SemiAnalysis is hosting an Nvidia Blackwell GPU Hackathon on Sunday March 16th. It is the ultimate playground for Blackwell PTX tech enthusiasts, offering hands-on exploration of Blackwell & PTX infrastructure while collaborating on open-source projects. Speakers will include Philippe Tillet of OpenAI, Tri Dao of TogetherAI, Horace He of Thinking Machines, and more. Sponsored by: Together, Lambda, Google Cloud, Nvidia, GPU Mode, Thinking Machines, OpenAI, PyTorch, Coreweave, Nebius. Apply to be part of the fun.
SemiAnalysis 将于 3 月 16 日星期日举办 Nvidia Blackwell GPU 黑客马拉松。它是Blackwell PTX技术爱好者的终极游乐场，提供对Blackwell和PTX基础设施的实践探索，同时在开源项目上进行协作。演讲者将包括 OpenAI 的 Philippe Tillet、TogetherAI 的 Tri Dao、Thinking Machines 的 Horace He 等。赞助方：Together、Lambda、Google Cloud、Nvidia、GPU Mode、Thinking Machines、OpenAI、PyTorch、Coreweave、Nebius。申请成为乐趣的一部分。

This is a Call for Action for the United States of America and the West. We are in the early precipice of a nonlinear transformation in industrial society, but the bedrock the US is standing on is shaky. Automation and robotics is currently undergoing a revolution that will enable full-scale automation of all manufacturing and mission-critical industries. These intelligent robotics systems will be the first ever additional industrial piece that is not supplemental but fully additive– 24/7 labor with higher throughput than any human—, allowing for massive expansion in production capacities past adding another human unit of work. The only country that is positioned to capture this level of automation is currently China, and should China achieve it without the US following suit, the production expansion will be granted only to China, posing an existential threat to the US as it is outcompeted in all capacities.
这是对美利坚合众国和西方的行动呼吁。我们正处于工业社会非线性转型的早期悬崖边上，但美国所站的基石却摇摇欲坠。自动化和机器人技术目前正在经历一场革命，这将使所有制造和任务关键型行业的全面自动化成为可能。这些智能机器人系统将是有史以来第一个非补充而是完全附加的工业产品——24/7 劳动力，吞吐量比任何人都高——允许大规模扩展生产能力，而不是增加另一个人工工作单元。目前唯一有能力实现这种自动化水平的国家是中国，如果中国在没有美国效仿的情况下实现了这一目标，那么生产扩张将只允许中国，这对美国构成生存威胁，因为它在所有产能上都处于劣势。

This is the manufacturing playing field that China has dominated for years now. The country has one of the most competitive economies in the world internally, where they will naturally achieve economies of scale and have shown themselves to be one of most skilled in high-volume manufacturing, at the same time their engineering quality has grown to be competitive in several critical industries at the highest level. This has already happened in batteries, solar, and is well underway in EVs. With these economies of scale, they are able to supply large developing markets, like Southeast Asia, Latin America, and others, allowing them to extend their advantage and influence. 
这是中国多年来一直主导的制造业竞争环境。该国拥有世界上最具竞争力的经济体之一，他们自然会在这里实现规模经济，并证明自己是大批量制造方面最熟练的经济体之一，同时他们的工程质量已经发展到在几个关键行业中具有最高水平的竞争力。这已经发生在电池、太阳能领域，并且正在电动汽车领域顺利进行。凭借这些规模经济，他们能够为东南亚、拉丁美洲等大型发展中市场供货，从而扩大其优势和影响力。

The impact of this in robotics will be exponential compared to their last strategic industry captures. These will be robotics systems manufacturing more robotics systems, and with each unit produced the cost will be driven down continuously and the quality will improve, only strengthening their production flywheel. This will repeat ad infinitum and as quality inevitably increases it will make it extraordinarily difficult for other countries to compete. Due to the fact that robotics is a general purpose technology, this will have horizontal impacts on all manufacturing sectors and all other currently advantaged industries as well–textiles, electronics, consumer goods, etc. At the moment, the West is caught flatfooted: South Korea and Japan have a birth rate crisis that is throttling their manufacturing capabilities, European industrial sectors are being eaten alive by China and their inability to generate power, and the US is focused on other markets and procuring cheap overseas production, all the while China’s manufacturing capacity has gotten stronger and robotics is catching fire. 
与他们上次的战略行业占领相比，这对机器人技术的影响将是指数级的。这些将是机器人系统制造更多的机器人系统，每生产一个单元，成本将不断降低，质量将提高，只会加强他们的生产飞轮。这种情况将无限期地重复，随着质量的提高，它将使其他国家的竞争变得异常困难。由于机器人技术是一种通用技术，这将对所有制造业和所有其他目前的优势行业（纺织、电子、消费品等）产生横向影响。目前，西方被打得措手不及：韩国和日本的出生率危机正在扼杀他们的制造能力，欧洲的工业部门被中国活生生地吃掉，他们无法发电，美国专注于其他市场并采购廉价的海外产品，与此同时，中国的制造能力越来越强，机器人技术正在着火。

China’s robotics localization effort is well underway. Local firms are taking over the world’s largest market, approaching a 50% market share, compared to just 30% in 2020. While Chinese manufacturers are currently on par with Western giants in the low-end market, our supply chain review leads us to believe that local firms are beginning to take over the higher-end market segments. The rise of Unitree exemplifies this shift: the only viable humanoid robot on the market, the Unitree G1, is now entirely decoupled from American components.
中国的机器人本地化工作正在顺利进行。本地公司正在占领世界上最大的市场，接近 50% 的市场份额，而 2020 年这一比例仅为 30%。虽然中国制造商目前在低端市场与西方巨头不相上下，但我们的供应链审查使我们相信，本地公司正在开始接管高端细分市场。Unitree 的崛起就是这种转变的例证：市场上唯一可行的人形机器人 Unitree G1 现在已经完全与美国组件解耦。

Today, building an exactly identical robotic arm (modeled after the Universal Robots UR5e) in the US is ~2.2x more expensive than in China. Under the hood, the situation is even more alarming. Even if those components are labeled “Made in USA”, they rely heavily upon China-made parts and materials – with no viable scalable alternative.
今天，在美国制造完全相同的机械臂（仿照优傲机器人 UR5e）的成本是中国的 ~2.2 倍。在幕后，情况更加令人担忧。即使这些组件贴上了“美国制造”的标签，它们也严重依赖中国制造的零件和材料——没有可行的可扩展替代品。

Drones, DJI, GoPro, and How Iteration Speed Paves Victory’s Path
无人机、DJI、GoPro 以及迭代速度如何为胜利铺平道路

The commercial drone market exemplifies China’s scale/oversupply playbook in every strategic industry it has entered, however, this is the first example of the strategy in a robotics-adjacent market. Local leader DJI today accounts for over 80% of the global commercial drone market… and 90% in the American consumer market! While the company was a first-mover, it maintained and consolidated its market position for over a decade thanks to China’s manufacturing dominance and economies of scale/oversupply strategy.
商用无人机市场是中国在其进入的每个战略行业中规模/供应过剩策略的例证，然而，这是在机器人相邻市场中实施该战略的第一个例子。本土领导者 DJI 今天占全球商用无人机市场的 80% 以上...90% 在美国消费市场！虽然该公司是先行者，但由于中国的制造业主导地位和规模经济/供应过剩战略，它十多年来一直保持并巩固其市场地位。

Let us explain how. To properly develop a functional and robust piece of hardware, the creation + recreation (i.e. manufacturing) must be iterated repeatedly and rapidly to work out the kinks and perfect the product before competitors. However, the most challenging thing for Western competitors is that Chinese markets are built to reward the company that can scale the fastest, so before a Chinese competitor ever enters the Western market it has already outclassed them in cost, all that’s left is for the quality to refine over the coming iterations. 
让我们解释一下如何。为了正确开发功能强大且坚固的硬件，必须反复快速地迭代创造 + 再创造（即制造），以在竞争对手之前解决问题并完善产品。然而，对于西方竞争对手来说，最具挑战性的是，中国市场是为了奖励能够最快扩展的公司而建立的，因此在中国竞争对手进入西方市场之前，它的成本已经超过了他们，剩下的就是在接下来的迭代中改进质量。

GoPro tried to compete in the consumer drone market despite having most of its manufacturing based in China, Malaysia, and Japan, which meant that each iteration of their drone took several weeks – likely starting the design in California, sending over the details to the manufacturers in China and having them build it, and shipping it back to the USA before ever finding out what needed to be ironed out in this attempt. Contrast this with DJI, which was based in Shenzhen, meaning the company could get any needed part from any factory in Shenzhen within hours of ordering and iterate at an unreal speed.
尽管 GoPro 的大部分制造业务都位于中国、马来西亚和日本，但该公司仍试图在消费级无人机市场竞争，这意味着他们的无人机每次迭代都需要数周时间——可能在加利福尼亚开始设计，将细节发送给中国的制造商并让他们制造，然后运回美国，然后再找出这次尝试中需要解决的问题。相比之下，总部位于深圳的大疆创新意味着该公司可以在订购后数小时内从深圳的任何工厂获得任何需要的零件，并以超乎想象的速度进行迭代。

As a result, in 2016, GoPro’s Karma Drone + Hero5 were outclassed by DJI’s drones. At $999 vs $1,099, DJI was slightly cheaper, had a battery life 50% longer, had obstacle avoidance already implemented, and the launch of the Karma was plagued with hardware issues and a recall/refund program for their faulty product, which sometimes lost power during operation. GoPro likely could have solved these problems through enough work, but the company simply didn’t have the time, as DJI had already surpassed them in every way. 
结果，在 2016 年，GoPro 的 Karma Drone + Hero5 被 DJI 的无人机超越。大疆的售价为 999 美元对 1,099 美元，略便宜，电池寿命延长了 50%，已经实施了避障功能，而且 Karma 的推出受到硬件问题和召回/退款计划的困扰他们的故障产品，有时会在运行过程中断电。GoPro 可能可以通过足够的工作来解决这些问题，但该公司根本没有时间，因为 DJI 已经在各个方面都超过了他们。

Quickly after entering the Western markets, DJI’s incredible cost advantage and sheer production capacity quickly led to oversupplying the market, and capturing a massive amount of market share. Every other major drone company was quickly undercut heavily by DJI’s aggressive pricing. GoPro cited “margin challenges” being a reason for disbanding their Karma program, and many other companies crashed alongside. DJI was the only one to understand that this was a competition of scale and had long been prepared before entering the Western markets. 
进入西方市场后不久，DJI 令人难以置信的成本优势和庞大的生产能力很快就导致了市场供过于求，并占领了大量的市场份额。其他所有主要的无人机公司都很快被 DJI 激进的定价严重削弱。GoPro 称“利润率挑战”是解散其 Karma 计划的原因，许多其他公司也随之倒闭。大疆是唯一一家明白这是一场规模竞争的公司，并且在进入西方市场之前早就做好了准备。

In the world of Robotics, manufacturing dominance is key. To build a complete and functional robot means recreating the robot countless times and fine-tuning each minor mistake until a solid, scalable, and cost-effective product. This luxury is readily available to those who have the manufacturing capacity nearby and at an affordable cost, and its absence means a disadvantage. With a share of GDP three times higher than that of the US, China’s industrial base outcompetes that of America’s in every possible way.
在机器人领域，制造业主导地位是关键。构建一个完整且功能齐全的机器人意味着无数次重新创建机器人并微调每一个小错误，直到成为可靠、可扩展且具有成本效益的产品。这种奢侈品对于那些附近拥有制造能力且成本低廉的人来说很容易获得，而没有它意味着劣势。中国的工业基础占 GDP 的比重是美国的三倍，在各个方面都超过了美国。

Our goal with this multi-part Robotics series is to illuminate landscape of the robotics and manufacturing industry, and convey the magnitude of the labor transformation it is poised to unleash. In Part One, we examine the current state of the market and take a deep dive into the hardware architecture of commercially available industrial robots. Our analysis demonstrates that China is rapidly taking over the market, leaving competing nations behind and preparing to capture a revolutionary technology. We also explore the broader repercussions for the Western trailing-edge semiconductor ecosystem.
我们这个由多个部分组成的机器人系列的目标是阐明机器人和制造业的前景，并传达它即将引发的劳动力转型的规模。在第一部分中，我们研究了市场的现状，并深入研究了市售工业机器人的硬件架构。我们的分析表明，中国正在迅速占领市场，将竞争国家甩在后面，并准备获得一项革命性的技术。我们还探讨了对西方后卫半导体生态系统的更广泛影响。

China’s ascendancy positions it perfectly to lead next-generation robotics—a field we anticipate will generate significantly higher macroeconomic benefits. In Parts Two and Three of our series, we will delve into the intricate hardware and software architectures of next-generation systems and address the remaining challenges on the path to achieving “Robotics AGI” across form factors. We will also pinpoint the likely frontrunners in this emerging market.
中国的崛起使其完全有可能引领下一代机器人技术，我们预计该领域将产生更高的宏观经济效益。在本系列的第二部分和第三部分中，我们将深入探讨下一代系统错综复杂的硬件和软件架构，并解决在实现跨外形尺寸的“机器人 AGI”的道路上仍然存在的挑战。我们还将确定这个新兴市场中可能的领跑者。

For now, let’s start with some basics and explain how why robots are more difficult to build than most understand.
现在，让我们从一些基础知识开始，解释为什么机器人的构建比大多数人理解的更难构建。

More Than Just A “Robot”
不仅仅是一个“机器人”

Robotics is a systems engineering problem with the end goal being a machine, or multiple machines, that can produce one or more human unit of work at equal or lower cost than that of a human. The feat is designing both a system of hardware with many many interconnected individual parts integrated with the software layer, where the software layer understands how to move and plan with the hardware. Repeated iterations are necessary to identify the discrepancies between the two systems and resolve them toward perfect accuracy. In essence, this is a delicate dance between two systems, with each iteration of choreography carving synchronicity from complexity. What happens as each etch gets closer to resolution?
机器人技术是一个系统工程问题，其最终目标是一台或多台机器，能够以等于或低于人类的成本生产一个或多个人类工作单元。这项壮举是设计一个硬件系统，该系统包含许多与软件层集成的互连单个部分，其中软件层了解如何使用硬件进行移动和规划。重复迭代对于识别两个系统之间的差异并解决它们以实现完美的精度是必要的。从本质上讲，这是两个系统之间的微妙舞蹈，编舞的每一次迭代都从复杂性中雕刻出同步性。当每个蚀刻越来越接近分辨率时会发生什么？

Engineering reliability into a system that is low-cost, performant, and scalable achieves a new type of system that has never existed. Comparing a robotic system to a human, the current labor force is lower skilled, lower ability, and a much higher attrition rate. Fusing mechanical capability with a software intelligence brings the world closer and closer to fully expanding the capacities of an industrial economy beyond the constraints of human labor. Similar to humans integrating sensory inputs and cognitive processing to understand and interact with the world, an embodied AI would perform the same actions and operate autonomously, allowing a new group of systems to contribute to all sectors. The imminent robotics transformation is promising to solve all of these and create a new labor force that only movies have been able to depict, but there’s more depth to the field and the industry than the words “embodied AI” might entail.
将可靠性设计到低成本、高性能和可扩展的系统中，实现了一种前所未有的新型系统。将机器人系统与人类系统进行比较，目前的劳动力技能较低，能力较低，流失率要高得多。将机械能力与软件智能融合，使世界越来越接近于超越人类劳动限制的全面扩展工业经济的能力。与人类整合感官输入和认知处理来理解世界并与之互动类似，具身 AI 将执行相同的作并自主运行，从而允许一组新的系统为所有部门做出贡献。迫在眉睫的机器人技术变革有望解决所有这些问题，并创造出只有电影才能描绘的新劳动力，但该领域和行业的深度比“具身 AI”一词可能意味着的更深入。

Operating in this industry has historically been traumatic, from manufacturing capabilities being subpar, to managing a business with a product that is a nightmare to scale, with many bottlenecks constantly in place:
从历史上看，在这个行业运营是痛苦的，从制造能力不佳，到使用规模化难以扩展的产品来管理业务，并且不断存在许多瓶颈：

• Limited innovation in hardware throttling accuracy and efficiency in mobility and manipulation
  硬件限制、移动和作的准确性和效率方面的创新有限
• Software/AI capabilities that never enabled variety among capabilities and real-time understanding 
  软件/AI 功能从未实现功能多样性和实时理解
• Exorbitant upfront CapEx for installation
  高昂的安装前期资本支出
• Elevated OpEx for maintenance of the systems 
  提高系统维护的运营支出

These have historically combined together to make automation a problem more than a solution. However, breakthroughs in hardware and AI models have finally unlocked the floodgates for early stages of rapid progress and unlocked the potential for general-purpose robotics.
这些因素历来结合在一起，使自动化成为一个问题，而不是一个解决方案。然而，硬件和 AI 模型的突破终于为快速发展的早期阶段打开了闸门，并释放了通用机器人的潜力。

Towards General Purpose Robotics
迈向通用机器人

General purpose robotics is the holy grail of robotics: a robot that can do any task in any environment, replacing the need for a human in the industrial process. Every step along the way the world will see massive unlocks for whoever steps toward general purpose robotics first. The robots currently implemented at scale across the world are rigid and fragile: environments must be predefined and tasks must be static, and any minute change in one factor means the robot will destroy the process. The bottlenecks in place have been impossible to break and stifled the whole industry of robotics for generations, intelligent or not. This meant the only improvements possible have been small, iterative, and incremental developments, and any company who tried to equip robots with anything above the current level of capabilities failed, leaving many researchers and investors sidelined and scarred, especially in Western markets. The only people who tried to cross the chasm into general-purpose robotics have been researchers in a lab. Building a functional replacement for a human that can achieve the same level accuracy as a human, often requiring ~99.99%, and making sure it was worth it in cost over a long enough timespan was a pipedream. Why would anyone believe it?
通用机器人技术是机器人技术的圣杯：可以在任何环境中完成任何任务的机器人，取代了工业过程中对人类的需求。一路走来的每一步，无论谁首先迈向通用机器人，都将看到巨大的解锁。目前在世界各地大规模实施的机器人是僵硬而脆弱的：环境必须是预定义的，任务必须是静态的，一个因素的任何微小变化都意味着机器人会破坏这个过程。现有的瓶颈是不可能打破的，并扼杀了整个机器人行业几代人，无论是否智能。这意味着唯一可能的改进是小的、迭代的和渐进的开发，任何试图为机器人配备高于当前能力水平的公司都失败了，这让许多研究人员和投资者被边缘化和受伤，尤其是在西方市场。唯一试图跨越鸿沟进入通用机器人技术的人是实验室的研究人员。为人类构建一个功能替代品，可以达到与人类相同水平的精度，通常需要 ~99.99%，并确保在足够长的时间跨度内成本是值得的，这是一个白日梦。为什么有人会相信呢？

Not even Google was able to overcome the data scarcity problem, having famously constructed an “arm farm” of 14 robots running continuously for 3,000 hours simply to achieve reliable grasping. This never left the lab. Data scarcity was a crippling challenge. Researchers were forced to build jerry-rigged robots due to the absence of hardware standardization, and then manually gather training data, a process that consumed vast amounts of time and resources. 
即使是谷歌也无法克服数据稀缺问题，它建造了一个由 14 个机器人组成的“手臂农场”，连续运行 3,000 小时，只是为了实现可靠的抓取。这从未离开过实验室。数据稀缺是一项艰巨的挑战。由于缺乏硬件标准化，研究人员被迫构建 jerry-riged 机器人，然后手动收集训练数据，这一过程消耗了大量的时间和资源。

Moreover, unlike the freely-available textual data on the internet that fueled LLMs, robotics demanded multimodal data, which did not exist. Every person trying to train a robot had to collect all data themselves in physical space with a functional robot. Hardware limitations compounded the issue. It was incredibly difficult to build a system of strong enough actuators that could fine-tune movements, all interconnected with non-standardized parts that don’t understand each other, into a robot that could perform one task with slight variations, and much less one that could perform a wide array of actions.
此外，与推动 LLMs• 机器人技术的互联网上免费提供的文本数据不同，它需要不存在的多模态数据。每个试图训练机器人的人都必须使用功能机器人在物理空间中自己收集所有数据。硬件限制使问题复杂化。构建一个足够强大的执行器系统，可以微调运动，所有运动都与彼此不理解的非标准化部件互连，构建成一个可以执行一项任务但变化很小的机器人，更不用说可以执行各种动作的机器人了，这是非常困难的。

However, we’re in the early precipice of this nonlinear transformation, but the bedrock the US is standing on is shaky. Significant research and funding across the entire robotics stack have yielded a cascade of breakthroughs. Advances in realistic simulated data, the ability to scale up real world training on multiple robots, and the rise of foundation models have opened the door for a more intelligent system. Simultaneously, advancements in hardware, like electric actuators, have brought down costs greatly and given robots better efficiency to operate at the desired accuracy level, unlocking new actions that were impossible before. General-purpose robotics has finally been unlocked as a potential real world solution. 
然而，我们正处于这种非线性转变的早期悬崖上，但美国所站的基石却摇摇欲坠。整个机器人堆栈的大量研究和资金产生了一连串的突破。真实仿真数据的进步、在多个机器人上扩展真实世界训练的能力以及基础模型的兴起为更智能的系统打开了大门。同时，电动推杆等硬件的进步大大降低了成本，并赋予了机器人更高的效率，使其能够以所需的精度水平运行，从而解锁以前不可能的新动作。通用机器人技术终于作为潜在的现实世界解决方案被解锁。

The first movement toward general-purpose robotics will be the entrance into “partially unstructured” domains – initially within their usual environments. In factories, this means operating outside of their isolated predefined environment and handling more than one task. As robots slide across the spectrum toward general purpose, they will replace more and more difficult and diverse tasks in factory settings until they can automate every step. 
通用机器人技术的第一个举措将是进入“部分非结构化”领域——最初是在它们的通常环境中。在工厂中，这意味着在隔离的预定义环境之外运行并处理多个任务。随着机器人从范围中滑向通用领域，它们将取代工厂环境中越来越困难和多样化的任务，直到它们能够实现每个步骤的自动化。

An even more difficult domain for robots is the human-populated domain, in which robots are considered intelligent/safe enough to operate in wholly unstructured and dynamic environments. Since human behavior is unpredictable, robots will need to adapt to avoid safety risks. In addition to full automation of industry, these robots will ease staffing shortages in elder care, improve hospital efficiency, enhance surgical accuracy, and automate dangerous construction tasks, thereby capturing nearly all labor demand.
对于机器人来说，一个更困难的领域是人类居住的领域，在这个领域中，机器人被认为足够智能/安全，可以在完全非结构化和动态的环境中运行。由于人类行为是不可预测的，机器人需要适应以避免安全风险。除了工业完全自动化外，这些机器人还将缓解老年护理领域的人员短缺，提高医院效率，提高手术准确性，并将危险的建筑任务自动化，从而捕获几乎所有的劳动力需求。

China Is Already Living In Another World
中国已经生活在另一个世界

Due to Chinese governmental investment and strategic declaration to accelerate robotics, the country has created incredible processes all while still under the usual rigid and fragile constraints of robotics systems. While still requiring perfectly structured environments and static tasks, China has implemented fully “lights-out” factories. Xiaomi’s “lights-out” factory currently operates constantly with 0 humans employed and produces 1 smartphone every minute. This is not the only one either, China is able to achieve this level of automation without general purpose robotics, and the implications for their production capacity when general-purpose arrives cannot be understated. This is not a statement that the US is losing, this is to demonstrate an absurd difference in manufacturing proficiency. This has nothing to do with cheap Chinese labor, this is a manufacturing country with a robust industrial base that has now created one single machine that can produce goods entirely autonomously. General purpose robotics would make this indistinguishable from a living organism, with mobile robots constantly moving around and solving tasks to support and keep the organism alive and functional.
由于中国政府的投资和加速机器人技术的战略宣言，该国在机器人系统通常僵化和脆弱的约束下创造了令人难以置信的流程。虽然仍然需要结构完美的环境和静态任务，但中国已经实施了完全“熄灯”的工厂。小米的“熄灯”工厂目前持续运营，员工人数为 0，每分钟生产 1 部智能手机。这也不是唯一的一个，中国能够在没有通用机器人的情况下实现这种自动化水平，当通用机器人到来时，对其生产能力的影响不能低估。这并不是说美国输了，而是为了证明制造业熟练度的荒谬差异。这与廉价的中国劳动力无关，这是一个拥有强大工业基础的制造业国家，现在已经创造了一台可以完全自主生产商品的机器。通用机器人技术将使它与生物体没有区别，移动机器人不断移动并解决任务，以支持和保持生物体的活力和功能。

This is only the first step in creating entirely automated machines to produce goods, and they will evolve as AI foundation models become more reliable and accurate. The country has already enabled robots to build robots at their KUKA factory in Guangdong, and a director at KUKA said that they should be able to cut times from one robot every half hour to one robot every one minute. They’re right. All of these aforementioned factories are running on either minimal levels of AI or the usual structured environment with static tasks and basic programming. General purpose robotics will turn this business into one single machine, and soon after, any complex manufacturing task could be completed by a general purpose robotic system.
这只是创建完全自动化机器来生产商品的第一步，随着 AI 基础模型变得更加可靠和准确，它们将不断发展。该国已经允许机器人在广东的 KUKA 工厂制造机器人，KUKA 的一位董事表示，他们应该能够将时间从每半小时一台机器人缩短到每分钟一台机器人。他们是对的。上述所有这些工厂要么运行在最低级别的 AI 上，要么运行在具有静态任务和基本编程的通常结构化环境中。通用机器人将把这项业务变成一台机器，不久之后，任何复杂的制造任务都可以由通用机器人系统完成。

From Industrial Robots to Cobots
从工业机器人到协作机器人

Let’s take a step back and first understand the current state of the industry. There are many types of robots and form factors that have become much more diverse and feasible in the last few years. The robots that have been most compelling for implementing automation at scale for the past decades however have been the industrial robots. 
让我们退后一步，首先了解该行业的现状。在过去几年中，有许多类型的机器人和外形尺寸变得更加多样化和可行。然而，在过去几十年中，在大规模实施自动化方面最引人注目的机器人是工业机器人。

Traditional industrial robots, like an articulated robot arm, prioritize speed, precision, and payload capacity. Equipped with high-torque actuators and finely tuned high-frequency control systems for precision, they are typically found in heavy industry environments that require repetition and high throughput, i.e. automotive factories or electronics manufacturing. 
传统的工业机器人，如铰接式机器人手臂，优先考虑速度、精度和有效载荷能力。它们配备了高扭矩执行器和微调的高频控制系统，以确保精度，通常用于需要重复和高吞吐量的重工业环境，即汽车工厂或电子制造。

They are required to work in isolated cells for two reasons:
他们需要在孤立的牢房中工作，原因有两个：

1. Human safety,  人体安全，
2. Their lack of flexibility.
   他们缺乏灵活性。

These robots are not capable of adaptation: any small deviation in the environment can break their process. For example, in automotive industries, spot welding metal panels together is often automated. This task requires remarkable accuracy to ensure the panels are correctly positioned next to each other, the spot weld is exactly over the designated points, and the weld is applied with the same consistent force and duration every time. Due to the accurate nature of the task, any slight deviation in the positioning or timing can affect the weld, and consequently the structural integrity of the vehicle
这些机器人无法适应：环境中的任何微小偏差都可能破坏它们的过程。例如，在汽车行业，将金属板点焊在一起通常是自动化的。这项任务需要非常高的精度，以确保面板彼此正确地相邻放置，点焊正好在指定点上，并且每次都以相同的一致力和持续时间进行焊接。由于任务的精确性，定位或计时的任何微小偏差都会影响焊缝，从而影响车辆的结构完整性

Collaborative robots (cobots) are the proposed solution to a human populated environment subject to the inherent dynamism of the world – enabling a higher level of automation inside a factory. Similar looking to an industrial robot but a bit smaller, they trade-off payload capacity with higher safety, flexibility and programmability – and can easily be restaked and moved around a factory when necessary. These are often the robots that are given higher levels of AI capabilities for some tasks today (higher variability pick and place and sorting).
协作机器人 （cobots） 是针对受世界内在动态影响的人类居住环境提出的解决方案，可在工厂内实现更高水平的自动化。它们看起来与工业机器人相似，但体积稍小，在有效载荷能力与更高的安全性、灵活性和可编程性之间进行权衡，必要时可以很容易地在工厂内更换和移动。这些机器人通常是当今某些任务（更高的可变性、拾取和放置以及分拣）被赋予更高级别 AI 能力的机器人。

Cobots sacrifice payload capacity and speed with weaker actuators and adding some type of safety hardware in place such as force-torque sensors to understand collision, additional vision sensors to build a more comprehensive view, and more onboard controllers for redundancy. They can be hand-guided or taught via some interface (tablet typically) so that programming an action requires less expertise and enabling them to easily change simple tasks.
协作机器人牺牲了有效载荷能力和速度，使用较弱的执行器并添加了某种类型的安全硬件，例如用于了解碰撞的力扭矩传感器、用于构建更全面视图的额外视觉传感器以及用于冗余的板载控制器。它们可以手动指导或通过某些界面（通常是平板电脑）进行教学，因此对作进行编程需要较少的专业知识，并使它们能够轻松更改简单的任务。

Typically given the tasks that require less force and more finesse, cobots (collaborative robots) might be tasked with lightweight materials handling in between processes in a factory where the industrial robot would take the materials and perform the heavier tasks. Cobots can also work as a companion to other industrial machines like CNCs (Computer Numerical Control) – where they can load the CNC with raw materials, retrieve the finished parts, and even perform routine supporting tasks like cleaning or quality checking. We show below an example of a robotic arm interacting with a CNC machine.
通常，由于任务需要更少的力和更多的技巧，协作机器人（协作机器人）可能会在工厂的流程之间处理轻量级材料，工业机器人将接收材料并执行更重的任务。协作机器人还可以作为 CNC（计算机数控）等其他工业机器的配套设备，它们可以向 CNC 装载原材料，检索成品零件，甚至执行清洁或质量检查等日常支持任务。我们在下面展示了一个机械臂与 CNC 机器交互的示例。

Naturally, the share of cobots of all industrial robot installations has been rising fast, as they enable higher automation settings and improved factory ROI. Cobots are financially viable in industrial settings, as the environment can be structured enough to make sure the robot’s accuracy on tasks remains high. At the moment, there are over four million robots installed and operating around the world, with 90% of annual shipments being standard industrial robots and 10% cobots. Industrial robots are usually implemented in automotive sectors, packaging in food and consumer goods, and electronics manufacturing. Cobots are seen in the same industries performing more complex tasks that require great precision, but under the guidance and instruction of human workers
自然，协作机器人在所有工业机器人安装中的份额一直在快速增长，因为它们支持更高的自动化设置和更高的工厂投资回报率。协作机器人在工业环境中在经济上是可行的，因为环境结构足以确保机器人在任务上保持高准确性。目前，全球有超过 400 万台机器人安装并运行，其中 90% 的年出货量是标准工业机器人和 10% 的协作机器人。工业机器人通常用于汽车行业、食品和消费品的包装以及电子产品制造。在同一行业中，可以看到协作机器人执行更复杂的任务，这些任务需要非常精确，但在人类工人的指导和指导下

While the scale of automation is impressive, there are reasons these robots are nearly always found in factory settings. Not all manufacturing is easy for these robots, high-mix low-volume production where frequent changes are common make it difficult to fully automate tasks and most tasks that require fine motor skills and dexterity require levels of manipulation not developed yet. Cobots are posed as the solution for this as well, but in practice, automation entails much more flexibility and capability than any of the current robots can provide. 
虽然自动化的规模令人印象深刻，但这些机器人几乎总是在工厂环境中找到是有原因的。对于这些机器人来说，并非所有的制造都很容易，频繁变化的大混合、小批量生产使其难以完全自动化，并且大多数需要精细运动技能和灵巧性的任务需要尚未开发的作水平。协作机器人也是解决这个问题的解决方案，但在实践中，自动化需要比当前任何机器人都要大得多的灵活性和能力。

The Rise of Mobile Robots
移动机器人的兴起

Mobile robots have been the newest addition to the robotic fleet of automation, leveraging mobility to conduct transportation tasks and coordinating with other robots, however, all have different difficulties, domains, and advantages in their mobility capabilities. Autonomous Guided Vehicles were the first foray into mobility around the same time as cobots. Their job is simple: transport objects, like a package inside of an Amazon fulfillment center, to another location. These are still rigid as most other robots, requiring that some guidance be placed on the floor for the AGV to follow.
移动机器人是自动化机器人车队的最新成员，利用移动性来执行运输任务并与其他机器人协调，但是，它们的移动能力都有不同的困难、领域和优势。自动导引车是与协作机器人几乎同时涉足移动出行领域的首次尝试。他们的工作很简单：将物品（如 Amazon 配送中心内的包裹）运输到另一个位置。这些机器人仍然像大多数其他机器人一样僵硬，需要在地板上放置一些引导，以便 AGV 遵循。

Mobile manipulators are often wheeled manipulators that are found in factories, where floors are legally required to be flat, and will be used for grasping and moving objects from station to station on a very strict and short navigation horizon. Quadrupeds are four legged mobile robots and are more often found in more open-world environments, typically found inspecting various areas of a construction site or similar, however, they are still in the prototyping phase as well. Finally, humanoids are able to be in the same environments as the others, but are poised to be functional in human-populated domains. These are currently in production with the aim of being an evolved and more capable mobile form factor with more degrees of freedom, range in tasks, and domains, but have yet to be integrated into any formal setting. 
移动机械手通常是在工厂中发现的轮式机械手，法律要求地板是平坦的，将用于在非常严格和短暂的导航视距上抓取物体并将其从一个站移动到另一个站。四足动物是四足移动机器人，更常见于更开放的世界环境中，通常用于检查建筑工地或类似区域，但是，它们也仍处于原型设计阶段。最后，类人机器人能够与其他类人机器人处于相同的环境中，但已准备好在人类居住的域中发挥作用。这些目前正在生产中，旨在成为一种进化的、功能更强大的移动外形，具有更多的自由度、任务范围和领域，但尚未集成到任何正式环境中。

However, all of these form factors still only function in static structured environments. At the moment, mobile manipulators are still in the early deployment phase in factories, and quadrupeds will soon begin deployment onto construction sites. Currently, only AGVs are widely deployed and integrated, and mobile manipulators, quadrupeds, and humanoids are still in early formats of more open-world domains, benefitted by the current progress in AI. 
但是，所有这些外形规格仍然只能在静态结构化环境中运行。目前，移动机械手在工厂中仍处于早期部署阶段，四足动物将很快开始部署到建筑工地。目前，只有 AGV 得到广泛部署和集成，移动机械手、四足动物和类人机器人仍处于更多开放世界领域的早期形式，受益于当前 AI 的进步。

Hardware: What Goes Into a Robot? 
硬件：机器人由什么组成？

Robot component markets are dominated by a few key players, and the US is noticeably absent in many. The industrial capacity necessary for entry—high volume, high quality, and low cost—is largely concentrated elsewhere, particularly in China. It will be a challenge for the US to carve a position, especially when most of the materials come from China.
机器人零部件市场由少数主要参与者主导，而美国显然在许多市场中缺席。进入市场所需的工业产能——大批量、高质量和低成本——主要集中在其他地方，尤其是中国。美国要占据一席之地将是一个挑战，尤其是当大部分材料来自中国时。

On the hardware side, actuators, motors, and drives are the pieces that will physically generate motion by converting an electrical input into either a hydraulic, pneumatic, or, more often, electrical output to generate this motion.
在硬件方面，执行器、电机和驱动器是通过将电气输入转换为液压、气动或更常见的电气输出来产生这种运动来物理产生运动的部件。

At the higher-level in a factory, a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) determines how a production line will be automated, sequencing each operation properly to ensure the entire automated process is functional. Within each robot, regardless of form factor, there is a Microcontroller Unit (MCU), or embedded systems with multiple MCUs, that is the dedicated processor handling low-level real-time tasks like reading sensor inputs, generating motor control signals, and running fast control loops. These systems are effectively the “brain” for most robotic systems.
在工厂的较高级别，可编程逻辑控制器 （PLC） 确定生产线的自动化方式，正确排序每个作以确保整个自动化过程正常运行。在每个机器人中，无论外形尺寸如何，都有一个微控制器单元 （MCU） 或具有多个 MCU 的嵌入式系统，它是处理低级实时任务的专用处理器，例如读取传感器输入、生成电机控制信号和运行快速控制回路。这些系统实际上是大多数机器人系统的“大脑”。

In the world of robotics, high-precision motors are required to ensure the proper torque is applied to avoid damaging its surroundings. Servo motors are the most common option – they are self-contained systems that include a motor, a control circuit, and a feedback mechanism. This overhead enables the motor to actively adjust itself and maintain a desired position or motion. Servo motors are one of the few components in a robot where the market is not dominated by China and fairly well distributed across countries.
在机器人领域，需要高精度电机来确保施加适当的扭矩以避免损坏其周围环境。伺服电机是最常见的选择 – 它们是独立的系统，包括电机、控制电路和反馈机构。这种开销使电机能够主动调整自身并保持所需的位置或运动。伺服电机是机器人中为数不多的市场不被中国主导且在各国分布相当好的部件之一。

The control circuit is referred to as “drive”. This is a power electronics box designed to regulate the voltage sent to the motor, through an AC-DC-AC conversion (or AC-DC for a DC motor). Its main component is a power electronics switch such as a MOSFET or IGBT, which combined with a rectifier and capacitors can electronically modify the electrical signal. 
控制电路称为“驱动器”。这是一个电力电子箱，旨在通过 AC-DC-AC 转换（或直流电机的 AC-DC）调节发送到电机的电压。它的主要组件是 MOSFET 或 IGBT 等电力电子开关，它与整流器和电容器相结合，可以电子方式修改电信号。

Gearboxes are also a common component found in servo motors. They are able to increase the force/torque of a motor, and increase accuracy. In essence, gearboxes reduce the speed of a motor, leading to a proportional increase in torque, which also enables the motor to make finer movements. Most gearboxes found in robotic systems have been largely produced by Japan’s Nabtesco.
齿轮箱也是伺服电机中的常见部件。它们能够增加电机的力/扭矩，并提高精度。从本质上讲，变速箱会降低电机的速度，导致扭矩成比例增加，这也使电机能够做出更精细的运动。机器人系统中的大多数齿轮箱主要由日本的 Nabtesco 生产。

Cameras and sensors are pivotal for the robot as well, as this has been the primary medium by which it knows both its own positioning and the steps required to complete the task it faces. Most robots use standard 2D cameras, 3D depth cameras, or a combination of both to create a full spatial understanding of its environment. Some form factors, typically those in a more human-populated environment, may use LiDAR to gain a much more detailed view of its surroundings, albeit usually at a higher cost. Most LiDAR, automotive specifically, comes from Hesai (China), and China has advanced enough in LiDAR innovation that Unitree has already developed a proprietary LiDAR system at a slightly higher price point than the Intel RealSense depth camera. 
摄像头和传感器对机器人也至关重要，因为这是它了解自身位置和完成所面临任务所需步骤的主要媒介。大多数机器人使用标准的 2D 摄像头、3D 深度摄像头或两者的组合来创建对其环境的完整空间理解。某些外形尺寸（通常是在人性较多的环境中的外形尺寸）可能会使用 LiDAR 来获得更详细的周围环境视图，尽管通常成本更高。大多数 LiDAR，特别是汽车，都来自河赛（中国），而中国在 LiDAR 创新方面已经足够先进，以至于宇树 Unitree 已经开发了专有的 LiDAR 系统，其价格略高于英特尔实感深度相机。

Industrial and precise robots are equipped with joint encoders, which allow the robot to understand the angle, position, or rotation speed of its joints. A broad set of sensors can be included such as touch and tactile sensors to understand pressure, texture, and more, proprioceptive sensors to understand physical internal states like balance, force-torque sensors to understand how much force-torque is being applied by a joint, etc. This market is a bit small/disjointed because the products are newer developments; however, most Western companies that are able to design and assemble these sensors will still typically buy the base materials from China. 
工业机器人和精密机器人配备了关节编码器，使机器人能够了解其关节的角度、位置或转速。可以包括一组广泛的传感器，例如用于了解压力、质地等的触摸和触觉传感器，用于了解物理内部状态（如平衡）的本体感觉传感器，用于了解关节施加多少力-扭矩的力-扭矩传感器等。这个市场有点小/脱节，因为产品是较新的开发成果;然而，大多数能够设计和组装这些传感器的西方公司通常仍会从中国购买基础材料。

Then there are the “end-effectors”, which are whatever the robot may have at the end of its arm, typically a tool or a very basic gripper for most robots. Each end-effector has its own use-case and payload capacity, or the amount of weight it is able to “hold”, so whatever the purpose of the robot will dictate the end-effector it has installed. This is one part of the robot that China is not very involved in at all, most end-effector producers are German (Schunk, Zimmer Group, Festo, Schmalz) and some are even American (ATI Industrial Automation, Destaco). However, it’s likely that Chinese companies are simply producing their own end-effectors and not exporting them yet, as vertical integration is their main strategy. While “hands” are catching much of the spotlight right now, these are not widely implemented and are far from achieving sufficient dexterity. We will explore the challenges of dexterity and what road lies ahead for manipulation in the next article of the robotics series!
然后是“末端执行器”，即机器人手臂末端可能具有的任何东西，通常是大多数机器人的工具或非常基本的抓手。每个末端执行器都有自己的用例和有效载荷能力，或者它能够“容纳”的重量，因此无论机器人的用途如何，它都会决定它安装的末端执行器。这是中国根本不怎么参与的机器人的一部分，大多数末端执行器生产商是德国的（Schunk、Zimmer Group、Festo、Schmalz），有些甚至是美国的（ATI Industrial Automation、Destaco）。然而，中国公司很可能只是生产自己的末端执行器，而不是出口，因为垂直整合是他们的主要战略。虽然“手”现在正受到关注，但这些并没有得到广泛实施，也远未达到足够的灵巧性。我们将在机器人系列的下一篇文章中探讨灵巧性的挑战以及前方的控之路！

Supply Chain Woes  供应链困境

In the US, the “Made in America” label is misleading at best, and downright harmful at worst. The substantial transformation principle allows for significant processing of foreign materials, notably from China, in intermediary countries, before final assembly in the US. This means a product can be labeled “Made in USA” even if its core components originated in China, obfuscating the true extent of foreign dependence. Consequently, many US companies will purchase cheap materials from China, transform them into robotics hardware packaged with Country of Origin (COO) America, and undercut the US firms that are actually extracting from the ground and manufacturing in the US. This is hard to talk about, but it’s even harder to solve.
在美国，“美国制造”的标签充其量是误导性的，最坏的情况是彻头彻尾的有害。实质性转换原则允许在中间国家对外国材料进行大量加工，特别是来自中国的材料，然后再在美国进行最终组装。这意味着即使其核心部件来自中国，产品也可以贴上“美国制造”的标签，从而混淆了对外依存的真实程度。因此，许多美国公司将从中国购买廉价材料，将其转化为与原产国 （COO） America 打包在一起的机器人硬件，并削弱实际上从地面开采并在美国制造的美国公司。这很难说，但更难解决。

It is far more difficult and time consuming than many people think to bring manufacturing capacity online and mass produce industrial robots to introduce automation, and worse, it’s very time consuming. Supply chains for many industrial robots are very complex, coming from many corners of the world where component production is typically already dominated through competitive cost advantages. There have been many cases of supply chain disruptions that have rattled Western economies. For example, in 2020-2022 during COVID the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach experienced a line of over 100 ships waiting outside the port for their turn to disembark. In stark contrast to this debacle, during the same time period (2020-2021), China pivoted and increased their robotics installation by 44% from 2020-2021 in order to implement automation to make up for the lack of a workforce. 
将制造能力上线并大规模生产工业机器人以引入自动化比许多人想象的要困难和耗时得多，更糟糕的是，这非常耗时。许多工业机器人的供应链非常复杂，来自世界许多角落，这些地方的组件生产通常已经通过有竞争力的成本优势占据主导地位。有许多供应链中断的案例让西方经济体感到不安。例如，在 2020-2022 年新冠疫情期间，洛杉矶港和长滩港经历了 100 多艘船在港口外排队等待轮到他们下船。与这场灾难形成鲜明对比的是，在同一时期（2020-2021 年），中国在 2020-2021 年期间调整并增加了 44% 的机器人安装，以实施自动化以弥补劳动力短缺。

Why didn’t the US follow suit? COVID was the largest wake up call in years regarding the supply chain dependencies, yet the country refused to open its eyes. As explained below, the US has no significant market share in any of the relevant manufacturing nodes for robotics, and in most it’s essentially absent. 
为什么美国不效仿呢？COVID 是多年来关于供应链依赖性的最大警钟，但该国拒绝睁开眼睛。如下所述，美国在机器人技术的相关制造节点中都没有重要的市场份额，而且在大多数国家中基本上没有市场份额。

Mechanical Components: Gearbox, Motors, Actuators
机械部件：变速箱、电机、执行器

On the hardware side, we will focus on what actually goes into generating locomotion in a robot: actuators/motors and their respective components. There are many types of motors available for generating motion, steppers with precise angular control in open-loop systems typically found in 3D printers or CNC machines, brushless DC motors with high power-to-weight ratios to propel drones and EVs, but the most important in robotics tends to be the servo motor. Most robotics companies, especially those of the Big 4, produce their own servo motors in-house and sell them individually as well. These are not terribly difficult to build, but manufacturing them at scale does create a bit of a moat for the aforementioned reasons: actuators must have incredible reliability and performance, so scaling up requires advanced manufacturing techniques to be nearly perfectly replicated. As such, the long-standing manufacturers of robotics components with the necessary expertise hold the largest market share are Yaskawa (Japan), Panasonic (Japan), Bosch (Germany), KUKA (now China), and Siemens (Germany). Rockwell (USA) must be named here as well because it holds some 7% of the servo motor market share, but this is also the only segment of the supply chain that is not dominated by any one player. 
在硬件方面，我们将重点介绍在机器人中产生运动的实际内容：执行器/电机及其各自的组件。有许多类型的电机可用于产生运动，在 3D 打印机或 CNC 机器中常见的开环系统中具有精确角度控制的步进电机，具有高功率重量比的无刷直流电机，用于推动无人机和电动汽车，但在机器人技术中最重要的是伺服电机。 大多数机器人公司，尤其是四大机器人公司，都在内部生产自己的伺服电机，也单独销售。这些并不是很难构建，但由于上述原因，大规模制造它们确实会产生一些护城河：执行器必须具有令人难以置信的可靠性和性能，因此扩大规模需要近乎完美地复制先进的制造技术。因此，具有必要专业知识的老牌机器人组件制造商占据最大的市场份额是安川电机（日本）、松下（日本）、博世（德国）、库卡（现中国）和西门子（德国）。罗克韦尔（美国）也必须在这里列出，因为它占据了伺服电机市场份额的 7% 左右，但这也是供应链中唯一不受任何参与者主导的部分。

Nearly 60% of the world’s gearboxes for medium-to-large industrial robots are supplied by Japan’s Nabtesco. Their difficulty to manufacture arises from the fact that almost every order is likely to be highly customized and tailored to the customer’s hardware specifications, yet must still meet the 99.99% accuracy threshold to replace a human. Gearboxes are absolutely pivotal for ensuring this precision, and therefore make up the largest % of COGS on an industrial robot at 14%. The manufacturing of these gearboxes must be accurate to an unreal degree, and as such, typically only long-standing and established players with years of experience building them have refined their process and process technology enough to achieve this quality, hence the Nabtesco dominance. They manufactured their first cycloidal gear in 1980. 
全球近 60% 的中大型工业机器人齿轮箱由日本 Nabtesco 提供。它们的制造难度在于，几乎每个订单都可能根据客户的硬件规格进行高度定制和定制，但仍必须满足 99.99% 的准确率阈值才能替代人工。齿轮箱对于确保这种精度绝对至关重要，因此在工业机器人的 COGS 中占最大百分比，为 14%。这些齿轮箱的制造必须精确到难以置信的程度，因此，通常只有具有多年制造经验的老牌企业才能改进他们的工艺和工艺技术，以达到这种质量，因此 Nabtesco 占据主导地位。他们在 1980 年制造了他们的第一台摆线齿轮。

There are even special types of gearboxes like Harmonic Drive (Japan), founded in 1970, which uses a patented strain-wave design for incredible precision. These are more expensive but a must-have in superprecise settings (like semiconductor fabrication) and as such have a strong presence at 15% of the gearbox market. However, to demonstrate what a proper industrial base and rapid iteration is capable of, Leaderdrive was founded in China in 2003 with the aim of manufacturing their own superprecise strain-wave gearbox. In just 14 years, the company had produced over 100,000 units and captured 90% of the Chinese domestic market for strain-wave gearboxes.
甚至还有特殊类型的变速箱，例如成立于 1970 年的 Harmonic Drive（日本），它使用获得专利的应变波设计，可实现令人难以置信的精度。这些更昂贵，但在超精密设置（如半导体制造）中是必不可少的，因此在变速箱市场的 15% 中占有很大份额。然而，为了展示适当的工业基础和快速迭代的能力，Leaderdrive 于 2003 年在中国成立，旨在制造自己的超精密应变波变速箱。在短短 14 年内，该公司生产了超过 100,000 台，并占领了中国国内 90% 的应变波齿轮箱市场。

Magnets and Materials – Manufacturing Dependence
磁铁和材料 – 制造依赖性

Motors and gearboxes are not in short supply and are fairly cheap; however, motors nowadays have undergone a breakthrough. Most high-quality high-speed motors are now developed with permanent magnets (PM motors) to achieve higher power efficiency and power-to-weight ratio — perfect for robots. Without getting into too much detail, permanent magnets effectively add more magnetism into the electromagnetic field of a motor, meaning less electricity is required to magnetize and can instead go toward generating motion. There remains one issue though, the process and elements that go into creating your typical Neodymium permanent magnet (NdFeB) is nearly entirely dominated by China with 90% of the market share. Of that 90%, roughly three producers in China hold a near-monopoly on it: Jingci, JL MAG, and Ningbo Yungsheng.
电机和变速箱并不短缺，而且相当便宜;然而，如今的电机已经取得了突破。现在大多数高质量的高速电机都是使用永磁体（永磁电机）开发的，以实现更高的功率效率和功率重量比——非常适合机器人。无需过多赘述，永磁体可以有效地在电机的电磁场中增加更多的磁性，这意味着磁化所需的电力更少，反而可以用于产生运动。不过，仍然存在一个问题，制造典型钕永磁体 （NdFeB） 的过程和要素几乎完全由中国主导，占据 90% 的市场份额。在这 90% 的生产商中，中国大约有三家生产商几乎垄断了它：精赐、JL MAG 和宁波永盛。

While “rare earth” is a misnomer — they are just as abundant as most other elements– the process needed to refine Neodymium and produce a final permanent magnet requires around ~12 complex steps and a strong industrial capacity. China dominates this process as well at 93%. After the trade restrictions on Chinese strategic minerals, there are attempts to try to minimize this dependency on Chinese permanent magnets. For instance, MP Materials in the US to become the only fully vertically integrated rare earths company in all of North America. Australia’s Lynas, the world’s largest non-Chinese producer, is expanding and building another separation plant in the US with US DoD support of USD$120M. BMW and Yamaha have backed a new US-based rare earths startup, Phoenix Tailings, to try to create another supplier. With MP Materials we have seen the process go from construction to early production in just a few years, but establishing a high-volume capacity would likely require a 5-10 year timeframe.
虽然“稀土”用词不当——它们与大多数其他元素一样丰富——但精炼钕和生产最终永磁体所需的过程需要大约 ~12 个复杂的步骤和强大的工业能力。中国也以 93% 的比例主导了这一过程。在对中国战略矿产实施贸易限制之后，有人试图尽量减少对中国永磁体的依赖。例如，美国的 MP Materials 成为整个北美唯一一家完全垂直整合的稀土公司。澳大利亚的 Lynas 是世界上最大的非中国生产商，在美国国防部 USD$120M 的支持下，正在美国扩建和建造另一个分离厂。宝马和雅马哈支持了一家总部位于美国的新稀土初创公司 Phoenix Tailings，试图创建另一家供应商。与 MP Materials 合作，我们在短短几年内就看到了从建设到早期生产的过程，但建立大批量产能可能需要 5-10 年的时间。

However, it’s likely that these companies will not catch up in scale without significant government subsidy to match the lower cost of capital in China. We’ve heard rumblings that China has some 250-275K tons of installed capacity for refining NdFeB magnets, and this will likely double in the next five years. For comparison, the USD$120M investment from the DoD in Lynas will likely produce somewhere around ~4,200 tons of NdFeB. At the moment, China’s economies of scale are in position to oversupply a large portion of the permanent magnet market.
然而，如果没有大量的政府补贴来匹配中国较低的资本成本，这些公司很可能无法在规模上赶上。我们听说有传言说，中国有大约 250-275K 吨的装机容量用于精炼钕铁硼磁体，而且在未来五年内可能会翻一番。相比之下，国防部对莱纳斯的 120M 美元投资可能会产生大约 ~4,200 吨的钕铁硼。目前，中国的规模经济已经能够供过于求的永磁市场的大部分。

Mining and materials beyond rare earth elements are just as — if not more essential, and while this is not typically bottlenecked, they are largely under the control of China. Additionally, having raw ore deposits or being capable of mining doesn’t imply too much for many of these elements. Many economies struggle to process these elements whereas China excels in this endeavor due to its advanced industrial economy. Stemming from two main initiatives in China, the Belt and Road initiative and Made in China 2025 initiative, the country has invested and built a well-paved path to absolute dominance over nearly the entire minerals processing industry.
稀土元素以外的采矿和材料同样重要，虽然这通常不是瓶颈，但它们在很大程度上受到中国的控制。此外，拥有原矿床或能够开采对于其中许多元素来说并不意味着太多。许多经济体都在努力处理这些要素，而中国由于其先进的工业经济而在这方面表现出色。源于中国的两项主要倡议，即“一带一路”倡议和“中国制造 2025”倡议，中国投资并建立了一条通往几乎整个矿物加工业绝对主导地位的铺平道路。

Lithium and Batteries  锂和电池

All of the ore may come from other countries rich in deposits, but this means nothing without the capacity to refine them at scale and with high enough grade. In fact, China is only rich in deposits in two of these minerals, lithium and graphite, but countries rely on Chinese processing to refine them into usable materials. The Belt and Road initiative came up with clever ways to circumvent the lack of mineral deposits.
所有的矿石都可能来自储量丰富的其他国家，但如果没有能力以足够高的品位大规模提炼它们，这就毫无意义。事实上，中国只有锂和石墨这两种矿物的储量丰富，但各国依靠中国的加工将它们提炼成可用的材料。“一带一路”倡议想出了巧妙的方法来规避矿藏的缺乏。

• Copper typically comes from Chile and Peru, and around 76% of Peru’s and 68% of Chile’s copper exports went to China, totaling up to 56% of all global raw copper. 
  铜通常来自智利和秘鲁，秘鲁约 76% 的铜出口和智利 68% 的铜出口到中国，占全球铜原料的 56%。
• Nickel is highlighted as the one key mineral that is not refined mostly in China, as 37% is refined in Indonesia, and “only” 28% in China. However, according to the most recent IEA report, over 80% of Indonesia’s battery-grade nickel output is owned by Chinese producers linked to the CCP.
  镍被强调为主要在中国未精炼的关键矿物，因为 37% 在印度尼西亚精炼，而在中国“仅”28%。然而，根据最新的 IEA 报告，印度尼西亚超过 80% 的电池级镍产量由与中共有关联的中国生产商拥有。
• Cobalt is mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and accounts for 80% of the world’s cobalt production, but China has struck up the Sicomines Pact with them and now owns 80% of the DRC’s cobalt output.
  钴在刚果民主共和国开采，占世界钴产量的 80%，但中国与他们签订了 Sicomines 协议，现在拥有刚果民主共和国 80% 的钴产量。

China understands that without access to processed minerals, there is no first step to manufacturing a product. The Western nations have not woken up to the fact that reshoring manufacturing starts at these minerals.
中国明白，如果无法获得加工矿物，就没有制造产品的第一步。西方国家还没有意识到，制造业回流始于这些矿物。

Batteries, lithium-ion specifically, are critical for mobile robots, like drones, service robots, autonomous guided vehicles in warehouses, mobile manipulators, humanoids, and especially EVs. If you wanted to realize the future of detaching robots from a connected power source, you’d most likely equip it with Chinese battery cells, as Chinese companies supply around 80% of battery cells globally. Chinese battery packs maintain an advantage by having a cost of around $127/kWh, while North America and Europe see prices 24% and 33% higher respectively. The largest producer, CATL, accounted for 37% of the global EV battery market in 2023, while BYD accounted for ~16%.
电池，特别是锂离子电池，对于移动机器人至关重要，例如无人机、服务机器人、仓库中的自主导引车、移动机械手、类人机器人，尤其是电动汽车。如果您想实现将机器人从互联电源中分离出来的未来，您很可能会为其配备中国电池，因为中国公司供应全球约 80% 的电池。中国电池组的成本约为 127 美元/kWh，保持优势，而北美和欧洲的价格分别高出 24% 和 33%。最大的生产商宁德时代占 2023 年全球电动汽车电池市场的 37%，而比亚迪占 ~16%。

The largest producer outside of China, LGES (South Korea), only accounted for roughly 13% of the global market share. It’s not easy to overcome the barriers to entry in this market, Sweden’s state-backed attempt to break the dependency, Northvolt, just filed for bankruptcy. While the US was committing at least ~USD$73B to battery supply chain investments with the Inflation Reduction Act, China was giving out over USD$230B in subsidies to EV companies since 2009. The current layout of the battery market is a bit spooky, given that Chinese companies can and will be iterating faster than Western companies due to the massive industrial base in China and continued government investment which will only further drive their costs down to edge out competitors. 
中国以外最大的生产商 LGES（韩国）仅占全球市场份额的 13% 左右。克服进入这个市场的壁垒并不容易，瑞典国家支持的打破依赖的尝试 Northvolt 刚刚申请破产。虽然美国通过《通货膨胀削减法案》承诺至少 ~USD$73B 用于电池供应链投资，但自 230 年以来，中国向电动汽车公司发放了超过 USD$2009B 的补贴。电池市场目前的布局有点令人毛骨悚然，因为中国公司拥有庞大的工业基础和持续的政府投资，这只会进一步降低他们的成本以超越竞争对手。

Building a battery from an engineering standpoint is a hurdle that Chinese companies have been able to climb over their repeated iterations. The balancing between complex chemistries within cathodes, anodes, and electrolytes must all meet stringent purity requirements as any impurity can lead to noticeable variations in battery lifetime. Constructing sufficient capacity to produce at scale is already challenging, especially in US, and can cost over USD$100M in the US to construct, which is 46% more expensive per GWh than its Chinese counterparts. LG has even paused the construction on their USD$5.5B battery plant in Arizona citing “market conditions.”
从工程角度构建电池是中国公司能够克服其重复迭代的障碍。阴极、阳极和电解质内复杂化学成分之间的平衡都必须满足严格的纯度要求，因为任何杂质都会导致电池寿命的明显变化。建造足够的产能进行大规模生产已经具有挑战性，尤其是在美国，在美国的建设成本可能超过 100M 美元，每兆瓦时的成本比中国同行高 46%。LG 甚至以“市场状况”为由暂停了他们在亚利桑那州的 5.5B 美元电池工厂的建设。

In the case of robots, batteries are all different sizes, there is no standardization, and the batteries have different demands. Power-to-weight ratio is a much stricter requirement as a robot doesn’t have the leniency to carry the same weight a car would, and often different robots have different power requirements. The battery that a quadruped would use is not the same battery that a humanoid would use, and this extends to nearly all form factors. The difficulty and cost in manufacturing a pure and efficient battery is already challenging enough, especially in the US, but the lack of uniformity in robot batteries will be one of the largest issues as the time arrives to scale production.
就机器人而言，电池大小各不相同，没有标准化，电池的要求也不同。功率重量比是一个更严格的要求，因为机器人无法承受与汽车相同的重量，而且不同的机器人通常有不同的功率要求。四足动物使用的电池与类人机器人使用的电池不同，这几乎延伸到所有外形尺寸。制造纯净高效的电池的难度和成本已经足够具有挑战性，尤其是在美国，但随着规模化生产的到来，机器人电池缺乏统一性将成为最大的问题之一。

Historical Robotics and How The Current Powers Came To Be
历史机器人技术以及当前力量是如何形成的

Industrial automation through robotics has been long in the making over the past decades, and throughout this time, some countries have prevailed as paragons of what the automated future can look like, and some have lost their position. Let’s take a look at the current world powers, where they stand in the robotics race to automation, and the driving forces moving their markets. So how did the world leaders in robotics end up on top?
在过去的几十年里，通过机器人技术实现的工业自动化已经酝酿了很长时间，在此期间，一些国家已成为自动化未来样子的典范，而一些国家则失去了自己的地位。让我们来看看当前的世界大国，它们在机器人自动化竞赛中的位置，以及推动其市场的驱动力。那么，机器人领域的世界领导者是如何最终名列前茅的呢？

The Robotics landscape has historically been dominated by four countries: South Korea, Japan, Germany, and the US. China today is a major force, but we will deep dive into the country later in the report. A closer look at the four incumbents reveals common factors driving their success to varying extents:
机器人领域历来由四个国家主导：韩国、日本、德国和美国。中国是当今的一支主要力量，但我们将在报告后面深入探讨中国。仔细观察这四家现任企业，可以发现在不同程度上推动他们成功的共同因素：

• Heavy industries: they are all historically large players in heavy-duty industries like Automotive and Electronics – which are prone to automation through robotics.
  重工业：它们都是汽车和电子等重型行业历史上的大型参与者，这些行业很容易通过机器人实现自动化。
• Presence of vast industrial conglomerates – the likes of Toyota, Siemens, Samsung, Emerson
  大型工业集团的存在 - 如丰田、西门子、三星、艾默生
• Technology-savvy culture  精通技术的文化
• Demographics and labor cost
  人口统计和劳动力成本

South Korea and Japan: Can’t Automate Birth Rates
韩国和日本：无法实现出生率自动化

South Korea has taken automation to an extreme level, with 10% of the workforce being automated! With high-tech manufacturing companies making up a whopping 61% of the Korean economy in 2022, it has a clear advantage. But cultural factors are also at play – for example, eCommerce adoption is among the world’s highest, with north of 30% of retail sales done online, double that of the US!
韩国已将自动化提升到一个极端水平，10% 的劳动力实现了自动化！到 61 年，高科技制造公司占韩国经济的 2022%，具有明显的优势。但文化因素也在起作用——例如，电子商务的采用率是世界上最高的，超过 30% 的零售额是在线完成的，是美国的两倍！

And the South Korean government and Chaebols are all-in: In 2021, Samsung declared their company-wide initiative to invest up to USD$163B into industrial automation and AI. Hyundai already acquired Boston Dynamics in 2021. LG set robotics as a key growth area after deploying self-driving airport guide robots at the Seoul airport in 2017, and recently just converted their stake in Bear Robotics into a majority stake. On top of all of this, the government is upping their investments as well. In total, the country has put forth four rounds of the Basic Plan for Intelligent Robots since 2008–2030, totaling USD$1.6B, and a new plan to invest ~USD$2.26B in the industry up to 2030. While the country needs automation more than ever, it doesn’t have the benefit of being a major manufacturer, having relied on other countries for ~60% of components in an industrial robot. South Korea is running on borrowed time.
韩国政府和财阀全力以赴：2021 年，三星宣布了他们在全公司范围内投资高达 163B 美元的计划，用于工业自动化和人工智能。现代汽车已经在 2021 年收购了波士顿动力公司。LG 于 2017 年在首尔机场部署了自动驾驶机场导游机器人后，将机器人技术作为关键增长领域，最近刚刚将其在 Bear Robotics 的股份转换为多数股权。最重要的是，政府也在增加投资。自 2008 年至 2030 年以来，该国总共提出了四轮智能机器人基本计划，总计 1.6B 美元，以及一项到 2030 年在该行业投资 ~2.26B 美元的新计划。虽然该国比以往任何时候都更需要自动化，但它没有成为主要制造商的优势，因为工业机器人中 ~60% 的组件依赖于其他国家。韩国正在利用借来的时间运行。

South Korea has found automation to be a necessity for the same reason as Japan: an aging labor demographic and low birth rates. Despite government initiatives across the board, the country continues to hit record-low birth rates. Case in point, the dearth of workers in rural areas is forcing factories to move near Seoul just to man their operations. They’ve even recently had to remove their decades-old foreign worker ban at certain manufacturing plants (in place due to security reasons) to make up for the labor shortage. Korea suffers from the lowest birthrate in the world, with Japan trailing closely behind. However, Japan stands a slightly better chance in the race to automation as they have two of the Big 4 titans, while Korea still imports some ~60% of the components in an industrial robot.
韩国发现自动化是必要的，原因与日本相同：劳动力人口老龄化和低出生率。尽管政府全面采取了举措，但该国的出生率继续创下历史新低。例如，农村地区工人的匮乏迫使工厂搬到首尔附近，只是为了维持运营。他们甚至最近不得不取消某些制造工厂长达数十年的外国工人禁令（由于安全原因而实施），以弥补劳动力短缺。韩国是世界上出生率最低的国家，日本紧随其后。然而，日本在自动化竞赛中的机会略大一些，因为他们拥有 4 大巨头中的两个，而韩国仍然进口了大约 ~60% 的工业机器人组件。

Germany and The EU: Watching from the Chair in the Corner
德国和欧盟：在角落的椅子上观察

Germany, the industrial powerhouse of Europe, holds the position of 4th highest robot density in the world, and has always been geared toward a strong industrial economy. The country introduced Industrie 4.0 to the broader European Union in 2011, aimed at bringing the region to the forefront of integrating new technologies and automation processes into industry to enhance competitiveness. Their heavy emphasis on industrial manufacturing has led them down the path toward great automation, and they would be well positioned for the coming of the robotics unlocks had the EU managed to stop China from eating away at their automation companies. 
德国是欧洲的工业强国，在世界机器人密度方面排名第四，并且一直致力于发展强劲的工业经济。该国于 2011 年向更广泛的欧盟引入了工业 4.0，旨在使该地区走在将新技术和自动化流程整合到工业中以提高竞争力的最前沿。他们对工业制造的高度重视使他们走上了通往高度自动化的道路，如果欧盟设法阻止中国蚕食他们的自动化公司，他们将为机器人技术的到来做好充分准备。

European countries have been complicit and passive in the selling of the EU’s industrial automation capacity and technologies to China. A travesty that will echo through the robotics revolution, Germany’s stringent and bureaucratic restrictions held them back from interfering on the KUKA take over in 2016, sidelined as it was sold off to China’s Midea Group. They could only reform the policy after it unfolded and their goliath was gone. Italy sold off many robotics companies (EVOLUT, OLCI Engineering, CMA Robotics), and in 2022 the country finally made the decision to veto one of the takeovers. Now, in February 2025, an automation organization industry finally issued a Call-To-Action to the EU to address its lack of competitiveness through robotics. Industrie 4.0 is a transformational plan, but it took the EU nine years to realize that it required the robots China was eating.
欧洲国家在向中国出售欧盟的工业自动化能力和技术方面一直是同谋和被动的。这一嘲讽将在机器人革命中回荡，德国严格的官僚限制使他们无法干预 2016 年对 KUKA 的收购，该接管因被中国美的集团收购而被边缘化。他们只能在政策展开并且他们的巨人消失后才能改革政策。意大利出售了许多机器人公司（EVOLUT、OLCI Engineering、CMA Robotics），2022 年，该国最终决定否决其中一项收购。现在，在 2025 年 2 月，一个自动化组织行业终于向欧盟发出了行动呼吁，以解决欧盟通过机器人技术缺乏竞争力的问题。工业 4.0 是一项转型计划，但欧盟花了 9 年时间才意识到它需要中国正在吃的机器人。

The US: The American Dream’s Rude Awakening
美国：美国梦的粗鲁觉醒

Lastly, in the US, we see a strange phenomenon of having a highly advanced tech sector, but both a lack of national strategy and the drawbacks of outsourcing manufacturing. Manufacturing capacity in the US is still a relevant topic, the issue is that it cannot compete in sectors that China competes in due to the expensive nature of manufacturing in America, and the “quality” moat that the US once had is slowly draining, as China now has the means to produce most goods at similar quality for cheaper. Automating certain sectors could alleviate this pain, but this would be a ways away. The country has a large automotive industry like its peers, but it only ranks 10th in robot density in 2023. One study showed that according to wage-adjusted robot adoption, the US is actually 49% lower than expected. Given the AI revolution in the country, it’s surprising to see one of the main potential beneficiaries, robotics, diverging from the path of its other tech sectors. Should robotics become a target sector for growth, the country may be able to benefit from the cheaper production and compete, but this is down the line.
最后，在美国，我们看到了一个奇怪的现象，即拥有高度先进的科技行业，但同时缺乏国家战略和外包制造的弊端。美国的制造能力仍然是一个相关的话题，问题是由于美国制造业的成本高昂，它无法在中国竞争的领域竞争，而美国曾经拥有的“质量”护城河正在慢慢耗尽，因为中国现在有办法以更便宜的价格生产大多数类似质量的商品。实现某些行业的自动化可以减轻这种痛苦，但这将是一条路要走。该国拥有与其他国家一样庞大的汽车工业，但到 10 年的机器人密度仅排名第 2023 位。一项研究表明，根据工资调整后的机器人采用率，美国实际上比预期低 49%。鉴于该国的人工智能革命，令人惊讶的是，机器人技术是主要的潜在受益者之一，它与其他科技领域的道路分道扬镳。如果机器人技术成为增长的目标部门，该国或许能够从更便宜的生产中受益并参与竞争，但这是未来的趋势。

There’s a number of reasons why the dissonance could be occurring in the US, a large one mainly being the lack of multi-year national initiatives that other countries see benefit from. For example, the CHIPS act and the Inflation Reduction Act, two major government initiatives aimed at bolstering domestic industry, were initiated under one administration and under another the IRA is already on the table for repeal, with the CHIPS act being in the conversation as well. Moreover, the economy was structured to follow different economic incentives than China.  The US found it more worthwhile to pursue digital innovation, cutting-edge technology, and services, and in the process it outsourced most production capabilities to countries with a better cost advantage as most American companies cannot compete. However, the US is now left at the mercy of Chinese manufacturing powers and will need a significant turnaround just to enter the race.
美国出现这种不和谐的原因有很多，其中一个很大的原因主要是缺乏其他国家认为从中受益的多年期国家倡议。例如，CHIPS 法案和《降低通货膨胀法案》是两届政府旨在支持国内工业的重大政府举措，是在一届政府下发起的，而在另一届政府的领导下，IRA 已经被提上废除的桌面，CHIPS 法案也在讨论中。此外，经济结构遵循与中国不同的经济激励措施。 美国发现追求数字创新、尖端技术和服务更值得，在此过程中，它将大部分生产能力外包给具有更好成本优势的国家，因为大多数美国公司无法竞争。然而，美国现在受制于中国制造大国，需要重大转变才能加入竞争。

To add insult to injury, a closer look at the Western world’s automation growth reveals a peak in ~2016-18. Japan’s 2023 additions are still ~13% below the 2018 peak, and South Korea has not grown since 2016. The only country among the top 4 that has reached a new peak in 2023 is Germany… but their goliath KUKA has been acquired by China and is shifting manufacturing to Asia.
雪上加霜的是，仔细观察西方世界的自动化增长会发现，它在 ~2016-18 年达到顶峰。日本 2023 年的新增人数仍比 2018 年的峰值低 ~13%，韩国自 2016 年以来就没有增长。前 4 名中唯一在 2023 年达到新高峰的国家是德国......但他们的巨人 KUKA 已被中国收购，并将制造转移到亚洲。

The Sleeping Goliaths and The Budding Davids
沉睡的歌利亚和萌芽的大卫

KUKA is part of the small set of companies referred to as the “Big 4” in robotics, having dominated the industry for decades: FANUC (Japan), ABB (Switzerland/Sweden), Yaskawa (Japan), and KUKA (prev Germany, now China). 
KUKA 是被称为机器人领域“四大”的少数公司之一，几十年来一直主导着该行业：FANUC（日本）、ABB（瑞士/瑞典）、Yaskawa（日本）和 KUKA（前德国，现在的中国）。

A closer look at those four titans reveals a lot of similarity: decades of experience in the space, high-volume manufacturing capacity among a broad product portfolio (cobots, robots, multiple industries, etc), but relatively low R&D ratio and overall limited willingness to participate in the capital-heavy and risk-oriented goal to build these next-gen robots that hold the same promises that have failed in the past. In addition, their business is increasingly tilted towards mainland China – leaving a large geopolitical risk.
仔细观察这四大巨头会发现很多相似之处：在该领域拥有数十年的经验，广泛的产品组合（协作机器人、机器人、多个行业等）的大批量制造能力，但研发比率相对较低，并且总体上参与资本密集且以风险为导向的目标的意愿有限，以构建这些拥有过去失败的相同承诺的下一代机器人。此外，他们的业务越来越向中国大陆倾斜，从而带来巨大的地缘政治风险。

The situation is particularly worrisome, with Chinese players now on track to catch up and fill the gaps with unprecedented speed.
情况尤其令人担忧，中国企业现在正以前所未有的速度迎头赶上并填补空白。

China’s Robotics Champions
中国机器人冠军

While the revenues of the major companies are much larger than those of China, the landscape has been shifting toward western sleeping giants growing complacent and Chinese innovation. Chinese robotics are picking up very quickly through companies like Estun, Efort, and Siasun, and their recent takeovers of the aforementioned European robotics companies.
虽然大公司的收入远高于中国，但形势已经转向西方沉睡的巨头，这些巨头越来越自满，而中国则不断创新。中国机器人技术通过 Estun、Efort 和 Siasun 等公司以及它们最近对上述欧洲机器人公司的收购而迅速崛起。

These companies are setting up to be powerhouses. Most are focused on strong vertical integration, like Estun with up to 95% of core components manufactured in-house, enabling them to rapidly iterate product development. They recognize the power of a strong production capacity, for example EFORT is planning to build out a “Super Plant” to upgrade production capacity by 100,000 robots/year. Siasun is already well-equipped for an impressive production output with around 2.3M square footage of factories globally. Furthermore, their R&D numbers may speak for themselves, but Siasun has gone even further in their innovation strategy. The company went so far as to buy a leading German mechanical engineering vocational school so that they could both train new employees abroad and gain access to the decades of German experience in training engineers, all while setting up its own robotics institute at a Chinese university.
这些公司正在成为强者。大多数公司都专注于强大的垂直整合，例如 Estun，高达 95% 的核心组件在内部制造，使他们能够快速迭代产品开发。他们认识到强大生产能力的力量，例如，埃夫特正计划建造一个“超级工厂”，将生产能力提高 100,000 个机器人/年。新松已经为令人印象深刻的产量做好了准备，在全球拥有约 2.3 平方英尺的工厂。此外，他们的研发数字可能说明了一切，但新松在他们的创新战略上走得更远。该公司甚至收购了一所领先的德国机械工程职业学校，这样他们就可以在国外培训新员工，并获得德国数十年的工程师培训经验，同时在中国的一所大学建立自己的机器人研究所。

The traditional industrial robotics market and the respective hardware is still dominated by the original four giants of ABB, KUKA, Fanuc, and Yaskawa, however, they are not matching the pace of their Chinese contemporaries. Lack of innovation and investment in R&D is leaving a door wide open for Chinese companies to enter through, and they’re only ramping up further. This expansion is not only happening at the company level but rather it’s the country’s imperative to cross the finish line first.
传统的工业机器人市场和相应的硬件仍然由 ABB、KUKA、Fanuc 和 Yaskawa 这四大巨头主导，然而，它们并没有跟上同时代的中国步伐。缺乏创新和研发投资为中国公司打开了大门，而且他们只会进一步发展。这种扩张不仅发生在公司层面，而且该国必须首先越过终点线。

China’s Hellbent Path to Robotics Dominance
中国通往机器人主导地位的艰难之路

In China, the most impressive shifts are taking place, going from outside the top 10 in robots per 10,000 employees in 2018, to overtaking 3rd place in the world from Germany with 470 robots/10,000 employees in 2024. China’s annual root installations dwarf that of the four western incumbents combined.
在中国，最令人印象深刻的转变正在发生，从 2018 年每 10,000 名员工机器人数排名前 10 名之外，到 2024 年从德国超越世界第三位，以 470 台机器人/10,000 名员工。中国每年的根安装量使四个西方老牌国家的总和相形见绌。

A change of this scale can only be described as a robotics revolution. Many factors can point to how this happened, but most stem from their massive industrial sector and policies that continue to fuel it, like the Made in China 2025 plan, and aggressive government subsidies. Exact numbers are hard to pinpoint, and the EV industry is a key recipient, but it is clear that the broad industrial landscape is benefiting from at least tens of billions of dollars every year.
这种规模的变化只能被描述为一场机器人革命。许多因素可以表明这是如何发生的，但大多数都源于其庞大的工业部门和继续推动工业发展的政策，如中国制造 2025 计划，以及激进的政府补贴。确切的数字很难确定，电动汽车行业是关键的受益者，但很明显，广阔的工业前景每年至少从数百亿美元中受益。

The Chinese manufacturing base is currently dominated by automotive and electronics production, as China has been producing more cars than the US and Japan combined since 2009, and assembles some 70% of the world’s electronics. Even with a massive sector ripe for automation, 51% of global robot installations in 2023 were coming from China, adding 276,000 units that year alone! China’s industrial economy is one of the most formidable players in the world, setting it up perfectly to reap the next evolutions of robotics and automation.
中国的制造基地目前以汽车和电子产品生产为主，因为自 2009 年以来，中国生产的汽车比美国和日本的总和还要多，并且组装了全球约 70% 的电子产品。尽管自动化行业已经成熟，但 2023 年全球机器人安装量的 51% 来自中国，仅当年就增加了 276,000 台！中国的工业经济是世界上最强大的参与者之一，为收获机器人和自动化的下一次发展做好了完美的准备。

The Made in 2025 plan was the largest catalyst toward becoming the industrial and high-tech manufacturing giant it is today. Signed by Li Keqiang in 2015, the plan initiated the move from 40% of domestic content of core components in 2020 to 70% by 2025. Additionally, the plan highlights the following six of the ten priority sectors going forward: automated machine tools & robotics, new-energy vehicles and equipment, power equipment, modern rail transport equipment, new advanced information technology, and new materials. With a focus on the entire manufacturing chain and the development of both advanced and traditional industries, the country laid out the road map to become an economic juggernaut. 
“2025 年制造”计划是成为当今工业和高科技制造巨头的最大催化剂。该计划由李克强于 2015 年签署，启动了核心零部件国产化比例从 2020 年的 40% 到 2025 年的 70% 的转变。此外，该计划强调了以下六个优先领域：自动化机床和机器人、新能源车辆和设备、电力设备、现代轨道运输设备、新的先进信息技术和新材料。该国专注于整个制造链以及先进和传统工业的发展，制定了成为经济巨头的路线图。

In 2023 they doubled down on robotics, with China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology posted their four-year plan positioning humanoids as a strategic engine of economic growth. Within this outline, they highlighted having a robust innovation system for humanoids and to achieve “production at scale” by 2025, with the engine of growth coming online by 2027. This state-backed interest is significant for the sector as the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission posted an Issue Alert in October 2024 stating that Chinese humanoid companies raised USD$769M in 2023 alone, and over USD$990M in the first half of 2024. China believes in robotics and its related form factors as the future of the country, just recently, Unitree CEO Wang Xingxing was even seen at the private sector symposium seated across from Xi Jinping.
2023 年，他们加倍投资于机器人技术，中国工业和信息化部发布了他们的四年计划，将类人机器人定位为经济增长的战略引擎。在这个大纲中，他们强调了拥有强大的类人创新系统，到 2025 年实现“大规模生产”，到 2027 年实现增长引擎。这种国家支持的兴趣对该行业来说意义重大，因为美中经济和安全审查委员会在 2024 年 10 月发布了一份问题警报，指出中国人形机器人公司仅在 2023 年就筹集了 769M 美元，在 2024 年上半年筹集了超过 990M 美元。中国相信机器人技术及其相关形式因素是国家的未来，就在最近，宇树 Unitree 首席执行官王兴兴甚至出现在坐在习近平对面的私营部门研讨会上。

Even humanoids are now booming in China, still considered the most difficult form factor to unlock, with many older estimates misinterpreting the coming revolution, i.e. Goldman Sachs having to revise their 2035 TAM by 6x! At the 2024 World Robot Conference in Beijing, over 27 different humanoids were debuted and active, while the Tesla Optimus remained motionless in a clear box. A stark contrast to the Unitree H1 which was performing synchronized choreography with both H1’s and humans nearby in Feb 2025. While it is impressive to see how well Chinese humanoids are performing, it’s more impressive that they can produce these at a much faster and larger scale than any other country. UBTech is already set to mass produce nearly 1000 units by late 2025. Agibot was created in 2023, and has started mass production already, with 962 units fully produced as of December 15. Most importantly, Unitree G1 is already in the United States and commercially available, and the humanoid boasts a shocking price tag of only USD$16K. There are no other humanoids in the world available for purchase by consumers, and the price tags for most humanoids are angling to be in the ~USD$100K range, and up to ~USD$200K for a significant portion. 
即使是类人机器人现在也在中国蓬勃发展，仍然被认为是最难解锁的外形尺寸，许多较旧的估计误解了即将到来的革命，即高盛不得不将他们的 2035 年 TAM 修改 6 倍！在北京举行的 2024 年世界机器人大会上，超过 27 种不同的类人机器人首次亮相并活跃起来，而特斯拉 Optimus 则在一个透明的盒子里一动不动。这与 Unitree H1 形成鲜明对比，后者在 2025 年 2 月与 H1 和附近的人类同步编排。虽然看到中国类人机器人的表现令人印象深刻，但更令人印象深刻的是，他们能够以比其他任何国家都快得多、规模更大的方式生产这些类人机器人。UBTech 已经计划到 2025 年底量产近 1000 台。Agibot 创建于 2023 年，已开始量产，截至 12 月 15 日已全面生产 962 台。最重要的是，Unitree G1 已经在美国上市并上市，而这款人形机器人的价格仅为 16 美元，令人震惊。世界上没有其他类人机器人可供消费者购买，大多数类人机器人的价格都在 ~USD$100K 范围内，很大一部分高达 ~USD$200K。

What Stands to Come  未来展望

This is a Call for Action. In America there are many companies attempting to build their own hardware, but in-house hardware development means the company designing and assembling it in-house, and everyone closes their eyes when the materials and base components roll in from China. The US once had a solid base to spin up heavy industry factories, but this withered away as cheaper overseas manufacturing cut US producers out and the American economy shifted toward leading edge technology and services. However, with each dilapidated factory and every “Made in China” sticker the dots connected a pointillist image of a nation depleted. Now the country stands at the bifurcated path between limitless labor expansion or obsolescence, and the echoes of industry’s past are shouting. 
这是一个行动呼吁。在美国，有许多公司试图构建自己的硬件，但内部硬件开发意味着公司在内部设计和组装，当材料和基础组件从中国运来时，每个人都睁一只眼闭一只眼。美国曾经拥有建立重工业工厂的坚实基础，但随着更便宜的海外制造业将美国生产商排除在外，美国经济转向尖端技术和服务，这种情况逐渐消失。然而，每一座破旧的工厂和每一个“中国制造”的贴纸，这些点都连接着一个枯竭的国家的点彩画形象。现在，这个国家站在无限的劳动力扩张或过时之间的分叉道路上，工业过去的回声正在呼喊。

China knew 10 years ago that these robots would be a force and doubled down again in 2023. This is not a question of ifs: China knows what comes next if they are first to unlock these robots, they will iterate faster than the US, they will subsidize the industry to an unprecedented extent, they will achieve massive economies of scale and oversupply all global markets, and the general purpose robotics boom will be nothing but a bad dream for the US if nothing changes. The US must take part in the robotics revolution before all labor is handed over to China to own in perpetuity.
中国在 10 年前就知道这些机器人将成为一股力量，并在 2023 年再次加倍投入。这不是一个如果的问题：如果中国率先解锁这些机器人，他们知道接下来会发生什么，他们将比美国更快地迭代，他们将以前所未有的程度补贴该行业，他们将实现大规模的规模经济并供过于求所有全球市场，如果不做出任何改变，通用机器人的繁荣对美国来说将是一个噩梦。美国必须在所有劳动力都交给中国永久拥有之前参与机器人革命。

Unitree exemplifies the threat posed by China’s rise to Western industrial semiconductor suppliers. Behind paywall, we dive into the different types of electronic components found in robots, explain how western incumbents like NXP, Infineon or TXN are positioned, and highlight the Chinese threat. We also discuss leading edge logic for next-gen robots and Nvidia’s position. 
宇树 Unitree 体现了中国崛起对西方工业半导体供应商构成的威胁。在付费墙的背后，我们深入探讨了机器人中不同类型的电子元件，解释了 NXP、Infineon 或 TXN 等西方老牌企业的定位，并强调了中国的威胁。我们还讨论了下一代机器人的领先逻辑和 Nvidia 的地位。

Check out our friends at Edge of Automation’s Parts 1 and 2 of the coming physical AI revolution for a great breakdown series on the current state of robotics!
查看我们在 Edge of Automation 的第 1 部分和第 2 部分的朋友，了解即将到来的物理 AI 革命，了解机器人技术现状的精彩细分系列！