The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market
电力-碳市场协同作用下开放式创新项目中合作治理机制的选择
1
School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China
合肥工业大学管理学院，中国合肥 230009
合肥工业大学管理学院，中国合肥 230009
2
School of Public Affairs, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
中国科学技术大学公共事务学院，中国合肥 230026
中国科学技术大学公共事务学院，中国合肥 230026
3
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
中国科学技术大学管理学院，中国合肥 230026
中国科学技术大学管理学院，中国合肥 230026
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
通讯作者
通讯作者
Energies 2023, 16(17), 6110; https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110
能源 2023》，16（17），6110；https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110
能源 2023》，16（17），6110；https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110
Submission received: 1 June 2023
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Revised: 9 July 2023
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Accepted: 16 August 2023
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Published: 22 August 2023
收到投稿：2023 年 6 月 1 日 / 修订：2023 年 7 月 9 日 / 接受：2023 年 8 月 16 日 / 出版：2023 年 8 月 22 日2023 年 8 月 16 日 / 出版：2023 年 8 月 22 日
收到投稿：2023 年 6 月 1 日 / 修订：2023 年 7 月 9 日 / 接受：2023 年 8 月 16 日 / 出版：2023 年 8 月 22 日2023 年 8 月 16 日 / 出版：2023 年 8 月 22 日
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Extreme Climate, Electricity–Carbon Markets, and Digitalization)
(本文属于特刊《极端气候、电力-碳市场和数字化》）。
(本文属于特刊《极端气候、电力-碳市场和数字化》）。
Abstract 摘要
Improving the level of cooperative governance of open innovation projects is a key bridge and powerful starting point for promoting the full integration and coordinated development of different market systems. Against the background of the synergy of the electricity–carbon market, this study explores how a company chooses a cooperative governance mechanism and the implementation effects of governance mechanisms. The results, based on the sample data from 175 OIPs of companies in China, show that the collaborative dependence of a company promotes the implementation of relational governance; however, it has no significant effect on contract control. Meanwhile, both relational governance and contract control have significant positive effects on knowledge transfer and cooperative performance. Moreover, knowledge transfer plays a mediating role in relational governance, contract control, and cooperative performance. The conclusion enriches the understanding of cooperative governance mechanisms, which has important implications for management research and the practice of open innovation projects. It also has certain practical significance for helping the power industry to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality.
提高开放式创新项目的合作治理水平，是促进不同市场体系充分融合、协调发展的关键桥梁和有力抓手。本研究以电碳市场协同为背景，探讨了企业如何选择合作治理机制以及治理机制的实施效果。基于中国 175 家企业 OIP 的样本数据，研究结果表明，企业的协同依赖会促进关系治理的实施；但对合同控制的影响并不显著。同时，关系治理和契约控制对知识转移和合作绩效都有显著的正向影响。此外，知识转移在关系治理、合同控制和合作绩效中发挥着中介作用。结论丰富了对合作治理机制的认识，对开放式创新项目的管理研究和实践具有重要意义。对于帮助电力行业实现碳中和目标也具有一定的现实意义。
提高开放式创新项目的合作治理水平，是促进不同市场体系充分融合、协调发展的关键桥梁和有力抓手。本研究以电碳市场协同为背景，探讨了企业如何选择合作治理机制以及治理机制的实施效果。基于中国 175 家企业 OIP 的样本数据，研究结果表明，企业的协同依赖会促进关系治理的实施；但对合同控制的影响并不显著。同时，关系治理和契约控制对知识转移和合作绩效都有显著的正向影响。此外，知识转移在关系治理、合同控制和合作绩效中发挥着中介作用。结论丰富了对合作治理机制的认识，对开放式创新项目的管理研究和实践具有重要意义。对于帮助电力行业实现碳中和目标也具有一定的现实意义。
Keywords:
electricity–carbon markets; open innovation projects; cooperative dependence; relational governance; knowledge transfer关键词：电力-碳市场；开放式创新项目；合作依赖；关系治理；知识转移
1. Introduction 1.导言
Responding to the increasingly severe climate change crisis and achieving the goal of net-zero carbon emissions is the general consensus of major countries in the world [1]. About 70% of the world’s carbon emissions come from the energy sector, and electricity is the single largest carbon emitter sector in the energy sector, accounting for more than 40% of China’s total carbon emissions [2]. The achievement of the carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals of the power sector, as well as an effective and extensive carbon trading market, are crucial to achieving the overall goal [3]. The findings of Gurrib et al. support the fact that there is an increase in energy efficiency where policymakers in China, Europe, and Japan are placing more emphasis on higher energy standards in construction and encouraging, through government support, the adoption of cleaner technologies, such as electric heat pumps, in light of higher fuel prices restraining consumer purchasing power [4]. At present, both China’s carbon market and electricity market are in their infancy and seem to operate independently of each other, but they have a natural connection in terms of trading subjects, trading products, and price correlation, and as the coupling and coordinated development of the electricity and carbon markets has become an inevitable trend, all these relevant topics belong to academic frontier issues [5]. Based on this, promoting the governance level of open cooperative innovation projects under the electricity–carbon market is a key bridge and a powerful starting point for promoting the full integration and coordinated development of different market systems, and it is also an important starting point for deepening the reform of the electricity market and realizing the “dual carbon” goal.
应对日益严峻的气候变化危机，实现碳净零排放目标是世界主要国家的普遍共识[1]。全球约 70% 的碳排放来自能源领域，而电力是能源领域最大的碳排放行业，占中国碳排放总量的 40% 以上[2]。实现电力行业的碳峰值和碳中和目标，以及有效和广泛的碳交易市场，是实现总体目标的关键[3]。Gurrib 等人的研究结果表明，由于燃料价格上涨抑制了消费者的购买力，中国、欧洲和日本的政策制定者更加重视提高建筑节能标准，并通过政府支持鼓励采用清洁技术，如电热泵，从而提高了能源效率[4]。目前，我国碳市场和电力市场都处于起步阶段，看似各自独立运行，但在交易主体、交易产品、价格关联等方面却有着天然的联系，电力市场和碳市场的耦合协调发展已成为必然趋势，这些相关课题都属于学术前沿问题[5]。基于此，提升电碳市场下开放式协同创新项目的治理水平，是促进不同市场体系全面融合、协调发展的关键桥梁和有力抓手，也是深化电力市场改革、实现 "双碳 "目标的重要切入点。
应对日益严峻的气候变化危机，实现碳净零排放目标是世界主要国家的普遍共识[1]。全球约 70% 的碳排放来自能源领域，而电力是能源领域最大的碳排放行业，占中国碳排放总量的 40% 以上[2]。实现电力行业的碳峰值和碳中和目标，以及有效和广泛的碳交易市场，是实现总体目标的关键[3]。Gurrib 等人的研究结果表明，由于燃料价格上涨抑制了消费者的购买力，中国、欧洲和日本的政策制定者更加重视提高建筑节能标准，并通过政府支持鼓励采用清洁技术，如电热泵，从而提高了能源效率[4]。目前，我国碳市场和电力市场都处于起步阶段，看似各自独立运行，但在交易主体、交易产品、价格关联等方面却有着天然的联系，电力市场和碳市场的耦合协调发展已成为必然趋势，这些相关课题都属于学术前沿问题[5]。基于此，提升电碳市场下开放式协同创新项目的治理水平，是促进不同市场体系全面融合、协调发展的关键桥梁和有力抓手，也是深化电力市场改革、实现 "双碳 "目标的重要切入点。
In the context of the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, the electricity industry has widely adopted open innovation projects for external cooperation to gain competitive advantages. For example, as early as 2016, the Beijing Environment Exchange and Shangneng Power Group jointly created the “Electric Carbon Treasure” product, and as recently as early 2022, Hubei province signed China’s first “Framework Agreement on Coordinated Development and Cooperation of Electricity–Carbon Market” to promote the coordinated development of the carbon market and the electricity market. Meanwhile, under the pressure of a highly competitive environment, more and more enterprises are choosing to cross organizational boundaries and integrate external knowledge and capabilities with the help of open innovation. Research shows that research and development (R&D) collaboration can effectively improve innovation performance [6,7,8,9,10]. Specifically, open innovation takes the project as the carrier, and the project is carried out by the cooperation of a focal company and partners using cross-organizational cooperation teams. Therefore, Chesbrough et al. proposed exploring open innovation at the level of R&D projects [11].
在电碳市场协同发展的背景下，电力行业广泛采用开放式创新项目开展对外合作，以获取竞争优势。例如，早在2016年，北京环境交易所就与上能电力集团联合打造了 "电碳宝 "产品，而就在2022年初，湖北省签署了我国首个《电力-碳市场协调发展合作框架协议》，推动碳市场与电力市场协调发展。同时，在激烈的竞争环境压力下，越来越多的企业选择跨越组织边界，借助开放式创新整合外部知识和能力。研究表明，研发（R&D）合作能有效提高创新绩效[6, 7, 8, 9, 10]。具体来说，开放式创新是以项目为载体，由重点企业与合作伙伴利用跨组织合作团队合作开展项目。因此，Chesbrough 等人提出在研发项目层面探索开放式创新[11]。
在电碳市场协同发展的背景下，电力行业广泛采用开放式创新项目开展对外合作，以获取竞争优势。例如，早在2016年，北京环境交易所就与上能电力集团联合打造了 "电碳宝 "产品，而就在2022年初，湖北省签署了我国首个《电力-碳市场协调发展合作框架协议》，推动碳市场与电力市场协调发展。同时，在激烈的竞争环境压力下，越来越多的企业选择跨越组织边界，借助开放式创新整合外部知识和能力。研究表明，研发（R&D）合作能有效提高创新绩效[6, 7, 8, 9, 10]。具体来说，开放式创新是以项目为载体，由重点企业与合作伙伴利用跨组织合作团队合作开展项目。因此，Chesbrough 等人提出在研发项目层面探索开放式创新[11]。
In the context of the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, governance mechanisms are an effective way for companies to deal with cooperation issues and prevent opportunistic risks [12,13]. In cross-organizational relationships, organizations manage cooperative activities through contract control and relationship governance, and some studies have proven that governance mechanisms significantly impact operational performance and customer satisfaction in supplier relationship studies [14]. However, governance mechanisms are still relatively insufficient according to open innovation project management research. Previous studies have only considered the effect and choice of governance mechanism from a single perspective of the focal company or the cooperative partners. For example, Bosch-Sijtsema and Postma believe that the cooperation purpose of focal companies (strategic cooperation or short-term cooperation) affects the choice of governance mechanism [12], and Wu et al. believe that enterprise resource input (specific assets) affects the implementation and effect of the governance mechanism [15]. Clauss and Kesting took cooperative instruction in industry–university–research cooperation as the research object and verified that the governance mechanism has a significant impact on knowledge integration, learning, and creation [16]. However, few studies have considered the potential role of partnership, and Chesbrough et al. proposed that partnership was an important factor in project-level studies of open innovation [11].
在电力-碳市场协调发展的背景下，治理机制是企业处理合作问题、防范机会主义风险的有效途径[12, 13]。在跨组织关系中，组织通过合同控制和关系治理来管理合作活动，有研究证明，在供应商关系研究中，治理机制对运营绩效和客户满意度有显著影响[14]。然而，在开放式创新项目管理研究中，治理机制的研究还相对不足。以往的研究仅从焦点公司或合作伙伴的单一角度考虑治理机制的效果和选择。例如，Bosch-Sijtsema 和 Postma 认为焦点企业的合作目的（战略合作或短期合作）会影响治理机制的选择[12]，Wu 等人认为企业资源投入（特定资产）会影响治理机制的实施和效果[15]。Clauss 和 Kesting 以产学研合作中的合作教学为研究对象，验证了治理机制对知识整合、学习和创造具有重要影响[16]。然而，很少有研究考虑合作伙伴关系的潜在作用，Chesbrough 等人提出，合作伙伴关系是开放式创新项目研究中的一个重要因素[11]。
在电力-碳市场协调发展的背景下，治理机制是企业处理合作问题、防范机会主义风险的有效途径[12, 13]。在跨组织关系中，组织通过合同控制和关系治理来管理合作活动，有研究证明，在供应商关系研究中，治理机制对运营绩效和客户满意度有显著影响[14]。然而，在开放式创新项目管理研究中，治理机制的研究还相对不足。以往的研究仅从焦点公司或合作伙伴的单一角度考虑治理机制的效果和选择。例如，Bosch-Sijtsema 和 Postma 认为焦点企业的合作目的（战略合作或短期合作）会影响治理机制的选择[12]，Wu 等人认为企业资源投入（特定资产）会影响治理机制的实施和效果[15]。Clauss 和 Kesting 以产学研合作中的合作教学为研究对象，验证了治理机制对知识整合、学习和创造具有重要影响[16]。然而，很少有研究考虑合作伙伴关系的潜在作用，Chesbrough 等人提出，合作伙伴关系是开放式创新项目研究中的一个重要因素[11]。
In open innovation projects (OIPs), the goal realization of the focal company depends on the knowledge and ability of the partners, and the partners need to create and share relevant knowledge in the process of cooperation, which makes the focal company and the cooperative partners form a relationship with a certain degree of cooperative dependence. Thompson pointed out, using organization theory, that organizations adopt specific ways to manage their dependence on the environment [17]. When the focal company has different degrees of cooperation dependence, it will have different rights and attitudes towards the cooperative partners, and these rebound to affect the governance mechanism of the focal company. At the same time, the governance mechanism is an important tool for the focal company to manage cooperative dependencies, and it will directly affect the process and results of cooperation [14,18]. First of all, knowledge transfer is the process of the cooperation dependence of the focal company, which acquires external knowledge through knowledge transfer [19]. This forms a process dependent on the cooperative partners and requires corresponding governance measures. Secondly, knowledge transfer is conducive to internal and external knowledge fusion and innovation, thus promoting the achievement of the cooperation goals. Therefore, from the perspective of cooperative dependence, this study explores how the focal company chooses an optimal governance mechanism in open innovation projects, and what influence the governance mechanism has on knowledge transfer and cooperative performance.
在开放式创新项目（OIPs）中，焦点企业的目标实现依赖于合作伙伴的知识和能力，合作伙伴需要在合作过程中创造和分享相关知识，这使得焦点企业与合作伙伴之间形成了一定程度的合作依赖关系。汤普森（Thompson）运用组织理论指出，组织会采取特定的方式来管理其对环境的依赖[17]。当焦点企业具有不同程度的合作依赖性时，它对合作伙伴的权利和态度也会不同，这些反弹会影响焦点企业的治理机制。同时，治理机制是焦点企业管理合作依赖关系的重要工具，它将直接影响合作的过程和结果[14, 18]。首先，知识转移是焦点公司的合作依赖过程，焦点公司通过知识转移获取外部知识[19]。这就形成了一个依赖于合作伙伴的过程，需要采取相应的管理措施。其次，知识转移有利于内外部知识的融合与创新，从而促进合作目标的实现。因此，本研究从合作依赖的角度出发，探讨焦点企业在开放式创新项目中如何选择最优治理机制，以及治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效有何影响。
在开放式创新项目（OIPs）中，焦点企业的目标实现依赖于合作伙伴的知识和能力，合作伙伴需要在合作过程中创造和分享相关知识，这使得焦点企业与合作伙伴之间形成了一定程度的合作依赖关系。汤普森（Thompson）运用组织理论指出，组织会采取特定的方式来管理其对环境的依赖[17]。当焦点企业具有不同程度的合作依赖性时，它对合作伙伴的权利和态度也会不同，这些反弹会影响焦点企业的治理机制。同时，治理机制是焦点企业管理合作依赖关系的重要工具，它将直接影响合作的过程和结果[14, 18]。首先，知识转移是焦点公司的合作依赖过程，焦点公司通过知识转移获取外部知识[19]。这就形成了一个依赖于合作伙伴的过程，需要采取相应的管理措施。其次，知识转移有利于内外部知识的融合与创新，从而促进合作目标的实现。因此，本研究从合作依赖的角度出发，探讨焦点企业在开放式创新项目中如何选择最优治理机制，以及治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效有何影响。
Under the background of dual carbon target constraints and the accelerated construction of a new power system, the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market has become an inevitable trend. After combing the literature, the current research on the electricity–carbon market has accumulated results in Western countries. However, China’s research on the electricity–carbon market is still in its infancy, mostly based on theoretical analysis and lack of systematic consideration. In terms of research content, the current research focuses on the following aspects: research on the coupling and coordinated development mechanism of electricity market and carbon market [20,21]; research on the formation mechanism of electricity comprehensive cost under the synergy of electricity–carbon market [22,23,24]; research on the joint operation mechanism under the coordination of electricity market and carbon market [25,26]. However, relevant research on cooperative innovation under the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market is relatively rare. Recent studies, such as Sun et al., began to discuss the noncooperative game equilibrium analysis of the electricity–carbon market, and provided suggestions for the mechanism construction of the electricity market and the carbon emission rights market based on the conclusions obtained [27]. Therefore, the research in this paper is helpful to enrich the research perspective and research content under the synergy of the electricity–carbon market.
在双重碳目标约束和新型电力体制加快建设的背景下，电力-碳市场协调发展已成为必然趋势。经过文献梳理，目前关于电力-碳市场的研究在西方国家已经积累了一定的成果。但我国对电力-碳市场的研究尚处于起步阶段，多以理论分析为主，缺乏系统性思考。从研究内容来看，目前的研究主要集中在以下几个方面：电力市场与碳市场耦合协调发展机制研究[20, 21]；电力-碳市场协同下的电力综合成本形成机制研究[22, 23, 24]；电力市场与碳市场协同下的联合运行机制研究[25, 26]。然而，关于电碳市场协调发展下协同创新的相关研究却相对较少。近期的研究，如孙文等人开始探讨电力-碳市场的非合作博弈均衡分析，并根据所得结论为电力市场和碳排放权市场的机制构建提供了建议[27]。因此，本文的研究有助于丰富电力-碳市场协同作用下的研究视角和研究内容。
在双重碳目标约束和新型电力体制加快建设的背景下，电力-碳市场协调发展已成为必然趋势。经过文献梳理，目前关于电力-碳市场的研究在西方国家已经积累了一定的成果。但我国对电力-碳市场的研究尚处于起步阶段，多以理论分析为主，缺乏系统性思考。从研究内容来看，目前的研究主要集中在以下几个方面：电力市场与碳市场耦合协调发展机制研究[20, 21]；电力-碳市场协同下的电力综合成本形成机制研究[22, 23, 24]；电力市场与碳市场协同下的联合运行机制研究[25, 26]。然而，关于电碳市场协调发展下协同创新的相关研究却相对较少。近期的研究，如孙文等人开始探讨电力-碳市场的非合作博弈均衡分析，并根据所得结论为电力市场和碳排放权市场的机制构建提供了建议[27]。因此，本文的研究有助于丰富电力-碳市场协同作用下的研究视角和研究内容。
Based on the points mentioned above, against the background of coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, by establishing a theoretical model and conducting an empirical analysis of 175 OIPs, this paper makes several contributions to the study of open innovation project management. First, it finds the basis for the selection of cooperative governance mechanism, among which the focal company cooperation dependence positively impacts the implementation of relationship governance. In contrast, contract control is more independent and not affected by cooperative dependencies. Second, this study proves that the governance mechanism positively impacts knowledge transfer and cooperation performance, indicating that the governance mechanism is an important guarantee to achieve cooperation goals. Third, this work reveals that knowledge transfer is an important process objective of governance mechanism; that is, knowledge transfer plays a significant mediating role in the governance mechanism and cooperation performance. Therefore, the research results of this paper have important practical significance for the management of open innovation projects; they are also of certain practical significance for promoting the power industry to achieve the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutrality.
基于上述观点，在电碳市场协调发展的背景下，本文通过建立理论模型并对 175 个开放式创新项目进行实证分析，为开放式创新项目管理研究做出了几点贡献。首先，本文找到了合作治理机制的选择依据，其中焦点企业合作依赖性对关系治理的实施有积极影响。相比之下，合同控制更具独立性，不受合作依赖的影响。其次，本研究证明了治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效的正向影响，表明治理机制是实现合作目标的重要保障。第三，本研究揭示了知识转移是治理机制的重要过程目标，即知识转移在治理机制与合作绩效中起着重要的中介作用。因此，本文的研究成果对开放式创新项目的管理具有重要的现实意义；对促进电力行业实现碳峰值和碳中和目标也具有一定的现实意义。
基于上述观点，在电碳市场协调发展的背景下，本文通过建立理论模型并对 175 个开放式创新项目进行实证分析，为开放式创新项目管理研究做出了几点贡献。首先，本文找到了合作治理机制的选择依据，其中焦点企业合作依赖性对关系治理的实施有积极影响。相比之下，合同控制更具独立性，不受合作依赖的影响。其次，本研究证明了治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效的正向影响，表明治理机制是实现合作目标的重要保障。第三，本研究揭示了知识转移是治理机制的重要过程目标，即知识转移在治理机制与合作绩效中起着重要的中介作用。因此，本文的研究成果对开放式创新项目的管理具有重要的现实意义；对促进电力行业实现碳峰值和碳中和目标也具有一定的现实意义。
2. Concept Definition 2.概念定义
2.1. Cooperation Dependence
2.1.合作依赖性
Among organizations, dependency refers to the organization’s requirements for key resources and the alternatives to key resource providers [28,29]. The evaluation of interorganizational dependency involves aspects such as substitutability and the essentiality of related resources to the organization. Specifically, the dependence of Organization A on Organization B is proportional to the resources that B can provide to A, and inversely proportional to the number of other organizations that can provide the same resources to A. Meanwhile, the power dependence theory shows that there is a symbiotic relationship between dependence and rights. In the process of social exchange, the dependent organization B will have corresponding rights in relation to the dependent organization A [28]. OIPs are innovative activities between different organizations. Such a project is usually initiated by the focal company, and it carries out innovation project cooperation by selecting external partners, including consumers, suppliers, competitors, universities, and research institutions [30]. Based on the resource dependence theory, the cross-organizational relationship between the focal company and the cooperative partners in OIPs is interdependent on resources and capabilities. Therefore, this paper defines cooperative dependence as a state in which one partner cannot grasp all the conditions to achieve the expected innovation goals, forcing that party to depend on the resources and capabilities of the other party.
在组织间，依赖性指的是组织对关键资源的需求以及关键资源提供者的替代品[28, 29]。组织间依存度的评估涉及相关资源对组织的可替代性和不可或缺性等方面。具体来说，A 组织对 B 组织的依赖程度与 B 组织能为 A 组织提供的资源成正比，与能为 A 组织提供相同资源的其他组织数量成反比。同时，权力依赖理论表明，依赖与权利之间存在共生关系。在社会交换过程中，依附组织 B 相对于依附组织 A 会拥有相应的权利[28]。开放式创新项目是不同组织之间的创新活动。此类项目通常由重点企业发起，通过选择外部合作伙伴，包括消费者、供应商、竞争对手、大学和研究机构等，开展创新项目合作[30]。根据资源依赖理论，OIPs 中的焦点企业与合作伙伴之间的跨组织关系是资源与能力相互依赖的关系。因此，本文将合作依赖定义为：一方无法掌握实现预期创新目标的所有条件，迫使该方依赖另一方的资源和能力。
在组织间，依赖性指的是组织对关键资源的需求以及关键资源提供者的替代品[28, 29]。组织间依存度的评估涉及相关资源对组织的可替代性和不可或缺性等方面。具体来说，A 组织对 B 组织的依赖程度与 B 组织能为 A 组织提供的资源成正比，与能为 A 组织提供相同资源的其他组织数量成反比。同时，权力依赖理论表明，依赖与权利之间存在共生关系。在社会交换过程中，依附组织 B 相对于依附组织 A 会拥有相应的权利[28]。开放式创新项目是不同组织之间的创新活动。此类项目通常由重点企业发起，通过选择外部合作伙伴，包括消费者、供应商、竞争对手、大学和研究机构等，开展创新项目合作[30]。根据资源依赖理论，OIPs 中的焦点企业与合作伙伴之间的跨组织关系是资源与能力相互依赖的关系。因此，本文将合作依赖定义为：一方无法掌握实现预期创新目标的所有条件，迫使该方依赖另一方的资源和能力。
2.2. Governance Mechanism
2.2.管理机制
Governance is crucial to the stability of exchange relations [31]). Governance involves one organization influencing the behavior, process, and output of another organization through its power and mechanism [32]. Generally speaking, the adoption of a governance mechanism in a cooperative relationship contains two purposes: to control opportunistic behavior and to promote cooperative activities [33,34]. In cross-organization relationships, the governance mechanism usually includes formal contract control and informal relationship governance [16,35,36].
治理对于交换关系的稳定至关重要[31]）。治理涉及一个组织通过其权力和机制影响另一个组织的行为、过程和产出[32]。一般来说，在合作关系中采用治理机制有两个目的：控制机会主义行为和促进合作活动[33, 34]。在跨组织关系中，治理机制通常包括正式合同控制和非正式关系治理 [ 16, 35, 36]。
治理对于交换关系的稳定至关重要[31]）。治理涉及一个组织通过其权力和机制影响另一个组织的行为、过程和产出[32]。一般来说，在合作关系中采用治理机制有两个目的：控制机会主义行为和促进合作活动[33, 34]。在跨组织关系中，治理机制通常包括正式合同控制和非正式关系治理 [ 16, 35, 36]。
2.2.1. Contract Control 2.2.1.合同控制
Contract control originates from transaction cost theory [37]. According to the transaction cost theory, due to bounded rationality, organizations cannot accurately predict the future situation before the transaction, leading to the risk of opportunistic behavior in the transaction process [38]. Liu et al. points out that contract control governs cooperative relationships through legal regulations and incentive mechanisms, seeking to mitigate the uncertainty of cooperation and reduce opportunistic behaviors in the process of cooperation [39]. Specifically, the formal contract will clearly specify the transaction details, cooperation process, rights, and obligations of the parties, and way to deal with various potential problems. Therefore, the effect of contract control depends on the accurate definition and reasonable control of cooperation roles, cooperation processes, and performance requirements [34]. However, in reality, a contract cannot cover all potential situations that may occur in the future; it can only deal with issues and conflicts that are explicitly covered in the terms of the contract [14].
合同控制源于交易成本理论[ 37]。根据交易成本理论，由于有界理性，组织在交易前无法准确预测未来情况，导致交易过程中存在机会主义行为的风险[38]。Liu 等人指出，契约控制通过法律规定和激励机制来规范合作关系，力求缓解合作的不确定性，减少合作过程中的机会主义行为[39]。具体来说，正式合同会明确规定交易细节、合作流程、各方的权利和义务，以及处理各种潜在问题的方式。因此，合同控制的效果取决于对合作角色、合作流程和履约要求的准确界定和合理控制[34]。然而，在现实中，合同不可能涵盖未来可能发生的所有情况，它只能处理合同条款中明确涵盖的问题和冲突[14]。
合同控制源于交易成本理论[ 37]。根据交易成本理论，由于有界理性，组织在交易前无法准确预测未来情况，导致交易过程中存在机会主义行为的风险[38]。Liu 等人指出，契约控制通过法律规定和激励机制来规范合作关系，力求缓解合作的不确定性，减少合作过程中的机会主义行为[39]。具体来说，正式合同会明确规定交易细节、合作流程、各方的权利和义务，以及处理各种潜在问题的方式。因此，合同控制的效果取决于对合作角色、合作流程和履约要求的准确界定和合理控制[34]。然而，在现实中，合同不可能涵盖未来可能发生的所有情况，它只能处理合同条款中明确涵盖的问题和冲突[14]。
2.2.2. Relationship Governance
2.2.2.关系管理
Relationship governance originates from the social exchange theory. This type of governance pays great attention to personal factors in social exchange, involving trust, personal relationship, social identity, and mutual understanding [40,41,42,43,44]. Liu et al. point out that relationship governance emphasizes internal and moral control and effectively manages cooperative relationships by establishing consistent cooperative goals and a favorable cooperative atmosphere [39]. At the same time, relationship governance is characterized by frequent interpersonal interactions and is based on social relationship management of partners’ behaviors (e.g., informal personal communication) [14,41].
关系治理源于社会交换理论。这种治理方式非常重视社会交换中的个人因素，涉及信任、个人关系、社会认同和相互理解[40, 41, 42, 43, 44]。Liu 等人指出，关系治理强调内部控制和道德控制，通过建立一致的合作目标和良好的合作氛围来有效管理合作关系[39]。同时，关系治理以频繁的人际互动为特征，并以合作伙伴行为的社会关系管理（如非正式的个人交流）为基础[14, 41]。
关系治理源于社会交换理论。这种治理方式非常重视社会交换中的个人因素，涉及信任、个人关系、社会认同和相互理解[40, 41, 42, 43, 44]。Liu 等人指出，关系治理强调内部控制和道德控制，通过建立一致的合作目标和良好的合作氛围来有效管理合作关系[39]。同时，关系治理以频繁的人际互动为特征，并以合作伙伴行为的社会关系管理（如非正式的个人交流）为基础[14, 41]。
Previous studies show that trust and personal relationship formed based on relationship governance can effectively reduce opportunistic behaviors of partners [12,38]. Although relationship governance does not clearly stipulate what cooperative behaviors partners should take, trust can gradually improve partners’ sense of identity and make them commit more to the cooperative relationship [14]. On the one hand, it will make partners resist opportunism spontaneously; on the other hand, partners will also enhance their confidence in the reliability of cooperation and take the initiative to adopt “win–win” cooperation behaviors to promote the establishment of long-term cooperative relationships [18,42].
以往的研究表明，基于关系治理而形成的信任和个人关系可以有效减少合作伙伴的机会主义行为[12, 38]。虽然关系治理并没有明确规定合作伙伴应该采取什么样的合作行为，但信任可以逐步提高合作伙伴的认同感，使他们对合作关系做出更多承诺[14]。一方面，信任会使合作伙伴自发抵制机会主义；另一方面，合作伙伴也会增强对合作可靠性的信心，主动采取 "双赢 "合作行为，促进长期合作关系的建立[18，42]。
以往的研究表明，基于关系治理而形成的信任和个人关系可以有效减少合作伙伴的机会主义行为[12, 38]。虽然关系治理并没有明确规定合作伙伴应该采取什么样的合作行为，但信任可以逐步提高合作伙伴的认同感，使他们对合作关系做出更多承诺[14]。一方面，信任会使合作伙伴自发抵制机会主义；另一方面，合作伙伴也会增强对合作可靠性的信心，主动采取 "双赢 "合作行为，促进长期合作关系的建立[18，42]。
2.3. Knowledge Transfer 2.3.知识转让
Knowledge transfer is an important concept in the field of knowledge management. Liyanage et al. defined knowledge transfer as the process of conveying specific information from one person or organization to another [45]. In the process of knowledge transfer across organizations, Kumar and Ganesh pointed out that the knowledge-demanding side will purposefully accept and use the knowledge shared by the knowledge provider [46].
知识转移是知识管理领域的一个重要概念。Liyanage 等人将知识转移定义为将特定信息从一个人或组织传递给另一个人或组织的过程[45]。在跨组织的知识转移过程中，Kumar 和 Ganesh 指出，知识需求方会有目的地接受和使用知识提供方共享的知识[46]。
知识转移是知识管理领域的一个重要概念。Liyanage 等人将知识转移定义为将特定信息从一个人或组织传递给另一个人或组织的过程[45]。在跨组织的知识转移过程中，Kumar 和 Ganesh 指出，知识需求方会有目的地接受和使用知识提供方共享的知识[46]。
Open innovation project is a typical cross-organizational, knowledge-intensive activity. The focal company launches open innovation projects to solve innovation problems by using external knowledge [47]. Therefore, the realization of open innovation goals requires partners to transfer knowledge to the focal company.
开放式创新项目是一种典型的跨组织、知识密集型活动。重点公司发起开放式创新项目，利用外部知识解决创新问题[47]。因此，开放式创新目标的实现需要合作伙伴向重点公司转让知识。
开放式创新项目是一种典型的跨组织、知识密集型活动。重点公司发起开放式创新项目，利用外部知识解决创新问题[47]。因此，开放式创新目标的实现需要合作伙伴向重点公司转让知识。
3. Research Hypothesis 3.研究假设
3.1. Focal Company Cooperative Dependence and Governance Mechanism
3.1.重点公司的合作依托和治理机制
Chesbrough proposed that enterprises can make use of knowledge and technology outside the organization for innovation; that is, use open innovation [48]. Open innovation requires enterprises to choose external partners for innovation collaboration across organizational boundaries. Therefore, in the open innovation project, the realization of the innovation goal of the focal company depends on the knowledge and technology of the cooperative partner; thus, the focal company relies on their partners for cooperation.
切斯布劳（Chesbrough）提出，企业可以利用组织外的知识和技术进行创新，即采用开放式创新[48]。开放式创新要求企业选择外部合作伙伴进行跨组织边界的创新合作。因此，在开放式创新项目中，焦点企业创新目标的实现依赖于合作伙伴的知识和技术，因此焦点企业依赖于合作伙伴的合作。
切斯布劳（Chesbrough）提出，企业可以利用组织外的知识和技术进行创新，即采用开放式创新[48]。开放式创新要求企业选择外部合作伙伴进行跨组织边界的创新合作。因此，在开放式创新项目中，焦点企业创新目标的实现依赖于合作伙伴的知识和技术，因此焦点企业依赖于合作伙伴的合作。
Due to differences in internal conditions and cooperation needs of the focal company, the focal company shows different degrees of dependence in different cooperation projects. According to the power-dependence theory, dependence determines the distribution of power among organizations [28]. When the focal company relies more on cooperation, its power in the cooperative relationship is weaker, and the cooperative partners will have more power in the cooperative relationship. The increase of the power of partners will not only enhance their autonomy in the process of cooperation, but also make the focal company face greater opportunistic risks. Contract control is an effective measure to prevent opportunistic behavior in cooperative relations [39]. To protect their interests in the cooperation, the focal company in a weak position of power will clearly define the objectives, rights, and obligations of cooperation through the contract, and will strengthen the evaluation of cooperation in the process of cooperation.
由于重点企业内部条件和合作需求的差异，重点企业在不同的合作项目中表现出不同程度的依赖性。根据权力依赖理论，依赖性决定了组织间的权力分配[28]。当焦点公司对合作的依赖程度较高时，其在合作关系中的权力较弱，而合作伙伴在合作关系中的权力较高。合作伙伴权力的增加不仅会增强其在合作过程中的自主性，也会使焦点公司面临更大的机会主义风险。合同控制是防止合作关系中机会主义行为的有效措施[39]。为了保护自身在合作中的利益，处于弱势地位的焦点企业会通过合同明确合作的目标、权利和义务，并在合作过程中加强对合作的评估。
由于重点企业内部条件和合作需求的差异，重点企业在不同的合作项目中表现出不同程度的依赖性。根据权力依赖理论，依赖性决定了组织间的权力分配[28]。当焦点公司对合作的依赖程度较高时，其在合作关系中的权力较弱，而合作伙伴在合作关系中的权力较高。合作伙伴权力的增加不仅会增强其在合作过程中的自主性，也会使焦点公司面临更大的机会主义风险。合同控制是防止合作关系中机会主义行为的有效措施[39]。为了保护自身在合作中的利益，处于弱势地位的焦点企业会通过合同明确合作的目标、权利和义务，并在合作过程中加强对合作的评估。
Sako and Helper pointed out that dependence strengthens partnerships [49]. According to the resource dependence theory, the focal company has a cooperative dependence on the partners, indicating that the partners constitute key resources for the success of innovative projects, and the partners are irreplaceable. This requires the focal company to strengthen its ties with the cooperative partner and adopt positive governance methods to promote the establishment of cooperative trust between the two sides to ensure that the focal company can effectively use the key resources of the cooperative partner. At the same time, Rusbult et al. pointed out that a company’s dependence on partners leads to a commitment to partnerships [50]. In the innovative cooperative relationship, the cooperation dependence of the focal company will also strengthen its attention to the cooperative relationship, and the focal company will devote itself to establishing a long-term cooperative relationship with the cooperative partner.
Sako 和 Helper 指出，依赖会加强伙伴关系[49]。根据资源依赖理论，重点企业对合作伙伴具有合作依赖性，说明合作伙伴是创新项目成功的关键资源，合作伙伴具有不可替代性。这就要求焦点企业加强与合作方的联系，采取积极的治理方式，促进双方合作信任的建立，确保焦点企业能够有效利用合作方的关键资源。同时，Rusbult 等人指出，公司对合作伙伴的依赖会导致对合作伙伴关系的承诺[ 50]。在创新合作关系中，焦点公司的合作依赖性也会加强其对合作关系的关注，焦点公司会致力于与合作伙伴建立长期的合作关系。
Sako 和 Helper 指出，依赖会加强伙伴关系[49]。根据资源依赖理论，重点企业对合作伙伴具有合作依赖性，说明合作伙伴是创新项目成功的关键资源，合作伙伴具有不可替代性。这就要求焦点企业加强与合作方的联系，采取积极的治理方式，促进双方合作信任的建立，确保焦点企业能够有效利用合作方的关键资源。同时，Rusbult 等人指出，公司对合作伙伴的依赖会导致对合作伙伴关系的承诺[ 50]。在创新合作关系中，焦点公司的合作依赖性也会加强其对合作关系的关注，焦点公司会致力于与合作伙伴建立长期的合作关系。
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
因此，我们提出以下假设：
因此，我们提出以下假设：
H1a.
H1a.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司对合作伙伴的依赖程度与合同控制程度呈正相关。
In open innovation projects, the focal company’s level of dependence on the cooperative partner is positively correlated with the degree of contract control.
H1a.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司对合作伙伴的依赖程度与合同控制程度呈正相关。
H1b.
H1b.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司对合作伙伴的依赖程度与关系治理程度呈正相关。
In open innovation projects, the focal company’s level of dependence on the cooperative partner is positively correlated with the degree of relationship governance.
H1b.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司对合作伙伴的依赖程度与关系治理程度呈正相关。
3.2. Governance Mechanism and Cooperative Performance
3.2.治理机制与合作社绩效
In cross-organizational open innovation projects, contract control and relationship governance are two common mechanisms for the focal company to governance partnerships. Among them, contract control ensures cooperative tasks and cooperative relations through the establishment of clear rules [39]. Specifically, contracts manage the cooperative partner by punishing breaches of contract and rewarding cooperative behavior. On the one hand, punishing breaches of contract can control the opportunistic behavior of partners and reduce the risk of cooperation; on the other hand, rewarding cooperative behavior can motivate partners to participate actively and promote cooperation integration.
在跨组织开放式创新项目中，合同控制和关系治理是焦点公司治理伙伴关系的两种常见机制。其中，合同控制通过建立明确的规则来确保合作任务和合作关系[39]。具体来说，合同通过惩罚违约行为和奖励合作行为来管理合作伙伴。一方面，惩罚违约行为可以控制合作伙伴的机会主义行为，降低合作风险；另一方面，奖励合作行为可以激励合作伙伴积极参与，促进合作整合。
在跨组织开放式创新项目中，合同控制和关系治理是焦点公司治理伙伴关系的两种常见机制。其中，合同控制通过建立明确的规则来确保合作任务和合作关系[39]。具体来说，合同通过惩罚违约行为和奖励合作行为来管理合作伙伴。一方面，惩罚违约行为可以控制合作伙伴的机会主义行为，降低合作风险；另一方面，奖励合作行为可以激励合作伙伴积极参与，促进合作整合。
Relationship governance encourages initiative to take relevant actions beneficial to the interests of partners with the help of social identity, social norms, mutual understanding, and trust. Poppo et al. pointed out that relationship governance can enhance the confidence of partners to establish long-term cooperative relationships [42]. At the same time, Yang et al. pointed out that the adoption of relationship governance by focal company can improve the cooperation satisfaction of partners [14]. As a result, the cooperative partners who are satisfied with and have confidence in OIPs will take the initiative to reduce opportunistic behavior and may increase investment in cooperation.
关系治理鼓励在社会认同、社会规范、相互理解和信任的帮助下，主动采取有利于合作伙伴利益的相关行动。Poppo 等人指出，关系治理可以增强合作伙伴建立长期合作关系的信心[42]。同时，Yang 等人指出，焦点公司采用关系治理可以提高合作伙伴的合作满意度[14]。因此，对 OIPs 满意并有信心的合作伙伴会主动减少机会主义行为，并可能增加对合作的投资。
关系治理鼓励在社会认同、社会规范、相互理解和信任的帮助下，主动采取有利于合作伙伴利益的相关行动。Poppo 等人指出，关系治理可以增强合作伙伴建立长期合作关系的信心[42]。同时，Yang 等人指出，焦点公司采用关系治理可以提高合作伙伴的合作满意度[14]。因此，对 OIPs 满意并有信心的合作伙伴会主动减少机会主义行为，并可能增加对合作的投资。
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
因此，我们提出以下假设：
因此，我们提出以下假设：
H2a.
H2a.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的合同控制会对合作绩效产生积极影响。
In open innovation projects, contract control by the focal company positively impacts cooperative performance.
H2a.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的合同控制会对合作绩效产生积极影响。
H2b.
H2b.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的关系管理会对合作绩效产生积极影响。
In open innovation projects, relationship governance by the focal company positively impacts cooperative performance.
H2b.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的关系管理会对合作绩效产生积极影响。
3.3. Governance Mechanism and Knowledge Transfer
3.3.管理机制和知识转让
The cooperative contract of an open innovation project is a formal agreement signed by the focal company and the cooperative partner, and the items in the agreement (e.g., cooperation objectives, rights, obligations) have legal effect. According to the transaction cost theory, contract control defines the cooperative relationship between the two parties in a legal form and guards against potential transaction risks; the contract will effectively control transaction costs and build a stable transaction environment. As a result, under the control of the contract, the interests of both parties can be effectively protected, thus laying a stable foundation for an environment promoting knowledge transfer in the process of cooperation.
开放式创新项目的合作合同是重点企业与合作伙伴签订的正式协议，协议中的各项内容（如合作目标、权利、义务等）具有法律效力。根据交易成本理论，合同控制以法律形式确定了双方的合作关系，防范了潜在的交易风险；合同将有效控制交易成本，构建稳定的交易环境。因此，在合同控制下，双方的利益都能得到有效保护，从而为合作过程中促进知识转移的环境奠定稳定的基础。
开放式创新项目的合作合同是重点企业与合作伙伴签订的正式协议，协议中的各项内容（如合作目标、权利、义务等）具有法律效力。根据交易成本理论，合同控制以法律形式确定了双方的合作关系，防范了潜在的交易风险；合同将有效控制交易成本，构建稳定的交易环境。因此，在合同控制下，双方的利益都能得到有效保护，从而为合作过程中促进知识转移的环境奠定稳定的基础。
Compared with contract control, relationship governance has advantages for unforeseen problems in the process of cooperation [51]. Hoetker and Mellewigt pointed out that relationship governance can promote trust, dependence, and cooperation between partners [34]. On the basis of trust, the two parties will carry out open communication and information sharing, but beyond that, the cooperative partner will voluntarily take risks and share special knowledge beyond the provisions of the contract [52]. At the same time, relationship governance can make the two parties understand each other and form a better tacit understanding of cooperation, which will also promote the integration and absorption of knowledge in the process of cooperation.
与合同控制相比，关系治理在解决合作过程中不可预见的问题方面具有优势[51]。Hoetker 和 Mellewigt 指出，关系治理可以促进合作伙伴之间的信任、依赖和合作[34]。在信任的基础上，双方会进行公开的交流和信息共享，除此之外，合作伙伴还会自愿承担风险，分享合同规定之外的特殊知识[52]。同时，关系治理可以使合作双方相互理解，形成更好的合作默契，也会促进合作过程中知识的整合与吸收。
与合同控制相比，关系治理在解决合作过程中不可预见的问题方面具有优势[51]。Hoetker 和 Mellewigt 指出，关系治理可以促进合作伙伴之间的信任、依赖和合作[34]。在信任的基础上，双方会进行公开的交流和信息共享，除此之外，合作伙伴还会自愿承担风险，分享合同规定之外的特殊知识[52]。同时，关系治理可以使合作双方相互理解，形成更好的合作默契，也会促进合作过程中知识的整合与吸收。
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
因此，我们提出以下假设：
因此，我们提出以下假设：
H3a.
H3a.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的合同控制会对知识转移产生积极影响。
In open innovation projects, contract control by focal company positively impacts knowledge transfer.
H3a.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的合同控制会对知识转移产生积极影响。
H3b.
H3b.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的关系管理会对知识转移产生积极影响。
In open innovation projects, relationship governance by focal company positively impacts knowledge transfer.
H3b.在开放式创新项目中，重点公司的关系管理会对知识转移产生积极影响。
3.4. Knowledge Transfer and Cooperative Performance
3.4.知识转让与合作绩效
Open innovation is a process in which the focal company absorbs knowledge from external cooperative partner and creates new knowledge [53,54]. In this process, the premise is the knowledge transfer from external cooperative partner. Knowledge transfer enables the focal company to directly acquire and use external knowledge in innovation [54], such as the cooperative partner transfer reports and technical documents that will directly help the focal company. In addition, knowledge transfer also promotes the generation of new knowledge [54]. When the knowledge of the cooperative partner and the original knowledge of the focal company complement each other and are transferred and exchanged, new values (e.g., ideas, knowledge, technology) may be created [18,55]. In particular, the transfer of the cooperative partner’s tacit knowledge helps the focal company form new innovation capabilities and achieve better cooperation performance.
开放式创新是重点企业吸收外部合作伙伴的知识并创造新知识的过程[53, 54]。在这个过程中，前提是外部合作伙伴的知识转移。知识转移能使重点企业在创新中直接获取和使用外部知识[54]，如合作伙伴转移的报告和技术文件会直接帮助重点企业。此外，知识转移还能促进新知识的产生[54]。当合作伙伴的知识与重点公司原有的知识相互补充并进行转让和交流时，就可能创造出新的价值（如想法、知识、技术）[18, 55]。特别是，合作伙伴隐性知识的转让有助于焦点公司形成新的创新能力，取得更好的合作绩效。
开放式创新是重点企业吸收外部合作伙伴的知识并创造新知识的过程[53, 54]。在这个过程中，前提是外部合作伙伴的知识转移。知识转移能使重点企业在创新中直接获取和使用外部知识[54]，如合作伙伴转移的报告和技术文件会直接帮助重点企业。此外，知识转移还能促进新知识的产生[54]。当合作伙伴的知识与重点公司原有的知识相互补充并进行转让和交流时，就可能创造出新的价值（如想法、知识、技术）[18, 55]。特别是，合作伙伴隐性知识的转让有助于焦点公司形成新的创新能力，取得更好的合作绩效。
In OIPs, contract control and relationship governance establish the basis and platform for cooperation. On the one hand, contract control provides a guarantee for knowledge transfer; on the other hand, relationship governance also builds confidence for the cooperative partner to share knowledge. Under the role of contract control and relationship governance, the efficiency of knowledge transfer between partners will be effectively improved, and the improved knowledge transfer promotes the performance of OIPs.
在开放式创新伙伴关系中，合同控制和关系治理建立了合作的基础和平台。一方面，合同控制为知识转移提供了保障；另一方面，关系治理也为合作伙伴共享知识建立了信心。在合同控制和关系治理的作用下，合作伙伴之间的知识转移效率将得到有效提高，而知识转移效率的提高将促进 OIP 的绩效。
在开放式创新伙伴关系中，合同控制和关系治理建立了合作的基础和平台。一方面，合同控制为知识转移提供了保障；另一方面，关系治理也为合作伙伴共享知识建立了信心。在合同控制和关系治理的作用下，合作伙伴之间的知识转移效率将得到有效提高，而知识转移效率的提高将促进 OIP 的绩效。
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
因此，我们提出以下假设：
因此，我们提出以下假设：
H4a.
H4a.在开放式创新项目中，知识转移会对合作绩效产生积极影响。
In open innovation projects, knowledge transfer positively impacts cooperative performance.
H4a.在开放式创新项目中，知识转移会对合作绩效产生积极影响。
H4b.
H4b.知识转移在合同控制和合作绩效中起中介作用。
Knowledge transfer plays an intermediary role in contract control and cooperative performance.
H4b.知识转移在合同控制和合作绩效中起中介作用。
H4c.
H4c.知识转移在关系治理和合作绩效中发挥中介作用。
Knowledge transfer plays an intermediary role in relationship governance and cooperative performance.
H4c.知识转移在关系治理和合作绩效中发挥中介作用。
Based on hypothetical logic analysis, this paper draws on the dependence-rights theory, resource dependence theory, transaction cost theory, and social exchange theory, and proposes a theoretical framework model for the selection of focal company governance mechanisms and governance effects in open cooperative innovation. As shown in Figure 1, based on the background of collaborative development of the electricity–carbon market, this theoretical framework model takes the focal company cooperation dependence relationship in open innovation cooperation as the research starting point, and clarifies the relationship between focal company cooperation dependence and governance mechanism. Specifically, it defines the core company’s choice logic of contract control and relationship governance, and the potential impact paths of the two governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer and cooperation performance.
本文在假设逻辑分析的基础上，借鉴依赖-权利理论、资源依赖理论、交易成本理论和社会交换理论，提出了开放合作创新中焦点企业治理机制选择与治理效果的理论框架模型。如图 1 所示，该理论框架模型以电碳市场协同发展为背景，以开放式创新合作中的焦点企业合作依赖关系为研究起点，厘清了焦点企业合作依赖与治理机制之间的关系。具体而言，它界定了核心企业对契约控制和关系治理的选择逻辑，以及两种治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效的潜在影响路径。
本文在假设逻辑分析的基础上，借鉴依赖-权利理论、资源依赖理论、交易成本理论和社会交换理论，提出了开放合作创新中焦点企业治理机制选择与治理效果的理论框架模型。如图 1 所示，该理论框架模型以电碳市场协同发展为背景，以开放式创新合作中的焦点企业合作依赖关系为研究起点，厘清了焦点企业合作依赖与治理机制之间的关系。具体而言，它界定了核心企业对契约控制和关系治理的选择逻辑，以及两种治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效的潜在影响路径。
4. Data and Variables Construction
4.数据和变量构建
4.1. Sample 4.1.样品
The data were collected during a large-scale electric–carbon market collaborative cooperation innovation development conference conducted in China. Most of the conference attendees were middle or senior members of enterprises, and they all had experience in innovation management. During the session, we presented the goal of our research to the 463 conference attendees. We invited participation in our research by all conference attendees who met our selection criteria: (1) your company has carried out at least one cooperative innovation project; (2) you have worked on at least one cooperative innovation project; and (3) you can get in touch with your last partner. A total of 281 conference attendees (out of the 463 conference attendees) who qualified for the study participated in our online survey. These respondents were asked to invite their partner from the last cooperative innovation project to respond to the online survey.
这些数据是在中国举办的一次大型电碳市场协同合作创新发展会议上收集的。参会者大多是企业的中高层人员，他们都具有创新管理经验。在会议期间，我们向 463 位与会者介绍了我们的研究目标。我们邀请所有符合我们选择标准的参会者参与我们的研究：(1) 您的公司至少开展过一个合作创新项目；(2) 您至少参与过一个合作创新项目；(3) 您可以与您的上一个合作伙伴取得联系。在 463 名参会者中，共有 281 名符合研究条件的参会者参与了我们的在线调查。我们要求这些受访者邀请他们上一个合作创新项目的合作伙伴参与在线调查。
这些数据是在中国举办的一次大型电碳市场协同合作创新发展会议上收集的。参会者大多是企业的中高层人员，他们都具有创新管理经验。在会议期间，我们向 463 位与会者介绍了我们的研究目标。我们邀请所有符合我们选择标准的参会者参与我们的研究：(1) 您的公司至少开展过一个合作创新项目；(2) 您至少参与过一个合作创新项目；(3) 您可以与您的上一个合作伙伴取得联系。在 463 名参会者中，共有 281 名符合研究条件的参会者参与了我们的在线调查。我们要求这些受访者邀请他们上一个合作创新项目的合作伙伴参与在线调查。
To reduce false consensus bias and common method variance, we used multisource data from the focal company and partner of the cooperative innovation project. Thus, before completing the questionnaire, we asked participants to fill in the basic information of the project, including the project name and their role in the project (focal company or partner). Then, we checked the congruence of the project descriptions from both sides of the cooperative innovation project. If the information from the partners about the project was inconsistent, or the project was only described by one side of the partnership, the data were considered invalid. After excluding incomplete responses and the outliers, we were left with 175 valid samples. The percentage of usable responses was 62.3% (175 out of 281 projects). The information from the usable responses for cooperative innovation projects is shown in Table 1.
为减少虚假共识偏差和常见方法差异，我们使用了来自合作创新项目的重点公司和合作伙伴的多源数据。因此，在填写问卷之前，我们要求参与者填写项目的基本信息，包括项目名称和他们在项目中的角色（重点公司或合作伙伴）。然后，我们检查了合作创新项目双方的项目描述是否一致。如果合作伙伴提供的项目信息不一致，或者只有合作一方对项目进行了描述，那么这些数据将被视为无效数据。在排除不完整的回答和异常值后，我们得到了 175 个有效样本。可用回答的百分比为 62.3%（281 个项目中的 175 个）。表 1 列出了合作创新项目可用答复的信息。
为减少虚假共识偏差和常见方法差异，我们使用了来自合作创新项目的重点公司和合作伙伴的多源数据。因此，在填写问卷之前，我们要求参与者填写项目的基本信息，包括项目名称和他们在项目中的角色（重点公司或合作伙伴）。然后，我们检查了合作创新项目双方的项目描述是否一致。如果合作伙伴提供的项目信息不一致，或者只有合作一方对项目进行了描述，那么这些数据将被视为无效数据。在排除不完整的回答和异常值后，我们得到了 175 个有效样本。可用回答的百分比为 62.3%（281 个项目中的 175 个）。表 1 列出了合作创新项目可用答复的信息。
4.2. Measures 4.2.措施
Focal company cooperative dependence. The extent of focal company cooperation dependence was based on a scale by Zhao et al. [56]. The scale included six items addressing “technical advantages of partner”, “technical competence of partner”, “availability of potential partner”, “switching costs of focal company”, “loss of partner’ exit to focal company”, and “partner’s exit impact on focal company program”. Most were evaluated on a scale of 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = “A great deal”, but the third question used the reverse measure. The Cronbach’s α value for the six-item scale was 0.862.
焦点公司合作依赖性。焦点公司的合作依赖程度基于 Zhao 等人的量表[ 56]。该量表包括六个项目，分别涉及 "合作伙伴的技术优势"、"合作伙伴的技术能力"、"潜在合作伙伴的可用性"、"焦点公司的转换成本"、"合作伙伴退出对焦点公司的损失 "和 "合作伙伴退出对焦点公司项目的影响"。大多数问题的评价尺度为 1 ="完全没有 "到 7 ="非常大"，但第三个问题的评价尺度则相反。六个项目量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.862。
焦点公司合作依赖性。焦点公司的合作依赖程度基于 Zhao 等人的量表[ 56]。该量表包括六个项目，分别涉及 "合作伙伴的技术优势"、"合作伙伴的技术能力"、"潜在合作伙伴的可用性"、"焦点公司的转换成本"、"合作伙伴退出对焦点公司的损失 "和 "合作伙伴退出对焦点公司项目的影响"。大多数问题的评价尺度为 1 ="完全没有 "到 7 ="非常大"，但第三个问题的评价尺度则相反。六个项目量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.862。
Contract control. Contract control assessment was based on a scale by Jap and Ganesan and Poppo and Zenger [51,57]. The scale covers four items: “The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly define cooperation objectives and various key performance indicators in the contract”, “The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly stipulate partners’ rights, responsibilities and penalties for breach of contract in the contract”, “The focal company and the cooperative partner have accurately stated the execution requirements of the cooperation in the contract”, and “The focal company regularly evaluates the cooperative partner’s behavior according to the contract” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). After inspection, the Cronbach’s α value for the four-item scale was 0.849.
合同控制。合同控制评估以 Jap 和 Ganesan 以及 Poppo 和 Zenger 的量表为基础[51, 57]。该量表包括四个项目："焦点公司与合作伙伴在合同中明确规定了合作目标和各种关键绩效指标"、"焦点公司与合作伙伴在合同中明确规定了合作伙伴的权利、责任和违约处罚"、"焦点公司与合作伙伴在合同中准确说明了合作的执行要求"、"焦点公司根据合同定期评估合作伙伴的行为"（1="完全没有"，7="非常多"）。经检验，四项量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.849。
合同控制。合同控制评估以 Jap 和 Ganesan 以及 Poppo 和 Zenger 的量表为基础[51, 57]。该量表包括四个项目："焦点公司与合作伙伴在合同中明确规定了合作目标和各种关键绩效指标"、"焦点公司与合作伙伴在合同中明确规定了合作伙伴的权利、责任和违约处罚"、"焦点公司与合作伙伴在合同中准确说明了合作的执行要求"、"焦点公司根据合同定期评估合作伙伴的行为"（1="完全没有"，7="非常多"）。经检验，四项量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.849。
Relationship governance. Relationship governance was assessed using a scale by Clauss and Kesting [16]. The scale has five items: “Members of the focal company regularly meet with the cooperative partner”, “The focal company has established close cooperative relations with the cooperative partner”, “There is always two-way communication between the focal company and the cooperative partner”, “It is very important for the focal company to establish frequent contact with the cooperative partner”, and “Frequent informal dialogues occur between focal company and the cooperative partner” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). After inspection, the Cronbach’s α value for the five-item scale was 0.896.
关系治理。关系治理采用 Clauss 和 Kesting 的量表进行评估[ 16]。该量表有五个项目："重点公司成员定期与合作伙伴会面"、"重点公司与合作伙伴建立了密切的合作关系"、"重点公司与合作伙伴之间始终保持双向沟通"、"重点公司与合作伙伴建立频繁联系非常重要"、"重点公司与合作伙伴之间经常进行非正式对话"（1 ="完全没有"，7 ="非常多"）。经检验，五项量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.896。
关系治理。关系治理采用 Clauss 和 Kesting 的量表进行评估[ 16]。该量表有五个项目："重点公司成员定期与合作伙伴会面"、"重点公司与合作伙伴建立了密切的合作关系"、"重点公司与合作伙伴之间始终保持双向沟通"、"重点公司与合作伙伴建立频繁联系非常重要"、"重点公司与合作伙伴之间经常进行非正式对话"（1 ="完全没有"，7 ="非常多"）。经检验，五项量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.896。
Knowledge transfer. Data on knowledge transfer were gathered using a scale by Bresman et al. [58]. The scale has four items: “The focal company has acquired a lot of information and knowledge from the cooperative partner”, “The focal company has learned key technologies and capabilities from the cooperative partner”, “The focal company has improved its knowledge, technologies, and capabilities by learning from the cooperative partner”, and “The focal company applies the acquired knowledge, technology, and capabilities to open innovation projects” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). After inspection, the Cronbach’s α value for the four-item scale was 0.887.
知识转移。有关知识转移的数据是通过 Bresman 等人的量表收集的[ 58]。该量表有四个项目："重点公司从合作伙伴那里获得了大量信息和知识"、"重点公司从合作伙伴那里学到了关键技术和能力"、"重点公司通过向合作伙伴学习提高了自己的知识、技术和能力"、"重点公司将获得的知识、技术和能力应用于开放式创新项目"（1 ="完全没有"，7 ="非常多"）。经检验，四项量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.887。
知识转移。有关知识转移的数据是通过 Bresman 等人的量表收集的[ 58]。该量表有四个项目："重点公司从合作伙伴那里获得了大量信息和知识"、"重点公司从合作伙伴那里学到了关键技术和能力"、"重点公司通过向合作伙伴学习提高了自己的知识、技术和能力"、"重点公司将获得的知识、技术和能力应用于开放式创新项目"（1 ="完全没有"，7 ="非常多"）。经检验，四项量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.887。
Cooperation performance. Due to the different goals of cooperative innovation projects in various industries, cooperation performance was based on subjective indicators, and we applied the subjective performance scale of Jambulingam et al. [59]. The scale includes three items. We measured cooperation by asking the members of both the cooperative partner and focal company to respond to the following: “The focal company and the cooperative partner always fulfill the common performance goals of cooperation”, “The focal company and the cooperative partner can always achieve the set goals on schedule”, and “More often than not, we attained our cooperative objectives” (1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “A great deal”). The Cronbach’s α value for the three-item scale was 0.786.
合作绩效。由于各行业合作创新项目的目标不同，合作绩效以主观指标为基础，我们采用了 Jambulingam 等人的主观绩效量表[ 59]。该量表包括三个项目。我们通过要求合作伙伴和重点公司的成员回答以下问题来衡量合作情况："焦点公司和合作伙伴总是能够实现合作的共同绩效目标"、"焦点公司和合作伙伴总是能够如期实现既定目标 "以及 "我们经常能够实现合作目标"（1 ="完全没有"，7 ="非常多"）。三项目量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.786。
合作绩效。由于各行业合作创新项目的目标不同，合作绩效以主观指标为基础，我们采用了 Jambulingam 等人的主观绩效量表[ 59]。该量表包括三个项目。我们通过要求合作伙伴和重点公司的成员回答以下问题来衡量合作情况："焦点公司和合作伙伴总是能够实现合作的共同绩效目标"、"焦点公司和合作伙伴总是能够如期实现既定目标 "以及 "我们经常能够实现合作目标"（1 ="完全没有"，7 ="非常多"）。三项目量表的 Cronbach's α 值为 0.786。
Control variables. Based on related research, this study uses the focal company scale, relationship development stage, and project characteristics as the control variables. Dröge et al. and Mithas et al. pointed out that large firms and mature relationships exert a greater influence on the process of exchange relationships [60,61]. Kim et al. pointed out that project characteristics directly affect the development of open innovation projects, including project type, project budget, and project cycle [62].
控制变量。在相关研究的基础上，本研究将焦点公司规模、关系发展阶段和项目特征作为控制变量。Dröge 等人和 Mithas 等人指出，大型企业和成熟的关系对交换关系的进程影响更大[60, 61]。Kim 等人指出，项目特征直接影响开放式创新项目的发展，包括项目类型、项目预算和项目周期[62]。
控制变量。在相关研究的基础上，本研究将焦点公司规模、关系发展阶段和项目特征作为控制变量。Dröge 等人和 Mithas 等人指出，大型企业和成熟的关系对交换关系的进程影响更大[60, 61]。Kim 等人指出，项目特征直接影响开放式创新项目的发展，包括项目类型、项目预算和项目周期[62]。
This study used SPSS20.0 and Amos26.0 to test the reliability and validity of the measurement variables. First, the Cronbach’s alpha and combined reliability values of all measured variables were greater than 0.7, which indicates that the scales produced strong internal consistency and good reliability. Second, the standardized factor loadings of all measured variables were greater than 0.6, and the average variance extraction value (AVE) was greater than 0.5, indicating good convergent validity among the scale factors. The specific measurement results are shown in Table 2.
本研究使用 SPSS20.0 和 Amos26.0 检验了测量变量的信度和效度。首先，所有测量变量的 Cronbach's alpha 和综合信度值均大于 0.7，表明量表具有较强的内部一致性和良好的信度。其次，所有测量变量的标准化因子载荷均大于 0.6，平均方差提取值（AVE）大于 0.5，表明量表各因子之间具有良好的收敛效度。具体测量结果见表 2。
本研究使用 SPSS20.0 和 Amos26.0 检验了测量变量的信度和效度。首先，所有测量变量的 Cronbach's alpha 和综合信度值均大于 0.7，表明量表具有较强的内部一致性和良好的信度。其次，所有测量变量的标准化因子载荷均大于 0.6，平均方差提取值（AVE）大于 0.5，表明量表各因子之间具有良好的收敛效度。具体测量结果见表 2。
This study used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the construct validity of the measurement model. The results show that the five-factor measurement model had good goodness of fit (χ2 = 326.594, df = 195; χ2/df = 1.675; CFI = 0.939; TLI = 0.927; IFI = 0.940; RMSEA = 0.062). This goodness of fit is significantly better than other factor models, which proves that all the measured variables in this study have good discriminant validity. The specific results are shown in Table 3.
本研究采用确证因子分析（CFA）来检验测量模型的构造效度。结果表明，五因素测量模型具有良好的拟合度（χ 2 = 326.594，df = 195；χ 2 /df = 1.675；CFI = 0.939；TLI = 0.927；IFI = 0.940；RMSEA = 0.062）。这一拟合优度明显优于其他因子模型，证明本研究中所有测量变量都具有良好的判别效度。具体结果如表 3 所示。
本研究采用确证因子分析（CFA）来检验测量模型的构造效度。结果表明，五因素测量模型具有良好的拟合度（χ 2 = 326.594，df = 195；χ 2 /df = 1.675；CFI = 0.939；TLI = 0.927；IFI = 0.940；RMSEA = 0.062）。这一拟合优度明显优于其他因子模型，证明本研究中所有测量变量都具有良好的判别效度。具体结果如表 3 所示。
4.3. Common Method Variance
4.3.普通方法差异
First, this study used Harman’s univariate analysis to test for common method variance. The results of unrotated factor analysis show that five factors have eigenvalues greater than 1, and the total explained variance accounts for 70.28%. Meanwhile, the results show that the explained variance of the first factor is only 30.6%, which does not exceed the limit of more than 50% explained by a single factor. Second, this study also adds common factors to the measurement model and constructs a six-factor measurement model to test the common method bias. The results show that the goodness of fit of the model (χ2 = 370.555, df = 177; χ2/df = 2.094; CFI = 0.910; TLI = 0.882; IFI = 0.0.912; RMSEA = 0.079) was significantly lower than that of the five-factor measurement model. Therefore, the analysis indicates no significant common method bias in this study.
首先，本研究采用哈曼单变量分析法检验共同方法方差。非旋转因子分析结果显示，有五个因子的特征值大于 1，总解释方差占 70.28%。同时，结果显示第一个因子的解释方差仅为 30.6%，没有超过单因子解释方差超过 50%的限制。其次，本研究还在测量模型中加入了公共因子，构建了六因子测量模型来检验公共方法偏差。结果显示，该模型的拟合优度（χ 2 = 370.555，df = 177；χ 2 /df = 2.094；CFI = 0.910；TLI = 0.882；IFI = 0.0.912；RMSEA = 0.079）明显低于五因素测量模型。因此，分析表明本研究没有明显的通用方法偏差。
首先，本研究采用哈曼单变量分析法检验共同方法方差。非旋转因子分析结果显示，有五个因子的特征值大于 1，总解释方差占 70.28%。同时，结果显示第一个因子的解释方差仅为 30.6%，没有超过单因子解释方差超过 50%的限制。其次，本研究还在测量模型中加入了公共因子，构建了六因子测量模型来检验公共方法偏差。结果显示，该模型的拟合优度（χ 2 = 370.555，df = 177；χ 2 /df = 2.094；CFI = 0.910；TLI = 0.882；IFI = 0.0.912；RMSEA = 0.079）明显低于五因素测量模型。因此，分析表明本研究没有明显的通用方法偏差。
5. Empirical Results 5.经验结果
This research used structural equation modeling (SEM) to verify the hypothesized model. The results are shown in Table 4. Overall, the model explains 55% of the cooperation performance, and the goodness of fit of the model is good (χ2 = 503.071, df = 309; χ2/df = 1.628; CFI = 0.914; TLI = 0.902; IFI = 0.915; RMSEA = 0.060). Specifically, the results reveal a significant positive correlation between cooperation dependence and relationship governance of the focal company (β = 0.52, p < 0.001), while the relationship between cooperation dependence and contract control of focal company is not significant, which means that H1b is supported, but H1a is not verified. Secondly, the results reveal that the relationship between contractual control and knowledge transfer is significantly positive (β = 0.32, p < 0.01). This result suggests a significant positive correlation between relational governance and knowledge transfer (β = 0.39, p < 0.001), which supports H3a and H3b. Thirdly, the results indicate that the relationship between contract control and cooperation performance is significantly positive (β = 0.29, p < 0.05), and the relationship between relationship governance and cooperation performance is also significantly positive (β = 0.40, p < 0.001). Meanwhile, the results prove a significant positive correlation between knowledge transfer and cooperation performance (β = 0.29, p < 0.001). Therefore, H2a, H2b, and H4a are supported.
本研究采用结构方程模型（SEM）来验证假设模型。结果如表 4 所示。总体而言，模型解释了 55% 的合作绩效，模型拟合优度良好（χ 2 = 503.071，df = 309；χ 2 /df = 1.628；CFI = 0.914；TLI = 0.902；IFI = 0.915；RMSEA = 0.060）。具体而言，结果显示，焦点企业的合作依赖与关系治理之间存在显著的正相关关系（β=0.52，P＜0.001），而焦点企业的合作依赖与合同控制之间的关系不显著，这意味着H1b得到支持，但H1a未得到验证。其次，研究结果显示，合同控制与知识转移之间的关系显著为正（β = 0.32，P < 0.01）。这一结果表明，关系治理与知识转移之间存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.39，p < 0.001），这支持了 H3a 和 H3b。第三，结果表明，合同控制与合作绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.29，p < 0.05），关系治理与合作绩效之间也存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.40，p < 0.001）。同时，结果证明知识转移与合作绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.29，p < 0.001）。因此，支持 H2a、H2b 和 H4a。
本研究采用结构方程模型（SEM）来验证假设模型。结果如表 4 所示。总体而言，模型解释了 55% 的合作绩效，模型拟合优度良好（χ 2 = 503.071，df = 309；χ 2 /df = 1.628；CFI = 0.914；TLI = 0.902；IFI = 0.915；RMSEA = 0.060）。具体而言，结果显示，焦点企业的合作依赖与关系治理之间存在显著的正相关关系（β=0.52，P＜0.001），而焦点企业的合作依赖与合同控制之间的关系不显著，这意味着H1b得到支持，但H1a未得到验证。其次，研究结果显示，合同控制与知识转移之间的关系显著为正（β = 0.32，P < 0.01）。这一结果表明，关系治理与知识转移之间存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.39，p < 0.001），这支持了 H3a 和 H3b。第三，结果表明，合同控制与合作绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.29，p < 0.05），关系治理与合作绩效之间也存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.40，p < 0.001）。同时，结果证明知识转移与合作绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系（β = 0.29，p < 0.001）。因此，支持 H2a、H2b 和 H4a。
Table 4.
Hypothesis testing: structural equation modeling, SEM (N = 175).
表 4.假设检验：结构方程模型，SEM（N = 175）。
表 4.假设检验：结构方程模型，SEM（N = 175）。
Furthermore, the study used the Sobel test to verify the mediation effect. The results show that the direct effect of contractual control on cooperation performance was significant (β = 0.254, p < 0.01), and the indirect effect of contractual control on cooperation performance through knowledge transfer was also significant (β = 0.148, p < 0.001). Meanwhile, the direct effect of relationship governance on cooperation performance was significant (β = 0.337, p < 0.001), and the indirect effect of relationship governance on cooperation performance through knowledge transfer was also significant (β = 0.150, p < 0.001). Therefore, H4b and H4c are supported.
此外，研究还使用了索贝尔检验来验证中介效应。结果显示，契约控制对合作绩效的直接影响显著（β = 0.254，p < 0.01），契约控制通过知识转移对合作绩效的间接影响也显著（β = 0.148，p < 0.001）。同时，关系治理对合作绩效的直接影响显著（β=0.337，P＜0.001），关系治理通过知识转移对合作绩效的间接影响也显著（β=0.150，P＜0.001）。因此，H4b 和 H4c 得到支持。
此外，研究还使用了索贝尔检验来验证中介效应。结果显示，契约控制对合作绩效的直接影响显著（β = 0.254，p < 0.01），契约控制通过知识转移对合作绩效的间接影响也显著（β = 0.148，p < 0.001）。同时，关系治理对合作绩效的直接影响显著（β=0.337，P＜0.001），关系治理通过知识转移对合作绩效的间接影响也显著（β=0.150，P＜0.001）。因此，H4b 和 H4c 得到支持。
6. Conclusions 6.结论
In the context of the coordinated development of the electricity–carbon market, this study established a theoretical model to study focal company governance mechanism selection and the governance effect in OIPs. From the perspective of focal company cooperative dependence, this model explores the choice tendency of contract control and relationship governance and the potential impact of the two governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer and cooperative performance. Through the empirical study, the following meaningful results were obtained, which have important theoretical significance for management research on open innovation projects in an electricity–carbon market synergy scenario.
在电力-碳市场协调发展的背景下，本研究建立了一个理论模型来研究 OIP 中的焦点公司治理机制选择和治理效应。该模型从焦点公司合作依赖的角度出发，探讨了契约控制和关系治理的选择倾向，以及两种治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效的潜在影响。通过实证研究，得出了以下有意义的结果，对电力-碳市场协同情景下开放式创新项目的管理研究具有重要的理论意义。
在电力-碳市场协调发展的背景下，本研究建立了一个理论模型来研究 OIP 中的焦点公司治理机制选择和治理效应。该模型从焦点公司合作依赖的角度出发，探讨了契约控制和关系治理的选择倾向，以及两种治理机制对知识转移和合作绩效的潜在影响。通过实证研究，得出了以下有意义的结果，对电力-碳市场协同情景下开放式创新项目的管理研究具有重要的理论意义。
First, the research results reveal a significant positive correlation between the cooperative dependence of the focal company and the implementation of relationship governance, but there is no correlation between that dependence and the implementation of contract control. This result partly proves our hypothesis that the higher the dependence of the focal company on the cooperative partner, the more willing the focal company is to establish a good cooperative relationship and enhance their commitment to cooperative relationship. However, it may be a common practice for a focal company to implement contract control in OIPs, because OIPs are ultimately commercial cooperative behaviors, and contract control is always the basic guarantee to prevent opportunistic behaviors in commercial cooperation. This indicates that in OIPs, contract control is an inevitable measure of the focal company, while relationship governance is a complementary governance mechanism. This conclusion supports previous research on the complementary relationship between contract control and relationship governance [38,51].
首先，研究结果表明，焦点公司的合作依赖度与关系治理的实施之间存在显著的正相关关系，但这种依赖度与合同控制的实施之间不存在相关关系。这一结果在一定程度上证明了我们的假设，即焦点公司对合作伙伴的依赖程度越高，焦点公司就越愿意建立良好的合作关系，并加强对合作关系的承诺。然而，在 OIPs 中，焦点企业实施合同控制可能是一种常见的做法，因为 OIPs 归根结底是商业合作行为，而合同控制始终是商业合作中防止机会主义行为的基本保障。这表明，在 OIPs 中，合同控制是焦点公司的必然措施，而关系治理则是一种补充治理机制。这一结论支持了以往关于合同控制与关系治理之间互补关系的研究[ 38, 51]。
首先，研究结果表明，焦点公司的合作依赖度与关系治理的实施之间存在显著的正相关关系，但这种依赖度与合同控制的实施之间不存在相关关系。这一结果在一定程度上证明了我们的假设，即焦点公司对合作伙伴的依赖程度越高，焦点公司就越愿意建立良好的合作关系，并加强对合作关系的承诺。然而，在 OIPs 中，焦点企业实施合同控制可能是一种常见的做法，因为 OIPs 归根结底是商业合作行为，而合同控制始终是商业合作中防止机会主义行为的基本保障。这表明，在 OIPs 中，合同控制是焦点公司的必然措施，而关系治理则是一种补充治理机制。这一结论支持了以往关于合同控制与关系治理之间互补关系的研究[ 38, 51]。
Second, the results of the research show that both contract control and relationship governance in the focal company are significantly positively correlated with knowledge transfer and cooperative performance. The results prove that a focal company adopting positive governance mechanisms can effectively control opportunistic behaviors and promote bilateral cooperation activities. The focal company will take the initiative to enhance relationship governance to promote cooperation activities such as knowledge transfer, especially when they are highly dependent on cooperation. The results also show that knowledge transfer plays a significant mediating role in the relationship between contract control and cooperative performance, as well as relationship governance and cooperative performance. This proves that knowledge transfer is an important process in open innovation projects. On the one hand, contract control can improve the efficiency of knowledge transfer while protecting the cooperative interests of partners, and relationship governance can provide the foundation of trust for partner knowledge transfer. On the other hand, knowledge transfer from the cooperative partner to the focal company is conducive to the absorption, fusion, and recreation of new knowledge by the focal company [63], thus achieving better cooperative performance.
其次，研究结果表明，焦点公司的合同控制和关系治理都与知识转移和合作绩效显著正相关。结果证明，焦点企业采用积极的治理机制可以有效控制机会主义行为，促进双边合作活动的开展。特别是在高度依赖合作的情况下，焦点企业会主动加强关系治理，促进知识转移等合作活动的开展。研究结果还表明，知识转移在契约控制与合作绩效、关系治理与合作绩效的关系中发挥着重要的中介作用。这证明，知识转移是开放式创新项目中的一个重要过程。一方面，合同控制可以在提高知识转移效率的同时保护合作伙伴的合作利益，关系治理可以为合作伙伴的知识转移提供信任基础。另一方面，从合作伙伴到重点企业的知识转移有利于重点企业对新知识的吸收、融合和再创造[63]，从而实现更好的合作绩效。
其次，研究结果表明，焦点公司的合同控制和关系治理都与知识转移和合作绩效显著正相关。结果证明，焦点企业采用积极的治理机制可以有效控制机会主义行为，促进双边合作活动的开展。特别是在高度依赖合作的情况下，焦点企业会主动加强关系治理，促进知识转移等合作活动的开展。研究结果还表明，知识转移在契约控制与合作绩效、关系治理与合作绩效的关系中发挥着重要的中介作用。这证明，知识转移是开放式创新项目中的一个重要过程。一方面，合同控制可以在提高知识转移效率的同时保护合作伙伴的合作利益，关系治理可以为合作伙伴的知识转移提供信任基础。另一方面，从合作伙伴到重点企业的知识转移有利于重点企业对新知识的吸收、融合和再创造[63]，从而实现更好的合作绩效。
Thirdly, the research results show that the scale of focal company negatively correlates with cooperative performance, and project duration also negatively correlates with cooperative performance. This indicates that the larger the scale of the focal company or the longer the project duration, the poorer the project cooperation performance. First of all, although a larger focal company has more resources, it may need to invest in a wider range of innovation fields, making it difficult for the firm to pay much attention to a single open innovation project. On the contrary, when the scale of focal company is small, it carries out relatively few innovation projects, and OIPs may be more important to the firm, which will increase the investment in project resources. This means that a small-scale focal company can achieve better cooperation performance in OIPs. This conclusion reveals that small and medium-sized enterprises are more suitable for open innovation than large enterprises. Secondly, the longer the open innovation project duration is, the more tasks or difficulties the project will have, which leads to the difficulty of realizing the cooperative goal completely.
第三，研究结果表明，重点公司的规模与合作绩效负相关，项目持续时间也与合作绩效负相关。这表明，重点公司规模越大或项目持续时间越长，项目合作绩效越差。首先，虽然规模较大的重点企业拥有更多的资源，但其需要投入的创新领域可能更广，因此企业很难对单一的开放式创新项目给予过多的关注。相反，当重点企业规模较小时，其开展的创新项目相对较少，开放式创新项目可能对企业更为重要，从而会增加对项目资源的投入。这意味着，规模小的重点企业可以在 OIPs 中取得更好的合作绩效。这一结论揭示了中小型企业比大型企业更适合开放式创新。其次，开放式创新项目持续时间越长，项目任务或困难越多，导致合作目标难以完全实现。
第三，研究结果表明，重点公司的规模与合作绩效负相关，项目持续时间也与合作绩效负相关。这表明，重点公司规模越大或项目持续时间越长，项目合作绩效越差。首先，虽然规模较大的重点企业拥有更多的资源，但其需要投入的创新领域可能更广，因此企业很难对单一的开放式创新项目给予过多的关注。相反，当重点企业规模较小时，其开展的创新项目相对较少，开放式创新项目可能对企业更为重要，从而会增加对项目资源的投入。这意味着，规模小的重点企业可以在 OIPs 中取得更好的合作绩效。这一结论揭示了中小型企业比大型企业更适合开放式创新。其次，开放式创新项目持续时间越长，项目任务或困难越多，导致合作目标难以完全实现。
Author Contributions 作者供稿
Conceptualization, P.F. and L.W.; methodology, L.W. and W.F.; software, W.F.; validation, L.W. and W.F.; formal analysis, P.F., L.W. and W.F.; investigation, W.F.; resources, L.W. and W.F.; data curation, W.F.; writing—original draft preparation, P.F., L.W. and W.F.; writing—review and editing, P.F. and L.W.; visualization, L.W.; supervision, L.W.; project administration, L.W.; funding acquisition, L.W. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
概念化，P.F. 和 L.W.；方法学，L.W. 和 W.F.；软件，W.F.；验证，L.W. 和 W.F.；正式分析，P.F.、L.W. 和 W.F.；调查，W.F.；资源，L.W. 和 W.F.；数据整理，W.F.；写作--原稿准备，P.F、L.W. 和 W.F.；写作-审阅和编辑，P.F. 和 L.W.；可视化，L.W.；监督，L.W.；项目管理，L.W.；资金获取，L.W. 所有作者均已阅读并同意手稿的出版版本。
概念化，P.F. 和 L.W.；方法学，L.W. 和 W.F.；软件，W.F.；验证，L.W. 和 W.F.；正式分析，P.F.、L.W. 和 W.F.；调查，W.F.；资源，L.W. 和 W.F.；数据整理，W.F.；写作--原稿准备，P.F、L.W. 和 W.F.；写作-审阅和编辑，P.F. 和 L.W.；可视化，L.W.；监督，L.W.；项目管理，L.W.；资金获取，L.W. 所有作者均已阅读并同意手稿的出版版本。
Funding 资金筹措
This research was funded by National Natural Science Foundation of China [72204243]; Ministry of Education, Humanities and social science research projects [20YJC630138]; New Liberal Arts Fund Expansion Project of University of Science and Technology of China [FSSF-A-230317] and Anhui Provincial Natural Science Foundation [2208085UD02].
本研究得到了国家自然科学基金[72204243]、教育部人文社会科学研究项目[20YJC630138]、中国科学技术大学新文科基金扩展项目[FSSF-A-230317]和安徽省自然科学基金[2208085UD02]的资助。
本研究得到了国家自然科学基金[72204243]、教育部人文社会科学研究项目[20YJC630138]、中国科学技术大学新文科基金扩展项目[FSSF-A-230317]和安徽省自然科学基金[2208085UD02]的资助。
Data Availability Statement
数据可用性声明
The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author.
本研究提供的数据可向通讯作者索取。
本研究提供的数据可向通讯作者索取。
Conflicts of Interest 利益冲突
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
作者声明没有利益冲突。
作者声明没有利益冲突。
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Figure 1.
Conceptual model.
Table 1.
Profiles of 175 cooperative innovation projects.
| Feature | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Partner type | ||
| User | 43 | 24.7% |
| Supplier | 52 | 29.9% |
| Competitor | 6 | 3.4% |
| Technical institution | 30 | 17.2% |
| University and research institution | 12 | 6.9% |
| Others | 31 | 17.8% |
| Project type | ||
| Research | 93 | 53.4% |
| Development | 81 | 46.6% |
Table 2.
Measurement results of variable data (N = 175).
| Construct | Item Description | Loading | CR | AVE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Focal Company Cooperation Dependence (α = 0.86) | In an open innovation project, the technical capabilities of the cooperative partner have an advantage over the focal company. | 0.63 | 0.86 | 0.51 | |
| In an open innovation project, the technical capabilities of the cooperative partner have an advantage over other potential collaborators. | 0.67 | ||||
| There are multiple potential collaborators who can provide similar knowledge and capabilities. | 0.75 | ||||
| If the focal company changes the cooperative partner, it needs to bear a lot of money and time cost. | 0.78 | ||||
| The termination of cooperation by the cooperative partner will bring huge losses to your company. | 0.72 | ||||
| The termination of cooperation by the cooperative partner will have a great adverse impact on your company. | 0.73 | ||||
| Contract Control (α = 0.85) | The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly define cooperation objectives and various key performance indicators in the contract. | 0.70 | 0.85 | 0.59 | |
| The focal company and the cooperative partner clearly stipulate partners’ rights, responsibilities and penalties for breach of contract in the contract. | 0.82 | ||||
| The focal company and the cooperative partner have accurately stated the execution requirements of the cooperation in the contract. | 0.83 | ||||
| The focal company regularly evaluates the cooperative partner’s behavior according to the contract. | 0.73 | ||||
| Relationship Governance (α = 0.90) | Members of focal company regularly meet with the cooperative partner. | 0.77 | 0.90 | 0.64 | |
| The focal company has established close cooperative relations with the cooperative partner. | 0.83 | ||||
| There is always two-way communication between the focal company and the cooperative partner. | 0.76 | ||||
| It is very important for the focal company to establish frequent contact with the cooperative partner. | 0.82 | ||||
| Frequent informal dialogues occur between the focal company and the cooperative partner. | 0.81 | ||||
| Knowledge Transfer (α = 0.89) | The focal company has acquired a lot of information and knowledge from the cooperative partner. | 0.75 | 0.89 | 0.67 | |
| The focal company has learned key technologies and capabilities from the cooperative partner. | 0.86 | ||||
| The focal company has improved its knowledge, technologies, and capabilities by learning from the cooperative partner. | 0.87 | ||||
| The focal company applies the acquired knowledge, technology, and capabilities to open innovation projects. | 0.79 | ||||
| Cooperation Performance (α= 0.79) | The focal company and the cooperative partner always fulfill the common performance goals of cooperation. | 0.78 | 0.79 | 0.55 | |
| The focal company and the cooperative partner can always achieve the set goals on schedule. | 0.75 | ||||
| More often than not, we attained our cooperative objectives. | 0.70 | ||||
Table 3.
CFA of measurement models.
| Model | χ2 | df | χ2/df | CFI | TLI | IFI | RMSEA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Five-factor Measurement Model (CD,CG,RG,KT,CP) | 326.594 | 195 | 1.675 | 0.939 | 0.927 | 0.940 | 0.062 |
| Four-factor Measurement Model (CD,CG + RG,KT,CP) | 771.356 | 203 | 3.800 | 0.735 | 0.698 | 0.738 | 0.127 |
| Three-factor Measurement Model (D,CG + RG + KT,CP) | 1095.746 | 206 | 5.319 | 0.585 | 0.535 | 0.590 | 0.158 |
| Two-factor Measurement Model (CD,CG + RG + KT + CP) | 1167.843 | 208 | 5.615 | 0.552 | 0.503 | 0.557 | 0.163 |
| One-factor Measurement Model (CD + CG + RG + KT + CP) | 1455.228 | 209 | 6.963 | 0.419 | 0.358 | 0.425 | 0.185 |
Table 4.
Hypothesis testing: structural equation modeling, SEM (N = 175).
| Model Relationship | Path Coefficient | t-Value |
|---|---|---|
| Focal Company Cooperation Dependence on Contract Control | −0.05 | −0.911 |
| Focal Company Cooperation Dependence on Relationship Governance | 0.52 *** | 5.628 |
| Contract Control—Knowledge Transfer | 0.32 ** | 2.679 |
| Relationship Governance—Knowledge Transfer | 0.39 *** | 4.497 |
| Contract Control—Cooperative Performance | 0.29 * | 2.614 |
| Relationship Governance—Cooperative Performance | 0.40 *** | 4.636 |
| Knowledge Transfer—Cooperative Performance | 0.29 *** | 3.797 |
| Control Variables | ||
| Focal Company Scale—cooperative performance | −0.097 ** | −2.618 |
| Relationship Development Stage—Cooperative Performance | −0.075 | −1.155 |
| Project Type—Cooperative Performance | −0.072 | −0.651 |
| Project Budget—Cooperative Performance | −0.005 | −0.136 |
| Project Duration—Cooperative Performance | −0.148 ** | −2.754 |
| Model Fit χ2 = 503.071, df = 309; χ2/df = 1.628; CFI = 0.914; TLI = 0.902; IFI = 0.915; RMSEA = 0.060 | ||
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.010, *** p < 0.001.
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Fang, P.; Wan, L.; Fang, W. The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market. Energies 2023, 16, 6110. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110
AMA Style
Fang P, Wan L, Fang W. The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market. Energies. 2023; 16(17):6110. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110
Chicago/Turabian StyleFang, Ping, Liang Wan, and Wenpei Fang. 2023. "The Choice of Cooperative Governance Mechanism in Open Innovation Projects under the Synergy of the Electricity–Carbon Market" Energies 16, no. 17: 6110. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16176110
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