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Comparative Strategy 比较战略

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The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient
地理距离的持续重要性和博尔丁的力量损失梯度

Kieran Webb $^{a}$ 基兰-韦伯 $^{a}$ $^{a}$ University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom
$^{a}$ 雷丁大学，英国雷丁Published online: 24 Oct 2007.
在线出版：2007 年 10 月 24 日。

To cite this article: Kieran Webb (2007) The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding’s Loss of Strength Gradient, Comparative Strategy, 26:4, 295-310, DOI:
引用本文：Kieran Webb (2007) The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient, Comparative Strategy, 26:4, 295-310, DOI：
10.1080/01495930701598607

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The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient
地理距离的持续重要性和博尔丁的力量损失梯度

KIERAN WEBB 基兰-韦伯University of Reading 雷丁大学Reading, United Kingdom 英国雷丁

Abstract 摘要

The loss of strength gradient (LSG), which demonstrates the importance of geographic distance and the advantage of forward basing, has been under attack. Proximity is supposedly becoming less importantfor prevailing in war. It is a view that has been expressed not only by President George W. Bush but even by the person who devised the LSG, Kenneth Boulding. As a result, it is being used as reason for the withdrawal of U.S. forces back to the American homeland. However, this view is flawed. Distance is retaining its importance as a result of two factors: the competitive nature of war and the impermanence of great-power status. The United States cannot withdraw forward-positioned forces and expect to maintain permanently the same power projection capabilities.
力量损失梯度（LSG）表明了地理距离的重要性和前沿基地的优势，但这一梯度一直受到攻击。据说，近距离对于在战争中取得胜利越来越不重要。不仅小布什总统，甚至连 LSG 的设计者肯尼斯-博尔丁也表达了这一观点。因此，它被用作美军撤回美国本土的理由。然而，这种观点是有缺陷的。距离之所以保持其重要性是因为两个因素：战争的竞争性和大国地位的不稳定性。美国不能撤出前沿部署的部队，并期望永久保持同样的力量投射能力。

Introduction 导言

Kenneth Boulding argued that the amount of a nation’s military power that can be brought to bear in any part of the world depends on geographic distance (see Figure 1). In devising the loss of strength gradient (LSG) diagram, he showed, in graphical form, that the further away the target of aggression the less strength that could be made available. He also showed how this loss of strength could be ameliorated by the use of forward positions.

^{1}

肯尼斯-博尔丁（Kenneth Boulding）认为，一个国家在世界上任何地方所能发挥的军事力量取决于地理距离（见图 1）。他设计了力量损失梯度（LSG）图，以图表形式表明，侵略目标越远，可动用的力量就越少。他还说明了如何通过使用前沿阵地来改善这种力量损失。

^{1}

But the need for forward basing has been under attack. Proximity supposedly is becoming less important for prevailing in war. This is a view held by President George W. Bush, who has said that American armed forces have become "better able to strike anywhere in the world over great distances.

^{2}

And he is by no means the first to have questioned the advantage of proximity. None other than Boulding himself supported the idea of decline in the loss of strength gradient.
但是，前沿基地的必要性一直受到攻击。据说，就近作战对战争胜利的重要性正在降低。乔治-W-布什总统就持这种观点，他说美国军队已经 "更有能力对世界上任何地方实施远距离打击"。

^{2}

他绝不是第一个质疑近距离优势的人。博尔丁本人也支持力量损失梯度下降的观点。

There are two lines of attack upon the LSG. One is that transport is becoming easier. The other is that there is an increased ability to strike the opponent through air and missile power. Boulding himself said that there had been a “military revolution” in the twentieth century, the significance of which was “a very substantial diminution in the cost of transportation of organized violence of all kinds, especially of organized armed forces” and "an enormous increase in the range of the deadly projectile."3
整筆撥款計劃受到兩方面的攻擊。一是运输越来越容易。另一个是通过空中和导弹力量打击对手的能力增强了。博尔丁本人曾说过，20 世纪发生了一场 "军事革命"，其意义在于 "各种有组织暴力，特别是有组织武装力量的运输成本大大降低"，"致命射弹的射程大大增加 "3。

This paper will refute the view that the loss of strength gradient, and thus the advantage of proximity derived from forward basing, has become less important during the last hundred years, the timeframe which Boulding cited. Where the LSG is reduced in significance it is of only temporary nature. The reason for this is to be found in two enduring factors. One is the competitive nature of war. Where one side benefits from a new technology or idea, another side will seek to redress the situation. It will counter it or acquire it, thereby reintroducing balance between both. The other factor is the impermanence of great-power status. While the actions of a larger state may be less impinged upon by the loss of strength gradient, this cannot be a permanent state of affairs. A country might well be a superpower but it cannot remain a superpower indefinitely. Boulding identified both of these enduring factors. He
本文将反驳这样一种观点，即在过去的一百年中，强度梯度的丧失以及由此产生的前沿基地的近距离优势已经变得不那么重要了，而这正是博尔丁所引用的时间框架。整流罩的重要性降低只是暂时的。其原因在于两个持久因素。其一是战争的竞争性。当一方从新技术或新理念中获益时，另一方就会设法扭转局面。它将对其进行反制或获取，从而重新恢复双方之间的平衡。另一个因素是大国地位的不稳定性。虽然大国的行动可能会因实力梯度的丧失而受到较少的影响，但这不可能是一种永久的状态。一个国家很可能是超级大国，但它不可能无限期地保持超级大国的地位。博尔丁指出了这两个持久因素。他

Figure 1. Boulding’s Loss of Strength Gradient. Boulding’s loss of strength gradient shows how a military force whose home base is at position

(A)

becomes weaker with geographic distance. It can use a forward position

(E)

to remedy this, bringing greater strength to bear upon its opponent

(B)

. Proximity maximizes the strength of the force being deployed.
图 1.博尔丁的力量损失梯度。博尔丁的力量损失梯度显示了大本营位于

(A)

位置的军队是如何随着地理距离的增加而变得虚弱的。它可以利用前沿阵地

(E)

来弥补这一不足，从而为对手

(B)

带来更强大的力量。距离越近，部署的兵力就越强。
Source: Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 262, Fig. 13.3.
资料来源资料来源：Kenneth Boulding，《冲突与防御》（纽约和伦敦：Harper & Row，1963 年），第 262 页，图 13.3。
defined conflict itself as a “situation of competition.” He spoke of the “impermanence of empire” as “one of the most striking phenomena in human history.”

^{4}

Yet he failed to apply these factors to the loss of strength gradient.
他将冲突本身定义为 "竞争局势"。他谈到 "帝国的无常 "是 "人类历史上最引人注目的现象之一"。

^{4}

然而，他却没有将这些因素应用于实力梯度的丧失。

As Boulding referred to his military revolution as having occurred during the twentieth century, so it is appropriate to make use of conflicts from either end of that century for comparison of their forward basing needs. The Boer War of 1899-1902 is chosen as an example of the preeminent military power of the pre-air power era, Britain, using its global reach. The choice of the Gulf War of 1990-91 allows for comparison with the forward basing needs of the United States as the preeminent power at the other end of the twentieth century. Both conflicts saw movement of forces, their equipment and supplies, over a similar transoceanic distance. A third conflict, the Falklands War of 1982, is also examined. This demonstrates not only the competitive nature of war but also the impermanence of greatpower status. More than eight decades after the Boer War, Britain had retained global reach and had experienced technological advance, but it had seen faster growth in military strength among competitors. It tests not only the importance of proximity for a nonsuperpower but also provides a potential scenario for the United States, if it were to undergo relative military decline, a circumstance that cannot be ruled out indefinitely.
博尔丁认为他的军事革命发生在 20 世纪，因此，利用 20 世纪末的冲突来比较它们的前沿基地需求是合适的。1899-1902 年的布尔战争被选为前空军时代卓越军事强国英国利用其全球影响力的范例。选择 1990-91 年的海湾战争，可以与 20 世纪另一端的卓越强国美国的前沿基地需求进行比较。这两场冲突中，部队及其装备和补给都是在类似的跨洋距离上移动的。本报告还探讨了第三场冲突，即 1982 年的福克兰群岛战争。这不仅表明了战争的竞争性，也表明了大国地位的不稳定性。布尔战争结束 80 多年后，英国仍保持着全球影响力，并经历了技术进步，但在竞争对手中，英国的军事实力增长更快。这不仅考验了非超级大国近距离作战的重要性，也为美国提供了一个潜在的情景，如果美国军事实力相对下降的话，而这种情况是无法无限期排除的。

This is of importance to American forward basing policy. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, left as the world’s only superpower, has undertaken considerable revision in its forward basing posture and continues to do so. A troop presence of 248,000 in Europe in 1989 was reduced to 109,000 by

2002 .^{5}

President Bush has used the belief that distance has decreased in importance as a justification for further reduction of uniformed personnel stationed at overseas bases. By 2014, under current policy, up to 70,000 are due to have returned to the continental U.S.

^{6}

This paper will show why no country can withdraw forces from forward positions and expect to maintain permanently the same power projection capabilities.
这对美国的前沿基地政策具有重要意义。冷战结束后，美国作为世界上唯一的超级大国，对其前沿基地态势进行了相当大的调整，并将继续这样做。布什总统以 "距离的重要性已经下降 "为由，进一步削减了驻扎在海外基地的军警人员。

^{6}

本文将说明为什么没有一个国家可以从前沿阵地撤军，并期望永久保持同样的力量投送能力。

The Advantage of Forward Locations for Logistics
物流前沿阵地的优势

At both ends of the twentieth century, despite their global reach, both Britain and the United States still chose to obtain much of their needs from local sources. Just as much of the supply load for the Boer War was obtained in South Africa, so much of that for the Gulf War was obtained in Southwest Asia.
在二十世纪的两个末期，尽管英国和美国的影响力遍及全球，但它们仍然选择从当地获取大量所需物资。正如布尔战争的大部分补给是在南非获得的一样，海湾战争的大部分补给也是在西南亚获得的。

The Boer War involved a global logistical effort. According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, the transportation required by the war in South Africa was “an incident unprecedented, and in its success unsurpassed, in military history.”

^{7}

The British had to transport their animals, equipment and supplies, as well as personnel, across the world’s oceans. As a result they found it advantageous to make as much use as they could of that which was locally available, demonstrating the importance of forward locations, as implied by Boulding’s LSG. 159,000 horses out a total of 519,000 were sourced for the campaign within South Africa, as were 45,000 mules and donkeys out of a total of

151, 000 .^{8}

Trek oxen were almost entirely sourced from within South Africa, and 150,000 were used in the first fifteen months.

^{9}

In addition, much food was bought locally. The supply of meat to the troops at the Cape was contracted out to the South African Cold Storage Company.

^{10}

The British also grew and raised their own locally produced food. During the guerrilla phase of the war they took control of seventy vacant Boer farms for this purpose. Even land around blockhouses and lines of communication was cultivated.

^{11}

布尔战争涉及全球后勤工作。阿尔弗雷德-塞耶-马汉（Alfred Thayer Mahan）认为，南非战争所需的运输是 "军事史上前所未有的事件，其成功也是无与伦比的"。

^{7}

英国人必须跨越世界各大洋运输牲畜、装备和补给品以及人员。因此，他们发现尽可能多地利用当地的物资是非常有利的，这表明了前沿阵地的重要性，正如博尔丁的LSG所暗示的那样。在总共 519,000 匹马中，有 159,000 匹马是在南非境内采购的；在总共 45,000 头骡子和驴中，也有 45,000 头骡子和驴是在南非境内采购的。

^{9}

此外，许多食物都是在当地购买的。开普敦部队的肉类供应由南非冷藏公司承包。

^{10}

英国人还在当地种植和养殖自己生产的粮食。在战争的游击阶段，他们为此控制了七十个空置的布尔人农场。甚至连碉堡和交通线周围的土地也被开垦出来。

^{11}

Much transport equipment was obtained locally. Following the Boer invasions in late 1899 there were still 563 engines, 779 coaches, plus the equivalent of 7,041 short trucks in the Cape and 1,363 six- and eight-wheeled trucks in Natal. Orders for further rolling stock to be built were placed within South Africa. Manufacture was carried out at Salt River in Cape Town, Uitenhage outside Port Elizabeth, and East London.

^{12}

Off-rail transport was also greatly dependent upon locally procured equipment. The British bought 2,163 wagons and carts in South Africa during the war as well hiring a further 1,400 ox wagons within the region up to March 1900. Local companies, principal of which was Julius Weil, were contracted as suppliers.

^{13}

The British relied upon stocks of coal in South Africa to supply ships and trains. The naval base at Simon’s Town near Cape Town had a reserve of 13,000 long tons at the start of the war. Mined coal was also sourced from within South Africa once the collieries of northern Natal and the Transvaal were in British hands.

^{14}

许多运输设备都是就地取材。1899 年底布尔人入侵后，开普省仍有 563 台发动机、779 辆客车和相当于 7041 辆短卡车的车辆，纳塔尔省有 1363 辆六轮和八轮卡车。在南非境内还接到了制造更多机车车辆的订单。制造厂分别位于开普敦的盐河、伊丽莎白港外的乌滕哈格和东伦敦。

^{12}

非铁路运输在很大程度上也依赖于当地采购的设备。战争期间，英国在南非购买了 2,163 辆马车和手推车，截至 1900 年 3 月，还在该地区租用了 1,400 辆牛车。当地公司（其中主要是朱利叶斯-威尔公司）作为供应商签订了合同。

^{13}

英国人依靠南非的煤炭库存为船只和火车提供补给。开普敦附近西蒙斯镇的海军基地在战争开始时储备了13000长吨的煤炭。纳塔尔省北部和德兰士瓦省的煤矿落入英国人手中后，开采的煤炭也从南非境内运来。

^{14}

The Gulf conflict of 1990-91 saw a considerable demand for logistics, evidenced by the fact that United States sealift and airlift moved a load of 9.7 million short tons.

^{15}

Supplies that were already forward located were of considerable importance. Much reliance was therefore put upon sourcing within the Southwest Asia region or else prepositioned stocks close by. In one respect, the countries of Southwest Asia were especially capable of providing for the needs of the Coalition forces. As the world’s most important oil-producing region, the Gulf States were able to supply most of the fuel for the campaign. Three quarters of the 6.1 million short tons of fuel delivered by U.S. Military Sealift Command was actually shipped to northeastern Saudi Arabia from elsewhere in the Gulf.

^{16}

Supplies were also moved by truck and by pipeline within the region. Saudi Arabia supplied fuel to the Coalition worth

$ 1.9

billion. In the view of Prince Khaled, the commander of the Saudi forces, without locally available supplies the Western allies would have needed to mobilize the world’s tanker fleets.

^{17}

在 1990-91 年的海湾冲突中，美国海运和空运了 970 万短吨的物资，这证明了对后勤的巨大需求。

^{15}

已经部署在前方的物资相当重要。因此，在很大程度上依赖于在西南亚地区采购，或者就近预置库存。在一个方面，西南亚国家尤其有能力满足联军的需求。作为世界上最重要的产油区，海湾国家能够为战役提供大部分燃料。美国军事海运司令部运送的 610 万短吨燃料中，有四分之三实际上是从海湾地区的其他地方运往沙特阿拉伯东北部的。

^{16}

供应品还通过卡车和管道在该地区内运输。沙特阿拉伯向联军提供了价值

$ 1.9

十亿美元的燃料。沙特军队指挥官哈立德亲王认为，如果没有当地供应的物资，西方盟国就需要调动全世界的油轮船队。

^{17}

The Americans and allies who arrived in the Kingdom were fortunate as well to be in a country which, because it had to cope with more than a million pilgrims on the hajj each year, was used to the arrival of large numbers of people. A local company, Astra Foods, which already supplied the Saudi military, was contracted by King Fahd to support U.S. forces. The Saudis were also able to handle the provision of processed water that was especially necessary in the desert environment. American forces were supplied with two million gallons of drinking water each day.

^{18} 3, 000

locally procured water tankers were used to carry supplies from Saudi Arabia’s desalination plants. Mobile kitchens were also manufactured by Saudi Arabia’s National Metal Industry. The importance of local supply went so far as to the provision of latrines, showers and sinks. By October, Saudi contractors were producing respectively 600,300 , and 200 of these daily.

^{19}

来到沙特王国的美国人和盟军也很幸运，因为这个国家每年要接待 100 多万朝觐者，已经习惯了大批人的到来。当地的一家公司 Astra Foods 已经为沙特军方提供了食品，法赫德国王又与该公司签订了支持美军的合同。沙特人还能够提供加工过的水，这在沙漠环境中尤为必要。每天向美军供应两百万加仑饮用水。

^{18} 3, 000

当地采购的水罐车被用来运送来自沙特阿拉伯海水淡化厂的补给品。移动厨房也由沙特阿拉伯国家金属工业公司制造。当地供应的重要性甚至体现在厕所、淋浴和水槽的供应上。截至 10 月，沙特承包商每天分别生产 600、300 和 200 个厕所。

^{19}

An estimated 22,000 vehicles were contracted from the private sector within Saudi Arabia. They included heavy equipment transporters (HETs), mainly leased from the oil and construction sectors, used to move tanks and armored personnel carriers up to and along the border area. The Americans got 1,000 of these, an important contribution given that the U.S. Army and Marines had only 146 of their own. The importance of the HETs was acknowledged by Lieutenant-General Gus Pagonis, the person responsible for the American logistics effort. In his words, “We might not have made it in the Gulf without” them.

^{20}

Also, 2,500 fuel tankers were contracted to operate out of the country’s oil refineries. And a particular need of the desert campaign was for refrigeration vans. The Americans were fortunate to find that the Saudis had more than 2,000 available for lease. Other vehicles that were hired locally included flatbeds, bulldozers, trailers, buses, mobile homes for headquarters staff, cars and

4 \times 4 s .^{21}

据估计，沙特阿拉伯境内的私营部门承包了 22 000 辆汽车。其中包括重型设备运输车（HETs），主要是从石油和建筑部门租赁的，用于将坦克和装甲运兵车运到边境地区并沿边境地区运输。美国人得到了 1000 辆重型装备运输车，鉴于美国陆军和海军陆战队仅有 146 辆，这是一项重要贡献。负责美军后勤工作的古斯-帕格尼斯中将承认了 HET 的重要性。用他的话说，"没有它们，我们可能无法在海湾地区取得成功"。

^{20}

此外，还与该国的炼油厂签订了 2500 辆油罐车的运营合同。沙漠战役的一个特殊需要就是冷藏车。美国人幸运地发现，沙特有 2000 多辆冷藏车可供租赁。在当地租用的其他车辆包括平板车、推土机、拖车、大客车、总部工作人员的活动房屋、汽车和

4 \times 4 s .^{21}

。

In addition, the United States was able to rely on its own supplies within the region. Air force munitions, for example, were already deployed at depots in Oman, Turkey, and Diego Garcia.

^{22}

Other prepositioned supplies in Oman included shelters, tents, generators, and water purification equipment.

^{23}

Pagonis had high regard for the prepositioned ships at Diego Garcia, which sent a variety of equipment and supplies necessary for the sustenance of the initial forces that arrived in the region. He said that they were “absolute lifesavers” that “enabled us to survive during those first few weeks in Saudi Arabia.”

^{24}

Items carried by these ships included 5.5 million gallons of jet fuel, small arms ammunition, 3,000 land mines, machine guns, and mortar rounds. They also brought sixteen bread ovens, cranes, refrigerated vans, forklifts, 6,000 sleeping bags, uniforms and overalls, seven field laundry units, fuel bars for heating food, medical supplies, cots, blankets, tents, stencil machines, microfiche viewers, file cabinets, and radio units. In addition to this, they delivered 450,000 board feet of timber and 1,800 sheets of plywood. There was food as well, namely 124,000 Class-1 rations, “Meals Ready to Eat.” 25
此外，美国还可以依靠自己在该地区的供应。例如，空军弹药已经部署在阿曼、土耳其和迪戈加西亚岛的仓库中。

^{22}

在阿曼预先部署的其他物资包括避难所、帐篷、发电机和净水设备。

^{23}

帕戈尼斯对在迪戈加西亚岛预先部署的船只给予了高度评价，这些船只为抵达该地区的初期部队提供了各种必要的设备和物资。他说，这些船只是 "绝对的救星"，"使我们在沙特阿拉伯的最初几周得以生存"。

^{24}

这些船只运载的物品包括 550 万加仑喷气燃料、小武器弹药、3000 枚地雷、机枪和迫击炮弹。它们还运来了 16 台面包烤箱、起重机、冷藏车、叉车、6000 个睡袋、制服和工作服、7 台野战洗衣机、加热食品的燃料棒、医疗用品、帆布床、毯子、帐篷、制版机、缩微胶片查看器、文件柜和无线电设备。除此之外，他们还运送了 450 000 板英尺的木材和 1 800 张胶合板。还有食品，即 124,000 份一级口粮（"即食餐"）。25

By comparison, the British in the Falklands War, forced to operate from the sea, were far less able to source supplies close to the conflict zone than the Americans in the Gulf or they themselves had been in the Boer War eight decades earlier. Merchant ships sent to the South Atlantic alone carried 100,000 long tons of freight and 95 aircraft as well as 9,000 personnel. The supply chain also carried 400,000 long tons of fuel.

^{26}

It would have been of considerable usefulness to the British had much of this been already forward positioned. While they faced an 8,000 mile journey from north western Europe to the South Atlantic, the Falklands were just 400 miles from the Argentine coast.
相比之下，福克兰群岛战争中被迫从海上作战的英国人，在冲突地区附近寻找补给的能力远不如海湾战争中的美国人，也不如他们自己在八十年前的布尔战争中。仅派往南大西洋的商船就运载了 10 万吨货物、95 架飞机和 9000 名人员。供应链还运送了 40 万长吨的燃料。

^{26}

如果这些物资中的大部分已经在前沿部署好，那么对英国人来说将是相当有用的。虽然他们面临着从欧洲西北部到南大西洋 8000 英里的旅程，但福克兰群岛距离阿根廷海岸仅 400 英里。

Where there were forward located supplies, the British made use of them. They went even so far as to visit whaling stations abandoned two decades earlier. After South Georgia was taken, ships called in at the stations on the island, where they requisitioned steel and other repair material.

^{27}

On the Falklands themselves the British made use of tractors belonging to farmers on the islands.

^{28}

There was, however, little else available in forward locations. The British were forced to bring almost everything they required. Whatever the advantages from forward prepositioning, they were not in a good position in this conflict to gain from them.
只要有前沿补给，英国人就会加以利用。他们甚至前往二十年前就已废弃的捕鲸站。南乔治亚岛被攻占后，船只停靠在岛上的捕鲸站，征用钢铁和其他维修材料。

^{27}

在福克兰群岛，英国人使用了岛上农民的拖拉机。

^{28}

然而，前沿阵地几乎没有其他可用物资。英国人被迫携带他们所需的几乎所有物品。无论前沿预置有什么好处，在这场冲突中，他们都无法从中获益。

The nearest forward base was on the British island of Ascension. Although the facilities there were American run, Washington released its strategic stockpiles on the island. Chief among these was the provision by the U.S. Air Force of aviation fuel. Americans provided a total of 12.5 million gallons or about 40,000 long tons for use by British aircraft.

^{29}

But the island was still situated 3,800 miles from the Falklands. It was the equivalent of the British conducting the Boer War from Sierra Leone or the Americans conducting the Gulf War from the Azores.
最近的前沿基地位于英属阿森松岛。虽然那里的设施是美国人经营的，但华盛顿还是在岛上释放了其战略储备。其中最主要的是美国空军提供的航空燃料。美国人总共提供了1250万加仑，约合4万长吨，供英国飞机使用。

^{29}

但该岛距离福克兰群岛仍有3800英里。这相当于英国人从塞拉利昂发动布尔战争，或者美国人从亚速尔群岛发动海湾战争。

That the impetus for local sourcing of supplies should reappear in conflicts at both ends of the twentieth century provides evidence of the continued advantage to be had from the forward location and thus the continued importance of the loss of strength gradient. It occurred because the overall cost and speed of transporting logistics had been little altered over this time.
在二十世纪两端的冲突中，在当地采购物资的动力再次出现，这证明了前沿阵地的优势依然存在，因此兵力损失梯度的重要性依然存在。之所以出现这种情况，是因为后勤运输的总体成本和速度在这一时期几乎没有变化。

Cost of Transport 运输成本

Boulding was wrong to argue that a twentieth century “military revolution” had resulted from the falling cost of transportation. That the cost of transport should not affect the LSG is due to the fact that it possesses linear relationships with the costs of the supplies carried over time. This means that if its price falls, so the price of the items it carries also has a tendency to fall. Moreover, as the prices of both fall, so the competitive circumstances of war mean that advantage will be taken of the falling costs to send more supplies. The result of this is to neutralize any easing of transport such that distance retains its importance as a hindrance to movement. Figures from the latter half of the twentieth century show that in the commercial world the average distance traveled by internationally traded goods has remained constant at around 3,000 miles. In 1962, an average of internationally traded goods moved by land, sea, and air traveled 4,790 kilometers. By 2000 this was little altered at 4,938 kilometers.

^{30}

博尔丁认为运输成本下降导致了二十世纪的 "军事革命"，这种观点是错误的。运输成本之所以不会影响整船运输成本，是因为运输成本与所运输物资的成本之间存在线性关系。这意味着，如果运输价格下降，其所运输物品的价格也会下降。此外，随着两者价格的下降，战争的竞争环境意味着人们会利用成本下降的优势运送更多的物资。这样做的结果是抵消了运输的便利性，从而使距离作为运输障碍的重要性得以保持。20 世纪后半叶的数字表明，在商业世界中，国际贸易货物的平均运输距离一直保持在 3000 英里左右。1962 年，海陆空国际贸易货物的平均运输距离为 4 790 公里。到 2000 年，这一数字变化不大，为 4938 公里。

^{30}

Further evidence shows that civilian-traded goods costs have an enduring linear relationship with transport costs over time. New Zealand, used as an example because it has the lengthiest time series, saw transport rates on imports by sea and air between 1964 and 1996 fluctuate between 7 and 11 percent. Transport rates did not decline with time. The same is to be said for the United States, where transport rates on imports between 1973 and 1996 also failed to show a decline. Although the 1973 oil shock caused a rise to 6 percent during the middle of that decade, transport rates otherwise remained stable at about

4 - 5

percent.

^{31}

This suggests that the overall costs of transport are closely aligned with the costs of goods carried.
进一步的证据表明，民用贸易品的成本与运输成本之间存在着长期的线性关系。以时间序列最长的新西兰为例，在 1964 年至 1996 年期间，海运和空运进口的运输费率在 7%至 11%之间波动。运输费用并没有随着时间的推移而下降。美国的情况也是如此，1973 年至 1996 年间的进口运输率也没有出现下降。虽然 1973 年的石油冲击导致运输率在十年中期上升到 6%，但除此之外，运输率一直稳定在

4 - 5

% 左右。

^{31}

这表明，运输的总成本与运输货物的成本密切相关。

The relevance of commercially traded goods to the study of military logistics can be seen from the fact that civilian-traded items are an important part of the load carried in war. For example, the limited stocks of coal in South Africa during the Boer War meant that much had to be transported from Britain. Construction material was also sent, including enough to rebuild destroyed railway bridges along the whole length of the Orange Free State.

^{32}

As has been mentioned, animals were an important part of the load moved for the campaign. There were numerous other items with a duel use in civilian life. Among these were, by 30 September 1900, 298,000 water bottles, 41,000 camp kettles, and 384,000 bars of soap that had been purchased in Britain and sent to South Africa.

^{33}

In the Persian Gulf War, although most petroleum products were sourced locally, some

1^{1 / 2}

million short tons was shipped from outside the region by U.S. Transportation Command.

^{34}

There were many other supplies with duel military/civilian usage. Combat Equipment Group Europe, for example, sent 3,400 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles as well as more than 12,000 light engineered items. Included among these were generators and light sets as well as 6,500 radios. There were also 7,000 chemical protective overgarments.

^{35}

In the Falklands War, the largest component of the supply load also was fuel. Another duel use military/civilian item was food. The refrigerated stores ships, the Saxonia and the Geestport, were, for example, dedicated to this.

^{36}

Tents were another dual use military/civilian item sent from Britain. Even fresh water was a constituent of the logistics load sent to the South Atlantic. The Fort Toronto served as a water tanker for the task force.

^{37}

商业贸易物品与军事后勤研究的相关性体现在，民用贸易物品是战争物资的重要组成部分。例如，布尔战争期间南非的煤炭存量有限，这意味着很多煤炭必须从英国运来。建筑材料也被运来，包括足够重建整个奥兰治自由邦被毁坏的铁路桥梁。

^{32}

如前所述，牲畜是为战役运输的重要物资。还有许多其他物品在平民生活中也有双重用途。其中包括截至 1900 年 9 月 30 日，从英国购买并运往南非的 298,000 个水瓶、41,000 个野营水壶和 384,000 块肥皂。

^{33}

在波斯湾战争中，尽管大多数石油产品都是在当地采购的，但美国运输司令部还是从该地区以外运来了约

1^{1 / 2}

百万短吨石油产品。

^{34}

还有许多其他军民两用物资。例如，欧洲战斗装备集团运送了 3,400 辆高机动性多用途轮式车辆以及 12,000 多件轻型工程物品。其中包括发电机和灯具以及 6 500 台收音机。此外，还有 7 000 件防化服。

^{35}

在福克兰群岛战争中，补给品中最大的部分也是燃料。另一个军民两用物品是食品。例如，"萨克森尼亚 "号和 "吉斯波特 "号冷藏船就是专门用于这方面的。

^{36}

帐篷是从英国运来的另一种军民两用物品。甚至淡水也是运往南大西洋的后勤物资之一。多伦多堡 "号充当了特遣部队的运水车。

^{37}

The "Upward Spiral" in the Cost of Military Items is Not Permanent
军用物资成本的 "螺旋式上升 "并非一劳永逸

While a reduction in the price of transport goes hand-in-hand with a similar reduction in the price of civilian traded goods, this is not always seen in items produced solely for war. Paul Kennedy, for example, has said that there is an “upward spiral,” at work in “all areas” of military production which is “becoming increasingly divergent from the commercial.” The desire for state-of-the-art weaponry is meant to be pushing up the cost.

^{38}

The

$ 2.1

billion stealth bomber deployed in 1993 provides one very expensive example of the rise in the cost of such equipment by the end of the twentieth century.

^{39}

虽然运输价格的下降与民用贸易品价格的下降相辅相成，但这并不总是出现在专为战争生产的物品上。例如，保罗-肯尼迪曾说过，在军工生产的 "所有领域"，都存在着一种 "螺旋式上升 "的现象，"与商业生产越来越背道而驰"。对最先进武器的渴望意味着成本上升。

^{38}

1993年部署的

$ 2.1

价值10亿美元的隐形轰炸机提供了一个非常昂贵的例子，说明到20世纪末这类装备的成本在上升。

^{39}

Yet the competitive nature of warfare has always compelled military forces to seek the most up-to-date equipment, whether the Byzantine development of Greek Fire or American development of the Tomahawk cruise missile. There is, instead, another reason, whose influence Kennedy has not scrutinized fully. This is the fact that, as he has acknowledged, they are “less numerous” than advanced technology items produced for the civilian sector, where, despite initial heavy investment in prototypes, average unit costs are pushed downward by volume production.

^{40}

This divergence with civilian manufacturing is only temporary.
然而，战争的竞争性总是迫使军队寻求最先进的装备，无论是拜占庭开发的 "希腊之火"，还是美国开发的 "战斧 "巡航导弹。相反，还有另一个原因，肯尼迪并没有充分研究其影响。正如他所承认的那样，与为民用部门生产的先进技术项目相比，这些项目的 "数量较少"，因为在民用部门，尽管最初在原型上投入了大量资金，但批量生产会降低平均单位成本。

^{40}

这种与民用制造业的差异只是暂时的。

The high expense of military equipment can be explained by the use of short production runs that are often prevalent in peacetime. Ironically, these are the result of efforts to economize. The price tag for the B-2 stealth bomber could be understood in large part by the fact that the original order for 132, itself made in the peacetime of the Cold War 1980s, was cut to just 21 in the even more peaceful 1990s. Yet each plane still had to cover the costs of research and development. Such a small number also meant that when production was started the benefits of economies of scale and experience could not be realized.

^{41}

军事装备的高昂开支可以用和平时期经常盛行的短期生产来解释。具有讽刺意味的是，这些都是努力节约的结果。B-2 隐形轰炸机的价格在很大程度上可以理解为，最初的 132 架订单本身是在 20 世纪 80 年代冷战的和平时期下达的，但在更加和平的 20 世纪 90 年代却被削减至 21 架。然而，每架飞机仍需支付研发费用。如此少的数量也意味着在开始生产时，无法实现规模经济和经验效益。

^{41}

Even the B-2 could be produced much more cheaply. In 2001, Northrop Grumman offered to build a further forty B-2s for a reduced price of

$ 735

million each.

^{42}

A larger production run, necessitated by an emergency wartime need to produce as much weaponry as possible, could get the price down much further. Aircraft manufacturing costs are typically brought down by a fifth with every doubling of production. A comparison can be made with commercial transportation systems. In the civil aviation industry it takes the production of 500-600 aircraft before a model earns a profit. As a result, such planes sell for between

$ 50

million and

$ 250

million (ranging from 120 seaters to jumbos).

^{43}

Applying a similar calculation to the B-2 one finds that the construction of 600 of these aircraft could be carried out at a unit cost of approximately

$ 300

million.
甚至 B-2 的生产成本也可以低得多。2001年，诺斯罗普-格鲁曼公司提出以每架

$ 735

百万美元的低价再制造40架B-2。

^{42}

由于战时需要紧急生产尽可能多的武器装备，因此有必要进行更大规模的生产，这样就可以进一步降低价格。飞机制造成本每增加一倍，通常会降低五分之一。可以与商业运输系统进行比较。在民用航空业，一个型号的飞机需要生产 500-600 架才能盈利。因此，这种飞机的售价在

$ 50

百万到

$ 250

百万之间（从 120 座到巨型飞机不等）。

^{43}

将类似的计算方法应用到 B-2 上，可以发现建造 600 架这种飞机的单位成本约为

$ 300

百万美元。

Military production costs thus need not vary greatly from the civilian. The previously explained relationship that exists between the costs of transport and civilian goods over time is therefore also relevant to military equipment and supplies. Price falls in one will tend towards price falls in the other.
因此，军用生产成本与民用生产成本之间的差异并不大。因此，前面解释过的运输成本与民用商品成本之间随时间变化的关系也适用于军事装备和用品。一方的价格下降会导致另一方的价格下降。

There is evidence from the Boer War that backs this argument. The price of military equipment was pushed up by short production runs and pushed down by long production runs in this era just as it could be at the other end of the twentieth century. The two leading commercial suppliers of guns and ammunition during the conflict, hoping to increase peacetime government orders, both gave evidence about this to the Royal Commission following the war. Lieutenant Arthur Dawson, Managing Director of Vickers, Sons and Maxim, argued that the production of military supplies in larger volumes over a longer time frame with people continually employed, increased efficiency and reduced cost to the government. The use of short production runs incurred extra expense because of the need, for example, to cover the cost of new gauges and jigs for items the firm had not previously produced.

^{44}

Sir Andrew Noble, Chairman of Sir William Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, noted that men had to be trained and tools and gauges had to be provided, all
布尔战争中就有证据支持这一论点。在这个时代，军事装备的价格被短期生产推高，又被长期生产压低，就像在 20 世纪的另一端一样。冲突期间，两家主要的枪支和弹药商业供应商都希望增加和平时期的政府订单，并在战后向皇家委员会提供了相关证据。维克斯父子公司（Vickers, Sons and Maxim）的总经理阿瑟-道森（Arthur Dawson）中尉认为，在较长时间内大批量生产军需品并持续雇用人员，可以提高效率并降低政府成本。短期生产会产生额外开支，例如，公司需要为以前未生产过的物品支付新量具和夹具的费用。

^{44}

威廉-阿姆斯特朗-惠特沃思爵士公司董事长安德鲁-诺贝尔爵士指出，必须对员工进行培训，提供工具和量具，所有这些都是为了降低生产成本。
of which took a great deal of preparation.

^{45}

Dawson also pointed to the fact that, after the war, government factories were producing explosive powder on three shifts continuously to keep prices down-evidence of economies of scale in action.

^{46}

这需要大量的准备工作。

^{45}

道森还指出，战后，政府工厂连续三班倒地生产炸药，以压低价格--这就是规模经济发挥作用的证据。

^{46}

To be sure, a conflict where one side is far better resourced than another may see the better resourced side prevail despite the fact that it uses short production runs. It may not be affected by the emergency need to devote every resource to the fight. The United States, for example, never devoted its full industrial capabilities to the wars in Korea or Vietnam. It has not done so in the Iraq War since 2003. But no power can retain superior military strength in relation to selected opponents on a permanent basis. As evidenced by the decline of Britain between the Boer War and the Falklands War, superpowers do not always remain superpowers.
可以肯定的是，在冲突中，如果一方的资源远远优于另一方，那么资源优越的一方可能会取得胜利，尽管它使用的是短期生产方式。它可能不会受到将所有资源投入战斗的紧急需要的影响。例如，美国从未将其全部工业能力投入朝鲜战争或越南战争。自 2003 年以来，它在伊拉克战争中也没有这样做。但是，没有哪个强国能长期保持相对于选定对手的军事实力优势。正如英国在布尔战争和福克兰群岛战争之间的衰落所证明的那样，超级大国并不总能保持超级大国的地位。

Prepaid Supplies 预付用品

The expense of solely military items was of little importance for either the Gulf War or the Falklands War. There was another linear relationship at work; that of transport costs with prepaid supplies. Because the cost of such items is nothing at the time of fighting they maintain a constant relationship with transport costs regardless of any changes over time. Any number divided by zero equals zero. Even in the Boer War, much of the equipment sent was paid for before the conflict. The British were able to draw upon prepaid food reserves that were kept at Woolwich prior to the war sufficient to feed a force of 40,000 men and 20,000 horses.

^{47}

Of the purely military supplies, much also came from preexisting stocks. 118,000 rifles, 8,500 carbines, and 2,300 pistols were sent out between 1 June 1899 and the end of the war.

^{48}

Of the approximately 139 million rounds of small arms ammunition sent to South Africa between 1 June 1899 and 1 June 1902, 106 million came from prewar stocks.

^{49}

In the cases of the Gulf and Falklands conflicts, all but a few exceptional items had been bought prior to the conflict. The Americans in 1990-91, as well as the British in 1982, could rely upon the resources they had built up in anticipation of conflict with the Soviet Union. In the Gulf, the U.S. had available sufficient items such as tanks, artillery, warships, and strike aircraft for it not to require the manufacture of more for the needs of the war. This was demonstrated when the decision was taken in November 1990 to increase the American presence in the region in order to provide what President George H. W. Bush described as “an adequate offensive military option.” This meant a doubling of the ground force, including a tripling of the number of tanks, as well as a doubling of the naval force and an increase in air power by a third.

^{50}

It called upon preexisting equipment. Much of the augmentation of the ground force was carried out by the transfer of the VII Corps from Germany, where it formerly had faced the Red Army. As the British government put it following the Falklands campaign, it was able to meet “all the demands of the task force,” which was given “first call” on preexisting stocks, including those built up for NATO operations.

^{51}

无论是海湾战争还是福克兰群岛战争，单纯的军用物资费用都不太重要。还有另一种线性关系在起作用，即运输成本与预付物资的关系。由于这些物品的成本在战争期间并不高，因此无论随着时间的推移发生任何变化，它们都与运输成本保持恒定的关系。任何数字除以零都等于零。即使在布尔战争中，运送的大部分装备也是在冲突前就已支付的。英国人能够动用战前存放在伍尔维奇的预付粮食储备，这些粮食足以养活一支由4万人和2万匹马组成的部队。

^{47}

在纯粹的军事物资中，也有很多来自于战前储备。从1899年6月1日到战争结束，共发送了118,000支步枪、8,500支卡宾枪和2,300支手枪。

^{48}

在1899年6月1日至1902年6月1日期间运往南非的约1.39亿发小武器弹药中，有1.06亿发来自战前库存。

^{49}

在海湾和福克兰群岛冲突中，除少数特殊物品外，其他所有物品都是在冲突前购买的。1990-91 年的美国人和 1982 年的英国人可以依靠他们在与苏联冲突前积累的资源。在海湾地区，美国拥有足够的坦克、大炮、战舰和攻击机等物资，无需为战争需要制造更多物资。1990 年 11 月，美国决定增加在该地区的驻军，以提供乔治-H-W-布什总统所说的 "足够的进攻性军事选择"，就证明了这一点。"这意味着地面部队增加一倍，包括坦克数量增加两倍，海军力量增加一倍，空中力量增加三分之一。

^{50}

这需要利用现有装备。地面部队的大部分扩充是通过从德国调来第七军团实现的，该军团以前曾在德国与红军作战。正如英国政府在福克兰群岛战役后所说的那样，英国能够满足 "特遣部队的所有需求"，特遣部队 "首先调用 "了原有的装备，包括为北约行动准备的装备。

^{51}

Whatever the item sent in war, linear cost relationships with transport mean that moving the load did not become permanently easier during the twentieth century.
无论战争中运送的是什么物品，运输的线性成本关系意味着，在 20 世纪，运送货物并没有变得永久性地容易。

Speed of Transport Has Not Permanently Altered the LSG
运输速度并没有永久性地改变整筆拨款制度

Cost is not the only factor that must be considered with regard to the impact of transport upon the loss of strength gradient. Speed must also be looked at. Greater speed means quicker response time, which can mean that the ultimate logistics requirement is greatly
在考虑运输对强度梯度损失的影响时，成本并不是唯一必须考虑的因素。速度也是必须考虑的因素。更快的速度意味着更快的反应时间，这可能意味着最终的物流要求大大降低。
reduced. If supplies can be moved in quick enough to defend territory, the load needed will be much less than that required to reconquer it.
减少。如果补给品能迅速运入，足以保卫领土，那么所需的负荷量就会比重新征服领土少得多。

An understanding of the advantage of defense can be found as far back as Sun Tzu in the first millennium B.C. It is because of this that he set out a “rule of numbers” in battle. When ten times larger, one could intimidate the opponent into surrendering by surrounding them. When five times larger, one could attack. But when only double the size, one had to scatter the opponent so as to take them on in parts.

^{52}

Similarly, by the time of the Gulf War in the late twentieth century, American doctrine was that an attacker should be at least three, and possibly up to five, times stronger than a defending opponent.

^{53}

早在公元前一千年的孙子时代，人们就已经认识到防守的优势。如果人数是对手的十倍，就可以用包围的方式迫使对手投降。五倍大时，可以进攻。但如果只有两倍大，就必须分散对手，以便分而击之。

^{52}

同样，到 20 世纪末海湾战争爆发时，美国的理论认为进攻方的力量至少应是防守方的三倍，甚至五倍。

^{53}

In both the Boer and Gulf Wars, a speedy response meant that territory could be defended in preference to being reconquered later. When the British made the decision to send troops to South Africa in September 1899, it was with the awareness that the Boers might rush Natal before they had been put ashore.

^{54}

They needed to be moved as fast as possible to limit the amount of territory falling into enemy control. In 1990, the challenge for the American-led Coalition, at least for the first month-and-a-half, was to rush enough troops and equipment into the theater to deter or resist the anticipated Iraqi onslaught against Saudi Arabia.

^{55}

在布尔战争和海湾战争中，快速反应意味着可以保卫领土，而不是事后重新征服。1899 年 9 月，当英国决定向南非派遣军队时，就已经意识到布尔人可能会在他们上岸之前抢占纳塔尔。

^{54}

他们需要尽快转移，以限制落入敌方控制的领土数量。1990 年，以美国为首的联军所面临的挑战是，至少在最初的一个半月里，如何将足够的部队和装备驰援战区，以遏制或抵抗伊拉克对沙特阿拉伯的预期攻击。

^{55}

The advantage of defense over attack is not the only reason that the speed of deployment can provide assistance in war. The requirement for speed can be influenced by political considerations. There may be a concern that action should be undertaken before domestic support for it falls away. There may be a need for international support which is presently available but cannot be expected indefinitely. Both of these occurred during the Falklands War.

^{56}

A deadline might have been set by which the opponent has been told that he must comply. This was the case for the Gulf War. The UN Security Council had passed a resolution authorizing all necessary means to expel the Iraqis if they had not withdrawn from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. Weather is another factor. Admiral Woodward, who commanded the British fleet during the Falklands War, said that the Royal Navy would effectively have been “out of action” because of southern hemisphere winter weather from late June.

^{57}

In theory, faster transport should make all these factors less constraining.
防御优于攻击并不是部署速度能为战争提供帮助的唯一原因。对速度的要求可能受到政治因素的影响。可能有人担心，应在国内支持消失之前采取行动。可能需要国际支持，而这种支持目前可以提供，但不能无限期地期待。福克兰群岛战争期间就出现了这两种情况。

^{56}

可能已经设定了最后期限，并告知对方必须在期限之前遵守。海湾战争就是这种情况。联合国安理会通过了一项决议，授权如果伊拉克人在1991年1月15日之前没有撤出科威特，就采取一切必要手段驱逐伊拉克人。天气是另一个因素。曾在福克兰群岛战争中指挥英国舰队的伍德沃德上将说，由于南半球从 6 月下旬开始就进入冬季，皇家海军实际上已经 "无法行动"。

^{57}

从理论上讲，更快的运输速度应该可以减少所有这些因素的制约。

Speed indeed increased during the twentieth century. Airlift made it possible to transport supplies across the world in a matter of hours; at the beginning of the century this took a matter of weeks. Yet the overall pace at which logistics could be delivered had been little altered. It was wrong to argue, as did Hallion after the Gulf War, that airlift had proved critical for the delivery of combat strength.

^{58}

By far, most movement continued to be conducted by sea, a mode of transport that had seen little improvement in speed since the beginning of the twentieth century, having hit limits imposed by physics. As speed on water is increased so there is a disproportionately rapid increase in the thrust required for propulsion. This is observed especially at speeds upwards of 25 knots. An FFG-7 class frigate of 408 feet needs 20,000 shaft horsepower to achieve 25 knots. To achieve 29 knots, however, it needs 41,000 shaft horsepower, a doubling over just 4 knots.

^{59}

二十世纪，运输速度确实加快了。空运使在数小时内将物资运往世界各地成为可能；而在本世纪初，这需要数周的时间。然而，物流配送的总体速度几乎没有改变。海湾战争后，哈里翁认为空运对战斗力的发挥至关重要，这种说法是错误的。

^{58}

到目前为止，大部分运输仍然是通过海运进行的，这种运输方式的速度自 20 世纪初以来几乎没有提高，已经达到了物理学规定的极限。随着水上速度的增加，推进所需的推力也会不成比例地迅速增加。这种情况在速度超过 25 节时尤为明显。一艘 408 英尺长的 FFG-7 级护卫舰需要 20,000 轴马力才能达到 25 节的速度。而要达到 29 节的速度，则需要 41,000 轴马力，比 4 节的速度提高了一倍。

^{59}

This is not to say that faster ships are not physically possible. But poor economy limits their role. The United States had only eight

33 -

knot Fast Sealift Ships in the Gulf War, delivering just 13 percent of all the cargo transported between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Expense has meant that the U.S. has not acquired more such vessels since.

^{60}

Catamarans are able to attain higher speeds, but not over transoceanic distances. The United States Navy’s HSV2 Swift, delivered in August 2003, can travel 1,100 nautical miles at 35 knots. But in order to travel at its maximum of 4,000 nautical miles it has to slow to a fuel-saving transit speed of 20 knots.

^{61}

As a result, the fastest ships used by the British in the Boer War could have outraced most of the supply ships used in the Gulf and Falklands conflicts. The
这并不是说更快的飞船在物理上不可能实现。但糟糕的经济性限制了它们的作用。在海湾战争中，美国只有八艘

33 -

结快速海运船，运送的货物仅占美国和沙特阿拉伯之间运输货物总量的 13%。由于费用高昂，美国此后再也没有购置更多此类船只。

^{60}

双体船可以达到更高的速度，但不能跨洋航行。美国海军的 HSV2 Swift 于 2003 年 8 月交付，能以 35 海里/小时的速度航行 1,100 海里。但为了达到 4000 海里的最大航程，它必须减速到 20 节的节油航速。

^{61}

因此，英国人在布尔战争中使用的最快舰艇可能超过了海湾和福克兰群岛冲突中使用的大多数补给舰。英国

20 knot Majestic, which set a trans-Atlantic record in 1891, could have beaten every one of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships that sailed from Diego Garcia and the Mariana Islands in the Pacific for the Gulf War. Most supply ships sent to the Falklands would also have failed to outrace this vessel, which was built in the previous century.

^{62}

20 节的 "Majestic "号曾在 1891 年创下横跨大西洋的记录，它本可以击败从太平洋的迪戈加西亚岛和马里亚纳群岛出发参加海湾战争的所有海上补给船。大多数派往福克兰群岛的补给船也无法超越这艘建造于上个世纪的船只。

^{62}

Airlift is much faster than sealift. The problem is that it costs too much and delivers too little. In the first month of the Gulf logistics effort, up to 4 September 1990, Americans brought in 634,000 short tons of supplies, including both dry cargo and fuel from all sources. Of this, just 47,000 was brought by air. That was 7.4 percent of the total. The situation was little improved the following month, with 69,000 short tons carried by air, or 8.3 percent, out of a total delivered of 829,000 short tons. It was sealift, as well as locally sourced supplies, that were relied upon to create a defense against a possible Iraqi advance into Saudi Arabia. Even taking into account the entire 544,000 short tons brought in by air throughout the campaign, airlift could not have succeeded in establishing the supplies put in place by midSeptember sufficient to deter an attack south by Saddam.

^{63}

This was the point at which it became clear that the American-led build-up could withstand an assault by Iraqi troops. For the war as a whole, airlift was responsible for approximately 10 percent of supplies brought in by the U.S. from outside Southwest Asia.

^{64}

空运比海运快得多。问题是空运成本太高，运送的物资太少。在海湾后勤工作的第一个月，截至 1990 年 9 月 4 日，美国人运入了 634 000 短吨物资，包括来自各种渠道的干货和燃料。其中，仅有 47 000 吨是空运的。占总数的 7.4%。下个月的情况几乎没有改善，空运了 6.9 万短吨，占总运送量 82.9 万短吨的 8.3%。正是依靠海运和当地采购的物资才得以抵御伊拉克可能向沙特阿拉伯的推进。即使考虑到整个战役期间空运的全部 544,000 短吨物资，空运也不可能在 9 月中旬之前成功建立起足以阻止萨达姆向南进攻的补给体系。

^{63}

至此，美国领导的集结显然可以抵御伊拉克军队的进攻。在整个战争期间，空运的物资约占美国从西南亚以外地区运入的物资的 10%。

^{64}

There were exceptional circumstances in the Gulf War, without which there would have been pressure to rely even less upon airlift. Financial circumstances eased the expense of this mode of transport. The United States managed to spend

$ 2.37

billion on airlift, which was more than half the total

$ 4.57

billion spent on transport during the whole campaign.

^{65}

But the burden of paying for this was alleviated by the fact that the U.S. received considerable financial and in kind support from other countries. Financial pledges for the campaign, principally from the Gulf, Japan, and Germany, amounted to

$ 55

billion.

^{66}

In addition to this was the fact that much of the supply requirement for Coalition forces was sourced from within the region. Had this not been possible, the burden placed on U.S. transport modes would have been much higher. The United States and its allies were also faced with a smaller opponent whom they could easily outmatch in terms of logistics effort. No state can assume that it will always face opponents smaller than itself, allowing it to divert financial resources towards airlift when sealift can deliver a greater load more cheaply, especially given the impermanence of great power status. Certainly, when the U.S. faced the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, forces deployed there were light enough to be able to rely on airlift. But while such a capability increased the vulnerability of the regime, one will not always face such disparity between belligerents.
海湾战争中出现了一些特殊情况，如果没有这些特殊情况，空运的压力会更小。财政状况减轻了这种运输方式的开支。美国在空运上花费了

$ 2.37

亿美元，超过了整个战役期间在运输上花费的

$ 4.57

亿美元总额的一半。

^{65}

但是，美国从其他国家获得了大量资金和实物支持，从而减轻了支付这些费用的负担。主要来自海湾国家、日本和德国的战役资金认捐额高达

$ 55

十亿美元。

^{66}

此外，联军所需的大部分补给品都来自该地区。如果不能做到这一点，美国运输方式所承受的负担将会更重。美国及其盟国还面临着一个规模较小的对手，他们在后勤工作方面很容易就能与之匹敌。任何国家都不能假定自己将永远面对比自己小的对手，从而在海运可以更廉价地运送更多物资的情况下将财政资源转用于空运，尤其是考虑到大国地位的不稳定性。当然，2001 年美国在阿富汗面对塔利班时，部署在那里的部队轻装上阵，可以依靠空运。虽然这种能力增加了塔利班政权的脆弱性，但交战双方之间并不总是存在这种差距。

The British could not afford to place much reliance upon airlift during the Falklands War. It constituted only a very small proportion of the load, at less than

11 / 2

percent of all supplies moved as far as Ascension Island.

^{67}

And at that point, for lack of airfields further south, most airlifted items were reloaded onto ships. The British did not have allies who were prepared to pay for much of the cost of the war. They were unable to source much of their supplies from the South Atlantic, so placing much more of the logistics burden upon their transport modes. And the twentieth century had seen the country lose its great-power status. It was far from certain that Britain would defeat Argentina. Faced with the need to get everything they possibly could to the South Atlantic, the British could not afford the luxury of a transport mode that delivered less for greater expense, made only more difficult by being unable to land close to the theater. As a result, the contribution of airlift was far smaller in the Falklands War than in the Gulf War, let alone in Afghanistan.
在福克兰群岛战争期间，英国人不能过分依赖空运。空运只占运输量的很小一部分，在运送到阿森松岛的所有物资中，空运只占不到

11 / 2

%。

^{67}

而到了那个时候，由于南部缺乏机场，大部分空运物资都被重新装船。英国人没有准备支付大部分战争费用的盟友。他们无法从南大西洋获取大量物资，因此他们的运输方式承担了更多的后勤负担。20 世纪，英国失去了大国地位。英国打败阿根廷的可能性微乎其微。面对将一切可能的物资运往南大西洋的需要，英国人无法奢望以更高的成本提供更少的物资的运输方式，而无法在战区附近着陆只会让运输变得更加困难。因此，空运在福克兰群岛战争中的作用远远小于海湾战争，更不用说阿富汗战争了。

Airlift is useful for the movement of personnel. But the impact of this upon the loss of strength gradient is limited by the fact that it makes up only a very small proportion of the load. For every person flown into Southwest Asia during the Gulf War there were
空运有助于人员的移动。但由于空运只占载荷的很小一部分，因此对兵力梯度损失的影响有限。在海湾战争期间，每空运一个人员到西南亚，就有
approximately twelve short tons of supplies brought into the region by American transport, both sealift and airlift. This was 120 times a soldier weighing 200 pounds.

^{68}

Measured against the 5,800 airlifted troops sent in the Falklands War, the ratio was even higher. Fuel and merchant-shipped supplies were alone in the region of 1,000 times that of personnel.

^{69}

And most of these troops could fly only so far as Ascension.
美国运输工具（包括海运和空运）运入该地区的物资约为 12 短吨。这相当于一名体重 200 磅的士兵的 120 倍。

^{68}

以福克兰群岛战争中空运的5800名士兵来衡量，这一比例甚至更高。仅燃料和商船补给就相当于人员的 1000 倍。

^{69}

而这些部队大多只能飞到阿森松岛。

To be sure, this does not mean that it has become more viable to use the option being implemented by the Pentagon of using austere Forward Operating Bases or “Lily-Pads,” with small numbers of personnel and prepositioned war material. Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo has been pointed to as an example of the type of facility where personnel can be flown in when needed, as opposed to the permanent stationing of large numbers of troops which occurred in Germany during the Cold War. The assumption here is of warfare increasingly of the asymmetrical variety.

^{70}

But again, a state cannot assume that it will always face opponents much less capable than itself.
当然，这并不意味着使用五角大楼正在实施的方案变得更加可行，即使用紧缩的前方作战基地或 "百合花圃"，配备少量人员和预先部署的战争物资。科索沃的邦德斯蒂尔营就是这种设施的一个例子，在需要时可以空运人员，而不是像冷战期间在德国那样长期驻扎大量部队。这里的假设是战争越来越多地采用非对称方式。

^{70}

但同样，一个国家不能假定它将永远面对能力远不如自己的对手。

Heavy ground equipment will still be needed and this cannot be easily separated from the personnel who need to train with it. Even though the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union was long enough to see the increased use of airlift as a means of transporting personnel, this did not diminish the importance of having troops close to the front line in Germany. Duplication of equipment to be used for training at home as well as for troops to use abroad would have involved extra resources that, in the competitive circumstances of such a confrontation, would have provided advantage to the opponent. Training within the terrain of northern Europe, the territory which had to be defended, also allowed troops to familiarize themselves with the environment they would have had to operate within in the event of war.
重型地面装备仍然需要，而这些装备与需要使用这些装备进行训练的人员是无法轻易分开的。尽管与苏联的冷战对抗持续了足够长的时间，以至于越来越多地使用空运作为运送人员的手段，但这并没有降低在德国前线附近部署部队的重要性。在国内训练和部队出国使用的重复装备会涉及额外的资源，在这种对抗的竞争环境下，会给对手带来优势。在必须保卫的北欧领土上进行训练，还能让部队熟悉战争时的作战环境。

Airlift has proved beneficial for the movement of critical equipment. During the Gulf War it allowed for the rapid deployment of Patriot missiles to Israel, twenty-four hours after that country had been attacked by Scuds.

^{71}

This forestalled the possible entry of that country into the war, which could have caused pressure on Arab members of the Coalition to withdraw their support. However, such missions have to be measured against the totality of supplies transported. While some items may indeed have been critical to the success of the campaign, they could not have done this in isolation. As already said, many other supplies were required which could not all have been transported by air.
事实证明，空运有利于关键设备的运输。在海湾战争期间，在以色列遭到飞毛腿导弹袭击24小时后，空运得以向该国迅速部署爱国者导弹。

^{71}

这避免了以色列可能参战的情况，而以色列参战可能会给联军的阿拉伯成员造成压力，迫使他们撤回对联军的支持。然而，此类任务必须根据运输的全部物资来衡量。虽然某些物资可能确实对战役的成功至关重要，但它们不可能单独完成任务。如前所述，还需要许多其他物资，而这些物资不可能全部空运。

The possibility has been raised by Martin Libicki that improved information about a war’s logistical needs could reduce the load, thereby making it easier to rely upon airlift. He has pointed to the fact that the Gulf War of 1990-91 saw more supplies sent than were used.

^{72}

But U.S. forces could not have been certain that this would be the case. The competitive circumstances of war mean that both sides will seek to minimize or falsify the intelligence available to the other side. In addition to this, incorrect assumptions can be made about an opponent. Thus, when an American-led coalition went to war again with Iraq in 2003, rather than overestimate the needs of the war, they underestimated them instead. Information on the country’s weapons of mass destruction program, used as a reason for mounting the invasion, was found to be incorrect. In addition to this, the likelihood that the burden of military occupation following the invasion, in the words of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, would be “a small one,” was proved to be inaccurate.

^{73}

Similarly, the Boer War, a century earlier, saw the British underestimate the capabilities of their opponent.

^{74}

Moreover, regardless of the ability to obtain information, the impermanence of great-power status saw the British in the Falklands War barely able to get enough supplies to the front line. On the final day of the war, the Argentines were actually superior in munitions and could have halted their opponent’s advance towards Stanley. If their morale had held they need not have surrendered that day.

^{75}

War has not seen the effort to gather information about the opponent
马丁-利比奇提出了一种可能性，即改进有关战争后勤需求的信息可以减少负荷，从而更容易依靠空运。他指出，在 1990-91 年的海湾战争中，运送的物资多于使用的物资。

^{72}

但美军不可能确定情况会如此。战争中的竞争环境意味着双方都会尽量减少或伪造对方掌握的情报。除此之外，还可能对对手做出不正确的假设。因此，当以美国为首的联军在 2003 年再次与伊拉克开战时，他们非但没有高估战争的需要，反而低估了战争的需要。作为发动入侵的理由，有关伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器计划的信息被发现是错误的。除此之外，用国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德的话说，入侵后军事占领的负担 "很小 "的可能性也被证明是不准确的。

^{73}

同样，在一个世纪前的布尔战争中，英国人也低估了对手的能力。

^{74}

此外，无论获取信息的能力如何，大国地位的不稳定性使得英国在福克兰群岛战争中几乎无法向前线提供足够的补给。在战争的最后一天，阿根廷人实际上在弹药方面占据优势，本可以阻止对手向斯坦利推进。如果他们的士气还能保持，他们就不会在那天投降。

^{75}

战争中未见收集对手情报的努力
become any easier, and therefore the possibility of reducing the logistics load become any more likely.
因此，减少物流负担的可能性就更大了。

The difficulty of relying upon improved information gathering also undermines an argument made by James R. Blaker that better intelligence about potential opponents could give forces more advance notice, allowing them to be located further away.

^{76}

Prior to the Boer conflict, Britain may have been insufficiently prepared to defend the South African colonies, but it expected the outbreak of war. The situation was not better when Kuwait was invaded by Iraq in 1990 or the Falklands when they were invaded by Argentina in 1982. In both cases, indeed, the attacks came as a surprise. The U.S. had deferred to “an almost universal consensus” held by Arab leaders and area experts that Iraqi military movements would not lead to a use of force or else it would be used only for very limited aims.

^{77}

For the British, even a prior standoff between them and Argentine forces on the island of South Georgia had not been enough for them to expect that the invasion of the Falklands would follow.

^{78}

詹姆斯-R.布莱克（James R. Blaker）曾提出，如果能更好地收集有关潜在对手的情报，就可以提前通知部队，使其能够部署在更远的地方，但依靠改进情报收集工作的困难也削弱了这一论点。

^{76}

布尔冲突之前，英国可能没有做好保卫南非殖民地的充分准备，但它预料到了战争的爆发。科威特在 1990 年遭到伊拉克入侵，福克兰群岛在 1982 年遭到阿根廷入侵，情况都没有好转。事实上，这两次入侵都是出人意料的。美国听从了阿拉伯领导人和地区专家 "几乎普遍达成的共识"，即伊拉克的军事行动不会导致使用武力，否则只会用于非常有限的目的。

^{77}

对于英国人来说，即使是他们与阿根廷军队之前在南乔治亚岛上的对峙也不足以让他们预期随后会入侵福克兰群岛。

^{78}

Miniaturization has been used as another argument for a reduced load. Some have pointed to the possibility that this could result from advancements such as increased firepower produced by smaller devices.

^{79}

Yet, as such improvements occur, competition causes increased production, as well as for countermeasures to emerge. The machine gun, for example, as used by the British against the Zulus in 1879, packed more firepower into a smaller device but did not reduce the load in the long term.

^{80}

When both sides were able to acquire this weapon, as was the case in the First World War, the result was not fewer soldiers and guns. Instead of reducing the load, the machine gun was produced, and along with soldiers, was deployed in as large numbers as possible. Countermeasures included the development of barrage techniques involving heavy consumption of shells, as well as the introduction of the tank, increasing the logistics load still further.

^{81}

微型化被用作减少载荷的另一个论据。一些人指出，这可能是进步的结果，例如小型设备产生的更强火力。

^{79}

然而，随着这种改进的出现，竞争会导致产量增加，同时也会出现反制措施。例如，英国人在 1879 年用来对付祖鲁人的机枪，在更小的设备中装入了更大的火力，但从长远来看，并没有减少负荷。

^{80}

当双方都能获得这种武器时，如第一次世界大战，结果并不是士兵和枪支都减少了。机枪非但没有减少载弹量，反而被生产出来，并与士兵一起被尽可能大量地部署。应对措施包括发展炮击技术，大量消耗炮弹，以及引进坦克，进一步增加后勤负荷。

^{81}

Even Libicki, who has looked to the increased use of “small objects” for the collection of information on the battlefield, has argued for their mass production and deployment in the “millions.” This is as should be expected given the competitive circumstances of war. Despite his hope that there should be too many to kill, one must expect that the threat they pose will provide an impetus for opponents to find ways to counter them as in the past.

^{82}

即使是利比基，他也希望在战场上更多地使用 "小物件 "来收集信息，并主张大规模生产和部署 "数以百万计 "的 "小物件"。考虑到战争的竞争环境，这是意料之中的事。尽管他希望 "多到杀不死"，但我们必须预料到，"小物件 "所构成的威胁将推动对手像过去一样想方设法对付 "小物件"。

^{82}

The Range of the Deadly Projectile Has Not Affected the LSG
致命射弹的射程并未影响整笔拨款

Boulding’s loss of strength gradient has not been made less important by the ability to attack an enemy over great distances through air power. Boulding believed that the LSG for air power was very much less than it was for land power, which meant that it could reduce the LSG overall.

^{83}

However, the continued ability of ground forces to withstand enemy bombardment means that air power has not gained importance at land power’s expense. The reason for this is that in the competitive circumstances of war ground forces have found means to protect themselves against air attack.
博尔丁的力量梯度损失并没有因为通过空中力量远距离攻击敌人的能力而变得不那么重要。博尔丁认为，空中力量的LSG比陆地力量的LSG要小得多，这意味着空中力量可以降低整体的LSG。

^{83}

然而，由于地面部队仍有能力抵御敌人的轰炸，这意味着空中力量的重要性并没有因陆地力量的牺牲而提高。原因在于，在竞争激烈的战争环境中，地面部队已经找到了抵御空袭的手段。

To be sure, the Gulf War has been argued for as an example of air power success.

^{84}

The campaign against front line forces may well have caused a

25 - 30

percent desertion rate prior to the start of the ground war. Analysis of enemy prisoner of war interviews suggested that many if not most of the remaining troops were prepared to offer minimal or no resistance to Coalition ground forces.

^{85}

But an explanation for this lies in the fact that Iraqi soldiers had no experience of serious air attack during the previous Iran-Iraq War, with the result that their efforts were insufficient to defend against the air strikes.

^{86}

By comparison, the ability of the Iraqis to protect their Scud missiles during the war showed how ground forces could
当然，海湾战争被认为是空中力量取得成功的范例。

^{84}

在地面战开始之前，针对前线部队的战役很可能造成了

25 - 30

%的逃兵率。对敌方战俘的访谈分析表明，即使不是大多数，也有许多剩余部队准备对联军地面部队进行最低限度的抵抗或不抵抗。

^{85}

但对此的一种解释是，伊拉克士兵在之前的两伊战争中没有遭受过严重空袭的经历，因此他们的努力不足以抵御空袭。

^{86}

相比之下，伊拉克人在战争中保护飞毛腿导弹的能力表明，地面部队可以
survive air attack. Most launches were carried out at night and equipment was exposed as briefly as possible before being returned to cover. Their deployment was dispersed, often in urban areas, while decoys were used to divert attacks.

^{87}

在空袭中幸存下来。大多数发射是在夜间进行的，设备在返回掩体前尽可能短暂地暴露。它们的部署比较分散，通常部署在城市地区，同时使用诱饵来转移攻击。

^{87}

In the 1999 Kosovo War, air power appeared to have found a way around its difficulties against ground forces. Keegan was able to say that the Kosovo conflict proved that war could indeed be won by air power alone.

^{88}

To be sure, the war also saw ground forces defend themselves successfully against air strikes. By its end, the Serb Army was able to leave the province, having been largely unscathed by NATO bombardment. They had used the province’s mountains and forests to hide themselves while using decoys to deceive aircraft above.

^{89}

What made Serbia different was that it was governed by a regime whose existence depended on domestic support that evaporated as precision strikes against regime and economic targets, which minimized civilian casualties, mounted. There were antiwar and anticonscription demonstrations in southern Serbia. There was evidence of a “peace party” emerging in Belgrade. Overt criticisms were made by certain provincial and civic leaders.

^{90}

There was pressure, too, from those who profited from the sanctions regime that the country had been under.

^{91}

在 1999 年的科索沃战争中，空中力量似乎找到了解决与地面部队作战困难的办法。基根可以说，科索沃冲突证明，单靠空中力量确实可以赢得战争。

^{88}

当然，在这场战争中，地面部队也成功地抵御了空袭。战争结束时，塞族军队在北约的轰炸中基本毫发无损，得以离开该省。他们利用该省的山脉和森林隐藏自己，同时使用诱饵欺骗上空的飞机。

^{89}

塞尔维亚的不同之处在于，它是由一个政权统治的，而这个政权的存在依赖于国内的支持，随着针对政权和经济目标的精确打击的增加，这种支持逐渐消失，而这种打击最大限度地减少了平民伤亡。塞尔维亚南部出现了反战和反征兵示威。有证据表明贝尔格莱德出现了一个 "和平党"。某些省级和民间领导人提出了公开批评。

^{90}

从制裁制度中获利的人也施加了压力。

^{91}

Subsequent wars have shown that regimes that are less dependent on domestic support need not be so vulnerable to precision air power. In 2001, the Taliban were supported by foreign jihadists fighting a war unconcerned by the political views of Afghans. They were overthrown with the support of troops, mainly of a local ally, fighting the opponent on the ground.

^{92}

In 2003, the invasion of Iraq, under the totalitarian rule of Saddam, was conducted by ground forces. In 2006, Israel had to use ground troops to fight Hezbollah, a guerrilla organization that was not answerable to the elected government of the country it operated in.
后来的战争表明，不那么依赖国内支持的政权不一定那么容易受到精确空中力量的攻击。2001 年，塔利班在外国圣战分子的支持下发动战争，对阿富汗人的政治观点漠不关心。在主要由当地盟友组成的部队的支持下，他们在当地与对手作战，最终被推翻。

^{92}

2003年，地面部队入侵了萨达姆极权统治下的伊拉克。2006 年，以色列不得不动用地面部队与真主党作战，因为真主党是一个游击组织，不对其所在国的民选政府负责。

The Kosovo War also poses a further difficulty as a model for strategic bombardment in that it involved a large coalition, including the world superpower, against a much smaller opponent. In 1982, the British could not have carried out an intensive air war over Argentina, however much the junta in Buenos Aires was susceptible to domestic pressure. Despite being a former superpower, the British never even acquired air superiority over the Falkland Islands, let alone the Argentine mainland. Roland anti-aircraft missiles deployed around the capital, Stanley, meant that British Harriers had to fly at a safe altitude of 20,000 feet, from which they were unable to carry out air strikes.

^{93}

Moreover, even if another Kosovo were to occur, this does not necessary mean even a temporary reduction in the LSG. Air strikes are advantaged by the use of forward positions. During the 1999 Kosovo conflict, by far most sorties were flown from neighboring countries, in particular Italy. In the Gulf War, most sorties used airfields in the Arabian peninsula and Turkey to be within range of Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The difficulties posed by not having such forward positions were demonstrated in the Falklands War. A single bombing mission from the nearest airfield on Ascension required multiple refuelings and therefore the backup of a fleet of aircraft all operating from the same base. The first Vulcan bomber mission, carried out on 1 May, required planning for eighteen sorties involving seventeen separate fuel transfers and a total of 925 long tons of fuel.

^{94}

科索沃战争作为战略轰炸的典范还带来了另一个困难，因为它涉及到一个庞大的联盟，包括世界超级大国，来对付一个小得多的对手。1982 年，无论布宜诺斯艾利斯的军政府多么容易受到国内压力的影响，英国都不可能在阿根廷上空发动一场密集的空战。尽管英国曾经是超级大国，但它甚至从未取得过对福克兰群岛的制空权，更不用说对阿根廷本土的制空权了。部署在首府斯坦利周围的罗兰防空导弹意味着英国鹞式战斗机必须在 2 万英尺的安全高度飞行，无法实施空袭。

^{93}

此外，即使再次发生科索沃事件，也不一定意味着整编小组的规模会暂时缩小。使用前沿阵地有利于空袭。在 1999 年科索沃冲突期间，到目前为止，大多数出动架次都来自邻国，特别是意大利。在海湾战争中，大多数架次使用了阿拉伯半岛和土耳其的机场，以接近伊拉克和被占领的科威特。没有这样的前沿阵地所带来的困难在福克兰群岛战争中得到了证明。从最近的阿森松机场起飞执行一次轰炸任务需要多次加油，因此需要从同一基地起飞的机队提供支援。5 月 1 日执行的第一次 "火神 "轰炸机任务需要计划出动 18 架次，涉及 17 次单独的燃料转移和总共 925 长吨的燃料。

^{94}

Air power’s logistics footprint can also be similar to that of ground forces. Most of the

1 \frac{1}{2}

million short tons of fuel moved to the Gulf in 1990-91 was jet fuel. There was little suitable refining capacity in the region for the specialist fuels required by military aviation.

^{95}

In the Falklands War, the Harriers’ dependence upon two aircraft carriers, which were protected and supported by a task force, meant that they had logistics requirements that were in part indistinguishable from those of surface power. Supplies supported the task force, which in turn supported both air and land power.
空中力量的后勤足迹也可能与地面部队相似。1990-91 年间，运往海湾地区的

1 \frac{1}{2}

百万短吨燃料中大部分是喷气机燃料。该地区几乎没有合适的炼油能力来生产军用航空所需的特种燃料。

^{95}

在福克兰群岛战争中，"鹞 "式战斗机依赖于两艘由特混舰队保护和支援的航空母舰，这意味着它们的后勤需求在一定程度上与水面力量的后勤需求不可同日而语。特混舰队为补给提供支持，而特混舰队又为空中和陆地力量提供支持。

Conclusion 结论

Despite Boulding’s view that there had been a military revolution in the twentieth century, geographic distance, and therefore the loss of strength gradient, has retained its importance. Two lines of attack are used against the LSG. One is that transport has become easier. The other is that air power has proved itself capable of reducing need for forward-positioned ground forces. Boulding believed that a military revolution had occurred because there had been a diminution in the cost of transportation and an enormous increase in the range of the deadly projectile. In both cases, reductions in the gradient were not found to be of a permanent nature.
尽管博尔丁认为二十世纪已经发生了一场军事革命，但地理距离以及因此造成的兵力梯度损失仍然具有重要意义。针对整装集团的攻击有两个方面。一是运输变得更加容易。另一个理由是，事实证明空中力量能够减少对前沿地面部队的需求。博尔丁认为，军事革命已经发生，因为运输成本降低了，致命弹丸的射程大大增加了。在这两种情况下，人们发现梯度的降低并不是永久性的。

The reason for the continued importance of the loss of strength gradient lies in two enduring factors. These are the competitive nature of war and the impermanence of greatpower status. This has implications for American forward basing posture. A policy of withdrawal from foreign bases has been influenced by the false view that geographic distance has become less important. This belief is held by President Bush, as it was by Kenneth Boulding. Any benefit to be derived from this belief, however, can only be temporary.
实力损失梯度之所以持续重要，在于两个持久因素。这就是战争的竞争性和大国地位的不稳定性。这对美国的前沿基地态势产生了影响。撤出外国基地的政策受到地理距离已变得不那么重要这一错误观点的影响。布什总统和肯尼斯-博尔丁都持有这种观点。然而，从这种观点中获得的任何好处都只能是暂时的。

Notes 说明

Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 262.
肯尼斯-博尔丁，《冲突与防御》（纽约和伦敦：哈珀与罗公司，1963 年），第 262 页。
President George W. Bush, speech at Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Cincinnati, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 16 August 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases
乔治-W-布什总统在辛辛那提退伍军人大会上的讲话，白宫新闻秘书办公室，2004 年 8 月 16 日，http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 发布。
Kenneth Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great Transition (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 87.
肯尼斯-博尔丁，《20 世纪的意义：The Great Transition》（伦敦：George Allen & Unwin 出版社，1965 年），第 87 页。
Boulding, 1963, p. 5; Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 105.
博尔丁，1963 年，第 5 页；肯尼斯-博尔丁，《稳定的和平》（奥斯汀：德克萨斯大学出版社，1978 年），第 105 页。
General James Jones, Statement, Military Construction Subcommittee Hearing, United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, 29 April 2003, http://appropriations.senate.gov
詹姆斯-琼斯将军，声明，军事建设小组委员会听证会，美国参议院拨款委员会，2003 年 4 月 29 日，http://appropriations.senate.gov
President George W. Bush, 16 August 2004.
乔治-W-布什总统，2004 年 8 月 16 日。
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Story of the War in South Africa 1899-1900 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1900), p. 85.
阿尔弗雷德-塞耶-马汉，《1899-1900 年南非战争故事》（伦敦：Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1900 年），第 85 页。
Royal Commission on the War in South Africa (RCWSA), (London: HMSO, 1903), vol. 2, p. 258, Appendix No. 38a.
南非战争皇家委员会（RCWSA），（伦敦：HMSO，1903 年），第 2 卷，第 258 页，附录第 38a 号。
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 139.
同上，第 1 卷，第 139 页。
Ibid., vol. 1. Evidence, pp. 269-71.
《同上，第 1 卷。证据》，第 269-71 页。
Ibid., vol. 2. Evidence, p. 357.
同上，第 2 卷，证据，第 357 页。
Lt-Col. Sir E. P. C. Girouard, History of the Railways During the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (London: HMSO, 1903), pp. 53, 55.
E. P. C. Girouard 爵士中校，《1899-1902 年南非战争期间铁路史》（伦敦：HMSO，1903 年），第 53 和 55 页。
Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2, p 222, Appendix No. 33.
根据 RCWSA 的统计数据计算，1903 年，第 2 卷，第 222 页，附录第 33 号。
RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2. Evidence, p. 384; Girouard, 1903, p. 21.
RCWSA, 1903 年，第 2 卷，证据，第 384 页；Girouard, 1903 年，第 21 页。
James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), p. 13.
James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast：美国运输司令部与沙漠盾牌/沙漠风暴行动的战略部署》（檀香山：太平洋大学出版社，2002 年），第 13 页。
Ibid., pp. 13, 126. 同上，第 13、126 页。
Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 286, 297-9.
哈立德-本-苏丹王子，《沙漠勇士》（伦敦：HarperCollins 出版社，1995 年），第 286、297-9 页。
Ibid., pp. 284-5, 287; Lt-Gen. William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the GulfWar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 113-5.
同上，第 284-5 页，第 287 页；William G. Pagonis 中将，《移动的山脉：美国的 "崛起"》（Moving Mountains: New York: New York）一书，第 287 页。William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains：Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the GulfWar（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛商学院出版社，1992 年），第 113-5 页。
Khaled, 1995, p. 296; Brad Lafferty, Richard Huhn, Ghoneim Al-Shaibani, Todd Behne, and Margaret Curran, “Gulf War Logistics: Theory into Practice,” Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 1995, p. 16.
Khaled, 1995, p. 296; Brad Lafferty, Richard Huhn, Ghoneim Al-Shaibani, Todd Behne, and Margaret Curran, "Gulf War Logistics：理论付诸实践"，空军指挥与参谋学院，麦克斯韦空军基地，阿拉巴马州，1995 年 4 月，第 16 页。
Khaled, 1995, p. 302; Pagonis, 1992, pp. 203-4.
Khaled, 1995 年，第 302 页；Pagonis, 1992 年，第 203-4 页。
Khaled, 1995, pp. 294, 298-9, 301; Pagonis, 1992, p. 205.
Khaled，1995 年，第 294、298-9、301 页；Pagonis，1992 年，第 205 页。
James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), p. 232.
James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen：海湾战争中的美国空中力量》（圣莫尼卡：兰德公司，1994 年），第 232 页。
Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 17.
Matthews 和 Holt，2002 年，第 17 页。
Pagonis, 1992, pp. 70, 208.
Pagonis, 1992, pp.
Ibid., pp. 70-1. 同上，第 70-1 页。
Ministry of Defence (MOD), The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (London: HMSO, 1982), p. 6.
国防部（MOD），《福克兰群岛战役：教训》（伦敦：HMSO，1982 年），第 6 页。
Major General Julian Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 257; Gordon Smith, Battles of the Falklands War (London: Ian Allan, 1989), p. 80 .
Julian Thompson 少将，《战争的命脉：武装冲突中的后勤》（牛津：Brassey's 出版社，1991 年），第 257 页；Gordon Smith，《福克兰群岛战争的战斗》（伦敦：Ian Allan 出版社，1989 年），第 80 页。
Thompson, 1991, pp. 253, 281.
汤普森，1991 年，第 253 和 281 页。
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: Volume III, The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts (London: Mansell, 1990), p. 262.
Anthony H. Cordesman 和 Abraham R. Wagner，《现代战争的教训：第三卷，阿富汗和福克兰群岛冲突》（伦敦：Mansell，1990 年），第 262 页。
Céline Carrère and Maurice Schiff, “On the Geography of Trade: Distance is Alive and Well,” 3 February 2004, World Bank Working Paper No. 3206, p. 40, Table 1, http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?id = 33022
Céline Carrère 和 Maurice Schiff，"On the Geography of Trade：2004 年 2 月 3 日，世界银行第 3206 号工作文件，第 40 页，表 1，http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?id = 33022
David Hummels, “Have International Transportation Costs Declined?” University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, November 1999, p. 5 & Figure 1, http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/research/decline/declined.pdf
David Hummels，"国际运输成本下降了吗？芝加哥大学商学院，1999 年 11 月，第 5 页和图 1，http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/hummelsd/research/decline/declined.pdf
Girouard, 1903, pp. 8, 39-40.
吉鲁瓦，1903 年，第 8、39-40 页。
RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2, p 187, Appendix No. 28.
RCWSA, 1903 年，第 2 卷，第 187 页，附录第 28 号。
Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 126, 281-2. Calculated on the figure given that 75 percent of shipments were derived from the Gulf region.
Matthews 和 Holt，2002 年，第 126 和 281-2 页。根据 75% 的货物来自海湾地区这一数字计算得出。
Major William L. Brame, “Building the Storm,” Army Logistician, January-February 1993, pp. 15-6.
William L. Brame 少校，"Building the Storm"，Army Logistician，1993 年 1-2 月，第 15-6 页。
Smith, 1989, p. 96. 史密斯，1989 年，第 96 页。
Ibid., p. 53. 同上，第 53 页。
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (London: Fontana, 1989), pp. 570-1.
Paul Kennedy，《大国的兴衰》（伦敦：Fontana，1989 年），第 570-1 页。
“B-2 Spirit” fact sheet, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC, 30 November 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-2.htm
"B-2 精神 "概况介绍，美国科学家联合会，华盛顿特区，1999 年 11 月 30 日，http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber/b-2.htm
Kennedy, 1989, pp. 570-1.
肯尼迪，1989 年，第 570-1 页。
James L. Barefield, “The Heavy Bomber Industrial Base: A Study of Present and Future Capabilities,” Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 1997, p. 15, retrieved from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber97-0070.pdf
James L. Barefield, "The Heavy Bomber Industrial Base：A Study of Present and Future Capabilities," Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 1997, p. 15, retrieved from www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/bomber97-0070.pdf
John Pike, “B-2 Production,” globalsecurity.org, 28 April 2005, http://www.globalsecurity. org/wmd/systems/b-2-production.htm
John Pike，"B-2 生产"，globalsecurity.org，2005 年 4 月 28 日，http://www.globalsecurity. org/wmd/systems/b-2-production.htm
“Boeing v. Airbus: Nose to Nose,” Economist, London, 23 June 2005, http://www. economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id $= 4102185$
"Boeing v. Airbus: Nose to Nose"，《经济学家》，伦敦，2005 年 6 月 23 日，http://www。economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id $= 4102185$ .
RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2. Evidence, p. 490.
RCWSA, 1903 年，第 2 卷，证据，第 490 页。
Ibid., vol. 2. Evidence, p. 487.
同上，第 2 卷，证据，第 487 页。
Ibid., vol. 2. Evidence, p. 492.
同上，第 2 卷，证据，第 492 页。
Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, vol. 2, p. 219, Appendix no. 33.
根据 RCWSA 的统计数据计算，1903 年，第 2 卷，第 219 页，附录第 33 号。
RCWSA, 1903, vol. 1, p. 93.
RCWSA, 1903 年，第 1 卷，第 93 页。
Calculated from statistics in RCWSA, 1903, vol. 1, pp. 85-6.
根据 RCWSA 的统计数据计算，1903 年，第 1 卷，第 85-6 页。
General Norman Schwartzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam, 1993), p. 437.
Norman Schwartzkopf 将军，《不需要英雄》（纽约：Bantam，1993 年），第 437 页。
MOD, 1982, p. 25. 国防部，1982 年，第 25 页。
Sun Tzu, The Art of Strategy, trans. by R. L. Wing, (London: Thorsons, 1997), p. 47.
《孙子兵法》，R. L. Wing 译，（伦敦：Thorsons 出版社，1997 年），第 47 页。
Pagonis, 1992, p. 126. Pagonis, 1992, 第 126 页。
Thomas Pakenham, Boer War (London: Abacus, 1992), p. 94.
Thomas Pakenham，《布尔战争》（伦敦：Abacus，1992 年），第 94 页。
Pagonis, 1992, p. 6, 125.
帕戈尼斯，1992 年，第 6 页，第 125 页。
Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Pan MacMillan, 1997), pp. 80, 88, 114, 125, 167.
Max Hastings 和 Simon Jenkins，《福克兰群岛之战》（伦敦：Pan MacMillan，1997 年），第 80、88、114、125 和 167 页。
Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days (London: HarperCollins, 2003), p. 331.
Sandy Woodward 海军上将，《一百天》（伦敦：HarperCollins 出版社，2003 年），第 331 页。
Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1992), p. 137.
Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq：空中力量与海湾战争》（华盛顿特区：史密森学会，1992 年），第 137 页。
“Resistance and Powering of Ships,” chapter 7, Course en200, Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, United States Naval Academy (USNA), Annapolis, MA, 13 January 2003, pp. 7-19, http://www.usna.edu/NAOE/courses/en200/ch07.pdf
"船舶的阻力和动力"，第 7 章，课程 en200，美国海军学院 (USNA) 海军建筑和海洋工程系，马萨诸塞州安纳波利斯，2003 年 1 月 13 日，第 7-19 页，http://www.usna.edu/NAOE/courses/en200/ch07.pdf
"Fast Sealift Ships-T-AKR United States Navy fact file, 22 September 2003, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-takr.html.
"Fast Sealift Ships-T-AKR United States Navy fact file", 22 September 2003, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/ships/ship-takr.html.
“High-Speed Vessel—HSV,” United States Navy fact file, 19 February 2004, http://www.navy.mil/navydata; Harold Kennedy, “Navy Tests Coastal Warfare Systems Aboard New Catamaran,” National Defense Magazine, July 2004, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
"High-Speed Vessel-HSV," United States Navy fact file, 19 February 2004, http://www.navy.mil/navydata; Harold Kennedy, "Navy Tests Coastal Warfare Systems Aboard New Catamaran," National Defense Magazine, July 2004, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets in Profile (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1978-80), vol. 2, p. 190; “Prepositioning Ships,” Military Sealift Command, retrieved 13 May 2005, http://www.msc.navy.mil; Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 267; Tony James, Royal Fleet Auxiliary 1905-85 (Liskeard, Cornwall: Maritime, 1985), pp. 87-125.
Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets in Profile (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1978-80), vol. 2, p. 190; "Prepositioning Ships," Military Sealift Command, retrieved 13 May 2005, http://www.msc.navy.mil; Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 267; Tony James, Royal Fleet Auxiliary 1905-85 (Liskeard, Cornwall: Maritime, 1985), pp.
Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 13.
根据 Matthews 和 Holt 2002 年第 13 页中的统计数据计算得出。
94.4 percent of all cargo deliveries throughout the war were made by sea. Only 5.6 percent came by air. However, two thirds of the load sent by sea was fuel and, of that, three quarters was moved within Southwest Asia. That puts airlift responsible for approximately one tenth of the load moved from outside the region. But even if fuel is entirely excluded from the equation, the importance of transport on water remains overwhelming. Of dry cargo sent into theater, 84.9 percent was delivered by sea and just 15.1 percent by air. Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 13, 126.
整个战争期间，94.4%的货物通过海运运送。空运只占 5.6%。然而，海运货物的三分之二是燃料，其中四分之三在西南亚境内运输。因此，空运约占从该地区以外运送的物资的十分之一。但是，即使将燃料完全排除在外，水路运输的重要性仍然是压倒性的。在运往战区的干货中，84.9% 通过海运，只有 15.1% 通过空运。马修斯和霍尔特，2002 年，第 13 和 126 页。
Matthews and Holt, 2002, p. 201.
马修斯和霍尔特，2002 年，第 201 页。
Using figures in Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991 (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 361.
使用 Lawrence Freedman 和 Efraim Karsh 的数字，《1990-1991 年海湾冲突》（伦敦：Faber and Faber 出版社，1993 年），第 361 页。
Calculated from statistics in MOD, 1982, pp. 6, 26.
根据 MOD 的统计数据计算，1982 年，第 6、26 页。
Calculated from statistics in Matthews and Holt, 2002, pp. 13, 126.
根据 Matthews 和 Holt 的统计数据计算，2002 年，第 13 和 126 页。
Calculated from statistics in MOD, 1982, p. 6.
根据 MOD 的统计数据计算，1982 年，第 6 页。
Jones, 29 April 2003; Associated Press, “Pentagon to close 35 percent of overseas bases: Forward operating sites to replace Cold War-era bases,” 23 September 2004, retrieved from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6078936/?displaymode = 1006; David McKeeby, “U.S. Reducing Number of Overseas Military Bases,” Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 22 June 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov
琼斯，2003 年 4 月 29 日；美联社，"五角大楼将关闭 35% 的海外基地：前方作战基地将取代冷战时期的基地"，2004 年 9 月 23 日，检索自 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6078936/?displaymode = 1006；David McKeeby，"美国减少海外军事基地数量"，美国国务院国际信息局，2006 年 6 月 22 日，http://usinfo.state.gov
John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle, Project Air Force Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency R-4269/4-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), pp. 17-8.
John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle, Project Air Force Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf：An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency R-4269/4-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), pp.
Martin Libicki, “The Emerging Primacy of Information,” Orbis, 40 (1996), p. 261.
Martin Libicki, "The Emerging Primacy of Information," Orbis, 40 (1996), p. 261.
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees regarding Iraq,” Washington, 18-19 September 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020918secdef.html
唐纳德-拉姆斯菲尔德，美国国防部长，"美国国防部长唐纳德-拉姆斯菲尔德在众议院和参议院军事委员会就伊拉克问题准备的证词"，华盛顿，2002 年 9 月 18-19 日，http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020918secdef.html
Pakenham, 1992, p. 252. Pakenham, 1992 年，第 252 页。
Duncan Anderson, The Falklands War 1982 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), pp. 86-7.
Duncan Anderson，《1982 年福克兰群岛战争》（牛津：Osprey，2002 年），第 86-7 页。
James R. Blaker, “Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century Defense,” Defense Working Paper 3, Progressive Policy Institute, Washington, DC, January 1997, p. 25, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Understanding_RMA.pdf
James R. Blaker, "Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs：美国 21 世纪国防指南》，国防工作文件 3，进步政策研究所，华盛顿特区，1997 年 1 月，第 25 页，http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Understanding_RMA.pdf
Cordesman and Wagner, 1996, pp. 44, 47.
Cordesman 和 Wagner，1996 年，第 44 和 47 页。
Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (London: HMSO, January 1983), p. 73.
《福克兰群岛回顾：枢密顾问委员会的报告》（伦敦：HMSO，1983 年 1 月），第 73 页。
J.L.W. Edgell, S.K. Spangler, G.F. Dragoo, and L.W. Jackson, “Logistics in 2025: Consider It Done!,” Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1996, pp. 26-28, http://www.au.af.mil/ au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf
J.L.W. Edgell、S.K. Spangler、G.F. Dragoo 和 L.W. Jackson，《2025 年的后勤工作：考虑完成！"空军指挥与参谋学院，麦克斯韦空军基地，阿拉巴马州，1996 年，第 26-28 页，http://www.au.af.mil/ au/2025/volume2/chap01/vol2ch01.pdf
Ian Knight, The Zulu War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2003), pp. 31-2, 60, 215.
Ian Knight，《祖鲁战争》（伦敦：Sidgwick & Jackson，2003 年），第 31-2 页、第 60 页、第 215 页。
David Stephenson, 1914-1918 The History of the First World War (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 192, 446-7.
David Stephenson，《1914-1918 年第一次世界大战史》（伦敦：企鹅出版社，2004 年），第 192 和 446-7 页。
Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon (Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), Chapter 2, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/menair/menair28/m028ch02.html
Martin Libicki, The Mesh and the Net：马丁-利比基，《网与网：自由硅时代的武装冲突猜想》（华盛顿：国防大学，国家战略研究所，1994 年），第 2 章，http://www.ndu.edu/inss/menair/menair28/m028ch02.html
Ibid., pp. 268, 272. 同上，第 268 和 272 页。
See, for example, James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, 1992), p. 178; or Hallion, 1992, p. 1.
例如，见 James P. Coyne，《海湾地区的空中力量》（弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿：空军协会，1992 年），第 178 页；或 Hallion，1992 年，第 1 页。
Information provided to Winnefeld et al., 1994, p. 159.
资料提供给 Winnefeld 等人，1994 年，第 159 页。
Norman Friedman, Desert Victory (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 117.
诺曼-弗里德曼，《沙漠胜利》（马里兰州安纳波利斯：海军学院出版社，1991 年），第 117 页。
Winnefeld et al., 1994, pp. 132-4.
Winnefeld 等人，1994 年，第 132-4 页。
John Keegan, “Please, Mr. Blair, never take such a risk again,” Telegraph, London, 6 June 1999, http://www.telegraph.co.uk
John Keegan，"请布莱尔先生不要再冒这样的风险"，《每日电讯报》，伦敦，1999 年 6 月 6 日，http://www.telegraph.co.uk
On Serb construction of decoys, see Associated Press, “NATO Attack on Yugoslavia Gave Iraq Good Lessons,” published in Globe and Mail, Toronto, 20 November 2002, http://www. theglobeandmail.com
关于塞族人建造诱饵，见美联社，"NATO Attack on Yugoslavia Gave Iraq Good Lessons"，发表于多伦多《环球邮报》，2002 年 11 月 20 日，http://www。theglobeandmail.com.
Sebastian Ritchie, “Air Power Victorious? Britain and NATO Strategy during the Kosovo Conflict,” in Air Power History, eds. S. Cox & P. Gray (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 324.
Sebastian Ritchie, "Air Power Victorious?科索沃冲突期间的英国和北约战略》，载于《空中力量史》，S. Cox & P. Gray 编辑（伦敦：Frank Cass 出版社，2002 年），第 324 页。S. Cox & P. Gray（伦敦：Frank Cass，2002 年），第 324 页。
Peter W. Gray, “The Balkans: An Air Power Basket Case,” in Air Power History, eds. S. Cox & P. Gray, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 339-40.
Peter W. Gray, "The Balkans：An Air Power Basket Case," in Air Power History, eds.S. Cox & P. Gray，（伦敦：Frank Cass，2002 年），第 339-40 页。
Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2002, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/afghan.pdf
Hastings and Jenkins, 1997, pp. 184-5.
黑斯廷斯和詹金斯，1997 年，第 184-5 页。
Martin Middlebrook, The Falklands War 1982 (London: Penguin, 2001), pp. 118-20.
Martin Middlebrook，《1982 年福克兰群岛战争》（伦敦：企鹅出版社，2001 年），第 118-20 页。
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington: Department of Defense, April 1992), pp. F-16, F-30.
《波斯湾战争的进行》（华盛顿：国防部，1992 年 4 月），第 F-16 和 F-30 页。

Comparative Strategy 比较战略

The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient 地理距离的持续重要性和博尔丁的力量损失梯度

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The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient 地理距离的持续重要性和博尔丁的力量损失梯度

Abstract 摘要

Introduction 导言

The Advantage of Forward Locations for Logistics物流前沿阵地的优势

Cost of Transport 运输成本

The "Upward Spiral" in the Cost of Military Items is Not Permanent军用物资成本的 "螺旋式上升 "并非一劳永逸

Prepaid Supplies 预付用品

Speed of Transport Has Not Permanently Altered the LSG运输速度并没有永久性地改变整筆拨款制度

The Range of the Deadly Projectile Has Not Affected the LSG致命射弹的射程并未影响整笔拨款

Conclusion 结论

Notes 说明

The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient
地理距离的持续重要性和博尔丁的力量损失梯度

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
请往下看文章

The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient
地理距离的持续重要性和博尔丁的力量损失梯度

The Advantage of Forward Locations for Logistics
物流前沿阵地的优势

The "Upward Spiral" in the Cost of Military Items is Not Permanent
军用物资成本的 "螺旋式上升 "并非一劳永逸

Speed of Transport Has Not Permanently Altered the LSG
运输速度并没有永久性地改变整筆拨款制度

The Range of the Deadly Projectile Has Not Affected the LSG
致命射弹的射程并未影响整笔拨款