THE ILLUSORY PROMISE OF STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE 利益相关者治理的虚幻承诺
Lucian A. Bebchuk †\dagger & Roberto Tallarita ‡\ddagger Lucian A. Bebchuk †\dagger & Roberto Tallarita ‡\ddagger
Abstract 摘要
To address growing concerns about the negative effects of corporations on their stakeholders, supporters of stakeholder governance (“stakeholderism”) advocate a governance model that encourages and relies on corporate leaders to serve the interests of stakeholders and not only those of shareholders. We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. Stakeholderism, we conclude, is an inadequate and substantially counterproductive approach to addressing stakeholder concerns. To assess the promise of stakeholderism to protect stakeholders, we analyze the full array of incentives facing corporate leaders; empirically investigate whether they have in the past used discretion to protect stakeholders; and show that recent 为了解决人们日益关注的公司对利益相关者的负面影响问题，利益相关者治理（"利益相关者主义"）的支持者倡导一种治理模式，鼓励并依靠公司领导者为利益相关者而不仅仅是股东的利益服务。我们对利益相关者主义及其预期后果进行了概念、经济和实证分析。我们得出的结论是，利益相关者主义是解决利益相关者问题的一种不适当的方法，而且会产生严重的反作用。为了评估利益相关者主义在保护利益相关者方面的前景，我们分析了公司领导者所面临的一系列激励措施；通过实证调查了解公司领导者在过去是否曾利用自由裁量权来保护利益相关者；并证明最近的利益相关者主义在保护利益相关者方面取得了重大进展。
commitments to stakeholderism were mostly for show rather than a reflection of plans to improve the treatment of stakeholders. Our analysis indicates that, because corporate leaders have strong incentives not to protect stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value, acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to produce material benefits for stakeholders. 对利益相关者主义的承诺大多是作秀，而不是反映改善利益相关者待遇的计划。我们的分析表明，由于公司领导者有强烈的动机不在有利于股东价值的范围内保护利益相关者，因此不应期望接受利益相关者主义会给利益相关者带来实质性利益。
Furthermore, we show that acceptance of stakeholderism could well impose major costs. By making corporate leaders less accountable and more insulated from shareholder oversight, acceptance of stakeholderism would increase slack and hurt performance, reducing the economic pie available to shareholders and stakeholders. In addition, and importantly, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own protect stakeholders, acceptance of stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring real, meaningful protection to stakeholders. 此外，我们还表明，接受利益相关主义很可能会带来重大损失。接受利益相关者主义会降低公司领导者的责任感，使其更加不受股东的监督，从而增加懈怠，损害业绩，缩小股东和利益相关者的经济蛋糕。此外，更重要的是，接受利益相关者主义会使人们产生虚幻的希望，认为公司领导者会自行保护利益相关者，这将阻碍或推迟能为利益相关者带来真正、有意义保护的改革。
The illusory promise of stakeholderism should not be atlowed to advance a managerialist agenda and to obscure the critical need for external interventions to protect stakeholders via legislation, regulation, and policy design. Stakeholderism should be rejected, including and especially by those who take stakeholder interests seriously. 利益相关者主义的虚幻承诺不应被允许用来推进管理主义议程，也不应被用来掩盖通过立法、监管和政策设计进行外部干预以保护利益相关者的迫切需要。利益相关者主义应该被摒弃，尤其是那些认真对待利益相关者利益的人。
Introduction … 93 导言 ... 93
I. The Rise of Stakeholderism … 103 I.
A. Origins, Evolution, and Breadth of Support … 103 A.起源、演变和支持范围...... 103
B. A Critical Juncture … 106 B.紧要关头...... 106
II. Alternative Versions and Conceptual Problems … 108 II.
A. Instrumental Stakeholderism … 108 A.工具利益相关者主义...... 108
Enlightened Shareholder Value … 108 启迪股东价值...... 108
Different from Shareholder Value? … 110 与股东价值不同？... 110
Why Move to Enlightened Shareholder Value? … 111 为什么要转向开明的股东价值？... 111
B. Pluralistic Stakeholderism … 114 B.
Stakeholder Welfare as an End … 114 利益相关者的福利是最终目的 ... 114
Conceptual Problems … 116 概念问题 ... 116
a. Who Is a Stakeholder? … 116 a.谁是利益相关者？... 116
b. The Ubiquity of Trade-Offs … 119 b.权衡的普遍性...... 119
c. How to Resolve Trade-Offs? … 121 c.如何解决权衡问题？... 121
d. Critical Dependence on Director Discretion … 121 d.
iII. The Brt Statement: A Meaningful Change or MOSTLY FOR SHOW? … 124 iII.布尔特声明：有意义的变革还是仅仅为了做秀？... 124
A. A Turning Point? … 124 A.转折点？... 124
B. Pluralistic or Merely Instrumental? … 127 B.多元化还是单纯的工具性？... 127
C. Denial of Trade-Offs … 129 C.
D. Lack of Board Approval … 130 D.缺乏董事会批准...... 130
E. Corporate Governance Guidelines … 133 E.
F. Disregard of Legal Constraints … 137 F.无视法律约束...... 137
IV. An Illusory Promise … 139 IV.虚幻的承诺...... 139
A. Director Incentives … 140 A.
Compensation … 140 补偿 ... 140
Labor and Control Markets … 143 劳动力和控制市场...... 143
B. CEO Incentives … 147 B.
Compensation … 148 补偿 ... 148
Labor and Control Markets … 153 劳动力和控制市场...... 153
C. Learning from the Past … 155 C.以史为鉴...... 155
D. Fixing Incentives? … 158 D.解决激励问题？... 158
Redesigning Executive Pay? … 158 重新设计高管薪酬？... 158
Changing Director Election Rules? … 161 改变董事选举规则？... 161
V. The Perils of Stakeholderism … 164 V.
A. Increased Insulation and Reduced Accountability … 164 A.
B. Chilling Stakeholder-Protecting Reforms … 168 B.
Stakeholder-Protecting Reforms … 168
How Stakeholderism Would Impede Reforms … 171
Are Stakeholder-Protecting Reforms Attainable? … 173 保护利益相关者的改革能否实现？... 173
CONCLUSION … 176 结论...... 176
[W]e share a fundamental commitment to all of our stake-holders. We commit to . . . . deliver value to all of them, for thefuture success of our companies, our communities and ourcountry.-Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of aCorporation ^(1){ }^{1} [我们对所有利益相关者有着共同的基本承诺。我们承诺......为所有利益相关者创造价值，使我们的公司、社区和国家在未来取得成功。
Introduction 导言
There are growing concerns about the adverse effects that corporations impose on stakeholders. By stakeholders we refer throughout this Article to all non-shareholder constituencies of the corporation-including employees, customers, suppliers, communities, and the environment. With growing inequality, large-scale losses of jobs and dislocations in the labor markets, rising climate change risks, and increasingly concentrated 企业对利益相关者造成的负面影响日益受到关注。本文中的利益相关者是指公司的所有非股东群体，包括员工、客户、供应商、社区和环境。随着不平等现象的加剧、工作岗位的大规模减少和劳动力市场的混乱、气候变化风险的上升，以及利益相关者的集中度越来越高，企业对利益相关者造成的负面影响越来越受到关注。
markets, capitalism is operating, as one prominent observer recently put it, in “a world on fire.” ^(2){ }^{2} 正如一位著名观察家最近所说的那样，资本主义是在 "一个着火的世界 "中运作的。 ^(2){ }^{2}
Those who are deeply concerned about how corporations affect stakeholders, and we count ourselves among them, should support efforts to ensure that capitalism works well for all corporate stakeholders. In our view, the most effective way to do so is by adopting laws, regulations and government poli-cies-such as labor-protecting laws, consumer-protecting regulations, and carbon-reducing taxes-aimed at protecting stakeholder groups. Such “external” interventions would constrain and incentivize companies to act in ways that would improve the welfare of stakeholders. 那些深切关注企业如何影响利益相关者的人--我们也是其中之一--应该支持确保资本主义为所有企业利益相关者带来良好效益的努力。我们认为，最有效的方法是通过法律、法规和政府政策，如劳动保护法、消费者保护法和减碳税等，来保护利益相关者群体。这些 "外部 "干预措施将约束和激励公司以改善利益相关者福利的方式行事。
By contrast, supporters of “stakeholder governance” or “stakeholder capitalism” put forward an alternative approach that relies on and encourages corporate leaders to make choices that would on their own protect stakeholders. In this Article, we warn against the flaws and dangers of this increasingly influential approach. Throughout this Article, we use the shorthand “stakeholderism” to refer to this approach, and we use “corporate leaders” to refer to those individuals, both directors and top executives, who make important corporate decisions. 与此相反，"利益相关者治理 "或 "利益相关者资本主义 "的支持者提出了另一种方法，即依靠并鼓励企业领导者做出能够保护利益相关者的选择。在本文中，我们将对这种影响力越来越大的方法的缺陷和危险提出警告。在本文中，我们使用速记词 "利益相关者主义 "来指代这种方法，我们使用 "公司领导者 "来指代那些做出重要公司决策的个人，包括董事和高层管理人员。
Stakeholderism naturally appeals to many because it relies on private ordering and seemingly makes external intervention unnecessary. However, as we show in this Article, stakeholderism is an ineffective and indeed counterproductive approach to protecting stakeholders; its acceptance is likely to be detrimental to stakeholders and society. 利益相关者主义自然吸引了许多人，因为它依赖于私人秩序，似乎没有必要进行外部干预。然而，正如我们在本文中所指出的，利益相关者主义是一种保护利益相关者的无效方法，甚至会适得其反；接受利益相关者主义很可能会对利益相关者和社会造成损害。
Recognizing the shortcomings and perils of stakeholderism is especially important due to the increasing support for it among corporate leaders, management advisors, and many others. In the summer of 2019, with much fanfare and massive publicity, the Business Roundtable (BRT)-the influential association of corporate chief executive officers (CEOs) ^(3){ }^{3}-announced a revision of its conception of corporate purpose. ^(4){ }^{4} The BRT CEOs committed to "lead their companies for the benefit of 由于企业领导者、管理顾问和其他许多人对利益相关者主义的支持与日俱增，认识到利益相关者主义的缺点和危险就显得尤为重要。2019 年夏天，在大张旗鼓的宣传下，具有影响力的企业首席执行官协会--商业圆桌会议（BRT） ^(3){ }^{3} 宣布修订其企业宗旨概念。 ^(4){ }^{4} BRT首席执行官们承诺 "领导他们的公司为以下方面造福
all stakeholders. ^(5){ }^{5} Moving away from a long-standing statement that explicitly embraced shareholder primacy, ^(6){ }^{6} the new BRT statement committed to “deliver value” not just to shareholders but also to employees, customers, suppliers, and communities. ^(7){ }^{7} The BRT statement was presented by its authors, and characterized by many commentators, as a major milestone in the evolution of the modern corporation. ^(8){ }^{8} 所有利益相关者。 ^(5){ }^{5}^(6){ }^{6} 新的 BRT 声明摒弃了长期以来明确支持股东至上的声明，承诺不仅要为股东，还要为员工、客户、供应商和社区 "创造价值"。 ^(7){ }^{7} BRT声明的作者将其称为现代公司发展过程中的一个重要里程碑，许多评论家也将其称为现代公司发展过程中的一个重要里程碑。 ^(8){ }^{8}
Following the issuance of the BRT statement, the World Economic Forum published in December 2019 a manifesto that urged companies to move from the traditional model of “shareholder capitalism” to the model of "stakeholder capitalism.“9 Also, the Reporter and advisors for the ongoing project of the Restatement of the Law, Corporate Governance (hereinafter Restatement of Corporate Governance Law”) are considering the introduction of stakeholderist elements into the restatement. ^(10){ }^{10} And a memorandum by the law firm Wachtell, Lipton declared 2019 to be a “watershed year” in corporate governance due to “the advent of stakeholder governance.” ^(11){ }^{11} BRT 声明发布后，世界经济论坛于 2019 年 12 月发表了一份宣言，敦促公司从传统的 "股东资本主义 "模式转向 "利益相关者资本主义 "模式。9 此外，正在进行的《公司治理法重述》（以下简称《公司治理法重述》）项目的报告人和顾问正在考虑在重述中引入利益相关者主义元素。 ^(10){ }^{10} 而 Wachtell, Lipton 律师事务所的一份备忘录宣布，由于 "利益相关者治理的出现"，2019 年将成为公司治理的 "分水岭"。 ^(11){ }^{11}
To assess the merits of stakeholderism, we conduct in this Article an economic, empirical, and conceptual analysis of stakeholderism, its expected consequences, and the claims made by its supporters. Our analysis indicates that 为了评估利益相关主义的优点，我们在本文中对利益相关主义、其预期后果及其支持者的主张进行了经济、经验和概念分析。我们的分析表明
stakeholderism should be expected to produce only illusory benefits as well as seriously detrimental effects. 利益相关主义只会带来虚幻的好处和严重的负面影响。
Some might view the ongoing debate on stakeholderism as being waged between those who side with stakeholders and those who side with shareholders, and might therefore view us, given our opposition to stakeholderism, as siding with shareholder interests over stakeholder interests. But such portrayal of our position would be seriously mistaken. To be sure, the position of some opponents of stakeholderism is grounded in their belief that stakeholder protection does not raise serious policy concerns and is best left entirely to market forces and private contracts. ^(12){ }^{12} We believe, however, that the effects of corporations on stakeholders do raise serious policy concerns and that addressing these concerns should be a first-order goal. 有些人可能会认为，目前关于利益相关者主义的辩论是在利益相关者一方和股东一方之间展开的，因此，鉴于我们反对利益相关者主义，可能会认为我们是站在股东利益一边，而不是利益相关者利益一边。但这种对我们立场的描述是大错特错的。可以肯定的是，一些利益相关者主义反对者的立场是基于他们认为利益相关者保护不会引发严重的政策问题，最好完全交由市场力量和私人契约来解决。 ^(12){ }^{12} 然而，我们认为，公司对利益相关者的影响确实会引发严重的政策问题，而解决这些问题应该是首要目标。
We are friends, not foes, of stakeholder interests, and we suspect that we take stakeholder concerns more seriously than many supporters of stakeholderism. If corporate law reforms could be an effective instrument for addressing such concerns, we would support such reforms. Our opposition to stakeholderism comes precisely because stakeholderism should not be expected to offer such a useful instrument. As the analysis of this Article shows, stakeholderism should be expected to be an ineffective and indeed counterproductive way to address stakeholder concerns. While stakeholderism would not produce material benefits for stakeholders, it would introduce illusory hopes, misperceptions, and distractions that would have significant adverse effects on stakeholders. Rejection of stakeholderism, we explain, is thus especially important for those who care deeply about stakeholder interests. ^(13){ }^{13} 我们是利益相关者利益的朋友，而不是敌人，而且我们认为我们比许多利益相关主义的支持者更认真地对待利益相关者的关切。如果公司法改革能成为解决这些问题的有效手段，我们会支持这种改革。我们之所以反对利益相关者主义，正是因为利益相关者主义不应该被期望提供这样一个有用的工具。正如本文的分析所显示的，利益相关者主义应该是一种解决利益相关者问题的无效方式，甚至是适得其反的方式。虽然利益相关者主义不会给利益相关者带来实质性的利益，但它会给利益相关者带来虚幻的希望、误解和干扰，从而对利益相关者产生严重的负面影响。因此，我们解释说，拒绝利益相关者主义对于那些深切关注利益相关者利益的人来说尤为重要。 ^(13){ }^{13}
Whereas many supporters of stakeholderism are motivated solely by concerns for stakeholder welfare, the support by some corporate leaders and management advisors might be at least partly motivated by other considerations. In particular, some of the corporate support for stakeholderism might be partly motivated by the prospects that acceptance of stakeholderism would advance a managerialist agenda and/or deflect the demand for stakeholder-protecting external interventions. Our analysis highlights these expected consequences of the acceptance of stakeholderism. Moreover, we show that, although these expected consequences might drive some of the management support for stakeholderism, they should lead others, especially those who are focused on stakeholder concerns, to oppose stakeholderism rather than support it. 尽管许多利益相关者主义的支持者完全是出于对利益相关者利益的考虑，但一些公司领导和管理顾问的支持可能至少部分是出于其他考虑。特别是，一些企业支持利益相关者主义的部分动机可能是，接受利益相关者主义会推进管理主义议程和/或转移对保护利益相关者的外部干预的需求。我们的分析强调了接受利益相关主义的这些预期后果。此外，我们还表明，尽管这些预期后果可能会促使部分管理层支持利益相关者主义，但它们也会导致其他人，尤其是那些关注利益相关者问题的人，反对而不是支持利益相关者主义。
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the evolution of stakeholderism and the broad support it has received among academics, practitioners, business leaders, and policymakers. We then discuss how stakeholderism provided the basis for antitakeover legislation adopted in the 1980s and 1990s by a majority of U.S. states. Finally, we discuss how and why support for stakeholderism has been rising substantially in recent years. The long-standing debate on stakeholderism is now at a critical juncture, and its influence and acceptance could well grow in the coming years. 本文其余部分内容如下。第一部分介绍了利益相关主义的演变过程，以及它在学术界、从业者、商界领袖和政策制定者中获得的广泛支持。然后，我们讨论了利益相关主义如何为 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代美国大多数州通过的反收购立法奠定了基础。最后，我们将讨论利益相关主义的支持率近年来如何以及为何大幅上升。关于利益相关者主义的长期争论现在正处于关键时刻，其影响力和接受度在未来几年很可能会增加。
Part II discusses two different versions of stakeholderism. Although we show that the promise of each of them (including the version that is “more ambitious”) is illusory, it is useful to distinguish between them for a discussion of their internal conceptual problems. According to the “enlightened shareholder value” version, corporate leaders should take into account stakeholder interests as a means to maximize shareholder value. Such an instrumental version of stakeholderism, we show, is not conceptually or operationally different from the traditional shareholder value principle, and there seem to be no good reasons for restating this principle in the language of enlightened shareholder value. 第二部分讨论了利益相关主义的两个不同版本。尽管我们表明，每种版本（包括 "更雄心勃勃 "的版本）的承诺都是虚幻的，但将它们区分开来对讨论其内部概念问题还是有帮助的。根据 "开明的股东价值 "版本，企业领导者应将利益相关者的利益作为实现股东价值最大化的一种手段。我们认为，这种工具性的利益相关者主义与传统的股东价值原则在概念和操作上并无不同，而且似乎也没有充分的理由用 "开明的股东价值 "来重述这一原则。
According to the second version, by contrast, corporate leaders can and should regard stakeholder interests as ends in themselves. This view, which we call “pluralistic,” posits that the welfare of each stakeholder group has independent value, and consideration for stakeholders might entail providing them with some benefits at the expense of shareholders. This version is the one that in theory-though, as we shall show, not in practice-could lead to decisions that would benefit stakehold- 相比之下，第二种观点认为，公司领导者可以而且应该将利益相关者的利益本身视为目的。这种观点我们称之为 "多元化"，它认为每个利益相关者群体的福利都具有独立的价值，考虑利益相关者可能需要牺牲股东的利益来为他们提供一些好处。这种观点在理论上--尽管我们将指出，在实践中并非如此--可能会导致有利于利益相关者的决策。
ers beyond what would be useful for shareholder value maximization. 这超出了股东价值最大化的需要。
We also discuss in Part II some conceptual problems and difficulties with pluralistic stakeholderism and its implementation. In particular, stakeholderists have commonly avoided the difficult issue of determining which groups should be considered stakeholders, leaving this decision to the discretion of corporate leaders; have tended to overlook the ubiquity of situations that present trade-offs between the interests of some stakeholders and long-term shareholder value; and have generally not provided a method to aggregate or balance the interests of different constituencies in the face of such trade-offs, leaving this matter again to the discretion of corporate leaders. Thus, the effects of pluralistic stakeholderism would critically depend on how corporate leaders choose to exercise discretion, and thus an evaluation of pluralistic stakeholderism must be grounded in an analysis of how corporate leaders should be expected to do so. 在第二部分中，我们还讨论了多元化利益相关者及其实施过程中的一些概念性问题和困难。特别是，利益相关者通常回避了确定哪些群体应被视为利益相关者这一难题，而将这一决定权留给了公司领导者的自由裁量权；他们往往忽视了在一些利益相关者的利益与长期股东价值之间存在权衡的普遍情况；他们通常没有提供一种方法，在面临这种权衡时综合或平衡不同支持者的利益，而将这一问题再次留给了公司领导者的自由裁量权。因此，多元利益相关者主义的效果关键取决于公司领导者如何选择行使自由裁量权，因此对多元利益相关者主义的评估必须以分析公司领导者应如何行使自由裁量权为基础。
Before examining the effects of stakeholderism in general, Part III considers the expected effects of the widely celebrated BRT statement. Based on evidence that we collected, and on a close reading of the statement and accompanying materials, we show that the BRT statement was mostly for show, largely representing a rhetorical public relations move, rather than the harbinger of meaningful change. 在研究利益相关者主义的总体效果之前，第三部分探讨了广受赞誉的快速公交声明的预期效果。根据我们收集到的证据，以及对该声明及其附带材料的仔细解读，我们发现快速公交声明主要是做做样子，在很大程度上代表了一种修辞上的公共关系举措，而不是有意义变革的先兆。
For example, our survey of corporations joining the BRT statement indicates that CEOs chose to sign the statement largely without seeking either advance board approval or subsequent board ratification: this behavior is consistent with CEOs perceiving the BRT statement as not requiring any meaningful changes to their company’s treatment of stakeholders. Similarly, our review of all the corporate governance guidelines of public companies joining the BRT statement, including the many companies that revised their guidelines in the year since the issuance of the statement, indicates that the guidelines mostly continue to reflect a shareholder primacy approach. 例如，我们对加入 BRT 声明的公司进行的调查表明，首席执行官们选择签署该声明时，基本都没有事先征得董事会的同意，也没有随后征得董事会的批准：这种行为与首席执行官们认为 BRT 声明并不要求其公司在对待利益相关者方面做出任何有意义的改变是一致的。同样，我们对所有加入 BRT 声明的上市公司的公司治理准则（包括在声明发布后一年内修订准则的许多公司）的审查表明，这些准则大多继续反映股东至上的方针。
The view that the BRT statement was mostly for show, and was not expected by signatories to bring about significant changes, is also supported by our examination of the statement and accompanying documents. In particular, this view is supported by (i) the ambiguity of the statement and accompanying documents regarding the critical question of whether companies should provide stakeholders with any benefits beyond what would be useful for shareholder value; (ii) the disregard of 我们对 BRT 声明及其附带文件的审查也支持这样的观点，即 BRT 声明主要是为了做秀， 签署方并不指望它能带来重大变化。特别是，支持这一观点的因素包括：(i) 声明及随附文件在公司是否应向利益相关者提供任何超出股东价值的利益这一关键问题上含糊不清；(ii) 声明及随附文件忽视了 "利益相关者 "这一概念；(iii) 声明及随附文件忽视了 "利益相关者 "这一概念。
the ubiquity of trade-offs between stakeholder and shareholder interests; and (iii) the lack of attention to legal constraints that preclude many companies from approaching stakeholder interests as an independent end. 利益相关者利益与股东利益之间的权衡无处不在；以及 (iii) 缺乏对法律限制的关注，这使得许多公司无法将利益相关者利益作为独立的目的。
Putting aside the effects of the BRT statement, Part IV turns to examine the potential effects of stakeholderism in general. We present an economic and empirical analysis of how corporate leaders should be expected to use discretion to protect stakeholder interests. We show and empirically document that corporate leaders (both directors and CEOs) have strong incentives to enhance shareholder value but little incentive to treat stakeholder interests as an independent end. Therefore, we argue, corporate leaders have significant incentives not to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value, and they should therefore not be expected to use their discretion to do so. ^(14){ }^{14} 抛开 BRT 声明的影响不谈，第四部分转而研究利益相关者主义的总体潜在影响。我们从经济学和实证角度分析了企业领导者应如何利用自由裁量权保护利益相关者的利益。我们通过实证分析表明，公司领导者（包括董事和首席执行官）有强烈的动机提高股东价值，但却没有什么动机将利益相关者的利益作为一个独立的目标。因此，我们认为，公司领导者有很大的动机不为利益相关者谋取超出股东价值的利益，因此不应期望他们利用自由裁量权这样做。 ^(14){ }^{14}
We then discuss the findings of empirical work that we have conducted together with Kobi Kastiel to examine what we can learn from the past behavior of corporate leaders. ^(15){ }^{15} In particular, we examine the choices that corporate leaders have made in connection with transactions governed by constituency statutes that, adopting a stakeholderist regime, authorize corporate leaders to give weight to stakeholder interests in negotiating a sale of their company. ^(16){ }^{16} Our empirical work analyzes the terms of over one hundred such acquisitions to identify for whom corporate leaders bargained and for whom they did not bargain. 然后，我们将讨论我们与科比-卡斯提尔（Kobi Kastiel）共同开展的实证研究的结果，以探讨我们可以从企业领导者过去的行为中学到什么。 ^(15){ }^{15} 特别是，我们研究了公司领导者在受选区章程管辖的交易中做出的选择，这些选区章程采用利益相关者制度，授权公司领导者在公司出售谈判中重视利益相关者的利益。 ^(16){ }^{16} 我们的实证研究分析了一百多宗此类收购的条款，以确定公司领导者为谁讨价还价，又没有为谁讨价还价。
This empirical investigation finds that corporate leaders negotiated to obtain gains for shareholders as well as for themselves. However, corporate leaders generally did not use their negotiating power to benefit employees, suppliers, communi- 这项实证调查发现，公司领导者通过谈判为股东和自身谋取利益。然而，企业领导者一般不会利用他们的谈判权来为员工、供应商、社区和其他利益相关者谋取利益。
ties, the environment or any other stakeholders. This evidence reinforces the conclusion of our incentive analysis that, even when encouraged to do so by stakeholderism, corporate leaders should not be expected to use discretion to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholders. 这些证据强化了我们的激励分析结论，即即使在利益相关者主义的鼓励下，也不应期望公司领导者利用自由裁量权为利益相关者谋取超出股东利益的利益。这些证据加强了我们的激励分析结论，即即使在利益相关者主义的鼓励下，也不应期望公司领导者利用自由裁量权为利益相关者谋取超出股东利益的利益。
The business corporation has proven itself to be a powerful and adaptive mechanism for producing economic growth and prosperity. For this reason, some might be attracted to stakeholderism in the hope that, by harnessing corporate power, stakeholderism can lead corporations to serve as a similarly effective engine for protecting stakeholder interests. However, the past success of corporations has been based on the presence of effective incentives for corporate decision makers. By contrast, with corporate leaders having incentives not to benefit stakeholders at shareholders’ expense, an attempt to benefit stakeholders by delegating the guardianship of their interests to corporate leaders would not be supported, but rather impeded, by the force of economic incentives. 事实证明，商业公司是促进经济增长和繁荣的强大适应机制。因此，一些人可能会被利益相关主义所吸引，希望通过利用企业的力量，利益相关主义能够引导企业成为保护利益相关者利益的同样有效的引擎。然而，企业过去的成功是建立在对企业决策者有效激励的基础之上的。相比之下，由于公司领导者有不以牺牲股东利益为代价为利益相关者谋利的激励机制，因此，试图通过将利益相关者利益的监护权交给公司领导者来为利益相关者谋利的做法不会得到经济激励机制的支持，反而会受到经济激励机制力量的阻碍。
Finally, whereas stakeholderists have generally advocated relying on corporate leaders to protect stakeholders without a major overhaul of existing systems of incentives, including those resulting from shareholders’ exclusive voting power, Part IV concludes by discussing the possibility of supplementing stakeholderism with reforms aimed at substantially changing the incentives of corporate leaders. We examine changes both to executive pay arrangements and to the rules governing the election of directors. Designing reforms that would provide leaders with adequate incentives to attach independent weight to the interests of all stakeholders, we show, would be quite challenging as well as very costly. 最后，利益相关者通常主张依靠公司领导人来保护利益相关者，而无需对现有的激励制度（包括股东专有投票权所产生的激励制度）进行大刀阔斧的改革，第四部分最后讨论了用旨在大幅改变公司领导人激励机制的改革来补充利益相关者主义的可能性。我们研究了对高管薪酬安排和董事选举规则的改革。我们发现，设计改革措施，为公司领导者提供足够的激励，使其独立地重视所有利益相关者的利益，将是一项相当具有挑战性的工作，而且成本非常高昂。
In Part V we turn to discussing the perils of stakeholderism. It might be argued that stakeholderism, even if it does not provide significant benefits to stakeholders, cannot hurt and might only move things on the margin in the right direction. As Part V shows, however, accepting stakeholderism would be substantially detrimental to shareholders, stakeholders, and society. 在第五部分，我们将讨论利益相关者主义的危害。也许有人会说，利益相关者主义即使不能给利益相关者带来重大利益，也不会造成伤害，而只会使事情朝着正确的方向发展。然而，正如第五部分所示，接受利益相关者主义将对股东、利益相关者和社会造成重大损害。
We first explain that acceptance of stakeholderism would make corporate leaders less accountable and more insulated from investor oversight. Indeed, in supporting stakeholderism, some corporate leaders and advisors might be partly motivated by the desire to obtain such insulation. Stakeholderism has been used to urge institutional investors to be more deferential to corporate leaders and more willing to side with them in any 我们首先要解释的是，接受利益相关主义会降低公司领导者的责任感，使其更加不受投资者的监督。事实上，一些公司领导人和顾问支持利益相关者主义的部分动机可能就是希望获得这种隔绝。利益相关主义被用来敦促机构投资者对公司领导者更加恭顺，在任何情况下更愿意站在他们一边。
engagement with hedge fund activists. In addition, stakeholderism has been used as a basis for justifying corporate and legal arrangements that insulate corporate leaders and for urging institutional investors and public officials to support such arrangements. 与对冲基金激进分子的接触。此外，利益相关者主义还被用来为保护企业领导者的企业和法律安排辩护，并敦促机构投资者和政府官员支持这些安排。
The increased insulation from shareholders, and the reduced accountability to them, would serve the private interests of corporate leaders, but not those of others. Increased insulation and reduced accountability would increase managerial slack and agency costs, thus undermining economic performance and thereby damaging both shareholders and stakeholders. The danger is that, by cloaking it in stakeholder clothing, stakeholderism would advance a managerialist agenda, thus facilitating a new managerial era. 加强与股东的隔绝，减少对股东的问责，有利于公司领导人的私人利益，但不利于其他人的利益。加强隔离和减少问责会增加管理松弛和代理成本，从而损害经济绩效，进而损害股东和利益相关者的利益。危险的是，利益相关主义披上利益相关者的外衣，将推动管理主义议程，从而促成一个新的管理时代。
We then discuss the danger that acceptance of stakeholderism would have a chilling effect on the prospects of legal, regulatory and policy reforms that could provide real, meaningful protection for stakeholders. By raising illusory hopes regarding its positive effects for stakeholders, stakeholderism could well weaken pressures and demands for such reforms and the openness of policymakers to them. Thus, for those interested in addressing corporate externalities and protecting corporate stakeholders, embracing stakeholderism would be substantially counterproductive. 然后，我们讨论了这样一种危险：接受利益相关者主义会对法律、监管和政策改革的前景产生寒蝉效应，而这些改革可以为利益相关者提供真正、有意义的保护。利益相关主义会给利益相关者带来虚幻的积极影响，从而削弱对此类改革的压力和要求，以及决策者对改革的开放性。因此，对于那些有志于解决公司外部性问题和保护公司利益相关者的人来说，拥护利益相关者主义会适得其反。
Before proceeding, we should note two subjects that lie outside the scope of our analysis but for which this analysis has significant implications. First, because our focus is on the use of stakeholder factors in decisions made by corporate leaders, our analysis does not directly address, but has implications for, the extent to which institutional investors should take such factors into account in their investment and stewardship decisions. 在继续讨论之前，我们应该注意到两个不属于我们分析范围但对我们的分析有重要影响的问题。首先，由于我们的重点是企业领导者在决策中对利益相关者因素的使用，因此我们的分析并不直接涉及机构投资者在投资和管理决策中应在多大程度上考虑这些因素，但却对其有影响。
There is now a substantial body of literature and a heated debate on the subject of socially responsible investing and stewardship. ^(17){ }^{17} Although this subject is related to the issues examined in this Article, it also raises some different questions 目前，关于社会责任投资和管理的主题已有大量文献和激烈的辩论。 ^(17){ }^{17} 虽然这一主题与本文探讨的问题有关，但它也提出了一些不同的问题
which go beyond the scope of this Article. However, our conclusions should inform the debate on this subject. To the extent that some institutional investors would like to improve how corporations treat stakeholders, our analysis indicates that supporting and relying on stakeholderism would fail to produce such outcomes. If (and to the extent that) institutional investors wish to secure such outcomes, a different approach would be necessary. 这超出了本文的讨论范围。不过，我们的结论应能为有关这一问题的讨论提供参考。如果一些机构投资者希望改善公司对待利益相关者的方式，我们的分析表明，支持和依赖利益相关者主义将不会产生这样的结果。如果（而且只要）机构投资者希望取得这样的结果，就必须采取不同的方法。
Second, although our focus is on standard publicly traded for-profit companies, and we do not devote attention to benefit corporations, our analysis does have implications for assessing such corporations. ^(18){ }^{18} By incorporating a stakeholderist purpose into their legal structure, benefit corporations seek to dispel any doubt that their leaders are legally authorized to consider the interests of stakeholders when making business decisions. ^(19){ }^{19} But in discussing the promise of stakeholderism, we take it as given that rules allowing or requiring corporate leaders to benefit stakeholders would be acceptable if assigning such a role to corporate leaders would best serve social goals. And our incentive analysis shows that corporate leaders assigned such a role should not be expected to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value. Thus, our analysis suggests that, by itself, the mere incorporation of a stakeholderist purpose into a corporation’s governance documents should not be expected to deliver material benefits to stakeholders. This conclusion should give pause to those who advocate the use of benefit corporations to advance a stakeholderist agenda. ^(20){ }^{20} 其次，尽管我们的重点是标准的公开交易营利公司，而没有关注福利公司，但我们的分析确实对评估这类公司有影响。 ^(18){ }^{18} 通过在其法律结构中纳入利益相关者宗旨，福利公司试图消除人们对其领导者在做出商业决策时依法有权考虑利益相关者利益的任何怀疑。 ^(19){ }^{19} 但是，在讨论利益相关者主义的承诺时，我们认为，如果赋予公司领导者这样的角色能够更好地服务于社会目标，那么允许或要求公司领导者为利益相关者谋福利的规则是可以接受的。而我们的激励分析表明，不应期望被赋予这种角色的公司领导者在为股东价值服务之外还能为利益相关者谋利。因此，我们的分析表明，仅仅将利益相关者宗旨纳入公司治理文件本身，并不能为利益相关者带来实质性利益。这一结论应该让那些主张利用利益公司来推进利益相关者议程的人暂停一下。 ^(20){ }^{20}
I
The Rise of Stakeholderism 利益相关主义的兴起
A.起源、演变和支持的广泛性
A. Origins, Evolution, and Breadth of Support ^(21){ }^{21}
In the early history of the U.S. corporation, recognition of the corporate form-and of its most important feature: limited liability-was strictly connected with the notion of public benefit. 22 This idea was rooted in English precedent, which drew a distinction between enterprises of direct benefit to public welfare and those aimed at making private profits, and viewed only the former as deserving the privilege of corporate personhood. ^(23){ }^{23} The argument, as transplanted into American legal thought and practice, was that limited liability was an extraordinary and undemocratic privilege, and only a prevailing public interest could justify it. ^(24){ }^{24} 在美国公司的早期历史中，对公司形式及其最重要的特征--有限责任--的承认与公共 利益的概念密切相关。22 这一理念植根于英国的先例，英国将直接造福于公共福利的企业与以牟取私利为目的的企业区分开来，认为只有前者才值得享有公司法人的特权。 ^(23){ }^{23} 移植到美国法律思想和实践中的论点是，有限责任是一种特殊的、不民主的特权，只有普遍的公共利益才能证明它的合理性。 ^(24){ }^{24}
This early conception was gradually abandoned with the passing of general incorporation acts, which enabled enterprises to adopt the corporate form without previous authorization by the state. ^(25){ }^{25} At that point, corporate personhood was no longer a privilege individually received from the state but a form of business organization generally available to all enterprises. ^(26){ }^{26} By the beginning of the 1920s, the idea that the main purpose of the business corporation was to make profits for shareholders was widely accepted and sanctioned by case law. ^(27){ }^{27} 随着《一般公司法》的通过，这种早期概念逐渐被放弃，该法使企业无需事先获得国家授权即可采用公司形式。 ^(25){ }^{25} 此时，公司法人身份不再是个人从国家获得的特权，而是所有企业普遍可以采用的一种商业组织形式。 ^(26){ }^{26} 到 20 世纪 20 年代初，商业公司的主要目的是为股东赚取利润这一观点已被广泛接受，并得到判例法的认可。 ^(27){ }^{27}
As discussed below in this Section, however, a competing conception of stakeholderism has been evolving in subsequent decades. It has received support from scholars (in law, management, and finance), practitioners, and thought leaders, and has had influence on lawmaking. 然而，正如本节下文所讨论的，在随后的几十年中，利益相关主义的另一种概念也在不断发展。它得到了（法律、管理和金融）学者、从业人员和思想领袖的支持，并对法律制定产生了影响。
In legal scholarship, support for stakeholderism goes back to the seminal and influential work of Merrick Dodd. ^(28){ }^{28} In the modern era, notable supporters of stakeholderism are Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, who have argued forcefully for abandoning shareholder primacy in a series of well-known works. ^(29){ }^{29} Other notable works by legal scholars in support of stakeholderism include those by Einer Elhauge, Simon Deakin, and Cynthia Williams. ^(30){ }^{30} 在法律学术界，对利益相关者主义的支持可以追溯到梅里克-多德（Merrick Dodd）具有开创性和影响力的著作。 ^(28){ }^{28} 在现代，利益相关者主义的著名支持者是玛格丽特-布莱尔和林恩-斯托特，他们在一系列著名的著作中有力地论证了放弃股东至上的观点。 ^(29){ }^{29} 法律学者支持利益相关者主义的其他著名作品包括 Einer Elhauge、Simon Deakin 和 Cynthia Williams 的作品。 ^(30){ }^{30}
In the management literature, an important strain has developed a “stakeholder approach” to strategic management. In a highly influential book with a long-lasting impact, R. Edward Freeman introduces this approach, according to which managers of business organizations must take into account the interests and the role of "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose."31 To help turn this approach into measurable management practices, subsequent studies have proposed various metrics for scoring performance with respect to stakeholder welfare. ^(32){ }^{32} 在管理文献中，一种重要的倾向是提出了战略管理的 "利益相关者方法"。爱德华-弗里曼（R. Edward Freeman）在一本影响深远的著作中介绍了这一方法，根据该方法，企业组织的管理者必须考虑到 "能够影响组织目标的实现或受其影响的任何群体或个人 "的利益和作用。 ^(32){ }^{32}
Finally, prominent economists and finance scholars have recently advocated reorienting the purpose of the corporation. 最后，著名经济学家和金融学者最近主张重新定位公司的宗旨。
A recent book by Colin Mayer, for example, argues that the purpose of business should be to "produc[e] profitable solutions to problems of people and planet. ^(33){ }^{33} Alex Edmans, in another recent book, suggests that the purpose of corporations should be to create value for society-and, by doing so, increase profits as a by-product. ^(34){ }^{34} And a recent book by Rebecca Henderson advocates reimagining capitalism so that companies “embrac[e] a pro-social purpose beyond profit maximization and tak[e] responsibility for the health of the natural and social systems.” ^("" ")^(35){ }^{\text {" }}{ }^{35} 例如，科林-梅耶（Colin Mayer）最近出版的一本书认为，企业的目的应该是 "为人类和地球问题提供有利可图的解决方案"。 ^(33){ }^{33} 亚历克斯-埃德曼斯（Alex Edmans）在最近出版的另一本书中提出，企业的目的应该是为社会创造价值，并以此作为副产品增加利润。 ^(34){ }^{34} 而丽贝卡-亨德森（Rebecca Henderson）最近出版的一本书则主张重新认识资本主义，让企业 "在追求利润最大化的同时，拥抱亲社会的目的，为自然和社会系统的健康承担责任"。 ^("" ")^(35){ }^{\text {" }}{ }^{35}
Turning from scholarship to lawmaking, stakeholderism has already had a significant impact. During the hostile takeover era of the 1980s and 1990s, stakeholderism provided the basis for antitakeover legislation: most states adopted statutes that explicitly allowed directors to consider the interests of other constituencies when making a decision on an acquisition of the company or, more generally, on any issue. ^(36){ }^{36} Importantly, as documented by Mark Roe and Roberta Romano, this legislative development was in part the result of lobbying efforts by management interests seeking to insulate managers from the threat of hostile takeovers. ^(37){ }^{37} 从学术研究转向法律制定，利益相关主义已经产生了重大影响。在 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的恶意收购时代，利益相关主义为反收购立法提供了基础：大多数州都通过了法规，明确允许董事在就公司收购或更广泛的任何问题做出决策时，考虑其他支持者的利益。 ^(36){ }^{36} 重要的是，正如马克-罗（Mark Roe）和罗伯塔-罗曼诺（Roberta Romano）所记录的那样，这一立法发展在一定程度上是管理层利益集团游说的结果，目的是使管理者免受敌意收购的威胁。 ^(37){ }^{37}
These statutes-commonly known as stakeholder statutes, constituency statutes, or other constituency statutes-are often presented as a clarification of the “interests of the corporation” that directors have the duty to serve. ^(38){ }^{38} The interests of the corporation, the statutes make clear, include the interests of employees, customers, suppliers, and sometimes creditors, local communities, or even the whole economy or nation. ^(39){ }^{39} 这些法规--通常称为利益相关者法规、选区法规或其他选区法规--通常是作为对董事有责任服务的 "公司利益 "的澄清而提出的。 ^(38){ }^{38} 这些法规明确指出，公司利益包括员工、客户、供应商的利益，有时还包括债权人、当地社区甚至整个经济或国家的利益。 ^(39){ }^{39}
While stakeholderist views thus had an actual impact already in prior decades, their impact on rules and behavior is likely to grow substantially in coming years as we now turn to discuss. 虽然利益相关者的观点在过去几十年中已经产生了实际影响，但正如我们现在要讨论的那样，它们对规则和行为的影响在未来几年中可能会大幅增长。
B. A Critical Juncture B.紧要关头
Despite the academic support for stakeholderism and its impact on antitakeover legislation, at the turn of the twentyfirst century shareholder primacy was still the dominant view. At that time, both supporters of shareholder primacy and proponents of stakeholderism agreed that the consensus among scholars leaned toward the former. ^(40){ }^{40} And although management interests played a key role in the adoption of constituency statutes, the BRT’s 1997 statement on corporate purpose declared that serving shareholders was "the paramount duty of . . . directors."41 尽管学术界支持利益相关者主义及其对反收购立法的影响，但在 21 世纪之交，股东优先仍是主流观点。当时，股东至上主义的支持者和利益相关者主义的支持者都认为，学者们的共识倾向于前者。 ^(40){ }^{40} 虽然管理层利益在选区法规的通过中发挥了关键作用，但1997年BRT关于公司宗旨的声明宣称，为股东服务是"......董事的首要职责 "41。
In the past decade, however, stakeholderism has been on the rise, especially in terms of its acceptance by corporate executives, management advisors, and policy thought leaders. The 2019 statement of the BRT, which committed to "deliver value to all [stakeholders], ^(42){ }^{42} has been widely viewed as a significant milestone in this trend, a break with decades of orthodoxy, and a turning point for corporate America. ^(43){ }^{43} The significance of the BRT statement was reinforced by the fact that its U.S.-based signatories led corporations with an aggregate market capitalization exceeding $11\$ 11 trillion and over one-third of total market capitalization in the U.S. equity markets. ^(44){ }^{44} 然而，在过去的十年中，利益相关者主义一直在崛起，尤其是在企业高管、管理顾问和政策思想领袖对其的接受程度方面。BRT 2019 年声明承诺 "为所有[利益相关者]创造价值"， ^(42){ }^{42} 被广泛认为是这一趋势中的一个重要里程碑，打破了几十年来的正统观念，是美国企业的一个转折点。 ^(43){ }^{43} BRT声明在美国的签署者所领导的公司总市值超过 $11\$ 11 万亿美元，占美国股票市场总市值的三分之一以上，这一事实强化了该声明的重要性。 ^(44){ }^{44}
In the following months, other prominent organizations officially backed stakeholderism. The World Economic Foruman international organization comprising many major global corporations and thought leaders-issued a manifesto urging companies to abandon the traditional model of “shareholder capitalism.” ^(45){ }^{45} The manifesto called instead for a model of stakeholder capitalism, and the executive chairman of the World Economic Forum even likened the session focusing on the subject to “the funeral of shareholder capitalism.” 46 在接下来的几个月里，其他著名组织也正式支持利益相关者主义。世界经济论坛（World Economic Forum）是一个由全球许多大型企业和思想领袖组成的国际组织，该组织发表了一份宣言，敦促企业放弃传统的 "股东资本主义 "模式。 ^(45){ }^{45} 宣言呼吁改用利益相关者资本主义模式，世界经济论坛执行主席甚至将关注这一主题的会议比作 "股东资本主义的葬礼"。46
The British Academy-the United Kingdom’s national body for the humanities and social sciences-issued a report championing a “revisitled] . . . contract between business and society.” ^(47){ }^{47} The report promoted accountability to all constituencies and advocated changes in corporate law and governance that would require directors to consider the interests of all stakeholders. ^(48){ }^{48} 英国科学院--英国的国家人文和社会科学机构--发布了一份报告，倡导 "重新界定].企业与社会之间的契约"。 ^(47){ }^{47} 该报告提倡对所有利益相关者负责，并主张修改公司法和公司治理，要求董事考虑所有利益相关者的利益。 ^(48){ }^{48}
These developments have been accompanied by growing support for stakeholderism among institutional investors as well. For example, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, issued a letter to all CEOs exhorting them to be “committed to embracing purpose and serving all stakeholders.” ^(49){ }^{49} Given these developments, it is unsurprising that when the American Law Institute began its project of Restatement of Corporate Governance Law last year, the project started examining the question of corporate purpose and the appropriate role that stakeholder interests should play in director decision making. ^(50){ }^{50} In short, it seems that, as a post coauthored by Martin Lipton recently stated, 2019 was a “watershed year in the evolution of corporate governance” due to the “advent of stakeholder governance.” ^(51){ }^{51} 在这些发展的同时，机构投资者也越来越支持利益相关者主义。例如，全球最大的资产管理公司贝莱德（BlackRock）的首席执行官拉里-芬克（Larry Fink）致信所有首席执行官，告诫他们要 "致力于实现目标并为所有利益相关者服务"。 ^(49){ }^{49} 鉴于这些事态发展，美国法学会去年开始实施《公司治理法重述》项目时，开始研究公司目的问题以及利益相关者的利益在董事决策中应发挥的适当作用，也就不足为奇了。 ^(50){ }^{50} 简而言之，正如马丁-利普顿（Martin Lipton）最近与他人合著的一篇文章所言，2019 年似乎是 "公司治理演变的分水岭"，原因是 "利益相关者治理的出现"。 ^(51){ }^{51}
What is driving the growing support for stakeholderism over the past decade? One driver, we believe, is the increasing concerns about the effects that companies and the corporate economy have on stakeholders, as well as the interest in and demand for, reforms to address them. ^(52){ }^{52} This makes stakeholderism, which relies on private decision making and avoids regulation, potentially appealing to many. A second driver is the interest among some corporate leaders and their advisors to use stakeholderism “strategically” to insulate corporate leaders from shareholder oversight and to impede or delay stakeholder-protecting reforms that would constrain companies’ choices. 是什么促使利益相关者主义在过去十年中得到越来越多的支持？我们认为，其中一个驱动因素是人们越来越关注公司和企业经济对利益相关者的影响，以及人们对改革以解决这些问题的兴趣和需求。 ^(52){ }^{52} 这使得依靠私人决策和避免监管的利益相关者主义对许多人具有潜在的吸引力。第二个驱动因素是，一些公司领导人及其顾问希望 "战略性地 "利用利益相关主义，使公司领导人免受股东监督，并阻碍或推迟利益相关者保护改革，从而限制公司的选择。
We discuss both of these aspects in Part V. In any event, whatever the drivers of the rise of stakeholderism, the debate might well have reached a critical juncture. These developments motivate this Article. As we explain in the following pages, despite its appeal to many, stakeholderism would actually be detrimental for shareholders, stakeholders, and society alike. 我们将在第五部分讨论这两方面的问题。无论如何，无论利益相关主义的兴起是出于何种原因，这场辩论很可能已经到了关键时刻。这些发展促使我们撰写本文。正如我们在下文中所解释的，尽管利益相关主义对很多人有吸引力，但它实际上对股东、利益相关者和社会都是有害的。
II
Alternative Versions and Conceptual Problems II
替代版本和概念问题
This Part distinguishes between two basic versions of stakeholderism and discusses the conceptual problems of each. Although defenses of stakeholderism are often unclear on which version they support, ^(53){ }^{53} the two approaches are conceptually distinct; a separate discussion of them is thus useful. In subparts II.A and II.B below, we describe “instrumental stakeholderism” and “pluralistic stakeholderism” respectively, and the conceptual problems afflicting them. 本部分区分了利益相关主义的两种基本版本，并讨论了每种版本的概念问题。尽管利益相关者主义的辩护者往往不清楚他们支持的是哪种版本， ^(53){ }^{53} 但这两种方法在概念上是截然不同的；因此，对它们进行单独讨论是有益的。在下文第 II.A 和 II.B 小节中，我们将分别介绍 "工具利益相关者主义 "和 "多元利益相关者主义"，以及困扰它们的概念问题。
A. Instrumental Stakeholderism A.工具利益相关者主义
1. Enlightened Shareholder Value 1.启迪股东价值
The relationship between a corporation and its stakeholders is, to some extent, mutually beneficial. Stakeholders depend on the corporation for jobs, salaries, sale orders, products 公司与其利益相关者之间的关系在某种程度上是互惠互利的。利益相关者依赖公司提供工作、工资、销售订单、产品和服务。
and services, loan payments, and positive spillover effects. ^(54){ }^{54} At the same time, the corporation depends on its stakeholders for financial and human capital, institutional infrastructure, and revenues, and it cannot operate and make profit without a certain degree of social and political recognition and trust. 和服务、贷款支付以及积极的溢出效应。 ^(54){ }^{54} 同时，公司的财务和人力资本、制度基础设施和收入都依赖于利益相关者，没有一定程度的社会和政治认可与信任，公司就无法运营和盈利。
It is thus unsurprising that maximizing long-term value for shareholders requires paying close attention to the effects of the company’s operations on stakeholders. For example, how the company treats employees could well affect its ability to attract, retain, and motivate the members of its labor force; how the company deals with customers could affect its ability to attract and retain them; and how the company deals with local communities or the environment could well affect its reputation and standing in ways that could be important for its success. Thus, it is undeniable that, to effectively serve the goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value, corporate leaders should take into account stakeholder effects-as they should consider any other relevant factors. 因此，要使股东的长期价值最大化，就必须密切关注公司运营对利益相关者的影响。例如，公司如何对待员工可能会影响其吸引、留住和激励劳动力的能力；公司如何对待客户可能会影响其吸引和留住客户的能力；公司如何对待当地社区或环境可能会影响其声誉和地位，而这对公司的成功至关重要。因此，不可否认的是，为了有效实现提高股东长期价值的目标，公司领导者应考虑利益相关者的影响，正如他们应考虑任何其他相关因素一样。
In light of the relevance of stakeholder effects for shareholder value, the “enlightened shareholder value” approach proposes that corporate leaders follow a decision rule that contains an explicit reference to the interests of stakeholders. A prominent example of this approach is the 2006 United Kingdom Companies Act, which lists factors that directors should consider in seeking to enhance shareholder value. ^(55){ }^{55} These factors, which include “the interests of the company’s employees” and “the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment,” are meant to be non-exhaustive examples of potentially relevant stakeholder effects. ^(56){ }^{56} Importantly, directors are called to consider such factors in order "to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its Ishareholders]."57 In other words, consideration of these factors is a means to the end of shareholder welfare. ^(58){ }^{58} Another important development is that the American Law Institute is currently 鉴于利益相关者效应与股东价值的相关性，"开明的股东价值 "方法建议公司领导者遵循明确提及利益相关者利益的决策规则。这种方法的一个突出例子是 2006 年英国《公司法》，其中列出了董事在寻求提高股东价值时应考虑的因素。 ^(55){ }^{55} 这些因素包括 "公司员工的利益 "和 "公司运营对社区和环境的影响"，它们并不是利益相关者潜在影响的详尽例子。 ^(56){ }^{56} 重要的是，要求董事考虑这些因素是为了 "促进公司的成功，为股东谋福利"。 ^(58){ }^{58} 另一个重要发展是，美国法学会目前正在
considering an enlightened shareholder value approach for the Restatement of Corporate Governance Law. ^(59){ }^{59} 为《公司治理法重述》考虑一种开明的股东价值方法。 ^(59){ }^{59}
2. Different from Shareholder Value? 2.与股东价值不同？
Given the positive connotations of the term “enlightened,” enlightened shareholder value sounds better than shareholder value. However, enlightened shareholder value is not conceptually different from the “old-fashioned” shareholder value (i.e., shareholder primacy) view. Whenever treating stakeholders well in a given way would be useful for long-term shareholder value, such treatment would be called for under either enlightened shareholder value or “old-fashioned” shareholder value. And whenever treating stakeholders well would not be useful for long-term shareholder value, such treatment would not be called for under either enlightened shareholder value or oldfashioned shareholder value. 鉴于 "开明 "一词的积极含义，开明股东价值听起来比股东价值更好。然而，开明股东价值在概念上与 "老式 "股东价值（即股东至上）观点并无不同。只要以特定方式善待利益相关者有利于实现长期股东价值，那么无论是开明股东价值还是 "老式 "股东价值都会要求这样做。而当善待利益相关者对长期股东价值无益时，开明的股东价值或 "老式 "股东价值都不会要求善待利益相关者。
In other words, enlightened shareholder value is only a particular articulation of shareholder value. Maximizing longterm shareholder value would sometimes call for closing plants and other times for improving employment terms. Such stake-holder-favoring decisions, however-exactly like their stake-holder-disfavoring counterparts-would only be as good as their instrumental value to shareholders. Enlightened shareholder value is thus no different from shareholder value tout court. 换句话说，开明的股东价值只是股东价值的一种特殊表述。要实现长期股东价值最大化，有时需要关闭工厂，有时需要改善雇佣条件。然而，这种有利于利益相关者的决策--就像不利于利益相关者的决策一样--对股东的工具价值越大，其效果就越好。因此，开明的股东价值与普通的股东价值并无不同。
Even Milton Friedman, the Nobel laureate who famously opposed corporate social responsibility, acknowledged that shareholder value maximization may sometimes call for stake-holder-friendly decisions. ^(60){ }^{60} As long as such decisions are taken to increase shareholder value, he did not view them as a deviation from the exclusive focus on shareholder value maximization he strongly advocated. Thus, Friedman would not have a problem with any choices made under enlightened shareholder value, as they would also be choices required by shareholder value. 即使是著名的反对企业社会责任的诺贝尔奖得主米尔顿-弗里德曼也承认，股东价值最大化有时可能需要做出有利于利益相关者的决策。 ^(60){ }^{60} 只要这些决策是为了增加股东价值，他就不认为这些决策偏离了他大力倡导的只关注股东价值最大化的原则。因此，弗里德曼对在开明股东价值下做出的任何选择都不会有意见，因为这些选择也是股东价值所要求的。
3. Why Move to Enlightened Shareholder Value? 3.为什么要转向启迪股东价值？
Having shown that enlightened shareholder value is conceptually equivalent to shareholder value, are there good reasons to restate the latter using the particular language of the former? Below we identify and discuss three potential reasons (not mutually exclusive) for such a move. 在证明开明股东价值在概念上等同于股东价值之后，是否有充分的理由使用前者的特定语言重述后者？下面我们将指出并讨论这样做的三个潜在理由（并不相互排斥）。
First, some supporters of enlightened shareholder value might hold the view that referring explicitly to stakeholder effects would have informational and educational value that would improve corporate decision making. ^(61){ }^{61} According to this view, corporate leaders have tended to systematically underappreciate the significance of stakeholder effects for long-term value. Moving to a principle of enlightened shareholder value could thus potentially highlight and make salient the relevance of stakeholder effects and thereby make corporate leaders more likely to take them fully into account. 首先，一些开明股东价值的支持者可能认为，明确提及利益相关者效应具有信息和教育价值，可以改善公司决策。 ^(61){ }^{61} 根据这种观点，公司领导者往往系统性地低估了利益相关者效应对长期价值的重要性。因此，转向开明股东价值原则可能会突出利益相关者效应的重要性，从而使公司领导者更有可能充分考虑到这些效应。
But is there a basis for believing that corporate leaders have systematically underestimated the relevance of stakeholder effects for shareholder value maximization? Consider, for example, the language of the British company law provision whose example the Restatement of Corporate Governance Law project is considering following. ^(62){ }^{62} This provision instructs directors to pursue shareholder value, reminds them that stakeholder effects may be relevant for assessing how best to pursue this goal, yet does not explicitly mention any of the other factors that unquestionably may be relevant in many situations. Is there a good reason for holding that corporate leaders need to be reminded that stakeholder effects are a relevant factor for long-term value-maximization but need no reminding of any other relevant factors? 但是，我们是否有理由相信，公司领导者系统性地低估了利益相关者效应对股东价值最大化的相关性呢？举例来说，《公司治理法重述》项目正在考虑效仿英国公司法条款的措辞。 ^(62){ }^{62} 该条款指示董事追求股东价值，提醒他们利益相关者的影响可能与评估如何以最佳方式实现这一目标有关，但却没有明确提及在许多情况下无疑可能相关的任何其他因素。是否有充分的理由认为，需要提醒公司领导人利益相关者的影响是长期价值最大化的一个相关因素，而不需要提醒他们任何其他相关因素？
In response to our discussion above, Alex Edmans argued that stakeholder effects often involve the assessment of intangibles and significant uncertainties. ^(63){ }^{63} However, intangibles and significant uncertainties are also involved in assessing other factors such as effects on the value of the company’s 针对我们的上述讨论，亚历克斯-埃德曼斯（Alex Edmans）认为，利益相关者的影响往往涉及对无形资产和重大不确定性的评估。 ^(63){ }^{63} 然而，无形资产和重大不确定性在评估其他因素时也会涉及，例如对公司价值的影响。
brands and the company’s intellectual property. ^(64){ }^{64} Yet we doubt that anyone would support a restatement of corporate purpose that would include an explicit listing of effects on the value of brands and intellectual property as relevant factors for long-term value maximization. 品牌和公司知识产权的影响。 ^(64){ }^{64} 然而，我们怀疑是否有人会支持重述公司宗旨，将对品牌和知识产权价值的影响明确列为长期价值最大化的相关因素。
Other than for stakeholder effects, stakeholderists are generally reluctant to tell corporate leaders which factors they should consider to maximize shareholder value. For all factors other than stakeholder effects, stakeholderists seem to believe that corporate leaders are likely to be in the best position to assess what is the best way to maximize value, and which factors are relevant to achieve such a goal. Supporters of enlightened shareholder value maximization are yet to provide a persuasive reason for why stakeholder effects should be singled out for special attention. 除了利益相关者效应之外，利益相关者主义者一般不愿意告诉公司领导者应该考虑哪些因素来实现股东价值最大化。对于利益相关者效应以外的所有因素，利益相关者似乎认为，公司领导者可能最有能力评估什么是实现价值最大化的最佳方式，以及哪些因素与实现这一目标相关。开明的股东价值最大化支持者尚未提出有说服力的理由，说明为何要特别关注利益相关者的影响。
Second, some might reason that enlightened shareholder value, although formally preserving director loyalty to shareholders, would provide moral support and practical coverage for directors who wish to offer some benefits to stakeholders at the expense of shareholders. According to this view, because courts generally avoid second-guessing the decisions of directors, ^(65){ }^{65} the language of enlightened shareholder value would enable and perhaps encourage directors to protect stakeholders beyond what would be desirable for long-term shareholder value maximization. 其次，有些人可能会认为，开明股东价值虽然在形式上维护了董事对股东的忠诚，但会为那些希望以牺牲股东利益为代价为利益相关者提供某些利益的董事提供道义支持和实际保障。根据这种观点，由于法院通常避免对董事的决定进行二次猜测， ^(65){ }^{65} 开明股东价值的措辞将使董事能够保护利益相关者，甚至鼓励董事保护利益相关者，使其超出长期股东价值最大化的理想范围。
This reasoning, however, is flawed. Under both enlightened shareholder value and shareholder value, directors are able to justify a stakeholder-friendly decision on the grounds that it would contribute to long-term shareholder value. Thus, a move to the language of enlightened shareholder value would not expand the justifications available to corporate leaders for favoring stakeholders. Furthermore, given the broad deference that Delaware law-the law governing most public companies ^(66" - gives to managerial decisions under the business judg- "){ }^{66 \text { - gives to managerial decisions under the business judg- }} ment rule, corporate leaders do not practically face a 然而，这种推理是有缺陷的。在开明股东价值和股东价值下，董事都能以有利于长期股东价值为由，为有利于利益相关者的决策辩护。因此，改用开明股东价值的措辞不会扩大公司领导者偏袒利益相关者的理由。此外，鉴于特拉华州法律--管理大多数上市公司的法律 ^(66" - gives to managerial decisions under the business judg- "){ }^{66 \text { - gives to managerial decisions under the business judg- }} 所规定的广泛服从性，公司领导者实际上并不面临以下问题
significant risk of not being able to justify their decision to a reviewing court. ^(67){ }^{67} 很有可能无法向复审法院证明其决定的合理性。 ^(67){ }^{67}
Moreover, it is doubtful that there are many corporate leaders interested in finding ways to justify stakeholder-friendly decisions beyond those that really serve long-term shareholder value. As we will show in Part IV, corporate leaders have incentives not to favor stakeholders at the expense of shareholders. 此外，除了那些真正有利于股东长期价值的决策之外，是否有许多公司领导者有兴趣为那些有利于利益相关者的决策寻找合理的解释，也是值得怀疑的。正如我们将在第四部分指出的那样，公司领导者有动机不以牺牲股东利益为代价来偏袒利益相关者。
Third, a move to a principle of enlightened shareholder value might be favored on the grounds that it would yield rhetorical and political gains. Whereas the first two motivations discussed above focus on how the move could potentially affect corporate decisions (despite the conceptual equivalence between enlightened shareholder value and shareholder value), this third motivation focuses on how the move could improve the way companies are perceived by outsiders. The prospect of improved corporate image could motivate the adoption of the enlightened shareholder value principle even if it should not be expected to have a material effect on the substance of corporate decisions. 第三，转向开明股东价值原则可能会获得支持，因为这将带来言论和政治上的好处。上文讨论的前两个动机侧重于此举可能如何影响公司决策（尽管开明股东价值与股东价值在概念上等同），而第三个动机则侧重于此举如何改善外界对公司的看法。改善公司形象的前景可能会促使采用开明股东价值原则，即使预计该原则不会对公司决策的实质产生实质性影响。
Business leaders and their advisors have long recognized the importance of how outsiders perceive corporations and their impact on stakeholders and society. About five decades ago, the Committee for Economic Development, a think tank established by business leaders, warned that “the corporation is dependent on the goodwill of society, which can sustain or impair its existence through public pressures on government.” ^(68){ }^{68} Fast forwarding to the present, BlackRock CEO, Larry Fink, recently stated that companies “[w]ithout a sense of purpose” will “lose the license to operate from key stakeholders.” 69 Given these concerns, some corporate decision makers might hope that a formal recognition of the enlightened shareholder value view would allay outsiders’ concerns about the adverse effects of corporate decisions on stakeholders and society. 商界领袖及其顾问早已认识到外界如何看待公司及其对利益相关者和社会的影响的重要性。大约五十年前，由商界领袖成立的智囊团经济发展委员会曾警告说："公司依赖于社会的善意，社会可以通过向政府施加公众压力来维持或损害公司的存在。 ^(68){ }^{68} 时至今日，贝莱德首席执行官拉里-芬克（Larry Fink）最近表示，"没有目标感 "的公司将 "失去主要利益相关者的经营许可"。69 鉴于这些担忧，一些公司决策者可能希望，对开明股东价值观的正式认可将减轻外界对公司决策对利益相关者和社会的不利影响的担忧。
However, to those interested in stakeholder protection this should be a reason for opposing this form of stakeholderism, 然而，对于那些对利益相关者保护感兴趣的人来说，这应该是反对这种形式的利益相关者主义的一个理由、
not for supporting it. Our earlier conclusion that the conceptual difference between shareholder value and enlightened shareholder value is trivial could, by itself, lead to a perception that the move from the first to the second would be neutral and inconsequential. But to the extent that it would lead outsiders to be less concerned about the effects of corporations on stakeholders, the move could well have significant adverse effects. As we explain in detail in subpart IV.B, one of these effects might be a reduced demand for meaningful legal and regulatory reforms that could effectively protect stakeholders. In this case, the adoption of the enlightened shareholder value principle would not only fail to directly improve stakeholder protection but also indirectly deteriorate the overall level of such protection. 而不是支持它。我们之前得出的结论是，股东价值与开明股东价值在概念上的差异微不足道，这一结论本身可能会让人认为，从前者转向后者将是中性的，无足轻重的。但是，如果这将导致外界对公司对利益相关者的影响不那么关注，那么这一举动很可能会产生重大的负面影响。正如我们在第四部分 B 节中所详细解释的，这些影响之一可能是减少了对能够有效保护利益相关者的有意义的法律和监管改革的需求。在这种情况下，采用开明的股东价值原则不仅不能直接改善对利益相关者的保护，反而会间接恶化这种保护的整体水平。
B. Pluralistic Stakeholderism B.多元利益攸关方主义
1. Stakeholder Welfare as an End 1.以利益相关者的福利为目的
A conceptually different version of stakeholderism treats stakeholder welfare as an end in itself rather than a mere means. According to this view, the welfare of each group of stakeholders is relevant and valuable independently of its effect on the welfare of shareholders. We call this approach “pluralistic,” because it provides directors with a plurality of independent constituencies and requires them to weigh and balance a plurality of autonomous ends. 与此概念不同的利益相关者理论认为，利益相关者的福利本身就是目的，而不仅仅是手段。根据这种观点，每个利益相关者群体的福利都是相关的、有价值的，与其对股东福利的影响无关。我们称这种方法为 "多元化"，因为它为董事提供了多个独立的支持者，并要求他们权衡和平衡多个自主的目的。
Some important examples of the pluralistic approach are the constituency statutes adopted by many U.S. states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As noted in Part I, these statutes allow directors to take into account the interests of stakeholders without limiting the relevance of these interests to their effect on shareholders. Some statutes even explicitly specify that the rule does not require that any particular interests be given priority over others. ^(70){ }^{70} Similarly, there are academics who advocate that corporate leaders must aggregate and balance the interests of their multiple constituencies. Thus, for example, Blair and Stout argue that directors should play the role of “mediating hierarchs” who decide how to allocate the value created by the corporation between shareholders and stakeholders. ^(71){ }^{71} Other well-known supporters of the pluralistic 多元化方法的一些重要例子是美国许多州在 20 世纪 80 年代末和 90 年代初通过的选区法规。如第一部分所述，这些法规允许董事考虑利益相关者的利益，而不将这些利益的相关性局限于其对股东的影响。有些法规甚至明确规定，该规则并不要求任何特定利益优先于其他利益。 ^(70){ }^{70} 同样，也有学者主张，公司领导者必须综合平衡多方利益。例如，Blair 和 Stout 认为，董事应扮演 "调解上级 "的角色，决定如何在股东和利益相关者之间分配公司创造的价值。 ^(71){ }^{71} 其他著名的多元化支持者包括
approach include Simon Deakin, Einer Elhauge, and Colin Mayer. ^(72){ }^{72} 参与人员包括 Simon Deakin、Einer Elhauge 和 Colin Mayer。 ^(72){ }^{72}
A variation within pluralistic theories is whether directors are required or merely allowed to consider the interests of stakeholders and balance them against the interests of shareholders. The states that have adopted constituency statutes permit-but do not obligate-directors to do so. ^(73){ }^{73} We believe, however, that this difference between the two versions is not practically consequential. The business judgment rule prevents courts from second-guessing the decisions of directors, and stakeholderists in any event do not wish to provide stakeholders with the right to sue directors. Therefore, even with a rule mandating that directors give weight to stakeholder interests, the extent to which they would do so would ultimately depend on their own discretion. 多元化理论中的一个差异是，是否要求董事考虑利益相关者的利益，并将其与股东的利益相平衡，还是仅仅允许董事这样做。采用选区法规的州允许董事这样做，但并不强制董事这样做。 ^(73){ }^{73} 不过，我们认为两种版本之间的这种差异实际上并不重要。商业判断规则可以防止法院对董事的决定进行二次猜测，而利益相关者无论如何都不希望为利益相关者提供起诉董事的权利。因此，即使规定董事必须重视利益相关者的利益，他们在多大程度上会这样做最终还是取决于他们自己的自由裁量权。
This reliance on the role of discretion is significant because the task that stakeholderism assigns to corporate leaders is Herculean. ^(74){ }^{74} As we explain in the next Section, pluralistic stakeholderism relies on directors to make the hard choices necessary to define the groups of stakeholders whose interests should be taken into account and then to weigh and balance these interests, which are often difficult to measure, in the vast number of situations in which trade-offs arise. This task would be immensely difficult even if corporate leaders were highly motivated to take it on, which, as we shall show in Part IV, is not the case. 这种对自由裁量权作用的依赖非常重要，因为利益相关者主义赋予公司领导者的任务是艰巨的。 ^(74){ }^{74} 正如我们在下一节中解释的那样，多元利益相关者主义依赖于董事们做出必要的艰难抉择，以确定利益相关者群体的利益应得到考虑，然后在出现权衡的大量情况下权衡和平衡这些通常难以衡量的利益。即使公司领导人有很高的积极性来承担这项任务，这项工作也是非常困难的，但正如我们将在第四部分所述，情况并非如此。
2. Conceptual Problems 2.概念问题
a. Who Is a Stakeholder? a.谁是利益相关者？
The first difficulty in the implementation of pluralistic stakeholderism is the determination of the stakeholder groups whose interests should be taken into account. Without first making such a determination, directors cannot proceed to aggregate and balance the relevant interests. 实施利益相关者多元化的第一个困难是确定哪些利益相关者群体的利益应得到考虑。如果不先行确定，董事们就无法着手汇总和平衡相关利益。
To highlight the difficulty involved in this task, Table 1 lists all groups of stakeholders specified by the thirty-two constituency statutes in force in the United States as of December 2019. 为凸显这项任务的难度，表 1 列出了截至 2019 年 12 月美国现行的 32 项选区法规所规定的所有利益攸关方群体。
Table 1. Stakeholder Groups in the Constituency Statutes 表 1.选区章程中的利益相关群体
MO ("similar contractual relations"), NY (retired employees and other benefit recipients) 密苏里州（"类似合同关系"），纽约州（退休雇员和其他福利领取者）
2
Catch-all 全部
AZ, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN, ME, NV, OR, PA, TN, VT, WI, WY 亚利桑那州、科罗拉多州、佛罗里达州、加拉加斯州、伊利诺伊州、内华达州、我州、内华达州、或州、帕劳州、田纳西州、佛蒙特州、威斯康星州、怀俄明州
14
Group or factor States No. of statutes
Employees AZ, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY 31
Customers AZ, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY 31
Suppliers CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, NE, NV, NJ, NM, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY 28
Creditors CT, GA, HI, IA, KY, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, PA, RI, SD, VT, WY 22
Local community CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, ME, MD, MO, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY 22
Society AZ, CT, HI, KY, MA, MN, MS, NV, ND, OH, OR, TX, VT 13
Economy of the state or the nation FL, HI, KY, MA, MN, MS, NV, NM, ND, OH, SD, VT 12
Environment AZ, TX 2
Other MO ("similar contractual relations"), NY (retired employees and other benefit recipients) 2
Catch-all AZ, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN, ME, NV, OR, PA, TN, VT, WI, WY 14| Group or factor | States | No. of statutes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Employees | AZ, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY | 31 |
| Customers | AZ, CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY | 31 |
| Suppliers | CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, NE, NV, NJ, NM, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY | 28 |
| Creditors | CT, GA, HI, IA, KY, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, PA, RI, SD, VT, WY | 22 |
| Local community | CT, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, ME, MD, MO, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WI, WY | 22 |
| Society | AZ, CT, HI, KY, MA, MN, MS, NV, ND, OH, OR, TX, VT | 13 |
| Economy of the state or the nation | FL, HI, KY, MA, MN, MS, NV, NM, ND, OH, SD, VT | 12 |
| Environment | AZ, TX | 2 |
| Other | MO ("similar contractual relations"), NY (retired employees and other benefit recipients) | 2 |
| Catch-all | AZ, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN, ME, NV, OR, PA, TN, VT, WI, WY | 14 |
The table summarizes which groups of stakeholders are identifled in the constituency statutes in force as of December 2019. 下表概述了截至 2019 年 12 月生效的选区章程中确定的利益攸关方群体。
All statutes list employees and customers as stakeholders, and most include suppliers as well. As for other groups, however, the statutes vary significantly. Many states mention creditors and local communities, but many do not. Some states allow directors to consider the effect of their decisions on society in general or on the economy of the state or the nation, but most do not. And some provisions are especially idiosyncratic; the New York statute, for example, allows directors to consider “the corporation’s retired employees and other beneficiaries re- 所有法规都将员工和客户列为利益相关者，大多数法规还包括供应商。然而，对于其他群体，各州的法规差异很大。许多州提及债权人和当地社区，但也有许多州没有提及。有些州允许董事考虑其决策对整个社会或州或国家经济的影响，但大多数州不允许。有些规定尤其特立独行；例如，纽约州的法规允许董事考虑 "公司的退休雇员和其他受益人"。
ceiving or entitled to receive” benefits sponsored by the corporation. 获得或有权获得 "公司赞助的福利。
Most notably, almost half of the states include an explicit catchall phrase that permits directors to consider any other (unidentified) groups or factors not listed in the statute. ^(75){ }^{75} The existence of this phrase indicates that the lawmakers were uncertain regarding the appropriate delineation of the set of stakeholder groups. 最值得注意的是，几乎有一半的州包含了一个明确的 "总括 "短语，允许董事考虑法规中未列出的任何其他（未指明的）群体或因素。 ^(75){ }^{75} 这一短语的存在表明，立法者对利益相关者群体的适当划分并不确定。
As commonly understood, the term “stakeholders” refers to individuals who are affected by corporate decisions. ^(76){ }^{76} But what counts as being affected by corporate decisions? Clearly, for many public companies, the set of individuals who are directly and indirectly affected by the activities of the corporation is very large indeed. Furthermore, as the examples below indicate, any attempt to delineate the set of relevant stakeholders will confront difficult and challenging questions that have no clear answer. 按照通常的理解，"利益相关者 "是指受企业决策影响的个人。 ^(76){ }^{76} 但什么才算受公司决策影响呢？显然，对于许多上市公司来说，受公司活动直接或间接影响的个人群体确实非常庞大。此外，正如下面的例子所示，任何试图界定相关利益相关者群体的尝试，都会面临困难和挑战性的问题，而这些问题并没有明确的答案。
Consider, for example, a plan to relocate a plant to another region. In addition to the negative effects of the plant relocation on the plant’s current employees and the community in which the plant is currently located, should the company’s leaders also take into account the positive effects on the employees of the new plant and on the community in which the new plant would operate? Would the answer to this question change if the new location were overseas? 例如，考虑将工厂搬迁到另一个地区的计划。除了考虑工厂搬迁对工厂现有员工和工厂所在社区的负面影响外，公司领导是否还应考虑对新工厂员工和新工厂所在社区的积极影响？如果新厂设在海外，这个问题的答案是否会改变？
To consider another example, suppose that a company is contemplating a plan that would expand its market share and the number of its employees and would result in a decline in a competitor’s revenues and number of employees. Should corporate leaders pay attention to the plan’s negative effects on the competitor’s employees, suppliers, or shareholders? For 再举一个例子，假设一家公司正在考虑一项计划，该计划将扩大公司的市场份额和员工人数，并将导致竞争对手的收入和员工人数下降。公司领导是否应该关注该计划对竞争对手的员工、供应商或股东造成的负面影响？对于
yet another example, consider the environmental impact of a company’s operations. Should the company’s leaders take into account the effects on the residents of faraway countries or only on those living in the United States? 再比如，考虑公司运营对环境的影响。公司的领导者是否应该考虑到对遥远国家居民的影响，还是只考虑对生活在美国的居民的影响？
Finally, consider the dimension of time. It is common to include a company’s current employees, suppliers, and customers among relevant stakeholders. But should former (or at least recent) employees, suppliers, and customers count as well? And what about potential future employees, suppliers, and customers? 最后，考虑时间因素。通常情况下，利益相关者包括公司的现有员工、供应商和客户。但以前（或至少是最近）的员工、供应商和客户是否也应计算在内？未来的潜在员工、供应商和客户又该如何？
Such questions must be resolved for any implementation of pluralistic stakeholderism. However, they are clearly difficult to answer, and any answers to them would likely be highly contestable. Stakeholderists have largely avoided offering answers to these questions, or even a methodology for reaching such answers. Instead, supporters of pluralistic stakeholderism have largely dealt with these questions by assigning them to corporate leaders to resolve at their discretion. Similarly, state constituency statutes have chosen to delegate to directors broad discretion to identify the relevant stakeholders. ^(77){ }^{77} Thus, on this matter, as in others to be presently discussed, stakeholderism critically relies on the discretion of corporate leaders and thus reinforces the importance of assessing (as we do in Part IV) how corporate leaders should be expected to use their discretion. 要实施多元化的利益相关者制度，就必须解决这些问题。然而，这些问题显然难以回答，而且任何答案都可能极具争议性。利益相关者在很大程度上回避了对这些问题的回答，甚至回避了得出这些答案的方法论。相反，多元化利益相关者主义的支持者在处理这些问题时，大多将其交给企业领导者自行解决。同样，各州的选区法规也选择将确定相关利益相关者的广泛自由裁量权授予董事。 ^(77){ }^{77} 因此，在这一问题上，正如我们接下来要讨论的其他问题一样，利益相关者主义在很大程度上依赖于公司领导者的自由裁量权，从而加强了评估（正如我们在第四部分中所做的）公司领导者应如何使用其自由裁量权的重要性。
b. The Ubiquity of Trade-Offs b.权衡的普遍性
Once the relevant stakeholders are identified, stakeholderism requires that their interests be weighed and balanced. Such an exercise raises very difficult questions regarding conflicts between groups of stakeholders and between stakeholders and shareholders, which stakeholderists have largely avoided by leaving their solution, again, to the discretion of corporate leaders. We conjecture that the limited attention devoted to this problem is due to an inaccurate perception that conflicts and trade-offs between shareholders and stakeholders are infrequent. The BRT statement, for example, explicitly de- 一旦确定了相关的利益相关者，利益相关主义就要求权衡和平衡他们的利益。这种做法提出了利益相关者群体之间以及利益相关者与股东之间的冲突等非常棘手的问题，而利益相关者主义者在很大程度上回避了这些问题，同样将其留给企业领导者自行解决。我们猜测，之所以对这一问题的关注有限，是因为人们错误地认为股东与利益相关者之间的冲突和权衡并不常见。例如，BRT 声明明确指出
nies the possibility that the interests of shareholders and stakeholders can clash in the long run. ^(78){ }^{78} 从长远来看，股东和利益相关者的利益有可能发生冲突。 ^(78){ }^{78}
This view, however, is unsupported. In fact, potential trade-offs between shareholders and stakeholders are ubiquitous. Even after adopting all the stakeholder-friendly policies that are expected to improve long-term shareholder value (that is, after carrying out instrumental stakeholderism to its fullest extent), companies will commonly face many opportunities to provide some stakeholders with benefits that will come at the expense of shareholders. 然而，这种观点并不成立。事实上，股东与利益相关者之间的潜在权衡无处不在。即使公司采取了所有有利于利益相关者的政策来提高股东的长期价值（即在最大程度地贯彻工具性利益相关者主义之后），公司通常也会面临许多机会，为某些利益相关者提供利益，而这些利益是以牺牲股东利益为代价的。
Consider a company that provides its employees with compensation and benefits at levels that fully enable it to attract and retain talented and productive employees. And suppose that this company has, as many major public companies do, a significant stream of profits that enables it to fund all necessary investments and to also pay dividends. In this common situation, if the directors were to follow pluralistic stakeholderism, they would face a trade-off. Financing an increase in employee compensation by reducing dividends would make employees somewhat better off and shareholders somewhat worse off. Trade-offs and conflicts of this kind are likely to be very common. 假设一家公司为员工提供的薪酬和福利水平完全能够吸引和留住有才能、有生产力的 员工。同时，假设这家公司和许多大型上市公司一样，拥有可观的利润流，使其能够为所有必要的投资提供资金，并支付股息。在这种常见的情况下，如果董事们遵循多元化利益相关者原则，他们将面临一个取舍问题。通过减少分红来提高员工报酬，会使员工的境况有所改善，而股东的境况则会有所恶化。这种权衡和冲突可能非常常见。
In forming the view that trade-offs are rare and that winwin choices are generally available, stakeholderists might have been influenced by empirical work documenting an association between employee satisfaction and shareholder return, ^(79){ }^{79} as well as between social responsibility scores and company valuation. ^(80){ }^{80} However, such associations can simply be explained by the fact that some firms find it value maximizing to take certain stakeholder-friendly actions. This in no way implies, however, that all or even most potential stakeholder-friendly options would be good for shareholders. The empirical evidence is thus fully consistent with the ubiquitous presence of trade-offs. ^(79){ }^{79} 实证研究表明，员工满意度与股东回报之间存在关联，社会责任得分与公司估值之间也存在关联。 ^(80){ }^{80} 不过，这种关联可以简单地解释为，一些公司认为采取某些有利于利益相关者的行动可以实现价值最大化。但是，这绝不意味着所有甚至大多数潜在的利益相关者友好型方案都对股东有利。因此，经验证据完全符合权衡的普遍存在。
c. How to Resolve Trade-Offs? c.如何解决折衷问题？
How should corporate leaders resolve the ubiquitous tradeoffs they would face under a pluralistic rule? This is another challenging question that must be addressed by whoever wishes to implement pluralistic stakeholderism. 在多元化规则下，企业领导者应如何解决无处不在的权衡问题？这是另一个具有挑战性的问题，无论谁想实施多元利益相关者主义，都必须解决这个问题。
Consider the following questions. How are directors supposed to assess the effects of their decisions on their various stakeholders? Should all stakeholder effects be converted into a monetary equivalent to enable comparison? If so, how should directors monetarize nonfinancial effects such as employees’ psychological well-being, the effects of increased employment on local crime rates, or the expected effects of the company’s emissions on global warming? ^(81){ }^{81} Furthermore, how should directors do the balancing? Should they seek to maximize the aggregate welfare of the different groups regardless of where the gains and losses from decisions fall? Or should they try to ensure that value is distributed among various constituencies in a certain way? 请考虑以下问题。董事应如何评估其决策对各利益相关者的影响？是否应将所有利益相关者的影响转换成货币等价物，以便进行比较？如果是这样，那么董事应该如何将非财务影响货币化，例如员工的心理健康、增加就业对当地犯罪率的影响，或者公司排放对全球变暖的预期影响？ ^(81){ }^{81} 此外，董事应如何进行平衡？他们是否应该寻求最大化不同群体的总体福利，而不考虑决策带来的收益和损失？还是应该努力确保价值以某种方式在不同群体之间进行分配？
Rather than devoting much attention to developing a methodology for aggregating and balancing the interests of diverse constituencies, stakeholderists commonly deal with this issue by leaving the resolution of trade-offs to the judgment and discretion of corporate leaders. For example, Blair and Stout expressly oppose the adoption of a rule or a criterion for resolving trade-offs, arguing that directors should be accorded broad discretion on this matter. ^(82){ }^{82} It is left unsaid, however, how directors should use their discretion to make these decisions and how outsiders should evaluate how well directors perform their role. 利益相关者通常不重视制定汇总和平衡不同支持者利益的方法，而是将解决权衡问题的办法留给公司领导者去判断和斟酌。例如，Blair 和 Stout 明确反对采用一种规则或标准来解决权衡问题，他们认为在这个问题上应该给予董事广泛的自由裁量权。 ^(82){ }^{82} 但是，他们没有说明董事应如何利用其自由裁量权做出这些决定，以及外部人士应如何评价董事履行职责的情况。
d. Critical Dependence on Director Discretion d.对董事自由裁量权的严重依赖
As discussed above in this subpart, both the determination of the relevant stakeholder groups and any attempt to balance 如上文本分节所述，确定相关利益群体以及试图平衡
their interests in the ubiquitous situations in which trade-offs arise involve difficult questions which stakeholderists commonly avoid. Rather than develop methodologies or suggestions as to how corporate leaders should confront such choices, stakeholderists leave them to the discretion of directors without attempting to assist directors in exercising such discretion. 在利益权衡无处不在的情况下，企业领导者如何权衡自己的利益涉及到利益相关者通常回避的棘手问题。利益相关者并没有就企业领导者如何面对这些选择制定方法或提出建议，而是让董事自行决定，而不试图帮助董事行使这种自由裁量权。
In his response to this Article, Colin Mayer criticizes our analysis of the above difficulties involved in implementing stakeholderism. ^(83){ }^{83} In his view, decisions-makers in general, and corporate leaders in particular, sometimes have to make difficult choices in the absence of clear answers, and the presence of such difficulties should therefore not be a basis for rejecting stakeholderism. ^(84){ }^{84} This criticism, however, fails to recognize that our discussion of these difficulties is not at all intended to provide a reason for rejecting stakeholderism. Rather, our discussion is meant to highlight that stakeholderism critically depends on the discretion of corporate leaders. 科林-迈尔在对本文的回应中，批评了我们对实施利益相关主义所涉及的上述困难的分析。 ^(83){ }^{83} 他认为，一般决策者，尤其是企业领导者，有时不得不在没有明确答案的情况下做出困难的选择，因此，这些困难的存在不应成为拒绝利益相关者主义的理由。 ^(84){ }^{84} 然而，这种批评没有认识到，我们对这些困难的讨论根本不是为了提供拒绝利益相关主义的理由。相反，我们的讨论旨在强调，利益相关主义在很大程度上取决于企业领导者的自由裁量权。
We wish to stress that the consequences of stakeholderism ultimately depend on the discretion of corporate leaders even under stakeholderist proposals that would require corporate leaders to attach independent weight to stakeholder interests. For example, both Colin Mayer and Leo Strine support legal rules mandating corporate leaders-rather than merely allowing them-to balance the interests of stakeholders and shareholders. ^(85){ }^{85} However, because Mayer and Strine (like other stakeholderists) wish to retain the business judgment rule’s insulation of the decisions of corporate leaders from scrutiny and second-guessing by courts, 86 corporate leaders would practically still have broad discretion as to how much weight to attach to stakeholder interests. 我们要强调的是，利益相关者主义的后果最终取决于公司领导者的自由裁量权，即使是在要求公司领导者独立重视利益相关者利益的利益相关者主义建议下也是如此。例如，科林-梅耶（Colin Mayer）和利奥-斯特林（Leo Strine）都支持制定法律规则，强制要求公司领导者平衡利益相关者和股东的利益，而不仅仅是允许他们这样做。 ^(85){ }^{85} 然而，由于梅耶尔和斯特林（与其他利益相关者主义者一样）希望保留商业判断规则对公司领导者决策的保护，使其免受法院的审查和猜疑，因此，86 公司领导者实际上仍将拥有广泛的自由裁量权，决定在多大程度上重视利益相关者的利益。
Both Mayer and Strine also believe that the imposition of a duty to attach independent weight to stakeholder interests would lead to the development of norms supporting compliance with such a duty. ^(87){ }^{87} On this view, earlier shareholder-centric Mayer 和 Strine 还认为，规定对利益相关者的利益给予独立重视的责任，将导致支持遵守这种责任的规范的发展。 ^(87){ }^{87} 根据这一观点，早先以股东为中心的
legal rules created shareholder-centric norms, whereas the imposition of a stakeholderist duty would produce a change in norms that would practically “force” corporate leaders to deliver benefits to stakeholders even in the absence of judicial enforcement. 法律规则创造了以股东为中心的规范，而利益相关者责任的实施将产生规范的变化，即使在没有司法强制执行的情况下，也会实际上 "迫使 "公司领导者为利益相关者带来利益。
However, prevailing norms to serve shareholder value have been supported by the system of robust incentives to serve shareholder value that we analyze in Part IV. By contrast, norms to balance the interests of shareholders with those of stakeholders would be resisted by and in tension with this incentive system. Furthermore, given the complexity of corporate decision-making and the information asymmetry between corporate leaders and outsiders, it would be difficult for the latter to determine whether the former are attempting in good faith to strike an adequate balance of interests. Thus, there is a good basis for expecting that, under a rule mandating corporate leaders to balance the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, the benefits actually obtained by stakeholders would practically depend on the discretion of corporate leaders. ^(88){ }^{88} 然而，服务于股东价值的现行规范得到了我们在第四部分分析的服务于股东价值的强大激励体系的支持。相比之下，平衡股东利益与利益相关者利益的准则会受到这种激励制度的抵制，并与之产生矛盾。此外，鉴于公司决策的复杂性以及公司领导者与外部人之间的信息不对称，外部人很难判断公司领导者是否在真诚地努力实现利益的充分平衡。因此，我们有充分的理由预期，在强制要求公司领导者平衡股东和利益相关者利益的规则下，利益相关者实际获得的利益实际上将取决于公司领导者的自由裁量权。 ^(88){ }^{88}
Once we recognize the critical dependence of stakeholderism on the discretion of corporate leaders, we must conclude that any evaluation of stakeholderism, and any support for it, should be based on a prior analysis of how corporate leaders should be expected to use their discretion. We carry out such an assessment in the subsequent two Parts. 一旦我们认识到利益相关主义对企业领导者自由裁量权的关键依赖性，我们就必须得出这样的结论：对利益相关主义的任何评估以及对其的任何支持，都应基于对企业领导者应如何使用其自由裁量权的事先分析。我们将在随后的两部分中进行这样的评估。
III
The BRT Statement: A Meaningful Change or
MOSTLY FOR SHOW? III
BRT 声明：有意义的变革还是
主要是作秀？
A. A Turning Point? A.转折点？
The BRT statement was widely viewed by many observers as a major milestone and a significant turning point for corporate America. Prominent media outlets described the statement as: 许多观察家普遍认为，BRT 的声明是一个重要的里程碑，是美国企业的一个重要转折点。知名媒体将该声明描述为
a “major philosophical shift” (Wall Street Journa); ^(89){ }^{89} 哲学上的重大转变"（《华尔街日报》）； ^(89){ }^{89}
a “significant shift” and one that broke “with decades of long-held corporate orthodoxy” (New York Times); ^(90){ }^{90} 这是一个 "重大转变"，打破了 "几十年来企业长期坚持的正统观念"（《纽约时报》）； ^(90){ }^{90}
“[t]he loudest reform call yet from inside the system” and “a potential sea change,” which was “so significant and so welcome” (Washington Post); ^(11){ }^{11} 这是 "来自系统内部的最响亮的改革呼声 "和 "潜在的巨变"，"意义重大，值得欢迎"（《华盛顿邮报》）； ^(11){ }^{11}
“a major change in thinking” (Financial Times); ^(92){ }^{92} "思维的重大转变"（《金融时报》）； ^(92){ }^{92}
“a big change in the way corporate leadership is acting” (CNBC Television); ^(96){ }^{96} "企业领导层的行为方式发生了巨大变化"（CNBC 电视台）； ^(96){ }^{96}
“toss[ing] the old [corporate purpose] into the dustbin” (Fortune); ^(97){ }^{97} and "将旧的（企业宗旨）扔进垃圾箱"（《财富》）； ^(97){ }^{97} 以及
a “revolutionary . . . moment in business” (Forbes). ^(98){ }^{98} 是 "商业的革命性..时刻"（《福布斯》）。 ^(98){ }^{98}
A year later, the BRT statement was still portrayed by media observers as a "historic . . . commitment,"99 one that "jettison[ed] [the BRT’s] prior focus on shareholders above all others"100 and “struck many as potentially revolutionary” ^(101){ }^{101} or even “an important step toward renewing the social compact of the United States.” ^(102){ }^{102} This widely held view of the BRT commitment as a significant turning point, expressed both immediately following its issuance and after the passage of significant time, was partly a product of statements made by the BRT and its leaders, which described the statement on corporate purpose as a “transformative statement”; ^(103){ }^{103} one that "mov[ed] ^(101){ }^{101} 一年后，BRT 的声明仍被媒体观察家描绘成一项 "历史性的......承诺"，99 它 "摒弃了（BRT）先前对股东的关注，将其置于其他一切之上 "100 ，"让许多人感到具有潜在的革命性" ^(101){ }^{101} ，甚至是 "向更新美国社会契约迈出的重要一步"。 ^(102){ }^{102} 人们普遍认为，BRT 的承诺是一个重要的转折点，这种观点在承诺发布后立即表达出来，并经过了相当长的时间，部分原因是 BRT 及其领导人发表的声明，他们将公司宗旨声明描述为 "变革性声明"； ^(103){ }^{103} "推动了"
away from shareholder primacy"104 and “raise[d] the bar for everyone”; ^(105){ }^{105} and “a bold declaration” with which the BRT “broadened the responsibility of corporate America to all stakeholders.” ^(106){ }^{106} ^(105){ }^{105} 和 "一个大胆的声明"，BRT "扩大了美国公司对所有利益相关者的责任"。 ^(106){ }^{106}
The CEOs who signed the statement head companies with an aggregate market capitalization exceeding $13\$ 13 trillion, including such major companies as Apple, Amazon, JPMorgan Chase, Walmart, Procter & Gamble, Exxon-Mobil, and Pfizer. ^(107){ }^{107} Thus, if the BRT statement reflected a signal of and commitment to significant changes in the treatment of stakeholders, the impact on society would be considerable. 签署该声明的首席执行官所领导的公司总市值超过 $13\$ 13 万亿美元，其中包括苹果、亚马逊、摩根大通、沃尔玛、宝洁、埃克森美孚和辉瑞等大公司。 ^(107){ }^{107} 因此，如果快速反应小组的声明反映了在对待利益相关者方面发生重大变化的信号和承诺，那么对社会的影响将是巨大的。
Therefore, before taking up the question of whether stakeholderism in general should be expected to benefit stakeholders, we discuss in this Part the narrower question of whether the BRT statement can be expected to produce such benefits. Below we analyze five dimensions of the BRT statement and accompanying materials and empirical evidence that we collected. We conclude that the BRT statement should be viewed as mostly for show rather than the harbinger of a major change. ^(108){ }^{108} 因此，在讨论一般的利益相关者主义是否会给利益相关者带来好处这一问题之前，我们先在本部分讨论一个范围较窄的问题，即 BRT 声明是否会给利益相关者带来好处。下面，我们将分析 BRT 声明的五个方面以及我们收集到的相关材料和经验证据。我们的结论是，快速公交声明主要应被视为摆设，而不是重大变革的先兆。 ^(108){ }^{108}
B. Pluralistic or Merely Instrumental? B.多元化还是仅仅是工具性的？
The statement, and the additional details published by the BRT in an explanatory note a few days later ^(109){ }^{109} are remarkably vague as to the nature and content of the commitment that is being made. The statement starts with the unobjectionable claim that corporations have effects that are socially beneficial (“creating jobs, fostering innovation and providing essential goods and services”) and then famously declares a “fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders.” ^(110){ }^{110} However, when the statement turns to describe how the signatories will treat several groups of stakeholders, the specifics of these commitments are quite vague and elusive. The statement offers nonspecific and underdefined commitments such as “meeting or exceeding customer expectations,” compensating employees “fairly” and treating them with “dignity and respect,” fostering “diversity and inclusion,” and treating suppliers “fairly and ethically.” ^(111){ }^{111} 几天后，BRT 在一份解释性说明 ^(109){ }^{109} 中公布了该声明和补充细节，但对所做承诺的性质和内容却非常模糊。该声明开宗明义地宣称，企业具有有益于社会的作用（"创造就业机会、促进创新、提供基本商品和服务"），然后又著名地宣布了 "对我们所有利益相关者的基本承诺"。 ^(110){ }^{110} 然而，当声明转而描述签署方将如何对待几类利益相关者时，这些承诺的具体内容却相当模糊，难以捉摸。声明提供了一些不具体且定义不清的承诺，如 "满足或超越客户期望"、"公平 "补偿员工并以 "尊严和尊重 "对待员工、促进 "多样性和包容性"，以及 "公平和合乎道德地 "对待供应商。 ^(111){ }^{111}
It is perhaps excessively demanding to expect detailed guidance from such a short statement. Importantly, however, the statement also fails to provide clarity on a critical question: which basic version of stakeholderism the BRT purports to endorse. Is it the instrumental approach, which supports taking stakeholder interests into account only to the extent that doing so would contribute to shareholder value? Or is it the pluralistic approach, which allows or requires directors to treat stakeholder welfare as an end in itself? The BRT statement remains ambiguous on this critical question. 期望从这样一份简短的声明中得到详细的指导，也许要求过高。然而，重要的是，该声明也未能澄清一个关键问题：BRT 试图支持哪种基本的利益相关者主义。是工具性方法，即支持只有在有利于股东价值的情况下才考虑利益相关者的利益？还是多元化方法，即允许或要求董事将利益相关者的利益本身作为目的？在这一关键问题上，BRT 的声明仍然模棱两可。
Some aspects of the statement might encourage readers to infer that the CEOs plan to protect stakeholders beyond what would be called for by shareholder value maximization. In addition to the expression of a “fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders,” the statement also describes all constituencies as “essential,” suggesting that the statement does not accord shareholders any priority over other constituencies. ^(112){ }^{112} Furthermore, the BRT describes the statement as “a call to action to ensure the benefits of capitalism are shared more broadly,” thus suggesting that implementing the commitments expressed in the statement will lead to a redistribution among constituencies relative to the current allocation of value. ^(113){ }^{113} 声明的某些方面可能会让读者推断，首席执行官们计划保护的利益相关者超出了股东价值最大化所要求的范围。除了表达 "对所有利益相关者的基本承诺 "之外，声明还将所有利益相关者描述为 "必不可少的"，这表明声明并没有将股东置于其他利益相关者之上。 ^(112){ }^{112} 此外，BRT 将该声明描述为 "呼吁采取行动，确保资本主义的利益得到更广泛的分享"，从而表明，相对于当前的价值分配，履行声明中所表达的承诺将导致利益相关者之间的重新分配。 ^(113){ }^{113}
The BRT statement and the accompanying press release emphatically present the new statement as a radical change from the BRT’s prior position: the statement is described as “redefin[ing] the purpose of [the] corporation,” “supersed[ing] previous statements,” and “mov[ingl away from shareholder primacy.” ^(114){ }^{114} However, the earlier 1997 statement, which proclaimed that “the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders,” already explicitly endorsed “tak[ing] into account the interests of the corporation’s other stakeholders” as an instrument for shareholder value maximization. ^(115){ }^{115} Thus, if the BRT statement were to be read as a significant move away from the earlier version, then it would be difficult to interpret it as requiring merely instrumental stakeholderism. BRT 的声明和随附的新闻稿强调，新声明与 BRT 之前的立场截然不同：声明被描述为 "重新定义公司的宗旨"、"取代之前的声明 "和 "摒弃股东至上"。 ^(114){ }^{114} 然而，早先的 1997 年声明宣称，"管理层和董事会的首要职责是为公司股东服务"，已经明确赞同 "考虑公司其他利益相关者的利益"，将其作为股东价值最大化的工具。 ^(115){ }^{115} 因此，如果将 BRT 声明理解为对先前版本的重大改动，那么就很难将其解释为仅仅要求工具性的利益相关者主义。
The BRT statement, however, does not explicitly endorse benefitting stakeholders beyond what would be useful for shareholder value maximization. In particular, addressing the concern that the BRT statement could be interpreted as “abandoning shareholders,” the BRT explanatory note indicates that creating long-term value for shareholders is a clear goal of corporations and that “for corporations to be successful [and] durable and return value to shareholders, they need to consider the interests and meet the fair expectations of a wide range of stakeholders.” ^(116){ }^{116} 然而，BRT 声明并没有明确赞同在股东价值最大化之外让利益相关者受益。特别是，针对人们对 BRT 声明可能被解释为 "抛弃股东 "的担忧，BRT 解释性说明指出，为股东创造长期价值是公司的明确目标，"公司要想成功[和]持久并为股东带来价值回报，就必须考虑广泛利益相关者的利益并满足他们的合理期望"。 ^(116){ }^{116}
Moreover, when the BRT provides examples of how companies will meet the “commitments of this statement,” it does not include any case that suggests that directors should put the interests of stakeholders above those of shareholders. ^(117){ }^{117} Two of the examples call for the government to adopt measures in favor of current and future employees (raising the federal minimum wage and facilitating access of part-time students to federal financial aid) rather than for companies to benefit employees directly. ^(118){ }^{118} The other two examples (apprenticeships and internship programs for students and employees and moving away from quarterly earnings guidance) might be per- 此外，当 BRT 举例说明公司将如何履行 "本声明的承诺 "时，它并没有包括任何暗示董事应将利益相关者的利益置于股东利益之上的案例。 ^(117){ }^{117} 其中有两个例子要求政府采取有利于当前和未来员工的措施（提高联邦最低工资和方便非全日制学生获得联邦财政援助），而不是要求公司直接让员工受益。 ^(118){ }^{118} 另外两个例子（为学生和员工提供学徒和实习计划，以及摒弃季度盈利指导）可能会被认为是.............
fectly consistent with shareholder value, and the language used does not suggest that those policies can be pursued beyond what would be desirable for shareholder value maximization. ^(119){ }^{119} 与股东价值完全一致，而且所使用的措辞并不表明这些政策可以超出股东价值最大化的理想范围。 ^(119){ }^{119}
Thus, despite the change in rhetoric, the BRT’s revision of its statement of corporate purpose does not seem to be a move away from the shareholder primacy approach of its 1997 statement to pluralistic stakeholderism. 因此，尽管言辞有所变化，但 BRT 对其公司宗旨声明的修订似乎并没有从 1997 年声明中的股东至上主义转向多元利益相关者主义。
C. Denial of Trade-Offs C.拒绝权衡
Another telling sign is that the BRT largely denies the possibility of trade-offs. In fact, it states that “while we acknowledge that different stakeholders may have competing interests in the short term, it is important to recognize that the interests of all stakeholders are inseparable in the long term.” ^(120){ }^{120} 另一个有说服力的迹象是，快速公交系统在很大程度上否认了权衡利弊的可能性。事实上，它指出，"虽然我们承认不同的利益相关者在短期内可能有相互竞争的利益，但重要的是要认识到，从长远来看，所有利益相关者的利益是不可分割的"。 ^(120){ }^{120}
As discussed in section II.B.2, however, trade-offs are inevitable and arise frequently. Companies constantly face choices that might favor one group at the expense of another and must pick winners and losers. 然而，正如第 II.B.2 节所述，权衡取舍是不可避免的，而且经常出现。公司经常要面对可能有利于某一群体而损害另一群体的选择，因此必须选择赢家和输家。
The language used by the BRT, in contrast, suggests that companies will generally face “win-win” outcomes in which a certain choice will be better than all alternative choices from the perspective of each of the company’s constituencies. This is at best a naïve misunderstanding or, more realistically, a mischaracterization of economic reality. If companies faced only win-win situations, there would be no practical difference between stakeholderism and shareholder value maximization; in a world of only win-win situations, companies making choices that maximize shareholder value would necessarily pick the options that would be best not only from the perspective of shareholders but also from the perspective of every other constituency. 与此相反，BRT 所使用的语言表明，公司通常会面临 "双赢 "的结果，即从公司每个支持者的角度来看，某种选择会优于所有其他选择。这充其量只是一种天真的误解，或者更现实地说，是对经济现实的错误描述。如果公司面临的只是双赢局面，那么利益相关主义与股东价值最大化之间就不会有实际区别；在一个只有双赢局面的世界里，公司在做出使股东价值最大化的选择时，必然会选择那些不仅从股东角度看，而且从其他所有支持者角度看都是最好的方案。
Insisting on a world of win-win situations is consistent with the expectation that signatories will generally treat stakeholders in whatever way would best serve shareholders. By assuming win-win situations, the BRT creates an inaccurate impression that signatories will treat all stakeholders as well as possible. 坚持双赢的世界符合人们的期望，即签署方一般会以最有利于股东的方式对待利益相关者。通过假定双赢局面，BRT 造成了一种不准确的印象，即签署方将尽可能善待所有利益相关者。
D. Lack of Board Approval D.未经董事会批准
In assessing the extent to which the BRT statement is expected to bring about major changes, it is useful to examine whether the decision to join the statement was approved by each company’s board of directors. The most important corporate decisions (such as approving a major transaction, amending bylaws, or making a major change in corporate strategy) require or at least commonly receive approval by a vote at a meeting of the board of directors. ^(121){ }^{121} Thus, if the commitment expressed by joining the BRT statement had been expected to bring about major changes in a company’s choices and practices, it would have been expected to be approved by the board of directors. ^(122){ }^{122} 在评估 BRT 声明预计会在多大程度上带来重大变化时，有必要研究一下加入声明的决 定是否得到了各公司董事会的批准。最重要的公司决策（如批准重大交易、修改公司章程或对公司战略进行重大调整）都需要或至少通常需要在董事会会议上通过投票表决才能获得批准。 ^(121){ }^{121} 因此，如果加入 BRT 声明所表达的承诺预期会给公司的选择和做法带来重大改变，那么它就会得到董事会的批准。 ^(122){ }^{122}
Therefore, to examine this issue, we contacted the public relations offices of 173 companies whose CEOs signed the BRT statement. ^(123){ }^{123} We asked each company to indicate who was the highest-level decision maker who approved the decision to join the BRT statement, either the CEO, the board of directors, or an executive below the CEO. Forty-eight companies responded to our inquiry. ^(124){ }^{124} Of the responding companies, 47 companies indicated that the decision was approved by the CEO and not by the board of directors. ^(125){ }^{125} Only one responding company 因此，为了研究这个问题，我们联系了 173 家首席执行官签署了 BRT 声明的公司的公共关系办公室。 ^(123){ }^{123} 我们要求每家公司说明批准加入 BRT 声明的最高决策者是谁，是首席执行官、董事会还是首席执行官以下的高管。有 48 家公司回复了我们的询问。 ^(124){ }^{124} 在答复的公司中，有 47 家公司表示，该决定是由首席执行官批准的，而不是由董事会批准的。 ^(125){ }^{125} 只有一家回复公司
indicated that the decision was approved by the board of directors. Thus, among responding companies, about 98%98 \% had no approval by the board of directors. 表示该决定已获董事会批准。因此，在作出答复的公司中，约 98%98 \% 没有获得董事会批准。
To be sure, a majority of the companies declined to answer even after a follow up. Still there is no reason to expect that the companies that did not answer were more likely than responding companies to have had the decision approved by the board. Thus, the strong results we obtained for our sample of 48 are telling. 可以肯定的是，即使进行了跟踪调查，大多数公司还是拒绝回答问题。不过，我们也没有理由认为，未作答的公司比作答的公司更有可能获得董事会的批准。因此，我们在 48 个样本中获得的有力结果很能说明问题。
What can explain the common CEO decision to join the BRT statement without seeking approval by the board of directors? It is implausible that CEOs chose not to seek approval for decisions that they viewed as sufficiently important to merit board consideration. For major decisions, even “imperial” CEOs can typically be expected not to disregard the need for board approval and instead use their power and influence to get the board to approve the choice they favor. 是什么原因导致首席执行官们普遍决定加入 BRT 声明而不寻求董事会的批准呢？如果首席执行官认为自己的决策非常重要，值得董事会考虑，那么他们选择不寻求批准的做法是难以置信的。对于重大决策，即使是 "御用 "首席执行官，通常也不会无视董事会批准的必要性，而是会利用自己的权力和影响力，让董事会批准他们赞成的选择。
Similarly, it is implausible that CEOs did not seek board approval because they viewed joining the BRT statement as a matter of personal belief rather than a statement made in their “official” capacity as corporate head. The BRT described the CEO signatories as committing “to lead their companies for the benefit of all stakeholders.” ^(126){ }^{126} Thus, the BRT statement did not seek to express a shared personal belief by a group of individuals but a commitment regarding the goals that the companies led by these individuals will pursue. ^(127){ }^{127} 同样，首席执行官们认为加入 BRT 声明是个人信仰问题，而不是以公司负责人的 "官方 "身份发表的声明，因此不寻求董事会的批准也是不可信的。BRT 将首席执行官签名者描述为承诺 "为了所有利益相关者的利益而领导他们的公司"。 ^(126){ }^{126} 因此，BRT 的声明并不是要表达一群人的共同个人信念，而是对这些人所领导的公司将追求的目标的承诺。 ^(127){ }^{127}
In our view, the most plausible explanation for CEOs choosing to join the BRT statement without board approval has to do with their view that the statement would not produce a significant change in their companies’ treatment of stakeholders. Indeed, two of the companies that responded to our survey stated that joining the BRT statement reflected an affirmation that the company’s past practices have been consistent with the principles of the BRT statement rather than an expectation that the company would make major changes in its future treatment of stakeholders. 我们认为，首席执行官们之所以选择在未经董事会批准的情况下加入 BRT 声明，最合理的解释是他们认为该声明不会对公司对待利益相关者的方式产生重大改变。事实上，有两家对我们的调查作出回应的公司表示，加入 BRT 声明反映了对公司过去做法符合 BRT 声明原则的肯定，而不是期望公司在未来对待利益相关者的方式上会有重大改变。
Furthermore, JPMorgan, the company headed by the chairman of the BRT at the time the statement was issued, also expressed the view that no significant future changes would be necessary to implement the principles of the BRT statement. In 此外，摩根大通（声明发布时 BRT 主席所领导的公司）也表示，今后无需为落实 BRT 声明的原则而做出重大改变。在
fact, in response to the submission of a shareholder proposal asking directors to report on the changes necessary to implement the principles of the BRT statement, JPMorgan stated that the company already “operated in accordance with the principles set forth in the BRT Statement before its publication, and continues to do so after its publication.” ^(128){ }^{128} 事实上，摩根大通在回应股东提出的要求董事报告为执行 BRT 声明中的原则而必须做出的改变的提案时表示，该公司 "在 BRT 声明发布之前就已经按照声明中规定的原则运作，在声明发布之后也将继续这样做"。 ^(128){ }^{128}
To the extent that this view was widely shared among other signatories to the statement, it can explain well why the decision to join the statement was commonly not approved by the company’s board of directors. In this case, however, the BRT statement merely reflected (i) the CEOs’ positive assessment of how their companies have been treating stakeholders thus far, as well as, importantly, (ii) the CEOs’ expectations that the statement will not lead to substantial changes in how stakeholders are treated. 如果声明的其他签署者也普遍持有这种观点，那么就可以很好地解释为什么加入声明的决定通常得不到公司董事会的批准。然而，在这种情况下，BRT 声明仅仅反映了：(i) 首席执行官们对其公司迄今为止对待利益相关者的方式的积极评价，以及 (ii) 首席执行官们对声明不会导致对待利益相关者的方式发生实质性变化的预期。
BRT President Joshua Bolten responded to our evidence on the lack of board approval stating in the Financial Times that " [m][\mathrm{m}] ost of the CEOs who signed that statement believe that that’s the way they’re [alreadyl trying to run their company now, so why would they need to get board approval?" ^(129){ }^{129} Relatedly, the Society for Corporate Governance, which represents corporate secretaries and business executives in governance, ethics, and compliance functions, published a post seeking to reply to our evidence regarding the lack of board approval in a similar fashion. ^(130){ }^{130} According to this post, “it’s not surprising that the signatory CEOs generally would not have sought board approval” because they “were not intending with this statement to signal a significant shift in how they operate.” ^(131){ }^{131} BRT 总裁 Joshua Bolten 在《金融时报》上回应了我们关于缺乏董事会批准的证据，他说：" [m][\mathrm{m}] 大多数签署该声明的首席执行官都认为，他们[现在已经在努力经营自己的公司，为什么还需要获得董事会的批准呢？ ^(129){ }^{129} 与此相关的是，代表公司秘书和治理、道德与合规职能部门业务主管的公司治理协会也发表了一篇文章，试图以类似的方式回应我们关于缺乏董事会批准的证据。 ^(130){ }^{130} 根据这篇帖子，"签署声明的首席执行官一般不会寻求董事会批准，这并不奇怪"，因为他们 "并不打算通过这份声明来表明他们的运营方式发生了重大转变"。 ^(131){ }^{131}
Although these two corporate responses explain why the lack of board approval was not a corporate governance failure, they concede the inference we draw from the lack of board 尽管这两家公司的回答解释了为什么缺乏董事会批准不是公司治理失误，但它们承认了我们从缺乏董事会批准中得出的推论，即："公司治理失误"。
approval and our resulting conclusions. Our explanation for the findings is that the lack of board approval reflected the perception on the part of CEOs that their pledge did not represent a commitment to make material changes to their company’s existing treatment of stakeholders. ^(132){ }^{132} By admitting that the lack of board approval resulted from CEO perception that the BRT statement did not commit them to run their company differently from how they “run their company now” and from the CEO intention not to effect “a significant shift in how they operate,” BRT President Bolten and the Society for Corporate Governance concede our explanation and its implications for the BRT statement. ^(133){ }^{133} 以及我们由此得出的结论。我们对这一结论的解释是，缺乏董事会批准反映了首席执行官们认为他们的承诺并不代表对公司现有的利益相关者待遇做出实质性改变的承诺。 ^(132){ }^{132} BRT总裁Bolten和公司治理协会承认，缺乏董事会批准是由于首席执行官们认为BRT声明并没有让他们承诺以不同于他们 "现在经营公司的方式 "来经营公司，也没有让首席执行官们打算 "对他们的经营方式做出重大改变"，因此他们承认了我们的解释及其对BRT声明的影响。 ^(133){ }^{133}
Thus, the lack of board approval is consistent with, and reinforces, the conclusion that the BRT statement was not expected by signatories to bring about major changes. 因此，缺乏董事会的批准符合并加强了这样的结论，即签署方并不期望 BRT 声明会带来重大变化。
E. Corporate Governance Guidelines E.企业管治准则
Corporate governance guidelines (also called corporate governance principles or policies) are official governance documents that are typically approved by the board of directors. ^(134){ }^{134} They are updated with significant frequency and specify at any time the main governance principles and procedures guiding the company’ corporate governance. ^(135){ }^{135} Although governance guidelines mostly deal with governance processes, they also often contain general principles or specific provisions regarding the goals that directors must pursue. ^(136){ }^{136} 公司治理准则（也称为公司治理原则或政策）是通常由董事会批准的正式治理文件。 ^(134){ }^{134} 它们的更新频率很高，随时明确规定指导公司企业治理的主要治理原则和程序。 ^(135){ }^{135} 虽然治理准则主要涉及治理流程，但也经常包含有关董事必须追求的目标的一般原则或具体规定。 ^(136){ }^{136}
These documents therefore provide a natural place to look for the company’s official position on corporate purpose. If companies whose CEOs signed the BRT statement are indeed committed to “mov[ingl away from shareholder primacy,” ^(137){ }^{137} we 因此，这些文件为我们提供了一个了解公司对企业宗旨的官方立场的自然场所。如果首席执行官签署了 BRT 声明的公司确实致力于 "摆脱股东至上"， ^(137){ }^{137} 我们
should expect this commitment to be reflected in the companies’ current governance guidelines. 应期待这一承诺在公司现行的治理准则中得到体现。
To examine this aspect, we reviewed the corporate governance guidelines of the companies whose CEO signed the BRT statement. The results of this study indicate that these guidelines largely reflect having shareholder value as the sole goal. ^(138){ }^{138} Below we illustrate the findings of this broad review by discussing the corporate governance guidelines of the companies in the “BRT Board Sample”-the twenty U.S. public companies whose CEOs sat on the board of the directors of the BRT at the time that the BRT statement was issued. ^(139){ }^{139} In each case, we examined when the corporate governance guidelines were last amended and how they address the welfare of stakeholders. 为了研究这一方面，我们审查了首席执行官签署了 BRT 声明的公司的公司治理准则。研究结果表明，这些指导方针在很大程度上反映了以股东价值为唯一目标。 ^(138){ }^{138} 下面，我们通过讨论 "BRT 董事会样本"--即在 BRT 声明发布时首席执行官担任 BRT 董事会成员的 20 家美国上市公司--中的公司的公司治理准则，来说明这一广泛审查的结果。 ^(139){ }^{139} 在每个案例中，我们都研究了公司治理准则最近一次修订的时间，以及这些准则是如何解决利益相关者的福利问题的。
Our review indicated that, of the twenty companies in the BRT Board Sample, ten amended their governance guidelines after the issuance of the BRT statement. Nine of them, however, did not make any changes in their formulation of corporate purpose. In particular, some companies left unchanged the text that explicitly reflected a shareholder primacy principle by prescribing that directors must “promote the interests of stockholders” (CVS), ^(140){ }^{140} “act solely in the best interest of the Corporation’s shareholders” (Duke), 141 “maximize stockholder value over the long-term” (Eastman), ^(142){ }^{142} or “serve the best interests of the Company and its shareholders” (Stryker). ^(143){ }^{143} 我们的审查结果表明，在 BRT 董事会样本中的 20 家公司中，有 10 家公司在 BRT 声明发布后修订了其管治准则。但是，其中九家公司在公司宗旨的表述上没有做任何改动。特别是，一些公司没有修改明确反映股东至上原则的条文，规定董事必须 "促进股东利益"（CVS）、 ^(140){ }^{140} "完全以公司股东的最佳利益行事"（杜克）、141 "长期实现股东价值最大化"（伊士曼）、 ^(142){ }^{142} 或 "为公司及其股东的最佳利益服务"（史赛克）。 ^(143){ }^{143}
The only company that amended its guidelines with language related to corporate purpose seems to be S&P Global. This company added to its guidelines a paragraph stating that 唯一一家在准则中修订了与企业宗旨相关措辞的公司似乎是 S&P Global。该公司在其准则中增加了一个段落，指出
“the interests of the Corporation’s shareholders are advanced by also considering and responsibly addressing the concerns of other stakeholders.” ^(144){ }^{144} Even in this case, however, serving shareholder interests remains the purpose of the corporation, while “responsibly addressing” the concerns of other stakeholders is only a means of advancing these interests. ^(145){ }^{145} "同时考虑并负责任地解决其他利益相关者的关切，从而促进公司股东的利益"。 ^(144){ }^{144} 然而，即使在这种情况下，为股东利益服务仍然是公司的宗旨，而 "负责任地解决 "其他利益相关者的关切只是促进这些利益的一种手段。 ^(145){ }^{145}
The remaining ten companies in the BRT Board Sample chose not to amend their guidelines after the issuance of the BRT statement, and many of them have guidelines containing a strong endorsement of the shareholder primacy principle. Notably, explicit endorsements of shareholder primacy can be found in the corporate governance guidelines of the two companies whose CEOs played a key leadership role in the BRT’s adoption of its statement. JPMorgan Chase, whose CEO Jamie Dimon was the chairman of the BRT when the statement was issued, states that " tt ]he Board as a whole is responsible for the oversight of management on behalf of the Firm’s shareholders." ^(146){ }^{146} Similarly, Johnson & Johnson, whose CEO Alex Gorsky chaired the BRT’s Corporate Governance Committee at the time the BRT statement was issued, states in quite clear terms that " [t]hebusinessjudgmentoftheBoardmustbeexercised[t] h e ~ b u s i n e s s ~ j u d g m e n t ~ o f ~ t h e ~ B o a r d ~ m u s t ~ b e ~ e x e r c i s e d ~ . . . in the long-term interests of our shareholders." ^(147){ }^{147} BRT 董事会样本中的其余 10 家公司选择在 BRT 声明发布后不修改其指导原则，其中许多公司的指导原则都强烈支持股东优先原则。值得注意的是，有两家公司的首席执行官在 BRT 通过声明的过程中发挥了关键的领导作用，这两家公司的公司治理准则明确认可了股东优先原则。摩根大通的首席执行官杰米-戴蒙（Jamie Dimon）在声明发布时担任 BRT 主席，他在声明中指出：" tt ]董事会作为一个整体，代表公司股东负责监督管理层。 ^(146){ }^{146} 同样，强生公司（其首席执行官亚历克斯-戈尔斯基在 BRT 发布声明时担任 BRT 公司治理委员会主席）也明确表示：" [t]hebusinessjudgmentoftheBoardmustbeexercised[t] h e ~ b u s i n e s s ~ j u d g m e n t ~ o f ~ t h e ~ B o a r d ~ m u s t ~ b e ~ e x e r c i s e d ~ ......为了我们股东的长远利益"。 ^(147){ }^{147}
Before concluding, we would like to stress the presence of some exceptions. The guidelines of a few companies in the BRT 在结束发言之前，我们想强调一些例外情况的存在。快速公交系统中少数公司的指导方针
Board Sample contain, and contained also prior to the issuance of the BRT statement, references to stakeholder interests, but they still do so without abandoning the focus on shareholder value as the ultimate goal. Cisco’s guidelines, for example, mention “high customer satisfaction and superior employee working environment” as goals the company seeks to achieve, but they do so while requiring that "[n]ominees for the Board should be committed to enhancing long-term shareholder value. ^(1148){ }^{1148} Similarly, the guidelines of Boeing, Marriott, and Walmart recognize that treating stakeholders well might enhance shareholder value, but they retain shareholder value as the ultimate goal and refer to the treatment of stakeholders as a means of advancing this goal. ^(149){ }^{149} 董事会样本中提到了利益相关者的利益，在 BRT 声明发布之前也是如此，但它们仍然没有放弃将股东价值作为最终目标。例如，思科公司的指导方针提到了 "高客户满意度和优越的员工工作环境 "作为公司追求的目标，但同时也要求 "董事会成员应致力于提升长期股东价值"。 ^(1148){ }^{1148} 同样，波音、万豪和沃尔玛的准则也承认，善待利益相关者可能会提升股东价值，但它们仍将股东价值作为最终目标，并将对待利益相关者作为实现这一目标的手段。 ^(149){ }^{149}
Finally, among the twenty companies in the BRT Board Sample, two companies, Cummins and International Paper Company, which are incorporated in states with constituency statutes (Indiana and New York, respectively) have (and had long prior to the BRT statement) guidelines that contain stake-holder-oriented language that echoes the statutory language in the constituency statutes governing them. ^(150){ }^{150} This language was adopted long ago and is based in part on the language of 最后，在 BRT 董事会抽样调查的 20 家公司中，有两家公司，即康明斯公司和国际纸业公司，是在有选区法规的州（分别是印第安纳州和纽约州）注册成立的，这两家公司的指导方针（早在 BRT 声明之前就有了）包含以利益相关者为导向的语言，与管辖它们的选区法规中的法定语言相呼应。 ^(150){ }^{150} 这些措辞是很久以前采用的，其部分依据是《纽约公约》的措辞。
The above discussion regarding the governance guidelines of the companies in the BRT Board Sample illustrates the patterns identified by our study of the corporate governance guidelines of all companies whose CEOs endorsed the BRT statement. These patterns cast doubt on the commitment of these companies to moving away from a focus on shareholder value. They thus support the conclusion that the BRT statement should not be viewed as a signal of coming changes in how these corporations treat stakeholders. 以上关于 BRT 董事会样本公司治理准则的讨论，说明了我们在对首席执行官赞同 BRT 声明的所有公司的公司治理准则进行研究后所发现的模式。这些模式使人怀疑这些公司是否致力于摆脱对股东价值的关注。因此，它们支持这样的结论，即 BRT 声明不应被视为这些公司对待利益相关者的方式即将发生变化的信号。
F. Disregard of Legal Constraints F.无视法律限制
Finally, we would like to note yet another sign that the BRT signatories do not intend to adopt pluralistic stakeholderism. The BRT statement and accompanying communications do not discuss or even acknowledge the fact that public companies are subject to different state corporate laws, and some of those might well impose constraints on the power of directors and executives to embrace stakeholderism. 最后，我们想指出的另一个迹象表明，BRT 的签署者并不打算采纳多元利益相关者主义。BRT 的声明和随附信函没有讨论甚至没有承认这样一个事实，即上市公司受不同州公司法的管辖，其中一些法律很可能会对董事和高管接受利益相关者主义的权力施加限制。
Most importantly, our review indicates that about 70% of U.S. companies that joined the BRT statement are incorporated in Delaware, which is widely viewed as a state with strong shareholder-centric corporate law. As then Chancellor William Chandler stated in a notable Delaware opinion: 最重要的是，我们的审查表明，在加入 BRT 声明的美国公司中，约有 70% 是在特拉华州注册成立的，而特拉华州被普遍认为是一个拥有强有力的以股东为中心的公司法的州。正如当时的大法官威廉-钱德勒（William Chandler）在一份著名的特拉华州意见书中所说的那样
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form . . . directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that specifically, clearly and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . . ^(151){ }^{151} 既然选择了营利性公司形式......董事们就必须遵守与这种形式相适应的信托责任和标准。这些标准包括为股东利益提升公司价值。公司名称后面的 "Inc. "至少意味着这一点。因此，我不能接受这样的公司政策：它明确、清晰、公认地不是为了股东的利益而最大化特拉华州营利性公司的经济价值......。 ^(151){ }^{151} .
Indeed, a recent article by Leo Strine, who served as the chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court at the time of the 事实上，特拉华州最高法院首席法官利奥-斯特林（Leo Strine）最近发表了一篇文章。
publication of the BRT statement, concludes that “a clear-eyed look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end,” ^(152){ }^{152} and that Delaware corporations can consider stakeholder interests “only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare.” ^(153){ }^{153} Similarly, at a recent roundtable on the subject of Delaware law’s approach to stakeholders, organized by Columbia Law School and Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, the consensus of the participants was in line with the above account by Chief Justice Strine. ^(154){ }^{154} A forthcoming article by Edward Rock reaches a similar conclusion regarding Delaware law on the subject. ^(155){ }^{155} ^(152){ }^{152} 特拉华州公司法委员会在出版《特拉华州公司法委员会声明》时得出结论："对特拉华州公司法的清醒认识表明，在其自由裁量权的范围内，董事必须以股东利益为唯一目的，" ^(152){ }^{152} 特拉华州公司可以考虑利益相关者的利益，"但只能将其作为促进股东利益的一种手段"。 ^(153){ }^{153} 同样，在哥伦比亚法学院和 Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP 最近组织的关于特拉华州法律对利益相关者的处理方法的圆桌会议上，与会者的共识与首席大法官 Strine 的上述论述一致。 ^(154){ }^{154} Edward Rock 即将发表的一篇文章就特拉华州法律在此问题上得出了类似的结论。 ^(155){ }^{155}
Given the concerns about the compatibility of stakeholderism with Delaware law, Martin Lipton, one of the most vocal supporters of stakeholderism, coauthored a client memorandum that purports to address “a number of questions [that] have been raised about the legal responsibilities of directors in . . . taking into account . . . [stakeholder] interests.” 156 What is most interesting about the memorandum is not what it includes but what it does not. The memorandum cautiously avoids opining that taking into account stakeholder interests beyond what would be useful for shareholder value is permissible under Delaware law, thus eluding a critical legal question. 考虑到利益相关者主义与特拉华州法律的兼容性问题，利益相关者主义最积极的支持者之一 Martin Lipton 与他人共同撰写了一份客户备忘录，旨在解决 "就董事在考虑......[利益相关者]利益时的法律责任提出的一些问题"。[利益相关者]的利益"。156 备忘录最有趣的地方不在于它包含了什么，而在于它没有包含什么。备忘录谨慎地回避了特拉华州法律允许考虑股东价值之外的利益相关者利益的观点，从而回避了一个关键的法律问题。
Therefore, it seems likely that Delaware corporations (and therefore a substantial majority of the companies joining the BRT statement) may not balance the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, or at least would face significant legal issues if they explicitly chose to do so. For present purposes, however, what is most important is that neither the BRT nor the numerous Delaware companies that joined the BRT statement acknowledged or addressed this legal issue. This disregard of the issue is, once again, consistent with the view that the BRT 因此，特拉华州的公司（因此也包括加入 BRT 声明的绝大多数公司）似乎可能无法平衡股东和利益相关者的利益，或者说，如果它们明确选择这样做，至少会面临重大的法律问题。然而，就目前而言，最重要的是，无论是 BRT 还是加入 BRT 声明的众多特拉华州公司都没有承认或解决这一法律问题。对这一问题的漠视再次与 BRT 的观点相吻合。
statement was mostly for show rather than a commitment to an actual change in corporate strategy. 该声明主要是做做样子，而不是承诺切实改变公司战略。
The evidence and analysis in the preceding five Sections thus clearly indicate that it was a mistake to portray the BRT statement as “jettison[ing] . . . prior focus on shareholders above all others,” “a major change in thinking” “toss[ing] the old [corporate purpose] into the dustbin,” a “revolutionary . . . moment in business,” and a move “away from shareholder primacy.” ^(157){ }^{157} The excitement and fanfare accompanying the statement, and the hopes that it would bring about significant improvements in the treatment of stakeholders, were misplaced. 摒弃......以前对股东高于一切的关注"、"思想上的重大转变"、"将旧的[公司宗旨]扔进垃圾箱"、"企业的革命性......时刻 "以及 "摒弃股东至上"。.商业的革命性时刻"，以及 "摆脱股东至上"。 ^(157){ }^{157} 伴随着该声明而来的兴奋和大肆宣传，以及希望它能在对待利益相关者方面带来重大改善的希望，都是错误的。
IV
An Illusory Promise 四
虚幻的承诺
In Part II we explained that the “enlightened shareholder value” version of stakeholderism (instrumental stakeholderism) is conceptually equivalent to the traditional shareholder primacy view as it would call for providing benefits to stakeholders only when, and as long as, it would serve shareholder value. In Part III, we showed that signatories of the BRT likely intended to continue operating as they have long done and serve stakeholders only instrumentally in pursuit of the shareholder value objective. Still, although pluralistic stakeholderism was not embraced by the BRT statement, it could in theory produce substantially different outcomes if corporate leaders were to use their discretion to protect stakeholders at shareholders’ expense in a significant number of cases. In this Part, we examine whether pluralistic stakeholderism should be expected to lead corporate leaders to act in this way. We show that this is not the case. 在第二部分中，我们解释了 "开明的股东价值 "版本的利益相关者主义（工具性利益相关者主义）在概念上等同于传统的股东至上观点，因为它要求只有在有利于股东价值的情况下才向利益相关者提供利益。我们在第三部分中指出，BRT 的签署方很可能打算继续沿用其一贯做法，在追求股东价值目标的过程中仅为利益相关者提供工具性服务。不过，尽管多元化利益相关者主义并没有被 BRT 声明所接受，但如果公司领导者在很多情况下利用其自由裁量权保护利益相关者，牺牲股东利益，那么理论上也会产生截然不同的结果。在本部分中，我们将探讨多元利益相关者主义是否会导致公司领导者以这种方式行事。我们的研究表明，情况并非如此。
In subparts IV.A and IV.B, we analyze the incentives of directors and CEOs, respectively, and we demonstrate that they have incentives, and should therefore be expected, to avoid serving stakeholder interests beyond what would be desirable for shareholder value. In subpart IV.C we present empirical evidence suggesting that corporate leaders in fact have not used their discretion to protect stakeholders when state constituency statutes have authorized them to do so. This evi- 在第 IV.A 和 IV.B 小节中，我们分别分析了董事和首席执行官的激励机制，我们证明他们有激励机制，因此应该避免为利益相关者的利益提供超出股东价值所期望的服务。在第 IV.C 小节中，我们提出了经验证据，表明当国家选区法规授权公司领导人保护利益相关者时，他们实际上并没有利用自己的自由裁量权这样做。这些证据表明
dence is consistent with, and reinforces, the conclusions of the incentive analysis in subparts IV.A and IV.B. 这些证据符合并加强了第 IV.A 和 IV.B 小节中的激励分析结论。
Finally, in subpart IV.D we examine whether the identified incentive problems could be addressed by supplementing stakeholderism with arrangements aimed at providing corporate leaders with significant incentives to protect stakeholders. Providing such incentives, we show, would require not only changes in executive pay arrangements but also giving stakeholders influence over the election of directors. Although such reforms are commonly not included in the proposals advanced by stakeholderists, we examine them, and we show their limitations and considerable costs. 最后，在第四部分 D 小节中，我们探讨了是否可以通过对利益相关者主义进行补充，为公司领导人提供保护利益相关者的重要激励措施，来解决所发现的激励问题。我们认为，提供这种激励不仅需要改变高管薪酬安排，还需要让利益相关者对董事选举施加影响。虽然利益相关者提出的建议中通常不包括此类改革，但我们对其进行了研究，并指出了其局限性和相当大的成本。
Before proceeding, we note that it might be argued that, even in the absence of economic incentives, stakeholderism would create internal corporate norms that would effectively lead corporate leaders to give independent weight to stakeholder interests. ^(158){ }^{158} However, the development of corporate rules and arrangements has long been based on the premise that incentives matter and that norms cannot by themselves be relied upon to ensure that corporate leaders would focus on socially desirable goals. ^(159){ }^{159} 在继续讨论之前，我们要指出的是，有人可能会说，即使没有经济激励，利益相关者主义也会形成企业内部规范，从而有效地引导企业领导者独立地重视利益相关者的利益。 ^(158){ }^{158} 然而，公司规则和安排的制定长期以来一直基于这样一个前提，即激励机制非常重要，规范本身并不能确保公司领导者专注于社会期望的目标。 ^(159){ }^{159}
Were such norms sufficient, it would not have been necessary, for example, to award large executive pay packages designed to produce incentives to serve shareholders, as well as to provide shareholders with rights to vote and sue designed to mitigate the underperformance or opportunism of corporate leaders. Incentives play an important role in shaping the behavior of corporate leaders, and the incentives produced by corporate rules and arrangements have contributed substantially to the success of the business corporation. Thus, it is important to determine whether the incentives of corporate leaders would encourage or discourage managerial discretion to balance shareholder and stakeholder interests. 如果这些规范足够充分，就没有必要为高管提供巨额薪酬，以激励他们为股东服务，也没有必要为股东提供投票权和起诉权，以减轻公司领导人业绩不佳或机会主义的影响。激励机制在塑造公司领导人的行为方面发挥着重要作用，公司规则和安排所产生的激励机制为商业公司的成功做出了巨大贡献。因此，确定公司领导者的激励机制是否会鼓励或阻碍管理者平衡股东和利益相关者利益的自由裁量权非常重要。
A. Director Incentives A.主任奖励
1. Compensation 1.赔偿
An important source of incentives for corporate directors is their compensation. Historically, the largest fraction of com- 激励公司董事的一个重要来源是他们的薪酬。从历史上看，公司董事中最大的一部分人是公司董事。
pensation for non-employee directors was represented by a fixed-cash payment. ^(160){ }^{160} In recent times, however, companies have increasingly compensated directors with equity-based compensation to align their interests with those of shareholders. ^(161){ }^{161} Under current compensation practices, 99%99 \% of S&P 500 companies give directors substantial equity compensation, mainly in the form of restricted or deferred stock. ^(162){ }^{162} Furthermore, equity pay represents more than half of total director compensation in S&P 500 companies. ^(163){ }^{163} 非雇员董事的薪酬以固定现金支付为代表。 ^(160){ }^{160} 然而，近来，公司越来越多地以股权为基础向董事提供报酬，以使他们的利益与股东的利益保持一致。 ^(161){ }^{161} 根据目前的薪酬惯例， 99%99 \% 标准普尔 500 强公司给予董事大量股权补偿，主要是以限制性股票或递延股票的形式。 ^(162){ }^{162} 此外，在标准普尔 500 强公司中，股权薪酬占董事薪酬总额的一半以上。 ^(163){ }^{163}
This practice is strongly considered a positive development for corporate governance, and it is supported by the two major proxy advisors, ISS and Glass Lewis. ISS’s policies on director pay support “reasonable practices that adequately align the interests of directors with those of shareholders” and suggests that director compensation “should incorporate meaningful director stock ownership.” ^(164){ }^{164} Glass Lewis typically “recommend[s] support for compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards.” ^(165){ }^{165} Both proxy firms favor fixed stock grants over performance-based equity plans. 这种做法被强烈认为是公司治理的积极发展，并得到了两大代理顾问 ISS 和 Glass Lewis 的支持。ISS 的董事薪酬政策支持 "使董事利益与股东利益充分一致的合理做法"，并建议董事薪酬 "应纳入有意义的董事持股"。 ^(164){ }^{164} Glass Lewis 通常 "建议支持包含期权授予或其他股权奖励的薪酬计划"。 ^(165){ }^{165} 这两家代理公司都倾向于授予固定股票，而不是基于业绩的股票计划。
The most conspicuous aspect to notice is that, while director compensation practices are designed to align the interests of directors with shareholder interests, they produce no alignment of director interests with the interests of stakeholders. This aspect of director compensation practices is supported by ISS and Glass Lewis, which do not even mention stakeholder welfare in their compensation guidelines. 最值得注意的是，虽然董事薪酬做法旨在使董事利益与股东利益相一致，但却没有使董事利益与利益相关者的利益相一致。这一点得到了 ISS 和 Glass Lewis 的支持，它们甚至没有在薪酬准则中提及利益相关者的福利。
To highlight the incentives produced by director compensation practices, we examine below these practices in twenty companies in the BRT Board Sample. We seek to determine whether these practices provide directors with any incentives to balance the interests of shareholders with those of stakeholders. 为了突出董事薪酬做法所产生的激励作用，我们对 BRT 董事会样本中 20 家公司的这些做法进行了如下研究。我们试图确定这些做法是否能激励董事平衡股东利益和利益相关者的利益。
Table 2 describes the structure of director compensation in the twenty companies in the BRT Board Sample. The data in the table is based on our review of the 2019 proxy statements of these companies. Consistent with market practice, these companies pay non-executive directors a fixed-cash salary, additional fixed-cash payments in connection with committee duties, and an equity award. 表 2 介绍了 BRT 董事会样本中 20 家公司的董事薪酬结构。表中数据基于我们对这些公司 2019 年委托书的审查。按照市场惯例，这些公司向非执行董事支付固定现金薪酬、与委员会职责相关的额外固定现金薪酬以及股权奖励。
Importantly, equity compensation accounts for 56%56 \% of the average compensation of non-executive directors. These stock holdings are intended to provide directors with incentives to increase stock value. According to the proxy statements we reviewed, the level of both the fixed-cash payments and the equity awards were determined based on the compensation practices at peer firms. 重要的是，股票薪酬占非执行董事平均薪酬的 56%56 \% 。持有这些股票的目的是激励董事提高股票价值。根据我们审查的委托书，固定现金支付和股权奖励的水平都是根据同行公司的薪酬惯例确定的。
Whereas the above compensation practices align the interests of directors with those of shareholders, they in no way contribute to any alignment of interest between directors and stakeholders. Consistent with this shareholder-centric approach, in no case did the 2019 proxy statements of these companies mention stakeholders or stakeholder interests as criteria taken into consideration to determine or review the amount of cash or stock paid to directors. 尽管上述薪酬做法使董事的利益与股东的利益相一致，但它们丝毫无助于董事与利益相关者之间的利益一致。与这种以股东为中心的做法相一致的是，在这些公司的 2019 年委托书中，均未提及利益相关者或利益相关者的利益是决定或审查支付给董事的现金或股票金额时所考虑的标准。
Table 2. 2018 Director Compensation in Companies with CeO ON THE BRT BOARD 表 2.有首席运营官进入 BRT 董事会的公司 2018 年董事薪酬情况
Company 公司名称
现金预付款和费用
Cash Retainer
and Fees
Cash Retainer
and Fees| Cash Retainer |
| :---: |
| and Fees |
Equity Comp. 股权补偿。
股本补偿百分比
% of Equity
Comp.
% of Equity
Comp.| % of Equity |
| :---: |
| Comp. |
JP Morgan 摩根大通
$152,947\$ 152,947
$250,000\$ 250,000
62%62 \%
General Motors* 通用汽车公司*
$168,055\$ 168,055
$126,073\$ 126,073
43%43 \%
AECOM
$133,000\$ 133,000
$160,008\$ 160,008
55%55 \%
Oracle 甲骨文
$88,658\$ 88,658
$444,566\$ 444,566
82%82 \%
Eastman 伊士曼
$119,750\$ 119,750
$85,073\$ 85,073
42%42 \%
Duke Energy 杜克能源公司
$140,000\$ 140,000
$160,000\$ 160,000
53%53 \%
Johnson & Johnson 强生公司
$130,556\$ 130,556
$184,940\$ 184,940
59%59 \%
United Technologies 联合技术公司
$183,321\$ 183,321
$180,000\$ 180,000
50%50 \%
Lockheed Martin 洛克希德-马丁公司
$170,500\$ 170,500
$155,000\$ 155,000
48%48 \%
Cummins 康明斯
$137,000\$ 137,000
$149,885\$ 149,885
52%52 \%
Stryker 史赛克
$127,143\$ 127,143
$175,121\$ 175,121
58%58 \%
Walmart 沃尔玛
$140,825\$ 140,825
$174,970\$ 174,970
55%55 \%
CVS Health
$102,918\$ 102,918
$209,917\$ 209,917
67%67 \%
Boeing 波音公司
$144,167\$ 144,167
$180,000\$ 180,000
56%56 \%
S&P Global 标准普尔全球
$119,636\$ 119,636
$150,000\$ 150,000
56%56 \%
Cisco Systems 思科系统公司
$130,000\$ 130,000
$224,960\$ 224,960
63%63 \%
IBM
$138,338\$ 138,338
$195,000\$ 195,000
58%58 \%
Marriott International 万豪国际酒店集团
$95,667\$ 95,667
$165,032\$ 165,032
63%63 \%
AT&T 美国电话电报公司
$152,917\$ 152,917
$170,000\$ 170,000
53%53 \%
International Paper 国际纸业公司
$140,942\$ 140,942
$163,000\$ 163,000
54%54 \%
Average 平均
$135,817\$ 135,817
$182,577\$ 182,577
56%56 \%
Company "Cash Retainer
and Fees" Equity Comp. "% of Equity
Comp."
JP Morgan $152,947 $250,000 62%
General Motors* $168,055 $126,073 43%
AECOM $133,000 $160,008 55%
Oracle $88,658 $444,566 82%
Eastman $119,750 $85,073 42%
Duke Energy $140,000 $160,000 53%
Johnson & Johnson $130,556 $184,940 59%
United Technologies $183,321 $180,000 50%
Lockheed Martin $170,500 $155,000 48%
Cummins $137,000 $149,885 52%
Stryker $127,143 $175,121 58%
Walmart $140,825 $174,970 55%
CVS Health $102,918 $209,917 67%
Boeing $144,167 $180,000 56%
S&P Global $119,636 $150,000 56%
Cisco Systems $130,000 $224,960 63%
IBM $138,338 $195,000 58%
Marriott International $95,667 $165,032 63%
AT&T $152,917 $170,000 53%
International Paper $140,942 $163,000 54%
Average $135,817 $182,577 56%| Company | Cash Retainer <br> and Fees | Equity Comp. | % of Equity <br> Comp. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| JP Morgan | $\$ 152,947$ | $\$ 250,000$ | $62 \%$ |
| General Motors* | $\$ 168,055$ | $\$ 126,073$ | $43 \%$ |
| AECOM | $\$ 133,000$ | $\$ 160,008$ | $55 \%$ |
| Oracle | $\$ 88,658$ | $\$ 444,566$ | $82 \%$ |
| Eastman | $\$ 119,750$ | $\$ 85,073$ | $42 \%$ |
| Duke Energy | $\$ 140,000$ | $\$ 160,000$ | $53 \%$ |
| Johnson & Johnson | $\$ 130,556$ | $\$ 184,940$ | $59 \%$ |
| United Technologies | $\$ 183,321$ | $\$ 180,000$ | $50 \%$ |
| Lockheed Martin | $\$ 170,500$ | $\$ 155,000$ | $48 \%$ |
| Cummins | $\$ 137,000$ | $\$ 149,885$ | $52 \%$ |
| Stryker | $\$ 127,143$ | $\$ 175,121$ | $58 \%$ |
| Walmart | $\$ 140,825$ | $\$ 174,970$ | $55 \%$ |
| CVS Health | $\$ 102,918$ | $\$ 209,917$ | $67 \%$ |
| Boeing | $\$ 144,167$ | $\$ 180,000$ | $56 \%$ |
| S&P Global | $\$ 119,636$ | $\$ 150,000$ | $56 \%$ |
| Cisco Systems | $\$ 130,000$ | $\$ 224,960$ | $63 \%$ |
| IBM | $\$ 138,338$ | $\$ 195,000$ | $58 \%$ |
| Marriott International | $\$ 95,667$ | $\$ 165,032$ | $63 \%$ |
| AT&T | $\$ 152,917$ | $\$ 170,000$ | $53 \%$ |
| International Paper | $\$ 140,942$ | $\$ 163,000$ | $54 \%$ |
| Average | $\$ 135,817$ | $\$ 182,577$ | $56 \%$ |
*Some directors chose to receive deferred stock units in Heu of part of their cash compensation. *一些董事选择以递延股票单位代替部分现金报酬。
This table reports director compensation as disclosed by the company in its annual proxy statement, filed with the SEC in 2019. The amount in each column is the average compensation paid to directors who served for the entire fiscal year. 本表报告了公司在 2019 年提交给美国证券交易委员会的年度委托书中披露的董事薪酬。各栏中的金额是支付给整个财政年度任职董事的平均薪酬。
2. Labor and Control Markets 2.劳动力市场和控制市场
In addition to pay arrangements, labor and control markets are an important source of incentives for directors. Individuals serving on a board of directors are interested in retaining their positions. ^(166){ }^{166} In addition, they may wish to increase their chances to serve on the boards of other companies. 除薪酬安排外，劳动力市场和控制权市场也是激励董事的一个重要来源。在董事会任职的个人都希望保住自己的职位。 ^(166){ }^{166} 此外，他们可能希望增加在其他公司董事会任职的机会。
The effects of the labor and control markets on director decisions have long been studied in the corporate governance literature. ^(167){ }^{167} This literature has concluded that directors’ interest in their current and future board positions provides them with strong incentives to be viewed favorably by, and not displease, both shareholders and the company’s CEO. ^(168){ }^{168} The election of directors is usually dependent on being nominated by the board, which is normally influenced in this matter by the company’s CEO. ^(169){ }^{169} However, shareholders register their preferences by supporting or withholding support from candidates nominated by the board ^(170){ }^{170} and may actively propose their own candidates when they are sufficiently displeased. ^(171){ }^{171} 长期以来，公司治理文献一直在研究劳动力市场和控制权市场对董事决策的影响。 ^(167){ }^{167} 这些文献得出的结论是，董事对其当前和未来董事会职位的兴趣为他们提供了强大的激励，使他们能够获得股东和公司首席执行官的青睐，而不是让他们不高兴。 ^(168){ }^{168} 董事的选举通常取决于董事会的提名，而董事会在这一问题上通常受到公司首席执行官的影响。 ^(169){ }^{169} 不过，股东可以通过支持或不支持董事会提名的候选人来表达自己的偏好 ^(170){ }^{170} ，当他们有足够的不满时，也可以积极提出自己的候选人。 ^(171){ }^{171}
Labor and control markets provide incentives for share-holder-friendly decisions in four different ways, each of which is supported by the empirical literature. First, building a shareholder-friendly reputation increases the chances that directors would keep their positions and acquire other directorships. Jeffrey Coles and Chun-Keung Hoi, for example, have found that following the enactment of certain antitakeover provisions by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1990, non-executive directors who decided to opt out of some or all of these provisions were three times as likely, in the following three years, to acquire at least another external directorship as were directors who decided to keep all the antitakeover provisions. ^(172){ }^{172} And Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri, and Stephen Stubben have 劳动力市场和控制权市场以四种不同的方式为股东友好型决策提供激励，每种方式都得到了实证文献的支持。首先，建立有利于股东的声誉会增加董事保住职位和获得其他董事职位的机会。例如，杰弗里-科尔斯（Jeffrey Coles）和海春强（Chun-Keung Hoi）发现，在宾夕法尼亚州立法机构于 1990 年颁布了某些反收购条款后，决定选择不遵守部分或全部这些条款的非执行董事在随后三年内至少获得另一个外部董事职位的可能性是决定遵守所有反收购条款的董事的三倍。 ^(172){ }^{172} 而Yonca Ertimur、Fabrizio Ferri和Stephen Stubben已经
found that directors implementing precatory proposals voted by a majority of shareholders are one-fifth less likely to lose their seat and other directorships. ^(173){ }^{173} 发现，执行由多数股东投票通过的预防性提案的董事失去其席位和其他董事职位的可能性要低五分之一。 ^(173){ }^{173}
Second, a low shareholder value increases the likelihood of a successful proxy fight, resulting in some management-proposed directors losing the election. A recent paper by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li, and James Pinnington, for example, shows that mutual funds’ support for dissident candidates in a contested election is higher when certain measures of shareholder value are lower. ^(174){ }^{174} An empirical study of proxy contests from 1996 to 2010 also shows that following a proxy contest, directors lose seats at targeted companies as well as in other companies. In the aggregate, the authors of the study estimate $1.3\$ 1.3 to $2.9\$ 2.9 million in forgone income for the median incumbent director. ^(175){ }^{175} Thus, a director who wants to minimize the chances of being targeted in a proxy contest, and possibly lose their position and other profitable job opportunities, has strong reason to pursue high shareholder value. 其次，股东价值低会增加代理权争夺战成功的可能性，导致一些管理层提名的董事在选举中落败。例如，Alon Brav、Wei Jiang、Tao Li 和 James Pinnington 最近发表的一篇论文显示，当股东价值的某些指标较低时，共同基金在有争议的选举中对持不同政见候选人的支持率较高。 ^(174){ }^{174} 对 1996 年至 2010 年代理权争夺的实证研究也表明，在代理权争夺之后，目标公司的董事和其他公司的董事都会失去席位。据该研究的作者估计，中位现任董事损失的收入总计 $1.3\$ 1.3 至 $2.9\$ 2.9 百万。 ^(175){ }^{175} 因此，如果董事希望尽量减少在代理权争夺中成为目标的机会，并可能失去职位和其他有利可图的工作机会，那么他就有充分的理由追求高股东价值。
Third, a low stock price and poor performance for shareholders increase the likelihood of a takeover bid, which would threaten directors’ positions. Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein, and Wei Jiang present evidence that an interquartile decline in valuation leads to a 7%7 \% increase in acquisition likelihood, relative to a 6%6 \% unconditional takeover probability. ^(176){ }^{176} In addition, there is empirical evidence that a completed takeover has a negative financial impact on outside directors, who typically lose their seats and are less likely to acquire other directorships in the future. ^(177){ }^{177} 第三，对股东来说，低股价和业绩不佳会增加被收购的可能性，从而威胁到董事的地位。Alex Edmans、Itay Goldstein和Wei Jiang提出的证据表明，相对于 6%6 \% 无条件收购概率，估值的区间下降会导致 7%7 \% 收购可能性增加。 ^(176){ }^{176} 此外，有经验证据表明，完成收购会给外部董事带来负面的财务影响，因为他们通常会失去席位，而且未来获得其他董事职位的可能性也会降低。 ^(177){ }^{177}
Finally, low shareholder value increases the chances of intervention by a hedge fund activist and, if the company is targeted, the likelihood that the hedge fund will obtain a settlement. There is considerable empirical evidence that the odds of 最后，股东价值低会增加对冲基金激进分子介入的机会，如果公司成为目标，对冲基金获得和解的可能性也会增加。有大量经验证据表明，对冲基金介入公司的几率会增加。
activist engagement and the threat it poses are higher when stock returns have been lagging and metrics of shareholder value such as Tobin’s qq are low relative to industry peers. ^(178){ }^{178} Furthermore, a recent study coauthored by one of us shows that settlements with activists are associated with board turnover (an increase in the number of directors connected with or approved by activists and a decrease in the number of longtenured directors) and that poor Tobin’s qq and stock returns increase the likelihood that the activist intervention will result in a settlement. ^(179){ }^{179} 当股票回报滞后，托宾指数 qq 等股东价值指标相对于行业同行较低时，激进分子的参与及其带来的威胁就会更大。 ^(178){ }^{178} 此外，我们中的一位最近与他人合著的一项研究表明，与激进分子达成和解与董事会更替有关（与激进分子有关联或得到激进分子批准的董事人数增加，长期任职的董事人数减少），而糟糕的托宾指数 qq 和股票回报率会增加激进分子干预导致和解的可能性。 ^(179){ }^{179}
The labor and control markets therefore provide directors with significant incentives to enhance shareholder value. To be sure, there are studies indicating that directors also face incentives to be on the CEO’s good side. ^(180){ }^{180} Thus, in those situations in which the interests of shareholders and the CEO do not coincide, the labor and control markets would require directors to trade-off and balance the competing goals of pleasing both shareholders and top management. ^(181){ }^{181} 因此，劳动力市场和控制权市场为董事提供了提高股东价值的重要激励。当然，也有研究表明，董事也面临着与首席执行官保持良好关系的激励。 ^(180){ }^{180} 因此，在股东和首席执行官的利益不一致的情况下，劳动力市场和控制权市场会要求董事权衡和平衡取悦股东和高层管理者这两个相互竞争的目标。 ^(181){ }^{181}
What is clear, however, is that the labor and control markets do not provide directors with any incentives to protect or benefit stakeholders. Unlike shareholders and management, though, stakeholders play no role in and have no power with respect to the selection or removal of directors. They have no voting rights and no other tool to influence the election of directors. As a consequence, making choices that would benefit stakeholders would not improve directors’ chances of retaining their position or obtaining positions on other boards. To the contrary, to the extent that certain stakeholder-friendly decisions would come at the expense of shareholders and managers, making these decisions could hurt directors’ chances of retaining their positions. 然而，显而易见的是，劳动力市场和控制权市场并没有为董事提供任何保护利益相关者或使其受益的激励机制。不过，与股东和管理层不同，利益相关者在选择或罢免董事方面不发挥作用，也没有权力。他们没有投票权，也没有影响董事选举的其他工具。因此，做出有利于利益相关者的选择并不会增加董事保住职位或在其他董事会获得职位的机会。相反，如果某些对利益相关者有利的决定是以牺牲股东和管理者的利益为代价的，那么做出这些决定可能会损害董事保住职位的机会。
What we have shown in this subpart is not intended to suggest that the interests of directors and shareholders are perfectly aligned. In fact, we believe that agency problems between shareholders and directors are significant, that director incentives are still insufficiently aligned with shareholder interests, and that shareholders’ tools to monitor corporate decisions are weaker than is desirable. Specifically, there is substantial literature, including by one of us, on how to strengthen directors’ incentives to be attentive to the interests of shareholders. ^(182){ }^{182} 我们在本分节中所展示的内容并不是要表明董事和股东的利益是完全一致的。事实上，我们认为股东与董事之间的代理问题非常严重，董事的激励机制与股东利益仍然不够一致，股东监督公司决策的工具也比理想的要弱。具体来说，有大量文献，包括我们其中一人的文献，探讨了如何加强董事关注股东利益的激励机制。 ^(182){ }^{182}
However, while directors obtain some direct benefits from increases in shareholder value, they obtain no or little direct benefit from increases in stakeholder welfare. The literature has identified specific mechanisms that encourage share-holder-friendly decisions, and empirical studies have supported some of these hypotheses. In contrast, no such mechanisms are in place to incentivize directors to benefit stakeholders beyond what would be desirable for shareholder value. 然而，虽然董事从股东价值的增加中获得了一些直接利益，但他们却没有或很少从利益相关者福利的增加中获得直接利益。有文献指出了鼓励做出有利于股东决策的具体机制，实证研究也支持了其中的一些假设。与此相反，目前还没有此类机制来激励董事为利益相关者谋取超出股东价值预期的利益。
To be sure, it might sometimes be the case that directors prefer a certain outcome that is not in the interests of shareholders but is in the directors’ own self-interest and that, coincidentally, this outcome may benefit employees or other stakeholders. But while there are factors that systematically tie the interests of directors and shareholders, there are no such factors with respect to the interests of stakeholders. Thus, an analysis of director incentives does not provide support for the hopes of the advocates of stakeholderism. 可以肯定的是，有时董事可能倾向于某种不符合股东利益但却符合董事自身利益的结果，而巧的是，这种结果可能有利于雇员或其他利益相关者。但是，虽然存在将董事和股东的利益系统地联系在一起的因素，但在利益相关者的利益方面却不存在这样的因素。因此，对董事激励机制的分析并不能支持利益相关者主义倡导者的希望。
B. CEO Incentives B.首席执行官激励机制
Like directors, CEOs have little or no incentive to ever favor stakeholders at the expense of shareholders. Many observations made above with respect to directors apply to CEOs as well. Furthermore, there are some additional elements that reinforce CEO incentives to avoid treating stakeholders better than what is called for by shareholder value maximization. 与董事一样，首席执行官很少或根本没有动力去偏袒利益相关者而牺牲股东的利益。上文针对董事提出的许多意见也适用于首席执行官。此外，还有一些额外的因素会强化首席执行官的动机，即避免给予利益相关者比股东价值最大化所要求的更好的待遇。
1. Compensation 1.赔偿
The median CEO of the 500 largest companies in the United States receives nearly $12\$ 12 million a year in compensation. ^(183){ }^{183} These large pay packages are intended to have a powerful influence on CEOs’ behavior and decision making. ^(184){ }^{184} 美国 500 家最大公司 CEO 的年薪中位数接近 $12\$ 12 百万美元。 ^(183){ }^{183} 这些巨额薪酬旨在对首席执行官的行为和决策产生强大的影响。 ^(184){ }^{184}
A substantial fraction of this sum ( 48.5%48.5 \% ) is paid in the form of restricted stock or units, whose eventual value is, by definition, fully driven by shareholder value. ^(185){ }^{185} An additional fraction of compensation ( 11.8%11.8 \% ) is paid through stock options, which have an even greater sensitivity to stock value. ^(186){ }^{186} Furthermore, equity awards are often conditional on the achievements of performance goals that are based on measures of profit, revenues, cash flow, or shareholder return. ^(187){ }^{187} Therefore, more than 60%60 \% of the average CEO pay in large corporations is directly linked to shareholder value and provides strong incentives to enhance it. ^(188){ }^{188} 其中很大一部分（ 48.5%48.5 \% ）是以限制性股票或单位的形式支付的，顾名思义，这些股票或单位的最终价值完全由股东价值决定。 ^(185){ }^{185} 还有一部分薪酬（ 11.8%11.8 \% ）是通过股票期权支付的，而股票期权对股票价值的敏感度更高。 ^(186){ }^{186} 此外，股权奖励通常以绩效目标的实现为条件，而绩效目标是基于利润、收入、现金流或股东回报的衡量标准。 ^(187){ }^{187} 因此，大公司首席执行官的平均薪酬中有超过 60%60 \% 部分与股东价值直接挂钩，并为提高股东价值提供了强有力的激励。 ^(188){ }^{188}
The second largest component of CEO pay for the largest companies is cash bonuses. ^(189){ }^{189} Most firms grant bonuses on the basis of a performance-based plan that specifies qualitative and quantitative goals. ^(190){ }^{190} The vast majority of these goals, in turn, are financial metrics that are relevant to performance for shareholders such as profit, revenues, capital efficiency, total shareholder return, and cash flow. According to a recent report by the Conference Board, only 77 Russell 3000 companies (that is, 2.6%2.6 \% of the total) use nonfinancial metrics to award bonuses. ^(191){ }^{191} 最大公司首席执行官薪酬的第二大组成部分是现金奖金。 ^(189){ }^{189} 大多数公司发放奖金的依据是基于绩效的计划，其中规定了定性和定量目标。 ^(190){ }^{190} 这些目标中的绝大多数又是与股东业绩相关的财务指标，如利润、收入、资本效率、股东总回报和现金流。根据 Conference Board 最近的一份报告，只有 77 家罗素 3000 指数公司（占总数的 2.6%2.6 \% ）使用非财务指标来发放奖金。 ^(191){ }^{191}
A minority of public companies use discretionary bonuses, which are not based on criteria known in advance but rather 少数上市公司采用自行决定的奖金，这种奖金不是基于事先知道的标准，而是
determined ex post at the discretion of the board of directors or its compensation committee. ^(192){ }^{192} As discussed in the preceding subpart, directors have incentives to be favorably viewed by shareholders and top managers. Thus, discretionary bonuses should be expected to incentivize shareholder-friendly decisions or to provide little incentive at all, depending on the weight directors attach to shareholder interests relative to the interests of managers; they should not be expected, however, to give CEOs any incentive to attach independent value to stakeholder benefits. 由董事会或其薪酬委员会事后决定。 ^(192){ }^{192} 正如上一部分所述，董事有动机获得股东和高层管理者的青睐。因此，根据董事对股东利益相对于经理利益的重视程度，酌情发放的奖金应该会激励股东做出对其有利的决策，或者根本不会产生什么激励作用；但是，不应该指望奖金会激励首席执行官独立重视利益相关者的利益。
To examine the effects of CEO pay in more detail, we reviewed the 2019 proxy statements of the companies in the BRT Board Sample. Table 3 presents a summary of CEOs’ total compensation, the level of compensation for each main component (salary, bonuses, and equity incentives), and the fraction of total compensation that is linked to the company’s performance. 为了更详细地研究首席执行官薪酬的影响，我们查阅了 BRT 董事会样本公司的 2019 年代理声明。表 3 汇总了首席执行官的薪酬总额、各主要部分（工资、奖金和股权激励）的薪酬水平以及与公司业绩挂钩的薪酬总额比例。
As the table shows, a very large fraction of CEO compensa-tion- 91%91 \% on average-is linked to performance. This kind of compensation takes many shapes, including stock-based compensation and bonuses. The realization value of stock compensation is intrinsically linked to shareholder value, and bonuses are based on the achievement of performance goals that are largely related to financial performance. 如表所示，首席执行官薪酬的很大一部分-- 91%91 \% 平均而言--与业绩挂钩。这种薪酬有多种形式，包括股票薪酬和奖金。股票薪酬的实现价值与股东价值有着内在的联系，而奖金则是基于业绩目标的实现情况，这些目标在很大程度上与财务业绩相关。
Table 3. 2018 Compensation of CEOS on the BRT Board 表 3.2018 年 BRT 董事会 CEOS 的报酬
*Performance goals for cash and equity incentives were not achieved. *未实现现金和股权激励的绩效目标。
This table reports CEO compensation as disclosed by the company in its annual proxy statement, filed with the SEC in 2019. Column “PBC” reports the fraction of performance-based compensation over the total compensation. 本表报告了公司在 2019 年提交给美国证券交易委员会的年度委托书中披露的首席执行官薪酬。PBC "一栏报告了绩效薪酬占总薪酬的比例。
In only three cases-those of Eastman, Duke Energy, and Marriott International-the bonus is linked to a quantified stakeholder metric, and even then in a rather limited way. In the case of Eastman, the annual bonus is determined on the 只有伊士曼公司、杜克能源公司和万豪国际集团等三家公司的奖金与利益相关者的量化指标挂钩，即便如此，挂钩的方式也相当有限。在伊士曼的案例中，年度奖金的确定依据是
basis of various corporate and individual performance goals that include three measures of employee safety, but no specific weight is assigned to the various metrics; therefore, the compensation committee has broad discretion in deciding how each of these aspects affects compensation. ^(193){ }^{193} 薪酬委员会以各种企业和个人绩效目标为基础，其中包括三项员工安全措施，但没有为各种指标分配具体权重；因此，薪酬委员会在决定这些方面如何影响薪酬时拥有广泛的自由裁量权。 ^(193){ }^{193}
At Marriott, the metrics determining the CEO’s annual bonus include satisfaction of employees and guests (as measured by external surveys), but the weights of these stakeholder metrics on the total CEO compensation are negligible: 1%1 \% and 2%2 \%, respectively. ^(194){ }^{194} At Duke Energy, the annual bonus is partly linked to three stakeholder metrics, with two of them getting negligible weights of 0.5%0.5 \% (environment) and 1.6%1.6 \% (customer satisfaction) and only the metric related to employee safety getting a meaningful weight of 19%.^(195)19 \% .^{195} 在万豪酒店，决定首席执行官年度奖金的指标包括员工和客人的满意度（由外部调查衡量），但这些利益相关者指标在首席执行官总薪酬中所占的权重微乎其微： 1%1 \% 和 2%2 \% 。 ^(194){ }^{194} 在杜克能源公司，年度奖金部分与三个利益相关者指标挂钩，其中两个指标的权重微乎其微，分别为 0.5%0.5 \% （环境）和 1.6%1.6 \% （客户满意度），只有与员工安全相关的指标获得了有意义的权重 19%.^(195)19 \% .^{195} 。
Note that, even in these three cases, the metrics refer only to some groups of stakeholders and to significant but limited aspects of their welfare. With respect to employees, the metric is limited to safety, which could have implications for financial performance, but does not take into account key aspects of employee welfare such as pay, benefits, or job protection. With respect to the environment, the metric adopted by Duke Energy concerns “reportable events” that require notification to or enforcement action by a regulatory agency-which again could have implications for the company’s financial performancebut ignores other kinds of environmental events and the general environmental impact of the firm. ^(196){ }^{196} 需要注意的是，即使在这三种情况下，衡量标准也只是针对某些利益相关者群体及其福利的重要但有限的方面。在员工方面，衡量标准仅限于安全，这可能会对财务业绩产生影响，但没有考虑到员工福利的关键方面，如薪酬、福利或工作保护。在环境方面，杜克能源公司采用的衡量标准涉及需要向监管机构通报或由监管机构采取执法行动的 "可报告事件"--这同样会对公司的财务业绩产生影响，但却忽略了其他类型的环境事件以及公司对环境的总体影响。 ^(196){ }^{196}
Such a shareholder-centric pattern is unsurprising. In setting executive pay arrangements, directors seek to avoid shareholder disapproval that could result in a relatively low “say-on-pay” vote or even withheld votes in director elections. ^(197){ }^{197} And shareholders and their proxy advisors are interested in performance for shareholders. 这种以股东为中心的模式不足为奇。在制定高管薪酬安排时，董事们力求避免股东的反对，因为股东的反对可能会导致 "对薪酬说 "的投票率相对较低，甚至在董事选举中被弃权。 ^(197){ }^{197} 而股东及其代理顾问关心的是股东的业绩。
The quantitative model used by the largest proxy adviser, ISS, to assess executive compensation in public companies is based entirely on financial metrics connected with shareholder value. ^(198){ }^{198} Specifically, ISS uses four different measures, over periods of one, three, or five years, to evaluate the alignment of executive pay with corporate performance. Two of the three primary measures are based on total shareholder return, while the third is a measure of compensation relative to the median compensation among comparable firms. The fourth measure is a combination of four metrics based on “economic value ad-ded”-that is, net operating profit before taxes, less the cost of capital. Importantly, none of these metrics register the effects of corporate decisions on stakeholder welfare. 最大的代理顾问公司 ISS 用于评估上市公司高管薪酬的量化模型完全基于与股东价值相关的财务指标。 ^(198){ }^{198} 具体而言，ISS使用四种不同的衡量标准，以一年、三年或五年为周期，评估高管薪酬与公司业绩的一致性。三个主要衡量标准中的两个基于股东总回报，第三个衡量标准是相对于可比公司薪酬中位数的薪酬。第四个衡量标准是基于 "附加经济价值"（即税前净营业利润减去资本成本）的四个衡量标准的组合。重要的是，这些指标都不能反映公司决策对利益相关者福利的影响。
In sum, actual compensation practices (including those at the companies whose CEOs sit on the board of directors of the BRT), and the evaluation of these practices by shareholders and proxy advisors, are strongly focused on shareholder value. ^(199){ }^{199} Thus, executive pay arrangements, and their evaluation by shareholders and proxy advisors, provide executives 总之，实际的薪酬做法（包括首席执行官是 BRT 董事会成员的公司的薪酬做法），以及股东和代理顾问对这些做法的评估，都非常注重股东价值。 ^(199){ }^{199} 因此，高管薪酬安排以及股东和代理顾问对这些安排的评估，为高管提供了
with incentives not to ever sacrifice shareholder value to provide benefits to stakeholders. 激励机制，绝不牺牲股东价值来为利益相关者提供利益。
2. Labor and Control Markets 2.劳动力市场和控制市场
As was shown earlier to be the case with respect to directors, ^(200){ }^{200} labor and control markets tie the interests of CEOs to those of stockholders. As discussed below, good stock price performance increases the likelihood of CEOs keeping their jobs or finding similar jobs with other companies and, by contrast, poor stock price performance increases the likelihood of CEOs being replaced. As a result, CEOs who care about their job and job market prospects have strong incentives not to protect stakeholders beyond what would be useful for shareholder value maximization. 如前文所示，在董事方面， ^(200){ }^{200} 劳动力市场和控制权市场将首席执行官的利益与股东的利益联系在一起。如下文所述，良好的股价表现会增加首席执行官保住工作或在其他公司找到类似工作的可能性，相反，糟糕的股价表现则会增加首席执行官被取代的可能性。因此，那些关心自己的工作和就业市场前景的首席执行官有强烈的动机不在有利于股东价值最大化的范围内保护利益相关者。
The theoretical reasons underlying these points are similar to those discussed with respect to director incentives. Shareholder discontent with performance may put pressure on the board to replace the CEO or may lead to hedge fund intervention or even a proxy fight. ^(201){ }^{201} At the same time, providing stakeholders with only what would be useful for shareholder value maximization would not have any such consequences. 这些观点的理论依据与讨论董事激励机制的理论依据相似。股东对业绩的不满可能会给董事会带来更换首席执行官的压力，也可能导致对冲基金的干预，甚至是代理权争夺战。 ^(201){ }^{201} 同时，只向利益相关者提供对股东价值最大化有用的东西不会产生任何此类后果。
The analysis above is consistent with a large body of empirical work. To begin with, the empirical literature on CEO turnover confirms that poor stock performance is associated with CEO turnover. Steven Kaplan and Bernadette Minton, for example, have found that CEO turnover-both internal (decided by the board) and external (resulting from a takeover or bankruptcy) is significantly related to stock performance. ^(202){ }^{202} A subsequent study by Dirk Jenter and Katharina Lewellen estimates that total turnover probabilities for CEOs increase significantly as industry-adjusted stock returns decrease. ^(203){ }^{203} The rich literature on this topic presents different estimates of the economic significance of the correlation between firm performance and CEO turnover, as well as different findings regarding the relative importance of the company’s industryadjusted stock performance. There is, however, a solid consen- 上述分析与大量实证研究相符。首先，有关首席执行官更替的实证文献证实，股票表现不佳与首席执行官更替有关。例如，史蒂文-卡普兰（Steven Kaplan）和伯纳黛特-明顿（Bernadette Minton）发现，首席执行官的更替--无论是内部更替（由董事会决定）还是外部更替（由收购或破产导致）--都与股票表现显著相关。 ^(202){ }^{202} Dirk Jenter 和 Katharina Lewellen 随后进行的一项研究估计，随着行业调整后股票回报率的下降，首席执行官的总更替概率会显著增加。 ^(203){ }^{203} 有关这一主题的丰富文献对公司业绩与首席执行官更替之间相关性的经济意义有不同的估计，对公司的行业调整后股票业绩的相对重要性也有不同的结论。然而，有一个坚实的共识是，公司业绩与首席执行官更替之间的相关性在经济学上的意义是不同的。
sus that CEOs who are successful in increasing shareholder return are more likely to keep their jobs. ^(204){ }^{204} 怀疑成功提高股东回报的首席执行官更有可能保住饭碗。 ^(204){ }^{204}
Furthermore, the above analysis is consistent with the empirical evidence on hedge fund activism. As we have earlier pointed out with respect to director incentives, a poor shareholder return increases the chances of an engagement by an activist hedge fund, of the company being forced to enter into a settlement agreement with the activist, and of the activist winning a proxy contest. ^(205){ }^{205} 此外，上述分析与对冲基金激进主义的经验证据是一致的。正如我们早些时候就董事激励机制所指出的，股东回报不佳会增加激进对冲基金参与、公司被迫与激进对冲基金达成和解协议以及激进对冲基金在代理权争夺中获胜的几率。 ^(205){ }^{205}
Finally, a study by C. Edward Fee, Charles Hadlock, and Joshua Pierce shows that losing a CEO position has a negative effect on subsequent employment prospects. The researchers document that, when CEOs find new executive employment in other firms, the new positions "tend to be substantially inferior to prior positions measured along a variety of dimensions."206 This effect operates to strengthen CEOs’ interest in retaining their position, and this interest is served by avoiding any decisions that would benefit stakeholders at the expense of shareholders. ^(207){ }^{207} 最后，C. Edward Fee、Charles Hadlock 和 Joshua Pierce 的一项研究表明，失去首席执行官职位会对随后的就业前景产生负面影响。研究人员发现，当首席执行官在其他公司找到新的高管职位时，新职位 "从多个维度衡量，往往大大逊色于之前的职位 "206。这种影响加强了首席执行官对保住职位的兴趣，而这种兴趣可以通过避免任何以牺牲股东利益为代价而使利益相关者受益的决策来实现。 ^(207){ }^{207}
To be sure, the analysis above and the evidence supporting it do not indicate that the interests of CEOs and shareholders generally overlap. In fact, the private interests of CEOs intro- 可以肯定的是，上述分析和支持分析的证据并不表明首席执行官和股东的利益普遍重叠。事实上，首席执行官的私人利益与股东的私人利益是相辅相成的。
duce agency problems and produce in some situations a significant divergence between the interests of CEOs and shareholders. Notwithstanding these agency problems, there is at least a robust link and substantial alignment between CEO and shareholder interests. As a result, CEOs have strong incentives to take the interests of shareholders very seriously. 在某些情况下，首席执行官和股东的利益会出现重大分歧。尽管存在这些代理问题，但首席执行官和股东的利益之间至少存在着紧密的联系和实质性的一致。因此，首席执行官有强烈的动机认真对待股东的利益。
In contrast, no such link exists between CEO interests and stakeholder interests. Consequently, CEOs do not have incentives to regard stakeholder interests as an independent end. With strong incentives to care about shareholder value, and little incentive to care about stakeholder interests, CEOs are discouraged from making any decisions that would benefit or protect stakeholders beyond what would be necessary for shareholder value maximization. Thus, once the actual structure of incentives is taken into account, there is no basis for stakeholderist claims and hopes that CEOs would use their discretion in such a stakeholder-friendly way. ^(208){ }^{208} 相比之下，首席执行官的利益与利益相关者的利益之间并不存在这种联系。因此，首席执行官没有动力将利益相关者的利益视为独立的目的。首席执行官关心股东价值的动机很强，而关心利益相关者利益的动机很弱，因此他们不愿意做出任何有利于或保护利益相关者的决策，而只是做出股东价值最大化所必需的决策。因此，一旦考虑到激励机制的实际结构，利益相关者主张和希望首席执行官以对利益相关者友好的方式使用其自由裁量权的想法就没有了依据。 ^(208){ }^{208}
C. Learning from the Past C.向过去学习
We have thus far shown that directors and executives have incentives not to provide stakeholder benefits that would come at the expense of shareholders. We now turn to discuss whether the past behavior of corporate leaders has been consistent with the conclusions of our incentive analysis. As we discussed in Part I, many states have in place constituency statutes that embrace an approach similar to that advocated by modern stakeholderists. Thus, an examination of the prom- 到目前为止，我们已经证明，董事和高管有动机不为利益相关者提供牺牲股东利益的利益。现在我们来讨论一下公司领导人过去的行为是否与我们的激励分析结论相一致。正如我们在第一部分所讨论的，许多州都制定了选区法规，这些法规所采用的方法与现代利益相关者所倡导的方法类似。因此，对企业领导者过去的行为与我们的激励分析结论是否一致进行研究，可以帮助我们更好地理解企业领导者的行为。
ise of stakeholderism could be informed by an examination of the decisions that corporate leaders made under such statutes. 对企业领导者根据这些法规做出的决定进行研究，可以为利益相关主义的观点提供信息。
We therefore conducted an empirical investigation on whether constituency statutes have actually delivered protections for stakeholders as was hoped for. ^(209){ }^{209} Our study examined the twenty-year period from 2000 through 2019 and reviewed all private equity acquisitions of public companies of significant size that were incorporated in a state with a constituency statute in force. We focused on private equity acquisitions because such acquisitions move assets to the control of managers with powerful incentives to maximize financial returns, and therefore often pose significant risks to stakeholders. For each of the acquisitions in our sample, we hand collected and analyzed detailed information about the process leading to the transaction and the full set of terms negotiated by the parties. 因此，我们进行了一项实证调查，研究选区法规是否真的如人们所希望的那样为利益相关者提供了保护。 ^(209){ }^{209} 我们的研究考察了从 2000 年到 2019 年这二十年间的情况，并审查了在有选区法规的州注册成立的具有相当规模的上市公司的所有私募股权收购。我们将重点放在私募股权收购上，因为此类收购将资产转移到了经理人的控制之下，而经理人具有将财务回报最大化的强大动机，因此往往会给利益相关者带来重大风险。对于样本中的每项收购，我们都亲手收集并分析了有关交易过程的详细信息，以及各方谈判达成的全套条款。
We found that the acquisitions were commonly the product of a long negotiation process that produced substantial benefits for both shareholders and corporate leaders. Shareholders enjoyed sizable premiums over the pre-deal stock price. In addition to the gains made on their own equity holdings, corporate leaders also frequently secured additional payments in connection with the transactions, and often obtained commitments for continued employment after the acquisition. 我们发现，这些收购通常都是长期谈判的产物，为股东和公司领导人都带来了巨大利益。与交易前的股价相比，股东享有可观的溢价。除了自己所持股票的收益外，公司领导还经常获得与交易相关的额外报酬，并经常获得收购后继续工作的承诺。
At the same time, however, corporate leaders generally did not use their negotiating power to secure any constraints on the power of the private equity buyer to make choices that would adversely impact stakeholders. In particular, despite the risk of significant post-sale layoffs and reduction in employment, we found that in almost all cases corporate leaders did not negotiate for any restrictions on the freedom of the private equity buyers to fire employees. Also, in the rare cases in which such restrictions were found, the deal terms denied employees any power to enforce these constraints. 但与此同时，公司领导者一般不会利用其谈判能力来限制私募股权买方做出会对利益相关者产生不利影响的选择。特别是，尽管存在出售后大幅裁员和减少就业的风险，我们发现几乎在所有情况下，公司领导者都没有通过谈判来限制私募股权买方解雇员工的自由。此外，在极少数有此类限制的案例中，交易条款也剥夺了员工执行这些限制的权力。
Furthermore, we found that corporate leaders generally did not negotiate any constraints on buyers’ post-deal choices that could pose risks to several other notable stakeholder groupsconsumers, suppliers, creditors, or the environment. In a few cases, the buyers pledged to retain the location of the company headquarters or to continue some local investments or philanthropy, but our analysis of the legal terms indicates that these 此外，我们还发现，企业领导者一般不会通过谈判对买方在交易后的选择做出任何限制，而这些限制可能会给其他几个重要的利益相关者群体--消费者、供应商、债权人或环境带来风险。在少数情况下，买方承诺保留公司总部所在地，或继续在当地进行某些投资或慈善活动，但我们对法律条款的分析表明，这些承诺并不会给买方带来风险。
rare pledges were rather “soft”: unlike commitments to shareholders or corporate leaders, these pledges were vague and underspecified and, importantly, denied potential beneficiaries any enforcement rights. 极少数承诺相当 "软"：与对股东或公司领导人的承诺不同，这些承诺含糊不清、不够具体，而且重要的是，拒绝给予潜在受益人任何强制执行的权利。
It might be argued that the shareholder-oriented approach of corporate leaders in these transactions is due to the proshareholder norms that prevailed in boardrooms and executive suites in the past. ^(210){ }^{210} However, even when we focused on the most recent deals from the past several years, we did not find any significant stakeholder protections, despite the widespread stakeholder rhetoric used by corporate leaders and their advisors during this period. ^(211){ }^{211} To be sure, stakeholderists might respond that such norms could still evolve in the future and that embracing stakeholderism would likely contribute to such evolution. However, the absence of any detectable trend in spite of the growing support for stakeholderism suggests, at a minimum, that much caution is warranted before relying on the future evolution of such norms as a basis for expecting stakeholderism to deliver on its promises. ^(212){ }^{212} 也许有人会说，公司领导者在这些交易中采取以股东为导向的做法，是由于过去在董事会和高管层中盛行的亲股东准则。 ^(210){ }^{210} 然而，即使我们关注过去几年的最新交易，我们也没有发现任何重要的利益相关者保护措施，尽管在此期间企业领导者及其顾问广泛使用了利益相关者言论。 ^(211){ }^{211} 可以肯定的是，利益相关者主义者可能会回应说，这种规范在未来仍有可能演变，而接受利益相关主义很可能会促进这种演变。然而，尽管利益相关者主义得到了越来越多的支持，但却没有出现任何可察觉的趋势，这至少表明，在依赖这些规范的未来演变作为期待利益相关者主义兑现其承诺的基础之前，我们必须慎之又慎。 ^(212){ }^{212}
Thus, the evidence on the decisions corporate leaders made in the presence of constituency statutes is consistent with our earlier conclusion that corporate leaders have incentives not to provide stakeholders with any benefits that would come at the expense of shareholders. Accordingly, if stakeholderism is widely accepted, corporate leaders should be expected to choose, as corporate leaders governed by constitu- 因此，有关公司领导者在选区章程存在的情况下所做决策的证据与我们之前得出的结论是一致的，即公司领导者有动力不向利益相关者提供任何以牺牲股东利益为代价的利益。因此，如果利益相关者主义被广泛接受，那么作为受选区法规管辖的公司领导者，公司领导者应该会做出如下选择
ency statutes chose, not to use their discretion to provide stakeholders with any such benefits. 在这种情况下，《国际商业法》选择不使用其自由裁量权为利益相关者提供任何此类福利。
D. Fixing Incentives? D.修复激励机制？
Stakeholderists commonly advocate giving corporate leaders discretion to protect stakeholders while otherwise retaining basic corporate law rules. ^(213){ }^{213} We have therefore examined in the preceding sections how corporate leaders should be expected to use such discretion, and how they have in fact used it in the past, under the existing systems of incentives. However, it might be argued that, even if stakeholderism as commonly proposed would not deliver material benefits for stakeholders, it would be possible to increase stakeholder welfare by supplementing standard stakeholderism with additional arrangements that would substantially alter the incentives of corporate leaders. 利益相关者通常主张给予公司领导者保护利益相关者的自由裁量权，同时保留基本的公司法规则。 ^(213){ }^{213} 因此，我们在前面的章节中研究了在现有的激励制度下，应该如何期望公司领导者使用这种自由裁量权，以及他们过去实际上是如何使用这种自由裁量权的。不过，我们也可以说，即使通常所建议的利益相关者主义不会给利益相关者带来实质性的好处，但通过对标准的利益相关者主义进行补充，做出一些额外的安排，从而大大改变公司领导者的激励机制，还是有可能增加利益相关者的福利的。
According to this possible view, it would be desirable to adopt arrangements that would align the interests of corporate leaders with those of stakeholders and thereby incentivize leaders to deliver value to stakeholders. Although a comprehensive analysis of all the possible designs of such an approach is beyond the scope of this Article, we briefly explain in this section the challenges and difficulties with which any attempt to develop such an approach would have to wrestle. In particular, we discuss below both (i) how difficult it would be to design arrangements that would incentivize corporate leaders to focus on the aggregate interests of all corporate constituencies, and (ii) the substantial costs that such arrangements would likely produce. 根据这种可能的观点，最好能做出一些安排，使公司领导者的利益与利益相关者的利益相一致，从而激励领导者为利益相关者创造价值。虽然对这种方法的所有可能设计进行全面分析超出了本文的范围，但我们在本节中简要说明了任何试图制定这种方法的尝试都必须面对的挑战和困难。特别是，我们将在下文中讨论：(i) 设计出能够激励公司领导者关注公司所有利益相关者总体利益的安排有多么困难；(ii) 这种安排可能产生的巨大成本。
1. Redesigning Executive Pay? 1.重新设计高管薪酬？
It is natural to begin this discussion with the design of executive and director pay. In subparts IV.A and IV.B we discussed how compensation practices commonly tie the payoffs of corporate leaders directly to shareholder value but not to stakeholder welfare. However, stakeholderists have expressed support for redesigning pay arrangements, ^(214){ }^{214} and compensa- 讨论自然要从高管和董事的薪酬设计开始。在第 IV.A 和 IV.B 小节中，我们讨论了薪酬实践通常是如何将公司领导者的薪酬与股东价值直接挂钩，而不是与利益相关者的福利挂钩。然而，利益相关者已经表示支持重新设计薪酬安排， ^(214){ }^{214} 而薪酬设计也应考虑到利益相关者的利益。
tion consultants have publicly discussed the possibility of substantial incorporation of stakeholder metrics in pay arrangements. ^(215){ }^{215} As explained below, however, such changes in pay arrangements should not be expected to enable stakeholderism to produce its purported benefits for three reasons. 薪酬顾问公开讨论了在薪酬安排中大量纳入利益相关者衡量标准的可能性。 ^(215){ }^{215} 但是，正如下文所解释的，由于以下三个原因，不应该指望薪酬安排的这种变化能够使利益相关者主义产生其所谓的好处。
First, it would be rather difficult to design pay schemes that would serve well the goals of stakeholderism. Designing schemes that tie payoffs to the interests of shareholders is itself far from straightforward even though the interests of shareholders are relatively well-defined and measurable. ^(216){ }^{216} Because the interests of some stakeholders are difficult to fully define and accurately measure, tying payoffs to the aggregate interests of all the relevant constituencies of a company would likely be orders of magnitude more challenging. 首先，要设计出能够很好地实现利益相关者目标的薪酬计划是相当困难的。即使股东的利益是相对明确和可衡量的，设计将薪酬与股东利益挂钩的方案本身也远非易事。 ^(216){ }^{216} 由于某些利益相关者的利益难以完全界定和准确衡量，因此将薪酬与公司所有相关支持者的总体利益挂钩可能更具挑战性。
For some constituencies, there would be no available metric that could reliably and effectively measure the company’s effects on their welfare. For example, even if a company were to focus solely on the effects of its decisions on climate change, it would have to choose among competing metrics developed by different organizations and that often lead to considerably different estimates of the company’s climate change impact. ^(217){ }^{217} 对于某些支持者来说，没有可用的衡量标准能够可靠有效地衡量公司对其福利的影响。例如，即使一家公司只关注其决策对气候变化的影响，它也必须在不同组织制定的相互竞争的衡量标准中做出选择，而这些衡量标准往往会导致对公司气候变化影响的估计大相径庭。 ^(217){ }^{217}
And a company’s climate change impact might represent only part of its environmental impact. 公司对气候变化的影响可能只是其环境影响的一部分。
Similarly, it would be difficult to develop quantitative metrics that would measure with reasonable accuracy a company’s effects on all of its suppliers, its effects on all relevant communities, or its aggregate effects on the various types of a company’s customers. Note that tying compensation to the interests of one group of stakeholders but not to the interests of a second relevant group of stakeholders might strengthen, not weaken, the incentive of corporate leaders not to give independent weight to the interests of the second group. 同样，也很难制定量化指标来合理准确地衡量公司对其所有供应商的影响、对所有相关社区的影响或对公司各类客户的综合影响。需要注意的是，将薪酬与一类利益相关者的利益挂钩，而不与第二类利益相关者的利益挂钩，可能会加强而不是削弱公司领导者不独立考虑第二类利益相关者利益的动机。
Furthermore, even if reliable metrics were available for each of the relevant stakeholder groups, it would be still necessary to meet the formidable challenge of combining them. What weight would be given to each of the metrics? As discussed in subpart II.B, stakeholderists have largely avoided proposing methods for aggregating the interests of all stakeholders, leaving this decision to the discretion of corporate leaders. Any attempt to design pay arrangements that would induce corporate leaders to serve all stakeholders would require the adoption of some methodology for aggregating and balancing the interests of the various constituencies. 此外，即使每个利益相关者群体都有可靠的衡量标准，仍有必要应对将这些标准结合起来的艰巨挑战。每个指标的权重是多少？如第 II.B 小节所述，利益相关者学家在很大程度上避免提出将所有利益相关者的利益综合在一起的方法，而是将这一决定权留给公司领导者。要想设计出能够促使公司领导人为所有利益相关者服务的薪酬安排，就必须采用某种方法来综合和平衡不同利益相关者的利益。
Second, corporate leaders might have private interests in setting pay arrangements that would enhance their own pay. ^(218){ }^{218} For this reason, policymakers have long paid attention to how pay is determined, including by mandating independent compensation committees and say-on-pay votes. ^(219){ }^{219} Since identifying and incorporating stakeholder metrics into pay arrangements would involve substantial discretionary choices, executives and their advisors would have the opportunity to influence pay setting in ways that would favor executives’ private interests. 其次，公司领导者在制定薪酬安排时可能会考虑到私人利益，从而提高自己的薪酬。 ^(218){ }^{218} 因此，政策制定者长期以来一直关注薪酬的确定方式，包括强制要求成立独立的薪酬委员会和对薪酬进行投票表决。 ^(219){ }^{219} 由于确定利益相关者的衡量标准并将其纳入薪酬安排将涉及大量的自由选择，高管及其顾问将有机会以有利于高管个人利益的方式影响薪酬的制定。
For example, executives might choose stakeholder-related targets that are expected to be reached anyway or that are inconsequential, thus increasing executive pay while contributing little to stakeholder welfare and weakening the link be- 例如，高管人员可能会选择一些与利益相关者有关的目标，而这些目标预计无论如何都会实现，或者无关紧要，这样就会增加高管人员的薪酬，但对利益相关者的福利却没有什么贡献，并削弱了与利益相关者的联系。
tween pay and performance. Thus, we have to recognize the risk that the primary effect of the advocated redesign of executive pay would be to increase executive payoffs and weaken performance incentives. 薪酬与绩效之间的关系。因此，我们必须认识到，所倡导的重新设计高管薪酬的主要效果可能是增加高管薪酬，削弱业绩激励。
Third, as long as shareholders exclusively have voting rights, effective oversight of how well pay arrangements incentivize maximizing the aggregate welfare of all constituencies would likely be lacking. Independent directors elected by shareholders would have limited incentives to oversee and shape effective executive pay arrangements that provide strong stakeholderist incentives. Similarly, shareholders casting say-on-pay votes could be more interested in how pay arrangements would affect their own interests rather than those of stakeholders. Therefore, shareholders and independent directors elected by them should not be expected to encourage or monitor the adoption of stakeholder-related metrics with the same effectiveness that they have thus far done with respect to shareholder-related metrics. 第三，只要股东只拥有投票权，就很可能无法有效监督薪酬安排如何激励所有利益相关者的总体福利最大化。由股东选举产生的独立董事在监督和制定有效的高管薪酬安排以提供强有力的利益相关者激励方面的动力有限。同样，对薪酬说 "不 "投票的股东可能更关心薪酬安排如何影响他们自己的利益，而不是利益相关者的利益。因此，不应期望股东及其选出的独立董事能够像迄今为止在股东相关指标方面所做的那样有效地鼓励或监督采用利益相关者相关指标。
Finally, as long as shareholders have exclusive power with respect to director elections, labor and control markets will provide both directors and executives with strong incentives not to benefit stakeholders beyond the point that would best serve shareholder value maximization. Thus, without major changes in how corporate directors are appointed, the incentives of corporate leaders would retain a significant pro-shareholder tilt. 最后，只要股东在董事选举方面拥有专属权力，劳动力市场和控制权市场就会为董事和高管提供强大的激励机制，使他们不会在最有利于股东价值最大化的情况下为利益相关者谋利。因此，如果不对公司董事的任命方式进行重大改革，公司领导者的激励机制仍将明显向股东倾斜。
2. Changing Director Election Rules? 2.改变董事选举规则？
Supporters of stakeholderism have thus far largely accepted shareholders’ exclusive voting power as a received premise. ^(220){ }^{220} Below, however, we examine the possibility of advancing the interests of stakeholders by providing them with voting rights with respect to director elections. For example, a widely discussed recent bill would reserve some seats on U.S. corporate boards to labor representatives, ^(221){ }^{221} similarly to what 迄今为止，利益相关者主义的支持者在很大程度上接受了股东专有投票权这一公认前提。 ^(220){ }^{220} 不过，我们将在下文探讨通过赋予利益相关者在董事选举中的投票权来促进其利益的可能性。例如，最近被广泛讨论的一项法案将在美国公司董事会中为劳工代表保留一些席位， ^(221){ }^{221} 与之类似。
some European countries mandate for large corporations. ^(222){ }^{222} Since stakeholderists view employees as only one group of stakeholders, ^(223){ }^{223} let us consider the possibility of enabling all corporate constituencies to participate in the election of directors. 一些欧洲国家规定大公司必须这样做。 ^(222){ }^{222} 既然利益相关者主义者认为雇员只是利益相关者中的一个群体，那么 ^(223){ }^{223} 让我们考虑一下让公司的所有利益相关者都能参与董事选举的可能性。
One approach would be to have each corporate constituency elect a subset of the company’s directors who would then represent its perspective and interests. An alternative approach would be to have all stakeholder groups participate together with shareholders in the election of all directors. To conserve space, we will only discuss below several serious problems that would afflict the latter approach, but the former approach would suffer from similarly severe problems. 一种方法是让每个公司利益相关者选出公司董事的一个子集，然后由他们代表自己的观点和利益。另一种方法是让所有利益相关群体与股东一起参与所有董事的选举。为了节省篇幅，我们在下文中将只讨论后一种方法会遇到的几个严重问题，但前一种方法也会遇到类似的严重问题。
First, note that if any significant group of stakeholders does not get its “own” subset of directors, then no director would have an incentive to give independent weight to the interest of this stakeholder group. Assuming that all stakeholder groups will get representation, however, raises the difficult question of how many directors to allocate to each constitu-ency-shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and so on. How will the allocation be determined in the case of each company and through what process? 首先要注意的是，如果任何重要的利益相关者群体没有 "自己的 "董事子集，那么任何董事都不会有动力独立考虑该利益相关者群体的利益。然而，假设所有利益相关者群体都有代表，就会产生一个棘手的问题，即应该为股东、雇员、客户、供应商等每个群体分配多少董事。每家公司如何分配，通过什么程序确定？
Second, it would be difficult to design an effective method to allow some stakeholder groups to elect their representatives. This would be especially so for those groups that are dispersed, uninformed, or ever-changing. How will customers or suppliers elect their respective representatives to the board of a company that has a broad national and ever-changing customer base and a large number of suppliers of different sizes and types? How will voting power be distributed among the members of such groups? Who will elect the directors that will represent the interests of local communities or the interests of society in slowing global climate change? 其次，很难设计出一种有效的方法来让某些利益相关群体选举自己的代表。对于那些分散、不了解情况或不断变化的群体来说，尤其如此。如果一家公司的客户群遍布全国且不断变化，供应商数量众多且规模和类型各异，那么客户或供应商将如何选举各自的代表进入董事会？如何在这些群体的成员之间分配投票权？谁将选举出代表当地社区利益或代表减缓全球气候变化的社会利益的董事？
Third, what mechanisms would ensure that a director elected by a certain constituency will focus on the interests of that constituency? As discussed in Subpart IV.A, directors elected by shareholders are in the current system incentivized to be attentive to shareholder interests by the prospect of proxy fights, their own equity holdings, and oversight by institutional investors. But such mechanisms might not be readily available for some other stakeholder groups. 第三，什么机制能确保由某一选区选出的董事会关注该选区的利益？如第四部分 A 小节所述，在现行制度下，股东选出的董事会受到代理权争夺战、自身持股以及机构投资者监督等因素的激励，从而关注股东利益。但对于其他一些利益相关者群体来说，可能就没有这样的机制了。
Finally, let us consider a hypothetical case in which shareholders and each stakeholder group elect a subset of directors and in which the elected directors can all be expected to focus on the interests of the corporate constituency that they represent. Given that the board can be controlled by a majority, the directors representing a particular stakeholder group could be marginalized and its interests would enjoy little protection. Furthermore, with a board made up of directors that focus on very different and sometimes conflicting objectives, the board’s decision-making process could lead to deadlocks and friction and become highly dysfunctional. 最后，让我们考虑一个假设的情况，即股东和每个利益相关者群体都会选出一个董事子集，而当选的董事都会专注于他们所代表的公司群体的利益。鉴于董事会可以由多数人控制，代表特定利益相关者群体的董事可能会被边缘化，其利益将几乎得不到保护。此外，由于董事会成员所关注的目标截然不同，有时甚至相互冲突，董事会的决策过程可能会陷入僵局和摩擦，从而导致功能严重失调。
We wish to conclude by noting an alternative approach to addressing the current asymmetry in power over directors that shareholders and stakeholders have. Instead of seeking to counterbalance the power of shareholders by giving stakeholders the power to participate in director elections, one could support addressing the current imbalance by weakening the power of shareholders to replace directors. This could be done by adopting arrangements that limit shareholder intervention, and thereby insulate directors from shareholder power, or by persuading institutional investors to be more deferential to directors in the event of a challenge to their continued service. 最后，我们希望指出解决目前股东和利益相关者对董事权力不对称问题的另一种方法。与其寻求通过赋予利益相关者参与董事选举的权力来制衡股东的权力，不如支持通过削弱股东更换董事的权力来解决目前的不平衡问题。要做到这一点，可以采取限制股东干预的安排，从而使董事不受股东权力的影响，或者说服机构投资者在董事继续任职受到质疑时更加尊重董事。
The above approach would not provide any alignment of the interests of corporate leaders with those of stakeholders and would only weaken the existing alignment between the interests of corporate leaders and those of shareholders, thus increasing the opportunities for corporate leaders to pursue their own private interests at the expense of shareholders. We will return to these issues in subpart V.A. As we will explain, acceptance of stakeholderism would likely be used to obtain arrangements and practices that would make corporate leaders less accountable to shareholders and more insulated from their oversight, which would be costly to shareholders, stakeholders, and society. 上述方法不会使公司领导人的利益与利益相关者的利益相一致，只会削弱公司领导人的利益与股东利益之间现有的一致性，从而增加公司领导人以牺牲股东利益为代价追求自身私人利益的机会。我们将在第五.A 小节中再次讨论这些问题。正如我们将解释的那样，接受利益相关者主义很可能会被用来获得一些安排和做法，使公司领导者对股东的责任更小，更加不受股东的监督，这将使股东、利益相关者和社会付出高昂的代价。
V
The Perils of Stakeholderism
The preceding two Parts have shown that the promise of stakeholderism is illusory. At this stage of the discussion, however, some readers might take the view that, even if it does not produce significant benefits for stakeholders, stakeholderism cannot hurt. According to this view, to the extent that protecting stakeholders is considered a valuable goal, stakeholderism cannot move corporate behavior in the wrong direction and could even move it marginally in the right direction. As this Part explains, however, this is not the case: acceptance of stakeholderism could well be substantially counterproductive and harmful to the interests of stakeholders and society. 前两部分已经表明，利益相关者主义的承诺是虚幻的。然而，在讨论的现阶段，一些读者可能会认为，即使利益相关者主义不能为利益相关者带来显著的利益，也不会有什么坏处。根据这种观点，只要保护利益相关者被认为是一个有价值的目标，那么利益相关者主义就不会使公司行为朝着错误的方向发展，甚至可能使其朝着正确的方向发展。然而，正如本部分所解释的，事实并非如此：接受利益相关者主义很可能会适得其反，损害利益相关者和社会的利益。
We show below that acceptance of stakeholderism, and the illusory hopes and mistaken perceptions coming with it, would have substantial and broad detrimental consequences. Subpart V.A discusses how stakeholderism would produce adverse effects on economic performance and society, by increasing the insulation of corporate leaders, their lack of accountability, and managerial slack. 我们将在下文中说明，接受利益相关者主义以及随之而来的虚幻希望和错误认识，将产生重大而广泛的有害后果。第 V.A 小节讨论了利益相关主义如何通过加强企业领导者的隔阂、缺乏责任感和管理松懈，对经济绩效和社会产生不利影响。
Subpart V.B in turn explains that accepting stakeholderism would adversely affect stakeholder interests by impeding, limiting, or delaying policy reforms that, unlike stakeholderism, would provide real and meaningful benefits to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would thus hurt the stakeholder constituencies that it purports to serve. 第 V.B 小节反过来又解释说，接受利益相关者主义会阻碍、限制或延迟政策改革，从而对 利益相关者的利益产生不利影响，而这些政策改革与利益相关者主义不同，会给利益相关者 带来真正有意义的利益。因此，利益相关者主义会损害其声称服务的利益相关者群体。
A. Increased Insulation and Reduced Accountability A.增强隔热性和减少问责
Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders and make them less accountable to them. The reduced accountability to shareholders would not be accompanied by the introduction of a novel accountability to stakeholders: stakeholderism does not advocate granting stakeholders the right to vote or to sue unfaithful directors and officers, but rather relies-as explained in Parts II and IV-on well-meaning corporate leaders using their discretion to incorporate stakeholder interests into their objectives. ^(224){ }^{224} 利益相关者主义会加强公司领导人与股东的隔阂，降低他们对股东的责任。在减少对股东负责的同时，并不会引入新的对利益相关者负责的方式：利益相关者主义并不主张赋予利益相关者投票权或起诉不忠实的董事和高管的权利，而是依赖于--正如第二部分和第四部分所解释的那样--善意的公司领导者利用其自由裁量权将利益相关者的利益纳入其目标之中。 ^(224){ }^{224}
As a matter of fact, therefore, stakeholderism would make corporate leaders freer in their decision making. Indeed, these expected consequences might at least partly motivate the support for stakeholderism by some corporate leaders and their advisors. For them, support for stakeholderism may well be strategic: an attempt to advance a managerialist agenda dressed in stakeholder clothing to make it more appealing to the general public and to gain support for it from those concerned about corporate externalities. 因此，事实上，利益相关主义会使公司领导人在决策时更加自由。事实上，这些预期的结果可能至少部分地促使一些公司领导人及其顾问支持利益相关者主义。对他们来说，支持利益相关主义很可能是一种战略行为：试图推进披着利益相关者外衣的管理主义议程，使其对公众更具吸引力，并从那些关注企业外部性的人那里获得支持。
Stakeholderism can be expected to contribute to increased insulation and reduced accountability in two ways. First, it could induce institutional investors to become more deferential to corporate leaders, less willing to support challenges to the control of these leaders, and more willing to support or accept corporate governance arrangements that shield management from market pressure. 利益相关者主义可望从两个方面促成隔阂的增加和问责的减少。首先，利益相关者主义会促使机构投资者对公司领导人更加恭顺，更不愿意支持对这些领导人控制权的挑战，更愿意支持或接受使管理层免受市场压力的公司治理安排。
Second, stakeholderism could induce policymakers and groups concerned about stakeholder interests to support or even initiate legal reforms that would have such an effect. Recall that during the era of hostile takeovers, stakeholderism provided a basis for and facilitated the passage of antitakeover constituency statutes that helped management fend off unwanted bidders. ^(225){ }^{225} 其次，利益相关主义可以促使政策制定者和关注利益相关者利益的团体支持甚至发起具有这种效果的法律改革。回顾敌意收购时代，利益相关主义为反收购法的通过提供了基础和便利，帮助管理层抵御不受欢迎的竞购者。 ^(225){ }^{225}
Indeed, for some management advisors, alleged benefits to stakeholders have been, for at least four decades, a standard reason provided for supporting rules that insulate corporate leaders and opposing rules that make them more accountable. For example, Lipton has argued for the right of directors to reject a takeover on grounds of concern for employees and the local community; for having a longer, five-year term for directors as a system to benefit nonshareholder constituencies; against facilitating shareholder nomination of directors, on the grounds that shareholders are not the only constituency to which directors must be responsible; and against a proposal to strengthen shareholders’ ability to replace directors, on the rationale that shareholders are no more entitled to control the corporation than are other stakeholders. ^(226){ }^{226} 事实上，至少 40 年来，对一些管理顾问来说，所谓的利益相关者的利益一直是支持保护公司领导人的规则和反对使他们更加负责的规则的标准理由。例如，利普顿主张董事有权以关心员工和当地社区为由拒绝收购；主张将董事的任期延长至五年，以此作为一项有利于非股东利益相关者的制度；反对为股东提名董事提供便利，理由是股东并不是董事必须对其负责的唯一利益相关者；反对加强股东更换董事能力的建议，理由是股东并不比其他利益相关者更有权控制公司。 ^(226){ }^{226}
Today, corporate leaders face increased activity by hedge fund activists and larger ownership blocks of institutional investors, as well as a more frequent alliance between these two classes of shareholders. ^(227){ }^{227} Stakeholderism could be used and is being used by corporate leaders and management advisors to urge institutional investors to avoid cooperating with hedge fund activists and to side with and support corporate leaders. For example, in a Wall Street Journal op-ed on the anniversary of the BRT statement, the BRT"s President portrays hedge fund activists (referred to as “short-term shareholders”) as a threat to stakeholder interests and to the ability of corporate leaders to serve such interests. ^(228){ }^{228} 如今，公司领导者面临着对冲基金激进分子和更大的机构投资者所有权集团的更多活动，以及这两类股东之间更频繁的联盟。 ^(227){ }^{227} 企业领导者和管理顾问可以而且正在利用利益相关者主义来敦促机构投资者避免与对冲基金激进分子合作，而是站在企业领导者一边并给予支持。例如，在《华尔街日报》关于 BRT 声明周年纪念的专栏文章中，BRT 主席将对冲基金激进分子（被称为 "短期股东"）描绘成对利益相关者利益的威胁，以及对企业领导者服务于这些利益的能力的威胁。 ^(228){ }^{228}
In addition, stakeholderism could be used, and has been used, for justifying or facilitating the adoption of legal rules that would help management deal with these challenges. Consider, for example, the restrictions on hedge fund activists included in the 2017 Brokaw Act proposal by Senators Baldwin and Perdue. ^(229){ }^{229} The bill would make activist intervention more difficult (and therefore less frequent) by expanding disclosure duties for hedge funds buying stocks or derivatives in a public company. The justification for these restrictions used by the bill’s sponsors was precisely that hedge fund activism comes "at the expense of workers, taxpayers, and local communi- 此外，利益相关主义可以用来证明或促进通过法律规则来帮助管理层应对这些挑战，而且已经被用来证明或促进通过法律规则来帮助管理层应对这些挑战。例如，考虑一下鲍德温参议员和珀杜参议员提出的 2017 年《布罗考法案》（Brokaw Act）提案中对对冲基金激进分子的限制。 ^(229){ }^{229} 该法案将通过扩大对冲基金购买上市公司的股票或衍生品的披露责任，增加激进分子干预的难度（从而减少干预的频率）。该法案的提案人提出这些限制的理由正是对冲基金的激进主义 "以工人、纳税人和当地社区为代价"。
ties." ^(230){ }^{230} It might not be a coincidence that support for stakeholderism among some management advisors and corporate leaders has been growing in recent years in which hedge fund activism has intensified. 关系"。 ^(230){ }^{230} 在对冲基金激进主义愈演愈烈的近几年，一些管理顾问和企业领导者对利益相关者主义的支持与日俱增，这可能并非巧合。
Whereas the increased insulation and reduced accountability brought about by acceptance of stakeholderism would serve the private interests of corporate leaders, they would have substantial adverse effects on the interests of other parties. Specifically, enhanced insulation and reduced accountability would increase managerial slack, worsen corporate performance, and reduce economic efficiency and value-creation. Indeed, there is a substantial body of empirical evidence that increased insulation and reduced accountability are associated with worse managerial decisions and worse corporate performance. ^(231){ }^{231} 尽管接受利益相关者主义所带来的隔阂增加和问责减少符合公司领导者的私人利益，但它们会对其他各方的利益产生重大不利影响。具体来说，加强隔绝和减少问责会增加管理上的懈怠，恶化公司业绩，降低经济效率和价值创造。事实上，有大量经验证据表明，加强隔绝和减少问责会导致管理决策失误和公司业绩恶化。 ^(231){ }^{231}
These effects would be obviously bad for shareholders. Furthermore, by hurting corporate performance and the economic value produced by corporations, these managerial inefficiencies would also reduce the aggregate wealth available to society as a whole. If the economic pie produced by the corporate sector becomes smaller, all who benefit from slices of it (whether contractually, through tax revenues, or due to positive externalities) might end up worse off. These include employees, suppliers, local residents, and other stakeholders. 这些影响显然对股东不利。此外，由于损害了公司业绩和公司创造的经济价值，这些管理上的低效率也会减少整个社会的总财富。如果企业部门创造的经济蛋糕变小，那么所有从蛋糕中获益的人（无论是通过合同、税收还是正外部效应）最终的境况都可能更糟。这些人包括雇员、供应商、当地居民和其他利益相关者。
To be sure, executives and directors who use their greater decisional slack to extract private benefits might happen to benefit stakeholders in the process. For example, managers working under a lower level of pressure might choose less challenging projects and a lower workload for themselves, and this might entail a looser supervision and quieter life for lower-level employees as well. Similarly, if corporate efficiency requires a painful restructuring, including a reduction of personnel, a CEO able to avoid hard choices for their own benefit (largescale projects, and restructurings in particular, require considerable effort) would indirectly benefit those employees who would have otherwise lost their jobs. 可以肯定的是，高管和董事利用其更大的决策空间来攫取私人利益，可能会使利益相关者在此过程中受益。例如，在较低压力下工作的管理人员可能会为自己选择挑战性较低的项目和较少的工作量，而这也可能会导致对下级员工的监管更加宽松，他们的生活更加安静。同样，如果企业要提高效率，就必须进行痛苦的重组，包括裁员，那么，首席执行官如果能够为了自己的利益而避免艰难的选择（大型项目，尤其是重组，需要付出相当大的努力），就会间接地使那些本来会失去工作的员工受益。
However, these are just coincidental effects. As explained in the preceding Part, there is little systematic overlap between 然而，这些只是巧合效应。正如上一部分所解释的那样，"......
the private interests of a company’s leaders and the interests of the company’s stakeholders. ^(232){ }^{232} Thus, there is no reason to expect that expanding the freedom of corporate leaders to pursue their own preferences would systematically operate to the benefit of the company’s stakeholders. 公司领导者的私人利益与公司利益相关者的利益之间的关系。 ^(232){ }^{232} 因此，我们没有理由期待，扩大公司领导者追求自身偏好的自由度会系统地有利于公司的利益相关者。
To illustrate, suppose that, with reduced accountability to shareholders, corporate leaders decide to sell the company to the buyer that would retain and reward them, rather than to a competing bidder willing to pay a higher price to shareholders. It might just so happen that management’s favored buyer would be good for employees (say, because it would be more likely to retain them); but it might also so happen that the acquisition would hurt the interests of the company’s employees (say, because the buyer would be less likely to retain current employees). Thus, in addition to the generally negative effects on shareholders and the performance of the economy, the increased insulation produced by stakeholderism would have effects on stakeholders that should not be expected to be systematically positive. 举例说明，假设公司领导人对股东的责任减少了，他们决定把公司卖给能留住他们并给予他们回报的买家，而不是卖给愿意向股东支付更高价的竞争者。管理层青睐的买家可能对员工有利（比如说，因为它更有可能留住员工）；但也可能恰好相反，收购会损害公司员工的利益（比如说，因为买家不太可能留住现有员工）。因此，除了对股东和经济表现产生普遍的负面影响外，利益相关主义所产生的更大隔阂也会对利益相关者产生影响，而这种影响不应该是系统性的积极影响。
B. Chilling Stakeholder-Protecting Reforms B.让保护利益攸关方的改革寒心
Part IV showed that stakeholderism should not be expected to provide material benefits for stakeholders. We now turn to show that acceptance of stakeholderism could well have an additional direct negative effect on stakeholder interests that would likely make them overall worse off. As explained below, by raising illusory expectations about its ability to remedy corporate externalities, stakeholderism would impede, limit, or delay policy reforms that could offer effective protection to stakeholders. We first discuss the array of stakeholder-protecting reforms that could be considered, and we then proceed to explain why the acceptance of stakeholderism would likely impede their adoption. 第四部分表明，不应期望利益相关者主义会给利益相关者带来实质性的利益。我们现在要说明的是，接受利益相关者主义很可能会对利益相关者的利益产生额外的直接负面影响，很可能会使他们的整体情况变得更糟。如下文所述，利益相关者主义会使人们对其纠正公司外部性的能力产生虚幻的期望，从而阻碍、限制或延迟可为利益相关者提供有效保护的政策改革。我们首先讨论一系列可以考虑的利益相关者保护改革，然后解释为什么利益相关者主义的接受可能会阻碍这些改革的通过。
1. Stakeholder-Protecting Reforms 1.保护利益攸关方的改革
There is currently a widespread and growing recognition that, although corporations have been a major engine for growth, their profit-seeking operations contribute to a wide array of society’s problems and impose serious negative externalities on employees, communities, consumers, and the environment. ^(233){ }^{233} Indeed, politicians and policymakers in the 目前，越来越多的人普遍认识到，尽管企业一直是经济增长的主要动力，但其追求利润的经营活动也造成了一系列社会问题，并对员工、社区、消费者和环境造成了严重的负面外部影响。 ^(233){ }^{233} 事实上，美国的政治家和政策制定者们已经意识到了这一点。
United States seem to recognize and respond to what is viewed as dissatisfaction with some of the results produced by the corporate economy. Below we briefly list some concerns that have been raised and some policy measures that could be considered for addressing them. This brief discussion, of course, does not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of stake-holder-oriented measures that could be adopted or to assess their merits. We only seek to highlight that there are a number of possible reform efforts that advocates of stakeholder welfare could pursue, which might be impaired by the illusory expectations created by stakeholderism. ^(234){ }^{234} 美国似乎认识到了人们对企业经济所产生的某些结果的不满，并对此作出了反应。下面，我们将简要列出已经提出的一些关切问题，以及为解决这些问题可以考虑采取的一些政策措施。当然，这一简短的讨论并不是要详尽无遗地介绍可以采取的以利益相关者为导向的措施，也不是要评估这些措施的优劣。我们只是想强调，利益相关者福利的倡导者可以采取一些可能的改革措施，这些措施可能会因为利益相关者主义造成的虚幻期望而受到损害。 ^(234){ }^{234}
Consider the impact of corporations on employees and communities. ^(235){ }^{235} Some commentators decry the slow or even stagnant growth in wages compared with the returns to shareholders (and the effects of this phenomenon on the inequality of wealth and income); the loss of jobs and the transfer of operations to off-shore locations in certain sectors and regions; and the risks and uncertainties imposed on employees by the disruptive forces of globalization and technological progress. ^(236){ }^{236} Some measures that have been considered to address these issues include changes in corporate and personal income taxes, an increase in the minimum wage, and measures to strengthen employees’ bargaining power. ^(237){ }^{237} 考虑一下企业对员工和社区的影响。 ^(235){ }^{235} 一些评论家谴责：与股东回报相比，工资增长缓慢甚至停滞不前（以及这种现象对财富和收入不平等的影响）；某些行业和地区工作岗位的流失和业务向海外转移；全球化和技术进步的破坏性力量给员工带来的风险和不确定性。 ^(236){ }^{236} 为解决这些问题而考虑采取的一些措施包括：修改公司和个人所得税、提高最低工资标准以及加强雇员谈判能力的措施。 ^(237){ }^{237}
Next, consider the impact of corporations on their customers. Some experts denounce the increasing concentration and 其次，要考虑企业对客户的影响。一些专家谴责企业日益集中和
reduced competition in many sectors of the economy and the growing market power of the largest digital platforms. ^(238){ }^{238} Measures that have been considered for addressing such issues include forcing interoperability among various market players, tightening antitrust policy and enforcement, regulating the portability and accessibility of data, and strengthening the privacy protection of consumers. ^(239){ }^{239} 许多经济部门的竞争减少，最大的数字平台的市场力量不断增强。 ^(238){ }^{238} 为解决这些问题而考虑采取的措施包括：强制实现各市场参与者之间的互操作性、收紧反托拉斯政策和执法、规范数据的可携带性和可访问性，以及加强对消费者隐私的保护。 ^(239){ }^{239}
Finally, consider the impact of corporations on the environment. ^(240){ }^{240} Large companies are believed to be responsible for a substantial fraction of greenhouse gas emissions, thereby playing a major role in climate change. ^(241){ }^{241} Policy proposals to address this issue include taxing the use of fossil fuels (carbon tax) and other polluting activities, subsidizing the production of renewable energies, funding research in green technologies, and creating regulatory constraints on some of the technological and operational choices made by companies. ^(242){ }^{242} 最后，考虑一下企业对环境的影响。 ^(240){ }^{240} 据信，大公司要对相当一部分温室气体排放负责，从而在气候变化中扮演重要角色。 ^(241){ }^{241} 解决这一问题的政策建议包括：对使用化石燃料和其他污染活动征税（碳税），对生产可再生能源提供补贴，资助绿色技术研究，以及对公司的某些技术和运营选择制定监管限制。 ^(242){ }^{242}
To be sure, it is understandable that those concerned about these problems might find the idea of stakeholderism appealing. Indeed, if stakeholderism could be expected to deliver on its promise, stakeholders’ welfare would be enhanced through private ordering and with no need (or at least a reduced need) for government intervention. Furthermore, if shareholders could be expected to deliver, corporate leaders would become an ally rather than an adversary to be overcome to enable the imposition of outside constraints. However, given our conclusion that stakeholderism should not be expected to deliver the hoped-for stakeholder protections, external adop- 当然，可以理解的是，那些担心这些问题的人可能会认为利益相关者主义的理念很有吸引力。事实上，如果利益相关者主义能够兑现其承诺，那么利益相关者的福利就会通过私人订货得到提高，而无需（或至少减少）政府干预。此外，如果股东可望兑现承诺，那么公司领导者就会成为盟友，而不是为施加外部约束而必须克服的对手。然而，鉴于我们得出的结论是，不应指望利益相关者主义能够提供人们所期望的利益相关者保护，因此，外部采用利益相关者主义的目的是为了保护利益相关者。
tion of laws, rules and policies remains the main avenue through which real protections could be achieved. 制定法律、规则和政策仍然是实现真正保护的主要途径。
2. How Stakeholderism Would Impede Reforms 2.利益相关主义如何阻碍改革
Given that the adoption of law, regulations, and policies is the main avenue through which corporate externalities on stakeholders can be effectively addressed, it is important to consider the potential effect of embracing stakeholderism on the prospects of such reforms. As we explain below, embracing stakeholderism should be expected to impede such reforms. ^(243){ }^{243} 鉴于法律、法规和政策的通过是有效解决企业对利益相关者外部性影响的主要途径，因此考虑拥护利益相关主义对此类改革前景的潜在影响就显得尤为重要。正如我们在下文中所解释的，拥护利益相关者主义应该会阻碍这种改革。 ^(243){ }^{243}
To begin, if those who care about stakeholder effects develop unrealistic expectations and hopes that corporate leaders will, on their own, deliver substantial protections to stakeholders, they could well devote less effort and resources to obtaining stakeholder-protecting reforms that would preclude or discourage corporations from imposing externalities on stakeholders. Such unrealistic expectations and hopes might lead defenders of stakeholders to push for acceptance of stakeholderism, might make them less motivated to seek the adoption of external laws, regulations and policies that would constraint and incentivize corporations to protect stakeholders, and might reduce their sense of urgency to obtain such reforms. 首先，如果那些关心利益相关者效应的人对公司领导者自身为利益相关者提供实质性保护抱有不切实际的期望和希望，那么他们很可能会减少为获得利益相关者保护改革所投入的精力和资源，而这些改革将排除或阻止公司将外部性强加给利益相关者。这种不切实际的期望和希望可能会导致利益相关者的维护者推动接受利益相关者主义，可能会降低他们寻求通过外部法律、法规和政策来约束和激励公司保护利益相关者的积极性，可能会降低他们获得此类改革的紧迫感。
To illustrate the above concerns regarding the chilling effect of stakeholderism on reforms, let us discuss the case of climate change advocacy. At present, there is a significant number of organizations that devote resources, energy, and passion to try to mitigate the effects of corporate operations on climate change. Major organizations based in the United States include Ceres, WWF, CDP, Conservation International, and the Environmental Defense Fund. Our review of their websites and most recent tax returns (Form 990) indicates that just these five major organizations have, in the aggregate, annual budgets higher than $500\$ 500 million, more than 2,000 employees, and hundreds of volunteers. ^(244){ }^{244} And these organizations re- 为了说明上述利益相关主义对改革的寒蝉效应，让我们以气候变化倡导为例。目前，有许多组织投入资源、精力和热情，试图减轻企业运营对气候变化的影响。总部设在美国的主要组织包括 Ceres、世界自然基金会（WWF）、CDP、保护国际（Conservation International）和环境保护基金（Environmental Defense Fund）。我们查阅了它们的网站和最新的纳税申报表（990 表格），发现仅这五个主要组织的年度预算总额就超过了 $500\$ 500 百万美元，拥有 2000 多名员工和数百名志愿者。 ^(244){ }^{244} 而且这些组织重新
present, of course, only a subset of the organizations and resources devoted to addressing the contribution of corporate operations to climate change. 当然，这些只是致力于解决企业运营对气候变化影响问题的组织和资源的一个子集。
Consider two types of activities in which such organizations can engage. The first type of activities, which focuses on internal corporate decision making, seeks to encourage corporate leaders to make their own choices that would mitigate climate change risks. The second type of activities, which focuses on laws, regulations and policies that would force such choices from the outside, seeks directly or indirectly to encourage lawmakers, regulators, and policymakers to adopt such laws, regulations, and policies, and to enhance public awareness that could contribute to such pressure on public officials. Unrealistic expectations that stakeholderism would contribute substantially to addressing climate change risks can be expected to encourage reliance on and investment in the first type of activities. By contrast, recognizing that corporate leaders should not be expected to address climate change risks on their own in ways that would be costly to shareholders would encourage a focus on, and investments in, the second type of activities, which are the ones that can most contribute to addressing climate change risks. 考虑此类组织可以参与的两类活动。第一类活动侧重于企业内部决策，旨在鼓励企业领导者做出自己的选择，以减轻气候变化风险。第二类活动侧重于从外部迫使企业做出此类选择的法律、法规和政策，旨在直接或间接地鼓励立法者、监管者和政策制定者通过此类法律、法规和政策，并提高公众意识，从而有助于向政府官员施加此类压力。如果不切实际地期望利益相关者会为应对气候变化风险做出重大贡献，那么就会鼓励对第一类活动的依赖和投资。与此相反，如果认识到不应期望企业领导者以对股东来说代价高昂的方式独自应对气候变化风险，就会鼓励对第二类活动的关注和投资，而第二类活动才是最有助于应对气候变化风险的活动。
Furthermore, raising expectations that corporate leaders would, on their own, address and mitigate climate change risks might also result in organizations that do focus on such risks attracting fewer resources in the first place. Indeed, potential donors, and potential employees and volunteers, might turn to other causes or projects if they come to believe that stakeholderism would make the work of such organizations less necessary and important. 此外，如果人们期望企业领导者能够自行解决和减轻气候变化风险，也可能导致那些关注气候变化风险的组织首先吸引到更少的资源。事实上，如果潜在的捐赠者、潜在的员工和志愿者认为利益相关者主义会降低这些组织工作的必要性和重要性，他们可能会转向其他事业或项目。
Finally, these unrealistic expectations about stakeholderism would affect the receptiveness of lawmakers, regulators, and policymakers to stakeholder-protecting reforms. To illustrate, let us take up again the example of corporate choices that affect climate change and consider public officials who face calls to impose a carbon tax or other policies that attach a financial cost to carbon emissions. The presence of illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own choose to reduce carbon emissions over the coming years might lead these public officials to view legal, regulatory, and policy interventions as not critical or at least give them a good excuse for avoiding such interventions or delaying them to first give stakeholderism time to perform its magic. 最后，这些对利益相关者的不切实际的期望会影响立法者、监管者和决策者对保护利益相关者的改革的接受程度。为了说明这一点，让我们再次以影响气候变化的企业选择为例，考虑一下面临征收碳税或其他对碳排放附加经济成本的政策呼吁的政府官员。企业领导者会在未来几年自行选择减少碳排放，这种虚幻希望的存在可能会导致这些公职人员认为法律、监管和政策干预并不重要，或者至少给了他们一个很好的借口来避免这些干预或推迟这些干预，先让利益相关者主义有时间施展它的魔力。
Whereas some corporate leaders and their advisors might genuinely believe that stakeholderism would contribute to stakeholder welfare, others might use this theory strategically to deflect the demand for legal, regulatory, and policy reforms aimed at stakeholder protections. ^(245){ }^{245} Indeed, some stakeholderist authors recognize that corporate leaders’ growing support for stakeholderism could be at least partly due to the recognition that the neglect of stakeholder interests is “unsustainable” and that it "threaten[s] to come to a head and produce outcomes that [corporate leaders] could not control. ^(246){ }^{246} This view assumes optimistically that such recognition has led corporate leaders to be willing to make major improvements in the treatment of stakeholders. However, this view overlooks that this recognition might have instead led corporate leaders to attempt to deflect pressures for real reforms by using a stakeholderist rhetoric without making such improvements. 一些企业领导者及其顾问可能真的相信利益相关者主义会促进利益相关者的福利，而另一些人则可能战略性地利用这一理论来转移对旨在保护利益相关者的法律、监管和政策改革的需求。 ^(245){ }^{245} 事实上，一些利益相关者理论的作者认为，企业领导者之所以越来越支持利益相关者理论，至少部分原因是他们认识到，忽视利益相关者的利益是 "不可持续的"，而且 "有可能会导致[企业领导者]无法控制的结果"。 ^(246){ }^{246} 这种观点乐观地认为，这种认识促使公司领导者愿意在对待利益相关者方面做出重大改进。然而，这种观点忽略了，这种认识可能反而导致公司领导者试图通过使用利益相关者主义的言论来转移真正改革的压力，而不做出这种改进。
In any event, regardless of the motivations of the corporate leaders and management advisors who support stakeholderism, the chilling effect of stakeholderism on stakeholder-protecting reforms is a significant peril. It should be recognized as such by those concerned for the effects of corporate externalities on society. 无论如何，不管支持利益相关者主义的公司领导人和管理顾问的动机如何，利益相关者主义对保护利益相关者的改革所产生的寒蝉效应都是一个重大的危险。关注企业外部性对社会影响的人们应该认识到这一点。
3. Are Stakeholder-Protecting Reforms Attainable? 3.保护利益相关者的改革能否实现？
It might be argued that the analysis of this subpart reflects an unjustified optimism about the prospects of stakeholderprotecting reforms. ^(247){ }^{247} On this pessimistic view, regardless of whether stakeholderism is accepted, the prospects of overcoming political gridlock and obtaining stakeholder-protecting laws, regulation, and policies are dim. 也许有人会说，本小节的分析反映了对保护利益相关者的改革前景毫无理由的乐观。 ^(247){ }^{247} 根据这种悲观的观点，无论利益相关者主义是否被接受，克服政治僵局并获得保护利益相关者的法律、法规和政策的前景都是暗淡的。
Indeed, in response to our work, some advocates of stakeholderism stressed “the limitations of regulation” arising from powerful corporate lobbying against any measures that 事实上，在回应我们的工作时，一些利益相关者主义的倡导者强调了 "监管的局限性"，因为强大的企业游说反对任何措施，这些措施包括
would reduce corporate profits. ^(248){ }^{248} The use of this argument by stakeholderists is ironical. If corporate leaders elect to resist any stakeholder-protecting policies that would hurt profits, why should stakeholderists expect corporate leaders, acting on their own, to protect stakeholders at the expense of profits? And if advocates of stakeholderism know how to change the behavior of corporate leaders, why don’t they first focus on precluding corporate leaders from lobbying against stake-holder-protecting rules and policies? 会减少企业利润。 ^(248){ }^{248} 利益相关者使用这一论点具有讽刺意味。如果企业领导者选择抵制任何会损害利润的利益相关者保护政策，那么利益相关者又何必指望企业领导者自行采取行动，以牺牲利润为代价来保护利益相关者呢？如果利益相关者主义的倡导者知道如何改变企业领导者的行为，他们为什么不首先集中精力阻止企业领导者游说反对利益相关者保护规则和政策呢？
In any event, our view is not based on a rosy assessment of the prospects of stakeholder-protecting reforms; we recognize the substantial impediments such reforms face. Rather, our view is based on a realistic assessment of the hopes that stakeholderism would produce material benefits for stakeholders. Part IV’s analysis showed that the hopes that stakeholderism would produce such benefits without the imposition of stakeholder-protecting external rules and policies are illusory; accordingly, such rules and policies provide the only avenue to meaningful stakeholder protection. 无论如何，我们的观点并不是基于对保护利益相关者的改革前景的乐观评估；我们承认这种改革面临着巨大的障碍。相反，我们的观点是基于对利益相关者主义为利益相关者带来实质利益的希望的现实评估。第四部分的分析表明，如果不实施保护利益相关者的外部规则和政策，利益相关者主义将产生这些利益的希望是不切实际的；因此，这些规则和政策提供了对利益相关者进行有意义保护的唯一途径。
To be sure, our analysis is based on the premise that the possibility of stakeholder-protecting reforms is not completely blocked. That is, we believe that, at least in the absence of illusory hopes introduced by stakeholderism, some significant reforms protecting stakeholders-whether employees, customers, or the environment-would be eventually possible even if they would face impediments and would not be adopted to the fullest extent desirable. We note that, after all, various laws, regulations, and policies aimed at protecting stakeholders are already in place; for example, reforms aimed at combating climate change or protecting consumers have been adopted in the past decade. 249 Thus, although in our view it would be desirable to substantially augment and strengthen the existing laws, regulations, and policies, viewing the political process as 可以肯定的是，我们的分析是基于这样一个前提，即保护利益相关者的改革并不是完全不可能的。也就是说，我们认为，至少在利益相关者主义没有带来虚幻希望的情况下，一些保护利益相关者--无论是员工、客户还是环境--的重大改革最终还是有可能实现的，即使这些改革会面临障碍，也不会被最大程度地采纳。我们注意到，毕竟旨在保护利益相关者的各种法律、法规和政策已经出台；例如，在过去十年中，已经通过了旨在应对气候变化或保护消费者的改革。249 因此，尽管我们认为最好能大幅扩充和加强现有的法律、法规和政策，但将政治进程视为
largely incapable of producing stakeholder-protecting reforms is unwarranted. 在很大程度上无法进行保护利益相关者的改革，这是毫无道理的。
Therefore, given the conclusion of our analysis that stakeholderism should not be expected to deliver significant stakeholder protections and that laws, regulations, and policies offer the only real prospect for such protections, introducing conditions that chill rather than facilitate such stakeholder-protection reforms would be detrimental to stakeholder welfare. Thus, embracing stakeholderism, and thereby introducing illusory hopes that the corporate leaders would serve as stakeholder guardians, would be costly to stakeholders. 因此，考虑到我们的分析结论，即不应指望利益相关者主义能够为利益相关者提供重要的保护，法律、法规和政策是提供此类保护的唯一真正前景，引入阻碍而非促进此类利益相关者保护改革的条件将损害利益相关者的利益。因此，拥护利益相关者主义，进而引入企业领导者作为利益相关者监护人的虚幻希望，将使利益相关者付出高昂的代价。
A recent joint statement by more than seventy academics in the fields of law, economics, finance, and management announces: "With less than a decade left in which to address the catastrophic threat of climate change, and with investors, companies, accountants, policymakers and academics expressing a shared sense of urgency, now is the time to act to reform corporate governance."250 However, our analysis indicates that, for all those with such a “shared sense of urgency,” it would actually be a serious mistake to focus on reforming corporate governance. 法律、经济、金融和管理领域的七十多位学者最近发表了一份联合声明："250 然而，我们的分析表明，对于所有具有这种 "共同紧迫感 "的人来说，专注于公司治理改革实际上是一个严重的错误。
As the analysis of the preceding Part demonstrated, corporate governance reforms in general, as well as stakeholderism in particular, are not an effective tool for addressing “the catastrophic threat of climate change.” Furthermore, as the above analysis in this section explained, directing efforts to reforming corporate governance, as the statement urges, could well come at the expense of efforts to adopt laws, regulations, and policies that would preclude or disincentivize corporate choices that could make a substantive contribution to addressing the catastrophic threat of climate change. 正如上一部分的分析所表明的，公司治理改革，特别是利益相关者主义，并不是应对 "气候变化灾难性威胁 "的有效工具。此外，正如本部分的上述分析所解释的那样，该声明所敦促的公司治理改革，很可能以牺牲通过法律、法规和政策的努力为代价，这些法律、法规和政策将排除或抑制公司的选择，而公司的选择可以为应对气候变化的灾难性威胁做出实质性贡献。
For all those with a shared sense of urgency, we maintain, it is high time to abandon the illusory hope offered by stakeholderism. They should devote all efforts and resources to advancing laws, regulations, and policies that address the catastrophic threat of climate change and to educating the public about the urgency of adopting such measures. 我们认为，对于所有具有共同紧迫感的人来说，现在是放弃利益相关者主义所带来的虚幻希望的时候了。他们应该投入一切努力和资源，推动法律、法规和政策的制定，以应对气候变化带来的灾难性威胁，并教育公众采取这些措施的紧迫性。
Conclusion 结论
In the face of growing concerns about the negative effects of corporations on stakeholders, stakeholderism seeks to make external intervention unnecessary by encouraging and relying on corporate leaders to protect stakeholders on their own. We have conducted a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism, the expected consequences of its acceptance, and the claims made by its proponents. Stakeholderism, we have concluded, offers an inadequate and counterproductive approach to the goal of stakeholder protection; its illusory promise should not be allowed to distract from the critical needs for external laws, regulations, and policies designed to provide such protection. 面对企业对利益相关者的负面影响日益增长的担忧，利益相关主义试图通过鼓励和依靠企业领导者自行保护利益相关者，从而使外部干预变得不必要。我们对利益相关者主义、接受利益相关者主义的预期后果以及利益相关者主义支持者的主张进行了概念、经济和实证分析。我们的结论是，利益相关者主义为实现保护利益相关者的目标提供了一种不适当的、适得其反的方法；不应允许其虚幻的承诺分散人们对旨在提供此类保护的外部法律、法规和政策的关键需求。
There are two versions of stakeholderism, and we have discussed the conceptual problems of each. Enlightened shareholder value turns out to be conceptually the same as shareholder value maximization. By contrast, pluralistic stakeholderism views stakeholder welfare as an independent end, with corporate leaders asked to balance the interests of shareholders and stakeholders. However, even for this more ambitious version of stakeholderism, the actual benefits for stakeholders critically depend on how corporate leaders elect to exercise their discretion. 利益相关者主义有两种版本，我们已经讨论了每种版本的概念问题。开明股东价值在概念上与股东价值最大化相同。相比之下，多元利益相关者主义将利益相关者的福利视为一个独立的目的，要求公司领导者平衡股东和利益相关者的利益。然而，即使是这种更雄心勃勃的利益相关者主义，利益相关者的实际利益也主要取决于公司领导者如何行使其自由裁量权。
By retaining basic corporate structures while amending corporate purpose, stakeholderists seek to harness corporate decision-making to protect stakeholders. Our analysis of the full array of incentives produced by basic corporate structures, however, has shown that corporate leaders have significant incentives not to protect stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value. This conclusion is reinforced by our empirical analysis of past choices made by corporate leaders operating under stakeholderist rules. The promise of stakeholderism to deliver material value to stakeholders, we have shown, is illusory. 通过保留基本公司结构，同时修改公司宗旨，利益相关者试图利用公司决策来保护利益相关者。然而，我们对基本公司结构所产生的全部激励机制的分析表明，公司领导者有很大的激励机制不在有利于股东价值的范围内保护利益相关者。我们对在利益相关者规则下运作的公司领导者过去所做选择的实证分析，进一步证实了这一结论。我们已经证明，利益相关主义为利益相关者带来实质价值的承诺是虚幻的。
Furthermore, embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on society. Stakeholderism would make corporate leaders less accountable and increase their insulation from shareholder oversight. These consequences would advance a managerial agenda and serve the private interests of corporate leaders. The increased insulation and reduced accountability would increase slack and agency costs, hurting performance and reducing the economic pie available for division among shareholders and stakeholders. 此外，接受利益相关者主义很可能会给社会带来巨大的成本。利益相关主义会降低公司领导者的责任感，使他们更加不受股东的监督。这些后果将推进管理议程，为公司领导人的私人利益服务。隔离的加强和问责的减少会增加懈怠和代理成本，损害业绩，减少股东和利益相关者之间可瓜分的经济蛋糕。
In addition, by raising illusory and distracting hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, acceptance of stakeholderism would impede or delay legal, regulatory, and policy reforms that could provide real, meaningful protection to stakeholders. In this way, acceptance of stakeholderism would be contrary to the goal of stakeholder protection that stakeholderism purports to serve. Indeed, although many supporters of stakeholderism are genuinely interested in stakeholder welfare, some supporters could be at least partly motivated by the prospect of insulating corporate leaders from shareholder oversight and chilling external interventions aimed at stakeholder protection. 此外，接受利益相关主义会阻碍或拖延法律、监管和政策改革，而这些改革可以为利益相关者提供真正有意义的保护。这样一来，接受利益相关者主义就与利益相关者主义所声称的保护利益相关者的目标背道而驰了。事实上，尽管许多利益相关者主义的支持者真正关心的是利益相关者的福利，但一些支持者的动机可能至少有一部分是为了使公司领导者免受股东监督，并阻止旨在保护利益相关者的外部干预。
The stakes in this debate are high. We hope that our analysis will enable all those who are concerned about corporate effects on stakeholders to resist the siren song of stakeholderism and to recognize the shortcomings and dangers of this view. Stakeholderism should be rejected, including by those who care deeply about stakeholders. 这场辩论事关重大。我们希望我们的分析能让所有关心公司对利益相关者影响的人抵制利益相关者主义的诱惑，认识到这种观点的缺点和危险。利益相关者主义应该被摒弃，包括那些深切关注利益相关者的人。
†\dagger James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. Professor Bebchuk is serving as an advisor to the American Law Institute’s project on the Restatement of the Law, Corporate Governance, which is examining the subjects of corporate purpose and social responsibility. †\dagger 詹姆斯-巴尔-艾姆斯（James Barr Ames）法学、经济学和金融学教授，哈佛大学法学院公司治理项目主任。Bebchuk 教授目前担任美国法学会关于《公司治理法重述》项目的顾问，该项目正在研究公司宗旨和社会责任等主题。 ‡\ddagger Terence M. Considine Senior Fellow in Law and Economics, and Associate Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. ‡\ddagger 特伦斯-康斯丁（Terence M. Considine）法律与经济学高级研究员，哈佛大学法学院公司治理项目副主任。
This Article is part of the Project on Stakeholder Capitalism of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. Responses to this Article by Einer Elhauge (Harvard Law School), Colin Mayer (Oxford University), and Aneil Kovvali and William Savitt (University of Chicago and Wachtell Lipton, respectively), are expected to be published in issue 7 of the Cornell Law Review, Volume 106, 2021. Presentation slides summarizing this Article’s analysis are available at https:// papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3581299. 本文是哈佛大学法学院公司治理项目利益相关者资本主义项目的一部分。Einer Elhauge（哈佛大学法学院）、Colin Mayer（牛津大学）、Aneil Kovvali 和 William Savitt（分别来自芝加哥大学和 Wachtell Lipton）对本文的回应预计将发表在《康奈尔法律评论》2021 年第 106 卷第 7 期。总结本文分析的演示幻灯片可在 https:// papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3581299 上获取。
We are grateful for conversations with and suggestions from many individuals, including Bob Eccles, Alex Edmans, Allen Ferrell, Jesse Fried, Rebecca Henderson, Jeff Gordon, Assaf Hamdani, Scott Hirst, Louis Kaplow, Kobi Kastiel, Colin Mayer, Josh Mitts, Alan Murray, Guy Rolnik, Leo Strine, and Andrew Tuch. We also benefitted from the helpful comments and questions of participants in workshops at Harvard University, Columbia University, and the Corporate Law Academic Webinar Series; debates on stakeholder capitalism at Oxford (with Colin Mayer) and London Business School (with Alex Edmans); and conferences at Columbia University, the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago, Toulouse Business School in Barcelona, Northeastern University, the Milken Institute, and the ICGN Global Summit. 我们感谢鲍勃-埃克斯、亚历克斯-埃德曼斯、艾伦-费雷尔、杰西-弗里德、丽贝卡-亨德森、杰夫-戈登、阿萨夫-哈姆达尼、斯科特-赫斯特、路易斯-卡普洛、科比-卡斯提尔、科林-梅耶、乔什-米茨、艾伦-默里、盖伊-罗尔尼克、利奥-斯特林和安德鲁-图奇等许多人的谈话和建议。此外，哈佛大学、哥伦比亚大学和公司法学术系列网络研讨会的与会者，牛津大学（与科林-梅耶合作）和伦敦商学院（与亚历克斯-埃德曼斯合作）的利益相关者资本主义辩论，以及哥伦比亚大学、芝加哥大学斯蒂格勒中心、巴塞罗那图卢兹商学院、东北大学、米尔肯研究所和 ICGN 全球峰会等会议的与会者提出的有益意见和问题，也使我们受益匪浅。
In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Aaron Haefner, Kevin Li, Tamar Groswald Ozery, Zoe Piel, Aisha Saad, Matthew Stadnicki, and Wanling Su. The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business provided financial support. 此外，我们还要感谢 Aaron Haefner、Kevin Li、Tamar Groswald Ozery、Zoe Piel、Aisha Saad、Matthew Stadnicki 和 Wanling Su 的出色研究协助。哈佛大学法学院公司治理项目和约翰-M-奥林法律、经济和商业中心提供了资金支持。
2 Rebecca Henderson, Reimagining Capitalism in a World of Fire 8-9 (2020).
3 Since the BRT was formed in 1972-73, it has evolved into a “singular political powerhouse that would make an indelible imprint on the history of business and politics in the United States.” Benjamin C. Waterhouse, Lobbying America 76-78 (2014) (citing an anonymous executive quote found in LeONard Silk & David Vogel, Ethics and Profits: The Crisis of Confidence in American Business 70 (1976)). 3 自 1972-73 年成立以来，BRT 已发展成为 "在美国商业与政治史上留下不可磨灭印记的独特政治力量"。Benjamin C. Waterhouse, Lobbying America 76-78 (2014)（引自 LeONard Silk & David Vogel, Ethics and Profits：The Crisis of Confidence in American Business 70 (1976)）。
4 Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of Corporation, supra note 1. 4 商业圆桌会议，《关于公司宗旨的声明》，前注 1。
7 Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of Corporation, supra note 1. 7 商业圆桌会议，《关于公司宗旨的声明》，前注 1。
8 See sources cited infra notes 89-106. 8 见下文注 89-106 所引用的资料来源。
9 Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Econ. F. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/3NAK-SCDQ] [hereinafter Davos Manifesto 2020] (“The purpose of a company is to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation. In creating such value, a company serves not only its shareholders, but all its stakeholders.”). One observer described stakeholders as the “winner of the 2020 World Economic Forum.” Jason Karaian, And the Winner of the 2020 World Economic Forum Is . . . Stakeholders, QUARTZ (Jan. 25, 2020), https://qz.com/1791153/winner-of-2020-world-eco-nomic-forum-in-davos-stakeholders [https://perma.cc/BJ6L-TPLA]. 9 《2020 年达沃斯宣言》：世界经济论坛》（2019 年 12 月 2 日）， agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020F.》（2019 年 12 月 2 日），https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/3NAK-SCDQ] [以下简称《达沃斯宣言 2020》]（"公司的宗旨是让所有利益相关者参与共同和持续的价值创造。在创造这种价值的过程中，公司不仅为股东服务，也为所有利益相关者服务"）。一位观察家将利益相关者形容为 "2020 年世界经济论坛的赢家"。Jason Karaian，《2020 年世界经济论坛的赢家是.. .利益相关者，《QUARTZ》（2020 年 1 月 25 日），https://qz.com/1791153/winner-of-2020-world-eco-nomic-forum-in-davos-stakeholders [https://perma.cc/BJ6L-TPLA] 。
10 The Reporter discussed this possibility at an NYU roundtable on December 6, 2019. 10 记者在 2019 年 12 月 6 日的纽约大学圆桌会议上讨论了这种可能性。
12 For a well-known early work taking this view, see Frank H. Easterbrook & daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate law 37 (1991). 12 持此观点的早期知名著作见 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 37 (1991)。
13 In a response to this Article, Colin Mayer criticizes us for asking the “wrong question” of what arrangement would be “most profitable” whereas his stakeholderist work asks what arrangement would produce “the best solution” for soclety. Colin Mayer, Shareholderism versus Stakeholderism - A Misconceived Contradiction. A Comment on “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance” by Luctan Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita 10 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 522/2020, 2020), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/ working_papers/documents/mayerfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY4S-N7HL] [hereinafter Mayer Response]. As the above paragraph clarifies, we are actually asking the same question as Mayer, and we agree that corporate law rules should be set in the way that would best serve society’s interests. Our rejection of stakeholderism is based on our conclusion that it would utterly fail to provide “the best solution,” or even move us in a direction helpful to addressing, the stakeholder concerns that trouble both Mayer and us. 13 在对本文的回应中，科林-梅耶批评我们提出了一个 "错误的问题"，即什么样的安排才是 "最有利可图的"，而他的利益相关者论著作则提出了什么样的安排才能为社会带来 "最佳解决方案"。Colin Mayer，《股东主义与利益相关者主义--一个被误解的矛盾》。A Comment on "The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance" by Luctan Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita 10 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 522/2020, 2020), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/ working_papers/documents/mayerfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY4S-N7HL] [hereinafter Mayer Response]。如上段所述，我们实际上提出了与 Mayer 相同的问题，我们也同意公司法规则应以最符合社会利益的方式制定。我们之所以拒绝利益相关者主义，是因为我们得出结论认为，利益相关者主义根本无法提供 "最佳解决方案"，甚至无法使我们朝着有助于解决困扰 Mayer 和我们的利益相关者问题的方向前进。
14 Our analysis in Part IV builds on, but goes substantially beyond, earlier discussions by one of us as well as others that expressed skepticism as to whether corporate leaders can be expected to protect stakeholders. For discussions expressing such skepticism, see, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. Rev. 675, 729-32 (2007); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 908-13 (2005); Robert C. Clark, Harmony or Dissonance? The Good Governance Ideas of Academics and Worldly Players, 70 Bus. Law. 321, 338 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 Wake forest L. Rev. 761, 768 (2015). 14 我们在第四部分中的分析建立在我们中的一位以及其他一些人早先的讨论基础之上，但又大大超出了这些讨论，他们对是否可以期望公司领导人保护利益相关者表示怀疑。关于表达这种怀疑的讨论，参见 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA.L. Rev. 675, 729-32 (2007); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.L. REV.833, 908-13 (2005)；Robert C. Clark, Harmony or Dissonance?The Good Governance Ideas of Academics and Worldly Players, 70 Bus.321, 338 (2015).321, 338 (2015)；Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial：The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 Wake forest L. Rev. 761, 768 (2015).
15 A full account of the empirical work we discuss in Part IV is provided in Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93 S. CaLIF. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155. 15 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 93 S. CaLIF.Rev. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155。
16 See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 16 见下文注 36-37 和附文。
17 For examples of recent contributions to this debate, see Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020); Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart & Lulgi Zingales, Exit us. Voice (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 694/2020, 2020), http:// ssrn.com/abstract_id=3671918 [https://perma.cc/5MDD-3WYU]; and Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381 (2020). 17 关于最近对这一辩论的贡献，见 Michal Barzuza、Quinn Curtis 和 David H. Webber，《股东价值》：Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. Calif.Rev. (forthcoming 2020); Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart & Lulgi Zingales, Exit us.Voice (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 694/2020, 2020), http:// ssrn.com/abstract_id=3671918 [https://perma.cc/5MDD-3WYU]; and Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience：The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan.L. Rev. 381 (2020)。
18 For a recent discussion of the benefit corporation and the challenge of designing a corporate form that produces benefits for stakeholders, see, for example, Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. Rev. 937, 989-1000 (2020). 18 关于利益公司以及设计一种能为利益相关者带来利益的公司形式所面临的挑战的最新讨论，见，例如，Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. Rev. 937, 989-1000 (2020)。Rev. 937, 989-1000 (2020)。
19 Id. at 965-66. 19 同上，第 965-66 页。
20 Leo Strine, for example, offers such support for benefit corporations in a paper released just before this Article went to print. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy. A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 Bus. Law. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 55-58), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3749654 [https:// perma.cc/UK2U-5D74]. Strine accepts that the directors of benefit corporations remain elected exclusively by shareholders and that their decisions remain insulated from judicial review under the business judgment rule. Therefore, the extent to which stakeholders will obtain benefits would practically be left to the discretion of corporate leaders. Our analysis casts substantial doubt on whether corporate leaders who are practically provided with such discretion would use their power in the way Strine hopes. 20 例如，Leo Strine 就在本文付印前发表的一篇论文中为福利公司提供了这种支持。Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration：The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy.A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 Bus.Law.(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 55-58), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3749654 [https:// perma.cc/UK2U-5D74].Strine 承认，福利公司的董事仍然完全由股东选举产生，根据商业判断规则，他们的决定仍然不受司法审查。因此，利益相关者能在多大程度上获得利益，实际上是由公司领导者自行决定的。我们的分析对实际拥有这种自由裁量权的公司领导人是否会像斯特林所希望的那样使用他们的权力产生了极大的怀疑。
21 We do not attempt to provide an exhaustive review of this debate. Our goal is only to illustrate the evolution, breadth, and recent growth of support for stakeholderism. For a recent detailed survey of stakeholderist theories, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, in THE Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance 44-52 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds. 2018). 21 我们并不试图对这场辩论进行详尽的回顾。我们的目的只是要说明利益相关者主义的演变、广度以及近期支持利益相关者主义的增长。有关利益相关者理论的最新详细调查，见 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, in THE Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance 44-52 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds. 2018)。
22 Before 1800, more than 75 percent of corporate charters had been granted to public services enterprises, such as water supply, turnpike, and canal companies; only 4 percent of the charters belonged to manufacturing, agricultural, or commercial firms. Joseph Stancliffe Davis, 4 Essays in the Earlier History of AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 26 (1917). 22 在 1800 年之前，超过 75% 的公司特许状被授予公共服务企业，如供水、岔道和运河公司；只有 4% 的特许状属于制造业、农业或商业公司。Joseph Stancliffe Davis，4 Essays in the Earlier History of AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 26 (1917)。
23 Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 4 AM. Bus. L. Ass’n Bull. 11, 13-14 (1960). 23 Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 4 AM.Bus.L. Ass'n Bull.11, 13-14 (1960).
24 Shaw Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations, 43 J. Pol. ECON. 674, 674 (1935). 24 Shaw Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations, 43 J. Pol.ECON.674, 674 (1935).
25 Id. at 675 n. 2. 25 同上，第 675 n. 2 页。
26 Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law 1836-1937, at 13 (1991).
27 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself . . . .”). 27 例如，见 Dodge 诉福特汽车公司案，170 N.W. 668, 684（密歇根州，1919 年）（"商业公司的组织和经营主要是为了股东的利润。董事的权力应为此目的而行使。董事的自由裁量权应在选择实现该目的的手段时行使，并不包括改变目的本身......"）。
28 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932). Dodd’s paper is one of the most cited law review articles ever. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Ttme, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1483, 1499 (2012) (listing Dodd’s paper as the fifth most cited corporate and securities law paper as of November 2011). 28 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv.1145 (1932)。多德的论文是有史以来被引用次数最多的法律评论文章之一。见 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Ttme, 110 Mich.L. Rev. 1483, 1499 (2012)（将 Dodd 的论文列为截至 2011 年 11 月被引用次数第五多的公司法和证券法论文）。
29 See, e.g., Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012) (arguing against “shareholder value maximization” from both a doctrinal and normative standpoint); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. Rev. 247 (1999) (advocating that directors be viewed as “mediating hierarchs” who should balance the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, and other stakeholders). 29 参见，例如，Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012)（从理论和规范的角度反对 "股东价值最大化"）；Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. Rev 247 (1999)（主张将董事视为 "调解阶层"，他们应平衡股东、雇员、债权人和其他利益相关者的利益。L. Rev. 247 (1999)（主张将董事视为 "调解等级"，他们应平衡股东、雇员、债权人和其他利益相关者的利益）。
30 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 (2005); Simon Deakin, The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 GUEEN’S L.J. 339 (2012); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securties and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1999). 30 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 (2005)；Simon Deakin, The Corporation as Commons：Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 37 GUEEN'S L.J. 339 (2012)；Cynthia A. Williams, The Securties and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv.L. Rev. 1197 (1999)。
31 R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach 53 (1984). 31 R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management：A Stakeholder Approach 53 (1984).
32 For a discussion of the “triple bottom line” and other ESG-based performance measurements, see, for example, John Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of the 21st Century Business 70 (1998); Erik G. Hansen & Stefan Schaltegger, The Sustainability Balanced Scorecard: A Systematic Review of Architectures, 133 J. Bus. Ethics 193, 195-197 (2016). 32 关于 "三重底线 "和其他基于环境、社会和公司治理的绩效衡量标准的讨论，见 John Elkington, Cannibals with Forks：The Triple Bottom Line of the 21st Century Business 70 (1998); Erik G. Hansen & Stefan Schaltegger, The Sustainability Balanced Scorecard：133 J. Bus.Ethics 193, 195-197 (2016)。
33 Colin Mayer, Prosperity 39 (2018). 33 科林-梅耶，《繁荣》第 39 期（2018 年）。
34 Alex Edmans, Grow The Pie: Creating Profit for Investors and Value for SOCIETY 46-47 (2020). 34 亚历克斯-埃德曼斯，《扩大蛋糕：为投资者创造利润，为社会创造价值》，第 46-47 页（2020 年）。
35 Henderson, supra note 2, at 11. 35 Henderson，前注 2，第 11 页。
36 For an excellent review and analysis of constituency statutes, see Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. Rev. 1973, 1995-97 (2009). 36 关于选区法规的精彩回顾和分析，见 Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. Rev. 1973, 1995-97 (2009)。L. Rev. 1973, 1995-97 (2009)。
37 See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in The Deal Decade 338-52 (Margaret M. Blair ed. 1993); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 CIN. L. Rev. 457, 458-65 (1988). During this period, the BRT contributed to the efforts to obtain takeover protections on stakeholderist grounds by stating that “[c]orporations are chartered to serve both their shareholders and society as a whole.” Bus. Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. Law. 241, 244 (1990). 37 见 Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in The Deal Decade 338-52 (Margaret M. Blair ed. 1993); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers：立法与舆论》，57 CIN.L. Rev. 457, 458-65 (1988)。在此期间，BRT 声明 "公司的章程既要服务于股东，也要服务于整个社会"，从而推动了以利益相关者为由获得收购保护的努力。Bus.Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus.Law.241, 244 (1990).
38 See, e.g., Artz. Rev. Stat. § 10-830 (LexisNexis); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §78.138\S 78.138 (LexisNexis); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.0827 (LexisNexis); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1715 (LexisNexis); 7 R.I. Gen. Laws §5.2-8\S 5.2-8 (LexisNexis). 38 参见，例如，Artz.Rev. Stat.§ 10-830 (LexisNexis); Nev.Rev. Stat.Ann. §78.138\S 78.138 （LexisNexis）；Wis.Stat.Ann.§ 180.0827 (LexisNexis); 15 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann.§ 1715 (LexisNexis); 7 R.I. Gen. Laws §5.2-8\S 5.2-8 (LexisNexis).
39 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2017) ("IA] director . . . may consider, in determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation . . . the interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, 39 See, e.g., CONN.GEN.STAT.§ 33-756 (2017)（"IA]董事......在确定其合理认为符合公司最佳利益的事项时，可考虑公司员工、客户的利益、
creditors and suppliers, and . . community and societal considerations, including those of any community in which any office or other facility of the corporation is located."). 债权人和供应商，以及......社区和社会因素，包括公司任何办事处或其他设施所在社区的社 会因素"）。
40 See Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, supra note 29, at 21 ("[B]y the close of the millennium . . . [m]ost scholars, regulators and business leaders accepted without question that shareholder wealth maximization was the only proper goal of corporate governance."); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEo. L.J. 439, 440 (2001) ("[T]here is convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests."). 40 见 Stout，《股东价值神话》，前注 29，第 21 页（"在千禧年结束时......，[m]大多数学者、监管者和商界领袖毫无疑问地接受了股东财富最大化是公司治理的唯一正确目标。["）；Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEo.L.J.439，440（2001 年）（"有一个共识是，实现这一目标（即追求总体社会福利）的最佳手段是使公司经理对股东利益负重大责任，而且至少在直接方面只对这些利益负责"）。
41 Bus. Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 3. 41 Bus.41 商业圆桌会议，公司治理声明，前注 6，第 3 页。
42 Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of Corporation, supra note 1 . 42 商业圆桌会议，《关于公司宗旨的声明》，前注 1。
43 See sources cited infra notes 89-106. 43 见下文注 89-106 所引用的资料来源。
44 Market capitalization of the public companies led by the signatories of the BRT statement, as well as all other public companies, is based on data collected from Compustat as of December 1, 2019. We excluded the private companies that signed the BRT statement (for which market capitalization is not available). As of that date, total market capitalization was $11.6\$ 11.6 trillion for all U.S.-incorporated signatories and $13.3\$ 13.3 trillion for all public companies. 44 BRT 声明签署方领导的上市公司以及所有其他上市公司的市值是基于从 Compustat 收集的截至 2019 年 12 月 1 日的数据。我们剔除了签署 BRT 声明的私营公司（无法获得其市值）。截至该日，所有在美国注册的签署公司的总市值为 $11.6\$ 11.6 万亿美元，所有上市公司的总市值为 $13.3\$ 13.3 万亿美元。
45 Davos Manifesto 2020, supra note 9. 45 《达沃斯宣言 2020》，前注 9。
46 Stakeholder Capitalism: What Is Required from Corporate Leadership?, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/events/ world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2020/sessions/stakeholder-capitalism-what-is-required-from-corporate-leadership. 46 《利益相关者资本主义：世界经济论坛（2020 年 1 月 21 日），https://www.weforum.org/events/ world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2020/sessions/stakeholder-capitalism-what-is-required-from-corporate-leadership.
47 British Acad., Principles for Purposeful Business 11 (2019). 47 British Acad., Principles for Purposeful Business 11 (2019)。
48 Id. at 16-17. 48 同上，第 16-17 页。
49 Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/16/a-fundamental-reshaping-of-finance/ [https://perma.cc/33ZV-TE5B]. For evidence on the dominant position of BlackRock, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 721, 732-737 (2019). 49 Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, HARV.L. SCH.F. ON CORP.GOVERNANCE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/16/a-fundamental-reshaping-of-finance/ [https://perma.cc/33ZV-TE5B].有关贝莱德主导地位的证据，见 Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 721, 732-737 (2019)。
50 See supra note 10 . 50 见前注 10。
51 See Lipton, Rosenblum & Cain, supra note 11. 51 见 Lipton, Rosenblum & Cain，前注 11。
52 For discussions expressing such concerns, see infra notes 233-241 and accompanying text. 52 关于表达此类关切的讨论，见下文注 233-241 及附文。
53 For a discussion of how the BRT statement is unclear on this matter, see infra subpart III.B. 53 关于 BRT 声明在这一问题上如何不明确的讨论，见下文第 III.B 分部分。
54 See, e.g., Enrico Moretti, Local Multipliers, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 373 (2010) (examining the economic effects that new businesses or new jobs can have on a community). 54 例如，见 Enrico Moretti, Local Multipliers, 100 Am.Rev. 373 (2010)（研究了新企业或新工作对社区的经济影响）。Rev. 373 (2010)（研究了新企业或新工作岗位对社区的经济影响）。
55 Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (UK). 55 《2006 年公司法》，c. 46, § 172(1)（英国）。
56 Id. 56 同上。
57 Id. 57 同上。
58 See Co. Law Review Steering Grp., Developing the Framework 14 (2000) (explaining that the directors’ duty to take into account stakeholder interests should not be viewed as an independent goal). For an analysis of the U.K. statutory provision of “enlightened shareholder value,” see Andrew Keay, Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: An Interpretation and Assessment, 28 Company Law. 106, 106-110 (2007). 58 见 Co.Law Review Steering Grp.，Developing the Framework 14 (2000)(解释了董事考虑利益相关者利益的义务不应被视为独立目标)。关于英国 "开明股东价值 "法定条款的分析，见 Andrew Keay，《2006 年公司法》第 172(1)条：解释与评估》，28 Company Law.106, 106-110 (2007).
59 See supra note 10 . For a current academic article that seems to support a version of enlightened shareholder value, see Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 1401 (2020). 59 见前注 10。目前的一篇学术文章似乎支持开明股东价值的版本，见 Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 Vand.L. Rev. 1401 (2020)。
60 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM12 (observing that, for example, “providing amenities to [the local] community or to improving its government . . . may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage and sabotage or have other worthwhile effects”). 60 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM12 (observing that, for example, "providing amenities to [the local] community or to improving its government ... may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce wage bill or lessen losses from pilit and sabath or have other worthwhile effects")。......可能会更容易吸引到理想的雇员，可能会减少工资支出或减少偷窃和破坏造成的损失，或产生其他有价值的影响"）。
64 For empirical studies showing that investors seem to underestimate the value of research and development expenditures, marketing expenditures, and other intangible assets, see Louis K. C. Chan, Josef Lakonishok & Theodore Sougiannis, The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures, 56 J. Fin. 2431 (2001); Rajiv D. Banker, Rong Huang, Ram Natarajan & Sha Zhao, Market Valuation of Intangible Asset: Evidence on SG&A Expenditure, 94 Acct. Rev. 61 (2019). 64 关于表明投资者似乎低估了研发支出、营销支出和其他无形资产价值的实证研究，见 Louis K. C. Chan, Josef Lakonishok & Theodore Sougiannis, The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures, 56 J. Fin. 2431 (2001)；Rajiv D. Banker, Rong Huang, Ram Natarajan & Sha Zhao, Market Valuation of Intangible Asset: Evidence on SG&A Expenditure, 94 Acct.2431 (2001)；Rajiv D. Banker, Rong Huang, Ram Natarajan & Sha Zhao, Market Valuation of Intangible Asset: Evidence on SG&A Expenditure, 94 Acct.Rev. 61 (2019)。
65 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 248 (3d ed. 2015). 65 参见 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law 248 (3d ed. 2015)。
66 Based on our analysis of FactSet data, as of December 6, 2020, 61.3% of S&P 1500 U.S. companies were incorporated in Delaware. 66 根据我们对 FactSet 数据的分析，截至 2020 年 12 月 6 日，61.3% 的标准普尔 1500 指数美国公司在特拉华州注册成立。
67 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 65 (“The court may hold forth on the primacy of shareholder interests, or may hold forth on the importance of socially responsible conduct, but ultimately it does not matter. Under either approach, directors . . . will be insulated from liability by the business judgment rule.”). 67 参见，例如，Bainbridge，前注 65（"法院可以强调股东利益至上，也可以强调对社会负责的 行为的重要性，但最终这并不重要。无论采用哪种方法，董事......都将受到商业判断规则的保护而免于承担责任。）
68 Comm. for Econ. Dev., Social Responsiblities of Business Corporations 27 (1971). 68 Comm. for Econ.68 Comm for Econ. Dev., Social Responsiblities of Business Corporations 27 (1971).
70 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 10-830 (LexisNexis 2020); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717 (Consol. 2020); 15 Pa. CONS. Stat. ANN. § 1715 (LexisNexis 2020). 70 见 Ariz.Rev. Stat.§10-830（LexisNexis 2020）；IOWA CODE ANN.§490.1108A（LexisNexis 2020）；N.Y. Bus.Corp.Law § 717 (Consol. 2020)；15 Pa.CONS.Stat.ANN.§1715（LexisNexis 2020）。
71 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 251, 281 (arguing that the board of directors should "coordinate the activities of the team members [that is, share- 71 例如，参见 Blair & Stout，前注 29，第 251 和 281 页（认为董事会应 "协调团队成员的活动[即，分担责任]"）。
holders and various groups of stakeholders], allocate the resulting production, and mediate disputes among team members over that allocation"). 持有者和各利益相关群体]，分配由此产生的生产，并调解团队成员之间关于分配的争议"）。
72 See Deakin, supra note 30; Elhauge, supra note 30; Mayer, supra note 33. 72 见 Deakin，前注 30；Elhauge，前注 30；Mayer，前注 33。
73 Originally, Connecticut obligated directors to consider the interests of stakeholders. In 2010, however, the state legislature amended its constituency statute and adopted a permissive approach as well. H.B. 5530, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2010) (amending Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-756 from “a director . . . shall consider, in determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, [the interests of stakeholders]” to “a director . . . may consider, in determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, [the interests of stakeholders]”). 73 最初，康涅狄格州规定董事有义务考虑利益相关者的利益。但在 2010 年，该州立法机构修订了其选区法规，也采用了允许性方法。H.B. 5530, Gen. Assemb.Gen.§33-756，从 "董事......在决定其合理认为符合公司最佳利益的事项时，应考虑[利益相关者的利益]"改为 "董事......在决定其合理认为符合公司最佳利益的事项时，可考虑[利益相关者的利益]"）。
74 We use this adjective as a reference to Ronald Dworkin’s ideal judge, Hercules, a person “of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen” who has the difficult task of deciding hard cases based on the correct interpretation of the whole body of the law. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1083 (1975). 74 我们使用这个形容词是指罗纳德-德沃金理想中的法官--大力士，一个 "具有超人的技巧、学识、耐心和敏锐 "的人，他的艰巨任务是根据对整个法律体系的正确解释来裁决疑难案件。见 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv.L. Rev. 1057, 1083 (1975)。
75 See, for example, the statutes of Illinois, Maine, and Pennsylvania, allowing directors to consider “all other pertinent factors.” 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/ 8.85 (LexisNexis 2019) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-C, §831\S 831 (2020); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1715 (LexisNexis 2020). See also the statute of Vermont, which allows directors to consider “any other factors the director in his or her discretion reasonably considers appropriate in determining what he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.” Vt. Stat. Ans. tit. 11A, § 8.30 (LexisNexis 2019). 75 例如，参见伊利诺伊州、缅因州和宾夕法尼亚州的法规，允许董事考虑 "所有其他相关因素"。805 Ill.Comp. Stat.Stat.Ann.5/ 8.85 (LexisNexis 2019); Me.Rev. Stat.Ann.13-C, §831\S 831 (2020)；15 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann.§1715（LexisNexis 2020）。另见佛蒙特州法规，该法规允许董事考虑 "在确定其合理认为符合公司最佳利益的事项时，董事酌情合理地认为适当的任何其他因素"。佛蒙特州法规Vt.Vt. Stat.11A, § 8.30 (LexisNexis 2019)。
76 According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), a stakeholder is “[s]omeone who has an interest or concern in a business or enterprise, though not necessarily as an owner,” or (more generally) “[a] person who has an interest or concern (not necessarily financial) in the success or fallure of an organization, system, plan, or strategy, or who is affected by a course of action.” In the strategic management literature, a stakeholder is any individual or group “that can affect, or [is] affected by, the accomplishment of organizational purpose.” Freeman, supra note 31, at 25. 76 根据《布莱克法律词典》（2019 年第 11 版），利益相关者是指 "在商业或企业中拥有利益或关注的人，尽管不一定是所有者"，或（更一般地）"在一个组织、系统、计划或战略的成败中拥有利益或关注（不一定是经济利益）的人，或受到行动方针影响的人"。在战略管理文献中，利益相关者是指任何 "能够影响组织目标的实现或受其影响 "的个人或团体。Freeman, supra note 31, at 25.
77 See, e.g., James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations §4:10\S 4: 10 (3d ed. 2019) ("[Constituency statutes] commit complete discretion to the board of directors without any reliable method to adjudge the appropriateness of its exercise."). 77 例如，见 James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Corporations §4:10\S 4: 10 (3d ed. 2019)("[选区章程]将完全的自由裁量权交给董事会，而没有任何可靠的方法来裁定其行使的适当性")。
78 Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation: Welcoming the Debate, MEDIUM (Aug. 25, 2019), https://medium.com/@BizRoundtable/redefined-purpose-of-a-corporation-welcoming-the-debate-8f03176f7ad8 [https:// perma.cc/DD3K-YKHU] [hereinafter Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation] (“While we acknowledge that different stakeholders may have competing interests in the short term, it is important to recognize that the interests of all stakeholders are inseparable in the long term.”). 78 Bus.78 Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation：欢迎辩论，MEDIUM（2019 年 8 月 25 日），https://medium.com/@BizRoundtable/redefined-purpose-of-a-corporation-welcoming-the-debate-8f03176f7ad8 [https:// perma.cc/DD3K-YKHU] [以下简称 Bus.Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation]（"虽然我们承认不同的利益相关者在短期内可能有相互竞争的利益，但重要的是要认识到所有利益相关者的利益在长期内是不可分割的"）。
79 See Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. Fin. Econ. 621, 622 (2011). 79 见 Alex Edmans，《股票市场是否充分重视无形资产？员工满意度与股票价格》，101 J. Fin.Econ.621, 622 (2011).
80 See Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, Socially Responsible Fyrms, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 585, 586 (2016). 80 见 Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, Socially Responsible Fyrms, 122 J. Fin.Econ.585, 586 (2016).
81 For a discussion of the complexity of estimating climate change effects, see Richard L. Revesz et al., Improve Economic Models of Climate Change, 508 Nature 173, 174 (2014); Katharine Ricke Laurent Drouet, Ken Caldeira & Massimo Tavoni, Country-Level Social Cost of Carbon, 8 Nature Climate Change 895, 895 (2018); William D. Nordhaus & Andrew Moffat, A Survey of Global Impacts of Climate Change: Replication, Survey Methods, and a Statistical Analysis 18-19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23646, 2017). 81 关于估算气候变化影响的复杂性的讨论，见 Richard L. Revesz 等人，Improve Economic Models of Climate Change, 508 Nature 173, 174 (2014)；Katharine Ricke Laurent Drouet, Ken Caldeira & Massimo Tavoni, Country-Level Social Cost of Carbon, 8 Nature Climate Change 895, 895 (2018)；William D. Nordhaus & Andrew Moffat, A Survey of Global Impacts of Climate Change：Replication, Survey Methods, and a Statistical Analysis 18-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23646, 2017)。
82 Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 325 ("[C]orporate directors as mediating hierarchs enjoy considerable discretion in deciding which members of the corporate coalition receive what portion of the economic surplus resulting from team production. Although the board must meet the minimum demands of each team member to keep the coalition together, beyond that threshold any number of possible allocations among groups is possible.") 82 Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 325 ("公司董事作为调解人，在决定公司联盟中的哪些成员能从团队生产中获得哪部分经济剩余时，享有相当大的自由裁量权。虽然董事会必须满足每个团队成员的最低要求，以维持联盟的团结，但在这一界限之外，各群体之间可能存在任何数量的分配。）
83 Mayer Response, supra note 13, at 3-4. 83 梅尔回应，前注 13，第 3-4 页。
84 Id. 84 同上。
85 See Mayer’s discussion of this Article in a session at the SHoF-ECGI Sustainable Finance Conference, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, ECGI.global, https://ecgi.global/video/illusory-promise-stakeholder-governance [https://perma.cc/M5CL-MD6S]; Strine, Restoration, supra note 20, at 51-52 (attributing the failure of constituency statutes in part to their permissive rather than mandatory nature, and criticizing those who wish to avoid mandatory language (“shall”) in describing a director’s duty to stakeholders). 85 见 Mayer 在 SHoF-ECGI 可持续金融会议的一次会议上对本文的讨论，The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, ECGI.global, https://ecgi.global/video/illusory-promise-stakeholder-governance [https://perma.cc/M5CL-MD6S]；Strine，Restoration，前注 20，第 51-52 页（将选区章程的失败部分归因于其允许性而非强制性，并批评那些希望在描述董事对利益相关者的责任时避免使用强制性语言（"应"）的人）。
86 See supra notes 65, 67, and accompanying text. 86 见前注 65、67 和附文。
87 See infra note 210 and accompanying text; Strine, Restoration, at 54. 87 见下文注 210 和附文；Strine, Restoration, at 54。
88 Indeed, in our study with Kobi Kastiel, we do not find differences in the choices made by corporate leaders when they are governed by rules allowing them to take into account stakeholder interests and when they are governed by rules requiring them to do so. Bebchuk, Kastiel, & Tallarita, supra note 15, Section III.A.2. 88 事实上，在我们与科比-卡斯提尔（Kobi Kastiel）的研究中，我们并没有发现公司领导者在受允许其考虑利益相关者利益的规则约束时，与受要求其考虑利益相关者利益的规则约束时，所做的选择有什么不同。Bebchuk、Kastiel 和 Tallarita，前注 15，第 III.A.2 节。
Hypothetically, one could consider supplementing pluralistic stakeholderism with a fundamental change in the judicial review of corporate decision-making. This change would require courts to review on the merits any challenged decision by corporate leaders that has an effect on the allocation of costs and benefits between shareholders and stakeholders. Such a fundamental change would involve frequent litigation that would call on courts to make balancing decisions and, in contrast to the spirit of stakeholderism, would make courts (and not only corporate leaders) a key decision-maker in determining the treatment of stakeholders. We doubt that stakeholderists or others would support such a judicial role. 在假设中，我们可以考虑从根本上改变对公司决策的司法审查，以补充多元利益相关者主义。这种变革将要求法院对公司领导者做出的、对股东和利益相关者之间的成本和利益分配产生影响的任何受质疑的决策进行实质审查。这种根本性的变革将涉及频繁的诉讼，要求法院做出平衡决定，而且与利益相关者主义的精神相反，将使法院（而不仅仅是公司领导者）成为决定利益相关者待遇的关键决策者。我们怀疑利益相关者或其他人是否会支持这样的司法角色。
89 David Benoit, Top CEOs See a Duty Beyond Shareholders, Wall ST. J., Aug. 20, 2019, at A1. 89 David Benoit, Top CEOs See a Duty Beyond Shareholders, Wall ST.J., Aug. 20, 2019, at A1.
109 Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 78. 109 Bus.圆桌会议，《重新定义的公司目的》，前注 78。
110 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose, supra note 5. 110 商业圆桌会议重新定义目的，前注 5。
111 Id. 111 同上。
112 Id. 112 同上。
113 Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 78. 113 Bus.圆桌会议，《重新定义的公司目的》，前注 78。
114 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose, supra note 5. 114 商业圆桌会议重新定义目的，前注 5。
115 According to the 1997 Statement, taking stakeholders into account was worthwhile from a shareholder perspective because " [it][i t] is in the long-term interests of stockholders for a corporation to treat its employees well, to serve its customers well, to encourage its suppliers to continue to supply it, to honor its debts, and to have a reputation for civic responsibility." Bus. Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 3. 115 根据 1997 年的声明，从股东的角度来看，将利益相关者考虑在内是值得的，因为" [it][i t] 公司善待员工、服务客户、鼓励供应商继续为其供货、履行债务并在公民责任方面享有声誉，这些都符合股东的长期利益"。Bus.圆桌会议，《公司治理声明》，前注 6，第 3 页。
116 Bus. Roundtable, Redefined Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 78. 116 Bus.圆桌会议，《重新定义公司的目的》，前注 78。
117 Id. 117 同上。
118 See id. 118 见同上。
121 See James D. Cox & thomas lee hazen, Treatise on the Law of CorporaTIONS § 9:1 (3d ed. 2019). 121 见 James D. Cox & Thomas Lee hazen, Treatise on the Law of CorporaTIONS § 9:1 (3d ed. 2019)。
122 Robert Eccles and Tim Youmans have led an initiative aimed at encouraging boards of directors of public companies to adopt a statement of purpose or “statement of significant audiences and materiality,” which should identify the company’s significant constituencies and the company’s priorities and time frames to deliver value to these constituencies. Robert G. Eccles & Tim Youmans, Materiality in Corporate Governance: The Statement of Significant Audiences and Materialty, 28 J . Appled Corp. Fin. 39, 39 (2016). These thought leaders believe that the board of directors is the corporate organ that should approve such a statement. It seems equally natural that the board should also be the organ that approves a company’s joining a collective statement of purpose such as the BRT statement. 122 罗伯特-埃克斯（Robert Eccles）和蒂姆-尤曼斯（Tim Youmans）牵头发起了一项倡议，旨在鼓励上市公司董事会通过一项宗旨声明或 "重要受众和重要性声明"，其中应明确公司的重要支持者以及公司为这些支持者创造价值的优先事项和时间框架。Robert G. Eccles & Tim Youmans，《公司治理中的重要性》：The Statement of Significant Audiences and Materialty, 28 J .Appled Corp.Fin.39, 39 (2016).这些思想领袖认为，董事会是应该批准此类声明的公司机关。似乎同样自然的是，董事会也应该是批准公司加入 BRT 声明等集体目的声明的机构。
123 The initial signatories of the BRT statement totaled 181. As of December 17, 2019, we identified three additional companies that publicly joined the BRT statement, for a total of 184 . Of these 184 companies, we contacted all the 173 companies for which we found a public relations or media inquiries email address on the corporate website. 123 BRT 声明的初始签署方共有 181 家。截至 2019 年 12 月 17 日，我们发现又有三家公司公开加入了 BRT 声明，总数达到 184 家。在这 184 家公司中，我们联系了在公司网站上找到公共关系或媒体咨询电子邮件地址的所有 173 家公司。
124 We also received two ambiguous responses that we did not include in the total of 48 . For example, one company responded that the decision was “a collaborative effort,” declining to specify a particular decision maker. 124 我们还收到了两份模棱两可的答复，我们没有将其计入 48 份答复中。例如，一家公司在答复中称，该决定是 "一项合作努力"，但拒绝说明具体的决策者。
125 Of these 48 companies, two added that while the decision was taken by the CEO, the CEO consulted (or “usually consults”) with the board of directors. However, important corporate decisions are generally approved by the board of directors through a formal vote at a board meeting. We therefore did not classify these two companies as having received board approval for the decision to join the BRT statement. 125 在这 48 家公司中，有两家公司补充说，虽然决定由首席执行官作出，但首席执行官与董事会进行了协商（或 "通常进行协商"）。不过，重要的公司决策一般由董事会在董事会会议上正式表决通过。因此，我们没有把这两家公司加入 BRT 声明的决定归类为已获得董事会批准。
126 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose, supra note 5. 126 商业圆桌会议重新定义目的，前注 5。
127 We note that no CEO would be expected to announce a commitment to lead the CEO’s company to acquire another company without approval of the acquisition plan by the board. 127 我们注意到，在收购计划未经董事会批准的情况下，任何首席执行官都不会宣布承诺带领其公司收购另一家公司。
132 Edgecliffe-Johnson & Nauman, supra note 129. 132 Edgecliffe-Johnson & Nauman，前注 129。
133 In the response provided to the Financial Times, Bolten added that “Ielven if many CEOs saw it as an affirmation of their existing priorities,” the statement reflected an “aspiration [ ]” to do more. Id. Note, however, that “doing more” was described as an aspiration rather than a commitment and that the stated commitment was merely to continue running the company in the future (in terms of treatment of stakeholders) as it is being run now. 133 在给《金融时报》的答复中，博尔滕补充说，"即使许多首席执行官认为这是对他们现有优先事项的肯定"，该声明也反映了他们 "希望[]"做得更多。同上。但请注意，"做得更多 "被描述为一种愿望而非承诺，而且声明中的承诺只是在未来（在对待利益相关者方面）继续按照现在的方式经营公司。
134 See NYSE Listed Company Manual: § 303A. 09 Corporate Governance Guidelines (requiring companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange to adopt and disclose corporate governance guidelines). See also Yaron Nill & Cathy Hwang, Shadow Governance, 108 Calff. L. Rev. 1097, 1112-13 (2020) (reporting that 87%87 \% of S&P1500 companies disclose their corporate governance guidelines). 134 见《纽约证券交易所上市公司手册》：§ 303A.09 《公司治理准则》(要求在纽约证券交易所上市的公司采用并披露公司治理准则)。另见 Yaron Nill 和 Cathy Hwang，《影子治理》，108 Calff.L.Rev.1097，1112-13 (2020)（报告称， 87%87 \% 标准普尔 1500 家公司披露了其公司治理准则）。
135 See Nili & Hwang, supra note 134, at 1126. 135 见 Nili 和 Hwang，前注 134，第 1126 页。
136 Id. at 1124. 136 同上，第 1124 页。
137 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose, supra note 5. 137 商业圆桌会议重新定义目的，前注 5。
Other examples of companies whose governance guidelines endorse shareholder primacy include AECOM and Lockheed Martin. AECOM’s guideline state that " [t][t] he primary responsibility of the Board of Directors . . . is to oversee the affairs of the Company for the benefit of stockholders." AECOM, Inc., CORPORATE Governance Guidelines 1 (Nov. 18, 2018), https://investors.aecom.com/static-files/d1206cf2-b313-4502-be58-469b2660a331 [https://perma.cc/Y7BDBELY]. Lockheed Martin’s governance guidelines state that " [t][t] he role of the Board is to oversee the management of the Corporation and to represent the interests of all the Corporation’s stockholders." Lockheed Martin Corp., Corporate GovernaNCE GUIDELINES 1 (Apr. 25, 2019), [https://perma.cc/7HS3-6X5T]. 其他公司治理准则支持股东至上的例子包括 AECOM 和洛克希德-马丁公司。AECOM 的准则规定：" [t][t] 董事会的主要职责......是为了股东的利益监督公司事务"。AECOM, Inc., CORPORATE Governance Guidelines 1 (Nov. 18, 2018), https://investors.aecom.com/static-files/d1206cf2-b313-4502-be58-469b2660a331 [https://perma.cc/Y7BDBELY].洛克希德-马丁公司的治理准则规定：" [t][t] 董事会的职责是监督公司的管理，并代表公司所有股东的利益"。洛克希德-马丁公司，公司治理指南 1（2019 年 4 月 25 日），[https://perma.cc/7HS3-6X5T] 。
151 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (emphasis in original). For a thoughtful discussion of the legal issues arising in connection with the adoption of a “corporate purpose,” see Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose? 115-123 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 510/2020, 2020), https:// ssrn.com/abstract=3561164 [https://perma.cc/EGU7-Q5KU]. 151 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (emphasis in original).关于采用 "公司目的 "所产生的法律问题的深思熟虑的讨论，见 Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?115-123 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 510/2020, 2020), https:// ssrn.com/abstract=3561164 [https://perma.cc/EGU7-Q5KU].
156 Martin Lipton, Stakeholder Governance-Some Legal Points, Harv. L. Sch. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 20, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 2019/09/20/stakeholder-governance-some-legal-points/ [https://perma.cc/ 78DT-CGL7]. 156 Martin Lipton, Stakeholder Governance-Some Legal Points, Harv.L. Sch.F. ON CORP.GOVERNANCE (Sept. 20, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 2019/09/20/stakeholder-governance-some-legal-points/ [https://perma.cc/ 78DT-CGL7].
158 For a related discussion of whether norms could be relied on to induce investment managers to make stewardship decisions that would serve the interests of their beneficial investors, see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 119 Colum. L. REv. 2029, 2071-72 (2019). 158 关于是否可以依靠规范来引导投资经理做出符合其受益投资者利益的管理决策的相关讨论，见 Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance：Theory, Evidence, and Policy.119 Colum.L. REv. 2029, 2071-72 (2019)。
159 Id. 159 同上。
160 For a discussion of the low level of stock ownership of directors in large public companies for most of the twentieth century, see, for example, Sanjal Bhagat, Dennis C. Carey & Charles M. Elson, Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 Bus. Law. 885, 886-88 (1999). 160 关于 20 世纪大部分时间大型上市公司董事持股比例较低的讨论，参见 Sanjal Bhagat, Dennis C. Carey & Charles M. Elson, Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 Bus.Law.885, 886-88 (1999).
161 See, e.g., General Motors Co., 2019 Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 18 (Apr. 18, 2019) (mentioning as one of the guiding principles for director compensation the “[a]lign[ment of] the interests of directors with our shareholders by providing a significant portion of compensation in equity”). 161 例如，参见通用汽车公司，2019 年代理声明（14A 表）18（2019 年 4 月 18 日）（提到董事报酬的指导原则之一是 "通过提供相当一部分股权报酬，将董事利益与股东利益结合起来"）。
162 Rebecca Burton & Peter Kim, Board Pay Under the Microscope, Harv. L. SCh. F. on Corp. Governance (Nov. 17, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 2019/11/17/board-pay-under-the-microscope/ [https://perma.cc/L7WDXGUV]. 162 Rebecca Burton & Peter Kim, Board Pay Under the Microscope, Harv.L. SCh. F. on Corp.Governance (Nov. 17, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 2019/11/17/board-pay-under-the-microscope/ [https://perma.cc/L7WDXGUV].
163 Id. (presenting evidence that in 2018 median outside director compensation for S&P 500 companies was $105,000\$ 105,000 cash and $166,743\$ 166,743 equity). 163 同上。(提供证据表明，2018 年标准普尔 500 强公司外部董事薪酬的中位数为 $105,000\$ 105,000 现金和 $166,743\$ 166,743 股权）。
164 Institutional S’holder Servs., United States Compensation Policies: FregUently Asked Questions 23 (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/ file/policy/latest/americas/US-Compensation-Policies-FAG.pdf [https:// perma.cc/TA7S-D65G]. 164 Institutional S'holder Servs.，United States Compensation Policies：FregUently Asked Questions 23 (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.issgovernance.com/ file/policy/latest/americas/US-Compensation-Policies-FAG.pdf [https:// perma.cc/TA7S-D65G].
165 Glass Lewis, United States Guidelines 44 (2019), https:// www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2019_GUIDELINES_UnitedStates.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9LT-NDAJ].
166 See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 166 见下文注 172 和附文。
167 For early important contributions on the disciplinary effect of the managerial labor market and the market for corporate control, see, for example, Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983). 167 关于管理劳动力市场和公司控制权市场的约束效应的早期重要贡献，参见 Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL.ECON.288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ.301 (1983).
168 For a recent economic analysis demonstrating this point, see Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance, 71 J. Fin. 775, 775-76 (2016). 168 有关证明这一点的最新经济分析，见 Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance, 71 J. Fin. 775, 775-76 (2016)。775, 775-76 (2016).
169 For a well-known review of the literature on the influence of the CEO on the selection of directors, see Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. Econ. Literature 58, 66-67 (2010). 169 关于首席执行官对董事遴选的影响的著名文献综述，见 Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance：A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. Econ. Literature 58, 66-67.Literature 58, 66-67 (2010)。
170 For a recent empirical study on the effects of shareholder dissent in director elections, see Reena Aggarwal, Sandeep Dahiya & Nagpurnan and R. Prabhala, The Power of Shareholder Votes: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections, 133 J. Fin. Econ. 134 (2019). 170 关于股东异议在董事选举中的影响的最新实证研究，见 Reena Aggarwal, Sandeep Dahiya & Nagpurnan and R. Prabhala, The Power of Shareholder Votes. Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections, 133 J. Fin：Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections, 133 J. Fin.Econ.134 (2019).
171 For a discussion of the substantial incidence of proxy fights in recent years, see Melissa Sawyer, Annual Review and Analysis of 2019 U.S. Shareholder Activism, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Nov. 20, 2019), https:// corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/20/annual-review-and-analysis-of-2019-u-s-shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/WH2P-FNYJ]. 171 关于近年来代理权争夺战大量发生的讨论，见 Melissa Sawyer, Annual Review and Analysis of 2019 U.S. Shareholder Activism, Harv.L. Sch.F. on Corp.Governance（2019 年 11 月 20 日），https:// corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/20/annual-review-and-analysis-of-2019-u-s-shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/WH2P-FNYJ].
172 Jeffrey L. Coles & Chun-Keung Hoi, New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 58 J. Fin. 197, 198 (2003). 172 Jeffrey L. Coles & Chun-Keung Hoi, New Evidence on the Market for Directors：董事会成员资格与宾夕法尼亚州参议院第 1310 号法案》，58 J. Fin.197, 198 (2003).
173 Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors’ Responsweness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 54 (2010). 173 Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors' Responsweness to Shareholders：Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP.FIN.53, 54 (2010).
174 Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fyghts: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 2-3 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssmn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101473 [https://perma.cc/A2BNJV4Z]. 174 Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fyghts：How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 2-3 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssmn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101473 [https://perma.cc/A2BNJV4Z].
175 Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J. Fin. ECoN. 316, 317 (2014). 175 Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democracy in Play：Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J. Fin.ECoN.316, 317 (2014).
176 Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. Fin. 933, 953-956 (2012). 176 Alex Edmans, Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, The Real Effects of Financial Markets：价格对收购的影响》，67 J. Fin.933, 953-956 (2012).
177 Jarrad Harford, Takeover Bids and Target Directors’ Incentiwes: The Impact of a Bld on Directors’ Wealth and Board Seats, 69 J. Fin. Econ. 51, 53 (2003). 177 Jarrad Harford, Takeover Bids and Target Directors' Incentiwes：The Impact of a Bld on Directors' Wealth and Board Seats, 69 J. Fin.51, 53 (2003).51, 53 (2003).
178 See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729, 1752 (2008). 178 见 Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729, 1752 (2008).1729, 1752 (2008).
179 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists, 137 J. Fin. ECON. 1, 2, 30 (2020). 179 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists, 137 J. Fin.ECON.1, 2, 30 (2020).
180 For empirical findings consistent with the view that directors have incentives to please the CEO, see, for example, Christa H. S. Bouwman, Corporate Governance Propagation Through Overlapping Directors, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2358 (2011). 180 关于与董事有取悦首席执行官的动机这一观点一致的实证研究结果，见 Christa H. S. Bouwman, Corporate Governance Propagation Through Overlapping Directors, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud.Stud.2358 (2011).
181 For a theoretical model of this trade-off, see Levit & Malenko, supra note 168. 181 关于这种权衡的理论模型，见 Levit & Malenko，前注 168。
182 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. Rev. 973 (2002) (explaining that arrangements that facilitate hostile takeovers strengthen the incentives of directors to pay attention to shareholder interests); Bhagat, Carey & Elson, supra note 160 (discussing how stock ownership by directors strengthens such incentives). 182 例如，见 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI.L.Rev.973（2002 年）（解释了有利于敌意收购的安排会加强董事关注股东利益的动机）；Bhagat、Carey & Elson，前注 160（讨论了董事持股如何加强这种动机）。
183 EgUILAR, CEO Pay Trends 14 (2018). These and the other data points in this paragraph and the next refer to the companies included in the Equilar 500 index for the fiscal year 2017. 183 EgUILAR, CEO 薪酬趋势 14 (2018)。本段和下一段中的这些数据以及其他数据指的是 2017 财年 Equilar 500 指数中的公司。
184 See, e.g., General Motors Co., 2019 Proxy Statement, supra note 161, at 6 (explaining that the incentives produced by pay arrangements are intended to “focus leaders on absolute stock price appreciation”). 184 例如，参见通用汽车公司，2019 年代理声明，前注 161，第 6 页（解释薪酬安排所产生的激励旨在 "让领导者关注股票价格的绝对升值"）。
185 EgULAR, supra note 183, at 18. 185 EgULAR，前注 183，第 18 页。
186 Id. 186 同上。
187 Meridian Comp. Partners, Trends and Developments in Executive CompenSATION 21 (2018) (presenting data from a survey of 127 companies). 187 Meridian Comp.Partners, Trends and Developments in Executive CompenSATION 21 (2018)（提供 127 家公司的调查数据）。
188 The compensation mix for CEOs of small companies looks quite different, with a much greater use of stock options. In 2018, CEOs of companies with revenues under $100 million, for example, received 43%43 \% of their total pay in stock options, 25%25 \% in fixed salary, 15.7%15.7 \% in stock awards, and 14%14 \% in cash bonuses. The Conference Bd., CEO and Executive Compensation Practices 18 (2019). 188 小公司首席执行官的薪酬组合看起来很不一样，股票期权的使用要多得多。以 2018 年为例，收入低于 1 亿美元的公司首席执行官的薪酬总额中， 43%43 \% 为股票期权， 25%25 \% 为固定工资， 15.7%15.7 \% 为股票奖励， 14%14 \% 为现金奖金。The Conference Bd., CEO and Executive Compensation Practices 18 (2019)。
189 In 2017, bonuses represented 23.3%23.3 \% of the average CEO compensation in the Equilar 500 companies. Equilar, supra note 183, at 18 . 189 2017 年，奖金占 Equilar 500 强公司首席执行官平均薪酬的 23.3%23.3 \% 。Equilar，前注 183，第 18 页。
190 See, e.g., id. at 23. 190 见，例如，同上，第 23 页。
191 The Conference Bd., supra note 188, at 27. 191 The Conference Bd.，前注 188，第 27 页。
197 For empirical studies of the effects of say-on-pay votes and “withhold” votes on executive pay, see Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Volkan Muslu, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 535 (2011); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. of Acct. Res. 951 (2013). 197 关于薪酬说投票和 "扣留 "投票对高管薪酬影响的实证研究，见 Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Volkan Muslu, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud.Stud.535 (2011); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors：Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. of Acct.951 (2013)。
198 For a discussion of all the aspects of the ISS practices noted in this paragraph, see Institutional S’holder Servs., United States Pay-For-Performance Mechanics 3-7 (2019). 198 关于本段中提到的 ISS 做法的所有方面的讨论，见 Institutional S'holder Servs.，United States Pay-For-Performance Mechanics 3-7 (2019)。
199 The current sentiment is described by the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in a recent memorandum: 199 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz 律师事务所在最近的一份备忘录中描述了当前的情绪：
We find that company boards are deeply engaged in lenvironmental, soctal, and governance (ESG)] issues and expect that there will be an increased focus on these matters through shareholder proposals and requests for disclosure in the coming years. We do not currently expect to see the use of ESG measures as stand-alone performance goals in incentive programs (other than in a unique circumstance where such a measure is integral to business performance), although ESG-type goals may be used for purposes of the qualitative or individual performance aspect of incentive awards or as a modiffer within specified parameters. 我们发现，公司董事会正在深入研究环境、社会和公司治理（ESG）问题，并预计在未来几年内，通过股东提案和信息披露要求，这些问题将得到越来越多的关注。目前，我们预计在激励计划中不会将环境、社会和公司治理措施作为独立的绩效目标（除非在特殊情况下，这种措施与企业绩效密不可分），但环境、社会和公司治理类型的目标可能会被用于激励奖励的定性或个人绩效方面，或作为特定参数范围内的一个调节因素。
200 See supra Section IV.A.2. 200 见上文第 IV.A.2 节。
201 Cf. supra notes 172-175, 178-179 and accompanying text. 201 参见前注 172-175、178-179 和附文。
202 Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 Int’l. Rev. Fin. 57, 58 (2012). 202 Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton，How Has CEO Turnover Changed？Rev. Fin.57, 58 (2012).
203 Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, Performance-Induced CEO Turnover, 1-2 (Working Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1570635 [https://perma.cc/J9WJ-RMZE].
204 For studies contributing to the literature and this consensus, see, for example, Jeff Brookman & Paul D. Thistle, CEO Tenure, the Risk of Termination and Firm Value, 15 J. Corp. Fin. 331, 332 (2009) (finding that stock returns are positively correlated with tenure); Andrea L. Eisfeldt & Camelia M. Kuhnen, CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework, 109 J. Fin. Econ. 351, 352 (2013) (proposing a competitive assignment model and finding that CEO turnover probabilities increase in negative absolute and relative performance, measured as stock returns and return on assets); Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation, 70 J. Fin. 2155, 2155-56 (2015) (finding that directors fire CEOs for bad stock performance but are not particularly effective in screening out the effects due to industry or market negative shocks). 204 有助于文献和这一共识的研究，见 Jeff Brookman & Paul D. Thistle, CEO Tenure, the Risk of Termination and Firm Value, 15 J. Corp.Fin.331, 332 (2009)（发现股票回报与任期正相关）；Andrea L. Eisfeldt & Camelia M. Kuhnen, CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework, 109 J. Fin.Econ.351, 352 (2013)（提出了竞争性分配模型，并发现首席执行官更替的概率会增加负的绝对和相对业绩，以股票回报率和资产回报率衡量）；Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation, 70 J. Fin.2155, 2155-56 (2015)（发现董事会因为股票表现不佳而解雇 CEO，但在屏蔽行业或市场负面冲击的影响方面并不特别有效）。
205 See studies cited supra notes 178-179. 205 见前注 178-179 所引研究。
206 C. Edward Fee, Charles J. Hadlock & Joshua R. Pierce, New Evidence on Managerial Labor Markets: An Analysis of CEO Retreads, 48 J. CORP. Fin. 428, 429 (2018). 206 C. Edward Fee, Charles J. Hadlock & Joshua R. Pierce, New Evidence on Managerial Labor Markets：CEO Retreads 分析》，48 J. CORP.Fin.428, 429 (2018).
207 Another empirical study that is worth noting is Taekjin Shin & Jihae You, Changing Words: How Temporal Consistency in a CEO’s Use of Language Toward Shareholders and Stakeholders Affects CEO Dismissal, 28 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 47, 48 (2020). This study documents that CEO interests are advanced by using shareholder-centric language, rather than stakeholder-oriented language in their annual letters to shareholders. The researchers found that, controlling for CEO characteristics and shareholder return, CEOs who use consistently share-holder-centric rhetoric are less likely to be replaced than those who use stake-holder-oriented language. 207 另一项值得注意的实证研究是 Taekjin Shin & Jihae You, Changing Words：CEO 对股东和利益相关者使用语言的时间一致性如何影响 CEO 辞职，28 CORP.governance int'l rev.47, 48 (2020).本研究记录了首席执行官在致股东的年度信函中使用以股东为中心的语言，而不是以利益相关者为导向的语言，从而促进了首席执行官的利益。研究人员发现，在控制首席执行官特征和股东回报的情况下，一贯使用以股东为中心措辞的首席执行官被替换的可能性低于使用以利益相关者为导向措辞的首席执行官。
208 It might be argued that, even if corporate leaders have an interest in giving weight to shareholder interests but little incentive to give independent weight to stakeholder interests, to the extent that some shareholders have certain prostakeholder preferences, the incentive to attach weight to shareholder interests might also provide corporate leaders with incentives to give weight to these prostakeholder preferences. For an analysis that relles on the presence of such prostakeholder preferences on the part of some shareholders, see Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 247, 248-49 (2017). However, the current incentives for directors and executives, as shown in this subpart, encourage corporate leaders to give independent weight only to the financial interests of shareholders. For example, director and executive pay arrangements tie their payoffs to shareholders’ financial return but not to the satisfaction of any pro-stakeholder preferences of shareholders. 208 有人可能会说，即使公司领导者有兴趣重视股东利益，但却没有什么动力去独立重视利益相关者的利益，只要有些股东有某些前股东偏好，重视股东利益的动力也可能会使公司领导者有动力去重视这些前股东偏好。关于部分股东存在这种前股东偏好的分析，见 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 247, 248-49 (2017)。然而，如本小节所示，目前对董事和高管的激励措施鼓励公司领导者只独立考虑股东的财务利益。例如，董事和高管的薪酬安排将他们的回报与股东的财务回报挂钩，而不是与股东的任何亲股东偏好的满足挂钩。
We note that even Hart & Zingales doubt that corporate managers have incentives to benefit stakeholders beyond what would maximize share value. They therefore focus on binding shareholder voting on social and environmental proposals as a potential mechanism for implementing pro-stakeholder preferences that shareholders might have. See id. at 258-61. 我们注意到，即使是 Hart & Zingales 也怀疑公司管理者是否有动力为利益相关者谋福利，而不只是最大化股票价值。因此，他们将重点放在对社会和环境提案进行有约束力的股东投票上，将其作为落实股东可能具有的支持利益相关者偏好的潜在机制。见同上，第 258-61 页。
209 Our empirical work described below, carried out jointly with Kobi Kastiel, is fully detailed in Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita, supra note 15, Part IV. 209 下文所述我们与 Kobi Kastiel 共同开展的实证研究，详见 Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita，前注 15，第 IV 部分。
210 This objection to our findings was suggested by Colin Mayer in a debate with one of us organized by the Said Business School at Oxford University. Stakeholder Versus Shareholder Capitalism: The Great Debate, U. Oxford: Said Bus. Sch. (June 25, 2020), https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/oxford-answers/stakeholder-versus-shareholder-capitalism-great-debate [https://perma.cc/E2RT-NQ9Z]. For empirical work suggesting that cultural norms might have an impact on directors’ attitudes towards shareholders and stakeholders, see Renée B. Adams, Amir N. Licht & Lilach Sagiv, Shareholders and Stakeholders: How Do Directors Decide?, 32 Strategic Mgmt. J. 1331 (2011); Amir N. Licht & Renée B. Adams, Shareholders and Stakeholders Around the World: The Role of Values, Culture, and Law in Directors’ Decisions (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 459/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3407 873 [https://perma.ce/G6D8-7VRP]. 210 柯林-梅耶在牛津大学赛德商学院组织的一场辩论中与我们中的一位提出了对我们研究结果的这一反对意见。利益相关者与股东资本主义：The Great Debate, U. Oxford：Said Bus.Sch. (June 25, 2020), https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/oxford-answers/stakeholder-versus-shareholder-capitalism-great-debate [https://perma.cc/E2RT-NQ9Z].有经验表明，文化规范可能会影响董事对股东和利益相关者的态度，参见 Renée B. Adams, Amir N. Licht & Lilach Sagiv, Shareholders and Stakeholders：32 Strategic Mgmt.J. 1331 (2011)；Amir N. Licht & Renée B. Adams, Shareholders and Stakeholders Around the World：The Role of Values, Culture, and Law in Directors' Decisions (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 459/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3407 873 [https://perma.ce/G6D8-7VRP].
211 Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita, supra note 15, Section IV.E. 211 Bebchuk, Kastiel & Tallarita，前注 15，第 IV.E 节。
212 Our study with Kobi Kastiel discusses other potential objections to our conclusion that our findings are due to the incentives of corporate leaders not to benefit stakeholders beyond what would serve shareholder value. Id. at Section V.B In particular, this discussion explains that our findings are unlikely to be generally explained by the need to obtain shareholder approval for a sale, uncertainties regarding the interpretation of the constituency statutes, or the expected outcome of a potential judicial review of the transaction. 212 我们与科比-卡斯提尔（Kobi Kastiel）的研究讨论了对我们的结论的其他潜在反对意见，即我们的发现是由于公司领导者的动机，即不在有利于股东价值的范围之外为利益相关者谋利。同上，第 V.B 节。特别是，该讨论解释说，我们的发现不太可能被以下因素普遍解释：出售需 要获得股东批准、选区章程解释的不确定性或对交易的潜在司法审查的预期结果。
213 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 82. 213 参见前注 82 中引用的资料来源。
214 See, e.g., Why We Need the ‘Davos Manifesto’ for a Better Kind of Capitalism, WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/ 12/why-we-need-the-davos-manifesto-for-better-kind-of-capitalism/ [https:// perma.cc/J9AT-JB24] [“Since the 1970s, executive pay has skyrocketed, mostly to “align” management decision-making with shareholder interests. In the new stakeholder paradigm, salaries should instead align with the new measure of long-term shared value creation.”). 214 例如，见《为什么我们需要 "达沃斯宣言 "来实现更好的资本主义》，WORLD ECON.F.》（2019 年 12 月 1 日），https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/ 12/why-we-need-the-davos-manifesto-for-better-kind-of-capitalism/ [https:// perma.cc/J9AT-JB24] ["自 20 世纪 70 年代以来，高管薪酬一路飙升，主要是为了使管理层决策与股东利益 "保持一致"。在新的利益相关者范式中，薪酬应与长期共享价值创造这一新的衡量标准保持一致"）。
In a recent article, Leo Strine and Kirby Smite argue for a “reconceived compensation committee” that would “more rationally set top executive compensation and establish metrics for top management and key personnel involved in gatekeeping functions that are tied to good ESG practices and not just stock price.” See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing and a Quality Workplace for Employees: How a Reconcewed Compensation Committee Might Help Make Corporations More Responsible Employers and Restore Faith in American Capitalism, 76 Bus. Law. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1), https:// ssrn.com/abstract=3619273 [https://perma.cc/LHG7-6WFC]. However, Strine and Smith’s proposal would not address the problems discussed below and our concern that the use of stakeholder metrics would operate to increase executive payoffs and weaken the link between pay and performance while providing little material benefits to stakeholders. 在最近的一篇文章中，Leo Strine 和 Kirby Smite 主张成立一个 "重新构想的薪酬委员会"，"更合理地制定高层管理人员的薪酬，并为高层管理人员和参与把关的关键人员制定与良好的环境、社会和公司治理实践而不仅仅是股票价格挂钩的衡量标准"。见 Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing and a Quality Workplace for Employees：重构薪酬委员会如何帮助公司成为更负责任的雇主并恢复对美国资本主义的信心，76 Bus.Law.(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1), https:// ssrn.com/abstract=3619273 [https://perma.cc/LHG7-6WFC].然而，斯特林和史密斯的建议并不能解决下文讨论的问题，也不能解决我们所担心的问题，即利益相关者衡量标准的使用会增加高管薪酬，削弱薪酬与绩效之间的联系，同时给利益相关者带来的实质性利益很少。
215 For recent posts by compensation advisors discussing such redesign of pay arrangements, see, for example, Seymour Burchman, A New Framework for Executive Compensation, Harv. L. Sch. F. On Corp. Governance (Mar. 13, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/13/a-new-framework-for-executivecompensation/ [https://perma.cc/63NE-KFRY]; Don Delves & Ryan Resch, Stakeholder Capitalism and Executive Compensation, Harv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. Governance (Oct. 2, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/02/ stakeholder-capitalism-and-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/4C2FZS4X]. 215 关于薪酬顾问最近讨论重新设计薪酬安排的文章，见 Seymour Burchman, A New Framework for Executive Compensation, Harv.L. Sch. F. On Corp.F. On Corp.Governance (Mar. 13, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/13/a-new-framework-for-executivecompensation/ [https://perma.cc/63NE-KFRY]; Don Delves & Ryan Resch, Stakeholder Capitalism and Executive Compensation, Harv.L. SCH.F. ON CORP.Governance (Oct. 2, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/02/ stakeholder-capitalism-and-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/4C2FZS4X].
216 For a discussion of the complexities of such design, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1915, 1919 (2010). 216 关于这种设计的复杂性的讨论，参见 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. Pa.L. Rev. 1915, 1919 (2010)。
217 For an analysis of the different metrics used by public companies to measure corporate sustainability and the problem of their comparability, see U.S. 217 关于上市公司衡量企业可持续性所使用的不同指标及其可比性问题的分析，见美国。
Gov’t accountability Office, Disclosure of Environmental, Social, and Governance Factors and Options to Enhance Them (2020). 政府问责办公室，《环境、社会和治理因素的披露及加强这些因素的备选方案》（2020 年）。
218 For a discussion of the agency problems generally afflicting the setting of executive pay arrangements, see Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without PERFORMANCE 80-86 (2004). 218 关于一般影响高管薪酬安排的代理问题的讨论，见 Lucian Bebchuk 和 Jesse Fried, Pay Without PERFORMANCE 80-86 (2004)。
219 For a discussion of these two mandates, see Securities Act Release No. 9199, Exchange Act Release No. 64149, 76 Fed. Reg. 18966 (proposed April 6, 201 1); Securities Act Release No. 9330, Exchange Act Release No. 67220, 77 Fed. Reg. 38422 (June 27, 2012). 219 有关这两项规定的讨论，请参见《证券法》第 9199 号公告，《交易法》第 64149 号公告，76 Fed.18966 (proposed April 6, 201 1); Securities Act Release No.38422（2012 年 6 月 27 日）。
220 For discussions by supporters of stakeholderism accepting this premise, see, for example, Martin Lipton & William Savitt, Stakeholder Governance-Issues and Answers, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Oct. 25, 2019), https:// corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/25/stakeholder-governance-issues-and-answers/ [https://perma.cc/GJ67-ZVAP] (“Insightful commentators accurately emphasize that shareholders alone enjoy the corporate franchise, and with it the power to select directors.”). 220 关于接受这一前提的利益相关者主义支持者的讨论，参见 Martin Lipton & William Savitt, Stakeholder Governance-Issues and Answers, Harv.L. Sch.F. on Corp.Governance》（2019 年 10 月 25 日），https:// corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/25/stakeholder-governance-issues-and-answers/ [https://perma.cc/GJ67-ZVAP] （"有见地的评论者准确地强调，只有股东享有公司特许权，并随之享有选择董事的权力"）。
221 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). For discussion of this bill, see David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate Purpose, 74 Bus. Law. 659, 672-73 (2019); Elizabeth Warren, Compantes Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, Wall St. J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 221 责任资本主义法案，S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018)。关于该法案的讨论，见 David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of Corporate Purpose, 74 Bus.Law.659, 672-73 (2019); Elizabeth Warren, Compantes Shouldn't Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, Wall St. J. (Aug. 14, 2018、
224 Earlier work by one of us challenges the use of “short-termism” arguments to support insulation of corporate leaders form market pressures and the claim that such insulation would serve the long-term interests of shareholders. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013). Here our concern is different-that 224 我们其中一人早先的研究对使用 "短期主义 "论据来支持公司领导人与市场压力绝缘，并声称这种绝缘符合股东的长期利益提出了质疑。参见 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum.L. Rev. 1637 (2013)。在此，我们的关注点有所不同--即
stakeholderism is used to support the insulation of corporate leaders in the name of stakeholders. 利益相关者主义被用来支持企业领导人以利益相关者的名义进行绝缘。
225 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 225 见前注 36-37 和附文。
226 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 102 (1979); Martin Lipton, Twenty-Fwe Years after Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: Old Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing War, 60 Bus. Law. 1369 (2005) (arguing that directors should have the power to reject a premium takeover because of the effects on the company’s employees, communities, 226 例如，参见 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.101, 102 (1979); Martin Lipton, Twenty-Fwe Years after Takeover Birds of the Boardroom, 35 Bus.101, 102 (1979); Martin Lipton, Twenty-Fwe Years after Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom：Old Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing War, 60 Bus.Law.1369 (2005)（认为董事应有权拒绝溢价收购，因为这会对公司员工、社区造成影响、
and other constituencies); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Guinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Ch. L. Rev. 187, 227-28 (1991) (“The quinquennial system would benefit the corporation’s other constituencles, which prosper if the enterprise’s business operations prosper over the long term.”); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. Law. 67, 67-68 (2003) (arguing that shareholders are one of many constituencies that invest in the corporation and that their powers should be balanced against the goal of board independence for the benefit of all stakeholders); Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 Va. L. Rev 733, 744-45 (2007) (opposing proposals to strengthen shareholder power to replace directors on the grounds that, among other things, doing so would have an adverse impact on stakeholders). 和其他选民）；Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance：The Guinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Ch. L. Rev. 187, 227-28 (1991) ("The quinquennial system would benefit the corporation's other constituencles, which prosper if the enterprise's business operations prosper over the long term."); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company's Proxy：An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus.Law.67, 67-68 (2003)（认为股东是投资于公司的众多支持者之一，他们的权力应与董事会的独立性目标相平衡，以维护所有利益相关者的利益）；马丁-利普顿和威廉-萨维特，《卢西安-贝布丘克的诸多神话》，93 Va. L. Rev 733, 744 (2003)（认为股东是投资于公司的众多支持者之一，他们的权力应与董事会的独立性目标相平衡，以维护所有利益相关者的利益）。L. Rev 733, 744-45 (2007)（反对加强股东更换董事权力的提案，理由之一是这样做会对利益相关者产生不利影响）。
227 For evidence on the growth and current high incidence of activist interventions, see, for example, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1100 (2015); Melissa Sawyer, Annual Review and Analysis of 2019 U.S. Shareholder Activism, supra note 171 . For a well-known discussion of the “alliance” between hedge fund activists and other institutional investors, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013). 227 关于激进主义干预的增长和当前高发生率的证据，参见 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum.L. Rev. 1085, 1100 (2015); Melissa Sawyer, Annual Review and Analysis of 2019 U.S. Shareholder Activism, supra note 171.关于对冲基金激进主义者与其他机构投资者之间 "联盟 "的著名讨论，见 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism：Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum.L. Rev. 863 (2013)。
228 Joshua Bolten, A Good Year for Stakeholder Capitalism, Wall St. J. (Aug. 18, 2020, 7:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-good-year-for-stakeholder-capitalism-11597792536 [https://perma.cc/AX8M-WQK7].
229 S. 1744, 115th Congress (2017).
232 See supra section IV.D.1. 232 见上文第 IV.D.1 节。
233 For recent discussions of such societal problems and negative externalities, see, for example, the papers presented at the conference A New Deal for this 233 有关此类社会问题和负外部性的近期讨论，请参见在 "本组织的新政 "会议上提交的论文。
243 For other discussions expressing concerns that support for stakeholderism may impede legal reforms that could protect stakeholders or give them means to more effectively protect themselves, see, for example, Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My Hometown, 33 Oxford Rev. ECON Pol’y 176, 177 (2017). 243 关于对利益相关者主义的支持可能会阻碍保护利益相关者或赋予他们更有效保护自己的手段的法律改革的担忧的其他讨论，参见 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My Hometown, 33 Oxford Rev. ECON Pol'y 176, 177 (2017)。
244 See CDP North America, Inc. (for the tax year ending on Mar. 31, 2019); Ceres, Inc., Form 990 (for the tax year ending on Oct. 31, 2018); Conservation International Foundation, Form 990 (for the tax year ending on Jun. 30, 2019); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., Form 990 (for the tax year ending on Sept. 30, 2018); World Wildlife Fund, Inc., Form 990 (for the tax year ending Jun. 30, 2019). 244 见 CDP North America, Inc.（截至 2019 年 3 月 31 日的纳税年度）；Ceres, Inc.，990 表格（截至 2018 年 10 月 31 日的纳税年度）；Conservation International Foundation，990 表格（截至 2019 年 6 月 30 日的纳税年度）；Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.，990 表格（截至 2018 年 9 月 30 日的纳税年度）；World Wildlife Fund, Inc.，990 表格（截至 2019 年 6 月 30 日的纳税年度）。
245 In a post published in response to an earlier version of this Article, Martin Lipton and coauthors stated that “new laws . . . are . . . unnecessary if companies and investors embrace stakeholder capitalism.” Martin Lipton et al., Professor Bebchuk’s Errant Attack on Stakeholder Governance, Harv. L. SCH. F. on Corp. GOvernance (Mar. 4, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/04/pro-fessor-bebchuks-errant-attack-on-stakeholder-governance/ [https://perma.cc/ BM2Y-WBUW]. 245 马丁-利普顿和合著者在一篇回应本文早期版本的文章中指出，"如果公司和投资者接受利益相关者资本主义，新法律......是......不必要的"。Martin Lipton et al., Professor Bebchuk's Errant Attack on Stakeholder Governance, Harv.L. SCH.F. on Corp.GOvernance》（2020 年 3 月 4 日），https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/04/pro-fessor-bebchuks-errant-attack-on-stakeholder-governance/ [https://perma.cc/ BM2Y-WBUW]。
246 Strine, Restoration, supra note 20, at 4-5. 246 Strine，《恢复》，前注 20，第 4-5 页。
247 For an analysis of the relevance for discussion of corporate social responsibility and of government’s failure to address corporate externalities, see Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 Economica 1, 2 (2010). 247 关于讨论企业社会责任和政府未能解决企业外部性问题的相关性分析，见 Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 Economica 1, 2 (2010)。
248 Mayer Response, supra note 13, at 9. 248 梅尔回应，前注 13，第 9 页。
249 Examples of such reforms adopted in the past decade include the Obama Administration’s adoption of regulations to constrain emissions by new and existing plants, and the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Power Sector Carbon Emission Standards for EPA, 3 C.F.R. 404-05 (2013); Consumer Financial Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §$5481-5603\S \$ 5481-5603 (2010). The platform of the incoming Biden Administration includes an ambitious plan to address climate change, see https://joebiden. com/climate-plan/ [https://perma.cc/XAA7-VED6]. Our analysis suggests that the scale of reforms that the Biden administration would actually adopt would substantially depend on the extent to which public officials, activists, the media, and public opinion would expect corporate leaders to act on their own to substantially reduce their companies’ contribution to climate change. 249 过去十年中通过的此类改革的例子包括奥巴马政府通过法规限制新工厂和现有工厂的排放，以及成立消费者金融保护局。参见《巴拉克-奥巴马总统就电力行业碳排放标准给环保局的备忘录》，3 C.F.R. 404-05 (2013)；《消费者金融保护法》，12 U.S.C. §$5481-5603\S \$ 5481-5603 (2010)。即将上任的拜登政府的政纲包括一项应对气候变化的雄心勃勃的计划，参见https://joebiden. com/climate-plan/ [https://perma.cc/XAA7-VED6] 。我们的分析表明，拜登政府实际采取的改革规模将在很大程度上取决于政府官员、活动家、媒体和公众舆论在多大程度上期望企业领导人自行采取行动，以大幅减少其公司对气候变化的影响。
250 Andrew Johnston et al., CORPORATE GOVERNance for Sustainability StateMENT (2019). 250 Andrew Johnston et al., CORPORATE GOVERNance for Sustainability StateMENT (2019)。