这是用户在 2024-6-4 19:38 为 https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/trumps-collaborators/612250/ 保存的双语快照页面,由 沉浸式翻译 提供双语支持。了解如何保存?
a sea of people with one person facing the opposite direction
Borja Alegre

History Will Judge the Complicit

Why have Republican leaders abandoned their principles in support of an immoral and dangerous president?

On a cold March afternoon in 1949, Wolfgang Leonhard slipped out of the East German Communist Party Secretariat, hurried home, packed what few warm clothes he could fit into a small briefcase, and then walked to a telephone box to call his mother. “My article will be finished this evening,” he told her. That was the code they had agreed on in advance. It meant that he was escaping the country, at great risk to his life.
1949 年三月一个寒冷的下午,沃尔夫冈-莱昂哈德从东德共产党秘书处溜出来,匆匆赶回家,把仅有的几件保暖衣服装进一个小公文包,然后走到电话亭给母亲打电话。"他告诉母亲:"我的文章今晚就能完成。这是他们事先约定好的暗号。这意味着他要冒着极大的生命危险逃离这个国家。

To hear more feature stories, get the Audm iPhone app.

Though only 28 years old at the time, Leonhard stood at the pinnacle of the new East German elite. The son of German Communists, he had been educated in the Soviet Union, trained in special schools during the war, and brought back to Berlin from Moscow in May 1945, on the same airplane that carried Walter Ulbricht, the leader of what would soon become the East German Communist Party. Leonhard was put on a team charged with re‑creating Berlin’s city government.
尽管莱昂哈德当时只有 28 岁,但他已经站在了东德新精英阶层的顶峰。他是德国共产党人的儿子,在苏联接受教育,战争期间在特殊学校接受培训,1945 年 5 月,他乘坐瓦尔特-乌尔布里希特(Walter Ulbricht)乘坐的同一架飞机从莫斯科返回柏林,他就是不久后东德共产党的领导人。莱昂哈德被编入一个小组,负责重建柏林市政府。

He had one central task: to ensure that any local leaders who emerged from the postwar chaos were assigned deputies loyal to the party. “It’s got to look democratic,” Ulbricht told him, “but we must have everything in our control.”

Leonhard had lived through a great deal by that time. While he was still a teenager in Moscow, his mother had been arrested as an “enemy of the people” and sent to Vorkuta, a labor camp in the far north. He had witnessed the terrible poverty and inequality of the Soviet Union, he had despaired of the Soviet alliance with Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941, and he knew about the Red Army’s mass rapes of women following the occupation. Yet he and his ideologically committed friends “instinctively recoiled from the thought” that any of these events were “in diametrical opposition to our Socialist ideals.” Steadfastly, he clung to the belief system he had grown up with.
莱昂哈德当时已经经历了很多事情。当他还是莫斯科的一名少年时,他的母亲就被当作 "人民公敌 "逮捕,并被送往最北部的沃尔库塔劳改营。他目睹了苏联可怕的贫困和不平等,他对苏联在 1939 年至 1941 年间与纳粹德国结盟感到绝望,他也知道红军在占领苏联后大规模强奸妇女。然而,他和他那些思想坚定的朋友们 "本能地回避 "这些事件,认为它们 "与我们的社会主义理想截然相反"。他坚定地坚持着自己从小到大的信仰体系。

The turning point, when it came, was trivial. While walking down the hall of the Central Committee building, he was stopped by a “pleasant-looking middle-aged man,” a comrade recently arrived from the West, who asked where to find the dining room. Leonhard told him that the answer depended on what sort of meal ticket he had—different ranks of officials had access to different dining rooms. The comrade was astonished: “But … aren’t they all members of the Party?”
转折点的到来是微不足道的。当他走在中央委员会大楼的大厅里时,一位 "面容和善的中年男子 "拦住了他,他是一位刚从西方来的同志,问餐厅在哪里。莱昂哈德告诉他,答案取决于他持有哪种饭票--不同级别的官员可以进入不同的餐厅。这位同志大吃一惊:"但是......他们不都是党员吗?

Leonhard walked away and entered his own, top-category dining room, where white cloths covered the tables and high-ranking functionaries received three-course meals. He felt ashamed. “Curious, I thought, that this had never struck me before!” That was when he began to have the doubts that inexorably led him to plot his escape.

At exactly that same moment, in exactly the same city, another high-ranking East German was coming to precisely the opposite set of conclusions. Markus Wolf was also the son of a prominent German Communist family. He also spent his childhood in the Soviet Union, attending the same elite schools for children of foreign Communists as Leonhard did, as well as the same wartime training camp; the two had shared a bedroom there, solemnly calling each other by their aliases—these were the rules of deep conspiracy—although they knew each other’s real names perfectly well. Wolf also witnessed the mass arrests, the purges, and the poverty of the Soviet Union—and he also kept faith with the cause. He arrived in Berlin just a few days after Leonhard, on another plane full of trusted comrades, and immediately began hosting a program on the new Soviet-backed radio station. For many months he ran the popular You Ask, We Answer. He gave on-air answers to listeners’ letters, often concluding with some form of “These difficulties are being overcome with the help of the Red Army.”
就在同一时刻,在同一个城市,另一位东德高级官员得出了恰恰相反的结论。马库斯-沃尔夫也是德国一个著名共产主义家庭的儿子。他的童年也是在苏联度过的,和莱昂哈德一样就读于外国共产党员子女的精英学校,以及同一个战时训练营;两人在那里共用一间卧室,郑重地用化名称呼对方--这是深层阴谋的规则--尽管他们对彼此的真名了如指掌。沃尔夫还目睹了苏联的大逮捕、大清洗和贫穷,他也对事业充满信心。就在莱昂哈德抵达柏林的几天后,他搭乘另一架满载可信赖同志的飞机抵达柏林,并立即开始在苏联支持的新广播电台主持节目。几个月来,他主持的 "你问我答 "节目广受欢迎。他在节目中回答听众的来信,经常以 "在红军的帮助下,这些困难正在被克服 "作为结束语。

In August 1947, the two men met up at Wolf’s “luxurious five-roomed apartment,” not far from what was then the headquarters of the radio station. They drove out to Wolf’s house, “a fine villa in the neighborhood of Lake Glienicke.” They took a walk around the lake, and Wolf warned Leonhard that changes were coming. He told him to give up hoping that German Communism would be allowed to develop differently from the Soviet version: That idea, long the goal of many German party members, was about to be dropped. When Leonhard argued that this could not be true—he was personally in charge of ideology, and no one had told him anything about a change in direction—Wolf laughed at him. “There are higher authorities than your Central Secretariat,” he said. Wolf made clear that he had better contacts, more important friends. At the age of 24, he was an insider. And Leonhard understood, finally, that he was a functionary in an occupied country where the Soviet Communist Party, not the German Communist Party, had the last word.
1947 年 8 月,两人在沃尔夫的 "豪华五居室公寓 "见面,该公寓离当时的广播电台总部不远。他们驱车前往沃尔夫的房子,"位于格利尼克湖附近的一栋精致的别墅"。他们在湖边散步,沃尔夫警告莱昂哈德,变化即将来临。他让莱昂哈德放弃对德国共产主义的希望,不要让德国共产主义的发展与苏联共产主义不同:这个长期以来一直是许多德国党员追求的目标即将破灭。莱昂哈德争辩说这不可能--他亲自负责意识形态,没有人告诉过他任何关于方向改变的消息。"他说:"有比你们中央秘书处更高的权威。沃尔夫明确表示,他有更好的关系,更重要的朋友。24 岁的他是个内行。莱昂哈德终于明白,他是被占领国家的一名官员,在那里说了算的是苏联共产党,而不是德国共产党。

Famously, or perhaps infamously, Markus Wolf’s career continued to flourish after that. Not only did he stay in East Germany, he rose through the ranks of its nomenklatura to become the country’s top spy. He was the second-ranked official at the Ministry of State Security, better known as the Stasi; he was often described as the model for the Karla character in John le Carré ’s spy novels. In the course of his career, his Directorate for Reconnaissance recruited agents in the offices of the West German chancellor and just about every other department of the government, as well as at NATO.

Leonhard, meanwhile, became a prominent critic of the regime. He wrote and lectured in West Berlin, at Oxford, at Columbia. Eventually he wound up at Yale, where his lecture course left an impression on several generations of students. Among them was a future U.S. president, George W. Bush, who described Leonhard’s course as “an introduction to the struggle between tyranny and freedom.” When I was at Yale in the 1980s, Leonhard’s course on Soviet history was the most popular on campus.
与此同时,莱昂哈德成为了该政权的著名批评家。他在西柏林、牛津大学、哥伦比亚大学写作和演讲。最终,他来到了耶鲁大学,在那里,他的讲座课程给几代学生留下了深刻印象。其中包括未来的美国总统乔治-W-布什,他将莱昂哈德的课程描述为 "暴政与自由斗争的入门"。20 世纪 80 年代我在耶鲁大学就读时,莱昂哈德的苏联史课程是校园里最受欢迎的课程。

Magazine Cover image

Explore the July/August 2020 Issue
浏览 2020 年 7/8 月刊

Check out more from this issue and find your next story to read.

View More 查看更多

Separately, each man’s story makes sense. But when examined together, they require some deeper explanation. Until March 1949, Leonhard’s and Wolf’s biographies were strikingly similar. Both grew up inside the Soviet system. Both were educated in Communist ideology, and both had the same values. Both knew that the party was undermining those values. Both knew that the system, allegedly built to promote equality, was deeply unequal, profoundly unfair, and very cruel. Like their counterparts in so many other times and places, both men could plainly see the gap between propaganda and reality. Yet one remained an enthusiastic collaborator, while the other could not bear the betrayal of his ideals. Why?
单独来看,每个人的故事都合情合理。但如果把它们放在一起看,就需要更深层次的解释。在 1949 年 3 月之前,莱昂哈德和沃尔夫的履历惊人地相似。两人都在苏联体制内长大。两人都接受过共产主义意识形态教育,拥有相同的价值观。两人都知道党正在破坏这些价值观。两人都知道,这个号称为促进平等而建立的制度,其实极不平等、极不公平,而且非常残酷。与其他许多时代和地方的同行一样,两人都清楚地看到了宣传与现实之间的差距。然而,一个人仍然是热情的合作者,而另一个人则无法忍受对理想的背叛。为什么?

In English, the word collaborator has a double meaning. A colleague can be described as a collaborator in a neutral or positive sense. But the other definition of collaborator, relevant here, is different: someone who works with the enemy, with the occupying power, with the dictatorial regime. In this negative sense, collaborator is closely related to another set of words: collusion, complicity, connivance. This negative meaning gained currency during the Second World War, when it was widely used to describe Europeans who cooperated with Nazi occupiers. At base, the ugly meaning of collaborator carries an implication of treason: betrayal of one’s nation, of one’s ideology, of one’s morality, of one’s values.
在英语中,"合作者 "一词有双重含义。同事可以被描述为中性或积极意义上的合作者。但与此相关的 "合作者 "的另一个定义则不同:与敌人、占领国、独裁政权合作的人。在这一消极意义上,通敌者与另一组词密切相关:勾结、共谋、纵容。这一负面含义在第二次世界大战期间流行起来,当时它被广泛用于描述与纳粹占领者合作的欧洲人。从根本上说,"通敌者 "的丑恶含义带有叛国的意味:背叛自己的民族、意识形态、道德和价值观。

Since the Second World War, historians and political scientists have tried to explain why some people in extreme circumstances become collaborators and others do not. The late Harvard scholar Stanley Hoffmann had firsthand knowledge of the subject—as a child, he and his mother hid from the Nazis in Lamalou-les-Bains, a village in the south of France. But he was modest about his own conclusions, noting that “a careful historian would have—almost—to write a huge series of case histories; for there seem to have been almost as many collaborationisms as there were proponents or practitioners of collaboration.” Still, Hoffmann made a stab at classification, beginning with a division of collaborators into “voluntary” and “involuntary.” Many people in the latter group had no choice. Forced into a “reluctant recognition of necessity,” they could not avoid dealing with the Nazi occupiers who were running their country.
自第二次世界大战以来,历史学家和政治学家一直试图解释为什么有些人在极端情况下会成为通敌者,而有些人则不会。已故哈佛大学学者斯坦利-霍夫曼(Stanley Hoffmann)对这一问题有切身体会--小时候,他和母亲在法国南部的一个村庄拉马卢莱班(Lamalou-les-Bains)躲避纳粹。但他对自己的结论很谦虚,他指出:"一个细心的历史学家几乎要写出一大系列的案例史;因为合作主义似乎与合作的支持者或实践者几乎一样多。尽管如此,霍夫曼还是尝试进行了分类,首先将合作者分为 "自愿 "和 "非自愿 "两类。后者中的许多人别无选择。他们被迫 "勉强承认有必要",无法避免与统治他们国家的纳粹占领者打交道。

Hoffmann further sorted the more enthusiastic “voluntary” collaborators into two additional categories. In the first were those who worked with the enemy in the name of “national interest,” rationalizing collaboration as something necessary for the preservation of the French economy, or French culture—though of course many people who made these arguments had other professional or economic motives, too. In the second were the truly active ideological collaborators: people who believed that prewar republican France had been weak or corrupt and hoped that the Nazis would strengthen it, people who admired fascism, and people who admired Hitler.
霍夫曼进一步将更热心的 "自愿 "合作者分为另外两类。第一类是那些以 "国家利益 "的名义与敌人合作的人,他们将合作合理化为维护法国经济或法国文化所必需的--当然,许多提出这些论点的人也有其他职业或经济动机。第二类是真正积极的意识形态合作者:他们认为战前的共和制法国软弱或腐败,希望纳粹能加强它;他们崇拜法西斯主义,也崇拜希特勒。

Hoffmann observed that many of those who became ideological collaborators were landowners and aristocrats, “the cream of the top of the civil service, of the armed forces, of the business community,” people who perceived themselves as part of a natural ruling class that had been unfairly deprived of power under the left-wing governments of France in the 1930s. Equally motivated to collaborate were their polar opposites, the “social misfits and political deviants” who would, in the normal course of events, never have made successful careers of any kind. What brought these groups together was a common conclusion that, whatever they had thought about Germany before June 1940, their political and personal futures would now be improved by aligning themselves with the occupiers.
霍夫曼注意到,许多成为意识形态合作者的人都是地主和贵族,是 "文职部门、军队和商界的精英",他们认为自己是天然统治阶级的一部分,而在 20 世纪 30 年代的法国左翼政府统治下,他们的权力被不公平地剥夺了。同样有合作动机的还有他们的对立面,即 "社会失足者和政治异类",在正常情况下,他们永远不会在任何领域取得成功。将这些人聚集在一起的是一个共同的结论,即无论他们在1940年6月之前对德国有什么看法,现在与占领者结盟都会改善他们的政治和个人前途。

Like Hoffmann, Czesław Miłosz, a Nobel Prize–winning Polish poet, wrote about collaboration from personal experience. An active member of the anti-Nazi resistance during the war, he nevertheless wound up after the war as a cultural attaché at the Polish embassy in Washington, serving his country’s Communist government. Only in 1951 did he defect, denounce the regime, and dissect his experience. In a famous essay, The Captive Mind, he sketched several lightly disguised portraits of real people, all writers and intellectuals, each of whom had come up with different ways of justifying collaboration with the party. Many were careerists, but Miłosz understood that careerism could not provide a complete explanation. To be part of a mass movement was for many a chance to end their alienation, to feel close to the “masses,” to be united in a single community with workers and shopkeepers. For tormented intellectuals, collaboration also offered a kind of relief, almost a sense of peace: It meant that they were no longer constantly at war with the state, no longer in turmoil. Once the intellectual has accepted that there is no other way, Miłosz wrote, “he eats with relish, his movements take on vigor, his color returns. He sits down and writes a ‘positive’ article, marveling at the ease with which he writes it.” Miłosz is one of the few writers to acknowledge the pleasure of conformity, the lightness of heart that it grants, the way that it solves so many personal and professional dilemmas.
与霍夫曼一样,曾获诺贝尔文学奖的波兰诗人切斯瓦夫-米沃什(Czesław Miłosz)也以自己的亲身经历书写合作。他在战争期间是反纳粹抵抗运动的积极分子,但战后却成为波兰驻华盛顿大使馆的文化专员,为波兰共产党政府服务。直到 1951 年,他才叛逃,谴责共产主义政权,并剖析了自己的经历。在一篇著名的散文《被囚禁的心灵》中,他勾勒了几幅伪装简朴的真实人物肖像,他们都是作家和知识分子,每个人都以不同的方式为与党合作辩护。他们中的许多人都是职业主义者,但米沃什明白,职业主义并不能提供完整的解释。对许多人来说,参加群众运动是一个机会,可以结束他们的疏离感,感受到与 "群众 "的亲近,与工人和店主团结在一个集体中。对于饱受折磨的知识分子来说,合作也是一种解脱,几乎是一种安宁:这意味着他们不再经常与国家交战,不再处于动荡之中。米沃什写道,一旦知识分子接受了别无他法的事实,"他就会津津有味地进食,他的动作会充满活力,他的脸色会恢复正常。他坐下来写一篇'积极的'文章,惊叹于自己写文章时的轻松自如"。米沃什是为数不多的承认顺从的乐趣的作家之一,承认顺从所带来的心灵的轻盈,承认顺从解决了许多个人和职业困境。

We all feel the urge to conform; it is the most normal of human desires. I was reminded of this recently when I visited Marianne Birthler in her light-filled apartment in Berlin. During the 1980s, Birthler was one of a very small number of active dissidents in East Germany; later, in reunified Germany, she spent more than a decade running the Stasi archive, the collection of former East German secret-police files. I asked her whether she could identify among her cohort a set of circumstances that had inclined some people to collaborate with the Stasi.
我们都有顺应潮流的冲动,这是人类最正常不过的欲望。最近,我在柏林玛丽安-博特勒(Marianne Birthler)充满灯光的公寓里拜访了她,这让我想起了这一点。20 世纪 80 年代,布瑞特勒是东德极少数活跃的持不同政见者之一;后来,在统一后的德国,她花了十多年时间管理斯塔西档案馆,该档案馆收集了前东德秘密警察的档案。我问她是否能从她的同僚中找出一些人倾向于与史塔西合作的情况。

She was put off by the question. Collaboration wasn’t interesting, Birthler told me. Almost everyone was a collaborator; 99 percent of East Germans collaborated. If they weren’t working with the Stasi, then they were working with the party, or with the system more generally. Much more interesting—and far harder to explain—was the genuinely mysterious question of “why people went against the regime.” The puzzle is not why Markus Wolf remained in East Germany, in other words, but why Wolfgang Leonhard did not.
她被这个问题问住了。生勒告诉我,合作并不有趣。几乎每个人都是合作者;99% 的东德人都在合作。如果他们不与史塔西合作,那么他们就是在与党合作,或者说是在与更广泛的体制合作。更有趣--也更难解释--的是 "人们为什么要与政权作对 "这个真正神秘的问题。换句话说,谜题不在于马库斯-沃尔夫为何留在东德,而在于沃尔夫冈-莱昂哈德为何没有留在东德。

photos of Wolfgang Leonhard and Markus Wolf
In the 1940s, both Wolfgang Leonhard (left, photographed in 1980) and Markus Wolf (right, photographed in 1997) were members of the East German elite. Both knew the Communist system was horribly cruel and unfair. But Leonhard risked his life to become a prominent critic of the Communist regime, while Wolf rose to become its top spy. (Ullstein Bild / Getty; Sibylle Bergemann / OSTKREUZ)
20 世纪 40 年代,沃尔夫冈-莱昂哈德(左,摄于 1980 年)和马库斯-沃尔夫(右,摄于 1997 年)都是东德精英分子。两人都知道共产主义制度非常残酷和不公平。但莱昂哈德冒着生命危险成为共产主义政权的著名批评家,而沃尔夫则晋升为共产主义政权的高级间谍。(Ullstein Bild / Getty; Sibylle Bergemann / OSTKREUZ)

Here is another pair of stories, one that will be more familiar to American readers. Let’s begin this one in the 1980s, when a young Lindsey Graham first served with the Judge Advocate General’s Corps—the military legal service—in the U.S. Air Force. During some of that time, Graham was based in what was then West Germany, on the cutting edge of America’s Cold War efforts. Graham, born and raised in a small town in South Carolina, was devoted to the military: After both of his parents died when he was in his 20s, he got himself and his younger sister through college with the help of an ROTC stipend and then an Air Force salary. He stayed in the Reserves for two decades, even while in the Senate, sometimes journeying to Iraq or Afghanistan to serve as a short-term reserve officer. “The Air Force has been one of the best things that has ever happened to me,” he said in 2015. “It gave me a purpose bigger than myself. It put me in the company of patriots.” Through most of his years in the Senate, Graham, alongside his close friend John McCain, was a spokesperson for a strong military, and for a vision of America as a democratic leader abroad. He also supported a vigorous notion of democracy at home. In his 2014 reelection campaign, he ran as a maverick and a centrist, telling The Atlantic that jousting with the Tea Party was “more fun than any time I’ve been in politics.”
下面是另一对故事,一个美国读者更熟悉的故事。让我们从 20 世纪 80 年代说起,当时年轻的林赛-格雷厄姆第一次在美国空军军法署服役。在此期间,格雷厄姆曾在当时的西德工作,那里是美国冷战的最前沿。格雷厄姆出生并成长于南卡罗来纳州的一个小镇,他对军队充满热情:20 多岁时父母双亡,他靠着预备役军官训练营的津贴和空军的薪水供自己和妹妹读完了大学。他在预备役服役长达二十年,甚至在参议院任职期间,有时还前往伊拉克或阿富汗担任短期预备役军官。"空军是我经历过的最好的事情之一,"他在 2015 年说。"它给了我一个比我自己更大的目标。它让我与爱国者为伴。"在参议院任职的大部分时间里,格雷厄姆与他的密友约翰-麦凯恩一道,一直是强大军队的代言人,也是美国作为海外民主领袖愿景的代言人。他还支持在国内大力推行民主。在2014年的连任竞选中,他以特立独行和中间派的形象参选,他告诉《大西洋月刊》,与茶党的较量 "比我从政的任何时候都有趣"。

While Graham was doing his tour in West Germany, Mitt Romney became a co-founder and then the president of Bain Capital, a private-equity investment firm. Born in Michigan, Romney worked in Massachusetts during his years at Bain, but he also kept, thanks to his Mormon faith, close ties to Utah. While Graham was a military lawyer, drawing military pay, Romney was acquiring companies, restructuring them, and then selling them. This was a job he excelled at—in 1990, he was asked to run the parent firm, Bain & Company—and in the course of doing so he became very rich. Still, Romney dreamed of a political career, and in 1994 he ran for the Senate in Massachusetts, after changing his political affiliation from independent to Republican. He lost, but in 2002 he ran for governor of Massachusetts as a nonpartisan moderate, and won. In 2007—after a gubernatorial term during which he successfully brought in a form of near-universal health care that became a model for Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act—he staged his first run for president. After losing the 2008 Republican primary, he won the party’s nomination in 2012, and then lost the general election.
格雷厄姆在西德巡回演讲时,米特-罗姆尼成为私人股权投资公司贝恩资本(Bain Capital)的联合创始人之一,随后担任总裁。出生于密歇根州的罗姆尼在贝恩工作期间一直在马萨诸塞州工作,但由于信仰摩门教,他与犹他州也保持着密切联系。格雷厄姆是一名军方律师,拿着军饷,而罗姆尼则负责收购公司、重组公司,然后将其出售。1990 年,他受邀管理母公司贝恩公司,并因此变得非常富有。尽管如此,罗姆尼仍然梦想着从政。1994 年,他竞选马萨诸塞州参议员,并将自己的政治派别从独立党改为共和党。他落选了,但在 2002 年,他以无党派温和派的身份竞选马萨诸塞州州长并获胜。2007 年,他在州长任期内成功推行了一种近乎全民的医疗保健制度,成为奥巴马《平价医疗法案》的典范,此后他开始了首次总统竞选。在 2008 年共和党初选中落败后,他在 2012 年赢得了党内提名,但在大选中落败。

Both Graham and Romney had presidential ambitions; Graham staged his own short-lived presidential campaign in 2015 (justified on the grounds that “the world is falling apart”). Both men were loyal members of the Republican Party, skeptical of the party’s radical and conspiratorial fringe. Both men reacted to the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump with real anger, and no wonder: In different ways, Trump’s values undermined their own. Graham had dedicated his career to an idea of U.S. leadership around the world—whereas Trump was offering an “America First” doctrine that would turn out to mean “me and my friends first.” Romney was an excellent businessman with a strong record as a public servant—whereas Trump inherited wealth, went bankrupt more than once, created nothing of value, and had no governing record at all. Both Graham and Romney were devoted to America’s democratic traditions and to the ideals of honesty, accountability, and transparency in public life—all of which Trump scorned.
格雷厄姆和罗姆尼都有竞选总统的野心;格雷厄姆曾在 2015 年发起过自己短暂的总统竞选活动(理由是 "世界正在分崩离析")。两人都是共和党的忠实成员,对党内激进和阴谋论的边缘人物持怀疑态度。两人对唐纳德-特朗普竞选总统的反应都非常愤怒,这也难怪:特朗普的价值观以不同的方式损害了他们自己的价值观。格雷厄姆将自己的职业生涯奉献给了美国领导世界的理念,而特朗普提出的 "美国优先 "理论则意味着 "我和我的朋友优先"。罗姆尼是一位优秀的商人,有着良好的公仆记录,而特朗普继承了财富,不止一次破产,没有创造任何有价值的东西,也没有任何执政记录。格雷厄姆和罗姆尼都致力于美国的民主传统,以及公共生活中诚实、负责和透明的理想,而这些都是特朗普所蔑视的。

Both were vocal in their disapproval of Trump. Before the election, Graham called him a “jackass,” a “nutjob,” and a “race-baiting, xenophobic, religious bigot.” He seemed unhappy, even depressed, by the election: I happened to see him at a conference in Europe in the spring of 2016, and he spoke in monosyllables, if at all.
两人都公开表示不支持特朗普。大选前,格雷厄姆称特朗普是 "蠢货"、"疯子 "和 "种族蛊惑、仇外、宗教偏执狂"。他似乎对大选感到不满,甚至沮丧:2016 年春天,我在欧洲的一次会议上碰巧见到了他,他说话时即使有也是单音节的。

Romney went further. “Let me put it very plainly,” he said in March 2016, in a speech criticizing Trump: “If we Republicans choose Donald Trump as our nominee, the prospects for a safe and prosperous future are greatly diminished.” Romney spoke of “the bullying, the greed, the showing off, the misogyny, the absurd third-grade theatrics.” He called Trump a “con man” and a “fraud.” Even after Trump won the nomination, Romney refused to endorse him. On his presidential ballot, Romney said, he wrote in his wife. Graham said he voted for the independent candidate Evan McMullin.
罗姆尼走得更远。"2016年3月,他在一次批评特朗普的演讲中说:"让我直截了当地说:"如果我们共和党人选择唐纳德-特朗普作为我们的提名人,那么安全和繁荣的未来前景就会大打折扣。"罗姆尼谈到了 "恃强凌弱、贪婪、炫耀、厌恶女性、荒唐的三流表演"。他称特朗普为 "骗子 "和 "欺诈者"。即使在特朗普赢得提名后,罗姆尼也拒绝为他背书。罗姆尼说,他在总统选票上写的是他的妻子。格雷厄姆说,他投给了独立候选人埃文-麦克马林(Evan McMullin)。

But Trump did become president, and so the two men’s convictions were put to the test.

A glance at their biographies would not have led many to predict what happened next. On paper, Graham would have seemed, in 2016, like the man with deeper ties to the military, to the rule of law, and to an old-fashioned idea of American patriotism and American responsibility in the world. Romney, by contrast, with his shifts between the center and the right, with his multiple careers in business and politics, would have seemed less deeply attached to those same old-fashioned patriotic ideals. Most of us register soldiers as loyal patriots, and management consultants as self-interested. We assume people from small towns in South Carolina are more likely to resist political pressure than people who have lived in many places. Intuitively, we think that loyalty to a particular place implies loyalty to a set of values.
许多人在翻阅他们的传记时都无法预料接下来会发生什么。从纸面上看,2016 年的格雷厄姆似乎与军队、法治以及美国爱国主义和美国在世界上的责任等老式理念有着更深的联系。相比之下,罗姆尼在中间派和右派之间摇摆不定,在商界和政界身兼数职,似乎对这些老式的爱国理想没有那么深的感情。我们大多数人都将士兵视为忠诚的爱国者,将管理顾问视为利己主义者。我们认为来自南卡罗来纳州小镇的人比在许多地方生活过的人更有可能抵制政治压力。凭直觉,我们认为对某一特定地方的忠诚意味着对一套价值观的忠诚。

But in this case the clichés were wrong. It was Graham who made excuses for Trump’s abuse of power. It was Graham—a JAG Corps lawyer—who downplayed the evidence that the president had attempted to manipulate foreign courts and blackmail a foreign leader into launching a phony investigation into a political rival. It was Graham who abandoned his own stated support for bipartisanship and instead pushed for a hyperpartisan Senate Judiciary Committee investigation into former Vice President Joe Biden’s son. It was Graham who played golf with Trump, who made excuses for him on television, who supported the president even as he slowly destroyed the American alliances—with Europeans, with the Kurds—that Graham had defended all his life. By contrast, it was Romney who, in February, became the only Republican senator to break ranks with his colleagues, voting to impeach the president. “Corrupting an election to keep oneself in office,” he said, is “perhaps the most abusive and destructive violation of one’s oath of office that I can imagine.”

One man proved willing to betray ideas and ideals that he had once stood for. The other refused. Why?

To the American reader, references to Vichy France, East Germany, fascists, and Communists may seem over-the-top, even ludicrous. But dig a little deeper, and the analogy makes sense. The point is not to compare Trump to Hitler or Stalin; the point is to compare the experiences of high-ranking members of the American Republican Party, especially those who work most closely with the White House, to the experiences of Frenchmen in 1940, or of East Germans in 1945, or of Czesław Miłosz in 1947. These are experiences of people who are forced to accept an alien ideology or a set of values that are in sharp conflict with their own.
对于美国读者来说,维希法国、东德、法西斯和共产党的提法可能显得过于夸张,甚至可笑。但再深入一点,这种类比就说得通了。重点不是把特朗普比作希特勒或斯大林;重点是把美国共和党高级成员的经历,尤其是那些与白宫合作最密切的人的经历,比作 1940 年法国人的经历,或 1945 年东德人的经历,或 1947 年切斯瓦夫-米沃什(Czesław Miłosz)的经历。这些都是人们被迫接受一种外来的意识形态或一套与自身价值观发生尖锐冲突的价值观的经历。

Not even Trump’s supporters can contest this analogy, because the imposition of an alien ideology is precisely what he was calling for all along. Trump’s first statement as president, his inaugural address, was an unprecedented assault on American democracy and American values. Remember: He described America’s capital city, America’s government, America’s congressmen and senators—all democratically elected and chosen by Americans, according to America’s 227-year-old Constitution—as an “establishment” that had profited at the expense of “the people.” “Their victories have not been your victories,” he said. “Their triumphs have not been your triumphs.” Trump was stating, as clearly as he possibly could, that a new set of values was now replacing the old, though of course the nature of those new values was not yet clear.
就连特朗普的支持者也无法对这一比喻提出异议,因为强加外来意识形态正是他一直呼吁的。特朗普作为总统发表的第一份声明,即就职演说,是对美国民主和美国价值观史无前例的攻击。请记住:他把美国的首都、美国的政府、美国的国会议员和参议员--所有这些都是由美国人根据美国 227 年的宪法民主选举和挑选出来的--说成是以牺牲 "人民 "为代价牟利的 "当权派"。"他说:"他们的胜利不是你们的胜利。"他们的胜利不是你们的胜利"。特朗普尽可能明确地指出,一套新的价值观正在取代旧的价值观,当然,这些新价值观的性质尚不明确。

Almost as soon as he stopped speaking, Trump launched his first assault on fact-based reality, a long-undervalued component of the American political system. We are not a theocracy or a monarchy that accepts the word of the leader or the priesthood as law. We are a democracy that debates facts, seeks to understand problems, and then legislates solutions, all in accordance with a set of rules. Trump’s insistence—against the evidence of photographs, television footage, and the lived experience of thousands of people—that the attendance at his inauguration was higher than at Barack Obama’s first inauguration represented a sharp break with that American political tradition. Like the authoritarian leaders of other times and places, Trump effectively ordered not just his supporters but also apolitical members of the government bureaucracy to adhere to a blatantly false, manipulated reality. American politicians, like politicians everywhere, have always covered up mistakes, held back information, and made promises they could not keep. But until Trump was president, none of them induced the National Park Service to produce doctored photographs or compelled the White House press secretary to lie about the size of a crowd—or encouraged him to do so in front of a press corps that knew he knew he was lying.

The lie was petty, even ridiculous; that was partly why it was so dangerous. In the 1950s, when an insect known as the Colorado potato beetle appeared in Eastern European potato fields, Soviet-backed governments in the region triumphantly claimed that it had been dropped from the sky by American pilots, as a deliberate form of biological sabotage. Posters featuring vicious red-white-and-blue beetles went up all across Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. No one really believed the charge, including the people making it, as archives have subsequently shown. But that didn’t matter. The point of the posters was not to convince people of a falsehood. The point was to demonstrate the party’s power to proclaim and promulgate a falsehood. Sometimes the point isn’t to make people believe a lie—it’s to make people fear the liar.
谎言是琐碎的,甚至是荒谬的;这也是它如此危险的部分原因。20 世纪 50 年代,当一种被称为科罗拉多马铃薯甲虫的昆虫出现在东欧的马铃薯田里时,该地区由苏联支持的政府得意洋洋地宣称,这是美国飞行员从天而降的,是一种蓄意的生物破坏。波兰、东德和捷克斯洛伐克各地都张贴了恶毒的红白蓝相间的甲虫海报。后来的档案显示,没有人真正相信这一指控,包括提出指控的人。但这并不重要。张贴海报的目的不是让人们相信谎言。重点是要展示党宣扬和传播谬误的力量。有时,重点不是让人们相信谎言,而是让人们害怕说谎者。

These kinds of lies also have a way of building on one another. It takes time to persuade people to abandon their existing value systems. The process usually begins slowly, with small changes. Social scientists who have studied the erosion of values and the growth of corruption inside companies have found, for example, that “people are more likely to accept the unethical behavior of others if the behavior develops gradually (along a slippery slope) rather than occurring abruptly,” according to a 2009 article in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. This happens, in part, because most people have a built-in vision of themselves as moral and honest, and that self-image is resistant to change. Once certain behaviors become “normal,” then people stop seeing them as wrong.
这些谎言还有一种相互叠加的方式。说服人们放弃现有的价值体系需要时间。这一过程通常从微小的变化开始,进展缓慢。实验社会心理学杂志》(Journal of Experimental Social Psychology)2009 年发表的一篇文章指出,社会科学家对价值观的侵蚀和公司内部腐败现象的增长进行研究后发现,"如果他人的不道德行为是逐步发展的(沿着一个滑坡),而不是突然发生的,那么人们就更有可能接受这种行为"。出现这种情况的部分原因是,大多数人对自己的道德和诚实有一种固有的看法,而这种自我形象是难以改变的。一旦某些行为变得 "正常",人们就不再认为它们是错误的。

This process happens in politics, too. In 1947, the Soviet military administrators in East Germany passed a regulation governing the activity of publishing houses and printers. The decree did not nationalize the printing presses; it merely demanded that their owners apply for licenses, and that they confine their work to books and pamphlets ordered by central planners. Imagine how a law like this—which did not speak of arrests, let alone torture or the Gulag—affected the owner of a printing press in Dresden, a responsible family man with two teenage children and a sickly wife. Following its passage, he had to make a series of seemingly insignificant choices. Would he apply for a license? Of course—he needed it to earn money for his family. Would he agree to confine his business to material ordered by the central planners? Yes to that too—what else was there to print?
这一过程也发生在政治领域。1947 年,东德的苏联军事管理者通过了一项管理出版社和印刷商活动的法规。该法令并未将印刷厂收归国有;它只是要求这些印刷厂的所有者申请执照,并要求他们的工作仅限于中央计划人员下令出版的书籍和小册子。试想一下,这样一条法律--它没有提到逮捕,更没有提到酷刑或古拉格--会对德累斯顿一家印刷厂的老板产生怎样的影响,他是一个负责任的家庭主妇,有两个十几岁的孩子和一个多病的妻子。法案通过后,他不得不做出一系列看似无关紧要的选择。他会申请执照吗?当然--他需要它来赚钱养家。他会同意把他的生意局限于中央计划人员规定的材料吗?也同意--还有什么可以印刷的呢?

After that, other compromises follow. Though he dislikes the Communists—he just wants to stay out of politics—he agrees to print the collected works of Stalin, because if he doesn’t do it, others will. When he is asked by some disaffected friends to print a pamphlet critical of the regime, however, he refuses. Though he wouldn’t go to jail for printing it, his children might not be admitted to university, and his wife might not get her medication; he has to think about their welfare. Meanwhile, all across East Germany, other owners of other printing presses are making similar decisions. And after a while—without anyone being shot or arrested, without anyone feeling any particular pangs of conscience—the only books left to read are the ones approved by the regime.

The built-in vision of themselves as American patriots, or as competent administrators, or as loyal party members, also created a cognitive distortion that blinded many Republicans and Trump-administration officials to the precise nature of the president’s alternative value system. After all, the early incidents were so trivial. They overlooked the lie about the inauguration because it was silly. They ignored Trump’s appointment of the wealthiest Cabinet in history, and his decision to stuff his administration with former lobbyists, because that’s business as usual. They made excuses for Ivanka Trump’s use of a private email account, and for Jared Kushner’s conflicts of interest, because that’s just family stuff.

One step at a time, Trumpism fooled many of its most enthusiastic adherents. Recall that some of the original intellectual supporters of Trump—people like Steve Bannon, Michael Anton, and the advocates of “national conservatism,” an ideology invented, post hoc, to rationalize the president’s behavior—advertised their movement as a recognizable form of populism: an anti–Wall Street, anti-foreign-wars, anti-immigration alternative to the small-government libertarianism of the establishment Republican Party. Their “Drain the swamp” slogan implied that Trump would clean up the rotten world of lobbyists and campaign finance that distorts American politics, that he would make public debate more honest and legislation more fair. Had this actually been Trump’s ruling philosophy, it might well have posed difficulties for the Republican Party leadership in 2016, given that most of them had quite different values. But it would not necessarily have damaged the Constitution, and it would not necessarily have posed fundamental moral challenges to people in public life.
特朗普主义一步步愚弄了许多最狂热的追随者。回想一下,特朗普最初的一些知识分子支持者--比如史蒂夫-班农(Steve Bannon)、迈克尔-安东(Michael Anton)和 "国家保守主义 "的倡导者(这是一种为使总统的行为合理化而临时发明的意识形态)--将他们的运动宣传为一种可识别的民粹主义形式:一种反华尔街、反外战、反移民的运动,以替代共和党建制派的小政府自由主义。他们提出的 "排干沼泽 "口号暗示,特朗普将清理扭曲美国政治的说客和竞选资金的腐朽世界,他将使公共辩论更加诚实,立法更加公平。如果这真的是特朗普的执政理念,很可能会在2016年给共和党领导层带来困难,因为他们中的大多数人都有着截然不同的价值观。但这不一定会破坏宪法,也不一定会对公共生活中的人们构成根本性的道德挑战。

In practice, Trump has governed according to a set of principles very different from those articulated by his original intellectual supporters. Although some of his speeches have continued to use that populist language, he has built a Cabinet and an administration that serve neither the public nor his voters but rather his own psychological needs and the interests of his own friends on Wall Street and in business and, of course, his own family. His tax cuts disproportionately benefited the wealthy, not the working class. His shallow economic boom, engineered to ensure his reelection, was made possible by a vast budget deficit, on a scale Republicans once claimed to abhor, an enormous burden for future generations. He worked to dismantle the existing health-care system without offering anything better, as he’d promised to do, so that the number of uninsured people rose. All the while he fanned and encouraged xenophobia and racism, both because he found them politically useful and because they are part of his personal worldview.

More important, he has governed in defiance—and in ignorance—of the American Constitution, notably declaring, well into his third year in office, that he had “total” authority over the states. His administration is not merely corrupt, it is also hostile to checks, balances, and the rule of law. He has built a proto-authoritarian personality cult, firing or sidelining officials who have contradicted him with facts and evidence—with tragic consequences for public health and the economy. He threatened to fire a top Centers for Disease Control and Prevention official, Nancy Messonnier, in late February, after her too-blunt warnings about the coronavirus; Rick Bright, a top Health and Human Services official, says he was demoted after refusing to direct money to promote the unproven drug hydroxychloroquine. Trump has attacked America’s military, calling his generals “a bunch of dopes and babies,” and America’s intelligence services and law-enforcement officers, whom he has denigrated as the “deep state” and whose advice he has ignored. He has appointed weak and inexperienced “acting” officials to run America’s most important security institutions. He has systematically wrecked America’s alliances.
更重要的是,他在执政过程中无视美国宪法,尤其是在上任第三年就宣布他对各州拥有 "完全 "权力。他的政府不仅腐败,而且敌视制衡和法治。他建立了一个原独裁的个人崇拜,解雇或排挤那些用事实和证据反驳他的官员,给公众健康和经济带来了悲剧性后果。2月底,他威胁要解雇美国疾病控制和预防中心(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)的高级官员南希-梅索尼耶(Nancy Messonnier),因为她对冠状病毒发出了过于尖锐的警告;卫生与公众服务部(Health and Human Services)的高级官员里克-布莱特(Rick Bright)说,他被降职是因为拒绝将资金用于推广未经证实的药物羟氯喹(hydroxychloroquine)。特朗普攻击美国军队,称他的将军们是 "一群笨蛋和婴儿",他还攻击美国情报部门和执法官员,诋毁他们为 "深层国家",并无视他们的建议。他任命软弱无能、缺乏经验的 "代理 "官员来管理美国最重要的安全机构。他有计划地破坏美国的联盟。

His foreign policy has never served any U.S. interests of any kind. Although some of Trump’s Cabinet ministers and media followers have tried to portray him as an anti-Chinese nationalist—and although foreign-policy commentators from all points on the political spectrum have, amazingly, accepted this fiction without questioning it—Trump’s true instinct, always, has been to side with foreign dictators, including Chinese President Xi Jinping. One former administration official who has seen Trump interact with Xi as well as with Russian President Vladimir Putin told me that it was like watching a lesser celebrity encounter a more famous one. Trump did not speak to them as the representative of the American people; he simply wanted their aura—of absolute power, of cruelty, of fame—to rub off on him and enhance his own image. This, too, has had fatal consequences. In January, Trump took Xi’s word when he said that COVID‑19 was “under control,” just as he had believed North Korea’s Kim Jong Un when he signed a deal on nuclear weapons. Trump’s fawning attitude toward dictators is his ideology at its purest: He meets his own psychological needs first; he thinks about the country last. The true nature of the ideology that Trump brought to Washington was not “America First,” but rather “Trump First.”
他的外交政策从未为美国的任何利益服务过。尽管特朗普的一些内阁部长和媒体追随者试图把他描绘成一个反华的民族主义者,尽管来自政治光谱各点的外交政策评论家们令人惊讶地接受了这种虚构,而没有提出质疑,但特朗普的真实本能始终是站在外国独裁者一边,包括中国国家主席习近平。一位曾目睹特朗普与习近平以及俄罗斯总统普京互动的前政府官员告诉我,这就像看一个不太出名的名人遇到一个更出名的名人。特朗普并没有以美国人民代表的身份与他们交谈;他只是想让他们身上的光环--绝对的权力、残酷、名声--蹭蹭蹭地往自己身上蹭,提升自己的形象。这也带来了致命的后果。今年 1 月,当习近平说 COVID-19 已 "在控制之下 "时,特朗普相信了习近平的话,就像他在签署核武器协议时相信朝鲜的金正恩一样。特朗普对独裁者的媚俗态度是他最纯粹的意识形态:他首先满足自己的心理需求,最后才考虑国家。特朗普带到华盛顿的意识形态的真正本质不是 "美国第一",而是 "特朗普第一"。

Maybe it isn’t surprising that the implications of “Trump First” were not immediately understood. After all, the Communist parties of Eastern Europe—or, if you want a more recent example, the Chavistas in Venezuela—all advertised themselves as advocates of equality and prosperity even though, in practice, they created inequality and poverty. But just as the truth about Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution slowly dawned on people, it also became clear, eventually, that Trump did not have the interests of the American public at heart. And as they came to realize that the president was not a patriot, Republican politicians and senior civil servants began to equivocate, just like people living under an alien regime.
也许,"特朗普优先 "的含义没有立即得到理解并不奇怪。毕竟,东欧的共产党--或者,如果你想要一个更近的例子,委内瑞拉的查韦斯党--都把自己宣传为平等和繁荣的倡导者,尽管在实践中,他们制造了不平等和贫困。但是,正如人们慢慢了解到乌戈-查韦斯的玻利瓦尔革命的真相一样,人们最终也清楚地认识到,特朗普并没有把美国公众的利益放在心上。随着人们逐渐认识到总统并非爱国者,共和党政客和高级公务员开始变得模棱两可,就像生活在异族政权下的人们一样。

In retrospect, this dawning realization explains why the funeral of John McCain, in September 2018, looked, and by all accounts felt, so strange. Two previous presidents, one Republican and one Democrat—representatives of the old, patriotic political class—made speeches; the sitting president’s name was never mentioned. The songs and symbols of the old order were visible too: “The Battle Hymn of the Republic”; American flags; two of McCain’s sons in their officer’s uniforms, so very different from the sons of Trump. Writing in The New Yorker, Susan Glasser described the funeral as “a meeting of the Resistance, under vaulted ceilings and stained-glass windows.” In truth, it bore an uncanny resemblance to the 1956 funeral of László Rajk, a Hungarian Communist and secret-police boss who had been purged and murdered by his comrades in 1949. Rajk’s wife had become an outspoken critic of the regime, and the funeral turned into a de facto political rally, helping to set off Hungary’s anti-Communist revolution a couple of weeks later.
现在回想起来,这种恍然大悟解释了为什么 2018 年 9 月约翰-麦凯恩的葬礼看起来,而且从各方面来看,感觉如此奇怪。两位前任总统,一位是共和党人,一位是民主党人--旧的爱国政治阶层的代表发表了讲话;现任总统的名字从未被提及。旧秩序的歌曲和象征也清晰可见:"共和国战歌》;美国国旗;麦凯恩的两个儿子身着军官制服,与特朗普的儿子截然不同。苏珊-格拉斯格在《纽约客》上撰文,将葬礼形容为 "在拱形天花板和彩色玻璃窗下举行的抵抗运动会议"。事实上,这场葬礼与 1956 年拉斯洛-拉伊克(László Rajk)的葬礼有着惊人的相似之处,拉伊克是匈牙利共产党员和秘密警察头目,1949 年被其同志清洗并杀害。拉伊克的妻子是一个直言不讳的政权批评者,葬礼变成了一场事实上的政治集会,几周后帮助掀起了匈牙利的反共革命。

Top: East German students sit atop the Berlin Wall by the Brandenburg Gate in November 1989, the month the wall fell. Bottom: An enraged crowd surrounds members of the secret police in Budapest, Hungary, in November 1956, during an unsuccessful uprising against Soviet tyranny. (U.S. Army; Mondadori / Getty)
上图:1989 年 11 月,柏林墙倒塌当月,东德学生坐在勃兰登堡门旁的柏林墙顶上。下图1956 年 11 月,在匈牙利布达佩斯,一群愤怒的人群包围了秘密警察,当时反对苏联暴政的起义没有成功。(美国陆军;Mondadori / Getty)

Nothing quite so dramatic happened after McCain’s funeral. But it did clarify the situation. A year and a half into the Trump administration, it marked a turning point, the moment at which many Americans in public life began to adopt the strategies, tactics, and self-justifications that the inhabitants of occupied countries have used in the past—doing so even though the personal stakes were, relatively speaking, so low. Poles like Miłosz wound up in exile in the 1950s; dissidents in East Germany lost the right to work and study. In harsher regimes like that of Stalin’s Russia, public protest could lead to many years in a concentration camp; disobedient Wehrmacht officers were executed by slow strangulation.
麦凯恩的葬礼之后,并没有发生如此戏剧性的事情。但它确实澄清了局势。特朗普执政一年半以来,这标志着一个转折点,许多美国人在公共生活中开始采用被占领国家的居民过去使用过的战略、策略和自我辩解--尽管相对而言,个人利害关系如此之低。20 世纪 50 年代,像米沃什这样的波兰人最终流亡国外;东德的持不同政见者失去了工作和学习的权利。在斯大林的俄国等更严厉的政权中,公开抗议可能会导致在集中营中度过多年;不服从命令的德国国防军军官会被慢慢勒死。

By contrast, a Republican senator who dares to question whether Trump is acting in the interests of the country is in danger of—what, exactly? Losing his seat and winding up with a seven-figure lobbying job or a fellowship at the Harvard Kennedy School? He might meet the terrible fate of Jeff Flake, the former Arizona senator, who has been hired as a contributor by CBS News. He might suffer like Romney, who was tragically not invited to the Conservative Political Action Conference, which this year turned out to be a reservoir of COVID‑19.
相比之下,敢于质疑特朗普的行为是否符合国家利益的共和党参议员则会面临--究竟是什么?失去他的席位,然后得到一份七位数的游说工作或哈佛肯尼迪学院的奖学金?他可能会遭遇前亚利桑那州参议员杰夫-弗莱克(Jeff Flake)的可怕命运,被哥伦比亚广播公司(CBS)聘为新闻撰稿人。他可能会像罗姆尼一样遭遇不幸,罗姆尼不幸没有被邀请参加保守派政治行动会议,而今年的会议变成了COVID-19的蓄水池。

Nevertheless, 20 months into the Trump administration, senators and other serious-minded Republicans in public life who should have known better began to tell themselves stories that sound very much like those in Miłosz’s The Captive Mind. Some of these stories overlap with one another; some of them are just thin cloaks to cover self-interest. But all of them are familiar justifications of collaboration, recognizable from the past. Here are the most popular.

We can use this moment to achieve great things. In the spring of 2019, a Trump-supporting friend put me in touch with an administration official I will call “Mark,” whom I eventually met for a drink. I won’t give details, because we spoke informally, but in any case Mark did not leak information or criticize the White House. On the contrary, he described himself as a patriot and a true believer. He supported the language of “America First,” and was confident that it could be made real.
我们可以利用这一时刻成就大事。2019 年春天,一位支持特朗普的朋友让我与一位我称之为 "马克 "的政府官员取得了联系,我最终约他喝了一杯。我不会透露细节,因为我们是非正式交谈,但无论如何,马克没有泄露信息或批评白宫。相反,他自称是一个爱国者和真正的信仰者。他支持 "美国优先 "的措辞,并坚信它能够成为现实。

Several months later, I met Mark a second time. The impeachment hearings had begun, and the story of the firing of the American ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, was then in the news. The true nature of the administration’s ideology—Trump First, not America First—was becoming more obvious. The president’s abuse of military aid to Ukraine and his attacks on civil servants suggested not a patriotic White House, but a president focused on his own interests. Mark did not apologize for the president, though. Instead, he changed the subject: It was all worth it, he told me, because of the Uighurs.
几个月后,我第二次见到了马克。弹劾听证会已经开始,美国驻乌克兰大使玛丽-约万诺维奇(Marie Yovanovitch)被解雇的新闻也随之见诸报端。美国政府意识形态的真实面目--"特朗普第一",而非 "美国第一"--变得越来越明显。总统滥用对乌克兰的军事援助并攻击公务员,这表明白宫不是一个爱国的白宫,而是一个只顾自己利益的总统。不过,马克并没有为总统道歉。相反,他转移了话题:他告诉我,这一切都是值得的,因为维吾尔人。

I thought I had misheard. The Uighurs? Why the Uighurs? I was unaware of anything that the administration had done to aid the oppressed Muslim minority in Xinjiang, China. Mark assured me that letters had been written, statements had been made, the president himself had been persuaded to say something at the United Nations. I doubted very much that the Uighurs had benefited from these empty words: China hadn’t altered its behavior, and the concentration camps built for the Uighurs were still standing. Nevertheless, Mark’s conscience was clear. Yes, Trump was destroying America’s reputation in the world, and yes, Trump was ruining America’s alliances, but Mark was so important to the cause of the Uighurs that people like him could, in good conscience, keep working for the administration.

Mark made me think of the story of Wanda Telakowska, a Polish cultural activist who in 1945 felt much the same as he did. Telakowska had collected and promoted folk art before the war; after the war she made the momentous decision to join the Polish Ministry of Culture. The Communist leadership was arresting and murdering its opponents; the nature of the regime was becoming clear. Telakowska nevertheless thought she could use her position inside the Communist establishment to help Polish artists and designers, to promote their work and get Polish companies to mass-produce their designs. But Polish factories, newly nationalized, were not interested in the designs she commissioned. Communist politicians, skeptical of her loyalty, made Telakowska write articles filled with Marxist gibberish. Eventually she resigned, having achieved nothing she set out to do. A later generation of artists condemned her as a Stalinist and forgot about her.
马克让我想起了波兰文化活动家旺达-特拉科夫斯卡的故事,她在 1945 年的感受与马克如出一辙。Telakowska 在战前收集并推广民间艺术;战后,她做出了一个重大决定,加入波兰文化部。共产党领导层逮捕并杀害了反对者,政权的本质逐渐清晰。然而,特拉科夫斯卡认为,她可以利用自己在共产党内部的地位,帮助波兰艺术家和设计师,宣传他们的作品,让波兰公司大量生产他们的设计。但刚刚国有化的波兰工厂对她委托的设计并不感兴趣。共产党政客对她的忠诚心存疑虑,让特拉科夫斯卡撰写充满马克思主义胡言乱语的文章。最终,她辞职了,因为她没有实现自己的目标。后一代艺术家谴责她是斯大林主义者,并将她遗忘。

We can protect the country from the president. That, of course, was the argument used by “Anonymous,” the author of an unsigned New York Times op-ed published in September 2018. For those who have forgotten—a lot has happened since then—that article described the president’s “erratic behavior,” his inability to concentrate, his ignorance, and above all his lack of “affinity for ideals long espoused by conservatives: free minds, free markets and free people.” The “root of the problem,” Anonymous concluded, was “the president’s amorality.” In essence, the article described the true nature of the alternative value system brought into the White House by Trump, at a moment when not everybody in Washington understood it. But even as they came to understand that the Trump presidency was guided by the president’s narcissism, Anonymous did not quit, protest, make noise, or campaign against the president and his party.
我们可以保护国家不受总统侵害。这当然是 "匿名者 "的论点,他是 2018 年 9 月发表的一篇未署名的《纽约时报》专栏文章的作者。对于那些已经忘记的人来说--自那以后已经发生了很多事情--那篇文章描述了总统的 "反复无常的行为"、无法集中精力、无知,以及最重要的是他缺乏 "对保守派长期以来所信奉的理想的亲和力:自由的思想、自由的市场和自由的人民"。无名氏总结说,"问题的根源 "是 "总统的无道德"。从本质上讲,这篇文章描述了特朗普带入白宫的另类价值体系的真实本质,而此时华盛顿并非人人都理解这一点。但是,即使在了解到特朗普总统职位是由总统的自恋所引导时,匿名者也没有退出、抗议、喧哗,或开展反对总统及其政党的运动。

Instead, Anonymous concluded that remaining inside the system, where they could cleverly distract and restrain the president, was the right course for public servants like them. Anonymous was not alone. Gary Cohn, at the time the White House economic adviser, told Bob Woodward that he’d removed papers from the president’s desk to prevent him from pulling out of a trade agreement with South Korea. James Mattis, Trump’s original secretary of defense, stayed in office because he thought he could educate the president about the value of America’s alliances, or at least protect some of them from destruction.
相反,"匿名者 "的结论是,对于像他们这样的公务员来说,留在系统内部,巧妙地分散和限制总统的注意力,才是正确的做法。匿名者并非孤例。当时的白宫经济顾问加里-科恩(Gary Cohn)告诉鲍勃-伍德沃德(Bob Woodward),他从总统办公桌上拿走了文件,以阻止总统退出与韩国的贸易协定。特朗普的前任国防部长詹姆斯-马蒂斯(James Mattis)之所以留任,是因为他认为自己可以让总统了解美国联盟的价值,或者至少保护其中一些联盟免遭破坏。

This kind of behavior has echoes in other countries and other times. A few months ago, in Venezuela, I spoke with Víctor Álvarez, a minister in one of Hugo Chávez’s governments and a high-ranking official before that. Álvarez explained to me the arguments he had made in favor of protecting some private industry, and his opposition to mass nationalization. Álvarez was in government from the late 1990s through 2006, a time when Chávez was stepping up the use of police against peaceful demonstrators and undermining democratic institutions. Still, Álvarez remained, hoping to curb Chávez’s worst economic instincts. Ultimately, he did quit, after concluding that Chávez had created a loyalty cult around himself—Álvarez called it a “subclimate” of obedience—and was no longer listening to anyone who disagreed.
这种行为在其他国家和其他时代也有回响。几个月前,在委内瑞拉,我与维克托-阿尔瓦雷斯(Víctor Álvarez)进行了交谈。阿尔瓦雷斯向我解释了他支持保护一些私营企业以及反对大规模国有化的理由。阿尔瓦雷斯从上世纪 90 年代末到 2006 年一直在政府任职,当时查韦斯正加紧使用警察对付和平示威者,并破坏民主体制。但阿尔瓦雷斯仍然留任,希望能遏制查韦斯最糟糕的经济本能。最终,他还是辞职了,因为他认为查韦斯在自己周围建立了一个忠诚崇拜--阿尔瓦雷斯称其为服从的 "亚文化"--并且不再听取任何不同意见。

In authoritarian regimes, many insiders eventually conclude that their presence simply does not matter. Cohn, after publicly agonizing when the president said there had been “fine people on both sides” at the deadly white-supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, finally quit when the president made the ruinous decision to put tariffs on steel and aluminum, a decision that harmed American businesses. Mattis reached his breaking point when the president abandoned the Kurds, America’s longtime allies in the war against the Islamic State.
在独裁政权中,许多内部人士最终会认为他们的存在根本不重要。当总统在弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔致命的白人至上主义集会上说 "双方都有好人 "时,科恩曾公开表示苦恼;当总统做出征收钢铝关税这一损害美国企业利益的决定时,科恩最终辞职。马蒂斯在总统抛弃库尔德人(美国在打击 "伊斯兰国 "战争中的长期盟友)时达到了崩溃的边缘。

But although both resigned, neither Cohn nor Mattis has spoken out in any notable way. (On June 3, after this article went to press, Mattis denounced Trump in an article on TheAtlantic.com.) Their presence inside the White House helped build Trump’s credibility among traditional Republican voters; their silence now continues to serve the president’s purposes. As for Anonymous, we don’t know whether he or she remains inside the administration. For the record, I note that Álvarez lives in Venezuela, an actual police state, and yet is willing to speak out against the system he helped create. Cohn, Mattis, and Anonymous, all living freely in the United States of America, have not been nearly so brave.

I, personally, will benefit. These, of course, are words that few people ever say out loud. Perhaps some do quietly acknowledge to themselves that they have not resigned or protested because it would cost them money or status. But no one wants a reputation as a careerist or a turncoat. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, even Markus Wolf sought to portray himself as an idealist. He had truly believed in Marxist-Leninist ideals, this infamously cynical man told an interviewer in 1996, and “I still believe in them.”
我个人将从中受益。当然,这些话很少有人会大声说出来。也许有些人确实悄悄地对自己承认,他们之所以没有辞职或抗议,是因为这会让他们失去金钱或地位。但是,没有人愿意背上 "事业狂 "或 "叛徒 "的名声。柏林墙倒塌后,就连马库斯-沃尔夫也试图把自己塑造成一个理想主义者。1996 年,这位声名狼藉的愤世嫉俗者在接受采访时说,他真正相信马克思列宁主义的理想,"我仍然相信这些理想"。

Many people in and around the Trump administration are seeking personal benefits. Many of them are doing so with a degree of openness that is startling and unusual in contemporary American politics, at least at this level. As an ideology, “Trump First” suits these people, because it gives them license to put themselves first. To pick a random example: Sonny Perdue, the secretary of agriculture, is a former Georgia governor and a businessman who, like Trump, famously refused to put his agricultural companies into a blind trust when he entered the governor’s office. Perdue has never even pretended to separate his political and personal interests. Since joining the Cabinet he has, with almost no oversight, distributed billions of dollars of “compensation” to farms damaged by Trump’s trade policies. He has stuffed his department with former lobbyists who are now in charge of regulating their own industries: Deputy Secretary Stephen Censky was for 21 years the CEO of the American Soybean Association; Brooke Appleton was a lobbyist for the National Corn Growers Association before becoming Censky’s chief of staff, and has since returned to that group; Kailee Tkacz, a member of a nutritional advisory panel, is a former lobbyist for the Snack Food Association. The list goes on and on, as would lists of similarly compromised people in the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and elsewhere.
特朗普政府内外的许多人都在谋求个人利益。他们中的许多人在谋取私利时所表现出的开放程度,在当代美国政治中,至少在这个层面上,是令人吃惊和不寻常的。作为一种意识形态,"特朗普优先 "适合这些人,因为这给了他们把自己放在第一位的许可。随便举个例子:农业部长桑尼-珀杜(Sonny Perdue)是前佐治亚州州长,也是一位商人,他和特朗普一样,在进入州长办公室时拒绝将自己的农业公司纳入盲目信托,这一点很有名。珀杜甚至从未假装将自己的政治利益和个人利益分开。自进入内阁以来,他几乎在没有任何监督的情况下,向因特朗普贸易政策而受损的农场发放了数十亿美元的 "补偿金"。他在自己的部门里塞满了前说客,这些人现在负责监管自己的行业:副部长斯蒂芬-岑斯基(Stephen Censky)曾担任美国大豆协会(American Soybean Association)首席执行官长达 21 年;布鲁克-阿普尔顿(Brooke Appleton)在成为岑斯基的幕僚长之前曾是全美玉米种植者协会(National Corn Growers Association)的说客,后来又回到了该协会;营养顾问小组成员凯莉-特卡兹(Kailee Tkacz)曾是休闲食品协会(Snack Food Association)的说客。类似的名单不胜枚举,能源部、环境保护局和其他部门也有类似的腐败分子。

Perdue’s department also employs an extraordinary range of people with no experience in agriculture whatsoever. These modern apparatchiks, hired for their loyalty rather than their competence, include a long-haul truck driver, a country-club cabana attendant, the owner of a scented-candle company, and an intern at the Republican National Committee. The long-haul truck driver was paid $80,000 a year to expand markets for American agriculture abroad. Why was he qualified? He had a background in “hauling and shipping agricultural commodities.”
珀杜的部门还雇用了大量毫无农业经验的人。这些因忠诚而非能力而受雇的现代官僚包括一名长途卡车司机、一名乡村俱乐部的服务员、一家香烛公司的老板和一名共和党全国委员会的实习生。长途卡车司机的年薪为 8 万美元,负责为美国农业拓展海外市场。他为什么能胜任呢?他有 "运输和装运农产品 "的背景。

I must remain close to power. Another sort of benefit, harder to measure, has kept many people who object to Trump’s policies or behavior from speaking out: the intoxicating experience of power, and the belief that proximity to a powerful person bestows higher status. This, too, is nothing new. In a 1968 article for The Atlantic, James Thomson, an American East Asia specialist, brilliantly explained how power functioned inside the U.S. bureaucracy in the Vietnam era. When the war in Vietnam was going badly, many people did not resign or speak out in public, because preserving their “effectiveness”—“a mysterious combination of training, style, and connections,” as Thomson defined it—was an all-consuming concern. He called this “the effectiveness trap”:
我必须继续接近权力。另一种利益更难衡量,它让许多反对特朗普政策或行为的人不敢直言不讳:令人陶醉的权力体验,以及接近权势人物就能获得更高地位的信念。这也不是什么新鲜事。1968 年,美国东亚问题专家詹姆斯-汤姆森(James Thomson)在为《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic)撰写的一篇文章中,精辟地解释了越战时期美国官僚机构内部的权力运作方式。当越南战争进展不顺利时,许多人并没有辞职或公开发表言论,因为保持他们的 "效率"--"培训、风格和关系的神秘组合",汤姆森这样定义--是他们最关心的问题。他称之为 "效能陷阱":

The inclination to remain silent or to acquiesce in the presence of the great men—to live to fight another day, to give on this issue so that you can be “effective” on later issues—is overwhelming. Nor is it the tendency of youth alone; some of our most senior officials, men of wealth and fame, whose place in history is secure, have remained silent lest their connection with power be terminated.
在伟人面前保持沉默或默许--活到老,战到老,在这个问题上让步,以便在以后的问题上 "有效"--这种倾向是压倒性的。这也不仅仅是年轻人的倾向;我们的一些最高级官员、财富和名声在外的人,他们在历史上的地位是稳固的,却一直保持沉默,以免他们与权力的联系被终止。

In any organization, private or public, the boss will of course sometimes make decisions that his underlings dislike. But when basic principles are constantly violated, and people constantly defer resignation—“I can always fall on my sword next time”—then misguided policies go fatally unchallenged.

In other countries, the effectiveness trap has other names. In his recent book on Putinism, Between Two Fires, Joshua Yaffa describes the Russian version of this syndrome. The Russian language, he notes, has a word—prisposoblenets—that means “a person skilled in the act of compromise and adaptation, who intuitively understands what is expected of him and adjusts his beliefs and conduct accordingly.” In Putin’s Russia, anyone who wants to stay in the game—to remain close to power, to retain influence, to inspire respect—knows the necessity of making constant small changes to one’s language and behavior, of being careful about what one says and to whom one says it, of understanding what criticism is acceptable and what constitutes a violation of the unwritten rules. Those who violate these rules will not, for the most part, suffer prison—Putin’s Russia is not Stalin’s Russia—but they will experience a painful ejection from the inner circle.
在其他国家,效能陷阱有其他名称。约书亚-亚法(Joshua Yaffa)在最近出版的一本关于普京主义的书《两把火之间》(Between Two Fires)中描述了俄罗斯版的这种综合症。他指出,俄语中有一个词--prisposoblenets--意思是 "善于妥协和适应的人,他凭直觉了解人们对他的期望,并据此调整自己的信念和行为"。在普京的俄罗斯,任何人要想不被淘汰--继续接近权力、保持影响力、赢得尊重--就必须不断地对自己的语言和行为做出细微的改变,谨慎地对待自己说的话和对谁说的话,了解哪些批评是可以接受的,哪些是对不成文规定的违反。在大多数情况下,违反这些规则的人不会遭受牢狱之灾--普京的俄罗斯不是斯大林的俄罗斯,但他们会经历被逐出核心圈子的痛苦。

For those who have never experienced it, the mystical pull of that connection to power, that feeling of being an insider, is difficult to explain. Nevertheless, it is real, and strong enough to affect even the highest-ranking, best-known, most influential people in America. John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, named his still-unpublished book The Room Where It Happened, because, of course, that’s where he has always wanted to be. A friend who regularly runs into Lindsey Graham in Washington told me that each time they meet, “he brags about having just met with Trump” while exhibiting “high school” levels of excitement, as if “a popular quarterback has just bestowed some attention on a nerdy debate-club leader—the powerful big kid likes me! ” That kind of intense pleasure is hard to relinquish and even harder to live without.
对于那些从未体验过这种感觉的人来说,那种与权力联系的神秘吸引力,那种身在其中的感觉,是难以解释的。然而,它是真实存在的,甚至足以影响到美国最高级别、最知名、最有影响力的人物。特朗普的前国家安全顾问约翰-博尔顿(John Bolton)将自己尚未出版的新书命名为《事情发生的房间》(The Room Where It Happened),当然,这也是他一直向往的地方。一位经常在华盛顿偶遇林赛-格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)的朋友告诉我,他们每次见面时,"他都会炫耀自己刚刚与特朗普见了面",同时表现出 "高中生 "水平的兴奋,就好像 "一个受欢迎的四分卫刚刚对一个书呆子辩论俱乐部领袖给予了一些关注--强大的大孩子喜欢我"!"这种强烈的快感让人难以割舍,没有这种快感就更难生活。

LOL nothing matters. Cynicism, nihilism, relativism, amorality, irony, sarcasm, boredom, amusement—these are all reasons to collaborate, and always have been. Marko Martin, a novelist and travel writer who grew up in East Germany, told me that in the 1980s some of the East German bohemia, influenced by then-fashionable French intellectuals, argued that there was no such thing as morality or immorality, no such thing as good or evil, no such thing as right or wrong—“so you might as well collaborate.”
LOL 什么都不重要。玩世不恭、虚无主义、相对主义、无道德感、讽刺、挖苦、无聊、娱乐--这些都是合作的理由,而且一直都是。在东德长大的小说家和旅行作家马尔科-马丁(Marko Martin)告诉我,20 世纪 80 年代,东德的一些波希米亚人受当时法国知识分子的影响,认为不存在道德或不道德,不存在善或恶,不存在对或错--"所以你们不妨合作"。

This instinct has an American variation. Politicians here who have spent their lives following rules and watching their words, calibrating their language, giving pious speeches about morality and governance, may feel a sneaking admiration for someone like Trump, who breaks all the rules and gets away with it. He lies; he cheats; he extorts; he refuses to show compassion, sympathy, or empathy; he does not pretend to believe in anything or to abide by any moral code. He simulates patriotism, with flags and gestures, but he does not behave like a patriot; his campaign scrambled to get help from Russia in 2016 (“If it’s what you say, I love it,” replied Donald Trump Jr., when offered Russian “dirt” on Hillary Clinton), and Trump himself called on Russia to hack his opponent. And for some of those at the top of his administration, and of his party, these character traits might have a deep, unacknowledged appeal: If there is no such thing as moral and immoral, then everyone is implicitly released from the need to obey any rules. If the president doesn’t respect the Constitution, then why should I? If the president can cheat in elections, then why can’t I? If the president can sleep with porn stars, then why shouldn’t I?
这种本能在美国也有变种。这里的政客一生循规蹈矩,谨言慎行,校准自己的语言,就道德和治理发表虔诚的演说,他们可能会对特朗普这样打破所有规则并逍遥法外的人暗自钦佩。他撒谎、欺骗、敲诈勒索;他拒绝表现出同情、怜悯或同理心;他不假装相信任何事情,也不假装遵守任何道德准则。他用旗帜和手势来模拟爱国主义,但他的行为却不像一个爱国者;2016年,他的竞选团队争先恐后地寻求俄罗斯的帮助("如果是你说的那样,我就喜欢",小唐纳德-特朗普在得到俄罗斯提供的关于希拉里-克林顿的 "污点 "时回答道),特朗普本人还呼吁俄罗斯入侵他的对手。对于他的政府和党内的一些高层人士来说,这些性格特征可能具有深层次的、不为人知的吸引力:如果不存在道德与不道德之分,那么每个人都被默认为无需遵守任何规则。如果总统不尊重宪法,那我为什么要尊重?如果总统可以在选举中作弊,为什么我不能?如果总统可以与色情明星上床,那么我为什么不可以?

This, of course, was the insight of the “alt-right,” which understood the dark allure of amorality, open racism, anti-Semitism, and misogyny long before many others in the Republican Party. Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian philosopher and literary critic, recognized the lure of the forbidden a century ago, writing about the deep appeal of the carnival, a space where everything banned is suddenly allowed, where eccentricity is permitted, where profanity defeats piety. The Trump administration is like that: Nothing means anything, rules don’t matter, and the president is the carnival king.
当然,这也是 "另类右翼 "的洞察力,他们比共和党中的许多人更早地认识到不道德、公开的种族主义、反犹太主义和厌女症的黑暗诱惑。俄罗斯哲学家和文学评论家米哈伊尔-巴赫金(Mikhail Bakhtin)早在一个世纪前就认识到了禁忌的诱惑力,他写道:"狂欢节具有深刻的吸引力,在这个空间里,一切被禁止的东西突然都被允许了,怪癖被允许了,亵渎打败了虔诚。特朗普政府就是这样:一切都没有意义,规则并不重要,总统就是狂欢之王。

My side might be flawed, but the political opposition is much worse. When Marshal Philippe Pétain, the leader of collaborationist France, took over the Vichy government, he did so in the name of the restoration of a France that he believed had been lost. Pétain had been a fierce critic of the French Republic, and once he was in control, he replaced its famous creed—Liberté, égalité, fraternité, or “Liberty, equality, fraternity”—with a different slogan: Travail, famille, patrie, or “Work, family, fatherland.” Instead of the “false idea of the natural equality of man,” he proposed bringing back “social hierarchy”—order, tradition, and religion. Instead of accepting modernity, Pétain sought to turn back the clock.
我这边可能有缺陷,但政治反对派要糟糕得多。当法国通敌派领导人菲利普-贝当元帅接管维希政府时,他是以恢复一个他认为已经失去的法国的名义这样做的。贝当一直是法兰西共和国的猛烈抨击者,在他掌权后,他用一个不同的口号取代了法兰西共和国著名的信条--自由、平等、博爱,即 "自由、平等、博爱",即 "工作、家庭、祖国"。他建议恢复 "社会等级制度"--秩序、传统和宗教,而不是 "人的自然平等的错误观念"。贝当没有接受现代性,而是试图让时光倒流。

By Pétain’s reckoning, collaboration with the Germans was not merely an embarrassing necessity. It was crucial, because it gave patriots the ability to fight the real enemy: the French parliamentarians, socialists, anarchists, Jews, and other assorted leftists and democrats who, he believed, were undermining the nation, robbing it of its vitality, destroying its essence. “Rather Hitler than Blum,” the saying went—Blum having been France’s socialist (and Jewish) prime minister in the late 1930s. One Vichy minister, Pierre Laval, famously declared that he hoped Germany would conquer all of Europe. Otherwise, he asserted, “Bolshevism would tomorrow establish itself everywhere.”
贝当认为,与德国人合作不仅仅是一种尴尬的需要。它至关重要,因为它让爱国者有能力打击真正的敌人:法国议员、社会主义者、无政府主义者、犹太人以及其他左派和民主主义者,他认为这些人正在破坏国家,剥夺国家的活力,摧毁国家的本质。俗话说 "宁要希特勒,不要布卢姆",布卢姆曾在20世纪30年代末担任法国的社会主义(犹太)总理。维希的一位部长皮埃尔-拉瓦尔(Pierre Laval)曾发表过著名的言论,他希望德国能够征服整个欧洲。他断言,否则 "布尔什维主义明天就会在各地建立起来"。

To Americans, this kind of justification should sound very familiar; we have been hearing versions of it since 2016. The existential nature of the threat from “the left” has been spelled out many times. “Our liberal-left present reality and future direction is incompatible with human nature,” wrote Michael Anton, in “The Flight 93 Election.” The Fox News anchor Laura Ingraham has warned that “massive demographic changes” threaten us too: “In some parts of the country it does seem like the America that we know and love doesn’t exist anymore.” This is the Vichy logic: The nation is dead or dying—so anything you can do to restore it is justified. Whatever criticisms might be made of Trump, whatever harm he has done to democracy and the rule of law, whatever corrupt deals he might make while in the White House—all of these shrink in comparison to the horrific alternative: the liberalism, socialism, moral decadence, demographic change, and cultural degradation that would have been the inevitable result of Hillary Clinton’s presidency.
对美国人来说,这样的理由听起来应该非常熟悉;自2016年以来,我们一直在听到这样的版本。来自 "左翼 "的威胁的存在性质已被多次阐明。迈克尔-安东(Michael Anton)在 "93号航班大选 "中写道:"我们的自由左翼目前的现实和未来的方向与人类本性格格不入。"福克斯新闻主播劳拉-英格拉哈姆(Laura Ingraham)警告说,"大规模的人口变化 "也威胁着我们:"在美国的某些地方,我们所熟悉和热爱的美国似乎已不复存在"。这就是维希逻辑:国家已经死亡或垂死挣扎,因此你能做的任何恢复国家的事情都是合理的。无论人们对特朗普有什么批评,无论他对民主和法治造成了什么伤害,无论他在白宫期间可能做了什么腐败交易--所有这些与可怕的替代方案相比都相形见绌:自由主义、社会主义、道德堕落、人口变化和文化退化,这些都将是希拉里-克林顿担任总统的必然结果。

The Republican senators who are willing to express their disgust with Trump off the record but voted in February for him to remain in office all indulge a variation of this sentiment. (Trump enables them to get the judges they want, and those judges will help create the America they want.) So do the evangelical pastors who ought to be disgusted by Trump’s personal behavior but argue, instead, that the current situation has scriptural precedents. Like King David in the Bible, the president is a sinner, a flawed vessel, but he nevertheless offers a path to salvation for a fallen nation.

The three most important members of Trump’s Cabinet—Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Attorney General William Barr—are all profoundly shaped by Vichyite apocalyptic thinking. All three are clever enough to understand what Trumpism really means, that it has nothing to do with God or faith, that it is self-serving, greedy, and unpatriotic. Nevertheless, a former member of the administration (one of the few who did decide to resign) told me that both Pence and Pompeo “have convinced themselves that they are in a biblical moment.” All of the things they care about—outlawing abortion and same-sex marriage, and (though this is never said out loud) maintaining a white majority in America—are under threat. Time is growing short. They believe that “we are approaching the Rapture, and this is a moment of deep religious significance.” Barr, in a speech at Notre Dame, has also described his belief that “militant secularists” are destroying America, that “irreligion and secular values are being forced on people of faith.” Whatever evil Trump does, whatever he damages or destroys, at least he enables Barr, Pence, and Pompeo to save America from a far worse fate. If you are convinced we are living in the End Times, then anything the president does can be forgiven.
特朗普内阁中最重要的三名成员--副总统迈克-彭斯、国务卿迈克-蓬佩奥和司法部长威廉-巴尔--都深受维希世界末日思想的影响。三人都很聪明,明白特朗普主义的真正含义,即它与上帝或信仰无关,是自私、贪婪和不爱国的。尽管如此,一位前政府成员(少数决定辞职的人之一)告诉我,彭斯和蓬佩奥都 "让自己相信,他们正处于圣经时刻"。他们所关心的禁止堕胎和同性婚姻,以及(尽管从未大声说出来)维持美国白人多数地位等问题都受到了威胁。时间越来越紧迫。他们认为,"我们正在接近被提,这是一个具有深刻宗教意义的时刻"。巴尔在圣母大学的一次演讲中也描述了他的信念:"激进的世俗主义者 "正在摧毁美国,"非宗教和世俗价值观正在强加给有信仰的人"。不管特朗普做了什么坏事,不管他破坏或摧毁了什么,至少他让巴尔、彭斯和蓬佩奥能够把美国从更糟糕的命运中拯救出来。如果你相信我们生活在末世,那么总统所做的一切都可以被原谅。

I am afraid to speak out. Fear, of course, is the most important reason any inhabitant of an authoritarian or totalitarian society does not protest or resign, even when the leader commits crimes, violates his official ideology, or forces people to do things that they know to be wrong. In extreme dictatorships like Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia, people fear for their lives. In softer dictatorships, like East Germany after 1950 and Putin’s Russia today, people fear losing their jobs or their apartments. Fear works as a motivation even when violence is a memory rather than a reality. When I was a student in Leningrad in the 1980s, some people still stepped back in horror when I asked for directions on the street, in my accented Russian: No one was going to be arrested for speaking to a foreigner in 1984, but 30 years earlier they might have been, and the cultural memory remained.
我不敢说出来。当然,恐惧是任何专制或极权社会的居民不抗议或不辞职的最重要原因,即使领导人犯下罪行、违反官方意识形态或强迫人们做他们明知是错误的事情。在纳粹德国和斯大林俄国等极端独裁政权中,人们担心自己的生命安全。在较温和的独裁政权中,如 1950 年后的东德和今天普京的俄罗斯,人们害怕失去工作或公寓。即使暴力只是记忆而非现实,恐惧也能成为一种动力。20 世纪 80 年代我在列宁格勒读书时,当我在街上用带着口音的俄语问路时,一些人仍然会惊恐地后退:1984 年,没有人会因为和外国人说话而被捕,但 30 年前,他们可能会被捕,文化记忆依然存在。

In the United States of America, it is hard to imagine how fear could be a motivation for anybody. There are no mass murders of the regime’s political enemies, and there never have been. Political opposition is legal; free press and free speech are guaranteed in the Constitution. And yet even in one of the world’s oldest and most stable democracies, fear is a motive. The same former administration official who observed the importance of apocalyptic Christianity in Trump’s Washington also told me, with grim disgust, that “they are all scared.”

They are scared not of prison, the official said, but of being attacked by Trump on Twitter. They are scared he will make up a nickname for them. They are scared that they will be mocked, or embarrassed, like Mitt Romney has been. They are scared of losing their social circles, of being disinvited to parties. They are scared that their friends and supporters, and especially their donors, will desert them. John Bolton has his own super PAC and a lot of plans for how he wants to use it; no wonder he resisted testifying against Trump. Former Speaker Paul Ryan is among the dozens of House Republicans who have left Congress since the beginning of this administration, in one of the most striking personnel turnovers in congressional history. They left because they hated what Trump was doing to their party—and the country. Yet even after they left, they did not speak out.
这位官员说,他们害怕的不是监狱,而是在推特上被特朗普攻击。他们害怕特朗普给他们起绰号。他们害怕自己会像米特-罗姆尼那样被嘲弄或难堪。他们害怕失去社交圈,害怕被取消参加聚会的邀请。他们害怕他们的朋友和支持者,尤其是他们的捐赠者会抛弃他们。约翰-博尔顿(John Bolton)有自己的超级政治行动委员会(super PAC),并为如何利用它制定了许多计划;难怪他拒绝针对特朗普作证。前议长保罗-瑞安(Paul Ryan)是自本届政府开始以来离开国会的数十名众议院共和党人之一,这是国会历史上最引人注目的人事变动之一。他们离开的原因是痛恨特朗普对他们的政党和国家所做的一切。然而,即使在离开之后,他们也没有大声疾呼。

They are scared, and yet they don’t seem to know that this fear has precedents, or that it could have consequences. They don’t know that similar waves of fear have helped transform other democracies into dictatorships. They don’t seem to realize that the American Senate really could become the Russian Duma, or the Hungarian Parliament, a group of exalted men and women who sit in an elegant building, with no influence and no power. Indeed, we are already much closer to that reality than many could ever have imagined.

In February, many members of the Republican Party leadership, Republican senators, and people inside the administration used various versions of these rationales to justify their opposition to impeachment. All of them had seen the evidence that Trump had stepped over the line in his dealings with the president of Ukraine. All of them knew that he had tried to use American foreign-policy tools, including military funding, to force a foreign leader into investigating a domestic political opponent. Yet Republican senators, led by Mitch McConnell, never took the charges seriously. They mocked the Democratic House leaders who had presented the charges. They decided against hearing evidence. With the single exception of Romney, they voted in favor of ending the investigation. They did not use the opportunity to rid the country of a president whose operative value system—built around corruption, nascent authoritarianism, self-regard, and his family’s business interests—runs counter to everything that most of them claim to believe in.
今年 2 月,共和党领导层的许多成员、共和党参议员和政府内部人员使用了这些理由的各种版本,为他们反对弹劾辩护。他们都看到了特朗普在与乌克兰总统打交道时越界的证据。他们都知道,特朗普曾试图利用包括军事资金在内的美国外交政策工具,迫使外国领导人调查国内政治对手。然而,以米奇-麦康奈尔为首的共和党参议员从未认真对待这些指控。他们嘲笑提出指控的民主党众议院领袖。他们决定不听取证据。除了罗姆尼之外,他们都投票赞成结束调查。他们没有利用这个机会让国家摆脱一位总统,因为这位总统的价值体系是围绕腐败、新生的独裁主义、自视甚高以及其家族的商业利益而建立的,与他们中大多数人声称信仰的一切背道而驰。

Just a month later, in March, the consequences of that decision became suddenly clear. After the U.S. and the world were plunged into crisis by a coronavirus that had no cure, the damage done by the president’s self-focused, self-dealing narcissism—his one true “ideology”—was finally visible. He led a federal response to the virus that was historically chaotic. The disappearance of the federal government was not a carefully planned transfer of power to the states, as some tried to claim, or a thoughtful decision to use the talents of private companies. This was the inevitable result of a three-year assault on professionalism, loyalty, competence, and patriotism. Tens of thousands of people have died, and the economy has been ruined.
就在一个月后的三月份,这一决定的后果突然变得清晰可见。在美国和世界被无药可治的冠状病毒卷入危机之后,总统以自我为中心、自我交易的自恋--他唯一真正的 "意识形态"--所造成的伤害终于显现出来。他领导的联邦应对病毒的措施历来混乱不堪。联邦政府的消失并不像某些人试图声称的那样,是经过精心策划的向各州的权力转移,也不是一个深思熟虑的利用私营公司才能的决定。这是三年来对专业精神、忠诚、能力和爱国主义的攻击的必然结果。数万人丧生,经济遭到破坏。

This utter disaster was avoidable. If the Senate had removed the president by impeachment a month earlier; if the Cabinet had invoked the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as soon as Trump’s unfitness became clear; if the anonymous and off-the-record officials who knew of Trump’s incompetence had jointly warned the public; if they had not, instead, been so concerned about maintaining their proximity to power; if senators had not been scared of their donors; if Pence, Pompeo, and Barr had not believed that God had chosen them to play special roles in this “biblical moment”—if any of these things had gone differently, then thousands of deaths and a historic economic collapse might have been avoided.
这场灾难完全是可以避免的。如果参议院早在一个月前就通过弹劾罢免了总统;如果内阁在特朗普的不称职显而易见时就立即援引第二十五修正案;如果那些知道特朗普无能的匿名和不公开的官员联合向公众发出警告;如果他们不那么关心如何保持与权力的接近;如果参议员们不惧怕他们的捐助者;如果彭斯、蓬佩奥和巴尔不相信上帝选择他们在这个 "圣经时刻 "扮演特殊角色--如果这些事情中的任何一件发生了变化,那么成千上万人的死亡和历史性的经济崩溃就可能避免。

The price of collaboration in America has already turned out to be extraordinarily high. And yet, the movement down the slippery slope continues, just as it did in so many occupied countries in the past. First Trump’s enablers accepted lies about the inauguration; now they accept terrible tragedy and the loss of American leadership in the world. Worse could follow. Come November, will they tolerate—even abet—an assault on the electoral system: open efforts to prevent postal voting, to shut polling stations, to scare people away from voting? Will they countenance violence, as the president’s social-media fans incite demonstrators to launch physical attacks on state and city officials?
在美国,合作的代价已经变得异常高昂。然而,沿着滑坡下滑的趋势仍在继续,就像过去在许多被占领的国家一样。特朗普的支持者们先是接受了有关就职典礼的谎言,现在又接受了可怕的悲剧和美国在世界上领导地位的丧失。更糟糕的还在后面。到了 11 月,他们是否会容忍--甚至教唆--对选举制度的攻击:公开阻止邮寄投票、关闭投票站、吓唬人们不要投票?当总统的社交媒体粉丝煽动示威者对州政府和市政府官员发动人身攻击时,他们会纵容暴力吗?

Each violation of our Constitution and our civic peace gets absorbed, rationalized, and accepted by people who once upon a time knew better. If, following what is almost certain to be one of the ugliest elections in American history, Trump wins a second term, these people may well accept even worse. Unless, of course, they decide not to.

When I visited Marianne Birthler, she didn’t think it was interesting to talk about collaboration in East Germany, because everybody collaborated in East Germany. So I asked her about dissidence instead: When all of your friends, all of your teachers, and all of your employers are firmly behind the system, how do you find the courage to oppose it? In her answer, Birthler resisted the use of the word courage; just as people can adapt to corruption or immorality, she told me, they can slowly learn to object as well. The choice to become a dissident can easily be the result of “a number of small decisions that you take”—to absent yourself from the May Day parade, for example, or not to sing the words of the party hymn. And then, one day, you find yourself irrevocably on the other side. Often, this process involves role models. You see people whom you admire, and you want to be like them. It can even be “selfish.” “You want to do something for yourself,” Birthler said, “to respect yourself.”
当我拜访玛丽安-布瑞特勒时,她认为谈论东德的合作并不有趣,因为在东德每个人都在合作。于是,我问她持不同政见的情况:当你所有的朋友、老师和雇主都坚定地支持体制时,你如何鼓起勇气反对它?她告诉我,就像人们可以适应腐败或不道德一样,他们也可以慢慢学会反对。选择成为一名持不同政见者很容易是 "你做出的一些小决定 "的结果--比如,你可以不参加五一游行,或者不唱党的赞美诗。然后,有一天,你发现自己不可逆转地站在了另一边。通常,这个过程涉及到榜样。你看到自己崇拜的人,就想成为他们那样的人。这甚至可以是 "自私 "的。"你想为自己做点什么,"Birthler说,"为了尊重自己。"

For some people, the struggle is made easier by their upbringing. Marko Martin’s parents hated the East German regime, and so did he. His father was a conscientious objector, and so was he. As far back as the Weimar Republic, his great-grandparents had been part of the “anarcho-syndicalist” anti-Communist left; he had access to their books. In the 1980s, he refused to join the Free German Youth, the Communist youth organization, and as a result he could not go to university. He instead embarked on a vocational course, to train to be an electrician (after refusing to become a butcher). In his electrician-training classes, one of the other students pulled him aside and warned him, subtly, that the Stasi was collecting information on him: “It’s not necessary that you tell me all the things you have in mind.” He was eventually allowed to emigrate, in May 1989, just a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
对于某些人来说,他们的成长经历让他们的斗争变得更加容易。马尔科-马丁的父母憎恨东德政权,他也一样。他的父亲是一名依良心拒服兵役者,他也是。早在魏玛共和国时期,他的曾祖父母就是 "无政府-自由主义 "反共左派的一员;他可以看到他们的书籍。20 世纪 80 年代,他拒绝加入共产主义青年组织 "自由德国青年",因此没能上大学。他转而开始学习职业课程,接受电工培训(在此之前他拒绝成为一名屠夫)。在电工培训课上,一位同学把他拉到一边,巧妙地警告他说,斯塔西正在收集他的信息:"没必要把你的想法都告诉我"。1989 年 5 月,就在柏林墙倒塌前几个月,他最终获准移居国外。

In America we also have our Marianne Birthlers, our Marko Martins: people whose families taught them respect for the Constitution, who have faith in the rule of law, who believe in the importance of disinterested public service, who have values and role models from outside the world of the Trump administration. Over the past year, many such people have found the courage to stand up for what they believe. A few have been thrust into the limelight. Fiona Hill—an immigrant success story and a true believer in the American Constitution—was not afraid to testify at the House’s impeachment hearings, nor was she afraid to speak out against Republicans who were promulgating a false story of Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election. “This is a fictional narrative that has been perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services themselves,” she said in her congressional testimony. “The unfortunate truth is that Russia was the foreign power that systematically attacked our democratic institutions in 2016.”
在美国,我们也有我们的玛丽安-伯特勒、我们的马尔科-马丁斯:他们的家庭教会他们尊重宪法,他们对法治充满信心,他们相信无私奉献的重要性,他们的价值观和榜样来自特朗普政府之外的世界。在过去的一年里,许多这样的人鼓起勇气,坚持自己的信念。少数人被推到了舆论的风口浪尖。菲奥娜-希尔(Fiona Hill)是一位成功的移民,也是美国宪法的忠实信徒,她不害怕在众议院弹劾听证会上作证,也不害怕公开反对共和党人散布乌克兰干预 2016 年大选的虚假故事。"她在国会作证时说:"这是俄罗斯安全部门自己制造和宣传的虚构故事。"不幸的事实是,俄罗斯是在2016年系统地攻击我们民主体制的外国势力。"

Top: Senator Lindsey Graham outside his office on Capitol Hill on December 19, 2019, the day after the House voted to impeach Donald Trump. Graham staunchly defended Trump during impeachment. Bottom: On November 21, 2019, during the House Intelligence Committee’s impeachment inquiry, Trump’s former deputy assistant Fiona Hill testified that Republicans were promulgating the president’s false narrative about Ukraine. (Anna Moneymaker / The New York Times / Redux; Erin Schaff / The New York Times / Redux)
上图:2019年12月19日,众议院投票弹劾唐纳德-特朗普的第二天,参议员林赛-格雷厄姆在国会山办公室外。格雷厄姆在弹劾期间坚定地为特朗普辩护。下图:2019年11月21日,在众议院情报委员会的弹劾调查中,特朗普的前副助理菲奥娜-希尔(Fiona Hill)作证称,共和党人正在颁布总统关于乌克兰的虚假说法。(安娜-钱梅克(Anna Moneymaker)/《纽约时报》/Redux;艾琳-沙夫(Erin Schaff)/《纽约时报》/Redux

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman—another immigrant success story and another true believer in the American Constitution—also found the courage, first to report on the president’s improper telephone call with his Ukrainian counterpart, which Vindman had heard as a member of the National Security Council, and then to speak publicly about it. In his testimony, he made explicit reference to the values of the American political system, so different from those in the place where he was born. “In Russia,” he said, “offering public testimony involving the president would surely cost me my life.” But as “an American citizen and public servant … I can live free of fear for mine and my family’s safety.” A few days after the Senate impeachment vote, Vindman was physically escorted out of the White House by representatives of a vengeful president who did not appreciate Vindman’s hymn to American patriotism—although retired Marine Corps General John Kelly, the president’s former chief of staff, apparently did. Vindman’s behavior, Kelly said in a speech a few days later, was “exactly what we teach them to do from cradle to grave. He went and told his boss what he just heard.”
亚历山大-温德曼(Alexander Vindman)中校--另一位成功的移民和另一位美国宪法的忠实信徒--也鼓起勇气,首先报告了总统与乌克兰同行的不当通话,温德曼作为国家安全委员会成员听到了这一消息,然后公开谈论了此事。在证词中,他明确提到了美国政治制度的价值观,这与他出生地的价值观大相径庭。"他说,"在俄罗斯,公开提供涉及总统的证词肯定会让我丢掉性命"。但作为 "美国公民和公务员......我可以不必担心自己和家人的安全"。参议院弹劾投票结束几天后,文德曼被复仇总统的代表们护送出白宫,总统并不欣赏文德曼对美国爱国主义的赞美--尽管总统的前参谋长、海军陆战队退役将军约翰-凯利显然欣赏他的赞美。凯利在几天后的一次演讲中说,文德曼的行为 "正是我们教他们从摇篮到坟墓都要做的事。他去告诉了他的上司他刚刚听到了什么"。

But both Hill and Vindman had some important advantages. Neither had to answer to voters, or to donors. Neither had prominent status in the Republican Party. What would it take, by contrast, for Pence or Pompeo to conclude that the president bears responsibility for a catastrophic health and economic crisis? What would it take for Republican senators to admit to themselves that Trump’s loyalty cult is destroying the country they claim to love? What would it take for their aides and subordinates to come to the same conclusion, to resign, and to campaign against the president? What would it take, in other words, for someone like Lindsey Graham to behave like Wolfgang Leonhard?
但希尔和温德曼都有一些重要的优势。他们都不必对选民或捐赠者负责。两人在共和党内都没有显赫的地位。相比之下,彭斯或蓬佩奥要怎样才能得出结论,认为总统对灾难性的健康和经济危机负有责任?共和党参议员要怎样才能承认特朗普的忠诚崇拜正在摧毁他们声称热爱的国家?他们的助手和下属要怎样才能得出同样的结论、辞职并开展反对总统的运动?换句话说,林赛-格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)这样的人要怎样才能表现得像沃尔夫冈-莱昂哈德(Wolfgang Leonhard)一样?

If, as Stanley Hoffmann wrote, the honest historian would have to speak of “collaborationisms,” because the phenomenon comes in so many variations, the same is true of dissidence, which should probably be described as “dissidences.” People can suddenly change their minds because of spontaneous intellectual revelations like the one Wolfgang Leonhard had when walking into his fancy nomenklatura dining room, with its white tablecloths and three-course meals. They can also be persuaded by outside events: rapid political changes, for example. Awareness that the regime had lost its legitimacy is part of what made Harald Jaeger, an obscure and until that moment completely loyal East German border guard, decide on the night of November 9, 1989, to lift the gates and let his fellow citizens walk through the Berlin Wall—a decision that led, over the next days and months, to the end of East Germany itself. Jaeger’s decision was not planned; it was a spontaneous response to the fearlessness of the crowd. “Their will was so great,” he said years later, of those demanding to cross into West Berlin, “there was no other alternative than to open the border.”
如果说,正如斯坦利-霍夫曼(Stanley Hoffmann)所写的那样,正直的历史学家不得不谈论 "合作主义",因为这种现象有如此多的变化,那么持不同政见者也是如此,或许应该称之为 "持不同政见者"。人们可能会因为自发的思想启示而突然改变主意,就像沃尔夫冈-莱昂哈德在走进他那间铺着白色桌布、摆着三道菜的豪华名流餐厅时所受到的启示一样。他们也会被外部事件所说服:例如,迅速的政治变革。1989年11月9日晚,哈拉尔德-耶格尔(Harald Jaeger)--一名默默无闻、直到那一刻才完全忠诚的东德边防军--意识到政权已经失去合法性,决定打开柏林墙的大门,让他的同胞穿过柏林墙--这一决定在接下来的几天和几个月中导致了东德本身的终结。耶格尔的决定并非计划好的,而是对人群无畏精神的自发回应。多年后,他在谈到那些要求穿越柏林进入西柏林的人时说道:"他们的意愿是如此强烈","除了开放边境,别无选择"。

But these things are all intertwined, and not easy to disentangle. The personal, the political, the intellectual, and the historical combine differently within every human brain, and the outcomes can be unpredictable. Leonhard’s “sudden” revelation may have been building for years, perhaps since his mother’s arrest. Jaeger was moved by the grandeur of the historical moment on that night in November, but he also had more petty concerns: He was annoyed at his boss, who had not given him clear instructions about what to do.
但这些东西都是相互交织的,不容易分开。个人、政治、知识和历史在每个人的大脑中以不同的方式结合在一起,其结果可能是不可预知的。莱昂哈德的 "突然 "启示可能已经酝酿了多年,也许从他母亲被捕时就开始了。11 月的那个夜晚,耶格尔被历史时刻的壮观所感动,但他也有更多琐碎的担忧:他对自己的上司感到恼火,因为他的上司没有明确指示他该怎么做。

Could some similar combination of the petty and the political ever convince Lindsey Graham that he has helped lead his country down a blind alley? Perhaps a personal experience could move him, a prod from someone who represents his former value system—an old Air Force buddy, say, whose life has been damaged by Trump’s reckless behavior, or a friend from his hometown. Perhaps it requires a mass political event: When the voters begin to turn, maybe Graham will turn with them, arguing, as Jaeger did, that “their will was so great … there was no other alternative.” At some point, after all, the calculus of conformism will begin to shift. It will become awkward and uncomfortable to continue supporting “Trump First,” especially as Americans suffer from the worst recession in living memory and die from the coronavirus in numbers higher than in much of the rest of the world.
林赛-格雷厄姆(Lindsey Graham)是否也会因为一些类似的琐事和政治因素的结合而相信,他帮助自己的国家走向了一条死胡同?也许个人经历能打动他,也许代表他以前价值体系的人能给他一记耳光--比如说,一个因特朗普的鲁莽行为而生活受到损害的空军老战友,或者他家乡的朋友。也许这需要一个大规模的政治事件:当选民开始转向时,也许格雷厄姆会和他们一起转向,像耶格尔那样辩称,"他们的意愿是如此之大......别无选择"。毕竟,在某些时候,顺应民意的算盘会开始打转。继续支持 "特朗普优先 "将变得尴尬和不自在,尤其是当美国人遭受记忆中最严重的经济衰退,死于冠状病毒的人数高于世界其他大部分地区的时候。

Or perhaps the only antidote is time. In due course, historians will write the story of our era and draw lessons from it, just as we write the history of the 1930s, or of the 1940s. The Miłoszes and the Hoffmanns of the future will make their judgments with the clarity of hindsight. They will see, more clearly than we can, the path that led the U.S. into a historic loss of international influence, into economic catastrophe, into political chaos of a kind we haven’t experienced since the years leading up to the Civil War. Then maybe Graham—along with Pence, Pompeo, McConnell, and a whole host of lesser figures—will understand what he has enabled.
或许唯一的解药就是时间。在适当的时候,历史学家将书写我们这个时代的故事,并从中吸取教训,就像我们书写 20 世纪 30 年代或 40 年代的历史一样。未来的米沃什和霍夫曼们将以事后诸葛亮的清晰眼光做出判断。他们会比我们更清楚地看到,是什么导致美国历史性地丧失国际影响力、陷入经济灾难、陷入自南北战争以来从未有过的政治混乱。到那时,也许格雷厄姆--连同彭斯、蓬佩奥、麦康奈尔和一大批较次要的人物--就会明白他促成了什么。

In the meantime, I leave anyone who has the bad luck to be in public life at this moment with a final thought from Władysław Bartoszewski, who was a member of the wartime Polish underground, a prisoner of both the Nazis and the Stalinists, and then, finally, the foreign minister in two Polish democratic governments. Late in his life—he lived to be 93—he summed up the philosophy that had guided him through all of these tumultuous political changes. It was not idealism that drove him, or big ideas, he said. It was this: Warto być przyzwoitym—“Just try to be decent.” Whether you were decent—that’s what will be remembered.
在此期间,我想把瓦迪斯瓦夫-巴托谢夫斯基的最后一段话留给此时此刻不幸身处公共生活中的人们,他曾是波兰战时地下组织的成员,也曾是纳粹和斯大林主义者的俘虏,最后还担任过两届波兰民主政府的外交部长。在他晚年(活到 93 岁),他总结了指导他经历所有这些动荡政治变革的哲学。他说,推动他的不是理想主义,也不是伟大的想法。而是这一点:Warto być przyzwoitym--"只要努力做个正派人"。你是否正派--这才是人们会记住的。

This article appears in the July/August 2020 print edition with the headline “The Collaborators.”
本文刊登于 2020 年 7/8 月印刷版,标题为 "合作者"。

Anne Applebaum is a staff writer at The Atlantic.

Most Popular 最受欢迎

  1. What Europe Fears 欧洲的恐惧

    American allies see a second Trump term as all but inevitable. “The anxiety is massive.”

    A map of Europe with the shadow of Donald Trump looming over it
set 限制解除