America’s new ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy could cause lasting damage
美国的新“战狼”外交可能造成持久损害

The writer is chief executive of the New America think-tank and an FT contributing editor
作者是新美国智库的首席执行官，同时也是《金融时报》的特约编辑

For almost two decades, China adhered to the doctrine of “peaceful rise”, a concept developed by state counsellor and intellectual Zheng Bijan. It emphasised China’s desire to grow in power and prosperity by integrating into the international system, without posing a threat to other nations.
近二十年来，中国坚持“和平崛起”这一理论，该概念由国务委员和知识分子郑必坚提出。它强调中国希望通过融入国际体系来增强自身的实力和繁荣，而不对其他国家构成威胁。

The strategy succeeded: from the 1990s to the mid-2010s, China’s GDP and global influence rose spectacularly. Xi Jinping, however, changed course. Beginning in 2017, he launched a set of tactics that became known as “wolf warrior diplomacy”. Chinese diplomats became more assertive in defending China’s interests. And in a few short years the Chinese government succeeded in undoing much of the goodwill that years of peaceful rise had engendered.
该战略成功了：从 1990 年代到 2010 年代中期，中国的 GDP 和全球影响力显著上升。然而，习近平改变了方向。从 2017 年开始，他推出了一系列被称为“战狼外交”的战术。中国外交官在捍卫中国利益方面变得更加自信。在短短几年内，中国政府成功地消除了多年来和平崛起所带来的大量善意。

In 2023, Xi backed off. But this aggressive advance of China’s interests had made it worse off in the world, creating lasting distrust and convincing many of China’s partners to hedge their bets by strengthening relations with the US. 
在 2023 年，习近平退缩了。但中国利益的这种激进推进使其在世界上的处境更加糟糕，造成了持久的不信任，并说服了许多中国的合作伙伴通过加强与美国的关系来降低风险。

Now, US president-elect Donald Trump and his merry band of tech titans are embracing their own brand of Wild West diplomacy, amplified with a dose of Silicon Valley swagger. Its hallmarks are supreme self-confidence, a disregard for rules of any kind and a willingness to make deals with anyone anywhere as long as they advance immediate self-interest. 
现在，美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普和他那群快乐的科技巨头们正在拥抱他们自己品牌的西部狂野外交，伴随着硅谷的自信气息。其特征是极度的自信、对任何规则的漠视，以及愿意与任何地方的任何人达成交易，只要这能促进眼前的自我利益。

Trump himself lives in a world of self-bestowed superlatives, which find a ready echo in his new friends from California. Many of the men who have risen to power and unimaginable riches on the back of technological innovation assume that American superiority over other countries is as evident as the superiority of the tech sector over the rest of the US economy. It is the future, and they control it. 
特朗普本人生活在一个自我赋予的超级优越感的世界中，这在他来自加利福尼亚的新朋友中找到了共鸣。许多在技术创新的推动下崛起并获得难以想象的财富的男性认为，美国相对于其他国家的优越性显而易见，就像科技行业相对于美国经济其他部分的优越性一样。这是未来，而他们掌控着它。

Such attitudes seem certain to create a regular stream of incidents and mini-crises with other countries. Yet based on the Chinese experience, the issue will not be this or that outrage, but the steady accumulation of statements and actions that gradually permeate the domestic politics of other nations, shifting coalitions in consequential ways.
这种态度似乎必然会与其他国家产生一系列的事件和小危机。然而，根据中国的经验，问题不在于这或那种愤怒，而在于逐渐渗透到其他国家国内政治中的声明和行动的稳步积累，从而以重要的方式改变联盟。

As Xi discovered, Beijing’s truculence and bald assertion of entitlement strengthened the hand of China hawks in both the US and the EU, and sowed doubt among former China supporters. Long-term damage to the relationship between Washington and Beijing was the result not only of Trump’s actions during his last term in office, but also a deep shift in the views of former Obama officials who entered the Biden administration and built on many of Trump’s anti-China policies.
正如习近平所发现的，北京的强硬态度和赤裸裸的权利主张增强了美国和欧盟中对华鹰派的力量，并在曾经支持中国的人士中播下了怀疑的种子。华盛顿与北京之间关系的长期损害不仅是特朗普在其最后任期内的行为所致，还源于进入拜登政府的前奥巴马官员观点的深刻转变，他们在许多特朗普的反华政策基础上进行了延续。

Pushing US technological supremacy, in particular, will embolden those in other countries who are already seeking to challenge the grip of big American tech companies. The EU has been fighting the power and reach of those companies for over a decade. The new Trump administration, following Meta’s refusal to deploy its artificial intelligence in the EU, is likely to force showdowns that will provide a needed spur to the creation of integrated European technology and defence markets. 
推动美国的技术霸权，特别是将鼓励其他国家那些已经寻求挑战大型美国科技公司控制力的人。欧盟已经与这些公司的权力和影响力斗争了十多年。新的特朗普政府在 Meta 拒绝在欧盟部署其人工智能后，可能会迫使对抗局面出现，这将为创建一体化的欧洲技术和防御市场提供必要的推动力。

In countries such as Mexico, India, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Indonesia, even where current leaders are friendly to Trump, the constant push from Washington to open markets and improve terms of trade in favour of US companies will alienate local entrepreneurs and exporters.
在墨西哥、印度、巴西、土耳其、南非、肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚和印度尼西亚等国家，即使当前领导人对特朗普友好，华盛顿不断推动开放市场和改善有利于美国公司的贸易条件也会使当地企业家和出口商感到疏远。

The US, like China in the wolf warrior years, will increasingly be known for breaking and circumventing domestic and international rules. Demands that everyone else “pay up” for American military protection could look ever more like a global extortion racket. 
美国，像中国在战狼时代一样，将越来越以破坏和规避国内外规则而闻名。要求其他国家“支付”以换取美国军事保护的要求，可能看起来越来越像一个全球敲诈勒索的团伙。

Rising middle powers, now able to play a much more independent role on the global stage than in the 20th century, are not willing to be pawns in a US-China competition. They will insist instead on asserting their own national interests in the same way that Trump wishes to put America first. 
崛起的中等强国现在能够在全球舞台上发挥比 20 世纪更独立的角色，不愿意成为美中竞争中的棋子。它们将坚持以与特朗普希望优先考虑美国相同的方式来维护自身的国家利益。

The George W Bush administration eschewed international rules and processes in favour of “coalitions of the willing”. Since then, Republican unilateralists have been followed by Democratic multilateralists who spent years repairing damage to the US’s global relationships and creating new informal alliances and coalitions.
乔治·W·布什政府摒弃了国际规则和程序，转而支持“愿意者联盟”。此后，共和党单边主义者被民主党多边主义者所取代，他们花费了数年时间修复美国的全球关系，并建立新的非正式联盟和联合体。

This cycle, however, has worn away trust and confidence in the US’s reliability as a partner and ally. Add a heavy dose of arrogance and insult, and the damage caused by the next era of American wolf warrior diplomacy could be permanent.
然而，这一周期削弱了人们对美国作为合作伙伴和盟友的可靠性的信任和信心。再加上严重的傲慢和侮辱，下一阶段美国战狼外交造成的损害可能是永久性的。