1/9 Sometimes you just have to trust the arithmetic. Since March I have argued that Beijing had little choice but to engineer a large demand-side stimulus of at least RMB 1 trillion before the end of... 有时候你只需要相信算术。从 3 月开始,我就一直认为,北京别无选择,只能在……结束之前,人为地制造至少 1 万亿元人民币的巨大需求侧刺激。
2/9 the year because – given trade and domestic investment constraints – more of the supply-side spending it had long favored wouldn’t allow it to achieve the 2024 GDP growth target.
由于贸易和国内投资的限制,长期以来它所青睐的供给侧支出增加将无法实现 2024 年的 GDP 增长目标,因此今年不会这样做。
3/9 Most China analysts disagreed, on the grounds that Beijing was unalterably opposed to “the idleness-breeding trap of welfarism”, and so would never initiate such a spending program, but I argued that the choice facing Beijing wasn’t between welfarism and no welfarism.
大多数中国分析人士对此表示不同意,理由是北京坚决反对“滋生懒惰的福利主义陷阱”,因此永远不会启动这样的支出计划,但我认为北京面临的选择不是福利主义与非福利主义之间的选择。
4/9 It was instead between welfarism and falling well short of the GDP growth target. 相反,它介于福利主义和严重低于 GDP 增长目标之间。
It had become so obvious that the Chinese economy was constrained mainly by weak demand that I told all my clients that any such announcement would probably set off a stock market rally.
中国经济受制于疲软需求已变得如此明显,我告诉所有客户,任何此类公告都可能引发股市反弹。
5/9 From recent events it now seems that Beijing might have finally chosen to implement a large demand-side stimulus (although we still don’t have details, so we can’t say for sure). Sure enough, the stock market has reacted positively, but excessively.
从最近的事件来看,北京似乎终于决定实施大规模需求侧刺激(尽管我们还没有细节,所以不能确定)。当然,股市对此做出了积极反应,但反应过度了。
6/9 Check out the rather shocking graph in the NYT article. But while we needed a rise, I don’t think a 16% surge in the CSI 300 in one week is at all a healthy stock market reaction. It just reinforces how highly speculative the markets are in China (and how volatile).
看看《纽约时报》文章中那张相当令人震惊的图表。虽然我们需要上涨,但我认为中国 CSI 300 指数一周内暴涨 16% 绝不是健康的股市反应。这只是再次证明了中国市场的高度投机性(以及波动性)。
7/9 But that’s what we’re stuck with. This violent surge seems to leaves us where we were after the February rally. If it isn’t sustained and prices start to fall again, it will demoralize investors and further undermine the credibility of the stock markets and the regulators.
但这就是我们现在所处的困境。这次暴涨似乎让我们回到了 2 月份集会后的位置。如果它不能持续下去,价格再次开始下跌,它将使投资者士气低落,并进一步损害股市和监管机构的信誉。
8/9 That is why I think this week’s stock market performance may not be what the regulators hoped for and may put even further pressure on Beijing to follow through with a substantial demand-side stimulus.
这就是为什么我认为本周股市的表现可能不是监管机构所希望的,并且可能会给北京带来更大的压力,要求其采取实质性的需求侧刺激措施。
9/9 Not only is a demand-side stimulus the only effective way to boost economic activity enough before year end to allow China to reach the GDP growth target, but Beijing also cannot allow this week’s stock-market rally to fizzle out yet again.
不仅需求侧刺激是今年年底前有效提振经济活动、实现中国 GDP 增长目标的唯一有效途径,北京也不能让本周的股市反弹再次消失。
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1/7 Amy Kapczynski argues that "everywhere you look in Washington today, there are signs that industrial policy is back. The presidential election is a fight not over whether we will have industrial policy, but over what kind we should have."
2/7 I would put it a little differently. Industrial policy has been especially powerful in driving the US economy in recent decades, but this industrial policy was mostly designed abroad. What's new is that the US is determined to regain control over how this policy is designed.
3/7 In a globalized world, changes in one country's trade and capital accounts must be automatically accommodated by opposite changes in the trade and capital accounts of its trade partners. That's because globally, external accounts must balance.
1/4 Bloomberg "China said it will give one-off cash handouts to people in extreme poverty before Tuesday, in a rare announcement of direct aid just a day after unveiling a sweeping program to stimulate the world’s second-largest economy."
2/4 These are just the kinds of fiscal transfers that will boost consumption spending in the short term. The problem is that the amounts are likely to be too small to matter and, more importantly, that these are one-off fiscal transfers that don't really address the underlying...
3/4 income distribution that has created the imbalances. Until structural reforms are implemented that eliminate the implicit and explicit transfers that force households to subsidize production and investment, the underlying imbalances won't really change.
1/8 An interesting debate between Elizabeth Pancotti, Todd N. Tucker and Matthew Yglesias on the pros and cons of tariffs. The problem I have with most debates over tariffs is that they often proceed as if tariffs were…
2/8 a unique (and often uniquely dangerous) form of trade policy. In fact tariffs are just like many other trade and industrial policies that operate through transfers from one sector of the economy (usually households) to another (usually manufacturers or other producers).
3/8 Tariffs affect the economy in the same ways as currency depreciation, subsidized borrowing costs, price controls, capital controls, export subsidies, support for specific industries or infrastructure, wage constraints, policies to support or undermine unions, and so on.
1/10
Good IMF blog that reminds us that trade imbalances are largely driven by domestic macro forces rather than by incremental price effects. It notes that China’s growing trade surpluses were driven by a rise in Chinese savings caused both by the...
2/10
weak household income share of GDP and the rise in precautionary savings as property prices crashed and economic uncertainty rose, while US deficits are caused by fiscal policies that drove down US savings.
3/10
But I have two problems with this analysis. First, the authors claim that while subsidies associated with Chinese industrial policy “do play some role in generating international trade spillovers in the respective sectors, the estimated effects are however modest, suggesting that…
1/8 China' private secret is suffering. Among other things, "“China used to be the best VC destination in the world after the US,” says one Beijing-based executive, but “the industry has just died before our eyes. The entrepreneurial spirit is dead.”
2/8 The article goes on to note that "in 2018, at the height of VC investment, 51,302 start-ups were founded in China, according to data provider IT Judi. By 2023, that figure had collapsed to 1,202 and is on track to be even lower this year."
3/8 While it has been clear for years that the role of the private sector in the economy has contracted relative to the role of the public sector, if you want to understand why China's adjustment has been, and will continue to be, so difficult, it is important to understand why this has happened.
1/5 This is almost a textbook example of why most discussions of tariffs and inflation completely miss the point. The discussion assumes that a tariff raises the price of the tariffed product (of course it does) but has no other impact on the overall economy.
2/5 The discussion assumes, among other things, that tariffs have no impact on tax collection or profits, when clearly they do. Much more importantly, it assumes tariffs have no impact on demand for non-tariffed goods or (most astonishingly) on total domestic production.
3/5 But this makes the discussion totally surreal. Inflation is not what happens when the price of a single product rises. It is what happens when total demand rises relative to total supply.
But the whole point of tariffs is to boost domestic production, i.e. total supply.