ALIBABA'S IPO DILEMMA: HONG KONG OR NEW YORK?
阿里巴巴的 IPO 困境：香港还是纽约？

Abstract 摘要

Emir Hrnjic wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.
Emir Hrnjic 撰写本案例的唯一目的是为课堂讨论提供素材。作者无意说明有效或无效的管理方法。为保密起见，作者可能对某些姓名和其他身份信息进行了伪装。

Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation prohibits any form of reproduction, storage or transmission without its written permission. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3K7; phone (519) 661-3208; fax (519) 661-3882; e-mail cases@ivey.uwo.ca.
理查德艾维商学院基金会未经其书面许可，禁止以任何形式复制、储存或传播本资料。本资料的复制不属于任何复制权组织的授权范围。如需订购副本或申请复制材料的许可，请联系 Ivey Publishing, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3K7；电话 (519) 661-3208；传真 (519) 661-3882；电子邮件 cases@ivey.uwo.ca。

Alibaba Group’s founder, Jack Ma, was named the Financial Times’ 2013 Person of the Year, joining the likes of Steve Jobs, Barack Obama and Google co-founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page. Even though Jack Ma had experienced a cult-like following in China similar to that of Steve Jobs in the United States, he was relatively unknown outside of China. Only after Alibaba Group started its preparations for the long-awaited initial public offering (IPO) and began negotiations with different stock exchanges, did this vivacious leader start making global headlines. While Jack Ma had been receiving most of the press attention, Alibaba’s executive vice-president, Yale-educated Joe Tsai, led efforts for Alibaba’s IPO.

^{1}

阿里巴巴集团创始人马云被《金融时报》评为2013年年度人物，与史蒂夫-乔布斯、巴拉克-奥巴马、谷歌联合创始人谢尔盖-布林和拉里-佩奇等人齐名。尽管马云在中国拥有与乔布斯在美国类似的追随者，但他在中国之外却相对默默无闻。直到阿里巴巴集团开始为期待已久的首次公开募股（IPO）做准备，并开始与不同的证券交易所谈判之后，这位活泼的领导者才开始成为全球头条新闻。虽然马云一直是媒体关注的焦点，但阿里巴巴的执行副总裁、耶鲁大学毕业的蔡崇信（Joe Tsai）领导了阿里巴巴的上市工作。

^{1}

In April 2014, Tsai faced several decisions regarding the IPO. Should Alibaba maintain its rigid stand on its proposed governance structure despite resistance from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange? When would be the best timing for its IPO? How should the company price its shares in one of the most anticipated IPOs of the 21st century?
2014 年 4 月，蔡崇信面临着几个有关 IPO 的决定。阿里巴巴是否应该不顾香港联交所的阻力，坚持其对拟议治理结构的坚定立场？何时是上市的最佳时机？作为 21 世纪最受瞩目的首次公开募股之一，公司应如何定价？

ALIBABA GROUP $^{2}$

By early 2014, Alibaba Group had emerged as one of the world’s leading e-commerce companies with 24,000 employees located in China, India, the United States, the United Kingdom and Singapore. Two of the more successful businesses within Alibaba Group, Taobao.com and Tmall.com, became China’s most popular consumer-to-consumer (C2C) and business-to-consumer (B2C) online shopping destinations, respectively. In fact, the gross merchandise volume (GMV) of these two businesses exceeded RMB1 trillion (US$164 billion

^{3}

) for the year ending March 31, 2013. This accounted for 80 per cent of the entire B2C and C2C e-commerce in China (

$ 204

billion in 2012), and was larger than Amazon (

$ 86

billion) and eBay (

$ 67.8

billion) combined. Other aspects of Alibaba’s business included online payment systems, cloud computing and mobile Internet services.
到 2014 年初，阿里巴巴集团已成为世界领先的电子商务公司之一，在中国、印度、美国、英国和新加坡拥有 24000 名员工。阿里巴巴集团旗下两家较为成功的企业淘宝网和天猫分别成为中国最受欢迎的消费者对消费者（C2C）和企业对消费者（B2C）网上购物目的地。事实上，在截至 2013 年 3 月 31 日的一年中，这两项业务的商品总额（GMV）超过了 1 万亿元人民币（1,640 亿美元

^{3}

）。这一数字占中国整个B2C 和C2C 电子商务总额（2012 年为

$ 204

十亿）的80%，超过亚马逊（

$ 86

十亿）和eBay（

$ 67.8

十亿）的总和。阿里巴巴的其他业务包括在线支付系统、云计算和移动互联网服务。

Alibaba’s ascent began in 1999, when Jack Ma, then an English teacher, shared his vision with Alibaba co-founders in his apartment. Alibaba Group utilized a simple business model of creating a platform for buyers and sellers to meet and transact. It was founded on two major insights: the cost-consciousness and importance of trust for Chinese consumers. Alibaba catered to the cost-consciousness of the Chinese population by making membership free.

^{4}

Thus, while buyers and sellers could use Alibaba for free, the
阿里巴巴的崛起始于 1999 年，当时还是一名英语教师的马云在自己的公寓里与阿里巴巴的联合创始人分享了他的愿景。阿里巴巴集团采用了一种简单的商业模式，即创建一个买卖双方见面和交易的平台。阿里巴巴的创立基于两大洞察力：成本意识和信任对中国消费者的重要性。阿里巴巴通过免费会员制迎合了中国人的成本意识。

^{4}

因此，虽然买家和卖家都可以免费使用阿里巴巴，但中国消费者的成本意识并不高。
sellers had to advertise heavily in order to attract customers, which generated large advertising fees for Alibaba. Alibaba also catered to the importance of trust by providing tools to build trust between buyers and sellers. It did so through an independent verification service, as well as the Alipay payments system (similar to PayPal), which placed monies received in an escrow account.

^{5}

By tailoring its business model to these observations about its customers, Alibaba turned out to be extremely successful.
卖家为了吸引客户，不得不大量投放广告，这为阿里巴巴带来了巨额广告费。阿里巴巴还通过提供在买卖双方之间建立信任的工具来迎合信任的重要性。阿里巴巴通过独立的验证服务以及支付宝付款系统（类似于贝宝）来建立信任，该系统将收到的款项存入一个托管账户。

^{5}

阿里巴巴根据这些对客户的观察结果调整其商业模式，最终取得了巨大成功。

One analyst described Alibaba as a mixture of “retailers like Amazon and eBay, financial services like PayPal and a search engine giant like Google.”

^{6}

Jack Ma explained the philosophy behind his direction for Alibaba in the following words: 'I always believed we shouldn’t build an ‘empire,’ instead, we should build an ‘ecosystem.’ Every empire will be toppled someday, but an ecosystem is sustainable."7

^{7}

一位分析师将阿里巴巴描述为 "亚马逊和 eBay 这样的零售商、PayPal 这样的金融服务和 Google 这样的搜索引擎巨头 "的混合体。

^{6}

马云用以下文字解释了他为阿里巴巴指明方向的理念：我一直认为我们不应该建立一个'帝国'，而应该建立一个'生态系统'。每个帝国都有被推翻的一天，但生态系统是可持续的。

E-Commerce in China 中国的电子商务

Analysts estimated that China’s online retail market would rise to 9 per cent of China’s RMB31.5 trillion (

$ 5.17

trillion) retail market by 2015, and to 25 per cent by 2028.

^{8}

Furthermore, The Economist predicted that by 2020, Chinese e-commerce would surpass that of America, Britain, Japan, Germany and France combined.

^{9}

The world had great expectations for the Chinese e-commerce market, where Alibaba was poised to be a dominant player.
分析师估计，到 2015 年，中国在线零售市场将占中国 31.5 万亿元人民币（

$ 5.17

万亿元）零售市场的 9%，到 2028 年将占 25%。

^{8}

此外，《经济学人》预测，到 2020 年，中国的电子商务将超过美国、英国、日本、德国和法国的总和。

^{9}

全世界都对中国的电子商务市场寄予厚望，而阿里巴巴有望成为中国电子商务市场的主导者。

Alibaba's Competition 阿里巴巴的竞争

China was becoming increasingly tech-savvy, with the number of Chinese Internet users estimated to be 612 million in 2014.

^{10}

Alibaba’s Tmall controlled the market share of roughly 50 per cent in the B2C market, while Taobao controlled more than 90 per cent in the C2C market. Within the B2C market, the closest competitors JD.com and electronics specialist Suning enjoyed 13 per cent and 3 per cent of the market share, respectively.

^{11}

Within the C2C market, Paipai (owned by Tencent) came in a distant second (see Exhibit 1).
中国正变得越来越精通技术，据估计，2014年中国网民人数为6.12亿。

^{10}

阿里巴巴的天猫控制着B2C市场约50%的市场份额，而淘宝则控制着C2C市场90%以上的市场份额。在 B2C 市场，最接近的竞争对手京东商城和电子产品专家苏宁分别占据了 13% 和 3% 的市场份额。

^{11}

在 C2C 市场，腾讯旗下的拍拍网遥遥领先（见图 1）。

Alibaba did not perceive U.S. competitors such as Amazon, eBay and Google to be major threats. The lack of serious competition was partially due to restrictive Chinese Internet laws. For instance, Internet users in China were under the Golden Shield Project, colloquially known as "the Great Firewall."12 Following tensions over Tibet, Chinese government expressly banned Internet users’ access to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter.

^{13}

Among local competitors, Alibaba fiercely competed with Tencent, which had a market capitalization of

$ 110

billion. Another Alibaba competitor, Baidu, the largest Chinese search engine with a market capitalization of

$ 60

billion, accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the search market in China.

^{14}

阿里巴巴并不认为亚马逊、eBay 和谷歌等美国竞争对手是主要威胁。缺乏激烈竞争的部分原因是中国互联网法律的限制。例如，中国的互联网用户受到金盾工程（俗称 "长城防火墙"）的管制12 。

^{13}

在本地竞争对手中，阿里巴巴与市值

$ 110

十亿美元的腾讯展开了激烈竞争。阿里巴巴的另一个竞争对手百度是中国最大的搜索引擎，市值

$ 60

十亿美元，占据了中国搜索市场近 80% 的份额。

^{14}

Acquisition Spree 收购狂潮

In June 2010, Alibaba’s acquisition of California-based e-commerce software firm Vendio represented the company’s first attempt to expand the company’s B2B2C model in the United States.

^{15}

Alibaba projected that Vendio’s customer base, consisting of 80,000 small U.S. businesses, would source products from Alibaba’s supplier network and then resell them through eBay, Amazon and other online stores.

^{16}

Alibaba continued to acquire more U.S. companies in subsequent years. In June 2013, Alibaba bought a minority stake in Fanatics Inc., an online retailer of official licensed sports merchandise with

$ 1

billion in annual revenue.

^{17}

Four months later, Alibaba invested in ShopRunner, an e-commerce website that offered, in exchange for a small annual fee, unlimited two-day shipping from a number of retailers such
2010 年 6 月，阿里巴巴收购了位于加利福尼亚州的电子商务软件公司 Vendio，这是该公司在美国拓展 B2B2C 模式的首次尝试。

^{15}

阿里巴巴预计，Vendio 的客户群包括 8 万家美国小型企业，他们将从阿里巴巴的供应商网络采购产品，然后通过 eBay、亚马逊和其他在线商店转售。

^{16}

随后几年，阿里巴巴继续收购更多美国公司。2013 年 6 月，阿里巴巴收购了官方授权体育商品在线零售商 Fanatics Inc.

^{17}

四个月后，阿里巴巴投资了电子商务网站 ShopRunner。
as GNC, Nine West and Tommy Hilfiger.

^{18}

At the time of the acquisition, ShopRunner was valued at about

$ 600

million.

^{19}

Even though Amazon’s 10 million members dwarfed ShopRunner’s membership of one million,

^{20}

analysts perceived these acquisitions as Alibaba’s attempt to compete with Amazon on its home turf.

^{18}

收购时，ShopRunner 的估值约为

$ 600

百万美元。

^{18}

收购时，ShopRunner 的估值约为

$ 600

百万美元。

^{19}

尽管亚马逊的 1,000 万会员数量与 ShopRunner 的 100 万会员数量相比相形见绌，

^{20}

分析师仍认为这些收购是阿里巴巴试图在其主场与亚马逊竞争。

Alibaba remained active in the acquisition market in China as well. In April 2013, the company bought an 18 per cent stake in Sina Weibo for almost

$ 600

million.

^{21}

Alibaba and Weibo expected their partnership to generate

$ 380

million in advertising revenues by

2016 .^{22}

A month later, Alibaba invested

$ 294

million in AutoNavi, the Chinese equivalent of Google Maps and China’s top online mapping company. While Alibaba could use AutoNavi in different ways, such as location-based marketing, the most immediate benefit to Alibaba was AutoNavi’s 100 million users on its mobile apps.

^{23}

In September 2013, Alibaba Group acquired the cloud storage service Kanbox (the Chinese equivalent of Dropbox with more than 15 million users).

^{24}

阿里巴巴在中国的收购市场也依然活跃。2013 年 4 月，阿里巴巴以近

$ 600

百万美元的价格收购了新浪微博 18% 的股份。

^{21}

阿里巴巴和微博预计，到

2016 .^{22}

年，双方的合作将产生

$ 380

百万美元的广告收入。一个月后，阿里巴巴向高德投资

$ 294

百万美元，高德是中国最大的在线地图公司，相当于谷歌地图。虽然阿里巴巴可以通过不同方式使用高德，例如基于位置的营销，但对阿里巴巴来说，最直接的好处是高德在其移动应用上的 1 亿用户。

^{23}

2013 年 9 月，阿里巴巴集团收购了云存储服务 Kanbox（相当于中国的 Dropbox，拥有超过 1500 万用户）。

^{24}

However, Alibaba did not stop at Internet acquisitions. Ma said: "The new economy is not the digital economy, but rather, one that combines the real economy and digital economy, a true blending of ‘virtual’ and ‘real.’, 25 In December 2013, Alibaba formed a strategic partnership with Haier, whose subsidiary, Goodaymart, owned nine shipping bases, 90 logistics delivery centres and 2 million square metres in warehouse space across China.

^{26}

This acquisition appeared to be consistent with Alibaba’s strategy of investing in distribution networks, instead of building and developing its own.
然而，阿里巴巴并没有止步于互联网收购。马云说新经济不是数字经济，而是实体经济与数字经济的结合，是'虚拟'与'现实'的真正融合。"25 2013 年 12 月，阿里巴巴与海尔结成战略合作伙伴关系，海尔的子公司好易购在中国拥有 9 个航运基地、90 个物流配送中心和 200 万平方米的仓储空间。

^{26}

此次收购似乎符合阿里巴巴投资分销网络而非自建和发展分销网络的战略。

In 2014, Alibaba completed several acquisitions, including a purchase of a minority stake in Intime Retail Group (which owned 36 department stores and shopping centres in China) - in an apparent plan to merge its e-commerce business with its retail business

^{27}

- and a 60 per cent stake in the Chinese entertainment company ChinaVision.

^{28}

2014 年，阿里巴巴完成了几项收购，包括收购银泰零售集团（该集团在中国拥有 36 家百货公司和购物中心）的少数股权（显然是计划将其电子商务业务与零售业务

^{27}

合并），以及收购中国娱乐公司华视传媒 60% 的股权。

^{28}

IPO PLANS 首次公开募股计划

Alibaba needed money to fund further acquisitions and the impending IPO was supposed to generate proceeds for this purpose. In May 2013, Ma announced that Alibaba was ready for an IPO.

^{29}

The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) seemed to be a natural fit for Alibaba’s public offering. Even though Alibaba prided itself on being a global company, the majority of its business revenues were generated within China. Furthermore, most Hong Kong investors were familiar with Alibaba’s business as they had used Alibaba’s services before. Overall, proximity, culture and language of Hong Kong investors appeared to make HKEx the favoured choice over other global exchanges.
阿里巴巴需要资金为进一步收购提供资金，而即将进行的首次公开募股本应为这一目的带来收益。2013 年 5 月，马云宣布阿里巴巴已做好上市准备。

^{29}

香港证券交易所（HKEx）似乎是阿里巴巴公开募股的天作之合。尽管阿里巴巴以自己是一家全球性公司而自豪，但其大部分业务收入都来自中国。此外，大多数香港投资者都熟悉阿里巴巴的业务，因为他们以前使用过阿里巴巴的服务。总体而言，香港投资者的就近性、文化和语言似乎使香港交易所成为比其他全球交易所更受欢迎的选择。

Trading Location 交易地点

Some argued that the listing destination should be irrelevant for such a decision. Indeed, if world stock exchanges were fully integrated, there should be no pricing differences for the same stock in different trading locations. One principle of finance was that the fundamental company value should be determined by the present value of the company’s cash flows discounted at the appropriate discount rate (determined by risk profile of these cash flows).

^{30}

In this case, global investors would value Alibaba’s underlying business and, consequently, the price of the shares would fully incorporate these estimates. Thus, in a frictionless world, valuations should depend solely on the company and not on the trading location. In other words, Alibaba’s shares would theoretically have the same price regardless of a listing in Hong Kong or in New York.
一些人认为，上市目的地与这一决定无关。事实上，如果世界证券交易所完全一体化，同一股票在不同交易地点的定价就不应该有差异。金融学的一个原则是，公司的基本价值应由公司现金流的现值按适当的贴现率（由这些现金流的风险状况决定）贴现后确定。

^{30}

在这种情况下，全球投资者将对阿里巴巴的基本业务进行估值，因此股票价格将充分考虑这些估值。因此，在一个无摩擦的世界中，估值应完全取决于公司而非交易地点。换句话说，无论阿里巴巴在香港还是纽约上市，其股票价格理论上都是一样的。

In contrast, academic research argued that trading location may influence pricing. Extant literature presented the evidence of frictions between exchanges, thus causing shares to be priced differently depending on their trading locations. For instance, prices of U.S.-traded foreign country funds were sensitive to the market movement in the U.S. market, even though their net asset values were completely determined by the asset values that were outside of the United States. Another seminal study found that prices of "twin stocks, which have nearly identical cash flows, [moved] more like the markets where they trade most intensively.

^{31}

This evidence indicated that international markets were segmented.

^{32}

Proximity and familiarity of investors thus seemed to be important determinants in stock valuation.
相反，学术研究认为，交易地点可能会影响定价。现有文献提供了交易所之间存在摩擦的证据，从而导致股票因交易地点不同而定价不同。例如，在美国交易的外国基金的价格对美国市场的市场走势很敏感，尽管其资产净值完全由美国境外的资产价值决定。另一项开创性的研究发现，"现金流几乎完全相同的孪生股票，其价格的[变动]更像它们交易最活跃的市场。

^{31}

这些证据表明，国际市场是分割的。

^{32}

因此，投资者的接近和熟悉程度似乎是股票估值的重要决定因素。

Dual-Class Ownership Structure
双层所有权结构

Tensions between HKEx and Alibaba began to emerge as Alibaba insisted on having a partnership governance structure. This resembled dual-class share structure, which was not consistent with HKEx’s “one share, one vote” policy and was therefore not allowed for companies listed on HKEx.
由于阿里巴巴坚持采用合伙人治理结构，香港交易所与阿里巴巴之间的关系开始紧张。这类似于双重股份结构，不符合香港交易所的 "一股一票 "政策，因此不允许在香港交易所上市。

The dual-class share structure meant that different share classes could have different levels of control over the company. There were three major ways in which one class of shares could have greater control, as compared to another class of shares within the same company.

^{33}

First, one class of shares may have exclusive rights to control the composition of the board, while another class could have no voting power at all. Secondly, one class of shares may have a higher voting power per share as compared to another class. For instance, class B shares could have 10 times the voting power of class A shares. Finally, one class of shares may have the exclusive right to vote for a fixed number or percentage of directors, while the voting power of the other classes of shares may be limited to the rest of the directors only. This differential in voting power created a mismatch between cash flow rights and voting rights. It enabled the minority shareholders to exert disproportionate control over the company (see Exhibit 2).
双层股份结构意味着不同的股份类别可以对公司拥有不同程度的控制权。与同一家公司的另一类股份相比，一类股份可以通过三种主要方式拥有更大的控制权。

^{33}

首先，一类股份可能拥有控制董事会组成的专属权利，而另一类股份可能完全没有投票权。其次，一类股份的每股投票权可能高于另一类股份。例如，B 类股票的投票权可能是 A 类股票的 10 倍。最后，一类股份可能拥有投票选举固定数量或比例董事的专属权利，而其他类别股份的投票权可能仅限于其他董事。这种投票权的差别造成了现金流权与投票权的不匹配。这使得少数股东能够对公司施加不成比例的控制（见图 2）。

In companies with dual-class share structure, control typically resided with founders and top executives of the company. Such structures were commonly found in Internet companies such as Facebook, Google and LinkedIn.

^{34}

The media industry, comprising companies such as CBS, Discovery and the New York Times, was also fond of dual-class share structure.

^{35}

在采用双层股权结构的公司中，控制权通常属于公司创始人和高层管理人员。这种结构常见于 Facebook、Google 和 LinkedIn 等互联网公司。

^{34}

由哥伦比亚广播公司（CBS）、Discovery 和《纽约时报》等公司组成的媒体行业也喜欢采用双层股权结构。

^{35}

Proponents of the dual-class share structure argued that it allowed founders to maintain a long-term view because it insulated the top executives from the myopic Wall Street mentality of investors who were more likely to be primarily concerned with quarterly earnings. It also incentivized the founders to take their companies public at an early stage, without fear of losing control.

^{36}

Moreover, the dual-class share structure was also more transparent than many other ways of retaining founder control, such as pyramid ownership or cross-shareholdings, which were frequently employed in some countries such as Korea and Japan.
双层股权结构的支持者认为，这种结构使创始人能够保持长远的眼光，因为它使高层管理人员免受华尔街投资者的近视心态的影响，而投资者更可能主要关注季度收益。它还激励创始人在早期阶段将公司上市，而不必担心失去控制权。

^{36}

此外，与韩国和日本等国家经常采用的金字塔式所有权或交叉持股等许多其他保留创始人控制权的方式相比，双层股权结构也更加透明。

Those against the dual-class share structure argued that it was not fair to ordinary shareholders. The imbalance in voting power could allow executives to entrench themselves, consume extravagant perks and take unnecessary risks - all while bearing disproportionately fewer consequences of their actions.
反对双层股权结构的人认为，这对普通股东不公平。投票权的不平衡可能会让高管们固步自封，享受奢侈的福利并承担不必要的风险，而他们却要为自己的行为承担不成比例的后果。

HKEx's Position 香港交易所的立场

In 2013, different exchanges around the world had different views regarding dual-class share structure. For instance, U.S. exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ allowed listed companies to have a dual-class share structure. In contrast, the United Kingdom discouraged such
2013 年，全球不同交易所对双层股份结构持有不同观点。例如，纽约证券交易所（NYSE）和纳斯达克等美国交易所允许上市公司采用双重股份结构。相比之下，英国不鼓励
structures, while Asian exchanges such as China, Japan and Singapore banned them.

^{37}

Technically, HKEx allowed dual-class share structure in “exceptional circumstances,” but this provision had never been used.

^{37}

从技术上讲，香港交易所允许在 "特殊情况下 "采用双重股份结构，但这一规定从未被使用过。

^{37}

从技术上讲，香港交易所允许在 "特殊情况下 "采用双重股份结构，但这一规定从未被使用过。

The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission firmly rejected Alibaba’s proposal, maintaining that there would be no exceptions to its “one share, one vote” policy. Charles Li, the chief executive of HKEx, articulated his opposition to Alibaba’s proposed governance structure in a widely read “dream post” on his blog on September 24, 2013. In his post, Li elaborated on different perspectives regarding the issue. The first perspective propagated status quo and followed the maxim, “If it isn’t broken, why fix it?” However, most other exchanges in the world permitted dual-class structure to protect company founders’ visions. Ultimately, sophisticated investors were expected to incorporate governance differences in their valuation of these companies; they could value them at a discount. Li argued that the disclosure regime worked in the United States because its aggressive litigious culture provided checks and balances, and deterrents against abuse of the system.

^{38}

香港证券及期货事务监察委员会坚决拒绝了阿里巴巴的提议，坚称 "一股一票 "政策不会有例外。2013年9月24日，香港交易所行政总裁李小加在其博客上发表了一篇广为流传的 "梦想文章"，明确表示反对阿里巴巴提议的治理结构。在这篇文章中，李小加阐述了有关这一问题的不同观点。第一种观点主张维持现状，并遵循 "如果没坏，为什么要修？然而，世界上大多数其他交易所都允许采用双层结构，以保护公司创始人的愿景。最终，成熟的投资者有望将治理差异纳入对这些公司的估值中；他们可以对这些公司打折估值。Li认为，美国的信息披露制度之所以行之有效，是因为其积极的诉讼文化提供了制衡和威慑，防止了制度的滥用。

^{38}

Alibaba's Reaction 阿里巴巴的反应

The day after the publication of the blog, Tsai replied to elaborate on the proposed “partnership structure” that Alibaba preferred. The partnership structure would operate to allow the firm’s senior management (of 28 persons) to nominate a majority of candidates for the board of directors, which would be then voted upon by the shareholders.

^{39}

Alibaba wanted its partners to set the company’s strategy without having to concern themselves with potentially fickle-minded and short-sighted public investors. Tsai thus argued that this structure would be in the long-term interest of all shareholders. He also added that the partnership structure would safeguard the Alibaba culture and sustain the innovation necessary to keep the company running. At the end of his post, he appealed to HKEx to consider the proposal.
在博客发表的第二天，蔡崇信在回复中详细阐述了阿里巴巴倾向于采用的 "合伙人结构"。合伙人结构的运作方式是让公司的高级管理层（28 人）提名董事会的大多数候选人，然后由股东投票决定。

^{39}

阿里巴巴希望其合伙人能够制定公司战略，而不必担心可能出现的心浮气躁、目光短浅的公众投资者。因此，蔡崇信认为这种结构符合所有股东的长期利益。他还补充说，合伙人结构将保护阿里巴巴文化，并维持公司运行所需的创新。最后，他呼吁港交所考虑这一建议。

Alibaba obtained the approval of its main shareholders to utilize a partnership structure. SoftBank’s president, Masayoshi Son, representing the largest shareholder with 37 per cent of the company, said: "Alibaba has built a phenomenal business and created tremendous value for its shareholders over the years. Alibaba’s special culture is at the heart of its success and preserving it will be very important going forward.

^{40}

Yahoo!, the second largest shareholder with 24 per cent of the company, similarly supported the proposed partnership structure. Jacqueline Reses, chief development officer of Yahoo! and a director of Alibaba said: “Yahoo! believes that management’s efforts reflect the desire to govern the company for long-term success while also balancing the rights of shareholders.”

^{41}

Other shareholders such as Temasek Holdings and China Investment Corporation did not voice objections.
阿里巴巴获得其主要股东的批准，采用合伙人结构。软银总裁孙正义代表持有公司 37% 股份的最大股东表示："阿里巴巴多年来建立了惊人的业务，为股东创造了巨大的价值。阿里巴巴的特殊文化是其成功的核心，保护这种文化在未来将非常重要。

^{40}

雅虎是阿里巴巴的第二大股东，持有公司 24% 的股份。雅虎首席发展官、阿里巴巴董事杰奎琳-雷瑟斯（Jacqueline Reses）说："雅虎相信，管理层的努力反映了他们治理公司以取得长期成功的愿望，同时也平衡了股东的权利。

^{41}

淡马锡控股公司和中国投资有限责任公司等其他股东没有表示反对。

Alibaba's Next Step 阿里巴巴的下一步

Alibaba understood its importance to HKEx. For instance, another Chinese Internet giant, Tencent, had been listed on the HKEx in 2004, and had been accounting for roughly 3 per cent of HKEx’s daily trading volume.

^{42}

While Alibaba would not contribute much regarding annual fees, it had a potential to add an even higher percentage to HKEx’s daily trading volume. When the negotiations with HKEx failed, Alibaba moved on to negotiate with NASDAQ and NYSE. Indeed, many Chinese companies, such as Baidu and Renren, had already taken that path. NASDAQ and NYSE had been competing for new listings and Alibaba’s listing had the potential to provide advantage in the battle for a likely revival of Chinese IPOs.

^{43}

阿里巴巴深知自己对港交所的重要性。例如，另一家中国互联网巨头腾讯于 2004 年在港交所上市，日交易量约占港交所日交易量的 3%。

^{42}

虽然阿里巴巴在年费方面的贡献不大，但它有可能为港交所增加更高的日交易量。与港交所的谈判失败后，阿里巴巴转而与纳斯达克和纽约证券交易所谈判。事实上，百度和人人网等许多中国公司已经走上了这条道路。纳斯达克和纽约证券交易所一直在争夺新的上市企业，阿里巴巴的上市有可能在这场可能重振中国首次公开募股的争夺战中占据优势。

^{43}

In October 2013, both NYSE and NASDAQ confirmed they would allow Alibaba to list with its proposed partnership structure.

^{44}

Li posted another opinion piece hinting that HKEx would be willing to consider
2013 年 10 月，纽交所和纳斯达克均确认将允许阿里巴巴以其提议的合伙结构上市。

^{44}

李小加再次发表评论文章，暗示港交所愿意考虑
the public debate about alternative governance structures. The next day, Alibaba signaled that it would be willing to reconsider a listing in Hong Kong, if HKEx would change its mind or consider a compromise.

^{45}

On January 9, 2014, the Wall Street Journal reported that HKEx was ready for the public debate on allowing the listing of companies with different ownership structures.

^{46}

这引发了公众对其他治理结构的讨论。第二天，阿里巴巴表示，如果港交所改变主意或考虑妥协，它愿意重新考虑在香港上市。

^{45}

2014年1月9日，《华尔街日报》报道称，香港交易所已准备好就允许不同所有权结构的公司上市展开公开辩论。

^{46}

IPO MARKETS IPO 市场

Hong Kong and New York
香港和纽约

The HKEx website stated that its mission was to be the global exchange of choice for Chinese clients and international clients who were seeking exposure to the Chinese market.

^{47}

Yet in the early 2000s, there remained a trend of Chinese companies who preferred to list in the United States. In 2010 alone, 41 Chinese companies went public in the United States, accounting for 26.6 per cent of all U.S. deals in that period.

^{48}

香港交易所网站称，其使命是成为中国客户和寻求进入中国市场的国际客户首选的全球交易所。

^{47}

然而，在21世纪初，中国公司仍有选择在美国上市的趋势。仅在2010年，就有41家中国公司在美国上市，占同期美国上市交易总数的26.6%。

^{48}

This naturally begged the question of why these companies had decided to list in the United States. First, they seemed to face an obstacle in the form of HKEx’s strict requirement that a private company had to post three years of profits before being listed.

^{49}

In contrast, U.S. exchanges did not have that requirement.

^{50}

Since many Internet companies did not have profits when they wished to go public to raise funds, the three-year profit requirement resulted in many high-tech companies opting to list in the United States, particularly on NASDAQ. Furthermore, companies believed that listing on U.S. exchanges would give them better visibility. U.S. exchanges also had an unmatched size and depth when compared to other global exchanges. Despite having more retail investors and family-run businesses in its listings, the level of legal protection that HKEx gave its investors did not seem to be as strong as in the United States.
这自然引出了这些公司为何决定在美国上市的问题。首先，它们似乎面临着一个障碍，即香港交易所严格要求私营公司在上市前必须实现三年盈利。

^{49}

相比之下，美国交易所则没有这一要求。

^{50}

由于许多互联网公司在希望上市融资时并没有利润，因此三年利润要求导致许多高科技公司选择在美国上市，尤其是在纳斯达克上市。此外，这些公司认为，在美国交易所上市会给它们带来更好的知名度。与全球其他交易所相比，美国交易所还拥有无与伦比的规模和深度。尽管港交所上市的公司中散户投资者和家族企业较多，但港交所给予投资者的法律保护程度似乎不如美国。

On the other hand, class action suits happened more frequently in the United States and this made litigation cost much higher than that in Hong Kong. Furthermore, compliance costs were higher and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created additional requirements for companies that were listed in the United States.

^{51}

Also, Hong Kong investors were more familiar with Chinese companies. Moreover, after the scandals with China Media Express Holdings, Sino-Forest and other fraudulent Chinese companies that had been listed in the United States and Canada, many U.S. investors lost confidence in the accounting practices of Chinese companies (see Exhibit 3).
另一方面，美国的集体诉讼更为频繁，这使得诉讼成本远高于香港。此外，合规成本也较高，《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》对在美国上市的公司提出了更多要求。

^{51}

另外，香港投资者更熟悉中国公司。此外，在美国和加拿大上市的中国传媒快讯控股公司、中林集团和其他欺诈性中国公司出现丑闻后，许多美国投资者对中国公司的会计实务失去了信心（见图 3）。

Differences in IPO Process
首次公开募股程序的差异

Since the 1990s, there had been a strong global trend of using the “book building” method of going public, especially in the United States.

^{52}

Global exchanges differed not only in institutional arrangements, but also regarding details of the process of going public. First, the IPO price in the United States could be freely determined and more than half of U.S. IPOs were priced outside the initial price range.

^{53}

In contrast, the price in Hong Kong was strictly limited to lie within the initial range.

^{54}

Second, in Hong Kong, retail investors were typically allocated 10 to 15 per cent of each IPO, but this fraction could go as high as 50 per cent if public demand was strong. In contrast, U.S. underwriters preferred to allocate shares to institutional investors. Third, pre-marketing an IPO in Hong Kong could start even before issuing a prospectus, while underwriters in the United States were not allowed to start collecting information about potential demand before filing with U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

^{55}

Finally, investment banking fees for medium- and large-sized IPOs (

$ 25

to 250 million) were almost always 7 per cent in the United States; however, these fees were much lower in Hong Kong ( 2.5 to 3.5 per cent).

^{56}

自 20 世纪 90 年代以来，采用 "建账 "方式上市在全球范围内形成了一股强劲的潮流，在美国尤为如此。

^{52}

全球交易所不仅在制度安排上存在差异，在上市过程的细节方面也不尽相同。首先，美国的首次公开募股价格可以自由决定，半数以上的美国首次公开募股定价都在初始价格范围之外。

^{53}

相比之下，香港的价格被严格限制在初始范围内。

^{54}

其次，在香港，散户投资者通常可获得每次首次公开发行股票的 10%至 15%，但如果公众需求旺盛，这一比例可高达 50%。相比之下，美国承销商更倾向于将股份分配给机构投资者。第三，在香港，首次公开募股的预营销甚至可以在发布招股说明书之前就开始，而美国的承销商在向美国证券交易委员会（SEC）提交申请之前，不得开始收集有关潜在需求的信息。

^{55}

最后，在美国，大中型 IPO（

$ 25

至 2.5 亿美元）的投资银行费用几乎都是 7%；但在香港，这些费用要低得多（2.5% 至 3.5%）。

^{56}

VALUATION 估价

For the quarter ending March 31, 2013, Alibaba reported

$ 1.38

billion of revenue and

$ 668.7

million of net income according to Yahoo!'s 10-Q.

^{57}

In the second quarter of 2013 (ending June 30, 2013), Alibaba revenues reached

$ 1.74

billion. This was an increase of 61 per cent, as compared to the same period in the previous year. Net income also increased 159 per cent to reach

$ 707

million.

^{58}

In the third quarter of 2013 (ending September 30, 2013), the company reported

$ 1.81

billion in net revenue, similar to the same period last year. Alibaba’s financial statements are presented in Exhibits 4, 5 and 6.
根据雅虎 10-Q 报告，在截至 2013 年 3 月 31 日的季度中，阿里巴巴实现收入

$ 1.38

亿美元，净利润

$ 668.7

百万美元。

^{57}

2013年第二季度（截至2013年6月30日），阿里巴巴的收入达到

$ 1.74

十亿美元。与去年同期相比增长了 61%。净收入也增长了 159%，达到

$ 707

亿。

^{58}

2013年第三季度（截至2013年9月30日），公司净收入为

$ 1.81

亿元，与去年同期持平。阿里巴巴的财务报表见附图 4、5 和 6。

In comparison, Amazon’s 2013 sales reached

$ 15.7

billion with a profit margin of 0.5 per cent.

^{59}

EBay’s revenues were

$ 3.88

billion, with a net profit of

$ 640

million.

^{60}

Twitter disclosed

$ 422

million in 2013 revenues, and a net loss of

$ 134

million.

^{61}

In 2014, Alibaba was expected to earn revenues of

$ 8.6

billion and net income of

$ 3.5

billion.

^{62}

Alibaba chief executive officer Jonathan Lu expected Alibaba to overtake Wal-Mart in revenues by 2016, when the total value of transactions should reach RMB3 trillion ($490 billion).

^{63}

相比之下，亚马逊 2013 年的销售额达到

$ 15.7

亿美元，利润率为 0.5%。

^{59}

易趣的收入为

$ 3.88

亿，净利润为

$ 640

万。

^{60}

Twitter披露的2013年收入为

$ 422

亿，净亏损为

$ 134

万。

^{61}

2014年，阿里巴巴预计收入为

$ 8.6

亿，净利润为

$ 3.5

亿。

^{62}

阿里巴巴首席执行官陆兆禧预计，到2016年，阿里巴巴的收入将超过沃尔玛，届时交易总额将达到3万亿元人民币（4900亿美元）。

^{63}

In January 2014, Yahoo! reported that Alibaba’s third quarter net income increased by 12 per cent to

$ 792

million, while revenue increased by 51 per cent to

$ 1.78

billion (compared to the previous quarter).

^{64}

This was in comparison to the previous year, when Alibaba’s profit doubled in the quarter ending in December 2012, tripled in the quarter ending in March 2013, and doubled in the quarter ending in June 2013.

^{65}

Over the same period, Facebook posted net income of

$ 422

million, while Yahoo! posted net income of $297 million.
2014年1月，雅虎报道称，阿里巴巴第三季度净收入增长12%，达到

$ 792

百万美元，收入增长51%，达到

$ 1.78

十亿美元（与上一季度相比）。

^{64}

与去年同期相比，阿里巴巴的利润在截至 2012 年 12 月的季度增长了一倍，在截至 2013 年 3 月的季度增长了两倍，在截至 2013 年 6 月的季度增长了一倍。

^{65}

同期，Facebook 的净利润为

$ 422

百万美元，而雅虎的净利润为 2.97 亿美元。

Market conditions appeared to be on the upswing. The NASDAQ index went up 38.3 per cent in

2013 .^{66}

In the same year, the Hang Seng Index increased by 2.9 per cent, led by the information technology sector with the upswing of 70 per cent.

^{67}

The shares of Chinese companies were rising, regardless of whether they were listed in the United States or in Hong Kong. The U.S. Internet stocks were also doing well. Facebook had a rocky start after going public, but eventually recovered. In contrast, Twitter started with a first day return of 73 per cent and had continued to rise ever since. At the same time, several Chinese tech companies such as Qunar and 58.com already filed for IPOs on the NYSE (see Exhibit 7).
市场状况似乎正在好转。

2013 .^{66}

同年，纳斯达克指数上涨了 38.3%，恒生指数上涨了 2.9%，其中信息技术板块上涨了 70%。

^{67}

无论在美国还是在香港上市，中国公司的股票都在上涨。美国互联网股票也表现不俗。Facebook 在上市之初曾一度陷入困境，但最终复苏。相比之下，Twitter 上市首日回报率高达 73%，此后持续上涨。与此同时，Qunar 和58.com等几家中国科技公司已经申请在纽约证券交易所上市（见图 7）。

However, nothing exemplified the volatility of investors’ appetite for Chinese stocks as much as two major events. “Chinese Amazon” JD.com’s sales had risen 96 per cent in 2012, and 68 per cent (to $11.5 billion) in 2013, but the company posted a net loss of

$ 8

million in 2013. Yet, its IPO was strongly oversubscribed and the price jumped from

$ 19

$ 21.75

on the first day of trading.

^{68}

On the other hand, the world’s largest pork-producing company, WH Group, cancelled its IPO on HKEx due to the weak investors’ demand, even though the company reduced its offering size by more than a half.

^{69}

然而，没有什么比两件大事更能体现投资者对中概股偏好的波动性。"中国亚马逊"JD.com的销售额在2012年增长了96%，2013年增长了68%（达到115亿美元），但该公司在2013年出现了

$ 8

万美元的净亏损。然而，该公司的首次公开募股却获得了大量超额认购，上市首日的价格从

$ 19

跃升至

$ 21.75

。

^{68}

另一方面，全球最大的猪肉生产公司 WH Group 由于投资者需求疲软而取消了在香港交易所的首次公开募股，尽管该公司将发行规模缩小了一半以上。

^{69}

EPILOGUE 后记

Tsai faced many difficult decisions. Listing in Hong Kong or listing in New York - each had its own pros and cons. While the Hong Kong investors knew Alibaba’s business better, New York investors valued Internet companies at higher multiples. Listing in Hong Kong would be a problem if HKEx refused to compromise its stance against companies with a dual-class structure. Moreover, Alibaba had to consider its valuation and IPO price: a lower IPO pricing would leave the “money on the table” but create buzz about the company, while a higher IPO price would result in more proceeds but risk alienating investors. Alibaba’s IPO timing remained another unresolved issue.
蔡文胜面临着许多艰难的抉择。在香港上市还是在纽约上市，各有利弊。香港投资者更了解阿里巴巴的业务，而纽约投资者对互联网公司的估值倍数更高。如果香港交易所拒绝对采用双重股权结构的公司妥协，那么在香港上市就会成为一个问题。此外，阿里巴巴还必须考虑估值和 IPO 定价：较低的 IPO 定价会让 "钱留在桌子上"，但会引起对公司的关注；而较高的 IPO 定价会带来更多收益，但有可能疏远投资者。阿里巴巴的上市时机仍是另一个悬而未决的问题。

	B2C (%)		C2C (%)		Mobile (%) 移动电话 (%)		Online Payment (%) 在线支付 (%)
Tmall 天猫	49.08	TaoBao 淘宝	92.59	TaoBao 淘宝	81.45	Alipay 支付宝	49
JingDong 京东	18.16	Paipai 派牌	5.56	JingDong 京东	6.67	Tenpay 天付通	20
Tencent B2C 腾讯 B2C	5.68	Eachnet 每个网络	1.85	Malmaibao	1.11	Unionpay 银联	10
Suning 苏宁	4.30			Suning 苏宁	1.01	Others 其他	21
Amazon China 亚马逊中国	2.72			Amazon 亚马逊	0.84
Dangdang 当当网	2.12			Others 其他	8.92
Others 其他	17.94

Source: A. Damodaran, “Musings on Market, Alibaba: A China Story with a profitable ending?,” May 8, 2014, http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.sg/2014/05/alibaba-china-story-with-profitable.html, accessed June 16, 2014.
资料来源A. Damodaran，"Musings on Market，Alibaba：一个有盈利结局的中国故事？"，2014 年 5 月 8 日，http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.sg/2014/05/alibaba-china-story-with-profitable.html，2014 年 6 月 16 日访问。

EXHIBIT 2: DUAL-CLASS FIRMS IN S&P 1500 COMPOSITE (SELECTED)
图表 2：标准普尔 1500 指数综合指数中的双级公司（部分）

Name 名称

Index 索引

Industry 行业

Ownership 所有权

AMC Networks Inc. AMC 网络公司

S&P 400 标准普尔 400

Media 媒体

多兰家族控制着 B 类股，B 类股有权选举大多数董事。

The Dolan family controls the Class B shares, which

are entitled to elect a majority of the directors.

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Insurance 保险

Class A: 1 vote; Class B: 1/10,000 of a vote.
A 类：1 票；B 类：1/10,000 票。

CBS Corporation 哥伦比亚广播公司

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Media 媒体

National Amusements 拥有约 79.1% 的投票权股票。

National Amusements owns approximately 79.1% of

the voting stock.

Comcast Corporation 康卡斯特公司

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Media 媒体

罗伯茨家族控制着该公司不可稀释的三分之一股份。

The Roberts family controls a non-dilutable one-third

stake in the firm.

发现传播公司

Discovery

Communications, Inc.

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Media 媒体

John Malone 拥有 92.7% 的 B 类股票，并持有

30 %

的投票权。

John Malone owns 92.7% of Class B shares and holds

30 %

of the voting power.

梦工厂动画公司（DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc.

DreamWorks Animation

SKG, Inc.

S&P 400 标准普尔 400

Media 媒体

Jeff Katzenberg controls 67% of the voting power.
杰夫-卡森伯格控制着 67% 的投票权。

Ford Motor Company 福特汽车公司

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Components 组件

The Ford family controls 40% of the voting power.
福特家族控制着 40% 的投票权。

Google Inc. 谷歌公司

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Services 服务

Co-founders control 48.4% of the voting power.
联合创始人控制着 48.4% 的投票权。

News Corporation 新闻集团

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Media 媒体

默多克家族控制着 39.7% 的 B 类股票，这是唯一有投票权的一类股票。

The Murdoch family controls 39.7% of Class B stock,

the only class with voting rights.

波士顿啤酒公司

The Boston Beer

Company, Inc.

S&P 600 标准普尔 600 指数

食品饮料及烟草

Food Beverage

& Tobacco

首席执行官科赫拥有所有 B 类股票，有权选举八名董事中的五名。

CEO Koch owns all Class B shares, which entitle him

to elect five of eight directors.

纽约时报公司

The New York Times

Company

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Media 媒体

Ochs-Sulzberger 家族成员有权选出董事会的大多数成员。

Members of the Ochs-Sulzberger family are entitled to

elect a majority of board members.

华盛顿邮报公司

The Washington Post

Company

S&P 400 标准普尔 400

Media 媒体

格雷厄姆家族成员有权选举

70 %

名董事。

Members of the Graham family are entitled to elect

70 %

of the directors.

Viacom Inc. 维亚康姆公司

S&P 500 标准普尔 500 指数

Media 媒体

萨姆纳-雷德斯通（Sumner Redstone）控制着近 80% 的唯一一类有投票权的股份。

Sumner Redstone controls nearly 80% of the only

class of shares entitled to vote.

Source: “Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Ten-year Performance and Risk Review,” IRRC Institute/ISS, October 2012.
《资料来源"标准普尔 1500 指数中的受控公司：十年业绩与风险回顾》，IRRC 研究所/ISS，2012 年 10 月。

INTERNET COMPANIES 互联网公司

Facebook Inc.

马克-扎克伯格持有 28.4% 的 B 类股，其投票权是 A 类股的 10 倍。

Mark Zuckerberg holds 28.4% of Class B shares with 10 times the voting power of Class A

shares.

Google Inc. 谷歌公司

联合创始人谢尔盖-布林（Sergey Brin）和拉里-佩奇（Larry Page）控制着 B 类股票，每股拥有 10 票投票权，而 A 类股票只有 1 票投票权，C 类股票没有投票权。

Co-founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page control the Class B stock with 10 votes per share

compared to Class A with one vote and class C with no voting power.

LinkedIn Inc.

联合创始人兼董事长里德-霍夫曼（Reid Hoffman）持有的 B 类股每股有 10 票投票权，而 A 类股只有 1 票投票权。

Co-founder and chairman, Reid Hoffman, holds Class B shares with 10 votes per-share as

compared to Class A shares with one vote.

Sources: www.insidefacebook.com/2012/02/01/heres-facebooks-cap-table-with-ownership-for-zuckerberg-other-earlyinvestors/, accessed January 27, 2014; S. Davidoff, “New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control,” New York Times, April 13, 2012; S. Davidoff, “Plans for LinkedIn’s I.P.O. May Make Few Friends,” New York Times, May 10, 2011.
资料来源www.insidefacebook.com/2012/02/01/heres-facebooks-cap-table-with-ownership-for-zuckerberg-other-earlyinvestors/, 访问日期：2014 年 1 月 27 日；S. Davidoff, "New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control," New York Times, April 13, 2012；S. Davidoff, "Plans for LinkedIn's I.P.O. May Make Few Friends," New York Times, May 10, 2011。

EXHIBIT 3: LISTING REQUIREMENTS IN HONG KONG AND NEW YORK EXCHANGES
附录 3：香港和纽约证券交易所的上市要求

The HKEx Main Board listing requirements
香港交易所主板上市要求

Financial performance (Must fulfill 1 of the 3 test)
财务业绩（必须完成 3 项测试中的 1 项）

利润测试最近一年的净利润超过 2,000 万港元之前两年的净利润总和超过 3,000 万港元

Profit test

Recent past year's net profit greater than HK$20 million Preceding two years combined net profit greater than HK$30 million

市值／收入測試／現金流量測試上市時的市值最少達 20 億港元過去一年的收入最少達 5 億港元過去三年來自營業活動的正現金流總額最少達 1 億港元

Market capitalization/ revenue test/ cash flow test Market capitalization of at least HK$2 billion at listing Recent past year's revenue of at least HK$500 million

Aggregate positive cash flow from operating activities for past three years of at least HK$100 million

市值/收入测试上市時市值至少達 40 億港元最近一年的收入至少達

港元 $ 500

万 1、上市时股东人数在 1000 人或以上

Market capitalization/ revenue test

Market capitalization of at least HK$4 billion at listing Recent past year's revenue of at least HK

$ 500

million 1,000 shareholders or above at listing

Operating history, management, and ownership
运营历史、管理和所有权

Under the management continuity for the past three financial years Most recent financial year under same ownership and control
过去三个财务年度的管理连续性最近一个财务年度的所有权和控制权不变

Minimum market capitalization and number of shareholders
最低市值和股东人数

上市时总市值至少 2 亿港元（如通过盈利测试规定申请）上市时公众持有的市值至少 5,000 万港元上市时至少有 300 名股东

Total market capitalization of at least HK$200 million at the time of listing (if applying through the profit test requirement)

Market capitalization of at least HK$50 million held by the public at the time of listing

At least 300 shareholders at the time of listing

Public float 公共浮动

公众持股量在任何时候均不得少于 25%。申请上市的证券类别不得少于已发行股本总额的 15%，市值不得少于 5,000 万港元。如上市时市值超过 100 亿港元，公众持股量可由联交所酌情降低 15%。

At least 25% in public hands at all times

The class of securities for which listing is sought must not be less than 15% of the total issued share capital, with minimum market capitalization of HK$50 million

Public float can be lowered 15% if market capitalization is more than HK$10 billion at the time of listing at the discretion of the Exchange The three largest public shareholders cannot hold more than 50% of the securities in public hands

NYSE listing requirements
纽约证券交易所上市要求

Round lot holders $^{1}$ or 圆形地段持有者 $^{1}$ 或	US$2,000 2,000 美元
Total shareholders together with 股东总数连同	US$2,200 2,200 美元
Average monthly trading volume (for the 月平均交易量（针对	100,000 shares 100,000 股
most recent six months) or 最近六个月）或
Total shareholders... together with 股东总数......加上	500
Average monthly trading volume (for the most recent 12 months) 月平均交易量（最近 12 个月）	100,000 shares 100,000 股
Public shares outstanding $^{2}$ 已发行的公众股 $^{2}$	1,100,000
Market value of public shares 公众股市值	US$60,000,000 6 000 万美元
Net tangible assets 有形资产净值	US$40,000,000 4 000 万美元
Pre-tax income for most recent year 最近一年的税前收入	US$2,500,000 2,500,000 美元
Pre-tax income for each of the two preceding years 前两年每年的税前收入	US$2,000,000 2,000,000 美元
Aggregate pre-tax income for past three years 过去三年税前收入总额	US$6,500,000 6,500,000 美元
Aggregate pre-tax income for companies with not less than $$ 500$ million in global market and $$ 100$ million revenues in the most recent 12 months 全球市场不少于 $$ 500$ 百万美元和最近 12 个月收入不少于 $$ 100$ 百万美元的公司的税前收入总额	US$4,500,000 4,500,000 美元
Aggregate operating cash flow for three years (each year must report a positive amount) 三年的运营现金流总额（每年必须为正数）	US$25,000 25,000 美元

EXHIBIT 3 (CONT'D): LISTING REQUIREMENTS IN HONG KONG AND NEW YORK EXCHANGES
附录 3（续）：香港和纽约证券交易所的上市要求

NASDAQ National Market listing requirements
纳斯达克全国市场上市要求

Option 1 方案 1

Option 2 方案 2

Option 3 方案 3

Stockholders' equity 股东权益

US$15 million 1,500 万美元

US$30 million 3000 万美元

N/A 不适用

市值

^{1 。}

或总资产和总收入

Market capitalization

^{1}

Total assets and

Total revenue

N/A 不适用

US$75 million or US$75 million and US$75 million
7,500 万美元或 7,500 万美元和 7,500 万美元

Income from continuing operations before income taxes (in the latest fiscal year or in two of the last three fiscal years)
所得税前持续经营业务收入（最近一个财政年度或过去三个财政年度中的两个年度）

US$1 million 100 万美元

N/A 不适用

Publicly held shares

^{2}

公开持有的股份

^{2}

1.1 million 110 万

Operating history 运营历史

N/A 不适用

2 years 2 年

N/A 不适用

Market value of publicly held shares
公众持股市值

US$8 million 800 万美元

US$18 million 1,800 万美元

US$20 million 2 000 万美元

Minimum bid price 最低投标价格

US$5 5 美元

Shareholders (round lot holders)

^{3}

股东（整数手持有人）

^{3}

400

Market makers 做市商

Meets corporate governance requirements
符合公司治理要求

Yes 是

^{1}

For a company to meet the requirements of Option 3, it must either satisfy the market capitalization requirement or else satisfy both the total assets and the total revenue requirements.

^{1}

要满足方案 3 的要求，公司必须满足市值要求，否则就必须同时满足总资产和总收入要求。

^{2}

Publicly held shares: Total shares outstanding less any shares held directly or indirectly by any officer or director of the company and by any other person who is the beneficial owner of more than

10 %

of the total shares outstanding.

^{2}

公开持有的股份：已发行股票总数减去公司任何高级职员或董事直接或间接持有的任何股票，以及作为实际所有人持有超过

10 %

已发行股票总数的任何其他人士直接或间接持有的任何股票。

^{3}

Round lot holders of 100 shares or more.

^{3}

100 股或以上的整手持有人。
Source: “Strategies for Going IPO,” Deloitte, 2007.
《资料来源"上市战略》，德勤，2007 年。

EXHIBIT 4: ALIBABA'S INCOME STATEMENT (2014)
附图 4：阿里巴巴损益表（2014 年）

Consolidated statements of operations data
合并业务报表数据

	Year ended March 31, 截至 3 月 31 日的年度					Nine months ended December 31, 20122013 截至 2012 年 12 月 31 日的九个月 2013 年
	$2010^{(1)}$	$2011^{(1)}$	2012	2013
	RMB	RMB	RMB	RMB	US$ 美元	RMB	RMB	US$ 美元
	(in millions, except per share data) (单位：百万，每股数据除外）
Revenue 收入
China commerce 中国商务	3,716	7,665	15,637	29,167	4,692	21,925	35,167	5,657
International commerce 国际商务	2,620	3,433	3,765	4,160	669	3,117	3,557	572
Cloud computing and Internet infrastructure 云计算和互联网基础设施	144	425	515	650	105	484	560	90
Others 其他	190	380	108	540	87	317	1,189	192
Total 总计	6,670	11,903	20,025	34,517	5,553	25,843	40,473	6,511
Cost of revenue 收入成本	$(1, 634)$	$(3, 497)$	$(6, 554)$	$(9, 719)$	$(1, 563)$	$(7, 442)$	$(9, 899)$	$(1, 592)$
Product development expenses 产品开发费用	$(1, 135)$	$(2, 062)$	$(2, 897)$	$(3, 753)$	(604)	$(2, 899)$	$(3, 893)$	(626)
Sales and marketing expenses 销售和营销费用	$(2, 335)$	$(3, 154)$	$(3, 058)$	$(3, 613)$	(581)	$(3, 092)$	$(3, 267)$	(526)
General and administrative expenses 一般和行政费用	$(1, 000)$	$(1, 724)$	$(2, 211)$	$(2, 889)$	(465)	$(2, 344)$	$(3, 704)$	(596)
Amortization of intangible assets 无形资产摊销	(131)	(144)	(155)	(130)	(21)	(105)	(197)	(32)
Impairment of goodwill and intangible assets 商誉和无形资产减值	$(1, 308)$	-	(135)	(175)	(28)	(175)	(44)	(7)
Yahoo TIPLA amendment payment 雅虎 TIPLA 修订付款	—	—	—	$(3, 487)$	(561)	$(3, 487)$	-	-
Income (loss) from operations 业务收入（亏损	(873)	1,322	5,015	10,751	1,730	6,299	19,469	3,132
Interest and investment income (loss), net 利息和投资收入（损失）净额	384	549	258	39	6	(25)	1,080	174

EXHIBIT 4 (CONTINUED) 展品 4（续）

	Year ended March 31 截至 3 月 31 日的年度				Nine months ended December 31 2012 2013 截至 12 月 31 日的九个月 2012 2013
	$2010^{(1)}$	$2011^{(1)}$	2012	2013
	(in millions, except per share data) (单位：百万，每股数据除外）
Interest expense 利息支出		(4)	(68)	$(1, 572)$	(253)	$(1, 113)$	$(1, 842)$	(296)
Other income, net 其他收入，净额	200	68	327	894	144	593	1,178	189
Income (loss) before income tax and share of results of equity investees 所得税及应占权益投资收益前收入（亏损	(289)	1,935	5,532	10,112	1,627	5,754	19,885	3,199
Income tax expenses 所得税支出	(181)	(327)	(842)	$(1, 457)$	(234)	$(1, 362)$	$(1, 969)$	(317)
Share of results of equity investees 应占权益投资对象业绩	(33)	-	(25)	(6)	(1)	(9)	(174)	(28)
Net income (loss) 净收入（亏损）	(503)	1,608	4,665	8,649	1,392	4,383	17,742	2,854
Net income (loss) attributable to noncontrolling interests 归属于非控股权益的净收入（亏损	(299)	(425)	(437)	(117)	(19)	(108)	(29)	(5)
Net income (loss) attributable to Alibaba Group Holding Limited 归属于阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司的净收入（亏损	(802)	1,183	4,228	8,532	1,373	4,275	17,713	2,849
Accretion of convertible preference shares 可转换优先股的增殖	-	—	—	(17)	(3)	(9)	(24)	(4)
Dividends accrued on convertible preference shares 可转换优先股应计股息	-	—	-	(111)	(18)	(59)	(156)	(25)
Net income (loss) attributable to ordinary shareholders 归属于普通股股东的净收入（亏损	(802)	1,183	4,228	8,404	1,352	4,207	17,533	2,820
Earnings (loss) per share attributable to ordinary shareholders: 普通股股东应占每股收益（亏损）：
Basic 基础	(0.34)	0.49	1.71	3.66	0.59	1.80	8.08	1.30
Diluted 稀释	(0.34)	0.48	1.67	3.57	0.57	1.76	7.63	1.23
Supplemental information: e 补充信息： e
Adjusted EBITDA 调整后的 EBITDA	1,390	3,009	7,274	16,607	2,672	11,698	23,845	3,836
Adjusted income (loss) from operations 调整后的运营收入（亏损	(511)	2,254	6,269	15,497	2,494	10,820	22,657	3,645
Adjusted net income (loss) 调整后净收入（亏损）	(141)	2,540	5,919	13,395	2,156	8,904	20,930	3,367
Free cash flow 自由现金流	2,280	4,881	8,752	19,745	3,177	17,389	29,936	4,816

| | Year ended March 31 | | | | Nine months ended December 31 2012 2013 | | | | | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | | $2010^{(1)}$ | $2011^{(1)}$ | 2012 | 2013 | | | | | | | (in millions, except per share data) | | | | | | | | | Interest expense | | (4) | (68) | $(1,572)$ | (253) | $(1,113)$ | $(1,842)$ | (296) | | Other income, net | 200 | 68 | 327 | 894 | 144 | 593 | 1,178 | 189 | | Income (loss) before income tax and share of results of equity investees | (289) | 1,935 | 5,532 | 10,112 | 1,627 | 5,754 | 19,885 | 3,199 | | Income tax expenses | (181) | (327) | (842) | $(1,457)$ | (234) | $(1,362)$ | $(1,969)$ | (317) | | Share of results of equity investees | (33) | - | (25) | (6) | (1) | (9) | (174) | (28) | | Net income (loss) | (503) | 1,608 | 4,665 | 8,649 | 1,392 | 4,383 | 17,742 | 2,854 | | Net income (loss) attributable to noncontrolling interests | (299) | (425) | (437) | (117) | (19) | (108) | (29) | (5) | | Net income (loss) attributable to Alibaba Group Holding Limited | (802) | 1,183 | 4,228 | 8,532 | 1,373 | 4,275 | 17,713 | 2,849 | | Accretion of convertible preference shares | - | — | — | (17) | (3) | (9) | (24) | (4) | | Dividends accrued on convertible preference shares | - | — | - | (111) | (18) | (59) | (156) | (25) | | Net income (loss) attributable to ordinary shareholders | (802) | 1,183 | 4,228 | 8,404 | 1,352 | 4,207 | 17,533 | 2,820 | | Earnings (loss) per share attributable to ordinary shareholders: | | | | | | | | | | Basic | (0.34) | 0.49 | 1.71 | 3.66 | 0.59 | 1.80 | 8.08 | 1.30 | | Diluted | (0.34) | 0.48 | 1.67 | 3.57 | 0.57 | 1.76 | 7.63 | 1.23 | | Supplemental information: $\quad$ e | | | | | | | | | | Adjusted EBITDA | 1,390 | 3,009 | 7,274 | 16,607 | 2,672 | 11,698 | 23,845 | 3,836 | | Adjusted income (loss) from operations | (511) | 2,254 | 6,269 | 15,497 | 2,494 | 10,820 | 22,657 | 3,645 | | Adjusted net income (loss) | (141) | 2,540 | 5,919 | 13,395 | 2,156 | 8,904 | 20,930 | 3,367 | | Free cash flow | 2,280 | 4,881 | 8,752 | 19,745 | 3,177 | 17,389 | 29,936 | 4,816 |

Source: Alibaba’s IPO Prospectus,
资料来源阿里巴巴 IPO 招股说明书、
http://edgar.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1577552/000119312514184994/d709111df1.htm, accessed April 16, 2014.
http://edgar.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1577552/000119312514184994/d709111df1.htm，2014 年 4 月 16 日访问。

EXHIBIT 5: COMPONENTS OF ALIBABA'S REVENUE (2014)
图表 5：阿里巴巴收入构成（2014 年）

Year ended March 31, 2012 2013
截至 2012 年 3 月 31 日的年度 2013

Nine months ended December 31, 2012 2013
截至 2012 年 12 月 31 日的九个月 2013 年

RMB

% of revenue 占收入的百分比

RMB

百万美元

US$

n milli

% of revenue ions, exc
占收入的百分比

人民币

RMB

ept perc

% of revenue entages) 占收入的百分比)

RMB

US$ 美元

% of revenue 占收入的百分比

China commerce 中国商务

Retail 零售

13,422

67.0%

26,970

\begin{matrix} 4, 33 \\ 9 \end{matrix}

78.1%

20,216

78.2%

33,461

5,383

82.7%

Wholesale 批发

2,215

11.1%

2,197

353

6.4%

1,709

6.6%

1,706

274

4.2%

Total China commerce 中国贸易总额

15,637

78.1%

29,167

\begin{matrix} 4, 69 \\ 2 \end{matrix}

84.5%

21,925

84.8%

35,167

5,657

86.9%

International commerce 国际商务

Retail 零售

223

1.1%

392

1.1%

264

1.0%

653

105

1.6%

Wholesale 批发

3,542

17.7%

3,768

606

10.9%

2,853

11.1%

2,904

467

7.2%

Total International commerce
国际商务共计

3,765

18.8%

4,160

669

12.0%

3,117

12.1%

3,557

572

8.8%

Cloud computing and Internet infrastructure
云计算和互联网基础设施

515

2.6%

650

105

1.9%

484

1.9%

560

1.4%

Others 其他

108

0.5%

540

1.6%

317

1.2%

1,189

192

2.9%

Total 总计

20,025

100.0%

34,517

\begin{matrix} 5, 55 \\ 3 \end{matrix}

100.0%

25,843

100.0%

40,473

6,511

100.0%

EXHIBIT 6: ALIBABA'S BALANCE SHEET (2014)
附图 6：阿里巴巴资产负债表（2014 年）

Consolidated balance sheet data:
合并资产负债表数据：

	As of March 31, 截至 3 月 31 日					As of December 31, 2013 截至 2013 年 12 月 31 日
	2010	2011	2012	201		As of December 31, 2013 截至 2013 年 12 月 31 日
	(in millions) （单位：百万）
Cash and cash equivalents and short-term investments $^{(1)}$ 现金及现金等价物和短期投资 $^{(1)}$	14,643	15,940	21,744	32,686	5,258	48,962	7,876
Investment securities and investment in equity investees 投资证券和对股权投资对象的投资	2,250	3,933	2,483	2,426	390	15,311	2,463
Property and equipment, net 财产和设备，净额	1,666	1,905	2,463	3,808	612	5,973	961
Goodwill and intangible assets 商誉和无形资产	11,518	11,846	11,791	11,628	1,871	13,250	2,131
Total assets 总资产	41,707	37,830	47,210	63,786	10,261	107,058	17,222
Current bank borrowings 当期银行借款	-	807	1,283	3,350	539	1,200	193
Secured borrowings 担保借款	—	-	-	2,098	337	8,884	1,429
Redeemable preference shares 可赎回优先股	—	—	—	5,191	835	-	-
Non-current bank borrowings 非流动银行借款	-	—	-	22,462	3,613	30,226	4,862
Total liabilities 负债总额	15,208	9,413	12,797	52,740	8,484	72,805	11,712
Convertible preference shares 可转换优先股	-	-	-	10,447	1,680	10,235	1,647
Total equity 总股本	26,493	28,402	34,383	513	83	23,892	3,843

EXHIBIT 7: SELECTED INTERNET IPOS (AS OF DECEMBER 2013)
图表 7：部分互联网 IPO（截至 2013 年 12 月）

COMPANY

Stock Ex- change 股票除权变动

IPO date 首次公开募股日期

首次公开募股发行价

IPO

Offer

Price

1^{st}

day price (adjusted)

1^{st}

当日价格（调整后）

current price 当前价格

Market Cap ($ billion)
市值（十亿美元）。

Forward P/E 远期市盈率

PIS

P/B

Amazon 亚马逊 Nasdaq 纳斯达克 5/16/1997 $\begin{aligned} 20.75 \\ (1.73) \end{aligned}$ 384.24 175.88B 143.91 2.49 19.22

eBay 易趣网 Nasdaq 纳斯达克 9/24/1998 $\begin{aligned} 47.38 \\ (1.97) \end{aligned}$ 51.55 66.74B 16.42 4.29 2.92

LinkedIn 公司

Corp

NYSE

05/18/2011

94.25

229.3

27.38

103.29

19.98

10.92

Groupon Inc. Nasdaq 纳斯达克 11/03/2011 26.11 10.24 6.84 40.96 2.84 8.57

Zynga Inc. Nasdaq 纳斯达克 12/15/2011 9.5 4.11 3.35 N/A 不适用 3.35 1.80

Facebook 在 Facebook 上 Nasdaq 纳斯达克 05/18/2012 38.23 53.32 130.89 47.61 18.52 9.69

Twitter 推特 NYSE 11/07/2013 44.29 59 32.14 N/A 不适用 56.39 36.86

Asia 亚洲

Tencent 腾讯 HK 06/16/2004 $\begin{array}{r} HK4.15 \\ (HK4.08) \end{array}$ HK466.2 HK$856.49 港币 856.49 元 $\begin{array}{r} 53.72 \\ (trailing) \end{array}$ 96.80 101.81

Baidu 百度 Nasdaq 纳斯达克 08/05/2005 $\begin{aligned} 122.54 \\ (12.25) \end{aligned}$ 171.24 59.92 4.27 13.09 10.73

巨人 Inter G

Giant Inter

NYSE

11/01/2007

\begin{aligned} 18.23 \\ (9.15) \end{aligned}

11.07

2.65

11.18

7.15

4.95

盛大游戏

Shanda

Games

Nasdaq 纳斯达克

09/25/2009

\begin{aligned} 10.75 \\ (8.43) \end{aligned}

4.36

1.17

5.25

1.62

30.29

Renren 人人网 NYSE 05/04/2011 18.01 2.91 3.22 N/A 不适用 16.96 2.75

Source: Assembled by the author based on the information provided by Yahoo! Finance.
资料来源作者根据雅虎财经提供的信息整理。

ENDNOTES 结束语

^{1}

A.Sorkin, “The Man Behind Alibaba’s Eventual IPO,” January 13, 2014, www.cnbc.com/id/101334435, accessed January 27, 2014.

^{1}

A.Sorkin, "The Man Behind Alibaba's Eventual IPO," January 13, 2014, www.cnbc.com/id/101334435, accessed January 27, 2014.

^{2}

Material in this section is based on Alibaba Group’s website, accessed December 14, 2013.

^{2}

本节材料基于阿里巴巴集团网站，访问日期：2013 年 12 月 14 日。

^{3}

All figures are in US$ unless otherwise stated.

^{3}

除非另有说明，所有数字均以美元为单位。
4 “The World’s Greatest Bazaar, Alibaba, a Trailblazing Chinese Internet Giant, Will Soon Go Public,” The Economist, March 23, 2013.
4 《世界上最伟大的集市--中国互联网巨头阿里巴巴即将上市》，《经济学人》，2013 年 3 月 23 日。

^{5} lbid

^{6}

D. Dion, “Yahoo’s Alibaba Prepares for IPO as Its Online Sales Are Set To Explode,” seekingalpha.com, November 11, 2013.

^{6}

D. Dion，"雅虎旗下阿里巴巴准备 IPO，其在线销售额即将爆发"，seekingalpha.com，2013 年 11 月 11 日。

^{7}

L. Yi, “I Made Cruel Decisions,’ Said Jack Ma of His Illustrious Career,” South China Morning Post, July 13, 2013.

^{7}

L. Yi，《"我做了残酷的决定"，马云谈及他辉煌的职业生涯》，《南华早报》，2013 年 7 月 13 日。

_{8}

A. Jourdan, “Surviving Chairman Ma: Life in the Shadow of China’s Alibaba,” Reuters, November 26, 2013.

_{8}

A. Jourdan，《马云主席的生存之道：中国阿里巴巴阴影下的生活》，路透社，2013 年 11 月 26 日。
9 “The Alibaba Phenomenon, China’s e-commerce Giant Could Generate Enormous Wealth - Provided the Country’s Rulers Leave It Alone,” The Economist, March 23, 2013.
9 《阿里巴巴现象，中国电子商务巨头可能创造巨大财富--前提是国家统治者不干涉》，《经济学人》，2013 年 3 月 23 日。

^{10}

L. Yilun Chen, “Alibaba Quarterly Profit Rises Ahead of Potential IPO,” Bloomberg, January 29, 2014.

^{10}

L. Yilun Chen，"阿里巴巴季度利润在潜在 IPO 前上升"，彭博社，2014 年 1 月 29 日。

^{11}

Jourdan, op. cit.

^{11}

Jourdan, 同前。

^{12}

A. Truong, “Google ‘Fighting the Good Fight’ in China,” Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2010.

^{12}

A. Truong，《谷歌在中国 "打得漂亮"》，《华尔街日报》，2010 年 9 月 30 日。

^{13}

S. Bass, “China’s Facebook Status: Blocked,” ABC News, July 8, 2009.

^{13}

S. Bass，"中国的 Facebook 状态：美国广播公司新闻，2009 年 7 月 8 日。
14 “Alibaba vs Baidu: Can e-Commerce Trump Search?” ZDNET, September 26, 2011.
14 "阿里巴巴与百度：电子商务能否战胜搜索？ZDNET，2011 年 9 月 26 日。

^{15}

S. Morrison, “Alibaba Buys U.S. e-Commerce Software Firm Vendio,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2010.

^{15}

S. Morrison，《阿里巴巴收购美国电子商务软件公司 Vendio》，《华尔街日报》，2010 年 6 月 25 日。

^{16}

Ibid.

^{16}

同上。

^{17}

http://venturebeat.com/2013/06/07/fanatics-raises-170m-at-3-1b-valuation-to-sell-stuff-to-sports-fans, accessed December 24, 2013.

^{17}

http://venturebeat.com/2013/06/07/fanatics-raises-170m-at-3-1b-valuation-to-sell-stuff-to-sports-fans, 2013 年 12 月 24 日访问。

^{18}

G. Bensinger, “Alibaba Leads $206 Million Investment in ShopRunner, Chinese e-Commerce Giant Continues U.S. Push Ahead of Planned IPO,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2013.

^{18}

G. Bensinger，"阿里巴巴领投 ShopRunner 2.06 亿美元，中国电子商务巨头在计划 IPO 前继续推进美国市场"，《华尔街日报》，2013 年 10 月 10 日。

^{19}

Ibid.

^{19}

同上。

^{20} Ibid

^{21}

R. Cookson, “Sina Sells Weibo Stake to Alibaba for US$586 Million,” Financial Times, April 29, 2013.

^{21}

R. Cookson，《新浪以 5.86 亿美元将微博股份出售给阿里巴巴》，《金融时报》，2013 年 4 月 29 日。

^{22}

Ibid.

^{22}

同上。

^{23}

www.techinasia.com/alibaba-invested-autonavi, accessed December 24, 2013.

^{23}

www.techinasia.com/alibaba-invested-autonavi, 2013 年 12 月 24 日访问。

^{24}

www.alizila.com/alibaba-buys-kanbox-expand-cloud-computing-services, accessed December 24, 2013.

^{24}

www.alizila.com/alibaba-buys-kanbox-expand-cloud-computing-services, 2013 年 12 月 24 日访问。

^{25}

www.alizila.com/alibaba-invests-364-million-haier-boost-china-logistics, accessed January 27, 2014.

^{25}

www.alizila.com/alibaba-invests-364-million-haier-boost-china-logistics, 2014 年 1 月 27 日访问。

^{26}

Ibid, accessed December 24, 2013.

^{26}

同上，2013 年 12 月 24 日访问。

^{27}

K. Anderson, “Alibaba IPO: Latest Acquisition Brings e-Commerce to Department Stores,” Money Morning, April 3, 2014.

^{27}

K. Anderson，"阿里巴巴 IPO：最新收购为百货公司带来电子商务》，《货币早报》，2014 年 4 月 3 日。

^{28}

C. Clover, “Alibaba Buys Majority Stake in ChinaVision,” Financial Times, March 11, 2014.

^{28}

C. Clover，《阿里巴巴收购华视传媒多数股权》，《金融时报》，2014 年 3 月 11 日。

^{29}

A. Wolfe, “How Is an IPO Like a Marriage? The Billionaire Founder of China’s Alibaba Goes Public,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2013.

^{29}

A. Wolfe，"IPO 如何像一场婚姻？中国阿里巴巴亿万富翁创始人上市》，《华尔街日报》，2013 年 5 月 10 日。

^{30}

S. Ross, R. Westerfield, B. Jordan, J. Lim and R. Tan, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, (Chapter 8), Asia Global Edition, 2012.

^{30}

S. Ross、R. Westerfield、B. Jordan、J. Lim 和 R. Tan，《公司财务基础》（第 8 章），亚洲环球版，2012 年。

^{31}

K. Froot and E. Dabora, “How Are Stock Prices Affected by the Location of Trade?” Journal of Financial Economics, 1999.

^{31}

K. Froot 和 E. Dabora，"贸易地点如何影响股票价格？金融经济学杂志》，1999 年。

^{32}

J. Bodurtha, Dong-Soon Kim and C. Lee, “Closed-end Country Funds and U.S. Market Sentiment,” Review of Financial Studies, 1995

^{32}

J. Bodurtha、Dong-Soon Kim 和 C. Lee，《封闭式国家基金与美国市场情绪》，《金融研究评论》，1995 年。

^{33}

The classification is based on Lease, McConnel and Mikkelson, “The Market Value of Control in Publicly Traded Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 1983.

^{33}

该分类基于 Lease、McConnel 和 Mikkelson 合著的《公开交易公司控制权的市场价值》，《金融经济学杂志》，1983 年。

^{34}

This is in contrast to Twitter, which, as an exception, opted to have a single class share structure.

^{34}

这与 Twitter 形成了鲜明对比，后者例外地选择了单一类别股份结构。

^{35}

A. Seave, “45 Media Companies Where Investors are Flying Second Class,” Forbes, October 21, 2013.

^{35}

A. Seave，《投资者乘坐二等舱的 45 家媒体公司》，《福布斯》，2013 年 10 月 21 日。

^{36}

A. Smith, P. J. Davies and S. Foley, “Exchanges Divided by Dual-class Shares,” Financial Times, October 3, 2013.

^{36}

A.Smith、P.J. Davies 和 S. Foley，"Exchanges Divided by Dual-class Shares"，《金融时报》，2013 年 10 月 3 日。

^{37}

T. Nenova, “The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: a Cross-Country Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 2003.

^{37}

T. Nenova，《公司表决权和控制权的价值：跨国分析》，《金融经济学杂志》，2003 年。

^{\frac{18}{8}}

This paragraph is based on Charles Li’s blog post on September 24, 2013,

^{\frac{18}{8}}

本段根据李嘉诚 2013 年 9 月 24 日的博文改写、
www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/blog/130925blog.htm, accessed December 13, 2013.
www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/blog/130925blog.htm, 2013 年 12 月 13 日访问。

^{39}

R. Chan and E. Yiu, “Alibaba in Stand-off with HKEx Over Hong Kong IPO,” South China Morning Post, August 24, 2013.

^{39}

R. Chan and E. Yiu, "Alibaba in stand-off with HKEx Over Hong Kong IPO," South China Morning Post, August 24, 2013.

^{40}

L. Yilun Chen, “Alibaba versus Hong Kong Exchange Plays Out in Tsai-Li Blogs,” Bloomberg, Sep 27, 2013.

^{40}

L. Yilun Chen，"阿里巴巴与香港交易所在蔡李博客中的较量"，彭博社，2013 年 9 月 27 日。

^{41}

Ibid.

^{41}

同上。

^{42}

E. Barreto and D. Thomas, “U.S. to Get Coveted Alibaba IPO After Hong Kong Talks Founder,” Reuters, September 26, 2013.

^{42}

E.Barreto和D.Thomas，《香港与创始人谈判后，美国将获得梦寐以求的阿里巴巴IPO》，路透社，2013年9月26日。

^{43}

J. Osawa and T. Demos, “Alibaba U.S. Listing Would be New Battle for Exchanges,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2013.

^{43}

J. Osawa 和 T. Demos，《阿里巴巴美国上市将是交易所的新战役》，《华尔街日报》，2013 年 9 月 25 日。

^{44}

M. J. de la Merced, “U.S. Exchanges Set to Compete for Alibaba I.P.O.,” New York Times, October 21, 2013.

^{44}

M. J. de la Merced，《美国交易所将争夺阿里巴巴 I.P.O.》，《纽约时报》，2013 年 10 月 21 日。

^{45}

X. Haiguang, “Commitment to Principles Trumps Alibaba IPO,” Global Times, October 17, 2013; C. Riley, “Alibaba and Hong Kong Resume IPO Flirtation,” CNNMoney, October 25, 2013.

^{45}

X. Haiguang，《对原则的承诺胜过阿里巴巴的 IPO》，《环球时报》，2013 年 10 月 17 日；C. Riley，《阿里巴巴与香港重启 IPO 调情》，《CNNMoney》，2013 年 10 月 25 日。

^{46}

E. Curran, “Alibaba Prompts Hong Kong IPO Rethink,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2014.

^{46}

E. Curran，《阿里巴巴促使香港重新思考 IPO》，《华尔街日报》，2014 年 1 月 9 日。

^{47}

www.hkex.com.hk/eng/exchange/corpinfo/profile.htm, accessed December 17, 2013.

^{47}

www.hkex.com.hk/eng/exchange/corpinfo/profile.htm, 2013 年 12 月 17 日访问。

^{48}

E. Hrnjic, P. Matos and L. Tu, Focus Media, 2014.

^{48}

E. Hrnjic、P. Matos 和 L. Tu，分众传媒，2014 年。

^{49}

G. Chang, “Chinese Companies to Nasdaq: Sayonara, Zai Jian, Bye Bye,” Forbes, October 10, 2013. www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/03/10/chinese-companies-to-nasdaq-sayonara-zai-jian-bye-bye/, accessed November 25, 2014.

^{49}

G. Chang，《中国公司登陆纳斯达克：再见，再建，再见》，《福布斯》，2013 年 10 月 10 日。www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/03/10/chinese-companies-to-nasdaq-sayonara-zai-jian-bye-bye/，2014 年 11 月 25 日访问。

^{50}

Ibid.

^{50}

同上。

^{51} Ibid

^{52}

R. Jagannathan, A. Jirnyi and A. Sherman, “Why Don’t Issuers Choose IPO Auctions? The Complexity of Indirect Mechanisms,” working paper, 2010.

^{52}

R. Jagannathan、A. Jirnyi 和 A. Sherman，《发行人为何不选择 IPO 拍卖？间接机制的复杂性》，工作文件，2010 年。

^{53}

Jay Ritter’s web page, http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2013Underpricing.pdf, accessed April 17, 2014.

^{53}

杰伊-里特的网页，http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2013Underpricing.pdf，2014年4月17日访问。

^{54}

In Europe, a very small percentage of IPOs is priced outside of the range - approximately 10 per cent of IPOs. See T. Jenkinson, A. D. Morrison and W. J. Wilhelm, Jr., “Why Are European IPOs So Rarely Priced Outside the Indicative Price Range?” Journal of Financial Economics, 2006.

^{54}

在欧洲，首次公开发行股票的定价超出范围的比例很小，约占首次公开发行股票的 10%。参见 T. Jenkinson、A. D. Morrison 和 W. J. Wilhelm, Jr.，"为什么欧洲 IPO 的定价很少超出指示性价格范围？金融经济学杂志》，2006 年。

^{55}

Hsiu-Hua Chang, A. Chen, L. Kao and Chin-Shun Wu, “IPO Price Discovery Efficiency under Alternative Regulatory Constraints: Taiwan, Hong Kong and the U.S.,” International Review of Economics & Finance, 2014.

^{55}

Hsiu-Hua Chang, A. Chen, L. Kao and Chin-Shun Wu, "IPO Price Discovery Efficiency under Alternative Regulatory Constraints：台湾、香港和美国》，《国际经济与金融评论》，2014 年。

^{56}

M. Abrahamson, T. Jenkinson and H. Jones, “Why Don’t U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs?” Journal of Finance, 2011.

^{56}

M.Abrahamson、T.Jenkinson 和 H.Jones，"为什么美国发行人不要求欧洲的 IPO 费用？金融杂志》，2011 年。
57 www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/6584732/yahoo-inc-yhoo-set-to-reap-biggest-windfall-as-alibaba-nears-ipo,

_{58}

accessed December 13, 2013.
57 www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/6584732/yahoo-inc-yhoo-set-to-reap-biggest-windfall-as-alibaba-nears-ipo,

_{58}

2013 年 12 月 13 日访问。
58 A. Oreskovic, “Yahoo’s Alibaba Stake Takes Heat Off Weak Forecast,” Reuters, October 15, 2013. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/yahoos-alibaba-stake-takes-heat-off-weak-forecast-010615293--sector.html, accessed November 25, 2014.
58 A. Oreskovic，《雅虎持有阿里巴巴股份，为疲软的预测降温》，路透社，2013 年 10 月 15 日。http://finance.yahoo.com/news/yahoos-alibaba-stake-takes-heat-off-weak-forecast-010615293--sector.html，2014 年 11 月 25 日访问。

^{59}

http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/10/16/alibaba-isnt-the-amazon-of-china, accessed December 17, 2013.

^{59}

http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/10/16/alibaba-isnt-the-amazon-of-china, 2013 年 12 月 17 日访问。

^{60} Ibid

^{61}

J. Dreyfuss, “Why the Alibaba IPO Is More Important Than Twitter’s,” CNBC.com, October 22, 2013, www.cnbc.com/id/101129930#, accessed November 25, 2014.

^{61}

J. Dreyfuss，《为什么阿里巴巴的 IPO 比 Twitter 的 IPO 更重要》，CNBC.com，2013 年 10 月 22 日，www.cnbc.com/id/101129930#，2014 年 11 月 25 日访问。

^{62}

B. Nichols, “What’s the Best Way to Play 2014’s Hottest IPO?” The Motley Fool, January 6, 2014. www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/06/whats-the-best-way-to-play-2014s-hottest-ipo.aspx, accessed November 25, 2014.

^{62}

B. Nichols，"玩转 2014 年最热门 IPO 的最佳方式是什么？"The Motley Fool，2014 年 1 月 6 日。www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/06/whats-the-best-way-to-play-2014s-hottest-ipo.aspx，2014 年 11 月 25 日访问。

^{63}

Dreyfuss, op. cit.

^{63}

Dreyfuss，引用如前。

^{64}

Chen, Alibaba Quarterly Profit Rises Ahead of Potential IPO, op. cit.

^{64}

陈，《阿里巴巴季度利润在潜在 IPO 前上升》，引用如前。

^{65} Ibid

^{66}

www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2013/12/31/market-year-end-high/4263237/, accessed April 17, 2014.

^{66}

www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2013/12/31/market-year-end-high/4263237/, 2014 年 4 月 17 日访问。

^{67}

www.hsi.com.hk/HSI-Net/static/revamp/contents/en/dI_centre/other_materials/20131231e.pdf, accessed April 17, 2014.

^{67}

www.hsi.com.hk/HSI-Net/static/revamp/contents/en/dI_centre/other_materials/20131231e.pdf, 2014 年 4 月 17 日访问。

^{68}

S. Schaefer, “JD.com IPO Shows Allure of Chinese e-Commerce, with Alibaba on Deck,” Forbes, May 22, 2014. www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2014/05/22/jd-com-jumps-in-ipo-debut-chinese-e-retailer-rallies-16/, accessed November 25, 2014.

^{68}

S.Schaefer，"JD.com IPO 显示了中国电子商务的诱惑力，阿里巴巴也在其中，"《福布斯》，2014 年 5 月 22 日。www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2014/05/22/jd-com-jumps-in-ipo-debut-chinese-e-retailer-rallies-16/，2014 年 11 月 25 日访问。

^{69}

F. Hu and J. Browning, "WH Group Pulls $1.9 Billion IPO as Bottom Price Said Snubbed,"Bloomberg, April 30, 2014. www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-29/wh-group-said-to-cancel-1-9-billion-hong-kong-initial-offer-1-.html, accessed November 25, 2014.

^{69}

F. Hu 和 J. Browning，"WH Group Pulls $1.9 billion IPO as Bottom Price Said Snubbed"，彭博社，2014 年 4 月 30 日。www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-29/wh-group-said-to-cancel-1-9-billion-hong-kong-initial-offer-1-.html，2014 年 11 月 25 日访问。

The authors would like to thank the Centre for Asset Management Research & Investments (CAMRI), NUS
作者衷心感谢新加坡国立大学资产管理研究与投资中心 (CAMRI)
Business School for its donation to this case.
感谢商学院对本案的捐赠。
$^{1}$ Round lot holders are holders of 100 shares or more.
$^{1}$ 整数手持有人指持有 100 股或更多股票的持有人。
$^{2}$ In connection with IPOs, the NYSE will accept assurance from the company’s underwriter that the offering will meet or exceed the exchange’s standards.
$^{2}$ 在 IPO 方面，纽约证券交易所将接受公司承销商的保证，即发行将达到或超过交易所的标准。

ALIBABA'S IPO DILEMMA: HONG KONG OR NEW YORK? 阿里巴巴的 IPO 困境：香港还是纽约？

Abstract 摘要

ALIBABA GROUP 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}

E-Commerce in China 中国的电子商务

Alibaba's Competition 阿里巴巴的竞争

Acquisition Spree 收购狂潮

IPO PLANS 首次公开募股计划

Trading Location 交易地点

Dual-Class Ownership Structure双层所有权结构

HKEx's Position 香港交易所的立场

Alibaba's Reaction 阿里巴巴的反应

Alibaba's Next Step 阿里巴巴的下一步

IPO MARKETS IPO 市场

Hong Kong and New York香港和纽约

Differences in IPO Process首次公开募股程序的差异

VALUATION 估价

EPILOGUE 后记

EXHIBIT 1: ALIBABA'S MARKET SHARE (2013)图表 1：阿里巴巴的市场份额（2013 年）

EXHIBIT 2: DUAL-CLASS FIRMS IN S&P 1500 COMPOSITE (SELECTED)图表 2：标准普尔 1500 指数综合指数中的双级公司（部分）

EXHIBIT 3: LISTING REQUIREMENTS IN HONG KONG AND NEW YORK EXCHANGES附录 3：香港和纽约证券交易所的上市要求

NYSE listing requirements纽约证券交易所上市要求

EXHIBIT 3 (CONT'D): LISTING REQUIREMENTS IN HONG KONG AND NEW YORK EXCHANGES附录 3（续）：香港和纽约证券交易所的上市要求

EXHIBIT 4: ALIBABA'S INCOME STATEMENT (2014)附图 4：阿里巴巴损益表（2014 年）

EXHIBIT 4 (CONTINUED) 展品 4（续）

EXHIBIT 5: COMPONENTS OF ALIBABA'S REVENUE (2014)图表 5：阿里巴巴收入构成（2014 年）

EXHIBIT 6: ALIBABA'S BALANCE SHEET (2014)附图 6：阿里巴巴资产负债表（2014 年）

EXHIBIT 7: SELECTED INTERNET IPOS (AS OF DECEMBER 2013)图表 7：部分互联网 IPO（截至 2013 年 12 月）

ENDNOTES 结束语

ALIBABA'S IPO DILEMMA: HONG KONG OR NEW YORK?
阿里巴巴的 IPO 困境：香港还是纽约？

ALIBABA GROUP $^{2}$

Dual-Class Ownership Structure
双层所有权结构

Hong Kong and New York
香港和纽约

Differences in IPO Process
首次公开募股程序的差异

EXHIBIT 1: ALIBABA'S MARKET SHARE (2013)
图表 1：阿里巴巴的市场份额（2013 年）

EXHIBIT 2: DUAL-CLASS FIRMS IN S&P 1500 COMPOSITE (SELECTED)
图表 2：标准普尔 1500 指数综合指数中的双级公司（部分）

EXHIBIT 3: LISTING REQUIREMENTS IN HONG KONG AND NEW YORK EXCHANGES
附录 3：香港和纽约证券交易所的上市要求

NYSE listing requirements
纽约证券交易所上市要求

EXHIBIT 3 (CONT'D): LISTING REQUIREMENTS IN HONG KONG AND NEW YORK EXCHANGES
附录 3（续）：香港和纽约证券交易所的上市要求

EXHIBIT 4: ALIBABA'S INCOME STATEMENT (2014)
附图 4：阿里巴巴损益表（2014 年）

EXHIBIT 5: COMPONENTS OF ALIBABA'S REVENUE (2014)
图表 5：阿里巴巴收入构成（2014 年）

EXHIBIT 6: ALIBABA'S BALANCE SHEET (2014)
附图 6：阿里巴巴资产负债表（2014 年）

EXHIBIT 7: SELECTED INTERNET IPOS (AS OF DECEMBER 2013)
图表 7：部分互联网 IPO（截至 2013 年 12 月）