UCC ARTICLE 2
《统一民法典》第 2 条

KEATING
基廷

SPRING 2016
2016 年春季

THE PROCESS OF SALES CONTRACT FORMATION PP. 70-71
销售合同形成过程 第 70-71 页

Problem 3.1(a)
问题 3.1（a）

Suppose that in Gateway 2000 case at the beginning of this assignment, the terms and conditions that the Hills failed to read closely also included the following: (1) that the buyers agreed not to use any other printer with the computer except a special Gateway printer (whether or not any other printers were actually compatible), (2) that the seller was not responsible for any consequential damages suffered by the buyers from defects in the computer, and (3) that the buyers’ only remedy for any defects in the computer is that buyers would receive a special Gateway baseball cap for their troubles. Would these clauses be just as enforceable against the buyers as the arbitration clause? U.C.C. §§2-206, 2-204, 2-207; Official Comment 1 to §2-207; Official Comment 1 to §2-719.
假设在本转让开始时的 Gateway 2000 案中，Hills 未能仔细阅读的条款和条件还包括以下内容：（1） 买方同意除特殊的 Gateway 打印机外，不在计算机上安装任何其他打印机（无论任何其他打印机是否实际兼容），（2） 卖方不对买方因计算机缺陷而遭受的任何间接损害负责， （3） 买方对计算机中的任何缺陷的唯一补救措施是买方将获得一顶特殊的 Gateway 棒球帽，以解决他们的问题。这些条款是否与仲裁条款一样对买方具有强制执行力？加州大学 §§2-206、2-204、2-207;第 2-207 条的官方评论 1;§2-719 的官方评论 1。

ANSWER: Under UCC, the time of formation of the contract is going to affect what the particular terms of the contract are. In Gateway 2000, Judge Easterbrook believes the contract was formed until some point after the consumer buyer received the goods they ordered, namely when the customer failed to reject the goods 30 days following receipt of the goods. With respect to contract formation, §2-206(1)(b) says “unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances, an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods”. Under that logic, why can’t it be said that the seller Gateway’s shipment of the computer constituted an acceptance of the buyer’s telephone offer to purchase? Indeed if Gateway the seller made a prompt promise to ship during the phone call, then acceptance under §2-206(1)(b) would occur even prior to shipment. Assume that contrary to Judge Easterbrook’s belief, this contract for the sale of goods was formed during the phone call, since there is no unambiguous indication that it should be otherwise. If the contract was formed during the phone call, then the buyer’s order was the offer while the seller’s prompt promise to ship was the acceptance. Under that view, the only definitive terms of the contract would be the model of the computer, the price, and the approximate shipment date. Under §2-204(3), which says “even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract, and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving appropriate remedy”, these terms are enough to create a binding contract. The other terms beyond the ones they agreed to orally would be the UCC gap-fillers, which do not include arbitration. The resolution UCC gap-filler provides is litigation.
回答： 根据 UCC，合同的订立时间将影响 合同的特定条款。在 Gateway 2000 中 ，Easterbrook 法官认为，合同是在消费者买家收到他们订购的商品后的某个时间点才形成的，即客户在收到商品后 30 天内未能拒收商品。关于合同的订立，§2-206（1）（b） 规定 “ 除非语言或情况另有明确说明，否则购买货物以立即或立即发货的订单或其他要约应解释为通过立即承诺发货或及时或当前发货合格或不合格货物邀请接受 ”。在这种逻辑下，为什么不能说卖方 Gateway 的电脑发货构成了 对买方电话购买要约的接受呢？ 事实上 ，如果卖方 Gateway 在电话中及时承诺发货，那么 根据 §2-206（1）（b） 的规定，甚至在发货之前就已经接受发货。假设与 Easterbrook 法官的信念相反，这份货物销售合同是在电话中形成的，因为没有明确的迹象表明它应该是其他的。如果合同是在电话中形成的，则买方的订单是报价，而卖方的及时发货承诺是接受。 在这种观点下，合同的唯一决定性条款 是计算机的型号、价格和大致的发货日期。根据 §2-204（3）， 即 “ 即使一个或多个条款未解决，如果双方打算签订合同，并且有合理确定的依据提供适当的补救措施，则销售合同不会无限期失效 ”，这些条款足以构成具有约束力的合同。除了他们口头同意的条款之外，其他条款将是 UCC 空白填补条款，其中不包括仲裁。UCC 空白填补者提供的解决方法是诉讼。

Another possible way to approach this case would be as a §2-207 case. Judge Easterbrook didn’t think §2-207 is appropriate here, because §2-207 is a battle of forms and here there is only one form. However, Official Comment 1 to §2-207 says one of the two cases §2-207 was specifically designed to cover is the written confirmation where an agreement has been reached either orally or via formal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the party sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far agreed upon. Comment 1 says clearly that one can have an oral contract followed by a single confirmation. As such, this case is under §2-207. If, in this case, the seller’s acceptance of the buyer’s offer to purchase took the form of shipment rather than the promise to ship promptly, then §2-207 would not apply, §2-206 analysis would be applicable. If there is an oral contract over the phone, then what was being sent by Gateway with their product would be their single confirmation, then Gateway’s arbitration clause or any other new terms in Gateway’s confirmation that was contained in the product box would be additional terms that would be “construed as proposals additional to the contract” under §2-207(2). Because in this case the buyer the Hills are not merchants, these additional terms would remain mere proposals by the seller, and would not become part of the contract unless and until the buyer specifically agree to them, which they never did.
处理此案例的另一种可能方法是作为 §2-207 案例。Easterbrook 法官认为 §2-207 在这里不合适，因为 §2-207 是一场形式之战，这里只有一种形式。然而，§2-207 的官方评论 1 表示，§2-207 专门设计的两种情况之一是指双方之间已通过口头或正式通信达成协议 并由 一方或双方遵循的书面确认发送正式备忘录，体现迄今为止商定的条款。评论 1 清楚地表明，一个人可以有一个口头合同，然后是一个确认。因此，本案属于 §2-207。在这种情况下，如果卖方接受买方的购买要约采取了发货的形式，而不是承诺立即发货，则 §2-207 将不适用，§2-206 分析将适用。如果通过电话签订了口头合同，那么 Gateway 随其产品发送的内容将是他们的单一确认，那么 Gateway 的仲裁条款或 Gateway 确认中包含的任何其他新条款将属于附加条款， 根据 §2-207（2） “ 解释为合同的附加建议 ”。 因为在这种情况下，买方 Hills 不是商人，因此这些附加条款将仅是卖方的建议 ， 除非买方明确同意，否则不会成为合同的一部分，而他们从未同意过。

Under Judge Easterbrook’s view, a seller is still bound by UCC Article 2’s limits as unconscionability and reasonableness of remedy limits found in Official Comment 1 to §2-719, which says “It is of the very essence of a sales contract that minimum adequate remedies be available.” This will invalidate the baseball cap remedy as an unacceptable use of remedy.
根据 Easterbrook 法官的观点，卖方仍受 UCC 第 2 条限制的约束 ，因为补救措施限制的不合情理性和合理性见第 2-719 条的官方评论 1，其中说 ：“ 提供最低限度的适当补救措施是销售合同的本质。“ 这将使棒球帽补救措施无效，因为这是一种不可接受的补救措施。

Problem 3.1(b)
问题 3.1（b）

Suppose that in Gateway 2000, following the phone conversation in which the Hills placed their order (and in which the seller promised to send the computer), the seller called the Hills back a week later and said, “We’ve decided that we cannot sell the computer to you at the price you ordered it; you must agree to pay 10 percent more than that or we won’t ship it.” Would the seller be able to enforce such a condition on the sale?
假设在 Gateway 2000 中 ，在 Hills 下订单的电话交谈之后（卖方承诺发送计算机），卖方在一周后给 Hills 回电说：“ 我们已经决定不能以您订购的价格向您出售计算机;您必须同意支付 10% 以上的费用，否则我们将不发货。“ 卖方能否在销售中执行此类条件？

If, as Judge Easterbrook says, this contract was not formed at the point when the seller took the buyer’s order and agree to ship, then the seller could theoretically back out with impunity or change the terms of the deal that the consumer thought they had struck over the phone. Even if the basic terms agreed to over the phone couldn’t be changed, the terms to come could be so onerous as to make the deal unattractive for the buyer. Indeed, if the seller’s shipment here is viewed as a counteroffer to buyer’s offer to purchase, then the seller could simply change the terms of their counteroffer prior to acceptance by the buyer, unless there is some detrimental reliance by the buyer.
如果正如 Easterbrook 法官所说，该合同不是在卖方接受买方的订单并同意发货时形成的，那么理论上卖方可以 不受惩罚地退出或更改消费者认为他们通过电话达成的交易条款。即使通过电话商定的基本条款无法更改，即将到来的条款也可能非常繁琐，以至于交易对买方没有吸引力。事实上，如果卖方的货物被视为对买方购买要约的还价 ，那么卖方可以在买方接受之前简单地更改他们的还价条款，除非买方有一些有害的依赖。

Problem 3.2 (a)
问题 3.2 （a）

Your law firm took on a new client last month, an exercise equipment manufacturer called Heavy Metal, Inc. You were assigned to meet with Heavy Metal’s president, Arlene Ledger, to discuss her various legal concerns about certain sales by this company, which she founded herself. Arlene’s first concern relates to a major order of stair climber machines that her company filled last month for Fit for Life, a national health club chain.
您的律师事务所上个月接洽了一个新客户，一家名为 Heavy Metal， Inc. 的健身器材制造商。您被指派与 Heavy Metal 的总裁 Arlene Ledger 会面，讨论她对这家她自己创立的公司的某些销售的各种法律担忧。Arlene 的第一个担忧与她的公司上个月为全国性健身俱乐部连锁店 Fit for Life 订购的楼梯爬楼梯机大订单有关。

Fit for Life’s purchase order, which Arlene had not read until recently, indicated that “seller will be liable for all remedies available under the UCC.” Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form, by contrast, disclaimed in boldface language all consequential damages. One other thing troubled Arlene about this transaction: she had meant to send the acknowledgement form before shipping the stair climbers, but instead she had shipped the machines and only later did she send the acknowledgement form. Arlene said that she is extremely worried about having all those stair climbers out there for which her company might be liable for unlimited consequential damages. Are Arlene’s fears well grounded? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
Arlene 直到最近才阅读 Fit for Life 的采购订单 ，其中指出 “ 卖方将对 UCC 下的所有可用补救措施负责。“ 相比之下，Heavy Metal 的确认书以粗体字否认了所有间接损害赔偿。关于这笔交易的另一件事让 Arlene 感到困扰：她本来打算在运送爬楼梯者之前发送确认表，但她已经运送了机器，后来才发送了确认表。Arlene 说，她非常担心那些爬楼梯的人在那里，她的公司可能会为此承担无限的间接损害赔偿。Arlene 的担忧有充分的理由吗？加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。

This is not a §2-207 case. §2-207 was meant to cover a few different cases, where a writing itself constituted acceptance (§2-207(1)), where there is a written confirmation with new terms following oral contract (Official Comment 1 to §2-207), or where the conduct which constituted acceptance came after a purported written acceptance which for some reason did not count as valid acceptance (§2-207(3)). In this problem, prior to the shipment, there is nothing that constituted acceptance by the seller. So, under §2-206(1)(b), this contract was formed when Heavy Metal ships the stair climbers. They accepted by shipping. The act of shipping was acceptance that implicitly incorporated whatever terms detailed in the purchase order, which was also the offer.
这不是 §2-207 案件。 §2-207 旨在涵盖几种不同的情况，其中书面本身构成接受 （§2-207（1）），口头合同后有新条款的书面确认（§2-207 的官方意见 1），或者构成接受的行为发生在所谓的书面接受之后，但由于某种原因不算作有效接受 （§2-207(3)).在这个问题中，在发货之前，没有任何内容构成卖方的接受。因此，根据 §2-206（1）（b），该合同是在 Heavy Metal 运送楼梯爬升器时成立的。他们通过发货接受了。发货行为是接受，它隐含地包含采购订单中详述的任何条款，这也是要约。

In Belden, the Court specifically notes that acknowledgement form was sent prior to the shipment of goods, that’s way Belden is a §2-207(3) case and this problem is not. Had the shipment preceded the sending of the acknowledgement form, the analysis would be very different. In Belden, there was first an exchange of forms that did not constitute a contract, prior to the conduct that did constitute a contract. And in this problem, there is no exchange of written forms prior to the conduct which constituted the contract. The effect of the later-sent acknowledgement form is merely a proposal for a modification for a contract that has already formed. And as such, in the absence of specific assent by the other side, the terms in the proposed modification will not be incorporated into the contract. Therefore, Arlene indeed needs to worry about the possibility of consequential damages with respect to that shipment of the stair climbers, since her disclaimer never became part of the contract.
在 Belden 案中 ，法院特别指出，确认表是在货物装运之前发送的， 这就是 Belden 案是 §2-207（3） 案件的方式，而这个问题不是。如果货物在发送确认表之前发货 ，则分析将大不相同。在 Belden 案中，首先是不构成合同的形式交换，然后是构成合同的行为。在这个问题上，在构成合同的行为之前没有书面形式的交换。后来发送的确认表的效果只是对已经形成的合同的修改建议。因此，在没有另一方明确同意的情况下，拟议修改中的条款将不会被纳入合同。因此，Arlene 确实需要担心与那批爬楼梯手相关的间接损害的可能性，因为她的免责声明从未成为合同的一部分。

Problem 3.2(b)
问题 3.2（b）

Same facts as part (a), except that instead of shipping the stair climbers that were requested in Fit for Life’s order, Heavy Metal ships an order of super-incline treadmills to Fit for Life but never sends an acknowledgement form. “We were out of stair climbers, but I felt like these treadmills would probably work for them instead,” reasoned Arlene. Arlene did not warn Fit for Life in advance about the change in product. When Fit for Life receives the treadmills, is there an enforceable contract? If so, on whose terms? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与第 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是 Heavy Metal 没有按照 Fit for Life 的订单运送楼梯爬楼梯机 ，而是向 Fit for Life 运送了超级倾斜跑步机的订单，但从未发送确认表。 “ 我们没有爬楼梯的人，但我觉得这些跑步机可能会适合他们，”Arlene 解释道。Arlene 没有提前警告 Fit for Life 关于产品的变化。当 Fit for Life 收到跑步机时，是否有可执行的合同？如果是这样，以谁的条件？加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。

This is an odd situation where Arlene’s shipment is simultaneously an acceptance of the offer and a breach of the contract. §2-206(1)(b) and Official Comment 4 to §2-206 make it clear that the same shipment can indeed constitute both acceptance and a breach. Since Arlene has not seasonably notified Fit for Life that the treadmills were offered only as an accommodation to Fit for Life, then the shipment of these non-conforming goods will suffice as conduct which accepts Fit for Life’s offer. Had Arlene given seasonably notification that the shipment of the treadmills was intended only as an accommodation to the buyer, then the conduct of shipping will not be acceptance but instead a counteroffer. Given that Arlene failed to give seasonably notification to Fit for Life, the terms of this contract will be governed by Fit for Life’s purchase order. Even if she sends an acknowledgement form after the fact, it will be merely a proposal for modification.
这是一个奇怪的情况，Arlene 的发货同时是接受报价和违反合同。 §2-206（1）（b） 和 §2-206 的官方评论 4 明确指出，同一货物确实可以同时构成验收和违约。由于 Arlene 没有及时通知 Fit for Life 跑步机仅作为 Fit for Life 的住宿提供， 因此这些不合格商品的运输将足以作为接受 Fit for Life 报价的行为 。如果 Arlene 及时通知跑步机的发货只是为了给买方提供住宿 ，那么发货行为将不是接受，而是还价。鉴于 Arlene 未能及时通知 Fit for Life，本合同的条款将受 Fit for Life 的采购订单管辖。即使她在事后发送了一份确认表，它也只是一个修改的建议。

Problem 3.2(c)
问题 3.2（c）

Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal neither ships the goods nor sends an acknowledgement form for three months, because the original purchase order got lost on Arlene’s desk. When Arlene finds it three months later, she sends an acknowledgement form in response by overnight mail. When Fit for Life receives the belated acknowledgement form, is there an enforceable contract? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
事实与 （a） 部分相同，只是 Heavy Metal 在三个月内既不发货也不发送确认表，因为原始采购订单在 Arlene 的办公桌上丢失了。三个月后，当 Arlene 找到它时，她通过隔夜邮件发送了一份确认表作为回应。当 Fit for Life 收到迟来的确认表时，是否有可执行的合同？加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。

Assuming that a three-month response period is neither prompt nor seasonable, then there is no enforceable contract here, neither under §2-206(1)(b), which says “An offer must be accepted by a prompt promise to ship or a prompt shipment”, nor under §2-207(1) battle of the forms, which requires “definite and seasonable expression of acceptance”
假设三个月的回复期既不及时也不适时，那么这里没有可执行的合同，无论是根据 §2-206（1）（b） 的规定，“必须通过及时承诺发货或及时发货来接受要约”，也不是根据 §2-207（1） 的形式之战，它要求“明确和适时地表示接受”.

Problem 3.2(d)
问题 3.2（d）

Same facts as part (a), except that Fit for Life’s purchase order includes a clause within that form’s boilerplate language that says, “This purchase order can only be accepted by an acknowledgement form that agrees with all of the terms contained in this purchase order. If the acknowledgement form varies in any way from the terms of this purchase order, then there is no contract.” If Heavy Metal has not yet sent the stair climbers and responses to this purchase order with its standard acknowledgement form, is there an enforceable contract? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是 Fit for Life 的采购订单在该表格的样板语言中包含一个条款，该条款规定：“ 此采购订单只能通过同意此采购订单中包含的所有条款的确认表来接受 。如果确认表与此采购订单的条款有任何差异，则不存在合同。“ 如果 Heavy Metal 尚未使用其标准确认表发送楼梯爬升者和对该采购订单的回复，是否有可执行的合同？加州大学 §§2-204、2-206、2-207。

There is no enforceable contract here. In light of the language in the purchase order, there is no contract by the writings here. If there were shipment and acceptance which follows the exchange of these forms, then there is a contract by conduct, and the terms in the two forms might then become relevant under §2-207(3). But for now, there is no offer and acceptance that is necessary for contract formation.
这里没有可执行的合同。 根据采购订单中的语言，这里的文字没有合同。如果在交换这些表格后有装运和验收，则存在行为合同，并且这两种表格中的条款可能根据 §2-207（3） 变得相关。但就目前而言，没有签订合同所需的要约和接受。

Problem 3.3(a)
问题 3.3（a）

Another recent situation that Arlene wants to ask about relates to a purchase order the company just received from Sportlife, a regional sporting goods chain, to buy a dozen 580XL circuit trainer weight machines for current shipment. In this case, Arlene said, immediately after receiving the purchase order she did send Sportlife an acknowledgment from before shipping the machines. In fact, although she sent the acknowledgment, she still has not shipped the machines to Sportlife. What bothers Arlene about this order is that she had a phone conversation yesterday with a friend in the industry, who strongly advised Arlene not to do business with Sportlife. “They’re more trouble than they’re worth,” her friend had told her. “They make your life miserable by complaining about problems with the orders that don’t even exist.”
Arlene 想询问的另一个最新情况与该公司刚刚从区域体育用品连锁店 Sportlife 收到的采购订单有关 ，该订单购买了十几台 580XL 循环训练器重量器械用于当前发货。在这种情况下，Arlene 说，在收到采购订单后，她确实在发货前立即向 Sportlife 发送了确认 。事实上，尽管她发送了确认，但她仍然没有将机器运送到 Sportlife。这项命令让 Arlene 感到困扰的是，她昨天与一位业内朋友通了电话，这位朋友强烈建议 Arlene 不要与 Sportlife 做生意 。“他们比得起的麻烦更大，”她的朋友告诉她。“他们抱怨甚至不存在的订单问题，让你的生活变得痛苦。”

Arlene wants to know whether it’s too late to get out of this contract. IN looking at the purchase order and the acknowledgement form, you notice that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgment form requires that all disputes be brought to binding arbitration. The purchase order says nothing about the mode of dispute resolution. Can Arlene still avoid this deal? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. Could she have avoided it under the common law?
Arlene 想知道现在摆脱这份合同是否为时已晚。在查看采购订单和确认表时，您注意到 Heavy Metal 的确认表要求将所有争议提交具有约束力的仲裁。采购订单没有说明争议解决的方式。Arlene 还能避免这笔交易吗？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。根据普通法，她可以避免这种情况吗？

ANSWER: The seller Arlene’s acknowledgment form will constitute an acceptance under §2-207(1) even though it states the terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon. The basic gist（要点） of §2-207(1) is that the acceptance does not have to agree in every respect with the offer in order to be counted as an acceptance. And that’s in contrast with the common law in the so-called mirror-image rule where if the acceptance did not agree in every respect with the offer it was not considered an acceptance. Instead, it is a counter-offer
回答： 卖方 Arlene 的确认表将构成 §2-207（1） 下的接受，即使它陈述了与要约或商定的条款不同的附加条款或不同于要约或商定的条款。§2-207（1） 的基本要点是，接受不必在所有方面都同意要约才能算作接受。这与普通法中的所谓镜像规则形成鲜明对比，在普通法中，如果接受在各个方面都与要约不一致，则不被视为接受。相反，它是一个还价.

Does that mean that every acceptance, no matter how variant in its terms and no matter what it says, will count as an acceptance under §2-207(1)? The answer to that question is no. There are two ways in which an acknowledgment form such as Arlene’s in this case would not constitute a valid acceptance. Although neither of those two ways seems present in this case. The first way is if the acceptance is for some reason is not a “definite and seasonable expression” of acceptance. How would that be the case? It could be not timely enough or it could be the buyer gives a purchase order for apples and the seller response, “I accept your offer to buy oranges.” And apples and oranges, that is not a definite and seasonable acceptance because it is not accepting what was offered. The second way under §2-207(1) for a written acceptance not to count as an acceptance is if you use the magic language expressly if you make your acceptance expressly conditional on buyer’s assent to any additional revision of the terms that are in your acceptance.
这是否意味着每一次接受，无论其条款多么不同，也无论它说了什么，都将算作 §2-207（1） 下的接受？ 这个问题的答案是否定的。在两种情况下，确认表（如 Arlene）不构成有效的接受。尽管在这种情况下，这两种方式似乎都不存在。第一种方法是，如果接受是出于某种原因，而不是接受的 “ 明确和适宜的表达 ”。情况会怎样呢？这可能是不够及时的，或者可能是买方给出了苹果的采购订单，而卖方回应说：“我接受你购买橙子的提议。而苹果和橙子，那不是一个确定的、合时宜的接受，因为它不是接受所提供的。根据 §2-207（1） 的第二种方式，书面接受不算作接受的方式是，如果您明确使用魔术语言 ， 如果您明确表示接受的条件是买方同意对您接受的条款进行任何额外修订。

Problem 3.3(b)
问题 3.3（b）

Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form purports to accept Sportife’s offer to buy a dozen Lifecycle stationary bikes rather than a dozen 580XL circuit trainer weight machines. Prior to the shipment by Heavy Metal, is there a contract at all? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Heavy Metal 的确认表旨在接受 Sportife 的提议，购买十几辆 Lifecycle 固定自行车，而不是十几台 580XL 循环训练器举重器械。在使用 Heavy Metal 发货之前，有没有合同？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。

ANSWER: this is the paradigm of apples and oranges. Prior to shipment by the seller, is there a contract at all here? And the answer is there is not. This is the so-called apples and oranges paradigm, where the term of the offer and acceptance are so fundamentally at odds with one another that it really cannot be said that there has been a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance by the seller. Therefore, there is no contract yet under §2-207(1). Arlene is still free to avoid the deal. This then raises the questions, so what is the test for deciding how much divergence there has to be between offer and acceptance before we can say that the acceptance is not a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance? One approach would be to say in order for it to be a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, it at least has to agree on the type of goods sold, the quantity, and the price. You would need those three in order to have a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy which brings us back to §2-204(3), which is one of the two tests for having an enforceable contract under Article 2. In order to have a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy, you have to at least have to be talking about the same type of product, the same number of product, and the same price for the product. One thing that we do know is that you can’t say the test for apples and oranges here is materiality. In other words, you can’t say the acceptance for it to count as an acceptance at least cannot include any different terms that are materially different or additional terms that are material terms and if there are materially different terms, then that shouldn’t count as an acceptance. We know that we cannot say that because under §2-207(2)(b), we have a specific mechanism for deciding what to do with terms that are materially different. So that’s assuming that we can have a contract by the exchange of forms with some of the terms in the acceptance are actually material terms that are additional and we just have to deal with them. Those material terms do not stop it from being a contract. So materiality is not the test.
答案： 这就是苹果和橙子的范式。在卖方发货之前，这里是否有合同？答案是没有。这就是所谓的苹果和橙子范式，其中要约和接受的条款从根本上彼此不一致，以至于真的不能说卖方已经明确和季节性地表达了接受。因此，根据 §2-207（1） 尚无合同。Arlene 仍然可以自由地避免这笔交易。这就提出了问题，那么，在我们说接受不是明确和适时的接受表达之前，决定要约和接受之间必须存在多少差异的测试是什么呢？ 一种方法是说 ， 为了使它成为一个明确和适时的接受表达，它至少必须就销售的商品类型、数量和价格达成一致。您需要这三项才能有合理确定的基础来提供适当的补救措施 ，这让我们回到了 §2-204（3）， 这是根据第 2 条拥有可执行合同的两项测试之一。为了有合理确定的依据来提供适当的补救措施 ，您至少必须谈论相同类型的产品、相同数量的产品和相同的产品价格。我们确实知道的一件事是，你不能说这里对苹果和橙子的测试是物质性。 换句话说，您不能说接受至少不能包括任何重大不同的不同条款或作为重要条款的附加条款，如果存在重大差异的条款，则不应被视为接受。我们知道我们不能这么说，因为根据 §2-207（2）（b）， 我们有一个特定的机制来决定如何处理存在重大差异的条款。所以，这是假设我们可以通过交换表格来签订合同，接受中的一些条款实际上是附加的重要条款， 我们只需要处理它们。这些实质性条款并不能阻止它成为一份合同。 所以重要性不是测试。

Problem 3.3(c)
问题 3.3（c）

Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form also says, “THIS ACCEPTANCE IS EXPRESSLY MADE CONDITIONAL ON BUYER’S ASSENT TO ANY ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS CONTAINED IN THIS FORM.” Prior to shipment of the goods, can Arlene still avoid this deal? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是 Heavy Metal 的确认表还说，“本接受明确规定为买方同意本表格中包含的任何附加或不同条款。在货物发货之前，Arlene 还能避免这笔交易吗？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。

ANSWER: Prior to shipment of the goods, Arlene can still avoid this deal because this represents the second way in which a purported written acceptance might not count as an acceptance under §2-207(1). She used the magic language that appears in §2-207(1). The magic language in the sense that courts tend to be strict about which language qualify for the “unless” clause of §2-207(1), unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on the sense to the additional different term. So if you are going to qualify for the “unless” clause then you should just mimic those very words. It is not enough to say in the acceptance: “but my terms govern.” That does not do it, so you will have to use the words given in the statute if you don’t want your acceptance to count.
回答： 在货物装运之前，Arlene 仍然可以避免这笔交易，因为这代表了第二种方式，即所谓的书面接受可能不算作 §2-207（1） 下的接受。她使用了出现在 §2-207（1 ） 中的魔法语言 。 从某种意义上说，法院往往对哪种语言符合 §2-207（1） 的“除非”条款的条件很严格 ，除非明确规定接受是附加的不同术语的含义条件。 因此 ， 如果你要符合“除非”子句的资格，那么你应该模仿这些词。在接受信中说：“但我的条件是正确的，这是不够的。那没有这样做，所以如果你不想让你的接受被计算在内，你将不得不使用法规中给出的词语。

Problem 3.3(d)
问题 3.3（d）

Same facts as part (a), except that Heavy Metal’s acknowledgement form also says, “THIS ACCEPTANCE IS EXPRESSLY MADE CONDITIONAL ON BUYER’S ASSENT TO ANY ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS CONTAINED IN THIS FORM,” and Arlene has both shipped the goods and accepted payment for them. Now is there a contract? If so, will disputes be subject to arbitration? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. What would the answers to those two questions be under the common law?
与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是 Heavy Metal 的确认表还说，“此接受明确以买方同意此表格中包含的任何附加或不同条款为条件 ”，并且 Arlene 已发货并接受付款。现在有合同吗？如果是这样，争议是否需要仲裁？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。在普通法下，这两个问题的答案是什么？

ANSWER: Yes there is a contract. This is an example of §2-207(3). The facts of this problem are very similar to what happened in the Belden case. In the Belden case, the court held that the exchange of writings by the two parties failed to establish contract because in the acknowledgment form, we had the magic language “this acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to different or additional terms”. So, no contract by the writing. But in Belden the conduct of the parties did establish a contract because there was shipment of the goods, acceptance of the goods, payment for the goods, and acceptance for the payments for the goods. So, if this is a contract, will disputes be subject to arbitration? The answer is under §2-207(3) the way we figure out terms is in this contract by conduct. The terms consist of those terms in which offer and acceptance agreed and they did not agree on arbitration plus UCC gap fillers. So, then we would look to the UCC gap fillers for mode of dispute resolution. The UCC gap fillers for mode of dispute resolution is not arbitration, rather it is the court’s litigation. How do we know this? There is no UCC provisions that says this explicitly but if you read the code provisions the assume mode of dispute resolution under the UCC is the court. One example of that can be found in §2-302(1) Unconscionability where it begins by says “if the court as a matter of law finds…” so it is just assuming that you are in front of a court.
回答： 是的 ， 有合同。这是 §2-207（3） 的一个例子。这个问题的事实与 Belden 案中发生的情况非常相似。在 Belden 案中，法院认为，双方的书面交换未能建立合同，因为在确认书中，我们有神奇的语言“这种接受明确地以同意不同或附加条款为条件”。所以，没有书面合同。但在 Belden 案中，双方的行为确实建立了合同，因为有货物的装运、货物的验收、货物的付款以及货物的付款。那么，如果这是一份合同，争议会接受仲裁吗？答案是根据 §2-207（3） 我们计算条款的方式是在本合同中按行为计算。这些条款包括要约和接受达成一致，但未就仲裁加上 UCC 差距填补达成一致的条款。因此，我们将寻求 UCC 空白填补者作为争议解决模式。UCC 争议解决模式的空白填补者不是仲裁，而是法院的诉讼。我们是怎么知道的呢？没有 UCC 条款明确说明这一点，但如果您阅读法典条款，则 UCC 下的假定争议解决模式是法院。这方面的一个例子可以在 §2-302（1） 不合情理性中找到，它的开头是“如果法院依法发现......”所以这只是假设你在法庭前。

Under the common law, the mirror image rule and the last shot doctrine, we would have a contract by conduct here not by the writings. And the last form sent under the common law, here the seller’s acknowledgment form would govern the terms of the contract. And that is because under the common law the seller’s acknowledgment form is now considered a counteroffer because it does not mirror the terms of the purchase order. And the counteroffer was then accepted by the buyer’s conduct. Therefore under the common law’s last shot doctrine, this contract would include the arbitration clause that was [art of the seller’s acknowledgment form.
根据普通法 、镜像规则和最后一枪原则，我们将通过行为而不是书面形式签订合同。根据普通法发送的最后一份表格，这里的卖方确认表将管辖合同的条款。这是因为在普通法下，卖方确认书现在被视为还价，因为它不反映采购订单的条款。然后买方的行为接受了还价。 因此 ， 根据普通法的最后一击原则，该合同将包括仲裁条款，该条款是 [卖方确认书的艺术。

Problem 3.4(a)
问题 3.4（a）

The next problem Arlene wants to talk about stems from her company’s sale of an industrial-level weight machine to a local Gold’s Gym franchise. It tunrs out that one of the cables on the machine broke during use and severely injured one of the Gold’s Gym patrons. The Gold’s Gym manager called Arlene last week and told her that if his patron sued the gym, Gold’s Gym would make Heavy Metal responsible for all of the damages.
Arlene 想谈的下一个问题源于她的公司将一台工业级举重机出售给当地的 Gold's Gym 特许经营权。它显示 ，机器上的一根电缆在使用过程中断裂，并严重伤害了 Gold's Gym 的一名顾客。Gold's Gym 的经理上周打电话给 Arlene，告诉她如果他的顾客起诉健身房，Gold's Gym 将让 Heavy Metal 承担所有损失。

This transaction involved a purchase order from Gold’s, an acknowledgment form from Heavy Metal, and then shipment of the machine from Heavy Metal to Gold’s. Gold’s purchase order specifically reserved all of its remedies and mentioned nothing about the mode of dispute resolution. Heavy Metal’s acknowledgment form had a conspicuous disclaimer of consequential damages and a provision that all disputes would be subject to binding arbitration (but no “expressly made conditional” language). Is there a contract at all? Will the consequential damages disclaimer holder? Will disputes be subject to arbitration? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
该交易涉及 Gold's 的采购订单、Heavy Metal 的确认表，然后将机器从 Heavy Metal 运送到 Gold's。Gold 的采购订单明确保留了其所有补救措施，并且没有提及争议解决方式。Heavy Metal 的确认书中有一个醒目的间接损害免责声明，并规定所有争议都将接受具有约束力的仲裁（但没有“明确制定的有条件”语言）。有合同吗？间接损害赔偿免责声明持有人会吗？争议是否需要仲裁？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。

ANSWER: Clearly, we have a contract here. And when it was formed was when the seller sent the acknowledgment form in response to the buyer’s purchase order. The fact that the seller’s acknowledgement form contained both a different term and an additional term did not prevent it from being a valid acceptance. The different term is the consequential damages disclaimer. The additional term is the arbitration clause. And again, even if we consider these differences to be material differences, that should not change things because §2-207(2)(b) specifically contemplates the possibility of a valid written acceptance that includes a terms that materially alters the offer. Then the question is which subsection of 2-207 will govern terms here? Not §2-207(3), only go to that subsection to figure out terms in a case where we did not have a contract by the writing. In other words, a case where there was an attempt to do a contract by the writings but the contract by the writings failed because the seller’s acknowledgement form had the expressly made conditional language or it failed because it was not a definite or seasonable expression of acceptance. In this case, the writings of the parties do establish a contract. Because we have a contract by the writings, that when formation occurred. We determine terms under §2-207(2); it is what we use in a case where we have a contract that was formed by the writings even if we are at a point in time when clearly the parties’ conducts also indicates they accepted contract. Will consequential damages be part of the contract? Look at §2-207(2), it says by its terms that it will handle additional terms; it does not say handling different terms. Then if you look at Official Comment 3 to §2-207 that says whether or not additional or different term become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection 2. So the statute says one thing the comment says something else. Courts actually do neither of those things; courts use the knockout rule. The knockout rule in the case of different terms is fairly straightforward; it simply says when you have different terms than offer and acceptance you just knock them out and then you go with the UCC gap filler. So here we knock out the “yes consequential damages, the no consequential damages” and we go to the UCC and say as a default matter does the UCC assume that the consequential damages are available? The answer is the UCC assumes all remedies are available including consequential damages. Will dispute be subject to arbitration? The arbitration clause is an additional term and therefore will be handled under §2-207(2). We start out under §2-207(2) by saying the additional terms are mere proposals, they don’t become part of the contract unless the other side specifically accepts them; unless, we got a couple of merchants. And between merchants these additional terms will become part of the contract unless one of three things is true. The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; they materially alter it; or notification of objection to them has already been given or has been given within a reasonable time after notice of them has been received. Does the addition of the arbitration clause materially alter this contract? What guidance are we given on this in the comment? If we look at Official Comment 4 and 5 to §2-207, they give examples of clause, which do and do not involve material alterations and those examples give us no clear answer on this question. But the key we are told in Official Comment 5 is this whether the additional term involves “an element of unreasonable surprise.” The determination of that will turn in part on how common the additional term is within a particular industry. If it is fairly common then it may not be material. If it’s fairly uncommon then it’s probably going to be considered material and even between merchants it won’t become part of the contract.
回答：显然，我们在这里有一份合同。 当它形成时，卖方发送确认表以响应买方的采购订单。卖方的认收书同时包含不同的条款和附加条款这一事实并不妨碍其成为有效的接受。不同的术语是间接损害免责声明。附加术语是仲裁条款。同样，即使我们认为这些差异是重大差异，也不应该改变事情，因为 §2-207（2）（b） 特别考虑了有效书面接受的可能性，其中包括对要约有重大影响的条款。那么问题是 2-207 的哪一个小节将管辖这里的术语？不是 §2-207（3）， 只去那个小节来弄清楚我们没有书面合同的情况下的条款。换句话说，试图通过书面合同订立合同，但书面合同失败是因为卖方的确认书有明确的条件语言，或者因为它不是明确或适宜的接受表达而失败。在这种情况下，双方的著作确实建立了合同。因为我们有一份书面合同，那是形成的时候。我们根据 §2-207（2） 确定条款; 这是我们在拥有由文字形成的合同的情况下使用的，即使我们处于一个明显双方的行为也表明他们接受了合同的时间点。 间接损害赔偿会成为合同的一部分吗？ 看看 §2-207（2）， 它在其条款中说它将处理额外的术语;它没有说处理不同的术语。然后，如果您查看 §2-207 的官方评论 3， 其中指出 附加条款或不同条款是否成为协议的一部分，取决于第 2 小节的规定。 所以法规说的是一件事，评论说的是另一件事。法院实际上两者都不做;法院使用淘汰赛规则 。 在不同条款的情况下 ， 淘汰赛规则相当简单 ;它只是说，当你有与报价和接受不同的条款时，你只需将它们淘汰，然后你使用 UCC 差距填充器。因此，在这里，我们剔除“是的间接损害赔偿，没有间接损害赔偿”，然后我们去向 UCC 说，作为默认事项，UCC 是否假定间接损害赔偿是可用的？答案是 UCC 假设所有补救措施都可用，包括间接损害赔偿。 争议是否需要仲裁？ 仲裁条款是一个附加条款，因此将根据 §2-207（2） 处理 。我们从 §2-207（2） 开始说附加条款只是提案，除非另一方明确接受它们，否则它们不会成为合同的一部分; 除非我们有几个商人。在商家之间，这些附加条款将成为合同的一部分，除非满足以下三个条件之一。 要约明确限制接受要约的条款;他们在物质上改变了它;或已发出反对通知，或已在收到反对通知后的合理时间内发出。 增加仲裁条款是否对本合同有重大影响？我们在评论中对此给出了什么指导？ 如果我们看一下 §2-207 的官方评论 4 和 5，它们给出了条款的例子，这些例子涉及和不涉及重大修改，这些例子在这个问题上没有给我们明确的答案。但是，我们在官方意见 5 中被告知的关键是，附加条款是否涉及“不合理意外的元素”。对此的确定将部分取决于附加术语在特定行业中的普遍程度。如果它相当普遍 ， 那么它可能不是实质性的。如果它相当不常见 ， 那么它可能会被视为重大问题，即使在商家之间，它也不会成为合同的一部分。

Problem 3.4(b)
问题 3.4（b）

Same facts as part (a), except suppose that Heavy Metal has sold various weight machines to this Gold’s Gym franchise during the past several months, with each side always using the same forms. Imagine that when this relationship between buyer and seller began, the manager of the Gold’s franchise actually read Heavy Metal’s acknowledgment form. At the time, he noticed the arbitration clause, called Arlene, and told her that he didn’t like the arbitration clause in her form. Arlene replied, “Take it or leave it.” The Gold’s manager said, “Well, I guess so.” Now Arlene wants to cite that one=time conversation to make the following argument: as far as the arbitration clause goes, this isn’t §2-207 case at all, since the buyer in fact specifically assented to this additional term on Arlene’s acknowledgment form. Will this argument work for Arlene?
与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是假设 Heavy Metal 在过去几个月中向 Gold's Gym 特许经营权出售了各种重量器械，每一方总是使用相同的表格。想象一下，当买卖双方之间的这种关系开始时，Gold's 特许经营权的经理实际上阅读了 Heavy Metal 的确认表。当时，他注意到了名为 Arlene 的仲裁条款，并告诉她他不喜欢她形式的仲裁条款。“阿琳回答说：”要么接受，要么离开。The Gold 的经理说，“嗯，我想是的。现在 Arlene 想引用那个 one=time 对话来提出以下论点：就仲裁条款而言，这根本不是 §2-207 案件，因为买方实际上在 Arlene 的确认表上明确同意了这个附加条款。这个论点对 Arlene 有用吗？

ANSWER: this is not a §2-207 case at all. The reason is that the buyer, in fact, specifically assented to these additional terms on Arlene’s acknowledgement form. And the question is will this argument work for the seller? Virtually all courts and commentators will agree that §2-207 was not meant to apply to dickered（讨价还价） terms, but rather is intended only to apply to boiler plate terms on conflicting forms that are presumed not to be read closely by either side. If you look at Official Comment 1 to §2-207, it specifically talks about that scenario. The question now is what does it take for a term in a form to become a dickered term that does not get handled by §2-207 rather than a boiler plate term? Most courts would say for the seller’s argument to work in a case like this “the buyer’s assent to the unwelcomed term in the seller’s form has to be fairly unequivocal, very clear.” Diamond Fruit v. Krack corporations, had facts very similar to these.
回答： 这根本不是 §2-207 案件。原因是买方实际上在 Arlene 的确认表上明确同意了这些附加条款。问题是 这个论点对卖家有用吗？几乎所有的法院和评论员都会同意，§2-207 并非旨在适用于 dickered（讨价还价） 术语，而仅适用于假定任何一方都没有仔细阅读的相互冲突形式的样板术语。如果你看一下 §2-207 的官方委员会 1，它专门谈到了这种情况。现在的问题是，如何才能使表单中的术语成为 §2-207 而不是样板术语处理的模糊术语 ？大多数法院会说，要使卖方的论点在这样的案件中起作用，“买方对卖方表格中不受欢迎的条款的同意必须相当明确，非常明确。Diamond Fruit 诉 Krack 公司的事实与这些非常相似。

Problem 3.4(c)
问题 3.4（c）

Same facts as part (a), except that this transaction had begun with an oral contract between Arlene and the Gold’s manager. The terms of the oral contract included the fact that Heavy Metal would not be responsible for consequential damages. Following the oral contract, Gold’s sent Arlene a written confirmation. That confirmation stated the terms of the oral contract, including type of machine and price, but it that the seller would be responsible for consequential damages. Further, the confirmation said, “THIS ACCEPTANCE IS EXPRESSLY MADE CONDITIONAL ON SELLER’S ASSENT TO THE ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS CONTAINED IN THE CONFIRMATION.” There has been no performance yet by either side. Arlene comes to you and says that she wants to enforce the oral contract, but only if she is not responsible for consequential damages. (1) What effect, if any, should be given to the “expressly made conditional” clause contained in the confirmation? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. (2) At this point, can Arlene enforce the sale according to the terms of the oral contract (i.e., no consequential damages)? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207. (3) What if Gold’s confirmation had included not only a different term (seller’s responsibility for consequential damages), but also an additional term (e.g., “delivery must take place on a Thursday”)? Would the additional term become part of the contract? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
与（a）部分的事实相同，只是这笔交易是从 Arlene 和 Gold 的经理之间的口头合同开始的。口头合同的条款包括 Heavy Metal 不对间接损害负责的事实。口头合同签订后，Gold's 向 Arlene 发送了一份书面确认。该确认书规定了口头合同的条款，包括机器的类型和价格，但卖方将负责间接损害。此外，确认书还说，“此接受明确以卖方同意确认书中包含的附加或不同条款为条件。双方都没有表现。Arlene 来找你，说她想执行口头合同，但前提是她不对间接损害负责。（1） 确认书中包含的“明确订立的条件”条款（如有）应具有什么效力？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。（2） 此时，Arlene 能否根据口头合同的条款（即无间接损害）强制执行销售？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。（3） 如果 Gold 的确认书不仅包括一个不同的条款（卖方对间接损害的责任），还包括一个附加条款（例如，“交货必须在星期四进行”）怎么办？附加条款会成为合同的一部分吗？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。

ANSWER: (1) the clause tracks the language of §2-207(1), where the provision in that section begins “unless acceptance is expressly made conditional”, but that provision is intended to apply only to a case of written acceptance rather than a written confirmation. Why is that? If there is a true confirmation (here, if this is a confirmation), then by definition there has to be an already existing contract. If there is an already existing contract, why should one party by sending the confirmation with an expressly conditional clause be able to unilaterally escape from an already concluded contract? Or to put this in another way, once you send a confirmation, it is too late to condition your acceptance since by definition you have already accepted or else you would not have an oral contract. It is too late to make your acceptance conditional on something. We should not give any weight to that clause.
答案：（1） 该条款沿用了 §2-207（1） 的措辞，其中该条款的开头是“除非明确规定接受是有条件的”，但该条款仅适用于书面接受的情况，而不是书面确认的情况。为什么？如果有真正的确认（在这里，如果这是一个确认），那么根据定义 ，必须有一个已经存在的合约。如果已经存在合同，为什么一方通过发送带有明确条件条款的确认函可以单方面逃避已经订立的合同？或者换句话说，一旦您发送了确认，现在以接受为时已晚，因为根据定义，您已经接受了，否则您将不会有口头合同。现在以某件事为条件让你接受已经太晚了。我们不应该对该条款给予任何重视。

(2) What should we do with a different term in a single confirmation? Should we use the knockout rule? The answer is probably not. It would seem unfair to use the knock out rule that we normally apply with different terms in a true offer/ acceptance in writing. Why doesn’t it seem right to use the knock out rule with a different term in a single confirmation? Because doing so could sometime enable the sender, here the buyer, to unilaterally change the terms of an already concluded oral contract and the reason that would occur here is that if we use the knock out rule and we go to the UCC gap filler for remedies, then the buyer will get what they want unilaterally after having concluded an oral contract. That is not fair. One party should not be able to change the terms after the fact. If we cannot use the knock out rule with a different term in a single confirmation, then what do you do with that term? Probably to consider the different term to be mere proposal that would only become part of the contract if it is expressly agreed to by the recipient, which in this case, it was not.
（2） 我们应该如何处理单个确认中的不同项？我们应该使用 Knockout 规则吗？ 答案可能不是。在 真正的书面要约/接受中使用我们通常与不同条款一起应用的淘汰规则似乎不公平。 为什么在单个确认中使用不同的术语使用 knock out 规则似乎不正确？ 因为这样做有时可能会使发件人（这里的买方 ） 能够单方面更改已经签订的口头合同的条款 ，这里出现的原因是，如果我们使用淘汰规则并寻求 UCC 填补缺口的补救措施，那么买方将在签订口头合同后单方面得到他们想要的东西。这不公平。一方不应能够在事后更改条款。 如果我们不能 在单个确认中将淘汰规则与不同的术语一起使用，那么您如何处理该术语？ 可能认为不同的条款只是提案，只有在 接收者明确同意的情况下才会成为合同的一部分，在这种情况下，事实并非如此。

(3) What should be done with an additional rather than a different term in a single confirmation? With an additional term, it is fair for the additional term to be included or not according to the dictates of §2-207(2), the recipient of the confirmation can avoid the inclusion of the additional term if they want simply by objecting to it under §2-207(2)(c). And it that way it wont become part of the contract. Maybe you would argue that the recipient of the confirmation of a different would have the same right to object. But with a different term, the recipient has already, in effect, objected by earlier agreeing to a term in the oral contract that contradicts the newly proposed term in the confirmation. That is why you cannot make the same argument with a different term to a single confirmation to an oral contract.
（3） 在单个确认中，应该如何处理附加项而不是不同的项？ 对于附加条款，根据 §2-207（2） 的规定，是否包含附加条款是公平的，如果确认的接受者愿意，只需根据 §2-207（2）（c） 提出反对即可避免加入附加条款。这样它就不会成为合同的一部分。也许你会争辩说，不同确认的接收者也有同样的反对权。但是，对于不同的条款，收款人实际上已经通过早些时候同意口头合同中的条款来反对，该条款与确认书中新提议的条款相矛盾。这就是为什么你不能用不同的条款来提出相同的论点，而不是对口头合同的单一确认。

Problem 3.5
问题 3.5

Arlene tells you that she is tired of talking about mistakes she may have made in the past. She now wants to know how she can avoid problems in the future. In particular, she wants to know if there is something else she should include in her form or if there is some procedure she should follow to ensure that her “exclusion of consequential damages” clause becomes a valid term of every sale that she makes. Do you have any suggestions to her? U.C.C. §§2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
Arlene 告诉你，她厌倦了谈论她过去可能犯的错误。她现在想知道如何避免将来出现问题。特别是，她想知道 她的表格中是否应该包含其他内容，或者她是否应该遵循一些程序来确保她的“排除间接损害”条款成为她进行的每笔销售的有效条款。你对她有什么建议吗？《美国法典》第 2-204、2-206、2-207 条。

ANSWER: whenever the offeree like seller here wants to include a term that is contrary to a UCC gap filler and consequential damages exclusion is contrary to a UCC gap filler; so, it is going to be difficult for the offeree to control the terms of acceptance. Even if Heavy Metal, the seller, were to make its acceptance expressly conditional on the offer’s assent to any different or additional terms contained in the acknowledgment form, what would happen there? Well, it would keep this from being a contract by the writings but ultimately if they performed it would become a contract by conduct. Under 2-207(3), we look for the terms that match. And if they are not matching we go to the gap fillers. And the gap fillers say that consequential damages are, indeed, available. So how could Arlene make the consequential damages disclaimer a dickered term? Well, the way to do that is to insist that the buyer separately sign in return of provision indicating that the buyer specifically assents to the disclaimer of consequential damages. If the buyer will not agree to this, then Arlene the seller could simply refuse to ship at that point. That is what she could do if this was that important to her. What are the problems with that approach? First, there is a business problem, is the seller Arlene willing to forgo the deal unless the buyer is willing to sign the disclaimer of consequential damages? To put this in another way, does Arlene really have the leverage to insist on that provision or can her buyers buy her equipments for a similar cost for companies that do not require such remedies exclusion? Second, even if Arlene does have the leverage, it is a somewhat cumbersome process to get that signature before you finally ship the goods?
回答： 每当受要约人（如此处的卖方）想要包含与 UCC 填缝条款相悖的条款，并且间接损害赔偿排除条款与 UCC 填缝条款相悖时;因此，受要约人将很难控制接受条款。即使卖方 Heavy Metal 明确表示接受要约的条件是同意确认书中包含的任何不同或附加条款，会发生什么情况？嗯，这将使这不成为书面合同，但最终如果他们履行了，它将成为行为合同。在 2-207（3） 下，我们查找匹配的术语。如果它们不匹配 ，我们就会去找补空者。而填补空白的人说，间接损害赔偿确实是可用的。那么，Arlene 如何使间接损害赔偿免责声明成为一个模糊的术语呢？嗯，做到这一点的方法是坚持让买方单独签署以返回条款，表明买方明确同意间接损害的免责声明。如果买方不同意这一点，那么卖方 Arlene 可以在此时简单地拒绝发货。如果这对她来说那么重要，她可以这样做。这种方法有什么问题？首先，存在一个商业问题，除非买方愿意签署间接损害赔偿免责声明，否则卖方 Arlene 是否愿意放弃交易？换句话说，Arlene 真的有影响力坚持该条款，还是她的买家可以以类似的成本为不需要此类补救措施排除的公司购买她的设备？其次，即使 Arlene 确实有影响力，在你最终发货之前获得签名也是一个有点麻烦的过程吗？

FORMATION WITH LEASES, INTERNATIONAL SALES, AND REAL ESTATE PP. 93
与租赁、国际销售和房地产一起组建 第 93 页

4.1. a.
4.1. 一个。

You were working out at your fitness center after work one night last week, when who should you run into again but your one-tome law school classmate Deborah Swift (from Problem 1.6). Deborah told you that she was feeling bad about the “misunderstanding” the two of you had at your fifth law school reunion a few weeks ago. She also told you that since the reunion she has quit her job as a lawyer and has started her own business selling and leasing Rolls Royces. In any event, to make amends Deborah said that she would offer to lease you that same used Rolls Royce for two years, for just $250 per month. To avoid any confusion, Deborah said that this time she would put the offer in writing and would keep it open for five months.
上周的一个晚上 ，你下班后在健身中心锻炼 ，这时你应该再次遇到谁，而不是你的一本书法学院同学黛博拉·斯威夫特（来自问题 1.6）。黛博拉告诉你，她对几周前你们俩在第五次法学院同学聚会上的 “ 误会 ”感到难过 。她还告诉你，自从重聚后，她辞去了律师的工作，开始了自己的业务，销售和租赁劳斯莱斯 。无论如何，为了弥补，黛博拉说她愿意以每月 250 美元的价格将同一辆二手劳斯莱斯租给你两年。为避免混淆，黛博拉表示，这次她会以书面形式提出报价，并将保持开放五个月。

You agreed to pay Deborah $200 for “tying up” this car for five months, and she said she would even apply this money toward the first month’s lease payment should you choose to lease the car. After you paid Deborah and got her signed writing, you remembered that your Uncle Harry, the auto buff, was due to visit you in four months. You are also a little suspicious about the great lease rate for Deborah’s car. Are you safe to wait until Uncle Harry comes and looks at the car before exercising your option? U.C.C. §2A-205.
您同意向 Deborah 支付 200 美元，因为她将这辆车“ 捆绑 ” 了五个月，她说如果您选择租赁这辆车， 她甚至会将这笔钱用于第一个月的租赁付款。在你付了钱给黛博拉并让她签了字后，你记得你的哈利叔叔，汽车迷，将在四个月后来看你。您对 Deborah 的汽车的高租金也有点怀疑 。你等到哈利叔叔来看车后再行使你的选择权，你安全吗？加州大学 §2A-205.

The language of §2A-205 indicates that it wouldn’t be safe to wait, since it says the period of irrevocability cannot exceed 3 months. However, under common law, firm offer is generally enforceable when there is consideration. So this contract would be enforceable under common law. §2A-205 creates a limited exception to the common law rule that firm offers, without consideration, are unenforceable. But in this problem, the lessee paid for the option, so there is no need to look to §2A-205 as a way to support the option that he specifically paid for. The gap-filling function of §2A-205 is in situation under common law where firm offers are not supported by consideration. §2A-205 is only relevant when there is a firm offer that is not supported by consideration, which is not the case in this problem. Here, the lessee can wait 5 months because he paid for it.
§2A-205 的语言表明等待是不安全的，因为它说不可撤销的期限不能超过 3 个月。然而，根据普通法，在有对价的情况下，确定要约通常是可执行的。 因此 ，该合同将根据普通法强制执行。 §2A-205 为普通法规则创造了一个有限的例外，即公司提供的产品在没有对价的情况下是不可执行的。但在这个问题上，承租人为期权支付了费用，因此没有必要将 §2A-205 作为支持他专门支付的期权的一种方式。§2A-205 的空白填补功能适用于普通法下没有对价支持确定要约的情况。 §2A-205 仅在存在没有对价支持的确定要约时才有意义，而此问题并非如此。在这里，承租人可以等待 5 个月，因为他支付了费用。

b.

Same facts as part (a), except you do not pay anything for Deborah’s signed writing promising the same lease deal. Are you safe now to wait until Uncle Harry comes to town? U.C.C. §2A-205.
与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是您无需为 Deborah 承诺相同租赁交易的签名文件支付任何费用。你现在可以等到哈利叔叔来镇上了吗？加州大学 §2A-205.

Now the lessee is not safe to wait because there is no consideration. He didn’t pay anything. Under common law, now the lessee does not have any right to enforce the firm offer. Now we look to §2A-205, which creates a limited exception to the unenforceability of firm offer. It is a limited exception because it limits the exception to an offer by merchants to lease goods, it has to be a signed writing, and the signed writing by its terms must be of assurance that will be hold open if not revocable during the time stated, but the period of irrevocability may not exceed 3 months.
现在承租人等待不安全，因为没有对价。他没有付任何钱。根据普通法，现在承租人无权执行确定要约。现在我们看看 §2A-205，它为确定要约的不可执行性创造了一个有限的例外。这是一个有限的例外，因为它将例外限制在商家租赁货物的要约上，它必须是签署的书面文件，并且签署的书面条款必须是保证，如果在规定的时间内不可撤销，则该保证将保持开放状态， 但不可撤销的期限不得超过 3 个月。

c.

What if under the facts of part (b), you did wait four months for Uncle Harry and then Deborah said that the offer was no longer open. Could you come up with another theory of enforcement outside of §2A-205? U.C.C. §1-103.
如果根据 （b） 部分的事实，您确实等了四个月才等到哈利叔叔，然后黛博拉说报价不再开放，该怎么办？您能否提出 §2A-205 之外的另一种执行理论？加州大学 §1-103.

Under §1-103(b), even in a case that is governed by the UCC, common law still applies unless it is specifically displaced. Here the principle of promissory estoppel under the common law could work if the lessee can argue that he detrimentally relied on the lessor’s promise. The lessee can make an argument that he would have accepted the lease offer immediately since it is such a good offer, but he detrimentally relied on the stated 5-month option period, and he reasonably believed that the deal could be checked out first with his uncle Harry when he comes in town in 4 months. So the lessee should be able to enforce this quasi-contract under the theory of promissory estoppel.
根据 §1-103（b），即使在受 UCC 管辖的案件中，普通法仍然适用，除非它被明确取代。在这里，如果承租人能够辩称他有害地依赖了出租人的承诺，那么普通法下的承诺禁止反言原则就可以发挥作用 。承租人可以争辩说，他会立即接受租赁报价，因为这是一个非常好的报价，但他有害地依赖了规定的 5 个月选择期，他有理由相信，当他 4 个月后来到镇上时，可以先与他的叔叔 Harry 一起完成交易。 因此 ，承租人应该能够在承诺禁止反言的理论下执行该准合同。

Courts are split on this. Some refuse to apply common law promissory estoppel on firm offers without consideration. Others decisions allow promissory estoppel theory to be used with firm offers that have no consideration.
法院在这个问题上存在分歧。有些人拒绝在没有对价的情况下对确定的要约适用普通法承诺禁止反言。 其他决定允许将承诺禁止反言理论与没有对价的确定要约一起使用。

4.2.

Recall the facts of Problem 3.4(a): Gym franchise sends purchase order to weight machine seller; seller responds with acknowledgement form that includes a different term (no consequential damages) and an additional term (arbitration); buyer and seller perform without discussing differences in forms, but later those differences become relevant when a gym patron is injured by the machine. Suppose now that the Gold’s Gym franchise in that problem had been based in Toronto, Canada, rather than in the United States. Suppose also that the consequential damages suffered by the buyer were purely economic rather than stemming from a patron’s personal injury (cf C.I.S.G. Art. 5). How would your answers to the three questions in Problem 3.4(a) change? Is there a contract at all? Will the consequential damages disclaimer hold? Will disputes be subject to arbitration? C.I.S.G. Arts. 1(1), 18(1), 19.
回想一下问题 3.4（a） 的事实：健身房特许经营权向称重机卖方发送采购订单;卖方以包括不同条款（无间接损害）和附加条款（仲裁）的确认表进行回应;买方和卖方在没有讨论形式差异的情况下进行表演，但后来当健身房顾客被机器伤害时，这些差异变得相关。现在假设 Gold's Gym 在这个问题上的特许经营权位于加拿大多伦多，而不是美国。再假设买方所遭受的间接损害纯粹是经济上的，而不是源于顾客的人身伤害（ 参见 C.I.S.G. Art. 5）. 您对问题 3.4（a） 中三个问题的回答会有什么变化？有合同吗？间接损害赔偿免责声明是否成立？争议是否需要仲裁？C.I.S.G. 第 1（1）、18（1）、19 条。

Under C.I.S.G. Art. 1, since this is a contract between parties whose place of business are in different contracting states and have adopted C.I.S.G. Thus the rule of C.I.S.G. applies unless the parties specifically opted out or one of the parties has no reason to know that they are dealing with a party in a different country, which is not the case in this problem. Putting the conducts of the parties aside, under C.I.S.G. Art. 19(1), the seller’s acknowledgement form constitutes as a counteroffer. However there is an exception under C.I.S.G. Art. 19(2), which says the seller’s acknowledgement form constitutes as an acceptance as long as the differences are not material. Under C.I.S.G. Art. 19(3), the difference here is material since it relates to one party’s liability and the settlement of dispute. Since the difference is material, then we are back to C.I.S.G. Art. 19(1). Thus the seller’s acknowledgement form is a counteroffer. The language of C.I.S.G. Art. 18(1) indicates that the ensuing conduct of the seller constitute an acceptance. Then under the common law “last shot” doctrine, if there is acceptance by conduct, then the one who sends the last form’s terms govern. Here because the seller fired the last shot, all of the seller’s terms will govern. Thus the consequential damages disclaimer and the arbitration clause become part of the terms of the contract.
根据 C.I.S.G. 第 1 条，由于这是营业地位于不同缔约国并已采用 C.I.S.G. 的各方之间的合同。 因此 ，C.I.S.G. 规则适用，除非各方明确选择退出，或者其中一方没有理由知道他们正在与不同国家的一方进行交易，而这个问题并非如此。撇开双方的行为不谈，根据 C.I.S.G. 第 19（1） 条，卖方的确认表构成还价。 但是 ， 根据 C.I.S.G. 第 19（2） 条有一个例外，即只要差异不大，卖方的确认表就构成接受 。根据 C.I.S.G. 第 19（3） 条，这里的差异是重大的，因为它涉及一方的责任和争议的解决。既然差异是实质性的，那么我们回到 C.I.S.G. 第 19（1） 条。 因此 ，卖方的认收表格是还价。C.I.S.G. 第 18（1） 条的措辞表明，卖方随后的行为构成接受。然后，根据普通法的 “ 最后一枪 ” 原则，如果行为被接受，则发送最后表格条款的人具有管辖权。在这里，由于卖家打响了最后一枪， 因此将适用卖家的所有条款。 因此 ，间接损害赔偿免责声明和仲裁条款成为合同条款的一部分。

4.3. The following letter appeared in the syndicated real estate column of Robert Bruss:
4.3. 以下信件出现在 Robert Bruss 的联合房地产专栏中：

“Dear Bob: I am selling a house I inherited. I told the Realtor to advertise it ‘as is’ because it’s a fixer-upper. A buyer made a purchase offer I accepted. It contained a contingency for a professional inspection. That was fine with me. But the inspection revealed many defects, as I knew it would. Now the buyer refuses to complete the purchase unless I give her a $7,500 credit for repairs. To me, this looks like a $7,500 price reduction. Can the buyer force me to pay for these repairs?”
“ 亲爱的鲍勃：我要卖掉我继承的房子。我告诉房地产经纪人按原样宣传它， 因为它是一个固定的鞋面 。买家提出了一个购买报价，我接受了。它包含了进行专业检查的应急措施。这对我来说很好。但正如我所知道的那样，检查发现了许多缺陷。现在买家拒绝完成购买，除非我给她 7,500 美元的维修信用额度。在我看来，这看起来像是降价 7,500 美元。买家可以强迫我支付这些维修费用吗？“

Assume that the inspection contingency read as follows: “Buyer’s purchase offer is contingent on the buyer’s approval of a professional inspection report, which the buyer will arrange to have prepared within 14 days of this offer.” What would your answer be if you were Robert Bruss?
假设或有检查内容如下： “ 买家的购买报价取决于买家对专业检验报告的批准，买家将安排在此要约后的 14 天内准备该报告。“ 如果你是罗伯特·布鲁斯，你会怎么回答？

The buyer cannot force the seller to pay the $7,500. If the purchase offer is contingent on the buyer’s approval on professional inspection report, as is the case here, the buyer can cancel the sale if she does not approve the report. However, a professional inspection report cannot be used to force the seller to pay for the repairs. If the buyer does not want to pay for the repairs, she can either cancel the sale or waive the inspection approval contingency.
买方不能强迫卖方支付 7,500 美元。如果购买要约取决于买家对专业检验报告的批准（如此处所示），则买家如果不批准该报告，可以取消销售。但是，专业的检验报告不能用来强迫卖家支付维修费用。如果买方不想支付维修费用，她可以取消销售或放弃检查批准或有事项。

4.4. Recall our hypothetical home buyers, the Shaughnessys. On the recommendation of some friends, they approached real estate agent Patty Schaner, who agreed to “work with” them in their quest to purchase a house. Imagine that when then Shaughnessys found their “dream home,” listed by the Garners at $200,000, the Shaughnessys asked Patty if she could advise them on how little they could offer and still get the house. Patty then had a discussion with Bob Erker, the Garners’ agent, who told Patty that the Garners had said from the start that though they were listing the home at $200,000, they would be thrilled to get $180,000 for it. In light of this conversation with Bob, what can Patty advise the Shaughnessys concerning their question to her about what offer to make?
4.4. 回想一下我们假设的购房者 Shaughnessys。在一些朋友的推荐下，他们联系了房地产经纪人 Patty Schaner，后者同意与他们 “ 合作 ” 购买房屋。想象一下，当 Shaughnessys 找到他们的 “ 梦想之家”时，Garners 以 200,000 美元的价格挂牌出售，Shaughnessys 问 Patty 是否可以建议他们提供多少，但仍然可以得到这所房子。帕蒂随后与加纳的经纪人鲍勃·埃尔克 （Bob Erker） 进行了讨论，鲍勃· 埃尔克 （Bob Erker） 告诉帕蒂，加纳夫妇从一开始就说过，虽然他们以 200,000 美元的价格挂牌出售这套房子，但他们会很高兴得到 180,000 美元。 鉴于与 Bob 的这次谈话，Patty 可以就 Shaughnessys 向她提出的关于提出什么提议的问题提出什么建议？

Under Agency Law, Patty owes a fiduciary duty for the seller. And under common law, Patty also has an assumed duty of care to the buyer. Therefore, Patty should advise the Shaughnessys that she is legally a sub-agent of the seller, therefore she cannot disclose any information she might have about the seller’s minimum acceptable price for the house, because that could potentially be a breach of her fiduciary duty to the seller who is paying for her services.
根据代理法，Patty 对卖方负有信托义务。根据普通法，Patty 也对买方负有注意义务。因此，Patty 应该告诉 Shaughnessys，她在法律上是卖方的次级代理，因此她不能透露她可能拥有的有关卖方房屋最低可接受价格的任何信息，因为这可能违反她对支付她服务的卖方的信托义务。

STATUTE OF FRAUDS WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 109
商品销售欺诈法规 ，第 109 页

Problem 5.1(a) Mike Sims and Sara McCarthy are both in the furniture business. The two of them met at an industry convention where Mike alleges that they made an oral contract in which Mike agreed to sell Sara eight antique oak desks for $12,000 each, delivery to be made in five weeks to Sara’s out-of-state place of business. Two days after the oral contract, Mike sent Sara a confirming memorandum on his company’s letterhead that outlined the terms of their deal, including quantity. Consistent with normal practice, there was no signature on the memo. When Sara received the confirmation, she immediately called Mike and said, “You promised that you could send me the desks in three weeks, not five. As far as I’m concerned, our deal is off.” If Sara does nothing more, can Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §§2-201, 2-201(b)(37); Official Comment 37 to §1-201.
问题 5.1（a） Mike Sims 和 Sara McCarthy 都从事家具业务。他们俩在一次行业会议上相遇，迈克声称他们签订了一份口头合同，其中迈克同意以每张 12,000 美元的价格向 Sara 出售八张古董橡木书桌，并在五周内运送到 Sara 的州外营业地点。口头合同签订两天后，Mike 用公司的信笺向 Sara 发送了一份确认备忘录，其中概述了他们的交易条款，包括数量。与正常做法一致，备忘录上没有签名。当 Sara 收到确认后，她立即打电话给 Mike 说：“你答应过你可以在三周内把桌子寄给我，而不是五周。就我而言，我们的交易已经结束了。如果 Sara 什么都不做，Mike 可以执行与 Sara 的口头合同吗？《美国法典》第 2-201 款、2-201（b）（37） 款;第 1-201 节的官方评论 37。

ANSWER: whenever we look at a case involving §2-201, even a case like this that screams out merchants’ exceptions in §2-201(2), we never want to go to the exceptions found in §2-201(2) and (3) unless they tell me first do we have any kind of a writing that would qualify under 2-201(1). Because if we do then the exceptions that are found in subsections (2) and (3) are going to be irrelevant. When you look at 2-201, you always need to start your analysis by saying do we have any kind of writing that would satisfy 2-201. Part of that is going to be a function of who is it that is seeking to enforce the oral contract and who is it that is seeking to deny the existence of the oral contract.
回答： 每当我们查看涉及 §2-201 的案件时，即使是像这样在 §2-201（2） 中大声疾呼商家例外情况的案件，我们永远不想去看 §2-201（2） 和 （3） 中的例外情况，除非他们首先告诉我，我们是否有任何符合第 2-201（1） 条规定的文字。因为如果我们这样做，那么第 （2） 和 （3） 小节中的例外情况将无关紧要。当你看 2-201 时，你总是需要通过说我们是否有任何类型的写作可以满足 2-201 来开始你的分析。其中一部分将取决于谁在寻求执行口头合同，谁在寻求否认口头合同的存在。

So in this case, does the seller (Mike Sims) have a writing that meets the requirements of 2-201(1)? No, because he has nothing at all signed by the party against whom the enforcement is sought. That is why he cannot just go with 2-201(1) since he has no writings. Can he overcome the statute of fraud defense that is raised by his buyer by using one of the exceptions found in Subsections (2) or (3)? He can with the merchant’s exception in 2-201(2). This exception has a number of seven requirements. (1) Between merchants, (2) sent between a reasonable time, (3) purports to confirm a contract, (4) was sufficient against the sender, (5) was actually received by Sarah (in this case), (6) Sarah had reason to know what it was about, and (7) Sara failed to give written notice of objections within ten days. Are all of those requirements met in this case? YES! What about “sufficient against the sender” what does it mean in 2-201 to say that the confirmation must be sufficient against the sender? In that confirmation, if it incorporates the requirements of 2-201(1) meaning you have to have three things. The sender’s signature, quantity, and an indication of a contract for sale was made. Here, we have clearly an indication that a contract for sale was made and we have quantity. Do we have a signature and if we do not, then we cannot say that this confirmation is sufficient against the sender (that would mean that he doesn’t qualify for the merchants’ exceptions under 2-201(2)? The definition of signature in §1-201(b)(37) says a signature can be a symbol (here, the seller uses letterhead) and Official comment 37 to 1-201 says that a letterhead counts as a signature. So even though Mike did not sign the letter in a traditional way, the fact that he used the company’s letterhead would be sufficient for meeting the signature requirement. The only reason we have a signature requirement in a confirmation is this requirement for 2-201(2) that confirmation be sufficient against the sender, which means that if the sender were trying to avoid the oral contract could the recipient use that confirmation against the sender? Which means would that confirmation meet the requirement of 2-201(1).
那么在这种情况下，卖家 （Mike Sims） 是否有符合 2-201（1） 要求的文字？ 不，因为他根本没有被寻求执行的一方签署的任何文件。这就是为什么他不能只选择 2-201（1），因为他没有著作。 他能否通过使用第 （2） 或 （3） 款中的例外情况之一来推翻买方提出的欺诈抗辩法规？ 他可以，但 2-201（2） 中的商人例外。此例外有 7 个要求。（1） 在商家之间，（2） 在合理时间内发送，（3） 旨在确认合同，（4） 对发件人来说足以，（5） Sarah 实际收到 （在本例中），（6） Sarah 有理由知道它是关于什么的，以及 （7） Sara 未能在十天内发出书面反对通知。 在这种情况下 ，所有这些要求都满足 了吗 ？ 是的！ “对发件人来说足够”呢，在 2-201 中说确认必须对发件人来说足够是什么意思？ 在该确认中，如果它包含 2-201（1） 的要求，这意味着您必须 具备三件事。发件人的签名、数量和销售合同的指示已经完成。在这里，我们清楚地表明已签订销售合同，并且我们有数量。我们有签名吗，如果没有，那么我们不能说这个确认对发件人来说就足够了（这意味着他不符合 2-201（2） 下的商家例外资格）？ §1-201（b）（37） 中对签名的定义表明，签名可以是符号（此处，卖家使用信笺抬头），官方评论 37 至 1-201 表示信笺抬头算作签名。因此，即使 Mike 没有以传统方式签署这封信，他使用公司的信笺这一事实也足以满足签名要求。我们在确认函中要求签名的唯一原因是 2-201（2） 的要求，即确认足以对发件人不利，这意味着如果发件人试图避免口头合同，收件人是否可以使用该确认来对付发件人？这意味着该确认将满足 2-201（1） 的要求。

What about Sara’s objection to this confirmation? It was just oral so it would be ineffective under 2-201(2) even though it was otherwise timely within ten days.
Sara 对这个确认的反对呢？ 它只是口头的，因此根据 2-201（2） 它是无效的，即使它在 10 天内是及时的。

Problem 5.1(b) Same facts as part (a), except Sara sends her objection in writing (the contents of which are quoted in part(a)). Can Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §2-201.
问题 5.1（b） 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，但 Sara 以书面形式提出反对意见（其内容在 （a） 部分引用）。迈克可以执行与 Sara 的口头合同吗？《美国法典》第 2-201 条。

ANSWER: He cannot use the merchant’s exception here because the objection was made in writing. The content of the objections said in 2-201(2): “UNLESS WRITTEN NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO ITS CONTENTS IS GIVEN WITHIN TEN DAYS.” So, there has to be written notice of objection for it to be content. What does that mean, what is she objecting to? She is objecting to one particular term in this oral contract. Is she objecting to the very existence of the oral contract? No, she is just contesting delivery. So the question is under 2-201(2), what constitutes a valid objection in this content? If you were a court how would you read that? The code is long and does not answer everything. So most courts would say you have to object to the very existence of the entire contract. Keating would say if you objected to the quantity that would be the one term (e.g. 12 desks vs. 4 desks) in that case, the court would be limited to enforcing the quantity as discussed within contract. Because quantity has to be included in the contract. Most courts would say that objection to count to take it out of 2-201(2), you would have to object to the existence of the contract, not just to a term (putting aside the special term of quantity). If Mike wins here on this statute of frauds it does not mean that he gets his way on the delivery term. It just means he can go forward with trying to enforce the contract. He will still have to argue on the issue of the delivery (keeping litigation alive). If you lose the statute of fraud argument, then it is over. There is nothing for you and you cannot enforce the contract.
回答： 他不能在此处使用商家的例外，因为反对意见是以书面形式提出的。反对意见的内容在 2-201（2） 中说：“除非在十天内发出对其内容的书面反对通知。因此， 必须有书面反对通知才能使其内容。这是什么意思，她反对什么？她反对这份口头合同中的一个特定条款 。她是否反对口头合同的存在？不，她只是在争夺外卖。 那么问题在于 2-201（2） 项下，什么构成此内容中的有效反对意见？如果你是一个法院 ， 你会怎么读？代码很长，不能回答所有问题。 所以大多数法院会说，你必须反对整个合同的存在。基廷会说，如果你反对在这种情况下的一个术语的数量（例如 12 张桌子对 4 张桌子），法院将仅限于执行合同中讨论的数量。因为数量必须包含在合同中。大多数法院会说，反对计数以将其从 2-201（2） 中删除，您将不得不反对合同的存在，而不仅仅是一个术语（撇开数量的特殊术语）。如果 Mike 在这个欺诈法规上获胜，这并不意味着他在交货期限内如愿以偿。这只是意味着他可以继续尝试执行合同。他仍然必须就交付问题进行争论（保持诉讼的进行）。如果你输了欺诈法规的争论，那么它就结束了。你什么都没有，你不能执行合同。

Problem 5.1(c) Same facts as part (a), except that Mike does not send a confirmation, but Sara sends Mike a check for $20,000, with “down payments for desk deal” marked on the memo line. To what extent may Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §2-201, Official Comment 2 to §2-201.
问题 5.1（c） 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Mike 没有发送确认，但 Sara 给 Mike 寄了一张 20,000 美元的支票，在备注行上标有“桌面交易的首付款”。Mike 可以在多大程度上执行与 Sara 的口头合同？U.C.C. §2-201，官方评论 2 至 §2-201。

ANSWER: does Sara’s check count as a writing sufficient to satisfy 2-201(1)? The check got the signature and sufficient to indicate contract because it says on the memo line “down payment for the desk deal” and there is no quantity (quantity for at least quantity of one). Do any exceptions apply to allow the seller to enforce the contract for more than one desk? Probably two desks. Comment to 2 to 2-201 discusses just apportionment in case where there have been either partial delivery and acceptance of goods or partial payment of the purchase price and it says if the price has been paid the seller can be forced to deliver an apportionable part of the goods. Now in this case, it is the buyer rather than the seller who wants out of the deal, but presumably the same apportionment principle would apply. So Mike should be able to bring suit to enforce the contract against Sara for 2 desks given that the payment is stated to be a down payment rather than the full payment and the desks are $12,000 each. If the check was sent back and rejected (bounced), then you would not have a contract by conduct by both side. If Mike got the check and did not send the check back, that would still be acceptance.
回答：Sara 的支票是否算作足以满足 2-201（1） 的写作？支票有签名并足以表明合同，因为它在备注行上写着“桌面交易的首付款”并且没有数量（至少数量为 1 的数量）。是否有任何例外情况允许卖方为多个办公桌执行合同？可能是两张桌子。对 2 至 2-201 的评论讨论了在部分交付和接受货物或部分支付购买价格的情况下的分摊，它说如果价格已经支付，卖方可以被迫交付可分摊的部分货物。现在在这种情况下，希望从交易中获利的是买方而不是卖方，但大概相同的分摊原则将适用。 因此 ， 迈克应该能够提起诉讼，对 Sara 执行 2 张办公桌的合同，因为付款被声明为首付款而不是全额付款，而且每张办公桌是 12,000 美元。如果支票被退回并被拒绝（退回），那么您将不会签订双方行为合同 。如果 Mike 收到了支票但没有寄回支票，那仍然是接受。

Problem 5.1(d) Same facts as part (a), except that Mike does not send a confirmation. When Mike eventually files a complaint in federal court to enforce the contract, Sara responds with a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion that states, “Even if everything alleged in plaintiff’s complaint is true, the contract is still unenforceable for lack of a writing.” Should the trial judge dismiss Mike’s complaint at this point? U.C.C. §2-201.
问题 5.1（d） 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Mike 没有发送确认。当 Mike 最终向联邦法院提起诉讼以执行合同时，Sara 以 F.R.C.P. 12（b）（6） 动议作为回应，该动议指出，“即使原告投诉中指控的所有内容都是真实的，合同仍然因缺乏书面规定而无法执行。主审法官是否应该在此时驳回 Mike 的投诉？《美国法典》第 2-201 条。

ANSWER: Sara is saying “assuming that all of the facts alleged are true, there is still no claim as a matter of law”…is that an admission? The middle ground would be for the court to do some discovery and try to get the defendant to try to admit that there was at least an oral contract. If the defendant denies that there was no contract under oath, the run the risk of perjury and if it can be proved later. This was what was going on in the Seventh Circuit case, DV Industries, and the majority said that it was enough for the defendants to simply sign sworn affidavits that there was no oral contract. That was enough to dismiss the plaintiff’s case. The dissent said that we need to give the trial court the discretion in a case like this to allow the plaintiff to at least take the deposition of the defendants and see if they can get the defendants to admit the existence of an oral contract through the deposition. Some commentators think that in these statutes of fraud case that every case the plaintiff should be able to take defendants to trial to see if they can get the defendants to admit the existence of the oral contract at the trial. Majority would that that such notion is a waste of time and defeats the whole purpose of the statute of frauds which is to save conditional time; and if you let every one of these cases go to trial, you’re wasting a lot of time and defeating the purpose of the statute of fraud.
回答：Sara 的意思是“假设所有指控的事实都是真实的，那么在法律上仍然没有索赔 ”...... 这是承认吗？中间立场是让法院进行一些证据开示，并试图让被告尝试承认至少有一份口头合同。如果被告在宣誓后否认没有合同，则有伪证的风险，如果以后可以证明。这就是第七巡回法院 DV Industries 案中发生的事情，大多数人表示，被告只需签署没有口头合同的宣誓书就足够了。这足以驳回原告的案件。异议者说，在这样的案件中，我们需要赋予初审法院自由裁量权，允许原告至少接受被告的证词，看看他们是否能通过证词让被告承认口头合同的存在。一些评论员认为，在这些欺诈法规案件中，每个案件的原告都应该能够将被告带到审判中，看看他们是否能让被告在审判中承认口头合同的存在。大多数人认为这种观念是浪费时间，并且违背了欺诈法规的全部目的，即节省有条件的时间;如果你让这些案件中的每一个都进入审判阶段，你就是在浪费大量时间，违背了欺诈法规的目的。

Problem 5.1(e) Same facts as part (a), except that Mike does not send a confirmation. However, shortly after his oral contract with Sara, Mike enters into a written contract with another furniture seller to buy eight antique oak desks (of the type promised to Sara) for $10,000 each. Now can Mike enforce the oral contract with Sara? U.C.C. §§2-201,1-103.
问题 5.1（e） 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Mike 没有发送确认。然而，在与 Sara 签订口头合同后不久，Mike 与另一家家具销售商签订了一份书面合同，以每张 10,000 美元的价格购买了八张古董橡木桌（承诺给 Sara 的那种）。现在迈克可以执行与 Sara 的口头合同吗？《美国法典》第 2-201 条，1-103 条。

ANSWER: Special manufacture is one form of detrimental reliance and in this case, there is no special manufacturing. Another form of detrimental reliance is to go out and procured the goods from another seller and now you are in a position to sell them to your buyer. Where might we go to allow the plaintiff to enforce this contract? §1-103(b) the common law is still out there unless it was specifically displaced by a provision of the UCC. Which cause of action? Detrimental reliance -promissory estoppel under the common law. Under this cause of action, you might be able to overcome the statute of frauds defense through this promissory estoppel theory of 1-103. The detrimental reliance is going out and purchasing the desks to fulfill what Mike though his obligations were to Sara. You could make a statutory argument under 2-201(1) that promissory estoppel should not be available and courts are split on this. Some courts believe that the specific exceptions listed in 2-201 were intended to be an exhaustive (or exclusive) list of the exceptions available to the statute of frauds requirements. Those courts point that the language in 2-201(1) that says “EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION, A CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE, UNLESS THERE IS SOME WRITING INDICATING ITS EXISTENCE.” Now there is a response to that argument. The response is this: 1-103 tells us that the common law should always supplement the provision of the UCC unless particular provision of the UCC has displaced the common law. So the uncertainty of this case is whether that first phrase in 2-201(1) was intended to displace the promissory estoppel doctrine that is otherwise available under the common law. So there is a split there.
回答： 特殊制造是有害依赖的一种形式，在这种情况下，没有特殊制造。另一种形式的有害依赖是出去从另一个卖家那里购买商品，现在您可以将它们出售给您的买家。我们可以去哪里让原告执行这份合同？§1-103（b） 普通法仍然存在，除非它被 UCC 的条款明确取代。哪个诉因？有害依赖 - 普通法下的承诺禁止反言。根据此诉因，您或许能够通过 1-103 的本位禁止反言理论来克服欺诈法规辩护。有害的依赖是出去购买书桌来履行迈克对萨拉的义务。您可以根据 2-201（1） 提出法定论点，即不应提供承诺禁止反言 ，法院对此存在分歧。一些法院认为，2-201 中列出的具体例外情况旨在成为欺诈法规要求可用的例外情况的详尽（或排他性）清单。这些法院指出，2-201（1） 中的语言说 “除非本节另有规定，否则合同不可执行，除非有一些书面表明其存在。现在有了对这个论点的回应。回应是这样的：1-103 告诉我们，普通法应始终补充 UCC 的规定，除非 UCC 的特定条款取代了普通法。 因此 ，本案的不确定性在于，2-201（1） 中的第一句话是否旨在取代普通法中其他可用的承诺禁止反言原则。 所以那里有一个分裂。

Problem 5.2 Arlene Ledger (from problem 3.2) is back at your law office to ask you about a couple of difficulties she has had with certain customers of her exercise equipment company, Heavy Metal. Several weeks ago, she had met with Tom Lauder, director of Monticello Senior Center, to discuss the possibility of Heavy Metal manufacturing three identical multi-station weight machines that would be custom-made for the special needs of the residents of his senior center. In particular, the weight stack would have lighter increments than normal and ach of the stations on the machine could be used even by residents who were wheelchair bound.
问题 5.2 Arlene Ledger（来自问题 3.2）回到您的律师事务所，询问您她与健身器材公司 Heavy Metal 的某些客户之间遇到的一些困难。几周前，她与蒙蒂塞洛老年中心主任汤姆·劳德 （Tom Lauder） 会面，讨论 Heavy Metal 制造三台相同的多工位称重机的可能性，这些机器将根据其老年中心居民的特殊需求进行定制。特别是，配重片的增量比正常情况要轻，即使坐轮椅的居民也可以使用机器上工作站的疼痛。

 Arlene said that Lauder had later called her and told her to go ahead and make the three special machines, which the two had agreed would cost $8,000 each. When Heacy Metal nearly finished the first of these three machines. Lauder called Arlene again and left a message that said, “We won’t need the machines after all. So sorry to trouble you.” Arlene sheepishly admits to you that she never put this deal in writing. Now, she tells you, she is stuck with one special machine that no other buyer may want, plus a $3,000 bill from a consultant who had helped to draft the plans for the prototype for these three machines. Will Arlene be in a position to enforce this contract with Monticello Senior Center? If so, can she enforce it just for the one machine in process or for all three? U.C.C. §2-201, cf. Official Comment 2 to §2-201.
Arlene 说，Lauder 后来打电话给她，让她去制造这三台特殊的机器，两人同意每台售价 8,000 美元。当 Heacy Metal 几乎完成这三台机器中的第一台时。Lauder 再次打电话给 Arlene 并留言说：“我们毕竟不需要这些机器。很抱歉给您添麻烦。Arlene 羞怯地向你承认，她从未把这笔交易写下来。现在，她告诉你，她被困在一台其他买家可能不想要的特殊机器上，再加上一位顾问提供的 3,000 美元账单，这位顾问曾帮助起草这三台机器的原型计划。Arlene 能否 执行与 Monticello Senior Center 的合同？如果是这样，她可以只对一台正在进行的机器强制执行，还是对所有三台机器强制执行？U.C.C. §2-201，参见官方评论 2 至 §2-201。

ANSWER: because this is a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more, it has to be evidenced by writing in order for it to be enforceable under 2-201(1). Since there is no writing here, under 2-201(1), the seller has to rely on one of the exceptions to the Statute of Frauds to 2-201. And the facts here, seem to fit 2-201(3)(a). these weight machine were to be specially manufacture for this buyer. They would not be suitable for sell to others in the ordinary course of the seller’s business. And by the time of repudiation, the seller had made a substantial beginning of the manufacturing. So, 2-201(3)(a) seem to clearly be the exception where this case might fall, so that the plaintiff can enforce this oral contract. But the question now is to what extent should this exception make a contract enforceable (just for the one machine that the seller has already made or for all three machines)? Argument for just one machine: 2-201(1) is very clear that the contract is only enforceable to the extent of the quantity indicated in the writing, therefore maybe we should use the same principle when we are using these exceptions like the one in 2-201(3)(a). What’s the argument that this contract should be enforced for all three machines? You could say that the quantity requirement was not specifically mentioned in 2-201(3)(a) as it is in 2-201(1). Nevertheless, one can imagine the reasons why enforcement of the oral contract should be limited to the quantity of goods for which manufacture has begun. For one think you might think 2-201(3)(a) as a codified form of detrimental reliance on the oral agreement and so enforcement ought to be limited to the extent of the detrimental reliance that can be shown in the given case. Another way to view 2-201(3)(a) is as a form of proof of contract by conduct. Even if we view it that way, proof of contract by conduct, the conduct here proves only the existence of a contract for one machine. Now, if, 2-201(3)(a) is really about detrimental reliance, what about the $3000 for outside consulting? Should that mean that the contract is enforceable for all three machines since that $3000 was spent with the expectation that it was going to be possibly spread over three machines? Well, one way to think of it: if the contract had been for one machine then the seller would have charged more for one machine in order to pay for the outside designer than she was able to charge for each machines. At a minimum, maybe the cost for that consultation should be delegated to al three machines rather than just one. That would mean Arlene would get to enforce the contract for one machine at a cost of not $8000 but $10,000. Why $10,000? $2000 higher than was agreed to in order to account for the $2000 of the $3000 consulting fees that would have been allocated to the other two machines. That is part of the detrimental reliance. You might analogize this to 2-201(3)(c) the exception for payments made or goods accepted where Comment 2 tells us that in the case of partial performance there should be a just apportionment made so that the contract can be enforce to the goods accepted for the price paid under 2-201(3)(c). And maybe we can take that just apportionment concept and apply it as well to 2-201(3)(a). How would you make a just apportionment argument here? Once again the problem is that certain subcost has been expanded which would have made the sale of the additional two machines more profitable than the sale of the first because of the $3000 subcost of consulting but we take care of that if we simply force a sale of a single machine for $10,000 rather than a single machine for $8000. If you think about this solution, it ends up being a mixed of expectation and reliance damages in this way: we get expectation damages mainly loss profit of the sale for the one machine ($8000) but you also get reliance damages the extra $2000 for the apportionment fee for the others two machines. Reliance damages is let put the seller in the position that they were in before the contract was even entered into, so we will give them back any cost that they incurred in reliance on the contract. Expectation damages says let’s put them in the position they were in when the contract was fully performed. And sometimes with promissory estoppel, we will only give you reliance damages but not expectation damages.
回答： 因为这是一份价格为 500 美元或以上的商品销售合同，所以必须以书面形式证明，才能根据 2-201（1） 强制执行。 由于这里没有文字，根据 2-201（1），卖方必须依赖 2-201 欺诈法规的例外情况之一。而这里的事实，似乎符合 2-201（3）（a）。 这些举重机是专门为这位买家制造的。在卖方的正常业务过程中，它们不适合出售给其他人。到拒绝时，卖方已经为制造工作做了一个实质性的开端。因此，2-201（3）（a） 似乎显然是本案可能适用的例外情况，因此原告可以执行本口头合同。但现在的问题是，这种例外应该在多大程度上使合同具有可执行性（仅针对卖方已经制造的一台机器或所有三台机器）？只使用一台机器的论点：2-201（1） 非常清楚，合同只能在书面说明的数量范围内强制执行，因此，当我们使用这些例外情况时，也许我们应该使用相同的原则，例如 2-201（3）（a） 中的例外情况。应该对所有三台机器强制执行此合同的论点是什么？ 您可以说 2-201（3）（a） 中没有像 2-201（1） 那样具体提到数量要求。然而，人们可以想象为什么口头合同的执行应该仅限于已经开始制造的商品数量。 例如，你可能会认为 2-201（3）（a） 是对口头协议的有害依赖的成文形式，因此执行应仅限于在特定情况下可以证明的有害依赖的程度。另一种看待 2-201（3）（a） 的方式是作为行为证明合同的一种形式。即使我们这样看，通过行为证明合同，这里的行为也只证明了一台机器的合同的存在。现在，如果 2-201（3）（a） 真的是关于有害的依赖，那么用于外部咨询的 3000 美元呢？这是否意味着合同对所有三台机器都是可执行的，因为那 3000 美元是花在了三台机器上的预期？ 嗯，一种思考方式是：如果合同是一台机器 ， 那么卖方为了支付外部设计师的费用，为一台机器收取的费用会比她能够为每台机器收取的费用更高。至少，也许该咨询的费用应该委托给所有三台机器，而不仅仅是一台。这意味着 Arlene 可以执行一台机器的合同，成本不是 8000 美元，而是 10,000 美元。 为什么是 10,000 美元？ 比商定的 2000 美元高出 3000 美元 ，该费用本应分配给其他两台机器的 3000 美元咨询费。这是有害依赖的一部分。您可以将其类比为 2-201（3）（c），即付款或接受货物的例外情况，其中注释 2 告诉我们，在部分履行的情况下，应进行公正的分摊，以便合同可以强制执行到以 2-201（3）（c） 项下支付的价格接受的货物。 也许我们可以将这个公正的分配概念也应用于 2-201（3）（a）。你会如何在这里提出公正的分配论点？ 同样 ，问题在于某些子成本已经扩大，这将使额外的两台机器的销售比第一台机器的销售更有利可图，因为咨询的子成本为 3000 美元 ，但如果我们简单地强制以 10,000 美元的价格出售一台机器，而不是以 8000 美元的价格出售一台机器，我们会解决这个问题。如果您考虑这个解决方案，它最终会以这种方式成为预期和依赖损害的混合：我们得到的期望损害主要是一台机器的销售利润损失（8000 美元 ）， 但你也会得到其他两台机器的额外 2000 美元的分摊费的依赖损害。Reliance 损害赔偿使卖方处于合同签订之前所处的位置 ，因此我们将退还他们因依赖合同而产生的任何费用。预期损害赔偿说 ，让我们把他们放在合同完全履行时他们所处的位置。有时，在承诺禁止反言的情况下，我们只会给您提供依赖损害赔偿，而不会给您预期损害赔偿。

Problem 5.3 Your law firm just took on a new client, Max Swain, an independent grocery store owner. Max was at an independent grocers’ convention last week and he head a lot about his colleagues’ use of Electronic Data Interchange. Max concedes that he is a traditionalist at heart, but he said that he would not mind eliminating all of the paperwork involved with the current method by which he orders groceries from his various suppliers. Max tells you that he thinks he is ready to “take the plunge” and buy a computer that will enable him to transmit orders via the EDI system. He wants to know if this new method of doing business has any increased risks over the old-fashioned way, and whether there are ways that he might reduce those risks. What do you advise him? U.C.C. §§2-201, 1-201(b)(37), 1-201(b)(43).
问题 5.3 您的律师事务所刚刚接受了一位新客户，Max Swain，一位独立的杂货店老板。Max 上周参加了一个独立的杂货商大会，他对同事们使用电子数据交换的很多意见都很感兴趣 。Max 承认他本质上是一个传统主义者，但他说他不介意消除 与当前他从各个供应商处订购杂货的方法所涉及的所有文书工作。Max 告诉您，他认为他已经准备好“冒险”并购买一台计算机，这将使他能够通过 EDI 系统传输订单。他想知道这种新的经营方式是否 比老式方式的风险更大，以及是否有方法可以降低这些风险。你对他有什么建议？《美国法典》第 2-201 条、1-201（b）（37）、1-201（b）（43） 款。

ANSWER: what are the added risks? Whenever you get into technology there is always the risk of technology breakdown. A bigger risk for Max here is he willing to accept the standard form terms on the electronic purchase order that the grocery industry has formulated for the DVI transactions? Those terms will probably not be quite as favorable to Max as terms on whatever buyer purchaser form he has been using doing it the traditional way. You could point out to Max that in any event how his more favorable terms would play out under the battles of form section doing it the way he has been doing it. So, by forgoing his written form he may not be giving up as much as it seems on surface. There is also the legal risk of the statute of frauds. And if you are doing things electronically rather than by paper, that might be an issue. But it might be less of an issue today and given the definition of writing under 1-201(b)(43) and signature under 1-201(b)(37) and you saw it in the Wal-Mart case in the book, courts are routinely going to accept emails as counting as writings and as counting to have signatures.
回答： 有哪些额外的风险？无论何时进入技术领域，总存在技术故障的风险。对 Max 来说，更大的风险是他愿意接受杂货行业为 DVI 交易制定的电子采购订单上的标准格式条款？这些条款对 Max 来说可能不如他一直使用的任何买方购买表格的条款那么有利 。你可以向 Max 指出，无论如何，他更有利的条件在状态之战部分会如何发挥作用，就像他一直在做的那样。因此，放弃他的书面形式，他可能不会像表面上看起来那样放弃。此外，还存在欺诈法规的法律风险。如果您以电子方式而不是纸质方式做事，那可能是一个问题。但今天这可能不是一个问题，考虑到 1-201（b）（43） 下对写作的定义和 1-201（b）（37） 下的签名定义，您在书中的沃尔玛案中看到了这一点 ，法院通常会接受电子邮件被视为写作和签名。

PAROLE EVIDENCE WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 129
销售货物的假释证据 第 129 页

6.1. a. Arlene Ledger (from Problem 3.2) is having difficulty with her company’s steel supplier, Wilson Steel. Jake Wilson, president of Wilson Steel, had negotiated a contract with Arlene by which Arlene had agreed to purchase all of her company’s requirements for steel over the next year from Wilson at a stated price per ton. In getting Arlene to sign this contract, Jake had assured Arlene that he was so confident of how low his price was, that if she happened to find a lower price during the next year she could buy her steel requirements from the lower-priced competitor. Arlene admits to you that she never did read the contract closely before signing it. Now, Arlene tells you, just two months after signing this contract, she has found a lower-priced steel supplier.
6.1. 一种。 Arlene Ledger（来自问题 3.2）在与公司的钢材供应商 Wilson Steel 合作时遇到了困难。Wilson Steel 总裁 Jake Wilson 与 Arlene 谈判了一份合同，根据该合同，Arlene 同意在明年以每吨的既定价格从 Wilson 那里购买她公司的所有钢材需求。在让 Arlene 签署这份合同时，Jake 向 Arlene 保证，他对自己的价格非常有信心，如果她在明年碰巧找到更低的价格 ， 她可以从价格较低的竞争对手那里购买所需的钢材。Arlene 向你承认，她在签署合同之前从未仔细阅读过合同。现在，Arlene 告诉你，在签订这份合同仅仅两个月后，她就找到了一家价格更低的钢材供应商。

As you look at the contract Arlene signed with Wilson, you notice two things: (1) the contract says nothing about this “low-price guarantee,” and (2) the contract does not contain a merger clause. What do you advise Arlene about her ability to buy her steel requirements from the lower-priced competitor to Wilson? U.C.C. §2-202, Official Comment 3 to §2-202
当您查看 Arlene 与 Wilson 签署的合同时，您会注意到两件事：（1） 合同没有提到这种“低价保证”，以及 （2） 合同不包含合并条款。关于她有能力从 Wilson 的低价竞争对手那里购买所需的钢材，您有什么建议？U.C.C. §2-202，官方评论 3 至 §2-202.

When approaching a parol evidence problem like this one, we need to consider two variables. First, consider the nature of the writing that seeks to exclude extrinsic evidence. Second, consider the nature of the extrinsic evidence sought to be excluded. As to the nature of the writing, there are three possibilities. On the one end, consider the writing is not even final as to the terms included therein. In the middle case, the writing is considered final but only as to the terms that are included within the writing. On the other extreme, there is a writing that is intended to be a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms by both parties, i.e., a fully integrated writing.
在处理 像这样的口头证据问题时，我们需要考虑两个变量。首先，考虑试图排除外在证据的写作的性质。其次，考虑寻求排除的外在证据的性质。至于写作的性质，有三种可能性 。一方面，考虑到写作甚至不是其中包含的术语的最终版本。在中间情况下，写作被认为是最终的，但仅限于写作中包含的术语。在另一个极端，有一种写作旨在成为双方所有条款的完整和排他性陈述，即完全整合的写作。

When considering this problem, we need to categorize this writing into one of these three categories. Given the absence of a merger clause, this writing is not a fully integrated one. This writing falls under category two, namely the writing is intended by the parties to be final but only with respect to the terms that are included therein. Under §2-202(b), extrinsic evidence of consistent additional terms may be introduced in a case like this. Then we need to determine the nature of the extrinsic evidence, namely is the low price guarantee consistent additional terms or contradictory terms. It is not contradictory in the sense that the contract is silent on whether there is a low price guarantee. However, it is contradictory since it goes against the very nature of a typical requirement contract. Under the language of Official Comment 3 to §2-202, if the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the writing in the view of the court, then such evidence must be excluded. The rationale is if it’s a really big deal, if it’s the kind of things that certainly would have been included, then we are not going to let the parol evidence in even though we don’t have a fully integrated writing, as long as we have a writing that is final as to the terms contained therein. Here it doesn’t matter whether the parol evidence is contradictory or while it is consistent, it’s the one kind of consistent additional terms we won’t allow in. At the end, we will not let the parol evidence in. The parol evidence in this problem, the low price evidence, is too significant not to include in the writing. Absent some usage of trade or course of dealings that make this particular low price guarantee “goes without saying” between these parties, this is probably too important a term not to have been included in the writing. So the evidence of the low price guarantee probably will be excluded.
在考虑这个问题时，我们需要将这篇文章归类为这三类之一。鉴于没有合并条款，本文并不是一个完全整合的条款。该书面文件属于第二类，即双方打算将书面文件视为最终文件，但仅限于其中包含的条款。根据 §2-202（b），在此类情况下可以引入一致附加条款的外在证据。那么我们需要确定外在证据的性质，即低价保证是一致的附加条款还是相互矛盾的条款。从某种意义上说，合同没有说明是否有低价保证，这并不矛盾 。然而，这是矛盾的，因为它违背了典型需求契约的本质。根据 §2-202 的官方意见 3 的措辞 ，如果附加条款是这样的，如果达成一致，法院认为它们肯定会被包含在书面中，那么此类证据必须被排除在外。理由是，如果这真的是一件大事，如果它是肯定会被包括在内的那种事情，那么即使我们没有完全整合的书面文件，我们也不会让口头证据进来 ，只要我们的书面文件对其中包含的条款是最终的。在这里， 口头证据是矛盾的还是一致的并不重要 ， 这是我们不允许的一种一致的附加条款 。 最后，我们不会让口头证据进来。 这个问题的口头证据， 低价证据，太重要了，不能不包括在写作中。由于没有一些贸易或交易过程的使用使这种特殊的低价保证在这些各方之间“ 不言而喻 ”，这可能是一个太重要的术语，不能不包括在书面文件中。 因此 ，低价保证的证据可能会被排除在外。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that the contract does contain a merger clause, and Jake gave Arlene the price guarantee after the two had signed the contract. In a suit to enforce the contract, may Arlene introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee? U.C.C. §§2-202, 2-209(1).
b. 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是合同确实包含合并条款，Jake 在两人签署合同后向 Arlene 提供了价格保证。在执行合同的诉讼中，Arlene 是否可以提供 Jake 价格保证的证据？ 《美国法典》第 2-2 条第 02 款、2-209（1） 款。

As a side deal entered into after the signing of the contract, this is not parol evidence, but a modification to the contract. As such, §2-202 does not bar it. §2-209(1) says you don’t need consideration for a modification to be binding. Then we need to consider whether the modification is valid against statute of fraud. §2-201 is about the parties’ ability to enforce a contract. As long as there is a writing to the main contract, the modification does not have to be in writing. §2-201 is only going to come into play if, for example, the modification is such that it brings the contract into §2-201 for the first time, meaning it raises the price over $500; or if the modification increases quantity, in which case the increased quantity cannot be enforced
作为合同签订后签订的附带协议，这不是口头证据，而是对合同的修改。因此，§2-202 并未禁止它。§2-209（1） 说你不需要考虑修改具有约束力。然后我们需要考虑修改是否对欺诈法规有效。§2-201 是关于双方执行合同的能力。只要有对主合同的书面说明，修改就不必以书面形式进行。§2-201 只有在修改后首次将合同纳入 §2-201 时才会发挥作用，这意味着它将价格提高到 500 美元以上;或者如果修改增加了数量，在这种情况下，无法强制执行增加的数量.

c. Same facts as part (a), except that the contract does contain a merger clause, and Jake and Arlene have done these requirements contracts several times in the past. In all of these prior deals, Jake has made the same oral assurances concerning the price guarantee, but Arlene has never had to exercise her rights under the guarantee. In a suit to enforce the contract, may Arlene introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee? U.C.C. §§1-303 (formly §1-205), 2-202.
c. 事实与 （a） 部分相同，只是合同确实包含合并条款，并且 Jake 和 Arlene 过去曾多次签订这些要求合同。在之前的所有这些交易中，Jake 都对价格保证做出了相同的口头保证，但 Arlene 从未行使过她在保证下的权利。在执行合同的诉讼中，Arlene 是否可以提供 Jake 价格保证的证据？ 《美国法典》第 1-303 条（ 原第 1-205 条）、第 2-202 条。

This is evidence of the parties’ course of dealing. As such, Arlene can introduce this evidence under §2-202(a), which says even if the parties have a fully integrated writing, a party can still introduce evidence of the parties’ course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade as long as it is to explain or supplement the writing.
这是双方交易过程的证据。因此，Arlene 可以根据 §2-202（a） 引入这些证据，该条款规定，即使双方有完全整合的书面文件，一方仍然可以提供双方履行过程、交易过程或贸易惯例的证据， 只要是为了解释或补充书面文件。

Then the question becomes in this case is this evidence the parties’ course of dealing. Course of dealing is defined in §1-303(b) as “a sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.” Jake can make an argument that this is not course of dealing evidence, because even though the parties have talked about this, but they have never actually done it. So there is no conduct. Under Official Comment 2 to §2-202, the course of actual performance by the parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing to mean. Here there is no actual performance, only Jake’s promises on the low price guarantee.
那么问题就变成了在这种情况下，这些证据是双方的交往过程吗。交易过程在 §1-303（b） 中定义为 “ 特定交易各方之间关于先前交易的一系列行为，这些行为应公平地被视为为解释其表达和其他行为建立了共同的理解基础。“ Jake 可以提出一个论点，说这不是处理证据的过程，因为即使双方已经谈论过这件事，但他们从未真正这样做过。 所以没有行为。根据 §2-202 的官方意见 2，各方的实际履行过程被认为是他们打算写作含义的最佳指标。这里没有实际的表现，只有 Jake 对低价保证的承诺 。

d. Same facts as part (a), except that the contract does contain a merger clause, and Jake and the customer in this industry is that for requirements contracts like this one, the price is typically the lowest price that the buyer could get from any other source at the time it requires each steal shipment. In a suit to enforce the contract, may Arlene introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee? If not, may she nevertheless introduce evidence of the price custom in the industry, which in fact is identical to what Jake guaranteed orally? U.C.C. §§1-303 (formly §1-205), 2-202.
d.与第 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是合同确实包含合并条款，并且 Jake 和 该行业的客户是，对于像这样的需求合同，价格通常是买方在需要每次偷货时可以从任何其他来源获得的最低价格。在执行合同的诉讼中，Arlene 是否可以提供 Jake 价格保证的证据？如果不是，她是否可以引入行业价格习俗的证据，这实际上与 Jake 口头保证的相同？《美国法典》第 1-303 条（ 原第 1-205 条）、第 2-202 条。

Given the merger clause, this is probably a fully integrated writing. As such, Arlene cannot introduce evidence of Jake’s price guarantee, even though it sounds very close to what the price custom in the industry is. Nevertheless, Arlene can introduce evidence of the price custom in the industry according to §2-202(a). However, Jake can make an argument that this evidence does not explain or supplement the writing, it contradicts it. Arlene can counter that argument by pointing to Official Comment 2 to §2-202, which says if a party wants to keep out evidence of usage of trade, he can carefully negates it in the contract. If Jake is aware of this industry custom, he should have carefully negated it in drafting the contract. If he doesn’t do that, Jake is probably going to lose given that courts are lenient towards the party seeking to introduce usage of trade evidence and generally give a broad definition to what it means to explain or supplement as is required to introduce under §2-202(a).
考虑到合并条款，这可能是一篇完全整合的文章。因此，Arlene 无法提供 Jake 价格保证的证据，即使这听起来非常接近业内的价格习惯。尽管如此，Arlene 可以根据 §2-202（a） 引入行业价格习惯的证据。然而，Jake 可以提出一个论点，即这些证据并不能解释或补充写作，它与写作相矛盾 。Arlene 可以通过引用 §2-202 的官方评论 2 来反驳这一论点 ，该评论指出，如果一方想要排除使用贸易的证据，他可以在合同中小心地否定它。如果 Jake 知道这个行业惯例，他应该在起草合同时小心翼翼地否定它。如果他不这样做，Jake 可能会输，因为法院对寻求引入商业证据使用的一方很宽容，并且通常会对 §2-202（a） 要求引入的解释或补充的含义给出宽泛的定义。

6.2. You have finally learned your lesson about doing business with your one-time law school classmate and Rolls Royce collector Deborah Swift (from Problem 1.6). Unfortunately, one of your friends has not. Justin Roberts, a non-lawyer and neighbor of yours, comes to you for some friendly advice about a problem that he is having with Deborah. Justin, himself a car buff, had gone with a friend to Deborah’s house and had done a “handshake deal” with Deborah to buy Deborah’s four ’89 Rolls Royces for $17,000 each. According to this oral agreement, Justin was to pick the car up in 30 days.
6.2. 您终于学到了与曾经的法学院同学、劳斯莱斯收藏家 Deborah Swift（来自问题 1.6）做生意的教训。不幸的是，你的一个朋友没有。贾斯汀·罗伯茨 （Justin Roberts） 是一位非律师，也是您的邻居，他来找您，就他与 Deborah 之间的问题提供一些友好的建议。贾斯汀本人就是一个汽车迷，他和朋友一起去了黛博拉的家，并与黛博拉做了一个“ 握手交易 ”， 以每辆 17,000 美元的价格买下了黛博拉的四辆 89 年劳斯莱斯 。根据这份口头协议，贾斯汀将在 30 天内取车。

The day after Justin’s visit to Deborah’s house, he received a signed letter from her purporting to confirm their agreement. Deborah’s letter, however, said their agreement was for Justin to purchase just two of her ’89 Rolls Royces, and for $25,000 each instead of $17,000. Following receipt of that letter, Justin tried for two weeks to reach Deborah to clear up what he thought might have been an honest mistake on her part about the terms of their deal. When Justin finally did reach her, Deborah insisted that it was “her way or the highway,” even though Justin’s friend was willing to swear that Justin’s version of the oral agreement was correct.
贾斯汀拜访黛博拉家的第二天 ，他收到了她的一封签名信，声称确认了他们的协议。然而，黛博拉的信中说，他们的协议是让贾斯汀只购买她的两辆 89 年劳斯莱斯 ，每辆 25,000 美元，而不是 17,000 美元。收到那封信后，贾斯汀花了两周时间试图联系黛博拉，以澄清他认为她对他们的交易条款可能是一个诚实的错误。当贾斯汀终于找到她时，黛博拉坚持说这是 “ 她的方式或高速公路”， 尽管贾斯汀的朋友愿意发誓贾斯汀版本的口头协议是正确的。

If you represent Justin, for what quantity and price will you be able to enforce his deal with Deborah? U.C.C. §§2-201, 2-202, 2-207.
如果你代表贾斯汀，你能以多少数量和价格执行他与黛博拉的交易？ 《美国法典》第 2-201、2-202、2-207 条。

Here, we don’t have a writing that is intended to be final even as to the terms contained therein, since that single confirmation is only the seller’s conception of the deal. So we have no parol evidence problem here and §2-202 does not bar the buyer’s contradictory evidence on the price and quantity. The general rule under §2-207 concerning different terms in a single confirmation is the different terms in a single confirmation is mere proposal. We rejected the knock-out rule under this circumstance, because it would potentially allow one party to unilaterally change the terms of an already concluded oral contract, if the different term that was in the confirmation did not agree with the UCC gap-filler, the party that wants to get out of that can simply knock that term out. Normally under §2-207, different terms in a single confirmation is mere proposal that have to be separately accepted by the other side, or they will not become part of the contract. But here we have a problem and we need to bring in §2-201. Here the buyer cannot enforce the contract for 4 cars, because under §2-201(1), such a contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity that’s stated in the writing. This is an exception to the usual rule in §2-207, namely additional terms in a single confirmation are mere proposals, UNLESS the different term is QUANTITY! Then the other party is limited to that quantity term. Here the requirement of §2-201 supersedes those of §2-207 because you cannot get to terms before you have enforceability. And one of the requirements to enforceability in §2-201 is QUANTITY. Official Comment 6 to §2-207 also says the written confirmation is also subject to §2-201. So in this problem Justin the buyer will not be able to enforce a contract with Deborah the seller beyond the 2 cars that are mentioned in her signed confirmation. That confirmation letter will quality as the writing Justin needs to enforce the contract at all under §2-201(1). However, Justin is not bound by the $25,000 price per car contained in that confirmation. Now we can go back to the usual rule concerning different terms in a single confirmation under §2-207. The $25,000 will be mere proposal and Justin will reject and go with the price in the original oral contract, namely $17,000 per car. The writing that serves to satisfy the Statute of Frauds is not conclusive as to the terms of the contract other than the quantity. Official Comment 3 to §2-201 says the only effect of failing to object to the confirmation is to take away from the party who fails to answer the defense of the Statute of Frauds; the burden of persuading the trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally prior to the written confirmation is unaffected. Now it’s up to the trier of fact. Justin can bring in his witness.
在这里，我们没有旨在成为最终的书面文件，即使其中包含的条款也是如此，因为该确认只是卖方对交易的概念。 因此 ，我们在这里没有口头证据问题，§2-202 并不 禁止买方就价格和数量提供相互矛盾的证据。§2-207 中关于单个确认中不同术语的一般规则是，单个确认中的不同术语仅属提案。在这种情况下，我们拒绝了取消规则，因为它可能允许一方单方面更改已经签订的口头合同的条款，如果确认书中的不同条款与 UCC 空白填补条款不一致，想要退出该条款的一方可以简单地取消该条款。通常，根据 §2-207，单一确认书中的不同条款只是提案，必须 由另一方单独接受，否则它们不会成为合同的一部分。但是这里我们有一个问题 ，我们需要引入 §2-201。在这里，买方不能执行 4 辆车的合同，因为根据 §2-201（1），此类合同不能超出书面中规定的数量。这是 §2-207 中通常规则的例外，即单个确认中的附加条款只是提案，除非不同的条款是 QUANTITY！然后，另一方仅限于该数量项。 在这里，§2-201 的要求取代了 §2-207 的要求，因为在具有可执行性之前，您无法达成条款。§2-201 中对可执行性的要求之一是数量。§2-207 的官方注释 6 还表示，书面确认也受 §2-201 的约束 。 因此 ，在这个问题中，买方 Justin 将无法执行与卖方 Deborah 的合同，超出她签署的确认书中提到的 2 辆车。该确认信的质量与 Justin 根据 §2-201（1） 执行合同所需的写作一样。但是，Justin 不受该确认中包含的每辆车 25,000 美元价格的约束。现在我们可以回到 §2-207 中关于单个确认中不同术语的通常规则 。25,000 美元只是提议，贾斯汀将拒绝并采用原始口头合同中的价格，即每辆车 17,000 美元。除数量外，用于满足欺诈法规的文字对于合同条款并不是决定性的。§2-201 的官方评论 3 表示，不反对确认的唯一效果是剥夺了未能回答欺诈法规辩护的一方;说服审理者相信事实证明合同实际上是在书面确认之前口头订立的负担不受影响。现在取决于事实的审判者。贾斯汀可以带来他的证词。

REQUISITES TO FORMALIZATION PP. 145
正规化的必要条件 第 145 页

7.1. a. Jay Berringer, owner of Jay’s Rent-to-Own Pianos (Problem 2.3), is back in your office with more questions. It seems that one of Jay’s brand new workers, Sam Clark, did not realize that Jay’s policy was that all of his store leases were to be in writing. As a write, Sam entered into an oral lease contract with Bonnie Kilgen. The terms of that “handshake deal” were that Bonnie would lease a used Steinway upright piano for $75 per month for one year, with an option for $150 to renew the lease for one more year on the same terms. Jay wants to know to what extent this oral lease contract will be enforceable if Bonnie decides she does not want to go forward with it. What do you advise? U.C.C. §2A-201.
7.1. 一种。Jay's Rent-to-Own Pianos（问题 2.3） 的所有者 Jay Berringer 带着更多问题回到了您的办公室 。似乎 Jay 的一位新员工 Sam Clark 没有意识到 Jay 的政策是他所有的商店租约都必须以书面形式签订。作为写作者，Sam 与 Bonnie Kilgen 签订了一份口头租赁合同 。那次 “ 握手协议 ” 的条款是，Bonnie 将以每月 75 美元的价格租赁一架二手施坦威立式钢琴，为期一年，并可选择以 150 美元的价格以相同的条款再续租一年。Jay 想知道，如果 Bonnie 决定不想继续执行，这份口头租赁合同将在多大程度上具有可执行性。您有什么建议？《美国法典》第 2A-201 条。

Since the total payment to be made under the lease contract minus the payment for option to renew is less than $1,000, the oral lease contract is enforceable under §2A-201(1).
由于根据租赁合同支付的总付款减去续约选择权的付款少于 1,000 美元，因此口头租赁合同可根据 §2A-201（1） 强制执行。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that the oral contract required that the first year’s rent would be $100 per month and would all be paid up-front in one $1,200 payment, which Bonnie has already made. The one-year lease renewal option is for $50 per month, rent to be paid at the start of each month. To what extent is this oral lease agreement enforceable by Bonnie? U.C.C. §2A-201, Official Comment to §2A-201.
b. 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是口头合同要求第一年的租金为每月 100 美元，并且全部以 1,200 美元的形式预先支付，Bonnie 已经支付了。一年的续租选项是每月 50 美元，租金在每个月初支付。Bonnie 在多大程度上可以执行此口头租赁协议？U.C.C. §2A-201，对 §2A-201 的官方评论。

Under the reading of §2A-201(1), this oral lease agreement is not enforceable since it is not in writing and the total payment to be made under the agreement minus the payment for option to renew exceeds $1,000. And Comment to §2A-201 says there’s no exception for transaction over payment has been made and accepted.
根据 §2A-201（1） 的解读 ，该口头租赁协议不可执行，因为它不是书面的，并且根据该协议支付的总付款减去续签选择权的付款超过 1,000 美元。 对 §2A-201 的评论说， 已经完成并接受了超额付款的交易没有例外。

However, Bonnie may be able to make a policy argument that this particular oral lease agreement should be enforceable. Comment to §2A-201 says the rationale for the drafters for not bringing in the payment exception for lease contract as they did for sales contract is because normally the lessee do not pay all the rent upfront, but rather on a monthly basis, yet that is precisely what happened in this case. Bonnie made a lump sum rent payment upfront, and the lessor accepted the payment. If Bonnie wins on her part performance argument, the lease terms she can enforce, under §2A-201(5), would be “a reasonable lease term”. If, however, Bonnie loses on her argument to fit within the part performance argument, she may then turn to the common law promissory estoppel or restitution doctrine. In this case, restitution damages equals Bonnie’s reliance damages, Bonnie would only get her money back. Under promissory estoppel, Bonnie would get expectation damages, meaning Bonnie would get to go through with the lease including the option to renew, which is more preferable for Bonnie.
但是，Bonnie 可能能够提出一个政策论点，即这个特定的口头租赁协议应该是可执行的。对 §2A-201 的评论称，起草者没有像销售合同那样为租赁合同引入付款例外的理由是，通常承租人不会预先支付所有租金，而是按月支付，但这正是本案中发生的情况。Bonnie 预先支付了一次性租金，出租人接受了这笔付款。如果 Bonnie 在履行论点上获胜，她可以根据 §2A-201（5） 执行的租赁条款将是 “ 合理的租赁条款 ”。然而，如果 Bonnie 在符合部分履行论点的论点上败诉，她可以求助于普通法承诺禁止反言或赔偿原则。在这种情况下，赔偿金等于 Bonnie 的赡养费，Bonnie 只能拿回她的钱。根据承诺禁止反言，Bonnie 将获得预期损害赔偿，这意味着 Bonnie 可以完成租约，包括续约的选择权，这对 Bonnie 来说更可取 。

NOTE: Expectation damages means to put the party in the position as if the contract was honored by the other side, while reliance damages means to put the party back in the position before she made any expenditure in reliance on the other side’s promise.
注意：Expectation damage 的意思是使一方处于另一方履行合同的位置，而 reliance damage 的意思是使一方回到她依赖另一方的承诺进行任何支出之前的位置 。

c. Same facts as part (a), except that the first year’s rent was $100 per month and Jay’s has delivered the piano to Bonnie, who accepted it and began using it. Two months later, however, before any written lease contract is executed, Bonnie enters into a written contract with a neighbor by which Bonnie purports to lease the piano to the neighbor for $200 per month for one year. Jay learns about this and decides that he would like to rent the piano to the neighbor for $200 per month instead of to Bonnie for $100 per month. May Jay void Bonnie’s oral lease so that he may enter into a new lease with her neighbor? U.C.C. §2A-201.
c. 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是第一年的租金是每月 100 美元，而且 Jay's 已经将钢琴交给了 Bonnie，Bonnie 接受了它并开始使用它。然而，两个月后，在签署任何书面租赁合同之前，Bonnie 与邻居签订了一份书面合同，根据该合同，Bonnie 声称以每月 200 美元的价格将钢琴租给邻居，为期一年。Jay 了解到这一点并决定以每月 200 美元的价格将钢琴租给邻居，而不是以每月 100 美元的价格租给 Bonnie。Jay 可以取消 Bonnie 的口头租约，以便他可以 和她的邻居签订新的租约吗？ 《美国法典》第 2A-201 条。

No, Jay cannot void Bonnie’s oral lease. Even though the writing requirement is not met, this problem satisfied the exception listed under §2A-201(4)(c), which allows lease contract to be enforceable despite the lack of writing with respect to goods that have been received and accepted by the lessee. The length of the lease term Bonnie can enforce would be “a reasonable lease term” under §2A-201(5).
不，Jay 不能取消 Bonnie 的口头租约。即使没有满足书面要求，这个问题也满足了 §2A-201（4）（c） 中列出的例外情况，该例外允许在承租人已接收和接受的货物缺乏书面规定的情况下，租赁合同可以强制执行。Bonnie 可以执行的租赁期限长度将是 §2A-201（5） 下的 “ 合理租赁期限 ”。

7.2. a. Susan Heil, an authorized sales agent for Ford Motor Co. of Detroit, entered into an oral contract on behalf of Ford Motor with Toronto Ford, a Canadian car dealership. The two sides agreed orally that Ford Motor Co. would sell Toronto Ford 36 Taurus station wagons at the manufacturer’s standard dealer price, delivery to take place in one month. The two sides also agreed orally that Michigan law (excluding the CISG) would govern the transaction. Shortly before delivery, Toronto Ford indicates to Susan that it wants out of the deal. Susan eventually files a lawsuit in Detroit to enforce the oral contract. Toronto Ford moves for summary judgment, pleading the statute of frauds defense and attaching a signed affidavit denying that it ever entered into a contract with the plaintiff. If you are the trial judge, should you grant the summary judgment motion? C.I.S.G. Arts. 1(1), 6, 11; U.C.C. §2-201.
7.2. 一种。 底特律福特汽车公司的授权销售代理 Susan Heil 代表福特汽车与加拿大汽车经销商多伦多福特签订了一份口头合同。双方口头同意，福特汽车公司将按制造商的标准经销商价格销售多伦多福特 36 Taurus 旅行车 ，交货时间为一个月内。双方还口头同意密歇根州法律（不包括 CISG）将管辖该交易。在交货前不久，多伦多福特向苏珊表示它希望退出这笔交易。苏珊最终在底特律提起诉讼以执行口头合同。Toronto Ford 提出简易判决，为欺诈法规辩护辩护，并附上一份签署的宣誓书，否认曾 与原告签订合同。如果您是主审法官，您应该批准简易判决动议吗？C.I.S.G. 第 1（1）、6、11 条;加州大学 §2-201.

If this contract is governed by C.I.S.G., then there is no requirement that the contract be in writing in order for the contract to be enforceable under C.I.S.G. Art. 11. If this contract is governed by C.I.S.G., then Toronto Ford’s statute of fraud defense would be ineffective. In that case, the contract would be enforceable despite lack of writing. However, if Michigan law applies, then UCC §2-201 will govern, which says lack of writing is a valid defense to enforceability. As such, we need to determine by which law this contract is governed. By default, this contract is subject to C.I.S.G., because the parties are from different contracting states that have adopted the C.I.S.G. per C.I.S.G. Art. 1(1). However, C.I.S.G. Art. 6 says parties can always agree between themselves to opt out of C.I.S.G. coverage. The two sides in this problem did just that, albeit orally. Here Toronto Ford would want the UCC to govern, since only by using the UCC statute of frauds provision can Toronto Ford’s statute of frauds defense stand. However, the problem for that is in order for the UCC to apply here, Toronto Ford will need to allege that application of Michigan law was part of its oral agreement with Ford Motor Co., but Toronto Ford denied in the affidavit that there ever was an oral deal. Instead of having Ford Motor Co.’s complain dismissed on the pleading, Toronto Ford would probably ultimately have to make its case to a jury for the nonexistence of this oral contract. Since the only way for them to argue for the operation of Michigan law is by admitting there was in fact an oral contract, and admission is another exception to the statute of frauds. Toronto Ford could try to get Susan Heil to concede on deposition that in the oral contract she is alleging, there was in fact a Michigan choice-of-law term. Then on the pleadings, Toronto Ford can make the argument that there’s no contract at all. And Ford Motor Co. will say there is an oral contract with Michigan law. Therefore, by Ford Motor Co.’s own admission, the UCC statute of frauds says this contract is unenforceable in the absence of a writing. As such, the case would be dismissed.
如果本合同受 C.I.S.G. 管辖，则无需合同采用书面形式才能根据 C.I.S.G. 第 11 条执行合同。如果这份合同受 C.I.S.G. 管辖，那么 Toronto Ford 的欺诈辩护法规将无效。在这种情况下，尽管没有书面规定，但合同是可执行的。但是，如果密歇根州法律适用，则 UCC §2-201 将适用，该条款规定缺乏书面规定是对可执行性的有效辩护。因此，我们需要确定此合同受哪部法律管辖。默认情况下，本合同受 C.I.S.G. 的约束，因为双方来自不同的缔约国，这些国家根据 C.I.S.G. 第 1 条第 （1） 款采用了 C.I.S.G.。然而，C.I.S.G. Art.6 表示各方始终可以达成一致，选择退出 C.I.S.G. 保险。这个问题的双方就是这样做的，尽管是口头上的。在这里，多伦多福特希望 UCC 进行管辖，因为只有使用 UCC 欺诈法规条款，多伦多福特的欺诈法规辩护才能成立。然而，问题在于 ， 为了让 UCC 在这里适用，多伦多福特需要声称密歇根州法律的适用是其与福特汽车公司口头协议的一部分，但多伦多福特在宣誓书中否认曾经有过口头交易。而不是拥有福特汽车公司。 的投诉被驳回，多伦多福特可能最终不得不向陪审团证明这份口头合同不存在。 因为他们为密歇根州法律的实施辩护的唯一方法是承认实际上存在口头合同，而承认是欺诈法规的另一个例外。多伦多福特可以尝试让苏珊·海尔在证词中承认 ，在她所指控的口头合同中，实际上有一个密歇根州的法律选择条款。然后在诉状上，多伦多福特可以提出根本没有合同的论点。福特汽车公司将表示与密歇根州法律签订了口头合同。因此，由福特汽车公司 UCC 欺诈法规自己承认，在没有书面规定的情况下，该合同是不可执行的。因此，该案将被驳回。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that the two parties do have a written sales contract. The contract, which has no merger clause, mentions all of the relevant terms except the fact that Michigan law (excluding the CISG) will govern the transaction. The choice-of-law provision was an oral side agreement that the two parties entered into before the writing was signed. Now Toronto Ford has breached the contract, and Susan Heil would like to avail her company of the UCC’s remedy provisions rather than the CISG’s. Will Susan be able to successfully introduce evidence of the side agreement on choice of law? C.I.S.G. Arts. 1(1), 6, 8(3); U.C.C. §2-202, Official Comment 3 to §2-202.
湾。 事实与 （a） 部分相同，只是双方确实有书面销售合同。该合同没有合并条款，除了 密歇根州法律（不包括 CISG）将管辖该交易这一事实外，提到了所有相关条款。法律选择条款是双方在签署书面协议之前签订的口头附带协议 。现在多伦多福特违反了合同，Susan Heil 想利用 UCC 的补救条款而不是 CISG 的补救条款 。Susan 能否成功提出关于法律选择的附加协议的证据？C.I.S.G. 第 1（1）、6、8（3） 条;加州大学 §2-202，官方意见 3 至 §2-202。

By default, this contract is governed by the C.I.S.G. before the parol evidence can be introduced by either side under C.I.S.G. Art. 1(1). On the other hand, C.I.S.G. Art. 6 says parties can always agree between themselves to opt out of C.I.S.G. coverage. Unlike U.C.C., C.I.S.G. does not have a parol evidence rule. It’s quite liberal in its willingness to consider evidence of all kinds in interpreting the parties’ contract under C.I.S.G. Art. 8(3). Ford Motor Co. can avail itself of the U.C.C. remedies. At the point when the parol evidence is sought to be introduced, U.C.C. §2-202 should not apply to bar introduction of the evidence because the U.C.C.’s application depends here on the parol evidence about choice of law first being introduced and the C.I.S.G. would allow that.
默认情况下，该合同由 C.I.S.G. 管辖，任何 一方都可以根据 C.I.S.G. 第 1（1） 条提出口头证据。另一方面，C.I.S.G. Art.6 表示各方始终可以达成一致，选择退出 C.I.S.G. 保险。与加州大学不同，C.I.S.G. 没有口头证据规则。它愿意根据 C.I.S.G. 第 8（3） 条在解释双方合同时考虑各种证据 ，这是相当自由的。福特汽车公司可以利用 UCC 的补救措施。在寻求引入口头证据时 ，UCC §2-202 不应适用于禁止引入证据，因为 U.C.C. 的适用取决于 首先引入法律选择的口头证据，而 CISG 会允许这样做。

7.3. a. When Pete Smarz’s daughter, Denise, got married two years ago, Pete decided that he would help out the newlywed couple by letting them rent his second home in West Virginia. Pete told Denise and her husband, Bill, that the two of them could rent the house for two years at $500 per month. All of the parties agree with that portion of the facts. Denise and Bill claim that Pete also told the two of them that if they were still married and had a child at the nd of the two years, Pete would let them buy the house for its appraised value less the total of the rent payments they made for two years. Pete denies that he ever gave the couple this purchase option. Denise tells you that her father is just angry because he and Bill had a falling out, and her father just wants to get back at Bill by kicking both of them out of the house. It has now been two years since the lease began, Denise and Bill have a six-month-old son, and the house has been appraised at $150,000. Denise asks you whether she can enforce the purchase option and buy the house from her father for $138,000, which is the appraised value minus the rent payments made. What do you advise her?
7.3. 一种。 两年前， 当 Pete Smarz 的女儿 Denise 结婚时，Pete 决定让这对新婚夫妇 租下他在西弗吉尼亚州的第二套房子。皮特告诉丹尼斯和她的丈夫比尔，他们两个可以以每月 500 美元的价格租两年的房子。 所有 parties 都同意这部分事实。丹尼斯和比尔声称，皮特还告诉他们两个，如果他们在两年后仍然结婚并有一个孩子 ，皮特会让他们以评估价值减去他们两年支付的租金总额来购买这所房子。皮特否认他曾经给这对夫妇这个购买选择权。丹妮丝告诉你，她爸爸只是因为他和比尔闹翻了而生气，她爸爸只是想把他们俩都赶出家门来报复比尔。租约开始已经两年了，Denise 和 Bill 有一个六个月大的儿子，房子的估价为 150,000 美元。Denise 问您是否可以执行购买选择权，以 138,000 美元的价格从她父亲那里买下这栋房子，这是评估价值减去支付的租金。你对她有什么建议？

Denise’s main problem in enforcing this oral agreement is she lacks a writing to evidence this contract. So she fails the common law statute of frauds for real estate sales. She might try to fit within the part performance exception to the statute of frauds, but here she probably won’t qualify for that exception, because none of the actions taken by Denise and her husband might count as part performance are actions that necessarily indicate reliance on the alleged sale agreement.
丹尼斯在执行这份口头协议时的主要问题是她缺乏证明这份合同的书面文件。 因此 ，她没有通过普通法中关于房地产销售欺诈的法规。她可能会试图将部分履行例外情况纳入欺诈法规，但在这里她可能不符合该例外情况，因为 Denise 和她丈夫采取的任何行动都不能算作部分履行，这些行为必然表明对所谓的销售协议的依赖。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that Denise and Bill added a two-story addition to the back of the house during their second year in the house, for a total cost of $40,000. To what extent does this help their case for enforcement of the purchase option?
b. 与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Denise 和 Bill 在入住房屋的第二年在房屋后面加建了两层楼，总成本为 40,000 美元。这在多大程度上有助于他们执行购买选择权的案例？

This helps greatly, because the building of a two-story addition at their expense will definitely seem to help their part performance argument, since they will not spend the time and money on building the addition if they didn’t believe they have the right to purchase the house at the end of the rental period. In Richard v. Richard, the court put a lot of weight on the fact that the couple invested some real money and sweat equity in permanent improvements that were in fact much less significant than the $40,000 addition in this problem. Yet the Richard Court felt that was enough.
这有很大帮助，因为以他们的费用建造两层楼的加建 似乎肯定会有助于他们的部分性能论点，因为如果他们不相信自己有权在租赁期结束时购买房屋，他们就不会花费时间和金钱来建造加建。在理查德诉理查德案中 ，法院非常重视这对夫妇在永久性改进中投入了一些真金白银和汗水资产的事实，这些改进实际上远不如在这个问题上增加的 40,000 美元重要。然而， 理查德· 考特认为这已经足够了。

WARRANTIES WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 161-164
货物销售的保证 第 161-164 页

8.1. a. You just sold your law school classmate a computer that you had owned for three months. A week after the sale, your classmate complains that the characters on the screen fade noticeably after about 20 minutes. You had never noticed this when you used the computer. Have you breached the implied warranty of merchantability? U.C.C. §2-314.
8.1. 一个。你刚刚卖给你的法学院同学一台你拥有三个月的电脑。促销一周后，您的同学抱怨屏幕上的字符在大约 20 分钟后明显褪色。当您使用计算机时，您从未注意到这一点。您是否违反了适销性的默示保证？《美国法典》第 2-314 条。

U.C.C. Article 2 applies even when there is no merchant in a sale. §2-102 says Article 2 applies in transactions in goods. And “goods” is defined in §2-105 as “things that are movable at the time of sale”. Thus even a non-merchant seller sales something that’s movable, that sale will be subject to the rules of Article 2.
即使销售中没有商家，《美国法典》第 2 条也适用。 §2-102 规定第 2 条适用于货物交易。§2-105 将 “ 货物 ” 定义为 “ 在销售时可移动的物品 ”。 因此 ，即使是非商家卖家销售动产， 该销售也将受到第 2 条规则的约束。

In this problem the seller did not make an implied warranty of merchantability because the seller is not a merchant. §2-314(1) says warranty of merchantability arises when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. When the seller is a merchant selling goods of that kind, there’s a greater level of reliance by the buyer.
在这个问题中 ，卖方没有对适销性做出默示保证，因为卖方不是商人。§2-314（1） 规定，当卖方是此类商品的商人时，即产生适销性保证。当卖方是销售此类商品的商人时， 买方的依赖程度会更高。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that you knew about the fading problem and did not mention it prior to the sale. Have you breached the implied warranty of merchantaility? Are you liable on some other theory? U.C.C. §§2-314, 1-304 (formly §1-203), 1-201(b)(19) (formly §1-201(19)); Official Comment 3 to §2-314.
b. 与第 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是您知道淡化问题，并且在销售前未提及。您是否违反了商铺的默示保证 ？你对其他理论负责吗？《美国法典》第 2-314 条、第 1-304 条（ 原第 1-203 条）、第 1-201（b）（19） 条（ 原第 1-201（19） 条）;§2-314 的官方评论 3。

In this problem the seller did not make an implied warranty of merchantability because the seller is not a merchant. §2-314(1) says warranty of merchantability arises when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. However, the seller did violate the obligation of good faith under §1-304, which arises in all sales, even when the seller is not a merchant. Under the definition of good faith in §1-201(20), the good faith requirement include both a subject and objective element, meaning honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing with the trade. Comment 3 to §2-314 also impose upon the seller an obligation to disclose known material but hidden defects.
在这个问题中，卖方没有对适销性做出默示保证，因为卖方不是商人。 §2-314（1） 规定，当卖方是此类商品的商人时，即产生适销性保证。但是，卖方确实违反了 §1-304 规定的诚信义务，该义务存在于所有销售中，即使卖方不是商家也是如此。根据 §1-201（20） 中对诚信的定义，诚信要求包括主体和客观要素，即事实上的诚实和遵守公平交易的合理商业标准。§2-314 的第 3 条评论还要求卖方有义务披露已知但隐藏的缺陷。

c. Same facts as part (a), except that you knew about the fading problem and not only did you not mention it, you told your classmate that this computer was “super”. Have you breached an express warranty? Are you liable on some other theory? U.C.C. §2-313, Official Comment 3 and 8 to §2-313, §1-103.
c. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是您知道衰落问题，并且您不仅没有提及它， 还告诉您的同学这台计算机是 “ 超级 ” 的。您是否违反了明示保证？你对其他理论负责吗？U.C.C. §2-313，官方评论 3 和 8 至 §2-313，§1-103。

Any seller, no matter a merchant or not, can make an express warranty under §2-313. If the seller’s statement that the computer was “super” was not an express warranty, there’s another category of statement known as “puffing” described in §2-313(2) as “statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods”. Such puffing does not create a warranty. Under an action for breach of express warranty, the buyer has the burden of proof. However, Comment 3 & 8 to §2-313 say this burden shifts to the seller to show lack of reliance by the buyer on any affirmation of facts that were made during the course of the bargain, once the seller made such affirmation of facts during the course of the bargain. Ultimately the test to determine whether the seller’s statement falls under the category of puffing or if it creates an express warranty is found in Comment 8 to §2-313: whether the statement “in objective judgment become part of the basis of the bargain”. Even if the seller’s statement in this problem is found to be mere puffing and therefore does not create an express warranty, still, under Comment 8 to §2-313, the seller might be liable for fraud or misrepresentation.
任何卖家，无论是否是商家，都可以根据 §2-313 做出明确保证。 如果卖方关于计算机是“ 超级 ” 的声明不是明示保证，那么还有另一类称为 “ 吹嘘 ” 的声明，在 §2-313（2） 中被描述为 “ 声称只是卖方对商品的意见或推荐 ”的声明”.这种吹嘘并不构成保修。在违反明示保证的诉讼中，买方负有举证责任。然而，§2-313 的评论 3 和 8 表示，一旦卖方在交易过程中对事实做出了这样的肯定， 这种责任就转移到了卖方身上，以证明买方对在交易过程中做出的任何事实的确认缺乏依赖 。最终，确定卖方的陈述是否属于吹嘘的类别或是否构成明示保证的测试见于 §2-313 的注释 8： 该陈述是否“ 客观判断成为交易基础的一部分 ”。 即使 卖方在此问题中的陈述被发现只是吹嘘，因此不构成明示保证，但根据 §2-313 的注释 8，卖方仍可能对欺诈或虚假陈述负责。

d. Same facts as part (a), except your law school classmate bought the used computer from your law school which holds an annual sale of used computers. Has the law school breached the implied warranty of merchantability? U.C.C. §2-314, Official Comment 3 to §2-314, §2-104(1), Official Comment 2 to §2-104.
d. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实，除了您的法学院同学从您的法学院购买了二手电脑，该学院每年都会销售二手电脑。法学院是否违反了适销性的默示保证？U.C.C. §2-314、官方意见 3 至 §2-314、§2-104（1）、官方意见 2 至 §2-104。

The problem here is whether the law school qualifies as a merchant. Comment 2 to §2-104 says the warranty of merchantability is implied only if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, requiring a professional status as to particular kinds of goods. Comment 3 to §2-314 says “A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a ‘merchant’ within the meaning of the full scope of this section, and, thus, no warranty of merchantability would apply.” The law school here probably is not a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. As such, no implied warranty of merchantability has been made.
这里的问题是法学院是否有资格成为商人。§2-104 的注释 2 表示，仅当卖方是此类商品的商人，需要特定类型商品的专业地位时，才暗示了适销性保证 。§2-314 的注释 3 说 ：“ 进行孤立商品销售的人不是本节完整范围内意义上的 ' 商人 '，因此，不适用适销性保证。“ 这里的法学院可能不是那种商品的商人。因此，不对适销性做出任何暗示保证。

Note: Implied warranty of merchantability does apply to sales of used goods under the language of Comment 3 to §2-314, however, in a sale of used goods, the obligation involved is those that are only appropriate to such goods for that is their contract description.
注意： 根据 §2-314 的注释 3 的语言 ， 适销性的默示保证确实适用于二手商品的销售 ，但是，在二手商品的销售中，所涉及的义务是仅适用于此类商品的义务，因为这是它们的合同描述。

8.2. a. Bob Sinclair owns a used-car lot, Bob’s Affordable Wheels. You just graduated from college and visit Bon’s with an eye to finding a car in the $5,000 price range. You spot a used Honda Accord for $4,900 and ask Bob about the car. “She’s a humdinger, all right,” says Bob. If you purchase the Accord, has Bob made an express warranty? If so, what is its content? U.C.C. §2-313.
8.2. a. Bob Sinclair 拥有一家二手车停车场 Bob's Affordable Wheels。您刚从大学毕业，参观 Bon's，着眼于找到一辆价格在 5,000 美元之间的汽车。您发现了一辆 4,900 美元的二手本田雅阁，并向鲍勃询问了这辆车的情况。“ 她是个傻瓜，好吧，” 鲍勃说。如果您购买了雅阁，鲍勃是否做出了明示保修？如果是这样，它的内容是什么？《美国法典》第 2-313 条。

Under the test for puffing found in Comment 8 to §2-313, the question whether Bob made an express warranty comes down to whether this is the kind of expression that a reasonable person would rely on as part of the basis of the bargain. Here the seller’s statement does not have enough specific content to enable the buyer to prove, in any event, the seller has not lived up to it. It’s simply too vague. Thus Bob did not make an express warranty.
根据 §2-313 的第 8 条评论中对吹嘘的测试 ，Bob 是否做出了明确保证的问题归结为这是否是一个合理的人会依赖的那种表达方式，作为交易基础的一部分。在这里，卖方的声明没有足够的具体内容使买方能够证明，无论如何，卖方没有履行它。它实在是太模糊了。 因此 ，鲍勃没有做出明确的保证。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that you are particularly concerned about as mileage, so you ask Bob what kind of mileage the used Accord gets. “You know the Accords,” says Bob. “They are like camels.” If you purchase the Accord, has Bob made an express warranty? If so, what is its content? U.C.C. §2-313.
b. 事实与 （a） 部分相同，只是您特别关心里程数，因此您询问 Bob 二手 Accord 的里程数是多少。 “ 你知道协议，” 鲍勃说。 “ 他们就像骆驼。“ 如果您购买了雅阁，鲍勃是否做出了明示保修？如果是这样，它的内容是什么？《美国法典》第 2-313 条。

Here the seller’s statement is more specific than that in part (a), but the seller didn’t give any measure to tell what good mileage is. Thus Bob did not make an express warranty.
在这里，卖方的陈述比 （a） 部分的陈述更具体，但卖方没有给出任何衡量标准来判断什么是好的里程数。 因此 ，鲍勃没有做出明确的保证。

c. Same facts as part (a), except that you bring your mother with you to Bob’s, because your mother knows a lot more about cars than you do. Your mother tells you that the used Accord is a good bet because it gets such good gas mileage. Just to be sure, you ask Bob about this particular Accord’s gas mileage, and he gives you the “like camels” line. Has Bob made an express warranty? U.C.C. §2-313.
c. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是您带上您的母亲一起去 Bob's，因为您母亲比您更了解汽车。妈告诉你，二手雅阁是一个不错的选择，因为它的油耗非常好。为了保险起见，你问鲍勃这辆雅阁的油耗是多少，他会给你“ 像骆驼一样 ” 这句话。Bob 是否做出了明确保修？《美国法典》第 2-313 条。

Assuming the “like camels” line here amounts to an express warranty, even though the buyer relied on both Bob’s statement as well as his mom’s expertise in deciding to buy the car, Bob indeed made an express warranty under §2-313(1)(a), which only requires the affirmation of fact or promise made by seller to form part of the basis of the bargain to create an express warranty.
假设这里的 “ 像骆驼一样 ” 这句话相当于明示保证，即使买方在决定购买这辆车时同时依赖 Bob 的陈述和他妈妈的专业知识，Bob 确实根据 §2-313（1）（a） 做出了明示保证，它只需要卖方对事实的确认或做出的承诺，以构成 构成明示保证的交易基础的一部分。

d. Same facts as part (a), except that as soon as you come in, you tell Bob that the most important thing for you is to buy a car that gets good gas mileage. “Then I’ve got just the car for you, young man,” Bob tells you, and shows you the used Accord. Has Bob made an express warranty? U.C.C. §2-313. Has he made any other type of warranty? U.C.C. §2-315
d. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是你一进来就告诉 Bob，对你来说最重要的是买一辆油耗好的车。“那我就给你买了这辆车，年轻人，”鲍勃告诉你，并给你看了那辆二手的雅阁。Bob 是否做出了明确保修？《美国法典》第 2-313 条。他有没有做过其他类型的保修？《美国法典》第 2-315 条.

Bob did not give any measurement with respect to what is good mileage, so his statement here probably won’t amount to an express warranty. However, under §2-315, Bob made an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, since Bob knows that the buyer specifically wanted a car with good mileage.
Bob 没有给出任何关于什么是良好里程的测量方法，因此他在这里的陈述可能不构成明示保证。然而，根据 §2-315，Bob 对特定用途的适用性做出了默示保证，因为 Bob 知道买方特别想要一辆行驶里程数好的汽车。

e. Same facts as part (a), except that right after you give Bob the check for $4,900 but before you leave his lot, you tell him, “By the way, I forgot to ask you about gas mileage. That’s extremely important to me. Does this car get good mileage?” Bob replies, “Son, I promise that this car will give you at least 30 miles per gallon in the city.” Has Bob made an express warranty? U.C.C. §§2-313, 2-209; Official Comment 7 to §2-313.
e. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是在您给 Bob 4,900 美元的支票之后，但在您离开他的地段之前，您告诉他，“ 顺便说一句，我忘了问你关于油耗的问题。这对我来说非常重要。这辆车的里程数好吗？“ 鲍勃回答说，” 儿子，我保证这辆车在城市里每加仑至少能给你 30 英里。“ 鲍勃是否做出了明确的保证？ 《美国法典》第 2-313、2-209 条;§2-313 的官方评论 7。

Here Bob made the statement after the buyer purchased the car. However, under Comment 7 to §2-313, “The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material.” Here, even though Bob made the statement after the buyer made the purchase, it’s still an express warranty, in the form of a modification. Under §2-209, a modification does not need consideration to be binding.
在这里，鲍勃在买家购买了汽车后发表了声明。然而，根据 §2-313 的第 7 条评论，“ 做出描述或肯定的词语或显示样本的确切时间并不重要。“ 在这里，即使 Bob 在买家购买后做出了声明，它仍然是以修改形式提供的明示保证。根据 §2-209，修改无需考虑即可具有约束力。

f. Same facts as part (a), except that before buying the car you ask Bob whether it comes with a warranty. “You bet, son,” says Bob, who then hands you a six-page warranty that you do not bother to read on the spot. Two days later, as you read the warranty, your eyes light up when you get to the part about gas mileage. “Great,” you tell yourself, “this says that the car will get at least 30 miles per gallon in the city.” Has Bob made an express warranty concerning the gas mileage? U.C.C. §2-313.
f. 与第 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是在购买汽车之前您询问 Bob 是否附带保修。 “ 你打赌，孩子，” 鲍勃说，然后他递给你一份六页的保修单，你懒得当场阅读。两天后，当您阅读保修单时，当您谈到有关油耗的部分时，您的眼睛会亮起来。“ 太好了，” 你告诉自己，“ 这表明这辆车在城市里每加仑至少可以行驶 30 英里。“ Bob 是否对油耗做出了明确保证？ 《美国法典》第 2-313 条。

Bob might try to argue that he did not make an express warranty because the buyer did not rely on his statement since the buyer did not read the warranty when making the purchase. From an equity standpoint, it seems hard for the seller to create a written warranty with specific statement and then later deny the enforceability of these statements on the grounds that the buyer did not specifically relied on them in making the purchase. Common law estoppel doctrine will prevent the seller from escaping responsibility for these statements he made in the warranty.
鲍勃可能会试图争辩说他没有做出明示保证，因为买方在购买时没有阅读保修单，所以买方没有依赖他的声明。从公平的角度来看 ，卖方似乎很难创建带有具体声明的书面保证，然后以买方在购买时没有特别依赖它们为由否认这些声明的可执行 性。普通法禁止反言原则将阻止卖方逃避对其在保修中所做的这些陈述的责任。

8.3. a. Carol Campbell owns a clothing store, Dress for Success, that sells a variety of men’s and women’s business attire. Paul Wofsey selected a new suit there, had it altered by the store, bought it, and took it home. When he tried the suit on two weeks later, he sat down and discovered to his painful surprise that someone had sewn a rusty tack into the seat of the pants. Is Carol’s store liable for breach of warranty? U.C.C. §2-314.
8.3. a. Carol Campbell 拥有一家名为 Dress for Success 的服装店，出售各种男士和女士商务装。Paul Wofsey 在那里挑选了一套新西装，让商店修改了它，买了下来，然后带回家。两周后，当他试穿这套西装时，他坐下来，惊讶地发现有人在裤子的座位上缝了一根生锈的钉子。Carol 的商店是否对违反保修负责？ 《美国法典》第 2-314 条。

Carol is liable for Paul here for breach of warranty since she is a merchant, and these pants will not pass without objection in the trade under the contract description per §2-314(2)(a), nor are these pants fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used per §2-314(2)(c).
Carol 在这里对 Paul 的违约行为负责，因为她是一名商人，根据 §2-314（2）（a） 的合同描述，这些裤子不会在贸易中毫无异议地通过 ，这些裤子也不适合根据 §2-314（2）（c） 使用它们的普通用途。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that Carol has her workers examine all of the inventory thoroughly every night to make sure there are no foreign objects such as pins stuck in the clothes. Will this evidence be useful for Carol if nobody knows how or when the rusty tack got into the pants? U.C.C. §2-314, Official Comment 13 to §2-314.
b. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是 Carol 让她的工作人员每晚彻底检查所有库存，以确保没有异物，例如针子卡在衣服上。如果没有人知道生锈的大头针是怎么或什么时候进入裤子的，这些证据对卡罗尔有用吗？U.C.C. §2-314，官方评论 13 至 §2-314。

We use strict liability standard in deciding warranty liability for a seller. It’s not a defense for a seller in a breach of warranty action to say the seller used all the due care in the world in making the product. However, even though the standard is strict liability, it’s still relevant here whether the seller’s workers used due care during inspection. Comment 13 to §2-314 says “In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to show not only the existence of the warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and that the breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained.” A possible defense in a case like this one is: the defect in the product was caused by something occurred following the sale. Thus, evidence indicating that the seller exercised care in the manufacture, processing or selection of the goods is relevant to the issue of whether the warranty was in fact broken. Thus evidence of the seller’s due care is still relevant even though it’s strict liability for the seller. Strict liability is measured at the point of the sale.
我们使用严格责任标准来确定卖方的保修责任。 对于违反保修诉讼的卖家来说，如果说卖家在制造产品时使用了世界上所有应有的谨慎，这并不是辩护。然而，即使标准是严格责任， 卖方的工人在检查期间是否采取了应有的谨慎措施仍然很重要 。§2-314 的注释 13 说 ：“ 在基于违反保证的诉讼中，当然不仅需要证明保证的存在，而且需要证明保证被破坏的事实，以及违反保证是造成损失的直接原因。“ 在这样的案件中，一种可能的辩护是：产品缺陷是由销售后发生的事情引起的。因此，有证据表明卖方在制造、加工或选择商品时谨慎行事，这与保修是否实际上被破坏的问题有关。 因此， 卖方应有注意的证据仍然具有相关性，即使这是卖方的严格责任。严格责任是在销售时衡量的。

Differences between a warrantor of a product and an insurer of a product?
产品的保证人和产品的保险公司之间的区别 ？

A warrantor’s strict liability for the condition of the goods is limited in time to the condition of the goods at the point of sale. A warrantor, unlike an insurer, are not responsible for things happened to the goods beyond that point, unless those things are manifestations of some latent defects that did exist at the time of the sale.
保修人对货物状况的严格责任仅限于销售点货物状况的时间。与保险公司不同，保证人不对超出该时间点后货物发生的事情负责，除非这些事情是销售时确实存在的一些潜在缺陷的表现。

c. Same facts as part (b). Will this evidence be useful for Carol if it is established as a fact that an angry customer placed the rusty tack in the pants a half-hour before Paul bought them? U.C.C. §2-314, Official Comment 13 to §2-314.
c. 与 （b） 部分相同的事实。如果确定一个愤怒的顾客在 Paul 买裤子前半小时将生锈的大头钉放在裤子里，那么这些证据对 Carol 有用吗？U.C.C. §2-314，官方评论 13 至 §2-314。

Once it is established as a fact that the tack was already sewn into the pants at the time of the sale, then all the evidence in the world of the seller’s due care becomes irrelevant. Seller’s due care is only relevant in a case where it is unknown or uncertain whether the defect existed at the time of the sale.
一旦确定在销售时大头钉已经缝在裤子上，那么世界上所有关于卖方应有注意的证据就变得无关紧要了。卖方的应有注意仅在销售时未知或不确定是否存在缺陷的情况下才有意义。

Problem 8.4 You just began your first job after graduation as in-house counsel for a major beer manufacturer. Your initial project involves a lawsuit that was filed against your company by a 62-year-old man who developed cirrhosis of the liver after several decades of heavy beer drinking. One of the theories of his suit, the one that you have been asked to focus on, is that your company breached its implied warranty of merchantability because beer that causes cirrhosis of the liver is not fit for ordinary use. Your general counsel asked you to think about different arguments that your company can make in response to this warranty claim. What statutory arguments can you come up with as to why your company should not be liable on an implied warranty theory? U.C.C. §2-314(2), Official Comment 12 to §2-314.
问题 8.4 您刚刚开始了毕业后的第一份工作，在一家大型啤酒制造商担任内部法律顾问。您的初始项目涉及一名 62 岁的男子对贵公司提起的诉讼，该男子在几十年的大量饮酒后患上了肝硬化。他的诉讼的一个理论，也是你被要求关注的理论之一，是你的公司违反了其对适销性的默示保证，因为导致肝硬化的啤酒不适合普通使用。您的总法律顾问要求您考虑您的公司可以针对此保修索赔提出不同的论点。您可以提出哪些法定论据来说明为什么您的公司不应该对默示保证理论负责？U.C.C. §2-314（2），官方评论 12 至 §2-314。

ANSWER: let’s assume first that the plaintiff in this case had no knowledge of this side effect of beer by the time that the product had done its damage and putting aside any assumption of risks defense that the beer manufacturer might have. Under that assumption, what can one say in defense of the beer manufacturer? The beer manufacturer could argue this beer was no different than any other been in that any beer could potentially cause cirrhosis of the liver. so in another word the beer manufacturer is saying this was not beer that had rat hairs in it, this beer was your good clean basic beer. So, the seller can say the beer being complained about clearly meets the standard of 2-314(2)(a) in that this beer can “pass without objection in the trade” it meets 2-314(2)(a) it is just like any other beer. Should the fact that he beer meets the standard of 2-314(2)(a) be dispositive for the seller (should that be enough for the seller to prevail in this case)? 2-314(2) says goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a), (b), (c), (d) through (f); and the conjunction that connects the letters is an “and” meaning you have to fulfill all of the requirements under 2-314(2). The according to the buyer which of 2-314(2) that the seller is arguably not meeting? 2-314(2)(c) not fit for its ordinary purpose. Analogy: imagine you have a farmer who buys insecticide for his crop that successfully kills insects but also kills grazing animals as well as anyone who eats the crops. So, this insecticide does what it is suppose to do, I kills insects and it has an undesirable side effect (not fit for its ordinary purpose because of its undesirable side effects, so it was violation of 2-314(2)(c)). So, that is like the beer. The beer does what it is suppose to do, and the buyer is saying this beer by giving cirrhosis of the liver after decades of heavy drinking is not fit for its ordinary purpose (which is drinking).
回答： 让我们首先假设本案中的原告在产品造成损害时不知道啤酒的这种副作用，并抛开啤酒制造商可能拥有的任何风险辩护假设。在这种假设下，我们能说什么来为啤酒制造商辩护呢？啤酒制造商可以争辩说，这种啤酒与任何其他啤酒没有什么不同，因为任何啤酒都可能导致肝硬化。 所以换句话说，啤酒制造商说这不是含有老鼠毛的啤酒，这种啤酒是很好的干净基本啤酒。因此，卖家可以说被投诉的啤酒显然符合 2-314（2）（a） 的标准，因为这种啤酒可以“在交易中无异议地通过”，它符合 2-314（2）（a） 它就像任何其他啤酒一样。 他的啤酒符合 2-314（2）（a）的标准这一事实是否应该对卖方具有决定性意义（这是否足以使卖方在本案中胜诉）？ 2-314（2） 规定可商售的商品必须至少是 （a）、（b）、（c）、（d） 到 （f）;连接字母的连词是“and”，这意味着您必须 满足 2-314（2） 下的所有要求。 根据买方的说法，卖方可以说没有满足 2-314（2） 中的哪一项？ 2-314（2）（c） 不适合其一般用途。打个比方：想象一下，你有一个农民为他的庄稼购买杀虫剂，成功地杀死了昆虫，但也杀死了吃草的动物以及任何吃庄稼的人。 所以，这种杀虫剂做了它应该 做的事情，我杀死昆虫，它有不良的副作用（由于其不良的副作用，不适合其正常用途，因此违反了 2-314（2）（c））。所以，这就像啤酒一样。啤酒做了它应该 做的事情，买家说这种啤酒在几十年的大量饮酒后导致肝硬化，不适合它的普通目的（即饮用）。

Assume that this plaintiff did know or should have known of the beer’s long-term side effect of his liver. Does this mean that the beer suddenly becomes fit for its ordinary purpose? The beer is still not fit for its ordinary purpose, even if he knows about it. That does not mean that the buyer means. Official comment 13 to 2-314 says if your plaintiff in a warranty action, you have got to show all kind of things in order to prevail. You have to show the existence of the warranty, you have to show that it has been breached (show that it is not fit for ordinary purpose – in this case you can show that), and you have to show that the warranty was broken and that was a proximate cause of the injury. The real proximate cause was the buyer’s decision to proceed to drink this beer knowing full well what that was going to do. Some courts will accept assumption of risk, even though it is typically a tort defense. Some court will consider it in the warranty context even though warranty in contract. Even if they do not accept the assumption of the risk because this is a contract and not a court, you can easily use the same facts for the proximate cause analysis accepting that this is a contract action rather than a tort action.
假设这位原告确实知道或应该知道啤酒对他的肝脏的长期副作用。这是否意味着啤酒突然变得适合其正常用途？这种啤酒仍然不适合它的普通用途，即使他知道它。这并不意味着买方的意思是。官方评论 13 至 2-314 说，如果您的原告在保修诉讼中，您必须出示各种事情才能获胜。您必须证明保修的存在，您必须证明它已被违反（表明它不适合普通用途 - 在这种情况下，您可以证明），并且您必须证明保修已损坏，这是造成伤害的直接原因。真正的直接原因是买方决定继续饮用这种啤酒，他完全知道这将产生什么影响。一些法院会接受风险承担，即使这通常是一种侵权抗辩。一些法院会在保修范围内考虑它，即使合同中有保修。即使他们因为这是合同而不是法院而不接受风险承担，您也可以轻松地使用相同的事实进行近因分析，接受这是合同诉讼而不是侵权诉讼。

If you look at the cigarette cases that have been brought, and some of them have been brought on a breach of implied warranty theory. Most of them have been decided on the basis of either: first, these cigarette was no worse than any other (as we discussed that fact alone should not be dispositive) or second, that the plaintiff knew of the risks which opens up defenses for the manufacturer of estoppel or assumption of the risk if the court will accept it or lack of causation because you have to show proximate cause as a plaintiff to win on breach of warranty suit.
如果你看一下已经提起的香烟案，其中一些是因违反默示保证理论而被提起的。他们中的大多数是根据以下任一因素做出裁决的：首先，这些香烟并不比其他任何香烟差 （正如我们所讨论的，仅凭这一事实不应成为决定性的），或者第二，原告知道风险，如果法院会接受，则为制造商提供禁反言或承担风险的辩护，或者缺乏因果关系，因为您必须证明作为原告的近因才能获胜违反保修诉讼。

Problem 8.5 Your law firm was just retained to represent a car manufacturer that was sued by a woman who was a passenger in one of your client’s newer models that the woman had purchased. The woman, who was seriously injured in a car accident, claims that the manufacturer’s failure to include side airbags as a standard feature in the case she bought amounted to a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The car, which was one of the manufacturer’s economy models, did have standard front airbags for both the driver and the passenger. What are the strongest Article 2 arguments your firm can muster to defend against his lawsuit? How generally should a court decide when the implied warranty of merchantability must include a particular safety feature? U.C.C. §2-314(2).
问题 8.5 您的律师事务所刚刚受聘代表一家汽车制造商，该汽车制造商被一名女性起诉，该女性是您客户购买的一款新车型的乘客。这名在车祸中受重伤的妇女声称，制造商未能将侧面安全气囊作为她购买的箱子的标准功能，这相当于违反了适销性的默示保证。这辆车是制造商的经济型车型之一，确实为驾驶员和乘客配备了标准的前安全气囊。 贵公司可以拿出哪些最有力的第 2 条论据来为他的诉讼辩护？法院通常应该如何决定适销性的默示保证何时必须包括特定的安全功能？《美国法典》第 2-314（2） 条。

ANSWER: strongest Article 2 arguments: looking at 2-314(2)(a)’s pass without objection in trade and suppose that the majority of car manufacturers that built similar cars were making their cars at this point in time with passenger side airbags. Suppose that the buyer could show that. How would that help or hurt the buyer’s case? Defending the manufacturer, you could still argue that well we really have to focus on the contract description and if the contract description said no passenger side airbags, then it is not enough to say that others similarly priced cars have a passenger side airbag. That could work. The buyer would think it would be more helpful than hurtful if he can show almost all cars in this price range had the passenger side airbags. The buyer could at least make an argument that it does not pass without objection in the trade, because for a car like this it really ought to have this safety feature. But if we focus on the contract description, we are narrow about it and we’ll probably prevail on that as a manufacturer. And certainly it would be true that if this were a case where a higher price line of cars all had the passenger side airbags, but this economy priced car did not (that is not going to help the buyer much because you cannot make every product live up to expensive product when it comes to safety features).
答案： 最有力的第 2 条论点：在贸易中没有异议地查看 2-314（2）（a） 的通行证 ，并假设大多数制造类似汽车的汽车制造商此时都在制造带有乘客侧安全气囊的汽车。假设买方可以证明这一点。这将如何帮助或伤害买方的案件？为制造商辩护，你仍然可以争辩说，我们真的必须关注合同描述，如果合同描述说没有乘客侧安全气囊，那么说其他价格相似的汽车有乘客侧安全气囊是不够的。那可能会奏效。如果买家能证明这个价格范围内的几乎所有汽车都有乘客侧安全气囊，那么他会认为这更有帮助而不是有害。买方至少可以提出一个论点，即它不会在交易中毫无异议地通过，因为对于这样的汽车，它确实应该具有这种安全功能。但是，如果我们专注于合同描述，我们就会狭隘地看待它 ，作为制造商，我们可能会在这一点上占上风。当然 ，如果这是这样一种情况，即价格较高的汽车都配备了乘客侧安全气囊，但这款经济型汽车却没有（这对买家没有太大帮助，因为在安全功能方面，您无法让每个产品都符合昂贵的产品）。

The question is when we talk about safety features, we have to ask ourselves at what point does the product need to have a safety feature? Assume for a moment that no car of any make of that kind included passenger side airbags. First, would that fact be helpful for the manufacturer on the issue of implied warranty liability? It would be helpful assuming that this car has met the minimum safety features. Would it be dispositive? It would not be dispositive because it could be that an entire industry is out of line when it comes to a particular safety feature. If you look at 2-314(2), by its terms, says goods to be merchantable must be at least such as and then it gives these six sub-requirements. At starters it has to meet all of the six requirements, but that does not mean you are done. Let’s assume that the lack of a passenger side airbag did at the relevant time meet industry standard for this type of car. Therefore, the seller meets 2-314(2)(a) it passes without objection to the trade. But the buyer makes different argument and says “well, I do not have to argue 2-314(2)(a), and I can win by just arguing 2-314(2)(c) that this car is nevertheless not fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used and it is not fit because when you crash the car, the car does not adequately protect the passenger.” Then the seller says “wait a minute, ordinary purpose of a car is driving it and not crashing it.” Is there any answer to that if you are the buyer? What is ordinary purpose mean? If ordinary purpose means not infrequent occurrence or not extraordinary, then the seller is not going to be off the hook by saying that the intended purpose of a car is to driving it. And this came up in Phillips v. Lighter Cricket, where the seller ended up winning the 2-314(2)(c) argument on the basis that the child’s use of the lighter was not an ordinary purpose for the lighter; even though, the plaintiff could point to statistics showing that this type of use was not really that extraordinary. Let’s say that we determine that the phrase “ordinary purpose” under 2-314(2)(c) might include unintended but not extraordinary uses, then we are left with the question as to how far manufacturer must go in protecting the buyer’s from these unintended but not extraordinary uses? That was the question in Cricket Lighter. But sometimes people inadvertently drive their cars into lakes or bodies of water; must a car include a water ejection seat to account for this possibility in order to be merchantable? What factors should the court consider in deciding whether a manufacturer has to include a particular safety feature in order for the product to be merchantable? The court could look at whether that particular use is foreseeable or reasonable and that could go to the probability of the unintended use and within that you could say and the likelihood that this safety feature would avoid or mitigate the loss that sought to be protected against by the safety feature. Gravity of the harm (in the case of the Cricket Lighter was the house burning down). The Learned Hand’s formula that there is a breach of IWM in the absence of a safety feature whenever the cost of that safety feature is less than the probability that the safety feature would have avoided or mitigated the harm times the gravity of the harm (B<PL). So, in the problem with a formula like this is that it becomes hard to actually quantify it in a very mathematical way, so you just kind of working roughly.
问题是，当我们谈论安全功能时，我们必须问自己 ，产品在什么时候需要具有安全功能？假设任何此类汽车都没有包含乘客侧安全气囊。首先，这一事实对制造商在默示保证责任问题上是否有帮助？假设这辆车满足最低安全功能会很有帮助。它会是决定性的吗？这不会是决定性的，因为当涉及到特定的安全功能时，整个行业都可能不合时宜。如果你看一下 2-314（2），根据它的条款，说可商销的商品必须至少是这样的，然后它给出了这六个子要求。首先 ，它必须满足所有六个要求，但这并不意味着您就完成了。让我们假设在相关时间缺少乘客侧安全气囊确实符合此类汽车的行业标准。因此，卖方满足 2-314（2）（a） 它通过，对交易没有异议。但买方提出了不同的论点，并说：“好吧，我不必争论 2-314（2）（a），我可以通过争论 2-314（2）（c） 来获胜，这辆车仍然不适合使用此类商品的普通用途，并且它不适合，因为当你撞车时， 这辆车没有充分保护乘客。然后卖家说 “等一下，汽车的正常目的是驾驶它而不是撞毁它。 如果你是买家，有什么答案吗？普通目的是什么意思？ 如果普通目的意味着不经常发生或不特殊，那么卖家不会说汽车的预期目的是驾驶它而摆脱困境。 这在 Phillips v. Lighter Cricket 案中出现 ，卖家最终赢得了 2-314（2）（c） 的争论，理由是儿童使用打火机不是打火机的普通目的;尽管如此，原告可以指出统计数据表明这种类型的使用并不是那么特别。 假设我们确定 2-314（2）（c） 下的“普通目的”一词可能包括非预期但非特殊用途，那么我们就会面临一个问题，即制造商必须在多大程度上保护买方免受这些意外但非特殊用途的影响？ 这是 Cricket Lighter 中的问题 。但有时人们会无意中将汽车驶入湖泊或水体;汽车必须配备喷水座椅才能适销吗？ 法院在决定制造商是否必须包含特定的安全功能才能使产品适销时应考虑哪些因素？ 法院可以查看该特定用途是否可预见或合理，这可能取决于意外使用的可能性，在此范围内，您可以说，该安全功能将避免或减轻试图通过安全功能保护的损失的可能性。伤害的严重性（在 Cricket Lighter 的情况下是房子被烧毁）。 Learned Hand's 公式 ，即在没有安全功能的情况下，只要该安全功能的成本低于该安全功能本来可以避免或减轻伤害的概率乘以伤害的严重性（B<PL），即违反 IWM。所以，像这样的公式的问题在于，很难以非常数学的方式真正量化它，所以你只是粗略地工作。

Problem 8.6 Consider the following actual news story that appeared in th St. Louis Post-Dispatch on June 7,1997:
问题 8.6 考虑一下 1997 年 6 月 7 日出现在 《圣路易斯邮报 》上的以下实际新闻报道 ：

Dairy Industry Sued Over Man’s III Health (SEATTLE) (AP)-Norman Mayo, 61, is suing the dairy industry, claiming drinking whole milk contributed to his clogged arteries and a minor stroke. He said he might have avoided the problems if he had been warned on the milk cartons about fat and cholesterol. The federal lawsuit names Safeway and the Dairy Farmers of Washington as defendants. Mayo wants warnings on dairy products. “If tobacco products can be required to have warning labels, why not dairy products?” said Mayo, a former smoker. “I think milk is just as dangerous as tobacco.”
乳制品行业起诉 Man's III Health （西雅图） （AP） - 61 岁的诺曼·梅奥 （Norman Mayo） 正在起诉乳制品行业，声称饮用全脂牛奶导致了他的动脉堵塞和轻微中风。他说，如果他在牛奶盒上被警告关于脂肪和胆固醇，他可能会避免这些问题。联邦诉讼将 Safeway 和华盛顿奶农列为被告。梅奥希望对乳制品发出警告。“如果可以要求烟草产品贴上警告标签，为什么不要求乳制品呢？”“我认为牛奶和烟草一样危险。”

Suppose Mr. Mayo’s implied warranty theory is not lack of fitness for ordinary use, as in Problem 8.4, but instead that the whole milk was not “adequately contained, packaged, and labeled” because of its lack of a warning about health risks. Should Mr. Mayo prevail on this theory? U.C.C. §2-314(2)(e).
假设梅奥先生的默示保证理论不是像问题 8.4 那样缺乏适合普通用途，而是由于缺乏关于健康风险的警告，全脂牛奶没有“充分容纳、包装和贴标签”。梅奥先生应该在这个理论上占上风吗？《美国法典》第 2-314（2）（e） 条。

ANSWER: This problem is a lot like Problem 8.5 in that both plaintiffs are arguing that the seller should have spent money to add a safety feature or a warning. Let’s consider the problem using the B<PL cost benefit analysis. How does that analysis look? What would the plaintiff want to argue under the B<PL paradigm? This plaintiff is going to want to argue that the milk industry should be liable under 2-314(2)(e) because the cost of placing a label on the milk cartons would have been fairly small and therefore the B side of the equation should be really low. So, the buyer would say it is not as if the buyer was suggesting that the makers of milk could only sell skim milk, which would immediately extract a much greater cost from the seller like trying to tell a coffee seller that they have to sell cold coffee. So how can the milk industry respond with its own version of B<PL to say that maybe it was not so clear that the whole milk should have had these warnings? The first thing is the milk seller could point out that at the time when it would have mattered the most to the seller the cost of the warning label would have been relatively high because there are information cost to labeling beyond just putting the letter on the cartons and it may not have been clear decades ago that the fat in milk was a significant health hazard for most people. And second as to the B side of the equation on this label, the milk industry could argue another cost or another reason why B is not as low as it seems it would be a reduction in sales to panic buyers who might overreact to a warning label that is comparable to the king of warning label you would see on a cigarette carton. And finally, using this B<PL formula, the milk sellers could also question the marginal benefits of putting on a warning label; particularly, this P one here because they could argue that this is a case where people like the buyer who really love their whole milk might choose to take the risk anyways and not reduce their whole milk consumption even in the face of such a warning. So the warning really would not have made such a difference to those who love their milk. And second, in this day and age, the milk seller could say the dangers of excessive fats in one’s diet are fairly well publicized which would call in the question what difference at the margin such a warning label would make when you are talking about something that is fairly obvious to many people anyways. Do the manufacturers really have to state the obvious? Yes, because some of these warning labels are crazy in terms of what it would tell you what not to do with the product that you might not have thought of doing with the product because they do not want to leave such litigation open. As a result, we get over warned.
回答： 这个问题很像问题 8.5，因为两个原告都争辩说，卖方应该花钱添加安全功能或警告。让我们使用 B<PL 成本效益分析来考虑这个问题。 该分析看起来如何？在 B<PL 范式下，原告想争论什么？ 该原告将要争辩说，牛奶行业应该根据 2-314（2）（e） 承担责任，因为在牛奶盒上贴标签的成本相当小 ，因此等式的 B 侧应该非常低。所以，买方会说，这并不是说买方在暗示牛奶制造商只能销售脱脂牛奶，这会立即从卖方那里榨取更大的成本，就像试图告诉咖啡卖家他们必须出售冷咖啡一样。 那么，牛奶行业如何用自己版本的 B<PL 来回应，说也许全脂牛奶应该有这些警告不是那么清楚呢？ 首先，牛奶销售商可以指出，在对销售商来说最重要的时候，警告标签的成本会相对较高，因为除了将字母贴在纸箱上之外，标签还需要支付信息成本，而且几十年前可能不清楚牛奶中的脂肪对大多数人的健康构成重大危害。其次，关于这个标签上等式的 B 面，牛奶行业可能会争论 B 没有看起来那么低的另一个成本或其他原因，这会导致销售减少，从而让恐慌的买家感到恐慌，他们可能会对警告标签反应过度，该标签可与您在香烟纸盒上看到的警告标签之王相媲美。 最后，使用这种 B<PL 配方奶粉，奶商还可以质疑贴上警告标签的边际好处;特别是这个 P 一，因为他们可以争辩说，在这种情况下，像买家这样真正热爱全脂牛奶的人可能会选择冒险，即使面对这样的警告，也不会减少他们的全脂牛奶消费量。 因此 ，这个警告真的不会对那些热爱牛奶的人产生如此大的影响。其次， 在这个时代 ，牛奶销售商可以说饮食中脂肪过多的危害已经相当广为人知，这会让人不禁要问，当你谈论对许多人来说相当明显的事情时，这样的警告标签会在边际上产生什么影响。 制造商真的必须说明显而易见的事情吗？ 是的，因为其中一些警告标签在告诉你什么不应该处理产品方面是疯狂的，你可能没有想过要对产品做什么，因为他们不想让这样的诉讼悬而未决。结果，我们被过度警告了。

Problem 8.7 Consider Carol Campbell again, and in particular the facts of Problem 8.3(c), where even her nightly inspection are not enough to catch the angry customer who put the rusty tack in. Carol now wants to defend by saying that the cost of avoiding this particular harm would not be worth the benefit. Since Carol’s workers would have needed to do clothes inspections every 15 minutes to avoid this harm. Therefore, says Carol, she should not be liable for an unavoidable harm. Will this defense work?
问题 8.7 再想想 Carol Campbell，特别是问题 8.3（c） 的事实，即使是她每晚的检查也不足以抓住那个生锈的顾客。卡罗尔现在想辩解说，避免这种特定伤害的成本不值得。因为 Carol 的工人需要每 15 分钟检查一次衣服以避免这种伤害。因此，Carol 说，她不应该对不可避免的伤害负责。这种防御措施会奏效吗？

ANSWER: no it will not work. The cost benefit defense will not work because this paradigm B<PL is only relevant in the implied warranty arena when the question at issue is whether a product breaches the implied warranty of merchantability because it lacks a particular safety feature or warning. When a product just does not work or it simply not up to industry standards, the seller is going to be liable for breach of IWM. That will be true even if the burden to the seller discovering this particular kind of defect would outweigh the benefit of preventing that defect. So, Carol says that is just not fair, after all how much more diligent can Carol be? Well, all we can say to a seller like Carol in a case like this is that some implied warranty liability is unavoidable or at least not worth spending the cost to avoid. But that is just another cost of doing business. Or maybe Carol could be more efficient with her inspections and just inspect the goods immediately before selling them rather than every night or every fifteen minutes.
回答： 不 ，它不会起作用。成本效益抗辩是行不通的，因为这种范式 B<PL 仅在有争议的问题是产品是否因为缺乏特定的安全功能或警告而违反了适销性的默示保证时，才与默示保证领域相关。当产品无法正常工作或根本达不到行业标准时，卖家将对违反 IWM 负责。即使卖方发现这种特定类型的缺陷的负担超过了防止该缺陷的好处，这也是正确的。所以，卡罗尔说这不公平，毕竟卡罗尔还能勤奋多少呢？好吧，在这种情况下，我们只能对像 Carol 这样的卖家说，一些默示的保修责任是不可避免的，或者至少不值得花钱来避免。但这只是做生意的另一种成本。或者，也许 Carol 可以更有效地进行检查，只在出售商品前立即检查商品，而不是每晚或每 15 分钟检查一次。

NOTICE AND PRIVITY PP. 175
《注意与知情》 第 175 页

9.1. a. Judi Pierce is an independent truck driver who just purchased a new truck from the Mack Company, a retail truck seller. Five months after the sale, the Mack Company gets the following fax from Judi: “Your new truck stinks. It broke down three months ago and I lost six jobs since then because my truck has been sitting in my driveway. I’m going to sue you for breach of warranty.” Does the Mack Company have a good defense to such a suit? U.C.C. §2-607(3)(a), Official Comment 4 to §2-607.
9.1. a. Judi Pierce 是一名独立卡车司机，他刚刚从零售卡车销售商 Mack Company 购买了一辆新卡车。出售五个月后，Mack 公司收到了 Judi 的以下传真：“ 你的新卡车很臭。三个月前它坏了，从那以后我失去了六份工作，因为我的卡车一直停在我的车道上。我要起诉你违反保修。“ Mack 公司对这样的诉讼有很好的辩护吗？加州大学 §2-607（3）（a），官方意见 4 至 §2-607。

The Mack Company can try to argue that Judi should be barred from any remedy against the seller for her failure to give time notice as required by §2-607(3)(a), which requires a buyer to notify the seller of the breach “within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should discover any breach.” This raises the question what constitute reasonable time. Judi can make the argument that 3 month isn’t that long, and the delay didn’t hinder the ability of the seller to have access to evidence about the defect.
Mack 公司可以尝试争辩说，如果 Judi 未能按照 §2-607（3）（a） 的要求发出时间通知，则应禁止 Judi 对卖方采取任何补救措施，该条款要求买方 “ 在买方发现或应该发现任何违约行为后的合理时间内”通知卖方违约行为。“ 这就提出了一个问题，什么构成合理时间。Judi 可以提出 3 个月并不长的论点，而且延迟并没有妨碍卖方获取有关缺陷证据的能力。

Rationale for timely notice: a. To preserve the seller’s right of inspection.
及时通知的理由： a.维护卖方的检查权。

b. To preserve the seller’s right to cure and mitigate its damages.
湾。维护卖方补救和减轻其损害的权利。

c. To facilitate settlement.
c. 促进结算。

d. Maintaining the seller’s right to repose. (To avoid unfair surprise to the seller.)
d. 维护卖方的休止权。（为避免对卖家造成不公平的惊喜。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that Judi ordered the truck for delivery on July 1. The truck did not ultimately arrive until October 1 of the same year. Although Judi had said nothing during the delay, on October 5 she fired off the following fax to the Mack Company: “You guys stink. How do you expect me to make a living when you deliver your truck three months late? Thanks to you guys, I lost six jobs that I could have had. I’m going to sue you for breach of contract.” Does the Mack Company have a good defense to such a suit? U.C.C. §2-607(3)(a), Official Comment 4 to §2-607.
b. 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Judi 在 7 月 1 日订购了卡车进行交付。卡车最终直到同年 10 月 1 日才到达。尽管 Judi 在延误期间什么也没说，但在 10 月 5 日，她向 Mack 公司发送了以下传真：“ 你们好臭。如果你晚了三个月才交付卡车，你指望我怎么维持生计？多亏了你们，我失去了六份我本可以做的工作。我要起诉你违约。“ Mack 公司对这样的诉讼有很好的辩护吗？加州大学 §2-607（3）（a），官方意见 4 至 §2-607。

The seller can argue that even though there was delay in delivery, but since the seller didn’t hear from the buyer, they assume the delay in delivery wasn’t a problem. If it’s a big problem the buyer should have said something. The seller didn’t know the extent to which the breach was causing the buyer damages.
卖家可以争辩说，即使交货延迟，但由于卖家没有收到买家的消息，他们认为交货延迟不是问题。如果这是一个大问题，买家应该说点什么。卖方不知道违约对买方造成的损害程度。

However, under the language of 2-607(3), the timely notice requirement for the buyer arises after the buyer accepts the goods. Here Judi can make the argument that due to the delay in delivery, she didn’t accept the goods until October 1. And her notice to the seller on October 5 is thus timely. However, this reasoning probably won’t work very well, since here the very breach being complained of is the lateness in delivery.
但是，根据 2-607（3） 的措辞，对买方的及时通知要求在买方接受货物后产生。在这里，Judi 可以提出一个论点，由于交货延迟，她直到 10 月 1 日才接受货物。因此，她在 10 月 5 日向卖家发出的通知是及时的。然而，这种推理可能不会很好，因为这里被抱怨的违规行为正是交货延迟。

c. Same facts as part (a), except Judi gives immediate notice of the problem to the Mack Company. Later, though, when the Mack Company goes bankrupt, she decides that she had better sue the manufacturer, Acme Truck. Is Acme entitled to the same notice as Mack? Should Judi’s notice to Mack also count for Acme? U.C.C. §§2-607(3)(a), 2-607(5)(a).
c. 事实与 （a） 部分相同，但 Judi 立即向 Mack 公司通知了问题。不过，后来，当 Mack 公司破产时，她决定最好起诉制造商 Acme Truck。Acme 是否有权获得与 Mack 相同的通知？Judi 给 Mack 的通知也应该计入 Acme 吗？加州大学 §§2-607（3）（a）、2-607（5）（a）。

According to §2-607(5)(a), after being sued by a buyer, if the immediate seller give notice to the manufacturer (“vouching in”) to let the manufacturer to defend for the seller in the suit, and the manufacturer do not come and defend for the seller, and the seller loses in the suit against the buyer, then such manufacturer will be bound by any finding of facts in this first suit when the seller later on sues the manufacturer. In practice, once a seller receives complaint from its buyer, the seller will complain to the manufacturer no matter the buyer brings suit or not. Thus in this problem, as a practical matter, it will come down to whether the seller give notice to the manufacture after receiving complaint from the buyer.
根据 §2-607（5）（a），在被买方起诉后，如果直接卖方向制造商发出通知（“ 担保 ”），让制造商在诉讼中为卖方辩护，而制造商没有来为卖方辩护，并且卖方在对买方的诉讼中败诉，那么当卖方稍后起诉制造商。在实践中，一旦卖方收到买方的投诉，无论买方是否提起诉讼，卖方都会向制造商投诉 。 因此 ，在这个问题上，作为一个实际问题，将归结为卖方在收到买方的投诉后是否通知制造商。

Here, the problem comes down to whether, before the immediate seller went bankrupt, the buyer actually started litigation or not. If all the buyer did is merely complaining, then §2-607(5)(a) doesn’t kick in. As for the question whether the manufacturer is entitled to the same notice as to the immediate seller under §2-607(3)(a), courts are split. The manufacturer can make the argument that if they are the one that’s going to be held responsible by the buyer despite the lack of vertical privity, then they should also entitled to the same notice the immediate seller is entitled to under §2-607(3)(a).
在这里，问题归结为，在直接卖方破产之前，买方是否真的开始了诉讼。如果买方所做的只是抱怨，那么 §2-607（5）（a） 就不会生效。至于制造商是否有权获得与 §2-607（3）（a） 项下的直接销售商相同的通知的问题，法院存在分歧。制造商可以提出这样的论点，如果他们是买方在缺乏纵向关系的情况下仍要承担责任的人，那么他们也应该有权获得与直接卖方根据 §2-607（3）（a） 有权获得的相同通知。

d. Same facts as part (a), except that the truck defect causes Judi to swerve off the road, hitting pedestrian Michael Baker. Michael spends two months in the hospital, and then a year later hires a lawyer to sue the Mack Company. The complaint filed by the lawyer is the first the Mack Company learns of Michael’s injury, although Judi did complain about the truck’s defect to the Mack Company shortly after the accident. Does the Mack Company have a good defense against Michael? U.C.C. §2-607(3)(a), Official Comment 5 to §2-607
d. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实，只是卡车缺陷导致 Judi 转弯离开道路，撞上了行人 Michael Baker。迈克尔在医院住了两个月，一年后聘请了一名律师起诉 Mack 公司。律师提交的投诉是 Mack 公司第一次得知迈克尔受伤的消息，尽管朱迪确实在事故发生后不久向 Mack 公司投诉了卡车的缺陷。麦克公司对迈克尔有很好的防御吗？U.C.C. §2-607（3）（a），官方评论 5 至 §2-607.

Comment 5 to §2-607 says a third party beneficiary, like Michael in this problem, is not bound to give notice to the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer’s acceptance, but such a beneficiary does have a duty to notify the seller that an injury has occurred with the extended time for consumers. Comment 5 to §2-607 further says the such consumer’s claim won’t be barred as long as he is in good faith and give timely notice once he has become aware of the legal situation. In this problem, even though Michael didn’t give notice to the seller until a year after his injury, he can make the argument that this is the first time that he became aware of the legal situation. In addition, the seller already knew about the truck defect from Judi and the truck is available for the seller to inspect.
§2-607 的第 5 条评论说， 第三方受益人，如此问题中的 Michael，没有义务在买方接受后的合理时间内通知卖方 ，但此类受益人确实有责任通知卖方，在延长消费者的时间内发生了伤害。 §2-607 的注释 5 进一步表示 ，只要该消费者是善意的， 并在了解法律情况后及时通知，就不会禁止该消费者的索赔 。在这个问题上，即使 Michael 在受伤一年后才通知卖方，他也可以提出这是他第一次意识到法律情况。此外，卖家已经从 Judi 那里知道卡车有缺陷，并且卡车可供 卖家检查。

9.2. a. A manufacturer of commercial lawn mowers brought your law firm a new case. The case involves an industrial-sized rider mower that had been built by this manufacturer and then sold to the ultimate buyer, Jack Reilly, by a separate retailer. Jack’s nephew, Tom, was driving the mower while working for his uncle’s lawn service when the brakes on the mower failed and Tom smashed into the client’s garage. Tom was hurt and incurred hospital bills of over $20,000. Although the mowing client, Erin Clark, was not hurt, her garage suffered damages of $6,000. Tom, who is uninsured, is suing the retailer on a breach of implied warranty theory (the tort statute of limitations has expired, but the UCC statute of limitations has not), seeking to recover both for his personal injury and for the property damage to Erin Clark’s garage, which her lawsuit is asking him to pay. How should this case come out in a jurisdiction that has adopted Alternative A to §2-318? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative A; Official Comment 3 to §2-318. How about in an Alternative B jurisdiction? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative B.
9.2. 一种。一家商用割草机制造商为您的律师事务所带来了一个新案例。该案涉及一台工业尺寸的骑手割草机，该割草机由该制造商制造，然后由另一家零售商出售给最终买家 Jack Reilly。Jack 的侄子 Tom 在为他叔叔的草坪服务工作时驾驶割草机 ， 当时割草机的刹车失灵，Tom 撞进了客户的车库。汤姆受伤并产生了超过 20,000 美元的医院账单。虽然割草客户 Erin Clark 没有受伤，但她的车库遭受了 6,000 美元的损失。没有保险的 Tom 正在起诉零售商违反默示保证理论（侵权诉讼时效已过期，但 UCC 诉讼时效尚未过期），寻求赔偿他的人身伤害和 Erin Clark 车库的财产损失 ，她的诉讼要求他支付。在采用 §2-318 替代方案 A 的司法管辖区，本案应该如何审理 ？加州大学 §2-318，备选方案 A;§2-318 的官方评论 3。在备选方案 B 司法管辖区怎么样？加州大学 §2-318，备选方案 B。

Alternative A has been adopted in roughly 35 states, and the rest of states are split about equally between Alternative B and C. Here the problem the plaintiff has in a suit against the retailer is the lack of horizontal privity. Any suit against a seller by a non-buyer is said to lack horizontal privity. Any suit against a seller other than the immediate seller is said to lack vertical privity. In an Alternative A jurisdiction, it is unclear whether Tom can be said to be in the family or household of his uncle, which seems to limit the scope to immediate family. Assuming Tom is in the family or household of his uncle, there’s two ways to interpret Alternative A. One the restriction is placed on the type of damages. The other interpretation is that the restriction is placed on the type of plaintiffs, and once one qualifies as a plaintiff, that opens the door to not only personal injury, but also property damages. It is unclear what a court will do. In an Alternative B jurisdiction, Tom would qualify as a plaintiff and be able to recover.
备选方案 A 已被大约 35 个州采用，其余州的备选方案 B 和 C 大致平分。在这里，原告在针对零售商的诉讼中遇到的问题是缺乏横向相互关系。 非买方对卖方提起的任何诉讼都被称为缺乏横向相互关系。任何针对直接卖方以外的卖方的诉讼都被称为缺乏纵向相互关系。 在备选方案 A 司法管辖区，目前尚不清楚是否可以说 Tom 在他叔叔的家庭或家庭中，这似乎将范围限制在直系亲属。假设 Tom 在他叔叔的家庭或家庭中，有两种方法可以解释备选方案 A。一是限制损害的类型。另一种解释是， 限制是针对原告的类型，一旦一个人有资格成为原告，这不仅会打开人身伤害的大门，还会打开财产损失的大门。目前尚不清楚法院将采取什么行动。在备选方案 B 司法管辖区，Tom 将有资格成为原告并能够恢复。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that Tom is suing the manufacturer for breach of warranty. How should this case come out in an Alternative A jurisdiction? How about an Alternative B jurisdiction? Official Comment 3 to §2-318.
b. 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Tom 起诉制造商违反保修。这个案子在备选方案 A 司法管辖区应该如何审理？备选方案 B 司法管辖区怎么样？§2-318 的官方评论 3。

In an Alternative A jurisdiction, here Tom lacks both horizontal and vertical privity in a suit against the manufacturer. Under Common Law, most states have eliminated the need for vertical privity in warranty suits against manufacturers when the user sustained personal injury. Comment 3 to §2-318 says Alternative A is neutral, and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether a seller’s warranty given to his buyer who resells extend to other people in the distributive chain. So we look to state’s common law to see if Tom can recover. Comment 3 to §2-318 says Alternative B is designed for states where the case law on vertical privity has already developed further. It seems that Alternative B also is intended to get rid of vertical privity problem as well as horizontal privity problem for plaintiffs who qualifiy under Alternative B.
在备选方案 A 司法管辖区，Tom 在针对制造商的诉讼中缺乏横向和纵向相互关系。根据普通法，大多数州已经消除了在用户遭受人身伤害时对制造商提起保修诉讼的纵向相互关系的需要。§2-318 的第 3 条评论称，备选方案 A 是中立的， 无意扩大或限制关于卖方对转售买方的保证是否适用于分销链中的其他人的不断发展的判例法。 因此 ，我们查看各州的普通法，看看 Tom 是否可以康复。§2-318 的第 3 条评论称，备选方案 B 是为关于纵向相互关系的判例法已经进一步发展的州设计的。似乎替代方案 B 也旨在为符合替代方案 B 资格的原告消除垂直相互关系问题和水平相互关系问题 。

c. Same facts as part (a), except that Erin Clark also suffered personal injury. Can Erin recover from the retailer in an Alternative A jurisdiction? How about an Alternative B jurisdiction?
c. 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Erin Clark 也遭受了人身伤害。Erin 可以从备选 A 司法管辖区的零售商那里收回款项吗？备选方案 B 司法管辖区怎么样？

Erin cannot recover in an Alternative A jurisdiction since she is not in the family or household of the purchaser of the lawn mower. It’s possible that Erin can recover in an Alternative B jurisdiction, since she is a client of Jack’s business, she is reasonably expected to be affected by the lawn mower and she was injured in person. Once again, it is unclear whether Erin can recover for both her personal injury and the damage to her garage or only her personal injury.
Erin 无法在备选 A 司法管辖区恢复，因为她不在割草机购买者的家庭或家庭中。Erin 有可能在备选方案 B 司法管辖区进行康复，因为她是 Jack 业务的客户 ，因此可以合理预期她会受到割草机的影响，并且她本人受伤。同样，目前尚不清楚 Erin 是否能够同时为她的人身伤害和车库损坏赔偿，或者只为她的人身伤害获得赔偿。

d. Would your answers to part (a) change if the written warranty included a boldface clause stating that the various warranties ran only to the purchaser of the mower and not to any third parties? Official Comment 1 to §2-318.
d. 如果书面保修包括一个粗体条款，说明各种保修仅针对割草机的购买者，而不针对任何第三方，您对 （a） 部分的回答是否会发生变化？§2-318 的官方评论 1。

Such disclaimer is inoperative under §2-318. If we allow such disclaimer to be enforceable, it would enable the original buyer to bargain away the right of third parties who are not at the table, and the third parties might not receive whatever benefits the original buyer receives.
根据 §2-318， 此类免责声明无效 。如果我们允许此类免责声明具有可执行性，则原始买家将能够与不在谈判桌上的第三方进行讨价还价，而第三方可能无法获得原始买家获得的任何利益。

e. Would your answers to part (a) change if the written warranty included a boldface clause stating that the implied warranty of merchantability was being disclaimed completely? Official Comment 1 to §2-318.
e. 如果书面保证包括粗体字条款，说明完全否认对适销性的默示保证，您对 （a） 部分的回答会发生变化吗？§2-318 的官方评论 1。

Such disclaimer is valid under §2-318. Here in giving away the right of third parties, the buyer is giving away his own right.
此类免责声明根据 §2-318 有效。在这里，买方放弃了第三方的权利，就是放弃了他自己的权利。

f. Same facts as part (a) (Erin’s garage was damaged but she was not hurt), except that there was a warranty disclaimer stating that all of the retailer’s warranties, including merchantability, extended only to the immediate buyer of the mower. Can Erin recover from the retailer in an Alternative B jurisdiction? In an Alternative C jurisdiction? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative B and C.
f. 与第 （a） 部分相同的事实（Erin 的车库受损，但她没有受伤），除了有一份免责声明，说明 零售商的所有保修，包括适销性，仅适用于割草机的直接购买者。Erin 可以从备选方案 B 司法管辖区的零售商处收回款项吗？在备选方案 C 司法管辖区？加州大学 §2-318，备选方案 B 和 C。

Such disclaimer is inoperative under §2-318. In order to qualify under Alternative B, Erin would have to have personal injury, and here Erin did not sustain personal injury. In an Alternative C jurisdiction, there’s no requirement for personal injury, so Erin’s property damage qualifies to recover under Alternative C. Under §2-318, in an Alternative C jurisdiction, a seller cannot exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person. Here the seller is only limiting or excluding it to the property damages and he can do that.
根据 §2-318， 此类免责声明无效 。 为了符合备选方案 B 的资格，Erin 必须受到人身伤害，而在这里 Erin 没有受到人身伤害。在备选方案 C 的司法管辖区， 不需要人身伤害，因此 Erin 的财产损失有资格根据备选方案 C 获得赔偿。根据 §2-318，在备选方案 C 司法管辖区，卖方不能排除或限制本节对人身伤害的实施。在这里，卖方仅将其限制或排除在财产损失之外 ，他可以这样做。

MAGNUSON MOSS PP. 191
马格努森·莫斯 （MAGNUSON MOSS）， 第 191 页

Problem 10.1(a) You are working as a summer intern at your city’s Legal Aid Bureau. Your first client is a college student who feels that he has been ripped off by one of the local computer stores. The student explains to you that when he bought his new computer, which cost $3,000 and has proven to be a disaster, the store did not even give him a written warranty on it. Is that a violation of Magnuson-Moss? 15 U.S.C. §2302.
问题 10.1（a） 您在您所在城市的法律援助局担任暑期实习生。您的第一个客户是一名大学生，他觉得自己被当地的一家电脑店敲诈了。该学生向您解释说，当他购买价值 3,000 美元且已被证明是一场灾难的新电脑时，商店甚至没有给他书面保修。这是否违反了 Magnuson-Moss？《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2302 条。

ANSWER: Magnuson Moss is a federal statute and the UCC is a state statute. Mag Moss is federal consumer protection statute that was drafted by congress at a time when Congress was very aware of the existence of the UCC. Basically, this federal statute is intended to work side by side with the UCC. To the extent that there is a conflict between Mag Moss and UCC, Mag Moss has to prevail because of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. But there should not be so many conflicts because Mag-Moss supplements in some ways the protection the UCC gives to consumers in the realm of warranties.
回答：Magnuson Moss 是联邦法规，而 UCC 是州法规。Mag Moss 是联邦消费者保护法规，由国会起草，当时国会非常清楚 UCC 的存在。基本上，这项联邦法规旨在与 UCC 并肩工作。在 Mag Moss 和 UCC 之间存在冲突的程度上，Mag Moss 必须获胜，因为宪法的至高无上条款。但不应该有这么多冲突，因为 Mag-Moss 在某些方面补充了 UCC 在保修领域为消费者提供的保护。

Is not giving the college student a written warranty on a consumer product a violation of Mag Moss? It is not a violation. You would find nothing in Mag-Moss that says anytime there is a sale of consumer product the seller is obligated to give some kind of written warranty. If you look at §2302(b)(2) it says specifically “nothing in this act shall be deemed to require a consumer product or any of its components be warranted.” Mag Moss does not even require the seller to give any warranties even implied warranty of merchantability.
给大学生提供消费品的书面保证不是违反了 Mag Moss 吗？ 这不是违规行为。您在 Mag-Moss 中找不到任何内容说，只要有消费品的销售，卖家就有义务提供某种书面保证。如果您查看 §2302（b）（2）， 它明确指出“本法案中的任何内容均不得被视为要求消费品或其任何组件得到保修。Mag Moss 甚至不要求卖方提供任何保证，甚至暗示对适销性做出保证。

Does Mag Moss only apply in a case where a seller does give a written warranty to a consumer? Courts are split on this issue. The split is exemplified by the three cases, which said that we do not need a written warranty for certain products for Mag Moss to apply (McCurdy). Then there is McNamara case, which says no written warranty then Mag Moss does not apply at all. If you look at Mag Moss, there are clearly certain parts of it, many parts of it, that will only apply in the case where the seller has made a written warranty. An example of this would be 2302(a), where it says any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of written warranty shall fully and conspicuously disclose the term of such written warranty. That indicates that the requirements that are set in 2302(a) apply only to written warranties in consumer goods sales. That by itself is not saying that Mag Moss in its entirety only has application in cases where there is a written warranty.
Mag Moss 是否仅适用于卖家确实向消费者提供书面保证的情况？ 法院在这个问题上存在分歧。这三个案例就是一个例子，这三个案例表明我们不需要某些产品的书面保证即可申请 Mag Moss （McCurdy）。然后是 McNamara 案，它说没有书面保证，那么 Mag Moss 根本不适用。如果你看一下 Mag Moss，显然它的某些部分，其中的许多部分，仅适用于卖方做出书面保证的情况。这方面的一个例子是 2302（a），其中规定任何保证人通过书面保证向消费者保证消费产品时，应全面、醒目地披露此类书面保证的期限。这表明 2302（a） 中规定的要求仅适用于消费品销售中的书面保证。这本身并不是说 Mag Moss 整体仅在有书面保证的情况下才适用。

So, what is required in a McCurdy (where we do not need a written warranty for Mag-Moss to apply)? You got to have a sale of goods to a consumer. The other thing that you need from 2023(b)(1) which is a breach of some kind of warranty not necessarily a written warranty (it could be a written warranty) such as a breach of an obligation of implied warranty or service contract.
那么，McCurdy 需要什么 （我们不需要 Mag-Moss 的书面保证即可适用）？ 你必须向消费者销售商品。从 2023（b）（1） 开始，您需要的另一件事是违反某种保证，不一定是书面保证（可以是书面保证），例如违反默示保证或服务合同的义务。

Do we need a written warranty for mag Moss to apply? In most cases involving a consumer product, a seller is going to give a written warranty of some kind, more likely a limited one where there are taking away as much as they are giving. In virtually every consumer sale case, there is a written warranty. There are few cases where there is no written warranty. So it is a moot issue in most cases. But even though it is a moot issue, it can still be an important one.
我们需要书面保证才能申请 mag Moss 吗？ 在涉及消费品的大多数情况下，卖家会提供某种形式的书面保证，更有可能是有限的保证，其中带走的和他们给予的一样多。几乎在每个消费者销售案例中，都有书面保证。很少有没有书面保证的情况。 因此 ， 在大多数情况下，这是一个没有实际意义的问题。但是，即使这是一个没有实际意义的问题，它仍然可能是一个重要的问题。

According to Keating the better view is the one found in McCurdy. When you look at the logic of the court in the McNamara case, it said that it could not reconcile 2308 with 2310(d)(1). §2308 says in a case where there is a written warranty, the seller is going to be more limited in its ability to limit or modify the implied warranties. §2310(d)(1) talks about causes of action under Mag-Moss; and it says a consumer who is damaged by the failure of the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter. The McNamara Court was saying how could a consumer sue when virtually all of the provisions leading up to 2310(d)(1) has to do with cases where seller has a written warranty. §2310(d)(1) says that a consumer who is damaged by the failure of the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor under this chapter, OR under a written warranty, implied warranty, and service contract may bring suit. And then implied warranty is defined in Mag Moss in reference to state law. So, it seems like §2310(d)(1) gives you an alternative as a plaintiff to have a suit under Mag Moss. You can sue for a violation of Mag Moss if you can find one and most of those will involve a written warranty. Or alternatively, you can sue the seller for breaching an obligation under written warranty or implied warranty (state law implied warranty does not require written warranty) or service contract. McNamara will make sense if reworded §2310(d)(1) to say a consumer who is damaged by the failure of the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter that arises under a written warranty, implied warranty, and service contract may bring suit.
根据基廷的说法，更好的观点是在麦科迪发现的。当你查看法院在 McNamara 案中的逻辑时，它说它无法调和 2308 和 2310（d）（1）。§2308 规定，在有书面保证的情况下，卖方限制或修改默示保证的能力将受到更多限制。§2310（d）（1） 讨论了 Mag-Moss 下的诉因;它说消费者因供应商、保证人或服务承包商未能遵守本章规定的任何义务而受到损害。 麦克纳马拉法院的意思是，当导致 2310（d）（1） 的几乎所有条款都与卖方有书面保证的情况有关时，消费者怎么能提起诉讼 。§2310（d）（1） 规定，因本章规定的供应商、保证人或服务承包商的失职而受到损害的消费者，或根据书面保证、默示保证和服务合同的失误，可以提起诉讼。然后，在 Mag Moss 案中，根据州法律定义了默示保证。因此，§2310（d）（1） 似乎为作为原告提供了根据 Mag Moss 提起诉讼的替代方案。如果您能找到一个，您可以起诉违反 Mag Moss 的行为，其中大多数都涉及书面保证。或者，您可以起诉卖家违反书面保证或默示保证（州法律默示保证不要求书面保证）或服务合同下的义务。如果将 McNamara 改写为 §2310（d）（1），即因供应商、保证人或服务承包商未能遵守本章规定的书面保证、默示保证和服务合同项下产生的任何义务而受到损害的消费者可以提起诉讼。

Problem 10.1(b) Same facts as part (a). even in the absence of a written warranty, how can Magnuson-Moss help your client? 15 U.S.C. §§2310(d), (a)(3), and (e), 2301; U.C.C. §2-314. If you are suing under Magnuson Moss, can you bring your suit in federal district court? 15 U.S.C §§2310(d)(1), (d)(3), (b), and (c)(1).
问题 10.1（b） 与部分（a）的事实相同。 即使没有书面保证，Magnuson-Moss 如何帮助你的客户呢？15 U.S.C. §§2310（d）， （a）（3）， and （e）， 2301; U.C.C. §2-314。如果您根据 Magnuson Moss 提起诉讼，您可以向联邦地区法院提起诉讼吗？《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310（d）（1）、（d）（3）、（b） 和 （c）（1） 款。

ANSWER: §2310(d)(2) gives extra damages in the form of attorney’s fees, whereas UCC does not. The typical American rule is even if you win as the plaintiff, you pay your own attorney’s fees. Mag Moss reverses the American Rule. If you’re bringing the suit under Mag Moss and if you win, you get Attorney’s Fees under §2310(d)(2). But in order to do that, we have to go back and consider the requirements of §2310(d)(1). So Mag Moss could enable a successful plaintiff in a breach of warranty suit to recover attorney’s fees and that is the point being made in the McCurdy case, rejected by the McNamara case. Here is how it happens, 2310(d)(2) says is a consumer prevails in an action brought under 2310(d)(1), then the court may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing consumer. If we look at 2310(d)(1), it begins “subject to subsections (a)(3) and e of this section, (a)(3) in effect says if the warrantor sets up a mandatory informal dispute resolution procedure, the consumer first must exhaust his remedies thereunder before filing suit under 2310(d)(1). 2310(e) says you cannot sue under 2310(d) until you first afford the warrantor a reasonable opportunity to cure.” Second, we got to have a consumer and a consumer is a defined term in 2301(3) and includes any person to whom the consumer product (defined in 2301(1) as tangible personal property which is normally used for personal, family or household purposes including fixtures). A consumer includes any person to whom a consumer product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty. Next, the consumer must be damaged by the failure of any supplier, warrantor, or service contractor’s failure to comply with any obligation under this act most of which arise when the warrantor makes a written warranty or under a written warranty which is a term of art under 2301(6) or under an implied warranty (defined under 2301(7) as an implied warranty under state law) or service contract may bring suit for legal and equitable relief. Supplier under 2301(4) is any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly to consumers. 2301(5) defines warrantor as any supplier who gives a written warranty or implied warranty. And then §2301(8) defines a service contractor as a written contract to perform services relating to maintenance or repair of consumer product.
答案：§2310（d）（2） 以律师费的形式提供额外损害赔偿，而 UCC 则没有。典型的美国规则是，即使您作为原告胜诉，您也要支付自己的律师费。马格·莫斯 （Mag Moss） 颠覆了美国规则。如果您根据 Mag Moss 提起诉讼并且您赢了，您将根据 §2310（d）（2） 获得律师费。但为了做到这一点，我们必须回过头来考虑 §2310（d）（1） 的要求。 因此 ，Mag Moss 可以使违反保证诉讼中的成功原告能够收回律师费，这就是 McCurdy 案中提出的观点 ，但被 McNamara 案驳回。2310（d）（2） 规定，如果消费者在根据 2310（d）（1） 提起的诉讼中胜诉，那么法院可以判给胜诉消费者律师费。如果我们看一下 2310（d）（1），它开始“根据本节的 （a）（3） 和 e 小节，（a）（3） 实际上是说，如果保证人设立了强制性的非正式争议解决程序，消费者在根据 2310（d）（1） 提起诉讼之前，首先必须用尽其补救措施。2310（e） 规定，在您首先为保证人提供合理的补救机会之前，您不能根据 2310（d） 提起诉讼。其次，我们必须有消费者，而消费者是 2301（3） 中定义的术语，包括将消费品（在 2301（1） 中定义为通常用于个人、家庭或家庭目的的有形个人财产，包括固定装置）的任何人。消费者包括在默示或书面保证期限内将消费品转让给的任何人。 接下来，消费者必须因任何供应商、保证人或服务承包商未能遵守本法规定的任何义务而受到损害，其中大部分是在保证人做出书面保证或根据 2301（6） 或默示保证（根据 2301（7） 定义为州法律下的默示保证）或服务合同提起法律诉讼时产生的。衡平法救济。根据 2301（4） 的规定，供应商是指直接或间接向消费者制造消费品业务的任何人。2301（5） 将保证人定义为提供书面保证或默示保证的任何供应商。然后 §2301（8） 将服务承包商定义为履行与消费品维护或维修相关的服务的书面合同。

Here in this problem, there has been no Mag Moss written warranty, does that mean no attorney’s fees if all you got is a breach of an implied warranty by a warrantor selling a consumer product? Yes, that is what McCurdy says and that is what the code says.
在这个问题中，没有 Mag Moss 的书面保证，如果您得到的只是销售消费品的保证人违反了默示保证，这是否意味着没有律师费？是的，这就是 McCurdy 所说的，也是准则所说的。

Can you bring your suit in federal district court? §2310(d)(3) says you cannot bring a suit in the federal district court unless a single claim is at least $50k, or a total claim in a class action is more than $50k with each individual claims to be at least $25 and you have at least 100 class members. 2310(b) also mention the federal trade commission can bring regulatory actions against those who violate Mag Moss.
您可以在联邦地区法院提起诉讼吗？ §2310（d）（3） 规定，您不能在联邦地区法院提起诉讼，除非单次索赔至少为 $50k，或者集体诉讼中的总索赔超过 $50k，每个索赔至少为 $25，并且您至少有 100 名集体成员。2310（b） 还提到联邦贸易委员会可以对违反 Mag Moss 的人提起监管行动。

Problem 10.1(c) Same facts as part (a), except that your client tells you that he lent his computer to a classmate a couple of weeks after buying it. While the classmate was using the computer in the classmate’s dorm room, the computer malfunctioned and destroyed an expensive custom-designed video game that the classmate had on a hard disk. Your client’s classmate would like to recover from the retail seller of the computer for the $200 in damages represented by the destroyed game. In an alternative A jurisdiction, may your client’s classmate recover against the retailer through a UCC warranty actions? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative A.
问题 10.1（c） 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是您的客户告诉您，他在购买计算机几周后将计算机借给了一位同学。当这位同学在同学的宿舍里使用电脑时，电脑出现故障，毁坏了这位同学在硬盘上的一个昂贵的定制设计的视频游戏。您客户的同学希望从计算机的零售销售商处追偿被毁游戏所代表的 200 美元损失。在替代 A 司法管辖区，您客户的同学可以通过 UCC 保修诉讼向零售商追偿吗？U.C.C. §2-318，备选方案 A。

ANSWER: In an Alternative A jurisdiction, may your client’s classmate recover against the retailer through a UCC warranty actions? No, because the classmate was not injured in person by the breach nor were they a guest in the client’s home (not a family member). So the classmate has a horizontal privity problem they cannot overcome with the UCC alone.
回答： 在备选方案 A 司法管辖区，您客户的同学可以通过 UCC 保修诉讼向零售商追偿吗？不，因为这位同学没有因违规行为而受伤，他们也不是客户家中的客人（不是家庭成员）。 所以这位同学有一个横向的相互关系问题，他们无法单独使用 UCC 来克服。

Problem 10.1(d) Same facts as part (c). May your client’s classmate recover against the retailer for his destroyed video game in a Magnuson-Moss action? 15 U.S.C. §§2310, 2301(3), 2301(7).
问题 10.1（d） 与 （c） 部分相同的事实。您客户的同学是否可以因在 Magnuson-Moss 诉讼中被毁的视频游戏而向零售商追偿？《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310 条、第 2301（3） 条、第 2301（7） 条。

ANSWER: Yes, the broad definition of the consumer makes a difference in this case (McCurdy). Consumer is any transferee of the consumer product during the duration of the written warranty or implied warranty. This broad definition of consumer would get rid of the horizontal privity problem that would appear in this case; however, it does of solve all of the horizontal privity problems. Think about in the previous problem, the client Erin whose garage was smashed into the faulty lawnmower, would her horizontal problem go away with this definition? NO, because she was not a transferee. Her garage got smashed but she was not riding it. When you talk about a transferee, do you think that the code drafters intended transferee to encompass somebody you just loaned the product to or do you think they intended transferee to cover only the case you gave out right ownership as a gift or even as resale? It is not clear, but according to Keating consider it as it is written and if the code drafters wanted to limit that language they would have said “any person to whom ownership of the consumer product was transferred.” But the code does not say such thing. So transferee could also mean even to people you just lent the consumer product.
回答： 是的，在这种情况下，消费者的广泛定义会有所不同 （McCurdy）。消费者是指在书面保证或默示保证期限内消费产品的任何受让人。消费者的这个宽泛定义将消除在这种情况下出现的水平关联性问题;但是，它确实解决了所有水平相互性问题。想想前面的问题，客户 Erin 的车库被砸进了有故障的割草机，她的水平问题会随着这个定义而消失吗？不，因为她不是调动对象。她的车库被砸碎了，但她没有骑车。当您谈论受让人时，您认为代码起草者希望受让人包括您刚刚将产品借给的人， 还是您认为他们打算让受让人仅涵盖您作为礼物甚至转售赠送权利所有权的情况？目前尚不清楚，但根据 Keating 的说法，请按照书面形式考虑，如果代码起草者想限制该语言，他们会说“任何消费品所有权转让给的人”。但法典并没有说这样的事情。 因此 ， 受让人甚至可能意味着您刚刚借给消费产品的人。

The one argument against this result of expanding ways to overcome horizontal privity on which courts are split is found in §2301(7), which defines an implied warranty with reference to state law. SO the seller here could say this classmate should be barred from recovery because an implied warranty under Mag-Moss are defined with respect to state law; and state law does require privity except to the extent that 2318 and state case law do away with such requirement. So the key question here, is whether Mag Moss’s incorporation of the state law definition of implied warranty is also intended to incorporate state law implied warranty limitations and defenses such as lack of privity? That is an issue to which courts are split.
反对扩大克服法院分歧的横向相互关系的方法这一结果的一个论点是在 §2301（7） 中找到，该条款参考州法律定义了默示保证。 所以这里的卖家可以说这个同学应该被禁止追偿，因为 Mag-Moss 下的默示保证是针对州法律定义的;州法律确实要求相互关系，除非 2318 和州判例法取消了这种要求。 因此 ，这里的关键问题是，Mag Moss 纳入州法律对默示保证的定义是否也旨在纳入州法律的默示保证限制和辩护，例如缺乏相互关系？这是法院存在分歧的问题。

Problem 10.1(e) Same facts as part (c), except that the retailer had included a full written warranty promising that the computer would run defect-free for at least two years. To what extent does this help the classmate’s cause of action for damages under Magnuson-Moss? 15 U.S.C. §§2310(d), 2301(3), 2301(6).
问题 10.1（e） 与 （c） 部分的事实相同，只是零售商提供了一份完整的书面保证，承诺计算机至少在两年内无缺陷运行。这在多大程度上帮助了同学根据 Magnuson-Moss 提出的损害赔偿诉讼因由？《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310（d）、2301（3）、2301（6） 条。

ANSWER: if you were in McNamara jurisdiction and now that you have a written warranty, there is no question about whether Mag Moss applies at all. There is no dispute on the definition of transferee. It also helps you where there is a split in courts and that is on the issue of whether Mag Moss incorporates state law’s definition of implied warranty, do they also mean to incorporate its limits on your ability to sue under implied warranty. Once you have a written warranty, you can sue on a written warranty, then you are not limited anymore by what the state law says about your limitation to sue under an implied warranty because with a written warranty which is defined by Mag Moss, it is clearly that you are not going to have any problems. Because the written warranty as defined basically takes away that privity problem; the way that Mag Moss defines consumer and the way that Mag Moss defines warranty. This is all now coming from Mag Moss not coming from state law.
回答： 如果您在 McNamara 管辖区， 现在您有书面保证，那么 Mag Moss 是否适用根本不存在问题。对于受让人的定义并无争议。它还可以帮助您在法院出现分歧时，即关于 Mag Moss 是否纳入州法律对默示保证的定义的问题，他们是否也意味着纳入其对您根据默示保证提起诉讼的能力的限制。一旦您有了书面保证，您就可以根据书面保证提起诉讼，那么您就不再受到州法律关于您根据默示保证提起诉讼的限制的限制，因为有了 Mag Moss 定义的书面保证，很明显您不会有任何问题。因为定义的书面保证基本上消除了这种相互关系问题;Mag Moss 定义消费者的方式以及 Mag Moss 定义保修的方式。现在这一切都来自 Mag Moss，而不是来自州法律。

§2301(6) –is a written warranty under Mag Moss the same as an express warranty under the UCC? And if it is not the same, which is broader or which is narrower? They are different. The UCC’s express warranty is broader because it could be created orally and it does not have to be in writing; and in terms of content it is broader because it could include a written warranty. UCC’s express warranty is broadly defined and it is defined, as “any affirmation of facts that relates to goods becomes part of the basis of the bargain.” But look at 2301(6)’s definition of a written warranty and you do not get such a broad definition there; it says “any written affirmation of facts, a written promise…which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship in a firm promise that such material or workmanship is defect free” and this definition is narrower than UCC’s definition of express warranty.
§2301（6） – Mag Moss 下的书面保证是否与 UCC 下的明示保证相同？如果它不相同，哪个更宽或哪个更窄？他们是不同的。UCC 的明示保证范围更广，因为它可以口头创建 ，而不必以书面形式创建;在内容方面，它更广泛，因为它可以包括书面保证。UCC 的明示保证定义很广 ，其定义是“任何与商品相关的事实确认都成为交易基础的一部分”。但是看看 2301（6） 对书面保证的定义，你并没有得到如此宽泛的定义;它说 “任何对事实的书面确认、书面承诺......这与材料或工艺的性质有关，并明确承诺此类材料或工艺无缺陷“，并且该定义比 UCC 对明示保证的定义更窄。

Bottom line: virtually, all Mag Moss’s written warranty would also qualify as UCC’s express warranty. However, not all UCC’s express warranty would necessarily qualify as Mag Moss’s written warranty.
底线：实际上，Mag Moss 的所有书面保证也都有资格作为 UCC 的明示保证。但是，并非所有 UCC 的明示保证都一定符合 Mag Moss 的书面保证条件。

Problem 10.1(f) Same facts as part (c), except that when the computer wrecked the classmate’s video game, that malfunction also disabled the computer and caused it $1,000 worth of damage. Now your client wants to sue both the retailer and the manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. May the manufacturer be joined in a suit under the UCC in an Alternative A jurisdiction? U.C.C. §2-318, Alternative A.
问题 10.1（f） 与 （c） 部分的事实相同，只是当计算机破坏了同学的视频游戏时，该故障也使计算机瘫痪并造成了价值 1,000 美元的损失。现在，您的客户想起诉零售商和制造商违反适销性的默示保证。制造商是否可以在备选方案 A 司法管辖区根据 UCC 加入诉讼？U.C.C. §2-318，备选方案 A。

ANSWER: The manufacturer cannot be joined in a suit for breach of implied warranty in Alternative A jurisdiction unless your state through its common law has independently gotten rid of the need for vertical privity either through case law or through so-called sealed containment law. But typically, the case law that would get rid of vertical privity, at least in a case of an implied warranty, would require some kind of personal injury and we do not have that here. Furthermore, in practice, most states have gotten rid of the vertical privity problem whenever a buyer is suing a manufacturer for breach of an express warranty made by the manufacturer (but that is not what we are talking about here, here we are discussing a breach of an implied warranty). So, in an Alternative A jurisdiction, the official comment 3 to 2-318 says explicitly that Alternative A is neutral on the question of vertical privity. So it does not do away with vertical privity. And so you may be out of luck under state law alone.
答： 制造商不能在备选方案 A 司法管辖区加入违反默示保证的诉讼，除非您所在的州通过其普通法通过判例法或所谓的密封遏制法独立地摆脱了对垂直隐私的需求。但通常情况下，至少在默示保证的情况下，摆脱垂直相互关系的判例法会要求某种形式的人身伤害，而我们这里没有。此外，在实践中，每当买方起诉制造商违反制造商做出的明示保证时，大多数州都已经摆脱了垂直相互关系问题（但这不是我们在这里谈论的内容，这里我们讨论的是违反默示保证）。因此，在备选方案 A 的司法管辖区，官方意见 3 至 2-318 明确指出，备选方案 A 在纵向相互关系问题上是中立的。 因此 ，它并没有消除垂直的相互关系。 因此 ，仅根据州法律，您可能就不走运了。

Problem 10.1(g) Same facts as part (f). May the manufacturer be joined in a suit under Magnuson-Moss? 15 U.S.C. §§2310(d)(1), 2301(4). Would it make any difference if the manufacturer had made a written warranty? 15 U.S.C. §2310(f).
问题 10.1（g） 与 （f） 部分相同的事实。制造商可以加入 Magnuson-Moss 的诉讼吗？《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310（d）（1） 条、第 2301（4） 条。如果制造商做出书面保证，会有什么不同吗？《美国法典》第 15 卷第 2310（f） 条。

ANSWER: Some courts believe that Mag Moss has eliminated even vertical privity problems such as this one in any consumer breach of warranty suit that is based on state law’s implied warranty. What is the argument? The argument is this: under §2310(d) consumers can sue suppliers for breach of implied warranties and if you look at the definition of suppliers defined in 2301(4) to include any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers and that would necessarily include manufacturers. Now you still would have the argument that we discussed prior that when you rely on the state law implied warranty, you may also have to contend with state law defenses such as lack of horizontal privity and that will be just as true when you are relying on an implied warranty to sue the manufacturer and trying to overcome the horizontal privity problem by reference to the definition of supplier.
答： 一些法院认为，Mag Moss 甚至消除了任何基于州法律默示保证的消费者违反保证诉讼中的垂直相互关系问题，例如这个问题。论点是什么？论点是这样的：根据 §2310（d），消费者可以起诉供应商违反默示保证，如果您查看 2301（4） 中定义的供应商定义，包括从事直接或间接向消费者提供消费品业务的任何人，这必然包括制造商。现在，您仍然会有我们之前讨论过的论点，当您依赖州法律的默示保证时，您可能还必须与州法律的辩护作斗争，例如缺乏横向相互性，当您依靠默示保证起诉制造商并试图通过参考供应商的定义来克服横向相互性问题时，情况也是如此。

Now if the manufacturer had made a written warranty, then it would be an easy case. You should be able to overcome the vertical privity problem under Mag Moss and even under state law.
现在，如果制造商做出了书面保证，那么这将是一个简单的情况。您应该能够在 Mag Moss 甚至州法律下克服垂直相互关系问题。

LEASE, INTERNATIONAL, AND REAL ESTATE WARRANTIES PP. 207
租赁、国际和房地产保修 第 207 页

11.1. a. First National Bank has a leasing division, First National Leasing, that leased a dozen trailers to a trucking firm, Standard Delivery. Prior to entering the lease, Standard determined the kind of trailer it wanted and identified for First National a company, Billings Equipment Co., that sold this type of trailer. First National then purchased a dozen custom-built trailers from Billings after having Standard sign off on the terms of First National’s purchase agreement with Billings, which included various express warranties. Following Standard’s approval of the sale terms, First National signed a 10-year lease agreement with Standard. One year into the lease, two of the trailers began leaking when it rained. What right does Standard have against First National Leasing as to the defective trailers? U.C.C. §§2A-103(1)(g), 2A-212(1), 2A-213, 2A-407, Official Comment (g) to §2A-103.
11.1. 一种。First National Bank 有一个租赁部门 First National Leasing，该公司将十几辆拖车租给了一家卡车运输公司 Standard Delivery。在签订租约之前，Standard 确定了它想要的拖车类型，并为 First National 确定了销售此类拖车的公司 Billings Equipment Co.。First National 随后从比林斯购买了十几辆定制的拖车，此前标准公司签署了 First National 与比林斯的购买协议条款，其中包括各种明示保证。在 Standard 批准销售条款后，First National 与 Standard 签署了一份为期 10 年的租赁协议。租约一年后，其中两辆拖车在下雨时开始漏水。Standard 对 First National Leasing 对有缺陷的拖车有什么权利？加州大学 §§2A-103（1）（g）、2A-212（1）、2A-213、2A-407、§2A-103 的官方意见 （g）。

Under §2A-212(1), §2A-213, a finance lease does not have implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. §2A-407(1) reinforces the independence and irrevocability of a lessee’s lease obligations to the lessor by providing that the lessee’s promises under the finance lease contract “become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee’s acceptance of the goods.” Therefore, if this is a finance lease, then the lessee, once they accept the goods, has to keep paying rent to the lessor even though the trailers are defective. This “hell or high water” clause under §2A-407(1) means the lessee has to pay the lessor no matter what.
根据 §2A-212（1） 和 §2A-213， 融资租赁没有对适销性的默示保证和对特定用途适用性的默示保证 。 §2A-407（1） 加强了承租人对出租人的租赁义务的独立性和不可撤销性 ，规定承租人在融资租赁合同下的承诺 “ 在承租人接受货物后变得不可撤销和独立 。“ 因此，如果这是融资租赁，那么承租人一旦接受了货物， 就必须继续向出租人支付租金，即使拖车有缺陷。 §2A-407（1） 下的 “ 地狱或高水位 ” 条款意味着承租人无论如何都必须向出租人付款。

Per the definition of a finance lease under §2A-103(1)(g), this lease qualifies as a finance lease in that the lessor does not select, manufacture or supply the goods, the lessor acquires the goods in connection with the lease, and the lessee is aware of the terms of the lessor’s agreement with the supplier. But in order for this lease to be a finance lease, it first has to be a true lease, meaning at the inception of the lease, there is a reasonable likelihood that the lessor will get the goods back at a time when the goods still have a meaningful residual value.
根据 §2A-103（1）（g） 中对融资租赁的定义 ， 该租赁属于融资租赁，因为出租人不选择、制造或供应货物，出租人购买与租赁相关的货物，并且承租人了解出租人与供应商签订的协议条款。 但是 ， 为了使该租赁成为融资租赁，它首先必须是真正的租赁，这意味着在租赁开始时，出租人有合理的可能性在货物仍具有有意义的剩余价值时收回货物。

b. Same facts as part (a), except that the leasing officer at First National tells the Standard officer in charge of this deal, “I highly recommend that we get the trailers from Billings Equipment Co. We’ve dealt with them before and their trailers have always been first-rate.” Would Standard now have rights against First National Leasing as to the defective trailers? U.C.C. §§2A-103(1)(g), 2A-210, 2A-407(1), Official Comment 2 to §2A-407.
b. 与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 First National 的租赁官员告诉负责这笔交易的标准官员，“ 我强烈建议我们从 Billings Equipment Co. 购买拖车。我们以前与他们打过交道 ，他们的拖车一直是一流的。“Standard 现在是否有权就有缺陷的拖车向 First National Leasing 提起诉讼？加州大学 §§2A-103（1）（g）、2A-210、2A-407（1），第 2A-407 条的官方意见 2。

A finance lessor, under §2A-210, could in theory make an express warranty to the lessee and be held liable for that, but it’s not very common. It almost comes into conflict with the first part of definition of finance lease under §2A-103(1)(g) that the finance lessor does not select, manufacture or supply the goods. Here the lessor’s endorsement of the trailers could potentially be considered to be an express warranty. However, First National can make the argument that there’s no reliance by the lessee because the lessee would have wanted the trailers to come from Billings Equipment even in the absence of the endorsement, or alternatively the endorsement is merely puffing under §2A-210(2).
根据 §2A-210，融资出租人理论上可以向承租人做出明确保证并为此承担责任，但这并不常见。这几乎与 §2A-103（1）（g） 中融资租赁定义的第一部分相冲突，即融资出租人不选择、制造或供应货物。在这里，出租人对拖车的认可可能被视为明示保证。然而，First National 可以辩称承租人没有依赖，因为即使没有背书，承租人也希望拖车来自 Billings Equipment，或者根据 §2A-210（2） 的规定，背书只是吹嘘。

How to reconcile a finance lessor who makes an express warranty to the lessee under §2A-210(1) with the independence and irrevocable language in §2A-407?
如何协调根据 §2A-210（1） 向承租人做出明确保证的融资出租人与 §2A-407 中的独立和不可撤销的语言 ？

Then the lessee would direct express warranty right against the finance lessor, but per 2A-407, the lessee has to keep paying even if the finance lessor is in breach of an express warranty. But the lessee can still sue the finance lessor while paying the rent in the meantime, and get certain remedies, including damages, request for repair or replacement, such as express warranty or infringement under Comment 2 to §2A-407, but not rescission or cancellation of the lease contract
然后承租人将直接向融资出租人提供明示保证权，但根据 2A-407，即使融资出租人违反了明示保证，承租人也必须继续付款。但承租人仍然可以在支付租金的同时起诉融资出租人，并获得某些补救措施，包括损害赔偿、维修或更换请求，例如根据 §2A-407 的第 2 条意见 2 的明示保证或侵权，但不能撤销或取消租赁合同.

c. Same facts as part (a). What rights does Standard have against Billings Equipment as to the defective trailers? U.C.C. §§2A-209(1), 2-313, 2-314; Official Comment 1 to §2A-209. What if the sales contract contained warranty disclaimers----would those be effective? U.C.C. §2A-209(1).
c. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实。对于有缺陷的拖车，Standard 对 Billings Equipment 有哪些权利？加州大学 §§2A-209（1）、2-313、2-314;§2A-209 的官方意见 1。如果销售合同包含保修免责声明怎么办----这些免责声明会有效吗？加州大学 §2A-209（1） 条。

§2A-209(1) brings the sales warranties (express warranty in §2-313, implied warranty of merchantability in §2-314 and implied warranty fitness for particular purpose in §2-315) down to the lessee, even if those sales warranties were originally given to the finance lessor by the supplier. So here Standard will get the benefit of any sales warranties that Billings Equipment made to First National, including the express warranty and the implied warranty of merchantability Billings Equipment made to First National. Comment 1 to §2A-209 also indicates that the whole purpose of a finance lease is to give the lessee the benefit of supplier’s warranties to the lessor. Likewise, the disclaimers contained in the sales warranties the supplier made to the finance lessor would be equally effective against the lessee.
§2A-209（1） 将销售保证（§2-313 中的明示保证、§2-314 中的适销性默示保证和 §2-315 中的特定用途适用性的默示保证 ）归于承租人 ，即使这些销售保证最初是由供应商提供给融资出租人。因此，Standard 将受益于 Billings Equipment 向 First National 提供的任何销售保证，包括 Billings Equipment 向 First National 提供的明示保证和适销性的默示保证。§2A-209 的注释 1 还表明，融资租赁的全部目的是让承租人享受供应商对出租人的保证。同样，供应商向融资出租人作出的销售保证中包含的免责声明对承租人同样有效。

d. Same facts as part (a), except that the Standard officer told the Billings salesman prior to the sale, “We make a lot of deliveries over rugged mountain roads. So we need trailers with good shocks.” The Billings salesman then replied, “Might I recommend our Rover XXL model?” It turned out that the Rover XXL had shock absorbers no better than those on the typical trailer, and so the shock failed on a number of the trailers within the first year of the lease. The written sales contract between Billings and First National said nothing about the durability of the shocks. Does Standard have any rights against Billings regarding the shocks? U.C.C. §§2-315, 2A-213, 2A-209(1).
d. 与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是标准官员在出售前告诉 Billings 推销员，“ 我们在崎岖的山路上进行大量送货。 所以我们需要具有良好减震器的拖车。“ 比林斯推销员接着回答说，” 我可以推荐我们的 Rover XXL 型号吗？“ 事实证明，Rover XXL 的减震器并不比典型拖车上的减震器好，因此 在租赁的第一年内，许多拖车的减震器都失败了。比林斯和 First National 之间的书面销售合同没有说明冲击的持久性。Standard 对 Billings 是否有权就冲击进行处罚？加州大学 §§2-315、2A-213、2A-209（1） 条。

Here Standard does not have any rights against Billings regarding the shocks. Standard will fail if it try to pursue a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose under §2A-213, because the supplier is not the lessor. Likewise, Standard will also fail if it try to pursue a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose under §2-315, because the buyer in this transaction is not Standard, but rather the lessor First National. We need the lessor’s reliance, but we only have the lessee’s reliance. However, Standard can try to argue that here the seller supplier did make an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose under §2-315 to the lessor, because the lessor was implicitly relying on the supplier to make the lessee happy. And whether or not the lessor was privy to this particular conversation between the supplier and the lessee, the lessor was at least relying generally on the supplier to supply goods that were suitable for any special needs of the lessor’s lessee that were communicated by the lessee to the supplier. Then §2A-209 would pass that §2-315 warranty that was given to the lessor down to the lessee. For purposes of §2-315, the finance lessee Standard was in effect an agent of the true buyer, the lessor First National. And therefore Standard’s reliance on the supplier was tantamount to First National’s required reliance under §2-315.
Here Standard 对 Billings 没有任何关于冲击的权利。如果 Standard 试图就违反 §2A-213 规定的特定用途适用性的默示保证提起诉讼， 则 Standard 将失败 ，因为供应商不是出租人。同样，如果 Standard 试图就违反 §2-315 规定的特定用途适用性默示保证提起诉讼， 它也会失败 ，因为该交易中的买方不是 Standard，而是出租人 First National。我们需要出租人的依赖，但我们只拥有承租人的依赖。然而，Standard 可以尝试争辩说，在这里，卖方供应商确实根据 §2-315 向出租人做出了适合特定用途的默示保证，因为出租人默许供应商使承租人满意。 无论出租人是否参与了供应商与承租人之间的这次特定对话，出租人至少在一般上依赖供应商提供适合出租人承租人向供应商传达的任何特殊需要的货物。然后 ，§2A-209 会将给予出租人的 §2-315 保证传递给承租人。就 §2-315 而言， 融资承租人 Standard 实际上是真正买方（出租人 First National）的代理人。 因此 ，Standard 对供应商的依赖等同于 First National 根据 §2-315 要求的依赖。

11.2. In your capacity as in-house counsel for First National Bank, the leasing division has asked you to take a look at the form lease that it uses whenever the bank engages in a finance lease. The leasing officers who do these deals on a regular basis tell you that it’s very important that these transactions get characterized as finance leases so that the bank can get all of the benefits of being a finance lessor. What kind of clauses will you make sure are included in the contract? U.C.C. §§2A-103(1)(g); Official Comment (g) §2A-103; §§2A-212(1), 2A-213, 2A-407(1).
11.2. 作为 First National Bank 的内部法律顾问，租赁部门要求您查看银行进行融资租赁时使用的租赁形式。定期进行这些交易的租赁官员告诉您， 将这些交易定性为融资租赁非常重要，这样银行才能获得 作为融资租赁商的所有好处。您将确保合同中包含哪些类型的条款？加州大学 §§2A-103（1）（g）;官方意见 （g） §2A-103; §§2A-212（1）、2A-213、2A-407（1）。

First make sure with recitation in the contract that this contract qualifies as a finance lease. To achieve that, first make sure that you have a true lease, not a disguised sale. Then make sure the lease meets the requirements for a finance lease spelled out under §2A-103(1)(g), meaning you insist the lessee selects the goods, make it clear the lessor is buying the goods only because of this finance lease, and give the finance lessee contract approval with respect to the bank’s sales contract with the supplier of the leased goods. And then recite in the lease contract how these requirements have been met in this case. Just to be sure, you can put into contract all of the benefit inures to a finance lessor, no implied warranty being made to the finance lessee and the automatic “hell or high water” clause under 2A-407(1), that the lessee’s promises under the contract become independent and irrevocable upon the lessee’s acceptance of the goods.
首先，在合同中背诵该合同符合融资租赁的条件。为此，首先确保您拥有真实的租约，而不是变相的销售。然后确保租赁符合 §2A-103（1）（g） 中规定的融资租赁要求，这意味着您坚持由承租人选择货物，明确出租人仅因该融资租赁而购买货物，并就银行与租赁货物供应商的销售合同批准融资承租人合同。然后在租赁合同中说明在这种情况下如何满足这些要求。为了保险起见，您可以将 融资出租人的所有利益都纳入合同中，不向融资承租人做出任何默示保证，以及 2A-407（1） 项下的自动 “ 地狱或高水位 ” 条款，即承租人在合同下的承诺在承租人接受货物后变得独立且不可撤销 。

11.3. Steve Stern is a construction worker whose job sometimes takes him out of state for a few weeks at a time. He and his wife, Sandra Werner, have been looking for a few months to buy a house after living in an apartment for the first three years of their marriage. When Sandra found a 4-year-old house in an established neighborhood of 80-year-old houses, she decided to make an offer on the house on the spot, even though Steve was out of town on a job. She included an inspection contingency clause in the contract, which was accepted by the seller. Sandra figured that Steve could do the inspection himself, but he was so exhausted from traveling and working the out-of-town job that he told Sandra she could do a walk-through on her own. Sandra did not notice anything in her admittedly superficial inspection, and she and her husband purchased the house. Two months after moving in, Steve was fixing the gutters when he noticed something peculiar about the way in which the roof shingles were attached. Upon closer inspection, Steve could see (because of his extensive experience in the construction industry) that the roof work was incredibly shoddy, and he estimated it would cost nearly $5,000 to get the roof done right. May Sandra and Steve recover against the original builder for the cost of the roof repairs?
11.3. 史蒂夫·斯特恩 （Steve Stern） 是一名建筑工人，他的工作有时一次需要他离开该州几周。他和他的妻子桑德拉·沃纳 （Sandra Werner） 在结婚的前三年住在公寓里后，几个月来一直在寻找买房。当 Sandra 在一个拥有 4 年历史的老房子的成熟社区找到一栋 80 年的历史房子时 ，她决定当场对这栋房子出价，即使史蒂夫正在外地工作。她在合同中加入了一项检查或有条款，卖方接受了该条款。Sandra 认为 Steve 可以自己进行检查，但他因旅行和外地工作而筋疲力尽，因此他告诉 Sandra 她可以自己进行一次巡视。桑德拉在她承认的肤浅检查中没有注意到任何东西，她和她的丈夫买下了这所房子。搬进来两个月后，史蒂夫在修理排水沟时，他注意到屋顶瓦片的固定方式有些奇怪。经过仔细检查，史蒂夫可以看到（因为他在建筑行业拥有丰富的经验）屋顶工作非常粗制滥造，他估计要花近 5,000 美元才能把屋顶做好。Sandra 和 Steve 是否可以向原始建筑商赔偿屋顶维修费用？

Here the problem could go either way depending on the jurisdiction, if the original builders normally liable for defects discovered by subsequent purchasers. And states are split. The Hershey court said the original builders are liable for defects discovered by subsequent purchasers but only for latent defects that could not have been discovered by subsequent purchasers with reasonable inspection. If we view the standard of the reasonable inspection strictly subjectively as the Hershey court seems to, the reasonable inspection rule says the original builder is not liable to subsequent purchaser for defect which a reasonable inspection done by a lay person could have uncovered prior to the purchase. Probably an average lay person would not have discovered this roof defect. But Steve could have, if he had taken the time to do the inspection using his expertise prior to the purchase. One of the reasons for the reasonable inspection exception, according to the Hershey case, is to ensure that subsequent purchasers don’t get a double benefit, meaning a reduced purchase price from the seller for a defect that was obvious and they were aware of and compensation from the original builder for the very defect that gave the buyer the reduction in price. However, here this risk of windfall does not exist since at the time of purchase, Sandra and Steve were not aware of the roof defect and purchased the house full price, thus it seems they will not get a double benefit if the original builders were required to do the roof work properly. Furthermore, if the original builder does not have to fix the roof for the original buyer, then it seems it’s the builders who end up with the windfall, because the original builder presumably charged full price for a new home with a latently shoddy roof and never have to pay the original buyer to make it right because the original buyer never discovered the defect. Thus in a Hershey jurisdiction, liabilities should be allow here since Sandra and Steve will not get a double benefit if they get the roof repaired even though one of the couple could have discovered the defect prior to purchase.
根据司法管辖区的不同 ，如果原始建筑商通常对后续购买者发现的缺陷负责， 那么问题可能会朝着任何一种方向发展 。各州都分裂了。 好时法院表示，原始建筑商应对后续购买者发现的缺陷负责 ，但仅限于后续购买者通过合理检查无法发现的潜在缺陷 。如果我们像 Hershey 法院那样严格主观地看待合理检查的标准，那么合理检查规则表明，原始建筑商不对后续购买者在购买前进行的合理检查可能发现的缺陷负责。可能一个普通的外行人不会发现这个屋顶缺陷。但是，如果史蒂夫在购买之前花时间利用他的专业知识进行检查，他就可以这样做。根据 Hershey 案，合理检查例外的原因之一是确保后续购买者不会获得双重利益，这意味着卖方会因他们知道且他们知道的明显缺陷而降低购买价格，并从原始建筑商处赔偿导致买方降价的缺陷。然而，这里不存在这种意外之财的风险，因为在购买时，Sandra 和 Steve 并不知道屋顶缺陷并全价购买了房子，因此如果需要原始建筑商正确进行屋顶工作，他们似乎不会获得双重利益。 此外，如果原始建筑商不必为原始买家修理屋顶，那么似乎最终获得意外之财的是建筑商，因为原始建筑商可能为屋顶潜在劣质的新房收取了全价，并且永远不必向原始买家支付费用来修复它，因为原始买家从未发现缺陷。 因此 ，在 Hershey 司法管辖区，这里应该允许责任，因为如果 Sandra 和 Steve 修理屋顶，即使这对夫妇中的一方可能在购买前发现了缺陷，他们也不会获得双重利益。

REDUCING OR ELIMINATING WARRANTY LIABILITY: BASICS PP. 221
减少或消除保修责任： 基本知识 第 221 页

Problem 12.1 Fresh out of law school, you have opened up your own practice in a storefront in the neighborhood where you grew up. One of your first clients is Mrs. McGillicudy, your former next door-neighbor, who remembers you back when “you just barely came up to my knees.” It turns out that Mrs. McGillicudy had just bought a used Cadillac from the local used car lot, Lou’s Used Cars for Less. Three weeks after the purchase, the Cadillac was giving Mrs. McGillicudy a host of problems that she wanted Lou’s to repair. When she brought the car back in, Lou pulled out the contract that she had signed and pointed out a clause that said there were no warranties included with the sale of this car. You take a look at the contract, which includes the following clause in very fine print: “There are no warranties, express or implied, that are included as part of this sale.” You ask Mrs. McGillicudy if she read that clause before purchasing the car. “Of course, dear,” she says. “I always read everything carefully before I sign something.” Is there still hope for Mrs. McGillicudy in having her car repaired by Lou’s? U.C.C. §§2-316, 1-201(b)(10).
问题 12.1 刚从法学院毕业的你，在你长大的社区的一家店面里开了自己的诊所。您的第一批客户之一是 McGillicudy 夫人 ，她是您以前的隔壁邻居，她记得您当时“您几乎无法跪下”。原来，McGillicudy 夫人刚刚从当地的二手车停车场 Lou's Used Cars for Less 买了一辆二手凯迪拉克。购买三周后，凯迪拉克给 McGillicudy 夫人带来了一系列问题，她希望 Lou's 解决这些问题。当她把车带回来时，Lou 拿出她签署的合同，并指出一项条款，说这辆车的销售不包括任何保修。您看一下合同，其中包括以下非常精细的条款：“本次销售不包含任何明示或暗示的保证。你问 McGillicudy 夫人在买车之前有没有读过那条。“当然，亲爱的，”她说。“我总是在签署之前仔细阅读所有内容。”McGillicudy 夫人还有希望让 Lou's 修理她的车吗？《美国法典》第 2-316 条，1-201（b）（10）。

ANSWER: when you are approaching a question involving a warranty disclaimer, the first thing you have to do is determine which warranty exists at all (because if there is no warranty in first place, then there is no need to disclaim it). Second, think about the distinction between the warranty disclaimer on one hand and the exclusive or limitations of remedies. You can think of these as two separate ways for the sellers to try to limit its liabilities with respect to a particular sale that the seller makes. And oftentimes you will see a seller who would include both. Warranty disclaimers and remedy limits are governed by two separate and distinct section of Article 2. Section 2-316 we see discussion of warranty disclaimers and Section 2-719 we get the restrictions on the seller’s ability to limit remedies to a buyer.
回答： 当您遇到涉及免责声明的问题时，您要做的第一件事 是确定存在哪种保修（因为如果一开始就没有保修，那么就没有必要否认它）。其次，一方面考虑保修免责声明与补救措施的排他性或限制之间的区别。您可以将这些视为卖方尝试限制其对卖方进行的特定销售的责任的两种不同方式。通常，您会看到一个将两者包括在内的卖家。免责声明和补救限制受第 2 条的两个单独且不同的部分管辖。第 2-316 节我们看到了对保修免责声明的讨论，第 2-719 节我们获得了对卖方限制买方补救措施的能力的限制。

Which warranties were made in the first place? Implied warranty of merchantability (IWM) under 2-315 because we have a merchant with respect to goods of the kind. How about the fact that these are used goods not new goods, can we still have IWM? According to Comment 3 to 2-314 says a contract for the sale of secondhand goods, however, involves only obligations as appropriate. So basically it is saying two things. One, yes you have an IWM even with respect to the sale of used goods by a merchant who is a merchant with respect to the goods of these kinds. But the content of IWM is not going to be the same as if they were selling new goods.
最初做出了哪些保证？2-315 规定的适销性默示保证 （IWM），因为我们有此类商品的卖家。这些是二手商品而不是新商品，我们还能有 IWM 吗？根据评论 3 至 2-314 表示，然而，二手商品销售合同仅涉及适当的义务。所以基本上它说了两件事。第一，是的，即使商人是此类商品的商人销售二手商品，您也拥有 IWM。但 IWM 的内容不会与他们销售新商品的内容相同。

So let’s assume that the problems that this buyer is having with this car would amount to a breach of IWM, has the seller here properly disclaimed the IWM? In looking at that question, let’s begin in 2-316(2) and ask the question has the seller properly disclaimed the IMW if we simply look at 2-316(2)? No because if you are going to successfully disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability under 2-316(2), at a minimum you have got to mention the word “merchantability” which was not done here. And if it is in writing, then it must be conspicuous. Here the disclaimer was in writing and we are told that this disclaimer was in very fine print. So, under 2-316(2) this attempt to disclaimer fails on both counts. Requirement of conspicuous: even though it is enough under 2-316(2), it’s enough for the buyer to say you did not use the word merchantability; so, at least under 2-316(2) you did not successfully disclaim IWM. If we change the fact and say that the seller did in the writing in the tiny fine print used the word merchantability, so the only issue would be conspicuousness. The fact that the buyer admits that she did read the disclaimer clause despite the fact that it was in very fine print, should the seller not lose on the grounds of lack of conspicuousness because in this case the buyer actually read it? No. 1-201(b)(10) says the purpose of conspicuousness requirement is to encourage sellers as a general way to make such a contact in a way that a reasonable person ought to have notice of it. And the fact that the seller got lucky here that the buyer noticed it should not be a basis on which the seller can be saved.
因此 ，让我们假设该买方在这辆车上遇到的问题相当于违反 IWM，这里的卖方是否正确地放弃了 IWM？ 在研究这个问题时，让我们从 2-316（2） 开始，并提出一个问题：如果我们只看 2-316（2），卖方是否正确地放弃了 IMW？不，因为如果您要成功否认 2-316（2） 规定的适销性默示保证，您至少必须提及“适销性”一词，但此处没有这样做。如果它是书面的，那么它必须是显眼的。这里的免责声明是书面的 ，我们被告知这个免责声明的字体非常细。因此，根据 2-316（2） 项，这种免责声明的尝试在这两个方面都失败了。显眼要求：即使根据 2-316（2） 就足够了，但买家说您没有使用适销性一词就足够了;因此，至少在 2-316（2） 下，您没有成功放弃 IWM。 如果我们改变事实，说卖家在小字的文字中使用了适销性这个词，那么唯一的问题是显眼。 买方承认她确实阅读了免责声明条款 ， 尽管该条款的字号非常细，但卖方是否应该因为在这种情况下买方实际上阅读了该条款而以缺乏显眼性为由而败诉？第 1-201（b）（10） 号规定，显眼要求的目的是鼓励卖家以合理的人应该注意到的方式进行此类联系。而卖方在这里很幸运，买方注意到了这一事实，这不应该成为拯救卖方的基础。

Seller can say you got me under 2-316(2) because I did not use the word “merchantability” and it was not conspicuous, but if I got to 2-316(3)(a) it does not require me to use the word “merchantability” and it does not say by its terms that it has to be conspicuous in order to be effective. 2-316 require the use of the word “as if” or “with all fault”. So, the seller can argue that he did not use the magic words “as is or with all fault,” but he did use the language in common understanding that would cause the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties; so, it makes plain that there is no implied warranty of merchantability. Such argument would be problematic because if we start to accept the 2-316(3)(a) substitute for the magic words “as is” or “with all fault,” then it seems like we would remove any significance to the requirements found in 2-316(2) that the seller must use the word “merchantability” in disclaiming the IWM. So, Keating would say if you are going to fall under 2-316(3)(a), it would be best to use the magic words “as is” or “with all fault.”
卖方可以说您根据 2-316（2） 找到了我，因为我没有使用“适销性”一词，而且它并不显眼，但如果我到了 2-316（3）（a），它不需要我使用“适销性”一词，也没有通过其条款说它必须显眼才能有效。2-316 要求使用“仿佛”或“全有过错 ”一词。因此，卖方可以争辩说，他没有使用“按原样或全有过错 ”的神奇词语，但他确实在达成共识的情况下使用了该语言，这将使买方注意到保修的排除;因此，它清楚地表明没有对适销性的默示保证。这种论点是有问题的，因为如果我们开始接受 2-316（3）（a） 替换“原样”或“全盘” 这两个神奇词 ，那么我们似乎会消除 2-316（2） 中关于卖方在否认 IWM 时必须使用“适销性”一词的要求的任何意义。所以，基廷会说，如果你 要属于 2-316（3）（a） 的范畴，最好使用“原样”或“全然过错”这些神奇的词。

What if the seller used “as is” in the tiny fine prints, would that still be effective under 2-316(3)(a)? 2-316(3)(a) does not have the conspicuous requirement, but many courts and commentators consider the absence of conspicuous requirement under 2-316(3)(a) to be just a drafting glitch. They assume that such a requirement implicitly exists as a matter of fundamental fairness to the buyer. Support for that view can be found in Comment 1 to 2-316 where it says implied warranties can only be excluded by conspicuous language or other circumstances that protect the buyer from surprise. And the tine fine prints, “as is,” is not conspicuous language and does not protect the buyer from surprise. The focus in 2-316 is trying to force the sellers to put these exclusions in a way that it ought to be obvious to any buyer.
如果卖方在微小的细则中使用“原样”，根据 2-316（3）（a） 是否仍然有效？2-316（3）（a） 没有明显的要求，但许多法院和评论员认为 2-316（3）（a） 没有明显的要求只是一个起草错误。他们假设这样的要求隐含地存在，是为了对买方的基本公平。支持该观点的评论可以在评论 1 至 2-316 中找到，其中表示默示保证只能通过显眼的语言或其他保护买方免受意外的情况来排除。而 “原样” 的细则并不显眼，也不能保护买家免受意外。2-316 的重点是试图迫使卖家以任何买家都应该显而易见的方式放置这些排除条款。

Problem 12.2 It seems that Lou’s Used Cars for Less is going to be a steady source of business for your fledging law practice. Another dissatisfied customer of Lou’s comes to you for advice. Deborah Swift (from problem 1.6), your erstwhile law school classmate and current personal injury lawyer, asks for your advice concerning a recent transaction she had with Lou’s. Deborah purchased a used Jeep Cherokee from Lou’s a few weeks ago, and she discovered only yesterday that the vehicle had serious engine problem. When Deborah brought the Jeep back to Lou’s for repair, he pointed out to her that he had asked her to check out the Jeep before buying it and she had refused. “I was in a hurry,” Deborah told you. “If I had spent a lot of time examining the car, I might have been able to discover the problem, but that’s only because I tinker with used cars as a hobby.” Does Deborah have a reasonable basis for demanding that Lou repair her Jeep? U.C.C. §2-316(3)(b), Official Comment 8 to §2-316.
问题 12.2 看来 Lou's Used Cars for Less 将成为您初出茅庐的律师事务所的稳定业务来源。Lou's 的另一位不满意的客户来找您寻求建议。黛博拉·斯威夫特（Deborah Swift）（来自问题 1.6）是您以前的法学院同学和现任人身伤害律师，她就她最近与 Lou 的交易向您寻求建议。黛博拉几周前从 Lou's 购买了一辆二手吉普切诺基，她昨天才发现这辆车有严重的发动机问题。当黛博拉将吉普车带回 Lou's 修理时，他向她指出，他让她在买吉普车之前先检查一下，但她拒绝了。“我很着急，”黛博拉告诉你。“如果我花很多时间检查这辆车，我可能会发现问题所在，但那只是因为我把摆弄二手车作为一种爱好。”Deborah 有合理的理由要求 Lou 修理她的吉普车吗？U.C.C. §2-316（3）（b），官方意见 8 至 §2-316。

ANSWER: which warranties are made in the first place? The implied warranty of merchantability. Can Lou, the seller, argue that the IWM was disclaimed in this case? The seller requested the buyer to inspect the Jeep before buying it and the buyer refused. Under 2-316(3)(b) says when the buyer, before entering into the contract, has examined the goods, or the sampler model, as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods, then there is no implied warranty of merchantability with regard to defects which an examination ought in a circumstance to have revealed to him. SO the first question is whether Deborah can be said to have refused to examine the good? Official Comment 8 to 2-316 says a mere request from the seller for the buyer to examine the goods is not sufficient to trigger this disclaimer. It says there must in addition be a demand by the seller that the buyer examine the goods fully. The seller by the demand puts the buyer on notice that he is assuming the risk of defect, which the examination ought to reveal. The language “refused to examine” in this paragraph is intended to make clear the necessity for such demands.
回答：首先做出哪些保修？ 适销性的默示保证。 卖方 Lou 能否辩称，在本案中放弃了 IWM？ 卖方要求买方在购买吉普车前检查吉普车，但买方拒绝了。根据 2-316（3）（b） 规定，当买方在签订合同之前，已经按照他的意愿全面检查了货物或样品模型，或者拒绝检查货物，那么对于检查在某种情况下应该向他揭示的缺陷，没有默示的适销性保证。 所以第一个问题是，是否可以说底波拉拒绝审视善？官方评论 8 至 2-316 表示，仅卖方要求买方检查货物不足以触发此免责声明。它说，此外，卖方必须要求买方全面检查货物。卖方通过要求通知买方，他正在承担缺陷的风险，检查应该揭示这一点。本段中的“拒绝审查”一词旨在阐明此类要求的必要性。

Let’s assume for the moment without deciding that the seller had made the required demand. If so, then what is the scope of the disclaimer or what gets disclaimed? 2-316(3)(b) says “then there is no implied warranty with respect to the defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to the buyer.” Official Comment 8 to 2-316 tells that a professional buyer examining the product in his field would be held to have assumed the risk as to all defect which a professional in the field ought to observe. While a non-professional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only for such defects as a laymen might be expected to observe. So, how does this standard apply to Deborah because her situation falls somewhere in between the professional/ non-professional dichotomy set out in Official Comment 8 in that her profession is personal injuries lawyer but her hobby is tinkering with old cars. So should Deborah be held to a standard here that takes into account the knowledge that she has acquired through her hobby? Comment 8’s last paragraph and look at the first four words (the particular buyer’s skill), so here Deborah knows a lot about cars and engines, though she is not a professional in that field. Maybe she could argue that for her to discover the defect she would have had to take the car apart practically and that is not the normal method of examining goods before buying them. But in terms of her own level of skills, comment 8 gives some support in using a subjective standard that would take into account Deborah’s non-professional expertise, where it says the particular buyer’s skill and the normal method of examining goods in determining what defects are excluded. On the other hand, since courts are consumer friendly they would be disinclined in placing the loss on Deborah rather than the seller.
让我们暂时假设，不要决定卖方已经提出了所需的要求。 如果是这样，那么免责声明的范围是什么，或者什么被否认了？2-316（3）（b） 说“那么，对于检查在当时情况下应该向买方揭示的缺陷，没有默示保证。 官方评论 8 至 2-316 指出，在其领域检查产品的专业买家将被视为已承担该领域专业人士应观察到的所有缺陷的风险。而非专业买家将被认定为仅承担了外行人可能观察到的缺陷的风险。那么，这个标准如何适用于黛博拉，因为她的情况介于官方评论 8 中规定的专业/非专业二分法之间，因为她的职业是人身伤害律师 ，但她的爱好是修补旧车。 那么 ， 黛博拉是否应该在这里保持一个标准，考虑到她通过自己的爱好获得的知识呢？ 评论 8 的最后一段，看看前四个词（ 特定买家的技能），所以这里 Deborah 对汽车和发动机了解很多，尽管她不是该领域的专业人士。也许她可以争辩说，如果她发现缺陷，她实际上必须把车拆开，这不是在购买商品之前检查商品的正常方法。 但就她自己的技能水平而言，评论 8 对使用主观标准提供了一些支持，该标准将考虑 Deborah 的非专业知识，其中说明了特定买家的技能和检查商品以确定排除哪些缺陷的正常方法。另一方面，由于法院对消费者友好 ， 他们不愿意将损失归咎于 Deborah 而不是卖方。

Problem 12.3 After you have won several cases against Lou’s Used Cars for Less. Lou has convinced his big law firm, Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe, to hire you to work for them. Now Lou wants you to look at his standard sales contract with an eye toward re-drafting it. Based on a couple of your previous victories against him, Lou knows that he needs to increase the prominence of his implied warranty disclaimer and to use the word “merchantability.” Lou wonders if there us any mileage in including a prominent disclaimer of express warranties as well. “You know those sales people, “ he says. “They’ll say darn near anything to sell a car, bless their souls.” What do you advise Lou? Are there other clauses you recommend including in the contract to prevent the sales people from “giving away the store?” U.C.C. §§2-316(1), 2-202, Official Comment 2 to §2-316.
问题 12.3 在您赢得了几起针对 Lou's Used Cars for Less 的官司之后。Lou 已经说服了他的大型律师事务所 Dewey， Cheatem 和 Howe，雇佣你为他们工作。现在，Lou 希望您查看他的标准销售合同，并着眼于重新起草它。根据您之前对他的几次胜利，Lou 知道他需要提高其默示免责声明的突出性，并使用“适销性”一词。Lou 想知道我们是否也包含了明确的明示保证免责声明。“你认识那些销售人员，”他说 。他们会说几乎任何事情都要卖车，祝福他们的灵魂。您对 Lou 有什么建议？您是否建议在合同中加入其他条款，以防止销售人员 “放弃商店”？U.C.C. §§2-316（1）、2-202，官方评论 2 至 §2-316。

ANSWER: Is it possible under 2-316(1) to disclaim an express warranty? 2-316(1) is convoluted to say the least, “words or conduct relevant for the creation of an express warranty, and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other. But subject to the provisions of this article on Parole or extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.” What they are saying is once an express warranty is made and is admissible under evidence, it should be impossible to disclaim according to 2-316(1). Nevertheless, there may be reasons why it still might be useful for a seller to include a prominent disclaimer of express warranties. Why? There are three reasons and two of the three comes from the statement “once an express warranty has been made and it is admissible under evidence” those two qualifiers are impossible to disclaim. Look at those two qualifiers, once an express warranty is made. Think about a case where you have a situation in which there is a question whether the express warranty was made at all. Think about the puffing situation where there is a statement by the seller, is it an affirmation of facts or is it merely the seller’s opinion. And that puffing question comes down to was it objectively reasonable for the buyer to rely on that statement as part of basis of the bargain. And on that question think of how it might help the seller to say, this buyer saw this disclaimer of warranties and so when I was saying these things it was not reasonable for the buyer to think that these were express warranties b/c these were my opinions (not reasonable for buyer to rely). The second qualifier is once an express warranty is made and is admissible under evidence; that gets under the parole evidence rule. Think about how that disclaimer might help you as a seller to exclude a particular oral statement made by the seller that maybe might have amounted to an express warranty; but you have a writing that was intended by both parties to be final at least with respect to the terms included therein and therefore the rule under 2-202 is which terms to be admitted are only consistent additional terms to explain or supplement. So if the terms that the buyer is bringing sounds like an express warranty is that a consistent additional term, if not then it will not be admitted. The third reason is maybe the most important in practice, which is the intimidation factor. But if you are a seller and you have an unsophisticated buyer and the buyer comes back and complains saying “I thought your salesperson said this or promised this.” And the seller pulls out the written contract saying “look no express warranties.”
回答： 根据 2-316（1） 是否可以否认明示保证？ 2-316（1） 至少可以说是令人费解的，“与创建明示保证相关的言语或行为，以及倾向于否定或限制保证的言语或行为 ，应在合理的情况下解释为彼此一致。但根据本条关于假释或外在证据的规定，如果这种解释不合理，否定或限制是无效的。他们所说的是，一旦做出了明确的保证并且可以作为证据被接受，根据 2-316（1） 应该不可能否认。 尽管如此，可能有一些原因表明卖方仍然需要包含明显的明示保证免责声明。 为什么？ 有三个原因，其中两个来自“一旦做出了明确的保证并且可以作为证据接受”这两项限定词是不可能否认的。一旦做出明确保证，请看这两个限定词 。考虑这样一种情况：您遇到的情况是，是否做出了明示保证。想想卖家发表声明的吹嘘情况，这是对事实的肯定，还是仅仅是卖家的意见。而这个令人毛骨悚然的问题归结为买方依赖该声明作为讨价还价基础的客观合理性。 在这个问题上，想想它如何帮助卖方说，这个买家看到了这个免责声明，所以当我说这些事情时，买方认为这些是明确的保证是不合理的，因为这些是我的观点（买方依赖是不合理的）。第二个限定词是一旦做出了明确的保证， 并且根据证据可以接受 ;这属于假释证据规则。想想该免责声明如何帮助您作为卖家排除卖方做出的特定口头声明，这些声明可能相当于明示保证;但是您有一份双方都打算至少就其中包含的条款而言是最终的书面文件，因此 2-202 下的规则是哪些条款被接受只是一致的附加条款来解释或补充。 因此 ，如果买家带来的条款听起来像是明确的保证，那么它是一个一致的附加条款，如果不是，那么它将不会被接受。第三个原因可能是实践中最重要的，那就是恐吓因素。但是，如果你是一个卖家，你有一个不成熟的买家 ，买家回来抱怨说：“我以为你的销售人员说了这个或承诺了这个。卖家拿出书面合同， 上面写着“看，没有明示保证”。

Are there any other clauses that should be included in the seller’s contract to prevent the salesperson to prevent from “giving away the store”? Official Comment 2 to 2-316 suggests two clauses. First, the merger clause, which would reinforce the buyer’s inability to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning alleged express warranties and the merger clause speaks directly to the parole evidence issue whereas a standard express warranty disclaimer reaches the parole evidence issue only indirectly (if at all). The second clause that seller could include is the no-authority clause, by which the seller could indicate that the only valid terms of the contract are those that are in the writing and any promises made separately by the salesperson should not have authority. Interestingly, if you look at Official Comment 2 to 2-316, it seems to validate the legitimacy of these two clauses where it says “the seller is protected under this Article against false allegations of oral warranties by this provision on parole and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized representation by the customary lack of authority clauses.” It also must be true that if a particular seller is including this no-authority clause while at the same time encouraging its salesperson to make such oral representations, then you probably have a common law fraud if that is a clear pattern.
卖家的合同中是否应该包含其他条款，以防止销售人员防止“送店”？ 官方评论 2 至 2-316 建议两个子句。首先， 合并条款将加强买方无法就所谓的明示保证提供外在证据，而合并条款直接涉及假释证据问题，而标准的明示免责声明仅间接涉及假释证据问题（如果有的话）。卖方可以包含的第二个条款是无授权条款 ，卖方可以通过该条款表明合同的唯一有效条款是书面条款，销售人员单独做出的任何承诺都不应具有授权。有趣的是，如果你看一下官方评论 2 到 2-316，它似乎验证了这两个条款的合法性，它说 “根据本条，卖方受到保护，免受本条关于假释和外在证据的条款的口头保证的虚假指控，以及惯常的缺乏授权条款的未经授权的陈述。如果某个卖家在加入这个无授权条款的同时鼓励其销售人员进行此类口头陈述，那么如果这是一个明显的模式，那么你可能属于普通法欺诈。

Problem 12.4 Since joining Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe, you seem to be getting as many cases for Lou’s Used Cars for Less as you used to get against him when you were on your own. Your next defense for Lou involves a buyer who bought a used Ford Taurus wagon from Lou’s. a month after the purchase, the brakes failed on the car and the buyer was seriously injured, although the car was not damaged. Lou’s contract for that sale involved a conspicuous limitation of remedy to repair or replace defective parts. Lou says he is happy to repair the car’s brakes, but he doesn’t feel like paying thousand of dollars in hospital bills. Lou asks you whether the exclusive remedy will be effective here. He also wants to know if it would have helped him in this case if he had included a prominent “AS IS” clause instead of the exclusive remedy. What do you say to Lou on these two questions? U.C.C. §§2-719, 2-316(3)(a), 2-302, Official Comment 2 to §2-316, Official Comments 1 and 3 to §2-719.
问题 12.4 自从加入 Dewey， Cheatem， & Howe 以来，你似乎因为 Lou 的二手车价格更低而接到的案件数量，就像你独自一人时对他提起的一样多。您对 Lou 的下一个辩护涉及从 Lou's 购买了一辆二手福特 Taurus 旅行车的买家。购买一个月后，汽车刹车失灵，买家受重伤，但汽车没有损坏。Lou 的那份销售合同涉及对修理或更换有缺陷零件的明显补救措施限制。Lou 说他很乐意修理汽车的刹车，但他不想支付数千美元的医院账单。Lou 问您，排他性补救措施在这里是否有效。他还想知道，如果他包括一个突出的“AS IS”条款而不是排他性补救措施，在这种情况下是否对他有所帮助。关于这两个问题，你对 Lou 有什么看法？《美国法典》第 2-719 条、第 2-316（3）（a） 条、第 2-302 条、第 2-316 条的官方意见 2 至 §2-316、第 2-719 条的官方意见 1 和 3。

ANSWER: if you look at 2-719(1)(a), you will note that this remedy limit to repair or replace defective parts is specifically mentioned there. So, at least prima facie it is acceptable. But how might this exclusive remedy be struck down nevertheless given these circumstances? First, 2-719(2) - the argument that this exclusive remedy may have failed of its essential purpose and if so it should be invalidated that is what 2-719(2) says. That forces us to ask what was the essential purpose of such remedy limitation. Lou says wasn’t the essential purpose of this exclusive remedy to limit his liability for breach. Maybe we should consider the essential purpose from the buyer’s perspective and consider what the remedy purports to give rather than what the remedy purports to take away. But even if we look at it that way, wasn’t it the essential purpose of the exclusive remedy simply to give the buyer a car that keeps running and won’t that purpose be served as long as Lou promptly and effectively repairs the bad brakes. The buyer could say that perhaps there should be a broader definition of this exclusive remedy “essential purpose;” mainly, that the essential purpose of this remedy was to give the buyer a safe car. And here, it failed of its essential purpose because the brakes failed and the buyer was injured in person.
回答： 如果您查看 2-719（1）（a）， 您会注意到那里特别提到了维修或更换有缺陷部件的补救限制。所以，至少从表面上看它是可以接受的。但是，在这种情况下，这种排他性的补救措施如何被推翻呢？首先，2-719（2） - 关于这种排他性补救措施可能未能达到其基本目的的论点，如果是这样 ，它应该被宣布无效，这就是 2-719（2） 所说的。这迫使我们问 ，这种补救限制的根本目的是什么 。Lou 说，这种排他性补救措施的根本目的并不是为了限制他的违约责任。也许我们应该从买方的角度考虑基本目的，并考虑补救措施旨在给予什么，而不是补救措施旨在带走什么。但是，即使我们这样看，独家补救措施的根本目的不就是给买方一辆可以持续行驶的汽车吗，只要 Lou 及时有效地修理坏的刹车，这个目的就不能达到吗？买方可以说，也许应该对这种排他性补救措施的“基本目的”有一个更广泛的定义;主要是，这种补救措施的根本目的是给买方一辆安全的汽车。在这里，它未能达到其基本目的，因为刹车失灵 ，买家本人受伤。

There is another way in which the exclusive remedy could be invalidated. Here, 2-719(3) comes into play because this exclusive remedy if it is valid will indirectly serve as an exclusion of consequential damages. 2-719(3) says a separate exclusion of consequential damages cannot limit damages for injuries to a person (such a limit is prima facie unconscionable). So, if you are the buyer you can rightly say why should a limited remedy be able to do indirectly (namely exclude consequential damages for injuries to a person) that which 2-719(3) clearly does not allow a separate exclusion of consequential damages to do directly.
还有另一种方式可以使排他性补救措施无效。在这里，2-719（3） 开始发挥作用，因为这种排他性补救措施如果有效，将间接排除间接损害赔偿。 2-719（3） 指出，单独排除间接损害赔偿并不能限制对人身伤害的损害赔偿（这种限制表面上是不合情理的）。因此，如果你是买方 ， 你可以正确地说出为什么有限补救措施能够间接地（即排除对人身伤害的间接损害赔偿），而 2-719（3） 显然不允许单独排除间接损害赔偿。

Suppose instead there had been a prominent “as is” clause in the contract, would that have made a difference for the seller? That raises the question should an “as is” clause be allow to do indirectly (namely exclude consequential damages for injuries to a person) that which 2-719(3) does not allow a separate exclusion of consequential damages to do directly? There is a difference between an “as is” disclaimer and an exclusive remedy. The difference is the “as is” disclaimer is a limit on the warranty, whereas the exclusive remedy is a limit on the remedy. Should that matter? Comment 2 to 2-316 says “this article treats the limits or exclusion of consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach separate from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies of breach of warranty.” Comment 3 to 2-719 talking about subsection 3 to 2-719. Subsection 3 recognizes the validity of clauses limiting or excluding consequential damages, but makes it clear that they may not operate in an unconscionable manner. The seller is free in all cases to disclaim warranties in the manner provided in section 2-316. So, if you properly disclaim the warranties, you don’t even get to the question of what remedy limit is okay or not okay.
相反，假设合同中有一个突出的“原样”条款，这会对卖方产生影响吗？这就提出了一个问题，是否应允许“原样”条款间接地做出（即不包括对人身伤害的间接损害赔偿）2-719（3） 不允许单独排除间接损害赔偿的行为？“原样”免责声明和排他性补救措施之间存在差异。区别在于“原样”免责声明是对保修的限制，而排他性补救措施是对补救措施的限制。这有关系吗？评论 2 至 2-316 说“本条将间接损害的限制或排除视为限制违约补救措施的问题，与根据保证产生责任的问题分开。如果不存在保证，当然不存在限制违反保证的补救措施的问题。评论 3 到 2-719 讨论第 3 到 2-719 小节。第 3 小节承认限制或排除间接损害的条款的有效性 ，但明确指出它们不得以不合情理的方式实施。在任何情况下，卖方都可以按照第 2-316 节中规定的方式否认保证。因此，如果您正确地否认保修，您甚至不会遇到什么补救限制是可以或不可以的问题。

Problem 12.5 Dan and Carol Pontello, who had a new home built by Cannon Construction Co. six years ago, recently came to see you in your law office. Their home had come with a written “Builder’s Warranty” providing that “Builder warrants that the home will be free of defects in material and workmanship for a period of five years on the foundation and for a period of two years on all other parts of the home. The five-year foundation warranty includes a warranty against any cracks or water seepage.” The contract also contained a merger clause, separately signed by both the buyer and seller, which said, “This contract is the complete and final understanding of the agreement between the parties and supersedes any and all other agreements or rights implied by law that are not contained within the four corners of this agreement.” Six years after the signing of this contract, the foundation suddenly developed significant cracks, leading to costly basement flooding. The Pontellos point out to you that most of their friends who had new houses built got 10-year foundation warranties, and further, that most foundations in new houses around this area last without problems for at least 10-years. The Pontellos want to know if they have a good cause of action against Cannon Construction for the cracks in their foundation. What do you tell them?
问题 12.5 Dan 和 Carol Pontello 在六年前由 Cannon Construction Co. 建造了新家，最近来你们的律师事务所见你。他们的房屋附有书面的“建筑商保修”，其中规定“建筑商保证，房屋在地基的五年内和房屋所有其他部分的两年内不会出现材料和工艺缺陷。五年基础保修包括对任何裂缝或渗水的保修。该合同还包含一项合并条款，由买卖双方分别签署，其中规定：“本合同是对双方协议的完整和最终理解，并取代法律默示的未包含在本协议四个角内的任何和所有其他协议或权利。签订这份合同六年后，地基突然出现明显的裂缝，导致代价高昂的地下室被淹。Pontellos 向您指出，他们大多数建造新房的朋友都获得了 10 年的地基保修，此外，该地区周围新房的大多数地基都可以使用至少 10 年而不会出现问题。Pontellos 想知道他们是否有充分的理由对 Cannon Construction 的地基裂缝提起诉讼。你告诉他们什么？

ANSWER: The issue here that the implied warranty of habitability that would say this foundation would last for 10 years is inconsistent with the written builder’s warranty that provided a five year express warranty and a two year express warranty on other parts of the home. This is like the Axline case. In the Axline case, the seller gave a one year builder’s warranty on this new home and there were problems with the home that occurred after the one year. And the problems that occurred after the one year were breaches of the implied warranty of habitability (IWH). So, the court in Axline said look seller if you want to disclaim the IWH, you cannot do it by just giving a more time limit of the express warranty that is your builder’s warranty. If you want to disclaim the IWH, then you better be very clear about it. Similarly here, if the IWH would arguably cover this foundation leak for at least 10 years, the fact that they gave an express warranty of 5 years that was time limited should not be seen to indirectly disclaim this IWH. If the seller wanted to do that, then they needed to separately and specifically disclaim the IWH.
回答： 这里的问题是，宜居性的默示保证说这个地基将持续 10 年，这与书面建筑商保修不一致，后者为房屋的其他部分提供五年明示保修和两年明示保修。这就像 Axline 的情况。在 Axline 案中，卖方为 这套新房提供了一年的建筑商保修，一年后房屋出现了问题。一年后出现的问题是违反了宜居性默示保证 （IWH）。因此，Axline 的法院说，如果您想放弃 IWH，您不能仅仅通过提供更多的明确保修时间限制来实现， 即您的建筑商保修。如果你想否认 IWH，那么你最好非常清楚。 同样 ，在这里，如果 IWH 可以说可以承保该地基泄漏至少 10 年，那么他们提供 5 年有时间限制的明确保证这一事实不应被视为间接否认该 IWH。如果卖方想这样做，那么他们需要单独明确地放弃 IWH。

REDUCING OR ELIMINATING WARRANTY LIABILITY: ADVANCED PP. 230
减少或消除保修责任：高级 第 230 页

13.1. a. Because his car lot’s reputation for quality has been going downhill lately, Lou (of Lou’s Used Cars for Less) is thinking of offering a new warranty for all of his used cars. He would title it in big bold letters as a “Full One-Year Warranty.” However, he would also like to include as part of the warranty the following limitations: a complete disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability of at least some limit on its duration, an exclusive remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts, and a separate exclusion of consequential damages. If Lou creates the Full One-Year Warranty, which of his proposed limitations will be allowable? 15 U.S.C. §§2304(a), 2304(e), 2308.
13.1. 一种。由于他的停车场的质量声誉最近一直在走下坡路，Lou（Lou's Used Cars for Less）正在考虑为他所有的二手车提供新的保修 。他会用粗体大字将其命名为 “ 完整的一年保修”。“ 但是，他还希望将以下限制作为保修的一部分：至少对其期限有一定限制的适销性默示保证的完整免责声明，维修或更换有缺陷部件的唯一补救措施，以及单独排除间接损害。如果 Lou 创建了完整的一年保修，他提议的哪些限制是允许的？15 美国法典 §§2304（a）、2304（e）、2308。

Simply by using the designation “Full One-Year Warranty”, the seller Lou’s used cars would, according to Magnuson-Moss §2304(e), thereby automatically incorporate, whether he meant to or not, all of the minimum warranty standards set out in Magnuson-Moss §2304(a).
根据 Magnuson-Moss §2304（e）， 只需使用 “ 全年保修 ” 的名称 ，卖方 Lou 的二手车就会自动纳入 Magnuson-Moss §2304（a） 中规定的所有最低保修标准，无论他是否有意。

Lou cannot completely disclaim implied warranty under Magnuson-Moss §2308(a). And because it is a full written warranty, Lou is not allowed to limit its duration under Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2). Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(4) requires a supplier that makes a full written warranty has to allow the buyer the option of either a full refund or a completely new product in any case where the seller is unable to remedy the defect after reasonable number of attempts. Thus Lou can put in this exclusive remedy to repair or replace defective parts, but if the buyer keeps coming back after several repair or replacement, then at some point Lou has to provide either a full refund or a completely new product. This restriction in Magnuson-Moss on the ability to have exclusive remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts is very similar to the option given to buyers in U.S.C. §2-719(2), the “failure of essential purpose”, in that if a buyer keeps coming back after the seller’s several attempts to repair or replace the defective part, then such repair or replacement can be said to fail its essential purpose. For the separate exclusion of consequential damages, Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(3) requires a supplier making full warranty includes such exclusion clause must be conspicuous.
Lou 不能完全否认 Magnuson-Moss §2308（a） 规定的默示保证。由于这是一份完整的书面保证，因此 Lou 不得根据 Magnuson-Moss §2304（a）（2） 限制其期限。 Magnuson-Moss §2304（a）（4） 要求提供完整书面保证的供应商必须允许买方选择全额退款或全新产品，前提是卖方在合理尝试次数后无法补救缺陷。 因此 ，Lou 可以采用这种独家补救措施来维修或更换有缺陷的零件，但如果买家在多次维修或更换后仍然回来，那么在某些时候 Lou 必须提供全额退款或全新的产品。Magnuson-Moss 案中对维修或更换有缺陷零件的排他性补救措施能力的限制与美国买家的选择非常相似。 §2-719（2），“ 基本目的失败 ”，因为如果买方在卖方多次尝试修理或更换有缺陷的部件后继续回来，那么这种修理或更换可以说是未能达到其基本目的。对于间接损害的单独排除，Magnuson-Moss §2304（a）（3） 要求供应商在提供全面保证时必须明显包含此类排除条款。

The most significant impact of Magnuson-Moss is with its prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers for sellers who make written warranties. It does very little with respect to the seller’s ability to limit its remedies.
Magnuson-Moss 最显着的影响是它禁止对做出书面保证的卖家提供默示保修免责声明。它对卖方限制其补救措施的能力几乎没有作用。

b. How would your answer change if Lou’s warranty were a “Limited One-Year Warranty”?
湾。如果 Lou 的保修是 “ 一年有限保修 ”，您的答案会有什么变化 ？

Still Lou cannot completely disclaim the implied warranty under Magnuson-Moss §2308(a)(1), but he can limit its duration under Magnuson-Moss §2308(b) since Lou only made a limited warranty not a full warranty. However, in limiting the duration of the implied warranty, the seller may only limit the duration no shorter than the duration of the limited warranty, namely one year in this problem.
尽管如此，Lou 仍不能完全否认 Magnuson-Moss §2308（a）（1） 项下的默示保证，但他可以根据 Magnuson-Moss §2308（b） 限制其期限，因为 Lou 仅作了有限保证，而不是完全保证。 但是，在限制默示保证的期限时， 卖方只能限制不短于有限保证期限的期限 ，即此问题中的一年。

The only meaningful difference between a full and a limited written warranty is that if the seller makes a limited warranty, he can then limit the duration of the implied warranties to the duration of the limited written warranty, as long as the duration of the limited written warranty is reasonable.
完整书面保证和有限书面保证之间唯一有意义的区别是，如果卖方做出有限保证，只要有限书面保证的期限合理，他就可以将默示保证的期限限制为有限书面保证的期限 。

13.2. Imagine that you get a call from a friend who purchased the swingset that carries the warranty printed earlier in this assignment. Four months after this purchase, your friend’s son was injured when the chain snapped on the swing he was using. You friend wonders whether he can recover damages for his son’s injuries despite the warranty. (Put aside tort possibilities for the purposes of this problem.) What is your advice to him? U.C.C. §§2-314(2)(c), 2-316(2), 2-317, 2-719(3); 15 U.S.C. §2308.
13.2. 想象一下，您接到一个朋友的电话，他购买了带有 本作业前面打印的保修单的秋千。这次购买四个月后，您朋友的儿子在他使用的秋千上被链条折断而受伤。你的朋友想知道，尽管有保修，他是否可以为儿子的伤害获得赔偿 。（将 为了解决这个问题，撇开侵权的可能性。你对他有什么建议？加州大学 §§2-314（2）（c）、2-316（2）、2-317、2-719（3）;《美国法典》第 15 卷 §2308.

Assuming the son is suing the immediate seller rather than the manufacturer, in an Alternative A jurisdiction, the son’s injury would not be barred by horizontal privity problem under U.C.C. §2-318, because the son sustained personal injury and is in the buyer’s family.
假设儿子起诉的是直接销售商而不是制造商，在备选方案 A 司法管辖区，根据 U.C.C.，儿子的受伤不会因横向相互关系问题而被禁止。 §2-318，因为儿子遭受了人身伤害，并且属于买方的家庭。

For the timing issue, note that the buyer will not sue on the written warranty anyway because written warranty only promises repair or replacement of defective parts. This exclusive remedy probably won’t be upheld, because this limit in the written remedy should not be able to exclude remedies for personal injuries under U.C.C. §2-719(3). Instead, the buyer may want to sue the seller under the implied warranty of merchantability under§ 2-314(2)(c) because a swing that breaks while in use is not fit for its ordinary purpose. Here the seller disclaims implied warranty of merchantability, and it seems he have met all the requirements under §2-316(2) given that the seller mentions the word merchantability and the disclaimer was conspicuous. However, Magnuson-Moss comes to the rescue for the buyer under §2308(a) by saying no supplier making a written warranty, whether full or limited, may disclaim completely the implied warranties. And if they do, §2308(c) says any such disclaimer will be ineffective. Here Magnuson-Moss as federal law trumps state UCC law. Therefore, here the seller’s disclaimer on the implied warranty of merchantability is ineffective. Moreover, in this case, the buyer would have no problem in overcoming the seller’s attempted limit of remedies. §2-719(3) says limitation of consequential damages for injury to person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. Plus the seller’s warranty itself, despite attempting to disclaim consequential damages, specifically says except damages to personal injuries shall not be precluded.
对于时间问题，请注意，买方无论如何都不会就书面保修提起诉讼，因为书面保修仅承诺维修或更换有缺陷的零件。这种排他性的补救措施可能不会得到支持，因为书面补救措施中的这一限制不应排除 U.C.C. 规定的人身伤害补救措施。 §2-719（3） 条。相反，买方可能希望根据 § 2-314（2）（c） 下的适销性默示保证起诉卖方，因为在使用时断裂的秋千不适合其正常用途。在这里，卖方否认了对适销性的默示保证， 鉴于卖方提到了适销性一词并且免责声明很明显，他似乎已经满足了 §2-316（2） 下的所有要求。然而，Magnuson-Moss 根据 §2308（a） 为买方提供了帮助，表示任何提供书面保证的供应商，无论是完全的还是有限的，都不能完全否认默示的战争保证。如果他们这样做，§2308（c） 表示任何此类免责声明都将无效。在这里，Magnuson-Moss 作为联邦法律胜过州 UCC 法律。因此，此处卖方对适销性的默示保证的免责声明无效。此外，在这种情况下，买方可以毫无问题地克服卖方尝试的补救措施限制。 §2-719（3） 规定，在消费品的情况下，对人身伤害的间接损害赔偿的限制在表面上是不合情理的。 此外 ，卖方的保修本身，尽管试图否认间接损害，但明确表示 不得排除对人身伤害的损害赔偿。

However, the seller may want to make the following argument: Even if a disclaimer on implied warranty is invalid, a 90-day express warranty like this one is inherently inconsistent with a more open-ended implied warranty of merchantability. And §2-317(c) says the 90-day express warranty here must displace the inconsistent implied warranty of merchantability. The buyer may make following counter argument: There’s nothing inconsistent cumulating the 90-day express warranty, which provides certain rights with certain length of time, with a lengthier, more open-ended implied warranty of merchantability, which provides other rights but for longer time. In other words, it’s not unreasonable here to stack a limited duration express warranty with a longer duration implied warranty. Plus the first clause of §2-317 urges us to construe multiple warranties “as consistent with each other and as cumulative”, unless such construction would be unreasonable. Furthermore, if the seller were able to apply §2-317(c) in a way that seller is trying to, that would be wholly inconsistent with Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2). If we let this 90-day written express warranty displace the implied warranty of merchantability or to limit its duration, then the seller would be doing indirectly, under the guise of U.C.C. §2-317(c), that which Magnuson-Moss §2304(a)(2) says a seller like this who gives a full warranty cannot do directly, namely limit the duration of the limited warranty. And since federal law trumps state law, Magnuson-Moss wins, even if this construction of §2-317(c) is a reasonable construction.
但是，卖家可能想提出以下论点：即使默示保证的免责声明无效， 像这样的 90 天明示保证本质上与更开放的适销性默示保证不一致。§2-317（c） 表示，此处的 90 天明示保证必须取代不一致的适销性默示保证。买方可以提出以下反驳论点： 累积 90 天明示保证并无不一致之处，前者提供具有一定时间长度的某些权利，后者提供更长、更开放的适销性默示保证，后者提供其他权利，但时间更长。换句话说， 在这里将有限期限的明示保证与较长期限的默示保证叠加起来并非没有道理。 此外 ，§2-317 的第一条款敦促我们将多项保证解释为“ 彼此一致且累积 ”，除非这种解释不合理。此外，如果卖方能够以卖方试图的方式适用 §2-317（c），那将与 Magnuson-Moss §2304（a）（2） 完全不一致。如果我们让这个 90 天的书面明示保证取代适销性的默示保证或限制其期限，那么卖方将以 UCC 为幌子间接地这样做。 §2-317（c），Magnuson-Moss §2304（a）（2） 说像这样提供全面保证的卖家不能直接做的事情，即限制有限保证的期限。 由于联邦法律凌驾于州法律，Magnuson-Moss 胜诉，即使 §2-317（c） 的这种解释是合理的解释。

13.3. a. Acme Advertising Agency enters into a contract with Hard Drive Computer Co. for the purchase of an office computer system. The price is $38,000. The contract says in boldface that the seller, Hard Drive, makes no warranties except that the goods are merchantable, and even with respect to that warranty, notice of breach must been given within four months of the sale or the buyer has no remedy. Five months after the sale, the computer system breaks down. Acme gives Hard Drive notice of the problem, but Hard Drive says it is simply too late for Acme to make a claim for breach. The Acme president complains, “Wait, that’s not fair. I gave you notice of this problem as soon as I discovered it. And there was just no way I could have discovered it until right now, five months after the sale.” Hard Drive refuses to fix the system, and Acme sues for breach of the warranty of merchantability. If you were the judge on these facts, in whose favor would you rule? U.C.C. §§2-607(3)(a), 1-302(b) (formerly §1-204(1)); Official Comment 1 to §1-302 (Formerly Official Comment 1 to §1-204); §2-316, Official Comment 1 to §2-316; §§2-317, 2-719.
13.3. a. Acme Advertising Agency 与 Hard Drive Computer Co. 签订合同，购买办公计算机系统。价格为 38,000 美元。合同以粗体字表示，卖方 Hard Drive 除了商品可商销外，不作任何保证，即使就该保证而言，也必须在销售后四个月内发出违约通知，否则买方无法获得补救措施。销售五个月后，计算机系统出现故障。Acme 向 Hard Drive 发出了问题通知，但 Hard Drive 表示 Acme 提出违规索赔为时已晚。Acme 总裁抱怨说：“ 等等，这不公平。我一发现这个问题就通知了你。直到现在，也就是拍卖会的五个月后，我才有可能发现它。“ Hard Drive 拒绝修复系统，Acme 起诉违反适销性保证。如果你是这些事实的法官，你会做出对谁有利的裁决？加州大学 §§2-607（3）（a）、1-302（b）（原 §1-204（1））;§1-302 的官方意见 1（原 §1-204 的官方意见 1）;§2-316，官方意见 1 至 §2-316; §§2-317、2-719。

In a case like this, a judge will look at the particular facts, and say if we hold for the seller here, in light of the facts, are we allowing unfair oppression or unfair surprise against the buyer. On the other hand, if we hold for the buyer, are we inhibiting freedom of contract?
在这样的案件中，法官会查看特定事实，并说如果我们在这里为卖方成立， 根据事实，我们是否允许对买方进行不公平的压迫或不公平的意外 。另一方面，如果我们为买方持有，我们是否抑制了合同自由？

Arguments for the buyer: This 4-month notice limitation is really just an attempt to modify by shortening the implied warranty of merchantability, but it fails in the disclaiming part under §2-316(2) to mention the word merchantability, therefore it’s ineffective. Moreover, the express warranty of merchantability that was made as part of this contract can’t be disclaimed or limited with words that are inconsistent with the words creating it under §2-316(1). And finally, under §2-607(3)(a), a buyer must within a reasonable time, after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. And that’s exactly what the buyer did in this problem.
买方的论点：这个 4 个月的通知限制实际上只是试图通过缩短适销性的默示保证来修改，但它在 §2-316（2） 下的免责声明部分没有提到适销性一词，因此它是无效的。此外，作为本合同一部分的适销性明示保证不能被否认或限制在与 §2-316（1） 下创建该合同的词语不一致的词语。最后，根据 §2-607（3）（a），买方必须在发现或应该发现任何违约行为后的合理时间内通知卖方违约行为或被禁止获得任何补救措施。而这正是买方在这个问题上所做的。

Arguments for the seller: Comment 1 to §2-316 suggests that broadly speaking, the disclaimer requirements were designed mainly to avoid unfair surprise to the buyer. Here, there’s no unfair surprise, the buyer was aware of the 4-month notice limitation prior to making the purchase. In addition, under §2-317(c), express warranty displaces inconsistent implied warranties, except implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, which we don’t have here. Therefore, this 4-month express warranty of merchantability should displace a more temporally open-ended implied warranty of merchantability. Furthermore, §2-607 is just a gap-filler about notice, which should be superseded anytime the parties put in an express term about timeliness of notice which is contrary to the gap-filler. §1-302(b) says whenever this act requires an action to be taken within a reasonable time, a time that is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement. As to the buyer’s §2-316(1) argument concerning the internal inconsistency of this express warranty limit, this express warranty as seller created came with this limitation on duration. It was part of the creation of the implied warranty of merchantability. Therefore, this is one of those rare cases in which “Words relevant to the creation of an express warranty, and words tending to negate or limit warranty can actually be construed consistently in a reasonable way.” Finally, this 4-month notification of claims period should be seen, in any event, as a limitation of remedy under §2-316(4), and therefore should not be subject at all to the restrictions of §2-316(2), but instead should be allowed under §2-719(1)(a).
卖方的论据：§2-316 的注释 1 表明，从广义上讲，免责声明要求的主要目的是避免对买方造成不公平的意外。在这里， 没有不公平的惊喜，买家在购买前就知道 4 个月的通知限制。此外，根据 §2-317（c），明示保证取代了不一致的默示保证，但对特定用途适用性的默示保证除外，我们在这里没有。因此，这种 4 个月的适销性明示保证应该取代对适销性的更临时的开放式默示保证。此外，§2-607 只是关于通知的空白填充， 只要当事方就通知的及时性提出与空白填充相反的明确条款 ，就应将其取代 。§1-302（b） 规定，当本法案要求在合理时间内采取行动时，可以通过协议确定并非明显不合理的时间。至于买方关于此明示保修限制的内部不一致的 §2-316（1） 论点，卖方创建的该明示保证带有此期限限制。这是创建适销性默示保证的一部分。 因此，这是“ 与创建明示保证相关的词语，以及倾向于否定或限制保证的词语实际上可以以合理的方式一致地解释的罕见情况之一。“ 最后，无论如何，这个 4 个月的索赔通知期应被视为 §2-316（4） 下的补救措施限制，因此根本不应受 §2-316（2） 的限制，而应根据 §2-719（1）（a） 允许。

b. Same facts as part (a), except now suppose that a computer system like this (without a specific time limit on notice of breach) normally would sell for $80,000 rather than the $38,000 that this seller sold it for. Now how would you rule?
b.事实与 （a） 部分相同，但现在假设像这样的计算机系统（没有具体的违规通知时间限制）通常售价为 80,000 美元，而不是该卖家出售时的价格为 38,000 美元。现在你会如何统治呢？

Now it seems that it must have been a conscious assumption of risk on the buyer’s part. The buyer apparently chose to pay less than one would normally pay in exchange for getting a lesser warranty protection. And it would seems odd to not holding the buyer to the 4-month warranty period specified in the contract after the buyer benefited by paying way less for this computer system.
现在看来，这一定是买方有意识地承担了风险 。买方显然选择支付比通常支付的费用少的费用 ，以换取较少的保修保护。在 买方为该计算机系统支付更少的费用后，不让买方遵守合同中规定的 4 个月保修期似乎很奇怪。

COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY PP. 252
商业上的不切实际 第 252 页

Problem 14.1 In your capacity as an associate at Dewey, Cheatem, & Howe, you were just handed another case from one of your firm’s most active clients, Lou’s Used Cars for Less 9from Problem 2.1). One of Lou’s sales people, “Slick Rick” Newman, explained to you that he had a contract to sell a used Cadillac convertible for $15,000 to a very demanding customer, Kristi Aiken. Kristi really wants this particular car because it was once driven by Tiger Woods. After the customer paid the price and signed the contract, she arranged to pick up her Cadillac from Lou’s the very next day. That evening a terrible hailstorm damaged the body of the Cadillac so badly that it would cost $18,000 to repair it. The car now has a scrap value of $500. Kristi insisted that Lou’s should pay for whatever bodywork it would take to put the car back in the condition it was when she signed the contract. Rick says he wants to know what his obligations and his options are with respect to Kristi’s demands. U.C.C. §§2-613, 2-509(3), Official Comment 3 to §2-509.
问题 14.1 作为 Dewey， Cheatem， & Howe 的合伙人，你刚刚收到了来自你公司最活跃的客户之一 Lou's Used Cars for Less 9 的另一起案件。Lou 的一位销售人员 “Slick Rick” Newman 向您解释说，他有一份合同，以 15,000 美元的价格将一辆二手凯迪拉克敞篷车卖给一位非常苛刻的客户 Kristi Aiken。Kristi 真的很想要这辆特别的车 ，因为它曾经由 Tiger Woods 驾驶。在客户付了价并签了合同后，她安排第二天从 Lou's 取走她的凯迪拉克。那天晚上，一场可怕的冰雹严重损坏了凯迪拉克的车身，以至于修理它要花费 18,000 美元。这辆车现在的废旧价值为 500 美元。Kristi 坚持认为 Lou's 应该支付将汽车恢复到她签署合同时的状态所需的任何车身费用。Rick 说，他想知道他对 Kristi 的要求有什么义务和选择。《美国法典》第 2-613 条、第 2-509（3） 条，第 3 条至第 2-509 条的官方意见。

ANSWER: what is the difference between a 2-613 case vs. a 2-615 case? What is the interaction between the code’s excuse provision of 2-613 and 2-615? What is the difference between risk of loss and excuse? Is it possible to have risk of loss if you are the seller but still be excused? Or if you are excused, isn’t that the same as saying you really do not have risk of loss? How can you reconcile a seller having risk of loss with respect to the goods but also be excused form their contractual obligation to deliver the goods?
回答：2-613 病例与 2-615 病例有什么区别？法典的 2-613 和 2-615 的辩解条款之间有什么相互作用？损失风险和借口有什么区别？如果您是卖方但仍被免除，是否有可能有损失的风险？或者，如果你被原谅了，那不等于说你真的没有损失的风险吗？您如何协调卖方在货物方面有损失风险，同时又免除他们交付货物的合同义务？

Who had the risk of loss in this case when the car was damaged, the seller or the buyer? The seller did according to 2-509(3). In this case, we have a seller who is a merchant and we have a buyer who has not yet received the good. If there is any doubt as to what the word “received” means, the code even defined that in a different part under 2-103(1)(c) defines received as taking physical possession of the goods. Then we have to ask what does it mean to say that the seller had risk of loss? What if the buyer had risk of loss? If the buyer had risk of loss, then that would relieve the seller of any damages that happened to the goods; and the seller would return the car to the buyer in its banged up state. Given that the seller had risk of loss, then why does it not mean that the seller has to return the car to its previous condition and fulfill its contractual obligation with regard to the car no matter? This is where excuse comes in under 2-613 does not change the risk of loss allocation; however, it relieves the seller of its contractual obligations. So, if the seller can successfully claim excuse in this case, then the buyer has no remedies against the seller for breach of this sales’ contract other than rescission. And rescission says buyer would get her money back but not the car, and that is a remedy but not a full expectation. Basically, if seller can successfully claim excuse, seller can get out of its obligation to deliver the buyer’s expectation, which the seller would normally have to do. But even if seller can claim excuse, he still has to undo the contract and give the buyer the option of getting her money back.
在这种情况下，当汽车损坏时，谁有损失的风险，卖方还是买方？ 卖方根据 2-509（3） 这样做了。在这种情况下，我们有一个卖家是卖家 ，而我们有一个买家尚未收到商品。如果对“接收”一词的含义有任何疑问，该法典甚至在 2-103（1）（c） 的不同部分定义接收为实际占有货物。 那么我们不得不问，说卖方有损失风险是什么意思？如果买方有损失风险怎么办？ 如果买方有损失的风险，那么这将减轻卖方对货物发生的任何损害;卖方会将处于爆炸状态的汽车归还给买方。 既然卖方有损失的风险，那么为什么不意味着卖方必须将汽车恢复到以前的状态并履行其对汽车的合同义务呢？ 这就是 2-613 下的借口不会改变损失分配的风险;但是，它免除了卖方的合同义务。因此，如果卖方在这种情况下可以成功要求免责，那么买方除了解除合同外，对卖方违反本销售合同没有任何补救措施。撤销说买家会拿回她的钱，但不会拿回汽车，这是一种补救措施，但不是完全的期望。基本上，如果卖方可以成功索赔借口，卖方就可以摆脱履行买方期望的义务，而卖方通常必须这样做。但即使卖方可以要求借口，他仍然必须撤销合同并让买方选择取回她的钱。

Does §2-613 cover this? When you look 2-613, part of the problem is if you look at the title to 2-613 it says “casualty to identified goods.” If you just read that on its face, it would suggest a much broader scope of 2-613 than 2-613 actually has. Why is that? You could have casualty to goods in the seller’s possession that have technically been identified. And identified is a term of art, which means that they have somehow been marked or set aside for this particular buyer. But if those identified goods were just fungible goods, even though they were identified goods and even though there was casualty to those identified goods, 2-613 would not apply to fungible goods. 2-613 says for application is that it basically require three different things to all be true. (1) Contract requires for its performance goods identified when contract was made (the word “requires” is important because it distinguishes from fungible goods and it means we are only talking about those cases where a seller is selling a particular thing that the buyer knows, understand, and wants; here, like this car once driven by Tiger Woods, nothing else will do). (2) The goods suffered casualty through no fault of either party (maybe here someone may argue that the car should have been protected; however, realistically, car dealers do not have enough garage space). (3) Before risk of loss passes to the buyer (if risk of loss had passed to the buyer, there would be no excuse situation at all). The buyer would not have an excuse, even if the buyer had risk of loss, because the excuse has to go to one’s ability to fulfill his obligation. So, if we are talking about the car being damaged, whose obligation in the contract does that affect? The seller’s obligation is to deliver the car. The buyer’s obligation is to pay money. The fact that the car got damaged after risk of loss had passed to the buyer, the buyer still got the money and there is nothing about her obligation (which is to pay money) for which she has the excuse. It appears that, in this case, 2-613 applies here even though the seller still had risk of loss. Given that 2-613 applies, what are the two possibilities that are indicated by this section? §2-613(a) if it is a total loss or 2-613(b) the goods have deteriorated so long as they can accept the goods under contract for a reduced price. In this case, the car price was $15k and it cost $18k to put it back in its original state, is this a total loss or a partial loss? It is a total loss under 2-613(a) and as a total loss the contract is avoided. In practical terms, what does that mean? Basically, the seller will keep the car for scrap value and the buyer will get her money back.
§2-613 是否涵盖此内容？ 当您查看 2-613 时，部分问题在于，如果您查看 2-613 的标题，它说 “已识别货物的伤亡”。如果你只是从表面上看，它表明 2-613 的范围比 2-613 的实际范围要广泛得多。 为什么？ 卖方拥有的货物在技术上已被确定，您可能会造成伤亡。而 identified 是一个艺术术语，这意味着它们以某种方式被标记或留给这个特定的买家 。但是，如果这些已识别的商品只是可替代的商品，即使它们是已识别的商品，即使这些已识别的商品有伤亡，2-613 也不适用于可替代商品 。2-613 表示，对于应用，它基本上需要三个不同的事情才能全部成立。 （1） 合同要求在订立合同时确定的其性能商品（“要求 ”一词很重要，因为它与可替代商品区分开来，这意味着我们只谈论卖方销售买方知道、理解和想要的特定物品的情况;在这里，就像老虎伍兹曾经驾驶的这辆车一样，其他一切都无济于事）。（2） 货物因任何一方的过错而遭受伤亡（也许这里有人可能会争辩说汽车应该受到保护;然而，实际上，汽车经销商没有足够的车库空间）。 （3） 在损失风险转移给买方之前（如果损失风险已经转移给买方，则完全没有借口情况）。 即使买方有损失的风险，买方也不会有借口，因为借口必须与一个人履行义务的能力有关。 那么，如果我们谈论的是汽车被损坏，那么这会影响合同中的谁义务呢？ 卖方的义务是交付汽车。买方的义务是付款。事实上，汽车在损失风险转移给买方后损坏，买方仍然拿到了钱，而且她没有任何借口的义务（即付款）。在这种情况下，即使卖方仍然存在损失风险，2-613 似乎也适用于此处。 鉴于 2-613 适用，本节指出的两种可能性是什么？ §2-613（a） 如果是全损或 2-613（b） 货物已经变质，只要他们能够以较低的价格接受合同下的货物。 在这种情况下，汽车价格为 15 美元，将其恢复到原始状态需要 18 美元，这是全部损失还是部分损失？ 根据 2-613（a） 规定，这是全部损失，作为全部损失，合同被撤销。实际上，这意味着什么？基本上，卖方将保留汽车作为废品价值，买方将拿回她的钱。

Suppose the buyer here had personally valued this car at $20k due to the Tiger Woods connection because she is the biggest Tiger Woods fan, should she have the right if she wishes to pay $18k of her own money to have the car brought back to its pre-hail condition so that she may own it? The buyer can argue that this is the 2-613(b) case based on her objective valuation of the car. Use the scrap value of the car and hold that her due allowance for deterioration is the original contract price ($15k) minus the scrap value, for a total due allowance of $14,500. That is the extent to which the car has depreciated. If she wants to, the buyer should be able to get the car plus $14,500. That $500 is her buying the car for the scrap value. If you look at the last sentence of Official Comment 1 to 2-613, it makes it clear that it is the buyer’s decision of whether this is a 2-613(a) case or 2-613(b) case once the seller claims excuse under 2-613.
假设这里的买家由于 Tiger Woods 的关系而个人将这辆车估价为 20 美元，因为她是 Tiger Woods 最大的粉丝，如果她希望支付 18 美元自己的钱，她是否有权将汽车恢复到冰雹前的状态，以便她可以拥有它？ 买方可以根据她对汽车的客观估价争辩说，这是 2-613（b） 案件。使用汽车的报废价值，并坚持她的应得劣化津贴是原始合同价格 （$15k） 减去报废价值，总到期津贴为 $14,500。那就是汽车贬值的程度。如果她愿意，买家应该能够得到这辆车加上 14,500 美元。那 500 美元是她以废品价值买下这辆车的。 如果您查看官方意见 1 至 2-613 的最后一句话，它清楚地表明，一旦卖方根据 2-613 要求免责，这是 2-613（a） 案件还是 2-613（b） 案件，这是买方的决定。

Problem 14.2(a) Arlene Ledger, president of Heavy Metal, Inc. (from Problem 3.2) is back in your office. Heavy Metal, as you may recall, is a manufacturer of exercise equipment. Arlene explains to you that last month she agreed to fill a larger order for a new local Gold’s Gym franchise that is planning its grand opening late next week. The problem, Arlene says, is that a heavy rain late last week caused a flood in the basement of Heavy Metal’s building, which is where Arlene had been storing the exercise machines that were earmarked for Gold’s Gym. As soon as Arlene discovered the problem she notified the president of Gold’s Gym, Cory Haney. Cory, however, has told Arlene that Gold’s Gym cannot afford to open late, given all of the advance publicity she has generated so far about the grand opening. Arlene asks you whether she will be able to claim an excuse for a delay in delivering the equipment to Gold’s Gym. Arlene says that it would take a few weeks for her company to manufacture replacement equipment for Gold’s. Arlene admits that she can buy the same equipment immediately from another manufacturer, but at a price that would cause her to lose money on her Gold’s Gym contract. In reading the sales contract, you see that it says nothing either about force majeure or about source of supply. What do you tell Arlene? U.C.C. §§2-613, 2-615; Official Comment 5 to §2-615.
问题 14.2（a） Heavy Metal， Inc. 的总裁 Arlene Ledger（来自问题 3.2）回到了您的办公室。您可能还记得，Heavy Metal 是一家健身器材制造商。Arlene 向您解释说，上个月她同意为当地新的 Gold's Gym 特许经营权完成一个更大的订单，该特许经营权计划在下周晚些时候盛大开业。Arlene 说，问题在于上周晚些时候的一场大雨导致 Heavy Metal 大楼的地下室被洪水淹没，Arlene 一直在那里存放着专门用于 Gold's Gym 的健身器材。Arlene 发现问题后， 立即通知了 Gold's Gym 的总裁 Cory Haney。然而，Cory 告诉 Arlene，鉴于她迄今为止对盛大开业的所有提前宣传，Gold's Gym 不能延迟开放。Arlene 问你，她是否可以为延迟将设备运送到 Gold's Gym 找借口。Arlene 说，她的公司需要几周时间才能制造出 Gold's 的替代设备。Arlene 承认，她可以立即从另一家制造商那里购买相同的设备，但价格会导致她在 Gold's Gym 合同上赔钱。在阅读销售合同时，您会发现它既没有提到不可抗力，也没有提到供应来源。你怎么告诉 Arlene？《美国法典》第 2-613、2-615 条;§2-615 的官方评论 5。

ANSWER: is this a 2-613 case or a 2-615 case? This is a 2-615 case. It is not a 2-613 case because it highly unlike that Gold’s Gym needs these very exercise machines that got wet in the basement as oppose to other machines that are just like them. And also, the mere fact that the seller here is speaking in terms of a delay, that is a give away that this cannot be a 2-613 case. Why? Because 2-613 does not even mention delay as an option, but only total avoidance or buyer takes the goods with the price reduction for the damage incurred. So, if the seller is going to claim excuse for delay, then the source for that has to be 2-615.
回答：这是 2-613 案例还是 2-615 案例？ 这是一个 2-615 案例。这不是 2-613 案例，因为它与此截然不同，Gold's Gym 需要这些在地下室被弄湿的健身器材 ， 而不是其他类似的机器。 而且 ，这里的卖家只是说延迟，这就是一个泄露 ，这不可能是 2-613 的情况。 为什么？ 因为 2-613 甚至没有提到延迟作为一种选项，而只是完全避免或买方以降价购买所造成的损害的货物。因此，如果卖家要申请延迟借口，那么其来源必须是 2-615。

Does the seller here qualify under 2-615? Yes. What is the seller’s responsibility under 2-615? The first thing they have to do is that they have to give notice under 2-615(c) and then it seems like in this case the allocation issues of 2-615(b) are not relevant. So the only issue here is this: whether this flooding that damaged the finished equipment is “a contingency that the nonoccurrence that was a basic assumption on which the contract was based.” How can the seller argue that this flooding was a contingency the nonoccurrence that was a basic assumption on which the contract was based? Since Heavy Metal is a manufacturer rather than a wholesaler, that by itself is a circumstance under Official Comment 5 to 2-615, such that both buyer and seller should have reasonably contemplated that the seller itself would be the exclusive source of supply rather than some third party. Comment 5 puts it this way: “where a particular source of supply is exclusive under the agreement and fails as a casualty the present section applies rather than 2-613. The same holds true where a particular supply is shown by the circumstances to have been contemplated or assumed by the parties.”
这里的卖家是否符合 2-615 的条件？ 是的。 根据 2-615 的规定，卖家的责任是什么？ 他们要做的第一件事 是，他们必须根据 2-615（c） 发出通知 ，然后在这种情况下，2-615（b） 的分配问题似乎无关紧要。 所以这里唯一的问题是：这场损坏成品设备的洪水是否是“一种偶然性，即未发生是合同所基于的基本假设”。卖方如何争辩说这次洪水是一种偶然事件，没有发生是合同所依据的基本假设？由于 Heavy Metal 是制造商而不是批发商，这本身就是官方意见 5 至 2-615 中的一种情况 ，因此买卖双方都应该合理地考虑卖方本身将是唯一的供应来源，而不是第三方。注释 5 是这样说的：“如果特定供应来源在协议下是排他性的，并且作为牺牲品而失败，则适用本条而不是 2-613。如果情况表明双方已经预期或假设了特定供应，情况也是如此。

Should Arlene been more prudent in her storage? Was this like a one-time flooding or does the basement have a propensity to flood? Even if you could show that Arlene was perhaps part of the problem with her storage practices, how does that become relevant under 20615 when if you compare the languages of 2-613? 2-613 specifically it says as one of its requirement “without fault of either party, there is a casualty. But if you look at the language of 2-615, where in 2-615 we find any reference to the fault of either party and its relevance for commercial impracticability? There is not that language, but does that mean it is irrelevant? No, because there is still the good faith requirement, but beyond that Comment 5 says “there is no excuse under this section, however, unless the seller has employed all due measure to assure himself that his source will not fail.” Now in this case, the seller’s source is the seller itself. But it seems that the same policy should apply of requiring the seller has done all he reasonably should have done to avoid the supervening event that is the basis for the excuse. Because if you did not have that rule, think about the moral hazard problem you would have. Think about where if a seller could know that if he is negligent and that’s okay, he will be able to claim excuse; then they would not have the normal incentive to take the precaution. The excuse doctrine is a form of insurance and every time you insure something you avoid the moral hazard problem.
Arlene 应该 更谨慎地存放吗？ 这就像一次性的洪水还是地下室有洪水的倾向？即使你能证明 Arlene 可能是她存储实践问题的一部分，但如果你比较 2-613 的语言，这在 20615 下怎么变得有意义呢？2-613 具体来说，作为其要求之一 “没有任何一方的过错，就有伤亡。但是，如果你看一下 2-615 的措辞，在 2-615 中，我们发现任何一方的过错及其与商业不切实际的相关性？ 没有那种语言，但这是否意味着它无关紧要？不，因为仍然存在善意要求，但除此之外，评论 5 说“然而，本节没有任何借口，除非卖方已采取一切适当措施向自己保证其来源不会失败。现在在这种情况下，卖家的来源是卖家本身。但似乎同样的政策也应该适用，即要求卖方已尽其合理应做的一切，以避免作为借口依据的后续事件。因为如果你没有这条规则，想想你会遇到的道德风险问题。想一想，如果卖家可以知道如果他疏忽大意并且没关系，他将能够要求借口;那么他们就不会有正常的动力来采取预防措施。借口原则是一种保险形式，每次你投保时，你都会避免道德风险问题。

Problem 14.2(b) Same facts as part (a), except the reason for Arlene’s failure to perform is that Arlene’s steel supplier, which was designated in Arlene’s contract with Gold’s Gym as Arlene’s exclusive source of steel for this contract, reneged on its contract with Arlene. The steel supplier’s failure to deliver was due to the destruction of its plant by a fire that was negligently caused by several of its own employees. Will Arlene be excused from her obligations to Gold’s Gym? U.C.C. §2-615, Official Comment 5 to §2-615. Would your answer change if this contract were governed by the CISG? C.I.S.G. Art. 79.
问题 14.2（b） 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，但 Arlene 未能履行合同的原因是 Arlene 的钢材供应商（在 Arlene 与 Gold's Gym 的合同中被指定为 Arlene 在该合同中的独家钢材来源）违背了与 Arlene 的合同。这家钢铁供应商未能交货是由于其工厂被几名员工的疏忽引起的火灾摧毁。Arlene 会被免除她对 Gold's Gym 的义务吗？U.C.C. §2-615，官方评论 5 至 §2-615。如果这份合同受 CISG 管辖，您的回答会改变吗？C.I.S.G. 第 79 条。

ANSWER: Will Arlene be excused from her obligations to Gold’s Gym? According to the fact, it says that this supplier was designated as the exclusive source and that is what Official Comment 5 to 2-615 says, as long as both parties understood or should have understood this was the exclusive source and in this case it was in the contract. So, Arlene should be off the hook for her delay because this source of supply was explicitly made exclusive under her contract with Gold’s Gym. Now, does Gold end up with any rights in that case under Comment 5? Under comment 5, the seller would have to turn over her buyer whatever right she has against her defaulting supplier as a condition to the seller getting the excuse benefits of 2-615. Maybe it is a suit for contract market damages for breach.
回答：Arlene 可以免除她对 Gold's Gym 的义务吗？ 根据事实，它说该供应商被指定为独家来源，这就是官方评论 5 至 2-615 所说的，只要双方都明白或应该明白这是独家来源， 在这种情况下 ，它在合同中。所以，Arlene 应该不会因为她的延误而摆脱困境，因为根据她与 Gold's Gym 的合同，这个供应来源被明确列为独家供应。 那么， 根据评论 5，Gold 是否最终在该案中获得了任何权利？ 根据评论 5，卖方必须将她对违约供应商的任何权利交给她的买方，作为卖方获得 2-615 的借口利益的条件。也许是违约的合同市场损害赔偿诉讼。

Would your answer change if this contract were governed by the CISG? Yes because the CISG lets the excuse (the ability to claim excuse) rest on whether your exclusive source could have claimed excuse. And if the exclusive source could not have claimed such excuse, then neither do you. You got a lawsuit against them, but you do not have an excused to get out of your contract with your buyer. That is found under Article 79(2)(b) because this deal supplier could not be excused against Arlene because of its own negligence causing casualty to the steel. This variation is an example where the UCC and the CISG come to a different result in a case involving a seller claiming excuse.
如果这份合同受 CISG 管辖，您的回答会改变吗？ 是的 ，因为 CISG 让借口（要求借口的能力）取决于您的独家来源是否可以声称有借口。如果独家消息来源不能声称这样的借口，那么你也不知道。你对他们提起了诉讼，但你没有理由解除与买家的合同。根据第 79（2）（b） 条，这是因为该交易供应商不能因为自己的疏忽导致钢材人员伤亡而免责 Arlene。这种差异是 UCC 和 CISG 在涉及卖家索赔借口的案件中得出不同结果的一个例子。

Problem 14.2(c) Same facts as part (a), except that there were 60 machines in the basement, only 30 of which were ruined by the flood. The Gold’s Gym, order was for 40 machines, but Big Jake’s Gym across town also had an order from Heavy Metal for 20 machines for his grand opening on the same day. Arlene would like to allocate 20 of the 30 good machines to Jake’s and just 10 to Gold’s Gym for at least two reasons: first, because she thinks it is better to have at least one happy customer rather than o customers; and second, because she heard from her friends in the industry that Jake’s will soon be opening up lots more local franchises, which she would love to supply with machines. Can Arlene justify her proposed allocation? U.C.C. §2-615(b).
问题 14.2（c） 事实与 （a） 部分相同，只是地下室有 60 台机器，其中只有 30 台被洪水毁坏。Gold's Gym 的订单是 40 台机器，但镇对面的 Big Jake's Gym 也收到了 Heavy Metal 的 20 台机器订单，用于他当天的盛大开业。Arlene 想将 30 台优质机器中的 20 台分配给 Jake's，只将 10 台分配给 Gold's Gym，至少有两个原因：首先，因为她认为至少有一个满意的客户比 o 客户更好;其次，因为她从业内朋友那里听说 Jake's 将很快在当地开设更多特许经营店，她很乐意为这些特许经营店提供机器。Arlene 能否证明她提议的分配是合理的？《美国法典》第 2-615（b） 条。

ANSWER: Can Arlene justify her proposed allocation? She cannot because if you look at the standard of allocation given in 2-615(b): it is that the seller may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable, and then 2-615(b) goes on to say the seller “must allocate production and delivery among its customer, but may as an option include regular customers not been under contract as well as its own requirements for further manufacture.” So, it would seem based on that standard that Arlene should have to come up with a better reason than pure self-interest for justifying a deviation from a pro-rata allocation in a case like this. A pro-rate allocation would look at the 60 machines and we now have thirty. So everybody would get 50%. Gold’s gym would get 20 of 40 machines and Heavy Metal gets 10 of 20 machines. That would seem to be the starting point. 20615(b) does provide two specific situations in which the seller can look out for interests that are not immediate interests. That is the right of the seller to include regular customers not been under contract and a right of the seller to include his own requirements for further manufacture. Arlene’s reasons for her proposed allocation do not fit either of those cases. So, one could argue that her long term motivations should be considered as acceptable for basis of deviating from a straight pro-rata distribution between Gold’s Gym and Jake’s Gym here.
回答：Arlene 能否证明她提议的分配是合理的？ 她不能，因为如果你看一下 2-615（b） 中给出的分配标准： 卖方可以以任何公平合理的方式进行分配，然后 2-615（b） 继续说，卖方“必须在其客户之间分配生产和交付，但可以作为一种选择包括未签订合同的老客户以及其自身对进一步生产的要求。因此，根据这个标准，Arlene 似乎必须提出一个比纯粹的自身利益更好的理由来证明在这样的情况下偏离按比例分配的合理性。按比例分配将查看 60 台计算机，我们现在有 30 台计算机。 所以每个人都会得到 50%。Gold 的健身房将获得 40 台机器中的 20 台，而 Heavy Metal 将获得 20 台机器中的 10 台。这似乎是起点。20615（b） 确实提供了两种具体情况，在这种情况下，卖方可以关注非直接利益的利益。这是卖方包括未签订合同的老客户的权利，也是卖方包括他自己对进一步制造的要求的权利。Arlene 提议分配的理由与这两种情况都不符。因此，有人可能会争辩说，她的长期动机应该被认为是可以接受的，因为她偏离了 Gold's Gym 和 Jake's Gym 之间的直接按比例分配。

Problem 14.2(d) Same facts as part (c), except Arlene chooses to allocate the good machines in a pro rata fashion: Jake’s get 10 and Gold’s Gym gets 20. When Arlene gives Gold’s Gym notice of the problem and of Gold’s share of the good machines, Cory Haney of Gold’s says, “We’ll take the 20 you have for us right now, and we’ll just wait to take the remaining 20 whenever you can make some new ones for us. We don’t want to lose that great price we got.” Arlene has to admit that she did undersell herself when she originally made the contract with Gold’s; Arlene’s strong preference would be to give Cory her fair allocation of the 20 machines and be finished for good with the Gold’s contract. May Arlene condition her allocation of 20 machines to Gold’s on Gold’s agreement to forget the rest of the contract? U.C.C. §§2-615, 2-616(1). Would our answer change if this contract were governed by the CISG? C.I.S.G. Art. 79.
问题 14.2（d） 与第 （c） 部分的事实相同，只是 Arlene 选择按比例分配好的机器：Jake 得到 10 个，Gold 的 Gym 得到 20 个。当 Arlene 向 Gold's Gym 报告问题以及 Gold 在优质机器中的份额时，Gold's 的 Cory Haney 说：“我们现在会拿走您给我们的 20 台，只要您能为我们制造一些新的机器，我们就会等着收走剩下的 20 台。我们不想失去我们得到的那个高价。Arlene 不得不承认，当她最初与 Gold's 签订合同时，她确实低估了自己;Arlene 的强烈偏好是将 20 台机器的公平分配给 Cory，并永远结束 Gold 的合同。Arlene 是否可以以 Gold 的协议为条件，将她分配给 Gold 的 20 台机器作为忘记合同其余部分的条件？《美国法典》第 2-615 条、第 2-616（1） 条。如果这份合同受 CISG 管辖，我们的答案会改变吗？C.I.S.G. 第 79 条。

ANSWER: May Arlene the seller condition her allocation for the 20 machines to Gold on Gold’s agreeing to forget about the rest of the contract once they get the 20 machines? The UCC does not speak directly to this issue of whether Arlene could escape the remainder of her contract obligation with Gold’s Gym in a case where Gold is insisting that they want to wait for the remaining machines under the contract. If you read 2-615(a), (b), and (c) along with 2-616(1), you cannot find for a buyer like Gold’s a specific right to insist on eventual complete delivery in a case like this. If you look at 2-615(a), it refers to a seller’s excuse for delaying delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part. If you look at 2-615(b), it outlines the seller’s duty to allocate in a case where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) only affect a part of the seller’s capacity to perform. So there is no mention in 2-615(b) of a seller’s duty to deliver in full, albeit, with a delay in a case where the seller’s immediate obligation to deliver all of the goods have been excused. §2-615(c) creates this duty for the seller to notify the buyer of a delay or non-delivery. And 2-616(1) says after receiving such a notice, a buyer may do one of two things: first, terminate the contract or modify the contract by agreeing to take this available quota in substitution. Note that 2-616(1) does not expressly offer the option to the buyer to “wait patiently until the seller is able to deliver the goods promised at the price promised.” Can you argue that a buyer in a case like this should have the right to insist for complete delivery at the contract price as long as the buyer is willing to wait however long it takes the seller to fulfill the buyer’s entire order under the contract? According to Keating, despite the lack of reference in the statute to such a right, the buyer ought to have such a right because otherwise the seller like Heavy Metal can sometimes avoid having to follow through with a disadvantage contract simply by having the excuse for not being able to deliver all of the goods on time. Put another way, if the seller is going to be allowed an excuse for nonperformance, the seller should not have the power to defy the consequences of that excuse, namely complete or partial delivery vs. merely a delay.
回答：卖家 Arlene 是否可以将她对 20 台机器的分配作为条件，以 Gold on Gold 同意在获得 20 台机器后忘记合同的其余部分？UCC 没有直接谈到这个问题，即在 Gold 坚持要等待合同规定的剩余机器的情况下，Arlene 是否可以逃避她与 Gold's Gym 的剩余合同义务。如果您将 2-615（a）、（b） 和 （c） 与 2-616（1） 一起阅读，您将无法为像 Gold 这样的买家找到在这种情况下坚持最终完全交付的特定权利。如果您查看 2-615（a），它指的是卖家延迟交货或全部或部分未交货的借口。如果您查看 2-615（b），它概述了在 （a） 段中提到的原因仅影响卖方履行部分能力的情况下，卖方的分配义务。 因此 ，2-615（b） 中没有提到卖方有全额交付的义务，尽管在卖方交付所有货物的直接义务已被免除的情况下，会延迟交付。§2-615（c） 规定卖方有义务通知买方延迟或未交货。2-616（1） 表示，在收到此类通知后，买方可以做以下两件事之一：首先，终止合同或通过同意以此可用配额作为替代来修改合同。 请注意，2-616（1） 并未明确为买方提供“耐心等待，直到卖方能够以承诺的价格交付承诺的货物”的选项。 您能否说，在这种情况下，只要 买方愿意等待，无论卖方根据合同履行买方的全部订单需要多长时间 ，买方都应该有权坚持以合同价格完成全部交货？ 根据 Keating 的说法，尽管法规中没有提及这种权利，但买方应该拥有这种权利，因为否则像 Heavy Metal 这样的卖方有时可以仅仅以无法按时交付所有货物为借口来避免履行不利合同 。换句话说，如果允许卖方以不履约为借口，则卖方不应有权无视该借口的后果，即完全或部分交货，而不仅仅是延迟交货。

Even if Heavy Metal is forced to deliver the rest of the machines later on to Gold at the contract price, Heavy Metal still gets the benefit from 2-615. How is that? When Heavy Metal final delivers the remaining machines, Gold’s Gym will not have a right to sue Heavy Metal for any damages caused by the delay. In the absence of an excuse under 2-615, Gold would have right to those damages due to the delay.
即使 Heavy Metal 被迫稍后以合同价格将其余的机器交付 给 Gold，Heavy Metal 仍然可以从 2-615 中受益。怎么样？当 Heavy Metal 最终交付剩余的机器时，Gold's Gym 无权起诉 Heavy Metal 因延误造成的任何损失。在没有 2-615 规定的辩解的情况下，Gold 有权要求因延误而造成的损害赔偿。

The CISG seem to address this issue more directly than the UCC. Article 79(3) provides that the exemption provided by this article have effect during the period the impediment exists. So, if Gold’s Gym is willing to wait for delivery past the period which the impediment exist, Arlene the seller would have no basis for an excuse as to her obligation to eventually deliver the remainder of her contractual obligated number of machines to Gold’s Gym.
CISG 似乎比 UCC 更直接地解决了这个问题。第 79 条第 （3） 款规定，本条规定的豁免在障碍存在期间有效。因此，如果 Gold's Gym 愿意等待在存在障碍的期限之后交货，那么卖方 Arlene 将没有理由证明她有义务最终将合同义务数量的剩余机器交付给 Gold's Gym。

Problem 14.3 The president of Golden Dairy, Ben Able, comes to your office to discuss a long-term supply contract that he is negotiating with a new retirement center. The directors of the retirement center would like to enter into a five-year deal in which Golden Diary supplies all of the milk for the center’s cafeteria. The center would very much like to negotiate a set price for the milk, even if that fixed price increases during each of the five years of the contract. Ben is not averse to that approach, but he is concerned about his dairy’s exposure if there is a significant milk shortage during the five-year contract period. Ben would like to suggest some ways in which the contract could give price certainty to the retirement center, but still limit the dairy’s risk in the event that milk prices go through the ceiling. In light of Ben’s stated desire, consider the following three possibilities: (1) completely fixed pricing, (2) completely variable pricing that ties the price to some objective market measure, and (3) variable pricing with specific price floors or ceilings. Which option would you recommend? Are there other options you can think of? Official Comments 4 and 8 to §2-615.
问题 14.3 Golden Dairy 的总裁 Ben Able 来到您的办公室，讨论他正在与新的退休中心谈判的长期供应合同。退休中心的董事们希望签订一项为期五年的协议，由 Golden Diary 为中心的自助餐厅提供所有牛奶。该中心非常愿意为牛奶协商一个固定价格，即使这个固定价格在合同的五年中每年都会上涨。Ben 并不反对这种方法，但他担心如果在五年合同期内出现严重的牛奶短缺，他的乳制品厂会面临风险。Ben 想提出一些方法，使合同可以赋予退休中心价格确定性，但在牛奶价格突破上限的情况下，仍然可以限制乳制品厂的风险 。 根据 Ben 所陈述的愿望，考虑以下三种可能性：（1） 完全固定的定价，（2） 将价格与某种客观的市场衡量标准挂钩的完全可变定价，以及 （3） 具有特定价格下限或上限的可变定价。您会推荐哪个选项？您能想到其他选择吗？§2-615 的官方评论 4 和 8。

ANSWER: Consider the following possibilities. (1) Completely fixed pricing meets the buyer’s desire for price certainty. What about the seller’s risk of an unexpected jump in future milk prices? Put another way, if milk prices skyrocket under this approach, would the dairy be able to claim excuse? The dairy probably would not be able to claim excuse because if you look at Comment 4 to 2-615, it does not give much encouragement generally to the notion of a price increase as a basis for excuse (it would have to be an extreme set of circumstances). (2) Completely variable pricing that ties the price to some objective market measure, does that work for what the two parties want? It would reduce all of the seller’s risk on pricing, but it would not meet the stated objective of the buyer, which wants price certainty. (3) Variable pricing with specific price floors or ceilings, for example the milk contractor might say that the original price of milk for two dollar per gallon can be increased to three dollars per gallon if the seller can show if the seller can show certain cost increases. That at least caps the buyer’s price exposures but what about the seller’s? What if it turns out that the seller needed to charge $5 more per gallon just to break even, would the seller be stuck with the loss or could the seller claim excuse? It is unlikely that the seller can claim excuse in that case. So, what else is there? How about variable pricing with the possibility of the buyer opting out when the price hits a certain ceiling? In another words, the seller doing a cost-plus deal by saying I will sell for my cost plus certain amount. And then the buyer can get some price certainty by defining an opt-out ceiling. That option might satisfy both sides.
答案： 考虑以下可能性。（1） 完全固定的定价满足买方对价格确定性的渴望。卖方未来牛奶价格意外上涨的风险怎么办？换句话说，如果牛奶价格在这种方法下飙升，乳品厂能找借口吗？乳品厂可能无法声称有借口，因为如果你看一下评论 4 到 2-615，它通常不会对将涨价作为借口基础的概念给予太多鼓励（这必须是一组极端的情况）。（2） 完全可变的定价，将价格与某种客观的市场衡量标准挂钩 ，这是否符合双方的需求？这将降低卖方的所有定价风险，但它无法满足买方的既定目标，买方希望获得价格确定性。（3） 具有特定价格下限或上限的可变定价 ，例如，如果卖家可以证明卖家是否可以证明某些成本增加，牛奶的原价可以提高到每加仑 2 美元 3 美元。这至少限制了买方的价格风险，但卖方的价格风险呢 ？如果事实证明卖方需要每加仑多收取 5 美元才能收支平衡，卖家会陷入亏损困境还是卖家可以辩解呢？在这种情况下，卖方不太可能要求借口。那么，还有什么呢？当价格达到某个上限时，买方有可能选择退出的可变定价怎么样？换句话说，卖家进行成本加成交易，说我将以我的成本加一定金额出售。 然后，买方可以通过定义选择退出上限来获得一些价格确定性。这个选项可能会让双方都满意。

THE TITLE WITH SALES OF GOODS PP. 279
商品销售标题 第 279 页

16.1. a. Your law firm has a new client, Pierre LaClede, who owns an art and framing gallery in the trendy part of town. As the firm’s UCC expert, you end up getting to counsel Pierre. He first confides to you that he really dislikes lawyers, but his shop has been having so many problems with title issues lately that he had no choice but to seek legal advice in order to sort things out. The first situation Pierre asks you about involves his gallery’s recent sale of a $70,000 abstract painting entitled Pain. The painting was purchased by a man who identified himself only as “the Critic” and who paid for Pain with a suitcase containing 700 $100 bills. The problem is, the bills turned out to be counterfeit and “the Critic” is nowhere to be found. Pierre did, however, discover Pain at Lucy’s, a competitor gallery down the street. Lucy Fenton, the owner of that gallery, said that she had purchased the paining for $20,000 from a stranger who called himself “the Critic”. Pierre wants to know whether he should be able to recover the painting from Lucy’s. What is your advice? U.C.C. §§2-403(1), 1-201(b)(20) (formerly §1-201(19)), 1-204 (formerly 1-201(44)).
16.1. 一个。您的律师事务所有一位新客户 Pierre LaClede，他在镇上的时尚区拥有一家艺术和装裱画廊。作为公司的 UCC 专家，您最终可以聘请 Pierre 的法律顾问。他首先向你吐露，他真的很不喜欢律师，但他的店最近在产权问题上遇到了很多问题，他别无选择，只能寻求法律建议来解决问题。Pierre 问你的第一种情况是他的画廊最近售出了一幅价值 70,000 美元的抽象画，题为 《痛苦 》。这幅画是由一个自称是“ 批评家 ” 的人买下的，他用一个装有 700 张 100 美元钞票的手提箱为 《痛苦 》支付了费用 。问题是 ， 这些钞票被证明是假的，而 《 批评家 》 无处可寻。然而，皮埃尔确实在街上的竞争对手画廊 Lucy's 发现了 Pain。该画廊的老板露西·芬顿（Lucy Fenton）说，她以 2 万美元的价格从一个自称“评论家”的陌生人那里买下了这幅画 。皮埃尔想知道他是否应该能够从露西那里找回这幅画 。你有什么建议？加州大学 §§2-403（1）、1-201（b）（20）（原 §1-201（19））、1-204（原 1-201（44））。

When the Critic bought the painting with counterfeit money, the Critic has voidable title to the painting under §2-403(1)(d) since it is a fraud. Then, under 2-403(1), the Critic has the power to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value. Here the unusual situation arises where the transferee has superior title than the transferor. Lucy qualifies as a good faith purchaser for value under §1-201(b)(20), which applies an objective test for good faith. As such, Lucy wins in the title battle over Pierre. Although both Pierre and Lucy are innocent parties, Pierre is more blameworthy, since Pierre is in a better position to exercise caution when he dealt with the Critic not to get tricked in the first place. Thus Pierre can only recover from the Critic under common law conversion, fraud and restitution.
当评论家用假币购买这幅画时，评论家根据 §2-403（1）（d） 对这幅画拥有可撤销的所有权，因为它是欺诈行为。然后，根据 2-403（1） 的规定，批评者有权将良好的所有权转让给善意的购买者以获取价值。 这里出现了不寻常的情况，即受让人拥有比转让人更高的所有权。 根据 §1-201（b）（20） 的规定，Lucy 有资格成为善意购买者 ，该条款对善意进行了客观测试。因此，露西在与皮埃尔的冠军争夺战中获胜。虽然皮埃尔和露西都是无辜的一方，但皮埃尔更应该受到指责，因为皮埃尔在与批评家打交道时更能谨慎行事 ，以免一开始就被欺骗。 因此 ，皮埃尔只能根据普通法转换、欺诈和赔偿从批评者那里获得赔偿。

Variation: If the Critic stole the painting from Pierre, and then sold the painting to Lucy for value. Then both the Critic and Lucy would have void title. In this variation, the Critic, as a true thief, breaks the chain of title. And everyone after the true thief gets void title to the stolen goods. However, if the owner only gets tricked and voluntarily gives up ownership right, then the trickster gets voidable right, and the good faith purchaser who bought the stolen goods for value from the trickster would get good title to the stolen good under §2-403(1).
变化：如果评论家从皮埃尔那里偷走了这幅画，然后将这幅画卖给了露西以换取价值。那么 Critic 和 Lucy 都将拥有无效的头衔。在这种变体中，评论家作为一个真正的小偷，打破了标题的链条。而真正的小偷之后的每个人都获得了赃物的无效所有权。但是，如果所有者只是被欺骗并自愿放弃所有权，那么骗子将获得可撤销的权利，而从骗子那里以有价购买赃物的善意购买者将根据 §2-403（1） 获得对赃物的良好所有权。

b. Same facts as part (a), except instead of selling Pain to “the Critic”, Pierre lends the painting to a friend who is not an art dealer, and the friend later sells the painting to Lucy. Under this scenario could Pierre recover the painting from Lucy? U.C.C. §2-403(1).
b. 与（a）部分相同的事实，只是皮埃尔没有将 《痛苦 》卖给 “ 批评家 ”，而是将这幅画借给了一位不是艺术品经销商的朋友，而这位朋友后来又把这幅画卖给了露西。在这种情况下，皮埃尔能从露西那里找回这幅画吗？加州大学 §2-403（1） 条。

When Pierre lends the painting to the friend, the friend has neither good title nor voidable title, because §2-403(1) requires goods to be delivered in a transaction of purchase. §1-201(b)(29) defines “purchase” as “…or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property”. Here when Pierre lends the painting to the friend, the friend acquired a possessory interest in the painting, so this may qualify as a transaction of purchase. The distinction of this problem to part (a) is, in part (a), when Pierre sold the painting to the Critic, Pierre intended to transfer full ownership interest to the Critic, whereas here, when Pierre lends the painting to the friend, Pierre only intended to give the friend a temporary possessory interest. §2-403(1) says “A purchaser of a limited interest acquires right only to the extent of interest purchased.” Even though the lending of the painting from Pierre to the friend may qualify as a transaction of purchase under the broad definition of purchase under §1-201(b)(29), Pierre did not voluntarily give the friend ownership right, but only right to temporary possession. And that’s all the friend can give to Lucy when he sold the painting to Lucy. The friend cannot give full ownership interest in the painting to Lucy, because he does not have full ownership interest in the painting himself. Therefore in this problem Pierre should defeat Lucy in the title battle.
当皮埃尔将画作借给朋友时，这位朋友既没有好的所有权，也没有可撤销的所有权，因为 §2-403（1） 要求在购买交易中交付货物。 §1-201（b）（29） 将 “ 购买 ” 定义为 “...... 或任何其他产生财产权益的自愿交易 ”。 在这里，当皮埃尔将画作借给朋友时，这位朋友获得了这幅画的所有权，因此这可能符合购买交易的条件。这个问题与（a）部分的区别在于，在（a）部分，当皮埃尔将画作卖给评论家时，皮埃尔打算将全部所有权权益转让给评论家，而在这里，当皮埃尔将画作借给朋友时，皮埃尔只打算给朋友暂时的占有权益。§2-403（1） 规定 “ 有限权益的购买者仅在所购买权益的范围内获得权利。“ 尽管根据 §1-201（b）（29） 中广义的购买定义，皮埃尔将画作借给朋友可能符合购买交易的条件 ，但皮埃尔并没有自愿给予朋友所有权，而只是暂时占有的权利。这就是这位朋友在将这幅画卖给 Lucy 时所能给予 Lucy 的全部。这位朋友不能将这幅画的全部所有权权益交给 Lucy，因为他自己对这幅画没有完全的所有权权益。 所以在这个问题上，皮埃尔应该在冠军争夺战中击败露西。

16.2 a. Pierre’s next question deals with a $40,000 painting (with frame) entitled Peace. Pierre had bought and then custom-framed that painting himself, and Lucy from down the street had asked Pierre to bring Peace by her shop so that she could look at the frame job. Pierre did as Lucy requested, but later that same day one of Lucy’s clerk mistakenly sold Peace to Frank Baebler, a new customer, for just $30,000 (reflecting Lucy’s customary 25 percent “new customer” discount). Frank paid for the painting with a personal check that was later returned for insufficient funds, but he said that this was just an oversight and that he would be happy to make good on that check with a $30,000 cashier’s check. Before Frank makes good on that check, however, Pierre discovers the problem and demands that Frank return the painting. Should Pierre be able to get it? U.C.C. §§2-403(1), 2-403(2), 2-403(3), 1-201(b)(9) (formerly §1-201(9)), 1-204 (formerly §1-201(44)).
16.2 a. 皮埃尔的下一个问题是关于一幅价值 40,000 美元的画作（带框），题为 《和平 》。皮埃尔买下了这幅画，然后自己定制了装裱，街对面的露西请皮埃尔把和平带到她的店里，这样她就可以看看装裱工作了。皮埃尔按照露西的要求做了，但当天晚些时候，露西的一名店员错误地将 Peace 卖给了新客户弗兰克 · 巴布勒 ，价格仅为 30,000 美元（反映了露西惯常的 25% 的“ 新客户 ” 折扣）。弗兰克用一张个人支票支付了这幅画的费用，后来由于资金不足而被退回，但他表示这只是一个疏忽，他很乐意用一张 30,000 美元的银行本票来偿还那张支票 。然而，在弗兰克还清那张支票之前，皮埃尔发现了问题所在，并要求弗兰克归还这幅画。皮埃尔应该能得到它吗？加州大学 §§2-403（1）、2-403（2）、2-403（3）、1-201（b）（9）（原 §1-201（9））、1-204（原 §1-201（44））。

Under §2-403(3), when Pierre left the painting to Lucy, he entrusted the painting to her. As such, the entrustee who is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind has power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business under §2-403(2). Thus Lucy gets good title to the painting from Pierre. Subsequently, Lucy’s power to give good title comes from §2-403(2) & (3) not §2-403(1). If Frank qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, then he would get good title in the painting from Lucy under §2-403(2). Under §1-201(b)(9), a buyer in the ordinary course of business means “a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind.” The distinction between a good faith purchaser for value and a buyer in the ordinary course of business is the latter must have purchased the goods from person in the business of selling goods of that kind, whereas the former doesn’t have to buy from someone in the business of selling goods of that kind. Before Frank makes good on the check, all he did was paying with a bad check. §1-201(b)(9) says “A buyer in ordinary course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on secured or unsecured credit.” However, paying with a bad check is not the equivalent as paying of unsecured credit, since it does not involve the extension of credit on the seller’s part at the time of contract formation. Moreover, §2-511(3) says “Payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment.” Under these facts, Frank does not qualify for a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Especially considering 2-403(1)(b), Frank would have a voidable title in the painting since he paid with a bad check. As such, Pierre’s right as the true owner of the painting would trump Frank’s voidable title to the painting.
根据 §2-403（3），当皮埃尔将这幅画留给露西时，他将这幅画托付给了她。因此， 作为经营此类商品的商人的受托人有权根据 §2-403（2） 在正常业务过程中将委托人的所有权利转让给买方。 因此 ，露西从皮埃尔那里得到了这幅画的好标题。随后，露西给予良好所有权的权力来自 §2-403（2）和（3），而不是 §2-403（1）。如果弗兰克在正常业务过程中有资格成为买家，那么他将根据 §2-403（2） 从 Lucy 那里获得画作的良好所有权。根据 §1-201（b）（9），正常业务过程中的买方是指 “在不知道销售侵犯他人对商品的权利的情况下，以及在正常情况下从典当商以外的人处购买商品的人，在销售此类商品的业务中。 善意的有价购买者和在正常业务过程中的买方之间的区别在于，后者必须从销售该类商品的人那里购买商品，而前者不必从从事该类商品销售业务的人那里购买。 在 Frank 还清支票之前，他所做的只是用一张空头支票付款。 §1-201（b）（9） 规定 “买方在正常业务过程中可以以现金、交换其他财产或有担保或无担保信用购买 ” 然而，用空头支票付款并不等同于支付无担保信用，因为它不涉及卖方在合同订立时提供信贷。此外，§2-511（3） 说 “ 支票支付是有条件的，并且在当事人之间因不兑现按时出示的支票而被击败。 根据这些事实，Frank 在正常业务过程中没有资格成为买家。特别是考虑到 2-403（1）（b），弗兰克在画中将有一个可撤销的头衔，因为他用空头支票支付。因此，皮埃尔作为这幅画的真正所有者的权利将胜过弗兰克对这幅画的可撤销所有权。

b. Same facts as part (a), except Frank quickly gives Lucy the cashier’s check for $30,000 after Pierre demands the painting back but before Pierre actually takes the painting from Frank. Should Pierre be able to get it? U.C.C. §2-403.
b. 与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是在皮埃尔要求归还这幅画之后，但在皮埃尔真正从弗兰克手中拿走这幅画之前，弗兰克很快就把 30,000 美元的银行本票给了露西。皮埃尔应该能得到它吗？加州大学 §2-403.

Now even though Frank gives value, he still does not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business. The speed with which Frank produced the cashier’s check when the title issue is still in controversy looks suspicious and makes Frank fail to meet the good faith requirement to qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, since he already has knowledge that the painting belongs to Pierre when Frank makes the payment. In addition, Pierre could argue that the validity of Frank’s title in the painting ought to be measured from the point when Pierre made an issue of it. So Frank’s rights against Pierre should be frozen at the time when Pierre demands the painting back. And no later production of good funds by Frank should be able to change things.
现在，即使 Frank 提供了价值，他仍然没有资格在正常业务过程中成为买家。当所有权问题仍然存在争议时，弗兰克制作银行本票的速度看起来很可疑，这使得弗兰克未能满足在正常业务过程中获得买家资格的诚信要求，因为他已经知道这幅画在弗兰克付款时属于皮埃尔。此外，皮埃尔可以争辩说，弗兰克在画中的标题的有效性应该从皮埃尔提出问题时开始衡量。 因此 ， 弗兰克对皮埃尔的权利应该在皮埃尔要求归还这幅画时被冻结。弗兰克后来制作的良好基金应该能够改变事情。

c. Same facts as part (a), except Frank quickly gives Lucy the cashier’s check for $30,000 before Pierre even demands the painting from him. Now should Pierre be able to retrieve the painting from Frank? U.C.C. §2-403.
c. 事实与 （a） 部分相同，只是弗兰克在皮埃尔要求他画画之前迅速将 30,000 美元的银行本票给了露西。现在皮埃尔应该能从弗兰克那里取回这幅画吗？ 加州大学 §2-403.

Under §2-403(2), now it seems Frank qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, since Frank did not have knowledge of the title controversy when he made payment. As such, since Frank is buying from the entrustee, Frank gets good title in the painting.
根据 §2-403（2），现在看来 Frank 在正常业务过程中有资格成为买家，因为 Frank 在付款时并不了解所有权争议。因此，由于弗兰克是从受托人那里购买的 ，因此弗兰克在画中获得了很好的所有权。

d. Same facts as part (a), except Frank never gives Lucy a bad check but instead a cashier’s check from the beginning. Now should Pierre be able to retrieve the painting from Frank? U.C.C. §2-403.
d. 与 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 Frank 从一开始就没有给 Lucy 一张空头支票，而是一张银行本票 。现在皮埃尔应该能从弗兰克那里取回这幅画吗？ 加州大学 §2-403.

Now Frank wins under §2-403(2) as a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
现在，Frank 在正常业务过程中作为买方根据 §2-403（2） 获胜。

e. Same facts as part (a). What rights does Pierre have against Lucy, assuming that Pierre cannot recover the painting from Frank? U.C.C. §1-103.
e. 与 （a） 部分相同的事实。 假设皮埃尔无法从弗兰克那里取回这幅画 ，皮埃尔对露西有什么权利？加州大学 §1-103.

Under §1-103, Pierre can bring a conversion action under the common law against Lucy.
根据 §1-103，Pierre 可以根据普通法对 Lucy 提起转换诉讼。

Problem 16.3(a) The next painting Pierre wants to discuss is Rustic Simplicity, a $50,000 impressionistic work by a hot new artist. Here is what Pierre tells you about the whereabouts of Rustic Simplicity: Pierre sold that painting to George Daly, who purchased it with a bad check. George then sold it for $40,000 cash to George’s family friend, Carla Stone. Carla in turn gave Rustic Simplicity to George Daly, Jr. as a birthday gift. George Jr., who is 23, still lives with George Sr. and is aware that his dad never made a good on the bounced check to Pierre. Does Pierre have recovery rights against just one Daly or against both of them? U.C.C. §§2-403(1), 1-201(b)(29), 1-201(b)(20).
问题 16.3（a） 皮埃尔想讨论的下一幅画是 Rustic Simplicity，这是一幅由炙手可热的新晋艺术家创作的 50,000 美元的印象派作品。以下是皮埃尔告诉你的关于 《质朴的朴素》 的下落 ：皮埃尔将那幅画卖给了乔治·戴利，后者用空头支票买下了这幅画。然后，George 以 40,000 美元现金的价格将其卖给了 George 的家庭朋友 Carla Stone。Carla 反过来将 Rustic Simplicity 作为生日礼物送给了 George Daly， Jr.。23 岁的小乔治仍然与老乔治住在一起，他知道他爸爸从未在给皮埃尔的跳票上赚到好钱。皮埃尔是否仅对一个戴利或两个戴利都有追偿权 ？《美国法典》第 2-403（1）、1-201（b）（29）、1-201（b）（20） 条。

ANSWER: the transfer from Pierre to George, Sr., when Pierre sold the painting to George, Sr. for a bad check, what kind of title did George, Sr. get? Voidable title, 2-403(1)(b) mentions the delivery being an exchange for a check, which is later dishonored. The next transfer, when Carla bought the painting from George, Sr. for $40k cash and assuming she was a good faith purchaser for value, what did Carla receive? Good title under 2-403(1)(b)’s second sentence says a person with voidable title can transfer good title. Then to the next transfer, what does George, Jr. as Carla’s donee? Since Carla has good title, she has the power to give good title to the donee. How do we know that? 1-201(b)(29)’s definition of purchase includes taking by gift and 2-403(1)’s first sentence says if the donor has good title, then the recipient gets good title. The first sentence applies to party who buys and parties who receives gifts. Another reason why we know a purchaser of an item could be someone who did not give value by looking at 2-403(1), the logic uses the term purchaser in the first sentence and uses it again in the second sentence; but there is a modifier “for value.” If purchase meant you had to buy it, then why did they have to say a purchaser for value, which would be redundant. That also tells that a mere gets to qualify for the benefits of the shelter rule under §2-403(1). As a policy matter, is it fair for George, Jr. to defeat Pierre’s title when George, Jr. knew about his dad not making good on the bad check? Put another way, does George Jr. have to be in good faith in order to inherit good title as a donee under the shelter principle? We have said already he does not have to give value to get the benefits of the shelter rule. Does he have to be in good faith to get the benefits of the shelter rule? From the language of 2-403(1) it does not look like it. They do not say in the first sentence of §2-403(1), “a good faith purchaser of goods acquires all title” it just says “a purchaser.” Now in this case, the mere fact that George, Jr. knows about his father’s bad check does not mean by itself that George, Jr. is necessarily not in good faith. If you can show that George, Jr. was part of some fraudulent scheme to try to wash the title clean using a scam, THEN not only could you say he was not in good faith, you could say he engaged in fraud and it would be a fraud action from Pierre that would overcome the shelter principle. In this case, just knowing about the bad check, if you think about how this implicates his good faith think about this fact: even if George, Jr. could say I cannot take this painting I know my dad bought it with a bad check. Does that help Pierre? Not particularly, Carla has good title anyways. Pierre has already lost. So at that point whether George, Jr. keeps the painting or not, Carla would keep it and Pierre would still loses.
回答： 当皮埃尔以空头支票将画卖给老乔治时，老乔治得到了什么样的头衔？可撤销的所有权，2-403（1）（b） 提到交付是支票的交换，后来被拒付。下一次转账，当 Carla 以 40 美元现金从 George， Sr. 那里买下这幅画时，假设她是一个善意的有价购买者，Carla 收到了什么？2-403（1）（b） 第二句下的 Good Title 说，拥有可撤销产权的人可以转让 Good Title。 然后到下一次转移，小乔治作为 Carla 的受赠人是什么 ？ 由于 Carla 拥有良好的所有权，她有权为受赠人授予良好的所有权。我们怎么知道呢？1-201（b）（29） 对购买的定义包括赠与，而 2-403（1） 的第一句话说，如果捐赠者有好的所有权，那么接受者就会得到好的所有权。第一句话适用于购买方和接受礼物的方。我们知道物品购买者的另一个原因可能是通过查看 2-403（1） 没有赋予价值的人，逻辑在第一句中使用了 purchaser 一词，并在第二句中再次使用它;但是有一个修饰符 “for value”。如果购买意味着你必须购买它，那么为什么他们必须说有价值购买者，这将是多余的。这也表明，仅仅是有资格获得 §2-403（1） 下的庇护所规则的好处 。从政策角度来看，当小乔治知道他爸爸没有兑现空头支票时，小乔治击败皮埃尔的头衔是否公平？换句话说，小乔治是这样说的。 必须真诚才能 根据庇护原则继承作为受赠人的良好所有权 ？ 我们已经说过，他不必付出价值来获得庇护所规则的好处。他是否必须真诚才能获得庇护所规则的好处？ 从 2-403（1） 的语言来看，它看起来不像。他们没有在 §2-403（1） 的第一句中说“善意的商品购买者获得所有所有权”，它只是说 “购买者”。现在在这种情况下，小乔治知道他父亲的空头支票这一事实本身并不意味着小乔治一定没有诚意。如果你能证明 George， Jr. 参与了某个欺诈计划，试图通过骗局洗清头衔，那么你不仅可以说他没有善意， 还可以说他参与了欺诈，这将是 Pierre 的欺诈行为，将克服庇护原则。在这种情况下，仅仅知道空头支票，如果你想想这如何暗示他的善意，想想这个事实：即使小乔治可以说我不能拿这幅画，我知道我爸爸是用空头支票买的。这对 Pierre 有帮助吗？不是特别的，反正 Carla 有个不错的头衔。皮埃尔已经输了。 所以到那时，无论小乔治是否保留这幅画，卡拉都会保留它，而皮埃尔仍然会输。

Problem 16.3(b) Same facts as part (a), except that George Jr. was not only aware of George Sr.’s bounced check, but was party to a scam that was intended to “wash the title clean” of the Rustic Simplicity painting. Does Pierre have recovery rights against George Jr.? U.C.C. §1-103.
问题 16.3（b） 与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，只是 George Jr. 不仅知道 George Sr. 的跳票，而且还参与了一场骗局，该骗局旨在“洗清”Rustic Simplicity 画作的标题。皮埃尔有针对小乔治的追偿权吗？《美国法典》第 1-103 条。

ANSWER: if you looked at 2-403 alone, you would not really find anything there to give Pierre recovery rights against George, Jr. to get those recovery rights Pierre would have to go outside of 2-403 to the common law of fraud which still applies under 1-103(b) in a case like this. Furthermore, if these were the facts and Carla was also a party to this fraud, then we could just look at 2-403 and say she never got good title under the voidable title rules because she was not in good faith.
回答： 如果你单独看 2-403，你不会真的在那里找到任何东西来赋予 Pierre 对 George， Jr. 的追偿权。为了获得这些追偿权，Pierre 将不得不超越 2-403 的欺诈普通法，该法仍然适用于在此类案件中根据 1-103（b） 的规定。此外，如果这些是事实，并且 Carla 也是这场欺诈的一方，那么我们可以只看 2-403 并说她从未在可撤销的所有权规则下获得好的所有权，因为她没有诚信。

Problem 16.3(c) Same facts as part (a), except that George Sr. purchased the painting with a bad check, he gave the painting to George Jr. for a birthday gift. Does Pierre have recovery rights against George Jr.? U.C.C. §2-403(1).
问题 16.3（c） 与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，除了 George Sr. 用空头支票购买了这幅画，他将这幅画送给了 George Jr. 作为生日礼物。皮埃尔有针对小乔治的追偿权吗？《美国法典》第 2-403（1） 条。

ANSWER: George Jr. got voidable title as well. George Jr. gets under the shelter principle whatever title his donor had. His donor in this case only had voidable title, so that’s all that he gets. George Jr. does not improve upon it because he is not a good faith purchaser for value here.
回答：George Jr. 也获得了可撤销的头衔。George Jr. 无论他的捐赠者拥有什么头衔，都受到庇护所原则的约束。在这种情况下，他的捐赠者只有可撤销的所有权，所以这就是他得到的全部。George Jr. 没有改进它，因为他在这里不是一个善意的价值购买者。

Problem 16.3(d) Same facts as part (a), except that George Sr. purchased the painting with a bad check, he gave the painting to George Jr. for a birthday gift. George Jr. then sold the painting for cash to Carla Stone, a bona fide purchaser for value. Does Pierre have recovery rights against Carla Stone? U.C.C. §2-403(1).
问题 16.3（d） 与第 （a） 部分的事实相同，除了老乔治用空头支票购买了这幅画，他将这幅画送给了小乔治作为生日礼物。小乔治随后将这幅画以现金卖给了卡拉·斯通 （Carla Stone），后者是一位真正的有价买家。皮埃尔有针对卡拉·斯通的追偿权吗？《美国法典》第 2-403（1） 条。