The Goal for China’s Chip Giant: Cut Out the U.S.
中国芯片巨头的目标：削减对美国的依赖。

By today’s standards, the operations done here by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. 981 0.36%increase; green up pointing triangle, or SMIC, are retrograde, several generations behind the likes of industry leaders Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., commonly known as TSMC, or Samsung Electronics 005930 -0.13%decrease; red down pointing triangle. 
按照今天的标准，中芯国际半导体制造有限公司（SMIC）的业务已经过时，比行业领导者台积电（TSMC）或三星电子（005930-0.13%）等公司落后了几代。

But SMIC, at the company’s new Jingcheng facility on the industrial outskirts of Beijing, is aggressively incorporating homegrown semiconductor-production equipment into its manufacturing line. Meanwhile, it is cutting back on its longtime reliance on industry-leading American tools, a person familiar with the matter said. 
但中芯国际在北京工业郊区的新京城工厂积极将国产半导体生产设备纳入其生产线。与此同时，据一位知情人士透露，该公司正在减少长期依赖行业领先的美国工具。

The line represents one of China’s most advanced efforts to date to commercially create chips with domestic tools—a technological self-survival tactic that would help inoculate Beijing from U.S. sanctions. 
该线路代表了中国迄今为止在商业上利用国产工具创造芯片的最先进努力之一，这是一种技术自救策略，有助于使北京免受美国制裁。

It is a part of a broader campaign to eradicate American technology in China, dubbed “Delete A” or “Decouple From A,” which has accelerated in recent years as the world’s two biggest economies intensify their battle to dominate in next-generation technology.
这是一个更广泛的运动的一部分，旨在根除中国的美国技术，被称为“删除 A”或“与 A 脱钩”，这在最近几年加速进行，因为世界上两个最大的经济体加剧了在下一代技术领域的主导地位争夺战。

The Biden administration, and some U.S. allies such as Japan and the Netherlands, have introduced targeted export curbs that have undercut China’s ability to make high-end chips. But those measures have also served as a rallying call for China’s homegrown industry to develop more quickly, leading to big spending, experimentation and even some breakthroughs.
拜登政府以及一些美国盟友，如日本和荷兰，已经实施了有针对性的出口限制措施，削弱了中国生产高端芯片的能力。但这些措施也成为中国本土产业更快发展的号召，导致大规模支出、实验以及一些突破。

China, defying the global drop in semiconductor-equipment purchases, went on a spending spree in 2023 and represented a third of worldwide sales, according to industry association SEMI. This year, the country will add more new semiconductor-production capacity than the rest of the world combined, all for mature-technology chips, according to an estimate by analytics firm Gavekal Research. In May, China established a third round of its national semiconductor fund worth roughly $48 billion—coming on top of the previous two iterations that totaled nearly $50 billion.
根据行业协会 SEMI 的数据，尽管全球半导体设备购买量下降，中国在 2023 年进行了一场狂欢式的支出，占据了全球销售的三分之一。根据分析公司嘉卫研究的估计，今年，中国将新增的半导体生产能力超过全球其他地区的总和，主要用于成熟技术芯片。今年 5 月，中国设立了第三轮国家半导体基金，价值约 480 亿美元，此前已有两轮基金总额近 500 亿美元。

The SMIC project, for now, remains largely aspirational. The production line still features some U.S. tools as well as other equipment from outside of China. China has a long way to go to shed its reliance on foreign technologies, especially those needed to produce higher-end chips, semiconductor executives and industry experts say. 
目前，中芯国际项目仍然主要是抱负。生产线仍然使用一些美国工具以及来自中国以外的其他设备。半导体高管和行业专家表示，中国在摆脱对外国技术依赖方面还有很长的路要走，特别是生产高端芯片所需的技术。

Still, SMIC is on a path to commercialization. It is now capable of producing chips as advanced as 28-nanometer circuits at this line, and recent output volume there is already beyond the pilot production level, a person familiar with the matter said. 
尽管如此，中芯国际正走向商业化。据一位知情人士称，该公司目前能够在该生产线生产 28 纳米电路这样先进的芯片，最近的产量已经超过试生产水平。

“By blocking everything, you force the sleeping lion to wake up,” said Konrad Kwang-Leei Young, a former executive at TSMC who served as an independent SMIC board member until 2021, referring to the state of China’s semiconductor industry.
“通过封锁一切，你迫使沉睡的狮子醒来，”台积电前高管、曾担任中芯国际独立董事直至 2021 年的杨光礼(Konrad Kwang-Leei Young)表示，指的是中国半导体行业的现状。

Awakened lion 觉醒的狮子

SMIC, a contract-chip manufacturer founded in 2000 in Shanghai, currently represents China’s best shot at one day churning out the world’s most-advanced chips. 
中芯国际是一家成立于 2000 年在上海的合同芯片制造商，目前代表着中国有望有一天生产出世界上最先进芯片的最佳机会。

SMIC, which isn’t a directly government-run enterprise, counts state-linked investors including the national semiconductor fund among its major shareholders. Its current chairman, who joined the board in 2023 with the recommendation of the national semiconductor fund, has previously served executive roles at state-owned enterprises.
中芯国际（SMIC）不是直接由政府运营的企业，其主要股东包括国家半导体基金等国有关联投资者。该公司现任董事长于 2023 年应国家半导体基金的推荐加入董事会，此前曾在国有企业担任高管职务。

In 2017, SMIC set up an innovation center adjacent to a fabrication plant in southern Beijing. There, it conducts research related to localizing the company’s supply chain, people familiar with the project said. 
2017 年，中芯国际在北京南部的一家晶圆厂旁设立了一个创新中心。据熟悉该项目的人士透露，该中心进行与本地化公司供应链相关的研究。

SMIC was added to the U.S.’s export blacklist in December 2020 over alleged links to the Chinese military. That meant companies with any U.S.-originating technology needed Washington’s signoff to sell tools, equipment or parts to SMIC that could aid more advanced chipmaking. SMIC has denied any links to China’s military.
中芯国际于 2020 年 12 月被列入美国的出口黑名单，理由是涉嫌与中国军方有关。这意味着拥有任何源自美国的技术的公司需要华盛顿的批准，才能向中芯国际出售可能有助于更先进芯片制造的工具、设备或零部件。中芯国际否认与中国军方有任何关联。

Since then, SMIC has accelerated its self-sufficiency efforts. The Jingcheng project that favors Chinese suppliers underscores how SMIC’s efforts have gone from research to nearing commercialization following the U.S. blacklisting.
自那时起，中芯国际加快了自给自足的努力。青城项目偏爱中国供应商，突显了中芯国际的努力已从研究转向商业化，并且接近商业化，这是对美国的制裁名单的回应。

Domestic tools used at the line include those made by China’s leading semiconductor-equipment makers, such as Naura Technology Group; Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equipment, or AMEC; and the Shanghai-based ACM Research, a person familiar with the matter said. 
国内生产线使用的工具包括中国领先的半导体设备制造商生产的工具，如诺芯科技集团、先进微细加工设备（AMEC）以及总部位于上海的 ACM 研究，一位知情人士表示。

The end-use of the chips made at the Jingcheng plant couldn’t be determined. Generally, chips of around 28 nanometers are widely used in household devices and cars, several generations removed from the cutting-edge technologies in new smartphones as well as those needed to train large language models driving generative artificial intelligence. 
在京城工厂生产的芯片的最终用途尚无法确定。一般来说，大约 28 纳米的芯片广泛应用于家用设备和汽车，距离新智能手机的尖端技术以及用于训练驱动生成人工智能的大型语言模型已有数代之遥。

SMIC has received $1.8 billion in direct government grants since 2017, according to data provider Wind. It is currently expanding production capacity for legacy chips. 
中芯国际自 2017 年以来已获得 18 亿美元的直接政府补助，据数据提供商 Wind 称。目前正在扩大传统芯片的生产能力。

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Before the U.S. restrictions, Chinese chip makers could access most foreign tools and other technology, and they made efficiency a priority instead of serving as a test bed for local companies. After the sanctions, they had no choice but to use domestic alternatives for some areas. Even when they have a choice, they are aiming to secure backup options, industry experts say.
在美国实施限制之前，中国芯片制造商可以获得大多数外国工具和其他技术，并将效率作为重点，而不是为本地公司提供试验平台。制裁之后，他们别无选择，只能在某些领域使用国内替代品。行业专家表示，即使有选择的余地，他们也在努力确保备用选项。

The self-sufficiency path forward will be increasingly difficult as chip technology advances. 
随着芯片技术的进步，自给自足的道路将变得越来越困难。

To be truly localized, China not only needs domestic equipment for making chips, but also must make sure the components inside the homegrown equipment are domestically produced. It would also need to locally manufacture wafers and other materials it uses for the chips. 
要真正实现本地化，中国不仅需要国产设备来制造芯片，还必须确保国产设备内部的组件是国产的。它还需要在本地制造用于芯片的晶圆和其他材料。

China’s new advances and bottlenecks
中国的新进展和瓶颈

There have been some apparent breakthroughs. Last year, Huawei Technologies released its new Mate 60 smartphone, which contained a system-on-chip made with SMIC’s technology comparable with the 7-nanometer process, according to a teardown by TechInsights, an industry research firm.
有一些明显的突破。去年，华为技术发布了其新的 Mate 60 智能手机，其中包含了一款由中芯国际技术制造的系统芯片，与 7 纳米工艺相媲美，根据行业研究公司 TechInsights 的拆解。

Neither Huawei nor SMIC have confirmed who manufactured the advanced chip in the Mate 60. 
华为和中芯国际均未确认是谁制造了 Mate 60 中的先进芯片。

It was seen as a feat because SMIC and other Chinese chip makers don’t have access to the latest lithography machine made by Netherlands-based ASML Holding. The Netherlands restricts such sales to China.  
这被视为一项壮举，因为中芯国际和其他中国芯片制造商无法获得荷兰 ASML 控股公司生产的最新光刻机。荷兰限制向中国出售这类设备。

Veteran semiconductor-manufacturing engineers think Huawei and its partners could have made the chips using a process that exposes the silicon to light multiple times instead of once—but doing so would lead to worse yields and higher costs.
资深半导体制造工程师认为，华为及其合作伙伴可能使用了一种将硅暴露多次于光线的工艺来制造芯片，而不是仅一次，但这样做会导致更低的产量和更高的成本。

At more advanced levels of chipmaking, the technique would become even more difficult and less efficient, the engineers say. 
在芯片制造的更高级别阶段，工程师们表示，这项技术将变得更加困难和低效。

China has no homegrown alternative for the higher-end lithography machines. The country’s top domestic option is Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment Group, whose website shows it makes lithography machines for production of chips as advanced as 90-nanometer circuit size.
中国没有国产替代品用于高端光刻机。该国顶尖的国产选择是上海微电子设备集团，其网站显示它生产的光刻机可用于生产 90 纳米电路尺寸的芯片。

Globally, that technology was introduced more than 20 years ago.
全球范围内，该技术已经推出超过 20 年。

The U.S. and its allies’ export controls clamped down access to a variety of foreign technology. Now, a flood of new local companies have been established to fill in the gaps. 
美国及其盟友的出口管制限制了对各种外国技术的获取。现在，大量新的本地公司已经成立，以填补这些空白。

Competition is so tight that some companies offer “buy one, get one free” enticements for certain chip-making tools, an industry executive said.
竞争如此激烈，以至于一些公司为某些芯片制造工具提供“买一送一”的诱惑，一位行业高管表示。

At Semicon, a chip-tool exhibition that took place in Shanghai in March, some exhibitors emphasized their homegrown offerings. One featured a sign that read: “High level of localization.” 
在三月份在上海举办的半导体芯片工具展览会上，一些参展商强调了他们的本土产品。其中一个展示牌上写着：“高度本地化”。

Meanwhile, Chinese companies are stockpiling foreign equipment untouched by the Biden administration or other governments’ restrictions.
与此同时，中国公司正在囤积拜登政府或其他政府限制未触及的外国设备。

Applied Materials and Lam Research, both based in California, each derived roughly two-fifths of their total revenue from China in their most recent quarter. About half of ASML’s lithography-system sales came from China in the first three months of the year.
应用材料和朗姆研究，两家总部位于加利福尼亚的公司，分别在最近一个季度的总收入中约有五分之二来自中国。在今年前三个月，ASML 的光刻系统销售约有一半来自中国。

Clarence Leong contributed to this article.
梁俊贤为本文做出了贡献。

Write to Yoko Kubota at yoko.kubota@wsj.com
请写信给 Yoko Kubota，邮箱地址为 yoko.kubota@wsj.com

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