Illustration: Jack Hughes for Bloomberg Markets
插图：杰克·休斯为彭博市场提供
Harvard’s Not-So-Smart Money: Two Decades of Poor Returns and Rich Pay
哈佛的非聪明资金：二十年的低回报与高薪酬
Its money managers underperformed after changing personnel and strategies at the worst times.
其资金经理在最糟糕的时机更换人员和策略后表现不佳。
Harvard University alumni and business luminaries gathered at the memorial service in Midtown Manhattan. They were there to honor Ron Daniel, a McKinsey & Co. managing partner and Harvard’s treasurer from 1989 to 2004.
哈佛大学校友和商业领袖们在曼哈顿中城的追悼会上聚集。他们在那里纪念罗恩·丹尼尔，麦肯锡公司的管理合伙人，以及 1989 年至 2004 年间的哈佛大学财务主管。
罗恩·丹尼尔。插图：克里斯蒂安·布拉扎为彭博市场提供
Daniel, who died at age 93, oversaw astonishing growth of the school’s endowment as chairman of the fund’s board. Under his leadership, the university built up a kind of in-house hedge fund, Harvard Management Co., or HMC. From Boston’s Federal Reserve building, with sweeping views of the harbor, HMC pioneered a strategy of long-term investments in then-exotic fare for endowments such as private equity and hedge funds.
丹尼尔于 93 岁去世，作为基金董事会主席，他监督了学校捐赠基金的惊人增长。在他的领导下，大学建立了一种内部对冲基金——哈佛管理公司（HMC）。HMC 从波士顿联邦储备银行大楼出发，俯瞰港口，开创了一种长期投资的策略，投资于当时对捐赠基金来说颇具异国情调的资产，如私募股权和对冲基金。
“HMC became regarded as one of the premier investment management firms in the world,” Jonathon Jacobson, a former Harvard manager who left to start his own hedge fund, said at Daniel’s February memorial.
“霍华德管理公司被视为全球顶尖的投资管理公司之一，”前哈佛经理乔纳森·雅各布森在丹尼尔二月份的追悼会上说道，他离开后创办了自己的对冲基金。
No more. Over the past 20 years, the 8.8% annualized return for Harvard’s endowment ranked seventh of the eight Ivy League universities and, according to the National Association of College and University Business Officers, lagged 60% of university funds with more than $5 billion under management. Harvard’s 10-year return trailed 80%.
不再。过去 20 年，哈佛大学的捐赠基金年化回报率为 8.8%，在八所常春藤盟校中排名第七，且根据全国大学和大学商业官员协会的数据，落后于 60%管理资产超过 50 亿美元的大学基金。哈佛的 10 年回报率落后于 80%。
Harvard’s Humbling 哈佛的谦卑
Size and return of university endowments
大学捐赠基金的规模和回报
Sources: University data, National Association of College and University Business Officers, Bloomberg
来源：大学数据，国家大学和学院财务官协会，彭博社
Note: Fiscal years ended June 30. Return period ended June 30, 2023.
注意：财政年度截至 6 月 30 日。回报期截至 2023 年 6 月 30 日。
Former Harvard President Lawrence Summers complained to the Harvard Crimson student newspaper that if the endowment had merely grown as much as its average peer over the past two decades, the university would have about $20 billion more. That sum is almost the size of the University of Pennsylvania’s entire endowment. (Summers, a Harvard professor and former US Treasury secretary, is a paid contributor to Bloomberg TV.)
前哈佛大学校长劳伦斯·萨默斯向哈佛克 rimson 学生报抱怨，如果过去二十年捐赠基金的增长仅与其平均同行相当，大学将多出约 200 亿美元。这个数额几乎与宾夕法尼亚大学的整个捐赠基金相当。（萨默斯是哈佛教授和前美国财政部长，也是彭博电视的有偿撰稿人。）
Big Take 大收获
Harvard’s Endowment Brings Lackluster Returns
哈佛大学的捐赠基金回报平平
Harvard didn’t scrimp on compensation for investment talent. Over the past two decades, HMC tax filings show the endowment paid its top investment managers and executives a total of about $800 million—enough to cover the school’s undergraduate financial aid budget for more than three years. (The endowment hasn’t disclosed pay for the most recent year.)
哈佛在投资人才的薪酬上没有吝啬。在过去的二十年中，HMC 的税务申报显示，捐赠基金支付给其顶级投资经理和高管的总额约为 8 亿美元——足以覆盖学校本科生的财政援助预算超过三年。（捐赠基金尚未披露最近一年的薪酬。）
At $50.7 billion, as of June 2023, Harvard’s endowment remains the biggest in higher education, but it may not for long; the University of Texas system, turbocharged by oil revenue, could surpass it.
截至 2023 年 6 月，哈佛大学的捐赠基金为 507 亿美元，仍然是高等教育中最大的捐赠基金，但这可能不会持续太久；得益于石油收入，德克萨斯大学系统可能会超越它。
The story of the Harvard endowment’s lagging performance stems from a classic investment mistake: shifting strategies at inopportune times, chasing gains and, in short, buying high and selling low. Since 2005, Harvard has had seven endowment leaders, including three interim appointments and two who served fewer than two years.
哈佛捐赠基金表现不佳的故事源于一个经典的投资错误：在不合时宜的时候改变策略，追逐收益，简而言之，就是高买低卖。自 2005 年以来，哈佛有七位捐赠基金领导人，其中包括三位临时任命和两位任职不到两年的领导人。
The school ratcheted up risk before market downturns, then cut its exposure right before markets recovered. It bought once hot investments, only to watch them go sour. Recently, Harvard piled into private equity right before its performance lagged. “You just feel they’re playing catch-up ball,” says Mark Williams, a lecturer in finance at Boston University who’s followed Harvard’s endowment for years.
学校在市场下跌前加大风险，然后在市场恢复前削减风险敞口。它购买了曾经热门的投资，却目睹它们变得不景气。最近，哈佛在其表现下滑前大量投资于私募股权。“你会觉得他们在追赶，”波士顿大学的金融讲师马克·威廉姆斯说，他多年来一直关注哈佛的捐赠基金。
Harvard’s current and former endowment chiefs either declined or didn’t respond to requests for comment. In a written statement, endowment spokesman Patrick McKiernan says HMC has a “singular focus” on generating risk-adjusted returns that support the school’s educational and research mission. The school has relied increasingly on the endowment to fund its operations; last year it supplied $2.2 billion, or 37%, of the school’s operating revenue. “In recent years, HMC undertook dramatic changes to its investment model, organizational structure and portfolio,” McKiernan says. “Long-term investments naturally take time to be fully realized, but early indications show that the endowment is well-positioned to meet both the current and future needs of Harvard University.” He declined to comment on compensation, but Harvard has said it changed pay so that it’s tied more directly to the fund’s overall return.
哈佛大学当前和前任的捐赠基金负责人要么拒绝，要么没有回应评论请求。在一份书面声明中，捐赠基金发言人帕特里克·麦基尔南表示，哈佛管理公司（HMC）“专注于”产生支持学校教育和研究使命的风险调整回报。学校越来越依赖捐赠基金来资助其运营；去年，捐赠基金提供了 22 亿美元，占学校运营收入的 37%。麦基尔南表示：“近年来，HMC 对其投资模型、组织结构和投资组合进行了重大调整。长期投资自然需要时间才能完全实现，但早期迹象表明，捐赠基金在满足哈佛大学当前和未来需求方面处于良好位置。”他拒绝对薪酬发表评论，但哈佛表示已改变薪酬，使其与基金的整体回报更直接相关。
在《彭博市场》十月/十一月期刊中亮相。摄影师：Rubén E. Reyes，来自彭博市场
The contrast with rival Yale University couldn’t be starker. It had only one chief investment officer for 36 years: David Swensen, who died in 2021. His successor, Matt Mendelsohn, a trusted lieutenant who oversaw its venture capital portfolio, has worked there since he graduated from Yale in 2007. Over the past 20 years, Yale posted a 10.9% annualized return, in the top 10% of large funds. After Swensen died, Yale renamed a tower after him and has described him as perhaps the greatest financial contributor to the university, because of the $57.6 billion in investment gains he generated. Around the turn of this century, Harvard’s endowment was twice the size of Yale’s. Today, it’s only 25% larger. And because Harvard has so many more students, on a per capita basis its endowment trails that of Yale and, even more so, Princeton University.
与竞争对手耶鲁大学的对比显得格外鲜明。耶鲁大学在 36 年间只有一位首席投资官：大卫·斯文森，他于 2021 年去世。他的继任者马特·门德尔松是一位受信任的副手，负责管理其风险投资组合，自 2007 年耶鲁毕业以来一直在该校工作。在过去 20 年中，耶鲁的年化回报率为 10.9%，位于大型基金的前 10%。斯文森去世后，耶鲁将一座大楼以他的名字命名，并称他可能是对大学贡献最大的金融家，因为他创造了 576 亿美元的投资收益。在本世纪初，哈佛的捐赠基金是耶鲁的两倍。如今，它仅大约大 25%。由于哈佛有更多的学生，按人均计算，其捐赠基金落后于耶鲁，甚至更落后于普林斯顿大学。
Harvard’s investment travails coincide with other challenges to the university’s vast wealth. The federal government assesses Harvard tens of millions annually because of a Trump-era tax on the investment income of some of the richest private universities. Massachusetts is considering levying its own. Its hometowns of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Boston are looking for it to pay more money in lieu of the property taxes it avoids from being a nonprofit.
哈佛大学的投资困境与该校庞大财富面临的其他挑战相吻合。联邦政府每年对哈佛征收数千万美元，因为特朗普时代对一些最富有的私立大学的投资收入征税。马萨诸塞州正在考虑征收自己的税。其母城剑桥和波士顿希望哈佛支付更多的替代物业税，因为它作为非营利组织而避免了这些税款。
The university and its endowment have also been drawn into the bitter dispute over the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. Major donors have said they’d halt giving because of the university’s handling of pro-Palestinian protests and antisemitism on campus. Its last president, Claudine Gay, resigned under pressure. Now that students have returned for the fall semester, Harvard will likely face more pressure to divest holdings related to Israel, a position it’s resisted for more than 20 years.
大学及其捐赠基金也卷入了关于以色列-哈马斯在加沙的战争的激烈争论。主要捐赠者表示，由于大学对亲巴勒斯坦抗议活动和校园反犹太主义的处理，他们将停止捐款。其前任校长克劳丁·盖伊在压力下辞职。随着学生们返回秋季学期，哈佛大学可能面临更大的压力，要求剥离与以色列相关的资产，而这一立场已持续抵制超过 20 年。
At the former Harvard treasurer’s memorial service, Jacobson made a reference to those struggles but could well have been talking about Harvard’s investment strategy. “Harvard would be doing a much better job navigating its current difficulties, and might not even have them at all, if they still had Ron and others from his generation as its North Star,” he told the crowd, which broke into applause.
在前哈佛财务主管的追悼会上，雅各布森提到了那些斗争，但也可能是在谈论哈佛的投资策略。“如果哈佛仍然有罗恩和他那一代人作为其北极星，它在应对当前困难方面会做得更好，甚至可能根本就不会遇到这些困难，”他对人群说道，随即引发了掌声。
In 1974, Walter Cabot, a member of the famed Boston Brahmin family, became HMC’s leader. He represented stability, after steering the fund for about 17 years, and conservative management, focusing on the common blend of stocks and bonds.
在 1974 年，著名的波士顿布拉明家族成员沃尔特·卡博特成为 HMC 的领导者。他代表了稳定，在管理该基金约 17 年后，采取了保守的管理方式，专注于股票和债券的常见组合。
Starting in the 1960s, the Ford Foundation said colleges such as Harvard had been too conservative in their strategies and should use their scale and long-term focus to increase returns. The idea: Endowments, with a time horizon in the range of hundreds of years for Harvard and other universities, can afford the risk of more volatile, illiquid investments, including venture capital and private equity.
自 1960 年代起，福特基金会表示，哈佛等大学在其策略上过于保守，应利用其规模和长期关注来提高回报。这个想法是：捐赠基金，哈佛和其他大学的时间跨度可达数百年，可以承受更具波动性和流动性差的投资风险，包括风险投资和私募股权。
At Harvard, Jack Meyer, along with Swensen at Yale, pioneered a shift toward that approach. A Harvard Business School graduate who once worked for white-shoe investment bank Brown Brothers Harriman, Meyer, who took over in 1990 after Cabot, hired his own traders to manage money internally. His performance was stellar—an annualized 14.4% during his 15-year tenure, not far below Yale’s—and the endowment grew from $4.8 billion to $25.9 billion. But Wall Street-style pay packages (as much as $35 million in a year for a single trader) drew criticism from some alumni for being inappropriate at a charitable institution. In part because of the criticism, Meyer left in 2005 to form his own company. “I thought that was a case of rather foolish intervention on the part of the alumni,” says Eric Maskin, a Harvard economics and mathematics professor who won a Nobel Prize in economics in 2007. “That mistake still reverberates.”
在哈佛，杰克·迈耶与耶鲁的斯文森一起开创了这种方法的转变。作为哈佛商学院的毕业生，曾在白手套投资银行布朗兄弟哈里曼工作，迈耶在 1990 年接替卡博特后，聘请了自己的交易员进行内部资金管理。他的表现非常出色——在他 15 年的任期内年化收益率为 14.4%，与耶鲁相差不远——而捐赠基金从 48 亿美元增长到 259 亿美元。但华尔街风格的薪酬方案（单个交易员一年高达 3500 万美元）引起了一些校友的批评，认为在慈善机构中不合适。部分由于这些批评，迈耶在 2005 年离开，成立了自己的公司。“我认为这是校友们相当愚蠢的干预，”哈佛经济学和数学教授埃里克·马斯金说，他在 2007 年获得诺贝尔经济学奖。“那个错误仍在回响。”
哈佛大学位于马萨诸塞州剑桥的校园。摄影师：Scott Eisen/Getty Images North America
Meyer’s successor, Mohamed El-Erian, left a managing director’s job at bond firm Pacific Investment Management Co. to run the endowment but stayed less than two years, until 2007. (He’s also a Bloomberg Opinion columnist.) He returned to Pimco as co-CEO before the global financial crisis devastated Harvard’s fund with the largest loss in the Ivy League under Jane Mendillo, his successor. Mendillo, a former Bain & Co. consultant who’d overseen Wellesley College’s endowment and had previously worked at Harvard’s fund, focused on reducing the endowment’s risk—unfortunately before the stock market again took off. She also increased Harvard’s investments in natural resources, including forest and farmland in Brazil, unusual holdings that initially boosted the endowment’s performance.
迈耶的继任者穆罕默德·埃尔-埃里安离开了债券公司太平洋投资管理公司的董事总经理职位，来管理哈佛的捐赠基金，但不到两年就离开了，直到 2007 年。（他还是彭博社的专栏作家。）在全球金融危机之前，他以联合首席执行官的身份回到 Pimco，哈佛的基金在简·门迪洛的领导下遭受了常春藤联盟中最大的损失。门迪洛是一位前贝恩公司的顾问，曾负责韦尔斯利学院的捐赠基金，并曾在哈佛的基金工作，专注于降低捐赠基金的风险——不幸的是，这发生在股市再次起飞之前。她还增加了哈佛在自然资源方面的投资，包括巴西的森林和农田，这些不寻常的资产最初提升了捐赠基金的表现。
An April 2015 internal report by McKinsey, gave an unflattering assessment of the prior five years under Mendillo. The firm said Harvard picked easy-to-beat internal benchmarks that led to outsize pay packages even as the endowment’s overall performance lagged peers. Employees and others complained to McKinsey of an inattentive board and complacent culture—in their words, “stable, rather than smart, capital” or, even more pointedly, “lazy, fat and stupid.” At the time, Harvard said it had since redesigned pay to align managers’ interests with those of the university, and current and former employees would forfeit pay held back in prior years.
2015 年 4 月，麦肯锡的一份内部报告对门迪洛执掌的过去五年进行了不太 flattering 的评估。该公司表示，哈佛选择了容易超越的内部基准，导致薪酬包过高，即使捐赠基金的整体表现落后于同行。员工和其他人向麦肯锡抱怨董事会不够关注和自满的文化——用他们的话说，就是“稳定，而不是聪明的资本”，甚至更尖锐地说是“懒惰、肥胖和愚蠢”。当时，哈佛表示已重新设计薪酬，以使管理者的利益与大学的利益保持一致，现任和前任员工将放弃之前年度扣留的薪酬。
After Mendillo retired in 2014, Stephen Blyth, a former Deutsche Bank AG bond trader who worked at HMC, took over, but he left after only 18 months while on medical leave.
在门迪洛于 2014 年退休后，前德意志银行债券交易员斯蒂芬·布莱斯接任，但他在休病假期间仅工作了 18 个月便离开了。
Harvard’s current fund manager is N.P. “Narv” Narvekar, a former managing director for equity derivatives at what is now JPMorgan Chase & Co. In December 2016 he came from Columbia University’s endowment, where he’d generated returns comparable to Yale’s, while minimizing losses during the 2008 financial crisis. At the direction of the board, Narvekar overhauled the Harvard fund, cutting half the endowment’s 230-member staff, revamping pay and later shifting toward external managers, the approach that had served Yale so well. One advantage of outside managers: Their pay doesn’t have to be reported on public university tax filings. Harvard insiders have long complained that other schools, in effect, pay Wall Street firms similarly huge sums as compensation in undisclosed management fees.
哈佛大学目前的基金经理是 N.P. “Narv” Narvekar，他曾是现今摩根大通的股权衍生品董事总经理。2016 年 12 月，他从哥伦比亚大学的捐赠基金来到哈佛，在那里他创造的回报与耶鲁大学相当，同时在 2008 年金融危机期间将损失降到最低。在董事会的指示下，Narvekar 对哈佛基金进行了彻底改革，裁减了捐赠基金 230 名员工中的一半，重新调整了薪酬，并随后转向外部管理者，这一做法在耶鲁大学取得了良好的效果。外部管理者的一个优势是：他们的薪酬不必在公立大学的税务申报中披露。哈佛内部人士长期抱怨，其他学校实际上以未披露的管理费向华尔街公司支付了同样巨额的补偿。
Narvekar brought in Columbia pros to aid in a turnaround. “I often hear the opinion that HMC’s endowment is too large to generate attractive returns, but as peer endowments with similar assets under management have shown, the size of the endowment is no excuse for muted returns,” Narvekar wrote in HMC’s 2018 annual report. He said he sought to pay special attention to risk when selecting its mix of investments.
纳尔维卡尔引入了哥伦比亚的专业人士来协助进行转型。“我经常听到这样的观点，认为 HMC 的捐赠基金规模过大，无法产生有吸引力的回报，但正如同行捐赠基金在管理资产相似的情况下所显示的，捐赠基金的规模并不是回报低迷的借口，”纳尔维卡尔在 HMC 的 2018 年年报中写道。他表示，在选择投资组合时，他特别关注风险。
N.P. “Narv” Narvekar 插图：Christian Blaza 为彭博市场提供
Narvekar reversed course on Mendillo’s favored natural resource investments, which had performed poorly, writing off $1 billion worth of holdings. He also increased Harvard’s allocation to hedge funds, which reached a third of its holdings in June 2019 and remain near that level, according to Harvard’s annual reports. In earlier years, those funds had offered strong performance and were seen as a way to diversify away from traditional stock and bond investments. Harvard’s picks included Daniel Sundheim’s D1 Capital Partners; Jeffrey Talpins’ Element Capital Management; and TPRV Capital, founded by former Harvard endowment managers with about $400 million from the university.
纳维卡尔改变了对门迪洛偏爱的自然资源投资的看法，这些投资表现不佳，注销了价值 10 亿美元的持股。他还增加了哈佛对对冲基金的配置，至 2019 年 6 月达到了其持股的三分之一，并保持在该水平附近，依据哈佛的年度报告。在早些年，这些基金表现强劲，被视为一种从传统股票和债券投资中分散风险的方式。哈佛的选择包括丹尼尔·桑德海姆的 D1 资本合伙公司；杰弗里·塔尔平的元素资本管理；以及由前哈佛捐赠基金经理创立的 TPRV 资本，管理着约 4 亿美元的大学资金。
In most years since 2018, money has been flowing out of hedge funds because of concern about lackluster performance and high fees. Element earlier this year said it would return $4 billion to clients after three years of declines. TPRV shut down its hedge fund in 2021 after investors pulled their cash.
自 2018 年以来的大多数年份，由于对表现平平和高费用的担忧，资金一直流出对冲基金。今年早些时候，Element 表示将在经历三年的下滑后向客户返还 40 亿美元。TPRV 在 2021 年关闭了其对冲基金，因为投资者撤回了他们的资金。
After four years of backing D1, Harvard asked the firm for its money back in 2022, a year when it generated double-digit losses after previously posting similar-size gains, says a person familiar with Harvard’s investment. Since Harvard sold, D1’s stock bets have soared, but markdowns of private equity holdings hurt performance, this person says. In the year ended June 2021, the last time Harvard disclosed its hedge funds’ status, they returned 16%, compared with 50% for public equity. The hedge funds either declined to comment or didn’t respond to questions.
在支持 D1 四年后，哈佛在 2022 年要求该公司退还投资，这一年该公司产生了两位数的亏损，而之前则录得类似规模的收益，一位熟悉哈佛投资的人士表示。自哈佛出售后，D1 的股票投资飙升，但私募股权持有的减值影响了业绩，这位人士表示。在截至 2021 年 6 月的一年中，哈佛最后一次披露其对冲基金的状态时，回报率为 16%，而公共股本的回报率为 50%。对冲基金要么拒绝评论，要么未对问题作出回应。
In his reports, Narvekar said Harvard didn’t have enough private equity and, over the years, had missed opportune times to buy. Harvard hadn’t invested with the kind of managers years ago that gave Princeton and Yale stellar returns. In 2021, private equity—a category that for Harvard includes venture capital—returned as much as 77% in a single year for the university. From 2017 to 2023, Narvekar increased Harvard’s holdings of private equity from 16% to 39%. It’s hard to determine how Harvard fared because private equity funds lag in reporting the values of their holdings. But public markets have recently performed better than private equity.
在他的报告中，Narvekar 表示哈佛大学的私募股权投资不足，多年来错过了购买的良机。哈佛大学多年前没有与那些为普林斯顿和耶鲁大学带来卓越回报的管理者进行投资。2021 年，私募股权——对哈佛大学而言包括风险投资——在一年内为该校带来了高达 77%的回报。从 2017 年到 2023 年，Narvekar 将哈佛的私募股权持有比例从 16%提高到 39%。由于私募股权基金在报告其持有资产的价值方面滞后，因此很难确定哈佛的表现。但最近，公共市场的表现优于私募股权。
Under instructions from the university, the endowment stopped making new fossil fuel-related investments, missing out on strong returns in the energy sector. Harvard said that decision contributed marginally to an investment loss in 2022. From July 2017 through June 2023, which reflects available results under Narvekar, Harvard’s fund has returned 9.2% annually, second lowest in the Ivy League, besting only Columbia’s. In his most recent annual letter, Narvekar says that Harvard’s portfolio takes less risk than many of its peers and has had success with hedge funds whose returns aren’t correlated with public markets. (In October, Harvard is expected to report the results for the year ended June 2024.)
根据大学的指示，捐赠基金停止了新的化石燃料相关投资，错过了能源行业的强劲回报。哈佛表示，这一决定在 2022 年对投资损失的贡献微乎其微。从 2017 年 7 月到 2023 年 6 月，在 Narvekar 的管理下，哈佛的基金年回报率为 9.2%，在常春藤联盟中排名第二低，仅高于哥伦比亚大学。在他最近的年度信中，Narvekar 表示，哈佛的投资组合承担的风险低于许多同行，并且在与公共市场无关的对冲基金方面取得了成功。（预计哈佛将在 10 月公布截至 2024 年 6 月的年度业绩。）
Pay has moderated at Harvard from the times of Jack Meyer. But Narvekar’s average package over the past five years—$6.6 million—still tops Swensen’s $5 million in his final years at Yale, as well as his successor’s compensation of $1.7 million in his first year in the role. The record suggests Harvard is “getting worse returns and paying too much,” says Stan Eleff, a lawyer in Tampa and member of the Harvard Class of 1969, which has long included a group critical of the school’s investment manager compensation. Since taking over, Narvekar made another change that will make it more difficult to assess how the fund is doing: In 2022, Harvard stopped disclosing the performance of the various sectors of its holdings, including private equity and hedge funds. —With Jack Witzig, Caleb Melby and Hema Parmar
哈佛的薪酬在杰克·迈耶时代之后有所缓和。但纳尔维卡在过去五年的平均薪酬为 660 万美元，仍然高于斯文森在耶鲁最后几年获得的 500 万美元，以及其继任者在担任该职务第一年获得的 170 万美元。记录显示，哈佛“获得的回报越来越差，支付的费用却太高，”坦帕的律师、1969 年哈佛校友斯坦·埃莱夫说，他长期以来一直批评学校投资经理的薪酬。自接任以来，纳尔维卡又做出了一项改变，这将使评估基金表现变得更加困难：2022 年，哈佛停止披露其持有的各个领域的表现，包括私募股权和对冲基金。——与杰克·维齐格、卡勒布·梅尔比和赫玛·帕尔马尔合作
Lorin, based in New York, covers education finance for Bloomberg.
洛林，位于纽约，为彭博社报道教育金融。
