UCC ARTICLE 2
《统一民法典》第 2 条
KEATING
基廷
SPRING 2016
2016 年春季
THE PROCESS OF SALES CONTRACT FORMATION PP. 70-71
销售合同形成过程 第 70-71 页
Problem 3.1(a)
问题 3.1(a)
Suppose that in Gateway 2000 case at the beginning of this assignment, the terms and conditions that the Hills failed to read closely also included the following: (1) that the buyers agreed not to use any other printer with the computer except a special Gateway printer (whether or not any other printers were actually compatible), (2) that the seller was not responsible for any consequential damages suffered by the buyers from defects in the computer, and (3) that the buyers’ only remedy for any defects in the computer is that buyers would receive a special Gateway baseball cap for their troubles. Would these clauses be just as enforceable against the buyers as the arbitration clause? U.C.C. §§2-206, 2-204, 2-207; Official Comment 1 to §2-207; Official Comment 1 to §2-719.
假设在本转让开始时的 Gateway 2000 案中,Hills 未能仔细阅读的条款和条件还包括以下内容:(1) 买方同意除特殊的 Gateway 打印机外,不在计算机上安装任何其他打印机(无论任何其他打印机是否实际兼容),(2) 卖方不对买方因计算机缺陷而遭受的任何间接损害负责, (3) 买方对计算机中的任何缺陷的唯一补救措施是买方将获得一顶特殊的 Gateway 棒球帽,以解决他们的问题。这些条款是否与仲裁条款一样对买方具有强制执行力?加州大学 §§2-206、2-204、2-207;第 2-207 条的官方评论 1;§2-719 的官方评论 1。
ANSWER: Under UCC, the time of formation of the contract is going to affect what the particular terms of the contract are. In Gateway 2000, Judge Easterbrook believes the contract was formed until some point after the consumer buyer received the goods they ordered, namely when the customer failed to reject the goods 30 days following receipt of the goods. With respect to contract formation, §2-206(1)(b) says “unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances, an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods”. Under that logic, why can’t it be said that the seller Gateway’s shipment of the computer constituted an acceptance of the buyer’s telephone offer to purchase? Indeed if Gateway the seller made a prompt promise to ship during the phone call, then acceptance under §2-206(1)(b) would occur even prior to shipment. Assume that contrary to Judge Easterbrook’s belief, this contract for the sale of goods was formed during the phone call, since there is no unambiguous indication that it should be otherwise. If the contract was formed during the phone call, then the buyer’s order was the offer while the seller’s prompt promise to ship was the acceptance. Under that view, the only definitive terms of the contract would be the model of the computer, the price, and the approximate shipment date. Under §2-204(3), which says “even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract, and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving appropriate remedy”, these terms are enough to create a binding contract. The other terms beyond the ones they agreed to orally would be the UCC gap-fillers, which do not include arbitration. The resolution UCC gap-filler provides is litigation.
回答: 根据 UCC,合同的订立时间将影响 合同的特定条款。在 Gateway 2000 中 ,Easterbrook 法官认为,合同是在消费者买家收到他们订购的商品后的某个时间点才形成的,即客户在收到商品后 30 天内未能拒收商品。关于合同的订立,§2-206(1)(b) 规定 “ 除非语言或情况另有明确说明,否则购买货物以立即或立即发货的订单或其他要约应解释为通过立即承诺发货或及时或当前发货合格或不合格货物邀请接受 ”。在这种逻辑下,为什么不能说卖方 Gateway 的电脑发货构成了 对买方电话购买要约的接受呢? 事实上 ,如果卖方 Gateway 在电话中及时承诺发货,那么 根据 §2-206(1)(b) 的规定,甚至在发货之前就已经接受发货。假设与 Easterbrook 法官的信念相反,这份货物销售合同是在电话中形成的,因为没有明确的迹象表明它应该是其他的。如果合同是在电话中形成的,则买方的订单是报价,而卖方的及时发货承诺是接受。 在这种观点下,合同的唯一决定性条款 是计算机的型号、价格和大致的发货日期。根据 §2-204(3), 即 “ 即使一个或多个条款未解决,如果双方打算签订合同,并且有合理确定的依据提供适当的补救措施,则销售合同不会无限期失效 ”,这些条款足以构成具有约束力的合同。除了他们口头同意的条款之外,其他条款将是 UCC 空白填补条款,其中不包括仲裁。UCC 空白填补者提供的解决方法是诉讼。
Another possible way to approach this case would be as a §2-207 case. Judge Easterbrook didn’t think §2-207 is appropriate here, because §2-207 is a battle of forms and here there is only one form. However, Official Comment 1 to §2-207 says one of the two cases §2-207 was specifically designed to cover is the written confirmation where an agreement has been reached either orally or via formal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the party sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far agreed upon. Comment 1 says clearly that one can have an oral contract followed by a single confirmation. As such, this case is under §2-207. If, in this case, the seller’s acceptance of the buyer’s offer to purchase took the form of shipment rather than the promise to ship promptly, then §2-207 would not apply, §2-206 analysis would be applicable. If there is an oral contract over the phone, then what was being sent by Gateway with their product would be their single confirmation, then Gateway’s arbitration clause or any other new terms in Gateway’s confirmation that was contained in the product box would be additional terms that would be “construed as proposals additional to the contract” under §2-207(2). Because in this case the buyer the Hills are not merchants, these additional terms would remain mere proposals by the seller, and would not become part of the contract unless and until the buyer specifically agree to them, which they never did.
处理此案例的另一种可能方法是作为 §2-207 案例。Easterbrook 法官认为 §2-207 在这里不合适,因为 §2-207 是一场形式之战,这里只有一种形式。然而,§2-207 的官方评论 1 表示,§2-207 专门设计的两种情况之一是指双方之间已通过口头或正式通信达成协议 并由 一方或双方遵循的书面确认发送正式备忘录,体现迄今为止商定的条款。评论 1 清楚地表明,一个人可以有一个口头合同,然后是一个确认。因此,本案属于 §2-207。在这种情况下,如果卖方接受买方的购买要约采取了发货的形式,而不是承诺立即发货,则 §2-207 将不适用,§2-206 分析将适用。如果通过电话签订了口头合同,那么 Gateway 随其产品发送的内容将是他们的单一确认,那么 Gateway 的仲裁条款或 Gateway 确认中包含的任何其他新条款将属于附加条款, 根据 §2-207(2) “ 解释为合同的附加建议 ”。 因为在这种情况下,买方 Hills 不是商人,因此这些附加条款将仅是卖方的建议 , 除非买方明确同意,否则不会成为合同的一部分,而他们从未同意过。
Under Judge Easterbrook’s view, a seller is still bound by UCC Article 2’s limits as unconscionability and reasonableness of remedy limits found in Official Comment 1 to §2-719, which says “It is of the very essence of a sales contract that minimum adequate remedies be available.” This will invalidate the baseball cap remedy as an unacceptable use of remedy.
根据 Easterbrook 法官的观点,卖方仍受 UCC 第 2 条限制的约束 ,因为补救措施限制的不合情理性和合理性见第 2-719 条的官方评论 1,其中说 :“ 提供最低限度的适当补救措施是销售合同的本质。“ 这将使棒球帽补救措施无效,因为这是一种不可接受的补救措施。
Problem 3.1(b)
问题 3.1(b)
Suppose that in Gateway 2000, following the phone conversation in which the Hills placed their order (and in which the seller promised to send the computer), the seller called the Hills back a week later and said, “We’ve decided that we cannot sell the computer to you at the price you ordered it; you must agree to pay 10 percent more than that or we won’t ship it.” Would the seller be able to enforce such a condition on the sale?
假设在 Gateway 2000 中 ,在 Hills 下订单的电话交谈之后(卖方承诺发送计算机),卖方在一周后给 Hills 回电说:“ 我们已经决定不能以您订购的价格向您出售计算机;您必须同意支付 10% 以上的费用,否则我们将不发货。“ 卖方能否在销售中执行此类条件?
If, as Judge Easterbrook says, this contract was not formed at the point when the seller took the buyer’s order and agree to ship, then the seller could theoretically back out with impunity or change the terms of the deal that the consumer thought they had struck over the phone. Even if the basic terms agreed to over the phone couldn’t be changed, the terms to come could be so onerous as to make the deal unattractive for the buyer. Indeed, if the seller’s shipment here is viewed as a counteroffer to buyer’s offer to purchase, then the seller could simply change the terms of their counteroffer prior to acceptance by the buyer, unless there is some detrimental reliance by the buyer.
如果正如 Easterbrook 法官所说,该合同不是在卖方接受买方的订单并同意发货时形成的,那么理论上卖方可以 不受惩罚地退出或更改消费者认为他们通过电话达成的交易条款。即使通过电话商定的基本条款无法更改,即将到来的条款也可能非常繁琐,以至于交易对买方没有吸引力。事实上,如果卖方的货物被视为对买方购买要约的还价 ,那么卖方可以在买方接受之前简单地更改他们的还价条款,除非买方有一些有害的依赖。
Problem 3.2 (a)
问题 3.2 (a)
Your law firm took on a new client last month, an exercise equipment manufacturer called Heavy Metal, Inc. You were assigned to meet with Heavy Metal’s president, Arlene Ledger, to discuss her various legal concerns about certain sales by this company, which she founded herself. Arlene’s first concern relates to a major order of stair climber machines that her company filled last month for Fit for Life, a national health club chain.
您的律师事务所上个月接洽了一个新客户,一家名为 Heavy Metal, Inc. 的健身器材制造商。您被指派与 Heavy Metal 的总裁 Arlene Ledger 会面,讨论她对这家她自己创立的公司的某些销售的各种法律担忧。Arlene 的第一个担忧与她的公司上个月为全国性健身俱乐部连锁店 Fit for Life 订购的楼梯爬楼梯机大订单有关。
Fit for Life’s purchase order, which Arlene had not read until recently, indicated that “seller will be liable for all remedies available under the UCC.” Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form, by contrast, disclaimed in boldface language all consequential damages. One other thing troubled Arlene about this transaction: she had meant to send the acknowledgement form before shipping the stair climbers, but instead she had shipped the machines and only later did she send the acknowledgement form. Arlene said that she is extremely worried about having all those stair climbers out there for which her company might be liable for unlimited consequential damages. Are Arlene’s fears well grounded? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
Arlene 直到最近才阅读 Fit for Life 的采购订单 ,其中指出 “ 卖方将对 UCC 下的所有可用补救措施负责。“ 相比之下,Heavy Metal 的确认书以粗体字否认了所有间接损害赔偿。关于这笔交易的另一件事让 Arlene 感到困扰:她本来打算在运送爬楼梯者之前发送确认表,但她已经运送了机器,后来才发送了确认表。Arlene 说,她非常担心那些爬楼梯的人在那里,她的公司可能会为此承担无限的间接损害赔偿。Arlene 的担忧有充分的理由吗?加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。
This is not a §2-207 case. §2-207 was meant to cover a few different cases, where a writing itself constituted acceptance (§2-207(1)), where there is a written confirmation with new terms following oral contract (Official Comment 1 to §2-207), or where the conduct which constituted acceptance came after a purported written acceptance which for some reason did not count as valid acceptance (§2-207(3)). In this problem, prior to the shipment, there is nothing that constituted acceptance by the seller. So, under §2-206(1)(b), this contract was formed when Heavy Metal ships the stair climbers. They accepted by shipping. The act of shipping was acceptance that implicitly incorporated whatever terms detailed in the purchase order, which was also the offer.
这不是 §2-207 案件。 §2-207 旨在涵盖几种不同的情况,其中书面本身构成接受 (§2-207(1)),口头合同后有新条款的书面确认(§2-207 的官方意见 1),或者构成接受的行为发生在所谓的书面接受之后,但由于某种原因不算作有效接受 (§2-207(3)).在这个问题中,在发货之前,没有任何内容构成卖方的接受。因此,根据 §2-206(1)(b),该合同是在 Heavy Metal 运送楼梯爬升器时成立的。他们通过发货接受了。发货行为是接受,它隐含地包含采购订单中详述的任何条款,这也是要约。
In Belden, the Court specifically notes that acknowledgement form was sent prior to the shipment of goods, that’s way Belden is a §2-207(3) case and this problem is not. Had the shipment preceded the sending of the acknowledgement form, the analysis would be very different. In Belden, there was first an exchange of forms that did not constitute a contract, prior to the conduct that did constitute a contract. And in this problem, there is no exchange of written forms prior to the conduct which constituted the contract. The effect of the later-sent acknowledgement form is merely a proposal for a modification for a contract that has already formed. And as such, in the absence of specific assent by the other side, the terms in the proposed modification will not be incorporated into the contract. Therefore, Arlene indeed needs to worry about the possibility of consequential damages with respect to that shipment of the stair climbers, since her disclaimer never became part of the contract.
在 Belden 案中 ,法院特别指出,确认表是在货物装运之前发送的, 这就是 Belden 案是 §2-207(3) 案件的方式,而这个问题不是。如果货物在发送确认表之前发货 ,则分析将大不相同。在 Belden 案中,首先是不构成合同的形式交换,然后是构成合同的行为。在这个问题上,在构成合同的行为之前没有书面形式的交换。后来发送的确认表的效果只是对已经形成的合同的修改建议。因此,在没有另一方明确同意的情况下,拟议修改中的条款将不会被纳入合同。因此,Arlene 确实需要担心与那批爬楼梯手相关的间接损害的可能性,因为她的免责声明从未成为合同的一部分。
Problem 3.2(b)
问题 3.2(b)
Same facts as part (a), except that instead of shipping the stair climbers that were requested in Fit for Life’s order, Heavy Metal ships an order of super-incline treadmills to Fit for Life but never sends an acknowledgement form. “We were out of stair climbers, but I felt like these treadmills would probably work for them instead,” reasoned Arlene. Arlene did not warn Fit for Life in advance about the change in product. When Fit for Life receives the treadmills, is there an enforceable contract? If so, on whose terms? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是 Heavy Metal 没有按照 Fit for Life 的订单运送楼梯爬楼梯机 ,而是向 Fit for Life 运送了超级倾斜跑步机的订单,但从未发送确认表。 “ 我们没有爬楼梯的人,但我觉得这些跑步机可能会适合他们,”Arlene 解释道。Arlene 没有提前警告 Fit for Life 关于产品的变化。当 Fit for Life 收到跑步机时,是否有可执行的合同?如果是这样,以谁的条件?加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。
This is an odd situation where Arlene’s shipment is simultaneously an acceptance of the offer and a breach of the contract. §2-206(1)(b) and Official Comment 4 to §2-206 make it clear that the same shipment can indeed constitute both acceptance and a breach. Since Arlene has not seasonably notified Fit for Life that the treadmills were offered only as an accommodation to Fit for Life, then the shipment of these non-conforming goods will suffice as conduct which accepts Fit for Life’s offer. Had Arlene given seasonably notification that the shipment of the treadmills was intended only as an accommodation to the buyer, then the conduct of shipping will not be acceptance but instead a counteroffer. Given that Arlene failed to give seasonably notification to Fit for Life, the terms of this contract will be governed by Fit for Life’s purchase order. Even if she sends an acknowledgement form after the fact, it will be merely a proposal for modification.
这是一个奇怪的情况,Arlene 的发货同时是接受报价和违反合同。 §2-206(1)(b) 和 §2-206 的官方评论 4 明确指出,同一货物确实可以同时构成验收和违约。由于 Arlene 没有及时通知 Fit for Life 跑步机仅作为 Fit for Life 的住宿提供, 因此这些不合格商品的运输将足以作为接受 Fit for Life 报价的行为 。如果 Arlene 及时通知跑步机的发货只是为了给买方提供住宿 ,那么发货行为将不是接受,而是还价。鉴于 Arlene 未能及时通知 Fit for Life,本合同的条款将受 Fit for Life 的采购订单管辖。即使她在事后发送了一份确认表,它也只是一个修改的建议。
Problem 3.2(c)
问题 3.2(c)
Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal neither ships the goods nor sends an acknowledgement form for three months, because the original purchase order got lost on Arlene’s desk. When Arlene finds it three months later, she sends an acknowledgement form in response by overnight mail. When Fit for Life receives the belated acknowledgement form, is there an enforceable contract? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是 Heavy Metal 在三个月内既不发货也不发送确认表,因为原始采购订单在 Arlene 的办公桌上丢失了。三个月后,当 Arlene 找到它时,她通过隔夜邮件发送了一份确认表作为回应。当 Fit for Life 收到迟来的确认表时,是否有可执行的合同?加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。
Assuming that a three-month response period is neither prompt nor seasonable, then there is no enforceable contract here, neither under §2-206(1)(b), which says “An offer must be accepted by a prompt promise to ship or a prompt shipment”, nor under §2-207(1) battle of the forms, which requires “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance”
假设三个月的回复期既不及时也不适时,那么这里没有可执行的合同,无论是根据 §2-206(1)(b) 的规定,“必须通过及时承诺发货或及时发货来接受要约”,也不是根据 §2-207(1) 的形式之战,它要求“明确和适时地表示接受”.
Problem 3.2(d)
问题 3.2(d)
Same facts as part (a), except that Fit for Life’s purchase order includes a clause within that form’s boilerplate language that says, “This purchase order can only be accepted by an acknowledgement form that agrees with all of the terms contained in this purchase order. If the acknowledgement form varies in any way from the terms of this purchase order, then there is no contract.” If Heavy Metal has not yet sent the stair climbers and responses to this purchase order with its standard acknowledgement form, is there an enforceable contract? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是 Fit for Life 的采购订单在该表格的样板语言中包含一个条款,该条款规定:“ 此采购订单只能通过同意此采购订单中包含的所有条款的确认表来接受 。如果确认表与此采购订单的条款有任何差异,则不存在合同。“ 如果 Heavy Metal 尚未使用其标准确认表发送楼梯爬升者和对该采购订单的回复,是否有可执行的合同?加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。
There is no enforceable contract here. In light of the language in the purchase order, there is no contract by the writings here. If there were shipment and acceptance which follows the exchange of these forms, then there is a contract by conduct, and the terms in the two forms might then become relevant under §2-207(3). But for now, there is no offer and acceptance that is necessary for contract formation.
这里没有可执行的合同。 根据采购订单中的语言,这里的文字没有合同。如果在交换这些表格后有装运和验收,则存在行为合同,并且这两种表格中的条款可能根据 §2-207(3) 变得相关。但就目前而言,没有签订合同所需的要约和接受。
Problem 3.3(a)
问题 3.3(a)
Another recent situation that Arlene wants to ask about relates to a purchase order the company just received from Sportlife, a regional sporting goods chain, to buy a dozen 580XL circuit trainer weight machines for current shipment. In this case, Arlene said, immediately after receiving the purchase order she did send Sportlife an acknowledgment from before shipping the machines. In fact, although she sent the acknowledgment, she still has not shipped the machines to Sportlife. What bothers Arlene about this order is that she had a phone conversation yesterday with a friend in the industry, who strongly advised Arlene not to do business with Sportlife. “They’re more trouble than they’re worth,” her friend had told her. “They make your life miserable by complaining about problems with the orders that don’t even exist.”
Arlene 想询问的另一个最新情况与该公司刚刚从区域体育用品连锁店 Sportlife 收到的采购订单有关 ,该订单购买了十几台 580XL 循环训练器重量器械用于当前发货。在这种情况下,Arlene 说,在收到采购订单后,她确实在发货前立即向 Sportlife 发送了确认 。事实上,尽管她发送了确认,但她仍然没有将机器运送到 Sportlife。这项命令让 Arlene 感到困扰的是,她昨天与一位业内朋友通了电话,这位朋友强烈建议 Arlene 不要与 Sportlife 做生意 。“他们比得起的麻烦更大,”她的朋友告诉她。“他们抱怨甚至不存在的订单问题,让你的生活变得痛苦。”
Arlene wants to know whether it’s too late to get out of this contract. IN looking at the purchase order and the acknowledgement form, you notice that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgment form requires that all disputes be brought to binding arbitration. The purchase order says nothing about the mode of dispute resolution. Can Arlene still avoid this deal? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. Could she have avoided it under the common law?
Arlene 想知道现在摆脱这份合同是否为时已晚。在查看采购订单和确认表时,您注意到 Heavy Metal 的确认表要求将所有争议提交具有约束力的仲裁。采购订单没有说明争议解决的方式。Arlene 还能避免这笔交易吗?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。根据普通法,她可以避免这种情况吗?
ANSWER: The seller Arlene’s acknowledgment form will constitute an acceptance under §2-207(1) even though it states the terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon. The basic gist(要点) of §2-207(1) is that the acceptance does not have to agree in every respect with the offer in order to be counted as an acceptance. And that’s in contrast with the common law in the so-called mirror-image rule where if the acceptance did not agree in every respect with the offer it was not considered an acceptance. Instead, it is a counter-offer
回答: 卖方 Arlene 的确认表将构成 §2-207(1) 下的接受,即使它陈述了与要约或商定的条款不同的附加条款或不同于要约或商定的条款。§2-207(1) 的基本要点是,接受不必在所有方面都同意要约才能算作接受。这与普通法中的所谓镜像规则形成鲜明对比,在普通法中,如果接受在各个方面都与要约不一致,则不被视为接受。相反,它是一个还价.
Does that mean that every acceptance, no matter how variant in its terms and no matter what it says, will count as an acceptance under §2-207(1)? The answer to that question is no. There are two ways in which an acknowledgment form such as Arlene’s in this case would not constitute a valid acceptance. Although neither of those two ways seems present in this case. The first way is if the acceptance is for some reason is not a “definite and seasonable expression” of acceptance. How would that be the case? It could be not timely enough or it could be the buyer gives a purchase order for apples and the seller response, “I accept your offer to buy oranges.” And apples and oranges, that is not a definite and seasonable acceptance because it is not accepting what was offered. The second way under §2-207(1) for a written acceptance not to count as an acceptance is if you use the magic language expressly if you make your acceptance expressly conditional on buyer’s assent to any additional revision of the terms that are in your acceptance.
这是否意味着每一次接受,无论其条款多么不同,也无论它说了什么,都将算作 §2-207(1) 下的接受? 这个问题的答案是否定的。在两种情况下,确认表(如 Arlene)不构成有效的接受。尽管在这种情况下,这两种方式似乎都不存在。第一种方法是,如果接受是出于某种原因,而不是接受的 “ 明确和适宜的表达 ”。情况会怎样呢?这可能是不够及时的,或者可能是买方给出了苹果的采购订单,而卖方回应说:“我接受你购买橙子的提议。而苹果和橙子,那不是一个确定的、合时宜的接受,因为它不是接受所提供的。根据 §2-207(1) 的第二种方式,书面接受不算作接受的方式是,如果您明确使用魔术语言 , 如果您明确表示接受的条件是买方同意对您接受的条款进行任何额外修订。
Problem 3.3(b)
问题 3.3(b)
Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form purports to accept Sportife’s offer to buy a dozen Lifecycle stationary bikes rather than a dozen 580XL circuit trainer weight machines. Prior to the shipment by Heavy Metal, is there a contract at all? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Heavy Metal 的确认表旨在接受 Sportife 的提议,购买十几辆 Lifecycle 固定自行车,而不是十几台 580XL 循环训练器举重器械。在使用 Heavy Metal 发货之前,有没有合同?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。
ANSWER: this is the paradigm of apples and oranges. Prior to shipment by the seller, is there a contract at all here? And the answer is there is not. This is the so-called apples and oranges paradigm, where the term of the offer and acceptance are so fundamentally at odds with one another that it really cannot be said that there has been a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance by the seller. Therefore, there is no contract yet under §2-207(1). Arlene is still free to avoid the deal. This then raises the questions, so what is the test for deciding how much divergence there has to be between offer and acceptance before we can say that the acceptance is not a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance? One approach would be to say in order for it to be a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, it at least has to agree on the type of goods sold, the quantity, and the price. You would need those three in order to have a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy which brings us back to §2-204(3), which is one of the two tests for having an enforceable contract under Article 2. In order to have a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy, you have to at least have to be talking about the same type of product, the same number of product, and the same price for the product. One thing that we do know is that you can’t say the test for apples and oranges here is materiality. In other words, you can’t say the acceptance for it to count as an acceptance at least cannot include any different terms that are materially different or additional terms that are material terms and if there are materially different terms, then that shouldn’t count as an acceptance. We know that we cannot say that because under §2-207(2)(b), we have a specific mechanism for deciding what to do with terms that are materially different. So that’s assuming that we can have a contract by the exchange of forms with some of the terms in the acceptance are actually material terms that are additional and we just have to deal with them. Those material terms do not stop it from being a contract. So materiality is not the test.
答案: 这就是苹果和橙子的范式。在卖方发货之前,这里是否有合同?答案是没有。这就是所谓的苹果和橙子范式,其中要约和接受的条款从根本上彼此不一致,以至于真的不能说卖方已经明确和季节性地表达了接受。因此,根据 §2-207(1) 尚无合同。Arlene 仍然可以自由地避免这笔交易。这就提出了问题,那么,在我们说接受不是明确和适时的接受表达之前,决定要约和接受之间必须存在多少差异的测试是什么呢? 一种方法是说 , 为了使它成为一个明确和适时的接受表达,它至少必须就销售的商品类型、数量和价格达成一致。您需要这三项才能有合理确定的基础来提供适当的补救措施 ,这让我们回到了 §2-204(3), 这是根据第 2 条拥有可执行合同的两项测试之一。为了有合理确定的依据来提供适当的补救措施 ,您至少必须谈论相同类型的产品、相同数量的产品和相同的产品价格。我们确实知道的一件事是,你不能说这里对苹果和橙子的测试是物质性。 换句话说,您不能说接受至少不能包括任何重大不同的不同条款或作为重要条款的附加条款,如果存在重大差异的条款,则不应被视为接受。我们知道我们不能这么说,因为根据 §2-207(2)(b), 我们有一个特定的机制来决定如何处理存在重大差异的条款。所以,这是假设我们可以通过交换表格来签订合同,接受中的一些条款实际上是附加的重要条款, 我们只需要处理它们。这些实质性条款并不能阻止它成为一份合同。 所以重要性不是测试。
Problem 3.3(c)
问题 3.3(c)
Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form also says, “THIS ACCEPTANCE IS EXPRESSLY MADE CONDITIONAL ON BUYER’S ASSENT TO ANY ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS CONTAINED IN THIS FORM.” Prior to shipment of the goods, can Arlene still avoid this deal? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是 Heavy Metal 的确认表还说,“本接受明确规定为买方同意本表格中包含的任何附加或不同条款。在货物发货之前,Arlene 还能避免这笔交易吗?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。
ANSWER: Prior to shipment of the goods, Arlene can still avoid this deal because this represents the second way in which a purported written acceptance might not count as an acceptance under §2-207(1). She used the magic language that appears in §2-207(1). The magic language in the sense that courts tend to be strict about which language qualify for the “unless” clause of §2-207(1), unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on the sense to the additional different term. So if you are going to qualify for the “unless” clause then you should just mimic those very words. It is not enough to say in the acceptance: “but my terms govern.” That does not do it, so you will have to use the words given in the statute if you don’t want your acceptance to count.
回答: 在货物装运之前,Arlene 仍然可以避免这笔交易,因为这代表了第二种方式,即所谓的书面接受可能不算作 §2-207(1) 下的接受。她使用了出现在 §2-207(1 ) 中的魔法语言 。 从某种意义上说,法院往往对哪种语言符合 §2-207(1) 的“除非”条款的条件很严格 ,除非明确规定接受是附加的不同术语的含义条件。 因此 , 如果你要符合“除非”子句的资格,那么你应该模仿这些词。在接受信中说:“但我的条件是正确的,这是不够的。那没有这样做,所以如果你不想让你的接受被计算在内,你将不得不使用法规中给出的词语。
Problem 3.3(d)
问题 3.3(d)
Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form also says, “THIS ACCEPTANCE IS EXPRESSLY MADE CONDITIONAL ON BUYER’S ASSENT TO ANY ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS CONTAINED IN THIS FORM,” and Arlene has both shipped the goods and accepted payment for them. Now is there a contract? If so, will disputes be subject to arbitration? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. What would the answers to those two questions be under the common law?
与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是 Heavy Metal 的确认表还说,“此接受明确以买方同意此表格中包含的任何附加或不同条款为条件 ”,并且 Arlene 已发货并接受付款。现在有合同吗?如果是这样,争议是否需要仲裁?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。在普通法下,这两个问题的答案是什么?
ANSWER: Yes there is a contract. This is an example of §2-207(3). The facts of this problem are very similar to what happened in the Belden case. In the Belden case, the court held that the exchange of writings by the two parties failed to establish contract because in the acknowledgment form, we had the magic language “this acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to different or additional terms”. So, no contract by the writing. But in Belden the conduct of the parties did establish a contract because there was shipment of the goods, acceptance of the goods, payment for the goods, and acceptance for the payments for the goods. So, if this is a contract, will disputes be subject to arbitration? The answer is under §2-207(3) the way we figure out terms is in this contract by conduct. The terms consist of those terms in which offer and acceptance agreed and they did not agree on arbitration plus UCC gap fillers. So, then we would look to the UCC gap fillers for mode of dispute resolution. The UCC gap fillers for mode of dispute resolution is not arbitration, rather it is the court’s litigation. How do we know this? There is no UCC provisions that says this explicitly but if you read the code provisions the assume mode of dispute resolution under the UCC is the court. One example of that can be found in §2-302(1) Unconscionability where it begins by says “if the court as a matter of law finds…” so it is just assuming that you are in front of a court.
回答: 是的 , 有合同。这是 §2-207(3) 的一个例子。这个问题的事实与 Belden 案中发生的情况非常相似。在 Belden 案中,法院认为,双方的书面交换未能建立合同,因为在确认书中,我们有神奇的语言“这种接受明确地以同意不同或附加条款为条件”。所以,没有书面合同。但在 Belden 案中,双方的行为确实建立了合同,因为有货物的装运、货物的验收、货物的付款以及货物的付款。那么,如果这是一份合同,争议会接受仲裁吗?答案是根据 §2-207(3) 我们计算条款的方式是在本合同中按行为计算。这些条款包括要约和接受达成一致,但未就仲裁加上 UCC 差距填补达成一致的条款。因此,我们将寻求 UCC 空白填补者作为争议解决模式。UCC 争议解决模式的空白填补者不是仲裁,而是法院的诉讼。我们是怎么知道的呢?没有 UCC 条款明确说明这一点,但如果您阅读法典条款,则 UCC 下的假定争议解决模式是法院。这方面的一个例子可以在 §2-302(1) 不合情理性中找到,它的开头是“如果法院依法发现......”所以这只是假设你在法庭前。
Under the common law, the mirror image rule and the last shot doctrine, we would have a contract by conduct here not by the writings. And the last form sent under the common law, here the seller’s acknowledgment form would govern the terms of the contract. And that is because under the common law the seller’s acknowledgment form is now considered a counteroffer because it does not mirror the terms of the purchase order. And the counteroffer was then accepted by the buyer’s conduct. Therefore under the common law’s last shot doctrine, this contract would include the arbitration clause that was [art of the seller’s acknowledgment form.
根据普通法 、镜像规则和最后一枪原则,我们将通过行为而不是书面形式签订合同。根据普通法发送的最后一份表格,这里的卖方确认表将管辖合同的条款。这是因为在普通法下,卖方确认书现在被视为还价,因为它不反映采购订单的条款。然后买方的行为接受了还价。 因此 , 根据普通法的最后一击原则,该合同将包括仲裁条款,该条款是 [卖方确认书的艺术。
Problem 3.4(a)
问题 3.4(a)
The next problem Arlene wants to talk about stems from her company’s sale of an industrial-level weight machine to a local Gold’s Gym franchise. It tunrs out that one of the cables on the machine broke during use and severely injured one of the Gold’s Gym patrons. The Gold’s Gym manager called Arlene last week and told her that if his patron sued the gym, Gold’s Gym would make Heavy Metal responsible for all of the damages.
Arlene 想谈的下一个问题源于她的公司将一台工业级举重机出售给当地的 Gold's Gym 特许经营权。它显示 ,机器上的一根电缆在使用过程中断裂,并严重伤害了 Gold's Gym 的一名顾客。Gold's Gym 的经理上周打电话给 Arlene,告诉她如果他的顾客起诉健身房,Gold's Gym 将让 Heavy Metal 承担所有损失。
This transaction involved a purchase order from Gold’s, an acknowledgment form from Heavy Metal, and then shipment of the machine from Heavy Metal to Gold’s. Gold’s purchase order specifically reserved all of its remedies and mentioned nothing about the mode of dispute resolution. Heavy Metal’s acknowledgment form had a conspicuous disclaimer of consequential damages and a provision that all disputes would be subject to binding arbitration (but no “expressly made conditional” language). Is there a contract at all? Will the consequential damages disclaimer holder? Will disputes be subject to arbitration? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
该交易涉及 Gold's 的采购订单、Heavy Metal 的确认表,然后将机器从 Heavy Metal 运送到 Gold's。Gold 的采购订单明确保留了其所有补救措施,并且没有提及争议解决方式。Heavy Metal 的确认书中有一个醒目的间接损害免责声明,并规定所有争议都将接受具有约束力的仲裁(但没有“明确制定的有条件”语言)。有合同吗?间接损害赔偿免责声明持有人会吗?争议是否需要仲裁?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。
ANSWER: Clearly, we have a contract here. And when it was formed was when the seller sent the acknowledgment form in response to the buyer’s purchase order. The fact that the seller’s acknowledgement form contained both a different term and an additional term did not prevent it from being a valid acceptance. The different term is the consequential damages disclaimer. The additional term is the arbitration clause. And again, even if we consider these differences to be material differences, that should not change things because §2-207(2)(b) specifically contemplates the possibility of a valid written acceptance that includes a terms that materially alters the offer. Then the question is which subsection of 2-207 will govern terms here? Not §2-207(3), only go to that subsection to figure out terms in a case where we did not have a contract by the writing. In other words, a case where there was an attempt to do a contract by the writings but the contract by the writings failed because the seller’s acknowledgement form had the expressly made conditional language or it failed because it was not a definite or seasonable expression of acceptance. In this case, the writings of the parties do establish a contract. Because we have a contract by the writings, that when formation occurred. We determine terms under §2-207(2); it is what we use in a case where we have a contract that was formed by the writings even if we are at a point in time when clearly the parties’ conducts also indicates they accepted contract. Will consequential damages be part of the contract? Look at §2-207(2), it says by its terms that it will handle additional terms; it does not say handling different terms. Then if you look at Official Comment 3 to §2-207 that says whether or not additional or different term become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection 2. So the statute says one thing the comment says something else. Courts actually do neither of those things; courts use the knockout rule. The knockout rule in the case of different terms is fairly straightforward; it simply says when you have different terms than offer and acceptance you just knock them out and then you go with the UCC gap filler. So here we knock out the “yes consequential damages, the no consequential damages” and we go to the UCC and say as a default matter does the UCC assume that the consequential damages are available? The answer is the UCC assumes all remedies are available including consequential damages. Will dispute be subject to arbitration? The arbitration clause is an additional term and therefore will be handled under §2-207(2). We start out under §2-207(2) by saying the additional terms are mere proposals, they don’t become part of the contract unless the other side specifically accepts them; unless, we got a couple of merchants. And between merchants these additional terms will become part of the contract unless one of three things is true. The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; they materially alter it; or notification of objection to them has already been given or has been given within a reasonable time after notice of them has been received. Does the addition of the arbitration clause materially alter this contract? What guidance are we given on this in the comment? If we look at Official Comment 4 and 5 to §2-207, they give examples of clause, which do and do not involve material alterations and those examples give us no clear answer on this question. But the key we are told in Official Comment 5 is this whether the additional term involves “an element of unreasonable surprise.” The determination of that will turn in part on how common the additional term is within a particular industry. If it is fairly common then it may not be material. If it’s fairly uncommon then it’s probably going to be considered material and even between merchants it won’t become part of the contract.
回答:显然,我们在这里有一份合同。 当它形成时,卖方发送确认表以响应买方的采购订单。卖方的认收书同时包含不同的条款和附加条款这一事实并不妨碍其成为有效的接受。不同的术语是间接损害免责声明。附加术语是仲裁条款。同样,即使我们认为这些差异是重大差异,也不应该改变事情,因为 §2-207(2)(b) 特别考虑了有效书面接受的可能性,其中包括对要约有重大影响的条款。那么问题是 2-207 的哪一个小节将管辖这里的术语?不是 §2-207(3), 只去那个小节来弄清楚我们没有书面合同的情况下的条款。换句话说,试图通过书面合同订立合同,但书面合同失败是因为卖方的确认书有明确的条件语言,或者因为它不是明确或适宜的接受表达而失败。在这种情况下,双方的著作确实建立了合同。因为我们有一份书面合同,那是形成的时候。我们根据 §2-207(2) 确定条款; 这是我们在拥有由文字形成的合同的情况下使用的,即使我们处于一个明显双方的行为也表明他们接受了合同的时间点。 间接损害赔偿会成为合同的一部分吗? 看看 §2-207(2), 它在其条款中说它将处理额外的术语;它没有说处理不同的术语。然后,如果您查看 §2-207 的官方评论 3, 其中指出 附加条款或不同条款是否成为协议的一部分,取决于第 2 小节的规定。 所以法规说的是一件事,评论说的是另一件事。法院实际上两者都不做;法院使用淘汰赛规则 。 在不同条款的情况下 , 淘汰赛规则相当简单 ;它只是说,当你有与报价和接受不同的条款时,你只需将它们淘汰,然后你使用 UCC 差距填充器。因此,在这里,我们剔除“是的间接损害赔偿,没有间接损害赔偿”,然后我们去向 UCC 说,作为默认事项,UCC 是否假定间接损害赔偿是可用的?答案是 UCC 假设所有补救措施都可用,包括间接损害赔偿。 争议是否需要仲裁? 仲裁条款是一个附加条款,因此将根据 §2-207(2) 处理 。我们从 §2-207(2) 开始说附加条款只是提案,除非另一方明确接受它们,否则它们不会成为合同的一部分; 除非我们有几个商人。在商家之间,这些附加条款将成为合同的一部分,除非满足以下三个条件之一。 要约明确限制接受要约的条款;他们在物质上改变了它;或已发出反对通知,或已在收到反对通知后的合理时间内发出。 增加仲裁条款是否对本合同有重大影响?我们在评论中对此给出了什么指导? 如果我们看一下 §2-207 的官方评论 4 和 5,它们给出了条款的例子,这些例子涉及和不涉及重大修改,这些例子在这个问题上没有给我们明确的答案。但是,我们在官方意见 5 中被告知的关键是,附加条款是否涉及“不合理意外的元素”。对此的确定将部分取决于附加术语在特定行业中的普遍程度。如果它相当普遍 , 那么它可能不是实质性的。如果它相当不常见 , 那么它可能会被视为重大问题,即使在商家之间,它也不会成为合同的一部分。
Problem 3.4(b)
问题 3.4(b)
Same facts as part (a), except suppose that Heavy Metal has sold various weight machines to this Gold’s Gym franchise during the past several months, with each side always using the same forms. Imagine that when this relationship between buyer and seller began, the manager of the Gold’s franchise actually read Heavy Metal’s acknowledgment form. At the time, he noticed the arbitration clause, called Arlene, and told her that he didn’t like the arbitration clause in her form. Arlene replied, “Take it or leave it.” The Gold’s manager said, “Well, I guess so.” Now Arlene wants to cite that one=time conversation to make the following argument: as far as the arbitration clause goes, this isn’t §2-207 case at all, since the buyer in fact specifically assented to this additional term on Arlene’s acknowledgment form. Will this argument work for Arlene?
与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是假设 Heavy Metal 在过去几个月中向 Gold's Gym 特许经营权出售了各种重量器械,每一方总是使用相同的表格。想象一下,当买卖双方之间的这种关系开始时,Gold's 特许经营权的经理实际上阅读了 Heavy Metal 的确认表。当时,他注意到了名为 Arlene 的仲裁条款,并告诉她他不喜欢她形式的仲裁条款。“阿琳回答说:”要么接受,要么离开。The Gold 的经理说,“嗯,我想是的。现在 Arlene 想引用那个 one=time 对话来提出以下论点:就仲裁条款而言,这根本不是 §2-207 案件,因为买方实际上在 Arlene 的确认表上明确同意了这个附加条款。这个论点对 Arlene 有用吗?
ANSWER: this is not a §2-207 case at all. The reason is that the buyer, in fact, specifically assented to these additional terms on Arlene’s acknowledgement form. And the question is will this argument work for the seller? Virtually all courts and commentators will agree that §2-207 was not meant to apply to dickered(讨价还价) terms, but rather is intended only to apply to boiler plate terms on conflicting forms that are presumed not to be read closely by either side. If you look at Official Comment 1 to §2-207, it specifically talks about that scenario. The question now is what does it take for a term in a form to become a dickered term that does not get handled by §2-207 rather than a boiler plate term? Most courts would say for the seller’s argument to work in a case like this “the buyer’s assent to the unwelcomed term in the seller’s form has to be fairly unequivocal, very clear.” Diamond Fruit v. Krack corporations, had facts very similar to these.
回答: 这根本不是 §2-207 案件。原因是买方实际上在 Arlene 的确认表上明确同意了这些附加条款。问题是 这个论点对卖家有用吗?几乎所有的法院和评论员都会同意,§2-207 并非旨在适用于 dickered(讨价还价) 术语,而仅适用于假定任何一方都没有仔细阅读的相互冲突形式的样板术语。如果你看一下 §2-207 的官方委员会 1,它专门谈到了这种情况。现在的问题是,如何才能使表单中的术语成为 §2-207 而不是样板术语处理的模糊术语 ?大多数法院会说,要使卖方的论点在这样的案件中起作用,“买方对卖方表格中不受欢迎的条款的同意必须相当明确,非常明确。Diamond Fruit 诉 Krack 公司的事实与这些非常相似。
Problem 3.4(c)
问题 3.4(c)
Same facts as part (a), except that this transaction had begun with an oral contract between Arlene and the Gold’s manager. The terms of the oral contract included the fact that Heavy Metal would not be responsible for consequential damages. Following the oral contract, Gold’s sent Arlene a written confirmation. That confirmation stated the terms of the oral contract, including type of machine and price, but it that the seller would be responsible for consequential damages. Further, the confirmation said, “THIS ACCEPTANCE IS EXPRESSLY MADE CONDITIONAL ON SELLER’S ASSENT TO THE ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS CONTAINED IN THE CONFIRMATION.” There has been no performance yet by either side. Arlene comes to you and says that she wants to enforce the oral contract, but only if she is not responsible for consequential damages. (1) What effect, if any, should be given to the “expressly made conditional” clause contained in the confirmation? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. (2) At this point, can Arlene enforce the sale according to the terms of the oral contract (i.e., no consequential damages)? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. (3) What if Gold’s confirmation had included not only a different term (seller’s responsibility for consequential damages), but also an additional term (e.g., “delivery must take place on a Thursday”)? Would the additional term become part of the contract? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与(a)部分的事实相同,只是这笔交易是从 Arlene 和 Gold 的经理之间的口头合同开始的。口头合同的条款包括 Heavy Metal 不对间接损害负责的事实。口头合同签订后,Gold's 向 Arlene 发送了一份书面确认。该确认书规定了口头合同的条款,包括机器的类型和价格,但卖方将负责间接损害。此外,确认书还说,“此接受明确以卖方同意确认书中包含的附加或不同条款为条件。双方都没有表现。Arlene 来找你,说她想执行口头合同,但前提是她不对间接损害负责。(1) 确认书中包含的“明确订立的条件”条款(如有)应具有什么效力?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。(2) 此时,Arlene 能否根据口头合同的条款(即无间接损害)强制执行销售?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。(3) 如果 Gold 的确认书不仅包括一个不同的条款(卖方对间接损害的责任),还包括一个附加条款(例如,“交货必须在星期四进行”)怎么办?附加条款会成为合同的一部分吗?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。
ANSWER: (1) the clause tracks the language of §2-207(1), where the provision in that section begins “unless acceptance is expressly made conditional”, but that provision is intended to apply only to a case of written acceptance rather than a written confirmation. Why is that? If there is a true confirmation (here, if this is a confirmation), then by definition there has to be an already existing contract. If there is an already existing contract, why should one party by sending the confirmation with an expressly conditional clause be able to unilaterally escape from an already concluded contract? Or to put this in another way, once you send a confirmation, it is too late to condition your acceptance since by definition you have already accepted or else you would not have an oral contract. It is too late to make your acceptance conditional on something. We should not give any weight to that clause.
答案:(1) 该条款沿用了 §2-207(1) 的措辞,其中该条款的开头是“除非明确规定接受是有条件的”,但该条款仅适用于书面接受的情况,而不是书面确认的情况。为什么?如果有真正的确认(在这里,如果这是一个确认),那么根据定义 ,必须有一个已经存在的合约。如果已经存在合同,为什么一方通过发送带有明确条件条款的确认函可以单方面逃避已经订立的合同?或者换句话说,一旦您发送了确认,现在以接受为时已晚,因为根据定义,您已经接受了,否则您将不会有口头合同。现在以某件事为条件让你接受已经太晚了。我们不应该对该条款给予任何重视。
(2) What should we do with a different term in a single confirmation? Should we use the knockout rule? The answer is probably not. It would seem unfair to use the knock out rule that we normally apply with different terms in a true offer/ acceptance in writing. Why doesn’t it seem right to use the knock out rule with a different term in a single confirmation? Because doing so could sometime enable the sender, here the buyer, to unilaterally change the terms of an already concluded oral contract and the reason that would occur here is that if we use the knock out rule and we go to the UCC gap filler for remedies, then the buyer will get what they want unilaterally after having concluded an oral contract. That is not fair. One party should not be able to change the terms after the fact. If we cannot use the knock out rule with a different term in a single confirmation, then what do you do with that term? Probably to consider the different term to be mere proposal that would only become part of the contract if it is expressly agreed to by the recipient, which in this case, it was not.
(2) 我们应该如何处理单个确认中的不同项?我们应该使用 Knockout 规则吗? 答案可能不是。在 真正的书面要约/接受中使用我们通常与不同条款一起应用的淘汰规则似乎不公平。 为什么在单个确认中使用不同的术语使用 knock out 规则似乎不正确? 因为这样做有时可能会使发件人(这里的买方 ) 能够单方面更改已经签订的口头合同的条款 ,这里出现的原因是,如果我们使用淘汰规则并寻求 UCC 填补缺口的补救措施,那么买方将在签订口头合同后单方面得到他们想要的东西。这不公平。一方不应能够在事后更改条款。 如果我们不能 在单个确认中将淘汰规则与不同的术语一起使用,那么您如何处理该术语? 可能认为不同的条款只是提案,只有在 接收者明确同意的情况下才会成为合同的一部分,在这种情况下,事实并非如此。
(3) What should be done with an additional rather than a different term in a single confirmation? With an additional term, it is fair for the additional term to be included or not according to the dictates of §2-207(2), the recipient of the confirmation can avoid the inclusion of the additional term if they want simply by objecting to it under §2-207(2)(c). And it that way it wont become part of the contract. Maybe you would argue that the recipient of the confirmation of a different would have the same right to object. But with a different term, the recipient has already, in effect, objected by earlier agreeing to a term in the oral contract that contradicts the newly proposed term in the confirmation. That is why you cannot make the same argument with a different term to a single confirmation to an oral contract.
(3) 在单个确认中,应该如何处理附加项而不是不同的项? 对于附加条款,根据 §2-207(2) 的规定,是否包含附加条款是公平的,如果确认的接受者愿意,只需根据 §2-207(2)(c) 提出反对即可避免加入附加条款。这样它就不会成为合同的一部分。也许你会争辩说,不同确认的接收者也有同样的反对权。但是,对于不同的条款,收款人实际上已经通过早些时候同意口头合同中的条款来反对,该条款与确认书中新提议的条款相矛盾。这就是为什么你不能用不同的条款来提出相同的论点,而不是对口头合同的单一确认。
Problem 3.5
问题 3.5
Arlene tells you that she is tired of talking about mistakes she may have made in the past. She now wants to know how she can avoid problems in the future. In particular, she wants to know if there is something else she should include in her form or if there is some procedure she should follow to ensure that her “exclusion of consequential damages” clause becomes a valid term of every sale that she makes. Do you have any suggestions to her? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
Arlene 告诉你,她厌倦了谈论她过去可能犯的错误。她现在想知道如何避免将来出现问题。特别是,她想知道 她的表格中是否应该包含其他内容,或者她是否应该遵循一些程序来确保她的“排除间接损害”条款成为她进行的每笔销售的有效条款。你对她有什么建议吗?《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。
ANSWER: whenever the offeree like seller here wants to include a term that is contrary to a UCC gap filler and consequential damages exclusion is contrary to a UCC gap filler; so, it is going to be difficult for the offeree to control the terms of acceptance. Even if Heavy Metal, the seller, were to make its acceptance expressly conditional on the offer’s assent to any different or additional terms contained in the acknowledgment form, what would happen there? Well, it would keep this from being a contract by the writings but ultimately if they performed it would become a contract by conduct. Under 2-207(3), we look for the terms that match. And if they are not matching we go to the gap fillers. And the gap fillers say that consequential damages are, indeed, available. So how could Arlene make the consequential damages disclaimer a dickered term? Well, the way to do that is to insist that the buyer separately sign in return of provision indicating that the buyer specifically assents to the disclaimer of consequential damages. If the buyer will not agree to this, then Arlene the seller could simply refuse to ship at that point. That is what she could do if this was that important to her. What are the problems with that approach? First, there is a business problem, is the seller Arlene willing to forgo the deal unless the buyer is willing to sign the disclaimer of consequential damages? To put this in another way, does Arlene really have the leverage to insist on that provision or can her buyers buy her equipments for a similar cost for companies that do not require such remedies exclusion? Second, even if Arlene does have the leverage, it is a somewhat cumbersome process to get that signature before you finally ship the goods?
回答: 每当受要约人(如此处的卖方)想要包含与 UCC 填缝条款相悖的条款,并且间接损害赔偿排除条款与 UCC 填缝条款相悖时;因此,受要约人将很难控制接受条款。即使卖方 Heavy Metal 明确表示接受要约的条件是同意确认书中包含的任何不同或附加条款,会发生什么情况?嗯,这将使这不成为书面合同,但最终如果他们履行了,它将成为行为合同。在 2-207(3) 下,我们查找匹配的术语。如果它们不匹配 ,我们就会去找补空者。而填补空白的人说,间接损害赔偿确实是可用的。那么,Arlene 如何使间接损害赔偿免责声明成为一个模糊的术语呢?嗯,做到这一点的方法是坚持让买方单独签署以返回条款,表明买方明确同意间接损害的免责声明。如果买方不同意这一点,那么卖方 Arlene 可以在此时简单地拒绝发货。如果这对她来说那么重要,她可以这样做。这种方法有什么问题?首先,存在一个商业问题,除非买方愿意签署间接损害赔偿免责声明,否则卖方 Arlene 是否愿意放弃交易?换句话说,Arlene 真的有影响力坚持该条款,还是她的买家可以以类似的成本为不需要此类补救措施排除的公司购买她的设备?其次,即使 Arlene 确实有影响力,在你最终发货之前获得签名也是一个有点麻烦的过程吗?
FORMATION WITH LEASES, INTERNATIONAL SALES, AND REAL ESTATE PP. 93
与租赁、国际销售和房地产一起组建 第 93 页
4.1. a.
4.1. 一个。
You were working out at your fitness center after work one night last week, when who should you run into again but your one-tome law school classmate Deborah Swift (from Problem 1.6). Deborah told you that she was feeling bad about the “misunderstanding” the two of you had at your fifth law school reunion a few weeks ago. She also told you that since the reunion she has quit her job as a lawyer and has started her own business selling and leasing Rolls Royces. In any event, to make amends Deborah said that she would offer to lease you that same used Rolls Royce for two years, for just $250 per month. To avoid any confusion, Deborah said that this time she would put the offer in writing and would keep it open for five months.
上周的一个晚上 ,你下班后在健身中心锻炼 ,这时你应该再次遇到谁,而不是你的一本书法学院同学黛博拉·斯威夫特(来自问题 1.6)。黛博拉告诉你,她对几周前你们俩在第五次法学院同学聚会上的 “ 误会 ”感到难过 。她还告诉你,自从重聚后,她辞去了律师的工作,开始了自己的业务,销售和租赁劳斯莱斯 。无论如何,为了弥补,黛博拉说她愿意以每月 250 美元的价格将同一辆二手劳斯莱斯租给你两年。为避免混淆,黛博拉表示,这次她会以书面形式提出报价,并将保持开放五个月。
You agreed to pay Deborah $200 for “tying up” this car for five months, and she said she would even apply this money toward the first month’s lease payment should you choose to lease the car. After you paid Deborah and got her signed writing, you remembered that your Uncle Harry, the auto buff, was due to visit you in four months. You are also a little suspicious about the great lease rate for Deborah’s car. Are you safe to wait until Uncle Harry comes and looks at the car before exercising your option? U.C.C. §2A-205.
您同意向 Deborah 支付 200 美元,因为她将这辆车“ 捆绑 ” 了五个月,她说如果您选择租赁这辆车, 她甚至会将这笔钱用于第一个月的租赁付款。在你付了钱给黛博拉并让她签了字后,你记得你的哈利叔叔,汽车迷,将在四个月后来看你。您对 Deborah 的汽车的高租金也有点怀疑 。你等到哈利叔叔来看车后再行使你的选择权,你安全吗?加州大学 §2A-205.
The language of §2A-205 indicates that it wouldn’t be safe to wait, since it says the period of irrevocability cannot exceed 3 months. However, under common law, firm offer is generally enforceable when there is consideration. So this contract would be enforceable under common law. §2A-205 creates a limited exception to the common law rule that firm offers, without consideration, are unenforceable. But in this problem, the lessee paid for the option, so there is no need to look to §2A-205 as a way to support the option that he specifically paid for. The gap-filling function of §2A-205 is in situation under common law where firm offers are not supported by consideration. §2A-205 is only relevant when there is a firm offer that is not supported by consideration, which is not the case in this problem. Here, the lessee can wait 5 months because he paid for it.
§2A-205 的语言表明等待是不安全的,因为它说不可撤销的期限不能超过 3 个月。然而,根据普通法,在有对价的情况下,确定要约通常是可执行的。 因此 ,该合同将根据普通法强制执行。 §2A-205 为普通法规则创造了一个有限的例外,即公司提供的产品在没有对价的情况下是不可执行的。但在这个问题上,承租人为期权支付了费用,因此没有必要将 §2A-205 作为支持他专门支付的期权的一种方式。§2A-205 的空白填补功能适用于普通法下没有对价支持确定要约的情况。 §2A-205 仅在存在没有对价支持的确定要约时才有意义,而此问题并非如此。在这里,承租人可以等待 5 个月,因为他支付了费用。
b.
Same facts as part (a), except you do not pay anything for Deborah’s signed writing promising the same lease deal. Are you safe now to wait until Uncle Harry comes to town? U.C.C. §2A-205.
与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是您无需为 Deborah 承诺相同租赁交易的签名文件支付任何费用。你现在可以等到哈利叔叔来镇上了吗?加州大学 §2A-205.
Now the lessee is not safe to wait because there is no consideration. He didn’t pay anything. Under common law, now the lessee does not have any right to enforce the firm offer. Now we look to §2A-205, which creates a limited exception to the unenforceability of firm offer. It is a limited exception because it limits the exception to an offer by merchants to lease goods, it has to be a signed writing, and the signed writing by its terms must be of assurance that will be hold open if not revocable during the time stated, but the period of irrevocability may not exceed 3 months.
现在承租人等待不安全,因为没有对价。他没有付任何钱。根据普通法,现在承租人无权执行确定要约。现在我们看看 §2A-205,它为确定要约的不可执行性创造了一个有限的例外。这是一个有限的例外,因为它将例外限制在商家租赁货物的要约上,它必须是签署的书面文件,并且签署的书面条款必须是保证,如果在规定的时间内不可撤销,则该保证将保持开放状态, 但不可撤销的期限不得超过 3 个月。
c.
What if under the facts of part (b), you did wait four months for Uncle Harry and then Deborah said that the offer was no longer open. Could you come up with another theory of enforcement outside of §2A-205? U.C.C. §1-103.
如果根据 (b) 部分的事实,您确实等了四个月才等到哈利叔叔,然后黛博拉说报价不再开放,该怎么办?您能否提出 §2A-205 之外的另一种执行理论?加州大学 §1-103.
Under §1-103(b), even in a case that is governed by the UCC, common law still applies unless it is specifically displaced. Here the principle of promissory estoppel under the common law could work if the lessee can argue that he detrimentally relied on the lessor’s promise. The lessee can make an argument that he would have accepted the lease offer immediately since it is such a good offer, but he detrimentally relied on the stated 5-month option period, and he reasonably believed that the deal could be checked out first with his uncle Harry when he comes in town in 4 months. So the lessee should be able to enforce this quasi-contract under the theory of promissory estoppel.
根据 §1-103(b),即使在受 UCC 管辖的案件中,普通法仍然适用,除非它被明确取代。在这里,如果承租人能够辩称他有害地依赖了出租人的承诺,那么普通法下的承诺禁止反言原则就可以发挥作用 。承租人可以争辩说,他会立即接受租赁报价,因为这是一个非常好的报价,但他有害地依赖了规定的 5 个月选择期,他有理由相信,当他 4 个月后来到镇上时,可以先与他的叔叔 Harry 一起完成交易。 因此 ,承租人应该能够在承诺禁止反言的理论下执行该准合同。
Courts are split on this. Some refuse to apply common law promissory estoppel on firm offers without consideration. Others decisions allow promissory estoppel theory to be used with firm offers that have no consideration.
法院在这个问题上存在分歧。有些人拒绝在没有对价的情况下对确定的要约适用普通法承诺禁止反言。 其他决定允许将承诺禁止反言理论与没有对价的确定要约一起使用。
4.2.
Recall the facts of Problem 3.4(a): Gym franchise sends purchase order to weight machine seller; seller responds with acknowledgement form that includes a different term (no consequential damages) and an additional term (arbitration); buyer and seller perform without discussing differences in forms, but later those differences become relevant when a gym patron is injured by the machine. Suppose now that the Gold’s Gym franchise in that problem had been based in Toronto, Canada, rather than in the United States. Suppose also that the consequential damages suffered by the buyer were purely economic rather than stemming from a patron’s personal injury (cf C.I.S.G. Art. 5). How would your answers to the three questions in Problem 3.4(a) change? Is there a contract at all? Will the consequential damages disclaimer hold? Will disputes be subject to arbitration? C.I.S.G. Arts. 1(1), 18(1), 19.
回想一下问题 3.4(a) 的事实:健身房特许经营权向称重机卖方发送采购订单;卖方以包括不同条款(无间接损害)和附加条款(仲裁)的确认表进行回应;买方和卖方在没有讨论形式差异的情况下进行表演,但后来当健身房顾客被机器伤害时,这些差异变得相关。现在假设 Gold's Gym 在这个问题上的特许经营权位于加拿大多伦多,而不是美国。再假设买方所遭受的间接损害纯粹是经济上的,而不是源于顾客的人身伤害( 参见 C.I.S.G. Art. 5). 您对问题 3.4(a) 中三个问题的回答会有什么变化?有合同吗?间接损害赔偿免责声明是否成立?争议是否需要仲裁?C.I.S.G. 第 1(1)、18(1)、19 条。
Under C.I.S.G. Art. 1, since this is a contract between parties whose place of business are in different contracting states and have adopted C.I.S.G. Thus the rule of C.I.S.G. applies unless the parties specifically opted out or one of the parties has no reason to know that they are dealing with a party in a different country, which is not the case in this problem. Putting the conducts of the parties aside, under C.I.S.G. Art. 19(1), the seller’s acknowledgement form constitutes as a counteroffer. However there is an exception under C.I.S.G. Art. 19(2), which says the seller’s acknowledgement form constitutes as an acceptance as long as the differences are not material. Under C.I.S.G. Art. 19(3), the difference here is material since it relates to one party’s liability and the settlement of dispute. Since the difference is material, then we are back to C.I.S.G. Art. 19(1). Thus the seller’s acknowledgement form is a counteroffer. The language of C.I.S.G. Art. 18(1) indicates that the ensuing conduct of the seller constitute an acceptance. Then under the common law “last shot” doctrine, if there is acceptance by conduct, then the one who sends the last form’s terms govern. Here because the seller fired the last shot, all of the seller’s terms will govern. Thus the consequential damages disclaimer and the arbitration clause become part of the terms of the contract.
根据 C.I.S.G. 第 1 条,由于这是营业地位于不同缔约国并已采用 C.I.S.G. 的各方之间的合同。 因此 ,C.I.S.G. 规则适用,除非各方明确选择退出,或者其中一方没有理由知道他们正在与不同国家的一方进行交易,而这个问题并非如此。撇开双方的行为不谈,根据 C.I.S.G. 第 19(1) 条,卖方的确认表构成还价。 但是 , 根据 C.I.S.G. 第 19(2) 条有一个例外,即只要差异不大,卖方的确认表就构成接受 。根据 C.I.S.G. 第 19(3) 条,这里的差异是重大的,因为它涉及一方的责任和争议的解决。既然差异是实质性的,那么我们回到 C.I.S.G. 第 19(1) 条。 因此 ,卖方的认收表格是还价。C.I.S.G. 第 18(1) 条的措辞表明,卖方随后的行为构成接受。然后,根据普通法的 “ 最后一枪 ” 原则,如果行为被接受,则发送最后表格条款的人具有管辖权。在这里,由于卖家打响了最后一枪, 因此将适用卖家的所有条款。 因此 ,间接损害赔偿免责声明和仲裁条款成为合同条款的一部分。
4.3. The following letter appeared in the syndicated real estate column of Robert Bruss:
4.3. 以下信件出现在 Robert Bruss 的联合房地产专栏中:
“Dear Bob: I am selling a house I inherited. I told the Realtor to advertise it ‘as is’ because it’s a fixer-upper. A buyer made a purchase offer I accepted. It contained a contingency for a professional inspection. That was fine with me. But the inspection revealed many defects, as I knew it would. Now the buyer refuses to complete the purchase unless I give her a $7,500 credit for repairs. To me, this looks like a $7,500 price reduction. Can the buyer force me to pay for these repairs?”
“ 亲爱的鲍勃:我要卖掉我继承的房子。我告诉房地产经纪人按原样宣传它, 因为它是一个固定的鞋面 。买家提出了一个购买报价,我接受了。它包含了进行专业检查的应急措施。这对我来说很好。但正如我所知道的那样,检查发现了许多缺陷。现在买家拒绝完成购买,除非我给她 7,500 美元的维修信用额度。在我看来,这看起来像是降价 7,500 美元。买家可以强迫我支付这些维修费用吗?“
Assume that the inspection contingency read as follows: “Buyer’s purchase offer is contingent on the buyer’s approval of a professional inspection report, which the buyer will arrange to have prepared within 14 days of this offer.” What would your answer be if you were Robert Bruss?
假设或有检查内容如下: “ 买家的购买报价取决于买家对专业检验报告的批准,买家将安排在此要约后的 14 天内准备该报告。“ 如果你是罗伯特·布鲁斯,你会怎么回答?
The buyer cannot force the seller to pay the $7,500. If the purchase offer is contingent on the buyer’s approval on professional inspection report, as is the case here, the buyer can cancel the sale if she does not approve the report. However, a professional inspection report cannot be used to force the seller to pay for the repairs. If the buyer does not want to pay for the repairs, she can either cancel the sale or waive the inspection approval contingency.
买方不能强迫卖方支付 7,500 美元。如果购买要约取决于买家对专业检验报告的批准(如此处所示),则买家如果不批准该报告,可以取消销售。但是,专业的检验报告不能用来强迫卖家支付维修费用。如果买方不想支付维修费用,她可以取消销售或放弃检查批准或有事项。
4.4. Recall our hypothetical home buyers, the Shaughnessys. On the recommendation of some friends, they approached real estate agent Patty Schaner, who agreed to “work with” them in their quest to purchase a house. Imagine that when then Shaughnessys found their “dream home,” listed by the Garners at $200,000, the Shaughnessys asked Patty if she could advise them on how little they could offer and still get the house. Patty then had a discussion with Bob Erker, the Garners’ agent, who told Patty that the Garners had said from the start that though they were listing the home at $200,000, they would be thrilled to get $180,000 for it. In light of this conversation with Bob, what can Patty advise the Shaughnessys concerning their question to her about what offer to make?
4.4. 回想一下我们假设的购房者 Shaughnessys。在一些朋友的推荐下,他们联系了房地产经纪人 Patty Schaner,后者同意与他们 “ 合作 ” 购买房屋。想象一下,当 Shaughnessys 找到他们的 “ 梦想之家”时,Garners 以 200,000 美元的价格挂牌出售,Shaughnessys 问 Patty 是否可以建议他们提供多少,但仍然可以得到这所房子。帕蒂随后与加纳的经纪人鲍勃·埃尔克 (Bob Erker) 进行了讨论,鲍勃· 埃尔克 (Bob Erker) 告诉帕蒂,加纳夫妇从一开始就说过,虽然他们以 200,000 美元的价格挂牌出售这套房子,但他们会很高兴得到 180,000 美元。 鉴于与 Bob 的这次谈话,Patty 可以就 Shaughnessys 向她提出的关于提出什么提议的问题提出什么建议?
Under Agency Law, Patty owes a fiduciary duty for the seller. And under common law, Patty also has an assumed duty of care to the buyer. Therefore, Patty should advise the Shaughnessys that she is legally a sub-agent of the seller, therefore she cannot disclose any information she might have about the seller’s minimum acceptable price for the house, because that could potentially be a breach of her fiduciary duty to the seller who is paying for her services.
根据代理法,Patty 对卖方负有信托义务。根据普通法,Patty 也对买方负有注意义务。因此,Patty 应该告诉 Shaughnessys,她在法律上是卖方的次级代理,因此她不能透露她可能拥有的有关卖方房屋最低可接受价格的任何信息,因为这可能违反她对支付她服务的卖方的信托义务。
STATUTE OF FRAUDS WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 109
商品销售欺诈法规 ,第 109 页
Problem 5.1(a) Mike Sims and Sara McCarthy are both in the furniture business. The two of them met at an industry convention where Mike alleges that they made an oral contract in which Mike agreed to sell Sara eight antique oak desks for $12,000 each, delivery to be made in five weeks to Sara’s out-of-state place of business. Two days after the oral contract, Mike sent Sara a confirming memorandum on his company’s letterhead that outlined the terms of their deal, including quantity. Consistent with normal practice, there was no signature on the memo. When Sara received the confirmation, she immediately called Mike and said, “You promised that you could send me the desks in three weeks, not five. As far as I’m concerned, our deal is off.” If Sara does nothing more, can Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §§2-201, 2-201(b)(37); Official Comment 37 to §1-201.
问题 5.1(a) Mike Sims 和 Sara McCarthy 都从事家具业务。他们俩在一次行业会议上相遇,迈克声称他们签订了一份口头合同,其中迈克同意以每张 12,000 美元的价格向 Sara 出售八张古董橡木书桌,并在五周内运送到 Sara 的州外营业地点。口头合同签订两天后,Mike 用公司的信笺向 Sara 发送了一份确认备忘录,其中概述了他们的交易条款,包括数量。与正常做法一致,备忘录上没有签名。当 Sara 收到确认后,她立即打电话给 Mike 说:“你答应过你可以在三周内把桌子寄给我,而不是五周。就我而言,我们的交易已经结束了。如果 Sara 什么都不做,Mike 可以执行与 Sara 的口头合同吗?《美国法典》第 2-201 款、2-201(b)(37) 款;第 1-201 节的官方评论 37。
ANSWER: whenever we look at a case involving §2-201, even a case like this that screams out merchants’ exceptions in §2-201(2), we never want to go to the exceptions found in §2-201(2) and (3) unless they tell me first do we have any kind of a writing that would qualify under 2-201(1). Because if we do then the exceptions that are found in subsections (2) and (3) are going to be irrelevant. When you look at 2-201, you always need to start your analysis by saying do we have any kind of writing that would satisfy 2-201. Part of that is going to be a function of who is it that is seeking to enforce the oral contract and who is it that is seeking to deny the existence of the oral contract.
回答: 每当我们查看涉及 §2-201 的案件时,即使是像这样在 §2-201(2) 中大声疾呼商家例外情况的案件,我们永远不想去看 §2-201(2) 和 (3) 中的例外情况,除非他们首先告诉我,我们是否有任何符合第 2-201(1) 条规定的文字。因为如果我们这样做,那么第 (2) 和 (3) 小节中的例外情况将无关紧要。当你看 2-201 时,你总是需要通过说我们是否有任何类型的写作可以满足 2-201 来开始你的分析。其中一部分将取决于谁在寻求执行口头合同,谁在寻求否认口头合同的存在。
So in this case, does the seller (Mike Sims) have a writing that meets the requirements of 2-201(1)? No, because he has nothing at all signed by the party against whom the enforcement is sought. That is why he cannot just go with 2-201(1) since he has no writings. Can he overcome the statute of fraud defense that is raised by his buyer by using one of the exceptions found in Subsections (2) or (3)? He can with the merchant’s exception in 2-201(2). This exception has a number of seven requirements. (1) Between merchants, (2) sent between a reasonable time, (3) purports to confirm a contract, (4) was sufficient against the sender, (5) was actually received by Sarah (in this case), (6) Sarah had reason to know what it was about, and (7) Sara failed to give written notice of objections within ten days. Are all of those requirements met in this case? YES! What about “sufficient against the sender” what does it mean in 2-201 to say that the confirmation must be sufficient against the sender? In that confirmation, if it incorporates the requirements of 2-201(1) meaning you have to have three things. The sender’s signature, quantity, and an indication of a contract for sale was made. Here, we have clearly an indication that a contract for sale was made and we have quantity. Do we have a signature and if we do not, then we cannot say that this confirmation is sufficient against the sender (that would mean that he doesn’t qualify for the merchants’ exceptions under 2-201(2)? The definition of signature in §1-201(b)(37) says a signature can be a symbol (here, the seller uses letterhead) and Official comment 37 to 1-201 says that a letterhead counts as a signature. So even though Mike did not sign the letter in a traditional way, the fact that he used the company’s letterhead would be sufficient for meeting the signature requirement. The only reason we have a signature requirement in a confirmation is this requirement for 2-201(2) that confirmation be sufficient against the sender, which means that if the sender were trying to avoid the oral contract could the recipient use that confirmation against the sender? Which means would that confirmation meet the requirement of 2-201(1).
那么在这种情况下,卖家 (Mike Sims) 是否有符合 2-201(1) 要求的文字? 不,因为他根本没有被寻求执行的一方签署的任何文件。这就是为什么他不能只选择 2-201(1),因为他没有著作。 他能否通过使用第 (2) 或 (3) 款中的例外情况之一来推翻买方提出的欺诈抗辩法规? 他可以,但 2-201(2) 中的商人例外。此例外有 7 个要求。(1) 在商家之间,(2) 在合理时间内发送,(3) 旨在确认合同,(4) 对发件人来说足以,(5) Sarah 实际收到 (在本例中),(6) Sarah 有理由知道它是关于什么的,以及 (7) Sara 未能在十天内发出书面反对通知。 在这种情况下 ,所有这些要求都满足 了吗 ? 是的! “对发件人来说足够”呢,在 2-201 中说确认必须对发件人来说足够是什么意思? 在该确认中,如果它包含 2-201(1) 的要求,这意味着您必须 具备三件事。发件人的签名、数量和销售合同的指示已经完成。在这里,我们清楚地表明已签订销售合同,并且我们有数量。我们有签名吗,如果没有,那么我们不能说这个确认对发件人来说就足够了(这意味着他不符合 2-201(2) 下的商家例外资格)? §1-201(b)(37) 中对签名的定义表明,签名可以是符号(此处,卖家使用信笺抬头),官方评论 37 至 1-201 表示信笺抬头算作签名。因此,即使 Mike 没有以传统方式签署这封信,他使用公司的信笺这一事实也足以满足签名要求。我们在确认函中要求签名的唯一原因是 2-201(2) 的要求,即确认足以对发件人不利,这意味着如果发件人试图避免口头合同,收件人是否可以使用该确认来对付发件人?这意味着该确认将满足 2-201(1) 的要求。
What about Sara’s objection to this confirmation? It was just oral so it would be ineffective under 2-201(2) even though it was otherwise timely within ten days.
Sara 对这个确认的反对呢? 它只是口头的,因此根据 2-201(2) 它是无效的,即使它在 10 天内是及时的。
Problem 5.1(b) Same facts as part (a), except Sara sends her objection in writing (the contents of which are quoted in part(a)). Can Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §2-201.
问题 5.1(b) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,但 Sara 以书面形式提出反对意见(其内容在 (a) 部分引用)。迈克可以执行与 Sara 的口头合同吗?《美国法典》第 2-201 条。
ANSWER: He cannot use the merchant’s exception here because the objection was made in writing. The content of the objections said in 2-201(2): “UNLESS WRITTEN NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO ITS CONTENTS IS GIVEN WITHIN TEN DAYS.” So, there has to be written notice of objection for it to be content. What does that mean, what is she objecting to? She is objecting to one particular term in this oral contract. Is she objecting to the very existence of the oral contract? No, she is just contesting delivery. So the question is under 2-201(2), what constitutes a valid objection in this content? If you were a court how would you read that? The code is long and does not answer everything. So most courts would say you have to object to the very existence of the entire contract. Keating would say if you objected to the quantity that would be the one term (e.g. 12 desks vs. 4 desks) in that case, the court would be limited to enforcing the quantity as discussed within contract. Because quantity has to be included in the contract. Most courts would say that objection to count to take it out of 2-201(2), you would have to object to the existence of the contract, not just to a term (putting aside the special term of quantity). If Mike wins here on this statute of frauds it does not mean that he gets his way on the delivery term. It just means he can go forward with trying to enforce the contract. He will still have to argue on the issue of the delivery (keeping litigation alive). If you lose the statute of fraud argument, then it is over. There is nothing for you and you cannot enforce the contract.
回答: 他不能在此处使用商家的例外,因为反对意见是以书面形式提出的。反对意见的内容在 2-201(2) 中说:“除非在十天内发出对其内容的书面反对通知。因此, 必须有书面反对通知才能使其内容。这是什么意思,她反对什么?她反对这份口头合同中的一个特定条款 。她是否反对口头合同的存在?不,她只是在争夺外卖。 那么问题在于 2-201(2) 项下,什么构成此内容中的有效反对意见?如果你是一个法院 , 你会怎么读?代码很长,不能回答所有问题。 所以大多数法院会说,你必须反对整个合同的存在。基廷会说,如果你反对在这种情况下的一个术语的数量(例如 12 张桌子对 4 张桌子),法院将仅限于执行合同中讨论的数量。因为数量必须包含在合同中。大多数法院会说,反对计数以将其从 2-201(2) 中删除,您将不得不反对合同的存在,而不仅仅是一个术语(撇开数量的特殊术语)。如果 Mike 在这个欺诈法规上获胜,这并不意味着他在交货期限内如愿以偿。这只是意味着他可以继续尝试执行合同。他仍然必须就交付问题进行争论(保持诉讼的进行)。如果你输了欺诈法规的争论,那么它就结束了。你什么都没有,你不能执行合同。
Problem 5.1(c) Same facts as part (a), except that Mike does not send a confirmation, but Sara sends Mike a check for $20,000, with “down payments for desk deal” marked on the memo line. To what extent may Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §2-201, Official Comment 2 to §2-201.
问题 5.1(c) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Mike 没有发送确认,但 Sara 给 Mike 寄了一张 20,000 美元的支票,在备注行上标有“桌面交易的首付款”。Mike 可以在多大程度上执行与 Sara 的口头合同?U.C.C. §2-201,官方评论 2 至 §2-201。
ANSWER: does Sara’s check count as a writing sufficient to satisfy 2-201(1)? The check got the signature and sufficient to indicate contract because it says on the memo line “down payment for the desk deal” and there is no quantity (quantity for at least quantity of one). Do any exceptions apply to allow the seller to enforce the contract for more than one desk? Probably two desks. Comment to 2 to 2-201 discusses just apportionment in case where there have been either partial delivery and acceptance of goods or partial payment of the purchase price and it says if the price has been paid the seller can be forced to deliver an apportionable part of the goods. Now in this case, it is the buyer rather than the seller who wants out of the deal, but presumably the same apportionment principle would apply. So Mike should be able to bring suit to enforce the contract against Sara for 2 desks given that the payment is stated to be a down payment rather than the full payment and the desks are $12,000 each. If the check was sent back and rejected (bounced), then you would not have a contract by conduct by both side. If Mike got the check and did not send the check back, that would still be acceptance.
回答:Sara 的支票是否算作足以满足 2-201(1) 的写作?支票有签名并足以表明合同,因为它在备注行上写着“桌面交易的首付款”并且没有数量(至少数量为 1 的数量)。是否有任何例外情况允许卖方为多个办公桌执行合同?可能是两张桌子。对 2 至 2-201 的评论讨论了在部分交付和接受货物或部分支付购买价格的情况下的分摊,它说如果价格已经支付,卖方可以被迫交付可分摊的部分货物。现在在这种情况下,希望从交易中获利的是买方而不是卖方,但大概相同的分摊原则将适用。 因此 , 迈克应该能够提起诉讼,对 Sara 执行 2 张办公桌的合同,因为付款被声明为首付款而不是全额付款,而且每张办公桌是 12,000 美元。如果支票被退回并被拒绝(退回),那么您将不会签订双方行为合同 。如果 Mike 收到了支票但没有寄回支票,那仍然是接受。
Problem 5.1(d) Same facts as part (a), except that Mike does not send a confirmation. When Mike eventually files a complaint in federal court to enforce the contract, Sara responds with a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion that states, “Even if everything alleged in plaintiff’s complaint is true, the contract is still unenforceable for lack of a writing.” Should the trial judge dismiss Mike’s complaint at this point? U.C.C. §2-201.
问题 5.1(d) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Mike 没有发送确认。当 Mike 最终向联邦法院提起诉讼以执行合同时,Sara 以 F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 动议作为回应,该动议指出,“即使原告投诉中指控的所有内容都是真实的,合同仍然因缺乏书面规定而无法执行。主审法官是否应该在此时驳回 Mike 的投诉?《美国法典》第 2-201 条。
ANSWER: Sara is saying “assuming that all of the facts alleged are true, there is still no claim as a matter of law”…is that an admission? The middle ground would be for the court to do some discovery and try to get the defendant to try to admit that there was at least an oral contract. If the defendant denies that there was no contract under oath, the run the risk of perjury and if it can be proved later. This was what was going on in the Seventh Circuit case, DV Industries, and the majority said that it was enough for the defendants to simply sign sworn affidavits that there was no oral contract. That was enough to dismiss the plaintiff’s case. The dissent said that we need to give the trial court the discretion in a case like this to allow the plaintiff to at least take the deposition of the defendants and see if they can get the defendants to admit the existence of an oral contract through the deposition. Some commentators think that in these statutes of fraud case that every case the plaintiff should be able to take defendants to trial to see if they can get the defendants to admit the existence of the oral contract at the trial. Majority would that that such notion is a waste of time and defeats the whole purpose of the statute of frauds which is to save conditional time; and if you let every one of these cases go to trial, you’re wasting a lot of time and defeating the purpose of the statute of fraud.
回答:Sara 的意思是“假设所有指控的事实都是真实的,那么在法律上仍然没有索赔 ”...... 这是承认吗?中间立场是让法院进行一些证据开示,并试图让被告尝试承认至少有一份口头合同。如果被告在宣誓后否认没有合同,则有伪证的风险,如果以后可以证明。这就是第七巡回法院 DV Industries 案中发生的事情,大多数人表示,被告只需签署没有口头合同的宣誓书就足够了。这足以驳回原告的案件。异议者说,在这样的案件中,我们需要赋予初审法院自由裁量权,允许原告至少接受被告的证词,看看他们是否能通过证词让被告承认口头合同的存在。一些评论员认为,在这些欺诈法规案件中,每个案件的原告都应该能够将被告带到审判中,看看他们是否能让被告在审判中承认口头合同的存在。大多数人认为这种观念是浪费时间,并且违背了欺诈法规的全部目的,即节省有条件的时间;如果你让这些案件中的每一个都进入审判阶段,你就是在浪费大量时间,违背了欺诈法规的目的。
Problem 5.1(e) Same facts as part (a), except that Mike does not send a confirmation. However, shortly after his oral contract with Sara, Mike enters into a written contract with another furniture seller to buy eight antique oak desks (of the type promised to Sara) for $10,000 each. Now can Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §§2-201,1-103.
问题 5.1(e) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Mike 没有发送确认。然而,在与 Sara 签订口头合同后不久,Mike 与另一家家具销售商签订了一份书面合同,以每张 10,000 美元的价格购买了八张古董橡木桌(承诺给 Sara 的那种)。现在迈克可以执行与 Sara 的口头合同吗?《美国法典》第 2-201 条,1-103 条。
ANSWER: Special manufacture is one form of detrimental reliance and in this case, there is no special manufacturing. Another form of detrimental reliance is to go out and procured the goods from another seller and now you are in a position to sell them to your buyer. Where might we go to allow the plaintiff to enforce this contract? §1-103(b) the common law is still out there unless it was specifically displaced by a provision of the UCC. Which cause of action? Detrimental reliance -promissory estoppel under the common law. Under this cause of action, you might be able to overcome the statute of frauds defense through this promissory estoppel theory of 1-103. The detrimental reliance is going out and purchasing the desks to fulfill what Mike though his obligations were to Sara. You could make a statutory argument under 2-201(1) that promissory estoppel should not be available and courts are split on this. Some courts believe that the specific exceptions listed in 2-201 were intended to be an exhaustive (or exclusive) list of the exceptions available to the statute of frauds requirements. Those courts point that the language in 2-201(1) that says “EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION, A CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE, UNLESS THERE IS SOME WRITING INDICATING ITS EXISTENCE.” Now there is a response to that argument. The response is this: 1-103 tells us that the common law should always supplement the provision of the UCC unless particular provision of the UCC has displaced the common law. So the uncertainty of this case is whether that first phrase in 2-201(1) was intended to displace the promissory estoppel doctrine that is otherwise available under the common law. So there is a split there.
回答: 特殊制造是有害依赖的一种形式,在这种情况下,没有特殊制造。另一种形式的有害依赖是出去从另一个卖家那里购买商品,现在您可以将它们出售给您的买家。我们可以去哪里让原告执行这份合同?§1-103(b) 普通法仍然存在,除非它被 UCC 的条款明确取代。哪个诉因?有害依赖 - 普通法下的承诺禁止反言。根据此诉因,您或许能够通过 1-103 的本位禁止反言理论来克服欺诈法规辩护。有害的依赖是出去购买书桌来履行迈克对萨拉的义务。您可以根据 2-201(1) 提出法定论点,即不应提供承诺禁止反言 ,法院对此存在分歧。一些法院认为,2-201 中列出的具体例外情况旨在成为欺诈法规要求可用的例外情况的详尽(或排他性)清单。这些法院指出,2-201(1) 中的语言说 “除非本节另有规定,否则合同不可执行,除非有一些书面表明其存在。现在有了对这个论点的回应。回应是这样的:1-103 告诉我们,普通法应始终补充 UCC 的规定,除非 UCC 的特定条款取代了普通法。 因此 ,本案的不确定性在于,2-201(1) 中的第一句话是否旨在取代普通法中其他可用的承诺禁止反言原则。 所以那里有一个分裂。
Problem 5.2 Arlene Ledger (from problem 3.2) is back at your law office to ask you about a couple of difficulties she has had with certain customers of her exercise equipment company, Heavy Metal. Several weeks ago, she had met with Tom Lauder, director of Monticello Senior Center, to discuss the possibility of Heavy Metal manufacturing three identical multi-station weight machines that would be custom-made for the special needs of the residents of his senior center. In particular, the weight stack would have lighter increments than normal and ach of the stations on the machine could be used even by residents who were wheelchair bound.
问题 5.2 Arlene Ledger(来自问题 3.2)回到您的律师事务所,询问您她与健身器材公司 Heavy Metal 的某些客户之间遇到的一些困难。几周前,她与蒙蒂塞洛老年中心主任汤姆·劳德 (Tom Lauder) 会面,讨论 Heavy Metal 制造三台相同的多工位称重机的可能性,这些机器将根据其老年中心居民的特殊需求进行定制。特别是,配重片的增量比正常情况要轻,即使坐轮椅的居民也可以使用机器上工作站的疼痛。
Arlene said that Lauder had later called her and told her to go ahead and make the three special machines, which the two had agreed would cost $8,000 each. When Heacy Metal nearly finished the first of these three machines. Lauder called Arlene again and left a message that said, “We won’t need the machines after all. So sorry to trouble you.” Arlene sheepishly admits to you that she never put this deal in writing. Now, she tells you, she is stuck with one special machine that no other buyer may want, plus a $3,000 bill from a consultant who had helped to draft the plans for the prototype for these three machines. Will Arlene be in a position to enforce this contract with Monticello Senior Center? If so, can she enforce it just for the one machine in process or for all three? U.C.C. §2-201, cf. Official Comment 2 to §2-201.
Arlene 说,Lauder 后来打电话给她,让她去制造这三台特殊的机器,两人同意每台售价 8,000 美元。当 Heacy Metal 几乎完成这三台机器中的第一台时。Lauder 再次打电话给 Arlene 并留言说:“我们毕竟不需要这些机器。很抱歉给您添麻烦。Arlene 羞怯地向你承认,她从未把这笔交易写下来。现在,她告诉你,她被困在一台其他买家可能不想要的特殊机器上,再加上一位顾问提供的 3,000 美元账单,这位顾问曾帮助起草这三台机器的原型计划。Arlene 能否 执行与 Monticello Senior Center 的合同?如果是这样,她可以只对一台正在进行的机器强制执行,还是对所有三台机器强制执行?U.C.C. §2-201,参见官方评论 2 至 §2-201。
ANSWER: because this is a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more, it has to be evidenced by writing in order for it to be enforceable under 2-201(1). Since there is no writing here, under 2-201(1), the seller has to rely on one of the exceptions to the Statute of Frauds to 2-201. And the facts here, seem to fit 2-201(3)(a). these weight machine were to be specially manufacture for this buyer. They would not be suitable for sell to others in the ordinary course of the seller’s business. And by the time of repudiation, the seller had made a substantial beginning of the manufacturing. So, 2-201(3)(a) seem to clearly be the exception where this case might fall, so that the plaintiff can enforce this oral contract. But the question now is to what extent should this exception make a contract enforceable (just for the one machine that the seller has already made or for all three machines)? Argument for just one machine: 2-201(1) is very clear that the contract is only enforceable to the extent of the quantity indicated in the writing, therefore maybe we should use the same principle when we are using these exceptions like the one in 2-201(3)(a). What’s the argument that this contract should be enforced for all three machines? You could say that the quantity requirement was not specifically mentioned in 2-201(3)(a) as it is in 2-201(1). Nevertheless, one can imagine the reasons why enforcement of the oral contract should be limited to the quantity of goods for which manufacture has begun. For one think you might think 2-201(3)(a) as a codified form of detrimental reliance on the oral agreement and so enforcement ought to be limited to the extent of the detrimental reliance that can be shown in the given case. Another way to view 2-201(3)(a) is as a form of proof of contract by conduct. Even if we view it that way, proof of contract by conduct, the conduct here proves only the existence of a contract for one machine. Now, if, 2-201(3)(a) is really about detrimental reliance, what about the $3000 for outside consulting? Should that mean that the contract is enforceable for all three machines since that $3000 was spent with the expectation that it was going to be possibly spread over three machines? Well, one way to think of it: if the contract had been for one machine then the seller would have charged more for one machine in order to pay for the outside designer than she was able to charge for each machines. At a minimum, maybe the cost for that consultation should be delegated to al three machines rather than just one. That would mean Arlene would get to enforce the contract for one machine at a cost of not $8000 but $10,000. Why $10,000? $2000 higher than was agreed to in order to account for the $2000 of the $3000 consulting fees that would have been allocated to the other two machines. That is part of the detrimental reliance. You might analogize this to 2-201(3)(c) the exception for payments made or goods accepted where Comment 2 tells us that in the case of partial performance there should be a just apportionment made so that the contract can be enforce to the goods accepted for the price paid under 2-201(3)(c). And maybe we can take that just apportionment concept and apply it as well to 2-201(3)(a). How would you make a just apportionment argument here? Once again the problem is that certain subcost has been expanded which would have made the sale of the additional two machines more profitable than the sale of the first because of the $3000 subcost of consulting but we take care of that if we simply force a sale of a single machine for $10,000 rather than a single machine for $8000. If you think about this solution, it ends up being a mixed of expectation and reliance damages in this way: we get expectation damages mainly loss profit of the sale for the one machine ($8000) but you also get reliance damages the extra $2000 for the apportionment fee for the others two machines. Reliance damages is let put the seller in the position that they were in before the contract was even entered into, so we will give them back any cost that they incurred in reliance on the contract. Expectation damages says let’s put them in the position they were in when the contract was fully performed. And sometimes with promissory estoppel, we will only give you reliance damages but not expectation damages.
回答: 因为这是一份价格为 500 美元或以上的商品销售合同,所以必须以书面形式证明,才能根据 2-201(1) 强制执行。 由于这里没有文字,根据 2-201(1),卖方必须依赖 2-201 欺诈法规的例外情况之一。而这里的事实,似乎符合 2-201(3)(a)。 这些举重机是专门为这位买家制造的。在卖方的正常业务过程中,它们不适合出售给其他人。到拒绝时,卖方已经为制造工作做了一个实质性的开端。因此,2-201(3)(a) 似乎显然是本案可能适用的例外情况,因此原告可以执行本口头合同。但现在的问题是,这种例外应该在多大程度上使合同具有可执行性(仅针对卖方已经制造的一台机器或所有三台机器)?只使用一台机器的论点:2-201(1) 非常清楚,合同只能在书面说明的数量范围内强制执行,因此,当我们使用这些例外情况时,也许我们应该使用相同的原则,例如 2-201(3)(a) 中的例外情况。应该对所有三台机器强制执行此合同的论点是什么? 您可以说 2-201(3)(a) 中没有像 2-201(1) 那样具体提到数量要求。然而,人们可以想象为什么口头合同的执行应该仅限于已经开始制造的商品数量。 例如,你可能会认为 2-201(3)(a) 是对口头协议的有害依赖的成文形式,因此执行应仅限于在特定情况下可以证明的有害依赖的程度。另一种看待 2-201(3)(a) 的方式是作为行为证明合同的一种形式。即使我们这样看,通过行为证明合同,这里的行为也只证明了一台机器的合同的存在。现在,如果 2-201(3)(a) 真的是关于有害的依赖,那么用于外部咨询的 3000 美元呢?这是否意味着合同对所有三台机器都是可执行的,因为那 3000 美元是花在了三台机器上的预期? 嗯,一种思考方式是:如果合同是一台机器 , 那么卖方为了支付外部设计师的费用,为一台机器收取的费用会比她能够为每台机器收取的费用更高。至少,也许该咨询的费用应该委托给所有三台机器,而不仅仅是一台。这意味着 Arlene 可以执行一台机器的合同,成本不是 8000 美元,而是 10,000 美元。 为什么是 10,000 美元? 比商定的 2000 美元高出 3000 美元 ,该费用本应分配给其他两台机器的 3000 美元咨询费。这是有害依赖的一部分。您可以将其类比为 2-201(3)(c),即付款或接受货物的例外情况,其中注释 2 告诉我们,在部分履行的情况下,应进行公正的分摊,以便合同可以强制执行到以 2-201(3)(c) 项下支付的价格接受的货物。 也许我们可以将这个公正的分配概念也应用于 2-201(3)(a)。你会如何在这里提出公正的分配论点? 同样 ,问题在于某些子成本已经扩大,这将使额外的两台机器的销售比第一台机器的销售更有利可图,因为咨询的子成本为 3000 美元 ,但如果我们简单地强制以 10,000 美元的价格出售一台机器,而不是以 8000 美元的价格出售一台机器,我们会解决这个问题。如果您考虑这个解决方案,它最终会以这种方式成为预期和依赖损害的混合:我们得到的期望损害主要是一台机器的销售利润损失(8000 美元 ), 但你也会得到其他两台机器的额外 2000 美元的分摊费的依赖损害。Reliance 损害赔偿使卖方处于合同签订之前所处的位置 ,因此我们将退还他们因依赖合同而产生的任何费用。预期损害赔偿说 ,让我们把他们放在合同完全履行时他们所处的位置。有时,在承诺禁止反言的情况下,我们只会给您提供依赖损害赔偿,而不会给您预期损害赔偿。
Problem 5.3 Your law firm just took on a new client, Max Swain, an independent grocery store owner. Max was at an independent grocers’ convention last week and he head a lot about his colleagues’ use of Electronic Data Interchange. Max concedes that he is a traditionalist at heart, but he said that he would not mind eliminating all of the paperwork involved with the current method by which he orders groceries from his various suppliers. Max tells you that he thinks he is ready to “take the plunge” and buy a computer that will enable him to transmit orders via the EDI system. He wants to know if this new method of doing business has any increased risks over the old-fashioned way, and whether there are ways that he might reduce those risks. What do you advise him? U.C.C. §§2-201, 1-201(b)(37), 1-201(b)(43).
问题 5.3 您的律师事务所刚刚接受了一位新客户,Max Swain,一位独立的杂货店老板。Max 上周参加了一个独立的杂货商大会,他对同事们使用电子数据交换的很多意见都很感兴趣 。Max 承认他本质上是一个传统主义者,但他说他不介意消除 与当前他从各个供应商处订购杂货的方法所涉及的所有文书工作。Max 告诉您,他认为他已经准备好“冒险”并购买一台计算机,这将使他能够通过 EDI 系统传输订单。他想知道这种新的经营方式是否 比老式方式的风险更大,以及是否有方法可以降低这些风险。你对他有什么建议?《美国法典》第 2-201 条、1-201(b)(37)、1-201(b)(43) 款。
ANSWER: what are the added risks? Whenever you get into technology there is always the risk of technology breakdown. A bigger risk for Max here is he willing to accept the standard form terms on the electronic purchase order that the grocery industry has formulated for the DVI transactions? Those terms will probably not be quite as favorable to Max as terms on whatever buyer purchaser form he has been using doing it the traditional way. You could point out to Max that in any event how his more favorable terms would play out under the battles of form section doing it the way he has been doing it. So, by forgoing his written form he may not be giving up as much as it seems on surface. There is also the legal risk of the statute of frauds. And if you are doing things electronically rather than by paper, that might be an issue. But it might be less of an issue today and given the definition of writing under 1-201(b)(43) and signature under 1-201(b)(37) and you saw it in the Wal-Mart case in the book, courts are routinely going to accept emails as counting as writings and as counting to have signatures.
回答: 有哪些额外的风险?无论何时进入技术领域,总存在技术故障的风险。对 Max 来说,更大的风险是他愿意接受杂货行业为 DVI 交易制定的电子采购订单上的标准格式条款?这些条款对 Max 来说可能不如他一直使用的任何买方购买表格的条款那么有利 。你可以向 Max 指出,无论如何,他更有利的条件在状态之战部分会如何发挥作用,就像他一直在做的那样。因此,放弃他的书面形式,他可能不会像表面上看起来那样放弃。此外,还存在欺诈法规的法律风险。如果您以电子方式而不是纸质方式做事,那可能是一个问题。但今天这可能不是一个问题,考虑到 1-201(b)(43) 下对写作的定义和 1-201(b)(37) 下的签名定义,您在书中的沃尔玛案中看到了这一点 ,法院通常会接受电子邮件被视为写作和签名。
PAROLE EVIDENCE WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 129
销售货物的假释证据 第 129 页
6.1. a. Arlene Ledger (from Problem 3.2) is having difficulty with her company’s steel supplier, Wilson Steel. Jake Wilson, president of Wilson Steel, had negotiated a contract with Arlene by which Arlene had agreed to purchase all of her company’s requirements for steel over the next year from Wilson at a stated price per ton. In getting Arlene to sign this contract, Jake had assured Arlene that he was so confident of how low his price was, that if she happened to find a lower price during the next year she could buy her steel requirements from the lower-priced competitor. Arlene admits to you that she never did read the contract closely before signing it. Now, Arlene tells you, just two months after signing this contract, she has found a lower-priced steel supplier.
6.1. 一种。 Arlene Ledger(来自问题 3.2)在与公司的钢材供应商 Wilson Steel 合作时遇到了困难。Wilson Steel 总裁 Jake Wilson 与 Arlene 谈判了一份合同,根据该合同,Arlene 同意在明年以每吨的既定价格从 Wilson 那里购买她公司的所有钢材需求。在让 Arlene 签署这份合同时,Jake 向 Arlene 保证,他对自己的价格非常有信心,如果她在明年碰巧找到更低的价格 , 她可以从价格较低的竞争对手那里购买所需的钢材。Arlene 向你承认,她在签署合同之前从未仔细阅读过合同。现在,Arlene 告诉你,在签订这份合同仅仅两个月后,她就找到了一家价格更低的钢材供应商。
As you look at the contract Arlene signed with Wilson, you notice two things: (1) the contract says nothing about this “low-price guarantee,” and (2) the contract does not contain a merger clause. What do you advise Arlene about her ability to buy her steel requirements from the lower-priced competitor to Wilson? U.C.C. §2-202, Official Comment 3 to §2-202
当您查看 Arlene 与 Wilson 签署的合同时,您会注意到两件事:(1) 合同没有提到这种“低价保证”,以及 (2) 合同不包含合并条款。关于她有能力从 Wilson 的低价竞争对手那里购买所需的钢材,您有什么建议?U.C.C. §2-202,官方评论 3 至 §2-202.
When approaching a parol evidence problem like this one, we need to consider two variables. First, consider the nature of the writing that seeks to exclude extrinsic evidence. Second, consider the nature of the extrinsic evidence sought to be excluded. As to the nature of the writing, there are three possibilities. On the one end, consider the writing is not even final as to the terms included therein. In the middle case, the writing is considered final but only as to the terms that are included within the writing. On the other extreme, there is a writing that is intended to be a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms by both parties, i.e., a fully integrated writing.
在处理 像这样的口头证据问题时,我们需要考虑两个变量。首先,考虑试图排除外在证据的写作的性质。其次,考虑寻求排除的外在证据的性质。至于写作的性质,有三种可能性 。一方面,考虑到写作甚至不是其中包含的术语的最终版本。在中间情况下,写作被认为是最终的,但仅限于写作中包含的术语。在另一个极端,有一种写作旨在成为双方所有条款的完整和排他性陈述,即完全整合的写作。
When considering this problem, we need to categorize this writing into one of these three categories. Given the absence of a merger clause, this writing is not a fully integrated one. This writing falls under category two, namely the writing is intended by the parties to be final but only with respect to the terms that are included therein. Under §2-202(b), extrinsic evidence of consistent additional terms may be introduced in a case like this. Then we need to determine the nature of the extrinsic evidence, namely is the low price guarantee consistent additional terms or contradictory terms. It is not contradictory in the sense that the contract is silent on whether there is a low price guarantee. However, it is contradictory since it goes against the very nature of a typical requirement contract. Under the language of Official Comment 3 to §2-202, if the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the writing in the view of the court, then such evidence must be excluded. The rationale is if it’s a really big deal, if it’s the kind of things that certainly would have been included, then we are not going to let the parol evidence in even though we don’t have a fully integrated writing, as long as we have a writing that is final as to the terms contained therein. Here it doesn’t matter whether the parol evidence is contradictory or while it is consistent, it’s the one kind of consistent additional terms we won’t allow in. At the end, we will not let the parol evidence in. The parol evidence in this problem, the low price evidence, is too significant not to include in the writing. Absent some usage of trade or course of dealings that make this particular low price guarantee “goes without saying” between these parties, this is probably too important a term not to have been included in the writing. So the evidence of the low price guarantee probably will be excluded.
在考虑这个问题时,我们需要将这篇文章归类为这三类之一。鉴于没有合并条款,本文并不是一个完全整合的条款。该书面文件属于第二类,即双方打算将书面文件视为最终文件,但仅限于其中包含的条款。根据 §2-202(b),在此类情况下可以引入一致附加条款的外在证据。那么我们需要确定外在证据的性质,即低价保证是一致的附加条款还是相互矛盾的条款。从某种意义上说,合同没有说明是否有低价保证,这并不矛盾 。然而,这是矛盾的,因为它违背了典型需求契约的本质。根据 §2-202 的官方意见 3 的措辞 ,如果附加条款是这样的,如果达成一致,法院认为它们肯定会被包含在书面中,那么此类证据必须被排除在外。理由是,如果这真的是一件大事,如果它是肯定会被包括在内的那种事情,那么即使我们没有完全整合的书面文件,我们也不会让口头证据进来 ,只要我们的书面文件对其中包含的条款是最终的。在这里, 口头证据是矛盾的还是一致的并不重要 , 这是我们不允许的一种一致的附加条款 。 最后,我们不会让口头证据进来。 这个问题的口头证据, 低价证据,太重要了,不能不包括在写作中。由于没有一些贸易或交易过程的使用使这种特殊的低价保证在这些各方之间“ 不言而喻 ”,这可能是一个太重要的术语,不能不包括在书面文件中。 因此 ,低价保证的证据可能会被排除在外。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that the contract does contain a merger clause, and Jake gave Arlene the price guarantee after the two had signed the contract. In a suit to enforce the contract, may Arlene introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee? U.C.C. §§2-202, 2-209(1).
b. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是合同确实包含合并条款,Jake 在两人签署合同后向 Arlene 提供了价格保证。在执行合同的诉讼中,Arlene 是否可以提供 Jake 价格保证的证据? 《美国法典》第 2-2 条第 02 款、2-209(1) 款。
As a side deal entered into after the signing of the contract, this is not parol evidence, but a modification to the contract. As such, §2-202 does not bar it. §2-209(1) says you don’t need consideration for a modification to be binding. Then we need to consider whether the modification is valid against statute of fraud. §2-201 is about the parties’ ability to enforce a contract. As long as there is a writing to the main contract, the modification does not have to be in writing. §2-201 is only going to come into play if, for example, the modification is such that it brings the contract into §2-201 for the first time, meaning it raises the price over $500; or if the modification increases quantity, in which case the increased quantity cannot be enforced
作为合同签订后签订的附带协议,这不是口头证据,而是对合同的修改。因此,§2-202 并未禁止它。§2-209(1) 说你不需要考虑修改具有约束力。然后我们需要考虑修改是否对欺诈法规有效。§2-201 是关于双方执行合同的能力。只要有对主合同的书面说明,修改就不必以书面形式进行。§2-201 只有在修改后首次将合同纳入 §2-201 时才会发挥作用,这意味着它将价格提高到 500 美元以上;或者如果修改增加了数量,在这种情况下,无法强制执行增加的数量.
c. Same facts as part (a), except that the contract does contain a merger clause, and Jake and Arlene have done these requirements contracts several times in the past. In all of these prior deals, Jake has made the same oral assurances concerning the price guarantee, but Arlene has never had to exercise her rights under the guarantee. In a suit to enforce the contract, may Arlene introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee? U.C.C. §§1-303 (formly §1-205), 2-202.
c. 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是合同确实包含合并条款,并且 Jake 和 Arlene 过去曾多次签订这些要求合同。在之前的所有这些交易中,Jake 都对价格保证做出了相同的口头保证,但 Arlene 从未行使过她在保证下的权利。在执行合同的诉讼中,Arlene 是否可以提供 Jake 价格保证的证据? 《美国法典》第 1-303 条( 原第 1-205 条)、第 2-202 条。
This is evidence of the parties’ course of dealing. As such, Arlene can introduce this evidence under §2-202(a), which says even if the parties have a fully integrated writing, a party can still introduce evidence of the parties’ course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade as long as it is to explain or supplement the writing.
这是双方交易过程的证据。因此,Arlene 可以根据 §2-202(a) 引入这些证据,该条款规定,即使双方有完全整合的书面文件,一方仍然可以提供双方履行过程、交易过程或贸易惯例的证据, 只要是为了解释或补充书面文件。
Then the question becomes in this case is this evidence the parties’ course of dealing. Course of dealing is defined in §1-303(b) as “a sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.” Jake can make an argument that this is not course of dealing evidence, because even though the parties have talked about this, but they have never actually done it. So there is no conduct. Under Official Comment 2 to §2-202, the course of actual performance by the parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing to mean. Here there is no actual performance, only Jake’s promises on the low price guarantee.
那么问题就变成了在这种情况下,这些证据是双方的交往过程吗。交易过程在 §1-303(b) 中定义为 “ 特定交易各方之间关于先前交易的一系列行为,这些行为应公平地被视为为解释其表达和其他行为建立了共同的理解基础。“ Jake 可以提出一个论点,说这不是处理证据的过程,因为即使双方已经谈论过这件事,但他们从未真正这样做过。 所以没有行为。根据 §2-202 的官方意见 2,各方的实际履行过程被认为是他们打算写作含义的最佳指标。这里没有实际的表现,只有 Jake 对低价保证的承诺 。
d. Same facts as part (a), except that the contract does contain a merger clause, and Jake and the customer in this industry is that for requirements contracts like this one, the price is typically the lowest price that the buyer could get from any other source at the time it requires each steal shipment. In a suit to enforce the contract, may Arlene introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee? If not, may she nevertheless introduce evidence of the price custom in the industry, which in fact is identical to what Jake guaranteed orally? U.C.C. §§1-303 (formly §1-205), 2-202.
d.与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是合同确实包含合并条款,并且 Jake 和 该行业的客户是,对于像这样的需求合同,价格通常是买方在需要每次偷货时可以从任何其他来源获得的最低价格。在执行合同的诉讼中,Arlene 是否可以提供 Jake 价格保证的证据?如果不是,她是否可以引入行业价格习俗的证据,这实际上与 Jake 口头保证的相同?《美国法典》第 1-303 条( 原第 1-205 条)、第 2-202 条。
Given the merger clause, this is probably a fully integrated writing. As such, Arlene cannot introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee, even though it sounds very close to what the price custom in the industry is. Nevertheless, Arlene can introduce evidence of the price custom in the industry according to §2-202(a). However, Jake can make an argument that this evidence does not explain or supplement the writing, it contradicts it. Arlene can counter that argument by pointing to Official Comment 2 to §2-202, which says if a party wants to keep out evidence of usage of trade, he can carefully negates it in the contract. If Jake is aware of this industry custom, he should have carefully negated it in drafting the contract. If he doesn’t do that, Jake is probably going to lose given that courts are lenient towards the party seeking to introduce usage of trade evidence and generally give a broad definition to what it means to explain or supplement as is required to introduce under §2-202(a).
考虑到合并条款,这可能是一篇完全整合的文章。因此,Arlene 无法提供 Jake 价格保证的证据,即使这听起来非常接近业内的价格习惯。尽管如此,Arlene 可以根据 §2-202(a) 引入行业价格习惯的证据。然而,Jake 可以提出一个论点,即这些证据并不能解释或补充写作,它与写作相矛盾 。Arlene 可以通过引用 §2-202 的官方评论 2 来反驳这一论点 ,该评论指出,如果一方想要排除使用贸易的证据,他可以在合同中小心地否定它。如果 Jake 知道这个行业惯例,他应该在起草合同时小心翼翼地否定它。如果他不这样做,Jake 可能会输,因为法院对寻求引入商业证据使用的一方很宽容,并且通常会对 §2-202(a) 要求引入的解释或补充的含义给出宽泛的定义。
6.2. You have finally learned your lesson about doing business with your one-time law school classmate and Rolls Royce collector Deborah Swift (from Problem 1.6). Unfortunately, one of your friends has not. Justin Roberts, a non-lawyer and neighbor of yours, comes to you for some friendly advice about a problem that he is having with Deborah. Justin, himself a car buff, had gone with a friend to Deborah’s house and had done a “handshake deal” with Deborah to buy Deborah’s four ’89 Rolls Royces for $17,000 each. According to this oral agreement, Justin was to pick the car up in 30 days.
6.2. 您终于学到了与曾经的法学院同学、劳斯莱斯收藏家 Deborah Swift(来自问题 1.6)做生意的教训。不幸的是,你的一个朋友没有。贾斯汀·罗伯茨 (Justin Roberts) 是一位非律师,也是您的邻居,他来找您,就他与 Deborah 之间的问题提供一些友好的建议。贾斯汀本人就是一个汽车迷,他和朋友一起去了黛博拉的家,并与黛博拉做了一个“ 握手交易 ”, 以每辆 17,000 美元的价格买下了黛博拉的四辆 89 年劳斯莱斯 。根据这份口头协议,贾斯汀将在 30 天内取车。
The day after Justin’s visit to Deborah’s house, he received a signed letter from her purporting to confirm their agreement. Deborah’s letter, however, said their agreement was for Justin to purchase just two of her ’89 Rolls Royces, and for $25,000 each instead of $17,000. Following receipt of that letter, Justin tried for two weeks to reach Deborah to clear up what he thought might have been an honest mistake on her part about the terms of their deal. When Justin finally did reach her, Deborah insisted that it was “her way or the highway,” even though Justin’s friend was willing to swear that Justin’s version of the oral agreement was correct.
贾斯汀拜访黛博拉家的第二天 ,他收到了她的一封签名信,声称确认了他们的协议。然而,黛博拉的信中说,他们的协议是让贾斯汀只购买她的两辆 89 年劳斯莱斯 ,每辆 25,000 美元,而不是 17,000 美元。收到那封信后,贾斯汀花了两周时间试图联系黛博拉,以澄清他认为她对他们的交易条款可能是一个诚实的错误。当贾斯汀终于找到她时,黛博拉坚持说这是 “ 她的方式或高速公路”, 尽管贾斯汀的朋友愿意发誓贾斯汀版本的口头协议是正确的。
If you represent Justin, for what quantity and price will you be able to enforce his deal with Deborah? U.C.C. §§2-201, 2-202, 2-207.
如果你代表贾斯汀,你能以多少数量和价格执行他与黛博拉的交易? 《美国法典》第 2-201、2-202、2-207 条。
Here, we don’t have a writing that is intended to be final even as to the terms contained therein, since that single confirmation is only the seller’s conception of the deal. So we have no parol evidence problem here and §2-202 does not bar the buyer’s contradictory evidence on the price and quantity. The general rule under §2-207 concerning different terms in a single confirmation is the different terms in a single confirmation is mere proposal. We rejected the knock-out rule under this circumstance, because it would potentially allow one party to unilaterally change the terms of an already concluded oral contract, if the different term that was in the confirmation did not agree with the UCC gap-filler, the party that wants to get out of that can simply knock that term out. Normally under §2-207, different terms in a single confirmation is mere proposal that have to be separately accepted by the other side, or they will not become part of the contract. But here we have a problem and we need to bring in §2-201. Here the buyer cannot enforce the contract for 4 cars, because under §2-201(1), such a contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity that’s stated in the writing. This is an exception to the usual rule in §2-207, namely additional terms in a single confirmation are mere proposals, UNLESS the different term is QUANTITY! Then the other party is limited to that quantity term. Here the requirement of §2-201 supersedes those of §2-207 because you cannot get to terms before you have enforceability. And one of the requirements to enforceability in §2-201 is QUANTITY. Official Comment 6 to §2-207 also says the written confirmation is also subject to §2-201. So in this problem Justin the buyer will not be able to enforce a contract with Deborah the seller beyond the 2 cars that are mentioned in her signed confirmation. That confirmation letter will quality as the writing Justin needs to enforce the contract at all under §2-201(1). However, Justin is not bound by the $25,000 price per car contained in that confirmation. Now we can go back to the usual rule concerning different terms in a single confirmation under §2-207. The $25,000 will be mere proposal and Justin will reject and go with the price in the original oral contract, namely $17,000 per car. The writing that serves to satisfy the Statute of Frauds is not conclusive as to the terms of the contract other than the quantity. Official Comment 3 to §2-201 says the only effect of failing to object to the confirmation is to take away from the party who fails to answer the defense of the Statute of Frauds; the burden of persuading the trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally prior to the written confirmation is unaffected. Now it’s up to the trier of fact. Justin can bring in his witness.
在这里,我们没有旨在成为最终的书面文件,即使其中包含的条款也是如此,因为该确认只是卖方对交易的概念。 因此 ,我们在这里没有口头证据问题,§2-202 并不 禁止买方就价格和数量提供相互矛盾的证据。§2-207 中关于单个确认中不同术语的一般规则是,单个确认中的不同术语仅属提案。在这种情况下,我们拒绝了取消规则,因为它可能允许一方单方面更改已经签订的口头合同的条款,如果确认书中的不同条款与 UCC 空白填补条款不一致,想要退出该条款的一方可以简单地取消该条款。通常,根据 §2-207,单一确认书中的不同条款只是提案,必须 由另一方单独接受,否则它们不会成为合同的一部分。但是这里我们有一个问题 ,我们需要引入 §2-201。在这里,买方不能执行 4 辆车的合同,因为根据 §2-201(1),此类合同不能超出书面中规定的数量。这是 §2-207 中通常规则的例外,即单个确认中的附加条款只是提案,除非不同的条款是 QUANTITY!然后,另一方仅限于该数量项。 在这里,§2-201 的要求取代了 §2-207 的要求,因为在具有可执行性之前,您无法达成条款。§2-201 中对可执行性的要求之一是数量。§2-207 的官方注释 6 还表示,书面确认也受 §2-201 的约束 。 因此 ,在这个问题中,买方 Justin 将无法执行与卖方 Deborah 的合同,超出她签署的确认书中提到的 2 辆车。该确认信的质量与 Justin 根据 §2-201(1) 执行合同所需的写作一样。但是,Justin 不受该确认中包含的每辆车 25,000 美元价格的约束。现在我们可以回到 §2-207 中关于单个确认中不同术语的通常规则 。25,000 美元只是提议,贾斯汀将拒绝并采用原始口头合同中的价格,即每辆车 17,000 美元。除数量外,用于满足欺诈法规的文字对于合同条款并不是决定性的。§2-201 的官方评论 3 表示,不反对确认的唯一效果是剥夺了未能回答欺诈法规辩护的一方;说服审理者相信事实证明合同实际上是在书面确认之前口头订立的负担不受影响。现在取决于事实的审判者。贾斯汀可以带来他的证词。
REQUISITES TO FORMALIZATION PP. 145
正规化的必要条件 第 145 页
7.1. a. Jay Berringer, owner of Jay’s Rent-to-Own Pianos (Problem 2.3), is back in your office with more questions. It seems that one of Jay’s brand new workers, Sam Clark, did not realize that Jay’s policy was that all of his store leases were to be in writing. As a write, Sam entered into an oral lease contract with Bonnie Kilgen. The terms of that “handshake deal” were that Bonnie would lease a used Steinway upright piano for $75 per month for one year, with an option for $150 to renew the lease for one more year on the same terms. Jay wants to know to what extent this oral lease contract will be enforceable if Bonnie decides she does not want to go forward with it. What do you advise? U.C.C. §2A-201.
7.1. 一种。Jay's Rent-to-Own Pianos(问题 2.3) 的所有者 Jay Berringer 带着更多问题回到了您的办公室 。似乎 Jay 的一位新员工 Sam Clark 没有意识到 Jay 的政策是他所有的商店租约都必须以书面形式签订。作为写作者,Sam 与 Bonnie Kilgen 签订了一份口头租赁合同 。那次 “ 握手协议 ” 的条款是,Bonnie 将以每月 75 美元的价格租赁一架二手施坦威立式钢琴,为期一年,并可选择以 150 美元的价格以相同的条款再续租一年。Jay 想知道,如果 Bonnie 决定不想继续执行,这份口头租赁合同将在多大程度上具有可执行性。您有什么建议?《美国法典》第 2A-201 条。
Since the total payment to be made under the lease contract minus the payment for option to renew is less than $1,000, the oral lease contract is enforceable under §2A-201(1).
由于根据租赁合同支付的总付款减去续约选择权的付款少于 1,000 美元,因此口头租赁合同可根据 §2A-201(1) 强制执行。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that the oral contract required that the first year’s rent would be $100 per month and would all be paid up-front in one $1,200 payment, which Bonnie has already made. The one-year lease renewal option is for $50 per month, rent to be paid at the start of each month. To what extent is this oral lease agreement enforceable by Bonnie? U.C.C. §2A-201, Official Comment to §2A-201.
b. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是口头合同要求第一年的租金为每月 100 美元,并且全部以 1,200 美元的形式预先支付,Bonnie 已经支付了。一年的续租选项是每月 50 美元,租金在每个月初支付。Bonnie 在多大程度上可以执行此口头租赁协议?U.C.C. §2A-201,对 §2A-201 的官方评论。
Under the reading of §2A-201(1), this oral lease agreement is not enforceable since it is not in writing and the total payment to be made under the agreement minus the payment for option to renew exceeds $1,000. And Comment to §2A-201 says there’s no exception for transaction over payment has been made and accepted.
根据 §2A-201(1) 的解读 ,该口头租赁协议不可执行,因为它不是书面的,并且根据该协议支付的总付款减去续签选择权的付款超过 1,000 美元。 对 §2A-201 的评论说, 已经完成并接受了超额付款的交易没有例外。
However, Bonnie may be able to make a policy argument that this particular oral lease agreement should be enforceable. Comment to §2A-201 says the rationale for the drafters for not bringing in the payment exception for lease contract as they did for sales contract is because normally the lessee do not pay all the rent upfront, but rather on a monthly basis, yet that is precisely what happened in this case. Bonnie made a lump sum rent payment upfront, and the lessor accepted the payment. If Bonnie wins on her part performance argument, the lease terms she can enforce, under §2A-201(5), would be “a reasonable lease term”. If, however, Bonnie loses on her argument to fit within the part performance argument, she may then turn to the common law promissory estoppel or restitution doctrine. In this case, restitution damages equals Bonnie’s reliance damages, Bonnie would only get her money back. Under promissory estoppel, Bonnie would get expectation damages, meaning Bonnie would get to go through with the lease including the option to renew, which is more preferable for Bonnie.
但是,Bonnie 可能能够提出一个政策论点,即这个特定的口头租赁协议应该是可执行的。对 §2A-201 的评论称,起草者没有像销售合同那样为租赁合同引入付款例外的理由是,通常承租人不会预先支付所有租金,而是按月支付,但这正是本案中发生的情况。Bonnie 预先支付了一次性租金,出租人接受了这笔付款。如果 Bonnie 在履行论点上获胜,她可以根据 §2A-201(5) 执行的租赁条款将是 “ 合理的租赁条款 ”。然而,如果 Bonnie 在符合部分履行论点的论点上败诉,她可以求助于普通法承诺禁止反言或赔偿原则。在这种情况下,赔偿金等于 Bonnie 的赡养费,Bonnie 只能拿回她的钱。根据承诺禁止反言,Bonnie 将获得预期损害赔偿,这意味着 Bonnie 可以完成租约,包括续约的选择权,这对 Bonnie 来说更可取 。
NOTE: Expectation damages means to put the party in the position as if the contract was honored by the other side, while reliance damages means to put the party back in the position before she made any expenditure in reliance on the other side’s promise.
注意:Expectation damage 的意思是使一方处于另一方履行合同的位置,而 reliance damage 的意思是使一方回到她依赖另一方的承诺进行任何支出之前的位置 。
c. Same facts as part (a), except that the first year’s rent was $100 per month and Jay’s has delivered the piano to Bonnie, who accepted it and began using it. Two months later, however, before any written lease contract is executed, Bonnie enters into a written contract with a neighbor by which Bonnie purports to lease the piano to the neighbor for $200 per month for one year. Jay learns about this and decides that he would like to rent the piano to the neighbor for $200 per month instead of to Bonnie for $100 per month. May Jay void Bonnie’s oral lease so that he may enter into a new lease with her neighbor? U.C.C. §2A-201.
c. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是第一年的租金是每月 100 美元,而且 Jay's 已经将钢琴交给了 Bonnie,Bonnie 接受了它并开始使用它。然而,两个月后,在签署任何书面租赁合同之前,Bonnie 与邻居签订了一份书面合同,根据该合同,Bonnie 声称以每月 200 美元的价格将钢琴租给邻居,为期一年。Jay 了解到这一点并决定以每月 200 美元的价格将钢琴租给邻居,而不是以每月 100 美元的价格租给 Bonnie。Jay 可以取消 Bonnie 的口头租约,以便他可以 和她的邻居签订新的租约吗? 《美国法典》第 2A-201 条。
No, Jay cannot void Bonnie’s oral lease. Even though the writing requirement is not met, this problem satisfied the exception listed under §2A-201(4)(c), which allows lease contract to be enforceable despite the lack of writing with respect to goods that have been received and accepted by the lessee. The length of the lease term Bonnie can enforce would be “a reasonable lease term” under §2A-201(5).
不,Jay 不能取消 Bonnie 的口头租约。即使没有满足书面要求,这个问题也满足了 §2A-201(4)(c) 中列出的例外情况,该例外允许在承租人已接收和接受的货物缺乏书面规定的情况下,租赁合同可以强制执行。Bonnie 可以执行的租赁期限长度将是 §2A-201(5) 下的 “ 合理租赁期限 ”。
7.2. a. Susan Heil, an authorized sales agent for Ford Motor Co. of Detroit, entered into an oral contract on behalf of Ford Motor with Toronto Ford, a Canadian car dealership. The two sides agreed orally that Ford Motor Co. would sell Toronto Ford 36 Taurus station wagons at the manufacturer’s standard dealer price, delivery to take place in one month. The two sides also agreed orally that Michigan law (excluding the CISG) would govern the transaction. Shortly before delivery, Toronto Ford indicates to Susan that it wants out of the deal. Susan eventually files a lawsuit in Detroit to enforce the oral contract. Toronto Ford moves for summary judgment, pleading the statute of frauds defense and attaching a signed affidavit denying that it ever entered into a contract with the plaintiff. If you are the trial judge, should you grant the summary judgment motion? C.I.S.G. Arts. 1(1), 6, 11; U.C.C. §2-201.
7.2. 一种。 底特律福特汽车公司的授权销售代理 Susan Heil 代表福特汽车与加拿大汽车经销商多伦多福特签订了一份口头合同。双方口头同意,福特汽车公司将按制造商的标准经销商价格销售多伦多福特 36 Taurus 旅行车 ,交货时间为一个月内。双方还口头同意密歇根州法律(不包括 CISG)将管辖该交易。在交货前不久,多伦多福特向苏珊表示它希望退出这笔交易。苏珊最终在底特律提起诉讼以执行口头合同。Toronto Ford 提出简易判决,为欺诈法规辩护辩护,并附上一份签署的宣誓书,否认曾 与原告签订合同。如果您是主审法官,您应该批准简易判决动议吗?C.I.S.G. 第 1(1)、6、11 条;加州大学 §2-201.
If this contract is governed by C.I.S.G., then there is no requirement that the contract be in writing in order for the contract to be enforceable under C.I.S.G. Art. 11. If this contract is governed by C.I.S.G., then Toronto Ford’s statute of fraud defense would be ineffective. In that case, the contract would be enforceable despite lack of writing. However, if Michigan law applies, then UCC §2-201 will govern, which says lack of writing is a valid defense to enforceability. As such, we need to determine by which law this contract is governed. By default, this contract is subject to C.I.S.G., because the parties are from different contracting states that have adopted the C.I.S.G. per C.I.S.G. Art. 1(1). However, C.I.S.G. Art. 6 says parties can always agree between themselves to opt out of C.I.S.G. coverage. The two sides in this problem did just that, albeit orally. Here Toronto Ford would want the UCC to govern, since only by using the UCC statute of frauds provision can Toronto Ford’s statute of frauds defense stand. However, the problem for that is in order for the UCC to apply here, Toronto Ford will need to allege that application of Michigan law was part of its oral agreement with Ford Motor Co., but Toronto Ford denied in the affidavit that there ever was an oral deal. Instead of having Ford Motor Co.’s complain dismissed on the pleading, Toronto Ford would probably ultimately have to make its case to a jury for the nonexistence of this oral contract. Since the only way for them to argue for the operation of Michigan law is by admitting there was in fact an oral contract, and admission is another exception to the statute of frauds. Toronto Ford could try to get Susan Heil to concede on deposition that in the oral contract she is alleging, there was in fact a Michigan choice-of-law term. Then on the pleadings, Toronto Ford can make the argument that there’s no contract at all. And Ford Motor Co. will say there is an oral contract with Michigan law. Therefore, by Ford Motor Co.’s own admission, the UCC statute of frauds says this contract is unenforceable in the absence of a writing. As such, the case would be dismissed.
如果本合同受 C.I.S.G. 管辖,则无需合同采用书面形式才能根据 C.I.S.G. 第 11 条执行合同。如果这份合同受 C.I.S.G. 管辖,那么 Toronto Ford 的欺诈辩护法规将无效。在这种情况下,尽管没有书面规定,但合同是可执行的。但是,如果密歇根州法律适用,则 UCC §2-201 将适用,该条款规定缺乏书面规定是对可执行性的有效辩护。因此,我们需要确定此合同受哪部法律管辖。默认情况下,本合同受 C.I.S.G. 的约束,因为双方来自不同的缔约国,这些国家根据 C.I.S.G. 第 1 条第 (1) 款采用了 C.I.S.G.。然而,C.I.S.G. Art.6 表示各方始终可以达成一致,选择退出 C.I.S.G. 保险。这个问题的双方就是这样做的,尽管是口头上的。在这里,多伦多福特希望 UCC 进行管辖,因为只有使用 UCC 欺诈法规条款,多伦多福特的欺诈法规辩护才能成立。然而,问题在于 , 为了让 UCC 在这里适用,多伦多福特需要声称密歇根州法律的适用是其与福特汽车公司口头协议的一部分,但多伦多福特在宣誓书中否认曾经有过口头交易。而不是拥有福特汽车公司。 的投诉被驳回,多伦多福特可能最终不得不向陪审团证明这份口头合同不存在。 因为他们为密歇根州法律的实施辩护的唯一方法是承认实际上存在口头合同,而承认是欺诈法规的另一个例外。多伦多福特可以尝试让苏珊·海尔在证词中承认 ,在她所指控的口头合同中,实际上有一个密歇根州的法律选择条款。然后在诉状上,多伦多福特可以提出根本没有合同的论点。福特汽车公司将表示与密歇根州法律签订了口头合同。因此,由福特汽车公司 UCC 欺诈法规自己承认,在没有书面规定的情况下,该合同是不可执行的。因此,该案将被驳回。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that the two parties do have a written sales contract. The contract, which has no merger clause, mentions all of the relevant terms except the fact that Michigan law (excluding the CISG) will govern the transaction. The choice-of-law provision was an oral side agreement that the two parties entered into before the writing was signed. Now Toronto Ford has breached the contract, and Susan Heil would like to avail her company of the UCC’s remedy provisions rather than the CISG’s. Will Susan be able to successfully introduce evidence of the side agreement on choice of law? C.I.S.G. Arts. 1(1), 6, 8(3); U.C.C. §2-202, Official Comment 3 to §2-202.
湾。 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是双方确实有书面销售合同。该合同没有合并条款,除了 密歇根州法律(不包括 CISG)将管辖该交易这一事实外,提到了所有相关条款。法律选择条款是双方在签署书面协议之前签订的口头附带协议 。现在多伦多福特违反了合同,Susan Heil 想利用 UCC 的补救条款而不是 CISG 的补救条款 。Susan 能否成功提出关于法律选择的附加协议的证据?C.I.S.G. 第 1(1)、6、8(3) 条;加州大学 §2-202,官方意见 3 至 §2-202。
By default, this contract is governed by the C.I.S.G. before the parol evidence can be introduced by either side under C.I.S.G. Art. 1(1). On the other hand, C.I.S.G. Art. 6 says parties can always agree between themselves to opt out of C.I.S.G. coverage. Unlike U.C.C., C.I.S.G. does not have a parol evidence rule. It’s quite liberal in its willingness to consider evidence of all kinds in interpreting the parties’ contract under C.I.S.G. Art. 8(3). Ford Motor Co. can avail itself of the U.C.C. remedies. At the point when the parol evidence is sought to be introduced, U.C.C. §2-202 should not apply to bar introduction of the evidence because the U.C.C.’s application depends here on the parol evidence about choice of law first being introduced and the C.I.S.G. would allow that.
默认情况下,该合同由 C.I.S.G. 管辖,任何 一方都可以根据 C.I.S.G. 第 1(1) 条提出口头证据。另一方面,C.I.S.G. Art.6 表示各方始终可以达成一致,选择退出 C.I.S.G. 保险。与加州大学不同,C.I.S.G. 没有口头证据规则。它愿意根据 C.I.S.G. 第 8(3) 条在解释双方合同时考虑各种证据 ,这是相当自由的。福特汽车公司可以利用 UCC 的补救措施。在寻求引入口头证据时 ,UCC §2-202 不应适用于禁止引入证据,因为 U.C.C. 的适用取决于 首先引入法律选择的口头证据,而 CISG 会允许这样做。
7.3. a. When Pete Smarz’s daughter, Denise, got married two years ago, Pete decided that he would help out the newlywed couple by letting them rent his second home in West Virginia. Pete told Denise and her husband, Bill, that the two of them could rent the house for two years at $500 per month. All of the parties agree with that portion of the facts. Denise and Bill claim that Pete also told the two of them that if they were still married and had a child at the nd of the two years, Pete would let them buy the house for its appraised value less the total of the rent payments they made for two years. Pete denies that he ever gave the couple this purchase option. Denise tells you that her father is just angry because he and Bill had a falling out, and her father just wants to get back at Bill by kicking both of them out of the house. It has now been two years since the lease began, Denise and Bill have a six-month-old son, and the house has been appraised at $150,000. Denise asks you whether she can enforce the purchase option and buy the house from her father for $138,000, which is the appraised value minus the rent payments made. What do you advise her?
7.3. 一种。 两年前, 当 Pete Smarz 的女儿 Denise 结婚时,Pete 决定让这对新婚夫妇 租下他在西弗吉尼亚州的第二套房子。皮特告诉丹尼斯和她的丈夫比尔,他们两个可以以每月 500 美元的价格租两年的房子。 所有 parties 都同意这部分事实。丹尼斯和比尔声称,皮特还告诉他们两个,如果他们在两年后仍然结婚并有一个孩子 ,皮特会让他们以评估价值减去他们两年支付的租金总额来购买这所房子。皮特否认他曾经给这对夫妇这个购买选择权。丹妮丝告诉你,她爸爸只是因为他和比尔闹翻了而生气,她爸爸只是想把他们俩都赶出家门来报复比尔。租约开始已经两年了,Denise 和 Bill 有一个六个月大的儿子,房子的估价为 150,000 美元。Denise 问您是否可以执行购买选择权,以 138,000 美元的价格从她父亲那里买下这栋房子,这是评估价值减去支付的租金。你对她有什么建议?
Denise’s main problem in enforcing this oral agreement is she lacks a writing to evidence this contract. So she fails the common law statute of frauds for real estate sales. She might try to fit within the part performance exception to the statute of frauds, but here she probably won’t qualify for that exception, because none of the actions taken by Denise and her husband might count as part performance are actions that necessarily indicate reliance on the alleged sale agreement.
丹尼斯在执行这份口头协议时的主要问题是她缺乏证明这份合同的书面文件。 因此 ,她没有通过普通法中关于房地产销售欺诈的法规。她可能会试图将部分履行例外情况纳入欺诈法规,但在这里她可能不符合该例外情况,因为 Denise 和她丈夫采取的任何行动都不能算作部分履行,这些行为必然表明对所谓的销售协议的依赖。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that Denise and Bill added a two-story addition to the back of the house during their second year in the house, for a total cost of $40,000. To what extent does this help their case for enforcement of the purchase option?
b. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Denise 和 Bill 在入住房屋的第二年在房屋后面加建了两层楼,总成本为 40,000 美元。这在多大程度上有助于他们执行购买选择权的案例?
This helps greatly, because the building of a two-story addition at their expense will definitely seem to help their part performance argument, since they will not spend the time and money on building the addition if they didn’t believe they have the right to purchase the house at the end of the rental period. In Richard v. Richard, the court put a lot of weight on the fact that the couple invested some real money and sweat equity in permanent improvements that were in fact much less significant than the $40,000 addition in this problem. Yet the Richard Court felt that was enough.
这有很大帮助,因为以他们的费用建造两层楼的加建 似乎肯定会有助于他们的部分性能论点,因为如果他们不相信自己有权在租赁期结束时购买房屋,他们就不会花费时间和金钱来建造加建。在理查德诉理查德案中 ,法院非常重视这对夫妇在永久性改进中投入了一些真金白银和汗水资产的事实,这些改进实际上远不如在这个问题上增加的 40,000 美元重要。然而, 理查德· 考特认为这已经足够了。
WARRANTIES WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 161-164
货物销售的保证 第 161-164 页
8.1. a. You just sold your law school classmate a computer that you had owned for three months. A week after the sale, your classmate complains that the characters on the screen fade noticeably after about 20 minutes. You had never noticed this when you used the computer. Have you breached the implied warranty of merchantability? U.C.C. §2-314.
8.1. 一个。你刚刚卖给你的法学院同学一台你拥有三个月的电脑。促销一周后,您的同学抱怨屏幕上的字符在大约 20 分钟后明显褪色。当您使用计算机时,您从未注意到这一点。您是否违反了适销性的默示保证?《美国法典》第 2-314 条。
U.C.C. Article 2 applies even when there is no merchant in a sale. §2-102 says Article 2 applies in transactions in goods. And “goods” is defined in §2-105 as “things that are movable at the time of sale”. Thus even a non-merchant seller sales something that’s movable, that sale will be subject to the rules of Article 2.
即使销售中没有商家,《美国法典》第 2 条也适用。 §2-102 规定第 2 条适用于货物交易。§2-105 将 “ 货物 ” 定义为 “ 在销售时可移动的物品 ”。 因此 ,即使是非商家卖家销售动产, 该销售也将受到第 2 条规则的约束。
In this problem the seller did not make an implied warranty of merchantability because the seller is not a merchant. §2-314(1) says warranty of merchantability arises when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. When the seller is a merchant selling goods of that kind, there’s a greater level of reliance by the buyer.
在这个问题中 ,卖方没有对适销性做出默示保证,因为卖方不是商人。§2-314(1) 规定,当卖方是此类商品的商人时,即产生适销性保证。当卖方是销售此类商品的商人时, 买方的依赖程度会更高。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that you knew about the fading problem and did not mention it prior to the sale. Have you breached the implied warranty of merchantaility? Are you liable on some other theory? U.C.C. §§2-314, 1-304 (formly §1-203), 1-201(b)(19) (formly §1-201(19)); Official Comment 3 to §2-314.
b. 与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是您知道淡化问题,并且在销售前未提及。您是否违反了商铺的默示保证 ?你对其他理论负责吗?《美国法典》第 2-314 条、第 1-304 条( 原第 1-203 条)、第 1-201(b)(19) 条( 原第 1-201(19) 条);§2-314 的官方评论 3。
In this problem the seller did not make an implied warranty of merchantability because the seller is not a merchant. §2-314(1) says warranty of merchantability arises when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. However, the seller did violate the obligation of good faith under §1-304, which arises in all sales, even when the seller is not a merchant. Under the definition of good faith in §1-201(20), the good faith requirement include both a subject and objective element, meaning honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing with the trade. Comment 3 to §2-314 also impose upon the seller an obligation to disclose known material but hidden defects.
在这个问题中,卖方没有对适销性做出默示保证,因为卖方不是商人。 §2-314(1) 规定,当卖方是此类商品的商人时,即产生适销性保证。但是,卖方确实违反了 §1-304 规定的诚信义务,该义务存在于所有销售中,即使卖方不是商家也是如此。根据 §1-201(20) 中对诚信的定义,诚信要求包括主体和客观要素,即事实上的诚实和遵守公平交易的合理商业标准。§2-314 的第 3 条评论还要求卖方有义务披露已知但隐藏的缺陷。
c. Same facts as part (a), except that you knew about the fading problem and not only did you not mention it, you told your classmate that this computer was “super”. Have you breached an express warranty? Are you liable on some other theory? U.C.C. §2-313, Official Comment 3 and 8 to §2-313, §1-103.
c. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是您知道衰落问题,并且您不仅没有提及它, 还告诉您的同学这台计算机是 “ 超级 ” 的。您是否违反了明示保证?你对其他理论负责吗?U.C.C. §2-313,官方评论 3 和 8 至 §2-313,§1-103。
Any seller, no matter a merchant or not, can make an express warranty under §2-313. If the seller’s statement that the computer was “super” was not an express warranty, there’s another category of statement known as “puffing” described in §2-313(2) as “statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods”. Such puffing does not create a warranty. Under an action for breach of express warranty, the buyer has the burden of proof. However, Comment 3 & 8 to §2-313 say this burden shifts to the seller to show lack of reliance by the buyer on any affirmation of facts that were made during the course of the bargain, once the seller made such affirmation of facts during the course of the bargain. Ultimately the test to determine whether the seller’s statement falls under the category of puffing or if it creates an express warranty is found in Comment 8 to §2-313: whether the statement “in objective judgment become part of the basis of the bargain”. Even if the seller’s statement in this problem is found to be mere puffing and therefore does not create an express warranty, still, under Comment 8 to §2-313, the seller might be liable for fraud or misrepresentation.
任何卖家,无论是否是商家,都可以根据 §2-313 做出明确保证。 如果卖方关于计算机是“ 超级 ” 的声明不是明示保证,那么还有另一类称为 “ 吹嘘 ” 的声明,在 §2-313(2) 中被描述为 “ 声称只是卖方对商品的意见或推荐 ”的声明”.这种吹嘘并不构成保修。在违反明示保证的诉讼中,买方负有举证责任。然而,§2-313 的评论 3 和 8 表示,一旦卖方在交易过程中对事实做出了这样的肯定, 这种责任就转移到了卖方身上,以证明买方对在交易过程中做出的任何事实的确认缺乏依赖 。最终,确定卖方的陈述是否属于吹嘘的类别或是否构成明示保证的测试见于 §2-313 的注释 8: 该陈述是否“ 客观判断成为交易基础的一部分 ”。 即使 卖方在此问题中的陈述被发现只是吹嘘,因此不构成明示保证,但根据 §2-313 的注释 8,卖方仍可能对欺诈或虚假陈述负责。
d. Same facts as part (a), except your law school classmate bought the used computer from your law school which holds an annual sale of used computers. Has the law school breached the implied warranty of merchantability? U.C.C. §2-314, Official Comment 3 to §2-314, §2-104(1), Official Comment 2 to §2-104.
d. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,除了您的法学院同学从您的法学院购买了二手电脑,该学院每年都会销售二手电脑。法学院是否违反了适销性的默示保证?U.C.C. §2-314、官方意见 3 至 §2-314、§2-104(1)、官方意见 2 至 §2-104。
The problem here is whether the law school qualifies as a merchant. Comment 2 to §2-104 says the warranty of merchantability is implied only if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, requiring a professional status as to particular kinds of goods. Comment 3 to §2-314 says “A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a ‘merchant’ within the meaning of the full scope of this section, and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply.” The law school here probably is not a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. As such, no implied warranty of merchantability has been made.
这里的问题是法学院是否有资格成为商人。§2-104 的注释 2 表示,仅当卖方是此类商品的商人,需要特定类型商品的专业地位时,才暗示了适销性保证 。§2-314 的注释 3 说 :“ 进行孤立商品销售的人不是本节完整范围内意义上的 ' 商人 ',因此,不适用适销性保证。“ 这里的法学院可能不是那种商品的商人。因此,不对适销性做出任何暗示保证。
Note: Implied warranty of merchantability does apply to sales of used goods under the language of Comment 3 to §2-314, however, in a sale of used goods, the obligation involved is those that are only appropriate to such goods for that is their contract description.
注意: 根据 §2-314 的注释 3 的语言 , 适销性的默示保证确实适用于二手商品的销售 ,但是,在二手商品的销售中,所涉及的义务是仅适用于此类商品的义务,因为这是它们的合同描述。
8.2. a. Bob Sinclair owns a used-car lot, Bob’s Affordable Wheels. You just graduated from college and visit Bon’s with an eye to finding a car in the $5,000 price range. You spot a used Honda Accord for $4,900 and ask Bob about the car. “She’s a humdinger, all right,” says Bob. If you purchase the Accord, has Bob made an express warranty? If so, what is its content? U.C.C. §2-313.
8.2. a. Bob Sinclair 拥有一家二手车停车场 Bob's Affordable Wheels。您刚从大学毕业,参观 Bon's,着眼于找到一辆价格在 5,000 美元之间的汽车。您发现了一辆 4,900 美元的二手本田雅阁,并向鲍勃询问了这辆车的情况。“ 她是个傻瓜,好吧,” 鲍勃说。如果您购买了雅阁,鲍勃是否做出了明示保修?如果是这样,它的内容是什么?《美国法典》第 2-313 条。
Under the test for puffing found in Comment 8 to §2-313, the question whether Bob made an express warranty comes down to whether this is the kind of expression that a reasonable person would rely on as part of the basis of the bargain. Here the seller’s statement does not have enough specific content to enable the buyer to prove, in any event, the seller has not lived up to it. It’s simply too vague. Thus Bob did not make an express warranty.
根据 §2-313 的第 8 条评论中对吹嘘的测试 ,Bob 是否做出了明确保证的问题归结为这是否是一个合理的人会依赖的那种表达方式,作为交易基础的一部分。在这里,卖方的声明没有足够的具体内容使买方能够证明,无论如何,卖方没有履行它。它实在是太模糊了。 因此 ,鲍勃没有做出明确的保证。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that you are particularly concerned about as mileage, so you ask Bob what kind of mileage the used Accord gets. “You know the Accords,” says Bob. “They are like camels.” If you purchase the Accord, has Bob made an express warranty? If so, what is its content? U.C.C. §2-313.
b. 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是您特别关心里程数,因此您询问 Bob 二手 Accord 的里程数是多少。 “ 你知道协议,” 鲍勃说。 “ 他们就像骆驼。“ 如果您购买了雅阁,鲍勃是否做出了明示保修?如果是这样,它的内容是什么?《美国法典》第 2-313 条。
Here the seller’s statement is more specific than that in part (a), but the seller didn’t give any measure to tell what good mileage is. Thus Bob did not make an express warranty.
在这里,卖方的陈述比 (a) 部分的陈述更具体,但卖方没有给出任何衡量标准来判断什么是好的里程数。 因此 ,鲍勃没有做出明确的保证。
c. Same facts as part (a), except that you bring your mother with you to Bob’s, because your mother knows a lot more about cars than you do. Your mother tells you that the used Accord is a good bet because it gets such good gas mileage. Just to be sure, you ask Bob about this particular Accord’s gas mileage, and he gives you the “like camels” line. Has Bob made an express warranty? U.C.C. §2-313.
c. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是您带上您的母亲一起去 Bob's,因为您母亲比您更了解汽车。妈告诉你,二手雅阁是一个不错的选择,因为它的油耗非常好。为了保险起见,你问鲍勃这辆雅阁的油耗是多少,他会给你“ 像骆驼一样 ” 这句话。Bob 是否做出了明确保修?《美国法典》第 2-313 条。
Assuming the “like camels” line here amounts to an express warranty, even though the buyer relied on both Bob’s statement as well as his mom’s expertise in deciding to buy the car, Bob indeed made an express warranty under §2-313(1)(a), which only requires the affirmation of fact or promise made by seller to form part of the basis of the bargain to create an express warranty.
假设这里的 “ 像骆驼一样 ” 这句话相当于明示保证,即使买方在决定购买这辆车时同时依赖 Bob 的陈述和他妈妈的专业知识,Bob 确实根据 §2-313(1)(a) 做出了明示保证,它只需要卖方对事实的确认或做出的承诺,以构成 构成明示保证的交易基础的一部分。
d. Same facts as part (a), except that as soon as you come in, you tell Bob that the most important thing for you is to buy a car that gets good gas mileage. “Then I’ve got just the car for you, young man,” Bob tells you, and shows you the used Accord. Has Bob made an express warranty? U.C.C. §2-313. Has he made any other type of warranty? U.C.C. §2-315
d. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是你一进来就告诉 Bob,对你来说最重要的是买一辆油耗好的车。“那我就给你买了这辆车,年轻人,”鲍勃告诉你,并给你看了那辆二手的雅阁。Bob 是否做出了明确保修?《美国法典》第 2-313 条。他有没有做过其他类型的保修?《美国法典》第 2-315 条.
Bob did not give any measurement with respect to what is good mileage, so his statement here probably won’t amount to an express warranty. However, under §2-315, Bob made an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, since Bob knows that the buyer specifically wanted a car with good mileage.
Bob 没有给出任何关于什么是良好里程的测量方法,因此他在这里的陈述可能不构成明示保证。然而,根据 §2-315,Bob 对特定用途的适用性做出了默示保证,因为 Bob 知道买方特别想要一辆行驶里程数好的汽车。
e. Same facts as part (a), except that right after you give Bob the check for $4,900 but before you leave his lot, you tell him, “By the way, I forgot to ask you about gas mileage. That’s extremely important to me. Does this car get good mileage?” Bob replies, “Son, I promise that this car will give you at least 30 miles per gallon in the city.” Has Bob made an express warranty? U.C.C. §§2-313, 2-209; Official Comment 7 to §2-313.
e. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是在您给 Bob 4,900 美元的支票之后,但在您离开他的地段之前,您告诉他,“ 顺便说一句,我忘了问你关于油耗的问题。这对我来说非常重要。这辆车的里程数好吗?“ 鲍勃回答说,” 儿子,我保证这辆车在城市里每加仑至少能给你 30 英里。“ 鲍勃是否做出了明确的保证? 《美国法典》第 2-313、2-209 条;§2-313 的官方评论 7。
Here Bob made the statement after the buyer purchased the car. However, under Comment 7 to §2-313, “The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material.” Here, even though Bob made the statement after the buyer made the purchase, it’s still an express warranty, in the form of a modification. Under §2-209, a modification does not need consideration to be binding.
在这里,鲍勃在买家购买了汽车后发表了声明。然而,根据 §2-313 的第 7 条评论,“ 做出描述或肯定的词语或显示样本的确切时间并不重要。“ 在这里,即使 Bob 在买家购买后做出了声明,它仍然是以修改形式提供的明示保证。根据 §2-209,修改无需考虑即可具有约束力。
f. Same facts as part (a), except that before buying the car you ask Bob whether it comes with a warranty. “You bet, son,” says Bob, who then hands you a six-page warranty that you do not bother to read on the spot. Two days later, as you read the warranty, your eyes light up when you get to the part about gas mileage. “Great,” you tell yourself, “this says that the car will get at least 30 miles per gallon in the city.” Has Bob made an express warranty concerning the gas mileage? U.C.C. §2-313.
f. 与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是在购买汽车之前您询问 Bob 是否附带保修。 “ 你打赌,孩子,” 鲍勃说,然后他递给你一份六页的保修单,你懒得当场阅读。两天后,当您阅读保修单时,当您谈到有关油耗的部分时,您的眼睛会亮起来。“ 太好了,” 你告诉自己,“ 这表明这辆车在城市里每加仑至少可以行驶 30 英里。“ Bob 是否对油耗做出了明确保证? 《美国法典》第 2-313 条。
Bob might try to argue that he did not make an express warranty because the buyer did not rely on his statement since the buyer did not read the warranty when making the purchase. From an equity standpoint, it seems hard for the seller to create a written warranty with specific statement and then later deny the enforceability of these statements on the grounds that the buyer did not specifically relied on them in making the purchase. Common law estoppel doctrine will prevent the seller from escaping responsibility for these statements he made in the warranty.
鲍勃可能会试图争辩说他没有做出明示保证,因为买方在购买时没有阅读保修单,所以买方没有依赖他的声明。从公平的角度来看 ,卖方似乎很难创建带有具体声明的书面保证,然后以买方在购买时没有特别依赖它们为由否认这些声明的可执行 性。普通法禁止反言原则将阻止卖方逃避对其在保修中所做的这些陈述的责任。
8.3. a. Carol Campbell owns a clothing store, Dress for Success, that sells a variety of men’s and women’s business attire. Paul Wofsey selected a new suit there, had it altered by the store, bought it, and took it home. When he tried the suit on two weeks later, he sat down and discovered to his painful surprise that someone had sewn a rusty tack into the seat of the pants. Is Carol’s store liable for breach of warranty? U.C.C. §2-314.
8.3. a. Carol Campbell 拥有一家名为 Dress for Success 的服装店,出售各种男士和女士商务装。Paul Wofsey 在那里挑选了一套新西装,让商店修改了它,买了下来,然后带回家。两周后,当他试穿这套西装时,他坐下来,惊讶地发现有人在裤子的座位上缝了一根生锈的钉子。Carol 的商店是否对违反保修负责? 《美国法典》第 2-314 条。
Carol is liable for Paul here for breach of warranty since she is a merchant, and these pants will not pass without objection in the trade under the contract description per §2-314(2)(a), nor are these pants fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used per §2-314(2)(c).
Carol 在这里对 Paul 的违约行为负责,因为她是一名商人,根据 §2-314(2)(a) 的合同描述,这些裤子不会在贸易中毫无异议地通过 ,这些裤子也不适合根据 §2-314(2)(c) 使用它们的普通用途。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that Carol has her workers examine all of the inventory thoroughly every night to make sure there are no foreign objects such as pins stuck in the clothes. Will this evidence be useful for Carol if nobody knows how or when the rusty tack got into the pants? U.C.C. §2-314, Official Comment 13 to §2-314.
b. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是 Carol 让她的工作人员每晚彻底检查所有库存,以确保没有异物,例如针子卡在衣服上。如果没有人知道生锈的大头针是怎么或什么时候进入裤子的,这些证据对卡罗尔有用吗?U.C.C. §2-314,官方评论 13 至 §2-314。
We use strict liability standard in deciding warranty liability for a seller. It’s not a defense for a seller in a breach of warranty action to say the seller used all the due care in the world in making the product. However, even though the standard is strict liability, it’s still relevant here whether the seller’s workers used due care during inspection. Comment 13 to §2-314 says “In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to show not only the existence of the warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and that the breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained.” A possible defense in a case like this one is: the defect in the product was caused by something occurred following the sale. Thus, evidence indicating that the seller exercised care in the manufacture, processing or selection of the goods is relevant to the issue of whether the warranty was in fact broken. Thus evidence of the seller’s due care is still relevant even though it’s strict liability for the seller. Strict liability is measured at the point of the sale.
我们使用严格责任标准来确定卖方的保修责任。 对于违反保修诉讼的卖家来说,如果说卖家在制造产品时使用了世界上所有应有的谨慎,这并不是辩护。然而,即使标准是严格责任, 卖方的工人在检查期间是否采取了应有的谨慎措施仍然很重要 。§2-314 的注释 13 说 :“ 在基于违反保证的诉讼中,当然不仅需要证明保证的存在,而且需要证明保证被破坏的事实,以及违反保证是造成损失的直接原因。“ 在这样的案件中,一种可能的辩护是:产品缺陷是由销售后发生的事情引起的。因此,有证据表明卖方在制造、加工或选择商品时谨慎行事,这与保修是否实际上被破坏的问题有关。 因此, 卖方应有注意的证据仍然具有相关性,即使这是卖方的严格责任。严格责任是在销售时衡量的。
Differences between a warrantor of a product and an insurer of a product?
产品的保证人和产品的保险公司之间的区别 ?
A warrantor’s strict liability for the condition of the goods is limited in time to the condition of the goods at the point of sale. A warrantor, unlike an insurer, are not responsible for things happened to the goods beyond that point, unless those things are manifestations of some latent defects that did exist at the time of the sale.
保修人对货物状况的严格责任仅限于销售点货物状况的时间。与保险公司不同,保证人不对超出该时间点后货物发生的事情负责,除非这些事情是销售时确实存在的一些潜在缺陷的表现。
c. Same facts as part (b). Will this evidence be useful for Carol if it is established as a fact that an angry customer placed the rusty tack in the pants a half-hour before Paul bought them? U.C.C. §2-314, Official Comment 13 to §2-314.
c. 与 (b) 部分相同的事实。如果确定一个愤怒的顾客在 Paul 买裤子前半小时将生锈的大头钉放在裤子里,那么这些证据对 Carol 有用吗?U.C.C. §2-314,官方评论 13 至 §2-314。
Once it is established as a fact that the tack was already sewn into the pants at the time of the sale, then all the evidence in the world of the seller’s due care becomes irrelevant. Seller’s due care is only relevant in a case where it is unknown or uncertain whether the defect existed at the time of the sale.
一旦确定在销售时大头钉已经缝在裤子上,那么世界上所有关于卖方应有注意的证据就变得无关紧要了。卖方的应有注意仅在销售时未知或不确定是否存在缺陷的情况下才有意义。
Problem 8.4 You just began your first job after graduation as in-house counsel for a major beer manufacturer. Your initial project involves a lawsuit that was filed against your company by a 62-year-old man who developed cirrhosis of the liver after several decades of heavy beer drinking. One of the theories of his suit, the one that you have been asked to focus on, is that your company breached its implied warranty of merchantability because beer that causes cirrhosis of the liver is not fit for ordinary use. Your general counsel asked you to think about different arguments that your company can make in response to this warranty claim. What statutory arguments can you come up with as to why your company should not be liable on an implied warranty theory? U.C.C. §2-314(2), Official Comment 12 to §2-314.
问题 8.4 您刚刚开始了毕业后的第一份工作,在一家大型啤酒制造商担任内部法律顾问。您的初始项目涉及一名 62 岁的男子对贵公司提起的诉讼,该男子在几十年的大量饮酒后患上了肝硬化。他的诉讼的一个理论,也是你被要求关注的理论之一,是你的公司违反了其对适销性的默示保证,因为导致肝硬化的啤酒不适合普通使用。您的总法律顾问要求您考虑您的公司可以针对此保修索赔提出不同的论点。您可以提出哪些法定论据来说明为什么您的公司不应该对默示保证理论负责?U.C.C. §2-314(2),官方评论 12 至 §2-314。
ANSWER: let’s assume first that the plaintiff in this case had no knowledge of this side effect of beer by the time that the product had done its damage and putting aside any assumption of risks defense that the beer manufacturer might have. Under that assumption, what can one say in defense of the beer manufacturer? The beer manufacturer could argue this beer was no different than any other been in that any beer could potentially cause cirrhosis of the liver. so in another word the beer manufacturer is saying this was not beer that had rat hairs in it, this beer was your good clean basic beer. So, the seller can say the beer being complained about clearly meets the standard of 2-314(2)(a) in that this beer can “pass without objection in the trade” it meets 2-314(2)(a) it is just like any other beer. Should the fact that he beer meets the standard of 2-314(2)(a) be dispositive for the seller (should that be enough for the seller to prevail in this case)? 2-314(2) says goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a), (b), (c), (d) through (f); and the conjunction that connects the letters is an “and” meaning you have to fulfill all of the requirements under 2-314(2). The according to the buyer which of 2-314(2) that the seller is arguably not meeting? 2-314(2)(c) not fit for its ordinary purpose. Analogy: imagine you have a farmer who buys insecticide for his crop that successfully kills insects but also kills grazing animals as well as anyone who eats the crops. So, this insecticide does what it is suppose to do, I kills insects and it has an undesirable side effect (not fit for its ordinary purpose because of its undesirable side effects, so it was violation of 2-314(2)(c)). So, that is like the beer. The beer does what it is suppose to do, and the buyer is saying this beer by giving cirrhosis of the liver after decades of heavy drinking is not fit for its ordinary purpose (which is drinking).
回答: 让我们首先假设本案中的原告在产品造成损害时不知道啤酒的这种副作用,并抛开啤酒制造商可能拥有的任何风险辩护假设。在这种假设下,我们能说什么来为啤酒制造商辩护呢?啤酒制造商可以争辩说,这种啤酒与任何其他啤酒没有什么不同,因为任何啤酒都可能导致肝硬化。 所以换句话说,啤酒制造商说这不是含有老鼠毛的啤酒,这种啤酒是很好的干净基本啤酒。因此,卖家可以说被投诉的啤酒显然符合 2-314(2)(a) 的标准,因为这种啤酒可以“在交易中无异议地通过”,它符合 2-314(2)(a) 它就像任何其他啤酒一样。 他的啤酒符合 2-314(2)(a)的标准这一事实是否应该对卖方具有决定性意义(这是否足以使卖方在本案中胜诉)? 2-314(2) 规定可商售的商品必须至少是 (a)、(b)、(c)、(d) 到 (f);连接字母的连词是“and”,这意味着您必须 满足 2-314(2) 下的所有要求。 根据买方的说法,卖方可以说没有满足 2-314(2) 中的哪一项? 2-314(2)(c) 不适合其一般用途。打个比方:想象一下,你有一个农民为他的庄稼购买杀虫剂,成功地杀死了昆虫,但也杀死了吃草的动物以及任何吃庄稼的人。 所以,这种杀虫剂做了它应该 做的事情,我杀死昆虫,它有不良的副作用(由于其不良的副作用,不适合其正常用途,因此违反了 2-314(2)(c))。所以,这就像啤酒一样。啤酒做了它应该 做的事情,买家说这种啤酒在几十年的大量饮酒后导致肝硬化,不适合它的普通目的(即饮用)。
Assume that this plaintiff did know or should have known of the beer’s long-term side effect of his liver. Does this mean that the beer suddenly becomes fit for its ordinary purpose? The beer is still not fit for its ordinary purpose, even if he knows about it. That does not mean that the buyer means. Official comment 13 to 2-314 says if your plaintiff in a warranty action, you have got to show all kind of things in order to prevail. You have to show the existence of the warranty, you have to show that it has been breached (show that it is not fit for ordinary purpose – in this case you can show that), and you have to show that the warranty was broken and that was a proximate cause of the injury. The real proximate cause was the buyer’s decision to proceed to drink this beer knowing full well what that was going to do. Some courts will accept assumption of risk, even though it is typically a tort defense. Some court will consider it in the warranty context even though warranty in contract. Even if they do not accept the assumption of the risk because this is a contract and not a court, you can easily use the same facts for the proximate cause analysis accepting that this is a contract action rather than a tort action.
假设这位原告确实知道或应该知道啤酒对他的肝脏的长期副作用。这是否意味着啤酒突然变得适合其正常用途?这种啤酒仍然不适合它的普通用途,即使他知道它。这并不意味着买方的意思是。官方评论 13 至 2-314 说,如果您的原告在保修诉讼中,您必须出示各种事情才能获胜。您必须证明保修的存在,您必须证明它已被违反(表明它不适合普通用途 - 在这种情况下,您可以证明),并且您必须证明保修已损坏,这是造成伤害的直接原因。真正的直接原因是买方决定继续饮用这种啤酒,他完全知道这将产生什么影响。一些法院会接受风险承担,即使这通常是一种侵权抗辩。一些法院会在保修范围内考虑它,即使合同中有保修。即使他们因为这是合同而不是法院而不接受风险承担,您也可以轻松地使用相同的事实进行近因分析,接受这是合同诉讼而不是侵权诉讼。
If you look at the cigarette cases that have been brought, and some of them have been brought on a breach of implied warranty theory. Most of them have been decided on the basis of either: first, these cigarette was no worse than any other (as we discussed that fact alone should not be dispositive) or second, that the plaintiff knew of the risks which opens up defenses for the manufacturer of estoppel or assumption of the risk if the court will accept it or lack of causation because you have to show proximate cause as a plaintiff to win on breach of warranty suit.
如果你看一下已经提起的香烟案,其中一些是因违反默示保证理论而被提起的。他们中的大多数是根据以下任一因素做出裁决的:首先,这些香烟并不比其他任何香烟差 (正如我们所讨论的,仅凭这一事实不应成为决定性的),或者第二,原告知道风险,如果法院会接受,则为制造商提供禁反言或承担风险的辩护,或者缺乏因果关系,因为您必须证明作为原告的近因才能获胜违反保修诉讼。
Problem 8.5 Your law firm was just retained to represent a car manufacturer that was sued by a woman who was a passenger in one of your client’s newer models that the woman had purchased. The woman, who was seriously injured in a car accident, claims that the manufacturer’s failure to include side airbags as a standard feature in the case she bought amounted to a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The car, which was one of the manufacturer’s economy models, did have standard front airbags for both the driver and the passenger. What are the strongest Article 2 arguments your firm can muster to defend against his lawsuit? How generally should a court decide when the implied warranty of merchantability must include a particular safety feature? U.C.C. §2-314(2).
问题 8.5 您的律师事务所刚刚受聘代表一家汽车制造商,该汽车制造商被一名女性起诉,该女性是您客户购买的一款新车型的乘客。这名在车祸中受重伤的妇女声称,制造商未能将侧面安全气囊作为她购买的箱子的标准功能,这相当于违反了适销性的默示保证。这辆车是制造商的经济型车型之一,确实为驾驶员和乘客配备了标准的前安全气囊。 贵公司可以拿出哪些最有力的第 2 条论据来为他的诉讼辩护?法院通常应该如何决定适销性的默示保证何时必须包括特定的安全功能?《美国法典》第 2-314(2) 条。
ANSWER: strongest Article 2 arguments: looking at 2-314(2)(a)’s pass without objection in trade and suppose that the majority of car manufacturers that built similar cars were making their cars at this point in time with passenger side airbags. Suppose that the buyer could show that. How would that help or hurt the buyer’s case? Defending the manufacturer, you could still argue that well we really have to focus on the contract description and if the contract description said no passenger side airbags, then it is not enough to say that others similarly priced cars have a passenger side airbag. That could work. The buyer would think it would be more helpful than hurtful if he can show almost all cars in this price range had the passenger side airbags. The buyer could at least make an argument that it does not pass without objection in the trade, because for a car like this it really ought to have this safety feature. But if we focus on the contract description, we are narrow about it and we’ll probably prevail on that as a manufacturer. And certainly it would be true that if this were a case where a higher price line of cars all had the passenger side airbags, but this economy priced car did not (that is not going to help the buyer much because you cannot make every product live up to expensive product when it comes to safety features).
答案: 最有力的第 2 条论点:在贸易中没有异议地查看 2-314(2)(a) 的通行证 ,并假设大多数制造类似汽车的汽车制造商此时都在制造带有乘客侧安全气囊的汽车。假设买方可以证明这一点。这将如何帮助或伤害买方的案件?为制造商辩护,你仍然可以争辩说,我们真的必须关注合同描述,如果合同描述说没有乘客侧安全气囊,那么说其他价格相似的汽车有乘客侧安全气囊是不够的。那可能会奏效。如果买家能证明这个价格范围内的几乎所有汽车都有乘客侧安全气囊,那么他会认为这更有帮助而不是有害。买方至少可以提出一个论点,即它不会在交易中毫无异议地通过,因为对于这样的汽车,它确实应该具有这种安全功能。但是,如果我们专注于合同描述,我们就会狭隘地看待它 ,作为制造商,我们可能会在这一点上占上风。当然 ,如果这是这样一种情况,即价格较高的汽车都配备了乘客侧安全气囊,但这款经济型汽车却没有(这对买家没有太大帮助,因为在安全功能方面,您无法让每个产品都符合昂贵的产品)。
The question is when we talk about safety features, we have to ask ourselves at what point does the product need to have a safety feature? Assume for a moment that no car of any make of that kind included passenger side airbags. First, would that fact be helpful for the manufacturer on the issue of implied warranty liability? It would be helpful assuming that this car has met the minimum safety features. Would it be dispositive? It would not be dispositive because it could be that an entire industry is out of line when it comes to a particular safety feature. If you look at 2-314(2), by its terms, says goods to be merchantable must be at least such as and then it gives these six sub-requirements. At starters it has to meet all of the six requirements, but that does not mean you are done. Let’s assume that the lack of a passenger side airbag did at the relevant time meet industry standard for this type of car. Therefore, the seller meets 2-314(2)(a) it passes without objection to the trade. But the buyer makes different argument and says “well, I do not have to argue 2-314(2)(a), and I can win by just arguing 2-314(2)(c) that this car is nevertheless not fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used and it is not fit because when you crash the car, the car does not adequately protect the passenger.” Then the seller says “wait a minute, ordinary purpose of a car is driving it and not crashing it.” Is there any answer to that if you are the buyer? What is ordinary purpose mean? If ordinary purpose means not infrequent occurrence or not extraordinary, then the seller is not going to be off the hook by saying that the intended purpose of a car is to driving it. And this came up in Phillips v. Lighter Cricket, where the seller ended up winning the 2-314(2)(c) argument on the basis that the child’s use of the lighter was not an ordinary purpose for the lighter; even though, the plaintiff could point to statistics showing that this type of use was not really that extraordinary. Let’s say that we determine that the phrase “ordinary purpose” under 2-314(2)(c) might include unintended but not extraordinary uses, then we are left with the question as to how far manufacturer must go in protecting the buyer’s from these unintended but not extraordinary uses? That was the question in Cricket Lighter. But sometimes people inadvertently drive their cars into lakes or bodies of water; must a car include a water ejection seat to account for this possibility in order to be merchantable? What factors should the court consider in deciding whether a manufacturer has to include a particular safety feature in order for the product to be merchantable? The court could look at whether that particular use is foreseeable or reasonable and that could go to the probability of the unintended use and within that you could say and the likelihood that this safety feature would avoid or mitigate the loss that sought to be protected against by the safety feature. Gravity of the harm (in the case of the Cricket Lighter was the house burning down). The Learned Hand’s formula that there is a breach of IWM in the absence of a safety feature whenever the cost of that safety feature is less than the probability that the safety feature would have avoided or mitigated the harm times the gravity of the harm (B<PL). So, in the problem with a formula like this is that it becomes hard to actually quantify it in a very mathematical way, so you just kind of working roughly.
问题是,当我们谈论安全功能时,我们必须问自己 ,产品在什么时候需要具有安全功能?假设任何此类汽车都没有包含乘客侧安全气囊。首先,这一事实对制造商在默示保证责任问题上是否有帮助?假设这辆车满足最低安全功能会很有帮助。它会是决定性的吗?这不会是决定性的,因为当涉及到特定的安全功能时,整个行业都可能不合时宜。如果你看一下 2-314(2),根据它的条款,说可商销的商品必须至少是这样的,然后它给出了这六个子要求。首先 ,它必须满足所有六个要求,但这并不意味着您就完成了。让我们假设在相关时间缺少乘客侧安全气囊确实符合此类汽车的行业标准。因此,卖方满足 2-314(2)(a) 它通过,对交易没有异议。但买方提出了不同的论点,并说:“好吧,我不必争论 2-314(2)(a),我可以通过争论 2-314(2)(c) 来获胜,这辆车仍然不适合使用此类商品的普通用途,并且它不适合,因为当你撞车时, 这辆车没有充分保护乘客。然后卖家说 “等一下,汽车的正常目的是驾驶它而不是撞毁它。 如果你是买家,有什么答案吗?普通目的是什么意思? 如果普通目的意味着不经常发生或不特殊,那么卖家不会说汽车的预期目的是驾驶它而摆脱困境。 这在 Phillips v. Lighter Cricket 案中出现 ,卖家最终赢得了 2-314(2)(c) 的争论,理由是儿童使用打火机不是打火机的普通目的;尽管如此,原告可以指出统计数据表明这种类型的使用并不是那么特别。 假设我们确定 2-314(2)(c) 下的“普通目的”一词可能包括非预期但非特殊用途,那么我们就会面临一个问题,即制造商必须在多大程度上保护买方免受这些意外但非特殊用途的影响? 这是 Cricket Lighter 中的问题 。但有时人们会无意中将汽车驶入湖泊或水体;汽车必须配备喷水座椅才能适销吗? 法院在决定制造商是否必须包含特定的安全功能才能使产品适销时应考虑哪些因素? 法院可以查看该特定用途是否可预见或合理,这可能取决于意外使用的可能性,在此范围内,您可以说,该安全功能将避免或减轻试图通过安全功能保护的损失的可能性。伤害的严重性(在 Cricket Lighter 的情况下是房子被烧毁)。 Learned Hand's 公式 ,即在没有安全功能的情况下,只要该安全功能的成本低于该安全功能本来可以避免或减轻伤害的概率乘以伤害的严重性(B<PL),即违反 IWM。所以,像这样的公式的问题在于,很难以非常数学的方式真正量化它,所以你只是粗略地工作。
Problem 8.6 Consider the following actual news story that appeared in th St. Louis Post-Dispatch on June 7,1997:
问题 8.6 考虑一下 1997 年 6 月 7 日出现在 《圣路易斯邮报 》上的以下实际新闻报道 :
Dairy Industry Sued Over Man’s III Health (SEATTLE) (AP)-Norman Mayo, 61, is suing the dairy industry, claiming drinking whole milk contributed to his clogged arteries and a minor stroke. He said he might have avoided the problems if he had been warned on the milk cartons about fat and cholesterol. The federal lawsuit names Safeway and the Dairy Farmers of Washington as defendants. Mayo wants warnings on dairy products. “If tobacco products can be required to have warning labels, why not dairy products?” said Mayo, a former smoker. “I think milk is just as dangerous as tobacco.”
乳制品行业起诉 Man's III Health (西雅图) (AP) - 61 岁的诺曼·梅奥 (Norman Mayo) 正在起诉乳制品行业,声称饮用全脂牛奶导致了他的动脉堵塞和轻微中风。他说,如果他在牛奶盒上被警告关于脂肪和胆固醇,他可能会避免这些问题。联邦诉讼将 Safeway 和华盛顿奶农列为被告。梅奥希望对乳制品发出警告。“如果可以要求烟草产品贴上警告标签,为什么不要求乳制品呢?”“我认为牛奶和烟草一样危险。”
Suppose Mr. Mayo’s implied warranty theory is not lack of fitness for ordinary use, as in Problem 8.4, but instead that the whole milk was not “adequately contained, packaged, and labeled” because of its lack of a warning about health risks. Should Mr. Mayo prevail on this theory? U.C.C. §2-314(2)(e).
假设梅奥先生的默示保证理论不是像问题 8.4 那样缺乏适合普通用途,而是由于缺乏关于健康风险的警告,全脂牛奶没有“充分容纳、包装和贴标签”。梅奥先生应该在这个理论上占上风吗?《美国法典》第 2-314(2)(e) 条。
ANSWER: This problem is a lot like Problem 8.5 in that both plaintiffs are arguing that the seller should have spent money to add a safety feature or a warning. Let’s consider the problem using the B<PL cost benefit analysis. How does that analysis look? What would the plaintiff want to argue under the B<PL paradigm? This plaintiff is going to want to argue that the milk industry should be liable under 2-314(2)(e) because the cost of placing a label on the milk cartons would have been fairly small and therefore the B side of the equation should be really low. So, the buyer would say it is not as if the buyer was suggesting that the makers of milk could only sell skim milk, which would immediately extract a much greater cost from the seller like trying to tell a coffee seller that they have to sell cold coffee. So how can the milk industry respond with its own version of B<PL to say that maybe it was not so clear that the whole milk should have had these warnings? The first thing is the milk seller could point out that at the time when it would have mattered the most to the seller the cost of the warning label would have been relatively high because there are information cost to labeling beyond just putting the letter on the cartons and it may not have been clear decades ago that the fat in milk was a significant health hazard for most people. And second as to the B side of the equation on this label, the milk industry could argue another cost or another reason why B is not as low as it seems it would be a reduction in sales to panic buyers who might overreact to a warning label that is comparable to the king of warning label you would see on a cigarette carton. And finally, using this B<PL formula, the milk sellers could also question the marginal benefits of putting on a warning label; particularly, this P one here because they could argue that this is a case where people like the buyer who really love their whole milk might choose to take the risk anyways and not reduce their whole milk consumption even in the face of such a warning. So the warning really would not have made such a difference to those who love their milk. And second, in this day and age, the milk seller could say the dangers of excessive fats in one’s diet are fairly well publicized which would call in the question what difference at the margin such a warning label would make when you are talking about something that is fairly obvious to many people anyways. Do the manufacturers really have to state the obvious? Yes, because some of these warning labels are crazy in terms of what it would tell you what not to do with the product that you might not have thought of doing with the product because they do not want to leave such litigation open. As a result, we get over warned.
回答: 这个问题很像问题 8.5,因为两个原告都争辩说,卖方应该花钱添加安全功能或警告。让我们使用 B<PL 成本效益分析来考虑这个问题。 该分析看起来如何?在 B<PL 范式下,原告想争论什么? 该原告将要争辩说,牛奶行业应该根据 2-314(2)(e) 承担责任,因为在牛奶盒上贴标签的成本相当小 ,因此等式的 B 侧应该非常低。所以,买方会说,这并不是说买方在暗示牛奶制造商只能销售脱脂牛奶,这会立即从卖方那里榨取更大的成本,就像试图告诉咖啡卖家他们必须出售冷咖啡一样。 那么,牛奶行业如何用自己版本的 B<PL 来回应,说也许全脂牛奶应该有这些警告不是那么清楚呢? 首先,牛奶销售商可以指出,在对销售商来说最重要的时候,警告标签的成本会相对较高,因为除了将字母贴在纸箱上之外,标签还需要支付信息成本,而且几十年前可能不清楚牛奶中的脂肪对大多数人的健康构成重大危害。其次,关于这个标签上等式的 B 面,牛奶行业可能会争论 B 没有看起来那么低的另一个成本或其他原因,这会导致销售减少,从而让恐慌的买家感到恐慌,他们可能会对警告标签反应过度,该标签可与您在香烟纸盒上看到的警告标签之王相媲美。 最后,使用这种 B<PL 配方奶粉,奶商还可以质疑贴上警告标签的边际好处;特别是这个 P 一,因为他们可以争辩说,在这种情况下,像买家这样真正热爱全脂牛奶的人可能会选择冒险,即使面对这样的警告,也不会减少他们的全脂牛奶消费量。 因此 ,这个警告真的不会对那些热爱牛奶的人产生如此大的影响。其次, 在这个时代 ,牛奶销售商可以说饮食中脂肪过多的危害已经相当广为人知,这会让人不禁要问,当你谈论对许多人来说相当明显的事情时,这样的警告标签会在边际上产生什么影响。 制造商真的必须说明显而易见的事情吗? 是的,因为其中一些警告标签在告诉你什么不应该处理产品方面是疯狂的,你可能没有想过要对产品做什么,因为他们不想让这样的诉讼悬而未决。结果,我们被过度警告了。
Problem 8.7 Consider Carol Campbell again, and in particular the facts of Problem 8.3(c), where even her nightly inspection are not enough to catch the angry customer who put the rusty tack in. Carol now wants to defend by saying that the cost of avoiding this particular harm would not be worth the benefit. Since Carol’s workers would have needed to do clothes inspections every 15 minutes to avoid this harm. Therefore, says Carol, she should not be liable for an unavoidable harm. Will this defense work?
问题 8.7 再想想 Carol Campbell,特别是问题 8.3(c) 的事实,即使是她每晚的检查也不足以抓住那个生锈的顾客。卡罗尔现在想辩解说,避免这种特定伤害的成本不值得。因为 Carol 的工人需要每 15 分钟检查一次衣服以避免这种伤害。因此,Carol 说,她不应该对不可避免的伤害负责。这种防御措施会奏效吗?
ANSWER: no it will not work. The cost benefit defense will not work because this paradigm B<PL is only relevant in the implied warranty arena when the question at issue is whether a product breaches the implied warranty of merchantability because it lacks a particular safety feature or warning. When a product just does not work or it simply not up to industry standards, the seller is going to be liable for breach of IWM. That will be true even if the burden to the seller discovering this particular kind of defect would outweigh the benefit of preventing that defect. So, Carol says that is just not fair, after all how much more diligent can Carol be? Well, all we can say to a seller like Carol in a case like this is that some implied warranty liability is unavoidable or at least not worth spending the cost to avoid. But that is just another cost of doing business. Or maybe Carol could be more efficient with her inspections and just inspect the goods immediately before selling them rather than every night or every fifteen minutes.
回答: 不 ,它不会起作用。成本效益抗辩是行不通的,因为这种范式 B<PL 仅在有争议的问题是产品是否因为缺乏特定的安全功能或警告而违反了适销性的默示保证时,才与默示保证领域相关。当产品无法正常工作或根本达不到行业标准时,卖家将对违反 IWM 负责。即使卖方发现这种特定类型的缺陷的负担超过了防止该缺陷的好处,这也是正确的。所以,卡罗尔说这不公平,毕竟卡罗尔还能勤奋多少呢?好吧,在这种情况下,我们只能对像 Carol 这样的卖家说,一些默示的保修责任是不可避免的,或者至少不值得花钱来避免。但这只是做生意的另一种成本。或者,也许 Carol 可以更有效地进行检查,只在出售商品前立即检查商品,而不是每晚或每 15 分钟检查一次。
NOTICE AND PRIVITY PP. 175
《注意与知情》 第 175 页
9.1. a. Judi Pierce is an independent truck driver who just purchased a new truck from the Mack Company, a retail truck seller. Five months after the sale, the Mack Company gets the following fax from Judi: “Your new truck stinks. It broke down three months ago and I lost six jobs since then because my truck has been sitting in my driveway. I’m going to sue you for breach of warranty.” Does the Mack Company have a good defense to such a suit? U.C.C. §2-607(3)(a), Official Comment 4 to §2-607.
9.1. a. Judi Pierce 是一名独立卡车司机,他刚刚从零售卡车销售商 Mack Company 购买了一辆新卡车。出售五个月后,Mack 公司收到了 Judi 的以下传真:“ 你的新卡车很臭。三个月前它坏了,从那以后我失去了六份工作,因为我的卡车一直停在我的车道上。我要起诉你违反保修。“ Mack 公司对这样的诉讼有很好的辩护吗?加州大学 §2-607(3)(a),官方意见 4 至 §2-607。
The Mack Company can try to argue that Judi should be barred from any remedy against the seller for her failure to give time notice as required by §2-607(3)(a), which requires a buyer to notify the seller of the breach “within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should discover any breach.” This raises the question what constitute reasonable time. Judi can make the argument that 3 month isn’t that long, and the delay didn’t hinder the ability of the seller to have access to evidence about the defect.
Mack 公司可以尝试争辩说,如果 Judi 未能按照 §2-607(3)(a) 的要求发出时间通知,则应禁止 Judi 对卖方采取任何补救措施,该条款要求买方 “ 在买方发现或应该发现任何违约行为后的合理时间内”通知卖方违约行为。“ 这就提出了一个问题,什么构成合理时间。Judi 可以提出 3 个月并不长的论点,而且延迟并没有妨碍卖方获取有关缺陷证据的能力。
Rationale for timely notice: a. To preserve the seller’s right of inspection.
及时通知的理由: a.维护卖方的检查权。
b. To preserve the seller’s right to cure and mitigate its damages.
湾。维护卖方补救和减轻其损害的权利。
c. To facilitate settlement.
c. 促进结算。
d. Maintaining the seller’s right to repose. (To avoid unfair surprise to the seller.)
d. 维护卖方的休止权。(为避免对卖家造成不公平的惊喜。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that Judi ordered the truck for delivery on July 1. The truck did not ultimately arrive until October 1 of the same year. Although Judi had said nothing during the delay, on October 5 she fired off the following fax to the Mack Company: “You guys stink. How do you expect me to make a living when you deliver your truck three months late? Thanks to you guys, I lost six jobs that I could have had. I’m going to sue you for breach of contract.” Does the Mack Company have a good defense to such a suit? U.C.C. §2-607(3)(a), Official Comment 4 to §2-607.
b. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Judi 在 7 月 1 日订购了卡车进行交付。卡车最终直到同年 10 月 1 日才到达。尽管 Judi 在延误期间什么也没说,但在 10 月 5 日,她向 Mack 公司发送了以下传真:“ 你们好臭。如果你晚了三个月才交付卡车,你指望我怎么维持生计?多亏了你们,我失去了六份我本可以做的工作。我要起诉你违约。“ Mack 公司对这样的诉讼有很好的辩护吗?加州大学 §2-607(3)(a),官方意见 4 至 §2-607。
The seller can argue that even though there was delay in delivery, but since the seller didn’t hear from the buyer, they assume the delay in delivery wasn’t a problem. If it’s a big problem the buyer should have said something. The seller didn’t know the extent to which the breach was causing the buyer damages.
卖家可以争辩说,即使交货延迟,但由于卖家没有收到买家的消息,他们认为交货延迟不是问题。如果这是一个大问题,买家应该说点什么。卖方不知道违约对买方造成的损害程度。
However, under the language of 2-607(3), the timely notice requirement for the buyer arises after the buyer accepts the goods. Here Judi can make the argument that due to the delay in delivery, she didn’t accept the goods until October 1. And her notice to the seller on October 5 is thus timely. However, this reasoning probably won’t work very well, since here the very breach being complained of is the lateness in delivery.
但是,根据 2-607(3) 的措辞,对买方的及时通知要求在买方接受货物后产生。在这里,Judi 可以提出一个论点,由于交货延迟,她直到 10 月 1 日才接受货物。因此,她在 10 月 5 日向卖家发出的通知是及时的。然而,这种推理可能不会很好,因为这里被抱怨的违规行为正是交货延迟。
c. Same facts as part (a), except Judi gives immediate notice of the problem to the Mack Company. Later, though, when the Mack Company goes bankrupt, she decides that she had better sue the manufacturer, Acme Truck. Is Acme entitled to the same notice as Mack? Should Judi’s notice to Mack also count for Acme? U.C.C. §§2-607(3)(a), 2-607(5)(a).
c. 事实与 (a) 部分相同,但 Judi 立即向 Mack 公司通知了问题。不过,后来,当 Mack 公司破产时,她决定最好起诉制造商 Acme Truck。Acme 是否有权获得与 Mack 相同的通知?Judi 给 Mack 的通知也应该计入 Acme 吗?加州大学 §§2-607(3)(a)、2-607(5)(a)。
According to §2-607(5)(a), after being sued by a buyer, if the immediate seller give notice to the manufacturer (“vouching in”) to let the manufacturer to defend for the seller in the suit, and the manufacturer do not come and defend for the seller, and the seller loses in the suit against the buyer, then such manufacturer will be bound by any finding of facts in this first suit when the seller later on sues the manufacturer. In practice, once a seller receives complaint from its buyer, the seller will complain to the manufacturer no matter the buyer brings suit or not. Thus in this problem, as a practical matter, it will come down to whether the seller give notice to the manufacture after receiving complaint from the buyer.
根据 §2-607(5)(a),在被买方起诉后,如果直接卖方向制造商发出通知(“ 担保 ”),让制造商在诉讼中为卖方辩护,而制造商没有来为卖方辩护,并且卖方在对买方的诉讼中败诉,那么当卖方稍后起诉制造商。在实践中,一旦卖方收到买方的投诉,无论买方是否提起诉讼,卖方都会向制造商投诉 。 因此 ,在这个问题上,作为一个实际问题,将归结为卖方在收到买方的投诉后是否通知制造商。
Here, the problem comes down to whether, before the immediate seller went bankrupt, the buyer actually started litigation or not. If all the buyer did is merely complaining, then §2-607(5)(a) doesn’t kick in. As for the question whether the manufacturer is entitled to the same notice as to the immediate seller under §2-607(3)(a), courts are split. The manufacturer can make the argument that if they are the one that’s going to be held responsible by the buyer despite the lack of vertical privity, then they should also entitled to the same notice the immediate seller is entitled to under §2-607(3)(a).
在这里,问题归结为,在直接卖方破产之前,买方是否真的开始了诉讼。如果买方所做的只是抱怨,那么 §2-607(5)(a) 就不会生效。至于制造商是否有权获得与 §2-607(3)(a) 项下的直接销售商相同的通知的问题,法院存在分歧。制造商可以提出这样的论点,如果他们是买方在缺乏纵向关系的情况下仍要承担责任的人,那么他们也应该有权获得与直接卖方根据 §2-607(3)(a) 有权获得的相同通知。
d. Same facts as part (a), except that the truck defect causes Judi to swerve off the road, hitting pedestrian Michael Baker. Michael spends two months in the hospital, and then a year later hires a lawyer to sue the Mack Company. The complaint filed by the lawyer is the first the Mack Company learns of Michael’s injury, although Judi did complain about the truck’s defect to the Mack Company shortly after the accident. Does the Mack Company have a good defense against Michael? U.C.C. §2-607(3)(a), Official Comment 5 to §2-607
d. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是卡车缺陷导致 Judi 转弯离开道路,撞上了行人 Michael Baker。迈克尔在医院住了两个月,一年后聘请了一名律师起诉 Mack 公司。律师提交的投诉是 Mack 公司第一次得知迈克尔受伤的消息,尽管朱迪确实在事故发生后不久向 Mack 公司投诉了卡车的缺陷。麦克公司对迈克尔有很好的防御吗?U.C.C. §2-607(3)(a),官方评论 5 至 §2-607.
Comment 5 to §2-607 says a third party beneficiary, like Michael in this problem, is not bound to give notice to the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer’s acceptance, but such a beneficiary does have a duty to notify the seller that an injury has occurred with the extended time for consumers. Comment 5 to §2-607 further says the such consumer’s claim won’t be barred as long as he is in good faith and give timely notice once he has become aware of the legal situation. In this problem, even though Michael didn’t give notice to the seller until a year after his injury, he can make the argument that this is the first time that he became aware of the legal situation. In addition, the seller already knew about the truck defect from Judi and the truck is available for the seller to inspect.
§2-607 的第 5 条评论说, 第三方受益人,如此问题中的 Michael,没有义务在买方接受后的合理时间内通知卖方 ,但此类受益人确实有责任通知卖方,在延长消费者的时间内发生了伤害。 §2-607 的注释 5 进一步表示 ,只要该消费者是善意的, 并在了解法律情况后及时通知,就不会禁止该消费者的索赔 。在这个问题上,即使 Michael 在受伤一年后才通知卖方,他也可以提出这是他第一次意识到法律情况。此外,卖家已经从 Judi 那里知道卡车有缺陷,并且卡车可供 卖家检查。
9.2. a. A manufacturer of commercial lawn mowers brought your law firm a new case. The case involves an industrial-sized rider mower that had been built by this manufacturer and then sold to the ultimate buyer, Jack Reilly, by a separate retailer. Jack’s nephew, Tom, was driving the mower while working for his uncle’s lawn service when the brakes on the mower failed and Tom smashed into the client’s garage. Tom was hurt and incurred hospital bills of over $20,000. Although the mowing client, Erin Clark, was not hurt, her garage suffered damages of $6,000. Tom, who is uninsured, is suing the retailer on a breach of implied warranty theory (the tort statute of limitations has expired, but the UCC statute of limitations has not), seeking to recover both for his personal injury and for the property damage to Erin Clark’s garage, which her lawsuit is asking him to pay. How should this case come out in a jurisdiction that has adopted Alternative A to §2-318? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative A; Official Comment 3 to §2-318. How about in an Alternative B jurisdiction? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative B.
9.2. 一种。一家商用割草机制造商为您的律师事务所带来了一个新案例。该案涉及一台工业尺寸的骑手割草机,该割草机由该制造商制造,然后由另一家零售商出售给最终买家 Jack Reilly。Jack 的侄子 Tom 在为他叔叔的草坪服务工作时驾驶割草机 , 当时割草机的刹车失灵,Tom 撞进了客户的车库。汤姆受伤并产生了超过 20,000 美元的医院账单。虽然割草客户 Erin Clark 没有受伤,但她的车库遭受了 6,000 美元的损失。没有保险的 Tom 正在起诉零售商违反默示保证理论(侵权诉讼时效已过期,但 UCC 诉讼时效尚未过期),寻求赔偿他的人身伤害和 Erin Clark 车库的财产损失 ,她的诉讼要求他支付。在采用 §2-318 替代方案 A 的司法管辖区,本案应该如何审理 ?加州大学 §2-318,备选方案 A;§2-318 的官方评论 3。在备选方案 B 司法管辖区怎么样?加州大学 §2-318,备选方案 B。
Alternative A has been adopted in roughly 35 states, and the rest of states are split about equally between Alternative B and C. Here the problem the plaintiff has in a suit against the retailer is the lack of horizontal privity. Any suit against a seller by a non-buyer is said to lack horizontal privity. Any suit against a seller other than the immediate seller is said to lack vertical privity. In an Alternative A jurisdiction, it is unclear whether Tom can be said to be in the family or household of his uncle, which seems to limit the scope to immediate family. Assuming Tom is in the family or household of his uncle, there’s two ways to interpret Alternative A. One the restriction is placed on the type of damages. The other interpretation is that the restriction is placed on the type of plaintiffs, and once one qualifies as a plaintiff, that opens the door to not only personal injury, but also property damages. It is unclear what a court will do. In an Alternative B jurisdiction, Tom would qualify as a plaintiff and be able to recover.
备选方案 A 已被大约 35 个州采用,其余州的备选方案 B 和 C 大致平分。在这里,原告在针对零售商的诉讼中遇到的问题是缺乏横向相互关系。 非买方对卖方提起的任何诉讼都被称为缺乏横向相互关系。任何针对直接卖方以外的卖方的诉讼都被称为缺乏纵向相互关系。 在备选方案 A 司法管辖区,目前尚不清楚是否可以说 Tom 在他叔叔的家庭或家庭中,这似乎将范围限制在直系亲属。假设 Tom 在他叔叔的家庭或家庭中,有两种方法可以解释备选方案 A。一是限制损害的类型。另一种解释是, 限制是针对原告的类型,一旦一个人有资格成为原告,这不仅会打开人身伤害的大门,还会打开财产损失的大门。目前尚不清楚法院将采取什么行动。在备选方案 B 司法管辖区,Tom 将有资格成为原告并能够恢复。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that Tom is suing the manufacturer for breach of warranty. How should this case come out in an Alternative A jurisdiction? How about an Alternative B jurisdiction? Official Comment 3 to §2-318.
b. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Tom 起诉制造商违反保修。这个案子在备选方案 A 司法管辖区应该如何审理?备选方案 B 司法管辖区怎么样?§2-318 的官方评论 3。
In an Alternative A jurisdiction, here Tom lacks both horizontal and vertical privity in a suit against the manufacturer. Under Common Law, most states have eliminated the need for vertical privity in warranty suits against manufacturers when the user sustained personal injury. Comment 3 to §2-318 says Alternative A is neutral, and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether a seller’s warranty given to his buyer who resells extend to other people in the distributive chain. So we look to state’s common law to see if Tom can recover. Comment 3 to §2-318 says Alternative B is designed for states where the case law on vertical privity has already developed further. It seems that Alternative B also is intended to get rid of vertical privity problem as well as horizontal privity problem for plaintiffs who qualifiy under Alternative B.
在备选方案 A 司法管辖区,Tom 在针对制造商的诉讼中缺乏横向和纵向相互关系。根据普通法,大多数州已经消除了在用户遭受人身伤害时对制造商提起保修诉讼的纵向相互关系的需要。§2-318 的第 3 条评论称,备选方案 A 是中立的, 无意扩大或限制关于卖方对转售买方的保证是否适用于分销链中的其他人的不断发展的判例法。 因此 ,我们查看各州的普通法,看看 Tom 是否可以康复。§2-318 的第 3 条评论称,备选方案 B 是为关于纵向相互关系的判例法已经进一步发展的州设计的。似乎替代方案 B 也旨在为符合替代方案 B 资格的原告消除垂直相互关系问题和水平相互关系问题 。
c. Same facts as part (a), except that Erin Clark also suffered personal injury. Can Erin recover from the retailer in an Alternative A jurisdiction? How about an Alternative B jurisdiction?
c. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Erin Clark 也遭受了人身伤害。Erin 可以从备选 A 司法管辖区的零售商那里收回款项吗?备选方案 B 司法管辖区怎么样?
Erin cannot recover in an Alternative A jurisdiction since she is not in the family or household of the purchaser of the lawn mower. It’s possible that Erin can recover in an Alternative B jurisdiction, since she is a client of Jack’s business, she is reasonably expected to be affected by the lawn mower and she was injured in person. Once again, it is unclear whether Erin can recover for both her personal injury and the damage to her garage or only her personal injury.
Erin 无法在备选 A 司法管辖区恢复,因为她不在割草机购买者的家庭或家庭中。Erin 有可能在备选方案 B 司法管辖区进行康复,因为她是 Jack 业务的客户 ,因此可以合理预期她会受到割草机的影响,并且她本人受伤。同样,目前尚不清楚 Erin 是否能够同时为她的人身伤害和车库损坏赔偿,或者只为她的人身伤害获得赔偿。
d. Would your answers to part (a) change if the written warranty included a boldface clause stating that the various warranties ran only to the purchaser of the mower and not to any third parties? Official Comment 1 to §2-318.
d. 如果书面保修包括一个粗体条款,说明各种保修仅针对割草机的购买者,而不针对任何第三方,您对 (a) 部分的回答是否会发生变化?§2-318 的官方评论 1。
Such disclaimer is inoperative under §2-318. If we allow such disclaimer to be enforceable, it would enable the original buyer to bargain away the right of third parties who are not at the table, and the third parties might not receive whatever benefits the original buyer receives.
根据 §2-318, 此类免责声明无效 。如果我们允许此类免责声明具有可执行性,则原始买家将能够与不在谈判桌上的第三方进行讨价还价,而第三方可能无法获得原始买家获得的任何利益。
e. Would your answers to part (a) change if the written warranty included a boldface clause stating that the implied warranty of merchantability was being disclaimed completely? Official Comment 1 to §2-318.
e. 如果书面保证包括粗体字条款,说明完全否认对适销性的默示保证,您对 (a) 部分的回答会发生变化吗?§2-318 的官方评论 1。
Such disclaimer is valid under §2-318. Here in giving away the right of third parties, the buyer is giving away his own right.
此类免责声明根据 §2-318 有效。在这里,买方放弃了第三方的权利,就是放弃了他自己的权利。
f. Same facts as part (a) (Erin’s garage was damaged but she was not hurt), except that there was a warranty disclaimer stating that all of the retailer’s warranties, including merchantability, extended only to the immediate buyer of the mower. Can Erin recover from the retailer in an Alternative B jurisdiction? In an Alternative C jurisdiction? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative B and C.
f. 与第 (a) 部分相同的事实(Erin 的车库受损,但她没有受伤),除了有一份免责声明,说明 零售商的所有保修,包括适销性,仅适用于割草机的直接购买者。Erin 可以从备选方案 B 司法管辖区的零售商处收回款项吗?在备选方案 C 司法管辖区?加州大学 §2-318,备选方案 B 和 C。
Such disclaimer is inoperative under §2-318. In order to qualify under Alternative B, Erin would have to have personal injury, and here Erin did not sustain personal injury. In an Alternative C jurisdiction, there’s no requirement for personal injury, so Erin’s property damage qualifies to recover under Alternative C. Under §2-318, in an Alternative C jurisdiction, a seller cannot exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person. Here the seller is only limiting or excluding it to the property damages and he can do that.
根据 §2-318, 此类免责声明无效 。 为了符合备选方案 B 的资格,Erin 必须受到人身伤害,而在这里 Erin 没有受到人身伤害。在备选方案 C 的司法管辖区, 不需要人身伤害,因此 Erin 的财产损失有资格根据备选方案 C 获得赔偿。根据 §2-318,在备选方案 C 司法管辖区,卖方不能排除或限制本节对人身伤害的实施。在这里,卖方仅将其限制或排除在财产损失之外 ,他可以这样做。
MAGNUSON MOSS PP. 191
马格努森·莫斯 (MAGNUSON MOSS), 第 191 页
Problem 10.1(a) You are working as a summer intern at your city’s Legal Aid Bureau. Your first client is a college student who feels that he has been ripped off by one of the local computer stores. The student explains to you that when he bought his new computer, which cost $3,000 and has proven to be a disaster, the store did not even give him a written warranty on it. Is that a violation of Magnuson-Moss? 15 U.S.C. §2302.
问题 10.1(a) 您在您所在城市的法律援助局担任暑期实习生。您的第一个客户是一名大学生,他觉得自己被当地的一家电脑店敲诈了。该学生向您解释说,当他购买价值 3,000 美元且已被证明是一场灾难的新电脑时,商店甚至没有给他书面保修。这是否违反了 Magnuson-Moss?《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2302 条。
ANSWER: Magnuson Moss is a federal statute and the UCC is a state statute. Mag Moss is federal consumer protection statute that was drafted by congress at a time when Congress was very aware of the existence of the UCC. Basically, this federal statute is intended to work side by side with the UCC. To the extent that there is a conflict between Mag Moss and UCC, Mag Moss has to prevail because of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. But there should not be so many conflicts because Mag-Moss supplements in some ways the protection the UCC gives to consumers in the realm of warranties.
回答:Magnuson Moss 是联邦法规,而 UCC 是州法规。Mag Moss 是联邦消费者保护法规,由国会起草,当时国会非常清楚 UCC 的存在。基本上,这项联邦法规旨在与 UCC 并肩工作。在 Mag Moss 和 UCC 之间存在冲突的程度上,Mag Moss 必须获胜,因为宪法的至高无上条款。但不应该有这么多冲突,因为 Mag-Moss 在某些方面补充了 UCC 在保修领域为消费者提供的保护。
Is not giving the college student a written warranty on a consumer product a violation of Mag Moss? It is not a violation. You would find nothing in Mag-Moss that says anytime there is a sale of consumer product the seller is obligated to give some kind of written warranty. If you look at §2302(b)(2) it says specifically “nothing in this act shall be deemed to require a consumer product or any of its components be warranted.” Mag Moss does not even require the seller to give any warranties even implied warranty of merchantability.
给大学生提供消费品的书面保证不是违反了 Mag Moss 吗? 这不是违规行为。您在 Mag-Moss 中找不到任何内容说,只要有消费品的销售,卖家就有义务提供某种书面保证。如果您查看 §2302(b)(2), 它明确指出“本法案中的任何内容均不得被视为要求消费品或其任何组件得到保修。Mag Moss 甚至不要求卖方提供任何保证,甚至暗示对适销性做出保证。
Does Mag Moss only apply in a case where a seller does give a written warranty to a consumer? Courts are split on this issue. The split is exemplified by the three cases, which said that we do not need a written warranty for certain products for Mag Moss to apply (McCurdy). Then there is McNamara case, which says no written warranty then Mag Moss does not apply at all. If you look at Mag Moss, there are clearly certain parts of it, many parts of it, that will only apply in the case where the seller has made a written warranty. An example of this would be 2302(a), where it says any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of written warranty shall fully and conspicuously disclose the term of such written warranty. That indicates that the requirements that are set in 2302(a) apply only to written warranties in consumer goods sales. That by itself is not saying that Mag Moss in its entirety only has application in cases where there is a written warranty.
Mag Moss 是否仅适用于卖家确实向消费者提供书面保证的情况? 法院在这个问题上存在分歧。这三个案例就是一个例子,这三个案例表明我们不需要某些产品的书面保证即可申请 Mag Moss (McCurdy)。然后是 McNamara 案,它说没有书面保证,那么 Mag Moss 根本不适用。如果你看一下 Mag Moss,显然它的某些部分,其中的许多部分,仅适用于卖方做出书面保证的情况。这方面的一个例子是 2302(a),其中规定任何保证人通过书面保证向消费者保证消费产品时,应全面、醒目地披露此类书面保证的期限。这表明 2302(a) 中规定的要求仅适用于消费品销售中的书面保证。这本身并不是说 Mag Moss 整体仅在有书面保证的情况下才适用。
So, what is required in a McCurdy (where we do not need a written warranty for Mag-Moss to apply)? You got to have a sale of goods to a consumer. The other thing that you need from 2023(b)(1) which is a breach of some kind of warranty not necessarily a written warranty (it could be a written warranty) such as a breach of an obligation of implied warranty or service contract.
那么,McCurdy 需要什么 (我们不需要 Mag-Moss 的书面保证即可适用)? 你必须向消费者销售商品。从 2023(b)(1) 开始,您需要的另一件事是违反某种保证,不一定是书面保证(可以是书面保证),例如违反默示保证或服务合同的义务。
Do we need a written warranty for mag Moss to apply? In most cases involving a consumer product, a seller is going to give a written warranty of some kind, more likely a limited one where there are taking away as much as they are giving. In virtually every consumer sale case, there is a written warranty. There are few cases where there is no written warranty. So it is a moot issue in most cases. But even though it is a moot issue, it can still be an important one.
我们需要书面保证才能申请 mag Moss 吗? 在涉及消费品的大多数情况下,卖家会提供某种形式的书面保证,更有可能是有限的保证,其中带走的和他们给予的一样多。几乎在每个消费者销售案例中,都有书面保证。很少有没有书面保证的情况。 因此 , 在大多数情况下,这是一个没有实际意义的问题。但是,即使这是一个没有实际意义的问题,它仍然可能是一个重要的问题。
According to Keating the better view is the one found in McCurdy. When you look at the logic of the court in the McNamara case, it said that it could not reconcile 2308 with 2310(d)(1). §2308 says in a case where there is a written warranty, the seller is going to be more limited in its ability to limit or modify the implied warranties. §2310(d)(1) talks about causes of action under Mag-Moss; and it says a consumer who is damaged by the failure of the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter. The McNamara Court was saying how could a consumer sue when virtually all of the provisions leading up to 2310(d)(1) has to do with cases where seller has a written warranty. §2310(d)(1) says that a consumer who is damaged by the failure of the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor under this chapter, OR under a written warranty, implied warranty, and service contract may bring suit. And then implied warranty is defined in Mag Moss in reference to state law. So, it seems like §2310(d)(1) gives you an alternative as a plaintiff to have a suit under Mag Moss. You can sue for a violation of Mag Moss if you can find one and most of those will involve a written warranty. Or alternatively, you can sue the seller for breaching an obligation under written warranty or implied warranty (state law implied warranty does not require written warranty) or service contract. McNamara will make sense if reworded §2310(d)(1) to say a consumer who is damaged by the failure of the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter that arises under a written warranty, implied warranty, and service contract may bring suit.
根据基廷的说法,更好的观点是在麦科迪发现的。当你查看法院在 McNamara 案中的逻辑时,它说它无法调和 2308 和 2310(d)(1)。§2308 规定,在有书面保证的情况下,卖方限制或修改默示保证的能力将受到更多限制。§2310(d)(1) 讨论了 Mag-Moss 下的诉因;它说消费者因供应商、保证人或服务承包商未能遵守本章规定的任何义务而受到损害。 麦克纳马拉法院的意思是,当导致 2310(d)(1) 的几乎所有条款都与卖方有书面保证的情况有关时,消费者怎么能提起诉讼 。§2310(d)(1) 规定,因本章规定的供应商、保证人或服务承包商的失职而受到损害的消费者,或根据书面保证、默示保证和服务合同的失误,可以提起诉讼。然后,在 Mag Moss 案中,根据州法律定义了默示保证。因此,§2310(d)(1) 似乎为作为原告提供了根据 Mag Moss 提起诉讼的替代方案。如果您能找到一个,您可以起诉违反 Mag Moss 的行为,其中大多数都涉及书面保证。或者,您可以起诉卖家违反书面保证或默示保证(州法律默示保证不要求书面保证)或服务合同下的义务。如果将 McNamara 改写为 §2310(d)(1),即因供应商、保证人或服务承包商未能遵守本章规定的书面保证、默示保证和服务合同项下产生的任何义务而受到损害的消费者可以提起诉讼。
Problem 10.1(b) Same facts as part (a). even in the absence of a written warranty, how can Magnuson-Moss help your client? 15 U.S.C. §§2310(d), (a)(3), and (e), 2301; U.C.C. §2-314. If you are suing under Magnuson Moss, can you bring your suit in federal district court? 15 U.S.C §§2310(d)(1), (d)(3), (b), and (c)(1).
问题 10.1(b) 与部分(a)的事实相同。 即使没有书面保证,Magnuson-Moss 如何帮助你的客户呢?15 U.S.C. §§2310(d), (a)(3), and (e), 2301; U.C.C. §2-314。如果您根据 Magnuson Moss 提起诉讼,您可以向联邦地区法院提起诉讼吗?《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310(d)(1)、(d)(3)、(b) 和 (c)(1) 款。
ANSWER: §2310(d)(2) gives extra damages in the form of attorney’s fees, whereas UCC does not. The typical American rule is even if you win as the plaintiff, you pay your own attorney’s fees. Mag Moss reverses the American Rule. If you’re bringing the suit under Mag Moss and if you win, you get Attorney’s Fees under §2310(d)(2). But in order to do that, we have to go back and consider the requirements of §2310(d)(1). So Mag Moss could enable a successful plaintiff in a breach of warranty suit to recover attorney’s fees and that is the point being made in the McCurdy case, rejected by the McNamara case. Here is how it happens, 2310(d)(2) says is a consumer prevails in an action brought under 2310(d)(1), then the court may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing consumer. If we look at 2310(d)(1), it begins “subject to subsections (a)(3) and e of this section, (a)(3) in effect says if the warrantor sets up a mandatory informal dispute resolution procedure, the consumer first must exhaust his remedies thereunder before filing suit under 2310(d)(1). 2310(e) says you cannot sue under 2310(d) until you first afford the warrantor a reasonable opportunity to cure.” Second, we got to have a consumer and a consumer is a defined term in 2301(3) and includes any person to whom the consumer product (defined in 2301(1) as tangible personal property which is normally used for personal, family or household purposes including fixtures). A consumer includes any person to whom a consumer product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty. Next, the consumer must be damaged by the failure of any supplier, warrantor, or service contractor’s failure to comply with any obligation under this act most of which arise when the warrantor makes a written warranty or under a written warranty which is a term of art under 2301(6) or under an implied warranty (defined under 2301(7) as an implied warranty under state law) or service contract may bring suit for legal and equitable relief. Supplier under 2301(4) is any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly to consumers. 2301(5) defines warrantor as any supplier who gives a written warranty or implied warranty. And then §2301(8) defines a service contractor as a written contract to perform services relating to maintenance or repair of consumer product.
答案:§2310(d)(2) 以律师费的形式提供额外损害赔偿,而 UCC 则没有。典型的美国规则是,即使您作为原告胜诉,您也要支付自己的律师费。马格·莫斯 (Mag Moss) 颠覆了美国规则。如果您根据 Mag Moss 提起诉讼并且您赢了,您将根据 §2310(d)(2) 获得律师费。但为了做到这一点,我们必须回过头来考虑 §2310(d)(1) 的要求。 因此 ,Mag Moss 可以使违反保证诉讼中的成功原告能够收回律师费,这就是 McCurdy 案中提出的观点 ,但被 McNamara 案驳回。2310(d)(2) 规定,如果消费者在根据 2310(d)(1) 提起的诉讼中胜诉,那么法院可以判给胜诉消费者律师费。如果我们看一下 2310(d)(1),它开始“根据本节的 (a)(3) 和 e 小节,(a)(3) 实际上是说,如果保证人设立了强制性的非正式争议解决程序,消费者在根据 2310(d)(1) 提起诉讼之前,首先必须用尽其补救措施。2310(e) 规定,在您首先为保证人提供合理的补救机会之前,您不能根据 2310(d) 提起诉讼。其次,我们必须有消费者,而消费者是 2301(3) 中定义的术语,包括将消费品(在 2301(1) 中定义为通常用于个人、家庭或家庭目的的有形个人财产,包括固定装置)的任何人。消费者包括在默示或书面保证期限内将消费品转让给的任何人。 接下来,消费者必须因任何供应商、保证人或服务承包商未能遵守本法规定的任何义务而受到损害,其中大部分是在保证人做出书面保证或根据 2301(6) 或默示保证(根据 2301(7) 定义为州法律下的默示保证)或服务合同提起法律诉讼时产生的。衡平法救济。根据 2301(4) 的规定,供应商是指直接或间接向消费者制造消费品业务的任何人。2301(5) 将保证人定义为提供书面保证或默示保证的任何供应商。然后 §2301(8) 将服务承包商定义为履行与消费品维护或维修相关的服务的书面合同。
Here in this problem, there has been no Mag Moss written warranty, does that mean no attorney’s fees if all you got is a breach of an implied warranty by a warrantor selling a consumer product? Yes, that is what McCurdy says and that is what the code says.
在这个问题中,没有 Mag Moss 的书面保证,如果您得到的只是销售消费品的保证人违反了默示保证,这是否意味着没有律师费?是的,这就是 McCurdy 所说的,也是准则所说的。
Can you bring your suit in federal district court? §2310(d)(3) says you cannot bring a suit in the federal district court unless a single claim is at least $50k, or a total claim in a class action is more than $50k with each individual claims to be at least $25 and you have at least 100 class members. 2310(b) also mention the federal trade commission can bring regulatory actions against those who violate Mag Moss.
您可以在联邦地区法院提起诉讼吗? §2310(d)(3) 规定,您不能在联邦地区法院提起诉讼,除非单次索赔至少为 $50k,或者集体诉讼中的总索赔超过 $50k,每个索赔至少为 $25,并且您至少有 100 名集体成员。2310(b) 还提到联邦贸易委员会可以对违反 Mag Moss 的人提起监管行动。
Problem 10.1(c) Same facts as part (a), except that your client tells you that he lent his computer to a classmate a couple of weeks after buying it. While the classmate was using the computer in the classmate’s dorm room, the computer malfunctioned and destroyed an expensive custom-designed video game that the classmate had on a hard disk. Your client’s classmate would like to recover from the retail seller of the computer for the $200 in damages represented by the destroyed game. In an alternative A jurisdiction, may your client’s classmate recover against the retailer through a UCC warranty actions? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative A.
问题 10.1(c) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是您的客户告诉您,他在购买计算机几周后将计算机借给了一位同学。当这位同学在同学的宿舍里使用电脑时,电脑出现故障,毁坏了这位同学在硬盘上的一个昂贵的定制设计的视频游戏。您客户的同学希望从计算机的零售销售商处追偿被毁游戏所代表的 200 美元损失。在替代 A 司法管辖区,您客户的同学可以通过 UCC 保修诉讼向零售商追偿吗?U.C.C. §2-318,备选方案 A。
ANSWER: In an Alternative A jurisdiction, may your client’s classmate recover against the retailer through a UCC warranty actions? No, because the classmate was not injured in person by the breach nor were they a guest in the client’s home (not a family member). So the classmate has a horizontal privity problem they cannot overcome with the UCC alone.
回答: 在备选方案 A 司法管辖区,您客户的同学可以通过 UCC 保修诉讼向零售商追偿吗?不,因为这位同学没有因违规行为而受伤,他们也不是客户家中的客人(不是家庭成员)。 所以这位同学有一个横向的相互关系问题,他们无法单独使用 UCC 来克服。
Problem 10.1(d) Same facts as part (c). May your client’s classmate recover against the retailer for his destroyed video game in a Magnuson-Moss action? 15 U.S.C. §§2310, 2301(3), 2301(7).
问题 10.1(d) 与 (c) 部分相同的事实。您客户的同学是否可以因在 Magnuson-Moss 诉讼中被毁的视频游戏而向零售商追偿?《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310 条、第 2301(3) 条、第 2301(7) 条。
ANSWER: Yes, the broad definition of the consumer makes a difference in this case (McCurdy). Consumer is any transferee of the consumer product during the duration of the written warranty or implied warranty. This broad definition of consumer would get rid of the horizontal privity problem that would appear in this case; however, it does of solve all of the horizontal privity problems. Think about in the previous problem, the client Erin whose garage was smashed into the faulty lawnmower, would her horizontal problem go away with this definition? NO, because she was not a transferee. Her garage got smashed but she was not riding it. When you talk about a transferee, do you think that the code drafters intended transferee to encompass somebody you just loaned the product to or do you think they intended transferee to cover only the case you gave out right ownership as a gift or even as resale? It is not clear, but according to Keating consider it as it is written and if the code drafters wanted to limit that language they would have said “any person to whom ownership of the consumer product was transferred.” But the code does not say such thing. So transferee could also mean even to people you just lent the consumer product.
回答: 是的,在这种情况下,消费者的广泛定义会有所不同 (McCurdy)。消费者是指在书面保证或默示保证期限内消费产品的任何受让人。消费者的这个宽泛定义将消除在这种情况下出现的水平关联性问题;但是,它确实解决了所有水平相互性问题。想想前面的问题,客户 Erin 的车库被砸进了有故障的割草机,她的水平问题会随着这个定义而消失吗?不,因为她不是调动对象。她的车库被砸碎了,但她没有骑车。当您谈论受让人时,您认为代码起草者希望受让人包括您刚刚将产品借给的人, 还是您认为他们打算让受让人仅涵盖您作为礼物甚至转售赠送权利所有权的情况?目前尚不清楚,但根据 Keating 的说法,请按照书面形式考虑,如果代码起草者想限制该语言,他们会说“任何消费品所有权转让给的人”。但法典并没有说这样的事情。 因此 , 受让人甚至可能意味着您刚刚借给消费产品的人。
The one argument against this result of expanding ways to overcome horizontal privity on which courts are split is found in §2301(7), which defines an implied warranty with reference to state law. SO the seller here could say this classmate should be barred from recovery because an implied warranty under Mag-Moss are defined with respect to state law; and state law does require privity except to the extent that 2318 and state case law do away with such requirement. So the key question here, is whether Mag Moss’s incorporation of the state law definition of implied warranty is also intended to incorporate state law implied warranty limitations and defenses such as lack of privity? That is an issue to which courts are split.
反对扩大克服法院分歧的横向相互关系的方法这一结果的一个论点是在 §2301(7) 中找到,该条款参考州法律定义了默示保证。 所以这里的卖家可以说这个同学应该被禁止追偿,因为 Mag-Moss 下的默示保证是针对州法律定义的;州法律确实要求相互关系,除非 2318 和州判例法取消了这种要求。 因此 ,这里的关键问题是,Mag Moss 纳入州法律对默示保证的定义是否也旨在纳入州法律的默示保证限制和辩护,例如缺乏相互关系?这是法院存在分歧的问题。
Problem 10.1(e) Same facts as part (c), except that the retailer had included a full written warranty promising that the computer would run defect-free for at least two years. To what extent does this help the classmate’s cause of action for damages under Magnuson-Moss? 15 U.S.C. §§2310(d), 2301(3), 2301(6).
问题 10.1(e) 与 (c) 部分的事实相同,只是零售商提供了一份完整的书面保证,承诺计算机至少在两年内无缺陷运行。这在多大程度上帮助了同学根据 Magnuson-Moss 提出的损害赔偿诉讼因由?《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310(d)、2301(3)、2301(6) 条。
ANSWER: if you were in McNamara jurisdiction and now that you have a written warranty, there is no question about whether Mag Moss applies at all. There is no dispute on the definition of transferee. It also helps you where there is a split in courts and that is on the issue of whether Mag Moss incorporates state law’s definition of implied warranty, do they also mean to incorporate its limits on your ability to sue under implied warranty. Once you have a written warranty, you can sue on a written warranty, then you are not limited anymore by what the state law says about your limitation to sue under an implied warranty because with a written warranty which is defined by Mag Moss, it is clearly that you are not going to have any problems. Because the written warranty as defined basically takes away that privity problem; the way that Mag Moss defines consumer and the way that Mag Moss defines warranty. This is all now coming from Mag Moss not coming from state law.
回答: 如果您在 McNamara 管辖区, 现在您有书面保证,那么 Mag Moss 是否适用根本不存在问题。对于受让人的定义并无争议。它还可以帮助您在法院出现分歧时,即关于 Mag Moss 是否纳入州法律对默示保证的定义的问题,他们是否也意味着纳入其对您根据默示保证提起诉讼的能力的限制。一旦您有了书面保证,您就可以根据书面保证提起诉讼,那么您就不再受到州法律关于您根据默示保证提起诉讼的限制的限制,因为有了 Mag Moss 定义的书面保证,很明显您不会有任何问题。因为定义的书面保证基本上消除了这种相互关系问题;Mag Moss 定义消费者的方式以及 Mag Moss 定义保修的方式。现在这一切都来自 Mag Moss,而不是来自州法律。
§2301(6) –is a written warranty under Mag Moss the same as an express warranty under the UCC? And if it is not the same, which is broader or which is narrower? They are different. The UCC’s express warranty is broader because it could be created orally and it does not have to be in writing; and in terms of content it is broader because it could include a written warranty. UCC’s express warranty is broadly defined and it is defined, as “any affirmation of facts that relates to goods becomes part of the basis of the bargain.” But look at 2301(6)’s definition of a written warranty and you do not get such a broad definition there; it says “any written affirmation of facts, a written promise…which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship in a firm promise that such material or workmanship is defect free” and this definition is narrower than UCC’s definition of express warranty.
§2301(6) – Mag Moss 下的书面保证是否与 UCC 下的明示保证相同?如果它不相同,哪个更宽或哪个更窄?他们是不同的。UCC 的明示保证范围更广,因为它可以口头创建 ,而不必以书面形式创建;在内容方面,它更广泛,因为它可以包括书面保证。UCC 的明示保证定义很广 ,其定义是“任何与商品相关的事实确认都成为交易基础的一部分”。但是看看 2301(6) 对书面保证的定义,你并没有得到如此宽泛的定义;它说 “任何对事实的书面确认、书面承诺......这与材料或工艺的性质有关,并明确承诺此类材料或工艺无缺陷“,并且该定义比 UCC 对明示保证的定义更窄。
Bottom line: virtually, all Mag Moss’s written warranty would also qualify as UCC’s express warranty. However, not all UCC’s express warranty would necessarily qualify as Mag Moss’s written warranty.
底线:实际上,Mag Moss 的所有书面保证也都有资格作为 UCC 的明示保证。但是,并非所有 UCC 的明示保证都一定符合 Mag Moss 的书面保证条件。
Problem 10.1(f) Same facts as part (c), except that when the computer wrecked the classmate’s video game, that malfunction also disabled the computer and caused it $1,000 worth of damage. Now your client wants to sue both the retailer and the manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. May the manufacturer be joined in a suit under the UCC in an Alternative A jurisdiction? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative A.
问题 10.1(f) 与 (c) 部分的事实相同,只是当计算机破坏了同学的视频游戏时,该故障也使计算机瘫痪并造成了价值 1,000 美元的损失。现在,您的客户想起诉零售商和制造商违反适销性的默示保证。制造商是否可以在备选方案 A 司法管辖区根据 UCC 加入诉讼?U.C.C. §2-318,备选方案 A。
ANSWER: The manufacturer cannot be joined in a suit for breach of implied warranty in Alternative A jurisdiction unless your state through its common law has independently gotten rid of the need for vertical privity either through case law or through so-called sealed containment law. But typically, the case law that would get rid of vertical privity, at least in a case of an implied warranty, would require some kind of personal injury and we do not have that here. Furthermore, in practice, most states have gotten rid of the vertical privity problem whenever a buyer is suing a manufacturer for breach of an express warranty made by the manufacturer (but that is not what we are talking about here, here we are discussing a breach of an implied warranty). So, in an Alternative A jurisdiction, the official comment 3 to 2-318 says explicitly that Alternative A is neutral on the question of vertical privity. So it does not do away with vertical privity. And so you may be out of luck under state law alone.
答: 制造商不能在备选方案 A 司法管辖区加入违反默示保证的诉讼,除非您所在的州通过其普通法通过判例法或所谓的密封遏制法独立地摆脱了对垂直隐私的需求。但通常情况下,至少在默示保证的情况下,摆脱垂直相互关系的判例法会要求某种形式的人身伤害,而我们这里没有。此外,在实践中,每当买方起诉制造商违反制造商做出的明示保证时,大多数州都已经摆脱了垂直相互关系问题(但这不是我们在这里谈论的内容,这里我们讨论的是违反默示保证)。因此,在备选方案 A 的司法管辖区,官方意见 3 至 2-318 明确指出,备选方案 A 在纵向相互关系问题上是中立的。 因此 ,它并没有消除垂直的相互关系。 因此 ,仅根据州法律,您可能就不走运了。
Problem 10.1(g) Same facts as part (f). May the manufacturer be joined in a suit under Magnuson-Moss? 15 U.S.C. §§2310(d)(1), 2301(4). Would it make any difference if the manufacturer had made a written warranty? 15 U.S.C. §2310(f).
问题 10.1(g) 与 (f) 部分相同的事实。制造商可以加入 Magnuson-Moss 的诉讼吗?《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310(d)(1) 条、第 2301(4) 条。如果制造商做出书面保证,会有什么不同吗?《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310(f) 条。
ANSWER: Some courts believe that Mag Moss has eliminated even vertical privity problems such as this one in any consumer breach of warranty suit that is based on state law’s implied warranty. What is the argument? The argument is this: under §2310(d) consumers can sue suppliers for breach of implied warranties and if you look at the definition of suppliers defined in 2301(4) to include any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers and that would necessarily include manufacturers. Now you still would have the argument that we discussed prior that when you rely on the state law implied warranty, you may also have to contend with state law defenses such as lack of horizontal privity and that will be just as true when you are relying on an implied warranty to sue the manufacturer and trying to overcome the horizontal privity problem by reference to the definition of supplier.
答: 一些法院认为,Mag Moss 甚至消除了任何基于州法律默示保证的消费者违反保证诉讼中的垂直相互关系问题,例如这个问题。论点是什么?论点是这样的:根据 §2310(d),消费者可以起诉供应商违反默示保证,如果您查看 2301(4) 中定义的供应商定义,包括从事直接或间接向消费者提供消费品业务的任何人,这必然包括制造商。现在,您仍然会有我们之前讨论过的论点,当您依赖州法律的默示保证时,您可能还必须与州法律的辩护作斗争,例如缺乏横向相互性,当您依靠默示保证起诉制造商并试图通过参考供应商的定义来克服横向相互性问题时,情况也是如此。
Now if the manufacturer had made a written warranty, then it would be an easy case. You should be able to overcome the vertical privity problem under Mag Moss and even under state law.
现在,如果制造商做出了书面保证,那么这将是一个简单的情况。您应该能够在 Mag Moss 甚至州法律下克服垂直相互关系问题。
LEASE, INTERNATIONAL, AND REAL ESTATE WARRANTIES PP. 207
租赁、国际和房地产保修 第 207 页
11.1. a. First National Bank has a leasing division, First National Leasing, that leased a dozen trailers to a trucking firm, Standard Delivery. Prior to entering the lease, Standard determined the kind of trailer it wanted and identified for First National a company, Billings Equipment Co., that sold this type of trailer. First National then purchased a dozen custom-built trailers from Billings after having Standard sign off on the terms of First National’s purchase agreement with Billings, which included various express warranties. Following Standard’s approval of the sale terms, First National signed a 10-year lease agreement with Standard. One year into the lease, two of the trailers began leaking when it rained. What right does Standard have against First National Leasing as to the defective trailers? U.C.C. §§2A-103(1)(g), 2A-212(1), 2A-213, 2A-407, Official Comment (g) to §2A-103.
11.1. 一种。First National Bank 有一个租赁部门 First National Leasing,该公司将十几辆拖车租给了一家卡车运输公司 Standard Delivery。在签订租约之前,Standard 确定了它想要的拖车类型,并为 First National 确定了销售此类拖车的公司 Billings Equipment Co.。First National 随后从比林斯购买了十几辆定制的拖车,此前标准公司签署了 First National 与比林斯的购买协议条款,其中包括各种明示保证。在 Standard 批准销售条款后,First National 与 Standard 签署了一份为期 10 年的租赁协议。租约一年后,其中两辆拖车在下雨时开始漏水。Standard 对 First National Leasing 对有缺陷的拖车有什么权利?加州大学 §§2A-103(1)(g)、2A-212(1)、2A-213、2A-407、§2A-103 的官方意见 (g)。
Under §2A-212(1), §2A-213, a finance lease does not have implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. §2A-407(1) reinforces the independence and irrevocability of a lessee’s lease obligations to the lessor by providing that the lessee’s promises under the finance lease contract “become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee’s acceptance of the goods.” Therefore, if this is a finance lease, then the lessee, once they accept the goods, has to keep paying rent to the lessor even though the trailers are defective. This “hell or high water” clause under §2A-407(1) means the lessee has to pay the lessor no matter what.
根据 §2A-212(1) 和 §2A-213, 融资租赁没有对适销性的默示保证和对特定用途适用性的默示保证 。 §2A-407(1) 加强了承租人对出租人的租赁义务的独立性和不可撤销性 ,规定承租人在融资租赁合同下的承诺 “ 在承租人接受货物后变得不可撤销和独立 。“ 因此,如果这是融资租赁,那么承租人一旦接受了货物, 就必须继续向出租人支付租金,即使拖车有缺陷。 §2A-407(1) 下的 “ 地狱或高水位 ” 条款意味着承租人无论如何都必须向出租人付款。
Per the definition of a finance lease under §2A-103(1)(g), this lease qualifies as a finance lease in that the lessor does not select, manufacture or supply the goods, the lessor acquires the goods in connection with the lease, and the lessee is aware of the terms of the lessor’s agreement with the supplier. But in order for this lease to be a finance lease, it first has to be a true lease, meaning at the inception of the lease, there is a reasonable likelihood that the lessor will get the goods back at a time when the goods still have a meaningful residual value.
根据 §2A-103(1)(g) 中对融资租赁的定义 , 该租赁属于融资租赁,因为出租人不选择、制造或供应货物,出租人购买与租赁相关的货物,并且承租人了解出租人与供应商签订的协议条款。 但是 , 为了使该租赁成为融资租赁,它首先必须是真正的租赁,这意味着在租赁开始时,出租人有合理的可能性在货物仍具有有意义的剩余价值时收回货物。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that the leasing officer at First National tells the Standard officer in charge of this deal, “I highly recommend that we get the trailers from Billings Equipment Co. We’ve dealt with them before and their trailers have always been first-rate.” Would Standard now have rights against First National Leasing as to the defective trailers? U.C.C. §§2A-103(1)(g), 2A-210, 2A-407(1), Official Comment 2 to §2A-407.
b. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 First National 的租赁官员告诉负责这笔交易的标准官员,“ 我强烈建议我们从 Billings Equipment Co. 购买拖车。我们以前与他们打过交道 ,他们的拖车一直是一流的。“Standard 现在是否有权就有缺陷的拖车向 First National Leasing 提起诉讼?加州大学 §§2A-103(1)(g)、2A-210、2A-407(1),第 2A-407 条的官方意见 2。
A finance lessor, under §2A-210, could in theory make an express warranty to the lessee and be held liable for that, but it’s not very common. It almost comes into conflict with the first part of definition of finance lease under §2A-103(1)(g) that the finance lessor does not select, manufacture or supply the goods. Here the lessor’s endorsement of the trailers could potentially be considered to be an express warranty. However, First National can make the argument that there’s no reliance by the lessee because the lessee would have wanted the trailers to come from Billings Equipment even in the absence of the endorsement, or alternatively the endorsement is merely puffing under §2A-210(2).
根据 §2A-210,融资出租人理论上可以向承租人做出明确保证并为此承担责任,但这并不常见。这几乎与 §2A-103(1)(g) 中融资租赁定义的第一部分相冲突,即融资出租人不选择、制造或供应货物。在这里,出租人对拖车的认可可能被视为明示保证。然而,First National 可以辩称承租人没有依赖,因为即使没有背书,承租人也希望拖车来自 Billings Equipment,或者根据 §2A-210(2) 的规定,背书只是吹嘘。
How to reconcile a finance lessor who makes an express warranty to the lessee under §2A-210(1) with the independence and irrevocable language in §2A-407?
如何协调根据 §2A-210(1) 向承租人做出明确保证的融资出租人与 §2A-407 中的独立和不可撤销的语言 ?
Then the lessee would direct express warranty right against the finance lessor, but per 2A-407, the lessee has to keep paying even if the finance lessor is in breach of an express warranty. But the lessee can still sue the finance lessor while paying the rent in the meantime, and get certain remedies, including damages, request for repair or replacement, such as express warranty or infringement under Comment 2 to §2A-407, but not rescission or cancellation of the lease contract
然后承租人将直接向融资出租人提供明示保证权,但根据 2A-407,即使融资出租人违反了明示保证,承租人也必须继续付款。但承租人仍然可以在支付租金的同时起诉融资出租人,并获得某些补救措施,包括损害赔偿、维修或更换请求,例如根据 §2A-407 的第 2 条意见 2 的明示保证或侵权,但不能撤销或取消租赁合同.
c. Same facts as part (a). What rights does Standard have against Billings Equipment as to the defective trailers? U.C.C. §§2A-209(1), 2-313, 2-314; Official Comment 1 to §2A-209. What if the sales contract contained warranty disclaimers----would those be effective? U.C.C. §2A-209(1).
c. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实。对于有缺陷的拖车,Standard 对 Billings Equipment 有哪些权利?加州大学 §§2A-209(1)、2-313、2-314;§2A-209 的官方意见 1。如果销售合同包含保修免责声明怎么办----这些免责声明会有效吗?加州大学 §2A-209(1) 条。
§2A-209(1) brings the sales warranties (express warranty in §2-313, implied warranty of merchantability in §2-314 and implied warranty fitness for particular purpose in §2-315) down to the lessee, even if those sales warranties were originally given to the finance lessor by the supplier. So here Standard will get the benefit of any sales warranties that Billings Equipment made to First National, including the express warranty and the implied warranty of merchantability Billings Equipment made to First National. Comment 1 to §2A-209 also indicates that the whole purpose of a finance lease is to give the lessee the benefit of supplier’s warranties to the lessor. Likewise, the disclaimers contained in the sales warranties the supplier made to the finance lessor would be equally effective against the lessee.
§2A-209(1) 将销售保证(§2-313 中的明示保证、§2-314 中的适销性默示保证和 §2-315 中的特定用途适用性的默示保证 )归于承租人 ,即使这些销售保证最初是由供应商提供给融资出租人。因此,Standard 将受益于 Billings Equipment 向 First National 提供的任何销售保证,包括 Billings Equipment 向 First National 提供的明示保证和适销性的默示保证。§2A-209 的注释 1 还表明,融资租赁的全部目的是让承租人享受供应商对出租人的保证。同样,供应商向融资出租人作出的销售保证中包含的免责声明对承租人同样有效。
d. Same facts as part (a), except that the Standard officer told the Billings salesman prior to the sale, “We make a lot of deliveries over rugged mountain roads. So we need trailers with good shocks.” The Billings salesman then replied, “Might I recommend our Rover XXL model?” It turned out that the Rover XXL had shock absorbers no better than those on the typical trailer, and so the shock failed on a number of the trailers within the first year of the lease. The written sales contract between Billings and First National said nothing about the durability of the shocks. Does Standard have any rights against Billings regarding the shocks? U.C.C. §§2-315, 2A-213, 2A-209(1).
d. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是标准官员在出售前告诉 Billings 推销员,“ 我们在崎岖的山路上进行大量送货。 所以我们需要具有良好减震器的拖车。“ 比林斯推销员接着回答说,” 我可以推荐我们的 Rover XXL 型号吗?“ 事实证明,Rover XXL 的减震器并不比典型拖车上的减震器好,因此 在租赁的第一年内,许多拖车的减震器都失败了。比林斯和 First National 之间的书面销售合同没有说明冲击的持久性。Standard 对 Billings 是否有权就冲击进行处罚?加州大学 §§2-315、2A-213、2A-209(1) 条。
Here Standard does not have any rights against Billings regarding the shocks. Standard will fail if it try to pursue a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose under §2A-213, because the supplier is not the lessor. Likewise, Standard will also fail if it try to pursue a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose under §2-315, because the buyer in this transaction is not Standard, but rather the lessor First National. We need the lessor’s reliance, but we only have the lessee’s reliance. However, Standard can try to argue that here the seller supplier did make an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose under §2-315 to the lessor, because the lessor was implicitly relying on the supplier to make the lessee happy. And whether or not the lessor was privy to this particular conversation between the supplier and the lessee, the lessor was at least relying generally on the supplier to supply goods that were suitable for any special needs of the lessor’s lessee that were communicated by the lessee to the supplier. Then §2A-209 would pass that §2-315 warranty that was given to the lessor down to the lessee. For purposes of §2-315, the finance lessee Standard was in effect an agent of the true buyer, the lessor First National. And therefore Standard’s reliance on the supplier was tantamount to First National’s required reliance under §2-315.
Here Standard 对 Billings 没有任何关于冲击的权利。如果 Standard 试图就违反 §2A-213 规定的特定用途适用性的默示保证提起诉讼, 则 Standard 将失败 ,因为供应商不是出租人。同样,如果 Standard 试图就违反 §2-315 规定的特定用途适用性默示保证提起诉讼, 它也会失败 ,因为该交易中的买方不是 Standard,而是出租人 First National。我们需要出租人的依赖,但我们只拥有承租人的依赖。然而,Standard 可以尝试争辩说,在这里,卖方供应商确实根据 §2-315 向出租人做出了适合特定用途的默示保证,因为出租人默许供应商使承租人满意。 无论出租人是否参与了供应商与承租人之间的这次特定对话,出租人至少在一般上依赖供应商提供适合出租人承租人向供应商传达的任何特殊需要的货物。然后 ,§2A-209 会将给予出租人的 §2-315 保证传递给承租人。就 §2-315 而言, 融资承租人 Standard 实际上是真正买方(出租人 First National)的代理人。 因此 ,Standard 对供应商的依赖等同于 First National 根据 §2-315 要求的依赖。
11.2. In your capacity as in-house counsel for First National Bank, the leasing division has asked you to take a look at the form lease that it uses whenever the bank engages in a finance lease. The leasing officers who do these deals on a regular basis tell you that it’s very important that these transactions get characterized as finance leases so that the bank can get all of the benefits of being a finance lessor. What kind of clauses will you make sure are included in the contract? U.C.C. §§2A-103(1)(g); Official Comment (g) §2A-103; §§2A-212(1), 2A-213, 2A-407(1).
11.2. 作为 First National Bank 的内部法律顾问,租赁部门要求您查看银行进行融资租赁时使用的租赁形式。定期进行这些交易的租赁官员告诉您, 将这些交易定性为融资租赁非常重要,这样银行才能获得 作为融资租赁商的所有好处。您将确保合同中包含哪些类型的条款?加州大学 §§2A-103(1)(g);官方意见 (g) §2A-103; §§2A-212(1)、2A-213、2A-407(1)。
First make sure with recitation in the contract that this contract qualifies as a finance lease. To achieve that, first make sure that you have a true lease, not a disguised sale. Then make sure the lease meets the requirements for a finance lease spelled out under §2A-103(1)(g), meaning you insist the lessee selects the goods, make it clear the lessor is buying the goods only because of this finance lease, and give the finance lessee contract approval with respect to the bank’s sales contract with the supplier of the leased goods. And then recite in the lease contract how these requirements have been met in this case. Just to be sure, you can put into contract all of the benefit inures to a finance lessor, no implied warranty being made to the finance lessee and the automatic “hell or high water” clause under 2A-407(1), that the lessee’s promises under the contract become independent and irrevocable upon the lessee’s acceptance of the goods.
首先,在合同中背诵该合同符合融资租赁的条件。为此,首先确保您拥有真实的租约,而不是变相的销售。然后确保租赁符合 §2A-103(1)(g) 中规定的融资租赁要求,这意味着您坚持由承租人选择货物,明确出租人仅因该融资租赁而购买货物,并就银行与租赁货物供应商的销售合同批准融资承租人合同。然后在租赁合同中说明在这种情况下如何满足这些要求。为了保险起见,您可以将 融资出租人的所有利益都纳入合同中,不向融资承租人做出任何默示保证,以及 2A-407(1) 项下的自动 “ 地狱或高水位 ” 条款,即承租人在合同下的承诺在承租人接受货物后变得独立且不可撤销 。
11.3. Steve Stern is a construction worker whose job sometimes takes him out of state for a few weeks at a time. He and his wife, Sandra Werner, have been looking for a few months to buy a house after living in an apartment for the first three years of their marriage. When Sandra found a 4-year-old house in an established neighborhood of 80-year-old houses, she decided to make an offer on the house on the spot, even though Steve was out of town on a job. She included an inspection contingency clause in the contract, which was accepted by the seller. Sandra figured that Steve could do the inspection himself, but he was so exhausted from traveling and working the out-of-town job that he told Sandra she could do a walk-through on her own. Sandra did not notice anything in her admittedly superficial inspection, and she and her husband purchased the house. Two months after moving in, Steve was fixing the gutters when he noticed something peculiar about the way in which the roof shingles were attached. Upon closer inspection, Steve could see (because of his extensive experience in the construction industry) that the roof work was incredibly shoddy, and he estimated it would cost nearly $5,000 to get the roof done right. May Sandra and Steve recover against the original builder for the cost of the roof repairs?
11.3. 史蒂夫·斯特恩 (Steve Stern) 是一名建筑工人,他的工作有时一次需要他离开该州几周。他和他的妻子桑德拉·沃纳 (Sandra Werner) 在结婚的前三年住在公寓里后,几个月来一直在寻找买房。当 Sandra 在一个拥有 4 年历史的老房子的成熟社区找到一栋 80 年的历史房子时 ,她决定当场对这栋房子出价,即使史蒂夫正在外地工作。她在合同中加入了一项检查或有条款,卖方接受了该条款。Sandra 认为 Steve 可以自己进行检查,但他因旅行和外地工作而筋疲力尽,因此他告诉 Sandra 她可以自己进行一次巡视。桑德拉在她承认的肤浅检查中没有注意到任何东西,她和她的丈夫买下了这所房子。搬进来两个月后,史蒂夫在修理排水沟时,他注意到屋顶瓦片的固定方式有些奇怪。经过仔细检查,史蒂夫可以看到(因为他在建筑行业拥有丰富的经验)屋顶工作非常粗制滥造,他估计要花近 5,000 美元才能把屋顶做好。Sandra 和 Steve 是否可以向原始建筑商赔偿屋顶维修费用?
Here the problem could go either way depending on the jurisdiction, if the original builders normally liable for defects discovered by subsequent purchasers. And states are split. The Hershey court said the original builders are liable for defects discovered by subsequent purchasers but only for latent defects that could not have been discovered by subsequent purchasers with reasonable inspection. If we view the standard of the reasonable inspection strictly subjectively as the Hershey court seems to, the reasonable inspection rule says the original builder is not liable to subsequent purchaser for defect which a reasonable inspection done by a lay person could have uncovered prior to the purchase. Probably an average lay person would not have discovered this roof defect. But Steve could have, if he had taken the time to do the inspection using his expertise prior to the purchase. One of the reasons for the reasonable inspection exception, according to the Hershey case, is to ensure that subsequent purchasers don’t get a double benefit, meaning a reduced purchase price from the seller for a defect that was obvious and they were aware of and compensation from the original builder for the very defect that gave the buyer the reduction in price. However, here this risk of windfall does not exist since at the time of purchase, Sandra and Steve were not aware of the roof defect and purchased the house full price, thus it seems they will not get a double benefit if the original builders were required to do the roof work properly. Furthermore, if the original builder does not have to fix the roof for the original buyer, then it seems it’s the builders who end up with the windfall, because the original builder presumably charged full price for a new home with a latently shoddy roof and never have to pay the original buyer to make it right because the original buyer never discovered the defect. Thus in a Hershey jurisdiction, liabilities should be allow here since Sandra and Steve will not get a double benefit if they get the roof repaired even though one of the couple could have discovered the defect prior to purchase.
根据司法管辖区的不同 ,如果原始建筑商通常对后续购买者发现的缺陷负责, 那么问题可能会朝着任何一种方向发展 。各州都分裂了。 好时法院表示,原始建筑商应对后续购买者发现的缺陷负责 ,但仅限于后续购买者通过合理检查无法发现的潜在缺陷 。如果我们像 Hershey 法院那样严格主观地看待合理检查的标准,那么合理检查规则表明,原始建筑商不对后续购买者在购买前进行的合理检查可能发现的缺陷负责。可能一个普通的外行人不会发现这个屋顶缺陷。但是,如果史蒂夫在购买之前花时间利用他的专业知识进行检查,他就可以这样做。根据 Hershey 案,合理检查例外的原因之一是确保后续购买者不会获得双重利益,这意味着卖方会因他们知道且他们知道的明显缺陷而降低购买价格,并从原始建筑商处赔偿导致买方降价的缺陷。然而,这里不存在这种意外之财的风险,因为在购买时,Sandra 和 Steve 并不知道屋顶缺陷并全价购买了房子,因此如果需要原始建筑商正确进行屋顶工作,他们似乎不会获得双重利益。 此外,如果原始建筑商不必为原始买家修理屋顶,那么似乎最终获得意外之财的是建筑商,因为原始建筑商可能为屋顶潜在劣质的新房收取了全价,并且永远不必向原始买家支付费用来修复它,因为原始买家从未发现缺陷。 因此 ,在 Hershey 司法管辖区,这里应该允许责任,因为如果 Sandra 和 Steve 修理屋顶,即使这对夫妇中的一方可能在购买前发现了缺陷,他们也不会获得双重利益。
REDUCING OR ELIMINATING WARRANTY LIABILITY: BASICS PP. 221
减少或消除保修责任: 基本知识 第 221 页
Problem 12.1 Fresh out of law school, you have opened up your own practice in a storefront in the neighborhood where you grew up. One of your first clients is Mrs. McGillicudy, your former next door-neighbor, who remembers you back when “you just barely came up to my knees.” It turns out that Mrs. McGillicudy had just bought a used Cadillac from the local used car lot, Lou’s Used Cars for Less. Three weeks after the purchase, the Cadillac was giving Mrs. McGillicudy a host of problems that she wanted Lou’s to repair. When she brought the car back in, Lou pulled out the contract that she had signed and pointed out a clause that said there were no warranties included with the sale of this car. You take a look at the contract, which includes the following clause in very fine print: “There are no warranties, express or implied, that are included as part of this sale.” You ask Mrs. McGillicudy if she read that clause before purchasing the car. “Of course, dear,” she says. “I always read everything carefully before I sign something.” Is there still hope for Mrs. McGillicudy in having her car repaired by Lou’s? U.C.C. §§2-316, 1-201(b)(10).
问题 12.1 刚从法学院毕业的你,在你长大的社区的一家店面里开了自己的诊所。您的第一批客户之一是 McGillicudy 夫人 ,她是您以前的隔壁邻居,她记得您当时“您几乎无法跪下”。原来,McGillicudy 夫人刚刚从当地的二手车停车场 Lou's Used Cars for Less 买了一辆二手凯迪拉克。购买三周后,凯迪拉克给 McGillicudy 夫人带来了一系列问题,她希望 Lou's 解决这些问题。当她把车带回来时,Lou 拿出她签署的合同,并指出一项条款,说这辆车的销售不包括任何保修。您看一下合同,其中包括以下非常精细的条款:“本次销售不包含任何明示或暗示的保证。你问 McGillicudy 夫人在买车之前有没有读过那条。“当然,亲爱的,”她说。“我总是在签署之前仔细阅读所有内容。”McGillicudy 夫人还有希望让 Lou's 修理她的车吗?《美国法典》第 2-316 条,1-201(b)(10)。
ANSWER: when you are approaching a question involving a warranty disclaimer, the first thing you have to do is determine which warranty exists at all (because if there is no warranty in first place, then there is no need to disclaim it). Second, think about the distinction between the warranty disclaimer on one hand and the exclusive or limitations of remedies. You can think of these as two separate ways for the sellers to try to limit its liabilities with respect to a particular sale that the seller makes. And oftentimes you will see a seller who would include both. Warranty disclaimers and remedy limits are governed by two separate and distinct section of Article 2. Section 2-316 we see discussion of warranty disclaimers and Section 2-719 we get the restrictions on the seller’s ability to limit remedies to a buyer.
回答: 当您遇到涉及免责声明的问题时,您要做的第一件事 是确定存在哪种保修(因为如果一开始就没有保修,那么就没有必要否认它)。其次,一方面考虑保修免责声明与补救措施的排他性或限制之间的区别。您可以将这些视为卖方尝试限制其对卖方进行的特定销售的责任的两种不同方式。通常,您会看到一个将两者包括在内的卖家。免责声明和补救限制受第 2 条的两个单独且不同的部分管辖。第 2-316 节我们看到了对保修免责声明的讨论,第 2-719 节我们获得了对卖方限制买方补救措施的能力的限制。
Which warranties were made in the first place? Implied warranty of merchantability (IWM) under 2-315 because we have a merchant with respect to goods of the kind. How about the fact that these are used goods not new goods, can we still have IWM? According to Comment 3 to 2-314 says a contract for the sale of secondhand goods, however, involves only obligations as appropriate. So basically it is saying two things. One, yes you have an IWM even with respect to the sale of used goods by a merchant who is a merchant with respect to the goods of these kinds. But the content of IWM is not going to be the same as if they were selling new goods.
最初做出了哪些保证?2-315 规定的适销性默示保证 (IWM),因为我们有此类商品的卖家。这些是二手商品而不是新商品,我们还能有 IWM 吗?根据评论 3 至 2-314 表示,然而,二手商品销售合同仅涉及适当的义务。所以基本上它说了两件事。第一,是的,即使商人是此类商品的商人销售二手商品,您也拥有 IWM。但 IWM 的内容不会与他们销售新商品的内容相同。
So let’s assume that the problems that this buyer is having with this car would amount to a breach of IWM, has the seller here properly disclaimed the IWM? In looking at that question, let’s begin in 2-316(2) and ask the question has the seller properly disclaimed the IMW if we simply look at 2-316(2)? No because if you are going to successfully disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability under 2-316(2), at a minimum you have got to mention the word “merchantability” which was not done here. And if it is in writing, then it must be conspicuous. Here the disclaimer was in writing and we are told that this disclaimer was in very fine print. So, under 2-316(2) this attempt to disclaimer fails on both counts. Requirement of conspicuous: even though it is enough under 2-316(2), it’s enough for the buyer to say you did not use the word merchantability; so, at least under 2-316(2) you did not successfully disclaim IWM. If we change the fact and say that the seller did in the writing in the tiny fine print used the word merchantability, so the only issue would be conspicuousness. The fact that the buyer admits that she did read the disclaimer clause despite the fact that it was in very fine print, should the seller not lose on the grounds of lack of conspicuousness because in this case the buyer actually read it? No. 1-201(b)(10) says the purpose of conspicuousness requirement is to encourage sellers as a general way to make such a contact in a way that a reasonable person ought to have notice of it. And the fact that the seller got lucky here that the buyer noticed it should not be a basis on which the seller can be saved.
因此 ,让我们假设该买方在这辆车上遇到的问题相当于违反 IWM,这里的卖方是否正确地放弃了 IWM? 在研究这个问题时,让我们从 2-316(2) 开始,并提出一个问题:如果我们只看 2-316(2),卖方是否正确地放弃了 IMW?不,因为如果您要成功否认 2-316(2) 规定的适销性默示保证,您至少必须提及“适销性”一词,但此处没有这样做。如果它是书面的,那么它必须是显眼的。这里的免责声明是书面的 ,我们被告知这个免责声明的字体非常细。因此,根据 2-316(2) 项,这种免责声明的尝试在这两个方面都失败了。显眼要求:即使根据 2-316(2) 就足够了,但买家说您没有使用适销性一词就足够了;因此,至少在 2-316(2) 下,您没有成功放弃 IWM。 如果我们改变事实,说卖家在小字的文字中使用了适销性这个词,那么唯一的问题是显眼。 买方承认她确实阅读了免责声明条款 , 尽管该条款的字号非常细,但卖方是否应该因为在这种情况下买方实际上阅读了该条款而以缺乏显眼性为由而败诉?第 1-201(b)(10) 号规定,显眼要求的目的是鼓励卖家以合理的人应该注意到的方式进行此类联系。而卖方在这里很幸运,买方注意到了这一事实,这不应该成为拯救卖方的基础。
Seller can say you got me under 2-316(2) because I did not use the word “merchantability” and it was not conspicuous, but if I got to 2-316(3)(a) it does not require me to use the word “merchantability” and it does not say by its terms that it has to be conspicuous in order to be effective. 2-316 require the use of the word “as if” or “with all fault”. So, the seller can argue that he did not use the magic words “as is or with all fault,” but he did use the language in common understanding that would cause the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties; so, it makes plain that there is no implied warranty of merchantability. Such argument would be problematic because if we start to accept the 2-316(3)(a) substitute for the magic words “as is” or “with all fault,” then it seems like we would remove any significance to the requirements found in 2-316(2) that the seller must use the word “merchantability” in disclaiming the IWM. So, Keating would say if you are going to fall under 2-316(3)(a), it would be best to use the magic words “as is” or “with all fault.”
卖方可以说您根据 2-316(2) 找到了我,因为我没有使用“适销性”一词,而且它并不显眼,但如果我到了 2-316(3)(a),它不需要我使用“适销性”一词,也没有通过其条款说它必须显眼才能有效。2-316 要求使用“仿佛”或“全有过错 ”一词。因此,卖方可以争辩说,他没有使用“按原样或全有过错 ”的神奇词语,但他确实在达成共识的情况下使用了该语言,这将使买方注意到保修的排除;因此,它清楚地表明没有对适销性的默示保证。这种论点是有问题的,因为如果我们开始接受 2-316(3)(a) 替换“原样”或“全盘” 这两个神奇词 ,那么我们似乎会消除 2-316(2) 中关于卖方在否认 IWM 时必须使用“适销性”一词的要求的任何意义。所以,基廷会说,如果你 要属于 2-316(3)(a) 的范畴,最好使用“原样”或“全然过错”这些神奇的词。
What if the seller used “as is” in the tiny fine prints, would that still be effective under 2-316(3)(a)? 2-316(3)(a) does not have the conspicuous requirement, but many courts and commentators consider the absence of conspicuous requirement under 2-316(3)(a) to be just a drafting glitch. They assume that such a requirement implicitly exists as a matter of fundamental fairness to the buyer. Support for that view can be found in Comment 1 to 2-316 where it says implied warranties can only be excluded by conspicuous language or other circumstances that protect the buyer from surprise. And the tine fine prints, “as is,” is not conspicuous language and does not protect the buyer from surprise. The focus in 2-316 is trying to force the sellers to put these exclusions in a way that it ought to be obvious to any buyer.
如果卖方在微小的细则中使用“原样”,根据 2-316(3)(a) 是否仍然有效?2-316(3)(a) 没有明显的要求,但许多法院和评论员认为 2-316(3)(a) 没有明显的要求只是一个起草错误。他们假设这样的要求隐含地存在,是为了对买方的基本公平。支持该观点的评论可以在评论 1 至 2-316 中找到,其中表示默示保证只能通过显眼的语言或其他保护买方免受意外的情况来排除。而 “原样” 的细则并不显眼,也不能保护买家免受意外。2-316 的重点是试图迫使卖家以任何买家都应该显而易见的方式放置这些排除条款。
Problem 12.2 It seems that Lou’s Used Cars for Less is going to be a steady source of business for your fledging law practice. Another dissatisfied customer of Lou’s comes to you for advice. Deborah Swift (from problem 1.6), your erstwhile law school classmate and current personal injury lawyer, asks for your advice concerning a recent transaction she had with Lou’s. Deborah purchased a used Jeep Cherokee from Lou’s a few weeks ago, and she discovered only yesterday that the vehicle had serious engine problem. When Deborah brought the Jeep back to Lou’s for repair, he pointed out to her that he had asked her to check out the Jeep before buying it and she had refused. “I was in a hurry,” Deborah told you. “If I had spent a lot of time examining the car, I might have been able to discover the problem, but that’s only because I tinker with used cars as a hobby.” Does Deborah have a reasonable basis for demanding that Lou repair her Jeep? U.C.C. §2-316(3)(b), Official Comment 8 to §2-316.
问题 12.2 看来 Lou's Used Cars for Less 将成为您初出茅庐的律师事务所的稳定业务来源。Lou's 的另一位不满意的客户来找您寻求建议。黛博拉·斯威夫特(Deborah Swift)(来自问题 1.6)是您以前的法学院同学和现任人身伤害律师,她就她最近与 Lou 的交易向您寻求建议。黛博拉几周前从 Lou's 购买了一辆二手吉普切诺基,她昨天才发现这辆车有严重的发动机问题。当黛博拉将吉普车带回 Lou's 修理时,他向她指出,他让她在买吉普车之前先检查一下,但她拒绝了。“我很着急,”黛博拉告诉你。“如果我花很多时间检查这辆车,我可能会发现问题所在,但那只是因为我把摆弄二手车作为一种爱好。”Deborah 有合理的理由要求 Lou 修理她的吉普车吗?U.C.C. §2-316(3)(b),官方意见 8 至 §2-316。
ANSWER: which warranties are made in the first place? The implied warranty of merchantability. Can Lou, the seller, argue that the IWM was disclaimed in this case? The seller requested the buyer to inspect the Jeep before buying it and the buyer refused. Under 2-316(3)(b) says when the buyer, before entering into the contract, has examined the goods, or the sampler model, as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods, then there is no implied warranty of merchantability with regard to defects which an examination ought in a circumstance to have revealed to him. SO the first question is whether Deborah can be said to have refused to examine the good? Official Comment 8 to 2-316 says a mere request from the seller for the buyer to examine the goods is not sufficient to trigger this disclaimer. It says there must in addition be a demand by the seller that the buyer examine the goods fully. The seller by the demand puts the buyer on notice that he is assuming the risk of defect, which the examination ought to reveal. The language “refused to examine” in this paragraph is intended to make clear the necessity for such demands.
回答:首先做出哪些保修? 适销性的默示保证。 卖方 Lou 能否辩称,在本案中放弃了 IWM? 卖方要求买方在购买吉普车前检查吉普车,但买方拒绝了。根据 2-316(3)(b) 规定,当买方在签订合同之前,已经按照他的意愿全面检查了货物或样品模型,或者拒绝检查货物,那么对于检查在某种情况下应该向他揭示的缺陷,没有默示的适销性保证。 所以第一个问题是,是否可以说底波拉拒绝审视善?官方评论 8 至 2-316 表示,仅卖方要求买方检查货物不足以触发此免责声明。它说,此外,卖方必须要求买方全面检查货物。卖方通过要求通知买方,他正在承担缺陷的风险,检查应该揭示这一点。本段中的“拒绝审查”一词旨在阐明此类要求的必要性。
Let’s assume for the moment without deciding that the seller had made the required demand. If so, then what is the scope of the disclaimer or what gets disclaimed? 2-316(3)(b) says “then there is no implied warranty with respect to the defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to the buyer.” Official Comment 8 to 2-316 tells that a professional buyer examining the product in his field would be held to have assumed the risk as to all defect which a professional in the field ought to observe. While a non-professional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as a laymen might be expected to observe. So, how does this standard apply to Deborah because her situation falls somewhere in between the professional/ non-professional dichotomy set out in Official Comment 8 in that her profession is personal injuries lawyer but her hobby is tinkering with old cars. So should Deborah be held to a standard here that takes into account the knowledge that she has acquired through her hobby? Comment 8’s last paragraph and look at the first four words (the particular buyer’s skill), so here Deborah knows a lot about cars and engines, though she is not a professional in that field. Maybe she could argue that for her to discover the defect she would have had to take the car apart practically and that is not the normal method of examining goods before buying them. But in terms of her own level of skills, comment 8 gives some support in using a subjective standard that would take into account Deborah’s non-professional expertise, where it says the particular buyer’s skill and the normal method of examining goods in determining what defects are excluded. On the other hand, since courts are consumer friendly they would be disinclined in placing the loss on Deborah rather than the seller.
让我们暂时假设,不要决定卖方已经提出了所需的要求。 如果是这样,那么免责声明的范围是什么,或者什么被否认了?2-316(3)(b) 说“那么,对于检查在当时情况下应该向买方揭示的缺陷,没有默示保证。 官方评论 8 至 2-316 指出,在其领域检查产品的专业买家将被视为已承担该领域专业人士应观察到的所有缺陷的风险。而非专业买家将被认定为仅承担了外行人可能观察到的缺陷的风险。那么,这个标准如何适用于黛博拉,因为她的情况介于官方评论 8 中规定的专业/非专业二分法之间,因为她的职业是人身伤害律师 ,但她的爱好是修补旧车。 那么 , 黛博拉是否应该在这里保持一个标准,考虑到她通过自己的爱好获得的知识呢? 评论 8 的最后一段,看看前四个词( 特定买家的技能),所以这里 Deborah 对汽车和发动机了解很多,尽管她不是该领域的专业人士。也许她可以争辩说,如果她发现缺陷,她实际上必须把车拆开,这不是在购买商品之前检查商品的正常方法。 但就她自己的技能水平而言,评论 8 对使用主观标准提供了一些支持,该标准将考虑 Deborah 的非专业知识,其中说明了特定买家的技能和检查商品以确定排除哪些缺陷的正常方法。另一方面,由于法院对消费者友好 , 他们不愿意将损失归咎于 Deborah 而不是卖方。
Problem 12.3 After you have won several cases against Lou’s Used Cars for Less. Lou has convinced his big law firm, Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe, to hire you to work for them. Now Lou wants you to look at his standard sales contract with an eye toward re-drafting it. Based on a couple of your previous victories against him, Lou knows that he needs to increase the prominence of his implied warranty disclaimer and to use the word “merchantability.” Lou wonders if there us any mileage in including a prominent disclaimer of express warranties as well. “You know those sales people, “ he says. “They’ll say darn near anything to sell a car, bless their souls.” What do you advise Lou? Are there other clauses you recommend including in the contract to prevent the sales people from “giving away the store?” U.C.C. §§2-316(1), 2-202, Official Comment 2 to §2-316.
问题 12.3 在您赢得了几起针对 Lou's Used Cars for Less 的官司之后。Lou 已经说服了他的大型律师事务所 Dewey, Cheatem 和 Howe,雇佣你为他们工作。现在,Lou 希望您查看他的标准销售合同,并着眼于重新起草它。根据您之前对他的几次胜利,Lou 知道他需要提高其默示免责声明的突出性,并使用“适销性”一词。Lou 想知道我们是否也包含了明确的明示保证免责声明。“你认识那些销售人员,”他说 。他们会说几乎任何事情都要卖车,祝福他们的灵魂。您对 Lou 有什么建议?您是否建议在合同中加入其他条款,以防止销售人员 “放弃商店”?U.C.C. §§2-316(1)、2-202,官方评论 2 至 §2-316。
ANSWER: Is it possible under 2-316(1) to disclaim an express warranty? 2-316(1) is convoluted to say the least, “words or conduct relevant for the creation of an express warranty, and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other. But subject to the provisions of this article on Parole or extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.” What they are saying is once an express warranty is made and is admissible under evidence, it should be impossible to disclaim according to 2-316(1). Nevertheless, there may be reasons why it still might be useful for a seller to include a prominent disclaimer of express warranties. Why? There are three reasons and two of the three comes from the statement “once an express warranty has been made and it is admissible under evidence” those two qualifiers are impossible to disclaim. Look at those two qualifiers, once an express warranty is made. Think about a case where you have a situation in which there is a question whether the express warranty was made at all. Think about the puffing situation where there is a statement by the seller, is it an affirmation of facts or is it merely the seller’s opinion. And that puffing question comes down to was it objectively reasonable for the buyer to rely on that statement as part of basis of the bargain. And on that question think of how it might help the seller to say, this buyer saw this disclaimer of warranties and so when I was saying these things it was not reasonable for the buyer to think that these were express warranties b/c these were my opinions (not reasonable for buyer to rely). The second qualifier is once an express warranty is made and is admissible under evidence; that gets under the parole evidence rule. Think about how that disclaimer might help you as a seller to exclude a particular oral statement made by the seller that maybe might have amounted to an express warranty; but you have a writing that was intended by both parties to be final at least with respect to the terms included therein and therefore the rule under 2-202 is which terms to be admitted are only consistent additional terms to explain or supplement. So if the terms that the buyer is bringing sounds like an express warranty is that a consistent additional term, if not then it will not be admitted. The third reason is maybe the most important in practice, which is the intimidation factor. But if you are a seller and you have an unsophisticated buyer and the buyer comes back and complains saying “I thought your salesperson said this or promised this.” And the seller pulls out the written contract saying “look no express warranties.”
回答: 根据 2-316(1) 是否可以否认明示保证? 2-316(1) 至少可以说是令人费解的,“与创建明示保证相关的言语或行为,以及倾向于否定或限制保证的言语或行为 ,应在合理的情况下解释为彼此一致。但根据本条关于假释或外在证据的规定,如果这种解释不合理,否定或限制是无效的。他们所说的是,一旦做出了明确的保证并且可以作为证据被接受,根据 2-316(1) 应该不可能否认。 尽管如此,可能有一些原因表明卖方仍然需要包含明显的明示保证免责声明。 为什么? 有三个原因,其中两个来自“一旦做出了明确的保证并且可以作为证据接受”这两项限定词是不可能否认的。一旦做出明确保证,请看这两个限定词 。考虑这样一种情况:您遇到的情况是,是否做出了明示保证。想想卖家发表声明的吹嘘情况,这是对事实的肯定,还是仅仅是卖家的意见。而这个令人毛骨悚然的问题归结为买方依赖该声明作为讨价还价基础的客观合理性。 在这个问题上,想想它如何帮助卖方说,这个买家看到了这个免责声明,所以当我说这些事情时,买方认为这些是明确的保证是不合理的,因为这些是我的观点(买方依赖是不合理的)。第二个限定词是一旦做出了明确的保证, 并且根据证据可以接受 ;这属于假释证据规则。想想该免责声明如何帮助您作为卖家排除卖方做出的特定口头声明,这些声明可能相当于明示保证;但是您有一份双方都打算至少就其中包含的条款而言是最终的书面文件,因此 2-202 下的规则是哪些条款被接受只是一致的附加条款来解释或补充。 因此 ,如果买家带来的条款听起来像是明确的保证,那么它是一个一致的附加条款,如果不是,那么它将不会被接受。第三个原因可能是实践中最重要的,那就是恐吓因素。但是,如果你是一个卖家,你有一个不成熟的买家 ,买家回来抱怨说:“我以为你的销售人员说了这个或承诺了这个。卖家拿出书面合同, 上面写着“看,没有明示保证”。
Are there any other clauses that should be included in the seller’s contract to prevent the salesperson to prevent from “giving away the store”? Official Comment 2 to 2-316 suggests two clauses. First, the merger clause, which would reinforce the buyer’s inability to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning alleged express warranties and the merger clause speaks directly to the parole evidence issue whereas a standard express warranty disclaimer reaches the parole evidence issue only indirectly (if at all). The second clause that seller could include is the no-authority clause, by which the seller could indicate that the only valid terms of the contract are those that are in the writing and any promises made separately by the salesperson should not have authority. Interestingly, if you look at Official Comment 2 to 2-316, it seems to validate the legitimacy of these two clauses where it says “the seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warranties by this provision on parole and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized representation by the customary lack of authority clauses.” It also must be true that if a particular seller is including this no-authority clause while at the same time encouraging its salesperson to make such oral representations, then you probably have a common law fraud if that is a clear pattern.
卖家的合同中是否应该包含其他条款,以防止销售人员防止“送店”? 官方评论 2 至 2-316 建议两个子句。首先, 合并条款将加强买方无法就所谓的明示保证提供外在证据,而合并条款直接涉及假释证据问题,而标准的明示免责声明仅间接涉及假释证据问题(如果有的话)。卖方可以包含的第二个条款是无授权条款 ,卖方可以通过该条款表明合同的唯一有效条款是书面条款,销售人员单独做出的任何承诺都不应具有授权。有趣的是,如果你看一下官方评论 2 到 2-316,它似乎验证了这两个条款的合法性,它说 “根据本条,卖方受到保护,免受本条关于假释和外在证据的条款的口头保证的虚假指控,以及惯常的缺乏授权条款的未经授权的陈述。如果某个卖家在加入这个无授权条款的同时鼓励其销售人员进行此类口头陈述,那么如果这是一个明显的模式,那么你可能属于普通法欺诈。
Problem 12.4 Since joining Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe, you seem to be getting as many cases for Lou’s Used Cars for Less as you used to get against him when you were on your own. Your next defense for Lou involves a buyer who bought a used Ford Taurus wagon from Lou’s. a month after the purchase, the brakes failed on the car and the buyer was seriously injured, although the car was not damaged. Lou’s contract for that sale involved a conspicuous limitation of remedy to repair or replace defective parts. Lou says he is happy to repair the car’s brakes, but he doesn’t feel like paying thousand of dollars in hospital bills. Lou asks you whether the exclusive remedy will be effective here. He also wants to know if it would have helped him in this case if he had included a prominent “AS IS” clause instead of the exclusive remedy. What do you say to Lou on these two questions? U.C.C. §§2-719, 2-316(3)(a), 2-302, Official Comment 2 to §2-316, Official Comments 1 and 3 to §2-719.
问题 12.4 自从加入 Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe 以来,你似乎因为 Lou 的二手车价格更低而接到的案件数量,就像你独自一人时对他提起的一样多。您对 Lou 的下一个辩护涉及从 Lou's 购买了一辆二手福特 Taurus 旅行车的买家。购买一个月后,汽车刹车失灵,买家受重伤,但汽车没有损坏。Lou 的那份销售合同涉及对修理或更换有缺陷零件的明显补救措施限制。Lou 说他很乐意修理汽车的刹车,但他不想支付数千美元的医院账单。Lou 问您,排他性补救措施在这里是否有效。他还想知道,如果他包括一个突出的“AS IS”条款而不是排他性补救措施,在这种情况下是否对他有所帮助。关于这两个问题,你对 Lou 有什么看法?《美国法典》第 2-719 条、第 2-316(3)(a) 条、第 2-302 条、第 2-316 条的官方意见 2 至 §2-316、第 2-719 条的官方意见 1 和 3。
ANSWER: if you look at 2-719(1)(a), you will note that this remedy limit to repair or replace defective parts is specifically mentioned there. So, at least prima facie it is acceptable. But how might this exclusive remedy be struck down nevertheless given these circumstances? First, 2-719(2) - the argument that this exclusive remedy may have failed of its essential purpose and if so it should be invalidated that is what 2-719(2) says. That forces us to ask what was the essential purpose of such remedy limitation. Lou says wasn’t the essential purpose of this exclusive remedy to limit his liability for breach. Maybe we should consider the essential purpose from the buyer’s perspective and consider what the remedy purports to give rather than what the remedy purports to take away. But even if we look at it that way, wasn’t it the essential purpose of the exclusive remedy simply to give the buyer a car that keeps running and won’t that purpose be served as long as Lou promptly and effectively repairs the bad brakes. The buyer could say that perhaps there should be a broader definition of this exclusive remedy “essential purpose;” mainly, that the essential purpose of this remedy was to give the buyer a safe car. And here, it failed of its essential purpose because the brakes failed and the buyer was injured in person.
回答: 如果您查看 2-719(1)(a), 您会注意到那里特别提到了维修或更换有缺陷部件的补救限制。所以,至少从表面上看它是可以接受的。但是,在这种情况下,这种排他性的补救措施如何被推翻呢?首先,2-719(2) - 关于这种排他性补救措施可能未能达到其基本目的的论点,如果是这样 ,它应该被宣布无效,这就是 2-719(2) 所说的。这迫使我们问 ,这种补救限制的根本目的是什么 。Lou 说,这种排他性补救措施的根本目的并不是为了限制他的违约责任。也许我们应该从买方的角度考虑基本目的,并考虑补救措施旨在给予什么,而不是补救措施旨在带走什么。但是,即使我们这样看,独家补救措施的根本目的不就是给买方一辆可以持续行驶的汽车吗,只要 Lou 及时有效地修理坏的刹车,这个目的就不能达到吗?买方可以说,也许应该对这种排他性补救措施的“基本目的”有一个更广泛的定义;主要是,这种补救措施的根本目的是给买方一辆安全的汽车。在这里,它未能达到其基本目的,因为刹车失灵 ,买家本人受伤。
There is another way in which the exclusive remedy could be invalidated. Here, 2-719(3) comes into play because this exclusive remedy if it is valid will indirectly serve as an exclusion of consequential damages. 2-719(3) says a separate exclusion of consequential damages cannot limit damages for injuries to a person (such a limit is prima facie unconscionable). So, if you are the buyer you can rightly say why should a limited remedy be able to do indirectly (namely exclude consequential damages for injuries to a person) that which 2-719(3) clearly does not allow a separate exclusion of consequential damages to do directly.
还有另一种方式可以使排他性补救措施无效。在这里,2-719(3) 开始发挥作用,因为这种排他性补救措施如果有效,将间接排除间接损害赔偿。 2-719(3) 指出,单独排除间接损害赔偿并不能限制对人身伤害的损害赔偿(这种限制表面上是不合情理的)。因此,如果你是买方 , 你可以正确地说出为什么有限补救措施能够间接地(即排除对人身伤害的间接损害赔偿),而 2-719(3) 显然不允许单独排除间接损害赔偿。
Suppose instead there had been a prominent “as is” clause in the contract, would that have made a difference for the seller? That raises the question should an “as is” clause be allow to do indirectly (namely exclude consequential damages for injuries to a person) that which 2-719(3) does not allow a separate exclusion of consequential damages to do directly? There is a difference between an “as is” disclaimer and an exclusive remedy. The difference is the “as is” disclaimer is a limit on the warranty, whereas the exclusive remedy is a limit on the remedy. Should that matter? Comment 2 to 2-316 says “this article treats the limits or exclusion of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach separate from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies of breach of warranty.” Comment 3 to 2-719 talking about subsection 3 to 2-719. Subsection 3 recognizes the validity of clauses limiting or excluding consequential damages, but makes it clear that they may not operate in an unconscionable manner. The seller is free in all cases to disclaim warranties in the manner provided in section 2-316. So, if you properly disclaim the warranties, you don’t even get to the question of what remedy limit is okay or not okay.
相反,假设合同中有一个突出的“原样”条款,这会对卖方产生影响吗?这就提出了一个问题,是否应允许“原样”条款间接地做出(即不包括对人身伤害的间接损害赔偿)2-719(3) 不允许单独排除间接损害赔偿的行为?“原样”免责声明和排他性补救措施之间存在差异。区别在于“原样”免责声明是对保修的限制,而排他性补救措施是对补救措施的限制。这有关系吗?评论 2 至 2-316 说“本条将间接损害的限制或排除视为限制违约补救措施的问题,与根据保证产生责任的问题分开。如果不存在保证,当然不存在限制违反保证的补救措施的问题。评论 3 到 2-719 讨论第 3 到 2-719 小节。第 3 小节承认限制或排除间接损害的条款的有效性 ,但明确指出它们不得以不合情理的方式实施。在任何情况下,卖方都可以按照第 2-316 节中规定的方式否认保证。因此,如果您正确地否认保修,您甚至不会遇到什么补救限制是可以或不可以的问题。
Problem 12.5 Dan and Carol Pontello, who had a new home built by Cannon Construction Co. six years ago, recently came to see you in your law office. Their home had come with a written “Builder’s Warranty” providing that “Builder warrants that the home will be free of defects in material and workmanship for a period of five years on the foundation and for a period of two years on all other parts of the home. The five-year foundation warranty includes a warranty against any cracks or water seepage.” The contract also contained a merger clause, separately signed by both the buyer and seller, which said, “This contract is the complete and final understanding of the agreement between the parties and supersedes any and all other agreements or rights implied by law that are not contained within the four corners of this agreement.” Six years after the signing of this contract, the foundation suddenly developed significant cracks, leading to costly basement flooding. The Pontellos point out to you that most of their friends who had new houses built got 10-year foundation warranties, and further, that most foundations in new houses around this area last without problems for at least 10-years. The Pontellos want to know if they have a good cause of action against Cannon Construction for the cracks in their foundation. What do you tell them?
问题 12.5 Dan 和 Carol Pontello 在六年前由 Cannon Construction Co. 建造了新家,最近来你们的律师事务所见你。他们的房屋附有书面的“建筑商保修”,其中规定“建筑商保证,房屋在地基的五年内和房屋所有其他部分的两年内不会出现材料和工艺缺陷。五年基础保修包括对任何裂缝或渗水的保修。该合同还包含一项合并条款,由买卖双方分别签署,其中规定:“本合同是对双方协议的完整和最终理解,并取代法律默示的未包含在本协议四个角内的任何和所有其他协议或权利。签订这份合同六年后,地基突然出现明显的裂缝,导致代价高昂的地下室被淹。Pontellos 向您指出,他们大多数建造新房的朋友都获得了 10 年的地基保修,此外,该地区周围新房的大多数地基都可以使用至少 10 年而不会出现问题。Pontellos 想知道他们是否有充分的理由对 Cannon Construction 的地基裂缝提起诉讼。你告诉他们什么?
ANSWER: The issue here that the implied warranty of habitability that would say this foundation would last for 10 years is inconsistent with the written builder’s warranty that provided a five year express warranty and a two year express warranty on other parts of the home. This is like the Axline case. In the Axline case, the seller gave a one year builder’s warranty on this new home and there were problems with the home that occurred after the one year. And the problems that occurred after the one year were breaches of the implied warranty of habitability (IWH). So, the court in Axline said look seller if you want to disclaim the IWH, you cannot do it by just giving a more time limit of the express warranty that is your builder’s warranty. If you want to disclaim the IWH, then you better be very clear about it. Similarly here, if the IWH would arguably cover this foundation leak for at least 10 years, the fact that they gave an express warranty of 5 years that was time limited should not be seen to indirectly disclaim this IWH. If the seller wanted to do that, then they needed to separately and specifically disclaim the IWH.
回答: 这里的问题是,宜居性的默示保证说这个地基将持续 10 年,这与书面建筑商保修不一致,后者为房屋的其他部分提供五年明示保修和两年明示保修。这就像 Axline 的情况。在 Axline 案中,卖方为 这套新房提供了一年的建筑商保修,一年后房屋出现了问题。一年后出现的问题是违反了宜居性默示保证 (IWH)。因此,Axline 的法院说,如果您想放弃 IWH,您不能仅仅通过提供更多的明确保修时间限制来实现, 即您的建筑商保修。如果你想否认 IWH,那么你最好非常清楚。 同样 ,在这里,如果 IWH 可以说可以承保该地基泄漏至少 10 年,那么他们提供 5 年有时间限制的明确保证这一事实不应被视为间接否认该 IWH。如果卖方想这样做,那么他们需要单独明确地放弃 IWH。
REDUCING OR ELIMINATING WARRANTY LIABILITY: ADVANCED PP. 230
减少或消除保修责任:高级 第 230 页
13.1. a. Because his car lot’s reputation for quality has been going downhill lately, Lou (of Lou’s Used Cars for Less) is thinking of offering a new warranty for all of his used cars. He would title it in big bold letters as a “Full One-Year Warranty.” However, he would also like to include as part of the warranty the following limitations: a complete disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability of at least some limit on its duration, an exclusive remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts, and a separate exclusion of consequential damages. If Lou creates the Full One-Year Warranty, which of his proposed limitations will be allowable? 15 U.S.C. §§2304(a), 2304(e), 2308.
13.1. 一种。由于他的停车场的质量声誉最近一直在走下坡路,Lou(Lou's Used Cars for Less)正在考虑为他所有的二手车提供新的保修 。他会用粗体大字将其命名为 “ 完整的一年保修”。“ 但是,他还希望将以下限制作为保修的一部分:至少对其期限有一定限制的适销性默示保证的完整免责声明,维修或更换有缺陷部件的唯一补救措施,以及单独排除间接损害。如果 Lou 创建了完整的一年保修,他提议的哪些限制是允许的?15 美国法典 §§2304(a)、2304(e)、2308。
Simply by using the designation “Full One-Year Warranty”, the seller Lou’s used cars would, according to Magnuson-Moss §2304(e), thereby automatically incorporate, whether he meant to or not, all of the minimum warranty standards set out in Magnuson-Moss §2304(a).
根据 Magnuson-Moss §2304(e), 只需使用 “ 全年保修 ” 的名称 ,卖方 Lou 的二手车就会自动纳入 Magnuson-Moss §2304(a) 中规定的所有最低保修标准,无论他是否有意。
Lou cannot completely disclaim implied warranty under Magnuson-Moss §2308(a). And because it is a full written warranty, Lou is not allowed to limit its duration under Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2). Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(4) requires a supplier that makes a full written warranty has to allow the buyer the option of either a full refund or a completely new product in any case where the seller is unable to remedy the defect after reasonable number of attempts. Thus Lou can put in this exclusive remedy to repair or replace defective parts, but if the buyer keeps coming back after several repair or replacement, then at some point Lou has to provide either a full refund or a completely new product. This restriction in Magnuson-Moss on the ability to have exclusive remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts is very similar to the option given to buyers in U.S.C. §2-719(2), the “failure of essential purpose”, in that if a buyer keeps coming back after the seller’s several attempts to repair or replace the defective part, then such repair or replacement can be said to fail its essential purpose. For the separate exclusion of consequential damages, Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(3) requires a supplier making full warranty includes such exclusion clause must be conspicuous.
Lou 不能完全否认 Magnuson-Moss §2308(a) 规定的默示保证。由于这是一份完整的书面保证,因此 Lou 不得根据 Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2) 限制其期限。 Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(4) 要求提供完整书面保证的供应商必须允许买方选择全额退款或全新产品,前提是卖方在合理尝试次数后无法补救缺陷。 因此 ,Lou 可以采用这种独家补救措施来维修或更换有缺陷的零件,但如果买家在多次维修或更换后仍然回来,那么在某些时候 Lou 必须提供全额退款或全新的产品。Magnuson-Moss 案中对维修或更换有缺陷零件的排他性补救措施能力的限制与美国买家的选择非常相似。 §2-719(2),“ 基本目的失败 ”,因为如果买方在卖方多次尝试修理或更换有缺陷的部件后继续回来,那么这种修理或更换可以说是未能达到其基本目的。对于间接损害的单独排除,Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(3) 要求供应商在提供全面保证时必须明显包含此类排除条款。
The most significant impact of Magnuson-Moss is with its prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers for sellers who make written warranties. It does very little with respect to the seller’s ability to limit its remedies.
Magnuson-Moss 最显着的影响是它禁止对做出书面保证的卖家提供默示保修免责声明。它对卖方限制其补救措施的能力几乎没有作用。
b. How would your answer change if Lou’s warranty were a “Limited One-Year Warranty”?
湾。如果 Lou 的保修是 “ 一年有限保修 ”,您的答案会有什么变化 ?
Still Lou cannot completely disclaim the implied warranty under Magnuson-Moss §2308(a)(1), but he can limit its duration under Magnuson-Moss §2308(b) since Lou only made a limited warranty not a full warranty. However, in limiting the duration of the implied warranty, the seller may only limit the duration no shorter than the duration of the limited warranty, namely one year in this problem.
尽管如此,Lou 仍不能完全否认 Magnuson-Moss §2308(a)(1) 项下的默示保证,但他可以根据 Magnuson-Moss §2308(b) 限制其期限,因为 Lou 仅作了有限保证,而不是完全保证。 但是,在限制默示保证的期限时, 卖方只能限制不短于有限保证期限的期限 ,即此问题中的一年。
The only meaningful difference between a full and a limited written warranty is that if the seller makes a limited warranty, he can then limit the duration of the implied warranties to the duration of the limited written warranty, as long as the duration of the limited written warranty is reasonable.
完整书面保证和有限书面保证之间唯一有意义的区别是,如果卖方做出有限保证,只要有限书面保证的期限合理,他就可以将默示保证的期限限制为有限书面保证的期限 。
13.2. Imagine that you get a call from a friend who purchased the swingset that carries the warranty printed earlier in this assignment. Four months after this purchase, your friend’s son was injured when the chain snapped on the swing he was using. You friend wonders whether he can recover damages for his son’s injuries despite the warranty. (Put aside tort possibilities for the purposes of this problem.) What is your advice to him? U.C.C. §§2-314(2)(c), 2-316(2), 2-317, 2-719(3); 15 U.S.C. §2308.
13.2. 想象一下,您接到一个朋友的电话,他购买了带有 本作业前面打印的保修单的秋千。这次购买四个月后,您朋友的儿子在他使用的秋千上被链条折断而受伤。你的朋友想知道,尽管有保修,他是否可以为儿子的伤害获得赔偿 。(将 为了解决这个问题,撇开侵权的可能性。你对他有什么建议?加州大学 §§2-314(2)(c)、2-316(2)、2-317、2-719(3);《美国法典》第 15 卷 §2308.
Assuming the son is suing the immediate seller rather than the manufacturer, in an Alternative A jurisdiction, the son’s injury would not be barred by horizontal privity problem under U.C.C. §2-318, because the son sustained personal injury and is in the buyer’s family.
假设儿子起诉的是直接销售商而不是制造商,在备选方案 A 司法管辖区,根据 U.C.C.,儿子的受伤不会因横向相互关系问题而被禁止。 §2-318,因为儿子遭受了人身伤害,并且属于买方的家庭。
For the timing issue, note that the buyer will not sue on the written warranty anyway because written warranty only promises repair or replacement of defective parts. This exclusive remedy probably won’t be upheld, because this limit in the written remedy should not be able to exclude remedies for personal injuries under U.C.C. §2-719(3). Instead, the buyer may want to sue the seller under the implied warranty of merchantability under§ 2-314(2)(c) because a swing that breaks while in use is not fit for its ordinary purpose. Here the seller disclaims implied warranty of merchantability, and it seems he have met all the requirements under §2-316(2) given that the seller mentions the word merchantability and the disclaimer was conspicuous. However, Magnuson-Moss comes to the rescue for the buyer under §2308(a) by saying no supplier making a written warranty, whether full or limited, may disclaim completely the implied warranties. And if they do, §2308(c) says any such disclaimer will be ineffective. Here Magnuson-Moss as federal law trumps state UCC law. Therefore, here the seller’s disclaimer on the implied warranty of merchantability is ineffective. Moreover, in this case, the buyer would have no problem in overcoming the seller’s attempted limit of remedies. §2-719(3) says limitation of consequential damages for injury to person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. Plus the seller’s warranty itself, despite attempting to disclaim consequential damages, specifically says except damages to personal injuries shall not be precluded.
对于时间问题,请注意,买方无论如何都不会就书面保修提起诉讼,因为书面保修仅承诺维修或更换有缺陷的零件。这种排他性的补救措施可能不会得到支持,因为书面补救措施中的这一限制不应排除 U.C.C. 规定的人身伤害补救措施。 §2-719(3) 条。相反,买方可能希望根据 § 2-314(2)(c) 下的适销性默示保证起诉卖方,因为在使用时断裂的秋千不适合其正常用途。在这里,卖方否认了对适销性的默示保证, 鉴于卖方提到了适销性一词并且免责声明很明显,他似乎已经满足了 §2-316(2) 下的所有要求。然而,Magnuson-Moss 根据 §2308(a) 为买方提供了帮助,表示任何提供书面保证的供应商,无论是完全的还是有限的,都不能完全否认默示的战争保证。如果他们这样做,§2308(c) 表示任何此类免责声明都将无效。在这里,Magnuson-Moss 作为联邦法律胜过州 UCC 法律。因此,此处卖方对适销性的默示保证的免责声明无效。此外,在这种情况下,买方可以毫无问题地克服卖方尝试的补救措施限制。 §2-719(3) 规定,在消费品的情况下,对人身伤害的间接损害赔偿的限制在表面上是不合情理的。 此外 ,卖方的保修本身,尽管试图否认间接损害,但明确表示 不得排除对人身伤害的损害赔偿。
However, the seller may want to make the following argument: Even if a disclaimer on implied warranty is invalid, a 90-day express warranty like this one is inherently inconsistent with a more open-ended implied warranty of merchantability. And §2-317(c) says the 90-day express warranty here must displace the inconsistent implied warranty of merchantability. The buyer may make following counter argument: There’s nothing inconsistent cumulating the 90-day express warranty, which provides certain rights with certain length of time, with a lengthier, more open-ended implied warranty of merchantability, which provides other rights but for longer time. In other words, it’s not unreasonable here to stack a limited duration express warranty with a longer duration implied warranty. Plus the first clause of §2-317 urges us to construe multiple warranties “as consistent with each other and as cumulative”, unless such construction would be unreasonable. Furthermore, if the seller were able to apply §2-317(c) in a way that seller is trying to, that would be wholly inconsistent with Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2). If we let this 90-day written express warranty displace the implied warranty of merchantability or to limit its duration, then the seller would be doing indirectly, under the guise of U.C.C. §2-317(c), that which Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2) says a seller like this who gives a full warranty cannot do directly, namely limit the duration of the limited warranty. And since federal law trumps state law, Magnuson-Moss wins, even if this construction of §2-317(c) is a reasonable construction.
但是,卖家可能想提出以下论点:即使默示保证的免责声明无效, 像这样的 90 天明示保证本质上与更开放的适销性默示保证不一致。§2-317(c) 表示,此处的 90 天明示保证必须取代不一致的适销性默示保证。买方可以提出以下反驳论点: 累积 90 天明示保证并无不一致之处,前者提供具有一定时间长度的某些权利,后者提供更长、更开放的适销性默示保证,后者提供其他权利,但时间更长。换句话说, 在这里将有限期限的明示保证与较长期限的默示保证叠加起来并非没有道理。 此外 ,§2-317 的第一条款敦促我们将多项保证解释为“ 彼此一致且累积 ”,除非这种解释不合理。此外,如果卖方能够以卖方试图的方式适用 §2-317(c),那将与 Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2) 完全不一致。如果我们让这个 90 天的书面明示保证取代适销性的默示保证或限制其期限,那么卖方将以 UCC 为幌子间接地这样做。 §2-317(c),Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2) 说像这样提供全面保证的卖家不能直接做的事情,即限制有限保证的期限。 由于联邦法律凌驾于州法律,Magnuson-Moss 胜诉,即使 §2-317(c) 的这种解释是合理的解释。
13.3. a. Acme Advertising Agency enters into a contract with Hard Drive Computer Co. for the purchase of an office computer system. The price is $38,000. The contract says in boldface that the seller, Hard Drive, makes no warranties except that the goods are merchantable, and even with respect to that warranty, notice of breach must been given within four months of the sale or the buyer has no remedy. Five months after the sale, the computer system breaks down. Acme gives Hard Drive notice of the problem, but Hard Drive says it is simply too late for Acme to make a claim for breach. The Acme president complains, “Wait, that’s not fair. I gave you notice of this problem as soon as I discovered it. And there was just no way I could have discovered it until right now, five months after the sale.” Hard Drive refuses to fix the system, and Acme sues for breach of the warranty of merchantability. If you were the judge on these facts, in whose favor would you rule? U.C.C. §§2-607(3)(a), 1-302(b) (formerly §1-204(1)); Official Comment 1 to §1-302 (Formerly Official Comment 1 to §1-204); §2-316, Official Comment 1 to §2-316; §§2-317, 2-719.
13.3. a. Acme Advertising Agency 与 Hard Drive Computer Co. 签订合同,购买办公计算机系统。价格为 38,000 美元。合同以粗体字表示,卖方 Hard Drive 除了商品可商销外,不作任何保证,即使就该保证而言,也必须在销售后四个月内发出违约通知,否则买方无法获得补救措施。销售五个月后,计算机系统出现故障。Acme 向 Hard Drive 发出了问题通知,但 Hard Drive 表示 Acme 提出违规索赔为时已晚。Acme 总裁抱怨说:“ 等等,这不公平。我一发现这个问题就通知了你。直到现在,也就是拍卖会的五个月后,我才有可能发现它。“ Hard Drive 拒绝修复系统,Acme 起诉违反适销性保证。如果你是这些事实的法官,你会做出对谁有利的裁决?加州大学 §§2-607(3)(a)、1-302(b)(原 §1-204(1));§1-302 的官方意见 1(原 §1-204 的官方意见 1);§2-316,官方意见 1 至 §2-316; §§2-317、2-719。
In a case like this, a judge will look at the particular facts, and say if we hold for the seller here, in light of the facts, are we allowing unfair oppression or unfair surprise against the buyer. On the other hand, if we hold for the buyer, are we inhibiting freedom of contract?
在这样的案件中,法官会查看特定事实,并说如果我们在这里为卖方成立, 根据事实,我们是否允许对买方进行不公平的压迫或不公平的意外 。另一方面,如果我们为买方持有,我们是否抑制了合同自由?
Arguments for the buyer: This 4-month notice limitation is really just an attempt to modify by shortening the implied warranty of merchantability, but it fails in the disclaiming part under §2-316(2) to mention the word merchantability, therefore it’s ineffective. Moreover, the express warranty of merchantability that was made as part of this contract can’t be disclaimed or limited with words that are inconsistent with the words creating it under §2-316(1). And finally, under §2-607(3)(a), a buyer must within a reasonable time, after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. And that’s exactly what the buyer did in this problem.
买方的论点:这个 4 个月的通知限制实际上只是试图通过缩短适销性的默示保证来修改,但它在 §2-316(2) 下的免责声明部分没有提到适销性一词,因此它是无效的。此外,作为本合同一部分的适销性明示保证不能被否认或限制在与 §2-316(1) 下创建该合同的词语不一致的词语。最后,根据 §2-607(3)(a),买方必须在发现或应该发现任何违约行为后的合理时间内通知卖方违约行为或被禁止获得任何补救措施。而这正是买方在这个问题上所做的。
Arguments for the seller: Comment 1 to §2-316 suggests that broadly speaking, the disclaimer requirements were designed mainly to avoid unfair surprise to the buyer. Here, there’s no unfair surprise, the buyer was aware of the 4-month notice limitation prior to making the purchase. In addition, under §2-317(c), express warranty displaces inconsistent implied warranties, except implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, which we don’t have here. Therefore, this 4-month express warranty of merchantability should displace a more temporally open-ended implied warranty of merchantability. Furthermore, §2-607 is just a gap-filler about notice, which should be superseded anytime the parties put in an express term about timeliness of notice which is contrary to the gap-filler. §1-302(b) says whenever this act requires an action to be taken within a reasonable time, a time that is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement. As to the buyer’s §2-316(1) argument concerning the internal inconsistency of this express warranty limit, this express warranty as seller created came with this limitation on duration. It was part of the creation of the implied warranty of merchantability. Therefore, this is one of those rare cases in which “Words relevant to the creation of an express warranty, and words tending to negate or limit warranty can actually be construed consistently in a reasonable way.” Finally, this 4-month notification of claims period should be seen, in any event, as a limitation of remedy under §2-316(4), and therefore should not be subject at all to the restrictions of §2-316(2), but instead should be allowed under §2-719(1)(a).
卖方的论据:§2-316 的注释 1 表明,从广义上讲,免责声明要求的主要目的是避免对买方造成不公平的意外。在这里, 没有不公平的惊喜,买家在购买前就知道 4 个月的通知限制。此外,根据 §2-317(c),明示保证取代了不一致的默示保证,但对特定用途适用性的默示保证除外,我们在这里没有。因此,这种 4 个月的适销性明示保证应该取代对适销性的更临时的开放式默示保证。此外,§2-607 只是关于通知的空白填充, 只要当事方就通知的及时性提出与空白填充相反的明确条款 ,就应将其取代 。§1-302(b) 规定,当本法案要求在合理时间内采取行动时,可以通过协议确定并非明显不合理的时间。至于买方关于此明示保修限制的内部不一致的 §2-316(1) 论点,卖方创建的该明示保证带有此期限限制。这是创建适销性默示保证的一部分。 因此,这是“ 与创建明示保证相关的词语,以及倾向于否定或限制保证的词语实际上可以以合理的方式一致地解释的罕见情况之一。“ 最后,无论如何,这个 4 个月的索赔通知期应被视为 §2-316(4) 下的补救措施限制,因此根本不应受 §2-316(2) 的限制,而应根据 §2-719(1)(a) 允许。
b. Same facts as part (a), except now suppose that a computer system like this (without a specific time limit on notice of breach) normally would sell for $80,000 rather than the $38,000 that this seller sold it for. Now how would you rule?
b.事实与 (a) 部分相同,但现在假设像这样的计算机系统(没有具体的违规通知时间限制)通常售价为 80,000 美元,而不是该卖家出售时的价格为 38,000 美元。现在你会如何统治呢?
Now it seems that it must have been a conscious assumption of risk on the buyer’s part. The buyer apparently chose to pay less than one would normally pay in exchange for getting a lesser warranty protection. And it would seems odd to not holding the buyer to the 4-month warranty period specified in the contract after the buyer benefited by paying way less for this computer system.
现在看来,这一定是买方有意识地承担了风险 。买方显然选择支付比通常支付的费用少的费用 ,以换取较少的保修保护。在 买方为该计算机系统支付更少的费用后,不让买方遵守合同中规定的 4 个月保修期似乎很奇怪。
COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY PP. 252
商业上的不切实际 第 252 页
Problem 14.1 In your capacity as an associate at Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe, you were just handed another case from one of your firm’s most active clients, Lou’s Used Cars for Less 9from Problem 2.1). One of Lou’s sales people, “Slick Rick” Newman, explained to you that he had a contract to sell a used Cadillac convertible for $15,000 to a very demanding customer, Kristi Aiken. Kristi really wants this particular car because it was once driven by Tiger Woods. After the customer paid the price and signed the contract, she arranged to pick up her Cadillac from Lou’s the very next day. That evening a terrible hailstorm damaged the body of the Cadillac so badly that it would cost $18,000 to repair it. The car now has a scrap value of $500. Kristi insisted that Lou’s should pay for whatever bodywork it would take to put the car back in the condition it was when she signed the contract. Rick says he wants to know what his obligations and his options are with respect to Kristi’s demands. U.C.C. §§2-613, 2-509(3), Official Comment 3 to §2-509.
问题 14.1 作为 Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe 的合伙人,你刚刚收到了来自你公司最活跃的客户之一 Lou's Used Cars for Less 9 的另一起案件。Lou 的一位销售人员 “Slick Rick” Newman 向您解释说,他有一份合同,以 15,000 美元的价格将一辆二手凯迪拉克敞篷车卖给一位非常苛刻的客户 Kristi Aiken。Kristi 真的很想要这辆特别的车 ,因为它曾经由 Tiger Woods 驾驶。在客户付了价并签了合同后,她安排第二天从 Lou's 取走她的凯迪拉克。那天晚上,一场可怕的冰雹严重损坏了凯迪拉克的车身,以至于修理它要花费 18,000 美元。这辆车现在的废旧价值为 500 美元。Kristi 坚持认为 Lou's 应该支付将汽车恢复到她签署合同时的状态所需的任何车身费用。Rick 说,他想知道他对 Kristi 的要求有什么义务和选择。《美国法典》第 2-613 条、第 2-509(3) 条,第 3 条至第 2-509 条的官方意见。
ANSWER: what is the difference between a 2-613 case vs. a 2-615 case? What is the interaction between the code’s excuse provision of 2-613 and 2-615? What is the difference between risk of loss and excuse? Is it possible to have risk of loss if you are the seller but still be excused? Or if you are excused, isn’t that the same as saying you really do not have risk of loss? How can you reconcile a seller having risk of loss with respect to the goods but also be excused form their contractual obligation to deliver the goods?
回答:2-613 病例与 2-615 病例有什么区别?法典的 2-613 和 2-615 的辩解条款之间有什么相互作用?损失风险和借口有什么区别?如果您是卖方但仍被免除,是否有可能有损失的风险?或者,如果你被原谅了,那不等于说你真的没有损失的风险吗?您如何协调卖方在货物方面有损失风险,同时又免除他们交付货物的合同义务?
Who had the risk of loss in this case when the car was damaged, the seller or the buyer? The seller did according to 2-509(3). In this case, we have a seller who is a merchant and we have a buyer who has not yet received the good. If there is any doubt as to what the word “received” means, the code even defined that in a different part under 2-103(1)(c) defines received as taking physical possession of the goods. Then we have to ask what does it mean to say that the seller had risk of loss? What if the buyer had risk of loss? If the buyer had risk of loss, then that would relieve the seller of any damages that happened to the goods; and the seller would return the car to the buyer in its banged up state. Given that the seller had risk of loss, then why does it not mean that the seller has to return the car to its previous condition and fulfill its contractual obligation with regard to the car no matter? This is where excuse comes in under 2-613 does not change the risk of loss allocation; however, it relieves the seller of its contractual obligations. So, if the seller can successfully claim excuse in this case, then the buyer has no remedies against the seller for breach of this sales’ contract other than rescission. And rescission says buyer would get her money back but not the car, and that is a remedy but not a full expectation. Basically, if seller can successfully claim excuse, seller can get out of its obligation to deliver the buyer’s expectation, which the seller would normally have to do. But even if seller can claim excuse, he still has to undo the contract and give the buyer the option of getting her money back.
在这种情况下,当汽车损坏时,谁有损失的风险,卖方还是买方? 卖方根据 2-509(3) 这样做了。在这种情况下,我们有一个卖家是卖家 ,而我们有一个买家尚未收到商品。如果对“接收”一词的含义有任何疑问,该法典甚至在 2-103(1)(c) 的不同部分定义接收为实际占有货物。 那么我们不得不问,说卖方有损失风险是什么意思?如果买方有损失风险怎么办? 如果买方有损失的风险,那么这将减轻卖方对货物发生的任何损害;卖方会将处于爆炸状态的汽车归还给买方。 既然卖方有损失的风险,那么为什么不意味着卖方必须将汽车恢复到以前的状态并履行其对汽车的合同义务呢? 这就是 2-613 下的借口不会改变损失分配的风险;但是,它免除了卖方的合同义务。因此,如果卖方在这种情况下可以成功要求免责,那么买方除了解除合同外,对卖方违反本销售合同没有任何补救措施。撤销说买家会拿回她的钱,但不会拿回汽车,这是一种补救措施,但不是完全的期望。基本上,如果卖方可以成功索赔借口,卖方就可以摆脱履行买方期望的义务,而卖方通常必须这样做。但即使卖方可以要求借口,他仍然必须撤销合同并让买方选择取回她的钱。
Does §2-613 cover this? When you look 2-613, part of the problem is if you look at the title to 2-613 it says “casualty to identified goods.” If you just read that on its face, it would suggest a much broader scope of 2-613 than 2-613 actually has. Why is that? You could have casualty to goods in the seller’s possession that have technically been identified. And identified is a term of art, which means that they have somehow been marked or set aside for this particular buyer. But if those identified goods were just fungible goods, even though they were identified goods and even though there was casualty to those identified goods, 2-613 would not apply to fungible goods. 2-613 says for application is that it basically require three different things to all be true. (1) Contract requires for its performance goods identified when contract was made (the word “requires” is important because it distinguishes from fungible goods and it means we are only talking about those cases where a seller is selling a particular thing that the buyer knows, understand, and wants; here, like this car once driven by Tiger Woods, nothing else will do). (2) The goods suffered casualty through no fault of either party (maybe here someone may argue that the car should have been protected; however, realistically, car dealers do not have enough garage space). (3) Before risk of loss passes to the buyer (if risk of loss had passed to the buyer, there would be no excuse situation at all). The buyer would not have an excuse, even if the buyer had risk of loss, because the excuse has to go to one’s ability to fulfill his obligation. So, if we are talking about the car being damaged, whose obligation in the contract does that affect? The seller’s obligation is to deliver the car. The buyer’s obligation is to pay money. The fact that the car got damaged after risk of loss had passed to the buyer, the buyer still got the money and there is nothing about her obligation (which is to pay money) for which she has the excuse. It appears that, in this case, 2-613 applies here even though the seller still had risk of loss. Given that 2-613 applies, what are the two possibilities that are indicated by this section? §2-613(a) if it is a total loss or 2-613(b) the goods have deteriorated so long as they can accept the goods under contract for a reduced price. In this case, the car price was $15k and it cost $18k to put it back in its original state, is this a total loss or a partial loss? It is a total loss under 2-613(a) and as a total loss the contract is avoided. In practical terms, what does that mean? Basically, the seller will keep the car for scrap value and the buyer will get her money back.
§2-613 是否涵盖此内容? 当您查看 2-613 时,部分问题在于,如果您查看 2-613 的标题,它说 “已识别货物的伤亡”。如果你只是从表面上看,它表明 2-613 的范围比 2-613 的实际范围要广泛得多。 为什么? 卖方拥有的货物在技术上已被确定,您可能会造成伤亡。而 identified 是一个艺术术语,这意味着它们以某种方式被标记或留给这个特定的买家 。但是,如果这些已识别的商品只是可替代的商品,即使它们是已识别的商品,即使这些已识别的商品有伤亡,2-613 也不适用于可替代商品 。2-613 表示,对于应用,它基本上需要三个不同的事情才能全部成立。 (1) 合同要求在订立合同时确定的其性能商品(“要求 ”一词很重要,因为它与可替代商品区分开来,这意味着我们只谈论卖方销售买方知道、理解和想要的特定物品的情况;在这里,就像老虎伍兹曾经驾驶的这辆车一样,其他一切都无济于事)。(2) 货物因任何一方的过错而遭受伤亡(也许这里有人可能会争辩说汽车应该受到保护;然而,实际上,汽车经销商没有足够的车库空间)。 (3) 在损失风险转移给买方之前(如果损失风险已经转移给买方,则完全没有借口情况)。 即使买方有损失的风险,买方也不会有借口,因为借口必须与一个人履行义务的能力有关。 那么,如果我们谈论的是汽车被损坏,那么这会影响合同中的谁义务呢? 卖方的义务是交付汽车。买方的义务是付款。事实上,汽车在损失风险转移给买方后损坏,买方仍然拿到了钱,而且她没有任何借口的义务(即付款)。在这种情况下,即使卖方仍然存在损失风险,2-613 似乎也适用于此处。 鉴于 2-613 适用,本节指出的两种可能性是什么? §2-613(a) 如果是全损或 2-613(b) 货物已经变质,只要他们能够以较低的价格接受合同下的货物。 在这种情况下,汽车价格为 15 美元,将其恢复到原始状态需要 18 美元,这是全部损失还是部分损失? 根据 2-613(a) 规定,这是全部损失,作为全部损失,合同被撤销。实际上,这意味着什么?基本上,卖方将保留汽车作为废品价值,买方将拿回她的钱。
Suppose the buyer here had personally valued this car at $20k due to the Tiger Woods connection because she is the biggest Tiger Woods fan, should she have the right if she wishes to pay $18k of her own money to have the car brought back to its pre-hail condition so that she may own it? The buyer can argue that this is the 2-613(b) case based on her objective valuation of the car. Use the scrap value of the car and hold that her due allowance for deterioration is the original contract price ($15k) minus the scrap value, for a total due allowance of $14,500. That is the extent to which the car has depreciated. If she wants to, the buyer should be able to get the car plus $14,500. That $500 is her buying the car for the scrap value. If you look at the last sentence of Official Comment 1 to 2-613, it makes it clear that it is the buyer’s decision of whether this is a 2-613(a) case or 2-613(b) case once the seller claims excuse under 2-613.
假设这里的买家由于 Tiger Woods 的关系而个人将这辆车估价为 20 美元,因为她是 Tiger Woods 最大的粉丝,如果她希望支付 18 美元自己的钱,她是否有权将汽车恢复到冰雹前的状态,以便她可以拥有它? 买方可以根据她对汽车的客观估价争辩说,这是 2-613(b) 案件。使用汽车的报废价值,并坚持她的应得劣化津贴是原始合同价格 ($15k) 减去报废价值,总到期津贴为 $14,500。那就是汽车贬值的程度。如果她愿意,买家应该能够得到这辆车加上 14,500 美元。那 500 美元是她以废品价值买下这辆车的。 如果您查看官方意见 1 至 2-613 的最后一句话,它清楚地表明,一旦卖方根据 2-613 要求免责,这是 2-613(a) 案件还是 2-613(b) 案件,这是买方的决定。
Problem 14.2(a) Arlene Ledger, president of Heavy Metal, Inc. (from Problem 3.2) is back in your office. Heavy Metal, as you may recall, is a manufacturer of exercise equipment. Arlene explains to you that last month she agreed to fill a larger order for a new local Gold’s Gym franchise that is planning its grand opening late next week. The problem, Arlene says, is that a heavy rain late last week caused a flood in the basement of Heavy Metal’s building, which is where Arlene had been storing the exercise machines that were earmarked for Gold’s Gym. As soon as Arlene discovered the problem she notified the president of Gold’s Gym, Cory Haney. Cory, however, has told Arlene that Gold’s Gym cannot afford to open late, given all of the advance publicity she has generated so far about the grand opening. Arlene asks you whether she will be able to claim an excuse for a delay in delivering the equipment to Gold’s Gym. Arlene says that it would take a few weeks for her company to manufacture replacement equipment for Gold’s. Arlene admits that she can buy the same equipment immediately from another manufacturer, but at a price that would cause her to lose money on her Gold’s Gym contract. In reading the sales contract, you see that it says nothing either about force majeure or about source of supply. What do you tell Arlene? U.C.C. §§2-613, 2-615; Official Comment 5 to §2-615.
问题 14.2(a) Heavy Metal, Inc. 的总裁 Arlene Ledger(来自问题 3.2)回到了您的办公室。您可能还记得,Heavy Metal 是一家健身器材制造商。Arlene 向您解释说,上个月她同意为当地新的 Gold's Gym 特许经营权完成一个更大的订单,该特许经营权计划在下周晚些时候盛大开业。Arlene 说,问题在于上周晚些时候的一场大雨导致 Heavy Metal 大楼的地下室被洪水淹没,Arlene 一直在那里存放着专门用于 Gold's Gym 的健身器材。Arlene 发现问题后, 立即通知了 Gold's Gym 的总裁 Cory Haney。然而,Cory 告诉 Arlene,鉴于她迄今为止对盛大开业的所有提前宣传,Gold's Gym 不能延迟开放。Arlene 问你,她是否可以为延迟将设备运送到 Gold's Gym 找借口。Arlene 说,她的公司需要几周时间才能制造出 Gold's 的替代设备。Arlene 承认,她可以立即从另一家制造商那里购买相同的设备,但价格会导致她在 Gold's Gym 合同上赔钱。在阅读销售合同时,您会发现它既没有提到不可抗力,也没有提到供应来源。你怎么告诉 Arlene?《美国法典》第 2-613、2-615 条;§2-615 的官方评论 5。
ANSWER: is this a 2-613 case or a 2-615 case? This is a 2-615 case. It is not a 2-613 case because it highly unlike that Gold’s Gym needs these very exercise machines that got wet in the basement as oppose to other machines that are just like them. And also, the mere fact that the seller here is speaking in terms of a delay, that is a give away that this cannot be a 2-613 case. Why? Because 2-613 does not even mention delay as an option, but only total avoidance or buyer takes the goods with the price reduction for the damage incurred. So, if the seller is going to claim excuse for delay, then the source for that has to be 2-615.
回答:这是 2-613 案例还是 2-615 案例? 这是一个 2-615 案例。这不是 2-613 案例,因为它与此截然不同,Gold's Gym 需要这些在地下室被弄湿的健身器材 , 而不是其他类似的机器。 而且 ,这里的卖家只是说延迟,这就是一个泄露 ,这不可能是 2-613 的情况。 为什么? 因为 2-613 甚至没有提到延迟作为一种选项,而只是完全避免或买方以降价购买所造成的损害的货物。因此,如果卖家要申请延迟借口,那么其来源必须是 2-615。
Does the seller here qualify under 2-615? Yes. What is the seller’s responsibility under 2-615? The first thing they have to do is that they have to give notice under 2-615(c) and then it seems like in this case the allocation issues of 2-615(b) are not relevant. So the only issue here is this: whether this flooding that damaged the finished equipment is “a contingency that the nonoccurrence that was a basic assumption on which the contract was based.” How can the seller argue that this flooding was a contingency the nonoccurrence that was a basic assumption on which the contract was based? Since Heavy Metal is a manufacturer rather than a wholesaler, that by itself is a circumstance under Official Comment 5 to 2-615, such that both buyer and seller should have reasonably contemplated that the seller itself would be the exclusive source of supply rather than some third party. Comment 5 puts it this way: “where a particular source of supply is exclusive under the agreement and fails as a casualty the present section applies rather than 2-613. The same holds true where a particular supply is shown by the circumstances to have been contemplated or assumed by the parties.”
这里的卖家是否符合 2-615 的条件? 是的。 根据 2-615 的规定,卖家的责任是什么? 他们要做的第一件事 是,他们必须根据 2-615(c) 发出通知 ,然后在这种情况下,2-615(b) 的分配问题似乎无关紧要。 所以这里唯一的问题是:这场损坏成品设备的洪水是否是“一种偶然性,即未发生是合同所基于的基本假设”。卖方如何争辩说这次洪水是一种偶然事件,没有发生是合同所依据的基本假设?由于 Heavy Metal 是制造商而不是批发商,这本身就是官方意见 5 至 2-615 中的一种情况 ,因此买卖双方都应该合理地考虑卖方本身将是唯一的供应来源,而不是第三方。注释 5 是这样说的:“如果特定供应来源在协议下是排他性的,并且作为牺牲品而失败,则适用本条而不是 2-613。如果情况表明双方已经预期或假设了特定供应,情况也是如此。
Should Arlene been more prudent in her storage? Was this like a one-time flooding or does the basement have a propensity to flood? Even if you could show that Arlene was perhaps part of the problem with her storage practices, how does that become relevant under 20615 when if you compare the languages of 2-613? 2-613 specifically it says as one of its requirement “without fault of either party, there is a casualty. But if you look at the language of 2-615, where in 2-615 we find any reference to the fault of either party and its relevance for commercial impracticability? There is not that language, but does that mean it is irrelevant? No, because there is still the good faith requirement, but beyond that Comment 5 says “there is no excuse under this section, however, unless the seller has employed all due measure to assure himself that his source will not fail.” Now in this case, the seller’s source is the seller itself. But it seems that the same policy should apply of requiring the seller has done all he reasonably should have done to avoid the supervening event that is the basis for the excuse. Because if you did not have that rule, think about the moral hazard problem you would have. Think about where if a seller could know that if he is negligent and that’s okay, he will be able to claim excuse; then they would not have the normal incentive to take the precaution. The excuse doctrine is a form of insurance and every time you insure something you avoid the moral hazard problem.
Arlene 应该 更谨慎地存放吗? 这就像一次性的洪水还是地下室有洪水的倾向?即使你能证明 Arlene 可能是她存储实践问题的一部分,但如果你比较 2-613 的语言,这在 20615 下怎么变得有意义呢?2-613 具体来说,作为其要求之一 “没有任何一方的过错,就有伤亡。但是,如果你看一下 2-615 的措辞,在 2-615 中,我们发现任何一方的过错及其与商业不切实际的相关性? 没有那种语言,但这是否意味着它无关紧要?不,因为仍然存在善意要求,但除此之外,评论 5 说“然而,本节没有任何借口,除非卖方已采取一切适当措施向自己保证其来源不会失败。现在在这种情况下,卖家的来源是卖家本身。但似乎同样的政策也应该适用,即要求卖方已尽其合理应做的一切,以避免作为借口依据的后续事件。因为如果你没有这条规则,想想你会遇到的道德风险问题。想一想,如果卖家可以知道如果他疏忽大意并且没关系,他将能够要求借口;那么他们就不会有正常的动力来采取预防措施。借口原则是一种保险形式,每次你投保时,你都会避免道德风险问题。
Problem 14.2(b) Same facts as part (a), except the reason for Arlene’s failure to perform is that Arlene’s steel supplier, which was designated in Arlene’s contract with Gold’s Gym as Arlene’s exclusive source of steel for this contract, reneged on its contract with Arlene. The steel supplier’s failure to deliver was due to the destruction of its plant by a fire that was negligently caused by several of its own employees. Will Arlene be excused from her obligations to Gold’s Gym? U.C.C. §2-615, Official Comment 5 to §2-615. Would your answer change if this contract were governed by the CISG? C.I.S.G. Art. 79.
问题 14.2(b) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,但 Arlene 未能履行合同的原因是 Arlene 的钢材供应商(在 Arlene 与 Gold's Gym 的合同中被指定为 Arlene 在该合同中的独家钢材来源)违背了与 Arlene 的合同。这家钢铁供应商未能交货是由于其工厂被几名员工的疏忽引起的火灾摧毁。Arlene 会被免除她对 Gold's Gym 的义务吗?U.C.C. §2-615,官方评论 5 至 §2-615。如果这份合同受 CISG 管辖,您的回答会改变吗?C.I.S.G. 第 79 条。
ANSWER: Will Arlene be excused from her obligations to Gold’s Gym? According to the fact, it says that this supplier was designated as the exclusive source and that is what Official Comment 5 to 2-615 says, as long as both parties understood or should have understood this was the exclusive source and in this case it was in the contract. So, Arlene should be off the hook for her delay because this source of supply was explicitly made exclusive under her contract with Gold’s Gym. Now, does Gold end up with any rights in that case under Comment 5? Under comment 5, the seller would have to turn over her buyer whatever right she has against her defaulting supplier as a condition to the seller getting the excuse benefits of 2-615. Maybe it is a suit for contract market damages for breach.
回答:Arlene 可以免除她对 Gold's Gym 的义务吗? 根据事实,它说该供应商被指定为独家来源,这就是官方评论 5 至 2-615 所说的,只要双方都明白或应该明白这是独家来源, 在这种情况下 ,它在合同中。所以,Arlene 应该不会因为她的延误而摆脱困境,因为根据她与 Gold's Gym 的合同,这个供应来源被明确列为独家供应。 那么, 根据评论 5,Gold 是否最终在该案中获得了任何权利? 根据评论 5,卖方必须将她对违约供应商的任何权利交给她的买方,作为卖方获得 2-615 的借口利益的条件。也许是违约的合同市场损害赔偿诉讼。
Would your answer change if this contract were governed by the CISG? Yes because the CISG lets the excuse (the ability to claim excuse) rest on whether your exclusive source could have claimed excuse. And if the exclusive source could not have claimed such excuse, then neither do you. You got a lawsuit against them, but you do not have an excused to get out of your contract with your buyer. That is found under Article 79(2)(b) because this deal supplier could not be excused against Arlene because of its own negligence causing casualty to the steel. This variation is an example where the UCC and the CISG come to a different result in a case involving a seller claiming excuse.
如果这份合同受 CISG 管辖,您的回答会改变吗? 是的 ,因为 CISG 让借口(要求借口的能力)取决于您的独家来源是否可以声称有借口。如果独家消息来源不能声称这样的借口,那么你也不知道。你对他们提起了诉讼,但你没有理由解除与买家的合同。根据第 79(2)(b) 条,这是因为该交易供应商不能因为自己的疏忽导致钢材人员伤亡而免责 Arlene。这种差异是 UCC 和 CISG 在涉及卖家索赔借口的案件中得出不同结果的一个例子。
Problem 14.2(c) Same facts as part (a), except that there were 60 machines in the basement, only 30 of which were ruined by the flood. The Gold’s Gym, order was for 40 machines, but Big Jake’s Gym across town also had an order from Heavy Metal for 20 machines for his grand opening on the same day. Arlene would like to allocate 20 of the 30 good machines to Jake’s and just 10 to Gold’s Gym for at least two reasons: first, because she thinks it is better to have at least one happy customer rather than o customers; and second, because she heard from her friends in the industry that Jake’s will soon be opening up lots more local franchises, which she would love to supply with machines. Can Arlene justify her proposed allocation? U.C.C. §2-615(b).
问题 14.2(c) 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是地下室有 60 台机器,其中只有 30 台被洪水毁坏。Gold's Gym 的订单是 40 台机器,但镇对面的 Big Jake's Gym 也收到了 Heavy Metal 的 20 台机器订单,用于他当天的盛大开业。Arlene 想将 30 台优质机器中的 20 台分配给 Jake's,只将 10 台分配给 Gold's Gym,至少有两个原因:首先,因为她认为至少有一个满意的客户比 o 客户更好;其次,因为她从业内朋友那里听说 Jake's 将很快在当地开设更多特许经营店,她很乐意为这些特许经营店提供机器。Arlene 能否证明她提议的分配是合理的?《美国法典》第 2-615(b) 条。
ANSWER: Can Arlene justify her proposed allocation? She cannot because if you look at the standard of allocation given in 2-615(b): it is that the seller may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable, and then 2-615(b) goes on to say the seller “must allocate production and delivery among its customer, but may as an option include regular customers not been under contract as well as its own requirements for further manufacture.” So, it would seem based on that standard that Arlene should have to come up with a better reason than pure self-interest for justifying a deviation from a pro-rata allocation in a case like this. A pro-rate allocation would look at the 60 machines and we now have thirty. So everybody would get 50%. Gold’s gym would get 20 of 40 machines and Heavy Metal gets 10 of 20 machines. That would seem to be the starting point. 20615(b) does provide two specific situations in which the seller can look out for interests that are not immediate interests. That is the right of the seller to include regular customers not been under contract and a right of the seller to include his own requirements for further manufacture. Arlene’s reasons for her proposed allocation do not fit either of those cases. So, one could argue that her long term motivations should be considered as acceptable for basis of deviating from a straight pro-rata distribution between Gold’s Gym and Jake’s Gym here.
回答:Arlene 能否证明她提议的分配是合理的? 她不能,因为如果你看一下 2-615(b) 中给出的分配标准: 卖方可以以任何公平合理的方式进行分配,然后 2-615(b) 继续说,卖方“必须在其客户之间分配生产和交付,但可以作为一种选择包括未签订合同的老客户以及其自身对进一步生产的要求。因此,根据这个标准,Arlene 似乎必须提出一个比纯粹的自身利益更好的理由来证明在这样的情况下偏离按比例分配的合理性。按比例分配将查看 60 台计算机,我们现在有 30 台计算机。 所以每个人都会得到 50%。Gold 的健身房将获得 40 台机器中的 20 台,而 Heavy Metal 将获得 20 台机器中的 10 台。这似乎是起点。20615(b) 确实提供了两种具体情况,在这种情况下,卖方可以关注非直接利益的利益。这是卖方包括未签订合同的老客户的权利,也是卖方包括他自己对进一步制造的要求的权利。Arlene 提议分配的理由与这两种情况都不符。因此,有人可能会争辩说,她的长期动机应该被认为是可以接受的,因为她偏离了 Gold's Gym 和 Jake's Gym 之间的直接按比例分配。
Problem 14.2(d) Same facts as part (c), except Arlene chooses to allocate the good machines in a pro rata fashion: Jake’s get 10 and Gold’s Gym gets 20. When Arlene gives Gold’s Gym notice of the problem and of Gold’s share of the good machines, Cory Haney of Gold’s says, “We’ll take the 20 you have for us right now, and we’ll just wait to take the remaining 20 whenever you can make some new ones for us. We don’t want to lose that great price we got.” Arlene has to admit that she did undersell herself when she originally made the contract with Gold’s; Arlene’s strong preference would be to give Cory her fair allocation of the 20 machines and be finished for good with the Gold’s contract. May Arlene condition her allocation of 20 machines to Gold’s on Gold’s agreement to forget the rest of the contract? U.C.C. §§2-615, 2-616(1). Would our answer change if this contract were governed by the CISG? C.I.S.G. Art. 79.
问题 14.2(d) 与第 (c) 部分的事实相同,只是 Arlene 选择按比例分配好的机器:Jake 得到 10 个,Gold 的 Gym 得到 20 个。当 Arlene 向 Gold's Gym 报告问题以及 Gold 在优质机器中的份额时,Gold's 的 Cory Haney 说:“我们现在会拿走您给我们的 20 台,只要您能为我们制造一些新的机器,我们就会等着收走剩下的 20 台。我们不想失去我们得到的那个高价。Arlene 不得不承认,当她最初与 Gold's 签订合同时,她确实低估了自己;Arlene 的强烈偏好是将 20 台机器的公平分配给 Cory,并永远结束 Gold 的合同。Arlene 是否可以以 Gold 的协议为条件,将她分配给 Gold 的 20 台机器作为忘记合同其余部分的条件?《美国法典》第 2-615 条、第 2-616(1) 条。如果这份合同受 CISG 管辖,我们的答案会改变吗?C.I.S.G. 第 79 条。
ANSWER: May Arlene the seller condition her allocation for the 20 machines to Gold on Gold’s agreeing to forget about the rest of the contract once they get the 20 machines? The UCC does not speak directly to this issue of whether Arlene could escape the remainder of her contract obligation with Gold’s Gym in a case where Gold is insisting that they want to wait for the remaining machines under the contract. If you read 2-615(a), (b), and (c) along with 2-616(1), you cannot find for a buyer like Gold’s a specific right to insist on eventual complete delivery in a case like this. If you look at 2-615(a), it refers to a seller’s excuse for delaying delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part. If you look at 2-615(b), it outlines the seller’s duty to allocate in a case where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) only affect a part of the seller’s capacity to perform. So there is no mention in 2-615(b) of a seller’s duty to deliver in full, albeit, with a delay in a case where the seller’s immediate obligation to deliver all of the goods have been excused. §2-615(c) creates this duty for the seller to notify the buyer of a delay or non-delivery. And 2-616(1) says after receiving such a notice, a buyer may do one of two things: first, terminate the contract or modify the contract by agreeing to take this available quota in substitution. Note that 2-616(1) does not expressly offer the option to the buyer to “wait patiently until the seller is able to deliver the goods promised at the price promised.” Can you argue that a buyer in a case like this should have the right to insist for complete delivery at the contract price as long as the buyer is willing to wait however long it takes the seller to fulfill the buyer’s entire order under the contract? According to Keating, despite the lack of reference in the statute to such a right, the buyer ought to have such a right because otherwise the seller like Heavy Metal can sometimes avoid having to follow through with a disadvantage contract simply by having the excuse for not being able to deliver all of the goods on time. Put another way, if the seller is going to be allowed an excuse for nonperformance, the seller should not have the power to defy the consequences of that excuse, namely complete or partial delivery vs. merely a delay.
回答:卖家 Arlene 是否可以将她对 20 台机器的分配作为条件,以 Gold on Gold 同意在获得 20 台机器后忘记合同的其余部分?UCC 没有直接谈到这个问题,即在 Gold 坚持要等待合同规定的剩余机器的情况下,Arlene 是否可以逃避她与 Gold's Gym 的剩余合同义务。如果您将 2-615(a)、(b) 和 (c) 与 2-616(1) 一起阅读,您将无法为像 Gold 这样的买家找到在这种情况下坚持最终完全交付的特定权利。如果您查看 2-615(a),它指的是卖家延迟交货或全部或部分未交货的借口。如果您查看 2-615(b),它概述了在 (a) 段中提到的原因仅影响卖方履行部分能力的情况下,卖方的分配义务。 因此 ,2-615(b) 中没有提到卖方有全额交付的义务,尽管在卖方交付所有货物的直接义务已被免除的情况下,会延迟交付。§2-615(c) 规定卖方有义务通知买方延迟或未交货。2-616(1) 表示,在收到此类通知后,买方可以做以下两件事之一:首先,终止合同或通过同意以此可用配额作为替代来修改合同。 请注意,2-616(1) 并未明确为买方提供“耐心等待,直到卖方能够以承诺的价格交付承诺的货物”的选项。 您能否说,在这种情况下,只要 买方愿意等待,无论卖方根据合同履行买方的全部订单需要多长时间 ,买方都应该有权坚持以合同价格完成全部交货? 根据 Keating 的说法,尽管法规中没有提及这种权利,但买方应该拥有这种权利,因为否则像 Heavy Metal 这样的卖方有时可以仅仅以无法按时交付所有货物为借口来避免履行不利合同 。换句话说,如果允许卖方以不履约为借口,则卖方不应有权无视该借口的后果,即完全或部分交货,而不仅仅是延迟交货。
Even if Heavy Metal is forced to deliver the rest of the machines later on to Gold at the contract price, Heavy Metal still gets the benefit from 2-615. How is that? When Heavy Metal final delivers the remaining machines, Gold’s Gym will not have a right to sue Heavy Metal for any damages caused by the delay. In the absence of an excuse under 2-615, Gold would have right to those damages due to the delay.
即使 Heavy Metal 被迫稍后以合同价格将其余的机器交付 给 Gold,Heavy Metal 仍然可以从 2-615 中受益。怎么样?当 Heavy Metal 最终交付剩余的机器时,Gold's Gym 无权起诉 Heavy Metal 因延误造成的任何损失。在没有 2-615 规定的辩解的情况下,Gold 有权要求因延误而造成的损害赔偿。
The CISG seem to address this issue more directly than the UCC. Article 79(3) provides that the exemption provided by this article have effect during the period the impediment exists. So, if Gold’s Gym is willing to wait for delivery past the period which the impediment exist, Arlene the seller would have no basis for an excuse as to her obligation to eventually deliver the remainder of her contractual obligated number of machines to Gold’s Gym.
CISG 似乎比 UCC 更直接地解决了这个问题。第 79 条第 (3) 款规定,本条规定的豁免在障碍存在期间有效。因此,如果 Gold's Gym 愿意等待在存在障碍的期限之后交货,那么卖方 Arlene 将没有理由证明她有义务最终将合同义务数量的剩余机器交付给 Gold's Gym。
Problem 14.3 The president of Golden Dairy, Ben Able, comes to your office to discuss a long-term supply contract that he is negotiating with a new retirement center. The directors of the retirement center would like to enter into a five-year deal in which Golden Diary supplies all of the milk for the center’s cafeteria. The center would very much like to negotiate a set price for the milk, even if that fixed price increases during each of the five years of the contract. Ben is not averse to that approach, but he is concerned about his dairy’s exposure if there is a significant milk shortage during the five-year contract period. Ben would like to suggest some ways in which the contract could give price certainty to the retirement center, but still limit the dairy’s risk in the event that milk prices go through the ceiling. In light of Ben’s stated desire, consider the following three possibilities: (1) completely fixed pricing, (2) completely variable pricing that ties the price to some objective market measure, and (3) variable pricing with specific price floors or ceilings. Which option would you recommend? Are there other options you can think of? Official Comments 4 and 8 to §2-615.
问题 14.3 Golden Dairy 的总裁 Ben Able 来到您的办公室,讨论他正在与新的退休中心谈判的长期供应合同。退休中心的董事们希望签订一项为期五年的协议,由 Golden Diary 为中心的自助餐厅提供所有牛奶。该中心非常愿意为牛奶协商一个固定价格,即使这个固定价格在合同的五年中每年都会上涨。Ben 并不反对这种方法,但他担心如果在五年合同期内出现严重的牛奶短缺,他的乳制品厂会面临风险。Ben 想提出一些方法,使合同可以赋予退休中心价格确定性,但在牛奶价格突破上限的情况下,仍然可以限制乳制品厂的风险 。 根据 Ben 所陈述的愿望,考虑以下三种可能性:(1) 完全固定的定价,(2) 将价格与某种客观的市场衡量标准挂钩的完全可变定价,以及 (3) 具有特定价格下限或上限的可变定价。您会推荐哪个选项?您能想到其他选择吗?§2-615 的官方评论 4 和 8。
ANSWER: Consider the following possibilities. (1) Completely fixed pricing meets the buyer’s desire for price certainty. What about the seller’s risk of an unexpected jump in future milk prices? Put another way, if milk prices skyrocket under this approach, would the dairy be able to claim excuse? The dairy probably would not be able to claim excuse because if you look at Comment 4 to 2-615, it does not give much encouragement generally to the notion of a price increase as a basis for excuse (it would have to be an extreme set of circumstances). (2) Completely variable pricing that ties the price to some objective market measure, does that work for what the two parties want? It would reduce all of the seller’s risk on pricing, but it would not meet the stated objective of the buyer, which wants price certainty. (3) Variable pricing with specific price floors or ceilings, for example the milk contractor might say that the original price of milk for two dollar per gallon can be increased to three dollars per gallon if the seller can show if the seller can show certain cost increases. That at least caps the buyer’s price exposures but what about the seller’s? What if it turns out that the seller needed to charge $5 more per gallon just to break even, would the seller be stuck with the loss or could the seller claim excuse? It is unlikely that the seller can claim excuse in that case. So, what else is there? How about variable pricing with the possibility of the buyer opting out when the price hits a certain ceiling? In another words, the seller doing a cost-plus deal by saying I will sell for my cost plus certain amount. And then the buyer can get some price certainty by defining an opt-out ceiling. That option might satisfy both sides.
答案: 考虑以下可能性。(1) 完全固定的定价满足买方对价格确定性的渴望。卖方未来牛奶价格意外上涨的风险怎么办?换句话说,如果牛奶价格在这种方法下飙升,乳品厂能找借口吗?乳品厂可能无法声称有借口,因为如果你看一下评论 4 到 2-615,它通常不会对将涨价作为借口基础的概念给予太多鼓励(这必须是一组极端的情况)。(2) 完全可变的定价,将价格与某种客观的市场衡量标准挂钩 ,这是否符合双方的需求?这将降低卖方的所有定价风险,但它无法满足买方的既定目标,买方希望获得价格确定性。(3) 具有特定价格下限或上限的可变定价 ,例如,如果卖家可以证明卖家是否可以证明某些成本增加,牛奶的原价可以提高到每加仑 2 美元 3 美元。这至少限制了买方的价格风险,但卖方的价格风险呢 ?如果事实证明卖方需要每加仑多收取 5 美元才能收支平衡,卖家会陷入亏损困境还是卖家可以辩解呢?在这种情况下,卖方不太可能要求借口。那么,还有什么呢?当价格达到某个上限时,买方有可能选择退出的可变定价怎么样?换句话说,卖家进行成本加成交易,说我将以我的成本加一定金额出售。 然后,买方可以通过定义选择退出上限来获得一些价格确定性。这个选项可能会让双方都满意。
THE TITLE WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 279
商品销售标题 第 279 页
16.1. a. Your law firm has a new client, Pierre LaClede, who owns an art and framing gallery in the trendy part of town. As the firm’s UCC expert, you end up getting to counsel Pierre. He first confides to you that he really dislikes lawyers, but his shop has been having so many problems with title issues lately that he had no choice but to seek legal advice in order to sort things out. The first situation Pierre asks you about involves his gallery’s recent sale of a $70,000 abstract painting entitled Pain. The painting was purchased by a man who identified himself only as “the Critic” and who paid for Pain with a suitcase containing 700 $100 bills. The problem is, the bills turned out to be counterfeit and “the Critic” is nowhere to be found. Pierre did, however, discover Pain at Lucy’s, a competitor gallery down the street. Lucy Fenton, the owner of that gallery, said that she had purchased the paining for $20,000 from a stranger who called himself “the Critic”. Pierre wants to know whether he should be able to recover the painting from Lucy’s. What is your advice? U.C.C. §§2-403(1), 1-201(b)(20) (formerly §1-201(19)), 1-204 (formerly 1-201(44)).
16.1. 一个。您的律师事务所有一位新客户 Pierre LaClede,他在镇上的时尚区拥有一家艺术和装裱画廊。作为公司的 UCC 专家,您最终可以聘请 Pierre 的法律顾问。他首先向你吐露,他真的很不喜欢律师,但他的店最近在产权问题上遇到了很多问题,他别无选择,只能寻求法律建议来解决问题。Pierre 问你的第一种情况是他的画廊最近售出了一幅价值 70,000 美元的抽象画,题为 《痛苦 》。这幅画是由一个自称是“ 批评家 ” 的人买下的,他用一个装有 700 张 100 美元钞票的手提箱为 《痛苦 》支付了费用 。问题是 , 这些钞票被证明是假的,而 《 批评家 》 无处可寻。然而,皮埃尔确实在街上的竞争对手画廊 Lucy's 发现了 Pain。该画廊的老板露西·芬顿(Lucy Fenton)说,她以 2 万美元的价格从一个自称“评论家”的陌生人那里买下了这幅画 。皮埃尔想知道他是否应该能够从露西那里找回这幅画 。你有什么建议?加州大学 §§2-403(1)、1-201(b)(20)(原 §1-201(19))、1-204(原 1-201(44))。
When the Critic bought the painting with counterfeit money, the Critic has voidable title to the painting under §2-403(1)(d) since it is a fraud. Then, under 2-403(1), the Critic has the power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value. Here the unusual situation arises where the transferee has superior title than the transferor. Lucy qualifies as a good faith purchaser for value under §1-201(b)(20), which applies an objective test for good faith. As such, Lucy wins in the title battle over Pierre. Although both Pierre and Lucy are innocent parties, Pierre is more blameworthy, since Pierre is in a better position to exercise caution when he dealt with the Critic not to get tricked in the first place. Thus Pierre can only recover from the Critic under common law conversion, fraud and restitution.
当评论家用假币购买这幅画时,评论家根据 §2-403(1)(d) 对这幅画拥有可撤销的所有权,因为它是欺诈行为。然后,根据 2-403(1) 的规定,批评者有权将良好的所有权转让给善意的购买者以获取价值。 这里出现了不寻常的情况,即受让人拥有比转让人更高的所有权。 根据 §1-201(b)(20) 的规定,Lucy 有资格成为善意购买者 ,该条款对善意进行了客观测试。因此,露西在与皮埃尔的冠军争夺战中获胜。虽然皮埃尔和露西都是无辜的一方,但皮埃尔更应该受到指责,因为皮埃尔在与批评家打交道时更能谨慎行事 ,以免一开始就被欺骗。 因此 ,皮埃尔只能根据普通法转换、欺诈和赔偿从批评者那里获得赔偿。
Variation: If the Critic stole the painting from Pierre, and then sold the painting to Lucy for value. Then both the Critic and Lucy would have void title. In this variation, the Critic, as a true thief, breaks the chain of title. And everyone after the true thief gets void title to the stolen goods. However, if the owner only gets tricked and voluntarily gives up ownership right, then the trickster gets voidable right, and the good faith purchaser who bought the stolen goods for value from the trickster would get good title to the stolen good under §2-403(1).
变化:如果评论家从皮埃尔那里偷走了这幅画,然后将这幅画卖给了露西以换取价值。那么 Critic 和 Lucy 都将拥有无效的头衔。在这种变体中,评论家作为一个真正的小偷,打破了标题的链条。而真正的小偷之后的每个人都获得了赃物的无效所有权。但是,如果所有者只是被欺骗并自愿放弃所有权,那么骗子将获得可撤销的权利,而从骗子那里以有价购买赃物的善意购买者将根据 §2-403(1) 获得对赃物的良好所有权。
b. Same facts as part (a), except instead of selling Pain to “the Critic”, Pierre lends the painting to a friend who is not an art dealer, and the friend later sells the painting to Lucy. Under this scenario could Pierre recover the painting from Lucy? U.C.C. §2-403(1).
b. 与(a)部分相同的事实,只是皮埃尔没有将 《痛苦 》卖给 “ 批评家 ”,而是将这幅画借给了一位不是艺术品经销商的朋友,而这位朋友后来又把这幅画卖给了露西。在这种情况下,皮埃尔能从露西那里找回这幅画吗?加州大学 §2-403(1) 条。
When Pierre lends the painting to the friend, the friend has neither good title nor voidable title, because §2-403(1) requires goods to be delivered in a transaction of purchase. §1-201(b)(29) defines “purchase” as “…or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property”. Here when Pierre lends the painting to the friend, the friend acquired a possessory interest in the painting, so this may qualify as a transaction of purchase. The distinction of this problem to part (a) is, in part (a), when Pierre sold the painting to the Critic, Pierre intended to transfer full ownership interest to the Critic, whereas here, when Pierre lends the painting to the friend, Pierre only intended to give the friend a temporary possessory interest. §2-403(1) says “A purchaser of a limited interest acquires right only to the extent of interest purchased.” Even though the lending of the painting from Pierre to the friend may qualify as a transaction of purchase under the broad definition of purchase under §1-201(b)(29), Pierre did not voluntarily give the friend ownership right, but only right to temporary possession. And that’s all the friend can give to Lucy when he sold the painting to Lucy. The friend cannot give full ownership interest in the painting to Lucy, because he does not have full ownership interest in the painting himself. Therefore in this problem Pierre should defeat Lucy in the title battle.
当皮埃尔将画作借给朋友时,这位朋友既没有好的所有权,也没有可撤销的所有权,因为 §2-403(1) 要求在购买交易中交付货物。 §1-201(b)(29) 将 “ 购买 ” 定义为 “...... 或任何其他产生财产权益的自愿交易 ”。 在这里,当皮埃尔将画作借给朋友时,这位朋友获得了这幅画的所有权,因此这可能符合购买交易的条件。这个问题与(a)部分的区别在于,在(a)部分,当皮埃尔将画作卖给评论家时,皮埃尔打算将全部所有权权益转让给评论家,而在这里,当皮埃尔将画作借给朋友时,皮埃尔只打算给朋友暂时的占有权益。§2-403(1) 规定 “ 有限权益的购买者仅在所购买权益的范围内获得权利。“ 尽管根据 §1-201(b)(29) 中广义的购买定义,皮埃尔将画作借给朋友可能符合购买交易的条件 ,但皮埃尔并没有自愿给予朋友所有权,而只是暂时占有的权利。这就是这位朋友在将这幅画卖给 Lucy 时所能给予 Lucy 的全部。这位朋友不能将这幅画的全部所有权权益交给 Lucy,因为他自己对这幅画没有完全的所有权权益。 所以在这个问题上,皮埃尔应该在冠军争夺战中击败露西。
16.2 a. Pierre’s next question deals with a $40,000 painting (with frame) entitled Peace. Pierre had bought and then custom-framed that painting himself, and Lucy from down the street had asked Pierre to bring Peace by her shop so that she could look at the frame job. Pierre did as Lucy requested, but later that same day one of Lucy’s clerk mistakenly sold Peace to Frank Baebler, a new customer, for just $30,000 (reflecting Lucy’s customary 25 percent “new customer” discount). Frank paid for the painting with a personal check that was later returned for insufficient funds, but he said that this was just an oversight and that he would be happy to make good on that check with a $30,000 cashier’s check. Before Frank makes good on that check, however, Pierre discovers the problem and demands that Frank return the painting. Should Pierre be able to get it? U.C.C. §§2-403(1), 2-403(2), 2-403(3), 1-201(b)(9) (formerly §1-201(9)), 1-204 (formerly §1-201(44)).
16.2 a. 皮埃尔的下一个问题是关于一幅价值 40,000 美元的画作(带框),题为 《和平 》。皮埃尔买下了这幅画,然后自己定制了装裱,街对面的露西请皮埃尔把和平带到她的店里,这样她就可以看看装裱工作了。皮埃尔按照露西的要求做了,但当天晚些时候,露西的一名店员错误地将 Peace 卖给了新客户弗兰克 · 巴布勒 ,价格仅为 30,000 美元(反映了露西惯常的 25% 的“ 新客户 ” 折扣)。弗兰克用一张个人支票支付了这幅画的费用,后来由于资金不足而被退回,但他表示这只是一个疏忽,他很乐意用一张 30,000 美元的银行本票来偿还那张支票 。然而,在弗兰克还清那张支票之前,皮埃尔发现了问题所在,并要求弗兰克归还这幅画。皮埃尔应该能得到它吗?加州大学 §§2-403(1)、2-403(2)、2-403(3)、1-201(b)(9)(原 §1-201(9))、1-204(原 §1-201(44))。
Under §2-403(3), when Pierre left the painting to Lucy, he entrusted the painting to her. As such, the entrustee who is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind has power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business under §2-403(2). Thus Lucy gets good title to the painting from Pierre. Subsequently, Lucy’s power to give good title comes from §2-403(2) & (3) not §2-403(1). If Frank qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, then he would get good title in the painting from Lucy under §2-403(2). Under §1-201(b)(9), a buyer in the ordinary course of business means “a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind.” The distinction between a good faith purchaser for value and a buyer in the ordinary course of business is the latter must have purchased the goods from person in the business of selling goods of that kind, whereas the former doesn’t have to buy from someone in the business of selling goods of that kind. Before Frank makes good on the check, all he did was paying with a bad check. §1-201(b)(9) says “A buyer in ordinary course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on secured or unsecured credit.” However, paying with a bad check is not the equivalent as paying of unsecured credit, since it does not involve the extension of credit on the seller’s part at the time of contract formation. Moreover, §2-511(3) says “Payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment.” Under these facts, Frank does not qualify for a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Especially considering 2-403(1)(b), Frank would have a voidable title in the painting since he paid with a bad check. As such, Pierre’s right as the true owner of the painting would trump Frank’s voidable title to the painting.
根据 §2-403(3),当皮埃尔将这幅画留给露西时,他将这幅画托付给了她。因此, 作为经营此类商品的商人的受托人有权根据 §2-403(2) 在正常业务过程中将委托人的所有权利转让给买方。 因此 ,露西从皮埃尔那里得到了这幅画的好标题。随后,露西给予良好所有权的权力来自 §2-403(2)和(3),而不是 §2-403(1)。如果弗兰克在正常业务过程中有资格成为买家,那么他将根据 §2-403(2) 从 Lucy 那里获得画作的良好所有权。根据 §1-201(b)(9),正常业务过程中的买方是指 “在不知道销售侵犯他人对商品的权利的情况下,以及在正常情况下从典当商以外的人处购买商品的人,在销售此类商品的业务中。 善意的有价购买者和在正常业务过程中的买方之间的区别在于,后者必须从销售该类商品的人那里购买商品,而前者不必从从事该类商品销售业务的人那里购买。 在 Frank 还清支票之前,他所做的只是用一张空头支票付款。 §1-201(b)(9) 规定 “买方在正常业务过程中可以以现金、交换其他财产或有担保或无担保信用购买 ” 然而,用空头支票付款并不等同于支付无担保信用,因为它不涉及卖方在合同订立时提供信贷。此外,§2-511(3) 说 “ 支票支付是有条件的,并且在当事人之间因不兑现按时出示的支票而被击败。 根据这些事实,Frank 在正常业务过程中没有资格成为买家。特别是考虑到 2-403(1)(b),弗兰克在画中将有一个可撤销的头衔,因为他用空头支票支付。因此,皮埃尔作为这幅画的真正所有者的权利将胜过弗兰克对这幅画的可撤销所有权。
b. Same facts as part (a), except Frank quickly gives Lucy the cashier’s check for $30,000 after Pierre demands the painting back but before Pierre actually takes the painting from Frank. Should Pierre be able to get it? U.C.C. §2-403.
b. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是在皮埃尔要求归还这幅画之后,但在皮埃尔真正从弗兰克手中拿走这幅画之前,弗兰克很快就把 30,000 美元的银行本票给了露西。皮埃尔应该能得到它吗?加州大学 §2-403.
Now even though Frank gives value, he still does not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business. The speed with which Frank produced the cashier’s check when the title issue is still in controversy looks suspicious and makes Frank fail to meet the good faith requirement to qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, since he already has knowledge that the painting belongs to Pierre when Frank makes the payment. In addition, Pierre could argue that the validity of Frank’s title in the painting ought to be measured from the point when Pierre made an issue of it. So Frank’s rights against Pierre should be frozen at the time when Pierre demands the painting back. And no later production of good funds by Frank should be able to change things.
现在,即使 Frank 提供了价值,他仍然没有资格在正常业务过程中成为买家。当所有权问题仍然存在争议时,弗兰克制作银行本票的速度看起来很可疑,这使得弗兰克未能满足在正常业务过程中获得买家资格的诚信要求,因为他已经知道这幅画在弗兰克付款时属于皮埃尔。此外,皮埃尔可以争辩说,弗兰克在画中的标题的有效性应该从皮埃尔提出问题时开始衡量。 因此 , 弗兰克对皮埃尔的权利应该在皮埃尔要求归还这幅画时被冻结。弗兰克后来制作的良好基金应该能够改变事情。
c. Same facts as part (a), except Frank quickly gives Lucy the cashier’s check for $30,000 before Pierre even demands the painting from him. Now should Pierre be able to retrieve the painting from Frank? U.C.C. §2-403.
c. 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是弗兰克在皮埃尔要求他画画之前迅速将 30,000 美元的银行本票给了露西。现在皮埃尔应该能从弗兰克那里取回这幅画吗? 加州大学 §2-403.
Under §2-403(2), now it seems Frank qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, since Frank did not have knowledge of the title controversy when he made payment. As such, since Frank is buying from the entrustee, Frank gets good title in the painting.
根据 §2-403(2),现在看来 Frank 在正常业务过程中有资格成为买家,因为 Frank 在付款时并不了解所有权争议。因此,由于弗兰克是从受托人那里购买的 ,因此弗兰克在画中获得了很好的所有权。
d. Same facts as part (a), except Frank never gives Lucy a bad check but instead a cashier’s check from the beginning. Now should Pierre be able to retrieve the painting from Frank? U.C.C. §2-403.
d. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Frank 从一开始就没有给 Lucy 一张空头支票,而是一张银行本票 。现在皮埃尔应该能从弗兰克那里取回这幅画吗? 加州大学 §2-403.
Now Frank wins under §2-403(2) as a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
现在,Frank 在正常业务过程中作为买方根据 §2-403(2) 获胜。
e. Same facts as part (a). What rights does Pierre have against Lucy, assuming that Pierre cannot recover the painting from Frank? U.C.C. §1-103.
e. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实。 假设皮埃尔无法从弗兰克那里取回这幅画 ,皮埃尔对露西有什么权利?加州大学 §1-103.
Under §1-103, Pierre can bring a conversion action under the common law against Lucy.
根据 §1-103,Pierre 可以根据普通法对 Lucy 提起转换诉讼。
Problem 16.3(a) The next painting Pierre wants to discuss is Rustic Simplicity, a $50,000 impressionistic work by a hot new artist. Here is what Pierre tells you about the whereabouts of Rustic Simplicity: Pierre sold that painting to George Daly, who purchased it with a bad check. George then sold it for $40,000 cash to George’s family friend, Carla Stone. Carla in turn gave Rustic Simplicity to George Daly, Jr. as a birthday gift. George Jr., who is 23, still lives with George Sr. and is aware that his dad never made a good on the bounced check to Pierre. Does Pierre have recovery rights against just one Daly or against both of them? U.C.C. §§2-403(1), 1-201(b)(29), 1-201(b)(20).
问题 16.3(a) 皮埃尔想讨论的下一幅画是 Rustic Simplicity,这是一幅由炙手可热的新晋艺术家创作的 50,000 美元的印象派作品。以下是皮埃尔告诉你的关于 《质朴的朴素》 的下落 :皮埃尔将那幅画卖给了乔治·戴利,后者用空头支票买下了这幅画。然后,George 以 40,000 美元现金的价格将其卖给了 George 的家庭朋友 Carla Stone。Carla 反过来将 Rustic Simplicity 作为生日礼物送给了 George Daly, Jr.。23 岁的小乔治仍然与老乔治住在一起,他知道他爸爸从未在给皮埃尔的跳票上赚到好钱。皮埃尔是否仅对一个戴利或两个戴利都有追偿权 ?《美国法典》第 2-403(1)、1-201(b)(29)、1-201(b)(20) 条。
ANSWER: the transfer from Pierre to George, Sr., when Pierre sold the painting to George, Sr. for a bad check, what kind of title did George, Sr. get? Voidable title, 2-403(1)(b) mentions the delivery being an exchange for a check, which is later dishonored. The next transfer, when Carla bought the painting from George, Sr. for $40k cash and assuming she was a good faith purchaser for value, what did Carla receive? Good title under 2-403(1)(b)’s second sentence says a person with voidable title can transfer good title. Then to the next transfer, what does George, Jr. as Carla’s donee? Since Carla has good title, she has the power to give good title to the donee. How do we know that? 1-201(b)(29)’s definition of purchase includes taking by gift and 2-403(1)’s first sentence says if the donor has good title, then the recipient gets good title. The first sentence applies to party who buys and parties who receives gifts. Another reason why we know a purchaser of an item could be someone who did not give value by looking at 2-403(1), the logic uses the term purchaser in the first sentence and uses it again in the second sentence; but there is a modifier “for value.” If purchase meant you had to buy it, then why did they have to say a purchaser for value, which would be redundant. That also tells that a mere gets to qualify for the benefits of the shelter rule under §2-403(1). As a policy matter, is it fair for George, Jr. to defeat Pierre’s title when George, Jr. knew about his dad not making good on the bad check? Put another way, does George Jr. have to be in good faith in order to inherit good title as a donee under the shelter principle? We have said already he does not have to give value to get the benefits of the shelter rule. Does he have to be in good faith to get the benefits of the shelter rule? From the language of 2-403(1) it does not look like it. They do not say in the first sentence of §2-403(1), “a good faith purchaser of goods acquires all title” it just says “a purchaser.” Now in this case, the mere fact that George, Jr. knows about his father’s bad check does not mean by itself that George, Jr. is necessarily not in good faith. If you can show that George, Jr. was part of some fraudulent scheme to try to wash the title clean using a scam, THEN not only could you say he was not in good faith, you could say he engaged in fraud and it would be a fraud action from Pierre that would overcome the shelter principle. In this case, just knowing about the bad check, if you think about how this implicates his good faith think about this fact: even if George, Jr. could say I cannot take this painting I know my dad bought it with a bad check. Does that help Pierre? Not particularly, Carla has good title anyways. Pierre has already lost. So at that point whether George, Jr. keeps the painting or not, Carla would keep it and Pierre would still loses.
回答: 当皮埃尔以空头支票将画卖给老乔治时,老乔治得到了什么样的头衔?可撤销的所有权,2-403(1)(b) 提到交付是支票的交换,后来被拒付。下一次转账,当 Carla 以 40 美元现金从 George, Sr. 那里买下这幅画时,假设她是一个善意的有价购买者,Carla 收到了什么?2-403(1)(b) 第二句下的 Good Title 说,拥有可撤销产权的人可以转让 Good Title。 然后到下一次转移,小乔治作为 Carla 的受赠人是什么 ? 由于 Carla 拥有良好的所有权,她有权为受赠人授予良好的所有权。我们怎么知道呢?1-201(b)(29) 对购买的定义包括赠与,而 2-403(1) 的第一句话说,如果捐赠者有好的所有权,那么接受者就会得到好的所有权。第一句话适用于购买方和接受礼物的方。我们知道物品购买者的另一个原因可能是通过查看 2-403(1) 没有赋予价值的人,逻辑在第一句中使用了 purchaser 一词,并在第二句中再次使用它;但是有一个修饰符 “for value”。如果购买意味着你必须购买它,那么为什么他们必须说有价值购买者,这将是多余的。这也表明,仅仅是有资格获得 §2-403(1) 下的庇护所规则的好处 。从政策角度来看,当小乔治知道他爸爸没有兑现空头支票时,小乔治击败皮埃尔的头衔是否公平?换句话说,小乔治是这样说的。 必须真诚才能 根据庇护原则继承作为受赠人的良好所有权 ? 我们已经说过,他不必付出价值来获得庇护所规则的好处。他是否必须真诚才能获得庇护所规则的好处? 从 2-403(1) 的语言来看,它看起来不像。他们没有在 §2-403(1) 的第一句中说“善意的商品购买者获得所有所有权”,它只是说 “购买者”。现在在这种情况下,小乔治知道他父亲的空头支票这一事实本身并不意味着小乔治一定没有诚意。如果你能证明 George, Jr. 参与了某个欺诈计划,试图通过骗局洗清头衔,那么你不仅可以说他没有善意, 还可以说他参与了欺诈,这将是 Pierre 的欺诈行为,将克服庇护原则。在这种情况下,仅仅知道空头支票,如果你想想这如何暗示他的善意,想想这个事实:即使小乔治可以说我不能拿这幅画,我知道我爸爸是用空头支票买的。这对 Pierre 有帮助吗?不是特别的,反正 Carla 有个不错的头衔。皮埃尔已经输了。 所以到那时,无论小乔治是否保留这幅画,卡拉都会保留它,而皮埃尔仍然会输。
Problem 16.3(b) Same facts as part (a), except that George Jr. was not only aware of George Sr.’s bounced check, but was party to a scam that was intended to “wash the title clean” of the Rustic Simplicity painting. Does Pierre have recovery rights against George Jr.? U.C.C. §1-103.
问题 16.3(b) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 George Jr. 不仅知道 George Sr. 的跳票,而且还参与了一场骗局,该骗局旨在“洗清”Rustic Simplicity 画作的标题。皮埃尔有针对小乔治的追偿权吗?《美国法典》第 1-103 条。
ANSWER: if you looked at 2-403 alone, you would not really find anything there to give Pierre recovery rights against George, Jr. to get those recovery rights Pierre would have to go outside of 2-403 to the common law of fraud which still applies under 1-103(b) in a case like this. Furthermore, if these were the facts and Carla was also a party to this fraud, then we could just look at 2-403 and say she never got good title under the voidable title rules because she was not in good faith.
回答: 如果你单独看 2-403,你不会真的在那里找到任何东西来赋予 Pierre 对 George, Jr. 的追偿权。为了获得这些追偿权,Pierre 将不得不超越 2-403 的欺诈普通法,该法仍然适用于在此类案件中根据 1-103(b) 的规定。此外,如果这些是事实,并且 Carla 也是这场欺诈的一方,那么我们可以只看 2-403 并说她从未在可撤销的所有权规则下获得好的所有权,因为她没有诚信。
Problem 16.3(c) Same facts as part (a), except that George Sr. purchased the painting with a bad check, he gave the painting to George Jr. for a birthday gift. Does Pierre have recovery rights against George Jr.? U.C.C. §2-403(1).
问题 16.3(c) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,除了 George Sr. 用空头支票购买了这幅画,他将这幅画送给了 George Jr. 作为生日礼物。皮埃尔有针对小乔治的追偿权吗?《美国法典》第 2-403(1) 条。
ANSWER: George Jr. got voidable title as well. George Jr. gets under the shelter principle whatever title his donor had. His donor in this case only had voidable title, so that’s all that he gets. George Jr. does not improve upon it because he is not a good faith purchaser for value here.
回答:George Jr. 也获得了可撤销的头衔。George Jr. 无论他的捐赠者拥有什么头衔,都受到庇护所原则的约束。在这种情况下,他的捐赠者只有可撤销的所有权,所以这就是他得到的全部。George Jr. 没有改进它,因为他在这里不是一个善意的价值购买者。
Problem 16.3(d) Same facts as part (a), except that George Sr. purchased the painting with a bad check, he gave the painting to George Jr. for a birthday gift. George Jr. then sold the painting for cash to Carla Stone, a bona fide purchaser for value. Does Pierre have recovery rights against Carla Stone? U.C.C. §2-403(1).
问题 16.3(d) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,除了老乔治用空头支票购买了这幅画,他将这幅画送给了小乔治作为生日礼物。小乔治随后将这幅画以现金卖给了卡拉·斯通 (Carla Stone),后者是一位真正的有价买家。皮埃尔有针对卡拉·斯通的追偿权吗?《美国法典》第 2-403(1) 条。
ANSWER: Carla is a good faith purchaser for value and George Jr. does have voidable title; therefore, Carla gets good title from George Jr. by virtue of George Jr. having voidable title and by virtue of Carla being a good faith purchaser for value.
回答:Carla 是有价的善意购买者,George Jr. 确实拥有可撤销的所有权;因此,Carla 凭借 George Jr. 拥有可撤销的所有权以及 Carla 是善意的有价购买者,从 George Jr. 那里获得了良好的所有权。
Problem 16.3(e) Same as facts as part (a), except that George Sr. steals the painting from Pierre rather than purchasing it with a bad check. George Sr. then sells it for cash to Carla Stone, a bona fide purchaser for value. Carla then sells the painting to George Jr., who pays for it with a bad check. Finally, George Jr. sells the painting Harvey Nichols, a bona fide purchaser for value. Does Pierre have recovery rights against Harvey? U.C.C. §2-403(1).
问题 16.3(e) 与事实 (a) 相同,只是老乔治从皮埃尔那里偷走了这幅画,而不是用空头支票买下它。然后,老乔治将其以现金出售给真正的有价买家卡拉·斯通 (Carla Stone)。然后,卡拉将这幅画卖给了小乔治,小乔治用空头支票支付了这幅画。最后,小乔治卖掉了哈维·尼科尔斯 (Harvey Nichols) 这幅画,他是一位真正的有价买家。皮埃尔有针对哈维的追偿权吗?《美国法典》第 2-403(1) 条。
ANSWER: when there is a thief, any subsequent transferor cannot transfer anything, they have void title (not even voidable title). The chain of title is broken. The language of 2-403(1) as it is applying this transfer from George Jr. to Harvey: Harvey says “okay, George Jr. walked with a bad check and anyone who buys with a bad check gets voidable title in the first sentence. And then the sentence in 2-403(1) says a person with a voidable title has power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value.” Harvey then says, “I am a good faith purchaser and I should get good title.” Isn’t that plain meaning? What do you think the code drafters really meant when they said what they said in the second sentence? 2-403(2) when they talk about the power of the merchant, they do not say that the merchant then has the power to transfer good title to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, instead the code drafters said the merchant has the power to transfer ALL RIGHTS of the entruster whatever those rights were. So maybe the better way to put that second sentence in 2-403(1) is a person with voidable title has the power to transfer good title whatever title their transferor had to a good faith purchaser for value. And if that is good title, then that is what their transferor gets; but if that was not good title, then they cannot turn void title into good title. Or the other way to look at it is to say they never had voidable title at all because all they had is void title and so we do not even get to that second sentence in 2-403(1).
回答: 当有小偷时,任何后续的转让人都不能转让任何东西,他们的所有权无效(甚至不是可撤销的所有权)。所有权链被打破了。2-403(1) 的语言,因为它应用了从 George Jr. 到 Harvey 的转移:Harvey 说“好吧,George Jr. 带着一张空头支票走了,任何用空头支票购买的人都会在第一句话中获得可撤销的所有权。然后 2-403(1) 中的句子说,拥有可撤销所有权的人有权将良好的所有权转让给善意的购买者以获取价值。Harvey 接着说:“我是一个善意的购买者 ,我应该获得好的所有权 。这不就是直白的意思吗? 你认为代码起草者说出他们在第二句话中所说的真正含义是什么? 2-403(2) 当他们谈到商人的权力时,他们并没有说商人有权在正常的业务过程中将良好的所有权转让给买方,相反,法典起草者说商人有权转让委托人的所有权利 ,无论这些权利是什么。因此,也许将第二句话放在 2-403(1) 中更好的方式是,拥有可撤销所有权的人有权将良好的所有权,无论他们的转让人拥有什么所有权,都转让给善意的购买者,以换取价值。如果这是一个好的头衔,那么这就是他们的转让人得到的;但是如果这不是一个好的标题,那么他们就不能把 void title 变成 Good title。或者另一种看待它的方式是说他们根本没有可撤销的所有权,因为他们所拥有的只是无效的所有权,所以我们甚至没有看到 2-403(1) 中的第二句话。
Who ends up stuck with the loss here? So, Pierre sues Harvey and gets the painting back. Harvey says now I am sitting with the loss and Harvey says that is okay because I can sue George Jr. on the theory of breach of warranty of title. That should a winner for Harvey. So, when it comes back to George Jr., he has his own problem because he gave a bad check and Carla maybe suing George Jr. for recovery on the bad check. If George Jr. has to pay Harvey for breach of warranty of good title, then George Jr. now has a defense in the suit on the bad check, namely he should not have to make good on the bad check because Carla did not give George Jr. the painting with good title. Then we go to Carla, who now has the bad check and has given up the painting. She is the one who is out and then Carla turns around to catch a thief. Usually, if you are the first one to take from a thief (or deal with a bad actor), you usually get stuck with the loss not because legally you should get stuck with the loss but because practically you cannot find the thief, or even if you can the thief usually don’t have the money. It comes down to figuring out who among the innocent party gets stuck with the loss. Just in Article 3 with forged checks, the loss will typically lie in a case like this with the first innocent party who dealt with the wrongdoer, or if the wrongdoer can be found and is solvent, obviously they should take the loss.
谁最终在这里遭受了损失? 所以,皮埃尔起诉哈维并拿回了这幅画。Harvey 说现在我坐视不理,Harvey 说没关系,因为我可以根据违反所有权保证的理论起诉 George Jr.。这应该是哈维的赢家。所以,当回到 George Jr. 时,他有自己的问题,因为他给了一张空头支票,而 Carla 可能会起诉 George Jr. 要求收回空头支票。如果 George Jr. 必须向哈维支付违反良好所有权保证的费用,那么小乔治现在在诉讼中对坏支票进行了辩护,即他不应该因为卡拉没有给小乔治那幅有良好所有权的画作而不得不偿还坏支票。然后我们去找 Carla,她现在有空头支票,已经放弃了这幅画。她是出去的人,然后 Carla 转身抓住了一个小偷。通常,如果你是第一个从小偷那里拿走钱的人(或与坏人打交道),你通常会陷入损失,不是因为从法律上讲你应该陷入损失,而是因为实际上你找不到小偷,或者即使你可以,小偷通常没有钱。归根结底,要弄清楚无辜的一方中谁会陷入损失。仅在第 3 条中使用伪造支票的情况下,损失通常在于与不法行为者打交道的第一方,或者如果可以找到不法行为者并且有偿付能力,显然他们应该承担损失。
Problem 16.4 Pierre’s next question has to do with a rare foreign painting knowns as La Cucaracha, which Pierre himself for $63,000 from a local art dealer. That sale was expressly agreed by the parties to be “as is.” It turns out that the dealer who sold to Pierre, Jules Locke, purchased the painting from the original owner, Mr. Delgado, with a $30, 000 check that bounced. Now Mr. Delgado has to Pierre’s insisting that Pierre give the painting back to him, or Mr. Delgado will sue Pierre for its return. Must Pierre relinquish La Cucaracha? Does Pierre have any recourse against Jules? How would you advise Pierre to disclaim the warranty of title if he ever wished to do so with a particular sale? U.C.C. §§2-403(1), 2-312(1), 2-312(2), 2-616(3); Official Comment 1 and 6 to §2-312; §2-607(5)(a).
问题 16.4 皮埃尔的下一个问题与一幅罕见的外国画作《La Cucaracha》有关 ,皮埃尔本人以 63,000 美元的价格从当地艺术品经销商那里买下了这幅画。该出售经双方明确同意“按原样”进行。事实证明,卖给皮埃尔的经销商朱尔斯·洛克 (Jules Locke) 从原主人德尔加多先生那里购买了这幅画,支票金额为 30, 000 美元,但支票跳票了。现在,德尔加多先生不得不在皮埃尔的坚持下,让皮埃尔把这幅画还给他,否则德尔加多先生就会起诉皮埃尔要求归还这幅画。皮埃尔必须放弃 La Cucaracha 吗?皮埃尔对朱尔斯有任何追索权吗?如果 Pierre 希望在某笔拍卖中放弃所有权保证,您会如何建议他放弃所有权保证?《美国法典》第 2-403(1)、2-312(1)、2-312(2)、2-616(3) 款;§2-312 的官方评论 1 和 6;§2-607(5)(a) 条。
ANSWER: Pierre bought the painting from Jules who had voidable title and he was a good faith purchaser for value, therefore, he should have good title against Mr. Delgado. But even still, Mr. Delgado is still going to be filing a lawsuit against Pierre for return of the painting. And so the question for Pierre is does he have any recourse against Jules with regard to the cost to Pierre of defending his lawsuit against Mr. Delgado? Does the “as is” disclaimer serve to disclaim the warranty of title? 2-312(2) requires in order to disclaim the title warranty, there needs to be specific language or circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in themselves. And then Official Comment 6 to 2-312 elaborates on 2-312(2) by specifically noting that the “as is” disclaimer that normally works to disclaim implied warranty under 2-316(3)(a) will not be enough to disclaim the warranty of title. So, is the warranty of title an express warranty or an implied warranty? An implied warranty because you assumed that you are buying the goods from somebody who is selling it with good title and the seller does not have to say anything and you do not even need to be a merchant with respect to goods of the kind with implied warranty of merchantability. Every seller makes this implied warranty of good title. And yet look at what Official Comment 6 to 2-312 says: “it should have said that the title warranty is an implied warranty, but the ‘as is’ disclaimer won’t effectively disclaim it.” However, official comment 6 to 2-312 does not say that. Instead it says “the title warranty ‘is not designated as an implied warranty’ and hence it is not subject to 2-316(3). That is crazy because it is an implied warranty and it’s just that the “as is” disclaimer won’t disclaim it like the “as is” disclaimer disclaims other implied warranties. So, in any event, it is an implied warranty, the warranty of title, it just cannot be disclaimed with an “as is” disclaimer. Given that this disclaimer is ineffective, what is the content of the title of warranty? What is it that you promise when you make the implied warranty of title according to 2-312(1)(a)? The tile is good and the transfer is rightful. Did Jules transfer good title to Pierre? Yes, even though Jules bought with a bad check. Pierre cannot say in a breach of warranty of title suit that Jules has breached 2-312(1)(a) because Jules gave good title. Since Jules did transfer good title, what can Pierre say to say that there is still a breach of warranty of title looking at 2-312(1)(a)? The second part of §2-312(1)(a) says that the transfer is rightful. When Jules transfers the painting to Pierre had he given the bad check, was that transfer rightful against Mr. Delgado who got the bad check but gave up a perfectly good painting? No, it was not rightful measured from the true owner Mr. Delgado. And if it was rightful Mr. Delgado should have no cause of action against Jules. And yet we know that Mr. Delgado does. So, it must not have been rightful. If there is a doubt about that, Official Comment 1 to 2-312 where it says “subsection 1 makes provision for buyer’s basic needs in respect to a title which he in good faith expects to acquire by its purchase namely that he received a good clean title transferred to him also in a RIGHTFUL manner so that he will not be exposed to a lawsuit in order to protect it.” So, this is a breach of implied warranty of title and Jules should compensate Pierre for it or Pierre should get damages from him for it. Those damages should include the attorney’s fees that he incurred in a lawsuit against Mr. Delgado because Jules caused that lawsuit due to his breach of the warranty of title as Jules transfer was not rightful and as a result exposed Pierre to lawsuit against Mr. Delgado.
回答: 皮埃尔从朱尔斯那里买下了这幅画,朱尔斯拥有可撤销的所有权,他是一个善意的有价购买者 , 因此,他应该对德尔加多先生有很好的所有权。但即便如此,德尔加多先生仍将对皮埃尔提起诉讼,要求归还这幅画。 因此 ,皮埃尔的问题是,他是否可以就皮埃尔为他与德尔加多先生的诉讼辩护的费用向朱尔斯追索权?“原样”免责声明是否用于否认所有权保证?2-312(2) 要求 , 为了放弃所有权保证,需要有特定的语言或情况,让买方有理由知道卖方本身并不主张所有权。然后 ,官方评论 6 至 2-312 详细阐述了 2-312(2), 特别指出通常用于否认 2-316(3)(a) 项下的默示保证的“原样”免责声明 不足以否认所有权保证。那么,所有权保证是明示保证还是默示保证?默示保证,因为您假设您是从具有良好所有权的人那里购买商品,卖家不必说什么,您甚至不需要成为具有默示适销性保证的商品类型的商人。每个卖家都对良好的所有权做出这种默示保证。然而,看看官方评论 6 到 2-312 是怎么说的:“它应该说标题保证是默示保证,但'原样'免责声明并不能有效地否认它。然而, 官方评论 6 到 2-312 并没有这么说。 相反 ,它说“标题保证'未被指定为默示保证',因此不受 2-316(3) 的约束。 这很疯狂,因为它是一个默示的保证,只是 “原样 ”的免责声明不会像 “原样 ”的免责声明否认其他默示保证那样否认它。因此,无论如何,这是一个默示的保证,所有权的保证,它不能用“原样”的免责声明来否认。鉴于本免责声明无效,保修标题的内容是什么?当您根据 2-312(1)(a) 做出所有权的默示保证时,您承诺了什么? 图块很好 ,转移是正确的。朱尔斯是否将好头衔转让给了皮埃尔?是的,即使 Jules 用空头支票买了。皮埃尔不能在违反产权保证诉讼中说 Jules 违反了 2-312(1)(a), 因为 Jules 给了很好的产权。既然 Jules 确实转让了良好的所有权,那么 Pierre 又能说什么说 2-312(1)(a) 仍然存在违反所有权保证的情况呢?§2-312(1)(a) 的第二部分说,转让是合法的。当儒勒把这幅画转让给皮埃尔时,他是否给了空头支票,那么这笔转让对德尔加多先生来说是正确的吗,他得到了空头支票,但放弃了一幅完美的画作?不,从真正的所有者 Delgado 先生那里衡量是不合理的。如果这是正当的,Delgado 先生不应该对 Jules 提起诉讼。但我们知道 Delgado 先生确实如此。所以,这一定是不对的。 如果对此有疑问, 官方评论 1 至 2-312 中写道 :“第 1 小节规定了买方对他真诚期望通过购买获得的所有权的基本需求,即他也以合法的方式收到了转让给他的良好干净的所有权,这样他就不会为了保护它而面临诉讼。因此,这违反了所有权的默示保证,Jules 应该赔偿 Pierre,或者 Pierre 应该因此从他那里获得赔偿。这些损害赔偿应包括他在对 Delgado 先生提起诉讼时产生的律师费,因为 Jules 因违反所有权保证而引起诉讼,因为 Jules 转让是不合法的,因此使 Pierre 面临对 Delgado 先生的诉讼。
Suppose that Jules had not used a bad check, but instead paid cash to Mr. Delgado. Then, some lunatic comes out of the blue and files a groundless lawsuit against Pierre claiming better title. Pierre successfully defends that lawsuit and incurred attorney’s fees in doing so. Now, does Jules have to reimburse Pierre for those attorney’s fees under a breach of warranty of title theory? Jules did not breach the warranty here. This third party came out of nowhere. Pierre has to have a theory, but the warranty of title was not breached because Jules gave good title and the transfer was rightful as Jules bought the painting with cash. There was nothing wrong with the title to this painting. Pierre has nobody to stick with this cost. If you look at Paragraph 3 to Official Comment 1 to 2-312, it says that the warranty of quiet possession has been abolished. That was a common law warranty that basically said that the party in Jules’ position is responsible for any and all lawsuit about title no matter how groundless. Now, in order to have a breach of warranty of title you have to show either that the titled delivered was not good or at least that the transfer was not rightful. Then the question is can we be strategic for Pierre and think about how we might use a different provision if this ever happens again? 2-607(5)(a)’s “vouching in,” Pierre can vouch in the party that he wants to hold responsible for the problem that he is trying to defend against. Here, Pierre would wants to hold Jules responsible, therefore he should vouch in Jules. How? Pierre should tell Jules about the lawsuit and explain to Jules that this notice should allow the seller to come in and defend the suit and if the seller does not do so, the seller will be bound in any action against the seller by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigation, the second litigation would be the lawsuit that Pierre is going to bring in against Jules if he loses this first one brought by the third party. What’s the thing that would be common? The issue would be the title and if in this third party lawsuit it’s found that the third party has better title, and that is a determination effect (a binding effect). Jules would be a collaterally estopped on that title issue because it was determined in the previous lawsuit and Jules chose not to come in and defend. In terms of Jules, how would he disclaim the warranty of title if he wishes to do so in a future sale? Because he tried the “as is” disclaimer and it did not work out for him. Jules should say “THE WARRANTY OF TITLE IS HEREBY DISCLAIMED.” That is very specific. No magic words, it is about specificity. Saying all implied warranty won’t do it.
假设 Jules 没有使用空头支票,而是向 Delgado 先生支付了现金。然后,一些疯子突然出现,对皮埃尔提起了毫无根据的诉讼,要求获得更好的所有权。Pierre 成功地为该诉讼辩护,并因此产生了律师费。现在,Jules 是否必须在违反所有权保证理论的情况下偿还 Pierre 的律师费?Jules 没有违反这里的保证。这个第三方凭空出现。皮埃尔必须有一个理论,但所有权保证并没有被违反,因为朱尔斯给了很好的所有权 ,而且转让是合法的,因为朱尔斯用现金买下了这幅画。这幅画的标题没有任何问题。Pierre 没有人可以坚持这个成本。如果您查看官方意见 1 至 2-312 的第 3 段,它说安静管有权的保证已被废除。这是一份普通法的保证,基本上是说,处于 Jules 位置的一方对任何和所有关于所有权的诉讼负责,无论多么毫无根据。现在, 为了违反所有权保证,您必须证明交付的所有权不好,或者至少转让不合法。那么问题是,我们能否对 Pierre 有战略意义,并考虑如果这种情况再次发生,我们该如何使用不同的条款?2-607(5)(a) 的“ 担保”,皮埃尔可以向他想追究的一方担保,对他试图捍卫的问题负责。在这里,皮埃尔想让朱尔斯负责,因此他应该为朱尔斯做担保。如何? 皮埃尔应该告诉朱尔斯关于诉讼的事情,并向朱尔斯解释说,该通知应允许卖方进来为诉讼辩护,如果卖方不这样做,卖方将受到买方对卖方的任何诉讼的约束,受两项诉讼共同的任何事实认定的约束。 第二场诉讼将是 Pierre 将对 Jules 提起的诉讼,如果他输掉了第三方提起的第一场诉讼。什么是常见的东西?问题在于所有权,如果在这场第三方诉讼中发现第三方拥有更好的所有权,这就是决定性效果(约束力)。Jules 将在该产权问题上被禁止反驳,因为这是在之前的诉讼中确定的,而 Jules 选择不进来辩护。就 Jules 而言,如果他希望在未来的销售中放弃所有权保证,他将如何否认所有权保证?因为他尝试了 “原样” 免责声明,但对他来说没有效果。Jules 应该说“特此否认所有权保证”。这是非常具体的。没有神奇的词语,这是关于具体性的。说所有默示保证是行不通的。
TITLE WITH LEASES, INTERNATIONAL SALES, AND REAL ESTATE PP. 291
标题与租赁、国际销售和房地产 第 291 页
17.1. a. Pierre, the art dealer from Problem Set 16, tells you that he feels especially embarrassed about his next problem, but he wants to try to make things right. A famous local art collector, Shelby Kostner, brought Pierre an original work, Caged Compassion, which she asked Pierre to frame for her. While the painting was still in Pierre’s gallery, one of his associates signed an agreement with the local museum in which the museum paid $10,000 for the right to display the painting during the next year. Pierre wants to know whether Shelby can get Caged Compassion back from the museum immediately. What do you advise? U.C.C. §§2-403(2), 2A-304(2), 2A-307(2); Official Comment 3 to §2A-304.
17.1. a. Pierre,问题集 16 中的艺术品经销商,告诉你他对下一个问题感到特别尴尬,但他想尝试把事情做好。当地著名的艺术收藏家谢尔比 · 科斯特纳 (Shelby Kostner) 为皮埃尔带来了一件原创作品《 笼中的同情 》, 她请皮埃尔为她装裱。当这幅画还在皮埃尔的画廊时,他的一位同事与当地博物馆签署了一项协议,博物馆支付了 10,000 美元,获得了明年展出这幅画的权利。皮埃尔想知道谢尔比是否可以立即从博物馆取回 Caged Compassion。您有什么建议?加州大学 §§2-403(2)、2A-304(2)、2A-307(2);§2A-304 的官方意见 3。
If Pierre can give good title to the museum in a sale under §2-403(2) entrustment doctrine which he clearly can, then why not also in a lease? After all, a lease represents a lesser ownership interest for the museum than what a buyer would get in a sale.
如果皮埃尔可以根据 §2-403(2) 委托原则在出售中赋予博物馆良好的所有权 ,而他显然可以这样做,那么为什么不也以租赁方式呢?毕竟,租约对博物馆的所有权利益 比买方在出售中获得的利益要小。
Does §2-403(2) apply in this problem?
§2-403(2) 是否适用于此问题?
§2-403(2) does not apply in this problem, because the museum, as a lessee, does not qualify as a “buyer in the ordinary course of business”. Note the difference in the UCC definitions between a “purchaser” under §1-201(b)(29) and a “buyer in the ordinary course of business” under §1-201(b)(9). The definition for a “purchaser” explicitly includes lessees. The definition for a “buyer in the ordinary course of business” does not include lessees in the ordinary course of business.
§2-403(2) 不适用于此问题,因为博物馆作为承租人,不符合 “ 正常业务过程中的买方 ” 的资格。 请注意 §1-201(b)(29) 中的 “ 买方 ” 与 § 1-201(b)(9) 下的 “ 正常业务过程中的买方 ”在 UCC 定义中的差异 。“ 购买者 ” 的定义明确包括承租人。“ 买方在日常业务过程中 ”的定义不包括在正常业务过程中的承租人。
Does §2A-304(2) apply in this problem?
§2A-304(2) 是否适用于此问题?
§2A-304 in general covers the case of a lessor who leases the same goods to two different lessees for the same lease period. §2A-304(1) says the general rule to sort out the relative rights of the two different lessees is the first in time. §2A-304(2) does not apply in this problem because this is not a case where we have a lessor trying to lease the same goods to two different lessees. The museum maybe a lessee in the ordinary course of business, but it is not a subsequent lessee.
§2A-304 通常涵盖出租人在同一租赁期内将相同货物出租给两个不同承租人的情况。 §2A-304(1) 规定 , 理清两个不同承租人相对权利的一般规则是第一个时间规则。 §2A-304(2) 不适用于此问题,因为这不是出租人试图将相同商品出租给两个不同的承租人的情况。博物馆在正常业务过程中可能是承租人,但它不是随后的承租人。
Does §2A-305(2) apply in this problem?
§2A-305(2) 是否适用于此问题?
§2A-305 in general covers the case of an initial lessee to a lease becomes a lessor and sub-leases to a sub-lessee. §2A-305(1) says the basic rule is that the initial lessee cannot give to the sub-lessee greater rights than he does in its own lease with the initial lessor. (Ex: If the initial lease term is for one year, the initial lessee cannot turn around and sub-lease it for five years). §2A-305(2) creates an exception to the basic rule in §2A-305(1). §2A-305(2) says unless the initial lessee happens to be a merchant who deals with goods in that kind. Then that would be an entrustment situation as it is broadly defined under §2-403(3) as any delivery of the goods no matter who condition was put on it. The initial lease would qualify as an entrustment. The rationale behind this exception is because the buyer that comes along and wants to buy the goods from the merchant dealing with goods of that kind, or the sub-lessee that comes along and wants to sub-lease the goods from the merchant dealing with goods of that kind don’t know about the conditions. All they see is that the goods are in the hands of the merchant dealing with goods of that kind. As such, the buyer and sub-lessee should be protected for their natural reliance on buying or sub-leasing from merchant dealing with goods of that kind. But §2A-305(2) does not apply in this problem, because Shelby did not lease the painting to Pierre. §2A-305(2) only applies where a lease is followed by a sub-lease. This problem is a pure entrustment followed by a lease.
§2A-305 通常涵盖租赁的初始承租人成为出租人并转租给分租人的情况。 §2A-305(1) 规定,基本规则是初始承租人不能给予次承租人比他自己与初始出租人签订的租约中更大的权利。(例如:如果初始租赁期限为一年,则初始承租人在五年内不能转租和转租)。§2A-305(2) 为 §2A-305(1) 中的基本规则创造了一个例外。§2A-305(2) 规定,除非初始承租人恰好是经营该类商品的商人。那么这将是一种委托情况,因为它在 §2-403(3) 中被广泛定义为任何货物的交付,无论其条件是谁。最初的租约将符合委托的条件。此例外背后的基本原理是因为,出现并希望从处理此类商品的商家处购买商品的买方,或者出现并希望从处理此类商品的商家处转租货物的次承租人不知道条件。他们所看到的只是货物在处理此类货物的商人手中。因此,买方和次承租人应该受到保护,因为他们自然依赖从处理此类商品的商家处购买或转租。但 §2A-305(2) 不适用于这个问题,因为谢尔比没有将这幅画租给皮埃尔。 §2A-305(2) 仅适用于租约后分租的情况。这个问题是纯粹的委托,然后是租约。
Does §2A-307(2) apply in this problem?
§2A-307(2) 是否适用于此问题?
The basic rule of §2A-307(2) is a creditor of lessor takes subject to the lease contract, unless the creditor has a prior perfected lien in the goods being leased by the lessor. Here Shelby is a creditor of Pierre according to Comment 3 to §2A-304. Shelby is a creditor of Pierre because Shelby is owed either a painting or its value. In this problem, under §2A-307(2), Shelby cannot get her painting back from the museum immediately. However, Shelby can, at a minimum, collect rent the museum is going to pay to Pierre. If Shelby can show other damages that exceeds the amount of the rent, she can recover that from Pierre too. Shelby’s rights as the true owner to the painting are superior to Pierre’s rights, therefore, Shelby ought to be able to step into Pierre’s shoes as lessor to collect the rent and ultimately to get the painting back at the end of the one year lease.
§2A-307(2) 的基本规则是,出租人的债权人受租赁合同的约束,除非债权人对出租人租赁的货物有事先完善的留置权。 根据 §2A-304 的第 3 条评论,Shelby 是 Pierre 的债权人 。谢尔比是皮埃尔的债权人,因为谢尔比欠一幅画或它的价值。在这个问题中,根据 §2A-307(2),谢尔比不能立即从博物馆取回她的画作。但是,谢尔比至少可以收取博物馆将支付给皮埃尔的租金。如果 Shelby 能证明其他损害赔偿超过租金金额,她也可以向 Pierre 追讨。谢尔比作为这幅画的真正所有者的权利 优于皮埃尔的权利,因此,谢尔比应该能够作为出租人站在皮埃尔的立场上收取租金,并最终在一年租约结束时取回这幅画 。
b. Same facts as part (a), except instead of taking the painting to frame, Pierre purchases Shelby’s painting with a check that later bounces. Pierre then leases the painting to the museum for one year. If Shelby discovers that Pierre is broke and is not going to make good on his bad check, at what point can Shelby recover the painting from the museum? U.C.C. §2A-304(1), Official Comment 2 to §2A-304, §2-403.
b. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是皮埃尔没有将画作装裱起来,而是用一张后来跳票的支票购买了谢尔比的画。然后,皮埃尔将这幅画租给了博物馆一年。如果谢尔比发现皮埃尔破产了,而且不打算偿还他的空头支票,谢尔比什么时候能从博物馆取回这幅画呢?加州大学 §2A-304(1),官方意见 2 至 §2A-304,§2-403。
Pierre could have given good title in a sale under §2-403(1), then why not also in a lease, since a lessee gets a limited right of ownership that what a buyer gets.
Pierre 本可以在第 2-403(1) 条下的销售中给予良好的所有权 ,那么为什么不在租赁中也给予所有权,因为承租人获得的所有权是买方所获得的有限。
By purchasing the painting with a bad check, Pierre is a lessor with voidable title under §2A-304(1)(b). However, §2A-304 does not apply in this problem because here Pierre as the lessor, did not lease the painting to two different lessees. Under §2A-304(1), the museum does not qualify as a subsequent lessee. It is the only lessee in this problem. Here §2-403(1) governs because a person with voidable title like Pierre has power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value, and a “purchase” includes a lease under §1-201(b)(29). Shelby’s rights as the true owner to the painting are superior to Pierre’s rights, therefore, Shelby ought to be able to step into Pierre’s shoes as lessor to collect the rent from the museum.
通过用空头支票购买这幅画,皮埃尔成为了根据 §2A-304(1)(b) 享有可撤销所有权的出租人。然而,§2A-304 不适用于这个问题,因为在这里,Pierre 作为出租人,没有将这幅画出租给两个不同的承租人。根据 §2A-304(1),博物馆不符合后续承租人的资格。它是此问题中唯一的承租人。这里管辖 §2-403(1),因为像 Pierre 这样拥有可撤销所有权的人有权将良好的所有权有价转让给善意的购买者, 而“ 购买 ” 包括 §1-201(b)(29 ) 下的租赁 。谢尔比作为这幅画的真正所有者的权利 优于皮埃尔的权利,因此,谢尔比应该能够作为出租人站在皮埃尔的立场上,向博物馆收取租金。
c. Same facts as part (a), except now when the museum receives possession of the painting pursuant to its one-year lease agreement, the museum leases the painting to a private art gallery for five years. What rights does Shelby have to recover the painting from the private art gallery? U.C.C. §§2A-305(1) and (2), 2A-103(2), 2-104(1), Official Comment 2 to §2-104.
c. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,除了现在博物馆根据其一年租赁协议获得该画作的所有权时,博物馆将该画作出租给私人艺术画廊,为期五年。谢尔比有什么权利从私人艺术画廊取回这幅画?加州大学 §§2A-305(1) 和 (2)、2A-103(2)、2-104(1)、官方意见 2 至 §2-104。
§2A-305 covers this problem where an initial lessee sub-leases. The general rule in §2A-305(1) says a sub-lessee such as the art gallery here is limited to take subject to the existing lease contract to which the museum is a party. So the art gallery cannot have longer than a one-year lease, which is what the museum has with its lessor. If this is the case, the art gallery will make rent payment to the museum under the one-year lease, and the museum will make rent payment to Pierre under its one-year lease, and Shelby should be able to get these lease payment from Pierre. At the end of the one year, Shelby can get the painting back.
§2A-305 涵盖了初始承租人分租的这个问题。§2A-305(1) 中的一般规则规定,次级承租人(例如这里的艺术画廊)仅限于受博物馆作为一方的现有租赁合同的约束。 因此 ,艺术画廊的租约不能超过一年,这就是博物馆与出租人之间的租约。如果是这种情况,艺术画廊将根据一年租约向博物馆支付租金,博物馆将根据一年租约向皮埃尔支付租金,谢尔比应该能够从皮埃尔那里获得这些租赁付款 。一年结束时,谢尔比可以取回这幅画。
However, the art gallery can argue for the application of the entrustment doctrine under §2A-305(2). The art gallery can make the argument that Pierre’s one-year lease with the museum counts as “entrusting” under §2-403(3). And the art gallery qualifies as a sub-lessee in the ordinary course of business from a lessee, the museum, who is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind. If this is the case, under §2A-305(2) the art gallery should take free of all of the lessor’s and the lessee’s rights to the goods and takes free of the existing lease contract. As such, the art gallery would get the full five-year lease. Whether this argument works for the art gallery comes down to whether the museum is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind. And that depends on if the museum frequently sell and lease paintings.
但是,艺术画廊可以主张适用 §2A-305(2) 下的委托原则 。艺术画廊可以提出,皮埃尔与博物馆的一年租约算作 §2-403(3) 下的“委托”。而艺术画廊在正常业务过程中有资格成为承租人,即博物馆,承租人是经营此类商品的商人。如果是这种情况,根据 §2A-305(2),美术馆应取消出租人和承租人对货物的所有权利,并取消现有的租赁合同。因此,艺术画廊将获得完整的五年租约。这种论点是否适用于艺术画廊,归根结底取决于博物馆是否是经营此类商品的商人 。这取决于博物馆是否经常出售和租赁画作。
However, Shelby can make the argument that even if the art gallery can show the museum is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind, §2A-305(2) does not talk about her interest as a true owner and does not explicitly subordinate her interest. So she should win as a true owner over the art gallery. But that argument probably won’t work. Shelby loses under §2A-307(2) when she entrusted the painting to Pierre in the first place.
然而,谢尔比可以提出这样的论点,即使艺术画廊可以证明博物馆是经营此类商品的商人,§2A-305(2) 也没有谈论她作为真正所有者的利益,也没有明确地从属于她的利益。 所以她应该作为真正的所有者胜过艺术画廊。但这种说法可能行不通。根据 §2A-307(2),谢尔比在最初将这幅画委托给皮埃尔时败诉。
17.2. As if things were not bad enough for Pierre, he now tells you that his problems have taken on an international flavor. Three weeks ago, Pierre sold a $60,000 painting, Mans of La Mancha, to a Mexican art gallery, Las Pinturas, located just across the Texas border. One week following the sale, when the owner of Las Pinturas brought the painting to be displayed at a Texas art show, local sheriffs seized the painting pursuant to a writ of attachment issued by a Texas state court in response to a title action brought by Texas resident Ronald Manson. It turns out that Manson used to own the Man of La Mancha painting, but sold it to Allison Wheeler, who paid for it with a check that bounced. Allison then sold the painting to Pierre, who sold it to Las Pinturas. Now Las Pinturas is threatening to sue Pierre in a Texas court for breach of the title warranty. Does Pierre have reason to be concerned? C.I.S.G. Arts. 4, 41; U.C.C. §2-403.
17.2. 好像事情对 Pierre 来说还不够糟糕,他现在告诉你,他的问题已经带有国际色彩。三周前,皮埃尔将一幅价值 60,000 美元的画作《 拉曼恰的曼斯》(Mans of La Mancha) 卖给了位于德克萨斯州边境对面的墨西哥艺术画廊 Las Pinturas。拍卖一周后,当 Las Pinturas 的所有者将这幅画带到德克萨斯州艺术展上展出时,当地治安官根据 德克萨斯州法院为回应德克萨斯州居民罗纳德·曼森 (Ronald Manson) 提起的所有权诉讼而签发的扣押令没收了这幅画。事实证明,曼森曾经拥有这幅画 ,但将其卖给了艾莉森·惠勒 (Allison Wheeler),后者用一张跳票支付了这幅画。艾莉森随后将这幅画卖给了皮埃尔,皮埃尔又把它卖给了拉斯平图拉斯。现在,Las Pinturas 威胁要在德克萨斯州法院起诉 Pierre 违反产权保证。皮埃尔有理由担心吗?C.I.S.G. 第 4、41 条;加州大学 §2-403.
C.I.S.G. Art 41 does give a title warranty to the buyer. However, there’s no provision in C.I.S.G. to determine which party has better title under C.I.S.G. Art 4. Thus, whether Las Pinturas can prevail in the title action against Pierre under C.I.S.G. Art 41 will be a function of whether Pierre really conveyed good title in the painting. Here the appropriate title law to apply would be Texas state law, namely U.C.C. §2-403. Allison gets voidable title in the painting by purchasing with a bad check and gave good title to Pierre as a good faith purchaser for value under §2-403(1)(b). And Pierre gave Las Pinturas good title when he sold the painting to Las Pinturas. Las Pinturas should not be focusing its energy on suing Pierre for breach of warranty for good title. Instead, Las Pinturas should sue Ronald Manson to recover the painting because Las Pinturas has better title than Ronald Manson. Nevertheless, Las Pinturas should still vouch in Pierre under §2-607(5)(a) whenever Las Pinturas sue Ronald Manson to recover the painting and hold Pierre answerable for the state of the painting’s good title.
C.I.S.G. 第 41 条确实为买方提供了产权保证。然而,CISG 中没有规定根据 CISG 第 4 条确定哪一方拥有更好的所有权。因此,Las Pinturas 能否在 C.I.S.G. 第 41 条下针对 Pierre 的所有权诉讼中获胜,将取决于 Pierre 是否真的在画中传达了良好的标题。这里适用的适当所有权法是德克萨斯州法律,即 UCC。 §2-403.Allison 通过用空头支票购买获得了这幅画的可撤销所有权,并根据 §2-403(1)(b) 将 Pierre 作为善意购买者给予了良好的所有权。皮埃尔在将拉斯·平图拉斯 (Las Pinturas) 的画作卖给拉斯·平图拉斯 (Las Pinturas) 时,给了这幅画很好的称号。Las Pinturas 不应该将精力集中在起诉 Pierre 违反良好所有权保证上。 我认为 ,Las Pinturas 应该起诉 Ronald Manson 以恢复这幅画,因为 Las Pinturas 的标题比 Ronald Manson 更好。尽管如此, 每当 Las Pinturas 起诉 Ronald Manson 以恢复这幅画并要求 Pierre 对这幅画的良好标题的状况负责时,Las Pinturas 仍应根据 §2-607(5)(a) 向 Pierre 担保 。
17.3. You represent Bobby Bailey, an Indiana resident who just bought a farm in Brown County, Indiana, a little over a year ago. The seller was a woman named Cindy Beecher. Now one of Bobby’s eccentric neighbors, Pearl Maberly, has filed a suit in the county courthouse claiming that nine of the acres on Bobby’s property actually belong to her by virtue of adverse possession. When Bobby contacted Cindy Beecher and the Hoosier Title Company, which was the title insurer at Bobby’s closing, they both told him that Pearl was crazy and that they did not believe it was their duty to defend Bobby against frivolous title suits. Bobby is not sure whether or not there is any merit to Pearl’s claims, but he is certain that he does not want to spend a lot of money defending Pearl’s suit. Bobby, who is not a lawyer but likes to read local court opinions as a hobby, suggests to you the following strategy: let Pearl win the suit by default judgment and then sue Cindy and Hoosier Title for breach of their title obligations to Bobby. That way, says Bobby, not only will he be compensated for the loss of land, but he can also be reimbursed for his attorney’s fees. Does Bobby have a viable strategy? Cf. U.C.C. §2-6-7(5)(a), F.R.C.P. 14.
17.3. 您代表 Bobby Bailey,他是印第安纳州居民,一年多前刚刚在印第安纳州布朗县购买了一个农场。卖家是一位名叫 Cindy Beecher 的女士。现在,鲍比的一位古怪邻居珀尔·马伯利 (Pearl Maberly) 向县法院提起诉讼,声称鲍比财产上的九英亩土地实际上因逆权占有而属于她。当 Bobby 联系 Cindy Beecher 和 Hoosier Title Company(Bobby 成交时的产权保险公司)时, 他们都告诉他 Pearl 疯了,他们不认为他们有责任为 Bobby 辩护免受无聊的产权诉讼。鲍比不确定 Pearl 的说法是否有任何价值 ,但他确信他不想花很多钱为 Pearl 的诉讼辩护。Bobby 不是律师,但喜欢阅读当地法院的意见书作为一种爱好,他向你建议以下策略:让 Pearl 通过缺席判决赢得诉讼, 然后起诉 Cindy 和 Hoosier Title 违反他们对 Bobby 的所有权义务。Bobby 说,这样他不仅可以获得土地损失的赔偿,还可以获得律师费的报销 。鲍比有可行的策略吗?参见 UCC §2-6-7(5)(a),F.R.C.P. 14.
The Keilbach Court said a buyer of real estate should get attorney’s fees for breach of title warranty only when the buyer loses a title action brought by a third party, but not when the buyer prevails against the third party who brought the title action. The danger with Bobby’s strategy is after he defaults to Pearl under the adverse possession claim, neither Cindy nor Hooiser Title would be collaterally estopped by the title determination in the first lawsuit when Bobby sues them for giving the bad title. Even if Bobby didn’t default, but actually litigated against Pearl, but spent little resources and lost the suit, there would still be no collateral estoppel against Cindy and Hoosier Title, because they are not parties to the suit. A better strategy for Bobby is to implead Cindy and Hoosier Title, on the theory that these two parties are or may be liable to Bobby depending on the merits on Pearl’s claim for adverse possession. Under this approach, This strategy would still entail Bobby paying some attorney’s fees, but might force Cindy and Hoosier Title to handle the brunt of the substantive defense on the title issue, because if these two parties were impleaded and Bobby lost to Pearl on the title issue, then Cindy and Hoosier would be collaterally estopped on the title question in Bobby’s lawsuit against them for breach of title warranty.
凯尔巴赫法院表示, 只有当买方在第三方提起的产权诉讼中败诉时, 房地产买方才应因违反产权保证而获得律师费,但当买方胜诉于提起产权诉讼的第三方时,则不应获得律师费。Bobby 策略的危险在于 ,在他根据逆权占有索赔对 Pearl 违约后,当 Bobby 起诉 Cindy 和 Hooiser Title 授予不良所有权时,Cindy 和 Hooiser Title 都不会因第一次诉讼中的所有权认定而受到附带反驳。即使 Bobby 没有违约,但实际上对 Pearl 提起了诉讼 ,但花费了很少的资源并输掉了诉讼,仍然不会有针对 Cindy 和 Hoosier Title 的附带禁止反言,因为他们不是诉讼的当事人。 对 Bobby 来说,更好的策略是暗示 Cindy 和 Hoosier Title,其理论是,根据 Pearl 逆权管有的申索,这两方对 Bobby 负有责任或可能对 Bobby 负责 。在这种方法下, 这种策略仍然需要 Bobby 支付一些律师费,但可能会迫使 Cindy 和 Hoosier Title 首当其冲地处理产权问题上的实质性辩护,因为如果这两方受到牵连,并且 Bobby 在产权问题上输给了 Pearl,那么 Cindy 和 Hoosier 将在 Bobby 的诉讼中在产权问题上被附带禁止反言 他们违反了所有权保证。
17.4. Take a look at Paragraph 7 of the buyers’ title insurance policy in the Hatch case, which appears in small print in the case excerpt above. Imagine that you are an in-house lawyer for the title insurance company, and you have been asked in light of the Hatch decision to prepare a proposal for the state insurance commission to revise the state’s form insurance policy to protect insurance companies against similar litigation in the future. Your job is to re-draft that paragraph so that in a future case like Hatch, the insurance company’s position will prevail. How would you re-draft the clause to avoid the result in the Hatch case?
17.4. 请看一下 Hatch 案中买方产权保险单的第 7 段 ,该段在上面的案例摘录中以小字显示。想象一下,您是产权保险公司的内部律师,根据 Hatch 的决定,您被要求 为州保险委员会准备一份提案,以修改该州的表格保险单,以保护保险公司在未来免受类似诉讼。你的工作是重新起草该段落 , 以便在将来像 Hatch 这样的案件中 ,保险公司的立场将占上风。您将如何重新起草该条款以避免 Hatch 案的结果?
In re-drafting, the goal is to make this exclusion clause both internally consistent and completely unambiguous. In the Hatch case, the fatal ambiguity was paragraph 7(b) of the contract, which renders meaningless the phrase “by litigation or otherwise” appears in paragraph 7(a). One solution is to substitute the phrase “by litigation or otherwise” in 7(a) with “(except in the case of litigation)”, to make it clear that the timing restriction in 7(a) doesn’t apply if this is a problem that involves litigation to solve. This would make it clear that the insurance company’s duty to remove clouds on title within a reasonable time under 7(a) did not apply when the alleged defect is the subject of litigation and the litigation has not concluded. In addition, to emphasize further the mutually exclusive nature of the three different coverage exclusions listed under paragraph 7, the paragraph should begin with “No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy under any of the following circumstances.” Thus to make it clear each of these three is a basis on which the insurer can get out of this duty to remove clouds on title.
在重新起草时,目标是使该免责条款既内部一致又完全明确。在 Hatch 案中,致命的歧义是合同的第 7(b) 段,这使得第 7(a) 段中出现的“ 通过诉讼或其他方式” 的短语变得毫无意义 。一种解决方案是将 7(a) 中的 “ 通过诉讼或其他方式” 替换为 “( 诉讼情况除外)”,以明确如果这是一个涉及诉讼需要解决的问题,则 7(a) 中的时间限制不适用。这将清楚地表明, 当被指控的缺陷是诉讼标的且诉讼尚未结束时,保险公司根据 7(a) 在合理时间内清除所有权云的义务并不适用 。此外,为了进一步强调第 7 段中列出的三种不同承保除外责任的互斥性质,该段应以 “ 在以下任何情况下,不得根据本保单产生或维持任何索赔。“ 明确这三项中的每一项都是保险公司可以摆脱消除产权乌云的责任的基础。
CLOSING THE SALE WITH SALES WITH GOODS PP. 311
CLOSE THE SALE WITH GOODS (以商品销售结束销售 ) PP. 311
Problem 18.1(a) Kim McNicholas orders a home computer from Computers by Mail, Inc. When the computer arrives, she takes it out of the box and uses it for about 10 minutes before she discovers that the left side of the screen’s frame is cracked. At this point, has Kim accepted the computer? U.C.C. §2-606, Official Comment 4 to §2-606.
问题 18.1(a) Kim McNicholas 从 Computers by Mail, Inc. 订购一台家用计算机。当电脑到达时,她从盒子里拿出来,使用了大约 10 分钟,然后她发现屏幕框架的左侧有裂缝。此时,Kim 是否接受了这台计算机?U.C.C. §2-606,官方评论 4 至 §2-606。
ANSWER: One way to approach a problem like this is to walk through the three possible ways for a buyer to accept that are listed in 2-606(1). In this problem, when we look at 2-606(1)(a), can we say that the buyer here as accepted the goods? Based on what we know, the buyer has not yet signified the seller that the goods are conforming or that she will take them or retained them despite whether the goods are non-conforming. The buyer has not reached out to the seller. So, 2-606(1)(a) seems fairly easy to reject as a possible way that the buyer might have accepted the goods. 2-606(1)(b) won’t work as way to say that she has accepted because probably ten minutes does not amount to a reasonable opportunity to inspect. One thing to note about 2-606(1)(b) is that 2-606(1)(b) is going to be the mode default acceptance in most cases and the default mode of acceptance is because acceptance under 2-606(1)(b) is going to occur with a mere passage of time in a case in which the buyer does not affect the proper and timely rejection. So, if the buyer gets the goods and does not do anything, then eventually we are going to say that the buyer have accepted because the buyer has not rejected the goods and a reasonable opportunity to inspect has passed. When you read the language of 2-606(1)(c), “any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership,” if such language was read broadly or literally then any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership would be opening up the box and taking up the computer. And so, when the code drafter used those terms, any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership they must mean only certain kinds of acts that are inconsistent with the seller’s ownership. So, we have to figure out how to narrow that language in a way that makes it possible as a way for acceptance. 2-606(c) is the only subsection that does not include the terms “after a reasonable time to inspect”. If we read “any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership,” then acceptance will have to take place in any case under 2-606(1)(c) because once the buyer opens the box they’ve done an act inconsistent with seller’s ownership. Ways to narrow such terms: 1 way in Official Comment 4 to 2-606 in the very first sentence gives us one circumstance in which 2-606(1)(c) would apply –that is if the buyer has already claimed that he has rejected the goods and acts inconsistently by using the goods for 10 minutes. Basically, any post rejection use by the buyer.
回答: 解决此类问题的一种方法是介绍 2-606(1) 中列出的买方接受的三种可能方式 。 在这个问题中,当我们查看 2-606(1)(a) 时, 我们是否可以说这里的买方接受了货物?根据我们所知道的情况,买方尚未向卖方表明货物符合要求,或者无论货物是否不合格,她都会接受或保留这些货物。买家尚未联系卖家。因此,2-606(1)(a) 似乎很容易被拒绝,因为买方可能已经接受了货物。 2-606(1)(b) 不能说她已经接受了,因为可能十分钟不构成合理的检查机会。关于 2-606(1)(b) 需要注意的一点是, 在大多数情况下,2-606(1)(b) 将成为默认接受模式,而默认接受模式是因为 2-606(1)(b) 下的接受将在短短一段时间内发生,在这种情况下,买方不会影响适当和及时的拒绝。所以,如果买方拿到货物但什么都没做,那么最终我们要说的是,买方已经接受了,因为买方没有拒绝货物,并且已经通过了合理的检查机会。当您阅读 2-606(1)(c) 的措辞时,“任何与卖方所有权不一致的行为”,如果这种措辞被广义或按字面理解,那么任何与卖方所有权不一致的行为都将是打开盒子并占用计算机。 因此,当代码起草者使用这些术语时,任何与卖方所有权不一致的行为,它们必须仅指与卖方所有权不一致的某些类型的行为。因此,我们必须 弄清楚如何缩小该语言的范围,使其成为可能成为一种接受的方式。 2-606(c) 是唯一不包括“在合理检查时间后”条款的小节。如果我们读到“ 任何与卖方所有权不一致的行为”,那么在任何情况下都必须根据 2-606(1)(c) 进行接受, 因为一旦买方打开盒子,他们就做出了与卖方所有权不一致的行为。缩小此类术语的方法: 官方评论 4 至 2-606 中第一句中的 1 种方式为我们提供了 2-606(1)(c) 适用的一种情况 ——即如果买方已经声称他拒绝了货物,并且通过使用货物 10 分钟而采取了不一致的行为。基本上,买方使用的任何 post rejection 。
Problem 18.1(b) Same facts as part (a), except that as soon as Kim takes the computer out of the box, she drills several holes in its plastic base and screws it on her desk. Then she uses it for about 10 minutes before she discovers that the left side of the screen’s frame is cracked. At this point, has Kim accepted the computer? U.C.C. §2-606.
问题 18.1(b) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Kim 一从盒子里拿出电脑,她就在塑料底座上钻了几个孔,然后用螺丝把它拧在她的桌子上。然后她使用它大约 10 分钟,然后她发现屏幕框架的左侧破裂了。此时,Kim 是否接受了这台计算机?《美国法典》第 2-606 条。
ANSWER: That is more likely acceptance because drilling holes is inconsistent with the seller’s ownership. It is still true that the buyer had not had a reasonable opportunity to inspect, which would rule out an acceptance under 2-606(1)(a) and (b). But this is another case where we should be able to apple 2-606(1)(c) without worrying about being unfair to the buyer. You could describe this category of cases where the buyer takes an act that effects a fundamental change in the goods.
回答: 这更有可能被接受,因为钻孔与卖方的所有权不一致。买方仍然没有合理的机会进行检查,这将排除根据 2-606(1)(a) 和 (b) 接受的可能性。但这是另一种情况,我们应该能够使用 apple 2-606(1)(c) 而不必担心对买方不公平。您可以描述此类情况,即买方采取的行为影响了商品的根本变化。
Problem 18.1(c) Same facts as pat (a), except that Kim sees the crack in the frame as soon as she takes the computer out of the box. Nevertheless, she proceeds to use the computer for 10 minutes. AT this point, has Kim accepted the compuTer? U.C.C. § 2-606.
问题 18.1(c) 与 pat (a) 的事实相同,只是 Kim 一把电脑从盒子里拿出来就看到了框架上的裂缝。尽管如此,她还是继续使用电脑 10 分钟。在这一点上,Kim 是否接受了 compuTer?U.C.C. § 2-606.
ANSWER: The buyer has more likely accepted the goods. If you look at Official Comment 4 to 2-606 that the buyer did not claim she rejected the goods. The buyer noticed the defect and then proceeds to using the good anyways to take an act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership and this is a kind of waiver. So this can be another category under 2-606(c) where the buyer has taken an act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership. The buyer might argue that she was only using it while she had knowledge of the particular defect to see if there were other defects. Maybe that would work for the buyer. Maybe in this case, you could say there was an acceptance also under 2-606(1)(b), and the argument there is that the buyer failed to make an effective rejection after a reasonable opportunity to inspect because in this case the buyer immediately discovered the defect and the time to inspect ended up being shorter than what we would normally require.
答案: 买方更有可能接受了商品。如果您查看官方评论 4 至 2-606, 买家没有声称她拒收了商品。买方注意到了缺陷,然后继续继续使用商品来采取与卖方所有权不一致的行为,这是一种弃权。 因此 ,这可能是 2-606(c) 项下的另一个类别,即买方采取了与卖方所有权不一致的行为。买方可能会争辩说,她只是在知道特定缺陷时才使用它 ,以查看是否有其他缺陷。也许这对买家有用。也许在这种情况下,您可以说根据 2-606(1)(b) 也有接受, 那里的论点是买方在合理的检查机会后未能做出有效的拒绝,因为在这种情况下,买方立即发现了缺陷,并且检查时间最终比我们通常要求的时间短。
Problem 18.1(d) Same facts as part (a), except that Kim sees the crack in the frame as soon as she takes the computer out of the box. She immediately calls the seller, Computer by Mail, and tells them that she is rejecting the computer. Nevertheless, she proceeds to use the computer for ten minutes. At this point, has Kim accepted the computer? U.C.C. §2-606.
问题 18.1(d) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Kim 一从盒子中取出计算机就看到了框架上的裂缝。她立即打电话给卖家 Computer by Mail,告诉他们她拒绝了这台电脑。尽管如此,她还是继续使用电脑 10 分钟。此时,Kim 是否接受了这台计算机?《美国法典》第 2-606 条。
ANSWER: This is the classic comment 4 to 2-606 case. Here, the buyer used the goods after purported to have rejected the good, 2-606(1)(c). This only counts as an acceptance if the seller ratifies it. In 2-606(1)(c) says “but if such act is wrongful as against the seller, it is an acceptance only if ratified by the seller. So, any post rejection use by the buyer is consider wrongful as against the seller and therefore has to be ratified by the seller in order to count as an acceptance by the buyer.
回答:这是经典的注释 4 到 2-606 案例 。在这里,买方在声称拒绝了商品 2-606(1)(c) 后使用了商品 。只有在卖家批准的情况下,这才算作接受。在 2-606(1)(c) 中说:“但如果这种行为对卖方来说是错误的,那么只有在卖方批准的情况下,它才是接受。因此,买方使用的任何拒绝后使用都被视为对卖方不利,因此必须得到卖方的批准才能算作买方的接受。
Problem 18.1(e) Same facts as part (a), except that Kim’s contract with Computer by Mail is for a series of four computers, one to be shipped at the beginning of each month. When the first computer arrives, Kim takes it out of the box and immediately notices a crack on the left side of the screen’s frame. May Kim reject this installment? May the seller cure the defective installment? May Kim cancel the remainder of the contract? U.C.C. §§2-612, 2-508; CF. §2-601.
问题 18.1(e) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Kim 与 Computer by Mail 的合同是一系列四台计算机,其中一台在每个月初发货。当第一台计算机到达时,Kim 将其从包装盒中取出,并立即注意到屏幕框架左侧有一条裂缝。金可以拒绝这一期吗?卖家可以纠正有缺陷的分期付款吗?Kim 可以取消合同的剩余部分吗?《美国法典》第 2-612、2-508 条;参见 §2-601。
ANSWER: what is the standard here? In 2-612(2), we are told that the only way the buyer to reject this installment is if it substantially impairs the value of this installment and cannot be cured. What is the normal standard for rejection in non-installment contract? 2-601 says if the goods are the tender delivery failed in any respect (perfect tender rule); so, the perfect tender rule is the standard rejection in non-installment contract and it is a very strict standard against the seller. Although, even the perfect standard rule if you look at comment 2 to 2-601 which talks about commercial leeways in assessing the seller’s performance, so even a perfect tender rule has a little wiggle room. So may the seller cure this defective installment? We know the standard is substantial impairment, but we also have to say that the seller cannot cure it if the buyer is going to be able to reject the installment. Is this a curable defect? Yes, how would the seller cure? Sending a new one or maybe even something less by sending a new one or replacing the screen. May the buyer cancel the remainder of this contract? The standard of cancelling the whole contract is if there is a substantial impairment of the whole contract, not just installments (that is a tougher standard for the buyer to meet).
回答:这里的标准是什么? 在 2-612(2) 中, 我们被告知买方拒绝这笔分期付款的唯一方法是它严重损害了这笔分期付款的价值并且无法治愈。 非分期付款合同中拒收的正常标准是什么?2-601 说如果货物是投标交货在任何方面都失败了(完美招标规则);所以,完美招标规则是非分期合同中的标准拒收 ,它是对卖方非常严格的标准。 虽然, 如果您查看评论 2 至 2-601, 即使是完美的标准规则 ,它谈到了评估卖方表现的商业回旋余地 ,因此即使是完美的投标规则也有一点回旋余地。 那么卖家可以纠正这个有缺陷的分期付款吗? 我们知道标准是实质性减值,但我们也必须说,如果买方能够拒绝分期付款,卖方就无法补救它。这是可治愈的缺陷吗?是的, 卖家将如何治愈? 通过发送新的或更换屏幕来发送新的甚至更少的内容。 买方可以取消本合同的剩余部分吗? 取消整个合同的标准是整个合同有重大减值,而不仅仅是分期付款(这是买方更难达到的标准)。
Problem 18.1(f) Same facts as part (a), except that Kim’s contract with Computers by Mail is for a series of four computers, one to be shipped at the beginning of each month. When the first computer arrives, Kim takes it out of the box, plugs it in, and the computer explodes. Kim is frightened, but she is not injured by the blast. May Kim reject this installment? May the seller cure the defective installment? May Kim cancel the remainder of the contract? U.C.C. §§2-612, 2-508.
问题 18.1(f) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Kim 与 Computers by Mail 签订的合同是一系列四台计算机,其中一台在每个月初发货。当第一台计算机到达时,Kim 将其从包装盒中取出,插上电源,然后计算机爆炸了。Kim 很害怕,但她并没有被爆炸炸伤。金可以拒绝这一期吗?卖家可以纠正有缺陷的分期付款吗?Kim 可以取消合同的剩余部分吗?《美国法典》第 2-612 条、第 2-508 条。
ANSWER: An exploding computer probably qualifies as a substantial impairment. On the issue of whether the buyer can reject this installment contract, the standard is not defect substantially impairs value of the whole contract, it is a lesser standard. But she also has to show that it cannot be cured. The seller says he can cure exploding computers by sending another one. With respect to this seller, the buyer’s faith has legitimately been shaken. The so-called shaken faith doctrine, which is not something you find under the code and it is a common law doctrine. Basically, the buyer can say that her faith has been shaken in this type of computer or perhaps in the seller, and therefore she should not have to accept the cure of this installment. So put, another way the buyer can argue that even if an objective standard was used for measuring a sufficient cure in light of the exploding computer no cure from this seller will cure in light of what happened with the exploding computer. As long as the buyer can show that the buyer probably falls within the shaken faith doctrine. Thinking about it that way, you can say a shaken faith doctrine is so much as describing what is or is not an acceptable cure in a given case and we are suppose to use an objective standard. In other word, the seller cannot unilaterally define what an acceptable cure is under 2-508. When look at the seller’s cure that is offered, we have to look at it objectively if it would be a cure that would be acceptable to a reasonable buyer in the buyer’s position.
回答: 爆炸的计算机可能属于重大损害。关于买方是否可以拒绝该分期付款合同的问题,该标准不是缺陷实质性损害整个合同的价值,它是一个较轻的标准。但她也必须证明它是无法治愈的。卖家说他可以通过发送另一台计算机来治愈爆炸的计算机。对于这个卖家,买家的信心已经合法地动摇了。所谓的动摇信仰原则 ,这不是你在法典中可以找到的东西 ,它是一个普通法原则。基本上,买方可以说她的信仰在这种类型的计算机中或可能在卖方中动摇了,因此她不应该接受这一分期付款的治疗方法。因此,买方可以以另一种方式争辩说,即使根据爆炸的计算机使用客观标准来衡量充分的治愈 , 该卖家的治愈方法也不会根据爆炸的计算机发生的情况而治愈。 只要买方能够证明买方可能属于 shaken faith 教义。这样想,你可以说动摇的信仰教义就是描述在特定情况下什么是可接受的治疗方法,什么是不可接受的治疗方法,我们应该 使用一个客观的标准。换句话说,卖家不能单方面定义 2-508 下的可接受治疗方法 。当查看卖方提供的治疗方法时,我们必须 客观地看待它,如果它是处于买方位置的合理买方可以接受的治疗方法。
May the buyer cancel the whole contract? Under 2-612(3), the standard for cancelling the remainder of the contract is whether there is a substantial impairment of the value of the whole contract. The buyer might successfully argue that this non-conformity does substantially impair the value of the whole contract because it objectively and legitimately shakes the buyer’s faith in this seller and if the buyer is successful in that argument then the buyer should be able to cancel the entire installment contract under 2-612(3) standard.
买方可以取消整个合同吗? 根据 2-612(3) 的规定,取消合同剩余部分的标准是整个合同的价值是否出现重大减值。买方可能会成功地争辩说,这种不符合项确实严重损害了整个合同的价值,因为它客观合法地动摇了买方对该卖方的信心,如果买方在该论点中获胜 ,那么买方应该能够根据 2-612(3) 标准取消整个分期付款合同。
Problem 18.1(g) As a general proposition, once Kim accepts the goods, has she precluded herself from any remedy for the computer’s defects? U.C.C. §§2-607(2) and (3)(a), 2-608(1).
问题 18.1(g) 作为一般性命题,一旦 Kim 接受了货物,她是否排除了对计算机缺陷的任何补救措施?U.C.C. §§2-607(2) 和 (3)(a)、2-608(1)。
ANSWER: §2-607(2) says once you have accepted the goods, you have lost the remedies of rejection. Rejection is a good-oriented remedy. But “acceptance does not in itself impair any other remedies provided by this article for non-conformity.” So, the buyer might have lost the rejection remedy, but the buyer have not lost any of the other remedies such as suing for damages for breach of warranty under §2-714, §2-715 (damages in cases of accepted goods, and the buyer still has revocation which is also a goods-oriented remedy under 2-608. With revocation in the time period, it says in 2-608(2) that revocation of acceptance must occur before any substantial changes to the condition of the goods, which was not caused by the goods’ own defect. And then comment 4 to 2-608 suggests that the time for revocation extends in most cases beyond the time when notification of breach must be given. This is where the North American Lighting case comes into play –the case about revocation where the 7th circuit said that even a full year from acceptance by the buyer was not too late for the buyer to revoke acceptance under the circumstances. What were those circumstances? The circumstances were that the seller kept giving assurances to the buyer that the seller was going to fix the problem and kept trying to fix the problem; and the buyer was being patient. And so the court said it was not going to punish the buyer for its patience in trying to work with the seller.
答案:§2-607(2) 规定,一旦您接受了货物,您就失去了拒收的补救措施。拒绝是一种面向好的补救措施。但是,“接受本身并不影响本文为不符合规定提供的任何其他补救措施。因此,买方可能已经失去了拒绝补救措施,但买方并没有失去任何其他补救措施,例如根据 §2-714、§2-715 起诉违反保证的损害赔偿(在接受货物的情况下的损害赔偿, 买方仍然享有撤销权,这也是 2-608 项下以商品为导向的补救措施 。对于期间的撤销 ,它在 2-608(2) 中规定 ,撤销接受必须在货物状况发生任何实质性变化之前发生,而这种变化不是由货物自身的缺陷引起的。然后 ,评论 4 到 2-608 表明,在大多数情况下,撤销的时间会延长到必须发出违约通知的时间之后。这就是 North American Lighting 案的用武之地——关于撤销的案件, 其中第 7 巡回法院表示,在这种情况下,即使买方接受后一整年,买方撤销接受也不算太晚。 那些情况是什么? 当时的情况是,卖方不断向买方保证,卖方会解决这个问题,并不断试图解决问题;而买方则很有耐心。 因此 ,法院表示,它不会因为买方耐心地试图与卖方合作而惩罚买方。
Problem 18.2 Arlene Ledger, president of Heavy Metal, Inc. (from problem 3.2), has come to your office with what she describes as an “ethical dilemma.” She also wonders whether her problem has legal implications. Last week Arlene received a shipment of raw steel from a new steel supplier, Nielson Steel. In conducting a spot inspection, Arlene discovered that the steel had a slight impurity that would make it somewhat more expensive for heavy Metal to use in manufacturing the circular weight plates that Heavy Metal sells to sporting goods stores. Accordingly, Arlene immediately called Nielson and told its president that Heavy Metal was rejecting the 10-ton shipment of raw steel. Heavy Metal kept possession of the steel while it waited for Nielson to pick it up. Two days ago, the price of raw steel suddenly shot up, and now Arlene wants to know whether her company, which still has the steel, could simply begin using it in production and thereby effectively “un-reject” the goods so as to take advantage of what now seems like a good deal. Arlene also tells you that Nielson is on the verge of filing for bankruptcy, so the likelihood is slim that Arlene could recover damages from Nielson. What do you tell Arlene? U.C.C. §2-606(1), Official Comment 4 to §2-606, §2-606(2)(a), Official Comment 2 to §2-601.
问题 18.2 Heavy Metal, Inc. 的总裁 Arlene Ledger(来自问题 3.2)来到您的办公室,提出了她所说的“道德困境”。她还想知道她的问题是否具有法律影响。上周,Arlene 收到了来自新钢铁供应商 Nielson Steel 的一批粗钢。在进行现场检查时,Arlene 发现这种钢有轻微的杂质,这使得 Heavy Metal 用于制造 Heavy Metal 出售给体育用品商店的圆形配重板的成本会更高一些。因此,Arlene 立即打电话给 Nielson 并告诉其总裁,Heavy Metal 拒绝了 10 吨的粗钢运输。Heavy Metal 一直拥有这根钢,等待 Nielson 来取走它。两天前,粗钢的价格突然飙升,现在 Arlene 想知道她的公司(仍然拥有这种钢材)是否可以简单地开始在生产中使用它,从而有效地“取消拒绝”商品, 从而利用现在看起来划算的交易。Arlene 还告诉你,Nielson 正处于申请破产的边缘,因此 Arlene 向 Nielson 追讨损失的可能性很小。你怎么告诉 Arlene?U.C.C. §2-606(1)、官方意见 4 至 §2-606、§2-606(2)(a)、官方意见 2 至 §2-601。
ANSWER: if the buyer were now to accept, under what part of 2-606 would the buyer be accepting? 2-606(1)(c), if the buyer plans on using the steel in production and then argue that the buyer accepted under 2-606(1)(c) as doing any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership, then the buyer is going to have a problem making this form of delayed acceptance be effective against the seller. Why? Because 2-606(1)(c) says that acceptance occurs when the buyer does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership, but it also says that if such acts is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by the seller. What exactly does 2-606(c) means when it refers to acts that are wrongful as against the seller? Which acts qualify as wrongful against the seller? If you look at 2-602(2)(a), that seems to make the phrase, “wrongful as against the seller,” a defined term; and it defines it as “any post rejection exercised ownership by the buyer is wrongful as against the seller. So using the steel in production following purported rejection of that steel would in fact be a post-rejection exercised of ownership by the buyer in this case, and therefore it would be wrongful as against the seller. Because this act would be wrongful against the seller, it would not count as an acceptance unless the seller specifically ratified that acceptance, which probably the seller is not going to do in this market (the rising price of steel). As Comment 4 to 2-606 puts it, the second clause in 2-606(1)(c) makes it clear that acceptance in law based on the wrongful act of the acceptance is acceptance only as against the wrongdoer and then only at the option of the party wronged. Official comment 2 to 2-601 suggests that a unilateral acceptance following rejection by a buyer can be treated by the seller as a form of conversion against the seller to which the buyer is liable in damages. Now the situation in comment 2 to 2-601 contemplates is one in which the seller has already made other arrangements to the disposition of the rejected goods. In this problem, even in the absence of the seller having made other arrangements for this steel, the seller could still show damages by the buyer’s un-rejection because of the effect of a sudden change in the market price.
答案: 如果买方现在接受,根据 2-606 的哪一部分, 买方将接受? 2-606(1)(c) 中, 如果买方计划在生产中使用钢材,然后争辩说买方根据 2-606(1)(c) 接受是做了任何与卖方所有权不一致的行为,那么买方在使这种形式的延迟接受对卖方无效时将遇到问题。为什么?因为 2-606(1)(c) 规定,当买方做出任何与卖方所有权不一致的行为时,即发生接受,但它也说,如果此类行为对卖方不利,则只有在卖方批准的情况下才属于接受。 当 2-606(c) 提到对卖方有不当行为时,它究竟是什么意思?哪些行为对卖家构成不法行为?如果你看一下 2-602(2)(a), 这似乎使“对卖方不法”一词成为一个定义的术语;它将其定义为“买方行使所有权的任何拒绝后对卖方都是错误的。 因此 ,在这种情况下,在声称拒绝该钢材后在生产中使用该钢材实际上是买方在被拒绝后行使所有权,因此对卖方不利。因为这种行为对卖方来说是错误的,所以除非卖方特别批准该接受,否则它不会算作接受,而卖方可能不会在这个市场(钢材价格上涨)这样做。 正如评论 4 至 2-606 所说,2-606(1)(c) 中的第二条清楚地表明,在法律上基于接受的不法行为的接受是仅针对过错行为者的接受,并且只有在被冤枉的一方的选择下才能接受。 官方意见 2 至 2-601 表明,买方拒绝后单方面接受,卖方可将其视为对卖方的一种转换形式,买方应承担损害赔偿责任。现在, 评论 2 至 2-601 中设想的情况是卖方已经对被拒绝的货物的处置做出了其他安排。在这个问题上,即使卖方没有为这种钢材做出其他安排,卖方仍然可以证明由于市场价格突然变化的影响而买方不拒绝而造成的损害。
What about 2-606(1)(a)? What if the buyer says acceptance following rejection using 2-606(1)(a) which says that the buyer can accept by signifying to the seller that the goods are conforming or in this case the buyer will retain the goods despite the non-conformity? There is still a problem, the buyer cannot unilaterally accept by just using the goods, the buyer cannot unilaterally accept following its rejection simply by signifying acceptance to the seller under 2-606(1)(a). How do we know that? Comment 2 to 2-601 says an original refusal to accept maybe withdrawn by later acceptance if the seller has indicated that he is holding the tender open. Comment 4 to 2-606 says that once the buyer rejects a tender, 2-606(1)(a) does not operate in favor of the buyer unless the seller has re-tendered the goods or taken affirmative action indicating that he is holding the tender open. Though buyer does not have the right to unilaterally un-reject once they reject the goods, the buyer still has a damaged claim for the initial breach against the seller.
2-606(1)(a) 呢? 如果买方使用 2-606(1)(a) 表示买方可以通过向卖方表明商品符合要求来接受,或者在这种情况下,尽管存在不符合要求,买方仍将保留商品,该怎么办? 仍然存在一个问题,买方不能仅仅通过使用货物来单方面接受,买方不能仅仅通过根据 2-606(1)(a) 向卖方表示接受来单方面接受其拒绝。 我们怎么知道呢? 注释 2 到 2-601 表示,如果卖方已表示他正在进行招标,则最初的拒绝接受可能会因后来的接受而撤回。 评论 4 至 2-606 指出,一旦买方拒绝投标,2-606(1)(a) 就不再有利于买方,除非卖方重新招标货物或采取平权行动表明他正在继续招标。尽管买方在拒收货物后无权单方面取消拒收,但买方仍可就最初的违约行为向卖方提出损害赔偿。
18.3. Lou from Lou’s Used Cars for Less (Problem 2.1) has come to you to talk about “quality control” problems he has been having with his used car business. When Lou obtains a fresh “pre-owned” vehicle, his company’s current procedure is to devote about six or seven hours of a mechanic’s time to inspecting the car for any major problems. “Do you know what mechanics cost these days?” Lou asks you rhetorically. Lou’s brilliant idea for saving money is to just wax and shine the cars as they come in, drive them around for 10 minutes, and then put them on the lot to sell. Lou explains that with the money he saves from mechanic inspection time, he will be more than happy to cure any problems that dissatisfied customers bring to him after they have owned the car for a time (these cars are not being sold “as is”). “I just need to know that I’ll still have the right to fix the car, and that no buyer can kill the deal and get their money back just because of some problem we didn’t discover,” Lou tells you in earnest. What advice do you have for Lou about is new plan? U.C.C. §2-508.
18.3. 来自 Lou 的 Used Cars for Less(问题 2.1)的 Lou 来找你谈谈 他在二手车业务中遇到的“质量控制”问题。当 Lou 获得一辆新的 “ 二手 ” 汽车时,他的公司目前的程序是机械师花费大约 6 到 7 小时的时间来检查汽车是否有任何重大问题。 “ 你知道现在的机械师要花多少钱吗?“Lou 反问你。Lou 省钱的绝妙主意是在汽车进来时给它们打蜡和擦亮,开它们转一圈 10 分钟,然后把它们放在地段上卖掉。Lou 解释说,凭借他从机械师检查时间节省下来的钱 ,他将非常乐意解决不满意的客户在拥有汽车一段时间后带给他的任何问题(这些汽车不是 “按原样 ” 出售的)。 “ 我只需要知道我仍然有权修理这辆车,而且没有买家可以仅仅因为我们没有发现的一些问题就取消交易并拿回他们的钱 ,”Lou 认真地告诉你。您对 Lou 的新计划有什么建议?加州大学 §2-508.
This problem comes down to the scope of a seller’s right to cure under §2-508, and whether Lou qualifies for a right to cure under §2-508 if he puts into place this new plan. §2-508(1) arises when a seller delivers before the agreed-upon delivery date, and the buyer rejects because of the non-conformity in the goods delivered, then the seller has a right to cure and make a conforming delivery before the agreed upon delivery date is due. This is not the situation here. §2-508(2) covers the situation when a buyer rejects because of non-conformity in the goods and the seller has reasonable grounds to believe the goods would have be acceptable, then the seller has a right to cure. Here the question depends on whether Lou has reasonable grounds to believe the used cars are acceptable. Comment 2 to §2-508 says such reasonable grounds to believe can lie in prior course of dealing, course of performance and usage of trade. There are two extreme positions of the reasonable grounds to believe. One is in a case where the seller knew about the particular non-conformity but nevertheless has reasonable grounds to believe the goods would still be ok. Another view on the reasonable grounds to believe is the one Lou is pushing for here, that is, as long as the seller was not aware of the non-conformity, then the seller should be protected and have a right to cure under §2-508(2). A middle ground is the one suggested by Comment 2 and White and Summers, which is to look to the usage of trade and see whether the seller’s inspection procedure comports to the industry standard, if yes then the seller’s right to cure is preserved even in a case where the seller didn’t know about the particular non-conformity
这个问题归结为卖家根据 §2-508 享有的治愈权的范围,以及如果 Lou 实施这项新计划,他是否有资格获得 §2-508 规定的治愈权。§2-508(1) 当卖方在约定的交货日期之前交货,并且买方因交付的货物不合格而拒绝交货时,卖方有权在约定的交货日期到期之前纠正并做出合格交货。这不是这里的情况。§2-508(2) 涵盖了买方因货物不合格而拒绝,而卖方有合理理由相信货物可以接受的情况,则卖方有权补救。这里的问题取决于 Lou 是否有合理的理由相信二手车是可以接受的。§2-508 的注释 2 表示,这种合理的相信理由可以存在于先前的交易过程、履约过程和交易习惯中。有理由相信的合理立场有两个极端。一种情况是卖方知道特定的不合格情况,但仍然有合理的理由相信货物仍然没问题。另一种有合理理由相信的观点是 Lou 在这里推动的观点,即只要卖方不知道不合格情况,那么卖方就应该受到保护,并有权根据 §2-508(2) 进行补救。一个中间立场是评论 2 和 White and Summers 提出的,即查看贸易的使用情况,看看卖家的检查程序是否符合行业标准,如果是,那么即使在卖家不知道特定不符合项的情况下,卖家的补救权也会得到保留.
18.4. Your firm does occasional work for a local small college, Mammoth College, which has a full Division III sports program. Mammoth’s athletic director, Shelly Stone, comes to see you about her school’s purchase of a used bus last week for the purpose of transporting school teams to away games. Mammoth purchased the bus from Big Al’s, a used-bus dealer in town, who promised in writing that the bus did not burn oil. After paying for the bus, the school learned that contrary to Big Al’s warranty, the bus was a true oil guzzler: on its first team trip, a mere 100 miles away, the bus consumed six quarts of oil. Shelly now has four questions about the bus purchase: (1) May the school void its deal with Big Al’s and get its money back? (2) If so, can the school keep possession of the bus until Big Al’s gives the school its money back? (3) Even though Shelly wants to undo the deal, she would desperately like to use the bus one last time this weekend, oil problems and all, for her school’s conference track meet, which is about 150 miles away. Would this final use hurt her school’s ability to give the bus back to Big Al’s and undo the deal? (4) Would Shelly’s school have to accept an offer by Big Al’s, should he make one, to fix the oil guzzling problem as an alternative to voiding the whole deal? What do you advise? U.C.C. §2-508, 2-602, 2-606, 2-608, 2-711(3).
18.4. 您的公司偶尔为当地的一所小型大学 Mammoth College 工作,该学院有一个完整的 Division III 体育课程。猛犸象的体育总监雪莉·斯通 (Shelly Stone) 来找您,谈论她的学校上周购买了一辆二手巴士,用于运送校队参加客场比赛。猛犸象从镇上的二手巴士经销商 Big Al's 那里购买了这辆巴士 ,后者以书面形式承诺这辆巴士不会烧油。在支付了巴士费用后,学校了解到,与 Big Al 的保修相反,这辆巴士是真正的耗油者:在仅 100 英里外的第一次团队旅行中,这辆巴士消耗了 6 夸脱的石油。Shelly 现在对购买公共汽车有四个问题:(1) 学校可以取消与 Big Al's 的交易并拿回它的钱吗?(2) 如果是这样,学校是否可以保留这辆公共汽车,直到 Big Al's 把钱还给学校?(3) 尽管 Shelly 想撤销这笔交易,但她还是迫切希望本周末最后一次使用公共汽车,因为石油问题等等,用于她学校的会议田径比赛,该会议距离大约 150 英里。这最后的使用会损害她的学校将校车归还给 Big Al's 并撤销交易的能力吗?(4) Shelly 的学校是否必须接受 Big Al's 的提议 ,如果他提出一个提议,以解决耗油问题,作为取消整个交易的替代方案?您有什么建议?加州大学 §2-508、2-602、2-606、2-608、2-711(3)。
(1) The buyer has accepted the bus here under §2-606(1)(b) for failure to make an effective rejection after having a reasonable opportunity to inspect. However, the buyer may still revoke under §2-608(1)(b) since the acceptance was induced by the seller’s assurances that the bus does not burn oil. However, to revoke under §2-608(1), the non-conformity must substantially impairs the value of the goods. This requirement is met here since before making the purchase the buyer told the seller it’s important to them that the bus does not burn oil.
(1) 买方已根据 §2-606(1)(b) 在此处接受了公共汽车,因为在有合理机会进行检查后未能做出有效的拒绝 。但是,买方仍可根据 §2-608(1)(b) 撤销,因为卖方保证公交车不燃烧油而诱导接受。但是,要根据 §2-608(1) 撤销,不符合项必须严重损害商品的价值。这里满足了这个要求,因为在购买之前,买方告诉卖方, 公共汽车不烧油对他们来说很重要。
(2) The school can keep possession of the bus until Big Al’s gives the school its money back. Under §2-711(3), “On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved seller.” In addition, under Comment 2 to §2-711, the buyer has a security interest for reliance damages. A rightfully rejecting or revoking non-merchant buyer does not have many duties under §2-602(2), the buyer only needs to hold the goods for the seller and not use it. Under §2-608(3), a revoking buyer has the same rights with regards to goods involved as a rejecting buyer does. A rightfully rejecting or revoking merchant buyer has slightly more duties under §2-603 in that the merchant buyer has a duty to resell the goods for the seller’s benefit if the goods are perishable or will decline in value quickly.
(2) 学校可以保留这辆公共汽车的所有权,直到 Big Al's 退还学校的钱。根据 §2-711(3),“ 在合法拒绝或合理撤销接受时,买方对其拥有或控制的货物享有担保权益 , 用于支付其价格的任何款项以及在检查、接收、运输、照料和保管过程中合理产生的任何费用,并且可以以与受害卖方相同的方式持有此类货物并转售 它们。“ 此外,根据 §2-711 的第 2 条评论,买方对依赖损害负有担保权益。根据 §2-602(2),合法拒绝或撤销非商家买家没有很多义务 ,买家只需要为卖家持有商品而不使用它。根据 §2-608(3),撤销的买方对所涉及的商品享有与拒绝的买方相同的权利。根据 §2-603,合法拒绝或撤销卖家买家的义务略多 , 因为如果商品易腐烂或会迅速贬值, 卖家买家有责任为卖家的利益转售商品 。
(3) Under §2-602(2)(a), any post-rejection exercise of ownership by the buyer is wrongful as against the seller. However, the school here can argue that to rent another bus on the last minute is very expensive, and it will be the seller who will bear that expense. So the last use will actually be to the seller’s accommodation and benefit. Therefore the school may reach an agreement with the seller to use the bus on last time. Some courts will allow such post-revocation uses of the goods by the buyer if the use is “unavoidable”. If the court finds the school’s post-revocation use of the bus could have been avoided, then the school will lose its right to revoke. However, even if the buyer loses the right to revoke, the buyer can still sue for breach of warranties under §2-607(2).
(3) 根据 §2-602(2)(a),买方在拒绝后行使所有权的行为对卖方来说是错误的。然而,这里的学校可以争辩说,在最后一刻租另一辆公共汽车是非常昂贵的,这笔费用将由卖方承担。 所以最后的用途其实是给卖家的便利和好处。 因此 ,学校可能会与卖方达成协议,最后一次使用校车。如果商品的使用是 “ 不可避免的”,一些法院会允许买方在撤销商品后进行此类使用 。如果法院认为学校在撤销后对公共汽车的使用是可以避免的,那么学校将失去撤销的权利。但是,即使买方失去了撤销权,买方仍然可以根据 §2-607(2) 起诉违反保证。
(4) Here the seller does not have a right to cure because the buyer is revoking not rejecting the goods. Under §2-508, the seller has a right to cure when the buyer rejects. However, some courts take a broader view and believe that the seller still have a right to cure even with a revoking buyer.
(4) 在这里,卖方无权补救,因为买方是撤销而不是拒绝货物。根据 §2-508,当买方拒绝时,卖方有权进行补救。然而,一些法院采取了更广泛的观点,认为即使买家撤销了索赔,卖方仍然有权进行补救。
18.5. Hi Tech Corp. was a Chicago retailer in the business of selling office computers. Danker & Kodner was a 10-lawyer partnership that was also located in Chicago. Don Danker, managing partner of the law firm, negotiated a contract with Hi Tech for the purchase of six computers. The contract indicated that Hi Tech would deliver the six machines to the Danker firm for a total price of $16,000. The contract said that the computers would be installed at no extra charge. On the date of performance, the six computers arrived at the law firm’s offices and Don paid the agreed-on purchase price. When Don called Hi Tech president Harold Scott to ask about installation, Harold said, “We’ll get to it eventually.” Disgusted, Don told Gretchen Giltner, a new associate who was the office computer whiz, to try to install the computers. Gretchen gave it her best shot, but during the next week both lawyers and secretaries at Danker experiences assorted difficulties with the computers. An angry Don once again called Harold, this time telling him that he was going to send back all of the computers and demand a refund of the purchase price. In response, Harold sent out one of his technicians, who concluded that the computers themselves each had a slight keyboard problem. The technician added, however, that almost all of the difficulties Danker workers had experienced the previous week were due to a faulty installation job. Discuss whether Danker & Kodner has the right at this point to send the computers back to Hi Tech for a refund. U.C.C. §2-508, 2-602, 2-606, 2-608; Official Comment 3 and 4 to §2-606, Official Comment 2 to §2-106.
18.5. Hi Tech Corp. 公司 是芝加哥的一家零售商 ,主要销售办公电脑。Danker & Kodner 是一家由 10 名律师组成的合伙企业,也位于芝加哥。该律师事务所的管理合伙人 Don Danker 与 Hi Tech 谈判了一份购买六台计算机的合同。合同表明,Hi Tech 将 以 16,000 美元的总价将这六台机器交付给 Danker 公司。合同规定,这些计算机将免费安装。在履约当天,六台电脑到达了律师事务所的办公室,Don 支付了商定的购买价格。当 Don 打电话给 Hi Tech 总裁 Harold Scott 询问安装问题时,Harold 说:“ 我们最终会解决这个问题。“ 唐感到厌恶,他告诉新同事格雷琴 · 吉尔特纳 (Gretchen Giltner),他是办公室的电脑专家,尝试安装这些电脑。Gretchen 尽了最大的努力,但在接下来的一周里,Danker 的律师和秘书都 遇到了电脑方面的各种困难。愤怒的 Don 再次打电话给 Harold,这次告诉他他要把所有的电脑都寄回 去,并要求退还购买价格。作为回应,Harold 派出了他的一名技术人员,他得出结论,每台计算机本身都存在轻微的键盘问题 。 然而,技术人员补充说,Danker 工人在前一周遇到的几乎所有困难都是由于安装工作错误造成的。 讨论 Danker & Kodner 是否有权此时将电脑退回给 Hi Tech 退款。 UCC §2-508、2-602、2-606、2-608;§2-606 的官方意见 3 和 4,§2-106 的官方意见 2。
Here the buyer has accepted the computers under §2-606(1)(b) for failure to make an effective rejection after a reasonable opportunity to inspect. Alternatively, the buyer has accepted the computers under §2-606(1)(c) since the buyer used the computer after knowing that the seller was arguably in breach of its contractual duty to install the computers. The buyer may argue that it did not have a reasonable opportunity to inspect under §2-606(1)(b) because given the seller’s delay in installing, the computers were never installed properly, therefore the buyer couldn’t tell if the computers function properly.
在此,买方接受了 §2-606(1)(b) 项下的计算机,因为在合理的检查机会后未能做出有效的拒绝。或者,买方已根据 §2-606(1)(c) 接受计算机,因为买方在知道卖方可以说违反了安装计算机的合同义务后使用了计算机。买方可能会争辩说,它没有合理的机会根据 §2-606(1)(b) 进行检查,因为鉴于卖方延迟安装,计算机从未正确安装,因此买方无法判断计算机是否正常运行。
Assume the buyer did accept the computers, the buyer probably could still revoke under §2-608(1)(b) and argue acceptance wasn’t due by the difficulty in discovering the non-conformity before acceptance. This argument probably will work with respect to the keyboard non-conformity. However, the buyer still needs to show the keyboard non-conformity amounts to substantial impairment of the computers’ value. If the buyer relies on the seller’s failure to install as the substantial impairment requirement under §2-608(1), the buyer can argue following his phone call with the seller, he assumed the seller would eventually cure the non-installation, thus satisfying §2-608(1)(a). But the problem with that argument is instead of waiting for the seller to cure the non-installation, the buyer took the matter into his own hand and installed the computers himself, which necessarily calls into question the buyer’s assumption that the seller eventually will cure the non-conformity. As for the timing of revocation, §2-608(2) requires revocation must occur before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects.
假设买方确实接受了这些计算机,买方可能仍然可以根据 §2-608(1)(b) 撤销,并辩称由于在接受之前难以发现不合格项而不应接受。这个论点可能适用于键盘不合规。但是,买方仍需要证明键盘不合格相当于对 计算机价值的重大损害 。 如果买方依赖卖方未能安装作为 §2-608(1) 项下的重大减值要求,买方可以在与卖方通电话后争辩说,他假设卖方最终会纠正未安装,从而满足 § 2-608(1)(a) 的。但这种论点的问题在于,买方不是等待卖方纠正不合格情况,而是自己动手处理此事并自己安装计算机,这必然会质疑买方关于卖方最终会纠正不合格情况的假设。至于撤销的时间,§2-608(2) 要求撤销必须在货物状况发生任何非 由自身缺陷引起的实质性变化之前发生。
Assume, however, the buyer did not accept the computers, the keyboard non-conformity probably violates the perfect tender rule in §2-601. As such, the seller would have a right to cure under §2-508(2). However, if the non-conformity is the failure to install, then the seller probably will not qualify for the right to cure under §2-508(2).
但是,假设买方不接受这些计算机,则键盘不合格可能违反了 §2-601 中的完美招标规则。因此,卖方有权根据 §2-508(2) 进行补救。 但是,如果不合格是安装失败,那么卖家可能没有资格获得 §2-508(2) 规定的补救权。
CLOSING WITH LEASES, INTERNATIONAL SALES, AND REAL ESTATE PP. 337
以租约、国际销售和房地产结束 第 337 页
Problem 19.1(a) Not quite a month following her last visit to your law office, Mammoth College athletic director Shelly Stone (from Problem 18.4) is back to see you again –with more bus problems. After unloading Big Al’s bus to him, Shelly discovered that a local bank, First National, had a leasing division that leased buses. A leasing officer there, Mark Archer, had convinced Shelly of the benefits of a financed lease. Shelly had agreed to a five-year finance lease of a two-year-old bus that she had personally selected form the fleet of Little Sal’s, a local bus dealer who happened to be Big Al’s younger sister. Shelly had intended to have a mechanic check out the bus before accepting it, but Marl Archer convinced her that his bank’s experience with Little Sal’s was so consistently positive that Shelly should not waste her time and money getting a mechanic. Unfortunately, when the bus took its first long trip with the women’s volleyball team, the bus turned out to be an even worse oil guzzler than the one Shelly had dumped back on Big Al’s. The lease contract that Shelly signed with First National had a clause that sais, “the lessee’s promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee’s acceptance of the goods, AND THERE SHALL BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS CLAUSE.” Shelly now wants to know if she can revoke acceptance of the bus, and if she cannot, what other recourse she has and against whom. What do you advise?
问题 19.1(a) 在她上次访问您的律师事务所后不到一个月,猛犸象学院的体育总监 Shelly Stone(来自问题 18.4)又回来见您了——带来了更多的公交问题。在将 Big Al 的公共汽车卸给他后,Shelly 发现当地一家名为 First National 的银行有一个租赁部门,负责租赁公共汽车。那里的租赁官员马克·阿切尔 (Mark Archer) 让雪莉相信融资租赁的好处。Shelly 同意了一辆两年前的公共汽车的五年期融资租赁,这辆公共汽车是她亲自从当地公共汽车经销商 Little Sal's 的车队中挑选的,而 Little Sal's 恰好是 Big Al 的妹妹。Shelly 本来打算在接受之前让机械师检查一下这辆公共汽车,但 Marl Archer 说服她,他的银行对 Little Sal's 的体验始终如一,以至于 Shelly 不应该浪费时间和金钱去找机械师。不幸的是,当这辆巴士与女子排球队一起进行第一次长途旅行时,这辆巴士的耗油量比 Shelly 倒在 Big Al's 上的那辆还要糟糕。Shelly 与 First National 签订的租赁合同中有一项条款 ,“承租人在租赁合同下的承诺在承租人接受货物后变得不可撤销且独立,本条款的效力无例外。Shelly 现在想知道她是否可以撤销对公共汽车的接受,如果她不能,她还有什么其他追索权以及针对谁。您有什么建议?
ANSWER: Does the financed lessee (Mammoth College) qualify for the financed lessee’s right to revoke acceptance under §2A-517? If you look at §2A-517, you will see that the financed lessee’s right to revoke acceptance of the goods is very narrow. But in this problem, we arguably have a case that qualifies under this fairly narrow window that we are given in a financed lease for the financed lessee to revoke acceptance that we find in 2A-517(1)(b). So the argument here for revocation, even though it is a financed lease, is the oil guzzling problem is a substantial nonconformity that was not discovered because Mammoth College’s (financed lessee) acceptance was reasonably induced by First National’s (financed lessor) assurances about the reliability of the supplier’s (Little Sale) buses. Now, maybe one could question whether it was really reasonable for Shelley to take Mark Archer’s word for it, rather than having her mechanic go through with the inspection she had originally planned. If we say that it was reasonable for her to be induced by the financed lessor’s assurances to accept these goods, then she could fit under §2A-517(1)(b), that very narrow window for revocation by a financed lessee.
回答:受资助的承租人(猛犸学院)是否有资格根据 §2A-517 获得受融资承租人撤销接受的权利? 如果您查看 §2A-517,您会发现融资承租人撤销对货物的接受权非常狭窄。但在这个问题上,我们可以说有一个案例,在这个相当狭窄的窗口下, 我们在融资租赁中获得了融资租赁,以撤销我们在 2A-517(1)(b) 中找到的接受 。 因此 ,即使这是融资租赁,这里支持撤销的论点是,耗油问题是一个严重的不合规行为,没有被发现,因为猛犸学院(融资承租人)的接受是由 First National(融资出租人)对供应商(Little Sale)公交车可靠性的保证合理诱导的。现在,也许有人会质疑 Shelley 相信 Mark Archer 的话,而不是让她的机械师完成她最初计划的检查,这是否真的合理。如果我们说融资出租人的承诺诱使她接受这些货物是合理的,那么她可以符合§2A-517(1)(b) 的规定 ,即融资承租人撤销货物的非常狭窄的窗口。
Suppose we say that the financed lessee does have a right to revoke, that Mammoth College really does qualify for the right to revocation under §2A-517(1)(b). Then the question is would that right to revocation under §2A-517(1)(b) overcome first the statutory “Heller High Water” clause of 2A-407(1)? The statutory “Heller High Water” clause of 2A-407(1) is going to be part of non-consumer financed lease. In the case where financed lessee still has a right to revoke under §2A-517(1)(b), that right to revoke triumphs the effect of the statutory “Heller High Water” clause of 2A-407(1). If you look at Official Comment 1 to §2A-516, it says “revocation of acceptance is not prohibited, even after the lessee’s promise has become irrevocable and independent.” And that means even after the statutory Heller High Water Clause has become effective. And then Official Comment 1 to §2A-407 says “the provisions of this Section (remember 2A-407 is the source of the statutory Heller High Water Clause) remains subject to the lessee’s revocation of acceptance). So, in two different Official Comments, it is clear that the financed lessee, to the extent it qualifies for the narrow window for revocation of acceptance, will be able to exercise that right to revoke acceptance against the financed lessor, notwithstanding the statutory Heller High Water Clause of 2A-407(1). So, then the question in this problem is are we dealing here with the statutory Heller High Water Clause? The answer is we always are, but in this case we are dealing with a contractual Heller High Water Clause and this contractual Heller High Water Clause sounds a lot like the statutory HHW Clause that we find in 2A-407(1); but it is not exactly the same because the contractual HHW has this boldface no-exception clause that was added to the standard statutory language of the HHW Clause. And that boldface no exception clause could serve to change the usual rule that the financed lessee’s right to revoke remains available even in the face of the statutory HHW Clause. This contractual HHW says no exceptions. The better way to draft the contractual HHW Clause according to Keating is to say “no exceptions, including, especially the right to revoke.” But it just says no exceptions. Maybe a court would refuse to enforce this contractual HHW Clause on the grounds they had a public policy, but it is not like we are dealing with a consumer financed lessee here. We are dealing with a merchant kind of financed lessee (nonprofit).
假设我们说受资助的承租人确实有权撤销,那么猛犸学院确实有资格根据 §2A-517(1)(b) 获得撤销权。 那么问题来了,根据 §2A-517(1)(b) 的撤销权是否会首先克服 2A-407(1) 的法定“Heller High Water”条款? 2A-407(1) 的法定“Heller High Water”条款将成为非消费者融资租赁的一部分。在融资承租人仍有权根据 §2A-517(1)(b) 撤销的情况下, 该撤销权胜过 2A-407(1) 的法定“Heller High Water”条款的效力。 如果您查看 §2A-516 的官方评论 1,它说“不禁止撤销接受,即使在承租人的承诺变得不可撤销和独立之后。这意味着即使在法定的 Heller High Water Clause 生效之后也是如此。然后 ,§2A-407 的官方评论 1 说“本节的规定(请记住 2A-407 是法定 Heller High Water 条款的来源 )仍受承租人撤销接受的约束)。 因此,在两个不同的官方意见中, 很明显, 尽管有 2A-407(1) 的法定 Heller High Water 条款 , 但融资承租人在其符合撤销接受的狭窄窗口的范围内,将能够行使撤销对融资出租人的接受的权利 。 那么,这个问题的问题是,我们在这里处理的是法定的 Heller High Water Clause 吗? 答案是我们总是这样,但在这种情况下,我们正在处理合同 Heller 高水位条款 ,这个合同 Heller 高水位条款听起来很像我们在 2A-407(1) 中找到的法定 HHW 条款;但它并不完全相同,因为合同 HHW 有这个粗体无例外条款 ,该条款被添加到 HHW 条款的标准法定语言中。而这个粗体字的无例外条款可以改变通常的规则,即即使面对法定的 HHW 条款,融资承租人的撤销权仍然有效。这份合同 HHW 没有例外。根据 Keating 的说法,起草合同 HHW 条款的更好方法是说 “没有例外,尤其是撤销权”。但它只是说没有例外。也许法院会以他们有公共政策为由拒绝执行这个合同 HHW 条款,但这不像我们在这里与消费者融资的承租人打交道。我们正在与一家商人融资的承租人(非营利组织)打交道。
Are parties allowed to enforce contractual HHW Clauses that are more severe or have few exceptions than the statutory HHW Clause that we find in §2A-407(1)? The answer to that question is yes, parties should be allowed to enforce contractual HHW Clauses that are more severe or have fewer exceptions than the statutory HHW Clause that we find in §2A-407(1). §2A-407(3) seems to sanction the validity of contractual HHW Clauses generally when it says “this Section does not affect the validity, under any other laws, of contractual HHW Clause.” Comment 6 to §2A-407 seems to accept, albeit in an unrelated context, that there could be differences between the statutory HHW Clauses in one hand and explicit contractual HHW Clause on the other hand. Comment 6 says “although there is no statutory HHW Clause implied in consumer financed leases, §2A-407 is neutral on the issue of whether an explicit contractual HHW Clause in a consumer financed lease would be enforced, and that issue will continue to be determined by the facts of this case and other law, which this Section does not affect; that court have enforced contractual HHW Clauses in non-consumer financed leases.” There seem to be no overriding policy in Article 2A to prevent parties from drafting HHW Clauses that are more severe in effect than the operation of the statutory HHW Clause provided by §2A-407(1).
是否允许各方执行比我们在 §2A-407(1) 中找到的法定 HHW 条款更严重或几乎没有例外情况的合同 HHW 条款?这个问题的答案是肯定的,应该允许各方执行比我们在 §2A-407(1) 中找到的法定 HHW 条款更严重或更少例外的合同 HHW 条款。§2A-407(3) 似乎一般认可合同 HHW 条款的有效性,因为它说“本节不影响合同 HHW 条款在任何其他法律下的有效性”。§2A-407 的第 6 条评论似乎接受了,尽管在无关的上下文中,法定的 HHW 条款与明确的合同 HHW 条款之间可能存在差异。评论 6 说:“尽管消费者融资租赁中没有隐含的法定 HHW 条款,但 §2A-407 对于消费者融资租赁中明确的合同 HHW 条款是否会得到执行的问题持中立态度,并且该问题将继续由本案的事实和其他法律决定,本节不影响这些法律;该法院在非消费者融资租赁中执行了合同 HHW 条款。第 2A 条中似乎没有压倒一切的政策来阻止各方起草比 §2A-407(1) 规定的法定 HHW 条款的实施更严重的 HHW 条款。
If you want to talk about the UCC more generally and its approach to questions like this: think about the provisions of Section 1-302, which applies to Article 2A as they do to all the UCC Articles, unless there is something in those other articles that specifically displaces it. Section 1-302 says the basic rule is that party are free to make their own agreement that varies the default terms of the code as a general proposition. As a general proposition, the terms of the code are default terms that can be varied by the two parties if they want to (freedom of contract). But there are exceptions to that freedom of contract, the exceptions are “unless something in the Code specifically prohibits it in a particular context OR unless the parties are attempting to disclaim the obligation of good faith, reasonableness, diligence, and care that are prescribed by the Code.”
如果您想更广泛地讨论 UCC 及其处理此类问题的方法:请考虑第 1-302 节的规定 ,该条款适用于第 2A 条 ,就像它们适用于所有 UCC 条款一样, 除非其他条款中有明确的内容取代了它。 第 1-302 节规定,基本规则是当事方可以自由地达成自己的协议,作为一般命题来改变法典的默认条款。作为一般主张,代码的条款是默认条款,如果双方愿意,可以更改(合同自由)。但是,这种合同自由也有例外,例外情况是“除非本准则中的某些内容在特定情况下明确禁止它,或者除非双方试图否认本准则规定的诚信、合理、勤勉和谨慎的义务。
It does not appear that the contractual HHW Clause inserted in this lease would conflict with the Code’s general presumption in favor of freedom of contract. Especially, given what we are told in 2A-407(3) that this section does not affect the validity, under any other law, of the contractual HHW Clause.
该租约中插入的合同 HHW 条款似乎不会与法典中有利于合同自由的一般推定相冲突。特别是,鉴于我们在 2A-407(3) 中被告知 ,本节不影响合同 HHW 条款在任何其他法律下的有效性。
Suppose that the contractual HHW Clause prevails and Mammoth College, the financed lessee, has no revocation right even though they might otherwise have such revocation right under 2A-517(1)(b), what other right does the financed lessee have here even though they bargained away the right of revocation? The financed lessee will still have implied warranty recourse against the Supplier (Little Sales). So, Shelley should be able to demand that Little Sales fix the bus or pay damages stemming from its breach of implied warranty. How can the financed lessee sue the supplier for breach of implied warranty when there is no privity, there is no direct contact with each other? Because this is a financed Lease, First National (the financed lessor) made no implied warranty to its financed lessee under 2A-212(1), but the sale’s implied warranty of merchantability under 2-314 which the supplier made to the financed lessor in that sale of the bus from the supplier to the financed lessor, that implied warranty of merchantability runs directly to the financed lessee according to 2A-209(1). Comment 2 to 2A-407 specifically notes the financed lessee’s rights against the supplier under 2A-209 as a kind of consolation for the harsh effect of the statutory HHW Clause. In addition, 2A-210 leaves open the possibility of express warranty rights against the financed lessor, which can apply even in the case of a financed lessee as long as the financed lessor makes such express warranties. Maybe in this case those rights will be relevant here, if we interpret Mark Archer’s (the officer for First National) comment to be an affirmation of fact that the bus from Little Sales will be reliable.
假设合同 HHW 条款占上风,并且融资承租人 Mammoth College 没有撤销权,即使他们可能根据 2A-517(1)(b) 拥有撤销权,那么即使融资承租人通过谈判放弃了撤销权,他们在这里还有什么其他权利? 融资承租人仍将对供应商 (Little Sales) 享有默示保证追索权。因此,Shelley 应该能够要求 Little Sales 修理巴士或支付因违反默示保证而产生的赔偿金。 在彼此之间没有相互关系、没有直接联系的情况下,融资承租人如何起诉供应商违反默示保证? 由于这是一项融资租赁,First National(融资出租人)未根据 2A-212(1) 向其融资承租人做出默示保证,但供应商在从供应商向融资出租人出售公共汽车时向融资出租人作出的 2-314 项下销售的适销性默示保证 ,该适销性默示保证根据 2A-209(1) 直接适用于融资承租人。 第 2 至 2A-407 条特别指出,融资承租人根据 2A-209 对供应商享有的权利 ,作为对法定 HHW 条款的严厉影响的一种安慰。此外,2A-210 保留了对融资出租人享有明示保证权的可能性, 只要融资出租人做出此类明示保证,该权利甚至适用于融资承租人。 也许在这种情况下,这些权利在这里是相关的,如果我们将 Mark Archer(First National 的官员)的评论解释为对 Little Sales 的公共汽车将是可靠的事实的肯定。
Problem 19.1 (b) Same facts as part (a), except that the lease contract did not contain the clause that was quoted in part (a). Can Shelly revoke acceptance of the bus?
问题 19.1 (b) 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是租赁合同不包含 (a) 部分中引用的条款。Shelly 可以撤销对公共汽车的接受吗?
ANSWER: in the absence of this contractual HHW Clause, Shelley should be able to revoke her acceptance because then the only HHW Clause will be the statutory one found in §2A-407(1). If the statutory HHW Clause was the only HHW Clause, the Code specifically says even if the statutory HHW Clause applies the right of revocation of acceptance for the financed lessee would supersede that, at least in a case where the financed lessee could show that it has the right of revocation. It is a narrow window for the financed lessee to show that they have a right of revocation. But in this fact, this may will be the case where the financed lessee could show that they qualify for that limited right of revocation that is outlined in 2A-517(1)(b).
回答:在没有此合同 HHW 条款的情况下,Shelley 应该能够撤销她的接受,因为唯一的 HHW 条款将是 §2A-407(1) 中的法定条款。如果法定的 HHW 条款是唯一的 HHW 条款,则《守则》明确规定,即使法定的 HHW 条款适用,融资承租人的撤销承兑权利将取代该权利,至少在融资承租人可以证明其拥有撤销权的情况下。对于融资承租人来说,这是一个狭窄的窗口,可以证明他们有撤销权。但在这种情况下,如果受资助的承租人可以证明他们有资格获得 2A-517(1)(b) 中概述的有限撤销权,则可能会出现这种情况。
Problem 19.1 (c) Same facts as part (a), except instead of a bus for Mammoth College, Shelly was leasing a van for her personal use, and the lease contract did not contain the clause that was quoted in part (a). Further, Mark Archer gave no assurances to Shelly in this case. When it turns out that the van is an oil guzzler, can Shelly revoke acceptance of the van? If not, what recourse does Shelly have and against whom?
问题 19.1 (c) 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,除了 Shelly 租用的不是前往猛犸学院的公共汽车,而是租了一辆面包车供她个人使用,并且租赁合同不包含 (a) 部分中引用的条款。此外,Mark Archer 在本案中没有向 Shelly 做出任何保证。当事实证明这辆面包车是耗油大户时,Shelly 可以撤销对这辆面包车的接受吗?如果不是,Shelly 有什么追索权,对谁?
ANSWER: Is Shelley subject to even a statutory HHW Clause? Because she is a consumer, she is not stuck with the statutory HHW Clause of 2A-407(1). Ultimately, that will not matter much for revocation purposes because the statutory HHW Clause remains subject to any revocation of acceptance right that the lessee would have. Does Shelley, as a consumer financed lessee in this case, have any right to revoke under §2A-517? 2A-517(1)(b), the problem for Shelley, even though she is a consumer now, is that she does not have the lessor’s assurances in this variation, and in the absence of the financed lessor’s assurances the financed lessee would not qualify under the narrow window of revocation that is available to any financed lessee, whether consumer or otherwise. So, in this variation, Shelley can no longer say, as she should say to qualify under 2A-517(1)(b), that the oil guzzling problem is a substantial non-conformity that was not discovered because her acceptance was reasonably induced by First National’s assurances about the reliability of Little Sales vans, because there were no such assurances in this variation. NO ASSURANCES, NO RIGHT TO REVOKE UNDER §2A-517(1)(B). What about the right to revocation for her under 2A-517(2)? That subsection allows revocation, except in a non-consumer financed lease, whenever “the lessor defaults under the lease contract and the default substantially impair the value of that lot or commercial unit for the lessee.” And an example of such a default given in Comment 1 to 2A-517 is if the lessor took on a continuing duty to maintain the leased goods, if the lessor took on a continuing duty to maintain the leased goods. The problem that Shelley is going to have under 2A-517(2) is the finding the nature of First National’s default in a case where First National did not make any implied warranties because of 2A-212(1) nor do they make any express warranty under 2A-210 because here they were no assurances by First National, nor they did assume any continuing duties to maintain the van. So, how can First National default when they have not made any promises?
回答:Shelley 是否受法定 HHW 条款的约束? 因为她是消费者,所以她不受 2A-407(1) 的法定 HHW 条款的约束。 最终,这对于撤销目的来说并不重要,因为法定的 HHW 条款仍然受制于承租人本应拥有的任何接受权的撤销。 Shelley 作为本案中的消费融资承租人,是否有权根据 §2A-517 撤销合同?2A-517(1)(b) 一案中, 即使 Shelley 现在是消费者,她的问题在于她没有出租人对这种变更的保证 ,并且在没有融资出租人的保证的情况下,融资承租人将不符合任何融资承租人(无论是消费者还是其他)可获得的狭窄撤销窗口的资格。因此,在这种变化中,Shelley 不能再说,正如她应该说的符合 2A-517(1)(b) 的资格一样, 耗油问题是一种严重的不符合项,没有被发现,因为她被接受是被 First National 对 Little Sales 货车可靠性的保证合理诱导的,因为这种变化中没有这样的保证。 无保证,无 §2A-517(1)(B) 规定的撤销权。根据 2A-517(2) 为她撤销的权利呢? 该小节允许撤销,但在非消费融资租赁中,只要“出租人违反租赁合同,并且违约严重损害了承租人该地块或商业单元的价值”。 评论 1 至 2A-517 中给出的此类违约的一个例子是,如果出租人承担了维护租赁货物的持续责任,如果出租人承担了维护租赁货物的持续责任。Shelley 在 2A-517(2) 下将面临的问题是 ,在 First National 没有根据 2A-212(1) 做出任何默示保证,也没有根据 2A-210 做出任何明示保证的情况下,发现 First National 违约的性质 ,因为在这里他们没有得到 First National 的保证,也没有承担任何持续的维护面包车的责任。那么,First National 在没有做出任何承诺的情况下怎么会违约呢?
Suppose that Shelley (the consumer financed lessee) in this variation has no revocation rights against First National (the financed lessor), in this case what recourse does she have and against whom? Once again, she is not without remedy even if she has no revocation rights against the financed lessor. She can sue for direct rights against the supplier (Little Sales) for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because of pass through rule under §2A-209(1). Knowing that she does have that right, let’s think about her remedies against Little Sales the Supplier. We already know that Shelley cannot revoke her acceptance here as against the financed lessor, First National. Can she at least revoke her acceptance against Little Sales, the supplier as a potential remedy for breach of implied warranty of merchantability? That is not going to work because the supplier does not even have the residual right to the vans anymore because the supplier sold the vans to the financed lessor, First National. So, any rights that Shelley would have against the supplier for this breach of implied warranty would have to be limited to either money damages or a cure of the problem rather than revoking acceptance and avoid this financed lease altogether. If Shelley’s warranty rights against the supplier enabled her to avoid the financed lease, then that would seem contrary to the specific prohibition of most financed lease revocation that we find in the language of 2A-517(1).
假设在此变体中,Shelley(消费者资助的承租人)对 First National(融资的出租人)没有撤销权,在这种情况下,她有什么追索权,对谁追索?再一次,即使她对融资出租人没有撤销权,她也不是没有补救措施。她可以起诉供应商 (Little Sales) 因 §2A-209(1) 下的传递规则而违反适销性默示保证的直接权利。知道她确实有这个权利,让我们想想她对 Little Sales the Supplier 的补救措施。我们已经知道,Shelley 不能撤销她对融资出租人 First National 的接受。她至少可以撤销她对供应商 Little Sales 的接受,作为违反适销性默示保证的潜在补救措施吗?这是行不通的,因为供应商甚至不再拥有货车的剩余权利,因为供应商将货车卖给了融资的出租商 First National。因此,Shelley 因违反默示保证而对供应商享有的任何权利都必须限于金钱赔偿或解决问题,而不是撤销接受并完全避免这种融资租赁。如果 Shelley 对供应商的保证权使她能够避免融资租赁,那么这似乎与我们在 2A-517(1) 中发现的对大多数融资租赁撤销的具体禁止相悖。
Problem 19.1 (d) Same facts as part (a), except instead of a bus for Mammoth College, Shelly was leasing a van for personal use. The lease contract contained the same clause as in part (a), but Mark Archer gave no assurances to Shelly in this case. When it turns out that the van is an oil guzzler, can Shelly revoke acceptance of the van? If not, what recourse does Shelly have and against whom?
问题 19.1 (d) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Shelly 没有租一辆公共汽车去猛犸学院,而是租了一辆面包车供个人使用。租赁合同包含与 (a) 部分相同的条款,但 Mark Archer 在本案中没有向 Shelly 提供任何保证。当事实证明这辆面包车是耗油大户时,Shelly 可以撤销对这辆面包车的接受吗?如果不是,Shelly 有什么追索权,对谁?
ANSWER: This is a contractual HHW Clause, so can Shelley revoke acceptance of the van? Should this contractual HHW Clause be given effect? Ultimately, it won’t matter much whether this contractual HHW Clause should be given affect. Why is that? Because if you look at the statutory HHW Clause alone and you look at 2A-517(1), which defines the right of revocation for any financed lessee, the problem is in this variation is that First National has given no assurances to Shelley. Without the financed lessor’s assurances, Shelley does not have a way to fit herself under 2A-517(1) – that narrow window for right of revocation for any financed lessee, consumer or not. She is not going to have a right of revocation anyway. Putting in the contractual HHW Clause does not make it any worse in the case where Shelley is not getting assurances from the financed lessee.
回答:这是合同 HHW 条款,那么 Shelley 可以撤销对面包车的接受吗? 该合同 HHW 条款是否应该生效? 最终,这个合同 HHW 条款是否应该生效并不重要。 为什么? 因为如果你只看法定的 HHW 条款,再看一下 2A-517(1), 它定义了任何融资承租人的撤销权,那么这种变化的问题在于 First National 没有向 Shelley 提供任何保证。如果没有融资出租人的保证,Shelley 就无法根据 2A-517(1) 调整自己 ——这是任何融资承租人(无论是否是消费者)的撤销权的狭窄窗口。无论如何,她都不会有撤销权。在 Shelley 没有从融资承租人那里获得保证的情况下,加入合同 HHW 条款并不会使情况变得更糟。
What recourse does she have and against whom? The same as part c, she will have damages remedy against the supplier for breach of implied warranty under §2A-209(1).
她有什么追索权,对谁追索?与 c 部分相同,她将根据 §2A-209(1) 对供应商违反默示保证获得损害赔偿。
Problem 19.1 (e) Same facts as part (a), except that the problem with the bus was not oil guzzling but a defective steering wheel that Shelly discovered even before leaving Little Sal’s lot (but rather after signing the lease with the bank). (1) Must Shelly go through with the lease? (2) What if the clause had said that Shelly’s obligations under the lease became irrevocable and independent “upon the lessee’s singing of the lease contract” instead of “upon the lessee’s acceptance of the goods”?
问题 19.1 (e) 与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是公共汽车的问题不是耗油,而是 Shelly 在离开 Little Sal 的地段之前(而是在与银行签订租约之后)发现的方向盘有缺陷。(1) Shelly 必须完成租约吗?(2) 如果该条款规定 Shelly 在租赁下的义务在“承租人唱租赁合同时”而不是“在承租人接受货物时”变得不可撤销和独立,该怎么办?
ANSWER: in this case, Shelley should not have to go through with this lease because both the statutory and the contractual HHW Clauses do not take effect or do not kick in until acceptance. So, it is unlikely that Shelley has accepted the bus at the point when she discovered the defects because at that point she had not yet a reasonable opportunity to inspect the bus, which it is going to be required for acceptance under §2A-515(1). That was the fighting issue in the Rafter-Seven case, which was whether the buyer (the farmer) had in fact accepted the sprinkler system under this financed lease, so as to trigger both the statutory and contractual HHW Clauses.
回答: 在这种情况下,Shelley 不应该必须完成这份租约,因为法定和合同 HHW 条款都不会生效,或者在接受之前不会生效。因此,Shelley 不太可能在发现缺陷时接受这辆公共汽车,因为那时她还没有合理的机会来检查公共汽车, 根据 §2A-515(1) 的规定,这将是被接受的要求。这就是 Rafter-Seven 案的争论点 ,即买方(农民)是否真的接受了该融资租赁下的自动喷水灭火系统, 从而触发了法定和合同 HHW 条款。
What if the clause had said that Shelley’s obligation under the lease became irrevocable and independent “upon the lessee’s signing of the lease contract” instead of upon the lessee’s acceptance of the goods? At first look, we might think that this goes to far or is unconscionable or exceed the bound of reasonableness under §1-302. However, there is a reasonable argument that such a clause should be enforceable even though it seems draconian. Remember that this is a financed lease. Even if the financed lessee would have no rights against the lessor once the financed lessee signed, the financed lessee would still have a valid rights of recovery against the supplier because of 2A-209(1). In this case, Shelley might have to proceed with the lease contract, but she could at least insist on the supplier either fixing the steering wheel or curing it by providing a new bus that has a working steering wheel.
如果该条款规定,Shelley 在租赁下的义务在“承租人签署租赁合同时”而不是在承租人接受货物时变得不可撤销和独立,那会怎样? 乍一看,我们可能会认为这太过分了,或者是不合情理的,或者超出了 §1-302 规定的合理界限。 然而,有一个合理的论点认为,这样的条款应该是可执行的,即使它看起来很严厉。请记住,这是融资租赁。即使融资承租人在融资承租人签署后对出租人没有权利, 根据 2A-209(1), 融资承租人仍对供应商享有有效的追偿权 。 在这种情况下,Shelley 可能不得不继续履行租赁合同,但她至少可以坚持要求供应商修理方向盘或通过提供一辆方向盘可以正常工作的新公共汽车来修复方向盘。
Problem 19.2(a) Mal’s Shop for Men, a Chicago suit retailer, made a contract to buy four dozen men’s suits form Italy’s Best, a suit manufacturer headquartered in Italy. Mal’s received the suits on time and, as was the store’s practice, simply put the suits on the racks. The suits sat there for a couple of months before anyone bought them. When customers finally started buying the suits, virtually every customer who had purchased those suits complained about the suit’s “cheap material,” which frayed significantly. At this point, which was bout three months after the store had received delivery of the suits, Ma’s announced to Italy’s Best that Mal’s was sending back all of the suits for a refund. Does Mal’s have a right to void this contract? Does Italy’s Best have a right to cure?
问题 19.2(a) 芝加哥西装零售商 Mal's Shop for Men 签订了一份合同,从总部位于意大利的西装制造商 Italy's Best 购买四打男式西装。 Mal's 按时收到了西装,按照商店的惯例,只需将西装放在架子上即可。这些西装在那儿放了几个月,才有人买下它们。当客户最终开始购买这些西装时,几乎每个购买这些西装的客户都抱怨西装的“廉价材料”,磨损严重。此时,也就是商店收到西装交货三个月后,马 向意大利最佳宣布 Mal's 将退回所有西装以获得退款。Mal's 有权取消此合同吗?意大利最佳有治愈权吗?
ANSWER: Whenever we ask about the buyer’s right to avoid a contract under CISG Article 49(1)(a), there will be two issues to answer. First, did this nonconformity amount to a fundamental breach? And second, was the buyer’s notice timely? Going back to the first issue, did this nonconformity amount to a fundamental breach? The standard for a fundamental breach is found in Article 25, and the question is did this nonconformity amount to a substantial deprivation of the buyer’s expectation in this contract? It seems like the defect in this suit material probably does amount to a fundamental breach. Then back to the question of whether the buyer’s notice was timely: the standard for timely notice under Article 49(2)(b), the buyer had to give notice of the breach within a reasonable time after the buyer knew or ought to have known of the breach (sounds a lot like the UCC standard). Also, Article 39 defines timely notice in a similar way, and then Article 39(2) sets up an outside default time limit for buyer to give notice for any non-conformity and they set that at 2 years from the buyer’s receipt of the goods unless the parties want to change that by contract. How could it be argued that the buyer did not give timely notice here? The only question here is whether the buyer should have done some inspection of the suit as they came in. maybe not, maybe it is common in this retail industry for stores to just put the goods on the shelves when they receive them. Furthermore, whether even an inspection by the store in this case would have revealed a particular defect, which may have only manifested itself upon a more extensive inspection of the suit. Does the seller have a right to cure here? If a buyer qualifies for the right to avoid a contract under Article 49, that apparently removes the seller’s right to cure. Why? Because Article 48’s right to cure is expressly made subject to Article 49, which defines a buyer’s right to avoid. If you can come up with a cure that is such as to avoid having the buyer lose the substantial benefit of its bargain then that maybe enough to make your nonconformity not sufficient to let the buyer avoid under Article 49. Can the buyer insist on the cure? Whether or not a breach is fundamental, a buyer always has the right to demand a cure under Article 46 either repair or a whole new shipment depending on the nature of the problem. In this case, it is not clear that a cure by the seller could save this seller from owing damages, even if the seller were willing to send an entirely new shipment of suits.
回答: 每当我们询问买方根据 CISG 第 49(1)(a) 条撤销合同的权利时,都会有两个问题需要回答。 首先,这种不合规行为是否构成根本违约? 其次,买家的通知是否及时? 回到第一个问题,这种不符合是否构成根本性的违约?第 25 条是根本违约的标准 ,问题是 这种不符合是否构成对买方对本合同的期望的实质性剥夺?看起来这套诉讼材料的缺陷可能确实构成了根本性的违约。然后回到买方通知是否及时的问题:根据第 49(2)(b) 条的及时通知标准, 买方必须在买方知道或应该知道违约后的合理时间内发出违约通知 (听起来很像 UCC 标准)。此外, 第 39 条以类似的方式定义了及时通知,然后第 39(2) 条为买方设定了一个外部默认时限,以便对任何不符合项发出通知,并且他们将其规定为买方收到货物后 2 年,除非双方想通过合同更改。 怎么能说买方没有及时通知呢? 这里唯一的问题是买家是否应该在他们进来时对西装进行一些检查。也许不是,也许在这个零售行业,商店在收到商品时就把商品上架是很常见的。 此外,在这种情况下,即使商店进行检查也会发现特定缺陷,这可能只有在对诉讼进行更广泛的检查后才会显现出来。卖家有权在这里治愈吗?如果买方符合第 49 条规定的规避合同的权利 ,这显然剥夺了卖方的补救权。 为什么? 因为第 48 条的补救权明确受第 49 条的约束 ,该条款定义了买方的避免权。如果你能想出一种解决方法,即避免让买方失去其交易的实质性利益, 那么这可能足以使你的不合规行为不足以让买方根据第 49 条避免。 买方可以坚持治疗吗? 无论违约是否是根本性的,买方始终有权根据第 46 条要求补救, 无论是维修还是全新的货物,具体取决于问题的性质。在这种情况下,尚不清楚卖方的补救措施是否可以使该卖方免于欠款损害赔偿,即使卖方愿意发送一批全新的西装。
Problem 19.2(b) Same facts as part (a), except that the suit’s material was fine, but the sleeves on a few of the suits were missing one or both buttons. Once again, Mal’s does not discover these defects until customers start complaining later on. Does Mal’s have a right to void this contract? Does Italy’s Best have a right to cure?
问题 19.2(b) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是西装的材料很好,但一些西装的袖子缺少一个或两个纽扣。再一次,Mal's 直到客户后来开始抱怨才发现这些缺陷 。Mal's 有权取消此合同吗?意大利最佳有治愈权吗?
ANSWER: The buyer’s right to avoid the contract in this problem is weaker. First, the buttons missing and a few rips does not seem as substantial a non-conformity as cheap fabric. This defect is less likely to qualify as a fundamental breach under Article 25. Second, the buyer might be more likely in this case to lose its avoidance rights due to lack of timely notice because even a cursory inspection by the buyer here might have uncovered this defect even if such an inspection might not have uncovered the more latent defect in the suits material itself. The buyer could argue that the custom in this industry is to put the suits on the racks in exactly the shape that you received them, so you do not have to do any inspections. The seller’s right to cure under Article 48 here seems even stronger because it seems less likely in this variation that this missing buttons would amount to a cause of avoidance under Article 25 and 49
回答: 买方在这个问题上规避合同的权利较弱。首先,纽扣缺失和一些撕裂似乎不像廉价面料那样严重不合格。根据第 25 条,这种缺陷不太可能被认定为根本违约。其次,在这种情况下,买方可能更有可能由于没有及时通知而失去撤销权,因为即使买方在这里粗略地检查也可能发现这一缺陷,即使这种检查可能没有发现西装材料本身的更潜在缺陷。买家可能会争辩说,这个行业的习惯是将西装完全按照您收到它们的形状放在架子上,这样您就不必做任何检查。根据第 48 条,卖方的补救权似乎更强,因为在这种变化中,这种缺失的纽扣构成第 25 条和第 49 条规定的撤销原因的可能性似乎较小.
Problem 19.2(c) Same facts as part (a), except that Italy’s Best delivers the suits three weeks before the contractual delivery date and Mal’s discovers the fraying material by inspecting the suits immediately. Mal’s then calls Italy’s Best to complain about the material. Does Mal’s have a right to avoid this contract? Does Italy’s Best have a right to cure?
问题 19.2(c) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Italy's Best 在合同交货日期前三周交付防护服,而 Mal's 通过立即检查防护服发现了磨损材料。 Mal's 随后打电话给 Italy's Best 抱怨这些材料。Mal's 有权撤销此合同吗?意大利最佳有治愈权吗?
ANSWER: here, the early discovery of defects potentially affects whether the nature of the breach is going to be fundamental or not. In this case, it seems like there is a much better chance than in part (a) that the seller could make the buyer call in time, so it does not deprive the buyer of this substantial benefit of this bargain under the fundamental breach standard of Article 29. If you look at Article 37, you will see that Article 37 allows curing any event prior to the performance date. And in that respect Article 37 sounds a lot like UCC §2-508(1), which is the first option to cure, if you deliver early and there is something wrong and you deliver something conforming by the original performance date, then you have a right to cure under §2-508(1) and in the CISG context under Article 37
答案:在这里,缺陷的早期发现可能会影响违规的性质是否是根本性的。在这种情况下,卖方可以及时让买方打电话的机会似乎比 (a) 部分要好得多,因此它不会剥夺买方根据第 29 条的基本违约标准从这笔交易中获得的实质性利益。如果您查看第 37 条,您会发现第 37 条允许在履行日期之前解决任何事件。在这方面,第 37 条听起来很像 UCC §2-508(1),这是第一个补救选项,如果您提前交货并且出现问题并且您在原始履行日期之前交付了符合要求的东西,那么您有权根据 §2-508(1) 和 CISG 第 37 条进行补救.
Problem 19.3 After three years living in an apartment, Mike and Dayna Wellston had finally put together enough funds to purchase their home in a modest section of Manchester, New Hampshire. Mike was an engineer for an environmental auditing firm and Dayna was a reporter. Together their salaries were just enough to qualify for the mortgage necessary to finance the $170,000 home. Two months after closing, Mike was digging a hole in his backyard to put a hole for a basketball hoop when he happened upon a buried gas tank. Mike believed the sellers when they told him they knew nothing about the tank, but when Mike learned of the $40,000 cost of removal he and Dayna came to see you about a possible rescission action. Mike and Dayna had commissioned a standard inspection of the home that, not surprisingly, did not discover the tank. Mike was aware from his work that occasionally prospective home buyers would commission an environmental audit of the land they were going to buy, but such audits were rare give n the tremendous expense. What do you say to Mike and Dayna about the likelihood of a successful rescission of their home purchase?
问题 19.3 在公寓里住了三年后,Mike 和 Dayna Wellston 终于凑齐了足够的资金,在新罕布什尔州曼彻斯特的一个不起眼的地方买了房子。Mike 是一家环境审计公司的工程师,Dayna 是一名记者。他们的薪水加起来刚好够支付 170,000 美元房屋所需的抵押贷款。关闭两个月后,迈克正在自家后院挖一个洞,为篮球架打个洞,这时他碰巧发现了一个埋在地下的油箱。当卖家告诉他他们对水箱一无所知时,迈克相信了他们,但是当迈克得知 40,000 美元的搬迁费用时, 他和 Dayna 来找您,讨论可能的撤销行动。Mike 和 Dayna 委托对房屋进行了标准检查,毫不奇怪,没有发现水箱。迈克从他的工作中了解到,偶尔潜在的购房者会委托对他们要购买的土地进行环境审计,但这样的审计很少见,会带来巨大的费用。您对 Mike 和 Dayna 成功撤销购房的可能性有何看法?
ANSWER: Unlike the Gray case, it is clear that this is not going to be a fraud case because Mike, the buyer, says he believes the sellers when they said they knew nothing about this gas tank. The buyer’s only hope for rescission is going to be on the grounds of mutual mistake. What is the standard for rescission under the common law based on mistake? The Gray case sets out the Second Restatement rescission based on mistake where mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption in which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party. Could you argue that the buyers here are in stronger position than were the plaintiffs in the Gray case itself with respect to mistake? You could because the Gray plaintiffs had some notice of the septic tank problem that they later complained about as their basis for rescission. In fact, they admitted that they intended to use that for leverage in negotiating down the price. But in this problem, the buyer had no notice of the gas tank in the ground. How could you argue against the buyer in this case? Maybe you could say that the buyer should be held to a higher standard than most buyers at least as to this kind of defect given his job as an engineer for an environmental auditing firm. How does this come out? Keating does not know. However, if you are advising the buyer on purchasing a home, if the law of the state would provide the buyer with hazardous waste insurance, then why should the buyer spend his own money on expenses inspection to learn of problems if the buyer will be covered anyways?
回答:与 Gray 案不同 ,很明显这 不会是一起欺诈案,因为买方 Mike 说,当卖方说他们对这个油箱一无所知时,他相信了卖方。买方解除合同的唯一希望将基于双方的错误。根据普通法,基于错误的撤销标准是什么?Gray 案规定了基于错误的第二次重述撤销, 其中双方在订立合同时对订立合同的基本假设的错误对约定的履约交换有重大影响,合同可因受到不利影响的一方而无效。 您能否争辩说,在错误方面,这里的买方比 Gray 案本身的原告处于更有利的地位 ? 你可以,因为 Gray 原告对化粪池问题有一些通知,他们后来抱怨这些问题作为他们撤销合同的依据。事实上,他们承认他们打算以此作为谈判降低价格的杠杆。但在这个问题上,买方没有注意到地下的油箱。 在这种情况下,您如何与买方争论呢? 也许你可以说,考虑到他在一家环境审计公司的工程师的工作,至少在这种缺陷方面,买家应该被要求比大多数买家更高。 这是怎么出来的呢? 基廷不知道。 但是,如果您建议买方购买房屋,如果州法律会为买方提供危险废物保险,那么如果买方无论如何都会得到保障,为什么买方要花自己的钱进行费用检查以了解问题呢?
RISK OF LOSS WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 349
货物销售的损失风险 第 349 页
20.1. Lou from Lou’s Used Cars for Less (Problem 2.1) stops by your office with a problem that he says he has never encountered before. Two weeks ago, a new customer came in and agreed to buy a 2003 Chevy Camaro that Lou has on his lot. The next day, the customer sent Lou a cashier’s check for the full amount of the price and told Lou that he would be in during the next couple of days to pick up his car. A week later, when the customer still had not picked up the car, Lou unsuccessfully tried to phone the customer several times. The car is still sitting on Lou’s lot “taking up space,” as Lou put it. Lou has a couple of questions for you. First, would Lou be responsible if the car were damaged or stolen? Second, what can Lou do in this case and in the future to ensure that customers pick up their cars after they purchase them? U.C.C. §§2-509(3), 2-509(4), 2-103(1)(c), 2-509(2)(b), 2-510(3); Official Comment 3 to §2-509.
20.1. 来自 Lou's Used Cars for Less (问题 2.1) 的 Lou 带着一个他说他以前从未遇到过的问题来到您的办公室。两周前,一位新客户进来并同意购买 Lou 的 2003 年雪佛兰科迈罗。第二天,客户给 Lou 寄了一张全额的银行本票 ,并告诉 Lou 他将在接下来的几天里来取车。 一周后,当客户仍未取车时,Lou 多次尝试给客户打电话 ,但均未成功 。正如 Lou 所说,这辆车仍然停在 Lou 的地段上,“ 占用空间 ”。Lou 有几个问题要问你。首先, 如果汽车损坏或被盗,Lou 是否负责?其次,Lou 在这种情况下和未来可以做些什么来确保客户在购买汽车后取车? 加州大学 §§2-509(3)、2-509(4)、2-103(1)(c)、2-509(2)(b)、2-510(3);§2-509 的官方评论 3。
Risk of loss means any post-formation, pre-receipt damage or loss, through no fault of buyer or seller. Risk of loss only comes into play when there is a contract. Once the buyer receives the goods, in most cases, the buyer bears the risk of loss. (Exception: If the buyer makes a valid revocation of acceptance, then the risk of loss shifts back to the seller.) If the damage or loss was due to fault of one of the party, then that party bears the loss.
损失风险是指非买方或卖方过错造成的任何形成后、收货前的损坏或损失。 只有在有合同的情况下,损失风险才会发挥作用。一旦买方收到货物,在大多数情况下,买方承担损失的风险。(例外:如果买方将 撤销接受,则损失风险转移回卖方。如果损坏或损失是由于一方的过错造成的 ,则该方承担损失。
Different factors for risk of loss analysis
损失风险分析的不同因素:
a. Is there a third party carrier involved?
一个。是否涉及第三方运营商?
b. Do we have a merchant or non-merchant seller?
b.我们有卖家还是非卖家?
c. Whether there is breach by either buyer or seller?
c. 买方或卖方是否存在违约行为?
Article 2 risk of loss rules are default rules, and can be modified by agreement by both parties as long as it’s reasonable and under good faith.
第 2 条 损失风险规则是默认规则, 在合理且善意的情况下 ,双方可以协商修改 。
(1). The rule governing risk of loss where a buyer is to pick up the goods from the seller is found under §2-509(3), which says in this situation where it does not involve a third party carrier or a bailee, risk of loss doesn’t pass on to the buyer until receipt of goods if the seller is a merchant. Receipt is defined under 2-103(1)(c) as physical possession of the goods. Here the buyer has not picked up the car, so there is no receipt. So Lou will bear the risk of loss if the car is damaged or stolen.
(1). §2-509(3) 规定了买方从卖方处提货的损失风险的规则 ,该规则规定,在这种情况下,如果卖方是商人 ,则损失风险不会转移给买方,直到收到货物。根据 2-103(1)(c) 的规定,收货是指实际拥有货物。在这里,买方没有取车,所以没有收据。 因此 ,如果汽车损坏或被盗,Lou 将承担损失风险。
Lou can try to make the argument that once he notified the buyer the car is ready to pick up, he thereby transformed himself from a seller to a bailee, and therefore the risk of loss shifts to the buyer under §2-509(2)(b), on acknowledge by the bailee of the buyer’s right to possession of the goods. However, this argument probably won’t work. From a policy standpoint, the seller at that point is still in control of the goods, he is therefore expected to insure the goods under Comment 3 to §2-509. Moreover, if allow this argument to stand, then every merchant will make the same argument and will thus render §2-509(3) pointless.
Lou 可以尝试提出这样的论点,即一旦他通知买方汽车已准备好取车,他就从卖方转变为受托人,因此,在受托人承认买方有权占有货物的情况下,损失风险根据 §2-509(2)(b) 转移到买方身上。但是,此参数可能行不通。从保单的角度来看,卖方此时仍然控制着货物,因此他应根据 §2-509 的第 3 条意见为货物投保 。此外,如果允许这个论点成立,那么每个商人都会提出相同的论点,从而使 §2-509(3) 变得毫无意义。
Lou can also make an argument under §2-510(3) saying this is the case where the buyer is in breach, so the case is no longer under §2-509. However, this argument will work only if the contract Lou had with the buyer specifically provides that “Buyer’s failure to pick up the car before a certain date constitutes a breach of the contract.” The default obligation of a buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract under §2-301. Here the buyer meets the default obligation.
Lou 还可以根据 §2-510(3) 提出论点,称这是买方违约的情况 ,因此该案件不再属于 §2-509。但是,只有当 Lou 与买方签订的合同明确规定 “ 买方未能在特定日期之前取车构成违约”时 ,这一论点才有效。“ 买方的默认义务是按照 §2-301 下的合同接受和付款。在这里,买方履行了违约义务。
(2). In this case, Lou can call the buyer and say if he still does not come to pick up the car, Lou will charge him a storage fee. Or alternatively, if Lou knows where the buyer works or lives, Lou can just drive over and physically deliver the car to the buyer. In the future, when Lou drafts his sales contract, Lou can put in a provision that provides “It’s the duty of buyer to pick up the car before a certain date. The buyer’s failure to do so constitutes a breach of contract. And the seller is entitled to storage fee after such date if the buyer does not pick up the car.”
(2). 在这种情况下,Lou 可以打电话给买家,说如果他仍然不来取车,Lou 将向他收取仓储费。或者,如果 Lou 知道买家的工作或居住地,Lou 可以开车过来,亲自将汽车交付给买家。将来,当 Lou 起草他的销售合同时,Lou 可以加入一项条款,规定 “ 买方有责任在特定日期之前取车。买方未能这样做构成违约。如果买方不取车,卖方有权在该日期之后收取仓储费。“
20.2. Before Lou leaves your office, he has one more “problem customer” that he needs to discuss. It turns out that the customer, Karen Frederick, is a law student (“or so she tells me,” says Lou). Karen had purchased a 2005 Ford Taurus from Lou and brought the car back a couple of weeks later because of a major problem with the car’s brake system. Karen (who still had not purchased insurance on the car) had told Lou upon returning the car, “If you don’t fix the brake problem in two days, I will revoke my acceptance of the car and demand my money back.” The next night, before the brakes were fixed, vandals entered Lou’s lot after it closed (through no fault of Lou’s) and caused $3,000 worth of body damage to the car. Lou tells you he has fixed the brakes but needs to know whether he is also responsible for fixing the extensive body damage. (1) What do you advise? (2) Would your answer be different if Karen had said, “I hereby revoke until you get the brake system working properly”? U.C.C. §§2-510(1), 2-510(2), 2-608(2); Comment 3 to §2-510.
20.2. 在 Lou 离开您的办公室之前,他还有一个 “ 问题客户 ” 需要讨论。事实证明,客户 Karen Frederick 是一名法学院学生(“ 或者她是这么告诉我的,”Lou 说 )。Karen 从 Lou 那里购买了一辆 2005 年的福特金牛座,几周后由于汽车制动系统出现重大问题而将这辆车带回 。Karen(她还没有为这辆车买保险)在还车时告诉 Lou,“ 如果你在两天内没有解决刹车问题,我将撤销我对这辆车的接受并要求退还我的钱。“ 第二天晚上,在刹车修好之前,破坏者在停车场关闭后进入了 Lou 的停车场(不是 Lou 的过错 ),并对汽车造成了价值 3,000 美元的车身损坏。Lou 告诉你他已经修复了刹车,但需要知道他是否也负责修复广泛的车身损坏。(1) 您有什么建议?(2) 如果 Karen 说,“ 我特此撤销,直到你让制动系统正常工作 ”, 你的回答会有所不同吗?加州大学 §§2-510(1)、2-510(2)、2-608(2);§2-510 的注释 3。
(1). Under §2-510(1), here the buyer bears the risk of loss because she already accepted the car. This result doesn’t seem fair since here the seller Lou is in breach given the problematic brake system, the buyer is not in breach. Lou can make the argument that his breach has nothing to do with the vandalism, other than the breach caused the buyer to bring the car back where the car was later vandalized. Therefore Lou’s breach is the but-for cause of the vandalism damages, not the proximate cause. However, Lou is a merchant seller and is in control of the car, Lou is expected to insure the car under Comment 3 to §2-509.
(1). 根据 §2-510(1),买方承担损失风险,因为她已经接受了汽车。这个结果似乎不公平,因为这里卖方 Lou 违规,鉴于制动系统有问题,买方没有违规。Lou 可以辩称 ,他的违规行为与故意破坏无关 ,只是违规行为导致买家将汽车带回了汽车后来被破坏的地方 。 因此 ,Lou 的违约是造成破坏损害赔偿的 unless for 原因 ,而不是直接原因。但是,Lou 是一名商人卖家并控制着这辆车,预计 Lou 将根据 §2-509 的评论 3 为汽车投保。
The buyer can make the argument and try to fit the case under §2-510(2). If that is the case, then Lou will bear the risk of loss since the buyer does not have insurance. The problem then becomes whether the buyer rightfully revoked acceptance. Under §2-608(2), revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers the defect and before any substantial change in the condition of the goods not caused by its own defect. Now there’s substantial change in the car not caused by its defect. The buyer can argue that the car’s defect is the but-for cause of the vandalism damages. However, the cause §2-608 talks about is probably proximate cause.
买方可以提出论点并尝试根据 §2-510(2) 调整情况。如果是这种情况,那么 Lou 将承担损失风险,因为买方没有保险。那么问题就变成了买方是否合法地撤销了接受。根据 §2-608(2),撤销验收必须在买方发现缺陷后的合理时间内,并且在非自身缺陷引起的货物状况发生任何实质性变化之前。现在 ,汽车发生了重大变化,而不是由其缺陷引起的。买方可以争辩说,汽车的缺陷是造成故意破坏损害的原因。然而,§2-608 谈到的原因可能是近因。
(2). Now the buyer rightfully revoked acceptance and thus would be able to fit under §2-510(2), and the risk of loss will be on the seller.
(2). 现在买方理所当然地撤销了接受,因此能够符合 §2-510(2)的规定,损失的风险将由卖方承担。
20.3. Arlene Ledger, president of Heavy Metal, Inc. (from Problem 3.2), is having another run-in with Gold’s Gym. Gold’s had signed a contract for an order of 10 tons of assorted free weights, all painted gold, for one of its franchisees that is expanding the size of its operations. The contract said that the order would be sent “FOB Seller’s Factory.” Arlene had Heavy Metal’s usual carrier, Dependo, come and pick up the weights, and Arlene had notified Gold’s Gym of the shipment. The first problem was that Arlene neglected to tell her shipping department that these were to be gold-painted weights rather than the standard black-painted weights. Thus, the weights that were given to the carrier were black instead of gold, and the shipping boxes indicated that fact. The second problem was that the two trucks carrying the shipment were stolen during transit while they were parked overnight. The third problem was that the carrier’s insurance, unknown to Arlene, had lapsed the previous month for failure to pay the premium. (1) What Arlene would like to know is who, between Heavy Metal and Gold’s Gym, has the burden of pursuing the carrier for the loss? (2) Would your answer change if the sales contract had included a conspicuous exclusive remedy clause that limited Gold’s Gym’s remedies to repair or replacement of defective weights? U.C.C. §§2-319(1)(a), 2-509(1)(a), 2-509(4), 2-510(1), 2-601, 2-719.
20.3. Heavy Metal, Inc. 的总裁 Arlene Ledger(来自问题 3.2)正在与 Gold's Gym 发生另一次冲突。Gold's 已与其一家正在扩大业务规模的特许经营商签署了一份订单合同,订购 10 吨各种自由重量,全部涂成金色。合同规定,订单将发送 “FOB Seller's Factory.“ Arlene 让 Heavy Metal 的惯常承运人 Dependo 来取重物,Arlene 已经将货物通知了 Gold's Gym。第一个问题是 Arlene 忘记告诉她的运输部门这些是镀金的砝码,而不是标准的黑漆砝码。因此,给承运人的重量是黑色而不是金色,而运输箱表明了这一事实。第二个问题是,两辆载有货物的卡车在运输途中停放了一夜,被盗。第三个问题是 Arlene 不知道的保险公司的保险因未能支付保费而在上个月失效。(1) Arlene 想知道的是,在 Heavy Metal 和 Gold's Gym 之间,谁有责任追究运营商的损失?(2) 如果销售合同中包括一项明显的排他性补救条款,将 Gold's Gym 的补救措施限制在修理或更换有缺陷的砝码上,您的回答会改变吗?加州大学 §§2-319(1)(a)、2-509(1)(a)、2-509(4)、2-510(1)、2-601、2-719。
(1). This is a shipment contract. As such, in the absence of breach, risk of loss passes to the buyer when the seller duly delivers the goods to the carrier under §2-509(1)(a) and §2-319(1)(a). “Duly deliver” encompasses several requirements for the seller in order to pass the risk of loss to the buyer. In this problem, by shipping the black-painted weights rather than the gold-painted weights, the seller breached. This breach “fails to conform to the contract as to give a right of rejection” under §2-510(1), the seller bears the risk of loss until cure or acceptance. The buyer would have a right to reject under the perfect tender rule found under §2-601. Therefore here the seller bears the risk of loss.
(1). 这是一份货运合同。因此,在没有违约的情况下,当卖方根据 §2-509(1)(a) 和 §2-319(1)(a) 将货物正式交付给承运人时,损失风险将转移给买方。“ 按时交付 ” 包括对卖方的几项要求 , 以便将损失风险转嫁给买方。在这个问题中,卖家通过运输黑漆的砝码而不是金漆的砝码, 违反了规定。根据 §2-510(1) 的规定,这种违约行为“ 不符合 赋予拒绝权的合同 ”,卖方承担损失风险,直到得到补救或验收。买方有权根据 §2-601 下的完美投标规则拒绝。 因此 ,卖方在这里承担损失的风险。
(2). Under §2-601 the perfect tender rule, it specifically makes the buyer’s normal right to reject subject to the provisions of §2-719 on contractual limitation of remedies. §2-719 on contractual limitation of remedies specifically talks about a limitation of remedies that is an exclusive remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts. §2-510(1) requires that the goods be so non-conforming as to give the buyer a right of rejection. In this case, even though the weights are non-conforming, the seller can argue they are not so non-conforming as to give the buyer a right of rejection, because the buyer bargained away his right of rejection with the exclusive remedy to repair and replacement of defective parts. There’s no longer any right of rejection for the buyer. So the seller can argue this is not a §2-510(1) case at all. However, the problem with that argument is that saying the case is not a §2-510(1) case sends it back to §2-509, and it doesn’t fit under §2-509 because here the seller clearly breached the contract, unless we say the only way for the seller to breach the contract is to refuse to repair or replace defective parts.
(2). 根据 §2-601 完美招标规则,它明确规定了买方的正常拒绝权 , 但须遵守 §2-719 关于补救措施的合同限制的规定。 §2-719 关于补救措施的合同限制,专门讨论了补救措施的限制,即修理或更换有缺陷部件的排他性补救措施。 §2-510(1) 要求货物不合格,以赋予买方拒收权。在这种情况下,即使重量不合格,卖方也可以争辩说它们没有不合格到赋予买方拒绝权,因为买方通过谈判放弃了他的拒绝权,获得了维修和更换有缺陷零件的唯一补救措施。 买方不再有任何拒绝权。 因此 ,卖方可以争辩说这根本不是 §2-510(1) 案件。然而,该论点的问题在于,说该案件不是 §2-510(1) 案件会将其退回到 §2-509,并且它不符合 §2-509,因为在这里卖方明显违反了合同,除非我们说卖方违反合同的唯一方式是拒绝修理或更换有缺陷的零件。
However, the buyer can argue this exclusive remedy clause does not change the risk of loss analysis and this is still a §2-510(1) case. The buyer can argue what §2-510(1) really means is risk of loss stays with the seller whenever the tender so fails to conform as would have given the buyer a right to reject but for the exclusive remedy clause. Therefore, what should be important for §2-510(1) purpose is that there has been a non-trivial, non-conformity in the seller’s performance. It’s not critical that the non-conformity in fact give the buyer a right to actually reject in a case where there’s an exclusive remedy that takes away his right to reject. Alternatively, the buyer can argue that for purposes of risk of loss and §2-510(1), this exclusive remedy clause should not operate at all, because this is the case where circumstances have caused it to fail its essential purpose under §2-719(2). So we should strike the exclusive remedy clause, and the problem would still falls under §2-510(1).
但是,买方可以争辩说,该排他性补救条款不会改变损失分析的风险,这仍然是 §2-510(1) 案件。买方可以争辩说 ,§2-510(1) 的真正含义是,只要投标不符合,卖方就有责任承担损失风险,如果没有排他性补救条款,买方有权拒绝。因此,对于 §2-510(1) 目的来说,重要的是卖方的表现存在非平凡、不合规的情况。 不合格实际上赋予买方实际拒绝的权利并不重要,因为存在剥夺其拒绝权的排他性补救措施。或者,买方可以争辩说,出于损失风险和 §2-510(1) 的目的,该排他性补救条款根本不应适用, 因为在这种情况下,情况导致其无法实现 §2-719(2) 规定的基本目的。 因此 ,我们应该删除排他性补救条款,问题仍属于 §2-510(1) 的范畴。
20.4. Same facts as Problem 20.3, except now suppose the weights Heavy Metal sent were conforming, but Arlene had neglected to give notice to Gold’s Gym of the shipment when it was made. Gold’s Gym was therefore not able to insure the goods in transit. (1) Which party, between Heavy Metal and Gold’s Gym, would bear the risk of loss in this situation? (2) Would your answer change if Gold’s Gym had happened to learn from third-party sources that the shipment was made, but still never bothered to insure the goods in transit? U.C.C. §§2-319(1)(a), 2-509(1)(a), 2-509(4); Official Comment 2 to §2-509, Official Comment 6 to §2-504.
20.4. 与问题 20.3 的事实相同,只是现在假设 Heavy Metal 发送的重量是一致的,但 Arlene 在发货时没有通知 Gold's Gym。 因此,Gold's Gym 无法为运输途中的货物投保。(1) 在这种情况下,Heavy Metal 和 Gold's Gym 之间的哪一方将承担损失风险?(2) 如果 Gold's Gym 碰巧从第三方来源得知货物已经发货,但仍然懒得为运输途中的货物投保 ,您的回答会改变吗?美国加州大学 §§2-319(1)(a)、2-509(1)(a)、2-509(4);§2-509 的官方意见 2,§2-504 的官方意见 6。
(1). Here the seller still has the risk of loss. Under §2-509(1)(a) which governs a shipment contract like this one, risk of loss passes to the buyer in a shipment contract when the seller duly delivers the goods to the carrier. However, Comment 2 to §2-509 incorporates into §2-509(1)(a) all of the requirements of §2-504 on shipment by the seller, among which is the requirement that the seller promptly notifies the buyer of the shipment. Similarly, §2-319(1)(a) on shipment contracts explicitly incorporates §2-504 in describing the operation of an F.O.B. shipment term like this one.
(1). 在这里,卖方仍然存在损失的风险。根据管理此类运输合同的 §2-509(1)(a),当卖方按时将货物交付给承运人时,运输合同中的损失风险将转移给买方。但是,§2-509 的注释 2 将 § 2-504 中关于卖方装运的所有要求纳入 §2-509(1)(a) 中 ,其中包括要求卖方立即通知买方货物。同样, 关于装运合同的 §2-319(1)(a) 明确纳入了 §2-504 来描述像这样的 FOB 装运条款的运作。
(2). This problem turns on the purpose of the notice requirement found in §2-504(c) that the seller give notice of shipment to the buyer. Is that notice simply to protect the buyer? If that is its purpose, then that purpose is served by this alternative notice from third party. Or is the purpose of §2-504(c) more broadly, to encourage seller to give notice in every case? If that is its purpose, then that purpose is not served by this alternative notice from third party.
(2). 此问题涉及 §2-504(c) 中通知要求的目的,即卖方向买方发出发货通知。该通知只是为了保护买家吗?如果这是它的目的,那么该目的由第三方的替代通知来实现。或者 §2-504(c) 的目的更广泛地说,是鼓励卖方在每种情况下都发出通知?如果这是它的目的,那么来自第三方的替代通知就无法实现该目的。
§2-504 says the failure of the seller to give notice to the buyer of the shipment constitutes ground for rejection only if material loss ensues. This suggests the main purpose is to give the buyer a chance to protect itself, and that purpose was served by the alternative notice in this problem. Comment 6 to §2-504 also says the seller’s failure to live up to its duty to notify the buyer is only grounds for rejection when a loss results from that failure in this case. Here, the seller should be able to argue successfully that in light of the alternative notice, the true cause of the loss to the buyer was the buyer’s own decision not to purchase insurance for the goods in transit, even though it knew, albeit from a source other than the seller, the goods has been delivered to the carrier.
§2-504 规定,只有在发生重大损失时,卖方未通知买方货物才构成拒绝的理由。这表明主要目的是给买方一个保护自己的机会,而这个问题中的替代通知达到了这一目的。§2-504 的注释 6 还指出,在这种情况下,卖方未能履行通知买方的义务只是在因该失败而造成损失时被拒绝的理由。在这里,卖方应该能够成功地争辩说, 根据替代通知,买方损失的真正原因是买方自己决定不为运输中的货物购买保险,即使它知道货物已经交付给承运人,尽管来自卖方以外的来源。
Problem 20.5(a) Frank Ziegler decided to sell his used rider mower through the classified ads. Frank was asking $3,000 for the mower, which he had purchased in 202. Not long after the ad appeared, Frank had a potential buyer, Ed Kinman, out to see the mower. Ed told Frank he would buy it for $3,000, and Frank had Ed sign a handwritten contract that Frank had prepared. The contract said nothing about risk of loss. Ed promised Frank that he would be back wit his pickup truck and a cashier’s check for $3,000 “in the next couple of days.” The next day, Frank discovered that the rider mower had been stolen from his garage. Who had the risk of loss as to the stolen mower? U.C.C. §§2-509(3), 2-503(1).
问题 20.5(a) Frank Ziegler 决定通过分类广告出售他的二手骑手割草机。弗兰克要价 3,000 美元购买这台割草机,这是他在 202 年购买的。广告出现后不久,Frank 就有一位潜在买家 Ed Kinman 出去看割草机。Ed 告诉 Frank 他愿意以 3,000 美元的价格买下它,Frank 让 Ed 签署了一份 Frank 准备好的手写合同。合同没有提到损失风险。Ed 向 Frank 承诺,他会“ 在接下来的几天内”带着他的皮卡车和一张 3,000 美元的银行本票回来。第二天,弗兰克发现骑乘式割草机从他的车库里被偷了。谁有被盗割草机的损失风险?《美国法典》第 2-509(3) 条、2-503(1) 款。
ANSWER: Because parties did not discuss the risk of loss, so the risk of loss will be governed by the UCC default rule and because this contract is not one that authorizes the seller to ship the good by carrier nor does this contract involves a bailee nor is either party in breach, then risk of loss will be govern by the default rule that is found in §2-509(3). This time we will look at the rule with respect to a non-merchant seller, and that section says when the seller is not a merchant risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery. How do we know a tender of delivery has taken place? We have a definition for that under 2-503(1)(a), and tender of delivery requires among other thing under this section that the goods must be “kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the buyer to take possession.” In this case, how long would that be, would be a period reasonably necessary to enable the buyer to take possession? In this case, Frank did not object as promised that Ed would pick up the mower in the next couple of days. Therefore, we must say that for this contract, a couple of days is the period reasonably necessary to enable Ed to pick up the goods and because there was no tender here because the goods got stolen before that period of time had lapsed. Then the seller still had risk of loss when the mower was stolen. What happens given that seller had risk of loss? What does that mean practically speaking? It means that here that the seller loses his mower and buyer does not have to pay for the stolen mower. So seller is stuck for the loss of the stolen mower. Can the buyer sue the seller for damages for breach? This takes us back to excuse or commercial impracticability under §2-613 or §2-615. The buyer should not be able to sue the seller here for damages because either the seller can look to 2-613(a) but only if stolen equals casualty or destroyed, and not sure it does because 2-613 applies to casualty to identified goods and the comment talks about goods being destroyed that is what casualty refers to. So maybe if the goods are stolen even if they are identified goods, maybe that is not a casualty. But that is okay for the seller because if it is not a §2-613 case, probably the seller can look to §2-615 the more general commercial impracticability section and say that this theft was one of those things that both parties assumed that it was not going to happen. So they can get an excuse under 2-615 for breach of damages.
回答: 由于双方没有讨论损失风险,因此损失风险将受 UCC 违约规则的约束,并且由于本合同不是授权卖方通过承运人运送货物的合同,本合同不涉及受托人,也没有任何一方违约,因此损失风险将受 §2-509(3) 中的默认规则的约束。 这一次,我们将研究有关非商家卖家的规则,该部分表示,当卖家不是卖家时,风险在交货时转移给买家。 我们如何知道已经进行了交货招标? 我们在 2-503(1)(a) 中对此进行了定义,交货招标要求除本节中的其他事项外,货物必须“在合理必要的期限内保持可用,以使买方能够占有”。 在这种情况下,那需要多长时间,是否是使买方能够占有的合理必要的期限? 在这种情况下,Frank 并没有像承诺的那样反对 Ed 会在接下来的几天里拿起割草机。因此,我们必须说,对于这份合同,几天是让 Ed 能够取货的合理必要时间,因为这里没有招标,因为货物在这段时间之前就被偷了 。那么当割草机被盗时,卖家仍然有损失的风险。 鉴于卖方存在损失风险,会发生什么情况?这实际上意味着什么? 这意味着在这里,卖方失去了他的割草机,买方不必为被盗的割草机付费。 所以卖家因丢失被盗的割草机而陷入困境。买方可以起诉卖方要求违约赔偿吗? 这让我们回到了 §2-613 或 §2-615 下的借口或商业不切实际。买方不应该在这里起诉卖方要求赔偿,因为卖方可以寻求 2-613(a),但前提是被盗等于伤亡或毁坏,并且不确定它是否适用,因为 2-613 适用于已识别货物的伤亡,而评论谈到货物被毁坏,这就是伤亡所指的。因此,即使货物是已识别的货物,也许也不是伤亡。但这对卖方来说没关系,因为如果这不是 §2-613 案件,可能卖方可以查看 §2-615 更一般的商业不切实际部分,并说这次盗窃是双方都认为它不会发生的事情之一。 因此 ,他们可以根据 2-615 获得违反损害赔偿的借口。
Problem 20.5(b) Same facts as part (a), except that a week had passed with no word from Ed, and then the mower was stolen from Frank’s garage. Who had risk of loss as to the stolen mower? U.C.C. §§2-509(3), 2-503(1), 2-510(3).
问题 20.5(b) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是一周过去了,Ed 没有任何消息,然后割草机从 Frank 的车库里被偷了。谁有被盗割草机的损失风险?《美国法典》第 2-509(3)、2-503(1)、2-510(3) 款。
ANSWER: in this variation, Ed had the risk because more than a couple of days had passed and Ed had not picked up the mower. In this variation, because the goods had been tendered under 2-503(1)(a) Frank passed the risk of loss to Ed under the default rule of 2-509(3). This is the case where we might also view this as a 2-510(3) case f we view the buyer’s lack of payment within a couple of days as a breach by the buyer. And in that case 2-510(3) should yield the same result, as 2-509(3) except here the seller would first have to exhaust his insurance coverage if this were a 2-510(3). If it were a 2-509(3) case, then maybe the seller would first have to exhaust his insurance coverage. What happens given that buyer had risk of loss in the 2-509(3) case? It means that buyer owes the seller for the price of the mower under 2-709 for an action of the price unless the seller does have the insurance and the insurance fully covers this, and in which case maybe the seller cannot show damages, and maybe 2-509(3) comes out the same way as 2-510 where we first look to the seller’s insurer, and if the coverage is inadequate then we look to the buyer. And probably we want 2-509(3) to come out the same way 2-510(3) in terms of risk of loss. Now can the buyer in this case avoid liability assuming that the seller has no insurance by arguing that there is no contract that the buyer has excuse under 2-613 or 2-615? The answer is the buyer could not. Because first 2-613 would not apply according to its terms if risk of loss has already passed to the buyer and it specifically says that. And 2-615 by its terms does not protect buyers only sellers could show commercial impracticability.
回答: 在这种变化中,Ed 有风险,因为已经过去了几天多 ,Ed 还没有拿起割草机。在这种变更中,由于货物是根据 2-503(1)(a) 进行招标的,因此 Frank 根据 2-509(3) 的默认规则将损失风险转嫁给 Ed。在这种情况下,我们也可能将其视为 2-510(3) 案例,如果我们认为买家在几天内未付款是买家的违约行为。在这种情况下,2-510(3) 应该产生与 2-509(3) 相同的结果,但在这种情况下,如果这是 2-510(3),卖方首先必须用尽他的保险范围。如果是 2-509(3) 案件,那么也许卖方首先必须用尽他的保险范围。鉴于买方在 2-509(3) 案件中存在损失风险,会发生什么情况?这意味着买方欠卖方 2-709 项下的割草机价格,除非卖方确实有保险并且保险完全涵盖此价格,在这种情况下,卖方可能无法证明损害赔偿,并且可能 2-509(3) 的结果与 2-510 相同,我们首先查看卖方的保险公司, 如果承保范围不足,那么我们会寻找买家。可能我们希望 2-509(3) 在损失风险方面与 2-510(3) 相同。 现在,在这种情况下,买方是否可以通过争辩说没有买方根据 2-613 或 2-615 可以免除的合同来避免假设卖方没有保险的责任 ? 答案是买方不能。因为如果损失风险已经转移给买方,并且它明确表示,根据其条款,first 2-613 将不适用。而 2-615 的条款并不保护买方,只有卖方可以证明商业上的不切实际。
Problem 20.5(c) Same facts as part (a), except that six months passed with no word from Ed, and then the mower was stole from Frank’s garage. Who has risk of loss as to the stolen mower? U.C.C. §§2-509(3), 2-503(1), 2-510(3), 2-709(1)(a), 1-103.
问题 20.5(c) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是六个月过去了,Ed 没有消息,然后割草机从 Frank 的车库里被偷走了。谁有被盗割草机的损失风险?《美国法典》第 2-509(3)、2-503(1)、2-510(3)、2-709(1)(a)、1-103 条。
ANSWER: On the one hand Frank the seller had clearly tendered the goods and therefore risk of loss passed to Ed under 2-509(3) probably after a few days. However, when the goods are stolen six months later, if frank tries to bring an action for the price under 2-709, Frank is going to have a problem. Why? Frank’s action for the price must lie if anywhere under 2-709(1)(a) and that section allows an action for the price by the seller of “of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after its risk of loss is passed to the buyer.” And in this case, Ed could argue that six months is too long to be a commercially reasonable time and therefore the risk of loss must have gone back to Frank at some point following Ed’s failure to pick up the mower after Frank had properly tendered the mower to Ed. So, the risk of loss is bouncing back and forth here between seller and buyer; it starts with seller and then when seller tenders it shifts to buyer, but then if a commercially reasonable time passes buyer’s still has not picked up the goods, then risk of loss under 2-709(1)(a) shift back to seller. Alternatively, we could look at this as a 2-510(3) case if we consider Ed’s failure to pay a breach of a contract by Ed and that risk of loss section ends up reconciling very neatly with the language of 2-709(1)(a) because both 2-510(3) and 2-709(1)(a) put the risk of loss on the buyer only for a commercially reasonable time. So if we step back on this one, away from the statute, and we say under these facts in fairness who ought to have the risk of loss? We have concluded that it comes back to the seller is that fair? Another way to consider the six months variation is to think of it as a common law case of waiver or estoppel under 1-103. In other words, you could say at some point’s Frank’s inaction here waived his right to sue Ed for the price. Or put another way Frank is estopped to sue for the price by his inaction in the face of Ed not showing up to pick and pay for the mower for six months when he said he was going to do it in a couple of days.
答: 一方面,卖方 Frank 显然已经投标了货物,因此损失风险可能在几天后根据 2-509(3) 转移给 Ed。但是,当商品在六个月后被盗时,如果 Frank 试图以低于 2-709 的价格提起诉讼,Frank 就会遇到问题。为什么?如果 2-709(1)(a) 项下的任何位置,弗兰克对价格的诉讼必须成立,并且该条款允许卖方对“在损失风险转移给买方后的商业合理时间内接受的货物或合格货物丢失或损坏”的价格提起诉讼。在这种情况下,Ed 可以争辩说,六个月太长了,不是一个商业上合理的时间,因此,在 Frank 适当地将割草机交给 Ed 后,Ed 未能取走割草机后,损失风险一定又回到了 Frank 身上。因此,损失的风险在卖方和买方之间来回波动;它从卖方开始,然后当卖方投标时,它转移到买方,但如果商业上合理的时间过去了 ,买方仍然没有取货,那么 2-709(1)(a) 规定的损失风险就会转移回卖方。或者,如果我们认为 Ed 未能付款是 Ed 的违约行为,我们可以将此视为 2-510(3) 案件,并且该损失风险部分最终与 2-709(1)(a) 的措辞非常巧妙地调和,因为 2-510(3) 和 2-709(1)(a) 都仅在商业上合理的时间内将损失风险归咎于买方。 因此 ,如果我们在这个问题上退后一步,远离法规,我们公平地说,在这些事实下,谁应该有损失的风险?我们得出的结论是,它回到了卖家身上,这公平吗? 考虑六个月变更的另一种方法是将其视为 1-103 下的普通法弃权或禁反言案件。换句话说,你可以说在某个时候,Frank 在这里的不作为放弃了他起诉 Ed 的权利。或者换句话说,弗兰克在面对 Ed 六个月没有出现挑选和支付割草机费用的情况下的不作为而被禁止起诉要价款,而他说他将在几天内完成。
Problem 20.5(d) same facts as part (a), except that Ed aid Frank with a $3,000 cashier’s check the first night that he looked at the mower, promising to come back with his pickup truck “in the next couple of days.” When the rider mower was stolen the next day, who had risk of loss? U.C.C. §§2-509(3), 2-503(1).
问题 20.5(d) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Ed 在弗兰克看割草机的第一晚就用 3,000 美元的银行本票帮助他,并承诺“在接下来的几天内”带着他的皮卡车回来。当骑手割草机第二天被盗时,谁有丢失的风险?《美国法典》第 2-509(3) 条、2-503(1) 款。
ANSWER: Here Frank, the seller, had the risk under 2-509(3) just like he did in part (a). Just like in part (a) there had not been a tender yet by Frank, the seller, so as to shift the risk of loss to the buyer, Ed under 2-509(3). Ed’s paying or not paying up front is not going to affect the risk in a case where the goods are stolen before the risk has even passed to Ed, the buyer. So what happens here if seller still has risk of loss? The seller now must give the buyer his money back and furthermore, the buyer cannot sue the seller for damages. This is just like the earlier problem where the buyer had not prepaid. Buyer cannot sue seller for damages because of 2-613 ad 2-615 (those section are going to save the seller giving him an excuse either the theft as a casualty to identified goods under 2-613 or it was commercially impracticability under 2-615 which will at least save the seller in terms of damages even though the seller will have to give the buyer his money back since the seller does have the risk of loss here).
回答: 在这里,卖方 Frank 承担了 2-509(3) 项下的风险,就像他在 (a) 部分中所做的那样。就像 (a) 部分一样,卖方 Frank 尚未进行投标, 以便将损失风险转移给买方,Ed 根据 2-509(3) 的规定。Ed 的付款或不预先付款不会影响风险,因为货物在风险转移到买方 Ed 之前就被盗了。 那么 ,如果卖家仍然存在损失风险,会发生什么呢?卖方现在必须把钱还给买方,此外,买方不能起诉卖方要求赔偿。这就像之前买家没有预付款的问题一样。买方不能因为 2-613 ad 2-615 而起诉卖方要求损害赔偿(这些部分将拯救卖方,给他一个借口,要么是 2-613 项下已识别货物的伤亡盗窃,要么是 2-615 项下的商业上不切实际,这至少可以节省卖方的损害赔偿,即使卖方必须退还买方的钱,因为卖方在这里确实有损失的风险)。
Problem 20.5(e) Same facts as part (a), except that after paying the $3,000 cashier’s check, Ed never picked up the mower. Then, six months later, the rider mower was stolen from Frank’s garage. Who had risk of loss as to the mower? U.C.C. §§2-509(3), 2-503(1), 2-510(3), 2-709(1)(a), 1-103.
问题 20.5(e) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是在支付了 3,000 美元的银行本票后,Ed 从未拿起割草机。然后,六个月后,骑手割草机从 Frank 的车库里被盗。谁有割草机丢失的风险?《美国法典》第 2-509(3)、2-503(1)、2-510(3)、2-709(1)(a)、1-103 条。
ANSWER: The buyer has the risk of loss here. Buyer’s advance payment matters because now Frank the seller does not have to contend with the “within commercially reasonable time” language of 2-709(1)(a) for action for the price. And it was that language that ended up putting the risk of loss back to Frank, the seller, in the case where Ed, the buyer, had not paid the price and Frank was forced to go after the buyer for an action for the price. But when the buyer has paid already, the seller does not need to deal with 2-709(1)(a) in an action for the price. Frank does not need to sue for the price in a case where he already has the price. What about 2-510(3), is failing to pick up the good a breach by the buyer who had already paid for the goods? Well, probably not. This goes back to 2-301 and the basic duty of the buyer is to accept and pay. The buyer has paid here; it’s just that the buyer has not picked up the goods. But accepting is more passive than that. So, if failing to pick up the goods is not a breach by a buyer, then we do not have a 2-510(3) issue at all; because 2-510(3) requires some kind of breach by the buyer. If failing to pick up the goods is a breach by the buyer, then the breaching buyer will end up with the risk under 2-510(3) to the extent of any deficiencies to the seller’s insurance coverage. Could Ed make a waiver estoppel argument here? If we were under 2-510(3) and we say that the buyer’s failure to pick up was a breach by the buyer and if seller did not have any insurance, the buyer would under 2-510(3) apparently be stuck with loss. Could the buyer defend the 2-510(3) action by saying that “no the seller has waived their ability to put the risk of loss on me and I need to get a different mower by the seller”? I think that these waiver in estoppel arguments, that we used in a case where the buyer has not paid the price, are a lot harder for the buyer to make in a case where the buyer already has paid the full purchase price. Why is that? Well, the reason why it’s different is that in a case where the buyer has neither paid nor picked up the mower and Frank, the seller, says nothing for six months, in that case it does not seem unreasonable to assume that Frank the seller does not care anymore about enforcing the contract; Frank has not gotten his money, the buyer has not picked it up, it’s been six months and he’s not pursuing the buyer that seems more like a waiver or estoppel. But in this case, Frank, the seller, has been paid in full by the buyer but the buyer has not picked up the mower. Frank’s silence would hardly seem to indicate his lack of interest in the contract because the buyer’s failure to pick up the mower is really the buyer’s problem since Frank, the seller, has already received all the benefits that he’s going to get from this contract. His not doing anything here does not seem like a waiver, it’s not his mower. Maybe he should be mad because the storage is full.
答: 买方在这里有损失的风险。买方的预付款很重要,因为现在卖方 Frank 不必与 2-709(1)(a) 的“在商业合理时间内”的措辞抗争,即可就价格采取行动。正是这种语言最终将损失风险转嫁给了卖方 Frank,在这种情况下,买方 Ed 没有支付价格,Frank 被迫追究买方要求支付价格。但是,当买方已经付款时,卖方无需在诉讼中处理 2-709(1)(a) 的价格。Frank 不需要在他已经知道价格的情况下起诉价格。那么 2-510(3) 呢,没有提货是已经支付货款的买方的违约行为吗?嗯,可能不是。这可以追溯到 2-301,买方的基本职责是接受和付款。买方已在此处付款;只是买家没有提货。但接受比这更被动。因此,如果买家没有提货,那么我们根本没有 2-510(3) 问题 ; 因为 2-510(3) 要求买方进行某种违约。如果买方未能提取货物是违约行为,那么违约的买方最终将面临 2-510(3) 项下的风险,以证明卖方的保险范围有任何缺陷。Ed 可以在这里提出弃权禁止反言的论点吗?如果我们根据 2-510(3) 并且我们说买方未能提货是买方的违约行为,如果卖方没有任何保险,那么根据 2-510(3) 的规定,买方显然会陷入损失。 买方能否为 2-510(3) 诉讼辩护说“ 不 ,卖方已经放弃了将损失风险放在我身上的能力,我需要从卖方那里购买另一台割草机”?我认为,我们在买方尚未支付价格的情况下使用的这些禁反言论点的弃权,在买方已经支付了全部购买价格的情况下,买方要困难得多。为什么?嗯,之所以不同,是因为在买方既没有付款也没有取走割草机的情况下,卖方弗兰克六个月内什么也没说,在这种情况下,假设卖方弗兰克不再关心执行合同似乎并非没有道理;弗兰克还没有拿到他的钱,买家也没有拿到钱,已经六个月了,他没有追求看起来更像是弃权或禁反言的买家。但在这种情况下,卖方 Frank 已经收到了买方的全额付款,但买方尚未取走割草机。 弗兰克的沉默似乎几乎不表明他对合同不感兴趣,因为买方未能拿起割草机实际上是买方的问题,因为卖方弗兰克已经获得了他将从这份合同中获得的所有好处。他在这里什么都不做似乎不像是一种弃权,这不是他的割草机。也许他应该生气,因为储藏室已经满了。
Problem 20.6(a) Grandma’s Superstore in Boise, Idaho, decided to start carrying frozen steaks to complement its wide inventory of non-food items. Grandma’s made a contract with Enos’s Slaughterhouse in Missoula, Montana, in which Enos’s was to ship 500 8-ounce filet mignons to Grandma’s, “FOB Missoula.” Because it was cheaper, Enos’s had the goods shipped by a non-refrigerated truck from Dependo Carriers, Inc. Dependo, as its name suggests, had an excellent reputation for reliability. The steaks were fine when they were loaded on the truck for the 400-mile journey to Boise, but about 10 miles into the journey the truck was run off the road and into a lake, where the steaks were destroyed. Enos’s had given Grandma’s timely and proper notice of shipment. Who had risk of loss as to the steaks? U.C.C. §§2-319(1), 2-509(1), 2-504; Official Comment 2 to §§2-509, 2-510(1).
问题 20.6(a) 爱达荷州博伊西的 Grandma's Superstore 决定开始销售冷冻牛排,以补充其广泛的非食品库存。 Grandma's 与蒙大拿州米苏拉的 Enos's Slaughterhouse 签订了一份合同,其中 Enos's 将向 Grandma's 的“FOB Missoula”运送 500 条 8 盎司的菲力牛排。因为它更便宜,Enos's 让 Dependo Carriers, Inc. 的一辆非冷藏卡车运送货物。Dependo,顾名思义,在可靠性方面享有盛誉。当牛排被装上卡车前往博伊西 400 英里时,它们还好,但在大约 10 英里的旅程中,卡车被冲出公路,进入一个湖中,牛排在那里被毁坏。Enos's 及时、适当地通知了奶奶。谁有牛排损失的风险?《美国法典》第 2-319(1)、2-509(1)、2-504 条;§§2-509、2-510(1) 的官方评论 2。
ANSWER: Because this was a shipment contract both 2-509(1)(a) and 2-319(1)(a) tell us that risk of loss shifts to the buyer as soon as the seller puts the goods into the possession of a third party carrier and takes the steps required under 2-504. §2-319(1)(a) makes explicit reference to 2-504 whereas 2-509(1)(a) uses the term “duly delivers” and Official Comment 2 to 2-509 tells us that duly delivers requires the seller to take all the proper steps that are listed under 2-504. Did the seller take all the proper steps under 2-504? By shipping frozen steaks in an unrefrigerated truck, Enos’s the seller has violated 2-504(a)’s requirement of making a reasonable contract for transport taking into account the nature of the goods. Ironically though it was not the lack of refrigeration that led to this problem. But instead it was the unrelated accident. And 2-504 says that the failure to make a proper contract for delivery is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss ensues from that failure. In other words, no harm no foul. Now under such a “no harm, no foul” view of 2-504 should we say that the risk here has passed to the buyer? This problem is similar to problem 20.4(2) and in that’s where the seller failed to give notice of shipment but the buyer got notice from a third party. The buyer in that problem still failed to insure the goods and the goods got stolen during transit, we said in that 20.4(2) case that the buyer should have risk of loss despite seller’s failure to give notice of the shipment. And that is because seller’s failure to give notice was not proximate cause of the buyer’s loss, it was instead the buyer’s failure to insure the goods despite having notice of the shipment. How is this failure neglecting to refrigerate the steaks different than the failure to give notice in problem 20.4? here is the difference, even if the seller can argue that the loss here did not ensue as a result from the lack of refrigeration, the buyer could respond that given the lack of refrigeration the steaks would have been bad in any event by the time they reached Boise. And in that respect the failure here is unlike failing to give proper notice or using an unreliable carrier. When the seller fails to give proper notice of delivery that may or may not cause damage to the buyer depending on whether the goods are insured or whether the goods get damage in transit. And same with using an unreliable carrier; maybe it would cause a loss or maybe it won’t. But the failure to refrigerate steaks would necessarily damage the goods no matter what. And therefore it would seem unfair to let the seller off the hook for damage not caused by the seller’s negligence when the goods would certainly have been damaged anyway because of seller’s breach of its shipment obligation. This would be like a Torts case, where I push you out the window of a thirty-story apartment building but you get struck and killed by lighting on the way down. And I should not escape my torts liability on the basis that you happen to get killed before you hit the ground.
回答: 因为这是一份装运合同,所以 2-509(1)(a) 和 2-319(1)(a) 都告诉我们,一旦卖方将货物交由第三方承运人占有并采取 2-504 规定的步骤,损失风险就会转移到买方身上。§2-319(1)(a) 明确提到了 2-504,而 2-509(1)(a) 使用了“适当交付”一词,官方评论 2 至 2-509 告诉我们,适当地 Deliver 要求卖家采取 2-504 中列出的所有适当步骤。卖家是否采取了 2-504 项下的所有适当步骤?卖家 Enos 用非冷藏卡车运输冷冻牛排,违反了 2-504(a) 的要求,即在考虑到货物的性质的情况下签订合理的运输合同 。但具有讽刺意味的是,导致这个问题的并不是缺乏冷藏。但 相反,这是一场无关的事故。2-504 表示,只有在未能签订适当的交付合同导致重大延误或损失的情况下,未能签订适当的交付合同才是拒绝的理由。换句话说,没有伤害,没有犯规。现在,在这样一个 2-504 的“无害、无犯规”的观点下,我们应该说这里的风险已经转移到了买方身上吗?此问题类似于问题 20.4(2),即卖方未能发出发货通知,但买方收到了第三方的通知。在该问题中,买方仍然未能为货物投保,并且货物在运输过程中被盗,我们在第 20.4(2) 号案例中说,尽管卖方没有发出发货通知,但买方应该有损失的风险。 这是因为卖方未能发出通知并不是买方损失的直接原因,而是买方尽管已收到发货通知,但仍未为货物投保。这种忽略冷藏牛排的失败与问题 20.4 中的未通知有何不同?区别在于,即使卖方可以争辩说这里的损失不是由于缺乏冷藏造成的,买方也可以回答说,鉴于缺乏冷藏,牛排到达博伊西时无论如何都会变质。在这方面,这里的失败与没有给予适当的通知或使用不可靠的运营商不同。当卖方未能提供适当的交货通知时,这可能会也可能不会对买方造成损害,具体取决于货物是否投保或货物在运输途中是否受到损坏。使用不可靠的运营商也是如此;也许它会导致损失,也可能不会。但是,不冷藏牛排无论如何都必然会损坏货物。 因此 , 让卖方免除非卖方疏忽造成的损害似乎是不公平的, 而货物肯定会因为卖方违反其运输义务而受损。这就像一个侵权案件,我把你推出一栋 30 层公寓楼的窗户 , 但你在下楼的路上被闪电击中并死亡。我不应该因为你碰巧在落地前就被杀了而逃避我的侵权责任。
Problem 20.6(b) Same facts as part (a), except that Enos’s did use a refrigerated truck and there was no accident on the way. However, 40 of the steaks were ruined during the trip when some rodents hopped aboard the truck midway through the journey. May Grandma’s reject some or all of the steaks when they arrive? U.C.C. §§2-319(1), 2-509(1), 2-510(1).
问题 20.6(b) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Enos 确实使用了冷藏卡车,而且途中没有发生事故。然而,其中 40 块牛排在旅途中被毁,因为一些啮齿动物在旅途中跳上了卡车。奶奶到货时可以拒绝部分或全部牛排吗?U.C.C. §§2-319(1)、2-509(1)、2-510(1)。
ANSWER: 2-509(1)(a) and 2-319(1)(a) would suggest that risk was on the buyer when the 40 steaks was ruined assuming that this was a proper carrier contract under 2-504(a). But when the steaks arrived to the buyer why can’t the buyer just point to 2-601 Perfect Tender Rule and reject the steaks on that basis that they fail to conform in any respect? In other words do we have a conflict here between the risk of loss and the perfect tender rule OR can we figure out a way to reconcile those two? We can reconcile them. The perfet tender rule tells us about right to reject 2-601 says the buyer may reject the goods “if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract. But here is what 2-601 and the perfect tender rule do not tell us, they don’t tell us at what point in time are we suppose to measure the perfectness of tender for purposes of applying the standard given to us in 2-601 for the perfect tender rule. And the answer is the risk of loss rules. At what point do we measure the perfectness of tender? The perfectness of the seller’s tender should be measured at the point when the risk of loss passes. That is the key thing to understand about the interaction between 2-601’s perfect tender rule and the various risk of loss rule of 2-509 and 2-510. In this case the risk of loss passed under 2-509(1)(a) when the seller put the goods into the possession of a third party carrier and did all the right things under 2-504. Assuming that the seller can persuade the fact finder (these are very fact dependent) that the steaks were good when they were put into the carrier’s possession here, then the risk of loss should be on the buyer rather than the seller. Note in the Design Gated case, the proof issue concerning the condition of the goods received by the buyer where parties of both side oppose. That is one of the tricky things of risk of loss.
答案:2-509(1)(a) 和 2-319(1)(a) 表明,假设这是 2-504(a) 项下的适当承运人合同,当 40 块牛排被毁时,风险由买方承担。但是,当牛排到达买方手中时 ,为什么买方不能直接指出 2-601 完美招标规则,并以牛排在任何方面都不符合为由拒绝这些牛排呢?换句话说 ,我们在损失风险和完美的招标规则之间是否存在冲突,或者我们能否找到一种方法来调和这两者?我们可以调和它们。perfet 招标规则告诉我们关于拒绝权 2-601 说,买方可以拒绝货物,“如果货物或交货招标在任何方面不符合合同。但是,这就是 2-601 和完美招标规则没有告诉我们的,它们没有告诉我们应该在什么时候 衡量招标的完美性,以便将 2-601 中提供给我们的标准应用于完美招标规则。答案是损失风险规则。我们在什么时候衡量温柔的完美程度?卖方投标的完美程度应在损失风险过去时衡量。这是了解 2-601 的完美投标规则与 2-509 和 2-510 的各种损失风险规则之间相互作用的关键。在本案中,当卖方将货物交由第三方承运人占有并按照 2-504 做了所有正确的事情时,损失风险就转移了 2-509(1)(a)。 假设卖方可以说服事实调查者(这些在很大程度上取决于事实)牛排在运输商手中时是好的,那么损失的风险应该由买方而不是卖方承担。请注意,在 Design Gated 案中,在双方当事人都反对的情况下,关于买方收到的货物状况的证明问题 。这是损失风险的棘手之处之一。
Problem 20.6(c) Same facts as part (a), except that Enos’s did use a refrigerated truck and there was no accident on the way. However, 30 of the steaks were already bad when Enos’s had loaded them on the truck, and another 40 were ruined during the trip when some rodents hopped aboard the truck midway through the journey. May Grandma’s reject some or all of the steaks when they arrive? U.C.C. §§2-319(1), 2-509(1), 2-510(1), 2-510(1).
问题 20.6(c) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Enos 确实使用了冷藏卡车,而且途中没有发生事故。然而,当 Enos's 将牛排装上卡车时,其中 30 块牛排已经变质了,另外 40 块牛排在旅途中由于一些啮齿动物跳上卡车而毁坏。奶奶到货时可以拒绝部分或全部牛排吗?U.C.C. §§2-319(1)、2-509(1)、2-510(1)、2-510(1)。
ANSWER: here the buyer may reject all the steaks. §2-601(a) makes it clear that buyer can reject the whole shipment on the grounds that 70 of the steaks were bad. We know that the seller was responsible for the 30 steaks that were already bad when they were handed over the carrier. But is the seller also responsible for the 40 steaks that were damaged by the rodents in route? The answer is yes because 2-510(1) keeps the risk of loss on the seller in any case where the tender of the goods would have given the buyer a right to reject. Here the 30 steaks that were already nonconforming at the time of delivery to the carrier would be enough to violate §2-601 perfect tender rule which would be measure at the time where the risk of loss is passed to the buyer. So that is why 2-510(1) keeps the risk of loss to the seller with respect to the additional 40 steaks that were damaged in transit.
答案: 在这里,买方可以拒绝所有牛排。§2-601(a) 明确规定,买方可以以 70 块牛排变质为由拒收整批货物。我们知道卖家对 30 块牛排负责,这些牛排在交给承运人时已经很糟糕了。但是,卖家是否也要对途中被啮齿动物损坏的 40 块牛排负责呢?答案是肯定的,因为 2-510(1) 在任何情况下,如果货物的投标会赋予买方拒绝的权利,则卖方仍承担损失风险。在这里,30 块牛排在交付给承运人时已经不合格,足以违反 §2-601 完美招标规则,该规则将在损失风险转移给买方时进行衡量。因此,2-510(1) 将额外 40 块在运输过程中损坏的牛排的损失风险留给卖方。
Problem 20.6(d) Same facts as part (a), except that Enos’s did use a refrigerated truck and there was no accident on the way. After Enos’s had selected the steaks and was about to load them on the truck, Grandma’s called and said that it was cancelling its order. Enos’s told Grandma’s that Enos’s was not waiving its right to sue for the breach. A week later, the 500 steaks that had been earmarked for Grandma’s were destroyed in a fire at Enos’s Slaughterhouse through no fault of Enos’s. Enos’s had insurance, but it came with a $1,000 deductible. Enos’s lost of a total of $15,000 worth of meat in the fire, including he 500 steaks that had been ordered by Grandma’s, for which Grandma’s had agreed to pay $6,000. Who had risk of loss as to the 500 steaks that had been earmarked for Grandma’s? U.C.C. §§2-510(3), 2-709(1).
问题 20.6(d) 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是 Enos 确实使用了冷藏卡车,而且途中没有发生事故。在 Enos's 选好牛排并准备将它们装上卡车后,奶奶打电话说它要取消订单。Enos's 告诉奶奶,Enos's 并没有放弃对违规行为提起诉讼的权利。一周后,原定用于奶奶的 500 块牛排在 Enos's 屠宰场的一场大火中被烧毁,这并不是 Enos's 的过错。Enos 有保险,但有 1,000 美元的免赔额。Enos 在大火中总共损失了价值 15,000 美元的肉,包括他奶奶订购的 500 块牛排, 奶奶同意为此支付 6,000 美元。谁有损失的风险,因为 500 块牛排是专门为奶奶准备的?《美国法典》第 2-510(3) 条、2-709(1) 款。
ANSWER: §2-510(3) says that the risk here should be split between the seller’s insurer and his buyer. One is we assume one week was not longer than the commercially reasonable time (2-709). Under that assumption the buyer here should only get stuck with a pro rata share of the deductible on the seller’s insurance. Because in this case, the buyer’s steaks were only a part of the total that got destroyed for which there was a total of $1,000 deductible. So, there was $15,000 worth of meat, the buyer’s share was $6,000. $6,000 divided by $15,000 is .4 or 40% of the total. SO, 40% of the deductible times $1,000 equals $400 that the buyer should have to pay. Now the seller would need to pay the remaining $600 of the deductible, which represents the proportion of share for the deductible for the $9,000 worth of the destroyed steaks that were not earmarked for this buyer. And the seller’s insurance company would pay $14,000 in total. Suppose that the seller simply sues for the price under 2-709(1)(a) as a way to avoid the risk sharing nature of the 2-510(3)? Here we get aninteresting conflict between 2-510(3) and 2-709(1): under 2-510(3) the seller’s insurer pays either the $5600 and buyer pays $400. If the seller proceeds under 2-709(1)(a) it would seem that the buyer would be responsible for the entire $6000 price for the steaks. How could the buyer argue that the seller should not be eligible to sue for the price? Well, first she could point to the policy of 2-510(3) and say that the seller should not be able to recover the whole price form her in a case where he has effective insurance. The easy response to that by the seller is but 2-709(1) contains no reference to insurance coverage as a limit on its action for the price. But that is where the buyer comes back and says well, the insurance limit is implicit in 2-709(1) in that the seller has no damages to the extent that the insurance covers the loss; how can you sue for the price when you have no damages. What if the seller argues that it well have damages if it is forced to make a claim on its insurance for the premium’s increase. Now maybe seller can try to claim that a premium increase is a consequential damages under 2-715(2)(a). but that does not seem like a foreseeable consequence of a breach by this buyer of when the contract was entered into (which is the test for economic damages). More to the point, Venus is a seller and 2-715(2)(a) only allows buyer to recover consequential damages.
答案:§2-510(3) 规定,这里的风险应该由卖方的保险公司和他的买方分担。一种是我们假设一周不超过商业上合理的时间 (2-709)。在这个假设下,这里的买方应该只被卖方保险的免赔额按比例分摊。因为在这种情况下,买方的牛排只是被销毁的总量的一部分,总共有 1,000 美元的免赔额。所以,有价值 15,000 美元的肉,买方的份额是 6,000 美元。6,000 美元除以 15,000 美元是 4 或总额的 40%。因此,自付额的 40% 乘以 1,000 美元等于买方应支付的 400 美元。现在卖方需要支付剩余的 600 美元免赔额,这代表了价值 9,000 美元的销毁牛排的免赔额份额,这些牛排没有指定给该买家。卖方的保险公司总共将支付 14,000 美元。假设卖方只是以 2-709(1)(a) 项下的价格起诉, 以避免 2-510(3) 的风险分担性质?在这里,我们在 2-510(3) 和 2-709(1) 之间遇到了一个有趣的冲突:在 2-510(3) 下,卖方的保险公司支付 5600 美元 , 买方支付 400 美元。如果卖方根据 2-709(1)(a) 进行 , 则买方似乎将负责牛排的全部 6000 美元价格。买方如何争辩说卖方没有资格就该价格提起诉讼?好吧,首先她可以指出 2-510(3) 的政策,并说在卖方有有效保险的情况下,卖方不应该能够从她那里收回全部价款。 卖方对此的简单回应是,2-709(1) 没有提到保险范围作为其对价格行动的限制。但这就是买方回来说好的地方,保险限额是隐含在 2-709(1) 中的地方,因为卖方在保险涵盖损失的范围内没有损害赔偿;当你没有损害赔偿时,你怎么能起诉这个价格。如果卖方争辩说 ,如果它被迫就保费的增加对其保险提出索赔,它肯定会受到损害怎么办。现在,也许卖方可以尝试声称保费增加是 2-715(2)(a) 项下的间接损害赔偿。但这似乎不像是该买方违反合同签订时间的可预见后果(这是经济损害的测试)。更重要的是,Venus 是卖方,2-715(2)(a) 只允许买方追讨间接损害赔偿。
Problem 20.6(e) Same facts as part (d), except Enos’s insurance policy included the following clause: “Insurance Company reserves the right to recover any amounts paid under this policy from parties that would have had the risk of loss as to the destroyed goods, but for the existence of this policy.” How would this clause affect Grandma’s liability for the destroyed steaks? U.C.C. §2-510(3), Official Comment 3 to §2-510.
问题 20.6(e) 与第 (d) 部分的事实相同,但 Enos 的保险单包含以下条款:“保险公司保留从没有本保单存在的情况下可能面临被毁货物损失风险的各方追讨根据本保单支付的任何款项的权利。该条款将如何影响奶奶对被毁坏牛排的责任?U.C.C. §2-510(3),官方意见 3 至 §2-510。
ANSWER: well, if this clause was valid what would be its effect here? If the clause is effective this clause in essence shifts the risk of loss away from the seller’s insurance company and back to the buyer despite the decision of code drafters of 2-510(3) to put the risk in cases like this at least initially on the seller’s insurance. So should this clause be valid? The last sentence of Official Comment 3 to 2-510 would seem to prevent the effectiveness of this clause which says “this section merely distributes the risk of loss as stated, it is not intended to be disturbed by any subrogation by the insurer.” That is really what this clause is, an attempt to subrogate for the insurance company. What is the policy reason here behind the code’s drafters decision to not to let insurers of sellers shift the loss back to the buyer in a 2-510(3) case? This is a classic case of two parties the seller and its insurers trying to bargain away the rights that the code has created for a third party the buyer who is not even at the table at the time this insurance agreement had been entered into. If clauses like these were given effect, why shouldn’t every insurer insist on them and why shouldn’t any seller resist them because it’s not going to be the seller’s ox that will be board on this clause, it is the future buyer who is not even on the table. That is why we don’t enforce this clause.
答: 那么,如果这个条款是有效的,它在这里会有什么影响呢?如果该条款有效,该条款实质上将损失风险从卖方的保险公司转移回买方,尽管 2-510(3) 的法典起草者决定在此类情况下将风险至少在最初放在卖方的保险上。 那么这个条款应该有效吗?官方意见 3 至 2-510 的最后一句似乎阻止了该条款的有效性,即 “本节仅按所述分散损失风险,无意因保险公司的任何代位求偿权而受到干扰。这就是这个条款的真正含义,试图为保险公司代位求偿。在 2-510(3) 案件中,该法典的起草者决定不让卖方的保险公司将损失转嫁给买方,背后的政策原因是什么?这是一个典型的案例,卖方及其保险公司试图讨价还价,以放弃代码为第三方(买方)创造的权利,而买方在签订此保险协议时甚至不在谈判桌上。如果像这样的条款生效,为什么不是每个保险公司都坚持它们,为什么任何卖方都不应该抵制它们,因为不会是卖方的牛会接受这些条款,而是未来的买家甚至不在谈判桌上。这就是我们不执行此条款的原因。
RISK OF LOSS WITH LEASES, INTERNATIONAL SALES, AND REAL ESTATE PP. 368
租赁、国际销售和房地产的损失风险 第 368 页
21.1. a. State Law School leased a hi-tech photocopying machine for use it its mailroom. The lessor was Ted’s Copy Shop. The lease was for five years at $2,000 per year, and the lease said nothing about the risk of loss. Steve Manion, a disgruntled mailroom employee, acts out his frustrations one night by taking an ax to the photocopying machine, which he thoroughly destroys. The parties were in the third year of the lease when the machine was destroyed. When Steve is caught, he loses his job and is more broken than ever. Neither the lessor nor the lessee had insured the goods. Who has risk of loss as to the destroyed machine? U.C.C. §2A-219(1).
21.1. a. 州法学院租用了一台高科技复印机,用于其收发室。出租人是 Ted's Copy Shop。租约为期五年,每年 2,000 美元,租约没有提到损失风险。史蒂夫·马尼恩 (Steve Manion) 是一位心怀不满的收发室员工,一天晚上,他拿着斧头对复印机发泄了他的挫败感 ,他彻底摧毁了复印机。当机器被毁坏时,双方正处于租约的第三年。当史蒂夫被抓住时,他失去了工作,比以往任何时候都更加崩溃。出租人和承租人都没有为货物投保。谁有损毁机器的损失风险?加州大学 §2A-219(1) 条。
The default rule in Article 2A for leases with respect to the risk of loss, under §2A-219(1), is that the lessor bears the risk of loss and does not pass on to the lessee, except in finance lease. The lease in this lease is not a finance lease, however, in this problem the risk of loss passes on to the lessee because the loss is caused by the lessee. If there’s a breach by one of the parties that causes the losses, then it is not a risk of loss question, but rather a tort question. Comment to §2A-219 says that this section does not deal with responsibility for loss caused by the wrongful act by either the lessor or the lessee. Since Steve is an employee of the law school at the time, under common law agency principle, the law school bears the loss.
根据 §2A-219(1), 第 2A 条中关于损失风险的租赁默认规则是,出租人承担损失风险,并且不会转嫁给承租人,融资租赁除外。该租赁中的租赁不是融资租赁,但是,在这个问题中,损失风险会转移到承租人身上,因为损失是由承租人造成的。如果其中一方违约导致损失,那么这不是损失风险问题,而是侵权问题。 对 §2A-219 的评论称,本节不涉及因出租人或承租人的不当行为而造成的损失的责任。 由于史蒂夫当时是法学院的雇员,根据普通法代理原则,法学院承担损失。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that the machine is destroyed by an accidental fire, and the lease is a finance lease. The lessor is First National Bank, and the supplier is Ted’s Copy Shop. Who has risk of loss as to the destroyed machine? U.C.C. §2A-219(1).
b. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,但机器被意外火灾毁坏,并且租赁是融资租赁。出租人是 First National Bank,供应商是 Ted's Copy Shop。谁有损毁机器的损失风险?加州大学 §2A-219(1) 条。
Since this is a finance lease, the risk of loss passes on to the lessee under §2A-219(1). The question is, however, when the risk of loss passes. Given the facts of this problem, whatever the test is for determining the passage of the risk of loss, this problem meets that test since the lessee received and accepted the leased goods and used it for two years.
由于这是融资租赁,因此损失风险根据 §2A-219(1) 转移给承租人。然而,问题是,损失的风险何时过去。鉴于这个问题的事实,无论用什么标准来确定损失风险的通过,这个问题都符合该标准,因为承租人接收并接受了租赁货物并使用了两年。
The subparts of §2A-219(2) are intended to apply only in a finance lease, since the risk of loss does not pass to the lessee in a non-finance lease situation. In the case of a finance lease, the question of when the risk of loss passes to the lessee depends on the factors listed under §2A-219(2), namely whether a carrier is involved, if a carrier is involved is it a shipment or destination contract, whether a bailee is involved, if neither carrier or bailee is involved then whether the finance lessor is a merchant or not.
§2A-219(2) 的子部分仅适用于融资租赁,因为在非融资租赁情况下,损失风险不会转移给承租人。在融资租赁的情况下,损失风险何时转移给承租人的问题取决于 §2A-219(2) 中列出的因素,即是否涉及承运人,如果涉及承运人,是装运合同还是目的地合同,是否涉及受托人,如果承运人或受托人均不参与,则融资出租人是否为商人。
c. Same facts as part (a), except the machine is destroyed by an accidental fire, and at the time of the machine’s destruction State Law School was two months behind in its lease payments. Who has risk of loss as to the destroyed machine? U.C.C. §2A-220(2).
c. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是机器被意外火灾毁坏,并且在机器毁坏时, 州立法学院拖欠了两个月租金。谁有损毁机器的损失风险?加州大学 §2A-220(2) 条。
Under §2A-220(2), in this problem the lessee bears the risk of loss, since the lessee law school is in breach by being two months behind in its lease payments, and neither party has insurance. However, §2A-220(2) conditions the lessor’s ability to pass the risk of loss to lessee when the lessee is in default on a commercially reasonable time. The lessee here may want to argue that more than commercially reasonable time has passed. However, that is a weak argument since the lessee is still in possession of the leased goods. The scenario contemplated by the commercially reasonable time requirement in §2A-220(2) is when the lessee is no longer in control of the leased goods.
根据 §2A-220(2),在这个问题上,承租人承担损失的风险,因为承租人法学院拖欠了两个月租金,并且双方都没有保险。但是,§2A-220(2) 规定了当承租人在商业上合理的时间内违约时,出租人将损失风险转嫁给承租人的能力。这里的承租人可能想争辩说,已经过去了超过商业上合理的时间。然而,这是一个无力的论点,因为承租人仍然拥有租赁货物。§2A-220(2) 中商业上合理的时间要求所设想的情况是承租人不再控制租赁货物。
d. Same facts as part (a), except the machine is destroyed by an accidental fire, and State Law School had promised in the lease contract that it would insure the machine. At the time of the machine’s destruction, State Law School had never taken out an insurance policy on the machine. Who has risk of loss as to the destroyed machine? U.C.C. §2A-220(2).
d. 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是机器被意外火灾毁坏,并且州法学院在租赁合同中承诺将为机器投保。在机器被毁时 ,州法学院从未在机器上购买过保险。谁有损毁机器的损失风险?加州大学 §2A-220(2) 条。
Under §2A-220(2), in this problem the lessee bears the risk of loss, since the lessee law school is in breach by not meeting its contractual obligation to insure the leased goods, and neither party has insurance. The lessee may want to argue that more than commercially reasonable time, i.e., two years, has passed since they were in breach. However, the commercially reasonable time requirement is intended to protect lessee who no longer has possession of the leased goods. Here the lessee is still in possession of the leased goods. Alternatively, the lessor can argue that, in any event, commercially reasonable time shouldn’t start to run until after the lessor learns of lessee’s breach. The lessor can also argue that the risk of loss rule is intended to cover the breach that has nothing to do with the loss sustained. In this case, it is the very breach of the lessee that caused the loss. Thus it is outside the risk of loss question and becomes a breach of contract question.
根据 §2A-220(2),在这个问题上,承租人承担损失的风险,因为承租人法学院没有履行其为租赁货物投保的合同义务,并且双方都没有保险。承租人可能想争辩说, 自他们违约以来已经过去了超过商业上合理的时间,即两年。但是,商业上合理的时间要求旨在保护不再拥有租赁货物的承租人。在这里,承租人仍然拥有租赁货物。或者,出租人可以争辩说, 无论如何,在出租人得知承租人违约之前 , 商业上合理的时间不应开始计算 。出租人还可以争辩说,损失风险规则旨在涵盖与所遭受的损失无关的违约行为。在这种情况下,正是承租人的违约行为导致了损失。 因此 , 它不属于损失风险问题,并成为违约问题。
21.2. Recall the facts of Problem 20.3: Heavy Metal signs a contract to sell Gold’s Gym 10 tons of assorted free weights, painted gold. The contract said that the order would be sent “FOB Seller’s Factory.” Arlene had Heavy Metal’s usual carrier, Dependo, come and pick up the weights, and Arlene had notified Gold’s Gym of the shipment. However, the weights that were given to the carrier were black instead of gold, and the two trucks carrying the shipment were stolen during transit. Finally, the carrier had no insurance. Assuming that this shipment was to a Gold’s Gym franchise in Canada, who would have risk of loss as to the stolen weights? C.I.S.G. Arts. 66, 67, 70, 82, 49, 25, 58(3).
21.2. 回想一下问题 20.3 的事实:重金属公司签署了一份合同,向 Gold's Gym 出售 10 吨各种涂金的自由重量器械。合同规定,订单将发送 “FOB Seller's Factory.“ Arlene 让 Heavy Metal 的惯常承运人 Dependo 来取重物,Arlene 已经将货物通知了 Gold's Gym。然而,交给承运人的重量是黑色而不是金色,而且运送货物的两辆卡车在运输过程中被盗。最后,运营商没有保险。假设这批货物是运往加拿大的 Gold's Gym 特许经营商,谁会有被盗砝码损失的风险?C.I.S.G. 第 66、67、70、82、49、25、58(3) 条。
The default rule for risk of loss under C.I.S.G., found in Art. 67(1), is consistent with the stated F.O.B. terms here, namely risk of loss passes from the seller to the buyer when the goods are handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in accordance with the contract for sale, depending on whether it is a shipment contract or a destination contract. And if the parties use a carrier but does not specify whether it is a shipment contract or destination contract, then the contract will be treated as a shipment contract. Here the buyer is discharged from his obligation to pay under C.I.S.G. Art. 66 due to the seller’s breach. According to C.I.S.G. Art. 70, the buyer can exercise its remedy to avoid the contract under C.I.S.G. Art. 49, if the seller’s breach constitutes a fundamental breach. The issue then becomes can the buyer avoid the contract. C.I.S.G. Art. 82(1) says “A buyer loses its right to avoid the contract whenever the buyer cannot make restitution of the goods substantially in the condition that the buyer received the goods.” However, in this case the buyer never received the goods. C.I.S.G. Art. 82(2)(a) says the rule of C.I.S.G. Art.82(1) does not apply “where the impossibility of making restitution is not due to the buyer’s act or omission.” So here C.I.S.G. Art.82(1) does not prevent the buyer from avoiding the contract. The question turns on whether the seller’s breach in sending black weights instead of gold weights amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract, which is the standard under which the buyer is allowed to avoid the contract. Whether or not a breach is fundamental depends on whether the breach “results in such detriment to the other party as to substantially to deprive him of what he’s entitled to under the contract.” according to C.I.S.G. Art.25. If sending black weights instead of gold weights amounts to a fundamental breach, then the buyer may avoid this contract, meaning the seller would bear the risk of loss since the buyer is excused from his contractual obligation to pay the price. If the buyer is unable to avoid the contract, the buyer will bear the risk of loss and have the duty to pay the price. Under this scenario, the buyer may want to argue that it is not bound to pay under C.I.S.G. Art. 58(3) “until it has had an opportunity to examine the goods.” However, the seller can make the counter argument by pointing to the rest of C.I.S.G. Art. 58(3), that this F.O.B. shipment delivery term, which was agreed upon by both parties, is “inconsistent with his having such an opportunity.” Given that this is a shipment contract, it shifted the risk of loss to the buyer as soon as the goods are delivered to the carrier, before the buyer has an opportunity to examine the goods.
第 67 条第 (1) 款规定的 C.I.S.G. 损失风险默认规则与此处规定的 FOB 条款一致,即当货物根据销售合同移交给第一承运人以转移给买方时,损失风险从卖方转移给买方, 取决于它是装运合同还是目的地合同。如果双方使用承运人,但没有具体说明是装运合同还是目的地合同,则该合同将被视为装运合同。在这里,由于卖方的违约行为,买方被免除了根据 C.I.S.G. 第 66 条的付款义务 。根据 C.I.S.G. 第 70 条, 如果卖方的违约构成根本违约,买方可以根据 C.I.S.G. 第 49 条行使补救措施来避免合同 。那么问题就变成了买方能否避免合同。C.I.S.G. 第 82(1) 条规定 :“ 如果买方在买方收到货物的情况下无法实质上归还货物 , 则买方就失去了撤销合同的权利 。“ 然而,在这种情况下,买方从未收到货物。C.I.S.G. 第 82(2)(a) 条规定,C.I.S.G. 第 82(1) 条的规则不适用于 “ 如果无法进行赔偿不是由于买方的行为或不作为 。“ 所以在这里,C.I.S.G. 第 82(1) 条并不阻止买方规避合同。 问题在于卖方发送黑色砝码而不是黄金砝码的违约是否构成对合同的根本违约,而合同是允许买方规避合同的标准。 违约是否为根本违约取决于违约是否 “ 对另一方造成了如此大的损害,以至于在很大程度上剥夺了他根据合同应得的权利。“ 根据 C.I.S.G. 第 25 条。 如果发送黑色砝码而不是黄金砝码构成根本违约,那么买方可以避免此合同,这意味着卖方将承担损失风险,因为买方可以免除支付价格的合同义务。如果买方无法避免合同, 买方将承担损失风险,并有义务支付价款。在这种情况下 ,买方可能想争辩说,根据 C.I.S.G. 第 58(3) 条 ,“ 在有机会检查货物之前 ,它没有义务付款。“ 然而,卖方可以通过指出 C.I.S.G. 第 58(3) 条的其余部分来提出反驳,即双方商定的 FOB 货物交货条款 ” 与他有这样的机会不一致 “。鉴于这是一份运输合同,一旦货物 在买方有机会检查货物之前交付给承运人。
21.3. a. Take a look at the sample risk-of-loss real estate clause excerpted earlier in this assignment. Mary Russel and David Gavin, a newly married couple and your clients, signed a purchase contract with this clause on a house that was being sold by David’s one-time neighbor, Mary Ellen O’Neil. Mrs. O’Neil is a widow who used to be a next-door neighbor to David when David was growing up. When Mrs. O’Neil decided that she needed to move to a retirement center, she gave David and Mary the opportunity to buy her house for $120,000, which David believed was at least $15,000 below market. In between the signing of the contract and the scheduled closing, there was an electrical fire at the house that caused $20,000 worth of damage. Mrs. O’Neil had fire insurance, but the policy had a $5,000 deductible. Mrs. O’Neil, through her lawyer, notified David and Mary that she would neither restore the property nor lower the price, although she was perfectly willing to proceed with the closing as scheduled. David and Mary come to you and ask you what their options are at this point, and which option you would advise them to take. What do you tell them?
21.3. 一种。 看看本作业前面摘录的房地产损失风险条款示例。Mary Russel 和 David Gavin,一对新婚夫妇和您的客户,签署了一份包含此条款的购买合同,该房屋由 David 的曾经的邻居 Mary Ellen O'Neil 出售。O'Neil 夫人是一位寡妇,在 David 长大后,她曾经是 David 的隔壁邻居。当 O'Neil 夫人决定她需要搬到退休中心时,她给了 David 和 Mary 以 120,000 美元的价格购买她的房子的机会,David 认为这至少比市场低 15,000 美元。在签订合同和按计划成交之间,房子发生了电气火灾,造成了价值 20,000 美元的损失。O'Neil 夫人有火灾保险,但保单有 5,000 美元的免赔额。O'Neil 夫人通过她的律师通知 David 和 Mary,她既不会恢复房产,也不会降低价格,尽管她完全愿意按计划进行成交。David 和 Mary 来找你,问你此时他们有什么选择,以及你会建议他们选择哪个选项。你告诉他们什么?
Assuming a standard risk of loss clause, the buyer has three options: (1) Go forward with the deal for $120,000 and be entitled to the $15,000 insurance proceeds ($20,000 minus $5,000 deductible) due to the seller; or (2) Rescind the deal; or (3) Try to get the seller to lower the price in light of the fire and use the threat of rescission as leverage. The buyer’s best option is option (1), if the buyer is right in his belief of the true value of the house.
假设有标准的损失风险条款,买方有三个选择:(1) 以 120,000 美元的价格继续交易,并有权获得应支付给卖方的 15,000 美元保险金(20,000 美元减去 5,000 美元的免赔额);或 (2) 撤销交易;或 (3) 试图让卖方在火灾发生的情况下降低价格,并利用解除合同的威胁作为杠杆。买方最好的选择是选项 (1),如果买方对房屋的真正价值的看法是正确的。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that the electrical fire was caused after David went through the house to do some last-minute inspection. He left one of the lamps on, which normally would not cause a fire, except this lamp had a faulty cord. David was actually in the house without permission, but Mrs. O’Neil had already moved to the nursing home, and David knew from growing up next door that Mrs. O’Neil always kept a spare house key under the bush near the front porch. How would these additional facts change the advice that you gave David and Mary in part (a).
b. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是电气火灾是在 David 穿过 房子进行最后一刻检查后引起的。他让其中一盏灯亮着,这盏灯通常不会引起火灾,只是这盏灯的电线有故障。David 实际上是 未经允许就进了房子, 但 O'Neil 太太已经搬到了疗养院, David 从隔壁长大就知道 O'Neil 太太总是在前廊附近的灌木丛下放着一把备用的房子钥匙。这些额外的事实将如何改变您在 (a) 部分给 David 和 Mary 的建议。
These additional facts probably won’t end up changing anything. In the Voorde Poorte case, the court was faced with a contractual clause similar to the one excepted in the casebook, namely that risk of loss would remain with the seller until closing. There was a factual question in that case whether the buyer’s taking possession prior to closing was in fact allowed by the seller. But the court said it ultimately didn’t matter, at least for risk of loss purposes, because the facts didn’t indicate the fire was proximately caused by the buyer. Similarly, it should not matter here, whether the buyer was technically trespassing when he turned on the lamp that started the fire. His trespassing was probably the but-for cause of the fire, but so was the occupancy of the buyer’s employees in the Voorde Poorte case. So as long as the buyer here is not the proximate cause of the fire, then the risk of loss should not shift away from the seller. This rule in real estate is in contract to U.C.C. §2-510, where the breaching party will often get the risk of loss shifted back to him even where the particular breach has nothing to do with the cause of the loss.
这些额外的事实可能最终不会改变任何事情。在 VoordePoorte 案中,法院面临着与案例集中排除的合同条款类似的合同条款 ,即损失风险将由卖方承担,直到成交。在该案中,存在一个事实问题 ,即买方在成交前接管是否真的被卖方允许。但法院表示,这最终并不重要,至少从损失风险的角度来看,因为事实并未表明火灾是由买方直接引起的。同样,买家在打开引发火灾的灯时是否在技术上擅自闯入也无关紧要。他的非法侵入可能是导致火灾的原因,但在 VoordePoorte 案中 ,买方员工的占用也是如此。因此 , 只要这里的买方不是火灾的直接原因,那么损失的风险就不应该从卖方身上转移开。 房地产的这一规则是与 UCC 签订的合同。 §2-510,违约方通常会将损失风险转移回他身上,即使特定的违约行为与损失的原因无关。
SELLER’S REMEDIES WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 382
卖方对商品销售的补救措施 第 382 页
Problem 22.1(a) Specialty Dolls, Inc., is in the business of manufacturing children’s dolls and stuffed animals. AT the height of the Beanie “Baby craze”, Specialty Dolls made a contract to sell 2,000 Beanie Babies to a retailer, Kid Knacks, for a total price of $10,000. The contract said that the 2,000 Beanie Babies would come from the “stock of 8,000 Beanie Babies currently stored in the Specialty Dolls warehouse.” When suddenly the Beanie Babies currently mania died out, Kid Knacks repudiated its contract with Specialty Dolls and told it not to ship the Beanie Babies. At this point, the dolls intended for the Kid Knacks contract had not been set apart form the other 6,000 dolls in the Specialty Dolls warehouse. Specialty Dolls spent lots of time during the next couple of days calling around for another buyer. The only one it found, however, was the Everything Is a Dollar store, which was willing to pay just $1,000 for a shipment of 2,000 Beanie Babies. If Specialty Dolls declines the offer from the Everything Is a Dollar store, may it recover the price from Kid Knacks? U.C.C. §§2-704(1)(a), 2-709.
问题 22.1(a) Specialty Dolls, Inc. 从事制造儿童娃娃和毛绒玩具的业务。在 Beanie 的“婴儿热潮”达到顶峰时,Specialty Dolls 签订了一份合同,以 10,000 美元的总价将 2,000 个 Beanie Babies 出售给零售商 Kid Knacks。合同称,这 2,000 个 Beanie Babies 将来自“目前存放在 Specialty Dolls 仓库中的 8,000 个 Beanie Babies 库存”。当 Beanie Babies 目前的狂热突然消失时,Kid Knacks 否认了与 Specialty Dolls 的合同,并告诉它不要运送 Beanie Babies。此时,用于 Kid Knacks 合同的娃娃尚未与 Specialty Dolls 仓库中的其他 6,000 个娃娃分开。在接下来的几天里,Specialty Dolls 花了很多时间打电话寻找另一位买家。然而,它找到的唯一一家是 Everything Is a Dollar 商店,该商店只愿意支付 1,000 美元购买一批 2,000 个 Beanie Babies。如果 Specialty Dolls 拒绝了 Everything Is a Dollar 商店的报价,它可以从 Kid Knacks 收回价格吗?《美国法典》第 2-704(1)(a) 款、2-709 款。
ANSWER: you have to look at the various options given to a seller to recover the price under 2-709(1) and there are effectively three even though it looks like two. 2-709(1)(a) really encompasses two within in it. You have to decide under which option of 2-709(1) would the seller have its best argument to bring an action for the price against this buyer. The goods were not destroyed or damaged and the goods were not accepted either. 2-709(1)(a) says seller may recover the price of goods accepted, so under that option that the goods do not necessarily have to be lot or damaged, the goods just have to be accepted. But that did not happen here. 2-709(1)(a) also says or conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss have passed to the buyer. So we can eliminate the two options under 2-709(1)(a), leaving us with 2-709(1)(b) the third option. 2-709(1)(b)’s first part says of goods identified to the contract and here the goods have not yet been identified to the contract. So how do we fix that if we were the seller? 2-704(1)(a) says an aggrieved seller can identify conforming goods to the contract that have not yet been identified if they were in the control of the seller when the breached occurred. Here, the goods were in the seller’s warehouse, then they were in the control of the seller. Now the seller has to show that it was unable after reasonable efforts to resale the goods at a reasonable price for the circumstances reasonably indicated that such would be unavailing. Has the seller lost for its opportunity to sue for the price because it has passed up the opportunity to resale to the dollar store? Probably not because 10% seem so low, and maybe that is not a reasonable price. Maybe the buyer can argue “in light of what happen in the market for beanie babies, 10% is quite reasonable. So, you the seller blew it for action for the price.”
回答: 您必须查看根据 2-709(1) 提供给卖家的各种选项来收回价格 ,实际上有三个,即使它看起来像两个。 2-709(1)(a) 实际上包含两个内部。您必须决定在 2-709(1) 的哪个选项下 ,卖方有最好的理由对该买方提起价格诉讼。货物没有被毁坏或损坏,货物也没有被接受。2-709(1)(a) 表示卖方可以收回已接受货物的价格,因此在货物不一定必须批量或损坏的选项下,货物只需 被接受即可。但这并没有在这里发生。2-709(1)(a) 还规定,在损失风险转移给买方后,在商业上合理的时间内丢失或损坏的货物。 因此 ,我们可以消除 2-709(1)(a) 下的两个选项, 留下 2-709(1)(b) 第三个选项。 2-709(1)(b) 的第一部分说了合同中确定的货物,而这里货物尚未被合同确定。 那么,如果我们是卖家,我们该如何解决这个问题呢?2-704(1)(a) 表示,如果违约发生时卖方在卖方的控制范围内, 则受害卖方可以识别尚未确定的符合合同的货物 。在这里,货物在卖方的仓库中,然后它们在卖方的控制之下。 现在,卖方必须证明,在合理努力后,它无法以合理的价格转售商品,而当时情况合理地表明这样做是无济于事的。 卖家是否因为错过了转售给一元店的机会而失去了起诉价格的机会? 可能不是因为 10% 看起来太低了,也许这不是一个合理的价格。也许买家可以争辩说:“ 鉴于 beanie babies 市场上的情况,10% 是相当合理的。所以,你这个卖家为了这个价格而炸毁了它。
Let’s suppose, without deciding, we conclude that the buyer is right and the seller cannot sue for the price here. Why shouldn’t the seller care about that in the end after losing their 2-709’s ability to sue for the price? The seller can say so what, because the seller has other remedies. What would those other remedies include that would still be available to this seller? The seller can try to recover under §2-708 contract market differential or damages. What would be damages be under §2-708? §2-708(1): KP(10k) – MP(1k) + ID(0) – ES(0) = $9k. It seems like the market price (MP) is 10% of what the buyer agreed to pay. So in that case under 2-708(1), the seller could get damages equal to $9000 and they get to keep the beanie babies. If you sue for the price, it makes sense that the buyer gets to keep the good because suing for the price is sort of like specific performance. But if you are suing for contract market, you recover for contract market and then you still get to keep the subject of the contract. Here, the seller keeps the beanie babies and go back to the dollar store if they still want the beanie babies, so then you get the other $1,000 that way. In the end, you get $10k. Similarly, under 2-706(1)’s contract resale you would have to give proper notice of a resale to the breaching buyer to sell the beanie babies for $1k and then sue the buyer for the rest $9k and you end up with 10k the price. just because you may lose out on your ability to sue for the price does not mean if you are the seller that all is lost. You have lots of options with remedies when there is a breaching buyer.
假设,在不决定的情况下,我们得出结论,买方是对的 ,卖方不能在这里起诉价格。为什么卖家在失去了 2-709 起诉价格的能力后,最后不应该关心这一点呢? 卖家可以说那又怎样,因为卖家还有其他补救措施。 这些其他补救措施包括哪些仍可供该卖家使用的补救措施? 卖方可以尝试根据 §2-708 合同收回市场差价或损害赔偿。 §2-708 下的损害赔偿是多少?§2-708(1):KP(10k) – MP(1k) + ID(0) – ES(0) = $9k。 市场价格 (MP) 似乎是买方同意支付的 10%。 因此 ,在这种情况下,根据 2-708(1) 的规定,卖方可以获得相当于 9000 美元的赔偿金,并且他们可以保留无檐小便帽宝宝。如果你为价格起诉,那么买家可以保留商品是有道理的,因为起诉价格有点像特定表现。但是,如果你起诉合同市场,你为合同市场追偿,然后你仍然可以保留合同的标的。在这里,卖家保留 beanie babies,如果他们仍然想要 beanie babies,就回到一元店,这样你就可以得到另外的 1,000 美元。最后,您将获得 10 美元。同样,根据 2-706(1) 的合同转售 ,您必须向违规买方发出适当的转售通知,以 1 美元的价格出售 beanie babies,然后起诉买方要求剩余的 9 美元,您最终得到 10k 的价格。仅仅因为您可能会失去起诉价格的能力,并不意味着如果您是卖家,一切都会丢失。当有违规买家时,您有很多补救措施选择。
Problem 22.1(b) Same facts as part (a), except that after turning down the offer from Everything is a Dollar store, the goods are completely destroyed in a fire through no fault of Specialty Dolls. Unfortunately, Specialty Dolls has no fire insurance. May Specialty Dolls recover the price from Kid Knacks? U.C.C. §§2-510(3), 2-709, 2-501(1); Offical Comment 5 to §2-501, §§2-105(4), 1-201(b)(18).
问题 22.1(b) 与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是在拒绝 Everything is a Dollar 商店的报价后,商品在火灾中被完全毁坏 , 这不是 Specialty Dolls 的过错。不幸的是,Specialty Dolls 没有火灾保险。Specialty Dolls 可以从 Kid Knacks 收回价格吗?《美国法典》第 2-510(3)、2-709、2-501(1) 款; 第 2-501 条、第 2-105(4) 条、第 1-201(b)(18) 条的官方评论 5。
ANSWER: this is a 2-709(1)(a) and it is the second part of (1)(a), you are arguing that this is a case in which conforming goods were lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss had passed to the buyer. Does it matter in a case like this whether the goods were identified to the contract at the time that they were destroyed in order to bring this action for the price under 2-709(1)(a)? It does matter and how do we know that? Comment 2 to 2-501 says there is a limited effect given to identification by this article, so the drafters are down playing the importance of identification. Even though identification is not generally a big deal, §2-510(3) says where the buyer, as to conforming goods already identified to the contract for sales, repudiates or is otherwise in breach before risk of loss passes to him then the seller may to the extent of any deficiency and effective insurance coverage may treat the risk of loss as resting to the buyer for commercially reasonable time. Ultimately, 2-510(3) is going to work in tandem with 2-709(1)(a) because if you look at 2-709(1)(a), it says within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss has passed to the buyer. How can you argue that risk of loss here is passed to the buyer other than under 2-50(3)? Here, you do not have any other argument that risk of loss has passed to the buyer. Your only argument that risk of loss has passed to the buyer has got to come from 2-510(3). If you are relying on 2-510(3) as the basis for your action for the price under 2-709(1)(a), then by definition the goods had to be identified to the contract in order for risk of loss to pass to the buyer and in order for you to have an action for the price under 2-709(1)(a).
回答: 这是 2-709(1)(a) 的第 (1)(a) 部分, 您认为这是在损失风险转移给买方后,合格货物在商业上合理的时间内丢失或损坏的情况。 在此类案件中,货物在被销毁时是否被确定为合同, 以便以 2-709(1)(a) 项下的价格提起诉讼 ,这是否重要? 这确实很重要,我们怎么知道呢? 评论 2 到 2-501 说这篇文章对识别的影响有限,所以起草者低估了识别的重要性。尽管身份识别通常不是什么大问题, 但 §2-510(3) 规定,如果买方在损失风险转移给买方之前就已经确定的符合销售合同的货物否认或以其他方式违约,则卖方可以在任何缺陷和有效保险范围的范围内将损失风险视为买方在商业上合理的时间内的责任。最终,2-510(3) 将与 2-709(1)(a) 协同工作 ,因为如果您查看 2-709(1)(a), 它表示在损失风险转移给买方后的商业合理时间内。 您如何争辩说这里的损失风险已转移给 2-50(3) 以外的买方? 在这里,您没有任何其他论点证明损失风险已转移给买方。您认为损失风险已转移给买方的唯一论点必须来自 2-510(3)。 如果您依赖 2-510(3) 作为您根据 2-709(1)(a) 项下的价格提起诉讼的依据,那么根据定义,必须在合同中确定货物, 以便将损失风险转移给买方,并以便您根据 2-709(1)(a) 项对价格提起诉讼。
So then the question becomes, were the goods identified to the contract? 2-501(1) says identification takes place in the absence of a specific agreement when 2-501(b) (future goods) and comment 5 to 2-501 says that the 2k beanie babies are both an undivided share in an identified fungible bulk. So what is fungible? 1-201(b)(18) defines fungible.
那么问题就变成了,货物是否在合同中被确定?2-501(1) 表示,当 2-501(b)(未来商品)和注释 5 至 2-501 说 2k 豆豆宝宝都是已确定的可替代散装的不可分割的份额时,在没有具体协议的情况下进行识别。 那么什么是可替代的呢?1-201(b)(18) 定义了可替代。
Problem 22.1(c) Same facts as part (a), except that after turning down the offer form Everything IS a Dollar, Specialty Dolls sends one of its representatives to a local flea market in an attempt to sell its last stock of Beanie Babies, including those intended for Kid Knacks. The Specialty Dolls rep brigs three identical boxes of 2,000 Beanie Babies each, including one that has Kid Knacks’ name on it. The first buyer at the flea market agrees to pay $6,000 for one of the boxes, so the Specialty rep gives the buyer the box with Kid Knacks’ name on it. The second buyer agrees to buy one of the two remaining boxes for $7,000 ad the third bur buys the last box for $4,000. Assuming that Specialty Dolls gave Kid Knacks proper notice of intent to resell at the flea market, for what amount may Specialty Dolls recover from Kid Knacks? U.C.C. §2-706.
问题 22.1(c) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是在拒绝了 Everything IS a Dollar 的要约后,Specialty Dolls 派遣了一名代表前往当地的跳蚤市场 ,试图出售其最后的 Beanie Babies 库存,包括那些打算用于 Kid Knacks 的豆豆宝宝。Specialty Dolls 代表三个相同的盒子,每个盒子有 2,000 个 Beanie Babies,其中一个上面有 Kid Knacks 的名字。跳蚤市场的第一个买家同意为其中一个盒子支付 6,000 美元,因此 Specialty 代表将印有 Kid Knklocks 名字的盒子给了买家。第二个买家同意以 7,000 美元的价格购买剩余的两个盒子中的一个 ,第三个买家以 4,000 美元的价格购买最后一个盒子。 假设 Specialty Dolls 向 Kid Knacks 发出了在跳蚤市场转售的适当意向通知,那么 Specialty Dolls 可以从 Kid Knacks 中收回多少金额?《美国法典》第 2-706 条。
ANSWER: §2-706’s last sentence says the resale must be reasonably identified as referring to the broken contract for it to be a valid resale for damages under §2-706. This problem demonstrates that sometimes it is hard to know exactly which sale from a reselling seller of fungible goods should count for the one attributable to the broken contract. That is why it is important for a seller of fungible goods, if the seller is going to do a resale, they need to be very clear which sale they are doing on count of the buyer and the buyer’s breach.
答案:§2-706 的最后一句话说,转售必须被合理地认定为指违反的合同,才能成为 §2-706 规定的有效转售损害赔偿。这个问题表明,有时很难确切地知道转售卖家的可替代商品的哪笔销售应该算作可归因于违约合同的销售。这就是为什么对于可替代商品的卖方来说很重要的原因,如果卖方要进行转售,他们需要非常清楚他们正在进行的销售,包括买方和买方的违规行为。
Problem 22.1(d) Same facts as part (a), except suppose that originally the parties had two separate contracts: one for a box of 1,000 “Dobie Dog” dolls for $5,000 and the second for a box of 1,000 “Digger Frog” dolls for $5,000. When Specialty Dolls goes to the flea market to sell its last stock of these dolls, it ends up selling the box of Dobie Dogs for $8,000 ad the box of Digger Frogs for $3,000. Assuming proper notice of the resale, for what amount may Specialty Dolls recover from Kid Knacks? U.C.C. §2-706.
问题 22.1(d) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,但假设最初双方有两份独立的合同:一份是一盒 1,000 个“Dobie Dog”娃娃,价值 5,000 美元,另一份是一盒 1,000 个“Digger Frog”娃娃,价值 5,000 美元。当 Specialty Dolls 去跳蚤市场出售这些娃娃的最后一批库存时,它最终以 8,000 美元的价格出售了一盒 Dobie Dogs,以 3,000 美元的价格出售了一盒 Digger Frogs。假设转售通知得到适当通知,Specialty Dolls 可以从 Kid Knacks 中收回多少钱?《美国法典》第 2-706 条。
ANSWER: 2-706(1): KP – RP + ID – ES
答案:2-706(1): KP – RP + ID – ES
If you look at it as two separate contracts, then the seller gets an allowable windfall on the one under 2-706 and then on the other one the seller is damaged and would want the damages. It comes down to whether we are willing to see them as two separate contracts or are we arguing no, we are going to go with the substance of reform and this was really one deal.
如果你把它看作是两份独立的合同,那么卖方在 2-706 下的一份合同上获得了允许的意外之财,然后在另一份合同上,卖方受到了损害,并希望获得损害赔偿。归根结底,我们是否愿意将它们视为两个独立的合同,或者我们是否愿意,我们将采用改革的实质 内容,这实际上是一笔交易。
Problem 22.2(a) Mel’s Furniture for Less makes a contract with Kathy Levine to sell her an oak desk for her home office that she just had built in her basement. Payment was due a month after delivery. Kathy receives the desk and immediately notices that there is significant water damage on the surface of the desk. She intends to call Mel’s to complain but she gets busy with other things. When Mel’s sends the bill a moth later, Kathy announces to Mel’s that she is going to pay for the desk and Mel’s should come and pick it up. Should Mel’s be allowed to recover from Kathy in a suit for the price? U.C.C. §§2-709, 2-606, 2-607(2) and (3), 2-602(1).
问题 22.2(a) Mel's Furniture for Less 与 Kathy Levine 签订了一份合同,向她出售一张橡木桌,用于她的家庭办公室,这是她刚刚在地下室建造的。付款应在交货后一个月到期。Kathy 收到桌子,立即注意到桌子表面有明显的水渍。她打算打电话给 Mel's 抱怨,但她忙于其他事情。当 Mel's 稍后将账单寄出时 ,Kathy 向 Mel's 宣布她要支付办公桌的费用,Mel's 应该来取货。是否应该允许 Mel's 以这个价格从西装革履的 Kathy 那里追偿?《美国法典》第 2-709、2-606、2-607(2) 和 (3)、2-602(1) 条。
ANSWER: The seller would need to use §2-709(1)(a)’s goods accepted. It seems like it is the only argument that the seller has here for the price. So, the fighting issue would become whether or not these goods were in fact accepted. Once the goods have been accepted, §2-607(2) says the buyer may no longer reject them because it is too late to reject them. Have the goods been accepted? If you look at §2-606(1)(b) that seems to indicate that the buyer has accepted in this case because she failed to make an effective or timely rejection according to 2-606(1) to make an effective rejection you have to give the seller a timely notice of the rejection. Now suppose the buyer points to the language of 2-709(3) and that language suggests that even though a buyer’s rejection is wrongful that is still enough to take away a seller’s ability to sue for the price. What do you say? Here the trick is distinguishing between a wrongful rejection on the one hand and an “ineffective rejection” on the other hand. If you look at 2-602(1), it says that a rejection is ineffective when the buyer fails to seasonably notify the seller. Section 2-602(3) talks about the seller’s rights in cases of wrongfully rejected goods. A wrongful rejection is one in which there is no substantive basis for it under whatever standard is appropriate (usually the perfect tender rule under 2-601 is the standard). An ineffective rejection is, although perhaps substantively justified like in this case, not procedurally proper under 2-602(1) and 2-606(1). Here, we have a case where we got §2-709(3) saying even though a buyer’s rejection is wrongful, the seller may not be entitled to the price. But in this case, the buyer’s rejection was not wrongful as it was ineffective because it was not timely under 2-606(1). Despite the language of 2-709(3), the seller here should still be able to sue for the price under 2-709(1)(a).
回答: 卖方需要使用 §2-709(1)(a) 接受的商品。这似乎是卖家对价格的唯一论据。因此,争论的问题将变成这些商品是否真的被接受。一旦货物被接受,§2-607(2) 规定买方就不能再拒绝它们,因为拒绝它们已经太晚了。货物是否被接受?如果您查看 §2-606(1)(b),这似乎表明买方在本案中接受了,因为她未能根据 2-606(1) 做出有效或及时的拒绝,您必须及时通知卖方拒绝。现在假设买方指向 2-709(3) 的语言,该语言表明即使买方的拒绝是错误的,这仍然足以剥夺卖方起诉价格的能力。你怎么说?这里的诀窍是区分错误的拒绝和“无效的拒绝”。如果您查看 2-602(1),它表示当买方未能及时通知卖方时,拒绝是无效的。第 2-602(3) 节讨论了卖方在错误拒绝货物的情况下的权利。错误拒绝是指在任何适当的标准下都没有实质性依据的拒绝(通常 2-601 下的完美投标规则是标准)。无效的驳回,尽管可能像本案一样在实质上是合理的,但在程序上根据 2-602(1) 和 2-606(1) 并不适当。在这里,我们有一个案例,我们得到了 §2-709(3) 说,即使买方的拒绝是错误的,卖方也可能无权获得该价格。但在这种情况下,买方的拒绝并不是错误的,因为它是无效的,因为它根据 2-606(1) 不及时。 尽管有 2-709(3) 的规定,但此处的卖方仍应能够就 2-709(1)(a) 项下的价格提起诉讼。
May the buyer still counterclaim for breach of warranty due to the defective service when the seller sued for the price? Just as it is probably too late for the buyer to reject, it may also be too late for her to claim damages for breach of warranty. Section 2-607(3)(a) which says the buyer has to give the seller notice of breach of warranty “within a reasonable time after she discovers or should have discovered any breach.” For a breach of warranty claim, the reasonable time is measured from when the buyer discovered or should have discovered any breach. But for rejection, the reasonable opportunity to start the clock starts immediately upon delivery to the buyer. In this problem, there probably no practical difference between the two staring points. The seller could say that the buyer failed to reject within a reasonable time after delivery and that she failed to give the seller notice of the breach of the warranty within a reasonable time after she discovered or should have discovered the breach. Even so, the courts will be more lenient on tardy notice by a buyer who is merely asserting a setoff defense of breach of warranty when the seller raised an action for the price as opposed to a buyer who is trying to avoid the whole deal by rejecting (where the court may be a little tougher on the timing standard).
当卖方起诉价款时,买方是否可以因服务缺陷而对违反保证提出反索赔? 正如买方拒绝可能为时已晚一样,她要求违反保证的损害赔偿也可能为时已晚。 第 2-607(3)(a) 条规定,买方必须 “在发现或应该发现任何违规行为后的合理时间内”向卖方发出违反保证的通知。对于违反保修索赔,合理时间是从买方发现或应该发现任何违约行为开始计算的。但对于拒绝,在交付给买家时立即开始计时的合理机会。在这个问题中,两个起始点之间可能没有实际的区别。卖方可以说,买方未能在交货后的合理时间内拒收,并且她未能在发现或应该发现违约后的合理时间内向卖方发出违反保证的通知。即便如此,法院对买方的延迟通知会更加宽容,当卖方提出价格诉讼时,买方只是主张违反保证的抵销抗辩,而不是试图通过拒绝来避免整个交易的买方(法院可能在时间标准上更严格一些)。
Problem 22.2(b) Same facts as part (a), except that the desk was perfectly fine, but Kathy decided on the day that she received it that she did not like how it looked in her basement. She immediately called Mel’s and told the manager there, “Come get your desk. I’ve decided I don’t want it after all, and I’m not paying for it.” Should Mel’s be allowed to recover from Kathy in a suit for the price? U.C.C. §§2-709, 2-606, 2-602.
问题 22.2(b) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是桌子完全没问题,但 Kathy 在收到桌子的那天决定,她不喜欢它在地下室里的样子。她立即打电话给 Mel's 并告诉那里的经理,“来拿你的桌子。我已经决定我毕竟不想要它,而且我不会为此付费。是否应该允许 Mel's 以这个价格从西装革履的 Kathy 那里追偿?《美国法典》第 2-709、2-606、2-602 条。
ANSWER: here, the seller cannot recover for the price. Because even though this rejection was substantively wrongful, it was at least procedurally effective as it was timely. Even though Kathy has no legitimate basis for rejecting the desk, she nevertheless has made a procedurally effective rejection under §2-602(1). Thus, Kathy has avoided accepting the goods. Because Kathy has not accepted the goods, the seller loses his rights to sue for the price under 2-709(1)(a). But that does not mean that the seller is out of luck altogether. According to §2-709(3), the seller here has to settle for his damages under the measures given in either §2-708 contract market damages or §2-706 contract resale remedy.
答案: 在这里,卖家无法收回价格。因为即使这种拒绝在本质上是错误的,但它至少在程序上是有效的,因为它是及时的。尽管 Kathy 没有合法理由拒绝办公桌,但她仍然根据 §2-602(1) 做出了程序上有效的拒绝。 因此,Kathy 避免接受货物。由于 Kathy 没有接受货物,卖方失去了根据 2-709(1)(a) 提起诉讼的权利。 但这并不意味着卖家完全不走运。根据 §2-709(3), 卖方必须根据 §2-708 合同市场损害赔偿或 §2-706 合同转售补救措施 中给出的措施解决其损害赔偿。
Problem 22.2(c) Same facts as part (a), except that the desk was perfectly fine, but Kathy decided two weeks after she received it that she did not like how it looked in her basement. She immediately called Mel’s and told the manager there, “Come get your desk. I’ve decided I don’t want it after all, and I’m not paying for it.” Should Mel’s be allowed to recover from Kathy in a suit for the price? U.C.C. §§2-709, 2-608;Official Comment 5 to §2-709.
问题 22.2(c) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是桌子完全没问题,但 Kathy 在收到桌子两周后决定,她不喜欢它在地下室里的样子。她立即打电话给 Mel's 并告诉那里的经理,“来拿你的桌子。我已经决定我毕竟不想要它,而且我不会为此付费。是否应该允许 Mel's 以这个价格从西装革履的 Kathy 那里追偿?《美国法典》第 2-709 条、第 2-608 条 ;§2-709 的官方评论 5。
ANSWER: Is Kathy rejecting or is she revoking acceptance? Because two weeks has passed, Kathy has probably accepted the goods by now under 2-606(1)(b)’s failure to reject after a reasonable opportunity to accept constitutes an acceptance. This is likely a case of wrongful revocation and here the code gives us mixed signals as how we should handle wrongful revocation with respect to a seller’s action for the price. Is this revocation also ineffective besides being wrongful? Maybe under §2-608(2). Let’s assume that it is just wrongful and if you look at 2-709(3), it talks about a buyer having wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods suggesting that in such cases of wrongful revocation the seller may not be entitled to the price. But if you look at comment 5 to 2-709, it says that “goods accepted by the buyer under subsection (1)(a) include only goods as to which there as been no justified revocation of acceptance. For such a revocation (namely a justified one) means that there has been a default by the seller, which would mars his right under this section.” So comment 5 would suggest that a wrongful revocation, even if it is procedurally effective by the buyer should not be enough to stop the seller from recovering the price.
回答:Kathy 是拒绝还是撤销接受? 因为两周过去了,Kathy 现在可能已经接受了货物,根据 2-606(1)(b) 的规定,在合理的接受机会后未能拒收构成接受。这可能是一个错误撤销的情况,这里的代码给了我们不同的信号,即我们应该如何处理与卖家的价格行为有关的错误撤销。 这种撤销除了不法之外,是否也无效? 也许根据 §2-608(2)。 让我们假设它只是不法的,如果你看一下 2-709(3), 它谈到买方错误地拒绝或撤销对货物的接受,这表明在这种错误撤销的情况下,卖方可能无权获得价格。但是,如果您查看评论 5 至 2-709,它说“买方根据第 (1)(a) 款接受的货物仅包括没有理由撤销接受的货物。因为这种撤销(即合理的撤销)意味着卖方违约,这将损害他根据本条享有的权利。 因此 , 评论 5 将表明,错误的撤销,即使买方在程序上有效,也不应足以阻止卖方收回价格。
Problem 22.3 Shoe works was a Boston Manufacturer of athletic footwear. Foot Locker was a Chicago retailer that sold shoes of all kinds, including sports shoes. On May 1, Shoe Works and Foot Locker entered into a contract in which Shoe Works agreed to sell Foot Locker 500 pairs of “Sambas,” a trendy brand of children’s gym shoes. The price was $7,500, the delivery date was “on or before June 1,” and the delivery term was “FOB Seller’s Plant.” Delivery costs Boston to Chicago were $300, which the buyer paid in advance. Shoe Works put the shoes into the possession of a carrier in Boston on May 25, and the shoes arrived at Foot Locker on June 1. By that point, Foot Locker had concluded that Sambas were no loner “hot,” so the Foot Locker manager immediately called the Shoe Works president and told her that the Foot Locker was rejecting the order. Shoe Works quickly arranged to have the shoes sold to Hermann’s Sporting Goods in the Chicago suburbs of Oak Lawn. Hermann’s paid $6,000 for the shoes and picked up the shoes itself from Foot Locker. Unfortunately for Shoe Works, it forgot to give Foot Locker notice of this resale. The market price of 500 Sambas was $6,000 in Chicago on June 1 and $6,500 in Boston on the same date. On May 1, the market price was $7,000 in Chicago and $7,500 in Boston. On May 25, the price was $6,200 in Chicago and $6,700 in Boston. In a suit against Foot Locker, how much Shoe Works recover (assuming Shoe Works is not a lost-volume seller)? U.C.C. §2-509(1)(a), Official Comment 2 to §2-706; §§2-706, 2-708(1), 2-503(2), 2-504.
问题 22.3 Shoe works 是波士顿的一家运动鞋制造商。Foot Locker 是芝加哥的一家零售商,销售各种鞋子,包括运动鞋。5 月 1 日,Shoe Works 和 Foot Locker 签订了一份合同,其中 Shoe Works 同意向 Foot Locker 出售 500 双“Sambas”,这是一个时尚儿童运动鞋品牌。价格为 7,500 美元,交货日期为“6 月 1 日或之前”,交货期限为“FOB 卖方工厂”。波士顿到芝加哥的运费为 300 美元,买家提前支付。Shoe Works 于 5 月 25 日将这些鞋子交给波士顿的一家运营商,鞋子于 6 月 1 日到达 Foot Locker。到那时,Foot Locker 已经得出结论,Sambas 并不孤单 “热门”,因此 Foot Locker 经理立即打电话给 Shoe Works 总裁,告诉她 Foot Locker 拒绝了订单。Shoe Works 很快安排将这些鞋子卖给芝加哥郊区奥克朗的 Hermann's Sporting Goods。Hermann's 花了 6,000 美元买了这双鞋,并从 Foot Locker 自己买了这双鞋。不幸的是,对于 Shoe Works 来说,它忘记向 Foot Locker 发出此次转售的通知。6 月 1 日,500 Sambas 在芝加哥的市场价格为 6,000 美元,同一天在波士顿的市场价格为 6,500 美元。5 月 1 日,芝加哥的市场价格为 7,000 美元,波士顿的市场价格为 7,500 美元。5 月 25 日,芝加哥的价格为 6,200 美元,波士顿的价格为 6,700 美元。在针对 Foot Locker 的诉讼中,Shoe Works 追回了多少钱(假设 Shoe Works 不是损失量卖家)?《美国法典》第 2-509(1)(a) 条,第 2-706 条的官方意见;§§2-706, 2-708(1), 2-503(2), 2-504.
ANSWER: Suppose first that the seller had given proper notice of the resale (which they did not): if the seller had given proper notice of resale, what would its damages have been? Here, we would be under 2-706(1) and the formula is KP(7,500) – RP(6k) + ID(0) – ES(0) =$1,500 in damages under 2-706(1) if the seller had given proper notice of the resale.
回答: 首先假设卖方已经发出了适当的转售通知(他们没有): 如果卖方发出了适当的转售通知,其损失会是多少? 在这里,我们将根据 2-706(1) 计算 ,公式为 KP(7,500) – RP(6k) + ID(0) – ES(0) = 1,500 美元 , 如果卖方已发出适当的转售通知, 则根据 2-706(1) 的损害赔偿 。
However, the seller did not give proper notice of the resale. So what happens given that our seller did not give proper notice of the resale? This is where Official Comment 2 to §2-706 comes in and it says failure to act properly under this section deprives the seller of the measure of damages here provided and relegates him to that provided in §2-708. So now we look at the seller’s damages under §2-708(1) (not 2-708(2) because not a lost volume seller) and the formula is KP(7,500) – MP(6,700) + ID(0) – ES(0) = $800 . To determine which MP, we look at the FOB contract and the time and place of tender, and here the time and place of tender would be when the seller handed the goods to the carrier in Boston on May 25th and the MP then and there was $6,700. Because the seller failed to give notice here, he gets relegated to contract market damages of $800 under 2-708(1). If 2-708(1) is supposed to create a hypothetical resale measure of damages, which is what some people contend, it ends up doing a pretty poor job in a case like this where you have an FOB seller’s place delivery term, but the buyer does not repudiate until after the buyer receives the goods. So, in a case like this one when you have a shipment contract, but the buyer does not repudiate until he gets the goods at the buyer’s place the relevant market price ought to be (at least for purposes of creating a hypothetical resale) the prevailing price at the buyer’s place of business measured at the time when the seller learned of the breach.
然而,卖方没有给出适当的转售通知。 那么 ,鉴于我们的卖家没有给出适当的转售通知,会发生什么呢?这就是 §2-706 的官方评论 2 的来源,它说未能根据本节正确行事将剥夺卖方在此处提供的损害赔偿金额,并将他降级为 §2-708 中规定的金额。所以现在我们看看卖家根据 §2-708(1) 的损害赔偿 (而不是 2-708(2), 因为不是损失的批量卖家),公式是 KP(7,500) – MP(6,700) + ID(0) – ES(0) = $800 。 为了确定哪个 MP,我们查看 FOB 合同以及投标的时间和地点,这里的投标时间和地点是卖方在 5 月 25 日将货物交给波士顿的承运人 ,然后是 MP,金额为 6,700 美元。由于卖方未能在此处发出通知,他根据 2-708(1) 被降级为 800 美元的合同市场损害赔偿 。如果 2-708(1) 应该创建一个假设的转售损害赔偿措施,就像有些人所争论的那样,那么在这样的情况下,它最终会做得相当糟糕 ,因为你有一个 FOB 卖方的现场交货条款,但买方在买方收到货物之前不会否认。因此,在这样的情况下,当您签订了运输合同,但买方在买方收到货物之前不会否认,则相关市场价格应该是(至少为了创建假设的转售)买方营业地点的现行价格,即卖方得知违约时所衡量的价格。
22.4. a. Ben Farmer, a local cattle rancher, is visiting your office for the first time. It turns out that earlier this year Ben had agreed to sell 100 cattle (the last 100 Ben had available for sale) to Mel’s Meat for Less (MMFL) for $50,000, “buyer to pick up on May 1.” On May 1, MMFL called Ben and repudiated the contract. The market price for 100 cattle on May 1 was $45,000. On June 15, without ever giving notice to MMFL, Ben sold the 100 cattle to a third party for $49,000. It cost Ben roughly $400 per month to feed these cattle. Ben would like to know what his damages against MMFL will be. What do you advise? U.C.C. §§2-708(1), 2-706, 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)); Official Comment 1 to §2-703.
22.4. a. 当地养牛场主 Ben Farmer 是第一次访问您的办公室。事实证明,今年早些时候,Ben 同意以 50,000 美元的价格将 100 头牛(Ben 最后 100 头可供出售)卖给 Mel's Meat for Less (MMFL),“ 买家在 5 月 1 日提货。“ 5 月 1 日,MMFL 打电话给 Ben 并否认了这份合同。5 月 1 日,100 头牛的市场价格为 45,000 美元。6 月 15 日,Ben 在没有通知 MMFL 的情况下,以 49,000 美元的价格将这 100 头牛卖给了第三方。Ben 每月大约需要 400 美元来喂养这些牛。Ben 想知道他对 MMFL 的赔偿金额是多少。您有什么建议?加州大学 §§2-708(1)、2-706、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1));§2-703 的官方评论 1。
This problem involves the issue of election of remedies. There are two possible approaches: contract market damages under §2-708(1) and contract resale damages under §2-706(1).
这个问题涉及到补救措施的选择问题。有两种可能的方法:§2-708(1) 下的合同市场损害赔偿和 §2-706(1) 下的合同转售损害赔偿。
The formula for contract market damages under §2-708(1) is KP(contract price)-MP(market price)+ID(incidental damages)-ES(expense saved). The formula for contract resale damages under §2-706(1) is KP(contract price)-RP(resale price)+ID(incidental damages)-ES(expense saved).
§2-708(1) 下的合同市场损害赔偿公式为 KP( 合同价格)-MP(市场价格)+ID(附带损害)-ES(节省的费用)。§2-706(1) 下的合同转售损害赔偿公式为 KP( 合同价格)-RP(转售价格)+ID(附带损害赔偿)-ES(节省的费用)。
Here the contract market damages is 50k-45k+0-0=$5k
这里合约市场损失是 50k-45k+0-0=$5k
When a seller chooses to sue under contract market damages, the seller is doing for his own account and nothing for the breaching buyer. The seller is claiming the goods for himself. Thus the seller cannot put the incidental damage of feeding the cattle on the breaching buyer.
当卖方选择根据合同市场损害赔偿提起诉讼时,卖方是在为自己做事,而不是为违约的买方做任何事情。卖方为自己索取货物。 因此 ,卖方不能将喂牛的附带损害归咎于违约的买方。
Here the contract resale damages is 50k-49k+600-0=$1.6k
这里的合同转售损害赔偿金是 50k-49k+600-0=$1.6k
When a seller chooses to sue under contract resale damages, the seller is not claiming ownership in the goods. He is keeping the goods for the buyer’s account and acting as the agent of the breaching buyer. So here the breaching buyer is responsible for the feeding cost, which was caused by the buyer’s breach.
当卖方选择根据合同转售损害赔偿提起诉讼时,卖方并不主张对商品的所有权。他为买方保管货物 ,并充当违约买方的代理人。所以在这里,违约的买方负责由买方违约引起的供餐费用 。
Here the seller would want to claim the higher damages under contract market damages of $5k, but the buyer is probably only willing to pay the lower contract resale damages of $1.6k. The seller can make an argument under Comment 1 to §2-703, which says this Article rejects any doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are cumulative in nature and include all of the available remedies for breach. The seller can say he could have not resold the cattle at all for his own account and just kept the cattle until they die, in which case there would be no question that he will get contract market damages. So the resale should not be used against him. And the reason he didn’t give notice to the buyer is because the resale was for the seller’s own account. On the other hand, the buyer can make an argument under §1-305(a), which says the goal is to give the aggrieved party the benefit of the bargain he struck for. Had the buyer performed, the seller would be left with $50k and no cattle. Currently the seller has $48.4k (resale price – extra feeding cost) and no cattle. To put the aggrieved seller to the position he would have been in had the breaching buyer performed, then the seller should get just $1.6k more, which added to the $48.4k would give the seller $50k, the position the seller would have been in had the breaching buyer performed, but not $5k more, since that would give the seller $53.4k, which is a better position than the seller would have been. In addition, the buyer can argue that the seller did not immediately announce his intention to take contract market damages promptly upon the buyer’s breach. It seems like the seller’s decision to do so after the resale is playing the market in a way that lets him get the benefit of hindsight and pick the higher of the two damage measures after he knows which one is higher. This is not giving him the benefit of his bargain. This is more than what he bargained for. Here the buyer’s §1-305(a) “spirit of remedies” argument is probably going to win.
在这里,卖方希望根据合同市场损害赔偿金 $5k 要求较高的损害赔偿金,但买方可能只愿意支付较低的合同转售损害赔偿金 $1.6k。卖方可以根据 §2-703 的第 1 条评论提出论点 ,即本文拒绝将选择补救措施作为基本政策的任何原则,因此补救措施本质上是累积的 ,包括所有可用的违约补救措施。卖方可以说,他根本不能为了自己的账户转售牛,而只是保留牛直到它们死去,在这种情况下,毫无疑问他将获得合同市场赔偿。 所以转售不应该用来对付他。他没有通知买家的原因是转售是为了卖家自己的账户。另一方面,买方可以根据 §1-305(a) 提出论点,即目标是让受害方从他所达成的讨价还价中获益。如果买方执行,卖方将留下 $50k 而没有牛。目前卖家有 48.4 美元(转售价格 - 额外饲养费用)并且没有牛。如果违约买方履行,将受屈的卖方置于他本应处于的位置,那么卖方应该只多获得 1.6 美元,再加上 48.4 美元,卖方将获得 50 美元,这是如果违约买方履行,卖方本应处于的位置,但不会多出 5 美元,因为这将给卖方 53.4 美元, 这比卖方的处境要好。 此外,买方可以争辩说,卖方没有在买方违约后立即宣布他打算立即接受合同市场赔偿 。卖方在转售后决定这样做似乎是在以一种让他事后诸葛亮的方式玩弄市场,并在知道哪一项较高之后选择两种损害措施中的较高者。这并没有给他带来交易的好处。这比他讨价还价的要多。在这里,买方的 §1-305(a) “ 补救措施精神 ” 论点可能会获胜。
b. Same facts as part (a), except Ben’s resale had been for just $40,000. What would Ben’s damages be then? Official Comment 2 to §2-706.
b. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Ben 的转售价格仅为 40,000 美元。那么 Ben 的赔偿金会是多少呢?§2-706 的官方评论 2。
Now the contract market damages is still $5k, but the contract resale damages become 50k-40k+600-0=$10.6k. Here the seller would want to get the contract resale damages since it is higher than the contract market damages. However, the seller did not follow the proper procedures required for an aggrieved seller to get damages under §2-706, namely the seller failed to give notice to the buyer of the resale. Under Comment 2 to §2-706, the seller is now relegated to seek damages under §2-708. So in this problem the seller can only recover the contract market damages of $5k.
现在合同市场损害赔偿 仍然是 $5k,但合同转售损害赔偿变成了 50k-40k+600-0=$10.6k。在这里,卖方希望获得合同转售损害赔偿,因为它高于合同市场损害赔偿。然而,卖方没有遵循受害卖方根据 §2-706 获得损害赔偿所需的适当程序,即卖方未能向买方发出转售通知。根据 §2-706 的注释 2,卖方现在被降级为根据 §2-708 寻求损害赔偿。 所以在这个问题上,卖方只能收回 $5k 的合同市场损失。
c. If Ben’s resale had been for $40,000, except this time he had given proper notice of the resale, what would Ben’s damages be then? Official Comment 5 to §2-706.
c.如果 Ben 的转售价格为 40,000 美元,但这次他已经发出了适当的转售通知,那么 Ben 的赔偿金会是多少?§2-706 的官方评论 5。
Here the only issue is the timing question. The buyer can argue a month and a half is too long to wait for resale. The statute does not provide guidance on this issue. Comment 5 to §2-706 says what is a reasonable time depends on the nature of the goods, the condition of the market and the other circumstances of the case, its length cannot be measured by any legal yardsticks r divided into degrees. In the Firwood case, the 6th Circuit said even three years was not too late for a commercially reasonable resale of some custom-made tire and inflator machines under the fact of that case. But cattle have a much wider market than do custom-made tire and inflator machines, so Firwood maybe distinguiable. If the seller can give a good reason for waiting a month and a half for the resale, then he probably will get the contract resale damages of $10.6k.
这里唯一的问题是时间问题。买家可以争辩说一个半月的时间太长了,不能等待转售。该法规没有就此问题提供指导。§2-706 的第 5 条评论说,什么是合理时间取决于货物的性质、市场状况和案件的其他情况,其长度不能用任何以度为单位的法律标准来衡量。在 Firwood 案中,第六巡回法院表示,根据该案的事实,即使是三年,对于一些定制轮胎和充气机的商业合理转售来说也不算太晚。 但牛的市场比定制的轮胎和充气机要广阔得多,因此 Firwood 可能与众不同 。如果卖方能给出一个等待一个半月进行转售的充分理由,那么他可能会获得 10.6 美元的合同转售赔偿金。
d. Suppose now that MMFL had repudiated on March 1, and then on March 15 Ben gave MMFL notice of resale, identified the cattle as the subject of resale, and resold the cattle for $48,000. If the market price of the cattle on May 1 were $45,000, would Ben still be eligible for §2-708(1) damages? If not, why not? U.C.C. §§2-708(1), 2-706, 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)); Official Comment 1 to §2-703.
d. 假设 MMFL 在 3 月 1 日拒绝出售,然后在 3 月 15 日,Ben 向 MMFL 发出转售通知,确定该牛为转售标的,并以 48,000 美元的价格转售该牛。如果牛在 5 月 1 日的市场价格为 45,000 美元,Ben 是否仍有资格获得 §2-708(1) 损害赔偿?如果不是,为什么不呢?加州大学 §§2-708(1)、2-706、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1));§2-703 的官方评论 1。
Here the contract resale damages would be 50k-48k+0-600=$1.4k. The contract market damages would be 50k-45k+0-0=$5k. The seller can try to make an argument that the mere fact that he ended up doing the resale before the original performance date should not be deemed as his final election of contract resale damages, because at that point he didn’t know whether he would want contract market damages, and he always has the right to pick contract market damages. So the seller can argue he shouldn’t be precluded from contract market damages just because he did a resale before the original performance date. The buyer can argue that the seller should get contract resale damages because it brings him closer to expectation damages. Comment 1 to §1-305 says that whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts of individual case. The buyer can argue the fact of this case suggest that the seller’s early resale must have precluded him from later choosing the contract market damages that ended up being higher than the contract resale damages, because if the seller is given the benefit of the hindsight, he is given better than what he had bargained for, i.e., the chance to play the market knowing which damage measure is higher. In this problem the buyer’s argument probably is going to win and thus the seller can only get the contract resale damages.
这里的合同转售损害赔偿为 50k-48k+0-600=$1.4k。合约市场损害赔偿为 50k-45k+0-0=$5k。卖方可以尝试提出一个论点,即他最终在原始履行日期之前进行了转售这一事实不应被视为他对合同转售损害赔偿的最终选择,因为那时他不知道他是否想要合同市场损害赔偿,他总是有权选择合同市场损害赔偿。 因此 ,卖方可以争辩说,他不应该仅仅因为他在原始履约日期之前进行了转售而被排除在合同市场损害赔偿之外。买方可以争辩说,卖方应该获得合同转售损害赔偿,因为这使他更接近预期损害赔偿。§1-305 的注释 1 指出,寻求一种补救措施是否禁止另一种补救措施完全取决于个别案件的事实。买方可以争辩说,本案的事实表明,卖方的早期转售一定阻止了他以后选择合同市场的损害赔偿,而最终的损害赔偿高于合同转售损害赔偿,因为如果卖方得到事后诸葛亮的利益,他得到的比他讨价还价的要好。 即,有机会在知道哪个损害指标更高的情况下参与市场。在这个问题上,买方的论点可能会获胜,因此卖方只能获得合同转售赔偿。
e. Suppose that MMFL had repudiated on March 1, and then on March 15 Ben identified the cattle as the subject of resale and resold the cattle for $48,000. But this time Ben, though he intended otherwise, completely forgot to give notice of the resale to MMFL. If the market price of the cattle on May 1 were $45,000, would Ben still be eligible for §2-708(1) damages? If not, why not? U.C.C. §§2-708(1), 2-706, 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)); Official Comment 1 to §2-703.
e. 假设 MMFL 在 3 月 1 日否认,然后在 3 月 15 日,Ben 确定这些牛是转售的对象,并以 48,000 美元的价格转售了这些牛。但这一次,尽管 Ben 的意图并非如此,但他完全忘记了向 MMFL 发出转售通知。如果牛在 5 月 1 日的市场价格为 45,000 美元,Ben 是否仍有资格获得 §2-708(1) 损害赔偿?如果不是,为什么不呢?加州大学 §§2-708(1)、2-706、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1));§2-703 的官方评论 1。
Here the seller is relegated to contract market damages under §2-708 for failure to give notice under Comment 2 to §2-706. The relegation is intended as punishment for the seller, however, here the damages under §2-708, i.e., $5k, ends up being higher than that under §2-706 which is $1.4k. Here a court facing this problem would probably interpret Comment 2 to §2-706 to mean the seller will get the lesser of the contract market and contract resale damages for failure to follow the procedure and give notice.
在这里,卖方因未能根据 §2-706 的注释 2 发出通知而被降级为 §2-708 下的合同市场损害赔偿 。降级旨在作为对卖方的惩罚,但是,此处 §2-708 下的损害赔偿,即 5 美元,最终高于 §2-706 下的 1.4 美元。在这里,面临此问题的法院可能会将 §2-706 的注释 2 解释为,卖方将获得合同市场和合同转售赔偿,以代替者,因为没有遵循程序并发出通知。
22.5. Super Dave’s Ford Dealership in Waterloo, Iowa, was participating in a manufacturer’s incentive program whereby Ford would give a $20,000 bonus to any dealership that sold 100 new Ford Aerostar mini-vans in one calendar year. In late November, Super Dave’s had sold 87 new Aerostars when the Waterloo School District made a contract with Dave’s to purchase 15 Aerostars for delivery on December 20. Immediately before the district signed the contract, Super Dave’s told the district representative, “The reason I am able to give you such a great price on these vans is that the 15 vans that you’re buying brings our total Aerostar sales to 102 for the year, and we get a $20,000 bonus from Ford if we sell over 100 Aerostars for the year.” On December 18, the superintendent of the school district calls Super Dave’s to tell him that the district had found a different dealership with a better price on the mini-vans, and thus it would not be buying the vans from Super Dave’s. On December 31, Super Dave’s had sold a total of 91 Aerostars for the year and therefore did not qualify for the $20,000 incentive payment. When Super Dave’s sues the school district for breach, may Super Dave’s include in its damages the $20,000 manufacturer’s incentive? U.C.C. §§2-710, 1-305(a), (formerly 1-106(1)), 2-706(1), 2-708, 2-709(1); cf. §2-715(2)(a).
22.5. 位于爱荷华州滑铁卢的 Super Dave 福特经销商正在参与一项制造商激励计划,根据该计划,福特将向在一个日历年内售出 100 辆新福特 Aerostar 小型货车的任何经销商提供 20,000 美元的奖金 。11 月下旬,当滑铁卢学区与 Dave's 签订合同购买 15 架 Aerostar 并于 12 月 20 日交付时,Super Dave's 已经售出了 87 架新的 Aerostar。 就在学区签署合同之前,Super Dave's 告诉学区代表,“ 我之所以能给你这些货车这么好的价格,是因为你买的 15 辆货车使我们今年的 Aerostar 总销量达到 102 辆,如果我们今年售出超过 100 辆 Aerostar,我们会从福特那里获得 20,000 美元的奖金 。“ 12 月 18 日,学区负责人打电话给 Super Dave's,告诉他该学区已经找到了一家价格更优惠的小型货车经销商,因此它不会从 Super Dave's 购买货车 。截至 12 月 31 日,Super Dave's 全年共售出 91 架 Aerostars,因此没有资格获得 20,000 美元的奖励金。当 Super Dave's 起诉学区违规时,Super Dave's 是否可以将 20,000 美元的制造商奖励金包含在其损害赔偿中 ?加州大学 §§2-710、1-305(a)、(原 1-106(1))、2-706(1)、2-708、2-709(1);参见。 §2-715(2)(a) 条。
Under all of the seller’s damage formulas in Article 2, §§2-706(1), 2-708(1), 2-709(1), an aggrieved seller can only get incidental damages, not consequential damages. Here the seller cannot make a plausible argument §2-710 to fit the $20k into incidental damages. And under §2-715(2)(a), only a buyer can get consequential damages, not a seller. It’s very rare when a seller can show consequential damages due to a buyer’s breach. Here the benefit of the seller’s bargain would include this consequential damages under §1-305(a). But it’s really hard for this seller to make a case for consequential damages given the clear statutory language under §1-305(a), which says neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in the UCC or by other rule of law.
根据 第 2 条第 2-706(1) 款、第 2-708(1) 条、第 2-709(1) 条中卖方的所有损害公式,受害卖方只能获得附带损害赔偿,不能获得间接损害赔偿。在这里,卖方无法提出合理的论点 §2-710 以将 $20k 计入附带损害赔偿。根据 §2-715(2)(a),只有买方才能获得间接损害赔偿,而卖方不能。 卖方可以证明由于买方违约而造成的间接损害是非常罕见的。在这里,卖方交易的利益将包括 §1-305(a ) 规定的间接损害赔偿 。但是 ,鉴于 §1-305(a) 下明确的法定语言,该卖家很难提出间接损害赔偿的理由 ,该语言规定,除非 UCC 或其他法律规则明确规定,否则不得获得间接或特殊损害赔偿或刑事损害赔偿。
LESSOR’S AND SELLER’S REMEDIES PP.397
出租人和卖方的补救措施第 397 页
Problem 23.1 Big Lou of Lou’s Used Cars for Less (from Problem 2.1) had not seen you for some time, but he just stopped by your office with a new problem. Lou’s problem stemmed from an experience he had with small fleet of used cars that he leased. A couple of years a new customer, Charlie Erker, had agreed to lease a used Cadillac for three years at $400 per month. Exactly one year into the lease, Charlie dropped the car off at Lou’s and said, “I don’t need it anymore.” Even before dropping the car off, Charlie had missed the last two payments on the lease. At the point when Charlie repudiated his lease, Lou’s lease fleet was all in use. Therefore, it took Lou three months and a $50 newspaper ad to re-lease the car to a different customer; the new lease was for two years at only $300 per month. Lou always uses the same standard lease form, which contains blanks for the length of the lease and the rental rate. Lou had, however, made a special allowance for Charlie only in which Lou agreed to have the car hand-washed every month for Charlie at Lou’s expense (this had cost Lou $10 per month). Lou asks you what amount of damages he could claim against Charlie for Charlie’s breach. What do you advise? U.C.C. §§2A-527, 2A-530; Official Comment 7 to §2A-527. (In calculating damages for this problem, don’t bother actually discounting any of the payment streams to present value, but not to yourself where that would normally be done).
问题 23.1 Big Lou of Lou's Used Cars for Less(来自问题 2.1)已经有一段时间没有见到你了,但他刚刚带着一个新问题来到你的办公室。Lou 的问题源于他租用的小型二手车车队的一次经历。几年前,一位新客户 Charlie Erker 同意以每月 400 美元的价格租一辆二手凯迪拉克三年。租约刚好一年后,Charlie 把车送到了 Lou's,并说:“我不再需要它了。甚至在还车之前,Charlie 就已经错过了租约的最后两笔付款。当 Charlie 拒绝租约时,Lou 的租约车队已全部使用。因此,Lou 花了三个月的时间和一则 50 美元的报纸广告,才将这辆车重新租给了不同的客户;新租约为期两年,每月只需 300 美元。Lou 始终使用相同的标准租赁表单,其中包含租赁期限和租赁费率的空白。然而,Lou 为 Charlie 提供了特殊津贴,其中 Lou 同意每个月为 Charlie 手洗汽车,费用由 Lou 承担(这花费了 Lou 每月 10 美元)。Lou 问您,他可以就 Charlie 的违规行为向 Charlie 索赔多少赔偿。您有什么建议?《美国法典》第 2A-527 条、第 2A-530 条;§2A-527 的官方评论 7。(在计算此问题的损害赔偿时,不要费心实际将任何付款流贴现为现值,但不要在通常这样做的情况下贴现给自己)。
Answer: §2A-527 is available to an aggrieved lessor that chooses to release the goods. As long as the lessor releases the goods in a lease agreement that is substantially similar to the original lease agreement, this is what the lessor will be entitled to §2A-527: UR + (PVOL – PVNL) + ID – ES. UR stands for accrued but unpaid rent on original lease measured as of the date of the new lease term (up to the date of the new lease term). PVOL refers to present value as of the same date, namely the date of the new lease term, of the total remaining lease payments under the original lease. PVNL stands or the present value as of that same date as of the total lease payment of the new lease for the term that is comparable to the remainder of the original lease. ID stands for incidental damages and ES stands for expenses saved.
答案:§2A-527 适用于选择释放货物的受害出租人。 只要出租人在租赁协议中释放的货物与原始租赁协议基本相似,这就是出租人有权获得 §2A-527 的内容:UR + (PVOL – PVNL) + ID – ES。UR 代表截至新租赁期限之日(直至新租赁期限之日)计算的原始租赁的应计但未付租金。 PVOL 是指原始租赁下剩余租赁付款总额的截至同一日期(即新租赁期限之日)的现值。 PVNL 是截至新租约总租赁付款额的现值,该期限与原始租赁的剩余部分相当。 ID 代表附带损害,ES 代表节省的费用。
Is this new customer’s lease substantially similar to the similar for the original lessee? If it is not then we are not able to proceed at all under 2A-527. The differences between the new and original lease: the new lease is a little bit shorter in total and it runs 2 years rather than the 3 years of the original lease. The new lease ends up extending 3 months beyond the original lease because it ends up starting one year and three months after the original lease. The other difference is that the original lease had the free carwash and the new lease does not. So, should these differences prevent the lease from being substantially similar? How would you use Official Comment 7 to 2A-527? Comment 7 says a new lease can be substantially similar to the original lease even though its term extend beyond the remaining term of the original lease, so long as (a) the original lease terms are commercially comparable (and that seems to be true here); and (b) the court can fairly apportion a part of the rental payment under the new lease as part of the new lease to the original lease. It seems that we can do that here because the new lease goes beyond the 21 months and we can take the 21 months from the original lease and put that against the new lease.
这个新客户的租约是否与原始承租人的租约基本相似? 如果不是 , 那么我们根本无法根据 2A-527 进行。 新租约和原始租约的区别 :新租约的总租约总时间短一点,有效期为 2 年,而不是原始租约的 3 年。新租约最终在原始租约之后延长 3 个月,因为它最终在原始租约后一年零三个月开始。另一个区别是,原始租约有免费洗车 , 而新租约没有。 那么,这些差异是否应该阻止租约实质上相似呢?您将如何使用官方评论 7 至 2A-527? 评论 7 表示,新租约可以与原始租约基本相似,即使其期限超过原始租约的剩余期限,只要 (a) 原始租赁条款在商业上具有可比性(这里似乎是正确的);以及 (b) 法院可以公平地将新租约下的一部分租金付款作为新租约的一部分分配给原始租约。我们似乎可以在这里做到这一点,因为新租约超过了 21 个月 ,我们可以从原始租约中取 21 个月,并将其与新租约相抵触。
§2A-527: UR (5 x 400) + (PVOL [21 x 400] – PVNL [21 x 300]) + ID (50) – ES (24 x 10) = $3,910. Expenses saved are $240 because the lessor promised to hand-wash the car that would cost $10 a month. And once the original lessee turned in the car exactly after a month, presumably they saved that amount as a result of the breach.
§2A-527:UR (5 x 400) + (PVOL [21 x 400] – PVNL [21 x 300]) + ID (50) – ES (24 x 10) = 3,910 美元。 节省的费用为 240 美元,因为出租人承诺手洗汽车,每月花费 10 美元 。一旦最初的承租人在一个月后上交了汽车,大概他们由于违规而节省了这笔钱 。
We won’t do the discounting method. But the discounting would be discounting the present value which would the difference between 21 months and the two lease terms.
我们不会采用贴现法。但贴现将是现值贴现值,即 21 个月和两个租赁期限之间的差额。
Problem 23.2 Big Lou had one more problem that was lease-related, and this one, Lou said, was even worse than the first. Lou had leased a used Ford Taurus Wagon to Sam Miller, a single father with four children. That lease was for $250 per month for four years. One year into the lease, Sam missed two consecutive payments and Lou had the car repossessed. Much to Lou’s horror, Sam’s children had torn much of the upholstery off the seats inside the car. It cost Lou $800 to repair the upholstery damage, after which Lou sod the car for $14,000, since Lou had stopped leasing used cars the day after Sam had leased this one. Now Lou wants to sue Sam for his breach of the lease agreement. The $250-per-month lease payments was roughly equal to the market value of the lease at the time of the breach. For what amount of damages may Lou recover? U.C.C. §§2A-527, 2A-528, 2A-539, 2A-530, 2A-532.
问题 23.2 Big Lou 还有一个与租赁相关的问题,Lou 说,这个问题比第一个问题还要严重。Lou 将一辆二手福特 Taurus Wagon 租给了 Sam Miller,他是一位有四个孩子的单身父亲。那份租约是每月 250 美元,为期四年。租约一年后,Sam 连续两次未付款项,Lou 收回了汽车。令 Lou 感到恐惧的是,Sam 的孩子们已经撕掉了车内座椅的大部分内饰。修复内饰损坏花费了 Lou 800 美元,之后 Lou 以 14,000 美元的价格买下了这辆车,因为 Lou 在 Sam 租下这辆车后的第二天就停止租赁二手车了。现在 Lou 想起诉 Sam 违反租赁协议。每月 250 美元的租赁付款大致等于违约时租赁的市场价值。 Lou 可以赔偿多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2A-527、2A-528、2A-539、2A-530、2A-532 条。
Answer: §2A-528(1): UR + (PVOL – PVNL) + ID – ES
答案:§2A-528(1):UR + (PVOL – PVNL) + ID – ES
What does 2A-427(1) tells us about resale? If the disposition ends up being by sale rather than by substantially similar lease, then §2A-528 will govern. Why wouldn’t the lessee sue for rent under 2A – 529(1)? 2A-529 is a lot like 2-709(1) in that it offers three different situations in which a lessor may sue for the rent. Does Lou qualify for any one of them? §2A-529(1)(a) for goods accepted by the lessee and not repossessed or tendered by the lessor and in this case we are told that the car has been repossessed. §2A-529(1)(a) has the possibility that conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss passes to the lessee. Now here these goods were damaged, so you might think Lou qualifies for damages under 2A-529(1)(a). But remember what we said about risk of loss with and this goes back to 2A-219(1), the basic rule in a non-financed lease stays with the loss and does not transfer with the lessee. So Lou is not going to qualify there either. 2A-529(1)(b) Lou is not able to argue that especially since he has already resold the car, he will not be able to argue that he is unable to dispose of the car at a reasonable price.
2A-427(1) 告诉我们关于转售的什么信息?如果处置最终是通过出售而不是实质上相似的租赁,则以 §2A-528 为准。为什么承租人不根据 2A – 529(1) 起诉出租?2A-529 与 2-709(1) 非常相似,因为它提供了三种不同的情况,出租人可以起诉要求支付租金。Lou 是否有资格获得其中任何一项? §2A-529(1)(a) 适用于承租人接受但未被出租人收回或交付的货物,在这种情况下 ,我们被告知汽车已被收回。§2A-529(1)(a) 有可能在损失风险转移给承租人后,合格货物在商业上合理的时间内丢失或损坏。现在这些货物已损坏,因此您可能会认为 Lou 符合 2A-529(1)(a) 项规定的损害赔偿条件。但请记住我们所说的损失风险 ,这可以追溯到 2A-219(1),非融资租赁的基本规则与损失有关,不与承租人转移。 因此 ,Lou 在那里也不符合资格。2A-529(1)(b) Lou 无法争辩说,特别是因为他已经转售了汽车,他将无法争辩说他无法以合理的价格出售该汽车。
§2A-528(1): UR (2 x 250) + (PVOL [0] – PVNL(0)) + ID(800) – ES(0) = $1,300.
§2A-528(1):UR (2 x 250) + (PVOL [0] – PVNL(0)) + ID(800) – ES(0) = 1,300 美元。
You cannot look at that UR figure and say there is all of these months left and we can get them all because that is an action for rent, you cannot get an action for rent unless you qualify under 2A-529(1). And this lease is at the market rent PVNL means the present value of a market lease of the same kind. Since this lease is at a market rent, then PVOL – PVNL has to be zero. ID – the lessor can arguments under 2A-530 for incidental damages or certainly they can argue under 2A-532 that the repair should be recovered (even if it is not incidental damages) because it is a damage of the lessor’s residual interest in the goods that is caused by the default of the lessee. But for now the $800 goes under ID.
你不能看着那个 UR 数字说还剩 下所有这些月,我们可以得到它们,因为这是租金诉讼,除非你符合 2A-529(1) 的资格,否则你不能获得租金诉讼 。而这种租约是按市场租金计算的 PVNL 是指同类市场租约的现值。由于此租约是按市场租金计算的,因此 PVOL – PVNL 必须为零。 ID – 出租人可以根据 2A-530 主张附带损害赔偿,或者他们当然可以根据 2A-532 主张应该追回维修(即使不是附带损害),因为它是由于承租人的违约而造成的出租人对货物的剩余权益的损害。但现在 这 800 美元归 ID 所有。
Can Lou make an argument for greater damages (not in an action for rent)? But can Lou say this is an under-compensation for me and I think I lost a profit here, I am a lost profit lessor? So the argument for lost profit is that Lou says if it were not for this breaching buyer, I would have made whatever profit I was going to make on this lease as well as the profit that I ended up making when I sold the car when the buyer breached; so Lou argues that he should have gotten to damages one for the profit he would have made and also for this one. This is an interesting argument for Lou but it is plausible. Keating is not sure which way such argument would go.
Lou 能否提出更高的损害赔偿(不是在租金诉讼中)?但是 Lou 能否说这对我来说是低估的,我认为我在这里损失了利润 , 我是一个亏损的利润出租商?因此,利润损失的论点是,Lou 说,如果不是这个违约的买家,我就会从这次租约中获得任何利润,以及我在买家违约时卖掉汽车时最终获得的利润;所以 Lou 争辩说,他应该为他本来可以赚取的利润赔偿一个人,也为了这个人。这对 Lou 来说是一个有趣的论点 , 但它是合理的。基廷不确定这种争论会走向何方。
The buyer can argue that Lou has not lost a profit on this buyer’s lease because Lou stopped Leasing used cars shortly after Sam’s lease therefore Lou’s capacity for leased car did not exceed the demands. If it didn’t then Lou will not win on his argument.
买方可以争辩说,Lou 没有从该买方的租赁中损失利润,因为 Lou 在 Sam 的租赁后不久就停止租赁二手车,因此 Lou 的租赁汽车容量没有超过需求。如果没有,那么 Lou 就不会在他的论点上获胜。
On the other hand, Lou can say if the lessee did not breach on his lease then Lou would have received the profit from Sam’s lease and plus a profit from a different buyer who would have purchased a different but comparable car from Lou and as long as Lou’s fleet of car was greater than the demand (then maybe Lou could win on his argument).
另一方面,Lou 可以说,如果承租人没有违反租约 , 那么 Lou 将从 Sam 的租约中获得利润,再加上其他买家的利润,该买家会从 Lou 那里购买不同但可比的汽车,只要 Lou 的车队大于需求(那么也许 Lou 可以在他的论点上获胜)。
Problem 23.3 Steel Works, Inc., is a Des Moines, Iowa, manufacturer that contracts to sell to Canadian Brinks, a Toronto security firm, a set of 10 specifically manufactured steel doors for $70,000. The delivery date is October 5, and the delivery term is “FOB Seller’s Factory.” Canadian Brinks was responsible for installing the doors. On October 1, Canadian Brinks calls Steel Works and repudiates the contract. In calling around to find other possible buyers, Steel Works gets two offers: the first is from an Iowa buyer that will pay $45,000 for the doors and will pick up and install the doors itself; the second is from a California buyer that will pay $60,000 for the doors if Steel Works ships them (at a cost of $3,000) and installs them (another $1,500). On October 1, the market price for these doors in Iowa is $45,000, and in Toronto it is $43,000.The president of Steel Works comes to you and asks what damage options are available to her company and which option would be the company’s best alternative. What do you advise? C.I.S.G. Arts. 25, 64(1)(a), 74, 75, 76, 62, 77, 28.
问题 23.3 Steel Works, Inc. 是一家位于爱荷华州得梅因的制造商,该公司与多伦多保安公司 Canadian Brinks 签订合同,以 70,000 美元的价格向 Canadian Brinks 出售一套 10 扇专门制造的钢门。交货日期为 10 月 5 日,交货期限为“FOB Seller's Factory”。Canadian Brinks 负责安装门。10 月 1 日,Canadian Brinks 致电 Steel Works 并否认合同。在打电话寻找其他可能的买家时,Steel Works 收到了两个报价:第一个来自爱荷华州的买家,他将支付 45,000 美元购买门,并自行取车和安装门;第二个来自加利福尼亚买家,如果 Steel Works 运送门(成本为 3,000 美元)并安装门(另外 1,500 美元),他们将支付 60,000 美元购买门。10 月 1 日,这些门在爱荷华州的市场价格为 45,000 美元,在多伦多为 43,000 美元。Steel Works 的总裁来找您,询问她的公司有哪些损坏方案,哪种方案是公司的最佳选择。您有什么建议?C.I.S.G. 第 25、64(1)(a)、74、75、76、62、77、28 条。
Answer: Would the buyer’s repudiation in this case amount to a fundamental breach of the contract? Under Article 25 it certainly would, because buyer is not going to pay and that is a substantial deprivation of what the seller expected under the contract, which was to get paid for the doors. Why is it significant that the buyer’s repudiation does amount to a fundamental breach? Because it means that now the seller has the option to avoid the contract entirely under Article 64(1)(a). The reason that the seller’s ability to avoid is important is that it is avoidance by the seller makes the seller eligible for any of the possible seller remedies outlined by the CISG. For all of the remedies for the seller in the CISG, the seller must first avoid the contract. The only exception under Article 62’s Action for the price because avoidance for the price is actually inconsistent by the seller if he avoids the contract (because action for the price is like a specific performance). So, if the seller were not eligible to avoid the contract, then the seller would not be able to sue for contract resale damages under Article 75 or for the contract market damages under Article 76. And the seller’s right then is to insist that the buyer cure its breach. Now under these facts, the buyer’s only cure is to retract its repudiation and pay for the price.
回答: 在这种情况下,买方的否认是否构成对合同的根本违约? 根据第 25 条 , 这肯定会,因为买方不打算付款,这大大剥夺了卖方在合同下的期望,即获得门的付款。 为什么买方的否认确实构成根本违约很重要? 因为这意味着现在卖方可以选择根据第 64(1)(a) 条完全避免签订合同。 卖家的回避能力之所以重要,是因为卖家的回避使卖家有资格获得 CISG 概述的任何可能的卖家补救措施。对于 CISG 中卖方的所有补救措施,卖方必须首先避免签订合同。根据第 62 条的价格诉讼,唯一的例外是卖方如果撤销合同,则价格的规避实际上是不一致的(因为价格诉讼就像特定的履行)。因此,如果卖方没有资格撤销合同,那么卖方将无法根据第 75 条起诉合同转售损害赔偿或根据第 76 条起诉合同市场损害赔偿 。而卖方的权利是坚持要求买方纠正其违规行为。现在,在这些事实下,买方唯一的解决办法是撤回其否认并支付价格。
Under Article 62, is the seller eligible to recover the price if we assume that the seller opts not to avoid the contract? What hurdles might stand in the way? Article 62 says the seller may require the buyer to pay the price unless the seller has resorted to a remedy, which is inconsistent with this requirement and such remedy that is inconsistent with an action for the price is avoidance of the contract by the seller plus contract market damages or avoidance of the contract by the seller plus contract resale damages.
根据第 62 条,如果我们假设卖方选择不撤销合同,卖方是否有资格收回价格? 哪些障碍可能会阻碍? 第 62 条规定,卖方可以要求买方支付价款,除非卖方已采取与此要求不一致的补救措施,并且与价款诉讼不一致的补救措施是卖方撤销合同加合同市场损害赔偿或卖方撤销合同加合同转售损害赔偿。
In this case, if seller tries to sue for the price he will encounter two hurdles. First, Article 77’s General Mitigation Duty, that duty might require a seller who wants the price to first pursue seriously a possibility of resale as a way to mitigate the buyer’s damages. If you got resale opportunities and you do not take them, then you are failing in the duty to mitigate and you probably cannot recover the price under Article 62. In this respect, if you combine Article 62’s Action for Price with Article 77’s mitigation duty, what you get is something tantamount to UCC Article §2-709(1)(b) that is the subsection that allows the action for the suit by the seller only if the seller cannot resale the goods at a reasonable price. Another hurdle is Article 28, which says that the forum court should require specific performance, and that is what an action for the price is for the seller, only in a case where the case’s only forum domestic law would require it. So if this suit were brought in the U.S.’s district court, the seller’s action for the price under the CISG would be subject to the same limit as the seller’s action for price under UCC §2-907(1). And under these facts, this seller would not qualify for any of the three situations in which an action for the price would be allowed under §2-709(1). This seller should not be able to sue for the price under the CISG.
在这种情况下,如果卖方试图起诉价格,他将遇到两个障碍。首先, 第 77 条的一般减轻责任,该义务可能要求希望价格的卖方首先认真寻求转售的可能性 , 以减轻买方的损害。如果您有转售机会但没有抓住它们,那么您就没有履行减轻责任 ,您可能无法根据第 62 条收回价格 。在这方面,如果您将第 62 条的价格诉讼与第 77 条的减轻责任相结合,您得到的相当于 UCC 第 2-709(1)(b) 条 , 即只有在卖方无法以合理价格转售商品的情况下才允许卖方提起诉讼的小节。另一个障碍是第 28 条,该条款规定法院应要求具体履行,这就是为价格而采取的诉讼对卖方而言,只有在案件唯一的法院地国内法要求的情况下。 因此 ,如果该诉讼在美国地方法院提起,卖方根据 CISG 提起的价格诉讼将与卖方根据 UCC §2-907(1) 提起的价格诉讼受到相同的限制。根据这些事实,该卖家将不符合根据 §2-709(1) 允许对价格提起诉讼的三种情况中的任何一种。该卖家不应能够根据 CISG 起诉货款。
Other possibilities: what about contract resale damages under Article 75? The seller would get the difference between the contract price (KP) and the resale price (RP) plus incidental damages (ID) and consequential damages under Article 74 (CD). If you look at Article 74, it speaks in terms of consequential damages and it does not say anything about incidental damages, but that term as it is used by the CISG would also include what the UCC defines separately as incidental damages. Because what the UCC really calls ID is just a subset of CD, namely damages that were caused to the seller as a consequence to the buyer’s breach. Now ID in the UCC as defined in §2-710 have to be in a certain category, but all of those incidental damages are as a consequence of the buyer’s breach. SO they are really broadly speaking consequential damages and that is the way the CISG looks at it, when they talk about consequential damages and the things we think of, as ID, would fall under Article 74’s broad definition of consequential damages.
其他可能性: 第 75 条规定的合同转售损害赔偿怎么办? 卖方将获得合同价格 (KP) 和转售价格 (RP) 之间的差额,加上第 74 (CD) 条规定的附带损害赔偿 (ID) 和间接损害赔偿。如果您看一下第 74 条,它指的是间接损害赔偿,并没有提到附带损害赔偿,但 CISG 使用的术语也将包括 UCC 单独定义的附带损害赔偿。因为 UCC 真正所说的 ID 只是 CD 的一个子集,即由于买方违约而给卖方造成的损害。现在,§2-710 中定义的 UCC 中的 ID 必须属于某个类别,但所有这些附带损害都是由于买方违约造成的。 因此 , 它们实际上是广义的间接损害赔偿,这就是 CISG 看待它的方式,当他们谈论间接损害赔偿时,我们认为作为 ID 的东西将属于第 74 条对间接损害的广泛定义。
So which resale option should the seller choose? For mitigation purposes, the seller should choose the California resale option, which would yield $70k -$50k +$3k (for installation) +$1,500 (for shipping cost) because seller would not have paid any shipping or installation in its original contract. The total under Article 75 would be $24,500 in damages and that would be lesser than the $25,000 in damages that they would get if the seller went with the Iowa resale option.
那么卖家应该选择哪种转售选项呢? 出于缓解目的,卖家应选择加利福尼亚州转售选项,这将产生 $70k -$50k + $3k(安装)+$1,500(运费),因为卖家不会在其原始合同中支付任何运费或安装费用。根据第 75 条的规定,赔偿总额为 24,500 美元,这将低于如果卖方选择爱荷华州转售选项,他们将获得的 25,000 美元赔偿金。
What about contract market damages under Article 76? That would be the difference between KP ($70k) and the MP ($45k in Iowa) at the place where the delivery should have been made. Article 76(2) would point us to Iowa because in this contract it was the seller’s responsibility to deliver the goods only to get them to seller’s place of business in Iowa. These damages in theory would be 25k but we would have to reduce that to the $24,500 California’s damages that you passed up under Article 77’s mitigation requirement and principle of reduction, anytime you fail to mitigate.
第 76 条规定的合同市场损害赔偿呢? 这将是 KP($70k)和 MP(爱荷华州 $45k)在应该交付的地方之间的差异。第 76(2) 条将我们指向爱荷华州,因为在该合同中,卖方有责任交付货物,只是为了将货物运送到卖方在爱荷华州的营业地点。这些损害赔偿理论上是 25k,但只要您未能减轻,我们就必须将其减少到您根据第 77 条的减轻要求和减少原则放弃的 24,500 美元加利福尼亚州的损害赔偿。
What about lost profit? We would need to know more.
利润损失怎么办? 我们需要了解更多。
Problem 23.4 Joe Thompson was a Portland, Maine, sportswriter who was tired of maintaining a single-family home and was looking to move into a condominium. He listed his house “For Sale by Owner” at $200,000, and he ultimately accepted Brad Pearson’s offer of $190,000, in large part because it did not contain a financing contingency clause. Joe required that Brad put down a $5,000 earnest money deposit. Unfortunately for Joe, Brad ended up being unable to secure financing and Brad ultimately breached the sales contract for lack of a mortgage. Joe returned Brad’s security deposit with a letter in which Joe retained his right sue Brad for any and all remedies. When the house failed to sell after several more months, Joe relented and got a real estate agent. The agent convinced Joe to spend $10,000 for central air-conditioning and finally the house sold almost exactly one year after Brad failed to close on his contract. The selling price was $170,000, but Joe owed his agent 6 percent of that. Besides the $10,000 Joe spent for central air-conditioning, he ended up paying $18,000 in mortgage payments and $1,500 in property taxes while he continued to occupy the house during the last year. Now that he finally has sold the house, Joe comes to you to ask for what amount he can recover from Brad for Brad’s breach of the earlier contract. What do you advise?
问题 23.4 乔·汤普森 (Joe Thompson) 是缅因州波特兰市的一名体育记者,他厌倦了维持单户住宅,并希望搬进公寓。他以 200,000 美元的价格将自己的房子挂牌出售给“业主出售”,他最终接受了布拉德·皮尔森 (Brad Pearson) 的 190,000 美元报价,这在很大程度上是因为它不包含融资应急条款。乔要求布拉德支付 5,000 美元的保证金。对 Joe 来说不幸的是,Brad 最终无法获得融资,而 Brad 最终因缺乏抵押贷款而违反了销售合同。Joe 将 Brad 的保证金退还给了一封信,信中 Joe 保留了他对 Brad 的任何和所有补救措施的起诉权。当房子在几个月后未能售出时,乔心软了,找了一位房地产经纪人。经纪人说服乔花 10,000 美元购买中央空调,最终,这所房子几乎在布拉德未能完成合同一年后售出。售价为 170,000 美元,但 Joe 欠他的经纪人其中的 6%。除了 Joe 花在中央空调上的 10,000 美元外,他最终还支付了 18,000 美元的抵押贷款和 1,500 美元的财产税,而他在过去一年中继续居住这所房子。现在他终于卖掉了房子,乔来找你,问他能从布拉德那里收回多少钱,因为布拉德违反了之前的合同。您有什么建议?
Answer: The seller should get the contract market difference of 190k – 170k because the William’s case suggest that the eventual selling price of the house is good evidence of its market value. So, 20k is the seller’s start. What about the air-conditioning cost? The seller should get that $10k as well because presumably that investment increased the ultimate resale price of the house to about that amount. To put this another way, the sale of the house to $170k with the 10k AC improvement would suggest that the market value of the house at the time the original buyer put down his offer was 160k. What about the agent’s commission? Probably, the seller should be entitled the agent’s commission as either ID or CD because this is the cost associated with the resale that the seller would not have incurred had he been able to proceed with the original sale. So, that is going to be 6% x $170 = 10,200. What about the mortgage payments and taxes? The William court makes it clear that this seller should not be entitled for any mortgages and taxes that he paid during the year following the breach. The reason is the seller continued to live in the house and enjoyed the house during that period. The other thing is the seller is getting the benefit by paying down the mortgage in this one year payment. So in total the seller gets $40,200 for damages.
答: 卖方应该得到 190k – 170k 的合同市场差额,因为 William 的案例表明,房子的最终售价是其市场价值的良好证据。所以,20k 是卖家的开始。 空调费用如何? 卖方也应该得到那 10 美元,因为据推测,这笔投资将房子的最终转售价格提高到大约这个金额。换句话说,将房子卖到 $170k AC 并改进 10k 表明在原始买家提出报价时房子的市场价值为 160k。代理商的佣金呢?可能,卖方应该有权以 ID 或 CD 的形式获得代理佣金,因为这是与转售相关的成本,如果卖方能够继续进行原始销售,他就不会产生。所以,这将是 6% x 170 美元 = 10,200。抵押贷款付款和税款呢?William 法院明确表示,该卖方无权获得他在违约后一年内支付的任何抵押贷款和税款。原因是卖家在此期间继续住在这所房子里并享受了这所房子。另一件事是卖方通过在这一年的付款中支付抵押贷款来获得好处 。 因此 ,卖方总共获得了 40,200 美元的赔偿金。
SELLER’S REMEDIES: ADVANCED PROBLEMS PP. 410
卖方的补救措施:高级问题 第 410 页
24.1. a. Swing Time was a retail store that sold expensive wooden swing-sets. Swing Time catered to upper-income families with small children and marketed itself as the “full-service swingset specialist.” The purchaser price on all of Swing Time’s sets included both installation and delivery. Swing Time had five full-time employees who did nothing but installations and two full employees who did nothing but deliveries. Swing Time’s average net profit on its sales was about 10 percent. Swing Time’s cost of materials for each set was about 50 percent of the retail price. Brian Kingsbury signed a contract to have Swing Time install an $8,000 wooden set in his family’s backyard. A couple of days before the delivery and installation, Brian called Swing Time and repudiated the contract because he found an identical set across town for just $7,000, including installation and delivery. For what amount may Swing Time recover from Brian? U.C.C. §§2-706(1), 2-708.
24.1. a. Swing Time 是一家零售店,出售昂贵的木制秋千。Swing Time 迎合了有小孩的高收入家庭,并将自己推销为 “ 提供全方位服务的 Swingset 专家”。“ Swing Time 所有套装的购买者价格包括安装和交付。Swing Time 有 5 名全职员工,他们只做安装,2 名全职员工只做送货。Swing Time 的平均销售净利润约为 10%。Swing Time 每套的材料成本约为零售价的 50%。布赖恩·金斯伯里 (Brian Kingsbury) 签署了一份合同,让 Swing Time 在他家的后院安装一台价值 8,000 美元的木制布景 。在交付和安装前几天,Brian 打电话给 Swing Time 并拒绝了这份合同,因为他在镇上发现了一套相同的设备,价格仅为 7,000 美元,包括安装和交付。Swing Time 可以从 Brian 那里恢复多少?加州大学 §§2-706(1)、2-708。
The seller’s contract resale damages under §2-706(1) is 0, other than any incidental damages they can show that’s associated with the buyer’s breach, if the seller resells the swingset for $8k. The seller’s contract market damages under §2-708(1) is $1k, if we use the $7k as market price. But this amount won’t give the seller its true expectation damages. Assume this seller is a lost volume seller, then under §2-708(2), the formula for his damages is KP-DC+ID. To qualify as a lost volume seller under §2-708(2), the seller would ultimately need to resell the swingset to a new buyer, and show they would have sold the same kind of swingset to the second buyer, even if the first buyer did not breach. If the seller is unable to resell the swingset to a new buyer, then the seller can go for action for the price under §2-709(1)(b) to get effectively specific performance, i.e., the full price for the swingset. Under §2-708(2), the seller’s direct cost for the swingset is just $4k, the cost for the material for the swingset. It seems there’s no expense saved here.
如果卖方以 $8k 的价格转售秋千 , 则根据 §2-706(1) 卖方的合同转售损害赔偿为 0,除了他们可以证明与买方违约相关的任何附带损害赔偿。 如果我们使用 7 美元作为市场价格,则 §2-708(1) 下的卖方合同市场损害赔偿为 1 美元。但这个金额不会给卖家带来真正的预期损害赔偿。假设该卖家是一名丢失的批量卖家,那么根据 §2-708(2),他的损害赔偿公式为 KP-DC+ID。要根据 §2-708(2) 成为损失的批量卖家,卖家最终需要将秋千转售给新买家,并证明他们会将相同类型的秋千出售给第二位买家,即使第一位买家没有违约。如果卖方无法将秋千转售给新买家,那么卖家可以根据 §2-709(1)(b) 的价格采取行动,以获得有效的特定性能,即秋千的全价 。根据 §2-708(2),卖方购买秋千的直接成本 仅为 4 美元,即秋千的材料成本 。这里似乎没有节省任何费用。
The buyer cannot point to the seller’s average net profit figure of 10% as the appropriate lost profit damages, because the net profit figure includes a deduction for an allocable share, a proportionate share, of Swing Time’s expense for overhead that can be attributed to the production of this particular swingset. And the damage formula under §2-708(2) has this parenthetical that says including reasonable overhead, makes it clear that in figuring its lost profit, a lost volume seller does not have to deduct from the contract price an allocable share of its fixed or overhead expense, but instead only has to deduct the correct variable cost that can be attributed to this particular contract.
买方不能将卖方 10% 的平均净利润数字作为适当的利润损失赔偿,因为净利润数字包括 Swing Time 的可分配份额( 按比例份额) 扣除可归因于此特定 swingset 的生产 。§2-708(2) 下的损害公式有这个括号 ,即包括合理的间接费用,清楚地表明, 在计算其损失的利润时,损失的批量卖家不必从合同价格中扣除其固定或间接费用的可分配份额,而只需 扣除可归因于该特定合同的正确可变成本。
b. Same facts as part (a), except that instead of employing a full-time staff of workers who deliver and install the sets, Swing Time uses a third-party independent contractor that charges Swing Time $50 for each delivery and $400 for each installation of this $8,000 set. For what amount may Swing Time recover from Brian? U.C.C. §2-708.
b. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,不同之处在于 Swing Time 没有雇用全职工作人员来交付和安装布景,而是使用第三方独立承包商,该承包商向 Swing Time 收取每次交付 50 美元的费用,每次安装这套 8,000 美元的费用为 400 美元。Swing Time 可以从 Brian 那里恢复多少?加州大学 §2-708.
Now the seller’s damages is $3.55k. Now the delivery and installation expenses are no longer category of overhead cost/fixed cost, which is not subtracted from the contract price under the §2-708(2) formula. Now these delivery and installation expenses are in the category of direct cost, which is subtracted from the contract price under the §2-708(2) formula. Now the seller’s damages under §2-708(2) is 8k-4k-450(delivery and installation)=$3.55k.
现在卖家的赔偿金是 3.55 美元。现在,交付和安装费用不再属于间接成本/固定成本的类别, 根据 §2-708(2) 公式,该费用未从合同价格中扣除。现在这些交付和安装费用属于直接成本类别,根据 §2-708(2) 公式从合同价格中减去。现在,根据 §2-708(2) 的规定,卖方的赔偿金为 8k-4k-450(交付和安装)=$3.55k。
c. Same facts as part (a), except that for some reason summer wooden swing-sets are all the rage, and Swing Time is forced to turn away lots of customers because it simply cannot keep up with the sudden demand. For what amount may Swing Time recover from Brian? U.C.C. §§2-708, 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)).
c. 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是由于某种原因,夏季木制秋千套装风靡一时,而 Swing Time 被迫拒绝大量顾客,因为它根本无法满足突然的需求。Swing Time 可以从 Brian 那里恢复多少?加州大学 §§2-708、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1))。
Now the seller has not lost a sale due to the buyer’s breach because demand now exceeds the seller’s supply. So this seller is not a lost volume seller under §2-708(2). Assume a market price of $7k, the seller can try to make an argument for contract market damages under §2-708(1) for 8k-7k=$1k. However, under the circumstance, this would overcompensate the seller since he did not lost profit due to the buyer’s breach. So the buyer can argue under §1-305(a), the seller should be put into a position it should have been in had the breaching party not breached. And here the seller would presumably in exactly the same position had this buyer purchased the swingset instead of repudiating the contract. The seller can make an argument that it can still get damages. §2-708(2) tells us we should use lost profit as measure of damages whenever the §2-708(1) damages are inadequate. Comment 1 to §2-703 makes a strong statement in support of a seller’s right to elect its remedy. Alternatively, maybe §2-708(1) is a kind of statutory liquidated damages for the seller. As such, §2-708(1) serves the purpose of not only simply compensating the seller’s loss, but also ensuring the buyer cannot save money by breaching its contract, therefore discouraging the buyer from breaching the contract in the first place, even if the breach in a particular contract didn’t seem to end up hurting the seller.
现在,卖方并没有因为买方违约而失去销售, 因为现在需求超过了卖方的供应。 因此 ,该卖家不是 §2-708(2) 规定的损失批量卖家 。假设市场价格为 $7k,卖方可以尝试根据 §2-708(1) 为 8k-7k=$1k 的合同市场损害赔偿提出论点。但是,在这种情况下 ,这将过度补偿卖方 , 因为他并没有因买方的违约而损失利润 。 因此 ,买方可以根据 §1-305(a) 争辩说,如果违约方没有违约,卖方应该处于其应该处于的境地。在这里,如果 这个买家购买了秋千而不是否认合同,卖方大概会处于完全相同的位置 。卖方可以提出理由,证明它仍然可以获得损害赔偿。§2-708(2) 告诉我们,当 §2-708(1) 损害赔偿不足时,我们应该使用利润损失作为损害赔偿的衡量标准。§2-703 的注释 1 强有力地声明了卖方选择其补救措施的权利。或者,也许 §2-708(1) 是卖方的一种法定违约金 。 因此,§2-708(1) 的目的不仅在于简单地赔偿卖方的损失,还确保买方不能通过违反合同来省钱,从而阻止买方首先违反合同,即使违反特定合同似乎最终没有伤害到卖方。
d. Same facts as part (a), except that due to lagging sales over the past year, Swing Time’s average net “profit” on its sales during the past year has been a negative 12 percent, even though its cost of materials has remained constant at about 50 percent of retail price. For what amount may Swing Time recover from Brian? U.C.C. §2-708.
d. 事实与 (a) 部分相同,只是由于过去一年的销售滞后,Swing Time 过去一年的平均销售净 “ 利润 ” 为负 12%,尽管其材料成本一直保持在零售价的 50% 左右。Swing Time 可以从 Brian 那里恢复多少?加州大学 §2-708.
Here the seller should still recover a damages of $4k, despite the fact that the seller is losing money overall. For §2-708(2) purposes, a seller’s net profitability is not what matters. §2-708(2) simply asks whether the contract price is greater than the direct cost to the seller in preforming the contract. Here the direct cost to the seller in preforming the contract is still 50% of the contract price, namely $4k. Even though the seller has been losing money on each sale, the seller will lose less money per sale with each additional sale it makes with the same fixed cost until eventually it makes a true net profit per sale.
在这里,尽管卖家总体上亏损,但卖家仍应获得 4 美元的损失。就 §2-708(2) 而言, 卖方的净盈利能力并不重要。 §2-708(2) 只是询问合同价格是否高于卖方在签订合同时所承担的直接成本 。在这里,卖方签订合同的直接成本仍然是合同价格的 50%,即 4 美元。即使卖家在每笔销售中亏损,卖家在相同的固定成本下每增加一次销售,每增加一次销售,每笔销售的亏损也会减少,直到最终每笔销售获得真正的净利润。
However, in §2-708(2) there’s a limit that profit includes reasonable overhead. Here the high fixed cost amounts to unreasonable overhead. Comment 2 to §2-708 suggests that even a negative net profit seller can recover §2-708(2) lost profit damages. So a seller doesn’t need to show a net profitability in order to be eligible for damages under §2-708(2).
但是,在 §2-708(2) 中, 利润包括合理开销是有限制的。在这里,高昂的固定成本相当于不合理的开销。§2-708 的注释 2 表明 ,即使是负净利润的卖方也可以追回 §2-708(2) 的利润损失。 因此 ,卖家无需证明净盈利能力即可获得 §2-708(2) 规定的损害赔偿。
e. Same facts as part (a), except that due to a sudden shortage of certain parts for this swingset, the materials for this set end up costing Swing Time $9,000. For what amount may Swing Time recover from Brian? U.C.C. §2-708.
e. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是由于该秋千的某些零件突然短缺 ,该套装的材料最终花费了 Swing Time 9,000 美元。Swing Time 可以从 Brian 那里恢复多少?加州大学 §2-708.
Here the seller cannot show any loss because of buyer’s breach since its direct cost now exceeds its contract price. However, the seller may still be able to argue for contract market damages under §2-708(1) of $1k, if we assume the market price to be $7k.
在这里,卖方不能证明由于买方违约而造成的任何损失 ,因为其直接成本现在超过了合同价格。但是, 如果我们假设市场价格为 7 美元 ,则卖方仍然可以根据 §2-708(1) 要求 1k 美元的合同市场损害赔偿。
f. Same facts as part (a), except Brian repudiates as to the $8,000 set and agrees to buy instead a $5,000 set from Swing Time. For what amount may Swing Time recover from Brian? U.C.C. §2-708.
f. 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Brian 否认了 8,000 美元的套装,并同意从 Swing Time 购买 5,000 美元的套装。Swing Time 可以从 Brian 那里恢复多少?加州大学 §2-708.
If we bundle the buyer’s breach and the buyer’s purchase into one package, then the seller should recover a total of $1.5k, because the seller lost $4k in profit in the buyer’s repudiation of the $8k swingset, but the seller did gain a $2.5k profit on the buyer’s substitute purchase of the $5k swingset. Under §2-708(2), here KP=8k-5k=$3k, DC=4k-2.5k=$1.5k, so the seller’s damages under §2-708(2) is KP-DC=$1.5k. There is no incidental damages here.
如果我们将买方的违约和买方的购买捆绑在一起,那么卖方应该总共收回 1.5 美元,因为卖方在买方否认 4 美元的秋千中损失了 8 美元的利润 ,但卖方确实在买方替代购买 2.5 美元的秋千上获得了 5 美元的利润 。根据 §2-708(2), 这里 KP=8k-5k=$3k,DC=4k-2.5k=$1.5k,所以卖家根据 §2-708(2) 的损害赔偿是 KP-DC=$1.5k。 这里没有附带损害。
g. Same facts as part (a), except Brian is the president of the state park district and his order, which he made two months ago, was for 100 $8,000 swingsets to be installed in all of the state parks over the next 12 months. Due to the impact of Brian’s repudiation, Swing Time feels that it must lay off one of its five full-time installers, whose employment cost the company $45,000 per year. (Each full-time installation employee would install about 100 swingsets each year.) For what amount may Swing Time recover from Brian? U.C.C. §2-708.
g. 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,除了 Brian 是州立公园区的主席,他在两个月前下达的命令是在未来 12 个月内在所有州立公园安装 100 个 8,000 美元的秋千 。由于 Brian 否认的影响 ,Swing Time 认为它必须解雇五名全职安装人员中的一名,他们的雇佣费用每年使公司损失 45,000 美元。(每个全职安装员工将安装大约 100 个 Swingsets 每年。Swing Time 可以从 Brian 那里恢复多少?加州大学 §2-708.
Here the seller’s damages is $355k. If the size of a breached contract is large enough, then what we normally think of as fixed cost can turn into direct cost at some point. Here the contract price is $800k, the direct cost is $400k for material, $45k for the employee’s salary who is laid off
在这里,卖方的损失是 355 美元。如果违约合同的规模足够大,那么我们通常认为的固定成本可能会在某个时候变成直接成本。这里的合同价格是 $800k,直接成本是 $400k 的材料,$45k 的被解雇员工的工资
24.2. With the winter holiday season coming, Arlene Ledger, President of Heavy Metal, Inc. (from Problem 3.2), has her hands full with all of the orders pouring in to her factory from retail fitness stores. One major order has gone sour, however, and that is the subject of her visit to your office today. Four weeks ago, on November 1, the Fitness Palace signed a contract to purchase 500 “Treadwalkers,” a new treadmill product that includes ski poles to work the exerciser’s arms as well as the legs. The contract price for the 500 Treadwalkers was $600 each, FOB Seller’s Factory, delivery date December 1. Two weeks ago the Fitness Palace called Arlene and announced it was repudiating the contract. When the Fitness Palace had originally called in its order, Heavy Metal already had in stock 300 Treadwalkers that had cost Heavy Metal its customary $400 each to produce. Arlene admitted to you, however, that since her factory was already working at full “normal” capacity, by the time of the Fitness Palace order it would have cost Heavy Metal about $450 each to manufacture any additional Treadwalkers by December 1. This is because of the overtime pay that would have been necessary to complete any new orders by that date. One week after the Fitness Palace had signed its order contract (but prior to its repudiation), another retailer, the Sport Shoppe, had signed a contract with Heavy Metal to buy 200 Treadwalkers for $600 each. The Sport Shoppe has not repudiated its contract, which also has a delivery term of FOB Seller’s Factory and a delivery date of December 1. Arlene would like to know what the extent of her damage claim will be against the Fitness Palace. (There were no other orders for Treadwalkers during the month of November.) What do you advice? U.C.C. §§2-708, 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)).
24.2. 随着寒假季节的到来,Heavy Metal, Inc. 的总裁 Arlene Ledger(来自问题 3.2) 忙得不可开交,所有订单都从零售健身店涌入她的工厂。然而,一个重大订单已经变质,那就是她今天访问您办公室的主题。四个星期前,即 11 月 1 日,Fitness Palace 签署了一份合同,购买 500 台“Treadwalkers”,这是一种新的跑步机产品,其中包括用于锻炼者手臂和腿部的滑雪杖。500 辆 Treadwalkers 的合同价格为每辆 600 美元,FOB 卖方工厂,交货日期为 12 月 1 日。两周前 ,Fitness Palace 打电话给 Arlene,宣布将拒绝签订合同。当 Fitness Palace 最初要求订购时,Heavy Metal 已经有 300 辆 Treadwalkers 的库存 ,而 Heavy Metal 通常每辆的生产成本为 400 美元。然而,Arlene 向你承认,由于她的工厂已经以完全 “ 正常 ” 的产能工作,因此在 Fitness Palace 订单之前,到 12 月 1 日制造任何额外的 Treadwalkers 将花费大约 450 美元 。这是因为在该日期之前完成任何新订单都需要加班费。在 Fitness Palace 签署订单合同一周后(但在拒绝之前),另一家零售商 Sport Shoppe 与 Heavy Metal 签署了一份合同,以每台 600 美元的价格购买 200 台 Treadwalkers。 The Sport Shoppe 并未否认其合同,该合同的交货期限为 FOB Seller's Factory,交货日期为 12 月 1 日。Arlene 想知道她对 Fitness Palace 的损害赔偿索赔的程度是多少。(没有其他命令 11 月份的 Treadwalkers。 你有什么建议?加州大学 §§2-708、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1))。
Given that the market price for the treadwalker appears to be $600 each, the contract market damages under §2-708(1) seems to be inadequate to put Heavy Metal in the position it would have been in had Fitness Palace performed. Here Heavy Metal’s capacity to produce treadwalkers does exceed its demand, although it would have cost Heavy Metal a little more than usual to meet any additional demand at this point, it still would have made a profit at the slightly higher direct cost of $450 per treadwalker. Since Heavy Metal sustained a loss by Fitness Palace’s repudiation of the contract, we’ll assume Heavy Metal to be a lost volume seller. The requirement under §1-305(a) is to put Heavy Metal in the position it would have been in had Fitness Palace performed.
鉴于 treadwalker 的市场价格 似乎是每支 600 美元,§2-708(1) 下的合同市场损害赔偿似乎不足以使 Heavy Metal 处于如果 Fitness Palace 表演时所处的位置。在这里,Heavy Metal 生产踏步者的能力确实超过了它的需求,尽管此时 Heavy Metal 的成本会比平时高一点才能满足任何额外的需求,但它仍然可以以每个踏步者 450 美元的略高直接成本获利 。由于 Heavy Metal 因 Fitness Palace 拒绝合同而蒙受损失 ,因此我们假设 Heavy Metal 是亏损的批量卖家。§1-305(a) 的要求是将 Heavy Metal 置于 Fitness Palace 表演时应处于的位置。
According to the formula under §2-708(2), Here KP=500*600=$300k, there is no incidental damages. There’s four possibilities for the direct cost: ①500*400=$200k ②500*450=$225k ③300*400+200*450=$210k ④100*400+400*450=$220k.
根据 §2-708(2) 下的公式,这里 KP=500*600=$300k,没有附带损害。 直接成本有四种可能性: (1)500*400=$200k (2)500*450=$225k (3)300*400+200*450=$210k (4)100*400+400*450=$220k。
The second buyer’s order is completely independent of the first buyer’s breach, meaning the second buyer would have made its order with or without the first buyer’s breach. If the first buyer has not breached, its gross revenue would have been (200+500)*600=$420k. It’s total direct cost would have been 300*400+400*450=$300k. So total profit on the two contracts would have been 420k-300k=$120k. Given the first buyer’s breach, now the seller is just only to sell 200 treadwalkers to the second buyer, which will yield a revenue of 200*600=$120k. It’s direct cost with this single contract is 200*400=$80k. Thus the seller’s total profit on this single contract given the first buyer’s breach is 120k-80k=$40k. So the first buyer’s breach costs the seller to lose a profit of 120k-40k=$80k. Working backwards, the correct direct cost should be option ④$220k, because the formula under §2-708(2) is 300k-220k+0=$80k.
第二个买家的订单完全独立于第一个买家的违规行为,这意味着无论第一个买家是否违规,第二个买家都会下单 。如果第一个买家没有违规,其总收入将为 (200+500)*600=$420k。 它的总直接成本将是 300*400+400*450=$300k。因此,这两份合约的总利润为 420k-300k=$120k。鉴于第一个买家的违约,现在卖家只需向第二个买家出售 200 个 treadwalkers,这将产生 200*600=$120k 的收入。 这份合同的直接成本是 200*400=$80k。 因此 , 考虑到第一个买方违约,卖方在这份合同上的总利润为 120k-80k=$40k。 因此 ,第一个买方的违约使卖方损失了 120k-40k=$80k 的利润。倒推工作,正确的直接成本应该是选项 (4)$220k,因为 §2-708(2) 下的公式是 300k-220k+0=$80k。
Here the seller cannot argue the 300 treadwalker already on hand should be allocated to the first buyer’s order for damage purposes. If the first buyer has not breached, and the seller did use the 300 lower-cost treadwalkers towards the first buyer’s order, the seller would have made less profit on the contract with the second buyer. If the seller had used up the 300 already made treadwalkers for the first contract if the first buyer had not breached, then the 200 treadwalkers needed to fill the second buyer’s order would have cost the seller the higher $450 per treadwalker, rather than the $400 it ended up costing for the second contract. The first buyer’s breach led the seller made a higher profit in the second contract.
在这里,卖方不能争辩说,出于损坏目的,手头已有的 300 辆 treadwalker 应该分配给第一个买方的订单。如果第一个买方没有违约,并且卖方确实为第一个买方的订单使用了 300 个低成本的 treadwalkers,那么卖方在与第二个买方的合同中获得的利润就会减少。如果第一个买方没有违约,卖方已经用完了第一份合同中已经制造的 300 个踏步者 ,那么填写第二个买家订单所需的 200 个踏步者将使卖方花费更高的 450 美元 , 而不是最终为第二份合同花费的 400 美元。第一个买方的违约导致卖方在第二个合约中获得了更高的利润。
Problem 24.3 Yesterday you got to meet a new client, Mark Rabid, who was president of Weapons Parts, Inc. (WPI). His company manufactures specially made parts for weapons systems. One of WPI’s clients, McDonald & Sons Space Systems (MSSS), commissioned WPI to produce custom-made missile delivery system (to be included in a massive fighter plane that MSSS was manufacturing) for a total price of $500,000. Mark calculated that the total direct costs of producing this device would be $240,000 worth of raw materials and $70,000 in direct labor costs. Early in the production process, MSSS called WPI and unambiguously repudiated the contract. At that point, WPI had completed only the frame of the delivery system, having so far purchased and used $110,000 worth of raw materials and having expended $30,000 in direct labor costs. Figuring that the market for tis specialized system was rather limited, WPI reasonably opted to cease production at that point. A couple of weeks later, a different WPI client, Steve Schale of Schale Aerospace (SA), was touring WPI’s plant when he noticed the frame for the uncompleted delivery system. After studying the frame for a few minutes, Steve told Mark Rabid that he would like to buy that frame for one of his company’s planes in progress. “I never would have thought to buy this from you if I haven’t seen it sitting there,” Steve said. “We generally make all of our own delivery systems in house,” Steve said he would pay $200,000 for the frame in its current state if WPI would simply have it painted to comply with applicable military specifications. Mark agreed to do so, and he expended an additional $5,000 for paint plus $5,000 for labor. Mark then seasonably informed MSSS of this proposed resale of the uncompleted delivery system. Mark wants to know in light of all this, what the extent of WPI’s damage claim is against MSSS. What do you advise him? U.C.C. §§2-703(c), 2-704, 2-706, 2-708(2).
问题 24.3 昨天,您遇到了一位新客户 Mark Rabid,他是 Weapons Parts, Inc. (WPI) 的总裁。他的公司生产用于武器系统的专用零件。WPI 的客户之一,麦当劳&儿子空间系统(MSSS),委托 WPI 以总价 50 万美元的价格生产定制的导弹投送系统(将包含在 MSSS 正在制造的大型战斗机中)。Mark 计算出,生产该设备的总直接成本为价值 240,000 美元的原材料和 70,000 美元的直接人工成本。在生产过程的早期,MSSS 打电话给 WPI 并明确否认了合同。那时,WPI 只完成了交付系统的框架,到目前为止已经购买并使用了价值 110,000 美元的原材料,并花费了 30,000 美元的直接劳动力成本。WPI 认为 tis 专用系统的市场相当有限,因此合理地选择在此时停止生产。几周后,另一个 WPI 客户,Schale Aerospace (SA) 的 Steve Schale 在参观 WPI 的工厂时,注意到未完成的交付系统的框架。在研究了这个框架几分钟后,史蒂夫告诉 Mark Rabid,他想为他公司的一架正在开发的飞机购买这个框架。“如果我没有看到它坐在那里,我永远不会想从你那里买这个,”史蒂夫说。“我们通常在内部制造所有自己的交付系统,”史蒂夫说,如果 WPI 简单地对其进行喷漆以符合适用的军事规范,他将为当前状态的框架支付 200,000 美元。Mark 同意这样做,他又花了 5,000 美元的油漆费和 5,000 美元的人工费。 然后,Mark 及时通知 MSSS 这一未完成的交付系统的转售提议。鉴于这一切,Mark 想知道 WPI 对 MSSS 的损害赔偿索赔的程度如何。你对他有什么建议?《美国法典》第 2-703(c)、2-704、2-706、2-708(2) 条。
Answer: §2-706(1): KP – RP + ID – ES * §2-708(2): KP – ADC (Anticipated direct cost) + ID + CI (cost incurred) – RP (resale proceeds)
答案:§2-706(1):KP – RP + ID – ES * §2-708(2):KP – ADC(预期直接成本)+ ID + CI(产生的成本)– RP(转售收益)
For this kind of aggrieved seller, we could just use the 2-706 Resale formula and come up with the same result as using the 2-708(2) formula.
对于这种受屈的卖家,我们可以只使用 2-706 转售公式,得出与使用 2-708(2) 公式相同的结果。
Total direct cost would $240k worth of raw materials and $70k in direct labor costs. The buyer repudiates and the seller ended up spending $110k worth of materials and $30k in direct labor costs.
总直接成本将价值 240 美元的原材料和 70 美元的直接劳动力成本。买方拒绝,卖方最终花费了价值 110 美元的材料和 30 美元的直接人工成本。
To recover damages under §2-706(1): KP – RP + ID – ES, the seller would begin by showing that this buyer has repudiated and that qualifies the seller under 2-703(d) to proceed under 2-704 and 2-704 defines the seller rights with respect to unfinished goods where the buyer repudiates. If you look at 2-704(1)(b) and 2-704(2), the seller here has exercised reasonable commercial judgment in ceasing manufacture. Therefore the resale of the unfinished parts and recover damages under 2-706. Looking at 2-706, the proper notice of the private resale was given under 2-706(3), thus, this is a seller who can recover under the basic contract resale measure of 2-706(1). We will use the following 2-706 formula §2-706(1): KP(500k) – Resale Price (200k) + ID(10k) – ES(170k) = $140k.
要根据 §2-706(1):KP – RP + ID – ES 追讨损害赔偿,卖方首先要证明该买方已否认,并且根据 2-703(d) 使卖方有资格根据 2-704 进行诉讼,而 2-704 定义了卖方对买方拒绝的未完成商品的权利。如果您查看 2-704(1)(b) 和 2-704(2),这里的卖方在停止生产时已经进行了合理的商业判断。 因此 ,根据 2-706 转售未完成的零件并追讨损害赔偿。查看 2-706,私人转售的适当通知是根据 2-706(3) 发出的,因此,这是可以根据 2-706(1) 的基本合同转售措施获得赔偿的卖方。我们将使用以下 2-706 公式 §2-706(1):KP(500k) – 转售价格 (200k) + ID(10k) – ES(170k) = $140k。
Damages under §2-708(2): KP(500k) – ADC(310k) + ID(10k) + CI(140k) – RP(200k) = 140k. if you are looking at the two equations, you will notice that the common terms cancel out and you are left with CI –ADC.
§2-708(2) 下的损害赔偿:KP(500k) – ADC(310k) + ID(10k) + CI(140k) – RP(200k) = 140k。如果您正在查看这两个方程式,您会注意到常用项相互抵消,只剩下 CI –ADC。
Suppose the seller makes the following argument this $140k figure actually undercompensate the seller because the seller ought to be entitled to no only its anticipated profit on the original deal which was $190k but also a separate profit on the seller’s sale of the part to the second buyer and that is a profit of at least $50k. The seller wants to be like a lost volume seller that gets the expected profit plus resale proceeds. Why doesn’t it that work? The key is that when we talk about the traditional lost volume seller we are talking about a case where the additional sale would have been made anyways even if the first buyer had performed. And in this case, the facts are set up is that the second buyer wonders in and sees the half finished products and wants to buy the parts. That sale would have never happened except for the original buyer’s breach. This seller is not that kind of lost volume seller. This second sale was a function of the first buyer’s breach and that is why this seller cannot make that argument.
假设卖方提出以下论点,这个 140 美元的数字实际上低估了卖方,因为卖方不仅有权获得其在原始交易中的预期利润,即 190 美元,还有权获得卖方将零件出售给第二个买方的单独利润,即至少 50 美元的利润。卖家希望像一个亏损的批量卖家一样,获得预期的利润和转售收益。为什么它不起作用?关键是,当我们谈论传统的损失量卖家时,我们谈论的是这样一种情况,即使第一个买家已经执行,无论如何都会进行额外的销售。在这种情况下,事实是第二个买家想知道并看到半成品并想购买零件。除非原始买家违约,否则这笔交易永远不会发生。这个卖家不是那种损失的批量卖家。第二次销售是第一个买方违约的一个功能,这就是为什么这个卖家不能提出这个论点。
The seller has a backup complaint and that is suppose that the seller argues instead by saying that the original profit was going to be 190k because seller had a KP of 500k and ADC of 310k; and 500k – 310k is 190k. how is getting 140k fair? The seller did the second sale as a resale to mitigate the first buyer’s damages. What does mitigation mean? It means it is a way that the aggrieved seller to recover something profit maybe not as much as their first sale, then we take that away from what the seller was expecting to get from the original contract and that leaves us with the damages that they should get to put them back where they were before the first buyer had breached. The resale was just a mitigation and how much did the mitigation get for the seller in terms of the second sale? Second sale was profitable although not as profitable as the first sale. How profitable was it? Seller got $200k and to get that $200k they had to spend $140k plus $10k. so they spend $150k and got $200k and made a profit of $50k in resale. So coming into court the seller is sitting at a +$50k. And if they are sitting at a +$50 and their original expectation was $190k then it seems fair for the seller to get $140k to get them from a +$50k to a +$190k. And that gets them to their expectation they had from the start.
卖家有一个备用投诉,也就是说,假设卖家反而争论说原始利润将是 190k,因为卖家的 KP 为 500k,ADC 为 310k;而 500k – 310k 是 190k。获得 140k 是公平的吗?卖方将第二次销售作为转售方式进行,以减轻第一位买方的损失。缓解措施是什么意思?这意味着这是一种方式,受害的卖方收回一些利润可能不如他们的第一笔销售那么多,然后我们从卖方期望从原始合同中获得的东西中扣除,这给我们留下了他们应该得到的赔偿,以将它们恢复到第一个买方违约之前的位置。转售只是一种缓解措施,就第二次销售而言,缓解措施为卖家带来了多少?第二次销售是有利可图的,尽管不如第一次销售有利可图。它的盈利能力如何?卖家得到了 $200k,要得到这 $200k,他们必须花费 $140k 加上 $10k。所以他们花了 $150k 得到了 $200k,并在转售中获得了 $50k 的利润。 因此 ,出庭时,卖方的赔率为 +$50k。如果他们的价格是 +50 美元,而他们最初的期望是 190 美元,那么卖家获得 140 美元以将他们从 +50 美元变为 +190 美元似乎是公平的。这让他们达到了他们从一开始就的期望。
Problem 24.4 Statues of American, Inc. (SOA), was a Nevada manufacturer of custom-designed wooden statues. OA entered into a written contract with Georgia Frontenac of Reno, Nevada, to specially manufacture a statue of a battering ram with hamburgers wedged on each horn for a total price of $60,000, which included delivery to Reno. Georgia wanted the statue to be displayed in front of her highly successful restaurant, the Ramburger. At the time the contract was entered into, SOA estimated that it would take $18,000 in parts and $30,000 in direct costs to build the statue. Midway through production of the statue, Georgia called SOA and repudiated the contract. At that point, SOA had purchased $10,000 in parts and had repudiated $20,000 in direct labor costs for the partially completed statue. Shortly following the repudiation call from Georgia, SOA concluded that it could currently sell the scrap for $7,000. As for buyers, SOA learned from calling around that one other buyer, Bill Wellbid, of Phoenix, Arizona, thought he might be interested in purchasing a finished statue of this type. Bill told SOA that before that before making a decision, he needed to see the finished statue. Nevertheless, Bill said that his good-faith estimate of the odds that he would purchase the statue he would pay purchase the statue once it was completed was about 75 percent that he would. Bill said that if he did purchase the completed statue he would pay $41,000 for it, but that price had to include delivery to Phoenix. Delivery to Reno, Nevada, would have cost SOA $2,000; delivery to Phoenix would cost SOA $5,000. Assume that Bill Wellbid would be the only possible buyer of the finished statue, that the odds he gives of his purchasing the finished the product are truthful, and that the finished statue would have zero scrap value (even though the currently unfinished statue, as noted earlier, has a $7,000 scrap value).
问题 24.4 美国雕像公司 (SOA) 是内华达州的一家定制木制雕像制造商。OA 与内华达州里诺的 Georgia Frontenac 签订了一份书面合同,专门制造一尊攻城槌雕像,每个角上都楔入了汉堡包,总价为 60,000 美元,其中包括运送到里诺。Georgia 希望将雕像展示在她非常成功的餐厅 Ramburger 前面。在签订合同时,SOA 估计建造雕像需要 18000 美元的零件和 30000 美元的直接成本。在雕像制作过程中,Georgia 打电话给 SOA 并拒绝了合同。那时,SOA 已经购买了 10,000 美元的零件,并拒绝了为部分完成的雕像支付的 20,000 美元的直接人工成本。在 Georgia 的拒绝呼吁之后不久,SOA 得出结论,它目前可以以 7,000 美元的价格出售这些废料。至于买家,SOA 通过打电话了解到,另一个买家, 亚利桑那州凤凰城的 Bill Wellbid,认为他可能有兴趣购买这种类型的成品雕像。Bill 告诉 SOA,在此之前 ,在做出决定之前,他需要看到完成的雕像。尽管如此,比尔说,他对他购买雕像的几率的善意估计,一旦雕像完工,他愿意支付购买雕像的费用约为 75%。比尔说,如果他真的买下了完成的雕像 , 他会支付 41,000 美元,但这个价格必须包括送到凤凰城的价格。运送到内华达州里诺市的成本为 SOA 2,000 美元;交付到 Phoenix 将花费 SOA 5,000 美元。 假设 Bill Wellbid 是成品雕像的唯一可能买家,他给出的购买成品的几率是真实的,并且成品雕像的废品价值为零(即使如前所述,目前未完成的雕像的废品价值为 7,000 美元)。
Given all of the above information, consider three different scenarios and separately describe SOA’s damage claim against Georgia Frontenac under each of the scenarios:
鉴于 上述所有信息,请考虑三种不同的情况,并分别描述 SOA 在每种情况下对 Georgia Frontenac 的损害索赔:
SOA chooses to stop manufacture now, gives proper resale notice, and sells the scrap for $7,000. U.C.C. §§2-703(c), 2-704, 2-706, 2-708(2); Official Comment 2 to §2-704.
SOA 选择立即停止生产,发出适当的转售通知,并以 7,000 美元的价格出售废料。《美国法典》第 2-703(c)、2-704、2-706、2-708(2) 款;§2-704 的官方评论 2。
Answer: Was the decision to stop manufacturing reasonable given the information that the seller knew at the time of the decision? Here we are under 2-704(2) which gives the aggrieved seller the option to stop or continue manufacture as long as the decision was based on the commercially reasonable judgment of the seller given the circumstances and Official Comment 2 to 2-704 says the burden is on the buyer to show the commercially unreasonably nature of the seller’s pleading.
答案: 鉴于卖家在做出决定时知道的信息,停止生产的决定是否合理?在这里,我们根据 2-704(2) 规定 ,只要决定是基于卖方在当时情况下的商业合理判断,受害卖方可以选择停止或继续生产 ,并且官方评论 2 至 2-704 表示,买方有责任证明卖方诉状的商业不合理性质。
Formula looks like this MCC < RFP – SV (is the marginal cost of completion less than the expected resale to finish the product minus the scrap value? And if the answer to that question is yes, the seller should probably complete manufacturing.) MCC is given what you spent already what is the amount you would have to spent to complete manufacture based on what you are now, not the total cost of completion.
公式是这样的 MCC < RFP – SV(完成的边际完成成本是否低于完成产品的预期转售减去废品价值?如果这个问题的答案是肯定的,那么卖家可能应该完成制造。MCC 会得到您已经花费的金额,即根据您现在的情况完成制造所必须花费的金额,而不是完成的总成本。
MCC ($18k) < RFP(.75(41k-5k) + .25(o)) – SV(7k)
MCC ($18k) < RFP(.75(41k-5k) + .25(o)) – SV(7k)
18k < (.75(41k-5k) +.25(0)) – 7k
18k < (.75(41k-5k) +.25(0)) – 7k
18k < 27k – 7k
18k < 20k when it is a close case like this, the seller might succeed in showing that it would be commercially unreasonable to complete the statue.
18k < 20k 当像这样一个势均力敌的案件时,卖方可能会成功地证明完成雕像在商业上是不合理的。
So then if we assume that the decision to stop was reasonable, what would the seller’s damages be? §2-708(2): KP(60k) – ADC(50k) + ID(0) + CI(30k) – RP(7k) = 33k. ($2k in delivery cost to ADC). The buyer says this formula is overcompensating given that the seller’s expected profit was $10k (60k-30k-18k-2k). Why is that not an overcompensation? Well, it is the flipside of the prior problem. The difference in between the two problems is the starting for the aggrieved seller here when the seller goes in court to ask for damages. In the prior problem, the seller was going into court with a gain of +$50k. Here, the seller is sitting at a -$23k. So, if you look at where the seller is here, even after they sell the scrap, they sell the scrap for 7k and the seller has already spent 10k for parts and 20k in labor, so that puts them in a -$23k. to get the seller to a net expected gain of +$10k, you would need to give that seller +$33k because +$33k + (-$23k) gives you your +$10k as expected. That is why you should always ask where is the seller at after their attempted mitigating.
那么,如果我们假设停止的决定是合理的,那么卖方的赔偿会是多少? §2-708(2):KP(60k) – ADC(50k) + ID(0) + CI(30k) – RP(7k) = 33k.(发给 ADC 的 $2k 运费)。买方表示,鉴于卖方的预期利润为 10 美元(60k-30k-18k-2k),此公式过度补偿。为什么这不是过度补偿呢?嗯,这是前一个问题的另一面。这两个问题之间的区别在于,当卖方上法庭要求赔偿时,受害的卖方在这里开始。在之前的问题中,卖家带着 +$50k 的收益上法庭。在这里,卖家的赔率为 -23 美元。所以,如果你看看卖家在哪里,即使在他们卖掉废料之后,他们也以 7k 的价格出售废料,而卖家已经花费了 10k 的零件和 20k 的劳动力,所以他们的收入为 -23k。要让卖家获得 +$10k 的预期净收益,您需要给该卖家 +$33k,因为 +$33k + (-$23k) 如预期般为您提供 +$10k。这就是为什么您应该始终询问卖家在尝试缓解后在哪里。
SOA completes manufacture, gives proper resale notice, and is able to sell the finished product to Bill Wellbid for $41,000.
SOA 完成了制造,发出了适当的转售通知,并能够以 41000 美元的价格将成品卖给 Bill Wellbid。
Answer: under 2-706 Resale damages, the proper notice was given of the private resale under 2-706(3). So the seller is entitled to §2-706: KP(60k) – RP(41k) + ID(3k) – ES(0) = $22k. In this resale, there is ID of $3k representing the extra delivery costs in selling to the second buyer rather than the second buyer because the first buyer would only cost $2k in delivery and this new buyer is going to cost $5k and the difference is $3k in incidental damages. So suppose the seller makes the following argument about this: this resale measure undercompensates the seller because this seller says they ought to be entitled not only to their anticipated profit on the statue but also a separate profit on its ultimate sale of the statue to the new buyer. How do you respond to this argument? The problem with this argument is this, at the price the second buyer was willing to pay, the seller would not have made a profitable sale at the second price that the buyer was willing to pay. Therefore it does not matter that the seller could show that it had the capacity to sell and produce statue to both the first and second buyer and even if the seller could show that the sale to the second buyer would have occurred had the first buyer not breached, it wont matter b/c the second sale would not have been profitable to the seller. Suppose the original buyer argues in this case that the $22k overcompensates the seller here and seller’s anticipated profit on the original contract was 10k. In this case, even after the mitigating resale of the finished product, the aggrieved seller is sitting at $-12k. because they got to spend 18k, 30k, and 5k that is a -$12k from the 41k. to turn a -$12k into a +10k expected notice, by giving the seller +22k.
答案:根据 2-706 转售损害赔偿,根据 2-706(3) 对私人转售发出了适当的通知。因此,卖家有权获得 §2-706:KP(60k) – RP(41k) + ID(3k) – ES(0) = $22k。在这次转售中,有 $3k 的 ID,代表卖给第二个买家而不是第二个买家的额外运费,因为第一个买家的运费只有 $2k,而这个新买家将花费 $5k,差额是 $3k 的附带损害。 因此 ,假设卖方对此提出以下论点:这种转售措施对卖方的补偿不足,因为该卖方表示,他们不仅有权获得雕像的预期利润,还有权获得将雕像最终出售给新买家的单独利润。你如何回应这个论点?这个论点的问题在于,以第二个买方愿意支付的价格,卖方不会以买方愿意支付的第二个价格进行有利可图的销售。 因此 ,卖方能否证明其有能力向第一和第二买方出售和出示雕像并不重要,即使卖方能够证明如果第一买方没有违约,向第二买方的销售就会发生, b/c 第二笔销售对卖方来说不会有利可图也无关紧要。假设原始买方在这种情况下争辩说 $22k 在这里过度补偿了卖方,而卖方在原始合同上的预期利润为 10k。在这种情况下,即使在成品的减轻转售之后,受害的卖家仍处于 $-12k 的价格。 因为他们必须花费 18k、30k 和 5k,即 41k 中的 -$12k。通过给卖家 +12k,将 -$10k 变成 +22k 预期通知。
SOA completes manufacture but after diligent effort is ultimately unable to sell the finished product to Bill Wellbid or to any other buyer. U.C.C. §2-709.
SOA 完成了制造,但经过努力后,最终无法将成品出售给 Bill Wellbid 或任何其他买家。《美国法典》第 2-709 条。
Answer: here the seller would end up in 2-709(1)(b) action for the price and that formula is simply KP(60k) + ID(0). Given of the lack of a resale here, now that the seller’s decision to complete was unreasonable. Given to the information the seller knew from the prior problem. It will be the breaching buyer to show that it was commercially unreasonable to complete. How can the breaching buyer argue that the 60k is an overcompensation? 1-305 spirit of the remedies’ argument the true price is not 60k but really $58k because the $2k is for delivery and there was not delivery here. So then the question is who gets the statue? After suing the price 2-709 says the seller must hold the statue pending the action for the price. When the breaching buyer gets the statue who ends up paying the $2k delivery fee.
答案:在这里,卖方最终会以 2-709(1)(b) 的价格行动结束,公式就是 KP(60k) + ID(0)。鉴于这里没有转售,现在卖家完成的决定是不合理的。鉴于卖方从上一个问题中知道的信息。违规买方应证明完成该交易在商业上是不合理的。违约的买家如何争辩说 60k 是过度补偿?1-305 补救措施的精神论点 真实价格不是 60k,而是真正的 58 美元,因为 2 美元是用于交付的,这里没有交付。 那么问题是谁得到雕像呢?在起诉价格后,2-709 表示卖家必须持有雕像,等待价格诉讼。当违规的买家得到雕像时,他最终支付了 2 美元的运费。
BUYER’S REMEDIES WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 422
买方对货物销售的补救措施 第 422 页
25.1. Jack’s Industrial Tile for Less installs tile for schools, businesses, and other institutions with large buildings. Jack Kost, president of Jack’s, has come to see you to discuss a couple of problem jobs that he has encountered during the last few weeks. The first involves Lakeside School, whose gymnasium Jack’s had contracted to re-tile. The $40,000 contract called for a very hard grade of tile that would have cost Jack’s $30,000 to obtain and install. Because of a mix-up at Jack’s office, his workers installed a softer, but more expensive vinyl tile that cost Jack’s $45,000 to obtain and install. Because of the various purposes for which the Lakeside School gym was used, the hard but cheaper tile was the only floor surface that would work for the school. The softer vinyl tile was essentially worthless for the school’s purposes, at least in its original form. However, the vinyl could be treated with a special coating for $5,000 that would harden it and make it just as suitable for Lakeside’s purposes as the tile that should have been installed. Removing the tile is not an attractive option, since it would cost Jack’s more to remove the tile than the used tile could command in a resale. What would be the proper measure of Lakeside’s damages if it chose to sue Jack’s on a breach of warranty theory? U.C.C. §§2-714(2), 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)).
25.1. Jack's Industrial Tile for Less 为学校、企业和其他拥有大型建筑物的机构安装 Tile。Jack's 的总裁 Jack Kost 来找您,讨论他在过去几周遇到的几项有问题的工作。第一个涉及湖滨学校,该学校的体育馆 Jack's 已签订重新铺设瓷砖的合同。这份 40,000 美元的合同要求使用非常坚硬的瓷砖,而 Jack 需要花费 30,000 美元来获得和安装。由于 Jack 办公室的混乱 ,他的工人安装了一种更柔软但更昂贵的乙烯基瓷砖,Jack 花了 45,000 美元来获得和安装。由于湖滨学校体育馆的用途多种多样,坚硬但更便宜的瓷砖是唯一适合学校的地板表面。较软的乙烯基瓷砖对于学校的目的来说基本上毫无价值 ,至少在其原始形式下是这样。然而,乙烯基可以用 5,000 美元的特殊涂层处理,这将使它变硬,使其与应该安装的瓷砖一样适合 Lakeside 的用途。移除瓷砖不是一个有吸引力的选择,因为移除瓷砖的成本比二手瓷砖在转售中的成本更高。 如果 Lakeside 选择以违反保证理论为由起诉 Jack's,那么 Lakeside 的损害赔偿的适当衡量标准是什么 ?加州大学 §§2-714(2)、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1))。
For a seller that learns of buyer’s repudiation midstream in the production process, such a seller can choose either to cease production or continue production. In making the decision, the seller must exercise reasonable commercial judgment as required under §2-704(2). According to Comment 2 to §2-704, the burden is on the buyer to prove the commercial unreasonableness in the seller’s decision. The standard for the seller to make such a decision is whether the marginal cost of completion is less than the marginal benefit of completion. If so, then the seller should complete production. 卖方做出此类决定的标准是完成交易的边际成本是否低于完成交易的边际收益。如果是这样,那么卖家应该完成生产。
对于在生产过程中得知买方拒绝销售的卖方,此类销售商可以选择停止生产或继续生产。在做出决定时,卖方必须按照 §2-704(2) 的要求进行合理的商业判断。根据 §2-704 的第 2 条评论,买方有责任证明卖方决定中的商业不合理性。卖方做出此类决定的标准是完成交易的边际成本是否低于完成交易的边际收益。如果是这样,那么卖家应该完成生产。卖方做出此类决定的标准是完成交易的边际成本是否低于完成交易的边际收益。如果是这样,那么卖家应该完成生产。
In the world of buyer remedies, we need to bifurcated the aggrieved buyer into buyer that has accepted the goods and has not revoked acceptance, and the buyer that has never received the goods or has received the goods but either revoked acceptance or rejected the goods. The former buyer can seek remedies under §2-714 and §2-715, while the latter buyer can seek remedies for contract cover damages under §2-712 and contract market damages under §2-713. 在买方补救措施的领域中,我们需要将受害买方分为已接受商品但未撤销接受的买方,以及从未收到商品或已收到商品但撤销接受或拒绝接受商品的买方。前者买方可以根据 §2-714 和 §2-715 寻求补救措施,而后者买方可以根据 §2-712 寻求合同保险损害赔偿,并根据 §2-713 寻求合同市场损害赔偿。
在买方补救措施的领域中,我们需要将受害买方分为已接受商品但未撤销接受的买方,以及从未收到商品或已收到商品但撤销接受或拒绝接受商品的买方。前者买方可以根据 §2-714 和 §2-715 寻求补救措施,而后者买方可以根据 §2-712 寻求合同保险损害赔偿,并根据 §2-713 寻求合同市场损害赔偿。在买方补救措施的领域中,我们需要将受害买方分为已接受商品但未撤销接受的买方,以及从未收到商品或已收到商品但撤销接受或拒绝接受商品的买方。前者买方可以根据 §2-714 和 §2-715 寻求补救措施,而后者买方可以根据 §2-712 寻求合同保险损害赔偿,并根据 §2-713 寻求合同市场损害赔偿。
Formula under §2-714(2) for an aggrieved buyer who has accepted the goods: VCG-VNCG+ID+CD, where VCG stands for value of conforming合格 goods, VNCG stands for value of non-conforming goods, ID stands for incidental damages, CD stands for consequential damages. The question then becomes do we measure the value of the goods at the market price or from the buyer’s perspective, if the two measurements are different.
§2-714(2) 中接受货物的受害买方的公式:VCG-VNCG+ID+CD,其中 VCG 代表合格货物的价值,VNCG 代表不合格货物的价值,ID 代表附带损害,CD 代表间接损害。那么问题就变成了,如果两种衡量标准不同,我们是以市场价格还是从买方的角度衡量商品的价值 。
Here the buyer’s expectation damages should be $5k, which is the cost of treating the non-confirming tile to make it usable for the buyer’s purposes. If we use the objective market value to value the goods, applying the §2-714(2) formula, the buyer’s damages would be $40k-45k=-$5k. However, using the subjective valuation measure, applying the §2-714(2) formula, the buyer’s damages would be $40k-(40k-5k)=$5k. In this problem, we should use the subjective measure of valuation to get the right result. This problem is the odd case referred to in §2-714(2): unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount. Here what is valued more by the market doesn’t work for the buyer’s purposes.
在这里,买方的期望损害赔偿应该是 $5k,这是处理未确认的瓷砖以使其可用于买方目的的费用 。如果我们使用客观市场价值对商品进行估值,应用 §2-714(2) 公式,买方的损害赔偿将为 $40k-45k=-$5k。但是,使用主观估价衡量标准 ,应用 §2-714(2) 公式,买方的损害赔偿将为 $40k-(40k-5k)=$5k。在这个问题中,我们应该使用估值的主观测量来获得正确的结果。此问题是 §2-714(2) 中提到的奇怪情况:除非特殊情况显示不同金额的近端损害赔偿。在这里,市场更看重的东西并不适合买方的目的。
Under the common law duty of mitigation, the buyer probably cannot reject the non-conforming tile altogether and sue under §2-712 or §2-713, which is just too wasteful.
根据普通法的减轻责任,买方可能无法完全拒绝不合格的瓷砖并根据 §2-712 或 §2-713 提起诉讼,这太浪费了。
25.2. Another school that Jack’s had a contract with, Beasley Prep, was a victim of the same mix-up as Jack’s involving Lakeside’s order. Beasley paid Jack’s $55,000 to have the more expensive vinyl tile for its gym, which was the same size as Lakeside’s. Instead, Beasley ended up getting the cheaper, hard tile that was intended for Lakeside. In fact, however, this foul-up on Jack’s part turned out to be a blessing in disguise for Beasley. The Beasley principal had not realized at the time she ordered the softer tile that it would simply not work for the various purposes for which the Beasley gym was used. Indeed, the softer tile Beasley had ordered would have proven worthless for that school’s purposes. The cheaper, harder tile, by contrast, was in fact perfect for the several uses to which the Beasley gym was put. What would be the proper measure of Beasley’s damages if it chose to sue Jack’s on a breach of warranty theory? U.C.C. §§2-714(2), 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)).
25.2. Jack 与之签订合同的另一所学校 Beasley Prep 与 Jack 一样,也受到了与 Jack 相同的混淆 , 涉及 Lakeside 的命令。比斯利向杰克支付了 55,000 美元,为其健身房购买了更昂贵的乙烯基瓷砖,该地板与 Lakeside 的健身房大小相同 。相反,比斯利最终得到了本来是为 Lakeside 设计的更便宜、更硬的瓷砖。然而,事实上,杰克的这次犯规对比斯利来说是因祸得福。比斯利校长在订购较软的瓷砖时并没有意识到,它根本无法用于比斯利健身房的各种用途。事实上,比斯利订购的较软的瓷砖对那所学校的目的毫无价值 。相比之下,更便宜、更硬的瓷砖实际上非常适合比斯利健身房的多种用途。如果 Beasley 选择以违反保证理论为由起诉 Jack's,那么衡量损害赔偿的适当标准是什么 ?加州大学 §§2-714(2)、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1))。
Applying the §2-714(2) formula using the subjective valuation measurement, the buyer’s damages would be 0-40k=-$40k. Here the buyer was made better off due to the seller’s mistake. Applying the §2-714(2) formula using the objective market valuation, the buyer’s damages would be $55k-40k=$15k. In this problem both the buyer and the seller made mistakes. Either way, one party is going to end up with a windfall. However, only the seller’s mistake was a breach of the contract. So the buyer should get the windfall.
使用主观估价测量法应用 §2-714(2) 公式,买方的损害赔偿将为 0-40k=-$40k。在这里,由于卖方的错误,买方变得更好 。 使用客观市场估值应用 §2-714(2) 公式,买方的损害赔偿将为 $55k-40k=$15k。在这个问题上,买方和卖方都犯了错误。无论哪种方式,一方最终都会获得意外之财。然而,只有卖家的错误是违约。 所以买家应该得到意外之财。
25.3. Joe Fortino owned a tennis specialty store. Two weeks ago he sold for $1,000 a custom-made, hand-strung racket to an up-and-coming pro player, Chrissie Austin. Chrissie had told Joe that she would be using this racket in an upcoming weekend tournament in Las Vegas that offered a $60,000 first prize. On that weekend, Chrissie cruised her way to the semifinal round of the tournament, at which point the frame cracked on her new racket while she was leading the match 6-2, 5-1. The cracked frame rendered the new racket worthless and clearly constituted a breach of the sales contract. Chrissie was able to borrow a racket from another player, but the new racket was a disaster for her. She ended up losing the next 12 games of the semifinal match, eventually dropping the match by scores of 2-6, 7-5, 6,0. The Vegas odds had made Chrissie a 4-1 favorite to win the tournament, and Chrissie can produce convincing evidence that she probably would have won the tournament if the racket had not cracked. Chrissie asks you for how much she can recover from Joe Fortino. What do you advise? U.C.C. §§2-714(2) and (3), 2-715(2)(a); Official Comments 2 and 3 to §2-715.
25.3. 乔· 福蒂诺 (Joe Fortino ) 拥有一家网球专卖店。两周前 ,他以 1,000 美元的价格将一个定制的手工球拍卖给了一位崭露头角的职业球员 Chrissie Austin。Chrissie 告诉 Joe,她将在即将到来的拉斯维加斯周末锦标赛中使用这款球拍,该锦标赛提供 60,000 美元的一等奖。那个周末,Chrissie 一路杀入了比赛的半决赛,此时她的新球拍的框架破裂了,而她以 6-2、5-1 领先比赛。破裂的框架使新球拍一文不值,显然构成对销售合同的违反。Chrissie 能够从另一名球员那里借到球拍,但新球拍对她来说是一场灾难。她最终输掉了半决赛接下来的 12 局,最终以 2-6、7-5、6,0 的比分输掉了比赛。拉斯维加斯的赔率使 Chrissie 成为 4-1 赢得比赛的热门,Chrissie 可以拿出令人信服的证据,证明如果球拍没有破裂,她可能会赢得比赛。Chrissie 问您她可以从 Joe Fortino 那里恢复多少 。您有什么建议?加州大学 §§2-714(2) 和 (3)、2-715(2)(a);§2-715 的官方评论 2 和 3。
Here the problem is what the consequential damage is. The seller can make the argument that the buyer shouldn’t be able to recover the $60k as consequential damages, since there is no guaranty the buyer will win the tournament and get the $60k prize. In any event, given the odds of the tournament, the $60k should be discounted down to 20% of the $60k. Then, applying the §2-714(2) formula, the buyer’s damages would be $1k-0+60k*0.2=$13k.
这里的问题是间接损害是什么。卖方可以提出辩点,即买方不应能够收回 $60k 作为间接损害赔偿,因为无法保证买方会赢得比赛并获得 $60k 奖金。无论如何,考虑到比赛的赔率,$60k 应该折扣到 $60k 的 20%。然后,应用 §2-714(2) 公式,买方的损害赔偿将为 $1k-0+60k*0.2=$13k。
The seller can also try to argue that the buyer failed to mitigate by bringing only one racket to the tournament. However, the buyer’s duty of mitigation arises after the breach occurs, not before.
卖方也可以尝试争辩说,买方未能通过只带一个球拍参加比赛来减轻压力。但是,买方的缓解责任是在违约发生之后产生的,而不是之前。
25.4. Arlene Ledger, President of Heavy Metal, Inc. (from Problem 3.2) comes by your office looking gum. Today, she says, she is not here to ask you about problems she is having with a breaching customer. Rather, she says, this time her company is the breacher. A large retailer, Company Fitness, had contracted to purchase from Heavy Metal an industrial-sized multi-station weight machine for $35,000. Company Fitness was planning to display (but not sell) the machine at a major trade show in order to attract possible future customers in the burgeoning business of supplying on-site office exercise facilities. The week before the trade show, Arlene realized that her production department had dropped the ball on this order and there was no way that Heavy Metal could fill the order in time for Company Fitness’s appearance at the trade show. When Arlene informed Company Fitness of this fact, Company Fitness sought to cover.
25.4. Heavy Metal, Inc. 的总裁 Arlene Ledger(来自问题 3.2)来到您的办公室,看起来口香糖不错。她说,今天她不是来问你她与违规客户遇到的问题的。相反,她说,这一次她的公司是违规者。一家大型零售商 Company Fitness 已签订合同,以 35,000 美元的价格从 Heavy Metal 购买一台工业尺寸的多工位重量机。Company Fitness 计划在大型贸易展上展示(但不出售)该机器 , 以吸引可能的未来客户参与供应现场办公锻炼设施的新兴业务 。在贸易展前一周,Arlene 意识到她的生产部门在这个订单上失误了,Heavy Metal 无法及时完成订单,以便 Company Fitness 出现在贸易展上。当 Arlene 将这一事实告知 Company Fitness 时,Company Fitness 试图进行保险。
a. Suppose that Company Fitness could not find a precisely comparable machine on such short notice and instead paid $42,000 for a slightly better machine. What would its cover damages be against Heavy Metal? U.C.C. §2-712, Official Comment 2 to §2-712.
a. 假设 Company Fitness 无法在如此短的时间内找到一台完全可比的机器,而是支付了 42,000 美元购买了一台稍微好一点的机器。它对 Heavy Metal 的保险赔偿是多少?加州大学 §2-712,官方意见 2 至 §2-712。
§2-712(2) formula: RBPP+CC-KP+ID+CD-ES, where CC stands for cost of cover. Here this substitute cover is reasonable under the circumstances under Comment 2 to §2-712, which does not require an exact substitute. The buyer’s damages should be $42k-35k=$7k.
§2-712(2) 公式:RBPP+CC-KP+ID+CD-ES,其中 CC 代表保险费用。在此,在 §2-712 的注释 2 下,这种替代覆盖是合理的 ,不需要确切的替代。买方的损失应该是 $42k-35k=$7k。
b. Suppose that Company Fitness could have purchased for $40,000 a machine exactly comparable to the one Heavy Metal promised to make. Instead, it covered by purchasing a much better machine that happened to be on sale for $40,500 (this machine normally sold for $50,000). What would its cover damages be against Heavy Metal? U.C.C. §§2-712, 2-713.
b. 假设 Company Fitness 可以以 40,000 美元的价格购买一台与 Heavy Metal 承诺制造的机器完全一样的机器。相反,它通过购买一台恰好以 40,500 美元的价格出售的更好的机器来弥补(这台机器通常以 50,000 美元的价格出售)。它对 Heavy Metal 的保险赔偿是多少?加州大学 §§2-712、2-713 条。
Here this cover may be unreasonable, because the buyer passed over the truly proper cover under the circumstances. Since this is not a proper cover, the buyer can only seek contract market damages under §2-713(1), since §2-712(3) says failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from any other remedy. Thus, the buyer’s damages under §2-713(1): RBPP+MP-KP+ID+CD-ES would be $40k-35k=$5k.
在这里,这种保险可能是不合理的,因为在这种情况下,买方错过了真正适当的保险。由于这不是适当的保险,买方只能根据 §2-713(1) 寻求合同市场损害赔偿,因为 §2-712(3) 规定买方未能根据本节进行保险并不禁止他获得任何其他补救措施。因此,根据 §2-713(1):RBPP+MP-KP+ID+CD-ES,买方的损害赔偿将为 $40k-35k=$5k。
c. Imagine under scenario (a) above that Company Fitness was intending to sell rather than just display the machine. Suppose that Company Fitness expected to sell the original machine for $45,000, but thanks to the additional features in the machine it purchased, it was able to sell it for $48,000. What would Company Fitness’ cover damages be then? U.C.C. §§2-712, 2-715(2)(a).
c. 想象一下,在上面的情景 (a) 下,Company Fitness 打算出售,而不仅仅是展示机器。假设 Company Fitness 预计以 45,000 美元的价格出售原始机器,但由于它购买的机器中的附加功能,它能够以 48,000 美元的价格出售它。那么 Company Fitness 将承担哪些损害赔偿?加州大学 §§2-712、2-715(2)(a) 款。
Applying the §2-712(2) formula, the buyer’s damages would be $42k-35k-(48k-45k)=$4k. Had the seller performed, the buyer would have spent $35k and gained $45k, a net profit of $10k. Now given the seller’s breach, the buyer spent $42k and gained $48k, a net profit of $6k. The buyer is $4k short of its expectation damages. So giving the buyer $4k under §2-712(2) makes the buyer whole.
应用 §2-712(2) 公式,买方的损害赔偿将为 $42k-35k-(48k-45k)=$4k。如果卖方执行,买方将花费 $35k 并获得 $45k,净利润为 $10k。现在鉴于卖家的违约,买家花费了 42 美元,获得了 48 美元,净利润为 6 美元。买方比其预期损害赔偿金少 4 美元。 因此 ,根据 §2-712(2) 给买方 $4k 可以使买方完整。
Problem 25.5(a) Henry Brock was a collector of sports memorabilia, including baseball cards. On September 1, Henry made a contract with a store called Sports Collectibles to purchase an original 1909 Ty Cobb baseball card for $1,700. The contract said that Henry could come in and pick up the card on November 11, at which point he would also pay the purchase price in full. On October 1, a different buyer offered Sports Collectibles $2,500 for the same card (on the theory that an upcoming ESPN special on Cobb would increase the value of Cobb cards), and the store sold it on the sport to the new buyer for that amount. That afternoon, the manager of Sports Collectibles called Henry to inform that the Ty Cobb card deal was off. Stunned by this unexpected development, Henry replied, “Not so fast. I’m going to let you off on this one. I think you’d better reconsider.” Two weeks later, on October 15, Henry called Sports Collectibles to ask if his Ty Cobb card would be ready on November 11. The clerk who answered the phone politely explained to Henry that the Cobb card had been sold to someone else two weeks ago. “Well,” Henry said, “you had better tell your boss to buy it back, because I will be there with my check on November 11.” True to his word, Henry shows up with his check on November 11, but the store does not have the Cobb card to sell him. If the market price of the card was $2,500 on October 1, $2,700 on October 15, and $3,000 on November 11, to what amount is Henry entitled in damages from Sports Collectibles? U.C.C. §§2-713(1), 2-610, 2-609(4).
问题 25.5(a) 亨利·布洛克 (Henry Brock) 是一位体育纪念品的收藏家,包括棒球卡。9 月 1 日,亨利与一家名为 Sports Collectibles 的商店签订了一份合同,以 1,700 美元的价格购买了一张 1909 年的 Ty Cobb 棒球卡原件。合同规定,亨利可以在 11 月 11 日进来取卡,届时他也将全额支付购买价格。10 月 1 日,另一个买家向 Sports Collectibles 出价 2,500 美元购买同一张卡(理论上,即将到来的 ESPN 关于 Cobb 的特别节目会增加 Cobb 卡的价值),商店以该金额将其出售给新买家。那天下午,Sports Collectibles 的经理打电话给 Henry,告知 Ty Cobb 卡交易已经结束。亨利对这个出乎意料的发展感到震惊,他回答说:“没那么快。我就不说这个问题了。我觉得你最好再考虑一下。两周后的 10 月 15 日,Henry 打电话给 Sports Collectibles,询问他的 Ty Cobb 卡是否会在 11 月 11 日准备好。接电话的店员礼貌地向亨利解释说,科布卡两周前已经卖给了别人。“嗯,”亨利说,“你最好告诉你的老板把它买回来,因为我会在 11 月 11 日带着我的支票到那里。正如他所说的那样,亨利在 11 月 11 日带着他的支票出现了,但商店没有科布卡来卖他。如果该卡的市场价格在 10 月 1 日为 2,500 美元,10 月 15 日为 2,700 美元,11 月 11 日为 3,000 美元,那么 Henry 有权从体育收藏品中获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-713(1)、2-610、2-609(4) 条。
Answer: §2-713: MP – KP + ID + CD – ES
答案:§2-713:MP – KP + ID + CD – ES
This is the case where we have an anticipatory repudiation by the seller. Where the seller unequivocally repudiates the contract prior to the seller’s date of performance. And then we have to decide when the buyer sues in a case like this, what is the appropriate time to measure the market price. If you look at §2-713(1), it talks about the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price. So, pretty much, it’s going to come down to at the time when the buyer learned of the breach. Learned of the breach could mean two things. It could mean learned of the repudiation because the repudiation is happening before the stated date of performance or it could mean if you want to be literal you can’t learn until the stated date of performance. Most courts would go with the date when the buyer’s learned of the repudiation and would call that the unequivocal repudiation equal to the breach for the purposes of measure the market price. Under that approach, most court would give this buyer $800 (the difference between the MP when the buyer first learned of the seller’s repudiation and contract price which is $2500-1700=$800). The code does make a distinction between when the party learns of the breach, which is the language used in §2-713(1) and when the party learns of the repudiation in 2-723(1) which governs anticipatory repudiation cases brought to trial prior to the time for performance and that says use the date of repudiation for market price for those cases.
在这种情况下,卖方预期拒绝。卖方在卖方履行合同之日之前明确否认合同。然后我们必须决定买方何时在这样的案件中提起诉讼,什么是衡量市场价格的合适时间。如果您查看 §2-713(1),它谈到了买方得知违约时的市场价格与合同价格之间的差额。所以,差不多,这将归结为买方得知违规行为的时间。得知泄露可能意味着两件事。这可能意味着得知了否认,因为否认发生在规定的履行日期之前,或者可能意味着如果你想按字面意思,你不能在规定的履行日期之前学习。大多数法院会选择买方得知毁约的日期,并将明确的毁约称为等于违约,以衡量市场价格。在这种方法下,大多数法院会给该买方 800 美元(买方第一次得知卖方拒绝时的 MP 与合同价格之间的差额,即 2500-1700 美元=800 美元)。该法典确实对当事方得知违约行为的时间(§2-713(1) 中使用的语言)和当事方得知 2-723(1) 中的否认行为进行了区分,该条款规定了在履行时间之前提交审判的预期否认案件,并规定为这些案件使用否认日期作为市场价格。
§2-713: MP(2500) – KP(1700) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = $800
§2-713: MP(2500) – KP(1700) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = $800
Problem 25.5(b) Same facts as part (a), except suppose that Sports Collectibles did not sell the Ty Cobb card to a different buyer. However, one month after Henry purchased the card from the store, Shelly Lopez sues Henry to recover the card on the grounds that she was the true owner and the card was stolen from her last year. Henry spends $800 in attorney’s fees defending the suit, but ultimately loses the suit (and the card) to Shelly. Even though the card had a market value of $3,000 on November 11, its value had increased to $4,000 by the time Henry lost the lawsuit. For what amount may Henry recover in a lawsuit against Sports Collectibles? U.C.C. §§2-312(1)(a), 2-714, 2-715(2), §1-305(a).
问题 25.5(b) 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,只是假设 Sports Collectibles 没有将 Ty Cobb 卡出售给其他买家。然而,在亨利从商店购买卡一个月后,雪莉·洛佩兹 (Shelly Lopez) 起诉亨利追回卡,理由是她是真正的所有者 ,而且这张卡是去年从她那里偷来的。亨利花了 800 美元的律师费为诉讼辩护,但最终将诉讼(和卡)输给了雪莉。尽管这张卡在 11 月 11 日的市场价值为 3,000 美元,但当亨利输掉诉讼时,它的价值已经增加到 4,000 美元。亨利在针对 Sports Collectibles 的诉讼中可以追回多少钱?《美国法典》第 2-312(1)(a)、2-714、2-715(2) 和第 1-305(a) 款。
Answer: §2-714: VCG – VNCG + ID + CD
答案:§2-714:VCG – VNCG + ID + CD
The basis of the buyer’s suit in this case would be a breach of warranty of title under §2-312(1)(a). the damage measure under 2-714(2), the buyer’s entitled to the difference of the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted which here would be zero given the title defect that would cause Henry to lose any right to the cards. Interestingly here, when you talk about the value of the goods accepted here as zero, are we using the subjective value or the objective value? Certainly, subjectively valued, this card would be worth zero to Henry with the bad title. But you could also say it’s also objective because the value to anybody without title would also be zero. The value that the good would have if it had been warranted, here we go with the market value as of the time of acceptance which was $3,000. And then 2-714(3) says in a proper case, any ID or CD under the next section may also be recovered. And the question is are attorney’s fees ever appropriate as CD? If you look at 1-305(a) , you might think no they are not ever appropriate because 1-305(a) specifically prohibits the awarding of special or penal damages except as specifically provided by the code or by other law. Now we normally think of awarding attorney’s fees as a type of special or penal damage because awarding attorney’s fees reverses the so-called American Rule that says that even the winner pays their own attorney’s fees. Why is this case different then? This case is different when it comes to awarding attorney’s fees under 2-715. In this case we are not awarding Henry attorney’s fees that he will pay to bring his breach of title of warranty suit against the seller. Rather, we would be awarding Henry’s attorney’s fees that he incurred in a suit brought by the third party because of the seller’s breach of the title warranty. And that is a different type of attorney’s fees. So attorney’s fees are going to be one of the most common form of CD that a buyer would suffer in any case the seller gives buyer bad title. Bad title is not going to cause the good to blow up in the buyer’s face, but arguably any seller should have reason to know under 2-715(a)(2) Hadley foreseeability that giving bad title is likely to encumber the buyer’s with attorney’s fees as the buyer defends a suit brought by the true owner of the goods. The other ting to note is that Henry in the alternative might have vouched in his seller under 2-607(5)(a) when the third party first sued him to recover the card on the basis of title and then that would force Henry to defend the suit brought by the third party or to be collaterally estopped by the collateral issue if Henry lost to the third party and suit his seller for breach of the title warranty. If the seller had refused to come in to defend the third party suit, then seller would be bound by any finding of title when Henry turned around and sued the seller for any breach of warranty. That is §2-607(5)(a) vouching in.
在这种情况下,买方诉讼的依据是违反 §2-312(1)(a) 规定的所有权保证。根据 2-714(2) 的损害措施,买方有权获得接受货物价值之间的时间和地点的差额,鉴于所有权缺陷,这里将为零,这将导致亨利失去对卡的任何权利。有趣的是,当你谈论这里接受的商品价值为零时,我们使用的是主观价值还是客观价值?当然,从主观价值来看,这张牌对标题不好的亨利来说价值为零。但你也可以说这也是客观的,因为对任何没有头衔的人来说,价值也将为零。如果商品有保证,它的价值,这里我们用的是截至验收时的市场价值,即 3,000 美元。然后 2-714(3) 说在适当的情况下,下一节下的任何 ID 或 CD 也可以恢复。问题是 律师费适合作为 CD 吗?如果您查看 1-305(a) , 您可能会认为不,它们从来都不合适,因为 1-305(a) 明确禁止判给特殊或刑事损害赔偿,除非法典或其他法律明确规定。现在我们通常认为判给律师费是一种特殊或刑事损害赔偿,因为判给律师费颠倒了所谓的美国规则,即即使是获胜者也要支付自己的律师费。那么,为什么这个案子不同呢?在 2-715 下判给律师费时,本案有所不同。在这种情况下,我们不会判给 Henry 律师费,他将支付律师费以对卖方提起违反保修所有权的诉讼。 相反,我们将判给 Henry 的律师费,因为他因卖方违反产权保证而在第三方提起的诉讼中产生。这是一种不同类型的律师费。 因此 ,律师费将成为买方在卖方给予买方不良所有权的情况下,买方会遭受的最常见的 CD 形式之一。不良的所有权不会导致商品在买方的脸上爆炸,但可以说,根据 2-715(a)(2) Hadley 案的预见性,任何卖方都应该有理由知道,在 买方为货物的真正所有者提起的诉讼辩护时,给予不良所有权可能会使买方的律师费负担。另一个 需要注意的是,当第三方首先起诉他以所有权为由收回卡时,Henry 可能已经根据 2-607(5)(a) 向他的卖家担保,然后这将迫使 Henry 为第三方提起的诉讼辩护,或者如果 Henry 输给了第三方并起诉他的卖家违约,则因抵押问题而被附带禁止标题保证。如果卖方拒绝为第三方诉讼辩护,那么当 Henry 转身起诉卖方违反保证时,卖方将受到任何所有权认定的约束。这就是 §2-607(5)(a) 担保。
Problem 25.6(a) Miles Gurney is a hog farmer, and for that reason he keeps a ready stock of hog feed in a warehouse on his farm. Miles had a contract with Mabel’s Feed ‘n Seed to purchase eight tons of hog feed for $6,400, which Mabel promised to deliver to Miles’ farm on May 1. On May 1, Mabel fails to deliver the feed and announces to Miles that she is breaching the contract. On May 1, the market price for comparable hog feed is $1,000 per ton. Over the next month, as the market price for hog feed declines, Miles purchases three separate eight-ton loads from other suppliers. The first load, purchased on May 20, costs Miles $7,000; the second, purchased on May 25, costs $6,500; and the third, purchased on May 30, costs $6,300. On June 15, Miles files suit against Mabel for breach of contract. To what amount is Miles entitled in damages? U.C.C. §§2-712, -713; Official Comment 3 to §2-712, Official Comment 5 to §2-713.
问题 25.6(a) Miles Gurney 是一名养猪户,因此他在农场的仓库中备有现成的猪饲料库存。Miles 与 Mabel's Feed 'n Seed 签订了一份合同,以 6,400 美元的价格购买了 8 吨猪饲料,Mabel 承诺在 5 月 1 日将其运送到 Miles 的农场。5 月 1 日,Mabel 未能交付信息,并向 Miles 宣布她违反了合同。5 月 1 日,同类猪饲料的市场价格为每吨 1,000 美元。在接下来的一个月里,随着猪饲料市场价格的下降,Miles 从其他供应商那里购买了三批单独的 8 吨重货物。第一次装载于 5 月 20 日购买,费用为 Miles 7,000 美元;第二套于 5 月 25 日购买,售价 6,500 美元;第三张于 5 月 30 日购买,售价 6,300 美元。6 月 15 日,Miles 以违约为由对 Mabel 提起诉讼。里程可获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-712、-713 条;§2-712 的官方意见 3,§2-713 的官方意见 5。
Answer: the buyer would want to choose the contract market difference under 2-713(1). §2-713(1): RBPP + MP – KP + ID + CD – ES. Which here comes out to $1600 = MP(8k) –KP(6400). 8k because on May 1 the market price for hog feed was 1k per ton and the contract was for 8 tons. Now the seller would want to argue that this buyer would have covered with at least one of those purchases that occurred shortly after the seller’s breach. But 2-712(3) makes it clear that this buyer sis not required to cover. And comment 3 to 2-712 reinforces that idea even further by stressing the buyer’s freedom to choose between contract cover damages and contract market damages. Comment 3 to 2-712 says the only obligation that the buyer has to cover is if the buyer is asking for consequential damages and those CD could have been avoided by cover. But that is not the case here. This buyer can say he was making his later purchases for his own account rather than to cover, and that is why he should be able to get these damages.
答案:买方希望根据 2-713(1) 选择合同市场差额。§2-713(1):RBPP + MP – KP + ID + CD – ES。这里得出 1600 美元 = MP(8k) –KP(6400)。8k,因为 5 月 1 日猪饲料的市场价格为每吨 1k,合同为 8 吨。现在,卖方想要争辩说,该买方至少会覆盖卖方违约后不久发生的一次购买。但 2-712(3) 明确表示,该买方不需要承保。评论 3 至 2-712 通过强调买方在合同承保损害赔偿和合同市场损害赔偿之间做出选择的自由,进一步强化了这一观点。评论 3 至 2-712 表示,买方必须承担的唯一义务是买方要求间接损害赔偿,而这些 CD 本可以通过保险来避免。但这里的情况并非如此。这位买家可以说他后来的购买是为了自己的账户,而不是为了支付,这就是为什么他应该能够获得这些赔偿。
Problem 25.6(b) Same facts as part (a), except that the May 1 market price is $800 per ton, and Miles makes the same three purchases on the same dates at the same prices as part (a). To what amount is Miles entitled in damages? U.C.C. §§2-712, 2-713; Comment 2 to §2-712.
问题 25.6(b) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 5 月 1 日的市场价格为每吨 800 美元,并且 Miles 在同一日期以与 (a) 部分相同的价格进行相同的三次购买。里程可获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-712、2-713 条;§2-712 的注释 2。
Answer: First of all note that the contract market damages would not be zero under 2-713. Here, the buyer will ask for contract cover damages under 2-712(2), they’re going to claim that May 20 purchase first purchase of the three and if the court accepts that then it would be §2-712(1): RBPP + CC (7k) – KP(6400) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = $600 damages. Should the buyer get those contract cover damages when the market contract damages would now be zero? Probably yes, unless the court determines that his first 8 tons purchase on May 20 was not done quickly enough to qualify as timely cover but that is not probably going to be a problem because official comment 2 to 2-712 seem to suggest that a court should not be too harsh on the buyer with respect to timing issue such as this one. And then 2-712(1) simply says that a cover should be made in good faith and without unreasonably delay and so that language when limit somewhat an aggrieved buyer’s ability to play the market in cases like if that is what the seller thinks the buyer is doing. The other thing to notice is there is no requirement that an aggrieved buyer give a breaching seller advance notice of cover by contrast as we saw when we cover seller’s remedies (an aggrieved seller must give a breaching buyer advanced notice of a resale that the seller wants to do according to 2-706(3)). There is also no requirement that the goods purchased by an aggrieved buyer as cover be reasonably identified by the buyer as referring to the broken contract under 2-706(2).
回答:首先请注意 ,根据 2-713 的规定,合同市场损害赔偿不会为零。在这里,买方将根据 2-712(2) 要求合同覆盖损害赔偿,他们将要求 5 月 20 日购买三项购买中的第一项,如果法院接受,则为 §2-712(1):RBPP + CC (7k) – KP(6400) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 600 美元的损害赔偿。 当市场合同损害赔偿现在为零时,买方是否应该获得这些合同保险损害赔偿?可能是的,除非法院确定他在 5 月 20 日购买的第一笔 8 吨货物没有足够快地完成,因此没有资格成为及时保险,但这可能不会成为问题,因为官方评论 2 至 2-712 似乎表明法院不应在时间问题上对买方过于苛刻,例如这个问题。然后 2-712(1) 简单地说,保险应该本着善意,不要无故拖延,因此,当该语言在一定程度上限制了受屈的买方在诸如卖方认为买方正在做的事情等情况下参与市场的能力。另一件需要注意的事情是,没有要求受害的买方提前通知违约的卖方, 相比之下,我们在承保卖方的补救措施时看到(根据 2-706(3) ,受害的卖方必须提前通知违约的买方卖方想要的转售。也没有要求买方根据 2-706(2) 合理地识别受害买方购买作为保险购买的商品是指违约合同。
Problem 25.6(c) Same facts as part (a), except Miles does not purchase any additional hog feed during the month following the breach. Instead, he takes 8 tones from the stock of 20 tons in his warehouse. The average price of the 20 tons of hog feed, which Miles had purchased through several deals during the past year, was $1,200 per ton. To what amount is Miles entitled in damages? U.C.C. §§2-712, 2-713.
问题 25.6(c) 事实与 (a) 部分相同,但 Miles 在违规后的一个月内没有购买任何额外的生猪饲料。相反,他从仓库的 8 吨库存中取出 20 吨。Miles 在过去一年中通过几笔交易购买了 20 吨猪饲料,其平均价格为每吨 1,200 美元。里程可获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-712 条、第 2-713 条。
Answer: the buyer should get $1600. §2-713(1): RBPP + MP(8k) – KP(6,400) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = $1,600. Now the buyer might want to argue here for a contract cover under 2-712(2) and his argument would be that his cost of cover is basically the average cost of what he had in stock and that is his cover taking from his own stock. And if that argument is successful he can argue for a cost of cover for the 8 tons at $9,600 - $6400 =$3200. The buyer will probably not win in this argument because Cronster Oil says no the buyer cannot do this. Judge Posner said in that case that a cover under 2-712(2) require at a minimum a purchase. You cannot purchase what you already own. So, no purchase, no cover.
答案:买方应获得 1600 美元。§2-713(1):RBPP + MP(8k) – KP(6,400) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 1,600 美元。现在买方可能想在这里争论 2-712(2) 下的合同保险,他的论点是他的保险成本基本上是他库存的平均成本,即他从自己的库存中提取的保险。如果这个论点成功 , 他可以争辩说 8 吨的保险费用为 9,600 美元 - 6400 美元 = 3200 美元。买方可能不会在这场争论中获胜,因为 Cronster Oil 说不,买方不能这样做。波斯纳法官在该案中表示,2-712(2) 下的保险至少需要购买。您不能购买您已经拥有的东西。所以,没有购买,就没有保障。
Problem 25.7(a) Rhonda Lewis, a traveling salesperson, buys a new Chevy Malibu for $22,000 from Jack Pollard’s Chevy City, but the car’s engine catches fire during the first week Rhonda drives. Rhonda was not hurt, but she was so disgusted that she called Jack to revoke her acceptance and to get him to send out a tow truck to take the Malibu back to Chevy City. She then demanded her $22,000 back from Jack, who gave it to her. After getting her refund, Rhonda intended to search for another new Malibu for $400 per month, plus 20 cents a mile for each mile over 1,000 per month. Because of her heavy travel schedule, Rhonda took four months to purchase a new Malibu, for which she ultimately paid $24,000. During the four months she used the rental Malibu, Rhonda put $2,500 miles on it per month, which added a total of $1,200 to her final rental bill. If Rhonda sues Jack Pollard’s Chevy for breach of contract, for what amount may she recover? U.C.C. §§2-712, 2-715; Comment 2 to §2-712, 1-305(a).
问题 25.7(a) 旅行推销员 Rhonda Lewis 以 22,000 美元的价格从 Jack Pollard 的 Chevy City 购买了一辆新的雪佛兰马里布,但在 Rhonda 驾驶的第一周,汽车的发动机起火了。朗达没有受伤,但她非常厌恶,以至于她打电话给杰克,撤销她的录取,并让他派出一辆拖车将马里布带回雪佛兰城。然后她向杰克索要 22,000 美元,杰克给了她。获得退款后,Rhonda 打算以每月 400 美元的价格寻找另一辆新的 Malibu,每月超过 1,000 英里的每英里加收 20 美分。由于旅行日程繁忙,朗达花了四个月的时间购买了一辆新的 Malibu,最终她花了 24,000 美元。在她使用租赁的马里布的四个月里,朗达每月投入 2,500 美元的里程,这为她的最终租金账单总共增加了 1,200 美元。如果 Rhonda 起诉 Jack Pollard 的雪佛兰违约,她可以追讨多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-712 条、第 2-715 条;§2-712、1-305(a) 的注释 2。
Answer: First of all, the buyer will seek the difference between the cost of cover and contract price. That is the difference between $24k and $22k, and this will probably be acceptable under 2-712(2) even though it took this buyer four months to cover given her busy travel schedule and the admonition that we get in 2-712. In any event, even if she cannot get contract cover, she would probably get the same amount under contract market damages at least if we assume that what she paid is also the appropriate market price then it would not so much matter. Will she be able to be reimbursed of the $2,800 for the four months it took her to get a new car to buy? Maybe these are incidental damages under 2-215(1) because these charges are arguably expenses reasonably incurred in connection with effecting a cover and certainly nobody is going to deny the need of a salesperson to have the need of a car. Maybe she wants to call these CD under 2-715(2)(a), the problem there is that it says which would not be reasonably prevented by cover or otherwise and at least if she goes that route she opens herself to an argument that she could have avoided the $2,800 by a faster cover than you did. How can argue that giving her these $2800 as incidental damages makes her better off than she would have been if the seller had performed? If she gets recovery of these full damages, then she ends up at a time four months following the breach with a car having zero miles instead of a car with 10k miles that she would have had if the seller had not breached. Maybe the seller could argue here in the spirit of 1-305(a), that if the seller is forced to pay all of these rental charges, maybe the seller should get some reduction cover in the contract that reflects the difference between the value of a new car and the value of the same car with 10k miles on it. This reminds Keating of the real estate case we did where the aggrieved party paid the rent in interim when there is a delay in closing. And in those cases, we said there should be no recovery for the cost of interim housing on the theory that the aggrieved buyer was getting benefit for the money that it spent on the interim house. But car rentals for short periods that aren’t long-term leases, they can be super expensive much more so than even the real estate rental market.
答: 首先 ,买方会寻求保险费用和合同价格之间的差额。这就是 $24k 和 $22k 之间的差额,这在 2-712(2) 下可能是可以接受的,即使考虑到她繁忙的旅行日程和我们在 2-712 中得到的警告,这位买家花了四个月的时间才付清。无论如何,即使她无法获得合同保障,她也可能在合同市场损害赔偿下获得相同的金额,至少如果我们假设她支付的费用也是适当的市场价格,那么这并不重要。她能否报销她购买新车四个月所花费的 2,800 美元?也许这些是 2-215(1) 下的附带损害赔偿,因为这些费用可以说是与保险相关的合理费用,当然没有人会否认销售人员需要汽车。也许她想根据 2-715(2)(a) 调用这些 CD,那里的问题在于它说这不会通过保险或其他方式合理地阻止,至少如果她走那条路 ,她会让自己面临一个争论,即她本可以通过比你更快的保险来避免 2,800 美元。怎么能说给她这 2800 美元作为附带损害赔偿会让她比卖方履行时过得更好呢?如果她获得了这些全额赔偿,那么她最终会在违规后四个月的时间里,一辆汽车的里程为零,而不是如果卖家没有违规,她本来会拥有一辆 10k 英里的汽车。 也许卖方可以本着 1-305(a) 的精神在这里争辩说,如果卖方被迫支付所有这些租赁费用,也许卖方应该在合同中获得一些减免保险,以反映新车的价值与同一辆车的价值之间的差额行驶 10k 英里。这让 Keating 想起了我们做的房地产案件,当成交延迟时,受害方临时支付了租金。在这些情况下,我们说不应该追讨临时住房的成本,因为受害的买家在临时住房上花费的钱得到了好处。但是不是长期租赁的短期汽车租赁,它们甚至可能比房地产租赁市场贵得多。
Problem 25.7(b) Same facts part (a), except that Rhonda had only paid $3,000 of the purchase price. Further, when Rhonda called to complain about the engine fire and give notice of her revocation, Jack Pollard failed to send out a tow truck and failed to tender a refund of Rhonda’s $3,000. After a couple of days, Rhonda paid a towing firm $100 to take her car to a local storage company, which agreed to hold the car for Rhonda for $10 per day. Four months later, after Rhonda had rented the Malibu and then paid $24,000 for a different new Malibu, Jack Pollard called and said he wanted his car back and that he was willing to refund Rhonda’s $3,000 in order to get it. To what extent may Rhonda hold out for still more money from Jack as a condition to her returning the car to him? U.C.C. §2-711(3).
问题 25.7(b) 相同的事实第 (a) 部分,只是 Rhonda 只支付了 3,000 美元的购买价格。此外,当 Rhonda 打电话投诉发动机起火并发出撤销通知时,Jack Pollard 没有派出拖车,也没有退还 Rhonda 的 3,000 美元。几天后,朗达向一家拖车公司支付了 100 美元,将她的车带到当地的一家仓储公司,该公司同意以每天 10 美元的价格为 Rhonda 保管这辆车。四个月后,在 Rhonda 租了 Malibu 然后支付 24,000 美元购买了另一辆新 Malibu 后,Jack Pollard 打电话说他想拿回他的车,并且他愿意退还 Rhonda 的 3,000 美元才能得到它。朗达在多大程度上能从杰克那里拿到更多的钱作为她把车还给他的条件呢?《美国法典》第 2-711(3) 条。
Answer: 2-711(3) tells us that the buyer can demand not only the $3k that paid on the purchase price so far but also the $100 in towing charges plus the $1200 or so in storage fees that have accumulated up to this point. The question that Rhonda wants to know is can she also hold the car as security unless the seller pays her contract cover and ID? while she can still sue for contract cover damages and incidental damages that were discussed in terms of car rental costs, she is not allowed to withhold the car as security until the seller pays those amounts under 2-711(3). The reason is 2-711(3) is limited is maybe because of fear that buyers like Rhonda would manufacture exaggerated damage claims of this sort and insist on those exaggerated amounts as a condition for returning the goods to the sellers. Instead the code drafter under 2-711(3) limited the aggrieved buyer’s security interest to items of damages that are more objectively verifiable, which are any payments made under a price and any expenses reasonably incurred for inspection and custody in which you could show receipts.
答案:2-711(3) 告诉我们,买方不仅可以要求到目前为止支付的 3 美元购买价格,还可以要求 100 美元的拖车费加上到目前为止已累积的 1200 美元左右的仓储费。朗达想知道的问题是,除非卖家支付她的合同保险和身份证,否则她是否也可以持有这辆车作为担保?虽然她仍然可以起诉合同保险损害赔偿和附带损害赔偿,这些损害赔偿和附带损害赔偿在汽车租赁费用方面讨论过,但在卖方根据 2-711(3) 支付这些金额之前,她不得扣留汽车作为担保。2-711(3) 受到限制的原因可能是因为担心像 Rhonda 这样的买家会制造此类夸大的损害索赔,并坚持将这些夸大的金额作为将货物退还给卖家的条件。 相反 ,2-711(3) 下的法典起草人将受害买方的担保权益限制在更客观可验证的损害赔偿项目上,即根据价格支付的任何款项以及您可以为检查和保管而合理产生的任何费用,您可以在其中出示收据。
Problem 25.8(a) Pro Roofing, Inc., a Atlanta residential roofing firm, made a contract with Industrial Shingles, a Nashville manufacturer, to purchase 20 tons of shingles for $50,000, “FOB Nashville.” The stated delivery date was “on or before July 20,” and the cost of delivering the shingles from Nashville to Atlanta was $1,500. On July 20, the shingles had not yet arrive to Pro Roofing, causing the president of Pro Roofing to call Industrial Shingles and learn that the seller was not going to perform. The market price of 20 tons of shingles on July 20 was $56,000 in Nashville, and $54,000 in Atlanta. Assuming that Pro Roofing does not cover, to what amount is it entitled in damages? U.C.C. §§2-713, 2-319(1), 2-509(1).
问题 25.8(a) 亚 特兰大住宅屋顶公司 Pro Roofing, Inc. 与纳什维尔制造商 Industrial Wingles 签订合同,以 50,000 美元的价格购买 20 吨带状疱疹,“FOB Nashville”。规定的交货日期是“7 月 20 日或之前”,将带状疱疹从纳什维尔运送到亚特兰大的费用为 1,500 美元。7 月 20 日,带状疱疹尚未到达 Pro Roofing,导致 Pro Roofing 总裁致电 Industrial Shingles,得知卖家不会履约。7 月 20 日,20 吨带状疱疹的市场价格在纳什维尔为 56,000 美元,在亚特兰大为 54,000 美元。 假设 Pro Roofing 不承保,它有权获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-713 条、2-319(1)、2-509(1)。
Answer: §2-713(1): RBPP (0) + MP(56k) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 6k. MP is the Nashville price. Does the buyer have to subtract 1,500 as an ES? Interestingly, most courts would say no because the buyer is assumed in this hypothetical Nashville cover that is setup in the contract market formula. MP in the 2-713 market formula is usually determined at a place of tender which would be a function of the FOB delivery term. Here it was FOB Nashville that is why we chose the Nashville MP. Second, the delivery term also dictates whether the states purchase price includes the cost of delivery in it. So with a shipment contract such as this one, the stated cost does not include cost of delivery to the final destination and that means in the shipment contract like this one the buyer has to separately pay for the cost of shipping to the stated destination. If on the other hand, we had a destination contract, meaning FOB buyer’s place, then the purchase price that the buyer pays would already include within it the cost of shipping for the stated destination FOB term. That is how it works under 2-319(1)(a) and under 2-509(1)(a).
答案:§2-713(1):RBPP (0) + MP(56k) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 6k。MP 是纳什维尔的价格。买方是否必须减去 1,500 作为 ES?有趣的是,大多数法院会说不,因为买方被假设在合同市场公式中设置的纳什维尔保险中。2-713 市场公式中的 MP 通常在投标地点确定,这将是 FOB 交货期限的函数。这里是 FOB Nashville,这就是我们选择 Nashville MP 的原因。其次,交货期限还决定了各州的购买价格是否包括运费。 因此 ,对于像这样的运输合同,规定的费用不包括运送到最终目的地的费用,这意味着在像这样的运输合同中,买方必须单独支付运送到规定目的地的费用。另一方面,如果我们有目的地合同,即 FOB 买方的地点,那么买方支付的购买价格已经包含了规定的目的地 FOB 期限的运费。这就是它在 2-319(1)(a) 和 2-509(1)(a) 下的运作方式。
Problem 25.8(b) Same facts as part (a), except that the delivery term is “FOB Atlanta.” Assuming that Pro Roofing does not cover, to what amount is it entitled in damages? U.C.C. §§2-713, 2-319(1), 2-509(1).
问题 25.8(b) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,但交货期限为“FOB Atlanta”。 假设 Pro Roofing 不承保,它有权获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-713 条、2-319(1)、2-509(1)。
Answer: Now we have a destination contract. §2-713(1): RBPP(0) + MP(54k ATL’s MP) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 4k. ES is still zero because it was a destination contract in this case it was the seller not the buyer who was responsible in any event for the delivery cost that was saved.
§2-713(1):RBPP(0) + MP(54k ATL 的 MP) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 4k。ES 仍然为零,因为它是目的地合同,在这种情况下,是卖方而不是买方负责节省的运费。
Problem 25.8(c) Same facts as part (a), except that the contract contains no delivery term whatsoever. Assuming that Pro Roofing does not cover, to what amount is it entitled in damages? U.C.C. §§2-713, 2-509(1), 2-308(a); Official Comment 5 to §2-503.
问题 25.8(c) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是合同不包含任何交货条款。 假设 Pro Roofing 不承保,它有权获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-713 条、2-509(1)、2-308(a) 款;§2-503 的官方评论 5。
Answer: the default delivery term when no term is stated in the UCC is a shipment contract under 2-308(a) and we also find the same result in Official Comment 5 to 2-503 which reinforces 2-308(a) and says under this article the shipment contract is regarded as a normal one and the destination contract has a variant one. Here, the buyer does not have to deliver at a named destination unless the seller has specifically agreed to deliver or unless the commercial understanding of the terms used by the parties contemplates such delivery that is what we are told by comment 5. What are the damages here? Because this is a shipment contract, the answer will be the same as part (a), so the damages will be $6k. §2-713(1): RBPP (0) + MP(56k) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 6k.
答案:当 UCC 中没有规定条款时,默认交货条款是 2-308(a) 下的货运合同,我们也在官方意见 5 至 2-503 中发现了相同的结果,该意见强化了 2-308(a),并表示根据该条款,货运合同被视为普通合同,目的地合同具有变体合同。在这里,买方不必在指定的目的地交货,除非卖方已明确同意交货,或者除非双方对所用条款的商业理解考虑了此类交货,这就是注释 5 告诉我们的。这里的损失是什么?因为这是一份运输合同,所以答案将与 (a) 部分相同,因此损害赔偿将为 6 美元。§2-713(1):RBPP (0) + MP(56k) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 6k。
Problem 25.8(d) Same facts as part (a), except that shingles arrive on July 20, prove to be obviously and horribly defective, and Pro Roofing immediately rejects the shingles. Assuming that Pro Roofing has already paid for the goods and does not cover, to what amount is it entitled in damages? U.C.C. §2-713.
问题 25.8(d) 与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,除了带状疱疹于 7 月 20 日到达外,被证明存在明显且可怕的缺陷,Pro Roofing 立即拒绝了带状疱疹。 假设 Pro Roofing 已经支付了货物费用并且不支付,它有权获得多少赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-713 条。
Answer: Although market price in the 2-713 market contract formula is usually place of tender, market price becomes place of arrival in a case of rejection or revocation of acceptance following arrival of the goods (even if the delivery term is for a shipment contract). §2-713(1): RBPP(0) + MP(54k ATL’s MP) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 4k. No ES here because the goods were shipped to Atlanta and this was a shipment contract. So the buyer did in fact end up paying for the shipment cost. So the buyer did not save any expenses here since the buyer ended up actually paying for shipment costs. What about the $1,500 in delivery cost that the buyer had to pay? Why shouldn’t that be an ID to add to the $4k? The $1,500 that the buyer had to pay in delivery costs is already included in the $4k damage figure that we got here if we accept $54k the market price in Atlanta as the value of what this buyer would have received if the seller had performed. The buyer expected to pay here $50k in contract price plus $1,500 in delivery cost and the buyer expected to pay that in order to get something worth $54k. So if you look at this, the expected net gain for this buyer in this contract is $2.5k. Here, the buyer has already paid $1,500 in delivery cost from Nashville to Atlanta. Pre-damages and coming into the damage suit, the buyer is already down $1,500. In order to get the buyer from where he is now from -$1,500 to +$2,500k we have to give the buyer 4k. If the buyer were it claim the $1,500 as ID, it would be overcompensation.
答案:尽管 2-713 市场合同公式中的市场价格通常是投标地点,但在货物到达后被拒绝或撤销验收的情况下(即使交货期限是针对装运合同的),市场价格成为到达地点。§2-713(1):RBPP(0) + MP(54k ATL 的 MP) – KP(50k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = 4k。这里没有 ES,因为货物被运到亚特兰大 ,这是装运合同。 因此 ,买方实际上最终确实支付了运费。 所以买家在这里没有节省任何费用,因为买家最终实际上支付了运费。买家必须支付的 1,500 美元运费呢?为什么这不应该是一个添加到 $4k 的 ID?买方必须支付的 1,500 美元运费已经包含在我们在这里得到的 4 美元损失数字中,如果我们接受亚特兰大市场价格的 54 美元作为如果卖方履行合同,该买方将收到的价值。买方希望在这里支付 $50k 的合同价格加上 $1,500 的运费,而买方希望支付这笔费用以获得价值 $54k 的东西。 因此 ,如果您看一下这个,该买家在此合同中的预期净收益为 2.5 美元。在这里,买家已经支付了 $1,500 的从纳什维尔到亚特兰大的运费。在损害赔偿之前,买方已经损失了 1,500 美元。 为了让买家从他现在的位置从 -$1,500 到 +$2,500k,我们必须给买家 4k。如果买方要求将 1,500 美元作为 ID,那将是超额赔偿。
Problem 25.8(e) Same facts as part (a), except that Pro Roofing learns on July 10 that Industrial Shingles had defaulted on its major bank loan and was threatening to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy unless its lender agreed to restructure the loan. In light of this news, what course of action should Pro Roofing pursue? U.C.C. §§2-609, 2-610.
问题 25.8(e) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Pro Roofing 在 7 月 10 日得知 Industrial Shingles 拖欠了其主要银行贷款,并威胁要根据第 11 章申请破产,除非其贷方同意重组贷款。 鉴于这一消息,Pro Roofing 应该采取什么行动方案?《美国法典》第 2-609 条、2-610 条。
Answer: is the threat of the bankruptcy filing an anticipatory repudiation under 2-610? Not necessarily b/c a company in Chapter 11 bankruptcy is still operating. Therefore, the company may still choose to assume its contract to sell the shingles to the buyer. What about 2-609 reasonable grounds for insecurity and adequate assurance of future performance? Even if the threat of the bankruptcy filing is not an anticipatory repudiation, it probably gives the buyer reasonable ground for insecurity with respect to the seller’s future performance according to 2-609. The buyer should demand in writing adequate assurance of future performance of the seller under 2-609. However, once the seller actually files for bankruptcy the buyer probably cannot make such a demand for adequate assurance anymore because of the automatic stay of bankruptcy. Assuming the seller is not yet in bankruptcy and the buyer makes a demand for adequate assurance for future performance. What if no adequate assurance are forth coming from the seller, then at that point if no adequate assurance are forth coming with a reasonable time (and in this point it would have to be a short reasonable time b/c delivery is due in 10 days), then we have an anticipatory repudiation by the seller under 2-609(4) that amounts to a breach of the contract. Of course the buyer’s remedy here will be limited to a claim in the seller’s bankruptcy case if the seller does in fact end up filing bankruptcy in a situation like this.
答案:根据 2-610 的规定,申请破产的威胁是否属于预期否认?不一定是 b/c 第 11 章破产中的公司仍在运营。因此,公司仍可能选择承担其合同,将带状疱疹出售给买方。2-609 不安全的合理理由和对未来表现的充分保证呢?即使申请破产的威胁不是预期的否认,也可能根据 2-609 为买方提供合理的理由,对卖方的未来表现感到不安全。买方应以书面形式要求卖方根据 2-609 对卖方的未来表现提供充分保证。但是,一旦卖方真正申请破产,买方可能无法再提出此类充分保证的要求,因为破产会自动中止。假设卖方尚未破产,并且买方要求为未来的表现提供足够的保证。如果卖方没有提供足够的保证,那么在这一点上,如果没有在合理的时间内提供足够的保证(在这一点上,必须是短而合理的时间,因为交货应在 10 天内),那么我们根据 2-609(4) 的规定,卖方的预期否认相当于违反合同。 当然 ,如果卖方实际上在这样的情况下最终申请破产,那么买方的补救措施将仅限于卖方破产案中的索赔。
Problem 25.8(f) Same facts as part (a), except that Pro Roofing gets an email from the Industrial Shingles president on July 10 that says the following: “I just got a call from a different buyer who is willing to pay $57,000 for 20 tons of the same shingles as yours. I guess this has become like an auction for those shingles. I hope that you can match that price if you still want the shingles.” How should Pro Roofing respond to this message? U.C.C. §§2-609, 2-610.
问题 25.8(f) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是 Pro Roofing 在 7 月 10 日收到了一封来自工业瓦片总裁的电子邮件,其中内容如下:“我刚刚接到另一个买家的电话,他愿意支付 57,000 美元购买 20 吨与您的瓦片相同的瓦片。我想这已经变成了那些带状疱疹的拍卖。如果你还想要带状疱疹,我希望你能匹配这个价格。Pro Roofing 应该如何回应这条信息?《美国法典》第 2-609 条、第 2-610 条。
Answer: Is this an anticipatory repudiation? Maybe, because there is an implied threat not to perform unless the buyer agrees to pay more than the original contract price. But if the buyer wants to play it safe here, the buyer should immediately demand adequate assurance of future performance in writing under 2-609(1). In this case that would mean assurances from the seller that the seller would still perform at the originally agreed contract price. And if no adequate assurances from the seller are forthcoming within a reasonable time and again it would have to be a short period of time because delivery is due in 10 days, then we have an anticipatory repudiation by the seller which amounts to breach of contract under 2-609(4).
答案:这是预期的否定吗?也许,因为存在暗示的威胁,除非买方同意支付高于原始合同价格的费用,否则不会履行。但是,如果买方想在这里安全起见,买方应立即根据 2-609(1) 要求以书面形式对未来表现做出充分保证。在这种情况下,这意味着卖方保证卖方仍将按最初约定的合同价格履行合同。如果卖方没有在合理的时间内提供足够的保证,则必须在很短的时间内交货,因为交货期在 10 天内到期,那么卖方的预期否认相当于违反 2-609(4) 项下的合同。
Problem 25.8(g) Same facts as part (a), except that on July 10, Pro Roofing gets a fax from the Industrial Shingles president that says, “Our deal is off. We’re just not making that type of shingles anymore.” On July 15, Pro Roofing covers by buying the same type of shingles from a different seller for $60,000 plus $2,000 in delivery costs. Then on July 16, Pro Roofing gets a voicemail message from the Industrial Shingles president that says, “You can ignore my July 10 fax. That just wouldn’t be the right thing for us to do. You can expect to receive your shingles order as scheduled.” Where does Pro Roofing stand now with respect to the original contract? U.C.C. §§2-610, 2-611.
问题 25.8(g) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,只是在 7 月 10 日,Pro Roofing 收到了 Industrial Shingles 总裁的传真,上面写着:“我们的交易结束了。我们只是不再生产那种类型的带状疱疹了。7 月 15 日,Pro Roofing 以 60,000 美元外加 2,000 美元的运费从不同的卖家那里购买相同类型的瓦片。然后在 7 月 16 日,Pro Roofing 收到了 Industrial Shingles 总裁的语音邮件消息,上面写着:“您可以忽略我 7 月 10 日的传真。这对我们来说不是正确的做法。您可以期待按计划收到您的带状疱疹订单。Pro Roofing 现在相对于原始合同的立场如何?《美国法典》第 2-610 条、第 2-611 条。
Answer: This is a clear anticipatory repudiation under 2-609 followed by an attempted retraction. Such attempted retraction should fail because under 2-611(1) the buyer has materially changed his position as a result of the repudiation by doing a cover purchase. So, the buyer can now sue for cover damages under 2-712 and tell the seller not to ship the shingles. And the cover damages in this case under 2-712 would look like this CC(60k) –KP(50k) + ID(2k) + CD(0) – ES($1500 delivery cost the buyer did not have to pay) = $10.5k
答案:这是根据 2-609 进行的明显预期否认,然后试图撤回。这种撤回尝试应该失败,因为根据 2-611(1) 项,买方通过购买封面已经因否认而实质性地改变了他的立场 。因此,买方现在可以根据 2-712 起诉要求保险损害赔偿,并告诉卖方不要运送带状疱疹。在这种情况下,根据 2-712 的保险损害赔偿金将如下所示 CC(60k) –KP(50k) + ID(2k) + CD(0) – ES(买方无需支付的 1500 美元运费)= 10.5 美元
2-607(12) the buyer covered as a result of the initial repudiation by the seller.
2-607(12) 买方因 卖方最初拒绝而承担的。
BUYER’S AND LESSEE’S REMEDIES PP. 437
买方和承租人的补救措施 第 437 页
26.1. a. Lou from Lou’s Used Car for Less (from Problem 2.1) has recently gone back into the business of leasing used cars, and is he ever sorry about that. He has a number of problem leases that he needs to ask you about. The first problem lease was a four-year, $100-per-month lease of a used Ford Taurus Wagon that Lou knew had an engine that suffered from hesitation problems. Lou had disclosed that fact to the lessee, and indeed the $100-per-month lease rate clearly reflected the car’s shaky engine. Two months into the lease, however, the engine stopped working completely. When the lessee called Lou to complain, Lou told him to have the engine problem fixed and to send Lou the bill. Yesterday Lou got a bill for $2,500, which indicated that a brand-new engine had been installed to replace the dead one. “The lessee tells me the car works great now and the engine doesn’t even hesitate,” says Lou, “But what do you expect with a brand-new engine? I could probably lease that car for $150 per month with the new engine.” Lou wants to know whether he must pay the entire $2,500 for the new engine or, alternatively, whether he can raise the lessee’s monthly rate to reflect the addition of a new engine in the car. What do you advise Lou? U.C.C. §§2A-519(4), 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)).
26.1. a. 来自 Lou's Used Car for Less(来自问题 2.1)的 Lou 最近又回到了二手车租赁业务中, 他是否为此感到遗憾。他有许多 有问题的租约需要询问您。第一个有问题的租约是一辆二手福特 Taurus 旅行车的四年期、每月 100 美元的租约,Lou 知道这辆车的发动机存在迟滞问题。Lou 已经向承租人披露了这一事实,事实上,每月 100 美元的租赁费清楚地反映了汽车摇晃的发动机。然而,租约两个月后,发动机完全停止工作。当承租人打电话给 Lou 投诉时,Lou 告诉他要解决发动机问题并将账单寄给 Lou。昨天 Lou 收到了一张 2,500 美元的账单,上面写着已经安装了一台全新的发动机来替换坏掉的发动机。“ 承租人告诉我,这辆车现在运行得很好,发动机甚至没有犹豫 ,”Lou 说,“ 但您对全新的发动机有什么期望呢?我可能会以每月 150 美元的价格租下那辆车,配备新发动机。“ Lou 想知道他是否必须为新发动机支付全部 2,500 美元,或者,他是否可以提高承租人的月费率,以反映在汽车中增加的新发动机。您对 Lou 有什么建议?加州大学 §§2A-519(4)、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1))。
The statute does not provide much guidance for the resolution of this problem. §2A-519(4) simply tells us that the lessee damages for breach of warranty where the lessee has accepted the goods are a lot like a buyer’s damages under §2-714(2), namely the difference between the value of the lease accepted given the non-conformity in the goods and the value the lease would have had if the lease had been as promised. The lessor can argue that if he is made to pay for the new engine, that would be an over-compensation for the lessee, because this repair ends up giving lessee more than he bargained for, namely a car with an engine that does not hesitate. Thus it puts the lessee in a better position than if the engine had never die in the first place. One the other hand, the lessee can argue that the lessor should pay the entire bill and not raise the rent, because the lessor authorized the lessee to have these repairs done and send him the bill afterwards. Maybe if the lessor himself had done the repair, he would have similarly concluded that this engine was beyond repair and had to be replaced.
该法规没有为解决这个问题提供太多指导 。 §2A-519(4) 只是告诉我们,如果承租人接受了货物,则承租人因违反保证而获得的损害赔偿很像 §2-714(2) 下的买方损害赔偿 ,即鉴于货物不合格而接受的租赁价值与如果租赁如承诺,租赁本应具有的价值之间的差额。出租人可以争辩说,如果让他支付新发动机的费用 ,那将是对承租人的过度补偿,因为这种维修最终给承租人带来比他讨价还价的更多,即一辆发动机毫不犹豫的汽车。 因此 ,它使承租人处于比发动机一开始就没有坏掉更好的位置。另一方面,承租人可以争辩说出租人应该支付全部账单而不是提高租金,因为出租人授权承租人进行这些维修,并在之后将账单发送给他。也许如果出租人自己进行了维修,他也会得出同样的结论,认为这台发动机无法维修,必须更换。
This problem is a lot like Problem 25.4 in which we had a buyer who covered with a slightly better product because a precisely identical cover was not available. In that case we said that we should still give the buyer the full benefit of the contract cover difference even though that arguably amounts to an over-compensation to the aggrieved buyer who covers. The exception to allowing such a buyer full contract cover damages is the case where the buyer is given a quantifiable economic benefit from the superior cover, such as a higher price on resale if the buyer is reselling the goods. If that is the case, then we should take into account the superior nature of the cover because the buyer is getting a direct quantifiable economic benefit that should be factored into the damage formula. Typically if the cover is the aggrieved buyer or lessee can do, then the benefit they are getting from the slightly superior cover is not quantifiable to them. So we will let such an aggrieved buyer or lessee gets slightly more than what he originally bargained for.
这个问题很像问题 25.4,其中我们有一个买家,由于没有完全相同的保险,他用稍微好一点的产品来承保。在这种情况下,我们说我们仍然应该给买方合同覆盖差额的全部利益,即使这可以说相当于对支付保险的受害买方的过度补偿。 允许此类买方全额合同保险损害赔偿的例外情况是,买方从优质保险中获得可量化的经济利益,例如,如果买方转售商品,转售价格会更高。如果是这样的话,那么我们应该考虑到 保险的优越性,因为买方获得了 直接可量化的经济利益,这应该被纳入损害公式。 通常 , 如果保险是受害的买方或承租人可以做的,那么他们从略高的保险中获得的利益对他们来说是无法量化的。 因此 ,我们将让这样一个受屈的买家或承租人得到比他最初讨价还价的略多一点。
b. Lou’s second problem arose when Lou made too many lease contracts with not enough cars to lease. Thus, he was forced to breach a lease that he had made on a used Honda Odyssey. That was a three-year, $300-per-month lease with a purchase option at fair market value at the end of the lease. This lease also provided that Lou’s would give the car a complete tune-up every six months during the lease at no extra charge. The aggrieved lessee has gone out and leased a different used Honda Odyssey from another dealer. The new lease was a four-year, $400-per-month lease with an end-of-the-lease purchase option at fair market value minus 10 percent of the total lease payment made. The new lease required the lessee to have the car tuned up every six months at the lessee’s expense, which Lou estimated would cost about $150 per tune-up. Both Lou’s lease and the new lease could be terminated by the lessee at any time by paying a $500 liquidated damages fee. The aggrieved lessee had told Lou that she was planning to sue him for his breach of their lease contract. Assuming that the lessee seeks contract-cover damages, for what amount of damages may she recover from Lou? U.C.C. §2A-518, Official Comments 3 through 7 to §2A-518. (In calculating damages for this problem, don’t bother actually discounting any of the payment streams to present value, but note to yourself where that normally would be done.)
b. Lou 的第二个问题出现,当 Lou 签订了太多的租赁合同,而没有足够的汽车可供租赁。因此,他被迫违反了他在二手本田奥德赛上签订的租约。那是一份为期三年、每月 300 美元的租约,在租约结束时有按公平市场价值购买的选择权。该租约还规定 Lou's 将在租赁期间每六个月对汽车进行一次全面调整,不收取额外费用。受屈的承租人已经出去,从另一家经销商那里租了一辆不同的二手本田奥德赛。新租约是为期四年、每月 400 美元的租约 ,具有租约结束购买选择权,公允市场价值减去已支付总租赁付款额的 10%。新租约要求承租人每六个月对汽车进行一次调整,费用由承租人承担 ,Lou 估计每次调整的费用约为 150 美元。 承租人可以随时通过支付 500 美元的违约金来终止 Lou 的租约和新租约。受屈的承租人告诉 Lou,她打算起诉他违反他们的租赁合同。假设承租人寻求合同覆盖的损害赔偿, 她可以从 Lou 那里获得多少赔偿?加州大学 §2A-518,官方意见 3 至 7 至 §2A-518。(在计算此问题的损害赔偿时,don 不要费心实际将任何付款流贴现为呈现价值,但要注意通常在哪里进行。
This problem depends on whether the new lease is substantial similar to the old lease. There is no particular test to determine the substantial similarity according to Comments 3 through 7 to §2A-518. The code drafters want us to take a fairly broad view whether a particular cover lease is indeed substantial similar. The fact that the new lease is for four years rather than for three years does not make the cover lease not substantial similar. Under Comment 7 to §2A-518, this is not so great a difference as to prevent the lease terms from being commercial comparable. Here, for damages purposes, we will only do a three year versus three year comparison, i.e., taking the three year portion from the four year cover lease that relates to the three year lease that was breached for purposes of damages. The fact that the lessor was supposed to pay for the cost of tune-up in the original lease, but the lessee will have to pay for those expenses herself in the new lease does not stop the new lease from being substantial similar either. For damage purposes, we can just take the cost of tune-ups and simply average them over the life of the lease and deduct them from the lease rent under the old lease. Comment 5 to §2A-518 gives a similar example. Another way to work this into the damage calculation is to take the total tune-up cost for the three years and consider those to be incidental damages for the lessee that’s caused by the lessor’s breach. The fact that the purchase option arises one year later in the new lease as compared to the old lease also does not stop the new lease from being substantial similar because the new lease simply reflects the additional one year depreciation, but it is still a fair market value option. However, the fact that the old lease included a straight forward fair market value purchase option, but the new lease gives a 10% credit of lease payment towards the purchase option will complicates the problem a bit. For purposes of damages, we can deal with this problem by subtracting 10% from the lease rate of the new lease to reflect the fact that the 10% is in fact partial payment from which the lessee will benefit when she exercises her purchase option. Alternatively, we can lump that sum together and call it expense saved as a result of the lessor’s breach. But the problem is that these two approaches assume that the lessee will necessarily exercise the purchase option, which may or may not be the case. If we do make that assumption, that the lessee will exercise the purchase option, then we are also saying in effect that this is now a disguised sale rather than a true lease, which means the new lease is not a substantial similar lease because it is a disguised sale. If the lessee stays with the new lease for the full year, she probably will exercise her purchase option at the end, because she will be able to buy the car at a price that’s nearly $2,000 below market value. A mathematically creative judge might subtract something less than 10% from the new lease rate in a contract cover formula to reflect the possibility the lessee will not end up taking advantage of the future credit fair market value purchase option. Putting aside the assumption, here the lessee’s right to terminate the new lease at any time for just $500 liquidated damages suggests some reasonable chance that the lessor will get the goods back at a time when there is still meaningful residual value in the leased good, which makes this new lease a true lease rather than a disguised sale. In light of these observations, applying the formula under §2A-518(2), (36*400-20) – (36*300) + 6*150+CD-ES, where (36*400-20) represents the present value of the new lease, (36*300) represents the present value of the old lease, 6*150 represents incidental damages.
此问题取决于新租约是否与旧租约具有实质性相似性。根据 §2A-518 的第 3 至 7 条,没有特定的测试来确定实质性相似性 。代码起草者希望我们从一个相当广泛的角度看待特定的封面租约是否确实具有实质性的相似性。新租约的租约是四年而不是三年,这一事实并不意味着封面租约在实质上不相似。根据 §2A-518 的第 7 条评论 ,这并没有太大的差异,以至于无法阻止租赁条款具有商业可比性。在这里,出于损害赔偿目的,我们只进行 3 年与 3 年的比较,即从四年期租约中扣除与因损害赔偿而违反的三年租约相关的三年部分。事实上,出租人在原始租约中应该支付调整费用,但承租人必须在新租约中自己支付这些费用,这也不能阻止新租约在实质上相似。出于损坏目的,我们可以只取调整成本,简单地在租约期限内将其平均,然后从旧租约下的租赁租金中扣除。§2A-518 的注释 5 给出了类似的例子。将其纳入损害计算的另一种方法是将三年的总调整成本考虑为出租人违约对承租人造成的附带损害 。 与旧租约相比,新租约的购买选择权晚一年出现这一事实也不能阻止新租约实质相似,因为新租约只是反映了额外的一年折旧,但它仍然是一个公平的市场价值选择权。然而,旧租约包括直接的公平市场价值购买选择权,但新租约为购买选择权提供 10% 的租赁付款信用,这一事实将使问题变得有点复杂。就损害赔偿而言,我们可以从新租约的租赁率中减去 10% 来处理这个问题,以反映这 10% 实际上是部分付款,承租人在行使购买选择权时将从中受益。或者,我们可以将这笔款项放在一起,称为因出租人违约而节省的费用 。但问题是,这两种方法都假设承租人必然会行使购买选择权,这可能是也可能不是。如果我们真的做出了这样的假设,即承租人将行使购买选择权,那么我们实际上也在说,这现在是一次变相的销售,而不是真正的租赁,这意味着新的租赁不是实质性的类似租赁,因为它是变相的销售。如果承租人全年都留在新租约中,她可能会在最后行使购买选择权,因为她将能够以比市场价值低近 2,000 美元的价格购买汽车。 在 合同覆盖公式中,一位数学创意法官可能会从新租赁率中减去不到 10% 的利率,以反映承租人最终不会利用未来信用公允市场价值购买选择权的可能性。撇开假设不谈,在这里,承租人有权随时以 500 美元的违约金终止新租约,这表明出租人有一定的合理机会在租赁货物仍有有意义的剩余价值时取回货物,这使得这个新租约成为真正的租约,而不是变相的销售。 根据这些观察结果,应用 §2A-518(2) 下的公式,(36*400-20) – (36*300) + 6*150+CD-ES,其中 (36*400-20) 代表新租约的现值,(36*300) 代表旧租约的现值,6*150 代表附带损害。
c. Lou’s third problem lease involved a used full-sized Dodge van that was leased to Larry Moppet, an unemployed cook who had just founded a new business that delivered food from popular local restaurants to people’s homes. This van had given Larry so much trouble that he had been unable, due to the van’s unreliability, to deliver meals on five evenings during the first two months on the job. Larry had brought the van in for repairs on three or four occasions during these first two months, but the van kept breaking down nevertheless. After revoking his acceptance of the van, Larry was suing Lou for the $300 that Larry was not paid for the delivery jobs he missed on those five evenings when the leased van failed to perform. Larry was also suing Lou for $100,000, representing what Larry claimed was the lost good will for his young business that was caused by the faulty van. Lou admits to you that Larry did tell Lou’s salesperson about the intended use of the van. To what extent will Lou be liable to Larry? U.C.C. §2A-520(2)(a).
c. Lou 的第三个问题租约涉及一辆二手全尺寸道奇面包车,该货车租给了 Larry Moppet,他是一名失业的厨师,刚刚创办了一家新企业,将食物从当地受欢迎的餐馆送到人们的家中。这辆面包车给 Larry 带来了很多麻烦,以至于由于面包车的不可靠,他在上班的头两个月里有五个晚上无法送餐。在最初的两个月里,Larry 已经把面包车送来维修了三四次,但面包车还是不断抛锚 。在撤销对面包车的接受后,Larry 起诉 Lou 要求 Larry 支付 300 美元,因为 Larry 在租赁面包车未能履行职责的那五个晚上错过了送货工作。Larry 还起诉 Lou 索赔 100,000 美元,这代表了 Larry 声称的那辆有故障的面包车给他的年轻企业造成的商誉损失。Lou 向你承认,Larry 确实告诉了 Lou 的售货员这辆面包车的预期用途。Lou 将在多大程度上对 Larry 负责?加州大学 §2A-520(2)(a) 条。
Under §2A-520(2)(a), the lessee can recover the $300. The lessee cannot recover the alleged lost good will of $100k. It’s too speculative for a business that’s only 2-month old. The standard of proof for lost good will is a very high standard.
根据 §2A-520(2)(a),承租人可以收回 300 美元。承租人无法追回据称损失的 100 美元商誉。对于一家成立仅 2 个月的企业来说,这太投机了 。失去善意的举证标准是一个非常高的标准。
26.2. The Fun Factory was a Minneapolis-based toy manufacturer that had a contract to buy three tons of raw plastic from a Canadian plastics distributor, Toronto Works. The Fun Factory was going to use the plastic to make 5,000 figurines to fulfill a contract that it had with a major retailer, Statues ‘R’ Us. Fun Factory agreed to pay Toronto Works $36,000 for the three tons of plastic, “FOB Buyer’s Factory.” A week before delivery was due, Toronto Works repudiated the contract. If the Fun Factory had made reasonable cover efforts, it could have purchased substitute plastic from a Seattle distributor for $45,000, “FOB Seller’s Plant.” Delivery costs from Seattle to Minneapolis would have been $500. (Cover was not available at all in Minneapolis.) Because the Fun Factory did not cover, it was unable to perform its contract with Statues ‘R’ Us. Although Statues ‘R’ Us has indicated it will not sue the Fun Factory, the Fun Factory did lose an expected profit in its Statues ‘R’ Us deal of $14,000. For what amount may the Fun Factory recover from Toronto Works? C.I.S.G. Arts. 74, 75, 76, 77
26.2. The Fun Factory 是一家位于明尼阿波利斯的玩具制造商,与加拿大塑料分销商 Toronto Works 签订了购买 3 吨塑料原料的合同。The Fun Factory 打算用这种塑料制作 5,000 个小雕像,以履行它与大型零售商 Statues 'R Us 签订的合同。Fun Factory 同意向 Toronto Works 支付 36,000 美元购买这三吨塑料,即“FOB 买方工厂”。在交货到期前一周,多伦多工厂拒绝了这份合同。如果 Fun Factory 做出了合理的掩护努力,它本可以以 45,000 美元的价格从西雅图经销商处购买替代塑料,即“FOB 卖方工厂”。从西雅图到明尼阿波利斯的运费为 500 美元。(在明尼阿波利斯根本没有封面。由于 Fun Factory 没有承保,它无法履行与 Statues 'R Us 的合同。尽管 Statues 'R Us 表示不会起诉 Fun Factory,但 Fun Factory 确实在其 Statues 'R Us 交易中损失了 14,000 美元的预期利润。Fun Factory 可以从 Toronto Works 收回多少钱?C.I.S.G. 第 74、75、76、77 条.
C.I.S.G. Arts. 74 tells us the goal of damage measure, whether it is for the buyer or the seller, is expectancy. C.I.S.G. Arts. 75 says cover is a possible route for an aggrieved buyer. C.I.S.G. Arts. 76 sets up the option of contract market damages where the buyer does not cover. C.I.S.G. Arts. 77 says an aggrieved party’s usual damages should be reduced by the amount that those damages were reasonably avoidable. Here the buyer expected to achieve a new gain of $14k. The buyer could have covered from the Seattle seller and still make some profit. The buyer’s cost would have been $9k higher on the price and $500 for delivery had the buyer covered. Nevertheless, that would still have left the buyer with a $4.5k profit. Therefore, under C.I.S.G. Arts. 77, the buyer should not be able to recover the entire lost profit of $14k, but only for the loss that are truly unavoidable, which is $9.5k.
C.I.S.G. 第 74 条告诉我们,损害赔偿措施的目标,无论是对买方还是卖方,都是预期。C.I.S.G. 第 75 条说,对于受害的买方来说,保险是一种可能的途径。C.I.S.G. 第 76 条规定了在买方不承保的情况下,合同市场损害赔偿的选择权。C.I.S.G. 第 77 条说,受害方的通常损害赔偿应减少这些损害赔偿可以合理避免的金额。在这里,买家预计会获得 14 美元的新收益。买方可以从西雅图卖方那里覆盖,并且仍然可以获得一些利润。 如果买家承担,买家的成本会比价格高出 9 美元,运费为 500 美元。尽管如此,这仍然会给买家留下 4.5 美元的利润。因此,根据 C.I.S.G. 第 77 条,买方不应能够收回 $14k 的全部损失利润,而只能收回真正不可避免的损失,即 $9.5k。
26.3. Last night you received a call from your cousin, Edgar, with whom you had not had contact since you were both children. It turns out Edgar heard that there was now a lawyer in the family, and you were it. Edgar’s problem is that he was supposed to close on a house purchase deal four months ago, but he did not close until yesterday. The seller of the home had gotten “cold feet” the first time around, and only after much pleading from the seller’s agent and many threats from Edgar’s agent did the closing finally take place four months later. The four-month delay had a number of effects on Edgar’s position, some negative and one positive: (1) he lost a $200 down payment that he had given to the movers whose job he had to cancel at the last minute; (2) he had to continue renting his apartment on a month-to-month basis, which cost him $700 per month compared to the $500 per month he had been paying under his annual lease; and (3) he had originally locked in an 8.5 percent rate on a 30-year, $100,000 mortgage, which would have had monthly payments, including taxes and insurance, of $950. By the time of the closing, rates had gone down during the four-month delay so that he ended up getting a 7.75 percent rate on the same mortgage. On a $100,000 mortgage, Edgar’s bank would generally charge a borrower’s $1,000 for every quarter of a point that the borrower wished to “buy down” the 30-year rate for its loan. Edgar wants to know for what amount he can sue the seller for damages due to the delay. (Assume that the sales contract simply says that an aggrieved buyer may pursue “any remedy at law or in equity.”) What would you advise Edgar?
26.3. 昨晚,您接到了表弟 Edgar 的电话,自从你们还是孩子以来,您就没有联系过他。原来埃德加听说家里现在有一位律师,而你就是他。Edgar 的问题在于,他本应在四个月前完成购房交易,但直到昨天才完成。房子的卖家第一次“ 冷淡 ”,只有在卖家的代理人的多次恳求和 Edgar 的代理人的多次威胁下,才最终在四个月后完成交易。四个月的时间延迟对 Edgar 的处境产生了许多影响,有些是消极的,有些是积极的:(1) 他失去了 200 美元的首付款,这笔首付是他给搬家公司的,他在最后一刻不得不取消了这些搬家公司的工作;(2) 他必须继续按月租房,与他根据年度租约每月支付的 500 美元相比,他每月要花 700 美元;(3) 他最初锁定了 8.5% 的 30 年期 100,000 美元抵押贷款的利率,该抵押贷款每月还款额为 950 美元,包括税款和保险。到交易结束时,利率在四个月延迟期间下降,因此他最终在同一抵押贷款上获得了 7.75% 的利率。对于 100,000 美元的抵押贷款,Edgar 的银行通常会向借款人的 1,000 美元收取借款人希望 “ 买断 ” 其贷款 30 年期利率的每四分之一点的费用。Edgar 想知道他可以起诉卖方因延误而造成的损害赔偿。 (假设销售合同只是说受害的买方可以追究 “ 法律或衡平法上的任何补救措施。“)你会给埃德加什么建议?
The buyer can recover the $200 down payment, and 4*200, representing the difference in his usual annual rate and the extra rent for monthly rate. The buyer probably cannot recover the entire rent for the 4 month he stayed in his apartment given the seller’s delay in closing. We should not reduce the buyer’s damage due to the change in mortgage rate. So the buyer can recover $200 + 4*200=$1k.
买方可以收回 200 美元的首付,以及 4*200,代表他通常的年费和月费的额外租金的差额。鉴于卖方延迟成交,买方可能无法收回他在公寓里住的 4 个月的全部租金 。我们不应减少因抵押贷款利率变化而对买方造成的损害 。 所以买方可以收回 $200 + 4*200=$1k。
26.4. Mike and Carol Vilchuck were both big Frank Lloyd Wright fans, which is why they bothered to come look at an $800,000 house for sale in Palo Alto, California, that was advertised s a “Frank Lloyd Wright Original.” Mike and Carol were both quite impressed in their walk-through of the house, and they began to talk seriously about making an offer on the house. Before making an offer, the couple called their friend, Barry Swedeen, who was the most knowledgeable Frank Lloyd Wright expert the Vilchucks knew. Barry told them that there was a real question whether Frank Lloyd Wright himself ever designed any Palo Alto homes, even though it was generally accepted that several architects who were trained in Wright’s studio had designed Palo Alto homes. Despite this uncertainty, the Vilchucks went forward and signed a sales contract to buy the house for $800,000. Three weeks after closing on this sale, the Vilchucks get a call from Barry, who managed through extensive research in the local real estate records to uncover definitive proof that their house was not designed by Frank Lloyd Wright. In light of this information, the Vilchucks come to you and tell you that they want to rescind this sales contract. What are the chances that they will be successful in a suit for rescission?
26.4. 迈克和卡罗尔 · 维尔查克都是弗兰克·劳埃德·赖特的忠实粉丝,这就是为什么他们费心去看加利福尼亚州帕洛阿尔托一栋价值 800,000 美元的待售房屋,该房屋的广告是 “ 弗兰克·劳埃德·赖特原创”。“ Mike 和 Carol 在参观这所房子时都印象深刻,他们开始认真讨论对这所房子的报价。在提出报价之前,这对夫妇打电话给他们的朋友 Barry Swedeen,他是 Vilchucks 认识的最博学的 Frank Lloyd Wright 专家 。巴里告诉他们,弗兰克·劳埃德·赖特本人是否设计过帕洛阿尔托的任何房屋是一个真正的问题,尽管人们普遍认为在赖特工作室接受过培训的几位建筑师设计了帕洛阿尔托的房屋。尽管存在这种不确定性,Vilchucks 还是向前迈进,签署了一份销售合同,以 800,000 美元的价格买下了这栋房子。此次销售完成三周后,Vilchucks 接到了 Barry 的电话,Barry 通过对当地房地产记录的广泛研究,发现了他们的房子不是由 Frank Lloyd Wright 设计的明确证据。 根据这些信息,Vilchucks 来找您,告诉您他们想解除这份销售合同。他们在撤销诉讼中成功的机会有多大?
In this problem the buyer learned of the dubious nature of the seller’s claim even before they sign the purchase contract, Given the buyer’s knowledge, the buyer here assumed the risk in going forward with the transaction. The Court in Smiser would not be as sympathetic to this buyer as to the buyer in Smiser, because the buyer in this problem learned of the potential misrepresentation before signing the contract and the buyer could have just refused to sign the purchase contract.
在这个问题中,买方甚至在签署购买合同之前就了解到卖方索赔的可疑性质,鉴于买方知道,这里的买方承担了继续进行交易的风险。 在 Smiser 案中,法院不会像对 Smiser 案中的买方那样同情这个买方 ,因为这个问题中的买方在签署合同之前就知道了潜在的虚假陈述,而买方可能只是拒绝签署购买合同。
BUYER’S REMEDIES: ADVANCED PROBLEMS PP. 452
买方的补救措施:高级问题 第 452 页
Problem 27.1(a) Tarpit, Inc. (TI) is an Austin, Texas, company that buys and sells asphalt. TI signed a contract on February 1 with Paving the Way (PTW), an Austin, Texas, driveway contractor, in which TI promised to sell PTW 10,000 tons of asphalt for a price of $55 per ton, delivery March 5 of the same year, “FOB Seller’s Place.” The cost of delivering 10,000 tons of asphalt from TI to PTW is $3,000. On February 2, TI signed a contract with Blackrock, Ltd. (BL), a Tulsa Oklahoma, company, to purchase from BL 10,000 tons of asphalt for a price of $52 per ton, delivery March 4 of the same year, “FOB Seller’s place.” The cost of delivering 10,000 tons of asphalt from BL to TI is $12,000. On March 4, BL announced to TI to arrange suitable cover, and the market price for 10,000 tons of asphalt is now (on March 4) $94 per ton in Tulsa, but $86 per ton in Austin. Assuming that PTW will sue TI for whatever damages the UCC allows PTW once TI breaches its contract with PTW, what damages can TI claim against BL for BL’s breach? U.C.C. §§2-713, 2-715(2)(a), 1-305(a); Official Comment 6 to §2-715. In this part and all f the variations below, consider how the result might differ depending on whether the court follows TexPar rather than Allied, or vice versa.
问题 27.1(a) Tarpit, Inc. (TI) 是一家位于德克萨斯州奥斯汀的沥青买卖公司。TI 于 2 月 1 日与德克萨斯州奥斯汀的车道承包商 Paving the Way (PTW) 签署了一份合同,其中 TI 承诺以每吨 55 美元的价格出售 10,000 吨 PTW 沥青,并于同年 3 月 5 日交付“FOB Seller's Place”。从 TI 向 PTW 运送 10,000 吨沥青的成本为 3,000 美元。2 月 2 日,TI 与俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的一家公司 Blackrock, Ltd. (BL) 签署了一份合同,以每吨 52 美元的价格从 BL 购买 10,000 吨沥青,并于同年 3 月 4 日交付,“FOB 卖方的地方”。从 BL 向 TI 运送 10,000 吨沥青的成本为 12,000 美元。3 月 4 日,BL 向 TI 宣布安排合适的覆盖物,10,000 吨沥青的市场价格现在(3 月 4 日)在塔尔萨为每吨 94 美元,但在奥斯汀为每吨 86 美元。 假设一旦 TI 违反了与 PTW 的合同,PTW 将起诉 TI 要求 PTW 获得 UCC 允许的任何损害赔偿,那么 TI 可以就 BL 的违约行为向 BL 索赔哪些损害赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-713 条、第 2-715(2)(a) 条、第 1-305(a) 条;§2-715 的官方评论 6。在这部分和 下面的所有变体中,考虑结果如何根据法院是否遵循 TexPar 而不是 Allied,反之亦然。
Answer: TI is expecting to make $550k – costs of purchase of asphalt $520k – cost of delivering asphalt from BL to asphalt and the buyer in that contract is TI $12k = 18k is the expected profit. The $3k in delivery cost in TI’s own contract will be paid by PTW because it is FOB Seller’s place and they do not have to subtract the $3k from the $18k expected profit.
答: TI 预计赚取 $550k – 购买沥青的成本 $520k – 将沥青从 BL 运送到沥青的成本,该合同的买方是 TI $12k = 18k 是预期利润。TI 自己合同中的 $3k 运费将由 PTW 支付,因为这是 FOB 卖方的地方,他们不必从 $18k 的预期利润中减去 $3k。
This is a weird case where the contract market difference given in §2-713’s measure of damages does not match expectancy. It overcompensates relative to expectancy. This is a weird case for a couple of reasons. 1) because with buyers we cannot measure exact expectancy except when you have a buyer like this one who is a middle man so we know exactly what their expectancy is because they have another contract waiting, so they’ve got their own buyer and they are going to be the seller. In most buyers who are buying the goods for their own use, it is hard to talk about expectancy, you can try to put a market value or a value on what they buyer was hoping to get and you can use the market value. For most buyers, you cannot say economically this is what they were expecting to get from the contract that the seller breached. 2) The other thing that is weird about this case is the only reason that you have this mismatch where the contract market differential clearly overcompensates the aggrieved middleman buyer is because of the wild fluctuation in market prices for the thing being sold. In this problem, not only do we have the market price going up by more than 50% from when the contract was entered into just about a month earlier, you also have at the original contract there was a higher price for the Austin asphalt than there was for the Tulsa asphalt. Now at the time at breached the market price for the asphalt in Tulsa is higher than in Austin. That is another oddity that makes this mismatch possible.
这是一个奇怪的情况,§2-713 的损害赔偿衡量标准中给出的合同市场差异与预期不符。相对于期望,它过度补偿。这是一个奇怪的情况,有几个原因。1) 因为对于买家,我们无法衡量确切的期望,除非你有一个像这样的买家,他是一个中间人 ,所以我们确切地知道他们的期望是多少,因为他们有另一份合同在等待,所以他们有自己的买家,他们将成为卖家。对于大多数购买商品供自己使用的买家来说,很难谈论期望,您可以尝试为他们的买家希望获得的东西赋予市场价值或价值 ,您可以使用市场价值。对于大多数买家来说,你不能从经济上说这就是他们期望从卖方违约的合同中得到的东西。2) 这个案例的另一件奇怪的事情是,你出现这种不匹配的唯一原因,即合同市场差价明显过度补偿了受屈的中间商买方,是因为所售商品的市场价格剧烈波动。在这个问题上,我们不仅市场价格比大约一个月前签订合同时上涨了 50% 以上,而且在原始合同中,奥斯汀沥青的价格也高于塔尔萨沥青的价格。现在,在突破时,塔尔萨的沥青市场价格高于奥斯汀。这是使这种不匹配成为可能的另一个奇怪之处。
§2-713(1): RBPP + MP – KP + ID + CD - ES
§2-713(1):RBPP + MP – KP + ID + CD - ES
Return of buyer’s purchase price is often not relevant if the buyer has not prepaid. But if the buyer has prepaid some or all of the price, then the first thing you’ll have to do is given them their money back. Here, that is going to be zero.
如果买家未预付款, 则买家购买价格的退货通常无关紧要。但是,如果买家已经预付了部分或全部价格,那么您要做的第一件事就是退还他们的钱。在这里,这将为零。
Market price for 2-713 is to be determined at the time when the buyer learned of the breach (March 4th) and at the place of the tender. Now the place of the tender in this contract is Tulsa given that we got FOB seller’s place in the TI/BL’s contract. So the market price is $940k.
2-713 的市场价格将在买方得知违规时间(3 月 4 日 )和招标地点确定。现在,该合同的投标地点是塔尔萨,因为我们在 TI/BL 的合同中获得了 FOB 卖方的位置。 所以市场价格是 $940k。
Contract price has to be the contract price between TI and BL, because that is the contract that was initially breached here and that is $520k. The contract price here is not $550k because that was between TI (middleman buyer/seller) and his own buyer PTW.
合同价格必须是 TI 和 BL 之间的合同价格,因为这是最初在这里违反的合同,即 $520k。这里的合同价格不是 550 美元,因为那是在 TI(中间人买家/卖家)和他自己的买家 PTW 之间。
What about consequential damages? Can TI say here, “well gosh, I’ve got potentially two consequential damages. First of all, I’ve got my lost profits because I was not able to perform and make the $18k I was hoping to make. In addition, I’ve got the consequential damages that I’m going to pay damages myself to my own buyer because of the seller’s failure to deliver here and that was foreseeable because my seller knew that I was a middleman. §2-715(2)(a) and its official comment 6 made clear that the possibility that a middleman will have to resale and would lose something.” Even the court is going to say no to that. Why? One way to look at it is to say those things are already taken care of in the number, the market price number. Another way to look at it maybe more theoretical is to say this: that anytime an aggrieved buyer chooses the contract market of damages under 2-713(1) we should view that as a hypothetical cover by the aggrieved buyer and in that view if they had done that hypothetical cover in the relevant market they would have been able to perform with their own buyer and they would not have breached. Furthermore, they would have made the profit they were suppose to make.
间接损害赔偿呢 ?TI 可以在这里说,“好吧,天哪,我可能有两个间接损害。 首先 ,我损失了利润,因为我无法执行并赚取我希望赚的 18 美元。此外,由于卖家未能在这里交货,我将获得间接损害赔偿,我将自己向自己的买家支付损害赔偿金,这是可以预见的,因为我的卖家知道我是中间人。§2-715(2)(a) 及其官方意见 6 明确指出,中间人可能不得不转售并会损失一些东西。甚至法院也会对此说不。为什么?一种看待它的方法是说这些事情已经在数字中得到了照顾,即市场价格数字。另一种可能更理论化的看待方式是这样说:无论何时受害买方根据 2-713(1) 选择损害赔偿合同市场,我们都应该将其视为受害买方的假设保险,从这个角度来看,如果他们在相关市场做了这个假设的保险,他们将能够与自己的买方一起履行,他们就不会违约。此外,他们本可以赚取他们应该 赚取的利润。
What about expenses saved? Can you say that they saved $12k in expenses as a result of the seller’s breach because they saved the $12k in delivery cost that they would have had to pay from Tulsa to Austin because it was FOB seller’s place Tulsa? The answer is going to be zero because in this hypo cover they did their hypothetical cover and that is what the market price reflects and in that cover they would have similarly had to pay $12k to deliver the goods to Austin. So no expenses saved.
节省的费用如何 ?您能否说由于卖家的违约,他们节省了 12 美元的费用 , 因为他们节省了从塔尔萨到奥斯汀必须支付的 12 美元运费,因为这是 FOB 卖家的地方塔尔萨?答案将是零,因为在这个 hypo cover 中 ,他们做了假设的 cover,这就是市场价格所反映的,在这个 cover 中,他们同样必须支付 $12k 才能将货物运送到奥斯汀。 所以没有节省任何费用。
§2-713(1): RBPP (0) + MP (940k) – KP (520k) + ID (0) + CD (0) - ES(0) = $420k
§2-713(1):RBPP (0) + MP (940k) – KP (520k) + ID (0) + CD (0) - ES(0) = $420k
In the TexPar approach you would get the figure above. At this point we do not know whether that is overcompensation relative to expectation. Expectation here for this buyer is going to be a combination of two things. One, the $18k profit they would have made. Second, expectation would have to include the damages TI would have pay to PTW when they are unable to deliver. Those damages amount to the following. §2-713(1): RBPP(0) + MP (860k Austin was place of tender) – KP(550k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES (0) = $310k (ES = zero because hypothetical cover in Austin between PTW and TI and assumed that PTW would have had to pay the original $3k for delivery). Market price differential seem to overcompensate TI. TexPar would say so what. Allied Tanners would say no and we have to go with the spirit of remedies and we have to go with the formulaic damages in case where there is over compensation: $310k + $18k = $328k (Allied Tanners).
在 TexPar 方法中,您将得到上图。在这一点上,我们不知道这是否是相对于期望的过度补偿。对这位买家的期望将是两件事的结合。第一,他们本来可以赚取的 18 美元利润。其次,预期必须包括 TI 在无法交付时向 PTW 支付的赔偿金。这些损害赔偿金额如下。§2-713(1):RBPP(0) + MP (860k 奥斯汀是投标地点) – KP(550k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES (0) = $310k (ES = 零,因为假设在奥斯汀的 PTW 和 TI 之间有保险,并假设 PTW 必须支付原来的 $3k 运费)。市场价格差异似乎过度补偿了 TI。TexPar 会说那又怎样。 Allied Tanners 会说不 ,我们必须本着补救的精神去做,在超额赔偿的情况下,我们必须去做公式化的赔偿:$310k + $18k = $328k(Allied Tanners)。
Problem 27.1(b) Same facts as part (a), except suppose that PTW decides it will not sue TI and executes an enforceable waiver to that effect. What damages can TI claim now against BL?
问题 27.1(b) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,但假设 PTW 决定不会起诉 TI 并为此执行可强制执行的弃权。TI 现在可以向 BL 索赔哪些损害赔偿?
Answer: if you are a TexPar court, then presumably you would shrug your shoulders. But what does that have to do with contract market differential that we are looking at in §2-713(1). I don’t think that in a TexPar court there would be any change. But in an Allied Tanners court where we just want to get the aggrieved middleman buyer back to their point of expectancy then what would happen is you would lose that $310k because we do not need to give it anymore to the aggrieved middleman buyer to give them their expectancy. So all we need to give the aggrieved middleman buyer now is $18k their loss profit. Under those facts there is a much greater discrepancy between the contract market difference and expectancy. It’s interesting in the Allied Tanners case itself, this is what happen that is to say the middleman buyer’s own buyer ended up not suing them for damages, it was a case of raisins and there was a raisins shortage. The middleman had two buyers: one executed the waivers and the other buyer did not and did not sue the middleman. Their rationale was that there was a shortage of raisins and there was not anything that the middleman buyer could do.
答案: 如果您是 TexPar 球场,那么大概您会耸耸肩。但这与我们在 §2-713(1) 中研究的合约市场差价有什么关系呢?我认为在 TexPar 球场中不会有任何变化。但是在 Allied Tanners 法庭上,我们只想让受屈的中间商买家回到他们的期望点,那么会发生什么情况是你会失去那 310 美元,因为我们不再需要把它给受委屈的中间商买家来给他们期望。 因此 ,我们现在需要给受屈的中间商买家 $18k 他们的亏损利润。在这些事实下,合同市场差异和预期之间的差异要大得多。Allied Tanners 案本身很有趣,这就是说 中间商买家自己的买家最终没有起诉他们要求赔偿,这是一个葡萄干案件,而且葡萄干短缺。中间人有两个买家:一个执行了弃权书 ,另一个买家没有也没有起诉中间人。他们的理由是葡萄干短缺,中间商买家无能为力。
Problem 27.1(c) Same facts as part (a), except suppose TI covers with a “great cross-border buy” by purchasing 10,000 tons of asphalt in Mexico City, Mexico, on March 4 at $53 per ton, plus $12,000 in delivery costs from Mexico to Austin. What damages can TI claim now against BL? U.C.C. §2-712.
问题 27.1(c) 与第 (a) 部分的事实相同,但假设 TI 于 3 月 4 日在墨西哥墨西哥城以每吨 53 美元的价格购买了 10,000 吨沥青,外加从墨西哥到奥斯汀的 12,000 美元运费,从而涵盖了“伟大的跨境购买”。TI 现在可以向 BL 索赔哪些损害赔偿?《美国法典》第 2-712 条。
Answer: §2-712(1): RBPP + CC – KP + ID + CD – ES
答案:§2-712(1):RBPP + CC – KP + ID + CD – ES
What is odd about these facts is that the prices are much lower in Mexico than it is in Austin and Tulsa. Here, we have an actual cover (there is no hypothetical cover). Contract price is between TI and BL who breached. No consequential damages because the cover is going to enable TI to fulfill its contract and therefore not to be subject to damages to breaching its own contract and it is also going to enable TI to make their profit once we give them the difference between cost of cover and contract price. What about the $12k their going to pay in delivery cost, should that have been an incidental damage? No because TI was going to pay that in the original contract that got breached anyways.
这些事实的奇怪之处在于,墨西哥的价格比奥斯汀和塔尔萨低得多。在这里,我们有一个实际的封面(没有假设的封面)。合同价格在 TI 和违规的 BL 之间。没有间接损害,因为保险将使 TI 能够履行其合同,因此不会因违反自己的合同而受到损害,并且一旦我们给 TI 保险费用和合同价格之间的差额,它也将使 TI 能够赚取利润。他们要支付的 12 美元运费呢,那应该是附带损坏吗?不,因为 TI 打算在无论如何都违反的原始合同中支付这笔费用。
§2-712(1): RBPP(0) + CC ($530k) – KP($520k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = $10k
§2-712(1):RBPP(0) + CC ($530k) – KP($520k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(0) = $10k
How does that stack up relative to expectancy? How does expectancy look? Here, expectancy is 550k -520k -12k = $18k which is TI’s expectancy. What do they actually make with cover here? 550k -530k -12k = $8k is what TI gets in light of having to cover. The $8k in light of the $18k TI expected to make is a 10k difference and we are giving them exactly that. In this case, there will not be a difference whether you take the TexPar formula’s paramount approach or Allied Tanners expectancy and spirit of remedy approach formula because here they are exactly the same. Cover almost always gives the buyers their expectancy because they go out buy the same goods and pay a little more and then they are given the difference. The only time the cover remedy ends up in a different place is where there is a big difference between expectancy and actual formula is in a case like KGM involving the lettuce. A middleman buyer who was going to sell the lettuce to someone who chopped it up and sold the piece to Taco Bell. What was odd about KGM was that the middleman buyer in its own contract with his buyer did not have a set cost. Their buyer was going to buy cost plus.
相对于预期,这如何叠加? 预期寿命如何? 在这里,预期为 550k -520k -12k = $18k,这是 TI 的预期预期。他们在这里用掩护实际上赚了什么 ?550k -530k -12k = $8k 是 TI 在必须覆盖的情况下得到的 。 鉴于 TI 预期产生的 $18k,$8k 是 10k 的差异,我们给他们的正是这个。在这种情况下,无论您采用 TexPar 公式的首要方法还是 Allied Tanners 期望和补救精神方法公式都不会有任何区别 ,因为在这里它们是完全相同的。保险几乎总是给买家带来他们的期望,因为他们出去买同样的商品,多付一点钱,然后他们得到了差价。保险补救措施最终出现在不同的地方的唯一时间是预期寿命和实际配方奶粉之间存在很大差异的情况,即像 KGM 这样涉及生菜的情况。一个中间商买家打算把生菜卖给一个切碎生菜的人,然后把生菜卖给塔可钟。KGM 的奇怪之处在于 ,中间人买方在自己与买方的合同中没有固定的成本。他们的买家打算购买成本加成。
Problem 27.1(d) Same facts as part (a), except assume that TI clearly could have covered by purchasing 10,000 tons of asphalt in Mexico City, Mexico on March 4 at $53 per ton, plus $12,000 in delivery costs from Mexico City to Austin, but failed to do so. What damages can TI claim now against BL?
问题 27.1(d) 与 (a) 部分相同的事实,但假设 TI 显然可以通过于 3 月 4 日在墨西哥墨西哥城以每吨 53 美元的价格购买 10,000 吨沥青,外加从墨西哥城到奥斯汀的 12,000 美元运费来支付费用,但未能做到这一点。TI 现在可以向 BL 索赔哪些损害赔偿?
Answer: under the TexPar approach, probably still $420k despite the failure to cover. Because the TexPar’s focus is simply on contract market different (§2-713(1)) and there is nothing in contract market difference that tells us to consider what the buyer might have done to reduce the difference such as covering in the more favorable market than the one that is assumed in the contract market formula. Basically it assumes a particular market and even if in reality there is a better market to actually cover, you can still get your hypothetical cover under §2-713(1) because mitigation does not figure in there. Where does mitigation figure in? it figures in when we get to consequential damages because 2-715(2)(a) talks about foreseeable economic loss that could not be prevented by cover or otherwise, that is when the UCC puts the mitigation duty on the buyer (if consequential damages could have been avoided by cover or otherwise, then the buyer would not get CD). In this case, consequential damages are zero, so 2-715(2)(a) does not come into play. At least under the TexPar approach.
答案: 在 TexPar 方法下,尽管未能覆盖,但可能仍然是 420 美元。因为 TexPar 的重点只是合约市场的不同 (§2-713(1)),而合约市场差异中没有任何内容告诉我们考虑买方可能已经采取了哪些措施来减少差异,例如在比合同市场公式中假设的更有利的市场中进行覆盖。 基本上 ,它假设了一个特定的市场,即使实际上有更好的市场可以实际覆盖,您仍然可以根据 §2-713(1) 获得假设的保险,因为缓解措施没有考虑在内。缓解措施的作用在哪里?当我们谈到间接损害赔偿时,它就会被计算在内,因为 2-715(2)(a) 谈到了无法通过保险或其他方式避免的可预见的经济损失,即 UCC 将减轻责任放在买方身上(如果间接损害可以通过保险或其他方式避免,那么买方将不会获得 CD)。在这种情况下,间接损害赔偿为零,因此 2-715(2)(a) 不起作用。至少在 TexPar 方法下是这样。
Under the Allied Tanners, it’s hard to say because this court did not talk specifically about 2-751(2)(a) when they talked about expectancy. They talked about spirit of the remedies 1-305. If you think that expectation for buyers typically come in the form of foreseeable economic loss then maybe it’s implicitly coming from 2-715(2)(a). If it is then maybe this court would say buyer you have a problem because buyer could have mitigate foreseeable economic loss relative to your expectation. In that case, this court if they believed that they would not give the $310k, this court would adjust the 18k by saying if you had covered you could not have made the full $18k loss profit but you could have made $8k had you covered. So we are going to reduce 18k by the 8k that was avoidable (had buyer mitigated) and give you a total 10k. If this court believed expectancy all come from 2-715(2)(a).
在 Allied Tanners 的领导下 ,这很难说,因为当法院谈到预期时,他们并没有专门讨论 2-751(2)(a)。他们谈到了补救措施的精神 1-305。如果您认为买家的预期通常以可预见的经济损失的形式出现,那么它可能隐含地来自 2-715(2)(a)。如果是这样,那么也许这个法院会说买方您有问题,因为买方本可以减轻相对于您的预期可预见的经济损失。在那种情况下,如果本法院认为他们不会给 $310k,本法院会调整 18k,说如果你覆盖了 ,你就不能获得全部 $18k 的亏损利润,但如果你覆盖了,你可以赚 $8k。 因此 ,我们将减少 18k 减去本可以避免的 8k(如果买家减轻了负担),并为您提供总共 10k。如果本法院认为期望都来自 2-715(2)(a)。
The reason why I don’t think TexPar would do anything different than $420k because the language in 2-712(3), which says that failure to cover, does not bar the buyer to seek any other remedies. And official comment 3 to §2-713 says subsection 3 express the policy that cover is not a mandatory remedy and buyer is free to choose between cover and market price remedy.
我认为 TexPar 不会做任何与 $420k 不同的事情,因为 2-712(3) 中的语言说未能承保,并不禁止买方寻求任何其他补救措施。§2-713 的官方评论 3 表示,第 3 小节表达了保险不是强制性补救措施的政策,买方可以在保险和市场价格补救措施之间自由选择。
Problem 27.1(e) Same facts as part (a), except suppose that TI covers by purchasing 10,000 tons of asphalt in Mexico City on March 4 at $54 per ton, “FOB Buyer’s Place.” What damages can TI claim now against BL? U.C.C. §2-712?
问题 27.1(e) 与第 (a) 部分相同的事实,但假设 TI 于 3 月 4 日在墨西哥城以每吨 54 美元的价格购买 10,000 吨沥青,即“FOB 买方位置”。TI 现在可以向 BL 索赔哪些损害赔偿?U.C.C. §2-712?
Answer: now it’s going to be §2-712(1): RBPP(0) + CC ($540k) – KP($520k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(12k) = $8k
答案: 现在将是 §2-712(1):RBPP(0) + CC ($540k) – KP($520k) + ID(0) + CD(0) – ES(12k) = $8k
Now an expense save because TI ends up saving 12k as a result of BL’s breach because in a contract with BL, TI would have had to pay $12k in shipment cost from Tulsa to Austin. In this actual cover, TI is not paying anything and now they are really saving $12k. So final damages is 8k. How does that stack with Allied Tanners? I think Allied would come to the same result because the court would say they would expect to make $18k in the original profit. TI actually made here 550-540 = 10k and they did not have to pay any shipment cost.
现在节省了费用 ,因为 TI 最终因 BL 的违约而节省了 12k,因为在与 BL 的合同中,TI 将不得不支付 12k 美元从塔尔萨到奥斯汀的运费。在这个实际的封面中,TI 没有支付任何费用,现在他们真的节省了 12 美元。所以最终的赔偿金是 8k。这与 Allied Tanners 有什么关系呢?我认为 Allied 会得出相同的结果,因为法院会说他们预计会从原始利润中获得 18 美元。TI 实际上在这里制造了 550-540 = 10k,他们不必支付任何运费。
Problem 27.1(f) Same facts as part (a), except assume that TI clearly could have covered by purchasing 10,000 tons of asphalt in Mexico City on March 4 at $54 per ton, “FOB Buyer’s Place,” but failed to do so. What damages can TI claim now against BL?
问题 27.1(f) 与 (a) 部分的事实相同,但假设 TI 显然可以通过 3 月 4 日在墨西哥城以每吨 54 美元的价格购买 10,000 吨沥青来支付费用,“FOB 买方位置”,但没有这样做。TI 现在可以向 BL 索赔哪些损害赔偿?
Answer: This raises the same issues that were discussed in part (d). The TexPar court would not budge, no cover you could always get contract market difference relative to getting the asphalt at a much lower price but TexPar does not care about that. You do not have to cover. Allied Tanners may because of their focus on expectancy they may be open to a broader mitigation concept than TexPar. Expectancy for this middleman buyer is all about economic loss §2-715(2)(a) consequential damages that was foreseeable and maybe Allied would limit them to $8k had TI actually cover even though they ultimately not covered.
答案: 这引发了与 (d) 部分中讨论的相同问题。TexPar 法院不会让步,没有保险,相对于以低得多的价格获得沥青,您总是可以获得合同市场差异 ,但 TexPar 并不关心这些。您不必覆盖。由于联合制革商专注于预期,他们可能对比 TexPar 更广泛的缓解概念持开放态度 。这个中间商买家的预期是关于经济损失 §2-715(2)(a) 可预见的间接损害赔偿,如果 TI 实际承保,也许 Allied 会将它们限制为 8 美元, 即使他们最终没有承保。
27.2. Garden-Aid (GA) was a distributor of fertilizer. On June 1, GA entered into a contract to purchase 3,000 tons of fertilizer from LawnCo, Inc. (LCI), a local manufacturer of fertilizer, for a price of $20 per ton, delivery date August 1, “FOB Buyer’s Place.” On June 2, GA entered into a contract to sell 3,000 tons of fertilizer to Flowers ‘n’ Stuff (FNS), a local garden retail chain. FNS agreed to pay $27 per ton for the fertilizer, delivery date August 2, “FOB Seller’s Place.” GA made the mistake of pre-paying the entire contract price of $60,000 to LCI. On July 20, LCI called GA and said that its promised fertilizer shipment would be delayed until August 10. GA said that such a delay would be unacceptable given GA’s contract with FNS, and so GA proceeded to arrange for the purchase of 3,000 tons of fertilizer from a third-party supplier in the same city as LCI for $22 per ton, “FOB Buyer’s Place.” After GA fulfilled its contract with FNS, LCI shipped the 3,000 tons of fertilizer to GA on August 10, despite GA’s earlier conversation with LCI about the effect of the delay. Five days later, GA found a buyer for the 3,000 tons of fertilizer it had on hand and sold it to this new buyer for $23 per ton, “FOB Seller’s Place.” What amount may GA recover from LCI for the delay in deliver? U.C.C. §§2-712, 2-715(2)(a), 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)), 2-711(3), 2-706(6).
27.2. Garden-Aid (GA) 是一家肥料经销商。6 月 1 日,GA 签订了一份合同,以每吨 20 美元的价格从当地肥料制造商 LawnCo, Inc. (LCI) 购买 3,000 吨肥料,交货日期为 8 月 1 日,“FOB 买方之地。 “ 6 月 2 日,GA 签订了一份合同,将 3,000 吨肥料出售给 当地花园零售连锁店 Flowers 'n Stuff (FNS)。FNS 同意以每吨 27 美元的价格购买肥料,交货日期为 8 月 2 日,“FOB 卖方的地方。“ GA 犯了一个错误,即向 LCI 预付了 60,000 美元的全部合同价格。7 月 20 日,LCI 致电 GA 并表示其承诺的化肥发货将推迟到 8 月 10 日。GA 表示,鉴于 GA 与 FNS 的合同,这样的延迟是不可接受的,因此 GA 开始安排以每吨 22 美元的价格从与 LCI 位于同一城市的第三方供应商处购买 3,000 吨肥料,“FOB Buyer's Place.“ 在 GA 履行与 FNS 的合同后,LCI 于 8 月 10 日将 3,000 吨肥料运往 GA,尽管 GA 早些时候与 LCI 就延误的影响进行了对话。五天后,GA 为手头的 3,000 吨肥料找到了买家,并以每吨 23 美元的价格将其卖给了这位新买家,“FOB Seller's Place.“ GA 可以从 LCI 中就延迟交货追讨多少金额? 加州大学 §§2-712、2-715(2)(a)、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1))、2-711(3)、2-706(6)。
Buyer’s cover damages under §2-712 is RBPP+CC-KP+ID+CD-ES, where RBPP represents return of buyer’s purchase price and CC represents cover cost. Applying the formula to this problem, the buyer’s cover damages would be 0+66k-60k+0+0=$6k. Here, even though the buyer prepaid the purchase price, after the buyer ultimately received the goods, it never returned the goods to the seller, so here the return of buyer’s purchase price is 0. The time when you would get a number for RBPP is when a buyer prepaid, and either the seller never delivers the goods at all, or the seller delivers but the buyer rightfully rejects or revokes acceptance of the goods and the seller gets the goods back. The problem then becomes the amount of expense saved. This problem is based on a real case, and in the real case, the amount of expense saved was a real point of contention.
§2-712 规定的买方保险损害赔偿为 RBPP+CC-KP+ID+CD-ES,其中 RBPP 代表买方购买价格的返还 ,CC 代表保险成本。将公式应用于此问题,买方的保险损失将为 0+66k-60k+0+0=$6k。 这里,即使买家预付了购买价格,在买家最终收到货物后,它从未将货物退还给卖家,所以这里买家购买价格的退货为 0。您获得 RBPP 号码的时间是买方预付,要么卖方根本没有交付货物,要么卖方交付但买方理所当然地拒绝或撤销对货物的接受,卖方取回货物。 然后问题就变成了节省的费用金额。这个问题是基于一个真实案例,在真实案例中,节省的费用金额是一个真正的争论点。
The seller LCI can argue that its buyer GA’s ultimate resale of the fertilizer for profit should be considered expense saved as a result of the seller’s breach, at least to the extent of the amount realized on the second resale. Here GA made a profit of $9k on the resale of the fertilizer that was delivered late. And that $9k was real profit to GA because of the delivery terms in the contracts. GA did not pay delivery charges either in its purchase from LCI or in its resale to the second buyer. If the $9k is considered expense saved as a consequence of the seller’s breach, then the buyer’s damages under §2-712 would be -$3k, meaning GA was better off as a result of the breach, since they made two profits instead of one profit. Originally, GA expected to make a profit of (27-20)*3,000=$21k. But ultimately GA made a profit of $24k from the two sales. On the first sale, it made a profit of (27-22)*3000=$15k. On the second sale, it made a profit of (23-20)*3000=$9k. Combined, GA made a profit of $24k as a result of LCI’s breach, $3k more than its expected profit had LCI performed.
卖方 LCI 可以争辩说,其买方 GA 最终转售肥料以获取利润,应被视为因卖方违约而节省的费用 ,至少在第二次转售时实现的金额范围内。在这里,GA 通过转售延迟交付的肥料获得了 9 美元的利润。由于合同中的交货条款,这 9 美元对 GA 来说是真正的利润 。GA 在从 LCI 购买或转售给第二个买家时都没有支付运费。如果 9 美元被认为是由于卖方违约而节省的费用 ,那么根据 §2-712 的买方赔偿将为 -3 美元,这意味着 GA 因违约而过得更好,因为他们获得了两笔利润而不是一笔利润。 最初 ,GA 预计盈利为 (27-20)*3,000=$21k。但最终 GA 从这两次销售中获得了 24 美元的利润。在第一次销售中,它获得了 (27-22)*3000=$15k 的利润。在第二次销售中,它获得了 (23-20)*3000=$9k 的利润。由于 LCI 的违规行为,GA 总共获得了 $24k 的利润 ,比 LCI 执行的预期利润高出 $3k。
In the real case, the court ultimately sided with the aggrieved buyer and didn’t count the profit made on second resale as expense saved. The court made factual finding that the aggrieved buyer would have still made the second sale even if the seller had not breached, saying that the second sale is transactionally independent of the seller’s breach, so the breaching seller has no right to take credit for any profit made by the buyer on the second sale. The dissent in the case says whenever an aggrieved and prepaying buyer covers but still ends up with the originally contracted for goods, the buyer’s possession of the goods can only be for purpose of security for any prepayments the buyer has made to the seller. For that conclusion, the dissent relied on §2-711(3), which says “On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price...” and §2-706(6), which says “… a buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance must account for any excess over the amount of his security interest.” Therefore, the dissent says, the buyer in GA’s position is liable to account to the seller LCI for any amount received on resale of the delayed but still delivered goods beyond the prepaid purchase price for the goods, i.e., the $60k.
在实际案件中,法院最终站在受屈的买家一边,没有将第二次转售的利润视为节省的费用。法院作出事实认定,即使卖方没有违约,受害的买方仍会进行第二次销售,称第二次销售在交易上独立于卖方的违约行为,因此违约的卖方无权将买方在第二次销售中获得的任何利润记入贷方。该案的异议者认为,每当受屈并预付款项的买方支付但最终仍然获得最初签订的合同货物时,买方对货物的占有只能用于买方向卖方支付的任何预付款的担保。对于该结论,异议依据了 §2-711(3),其中规定 “ 在合法拒绝或合理撤销接受时,买方对其拥有或控制的商品享有担保权益,以支付按其价格支付的任何款项......“ 和 §2-706(6),其中说 ”...... 买方正确地拒绝或合理撤销接受的 , 必须说明超出其担保权益金额的任何超额部分。“ 因此,异议者说,处于 GA 地位的买方有责任向卖方 LCI 说明转售延迟但仍交付的货物时收到的任何超出货物预付购买价格(即 60 美元)的金额。
However, GA can respond to the dissent’s argument by pointing out that the buyer in GA’s position never did either reject the goods or revoke acceptance, therefore technically never triggering the operation of §2-711(3) on which the dissent relied. Also, under §2-602(1), a buyer cannot reject the goods before he receives the goods. Therefore, the phone call here where the buyer says “Not to bother sending the fertilizer late” cannot count as rejection by the buyer, because at that point the buyer has not received the fertilizer yet. Therefore, when GA resold the goods, it must have accepted the goods under §2-606(1)(c), which says “Acceptance occurs when the buyer does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership.” Even though by doing so GA did not at the same time waive its right to sue for the damages that was caused by seller’s delay in delivery. §2-607(2) says “Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted, but acceptance does not in itself impair any other remedies provided by this Article for non-conformity.”
但是,GA 可以回应异议的论点,指出处于 GA 地位的买方从未拒绝货物或撤销接受,因此从技术上讲,从未触发异议所依赖的 §2-711(3) 的实施。此外,根据 §2-602(1),买方在收到货物之前不能拒收货物。因此,买家在这里打电话说 “ 不要打扰延迟发送肥料 ” 不能算作买家拒绝,因为此时买家还没有收到肥料。因此,当 GA 转售商品时,它必须根据 §2-606(1)(c) 接受商品,该条款规定 “ 当买方做出任何与卖方所有权不一致的行为时,即表示接受 。“ 即使这样做,GA 并没有同时放弃其起诉因卖方延迟交货而造成的损害的权利 。 §2-607(2) 规定 “ 买方接受货物排除了拒绝接受的货物的可能性,但接受货物本身并不损害本条规定的针对不符合项的任何其他补救措施 ”
27.3. Carl Cautious was not found of taking risks. Therefore, he started to worry when he began to hear reports on the news that a famous seismologist, Iben There, was predicting a major earthquake in Carl’s hometown of St. Louis on July 10 of that year. Carl lived in an old brick house in south St. Louis, and he feared that the house would never withstand the force of a break in the mighty New Madrid fault. Accordingly, Carl determined that he needed to have constructed for himself a special earthquake shelter for his backyard in which he could confidently take refuge on that day. In addition, Carl wanted built for the shelter a special compact multi-purpose, single-unit appliance that included a refrigerator, a TV, and a microwave, not to exceed a total cubic space of three feet by four feet by two feet. Carl figured he might have to live in the shelter for a couple of weeks after July 10 to avoid the effects of the likely aftershocks.
27.3. Carl Cautious 未被发现冒险。因此,当他开始听到新闻报道,著名地震学家 Iben There 预测 Carl 的家乡圣路易斯将于当年 7 月 10 日发生大地震时,他开始担心。卡尔住在圣路易斯南部的一座古老的砖房里,他担心这所房子永远经不起强大的新马德里断层破裂的力量。因此,Carl 决定他需要为自己建造一个特殊的地震避难所,以便他在那一天可以放心地避难。此外,Carl 还想为避难所建造一个特殊的紧凑型多用途单单元设备,其中包括冰箱、电视和微波炉,总立方空间不超过 3 英尺 x 4 英尺 x 2 英尺。卡尔认为,在 7 月 10 日之后,他可能不得不在避难所住几周,以避免可能的余震的影响。
On May 10 of the same year, Carl entered into contracts with two separate manufacturers. His first contract was with Shelters ‘R’ Us, an Atlanta manufacturer of sturdy, portable, and prefabricated mini-shelters. Carl entered into a written contract with Shelters ‘R’ Us in which Shelters agreed to construct for Carl’s backyard in St. Louis an eight foot by ten foot by eight foot portable shelter that was made of galvanized, earthquake-proof steel. The contract price was $12,000, the delivery date was July 5, and the delivery term was “FOB Seller’s Place of Business.” Delivery of the shelter from Atlanta to St. Louis would cost $500. In entering into the contract with Shelters, Carl told the representative he dealt with there about Carl’s purpose for the shelter and about Carl’s “master plan” for protection from the earthquake, including Carl’s intent to commission the separate manufacturer of a multi-purpose, single-unit appliance.
同年 5 月 10 日,Carl 与两家不同的制造商签订了合同 。他的第一份合同是与 Shelters 'R Us 签订的, 这是一家亚特兰大的坚固、便携和预制迷你避难所制造商 。Carl 与 Shelters 'R Us 签订了一份书面合同 ,其中 Shelters 同意为 Carl 在圣路易斯的后院建造一个 8 英尺 x 10 英尺 x 8 英尺的便携式避难所,该避难所由镀锌、抗震钢制成。合同价格为 12,000 美元,交货日期为 7 月 5 日,交货期限为 “FOB 卖方的营业地点”。“ 将避难所从亚特兰大运送到圣路易斯将花费 500 美元。在 与 Shelters 签订合同时,Carl 告诉他在那里打交道的代表,Carl 对避难所的用途以及 Carl 的地震防护“ 总体规划 ”,包括 Carl 打算委托单独的制造商制造一种多用途、单单元设备。
Carl’s second contract was with Gizmoes ‘N Such, a Chicago manufacturer of appliances. In a written contract, Gizmoes agreed to specially manufacture for Carl the combination refrigerator-TV-microwave device that Carl envisioned. The contract price was $2,000, the delivery date was July 8, and the delivery term was “FOB Buyer’s Backyard.” Gizmoes’s direct costs in manufacturing the appliance were expected to be $600 in raw material and $700 in direct labor. Delivery of the appliance from Chicago to St. Louis would cost $100.
Carl 的第二份合同是与芝加哥的一家电器制造商 Gizmoes'N So 签订的。在一份书面合同中,Gizmoes 同意专门为 Carl 制造 Carl 设想的冰箱-电视-微波组合设备。合同价格为 2,000 美元,交货日期为 7 月 8 日,交货期限为 “FOB 买方后院”。“Gizmoes 制造该设备的直接成本预计为 600 美元的原材料和 700 美元的直接人工成本。将设备从芝加哥运送到圣路易斯的费用为 100 美元。
On July 1, someone from Shelters ‘R’ Us called Carl and told him that Shelters definitely was not going to perform its contract with Carl. The market price of similar shelters in Atlanta on that day and on July 5 was $14,000; in St. Louis it was $18,000. The problem was, in neither location nor anywhere else could Carl, despite his best efforts, get a seller to agree to build such a special shelter for him by July 10. According, on July 2, Carl called Gizmoes ‘N Such and told the representative there that regrettably, Carl would have to call off the manufacture of the special appliance unit. Gizmoes’s representative told Carl to expect that Carl would be held accountable for all of Gizmoes’s damages from Carl’s breach. At that point, Gizmoes had purchased all of the raw materials for the project but had spent just $400 in direct labor. After spending $75 in employee time searching for possible buyers of either a completed unit or the partially completed unit in its current form, Gizmoes made the commercially reasonable decision to cease manufacture. Gizmoes then gave proper notice to Carl and resold the partially completed unit for $800 to a Chicago buyer who agreed to come and pick it up.
7 月 1 日,Shelters 'R Us 的人打电话给 Carl,告诉他 Shelters 绝对不会履行与 Carl 的合同。当天和 7 月 5 日,亚特兰大类似避难所的市场价格为 14,000 美元;在圣路易斯,这个数字是 18,000 美元。问题是,尽管 Carl 尽了最大努力,但无论是在哪个地方还是其他任何地方,都无法让卖家同意 在 7 月 10 日之前为他建造这样一个特殊的庇护所。根据 7 月 2 日,Carl 打电话给 Gizmoes'N Such,并告诉那里的代表,遗憾的是,Carl 将不得不取消特殊设备单元的制造。 Gizmoes 的代表告诉 Carl 期望 Carl 对 Carl 违约造成的 Gizmoes 造成的所有损失负责 。那时,Gizmoes 已经购买了该项目的所有原材料,但直接人工费用仅为 400 美元。在花费了 75 美元的员工时间寻找当前形式的已完成单元或部分完成单元的可能买家后,Gizmoes 做出了商业上合理的决定,停止生产。 Gizmoes 随后向 Carl 发出了适当的通知,并以 800 美元的价格将部分完成的单元转售给芝加哥买家,该买家同意来取货。
July 10 came and went with no earthquake. With that worry behind him, Carl now comes to your law office and wants to know for what amount he can sue Shelters ‘R’ Us for its breach. (Carl notes that he has made no payments so far to either seller.) In light of all of the above facts, what do you advise him? U.C.C. §§2.713, 2.319(1), 2-509(1), 2-715, 2-708(2), 2-706(1), 1-305(a) (formerly §1-106(1)).
7 月 10 日来来去去,没有地震。带着这种担忧,卡尔现在来到您的律师事务所,想知道他可以起诉 Shelters 'R Us 的违规行为多少金额。(Carl 指出,到目前为止,他还没有向任何一个卖家付款。 鉴于上述所有事实,您对他有什么建议?加州大学 §§2.713、2.319(1)、2-509(1)、2-715、2-708(2)、2-706(1)、1-305(a)(原 §1-106(1))。
The buyer’s damages formula for seller’s non-delivery under §2-713(1) is RBPP+MP-KP+ID+CD-ES. Here the consequential damages become the biggest issue. Expense saved here is 0, not $500, because the Atlanta market price used in §2-713(1) assumes a hypothetical cover in Atlanta, for which Carl would have ended up paying the shipping charges of $500 anyway in the hypothetical cover that’s represented by the market price. White & Summer’s explanation on this point is: When the goods are never shipped as under a FOB shipment contract, market price is measured as of the place for tender, the seller’s place of business. The general assumption expressed in Comment 1 to §2-713 is that the buyer will search for a replacement contract at the shipping point. If buyer seeks replacement at the shipping point, he would have incurred replacement shipping cost roughly equivalent to those on the original contract. Thus, by comparison with such replacement contract, there would be no expense saved in consequent of the seller’s breach, because we are assuming that the buyer must pay the expense for shipping under the new contract as well.
根据 §2-713(1) 的规定 ,卖方未送达的买方赔偿公式为 RBPP+MP-KP+ID+CD-ES。在这里,间接损害成为最大的问题。此处节省的费用为 0,而不是 500 美元,因为 §2-713(1) 中使用的亚特兰大市场价格假设在亚特兰大有保险 ,为此,Carl 最终会支付 500 美元的运费,无论如何,在市场价格所代表的假设保险中。White & Summer 对此的解释是:当货物从未按照 FOB 发货合同发货时,市场价格是根据投标地点,即卖方的营业地点来衡量的。§2-713 的注释 1 中表达的一般假设是买方将在装运点寻找替代合同。如果买方在装运点寻求更换,他将产生大致等于原始合同上的更换运费。因此,与此类替代合同相比,卖方的违约不会节省任何费用 , 因为我们假设买方也必须支付新合同下的运费。
The buyer’s damages under the formula would be 0+14k-12k+0-0=$2k. Here A component part seller who stops production midstream and resells for scrap can seek damages under either §2-708(2) or §2-706(1). Here the two formulas give the same result.
根据该公式 ,买方的赔偿金为 0+14k-12k+0-0=$2k。在此,中途停止生产并转售为废料的零部件销售商可以根据 §2-708(2) 或 §2-706(1) 寻求损害赔偿。这里这两个公式给出了相同的结果。
Under §2-708(2), the formula for a seller’s damages for non-acceptance or repudiation is KP-AD+ID+CI-RP, where AD represent anticipatory direct cost, CI represents cost incurred and RP represents resell proceeds. Here, the seller’s damages would be 2k-1.4k+75+1k-800=$875.
根据 §2-708(2),卖方因不接受或否认而造成的损害赔偿公式为 KP-AD+ID+CI-RP,其中 AD 代表预期直接成本,CI 代表产生的成本,RP 代表转售收益。 在这里,卖家的赔偿金为 2k-1.4k+75+1k-800=$875。
Under §2-706(1), the formula for a seller’s damages for resale is KP-RP+ID-ES. Here, the seller’s damages would be 2k-800+75-(300+100)=$875. Here the $100 in delivery cost count as expense saved, because the seller was going to pay the $100. And as a result of the buyer’s breach, it did not have to pay the $100, and they did an actual resale in which they incurred no delivery cost. So here there’s no hypothetical cover or hypothetical resale because the seller did an actual resale in which they paid no delivery cost. That’s why we count the $100 delivery cost here as expense saved, because the seller would have paid that if the buyer had not breached.
根据 §2-706(1),卖方转售赔偿金的公式为 KP-RP+ID-ES。在这里,卖家的赔偿金为 2k-800+75-(300+100)=$875。 在这里,100 美元的运费算作节省的费用,因为卖家要支付 100 美元。 由于买方的违约,它不必支付 100 美元,他们进行了实际转售,没有产生任何运费。所以这里没有假设的封面或假设的转售,因为卖家进行了实际的转售 , 他们没有支付运费。这就是为什么我们在这里将 100 美元的运费算作节省的费用,因为如果买家没有违规,卖家会支付这笔费用。
The issue in this problem becomes the amount of consequential damages. Here Carl cannot recover the $875 on top of the $2k. Even the TexPar court, which didn’t have a problem with over-compensating the expectation, did not give separate consequential damages when the market price/contract price difference was higher than whatever the consequential damages would be. In the case of a lost profit buyer, the consequential damages is their lost profits plus the damages they would have to pay, when the contract/market difference alone give more than that. The TexPar court didn’t add consequential damages on top of what already arguably an over-compensation relative to expectation. So here Carl probably can only recover $2k. However, even the $2k maybe an over-compensation. Carl ends up keeping $1,125 for himself, after he’s forced to pay damages of $875 to Gizmoes ‘N Such. Then Allied Canners court would argue §1-305(a) directs us to limit Carl’s damages to the position that he would have been in had Shelters not breached. However, the problem with that argument is that Carl is not a buyer who is going to resell, like the buyer in Allied Canners and TexPar. So all we can say about the position Carl would have been in had Shelters performed is that Carl would have been in possession of a shelter that has a market value of $14k for a purchase price of $12k plus delivery cost of $500. Considering that, it might seems that allowing Carl to net $1,125 after he pays the damages he owes under §2-713(1) does not necessarily put Carl in a better position than he would have been in had Shelters performed. Under that view, Carl may be under-compensated by $375. However, it is difficult to measure the true expectation of a buyer who is not planning on resell. Here $2k is probably as good as any for Carl’s damages.
这个问题的问题变成了 间接损害的金额。在这里, Carl 无法在 $2k 之外收回 $875。即使是 TexPar 法院,在过度补偿预期方面没有问题,当市场价格/合同价格差异高于间接损害赔偿时,也没有给予单独的间接损害赔偿。在利润损失买方的情况下,间接损害赔偿是他们的利润损失加上他们必须支付的损害赔偿,当合同/市场差异本身提供的金额超过此金额时。TexPar 法院没有在已经可以说是相对于预期过度赔偿的基础上增加间接损害赔偿。所以在这里 Carl 可能只能收回 $2k。然而,即使是 2 美元也可能是过度补偿。Carl 最终为自己保留了 1,125 美元,此前他被迫向 Gizmoes 'N So 支付了 875 美元的赔偿金 。然后 ,Allied Canners 法院会争辩说,§1-305(a) 指示我们将 Carl 的损害赔偿限制在他没有违反 Shelter 的情况下本应处于的境地。 然而,该论点的问题在于,Carl 不是像 Allied Canners 和 TexPar 中的买家那样要转售的买家 。 因此 , 如果 Shelters 执行,我们只能说 Carl 将拥有一个市场价值为 14 美元的 Shelter,购买价格为 12 美元,外加 500 美元的交付成本。 考虑到这一点, 允许 Carl 在根据 §2-713(1) 支付所欠损害赔偿金后净赚 1,125 美元似乎并不一定使 Carl 处于比 Shelters 执行时更好的位置。根据这种观点,Carl 的薪酬可能少了 375 美元。然而,很难衡量不打算转售的买家的真实期望。这里 $2k 可能和 Carl 的损害一样好。