In China: The 100-Year Storm on the Horizon and How the Five Big Forces Are Playing Out
在中国：一百年风暴即将来临以及五股力量如何发挥作用

A few years ago, President Xi Jinping started warning that a 100-year big storm is coming. As is typical of the early days of a hurricane, one can now feel it. The circumstances and the mood in China have indisputably changed to become more threatening. These changes are mostly due to big cycle forces.
几年前，习近平主席开始警告百年一遇的大风暴即将来临。正如飓风早期的典型情况一样，人们现在可以感觉到它。毫无疑问，中国的情况和情绪已经发生变化，变得更具威胁性。这些变化主要是由于大周期的力量。

The most joyous and productive environments are ones that have freedom, civility, and creativity, and ones in which people can make their dreams into great realities with prosperity that is shared by most people. This happened in China from around 1980 until around five years ago. It is quite typical for such booms to produce debt bubbles and big wealth gaps that lead the booms to turn into bubbles that turn into busts. That happened in China at the same time as the global great power conflict intensified, so China is now in the post-bubble and great power conflict part of the Big Cycle that is driven by the five big forces that have changed the mood and the environment. In this piece, I will first describe in brief how the Big Cycle has transpired over roughly the past century, and then I will explain the current picture of what is happening today, with a focus on the challenges that China is facing. This history and these dynamics are complex and important to world history and the global order—everything I write here is how I see it based on my own experience, relationships, and research.
最快乐、最富有成效的环境是自由、文明、创造力的环境，是人们能够将梦想变成伟大现实、大多数人共享繁荣的环境。从1980年左右到五年前，这种情况在中国发生过。 这种繁荣会产生债务泡沫和巨大的贫富差距，从而导致繁荣转变为泡沫，进而导致萧条，这是很典型的情况。这种情况发生在中国，同时全球大国冲突加剧，因此中国现在正处于由五大力量驱动的大周期的后泡沫和大国冲突部分，改变了情绪和环境。在这篇文章中，我将首先简要描述近一个世纪以来大周期是如何发生的，然后我将解释当前正在发生的情况，重点是中国面临的挑战。这段历史和这些动态对于世界历史和全球秩序来说是复杂而重要的——我在这里写的所有内容都是我根据自己的经验、关系和研究得出的看法。

How the Big Cycle in China Transpired to Create the Conditions from the Beginning of the PRC Through the Current Conditions 
中国的大循环是如何发生的，从建国之初创造了条件到现在的条件

• In the 1930-45 period, there was the last 100-year big storm, which was driven classically by the confluence of 1) a debt bust that triggered a global depression, 2) a civil war in China between the rich rightist-capitalists and the poor leftist-communists (which ended in 1949 when the Communists won), 3) an international great power conflict-war that ended in 1945 when the United States (and, to a much lesser extent, Great Britain and Russia) won, creating the American-led world order, 4) many disruptive acts of nature, and 5) big technological changes. That period ended in the classic ways they end, with a debt and economic collapse, one side winning over the other in the great international war and the new world order beginning (in 1945), and one side winning over the other in the civil war and the new domestic order beginning (in 1949).
  1930-45 年间，出现了最后 100 年的大风暴，其典型原因是：1）债务危机引发了全球萧条，2）中国富有的右翼资本家和右派资本家之间的内战。可怜的左翼共产主义者（这场战争于 1949 年共产党获胜时结束），3) 一场国际大国冲突战争于 1945 年结束，当时美国（以及较小程度上的英国和俄罗斯）获胜，创造了美国领导的世界秩序，4）许多破坏性的自然行为，以及5）重大的技术变革。那段时期以经典的方式结束：债务和经济崩溃，一方在伟大的国际战争中战胜了另一方，新的世界秩序开始了（1945年），一方在内战中战胜了另一方以及新的国内秩序的开始（1949年）。
• From 1949 (the year the new domestic order was created via the PRC being formed) until 1978 (the year Deng Xiaoping came to power), there was a typical post-war consolidation period led by Mao in the way he wanted via a domestic economic policy that was communist, a domestic political policy that was oppressive (dictatorial and designed to purge the opposition), and a foreign policy that was isolationist. That and big disruptive acts of nature led to many big challenges and big bad periods and few economic and technological advances. Mao and that era died in 1976. 
  从1949年（中华人民共和国成立，国内新秩序建立的那一年）到1978年（邓小平上台那一年），有一个典型的战后巩固时期，毛泽东按照他想要的方式通过国内经济共产主义政策，压迫性的国内政治政策（独裁且旨在清除反对派），以及孤立主义的外交政策。这种巨大的破坏性自然行为导致了许多巨大的挑战和严重的困难时期，以及很少的经济和技术进步。毛泽东和那个时代于1976年消亡。
• When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he reduced the one-man control and repressions, increased collective leadership, replaced hardcore autocratic communism with more free markets and increasingly larger doses of capitalism, and opened China up to foreigners to learn and earn from them. It was like sprinkling water on fertile ground that led to a great blossoming. From 1978 until Xi came to power, there was a classic capitalist rejuvenation that led to a boom in which the economy, living standards, and debt all grew greatly. At the same time, China was not perceived by other countries to be a threat to the leading great power (the United States) and its world order. As a result, China had a joyous and productive environment in which there was a relatively large increase in freedom, civility, and creativity, and in which people could make their dreams into great realities and most people benefited, though the rich benefited more than the poor. As is typically the case, these policies also produced greater wealth gaps and greater amounts of corruption. That began to end when Xi came to power, not because he came to power but because of where China was in its Big Cycle and how the new leadership approached it. 
  1978年邓小平上台后，他减少了个人控制和镇压，加强了集体领导，用更多的自由市场和越来越大的资本主义取代了铁杆专制共产主义，并向外国人开放了中国，让他们向外国人学习和赚钱。 。就像把水浇在肥沃的土地上，就会开出灿烂的花朵。 从1978年到习近平上台，出现了一场典型的资本主义复兴，带来了经济、生活水平和债务大幅增长的繁荣。与此同时，其他国家并不认为中国对领先大国（美国）及其世界秩序构成威胁。结果，中国有了一个欢乐而富有成效的环境，自由度、文明性、创造力都有较大提高，人们可以把自己的梦想变成伟大的现实，大多数人受益，但富人受益更多。贫穷的。与通常的情况一样，这些政策也造成了更大的贫富差距和更多的腐败。当习近平上台后，这种情况开始结束，不是因为他上台，而是因为中国处于大周期的哪个位置以及新领导层如何处理它。
• When President Xi came to power in 2012, a roughly 11-year transition began that brought China from what it was like in 2012 to what it is like today. I was lucky to see it up close. At the start of his presidency, Xi and the leadership’s main goals were to reform the economy and eliminate corruption. For most of Xi’s first five-year term there was a) still an openness to outside thinking, b) a strong desire to further reform the economy by making it more market-driven and building and reforming the capital markets, and c) strong actions taken to eliminate corruption. The senior leaders chosen were the ones who were inclined to do those things. Of course, how to do these things was debated and some people benefited from the changes while others were hurt by them, so in Xi’s first term there was a movement to consolidate power via a move to “core leadership.” This became most clear in the leadership changes that accompanied the shift from the first to the second five-year term under Xi. In 2015, Xi put out his bold 2025 plan, which was viewed as aspirational by the Chinese and threatening by Americans. China could no longer “hide power.” Americans viewed the Chinese as a threat. By the time Donald Trump came to power in 2017 and Xi began his second term in 2017, the great power conflict had begun. In 2019-20, COVID-19 emerged. At the same time, the debt bubble and the wealth gaps had grown—so the classic convergence of forces led to the formation of the “100-year big storm.” In 2021, about halfway through Xi’s second term, China’s domestic debt bubble burst and the international great power conflict intensified. At the beginning of Xi’s third term in October 2022, China’s leadership changed from reform-minded globalists to loyal communist nationalists, and purges and crackdowns ensued, which brings us up until now. I will soon describe what things now look like, but before I do, I want to drive home the point about how the Big Cycle is playing a big role in driving what has happened. 
  当习主席于 2012 年上台时，中国开始了大约 11 年的过渡，将中国从 2012 年的样子变成了今天的样子。我很幸运能够近距离看到它。在就任国家主席之初，习近平和领导层的主要目标是改革经济和消除腐败。在习近平第一个五年任期的大部分时间里，a) 仍然对外界思想持开放态度，b) 强烈渴望进一步改革经济，使其更加市场化，建设和改革资本市场，c) 采取强有力的行动采取措施消除腐败。被选中的高级领导人是那些愿意做这些事情的人。当然，如何做这些事情是有争议的，一些人受益，另一些人受到伤害，所以在习近平的第一个任期内，出现了通过“核心领导”来巩固权力的运动。这一点在习近平的第一个五年任期转向第二个五年任期期间的领导层变动中表现得最为明显。 2015年，习近平提出了大胆的2025计划，该计划被中国人视为抱负，但被美国人视为威胁。中国不能再“隐藏实力”。美国人将中国人视为威胁。当唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump) 于 2017 年上台、习近平于 2017 年开始其第二个任期时，大国冲突已经开始。 2019-20 年，新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 出现。与此同时，债务泡沫和贫富差距扩大——因此经典的力量汇聚导致了“100年大风暴”的形成。 2021年，习近平第二任期过半，中国国内债务泡沫破灭，国际大国冲突加剧。 2022 年 10 月，习近平第三个任期开始时，中国的领导层从具有改革思想的全球主义者转变为忠诚的共产主义民族主义者，清洗和镇压随之而来，这让我们走到了现在。我很快就会描述现在的情况，但在此之前，我想强调一下大周期如何在推动所发生的事情中发挥重要作用。

The Hand Xi Was Dealt and How He Is Choosing to Play That Hand
Xi 的牌局以及他如何选择打这手牌

A Chinese leader, historian, and friend of mine told me several years ago that the conditions of the times create the type of leader that emerges because the evolutionary process pulls out the leader who suits the environment. In other words, how the times are transpiring determines the leader even more than the leader determines how the times are going. He gave me the book The Role of the Individual in History by the Russian political philosopher Georgi Plekhanov, which you might find interesting. When Henry Kissinger was writing his book on leadership and we talked about what makes a great leader, he made the same point—that what made a great leader at the time depended on what was needed at the time. For example, Konrad Adenauer (Germany’s chancellor immediately after World War II) was a great leader for a country that was defeated after a war because he knew how to be both deferential and pushy enough to deal with both 1) the dominant powers that Germany had just came out of a horrendous war with and 2) a domestic population that was defeated and destroyed in most ways. My point is that what is happening now and Xi’s leadership must be looked at within the context of the Big Cycle. In other words, it is important to distinguish between the hand that Xi was dealt and how he has been choosing to play it. It is also important to understand what is happening now and how Xi is playing his hand without judging these things, because judging them can stand in the way of understanding them. My goal is only to understand what’s happening and what’s likely to happen, and I don’t want to let judgments stand in the way of doing that.
一位中国领导人、历史学家和我的朋友几年前告诉我，时代条件创造了出现的领导者类型，因为进化过程会淘汰出适合环境的领导者。换句话说，时代如何发展决定领导者，胜过领导者决定时代如何发展。 他给了我俄罗斯政治哲学家格奥尔基·普列汉诺夫写的《个人在历史中的作用》一书，你可能会觉得有趣。当亨利·基辛格（Henry Kissinger）写他关于领导力的书时，我们讨论了什么造就了伟大的领导者，他提出了同样的观点——什么造就了伟大的领导者取决于当时的需要。例如，康拉德·阿登纳（康拉德·阿登纳，二战后不久的德国总理）对于一个战败国来说是一位伟大的领导人，因为他知道如何既恭敬又咄咄逼人，以应对以下两个问题：1）德国拥有的主导力量刚刚结束一场可怕的战争，2）国内人口在大多数方面都被击败和摧毁。我的观点是，必须在大周期的背景下看待现在正在发生的事情和习近平的领导。 换句话说，区分习近平所拿到的牌和他选择如何打牌是很重要的。同样重要的是要了解现在正在发生的事情以及习近平在不评判这些事情的情况下如何行事，因为评判它们可能会妨碍理解它们。我的目标只是了解正在发生的事情以及可能发生的事情，我不想让判断成为这样做的障碍。

As I see it, the template to keep in mind is that capitalism (with or without “Chinese characteristics”) produces credit that creates spending power, which when used well unleashes creativity and prosperity, which produces the upward wave in the cycle. But it also inevitably creates a lot of debt and wealth gaps, and when the debt becomes too large to pay off and there are big wealth gaps, that causes the cycle to reverse. When there is a lot of debt and big wealth gaps at the same time as there are great domestic and international power conflicts and/or great disruptive changes in nature (like droughts, floods, and pandemics, which China is especially prone to) and great changes in technology, there is an increased likelihood of a “100-year big storm.” That is the current environment in China. Destiny put Xi in the position he is in, and how he plays his hand will reflect where he is coming from, motivating him to do what he does, which will have a big influence on what happens.
在我看来，要记住的模板是，资本主义（有或没有“中国特色”）产生的信贷创造了消费能力，如果使用得当，可以释放创造力和繁荣，从而在周期中产生向上的波浪。但它也不可避免地造成大量债务和贫富差距，当债务太大而无法偿还且贫富差距巨大时，就会导致循环逆转。 当存在大量债务和巨大贫富差距，同时存在巨大的国内和国际权力冲突和/或巨大的破坏性自然变化（如干旱、洪水和流行病，中国特别容易发生）和巨大的经济损失时，随着技术的变化，发生“100年大风暴”的可能性增加。 这就是中国目前的环境。命运把习近平放在了他现在的位置上，他的出手方式将反映出他从哪里来，激励他去做他所做的事情，这将对发生的事情产生很大的影响。

History shows that in all countries through all times during these very difficult 100-year-storm-like periods, leaders go to much more autocratic policies because the alternative becomes great internal conflict and disorder, and typically there are forced changes of leadership that those in power fight against. This is especially true in the Chinese culture. Losing the “mandate of heaven” is something everyone is aware of. A Chinese scholar told me that 38% of China’s emperors died of unnatural causes while in power. There are many dynasties that went through such big storm periods and different philosophies that emperors used to guide them. “Legalism” is the belief that people are motivated by self-interest, especially during difficult times, so they must be required to strictly follow the emperor and his rules, especially big storm periods. The legalist approach with Marxist/Maoist characteristics appears to be the approach Xi has chosen. To be clear, I don’t think that what it is exactly is clear to either non-policy makers or policy makers. They appear to be figuring out the “dialectic.” For example, I know that entrepreneurship and open markets remain much more open than my characterization of a legalist approach with Marxist/Maoist characteristics would seem to imply.
历史表明，在所有国家的任何时候，在这些非常困难的100年风暴般的时期，领导人都会采取更加专制的政策，因为否则就会导致巨大的内部冲突和混乱，而且通常会强制更换领导层权力斗争。在中国文化中尤其如此。失去“天命”，是所有人都知道的事情。一位中国学者告诉我，中国38%的皇帝在位期间死于非自然原因。许多朝代都经历过如此大的风暴时期，皇帝们也用不同的哲学来指导他们。 “法家”相信人们都是出于自身利益的动机，特别是在困难时期，因此必须要求他们严格遵守皇帝和他的规则，特别是在大风暴时期。具有马克思主义/毛主义特征的法家方法似乎是习近平所选择的方法。需要明确的是，我认为非政策制定者或政策制定者都不清楚它到底是什么。他们似乎正在找出“辩证法”。例如，我知道企业家精神和开放市场仍然比我对具有马克思主义/毛主义特征的法家方法的描述所暗示的开放得多。

While people can debate the merits of Xi and the Chinese government creating a fearful and strict-control environment to get people to behave the way the government wants them to behave, just as people can debate the merits of the American government’s more democratic and disorderly approach, it is more important to see what’s happening as objectively as possible than to be quick to pass judgments on it. Here is the current picture of what is happening as I see it.
人们可以争论习近平和中国政府创造一个可怕和严格控制的环境，让人们按照政府希望的方式行事的优点，就像人们可以争论美国政府更加民主和无序的做法的优点一样，尽可能客观地看待正在发生的事情比快速做出判断更重要。这是我所看到的当前正在发生的情况。

The Current Picture of What Is Happening in China
中国现状

I will describe this in terms of what I see as the five big forces that drive the changing world order and tend to evolve in big cycles. They are: how well the economic system works, how well the internal order works within countries, and how well the world order works between countries, along with acts of nature and technology.
我将用我所认为的推动不断变化的世界秩序并倾向于以大周期发展的五大力量来描述这一点。它们是：经济体系的运作情况、国家内部秩序的运作情况、国家之间的世界秩序以及自然和技术行为的运作情况。

1. There are big debt and economic problems that are depressing economic activity, prices, and psychology. Domestically, it is a very difficult time for China financially because many people are suffering the negative wealth effects of falling a) real estate prices, b) equity and other asset prices, c) employment, and d) employee compensation. Also, there are debt and financial problems that exist in many companies and many local governments that are drags, which, if not properly dealt with, will have bad consequences for a long time. These things have contributed to the mood having become more dour.
   巨大的债务和经济问题正在抑制经济活动、价格和心理。在国内，中国的经济正处于非常困难的时期，因为许多人正在遭受a）房地产价格、b）股票和其他资产价格、c）就业和d）员工薪酬下跌带来的负面财富效应。 此外，很多企业和很多地方政府都存在债务和财务问题，这些问题如果处理不好，将在很长一段时间内产生不良后果。 这些事情导致情绪变得更加阴郁。

How should these problems be dealt with? To me, as a macroeconomic thinker who approaches such debt and economic problems more like a doctor than an ideologue, the leadership needs to have a debt restructuring, which it should do via engineering a beautiful deleveraging (see my book Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises, which I’m giving you here for free if you’re interested in delving into what that looks like) or it will have a “lost decade” like Japan’s. While many people think policy makers should ease monetary policy to create more credit, I think they correctly view creating more credit and debt like giving an alcoholic a drink to help ease withdrawal problems. I believe that they should engineer both 1) a deleveraging (which is deflationary, depressing, and will reduce the debt burden) and 2) an easing of monetary policy (which is inflationary, stimulative, and will ease the debt burden) so that the deflationary ways of reducing debt and the inflationary ways of doing it balance. This is what I mean by a “beautiful deleveraging.” In my opinion, this should have been done two years ago and if not done will probably lead to a lost decade. I think some of the economic leaders, especially those who did this under Zhu Rongji, understand how to do this, but it is very difficult and politically dangerous to do because it engineers big changes in wealth, which is politically challenging, especially during a difficult time because people squawk. In my opinion, if the leadership doesn’t execute a beautiful deleveraging, China will have a Japanese-style lost decade with Marxist characteristics.
这些问题应该如何处理呢？对我来说，作为一个宏观经济思想家，他更像是一位医生而不是一位理论家来处理此类债务和经济问题，领导层需要进行债务重组，而这应该通过设计一个漂亮的去杠杆化来实现（参见我的书《应对大债务危机的原则》） ，如果你有兴趣深入研究它是什么样的，我在这里免费给你）否则它将有一个像日本一样的“失去的十年”。虽然许多人认为政策制定者应该放松货币政策以创造更多信贷，但我认为他们正确地认为创造更多信贷和债务就像喝一杯酒来帮助缓解提款问题一样。我认为他们应该同时设计 1) 去杠杆化（通缩、抑制并减轻债务负担）和 2) 放松货币政策（通胀、刺激并减轻债务负担），以便减少债务的通货紧缩方式和平衡债务的通货膨胀方式。这就是我所说的“漂亮的去杠杆化”。我认为，这件事在两年前就应该做，如果不做，很可能会导致失去的十年。我认为一些经济领导人，特别是朱镕基领导下的那些人，知道如何做到这一点，但这样做非常困难，而且在政治上很危险，因为它会导致财富的巨大变化，这在政治上具有挑战性，尤其是在困难时期。时间，因为人们尖叫。在我看来，如果领导层不执行漂亮的去杠杆，中国将会经历一个具有马克思主义特征的日本式的失去的十年。

The aging population issue is a heavy weight for those who are old, for their children, and for the government’s finances and social issues. The average age of retirement is 53 and the average age of death is 84, so people without incomes have to be taken care of for 31 years on average. This is made more difficult because the previous one-child policy means that one person has to take care of two parents. This has been a depressant in the mood and the financial situation. While the retirement age should be raised and a social support system including old-age care should be improved, neither is happening at an adequate pace. That is mostly because people don’t want their retirement ages to rise so doing that is politically untenable and because the government bureaucracy is moving very slowly, especially now that most government officials are reluctant to take bold actions because those can be politically disruptive (as they were in other countries, most notably France) and people squawk, so it takes courage. Also, with the workforce declining and old people getting ill and passing away, this is burdensome and depressing. Once again, this is likely to remain a burden unless the government deals with it in a more forceful way.
人口老龄化问题对于老年人、对于子女、对于政府的财政和社会问题都是一个沉重的负担。平均退休年龄为53岁，平均死亡年龄为84岁，因此没有收入的人平均需要被照顾31年。这变得更加困难，因为以前的一胎政策意味着一个人必须照顾两个父母。这对情绪和财务状况都是一种抑制。虽然应该提高退休年龄并改善包括养老护理在内的社会支持系统，但两者的进展速度都不够。这主要是因为人们不希望提高退休年龄，因此这样做在政治上是站不住脚的，而且政府官僚机构的行动非常缓慢，特别是现在大多数政府官员不愿意采取大胆的行动，因为这些行动可能会造成政治破坏（如他们在其他国家，尤其是法国），人们会大声叫嚷，所以这需要勇气。此外，随着劳动力的减少和老年人的生病和去世，这是负担和令人沮丧的。除非政府以更有力的方式处理，否则这可能仍然是一个负担。

2. The internal wealth gap and the resulting conflict over wealth and values are intensifying, which is fear-inducing. The internal wealth gap has led to the government’s push for common prosperity and government-directed, seemingly arbitrary rather than rule-based actions. These moves appear to some people to be anti-capitalist, while to others they are simply the government’s messages to people to stay out of politics and do what the leadership wants them to do to help society. In any case, it’s fear-inducing and oppressive, especially for the capitalist elites. On a recent trip to China, my Chinese friends reminded me that throughout Chinese history, it’s typically been the case that you can’t be rich and be a government official. The merchant-capitalist who sought financial gain was traditionally assumed to be dangerously greedy and easily corruptible, and not allowed to be in government. It wasn’t until 2002 that these merchant-capitalists were allowed to become Communist Party members. That was during the reformist period. Now it is no longer as “glorious to be rich.” As is increasingly the case around the world but more so in China, there is a greater inclination to think that the rich are selfish and corrupt. Purging and rooting out corruption is also going on in most areas, perhaps most notably in the military. In other words, it’s a time of big policing and strict enforcing of what should be done and how people should behave that has become threatening to some.
2、内部贫富差距及其引发的财富和价值观冲突加剧，令人恐惧。内部贫富差距导致政府推动共同繁荣和政府主导、看似武断而非基于规则的行动。这些举措在一些人看来是反资本主义的，而在另一些人看来，它们只是政府向人们发出的信息，要求他们远离政治，做领导层希望他们做的事情来帮助社会。无论如何，它都会引起恐惧和压迫，特别是对于资本主义精英来说。在最近的一次中国之行中，我的中国朋友提醒我，纵观中国历史，典型的情况是你不可能既富有又当政府官员。传统上，寻求经济利益的商业资本家被认为是危险的贪婪和容易腐败的人，并且不被允许进入政府。直到2002年，这些商业资本家才被允许成为共产党员。那是在改良主义时期。现在不再是“富有光荣”了。世界各地的情况越来越多，但在中国更是如此，人们更倾向于认为富人自私和腐败。大多数领域也正在进行清洗和根除腐败行为，也许最引人注目的是军队。换句话说，这是一个大规模警务和严格执行应该做什么以及人们应该如何行为的时代，这对一些人来说已经成为威胁。

With the pendulum now swinging in the more legalistic, autocratic, communist direction, naturally people are asking how far it will go, which leads people to probably exaggerate the possibilities. My study of Chinese history (and my studies of similar histories in analogous periods) has put in my mind, which are also in some others’ minds, the memories of anti-rightist-capitalist campaigns that led to the persecutions of such people, the confiscations of wealth, the shutting down of stock markets, the enforcing of strict foreign exchange controls, the restrictions against leaving China, and the questions about whether that is where China is headed. People remember the civil war and the changes after 1949. The elites who are experiencing these pains to a greater degree are more concerned. It appears that the “elites” are most concerned and least supportive of Xi, while many who feel Xi is trying to take care of them from being exploited by the elites are strongly supportive of him. It appears that Xi and the leadership think that most of those people who are discontented are spoiled and unappreciative of how much better off they are than they were not long ago and that they need to toughen up, get disciplined, and get in line with the program to help others. This has contributed to the mood becoming more dour and pessimistic.
随着钟摆现在朝着更加法制、专制、共产主义的方向摆动，人们自然会问它会走多远，这导致人们可能夸大了可能性。我对中国历史的研究（以及我对类似时期的类似历史的研究）让我和其他一些人的脑海中浮现出反右资本主义运动的记忆，这些运动导致了这些人的迫害，没收财富、关闭股票市场、实施严格的外汇管制、限制离开中国，以及这是否是中国的发展方向的问题。人们还记得内战和1949年之后的变化。在更大程度上经历这些痛苦的精英们更关心。看来“精英”最关心、最不支持习近平，而许多认为习近平试图保护他们免遭精英剥削的人却强烈支持他。 习近平和领导层似乎认为，那些不满的人大多数都被宠坏了，不知道自己的生活比不久前好多少，他们需要坚强起来，遵守纪律，与国家保持一致。帮助他人的计划。这导致情绪变得更加阴沉和悲观。

No one knows how far the pendulum will swing back toward the more Maoist/Marxist ways of doing things. The absence of clear communication from the leadership about the motivations behind their actions and where they are headed is leading to greater amounts of imaginary speculation than there would be if there were clearer communication. The impediment is that communicating more directly is not the Chinese leadership’s traditional way of doing things, which, as China goes back toward the more traditional ways of doing things, is understandable. China’s new premier Li Qiang’s decision to discontinue press conferences for the first time in 30 years is consistent with the move to lesser clarity rather than greater clarity at this time of greater risk.
没有人知道钟摆会向更毛主义/马克思主义的做事方式摆回多远。领导层对于其行为背后的动机和前进方向缺乏清晰的沟通，导致比有更清晰的沟通时更多的想象猜测。障碍在于，更直接的沟通并不是中国领导层的传统做事方式，随着中国回归更传统的做事方式，这是可以理解的。中国新任总理李强30年来首次决定停止举行新闻发布会，这与在这个风险更大的时刻采取降低透明度而不是提高透明度的做法是一致的。

3. The great-power conflict between China and the US is having a big negative effect. It is causing foreign investors and businesses and domestic investors and businesses to want to diversify or leave China and to fear being discriminated against globally for being friendly to China. In trade and capital flows, a cat-and-mouse game has developed that has led companies and people to move to neutral countries and to try to appear to be non-Chinese or not Chinese sympathizers, so much so that the Chinese are having problems getting other countries and companies to accept them being there and/or investing in them. For example, Chinese businesses setting up Mexican companies and exporting to the US to get around tariffs on Chinese goods is leading the US to explore moving to look through the entities to identify the beneficial owners to catch and punish these entities. The TikTok identity pursuit game is the most attention-getting example. Even in the industries and world markets that China has become very competitive in—most obviously electric vehicles, batteries, green energy (solar and wind) products, chips, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, etc.—there are geopolitical conflicts that blend with economic conflicts, so they are increasingly run by governments. The not-too-long-ago old days of free and open markets and the idea that government interference in them is bad are gone for the foreseeable future. This will affect China because it has excess capacity and will be accused of dumping, leading to big tariff increases as protectionism and nationalism come back into fashion as they did in the 1930s. The Chinese economic model is based on gaining an increasing share of world manufacturing output, which has a good chance of not happening because countries that in the past have imported Chinese goods are more likely to prevent them with rising tariffs.
三、中美大国冲突负面影响较大。这导致外国投资者和企业以及国内投资者和企业想要多元化或离开中国，并担心因对中国友好而受到全球歧视。在贸易和资本流动中，一场猫捉老鼠的游戏已经发展起来，导致公司和人民转移到中立国家，并试图表现出自己不是中国人或不是中国同情者，以至于中国人遇到了问题让其他国家和公司接受他们在那里和/或投资。例如，中国企业在墨西哥设立公司并向美国出口以规避对中国商品征收的关税，这导致美国正在探索对这些实体进行审查，以确定受益所有人，以抓捕和惩罚这些实体。 TikTok 身份追求游戏是最受关注的例子。即使在中国已经变得非常有竞争力的行业和世界市场——最明显的是电动汽车、电池、绿色能源（太阳能和风能）产品、芯片、人工智能、量子计算、太空等——也存在着地缘政治冲突。由于经济冲突，它们越来越多地由政府管理。不久前的自由开放市场的时代以及政府干预市场不好的想法在可预见的未来已经一去不复返了。这将影响中国，因为中国产能过剩，将被指控倾销，导致关税大幅上涨，因为保护主义和民族主义像 20 世纪 30 年代那样重新流行。 中国经济模式的基础是在世界制造业产出中获得越来越大的份额，但这很可能不会发生，因为过去进口中国商品的国家更有可能通过提高关税来阻止它们。

In addition to economic clashes with the West, there are cultural clashes. They were described to me by a Chinese leader as mutual cultural ignorance with evolutionary change. He explained that 1) the Anglo-European culture extended by Great Britain passing dominance to the US is having problems accepting the rise of China and its Chinese-Asian culture, 2) there are failures of the two sides to understand and accept the different approaches, and 3) Western culture is more zero-sum than win-win and more inclined to slip into lose-lose wars. I agree with his assessment and find it tragic. It is certainly the case that the Chinese fight wars differently. Think about the “art of war”—fighting to win by focusing on the “pressure points” that can weaken or hurt the other side without even being seen. For example, if one were conjecturing how the Chinese might play the existing geopolitical situation if the conflict rises, because the US is overextended in two wars, the Chinese might think about where there could be a third front—like a war in Asia, something like a conflict with the Philippines or North Korea, that would put the two sides in the US election in the awkward position of having to step into a third conflict (which would be unpopular in the US) or not appear strong enough. Almost all leaders on both sides believe that the other side is working to destroy the other and are working to be able to destroy the other. They are in an intensifying prisoner’s dilemma. To be clear, I don’t believe that either side wants to provoke the other side, and I do believe that greater understanding of and respect for the other’s culture are required. But more than that, each should ask the other, “What are your greatest existential fears?” and work with the other side to figure out what can be done to alleviate them. Without that, the odds of some sort of a devastating war within the next 10 years are high and people are positioning themselves with that possibility in mind, which itself is very damaging.
除了与西方的经济冲突外，还有文化冲突。一位中国领导人向我描述了这种现象，即伴随着进化变化的相互文化无知。他解释说，1）英国将主导地位转移到美国所延伸的英欧文化在接受中国的崛起及其中亚文化方面存在问题，2）双方未能理解和接受不同的做法，3）西方文化更多的是零和而非双赢，更容易陷入双输的战争。我同意他的评价，并认为这是悲剧。中国人打仗的方式确实不同。想想“战争的艺术”——通过专注于“压力点”来赢得胜利，这些“压力点”甚至可以在不被发现的情况下削弱或伤害对方。例如，如果有人猜测，如果冲突升级，中国人可能会如何应对现有的地缘政治局势，因为美国在两场战争中都过度扩张，中国人可能会考虑哪里可能存在第三条战线——比如亚洲的战争，或者其他一些事情。就像与菲律宾或朝鲜的冲突一样，这将使美国大选的双方陷入尴尬的境地，要么不得不进入第三次冲突（这在美国不受欢迎），要么显得不够强大。双方几乎所有领导人都认为对方正在努力摧毁对方，并且正在努力能够摧毁对方。他们陷入了日益加剧的囚徒困境。需要明确的是，我不认为任何一方想要激怒对方，而且我确实认为需要更多地理解和尊重对方的文化。但更重要的是，每个人都应该问对方：“你最大的生存恐惧是什么？”并与对方合作找出可以采取哪些措施来缓解这些问题。如果没有这一点，未来十年内发生某种毁灭性战争的可能性就会很高，人们在考虑这种可能性时就做好了准备，这本身就是非常具有破坏性的。

4. Climate and climate-related issues are big, threatening, and top-of-mind. They extend from having droughts, floods, and pandemics to not having enough clean water. They will probably cost a lot and hurt a lot.
4. 气候和气候相关问题是重大、具有威胁性和首要考虑的问题。这些问题包括干旱、洪水和流行病以及没有足够的清洁水。他们可能会付出很大的代价并受到很大的伤害。

5. While technology development has always been a critical defining force and while it is well known that whoever wins the technology war wins the economic, geopolitical, and military wars, this has never been truer than now, and China and the US are the leaders and big adversaries. Throughout the history of war, the desired path has been to secretively build the technology that is strong enough so that showing it to the opposition will make the opposition become submissive. Watch the movie Oppenheimer for a refresher. That is certainly going on. There are many technologies that both China and the US are putting huge amounts of talent and resources into using their different approaches, one more top-down, government-directed and one more bottom-up, corporate/capitalist—some of which we know about (e.g., chips, AI, quantum computing, outer space, cyber, batteries, clean energy, electric vehicles, robotics, etc.), some of which China is in the lead on, and some of which the US is in the lead on, and none of which we can anticipate exactly how it will transpire in the future. I won’t digress into looking into these because it would take too long, and now is the time to step back up to look at the big picture.
5. 虽然技术发展一直是关键的决定性力量，众所周知，谁赢得了技术战争，谁就赢得了经济、地缘政治和军事战争，但这一点从未像现在这样真实，而中国和美国是领导者和大对手。纵观战争史，人们所希望的道路一直是秘密地开发足够强大的技术，以便将其展示给反对派，从而使反对派变得屈服。观看电影《奥本海默》以复习一下。这肯定正在发生。中国和美国都在许多技术上投入了大量的人才和资源，采用不同的方法，一种是自上而下的、政府主导的，另一种是自下而上的、企业/资本家的——其中一些是我们所知道的（例如芯片、人工智能、量子计算、外太空、网络、电池、清洁能源、电动汽车、机器人等），有些领域中国领先，有些领域美国领先，我们都无法准确预测未来会如何发生。我不会偏离主题去研究这些，因为这会花费太长时间，现在是时候退后一步来看看大局了。

For the previously described reasons it is understandable why President Xi believes that there is a 100-year storm on the horizon. That assessment seems right to me. At the same time, I am not certain of anything other than that I am trying to be as objective and helpful as possible in bringing about understanding. China is an enigma that I am trying to make less enigmatic. I have been very lucky to see up close for nearly 40 years what has happened in China, the United States, and China-US relations, all of which I care about deeply. And I have found it all intensely interesting and important to watch. It seems that we all have been affected by the supposed Chinese curse “May you live in interesting times.”
出于上述原因，习主席认为一百年风暴即将来临是可以理解的。这个评价对我来说似乎是正确的。与此同时，除了我试图尽可能客观和有帮助地达成理解之外，我不确定其他任何事情。中国是一个谜，我正试图让其不再那么神秘。我有幸近距离看到近40年来我所关心的中国、美国以及中美关系所发生的一切。我发现这一切都非常有趣且值得观看。似乎我们都受到了所谓的中国咒语“愿你生活在有趣的时代”的影响。

Since I published this, a number of people have asked what I think about investing in China. I find high quality Chinese assets very attractively priced and I have done very well investing there.  I also have great affection and respect for the Chinese people and culture. For these reasons, I remain committed to my meaningful work, meaningful relationships, and investing there--and to trying to improve mutual understanding through my radical truthfulness.
自从我发表这篇文章以来，很多人问我对投资中国有何看法。 我发现中国优质资产的价格非常有吸引力，而且我在那里的投资做得非常好。  我对中国人民和文化也怀有极大的感情和尊重。 出于这些原因，我仍然致力于我有意义的工作、有意义的关系和投资，并试图通过我的彻底诚实来增进相互理解。

Disclosures 披露

Bridgewater Daily Observations is prepared by and is the property of Bridgewater Associates, LP and is circulated for informational and educational purposes only. There is no consideration given to the specific investment needs, objectives, or tolerances of any of the recipients. Additionally, Bridgewater's actual investment positions may, and often will, vary from its conclusions discussed herein based on any number of factors, such as client investment restrictions, portfolio rebalancing and transactions costs, among others. Recipients should consult their own advisors, including tax advisors, before making any investment decision. This material is for informational and educational purposes only and is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy the securities or other instruments mentioned. Any such offering will be made pursuant to a definitive offering memorandum. This material does not constitute a personal recommendation or take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situations, or needs of individual investors which are necessary considerations before making any investment decision. Investors should consider whether any advice or recommendation in this research is suitable for their particular circumstances and, where appropriate, seek professional advice, including legal, tax, accounting, investment, or other advice.
《桥水每日观察》由 Bridgewater Associates, LP 编制并归其所有，仅供参考和教育目的。没有考虑任何接受者的具体投资需求、目标或容忍度。此外，桥水的实际投资头寸可能而且经常会因客户投资限制、投资组合再平衡和交易成本等多种因素而与此处讨论的结论有所不同。在做出任何投资决定之前，接受者应咨询自己的顾问，包括税务顾问。本材料仅供参考和教育目的，并非出售要约或征求购买所提及的证券或其他工具的要约。任何此类发行都将根据最终发行备忘录进行。本材料不构成个人建议，也不考虑个人投资者在做出任何投资决定之前必须考虑的特定投资目标、财务状况或需求。投资者应考虑本研究中的任何建议或推荐是否适合其特定情况，并在适当情况下寻求专业建议，包括法律、税务、会计、投资或其他建议。

The information provided herein is not intended to provide a sufficient basis on which to make an investment decision and investment decisions should not be based on simulated, hypothetical, or illustrative information that have inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record simulated or hypothetical results do not represent actual trading or the actual costs of management and may have under or overcompensated for the impact of certain market risk factors. Bridgewater makes no representation that any account will or is likely to achieve returns similar to those shown. The price and value of the investments referred to in this research and the income therefrom may fluctuate. Every investment involves risk and in volatile or uncertain market conditions, significant variations in the value or return on that investment may occur. Investments in hedge funds are complex, speculative and carry a high degree of risk, including the risk of a complete loss of an investor’s entire investment. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a complete loss of original capital may occur. Certain transactions, including those involving leverage, futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Fluctuations in exchange rates could have material adverse effects on the value or price of, or income derived from, certain investments.
本文提供的信息无意为做出投资决策提供充分的基础，投资决策不应基于具有固有局限性的模拟、假设或说明性信息。与实际业绩记录不同，模拟或假设结果并不代表实际交易或实际管理成本，并且可能对某些市场风险因素的影响进行了不足或过度补偿。桥水不表示任何账户将或可能实现与所示类似的回报。本研究中提到的投资的价格和价值以及由此产生的收入可能会波动。每项投资都涉及风险，在波动或不确定的市场条件下，该投资的价值或回报可能会发生重大变化。对冲基金的投资是复杂的、投机性的，并且具有很高的风险，包括投资者完全损失全部投资的风险。过去的业绩并不能作为未来业绩的指南，未来的回报无法得到保证，并且可能会发生原始资本的完全损失。某些交易，包括涉及杠杆、期货、期权和其他衍生品的交易，会产生很大的风险，并不适合所有投资者。汇率波动可能会对某些投资的价值或价格或所得收入产生重大不利影响。

Bridgewater research utilizes data and information from public, private, and internal sources, including data from actual Bridgewater trades. Sources include BCA, Bloomberg Finance L.P., Bond Radar, Candeal, CBRE, Inc., CEIC Data Company Ltd., China Bull Research, Clarus Financial Technology, CLS Processing Solutions, Conference Board of Canada, Consensus Economics Inc., DataYes Inc, Dealogic, DTCC Data Repository, Ecoanalitica, Empirical Research Partners, Entis (Axioma Qontigo Simcorp), EPFR Global, Eurasia Group, Evercore ISI, FactSet Research Systems, Fastmarkets Global Limited, the Financial Times Limited, FINRA, GaveKal Research Ltd., Global Financial Data, GlobalSource Partners, Harvard Business Review, Haver Analytics, Inc., Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the Investment Funds Institute of Canada, ICE Derived Data (UK), Investment Company Institute, International Institute of Finance, JP Morgan, JSTA Advisors, M Science LLC, MarketAxess, Medley Global Advisors (Energy Aspects Corp), Metals Focus Ltd, Moody’s ESG Solutions, MSCI, Inc., National Bureau of Economic Research, Neudata, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Pensions & Investments Research Center, Refinitiv, Rhodium Group, RP Data, Rubinson Research, Rystad Energy, S&P Global Market Intelligence, Scientific Infra/EDHEC, Sentix GmbH, Shanghai Metals Market, Shanghai Wind Information, Smart Insider Ltd., Sustainalytics, Swaps Monitor, Tradeweb, United Nations, US Department of Commerce, Verisk Maplecroft, Visible Alpha, Wells Bay, Wind Financial Information LLC, Wood Mackenzie Limited, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, World Economic Forum, and YieldBook. While we consider information from external sources to be reliable, we do not assume responsibility for its accuracy.
桥水基金研究利用来自公共、私人和内部来源的数据和信息，包括来自桥水基金实际交易的数据。资料来源包括 BCA、Bloomberg Finance L.P.、Bond Radar、Candeal、CBRE, Inc.、CEIC Data Company Ltd.、China Bull Research、Clarus Financial Technology、CLS Process Solutions、加拿大大型企业联合会、Consensus Economics Inc.、DataYes Inc、Dealogic 、DTCC Data Repository、Ecoanalitica、Empirical Research Partners、Entis (Axioma Qontigo Simcorp)、EPFR Global、Eurasia Group、Evercore ISI、FactSet Research Systems、Fastmarkets Global Limited、金融时报有限公司、FINRA、GaveKal Research Ltd.、Global Financial Data 、GlobalSource Partners、哈佛商业评论、Haver Analytics, Inc.、机构股东服务 (ISS)、加拿大投资基金协会、ICE Derived Data（英国）、投资公司协会、国际金融协会、摩根大通、JSTA Advisors、 M Science LLC、MarketAxess、Medley Global Advisors (Energy Aspects Corp)、Metals Focus Ltd、穆迪 ESG Solutions、MSCI, Inc.、国家经济研究局、Neudata、经济合作与发展组织、养老金与投资研究中心、Refinitiv 、Rhodium Group、RP Data、Rubinson Research、Rystad Energy、S&P Global Market Intelligence、Scientific Infra/EDHEC、Sentix GmbH、上海金属市场、上海风信息、Smart Insider Ltd.、Sustainalytics、Swaps Monitor、Tradeweb、联合国、美国美国商务部、Verisk Maplecroft、Visible Alpha、Wells Bay、Wind Financial Information LLC、Wood Mackenzie Limited、世界金属统计局、世界经济论坛和 YieldBook。虽然我们认为来自外部来源的信息是可靠的，但我们不对其准确性承担责任。

This information is not directed at or intended for distribution to or use by any person or entity located in any jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability, or use would be contrary to applicable law or regulation, or which would subject Bridgewater to any registration or licensing requirements within such jurisdiction. No part of this material may be (i) copied, photocopied, or duplicated in any form by any means or (ii) redistributed without the prior written consent of Bridgewater® Associates, LP.
该信息不针对或旨在向位于任何司法管辖区的任何个人或实体分发或使用，如果此类分发、发布、可用性或使用会违反适用的法律或法规，或者会使 Bridgewater 受到任何注册或使用，该管辖范围内的许可要求。未经 Bridgewater® Associates, LP 事先书面同意，不得 (i) 通过任何方式以任何形式复印、影印或复制本材料的任何部分，或 (ii) 重新分发。

The views expressed herein are solely those of Bridgewater as of the date of this report and are subject to change without notice. Bridgewater may have a significant financial interest in one or more of the positions and/or securities or derivatives discussed. Those responsible for preparing this report receive compensation based upon various factors, including, among other things, the quality of their work and firm revenues.
本文表达的观点仅代表桥水截至本报告发布之日的观点，如有更改，恕不另行通知。桥水可能在所讨论的一项或多项头寸和/或证券或衍生品中拥有重大财务利益。负责准备本报告的人根据各种因素获得报酬，其中包括他们的工作质量和公司收入。