Q1: 数字服务税 (Digital Services Taxes - DSTs)
问题 1：数字服务税 (Digital Services Taxes - DSTs)

A. The Underlying Problem: Digitalisation vs. Traditional Tax Rules
A. 根本问题：数字化与传统税收规则

1. Traditional Nexus Rules (Taxing Rights Trigger):
   传统关联规则（税收管辖权触发）：

• Core Concept: Nexus refers to the required connection a business must have with a country (the "source country") for that country to have the right to tax the business's profits generated there. For business profits, the primary nexus rule under international tax treaties (like the OECD MTC, Article 5) is the Permanent Establishment (PE) concept.
  核心概念：关联性是指企业必须与某个国家（“来源国”）建立的必要联系，该国才有权对企业在那里产生的利润征税。对于企业利润，国际税收条约（如 OECD MTC 第 5 条）下的主要关联性规则是常设机构 (Permanent Establishment, PE) 的概念。
• Mechanism/Details (PE Definition): A PE typically exists if a non-resident enterprise has:
  机制/细节（常设机构定义）：如果非居民企业具有以下条件，通常存在常设机构 (PE)：

• A Fixed Place of Business: A physical location (office, factory, workshop) that is geographically fixed, has a degree of permanence, and through which the business is carried on.
  固定营业场所：一个地理位置固定、具有一定程度的永久性，并通过其开展业务的实际场所（办公室、工厂、车间）。
• A Dependent Agent: An agent (not independent) acting on behalf of the enterprise who has, and habitually exercises, authority to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise. (BEPS Action 7, implemented via the Multilateral Instrument [MLI], slightly tightened this to counter specific avoidance structures like commissionaire arrangements, focusing on the agent playing the "principal role" leading to contract conclusion).
  从属代理人：代表企业行事的代理人（非独立），其拥有并惯常行使以企业名义订立合同的权力。（BEPS 行动计划 7，通过多边工具[MLI]实施，略微收紧了这一规定，以打击特定的规避结构，如佣金代理安排，重点关注在促成合同订立方面发挥“主要作用”的代理人）。

• Importance/Why they Fail for Digital Business: Digital businesses often operate remotely. They can sell digital goods (software), provide digital services (streaming, cloud computing), or generate revenue through online advertising targeted at users in a country without needing a local office or local agents concluding contracts. Their value creation might stem from algorithms, user data, or network effects managed from afar. Consequently, they often don't meet the traditional physical presence requirements of a PE, meaning the market country (where users/revenue are) cannot tax their business profits under treaty rules (Art. 7 MTC usually requires a PE).
  重要性/数字业务失败的原因：数字业务通常远程运营。他们可以销售数字商品（软件）、提供数字服务（流媒体、云计算），或者通过针对某个国家用户的在线广告产生收入，而无需当地办事处或当地代理人订立合同。他们的价值创造可能源于算法、用户数据或从远处管理的网络效应。因此，他们通常不符合常设机构（PE）的传统物理存在要求，这意味着市场所在国（用户/收入所在地）无法根据税收协定规则（《经合组织税收协定范本》第 7 条通常要求常设机构）对其营业利润征税。

2. Traditional Profit Allocation Rules:
   传统的利润分配规则：

• Core Concept: Once a nexus (like a PE) is established, the next step is to determine how much profit should be allocated to that nexus (e.g., the PE) for taxation in the source country. The international standard is the Arm's Length Principle (ALP) (OECD MTC Article 9).
  核心概念：一旦建立了联系（如常设机构），下一步就是确定应将多少利润分配给该联系（例如，常设机构）以供来源国征税。国际标准是独立交易原则（ALP）（OECD MTC 第 9 条）。
• Mechanism/Details (ALP): The ALP requires treating transactions between related parts of an MNE (e.g., parent and subsidiary, or head office and PE) as if they were transactions between unrelated, independent enterprises negotiating in the open market. This involves:
  机制/细节（ALP）：独立交易原则要求将跨国企业（MNE）关联方之间的交易（例如，母公司和子公司，或总公司和常设机构）视为在公开市场上谈判的无关独立企业之间的交易。这包括：

• Identifying the commercial/financial relations and conditions between related parties.
  识别关联方之间的商业/财务关系和条件。
• Performing a Comparability Analysis to find comparable transactions between independent parties.
  进行可比性分析，以找到独立方之间的可比交易。
• Analyzing the Functions performed, Assets used, and Risks assumed (FAR) by each related party in the transaction.
  分析交易中各关联方履行的职能、使用的资产和承担的风险 (FAR)。
• Selecting and applying the most appropriate Transfer Pricing Method (e.g., CUP, Resale Price, Cost Plus, TNMM, Profit Split) to determine the "arm's length" price/profit allocation.
  选择并应用最合适的转让定价方法（例如，CUP、转售价格、成本加成、TNMM、利润分割）以确定“公平交易”价格/利润分配。

• Importance/Why they Struggle with Digital Business:
  重要性/他们为什么在数字业务中挣扎：

• Valuing Intangibles: Digital businesses heavily rely on unique, hard-to-value intangibles (algorithms, platforms, brand recognition). Finding comparable independent transactions to price the use of these assets (e.g., setting royalty rates) is extremely difficult under ALP.
  无形资产估值：数字业务严重依赖独特的、难以估值的无形资产（算法、平台、品牌认知）。在 ALP 下，找到可比的独立交易来评估这些资产的使用价格（例如，设定特许权使用费率）极其困难。
• Valuing Data/User Contribution: ALP struggles to quantify and allocate profit based on value derived from user data (which may not be a legally owned 'asset'), user engagement (e.g., content creation on social media), or network effects (value arising from the scale of the user base itself, not just MNE inputs). These are not traditional 'functions' or 'assets' easily dealt with by FAR analysis.
  数据/用户贡献估值：ALP 难以量化和分配利润，这些利润基于用户数据（可能不是法律上拥有的“资产”）、用户参与度（例如，社交媒体上的内容创建）或网络效应（价值源于用户群体的规模本身，而不仅仅是跨国企业的投入）所产生的价值。这些不是传统的“功能”或“资产”，FAR 分析难以处理。
• Highly Integrated Businesses/Multi-sided Models: Digital MNEs often operate globally integrated value chains where isolating distinct intercompany transactions for pricing is difficult. Multi-sided platforms (like free search funded by ads) have complex value flows that don't fit neatly into traditional transactional ALP methods.
  高度整合的业务/多边模式：数字跨国企业通常运营全球整合的价值链，因此很难分离出用于定价的独立公司间交易。多边平台（如广告资助的免费搜索）具有复杂的价值流，无法完全适应传统的交易性 ALP 方法。
• Profit Shifting Facilitation: The focus on legal transactions allowed MNEs to structure intra-group arrangements (like placing valuable IP in low-tax entities and charging high fees to market entities) to legally shift profits away from high-tax markets, even if substantial value was derived there.
  利润转移便利化：对法律交易的关注使得跨国企业能够构建集团内部安排（例如将有价值的知识产权置于低税实体中，并向市场实体收取高额费用），从而合法地将利润从高税收市场转移出去，即使这些市场产生了巨大的价值。

3. Key Features of Digital Economy (Relevant to Tax Challenges):
   数字经济的关键特征（与税务挑战相关）：

• Mobility: Intangibles (IP), functions (R&D, HQs), and capital can be easily located in low-tax jurisdictions, disconnected from market locations.
  流动性：无形资产（知识产权）、职能（研发、总部）和资本可以很容易地位于低税收司法管辖区，与市场所在地脱节。
• Reliance on Data: Value creation heavily depends on collection, analysis, and monetization of user data, often gathered remotely.
  依赖数据：价值创造在很大程度上依赖于用户数据的收集、分析和货币化，这些数据通常是远程收集的。
• Network Effects: Value increases with the number of users (e.g., social media, marketplaces), leading to scale economies and market concentration.
  网络效应：价值随着用户数量的增加而增加（例如，社交媒体、市场），从而导致规模经济和市场集中。
• Multi-sided Business Models: Platforms often connect different user groups (e.g., users, advertisers, sellers), creating complex value flows where one side might subsidize the other.
  多边商业模式：平台通常连接不同的用户群体（例如，用户、广告商、卖家），从而创造复杂的价值流，其中一方可能补贴另一方。
• Tendency towards Monopoly/Oligopoly: Network effects and scale can lead to dominant market positions ("winner-take-all").
  趋向垄断/寡头垄断：网络效应和规模可能导致占据主导地位的市场地位（“赢者通吃”）。
• Importance: These features exacerbate the limitations of traditional rules based on physical presence and tangible asset/function analysis, making it easier for digital MNEs to generate value in markets while booking profits elsewhere.
  重要性：这些特征加剧了基于物理存在和有形资产/功能分析的传统规则的局限性，使得数字跨国企业更容易在市场中创造价值，同时在其他地方记录利润。

B. BEPS 1.0: Action 1 (2015 Report) - The Initial Response
B. BEPS 1.0：行动计划 1（2015 年报告）——初步回应

1. Objective: To comprehensively analyze the tax challenges posed by the digital economy, assess how existing BEPS measures might apply, and evaluate potential new options to address remaining issues.
   目标：全面分析数字经济带来的税务挑战，评估现有的 BEPS 措施可能如何适用，并评估解决剩余问题的潜在新方案。
2. Key Finding: The report concluded that the digital economy is increasingly integrated into all aspects of the broader economy, making it difficult or impossible to "ring-fence" or treat separately for tax purposes. This implied that solutions might need to apply more broadly.
   主要发现：该报告的结论是，数字经济正日益融入到更广泛经济的各个方面，使得对其进行“隔离”或单独进行税务处理变得困难或不可能。 这意味着解决方案可能需要更广泛地应用。
3. Options Considered (but No Consensus Reached): Action 1 explored three main avenues for potential fundamental reform beyond refining existing rules:
   考虑过的选项（但未达成共识）：行动计划 1 探讨了在完善现有规则之外进行潜在根本性改革的三个主要途径：

• New Nexus Rule (Significant Economic Presence - SEP): Proposed creating a new basis for taxing rights (nexus) not dependent on physical presence. This SEP could be triggered by factors indicating significant economic engagement in a market, such as high revenue derived from the market, a large user base, or intensive digital activities targeted at the market.
  新的联系规则（重大经济存在 - SEP）：提议创建一种新的征税权基础（联系），不依赖于实际存在。 这种 SEP 可能由表明在市场中存在重大经济活动的因素触发，例如来自市场的高收入、庞大的用户群或针对市场的密集的数字活动。
• Withholding Tax (WHT): Proposed imposing a WHT on certain types of payments made for digital goods or services provided by non-residents. Concerns included defining the scope of taxable payments, potential for gross-basis taxation to be excessive (taxing revenue, not profit), administrative complexity, and potential conflicts with existing treaty provisions (e.g., Art 7 on business profits, Art 12 on royalties often exempting or limiting WHT).
  预提税 (WHT)：提议对非居民提供的数字商品或服务的某些类型的付款征收预提税。 担忧包括定义应税付款的范围，总额征税可能过高（对收入而非利润征税），行政复杂性，以及与现有条约条款的潜在冲突（例如，关于营业利润的第 7 条，关于通常免除或限制预提税的特许权使用费的第 12 条）。
• Equalisation Levy: Proposed a new tax, levied on the gross consideration paid for certain digital supplies received from non-resident providers. This was somewhat inspired by indirect taxes (like VAT/GST) but could function as a direct tax. Issues included its precise legal characterization (income tax vs. other tax), its relationship with existing tax treaties, the risk of double taxation (as it's on revenue), and potential economic distortions.
  均衡税：提议征收一项新税，针对从非居民供应商处获得的某些数字供应支付的总对价征收。这在一定程度上受到了间接税（如增值税/商品及服务税）的启发，但可以作为直接税发挥作用。问题包括其精确的法律定性（所得税与其他税种），其与现有税收协定的关系，双重征税的风险（因为它基于收入），以及潜在的经济扭曲。

4. Outcome: Due to significant disagreements among countries (e.g., residence vs. source countries, US vs. European views), concerns about complexity, potential negative economic impacts, and a reluctance to fundamentally depart from established principles (like physical presence PE), no consensus was reached on implementing any of these three options in 2015. The focus shifted to implementing the other 14 BEPS Actions (e.g., improving PE, TP, CFC rules) and continuing work on digital issues via the Task Force on the Digital Economy (TFDE). Note: Consensus was achieved on VAT/GST rules for B2C digital supplies (taxation at place of consumption).
   结果：由于各国之间存在重大分歧（例如，居住地与来源地国家、美国与欧洲的观点），对复杂性、潜在的负面经济影响以及不愿从根本上偏离既定原则（如常设机构 PE）的担忧，2015 年未能就实施这三个方案中的任何一个达成共识。重点转移到实施其他 14 项 BEPS 行动（例如，改进 PE、TP、CFC 规则），并通过数字经济工作组（TFDE）继续开展数字问题的工作。注：就 B2C 数字供应的增值税/商品及服务税规则达成了共识（在消费地征税）。

C. Unilateral Measures: Digital Services Taxes (DSTs)
C. 单边措施：数字服务税 (DST)

1. Definition: Taxes enacted by individual countries acting alone (unilaterally), outside the coordinated framework of tax treaties. They typically apply to the gross revenues of large MNEs derived from specific digital activities deemed connected to users or consumers within the taxing country.
   定义：由各个国家单独（单方面）颁布的税收，不属于税收协定的协调框架。它们通常适用于大型跨国公司（MNE）从被认为与征税国家内的用户或消费者相关的特定数字活动中获得的总收入。
2. Motivation: Stemmed directly from the lack of global consensus in BEPS Action 1. Market countries felt existing rules were inadequate to tax highly profitable digital MNEs deriving significant value from their jurisdictions. Political pressure ("fair share" narrative) was also a major driver. DSTs were often presented as interim or temporary measures until a global solution could be agreed upon.
   动机：直接源于 BEPS 行动计划 1 中缺乏全球共识。市场国家认为，现有规则不足以对从其管辖范围内获得重大价值的高利润数字跨国公司征税。政治压力（“公平份额”的说法）也是一个主要驱动因素。数字服务税（DST）通常被认为是临时或过渡性措施，直到达成全球解决方案。
3. Common Design Features:  通用设计特点：

• Tax Base: Levied on Gross Revenue derived from in-scope activities, NOT on net profit. This is a fundamental departure from traditional income tax.
  税基：对来自范围内的活动的毛收入征税，而不是对净利润征税。这与传统的所得税制度存在根本性的背离。
• Scope: Usually targeted at specific types of digital services where value is perceived to be strongly linked to user participation or data:
  范围：通常针对特定类型的数字服务，在这些服务中，价值被认为与用户参与或数据密切相关：

• Online Advertising: Revenue from placing targeted ads shown to users in the country.
  在线广告：从向该国用户展示的定向广告中获得的收入。
• Sale of User Data: Revenue from selling data collected from local users.
  用户数据销售：通过销售从本地用户处收集的数据获得的收入。
• Online Intermediation/Marketplace Services: Fees or commissions earned by platforms facilitating transactions between users (e.g., ride-hailing apps, e-commerce marketplaces, app stores) where at least one user is local. Scope varies by country.
  在线中介/市场服务：平台促成用户之间交易而赚取的费用或佣金（例如，网约车应用、电子商务市场、应用商店），其中至少有一方用户是本地用户。范围因国家/地区而异。

• Thresholds: Designed to target only the largest global players. Typically requires an MNE to have both:
  门槛：旨在仅针对最大的全球参与者。通常要求跨国企业同时满足以下条件：

• Very high global annual revenue (e.g., €750 million, aligning with Pillar Two scope).
  非常高的全球年度收入（例如，7.5 亿欧元，与支柱二的范围一致）。
• Significant local annual revenue from the in-scope digital services (e.g., €25 million in France, £25 million in the UK). This effectively focuses DSTs on companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc. (GAFA).
  从范围内的数字服务获得的 значительный 本地年度收入（例如，法国为 2500 万欧元，英国为 2500 万英镑）。这实际上将数字服务税 (DST) 重点放在像谷歌、脸书、亚马逊等公司 (GAFA) 上。

• Rate: Relatively low single-digit percentage (e.g., 2%, 3%, 5%, 7.5%) applied to the gross revenue base.
  税率：应用于总收入基数的相对较低的个位数百分比（例如，2%、3%、5%、7.5%）。
• Legal Design & DTA Interaction: Often intentionally drafted to avoid being classified as a "tax on income or on capital" as defined in Article 2 of typical OECD MTC-based Double Tax Agreements (DTAs). If successful, this means the DST would not be restricted by treaty limitations, such as the requirement for a PE to tax business profits (Art. 7) or limits on withholding taxes for royalties/interest (Art. 11, 12). The legal validity of this approach is highly debated.
  法律设计与双重征税协定互动：通常有意起草以避免被归类为典型 OECD MTC 范本的双重征税协定 (DTA) 第 2 条中定义的“对收入或资本征收的税”。如果成功，这意味着数字服务税将不受条约限制的约束，例如对营业利润征税的常设机构 (PE) 要求（第 7 条）或对特许权使用费/利息预扣税的限制（第 11、12 条）。这种方法的法律效力备受争议。
• Sourcing Rules: Crucial for determining which revenues are taxable. Rules typically rely on user location data (e.g., IP address for ads/data, delivery address or account location for marketplace transactions).
  来源规则：对于确定哪些收入应纳税至关重要。这些规则通常依赖于用户位置数据（例如，广告/数据使用 IP 地址，市场交易使用送货地址或帐户位置）。

4. Examples: France (3%), UK (2%), Spain (3%), Italy (3%), Austria (5%), Turkey (7.5%), India (Equalisation Levy, originally 6% on online ads, expanded in 2020 with 2% rate on broader e-commerce supplies by non-residents).
   示例：法国 (3%)、英国 (2%)、西班牙 (3%)、意大利 (3%)、奥地利 (5%)、土耳其 (7.5%)、印度（均衡税，最初对在线广告征收 6%，2020 年扩大到对非居民提供的更广泛的电子商务商品征收 2% 的税率）。

D. Controversies and Issues Surrounding DSTs
D. 关于数字服务税的争议和问题

1. Departure from International Norms: Criticized for taxing gross revenue instead of net profit (which ignores costs and can tax loss-making operations); for being unilateral actions that undermine multilateral consensus-building; and for bypassing the established PE nexus threshold.
   背离国际准则：因对总收入而非净利润征税（忽略成本，可能对亏损运营征税）而受到批评；因单边行动破坏多边共识建设而受到批评；并因绕过既定的常设机构 (PE) 关联阈值而受到批评。
2. Risk of Double (or Multiple) Taxation: Revenue subject to DST in one country might still be included in the calculation of taxable profits subject to Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in another country (e.g., the MNE's residence country) or subject to Pillar Two top-up tax. Because DSTs are often not considered "income taxes" under treaties, obtaining foreign tax credits to relieve this double taxation is usually difficult or impossible.
   双重（或多重）征税的风险：在一个国家/地区征收数字服务税 (DST) 的收入可能仍包含在应缴纳公司所得税 (CIT) 的应税利润的计算中（例如，跨国企业的居民国）或应缴纳第二支柱补足税。由于数字服务税在条约中通常不被视为“所得税”，因此获得外国税收抵免以减轻这种双重征税通常很困难或不可能。
3. Discrimination Concerns: The primary argument raised by the US. While DSTs are often facially neutral (applying to any company meeting thresholds), the high thresholds and the specific focus on activities dominated by large US tech companies mean they disproportionately affect US MNEs in practice (de facto discrimination). The US argued this was often the intended outcome.
   歧视问题：美国提出的主要论点。虽然数字服务税通常表面上是中立的（适用于任何达到阈值的公司），但高阈值和对大型美国科技公司主导的特定活动的关注意味着它们实际上对美国跨国企业产生不成比例的影响（事实上的歧视）。美国认为这通常是预期的结果。
4. Complexity & Uncertainty: A proliferation of different, uncoordinated DSTs across various countries creates significant administrative and compliance burdens for MNEs operating globally. They need to track revenues based on varying sourcing rules and comply with different filing/payment obligations.
   复杂性与不确定性： 各国未经协调而大量涌现的各种数字服务税（DSTs）给在全球运营的跨国企业（MNEs）带来了巨大的行政和合规负担。它们需要根据不同的来源规则跟踪收入，并遵守不同的申报/付款义务。
5. Trade Law Conflicts: Potential violation of non-discrimination obligations under WTO GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) – e.g., National Treatment, Most-Favoured Nation. Arguments depend on whether DST is seen as a tax on services vs. income, and whether foreign/domestic services are "like".
   贸易法冲突：可能违反 WTO《服务贸易总协定》（GATS）下的非歧视义务——例如，国民待遇、最惠国待遇。争议取决于数字服务税被视为对服务还是对收入征税，以及外国/国内服务是否“类似”。
6. Economic Incidence: Significant debate exists on who ultimately bears the economic burden of the DST. While legally imposed on the MNE, strong market power often allows dominant digital firms to pass the cost forward to:
   经济归宿：关于谁最终承担数字服务税的经济负担，存在着激烈的争论。虽然法律上是向跨国企业征收，但强大的市场力量通常允许占主导地位的数字公司将成本转嫁给：

• Consumers (through higher prices for goods/services sold on platforms).
  消费者（通过平台上销售的商品/服务价格上涨）。
• Business users (through higher fees for using marketplaces or higher advertising costs).
  商业用户（通过更高的市场使用费或更高的广告成本）。
• There's anecdotal and some empirical evidence suggesting this pass-through occurs.
  有轶事和一些经验证据表明这种转嫁确实存在。

7. Economic Distortions: Being a tax on revenue, DSTs can distort economic decisions:
   经济扭曲：作为一种对收入征收的税，数字服务税可能会扭曲经济决策：

• They can make low-margin but high-volume digital activities unprofitable.
  它们可能使利润率低但交易量大的数字活动变得无利可图。
• They tax companies even if they are making a net loss on their activities in that country or globally.
  即使公司在该国或全球的活动中出现净亏损，它们也会被征税。
• They might discourage investment or provision of services in countries with DSTs, especially smaller markets.
  它们可能会阻碍在设有数字服务税的国家/地区的投资或服务提供，尤其是在较小的市场中。
• They can lead to tax cascading if the cost is passed through multiple layers of a supply chain.
  如果成本通过供应链的多个层级传递，它们可能会导致税收累积效应。

8. US Section 301 Response: The US government used Section 301 of its Trade Act of 1974 to retaliate. The process involved:
   美国 301 条款的回应：美国政府利用其 1974 年贸易法第 301 条进行报复。该过程包括：

• The US Trade Representative (USTR) launching investigations into specific countries' DSTs.
  美国贸易代表 (USTR) 对特定国家的 DST 发起调查。
• Determining whether the DST was "unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts US commerce".
  确定 DST 是否“不合理或具有歧视性，并且会给美国商业带来负担或限制”。
• Findings often concluded they were discriminatory (targeting US firms).
  调查结果通常认为它们具有歧视性（针对美国公司）。
• Threatening or imposing substantial retaliatory tariffs (taxes on imports) on goods from the DST-imposing country (e.g., French wine, handbags).
  对来自征收数字服务税国家的商品（如法国葡萄酒、手提包）威胁或施加实质性的报复性关税（进口税）。
• This transformed tax disputes into serious international trade conflicts, demonstrating the use of trade policy as leverage in tax matters.
  这使得税务争端转变为严重的国际贸易冲突，表明了将贸易政策作为税务问题的筹码。

E. BEPS 2.0: The Multilateral Response (Pillars One & Two)
E. BEPS 2.0：多边应对方案（支柱一和支柱二）

1. Overall Goal: To address the remaining BEPS challenges, particularly those related to digitalisation and globalisation, by forging a new international consensus. Aims to restore stability to the international tax system, prevent the proliferation of uncoordinated unilateral measures like DSTs, and curb harmful tax competition.
   总体目标：通过形成新的国际共识，应对剩余的 BEPS 挑战，特别是那些与数字化和全球化相关的挑战。旨在恢复国际税收体系的稳定性，防止像 DSTs 这样未经协调的单边措施的扩散，并遏制有害的税收竞争。
2. Pillar One: Re-allocation of Taxing Rights
   第一支柱： налогообложения的重新分配

• Objective: To fundamentally reform international tax rules to allocate a portion of the profits of the largest and most profitable MNEs to the market jurisdictions where their customers and users are located, regardless of whether the MNE has a physical presence (PE) there. It aims to better align taxing rights with modern value creation, especially in the digital age, and is explicitly intended to serve as the coordinated replacement for unilateral DSTs.
  目标：从根本上改革国际税收规则，将最大和最盈利的跨国企业的利润的一部分分配到其客户和用户所在的市场管辖区，无论该跨国企业在那里是否具有实际存在（PE）。它旨在更好地将征税权与现代价值创造对齐，尤其是在数字时代，并且明确旨在作为单边 DSTs 的协调替代方案。
• Scope (Amount A): Targets very large MNEs with global turnover exceeding €20 billion AND profitability exceeding 10% (Profit Before Tax / Revenue). Applies across most sectors, but with specific exclusions (e.g., extractives, regulated financial services).
  范围（金额 A）：针对全球营业额超过 200 亿欧元且盈利能力超过 10%（税前利润/收入）的超大型跨国企业。适用于大多数行业，但有特定的排除项（例如，采掘业、受监管的金融服务）。
• Mechanism (Amount A - The New Taxing Right):
  机制（金额 A - 新的征税权）：

• Calculates the MNE's global profit exceeding a 10% return on revenue (this is deemed "residual profit").
  计算跨国企业的全球利润超出收入 10%的部分（这部分被视为“剩余利润”）。
• Re-allocates 25% of this calculated residual profit to eligible market jurisdictions.
  将计算出的剩余利润的 25%重新分配给符合条件的市场管辖区。
• Uses a revenue-based allocation key to distribute this share among market jurisdictions, based on detailed revenue sourcing rules that determine where revenue is considered derived (e.g., location of end-users, consumers, delivery points).
  使用基于收入的分配方法，根据详细的收入来源规则，在市场辖区之间分配这部分份额，这些规则确定收入被视为来源于何处（例如，最终用户、消费者、交付地点的位置）。
• Establishes a new nexus rule for Amount A, separate from PE rules. This nexus is based on meeting a certain revenue threshold derived from the market jurisdiction (e.g., €1 million), allowing the market to tax its allocated Amount A share even without a PE.
  为 Amount A 建立新的 nexus 规则，独立于 PE 规则。该 nexus 基于达到来自市场辖区的特定收入门槛（例如，100 万欧元），即使没有 PE，也允许市场对其分配的 Amount A 份额征税。

• Mechanism (Amount B): Focuses on simplifying the application of the ALP for certain baseline marketing and distribution activities performed by related parties in market jurisdictions. It aims to provide a fixed, predictable return for these routine functions, thereby reducing transfer pricing disputes and increasing tax certainty.
  机制（Amount B）：侧重于简化市场辖区内关联方执行的某些基线营销和分销活动的 ALP 应用。它旨在为这些常规职能提供固定、可预测的回报，从而减少转让定价争议并增加税收确定性。
• DST Rollback: A critical political agreement embedded within the Pillar One framework is that all participating jurisdictions must withdraw their existing DSTs and comparable unilateral measures, and commit not to introduce such measures in the future. This is essential for achieving stability.
  DST 回滚：Pillar One 框架中嵌入的一项关键政治协议是，所有参与辖区必须撤回其现有的 DST 和类似单边措施，并承诺将来不引入此类措施。这对于实现稳定至关重要。
• Implementation: Pillar One requires a new Multilateral Convention (MLC) to be signed and ratified by participating countries to modify existing bilateral tax treaties simultaneously. Drafting and ratifying this MLC has proven complex and is currently facing significant delays, particularly regarding US participation.
  实施：Pillar One 需要参与国签署并批准新的多边公约（MLC），以同时修改现有的双边税收条约。起草和批准这项 MLC 已被证明非常复杂，并且目前面临重大延误，尤其是在美国参与方面。

3. Pillar Two: Global Minimum Tax (GloBE)
   支柱二：全球最低税（GloBE）

• Objective: To ensure that large MNEs (those with global turnover exceeding €750 million) pay a minimum level of tax on their profits in every jurisdiction where they operate. The agreed minimum Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is 15%. Its primary goal is to curb harmful tax competition between countries ("race to the bottom") and reduce incentives for MNEs to shift profits to very low-tax jurisdictions.
  目标：确保大型跨国企业（全球营业额超过 7.5 亿欧元的企业）在其运营的每个司法管辖区为其利润支付最低水平的税款。商定的最低有效税率 (ETR) 为 15%。其主要目标是遏制各国之间有害的税收竞争（“逐底竞争”），并减少跨国企业将利润转移到极低税收司法管辖区的动机。
• Mechanisms: The Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) rules operate through a system of top-up taxes:
  机制：《全球反税基侵蚀》(GloBE) 规则通过补足税体系运作：

• Income Inclusion Rule (IIR): Allows the ultimate parent entity's country to impose a top-up tax on its share of the income of foreign subsidiaries if that income is taxed below the 15% minimum ETR in the subsidiary's jurisdiction.
  收入纳入规则（IIR）：允许最终母公司所在国家/地区对其外国子公司的收入份额征收补足税，如果该收入在子公司所在司法管辖区按低于 15%的最低有效税率（ETR）征税。
• Undertaxed Payments Rule (UTPR): Acts as a backstop to the IIR. If low-taxed income isn't fully captured by an IIR (e.g., if the parent country hasn't implemented an IIR), the UTPR allows other countries where the MNE group operates to collect the top-up tax, typically by denying deductions or making equivalent adjustments for payments made to the low-taxed entity.
  未足额征税支付规则（UTPR）：作为收入纳入规则（IIR）的后备措施。如果低税收入未被收入纳入规则（IIR）完全覆盖（例如，如果母公司所在国家/地区尚未实施收入纳入规则），则未足额征税支付规则（UTPR）允许跨国企业集团运营所在的其他国家/地区征收补足税，通常通过拒绝扣除或对支付给低税实体的款项进行等效调整来实现。
• Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT): Allows a country to enact its own domestic minimum tax consistent with GloBE rules. If applied, this allows the source/subsidiary country to collect the top-up tax itself, which is then creditable against GloBE liabilities elsewhere, preserving primary taxing rights.
  合格境内最低补足税（QDMTT）：允许一个国家制定符合 GloBE 规则的本国最低税。如果适用，这将允许来源国/子公司自行征收补足税，然后该税款可抵免其他地方的 GloBE 负债，从而维护主要征税权。
• Subject to Tax Rule (STTR): A treaty-based rule allowing source countries to impose limited withholding tax on certain related-party payments (e.g., interest, royalties) that are subject to a nominal tax rate below a minimum (9%) in the recipient's country. Primarily benefits developing countries.
  须服从税则（STTR）：一项基于条约的规则，允许来源国对某些关联方付款（例如，利息、特许权使用费）征收有限的预提税，如果这些付款在收款人所在国的名义税率低于最低税率（9%）。主要惠及发展中国家。

• Implementation: Unlike Pillar One, Pillar Two is being implemented primarily through changes to domestic legislation based on detailed OECD Model Rules and Commentary. Many jurisdictions (including the EU, UK, Japan, South Korea, etc.) have already enacted or are well underway with implementing these rules, generally effective from 2024 or 2025.
  实施：与支柱一不同，支柱二主要通过根据详细的 OECD 示范规则和评注修改国内立法来实施。许多司法管辖区（包括欧盟、英国、日本、韩国等）已经颁布或正在顺利实施这些规则，通常从 2024 年或 2025 年起生效。

F. Key Relationships & Status
F. 主要关系及现状

1. DSTs vs. Pillar One:  数字服务税与支柱一：

• Substitution: Pillar One (Amount A) is designed as the internationally agreed, multilateral replacement for uncoordinated, unilateral DSTs.
  替代方案：第一支柱（金额 A）旨在成为经国际协议达成、取代未经协调的单边数字服务税的多边方案。
• Fundamental Difference: Pillar One allocates a share of net profit based on formulaic factors (revenue key), whereas DSTs tax gross revenue.
  根本区别：第一支柱基于公式化因素（收入关键）分配净利润的一部分，而数字服务税则对总收入征税。
• Political Link: The agreement by countries to withdraw DSTs is politically contingent on the successful implementation of Pillar One through the MLC.
  政治联系：各国撤销数字服务税的协议在政治上取决于通过多边公约成功实施第一支柱。

2. Interdependency: The stability sought by the BEPS 2.0 project relies on both Pillars being implemented, but the resolution of the specific "digital tax" debate and the future of DSTs hinges primarily on Pillar One's success.
   相互依赖性：BEPS 2.0 项目寻求的稳定性依赖于两个支柱的实施，但特定“数字税”辩论的解决以及数字服务税的未来主要取决于第一支柱的成功。
3. Current Situation (Contextualized to May 2025 based on document timings):
   当前形势（根据文件时点，结合 2025 年 5 月的情况）：

• Pillar One MLC Stalled: Significant delays exist in finalizing and opening the MLC for signature, largely due to political difficulties in securing ratification prospects in key countries, notably the United States. Original implementation timelines (e.g., starting 2023/2024) have passed.
  第一支柱多边公约受阻：在最终确定多边公约并开放签署方面存在重大延误，这主要是由于在主要国家（尤其是美国）确保批准前景方面存在政治困难。最初的实施时间表（例如，从 2023/2024 年开始）已经过去。
• DST Uncertainty: Countries that had paused their DSTs based on agreements with the US (often tied to Pillar One progress by end-2023/2024) are now facing decisions. The risk of these DSTs being reactivated or new ones being introduced (e.g., Canada's proposed DST) is increasing due to Pillar One delays, potentially reigniting trade tensions.
  数字服务税的不确定性：根据与美国达成的协议（通常与 2023/2024 年底之前的第一支柱进展相关）而暂停征收数字服务税的国家现在正面临决策。由于第一支柱的延误，这些数字服务税重新启动或引入新的数字服务税（例如，加拿大提议的数字服务税）的风险正在增加，这可能会重新引发贸易紧张局势。
• Pillar Two Rollout: Implementation of the GloBE rules is proceeding relatively rapidly through domestic legislation in numerous countries, becoming effective in 2024 and 2025. This is changing the global tax landscape irrespective of Pillar One's immediate fate.
  第二支柱的推出：GloBE 规则的实施正在通过许多国家的国内立法相对迅速地进行，并在 2024 年和 2025 年生效。无论第一支柱的直接命运如何，这都在改变着全球税收格局。
• Overall: The international tax system is in a state of flux. While Pillar Two is establishing a global minimum tax floor, the core issue of taxing rights allocation in the digital age addressed by Pillar One remains unresolved, leaving the future of DSTs and related trade disputes uncertain.
  总体而言：国际税收体系正处于不断变化之中。虽然支柱二正在建立全球最低税率，但支柱一所解决的数字时代税收管辖权分配这一核心问题仍未解决，导致数字服务税（DSTs）的未来和相关的贸易争端仍不明朗。