美国打破全球规则，捍卫自由世界

As an organising principle for western foreign policy, the “rules-based international order” has long suffered from some disastrous flaws. It is a phrase that means nothing to a normal person. As a result, it is a deeply uninspiring concept. People might go to war to defend freedom or the motherland. Nobody is going to fight and die for the RBIO.
作为西方外交政策的组织原则，"基于规则的国际秩序 "长期以来一直存在一些灾难性的缺陷。对于普通人来说，这是一个毫无意义的短语。因此，它是一个极不鼓舞人心的概念。人们可能会为了捍卫自由或祖国而参战。没有人会为 RBIO 而战，为 RBIO 而死。

Nonetheless, senior western policymakers seem to be in love with the concept. Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state, is fond of appealing to the rules-based international order when he visits China. Rishi Sunak, Britain’s prime minister, has put the RBIO at the centre of UK foreign policy. His likely successor, Sir Keir Starmer, a former lawyer, will be just as committed to the idea.
不过，西方高层决策者似乎对这一概念情有独钟。美国国务卿安东尼-布林肯在访华时喜欢呼吁建立以规则为基础的国际秩序。英国首相苏纳克（Rishi Sunak）将《国际秩序》置于英国外交政策的中心。他的继任者、前律师基尔-斯塔默爵士（Sir Keir Starmer）也将同样致力于这一理念。

In opposing Russian aggression, Blinken argues that the US is standing up for a world based on rules rather than raw power. That is an attractive idea. But rules are meant to be consistent. And America’s own actions are undermining vital parts of the rules-based order.
布林肯认为，美国反对俄罗斯的侵略，是在维护一个基于规则而非原始力量的世界。这个观点很有吸引力。但是，规则就是要保持一致。而美国自己的行动正在破坏基于规则的秩序的重要部分。

The past fortnight has brutally exposed these contradictions. The 100 per cent tariffs that the Biden administration has imposed on Chinese electric vehicles are virtually impossible to reconcile with international rules on trade. As a paper for Bruegel, a think-tank, puts it: “The tariffs . . . quash any notion that the US intends to abide by World Trade Organization rules.”
过去两周残酷地暴露了这些矛盾。拜登政府对中国电动汽车征收 100% 的关税，这与国际贸易规则几乎无法调和。正如智库布鲁盖尔（Bruegel）的一份文件所指出的那样"关税......粉碎了美国打算遵守世界贸易组织规则的任何想法"。

America’s response to the prospect that the International Criminal Court will bring war crimes charges against Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, was also telling. Rather than supporting the court’s effort to enforce international law, Blinken told the US Congress that the administration would consider imposing sanctions on the ICC.
对于国际刑事法院将对以色列总理本雅明-内塔尼亚胡提出战争罪指控的前景，美国的反应也很能说明问题。布林肯非但没有支持法院执行国际法的努力，反而告诉美国国会，美国政府将考虑对国际刑事法院实施制裁。

Of course, the US can deploy arguments to justify these moves. It is possible to argue that the ICC has exceeded its jurisdiction or wrongly intervened in an ongoing conflict. The US also insists that China has broken international trade rules for decades.
当然，美国可以为这些举动辩解。可以说，国际刑事法院超越了其管辖权，或者错误地介入了一场正在进行的冲突。美国还坚持认为，中国几十年来一直在违反国际贸易规则。

But, as the saying goes, in politics when you are explaining, you are losing. In large parts of the world, America’s claim to be upholding the rules-based international order is treated with derision. So what can be salvaged from this mess? One answer is for Blinken and co to talk less about the rules-based international order and more about defending the free world. That is a more accurate and comprehensible description of what western foreign policy is actually about.
但是，俗话说，在政治上，当你解释时，你就输了。在世界上的许多地方，美国声称要维护以规则为基础的国际秩序，却遭到了嘲笑。那么，怎样才能从这场混乱中挽回局面呢？答案之一就是布林肯和其他人少谈基于规则的国际秩序，多谈捍卫自由世界。这是对西方外交政策的更准确、更易理解的描述。

The US, the EU, the UK and other democracies such as Japan, South Korea and Ukraine are currently struggling to contain the territorial and political ambitions of authoritarian countries — above all, China and Russia. A world in which those countries are more powerful will be less safe for free people and countries.
美国、欧盟、英国以及日本、韩国和乌克兰等其他民主国家目前正竭力遏制专制国家--首先是中国和俄罗斯--的领土和政治野心。对自由的人民和国家来说，这些国家更加强大的世界将更加不安全。

Unlike the defence of a rule-based order — which implies absolute consistency — the defence of the free world involves accepting some necessary inconsistency. During the cold war, the US and its allies made some tactical alliances with undemocratic regimes, as part of the broader effort to contain and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union.
与捍卫基于规则的秩序（这意味着绝对的一致性）不同，捍卫自由世界需要接受一些必要的不一致性。冷战期间，美国及其盟国与非民主政权结成了一些战术联盟，作为遏制并最终打败苏联的更广泛努力的一部分。

In today’s world, the US is once again making uncomfortable trade-offs as part of a larger struggle with the major authoritarian powers. America’s tariffs on Chinese EVs make little sense as a defence of the rules-based order. They make much more sense when seen as an effort to prevent China dominating the industries of the future.
在当今世界，美国在与主要专制大国的斗争中再次做出令人不安的权衡。美国对中国电动汽车征收关税，作为对基于规则的秩序的捍卫，意义不大。如果将其视为防止中国主导未来产业的努力，则更有意义。

As it seeks to combat China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, the US has accurately accused Beijing of violating the UN convention on the law of the sea. The difficulty is that the US itself has not ratified that particular convention. So why not accept that America’s primary motivation is not upholding international law for its own sake — but is instead about preventing a crucial trade route from coming under the domination of an authoritarian power?
为了打击中国在南海的领土主张，美国准确地指责中国政府违反了联合国海洋法公约。但问题是，美国本身并未批准该公约。那么，为什么不承认美国的主要动机不是为了维护国际法而维护国际法，而是为了防止一条重要的贸易路线被一个独裁国家所控制呢？

And what about Israel? A lot of what Biden is doing can be explained by domestic politics. But an instinct to defend democratic allies also underpins his dogged support for Israel. America’s refusal to contemplate the idea that Netanyahu may have committed war crimes in Gaza is discreditable. But it is easier to understand US discomfort with a process that sees the only democracy in the Middle East placed in the dock, while the leaders of Syria and Iran escape prosecution for their crimes.
那么以色列呢？拜登所做的很多事情都可以用国内政治来解释。但捍卫民主盟友的本能也是他坚定支持以色列的基础。美国拒绝考虑内塔尼亚胡可能在加沙犯下战争罪行的想法是不光彩的。但更容易理解的是，美国不愿看到中东唯一的民主国家被推上被告席，而叙利亚和伊朗的领导人却逃脱了对其罪行的起诉。

Dialling down the rhetoric about the rules-based international order should not mean abandoning international law altogether. That would be a recipe for global anarchy. It would also be unwise and impractical. There is a lot of international law and finding yourself on the wrong side of it can be very disadvantageous. Vladimir Putin — and perhaps soon, Netanyahu — will find that their travel plans are severely restricted by ICC warrants.
减少关于基于规则的国际秩序的言论不应意味着完全放弃国际法。这将导致全球无政府状态。这也是不明智和不切实际的。国际法的内容非常多，如果发现自己站错了一边，可能会非常不利。弗拉基米尔-普京--也许很快还有内塔尼亚胡--会发现他们的旅行计划受到国际刑事法院逮捕令的严重限制。

Russia and China always argue that their actions are consistent with international law — even when they blatantly are not. The US will sometimes have to do the same thing. International lawfare is part of the emerging struggle between democratic and authoritarian powers.
俄罗斯和中国总是辩称自己的行动符合国际法--即使它们公然不符合国际法。美国有时也不得不这样做。国际法律战是民主与专制大国之间新出现的斗争的一部分。

That does not mean that the two sides are on the same moral level. As in the cold war and the earlier struggles of the 20th century, the world’s democracies do not need to apologise for being ruthless in defence of free societies.
这并不意味着双方的道德水平相同。正如在冷战和 20 世纪早期的斗争中一样，世界上的民主国家并不需要为捍卫自由社会的无情而道歉。

gideon.rachman@ft.com