What Is Power in Global Affairs?
全球事务中的力量是什么?

For a concept that is so widely used, "power" is surprisingly elusive and difficult to measure. But such problems do not make a concept meaningless. Few of us deny the importance of love even if we cannot say, "I love you 3.6 times more than I love something else." Like love, we experience power in our everyday lives, and it has real effects despite our inability to measure it precisely. Sometimes, analysts have been tempted to discard the concept as hopelessly vague and imprecise, but it has proven hard to replace.
对于一个如此广泛使用的概念而言,"权力"意外地难以捉摸和难以衡量。但这种问题并不会使概念毫无意义。尽管我们无法说"我对另一件事的爱比对你的爱多 3.6 倍",但我们中的大多数人都不会否认爱的重要性。像爱一样,我们在日常生活中体验到权力,尽管我们无法精确地衡量它,但它确实产生了实际影响。有时,分析人员被诱惑想放弃这个概念,因为它过于模糊和不精确,但事实证明很难替代它。

The great British philosopher Bertrand Russell once compared the role of power in social science to the centrality of the concept of "energy" in physics, but the comparison is misleading. Physicists can measure relations of energy and force among inanimate objects quite precisely, whereas power refers to more ephemeral human relationships that change shape under different circumstances. Others have argued that power is to politics as money is to economics. Again, the metaphor misleads us. Money is a liquid or fungible resource. It can be used to buy a wide variety of goods, but the resources that produce power in one relationship or context may not
伟大的英国哲学家伯特兰·罗素曾将社会科学中权力的角色与物理学中"能量"概念的中心性进行比较,但这种比较是误导性的。物理学家可以相当准确地测量无生命物体之间的能量和力量关系,而权力则指的是在不同环境下形状变化的更为虚无缥缈的人际关系。其他人则认为,权力之于政治,犹如金钱之于经济。这种隐喻也误导了我们。金钱是一种流动的或可替代的资源。它可用于购买各种商品,但在一种关系或背景下产生权力的资源在另一种关系或背景下可能无法产生权力。
produce it in another. You can use money in a housing market, at a vegetable market, or in an Internet auction, whereas military capacity, one of the most important international power resources, may produce the outcomes you want in a tank battle, but not on the Internet.
在另一个地方生产它。你可以在房地产市场、蔬菜市场或互联网拍卖中使用金钱,而军事实力作为最重要的国际权力资源之一,可以在坦克战中产生你想要的结果,但在互联网上却不行。

Over the years, various analysts have tried to provide formulas that can quantify power in international affairs. For example, Ray Cline was a high-ranking official in the CIA whose job was to tell political leaders about the balance of American and Soviet power during the Cold War. His views affected political decisions that involved high risks and billions of dollars. In 1977, he published a distillation of the formula he used for estimating power:
多年来,各种分析师试图提供可以量化国际事务中权力的公式。例如,雷·克莱恩(Ray Cline)曾是中央情报局的高级官员,职责是告知政治领导人在冷战期间美苏两国力量的平衡。他的观点影响到涉及高风险和数十亿美元的政治决策。他在 1977 年发表了他用于估算权力的公式的浓缩版。

(POPULATION + TERRITORY + ECONOMY + MILITARY) STRATEGY + WILL
(人口 + 领土 + 经济 + 军事) 策略 + 意志

After inserting numbers into his formula, he concluded that the Soviet Union was twice as powerful as the United States. Of course, as we now know, this formula was not a very good predictor of outcomes. In a little more than a decade, the Soviet Union collapsed and pundits were proclaiming that the United States was the sole superpower in a unipolar world.
在将数字插入公式后,他得出结论认为苏联的实力是美国的两倍。当然,正如我们现在所知,这个公式并不是一个很好的结果预测器。在不到 10 年的时间里,苏联崩溃,舆论界宣称美国是单极世界中的唯一超级大国。

A more recent effort to create a power index included a country's resources (technology, enterprise, human, capital, physical) and national performance (external constraints, infrastructure, ideas) and how they determined military capability and combat proficiency. 4 This formulation tells us about relative military power, but not about all relevant types of power. Although effective military force remains one of the key power resources in international affairs, as we shall see in the next chapter, the world is no longer as uncon strained as in nineteenth-century Europe when historians could define a "great power" as one capable of prevailing in war.
一项较新的努力是创建一个权力指数,包括一个国家的资源(技术、企业、人力、资本、物力)和国家绩效(外部约束、基础设施、创意)以及它们如何决定军事实力和战斗技能。4 这一表述告诉我们相对的军事力量,但并非所有相关类型的力量。尽管有效的军事力量仍是国际事务中的一个关键权力资源,正如我们将在下一章看到的那样,世界已不再像 19 世纪欧洲那样无约束,当时历史学家可以将"大国"定义为在战争中胜出的国家。

Military force and combat proficiency do not tell us much abou outcomes, for example, in the world of finance or climate change
军事力量和战斗熟练度并不能告诉我们太多关于结果的信息,例如在金融或气候变化领域
Nor do they tell us much about the power of nonstate actors. In military terms, Al Qaeda is a midget compared to the American giant, but the impact of terrorists relies less on the size of their forces than on the theatrical effects of their actions and narratives and the overreactions they can produce. In that sense, terrorism is like the sport of jujitsu in which the weak player uses the strength of the larger against himself. This dynamic is not caught by typical indices of military power.
它们也不告诉我们太多关于非国家行为者的力量。从军事角度来看,与美国这个巨人相比,基地组织只是个矮子,但恐怖分子的影响力并不取决于他们军力的大小,而更多依赖于他们行动和叙事的戏剧效果,以及他们可能引发的过度反应。从这个意义上说,恐怖主义就像柔道,弱者利用强者的力量对付自己。这种动态不能用典型的军事力量指标来衡量。

In certain bargaining situations, as Thomas Schelling demonstrates, weakness and the threat that a partner will collapse can be a source of bargaining power. A bankrupt debtor who owes has little power, but if it owes billion, that debtor may have considerable bargaining power-witness the fate of institutions judged "too big to fail" in the 2008 financial crisis. North Korea's Kim JongI1 "is probably the only world leader who can make Beijing look powerless. . . . Diplomats say Mr. Kim brazenly plays on Chinese fears. If the Chinese do not pump aid into his crumbling economy, he argues, they will face refugees pouring across the border and possible unrest."
在某些谈判情况下,正如托马斯·谢林所示,软弱和一位伙伴即将崩溃的威胁可以成为谈判实力的来源。一位破产的债务人欠下 并没有多少实力,但如果它欠下 亿,这位债务人可能会有相当大的谈判实力——这就是在 2008 年金融危机中那些被认为"太大而不能倒闭"的机构的命运。 朝鲜的金正恩"可能是唯一能让北京显得无助的世界领导人。外交官们说,金先生公然利用中国的恐惧。如果中国不向他那个摇摇欲坠的经济注入援助,他就会威胁,他们将面临大量难民涌入边境,并可能引发动荡。"

Any attempt to develop a single index of power is doomed to fail because power depends upon human relationships that vary in different contexts. Whereas money can be used to measure purchasing power across different markets, there is no standard of value that can summarize all relationships and contexts to produce an agreed overall power total.
试图制定单一的权力指数注定会失败,因为权力取决于不同情境下的人际关系。金钱可以用于衡量跨市场的购买力,但没有标准化的价值尺度可以概括所有关系和情境,从而得出一个公认的总体权力值。

Like many basic ideas, power is a contested concept. No one definition is accepted by all who use the word, and people's choice of definition reflects their interests and values. Some define power as the ability to make or resist change. Others say it is the ability to get what we want. 10 This broad definition includes power over nature as well as over other people. For my interest in actions and
像许多基本思想一样,权力是一个有争议的概念。没有一个定义被所有使用这个词的人所接受,人们选择定义反映了他们的利益和价值观。有些人将权力定义为产生或抵制变革的能力。其他人说它是获得我们想要的东西的能力。这个广泛的定义包括对自然以及对他人的权力。对于我对行动和
policies, a commonsense place to start is the dictionary, which tells us that power is the capacity to do things and in social situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want. Some people call this influence, and distinguish power from influence, but that is confusing because the dictionary defines the two terms as interchangeable. There are many factors that affect our ability to get what we want. We live in a web of inherited social forces, some of which are visible and others of which are indirect and sometimes called "structural." We tend to identify and focus on some of these constraints and forces rather than others depending on our interests. For example, in his work on civilizations, political scientist Peter Katzenstein argues that the power of civilizations is different from power in civilizations. Actors in civilizations command hard and soft power. Social power operates beneath the behavioral level by shaping underlying social structures, knowledge systems and general environment. Even though such structural social forces are impor tant, for policy purposes we also want to understand what actors or agents can do within given situations. Civilizations and societies are not immutable, and effective leaders can try to shape larger social forces with varying degrees of success. As the famous German theorist Max Weber puts it, we want to know the probability that an actor in a social relationship can carry out his own will.
政策,从字典开始是一个常识之处,它告诉我们权力是做事的能力,在社会情境中影响他人以达到我们想要的结果。有些人称之为影响力,并将权力与影响力区分开来,但这是令人困惑的,因为字典将两个术语定义为可互换的。影响我们获得想要的东西的能力有很多因素。我们生活在一张继承而来的社会力量之网中,其中一些是可见的,而另一些则是间接的,有时被称为"结构性"的。我们倾向于根据自己的利益来识别和关注这些约束和力量中的一些,而不是其他的。例如,在对文明的研究中,政治学家彼得·卡岑斯坦认为,文明的权力不同于文明中的权力。文明中的行动者拥有硬实力和软实力。社会权力在行为层面之下运作,通过塑造潜在的社会结构、知识体系和一般环境。尽管这些结构性的社会力量很重要,但对于政策目的而言,我们也想了解行动者或代理人在给定情况下能做什么。文明和社会并非不可改变,有效的领导者可以尝试塑造更大的社会力量,并取得不同程度的成功。正如著名的德国理论家马克斯·韦伯所说,我们想知道行动者在社会关系中可能执行自己意愿的概率。

Even when we focus primarily on particular agents or actors, we cannot say that an actor "has power" without specifying power "to do what."15 We must specify who is involved in the power relationship (the scope of power) as well as what topics are involved (the domain of power). For example, the pope has power over some Christians, but not over others (such as Protestants). And even among Catholics, he may wish to have power over all their moral decisions, but some adherents may reject his power on some issues (such as birth control or marriage outside the church). Thus, to say that the pope has power requires us to specify the contex (scope and domain) of the relationship between the pope and any
即使我们主要关注某些特定的代理人或参与者,我们也不能说一个参与者"有权力"而不指定"做什么"的权力。15 我们必须明确谁参与了权力关系(权力范围),以及涉及什么主题(权力领域)。例如,教皇对某些基督教徒有权力,但对其他人(如新教徒)则没有。即使在天主教徒中,他可能希望对他们所有的道德决定都有权力,但一些信徒可能会拒绝他在某些问题(如避孕或在教会外结婚)上的权力。因此,要说教皇有权力,需要我们明确说明教皇与任何 之间关系的背景(范围和领域)。
A psychopath may have the power to kill and destroy random strangers, but not the power to persuade them. Some actions that affect others and obtain preferred outcomes can be purely destructive and not dependent on what the victim thinks. For example, Pol Pot killed millions of Cambodian citizens. Some say such use of force is not power because there was no two-way relationship involved, but that depends on context and motive. If the actor's motive is pure sadism or terror, the use of force fits within the definition of power as affecting others to get what the actor wants. Most power relationships, however, depend very much on what the victim thinks. A dictator who wishes to punish a dissident may be misled in thinking he exercised power if the dissident really sought martyrdom to advance her cause. But if the dictator simply wanted to destroy the dissident, her intentions did not matter to his power.
一个精神病患者可能有杀害和毁灭无辜者的能力,但没有说服他们的能力。某些影响他人并获得理想结果的行为可能纯属破坏性的,并不取决于受害者的想法。例如,波尔布特屠杀了数百万柬埔寨公民。有人说这种使用武力不能算是权力,因为没有双向关系,但这取决于背景和动机。如果行为者的动机是纯粹的虐待或恐怖,使用武力符合权力的定义,即影响他人以获得自己想要的东西。然而,大多数权力关系确实很大程度上取决于受害者的想法。一个独裁者想惩罚一名异见人士,如果这名异见人士真的寻求成为烈士来推进自己的事业,那么这位独裁者可能被误导认为他行使了权力。但如果这位独裁者只是想摧毁这名异见人士,她的意图对他的权力并不重要。

Actions often have powerful unintended consequences, but from a policy point of view we are interested in the ability to produce preferred outcomes. If a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldier in Afghanistan kills a child by a stray bullet, he had the power to destroy but not to achieve his preferred outcome. An air strike that kills one insurgent and many civilians demonstrates a general power to destroy, but it may prove counterproductive for a counterinsurgency policy. The actions of a country with a large economy may have unintended effects that cause accidental harm (or wealth) in a small country. Again, if the effects are unintended, then there is power to harm (or benefit), but it is not power to achieve preferred outcomes. Canadians often complain that living next to the United States is like sleeping with an elephant. From the Canadian point of view, intentions do not matter; it hurts if the beast rolls over. But from a policy-oriented perspective, intentions matter in terms of getting preferred outcomes. policy-oriented concept of power depends upon a specified context to tell us who gets what, how, where, and when.
行动通常会产生强大的非预期后果,但从政策角度来看,我们对产生首选结果的能力感兴趣。如果北大西洋公约组织(NATO)的士兵在阿富汗误杀一名儿童,他有破坏的力量,但无法实现他的首选结果。一次空袭杀死一名叛乱分子和许多平民,表明了一种破坏的普遍力量,但这可能会对反叛败犯政策产生适得其反的影响。一个经济大国的行为可能会产生非预期的影响,导致小国意外遭受损害(或获得财富)。再次提醒,如果效果是非预期的,那么就存在损害(或获益)的力量,但这不是实现首选结果的力量。加拿大人常常抱怨,居住在美国的附近就像和大象共睡一张床。从加拿大的角度来看,意图并不重要;当这头野兽翻身时,伤害就来了。但从以政策为导向的角度来看,意图在获得首选结果方面很重要。以政策为导向的权力概念取决于一个特定的背景,告诉我们谁得到什么,如何得到,在哪里得到,以及何时得到。

Practical politicians and ordinary people often find these questions of behavior and motivation too complicated and unpredictable.
实用的政客和普通人通常会发现这些行为和动机问题太复杂和难以预测。

Behavioral definitions judge power by outcomes that are determined after the action (what economists call "ex post") rather than before the action ("ex ante"). But policymakers want predictions about the future to help guide their actions. Thus, they frequently define power simply in terms of the resources that can produce outcomes. By this second definition of power as resources, a country is powerful if it has a relatively large population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. The virtue of this second definition is that it makes power appear to be concrete, measurable, and predictable-a guide to action. Power in this sense is like holding the high cards in a card game. But this definition has major problems. When people define power as synonymous with the resources that (may) produce outcomes, they often encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want.
行为定义通过行动后（经济学家称之为"事后"）确定的结果来判断权力,而不是行动之前（"事先"）。但决策者希望能够预测未来,以帮助指导他们的行动。因此,他们经常简单地将权力定义为可产生结果的资源。根据这种将权力定义为资源的第二种定义,一个国家如果拥有相对较大的人口、领土、自然资源、经济实力、军事力量和社会稳定性,则可视为强大。这种第二种定义的优点在于,它使权力看起来是具体的、可度量的和可预测的,从而成为行动的指南。在这种意义上,权力就像在纸牌游戏中持有高牌一样。但这种定义存在很大问题。当人们将权力等同于(可能)产生结果的资源时,他们经常遇到一种悖论,那就是那些拥有最丰富资源的人并不总是能得到他们想要的结果。

This is not to deny the importance of power resources. Power is conveyed through resources, whether tangible or intangible. People notice resources. If you show the highest cards in a poker game others may fold their hands rather than challenge you. But power resources that win in one game may not help at all in another. Hold ing a strong poker hand does not win if the game is bridge. Even if the game is poker, if you play your high hand poorly, or fall victim to bluff and deception, you can still lose. Power conversion-getting from resources to behavioral outcomes-is a crucial intervening variable. Having the resources of power does not guarantee that you will always get the outcome you want. For example, in terms of resources, the United States was far more powerful than Vietnam yet lost the war. Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strate gies and skillful leadership-what I call smart power. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge.
这并不是否认权力资源的重要性。权力通过有形或无形的资源来传递。人们会注意到资源。如果在扑克游戏中你出示了最大的牌,其他人可能会放弃他们的手而不与你对抗。但在一个游戏中获胜的权力资源在另一个游戏中可能毫无用处。拥有强大的扑克手牌并不能赢得桥牌游戏。即使是在扑克游戏中,如果你打出了高牌却操作不善,或者成为了欺骗和欺骗的受害者,你仍然可能失败。权力转换-从资源到行为结果-是一个关键的中介变量。拥有权力资源并不能保证你总是能得到你想要的结果。例如,从资源来看,美国比越南强大得多,但仍然输掉了战争。将资源转化为实现权力,即获得所需的结果,需要精心设计的策略和熟练的领导力,这就是我所说的"智慧力量"。但是,策略通常是不充分的,领导者也常常评判错误。

Nonetheless, defining power in terms of resources is a shortcu that policymakers find useful. In general, a country that is well en dowed with power resources is more likely to affect a weaker coun- try and be less dependent upon an optimal strategy than vice versa. Smaller countries may sometimes obtain preferred outcomes because they pick smaller fights or focus selectively on a few issues. On average, and in direct conflicts, we would not expect Finland to prevail over Russia.
尽管如此,将权力定义为资源是一种捷径,决策者发现这很有用。一般来说,拥有丰富权力资源的国家更可能影响较弱的国家,而不是依赖于最佳策略,反之亦然。小国有时可以获得首选结果,因为他们参与较小的争斗或专注于少数几个问题。平均而言,在直接冲突中,我们不希望芬兰战胜俄罗斯。
As a first step in any game, it helps to start by figuring out who is holding the high cards and how many chips that player has. Equally important, however, is that policymakers have the contextual intelligence to understand what game they are playing. Which resources provide the best basis for power behavior in a particular context? Oil was not an impressive power resource before the in-
作为任何游戏的第一步,搞清楚谁手持大牌以及该玩家有多少筹码是很有帮助的。同样重要的是,决策者需要有上下文智慧来了解他们正在玩什么游戏。哪些资源在特定情况下提供最佳的权力行为依据?在石油成为重要的权力资源之前,它并不那么令人印象深刻。
a I dustrial age, nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age. In traditional realist views of international affairs, war was the ultimate game in which the cards of international politics were played. When all the cards were on the table, estimates of relative power were proven and disproven. But over the centuries, as technologies evolved, the sources of strength for war often changed. Moreover, on an increasing number of issues in the twenty-first century, war is not the ultimate arbiter.
工业时代,铀也在核时代前没有什么重要意义。在国际事务的传统现实主义观点中,战争是国际政治博弈的最终形式。当所有手牌都摊在桌面上时,相对实力的估计会被证明或推翻。然而,随着技术的发展,战争的力量来源常常发生变化。此外,在 21 世纪的越来越多问题上,战争已不再是最终裁决者。

As a result, many analysts reject the "elements of national power" approach as misleading and inferior to the behavioral or relational approach that became dominant among social science analysis in the latter half of the twentieth century. Strictly speaking, the skeptics are correct. Power resources are simply the tangible and intangible raw materials or vehicles that underlie power relationships, and whether a given set of resources produces preferred outcomes or not depends upon behavior in context. The vehicle is not the power relationship. Knowing the horsepower and mileage of a vehicle does not tell us whether it will get to the preferred destination.
因此,许多分析师拒绝"国家力量要素"方法,认为它是误导性的,不如二十世纪后半叶社会科学分析中占主导地位的行为或关系方法。严格来说,怀疑者是正确的。权力资源只是构成权力关系的有形和无形的原材料或载体,给定的一组资源是否能产生首选结果,取决于处境中的行为。车辆并非权力关系。知道一辆车的马力和油耗并不能告诉我们它是否能到达首选目的地。

In practice, discussions of power in global affairs involve both definitions. Many of the terms that we use daily, such as "military power" and "economic power," are hybrids that combine both resources and behaviors. So long as that is the case, we must make clear Whether we are speaking of behavioral- or resource-based definitions
在实践中,关于全球事务中的权力讨论涉及两种定义。许多我们日常使用的术语,如"军事力量"和"经济力量",都是结合了资源和行为的混合体。只要这种情况存在,我们就必须明确我们是在谈论基于行为还是基于资源的定义。

FIGURE 1.1 Power as Resources and Power as Behavioral Outcomes
图 1.1 资源视角下的权力和行为结果视角下的权力

Power resources conversion strategy preferred outcomes
电力 资源 转换策略 首选结果
POWER DEFINED AS BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES
将行为结果界定为权力
Power affect others re: something by means to preferred outcomes (domain) (scope) (coercion, reward, attraction)
权力能够 影响他人 以某种 方式 来达到预期的结果(领域)(范围)(强制、奖赏、吸引)
of power, and we must be aware of the imperfect relation between them. For example, when people speak of the rising power of China or India, they tend to point to the large populations and increased economic or military resources of those countries. But whether the capacity that those resources imply can actually be converted into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the country's skill in converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes. These different definitions are summarized in Figure 1.1. The figure also illustrates the more careful relational definition in which power is the ability to alter others' behavior to produce preferred outcomes.
关于权力,我们必须认识到它与所期望的结果之间的不完全关系。例如,当人们谈到中国或印度崛起的权力时,他们倾向于指出这些国家庞大的人口和不断增长的经济或军事资源。但是,这些资源所隐含的能力是否真的能够转化为所期望的结果,将取决于背景环境以及该国将资源转化为策略的能力,从而实现所期望的结果。这些不同的定义总结在图 1.1 中。该图还说明了更为谨慎的关系定义,即权力是改变他人行为以获得所期望结果的能力。

This is what people are getting at when they say things like "Power doesn't necessarily lead to influence" (though for reasons already explained, that formulation is confusing).
这就是人们在说"权力不一定会导致影响力"时的含义(尽管由于之前解释的原因,这种表述令人困惑)。

In the end, because it is outcomes, not resources, that we care about, we must pay more attention to contexts and strategies. Power-conversion strategies turn out to be a critical variable that does not receive enough attention. Strategies relate means to ends, and those that combine hard and soft power resources successfully in different contexts are the key to smart power.
最终,因为我们关注的是结果而不是资源,我们必须更多地关注背景和策略。功率转换策略原来是一个关键变量,却没有得到足够的关注。策略将手段与目的联系起来,在不同背景下成功结合硬实力和软实力资源的策略是智慧实力的关键。

In addition to the distinction between resource and relational definitions of power, it is useful to distinguish three different aspects of relational power: commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences. All too often these are conflated. For example, a recent book on foreign policy defines power as "getting people or groups to do something they don't want to do."22 But such a narrow approach can lead to mistakes.
除了资源和关系定义力量的区别外,还有必要区分关系力量的三个不同方面:命令变革、控制议程和建立偏好。这些往往被混淆。例如,一本关于外交政策的新书将力量定义为"让人或群体做他们不想做的事"。22 但是这种狭隘的方法可能会导致错误。
The ability to command others to change their behavior against their initial preferences is one important dimension of relational power, but not the only one. Another dimension is the ability to affect others' preferences so that they want what you want and you need not command them to change. Former president (and general) Dwight Eisenhower referred to this as getting people to do something "not only because you tell them to do so, but because they instinctively want to do it for you." This co-optive power contrasts with and complements command power. It is a mistake to think that power consists of just ordering others to change. You can affect their behavior by shaping their preferences in ways that produce what you want rather than relying on carrots and sticks to change their behavior "when push comes to shove." Sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without pushing or shoving. Ignoring this dimension by using a too narrow definition of power can lead to a poorly shaped foreign policy.
命令他人改变他们的行为,使之违背初衷,是关系上权力的一个重要因素,但并非唯一。另一个因素是影响他人的偏好,使他们想要你想要的,从而不需命令他们改变。前总统(兼将军)艾森豪威尔曾说,让人们做某事不仅因为你告诉他们这么做,而是因为他们本能地想为你这么做。这种共谋权力与指令权力形成对比,同时也补充了指令权力。认为权力只是命令他人改变是错误的。你可以塑造他们的偏好,使之产生你想要的结果,而不必使用奖惩手段来迫使他们改变。有时你可以获得你想要的结果而无需推挤。忽视这一维度,过于狭隘地定义权力,会导致外交政策的失误。
The first aspect, or "face," of power was defined by Yale political scientist Robert Dahl in studies of New Haven in the 1950s, and it is widely used today even though it covers only part of power behavior. This face of power focuses on the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies. To measure or judge power, you have to know how strong an other person's or nation's initial preferences were and how much they were changed by your efforts. Coercion can be quite clear in a situation in which there appears to be some degree of choice. If a man holding a gun on you says, "Your money or your life," you have some choice, but it is small and not consistent with your initial preferences (unless they included suicide or martyrdom). When Czechoslovakia succumbed to German and Soviet troops entering
这一方面或"面貌"的权力由耶鲁大学政治学家罗伯特·达尔在 20 世纪 50 年代对新哈文的研究中定义,尽管它只涵盖了部分权力行为,但仍被广泛使用。它关注的是让他人以违背他们最初意愿和策略的方式行事的能力。要衡量或判断权力,需要知道其他个人或国家的最初喜好有多强烈,以及你的努力使他们改变了多少。在表面上存在某种程度选择的情况下,威迫也可能很明确。如果一个人用枪指着你说"你的钱还是你的命",你确实有某些选择,但是很小,也与你最初的偏好不一致(除非你包括自杀或殉道)。当捷克斯洛伐克屈服于德国和苏联军队入侵时,

Prague in 1938 and again in 1968, it was not because that country wanted to.
1938 年和 1968 年的布拉格,并非因为那个国家想要如此。

Economic measures are somewhat more complex. Negative sanctions (taking away economic benefit) are clearly felt as coercive. Payment or economic inducement to do what you initially did not want to may seem more attractive to the subject, but any payment can easily be turned into a negative sanction by the implicit or explicit threat of its removal. A year-end bonus is a reward, but its removal is felt as a penalty. Moreover, in unequal bargaining relationships, say, between a millionaire landowner and a starving peasant, a paltry "take it or leave it" payment may give the peasant little sense of choice. The important point is that someone has the capacity to make others act against their initial preferences and strategies, and both sides feel that power.
经济措施相对更为复杂。负面制裁（剥夺经济利益）显然会被视为强制性行为。向对方支付或提供经济诱因来达成自己最初不想做的事情可能看起来更有吸引力,但任何付款都可能通过明示或暗示的移除威胁而转化为负面制裁。年终奖金是一种奖励,但其移除会被视为惩罚。此外,在不平等的谈判关系中,比如一个百万富翁地主和一个饥饿的农民,微不足道的"接受或离开"付款可能会让农民感觉别无选择。关键在于某人有能力迫使他人与自己的初衷和策略背道而驰,双方都感受到了这种权力。

In the 1960s, shortly after Dahl developed his widely accepted definition, political scientists Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz pointed out that Dahl's definition missed what they called the "second face of power." Dahl ignored the dimension of framing and agenda-setting. If ideas and institutions can be used to frame the agenda for action in a way that make others' preferences seem irrelevant or out of bounds, then it may never be necessary to push or shove them. In other words, it may be possible to shape others' preferences by affecting their expectations of what is legitimate or feasible. Agenda-framing focuses on the ability to keep issues off the table, or as Sherlock Holmes might put it, dogs that fail to bark.
20 世纪 60 年代,在达尔提出他广为人知的定义之后不久,政治科学家彼得·巴克拉赫和莫顿·巴拉茨指出,达尔的定义忽略了他们所谓的"权力的第二面"。达尔忽略了框定议程和设置议程的维度。如果观念和制度可以用来以一种使他人的偏好显得无关紧要或越界的方式来框定行动议程,那么就可能永远不需要去推动或强迫他们。换句话说,可以通过影响他人对什么是合法或可行的期望来塑造他人的偏好。议程框定关注的是保持问题不上台面的能力,或正如福尔摩斯可能会说的,那些不吠的狗。

Powerful actors can make sure that the less powerful are never invited to the table, or if they get there, the rules of the game have already been set by those who arrived first. International financial policy had this characteristic, at least before the crisis of 2008 opened things up somewhat when the Group of was supplemented by the Group of . Those who are subject to this second face of power may or may not be aware of it. If they accept the legitimacy of the institutions or the social discourse that framed the agenda, they may not feel unduly constrained by the second face of power. But if the agenda of action is constrained by threats of coercion or promises of payments, then it is just an instance of the first face of power. The target's acquiescence in the legitimacy of the agenda is what makes this face of power co-optive and partly constitutive of soft power-the ability to get what you want by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction.
强大的行动者可以确保较弱的人从未被邀请入席,或者如果他们到了那里,游戏规则已经由最先到达的人设定好了。国际金融政策就具有这种特点,至少在 2008 年危机之前是如此,当时集团被集团所补充。 那些受制于这种第二种权力面相的人可能会也可能不会意识到这一点。如果他们接受了机构的合法性或者界定议程的社会话语,他们可能并不会感到受到过度的限制。但是,如果行动议程受到了胁迫或者付款承诺的约束,那就是第一种权力面相的一个实例。目标者对议程合法性的默许,使这种权力面相具有同化性,部分构成了软实力——即通过设定议程、说服、引发正面吸引来获得想要的东西的能力。

Still later, in the 1970s, sociologist Steven Lukes pointed out that ideas and beliefs also help shape others' initial preferences. In Dahl's approach, I can exercise power over you by getting you to do what you would otherwise not want to do; in other words, by changing your situation, I can make you change your preferred strategy. But I can also exercise power over you by determining your very wants. I can shape your basic or initial preferences, not merely change the situation in a way that makes you change your strategy for achieving your preferences.
直到 20 世纪 70 年代,社会学家史蒂文·卢克斯指出,观念和信仰也有助于塑造他人的初始偏好。在达尔的方法中,我可以通过让你做你原本不想做的事来对你施加权力;换句话说,通过改变你的处境,我可以让你改变你的首选策略。但我也可以通过决定你的需求本身来对你施加权力。我可以塑造你的基本或初始偏好,而不仅仅是改变使你改变实现偏好的策略的处境。

This dimension of power is missed by Dahl's definition. A teenage boy may carefully choose a fashionable shirt to wear to school to attract a girl, but the teenager may not be aware that the reason the shirt is so fashionable is that a national retailer recently launched a major advertising campaign. Both his preference and that of the other teenagers have been formed by an unseen actor who has shaped the structure of preferences. If you can get others to want the same outcomes that you want, it will not be necessary to override their initial desires. Lukes called this the "third face of power."
这个权力的层面被达尔的定义忽略了。一个青少年可能会仔细选择一件时髦的衬衫去上学,以吸引一个女孩,但这个青少年可能不知道这件衬衫之所以如此时髦,是因为一家全国性零售商最近推出了一场大规模的广告宣传活动。他的偏好以及其他青少年的偏好都是由一个看不见的参与者形成的,这个参与者塑造了偏好的结构。如果你能让别人想要和你一样的结果,就不需要压制他们最初的欲望。卢克斯称之为"权力的第三面"。

There are critical questions of voluntarism in determining how freely people chose their preferences. Not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics. In some extreme cases, it is difficult to ascertain what constitutes voluntary formation of preferences. For instance, in the "Stockholm syndrome," victims of kidnapping who suffered traumatic stress began to identify with their abductors. Captors sometimes try to "brainwash" their captives and sometimes try to win them over with kindnesses. But in some situations, it is more difficult to be certain of others' interests. Are Afghan women
决定人们如何自由选择偏好存在着关键的自愿主义问题。 并非所有的软实力在外部评论看来都太温和。 在一些极端情况下,很难确定什么构成了对偏好的自愿构建。 例如,在"斯德哥尔摩综合症"中,受到创伤性压力的绑架受害者开始认同他们的绑架者。 囚禁者有时试图"洗脑"他们的俘虏,有时试图用善意来赢得他们。 但在某些情况下,很难确定他人的利益。 阿富汗妇女是否

FIRST FACE: A uses threats or rewards to change B's behavior against B 's initial preferences and strategies. B knows this and feels the effect of A's power
第一种情况:A 使用威胁或奖赏来改变 B 的行为,违背了 B 最初的偏好和策略。B 知道这一点,并感受到 A 的权力影响。

SECOND FACE: A controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits B's choices of strategy B may or may not know this and be aware of A's power:
第二张脸: A 以一种限制 B 战略选择的方式控制行动议程。 B 可能知道也可能不知道这一点,也可能意识到 A 的权力

THIRD FACE: A helps to create and shape B's basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. is unlikely to be aware of this or to realize the effec of A's power.
第三面相：A 帮助创造和塑造 B 的基本信念、看法和偏好。B 不太可能意识到这一点或意识到 A 的力量产生的影响。
oppressed when they choose to wear a burka? What about women who choose to wear a veil in democratic France? Sometimes it is difficult to know the extent of voluntarism from mere outward appearances. Dictators such as Adolf Hitler and Stalin tried to create an aura of invincibility to attract followers, and some leaders in southeastern European countries succumbed to this effect. To the extent that force creates a sense of awe that attracts others, it can be an indirect source of co-optive power, but if the force is directly coercive, then it is simply an instance of the first face of power.
被压迫当他们选择戴布尔卡吗?在民主的法国,选择戴面纱的女性又如何?有时很难仅凭外表就知道自愿的程度。就像希特勒和斯大林这样的独裁者试图营造不可战胜的形象吸引追随者,一些东南欧国家的领导人也屈从于此效应。在某种程度上,力量所创造的敬畏感会吸引他人,从而成为一种间接的共谋力量,但如果力量直接地强制,那就仅仅是权力的第一面。

Some theorists have called these the public, hidden, and invisible faces of power, reflecting the degrees of difficulty that the target has in discovering the source of power. The second and third faces embody aspects of structural power. A structure is simply an arrangement of all the parts of a whole. Humans are embedded in complex structures of culture, social relations, and power that affect and constrain them. A person's field of action is "delimited by actors with whom he has no interaction or communication, by actions distant in time and space, by actions of which he is, in no explicit sense the target. Some exercises of power reflect the intentional decisions of particular actors, whereas others are the product of unintended consequences and larger social forces.
一些理论家将这些称为公共的、隐藏的和无形的权力面貌,反映了目标发现权力来源的难度程度。第二和第三面体现了结构性权力的方面。结构只是一个整体的所有部分的安排。人们嵌入在复杂的文化、社会关系和权力结构中,这些结构影响和限制着他们。一个人的行动领域"由他无法互动或交流的行为者、时空隔离的行为以及他明确不是目标的行为所界定"。一些权力的行使反映了特定行为者的有意决策,而另一些则是非预期后果和更大社会力量的产物。
For example, why do large automobiles dominate our city streets? In part the answer reflects individual consumer choices, but these consumer preferences are themselves shaped by a social history of advertising, manufacturers' decisions, tax incentives, public transport policy, road-building subsidies, and urban planning. Different choices on these issues by many visible as well as unseen past actors confront an urban resident today with a limited set of choices.
举个例子,为什么大型汽车主导着我们的城市街道?部分答案反映了个人消费者的选择,但这些消费偏好本身受到广告、制造商决策、税收激励、公共交通政策、道路建设补贴和城市规划等社会历史的影响。不同的过去行为者,无论是公众还是隐藏的人,对这些问题的不同选择,使得今天的城市居民只能在有限的选择范围内进行选择。

In 1993, Bill Clinton's political adviser James Carville is alleged to have joked that he wished he could be reborn as the bond market because then he would have real power. When we speak of the power of markets, we are referring to a form of structural power. A wheat farmer who wants to earn more income to pay for his daughter's college tuition may decide to plant more wheat. But if other farmers plant more as well (and demand does not change); market forces may reduce his income and affect her educational prospects In a perfect market, the agent has no pricing power. Millions of other unseen agents making independent choices create the supply and demand that determine the price. This is why poor countries that produce commodities are often subject to wide variations in their terms of trade. But if an agent can find a way to change the structure of a market by introducing an element of monopoly (a single seller) or monopsony (a single buyer), she can gain some power over price. She can do this by differentiating her product through advertising, creating brand loyalty, picking a special location, and so forth. Or in the case of oil-producing countries, agents can try to form a cartel like the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC)
1993 年，比尔·克林顿的政治顾问詹姆斯·卡维尔据称开玩笑说,他希望自己能转生为债券市场,因为那样才有真正的权力。当我们谈论市场力量时,我们指的是一种结构性权力。一个小麦农民想要增加收入以支付女儿的大学学费,可能会决定种植更多小麦。但如果其他农民也种植更多(需求没有变化),市场力量可能会降低他的收入并影响她的教育前景。在完美市场中,代理人没有定价能力。数百万其他看不见的独立选择的代理人创造了决定价格的供给和需求。这就是为什么生产大宗商品的贫穷国家常常遭受贸易条件剧烈波动的原因。但如果一个代理人能够找到改变市场结构的方式,引入垄断(单一卖家)或买方垄断(单一买家)的因素,他就可以获得一些价格控制权。他可以通过广告差异化产品,培养品牌忠诚度,选择特殊位置等方式来做到这一点。或者在石油出口国的情况下,代理人可以尝试组成像欧佩克这样的卡特尔。

Different analysts cut into the complex pattern of causation and draw the line between individual choice and larger structures at different places. For example, sociologists tend to focus less on specific actions and outcomes than political scientists do. Analysts who focus only on individual agents, as the first face of power tends to do, are clearly failing to understand and describe power relationships fully. But those who focus only on broad social forces and longer
不同的分析师从不同的角度切入复杂的因果关系,在个人选择和更大结构之间划分界限。例如,社会学家往往比政治学家更关注整体影响而非个别行动和结果。仅关注个人行为主体的分析师,如第一种权力视角,显然无法充分理解和描述权力关系。而仅关注广泛的社会力量和长期趋势的分析师,也可能忽视具体的行动和结果。
historical perspective, as the second and third faces of power tend to do, pay too little attention to the individual choices and intentions that are crucial in policy. Some critics have called my approach too "agent centered," but it still allows some consideration of structural forces even if it does not include all aspects of structure.
从历史角度来看,第二种和第三种权力面貌往往过于忽视决策中个人选择和意图的重要性。一些批评者称我的方法过于"注重行动者",但即使没有包括结构的所有方面,它仍然允许对结构性力量进行一定程度的考虑。

Some analysts regard these distinctions as useless abstractions that can all be collapsed into the first face of power. If we succumb to this temptation, however, we are likely to limit what we see in terms of behavior, which tends to limit the strategies that policymakers design to achieve their goals. Command power (the first face) is very visible and readily grasped. It is the basis for hard power-the ability to get desired outcomes through coercion and payment. The co-optive power of faces two and three is more subtle and therefore less visible. It contributes to soft power, the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agendasetting, persuasion, and attraction. All too often policymakers have focused solely on hard command power to compel others to act against their preferences and have ignored the soft power that comes from preference formation. But when co-opting is possible, policymakers can save on carrots and sticks.
一些分析师认为这些区分是无用的抽象概念,可以全部归结为第一种权力面相。 然而,如果我们屈服于这种诱惑,我们就可能会限制我们对行为的观察,这往往会限制决策者设计实现目标的策略。指令性权力(第一种面相)非常明显和容易掌握。这是硬实力的基础,即通过威慑和交易获得预期结果的能力。第二和第三种面相的共同选择权力更加微妙,因此更不明显。它有助于软实力,即通过议程设置、说服和吸引等共同选择手段获得首选结果的能力。政策制定者往往过于专注于强制他人违背自己意愿的硬指令性权力,忽视了来自偏好形成的软实力。但是,当可以进行共同选择时,决策者可以减少胡萝卜和大棒。

In global politics, some goals that states seek are more susceptible to the second and third than to the first face of power. Arnold Wolfers once distinguished between what he called possession goals-specific and often tangible objectives-and milieu goals, which are often structural and intangible. For example, access to resources or basing rights or a trade agreement is a possession goal, whereas promoting an open trade system, free markets, democracy, or human rights is a milieu goal. In the terminology used previously, we can think of states having specific goals and general or structural goals. Focusing solely on command power and the first face of power may mislead us about how to promote such goals. For example, in the promotion of democracy, military means alone are less successful than military means combined with soft power approaches-as the United States discovered in Iraq. And the soft power of attraction and persuasion can have both agentic and structural dimensions. For example, a country can try to attract others through actions such as public diplomacy, but it may also attract others through the structural effects of its example or what can be called the "shining city on the hill" effect.
在全球政治中,某些国家追求的目标更容易受到权力的第二和第三面而不是第一面的影响。阿诺尔德·沃尔夫斯曾经区分了他所称的占有目标(特定的、通常有形的目标)和环境目标(通常是结构性的、无形的)。例如,获取资源或基地权或贸易协议是占有目标,而推广开放贸易体系、自由市场、民主或人权则是环境目标。使用之前的术语,我们可以认为国家有具体目标和一般或结构性目标。仅关注命令性权力和权力的第一面可能会误导我们如何推动这些目标。例如,在促进民主方面,单凭军事手段不如将军事手段与软实力方法结合使用(正如美国在伊拉克所发现的那样)。而吸引力和说服的软实力既有主体性维度也有结构性维度。例如,一个国家可以通过公共外交等行动来吸引他人,但它也可能通过其范例或所谓"山巅之城"效应的结构性影响来吸引他人。

Another reason not to collapse all three faces of power into the first is that doing so diminishes attention to networks, which are an important type of structural power in the twenty-first century. Networks are becoming increasingly important in an information age, and positioning in social networks can be an important power resource. For example, in a hub-and-spokes network, power can derive from being the hub of communications. If you communicate with your other friends through me, that gives me power. If the points on the rim are not directly connected to each other, their dependence on communication through the hub can shape their agenda. For example, even after independence, many communications among former French African colonies ran through Paris, and that increased French power to shape their agenda.
将三种权力面向都归结于第一种是错误的,因为这会忽视网络在 21 世纪作为一种重要结构性力量的重要性。网络在信息时代变得越来越重要,在社会网络中的定位可以成为一种重要的权力资源。例如,在中心-辐射型网络中,权力可以来自于成为通信中心。如果朋友们都要通过我才能相互交流,这就给了我权力。如果网络边缘上的点之间没有直接联系,他们就必须依赖通过中心点进行交流,这可能会影响到他们的议程。例如,即使在独立之后,许多法国非洲殖民地之间的交流也都要通过巴黎,这增强了法国塑造它们议程的能力。
In other more complex network arrangements, theorists point to the importance of structural holes that prevent direct communication between certain parts of the network. Those who can bridge or exploit structural holes can use their position as a source of power by controlling communication between others. Another aspect of networks that is relevant to power is their extensiveness. Even weak extensive ties can be useful in acquiring and disseminating novel and innovative information. Weak ties provide the ability to link diverse groups together in a cooperative, successful manner. This increases a country's ability to gain power with, rather than over, others. The ability to create networks of trust that enable groups to work together toward common goals is what economist Kenneth Boulding calls "integrative power." According to psychologists, "Years of research suggest that empathy and social intelligence are vastly more important to acquiring and exercising power than are force, deception, or terror.
在更复杂的网络结构中,理论学家指出结构性空白的重要性,这些空白阻碍了网络中某些部分之间的直接沟通。 能够填补或利用结构性空白的人可以利用自己的地位作为控制他人沟通的权力来源。网络的广泛性也是与权力相关的另一个方面。即使微弱的广泛联系也可以在获取和传播新颖和创新信息方面发挥作用。弱联系提供了将不同群体以合作、成功的方式联系在一起的能力。 这增加了一个国家通过而不是凌驾于他人之上来获得权力的能力。经济学家肯尼斯·鲍尔丁称"创造信任网络,使群体能够共同实现目标"为"整合性权力"。 根据心理学家的说法,"多年的研究表明,同情心和社交智力对于获得和行使权力远比武力、欺骗或恐怖更为重要"。

Political theorist Hannah Arendt once said that "power springs up among men when they act together." Similarly, a state can wield global power by engaging and acting together with other states, not merely acting against them. Princeton political scientist John Ikenberry argues that American power after World War II rested on a network of institutions that constrained the United States but were open to others and thus increased America's power to act with others. This is an important point in assessing the power of nations in the current international system and an important dimension for assessing the future of American and Chinese power in the twenty-first century. For example, if the United States is involved in more communication networks, it has a greater opportunity to shape preferences in terms of the third face of power.
政治理论家汉娜·阿伦特曾经说过,"当人们共同行动时,力量就会产生"。类似地,一个国家通过与其他国家互动和合作,而不仅仅是针对他们采取行动,就可以发挥全球影响力。普林斯顿政治学家约翰·伊肯伯里认为,二战后美国的实力建立在一个网络系统之上,这个网络系统限制了美国,但却向其他国家敞开大门,从而增强了美国与他国合作的能力。这在评估当前国际体系中各国的实力以及 21 世纪美国和中国实力的未来发展方面都很重要。例如,如果美国参与更多的交流网络,它就有更多的机会来塑造第三面向的权力。

For policy purposes, it can be useful to think of the three faces of power in a reverse sequence from the order in which they were invented by social scientists. A policymaker should consider preference formation and agenda-framing as means of shaping the environment before turning to the first, or command, face of power. In short, those who insist on collapsing the second and third dimensions of power into the first will miss an increasingly important aspect of power in this century.
从政策角度来看，可以按与社会科学家发现顺序相反的方式,来思考权力的三种面向。政策制定者应该先考虑偏好形成和议程设置,作为塑造环境的手段,再转向第一种,即命令性的权力面向。简而言之,那些坚持将第二和第三维度的权力归入第一维度的人,将错过本世纪权力日益重要的一个方面。

In the United States, the tendency to focus on the first face of power is partly a reflection of American political culture and institutions. No politician wants to appear "soft," and Congress finds it easier to boost the budget of the Pentagon than that of the State Department. That bias has been reinforced by prevailing theories of international politics. For centuries, the dominant classical approach to international affairs has been called "realism," and its lineage stretches back to such great thinkers as Thucydides and Niccolo
在美国,关注第一种权力面相的倾向部分反映了美国的政治文化和制度。没有任何政客想要被视为"软弱",国会也更容易提高国防部预算而不是国务院预算。这种偏见得到了国际政治学流行理论的增强。几个世纪以来,国际事务的主导古典方法被称为"现实主义",其系谱可回溯到修昔底斯和尼科洛·马基雅维里等伟大思想家。
Machiavelli. Realism assumes that in the anarchic conditions of world politics, where there is no higher international government authority above states, they must rely on their own devices to preserve their independence, and that when push comes to shove, the ultima ratio is the use of force. Realism portrays the world in terms of sovereign states aiming to preserve their security, with military force as their ultimate instrument. Thus, war has been a constant aspect of international affairs over the centuries. Realists come in many sizes and shapes, but all tend to argue that global politics is power politics. In this they are right, but some limit their understanding by conceiving of power too narrowly. A pragmatic or commonsense realist takes into account the full spectrum of power resources, including ideas, persuasion, and attraction. Many classical realists of the past understood the role of soft power better than some of their modern progeny.
马基雅维利。现实主义假设,在世界政治无政府状态的条件下,没有高于国家的国际政府权威,它们必须依靠自己的手段来维护独立性,当推动变革临到眼前时,最后的手段就是使用武力。现实主义从主权国家试图维护其安全的角度描绘世界,军事力量是它们的最终工具。因此,战争一直是国际事务的一个持续方面。现实主义者有各种规模和形状,但都倾向于认为全球政治就是权力政治。在这一点上他们是正确的,但有些人通过过于狭隘的理解权力而限制了自己的认知。一个务实或常识性的现实主义者会考虑权力资源的全谱,包括思想、劝说和吸引力。过去的许多古典现实主义者比当代的一些后来者更好地理解了软实力的作用。

Realism represents a good first cut at portraying some aspects of international relations. But as we have seen, states are no longer the only important actors in global affairs; security is not the only major outcome that they seek, and force is not the only or always the best instrument available to achieve those outcomes. Indeed, these conditions of complex interdependence are typical of relations among advanced postindustrial countries such as the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, and Japan. Mutual democracy, liberal culture, and a deep network of transnational ties mean that anarchy has very different effects than realism predicts. In such conditions, a smart power strategy has a much higher mixture of the second and third faces of power
现实主义代表了在描述国际关系某些方面的良好首次尝试。但正如我们所见,国家已经不再是全球事务中唯一重要的参与者;安全不再是他们唯一追求的主要结果,武力也不是实现这些结果的唯一或最佳手段。事实上,这些复杂相互依存的条件是典型的出现在诸如美国、加拿大、欧洲、澳大利亚和日本等发达后工业国家之间的关系中。互利民主、自由文化和深厚的跨国纽带意味着无政府状态产生的效果并不像现实主义所预测的那样。在这种情况下,一个聪明的权力战略更多地体现了权力的第二和第三面向。

It is not solely in relations among advanced countries, however, that soft power plays an important role. In an information age, communications strategies become more important, and outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins but also by whose story wins. In the fight against terrorism, for example, it is essential to have a narrative that appeals to the mainstream and prevents its recruitment by radicals. In the battle against insurgencies, kinetic
软实力不仅在发达国家之间的关系中发挥重要作用。在信息时代,沟通策略变得更加重要,结果不仅取决于谁的军队获胜,也取决于谁的故事获胜。例如,在打击恐怖主义的斗争中,拥有一个吸引主流和阻止激进分子招募的叙事至关重要。在对抗叛乱的战斗中,动能行动 (kinetic action) 和软实力行动同等重要。
military force must be accompanied by soft power instruments that help to win over the hearts and minds (shape the preferences) of the majority of the population.
军事力量必须配合软实力工具,帮助赢得大多数人的心智(塑造偏好)。

Smart strategies must have an information and communications component. States struggle over the power to define norms, and framing of issues grows in importance. For instance, CNN and the BBC framed the issues of the First Gulf War in 1991, but by 2003 Al Jazeera was playing a large role in shaping the narrative in the Iraq War. Such framing is more than mere propaganda. In describing events in March 2003, we could say that American troops "entered Iraq" or that American troops "invaded Iraq." Both statements are true, but they have very different effects in terms of the power to shape preferences. Similarly, if we think of international institutions, it makes a difference if agendas are set in a Group of 8 with a few invited guests or in a Group of 20 equal invitees. These are just some examples of how the dimensions of the second and third faces of power are becoming more important in the global politics of an information age.
智慧策略必须包含信息和通信成分。国家在定义规范的权力上争论不休,议题框架的重要性也日益增加。例如,1991 年海湾战争期间,CNN 和 BBC 主导了话语权,而到 2003 年,半岛电视台在塑造伊拉克战争叙事中扮演了重要角色。这种框定不仅仅是简单的宣传。在描述 2003 年 3 月的事件时,我们可以说美国军队"进入伊拉克"或"入侵伊拉克"。这两个陈述都是真实的,但在塑造偏好的能力方面,它们产生了完全不同的效果。同样,如果我们考虑国际机构,如果议程是在少数国家邀请的八国集团中制定,还是在二十国集团的平等邀请下制定,也会产生不同的效果。这些只是信息时代全球政治中第二和第三面向权力的一些例子。

Some critics complain that the prevailing definition of soft power has become fuzzy through its expansion "to include both economic statecraft-used as both a carrot and as a stick-and even military power. . . . Soft power now seems to mean everything." But these critics are mistaken because they confuse the actions of a state seeking to achieve desired outcomes with the resources used to produce them. Many types of resources can contribute to soft power, but that does not mean that soft power is any type of behavior. The use of force, payment, and some agenda-setting based on them I call hard power. Agenda-setting that is regarded as legitimate by the target, positive attraction, and persuasion are the parts of the spectrum of behaviors I include in soft power. Hard power is push; soft power is pull. Fully defined, soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.
一些批评者抱怨,软实力的普遍定义已经变得模糊,它已经扩展到包括了"既作胡萝卜又作大棒的经济实力操纵,甚至还包括了军事力量。软实力现在似乎包含了任何东西。"但是这些批评者是错误的,因为他们将一个国家寻求实现预期结果的行动与用于产生这些结果的资源混淆了。许多类型的资源都可以有助于软实力,但这并不意味着软实力就是任何类型的行为。使用武力、支付以及部分基于它们的议程设置,我称之为硬实力。被目标视为合法的议程设置、积极的吸引力以及说服,是我包括在软实力范畴内的行为。硬实力是推动,软实力是吸引。完整地定义,软实力就是通过议程设置、说服和激发积极吸引力等协作手段来影响他人,从而获得首选结果的能力。

Here is a representation of a spectrum of power behaviors:
以下是一种权力行为光谱的表现形式：

In general, the types of resources associated with hard power include tangibles such as force and money. The types of resources associated with soft power often include intangible factors such as institutions, ideas, values, culture, and the perceived legitimacy of policies. But the relationship is not perfect. Intangible resources such as patriotism, morale, and legitimacy strongly affect the military capacity to fight and win. And threats to use force are intangible, even though they are a dimension of hard power.
一般而言,硬实力相关的资源类型包括诸如武力和金钱等有形因素。软实力相关的资源类型通常包括诸如制度、思想、价值观、文化以及政策的感知合法性等无形因素。但这种关系并非完美。爱国主义、士气和合法性等无形资源强烈影响军事能力的战斗和胜利。而威胁使用武力是无形的,尽管它是硬实力的一个维度。

If we remember the distinction between power resources and power behavior, we realize that the resources often associated with hard power behavior can also produce soft power behavior depending on the context and how they are used. Command power can create resources that in turn can create soft power at a later phasefor example, institutions that will provide soft power resources in the future. Similarly, co-optive behavior can be used to generate hard power resources in the form of military alliance or economic aid. A tangible hard power resource such as a military unit can produce both command behavior (by winning a battle) and co-optive behavior (by attracting) depending on how it is used. And because attraction depends upon the mind of the perceiver, the subject's perceptions play a significant role in whether given resources produce hard or soft power behavior.
如果我们记住权力资源和权力行为之间的区别,我们就会意识到,通常与硬实力行为相关的资源也可以根据上下文和使用方式产生软实力行为。指令权力可以创造资源,这些资源未来可以产生软实力。同样地,吸纳型行为可用于产生军事联盟或经济援助等硬实力资源。一个有形的硬实力资源,如军事单位,可以根据使用方式产生指令行为(通过赢得战斗)和吸纳行为(通过吸引)。而且,由于吸引依赖于感知者的心智,主体的感知在决定给定资源是产生硬实力还是软实力行为方面起着重要作用。

For example, naval forces can be used to win battles (hard power) or win hearts and minds (soft power) depending on what the target and what the issue are. The U.S. Navy's help in providing relief to
例如,海军力量可以用于赢得战斗(硬实力)或赢得人心(软实力),这取决于目标和问题的性质。美国海军提供救援援助

Indonesia after the 2004 East Asian tsunami had a strong effect on increasing Indonesians' attraction to the United States, and the U.S. Navy's 2007 Maritime Strategy referred not only to war-fighting but also to "maritime forces . . . employed to build confidence and trust among nations. Similarly, successful economic performance such as that of China can produce both the hard power of sanctions and restricted market access and the soft power of attraction and emulation of success.
2004 年东亚海啸后,印尼对美国的吸引力大大增强,2007 年美国海军的海事战略不仅涉及作战,还提到"海军力量...用于建立国与国之间的信任。同样,中国等成功的经济表现,可产生制裁和限制市场准入的硬实力,也可产生吸引力和成功效仿的软实力。
Some analysts have misinterpreted soft power as a synonym for culture and then gone on to downgrade its importance. For example, the historian Niall Ferguson describes soft power as "nontraditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods" and then dismisses it on the grounds that "it's, well, soft."54 Of course, eating at McDonald's or wearing a Michael Jackson shirt does not automatically indicate soft power. Militias can perpetrate atrocities or fight Americans while wearing Nikes and drinking Coca-Cola. But this criticism confuses the resources that may produce behavior with the behavior itself. Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favorable behavior depends upon the context and the skills of the agent in converting the resources into behavioral outcomes. Eating sushi, trading Pokemon cards, or hiring a Japanese pitcher (as the Boston Red Sox did) does not necessarily convey power to Japan. But this is not unique to soft power resources. Hav ing a larger tank army may produce victory if a battle is fought in a desert, but not if it is fought in a swamp. Similarly, a nice smile can be a soft power resource, and you may be more inclined to do something for me if I smile whenever we meet, but if I smile at your mother's funeral, it may destroy soft power rather than create it.
一些分析人士将软实力误解为文化的同义词,并进一步贬低其重要性。例如,历史学家奈尔·弗格森将软实力描述为"非传统力量,如文化和商业商品",然后却以"它很'软'而将其抛开。当然,在麦当劳就餐或穿迈克尔·杰克逊的 T 恤并不能自动表示软实力。民兵可以在穿着耐克、喝可口可乐的情况下犯下暴行或与美国人作战。但这种批评混淆了可能产生行为的资源与行为本身。拥有权力资源是否真正产生有利行为取决于背景和行为主体将资源转化为行为结果的技能。吃寿司、交易宠物小精灵卡或聘请日本投手(如波士顿红袜队所做的)并不一定传递给日本权力。但这并不是软实力资源所独有的。有更大的坦克军队可能会在沙漠中获胜,但在沼泽中则不会。同样,友好的微笑也可以成为软实力资源,如果我每次见到你都微笑,你可能会更愿意为我做些什么,但如果我在你母亲的葬礼上微笑,那可能会破坏而不是创造软实力。

As mentioned in the Preface, I developed the term "smart power" in 2004 to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy. I defined smart power as the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies. Unlike soft power, smart power is an evaluative as well as a descriptive concept. Soft power can be good or bad from a normative perspective, depending on how it is used. Smart power has the evaluation built into the definition. Critics who say "smart powerwhich can be dubbed Soft Power 2.0 -has superseded Soft Power 1.0 in the U.S. foreign policy lexicon" are simply mistaken. more accurate criticism is that because the concept (unlike that of soft power) has a normative dimension, it often lends itself to slogans, though that need not be the case.
我在前言中提到过,我在 2004 年提出了"智慧力量"这个概念,以消除软实力独立无法产生有效外交政策的错误认知。我将"智慧力量"定义为将硬实力和软实力资源结合为有效策略的能力。与软实力不同,智慧力量是一个既有评价性又有描述性的概念。从规范性角度来看,软实力可以是好的也可以是坏的,这取决于它的使用方式。而智慧力量的定义中就内置了评价维度。那些认为"智慧力量"(可称之为软实力 2.0)已经取代了"软实力 1.0"在美国外交政策词汇中的地位的批评者是完全错误的。更准确的批评是,由于这个概念(不像软实力)具有规范性的维度,它经常容易变成口号,但这并不是必然的。

Smart power is available to all states (and nonstate actors), not just the United States. For example, as we will see in Chapter 7 , small states have often developed smart power strategies. Norway, with 5 million people, has enhanced its attractiveness with legitimizing policies in peacemaking and development assistance, while also being an active and effective participant in NATO. And at the other extreme in terms of population size, China, a rising power in economic and military resources, has deliberately decided to invest in soft power resources so as to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbors and thus develop a smart strategy.
智慧力量可供所有国家(和非国家行为体)使用,不仅仅是美国。例如,我们将在第 7 章看到,小国家经常制定智慧力量策略。挪威拥有 500 万人口,通过参与和平缔造和发展援助等合法化政策增强了自身的吸引力,同时也是北约的积极和有效参与者。在人口规模方面处于另一个极端的中国,这个经济和军事资源不断增长的新兴大国,已经有意识地决定投资软实力资源,从而使其硬实力对邻国看起来不那么具有威胁性,从而制定智慧策略。

Smart power goes to the heart of the problem of power conversion. As we saw earlier, some countries and actors may be endowed with greater power resources than others, yet not be very effective in converting the full range of their power resources into strategies that produce the outcomes they seek. Some argue that with an inefficient eighteenth-century government structure, the United States is weak in power conversion. Others respond that much of American strength is generated outside of government by the nation's open economy and civil society. And it may be that power conversion is easier when a country has a surplus of assets and can afford to absorb the costs of mistakes. But the first steps to smart power and effective power-conversion strategies are understanding the full range of power resources and recognizing the problems of combining them effectively in various contexts.
智慧型权力触及到电力转换问题的核心。正如我们先前所见,一些国家和行动者可能拥有比其他人更丰富的权力资源,但却不能很好地将其全部权力资源转化为实现其所追求目标的策略。有人认为,由于拥有低效的 18 世纪政府结构,美国在权力转换方面较为薄弱。另一些人则回应,美国的很大部分实力是由其开放的经济和公民社会之外产生的。此外,当一个国家拥有过剩的资产并且能承担错误带来的成本时,权力转换可能会更加容易。但要实现智慧型权力和有效的权力转换策略,首先需要了解权力资源的全面范围,并认识到在各种情境中有效结合它们的问题。

Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes undercut each other, and good contextual intelligence is important in distinguishing how they interact in different situations. But it is a mistake to think of information campaigns in terms that misunderstand the essence of soft power. If we had to choose between having military or having soft power in world politics, we would opt for military power. But smart power suggests it is best to have both. "The military has to understand that soft power is more challenging to wield in terms of the application of military force-particularly if what that force is doing is not seen as attractive. If the levers of soft power are not pulling in the same direction, then the military often cannot create favorable conditions on its own.
硬实力和软实力有时会相互加强,有时会相互抵消,在不同情况下辨别它们的相互作用需要良好的情境智慧。但是,将信息宣传活动理解为误解软实力本质的方式是错误的。如果我们不得不在世界政治中选择军事力量还是软实力,我们会选择军事力量。但是智慧型实力表明拥有这两种力量是最好的。"军事力量必须明白,如果其所采取的行动不吸引人,那么软实力很难发挥作用。如果软实力的杠杆没有指向同一个方向,那么军事力量通常无法自行创造有利条件。

Early in 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said of the Bush administration's global war on terror, "In this war, some of the most critical battles may not be in the mountains of Afghanistan or the streets of Iraq but in newsrooms in New York, London, Cairo and elsewhere." As The Economist commented about Rumsfeld's speech, "Until recently he plainly regarded such a focus on 'soft power' as, well, soft-part of 'Old Europe's' appeasement of terrorism." Now he realized the importance of winning hearts and minds, but "a good part of his speech was focused on how with slicker PR America could win the propaganda war."58 Unfortunately, Rumsfeld forgot the first rule of advertising: If you have a poor product, not even the best advertising will sell it. He also forgot that the administration's poor power-conversion strategy was wasting both hard and soft power assets. The first step toward developing more effective smart power strategies starts with a fuller understanding of the types and uses of power.
在 2006 年初,国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德谈及布什政府全球反恐战争时说,"在这场战争中,最关键的战场可能不在阿富汗的山区或伊拉克的街道,而是在纽约、伦敦、开罗等新闻机构。"正如《经济学人》评论拉姆斯菲尔德的讲话时所言,"直到最近,他还将这种关注'软实力'视为'老欧洲'对恐怖主义的妥协。"现在他意识到赢得民心民意的重要性,但"他的讲话大部分集中在如何通过更出色的公关来赢得舆论战争。"不幸的是,拉姆斯菲尔德忘记了广告的第一条规则:如果产品质量不好,即使最出色的广告也无法销售。他也忘记了政府的低效率战略不仅浪费了硬实力,也浪费了软实力。制定更有效的综合实力战略的第一步是更全面地理解各种实力类型及其用途。

When most people speak or write about military power, they tend to think in terms of the resources that underlie the hard power behavior of fighting and threatening to fight-soldiers, tanks, planes, ships, and so forth. In the end, if push comes to shove, such military resources matter. Napoleon famously said that "God is on the side of the big battalions."
当大多数人谈论或写作关于军事力量时,他们往往会想到支撑打斗和威胁行为的硬实力资源-士兵、坦克、飞机、舰船等。最终,如果事态恶化,这些军事资源将变得重要。拿破仑有名的说道:"上帝偏向于拥有大军的一方。"

But military power needs a closer look. There is much more to military resources than guns and battalions and more to military behavior than fighting or threatening to fight. Military power resources have long been used to provide protection to allies and assistance to friends. Even the behavior of fighting on behalf of friends can engender soft power. As we saw in the last chapter, noncoercive and benign uses of military resources can be an important source of the soft power behavior of framing of agendas, persuasion, and attraction in world politics.
但是军事力量需要更仔细的审视。军事资源远不止枪支和营房,军事行为也远不限于战斗或威胁战斗。长期以来,军事力量资源一直被用于为盟友提供保护和对朋友提供援助。即使是代表朋友而战的行为也可能产生软实力。正如我们在上一章所看到的,对军事资源的非胁迫性和良性利用可能成为塑造议程、说服和吸引的软实力的重要来源,在世界政治中发挥重要作用。

Even when thinking only of fighting and threats, many people envisage interstate war between soldiers in uniforms, organized and equipped by the state in formal military units. But so far in the twenty-first century, more "wars" occur within, rather than between, states and many combatants do not wear uniforms. Of
即使只想到战争和威胁,很多人也会想象国家之间的战争,在军装中的士兵,由国家组织和装备的正式军事单位。但到目前为止,在 21 世纪,更多的"战争"发生在国家内部,而不是国家之间,许多战斗人员也不穿军装。