Road to Power  权力之路

STEVEN G. MARKS  史蒂文·G·马克斯

Road to Power   权力之路

Cornell University Press
康奈尔大学出版社

Copyright © 1991 by Cornell University
版权所有 © 1991 康奈尔大学

1. Siberia (R.S.F.S.R.)—History. 2. Velikaia Sibirskaia magistral’—History.
   西伯利亚（俄罗斯苏维埃联邦社会主义共和国）——历史。2. 大西伯利亚干线——历史。
2. Soviet Union—Economic conditions-1861-1917. 4. Vitte, S. IU. (Sergeǐ IUl’evich), graf, 1849-1915. I. Title.
   苏联——经济状况-1861-1917 年。4. 维特，S.YU.（谢尔盖·尤利耶维奇），伯爵，1849-1915 年。I. 标题。
   DK766.M36 1991  DK766.M36 1991（此为索书号，保留原格式）
   957.08 -dc20  957.08 -dc20（此为分类号，保留原格式）

TO CINDY  献给辛迪

Contents  目录

1. A Weak and Distant Domain … 13
   薄弱而遥远的统治……13
2. An Appetite for Asia … 28
   对亚洲的渴望……28
3. Siberia Is for Russia … 46
   西伯利亚属于俄罗斯……46
   PART II. DEBATE AND DECISION
   第二部分. 辩论与决策
4. Divergent Visions … 57
   分歧的愿景……57
5. The Vital Nerve and the Tail End … 74
   生命线与末端……74
6. Bureaucracy Prolix … 94  官僚机构的冗长……94
   PART III. CREATION  第三部分 创建
7. A State within a State … 117
   国中之国……117
8. Witte and the Taming of the Wild East … 141
   维特与驯服远东……141
9. Monument to Bungling … 170
   拙劣工程的纪念碑……170
10. The Limits of Railroad Colonization … 196
    铁路殖民的界限…196
    Conclusion … 220  结论……220
    Bibliography of Primary Sources … 227
    主要参考文献目录…227
    Index … 237  索引……237

Illustrations  插图

Preface  前言

Abbreviations  缩写

Note on Transliteration and Dates
关于音译与日期的说明

Russian Measurements  俄制计量单位

Cast of  演员表

Major Characters  主要人物

Road to Power  权力之路

Introduction  引言

1. V. V. Shulgin, The Years: Memoirs of a Member of the Russian Duma, 1906-1917, trans. Tanya Davis (New York, 1984), 84.
   V·V·舒利金，《岁月：一位俄国杜马成员的回忆录，1906-1917》，塔尼娅·戴维斯译（纽约，1984 年），第 84 页。
2. On the United States and Canada, see L. Girard, “Transport,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 6, pt. 1, ed. H. J. Habakkuk and M. Postan (Cambridge, 1965), 231-232, 254; Leonard Bertram Irwin, Pacific Railways and Nationalism in the Canadian-American Northwest, 1845-1873 (Philadelphia, 1939). On railroads and German unification, see S. Iu. Witte, Printsipy zheleznodorozhnykh tarifov po perevozke gruzov, 3d ed. (St. Petersburg, 1910), 83-84, 219. On Cavour’s nationalism and Italian railroads, see Andrew Wingate, Railway Building in Italy before Unification, Centre for the Advanced Study of Italian Society, Occasional Papers no. 3 (Reading, 1970), 5-6, 12-
   关于美国和加拿大，参见 L·吉拉尔《交通》，载于《剑桥欧洲经济史》第 6 卷第 1 分册，H·J·哈巴谷与 M·波斯坦编（剑桥，1965 年），231-232 页、254 页；伦纳德·伯特伦·欧文《太平洋铁路与加拿大-美国西北部的民族主义，1845-1873》（费城，1939 年）。关于铁路与德国统一，参见 S·尤·维特《货物运输铁路费率原则》第 3 版（圣彼得堡，1910 年），83-84 页、219 页。关于加富尔的民族主义与意大利铁路，参见安德鲁·温盖特《统一前意大利的铁路建设》，意大利社会高级研究中心临时论文第 3 号（雷丁，1970 年），5-6 页、12 页。
3. On Turkey, see Orhan Conker, Les Chemins de fer en Turquie et la politique ferroviaire turque (Paris, 1935). That Russians viewed the Canadian-Pacific Railway in purely political terms is obvious from the sources. See, e.g., TIRTO 6:11.
   关于土耳其，参见奥尔罕·琼克《土耳其铁路与土耳其铁路政策》（巴黎，1935 年）。俄国人将加拿大太平洋铁路纯粹视为政治工具的观点在史料中显而易见，例如参见 TIRTO 第 6 卷第 11 期。
   partially to consolidate their political control. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} In none of these cases, however, was the nonpolitical or “private-industrial character of railroads,” to quote Sergei Witte, subordinated to state purposes as it was in Russia by the time of Alexander III. The Siberian Railroad in particular was built for “military-political reasons.” 4 In Alexander’s reign economic policy was characterized by the increasing intervention of the state in the nation’s economy, which the tsar came to consider almost exclusively in political terms. ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5}
   部分是为了巩固其政治控制。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 然而，在这些案例中，铁路的非政治性或“私营工业性质”——引用谢尔盖·维特的话——从未像亚历山大三世时期的俄国那样被国家目的所主导。尤其是西伯利亚铁路，其建设纯粹出于“军事政治考量”。 ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 在亚历山大统治时期，经济政策的特点是国家对国民经济的干预日益加深，沙皇几乎完全从政治角度来考量经济问题。

Asian Russia and its major railroads, 1916
1916 年的亚洲俄罗斯及其主要铁路线

state, in principle, can pursue no other goal than the common good of Russia. In the hands of the government of the tsar, who belongs to all social classes and to none, railroads cannot and will not ever consciously serve as the tool of estate or propertied privilege, or for the conscious maintenance or establishment of inequality; in a word, they can serve the interests of the Russian people alone, as a means of giving the people access to the highest blessings of culture.
原则上，国家追求的目标只能是俄罗斯的共同福祉。在属于所有社会阶层又不专属任何阶层的沙皇政府手中，铁路不能也永远不会有意成为阶级或财产特权的工具，或有意维持或制造不平等；简言之，它只能服务于俄罗斯人民的利益，作为让民众接触最高文化福祉的途径。

CHAPTERONE  第一章

A Weak and Distant Domain
脆弱而遥远的疆域

Population  人口

Cossacks of the Far East
远东哥萨克

Climate and Agriculture  气候与农业

15. Kropotkin, Memoirs, 186.
15. 克鲁泡特金，《回忆录》，第 186 页。

16. Chikhachev, “Kaliforniia,” 561.
    奇哈切夫，《加利福尼亚》，第 561 页。
17. Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904: With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (Berkeley, 1958), 1 and passim. For the historical context, see also James R. Gibson, Feeding the Russian Fur Trade: Provisionment of the Okhotsk Seaboard and the Kamchatka Peninsula, 1639-1856 (Madison, 1969).
    安德鲁·马洛泽莫夫，《1881-1904 年俄国远东政策：特别关注日俄战争成因》（伯克利，1958 年），第 1 页及散见各处。历史背景可另参阅詹姆斯·R·吉布森，《滋养俄罗斯毛皮贸易：1639-1856 年鄂霍次克海沿岸与堪察加半岛的物资供应》（麦迪逊，1969 年）。
18. S. P. Suslov, Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia, trans. Noah D. Gershevsky (San
    S·P·苏斯洛夫，《亚洲俄罗斯自然地理》，诺亚·D·格舍夫斯基译（旧金山

Transport  运输

but what makes it worse is the thought that this foul strip of earth, this pock-marked horror, is practically the only artery connecting Europe with Siberia. And along this artery, we say, civilization flows into Siberia. So we say, we say a lot. If we were overheard by the drivers, the mailmen, or those wet, muddied peasants walking knee-deep in ooze beside their carts, which are loaded with tea for Europe, what would they think of Europe’s candor? ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37}
但更糟的是想到这条污秽的土地、布满坑洼的恐怖地带，几乎是连接欧洲与西伯利亚的唯一动脉。而我们却说，文明正是通过这条动脉流入西伯利亚。我们如此宣称，说得天花乱坠。倘若被那些车夫、邮差，或是那些在齐膝泥泞中跋涉、为欧洲运送茶叶的湿漉漉农民听见，他们对欧洲的坦诚会作何感想？ ${}^{37}$${}^{37}$^(37){ }^{37}

CHAPTERTWO  第二章

An Appetite for Asia
对亚洲的渴望

Russia in the Pacific Rim
俄罗斯在环太平洋地区

Russo-British Rivalry  俄英竞争

Beyond the Chinese Border
中国边界之外

A Russian Railroad in the Far East
远东的俄国铁路

As military strategists throughout the 1880s discussed construction of a railroad across Siberia, or at the very least from Vladivostok to the Amur River, their ostensible intent was to enhance the defense of Russian territory; but official perceptions of the railroad presupposed that it would also be the means to an offensive, “forward” policy in China.
19 世纪 80 年代，军事战略家们讨论建设横跨西伯利亚的铁路，或至少从符拉迪沃斯托克延伸至阿穆尔河时，其表面目的是加强俄国领土的防御；但官方对这条铁路的预期还包含将其作为对中国实施“前进”攻势政策的工具。
Some officers opposed construction of a railroad as wasteful or feared that it would benefit the military and economic activities of foreigners. Reflecting, for the time being, a lack of concern about Tokyo and its potential ability to restrict access to the Sea of Japan, they argued that a strong Pacific fleet based in Vladivostok, having free exit to the seas, would serve well to counter foreign threats and
部分军官反对修建铁路，认为这是浪费资源，或担心它会助长外国人的军事和经济活动。他们当时对东京及其可能限制日本海通道的能力并不担忧，主张以符拉迪沃斯托克为基地的强大太平洋舰队若能自由出入海洋，便足以应对外来威胁。
45. Evtiugin, 218.  45. 叶夫秋金，第 218 页。
46. Voloshinov, “Sibirskaia zheleznaia doroga,” 26-27.
46. 沃洛希诺夫，《西伯利亚铁路》，26-27 页。
47. Narochnitskii, Kolonial’naia politika, 386, 391, 421-422; Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 23.
47. 纳罗奇尼茨基，《殖民政策》，386、391、421-422 页；马洛泽莫夫，《俄国远东政策》，23 页。
48. “‘O narodonaselenii Sibiri i o velikoi vostochnoi zheleznoi doroge,’ (Doklad professora E. Iu. Petri i beseda v VIII otdele IRTO),” ZhdD, 1888, nos. 33-34: 278.
48. “关于西伯利亚人口与东方大铁路的报告”（E. Iu. 彼得里教授在 IRTO 第八分部的演讲及讨论），《铁路杂志》，1888 年，第 33-34 期：278 页。

provision the troops. As for transport within Siberia, General I. I. Filipenko suggested that improvements in the existing water routes would be sufficient. ${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49}
为部队提供补给。至于西伯利亚境内的运输，I. I. 菲利片科将军认为改善现有水路即可满足需求。 ${}^{49}$${}^{49}$^(49){ }^{49}
The opponents of the railroad thus favored expansion of Russian naval power in the Pacific. They were in the minority, though, and the land-based strategy first implemented by Murav’ev-Amurskii predominated. The Russian military had learned from experience. The usefulness of Russian railroads in battle against Afghan troops in Central Asia proved their importance for the Far East. Past mistakes were also not forgotten. Inadequacies of the railroad network during the Russo-Turkish War had hindered the transport of troops and supplies. ${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} Voloshinov repeated over and over that Russia should show it had learned the lesson of the Crimean War; lacking railroads, Vladivostok would be as exposed as Sevastopol’ had been. ${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51}
铁路的反对者因此主张扩大俄国在太平洋的海军力量。但他们属于少数派，而由穆拉维约夫-阿穆尔斯基首倡的陆基战略仍占据主导。俄国军方从经验中汲取教训——在中亚对抗阿富汗军队时，俄铁在实战中的价值证明了其对远东的重要性。过去的失误亦未被遗忘：俄土战争期间铁路网络的缺陷曾阻碍部队与物资运输。 ${}^{50}$${}^{50}$^(50){ }^{50} 沃洛希诺夫反复强调，俄国应展现其已从克里米亚战争中吸取教训；若无铁路，符拉迪沃斯托克将如塞瓦斯托波尔般暴露无援。 ${}^{51}$${}^{51}$^(51){ }^{51}