日,3-4 页,第 1 栏。这些机车的轮式排列为 2-4-4-0 或 00-8-0(Westwood,《历史》,119 页)。
    2. On the relationship between the government and the Nadezhdinsk works, see Steven G. Marks, “The Trans-Siberian Railroad: State Enterprise and Economic Development in Imperial Russia” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988), 259-263.
      关于政府与 Nadezhdinsk 工厂的关系,参见 Steven G. Marks,《西伯利亚大铁路:沙俄时期的国有企业与经济发展》(博士论文,哈佛大学,1988 年),259-263 页。
    1. ZhKSZhD, zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, pp. 27-28, col. 1; George Sherman Queen, The United States and the Material Advance in Russia, 1881-1906 (New York, 1976), 166-170, 175. Queen cites no evidence that more than 100,000 of 300,000 tons of rails ordered in the United States were ever delivered. It is equally unclear whether the number of locomotives he cites (500) were delivered to Russia and, if so, to which railroad. The Chinese-Eastern Railroad relied heavily on foreign steam engines, but it is unlikely that the Siberian Railroad did. Of the total number of locomotives that came into use on Russian railroads in the 1890 s, fewer than 16 % 16 % 16%16 \% were made abroad. If all types of rolling stock were included, the percentage presumably would be even lower. See D. P. Il’inskii and V. P. Ivanitskii, Ocherk istorii russkoi parovozostroitel’noi i vagonostroitel’noi promyshlennosti (Moscow, 1929), 80. The Railroad Gazette, Mar. 22, 1895, p. 188, reported that some secondhand American locomotives were in use on the Ussuri Railroad in 1895 , but that thereafter rolling stock and other iron equipment manufactured in the Baltic provinces were to be introduced. As for rails, Peter Gatrell, in The Tsarist Economy, 1850-1917 (New York, 1986), 154, says that Russian imports did not exceed 1% in the 1890s. No rails purchased from the United States appear to have made their way for use anywhere outside of the Vladivostok terminus (Railroad Gazette, Mar. 17, 1899, p. 189).
      ZhKSZhD, zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, pp. 27-28, col. 1; 乔治·谢尔曼·奎恩,《美国与俄国的物质进步,1881-1906》(纽约,1976 年),166-170 页,175 页。奎恩没有提供证据表明从美国订购的 30 万吨铁轨中有超过 10 万吨实际交付。同样不清楚的是,他引用的机车数量(500 台)是否交付给了俄国,如果是,交付给了哪条铁路。中东铁路大量依赖外国蒸汽机车,但西伯利亚铁路不太可能如此。在 1890 年代俄国铁路投入使用的机车总数中,只有不到 16 % 16 % 16%16 \% 是在国外制造的。如果将所有类型的车辆都计算在内,这一比例可能会更低。参见 D. P. 伊林斯基和 V. P. 伊万尼茨基,《俄国机车制造和车辆制造工业史纲》(莫斯科,1929 年),80 页。《铁路公报》1895 年 3 月 22 日第 188 页报道,1895 年乌苏里铁路使用了一些美国二手机车,但此后将引入波罗的海省份制造的车辆和其他铁制设备。 至于铁轨,彼得·加特雷尔在《沙皇经济,1850-1917》(纽约,1986 年)第 154 页中提到,19 世纪 90 年代俄罗斯的进口量未超过 1%。从美国购买的铁轨似乎并未用于符拉迪沃斯托克终点站以外的任何地方(《铁路公报》,1899 年 3 月 17 日,第 189 页)。
    2. The first claim is made by Borzunov, “Istoriia sozdaniia,” 386. Other Soviet historians criticize Witte for relying too heavily on Russian factories, which were often far costlier than their foreign counterparts. This is closer to the truth, and Borzunov’s figures back up this statement more than they do his own. See Peter I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution, trans. L. M. Herman (New York, 1949), 560, and G. K. Tsvetkov, “Khod stroitel’stva velikogo sibirskogo zheleznodorozhnogo puti,” Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta, 1947, no. 2: 138. The second claim is by William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (New York, 1952), 83, cited in John J. Stephan, “Russian-American Economic Relations in the Pacific: A Historical Perspective,” in Soviet-American Horizons on the Pacific, ed. John J. Stephan and V. P. Chichkanov (Honolulu, 1986), 72.
      第一条主张由博尔祖诺夫提出,见《创建史》,386 页。其他苏联历史学家批评维特过度依赖俄罗斯本土工厂,这些工厂的成本往往远高于国外同行。这一观点更接近事实,而博尔祖诺夫的数据更多佐证了此说法而非其自身观点。参见彼得·I·利亚申科,《1917 年革命前俄罗斯国民经济史》,L·M·赫尔曼译(纽约,1949 年),560 页;以及 G·K·茨韦特科夫,《伟大西伯利亚铁路建设进程》,《莫斯科大学学报》,1947 年第 2 期:138 页。第二条主张引自威廉·阿普尔曼·威廉姆斯,《1781-1947 年美俄关系》(纽约,1952 年),83 页,转引自约翰·J·斯蒂芬,《太平洋地区的俄美经济关系:历史视角》,载《苏联与美国的太平洋视野》,约翰·J·斯蒂芬与 V·P·奇奇卡诺夫编(檀香山,1986 年),72 页。
    3. “O velikom sibirskom puti (Prodolzhenie besedy po dokladu N. A. Sytenko),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 22-24: 197.
      “论伟大的西伯利亚之路(续 N·A·瑟坚科报告讨论)”,《铁路杂志》,1888 年第 22-24 期:197 页。
    1. B. V. Anan’ich, Rossiia i mezhdunarodnyi kapital, 1897-1914 (Leningrad, 1970), 15. 40. Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god, 41-42; ZhMPS, official sec.: “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 1894, no. 4: 53-54, 58-60; ZhKSZhD, zas. 23, May 3, 1895, pt. 1, SP, pp. 16-17; zas. 26, Mar. 6, 1896, SP, pp. 33-34, col. 1; zas. 29, Apr. 2, 1897, SP, pp.41-43, col. 1, and pp. 4142, col. 2; zas. 31, Apr. 29, 1898, SP, pp. 34-36, col. 1; zas. 32, Jan. 27, 1899, SP, pp. 25-26, col. 2; zas. 38, Dec. 5, 1901, SP, p. 11, col. 2; P. K. Iavorovskii, Gornaia promyshlennost’ Sibiri i sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga (St. Petersburg, 1895), 1-2.
      B. V. 阿纳尼奇,《俄国与国际资本,1897-1914》(列宁格勒,1970 年),第 15 页。40.《1894 年 KSZhD 报告》,第 41-42 页;《ZhMPS》官方版块:“西伯利亚铁路”,1894 年第 4 期:第 53-54、58-60 页;《ZhKSZhD》,第 23 次会议,1895 年 5 月 3 日,第一部分,SP,第 16-17 页;第 26 次会议,1896 年 3 月 6 日,SP,第 33-34 页,第 1 栏;第 29 次会议,1897 年 4 月 2 日,SP,第 41-43 页,第 1 栏,及第 41-42 页,第 2 栏;第 31 次会议,1898 年 4 月 29 日,SP,第 34-36 页,第 1 栏;第 32 次会议,1899 年 1 月 27 日,SP,第 25-26 页,第 2 栏;第 38 次会议,1901 年 12 月 5 日,SP,第 11 页,第 2 栏;P. K. 亚沃罗夫斯基,《西伯利亚的矿业与西伯利亚铁路》(圣彼得堡,1895 年),第 1-2 页。
    2. Witte, Vospominaniia, 1:441; Otchet po KSZhD za 1893 god, 26; ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, June 2,1893, p. 14, col. 2 . Of the more than 32 million rubles spent by the
      维特,《回忆录》,1:441;《1893 年东清铁路报告》,26;《东清铁路特别日志》,1893 年 6 月 2 日,第 14 页,第 2 栏。在超过 3200 万卢布的开支中,
  21. auxiliary enterprises fund between 1893 and 1903, approximately 27 million went directly or indirectly for peasant resettlement. See Sabler and Sosnovskii, Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga, app., table 2.
    1893 年至 1903 年间,辅助企业基金中约有 2700 万直接或间接用于农民移民安置。参见 Sabler 和 Sosnovskii 所著《西伯利亚铁路》附录中的表 2。

    42. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, Feb. 10 and 24, 1893, p. 4, col. 2; ibid., June 2, 1893, pp. 5-6, col. 1, and pp. 11-13, col. 2; ibid., June 14, 1893 (Ministr vnutrennykh del), pp. 2-3, col. 1; Otchet po KSZhD za 1894 god, 24-25, 29-30; TKIM(VP), vol. 21. Regardless of the dearth of water in the Barabinsk steppe, the committee prepared settler plots close to the railroad so as to guarantee that people would be available to clear the track of snow.
    42. 铁路建设特别委员会会议记录,1893 年 2 月 10 日及 24 日,第 4 页第 2 栏;同前,1893 年 6 月 2 日,第 5-6 页第 1 栏,及第 11-13 页第 2 栏;同前,1893 年 6 月 14 日(内政大臣部分),第 2-3 页第 1 栏;1894 年铁路建设年度报告,第 24-25、29-30 页;TKIM(VP)第 21 卷。尽管巴拉宾草原缺水,委员会仍将移民安置地规划在铁路附近,以确保有足够人力清除轨道积雪。

    43. ZhKSZhD, osobyi zhurnal, June 14, 1893 (Ministr vnutrennykh del), p. 2, col. 1; zas. 10, Nov. 10, 1893, p. 19, cols. 1-2; zas. 22, Mar. 8, 1895, pt. 1, pp. 7-8; zas. 34, Dec. 8, 1899, SP, pp. 30-31, col. 2; zas. 35, June 14, 1900, SP, pp. 17-18, cols. 1-2, and pp. 19-20, col. 2; Otchet po KSZhD za 1893-1897 gg., 21.
    43. 铁路建设委员会特别会议记录,1893 年 6 月 14 日(内政大臣),第 2 页第 1 栏;1893 年 11 月 10 日第 10 次会议,第 19 页第 1