Everything You Wanted to Know About Trump’s Tariffs But Were Afraid to Ask
關於特朗普關稅的一切你想知道的但不敢問

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, the self-proclaimed “tariff man,” campaigned on the promise of ratcheting import duties as high as 60 percent against all goods from China, and perhaps 20 percent on everything from everywhere else. And he might be able to do it—including by drawing on little-remembered authorities from the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the previous nadir of U.S. trade policy.
美國當選總統唐納德・特朗普自稱為 “關稅人”，在競選中承諾對所有來自中國的商品加徵高達 60％的進口關稅，對其他地方的所有商品可能高達 20％。他可能做得到，包括利用人們很少記得的 1930 年史姆特 - 霍利關稅法的權限，這是美國貿易政策的前低谷。

Trump’s tariff plans are cheered by most of his economic advisers, who see them as a useful tool to rebalance an import-dependent U.S. economy. Most economists fear the inflationary impacts of sharply higher taxes on U.S. consumers and businesses, as well as the deliberate drag on economic growth that comes from making everything more expensive. Other countries are mostly confused, uncertain whether Trump’s tariff talk is just bluster to secure favorable trade deals for the United States, or if they’ll be more narrowly targeted or smaller than promised. Big economies, such as China and the European Union, are preparing their reprisals, just in case.
特朗普的關稅計劃受到大多數經濟顧問的歡呼，他們認為這是一個有用的工具，可以重新平衡依賴進口的美國經濟。大多數經濟學家擔心對美國消費者和企業徵收大幅度更高的稅收將帶來通脹的影響，以及通過使所有東西變得更昂貴而對經濟增長造成故意的拖累。其他國家大多感到困惑，不確定特朗普的關稅言談是否僅僅是為了為美國爭取有利的貿易協議，或者它們是否會比承諾的更為狹隘或更小。像中國和歐盟這樣的大經濟體正在準備采取報復措施，以防萬一。

What makes it hard for economists to model and other countries to understand is that nobody, even in Trump world, seems to know exactly why tariffs are on the table. Trump himself has suggested using tariffs as a replacement for the entirety of U.S. federal income tax revenue; at the very least, Trump and his braintrust are relying on enhanced tariff revenue to offset the falling revenues that will come from a renewal of his 2017 tax cuts, which are set to expire next year and are an early priority for the incoming administration. Congress could include its own tariffs as part of the tax bill, or it could defer to Trump and his own authority to raise tariffs.
經濟學家難以建模和其他國家難以理解的原因是，即使在特朗普的世界中，似乎也沒有人確切知道為什麼要提出關稅。特朗普本人曾建議將關稅作為美國聯邦所得稅收入的全部替代品；至少，特朗普和他的智囊團依賴增加的關稅收入來抵消將來自他 2017 年減稅方案的收入下降，這些減稅方案將在明年到期，是新政府的早期重點。國會可以將自己的關稅納入稅法草案，或者可以讓特朗普行使提高關稅的權力。

Either way, they appear to be coming.
無論如何，他們似乎正在接近。

It’s such an early priority, and tariffs are such a clear way to help pay for those tax cuts, that Trump’s former national security advisor, John Bolton, puts an early tariff-induced trade war at the top of his list of immediate concerns. “The first thing that worries me are the tariffs. We could have an economic crisis in the first six months of the administration,” he said.
這是一個非常重要的優先事項，關稅是一種明確的方式來幫助支付這些減稅，特朗普的前國家安全顧問約翰・博爾頓將由關稅引發的貿易戰置於他的即時關切事項之首。他說：“讓我擔心的第一件事是關稅。我們可能會在政府的前六個月內陷入經濟危機。”

But tariffs are also touted by Trump’s trade sherpas, such as former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, as a way to force manufacturing back to the United States by discouraging pricier imports. The more that plan works—and tariffs are a notoriously slow and inefficient way to juice domestic manufacturing—the less tariff revenue there will be.
但關稅也被特朗普的貿易謀士們所吹捧，例如前美國貿易代表萊特希澤（Robert Lighthizer），作為一種通過阻止價格較高的進口來迫使製造業回到美國的方式。該計劃越成功 —— 而關稅是一種出名緩慢且低效的刺激國內製造業的方式 —— 關稅收入就會越少。

And yet, tariffs are also described by those around Trump, and often seen as such abroad, as little more than a negotiating ploy to get better deals for U.S. exports. That was how they worked in a few instances in Trump’s first term, such as with Japan, and how they were meant to work but did not, such as with China. If tariffs are just a threatened big stick to get better trade terms for U.S. goods, then there won’t be tariff revenue to offset tax cuts, nor the spur to domestic manufacturing.
然而，特稅也被特朗普周圍的人描述，並且在國外也常被視為不過是一種談判手段，以獲得更好的美國出口交易。這就是特朗普第一個任期中在一些情況下的運作方式，比如與日本的情況，以及他們應該如何運作但卻沒有實現的情況，比如與中國的情況。如果特稅只是一種威脅性的大棒，用來為美國商品爭取更好的貿易條件，那麼就不會有特稅收入來抵銷減稅，也不會有刺激國內製造業的動力。

“What’s at war in all of this is that the president wants to pursue U.S. trading rights, and do his deals, and he wants the revenue from tariffs,” said Alan Wolff, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “How all that sorts out is anybody’s guess.”
“在這一切中發生的爭端是總統想要追求美國的貿易權利，進行他的交易，並且他想要從關稅中獲得收入，” 國際經濟學皮特森研究所的研究員艾倫・沃爾夫說。“這一切如何解決，任何人都無法預測。”

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The other natural question about a fresh round of record-high tariffs is the how. Since Congress, according to the Constitution, has authority over foreign commerce such as trade and tariffs, could Trump slap duties on goods from around the world by himself? The short answer is yes—but maybe not quite to the extent that he has promised.
對於一輪新一輪創紀錄的高關稅的另一個自然問題是如何。根據憲法，國會對外國商業，如貿易和關稅，擁有權限，特朗普能否獨自對來自世界各地的商品徵收關稅？簡短的答案是肯定的，但也許不完全符合他所承諾的程度。

For nearly a century, Congress has delegated expansive trade authority to the executive branch, and the courts are already examining some alleged overreach; a bigger batch of tariffs would almost certainly invite fresh legal challenges.
近一個世紀來，國會已將廣泛的貿易權限委派給行政部門，法院已經在審查一些被指控的過度行為；更多的關稅幾乎肯定會引發新的法律挑戰。

But Trump would have four powerful tools at his disposal to levy tariffs, two of which he has used before. These once-obscure provisions of decades-old trade legislation will likely be where the rubber meets the road in terms of Trump’s frontal challenge to the global trading order.
但特朗普將擁有四種強大的工具來徵收關稅，其中兩種是他以前使用過的。這些曾經默默無聞的數十年前貿易立法的條款很可能是特朗普對全球貿易秩序正面挑戰的關鍵所在。

The easiest one is the one he turned to in order to put tariffs on imports from China in his first term. The so-called Section 301 provisions of the 1974 Trade Act (there are actually several sections under 301) allow the president to put tariffs on countries that engage in unfair or discriminatory practices. China fit the bill in Trump’s first term, for its state subsidies, currency manipulation, theft of intellectual property, and more. The Biden administration has also used Section 301 to add further tariffs on China, including the last round of duties on electric vehicle imports, solar panels, and the like.
最簡單的方法是他在第一個任期中轉向的方法，以對來自中國的進口商品徵收關稅。 1974 年貿易法案的所謂第 301 條款（實際上有幾個 301 條款）允許總統對從事不公平或歧視性做法的國家徵收關稅。 在特朗普的第一個任期中，中國符合這一條款，因為其國家補貼、貨幣操縱、知識產權盜竊等行為。 拜登政府也利用第 301 條款對中國加徵進一步的關稅，包括最後一輪對電動車進口、太陽能板等商品的關稅。

Trump could simply raise the tariff level under that existing authority if he wants to target all Chinese exports to the United States.
特朗普如果想要針對所有中國出口到美國的商品，他可以通過現有的權限來提高關稅水平。

“Using 301 would be easy to do. Trump could wake up and not like breakfast, and put 60 percent tariffs on China. It’s instant and easy,” said Wolff, previously the deputy director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a U.S. trade official before that.
“使用 301 條款將會很容易。沃爾夫（Wolff）曾是世界貿易組織（WTO）副總幹事，之前也是美國貿易官員，他說：「特朗普可能醒來不喜歡早餐，就對中國加徵 60% 的關稅。這是即時且容易的。」”

The other tool Trump turned to before might not be so useful this time. Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act gives the president the authority to use tariffs to protect national security; that was how Trump raised tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in his first term, even from close allies.
特朗普在此之前可能不會再使用的另一個工具。1962 年《貿易擴張法》第 232 條賦予總統使用關稅保護國家安全的權限；這就是特朗普在第一個任期中提高鋼鋁進口關稅的方式，即使對象是親密盟友。

The problem with using (and abusing) Section 232 is that the administration has to at least make the case that the protected products are crucial to national security, through a determination from the Commerce and Defense departments. That was just doable with steel, but more specious when it came to protecting beer cans, construction rebar, and Pennsylvania votes.
使用（和濫用）第 232 條的問題在於，政府至少必須證明受保護的產品對國家安全至關重要，通過商務部和國防部的裁定。這在鋼鐵方面是可行的，但在保護啤酒罐、建築鋼筋和賓夕法尼亞州選票時就顯得牽強了。

Using the national security exception also rankles the WTO—not that the United States, under any administration, has ever cared. But other countries did file complaints against abuses of that national-security exception, which may very well have gone somewhere if successive U.S. administrations had not defanged the WTO’s ability to hear and adjudicate trade disputes.
使用國家安全例外條款也激怒了世界貿易組織，不過美國在任何政府下從未在意過。但其他國家確實對濫用該國家安全例外條款提出投訴，如果美國歷屆政府沒有削弱世貿組織審理和裁決貿易爭端的能力，這些投訴很可能會有所作為。

What’s either encouraging or alarming is that Trump has two additional authorities to impose tariffs that he has not tapped yet.
特朗普有兩個尚未使用的權限可以徵收關稅，這既令人鼓舞又令人擔憂。

The first superpower comes from the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which gives the president sweeping and nearly unchecked powers to impose sanctions, fight cyber crime, punish foreign election interference—and, potentially—levy tariffs. (It hasn’t ever been used that way, though former U.S. President Richard Nixon, in so many ways Trump’s trailblazer, used precursor legislation for his 1971 shock tariffs.)
第一個超級大國來自 1977 年的《國際緊急經濟權力法案》（IEEPA），該法賦予總統廣泛且幾乎無限制的權力，可以實施制裁、打擊網絡犯罪、懲罰外國選舉干預，以及可能徵收關稅。（儘管從未以這種方式使用過，但前美國總統理查德・尼克松，在許多方面都是特朗普的先驅者，曾利用 1971 年的先驅性立法實施震撼性關稅。）

All it requires is a presidential determination that there is a national economic emergency—there were nearly a dozen such in Trump’s first term—for the White House to be able to impose tariffs as a remedy.
只需要總統確定存在國家經濟緊急情況 —— 在特朗普的第一任期中幾乎有十幾個這樣的情況 —— 白宮就可以實施關稅作為一種補救措施。

IEEPA could be an option “if he wants to move earlier,” Wolff said. “None of the other delegated authorities ever contemplated an entire tariff schedule set by the president, but if there is a ‘national emergency,’ and he puts a tariff on everything, would the Supreme Court find that credible? It’s possible.”
IEEPA 可能是一個選擇，“如果他想提前行動的話，” 沃爾夫說。“其他轉授權機構從未考慮過總統設定整個關稅表，但如果出現‘國家緊急情況’，並且他對所有產品徵收關稅，最高法院會認為這可信嗎？這是可能的。”

But the real break-the-glass moment for Trump’s tariff plans would hearken back to the last big (and cautionary) foray by Congress into throttling trade as a way to pacify restless voters, the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, whose most frightening provisions remain on the books.
但對特朗普關稅計劃的真正突破性時刻將回溯到國會最後一次大規模（並且警示性的）干預貿易以平息不安選民的行動，即臭名昭著的 1930 年斯穆特 - 霍利關稅法案，其最令人恐懼的規定仍然有效。

Section 338 of the 1930 law would allow the president, with only a cursory determination and with unilateral authority, to slap tariffs of up to 50 percent on goods from any country that treat the United States unfairly or restrict U.S. goods in any way. If the harms continue, Section 338 allows the president to prohibit the import of those goods altogether.
1930 年法律第 338 條允許總統僅需簡單判斷並具有單方面權限，對任何不公平對待美國或以任何方式限制美國商品的國家商品徵收高達 50％的關稅。如果損害持續，第 338 條允許總統完全禁止進口這些商品。

Most economists agree that Smoot-Hawley’s steep tariff increases at the start of an economic downturn—tariffs that were quickly matched by trading partners—made the Great Depression worse; global trade cratered by the mid-1930s. The bill that made a depression great could help Trump make his recession even greater.
大多數經濟學家一致認為，斯穆特 - 霍利在經濟衰退初期實施的高關稅增加措施 —— 這些關稅很快被貿易夥伴所匹配 —— 使大蕭條變得更糟；到了 1930 年代中期，全球貿易急劇下降。使一場蕭條變得嚴重的法案可能會幫助特朗普使他的衰退變得更加嚴重。

This brings Congress back into play. The election of Sen. John Thune as Senate majority leader has raised some hopes that a vestigial free-trade wing of the Republican Party remains alive and could act as a check on Trump’s ability to reach for tariffs. Thune has warned that tariffs will lead to inflation and prefers free trade that could find more, not fewer, outlets for farm goods like those from his home state of South Dakota. A desire to avoid the kind of punishment China doled out to U.S. agricultural exports in Trump’s first term might encourage some GOP senators to reclaim some trade authority (though Trump used tariff revenues to mollify battered farmers and ranchers).
這將使國會再次發揮作用。參議員約翰・東恩當選為參議院多數黨領袖，引起了一些希望，認為共和黨中殘存的自由貿易派仍然存在，並且可能作為一個制約特朗普尋求關稅的能力的力量。東恩警告說，關稅將導致通脹，並且更傾向於自由貿易，可以為農產品開拓更多而不是更少的市場，比如他的家鄉南達科他州的農產品。一些共和黨參議員可能會希望避免中國在特朗普第一個任期對美國農產品實施的懲罰，以此來重新爭取一些貿易權力（盡管特朗普使用關稅收入來安撫受打擊的農民和牧場主）。

Congress has lately taken some steps to reassert its authority over trade matters, in both chambers, though more to restrict trade than to free it. Sen. Tom Cotton and Rep. John Moolenaar have proposed legislation in their respective chambers that would strip China of its normal trading relations with the United States and legislate stiffer tariffs on goods from China, though leaving future tariff adjustments up to the president.
國會最近已採取一些措施，重新確立其對貿易事項的權威，雖然更多的是為了限制貿易而不是解放貿易。參議員湯姆・科頓和眾議員約翰・穆倫納爾分別在各自的議院提出了立法草案，該草案將剝奪中國與美國的正常貿易關係，並對來自中國的商品立法實施更嚴格的關稅，儘管未來的關稅調整將由總統決定。

If Congress wanted to constrain Trump, it could limit the size and scope of his existing tariff authorities, though that would require buy-in from the more protectionist House of Representatives and a fight with a newly-elected president. It could also pass legislation to put certain limits on other authorities, such as IEEPA, in order to curtail executive powers.
如果國會想要限制特朗普，它可以限制他現有的關稅權力的規模和範圍，儘管這將需要更多保護主義的眾議院的支持，以及與新當選總統的爭執。它也可以通過立法對其他權力，如 IEEPA，設定某些限制，以限制行政權力。

But with renewed tax cuts—and the tariffs to pay for them—an early priority, time is of the essence. If Congress aims to reassert its trade authority, it better do so soon.
但隨著重新實施減稅措施和為此支付關稅成為一個早期重點，時間就變得至關重要。如果國會旨在重新確立其貿易權威，最好趕快這樣做。