Every area of research has two boundaries marking the point at which the process of reflection ceases to be exact and takes on a philosophical character. The pre-conditions for cognition in general, like the axioms of every specific domain, cannot be presented and tested within the latter domain, but rather they call for a science of a more fundamental nature. The goal of this science, which is located in infinity, is to think without pre-conditions - a goal which the individual sciences deny themselves since they do not take any step without proof, that is, without pre-conditions of a substantive and methodological nature. Philosophy, too, cannot completely transcend such pre-conditions with regard to its own activity when it presents and tests them. But in this case, it is always the last point of cognition at which an authoritative decision and the appeal to the unprovable arises within us, and yet in view of the advances made in terms of what can be proved this point is never definitively fixed. If the start of the philosophical domain marks, as it were, the lower boundary of the exact domain, then its upper boundary lies at the point where the ever-fragmentary contents of positive knowledge seek to be augmented by definitive concepts into a world picture and to be related to the totality of life. If the history of the sciences really does reveal that the philosophical mode of cognition is the primitive mode, is a mere estimate of the phenomena in general concepts, then this provisional procedure is nevertheless indispensable when confronted with certain questions, namely those questions - especially those related to valuations and the most general relations of intellectual life - that we have so far been unable either to answer or to dismiss. Moreover, even the empirical in its perfected state might no more replace philosophy as an interpretation, a colouring and an individually selective emphasis of what is real than would
每个研究领域都有两个边界，标志着反思过程不再精确并开始带有哲学性质的点。一般认知的前提条件，像每个特定领域的公理，不能在后者领域内呈现和测试，而是需要一种更为基础性质的科学。这种位于无限的科学的目标是无条件思考——这个目标个别科学否定了自己，因为它们在没有证据的情况下不采取任何步骤，即，在没有实质性和方法论性质的前提条件下。哲学也不能在其自身活动中完全超越这样的前提条件，当它呈现和测试这些条件时。但在这种情况下，它始终是认知的最后一点，在这点上我们内心产生权威决策和对不可证伪的诉求，然而，考虑到在可证明内容方面所取得的进展，这个点从未被确定地固定下来。如果哲学领域的开始标志着精确领域的下界，那么它的上界则位于积极知识的碎片化内容试图通过确切概念来丰富成世界图景并与生命的整体相关联的点。 如果科学史确实揭示出哲学的认知模式是原始模式，是对现象的一种仅仅在一般概念中的估计，那么，面对某些问题——特别是那些与价值判断以及知识生活最普遍关系相关的问题——这种临时性的程序仍然是不可或缺的，因为到目前为止，我们既无法回答这些问题，也无法将其摒弃。此外，即使经验主义在其完善状态下，也不可能像哲学那样取代对现实的诠释、着色和个体选择性的强调，正如现象的机械复制的完善并不会使视觉艺术变得多余一样。
the perfection of the mechanical reproduction of phenomena make the visual arts superfluous.
现象的机械复制的完善并不会使视觉艺术变得多余。

Out of this general appraisal of philosophy’s position there emerge the rights that it possesses with regard to individual objects. If there is to be a philosophy of money, then it can only lie on either side of the economic science of money. On the one hand, it can present the pre-conditions that, situated in mental states, in social relations and in the logical structure of reality and values, give money its meaning and its practical position. This is not the question of the origin of money, for such a question belongs to history and not to philosophy. Moreover, no matter how much we appreciate the gain in the understanding of a phenomenon that is derived from a study of its historical development, its substantive meaning and importance often rest upon connections of a conceptual, psychological or ethical nature that are not temporal but rather are purely material. Such connections have, of course, been realized by historical forces, but are not exhausted by the fortuitousness of the latter. The significance, the dignity and the substance of justice, religion or knowledge lie completely beyond the question concerning the manner in which they were historically realized. The first part of this book, therefore, relates money to the conditions that determine its essence and the meaning of its existence.
在对哲学地位的总体评估中，出现了它在涉及个别对象时所拥有的权利。如果要有一门货币哲学，那么它只能位于货币经济科学的任一侧。一方面，它可以呈现出位于心理状态、社会关系以及现实和价值的逻辑结构中的前提条件，这些条件赋予了货币它的意义和实用地位。这并不是货币起源的问题，因为这样的问提属于历史而不是哲学。此外，无论我们多么重视通过研究一个现象的历史发展所获得的理解上的收益，其实质性的意义和重要性往往基于一些概念的、心理的或伦理性质的联系，而这些联系既不是时间性的，而是纯粹的物质性的。当然，这些联系是由历史力量实现的，但并未被后者的偶然性所耗尽。正义、宗教或知识的意义、尊严和实质完全超越了关于它们历史实现方式的问题。因此，本书的第一部分将货币与决定其本质和存在意义的条件联系起来。

The historical phenomenon of money, the idea and structure of which I shall attempt to develop out of feelings of value, out of praxis in relation to things and the reciprocal relationships between people as its presupposition, is studied in the second part of the book in its effects upon the inner world - upon the vitality of individuals, upon the linking of their fates, upon culture in general. Here, then, it is a question, on the one hand, of connections that are basically open to exact and detailed investigation but that, given the present state of knowledge, are not studied. They can only be dealt with in a philosophical manner, namely by a general estimation, by representing individual occurrences through connections between abstract concepts. On the other hand, it is a question of mental causes that will always be a matter of hypothetical interpretation and artistic reconstruction which can never be completely free from individual colouring. This combination of the money principle with the developments and valuations of inner life stands just as far behind the economic science of money as the problem area of the first part of the book stood before it. The one part seeks to make the essence of money intelligible from the conditions and connections of life in general; conversely, the other part seeks to make the essence and organization of the latter intelligible from the effectiveness of money.
货币的历史现象，我将尝试从价值感、与事物的实践以及人与人之间的互相关系作为其前提出发来展开，书籍的第二部分研究了其对内心世界的影响——对个体活力、命运的联系以及文化的整体影响。那么，这里一方面涉及到基本上可以进行精确和详细调查的联系，但由于目前的知识状况，这些联系并未被研究。它们只能从哲学的角度加以处理，即通过一般的估计，通过通过抽象概念之间的联系来代表个体发生的事情。另一方面，这是一个心理原因的问题，这些问题将始终是假设性解释和艺术重构的课题，永远无法完全摆脱个体的色彩。货币原则与内心生活的发展和评价的结合，正如书籍第一部分的问题领域在其之前一样，距离经济学的货币科学也相当遥远。一部分旨在从生活条件和联系中使货币的本质变得明了；相反，另一部分旨在从货币的有效性中使后者的本质和组织变得明了。

Not a single line of these investigations is meant to be a statement about economics. That is to say, the phenomena of valuation and purchase, of
这些研究中没有任何一行文字意在论述经济学。也就是说，经济学从一个角度看待的估价和购买、交换和交换手段、生产形式和占有价值等现象，在这里是从另一个角度看待的。仅仅是因为这些现象中与经济学最为接近的方面在实践中最为有趣，研究得最为透彻，并且能够以最精确的方式加以表达，这才产生了将它们简单地视为“经济事实”的表面理由。但正如宗教创始人的出现绝不仅仅是一种宗教现象，也可以运用心理学，甚至病理学、通史和社会学的范畴来研究一样；正如一首诗不仅仅是文学史的事实，也是美学、语言学和传记的事实一样；或者正如单一科学的立场，它也基于劳动分工，永远无法穷尽现实的全部一样——两个人交换产品这一事实绝不仅仅是一个经济事实。这样一个事实——即其内容会在经济学对其的描述中穷尽的事实——是不存在的。此外，同样合情合理的是，这种交换可以被视为一种心理学事实，或者一种源于道德史的事实，甚至是一种美学事实。
exchange and the means of exchange, of the forms of production and the values of possession, which economics views from one standpoint, are here viewed from another. It is merely the fact that the aspect of these phenomena closest to economics is the most interesting in practical terms, is the most thoroughly investigated and can be represented in the most exact manner which has given rise to the apparent justification for regarding them simply as ‘economic facts’. But just as the appearance of a founder of a religion is by no means simply a religious phenomenon, and can also be studied by using the categories of psychology, perhaps even of pathology, general history and sociology; or just as a poem is not simply a fact of literary history, but also an aesthetic, a philological and a biographical fact; or just as the very standpoint of a single science, which is also based on the division of labour, never exhausts the totality of reality - so the fact that two people exchange their products is by no means simply an economic fact. Such a fact - that is, one whose content would be exhausted in the image that economics presents of it - does not exist. Moreover, and just as legitimately, such an exchange can be treated as a psychological fact, or as one that derives from the history of morals or even as an aesthetic fact. Even when it is considered to be an economic fact, it does not reach the end of a cul-de-sac; rather, in this guise it becomes the object of philosophical study, which examines its pre-conditions in non-economic concepts and facts and its consequences for non-economic values and relationships.
exchange and the means of exchange, of the forms of production and the values of possession, which economics views from one standpoint, are here viewed from another. It is merely the fact that the aspect of these phenomena closest to economics is the most interesting in practical terms, is the most thoroughly investigated and can be represented in the most exact manner which has given rise to the apparent justification for regarding them simply as ‘economic facts’. But just as the appearance of a founder of a religion is by no means simply a religious phenomenon, and can also be studied by using the categories of psychology, perhaps even of pathology, general history and sociology; or just as a poem is not simply a fact of literary history, but also an aesthetic, a philological and a biographical fact; or just as the very standpoint of a single science, which is also based on the division of labour, never exhausts the totality of reality - so the fact that two people exchange their products is by no means simply an economic fact. Such a fact - that is, one whose content would be exhausted in the image that economics presents of it - does not exist. Moreover, and just as legitimately, such an exchange can be treated as a psychological fact, or as one that derives from the history of morals or even as an aesthetic fact. 即使它被视为经济事实，它也并不陷入死胡同；相反，以这种形式，它成为哲学研究的对象，探讨其在非经济概念和事实中的前提条件，以及对非经济价值和关系的影响。

In this problem-complex, money is simply a means, a material or an example for the presentation of relations that exist between the most superficial, ‘realistic’ and fortuitous phenomena and the most idealized powers of existence, the most profound currents of individual life and history. The significance and purpose of the whole undertaking is simply to derive from the surface level of economic affairs a guideline that leads to the ultimate values and things of importance in all that is human. The abstract philosophical construction of a system maintains such a distance from the individual phenomena, especially from practical existence, that actually, at first sight, it only postulates their salvation from isolation and lack of spirituality, even from repulsiveness. Here the achievement of such salvation will be exemplified in only a single instance, but in one which, like money, not merely reveals the indifference of purely economic techniques but rather is, as it were, indifference itself, in that its entire significance does not lie in itself but rather in its transformation into other values. But since the opposition between what is apparently most superficial and insubstantial and the inner substance of life reaches a peak here, there must be the most effective reconciliation if this particular fact not only permeates, actively and passively, the
在这个问题的复杂性中，金钱仅仅是一种手段，一种材料或一个例子，用于展示存在于最表层的“现实”和偶然现象与最理想化的存在力量、个体生命和历史的最深刻潮流之间的关系。整个工作的意义和目的就是从经济事务的表面层面引出一种指导方针，指向人类所有重要的最终价值和事物。抽象的哲学体系构建与个体现象，特别是与实际存在之间保持着如此遥远的距离，以至于实际上，乍一看，它只是假设了它们从孤立和缺乏灵性中解救出来，甚至从厌恶中解救出来。在这里，取得这种拯救的实例仅表现为单一的一个，但这个实例像金钱一样，不仅揭示了纯粹经济技术的漠不关心，甚至可以说就是漠不关心本身，因为它的全部意义不在于自身，而在于其转化为其他价值。但由于看似最表面的和无实质的事物与生活的内在实质之间的对立在此达到了顶峰，因此必须进行最有效的和解，如果这个特定事实不仅在积极和消极方面渗透。
entire range of the intellectual world but also manifests itself as the symbol of the essential forms of movement within this world. The unity of these investigations does not lie, therefore, in an assertion about a particular content of knowledge and its gradually accumulating proofs but rather in the possibility - which must be demonstrated - of finding in each of life’s details the totality of its meaning. The great advantage of art over philosophy is that it sets itself a single, narrowly defined problem every time: a person, a landscape, a mood. Every extension of one of these to the general, every addition of bold touches of feeling for the world is made to appear as an enrichment, a gift, an undeserved benefit. On the other hand, philosophy, whose problem is nothing less than the totality of being, tends to reduce the magnitude of the latter when compared with itself and offers less than it seems obliged to offer. Here, conversely, the attempt is made to regard the problem as restricted and small in order to do justice to it by extending it to the totality and the highest level of generality.
整个知识世界的范围不仅体现为该世界内在运动的基本形式的象征。因此，这些研究的统一性并不在于对某一特定知识内容及其逐渐累积的证明的断言，而在于必须证明的可能性——即在生活的每一个细节中找到其意义的整体性。艺术相对于哲学的一大优势在于，它每次都设定一个单一且狭窄定义的问题：一个人、一幅风景、一种情绪。将这些扩展到一般性的每一次尝试，以及对世界的大胆情感的每一次增添，都显得像是一种丰富、一种恩赐、一种不应得的好处。另一方面，哲学，其问题无异于存在的整体性，往往在与自身的比较中削低后者的巨大程度，并提供的少于它似乎应当提供的。相反，在这里，尝试是将问题视为有限且微小，以便通过将其扩展到整体性和最高层次的普遍性来公正对待。

Methodologically, this basic intention can be expressed in the following manner. The attempt is made to construct a new storey beneath historical materialism such that the explanatory value of the incorporation of economic life into the causes of intellectual culture is preserved, while these economic forms themselves are recognized as the result of more profound valuations and currents of psychological or even metaphysical pre-conditions. For the practice of cognition this must develop in infinite reciprocity. Every interpretation of an ideal structure by means of an economic structure must lead to the demand that the latter in turn be understood from more ideal depths, while for these depths themselves the general economic base has to be sought, and so on indefinitely. In such an alternation and entanglement of the conceptually opposed principles of cognition, the unity of things, which seems intangible to our cognition but none the less establishes its coherence, becomes practical and vital for us.
在方法论上，这一基本意图可以如下表达。试图在历史唯物主义之下构建一个新的基础层，以保持将经济生活融入知识文化原因中的解释价值，同时认识到这些经济形式本身是更深层次的评估和心理或甚至形而上学前提的结果。对于认识的实践而言，这必须在无限的互惠关系中发展。通过经济结构对理想结构的每一次解释，必须导致对后者的要求，即从更理想的深度来理解它，同时，这些深度本身也必须寻找一般经济基础，依此类推。在这种概念上对立原则的交替与纠缠中，事物的统一性虽然对我们的认知似乎是无形的，但仍然确立了其连贯性，并对我们变得实用和生动。

The intentions and methods referred to here could not lay claim to any justification in principle if they were not able to serve a substantive diversity of basic philosophical convictions. It is possible to relate the details and superficialities of life to its most profound and essential movements, and their interpretation in accordance with the total meaning of life can be performed on the basis of idealism just as much as of realism, of a rational as much as a volitional or an absolutist as much as a relativistic interpretation of being. The fact that the following investigations are founded on one of these world pictures, which I consider to be the most appropriate expression of the contemporary contents of science and emotional currents and decisively exclude the opposing world picture, might secure for them at
此处提及的意图和方法，如果不能服务于各种基本哲学信念的实质性多样性，则不能声称具有任何原则上的正当性。可以将生活的细节和表面现象与它最深刻和最本质的运动联系起来，并且可以基于唯心主义和唯物主义，基于理性主义和意志主义，以及基于绝对主义和相对主义对存在的解释，来对它们进行符合生命整体意义的诠释。以下研究基于其中一种世界图景，我认为这是当代科学内容和情感潮流最恰当的表达，并果断地排除了对立的世界图景，这或许可以确保它们至少获得一个仅仅是典型例子的角色，即使它在事实上是不正确的，也能揭示其作为未来真理形式的方法论意义。
worst the role of a mere typical example which, even if it is factually incorrect, reveals its methodological significance as the form of future truths.
最糟糕的情况是，它只是一个典型的例子，即使在事实上不正确，也能揭示其作为未来真理形式的方法论意义。

At no point do the amendments to the second impression affect the essential motifs. However, through new examples and discussions and, above all, through an extension of the foundations, I have attempted to increase the likelihood of these motifs being intelligible and acceptable.
第二版修订之处丝毫未影响其基本主题。然而，通过新的例子和讨论，尤其通过对基础的扩展，我试图提高这些主题的可理解性和可接受性。

Analytical Part  分析部分

The order in which things are placed as natural entities is based on the proposition that the whole variety of their qualities rests upon a uniform law of existence. Their equality before the law of nature, the constant sum of matter and energy, the convertibility of the most diverse phenomena into one another, transform the differences that are apparent at first sight into a general affinity, a universal equality. Yet on a closer view this means only that the products of the natural order are beyond any question of a law. Their absolute determinateness does not allow any emphasis that might provide confirmation or doubt of their particular quality of being. But we are not satisfied with this indifferent necessity that natural science assigns to objects. Instead, disregarding their place in that series we arrange them in another order - an order of value - in which equality is completely eliminated, in which the highest level of one point is adjacent to the lowest level of another; in this series the fundamental quality is not uniformity but difference. The value of objects, thoughts and events can never be inferred from their mere natural existence and content, and their ranking according to value diverges widely from their natural ordering. Nature, on many occasions, destroys objects that, in terms of their value, might claim to be preserved, and keeps in existence worthless objects which occupy the place of the more valuable ones. This is not to say that there is a fundamental opposition between the
事物作为自然实体的排列顺序基于这样一个命题：它们各种特性的整体多样性依赖于一个统一的存在法则。它们在自然法则面前的平等、物质和能量的恒定总和、最不同现象之间的可转化性，将乍一看明显的差异转化为一种普遍的亲和力和普遍的平等。然而，仔细观察，这仅意味着自然秩序的产物超越了任何法律的问题。它们的绝对确定性不允许任何可能确认或怀疑其特殊存在特质的强调。但我们并不满足于自然科学给对象赋予的这种无动于衷的必然性。相反，不顾它们在那个序列中的位置，我们将它们排列成另一个顺序——一个价值的顺序——在这个顺序中，平等完全被消除，其中一个点的最高水平与另一个点的最低水平相邻；在这个序列中，基本特性不是同质性而是差异。对象、思想和事件的价值决不能仅从它们的自然存在和内容来推断，它们根据价值的排名与自然排序大相径庭。自然在许多情况下摧毁那些在其价值方面可能要求保留的对象，同时保留那些无价值的对象，这些对象占据了更有价值对象的位置。 这并不是说这两个序列之间存在根本的对立，或者它们是相互排斥的。这种观点意味着这两个序列之间存在某种关系；事实上，它会建立一个由价值观决定但符号相反的魔鬼世界。情况恰恰相反，这两个序列之间的关系完全是偶然的。自然界以同样的冷漠，有时给予我们高度重视的物体，有时又将它们拒之门外。这两个序列之间偶尔的和谐，即通过现实序列实现源于价值序列的需求，与相反的情况一样，都同样显著地表明它们之间不存在任何逻辑关系。我们可能将同一种生活体验视为真实而有价值的，但在两种情况下，这种体验的意义却大相径庭。自然现象序列可以完整地描述，而无需提及事物的价值；而我们的价值量表仍然是有意义的，无论其任何对象是否频繁出现或根本不出现在现实中。价值是对完全确定的客观存在的补充，如同光和影一样，并非内在于它，而是来自不同的来源。然而，我们应该避免一种误解；即价值概念的形成，作为一个心理事实，与自然过程是截然不同的。
two series, or that they are mutually exclusive. Such a view would imply a relation between the two series; it would establish, indeed, a diabolical world, determined by values, but with the signs reversed. The case is, rather, that the relation between these series is completely accidental. With the same indifference, nature at one time offers us objects that we value highly, at another time withholds them. The occasional harmony between the series, the realization through the reality series of demands derived from the value series, shows the absence of any logical relationship between them just as strikingly as does the opposite case. We may be aware of the same life experience as both real and valuable, but the experience has quite a different meaning in the two cases. The series of natural phenomena could be described in their entirety without mentioning the value of things; and our scale of valuation remains meaningful, whether or not any of its objects appear frequently or at all in reality. Value is an addition to the completely determined objective being, like light and shade, which are not inherent in it but come from a different source. However, we should avoid one misinterpretation; namely, that the formation of value concepts, as a psychological fact, is quite distinct from the natural process. A superhuman mind, which could understand by means of natural laws everything that happens in the world, would also comprehend the fact that people have concepts of values. But these would have no meaning or validity for a being that conceived them purely theoretically, beyond their psychological existence. The meaning of value concepts is denied to nature as a mechanical causal system, while at the same time the psychic experiences that make values a part of our consciousness themselves belong to the natural world. Valuation as a real psychological occurrence is part of the natural world; but what we mean by valuation, its conceptual meaning, is something independent of this world; is not part of it, but is rather the whole world viewed from a particular vantage point. We are rarely aware of the fact that our whole life, from the point of view of consciousness, consists in experiencing and judging values, and that it acquires meaning and significance only from the fact that the mechanically unfolding elements of reality possess an infinite variety of values beyond their objective substance. At any moment when our mind is not simply a passive mirror or reality - which perhaps never happens, since even objective perception can arise only from valuation we live in a world of values which arranges the contents of reality in an autonomous order.
two series, or that they are mutually exclusive. Such a view would imply a relation between the two series; it would establish, indeed, a diabolical world, determined by values, but with the signs reversed. The case is, rather, that the relation between these series is completely accidental. With the same indifference, nature at one time offers us objects that we value highly, at another time withholds them. The occasional harmony between the series, the realization through the reality series of demands derived from the value series, shows the absence of any logical relationship between them just as strikingly as does the opposite case. We may be aware of the same life experience as both real and valuable, but the experience has quite a different meaning in the two cases. The series of natural phenomena could be described in their entirety without mentioning the value of things; and our scale of valuation remains meaningful, whether or not any of its objects appear frequently or at all in reality. Value is an addition to the completely determined objective being, like light and shade, which are not inherent in it but come from a different source. However, we should avoid one misinterpretation; namely, that the formation of value concepts, as a psychological fact, is quite distinct from the natural process. 一个超人类的思想，能够通过自然法则理解世界上发生的一切，也会理解人们对价值的概念。但对于一个纯粹理论上构思这些概念的存在，这些概念就没有意义或有效性。价值概念的意义对于作为机械因果系统的自然是被否定的，同时，使价值成为我们意识一部分的心理体验本身又属于自然界。作为真实心理现象的评估是自然界的一部分；但我们所指的评估，它的概念意义，是独立于这个世界的；不是这个世界的一部分，而是从特定的视角看待的整个世界。我们很少意识到，从意识的角度来看，我们的整个生活实际上就是经历和判断价值，而它只有从现实中机械展开的元素所蕴含无限多样的价值之中，才能获得意义和重要性。在任何时刻，当我们的思想不单纯是现实的被动镜子时——这或许从未发生过，因为即便是客观的感知也只能从评估中产生——我们生活在一个价值的世界中，这个世界将现实的内容以自主的秩序进行排列。

Thus, value is in a sense the counterpart to being, and is comparable to being as a comprehensive form and category of the world view. As Kant pointed out, being is not a quality of objects; for if I state that an object,
因此，价值在某种意义上是存在的对应物，并且可以与存在相比较，作为世界观的一个综合形式和范畴。正如康德所指出的，存在不是物体的属性；因为如果我说一个物体，
which so far existed only in my thoughts, exists, it does not acquire a new quality, because otherwise it would not be the same object that I thought of, but another one. In the same way, an object does not gain a new quality if I call it valuable; it is valued because of the qualities that it has. It is precisely its whole already determined being that is raised to the sphere of value. This is supported by a thorough analysis of our thinking. We are able to conceive the contents of our world view without regard for their real existence or non-existence. We can conceive the aggregates of qualities that we call objects, including all the laws of their interrelation and development, in their objective and logical significance, and we can ask - quite independently of this - whether, where and how often all these concepts or inner notions are realized. The conceptual meaning and determinateness of the objects is not affected by the question as to whether they do exist, nor by the question whether and where they are placed in the scale of values. However, if we want to establish either a theory or a practical rule, we cannot escape the necessity to answer these two questions. We must be able to say of each object that it exists or does not exist, and each object must have a definite place for us in the scale of values, from the highest through indifference to negative values. Indifference is a rejection of positive value; the possibility of interest remains inactive but is always in the background. The significance of this requirement, which determines the constitution of our world view, is not altered by the fact that our powers of comprehension are often insufficient to decide upon the reality of concepts, or by the fact that the range and certainty of our feelings are often inadequate to rank things according to their value, especially in any permanently and universal fashion. Over against the world of mere concepts, of objective qualities and determinations, stand the great categories of being and value, inclusive forms that take their material from the world of pure contents. Both categories have the quality of being fundamental, that is irreducible to each other or to other simpler elements. Consequently, the being of objects can never be inferred logically; being is rather a primary form of our perception, which can be sensed, experienced and believed, but cannot be deduced for somebody who does not yet know it. When this form of perception has once grasped a specific content - by a non-logical act - it can then be interpreted in its logical context and developed as far as this logical context reaches. As a rule, we are able to state why we assume the reality of a particular phenomenon; namely, because we have already assumed another phenomenon with which this one is connected by its specific characteristics. The reality of the first one, however, can be shown only by tracing it in similar fashion to a more fundamental one. This regression requires a final member whose existence
到目前为止仅存在于我脑海中的对象，存在时并不会获得新的品质，否则它就不再是我所想的那个对象，而是另一个。以同样的方式，如果我称之为有价值，物体并不会获得新的品质；它之所以被赋予价值，是因为它所具备的特性。正是其整体已确定的存在被提升到了价值领域。这一点可以通过对我们思维的深入分析得到支持。我们能够构思我们的世界观的内容，而不考虑它们的真实存在或不存在。我们可以构思我们称之为对象的特性集合，包括它们相互关系和发展的一切规律，基于它们的客观和逻辑意义，我们可以提出问题——完全独立于此——这些概念或内在观念在何处、以多大频率得以实现。对象的概念意义和确定性不受它们是否存在的问题的影响，也不受它们在价值等级中被放置在何处的问题的影响。然而，如果我们想建立理论或实际规则，我们无法摆脱回答这两个问题的必要性。我们必须能够对每个对象说它存在或不存在，每个对象在我们的价值等级中必须有一个明确的位置，从最高到无所谓再到负值。 无差别是对积极价值的拒绝；兴趣的可能性保持不活动，但始终在背景中存在。这个要求的重要性决定了我们世界观的构成，尽管我们的理解能力往往不足以决定概念的现实性，或者我们的感受范围和确定性往往不足以根据价值对事物进行排名，尤其是在任何永久和普遍的方式中，这一点并没有改变。与单纯概念、客观质量和决定的世界相对立的是存在和价值的伟大范畴，这些包容形式从纯内容的世界中获取物质。这两种范畴都有根本性，也就是无法简化为彼此或其他更简单的元素。因此，物体的存在永远无法通过逻辑推导；存在是一种我们感知的基本形式，可以被感知、体验和信仰，但不能被尚未了解它的人推导。当这种感知形式一旦通过一种非逻辑的行为抓住了特定内容后，它可以在其逻辑背景中进行解释，并根据这个逻辑背景的发展进行扩展。通常，我们能够说明为什么我们认为某一现象的现实性；即因为我们已经假设了与该现象通过其特定特征相连接的另一个现象。 然而，第一个现实的存在只能通过与更基本的现实类似的方式追溯来展现。这种回归需要一个最终的成员，其存在
depends only upon a sense of conviction, affirmation and acceptance, a sense that is directly given. Valuation has exactly the same relation to objects. All proofs of the value of an object are nothing more than the necessity of recognizing for that object the same value as has been assumed, and for the time being accepted, as indubitable for another object. We will later analyse the motives of this action. Here it will suffice to say that what we consider a proof of value is only the transference of an existing value to a new object. It does not reveal the essence of value, or the reason why value was originally attached to the object from which it is transferred to others.
只依赖于一种信念、肯定和接受的感觉，一种直接给予的感觉。价值与客体的关系完全相同。所有关于客体价值的证明，都只不过是必须承认该客体具有与另一个客体已被假定并暂时接受为无可置疑的相同价值。我们稍后将分析这种行为的动机。在此，只需说明我们所认为的价值证明，只是将现有的价值转移到新的客体上。它并没有揭示价值的本质，也没有揭示为什么价值最初会附加到将价值转移到其他客体的客体上。

If we accept the existence of a value, then the process of its realization, its evolution, can be comprehended rationally, because in general it follows the structure of the contents of reality. That there is a value at all, however, is a primary phenomenon. Value inferences only make known the conditions under which values are realized, yet without being produced by these conditions, just as theoretical proofs only prepare the conditions that favour the sense of affirmation or of existence. The question as to what value really is, like the question as to what being is, is unanswerable. And precisely because they have the same formal relation to objects, they are as alien to each other as are thought and extension for Spinoza. Since both express the same absolute substance, each in its own way and perfect in itself, the one can never encroach upon the other. They never impinge upon each other because they question the concepts of objects from completely different points of view. But this disjunctive parallelism of reality and value does not divide the world into a sterile duality, which the mind with its need for unity could never accept - even though its destiny and the method of its quest may be to move incessantly from diversity to unity and from unity to diversity. What is common to value and reality stands above them: namely the contents, which Plato called ‘ideas’, the qualitative, that which can be signified and expressed in our concepts of reality and value, and which can enter into either one or the other series. Below these two categories lies what is common to both: the soul, which absorbs the one or produces the other in its mysterious unity. Reality and value are, as it were, two different languages by which the logically related contents of the world, valid in their ideal unity, are made comprehensible to the unitary soul, or the languages in which the soul can express the pure image of these contents which lies beyond their differentiation and opposition. These two compilations made by the soul, through perceiving and through valuing, may perhaps once more be brought together in a metaphysical unity, for which there is no linguistic term unless it be in religious symbols. There is perhaps a cosmic ground where the heterogeneity and divergencies that we experience between reality and value no longer
如果我们接受价值的存在，那么其实现过程及其演变就可以理性地理解，因为一般而言，它遵循现实内容的结构。然而，价值的存在本身是一种主要现象。价值推理仅使得在何种条件下实现价值变得明确，尽管这些条件并不会产生价值，就像理论证明只能准备有利于肯定或存在意义的条件一样。关于价值究竟是什么的问题，就像关于存在究竟是什么的问题，是无解的。恰恰因为它们与对象有相同的形式关系，它们彼此之间也像斯宾诺莎所说的思想与延展一样是陌生的。由于两者以各自的方式表达同一绝对实质，各自完美，因此一个永远不能侵犯另一个。它们互不干扰，因为它们从完全不同的视角质疑对象的概念。然而，这种现实与价值的分裂平行性并没有将世界划分为一种消极的二元性，理性的思维因其对统一的需求而无法接受这种二元性——尽管其命运和探索的方法可能是在多样性与统一性之间不断迁移。 价值与现实的共同之处在其之上：即内容，柏拉图称之为“理念”，即质的方面，它可以在我们对现实和价值的概念中被指明和表达，并且可以进入其中任何一个序列。在这两个范畴之下是两者共同之处：灵魂，它在其神秘的统一性中吸收其一或产生其二。现实与价值，可以说是两种不同的语言，通过它们，在理想统一中有效的世界的逻辑相关内容，变得可以被统一的灵魂所理解，或者说是灵魂可以表达这些内容纯粹意象的语言，这些意象超越了它们的差异和对立。灵魂通过感知和评价所做的这两种汇编，或许可以再次在一个形而上学统一中结合起来，除非是在宗教象征中，否则没有语言术语可以表达这种统一。或许存在一个宇宙基础，在那里我们体验到的现实与价值之间的异质性和差异不再
exist, where both series are revealed as one; this unity either being unaffected by the two categories, and standing beyond them in majestic indifference, or signifying a harmonious interweaving of both, which is shattered and distorted into fragments and contrasts only by our way of regarding it, as if we had an imperfect visual faculty.
存在，在那里这两个序列被揭示为一体；这种统一要么不受这两个范畴的影响，超越它们而处于庄严的冷漠之中，要么意味着两者的和谐交织，只是由于我们的看待方式，它才被粉碎和扭曲成碎片和对比，就好像我们具有不完善的视觉能力一样。

The characteristic feature of value, as it appears in contrast to reality, is usually called its subjectivity. Since one and the same object can have the highest degree of value for one soul and the lowest for another, and vice versa, and since on the other hand the most extensive and extreme differences between objects are compatible with equality of value, there appears to remain only the subject with his customary or exceptional, permanent or changing, moods and responses as the ground for valuation. This subjectivity, needless to say, has nothing to do with the subjectivity that refers to ‘my perception’ of the totality of the world. For the subjectivity of value contrasts value with the given objects, regardless of the way they are conceived. In other words, the subject who comprehends all objects is different from the subject who is confronted with the objects; the subjectivity that value shares with all other objects does not play any role here. Nor is his subjectivity merely caprice; independence from reality does not mean that value can be bestowed here and there with unrestrained and capricious freedom. Value exists in our consciousness as a fact that can no more be altered than can reality itself. The subjectivity of value, therefore, is first of all only negative, in the sense that value is not attached to objects in the same way as is colour or temperature. The latter, although determined by our senses, are accompanied by a feeling of their direct dependence upon the object; but in the case of value we soon learn to disregard this feeling because the two series constituted by reality and by value are quite independent of each other. The only cases more interesting than this general characterization are those in which psychological facts appear to lead to an opposite view.
价值的特征在与现实对比时通常被称为其主观性。由于同一个物体对一个灵魂可能具有最高的价值，而对另一个灵魂则可能具有最低的价值，反之亦然；另一方面，物体之间最广泛和极端的差异与价值的平等是相容的，因此似乎只有主体及其惯常或特殊、持久或变化的情绪和反应作为估值的基础。毫无疑问，这种主观性与指代“我对世界整体的感知”的主观性无关。价值的主观性使价值与给定的物体形成对比，而不论这些物体被如何构思。换句话说，理解所有物体的主体与面对物体的主体是不同的；价值与所有其他物体共享的主观性在这里并不起任何作用。也不是说他的主观性仅仅是任性；与现实的独立并不意味着价值可以在这里和那里不受约束且任意地赋予。价值在我们的意识中作为一个事实存在，它无法被改变，就像现实本身无法被改变一样。因此，价值的主观性首先仅仅是消极的，因为价值并不像颜色或温度那样附着于物体。 后者虽然由我们的感官决定，但却伴随着一种对其直接依赖于客体的感受；但在价值的情况下，我们很快就会学会忽略这种感受，因为由现实和价值构成的两个序列是彼此完全独立的。比这种一般性描述更有趣的案例，是那些心理学事实似乎导致相反观点的案例。

In whatever empirical or transcendental sense the difference between objects and subjects is conceived, value is never a ‘quality’ of the objects, but a judgment upon them which remains inherent in the subject. And yet, neither the deeper meaning and content of the concept of value, nor its significance for the mental life of the individual, nor the practical social events and arrangements based upon it, can be sufficiently understood by referring value to the ‘subject’. The way to a comprehension of value lies in a region in which that subjectivity is only provisional and actually not very essential.
无论以何种经验的或先验的意义来理解客体与主体之间的区别，价值从来都不是客体的“品质”，而是对客体的判断，这种判断仍然存在于主体之中。然而，价值概念的更深层次的意义和内容，它对个人精神生活的意义，以及基于它的实践社会事件和安排，都不能仅仅通过将价值归于“主体”来充分理解。理解价值的途径在于一个主体性只是暂时的，实际上并不十分重要的领域。

The distinction between subject and object is not as radical as the accepted separation of these categories in practical life and in the scientific world would have us believe. Mental life begins with an undifferentiated state in which the Ego and its objects are not yet distinguished; consciousness is filled with impressions and perceptions while the bearer of these contents has still not detached himself from them. It is as a result of a second-stage awareness, a later analysis, that a subject in particular real conditions comes to be distinguished from the content of his consciousness in those conditions. This development obviously leads to a situation where a man speaks of himself as ’ $I$$I$II ’ and recognizes the existence of other objects external to this ’ $I$$I$II '. Metaphysics sometimes claims that the transcendent essence of being is completely unified, beyond the opposition of subject-object, and this has a psychological counterpart in the simple, primitive condition of being possessed by the content of a perception, like a child who does not yet speak of himself as ’ $I$$I$II ', or as may perhaps be observed in a rudimentary form at all stages of life. This unity from which the categories of subject and object develop in relation to each other - in a process to be examined later - appears to us as a subjective unity because we approach it with the concept of objectivity developed later; and because we do not have a proper term for such unities, but name them usually after one of the partial elements that appear in the subsequent analysis. Thus, it has been asserted that all actions are essentially egoistic, whereas egoism has a meaning only within a system of action and by contrast with its correlate, altruism. Similarly, pantheism has described the universality of being as God, although a positive concept of God depends on its contrast with everything empirical. This evolutionary relation between subject and object is repeated finally on a large scale: the intellectual world of classical antiquity differs from that of modern times chiefly in the fact that only the latter has, on the one hand, developed a comprehensive and clear concept of the Ego, as shown by the significance of the problem of liberty which was unknown in ancient times; and on the other, expressed the independence and force of the concept of the object through the idea of unalterable laws of nature. Antiquity was much closer than were later periods to the stage of indifference in which the contents of the world were conceived as such, without being apportioned between subject and object.
主客之间的区别并不像实践生活和科学世界中所接受的这些类别的分离那样根本。心理生活始于一种未分化的状态，在这种状态下，自我与其对象尚未区分；意识充满了印象和感知，而这些内容的承载者仍未与之分离。正是由于第二阶段的觉察，经过后期的分析，一个人在特定现实条件下才会从他在这些条件下的意识内容中被区分出来。这一发展显然导致了一种情况，即一个人自称为’ $I$$I$II ’，并承认存在其他外部于这个’ $I$$I$II ’ 的对象。形而上学有时声称存在的超越本质是完全统一的，超越了主客对立，这在心理学上对应于被感知内容所占有的简单、原始的状态，就像一个尚未称自己为’ $I$$I$II ’ 的孩子，或是在生活的所有阶段可能以某种初步形式观察到的情况。 这个统一体从中，主观和客观的范畴相互发展——这个过程将在后面进行研究——对我们来说呈现为一种主观统一，因为我们以后来发展的客观性概念来接近它；并且因为我们没有适当的术语来描述这样的统一体，而通常用后续分析中出现的部分元素之一来命名它们。因此，有人主张所有行为本质上都是自私的，而自私的意义仅在于行动体系内，并与其对应的利他主义形成对比。同样，泛神论将存在的普遍性描述为上帝，尽管上帝的积极概念依赖于其与一切经验的对立。这种主观与客观之间的进化关系最终在大规模上重复：古典时代的智力世界与现代时代的主要差异在于，只有后者一方面发展了一个全面而明确的自我概念，这反映在古代时期未知的自由问题的重要性；另一方面，通过不可改变的自然法则的理念，表达了对象概念的独立性和力量。古代比后来时期更接近于无差异的阶段，在这个阶段，世界的内容被视为这样的，未在主观和客观之间分配。

This development which separates subject and object appears to be sustained on both sides by the same theme, but operating at different levels. Thus, the
这种将主体与客体分开的发展似乎在双方都受到相同主题的支撑，但在不同层次上运作。因此，
awareness of being a subject is already an objectification. This is a basic feature of the mind in its form as personality. The fundamental activity of our mind, which determines its form as a whole, is that we can observe, know and judge ourselves just like any other ‘object’; that we dissect the Ego, experienced as a unity, into a perceiving subject and a perceived object, without its losing its unity, but on the contrary with its becoming aware of its unity through this inner antagonism. The mutual dependence of subject and object is here drawn together in a single point; it has affected the subject itself, which otherwise stands confronting the world as object. Thus man has realized the basic form of his relation to the world, of his acceptance of the world, as soon as he becomes aware of himself and calls himself ’ I '. But before that happens there exists - in respect of meaning as well as of mental growth - a simple perception of content which does not distinguish between subject and object and is not yet divided between them. Regarded from the other side, this content itself, as a logical and conceptual entity, likewise lies beyond the distinction between subjective and objective reality. We can think of any object simply in terms of its qualities and their interconnection without asking whether or not this ideal complex of qualities has an objective existence. To be sure, so far as such a pure objective content is thought, it becomes a conception and to that extent a subjective structure. But the subjective is here only the dynamic act of conception, the function that apprehends the content; in itself this content is thought of as being independent of the act of conceiving. Our mind has a remarkable ability to think of contents as being independent of the act of thinking; this is one of its primary qualities, which cannot be reduced any further. The contents have their conceptual or objective qualities and relationships which can be apprehended but which are not thereby completely absorbed; they exist whether or not they are part of my representation and whether or not they are part of objective reality. The content of a representation does not coincide with the representation of contents. The simple undifferentiated conception that consists only in becoming aware of a content cannot be characterized as subjective, because it does not yet know the contrast between subject and object. Similarly, the pure content of objects or conceptions is not objective, but escapes equally this differential form and its opposite, while being ready to present itself in one or the other. Subject and object are born in the same act: logically, by presenting the conceptual ideal content first as a content of representation, and then as a content of objective reality; psychologically, when the still ego-less representation, in which person and object are undifferentiated, becomes divided and gives rise to a distance between the self and its object, through which each of them becomes a separate entity.
意识到自己是主体本身就是一种客观化。这是心灵作为人格形式的一个基本特征。我们心灵的基本活动，决定着它作为一个整体的形式，那就是我们可以像观察任何其他“客体”一样观察、认识和判断自己；我们将体验为统一的自我剖析成感知的主体和被感知的客体，而它并没有失去其统一性，相反，它通过这种内在的对抗意识到了自身的统一性。主体与客体的相互依赖在这里汇聚于一点；它影响了主体自身，否则主体将与世界作为客体相对立。因此，人一旦意识到自己并称自己为“我”，就实现了其与世界关系的基本形式，即其对世界的接受。但在此之前，就意义而言以及就精神成长而言，存在着一种简单的内容感知，它不区分主体和客体，也不在其间区分。从另一方面来看，这种内容本身，作为逻辑和概念实体，同样也超越了主观和客观现实之间的区别。我们可以简单地根据任何客体的属性及其相互联系来思考它，而无需询问这种理想的属性复合体是否存在客观存在。 可以肯定的是，至于这种纯粹的客观内容被思考时，它成为一个概念，在这个程度上是一个主观结构。但是，主观在这里仅仅是概念化的动态行为，是把握内容的功能；就其本身而言，这个内容被认为是独立于概念行为的。我们的心智具有将内容视为独立于思考行为的显著能力；这就是其主要特质之一，无法进一步简化。内容具有其概念或客观特质和关系，这些特质和关系可以被把握，但并不因此而完全被吸收；它们的存在与否不取决于它们是否是我表象的一部分，也不取决于它们是否是客观现实的一部分。表象的内容与内容的表象并不相符。仅仅意识到一个内容的简单未分化的概念不能被特征化为主观，因为它尚未了解主体和对象之间的对比。同样，纯粹的对象或概念的内容也不是客观的，而同样逃避这种差别形式及其对立，同时准备以一种或另一种形式展现自己。 主体和客体在同一行为中产生：逻辑上，首先将概念的理想内容呈现为表象的内容，然后呈现为客观现实的内容；心理学上，当仍然没有自我意识的表象（其中人和物没有区别）分裂并导致自我和客体之间产生距离时，两者都成为独立的实体。

This process, which finally produces our intellectual world view, also occurs in the sphere of our volitional practical activity. Here also the distinction between the desiring, consuming, valuing subject and the valued object does not comprehend all aspects of mental life, nor all the objective circumstances of practical activity. Human enjoyment of an object is a completely undivided act. At such moments we have an experience that does not include an awareness of an object confronting us or an awareness of the self as distinct from its present condition. Phenomena of the basest and the highest kind meet here. The crude impulse, particularly an impulse of an impersonal, general nature, wants to release itself towards an object and to be satisfied, no matter how; consciousness is exclusively concerned with satisfaction and pays no attention to its bearer on one side or its object on the other. On the other hand, intense aesthetic enjoyment displays the same form. Here too ‘we forget ourselves’, but at the same time we no longer experience the work of art as something with which we are confronted, because our mind is completely submerged in it, has absorbed it by surrendering to it. In this case, as in the other, our psychological condition is not yet, or is no longer, affected by the contrast between subject and object. Only a new process of awareness releases those categories from their undisturbed unity; and only then is the pure enjoyment of the content seen as being on the one hand a state of the subject confronting an object, and on the other the effect produced by an object that is independent of the subject. This tension, which disrupts the naive-practical unity of subject and object and makes us conscious of each in relation to the other, is brought about originally through the mere fact of desire. In desiring what we do not yet own or enjoy, we place the content of our desire outside ourselves. In empirical life, I admit, the finished object stands before us and is only then desired - if only because, in addition to our will, many other theoretical and emotional events contribute to the objectification of mental contents. Within the practical world, however, in relation to its inner order and intelligibility, the origin of the object itself, and its being desired by the subject, are correlative terms - the two aspects of this process of differentiation which splits the immediate unity of the process of enjoyment. It has been asserted that our conception of objective reality originates in the resistance that objects present to us, especially through our sense of touch. We can apply this at once to the practical problem. We desire objects only if they are not immediately given to us for our use and enjoyment; that is, to the extent that they resist our desire. The content of our desire becomes an object as soon as it is opposed to us, not only in the sense
这个过程最终产生我们的知识世界观，也发生在我们的意志实践活动领域。在这里，渴望、消费、评估的主体与被评估的对象之间的区别，并没有涵盖心理生活的所有方面，也没有涵盖实践活动的所有客观情况。人类对一个对象的享受是一个完全不分割的行为。在这样的时刻，我们有一种经验，这种经验不包括意识到一个与我们对立的对象或意识到自我与其当前状态的区别。最卑微和最崇高的现象在这里相遇。粗俗的冲动，特别是无个人性质的一般冲动，想要向一个对象释放自己，并以任何方式获得满足；意识专注于满足，而不关注一方面的承载者或另一方面的对象。另一方面，强烈的审美享受展现了同样的形式。在这里，我们也“忘记了自己”，但同时我们不再将艺术作品视为与我们对立的事物，因为我们的思想完全沉浸其中，已经通过放弃而吸收它。在这种情况下，和前一种情况一样，我们的心理状态尚未，或不再，受到主体与对象之间对比的影响。 只有一种新的意识过程才能将这些类别从其未受干扰的统一中释放出来；而只有在这种情况下，内容的纯粹享受才能被视为一方面是主体面对对象的状态，另一方面是由一个独立于主体的对象所产生的效果。这种紧张关系打破了主体和对象的天真-实用统一，使我们意识到双方的相互关系，这最初是通过欲望的简单事实产生的。在渴望我们尚未拥有或享受的事物时，我们将欲望的内容置于自我之外。坦率地说，在经验生活中，完成的对象摆在我们面前，只有在那时才被渴望——这不仅是因为我们的意志，许多其他理论和情感事件也促成了心智内容的对象化。然而，在实用世界中，就其内在秩序和可理解性而言，对象自身的起源以及被主体所渴望互为相关——这是分裂享受过程的直接统一的这一差异化过程的两个方面。有人主张，我们对客观现实的概念源于对象对我们所呈现的抵抗，尤其是通过我们的触觉。我们可以立即将这一点应用于实际问题。我们只在对象未被立即提供给我们使用和享受时才会渴望它们；也就是说，在它们抵抗我们欲望的程度上。 我们欲望的内容，一旦与我们对立，就成为客体，这不仅指它对我们而言是不可渗透的，而且指它作为尚未享有的东西的距离，这种状态的主观方面就是欲望。正如康德所说：经验的可能性是经验对象的可能性——因为拥有经验意味着我们的意识从感官印象中创造出客体。同样，欲望的可能性是欲望对象的可能性。这样形成的客体，其特征是与主体分离，主体同时确立它并试图通过其欲望克服它，对我们来说是一个价值。享乐的时刻本身，当主体与客体之间的对立被抹去时，消解了价值。价值只有作为对比，作为与主体分离的客体才能重新确立。
of being impervious to us, but also in terms of its distance as something not-yet-enjoyed, the subjective aspect of this condition being desire. As Kant has said: the possibility of experience is the possibility of the objects of experience - because to have experiences means that our consciousness creates objects from sense impressions. In the same way, the possibility of desire is the possibility of the objects of desire. The object thus formed, which is characterized by its separation from the subject, who at the same time establishes it and seeks to overcome it by his desire, is for us a value. The moment of enjoyment itself, when the opposition between subject and object is effaced, consumes the value. Value is only reinstated as contrast, as an object separated from the subject. Such trivial experiences as that we appreciate the value of our possessions only after we have lost them, that the mere withholding of a desired object often endows it with a value quite disproportionate to any possible enjoyment that it could yield, that the remoteness, either literal or figurative, of the objects of our enjoyment shows them in a transfigured light and with heightened attractions - all these are derivatives, modifications and hybrids of the basic fact that value does not originate from the unbroken unity of the moment of enjoyment, but from the separation between the subject and the content of enjoyment as an object that stands opposed to the subject as something desired and only to be attained by the conquest of distance, obstacles and difficulties. To reiterate the earlier analogy: in the final analysis perhaps, reality does not press upon our consciousness through the resistance that phenomena exert, but we register those representations which have feelings of resistance and inhibition associated with them, as being objectively real, independent and external to us. Objects are not difficult to acquire because they are valuable, but we call those objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them. Since the desire encounters resistance and frustration, the objects gain a significance that would never have been attributed to them by an unchecked will.
我们欲望的内容，一旦与我们对立，就成为客体，这不仅指它对我们而言是不可渗透的，而且指它作为尚未享有的东西的距离，这种状态的主观方面就是欲望。正如康德所说：经验的可能性是经验对象的可能性——因为拥有经验意味着我们的意识从感官印象中创造出客体。同样，欲望的可能性是欲望对象的可能性。这样形成的客体，其特征是与主体分离，主体同时确立它并试图通过其欲望克服它，对我们来说是一个价值。享乐的时刻本身，当主体与客体之间的对立被抹去时，消解了价值。价值只有作为对比，作为与主体分离的客体才能重新确立。 这样的琐碎经验，比如我们意识到只有在失去财物后才珍惜它们的价值，渴望的对象仅仅被拒绝时常赋予它一种与可能获得的享受不成比例的价值，享受对象的字面或比喻上的遥远使它们以一种转变的光芒和增强的吸引力展现出来——所有这些都是基本事实的衍生、改编和杂交，即价值并不源于享受时刻的完整统一，而是源于主体与享受内容之间的分离，作为一种与主体对立的对象，被视为渴望的东西，只有通过征服距离、障碍和困难才能获得。重申之前的类比：最终分析来看，现实并不是通过现象施加的阻力来压迫我们的意识，而是我们将那些伴随有抵抗和抑制感觉的表征视为客观真实、独立于我们、外在于我们的。对象并不是因为有价值而难以获得，而是我们称之为有价值的对象是那些抵抗我们拥有欲望的对象。由于欲望遭遇了阻力和挫折，这些对象获得了本来不会被不受限的意志赋予的意义。

Value, which appears at the same time and in the same process of differentiation as the desiring Ego and as its correlate, is subordinate to yet another category. It is the same category as applies to the object that is conceived in theoretical representations. We concluded, in that case, that the contents that are realized in the objective world and also exist in us as subjective representations have, in addition, a peculiar ideal dignity. The concepts of the triangle or of the organism, causality or the law of gravitation have a logical sense, an inner structural validity which indeed determines their realization in space and in consciousness; but even if they were never realized, they would still belong to the ultimate unanalysable category of the valid and significant, and would differ entirely from fantastic and
与欲望自我及其相关物同时并在同一分化过程中出现的价值，则服从于另一范畴。这与在理论表象中被构想的客体所适用的范畴相同。在这种情况下，我们得出结论：在客观世界中实现并在我们自身作为主观表象存在的那些内容，此外还具有某种特殊的理想尊严。三角形或有机体的概念、因果关系或万有引力定律具有逻辑意义，一种内在的结构有效性，这确实决定了它们在空间和意识中的实现；但即使它们从未实现，它们仍然属于最终不可分析的有效和意义范畴，并且与虚幻的
contradictory conceptual notions to which they might be akin in their reference to physical and mental non-reality. The value that is attributed to the objects of subjective desire is analogous to this, with the qualifications required by its different sphere. Just as we represent certain statements as true while recognizing that their truth is independent of our representation, so we sense that objects, people and events are not only appreciated as valuable by us, but would still be valuable if no one appreciated them. The most striking example is the value that we assign to people’s dispositions or characters, as being moral, dignified, strong or beautiful. Whether or not such inner qualities ever show themselves in deeds that make possible or demand recognition, and whether their bearer himself reflects upon them with a sense of his own value, appears to us irrelevant to their real value; still more, this unconcern for recognition endows these values with their characteristic colouring. Furthermore, intellectual energy and the fact that it brings the most secret forces and arrangements of nature into the light of consciousness; the power and the rhythm of emotions that, in the limited sphere of the individual soul, are yet much more significant than the external world, even if the pessimistic view of the predominance of suffering in the world is true; the fact that, regardless of man, nature moves according to reliable fixed norms, that the manifold natural forms are not incompatible with a more profound unity of the whole, that nature’s mechanism can be interpreted through ideas and also produces beauty and grace - all this leads us to conceive that the world is valuable no matter whether these values are experienced consciously or not. This extends all the way down to the economic value that we assign to any object of exchange, even though nobody is willing to pay the price, and even though the object is not in demand at all and remains unsaleable. Here too a basic capacity of the mind becomes apparent: that of separating itself from the ideas that it conceives and representing these ideas as if they were independent of its own representation. It is true that every value that we experience is a sentiment; but what we mean by this sentiment is a significant content which is realized psychologically through the sentiment yet is neither identical with it nor exhausted by it. Obviously this category lies beyond the controversy about the subjectivity or objectivity of value, because it denies the relation to a subject that is indispensable for the existence of an ‘object’. It is rather a third term, an ideal concept which enters into the duality but is not exhausted by it. In conformity with the practical sphere to which it belongs, it has a particular form of relationship to the subject which does not exist for the merely abstract content of our theoretical concepts. This form may be described as a claim or demand. The value that attaches to any object, person,
他们可能与其所涉及的物理和心理非现实性相对应的矛盾概念观念。赋予主观欲望对象的价值类似于此，尽管在其不同领域中需要不同的限定。正如我们将某些陈述视为真实，尽管承认其真实性独立于我们的表现一样，我们也感知到，事物、人物和事件不仅是被我们欣赏为有价值的，即使没有人欣赏它们，它们仍然是有价值的。最显著的例子是我们赋予人们性格或特质的价值，例如道德、 digno、强大或美丽。无论这些内在的品质是否在使他人承认的行为中显现，或者其承载者是否将其自身的价值反映在内心，这似乎与它们的真实价值无关；更重要的是，对认可的这种漠不关心使得这些价值呈现出其特有的色彩。 此外，智力能量以及它将自然最秘密的力量和安排带入意识光辉中的事实；情感的力量和节奏，在个人灵魂的有限领域中，它们比外部世界更为重要，即使对世界上苦难占主导地位的悲观观点是真实的；不论人类，自然依照可靠的固定规范运转的事实，多样的自然形式与整体更深层次的统一并不相互排斥，自然的机制可以通过思想进行解释，并且也能产生美和优雅——所有这些使我们想到，无论这些价值是否被有意识地体验到，世界是有价值的。这一路延伸到我们赋予任何交换对象的经济价值，即使没有人愿意支付这个价格，即使这个对象根本没有需求并且无法出售。在这里，一个基本的心智能力也显现出来：将自己与它所构思的思想分离，并将这些思想表现得好像它们独立于自身表现。当我们体验到的每一种价值确实是情感时，但我们所意味的这种情感是一个重要的内容，这种内容通过情感在心理上得以实现，但既不与其相同，也并未被其耗尽。 显然，这一类别超出了关于价值的主观性或客观性的争议，因为它否定了对“对象”存在不可或缺的主体关系。它更是一个第三个术语，一个理想概念，进入了二元性，但并未被其耗尽。与其所属于的实践领域相一致，它与主体之间有一种特定的关系，这种关系在我们理论概念的纯粹抽象内容中并不存在。这种形式可以描述为一种主张或要求。附着在任何对象、人的价值，
relationship or happening demands recognition. This demand exists, as an event, only within ourselves as subjects; but in accepting it we sense that we are not merely satisfying a claim imposed by ourselves upon ourselves, or merely acknowledging a quality of the object. The ability of a tangible symbol to awaken in us religious feelings; the moral challenge to revolutionize particular conditions of life or to leave them alone, to develop or retard them; the feeling of obligation not to remain indifferent to great events, but to respond to them; the right of what is perceived to be interpreted in an aesthetic context - all of these are claims that are experienced or realized exclusively within the Ego and have no counterpart or objective point of departure in the objects themselves, but which, as claims, cannot be traced either to the Ego or to the objects to which they refer. Regarded from a naturalistic point of view such a claim may appear subjective, while from the subject’s point of view it appears to be objective; in fact, it is a third category, which cannot be derived from either subject or object, but which stands, so to speak, between us and the objects. I have observed that the value of things belongs among those mental contents that, while we conceive them, we experience at the same time as something independent within our representation, and as detached from the function by which it exists in us. This representation, when its content is a value, appears upon closer scrutiny as a sense that a claim is being made. The ‘function’ is a demand which does not exist as such outside ourselves, but which originates in an ideal realm which does not lie within us. It is not a particular quality of the objects of valuation, but consists rather in the significance that the objects have for us as subjects through their position in the order of that ideal realm. This value, which we conceive as being independent of its recognition, is a metaphysical category, and as such it stands as far beyond the dualism of subject and object as immediate enjoyment stands below it. The latter is a concrete unity to which the differentiating categories have not yet been applied; the former is an abstract or ideal unity, in whose self-subsistent meaning the dualism has again disappeared, just as the contrast between the empirical Ego and the empirical Non-Ego disappears in the all-comprehending system of consciousness that Fichte calls the Ego. At the moment of complete fusion of the function and its content, enjoyment cannot be called subjective, because there is no counterposed object that would justify the concept of a subject. Likewise, this independent, self-justifying value is not objective simply because it is conceived as independent by the subject who conceives it; although it becomes manifest within the subject as a claim for recognition, it will not forfeit anything of its reality if this claim is not fulfilled.
关系或事件的发生需要被认可。这种需求作为一种事件，仅存在于我们作为主体的内心；但在接受它时，我们意识到我们不仅仅是在满足自己对自己的要求，或仅仅是在承认对象的某种特性。一个有形符号唤起我们宗教情感的能力；对革命特定生活条件的道德挑战，或选择不去干预它们，发展或抑制它们的选择；对重大事件不保持冷漠而作出回应的义务感；在美学背景下对所感知事物的解读权——所有这些要求都是在自我内部独特体验或实现的，并且在对象本身中没有对应或客观的出发点，但作为要求，它们既无法追溯到自我，也无法追溯到它们所指涉的对象。从自然主义的角度来看，这种要求可能显得主观，而从主体的角度来看，它又显得客观；实际上，它是一个第三类，既不能从主体或对象中推导出来，但可以说，它处于我们与对象之间。我观察到，事物的价值属于那些心理内容，在我们构思它们的同时，我们也体验到它们在我们的表象中作为某种独立的存在，并且与其在我们内部存在的功能相脱离。 这种表述，当其内容是一个价值时，经过仔细审视，似乎表现出一种主张正在被提出。“功能”是一种需求，这种需求在我们之外并不存在，而是源于一个不在我们内部的理想领域。它不是评价对象的特定属性，而是体现在这些对象作为主体在那个理想领域秩序中的位置对我们所具有的意义。我们所构思的这种价值是独立于其认知的，是一种形而上学的范畴，因此它远远超越了主体与客体的二元对立，就像直接享受低于它一样。后者是一个具体的统一体，尚未应用区分的范畴；前者是一个抽象或理想的统一体，在其自足的意义中，二元对立再次消失，就像经验自我与经验非自我之间的对比在费希特所称的自我所包含的全面意识系统中消失一样。在功能与其内容完全融合的瞬间，享受不能被称为主观，因为没有对立的对象可以证明主体的概念。 同样，这种独立的、自我辩护的价值并不是客观的，仅仅因为它被提出的主体视为独立；尽管它作为一种认同的请求在主体内显现，但如果这个请求没有得到满足，它的现实性不会因此而丧失。

This metaphysical sublimation of value does not play any role in the valuations of daily life, which are concerned only with values in the consciousness of the subject and with the objectivity that emerges as a counterposed object in this psychological process of valuation. I showed earlier that this process of the formation of values develops with the increase in distance between the consumer and the cause of his enjoyment. The differences in valuation which have to be distinguished as subjective and objective, originate from such variations in distance, measured not in terms of enjoyment, in which the distance disappears, but in terms of desire, which is engendered by the distance and seeks to overcome it. At least in the case of those objects whose valuation forms the basis of the economy, value is the correlate of demand. Just as the world of being is my representation, so the world of value is my demand. However, in spite of the logical-physical necessity that every demand expects to be satisfied by an object, the psychological structure of demand is such that in most cases it is focused upon the satisfaction itself, and the object becomes a matter of indifference so long as it satisfies the need. When a man is satisfied with any woman whatsoever, without exercising an individual choice, when he eats anything at all that he can chew and digest, when he sleeps at any resting place, when his cultural needs can be satisfied by the simplest materials offered by nature, then his practical consciousness is completely subjective, he is inspired exclusively by the agitations and satisfactions of his own subjective condition and his interest in objects is limited to their being the causes of these effects. This fact is observed in the naive need for projection by primitive man, who directs his life towards the outside world and takes his inner life for granted. But the conscious wish cannot always be taken as a sufficient index of the really effective valuation. Often enough it is some expediency in the direction of our practical activities that leads us to regard an object as valuable, and it is not in fact the significance of the object but the possible subjective satisfaction that excites us. From this condition - which is not always temporally prior but is, so to speak, the simplest and most fundamental and thus in a systematic sense prior - consciousness is led to the object along two roads which finally merge. When an identical need rejects a number of possible satisfactions, perhaps all but one, and when, therefore, it is not satisfaction as such but satisfaction by a specific object that is desired, there begins a fundamental reorientation from the subject to the object. It may be said that this is still only a question of the subjective satisfaction of need, but that in this second case the need is differentiated to such an extent that only a specific object can satisfy it. In this case also the object is only the cause of sensation and is not valued in itself. Such an objection would indeed nullify
这种价值的形而上学升华在日常生活的评估中并没有任何作用，这些评估仅关注主体意识中的价值以及在这种心理评估过程中作为对立对象出现的客观性。我之前已经指出，这种价值形成的过程随着消费者与其享受原因之间距离的增加而发展。必须区分的主观和客观的评估差异源于这种距离的变化，这种距离不是以享受为衡量标准的，因为在享受中距离消失，而是以欲望为衡量标准，欲望是由距离产生的并试图克服它。至少在那些其评估形成经济基础的物品的情况下，价值是需求的相关物。正如存在的世界是我的表象一样，价值的世界是我的需求。然而，尽管每个需求都逻辑上和物理上期待由一个对象来满足，但需求的心理结构在大多数情况下是集中在满足本身上，而只要对象满足需要，它就变得无关紧要。 当一个男人对任何女人都感到满意，而不进行个体选择时，当他吃任何他能咀嚼和消化的食物时，当他在任何休息的地方睡觉时，当他的文化需求可以通过自然提供的最简单材料得到满足时，那么他的实践意识就是完全主观的，他的灵感完全来自他自己主观状态的激动和满足，他对物体的兴趣仅限于它们作为这些效果的原因。这一事实在原始人天真的投射需求中得到了体现，他们将生活方向指向外部世界，并将内心生活视为理所当然。但有意识的愿望并不总能作为真实有效评估的充分指标。往往是我们实际活动方向上的某种便利使我们将一个物体视为有价值，实际上吸引我们的不是物体的意义，而是可能的主观满足。从这种状态出发——这并不总是在时间上优先，但可以说是最简单和最基本的，因此在系统意义上是优先的——意识沿着两条道路走向对象，这两条道路最终汇合。 当一个相同的需求拒绝了多个可能的满足，或许只剩下一个时，因此，所渴望的不是作为满足本身的满足，而是通过特定对象的满足，这就开始了从主体到客体的根本重定向。可以说，这仍然只是一个主观需求满足的问题，但在这种第二种情况下，需求被区分到只有特定对象才能满足它的程度。在这种情况下，对象也仅仅是感觉的原因，并不被自身所重视。这样的反对意见确实会使得
the difference, if it were the case that the differentiation of the impulse directed it exclusively upon a single satisfying object and ruled out the possibility of satisfaction through any other object. However, this is a very rare and exceptional case. The broader basis from which even the most highly differentiated impulses evolve, and the original diffuseness of need which includes only a drive but not yet a definite single goal, remain as a substratum upon which a consciousness of the individual character of more specific desires for satisfaction develops. The circle of objects that can satisfy the subject’s needs is diminished as he becomes more refined, and the objects desired are set in a sharper contrast with all the others that might satisfy the need but are no longer acceptable. It is well known from psychological investigations that this difference between objects is largely responsible for directing consciousness towards them and endowing them with particular significance. At this stage the need seems to be determined by the object; feeling is guided increasingly by its terminus ad quem instead of its terminus a quo, in the measure that impulse no longer rushes upon every possible satisfaction. Consequently, the place that the object occupies in our consciousness becomes larger. There is also another reason for this. So long as man is dominated by his impulses the world appears to him as an undifferentiated substance. Since it represents for him only an irrelevant means for the satisfaction of his drives - and this effect may arise from all kinds of causes - he has no interest in the nature of the objects themselves. It is the fact that we need a particular single object that makes us acutely aware that we need an object at all. But such awareness is, so to speak, more theoretical - and it diminishes the blind energy of the impulse which is directed only to its own extinction.
如果冲动的区别使其仅仅指向一个令人满意的对象，并排除了通过任何其他对象获得满足的可能性，那么这种差异将是存在的。然而，这种情况是非常罕见和特殊的。即使是最高度差异化的冲动也源于更广泛的基础，最初需求的模糊性只包含一种驱动，但还没有一个明确的单一目标，作为一个基础，意识在此基础上发展出对更具体的满足欲望的个体特征的认识。当个体变得更加精致时，能够满足主体需求的对象范围减小，所渴望的对象与所有其他可能满足需求但不再可接受的对象之间的对比更加鲜明。心理学研究表明，这种对象之间的差异在很大程度上负责引导意识关注它们，并赋予它们特定的意义。在这个阶段，需求似乎是由对象决定的；感受越来越多地受到其终点的引导，而不是其起点，冲动不再急于追求每一个可能的满足。因此，对象在我们意识中所占据的位置变得更大。还有另一个原因。只要人类被自己的冲动主导，世界对他来说就显得是一种未分化的物质。 因为对他来说，这仅仅是满足他驱动的一种无关手段——这种效果可能源于各种原因——他对物体本身的性质没有兴趣。正是我们需要一个特定的单一对象，使我们清晰地意识到我们确实需要一个对象。然而，这种意识可以说是更理论的——它减弱了冲动的盲目能量，而这种能量仅仅是指向自身的消亡。

Since the differentiation of need goes hand in hand with the reduction of its elemental power, consciousness becomes more able to accommodate the object. Or regarded from the other aspect: because consciousness is constrained by the refinement and specialization of need to take a greater interest in the object, a certain amount of force is removed from the solipsistic need. Everywhere the weakening of the emotions, that is to say of the absolute surrender of the Ego to his momentary feelings, is correlated with the objectification of representations, with their appearance in a form of existence that stands over against us. Thus, for instance, talking things over is one of the most powerful means for subduing emotions. The inner process is, as it were, projected by the word into the external world; it now stands over against the individual like a tangible structure, and the intensity of the emotions is diverted. The tranquillization of the passions, and the representation of the objective world as existing and significant, are two sides of one
由于需要的分化与其实质力量的减弱相伴而生，意识就更能容纳客体。或者从另一方面来看：因为意识受制于需要的精细化和专门化而对客体更感兴趣，所以某种力量从唯我需要的状态中被移除了。在任何地方，情感的减弱，也就是说自我对其瞬间感受的绝对屈服的减弱，都与表象的客观化相关，与它们以一种与我们对立的存在形式出现相关。例如，把事情说清楚是最有效的抑制情绪的方法之一。内在的过程仿佛被语言投射到外部世界；它现在像一个具体的结构一样与个体对立，而情感的强度就被转移了。激情的平静与客观世界作为存在和具有意义的事物而呈现，是同一事物的两个方面。
and the same basic process. The diversion of inner interest from mere need and its satisfaction to the object itself, as a result of diminishing the possibility of satisfying the need, can obviously be brought about and strengthened just as well from the side of the object, if the latter makes satisfaction difficult, rare, and to be attained only indirectly or by exceptional effort. Even if we assume a highly differentiated desire concentrated upon selected objects, satisfaction might still be regarded as more or less a matter of course so long as there is no difficulty or resistance. What really matters, in order to conceive the independent significance of objects, is the distance between them and our impression of them. It is one of the numerous cases in which one has to stand back from the objects, to establish a distance between them and oneself, in order to get an objective picture of them. This is certainly no less subjective a view than the unclear or distorted picture that is obtained when the distance is too great or too small; but inner expediential reasons of our cognition lay a special emphasis upon subjectivity in the case of these extremes. At first, the object exists only in our relationship to it and is completely absorbed in this relationship; it becomes something external and opposed to us only in the degree that it escapes from this connection. Even the desire for objects, which recognizes their autonomy while seeking to overcome it, develops only when want and satisfaction do not coincide. The possibility of enjoyment must be separated, as an image of the future, from our present condition in order for us to desire things that now stand at a distance from us. Just as in the intellectual sphere the original oneness of perception, which we can observe in children, is only gradually divided into awareness of the self and of the object, so the naive enjoyment of objects only gives way to an awareness of the significance of things, and respect for them, when the objects are somewhat withdrawn. Here, too, the relationship between the weakening of desire and the beginning of an objectification of values is apparent, since the decline of the elemental strength of volition and feeling favours the growing awareness of the self. So long as a person surrenders unreservedly to a momentary feeling and is completely possessed by it, the Ego cannot develop. The awareness of a self that exists beyond its various emotions can emerge only when it appears as an enduring entity amid all these changes, and when the emotions do not absorb the whole self. The emotions must leave a part of the self untouched, as a neutral point for their contrasts, so that a certain reduction and limitation of the emotions allows the self to develop as the unchanging bearer of diverse contents. In all areas of our life Ego and object are related concepts, which are not yet separated in the initial forms of representation and only become differentiated through each other; and in just the same way, the
同样的基本过程。由于满足需求的可能性减小，内心兴趣的转移不仅仅是满足需求本身，而是转向对象本身，显然可以通过对象本身的侧面来实现和增强，如果后者使得满足变得困难、稀少，并且只能通过间接或特殊的努力来获得。即使我们假设一种高度分化的欲望集中于选定的对象，只要没有困难或抵抗，满足仍然可能被视为或多或少是理所当然的。为了理解对象的独立意义，真正重要的是它们与我们印象之间的距离。这是许多情况下的一个例子，其中人们必须与对象保持距离，在它们与自己之间建立一种距离，以便获得它们的客观图景。这无疑是一种不亚于当距离过大或过小时所获得的模糊或扭曲图景的主观观点；但我们认知的内在经验理由在这些极端情况下对主观性给予了特别的强调。起初，对象仅存在于我们与它的关系中，完全融入这一关系；它只有在逃脱这种联系的程度上，才能成为对我们外部和对立的东西。 即便是对物体的渴望，它承认物体的自主性同时又试图超越这种自主性，仅在欲望与满足不相吻合时才得以发展。享受的可能性必须与我们当前的状态隔离，作为未来的映像，才能让我们渴望那些现在距离我们尚远的事物。正如在智力领域，我们可以在儿童身上观察到的感知的原初统一性，只有逐渐分化为自我意识和对象意识，幼稚的对物体的享受也只有在物体稍微撤回时，才会让位于对事物意义及其尊重的意识。在这里，欲望的削弱与价值的物化开始之间的关系也显而易见，因为意志和情感的基本力量的衰退有利于自我意识的增强。只要一个人无条件地屈从于瞬间的感受，并被其完全占据，自我就无法发展。只有当自我作为一个持久的实体在所有这些变化中出现，并且这些情感并未完全吸收整个自我时，那种超越各种情感的自我意识才能浮现。情感必须留下一部分自我未被触动，作为其对比的中立点，以便某种情感的减弱和限制使得自我能够作为多样内容的固定承载者发展。 在我们生活的各个领域，自我与客体都是相关的概念，在表象的初始形式中两者尚未分离，只有通过彼此才得以区分；同样，客体的独立价值也只有与已变得独立的自我形成对比才得以发展。只有我们体验到的排斥、获得客体的困难、愿望与满足之间等待和劳作，才能将自我与客体区分开来；否则，它们将在需求与满足的近距离中保持未发展和未分化的状态。客体的有效定义是源于其相对于需求的稀缺性，还是源于获得它的积极努力，毫无疑问，只有通过这种方式才能在客体与我们自身之间建立距离，使我们能够赋予它超越仅仅被享用的价值。
independent value of objects develops only by contrast with an Ego that has become independent. Only the repulsions that we experience, the difficulties of attaining an object, the waiting and the labour that stand between a wish and its fulfilment, drive the Ego and the object apart; otherwise they remain undeveloped and undifferentiated in the propinquity of need and satisfaction. Whether the effective definition of the object arises from its scarcity, in relation to demand, or from the positive effort to acquire it, there is no doubt that only in this way is distance established between the object and ourselves which enables us to accord it a value beyond that of being merely enjoyed.
The independent value of objects develops only by contrast with an Ego that has become independent. Only the repulsions that we experience, the difficulties of attaining an object, the waiting and the labour that stand between a wish and its fulfilment, drive the Ego and the object apart; otherwise they remain undeveloped and undifferentiated in the propinquity of need and satisfaction. Whether the effective definition of the object arises from its scarcity, in relation to demand, or from the positive effort to acquire it, there is no doubt that only in this way is distance established between the object and ourselves which enables us to accord it a value beyond that of being merely enjoyed.

It may be said, therefore, that the value of an object does indeed depend upon the demand for it, but upon a demand that is no longer purely instinctive. On the other hand, if the object is to remain an economic value, its value must not be raised so greatly that it becomes an absolute. The distance between the self and the object of demand could become so large - through the difficulties of procuring it, through its exorbitant price, through moral or other misgivings that counter the striving after it - that the act of volition does not develop, and the desire is extinguished or becomes only a vague wish. The distance between subject and object that establishes value, at least in the economic sense, has a lower and an upper limit; the formula that the amount of value equals the degree of resistance to the acquisition of objects, in relation to natural, productive and social opportunities, is not correct. Certainly, iron would not be an economic value if its acquisition encountered no greater difficulty than the acquisition of air for breathing; but these difficulties had to remain within certain limits if the tools were to be manufactured which made iron valuable. To take another example: it has been suggested that the pictures of a very productive painter would be less valuable than those of one who was less productive, assuming equal artistic talent. But this is true only above a certain quantitative level. A painter, in order to acquire the fame that raises the price of his pictures, is obliged to produce a certain number of works. Again, the scarcity of gold in some countries with a paper currency has created a situation in which ordinary people will not accept gold even when it is offered to them. In the particular case of precious metals, whose suitability as the material of money is usually attributed to their scarcity, it should be noted that scarcity can only become significant above a considerable volume, without which these metals could not serve the practical demand for money and consequently could not acquire the value they possess as money. It is, perhaps, only the avaricious desire for an unlimited quantity of goods, in terms of which all values are scarce, that leads us to overlook that a certain proportion between scarcity
因此，可以说，一个物体的价值确实取决于对它的需求，但这种需求不再是纯粹本能的。另一方面，如果这个物体要保持经济价值，它的价值就不能被提高到绝对的程度。自我与需求对象之间的距离可能会变得非常大——通过获取它的困难，通过其过高的价格，通过与追求它相悖的道德或其他顾虑——以至于意志行为得不到发展，欲望被熄灭或仅变成一种模糊的愿望。建立价值的主体与客体之间的距离，至少在经济意义上，有一个下限和上限；价值等于获取物体的阻力程度的公式，在自然、生产和社会机会的关系中并不正确。确实，如果获取铁的难度与获取呼吸空气的难度没有显著差异，铁就不会成为经济价值；但这些困难必须保持在某些限度之内，才能制造出使铁具有价值的工具。再举一个例子：有人曾建议，假设艺术才能相同，产量更高的画家的作品将比产量较低的画家的作品价值更低。但这只有在超过某个量的水平时才是正确的。 一位画家，为了获得提高自己作品价格的名声，不得不创作一定数量的作品。此外，一些拥有纸币的国家中黄金稀缺，导致普通人即使在提供黄金时也不愿意接受。在贵金属的特定案例中，通常将其作为货币材料的适用性归因于其稀缺性，但需要注意的是，稀缺性只有在达到相当数量时才变得重要，否则这些金属无法满足对货币的实际需求，因此无法获得作为货币所具有的价值。也许，正是对无限量商品的贪婪欲望，让我们忽视了稀缺性之间的某种比例关系。
and non-scarcity, and not scarcity itself, is the condition of value. The factor of scarcity has to be related to the significance of the sense for differences; the factor of abundance to the significance of habituation. Life in general is determined by the proportion of these two facts: that we need variety and change of content just as we need familiarity; and this general need appears here in the specific form that the value of objects requires, on the one hand, scarcity - that is to say, differentiation and particularity - while on the other hand it needs a certain comprehensiveness, frequency and permanence in order that objects may enter the realm of values.
价值的条件并非稀缺性本身，而是非稀缺性。稀缺性因素必须与差异感的重要性相关；丰裕性因素与习惯的重要性相关。生活普遍由这两个因素的比例决定：我们需要多样性和内容变化，正如我们需要熟悉感一样；这种普遍需求在此以具体形式出现，即物体的价值一方面需要稀缺性——也就是说，差异性和特殊性——另一方面，它需要一定的全面性、频率和持久性，以便物体能够进入价值领域。

I would like to show the universal significance of distance for supposedly objective valuation by an example that has nothing to do with economic values and which therefore illustrates the general principle, namely aesthetic valuation. What we call the enjoyment of the beauty of things developed relatively late. For no matter how much immediate sensual enjoyment may exist even today in the individual case, the specific quality of aesthetic enjoyment is the ability to appreciate and enjoy the object, not simply an experience of sensual or supra-sensual stimulation. Every cultivated person is able to make a clear distinction in principle between the aesthetic and the sensual enjoyment of female beauty, even though he may not be able to draw the line between these components of his impression on a particular occasion. In the one case we surrender to the object, while in the other case the object surrenders to us. Even though aesthetic value, like any other value, is not an integral part of the object but is rather a projection of our feelings, it has the peculiarity that the projection is complete. In other words, the content of the feeling is, as it were, absorbed by the object and confronts the subject as something which has autonomous significance, which is inherent in the object. What was the historical psychological process in which this objective aesthetic pleasure in things emerged, given that primitive enjoyment which was the basis for any more refined appreciation must have been tied to direct subjective satisfaction and utility? Perhaps we can find a clue in a very simple observation. If an object of any kind provides us with great pleasure or advantage we experience a feeling of joy at every later viewing of this object, even if any use or enjoyment is now out of the question. This joy, which resembles an echo, has a unique psychological character determined by the fact that we no longer want anything from the object. In place of the former concrete relationship with the object, it is now mere contemplation that is the source of enjoyable sensation; we leave the being of the
我想通过一个与经济价值无关的例子来展示距离对于所谓客观评估的普遍意义，从而说明这一一般原则，即审美价值。我们所称的对事物美的享受相对较晚发展。因为无论今天在个别情况下存在多少立即的感官享受，审美享受的具体品质在于能够欣赏和享受对象，而不仅仅是感官或超感官刺激的体验。每一个有修养的人在原则上都能够清楚地区分女性美的审美享受与感官享受，即使他在特定场合可能无法划分这些成分。在一种情况下，我们向对象屈服，而在另一种情况下，对象向我们屈服。尽管审美价值像任何其他价值一样，并不是对象的一个不可分割的部分，而更像是我们情感的投射，但它具有投射的完整性这个特征。换句话说，情感的内容在某种程度上被对象所吸收，并作为具有自主意义的东西面对主体，这种自主意义是内在于对象的。 这种客观的美学愉悦感是如何在历史心理过程中产生的，考虑到作为任何更精致欣赏基础的原始享受必定与直接的主观满足和实用性密切相关？也许我们可以在一个非常简单的观察中找到线索。如果任何物体为我们提供了巨大的快乐或好处，在此后每次观看该物体时，即使使用或享受现在已不再可能，我们也会体验到一份喜悦。这种类似回声的快乐具有独特的心理特征，因为我们已不再对该物体有任何需求。取而代之的是，与物体之前的具体关系，现在的享受感觉仅仅来源于对物体的沉思；我们已离开了物体的存在。
object untouched, and our sentiment is attached only to its appearance, not to that which in any sense may be consumed. In short, whereas formerly the object was valuable as a means for our practical and eudaemonistic ends, it has now become an object of contemplation from which we derive pleasure by confronting it with reserve and remoteness, without touching it. It seems to me that the essential features of aesthetic enjoyment are foreshadowed here, but they can be shown more plainly if we follow the changes in sensation from the sphere of individual psychology to that of the species as a whole. The attempt has often been made to derive beauty from utility, but as a rule this has led only to a philistine coarsening of beauty. This might be avoided if the practical expediency and sensual eudaemonistic immediacy were placed far enough back in the history of the species, as a result of which an instinctive, reflex-like sense of enjoyment in our organism were attached to the appearance of objects; the physico-psychic connection would then be genetic and would become effective in the individual without any consciousness on his part of the utility of the object. There is no need to enter into the controversy about the inheritance of such acquired associations; it suffices here that the events occur as if such qualities were inheritable. Consequently, the beautiful would be for us what once proved useful for the species, and its contemplation would give us pleasure without our having any practical interest in the object as individuals. This would not of course imply uniformity or the reduction of individual taste to an average or collective level. These echoes of an earlier general utility are absorbed into the diversity of individual minds and transformed into new unique qualities, so that one might say that the detachment of the pleasurable sensation from the reality of its original cause has finally become a form of our consciousness, quite independent of the contents that first gave rise to it, and ready to absorb any other content that the psychic constellation permits. In those cases that offer realistic pleasure, our appreciation of the object is not specifically aesthetic, but practical; it becomes aesthetic only as a result of increasing distance, abstraction and sublimation. What happens here is the common phenomenon that, once a certain connection has been established, the connecting link itself disappears because it is no longer required. The connection between certain useful objects and the sense of pleasure has become so well established for the species through inheritance or some other mechanism, that the mere sight of these objects becomes pleasurable even in the absence of any utility. This explains what Kant calls ‘aesthetic indifference’, the lack of concern about the real existence of an object so long as its ‘form’, i.e. its visibility, is given. Hence also the radiance and transcendence of the beautiful, which arises from the temporal remoteness
物体未被触碰，而我们的情感仅与它的外观相关，而不是与任何意义上可能被消费的东西相关。简而言之，以前物体因其作为我们实际和幸福主义目的的手段而有价值，而现在它已成为一种沉思的对象，我们通过与之保持距离和保留来获得愉悦，而不去触碰它。在我看来，这里预示着审美享受的基本特征，但如果我们跟随从个体心理学领域到整个物种领域的感知变化，可以更清晰地展示这些特征。人们常常试图从实用性中推导出美，但通常只会导致对美的粗俗化。这可以通过将实用性和感性的幸福主义即时性放置在物种历史的较早阶段来避免，从而使我们有机体中对物体外观的本能、反射式的享受感应运而生；物理-心理的联系将是遗传的，并将在个体中生效，而个体并不意识到物体的实用性。关于这种获得性联结的遗传性争论没有必要深入讨论；在这里足够的是，这些事件的发生就仿佛这些特质是可遗传的。 因此，美对于我们来说，将是曾经对物种有用的东西，它的观赏会给我们带来愉悦，尽管作为个体我们对该物体并无实际兴趣。当然，这并不意味着统一或将个人品味降低到平均或集体的水平。这些早期普遍实用性的回响被个体思想的多样性所吸收，并转化为新的独特品质，因此可以说，愉悦感与其原始原因的现实脱离，最终已经成为我们意识的一种形式，完全独立于最初引发它的内容，并准备吸收任何其他精神构星所允许的内容。在那些提供现实愉悦的情况下，我们对物体的欣赏并非特定的美学，而是实用的；仅随着距离、抽象和升华的增加，才成为美学。在这里发生的现象是，一旦某种连接建立，连接的环节本身便会消失，因为它不再被需要。特定有用物体与愉悦感之间的联系通过遗传或其他机制对物种的建立已如此牢固，即使在没有任何效用的情况下，仅仅看到这些物体也会变得愉悦。 这解释了康德所称的“审美无关”，即对物体实际存在的缺乏关心，只要其“形式”，即其可见性被给予。因此，美的光辉和超越也源于时间的遥远。
of the real motives in which we now discover the aesthetic. Hence the idea that the beautiful is something typical, supra-individual, and universally valid; for the evolution of the species has long ago eliminated from these inner states of mind anything specific and individual in the motives and experiences. In consequence it is often impossible to justify on rational grounds aesthetic judgments or the opposition that they sometimes present to what is useful and agreeable to the individual. The whole development of objects from utility value to aesthetic value is a process of objectification. When I call an object beautiful, its quality and significance become much more independent of the arrangements and the needs of the subject than if it is merely useful. So long as objects are merely useful they are interchangeable and everything can be replaced by anything else that performs the same service. But when they are beautiful they have a unique individual existence and the value of one cannot be replaced by another even though it may be just as beautiful in its own way. We need not pursue these brief remarks on the origin of aesthetic value into a discussion of all the ramifications of the subject in order to recognize that the objectification of value originates in the relative distance that emerges between the direct subjective origin of the valuation of the object and our momentary feeling concerning the object. The more remote for the species is the utility of the object that first created an interest and a value and is now forgotten, the purer is the aesthetic satisfaction derived from the mere form and appearance of the object. The more it stands before us in its own dignity, the more we attribute to it a significance that is not exhausted by haphazard subjective enjoyment, and the more the relationship of valuing the objects merely as means is replaced by a feeling of their independent value.
我们现在发现美学的真实动机。因此，认为美是一种典型的、超个人的和普遍有效的东西；因为物种的演化早已从这些内心状态中消除了任何特定和个体的动机和经历。因此，常常很难从理性上证明美学判断或它们有时与个体的有用和愉悦之间对立的理由。从效用价值到审美价值的整个物体发展是一个物化的过程。当我称一个物体为美丽时，它的品质和意义变得比仅仅有用时更独立于主体的安排和需求。只要物体仅仅是有用的，它们就是可互换的，任何东西都可以被执行相同功能的其他东西所替代。但当它们是美的时，它们就具有独特的个体存在，一个的价值不能被另一个替代，即使另一个在自身的方式上也同样美丽。我们不需要追求对审美价值起源的这些简要评论，在进行对该主题所有分支的讨论之前，就能认识到价值的物化源于对物体的价值评估的直接主观来源与我们对物体的瞬时感觉之间出现的相对距离。 物体最初引起兴趣和价值，而今已被遗忘，其对物种的效用越遥远，则纯粹从物体的形态和外观获得的美学满足感就越强烈。它在我们面前越独立地存在，我们就越赋予它一种不局限于偶然的主观享乐的意义，而将物体仅仅作为手段进行评价的关系，则越被对其独立价值的感受所取代。

I have chosen the above example because the objectifying effect of what I have called ‘distance’ is particularly clear when it is a question of distance in time. The process is, of course, intensive and qualitative, so that any quantitative designation in terms of distance is more or less symbolic. The same effect can be brought about by a number of other factors, as I have already mentioned: for example, by the scarcity of an object, by the difficulties of acquisition, by the necessity of renunciation. Even though in these economically important instances the significance of the objects remains a significance for us and so dependent upon our appreciation, the decisive change is that the objects confront us after these developments as independent powers, as a world of substances and forces that determine by their own qualities
我之所以选择上述例子，是因为当我谈到时间上的距离时，我所说的“距离”的客观化效应尤为明显。当然，这个过程是密集的、质的，因此任何用距离来进行的数量化规定都或多或少是象征性的。正如我前面提到的，许多其他因素也能产生同样的效果：例如，物体的稀缺性、获取的困难、放弃的必要性。即使在这些经济上重要的例子中，物体的意义仍然对我们有意义，因此依赖于我们的评价，但决定性的变化是，在这些发展之后，物体以独立的力量呈现在我们面前，作为一个由其自身品质决定的物质和力量的世界。
whether and to what extent they will satisfy our needs, and which demand effort and hardship before they will surrender to us. Only if the question of renunciation arises - renunciation of a feeling that really matters - is it necessary to direct attention upon the object itself. The situation, which is represented in stylized form by the concept of Paradise, in which subject and object, desire and satisfaction are not yet divided from each other - a situation that is not restricted to a specific historical epoch, but which appears everywhere in varying degrees - is destined to disintegrate, but also to attain a new reconciliation. The purpose of establishing a distance is that it should be overcome. The longing, effort and sacrifice that separate us from objects are also supposed to lead us towards them. Withdrawal and approach are in practice complementary notions, each of which presupposes the other; they are two sides of our relationship to objects, which we call subjectively our desire and objectively their value. We have to make the object enjoyed more remote from us in order to desire it again, and in relation to the distant object this desire is the first stage of approaching it, the first ideal relation to it. This dual significance of desire - that it can arise only at a distance from objects, a distance that it attempts to overcome, and yet that it presupposes a closeness between the objects and ourselves in order that the distance should be experienced at all - has been beautifully expressed by Plato in the statement that love is an intermediate state between possession and deprivation. The necessity of sacrifice, the experience that the satisfaction of desire has a price, is only the accentuation or intensification of this relationship. It makes us more distinctly aware of the distance between our present self and the enjoyment of things, but only by leading along the road towards overcoming it. This inner development towards the simultaneous growth of distance and approach also appears as a historical process of differentiation. Culture produces a widening circle of interests; that is, the periphery within which the objects of interest are located becomes farther and farther removed from the centre, the Ego. This increase in distance, however, depends upon a simultaneous drawing closer. If objects, persons and events hundreds or thousands of miles away acquire a vital importance for modern man, they must have been brought much closer to him than to primitive man, for whom they simply do not exist because the positive distinction between close and far has not yet been made. These two notions develop in a reciprocal relation from the original undifferentiated state. Modern man has to work in a different way, to apply a much greater effort than primitive man; the distance between him and the objects of his endeavours is much greater and much more difficult obstacles stand in his way, but on the other hand he acquires a greater quantity of
无论它们在多大程度上会满足我们的需要，以及在它们向我们屈服之前需要付出怎样的努力和艰辛。只有当放弃这一真正重要的感受的问题出现时，才有必要将注意力集中在对象本身。情境以理想化的形式被“天堂”的概念所代表，在这个境况中，主体与对象、欲望与满足尚未分开——这种情境并不限于特定的历史时代，而是以不同程度普遍存在——注定要瓦解，但也注定要实现新的和解。建立距离的目的是为了克服它。将我们与对象分开的渴望、努力和牺牲也应该引领我们接近它们。撤退和接近在实践中是互补的概念，彼此假定对方；它们是我们与对象关系的两个方面，我们主观上称之为欲望，客观上称之为它们的价值。我们必须使所享受的对象离我们更远，以便重新渴望它，关于这一遥远对象的渴望是接近它的第一阶段，是对它的第一种理想关系。 欲望的双重意义——它只能在与对象的距离中产生，这种距离试图被克服，而它又预设了对象与我们之间的亲近，以便该距离能够被体验——已被柏拉图在其对爱的描述中美妙地表达为：爱是一种介于占有与剥夺之间的中间状态。牺牲的必要性，欲望满足的体验是有代价的，仅仅是这种关系的强调或强化。它使我们更清晰地意识到现自我与享受事物之间的距离，但仅仅是通过引导走向克服它的道路。这种朝向距离与接近同时增长的内在发展也表现为一种历史上的差异化过程。文化产生了一圈圈扩大的兴趣；即，兴趣对象所在的周边逐渐远离中心，自我 Ego。然而，距离的增加却依赖于同时的拉近。如果距离数百或数千里之外的对象、人物和事件对现代人变得极为重要，那么它们必然比对原始人更接近，因为对他们而言，这些对象根本不存在，因为近与远的正向区分尚未形成。这两个概念在原始未分化状态中以相互关系的发展。 现代人必须以不同的方式工作，付出比原始人多得多的努力；他和其努力目标之间的距离要远得多，而且要克服更多困难得多的障碍，但另一方面，他获得的物品数量也更多
objects, ideally through his desire and in practice through his work. The cultural process - which transposes the subjective condition of impulse and enjoyment into the valuation of objects - separates more distinctly the elements of our dual relationship of closeness and distance.
文化过程——它将冲动和享乐的主观状态转化为对客体的评价——更清晰地将我们这种既亲近又疏远的双重关系中的各个要素区分开来。

The subjective events of impulse and enjoyment become objectified in value; that is to say, there develop from the objective conditions obstacles, deprivations, demands for some kind of ‘price’ through which the cause or content of impulse and enjoyment is first separated from us and becomes, by this very act, an object and a value. The fundamental conceptual question as to the subjectivity or objectivity of value is misconceived. The subjectivity of value is quite erroneously based upon the fact that no object can ever acquire universal value, but that value changes from place to place, from person to person, and even from one hour to the next. This is a case of confusing subjectivity with the individuality of value. The fact that I want to enjoy, or do enjoy, something is indeed subjective in so far as there is no awareness of or interest in the object as such. But then an altogether new process begins: the process of valuation. The content of volition and feeling assumes the form of the object. This object now confronts the subject with a certain degree of independence, surrendering or refusing itself, presenting conditions for its acquisition, placed by his original capricious choice in a law-governed realm of necessary occurrences and restrictions. It is completely irrelevant here that the contents of these forms of objectivity are not the same for all subjects. If we assumed that all human beings evaluated objects in exactly the same way, this would not increase the degree of objectivity beyond that which exists in an individual case; for if any object is valued rather than simply satisfying desire it stands at an objective distance from us that is established by real obstacles and necessary struggles, by gain and loss, by considerations of advantage and by prices. The reason why the misleading question about the objectivity or subjectivity of value is raised again and again is that we find empirically an infinite number of objects that are entirely the products of representations. But if an object in its finished form arises first in our consciousness, its value seems to reside entirely in the subject; the aspect from which I began - the classification of objects in the two series of being and value - seems to be identical with the division between objectivity and subjectivity. But this fails to take into account that the object of volition is different from the object of representation. Even though both may occupy the same place in the series of space, time and quality, the desired object confronts us in a different way and has quite a different significance from the represented object. Consider the analogy of love. The person we love is not the same being as our reason represents. I am
冲动和享乐的主观事件在价值中客观化；也就是说，客观条件中产生障碍、剥夺、对某种“价格”的需求，通过这些，冲动和享乐的原因或内容首先与我们分离，并通过这一行为成为对象和价值。关于价值的主观性或客观性的基本概念问题是被误解的。价值的主观性错误地基于这样一个事实：没有对象能够获得普遍价值，而是价值在不同地点、不同人之间甚至在不同时间之间发生变化。这是将主观性与价值的个性混淆的结果。我想要享受或确实享受某种事物的事实在某种程度上是主观的，因为没有对对象本身的意识或兴趣。但随之而来的是一个完全新的过程：价值评价过程。意志和情感的内容以对象的形式呈现。这个对象现在以某种独立性面对主体，屈服或拒绝自己，呈现出获取它的条件，这些条件是主体最初任性选择在一个象征必然发生和限制的法则支配的领域中所置放的。在这里，这些客观形式的内容对所有主体并不相同是完全无关紧要的。 如果我们假设所有人类以完全相同的方式来评估对象，这并不会增加超出个案所存在的客观性；因为如果任何对象的价值是被重视而不仅仅是满足欲望，它与我们之间的客观距离是由真正的障碍和必要的斗争、由得失、由利益考量和价格所确定的。关于价值的客观性或主观性所提出的误导性问题之所以屡屡被提起，是因为我们在经验上发现有无数完全是表象产物的对象。然而，如果一个对象在其完成形式中首先出现在我们的意识中，其价值似乎完全存在于主体中；我开始时的那个方面——将对象分类为存在和价值的两个系列——似乎与客观性和主观性之间的划分是相同的。但这未能考虑到意志的对象与表象的对象是不同的。即使两者可能在空间、时间和质量的系列中占据相同的位置，所渴望的对象以不同的方式面对我们，并且与被表象的对象有着截然不同的意义。考虑爱的类比。我们所爱的人并不是我们的理智所表征的那个存在。 我是
not referring here to the distortions or falsifications that emotions may produce in the object of cognition; for these remain within the sphere of representation and of intellectual categories, even though the content is modified. It is in a completely different way from that of intellectual representations that the beloved person is an object to us. Despite the logical identity it has a different meaning for us, just as the marble of the Venus de Milo means different things for a crystallographer and an art critic. A single element of being, although recognized as one and the same, can become an object for us in quite different ways: as an object of representation, and as an object of desire. Within each of these categories the confrontation between subject and object has other causes and other effects, so that it leads only to confusion if the practical relation between man and his object is equated with the alternative between subjectivity and objectivity which is valid only in the realm of intellectual representation. For even though the value of an object is not objective in the same manner as colour or weight, it is also not at all subjective in the sense of corresponding with this kind of objectivity; such subjectivity would apply rather to a perception of colour resulting from a deception of the senses, or of any other quality of the object based on a mistaken conclusion, or of a quality suggested by superstition. The practical relation to objects, however, produces a completely different kind of objectivity, because the conditions of reality withdraw the object of desire and enjoyment from the subjective realm and thus produce the specific category that we call value.
这里所指的并不是情感可能在认知对象中产生的扭曲或伪造；因为这些仍然属于表征和智力范畴，即使内容有所修改。心爱的人以一种与智力表征完全不同的方式成为我们的对象。尽管逻辑上具有同一性，但对我们来说它的意义是不同的，就像米洛的维纳斯的大理石对于结晶学家和艺术评论家具有不同的意义一样。存在的单一元素，尽管被认作是一个和相同的，但可以以截然不同的方式成为我们的对象：作为表征对象，以及作为欲望对象。在这两个类别中，主体与对象之间的对抗具有其他原因和其他效果，因此如果将人类与其对象之间的实际关系等同于仅在智力表征领域内有效的主观性与客观性之间的选择，将只会导致混乱。因为尽管对象的价值并不像颜色或重量那样客观，但它在与这种客观性相对应的意义上也根本不具备主观性；这种主观性更适用于因感官欺骗而产生的颜色感知，或基于错误结论的对象的任何其他特质，或由迷信暗示的特质。 然而，与物体的实际关系产生了一种完全不同的客观性，因为现实的条件将欲望和享受的对象从主观领域中撤回，从而产生了我们称之为价值的特定类别。

Within the economic sphere, this process develops in such a way that the content of the sacrifice or renunciation that is interposed between man and the object of his demand is, at the same time, the object of someone else’s demand. The one has to give up the possession or enjoyment that the other wants in order to persuade the latter to give up what he owns and what the former wants. I shall show that the subsistence economy of an isolated producer can be reduced to the same formula. Two value formations are interwoven; a value has to be offered in order to acquire a value. Thus it appears that there is a reciprocal determination of value by the objects. By being exchanged, each object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value through the other object. This is the most important consequence and expression of the distance established between the objects and the subject. So long as objects are close to the subjects, so long as the differentiation of demand, scarcity, difficulties and resistance to acquisition have not yet removed the objects to a distance from the subject, they are, so to speak, desire and enjoyment, but not yet objects of desire and enjoyment. The process that I have outlined through which they become objects is brought
在经济领域，这一过程的发展方式是，置于人和他所需物体之间的牺牲或放弃的内容，同时也是他人需求的对象。一个人必须放弃另一个人想要的占有或享受，以说服后者放弃他拥有的而前者想要的东西。我将展示孤立生产者的生存经济可以简化为相同的公式。两种价值形成交织在一起；必须提供一种价值才能获取另一种价值。因此，似乎存在物品之间价值的相互决定。通过交换，每个物体通过另一个物体获得其实践实现和价值的衡量。这是建立在物体与主体之间距离的最重要结果和表现。只要物体靠近主体，只要需求的差异、稀缺性、获取的困难和阻力尚未使物体远离主体，它们可以说是欲望和享受，但还不算欲望和享受的对象。我所概述的它们成为对象的过程是通过
to completion when the object, which is at the same time remote and yet overcomes the distance, is produced specifically for this purpose. Thus, pure economic objectivity, the detachment of the object from any subjective relationship to the subject, is established; and since production is carried out for the purpose of exchange with another object, which has a corresponding role, the two objects enter into a reciprocal objective relationship. The form taken by value in exchange places value in a category beyond the strict meaning of subjectivity and objectivity. In exchange, value becomes suprasubjective, supra-individual, yet without becoming an objective quality and reality of the things themselves. Value appears as the demand of the object, transcending its immanent reality, to be exchanged and acquired only for another corresponding value. The Ego, even though it is the universal source of values, becomes so far removed from the objects that they can measure their significance by each other without referring in each case to the Ego. But this real relationship between values, which is executed and supported by exchange, evidently has its purpose in eventual subjective enjoyment, that is, in the fact that we receive a greater quantity and intensity of values than would be possible without exchange transactions. It has been said that the divine principle, after having created the elements of the world, withdrew and left them to the free play of their own powers, so that we can now speak of an objective cosmos, subject to its own relations and laws; and further, that the divine power chose this independence of the cosmic process as the most expedient means of accomplishing its own purposes for the world. In the same way, we invest economic objects with a quantity of value as if it were an inherent quality, and then hand them over to the process of exchange, to a mechanism determined by those quantities, to an impersonal confrontation between values, from which they return multiplied and more enjoyable to the final purpose, which was also their point of origin: subjective experience. This is the basis and source of that valuation which finds its expression in economic life and whose consequences represent the meaning of money. We turn now to their investigation.
当对象同时是遥远的并且克服距离时，为此目的而特别生产的对象完成了。由此，纯粹的经济客观性，即对象与主体之间任何主观关系的脱离得以确立；由于生产是为了与另一个具有相应作用的对象进行交换而进行的，这两个对象便进入了一种相互的客观关系。价值在交换中所呈现的形式将价值置于超越主观性和客观性严格意义的范畴。在交换中，价值变得超主观、超个体，但并没有成为事物本身的客观特性和现实。价值表现为对象的需求，超越其内在现实，仅能为另一个对应的价值交换和获取。自我，即使它是价值的普遍源泉，也与对象保持如此遥远的关系，以至于对象可以相互衡量其重要性，而不需在每个情况下都参考自我。但这种通过交换执行和支持的价值之间的真实关系，显然其目的在于最终的主观享受，即我们所获得的价值的数量和强度要比没有交换交易时可能获得的要大。 人们常说，神圣的原则在创造了世界的元素之后，便退却了，将它们留给自身力量的自由发挥，因此我们现在可以说存在一个客观的宇宙，它服从于自身的关系和规律；此外，神圣的力量选择宇宙过程的这种独立性作为实现其自身世界目的的最有效手段。同样，我们将一定数量的价值赋予经济对象，就好像它是一种内在的品质一样，然后将其交给交换过程，交给由这些数量决定的机制，交给价值之间非个人的对抗，从这种对抗中，它们以倍增的形式回归，并为最终目的带来更多愉悦，而这个最终目的也是它们的起源点：主观体验。这就是在经济生活中找到表达的估价的基础和来源，其结果代表了货币的意义。我们现在转向对它们的考察。

The technical form of economic transactions produces a realm of values that is more or less completely detached from the subjective-personal substructure. Although the individual buys because he values and wants to consume
经济交易的技术形式产生了一个或多或少完全脱离主观个人基础结构的价值领域。尽管个人购买是因为他重视并想要消费