5 January 2025 | 10:14PM HKT
5 一月 2025 |香港时间晚上 10：14
5 一月 2025 |香港时间晚上 10：14
Research | Economics |
研究 |经济学 | 人
研究 |经济学 | 人
We wish our readers a happy and healthy new year. In our first Asia Economics Analyst of the year, we offer our answers to ten economic and market questions for the Asia-Pacific region and individual countries in 2025. We also review our questions and answers from one year ago.
我们祝愿我们的读者新年快乐、身体健康。作为我们首届年度亚洲经济分析师，我们回答了 2025 年亚太地区和各个国家的 10 个经济和市场问题。我们还回顾了一年前的问题和答案。Potential US tariffs are a major external uncertainty for the year ahead; we expect China to face a material increase in the US tariff rate, with Vietnam also at significant risk. Partly for this reason, and partly because real income growth should improve in DMs, we expect moderately slower growth in China and relatively better growth performance in Japan and ANZ this year than last.
美国的潜在关税是未来一年的主要外部不确定性;我们预计中国将面临美国关税税率的大幅上调，越南也将面临重大风险。部分原因是这个原因，部分是因为发达市场的实际收入增长应该会有所改善，我们预计今年中国的增长将适度放缓，而日本和澳新银行的增长表现将相对好于去年。We expect policymakers to cut interest rates across the vast majority of Asian economies in 2025. The key exception will remain Japan, where we expect reflation to be sustained this year and rate hikes to continue.
我们预计绝大多数亚洲经济体的政策制定者将在 2025 年降息。关键的例外仍然是日本，我们预计日本今年将维持再通胀，并继续加息。In China, we do not expect a nationwide bottom in housing activity or prices. With a more challenging export environment, we expect the augmented fiscal deficit (and our broader China macro policy proxy) to ease materially, with a modestly greater tilt towards consumption-oriented policies.
在中国，我们预计住房活动或价格不会在全国范围内触底。随着出口环境更具挑战性，我们预计扩大的财政赤字（以及我们更广泛的中国宏观政策指标）将大幅缓解，并适度地向消费导向型政策倾斜。India's growth has slowed but should improve somewhat later in 2025. The Indian rupee remains our favored high-carry currency in the region.
印度的增长有所放缓，但到 2025 年晚些时候应该会有所改善。印度卢比仍然是我们在该地区青睐的高利差货币。While the majority of our answers from a year ago worked out broadly as anticipated, the BOJ began normalizing policy faster than we expected, the Korean won substantially underperformed our expectations (in part due to the political turmoil in recent weeks), and China's current account surplus expanded even further.
虽然我们一年前的大部分回答都符合预期，但日本央行开始正常化政策的速度比我们预期的要快，韩元的表现远低于我们的预期（部分原因是最近几周的政治动荡），中国的经常账户盈余进一步扩大。
Questions for 2025 2025 年问题
In our first Asia Economics Analyst of the year, we offer our answers to ten economic and market questions for the Asia-Pacific region and individual countries in 2025. These highlight some of our key macroeconomic views—for more detail on our outlooks across the region and globally, please see the 2025 outlook page on our research portal.
作为我们首届年度亚洲经济分析师，我们回答了 2025 年亚太地区和各个国家的 10 个经济和市场问题。这些观点突出了我们的一些主要宏观经济观点——有关我们在该地区和全球的展望的更多详细信息，请参阅我们研究门户网站上的 2025 年展望页面。
1. Can Japan’s reflation be sustained?
1. 日本的再通胀能否持续？
Yes. We expect CPI and core CPI inflation of 2.2% yoy for 2025 as a whole, down slightly from 2024 levels (2.5%/2.4% respectively for headline and core CPI) but still above the Bank of Japan's policy target. Importantly, wage growth and key service price measures are also running in the 2-3% range (Exhibit 1). This should enable the BOJ to lift rates further (we expect two hikes of 25bp each in 2025).
是的。我们预计 2025 年全年 CPI 和核心 CPI 通胀率同比为 2.2%，略低于 2024 年的水平（整体和核心 CPI 分别为 2.5%/2.4%），但仍高于日本央行的政策目标。重要的是，工资增长和关键服务价格指标也在 2-3% 的范围内运行（图 1）。这应该使日本央行能够进一步加息（我们预计 2025 年将加息两次，每次 25 个基点）。
At the conclusion of the most recent BOJ meeting on December 19, Governor Ueda said that the timing of the next rate hike would be based on information on the wage momentum for next year's shunto, the direction of the new US administration's economic policies, and various data. We maintain our base case scenario that the next rate hike will occur at the January 23-24 meeting, but there is a possibility (still low, in our view) of a delay to March or April.
在 12 月 19 日的日本央行最新会议结束时，植田行长表示，下一次加息的时间将基于明年 shunto 的工资势头、美国新政府经济政策的方向以及各种数据等信息。我们维持基本情景，即下一次加息将在 1 月 23 日至 24 日的会议上进行，但有可能（我们认为仍然很低）推迟到 3 月或 4 月。
2. Will China’s housing market bottom out in 2025?
2. 中国房地产市场会在 2025 年触底反弹吗？
Not across all indicators. While sales could stabilize (after falling more than 60% from the peak – see Exhibit 2), construction activity and prices seem likely to decline further. Housing starts are down ~70% from the peak 2020 level, but the level of construction activity has fallen only about 30% since then as pipelines of existing work are still being completed. Home prices have plunged (Exhibit 3). While they have shown some early hints of stabilization in top-tier cities owing to relatively better fundamentals and more room to relax purchase restrictions, we still expect home prices in the majority of the country to be net lower at the end of 2025.
并非在所有指标中。虽然销售额可能会稳定下来（从峰值下降 60% 以上 - 见图 2），但建筑活动和价格似乎可能会进一步下降。新屋开工率比 2020 年的峰值水平下降了 ~70%，但自那时以来，由于现有工程的管道仍在完成，建筑活动水平仅下降了约 30%。房价暴跌（图 3）。虽然由于基本面相对较好和放宽购买限制的空间更大，它们在一线城市显示出一些企稳的早期迹象，但我们仍然预计该国大部分地区的房价将在 2025 年底净跌。
3. Will interest rates fall further in China?
3. 中国的利率会进一步下降吗？
Yes. We continue to expect the main policy (7-day OMO) rate to be cut by 40bp this year, with the Politburo’s recent change to the official monetary policy stance to “moderately loose” reinforcing our confidence—and that of other analysts, as consensus views have moved towards our own. If anything, recent commentary suggests to us that risks may be skewed towards larger cuts. Government bond yields have moved materially lower (Exhibit 4). Despite the rally in bonds, we have maintained our recommendation to be long 5y CGBs, as we expect yields to make new lows in 2025.
是的。我们继续预计今年主要政策（7 天 OMO）利率将下调 40 个基点，政治局最近将官方货币政策立场更改为“适度宽松”，这增强了我们和其他分析师的信心，因为共识观点已转向我们自己的观点。如果有什么不同的话，最近的评论向我们表明，风险可能会偏向于更大规模的降息。政府债券收益率大幅走低（图 4）。尽管债券价格上涨，但我们维持做多 5 年期 CGB 的建议，因为我们预计收益率将在 2025 年创下新低。
4. Will China's government stimulate consumption more than in previous easing cycles?
Yes, but probably not dramatically so. At the recently completed Central Economic Work Conference, China's policymakers provided more detail on their recent pledges to "strongly boost consumption" (especially household consumption), "improve investment returns", and "comprehensively expand domestic demand". Specifically, they vowed to launch special actions to boost consumption (提振消费专项行动), facilitate income growth for low-income individuals, increase basic pensions and fiscal subsidies for health insurance, strengthen and expand the consumer goods trade-in and equipment upgrade programs (两新项目), among other actions. Among the key tasks for next year, policymakers put consumption as the top priority this time (up from the second-most-important task in the 2023 CEWC), ahead of high-tech manufacturing.
Analysts broadly expect the official fiscal deficit target to increase in 2025, with some media reports suggesting it could rise to 4% of GDP, from 3% in 2024. However, this is only a signal as to the direction of fiscal policy, with much of the action happening off-budget. We expect our calculation of the "augmented fiscal deficit" to rise to 13% of GDP in 2025, with risks skewed towards an even bigger fiscal push (Exhibit 5). While much of this could continue to be directed at local governments and various investment priorities, we do expect a greater portion than in the past to be earmarked for households—including but not limited to the expansion of the trade-in program. Leaving aside bank recapitalization and local governments buying back raw land, we could see the proportion of fiscal easing targeting broadly defined consumption (consumer goods trade-in, subsidies for families with multiple kids, increased pension and medical insurance) rise relative to investment ("new infrastructure" and urban infrastructure).
5. Can India see a revival in growth in 2025?
Yes, but for late 2024/early 2025 we remain below consensus. We expect the 5.4% yoy real GDP outturn in Q3 to mark the bottom for growth, with a gradual reacceleration to above 6% in 2025.
One reason why we are not overly concerned about the recent deceleration is that we believe policy tightening to have been an important contributor. Exhibit 6 shows that the fiscal deficit was materially lower over much of 2024—though the quarterly path is quite volatile, the net effect was a fiscal tightening. In addition, credit growth has decelerated modestly following regulatory measures by the RBI at the end of 2023.
6. Which Asian currencies will outperform in 2025?
We continue to like the INR as a high-carry currency. We believe Indian policymakers have a preference for currency stability (Exhibit 7), and significant buffers against external shocks. India faces relatively modest risks of US tariffs in our view. Also, notwithstanding the recent slowdown, India still ranks as one of the fastest-growing economies globally.
We expect the CNY to experience modest depreciation assuming US tariffs are imposed sometime in early 2025—our forecast for USDCNY is 7.50 at midyear. Among the lower-yielding currencies, we believe KRW has undershot fair value lately given heightened political turmoil and continued domestic demand weakness.
7. Which Asian economies will face new US tariffs in 2025?
China and possibly Vietnam. We and most others anticipate that the second Trump administration will impose additional tariffs on imports from China. Our assumption is that tariffs remain concentrated mainly on industrial products, as in the 2018-19 tariff war, with an average increase of 20pp. Beyond China, a range of other Asian economies run large trade surpluses with the US. Of these, Vietnam’s is the largest at approximately $100bn and growing, so in our view Vietnam is the next most likely to face US tariffs.
8. Will the RBA complete its pivot and cut rates in early 2025?
Yes. Since June 2024, we have forecasted that the Reserve Bank of Australia will commence an easing cycle in February 2025. In its December meeting, the RBA displayed a notable pivot in language that we think opens the door to a cut in the near future. After all, Australia's macro conditions are "not that different" to peer economies that have already begun cutting. Our rate strategists continue to recommend receiving Australia 2y IRS vs paying NZ 2y IRS.
9. How broadly will the rate cut cycle extend across Asia?
We expect the vast majority of Asia-Pacific central banks to cut rates in 2025. As Asia was farther from the epicenter of 2022's commodity shock, many countries operated with somewhat more excess capacity during the pandemic, and regional policymakers often regulated key energy prices, the inflation and rate spike in 2022-23 was less extreme in Asia than other regions. We therefore do not expect cutting cycles to be particularly deep—typically in the 50-100bp range (Exhibit 11). Domestic conditions favor easing by most Asian central banks in 2025, but USD strength and lack of clarity on the likely scope of US tariffs are constraints. We remain below consensus in our rate expectations in Korea, where recent political turmoil has added to what are already somewhat challenging domestic macro conditions. India has recently seen important changes at the top of the RBI, with Sanjay Malhotra replacing Shaktikanta Das as Governor and Deputy Governor Patra retiring this month; we think easing is likely to commence before the end of the quarter. We also hold an out-of-consensus view that Singapore's MAS will ease monetary policy parameters in April on the back of heightening trade tension and easing inflation (we forecast below-consensus headline CPI inflation). Growth in Thailand is likely to remain under pressure from household debt deleveraging and auto sector weakness in 2025, and at least another rate cut there seems more likely than not.
10. Will there be a rotation of growth within the region?
Yes. We expect growth to be more domestically driven, particularly in China/north Asia. This reflects several factors. First, on the export side, US tariffs present a risk to export growth—even if they don't occur, some "front-loading" of exports has already occurred with a likely payback in 2025. Second, as noted, domestic macro policies should ease in China and likely in Japan.
We also expect some rotation in growth from China to higher-income (Japan, Australia, NZ) economies—partly for the above reasons, but also because real income growth has lagged in the latter economies but is now improving on better wage settlements (Japan) and lower inflation (ANZ).
A brief recap of our questions and answers from 2024
While the majority of our questions and answers worked out broadly as anticipated, the BOJ began normalizing policy faster than we expected, the Korean won substantially underperformed our expectations (in part due to the political turmoil in recent weeks), and China's current account surplus expanded further.
1. How will economic growth shift around the region in 2024?
Our answer: Slower overall, including in Japan and China, but faster in many smaller export-oriented economies.
Verdict: Correct. On a full-year basis, growth slowed materially in Japan and slightly in China. It accelerated significantly in Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
2. Will the Bank of Japan exit negative policy rates (NIRP) in the first half of 2024?
Our answer: No.
Verdict: Incorrect. The BOJ exited negative rates and yield curve control in March, sooner than we had expected at the onset of the year.
3. Is the worst over for China property activity?
Our answer: Yes in terms of the pace of decline in sales and starts, no in terms of the level of construction activity or prices (the cumulative depth of the downturn).
Verdict: Correct. Sales and starts continued to decline, but less rapidly than in 2021-22. Construction activity and prices are clearly still falling.
4. Will China run even looser macro policy than 2023?
Our answer: Yes.
Verdict: Correct. Overall, our China domestic macro policy proxy eased moderately in 2024 vs 2023. Monetary policy eased, with 30bp of policy rate cuts. Credit policy did too, with lower RRR and mortgage rates. Housing restrictions were generally removed. Fiscal policy was an exception, with the augmented fiscal deficit actually smaller in 2024 (0.4pp as of this writing) than in 2023.
5. Will China lever up further in 2024?
Our answer: Yes.
Verdict: Correct. China’s debt-to-GDP ratio increased materially further, from 297% at end-2023 to our current estimate of 307%.
6. Where could high inflation remain a constraint on easing in 2024?
Our answer: We think inflation will remain relatively high in India and Philippines in EM, Australia and New Zealand in DM.
Verdict: Largely correct. India and Australia did not ease at all in 2024. The Philippines and NZ faced high inflation in H1, but began cutting in Q3 and have moved more expeditiously.
7. Which central bank(s) in the region could be the first to cut policy rates in 2024?
Our answer: South Korea and Indonesia.
Verdict: Partly correct. Indonesia was among the first in the region to cut in Q3 (China, Philippines, and NZ also cut that quarter). The Bank of Korea implemented its first cut in early October.
8. Where is fiscal policy most likely to turn more accommodative in 2024?
Our answer: Australia and Thailand.
Verdict: Correct. Australia swung from a fiscal surplus in 2023 to a small deficit in 2024, based on our latest estimates; Thailand's deficit also widened slightly. Korea and Indonesia were other economies where fiscal policy loosened, while budgets tightened in Japan, China (augmented basis), and India.
9. How will current accounts evolve in EM Asia?
Our answer: We expect a narrower surplus in China but wider deficits in India and Indonesia.
Verdict: Partly correct. Deficits in India and Indonesia widened slightly as we expected. But with strong exports and weak domestic demand, China’s surplus expanded from a downwardly-revised 1.4% of GDP in 2023 to an estimated 2.1% in 2024.
10. Which EM Asia currencies can outperform in 2024?
Our answer: We expect small open economy currencies, particularly the KRW, to outperform.
Verdict: Incorrect. Although some small economy currencies did indeed outperform (MYR, THB), the KRW weakened significantly on poor economic performance, rate cuts, and political volatility (Exhibit 7).
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