Citrini: 宏观解读better than fear

How should we think about “macro” in this current environment?在当前环境下，我们应如何看待“宏观”？

When we wrote “Global Macro Trading for Idiots: Part 4” in July 2024, we commented that the traditional macroeconomic indicators of a recession within the next year (the Sahm Rule, the Fed’s yield-curve based model and inversion of the yield curve, etc.) all meant that if we were going to have a recession, it was going to come in the next 12 months.当我们在 2024 年 7 月撰写《全球宏观交易入门：第四部分》时，我们评论说，传统的宏观经济衰退指标（萨姆规则、美联储基于收益率曲线的模型及收益率曲线倒挂等）都表明，如果我们将迎来衰退，那将在未来 12 个月内发生。

We’re nearing the end of that window, but we’re hardly out of the woods given the policy curveballs that have been thrown into the mix. Still, outside of the downward pressures created by the tariffs, the US economy continues a trend of further cooling labor market and further disinflation.我们正接近这一时间窗口的末尾，但鉴于政策上的变数，我们仍未完全脱离困境。尽管如此，除关税带来的下行压力外，美国经济仍呈现劳动力市场进一步降温和通胀进一步缓解的趋势。

While tariffs create enormous bimodal uncertainty, could there be sufficient resiliency in the US economy to withstand tariff shocks long enough to get through to the other side? Could a sudden reversal of trade policies also reverse gloomy growth expectations as the Fed’s jumbo cut in 2024 Sep did?虽然关税带来了巨大的双峰不确定性，但美国经济是否具备足够的韧性来承受关税冲击，足够长时间渡过难关？贸易政策的突然逆转是否也能像美联储 2024 年 9 月的大幅降息那样，扭转悲观的增长预期？

However, there is a large disparity between the pricing of a recession in areas like bonds (especially the front end of the curve) and oil vs. equities. On equities broadly, we see a sideways trend emerging for indices that will be marked by rapid overreactions in both directions and extreme dispersion.然而，在债券（尤其是曲线前端）和石油等领域对衰退的定价与股票市场之间存在巨大差异。就股票市场整体而言，我们看到指数呈现横盘趋势，伴随着双向的快速过度反应和极端的分散性。

The enormous uncertainty of tariffs ultimately stems from a geopolitical realignment shock that is at least in the short term determined in the mind of a man and a tweet. In his book “Geopolitical Alpha”, Marko Papic says that predictions are better made from the perspective of “constraints” rather than “preferences”.关税带来的巨大不确定性最终源于地缘政治重组冲击，而这种冲击至少在短期内是由一个人的思维和一条推文决定的。在他的著作《地缘政治阿尔法》中，Marko Papic 表示，预测更应从“约束”而非“偏好”的角度出发。

We all know what President Trump’s preferences are, but what are his constraints? We would lay them down as the following three categories:我们都知道特朗普总统的偏好，但他的限制是什么？我们将其归纳为以下三类：

President Xi has constraints too, notwithstanding the wolf warrior bravado, China is indeed under serious economic pressure to find an off-ramp. This likely explains China’s recent exemption of certain US imports as well as the overtures to open trade talks, but we’ll focus on the US and macro in this piece.尽管有战狼式的嚣张态度，习近平主席也有制约，中国确实面临着寻找出路的严重经济压力。这很可能解释了中国最近对某些美国进口商品的豁免以及开启贸易谈判的姿态，但我们将在本文中重点关注美国和宏观经济。

Since Liberation Day, recession odds have sharply risen, pro-cyclical assets such as crude oil have sold off but stocks have returned to levels from before the event.自解放日以来，衰退概率大幅上升，顺周期资产如原油价格下跌，但股票已回升至事件发生前的水平。

Meanwhile, the continued heightened recession risks are clearly a concern for the administration notwithstanding their claims to the contrary. The White House does not want the US economy to sink into a deep recession, which puts Republican control of Congress hence their support in peril and their rest of their legislative agenda in jeopardy. Collectively, this guides us towards thinking that the administration, spearheaded by Treasury Sec Bessent, would be eager to pursue off-ramps on the trade war.与此同时，尽管白宫声称情况相反，但持续加剧的衰退风险显然令政府担忧。白宫不希望美国经济陷入深度衰退，因为这将威胁共和党对国会的控制，从而危及他们的支持基础和其余立法议程。总体来看，这使我们认为，由财政部长 Bessent 领导的政府将急于寻求贸易战的退出途径。

There is a lot of noise and speculation about what the tariffs may cause businesses to do and how they may usher in devastating rolling bankruptcies and a deep recession. For example, we’ve seen the deck from Apollo painting compellingly a rather bleak picture of an impending Voluntary Trade Reset Recession.关于关税可能导致企业采取的行动以及它们如何引发毁灭性的连环破产和深度衰退，有很多噪音和猜测。例如，我们看到 Apollo 的报告生动地描绘了一幅即将到来的自愿贸易重置衰退的相当黯淡的图景。

In this piece, we’ll to focus on the data points that have guided us well up during this cycle up to this point to help cut through the noise and get to a balanced assessment of where we are and where we will likely be over the next few months. Our takeaway is a bit more constructive than where we think consensus is.在这篇文章中，我们将重点关注在本轮周期中迄今为止为我们提供良好指导的数据点，以帮助我们穿透噪音，进行平衡评估，了解我们目前所处的位置以及未来几个月可能的发展方向。我们的结论比市场普遍预期更为积极。

By almost all accounts, the US labor market has unmistakably cooled. This is the clearest and most diagnostic signal that we have been emphasizing over the last two years as the noise about inflation lurched. Softened labor market, slower wage growth, lower rent inflation, continued services disinflation, which means inflation overall is pointed downwards. This has been the economic mechanism guiding us the last two years. So far, the cooling in the labor market represents a continuation rather than a clear response to any tariffs, which may yet come.几乎所有的报告都显示，美国劳动力市场明显降温。这是我们在过去两年中一直强调的最清晰、最具诊断性的信号，因为通胀的波动引发了各种噪音。劳动力市场疲软、工资增长放缓、租金通胀下降、服务业通胀持续走低，这意味着整体通胀呈下降趋势。这一直是过去两年指导我们的经济机制。到目前为止，劳动力市场的降温更多是延续趋势，而非对可能出台的关税的明确反应。

The softening of the job market during this cycle has been almost exclusively accomplished by a drop in job openings rather than outright involuntary job losses. At present, we see a continued acceleration downward of new job postings. The private job posting website Indeed’s index is a faster private data point that has historically indicated where job openings will be. The current job opening rate of 4.5% was the threshold beyond which Fed Governor Chris Waller had warned of the risk of accelerating unemployment. Hire and quit rates, which are our favorite metrics to track, interestingly have gone sideways or even ticked up slightly.本轮周期内就业市场的疲软几乎完全是通过职位空缺的减少实现的，而非直接的非自愿失业。目前，我们看到新的职位发布持续加速下降。私人招聘网站 Indeed 的指数是一个更快的私人数据点，历来能指示职位空缺的走势。当前 4.5%的职位空缺率是美联储理事 Chris Waller 警告过的失业率加速上升的临界点。我们最喜欢跟踪的招聘和离职率有趣的是，表现持平甚至略有上升。

Wage growth, which also captures the tightness and the health of the labor market, continues to show a steady decrease and normalization to pre-COVID levels, a temporary bump in the H2 of 2024 into the election notwithstanding. The pattern is consistent across nearly all different measures of wage growth. We do not see any obvious impact of the tariffs yet.工资增长，同时反映了劳动力市场的紧张程度和健康状况，继续显示出稳步下降并回归到疫情前的水平，尽管 2024 年下半年临近选举时会有一次暂时的上升。几乎所有不同的工资增长指标都显示出这一趋势。我们尚未看到关税的明显影响。

We are starting to see some small cracks in the labor market. Based on Chris Waller’s historical observation, a job openings rate under 4.5% and trending lower should be followed by higher unemployment. Indeed we see that job claims and unemployment rates have ticked up unseasonably ever so slightly, but job number growth remains well within seasonality trends. However, it's unclear if any of these reflects the impact and uncertainty of tariffs at all.我们开始看到劳动力市场出现一些小裂痕。根据 Chris Waller 的历史观察，职位空缺率低于 4.5%且呈下降趋势，随后通常会出现更高的失业率。事实上，我们确实看到失业救济申请和失业率略有异常上升，但就业人数增长仍在季节性趋势范围内。然而，目前尚不清楚这些是否反映了关税的影响和不确定性。

There has been a lot of reporting of weak sentiments. The vibes are indeed very bad. Depending on the survey, consumer confidence is at the bottom lows of 2020 or even 2008 GFC. (Personally, I find it hard to take the UMich survey too seriously given the frequency at which it reaches the 2008 lows.) Regardless, consumer confidence seems highly correlated with the (perceived) strength of the labor market, which is indeed soft, but not collapsing by any means with still decent wage growth, low unemployment, and robust monthly net new jobs added.有很多关于情绪低迷的报道。氛围确实非常糟糕。根据不同的调查，消费者信心处于 2020 年甚至 2008 年全球金融危机的最低点。（就个人而言，鉴于密歇根大学调查频繁达到 2008 年低点，我很难对其结果过于认真。）无论如何，消费者信心似乎与（感知的）劳动力市场强度高度相关，劳动力市场确实疲软，但绝非崩溃，工资增长仍然不错，失业率低，每月新增净就业岗位稳健。

Nevertheless, the bad vibes extend from job seekers to job holders. Across the income spectrum, survey respondents are expecting higher odds of losing their jobs. However, it is very hard to know how much if any comes from actual personal job risks versus simply reporting what they’ve heard in the news.尽管如此，糟糕的氛围从求职者延伸到在职者。无论收入水平如何，调查受访者都预期失业的可能性更高。然而，很难判断这到底有多少是来自实际的个人失业风险，还是仅仅反映了他们从新闻中听到的信息。

Surveys are tricky and have been tricking us for most of the last three years with a vibescession.调查很棘手，过去三年大部分时间都在用一种“情绪衰退”欺骗我们。

That’s why we prefer to “watch what they do, not what they say”. So far real time consumer spending does not seem to have had an overall slowdown, however there are signs of moderation.这就是为什么我们更倾向于“观察他们的行为，而不是他们的话语”。到目前为止，实时消费者支出似乎整体上并未放缓，但有放缓的迹象。

Card transaction data has been disparate - with Visa showing that consumer spending growth, which has been flat since the election, in fact picked after Liberation Day and Fiserv’s SpendTrend showing a moderation YoY from 3.67% in March to 2.76% in April.卡片交易数据表现不一——Visa 显示，自选举以来消费者支出增长持平，实际上在解放日后有所回升，而 Fiserv 的 SpendTrend 显示同比增长从 3 月份的 3.67%放缓至 4 月份的 2.76%。

The growth categories seem broadly consistent with a pull-forward of tariff sensitive consumer goods, while there has been an unmistakable cutback of categories of discretionary services consumption and big ticket durable items such as furniture. All in all, this speaks to the continued US consumer resiliency while exercising increasing caution.增长类别大致与关税敏感消费品的提前购买一致，而非必需服务消费和家具等大件耐用品类别则明显减少。总体而言，这表明美国消费者依然具有韧性，同时更加谨慎。

The Bloomberg Second Measure card data, which biases towards lower middle income households in the US Midwest, agrees with data from payment processors like Visa/Mastercard, which report resiliency too.Bloomberg Second Measure 的卡片数据偏向美国中西部的中低收入家庭，这与 Visa/Mastercard 等支付处理商的数据一致，也显示出韧性。

Meanwhile, McDonald's reports that lower and middle income customers are cutting back while top income customers are still spending. Finally, we have the commentary from Q1 earnings calls that seems to suggest that even the recent accelerated purchase may not have been tariff pull-forwards.同时，麦当劳报告称，中低收入客户正在减少消费，而高收入客户仍在消费。最后，我们从第一季度财报电话会议的评论中了解到，似乎即使是最近加速的购买也可能不是关税的提前拉动。

Again, that’s the beauty of this game. Lots of mixed signals, unclear if people are being honest, or even understand correctly what they are seeing. However, the overall impression we gather is that there doesn’t seem to yet be any panic among US consumers in response to the tariffs.再次强调，这就是这个游戏的魅力所在。信号混杂，不清楚人们是否诚实，甚至是否正确理解他们所看到的。然而，我们总体的印象是，美国消费者似乎尚未因关税而出现恐慌。

Some have made the comparison of the Liberation Day shock to the COVID shock: hard economic data seemed just fine, maybe slightly slowing in Feb 2020, but all hard data just became completely irrelevant as companies scrambled to stock up inventory amidst a global supply chain disruption. This time too we hear news of mass cancellations of cargo ships, empty ports and impending shelves. However, there’s an unmistakable air of companies and consumers attempting to “get ahead of it”.有人将解放日冲击与新冠冲击进行了比较：硬数据看起来还好，2020 年 2 月可能略有放缓，但所有硬数据在企业争相囤积库存、全球供应链中断的情况下变得完全无关紧要。这次我们也听到大量货船取消、港口空旷和货架即将空缺的消息。然而，企业和消费者明显有一种“抢先一步”的氛围。

It seems reasonable to expect that companies have been preparing for tariffs and supply chain disruptions even if not to the same extent as was announced on Liberation Day. One reason for incremental bullishness now may be that companies knew they were going to have to be nimble, liquid, and reactionary for FY25.预计公司一直在为关税和供应链中断做准备，即使没有达到解放日宣布的程度，这似乎是合理的。现在增量看涨的一个原因可能是公司知道他们在 2025 财年必须保持灵活、流动性充足并能迅速反应。

We believe companies’ advanced planning, whether it’s anticipating longer lead times or rightsizing regional sales teams, likely helps extend a cushion period, during which trade deals may be struck or policies unwound, so that the uncertainty and frozen trade alone do not cause irreversible damage and guarantee a bad recession. However, like everything this has dispersion.我们认为公司提前规划，无论是预见更长的交货时间还是调整区域销售团队规模，可能都有助于延长缓冲期，在此期间可能达成贸易协议或政策被撤销，从而使不确定性和冻结的贸易本身不会造成不可逆转的损害，也不会保证发生严重的经济衰退。然而，像所有事情一样，这存在差异。

U.S. Import data released this morning only shows up to March, but gives us a better idea of the areas where companies were aggressively front-running tariffs by stocking up inventory and those that weren’t.美国今天早上发布的进口数据仅显示到三月份，但让我们更好地了解了哪些领域的公司通过囤积库存积极抢先应对关税，哪些则没有。

US companies likely have a 2 month inventory buffer to weather through the trade negotiations. Orders for the holidays that would be typically placed now could still potentially be made and expedited for the holiday season, should “temporary trade deals” or de-escalation materialize in the coming weeks to bring down the effective tariff rates, particularly those on China, to much lower practical levels.美国公司可能有两个月的库存缓冲，以应对贸易谈判。通常现在会下的假日订单，如果未来几周出现“临时贸易协议”或局势缓和，导致对中国的有效关税率降至更低的实际水平，这些订单仍有可能被下达并加快发货，以赶上假日季。

We believe this is part of the understood calculus for both the administration and the CEOs of big box retailers, who visited President Trump in the Oval Office.我们认为这是政府和大型零售商首席执行官们（他们曾在椭圆办公室会见特朗普总统）都理解的计算部分。

This would mean that we’ve got until the beginning of June to start seeing truly negative economic impact in the areas that have least prepared, even if there are numerous trade deals announced in the interim we will still see impacts from the 10% ad-valorem tariff placed during the pause on all countries ex-China.这意味着我们有直到六月初的时间，才能开始看到在准备最少的地区出现真正的负面经济影响，即使在此期间宣布了众多贸易协议，我们仍将看到暂停期间对除中国外所有国家征收的 10%从价关税带来的影响。

This sounds like a company that is reasonably experiencing an enormous degree of uncertainty and has every incentive to broadcast its plight under such macroeconomic and policy uncertainty. However, once again watch what they do. From the current demand for their products to their actual business investment plans, Ford does not sound like a company in sheer panic as were companies at the onset of COVID.这听起来像是一家公司正合理地经历着巨大的不确定性，并且在这种宏观经济和政策不确定性下有充分的动机来传播其困境。然而，再次观察他们的行动。从当前对其产品的需求到其实际的商业投资计划，福特听起来不像是在纯粹恐慌中的公司，正如 COVID 爆发初期的那些公司。

"The objective is not free or fair trade to lower tariffs everywhere. Trump is also not fundamentally motivated by the so-called Thucydides trap. His objective is simply tariff revenue to aid the growing federal deficits. That's why the trade war started with the tax cuts and the first round of tariffs was on steel and aluminum. That's also why Vietnam will eventually be on the top of the list.""目标并不是在所有地方实现自由或公平贸易以降低关税。特朗普的根本动机也不是所谓的修昔底德陷阱。他的目标仅仅是通过关税收入来帮助日益增长的联邦赤字。这就是贸易战从减税开始，第一轮关税针对钢铁和铝材的原因。这也是为什么越南最终会排在名单的最前面。"

The US economy coming into Liberation Day had been progressing as we had expected in the March Macro update: the rockiness of the stock market heading to our SPX 5600 Q1 price target by the end of March. The decline in the 10Y yield due to the fading of economic growth optimism and the underestimated disruptiveness of Trump’s agenda.进入解放日时，美国经济的进展符合我们在三月宏观更新中的预期：股市波动向我们设定的 3 月底标普 500 指数 5600 点目标迈进。由于经济增长乐观情绪减退以及低估了特朗普议程的破坏性，10 年期国债收益率下降。

Since Liberation Day’s aggressive rollout of Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs”, however, the picture has been much more unclear - dominated by “what-ifs” rather than “what the data currently shows”.然而，自解放日特朗普“互惠关税”激进推出以来，局势变得更加不明朗——更多被“如果发生什么”所主导，而非“当前数据所显示的”。

It’s possible that the “reciprocal tariffs” were always what behavioral economists call a “Decoy Effect” or an Overton window, where a 3rd less appealing extreme option is added to make the less unappealing option, in this case a global universal 10% tariff, more palatable, the same way nomination of Matt Gaetz for attorney general may have helped with the rest of the cabinet nominations.“互惠关税”很可能一直是行为经济学家所称的“诱饵效应”或奥弗顿窗口，即通过添加第三个较不吸引人的极端选项，使得较不令人反感的选项（在本例中为全球统一的 10%关税）更易被接受，就像提名马特·盖茨（Matt Gaetz）为司法部长可能有助于其他内阁提名一样。

We have already discussed extensively in the previous section about the genuine rising odds of recession. In fact, the odds of a devastatingly bad global recession if the whole gamut of tariffs as announced on Liberation Day were implemented in earnest are quite high. President Trump does not want to cause a deep recession in the US despite their explanations of “detox” or “taking medicine”. The fact of the matter is the US electorate is unforgiving and the incumbent political leader overseeing a bad recession will be punished and their legacy and reputation tarnished.我们在前一部分已经广泛讨论了经济衰退的真实上升概率。事实上，如果在解放日宣布的全部关税措施被认真实施，发生严重全球经济衰退的可能性相当高。尽管他们解释为“排毒”或“服药”，特朗普总统并不希望在美国引发深度衰退。事实是，美国选民不宽容，执政领导人在经历严重衰退时将受到惩罚，其遗产和声誉将受到损害。

As early as Jan 2024, Trump said: “And when there’s a crash — I hope it’s going to be during this next 12 months because I don’t want to be Herbert Hoover. The one president I just don’t want to be, Herbert Hoover.” Whether the tariffs can actually wreck such severe damage is almost besides the point, as long as there’s broad consensus including the administration that they can, the recession constraint will be real.早在 2024 年 1 月，特朗普就说：“当发生崩盘时——我希望是在接下来的 12 个月内，因为我不想成为赫伯特·胡佛。唯一一个我绝不想成为的总统，就是赫伯特·胡佛。”无论关税是否真的会造成如此严重的损害，这几乎无关紧要，只要包括政府在内的广泛共识认为它们会造成损害，经济衰退的约束就是真实存在的。

Of course, most including those in the Trump administration and President Trump himself think those tariffs are little more than a shock factor to get everyone’s attention and to gain some sort of negotiating leverage. A reminder: USTR has until 9 Jul to ink “reciprocity” MOUs; skeptics note 75+ simultaneous talks are a logistical fantasy当然，包括特朗普政府内部人士和特朗普总统本人在内的大多数人认为这些关税不过是一个震撼因素，用来吸引所有人的注意力并获得某种谈判筹码。提醒一下：美国贸易代表办公室（USTR）必须在 7 月 9 日前签署“互惠”谅解备忘录；怀疑者指出，75+场同时进行的谈判在后勤上几乎是不可能的幻想。

However, in this game of chicken, where every major player is keen to look strong and save “face” in front of a domestic political constituency, once the stakes are raised, it’s awkward and hard to climb down without off ramps. That’s why we believe the administration is currently highly motivated to find an off ramp.然而，在这场“鸡的游戏”中，每个主要参与者都渴望表现强硬并在国内政治选区面前保全面子，一旦赌注提高，没有下台阶的情况下，局面就会变得尴尬且难以收场。这就是为什么我们认为政府目前非常有动力寻找一个下台阶的方案。

Secretary Scott Bessent has been adamantly arguing that the Trump administration’s economic policy represents a three-legged stool approach: tariffs, tax cuts, and deregulation. In his latest WSJ op-ed published on Sunday (May 4, 2025), Bessent predicts that the overall economic policy will lead the US economy to re-accelerate in the second half of 2025 that “the American people should expect to hear the engine humming during the second half of 2025.”秘书斯科特·贝森特坚决主张，特朗普政府的经济政策代表了一种三足鼎立的策略：关税、减税和放松监管。在他于 2025 年 5 月 4 日星期日发表的最新《华尔街日报》专栏文章中，贝森特预测整体经济政策将在 2025 年下半年推动美国经济重新加速，“美国人民应期待在 2025 年下半年听到引擎的轰鸣声。”

To make progress on tax cut legislation and significant deregulation, the administration cannot rely on executive orders but must rely on Republicans in Congress to unite and pass legislation. This means that the administration must make significant and highly visible progress on trade deals to lift downward economic pressure and policy uncertainty. This means that the Republicans in Congress, some of whom have been quietly if not openly unhappy with the tariff rollout, will have leverage versus the President. We anticipate significant “progress” on the trade talks in the coming weeks, including a potential significant de-escalation between US and China.为了在减税立法和重大放松管制方面取得进展，政府不能依赖行政命令，而必须依靠国会中的共和党人团结一致通过立法。这意味着政府必须在贸易协议上取得显著且高度可见的进展，以缓解经济下行压力和政策不确定性。这也意味着国会中的共和党人，其中一些人对关税的实施一直默默甚至公开表示不满，将对总统拥有一定的影响力。我们预计未来几周贸易谈判将取得重大“进展”，包括美中之间可能出现的显著降级。

Just because President Trump has constraints, it doesn’t mean that we’ll see an immediate full capitulation on trade deals of course. No where is the concept of reflexivity demonstrated more clearly this year. Trump retreated on reciprocal tariffs because “people were getting the yips”, by which he referred to the markets, especially the bond market. But, Trump certainly noticed the sharp stock market sell-off, whose recovery over the past two weeks he also celebrated. The bounce back of the stock market will likely give Trump and his team renewed confidence and ammunition to take a harder line on trade policies. The push and pull may continue for a while. However, we expect not for too much longer. During this period, President Trump will also want the Fed’s help to relax some of these three constraints for him as he attempts to reach his goals.仅仅因为特朗普总统有一些限制，并不意味着我们会立即看到贸易协议的全面让步。今年没有哪个地方比这里更清楚地展示了反身性概念。特朗普在互惠关税问题上退让，是因为“人们开始紧张”，他指的是市场，尤其是债券市场。但特朗普无疑注意到了股市的急剧抛售，他也庆祝了过去两周的股市反弹。股市的反弹很可能会给特朗普及其团队带来新的信心和筹码，使他们在贸易政策上采取更强硬的立场。拉锯战可能还会持续一段时间。然而，我们预计不会太久。在此期间，特朗普总统也希望美联储帮助放松这三个限制，以便他实现目标。

We have recently discussed that the economy is not a speedboat, it’s more like an aircraft carrier that turns slowly and can’t be maneuvered quickly. However, it seems that Bessent has taken the (potentially too sanguine) view that they can combat the drag from tariffs during the negotiations with the stimulatory effects of their domestic plans.我们最近讨论过，经济不是快艇，更像是一艘航母，转向缓慢，无法快速机动。然而，似乎贝森特持有（可能过于乐观的）观点，认为他们可以在谈判期间通过国内计划的刺激效应来抵消关税带来的阻力。

As the FOMC convenes on May 6 Tue and announces a rate decision on May 7 Wed, the Fed is grappling with extraordinary difficulties. On the one hand, the Fed sees the same murky and highly uncertain if not outright confusing macro picture and feels uncertain about what to do. On the other hand, with President Trump having returned to attacking Powell and the Fed’s independence, the Fed grapples with how a move to ease right now may be perceived by the market.随着联邦公开市场委员会于 5 月 6 日星期二召开会议，并于 5 月 7 日星期三宣布利率决定，美联储正面临非同寻常的困难。一方面，美联储看到同样模糊且高度不确定，甚至可以说是令人困惑的宏观经济形势，感到不确定该如何应对。另一方面，随着特朗普总统重新开始攻击鲍威尔及美联储的独立性，美联储正挣扎于此时采取宽松措施可能被市场如何解读。

If we put our pretend Fed hat on and based our analysis exclusively on the data on inflation and growth, there is actually ample reason for the Fed to resume cutting rates as disinflation has resumed. The stickiest categories of inflation have continued to go down as well. With core CPI and core PCE having resumed declining, reaching 2.8% and 2.65% respectively, with further services disinflation to come, inflation is practically a solved problem.如果我们戴上假想的美联储帽子，并且仅基于通胀和增长的数据进行分析，实际上有充分的理由让美联储恢复降息，因为通缩已经重新开始。最顽固的通胀类别也持续下降。随着核心 CPI 和核心 PCE 重新开始下降，分别达到 2.8%和 2.65%，且服务业通缩还将继续，通胀实际上已成为一个解决了的问题。

Some may point to the recent rise in goods inflation, including for example the hotter than expected ISM Services Prices Paid print. But, if we plot core inflation alongside core services, core goods and services prices paid. We see that goods have been in deflation recovering and services prices paid correlate much more with goods inflation. In a dominantly services economy, we are just not that worried about goods inflation dominating. While it is theoretically possible that a full-blown escalating global trade war could set off another episode raging goods inflation a la COVID in 2020, the realistic likelihood seems quite remote.有些人可能会指出最近商品通胀的上升，例如高于预期的 ISM 服务业支付价格指数。但如果我们将核心通胀与核心服务、核心商品和服务业支付价格进行对比，我们会发现商品处于通缩恢复阶段，服务业支付价格与商品通胀的相关性更强。在以服务业为主的经济体中，我们并不太担心商品通胀占主导地位。虽然理论上全面升级的全球贸易战可能引发另一轮类似 2020 年 COVID 期间的商品通胀，但现实可能性似乎相当渺茫。

Taking a step back, if we look at nominal and real GDP in the long run, the US economy has basically fully normalized. Long run inflation expectations remain well anchored as well, ideology-plagued unreliable UMich survey notwithstanding. Barring tariffs, there is indeed a good argument to resume cutting rates based on favorable inflation and “preservation of a good thing” that is the US economy, which is the same argument the Fed used for cutting last year. Chris Waller has been arguing in favor of resuming rate cuts as well.回顾过去，如果我们从长期来看名义和实际 GDP，美国经济基本上已经完全正常化。长期通胀预期也保持良好锚定，尽管存在意识形态困扰的不可靠密歇根大学调查。除非有关税，否则确实有充分理由基于有利的通胀形势和“保持美国经济这一好局面”来恢复降息，这也是美联储去年降息时使用的论点。克里斯·沃勒也一直主张恢复降息。

So why is the Fed hesitant and mentioning the risk of “stagflation” at every turn as Powell did in recent interviews? Does the Fed not see the same balance of evidence as we do? Of course they see it.那么，为什么美联储犹豫不决，并且像鲍威尔在最近的采访中所说的那样，在每个场合都提到“滞胀”的风险？美联储难道没有看到和我们一样的证据平衡吗？当然他们看到了。

However, stagflation is the only politically correct answer even if the Fed believes tariffs were ultimately not inflationary but recessionary. We outlined the path by which tariffs (if they were unchanged from Liberation day and we did not get a pause) would lead to stagflation in “Seeing the Stag.”然而，即使美联储认为关税最终不是通胀性的而是导致衰退的，滞胀仍然是唯一政治正确的答案。我们在《看见滞胀》中阐述了关税（如果从解放日开始保持不变且没有暂停）将如何导致滞胀的路径。

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If the Fed accepts that tariffs are strictly a supply shock that’s ultimately recessionary, it’s supposed to look through and preemptively ease. But because the Fed cannot pre-judge the economic outcome of the tariffs which are currently highly uncertain, the tariffs must be stagflationary to justify inaction.如果美联储接受关税纯粹是供应冲击且最终会导致衰退的观点，那么它应该透过表象并预先放松政策。但由于美联储无法预先判断目前高度不确定的关税对经济的影响，关税必须是滞胀性的，才能为不采取行动提供理由。

Another reason for the Fed’s hesitation, albeit a smaller one, is of course President Trump’s nonstop public haranguing of Chair Powell and the Fed and the threat to the Fed’s perceived independence from political interference. However, Central Bank independence is ultimately a modern political construct and a gentleman’s agreement between good faith political branches. We are not in that era anymore and the Fed/Powell understands that very well. They will make an attempt to keep up the appearance but it ultimately cannot get in the way of setting the correct economic policy for too long if easing was indeed the correct policy but also happens to coincide with what President Trump wants. The Fed just needs a graceful off-ramp or some time so it appears plausible they had arrived at the easing decision independent of political pressure. President Trump has for now laid off threatening to fire Powell or intervening with the Fed’s decision, but he’s definitely not helping himself here.美联储犹豫的另一个原因，虽然较小，当然是特朗普总统对鲍威尔主席和美联储的不断公开指责，以及对美联储被政治干预影响其独立性的威胁。然而，中央银行的独立性最终是一种现代政治构造，是各政治部门之间的君子协议。我们已经不再处于那个时代，美联储和鲍威尔对此非常清楚。他们会试图保持表面上的独立，但如果宽松政策确实是正确的经济政策，同时又恰好符合特朗普总统的意愿，这种表面独立最终无法长时间阻碍正确政策的制定。美联储只需要一个体面的退出方案或一些时间，让外界相信他们是在没有政治压力的情况下独立做出宽松决定的。特朗普总统目前已停止威胁解雇鲍威尔或干预美联储决策，但这显然对他自己没有帮助。

In short: The Fed is currently frozen, but is unlikely to stay that way for long.简而言之：美联储目前处于冻结状态，但不太可能长时间保持这种状态。

China has pain points too. President Xi has his own set of constraints. However, we will not go into details in this piece. It suffices to say that despite public pronouncements, bravado, and genuinely greater pain tolerance at national level, the trade war puts enormous unemployment pressure on China’s one remaining shining economic engine: the export sector. China does want to find an off-ramp too and reach a trade deal even if both sides understand that a looser economic relationship is eventually inevitable.中国也有痛点。习近平主席有他自己的一套制约因素。然而，我们在本文中不会详细讨论。只需说，尽管有公开声明、虚张声势以及国家层面上真正更强的痛苦容忍度，贸易战对中国唯一剩下的经济亮点——出口部门施加了巨大的失业压力。中国也希望找到一个出路，达成贸易协议，即使双方都明白，经济关系最终会趋于松散。

China does have an enormous positive trade balance despite export having fallen as a share of GDP. This is largely a consequence of its import having fallen even more as a share of GDP, both of which stem ultimately from the weakness of Chinese domestic consumption demand. China needs to reignite its domestic economic engine, which is presently plagued by the massive debt overhang accumulated over the past two decades. The rebalancing is painful, slow but necessary. Learn more about our perspective on China from our China piece.尽管出口占 GDP 的比重下降，中国仍然拥有巨大的贸易顺差。这在很大程度上是因为进口占 GDP 的比重下降更多，这两者最终都源于中国国内消费需求的疲软。中国需要重新点燃其国内经济引擎，而目前这一引擎正受到过去二十年积累的大量债务负担的困扰。经济再平衡是痛苦的、缓慢的，但却是必要的。想了解我们对中国的看法，请参阅我们的中国专题文章。

If all the major actors in this play take their self-interested off-ramps, we believe that the market has priced too high a probability for recession this year. We may see a short-term (quarterly) economic slowdown or even technical negative growth, and rising unemployment, however, we quite likely will not experience an actual recession before the economy re-accelerates on another set of growth catalysts. Since the start of last year, we’ve swung from one extreme to another every quarter. A quarter ago, we were all worried about a potentially overheated US economy and inflation, now recession risk has dominated. We suspect things will look yet again very differently in a quarter’s time.如果这出戏中的所有主要参与者都选择各自的利己出口，我们认为市场对今年经济衰退的概率定价过高。我们可能会看到短期（季度）经济放缓甚至技术性负增长，以及失业率上升，然而，在经济因另一组增长催化剂重新加速之前，我们很可能不会经历真正的衰退。自去年年初以来，我们每个季度都在极端之间摇摆。一个季度前，我们都担心美国经济可能过热和通胀，现在衰退风险占据主导地位。我们怀疑一个季度后情况又会大不相同。

Presented without comment, as analogs tend to make people testy无评论呈现，因为类比往往让人感到不耐烦

Choose your own adventure here - we simply believe that viewing similar periods of price action offers an interesting framework and makes you more open to the possibilities:这里由你选择冒险——我们只是认为，观察类似的价格行为时期提供了一个有趣的框架，并让你对各种可能性更加开放：

Needless to say, the rejection off of the 200 day moving average is slightly concerning. Still, this isn’t something to base a decision off of entirely and the rest of the picture lends itself to a more bullish resolution.不用说，200 日移动平均线的拒绝略显令人担忧。不过，这并不是完全基于此做出决策的依据，整体情况更倾向于看涨的结论。

● AI will continue to be the defining technology of this decade, driving massive innovation in healthcare, labor, the way we think about data etc. It will increase productivity massively. In the event of a recession, it will make any fiscal response to improve the labor market potentially more difficult and drawn out. This will branch into robotics/automation, agentic assistants & employees, etc etc. You can own secular stories and trade tactically around them to generate consistent and compounding returns (a core view regardless of the market we’re in).● 人工智能将继续成为本十年的定义性技术，推动医疗、劳动力、我们对数据的思考方式等领域的巨大创新。它将大幅提升生产力。在经济衰退的情况下，它可能使任何改善劳动力市场的财政响应变得更加困难且拖延。这将延伸到机器人/自动化、代理助理和员工等领域。你可以持有长期故事，并围绕它们进行战术交易，以产生持续且复利的回报（无论市场如何，这是核心观点）。

● The economy has been stronger over the past 2 years than it has been in a while, certainly stronger than any period during the 2010s. That has a lot of momentum, despite worsening sentiment (we are still deeply in the dynamic of soft surveys / strong hard data). The largest risk to the economy is the trade war.● 过去两年经济比以往任何时候都更强劲，肯定比 2010 年代的任何时期都强。这有很大的动力，尽管情绪恶化（我们仍深陷软调查/强硬数据的动态中）。经济面临的最大风险是贸易战。

● In a somewhat reassuring turn, that risk seems to be more appreciated by the administration currently than it was in the first couple weeks following the announcement on April 2nd.● 在某种程度上令人稍感安心的是，目前政府对这一风险的重视程度似乎比 4 月 2 日宣布后的最初几周要高。

● The trade war’s actual impact on the economy can go ignored for a maximum of 2 months by the market, but the pressure to resolve is mounting and the possibility of a resolution that is constructive for equities is possible. Only during this pre-china trade talk stage is there infinite room for upside and the climbing of a wall of worry.● 贸易战对经济的实际影响，市场最多可以忽视 2 个月，但解决的压力正在增加，且出现对股市有利的解决方案的可能性存在。只有在中美贸易谈判前阶段，才有无限的上涨空间和攀登忧虑之墙的可能。

● Because of that, marrying long term views right now is very stupid. Unless you are Trump or able to read his mind (and don’t get confused here - literally only him), this is the part of the cycle to be reactive rather than proactive. You simply don’t have enough data right now and both outcomes are plausible - while it’s tempting to assume this will result in a deep recession, that’s not dissimilar to how the situation looked in the first 12 months of Reagan’s term. People thought his strategies were stupid and were widely bearish because of it as well. Outcomes can surprise, so we stay nimble.● 因此，现在抱有长期观点是非常愚蠢的。除非你是特朗普或能读懂他的心思（别搞混了——真的是只有他），这是周期中应采取被动而非主动的阶段。你现在根本没有足够的数据，两个结果都是可能的——虽然很容易假设这将导致深度衰退，但这与里根任期前 12 个月的情况并无二致。人们当时也认为他的策略愚蠢，因此普遍看空。结果可能会出乎意料，所以我们保持灵活。

We are currently out of our FX Basket (which, as of March 4th, was Long 50% EUR 50% JPY and Short 100% USD).我们目前已退出外汇篮子（截至 3 月 4 日，持有 50%欧元和 50%日元多头，做空 100%美元）。

In commodities, we are exiting our natural gas long and entering long crude oil and copper.在大宗商品方面，我们正在退出天然气多头，转而做多原油和铜。

In STIR, we are fully exiting two of our plays and putting on a new one.在短期利率期货(STIR)方面，我们完全退出了两个交易策略，并建立了一个新的策略。First, our SFRM6 long (which began as an M5M6 flattener, but had the short M5 leg covered in our last update)首先，我们的 SFRM6 多头仓位（最初是作为 M5M6 平坦交易，但在我们上次更新中已覆盖了空头 M5 腿）

We fully exit this, above our original price target of 96.60 at 96.825. Additionally, we exit our SOFRZ5 / EURIBORZ5 spread for a modest gain.我们在原始价格目标 96.60 以上的 96.825 完全退出该仓位。此外，我们退出了 SOFRZ5 / EURIBORZ5 价差交易，获得了适度收益。

The Fed is currently frozen but will not stay that way for long. I like selling the belly on the m5z5m6 fly (long SFRM5/short 2x SFRZ5/long SFRM6), currently pricing 31bps more cuts into the second half of this year vs the first half of next year.美联储目前处于冻结状态，但这种情况不会持续太久。我喜欢卖出 m5z5m6 蝶式价差的中间腿（多头 SFRM5/空头 2 倍 SFRZ5/多头 SFRM6），目前该交易对今年下半年比明年上半年多计价了 31 个基点的降息预期。

I’d like to play for that to be ~0 or even go positive. If this play seems like a bunch of gibberish to you, but you’re interested in making that not the case, check out Global Macro Trading for Idiots: Part Three (STIR).我希望这个价差能接近 0，甚至转为正值。如果你觉得这个交易听起来像一堆胡言乱语，但你有兴趣弄明白它，可以看看《全球宏观交易傻瓜指南：第三部分（STIR）》。

We are still positioned net long equities in our thematic portfolio (which has a longer-term view than our macro trades) on the fact that what is widely perceived as “complacency” is actually the old school macro axiom of “bad news, good action”. Dips get bought and risks provide fuel higher.我们在主题投资组合中仍然持有净多头股票头寸（该组合的视角比我们的宏观交易更长期），原因是广泛被认为的“自满”实际上是老派宏观原则中的“坏消息，好行动”。下跌被买入，风险为上涨提供动力。

However, we see the risk in the near term from a Fed that could be perceived as too hawkish and wild fluctuations in market perception of a recession - so, while we think the worst of the sell-off is currently over, we hedge against continued volatility with 30-90dte SPX puts.然而，我们认为近期的风险来自于美联储可能被视为过于鹰派以及市场对衰退预期的剧烈波动——因此，虽然我们认为抛售的最糟阶段目前已过，但我们通过持有 30-90 天到期的标普 500 看跌期权对持续波动进行对冲。

Currently, we hold 2% of our NAV in index hedges (SPX June 5200p and August 4800p). We believe that if the market were to unwind, it would do so in a unidirectional large move, making it compelling to own downside optionality rather than delta 1 as we position for larger trends.目前，我们持有 2%的净资产价值用于指数对冲（标普 500 六月 5200 看跌期权和八月 4800 看跌期权）。我们认为如果市场出现回撤，将会是单向的大幅波动，因此持有下行期权比持有 Delta 1 头寸更具吸引力，因为我们在为更大的趋势布局。

The signal to flip short meaningfully is simple to us; when the market begins treating bad news as bad news we will begin shorting in earnest (not just taking on 3-6mo puts to hedge our net long). As long as we are trading below the 200 day moving average (~5750 on SPX), we will remain somewhat paranoid and continue increasing the size of our equity index put options, but not get outright short.对我们来说，明确做空的信号很简单；当市场开始将坏消息真正视为坏消息时，我们将开始认真做空（不仅仅是持有 3-6 个月的看跌期权来对冲我们的净多头头寸）。只要我们交易价格低于 200 日移动平均线（SPX 约为 5750 点），我们将保持一定的警惕，继续增加我们股票指数看跌期权的规模，但不会完全做空。

In our second installment of “Global Macro Trading for Idiots” detailing foreign exchange, I explained that exchange rate movements are pretty much just interest rate differentials and expectations thereof.在我们“全球宏观交易入门”系列的第二部分中，详细介绍了外汇，我解释了汇率变动基本上就是利率差异及其预期。

But, of course, there are exceptions that prove the rule. And we have a great one in USDTWD’s *NINETEEN STANDARD DEVIATION MOVE*.但当然，也有例外证明规则。我们在 USDTWD 的*十九倍标准差波动*中就有一个很好的例子。

The basics are similar to SVB - financial institutions not hedging because it seems counterintuitive and expensive. A tale as old as time (or at least, the time cost of money).基本情况与 SVB 类似——金融机构不进行对冲，因为这看起来违反直觉且成本高昂。这是一个古老的故事（或者至少是资金时间成本的故事）。

Taiwan’s dollar should be a textbook “strong-surplus” currency: the island rings up a current-account surplus near 8 percent of GDP, piles its reserves beyond $560 billion, and never met a semiconductor it couldn’t sell.台湾元应该是教科书式的“强劲顺差”货币：该岛的经常账户顺差接近 GDP 的 8%，外汇储备超过 5600 亿美元，从未遇到卖不出的半导体。

Yet for years the central bank quietly leaned on the exchange rate, letting interest-rate differentials shoulder the load while exporters and insurers enjoyed a cheap TWD. That’s driven flows that are extremely outsized relative to Taiwan’s small size - with Taiwanese life insurers holding $300B of USTs and Taiwanese foreign assets held >$1T.然而，多年来中央银行默默地对汇率施加压力，让利率差异承担重任，而出口商和保险公司则享受廉价的台币。这推动了相对于台湾小规模经济极为庞大的资金流动——台湾寿险公司持有 3000 亿美元的美国国债，台湾的海外资产超过 1 万亿美元。

That policy crumpled last week. At a time when life insurers in Taiwan are the least hedged vs dollar weakness than they’ve been in the last seven years.上周该政策崩溃了。在台湾，寿险公司对美元走弱的对冲程度处于过去七年来的最低点。

Negotiators in Washington have hinted that a visibly weak TWD is no longer “polite.” Taipei has stopped leaning so hard on the bid, and the market pounced. Spot USDTWD slid 10 percent in two sessions—the sharpest Taiwan-dollar jump since 1992.华盛顿的谈判者暗示，明显疲软的新台币已不再“礼貌”。台北已不再大力支撑买盘，市场随即反应。现货 USDTWD 在两天内下跌了 10%，是自 1992 年以来新台币涨幅最大的一次。

A bigger trade surplus now matters more directly for FX strength than rate differentials and is supported by frenzied hedging by exporters and life insurers (who act more like banks than life insurers in the west). And this is primarily why the usual interest rate differential maths dictating the carry trade just broke.现在更大的贸易顺差对外汇强势的影响比利差更直接，并且得到了出口商和寿险公司（他们的行为更像西方的银行而非寿险公司）疯狂对冲的支持。这也是通常由利差决定的套息交易数学原理被打破的主要原因。

Why does this matter for anyone besides Taiwan?这对台湾以外的其他人为什么重要？

Taiwanese life insurers have built a $1.7 trillion offshore book, roughly 70 percent in USD assets. That is more than twice domestic GDP and five times the size of the local bond market. Most of those positions remain only partially hedged, a conscious bet that TWD weakness was structural. Check out what your return looks like if you’re a degen Taiwanese lifer stuffed to the gills with unhedged USTs:台湾寿险公司建立了 1.7 万亿美元的离岸资产组合，其中约 70%为美元资产。这是国内 GDP 的两倍多，是本地债券市场规模的五倍。大部分头寸仍然只是部分对冲，这是有意识地押注新台币贬值是结构性的。如果你是一个满仓未对冲美国国债的台湾寿险投资者，看看你的回报会是什么样子：

The analogy to SVB is uncomfortably neat - where SVB was irrationally comfortable with the assurance that rates would stay low forever, Taiwanese lifers were comfortable that the exchange rate would stay favorable. They’ve got tons of long-duration US bonds funded by liabilities callable in local currency. A 10 percent rally in the TWD torches capital ratios and, thanks to the liquidity features of Taiwanese life insurance products being more similar to banks’ demand deposits than western life insurance products, their solvency now hinges on how fast they can slap on hedges or dump Treasuries.与硅谷银行的类比令人不安地贴切——硅谷银行非理性地相信利率会永远保持低位，台湾寿险公司则自信汇率会保持有利。他们持有大量长期美国债券，负债以本地货币可赎回。新台币上涨 10%会严重削弱资本充足率，而且由于台湾寿险产品的流动性特征更类似于银行的活期存款，而非西方寿险产品，他们的偿付能力现在取决于他们能多快地加上对冲或抛售国债。

Some lifers are rumored to be short KRW or INR as a rough proxy for TWD weakness. Correlation trades work until they don’t: Korea’s and India’s balance sheets look nothing like Taiwan’s, and liquidity mismatches multiply under stress. If those proxies blow out, forced unwinds could amplify regional FX volatility.有传言称一些长期持有者做空韩元（KRW）或印度卢比（INR），作为台币（TWD）走弱的粗略代理。相关性交易有效直到失效：韩国和印度的资产负债表与台湾截然不同，流动性错配在压力下成倍增加。如果这些代理货币出现崩溃，被迫平仓可能会加剧区域外汇波动。

This introduces another issue for the administration - besides recession risk, President Trump faces another hard constraint as some 6-9 Trillion of US federal debt comes due between Apr and June this year. Meanwhile, traditionally reliable price insensitive foreign buyers like East Asian (Japan, China, and Taiwan) Central Banks and financial institutions are pulling back from buying US Treasuries, wary of heavy capital losses resulting from USD depreciation. The US government faces a debt demand problem. Further, we are in a generally unfavorable environment about debt financing with the stock-bond correlation having flipped positive.这给政府带来了另一个问题——除了经济衰退风险外，特朗普总统还面临另一个严峻限制，因为今年 4 月至 6 月间约有 6 至 9 万亿美元的美国联邦债务到期。与此同时，传统上价格不敏感的外国买家，如东亚（日本、中国和台湾）中央银行及金融机构，正减少购买美国国债，担心美元贬值带来的重大资本损失。美国政府面临债务需求问题。此外，我们正处于一个债务融资环境普遍不利的时期，股票与债券的相关性已转为正相关。

While I have traded TWD and spoken previously about this risk, I am nowhere near an expert. I highly recommend following Brad Setser (@brad_setser) on X (and reading his/Josh Younger/Robin Wigglesworth’s FT pieces about this) to continue to gauge the potential for contagion.* If you’re trading US bonds, keep an eye on TWD cross-currency basis; a sudden widening would signal real money exiting.虽然我曾交易过新台币（TWD）并且之前谈到过这一风险，但我远非专家。我强烈建议关注 Brad Setser（@brad_setser）在 X 上的动态（并阅读他、Josh Younger 和 Robin Wigglesworth 在《金融时报》上的相关文章），以继续评估潜在的传染风险。* 如果你交易美国债券，请关注新台币的跨货币基差；基差突然扩大将表明真实资金正在撤出。

Some articles here:  这里有一些文章：

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Thanks for your great commentary and well-reasoned report.

While there are some constraints -- the bond market for one and the Republican Congress in theory -- Trump 2.0 has seemed much less constrained by conventional forces than Trump 1.0. Bessent is smart and well meaning, but others in the White House seem to have Trump's ears as much as Bessent. Trump has some political constraints but he's not facing a reelection ever again (presumably) and probably doesn't expect to get a lot done via Congress after the midterms in any event.

The April 2 tariffs were huge and a negative surprise to Wall Street, and it seems like there is a risk that Trump is less than willing to back down and accommodate "deals" -- spurred on by his most hawkish trade advisors. Trump has gone well beyond what is legal with his executive orders and even is ignoring a Supreme Court order on facilitating the return of a legal resident from an El Salvador prison. There is certainly a significant risk that he might choose to ignore economic constraints that a more reasonable politician wouldn't.

His love of tariffs goes back several decades. While he doesn't want to be considered another Hoover (there is a case that Hoover is unfairly blamed, but still he is blamed) it might take quite a lot of compelling evidence to persuade him things are going south or Trump may judge he can blame whatever happens this year on Biden or on a short-term pain for long-term gain.

I certainly hope your optimistic view is right, but there are risks in the other direction.

Banger!!

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