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THINKING THROUGH
AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
思考当代哲学导论

Kwame Anthony Appiah 夸梅-安东尼-阿皮亚

Thinking It Through  深思熟虑

AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
当代哲学导论

Kwame Anthony Appiah 夸梅-安东尼-阿皮亚

OXFORD 奥克斯

UNIVERSITY PRESS 大学出版社
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CONTENTS  目 录

Preface ix 序言 ixIntroduction: A Few Preliminaries xi
导言:序言 xi

CHAPTER 1: MIND 1
第 1 章:思维 1
1.1 Introduction. 1. 1.2 Descartes: The beginnings of modern philosophy of mind. 5. 1.3 The private-language argument. 12. 1.4 Computers as models of the mind. 19. 1.5 Why should there be a functionalist theory? 22.
1.1 引言 1.1.2 笛卡尔:现代心灵哲学的开端 5.5.1.3 私语论证12.1.4 作为心智模型的计算机19.1.5 为什么要有功能主义理论?22.
1.6 Functionalism: A first problem. 23. 1.7 A simple-minded functionalist theory of pain. 25. 1.8 Ramsey's solution to the first problem. 26. 1.9 Functionalism: A second problem. 28. 1.10 M again. 29. 1.11 Consciousness. 31. 1.12 The puzzle of the physical. 36. 1.13 Conclusion. 37.
1.6 功能主义:第一个问题。23.1.7 一种头脑简单的疼痛功能主义理论25.1.8 拉姆齐对第一个问题的解决方案。26.1.9 功能主义:第二个问题28.1.10 M again.29.1.11 意识31.1.12 物质之谜36.1.13 结论37.

CHAPTER 2: KNOWLEDGE 39
第 2 章 知识知识 39

2.1 Introduction. 39. 2.2 Plato: Knowledge as justified true belief. 41.
2.1 导言39.2.2 柏拉图:知识是合理的真实信念41.
2.3 Descartes' way: Justification requires certainty. 44. 2.4 Locke's way: Justification can be less than certain. 53. 2.5 The foundations of knowledge. 57. 2.6 Ways around skepticism I: Verificationism. 61. 2.7 Ways around skepticism II: Causal theories of knowledge. 66. 2.8 Causal theories contrasted with traditional accounts of justification. 70. 2.9 Epistemology naturalized. 74. 2.10 Conclusion. 77.
2.3 笛卡尔的方法:正义需要确定性44.2.4 洛克的方式:正义可以不那么确定。53.2.5 知识的基础57.2.6 绕过怀疑论的方法 I.验证论61.2.7 摆脱怀疑论的途径之二:知识的因果理论。66.2.8 因果理论与传统理由论的对比。70.2.9 认识论的自然化。74.2.10 Conclusion.77.
3.1 Introduction. 79. 3.2 The linguistic turn. 80. 3.3 The beetle in the box. 84. 3.4 Frege's "sense" and "reference." 87. 3.5 Predicates and open
3.1 导言79.3.2 语言学转向80.3.3 盒子里的甲虫84.3.4 弗雷格的 "意义 "与 "指称"87.3.5 谓词与开放

sentences. 92. 3.6 Problems of intensionality. 96. 3.7 Truth conditions and possible worlds. 99. 3.8 Analytic-synthetic and necessary-contingent. 102.
句子。92.3.6 内在性问题。96.3.7 真理条件与可能世界.3.8 分析-综合与必要-条件。102.
3.9 Natural language and logical form. 106. 3.10 Using logic: Truth preservation, probability, and the lottery paradox. 113. 3.11 Logical truth and logical properties. 115. 3.12 Conventions of language. 117.
3.9 自然语言和逻辑形式106.3.10 使用逻辑:保真、概率和彩票悖论。113.3.11 逻辑真理与逻辑性质。115.3.12 语言的约定117.
3.13 The paradox of analysis. 120. 3.14 Conclusion. 124.
3.13 分析的悖论120.3.14 结论124.

CHAPTER 4: SCIENCE 127
第 4 章:科学 127

4.1 Introduction. 127. 4.2 Description and prescription. 129. 4.3 An example: Gregor Mendel's genetic theory. 130. 4.4 Theory and observation. 136. 4.5 The received view of theories. 141. 4.6 The deductive-nomological model of explanation. 145. 4.7 Theory reduction and instrumentalism. 148. 4.8 Theory-ladenness. 152. 4.9 Justifying theories I: The problem of induction. 157. 4.10 Goodman's new riddle of induction. 161. 4.11 Justifying theories II: Popper and falsification. 163. 4.12 Justifying theories III: Inference to the best explanation. 167. 4.13 Laws and causation. 171. 4.14 Conclusion. 174.
4.1 导言127.4.2 说明和处方129.4.3 一个例子:格雷戈尔-孟德尔的遗传理论130.4.4 理论与观察136.4.5 接受的理论观141.4.6 阐释的演绎-名词模型145.4.7 理论还原与工具主义148.4.8 理论滞后性152.4.9 证明理论的合理性 I:归纳问题157.4.10 古德曼的归纳法新谜。161.4.11 证明理论的合理性之二:波普尔与证伪。163.4.12 证明理论的合理性之三:最佳解释的推论。167.4.13 规律与因果关系171.4.14 结论174.

CHAPTER 5: MORALITY 177
第 5 章:道德 177

5.1 Introduction. 177. 5.2 Facts and values. 180. 5.3 Realism and emotivism. 183. 5.4 Intuitionism. 187. 5.5 Emotivism again. 191. 5.6 Kant's universalizability principle. 197. 5.7 Dealing with relativism. 201. 5.8 Prescriptivism and supervenience. 204. 5.9 Problems of utilitarianism I: Defining "utility." 205. 5.10 Problems of utilitarianism II: Consequentialism versus absolutism. 208.
5.1 导言177.5.2 事实与价值180.5.3 现实主义与情感主义183.5.4 直觉主义187.5.5 再次情感主义191.5.6 Kant's universalizability principle.197.5.7 处理相对主义.201.5.8 规定论与超验性.204.5.9 功利主义的问题 I.功利主义的问题 I:"功利 "的定义205.5.10 功利主义的问题二:后果主义与绝对主义。208.
5.11 Rights. 213. 5.12 Self and others. 215. 5.13 Conclusion. 217.
5.11 Rights.213.5.12 自我与他人215.5.13 结论217.

CHAPTER 6: POLITICS 221
第 6 章:政治 221

6.1 Introduction. 221. 6.2 Hobbes: Escaping the state of nature. 224.
6.1 导言221.6.2 Hobbes:摆脱自然状态224.
6.3 Problems for Hobbes. 229. 6.4 Game theory I: Two-person zero-sum games. 232. 6.5 Game theory II: The prisoners' dilemma. 242. 6.6 The limits of prudence. 245. 6.7 Rawls's theory of justice. 248. 6.8 The difference principle and inequality surpluses. 250. 6.9 Criticizing Rawls I: The structure of his argument. 252. 6.10 Criticizing Rawls II: Why maximin? 254.
6.3 霍布斯的问题。229.6.4 博弈论 I:两人零和博弈.232.6.5 博弈论 II:囚徒困境。242.6.6 谨慎的限度245.6.7 罗尔斯的正义理论248.6.8 差异原则与不平等盈余 250.250.6.9 對羅爾斯的批判 I. 羅爾斯的論證結構:罗尔斯论证的结构252.6.10 对罗尔斯二的批评:为什么是最大限度原则?254.
6.11 Criticizing Rawls III: The status of the two principles. 256.
6.11 对罗尔斯的批评 III:两个原则的地位。256.
6.12 Reflective equilibrium. 258. 6.13 Are the two principles right? 260.
6.12 反射平衡258.6.13 这两个原则正确吗?260.
6.14 Nozick: Beginning with rights. 261. 6.15 The entitlement theory. 265.
6.14 诺齐克从权利开始261.6.15 权利理论265.
6.16 Ethics and politics. 267. 6.17 Conclusion. 269.
6.16 道德与政治267.6.17 结论269.
CHAPTER 7: LAW 271
第 7 章:法律 271
7.1 Introduction. 271. 7.2 Defining "law" I: Positivism and natural law. 275.
7.1 导言271.7.2 "法律 "的定义 I. 实证主义与自然法 271:实证主义与自然法275.
7.3 Defining "law" II: Legal systems and the variety of laws. 278.
7.3 "法律 "的定义之二:法律体系和法律的多样性。278.
7.4 Hart: The elements of a legal system. 280. 7.5 Punishment: The problem. 285.
7.4 哈特:法律制度的要素。280.7.5 惩罚:问题285.
7.6 Justifying punishment: Deterrence. 286. 7.7 Retributivism: Kant's objections. 288. 7.8 Combining deterrence and retribution. 289.
7.6 惩罚的正当性:威慑286.7.7 报应主义:康德的反对意见288.7.8 威慑与惩罚的结合。289.
7.9 Deterrence theory again. 291. 7.10 Why do definitions matter? 293.
7.9 再次威慑理论。291.7.10 为什么定义很重要?293.
7.11 Conclusion. 296. 7.11 结论296.

CHAPTER 8: METAPHYSICS 299
第 8 章:形而上学 299

8.1 Introduction. 299. 8.2 An example: The existence of numbers. 300. 8.3 "God" as a proper name. 305. 8.4 The necessary being. 310. 8.5 Hume: No a priori proofs of matters of fact. 316. 8.6 Kant: "Existence" is not a predicate. 317. 8.7 A posteriori arguments. 322. 8.8 The argument from design 324. 8.9 The harmony of nature. 325. 8.10 The necessity of a creative intelligence. 329 .
8.1 导言299.8.2 一个例子:数字的存在.300.8.3 作为专有名词的 "上帝"305.8.4 必然的存在310.8.5 休谟事实问题没有先验证明。316.8.6 康德"存在 "不是谓词。317.8.7 后验论证。322.8.8 设计论证 324.8.9 自然的和谐325.8.10 创造性智慧的必然性329 .
8.11 Hume's argument from design: The argument from experience. 331.
8.11 休谟的设计论证:经验论证331.
8.12 The problem of evil and inference to the best explanation. 334.
8.12 邪恶与最佳解释的推论问题。334.
8.13 Conclusion. 337. 8.13 结论337.

CHAPTER 9: PHILOSOPHY 339
第 9 章:哲学 339

9.1 Introduction. 339. 9.2 Traditional thought. 341. 9.3 Arguing with the Azande. 344. 9.4 The significance of literacy. 349. 9.5 Cognitive relativism. 353. 9.6 The argument against strong relativism. 355. 9.7 The argument for weak relativism. 357. 9.8 Philosophy and religion. 360. 9.9 Philosophy and science. 364. 9.10 An example: Free will and determinism. 365.
9.1 导言339.9.2 传统思想341.9.3 与阿赞德人争论344.9.4 扫盲的意义349.9.5 认知相对主义353.9.6 反对强相对主义的论据 355.355.9.7 弱相对主义的论据357.9.8 哲学与宗教360.9.9 哲学与科学364.9.10 一个例子:自由意志与决定论365.
9.11 Compatibilism and moral responsibility. 373. 9.12 The special character of philosophy. 377. 9.13 Conclusion. 379.
9.11 兼容性与道德责任.373.9.12 哲学的特殊性377.9.13 結論379.

PREFACE 前言

You learn a lot about your subject when you set out to introduce the range of it to people who are approaching it for the first time. That is a good part of the reason I set out to write an introduction to contemporary philosophy. After a while, as you do the detailed work of professional research, you risk losing sight of the forest for the trees. Stepping back for a bit, to think again about the shape of the subject and where your own work fits into it, allows you not just to rediscover connections but also to make new ones. That is why undergraduate teaching is so invigorating.
当你着手向第一次接触该学科的人介绍该学科的范围时,你会对自己的学科有很多了解。这也是我着手撰写当代哲学导论的主要原因。经过一段时间的专业研究工作后,你可能会迷失方向。退后一步,重新思考学科的形态以及自己的工作在其中的位置,不仅能重新发现联系,还能建立新的联系。这就是为什么本科教学如此令人振奋。
What I have tried to write is a reliable and systematic introduction to the central questions of current philosophical interest in the English-speaking world. (I have also pursued some less mainstream questions because I think they should be more mainstream!) A philosophy textbook can't be a record of current answers to the central questions, because philosophy is as much about deepening our understanding of a question as it is about finding an answer. So my task has been to prepare the reader to enter into contemporary debates by delineating the conceptual territory within which the many answers currently in play are located. I hope I have succeeded in making it possible for a newcomer to navigate that territory and that I have also made the navigation seem engaging, for that will mean that some of my readers will want to read more deeply in the subject. An introduction can be the beginning of a lifelong romance.
我试图写的是一本可靠而系统的入门书,介绍当前英语世界感兴趣的哲学核心问题(我也探讨了一些不那么主流的问题,因为我认为它们应该更主流!)。(我也探讨了一些不那么主流的问题,因为我认为它们应该更主流!)。哲学教科书不可能记录当前对中心问题的答案,因为哲学既要加深我们对问题的理解,也要找到答案。因此,我的任务是为读者进入当代争论做好准备,为读者勾勒出当前众多答案所处的概念领域。我希望我已经成功地让一个新读者能够浏览这一领域,而且我也让浏览看起来引人入胜,因为这意味着我的一些读者会想要更深入地阅读这一主题。一篇导读可能是一段终生浪漫的开始。
I find I have now taught philosophy on three continents, and it is astonishing how the same questions arise in such culturally disparate circumstances. I am grateful to all of my students, in Ghana, in England, and in the United States: Almost every one of them has taught me a new argument or-what is much the same-shown me an old one in a new light. This book is dedicated to them.
我发现自己现在已经在三大洲教授哲学,令人惊讶的是,在如此不同的文化环境中,竟然会出现同样的问题。我非常感谢我在加纳、英国和美国的所有学生:他们中的几乎每一个人都教会了我一个新的论点,或者--同样的--从一个新的角度向我展示了一个旧的论点。这本书就是献给他们的。

INTRODUCTION 引言

A Few Preliminaries 一些前言

People come to philosophy by many different routes. The physicist Schrödinger, who developed some of the key concepts of modern quantum theory, was drawn into philosophy by the profoundly puzzling nature of the world he and others discovered when they started to examine things on the scale of the atom. One of my friends came to philosophy when, as a teenager, he was first developing adult relationships of friendship and love. He was perplexed about how easy it was to think you understood somebody and then discover that you had not understood her at all. This led him to wonder whether we ever really know what is going on in other people's minds. And many people come to philosophy when they are trying, as we say, to "find themselves": to make sense of their lives and to decide who they are.
人们学习哲学的途径多种多样。物理学家薛定谔提出了现代量子理论的一些关键概念,他和其他人在开始研究原子尺度上的事物时,发现了这个世界令人深感困惑的本质,从而被吸引到哲学中来。我的一位朋友是在青少年时期开始接触哲学的,那时他刚刚建立起成人的友谊和爱情关系。他感到困惑的是,以为自己理解了某人,却发现自己根本没有理解她,这是多么容易的事情。这让他开始思考,我们是否真的了解别人的想法。正如我们所说的,许多人在试图 "找到自我 "的时候都会接触哲学:了解自己的生活,决定自己是谁。
If, for these or any other reasons, you come to have an interest in philosophy, it is natural to turn to the works of great philosophers. But for most people the content of these works is rather a shock. Instead of offering direct answers to these questions-What is physical reality really like? Can we ever be sure we know what other people are thinking? Who am I? - a philosopher is likely to start with questions that seem to him or her more basic than these . . . but which may seem to others far less interesting. Instead of beginning by asking what we can know about other people's thoughts, a philosopher is likely to start by asking what it is to know anything at all-thus beginning with epistemology, which is the philosophical examination of the nature of knowledge. Despite the natural disappointment it produces, I think that starting with these fundamental questions makes sense. Let me suggest an image that might help you to see why.
如果出于这些原因或其他原因,你对哲学产生了兴趣,自然会去阅读伟大哲学家的作品。但对大多数人来说,这些著作的内容却让人大跌眼镜。我们并没有直接回答这些问题--物理现实到底是什么样的?我们能确定自己知道别人在想什么吗?我是谁?- 哲学家很可能会从对他或她来说比这些问题更基本......但对其他人来说可能远没那么有趣的问题开始。与其一开始就问我们能知道别人的想法是什么,哲学家很可能一开始就问知道任何东西是什么--这就是从认识论开始,也就是对知识本质的哲学审视。尽管这自然会令人失望,但我认为从这些基本问题入手是有意义的。让我举个形象的例子,也许能帮助你理解其中的原因。
Imagine you are lost in a large old city in Africa or Asia or Europe. Every way you turn there is interest and excitement. But
想象一下,你迷失在非洲、亚洲或欧洲的一座古老大城市中。每转一圈,你都会感到兴趣盎然、兴奋不已。但是

you'd like to know where you are. The trouble is that just when you think you have found your way out of one maze of alleys, you are plunged into another. If, in your wanderings, you climb to the top of a tall tower, you can look down over the streets you have been lost in, and suddenly everything begins to make sense. You see where you should have turned one way but went another; you realize that the little shop you walked past, with the cat in the window, was only yards away from the garden in the next street, which you found hours later. And when you get back down into the maze you find your way easily. Now you know your way about.
你想知道自己身在何处。问题是,当你以为自己已经找到了走出迷宫的道路时,却又陷入了另一个迷宫。如果你在游荡中爬上了一座高塔的顶端,你就可以俯瞰你曾经迷失过的街道,突然间一切都变得有意义了。你会发现自己本该拐向一条路,却走了另一条路;你会意识到,你走过的那家橱窗里有只猫的小店,离下一条街的花园只有几码之遥,而你几小时后就找到了花园。当你回到迷宫中时,你很容易就能找到自己的路。现在,你对自己的路了如指掌。
In this book we shall find ourselves discussing the nature of morality, when we set out to decide whether it is always wrong to kill an innocent person; we shall end up talking about what it is for a theory to be scientific when we started out wondering about the claims of astrologers. And when this happens, I think it will help to bear in mind this image of being lost in an old city. When we move to these abstract questions, apparently remote from the practical concerns we started with, what we are doing is like climbing up that tower. From up there we can see our way around the problems. So that when we get back down into the city, back to the concrete problems that started us out, we should find it easier to get around.
在这本书中,当我们开始讨论杀死无辜的人是否总是错误时,我们会发现自己在讨论道德的本质;当我们开始怀疑占星家的说法时,我们最终会讨论什么是科学的理论。当这种情况发生时,我认为牢记 "迷失在古城中 "这一形象会有所帮助。当我们转向这些抽象的问题时,我们所做的事情就像是爬上了那座塔。在上面,我们可以看到问题的来龙去脉。这样,当我们回到城市,回到一开始的具体问题时,我们就会发现绕过去会更容易。
People are normally introduced to philosophy by one of two routes. The first is through reading the more accessible of the great historical texts of philosophy-Plato's dialogues, for example, or Descartes' Meditations. The second is by examining some central philosophical question: "What is knowledge?" say, or "Is morality objective?" In this book I shall be following this second route, but I shall discuss the views of some of the great philosophers on the central questions on the way. Still, it is important to keep in mind that I will always be trying to move toward a philosophical understanding of the problem I am looking at, rather than trying to give a historically accurate account of a past philosopher.
人们通常通过两种途径之一接触哲学。第一种是通过阅读比较通俗易懂的哲学史巨著--比如柏拉图的对话录或笛卡尔的沉思录。第二种是通过研究某个核心哲学问题:比如 "知识是什么?"或者 "道德是客观的吗?"在本书中,我将遵循第二条路线,但我会在途中讨论一些伟大哲学家对核心问题的看法。不过,重要的是要记住,我将始终努力从哲学角度理解我正在研究的问题,而不是试图对过去的哲学家进行历史性的准确描述。
It is fashionable, at the moment, to stress the way that the central problems of philosophy change over time. People say that no one nowadays can really be concerned with all of the problems that worried Plato. There is some truth in this. There are things in Plato that it is hard to understand or get excited by: much of the theory in the
强调哲学的核心问题会随着时间的推移而发生变化,是当下的一种时尚。人们说,如今没有人能够真正关心柏拉图担心的所有问题。这种说法有一定道理。柏拉图的有些东西很难理解,也很难让人感到兴奋:《柏拉图哲学》中的许多理论都是如此。
Symposium about the nature of love, for example, is likely to seem to a modern reader hopelessly wrong. Fortunately, however, a good deal more in Plato is extremely interesting and relevant: his Theaetetus, which is a dramatic dialogue about the nature of knowledge, remains one of the great classics of philosophy, and I shall discuss it in Chapter 2.
例如,在现代读者看来,《神曲》中关于爱的本质的论述很可能是无可救药的错误。不过,幸运的是,柏拉图中还有很多内容都非常有趣且具有现实意义:他的《泰阿泰德篇》(Theaetetus)是关于知识本质的戏剧性对话,至今仍是伟大的哲学经典之一,我将在第二章中讨论它。
So the reason we philosophers continue to read Plato and many other philosophers between his time and ours is not simple curiosity about the history of our subject. Rather, we find in the great works of the past clues to a deeper understanding of the philosophical questions that trouble us now. That's why mentioning Plato and Descartes isn't some kind of concession to the proponents of the historical route into philosophy. It isn't even just a concession to old habits in the teaching of philosophy. It is simply a reflection of the facts that make the historical route work.
因此,我们哲学家之所以继续阅读柏拉图以及从他的时代到我们的时代之间的许多其他哲学家的作品,并不是因为对我们学科的历史感到好奇。相反,我们从过去的伟大作品中找到了一些线索,从而更深入地理解困扰我们的哲学问题。这就是为什么提到柏拉图和笛卡尔并不是对历史哲学路线支持者的某种让步。这甚至不仅仅是对哲学教学中的旧习惯的让步。它只是反映了使历史路线行之有效的事实。
My aim in this book is twofold, then: First, I would like anyone who reads it carefully to be able to go on to read contemporary philosophical discussions. Second, I would like such a reader to be able when he or she comes to read Plato, say, or Descartes, to see why their work remains an enduring contribution to our understanding of the central problems of philosophy. I shall always have in mind a beginning philosophy student who knows none of the technical language of philosophy but is, nevertheless, willing to think through difficult questions. There are bibliographical notes and some advice on further reading at the end of the book; and there is also an index, which gives in bold type the page number of the page where a term is introduced or defined. Finally, because I often need to refer you back or forward to a discussion of a related issue, I have numbered the sections of each chapter. So sometimes I'll refer to section 5 of chapter 3, for example, as 3.5. Together, these various tools - the notes, the index, the further reading, and the numbered sections-are meant to help you find your way around.
我写这本书有两个目的:首先,我希望认真阅读本书的读者能够继续阅读当代哲学讨论。其次,我希望这样的读者在阅读柏拉图或笛卡尔的著作时,能够明白为什么他们的著作对我们理解哲学的核心问题仍有持久的贡献。我始终认为,初学哲学的学生不懂哲学的专业语言,但他们愿意思考棘手的问题。书末有书目注释和一些进一步阅读的建议;还有一个索引,用粗体字标出了介绍或定义某个术语的页码。最后,由于我经常需要让你回溯或向前查阅相关问题的讨论,因此我对每一章的章节进行了编号。因此,有时我会把第 3 章第 5 节称为 3.5。这些不同的工具--注释、索引、进一步阅读和章节编号--都是为了帮助你找到方向。
You will learn a lot of new words in the course of reading this book. Philosophy, like all scholarly disciplines, has its own technical terms. We use them because technical language allows you to keep track of important distinctions and to speak and write in ways that are
在阅读本书的过程中,你会学到很多新词。与所有学术学科一样,哲学也有自己的专业术语。我们使用这些专业术语,是因为专业术语可以让你掌握重要的区别,并在说话和写作时

somewhat more precise than our everyday talk. The important thing is to grasp the ideas these terms express and the distinctions they make and to see how these distinctions and ideas can be used in arguments that deepen our understanding. And one general rule to keep in mind was set out by the Greek philosopher Aristotle about twenty-five hundred years ago: he insisted that we should adopt the degree of precision appropriate to the subject matter. We could say, more generally, that distinctions are worth making only if they do some work in an argument or help us to see something we wouldn't otherwise see. The technical terms are tools for a purpose, not the point of the exercise. As far as possible, contemporary philosophers actually prefer to use what the English philosopher Bernard Williams once called "moderately plain speech." So while philosophy has a technical vocabulary, doing philosophy means more than knowing and throwing around those special terms.
这些术语比我们的日常用语更为精确。重要的是要掌握这些术语所表达的思想和它们所做的区分,并了解如何在论证中使用这些区分和思想来加深我们的理解。希腊哲学家亚里士多德在大约 2500 年前提出了一条需要牢记的一般规则:他坚持认为,我们应该采用与主题相适应的精确度。我们可以更笼统地说,只有当区别在论证中起到一定作用或帮助我们看到一些我们无法看到的东西时,才值得进行区分。专业术语是达到目的的工具,而不是工作的重点。当代哲学家实际上更喜欢尽可能使用英国哲学家伯纳德-威廉姆斯(Bernard Williams)曾称之为 "适度平实的语言"。因此,虽然哲学有专业词汇,但做哲学不仅仅意味着知道和使用这些专门术语。
The book is organized around eight central areas of the subject: mind, knowledge, language, science, morality, politics, law, and metaphysics. (Only the last of these, as you see, has a technical name. When we get to the chapter on metaphysics, I'll explain why it has to be there.) In the chapter on language I say something about logic; in the chapter on metaphysics I discuss the existence of God.
全书围绕该学科的八个核心领域展开:心智、知识、语言、科学、道德、政治、法律和形而上学。(如你所见,只有最后一个领域有一个专业名称。当我们讲到形而上学这一章时,我会解释为什么要把它放在这里)。在关于语言的那一章里,我将谈谈逻辑学;在关于形而上学的那一章里,我将讨论上帝的存在。
Now I'm going to start straight in with Mind and this may seem surprising. You might have supposed that a good question to answer at the beginning of an introductory philosophy book is: "What is philosophy?" But I think that is a mistake, and if we consider the same question about a different subject, I think you will see why.
现在,我要直接从 "心智 "开始讲起,这可能会让人感到意外。你可能认为,在哲学入门书的开头,一个好的问题应该是:"哲学是什么?"但我认为这是一个错误,如果我们换一个主题来思考同样的问题,我想你就会明白为什么了。
So consider the question: "What is physics?" If you asked what physics was, you might well get the answer that it is the study of the physical world. In some ways this isn't a very helpful answer. One trouble is that if you take the answer broadly, then biology is a branch of physics: living organisms are part of the physical world. But this just shows that not every part of the physical world gets studied in physics. Which aspects are the physical aspects? Well, if you knew that, and were thus able to rule out biological questions, you would already be well on the way to knowing what physics is.
那么请考虑一下这个问题"物理学是什么?"如果你问物理学是什么,你很可能会得到这样的答案:物理学是对物理世界的研究。在某些方面,这并不是一个非常有用的答案。麻烦之一在于,如果你从广义上理解这个答案,那么生物学就是物理学的一个分支:生物体是物理世界的一部分。但这恰恰说明,物理学并不是对物理世界的每一部分都进行研究。哪些方面是物理方面?好吧,如果你知道这一点,从而能够排除生物学问题,那么你就已经在了解物理学是什么的道路上走得很顺利了。
Nevertheless, there is a reason why most of us don't find this answer just unhelpful. We learned some physics in high school, and
尽管如此,我们中的大多数人并不觉得这个答案毫无用处,这是有原因的。我们在高中时学过一些物理知识,而且

so we already have lots of examples of physical experiments and problems to draw on. These examples allow us to understand what is meant by "the physical world": it consists of those aspects of the world that are like the ones we studied in high school physics. If we tell someone who has never done any physics that physics is the systematic study of the physical world, we should not be surprised if they find our answer rather unhelpful.
因此,我们已经有很多物理实验和问题的例子可以借鉴。通过这些例子,我们可以理解 "物理世界 "的含义:它包括世界的那些方面,就像我们在高中物理中学习的那些方面一样。如果我们告诉一个从未学过物理的人,物理学是对物理世界的系统研究,那么如果他们觉得我们的回答毫无帮助,我们也不应该感到惊讶。
There is a lesson here for how we should begin to develop an understanding of what philosophy is. What it suggests is that rather than tackling the question head on, we should look at some examples of philosophical work. With these examples in mind it won't be so unhelpful to be given an answer like the one we got to "What is physics?" For if we end up by saying that philosophy is the study of philosophical problems, that won't be uninformative if we have an idea of what some of the major philosophical problems are. So I'm not going to start this book by telling you what I-or anyone elsethink philosophy is. I'm going to start by doing some. Just as you are in a better position to understand what physics is when you have done some, so you will be better able to see how philosophy fits into our thought and our culture when you have a "feel" for how philosophers argue and what they argue about.
这为我们如何开始理解哲学提供了启示。它告诉我们,与其直面问题,不如看看哲学工作的一些实例。有了这些例子,我们在回答 "物理学是什么 "时就不会那么无助了。因为如果我们最后说哲学是研究哲学问题的,如果我们知道一些主要的哲学问题是什么,那就不会一无所获了。因此,我不会在本书一开始就告诉你我或其他人认为哲学是什么。我打算从做一些事情开始。就像当你研究过物理学之后,你就能更好地理解物理学是什么一样,当你 "感觉 "到哲学家们是如何争论以及他们争论什么的时候,你就能更好地理解哲学是如何融入我们的思想和文化的。
Before we start I need, finally, to introduce a couple of conventions that I'm going to use. I shall use quotation marks to do two different jobs. One job-exemplified in the last sentence of the previous paragraph - is to indicate that a word is being used in a nonstandard way. Philosophers call these "scare quotes." The other job is to allow me to refer to words, sentences and other expressions, as when I say that the word "word" has four letters. The sentence
最后,在我们开始之前,我需要介绍一下我将要使用的几个惯例。我将使用引号来完成两项不同的工作。一项工作--上一段的最后一句就是例子--是表示某个词的使用方式不规范。哲学家称之为 "恐吓引号"。另一个作用是允许我指代单词、句子和其他表达方式,比如我说 "word "这个词有四个字母。句子
A: There are nine letters in "most words." is true. The sentence
答:"大多数单词 "中有九个字母。句子
B: There are nine letters in most words.
B:大多数单词都有九个字母。
is false. ("False," for example, has only five letters!) And I've just exemplified one other convention. When I display a sentence or expression indented on a line by itself, I will not put it in quotes; the fact of displaying it in this way is an alternative convention for allowing
是假的。(例如,"False "只有五个字母!)我刚才还举例说明了另一个惯例。当我显示一个单独缩进一行的句子或表达式时,我不会把它放在引号里。

me to refer to words and other linguistic expressions. If I put a letter at the start of the line, I'll use that letter as the name of the sentence later. So here, for example, I can say that A and B have very different meanings. In A, we say, I am mentioning the words "most words." In B, I am using them. This distinction between use and mention may seem obvious. But sometimes, in a complex argument, we may get into a muddle if we don't keep use and mention distinct. In chapter eight, for example, we'll discuss the existence of numbers. There it will be important to distinguish between asking whether the numeral (i.e., the word or symbol) " 9 " exists, and whether 9 itself exists. The answer to the first question is obviously Yes. But the answer to the second question is not nearly so simple.
我可以用它来指代单词和其他语言表达方式。如果我在行首写上一个字母,稍后我就会用这个字母作为句子的名称。因此,比如在这里,我可以说 A 和 B 的含义截然不同。在 A 中,我们可以说,我提到了 "大多数单词"。而在 B 中,我在使用它们。使用和提及之间的区别看似显而易见。但有时,在复杂的论证中,如果我们不把 "使用 "和 "提及 "区分开来,就会陷入困境。例如,在第八章中,我们将讨论数字的存在。在那里,重要的是要区分 "9 "这个数字(即单词或符号)是否存在,以及 "9 "本身是否存在。第一个问题的答案显然是肯定的。但第二个问题的答案就没那么简单了。
If I were to follow this convention strictly, then, when I introduced a term (as I often will) by saying "I will call something ," I would have to put the " " in quotes. But here the boldface type can do the job of the quotes-which is to show that I'm mentioning a term and not using it-so I won't usually bother. The convention is meant to help avoid confusion: it's not an obsession to be pursued for its own sake! (For the record, terms occur in boldface only at the point where I introduce or define them.)
如果我严格遵守这一惯例,那么,当我在介绍一个术语时(我经常这样做)说:"我将把某物称为 ,"我就必须把 " "加上引号。但在这里,粗体字可以完成引号的工作--即表明我是在提及一个术语,而不是在使用它,所以我通常不会去麻烦它。这个惯例的目的是避免混淆,而不是为了追求它而追求它!(为了记录在案,只有在我介绍或定义术语时,才会用黑体字表示)。
I began this introduction by mentioning various questions that might lead you to philosophy in the first place; but perhaps you have never been bothered by any such questions. That is no reason to think that philosophy is not for you. Many people do, of course, live their lives without ever thinking systematically about philosophy. But I shall be arguing that many problems that trouble us in ordinary life-down in the city, rather than up in the tower-can only be answered if we first ask the more fundamental questions that are the hallmark of philosophy. Doing philosophy, then, enlarges your capacity to think about the life you are leading and what matters in it. Socrates famously said that the unexamined life was not worth living. Philosophy is one way to enrich your ability to examine the assumptions and ambitions that guide your life.
在这篇导言的开头,我提到了可能会让你首先接触哲学的各种问题;但也许你从未被任何此类问题困扰过。但这并不能成为你认为哲学不适合你的理由。当然,许多人在生活中从未系统地思考过哲学。但我要论证的是,许多困扰我们普通生活的问题,只有在我们首先提出作为哲学标志的更基本的问题时,才能得到解答。因此,学习哲学可以提高你思考生活和生活中重要问题的能力。苏格拉底有句名言:未经审查的生活是不值得过的。哲学就是一种丰富你审视指导你生活的假设和抱负的能力的方法。

CHAPTER 1 第 1 章

Mind 思想

What is a mind?
什么是思想?
Could we make a machine with a mind? What is the relationship between minds and bodies?
我们能制造出有思想的机器吗?思想和身体之间的关系是什么?

1.1 Introduction 1.1 导言

In countless movies, computers play a starring role. Some talk in synthesized voices; others write a stream of words on a screen. Some manage spaceships; others, the "brains" of robots, manage their own "bodies." People converse with them, are understood by them, exchange information and greetings with them. Much of this is still science fiction. But real computers advise lawyers on relevant cases, doctors on diagnoses, engineers on the state of atomic reactors. Both the fantasy and the fact would have astonished our grandparents. Their grandparents might have thought that this could only be achieved by magic. Yet most of us are getting used to it, taking the silicon age for granted.
在无数电影中,计算机都是主角。有的用合成声音说话,有的在屏幕上书写文字。有的管理着宇宙飞船;有的则是机器人的 "大脑",管理着自己的 "身体"。人们与它们交谈,被它们理解,与它们交换信息和问候。这些在很大程度上还是科幻小说。但真正的计算机会就相关案件向律师提供建议,就诊断向医生提供建议,就原子反应堆的状态向工程师提供建议。无论是幻想还是事实,都会让我们的祖辈感到惊讶。他们的祖辈可能会认为,这只有通过魔法才能实现。然而,我们中的大多数人却对此习以为常,认为硅时代的到来是理所当然的。
Still, a suspicion remains. We human beings have always thought of ourselves as special. We all assume some contrast between the world of material things and the world of spiritual things. If the computer really is a "material mind," then not only must we rethink this distinction, but we have broken it with our own creations. We should be careful to avoid such an important conclusion until we have really thought it through. However natural it seems to take it for granted that computers can think and act, then, we shouldn't just assume it. In philosophy we often find that what we normally take for granted - the "commonsense" point of view-gets in the way of a proper understanding of the issues. So let's see if the way I spoke about computers in the first paragraph is accurate.
尽管如此,一种怀疑依然存在。我们人类总是认为自己很特别。我们都假定物质世界和精神世界之间存在某种对比。如果计算机真的是一种 "物质心灵",那么我们不仅必须重新思考这种区别,而且我们自己的创造也打破了这种区别。在我们真正想清楚之前,我们应该小心避免得出这样一个重要的结论。无论我们认为计算机能够思考和行动是理所当然的,但我们都不应该只是假设。在哲学中,我们经常会发现,我们通常认为理所当然的东西--"常识 "观点--会妨碍我们对问题的正确理解。所以,让我们看看我在第一段中谈到计算机的方式是否准确。
I said that they talk. But do they really talk in the sense that
我说它们会说话。但它们真的会说话吗?

people do? It isn't enough to say that they produce something that sounds like speech. Tape recorders do that, but they don't talk. When people talk they mean something by what they say. To mean something, they need to be able to understand sentences. Now I also said that computers understand what we say to them. But do they really? The sounds of our speech are turned into electrical impulses. The impulses pass through the circuits of the machine. And that causes the speech synthesizer to produce sounds. It may be very clever to design a machine that does this, but what evidence do we have that the machine understands?
人做什么?光说他们发出听起来像说话的声音是不够的。录音机可以做到这一点,但它们不会说话。当人们说话时,他们所说的话是有意义的。为了表达某种意思,他们必须能够理解句子。我还说过,电脑能听懂我们对它们说的话。但它们真的能听懂吗?我们说话的声音会变成电脉冲。这些脉冲通过机器的电路。这样,语音合成器就会发出声音。设计出这样的机器也许非常聪明,但我们有什么证据能证明机器听得懂呢?
Well, could a machine understand? There are two obvious responses to this question. The first response I'll call mentalist, for the sake of a label. It's the response you make if you think that understanding what people say involves having a mind. The mentalist says:
那么,机器能听懂吗?对于这个问题,有两种显而易见的回答。第一种回答,为了贴标签起见,我称之为 "心智学家"。如果你认为理解人们所说的话需要有思想,你就会这样回答。心理学家说:
Computers can't really understand anything. To understand they would have to have conscious minds. But we made them from silicon chips and we programmed them. We didn't give them conscious minds. So we know they don't have them.
计算机无法真正理解任何事物。要想理解,它们必须拥有有意识的思维。但我们用硅芯片制造了它们,并给它们编程。我们并没有赋予它们意识所以我们知道它们没有意识
At the other extreme is the response I'll call behaviorist. The behaviorist says:
另一个极端是我称之为行为主义者的反应。行为主义者说:
Naturally, everyone should agree that some computers don't understand. But there's no reason why a computer couldn't be made that does understand. If a machine responds in the same ways to speech as a person who understands speech, then we have just as much reason to say that the machine understands as we have to say that the person does. A machine that behaves in every way as if it understands is indistinguishable from a machine that understands. If it behaved in the right way, that would show that it had a mind.
当然,每个人都应该同意,有些计算机听不懂。但是,我们没有理由不制造出一台听得懂话的计算机。如果一台机器对言语的反应与一个理解言语的人相同,那么我们就有理由说这台机器理解言语,就像我们有理由说这个人理解言语一样。如果一台机器在各方面的表现都像是听懂了,那么它与一台听懂了的机器是没有区别的。如果它的行为方式是正确的,那就说明它有思想。
It is clear why I call this response "behaviorist." For the behaviorist says that to understand is to behave as if you understand.
很显然,我为什么称这种反应为 "行为主义"。因为行为主义者说,理解就是要表现得好像你理解了一样。
What we have here is a situation that is quite familiar in philosophy. There are two opposing views-mentalist and behaviorist, in this case-each of which seems to have something in its favor, but neither of which looks completely right. Each of these views has a
这里的情况在哲学中很常见。有两种对立的观点--在这里是唯心主义观点和行为主义观点--每种观点似乎都有其有利之处,但看起来都不完全正确。每种观点都有一个

bit of common sense on its side. The mentalist relies on the common sense claim that machines can't think. The behaviorist relies on the common sense claim that all we know about other people's minds we know from what they do. It looks as though common sense here isn't going to tell us if the mentalist or the behaviorist is right.
常识。心智论者依据的常识是,机器不会思考。行为主义者依据的常识是,我们对他人思想的了解都是从他们的行为中得知的。看起来,常识并不能告诉我们是心理学家还是行为主义者是对的。
In fact, if you hold either of these views you can face difficult intellectual choices. Let's start with a problem you get into if you are a mentalist. Suppose the computer in question is in a robot, which, like androids in science fiction, looks exactly like a person. It's a very smart computer, so that its "body" responds exactly like a particular person: your mother, for example. For that reason I'll call the robot "M." Wouldn't you have as much reason for thinking that M had a mind as you have for thinking that your mother does? You might say, "Not if I know that it's got silicon chips in its head." But did you ever check that your mother has got brain tissue in her head? You didn't, of course, because it wouldn't prove anything if you did. Your belief that your mother has a mind is based on what she says and does. What's in her head may be an interesting question, the behaviorist will say, but it isn't relevant to deciding whether she has thoughts. And if it doesn't matter what is in your mother's head, why should it matter what's in M's?
事实上,如果你持有这两种观点中的任何一种,你都会面临困难的智力选择。让我们先来看看心理学家会遇到的一个问题。假设问题中的计算机是一个机器人,就像科幻小说中的机器人一样,它看起来和人一模一样。它是一台非常聪明的电脑,因此它的 "身体 "的反应完全像一个特定的人:比如你的母亲。因此,我称这个机器人为 "M"。难道你没有理由认为 M 和你母亲一样有思想吗?你可能会说,"如果我知道它脑袋里有硅芯片就不会"但你有没有检查过你妈妈的脑袋里有没有脑组织呢?你当然没有,因为就算你检查了也证明不了什么。你认为你妈妈有思想是基于她的言行。行为学家会说,她脑子里有什么可能是个有趣的问题,但这与判断她是否有思想无关。如果你母亲脑子里有什么并不重要,那么 M 脑子里有什么又有什么关系呢?
That's a major problem if you're a mentalist: how to explain why you wouldn't say an android had a mind, even if you had the same evidence that it had a mind as you have that your mother does. Surely it would be absurd to believe your mother has a mind on the basis of what she does and says, yet refuse to believe has a mind on the very same evidence. If it's the evidence of what your mother does that entitles you to believe she has a mind (and not, say, an innate prejudice), then the very same evidence about something else would entitle you to believe that it had a mind. This is one line of thought that might lead you to behaviorism.
如果你是一个唯心主义者,这就是一个大问题:如何解释为什么你不会说一个机器人有思想,即使你有同样的证据证明它有思想,就像你有证据证明你母亲有思想一样。根据你母亲的一言一行就相信她有思想,而根据同样的证据却拒绝相信 有思想,这无疑是荒谬的。如果是你母亲的所作所为让你有资格相信她有思想(而不是天生的偏见),那么关于其他事物的同样证据也会让你有资格相信它有思想。这种思路可能会把你引向行为主义。
But if you decide to be a behaviorist, you have problems too. You and I both know, after all, since we both do have minds, what it is like to have a mind. So you and I both know there's a difference between us and a machine that behaves exactly like us but doesn't have any experiences. Unless has experiences, it hasn't got a mind. The difference between having a mind and operating as if
但如果你决定成为一名行为主义者,你也有问题。毕竟,你和我都知道,因为我们都有思想,有思想是什么感觉。所以,你我都知道,我们和一台行为与我们一模一样,但却没有任何经验的机器之间是有区别的。除非 有经验,否则它就没有思想。有思想和仿佛有思想一样运作之间的区别是

you've got one seems as clear as the difference between being conscious and being unconscious.
就像有意识和无意识之间的区别一样明显。
The upshot is this: If you look at the question from the outside, comparing M with other people, behaviorism looks tempting. From the point of view of the evidence you have, and your mother are the same. Looked at from the inside, however, there is all the difference in the world. You know you have a mind because you have conscious experiences, an "inner life." M may have experiences, for all we know. But if it doesn't, no amount of faking is going to make it true that it has a mind.
结果就是这样:如果你从外部来看待这个问题,将 M 与其他人进行比较,行为主义看起来很有诱惑力。从你所掌握的证据来看, 和你的母亲是一样的。然而,从内心来看,他们却有着天壤之别。你知道自己有思想,因为你有有意识的体验,有 "内在生命"。就我们所知,"M "也可能有体验。但如果它没有,那么再怎么伪装也无法让人相信它有思想。
We started with a familiar fact: computers are everywhere and they're getting smarter. It looks as though there will soon be intelligent machines, machines that will understand what we say to them. But when we look a little closer, things are not so simple. On the one hand, there is reason to doubt that behaving like a person with a mind and having a mind are the same thing. On the other, once we start asking what and how we know about the minds of other people, it seems that our conviction that people have minds is no better based than the belief that there could be understanding computers. We call someone who asks philosophical questions about what and how we know an epistemologist. And if we ask how we know about the minds of other people it seems plain that it is from what they say and do. We simply have no direct way of knowing what-if anything - is going on in other people's minds. But then, if what people say and do is what shows us they have minds, a machine that says and does the same things shows us that it has a mind also. From the epistemologist's point of view, other people's minds and the "minds" of computers are in the same boat.
我们从一个熟悉的事实开始:计算机无处不在,而且越来越智能。似乎很快就会出现智能机器,这些机器能听懂我们对它们说的话。但是,当我们再仔细观察一下,事情就不那么简单了。一方面,我们有理由怀疑,行为像一个有思想的人和有思想是一回事。另一方面,一旦我们开始追问我们对其他人的思想了解多少以及如何了解,我们相信人有思想的信念似乎并不比相信有理解力强的计算机更有根据。我们把追问 "我们知道什么 "和 "我们如何知道 "的哲学问题的人称为认识论者。如果我们要问我们是如何了解他人的思想的,那么似乎很明显,我们是从他们的言行中了解的。我们根本无法直接了解他人的思想到底是怎么回事。但是,如果人们的一言一行能让我们知道他们有思想,那么一台说着同样的话、做着同样的事的机器也能让我们知道它有思想。从认识论者的角度来看,其他人的思想和计算机的 "思想 "是一脉相承的。
When we look at the question from the inside, as we have seen, the picture looks different. Someone who looks from the inside we can call a phenomenologist. "Phenomenology" is the philosopher's word for reflecting on the nature of our conscious mental life. From the phenomenologist's point of view, , and all machines, however good they are at behaving like people, may well turn out not to have minds.
正如我们所看到的,当我们从内部来看待这个问题时,情况就会有所不同。我们可以称从内部观察问题的人为现象学家。"现象学 "是哲学家对我们有意识的精神生活的本质进行反思的术语。从现象学家的角度来看, ,以及所有的机器,无论它们表现得多么像人,很可能都没有思想。
From thinking about computers in science fiction we have found our way to the center of the maze of problems that philosophers call the philosophy of mind or philosophical psychology.
从科幻小说中对计算机的思考出发,我们找到了通往问题迷宫中心的道路,哲学家们称之为心灵哲学或哲学心理学。
As I said in the introduction, philosophical perplexity is a little like being lost in an old city. It is time now to find our way up that tower to have a look around. We have already been forced back to two of the most fundamental philosophical questions, "What is it to have a mind?" and "How do we know that other people have minds?" So let us put aside the question about and take up these more fundamental questions directly. At the end of the chapter I'll get back to , and we'll see then if our trip up the tower has indeed helped us to find our way about.
正如我在导言中所说,哲学的困惑有点像迷失在一座古城中。现在是时候找到上塔的路,四处看看了。我们已经被迫回到了两个最基本的哲学问题:"什么是有思想?"和 "我们怎么知道其他人有思想?"因此,让我们抛开关于 的问题,直接讨论这些更基本的问题。在本章结尾,我将回到 ,到时我们再看看我们的登塔之旅是否真的帮助我们找到了方向。

1.2 Descartes: The beginnings of modern philosophy of mind
1.2 笛卡尔:现代心灵哲学的开端

The dominant view of the mind for the last three hundred years of Western philosophy has been one that derives from the French philosopher René Descartes, one of the most influential philosophers of all time. His method is to start looking at questions by asking how an individual can acquire knowledge. He starts, that is, by asking how he knows what he knows; and if you want to see the force of his arguments, you will have to start by asking yourself how you know what you know. The fact that Descartes starts with how he knows things marks him as one of the first modern philosophers. For, since Descartes, much of Western philosophy has been based on epistemological considerations.
在过去三百年的西方哲学中,关于心灵的主流观点源自法国哲学家勒内-笛卡尔,他是有史以来最具影响力的哲学家之一。他的方法是从个人如何获取知识开始研究问题。也就是说,他先问自己是如何知道自己知道什么的;如果你想了解他的论点的力量,你就必须先问自己是如何知道自己知道什么的。笛卡尔从如何认识事物入手,这标志着他是最早的现代哲学家之一。因为,自笛卡尔以来,西方哲学的大部分内容都是基于认识论的考虑。
Descartes' best-known work, the Discourse on Method-its full title is actually Discourse on the Method for Properly Conducting Reason and Searching for Truth in the Sciences-is written in a clear, attractive style. This may make what he is saying seem simpler and more obvious than it really is, so we need to consider what he says very carefully. Here is a passage from the fourth part of the Discourse, published in 1637, where he sets out very clearly his view of the nature of his own self: would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I knew from this that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature was only to think, and that had no need for any place to exist and did not depend on any material thing; so that this "I," which is to say my mind, through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from my body, and even that it is easier to know than my body, and further that even if my body did not exist at all, my mind would not cease to be all that it is.
笛卡尔最著名的作品《方法论》--全名实际上是《关于在科学中正确地进行理性思辨和探求真理的方法的论述》--是用一种清晰、吸引人的风格写成的。这可能会让他所说的话看起来比实际情况更简单、更明显,因此我们需要仔细斟酌他所说的话。下面是 1637 年出版的《论语》第四部分中的一段话,他在这段话中非常清楚地阐述了他对自我本质的看法:我没有理由相信我是存在的;我知道我是一种物质,它的全部本质或性质只是思考,它不需要任何地方存在,也不依赖于任何物质;因此,这个 "我",也就是我的思想,通过它我才是我,它完全不同于我的身体,甚至它比我的身体更容易被认识,而且,即使我的身体根本不存在,我的思想也不会停止它的存在。
This passage contains practically every central component of Descartes' philosophy of mind.
这段话几乎包含了笛卡尔心灵哲学的所有核心内容。
First, Descartes is a dualist. This means he believes that a mind and a body are two quite distinct sorts of thing, two kinds of what he calls "substance."
首先,笛卡尔是二元论者。这意味着他认为心灵和身体是两种截然不同的东西,是他所谓的 "物质 "的两种。
Second, what he thinks you really are, your self, is a mind. Since you are your mind, and minds are totally independent of bodies, you could still exist, even without a body.
其次,他认为你真正的自我是一种思想。既然你就是你的思想,而思想完全独立于身体,那么即使没有身体,你也可以存在。
Third, your mind and your thoughts are the things you know best. For Descartes it is possible, at least in principle, for there to be a mind without a body, unable, however hard it tries, to become aware of anything else, including any other minds. Descartes knew, of course, that the way we do in fact come to know what is happening in other minds is by observing the speech and actions of "other bodies." But for him there were two serious possibilities, each of which would mean that our belief in the existence of other minds was mistaken. One is that these other bodies could be mere figments of our imagination. The other is that, even if bodies and other material things do exist, the evidence we normally think justifies our belief that other bodies are inhabited by minds could have been produced by automata, by mindless machines.
第三,你的心灵和思想是你最了解的东西。在笛卡尔看来,至少在原则上,存在一个没有身体的心灵是可能的,无论它如何努力,都无法意识到任何其他事物,包括任何其他心灵。当然,笛卡尔知道,我们事实上是通过观察 "其他身体 "的言行来了解其他心灵的。但对他来说,有两种严重的可能性,每一种都意味着我们对其他心灵存在的信念是错误的。一种可能是,这些其他身体可能只是我们的想象。另一种可能是,即使身体和其他物质确实存在,我们通常认为证明我们相信其他身体有思想的证据也可能是由自动机、无意识的机器制造出来的。
Fourth, the essence of a mind is to have thoughts, and by "thoughts" Descartes means anything that you are aware of in your mind when you are conscious. (The essence of a kind of thing, , is the property — or set of properties-whose possession is a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in . That is, if something has the essential property , then it belongs to - so is sufficient for membership in ; anything that doesn't have doesn't belong to -so is necessary for membership.) In other places Descartes says that the essence of a material thing - the property, in other
第四,心灵的本质是有思想,而笛卡尔所说的 "思想 "是指当你有意识时你头脑中意识到的任何东西。(一种事物的本质, ,是指属性--或一组属性--它的拥有是成为 成员的必要和充分条件。也就是说,如果某物具有 这一本质属性,那么它就属于 --所以 的充分条件;任何不具有 的东西都不属于 --所以 是加入的必要条件)。在其他地方,笛卡尔说,物质的本质--属性,换句话说--是"......"。

words, every material thing must have-is that it occupies space. This means that for Descartes the two essential differences between material things and minds are (1) that minds think, whereas matter does not, and (2) that material things take up space, whereas minds do not. Descartes' claim, then, is that what distinguishes the mind from the body is the negative fact that the mind is not in space and the positive fact that the mind thinks.
换句话说,每种物质都必须具备--那就是它占据空间。这意味着,在笛卡尔看来,物质与心灵的两个本质区别是:(1)心灵会思考,而物质不会;(2)物质占据空间,而心灵不占据空间。因此,笛卡尔的主张是,心灵与肉体的区别在于:消极的事实是心灵不在空间中,而积极的事实是心灵会思考。
It is not surprising that Descartes believed that matter does not think. Very few people suppose that stones or tables or atoms have thoughts. But why did he think that minds were not in space? After all, you might think that my mind is where my body is. But if I had no body, as Descartes thought was possible, I would still have a mind. So he couldn't say that a mind must be where its body is, simply because it might not have a body at all. Still, if I do have a body, why shouldn't I say that that is where my mind is? If I didn't have a body, that would be the wrong answer; but, as it happens, I do.
笛卡尔认为物质不会思考,这并不奇怪。很少有人认为石头、桌子或原子有思想。但为什么他认为思想不在空间里呢?毕竟,你可能会认为我的思想就在我身体所在的地方。但如果我没有身体,就像笛卡尔认为的那样,我仍然会有思想。因此,他不能说心灵一定在身体所在的地方,因为它可能根本没有身体。尽管如此,如果我有一个身体,我为什么不能说那就是我的思想所在呢?如果我没有身体,那就是错误的答案;但事实上,我有。
I think the main reason for thinking that minds are not in space is that it does really seem strange to ask, "Where are your thoughts?" Even if you answered this question by saying "In my head," it would not be obvious that this was literally true. For if they were in your head, you could find out where they were in your head, and how large a volume of space they occupied. But you cannot say how many inches long a particular thought is, or how many centimeters wide, or whether it is currently north or south of your cerebral cortex.
我认为,认为思想不在空间的主要原因是,问 "你的思想在哪里?"确实显得很奇怪。即使你回答这个问题说 "在我的脑袋里",也不一定就真的如此。因为如果它们在你的脑袋里,你就可以知道它们在你脑袋里的什么位置,以及它们占据了多大的空间。但是,你无法知道某个想法有几英寸长,几厘米宽,也无法知道它目前是在你大脑皮层的北面还是南面。
There is a fifth and final characteristic of this passage that is typical of Descartes' philosophy of mind: throughout the argument Descartes insists on beginning with what can be known for certain, what cannot be doubted. He insists, that is, on beginning with an epistemological point of view.
这段话的第五个也是最后一个特点是笛卡尔心灵哲学的典型特征:在整个论证过程中,笛卡尔坚持从可以确定知道的、不容置疑的东西入手。也就是说,他坚持从认识论的角度出发。
These are the major features of Descartes' philosophy of mind, and, as I said, this has been the dominant view since his time. So dominant has it been, in fact, that by the mid-twentieth century the central problems of the philosophy of mind were reduced, in effect, to two. The first was a problem M made us think about, the problem of other minds: What justifies our belief that other minds exist at all? And the second is the mind-body problem: How are we to explain the relations of a mind and its body? The first of these
这些就是笛卡尔心智哲学的主要特征,正如我所说的,自笛卡尔时代以来,这一直是主流观点。事实上,这种观点一直占据主导地位,以至于到了二十世纪中叶,心灵哲学的核心问题实际上被简化为两个。第一个问题是 M 让我们思考的问题,即其他心灵的问题:我们有什么理由相信其他心灵的存在?第二个问题是身心问题:我们如何解释心灵与其身体的关系?其中第一个

questions reflects Descartes' epistemological outlook; the second reflects his dualism.
问题反映了笛卡尔的认识论观点;第二个问题反映了他的二元论。
Now, it is just this dualism that raises some of the major difficulties of Descartes' position. For anyone who thinks of mind and body as totally distinct needs to offer an answer to two main questions. First, how do mental events cause physical events? How, for example, do our intentions, which are mental, lead to action, which involves physical movements of our bodies? Second, how do physical events cause mental ones? How, for example, is it possible for physical interaction between our eyes and the light to lead to the sensory experiences of vision, which is mental? And, as we shall see, the answer Descartes gives to these questions seems not to be consistent with his explanation of the essential difference between body and mind.
现在,正是这种二元论为笛卡尔的立场提出了一些主要难题。因为任何认为身心完全不同的人都需要回答两个主要问题。首先,精神事件如何导致身体事件?例如,我们的意图是精神性的,它如何导致行动,而行动涉及我们身体的物理运动?第二,物理事件如何导致心理事件?例如,我们的眼睛与光线之间的物理相互作用如何可能导致视觉的感官体验,而视觉是精神体验?正如我们将要看到的,笛卡尔对这些问题的回答似乎与他对身体和心灵之间本质区别的解释并不一致。
Descartes' answer to these questions seems clear and simple enough. The human brain, he thought, was a point of interaction between mind and matter. Indeed, Descartes suggested that the pineal gland, in the center of your head, was the channel between the two distinct realms of mind and matter. That was his answer to the mind-body question.
笛卡尔对这些问题的回答看似简单明了。他认为,人脑是精神与物质的互动点。事实上,笛卡尔认为,位于头部中央的松果体是心灵与物质两个不同领域之间的通道。这就是他对身心问题的回答。
But this theory comes into conflict with Descartes' claim that what distinguishes the mental from the material is that it is not spatial. For if mental happenings cause happenings in the brain, then doesn't that mean that mental events occur in the brain? How can something cause a happening in the brain unless it is another happening in (or near) the brain? Normally, when one event-call it "A"-causes another event-call it "B"-A and B have to be next to each other, or there has to be a chain of events that are next to each other which runs from to . The drama in the television studio causes the image on my TV screen miles away. But there is an electromagnetic field that carries the image from the studio to me, a field that is in the space between my TV and the studio. Descartes' view has to be that my thoughts cause changes in my brain and that these changes then lead to my actions. But if the thoughts aren't in or near my brain, and if there's no chain of events between my thoughts and my brain, then this is a very unusual brand of causation.
但这一理论与笛卡尔的说法相冲突,笛卡尔认为精神与物质的区别在于它不具有空间性。因为如果精神事件导致大脑中的事件发生,那不就意味着精神事件发生在大脑中吗?除非是大脑中(或附近)发生的另一个事件,否则怎么会导致大脑中发生的事件呢?通常,当一个事件--称之为 "A"--引起另一个事件--称之为 "B "时,A 和 B 必须紧挨着,或者必须有一连串紧挨着的事件,从 。电视演播室里的戏剧导致我电视屏幕上的图像出现在数英里之外。但是,有一个电磁场将图像从演播室传送到我这里,这个电磁场就在我的电视机和演播室之间。笛卡尔的观点是,我的思想会导致我的大脑发生变化,而这些变化又会导致我的行为。但是,如果思想不在我的大脑中或附近,如果在我的思想和大脑之间没有事件链,那么这就是一种非常不寻常的因果关系。
Descartes wants to say that thoughts aren't anywhere. But, according to him, at least some of the effects of my thoughts are in
笛卡尔想说思想无处不在。但是,根据他的说法,我的思想的影响至少有一部分存在于

my brain, and none of the direct effects of my thoughts are in anybody else's brain. My thoughts regularly lead to my actions and never lead directly to someone else's. We have now reached one central problem for Descartes' position. For it is normal to think that things are where their effects originate. (We can call this the causal account of location.) And on this view my thoughts are in my brain, which is the origin of my behavior. But if mental events occur in the brain, then, since the brain is in space, at least some mental events are in space also. And then Descartes' way of distinguishing the mental and the material won't work. Let's call this apparent conflict between
我的思想不会直接影响其他人的大脑。我的思想经常导致我的行为,而绝不会直接导致别人的行为。现在我们已经找到了笛卡尔立场的一个核心问题。因为人们通常会认为,事物是其影响的起源。(根据这种观点,我的思想在我的大脑中,而大脑是我行为的起源。但如果心理事件发生在大脑中,那么,既然大脑在空间中,至少某些心理事件也在空间中。这样一来,笛卡尔区分精神和物质的方法就行不通了。让我们把这两者之间的明显冲突称为
a) the fact that mind and matter do seem to interact causally and
a) 心灵与物质似乎确实存在因果关系,而且
b) Descartes' claim that the mind is not in space
b) 笛卡尔关于心灵不在空间中的主张
Descartes' problem. Once you accept the causal account of location, there are four main ways you might try to deal with this problem.
笛卡尔的问题一旦你接受了位置的因果关系,你可以尝试用四种主要方法来解决这个问题。
The first would be to deny that causes and their effects have to be in space. Descartes' is only one of the possible dualist solutions to the mind-body question that takes this approach. Because he thinks that mental and material events interact, even if only in the brain, his view is called interactionism. But if you want to keep Descartes' view that the mind is not in space, and if you do not think that causes and effects of events in space have themselves to be in space, you might also try one of the other forms of dualism. There are two kinds of dualism you might try in which the causation goes only one way. You could hold either that mental events have bodily causes but not bodily effects, or that mental events have material effects but no material causes. Each of these positions deserves consideration. But each of these two kinds of dualism claims that minds are both causally active in space and yet somehow not in space themselves. As a result, they need to offer some way of thinking about causation that is very unlike the way we normally think about it.
第一种方法是否认因果必须在空间。笛卡尔只是采用这种方法解决心身问题的二元论者之一。因为他认为精神和物质事件是相互作用的,即使只是在大脑中,所以他的观点被称为相互作用论。但是,如果你想保留笛卡尔关于心灵不在空间中的观点,如果你不认为空间事件的因果本身必须在空间中,那么你也可以尝试其他形式的二元论。你可以尝试两种二元论,其中的因果关系只有一种。你可以认为精神事件有身体原因而无身体结果,或者精神事件有物质结果而无物质原因。这两种观点都值得考虑。但这两种二元论都声称,思维既在空间中具有因果活动,但又在某种程度上不在空间中。因此,它们需要提供某种与我们通常思考因果关系的方式截然不同的思维方式。
A second way out of Descartes' problem is to deny that there are any causal connections between mind and matter at all. On this view there are corresponding material and mental realms, which run in
解决笛卡尔问题的第二个办法是否认精神与物质之间存在任何因果联系。根据这种观点,存在着相应的物质领域和精神领域,它们以如下方式运行

parallel, without any causal interaction. Psychophysical parallelism, as this theory is called, certainly escapes Descartes' problem. But we are left with a mystery: why do the mind and the body work together if there is no interaction between them? Psychophysical parallelism says mind and body run in parallel without explaining why.
平行,没有任何因果互动。这种被称为 "心理物理平行论 "的理论当然可以解决笛卡尔的问题。但我们仍然有一个谜团:如果心灵和身体之间没有相互作用,为什么它们会一起工作呢?心理物理平行说认为心灵和身体是平行运行的,但没有解释原因。
The third way out of Descartes' problem would be to try a different way of distinguishing mind and matter. If you think that both causes and their effects have to be in space and that mental events have material causes or effects, you cannot maintain Descartes' claim that minds are not spatial. Starting with some new way of distinguishing mind and matter, however, you might still be able to keep dualism, while taking into account the fact that causes have to be in space if their effects are.
解决笛卡尔问题的第三条出路是尝试用另一种方法来区分心灵和物质。如果你认为因和果都必须在空间中,而且精神事件有物质的因和果,那么你就不能坚持笛卡尔关于心灵不是空间的说法。然而,从某种区分心与物的新方法出发,你也许仍然能够保留二元论,同时考虑到这样一个事实,即如果因果都在空间,那么因就必须在空间。
But however you distinguish the mental and the material, if you believe they are two different kinds of thing you will have to face the other-minds problem. If your mind and body are utterly distinct kinds of thing, how can I know anything about your mind, since all I can see (or hear or touch) is your body? You brush off the fly, and I judge that you want to get rid of it. But if there is no necessary connection between what your body does and what is going on in your mind, how is this judgment justified? How can I know your body isn't just an automaton, a machine that reacts mechanically, with no intervening mental processes? If you find this thought compelling, you might want to try a solution to Descartes' problem that is not dualist at all.
但是,无论你如何区分精神和物质,如果你认为它们是两种不同的东西,你就不得不面对另一种精神的问题。如果你的心灵和身体是完全不同的两类事物,那么我怎么能了解你的心灵,因为我能看到(或听到或触摸到)的只是你的身体?你赶走了苍蝇,我判断你想摆脱它。但是,如果你的身体所做的事情与你的思想之间没有必然联系,那么这种判断又是如何成立的呢?我怎么知道你的身体不只是一台自动机,一台机械地做出反应,没有任何心理过程介入的机器?如果你觉得这种想法很有说服力,不妨试试笛卡尔问题的解决方案,它根本不是二元论的。
So the fourth and last way out of Descartes' problem is just to give up the idea that mind and matter really are distinct kinds of thing, and thus to become what philosophers call a "monist." Monism is the view that reality consists of only one kind of thing. For monists, beliefs and earthquakes are just things in the world. Things in the world can interact causally with each other, so there's nothing surprising about my belief that there's a table in my way causing me to move the table. The movement of the table is partly caused by the belief. That's no more surprising than a movement of the table caused by an earthquake.
因此,解决笛卡尔问题的第四条,也是最后一条出路,就是放弃心灵和物质确实是不同种类事物的想法,从而成为哲学家所说的 "一元论者"。一元论认为现实只由一种事物组成。对于一元论者来说,信仰和地震只是世界上的事物。世界上的事物可以因果地相互作用,所以我相信有一张桌子挡住了我的路,导致我移动桌子,这并不奇怪。桌子的移动部分是由信念引起的。这并不比地震引起的桌子移动更令人惊讶。
I've suggested that thinking about the other-minds problem might lead you to give up dualism. And if you consider the very evident fact that we do know that other people have minds you may be
我曾建议过,思考 "他心 "问题可能会让你放弃二元论。如果你考虑到一个非常明显的事实,即我们确实知道其他人有思想,你可能会

led, with many twentieth-century philosophers and psychologists to the form of monism called "behaviorism." Behaviorism, which we noticed as one possible response to the problem of deciding whether a computer could have a mind, is simply the identification of the mind with certain bodily dispositions. A behaviorist, then, is someone who believes that to have a mind is to be disposed to behave in certain ways in response to input. On one behaviorist view, for example, for English-speakers to believe that something is red is for them to be disposed to say, "It is red," or to reply with a "Yes" if asked the question "Is it red?" And dispositions like this are a familiar part of the world. Being sharp is (roughly) being disposed to cut if pressed against a surface; being fragile is (roughly) being disposed to break if dropped.
二十世纪的许多哲学家和心理学家将这种一元论形式称为 "行为主义"。我们注意到,行为主义是对计算机是否有思想这一问题的一种可能的回应,它只是将思想与身体的某些倾向性相联系。因此,行为主义者认为,有思想就是会对输入的信息做出某种反应。例如,根据一种行为主义者的观点,说英语的人如果相信某样东西是红色的,他们就会说 "它是红色的",或者在被问到 "它是红色的吗?"这个问题时回答 "是的"。像这样的倾向性是我们所熟悉的世界的一部分。锋利(大致)是指如果被压在表面上就会被切开;易碎(大致)是指如果掉在地上就会被摔碎。
There's a strong contrast between behaviorism and Descartes' view. Descartes thought belief was a private matter. That had two consequences. First, that you know for sure what you believe. Second, that only you know for sure what you believe. And the trouble with Descartes' view of the mind is that it makes it very hard to see how we can know about other minds at all. For the behaviorist, on the other hand, belief is a disposition to act in response to your environment. If you respond in the way that is appropriate for someone with a certain belief, that's evidence that you have it. Since your response is public-visible and audible-others can find out what you believe. Indeed, as the English philosopher Gilbert Ryle argued in his book The Concept of Mind, we sometimes find out what we ourselves believe by noticing our own behavior.
行为主义与笛卡尔的观点形成了强烈的对比。笛卡尔认为信仰是私事。这有两个后果。第一,你确定自己相信什么。第二,只有你自己知道你相信什么。而笛卡尔的心灵观的问题在于,它让我们很难了解其他心灵。另一方面,对于行为主义者来说,信念是一种对环境做出反应的行为倾向。如果你的反应方式适合于有某种信念的人,这就是你有这种信念的证据。由于你的反应是公开的--可见的、可听的--其他人可以发现你的信念。事实上,正如英国哲学家吉尔伯特-赖尔(Gilbert Ryle)在他的著作《心灵的概念》(The Concept of Mind)中所指出的,我们有时会通过注意自己的行为来发现自己的信念。
It is a big step from saying that some of our mental states are things that other people can know about, to saying, with the behaviorists, that all of them must be in this way public. Yet one of the most influential philosophical arguments of recent years has just this conclusion. The argument was made by the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose work we will discuss again in the chapter on language.
从说我们的某些心理状态是其他人可以知道的事情,到与行为主义者一样说所有的心理状态都必须以这种方式公开,这是一个很大的进步。然而,近年来最有影响力的哲学论证之一就得出了这样的结论。这个论点是由奥地利出生的哲学家路德维希-维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)提出的,我们将在有关语言的章节中再次讨论他的著作。
Wittgenstein began by supposing that anyone who believed in the essentially private thoughts of Descartes' philosophy of mind would find it quite acceptable to suppose that someone could name a private experience-one, that is, that nobody else could know about. And indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 3, Thomas Hobbes,
维特根斯坦一开始就假定,任何相信笛卡尔心灵哲学本质上的私人思想的人都会认为,假定有人可以说出一种私人经验--也就是说,别人不可能知道的经验--是完全可以接受的。事实上,我们将在第 3 章中看到托马斯-霍布斯的观点、

who was an English philosopher who reacted against some of Descartes' ideas, thought that we used words as names of our private thoughts in order to remember them. He called them "marks" of our thoughts. To use marks in this way, someone would have to have a rule that they should use the name just on the occasions where that private experience occurred. Wittgenstein argued that obeying such a rule required more than that there should be both circumstances when it was and circumstances when it wasn't appropriate to use the name. He thought that it also required that it should be possible to check whether you were using the name in accordance with the rule. And he offered a very ingenious argument that was supposed to show that such checking was impossible. If Wittgenstein was right, there could be no such "private languages." And his argument is called, for that reason, the privatelanguage argument.
他认为,我们使用词语作为私人思想的名称,以便记住它们。他将其称为我们思想的 "标记"。要以这种方式使用 "标记",就必须有一个规则,规定只有在发生私人经历的场合才可以使用这个名称。维特根斯坦认为,遵守这样一条规则所需要的不仅仅是在适当和不适当的情况下使用名字。他认为,这还要求能够检查你是否按照规则使用了名字。他提出了一个非常巧妙的论证,试图证明这种检查是不可能的。如果维特根斯坦是对的,就不可能有这样的 "私人语言"。因此,他的论证被称为 "私人语言论证"。

1.3 The private-language argument
1.3 私语参数

Wittgenstein's objection to a Hobbesian private language depends, as I have said, on a claim about what is involved in following a rule. His Philosophical Investigations begins by introducing the idea of a language-game, which is any human activity where there is a systematic rule-governed use of words. One of the conclusions Wittgenstein suggests we should draw from his consideration of language-games is that the notion of following a rule can only apply in cases where it is possible to check whether someone is following it correctly. If someone uses a word or a sentence in a rule-governed way, Wittgenstein argues, it must make sense to ask how we know that they are using the rule correctly; or, as he puts it, there must be a "criterion of correctness."
维特根斯坦反对霍布斯式的私人语言,正如我所说的,取决于他对遵守规则的主张。维特根斯坦的《哲学研究》一开始就提出了 "语言游戏 "这一概念。"语言游戏 "是指任何人类活动,在这种活动中,词语的使用是有系统的、受规则制约的。维特根斯坦认为,我们应该从他对语言游戏的思考中得出这样一个结论:遵守规则的概念只适用于可以检查某人是否正确遵守规则的情况。维特根斯坦认为,如果有人以一种受规则制约的方式使用一个词或一个句子,我们就必须要问,我们是如何知道他们是在正确地使用规则的;或者,正如他所说,必须要有一个 "正确性标准"。
Suppose, for example, Mary claims to be using the word "tonk" in a language-game. We watch her for a while, and she says the word "tonk" from time to time but we cannot detect any pattern to the way she uses the word. So we ask her what rule she is following. If Mary claims simply to know when it is appropriate to use the word but we cannot discover what it is that makes her use of the word appropriate, then we have no reason to think she is following a rule. Unless we can check on whether it is appropriate for Mary to use the word "tonk," we cannot say that there is a difference between
例如,假设玛丽声称她在语言游戏中使用了 "tonk "一词。我们观察了她一会儿,她时不时地会说 "tonk "这个词,但我们无法发现她使用这个词的任何规律。于是我们问她在遵循什么规则。如果玛丽只是说她知道什么时候使用这个词合适,但我们却无法发现她使用这个词的合适之处,那么我们就没有理由认为她在遵循一条规则。除非我们能确认玛丽使用 "tonk "这个词是否合适,否则我们就不能说 "tonk "和 "Mary "之间有区别。
Marys following a rule, on the one hand, and Mary's simply uttering a sound at random from time to time, on the other.
一方面,玛丽在遵循规则,另一方面,玛丽只是不时地随意发出一种声音。
Let us now see how Wittgenstein can put the claim that rule following involves a criterion of correctness to use in attacking the Hobbesian private language.
现在,让我们来看看维特根斯坦如何将规则遵循涉及正确性标准的说法用于攻击霍布斯的私人语言。
We can start by considering in a little more detail the kind of private use of language that Hobbes thought was possible. Suppose I have an experience that I have never had before. For a Cartesian (this is the adjective from "Descartes") there can be no doubt in my mind either that I am having the experience or what the experience is. Still, since it is new, I might want to give it a name, just so that if it ever comes along again, I can remember that I have had it before. So I call the experience a "twinge." I know exactly what a twinge is like, and I just decide to refer to things like that as "twinges." Of course, I cannot show you a twinge and, since I don't know what caused it in me, I don't know how to produce one in you either. My twinge is essentially private: I know about it and nobody else can.
我们可以先更详细地考虑一下霍布斯认为可能存在的那种私人使用语言的情况。假设我有一种从未有过的体验。对于一个笛卡尔主义者(这是来自 "笛卡尔 "的形容词)来说,我心中不会有任何疑问,无论是我有了这种体验,还是这种体验是什么。不过,既然是新的体验,我还是想给它起个名字,这样如果它再次出现,我就能记得我曾经有过这种体验。所以,我把这种体验叫做 "绞痛"。我很清楚 "绞痛 "是什么感觉,所以我决定把这种感觉称为 "绞痛"。当然,我不能给你看 "绞痛",因为我不知道是什么让我产生了 "绞痛",所以我也不知道如何让你产生 "绞痛"。我的痛苦本质上是隐私:我知道,别人不知道。
This story seems to make sense. But Wittgenstein thought that if we analyzed the matter a little further, we could see that it does not. Here is the passage where Wittgenstein makes his objection to the sort of Hobbesian private language that I have described.
这个故事似乎很有道理。但维特根斯坦认为,如果我们再进一步分析,就会发现它并不合理。下面是维特根斯坦反对我所描述的那种霍布斯式私人语言的段落。
Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign " " and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.-I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated.-But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.-How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.-But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.-Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation.-But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about "right."
让我们设想一下下面的情况。我想写一本日记,记录某种感觉的反复出现。为此,我把它与 " "这个符号联系起来,并在日历上写下这个符号,记下我有这种感觉的每一天。--我首先要指出的是,这个符号的定义是无法确定的。--但是,我仍然可以给自己下一个表层定义。--怎么下?我能指出感觉吗?普通意义上不能。但我在说话或写下符号的同时,会把注意力集中在感觉上--就像这样,在内心指向它!定义当然是为了确定一个符号的意义--嗯,这正是通过集中我的注意力来实现的;因为通过这种方式,我给自己留下了符号和感觉之间联系的印象--但 "我给自己留下了印象 "只能是指:这个过程使我在未来正确地记住了这种联系。但在目前的情况下,我没有正确与否的标准。有人会说:在我看来正确的东西就是正确的。这只能说明在这里我们无法谈论 "正确"。
Before we try to work out what the argument is that Wittgenstein is making here, we should notice a number of features of the way this passage is written. This passage is rather like a dialogue in a play. Some philosophers, such as Plato, whom we'll discuss in the next chapter, actually wrote philosophical dialogues in order to make their arguments. Wittgenstein doesn't give different names to the people expressing different points of view. Nevertheless you can see that what is going on here is, in effect, a discussion between someone who believes that Hobbes's story makes sense and someone who does not. This means that we have to be careful to decide which of the positions is the one that Wittgenstein is actually defending. In fact, he was defending the point of view of the position which has the last word in this passage: the point of view of the person who says that "this means that here we can't talk about 'right.' " We must try to see what Wittgenstein means by this claim and how he argues for it.
在我们试图弄清维特根斯坦在这里提出的论点是什么之前,我们应该注意到这段文字写作方式的一些特点。这段话颇像戏剧中的对话。有些哲学家,比如我们将在下一章讨论的柏拉图,实际上是通过写哲学对话来表达他们的论点的。维特根斯坦并没有给表达不同观点的人起不同的名字。尽管如此,你可以看到,这里实际上是一个认为霍布斯的故事有道理的人与不相信霍布斯的故事有道理的人之间的讨论。这就意味着,我们必须谨慎判断维特根斯坦究竟是在捍卫哪种立场。事实上,他是在为这段话中占最后发言权的立场的观点辩护:即说 "这意味着在这里我们不能谈论'权利'"的人的观点。" 我们必须试着看看维特根斯坦的这个说法是什么意思,以及他是如何论证的。
So how does he get to this conclusion? Let's make explicit the fact that two opposed positions are represented here, by identifying each of them with a character. We might as well call one of these characters "Hobbes" and the other "Wittgenstein." Then we can paraphrase this passage as if it were a philosophical dialogue; and, for the sake of concreteness, let's call the sensation a "twinge," as we did before, rather than using Wittgenstein's rather neutral term "S."
那么,他是如何得出这一结论的呢?让我们明确一个事实,即这里代表了两种截然相反的立场,将它们分别用一个人物来表示。我们不妨称其中一个人物为 "霍布斯",另一个为 "维特根斯坦"。然后,我们可以把这段话当作哲学对话来解析;为了具体起见,让我们像以前一样把这种感觉称为 "刺痛",而不是使用维特根斯坦的中性词 "S"。
HOBBES: For there to be a private language, all that is required is that I associate some word, "twinge," with a sensation and use that word to record the occasions when the sensation occurs.
霍布斯:要有一种私人语言,只需要我把 "绞痛 "这个词与某种感觉联系起来,并用这个词来记录这种感觉出现的场合。
WITTGENSTEIN: But how can you define the term "twinge"?
维特根斯坦:但你如何定义 "绞痛 "一词?
HOBBES: I can give a kind of ostensive definition. In an ostensive definition, we show what a term means by pointing to the thing it refers to. Thus, suppose we were trying to explain to someone-a person who didn't know English—what "red" meant. We could point to some red things and say "red" as we pointed to them. That would be an ostensive definition of the word "red."
霍布斯:我可以给出一种表层定义。在表层定义中,我们通过指出一个词所指的事物来说明这个词的含义。因此,假设我们要向某人--一个不懂英语的人--解释 "红色 "是什么意思。我们可以指着一些红色的东西说 "红色"。这就是 "红色 "一词的表层定义。
WITTGENSTEIN: But for an ostensive definition to be possible, one must be able to point to something, and in this case pointing is not possible. I cannot point to my own sensations.
维特根斯坦:但要使表层定义成为可能,人们必须能够指向某物,而在这种情况下,指向是不可能的。我无法指向我自己的感觉。
HOBBES: Naturally, you cannot literally point to a sensation, but you can direct your attention to it; and if, as you concentrate on the sensation, you say or write the name, then you can impress on yourself the connection between the name, "twinge," and the sensation.
霍布斯:当然,你不能真的指向一种感觉,但你可以把注意力引向它;如果当你集中注意力于这种感觉时,你能说出或写出这个名字,那么你就能给自己留下 "绞痛 "这个名字与这种感觉之间的联系。
WITTGENSTEIN: What do you mean by saying you "impress the connection on yourself"? All you can mean is that you do something whose consequence is that you remember the connection correctly in future. But what does it mean, in this case, to say that you have remembered it correctly? In order to be able to make sense of saying that you have remembered it correctly, you must have a way of telling whether you have remembered it correctly, a criterion of correctness. And how would you check, in this case, that you had remembered it right?
维特根斯坦:你说 "给自己留下联系的印象 "是什么意思?你只能说你做了一件事,而这件事的后果就是你将来能正确地记住这个联系。但在这种情况下,说你正确地记住了它又是什么意思呢?为了让 "你已经正确地记住了它 "这句话有意义,你必须有一种方法来判断你是否正确地记住了它,也就是正确与否的标准。那么,在这种情况下,你如何检查自己是否记对了呢?
This is the key step in the argument. Wittgenstein asks Hobbes in effect to consider the question "How do you know, when you say 'Aha, there's another twinge,' that it is the same experience you are having this time?" "Well," Hobbes might answer, "since nothing is more certain than what is going on in your own mind, there can be no doubt that you know."
这是论证的关键一步。维特根斯坦实际上要求霍布斯思考这样一个问题:"当你说'啊哈,又有一阵刺痛'时,你怎么知道这次你所经历的是同一种体验?""好吧,"霍布斯可能会回答,"既然没有什么比你自己心中的想法更确定,那么毫无疑问,你是知道的。"
But if it is possible for you to remember correctly, then it must be possible that you remember incorrectly. After all, according to Hobbes, it is the fact that we may forget an experience that makes names useful as marks. So suppose you have misremembered. Suppose that this experience is in fact not the same experience at all. How could you find out that this was so? And, if you can't find out, what use is the word "twinge"? The name gives you no guarantee that you have remembered correctly, if you have no guarantee that you know what the name refers to.
但是,如果你有可能记错,那么你也一定有可能记错。毕竟,根据霍布斯的观点,正是因为我们可能会忘记某段经历,所以名字才成为有用的标记。所以,假设你记错了。假设这段经历实际上根本不是同一段经历。你怎样才能发现这一点呢?如果你无法发现,"绞痛 "这个词又有什么用呢?如果你不能保证自己知道这个名字指的是什么,那么这个名字就不能保证你的记忆是正确的。
In order to bring out the force of Wittgenstein's argument, you might argue as follows. Hobbes's idea is that the name can help you remember that you have had the experience before. If it is possible that you have forgotten the experience of the twinge, however, then it is surely possible that you have forgotten the experience of naming the twinge. Do you need another "mark" that names the experience of naming the twinge? If every memory needs a name to help us remember it, then we seem to be caught in an infinite regress. Hobbes's use of marks seems to be like the old Indian theory that the world is supported on the back of an elephant. If the world
为了突出维特根斯坦论证的力度,你可以做如下论证。霍布斯的观点是,名字可以帮助你回忆起曾经有过的经历。然而,如果你有可能忘记了 "绞痛 "的体验,那么你肯定也有可能忘记了为 "绞痛 "命名的体验。你还需要另一个 "标记 "来命名 "绞痛 "的经历吗?如果每段记忆都需要一个名称来帮助我们记忆,那么我们似乎就陷入了无限的倒退之中。霍布斯对 "标记 "的使用似乎就像印度人的古老理论:世界是由大象的背支撑着的。如果世界

needs supporting, then the elephant needs supporting too. And if the elephant doesn't need support, then why does the world?
那么大象也需要支持。如果大象不需要支持,那么世界为什么需要支持呢?
An infinite regress argument like this shows
这样的无限倒退论证表明
a) that a proposed solution to a problem - in this case the problem of how the world stays in place-only creates another one-in this case, the problem of how the elephant stays in place, and
a) 一个问题的拟议解决方案--在这里是 "世界如何保持原位 "的问题--只会产生另一个问题--在这里是 "大象如何保持原位 "的问题,而且
b) that every time we use the proposed solution to deal with the new problem there will automatically be yet another one to solve.
b) 每次我们用提出的解决方案来处理新问题时,就会自动出现另一个需要解决的问题。
This shows that the proposed solution leads to the ridiculous position where we accept a strategy for solving a problem that creates a new problem for every problem it solves. In other words, it isn't a solution at all.
这表明,所提出的解决方案会导致一种荒谬的局面,即我们接受一种解决问题的策略,而这种策略每解决一个问题,就会产生一个新的问题。换句话说,这根本不是一种解决方案。
This infinite regress argument is the one that shows that there is no possibility in this case of checking that you are using the term "twinge" correctly. And, once this point is established, we have reached the heart of Wittgenstein's line of reasoning. Using the word "twinge" to refer to a private state involves conforming to the rule that you should say to yourself "twinge" only when you experience that private state. But the idea of trying to conform to a rule essentially involves the possibility that you might fail to apply it correctly, and in this case there is no such possibility. "Whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right." If we have mental states that are private, the argument shows that we can't talk about them, even to ourselves! Since it doesn't make sense to talk about such private states, Wittgenstein drew the conclusion that there could not be any: after all, if the sentence "There are private states" makes no sense, it certainly can't be true!
这个无限倒退的论证表明,在这种情况下,根本不可能检查你是否正确地使用了 "twinge "一词。这一点一旦确立,我们就进入了维特根斯坦推理思路的核心。使用 "twinge "一词来指代一种私人状态,就需要遵守这样一条规则:只有当你体验到这种私人状态时,你才应该对自己说 "twinge"。但是,试图遵守规则的想法本质上涉及到你可能无法正确运用规则的可能性,而在这种情况下,不存在这种可能性。"我认为正确的就是正确的。这只能说明在这里我们不能谈论'正确'。"如果我们的心理状态是私人的,那么这个论证就表明我们不能谈论它们,即使是对我们自己!既然谈论这种私人状态毫无意义,维特根斯坦就得出了 "不可能有私人状态 "的结论:毕竟,如果 "有私人状态 "这个句子毫无意义,它当然就不可能是真的!
We might be able to turn the strategy of the infinite regress argument against Wittgenstein at this point, however. For the idea of a criterion of correctness is, presumably, the idea of some standard against which we can check whether we are following the rule properly. But isn't this the idea that we are applying the rule: check your use of the first rule against the standard? And if so, don't we
不过,在这一点上,我们或许可以用无限倒退论证的策略来反驳维特根斯坦。因为 "正确性标准 "的概念大概就是 "某种标准 "的概念,我们可以对照这个标准来检查我们是否正确地遵循了规则。但这不就是我们在应用规则:对照标准检查你对第一条规则的使用吗?如果是这样的话,我们

need a criterion of correctness to apply this second rule? Once this chain begins, there's no stopping it. So perhaps we shouldn't let it begin. Perhaps there can, in fact, be rules that we apply without criteria of correctness.
应用第二条规则是否需要一个正确性标准?这个链条一旦开始,就无法停止。所以,也许我们不应该让它开始。也许,事实上,我们可以在没有正确性标准的情况下应用一些规则。
Actually, Wittgenstein himself pointed something like this out. For he argued that when we continue a numerical series (such as 1 , it doesn't help to say that we are following a rule, because any way we go on conforms to some rule or other. So he seems to have concluded that it was just a fact that human beings presented with a series eventually just start to "go on in the same way."
事实上,维特根斯坦本人也指出了类似的问题。因为他认为,当我们继续一个数列(如 1 , )时,说我们是在遵循一个规则并没有用,因为我们继续下去的任何方式都符合某种规则或其他规则。因此,他似乎得出了这样的结论:人类面对一个数列,最终会开始 "以同样的方式继续",这只是一个事实。
Notice that these problems about following rules don't seem to have anything special to do with the point about privacy. If I had introduced the word "twingle" to refer to a kind of marble, there would need to be some criterion of correctness to decide whether I was using the word correctly. It would not be enough for me to say "Yes, a twingle" or "No, not a twingle" when each marble is shown to me: that could be like Mary's using the word "tonk." You would only be persuaded I was following a rule if there was something about each twingle - that it had more green than red in it, or that it was of a certain size, or something of the sort-that made me pick it from other marbles. It would not be satisfactory if "whatever was going to seem right to me was right."
请注意,这些关于遵守规则的问题似乎与关于隐私的观点没有什么特别的关系。如果我用 "twingle "这个词来指一种大理石,那么就需要有某种正确性标准来判定我是否正确地使用了这个词。当每块弹珠展示给我看时,我说 "是的,一块 twingle "或 "不,不是一块 twingle "是不够的:这可能就像玛丽使用 "tonk "这个词一样。只有当每颗弹珠都有一些特点--绿色多于红色,或者有一定的大小,或者类似的东西--让我从其他弹珠中挑出它,你才会相信我是在遵守规则。如果 "在我看来对的就是对的",那就不令人满意了。
Now, this may seem persuasive when it's applied to kinds of marble, but what about the concepts in terms of which you check my use of a rule like "Call it 'a twingle' only if it's green and large." What criterion of correctness is there for the use of the word "green" here? You could say the rule I'm following is:
现在,当这适用于大理石的种类时,似乎很有说服力,但如果你检查我使用 "只有当它又绿又大时,才称它为'捻子'"这样的规则所依据的概念呢?这里使用 "绿色 "一词的正确性标准是什么?你可以说我遵循的规则是:

G: Call it "green" only if it's green.
G:只有绿色的才叫 "绿色"。

But if that will do as a criterion of correctness, why won't
但是,如果这样就能作为正确性的标准,为什么不能
T: Call it a "twinge" only if it's a twinge
T:"绞痛 "才叫 "绞痛
do as a criterion of correctness in the original case? The difference between and seems only to be that is a rule that other people can check that I am using correctly, whereas T isn't.
作为原始情况下的正确性标准? 之间的区别似乎只是 是一条别人可以检查我是否正确使用的规则,而 T 则不是。
But that suggests that the problem of the mental twinge isn't so
但这表明,精神痛苦的问题并不那么

much that I can't check on myself, but that other people can't check on me. And if that is what Wittgenstein thinks is the problem, then he seems to be begging the question. (An argument begs the question if it assumes what it sets out to prove.) For the private-language argument was meant to show that there couldn't be mental states that are knowable only by the person who has them; but now it looks as though that is one of the premises of the argument!
我不能检查我自己,而是其他人不能检查我。如果这就是维特根斯坦认为的问题所在,那么他似乎是在乞求问题。(如果一个论证假设了它想要证明的东西,那么这个论证就是在乞求问题。)因为私人语言论证的本意是要证明,不可能存在只有拥有心理状态的人才能知道的心理状态;但现在看来,这似乎是论证的前提之一!
There has been a good deal of philosophical discussion about whether Wittgenstein was right to make his claim about rule following. As I have said, much of the first part of his Philosophical Investigations is concerned with an attempt to defend this claim. If it is right, this seems to be a very powerful argument against the Hobbesian view that the primary function of language is to help us remember our own experiences. So you might want to think about whether you should accept Wittgenstein's view that following a rule requires a criterion of correctness. If you do accept Wittgenstein's claim about rules, you have good reason to prefer behaviorism to Cartesianism. (Though it's worth insisting at this point that Wittgenstein himself did not endorse behaviorism.)
关于维特根斯坦提出 "遵循规则 "的主张是否正确,哲学界已经进行了大量的讨论。正如我所说的,维特根斯坦《哲学研究》第一部分的大部分内容都在试图为这一主张辩护。如果它是正确的,那么这似乎是一个非常有力的论据,可以反驳霍布斯的观点,即语言的主要功能是帮助我们记住自己的经验。因此,你可能需要思考一下,你是否应该接受维特根斯坦的观点,即遵循规则需要一个正确性标准。如果你接受维特根斯坦关于规则的主张,你就有充分的理由选择行为主义,而不是笛卡尔主义。(尽管在这一点上值得坚持的是,维特根斯坦本人并不赞同行为主义)。
The behaviorist view of belief solves Descartes' problem: there is no difficulty for the behaviorist about the causal relations of mind and body. So the view has an answer to the mind-body question, namely, that having a mind is having a body with certain specific dispositions. And behaviorism certainly isn't open to the privatelanguage argument. So it solves the other-minds problem because it says that we can know about other people's minds just as easily as we know about any dispositions. We can know about your pain just as easily as we can know that a glass is fragile.
行为主义的信念观解决了笛卡尔的问题:行为主义者在心与身的因果关系上没有任何困难。因此,该观点对身心问题有了一个答案,即拥有心灵就是拥有一个具有某些特定倾向的身体。行为主义当然不会接受私语论证。因此,它解决了 "他心 "问题,因为它说,我们可以知道别人的心,就像我们知道任何处置一样容易。我们可以知道你的痛苦,就像我们知道玻璃杯易碎一样容易。
But behaviorism seems to create new problems as it solves these old ones. Here is one of them. The behavior that most obviously displays belief is speech: if you want to know what I believe, the first step is to ask me. So, as I've said, some behaviorists have held that to believe something is to be disposed (in certain specific sorts of circumstances) to say certain sorts of words-the words, in fact that would ordinarily be taken to be the expression of that belief. The trouble is that this theory makes it impossible, for example, to explain the beliefs of nonspeaking creatures (including infants) and has led some philosophers to deny that such creatures can have
但行为主义在解决这些老问题的同时,似乎又制造了新的问题。下面就是其中之一。最能体现信念的行为是说话:如果你想知道我相信什么,第一步就是问我。因此,正如我所说的,一些行为主义者认为,相信某件事就是(在某些特定的情况下)愿意说某些话--事实上,这些话通常会被认为是这种信念的表达。问题在于,这种理论无法解释不说话的生物(包括婴儿)的信念,并导致一些哲学家否认这类生物可以有

beliefs at all. Though there is something rather unsatisfactory about the privacy of the Cartesian mind, there is something simply crazy about the publicness of the behaviorist one. "Hello; you're fine. How am I?" says the behaviorist in a well-known cartoon, and the cartoonist has a point. We do know better than others about at least some aspects of our mental life. And the question for behaviorism is: why? It isn't just that we witness more of our actions than others. For in interpreting the minds of others we rely very much on their facial expressions; but we hardly ever see our own facial expressions at all. And, in fact, it seems obvious that I can tell what I am going to do next-what my current dispositions are-because I know (by, as it were, "looking inward") something of my own beliefs, desires and intentions.
信念。虽然笛卡尔思想的私密性有些令人不满意,但行为主义思想的公开性简直令人抓狂。"你好,你很好。我怎么样?"在一幅著名的漫画中,行为主义者如是说。至少在心理生活的某些方面,我们确实比别人更了解自己。行为主义的问题是:为什么?这不仅仅是因为我们比别人目睹了更多自己的行为。因为在解读他人的心理时,我们非常依赖于他们的面部表情;但我们却几乎看不到自己的面部表情。而且,事实上,我能知道自己下一步要做什么--我现在的倾向是什么--这似乎是显而易见的,因为我知道(通过 "向内看")我自己的一些信念、欲望和意图。
Neither behaviorism nor Descartes' theory seems to be quite right.
行为主义和笛卡尔的理论似乎都不太正确。

1.4 Computers as models of the mind
1.4 作为思维模型的计算机

In recent years, a new alternative to behaviorism has been suggested, which treats the mind neither as absurdly public, in the way behaviorism does, nor as completely private, in the way Cartesianism did. It is, in other words, a halfway house between behaviorism and Cartesianism, and it is called functionalism. Its recent appeal derives from the development of the very computers with which we began. For one way of expressing what functionalism claims is to say that it is the view that having a mind, for a body, is like having a program, for a machine.
近年来,有人提出了行为主义的新替代方案,它既不像行为主义那样把心智视为荒谬的公共性,也不像笛卡尔主义那样把心智视为完全的私人性。换句话说,它是介于行为主义和笛卡尔主义之间的中庸之道,被称为功能主义。它最近的吸引力来自计算机的发展,而我们正是从计算机开始的。表达功能主义主张的一种方式是,功能主义认为,对于身体而言,拥有思想就像拥有机器的程序一样。
A good way to start thinking about functionalist theories, however, is to look at similar theories of a simpler kind. Consider, then, what sort of theory you would need to give if you were trying to explain the workings not of something really complex, like a mind, but of something fairly simple and familiar, like a thermostat designed to keep the temperature above a certain level. What should a theory of such a thermostat say?
然而,开始思考功能主义理论的一个好方法,就是看看更简单的类似理论。那么,考虑一下,如果你要解释的不是真正复杂的东西(比如头脑)的运作,而是相当简单和熟悉的东西(比如旨在将温度保持在一定水平之上的恒温器)的运作,你需要给出什么样的理论?关于这种恒温器的理论应该怎么说呢?
It should say, of course, that a thermostat is a device that turns a heater on and off in such a way as to keep the temperature above a certain level. Consider a thermostat that keeps the temperature above 60 degrees. An analysis of what something has to be like to do this job can be stated in a little theory of the thermostat.
当然,应该说自动调温器是一种开启和关闭加热器以保持温度高于某一水平的装置。考虑一下将温度保持在 60 度以上的恒温器。关于恒温器的一个小理论,可以分析一下完成这项工作的东西必须是什么样的。
A thermostat has to have three working parts. The first, which is the heat sensor, has to have two states: in one state the heat sensor is , in the other it is OFF. It should be ON when the external temperature is below 60 degrees and OFF when it is above. It doesn't matter how the heat sensor is made. If it is a bimetallic strip, then maybe whether it is ON or OFF will depend on how bent the strip is; if it is a balloon of gas that expands and contracts as the temperature changes, then ON will be below a certain volume, OFF will be above. The second part is the switch, which needs to have two states also. It should go into the ON state if the heat sensor goes into its ON state and into its OFF state if the heat sensor goes OFF. Finally, we need the heat source, which should produce heat when the switch goes ON and stop producing heat when the switch goes OFF. (What I said about the heat sensor applies to the other parts too: it doesn't matter what they are made of as long as they do the job I have just described.)
自动调温器必须有三个工作部件。第一个是热传感器,它必须有两种状态:一种状态是热传感器处于 ,另一种状态是处于关闭状态。当外部温度低于 60 度时,它应该处于打开状态;当外部温度高于 60 度时,它应该处于关闭状态。热传感器的制造方式并不重要。如果是双金属条,那么接通还是断开可能取决于双金属条的弯曲程度;如果是气体气球,随着温度的变化会膨胀和收缩,那么低于一定体积时接通,高于一定体积时断开。第二部分是开关,它也需要有两种状态。如果热传感器进入 "开 "的状态,开关就会进入 "开 "的状态;如果热传感器处于 "关 "的状态,开关就会进入 "关 "的状态。最后,我们还需要热源,它应该在开关接通时产生热量,在开关断开时停止产生热量。(我所说的关于热传感器的内容也适用于其他部件:只要它们能完成我刚才描述的工作,由什么材料制成并不重要)。
This explanation of the nature of a thermostat also shows what a functionalist theory is, for this little theory is a functionalist theory. And what makes it functionalist is that it has all of the following characteristics:
对恒温器性质的解释也说明了什么是功能主义理论,因为这个小理论就是功能主义理论。它之所以是功能主义的,是因为它具有以下所有特征:
It says how a thermostat functions by saying:
这句话道出了恒温器的功能:
a) what external events in the world produce changes inside the system-here, changes in temperature cause the sensor to go ON and OFF;
a) 世界上的哪些外部事件会导致系统内部发生变化--在这里,温度的变化会导致传感器 "开 "或 "关";
b) what internal events produce other internal events-here, changes from ON to OFF in the sensor produce changes from ON to OFF in the switch; and
b) 哪些内部事件会产生其他内部事件--在这里,传感器从 ON 到 OFF 的变化会导致开关从 ON 到 OFF 的变化;以及
c) what internal events lead to changes in the external world-here changes from OFF to ON in the switch lead to increased heat-output; changes from ON to OFF produced reduced heat-output.
c) 什么样的内部事件会导致外部世界发生变化--在这里,开关从 "关 "到 "开 "的变化会导致热量输出增加;从 "开 "到 "关 "的变化会导致热量输出减少。
Anything at all that meets these specifications functions as a thermostat, and anything that has parts that play these roles can be said to have a heat sensor, a switch, and a heat source of the appropriate kind. In other words, at the most general level, a functionalist theory says what the internal states of a system are by fixing how they interact with input, and with other internal states, to produce output. What I mean by saying that the theory says what states are, can be explained by way of an example: our thermostat theory says what a heat sensor is by saying that it
任何符合这些规格的东西都具有恒温器的功能,而任何具有发挥这些作用的部件的东西都可以说是具有热传感器、开关和适当类型的热源。换句话说,在最一般的层面上,功能主义理论通过确定系统的内部状态如何与输入以及其他内部状态相互作用以产生输出,来说明系统的内部状态是什么。我所说的理论说明状态是什么,可以用一个例子来解释:我们的恒温器理论说明热传感器是什么,就是说它

a) changes from ON to OFF (and back again) as the external temperature falls below (and rises above) 60 degrees, and
a) 当外部温度低于(或高于)60 度时,从 ON(开启)变为 OFF(关闭),以及
b) causes changes that lead to an increase in heat-output if it is , and to a decrease when it is OFF.
b) 在 时,会导致热量输出增加,而在关断时,会导致热量输出减少。
A heat sensor is thus characterized by its functional role, which is the way it functions in mediating between input and output in interaction with other internal states. And we can say, in general, that a functionalist theory says what a state is by saying how it functions in the internal working of a system.
因此,热传感器的特征在于它的功能作用,即它在与其他内部状态的相互作用中,在输入和输出之间发挥中介作用的方式。一般来说,我们可以说,功能主义理论通过描述一个状态在系统内部工作中的功能,来说明它是什么。
We can apply this general model to computers. They have large numbers of internal, usually electronic, states. Programming a computer involves linking up these states to each other and to the outside of the machine so that when you put some input into the machine, the internal states change in certain predictable ways, and sometimes these changes lead it to produce some output. So, in a simple case, you put in a string of symbols like " " at a terminal, and the machine's internal states change in such a way that it outputs " 4 " at a printer. We can now see why computer programs can be thought of as functionalist theories of the computer. For a computer program is just a way of specifying how the internal states of the computer will be changed by inputting signals from disk or tape or from a keyboard, and how those changes in internal state will lead to output from the computer.
我们可以将这一通用模型应用于计算机。计算机有大量的内部状态,通常是电子状态。计算机编程涉及将这些状态相互连接起来,并与计算机外部连接起来,这样当你向计算机输入一些信息时,内部状态就会以某些可预测的方式发生变化,有时这些变化会导致计算机产生一些输出结果。因此,在一个简单的例子中,你在终端输入一串符号,比如 " ",机器的内部状态就会发生变化,从而在打印机上输出 "4"。现在我们可以明白,为什么计算机程序可以被视为计算机的功能主义理论。因为计算机程序只是一种方式,它规定了从磁盘、磁带或键盘输入信号将如何改变计算机的内部状态,以及这些内部状态的变化将如何导致计算机的输出。
From one point of view-the engineer's-all that is going on in a computer is a series of electronic changes. From another-the programmer's-the machine is adding 2 and 2 to make 4 . People who are functionalists about the mind-which is what I shall mean by "functionalists" from now on-believe that there are similarly two ways of looking at the mind-brain. The neurophysiologist's way, which is like the engineer's, sees the brain in terms of electrical currents or biochemical reactions. The psychologist's way, which is like the programmer's, sees the mind in terms of beliefs, thoughts, desires, and other mental states and events. Yet just as there is only one computer, with two levels of description, so, the functionalist claims, there is only one mind-brain, with its two levels of description. In fact, just as we can say what electrical events in a computer correspond to its adding numbers, a functionalist can claim that we
从工程师的角度来看,计算机中发生的只是一系列电子变化。从另一个角度--程序员的角度--来看,机器正在把 2 加 2 变成 4。对心智持功能学派观点的人--也就是我现在所说的 "功能学派"--认为,看待心智-大脑同样有两种方法。神经生理学家的方法就像工程师的方法一样,从电流或生化反应的角度来看待大脑。心理学家的方式就像程序员的方式,从信念、思想、欲望以及其他心理状态和事件的角度来看待心智。然而,正如只有一台计算机,却有两个层次的描述,功能主义者也声称,只有一个心脑,却有两个层次的描述。事实上,正如我们可以说计算机中的哪些电子事件对应于它的数字加法一样,功能主义者也可以声称我们

can find out which brain events correspond to which thoughts. Functionalism thus leads to monism. There is only one kind of thing, even though there are different levels of theory about it.
可以找出哪些大脑事件与哪些思想相对应。因此,功能主义导致了一元论。事物只有一种,尽管对它有不同层次的理论。
Functionalism starts with an analogy between computers and minds. It doesn't say that computers have minds. But if we go carefully through the functionalist's arguments, we will see how you might end up holding that they could have minds, even if they don't yet.
功能主义首先将计算机与思维进行类比。它并没有说计算机有思想。但是,如果我们仔细研究功能论者的论证,我们就会发现,即使计算机还没有思想,你最终也会认为它们可能有思想。

1.5 Why should there be a functionalist theory?
1.5 为什么要有功能主义理论?

But before we look in more detail at some functionalist proposals, it will help if we consider why anyone should think that it ought to be possible to construct a functionalist theory.
不过,在我们更详细地研究一些功能主义的提议之前,我们不妨先考虑一下为什么有人会认为应该有可能构建一种功能主义理论。
In section 1.2 I raised two questions that a theory of the mind ought to answer: "What justifies our belief that other minds exist at all?" and "How are we to explain the relations of a mind and its body?" Functionalism answers the second question quite simply: a person's body is what has the states that function as his or her mind. Just as the physical parts that make up the "body" of the thermostat are what function as heat sensor, switch and heater, so the physical "hardware" of a computer is what has the states that function according to the program.
在第 1.2 节中,我提出了心灵理论应该回答的两个问题:"我们有什么理由相信其他心灵的存在?"以及 "我们如何解释心灵与其身体的关系?"功能主义对第二个问题的回答非常简单:一个人的身体具有作为其心灵的功能状态。就像构成恒温器 "身体 "的物理部件具有热传感器、开关和加热器的功能一样,计算机的物理 "硬件 "也具有根据程序运行的状态。
But consider now what functionalism implies in answer to the first question. To have a mind, functionalists claim, is to have internal states that function in a certain way, a way that determines how a person will react to input-in the form of sensations and perceptions. The answer to the other-minds problem must, therefore, be that we know about other minds because we have evidence that people have internal states that function in the right way. And, in fact, we do have such evidence, as the behaviorists pointed out. People with minds act in ways that are caused by what is going on in their minds, and what is going on in their minds is caused by things that happen around them. One reason for being a functionalist is, thus, that it allows you to deny the Cartesian claim that minds are essentially private, that only you can know what is going on in your mind. Wittgenstein's private-language argument gives us a reason for doubting that minds can be essentially private. We shall see in the next chapter why many philosophers have held that nothing that
但现在我们来看看功能主义在回答第一个问题时意味着什么。功能论者认为,拥有思想就是拥有以某种方式运作的内部状态,这种方式决定了一个人将如何对输入做出反应--以感觉和知觉的形式。因此,"其他心灵 "问题的答案必须是,我们之所以知道其他心灵,是因为我们有证据表明,人们拥有以正确方式运作的内部状态。事实上,我们确实有这样的证据,正如行为主义者所指出的那样。有思想的人的行为方式是由他们的思想所引起的,而他们的思想又是由周围发生的事情所引起的。因此,成为功能主义者的一个原因是,它允许你否认笛卡尔的主张,即思想本质上是私人的,只有你自己才能知道你的思想在发生什么。维特根斯坦的 "私人语言 "论证为我们提供了一个理由,使我们可以怀疑思维本质上是私人的。我们将在下一章中看到,为什么许多哲学家都认为,没有什么东西是

exists can be knowable by only one person. For the thesis that there are things that cannot, even in principle, be known by anyone appears inconsistent with some very basic facts about knowledge. To make these arguments now, I would have to step ahead of this chapter's topic. But when you have read what I say in the next chapter (2.6) about verificationism, you might want to think again about whether functionalists are right in holding that it is an advantage of their theory that it denies that the mind is essentially private.
只有一个人可以知道。因为有些东西即使在原则上也不可能为任何人所知,这一论点似乎与关于知识的一些非常基本的事实不符。现在要提出这些论点,我就必须超越本章的主题。不过,当你读完我在下一章(2.6)中所说的关于验证论的内容后,你也许会想再思考一下,功能主义者认为他们的理论的一个优点是否认心智本质上是私有的,这种观点是否正确。

1.6 Functionalism: A first problem
1.6 功能主义:第一个问题

So far what I have said about functionalism is very abstract. If we are to make it plausible, we will need a more concrete case to consider. Take beliefs.
到目前为止,我所说的功能主义是非常抽象的。如果我们要让它变得可信,就需要考虑一个更具体的案例。就拿信念来说吧。
Beliefs, for a functionalist, are characterized as states that are caused by sensations and perceptions of the appropriate kind, and that can cause other beliefs, and that interact with desires to produce action. Thus, for example, seeing a gray sky causes me to believe that the sky is gray, which may lead me to believe that it will rain, which may lead me to take my umbrella, because I desire not to get wet. Here the input is sensation and perception and the output is action; the internal states that mediate between the two are beliefs and desires.
在功能主义者看来,信念的特点是由适当类型的感觉和知觉引起的状态,这些状态可以引起其他信念,并与欲望相互作用产生行动。例如,看到灰蒙蒙的天空会让我相信天空是灰色的,这可能会让我相信会下雨,这可能会让我打伞,因为我不想被淋湿。在这里,输入是感觉和知觉,输出是行动;介于两者之间的内部状态是信念和欲望。
There is an immediate and obvious problem for anyone who wants to say what beliefs are in a theory of this kind. Remember that a functionalist says what an internal state of the system is by describing its functional role: by saying how it functions in mediating between input and output in interaction with other internal states. Suppose we try to do this for some particular belief-say, the belief that the sky is gray. You might think you can say fairly precisely what would cause this belief. Looking up, eyes open, fully conscious, at a gray sky ought to do it. But the trouble is that this is really neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for acquiring the belief. It isn't necessary, because you can acquire the belief in lots of other ways: looking at the sky's reflection in a pond, for example, or listening to a weather forecaster. It isn't sufficient, because, in suitably weird circumstances, you might reasonably believe that the sky wasn't gray when it looked gray. (Suppose, for example, I told you I had inserted gray contact lenses in your eye while you were asleep; suppose you
对于任何想在这种理论中说明信念是什么的人来说,都有一个直接而明显的问题。请记住,功能主义者是通过描述系统内部状态的功能作用来说明系统内部状态是什么的,即说明系统内部状态在与其他内部状态的相互作用中是如何在输入与输出之间发挥中介作用的。假设我们尝试对某种特定的信念--比如说,"天空是灰色的 "这一信念--进行这样的描述。你可能会认为你可以相当准确地说出是什么导致了这种信念。睁开眼睛,完全清醒地抬头仰望灰色的天空,应该就能做到这一点。但问题是,这其实既不是获得这种信念的必要条件,也不是充分条件。它不是必要条件,因为你可以通过很多其他方式获得这种信念:比如,看天空在池塘中的倒影,或者听天气预报员的预报。它不是充分条件,因为在适当的奇怪情况下,你可以合理地相信天空看起来是灰色的,但它并不是灰色的(例如,假设我告诉你,我在你睡觉的时候把灰色隐形眼镜塞进了你的眼睛;假设你

believed me. Then it would be very strange indeed if you came to believe the sky was gray when it looked gray.) The general point, so far as input goes, is that whether the evidence of your senses would lead you to some particular belief-here, that the sky is graydepends on what else you believe.
相信我。如果天空看起来是灰色的,你却相信它是灰色的,那就真的很奇怪了)。就输入而言,一般的观点是,你的感官证据是否会引导你产生某种特定的信念--在这里,天空是灰色的--取决于你还相信什么。
A similar problem arises with output, though here the issue is even more complex. For what you do on the basis of the belief that the sky is gray depends not only on what other beliefs you have-for example, do you believe that gray skies "mean" rain?-but also on what desires you have-for example, do you want to avoid getting wet? So whereas for a heat sensor in a thermostat the effect of input doesn't depend on an indefinitely large number of other internal states, in the case of belief in a mind it does.
输出也有类似的问题,不过这里的问题更加复杂。因为你基于 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念所做的事情,不仅取决于你还有哪些其他信念--例如,你是否相信灰色的天空 "意味着 "下雨--而且还取决于你有哪些欲望--例如,你是否想避免被淋湿?因此,对于恒温器中的热传感器来说,输入的效果并不取决于无限多的其他内部状态,而对于头脑中的信念来说,它则是如此。
In finding a way to handle this increased complexity, the analogy with the computer is helpful. For, in this respect, computers are more like minds than like thermostats. The results of inputting a number to a computer depend also on a complex array of internal states. If I put in a " " to an adding program after putting in " 2 " followed by " " followed by " 2 ", then the output will be " 4 "; but if I put in the same sign, " ", after putting in " 4 " followed by " + " followed by " 2 ", then the output will be " 6 ". Yet we can still give a functional role to each internal state of the system: we can do it by saying, for example, that when the adding program is in the functional state of having a " 2 " stored, entering " + " followed by any numeral, " ", followed by " " will result in outputting the numeral " ". The general strategy is this: we must specify the functional role of a state, A, by saying what will happen, for any input, if the computer is in state A, but in a way that depends on what the other internal states are.
在寻找处理这种日益增加的复杂性的方法时,与计算机的类比很有帮助。因为在这方面,计算机更像大脑,而不是恒温器。向计算机输入一个数字的结果也取决于一系列复杂的内部状态。如果我在输入 "2",然后是 " ",接着是 "2 "之后,再向加法程序输入一个 " ",那么输出结果将是 "4";但如果我在输入 "4",然后是 "+",接着是 "2 "之后,再输入同样的符号 " ",那么输出结果将是 "6"。然而,我们仍然可以给系统的每个内部状态赋予功能性作用:例如,当加法运算程序处于存储有 "2 "的功能状态时,输入 "+"后的任意数字 " ",然后输入 " ",就会输出数字 " "。一般的策略是这样的:我们必须说明一个状态 A 的功能作用,即如果计算机处于状态 A,对于任何输入都会发生什么,但其方式取决于其他内部状态。
So for a functionalist account of the belief that the sky is gray, we can say, at the level of input, that it will be caused by looking at gray skies, provided you don't believe that there's some reason why the sky should look gray when it isn't; and that it will also be caused by acquiring any other belief that you think is evidence that the sky is gray. And we can say, at the level of output, that having the belief will lead you to try to perform those actions that would best satisfy your desires - whatever they are-if the sky was in fact gray. Which actions you think those are will itself depend on your other beliefs.
因此,对于功能主义关于 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念的解释,我们可以说,在输入的层面上,只要你不相信天空看起来是灰色的,那么看灰色的天空就会导致你产生这种信念;如果你认为其他信念是天空是灰色的证据,那么产生这种信念也会导致你产生这种信念。在输出的层面上,我们可以说,如果天空真的是灰色的,那么有了这个信念,你就会尝试去做那些最能满足你的欲望的行为--不管它们是什么。你认为这些行动是什么,本身就取决于你的其他信念。
It may look as though we have still not solved the problem we started out with. For this definition of the belief that the sky is gray still seems to define it in terms of other states of belief and desire, and these other states are ones we want to give functionalist definitions also. So, you might ask, isn't this sort of definition going to be circular? We are going to define the belief that the sky is gray partly in terms of what it will lead you to do if you believe that gray skies mean rain; but aren't we going to have to define the belief that gray skies mean rain partly in terms of what it will lead you to do when you believe the skies are gray?
看起来,我们似乎仍然没有解决我们一开始提出的问题。因为 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念的定义似乎仍然是根据其他信念和欲望的状态来定义它的,而这些其他状态也是我们想要给予功能主义定义的。那么,你可能会问,这种定义难道不是循环论证吗?我们要定义 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念,部分原因在于,如果你相信灰色的天空意味着下雨,它会引导你做什么;但是,我们不是又要定义 "灰色的天空意味着下雨 "这一信念,部分原因在于,当你相信天空是灰色的时候,它会引导你做什么?
This is a genuine problem if you want to use functionalist definitions, but there is a procedure that allows us to solve it in a way that avoids this circularity. Applying it in the case of beliefs is extremely complex, so it will help, once more, to start with a simpler case.
如果你想使用功能主义的定义,这确实是一个问题,但有一个程序可以让我们以避免这种循环性的方式来解决这个问题。在信念的情况下应用这个程序是极其复杂的,所以我们还是从一个更简单的情况开始吧。

1.7 A simple-minded functionalist theory of pain
1.7 思想简单的功能主义疼痛理论

Pain is a mental state. Let's suppose we are trying to produce a functionalist theory of it. We begin by gathering together all the truths we normally suppose a mental state must satisfy if it is to be a pain. The American philosopher Ned Block has suggested how we might do it, for what he calls the "ridiculously simple theory," which we'll call " ", that
疼痛是一种精神状态。假设我们正试图提出一种功能主义理论。我们首先要把我们通常认为一种心理状态若要成为一种痛苦,就必须满足的所有真理集合起来。美国哲学家奈德-布洛克(Ned Block)建议我们这样做,他称之为 "简单得可笑的理论",我们称之为 " ",即
: "Pain is caused by pinpricks and causes worry and the emission of loud noises, and worry, in turn, causes brow wrinkling."
"针刺引起疼痛,引起忧虑和发出巨响,忧虑又引起眉头紧皱"。
is ridiculously simple. But we can still use it to elucidate some general points about functionalist theories of the mind. For with this simple theory we can see how the charge of circularity might be avoided.
简单得令人发指。但我们仍然可以用它来阐明关于功能主义心智理论的一些一般性观点。因为通过这个简单的理论,我们可以看到如何避免循环论的指控。
So, begin with . We write it as one sentence. Then, we replace every reference in the sentence to pain-whether actual or potential-by a letter, and each other, distinct, mental term by a different letter, to get
因此,从 开始。我们把它写成一个句子。然后,我们用一个字母替换句子中每一个提到疼痛(无论是实际的还是潜在的)的地方,并用不同的字母替换其他每一个不同的心理术语,得到
is caused by pinpricks and causes and the emission of loud noises, and Y, in turn, causes brow wrinkling.
是由针刺引起的,会导致 和发出巨响,而 Y 又会导致眉头皱起。
(In this case, since there is only one other mental term, "worry," we only need the one extra letter, ; but in other cases, as we'll see, we would need many more.) The next step is to write in front of this the words "There exists an , and there exists a , and there exists a ... which are such that" for as many letters as we introduced when we removed the mental terms. So, in this simple case, we get
(在这种情况下,由于只有一个心理术语 "担心",我们只需要一个额外的字母 ;但在其他情况下,正如我们将要看到的,我们需要更多的字母)。下一步是在前面写下 "存在一个 ,存在一个 ,存在一个......,它们是这样的",字母的数量与我们删除心理术语时引入的字母数量相同。因此,在这个简单的例子中,我们可以得到
R: There exists an , and there exists a , which are such that is caused by pinpricks and causes and the emission of loud noises, and , in turn, causes brow wrinkling.
R:存在一个 ,也存在一个 ,它们是这样的: 由针刺引起,并导致 和发出巨响,而 又会导致眉头紧皱。
Notice that we now have a sentence, , that has no mental terms in it. It allows us to say how pain works without relying circularly on knowing what "worry" is. It would be circular to rely on our understanding of what "worry" is, because, in a full functionalist theory, we would be going on to define worry later. Now, finally, we can define what it is for someone to be in pain. For we can say that someone-let's call her Mary-is in pain if there exist states of Mary's, , and , which are such that is caused by pinpricks and causes and the emission of loud noises, and , in turn, causes brow wrinkling, and Mary has X. If Mary has such a state, a state that functions in this way, she is in pain.
请注意,我们现在有一个句子 ,其中没有任何心理术语。它让我们能够说出疼痛是如何起作用的,而不必循环地依赖于我们对 "担心 "是什么的理解。如果依赖于我们对 "担心 "是什么的理解,那将是循环论证,因为在一个完整的功能主义理论中,我们会在后面继续定义 "担心"。现在,我们终于可以给 "痛苦 "下定义了。 因为我们可以说,如果存在这样的状态,即 由针刺引起并导致 和发出巨响,而 又反过来导致眉头皱起,并且玛丽有 X,那么这个人--让我们称她为玛丽--就处于痛苦之中。如果玛丽有这样的状态,一个以这种方式发挥作用的状态,她就处于痛苦之中。
Now, is, as I said, ridiculously simple. But it has allowed us to see how to define one mental state-pain-that can only be explained in terms of its interactions with another mental stateworry-without assuming that we can define the other mental state first.
现在,正如我所说, ,简单得令人发指。但它让我们看到了如何定义一种心理状态--"痛",而这种心理状态只能通过它与另一种心理状态 "忧 "的相互作用来解释--而不必假设我们可以先定义另一种心理状态。

1.8 Ramsey's solution to the first problem
1.8 拉姆齐对第一个问题的解答

Now that we have seen how to solve the problem of defining one mental state without circularly assuming that we have already defined some others, let's see if we can see how to do this for belief. If we were to try to do this for belief, we should need many more letters than "X" and "Y." We call these letters "variables," and they function in a way I shall explain in the chapter on language. But the procedure would be exactly the same. We would first write down all the claims about beliefs and desires and evidence and action that we think have to be satisfied by a creature that has a mind. This body of
既然我们已经看到了如何在不循环地假设我们已经定义了其他一些心理状态的情况下解决定义一种心理状态的问题,那么让我们来看看如何为信念做这件事。如果我们试图为信念下定义,我们需要的字母应该比 "X "和 "Y "多得多。我们称这些字母为 "变量",它们的作用我将在语言一章中解释。但程序是完全一样的。我们首先要写下所有我们认为有思想的生物必须满足的关于信念、欲望、证据和行动的要求。这些

ideas is what is sometimes called our "folk psychology": it's the shared consensus of our culture about how minds work, the "theory" we learn as we grow up. If we join all the claims of folk psychology together with "and's" we will have one very long sentence, and that will be our functionalist theory of the mind. Call that sentence MT (for "mental theory"). From MT, we would then take out all the mental terms referring to beliefs and desires and replace them with "variables." The result of this we can call . Finally, for each variable we should write "There exists a . . ." in front of MT", and we would have a new sentence, which didn't have any mental terms in it. That sentence is called the Ramsey-sentence of the theory MT, because the British philosopher Frank Ramsey invented this procedure. The Ramsey-sentence of MT says, in effect, that something that has a mind has a large number of internal states - one for each variable-that interact with input and with each other in certain specific ways, to produce behavior. (I called the final version of the simple-minded theory of pain " ," because it's the Ramsey-sentence of the simple-minded theory of pain.)
思想有时被称为我们的 "民间心理学":它是我们的文化中关于思维如何运作的共识,是我们在成长过程中学到的 "理论"。如果我们把民间心理学的所有主张用 "和 "连接起来,就会得到一个很长的句子,这就是我们的功能主义心智理论。把这句话称为 MT("心智理论 "的意思)。从 MT 中,我们可以去掉所有涉及信念和欲望的心理术语,代之以 "变量"。这样得到的结果我们可以称之为 。最后,对于每个变量,我们都应该在 MT 前面写上 "存在一个......",这样我们就有了一个新句子,其中没有任何心理术语。这个句子被称为 MT 理论的拉姆齐句(Ramsey-sentence),因为英国哲学家弗兰克-拉姆齐(Frank Ramsey)发明了这个程序。MT的拉姆齐句实际上是说,有思想的东西有大量的内部状态--每个变量有一个内部状态--这些状态以某些特定的方式与输入和其他状态相互作用,从而产生行为。(我把头脑简单的疼痛理论的最终版本称为 " ",因为它是头脑简单的疼痛理论的拉姆齐句)。
In 1.4 I said that many philosophers who have thought about the other-minds question have wanted to be able to define mental states in such a way that it was always possible, at least in principle, that somebody else should know what is going on in your mind. Notice that this functionalist theory, set up in the way Ramsey suggested, seems to make this possible. For Ramsey's method allowed us to define pain in terms of its causes and effects, its functional role, in such a way that if we have evidence that someone's internal states would make them react in certain public ways-brow wrinkling and the emission of loud noises - in response to certain public eventspinpricks - we have evidence that they are in pain. It allowed us to do this without requiring that we know anything about the other internal states - in this case, worry- except that they too would have certain causes and effects, which could, in the end, be seen to show up in what people do. For the Ramsey-sentence of MT is true of someone if and only if he or she has a system of internal states that produces the right pattern of responses in output-in this case, brow wrinkling and loud noises-to input-in this case, pinpricks.
我在 1.4 中说过,许多思考过他心问题的哲学家都希望能够以这样一种方式来定义心理状态,即至少在原则上,别人总是有可能知道你心里在想什么。请注意,以拉姆齐建议的方式建立起来的功能主义理论似乎可以做到这一点。因为拉姆齐的方法让我们能够根据疼痛的原因和影响、功能作用来定义疼痛,这样,如果我们有证据表明某人的内心状态会让他们在某些公共场合做出反应--皱眉头和发出巨大的声音--以回应某些公共事件--我们就有证据表明他们感到痛苦。它让我们能够做到这一点,而不需要我们对其他内部状态--在这种情况下是担心--有任何了解,只是它们也会有一定的原因和影响,而这些原因和影响最终会在人们的行为中显现出来。因为 MT 的拉姆齐句子是真实的,当且仅当他或她有一个内部状态系统,该系统在输出(本例中为皱眉和大声喧哗)中对输入(本例中为针刺)产生正确的反应模式。
In the more complex case of beliefs, as we saw, we can proceed in a similar way. But here, just because the case is more complex and
正如我们所看到的,在信念这一更为复杂的情况下,我们可以采用类似的方法。但在这里,正因为情况更复杂,而且

there are so many more internal states, it may be very hard, in practice, to discover that the right complex pattern of dispositions to respond to input exists. So, while allowing us to take mental states seriously, functionalism also allows us to believe that they might be very difficult-indeed, practically impossible-for anyone, except perhaps the person who has them, to find out about. (I'll say something about how a functionalist might explain our knowledge of our own states later, in section 1.11.) It is in this sense that functionalism is a halfway house between Descartes and behaviorism. For Descartes, as we saw, left open the possibility that someone could have mental states that no one else could know existed even in principle. Functionalism denies this. Any evidence of the existence of the right (extremely complex) pattern of dispositions will be evidence of your mental states. For behaviorism, every mental state is nothing more than a disposition to respond to input. Functionalism denies this also. What someone with a certain belief will do when stimulated depends, the functionalist claims, on other internal states as well.
由于有如此多的内部状态,在实践中可能很难发现存在着对输入做出反应的正确的复杂处置模式。因此,在允许我们认真对待心理状态的同时,功能主义也允许我们相信,除了拥有心理状态的人之外,任何人都很难--事实上,几乎不可能--发现心理状态。(我稍后会在第 1.11 节中谈谈功能论者如何解释我们对自身状态的了解)。正是在这个意义上,功能主义是笛卡尔与行为主义之间的中途站。正如我们所看到的,笛卡尔认为有人可能会有别人无法知道的心理状态,即使在原则上也是如此。功能主义否认了这一点。任何存在正确的(极其复杂的)处置模式的证据,都是你的心理状态的证据。在行为主义看来,每一种心理状态都不过是对输入做出反应的处置。功能主义也否认这一点。功能论者认为,拥有某种信念的人在受到刺激时会做什么,还取决于其他的内在状态。

1.9 Functionalism: A second problem
1.9 功能主义:第二个问题

I said, in 1.1, that from an epistemological point of view, it seemed plausible to say that had a mind. We have been looking, in the last three sections, at functionalism about minds from an essentially epistemological point of view. We have seen that functionalism offers a plausible answer to the other-minds question: we can know, at least in principle, what is going on in other peoples' minds. But from the phenomenological point of view, which denied that machines could have minds, functionalism doesn't look so attractive. For if functionalism is right and to have a mind is to have certain internal states that function in a certain way, then anything that has states that function in the right way has a mind. That seems to have the consequence that if a computer had internal states that functioned in the right way, it would have a mind. And, the phenomenologist says, that is quite wrong. It isn't enough to have internal states that lead you to respond in the right way; you must also have an inner life. That inner life has to have the sort of character that Descartes thought it had. It has to be conscious mental life. And a machine could quite well behave in the right way without having any mental life at all.
我在 1.1 中说过,从认识论的角度来看,说 有思想似乎是可信的。在过去的三节中,我们主要从认识论的角度探讨了关于心灵的功能主义。我们已经看到,功能主义为 "他心智 "问题提供了一个合理的答案:我们至少在原则上可以知道其他人的心智是怎么回事。但从现象学的角度来看,功能主义否认机器可能有思想,因此看起来并不那么有吸引力。因为如果功能主义是正确的,而拥有思想就是拥有以某种方式发挥作用的特定内部状态,那么任何拥有以正确方式发挥作用的状态的东西都拥有思想。这似乎会导致这样一个结果:如果计算机具有以正确方式运行的内部状态,那么它就会有思想。现象学家说,这是大错特错的。仅仅有导致你以正确方式做出反应的内部状态是不够的;你还必须有一种内在生活。这种内在生活必须具有笛卡尔所认为的那种特征。它必须是有意识的精神生活。机器完全可以在没有任何精神生活的情况下做出正确的行为。
If the phenomenologists are right, it follows that functionalism has failed to capture the essence of what it is to have a mind. For if they are right, a functionalist might say that a creature (or a machine) had a mind because it had internal states with the right functions, even though it did not, in fact, have a mind because it had no inner life. To understand this objection to functionalism, we must first try to make more precise what "having an inner life" means. The phenomenologist will usually explain this by saying that the difference between a creature with an inner life and one without an inner life is that there is something that it feels like to be a creature with an inner life, but nothing that it feels like to be a creature without one. If a person has an experience-say, seeing something redwe can ask what it feels like to have that experience. So, for example, if you, like me, are neither blind nor color-blind, then you know what it feels like to see red.
如果现象学家是对的,那么功能主义就没有抓住 "心灵 "的本质。因为如果他们是对的,那么功能主义者可能会说,一个生物(或机器)有思想,因为它有具有正确功能的内部状态,尽管事实上它并没有思想,因为它没有内在生命。要理解对功能主义的这一反对意见,我们必须首先明确 "具有内在生命 "的含义。现象学家通常会这样解释:有内在生命的生物与没有内在生命的生物之间的区别在于,有内在生命的生物有某种感觉,而没有内在生命的生物则没有任何感觉。如果一个人有了某种经历,比如看到了红色的东西,我们就可以问他这种经历是什么感觉。因此,举例来说,如果你和我一样既不是盲人也不是色盲,那么你就知道看到红色是什么感觉。
Suppose there was a machine that was sensitive to red things and had internal states that led it to say "That's red" and, generally, to do all the things that people do with visual information. The phenomenologist believes we could still not be sure that the machine knew what it felt like to see red. That is why the phenomenologist thinks that a functionalist might mistakenly think that a machine had a mind.
假设有一台机器对红色的东西很敏感,它的内部状态会让它说 "那是红色的",一般来说,它会做所有人们用视觉信息做的事情。现象学家认为,我们仍然无法确定这台机器知道看到红色是什么感觉。这就是为什么现象学家认为功能主义者可能会错误地认为机器有思想。
How are we to settle this dispute between the phenomenologist and the functionalist? It will help, I think, to consider it in the light of specific examples again; and, as we shall see, and your mother provide just the right kinds of examples.
我们该如何解决现象学家与功能学家之间的争论呢?我认为,再次从具体事例的角度来考虑这个问题会有所帮助;正如我们将会看到的, 和你的母亲提供了恰如其分的事例。

1.10 again 1.10 again

was a machine that would behave in every situation exactly like your mother. A machine that is made to have internal states that function like a human mind we can call functionally equivalent to a person. and your mother are functionally equivalent. But phenomenologists might have different attitudes to them. The phenomenologist might say:
是一台在任何情况下都能表现得和你母亲一模一样的机器。如果一台机器的内部状态与人的思维一样,我们就可以把它称为功能等同于人。 和你的母亲在功能上是等同的。但现象学家可能对它们持不同的态度。现象学家可能会说:
How do I know whether M knows, as your mother does, what it feels like to see red? Your mother, I believe, does know, because she, like me, is a human being. I have reason to think that human beings with normal vision know what
我怎么知道 M 是否和你母亲一样,知道看到红色是什么感觉?我相信,你妈妈是知道的,因为她和我一样,都是人。我有理由认为,视力正常的人类知道

seeing red feels like. For I know what it is like, and I believe that other human beings are like me.
看到红色的感觉。因为我知道那是什么感觉,我相信其他人也和我一样。
The functionalist replies:
功能主义者回答说
All the evidence you have that your mother knows what it is like to see red is from what she says and does. Since M does the same, it is unreasonable to believe that your mother has a mind and M does not.
你母亲知道看到红色是什么感觉的所有证据都来自她的言行。既然 M 也是这样做的,那么认为你妈妈有思想而 M 没有是不合理的。
Notice, first, that we cannot appeal to any evidence to settle the dispute. Even if we were discussing an actual machine instead of a hypothetical one, it wouldn't help, for example, to ask it if it knew what it felt like to see red. For any machine functionally equivalent to your mother would say "Yes" if you asked it if it knew what it felt like to see red, because that is what your mother would say. If you didn't believe that what the machine said was true, you might try to test it, just as you might try to test your mother, if you suspected that she was colorblind. But whatever she would do in the test the machine would do also. So no amount of such testing is going to give you a reason to say something about the machine that you wouldn't say about your mother. The phenomenologist's worry that may lack mental states will never be settled by the kind of evidence that normally persuades us that people have them.
首先请注意,我们不能诉诸任何证据来解决争议。即使我们讨论的是一台真实的机器而不是一台假设的机器,例如,问它是否知道看到红色是什么感觉也无济于事。因为如果你问一台功能等同于你母亲的机器是否知道看到红色是什么感觉,它肯定会说 "知道",因为你母亲也会这么说。如果你不相信机器说的是真的,你可以试着测试它,就像你怀疑你妈妈是色盲一样。但无论她在测试中做什么,机器也会做什么。因此,无论如何测试,你都没有理由对机器说一些你不会对你母亲说的话。现象学家担心 可能缺乏精神状态,但这种担心永远也不会通过通常说服我们相信人有精神状态的那种证据得到解决。
This is already a rather strange situation, since we normally think we can tell whether people know what it feels like, for example, to see red by testing their responses to red things. Nevertheless, despite the fact that no amount of evidence could settle the issue, the conviction that there is a real doubt about whether such a machine would have a mind is very widespread, including among philosophers. In the next chapter I shall be looking at arguments for the view that if no amount of evidence could decide an issue, there is no real issue. Someone who believes this is called a verificationist. And if verificationism is correct, then the phenomenologist must be wrong.
这已经是一种相当奇怪的情况了,因为我们通常认为,我们可以通过测试人们对红色事物的反应来判断他们是否知道看到红色是什么感觉。然而,尽管再多的证据也无法解决这个问题,但包括哲学家在内的许多人都深信,这样的机器是否会有思想确实存在疑问。在下一章中,我将探讨这样一种观点的论据,即如果没有任何证据能够决定一个问题,那么就不存在真正的问题。相信这种观点的人被称为验证论者。如果验证论是正确的,那么现象学家就一定是错的。
But even if the phenomenologist is right in thinking that some states, such as seeing that something is red, can be had only by someone with an inner life, there are other mental states for which this does not seem to be true.
但是,即使现象学家认为某些状态(比如看到某物是红色的)只有具有内在生命的人才能拥有,这也是正确的,但还有一些心理状态似乎并非如此。
Take beliefs once more. We do not normally talk of "knowing what it feels like to have a belief." Indeed, we can have beliefsunconscious ones - that we are unaware of altogether, and even our conscious beliefs do not have a special "feel" to them. What does it feel like to believe consciously that the president is in Washington, or that the rain in Spain stays mainly on the plain?
再以信念为例。我们通常不会说 "知道信念是什么感觉"。事实上,我们可能会有一些我们完全没有意识到的信念,甚至我们有意识的信念也没有特别的 "感觉"。有意识地相信总统在华盛顿,或者相信西班牙的雨主要下在平原上,会是什么感觉呢?
If this is so, then, even if the phenomenologist was right to be suspicious about the claim that knows what it feels like to see red, that would not give you a reason to doubt that it had beliefs. And, as the functionalist will insist, you would have all the same reasons for thinking that did have beliefs as you have for thinking that your mother has them. But beliefs are a pretty important feature of people's minds, and if having beliefs is enough to have a mind, then, as I said, we might end up holding that machines could have minds, even if they don't yet.
如果是这样的话,那么,即使现象学家对 知道看到红色是什么感觉的说法持怀疑态度是正确的,这也不会给你怀疑它有信念的理由。而且,正如功能主义者所坚持的那样,你认为 确实有信念的理由与你认为你母亲有信念的理由是一样的。但信念是人们思想的一个相当重要的特征,如果有信念就足以拥有思想,那么,正如我所说的,我们最终可能会认为机器可能拥有思想,即使它们现在还没有。

1.11 Consciousness 1.11 意识

The core of the dispute between functionalists and phenomenologists seems, then, to reside in their views of consciousness. Whether or not there are mental states-like unconscious beliefs- that are not in consciousness, there surely are conscious mental states. (If there are nonconscious mental states, then they will have to be picked out in some non-Cartesian manner. Since Descartes said that mental states were the contents of the conscious mind, for him the idea of an unconscious mental state would be a contradiction in terms.) What should the functionalist say is the characteristic feature of conscious mental states?
因此,功能主义者与现象主义者之间争论的核心似乎在于他们对意识的看法。无论是否存在不属于意识的精神状态--比如无意识的信念,但肯定存在有意识的精神状态。(如果存在非意识的精神状态,那么就必须以某种非笛卡尔的方式把它们挑出来)。既然笛卡尔说心理状态是有意识思维的内容,那么对他来说,无意识心理状态的观点就是自相矛盾的)。功能论者认为有意识精神状态的特征是什么?
One possibility, which was proposed by the British philosopher Hugh Mellor (who happens to have been one of my own teachers), is to say that conscious states are the states of our own minds about which we currently have beliefs; they are the ones we are currently aware of. So, in particular, a conscious belief that it is raining will be present, on this account, when I believe that I currently believe that it is raining. Let's call a belief about your own current mental state a "second-order" belief. A conscious sensation (of redness, say) will occur when I have the belief that I am currently seeing red.
英国哲学家休-梅洛(Hugh Mellor)(他恰好是我的老师之一)提出的一种可能性是,意识状态是我们目前拥有信念的心灵状态;它们是我们目前意识到的状态。因此,具体来说,当我相信我现在相信正在下雨时,"正在下雨 "这个有意识的信念就会出现。我们把对自己当前心理状态的信念称为 "二阶 "信念。当我相信我现在看到的是红色时,就会产生有意识的感觉(比如说红色)。
The functional role of these second-order states will be specified by saying that they are caused by first-order states-like seeing red
这些二阶状态的功能性作用,可以说是由一阶状态引起的,比如看到红光

or believing it's raining - and that they play a role in shaping our behavior, in particular, in relation to ourselves. For one central form of behavior that a belief about something — call it "A" - can produce is behavior aimed at affecting A. So one kind of behavior my beliefs about my own current states is likely to affect is behavior aimed at changing or maintaining my current state.
或相信正在下雨--它们在塑造我们的行为,尤其是与我们自身相关的行为方面发挥着作用。因此,我对自己当前状态的信念可能会影响的一种行为就是旨在改变或维持我当前状态的行为。
An obvious example is this. I believe there's a reliable clock in the kitchen. I also want to know what the time is. So I go to the kitchen in the belief that if I look at the clock, I will come to believe that the time is whatever the clock says it is and that that will be (roughly) right. In order for this line of reasoning to work, however, at some point I have to be aware that I am uncertain of the time, and for that to happen, on the functionalist view, I have to have a second-order belief about my (current) mental state. It follows that, on the functionalist view, it is only if I am conscious of my ignorance of the time that you can explain why I go to the kitchen to look at the clock. So here is a kind of behavior that can only occur with consciousness.
一个明显的例子是这样的。我相信厨房里有一个可靠的时钟。我也想知道现在几点了。因此,我去厨房时相信,如果我看了时钟,我就会相信时间就是时钟显示的时间,而且(大致)是正确的。然而,为了使这一推理行之有效,我必须在某个时刻意识到我对时间的不确定性,而要做到这一点,根据功能主义的观点,我必须有一个关于我(当前)心理状态的二阶信念。因此,根据功能主义观点,只有当我意识到自己对时间的无知时,你才能解释我为什么要去厨房看钟。所以,这里有一种行为只有在有意识的情况下才会发生。
On the other hand, if I am driving and a traffic light in front of me turns red, I can stop the car, as we say, "automatically": my belief that the red light is there and my desire to obey the traffic laws can operate directly without my coming to believe I believe anything. So, on this sort of functionalist view, some behavior can occur without consciousness.
另一方面,如果我正在开车,前方的交通灯变成了红灯,我可以 "自动 "停车:我相信红灯就在那里,我想遵守交通规则的愿望可以直接发挥作用,而不需要我相信自己相信什么。因此,根据这种功能主义观点,有些行为可以在没有意识的情况下发生。
There is another obvious kind of behavior that will require consciousness: telling you what I think or desire. For here, I need to form beliefs about my own mental states and then desire to communicate what I believe. Indeed, since, as we shall see in the chapter on language, communication is a matter of aiming to get people to believe things about your own beliefs, all communication will require second-order beliefs-beliefs about what I currently believe-and so will require consciousness.
还有一种明显需要意识的行为:告诉你我的想法或愿望。在这里,我需要对自己的心理状态形成信念,然后渴望传达我的信念。事实上,正如我们将在语言一章中看到的,交流的目的是让别人相信你自己的信念,因此所有的交流都需要二阶信念--关于我目前所相信的信念--因此需要意识。
The view that both going to find out what the time is and linguistic communication require consciousness is, I think, intuitively appealing, as is the view that we sometimes act on our beliefs without any conscious mediation. In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that people can act not just without conscious mediation but when they are not conscious at all. Unconscious people-people when they are asleep, for example — can do things like swat mosquitoes.
我认为,"查时间 "和 "语言交流 "都需要意识这一观点在直觉上很有吸引力,而我们有时在没有任何意识中介的情况下按照自己的信念行事这一观点也很有吸引力。事实上,我们可以合理地认为,人们不仅可以在没有意识中介的情况下行动,而且可以在完全没有意识的情况下行动。无意识的人--比如说睡着的人--可以做出打蚊子之类的事情。
An account of consciousness of this generally functionalist kind is likely to produce some impatience in the phenomenologist. For the apparatus of second-order states-states that are produced by other current states and that shape the behavior of a system by changing, or maintaining, its own mental states-could obviously be produced in an android: as I have already pointed out, certainly has the full range of behavior that your mother has, including answering questions and going to see what the time is. Perhaps, the phenomenologist could concede, the functionalists' account of consciousness captures something about consciousness, just as their account of belief-with its role in shaping behavior-captures something about belief. But it leaves out entirely the phenomenological character of consciousness-what it feels like to be your mother or me or anyone else with consciousness. And without that character what you have is just a very good fake.
这种泛功能主义的意识论很可能会让现象学家感到不耐烦。因为二阶状态的装置--由其他当前状态产生的状态,通过改变或维持系统自身的精神状态来塑造系统的行为--显然可以在机器人身上产生:正如我已经指出的, ,它肯定具有你母亲所具有的全部行为,包括回答问题和去看时间。也许,现象学家可以承认,功能论者关于意识的论述捕捉到了一些关于意识的东西,正如他们关于信念的论述--其在塑造行为中的作用--捕捉到了一些关于信念的东西。但它完全忽略了意识的现象学特征--作为你的母亲、我或其他任何具有意识的人是什么感觉。没有这种特征,你所拥有的只是一个很好的赝品。
We seem to have reached an impasse: a situation where arguments have run out and there is still no secure conclusion. Faced with an impasse such as this, it is often helpful to ask whether there is some assumption shared by both parties to the debate-what we call a shared presupposition - that needs to be examined. If there are good arguments for both sides and both sides can't be right, maybe it's because they're both wrong in some way we haven't noticed. One shared assumption in the debate so far is an assumption about philosophical method. It is that we can discover the essence of the mind or of consciousness by a purely conceptual inquiry. We have been proceeding by making arguments that are based on our understanding of key terms, such as "belief," "behavior," "feeling." I have mentioned no experimental explorations of the nature of the mind by psychologists. (Indeed, I suggested at the start, you will recall, that it was irrelevant whether your mother had brain tissue as opposed to silicon chips in her head!) The only experiments I have considered are thought experiments, where you think about an imaginary case and ask yourself what you would say if it actually occurred. But you might object to this procedure on various grounds.
我们似乎陷入了一个僵局:争论已经耗尽,却仍然没有可靠的结论。面对这样的僵局,我们通常会问,辩论双方是否有一些共同的假设--我们称之为共同的预设--需要加以研究。如果双方都有很好的论据,而双方又都不可能是对的,那也许是因为他们都错在了某些我们没有注意到的方面。迄今为止,辩论中的一个共同假设是关于哲学方法的假设。那就是,我们可以通过纯粹的概念探究来发现心灵或意识的本质。我们一直在根据对 "信念"、"行为"、"感觉 "等关键术语的理解进行论证。我没有提到心理学家对心灵本质的实验探索。(事实上,我在一开始就提出,你应该记得,你母亲的脑袋里是否有脑组织而不是硅芯片并不重要!)。我考虑过的唯一实验是思想实验,即你思考一个想象中的案例,然后问自己,如果它真的发生了,你会怎么说。但你可能会以各种理由反对这一程序。
For one thing, it might matter whether the thought experiments were about things that could in fact actually happen. It is not at all obvious, for example, that there could in fact be a creature like M.
首先,思想实验所涉及的事物是否真的可能发生可能很重要。例如,事实上是否存在 M 这样的生物并不明显。
(Perhaps the only sort of thing that could exactly reproduce your mother's behavior would have to be made pretty much, molecule for molecule, as your mother is. And then most of us would probably suppose that there was something that it was like to be her, so that she would meet both the functionalist and the phenomenological criteria for being mentally the same as your mother.) What significance should we attach to our response to being told that something might happen, when, in fact, it can't happen? Why should we assume, that is, that ways of thought that work well enough in a rough-and-ready way in ordinary life would work just as well in a very different world?
(也许只有一种东西能够完全再现你母亲的行为,那就是它的分子必须与你母亲的分子基本相同。然后,我们中的大多数人可能都会假定,有某种东西就像她一样,这样,她就既符合功能主义标准,也符合现象学标准,即在精神上与你母亲相同)。当我们被告知某件事情可能会发生,而事实上它不可能发生时,我们的反应应该具有什么意义呢?我们为什么要假定,在普通生活中粗略可行的思维方式,在一个截然不同的世界中也同样可行呢?
Another, more fundamental line of objection would be to ask why we take it for granted that we have such internal states as beliefs and sensations at all. We are normally inclined to take it as obvious that someone has beliefs when they act, or sensations when they open their eyes on a lighted world. But the fact that this is part of the package of regular commonsense assumptions doesn't guarantee that we are right. People used to think it was obvious that some people were witches and that there were ghosts. (As a matter of fact, as we shall see in the final chapter, there are still places where most people think something similar.) Perhaps the very fact that our ordinary ways of thinking can lead both to functionalism and to phenomenology suggests that those ways of thinking are muddled. (After all, if you can draw incompatible conclusions from a set of assumptions, that shows there's something wrong with them!) Perhaps, in fact, we should rethink the sources of behavior.
另一个更基本的反对理由是,我们为什么要想当然地认为我们有信念和感觉这样的内在状态。我们通常倾向于认为,一个人在行动时会有信念,或在睁开眼睛看到光亮的世界时会有感觉,这是显而易见的。但这是常识性假设的一部分,并不能保证我们是正确的。人们曾经认为,有些人是女巫,有些人是鬼,这些都是显而易见的。(事实上,正如我们将在最后一章看到的,在有些地方,大多数人仍然会有类似的想法)。也许,我们的普通思维方式既能导致功能主义,也能导致现象学,这一事实本身就表明这些思维方式是混乱的。(毕竟,如果你能从一系列假设中得出不相容的结论,那就说明这些假设有问题!)。也许,事实上我们应该重新思考行为的来源。
The contemporary American philosopher Stephen Stich has suggested that we may indeed have to do just this. He has examined a good deal of recent work in cognitive psychology, the branch of the subject that seeks to explain how we perceive, remember, reason, decide, and then act, by postulating internal processes very like those in a computer program. Stich argues that there is already a good deal of evidence from cognitive psychology that our folk psychological theory is just plain wrong. In fact, he thinks, it may eventually turn out that there is simply nothing at all inside our heads that operates in the way that our folk psychology of belief and desire supposes. If that is true, then there would be no beliefs or desires! And then we should have to proceed, guided by cognitive psychol-
当代美国哲学家斯蒂芬-斯蒂奇(Stephen Stich)认为,我们可能确实必须这样做。他研究了认知心理学的大量最新研究成果。认知心理学是这一学科的一个分支,旨在通过假设与计算机程序非常相似的内部过程,来解释我们是如何感知、记忆、推理、决定并采取行动的。斯蒂奇认为,认知心理学已有大量证据表明,我们的民间心理学理论是完全错误的。事实上,他认为,最终可能会发现,在我们的大脑中根本就没有什么东西是以我们关于信念和欲望的民间心理学所假定的方式运作的。如果这是真的,那么就不会有信念或欲望了!那么,我们就必须在认知心理学的指导下,继续研究我们的大脑。

ogy or neuroscience (or perhaps some new field of science), to try to understand the causes of behavior in terms of internal states quite unlike those we have gotten used to. That is why the subtitle of his book From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science is The Case Against Belief.
他的研究方向是心理学或神经科学(或许是某个新的科学领域),试图从与我们习以为常的内部状态截然不同的角度来理解行为的原因。这就是为什么他的《从民间心理学到认知科学》一书的副标题是《反对信仰的案例》。
One natural response to this possibility is to say that even if science does end up showing this, we would still want to continue with our folk psychological theory for everyday purposes. We would still, that is, want to treat other people as if they had beliefs and desires and the rest, even if our official position was that they didn't. Another American philosopher, Daniel Dennett, has given this strategy a name: he calls it "adopting the intentional stance" toward them. We adopt the intentional stance toward someone (or something) when we predict its behavior on the basis of what it would do if it had beliefs, desires, and intentions, while leaving open the possibility that it does not, in fact, have them. Many of us already adopt the intentional stance toward objects that we don't believe have minds. It's perfectly natural to talk about what a computer "thinks," or to explain a chess-playing machine's moves by saying it's "trying to ward off my rook." But it's also perfectly natural to deny that any existing computer or chess machine really has beliefs, desires, or intentions. (Analogously, most of us still speak of the sun going "up" and "down" in the sky, even though we know that, strictly speaking, we're actually rotating around .)
对这种可能性的一种自然反应是,即使科学最终证明了这一点,我们仍然希望在日常工作中继续使用我们的民间心理学理论。也就是说,即使我们的官方立场认为其他人没有信仰和欲望,我们仍然希望把他们当作有信仰和欲望的人对待。另一位美国哲学家丹尼尔-丹尼特(Daniel Dennett)给这一策略起了个名字:他称之为对他人 "采取意向立场"。当我们根据某人(或某物)如果有信念、欲望和意图会做什么来预测它的行为时,我们就会对它采取意向性立场,同时也保留了它事实上没有这些信念、欲望和意图的可能性。我们中的许多人已经对我们不相信有思想的物体采取了意向立场。谈论计算机 "在想什么",或者用 "试图抵挡我的车 "来解释下棋机器的走法,都是再自然不过的事了。但否认任何现存的计算机或国际象棋机器真的有信念、欲望或意图也是很自然的。(打个比方,尽管我们知道,严格来说,我们实际上是在围绕着 自转,但我们中的大多数人仍然会说太阳在天空中 "上 "和 "下")。
Stich argues that Dennett's proposal is intellectually irresponsible. What's the point of explaining the way people behave in terms of states they haven't got, once you develop a theory that explains how they behave in terms of states they have? But to this objection one might reply that there may be practical reasons why it is easier to use the folk psychological theory. Perhaps, for example, we are attached to this theory because it is programmed into us by evolution, so that, just as certain visual illusions persist, even once we know they are illusions, we will continue to think spontaneously of people as having beliefs, even once we realize they do not. Or perhaps the states that the new cognitive psychological theory postulates are rather difficult to identify, so that only a psychologist with special instrumentation can find out exactly what they are. (There is something odd about discussing what we should believe if there
斯蒂奇认为,丹尼特的提议在智力上是不负责任的。一旦你发展出一种理论,可以用人们已有的状态来解释他们的行为方式,那么用他们没有的状态来解释他们的行为方式还有什么意义呢?不过,对于这种反对意见,我们可以回答说,可能有一些实际原因,让我们更容易使用民间心理学理论。举例来说,也许我们之所以对这一理论情有独钟,是因为进化给我们设定了这一理论,因此,就像某些视觉幻觉即使在我们知道它们是幻觉之后仍然存在一样,我们会继续自发地认为人们有信仰,即使我们意识到他们没有信仰。或者,新的认知心理学理论所假设的状态很难确定,因此只有心理学家通过特殊的仪器才能准确地发现它们是什么。(讨论我们应该相信什么有些奇怪,如果有

aren't really any beliefs!) The rough-and-ready apparatus of folk psychology at least has the advantage that we can apply it pretty easily on the basis of looking and listening without special equipment.
其实并没有什么信仰!)。民间心理学的粗略工具至少有一个优点,那就是我们可以在没有特殊设备的情况下,通过观察和聆听就能很容易地运用它。
But there is a natural response to both Stich's proposal and Dennett's, a response that challenges a presupposition they seem to share. It is that both of them ignore the fact from which the phenomenologist starts: the fact that each of us knows very well in our own case that we have beliefs, desires, sensations, and so on. In response to Stich, one wants to say:
但是,对于斯蒂奇和丹尼特的提议,人们自然会有一种回应,这种回应是对他们似乎共享的一个预设前提的挑战。这就是,他们都忽略了现象学家的出发点:我们每个人都清楚地知道自己有信念、欲望、感觉等等。针对施蒂希,有人想说:
I grant that I might be wrong about how my mental states work, and about their causal relations. But I can't be wrong about whether I have mental states. They are, as Descartes rightly insisted, the one thing in the world I am most certain of. By "belief" I just mean something like the state I am in when I look at a vase and come to believe that it has a flower in it.
我承认,关于我的心理状态是如何运作的,以及它们之间的因果关系,我可能是错的。但在我是否有心理状态这一点上,我不会错。正如笛卡尔所坚持的那样,它们是世界上我最确定的一件事。我所说的 "信念 "指的是当我看着一个花瓶并相信里面插着一朵花时的状态。

And to Dennett one might say:
对于登尼特,人们可能会说

I can imagine taking the intentional stance toward somebody else, exactly because I can imagine that someone else doesn't really have beliefs and desires but only appears to do so. That is just the problem of other minds. But it's a problem of other minds; just because I have direct experience of my own internal states, I can't imagine taking the intentional stance toward myself.
我能想象对别人采取有意的立场,正是因为我能想象别人并没有真正的信念和欲望,而只是看起来有而已。这只是其他思维的问题。但这只是其他思维的问题;正因为我对自己的内心状态有直接体验,所以我无法想象对自己采取有意的立场。

1.12 The puzzle of the physical
1.12 物理之谜

I mentioned a little while ago that sometimes, in philosophy, it is important to examine the shared presuppositions of the parties to a debate, and I discussed a number of assumptions (some common to the functionalist and the phenomenologist, and one to Dennett and Stich) that might be questioned. I want to end this chapter by inviting you to think about another shared assumption: namely, that the puzzles about the relations between mind and body stem from the special character of the mind. After all, the idea that there is something special about the mind to be explained at all seems to presuppose that there is nothing much to be explained about the nonmental, the physical world. On the best current theories of nature, at one time the universe contained no minds, and they then evolved. One way of understanding how phenomenologists think about the mind-
我刚才提到,在哲学中,有时审视辩论双方的共同预设是很重要的,我讨论了一些可能受到质疑的假设(一些是功能论者和现象论者的共同假设,还有一个是丹尼特和斯蒂奇的共同假设)。在本章的最后,我想请大家思考另一个共同的假设:即关于身心关系的困惑源于心灵的特殊性。毕竟,认为心灵有什么特殊之处需要解释的想法似乎预先假定,非心灵的物理世界没有什么需要解释的。根据目前最好的自然理论,宇宙曾一度不包含思想,后来思想进化了。理解现象学家如何看待心智的一种方法是--"心智"。

body problem is to think of them as asking: "How could my mindwhich I know from direct experience-be made out of matter, which seems so different from it?"
身体的问题是把它们看作是在问:"我的思想是我从直接经验中认识的" "它怎么可能是由物质构成的?" "而物质似乎与思想大相径庭"
But why is it puzzling that minds are made out of matter? Stars, magnets, bacteria, and elephants are made out of matter, and each of these would have been hard to anticipate from the character of the universe before they emerged. We have learned about the properties of matter by seeing what can be made of it: we know that it is the kind of thing that magnets can be made out of, because we have found magnetic substances; we know that it is the kind of thing bacteria can be made out of, because we have found bacteria. Why is it especially hard to accept that it is the kind of thing minds can be made out of? Indeed, since the one thing of which each of us surely has the most extensive direct experience is our own mind, shouldn't we be puzzled, if we are puzzled by anything, by the nature of matter? How can it be, one might want to ask, that a world made of the sorts of things and governed by the sorts of laws that physicists now believe in should give rise to the astonishing range of experiences that each of us has every day?
但是,为什么思想是由物质构成的这一点令人费解呢?恒星、磁铁、细菌和大象都是由物质构成的,而每一种物质在出现之前都很难从宇宙的特性中预料到。我们通过观察物质的构成来了解物质的特性:我们知道磁铁是由磁性物质构成的,因为我们发现了磁性物质;我们知道细菌是由细菌构成的,因为我们发现了细菌。为什么我们特别难以接受 "思想 "是由这种物质构成的呢?事实上,既然我们每个人都对自己的思想有着最丰富的直接经验,那么我们难道不应该对物质的本质感到困惑吗?人们可能会问,一个由物理学家现在所相信的那种东西构成并受那种定律支配的世界,怎么会产生我们每个人每天都有的令人惊讶的各种体验呢?

1.13 Conclusion 1.13 结论

In this chapter we have discussed some of the central questions of the philosophy of mind. We started by asking, "Can machines have minds?" But that led us to ask how we know that people have minds, and to think about the special kind of knowledge we seem to have of our own minds. Because we asked these epistemological questions, we came, at the end, to a point where we could go no further until we had thought more about knowledge. We were also led to consider what the relationship is between a mind and its body. And because causation seems very important to this relationshipbecause thoughts seem to cause actions, and events in the world seem to cause sensations-we found at another point that we could go no further until we had thought some more about causation. That is one reason why I haven't been able to settle the central dispute of this chapter - between the functionalist and the phenomenologistdecisively in favor of one or the other. But even if I had given an explanation of the nature of causation and of knowledge, I should not have been able to settle that question decisively. For it is a question
在本章中,我们讨论了心灵哲学的一些核心问题。我们先问:"机器会有思想吗?"",但这又引出了一个问题:我们是如何知道人有思想的?因为我们提出了这些认识论问题,所以我们最后走到了这样一个地步:在我们对知识有了更多的思考之前,我们不能再往前走了。我们也开始思考心灵与身体之间的关系。由于因果关系似乎对这种关系非常重要,因为思想似乎会导致行动,而世界上的事件似乎会导致感觉,所以我们在另一个点上发现,除非我们对因果关系有更多的思考,否则我们就无法继续前进。这就是为什么我无法解决本章的核心争论--功能论者和现象论者之间的争论--决定性地支持其中一方的原因之一。不过,即使我对因果关系和知识的本质做出了解释,我也不可能决定性地解决这个问题。因为这个问题

that divides philosophers now, and there is something to be said in favor of both sides. If, when we have gone further with knowledge, you decide to join the phenomenologist, on one hand, or the functionalist, on the other, I hope you will keep in mind that there are good arguments in support of each of them.
这也是目前哲学家们的分歧所在,双方都有自己的观点。如果我们对知识有了进一步的了解,你决定加入现象学派或功能学派,我希望你能记住,支持这两种观点的论据都很充分。
But I hope you will also entertain the possibility that these tensions in our thought reveal that we may need entirely new ways of thinking in order to understand what our brains are doing-even, perhaps, that we may end up giving up the idea of the mind altogether. After all, when Descartes began modern philosophy of mind, he did so by treating as a single category everything of which we can be directly conscious: but perceptions, beliefs, hopes, twinges, anxieties, emotions, wishes and desires-even as we normally think of them - are a fairly diverse bunch of things. Perhaps it was a mistake to think that a single theory that covered all of them could be constructed. And, I have suggested, perhaps it was also a mistake to think that the deep puzzle is about the nature of the mind, rather than about the nature of matter. If, after all, as the best current theories of nature suggest, minds appear in the world through evolution in material organisms, then one of the facts about matter that needs explaining is that it can produce all the many diverse phenomena that we call "the mind."
但我希望你们也能接受这样一种可能性,即我们思维中的这些紧张关系揭示出,我们可能需要全新的思维方式才能理解我们的大脑在做什么--甚至,我们可能最终会完全放弃心灵的概念。毕竟,当笛卡尔开始研究现代心灵哲学时,他是把我们能够直接意识到的一切事物都视为一个单一的范畴:但知觉、信念、希望、痛苦、焦虑、情感、愿望和欲望--即使是我们通常认为的那样--是相当多样化的一群事物。也许,认为可以构建一种涵盖所有理论的单一理论是错误的。而且,我曾建议,也许认为深层谜题是关于心灵的本质而非物质的本质也是错误的。毕竟,如果正如目前最好的自然理论所表明的那样,心灵是通过物质有机体的进化而出现在这个世界上的,那么需要解释的关于物质的事实之一就是,它可以产生我们称之为 "心灵 "的所有各种现象。

CHAPTER 2 第 2 章

Knowledge 知识

What is knowledge? How can we justify our claims to knowledge?
什么是知识?我们如何证明自己的知识主张?
What can we know?
我们能知道什么?

2.1 Introduction 2.1 导言

Brain surgery is getting better all the time. Though we can't do brain transplants yet, one day we may well be able to. Let's imagine that we are living in a time when they are possible. Unlike other transplants, of course, the person who survives the operation is presumably the owner of the organ, not the owner of the body! But like all organ transplants, brain transplants involve an intermediate stage. For a while, a brain has to be stored outside its old body before it is connected into a new one. Now suppose that someone-call him Albert-is very badly injured in an accident. His body is hopelessly damaged. Fortunately, his brain was protected by a helmet, and it is unhurt. So a neurosurgeon sets about removing Albert's brain from his body in order to transplant it to a new one. Let's call this surgeon Marie. Marie carefully removes, along with the brain, both
脑外科技术日臻完善。虽然我们还不能进行大脑移植手术,但总有一天我们很可能可以做到。让我们想象一下,我们生活在一个可以进行脑移植的时代。当然,与其他移植手术不同的是,手术后存活下来的人可能是器官的主人,而不是身体的主人!但与所有器官移植一样,大脑移植也需要一个中间阶段。在将大脑连接到新身体之前,大脑必须暂时存放在旧身体之外。现在假设一个人--叫他阿尔伯特--在一次事故中受了重伤。他的身体已经严重受损。幸运的是,他的大脑受到头盔的保护,没有受伤。于是,一位神经外科医生开始将阿尔伯特的大脑从他的身体中取出,以便移植到一个新的大脑中。我们称这位外科医生为玛丽。玛丽小心翼翼地将艾伯特的大脑和两个
a) the sensory nerves that used to carry information from Albert's eyes, ears, nose, mouth and so on, about the looks, sounds, smells and tastes and the feel of the world around him; and
a) 从艾伯特的眼睛、耳朵、鼻子、嘴巴等处传来的关于他周围世界的外观、声音、气味、味道和感觉等信息的感觉神经;以及 b) 从艾伯特的眼睛、耳朵、鼻子、嘴巴等处传来的关于他周围世界的外观、声音、气味、味道和感觉等信息的感觉神经。
b) the motor nerves that used to carry messages from the brain to the muscles, "telling them" what to do.
b) 运动神经,用于从大脑向肌肉传递信息,"告诉它们 "该做什么。
Unfortunately, there isn't a spare body available just yet. So Marie puts Albert's brain into a vat of fluid and connects up the main blood vessels to a supply of blood. This is science fiction, so
遗憾的是,现在还没有备用躯体。于是,玛丽将艾伯特的大脑放入一桶液体中,并将主要血管与血液供应连接起来。这是科幻小说,所以

let's add interest by supposing that Marie is a mite unscrupulous. She's willing to do pretty much anything in the interest of knowledge. Here's a spare brain, and she just can't resist investigating it while she waits for a body. So she connects up the sensory nerve endings to an elaborate computer. The computer is designed to feed those nerve endings with electrical stimuli that are just like the stimuli that Albert got when his brain was properly connected to his body. Thus, when Albert's brain recovers consciousness, the computer feeds it electrical stimuli that produce in the nerves of his eyes the very same electrical signals that used to make him think he was looking around a room. If Marie connected the motor nerve endings to the computer too, she could tell what the brain was trying to do, and the computer could fake the experiences that the brain would have had in a body if it had succeeded in what it was trying to do.
让我们假设玛丽有点不择手段来增加趣味性。为了获取知识,她愿意做任何事。这里有一个空闲的大脑,在等待躯体的时候,她忍不住要对它进行研究。于是她把感觉神经末梢连接到了一台精密的电脑上。这台电脑的设计目的是给这些神经末梢提供电刺激,这些电刺激就像艾伯特的大脑与身体正常连接时受到的刺激一样。因此,当艾伯特的大脑恢复知觉时,计算机就会向其输入电刺激,在他的眼部神经中产生与过去让他以为自己在环顾房间时相同的电信号。如果玛丽把运动神经末梢也连接到电脑上,她就能知道大脑想做什么,电脑就能伪造大脑在身体中的体验,如果它成功地完成了它想做的事情。
Now here's a question. Is there any way Albert could tell that he was being fooled? Most people would say that the answer is no. But if Albert couldn't tell in that situation, then if you were in a similar situation, you couldn't tell either. So what makes you so sure you aren't being fooled right now? Maybe you're part of the first experimental program that will eventually lead to regular brain transplants. The researchers know that you would be very distressed to discover that you had lost your body, so they've deliberately wiped out all memories of the accident. They've faked your experience of reading this chapter in order to start you thinking about the idea of a new body! Later on, maybe, they'll tell you the truth about Marie and her computer, but for now you are "living" like Albert. Of course, if you are being fooled now, then all the things you think are going on around you are not happening at all. This book you think you are reading, for example, is just an illusion produced by a device like Marie's computer. (This is a favorite topic of science fiction in films such as The Matrix.)
现在有个问题艾伯特有办法看出自己被骗了吗?大多数人会说答案是否定的。但是,如果艾伯特在那种情况下都看不出来,那么如果你在类似的情况下,你也看不出来。那么,是什么让你如此确信自己现在没有被愚弄呢?也许你是第一个实验项目的一部分,这个项目最终会导致常规的大脑移植。研究人员知道,如果你发现自己失去了身体,一定会非常痛苦,所以他们故意抹去了你对事故的所有记忆。他们伪造了你阅读这一章的经历,目的是让你开始思考一个新身体的想法!以后,也许他们会告诉你玛丽和她的电脑的真相,但现在你还像艾伯特一样 "活着"。当然,如果你现在被愚弄了,那么你认为在你周围发生的所有事情根本就没有发生。比如,你以为自己正在阅读的这本书,其实只是玛丽的电脑等设备产生的幻觉。(这是电影《黑客帝国》等科幻小说最喜欢的主题)。
Philosophers are often caricatured as being worried about things that it is absurd to worry about. We are supposed to ask questions like "How do I know that the book in front of me is really there?" Without a context, that really can seem a pointless question. But once we place the question in the context of this science fiction possibility, it does not seem so obviously pointless. Maybe, one day not
哲学家常常被讽刺为担心一些荒谬的事情。我们应该问这样的问题:"我怎么知道我面前的书真的存在?"在没有语境的情况下,这确实是一个毫无意义的问题。但是,一旦我们把这个问题放在科幻小说的可能性背景下,它就不会显得那么明显无意义了。也许,有一天不

too far from now, people will find themselves asking this question in all seriousness. Once again a piece of science fiction has led us straight to the heart of a philosophical problem. How do we know about the existence of physical objects? Our maternal robot, M, raised the question of how we know that other people have minds. Now we have to ask an even more disturbing question: How do we know that other people have bodies? Indeed, how do we know that anything exists at all?
在不远的将来,人们会发现自己会认真地提出这个问题。一部科幻小说再一次把我们引向了哲学问题的核心。我们如何知道物理对象的存在?我们的母机器人 M 提出了一个问题:我们如何知道其他人有思想?现在,我们不得不提出一个更令人不安的问题:我们怎么知道其他人有身体?事实上,我们怎么知道有任何东西存在呢?
Questions like these, about the nature of knowledge, belong to epistemology - the philosophical examination of the nature of knowledge. And one way to set about answering the sorts of questions raised by this story is to start by asking what we mean by "knowledge." If we can answer that question, we'll be in a better position to discover whether-and if so, how-we know that we aren't just brains in fluid, the playthings of an unscrupulous scientist.
像这样关于知识本质的问题属于认识论--对知识本质的哲学研究。要回答这个故事所提出的问题,一种方法是先问一问我们所说的 "知识 "是什么意思。如果我们能回答这个问题,我们就能更好地发现,我们是否--如果是的话,我们如何--知道我们不只是流体中的大脑,不只是无良科学家的玩物。

2.2 Plato: Knowledge as justified true belief
2.2 柏拉图知识是合理的真实信念

Plato is the first Western philosopher who left us a substantial body of writing. But he didn't write philosophical treatises like Descartes' Discourse on Method. Instead he wrote dialogues: dramatic works in which different characters represent and argue for different philosophical positions. (He did this more explicitly than Wittgenstein, who doesn't actually give names and personalities to the exponents of the different positions that are canvassed in the Philosophical Investigations.) In Plato's dialogues the central character is usually his teacher, Socrates, whose philosophical technique was to proceed not by stating a position but by asking questions and leading those with whom he talked to their own answers. (This is sometimes called the Socratic method.) In the dialogue called the Theaetetus, Socrates discusses the question "What is knowledge?" with a young man called Theaetetus. Because Plato’s discussion of knowledge has been as central to the Western tradition as Descartes' view of mind has been to modern philosophical psychology, I want to begin considering what knowledge is by examining some of the ideas discussed by Socrates and Theaetetus in this famous dialogue.
柏拉图是第一位为我们留下大量著作的西方哲学家。但他并没有像笛卡尔的《方法论》那样写哲学论著。相反,他写的是对话:在戏剧作品中,不同的人物代表不同的哲学立场并为之争辩。(他比维特根斯坦更明确地做到了这一点,因为维特根斯坦实际上并没有为《哲学探究》中所阐述的不同立场的阐述者给出名字和人物)。在柏拉图的对话中,中心人物通常是他的老师苏格拉底,苏格拉底的哲学技巧不是通过陈述立场,而是通过提问,引导与他对话的人得出自己的答案(这有时被称为 "苏格拉底哲学")。(在《泰埃泰特斯》对话中,苏格拉底与一个名叫泰埃泰特斯的年轻人讨论了 "知识是什么?由于柏拉图对知识的讨论就像笛卡尔的心智观对现代哲学心理学的影响一样,一直是西方传统的核心,因此我想通过研究苏格拉底和泰厄泰图斯在这段著名对话中讨论的一些观点,来开始思考什么是知识。
Theaetetus begins answering Socrates' question "What is knowledge?" by giving examples of knowledge: geometry, for example, and the technical know-how of a shoemaker. But Socrates objects
在回答苏格拉底的问题 "什么是知识?"时,泰厄泰图斯首先举出了一些知识的例子:比如几何学和鞋匠的技术诀窍。但苏格拉底反对

that what he wants is not a bunch of examples of knowledge, but rather an explanation of the nature of knowledge. In answer to the philosophical question "What is knowledge?" what is wanted is a definition that we can use to decide whether any particular case really is a case where somebody knows something.
他想要的不是一堆知识的例子,而是对知识本质的解释。在回答 "什么是知识?"这个哲学问题时,我们需要的是一个定义,我们可以用这个定义来判断任何特定的情况是否真的是某人知道某些东西的情况。
Theaetetus then makes other attempts at answering the question that give definitions of this sort. But Socrates argues against all of them. Finally, Theaetetus suggests that to know something is just to believe something that is true. If you know that you are reading this book, for example, then, on Theaetetus's theory,
然后,泰厄泰图斯又试图回答这个问题, ,给出这类定义。但苏格拉底一一反驳。最后,泰厄泰图斯提出,知道某事就是相信某事是真的。举例来说,如果你知道你正在阅读这本书,那么,按照泰厄忒斯的理论、
a) you must believe you are reading this book, and
a) 你必须相信自己正在阅读这本书,并且
b) you must, in fact, be reading this book.
b) 事实上,你一定在读这本书。
Socrates points out that it follows from this theory of Theaetetus' that when a skilled lawyer persuades a jury that someone is innocent, then if the person is in fact innocent, the jury knows he or she is innocent, even if the lawyer has persuaded the jury by dishonest means. This consequence, Socrates argues, shows that Theaetetus' theory must be wrong, because in such circumstances we would not allow that the jurors knew that the accused person was innocent, even if they correctly believed it.
苏格拉底指出,根据泰埃特斯的这一理论,当一个熟练的律师说服陪审团相信某人是无辜的,那么如果这个人事实上是无辜的,陪审团就知道他或她是无辜的,即使律师是用不诚实的手段说服陪审团的。苏格拉底认为,这一结果表明泰厄忒斯的理论肯定是错误的,因为在这种情况下,我们不会允许陪审员知道被告是无辜的,即使他们正确地相信了这一点。
Socrates has a point. Suppose, for example, my lawyers believe that I am innocent and that I am being framed. They might decide that it was more important to protect someone from being framed than to respect the law, which the prosecutors are, after all, abusing. So they might fake "evidence" that undermines the fake "evidence" produced by the prosecutors. Suppose they persuaded the jury: the members of the jury would correctly believe I am innocent, but they certainly wouldn't know that I am innocent.
苏格拉底说得有道理。例如,假设我的律师认为我是无辜的,我是被陷害的。他们可能会认为,保护某人不被陷害比尊重法律更重要,毕竟检察官正在滥用法律。因此,他们可能会伪造 "证据",以破坏检察官提供的假 "证据"。假设他们说服了陪审团:陪审团成员会正确地相信我是无辜的,但他们肯定不会知道我是无辜的。
Here is the passage where Socrates summarizes his objection and Theaetetus responds: belief with a justification is knowledge, and the kind without a justification falls outside the sphere of knowledge.
苏格拉底在这段话中总结了他的反对意见,而忒亚提图斯则做出了回应:有理由的信念是知识,而没有理由的信念则不属于知识的范畴。
Theaetetus realizes that this case shows that we need some third condition for knowledge: knowing does involve believing, and it does involve the truth of what you believe, but it also requires something else. And, since he is nothing if not persistent, Theaetetus suggests that knowledge is true belief along with a justification. The rest of the Theaetetus is taken up with discussing what sort of justification is necessary. But the essential idea is that to know something,
Theaetetus 意识到,这种情况表明,我们需要知识的第三个条件:知道确实涉及相信,确实涉及你所相信的真理,但它还需要其他东西。鉴于他的坚持不懈,泰厄泰图斯提出,知识就是真实的信念和理由。Theaetetus 的其余部分都在讨论什么样的理由是必要的。但其基本思想是,要想知道某件事情、
a) you must believe it,
a) 你必须相信它、
b) it must be true, and
b) 它必须是真实的,并且
c) you must be justified in believing it.
c) 你必须有理由相信它。
It is the recognition that we need this third condition-which I'll call the justification condition - that is the Theaetetus' major legacy to epistemology. That the justification condition and the first two conditions, taken together, are necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge is a central philosophical claim of the Western tradition since Plato. This idea is often expressed in the slogan "Knowledge is justified true belief."
正是认识到我们需要这第三个条件--我称之为 "正当性条件"--才是《底伊特》留给认识论的主要遗产。自柏拉图以来,西方哲学传统的一个核心主张是,正义条件和前两个条件合在一起,是知识的必要和充分条件。这一观点经常被表述为 "知识是有理由的真实信念"。
Socrates never accepts any of Theaetetus' attempts to define exactly which kind of justification is necessary to turn true belief into knowledge, but the idea provides the starting point for many philosophical attempts to define knowledge since. Typically, philosophers have first argued for the view that knowledge is justified true belief and then gone on to ask the question "What kind of justification do you need in order to have knowledge?"
苏格拉底从未接受过忒耳忒斯试图准确定义哪种正当理由是将真实信念转化为知识的必要条件,但这一观点为此后许多试图定义知识的哲学活动提供了出发点。通常情况下,哲学家们首先论证了知识就是有正当理由的真实信念这一观点,然后继续追问 "你需要什么样的正当理由才能拥有知识?
Theaetetus' idea is suggested by a diagnosis of why the jurors don't really know I'm innocent. That diagnosis is, roughly, that though the jurors have a true belief, it isn't one that they are entitled to have, since my lawyers could have used the very same evidence to convince them I was innocent, even if I had been guilty. In other words, the evidence my lawyers gave the jury for the claim that I was innocent was consistent with my being guilty, even though it persuaded them that I was not. This diagnosis is at the root of the first of two major ways in which philosophers have tried to say
Theaetetus 的想法是通过对陪审员为何并不真正知道我无罪的诊断提出的。这个诊断大致是,虽然陪审员们有一个真实的信念,但这并不是他们有权拥有的信念,因为即使我有罪,我的律师也可以用同样的证据让他们相信我是无辜的。换句话说,我的律师向陪审团提供的关于我无罪的证据与我有罪是一致的,尽管这些证据说服了他们我无罪。这一诊断是哲学家们试图用两种主要方式中的第一种来说明

exactly what the justification condition amounts to. That account is found in the epistemology of Descartes.
究竟正当性条件相当于什么?这种说法可以在笛卡尔的认识论中找到。

2.3 Descartes' way: Justification requires certainty
2.3 笛卡尔的方法:正义需要确定性

To see how we might get to the first way of interpreting the justification condition-Descartes' way-let's start by examining more precisely what it means to say that the evidence my lawyers present in the hypothetical case we have been considering is consistent with my being guilty.
为了弄清我们如何能够以第一种方式--笛卡尔的方式--来解释正当性条件,让我们先更精确地研究一下,在我们一直在考虑的假设案件中,我的律师所提供的证据与我有罪是一致的,这意味着什么。
One way of putting more precisely what I mean by saying the evidence is consistent with my being guilty is this:
我说证据与我有罪是一致的,有一种说法可以更准确地表达我的意思:
a) there is a true sentence (call it " ") that reports all the evidence, and
a) 有一个真实的句子(称之为 " ")报告了所有证据,并且

b) is consistent with a sentence that says I am guilty.
b) 与 "我有罪 "的句子是一致的。
Two sentences are consistent just in case it is possible for them to be true at the same time. (Throughout this chapter, when I am discussing evidence I shall often talk about sentences that report the evidence. This doesn't mean that I think having evidence is simply a matter of believing sentences to be true. If I thought that, I'd have difficulty explaining how a creature that didn't know at least one language could know anything, even though I believe, say, that my dog's tail-wagging shows that she knows that I am at the door. It's just that putting it in terms of sentences makes it easier to express the points I want to make.)
如果两个句子有可能同时为真,那么这两个句子就是一致的。(在本章中,当我讨论证据时,我将经常谈论报告证据的句子)。这并不意味着我认为拥有证据仅仅是相信句子为真的问题。如果我这么想,我就很难解释一个至少不懂一种语言的生物怎么会知道任何事情,即使我相信,比如说,我的狗摇尾巴说明它知道我在门口。只是,用句子来表达更容易表达我想表达的观点)。
Suppose, then, that we have a sentence, and we're looking at the evidence for it. Let's call the sentence that reports the evidence the "evidence-sentence," and the sentence for which it is evidence "S." What we mean, then, by the evidence being consistent with the sentence being false is that it is possible that the evidence-sentence should be true and should be false at the same time. Thus, for example, the evidence-sentence "John is crying and looking downcast" is quite consistent with the falsehood of the sentence "John is unhappy", since John might be trying to fool us. So, if we wanted to drop the talk about sentences, we could say that having evidence that John is crying and looking downcast is consistent with John's being happy.
那么,假设我们有一个句子,我们正在研究它的证据。我们把报告证据的句子称为 "证据句",把它作为证据的句子称为 "S"。那么,我们所说的证据与句子 是假的相一致的意思是,证据-句子有可能是真的,而 有可能同时是假的。因此,举例来说,证据句 "约翰在哭泣,神情低落 "与句子 "约翰不快乐 "的虚假性是完全一致的,因为约翰可能在试图愚弄我们。因此,如果我们不想谈论句子,我们可以说,"约翰在哭泣,神情低落 "的证据句与 "约翰很快乐 "的假句是一致的。
Nevertheless, "John is crying and looking downcast" is good evidence that John is unhappy. Evidence like this, which is consistent with the falsity of the sentence it supports, is called "defeasible" evidence. ("Defeasible" because it could be defeated by later evidence that undermined it.) If, on the other hand, you have evidence for the truth of a sentence, , that is so good that it is not possible that should be false when the evidence-sentence is true, then you have what we call "indefeasible" evidence for S. The evidence-sentence "It looks red to me," for example, if true, would be taken by Descartes (and most people) as indefeasible evidence for the sentence "I am having a visual experience."
然而,"约翰在哭泣,神情低落 "是约翰不快乐的有力证据。这样的证据与它所支持的句子的虚假性是一致的,被称为 "可推翻 "证据("可推翻 "是因为它可以被后来破坏它的证据所推翻)。("可击溃 "是因为它可以被后来破坏它的证据所击溃)。另一方面,如果你有证据证明一个句子 是真的,而这个证据句子是真的时, 不可能是假的,那么你就有了我们所说的 S 的 "不可辩驳 "证据。例如,证据句子 "对我来说它看起来是红色的",如果是真的,笛卡尔(和大多数人)就会认为它是 "我正在经历视觉体验 "这个句子的不可辩驳证据。
The jury in my story plainly did not have indefeasible evidence that I was innocent: for, as I said, the evidence was consistent with my being guilty. One possible view, then, would be that what the jury in my story lacked was indefeasible evidence and that, if they had had that, they would have had knowledge. The justification condition for knowledge, on this view, means that you must have evidence that justifies your belief indefeasibly.
在我的故事中,陪审团显然没有不可辩驳的证据证明我是无辜的:因为正如我所说,证据与我有罪是一致的。那么,一种可能的观点是,我故事中的陪审团缺乏的是不可辩驳的证据,如果他们有了这种证据,他们就会有知识。根据这种观点,"知识 "的正当性条件意味着你必须拥有能够证明你的信念是正当的证据。
This was, as I say, essentially Descartes' view. Descartes didn't know much about how brains work. But he got to this conclusion by considering problems very much like the one raised by Marie, the unscrupulous neurosurgeon, with which I began. One problem he raised was how we could know that all our experiences were not just a dream. In many ways this is just like asking how we know that we are not Marie's victims. But his most convincing way of raising the question of our knowledge of the physical world, in terms that were natural and of immediate concern in his day, was to consider the possibility of an evil demon's fooling us into believing things by careful manipulation of our senses. This demon would be able, like Marie, to keep us from knowing what it was doing, while essentially fabricating all our experiences for us.
正如我所说,这基本上是笛卡尔的观点。笛卡尔并不了解大脑是如何工作的。但他是通过考虑与我开头提到的那个无良神经外科医生玛丽提出的问题非常相似的问题,才得出这个结论的。他提出的一个问题是,我们如何才能知道我们的所有经历并非只是一场梦。在很多方面,这就像我们问自己如何知道自己不是玛丽的受害者一样。不过,他提出的关于我们对物理世界的认识的问题,在他那个时代是自然而然的,也是我们最关心的问题,而他提出的最有说服力的方式,就是考虑一个邪恶的魔鬼通过精心操纵我们的感官来愚弄我们,让我们相信一些事情的可能性。这个恶魔就像玛丽一样,能够让我们不知道它在做什么,同时基本上为我们编造了我们所有的经历。
Here are two passages where Descartes first faces the possibility of the evil demon, and then considers how to respond to it. all external objects that we see, are nothing but illusions and tricks, which he uses to entrap my credulity.
在这两段文字中,笛卡尔首先面对了邪魔的可能性,然后思考了如何应对邪魔。"我们所看到的一切外物,都不过是幻象和诡计,他用这些幻象和诡计来诱骗我的轻信。
But were I persuaded that there was nothing at all in the world, that there was no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies; would I also be persuaded that I did not exist? No, surely, I would exist, without doubt, if I was persuaded, or even if I thought anything. "But there is some unknown deceiver, who is very powerful and very devious, who is using all his ingenuity to deceive me." Then there is no doubt at all that I exist, if he is deceiving me; and were he to deceive me as much as he wishes, he would never be able to make it true that I am nothing, so long as I am thinking that I am something. The result is that after having thought precisely about it and having carefully examined all things, in the end one must conclude, and hold as sound that this proposition: "I am," "I exist," is necessarily true on all occasions that I utter it or that I conceive it in my mind.
但是,如果我相信世界上什么都没有,没有天空,没有大地,没有思想,没有身体,我还会相信我不存在吗?不,毫无疑问,如果我被说服,甚至如果我有任何想法,我都会存在。"但是,有一个不知名的骗子,他非常强大,非常狡猾,正在用他所有的聪明才智来欺骗我"。那么,如果他在欺骗我,我的存在就毫无疑问了;即使他想怎么欺骗我都行,只要我在想我是存在的,他就永远无法让我真的什么都不是。结果是,在经过精确的思考和对所有事物的仔细研究之后,人们最终必须得出结论,并认为这个命题是正确的:"我是"、"我存在 "这个命题在我说出它或在我头脑中设想它的所有场合都必然是真实的。
This is a very persuasive argument: it is, indeed, one of the most famous arguments in the history of philosophy. What Descartes realized was that, however powerful the demon was, there was one thing the demon couldn't fool him about, namely, Descartes' own existence. The evidence each of us has of our own existence is indefeasible: it is obviously impossible both to be aware of yourself (or anything else) and not to exist. Descartes formulated this argument rather pithily in Latin in one of the best-known slogans in all philosophy: "Cogito ergo sum," which means "I think, therefore I am." (This argument is sometimes just called "the cogito.")
这是一个非常有说服力的论证:它的确是哲学史上最著名的论证之一。笛卡尔意识到,无论恶魔多么强大,有一件事恶魔是骗不了他的,那就是笛卡尔自己的存在。我们每个人都有自己存在的证据,这是不可辩驳的:显然,既不可能意识到自己(或其他任何事物),也不可能不存在。笛卡尔用拉丁语相当精辟地表述了这一论点,这也是所有哲学中最著名的口号之一:"Cogito ergo sum",意思是 "我思故我在"。(这个论点有时被称为 "cogito")。
Descartes thought he could escape the demon's tricks if he could find other beliefs that were as certain and indubitable for him as his own existence - the "I am" - and the fact that he had thoughts - the "I think." So long as he had any such certain and indubitable beliefs at all, he could claim these beliefs as knowledge, however hard the demon tried to confuse him.
笛卡尔认为,如果他能找到与他自身的存在--"我是"--和他有思想的事实--"我思 "一样确定无疑的其他信念,他就能逃脱魔鬼的诡计。只要他有任何这样确定和不可辩驳的信念,他就可以把这些信念说成是知识,无论魔鬼如何试图迷惑他。
Descartes, then, suggested that the right way to explain the justification condition was to insist that the evidence you possessed entitled you to be certain of what you believed. And by "certain" he meant that it had to be impossible to doubt it. This, after all, is a natural extension of the idea that we express by asking people who think they know something, "But are you sure?" We want them to consider whether they really have no doubt at all that they are right.
于是,笛卡尔提出,解释正当性条件的正确方法是坚持认为,你所拥有的证据使你有权确定你所相信的东西。他所说的 "确信 "是指不可能对其产生怀疑。毕竟,这是我们在问那些自以为知道什么的人 "但你确定吗?"时所表达的观点的自然延伸。我们希望他们考虑一下,他们是否真的毫不怀疑自己是对的。
It is only a short step from insisting that a belief that is to count as knowledge must be impossible to doubt to insisting that you must have indefeasible evidence for the belief. For if it is impossible for you to doubt , then you must have evidence that couldn't be true unless was true. And I defined "indefeasible evidence" as evidence for the truth of a sentence, , that is so good that it is not possible that should be false when the evidence-sentence is true. So Descartes is committed to the view that to know something you must have indefeasible evidence for it-or, equivalently, that your evidence must make the belief indubitable. To know something, for Descartes,
从坚持认为要算作知识的信念必须是不可能被怀疑的,到坚持认为你必须有不可辩驳的证据来证明你的信念,这只是很短的一步。因为如果你不可能怀疑 ,那么你就必须有证据证明 不可能是真的。我给 "不可辩驳的证据 "下的定义是:当证据句子为真时, ,它是如此之好,以至于 不可能是假的。因此,笛卡尔坚信,要想知道某件事情,就必须有不可辩驳的证据,或者说,你的证据必须使信念不可辩驳。对笛卡尔来说,要知道某件事情、
a) you must believe it,
a) 你必须相信它、
b) it must be true, and
b) 它必须是真实的,并且
c) you must have indefeasible evidence for the belief.
c) 你必须有不可辩驳的证据来证明你的信念。
Descartes' view has one surprising immediate consequence. Some sentences-such as "Nothing is both in New York and not in New York at the same time" - couldn't be false, and they are called "necessary truths." It turns out that, given the way indefeasible evidence is defined, any sentence at all is indefeasible evidence for a necessary truth. Take a sentence, , which is a necessary truth. By definition, it can't be false. Indefeasible evidence for is defined as evidence that couldn't be true if were false. Consider any other sentence at all; say, T. It certainly isn't possible for to be false if is true. For it isn't possible for to be false under any circumstances. So you have indefeasible evidence for any sentence that is a necessary truth, provided you believe anything at all!
笛卡尔的观点有一个令人惊讶的直接后果。有些句子--比如 "没有什么东西同时既在纽约又不在纽约"--不可能是假的,它们被称为 "必然真理"。事实证明,根据不可否认证据的定义方式,任何句子都是必然真理的不可否认证据。以一个句子 为例,它是一个必然真理。根据定义,它不可能是假的。 的不可否认的证据的定义是,如果 是假的,那么这个证据就不可能是真的。考虑任何其他句子,比如 T。如果 是真的, 当然不可能是假的。因为在任何情况下, 都不可能是假的。因此,只要你相信任何事情,你就有不可辩驳的证据证明任何句子都是必然真理!
It follows, of course, that, on Descartes' view, we know any necessary truths we believe. For necessary truths are, by definition, true under any circumstances, and, as we have seen, we automatically have indefeasible evidence for them.
当然,根据笛卡尔的观点,我们知道我们所相信的任何必然真理。因为根据定义,必然真理在任何情况下都是真实的,而且正如我们所看到的,我们自动拥有它们的不可辩驳的证据。
As far as necessary truths are concerned, then, Descartes' theory is very permissive. The difficulty with the theory is that it is, by contrast, very demanding when it comes to beliefs about the physical world. Indeed, it is so demanding that it is hard to think of any beliefs about physical objects that Descartes could claim to know. For, after all, as the story of Marie and Albert showed-as
因此,就必然真理而言,笛卡尔的理论是非常宽容的。该理论的难点在于,与之形成鲜明对比的是,它在涉及物理世界的信念时要求非常苛刻。事实上,它的要求之高,以至于很难想象笛卡尔可以声称知道任何关于物理对象的信念。毕竟,正如玛丽和阿尔伯特的故事所表明的那样
Descartes' own story of the demon shows-the evidence we actually have is consistent with our being wrong about almost everything we believe, except (as Descartes saw) what we believe about our own existence and our own thoughts. Nothing at all-save the existence of our own minds - is certain. So, on the Cartesian view, apart from necessary truths, we know nothing at all save the existence of our own minds. The philosophical position that we can know nothing about some kind of thing is known as skepticism about things of that kind. The Cartesian definition of knowledge leads swiftly to skepticism about the physical world.
笛卡尔自己关于恶魔的故事表明--我们实际掌握的证据表明,我们所相信的几乎所有东西都是错的,除了(正如笛卡尔所看到的)我们所相信的关于我们自己的存在和我们自己的思想的东西。除了我们自己的思想存在之外,没有任何东西是确定的。因此,根据笛卡尔的观点,除了必要的真理之外,除了我们自己的思想存在之外,我们什么都不知道。我们对某种事物一无所知的哲学立场被称为对该类事物的怀疑论。笛卡尔对知识的定义迅速导致了对物理世界的怀疑论。
Descartes thought he could escape the skeptical consequences of his definition of knowledge. His way of avoiding these consequences depends on the belief that there is an omnipotent, benevolent God who does not want us to be deceived. It is important to state as clearly as possible why this helps, because it allows us to make explicit one of Descartes' assumptions about the way we ought to seek justification for our beliefs. That assumption, as we shall see, is crucial to many philosophical views about justification.
笛卡尔认为他可以逃避他的知识定义所带来的怀疑论后果。他避免这些后果的方法依赖于这样一个信念,即存在着一个全能、仁慈的上帝,他不希望我们被欺骗。我们必须尽可能清楚地说明这一点,因为它让我们能够明确笛卡尔关于我们应该如何为自己的信念寻找理由的一个假设。正如我们将要看到的,这一假设对许多关于正当性的哲学观点都至关重要。
But before we go any further, we must notice another of Descartes' assumptions. Descartes thought that we could not be wrong about the contents of our own minds. He thought, for example, that if I think I am now thinking about oranges, then I must, in fact, be thinking about oranges. It is worth asking whether Descartes is right about this. For it might seem that sometimes, in fact, we make mistakes about what we are thinking. Certainly, it does not follow from the cogito argument alone. From the fact that, if I am thinking, I must exist it doesn't follow that I can't be wrong about what I'm thinking; it follows only that I can't be wrong in thinking that I exist. Nevertheless, there is at least some plausibility to the thought that I can't be wrong about the contents of my own mind, and many philosophers of his day thought that this was so.
不过,在继续深入之前,我们必须注意到笛卡尔的另一个假设。笛卡尔认为,我们对自己头脑中的内容不会有错。例如,他认为,如果我认为我现在在想橘子,那么我事实上就一定在想橘子。值得一问的是,笛卡尔的看法是否正确。因为事实上,我们有时可能会对自己在想什么犯错误。当然,这不能仅从 "cogito "论证中得出。根据 "如果我在思考,我就一定存在 "这一事实,并不能推导出我的思考不会出错,而只能推导出我在思考我的存在时不会出错。尽管如此,"我对自己思想内容的看法不会错 "这一观点至少还是有一定的可信度的,他那个时代的许多哲学家都这么认为。
Now, suppose I have a sensory experience that I can describe by saying:
现在,假设我有一种感官体验,我可以用一句话来描述这种体验:
E: It looks to me as though there is a book in front of me.
E:在我看来,我面前好像有一本书。
I call this sentence "E"-for "evidence." Since E is about my own mind, Descartes will allow that I can know it to be true: according
我称这句话为 "E"--"证据 "的意思。既然 E 是关于我自己的心灵的,笛卡尔就会允许我知道它是真的:根据

to him, as I have just pointed out, I can have indefeasible evidence of my own state of mind.
对他来说,正如我刚才指出的那样,我可以有自己思想状态的不可辩驳的证据。
But how can I come to know, on the basis of this state of mind, that there is, in fact, a book in front of me? Descartes says that if God is both benevolent and all-powerful, then He can make sure that the experiences we have correspond with the way the world really is. But even if my experience in fact corresponds with reality, because God has guaranteed it, I cannot know that it does unless I have indefeasible evidence. Suppose, however, that I have indefeasible evidence that God guarantees that sensory experience corresponds to how the world is. Then I know that if it looks, sounds, or, in general, seems to me that something is so, it is so. And so I know, in particular, that
但是,基于这种思维状态,我怎么能知道我面前其实有一本书呢?笛卡尔说,如果上帝既仁慈又万能,那么他就能确保我们的经验与世界的真实情况相符。但是,即使我的经验事实上与现实相符,因为上帝保证了这一点,除非我有不可辩驳的证据,否则我无法知道它是否与现实相符。然而,假设我有不可辩驳的证据,证明上帝保证感官经验与世界的真实情况相符。那么我就知道,如果在我看来,某件事情看起来是这样,听起来是这样,或者,一般来说,看起来是这样,那么它就是这样。因此,我特别知道
: If it looks to me as though there is a book in front of me, then there is a book in front of me.
如果在我看来面前有一本书,那么我面前就有一本书。
Now from the two sentences, and , it follows logically that there is a book in front of me. (We shall discuss what it means for something to follow logically in the next chapter; see 3.10.) Furthermore, I know, according to Descartes, that both and are true. Suppose that if something you believe follows logically from two things you know, then you know it, too. If that were true, Descartes could say that I knew that there was a book in front of me.
现在,根据 这两个句子,逻辑上可以得出结论:我面前有一本书。(我们将在下一章讨论逻辑上可以得出结论的含义,见 3.10)。此外,根据笛卡尔的观点,我知道 都是真的。假设如果你相信的东西在逻辑上是从你所知道的两件事中推导出来的,那么你也知道它。如果这是真的,笛卡尔就可以说,我知道我面前有一本书。
Descartes' claim that God's guarantee of our senses can form the basis of knowledge will be correct, therefore, if both
因此,笛卡尔认为上帝对我们感官的保证可以构成知识的基础,如果两者都是正确的,那么
a) we know about God's guarantee, and
a) 我们知道上帝的保证,以及
b) the following principle is correct: for any two sentences, A and B, if you know A and know B, and if from A and B, together, C follows logically, then if you believe C, you know C.
b) 下面的原则是正确的:对于任何两个句子 A 和 B,如果你知道 A 也知道 B,并且如果从 A 和 B 一起逻辑地得出 C,那么如果你相信 C,你就知道 C。
This principle is usually called the "deductive closure principle." For it says that the class of things you know includes all your beliefs that are logical (or "deductive") consequences of everything you know already.
这一原则通常被称为 "演绎封闭原则"。因为它说,你所知道的事物的类别包括你所有的信念,这些信念是你已经知道的一切事物的逻辑(或 "演绎")结果。
Notice that the deductive closure principle is really a consequence
请注意,演绎闭包原理实际上是一个结果

of Descartes' definition of knowledge. For, on Descartes' theory, if you know both and , then it is true of each sentence that
笛卡尔的知识定义。因为,根据笛卡尔的理论,如果你同时知道 ,那么每个句子都是真的,即
a) you believe it,
a) 你相信它、
b) it is true, and
b) 它是真实的,并且
c) you have indefeasible evidence for it.
c) 你有不可辩驳的证据。
Suppose you believe C, which follows logically from A and B. Since you do know A and B, it follows that your belief in C is true. (Here's the argument: If a conclusion follows logically from some assumptions, then the conclusion will be true if the assumptions are. From (b), it follows that if you know A and B, then A and B are both true. As I just said, if C follows logically from A and B, then C is true if they both are. So if you know A and B and if C follows from them, then is true.) That gives us conditions (a) and (b) for your belief C. So you know C, provided the justification condition (c) is satisfied as well. Does your knowing A and B mean you have indefeasible evidence for C, which follows from them? Obviously. For if C follows from and , then the evidence-sentence that makes and true makes true as well. (Here's the argument: Suppose is the indefeasible evidence for and ' is the indefeasible evidence for . Then is indefeasible evidence for . That just means that if is true, then must be. But if must be true then must be true, too, because it follows from ( . So, if ( is true, must be true. Which means that ( is indefeasible evidence for .) So the deductive closure principle is correct.
假设你相信由 A 和 B 逻辑推导出的 C,由于你确实知道 A 和 B,所以你相信 C 是真的:如果一个结论在逻辑上是由一些假设得出的,那么如果假设是真的,结论就是真的。根据(b),如果你知道 A 和 B,那么 A 和 B 都是真的。正如我刚才所说,如果 C 是由 A 和 B 逻辑推导出来的,那么如果它们都是真的,C 就是真的。因此,如果你知道 A 和 B,并且 C 从它们得出,那么 为真)。这就为你的信念 C 提供了条件 (a) 和 (b)。因此,你知道 C,前提是证明条件 (c) 也满足。你知道 A 和 B 是否意味着你对 C 有不可辩驳的证据,而 C 是由它们推导出来的?显然是的。因为如果 C 来自 ,那么使 成真的证据句子也使 成真。(论证如下:假设 的不可辩驳证据,而 ' 是 的不可辩驳证据。那么 就是 的不可辩驳证据。这就意味着,如果 是真的,那么 也一定是真的。但是,如果 一定为真,那么 也一定为真,因为它是从 ( 。因此,如果 ( 为真,那么 也一定为真。这意味着 ( 的不可推翻的证据。)所以演绎封闭原则是正确的。
The core of the argument here is expressed in the following principle:
论证的核心内容体现在以下原则中:
PDJ: If you take any two sentences, and , then, if you are justified in believing both A and B, and if from A and B together, C follows logically, then, if you believe C, you are justified in believing .
PDJ:如果你任意取两个句子, ,那么,如果你有理由同时相信 A 和 B,如果从 A 和 B 一起逻辑地得出 C,那么,如果你相信 C,你就有理由相信
The American philosopher Irving Thalberg has called this the "principle of deduction for justification" (PDJ, for short.) The PDJ is certainly correct if justification means "indefeasible justification."
美国哲学家欧文-塔尔伯格(Irving Thalberg)将此称为 "正当理由的演绎原则"(简称 PDJ)。
And, as we just saw, given the PDJ and Descartes' definition of knowledge, the deductive closure principle follows.
而且,正如我们刚才看到的,考虑到 PDJ 和笛卡尔对知识的定义,演绎闭合原理也就水到渠成了。
Descartes requires the deductive closure principle because, without it, even the existence of a benevolent God, attempting to do the opposite of the evil demon, would not allow us knowledge of the world. With both the principle and the knowledge that God guarantees that our senses will not deceive us, however, Descartes is able to allow that we have some knowledge of the physical world.
笛卡尔之所以需要演绎封闭原则,是因为如果没有这个原则,即使存在一个试图与恶鬼相反的仁慈的上帝,我们也无法了解这个世界。然而,有了这个原则和上帝保证我们的感官不会欺骗我们的知识,笛卡尔就能够允许我们对物理世界有一定的了解。
But there is a serious problem with the Cartesian position. It is that Descartes offers no convincing reason for thinking that we know that God guarantees the evidence of our senses. After all, it seems that our senses can sometimes deceive us: sometimes we seem to have hallucinations. And if we sometimes have hallucinations, then God doesn't always guarantee that the world is as it appears to be.
但是,笛卡尔的立场存在一个严重的问题。这就是,笛卡尔没有提供令人信服的理由,让我们认为上帝的存在是我们感官证据的保证。毕竟,我们的感官有时似乎会欺骗我们:有时我们似乎会产生幻觉。如果我们有时会产生幻觉,那么上帝就不会总是保证世界就是它所显示的那样。
It won't help here to say that God sometimes makes sure our senses don't deceive us, because to know anything, on Descartes' view, we would have to know when. Descartes was aware of this problem, and he proposed a solution to it. His idea was that God had given us a way of telling which of our ideas were in fact reliable. For he argued that we would never go wrong if we believed only those ideas that were "clear and distinct." But it is far from clear that we do in fact have a way of telling, from the character of our experiences, whether or not they are reliable, and Descartes' notion of "clear and distinct" ideas is not, in the opinion of many philosophers, a satisfactory solution to this problem. If they are right, then we do not, in fact, have a God-given guarantee that some of the evidence of our senses is correct.
在这里,说上帝有时会确保我们的感官不会欺骗我们是无济于事的,因为根据笛卡尔的观点,要想知道任何事情,我们就必须知道时间。笛卡尔意识到了这个问题,并提出了一个解决方案。他的想法是,上帝给了我们一种方法,告诉我们哪些想法实际上是可靠的。因为他认为,如果我们只相信那些 "清晰明确 "的想法,我们就不会出错。许多哲学家认为,笛卡尔关于 "清晰明确 "的观念并不能令人满意地解决这个问题。许多哲学家认为,笛卡尔 "清晰明确 "的观念并不能令人满意地解决这个问题。如果他们的观点是正确的,那么事实上,我们并没有得到上帝赋予的保证,即我们感官的某些证据是正确的。
Unless we know that God guarantees at least some of what our senses lead us to believe, then we don't have any indefeasible true beliefs about the physical world. So we know nothing about it. Still, as we saw earlier, we do have some knowledge, since we know any necessary truths we believe. The real reason that Descartes thought we knew necessary truths is that we do not need evidence from our senses to justify belief in them at all. His theory leads to skepticism about the physical world because all the evidence of our senses is defeasible. But we can work out necessary truths without relying on our unreliable senses.
除非我们知道上帝至少保证了我们感官所相信的某些东西,否则我们对物理世界就没有任何不可辩驳的真实信念。因此,我们对它一无所知。不过,正如我们前面所看到的,我们还是有一些知识的,因为我们知道我们所相信的任何必然真理。笛卡尔认为我们知道必然真理的真正原因是,我们根本不需要感官的证据来证明对它们的信念是正确的。他的理论导致了对物理世界的怀疑,因为我们感官的所有证据都是虚无的。但是,我们可以不依赖我们不可靠的感官,找出必然真理。
Because Cartesianism lays such stress on certainty, it leads to the conclusion that we know only those things that we can work out by reasoning, without appeal to sensory evidence, even though Descartes tried to avoid this consequence. The position that the most significant elements of what we know are derived by reasoning rather than experience is called "rationalism." We shall discuss the nature of necessary truths in the next chapter, where we shall see that the rationalist belief that all our knowledge of necessary truths comes solely from reasoning alone is mistaken.
由于笛卡尔主义如此强调确定性,它导致的结论是,我们只知道那些我们可以通过推理得出的东西,而不需要诉诸感官证据,尽管笛卡尔试图避免这种后果。我们所知道的最重要的内容是通过推理而非经验得出的,这一立场被称为 "理性主义"。我们将在下一章讨论必然真理的性质,我们将看到,理性主义认为我们对必然真理的所有认识都仅仅来自推理的观点是错误的。
The main objection to Cartesian rationalism, however, is that it leads to skepticism about the physical world. Isn't it just absurdthe worst sort of philosopher's nonsense-to claim that we don't know of the existence of any physical objects at all? The British philosopher G. E. Moore once held up his hands in an expression of exasperation with those who deny the existence of the "external world," the world "outside" our minds, and said that he certainly knew that his hands existed. He was, in effect, assuming that we should reject a theory that had so absurd a consequence as that he didn't know he had two hands. Very often in philosophy, we argue against a position by showing that it has absurd consequences: a procedure called reductio ad absurdum (or reductio, for short), which is just the Latin for "reducing to absurdity." Moore's point was that we should reject a philosophical theory of knowledge that leads us to conclude that we do not know that our own hands exist. We should reject such a theory because this consequence reduces it to absurdity.
然而,对笛卡尔理性主义的主要反对意见是,它导致了对物理世界的怀疑。声称我们根本不知道任何物理对象的存在,这难道不是最荒谬的哲学家无稽之谈吗?英国哲学家摩尔(G. E. Moore)曾举起双手,对那些否认 "外部世界"(我们头脑之外的世界)存在的人表示愤慨,并说他当然知道他的双手是存在的。实际上,他是在假设我们应该拒绝接受一种理论,因为这种理论会产生他不知道自己有两只手这样荒谬的结果。在哲学中,我们经常通过证明某个立场会产生荒谬的后果来反驳它:这个过程被称为 "归谬法"(reductio ad absurdum,简称 "归谬法"),拉丁文的意思就是 "归结为荒谬"。摩尔的观点是,我们应该拒绝一种关于知识的哲学理论,因为这种理论会让我们得出结论:我们不知道我们自己的手是否存在。我们应该拒绝这样的理论,因为这样的结果会使它归于荒谬。
It is important in a reductio proof that the consequence we draw should not merely strike us as absurd but actually be false. We shall discuss in the next chapter the fact that if you can draw a false conclusion from a position, the position must be false itself. Because it is the falsity of the conclusion that means that the position must be false, we sometimes refer to an argument as a reductio simply because it shows that a position leads to (what we believe is) a false conclusion.
在归谬法证明中,重要的是我们得出的结果不应该仅仅让我们觉得荒谬,而应该实际上是错误的。我们将在下一章讨论这样一个事实,即如果你能从一个立场得出一个虚假的结论,那么这个立场本身一定是虚假的。由于结论的虚假性意味着立场一定是虚假的,所以我们有时称一个论证为还原论证,仅仅因为它表明了一个立场导致了(我们认为的)一个虚假的结论。
There is no doubt that we have to be very careful with reductio ad absurdum as a form of argument. This is because it is not always clear that what we take to be absurd really is false. For a long time, for example, it might have been thought absurd to draw the conclu-
毫无疑问,我们必须非常谨慎地对待荒诞归谬法这种论证方式。这是因为,我们并不总是清楚我们认为荒谬的东西是否真的是错误的。例如,在很长一段时间里,人们可能会认为得出以下结论是荒谬的:"......"。

sion that God doesn't exist. Nowadays, even many believers agree that it is not absurd to suppose that there is no God (though, of course, they think that it is an error to believe this). So before we reject Descartes' position in Moore's way, we should consider seriously the possibility that it is not false that we know nothing of the external world.
认为上帝并不存在。如今,就连许多信徒也同意,认为没有上帝并不荒谬(当然,他们认为这样认为是错误的)。因此,在我们以摩尔的方式否定笛卡尔的立场之前,我们应该认真考虑这样一种可能性,即我们对外部世界一无所知并不是错误的。
But we have at least one strong motive for rejecting Descartes' extremely strict interpretation of the justification condition, if it does have the consequence that we know only of the existence of our own thoughts; namely, that a theory of knowledge that says that we can know nothing about the world in which we live makes the concept of knowledge rather uninteresting. We certainly have beliefs about the world, and some of them seem better justified than others. Even if knowledge is unavailable, we should still need the idea of justified beliefs. And whatever "justified" means, it cannot mean "indefeasibly justified" in this context, because, as we have seen, no beliefs about the physical world are indefeasibly justified.
但是,我们至少有一个强烈的动机来拒绝笛卡尔对合理性条件的极其严格的解释,如果它确实产生了我们只知道我们自己思想存在的结果的话;那就是,一种知识理论说,我们对我们生活的世界一无所知,这使得知识的概念变得相当无趣。我们当然有关于这个世界的信念,而且有些信念似乎比其他信念更有道理。即使没有知识,我们仍然需要 "合理信念 "这一概念。无论 "有理 "是什么意思,在这里都不可能是指 "不可辩驳的有理",因为正如我们所看到的,没有任何关于物理世界的信念是不可辩驳的。
We have, then, good reason for hoping that Descartes is wrong to insist on indefeasible justification, because this theory of knowledge leads to skepticism. But we may be able to develop a theory of knowledge that does not lead to skepticism if we find another way of interpreting the justification condition. Is there any way of interpreting the condition that is less demanding?
因此,我们有充分的理由希望笛卡尔坚持不可辩解的正当性是错误的,因为这种知识论会导致怀疑论。但是,如果我们找到另一种解释正当性条件的方法,我们也许能够发展出一种不会导致怀疑论的知识理论。有没有要求不那么高的解释该条件的方法呢?

2.4 Locke's way: Justification can be less than certain
2.4 洛克的方式:正义可以不那么确定

The obvious thing to do is to weaken the justification condition, to require not indefeasible evidence but just good evidence. As Moore pointed out, we normally take it that we know that we have hands, even though we do not have indefeasible evidence that we have them. The evidence that we have hands-which is the evidence of our senses-is strong evidence, even if it isn't strong enough to satisfy Descartes.
Let us examine the proposal, then, that to know something
那么,让我们来研究一下这样的建议,即要知道一些事情
a) you must believe it,
a) 你必须相信它、
b) it must be true, and
b) 它必须是真实的,并且
c) you must have good-but not necessarily indefeasibleevidence for the belief.
c) 你必须有很好的--但不一定是不可辩驳的--证据来证明你的信念。
On this theory, unlike Descartes', I can know, for example, that I have two hands, because I have very good evidence from experience for my true belief that I have two hands. Someone who believes that evidence of this sort is what we require for knowledge of the physical world is called an empiricist. Empiricism is the claim that most or all of our beliefs are justified by experience-by empirical evidence, as it is called. Such evidence comes from our senses: our sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, and so on. Just as rationalists regard necessary truths-sentences that must be true-as the model of knowledge, empiricists regard contingent truths-which might not have been true-as the model. (We shall discuss the idea of truths being necessary or contingent in the next chapter.) For a rationalist like Descartes, " " would be a very good example of something we know, because reasoning can give us indefeasible evidence that it is true. For an empiricist, a sentence such as "It is raining here," said by someone standing in the rain, would be a very good example of something someone knows.
与笛卡尔的理论不同,根据这一理论,例如,我可以知道我有两只手,因为我有很好的经验证据来证明我有两只手的真实信念。认为我们需要这种证据来了解物理世界的人被称为经验主义者。经验主义认为,我们的大部分或全部信念都是由经验--即所谓的经验证据--来证明的。这些证据来自我们的感官:视觉、听觉、味觉、嗅觉、触觉等等。正如理性主义者将必然真理--必须为真的句子--视为知识模型一样,经验主义者也将偶然真理--可能并不为真的句子--视为知识模型。(我们将在下一章讨论真理的必然性或偶然性)。对于像笛卡尔这样的理性主义者来说," "是我们所知道的事物的一个很好的例子,因为推理可以给我们提供不可辩驳的证据,证明它是真的。对于经验主义者来说,一个人站在雨中说出 "这里在下雨 "这样的句子,就是一个人知道什么的很好的例子。
Descartes was a leading rationalist. The English philosopher John Locke, who also wrote in the seventeenth century, was one of the founders of modern empiricism. In Book Two, Chapter One, Section 2, of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, one of the great classics of empiricism, he says:
笛卡尔是一位主要的理性主义者。英国哲学家约翰-洛克也写于 17 世纪,是现代经验主义的创始人之一。在他的经验主义经典著作之一《论人类的理解》的第二卷第一章第二节中,他说:
Though this is an apparently clear statement of the essentials of empiricism, what Locke is saying is not as simple as it seems. There are two main reasons.
虽然这表面上是对经验主义要义的明确阐述,但洛克所说的并不像看起来那么简单。主要原因有两个。
First, Locke held a special view about what our minds contain. Our knowledge, he believed, is stored in our minds in the form of collections of ideas. These ideas are what he calls the "materials" of knowledge: they are quite literally what our knowledge is made of.
首先,洛克对我们的思想所包含的内容持有一种特殊的观点。他认为,我们的知识是以思想集合的形式储存在我们的头脑中的。这些观念就是他所说的知识的 "材料":从字面上看,它们就是我们知识的构成。
When he says that all our knowledge is founded in experience, then, he does not mean that all of our knowledge is justified by experience. He means rather that we can have no ideas that are not derived from experience; and that, therefore, every piece of knowledge is made up of materials that come from experience. As we shall see in a moment, it is very important that Locke did not hold that all of our knowledge has to be justified by experience.
当他说我们所有的知识都建立在经验之上时,他并不是说我们所有的知识都是由经验证明的。他的意思是,我们不可能有不是来自经验的观念;因此,每一种知识都是由来自经验的材料构成的。我们稍后将看到,洛克并不认为我们所有的知识都必须由经验来证明,这一点非常重要。
A second reason why what Locke says here is not as simple as it seems is that Locke meant by "experience" something rather more than just sensation. In Book Two, Chapter One, Sections 3 and 4, he argues that there are two sources of ideas in experience:
洛克在这里所说的并不像看起来那么简单的第二个原因是,洛克所说的 "经验 "不仅仅是指感觉。在第二卷第一章第3节和第4节中,他认为经验中有两种观念来源:
The Objects of Sensation one Source of Ideas. First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. . . This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.
感官对象是观念的来源。首先,我们的感官与特定的感官对象相联系,会根据这些对象影响它们的不同方式,把对事物的几种不同的认识传入心灵。. .我们所拥有的大多数观念的这一伟大来源,完全依赖于我们的感官,并由感官衍生到理解,我称之为感觉。
The Operations of our Minds, the other Source of them. Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,the perception of the operations of our own mind, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; . . I I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. . . These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings.
我们心灵的运作,它们的另一个源泉。其次,经验为理解力提供观念的另一个源泉是,我们对自己心灵运作的感知,因为我们的心灵是在对它所获得的观念进行运作;......。......我把它叫做反思,它所提供的观念只是心灵通过反思它自身的运作而获得的。. ..我说,这两者,即作为感官对象的外部物质事物和作为反思对象的我们自己内心的思维活动,在我看来是我们所有观念起源的唯一原点。
All of our ideas, then, come from experience: either experience, in sensation, of the world outside us, or experience, in reflection, of the workings of our own minds. It is also true that most of our beliefs derive from experience. But, Locke holds, we can also come to know things - mathematical truths, for example, such as " 4 "-by reasoning, which he calls "demonstration." "Mathematical demonstration," he says, "depends not upon sense" (Book Three, Chapter Eleven, Section 6). Even here, however, our knowledge is founded in experience: for our ideas of the numbers 2 and 4 , or of addition and the equality of numbers, are just as much derived from experience, according to Locke, as our ideas of tables and chairs.
因此,我们所有的想法都来自于经验:或者是对我们外部世界的感官经验,或者是对我们自身思想运作的反思经验。我们的大部分信念也确实来自经验。但是,洛克认为,我们也可以通过推理(他称之为 "证明")来认识事物--例如数学真理,如 " 4"。他说,"数学证明""不依赖于感性"(第三卷,第十一章,第六节)。然而,即使在这里,我们的知识也是建立在经验之上的:因为洛克认为,我们对数字2和4的观念,或对数字加法和相等的观念,就像我们对桌子和椅子的观念一样,都是来自经验。
The idea of the number 2 , for example, he thought was derived by "abstraction" from our experiences of pairs of things.
例如,他认为数字 "2 "的概念是从我们对成对事物的经验中 "抽象 "出来的。
It follows, then, that though Locke stresses that our ideas come from or are "founded in" experience, he can agree that reason can be as much a source of knowledge as experience. Locke can, therefore, accept all the kinds of knowledge that Descartes' theory allowed: but he is not restricted to truths known indefeasibly. So he can hold that we sometimes come to know things other than by reasoning.
由此可见,尽管洛克强调我们的观念来自经验或 "建立在经验之上",但他同意理性与经验一样可以是知识的来源。因此,洛克可以接受笛卡尔理论所允许的所有类型的知识:但他并不局限于已知的真理。因此,他可以认为,我们有时不是通过推理来认识事物的。
Empiricism as an approach to epistemology has grown side by side with modern science. Locke was a contemporary of Sir Isaac Newton, the first great modern physicist. This connection between the growth of empiricism and the growth of science is not very surprising. Science depends a great deal on experience in its search for knowledge of the physical world. Even psychology, which sometimes relies on our experiences of our own mental life for its evidence, relies on experience, in Locke's sense. For, remember, Locke regarded "reflection," by which he meant our experience of our own mental lives, as a kind of experience.
经验主义作为一种认识论方法,是与现代科学同步发展的。洛克与现代第一位伟大的物理学家艾萨克-牛顿爵士同时代。经验主义的发展与科学的发展之间的这种联系并不十分令人惊讶。科学在探寻物理世界的知识时,在很大程度上依赖于经验。就连有时依赖于我们自身精神生活经验作为证据的心理学,也依赖于洛克意义上的经验。因为,请记住,洛克把 "反思"(他指的是我们对自己精神生活的体验)视为一种经验。
The basic idea that much of our knowledge derives from our experiences of the world is, as a result, an attractive one in an age of science. Mathematics is, of course, important to modern science too, and we learn mathematical facts not from experience but-as Locke pointed out-by using our powers of reasoning. But even in mathematical physics, which uses more mathematics than most other sciences, the evidence of experience is tremendously important.
因此,在科学时代,我们的大部分知识都来源于我们对世界的体验,这一基本理念很有吸引力。当然,数学对现代科学也很重要,我们不是从经验中学习数学事实,而是--正如洛克所指出的--利用我们的推理能力。但是,即使在数学物理学中,数学的应用也多于其他大多数科学,经验的证据也是非常重要的。
Nevertheless, it is one thing to say that we know only those things that we correctly believe and that experience-or demonstrationjustifies us in believing; it is another to say precisely how our experiences justify our beliefs. Indeed, we have already come across the fact that creates the main problem for empiricism: the evidence of experience is always defeasible. This means that the evidence we have could, in each case, be misleading us. So we have to ask whether there is any way of deciding which evidence we should actually rely on. In answering this question, empiricists have often tried to develop the idea that some of the knowledge we acquire in experience provides the basis for the rest of our knowledge. They have held, in effect, that all of our knowledge is founded on one
尽管如此,说我们只知道那些我们正确相信的东西,经验或证明证明我们相信是正确的,这是一码事;准确地说我们的经验如何证明我们的信念是正确的,这又是另一码事。事实上,我们已经遇到了一个给经验主义带来主要问题的事实:经验的证据总是可以被击败的。这意味着,我们所掌握的证据在每一种情况下都可能误导我们。因此,我们要问,是否有办法决定我们究竟应该依赖哪些证据。在回答这个问题时,经验主义者常常试图发展这样一种观点,即我们从经验中获得的某些知识为我们的其他知识提供了基础。实际上,他们认为我们所有的知识都建立在一个基础之上,那就是

basic class of things we know. This approach is called foundationalist epistemology.
我们所知道的事物的基本类别。这种方法被称为基础主义认识论。

2.5 The foundations of knowledge
2.5 知识的基础

According to all foundationalist epistemologies,
根据所有基础主义认识论、
a) we need to find some class of beliefs, of which we have secure knowledge; and
a) 我们需要找到某类信念,我们对这些信念有可靠的了解;以及
b) once we find this class, we can then honor some of our other beliefs with the special status of knowledge by showing that they are properly supported by the members of this class of foundational beliefs.
b) 一旦我们找到了这一类信念,我们就可以证明我们的一些其他信念得到了这一类基础信念成员的适当支持,从而使这些信念具有知识的特殊地位。
So every foundationalist epistemology needs to answer two main questions:
因此,每一种基础主义认识论都需要回答两个主要问题:
a) the nature of the foundations: what are the foundational beliefs? and
a) 基础的性质:基础信念是什么?
b) the nature of the justification: how do the foundational beliefs support the other, derivative, beliefs?
b) 理由的性质:基本信念如何支持其他派生信念?
If we could find the right foundational beliefs and the right explanation of how they support other beliefs, then we might be able to find a way around Marie, the unscrupulous scientist, and Descartes' demon. With the right answers to these two questions, we might be able to deal with the problems created by the fact that the evidence of experience is always defeasible. The possibility is worth investigating.
如果我们能找到正确的基础信念,并正确解释这些信念如何支持其他信念,那么我们或许就能找到一条绕过玛丽、无良科学家和笛卡尔恶魔的道路。有了这两个问题的正确答案,我们也许就能解决经验的证据总是可否定的这一事实所带来的问题。这种可能性值得研究。
I said just now that foundationalism has appealed to many empiricists. But it is a natural view for any rationalist as well. Rationalists believe that reasoning is the best source of knowledge; and, in the most rigorous sort of reasoning-namely, mathematical proof - we start with axioms, as our foundation, and proceed by logical steps to our conclusions. The axioms are certain: they are the foundations. And they support the consequences we draw in the strongest possible way: indefeasibly.
我刚才说过,基础主义吸引了许多经验主义者。但对于任何理性主义者来说,这也是一种自然而然的观点。理性主义者认为,推理是知识的最佳来源;而在最严格的推理中--即数学证明--我们以公理为基础,然后通过逻辑步骤得出结论。公理是确定的:它们是基础。它们以最有力的方式支持我们得出的结果:不可动摇。
Descartes is typical of rationalists in this respect. For him, the foundational class was just the class of thoughts that could not be
在这方面,笛卡尔是典型的理性主义者。对他来说,基础类只是思想中无法

doubted, because you had indefeasible evidence for them. His famous slogan "I think, therefore I am" was one thing he thought you couldn't doubt. You couldn't doubt it because you couldn't be fooled about it. Even someone as clever as Marie, our unscrupulous scientist, couldn't be fooling the brain if she got it to think that it was thinking; and if it thought that, it would know it existed, because you can't think without existing.
因为你有不容置疑的证据。他的名言 "我思故我在 "就是他认为你不能怀疑的一件事。你不能怀疑它,因为你不能被它愚弄。即使像玛丽这样聪明的人,我们肆无忌惮的科学家,如果她让大脑认为自己在思考,她也骗不了大脑;如果大脑这么想,它就会知道自己存在,因为没有存在就不可能思考。
It is worth noticing that there are many arguments of the form of the cogito that are equally valid. For example, "I laugh, therefore I am." It's true that you can't think if you don't exist, but you can't laugh unless you exist either. What is special about the cogito is that the premise-"I think"-is something that is not just true whenever I think it but also indubitable or certain, according to Descartes, whenever I think it. "I laugh," on the other hand, could be believed by someone who wasn't laughing (for example, by Albert in the vat). The reason Descartes wanted a premise that was indubitable was that he wanted to use the foundationalist strategy. He wanted a premise that was certain ("I think") from which to deduce his conclusion ("I exist") because he thought that a valid argument that has premises that are certain can transmit the certainty to the conclusion. (We'll learn more about valid arguments in the next chapter.)
值得注意的是,有许多 "cogito "形式的论证同样有效。例如,"我笑,所以我是"。的确,如果你不存在,你就不能思考,但如果你不存在,你也不能笑。笛卡尔认为,"我思 "的特殊之处在于,它的前提--"我思"--不仅在我思考的时候是真实的,而且在我思考的时候也是不可推翻或确定的。另一方面,"我笑了 "可能被一个没有笑的人(比如大桶里的阿尔伯特)所相信。笛卡尔之所以想要一个不可推翻的前提,是因为他想使用基础主义策略。他想要一个确定的前提("我认为"),并由此推导出他的结论("我存在"),因为他认为,一个有效的论证,如果前提是确定的,就能将确定性传递给结论。(我们将在下一章进一步了解有效论证)。
But, as we have seen, Descartes' foundational class was too small to provide us with a basis for knowledge of the physical world. For there is nothing at all-save our own minds-whose existence is certain. Since Descartes required that all knowledge should be certain, that led to the general attitude of doubt that is the most extreme form of skepticism about the physical world.
但是,正如我们所看到的,笛卡尔的基础阶级太小,无法为我们提供物理世界的知识基础。因为除了我们自己的思想之外,根本没有任何东西的存在是确定的。由于笛卡尔要求所有知识都应该是确定的,这就导致了普遍的怀疑态度,这是对物理世界最极端的怀疑论形式。
For Locke, on the other hand, the foundational class of beliefs, from which we derive our knowledge of the physical world, is the class of perceptual beliefs. Locke was, therefore, an exponent of a form of empiricist, foundationalist epistemology in which our beliefs about the world all have to be supported by sensory experience, just as our beliefs about our minds have to be supported by reflection. That was Locke's view of the nature of the foundations.
另一方面,在洛克看来,我们对物理世界的认识所依据的基础性信念是感知信念。因此,洛克是一种经验主义、基础主义认识论的倡导者,在这种认识论中,我们关于世界的信念都必须得到感官经验的支持,正如我们关于心灵的信念必须得到反思的支持一样。这就是洛克对基础性质的看法。
Locke was aware of Descartes' arguments and of the skepticism about the physical world to which they so easily lead. But he had an answer for them, which relies on two main claims:
洛克意识到笛卡尔的论点以及这些论点很容易导致的对物理世界的怀疑。但他对这些论点有一个答案,这个答案依赖于两个主要主张:

a) Our experiences are involuntary. We cannot simply choose what experiences we should have. I can decide whether or not to open my eyes. But I cannot choose whether I will see this book in front of me once I do open my eyes. So something other than my own mind must cause my experiences.
a) 我们的经历是不由自主的。我们不能简单地选择我们应该拥有什么样的体验。我可以决定是否睁开眼睛。但我无法选择睁开眼睛后是否会看到眼前的这本书。因此,除了我自己的思维之外,一定还有其他东西导致了我的体验。
b) Our experiences are consistent: "Our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report." For example, we can check on what our eyes tell us when we see a fire by using our hands to feel its warmth.
b) 我们的经验是一致的:"我们的感官在很多情况下都能见证彼此报告的真实性"。例如,当我们看到一团火时,我们可以用手去感受它的温度,从而验证眼睛所告诉我们的信息。
These are, indeed, arguments that might satisfy someone who was worried about whether some particular experiences were in fact reliable. If I was unsure whether a vision in the desert was a mirage, for example, it would help to check whether my other senses confirmed it. I might run to where the water seemed to be, to find out if I could touch or taste it. Similarly, it seems reasonable to think that if I could make an experience come and go simply by wishing, then that experience could not be evidence for the existence of a physical object. But notice that neither of these points really meets the skeptic's worry. For Albert, the brain in the vat, could think both (a) that his experiences were involuntary and (b) that his experiences were consistent; but he would still be wrong if he believed his senses. And the demon would make Descartes' experiences both consistent and involuntary too-or at least as consistent and involuntary as they actually are.
事实上,这些论点可以满足那些担心某些特定经历是否可靠的人。例如,如果我不确定沙漠中的幻象是否是海市蜃楼,那么检查一下我的其他感官是否证实了这一点会有所帮助。我可能会跑到似乎有水的地方,看看能否触摸到或尝到水的味道。同样,如果我仅仅通过许愿就能让某种体验来来去去,那么这种体验就不能作为实物存在的证据,这种想法似乎也是合理的。但请注意,这两点都没有真正满足怀疑论者的担忧。因为缸中的大脑阿尔伯特可以同时认为(a)他的经验是非自愿的,(b)他的经验是一致的;但如果他相信自己的感觉,他仍然是错的。而恶魔也会让笛卡尔的经验变得既一致又非自愿--或者至少像它们实际上一样一致又非自愿。
The problem is that though the involuntary nature of my experience may show that it must have some cause outside of my conscious mind, the story that I am a brain in a vat seems to account for the involuntary nature of my experience just as well as the story that I am experiencing a real world. And though the consistency of our experience does need explaining, it seems as if the story that I am a brain in a vat just could be the right explanation. It seems that to say our experience is only defeasible evidence for the existence of things in the world is just to admit that the suggestion that all our experience is faked is a real possibility. If that is right, whatever reason we give for trusting our senses cannot rule out the possibility that they are misleading us. Someone who believes that we have no right to
问题在于,虽然我的经验的非自主性可能表明它必须有我的意识之外的原因,但 "我是缸中之脑 "的故事似乎和 "我正在经历一个真实的世界 "的故事一样,都能解释我的经验的非自主性。尽管我们的经验的一致性确实需要解释,但 "我是缸中之脑 "的故事似乎就是正确的解释。如果说我们的经验是世界上存在事物的唯一可击败的证据,这似乎就是承认我们所有的经验都是伪造的这一说法是真实存在的。如果这是正确的,那么无论我们提出什么理由来相信我们的感官,都不能排除它们误导我们的可能性。认为我们无权

think that any of our beliefs about the world could not be wrong is called a fallibilist.
认为我们对世界的任何信念都不可能出错的人被称为 "不可靠论者"。
Locke followed this line of argument, and so he said that our senses provide us with grounds for probable beliefs, not for certain ones. But then he claimed that probability is all that we practically require.
洛克遵循了这一论证思路,因此他说,我们的感官为我们提供的是可能的信念,而不是确定的信念。但他又说,概率是我们实际所需的一切。
Certainty comes only with those truths of reason that we can establish by "direct plain demonstration." If you will accept only these truths and refuse to believe the evidence of your senses, Locke is saying, you will simply end up suffering the consequences. Skepticism may seem a real possibility in the study, but no one could survive as a skeptic in the real world.
只有那些我们可以通过 "直接明证 "确立的理性真理,才具有确定性。洛克说,如果你只接受这些真理,而拒绝相信感官的证据,那么你最终只会自食其果。怀疑论在研究中似乎是一种真实的可能性,但没有人能够作为一个怀疑论者在现实世界中生存。
Locke's definition of knowledge is closer than Descartes' to the one we normally assume, in the sense that he agrees with many of our commonsensical claims to know things. He allows, for example, that we know that we have hands, because we have consistent evidence from our experience that we have hands. We began our search for a definition of knowledge in the hope that we could answer the question whether-and if so, how-we know that we aren't just brains in fluid. Locke's answer has to be that we do know this. For, as we saw, the PDJ means that if we believe something and it is a logical consequence of something we know, then we know it too. And since it is a logical consequence of my knowledge that I am experiencing my two hands that my experience is not being faked by Marie, I must know that I am not a brain in Marie's vat.
洛克对知识的定义比笛卡尔的定义更接近我们通常的假设,因为他同意我们对事物的许多常识性认识。例如,他允许我们知道我们有双手,因为我们从经验中得到了我们有双手的一致证据。我们开始寻找 "知识 "的定义,是希望能够回答这样一个问题:我们是否知道--如果知道,我们又是如何知道--我们不仅仅是流体中的大脑。洛克的答案是,我们确实知道这一点。因为,正如我们所看到的,PDJ意味着,如果我们相信某件事情,而它又是我们所知道的某件事情的逻辑结果,那么我们也就知道它。既然我知道我正在体验我的两只手,而我的体验并不是玛丽伪造的,那么我就必须知道我不是玛丽大桶里的大脑。
As for Locke's explanation of why the brain in a vat does not know things about the physical world, it must be that the brain's beliefs are false, not that they are unjustified. For it is evidence that justifies beliefs, and a brain in a vat would have exactly the same evidence that its senses were not deceiving it as I now have that mine are not deceiving me. It follows that the brain is as justified in its beliefs as it would be if they were true, as mine are.
至于洛克关于为什么缸中的大脑不知道物理世界的事情的解释,那一定是大脑的信念是错误的,而不是它们没有理由。因为证明信念合理的是证据,而缸中的大脑会有完全相同的证据证明它的感官没有欺骗它,就像我现在有证据证明我的感官没有欺骗我一样。由此可见,如果大脑的信念是真的,那么它的信念也是合理的,就像我的信念一样。
Here is the problem with this explanation of why Albert's brain
关于阿尔伯特的大脑为什么会这样的解释,问题就在这里。

does not know things about the world. Suppose Marie allowed Albert's brain to have some true beliefs. Suppose she made him believe that the sun was shining on a day when it really was shining. Suppose she got him to believe it by giving him just the evidence I now have that the sun is shining (which in my case is produced by looking out of my window on this sunny day). Needless to say, Albert wouldn't know that the sun was shining. Yet Locke would have to say that he did know it, since the brain would have a justified true belief. (After all, Albert's belief is justified if mine is: we have the same evidence.) Descartes' view of knowledge-which required indefeasible evidence-led to skepticism. He had to deny that we knew anything about the physical world. So his theory led to the conclusion that we do not know some things that we do know. But if we simply weaken Descartes' justification condition to allow defeasible evidence, we get Locke's theory-which leads to the conclusion that the brain knows things that it doesn't know. If knowledge is justified true belief, skepticism is not so easily evaded.
不了解这个世界。假设玛丽允许艾伯特的大脑拥有一些真实的信念。假设她让阿尔伯特相信,在某一天太阳真的照耀着大地。假设她只给了他我现在拥有的太阳正在照耀的证据(在我的情况下,这个证据是在这个阳光明媚的日子里从我的窗户向外看而产生的),就让他相信了这一点。不用说,艾伯特不会知道太阳正在照耀。然而洛克却不得不说他确实知道,因为大脑会有一个合理的真实信念。(毕竟,如果我的信念是合理的,阿尔伯特的信念也是合理的:我们拥有相同的证据)。笛卡尔的知识观--它需要不可辩驳的证据--导致了怀疑论。他不得不否认我们对物理世界有任何了解。因此,他的理论得出了这样的结论:我们不知道我们所知道的某些事情。但是,如果我们简单地弱化笛卡尔的正当化条件,允许可击败的证据,我们就会得到洛克的理论--它导致的结论是,大脑知道它不知道的事情。如果知识是有理由的真实信念,那么怀疑论就不那么容易逃避了。

2.6 Ways around skepticism I: Verificationism
2.6 绕过怀疑论的方法 I.验证主义

I want to consider now a view of knowledge that was very influential in the twentieth century and that seems to offer a way out of the skeptical impasse. It is a view I mentioned in passing in the last chapter, namely, verificationism. I described it there as the view that if no amount of evidence could decide an issue, there is no real issue. To decide an issue, in this context, is to decide whether or not a particular state of affairs obtains in the world.
我现在想考虑一种在二十世纪非常有影响力的知识观,它似乎为摆脱怀疑论的僵局提供了一条出路。这是我在上一章中顺带提到的一种观点,即验证主义。我在那里把它描述为:如果没有任何证据能够决定一个问题,那么就不存在真正的问题。在这里,决定一个问题就是决定世界上是否存在某种特定的事态。
Since we are usually concerned with states of affairs that we can discuss in our language, verificationists usually express their position in terms of the sentences that describe states of affairs. Sentences that describe states of affairs and can therefore be true (if the state of affairs is as they say it is) or false (if it is not) we can call declarative sentences. They declare how the person who says them believes the world to be. So we can express verificationism like this:
由于我们通常关注的是可以用我们的语言讨论的事态,验证学家通常用描述事态的句子来表达他们的立场。描述事态的句子可以是真的(如果事态如其所说),也可以是假的(如果事态并非如此),我们可以称之为陈述句。它们宣告了说这些句子的人认为世界是怎样的。因此,我们可以这样表述验证论:
A sentence for which there is the possibility of evidence-either for or against-is called a verifiable sentence. Every declarative sentence, the verificationist says, must be verifiable. This thesis, which we call the verification principle, is a radical version of empiricism—radical because it says, in effect, that every sentence that makes a claim about the world has to be subject to the evidence of experience. Indeed, the Austrian philosopher Moritz Schlick, who was one of the leaders of the school of philosophy called logical positivism, which developed verificationism, called his view "consistent empiricism." But on the face of it, the verification principle seems to assume that the universe is arranged for our epistemological convenience. What reasons could there be for believing that this is so?
一个有可能得到证据--无论是支持还是反对--的句子被称为可验证的句子。验证论者说,每一个陈述句都必须是可验证的。这一论点,我们称之为验证原则,是经验主义的激进版本--激进是因为它实际上是说,每一个对世界提出主张的句子都必须接受经验证据的检验。事实上,奥地利哲学家莫里茨-施利克(Moritz Schlick)是发展了验证主义的逻辑实证主义哲学流派的领袖之一,他将自己的观点称为 "一贯经验主义"。但从表面上看,验证原则似乎假定宇宙是为了我们的认识论方便而安排的。有什么理由相信事实如此呢?
The best argument for the verification principle depends on some assumptions about language, which we shall be discussing in more detail in the next chapter. But I will outline the basic argument here:
验证原则的最佳论据取决于对语言的一些假设,我们将在下一章详细讨论这些假设。但我将在此概述基本论点:
For our sentences to have meanings, there must be rules for how we use them. A sound that you use without following any rule at all cannot be a meaningful sentence. A rule for a sentence will say when you should use it and when you should not. For example, the rule for using the sentence "I am hot" is, roughly, that you should use it when you want to communicate the fact that you are hot, and not otherwise.
我们的句子要有意义,就必须有如何使用它们的规则。完全不遵守规则而使用的声音不可能是一个有意义的句子。一个句子的规则会说明什么时候该用,什么时候不该用。例如,使用 "我很热 "这个句子的规则大致是,当你想表达你很热这一事实时,你应该使用这个句子,否则就不应该使用。
One way to defend a position is to show by reductio that it is wrong to deny that position. If we can show that denying a claim leads to a conclusion we can recognize as false, then the claim itself must be true. So let's suppose that the verification principle, , is false, and see if that leads to a false conclusion.
为立场辩护的一种方法是通过归纳法证明否认该立场是错误的。如果我们能证明,否认一个主张会导致一个我们可以认定为错误的结论,那么这个主张本身就一定是真的。因此,让我们假设验证原则 是假的,看看这是否会导致一个错误的结论。
Suppose, then, that there could be a declarative sentence, , that you could not in any circumstances find evidence for or against. So, of course, there would be no circumstances in which you could use it. But then there would be no rule that said under what circumstances you should use it and under what other circumstances you should not. But since, as I said, every sentence that is meaningful must be used in accordance with some rule, it follows that there cannot be a meaningful sentence like .
那么,假设有一个陈述句, ,你在任何情况下都找不到支持或反对它的证据。当然,在任何情况下都不能使用它。但这样一来,就没有规则规定在什么情况下应该使用,在其他什么情况下不应该使用了。但是,正如我所说,每一个有意义的句子都必须按照某种规则来使用,因此,不可能有像 这样有意义的句子。
Some argument of this sort led many philosophers to accept verificationism. Verificationism says that the only reality we can mean-
这类论证让许多哲学家接受了验证主义。验证主义认为,我们所能指代的唯一现实--

ingfully talk about consists of things that people are capable of detecting. Because they insist on every sentence being one for which we could have evidence, verificationists are particularly likely to adopt the epistemological point of view that led us to functionalism in the last chapter. Indeed, as you will have noticed, the argument for verificationism is very like Wittgenstein's private-language argument. That argument said we couldn't refer in a private language to things that people generally can't know about; this one says that we cannot refer to things that people generally can't know about in a public language. This similarity is not so surprising, since Wittgenstein was close to the Vienna Circle, the group of philosophers who founded logical positivism.
因为他们坚持每一句话都是我们可以找到证据的。由于他们坚持认为每个句子都是我们可以得到证据的句子,验证论者特别有可能采纳上一章中引导我们走向功能主义的认识论观点。事实上,正如你们已经注意到的,验证论的论证非常像维特根斯坦的私人语言论证。那个论证说,我们不能用私人语言来指称人们一般无法知道的事物;这个论证说,我们不能用公共语言来指称人们一般无法知道的事物。这种相似性并不奇怪,因为维特根斯坦与维也纳圈子关系密切,而维也纳圈子正是创立逻辑实证主义的哲学家团体。
There are two important things to notice about this argument for verificationism. First, it doesn't show that we must actually be able to find evidence for or against every declarative sentence. A rule must establish circumstances in which the sentence would be properly used. But for there to be a rule it does not have to be possible for us actually to get into one of those circumstances. I am not able to get to the nearest star, and I don't know how to measure the temperature of remote objects. But there is a perfectly good rule for when to use the sentence "The nearest star is hot": use it when you want to communicate the fact that the nearest star is hot. This is a sentence that you could have evidence for if you traveled 4.3 lightyears to Proxima Centauri with a thermometer, even if you can't actually get there now. It follows that if the verification principle is supported by this argument, we must interpret it as requiring that it should be possible for someone, somewhere, sometime to have gathered evidence for or against every declarative sentence, not as requiring that it should be possible for you or me to find evidence here and now.
关于验证论的这一论证,有两点值得注意。首先,它并不表明我们实际上必须能够找到支持或反对每一个陈述句的证据。规则必须确定在什么情况下该句子会被正确使用。但是,要想有一条规则,我们并不一定要真正进入其中的一种情况。我无法到达最近的恒星,也不知道如何测量远处物体的温度。但是,对于什么时候使用 "最近的恒星很热 "这个句子,有一个非常好的规则:当你想表达 "最近的恒星很热 "这个事实时,就可以使用这个句子。如果你带着温度计前往 4.3 光年外的比邻半人马座,即使你现在无法真正到达那里,你也能得到这句话的证据。由此可见,如果验证原则得到了这个论证的支持,我们就必须把它解释为要求某人、某地、某时收集到支持或反对每一个陈述句的证据,而不是要求你或我此时此地找到证据。
That brings us to the second important thing to notice about the argument, which is that it does not assume that the universe is organized for our epistemological convenience. The argument I have given depends on assumptions about what our language must be like, not on assumptions about what the universe must be like. But there is another way of making the argument that is based not on assumptions about language but on assumptions about our beliefs.
这就引出了关于这个论证的第二个重要问题,即它并没有假设宇宙是为了我们的认识论方便而组织起来的。我给出的论证依赖于对我们的语言必须是什么样的假设,而不是对宇宙必须是什么样的假设。但还有另一种论证方法,它不是基于对语言的假设,而是基于对我们信念的假设。
Consider any property, , about which we have beliefs. For to play any part in our lives we must be able to conceive of circumstances in which we would apply it. Call such circumstances P's "circumstances of ascription." Under a property's circumstances of ascription, a suitably situated observer may interact with the property in ways that give him or her knowledge that it obtains. Even if we don't actually know whether anything has this property, we can still imagine that if anything does have it, someone could have known this if its circumstances of ascription had obtained and if they had been in a position to perceive the circumstances of ascription. It follows that we cannot possess the idea of any property that no one could in any circumstances have known to hold.
考虑一下我们所相信的任何属性 。为了让 在我们的生活中发挥任何作用,我们必须能够设想出我们应用它的情况。我们称这种情况为 P 的 "归属情况"。在一个属性的归属环境下,一个处于适当位置的观察者可能会与该属性进行互动,从而使他或她知道该属性的存在。即使我们实际上不知道任何事物是否具有这种属性,我们仍然可以想象,如果任何事物确实具有这种属性,那么如果它的 "归属情形 "发生了,如果有人能够感知到 "归属情形",他(她)就会知道这一点。由此可见,我们不可能拥有在任何情况下都没有人知道的任何属性的概念。
This argument should be particularly appealing to someone who believes that the kind of functionalism I described in the last chapter is correct. For, if functionalism is correct, then for each belief there should be a way of saying what its functional role is, a way of saying what role it plays in determining what people with that belief will in response to the experiences they have. But if it is impossible for anyone to come to believe that something has the property , then the belief that something is has no functional role: there are no experiences that would cause the person with that belief to do anything.
如果有人认为我在上一章中描述的那种功能主义是正确的,那么这个论点应该特别有吸引力。因为,如果功能主义是正确的,那么对于每一种信念,都应该有一种方法来说明它的功能作用是什么,有一种方法来说明它在决定具有这种信念的人将 ,以回应他们所具有的经验方面所起的作用。但是,如果任何人都不可能相信某物具有 这一属性,那么相信某物是 这一信念就没有任何功能作用:没有任何经验会导致拥有这一信念的人做任何事情。
This line of thought might, if suitably elaborated, lead you to accept a version of verificationism: one that said that every property in a certain class must be one that could be known under some circumstances to obtain. A similar line of thought would lead to the view that every name must have circumstances in which some agent could know that the thing it named had some property.
如果对这一思路进行适当的阐释,它可能会让你接受一种版本的验证主义:即某一类别中的每一种属性都必须是在某种情况下可以知道的属性。类似的思路会导致这样一种观点,即每个名称都必须有某种情况,在这种情况下,某个代理人可以知道它所命名的事物具有某种属性。
If this argument is sound, we have reason to believe that the behaviorists and the functionalists were right to deny that there could be essentially private mental states. If there were such a state-call it "S" - someone could have the property of having-S even though nobody else could in any circumstances have known that she did.
如果这个论点是正确的,我们就有理由相信,行为主义者和功能主义者否认存在本质上私人的心理状态是正确的。如果存在这样一种状态--把它称作 "S"--那么即使在任何情况下其他人都不可能知道某人拥有 "S",他也可以拥有 "S "的属性。
Verificationism not only provides grounds for rejecting Cartesian philosophical psychology but also offers an answer to skepticism. The skeptical hypotheses of the evil demon and the brain in the vat are both designed to raise the possibility that there are states of
验证主义不仅为否定笛卡尔的哲学心理学提供了依据,也为怀疑论提供了答案。怀疑论的邪魔假说和缸中之脑假说都是为了提出这样一种可能性,即存在着这样一种状态,即 "我 "和 "我 "之间的关系。

affairs that no amount of evidence could detect. But the verification principle says that no sentences that purport to describe undetectable states of affairs can be meaningful, and the argument I have just offered is intended to show that nobody can have beliefs about undetectable states of affairs. So if the verification principle is correct, skepticism will not be a real possibility, because the skeptical stories literally will not make sense.
但是,验证原则指出,任何旨在描述无法检测的事态的句子都不可能是有意义的。但验证原则指出,任何旨在描述无法检测到的事态的句子都不可能是有意义的,而我刚才提出的论证旨在说明,没有人能对无法检测到的事态抱有信念。因此,如果验证原则是正确的,怀疑论就不会成为一种真正的可能性,因为怀疑论的故事从字面上讲是没有意义的。
But because we started with the story of Albert, the brain in the vat, the verification principle is likely to seem implausible. Albert was unable to tell the difference between the following two hypotheses:
但是,由于我们是从 "缸中之脑 "阿尔伯特的故事开始的,验证原则很可能显得难以置信。阿尔伯特无法区分以下两种假设:
a) that he was moving around in the world having experiences of real things; and
a) 他在世界上四处游荡,体验真实的事物;以及
b) that he was a brain in a vat with faked experiences.
b) 他是一个装在大桶里的大脑,有着伪造的经历。
And the story seems to make perfect sense. If it does make sense, it seems to be a clear case of something that the verificationist says is impossible: an issue that no evidence could decide.
而这个故事似乎完全说得通。如果它确实说得通,那么它似乎就是验证论者所说的不可能的事情的一个明显案例:一个没有证据可以决定的问题。
But is it really a case that the verificationist should accept as a counterexample? For example, suppose Marie found a new body for Albert. Couldn't she then reconnect him to his body and tell him that his experiences since the crash were all faked? And wouldn't he then have evidence that he used to be a brain in a vat? Of course, Albert has no control over whether Marie does provide him with this evidence. But the verificationist didn't say that we had to be able to produce the evidence by our own efforts, only that it had to be logically possible that there should be evidence. And the fact that Marie could reconnect the brain in the vat with a new body means that Albert could be given evidence that he was once a brain in a vat.
但这真的是验证论者应该接受的反例吗?例如,假设玛丽为艾伯特找到了一具新的躯体。难道她就不能把他和他的身体重新连接起来,并告诉他,他在坠机后的经历都是伪造的吗?这样一来,他不就有证据证明自己曾经是缸中之脑了吗?当然,艾伯特无法控制玛丽是否真的向他提供了这些证据。但验证论者并没有说,我们必须能够通过自己的努力获得证据,而只是说从逻辑上讲,必须有可能存在证据。玛丽可以将缸中的大脑与新的身体重新连接起来,这就意味着艾伯特可以得到证据,证明他曾经是缸中的大脑。
Verificationism doesn't help as a solution to skepticism. The skeptics want a way of checking whether their experience is misleading them, not the reassurance that evidence that they are being misled could eventually show up. And if verificationism is correct, it offers only this weaker sort of reassurance.
验证主义无助于解决怀疑论。怀疑论者想要的是一种检查他们的经验是否误导了他们的方法,而不是他们被误导的证据最终会出现的保证。如果验证主义是正确的,那么它只能提供这种较弱的保证。
But another way out of skepticism has been suggested recently. This new approach was prompted by a class of examples that undermined the long-established principle of deduction for justification.
但最近有人提出了另一种摆脱怀疑论的方法。这一新方法是由一类例子引发的,这些例子破坏了长期以来确立的演绎推理原则。

2.7 Ways around skepticism II: Causal theories of knowledge
2.7 摆脱怀疑论的途径之二:知识的因果理论

We saw that Descartes' definition of knowledge committed him to the deductive closure principle because he had to accept the principle of deduction for justification. But Locke is committed to the PDJ, too. In fact, everything that we are justified in believing on Descartes' strong interpretation of the justification condition, we are justified in believing on Locke's weaker interpretation. Indeed, most other epistemologists have assumed until recently that the PDJ is correct. Then, in 1963, in one of the few examples in the history of philosophy where a really new argument changes the course of the subject, the American philosopher Edmund Gettier provided examples that showed the PDJ to be wrong.
我们看到,笛卡尔对知识的定义使他致力于演绎封闭原则,因为他必须接受演绎原则来证明自己。但洛克也信奉演绎原则。事实上,根据笛卡尔对证明条件的强解释,我们有理由相信的一切,根据洛克的弱解释,我们也有理由相信。事实上,直到最近,大多数其他认识论学者都认为PDJ是正确的。1963年,美国哲学家埃德蒙-盖蒂埃(Edmund Gettier)提出了一个哲学史上为数不多的例子,一个真正的新论点改变了这一课题的研究方向。
Gettier prepared the ground for his examples by making explicit another important assumption that all empiricists had made. It was that one could be justified in believing what was, in fact, false. This is a simple corollary of Locke's empiricist view that your beliefs can be justified by defeasible evidence. For, remember, to say that defeasible evidence can justify a belief is to say that a belief can be supported by evidence that is consistent with its being false. If-as Locke supposed-what justifies your belief is the evidence, then you could have the same justification in the cases where the belief was false as you have in the cases where it is true.
盖蒂埃通过明确提出所有经验主义者都曾提出过的另一个重要假设,为他的例子奠定了基础。这就是,一个人可以有理由相信事实上是错误的东西。这是洛克经验主义观点的一个简单推论,即你的信念可以被可击败的证据所证明。因为,请记住,说可击败的证据可以证明一个信念是正确的,就是说一个信念可以得到与它是假的相一致的证据的支持。如果--正如洛克所假设的--证明你的信念是正确的证据,那么在信念是假的情况下,你可以拥有与在信念是真的情况下同样的正当性。
Here is one of Gettier's examples: We suppose that two people, Smith and Jones, have applied for a job. Smith has been reliably informed by the president of the company doing the hiring that in the end Jones will be selected. It also happens that a few minutes ago Smith counted the ten coins in Jones' jacket pocket. So Smith has very strong evidence in support of the following sentence:
下面是盖蒂埃的一个例子:我们假设有两个人,史密斯和琼斯,申请了一份工作。负责招聘的公司总裁可靠地告诉史密斯,琼斯最终会被选中。几分钟前,史密斯数了数琼斯上衣口袋里的十枚硬币。因此,史密斯有非常有力的证据支持下面的句子:
D: Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
D:琼斯将得到这份工作,琼斯的口袋里有十个硬币。
From (D) it follows that:
由 (D) 可知
E: The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
E:能得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币。
Now, Smith knows perfectly well that E follows from D, and accepts
现在,史密斯完全知道 E 是由 D 推导出来的,并且接受了
E precisely because he believes . Because he has strong evidence for , Smith is clearly justified by the PDJ in believing that is true.
E 正是因为他相信 。因为他有强有力的证据证明 ,所以根据 PDJ,史密斯显然有理由相信 是真的。
But now suppose also that, despite what the president said, Smith, not Jones, is going to get the job. Perhaps they decide he is just too impressive to turn down. And suppose, too, that Smith himself has ten coins in his pocket, even though he does not know it. Then is true, though , which was his sole reason for believing it, is false.
但现在又假设,尽管总统这么说,史密斯,而不是琼斯,会得到这份工作。也许他们认为他实在是太出色了,无法拒绝。再假设,史密斯自己口袋里也有十枚硬币,尽管他自己并不知道。那么 是真的,尽管 是假的,这是他相信它的唯一理由。
In Gettier's example, then, all of the following three conditions clearly hold:
那么,在格蒂埃的例子中,以下三个条件显然都成立:
a) E is true,
a) E 为真、
b) Smith believes that is true, and
b) 斯密认为 是真实的,并且
c) Smith is justified in believing that is true.
c) 斯密有理由相信 是真的。
Gettier concludes: 盖蒂尔总结道:

Abstract 摘要

But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true. For (e) is true because of the coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in his own pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, while falsely believing that Jones is the man who will get the job.
但同样清楚的是,史密斯并不知道(e)是真的。因为(e)是真的,因为史密斯口袋里有硬币,而史密斯不知道自己口袋里有多少硬币,他相信(e)的依据是数琼斯口袋里的硬币,同时错误地相信琼斯是会得到这份工作的人。

Because it requires the assumption that a false belief can be justified, this example only works against a theory that allows that justification is sometimes defeasible. It therefore poses no threat to the rationalist who believes that all evidence must be indefeasible. But it is not too hard to show that the PDJ is inconsistent with rationalist assumptions as well.
因为它需要假定一个错误的信念是可以被证明的,所以这个例子只对允许证明有时是不成立的理论有效。因此,它对那些认为所有证据都是不可辩驳的理性主义者并不构成威胁。但要证明PDJ与理性主义假设不一致也并不难。
Suppose, for example, I believe that some very complicated mathematical theorem is true, just because you told me and I had mistaken you for a very gifted mathematician. Let's suppose that, in fact, you are a very poor mathematician and just made the theorem up on the spur of the moment, but you happened, by pure chance, to come up with a truth. Suppose, furthermore, I know some mathematical truths from which this theorem follows logically even though I do not know that it follows from them. Still, Descartes'
例如,假设我相信某个非常复杂的数学定理是真的,只是因为你告诉了我,而我误以为你是一个非常有天赋的数学家。让我们假设,事实上你是一个非常差劲的数学家,只是一时兴起编造了这个定理,但纯属偶然,你碰巧得出了一个真理。再假设,我知道一些数学真理,从这些真理中可以逻辑地推导出这个定理,尽管我不知道从这些真理中可以推导出这个定理。尽管如此,笛卡尔的

theory is committed to the principle of deductive closure: anything I believe that follows from things I know, I also know. So on Descartes' account, I know that the theorem is true. But, of course, I know no such thing.
笛卡尔的理论信奉演绎封闭性原则:从我所知道的事物中得出的任何我相信的东西,我也都知道。因此,按照笛卡尔的说法,我知道定理是真的。但是,我当然不知道这样的事情。
How are we to react to the discovery that the PDJ is not right? We can begin by noticing that, in each of these cases, it is mere chance that the belief that the person has acquired is true. Though in each case the belief is true and justified, the fact that it is true plays no part in explaining why it is justified. It is the merest chance that Smith is correct in believing E or that I am correct in believing the mathematical theorem you told me. Perhaps, then, we should interpret the justification condition as requiring-as the American philosopher Peter Unger has suggested - that the fact that the belief is true should not be a mere accident.
当我们发现 "PDJ "并不正确时,我们该如何反应呢?首先,我们可以注意到,在上述每一种情况中,当事人所获得的信念都是真实的,这仅仅是一种偶然。尽管在每种情况下,信念都是真实的、合理的,但它是真实的这一事实并不能解释为什么它是合理的。史密斯相信 E 是正确的,或者我相信你告诉我的数学定理是正确的,这都是最偶然的。因此,也许我们应该像美国哲学家彼得-昂格尔(Peter Unger)所建议的那样,把合理性条件解释为:信念为真的事实不应该仅仅是一个偶然。
There are some recent theories, prompted in part by Gettier's problems, that try to say what knowledge is in a way that follows up this idea. And, as it happens, they also allow us to find a sort of solution to the skeptical problem with which we began. These theories are known collectively as causal theories of knowledge.
最近有一些理论,部分是由盖蒂埃的问题引发的,它们试图用一种跟进这种想法的方式来说明什么是知识。碰巧的是,这些理论也让我们找到了解决我们一开始提出的怀疑论问题的方法。这些理论统称为知识的因果理论。
The basic idea of causal theories of knowledge is that in order to know ,
因果知识理论的基本思想是,要想知道
a) you must believe ,
a) 你必须相信

b) must be true, and
b) 必须为真,并且
c) your belief in must be caused in an appropriate way.
c) 您对 的信仰必须以适当的方式产生。
The causal theory's interpretation of the justification condition amounts to this: your belief is justified if it is caused in the right sort of way.
因果理论对合理性条件的解释是:如果你的信念是以正确的方式产生的,那么它就是合理的。
Originally it was suggested that your belief must be caused-in an appropriate way—by the fact that is true. Theories of this sort deal with the example of Gettier's I cited just now. Though Smith correctly believed that the man who would get the job had ten coins in his pocket, he would still have believed it even if the man who had got the job had not had ten coins in his pocket. The fact that the man who was going to get the job had ten coins in his pocket was not part of the cause of Smith's believing it. So, on a theory of this sort, we should say that Smith did not know that the man who would get the
最初有人认为,你的信念必须以适当的方式由 是真的这一事实引起。这类理论涉及我刚才引用的盖蒂埃的例子。虽然斯密正确地相信那个会得到工作的人口袋里有十个硬币,但即使那个得到工作的人口袋里没有十个硬币,他也会相信。将得到这份工作的人口袋里有十枚硬币的事实,并不是史密斯相信这一事实的部分原因。因此,根据这种理论,我们应该说,史密斯并不知道将得到这份工作的人

job had ten coins in his pocket. But we have to give up the idea that the fact that makes the belief true should actually cause the belief. For we know many general facts - such as the fact that all men are mortal-and general facts cannot cause things. (Or, at least so many philosophers have thought!)
job 口袋里有十枚硬币。但是,我们必须放弃这样的想法,即使信念成真的事实应该是信念的真正原因。因为我们知道许多一般事实--比如人都是凡人--而一般事实不可能导致事情的发生。(至少许多哲学家是这么认为的!)。
Once we give up the idea that the fact that makes the belief true should actually cause the belief, the main problem for causal theories is that talk of a belief's being caused in an appropriate way is left rather vague. So we need to answer this question: How, exactly, do we decide which ways are appropriate?
一旦我们放弃了 "使信念成真的事实应该是导致信念产生的原因 "这一观点,因果理论的主要问题就在于,关于信念是以适当的方式产生的这一说法就变得相当模糊了。因此,我们需要回答这个问题:我们究竟该如何确定哪些方式是适当的?
We can provide an example at once that shows that not just any way will do. This example is one from the work of the American philosopher Alvin Goldman, who has played a leading part in developing causal theories. Someone called Henry is out driving and sees a barn. On this basis, he comes to believe correctly that there is a barn. Since there is a barn there and his seeing it is part of the explanation for why he truly believes it is there, this might seem to be a clear case of knowledge on the causal theory. Since there is little doubt that in this case, as described, we would say that Henry knew that there was a barn there, the theory does all right so far. But now Goldman expands the story with some extra details.
我们可以立即提供一个例子,说明并非任何方法都能解决问题。这个例子出自美国哲学家阿尔文-戈德曼(Alvin Goldman)之手,他在因果理论的发展方面发挥了重要作用。一个叫亨利的人开车出去,看到了一个谷仓。在此基础上,他正确地认为那里有一个谷仓。由于那里确实有一个谷仓,而他看到谷仓是他真正相信谷仓存在的部分原因,这似乎是一个关于因果理论知识的明显案例。毫无疑问,在这个案例中,我们可以说亨利知道那里有一个谷仓,所以到目前为止,这个理论是正确的。但现在,戈德曼又用一些额外的细节扩展了这个故事。
Goldman suggests that the reason we shouldn't say that Henry knows there is a barn there, is that in this district just looking at a barn from a car is not a way of finding out whether there is a barn there. For, in these special circumstances, just looking out of your car window will lead you to believe that there is a barn on many occasions when there isn't one. Just looking out of your car window
戈德曼认为,我们之所以不能说亨利知道那里有一个谷仓,是因为在这个地区,仅仅从车上看谷仓并不能确定那里是否有谷仓。因为,在这种特殊情况下,从车窗往外看,会让你误以为那里有一个谷仓,而在很多情况下,那里并没有谷仓。从车窗向外看

is, in these circumstances, an unreliable way of acquiring the belief that there is a barn.
在这种情况下,获得 "有一个谷仓 "的信念是不可靠的。
What this story suggests is that the appropriate way of getting a true belief, if you want to have knowledge, is to get it by a method that is reliable in the circumstances. One form of causal theory, then, says that knowledge is true belief produced by a means that is reliable in the circumstances. A view that replaces the phenomenological justification condition with an objective reliability condition, such as this one, is a form of reliabilism. Different forms of reliabilism spell out different ways in which the belief-forming process must be reliable for the resultant belief to count as knowledge if it is true.
这个故事告诉我们,如果你想拥有知识,获得真实信念的适当方法就是通过在当时情况下可靠的方法来获得。因此,一种因果理论认为,知识就是通过在当时情况下可靠的方法产生的真实信念。用客观可靠性条件取代现象学合理性条件的观点,如这种观点,就是一种可靠论。不同形式的可靠论阐述了形成信念的过程必须可靠的不同方式,这样产生的信念如果是真实的,就可以算作知识。
Notice that this theory explains why Smith didn't know that the man who would get the job had ten coins in his pocket and, more generally, why the PDJ is wrong. For Smith came to believe
请注意,这个理论解释了为什么史密斯不知道会得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币,而且更广泛地说,为什么 "PDJ "是错误的。因为史密斯开始相信
E: The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket
E:能得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币
by deducing it from
推导出
: Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
琼斯的口袋里有 10 个硬币。
But, in these circumstances, this was not a reliable way of coming to believe E. For if Smith himself had not happened, quite by chance, to have ten coins in his pocket, would have been false. We cannot accept the PDJ, because in many circumstances, like this one, deducing a consequence will cause you to have a true belief only by the merest chance. That is possible because you can draw a true consequence from a false assumption, a fact we shall discuss in the next chapter.
但是,在这种情况下,这种相信 E 的方法并不可靠。因为如果斯密本人不是碰巧口袋里有十个硬币, ,那么他的相信就会是错误的。我们不能接受 "PDJ",因为在很多情况下,比如在这种情况下,推导出一个结果会让你产生一个真实的信念,而这只是一个最偶然的机会。这是有可能的,因为你可以从一个错误的假设中推导出一个真实的结果,我们将在下一章讨论这个事实。

2.8 Causal theories contrasted with traditional accounts of justification
2.8 因果理论与传统的理由说明的对比

There are still many problems to be worked out before a causal theory can be accepted as an answer to our original question: What is knowledge? But causal theories are certainly one important response to Gettier's problems. More than that, however, proposals
在接受因果理论作为我们最初问题的答案之前,还有许多问题需要解决:什么是知识?但因果理论无疑是对盖蒂埃问题的一个重要回应。然而,建议

such as Goldman's represent a radical break with the kind of traditional epistemology that Descartes and Locke developed.
戈德曼等人的观点与笛卡尔和洛克提出的传统认识论截然不同。
There are two major ways in which these theories are unlike the sorts of traditional approaches we have considered. First of all, traditional epistemologies assume that the difference between people who are justified in believing something and people who are not must depend on states of which those people are consciously aware. Traditional epistemologies give what we can call phenomenological accounts of the justification condition. ("Phenomenological," remember, means having to do with the conscious aspects of our mental life.) Such accounts of justification are also sometimes called "internalist," because on these accounts what a person is justified in believing depends only on states internal to the believer's mind.
这些理论在两个主要方面与我们所考虑的传统方法不同。首先,传统认识论认为,有理由相信某事的人与没有理由相信某事的人之间的区别必须取决于这些人有意识意识到的状态。传统认识论对合理性条件给出了我们可以称之为现象学的描述。(记住,"现象学 "的意思是与我们精神生活中有意识的方面有关)。这种关于正当性的论述有时也被称为 "内在论",因为在这些论述中,一个人的正当信仰只取决于信仰者内心的状态。
Descartes and Locke, for example, both gave phenomenological theories of justification. Justification, for Descartes, had to be indefeasible, and if you have indefeasible evidence, you can tell that you have it simply by reflection on the contents of your own conscious mind. Locke's justifications came from experience, but experience too, as he conceived of it, is something you are aware you have whenever you have it.
例如,笛卡尔和洛克都提出了关于正当性的现象学理论。对笛卡尔来说,正当性必须是不可辩驳的,而如果你有不可辩驳的证据,你只需对自己意识中的内容进行反思,就能知道自己拥有这种证据。洛克的正当性来自经验,但经验也是如此,正如他所设想的那样,只要你拥有经验,你就会意识到你拥有它。
Goldman's causal theory of knowledge, on the other hand, is not phenomenological. It is not phenomenological because the facts that he told us about Henry-the facts that made us change from saying he knew there was a barn there to saying that he didn't know it-had nothing to do with the nature of his conscious mental life. Rather, they had to do with facts about Henry's relations with the world around him. If we replaced all the papier-mâché facsimiles of barns around Henry with real barns, then on Goldman's theory, we should now say that he did know that there was a barn there. And this means that whether or not Henry's true belief is justified can depend on facts of which he is unaware. Because causal theorists explain justification in a way that depends on facts about the world outside the mind of the knower, we can call their theories of justification "objective" theories. Such accounts of justification are also sometimes called "externalist," because on these accounts what a person is justified in believing may depend on states external to the believer's mind. The first break with traditional epistemology, then, is that causal theories of justification are objective (or externalist) and not phenomenological (or internalist).
另一方面,戈德曼的知识因果理论并不是现象学的。它不是现象学的,因为他告诉我们的关于亨利的事实--使我们从说他知道那里有一个谷仓到说他不知道的事实--与他有意识的精神生活的性质毫无关系。相反,这些事实与亨利与周围世界的关系有关。如果我们用真正的谷仓代替亨利周围所有的纸糊谷仓,那么根据戈德曼的理论,我们现在应该说,他确实知道那里有一个谷仓。这就意味着,亨利的真实信念是否合理可能取决于他不知道的事实。由于因果理论家解释正当性的方式取决于认识者头脑之外的世界事实,因此我们可以称他们的正当性理论为 "客观 "理论。这种对正当性的解释有时也被称为 "外部主义",因为在这些解释中,一个人的正当信仰可能取决于信仰者心灵之外的状态。因此,与传统认识论的第一个突破是,因果论证理论是客观的(或外部主义的),而不是现象学的(或内部主义的)。
The second break with tradition is that causal theories are not foundationalist. Causal theories do not, of course, deny that one belief can be the basis for reasonably believing another. But they do deny that whether a belief is justified depends on whether it is supported by beliefs in some foundational class. Provided the belief is produced by a reliable method, Goldman says, it is suitably justified.
与传统的第二个决裂是因果理论不是基础主义的。当然,因果理论并不否认一种信念可以作为合理相信另一种信念的基础。但它们否认一个信念是否合理取决于它是否得到某个基础类信念的支持。戈德曼说,只要信念是通过可靠的方法产生的,它就是合理的。
There are many cases where the causal theory works in a nonfoundationalist way. If, to use an example of Goldman's, I am able to tell the twins Trudy and Judy apart without knowing what it is about them that allows me to do it, then I have a reliable method of forming the belief that this one is Trudy. If I do form that belief correctly, then, the causal theory says-surely correctly-that I know it is Trudy. But since I am unable to say what it is about Trudy that allows me to tell her apart from Judy, I have no foundational beliefs that justify my claim that it is, in fact, she.
在很多情况下,因果理论以非基础主义的方式发挥作用。举个戈德曼的例子,如果我能够把双胞胎特鲁迪和朱迪区分开来,而不知道是什么原因让我能够做到这一点,那么我就有一种可靠的方法来形成这样的信念:这个是特鲁迪。如果我正确地形成了这个信念,那么,因果理论就会说--肯定是正确的--我知道它是特鲁迪。但是,由于我无法说明特鲁迪身上有什么东西能让我把她和朱迪区分开来,所以我没有任何基础信念能证明我的说法是正确的,那就是,事实上,她就是特鲁迪。
In recent years, many philosophers have become skeptical of foundationalism anyway. For once it is agreed that no beliefs about the world are indefeasible, there seems no point in looking for a secure foundation of beliefs that are certain. And if there is no foundation of certain beliefs, there is no clear way of distinguishing the foundational class. If both
近年来,许多哲学家对基础主义持怀疑态度。因为一旦人们同意,关于世界的任何信念都是不可辩驳的,那么寻找确定信念的安全基础似乎就没有意义了。而如果没有确定信念的基础,就没有明确的方法来区分基础类信念。如果两者都
a) the foundational class were certain, and
a) 基础课是确定的,而且
b) the process of justification could transfer the certainty to the derived beliefs,
b) 论证过程可以将确定性转移到派生信念上、
foundationalism would be very attractive. But beliefs about the physical world-unlike mathematical beliefs-satisfy neither of these conditions.
基础主义会非常有吸引力。但是,关于物理世界的信念--不同于数学信念--既不满足上述条件,也不满足上述条件。
Causal theories, then, are both objective and nonfoundationalist. These two features make theories such as Goldman's quite different from Locke's and Descartes'. But it is the fact that Goldman's theory is objective that allows it to provide an answer to the double question with which we began: Do you know that you aren't just a brain in a vat-and if so, how do you know it? To see why this is so, we must first provide the causal theory's answer to the question.
因此,因果理论既是客观的,也是非基础主义的。这两个特点使得戈德曼的理论与洛克和笛卡尔的理论截然不同。但正是因为戈德曼的理论是客观的,所以它能够为我们一开始提出的双重问题提供答案:你知道自己不是缸中的大脑吗?如果知道,你是怎么知道的?要想知道为什么会这样,我们必须首先提供因果理论对这个问题的答案。
That answer, of course, is that you know you aren't a brain in a vat, provided your true belief that you have a body that moves about in the physical world is produced by a process that is reliable in the circumstances. Since, in fact, you are not a brain in a vat, your beliefs about the world are produced by the reliable process of using your eyes, ears, and other senses, and therefore you do know that you are not a brain in a vat. Of course, if, like Albert, you were a brain in a vat, you would not know that you were. As a matter of fact, you would know practically nothing about the physical world. All your beliefs about it would be produced by something like Marie's computer, and that is an extremely unreliable way of forming beliefs, since Marie, you'll remember, faked all Albert's experiences.
答案当然是,你知道自己不是缸中之脑,只要你真正相信自己有一个在物理世界中活动的身体,而这个过程在当时的情况下是可靠的。由于事实上你不是缸中之脑,你对世界的信念是通过使用你的眼睛、耳朵和其他感官的可靠过程产生的,因此你确实知道你不是缸中之脑。当然,如果你像艾伯特一样是缸中之脑,你也不会知道自己是缸中之脑。事实上,你对物理世界几乎一无所知。你对物理世界的所有信念都是由类似玛丽的电脑产生的,而这种形成信念的方式是极其不可靠的,因为你应该记得,玛丽伪造了艾伯特的所有经历。
This solution to our original question has something of an air of paradox about it. For we have come to the conclusion that we know we aren't brains in a vat, even though we would have had exactly the same experiences if we were. But that, for the causal theory, is precisely the point. To be concerned only with the nature of our experiences-our phenomenology-without looking at whether our ways of getting beliefs are in fact reliable is just to refuse to adopt an objective theory of justification.
这个对我们最初问题的解答带有一些悖论的意味。因为我们得出的结论是,我们知道我们不是缸中之脑,尽管如果我们是缸中之脑,我们也会有完全相同的经历。但对于因果理论来说,这正是问题的关键所在。只关注我们经验的本质--我们的现象学--而不关注我们获得信念的方式是否可靠,这只是拒绝采用客观的正当性理论。
If you don't accept an objective theory of justification, then you are bound to allow that the brain in the vat is as justified as we are in believing that it is not in a vat, since it has exactly the same sort of experiences as a person who is living a normal human life. I objected to Locke's theory that if Marie gave Albert the true belief that the sun was shining, that still wouldn't mean that the brain in the vat knew the sun was shining. But any phenomenological theory of justification has to say either
如果你不接受客观的合理性理论,那么你就必然会允许缸中的大脑和我们一样有理由相信它不在缸中,因为它和过着正常人生活的人有着完全相同的经历。我反对洛克的理论,即如果玛丽让阿尔伯特真正相信太阳正在照耀,这仍然不意味着缸中的大脑知道太阳正在照耀。但是,任何关于正当性的现象学理论都必须说,要么
a) that Albert's belief is justified-and thus wrongly conclude that he knows that the sun is shining-or
a) 阿尔伯特的信念是合理的,因此错误地得出结论说他知道太阳正在发光;或 b) 阿尔伯特的信念是错误的,因此错误地得出结论说他知道太阳正在发光。
b) that Albert's belief is not justified - and thus wrongly draw the skeptical conclusion that my belief that the sun is shining is not justified either.
b) 阿尔伯特的信念是不成立的--从而错误地得出了我认为太阳正在发光的信念也是不成立的这一怀疑性结论。
Causal theorists say that since neither of these conclusions is correct, no phenomenological theory of knowledge can be accepted.
因果论者说,既然这两个结论都不正确,那么就不能接受任何关于知识的现象学理论。

2.9 Epistemology naturalized
2.9 认识论归化

We have been discussing the relationship between justification and knowledge on the assumption that we can decide the issue by thought experiments. Each time a proposal has been made, we have followed Socrates' example in the Theaetetus, testing the proposal against cases, like Goldman's Henry and the barns, or Gettier's Smith, Jones, and the coins in the pockets. This suggests that what we are doing is exploring the nature of our concepts of knowledge, belief and justification, on the assumption that we can always judge correctly whether these terms apply to particular cases. That is not an unreasonable assumption: anyone who knows English knows how to use the words "know," "believe" and "justify"-knows, that is, what those words mean. And surely someone who knows what those words mean knows when they can and cannot properly be applied. But if we know what these words mean, why can't we just say what they mean? Why, that is, has it been so hard to find an answer to Socrates' definitional question, "What is knowledge?" It looks as though, on one hand, we can tell when the word "know" applies in a case (provided we are told enough about it) but, on the other, we are not very good at uncovering and explaining how we tell whether it applies. If we could tell, then we would surely have agreed on an answer to the definitional question long ago.
我们一直在讨论理由与知识之间的关系,前提是我们可以通过思想实验来决定这个问题。每次提出建议时,我们都会效仿苏格拉底在《泰阿泰特》中的例子,用案例来检验建议,比如戈德曼的亨利和谷仓,或盖提尔的史密斯、琼斯和口袋里的硬币。这表明,我们正在探索知识、信念和正当性概念的本质,我们的假设是,我们总能正确判断这些术语是否适用于特定情况。这并不是一个不合理的假设:任何懂英语的人都知道如何使用 "知道"、"相信 "和 "证明 "这些词--也就是说,知道这些词的含义。当然,知道这些词含义的人也知道什么时候可以用,什么时候不能用。但是,如果我们知道这些词的意思,为什么我们不能直接说出它们的意思呢?苏格拉底的定义性问题 "知识是什么?"为什么一直难以找到答案?看起来,一方面,我们可以知道 "知道 "这个词在什么情况下适用(只要我们被告知了足够多的情况),但另一方面,我们并不擅长揭示和解释我们是如何判断它是否适用的。如果我们能够知道,那么我们肯定早就对定义问题的答案达成一致了。
I shall return to questions about the relationship between our knowledge of the meanings of the words in our language and our ability to spell out what we know in the next chapter; see 3.13. For now, however, I want to observe that we could have proceeded in a different way. We could have drawn not just on our intuitive understanding of the concepts of knowledge and justification but also on scientific study of the processes by which people come to believe things, on cognitive psychology, for example, or the sociology of knowledge. We could, that is, have taken up the study of knowledge not as a purely conceptual inquiry but alongside work done in the sciences. To take that approach to epistemology would be to follow the recommendation of the American philosopher W. V. O. Quine, who proposed in 1969 that we should "naturalize" epistemology. In a famous article, entitled "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine suggested that epistemology should be "a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science."
在下一章中,我将再次讨论我们对语言中词义的了解与我们表达自己所知的能力之间的关系问题;见 3.13。不过,现在我想说的是,我们本可以采用另一种方式。我们不仅可以利用我们对知识和理由概念的直观理解,还可以利用对人们相信事物的过程的科学研究,例如认知心理学或知识社会学。也就是说,我们可以不把知识研究作为纯粹的概念研究,而是与科学研究并驾齐驱。对认识论采取这种方法,就等于听从了美国哲学家奎因(W. V. O. Quine)的建议,他在 1969 年提出,我们应该将认识论 "自然化"。在一篇题为 "认识论自然化 "的著名文章中,奎因建议,认识论应该是 "心理学的一章,因而也是自然科学的一章"。
This is a slightly surprising proposal, because, as we have seen, inquiring into the nature of knowledge involves thinking about when and how our beliefs are justified. To claim that a belief is justified is not just to say when it will be believed but also to say when it ought to be believed. And we don't normally think of natural science as telling us what we ought to do. Science, surely, is about describing and explaining the world, not about what we should do?
这是一个略微令人吃惊的提议,因为正如我们所看到的,探究知识的本质涉及思考我们的信念何时以及如何是合理的。声称一个信念是合理的,不仅是说它何时会被相信,也是说它何时应该被相信。我们通常不会认为自然科学是在告诉我们应该做什么。科学当然是关于描述和解释世界,而不是关于我们应该做什么?
One way to reconcile these two ideas would be to build on the central idea of reliabilism and say that what psychology can teach us is which belief-forming processes are in fact reliable. So here epistemology and psychology would go hand in hand. Epistemology would tell us that we ought to form our beliefs in ways that are reliable, while psychology examines which ways these are: so the "ought" comes from epistemology, not from psychology, leaving us able to continue to think of natural science as free of "oughts." Claims about what people ought to do, say, or believe are prescriptive: they don't just describe what people do, they prescribe what they ought to do. So this way of dividing up the job between psychology and epistemology leaves epistemology the job of prescription and retains the view that psychology describes our mental processes. Quine suggested later that the "oughts" of epistemology are like the "oughts" of engineering: when Emma the engineer says that you ought to use steel of a certain strength in making a bridge, she means only that you should use that steel if you want the bridge to hold up under the load it is going to have to bear. The "ought" is conditional: it assumes a certain aim, in this case to build a bridge that will take a certain load. We shall see, later, when we come to discuss morality, that the German philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that moral "oughts" were not conditional-his term was "hypothetical" - in this way. Rather, they were what he called "categorical." (See 5.3.)
调和这两种观点的一种方法是以可靠论的核心思想为基础,说心理学能教给我们的是哪些信念形成过程实际上是可靠的。在这里,认识论和心理学将携手并进。认识论告诉我们,我们应该以可靠的方式形成我们的信念,而心理学则研究哪些方式是可靠的:因此,"应该 "来自认识论,而不是心理学,这样我们就可以继续认为自然科学不存在 "应该"。关于人们应该做什么、说什么或相信什么的说法是规定性的:它们不仅仅描述人们做了什么,还规定了他们应该做什么。因此,这种心理学与认识论之间的分工方式让认识论承担了规定性的工作,并保留了心理学描述我们心理过程的观点。奎因后来提出,认识论中的 "应该 "就像工程学中的 "应该":当工程师艾玛说,你应该使用某种强度的钢材来造桥时,她的意思只是说,如果你想让这座桥在必须承受的负荷下支撑得住,你就应该使用这种钢材。这个 "应该 "是有条件的:它假定了一个特定的目标,在这里是指建造一座能承受一定负荷的桥。我们稍后在讨论道德时会看到,德国哲学家伊曼纽尔-康德认为,道德 "应该 "不是有条件的,他的术语是 "假设"。相反,它们被他称为 "绝对的"。(见 5.3)。
So what is the aim upon which the "oughts" of epistemology are conditional?
那么,认识论的 "必须 "以什么目标为条件呢?
The obvious answer, as Quine proposed, is that epistemology says you ought to believe what you are justified in believing if you want to have true beliefs. And that suggests a way of formulating an understanding of what knowledge is: it is true belief produced by processes that normally produce true beliefs. Understood that way,
答案显而易见,正如奎因所提出的,认识论认为,如果你想拥有真正的信念,你就应该相信你有理由相信的东西。这就提出了一种理解知识的方式:知识是由通常产生真实信念的过程所产生的真实信念。可以这样理解、

we can see the tradition of phenomenological approaches to justification as a series of hypotheses about what processes are most likely to produce true belief. In the empiricist tradition, it was assumed that we are so constructed that we will usually get true beliefs if we believe our senses. Simply coming to believe what we are naturally disposed to believe on the basis of our senses is therefore justified, and so we do not need to study our own sensory systems in order to get closer to the truth. But the existence of hallucinations and illusions-both of which Descartes discussed-shows, of course, that our senses are not, in fact, so reliable that we cannot learn from studying them about better ways of forming beliefs. And once we see that, we can see that a foundationalist empiricism, which treats what our senses tell us as a secure foundation for all our other beliefs, is not warranted.
我们可以把现象学的正义论传统看作是一系列关于什么过程最有可能产生真实信念的假设。在经验主义传统中,人们假定我们的构造是这样的:如果我们相信我们的感官,我们通常会得到真正的信念。因此,根据我们的感官来相信我们自然倾向于相信的东西是合理的,所以我们不需要为了接近真理而研究我们自己的感官系统。当然,笛卡尔讨论过的幻觉和错觉的存在表明,我们的感官其实并不那么可靠,以至于我们无法通过研究它们来学习形成信念的更好方法。一旦我们明白了这一点,我们就会明白,把感官告诉我们的东西当作我们所有其他信念的可靠基础的基础主义经验主义是没有道理的。
Similarly, when rationalists say that reason is the major source of our knowledge, they are assuming that we are so constructed that we will usually get true beliefs if we follow what Descartes called the "natural light" of reason. But experience has taught us that our reasoning capacities are in fact quite limited: people regularly make elementary logical mistakes, for example. Furthermore (as Descartes, who was something of a scientist, knew very well), reason by itself cannot lead us to the truth about the world around us. So here too there are grounds for doubt that relying on this method will get us to the truth.
同样,当理性主义者说理性是我们知识的主要来源时,他们是在假定我们的构造是这样的:如果我们遵循笛卡尔所说的理性的 "自然之光",我们通常会得到真实的信念。但经验告诉我们,我们的推理能力实际上是非常有限的:例如,人们经常会犯一些基本的逻辑错误。此外(作为科学家的笛卡尔非常清楚),理性本身并不能引导我们找到周围世界的真相。因此,我们也有理由怀疑,依靠这种方法能否让我们找到真相。
As a result, then, of the development of naturalized epistemology, there has been increasing interest in using the insights gained from scientific study of the ways in which we acquire our beliefs to enhance our grasp of the nature of knowledge. This approach has led to the development of evolutionary epistemology, which draws on Darwin's ideas about evolution in two important-and importantly distinct-respects. First, evolutionary epistemology examines the consequences of the fact that our cognitive capacities are themselves the product of an evolutionary process. And second, it explores how ideas and theories compete with each other and are selected, in a way that is somewhat analogous to the process of the natural selection of biological traits. Here, then, the philosopher's interest in questions about knowledge comes into close interaction with the work of biologists and psychologists.
因此,归化认识论发展的结果是,人们越来越有兴趣利用从科学研究中获得的关于我们获取信念的方式的见解来加强我们对知识本质的把握。这种方法导致了进化认识论的发展,进化认识论在两个重要的方面借鉴了达尔文关于进化的思想,而这两个方面又是截然不同的。首先,进化认识论研究了我们的认知能力本身就是进化过程的产物这一事实的后果。其次,它探讨了思想和理论是如何相互竞争并被选择的,其方式有点类似于生物特征的自然选择过程。因此,哲学家对知识问题的兴趣与生物学家和心理学家的工作密切相关。

2.10 Conclusion 2.10 结论

In this chapter, we have discussed some of the central questions of epistemology. Starting with the question how we know that we aren't just brains in a vat, the playthings of an unscrupulous scientist, we were led to ask what knowledge is. We discussed the very different answers to this question given by Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism. But both of them shared the Theaetetus' assumption that knowledge was justified true belief: and both of them, as we have just seen, regarded justification as both phenomenological and foundational. The problem was that Descartes' theory led immediately to the impasse of skepticism, while Locke wrongly allowed knowledge to the brain in the vat.
在本章中,我们讨论了认识论的一些核心问题。从我们如何知道自己不是无良科学家玩弄的缸中之脑开始,我们开始追问知识是什么。我们讨论了笛卡尔理性主义和洛克经验主义对这个问题给出的截然不同的答案。但它们都赞同忒伊忒斯的假设,即知识是有正当理由的真实信念:正如我们刚才所看到的,它们都认为正当理由既是现象学的,也是基础性的。问题在于,笛卡尔的理论立即导致了怀疑论的僵局,而洛克则错误地将知识置于大脑之中。
Finally, we tried a radical way out. We gave up the idea that our theory of justification needed to be phenomenological. The resultant theory is that in order to know ,
最后,我们尝试了一条激进的出路。我们放弃了理由理论必须是现象学理论的想法。由此产生的理论是,为了了解
a) you must believe ,
a) 你必须相信

b) must be true, and
b) 必须为真,并且
c) your belief in must be caused in a way that is reliable in the circumstances.
c) 您对 的信任必须是在当时情况下可靠的。
This theory allows us to claim to know that we aren't brains in a vat even though our experiences could be the very same if we were brains in a vat. It also provides us with a reason for caring about whether other people's true beliefs are knowledge, for we have an interest in the reliability of the processes by which beliefs are acquired. If someone has a lot of knowledge about a certain subject matter, then he or she forms beliefs reliably. And that means we have a reason to rely on that person in the future.
这一理论使我们能够声称我们不是缸中之脑,尽管如果我们是缸中之脑,我们的经验可能是一样的。它还为我们提供了一个关心他人的真实信念是否是知识的理由,因为我们对获取信念的过程的可靠性很感兴趣。如果某人对某一主题有很多知识,那么他或她形成信念的过程就是可靠的。这就意味着我们有理由在未来依赖这个人。
The dispute between causal theory and traditional epistemology is a dispute between a theory that regards minds as causal systems in the world, on the one hand, and a theory that regards minds from the point of view of the individual "looking out" on the world, on the other. In this respect it is like the dispute between phenomenologist and functionalist that we discussed at the end of the last chapter. Just as Descartes is on the same side-against the "objective" view of mind-in both these disputes, so many philosophers who are functionalists are on the objective side in epistemology. To see mind
因果理论与传统认识论之间的争论,一方面是将心智视为世界中的因果系统的理论,另一方面是以个人 "眺望 "世界的视角看待心智的理论。在这方面,这就像我们在上一章末尾讨论的现象学家与功能学家之间的争论。正如笛卡尔在这两场争论中都站在同一阵营--反对 "客观 "的心灵观一样,许多功能主义者哲学家在认识论中也站在客观的一方。看待心灵

and knowledge in the way the functionalist and the causal epistemologist do - as a causal system in the world - is to support a form of naturalism. It is to see human beings with their philosophical problems as part of the wider world of nature, not as privileged observers somehow outside that natural world.
以功能主义者和因果认识论者的方式--作为世界中的因果系统--看待人类和知识,就是支持一种形式的自然主义。这是将人类及其哲学问题视为更广阔的自然世界的一部分,而不是在自然世界之外享有特权的观察者。

CHAPTER 3 第 3 章

Language 语言

What is meaning? 什么是意义?
How does language relate to reality?
语言与现实有什么关系?
How do written and spoken words express thoughts?
文字和口头语言如何表达思想?

3.1 Introduction 3.1 导言

Ever since Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species, biologists have increasingly seen human beings as just one kind of animal. Darwin's theory of evolution claims that we are descended from other, earlier kinds of animals by natural selection. Biologists are not surprised, therefore, that our respiration, nutrition, and reproduction are typically mammalian; and that our cells look very like the cells of other animals, with their nuclei and cytoplasm and the multiplicity of organelles that we can see under an electron-microscope. But even a biologist would have to agree that we have some important distinctive traits, and one of the most important is that we use language, to speak, to write, and, some would say, to think. So far as we know, we are the only animals, from the amoeba to the elephant, that naturally use language. Furthermore, many of the other distinguishing features of our species-our social organization, our arts and crafts and sciences - are inconceivable without language. Even if other animals do have languages, what they have done with them seems very limited by comparison. Imagine trying to coordinate a bank or an art gallery or an experiment in chemistry without being able to understand, speak, read, or write a word.
自从查尔斯-达尔文(Charles Darwin)出版了《物种起源》(Origin of Species)一书之后,生物学家越来越多地将人类视为动物的一种。达尔文的进化论认为,人类是其他更早的动物通过自然选择繁衍下来的。因此,生物学家们对我们的呼吸、营养和繁殖是典型的哺乳动物并不感到惊讶;我们的细胞看起来与其他动物的细胞非常相似,有细胞核、细胞质和多种细胞器,我们可以在电子显微镜下看到这些细胞。但是,即使是生物学家也不得不同意,我们有一些重要的与众不同的特征,其中最重要的特征之一就是我们会使用语言,会说话,会写字,有人会说,还会思考。据我们所知,从变形虫到大象,我们是唯一自然使用语言的动物。此外,我们这个物种的许多其他显著特征--我们的社会组织、我们的艺术、手工艺和科学--如果没有语言都是不可想象的。即使其他动物真的有语言,它们用语言所做的事情相比之下也非常有限。试想一下,如果不能听、说、读、写任何一个字,要想协调银行、美术馆或化学实验的工作是多么困难。
Human beings have been using language for at least a hundred thousand years, and most of us learned a language easily and naturally when we were very young. In Chapter 1 I mentioned how easily we have come to take computers, which are relatively new on the human scene, for granted; how much easier it is for us to take
人类使用语言的历史至少已有十万年之久,我们中的大多数人在很小的时候就能轻松自然地学会一种语言。在第 1 章中,我提到了我们是如何轻易地将计算机视为理所当然,而计算机在人类社会中还是相对较新的事物。

language for granted, along with all the distinctively human activities that it makes possible. But actually, what we can do with language is fairly remarkable. For example, we can put together strings of sounds or written symbols that connect us over unimaginable distances of space and time with other places and periods. Suppose I ask, "Are there creatures with consciousness on the other side of the galaxy?" Then I am in some sense connected, by those words, over hundreds of light-years with a place that I couldn't literally get to in many lifetimes of travel in a spaceship. If you speak of "when life on Earth began," you are talking about something that happened several thousand million years ago. And we make these connections simply by making sounds or writing letters on a piece of paper or typing them onto a computer. How does it come about that these words in our language-English-can be used to connect us to things both far away and near?
我们总是认为语言是理所当然的,语言所带来的人类活动也是理所当然的。但实际上,我们用语言所能做的事情是相当了不起的。例如,我们可以将声音或文字符号组合成串,在难以想象的时空距离内将我们与其他地方和其他时期联系起来。假设我问:"银河系的另一端是否存在有意识的生物?"那么在某种意义上,通过这些文字,我与数百光年之外的一个地方建立了联系,而这个地方是我乘坐宇宙飞船旅行几辈子也无法到达的。如果你说 "地球上的生命始于何时",你说的是几千万年前发生的事情。而我们只是通过发出声音、在纸上写字或在电脑上打字来建立这些联系。我们的语言--英语--中的这些词语是如何将我们与远近的事物联系起来的呢?
We can also use language to talk about things that we will never know about. Thus, we can say: "I wonder what Caesar's last thoughts were." But we'll never know the answer. Of course, we think we know what his last words were: "Et tu, Brute." And that raises another fascinating set of puzzles. For why is it that in his language, Latin, the way to say "You too, Brutus" is to say those famous Roman words? And how come different sounds and signs are used in other languages to make the same connections?
我们还可以用语言来谈论我们永远不会知道的事情。因此,我们可以说:"我想知道凯撒最后的想法是什么"但我们永远不会知道答案当然,我们自以为知道他的遗言是什么"等等,畜生"这又引发了另一系列令人着迷的谜题为什么在他的语言--拉丁语中,说 "你也是,布鲁图 "的方式是说那些著名的罗马词?在其他语言中,又是如何用不同的声音和符号来表达同样的意思呢?

3.2 The linguistic turn
3.2 语言学转向

Because there are these very general puzzles about how language works, puzzles that seem rather like the ones that are central to philosophy of mind and to epistemology, it should not be surprising that Western philosophy has been concerned from its very beginning with language. Philosophers, as we have already seen, ask fundamental questions about mind and knowledge: language seems at least as interesting, as puzzling, and as important. We have also seen that issues about how language works come up very naturally in the course of philosophical thinking about other issues. In Chapter 1, we found ourselves thinking about private languages and language games while reflecting on the nature of our mental lives. We also discussed the ways in which language seems to require consciousness. In Chapter 2 we found language central to thinking about the
由于存在着关于语言如何运作的这些非常普遍的困惑,这些困惑似乎与心灵哲学和认识论的核心问题颇为相似,因此,西方哲学从一开始就关注语言也就不足为奇了。正如我们已经看到的,哲学家们提出了关于心智和知识的基本问题:语言似乎至少同样有趣、同样令人困惑、同样重要。我们还看到,在对其他问题进行哲学思考的过程中,有关语言如何运作的问题会很自然地出现。在第 1 章中,我们在思考我们精神生活的本质时,发现自己在思考私人语言和语言游戏。我们还讨论了语言似乎需要意识的方式。在第 2 章中,我们发现语言在思考

verification principle. Then we ended up wondering about how it was possible for us to understand the word "know" and yet not be able to give a simple definition of its meaning. We'll see later that questions about language will come up in other ways in other areas of the subject. So in fact there are many answers to the question "Why does language matter to philosophy?" which is the title of a very engaging book by the Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking. As Hacking shows, in different eras of philosophy, different reasons for reflecting on language have seemed important.
验证原则。最后,我们不禁要问,我们怎么可能理解 "知道 "这个词,却又无法给出其含义的简单定义。稍后我们将看到,关于语言的问题还会以其他方式出现在本学科的其他领域。加拿大哲学家伊恩-哈金(Ian Hacking)写了一本非常吸引人的书,书名就是 "为什么语言对哲学很重要"。正如哈金所言,在哲学的不同时代,对语言进行反思的不同原因似乎都很重要。
Still, one perennial source of the appeal that language has for philosophers is the fact that language is the tool with which we do our work. The philosopher's product, in the Western tradition, is a text, a piece of writing. Philosophy, as we have already seen, is especially concerned with the careful exposition of arguments that illuminate the central concepts with which and through which we understand reality. It is natural, therefore, that philosophers should have attended very closely to how language works, and, more especially, to questions about how to use language in valid arguments.
尽管如此,语言对哲学家具有吸引力的一个长期根源是,语言是我们开展工作的工具。在西方传统中,哲学家的产品是文本,是一篇文章。正如我们已经看到的那样,哲学特别关注对论点的仔细阐述,这些论点阐明了我们理解现实的核心概念。因此,哲学家们自然会密切关注语言如何发挥作用,尤其是如何在有效论证中使用语言的问题。
But everybody has a reason for being concerned to understand language properly. Whoever you are, you will sometimes have to think through difficult questions. And when you do, you will almost certainly have to do it with language. Even if you believe you can do without language for your private thinking, you will need to use it if you want to discuss these problems with others, or to look for relevant information or argument in books. So that, though philosophers have to be very careful about language, the fact that language is the tool of their trade does not distinguish philosophy from most forms of other intellectual activity.
但是,每个人都有理由关心如何正确理解语言。无论你是谁,有时都需要思考一些棘手的问题。而当你这样做的时候,你几乎肯定要使用语言。即使你认为自己的私人思考可以不使用语言,但如果你想与他人讨论这些问题,或在书中寻找相关信息或论据,你还是需要使用语言。因此,尽管哲学家必须非常谨慎地对待语言,但语言是他们的职业工具这一事实并没有将哲学与其他大多数形式的智力活动区分开来。
Nor does this fact explain the tremendous importance that has been attached to philosophical questions about language in the last hundred or so years of European philosophy. From the work of the German philosopher Gottlob Frege, more than a hundred years ago, to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations in the middle of the twentieth century, some of the most influential philosophical writings have asked questions about how language works. In the philosophy of language, questions about language have been addressed not because care with words allows us to avoid confusion, but because the nature of linguistic meaning, or of what it is for
这一事实也无法解释,在过去一百多年的欧洲哲学史上,有关语言的哲学问题受到了极大的重视。从一百多年前德国哲学家戈特洛布-弗雷格(Gottlob Frege)的著作,到二十世纪中叶路德维希-维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)的《哲学研究》(Philosophical Investigations),一些最具影响力的哲学著作都提出了关于语言如何运作的问题。在语言哲学中,有关语言的问题之所以受到关注,并不是因为对词语的小心谨慎可以让我们避免混淆,而是因为语言意义的本质,或者说语言意义对于我们来说是什么。

sentences to be true or false, has come to be regarded as intrinsically philosophically important. Philosophy, whose traditional preoccupation is with concepts and ideas, has come, over the last century, to be centrally engaged with questions about words and sentences. In a phrase the American philosopher Richard Rorty has made famous, philosophy has taken a "linguistic turn."
在过去的一个世纪里,哲学的核心问题是关于词语和句子的问题。哲学的传统关注点是概念和观念,而在过去的一个世纪里,哲学的中心工作则是与词语和句子有关的问题。用美国哲学家理查德-罗蒂(Richard Rorty)的名言来说,哲学已经发生了 "语言学转向"。
It will help you to see why language came to be so important to recent philosophy if we begin before the "linguistic turn." So let's begin again with Cartesianism, which (as I have already said) has been the dominant philosophy of mind of the last three centuries. In particular, let's consider the view of language that went with it.
如果我们在 "语言学转向 "之前就开始研究语言,会有助于你理解为什么语言对近代哲学如此重要。因此,让我们从笛卡尔主义重新开始,它(我已经说过)是过去三个世纪占主导地位的心灵哲学。特别是,让我们考虑一下与之相伴的语言观。
For Descartes, you remember, your mind and the thoughts you have are the things you know best. In this framework-which we find, for example, in Descartes' English contemporary, Thomas Hobbes-public language is naturally seen as the expression of these private thoughts. As Hobbes puts it, with his characteristic directness: "Words so connected as that they become signs of our thoughts, are called SPEECH." Whether or not you share Descartes' view of thoughts, this is, surely, a very natural view of one of the major ways that language functions. But, for Hobbes, language had a more important function than its role in communication, one that I mentioned in Chapter 1.
对笛卡尔来说,你要记住,你的头脑和你的思想是你最了解的东西。在笛卡尔的同时代英国人托马斯-霍布斯(Thomas Hobbes)等人的这一框架中,公共语言自然被视为这些私人思想的表达。正如霍布斯以其特有的直截了当的方式所说的那样"言语相连,成为我们思想的标志,这就叫言语"。无论你是否赞同笛卡尔的思想观,这肯定是对语言功能的主要方式之一的一种非常自然的看法。但是,对霍布斯来说,语言除了在交流中的作用之外,还有一个更重要的功能,我在第一章中已经提到过。
Hobbes is saying that the major function of language is to help us remember our thoughts, and he says that language is a system of "sensible moniments"-reminders we can see and hear. Thus, he claims in this passage that no one could remember "number," that is, how many things there are of a certain kind, if they did not have the numerals, the written or spoken signs for numbers; and he
霍布斯说,语言的主要功能是帮助我们记住我们的思想,他说语言是一个 "感性符号 "系统--我们可以看到和听到的提醒。因此,他在这段话中声称,如果没有数字,即数字的书面或口头符号,没有人能记住 "数",也就是某类事物有多少;他还说:"如果没有数字,我们就不可能记住'数'。

implies that no one could count things unless they had learned the numerals in their proper order. He claims, too, that you could not remember what color things were if you did not have the names of the colors-the words "red" and "yellow" and so on-so that you could store away the memory of a sunset, for example, by storing away the words "The sunset was a spectacular red." In fact, Hobbes believed that almost every word was a name of a "thought"; and by a "thought," like Descartes, he meant anything that you are aware of in your mind when you are conscious. The heart of his view of language, then, was that
他的意思是说,除非学会了按正确顺序排列的数字,否则没有人会数数。他还声称,如果没有颜色的名称--"红"、"黄 "等字眼,就无法记住事物的颜色--例如,你可以通过储存 "夕阳是壮观的红色 "这样的字眼来储存对夕阳的记忆。事实上,霍布斯认为,几乎每一个词都是一个 "思想 "的名称;和笛卡尔一样,他所说的 "思想 "指的是当你有意识时,你头脑中意识到的任何东西。因此,他的语言观的核心是
As I argued in the chapter on mind, Cartesian thoughts are essentially a private matter. For Hobbes, it is just "by accident" that names also have a role in public language. So far as Hobbes was concerned, Robinson Crusoe would have had just as much use for language before Friday arrived in his life as afterward. So far as Hobbes was concerned, then, it was only an accident that human beings do not have private languages, consisting of systems of "marks" that allow each person to remember his or her own ideas and that are not used in communication at all. If Hobbes were right, the fact that chimpanzees in the wild do not appear to use signs to communicate would not show that they didn't use sounds or gestures as marks for their thoughts.
正如我在 "心智 "一章中所论证的,笛卡尔的思想本质上是私人问题。对霍布斯来说,名字在公共语言中也有作用只是 "偶然"。在霍布斯看来,《鲁滨逊漂流记》在 "星期五 "出现之前和之后对语言的使用都是一样的。因此,在霍布斯看来,人类没有私人语言只是一个意外,私人语言由 "标记 "系统组成,让每个人都能记住自己的想法,而这些 "标记 "根本不用于交流。如果霍布斯是对的,那么野外黑猩猩似乎不使用符号进行交流这一事实,并不能说明它们不使用声音或手势作为思想的标记。
You will remember that I argued in Chapter 1 that the extreme privacy of Cartesian thoughts raised serious problems for Descartes' theory. In particular, his theory raised in an especially acute way the problem of other minds. Wittgenstein's private-language argument brought this problem into sharp focus, and this led us to behaviorism and then to functionalism. Hobbes' theory is, in essence, that we use languages as private languages. Thus, behaviorists and functionalists are likely to object to Hobbes' view because they do not believe in the existence of the totally private states - the "thoughts" - that Hobbes, like Descartes, regarded as the one sort of thing that we each know for certain. Blaming the defects of the Cartesian view on its commitment to the existence of private mental states, behaviorists
大家应该还记得,我在第一章中指出,笛卡尔思想的极端私密性给笛卡尔的理论带来了严重的问题。特别是,他的理论以一种特别尖锐的方式提出了其他思想的问题。维特根斯坦的 "私人语言 "论证使这一问题变得尖锐起来,并将我们引向了行为主义,然后又引向了功能主义。霍布斯的理论本质上是,我们把语言当作私人语言来使用。因此,行为主义者和功能主义者很可能反对霍布斯的观点,因为他们不相信存在完全私人化的状态--"思想"--而霍布斯和笛卡尔一样,都认为这种状态是我们每个人都能确定知道的。行为主义者将笛卡尔观点的缺陷归咎于其对私人精神状态存在的承诺,他们认为

placed their confidence in the certain existence of public language. A significant part of the appeal that language has had for many recent philosophers as an object of philosophical study is that it is public. Spoken and written languages, unlike the minds of their speakers and writers, are open to the inspection of all.
他们对公共语言的确定存在充满信心。语言作为哲学研究的对象,对近代许多哲学家具有吸引力,其中很重要的一点就是它的公共性。口头语言和书面语言不同于说话者和书写者的思想,它们向所有人开放。
But there is another, connected reason why the study of language has come to occupy a central place in recent philosophy: philosophers have come to believe that it is not, as Hobbes thought, an accident that language is a public phenomenon. As we saw in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's private-language argument was supposed to show that Hobbes's notion that we use language as a "sensible moniment" was actually incoherent. But Wittgenstein also offered to show why Hobbes and Descartes might have come to make the mistake of thinking that a private language was possible. His explanation relies, like the verificationist argument of Chapter 2 , on an appeal to a fact about public language.
但是,语言研究之所以在近代哲学中占据中心位置,还有另一个相关的原因:哲学家们开始相信,语言是一种公共现象并不像霍布斯所认为的那样是一种偶然。正如我们在第一章中所看到的,维特根斯坦的私人语言论证旨在说明,霍布斯关于我们将语言作为一种 "感性媒介 "的观点实际上是不连贯的。但维特根斯坦也提出要说明为什么霍布斯和笛卡尔可能会误以为私人语言是可能的。他的解释与第二章的验证论论证一样,依赖于对公共语言事实的诉诸。

3.3 The beetle in the box
3.3 盒子里的甲虫

Here is the passage from Philosophical Investigations, section 293, where Wittgenstein examines one way in which we might conceive of a private language. He considers why we might think that we use the word "pain" as if it were the name of a private object. He considers, in other words, why we might think that the word "pain" was used like the word "twinge" in my story in Chapter 1.
下面是《哲学研究》第 293 节中的一段话,维特根斯坦在这段话中探讨了我们构想私人语言的一种方式。他探讨了为什么我们会认为我们使用 "疼痛 "这个词,就好像它是一个私人物品的名称。换句话说,他考虑的是,为什么我们会认为 "疼痛 "一词的使用就像我在第一章的故事中使用的 "抽痛 "一词。
The analogy between pain, on one hand, and the beetle in the box, on the other, is meant to reinforce the point of the private language argument. If you really could not, even in principle, get into someone else's box to see if there was a beetle, then whether there was a beetle in the box could not possibly matter to the language-game. Wittgenstein suggests at the end of this passage that we have been misled by the "grammar" of the sentence "I have a pain" into thinking that when John is in pain, there is a private object that he experiences, just as when Joanna has a beetle in a matchbox, there is a public object that she possesses. But Wittgenstein thinks that we should regard "I have a pain" as being like "I have a fever." It makes no more sense, he thinks, to say that there is some fever that I have than to say that there is some pain that I have. When I have a fever, there are not two things, me and the fever: there is just one thing, me, in a feverish state. So too when I have a pain, there are not two things involved - me and the pain-but only one thing-mewhich is in a certain state: the state of having-a-pain.
将疼痛与盒子里的甲虫进行类比,一方面是为了强化私人语言论证的观点。如果你真的不能,甚至原则上不能进入别人的盒子去看是否有甲虫,那么盒子里是否有甲虫对语言游戏来说就不可能有什么影响。维特根斯坦在这段话的末尾指出,我们被 "我很痛苦 "这个句子的 "语法 "所误导,以为当约翰感到痛苦时,他所体验到的是一个私人对象,就像当乔安娜在火柴盒里发现一只甲虫时,她所拥有的是一个公共对象一样。但维特根斯坦认为,我们应该把 "我感到疼痛 "看作是 "我发烧了"。他认为,说 "我发烧 "比说 "我疼痛 "更没有意义。当我发烧时,并不存在我和发烧这两个事物:只有一个事物,即处于发烧状态的我。同样,当我感到疼痛时,也不存在两个东西--我和疼痛,而只有一个东西--处于某种状态:疼痛的状态。
Having-a-pain is certainly not an essentially private state. If, for example, I stick a pin in you while you are awake and I see you wince, then, in the normal course of things, I know that you are in pain. (This was the basic idea behind Block's "simple-minded theory of pain" in 1.7.) If Wittgenstein is right, the problems generated by the privacy of pain are all dissolved. Indeed, if we could replace all the Cartesian talk of the allegedly private objects of experience by talk of the public (that is, in principle detectable) property of having-the-experience, the problem of other minds would disappear. Thus, even though Wittgenstein discusses the issue of privacy in terms of private language and not in terms simply of private objects of experience, his arguments, if successful, solve a central problem in the philosophy of mind.
疼痛当然不是一种本质上的私人状态。例如,如果我在你清醒的时候给你扎针,看到你抽搐,那么,在正常情况下,我就知道你在疼痛。(这就是布洛克在 1.7 中提出的 "头脑简单的疼痛理论 "的基本思想)。如果维特根斯坦是对的,那么由疼痛的隐私所产生的问题就都迎刃而解了。事实上,如果我们能用 "具有经验 "这一公共属性(即原则上可以被检测到)来取代笛卡尔关于所谓私人经验对象的所有论述,那么其他思维的问题也就不复存在了。因此,尽管维特根斯坦是从私人语言的角度而非简单地从私人经验对象的角度来讨论隐私问题的,但他的论证如果成功的话,就解决了心灵哲学中的一个核心问题。
Wittgenstein's talk of "grammar" here suggests he thinks that, in this case, clarity about how language works will allow us to avoid the philosophical error of thinking that there can be private states. So you might be led to conclude that Wittgenstein's interest in language was just the sort of interest in language as a tool that I said was not the main reason for philosophical concern with language in our own century. The reason why I think you should not draw this conclusion is that I believe Wittgenstein's concern for issues about
维特根斯坦在这里谈到 "语法",表明他认为,在这种情况下,弄清语言是如何运作的,将使我们避免认为可能存在私人状态的哲学错误。因此,你可能会得出这样的结论:维特根斯坦对语言的兴趣,正是我所说的那种把语言作为工具的兴趣,而这并不是我们这个世纪哲学关注语言的主要原因。我之所以认为你不应该得出这样的结论,是因为我相信维特根斯坦对有关语言的问题的关注,并不是因为他对语言的兴趣。

grammar is a consequence and not a cause of his skepticism about the usefulness of trying to explain human action, including human speech, by talking about private mental states. One reason for such skepticism becomes clear if we ask ourselves exactly what Hobbes would say if you asked him what was involved in understanding a sentence.
霍布斯对试图通过谈论私人心理状态来解释人类行为(包括人类言语)的有用性持怀疑态度,语法是其结果而非原因。如果我们扪心自问一下,如果你问霍布斯,理解一个句子涉及到什么,他会怎么说,那么这种怀疑态度的一个原因就很清楚了。
Hobbes' answer would be that to understand a sentence is to know "what thought the speaker had . . . before his mind." So, according to Hobbes, if I know what Joanna means by the word "table," I know that it "signifies" her idea of a table. There are at least two sorts of objection that one might make to this explanation. The first is that, far from helping us understand what Joanna means, it actually makes understanding Joanna impossible. After all, Hobbes thinks that I cannot know about Joanna's ideas since they are Joanna's private property. Yet if this explanation of meaning were right, I would have to know what Joanna's idea of a table was like in order to know what she meant by her word "table" - which, according to Hobbes, is impossible!
霍布斯的答案是,要理解一个句子,就必须知道 "说话者......脑海中有什么想法"。因此,按照霍布斯的说法,如果我知道乔安娜所说的 "桌子 "是什么意思,我就知道这个词 "表示 "她对桌子的想法。对于这种解释,至少有两种反对意见。第一种反对意见认为,这种解释非但不能帮助我们理解乔安娜的意思,反而会让我们无法理解乔安娜。毕竟,霍布斯认为我不可能知道乔安娜的想法,因为它们是乔安娜的私有财产。然而,如果这种对意义的解释是正确的,那么我就必须知道乔安娜对桌子的想法是什么样的,才能知道她所说的 "桌子 "是什么意思--按照霍布斯的说法,这是不可能的!
A second objection to Hobbes' theory is that it mistakes a fundamentally subjective question for an objective one. The question of what experiences go with Joanna's use of words is subjective. It depends on Joanna's particular psychology. But the question of what Joanna means is not, in this sense, subjective at all. What Joanna means by the word "table," if she understands English, is the same as what you or I mean by it; it is quite independent of her psychological peculiarities.
对霍布斯理论的第二个反对意见是,它把一个根本上主观的问题误认为是一个客观的问题。乔安娜在使用词语时会有哪些体验,这个问题是主观的。这取决于乔安娜的特殊心理。但从这个意义上说,乔安娜的意思根本不是主观的。如果乔安娜听得懂英语,那么她对 "桌子 "这个词的理解与你我的理解是一样的;这与她的心理特点完全无关。
This second objection was made by the German philosopher Gottlob Frege in a very well-known article called "On Sense and Reference." "Sense" and "reference" are the words that Frege used, as we shall see, to explain what is involved in understanding language. For the moment, let's just take "sense" to refer to meaning and "reference" to mean the thing that a name names. In this passage, he makes his point by considering what is involved in understanding what someone means when they use the name "Bucephalus," which was the name of Alexander the Great's horse. object that can be perceived by the senses, then my idea of it is an inner picture originating from memories of sensory impressions that I have had and from acts, both inner and outer, that I have carried out. This picture is often imbued with feelings; the clarity of its discrete parts is variable and fluctuating. Nor is the same idea always associated with the same sense, even in the same person. The idea is subjective: one person's idea is not the same as another's. As a result, there are multifarious differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a rider, and a zoologist will probably associate very differing ideas with the name "Bucephalus."
第二种反对意见是德国哲学家戈特洛布-弗雷格在一篇非常著名的文章《论意义与参照》中提出的。我们将会看到,弗雷格用 "意义 "和 "参照 "这两个词来解释理解语言所涉及的内容。我们暂且把 "感性 "理解为意义,把 "所指 "理解为名称所命名的事物。在这段话中,他通过考虑在理解某人使用 "Bucephalus"(亚历山大大帝的坐骑)这一名称时所涉及的含义来阐明自己的观点。"如果物体可以被感官所感知,那么我对它的概念就是一个内在的图景,它源于我对感官印象的记忆以及我所实施的内在和外在行为。这幅图景往往充满了感情;它的各个部分的清晰度是多变和波动的。即使在同一个人身上,同样的想法也不总是与同样的感觉联系在一起。观念是主观的:一个人的观念与另一个人的观念并不相同。因此,与同一感官相关联的观念存在着各种各样的差异。一个画家、一个骑手和一个动物学家可能会对 "Bucephalus "这个名字产生截然不同的想法。
One reasonable response to these two objections, both of which are arguments against the subjective character of the Hobbesian theory of meaning, is to try to explain what is going on in language not by saying how it relates to our inner subjective experiences but by saying how it relates to the outer objective world. And Frege was the pioneer of modern thought on this issue.
这两种反对意见都是反对霍布斯意义理论主观性的论据,对这两种反对意见的一个合理回应是,试图解释语言中发生的事情,不是说它如何与我们的内在主观经验相关,而是说它如何与外在客观世界相关。弗雷格是在这个问题上的现代思想先驱。

3.4 Frege's "sense" and "reference"
3.4 弗雷格的 "意义 "和 "参照"

Frege was a mathematician, and his interest in questions about how language works derived, originally, from a concern to give a precise account of how the signs used in mathematics worked. He thought that if we understood properly how mathematical language functioned, we should be able to avoid certain sorts of mathematical error. But he soon developed an independent interest in how languages function, and though he did a great deal of work on questions about how mathematical signs such as numerals (" 1 ," " 2 ," “ 3 ," and so on) operate, he also worked out a theory that covered proper names, like "Bucephalus," and various forms of words, such as "I doubt that," which are not used in mathematical proofs at all.
弗雷格是一位数学家,他对语言如何运作的问题感兴趣,最初源于对数学符号如何运作的精确解释。他认为,如果我们能正确理解数学语言的运作方式,就能避免某些数学错误。不过,他很快就对语言如何运作产生了独立的兴趣,尽管他做了大量关于数学符号(如数字 "1"、"2"、"3 "等)如何运作的工作,但他也提出了一套理论,涵盖了专有名词(如 "Bucephalus")和各种形式的词语(如 "我怀疑"),而这些词语在数学证明中根本用不上。
Frege's aim was to develop a theory of meaning, a philosophical account that would tell us what we had to know about the words and sentences of a language in order to understand the way people use them. His fundamental idea was that the meaning of a word is just what you have to know about it in order to understand how it is used in a language. Since the word "semantic" means "having to do with meaning," what Frege was doing is also called "philosophical semantics," and his theory is called a "semantic theory."
弗雷格的目标是发展一种意义理论,一种哲学解释,告诉我们为了理解人们使用语言的方式,我们必须了解语言中的词语和句子。他的基本观点是,一个词的意义就是你为了理解它在语言中的使用方式而必须了解的东西。由于 "语义 "一词的意思是 "与意义有关",弗雷格的工作也被称为 "哲学语义学",他的理论被称为 "语义学理论"。
One of Frege's most important insights was that previous theories
弗雷格最重要的见解之一是,以前的理论

of meaning had started in the wrong place. Hobbes, as we saw, started by trying to explain the meaning of individual words, such as names. Frege pointed out that, in a sense, words on their own do not mean anything at all. For the meaning of a word is what you have to know in order to understand proper uses of that word in the language; and just saying "dog" is not a proper use of a word in English. Only if I use the word "dog" with other words to form a sentence will I be saying something that you can understand. It is not that the word "dog" doesn't mean anything; it is simply that what it means depends on how it is used in sentences. This discovery of the primacy of the sentence is one of the basic insights of Frege's philosophy of language. You might put his discovery like this: to say what a word or phrase means, you have to say how it contributes to the meaning of complete sentences.
意义的起点是错误的。正如我们所看到的,霍布斯一开始就试图解释单个词的意义,比如名字。弗雷格指出,从某种意义上说,单词本身并没有任何意义。因为一个词的意义是你必须知道的,这样才能理解这个词在语言中的正确用法;而仅仅说 "狗 "在英语中并不是一个词的正确用法。只有当我把 "dog "这个单词和其他单词搭配在一起造句时,我说的话你们才能理解。并不是说 "dog "这个词没有任何意义,只是它的意义取决于它在句子中的用法。这一句子至上的发现是弗雷格语言哲学的基本见解之一。你可以这样理解他的发现:要想知道一个词或短语的意思,你就必须知道它是如何为完整句子的意思做出贡献的。
With this basic idea established, Frege sets out to discuss how we understand names like "Bucephalus." He says that we must think of them as referring to some object. Given the primacy of the sentence, we must now ask what this means in terms of how words contribute to sentence meaning. A simple, preliminary answer is that a word " " refers to an object, , if and only if " " is used in sentences to determine what those sentences are about. Thus, because the word "Bucephalus" refers to a certain horse, the sentence "Alexander rode Bucephalus" is about that horse. As we shall see, Frege had a better, more precise answer than this preliminary answer; but before I give it, we shall need some more of Frege's terminology.
有了这个基本思想,弗雷格开始讨论我们如何理解 "Bucephalus "这样的名字。他说,我们必须把它们看作是对某个对象的指称。鉴于句子的首要地位,我们现在必须要问,就词语如何促成句子意义而言,这意味着什么。一个简单而初步的答案是,当且仅当 " "被用于句子以确定句子的内容时," "这个词才指代一个对象,即 。因此,因为 "Bucephalus "指的是某匹马,所以 "Alexander rode Bucephalus "这个句子指的就是那匹马。我们将会看到,弗雷格有一个比这个初步答案更好、更精确的答案;但在我给出这个答案之前,我们还需要弗雷格的一些术语。
Once Frege has introduced the idea of reference, he points out immediately that we cannot say that the thing that a name refers to-its reference-is all you need to know in order to understand how that name functions in our language. For if it were all that you had to know, then the meaning of two words with the same reference would be identical; and he gives a famous example that shows that this is not so. Here is the example.
弗雷格一旦引入所指的概念,就立即指出,我们不能说一个名称所指的东西--它的所指--就是理解该名称在我们的语言中如何发挥作用所需的全部知识。他举了一个著名的例子来说明事实并非如此。下面就是这个例子。
The planet Venus is often observable near the horizon both at sunset and at sunrise. In antiquity, people called Venus "the Evening Star" when they saw it at sunset and "the Morning Star" when they saw it at dawn, without realizing that they were talking about the very same heavenly body. (As you can see from the names,
在日落和日出时,人们经常可以在地平线附近观测到金星。在古代,人们把日落时看到的金星称为 "黄昏之星",把黎明时看到的金星称为 "晨星",却不知道他们说的是同一个天体。(从名称中可以看出、

they didn't know it was not a star but a planet either.) In the course of the history of astronomy, it was discovered that the heavenly body people saw at sunset and the one they saw at sunrise were the same. This discovery could be reported by saying
他们也不知道那不是一颗恒星,而是一颗行星)。在天文学发展史上,人们发现日落时看到的天体和日出时看到的天体是一样的。这一发现的报告可以说是
F: The Morning Star is the Evening Star.
F:晨星就是晚星。
Now suppose we held that the meaning of "the Morning Star" was just its reference, and likewise for "the Evening Star." Then it would follow that, since these two names refer to the same thing, they must have the same meaning. If that were true, then the sentence, F, could not possibly be informative. For if the two words meant the same, then all you would have to know in order to know that was true was what the two words meant. But the discovery that was true is not something that people knew simply because they knew what the words meant; it was an astronomical discovery.
现在,假设我们认为 "晨星 "和 "黄昏之星 "的含义仅仅是指晨星和黄昏之星。那么,既然这两个名称指代的是同一事物,那么它们的含义就一定是相同的。如果这是真的,那么句子 F 就不可能有任何信息。因为如果这两个词的意思相同,那么要知道 是真的,你所需要知道的就是这两个词的意思。但是, 是真的这一发现并不是人们仅仅因为知道这两个词的意思而知道的;这是一个天文发现。
Frege made the same point in a slightly different way. He offered a reductio argument that showed that reference was not the same as meaning. The argument depends on the following assumption:
弗雷格以略微不同的方式提出了同样的观点。他提出了一个还原论证,说明所指并不等于意义。这个论证依赖于以下假设:
CT: If two words or phrases have the same meaning, then we should be able to replace one of them with the other in any sentence, , without changing the meaning of .
CT:如果两个词或短语具有相同的含义,那么我们应该能够在任何句子中用另一个词或短语替换其中一个词或短语, ,而不改变
"Bachelor" and "unmarried adult male" mean the same. So "John is a bachelor" and "John is an unmarried adult male" mean the same also. I shall call CT the compositionality thesis for meanings. (I call it this because it is a consequence of the idea that the meaning of a sentence is composed out of the meanings of its component parts. That more general idea is often called "compositionality.") The argument for it is quite simple. The meaning of a word or phrase is what you know if and only if you know how it is used in the language. Given the primacy of the sentence this means that the meaning of a word or phrase, "W," is what you know if and only if you understand how "W" contributes to the meaning of any sentence containing it. It follows that two words, "X" and "Y," mean the same if and only if they make the same contribution to the meaning of every sentence.
"单身汉 "和 "未婚成年男子 "意思相同。因此,"约翰是个单身汉 "和 "约翰是个未婚成年男子 "的意思也是一样的。我将把 "CT "称为意义构成论。(我之所以这样称呼它,是因为它是这样一种观点的结果,即句子的意义是由其各组成部分的意义构成的。这一更为普遍的观点通常被称为 "构成性")。它的论据非常简单。一个词或短语的含义是你所知道的,前提是你知道它在语言中是如何使用的。鉴于句子的首要地位,这就意味着,当且仅当你理解了 "W "如何有助于包含它的任何句子的意义时,你才会知道一个词或短语 "W "的意义。由此可见,"X "和 "Y "这两个词的意义是相同的,前提是它们对每个句子的意义都有相同的贡献。
Frege asked us to compare with
弗雷格要求我们将
G: The Morning Star is the Morning Star.
G:晨星就是晨星。
He pointed out that G, unlike F, is a sentence that you know is true just because you know what the words mean. It follows from the compositionality thesis that if the meaning of "the Morning Star" is just what it refers to, then, since it refers to the same thing as "the Evening Star" does, F and G must mean the same. Since they plainly do not mean the same, this is a reductio of the claim that the meaning of a name is its reference.
他指出,与 F 不同,G 是一个你知道它是真的句子,只是因为你知道这些词的意思。根据构成论,如果 "晨星 "的含义只是它所指称的东西,那么,既然它所指称的东西与 "黄昏之星 "所指称的东西相同,F 和 G 的含义必然相同。由于它们的含义显然并不相同,这就还原了 "名称的含义就是其所指 "的说法。
Frege's explanation of why F and G differ in meaning is that "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star," though they have the same reference, differ in the "mode of presentation" of what they refer to, and he calls the mode of presentation associated with a word its sense.
弗雷格对 F 和 G 意义不同的解释是,"晨星 "和 "黄昏之星 "虽然具有相同的所指,但它们所指的 "呈现方式 "不同,他把与一个词相关的呈现方式称为意义。
We can see what Frege means by a "mode of presentation," and thus by a "sense," in the case we have been considering. To know the sense of "the Morning Star" you have to know that it refers to the heavenly body that often appears at a certain point on the horizon in the morning. To know the sense of "the Evening Star" you have to know that it refers to the heavenly body that often appears at a certain point on the horizon in the evening. In other words, for a name, a sense is a way of identifying the referent. If you know the sense of a name, you know what determines whether any object is the reference of that name. It is very important, as we shall see later, that a sense is defined as something you have to know in order to understand its use in sentences. This follows, of course, from Frege's basic idea that meaning is what you have to know in order to understand how words are used in sentences.
在我们所考虑的案例中,我们可以看到弗雷格所说的 "呈现方式 "以及 "意义 "的含义。要知道 "晨星 "的意义,就必须知道它指的是早晨经常出现在地平线上某一点的天体。要知道 "黄昏之星 "的含义,就必须知道它指的是晚上经常出现在地平线上某一点的天体。换句话说,对于一个名称来说,意义是识别所指的一种方法。如果你知道一个名字的意义,你就知道是什么决定了任何物体是否是这个名字的所指。正如我们稍后将看到的,非常重要的一点是,意义被定义为你必须知道的东西,以便理解它在句子中的用法。当然,这源于弗雷格的基本思想,即意义是为了理解词语在句子中的用法而必须知道的东西。
Proper names are, of course, only one class among many classes of expressions that a theory of meaning has to explain. As we should expect, Frege, who discovered the primacy of the sentence, now asks whether we can apply similar notions to whole sentences. reference, but a different sense; then this can have no influence on the reference of the sentence. But now we see that the thought is in fact altered in such a case; because, for example, the thought in the sentence "The Morning Star is a body illuminated by the sun" is different from that in the sentence "The Evening Star is a body illuminated by the Sun." Someone who didn't know that the Evening Star is the Morning Star could take one of these thoughts to be true and the other to be false. The thought then cannot be the reference of the sentence; we will do better to interpret it as its sense.
当然,专名只是意义理论必须解释的众多表达式中的一类。正如我们所预料的那样,弗雷格发现了句子的首要性,现在他提出了一个问题:我们是否可以把类似的概念应用于整个句子?但现在我们看到,在这种情况下,思想实际上发生了变化;因为,举例来说,"晨星是被太阳照亮的物体 "这句话中的思想与 "晚星是被太阳照亮的物体 "这句话中的思想是不同的。一个不知道 "黄昏之星就是晨星 "的人可能会认为其中一个想法是真的,而另一个想法是假的。因此,思想不能作为句子的所指;我们最好将其解释为句子的意义。
Frege says in a footnote that by a "thought" he means "not the subjective activity of thinking, but its objective content, which is capable of being the common property of many people." So his claim is that the sense of the sentence "The Morning Star is a body illuminated by the Sun" is the content of the belief shared by two people who both believe that the Morning Star is a body illuminated by the Sun. This shared content is what philosophers have usually meant by the word "proposition." We often say that a sentence expresses a proposition, which means that it has a certain content.
弗雷格在脚注中说,他所说的 "思想 "指的是 "不是思维的主观活动,而是它的客观内容,它能够成为许多人的共同财产"。因此,他的主张是,"晨星是被太阳照亮的身体 "这句话的意义,是两个都相信晨星是被太阳照亮的身体的人所共有的信念内容。这个共同的内容就是哲学家通常所说的 "命题"。我们常说一个句子表达了一个命题,这意味着它有一定的内容。
Notice that in this passage Frege applies something like the compositionality thesis to references when he says that if we "substitute in it a word with another word with the same reference, but a different sense ... this can have no influence on the reference of the sentence." In other words, he is assuming that the reference of a sentence is determined exclusively by the references of the component words or phrases. If we can discover a property of a sentence that is determined exclusively by the references of the words that make it up, we shall have discovered, according to Frege, what the references of sentences are.
请注意,在这段话中,弗雷格将类似于构成性论题的东西应用于指称,他说,如果我们 "用具有相同指称但不同意义的另一个词代替其中的一个词......这不会对句子的指称产生任何影响"。换句话说,他假定句子的指称完全由组成词或短语的指称决定。弗雷格认为,如果我们能够发现一个句子的属性完全是由组成它的词的指称决定的,那么我们就发现了句子的指称是什么。
So far we only know what the sense and reference of proper names are. We call two names with the same reference "co- referential." So the question we must ask is: What property of sentences is always preserved if we replace the names in them by other co-referential names? Frege's answer is that the property that is preserved is what he calls the "truth value." "I understand by the truth value of a sentence the circumstance that it is true or that it is false. There are no other truth values." Frege's point is that if we substitute one name for another co-referential name in any sentence, then we shall not affect whether that sentence is true or false.
到目前为止,我们只知道专名的意义和所指是什么。我们把具有相同所指的两个名称称为 "共指"。所以我们要问的问题是:如果我们把句子中的名称换成其他共指名称,句子的什么性质总是保留下来?弗雷格的答案是,被保留的属性就是他所说的 "真值"。"我把一个句子的真值理解为它是真的或它是假的。没有其他真值"。弗雷格的观点是,如果我们在任何句子中用一个名称代替另一个共指名称,那么我们将不会影响该句子的真假。
Thus, since "the Morning Star" and "the Evening Star" are coreferential, we should be able to replace one by the other in any true sentence and get a sentence that is true; and we should likewise be able to replace one by the other in any false sentence and get a sentence that is false. Let us accept, for the moment, that this is correct.
因此,既然 "晨星 "和 "黄昏之星 "是同义词,我们就应该能够在任何真句中用一个替换另一个,得到一个真句;同样,我们也应该能够在任何假句中用一个替换另一个,得到一个假句。我们暂且认为这是正确的。
If the reference of a sentence is a truth value, then just as the sense of a name is a mode of presentation of the reference, so the sense of a sentence should be a mode of presentation of a truth value. And just as the sense of a name is a way of identifying the object it refers to, so the sense of a sentence will be a way of identifying whether or not the sentence is true. If you know the sense of a sentence, you know what determines whether that sentence is true or false. And the referent of a sentence in the actual world is its truth value.
如果句子的所指是真值,那么正如名称的意义是所指的呈现方式一样,句子的意义也应该是真值的呈现方式。正如名称的意义是识别所指对象的一种方式,句子的意义也将是识别句子是否为真的一种方式。如果你知道一个句子的意义,你就知道是什么决定了这个句子的真假。而句子在现实世界中的所指就是它的真值。
If you know what determines whether a sentence is true or false, we say that you know its truth conditions. Thus, Frege's theory of meaning says that the meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions. Since, on Frege's view, every sentence that is not true is false, if you know when a sentence would be true, you know its truth conditions. For in any circumstance where it was not true, it would be false.
如果你知道是什么决定了一个句子的真假,我们就说你知道了它的真值条件。因此,弗雷格的意义理论认为,一个句子的意义就是它的真假条件。根据弗雷格的观点,每一个非真的句子都是假的,因此,如果你知道一个句子何时为真,你就知道了它的真假条件。因为在任何情况下,只要句子不是真的,它就是假的。
We have now reached a point where another major reason for philosophical interest in language becomes clear. Language is the medium in which we express truths. From the very beginning of Western philosophy, the nature of truth has been regarded as a crucial philosophical question. The theory of meaning provides one route to an answer. For looking at how sentences express truth and falsehood helps us to understand the nature of truth. In Frege's theory, where there is this close connection between meaning and truth, this traditional problem is central to philosophical semantics.
现在,我们已经明白了哲学关注语言的另一个主要原因。语言是我们表达真理的媒介。从西方哲学一开始,真理的本质就被视为一个至关重要的哲学问题。意义理论提供了一条通往答案的途径。因为研究句子如何表达真理和谬误有助于我们理解真理的本质。在弗雷格的理论中,意义与真理之间存在着这种密切的联系,这一传统问题是哲学语义学的核心问题。

3.5 Predicates and open sentences
3.5 谓语和开放式句子

Once Frege has an explanation of the sense and reference of sentences he can explain the sense and reference of other words and phrases, relying always on the compositionality thesis, applied now both to sense and to reference. The sense of a word or phrase will be a property that determines the truth conditions-the sense-of a sentence in which it occurs; the reference will be a property that determines the truth value--the reference. To explain the rest of his theory, however, we shall need to introduce a little more terminology.
弗雷格一旦解释了句子的意义和指称,他就可以解释其他词和短语的意义和指称,这始终依赖于构成性论题,现在它既适用于意义,也适用于指称。一个词或短语的意义将是一个决定真值条件的属性--即出现该词或短语的句子的意义;所指将是一个决定真值的属性--即所指。然而,为了解释他的理论的其余部分,我们需要引入更多的术语。
In traditional grammar, sentences were said to consist of a subject and a predicate. Thus, the sentence "Susan is in Canada" was said to consist of the subject, "Susan," and the predicate, "is in Canada." The subject-in this case a name-fixed what the sentence was about, and the predicate fixed what was being said about it. Suppose we are trying to determine what is the reference of "is in Canada." Since Canada is the largest country on the North American continent, any sentence that says that something or somebody is in the largest country on the North American continent will have the same truth value as a sentence that says that somebody is in Canada. Using the compositionality thesis for reference, we can say that the property that the predicate "is in Canada" shares with the predicate "is in the largest country on the North American continent" is their common reference.
在传统语法中,句子由主语和谓语组成。因此,"苏珊在加拿大 "这个句子是由主语 "苏珊 "和谓语 "在加拿大 "组成的。主语--这里是一个名字--确定了句子的内容,而谓语则确定了句子的内容。假设我们要确定 "在加拿大 "的所指是什么。因为加拿大是北美大陆上最大的国家,所以任何说某物或某人在北美大陆上最大的国家的句子与说某人在加拿大的句子具有相同的真值。利用参照的构成性定理,我们可以说,谓词 "在加拿大 "与谓词 "在北美大陆最大的国家 "的共同属性是它们的共同参照。
That shared reference, on Frege's theory, was the class of things in Canada. So, just as a name refers to an object, a predicate refers to a class of objects. That class is called the "extension" of the predicate. If you want to find out if something is in the extension of a predicate, you simply make a sentence with the name of that thing followed by the predicate and see if that sentence is true. So if you want to know if something - call it " " - is in the extension of the predicate "is in Canada," you simply see if the sentence " is in Canada" is true. If it is true, we say that satisfies the predicate "is in Canada."
根据弗雷格的理论,这个共同参照物就是加拿大的一类事物。因此,就像一个名称指代一个对象一样,一个谓词指代一类对象。这个类别被称为谓词的 "外延"。如果你想知道某物是否在谓词的外延中,你只需用该物的名称和谓词造一个句子,然后看看这个句子是否为真。因此,如果你想知道某样东西--把它叫做 " "--是否在 "在加拿大 "这个谓词的外延中,你只需看看 " 在加拿大 "这个句子是否为真。如果为真,我们就说 满足谓词 "在加拿大"。
Now we know what the reference of a predicate is. We can apply the general rule that the sense of a word or phrase is a mode of presentation of the reference. The predicates "is in Canada" and "is in the largest country on the North American continent" are different modes of presentation of the same class of objects: the class, namely, of things in the country whose capital is Ottawa. The sense of a predicate is sometimes referred to as its "intension." As we shall see in 3.8, however, this terminology could lead to confusion, so I'll stick to talking of "senses."
现在我们知道谓词的所指是什么了。我们可以运用一般规则,即一个词或短语的意义是所指的呈现方式。谓词 "在加拿大 "和 "在北美大陆最大的国家 "是对同一类对象的不同呈现方式:这类对象就是首都为渥太华的国家中的事物。谓词的意义有时被称为它的 "意指"。不过,正如我们在 3.8 中将要看到的,这个术语可能会引起混淆,所以我还是只谈 "意义"。
Now, Frege knew that not all sentences fitted the simple subjectpredicate pattern. After all, is the sentence
弗雷格知道,并非所有句子都符合简单的主谓模式。毕竟,句子
S: John and Mary, who are friends of Peter's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries
S:约翰和玛丽是彼得的朋友,他们坐在花园里吃草莓

about John or Mary or something called "John and Mary" or even something called "John and Mary, who are friends of Peter's"? So Frege suggested that we should replace the traditional notion of a predicate with the notion of what is called an "open sentence." To get an open sentence from , you simply remove one or several of the names. Thus
约翰和玛丽",甚至是 "彼得的朋友约翰和玛丽"?于是弗雷格建议我们用所谓 "开放句 "的概念来取代传统的谓词概念。要从 得到一个开放句,只需去掉一个或几个名字。因此

: - and Mary, who are friends of Peter's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries
彼得的朋友玛丽坐在花园里吃草莓。

and
: - and Mary, who are friends of — 's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries
-和玛丽是-的朋友,她们坐在花园里吃草莓
are both open sentences.
都是开放式句子。
We can easily see how to apply Frege's suggestion to . If is true, then John satisfies the open sentence . So the extension of is the class of things that satisfy this open sentence, the class of things whose names produce a true sentence when they are put in the blank.
我们不难看出如何将弗雷格的建议应用于 。如果 为真,那么约翰就满足开放句 。因此, 的外延就是满足这个开放句子的一类事物,也就是当把它们的名字放在空白处时会产生一个真句子的一类事物。
Frege suggested that the reference of was the class of ordered pairs of things such that if you put the name of the first member of the pair in the first blank and the name of the second member in the second blank, you got a true sentence. An ordered pair is just a pair of things taken in a particular order. (So is a different ordered pair from , even though the pairs have the same members.) Obviously, it can be true that
弗雷格认为, 的参照物是有序的一对事物的类别,如果把这对事物中第一个成员的名字放在第一个空白处,第二个成员的名字放在第二个空白处,就会得到一个真句。有序对只是按特定顺序排列的一对事物。(因此, 是不同的有序对,尽管这对有相同的成员)。显然,下列情况可以为真
John and Mary, who are friends of Peter's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries
彼得的朋友约翰和马利亚坐在花园里吃草莓
when it is false that
假若
Peter and Mary, who are friends of John's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries.
约翰的朋友彼得和马利亚坐在花园里吃草莓。

the pair has to be ordered. It is clear that this idea can be generalized: if you took out three names, then the open sentence would be satisfied not by ordered pairs but by ordered triples, and so on. However complex a sentence is, and however many names it contains, Frege's theory can say what the reference and the sense are of the open sentence produced by removing all the names.
对必须是有序的。很显然,这个想法可以被推广:如果去掉三个名字,那么开放句子就不是由有序的对来满足,而是由有序的三元组来满足,以此类推。无论一个句子多么复杂,无论它包含多少个名称,弗雷格的理论都能指出去掉所有名称后产生的开放句子的所指和意义是什么。
In Chapter 1, you will remember, I introduced the idea of a variable to explain the Ramsey-sentences that functionalists use to set up their theory of the mind. There is a simple connection between variables and these open sentences. When you create an open sentence, you introduce one variable for each name you remove. So instead of writing the open sentence
大家应该还记得,在第一章中,我引入了变量的概念来解释功能论者用来建立心智理论的拉姆齐句子。变量和这些开放式句子之间有一个简单的联系。当你创建一个开放式句子时,你每删除一个名字,就会引入一个变量。因此,与其写开放式句子
sat in the garden and ate strawberries
坐在花园里吃草莓
you write 你写道
sat in the garden and ate strawberries.
坐在花园里吃草莓
(If you remove the same name more than once from a sentence, you can replace it each time with the same variable.) Frege showed that using this device, you could then explain how the words "some" and "all" - and related words like "somebody" and "everybody," all of which are called quantifiers-worked in English. (Or rather, how the equivalent words work in German!) For "somebody" the story is that "Somebody sat in the garden and ate strawberries" is true if there is any person who satisfies this open sentence. (Sometimes logicians call an object that satisfies an open sentence a "satisfying value of the variable" that replaces the blank. So if you sat in the garden and ate strawberries, you would be one satisfying value of the variable " " in: " sat in the garden and ate strawberries.") For "everybody" the story is that "Everybody sat in the garden and ate strawberries" is true if every person satisfies this open sentence (in other words, if any name you substitute for the " " will produce a true sentence). For this reason, we sometimes write, instead of "Everybody sat in the garden and ate strawberries,"
(如果在一个句子中多次删除同一个名字,那么每次都可以用同一个变量来代替)。弗雷格指出,使用这种方法,就可以解释 "一些 "和 "所有 "这些词,以及 "某人 "和 "大家 "等相关词在英语中是如何工作的。(对于 "somebody "来说,如果有任何人满足这个开放句子的要求,那么 "Somebody sat in the garden and ate strawberries "就是真的。(有时,逻辑学家把满足开放句子的对象称为 "变量的满足值",它代替了空白)。因此,如果你坐在花园里吃草莓,你就是变量 " "的一个满足值:" 坐在花园里吃草莓。")对于 "每个人 "来说,如果每个人都满足这个开放句子,那么 "每个人都坐在花园里吃草莓 "就是真句(换句话说,如果你用任何名字代替 " "都能产生一个真句)。因此,我们有时会写 "每个人都坐在花园里吃草莓",而不是 "每个人都坐在花园里吃草莓"。
For all sat in the garden and ate strawberries
因为所有 都坐在花园里吃草莓

and for "Somebody sat in the garden and ate strawberries,"
以及 "有人坐在花园里吃草莓"
There exists an such that sat in the garden and ate strawberries
存在这样一个 坐在花园里吃草莓
which is what we did with the Ramsey-sentences. "For all X, X . . " is the universal quantifier; we use it to make the claim that everything - in the universe! - satisfies an open sentence. "There exists an X, such that X F" is the existential quantifier; we use it to make claims about the existence of something that satisfies an open sentence. (Here " " is standing in for some particular open sentence. So if "F" is "laughs," then "There exists an such that laughs" is true just in case some object satisfies the open sentence "laughs," that is, just in case somebody laughs.) Given the way we dealt with open sentences with two blanks just now, you can see how Frege could have gone on to handle sentences with more than one quantifier, in the sort of way we did in the Ramsey-sentences of Chapter 1.
这就是我们在拉姆齐句子中所做的。"对于所有 X,X ."是普遍量词;我们用它来宣称宇宙中的万事万物!- 满足一个开放句子。"存在一个 X,使得 X F "是存在量词;我们用它来断言满足一个开放句子的事物是否存在。(这里的 " "代表某个特定的开放句子。因此,如果 "F "是 "笑",那么 "存在一个 ,使得 笑 "就是真的,只是在某个对象满足开放句 "笑 "的情况下,也就是说,只是在某人笑的情况下)。考虑到我们刚才处理有两个空白的开放句子的方法,你可以看到弗雷格是如何用我们在第一章的拉姆齐句子中所做的那种方法来处理有一个以上量词的句子的。

3.6 Problems of intensionality
3.6 内在性问题

I have been assuming, as I said, that if we replace one co-referential term by another in a sentence, we should get a true sentence if the original sentence was true, and a false sentence if the original sentence was false. I have been assuming, that is, that the compositionality thesis applies to references as well as to senses. But Frege pointed out that this did not seem on the face of it to be correct.
正如我所说的,我一直在假设,如果我们在一个句子中用一个共指词替换另一个共指词,如果原来的句子是真的,我们就应该得到一个真句子,如果原来的句子是假的,我们就应该得到一个假句子。也就是说,我一直假定构成性论题既适用于指称,也适用于感觉。但弗雷格指出,从表面上看这似乎并不正确。
Consider the two sentences "I believe that the Morning Star is Venus" and "I believe that the Evening Star is Venus." As we have seen, one of these could be true and the other false. Yet the one sentence is produced from the other by substituting co-referential expressions. We might conclude that it is just wrong to suppose that substitution of co-referring expressions preserves truth value.
请看 "我相信晨星是金星 "和 "我相信晚星是金星 "这两个句子。正如我们所看到的,其中一个可能是真的,另一个可能是假的。然而,其中一个句子是通过替换共指表达式从另一个句子中产生的。我们可以得出这样的结论:认为替换共指表达式可以保持真值是错误的。
What Frege argued, however, was that "one can only justifiably conclude ... that 'the Morning Star' does not always refer to the planet Venus." If, in the sentence "I believe that the Morning Star is Venus" the name "the Morning Star" does not refer to Venus, then, of course, it does not count as a counterexample to the compositionality thesis for reference. But this reply should only satisfy
然而,弗雷格认为,"人们只能合理地得出结论......'晨星'并不总是指金星"。如果在 "我相信晨星是金星 "这个句子中,"晨星 "这个名称并不是指金星,那么,它当然不能算作指称构成论的反例。但这一答复只能满足

us if we have an explanation both of when it does not refer to Venus and why it does not. I will try to offer such an explanation at the end of this section and in the next. Before I do that, let me describe the way Frege set about solving this problem.
如果我们能解释它何时不指金星,以及为什么不指金星。在本节末尾和下一节中,我将尝试给出这样的解释。在此之前,让我先介绍一下弗雷格解决这个问题的方法。
In the sentence 句中
F: The Morning Star is the Evening Star
F: 晨星就是晚星
which we considered earlier, substitution of co-referential expressions, as we saw, preserves truth value. This means that the open sentence
正如我们之前所考虑的,共同指称表达式的替换保留了真值。这意味着开放句
F1: is the Evening Star
F1: 是黄昏之星
will produce a sentence with the same truth value as F, provided we substitute into the blank a word, such as "Venus," that has the same reference as "the Morning Star." An open sentence like this, which produces a sentence with the same truth value whenever we substitute an expression with the same reference for the blank, is called an "extensional context." (Remember, the reference of a predicate was called its extension.)
只要我们在空白处替换一个与 "晨星 "具有相同所指的词,如 "维纳斯",就会产生一个与 F 具有相同真值的句子。这样一个开放式句子,只要我们在空白处替换一个具有相同所指的表达式,就会产生一个具有相同真值的句子,我们称之为 "扩展语境"(extension context)。(请记住,谓词的指称被称为它的外延)。
On the other hand, the open sentence
另一方面,开放式句子

I believe that_—is Venus
我相信那_-是金星

is not an extensional context, as we have seen. If we want to provide terms whose substitution into this blank will preserve truth value, they must be terms with the same sense. Since, as I have said, the sense of a predicate is sometimes called its intension, these are called "intensional contexts." Frege's solution to the problems raised for his basic theory by intensional contexts was very simple. He proposed that in intensional contexts, words and phrases referred not to their normal references but to their senses.
不是扩展语境,我们已经看到了这一点。如果我们想提供一些术语,将它们替换到这个空白中可以保持真值,那么它们必须是具有相同意义的术语。正如我所说的,谓词的意义有时被称作它的内涵,因此这些谓词被称作 "内涵语境"。弗雷格对内维语境给他的基本理论带来的问题的解决办法非常简单。他提出,在内延语境中,词和短语不是指它们的正常指称,而是指它们的意义。
Though this is a very simple solution, it is also rather hard to get a grip on. It follows from this theory, after all, that "the Morning Star" in
虽然这是一个非常简单的解决方案,但也相当难以把握。毕竟,根据这一理论,"晨星 "在
I believe that the Morning Star is Venus
我相信晨星就是金星

refers to the sense of "the Morning Star." So the sense of "the Morning Star" in this sentence is the mode of presentation of the sense that "the Morning Star" has in extensional contexts. It is the sense of a sense.
指的是 "晨星 "的意义。因此,本句中 "晨星 "的意义是 "晨星 "在扩展语境中的意义的呈现方式。它是一种意义的意义。
Put this way, as I say, Frege's proposal is not very easily understood; but we can put Frege's theory in another way, which makes it easier to grasp what he is getting at. He is saying that the contribution that the words "the Morning Star" in "I believe that the Morning Star is Venus" make to determining whether or not that sentence is true depends not only on their reference but also on their sense. And this is surely right. For whether or not I do believe that the Morning Star is Venus depends, in part, on whether I know that the star that sometimes appears at a certain point on the horizon at dawn is Venus; whether I believe it, then, depends on whether I have associated the correct mode of presentation with the words "the Morning Star."
这样说来,正如我所说,弗雷格的提议并不容易理解;但我们可以用另一种方式来表述弗雷格的理论,这样就更容易理解他的意思了。他的意思是说,"我相信晨星是金星 "中的 "晨星 "一词对判断该句子是否为真所做的贡献不仅取决于它们的所指,还取决于它们的意义。这无疑是正确的。因为我是否相信晨星是金星,在一定程度上取决于我是否知道有时在黎明时出现在地平线上某一点的星星是金星;那么,我是否相信晨星是金星,取决于我是否将正确的表述方式与 "晨星 "一词联系起来。
In fact, Frege can offer a general explanation of why "I believe that_is Venus" should create intensional contexts. The effect of interchanging co-referential terms in the blank here is equivalent to interchanging co-referential sentences in the blank of the open sentence "I believe that__." According to Frege, the content of a sentence, the thought it expresses, is its sense. Two sentences with different contents express different beliefs. It is natural, therefore, that interchanging sentences with the same reference but different sense in the context "I believe that__" will sometimes lead us from truth to falsehood.
事实上,弗雷格可以对 "我相信__是维纳斯 "为什么会产生内向语境做出一般解释。在这里的空白处互换共指词语的效果,相当于在开放句 "我相信__"的空白处互换共指句子的效果。弗雷格认为,一个句子的内容,即它所表达的思想,就是它的意义。两个内容不同的句子表达了不同的信念。因此,在 "我相信__"的上下文中,把具有相同指称但不同意义的句子互换一下,有时自然会把我们从真理引向谬误。
Many intensional contexts that involve the attitudes of people to propositions can be explained in this way. People's attitudes to them depend on the thought and not simply on whether it is true. Thus, "I doubt that__," "I hope that__," "I fear that__, "I know that__," "I suppose that__," and so on are all intensional contexts for this reason. These sorts of expressions are the names of what are called "sentential attitudes" or "propositional attitudes," because what fills the blank is a sentence, which expresses a proposition. So Frege's proposal that we should treat the reference of an expression in an intensional context as its sense is a reasonable way of dealing, in the terms of his theory, with intensional contexts involving many of the sentential attitudes.
许多涉及人们对命题的态度的意向性语境都可以这样解释。人们对命题的态度取决于命题的思想,而不仅仅取决于命题是否真实。因此,"我怀疑__"、"我希望__"、"我害怕__"、"我知道__"、"我猜想__"等等都是内涵式语境。这些表达式是所谓 "句子态度 "或 "命题态度 "的名称,因为填补空白的是一个句子,而句子表达的是一个命题。因此,弗雷格提出,我们应该把表达式在内含语境中的指称当作它的意义,这是用他的理论来处理涉及许多句态的内含语境的合理方法。
Unfortunately, however, not all intensional contexts involve sentential attitudes. If, for example, we replace the sentence "It is or is not raining" in "It is necessary that it is or is not raining" with a sentence with the same reference-that is, the same truth value-we will not always get a sentence that is also true. Thus "I like celery" is true, but it is not necessarily true. So we must see, now, if we can explain why "It is necessary that-" creates intensional contexts.
然而,遗憾的是,并非所有的意指语境都涉及句态。例如,如果我们把 "It is or is not raining "中的句子 "It is or is not raining "换成一个具有相同参照的句子--也就是说,具有相同真值的句子--我们并不总是能得到一个同样为真的句子。因此,"我喜欢芹菜 "是真的,但不一定是真的。因此,我们现在必须看看,我们能否解释为什么 "有必要--"会产生内向语境。

3.7 Truth conditions and possible worlds
3.7 真实条件和可能世界

To answer this question, I am going to use a theory about necessity that has been developed in recent years, which starts from an idea of the eighteenth-century German philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. That idea was the idea of a possible world. By a possible world Leibniz meant a way the universe might have been. (Bear in mind that a possible world is not a way the Earth might have been, but a way the whole universe might have been. When I speak of "worlds" in this book, I'll usually mean whole possible universes.) Thus, we all believe President Kennedy might not have been assassinated. So, in Leibniz' way of thinking, there is a possible world that is exactly like our universe until the moment that Kennedy was shot, and then differs from it in all sorts of ways. In fact, there are infinitely many such possible worlds. In some of them Kennedy dies of old age; in others he is assassinated later, and so on. There are infinitely many worlds, because there are infinitely many such things that might have turned out differently.
为了回答这个问题,我将使用近年来发展起来的一种关于必然性的理论,它源于十八世纪德国哲学家戈特弗里德-威廉-莱布尼茨的一个思想。这个思想就是 "可能世界 "的思想。莱布尼茨所说的可能世界指的是宇宙可能存在的一种方式。(请记住,"可能的世界 "并不是地球本来的样子,而是整个宇宙本来的样子。当我在本书中提到 "世界 "时,我通常指的是整个可能的宇宙)。因此,我们都相信肯尼迪总统可能不会被暗杀。因此,按照莱布尼茨的思维方式,有一个可能的世界在肯尼迪被枪杀的那一刻之前与我们的宇宙一模一样,然后又与我们的宇宙有各种各样的不同。事实上,这样的可能世界有无数个。在其中一些世界里,肯尼迪老死;在另一些世界里,他后来被暗杀,等等。之所以有无限多的世界,是因为有无限多这样的事情可能会有不同的结果。
Leibniz was able to use the idea of possible worlds to answer a number of important philosophical questions. In particular, he was able to say what it was for a sentence to be necessarily true. His explanation was that a sentence was necessarily true if it was true in every possible world. There is no way the universe could have been in which a necessary sentence was not true. Thus, " 2 and 2 is 4 " is true in every possible world.
莱布尼兹能够利用可能世界的思想来回答许多重要的哲学问题。尤其是,他能够说出一个句子必然为真的含义。他的解释是,如果一个句子在每一个可能的世界中都是真的,那么这个句子就必然是真的。宇宙中不可能存在一个必然为真的句子。因此,"2 加 2 等于 4 "在每一个可能的世界中都是真的。
Leibniz believed that God, at the Creation, had chosen among all the possible worlds and chosen the best one. (It is from Leibniz that we get the expression "the best of all possible worlds." I'll discuss this thesis again in 8.12, in connection with arguments for the existence of God.) Since he thought that there were no possible worlds in which " 2 and 2 is 4 " is false, he held that even God could not have
莱布尼茨认为,上帝在创世时,从所有可能的世界中选择了最好的一个。(正是从莱布尼茨那里,我们得到了 "所有可能世界中最好的一个 "这一说法。我将在第 8.12 节关于上帝存在的论证中再次讨论这一论点)。由于他认为不存在 "2 和 2 是 4 "为假的可能世界,因此他认为即使上帝也不可能有

created a world in which two and two did not make four. Naturally enough, Leibniz called the universe God in fact created the "actual world." (It's important to be clear, however, that employing the idea of a possible world doesn't commit you to any theological doctrines.)
上帝创造了一个 "二加二不等于四 "的世界。很自然,莱布尼茨把上帝创造的宇宙称为 "现实世界"。(不过,必须明确的是,使用可能世界的概念并不会让你信奉任何神学教义)。
We shall examine some other problems we can treat in terms of possible worlds in the chapters on science and metaphysics. But we can use Leibniz's idea of a possible world here to build on Frege's theory of meaning. Frege said the meaning of a sentence was its truth conditions. We could formulate his theory as saying that what a sentence meant was determined by what the universe would have to be like if it was true. So we might propose, in Leibniz's terminology, that the meaning of a sentence is determined by which possible worlds make it true. How would this theory work out?
我们将在有关科学和形而上学的章节中探讨我们可以用可能世界来处理的其他一些问题。不过,我们可以在此利用莱布尼茨的可能世界思想来建立弗雷格的意义理论。弗雷格说,句子的意义就是它的真理条件。我们可以把他的理论表述为:一个句子的意义取决于如果它是真的,宇宙会是什么样子。因此,我们可以用莱布尼茨的术语提出,一个句子的意义是由哪些可能的世界使它成真决定的。这个理论是如何实现的呢?
Leibniz, as we have seen, thought that all the possible worlds, all the ways the universe might have been, really existed; some other philosophers in recent times have also held this view. It is a difficult question whether possible worlds do exist, and certainly most people find the idea rather counterintuitive. But whether or not you believe in the existence of possible worlds (apart from the actual one), Leibniz's idea provides a very useful way of thinking about reference. For we can translate Frege's theory about reference very easily into Leibniz's imagery.
正如我们所看到的,莱布尼茨认为所有可能的世界,即宇宙可能存在的所有方式,都是真实存在的;近代的其他一些哲学家也持这种观点。可能的世界是否真的存在,这是一个难题,当然,大多数人都觉得这个观点相当反直觉。不过,无论你是否相信可能世界(除了现实世界)的存在,莱布尼茨的观点都为我们提供了一种非常有用的参照思维方式。因为我们可以很容易地将弗雷格的参照理论转化为莱布尼茨的意象。
Take names. Frege said the reference of "Bucephalus" was the horse it referred to. Well, that horse exists in many possible worlds. (Remember what this means: that the universe could have been different in many ways while still containing that horse.) In some of those possible worlds Alexander rides it; in others, Alexander doesn't ride it but instead gives it to his teacher, Aristotle.
取名字。弗雷格说,"Bucephalus "的参照物就是它所指的那匹马。那么,这匹马存在于许多可能的世界中。(记住这句话的意思:宇宙可以有很多不同的方式,但仍然包含那匹马)。在某些可能的世界里,亚历山大骑着它,而在另一些可能的世界里,亚历山大没有骑它,而是把它送给了他的老师亚里士多德。
Take a simple predicate, such as "_——was ridden." Frege said that the reference of this predicate was its extension, the class of things that were ridden. In this world, Bucephalus is in that extension. But if he had stayed wild on the plains of Macedonia, he would not have been. So there is a possible world in which Bucephalus is not in the extension of "——was ridden," and in that possible world the sentence "Bucephalus was ridden" is false. In fact, there are many possible worlds in which Bucephalus was not ridden. In some he stays in Macedonia; in others he gallops off into Russia.
以一个简单的谓词为例,如"_--被人骑过"。弗雷格说,这个谓词的所指是它的外延,也就是被骑的那一类事物。在这个世界上,Bucephalus 就属于这个外延。但是,如果他一直在马其顿平原上疯跑,他就不会是这样。因此,在一个可能的世界里,Bucephalus 不在"--被骑 "的外延中,而在那个可能的世界里,"Bucephalus 被骑 "这个句子是假的。事实上,有许多可能的世界,其中布赛佛勒斯没有被骑。在一些可能的世界里,他留在了马其顿;在另一些可能的世界里,他飞奔到了俄罗斯。
The general idea of explaining reference in terms of possible
从可能的角度解释参照系统的总体思路

worlds is simple: a subject-predicate sentence is true in a world if and only if the referent of the subject is in the extension of the predicate in that world. For a sentence to be true in the actual worldin other words, for it to be simply true-the referent of the subject must be in the extension of the predicate in this universe.
世界是简单的:一个主谓句在一个世界中是真的,当且仅当主语的指称位于谓语在该世界中的外延中。要使一个句子在现实世界中为真,换句话说,要使它简单地为真,主语的指称必须在谓语在这个宇宙中的外延中。
Using the idea of possible worlds in this way to understand reference and meaning is called "possible-world semantics." Given this possible-world semantics for reference, we can understand at once why "It is necessary that__" produces an intensional context. For this semantics says that
以这种方式使用可能世界的概念来理解指称和意义被称为 "可能世界语义学"。有了这种关于指称的可能世界语义学,我们就可以立刻理解为什么 "有必要__"会产生内向语境。因为这种语义学认为
: It is necessary that 2 and 2 is 4
:2 和 2 必须是 4
is true if and only if
当且仅当

S: 2 and 2 is 4
S:2 和 2 是 4

is true in every possible world. If we substitute for another sentence with the same reference, then we are simply substituting a sentence that is true in the actual world. So there is no guarantee that, in this context, substituting co-referring expressions will preserve the truth of .
在每一个可能的世界中都是真实的。如果我们把 换成另一个具有相同参照的句子,那么我们只是换成了一个在实际世界中为真的句子。因此,在这种情况下,并不能保证替换共指表达式就能保持 的真实性。
So far as reference is concerned, then, the possible-world semantics is easy. But what about sense? We have already seen that it is natural to say that the meaning of a sentence is determined by which possible worlds make it true. Put another way, this means that the meaning of a sentence is determined by what its reference is in every possible world. For since the reference of a sentence is a truth value, once we know whether or not a sentence is true in a world, we know what its reference is in that world. It seems that the natural way, therefore, of treating the senses of words and phrases is to say that their senses are determined by what their references are in each possible world. I am going to follow this idea through for a moment. But, as we shall see in the next section, it turns out that it is not quite right to say that the sense of an expression is determined by its reference in every possible world.
那么,就参照而言,可能世界语义很简单。那么意义呢?我们已经看到,可以很自然地说,一个句子的意义是由哪些可能世界使它成真决定的。换句话说,这意味着一个句子的意义是由它在每个可能世界中的所指决定的。因为句子的参照是一个真值,一旦我们知道了一个句子在某个世界中是否为真,我们就知道了它在那个世界中的参照是什么。因此,处理词和短语的意义的自然方法似乎是说,它们的意义是由它们在每个可能世界中的所指决定的。我想先跟进一下这个想法。但是,正如我们将在下一节看到的那样,说一个表达式的意义是由它在每一个可能世界中的所指决定的,这种说法并不完全正确。
To know the meaning of "Bucephalus," on this theory, would be to know what the reference of "Bucephalus" was in every possible
根据这一理论,要想知道 "Bucephalus "的含义,就必须知道 "Bucephalus "在各种可能的情况下的所指。

world. So to determine the meaning of "Bucephalus" would be to identify the referent of "Bucephalus" in the actual world and its referent in every other world as well. To know the meaning of " was ridden" would be to know what the extension of that predicate was in every possible world: to know that in any world the class of things that was ridden was the extension of the predicate " was ridden." So to determine the meaning of "——was ridden" is to identify the extension of "__ was ridden" in this world along with the extension of "__ was ridden" in every other world.
因此,要确定 "Bucephalus "的含义,就必须确定 "Bucephalus "在现实世界中的所指,以及它在其他世界中的所指。因此,要确定 "Bucephalus "的含义,就必须确定 "Bucephalus "在现实世界中的所指,以及它在所有其他世界中的所指。要知道 "被骑 "的含义,就必须知道这个谓词在每一个可能的世界中的外延是什么:知道在任何一个世界中,被骑的那类事物就是 "被骑 "这个谓词的外延。因此,要确定"--被骑 "的含义,就是要确定"__被骑 "在这个世界中的外延,以及"__被骑 "在所有其他世界中的外延。
Though this is, indeed, a natural way to apply possible-world thinking to Frege's theory of meaning, it turns out that this way of thinking about sense and reference is not equivalent to Frege's. (Indeed, Frege never dealt with possible worlds, even though Leibniz had already proposed them as a way of thinking about necessity and possibility.) For this reason, I shall say that the possible-world explanation gives words and sentences not senses but "intensions," using what has now come to be the standard term. The intension of a word is determined once we fix its reference in every possible world. Intensions, unlike senses, are not meanings, which is why I said earlier it is confusing that the sense of a predicate is sometimes called its intension. To understand the distinction between senses and intensions, we must return to Leibniz' answer to this question: What is it for a sentence to be necessarily true?
尽管这的确是将可能世界思维应用于弗雷格意义理论的一种自然方式,但事实证明,这种关于意义和指称的思维方式并不等同于弗雷格的思维方式。(事实上,弗雷格从未涉及过可能世界,尽管莱布尼茨已经提出了可能世界作为一种关于必然性和可能性的思维方式)。因此,我要说,可能世界的解释给予词和句子的不是意义,而是 "意向"(intension),使用的是现已成为标准的术语。一旦我们确定了一个词在每一个可能世界中的所指,它的义项就确定了。引申义与感官不同,它不是意义,这就是为什么我在前面说过,一个谓词的感官有时被称作它的引申义,这是令人困惑的。要理解意义和意图的区别,我们必须回到莱布尼茨对这个问题的回答:什么是句子必然为真呢?

3.8 Analytic-synthetic and necessary-contingent
3.8 分析-合成和必要条件

As we saw, Leibniz said that a sentence was necessarily true if it was true in every possible world. We can use this fact as a basis for a reductio of the idea that intensions are meanings. According to the proposal that intensions are meanings, the meaning of a name is fixed once we know what it refers to in every possible world.
正如我们所看到的,莱布尼茨说过,如果一个句子在每一个可能的世界中都是真的,那么它就必然是真的。我们可以利用这一事实作为还原 "意图即意义 "这一观点的基础。根据 "意指即意义 "的提议,一旦我们知道一个名字在每一个可能的世界中指的是什么,那么它的意义就是固定不变的。
Let's consider, then, what the intension of "the Morning Star" is. Well, it turns out that in every possible world "the Morning Star" refers to the Evening Star. If we consider a way the universe might have been in which the Morning Star is in various ways different, that is the same thing as considering a way the universe might have been in which the Evening Star is different.
那么,让我们考虑一下 "晨星 "的含义是什么。事实证明,在每一个可能的世界里,"晨星 "都是指黄昏之星。如果我们考虑宇宙可能存在的一种方式,即晨星在各种方面有所不同,这与考虑宇宙可能存在的一种方式,即黄昏之星有所不同是一回事。
You might think this was wrong. Surely it is possible, you might say, that the Morning Star should not have been the Evening Star.
你可能会认为这是不对的。你可能会说,晨星当然有可能不是晚星。
But think about it for a moment. Since the Evening Star is the Morning Star, what is it that you are supposing might not have been the Evening Star? Of course, the Evening Star might not have been visible on the horizon at dawn. So there is a possible world in which the Evening Star doesn't appear on the horizon at dawn. But that is a possible world in which the Morning Star doesn't appear on the horizon at dawn, either. In that world, the Evening Star might never have come to be called "the Morning Star." Because there is such a possible world, the sentence
但请你想一想。既然黄昏之星就是晨星,那么你认为可能不是黄昏之星的是什么呢?当然,黎明时地平线上可能看不到黄昏之星。因此,在一个可能的世界里,黎明时的地平线上可能看不到黄昏之星。但在这个可能的世界里,晨星也不会在黎明时出现在地平线上。在那个世界里,晚星可能永远都不会被称为 "晨星"。因为存在这样一个可能的世界,所以句子

The Morning Star might not have been called "the Morning Star"
晨星可能不叫 "晨星"

is true. But in our language, in this world, the Morning Star is called "the Morning Star." And the thing that our expression "the Morning Star" refers to is the same thing in every possible world as the thing that "the Evening Star" refers to. It follows, of course, that the sentence
是真的。但在我们的语言中,在这个世界上,晨星被称为 "晨星"。而我们所说的 "晨星 "与 "黄昏之星 "所指的事物在每一个可能的世界里都是相同的。当然,句子

F: The Morning Star is the Evening Star
F: 晨星就是晚星

is true in every possible world, and thus necessary. The fact that true identity statements between names are all necessarily true is called the necessity of identity. It is the necessity of identity that leads to the conclusion that intensions are not meanings.
在每一个可能的世界中都是真的,因此是必然的。名称之间真正的同一性陈述都必然为真,这一事实被称为同一性的必然性。正是同一性的必然性得出了意图不是意义的结论。
For, remember, the meaning of a sentence is what you have to know in order to understand it. If intensions were meanings, therefore, anyone who knew the meaning of the names in a language would be in a position to know the truth of every identity statement involving names. But, as Frege pointed out, F, which is an identity statement involving names, is not a piece of semantic knowledge, but a great astronomical discovery. This argument provides a reductio of the claim that intensions are meanings.
因为,请记住,一个句子的意义是你要理解它所必须知道的。因此,如果意图就是意义,那么任何知道语言中名称意义的人都能知道每一个涉及名称的同一性陈述的真假。但是,正如弗雷格所指出的,F 是一个涉及名称的同一性陈述,它不是语义知识,而是一个伟大的天文发现。这个论证还原了意图就是意义的说法。
There is another important reason why this theory is wrong. If intensions were meanings, then the meaning of a sentence would be determined by the class of possible worlds in which it was true. So any sentences that were true in just the same possible worlds would have the same meaning.
这一理论之所以是错误的,还有一个重要原因。如果意图就是意义,那么一个句子的意义将由它为真的可能世界的类别决定。因此,任何在相同的可能世界中为真的句子都具有相同的意义。
This would have very bizarre consequences. It would mean, for one thing, that every necessarily true sentence had the same meaning. So " 2 and 2 is 4 " would mean the same as " 16 and 16 is 32. ." More than this, any two contingent sentences that were true in just the same possible worlds would have the same meaning. Thus, not only would "The Evening Star is often visible on the horizon at dusk" mean the same as "Venus is often visible on the horizon at dusk," but "John is a bachelor" would mean the same as "John is a bachelor and 2 and 2 is 4 "!
这会产生非常奇怪的后果。首先,这意味着每个必然为真的句子都具有相同的含义。因此,"2 和 2 等于 4 "与 "16 和 16 等于 32。."不仅如此,任何两个在相同的可能世界中为真的或然句都具有相同的含义。因此,不仅 "黄昏时分地平线上经常可以看到黄昏之星 "与 "黄昏时分地平线上经常可以看到金星 "的含义相同,而且 "约翰是个单身汉 "与 "约翰是个单身汉,2 和 2 等于 4 "的含义也相同!
These are the two main sorts of reasons why we have to distinguish between senses and intensions. In 3.4 I said it was going to prove important that sense be defined as what you had to know to understand a sentence. Sense, Frege insisted, is a cognitive idea. ("Cognitive" just means "having to do with knowledge.") If two names, "a" and "b," have the same sense, then anyone who knows their senses - anyone who understands how those names function in the language — will know that "a is b" is true. But an intension is not a cognitive idea. From the fact that two names, "a" and "b," have the same intension, it does not follow that people who understand the language will know that "a is b" is true.
这就是我们必须区分意义和意图的两个主要原因。在 3.4 中,我说过,将感性定义为理解一个句子所必须知道的东西,这一点将被证明是很重要的。弗雷格坚持认为,意义是一种认知观念。(如果 "a "和 "b "这两个名称具有相同的意义,那么任何了解它们的意义的人--任何了解这些名称在语言中的作用的人--都会知道 "a is b "是真的。但是,意指并不是一种认知观念。从 "a "和 "b "这两个名称具有相同的义项这一事实出发,并不能推导出理解语言的人会知道 "a is b "是真的。
What is true in every possible world, then, is what is necessary. And we use the word "contingent" to refer to things that are true in only some possible worlds. Thus, it is a contingent fact that cucumbers are green, because they might not have been green. That is equivalent to saying that the universe could have been different in such a way that cucumbers were some other color; it is also equivalent to saying that there are possible worlds in which cucumbers aren't green.
那么,在每一个可能的世界中都为真的东西就是必然的东西。我们用 "或然 "一词来指那些只在某些可能的世界中为真的事物。因此,黄瓜是绿色的是一个偶然的事实,因为它们本来可能不是绿色的。这等同于说,宇宙本来可能是不同的,以至于黄瓜是其他颜色;这也等同于说,存在黄瓜不是绿色的可能世界。
It is crucially important to notice that whether a sentence is necessary is not the same question as whether anyone who knows the meaning must know (or be able to work out) that that sentence is true without relying on any nonsemantic information. For this reason we need another word to describe sentences whose truth does follow, in this way, from their meaning. We call such sentences "analytic," using a word that the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant introduced with this meaning. A true sentence that is not analytic is called a "synthetic" truth.
至关重要的是,我们要注意到,一个句子是否有必要,与知道其含义的人是否必须知道(或能够知道)这个句子不依赖任何非语义信息而为真,并不是同一个问题。因此,我们需要另一个词来描述这样的句子,即其真理性确实是由其意义决定的。我们使用德国伟大哲学家伊曼纽尔-康德(Immanuel Kant)提出的一个具有这种含义的词,将这类句子称为 "分析性 "句子。非分析性的真句被称为 "合成 "真句。
We have already seen that there are necessary truths-"The
我们已经看到,有一些必然的真理--"真理 "和 "真理 "是相通的。
Morning Star is the Evening Star," for example-that are not analytic. But it is also true that there are contingent truths that are analytic. Thus, everybody who knows English and understands what "centigrade" means, in particular, knows that "Water freezes at sea level at zero degrees centigrade" is true, because zero degrees on the centigrade scale is defined as the freezing point of water at sea level. But it isn't necessarily true that water freezes at zero degrees centigrade: there are possible worlds in which it freezes at a higher temperature.
例如,"晨星就是晚星"--就不是分析性的。但是,也有一些偶然的真理是可以分析的。因此,每个懂英语并理解 "摄氏度 "含义的人都知道,"水在海平面摄氏零度结冰 "是真的,因为摄氏零度被定义为水在海平面的凝固点。但是,水在摄氏零度结冰并不一定是真的:有可能在更高的温度下结冰。
In the last chapter I said that rationalists thought that we could know necessary truths, because we could come to know them by reasoning, which is the only source of certainty. But, as we have now seen, this is not true. We can find out analytic truths by reasoning; but not all necessary truths are analytic, and not all analytic truths are necessary. We use the Latin expression "a priori" to refer to truths that can be known by reason alone. In a sense, they can be known prior to any particular experience. A posteriori truths are those that require more than reason to discover. In a sense, they can be known only after (that is, posterior to) experience. The rationalists assumed that all necessary truths were a priori and all a priori truths were necessary.
我在上一章中说过,理性主义者认为我们可以认识必然真理,因为我们可以通过推理来认识它们,而推理是确定性的唯一来源。但是,正如我们现在所看到的,事实并非如此。我们可以通过推理找出分析真理;但并非所有必然真理都是分析真理,也并非所有分析真理都是必然真理。我们用拉丁语 "先验 "来指那些仅凭理性就能知道的真理。从某种意义上说,它们可以在任何特定经验之前被认识。后验真理是指那些需要理性以外的力量才能发现的真理。从某种意义上说,它们只有在经验之后(即后验之后)才能被认识。理性主义者假定所有必然的真理都是先验的,所有先验的真理都是必然的。
Because the meaning of a sentence is known to everybody who understands it, anybody who understands a sentence that is analytic can work out that it is true. So, provided you understand an analytic sentence, its truth, for you, is an a priori matter. Whether every a priori truth is analytic is a disputed question. But you might think that while mathematical theorems, which can be proved, are a priori, they are not true simply in virtue of the meanings of the terms they contain, because not everyone who understands the terms can work out the theorems. (I'll say more about this in 3.13.) Certainly, however, not every analytic truth is necessary, as we have just seen. Finally, there remains the possibility that some a posteriori truths are necessary, such as "The Morning Star is the Evening Star."
因为句子的意思是每个理解它的人都知道的,所以任何理解一个分析句子的人都能知道它是真的。因此,只要你理解一个分析句子,它的真理对你来说就是一个先验的问题。是否每个先验真理都是可分析的,这是一个有争议的问题。但你可能会认为,虽然可以证明的数学定理是先验的,但它们并不只是因为其中包含的术语的含义而为真,因为并不是每个理解这些术语的人都能算出这些定理。(当然,正如我们刚才所看到的,并不是每一个分析真理都是必然的。最后,还有一种可能性,即某些后验真理是必然的,比如 "晨星就是晚星"。
It is essential, therefore, as I said a little earlier, to keep questions about whether truths are analytic or a priori, on one hand, distinct from questions about whether they are necessary, on the other. That is one reason I have taken such trouble to use possible worlds to explain the relations between them. But there is another reason. Though we cannot use possible worlds in this way to explain the
因此,正如我在前面所说的,必须把关于真理是否是分析的或先验的问题与关于真理是否是必然的问题区分开来。这就是我不厌其烦地使用可能世界来解释它们之间关系的原因之一。但还有另一个原因。虽然我们不能以这种方式用可能世界来解释
Necessary Analytic A priori "Bachelors are unmarried."
"单身汉都是未婚的"
Contingent Analytic A priori
“Water freezes at zero
"水在零度结冰
degrees centigrade." 摄氏度"。
Necessary Synthetic A priori
Any (complex) 任何(复杂)
mathematical theorem. 数学定理
Contingent Synthetic A priori
Necessary Analytic A posteriori
Contingent Analytic A posteriori
Necessary Synthetic A posteriori
"The Morning Star is the
"晨星是
Evening Star." 黄昏之星"。
Contingent Synthetic A posteriori
“It's raining in your
"你的
favorite city." 最喜欢的城市"。
Relationships among necessary-contingent, analytic-synthetic,
必要--条件、分析--综合之间的关系、
and a priori-a posteriori.
和先验-后验。
meanings of words, we can use them for another highly important philosophical task that has to do with language. And that task is understanding the nature of arguments.
在理解了词义之后,我们就可以利用它们来完成另一项与语言有关的极为重要的哲学任务。这项任务就是理解论证的本质。

3.9 Natural language and logical form
3.9 自然语言和逻辑形式

The study of arguments is logic, and beginning with the work of Frege, very great strides have been made in this subject. In the work of philosophers after Frege, the excitement that followed their logical discoveries led them to find-like Aristotle more than two millennia before-that the nature and status of logical truths is a topic of intrinsic interest. Building on their theories, we can deepen our understanding of how arguments work.
对论证的研究就是逻辑学,从弗雷格的研究开始,这门学科取得了长足的进步。在弗雷格之后的哲学家的研究中,他们在逻辑学上的发现所带来的兴奋,使他们像两千多年前的亚里士多德一样,发现逻辑真理的性质和地位是一个具有内在意义的话题。以他们的理论为基础,我们可以加深对论证如何发挥作用的理解。
Here, then, are some of the basic ideas of logic. An argument is a sequence of declarative sentences that leads us to a final sentence, which is the conclusion. The other sentences, the premises, are
下面是逻辑学的一些基本思想。论证是一连串的陈述句,它引导我们得出最后一句话,也就是结论。其他句子,即前提,是

supposed to support the conclusion. An argument is valid when any situation that makes the premises true makes the conclusion true also. If an argument is valid, we say that the conclusion follows from-or is a (deductive) consequence of-the premises. Logicians are especially interested in arguments that are formally valid. These are arguments where a sentence with the form of the conclusion must be true if the members of a class of sentences with the forms of the premises are true. Such arguments are also said to have a valid form. The idea of the form of a sentence is thus crucial to an understanding of logical theory. In order to explain what form is, I shall now make explicit an idea that we have been using implicitly throughout this chapter.
应该支持结论。如果任何情况下前提为真,那么结论也为真,这样的论证就是有效的。如果一个论证是有效的,我们就说结论是从前提得出的,或者说是前提的(演绎)结果。逻辑学家对形式上有效的论证特别感兴趣。在这些论证中,如果具有前提形式的一类句子的成员为真,那么具有结论形式的句子就一定为真。这类论证也被称为形式有效论证。因此,句子形式的概念对于理解逻辑理论至关重要。为了解释什么是形式,我现在要明确提出我们在本章中一直隐含使用的一个概念。
When I was discussing Frege's semantic theory, I talked about names and predicates and sentences, which are linguistic items, and discussed their connection with objects and properties and truths, which are things in the world. When we talk about the words and expressions that make up the sentence and the order in which they occur, we are talking about syntax. So among the syntactic properties of the sentence "Snow is white" are
在讨论弗雷格的语义理论时,我谈到了名称、谓词和句子这些语言项目,并讨论了它们与对象、属性和真理这些世界上的事物之间的联系。当我们谈论组成句子的词和表达式以及它们出现的顺序时,我们谈论的是句法。因此,"雪是白色的 "这个句子的句法属性包括
a) that its first word is "snow"
a) 它的第一个词是 "雪"
b) that the predicate is "is white"
b) 谓语是 "是白色的"
c) that it is three words long.
c) 长度为三个单词。
The idea of form is essentially the idea of syntax.
形式的概念本质上就是句法的概念。
In logic, then, what we seek to do is to identify those arguments that are reliable because of the syntax of the premises and the conclusion. So we want to identify patterns of argument that will work, whatever the particular content of the sentences. Just as we used variables earlier to stand in for names, so we can use sentential variables to stand in for sentences in order to make generalizations about arguments. Thus, using " " and " " to stand for sentences, we can say that an argument from a sentence of the form " and " to the conclusion " " is reliable because it is not possible for " and " to be true when " " is false. It is because we are interested in the form, the shape, of valid arguments, not in the particular contents of the sentences that make them up, that logic is sometimes called "formal logic."
因此,在逻辑学中,我们要做的就是找出那些因前提和结论的句法而可靠的论证。因此,无论句子的内容如何,我们都要找出行之有效的论证模式。就像我们前面用变量来表示人名一样,我们也可以用句子变量来表示句子,以便对论证进行归纳。因此,用 " "和 " "来代表句子,我们可以说,从 " "这种形式的句子到结论 " "的论证是可靠的,因为当 " "为假时," "不可能为真。正是因为我们感兴趣的是有效论证的形式,而不是构成论证的句子的具体内容,所以逻辑有时被称为 "形式逻辑"。
So far I have been talking about the natural languages that human cultures have developed for communication. But in order to study the issues about argument that are central to logic, philosophers and linguists have developed various artificial languages. When I wrote "S and T" just now, I was already moving away from natural languages toward the sorts of artificial languages that logicians have developed to study arguments. The use of symbols such as sentential variables has a number of advantages. One is that it allows us to see very clearly how the form of an argument affects its validity. Another is that it allows us to escape some of the vagueness and imprecision of natural languages. But to use the artificial languages of formal logic we have to start by being clear about what we are developing them for. And if we are to be clear about this, it is very important to be clear about what is meant by the form of an argument in natural language.
到目前为止,我一直在谈论人类文化为交流而发展的自然语言。但是,为了研究作为逻辑核心的论证问题,哲学家和语言学家开发了各种人工语言。当我刚才写 "S 和 T "时,我已经从自然语言转向了逻辑学家为研究论证而开发的人工语言。使用句法变量等符号有很多好处。其一,它能让我们非常清楚地看到论证的形式是如何影响其有效性的。另一个好处是,它可以让我们摆脱自然语言的某些模糊性和不精确性。但是,要使用形式逻辑的人工语言,我们必须首先明确我们开发这些语言的目的。如果我们要明确这一点,那么明确自然语言中论证形式的含义就非常重要。
So let's consider an example. Take a sentence we've looked at before, and a conclusion we could draw from it.
因此,让我们举个例子。以我们之前看过的一个句子为例,我们可以从中得出一个结论。
Premise: S: John and Mary, who are friends of Peter's, sat in
前提:S:约翰和马利亚是彼得的朋友,他们坐在彼得的座位上。

the garden and ate strawberries.
在花园里吃草莓
Conclusion: T: Somebody ate strawberries.
结论T:有人吃了草莓。
Here there is one premise, and the conclusion certainly seems to follow. But it is also formally valid. According to the definition I just gave, this means that a sentence of the form of the conclusion must be true if a sentence of the form of the premise is. So what are the forms of these sentences?
这里只有一个前提,结论当然似乎是顺理成章的。但它在形式上也是有效的。根据我刚才给出的定义,这意味着如果前提形式的句子为真,那么结论形式的句子也一定为真。那么,这些句子的形式是什么呢?
One way to get a clearer picture of what is meant by the form of a sentence is to go back to considering Frege's open sentences. We get open sentences by removing the names from complete sentences. We can then say that the sentence is "composed from" the names and the open sentence. (As before, we label the blanks with variables, one for each name we remove.) , the premise in this argument, is composed from the names "John," "Mary," and "Peter," and the open sentence
要想更清楚地了解句子形式的含义,一个办法就是回到弗雷格的开放句子。我们把完整句子中的名称去掉,就得到了开放句子。这样我们就可以说,句子是由名称和开放句 "组成 "的。(和以前一样,我们在空白处标上变量,每去掉一个名字就标上一个变量。) ,这个论证的前提是由 "约翰"、"玛丽 "和 "彼得 "这三个名字以及开放句组成的。
and , who are friends of Z's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries.
和 是 Z 的朋友,他们坐在花园里吃草莓。
Using the variables as labels, we can say that "John" is in the Xposition, "Mary" in the Y-position, and so on.
使用变量作为标签,我们可以说 "约翰 "在 X 位置,"玛丽 "在 Y 位置,以此类推。
Now, there is nothing to stop us from removing words other than names. Just as we can have variables for names, we could have variables for nouns and for any other words. Thus we could say that is made up of the three names, the noun "friends," and the expression
现在,没有什么可以阻止我们删除除姓名以外的单词。正如我们可以为名字设置变量一样,我们也可以为名词和任何其他词设置变量。因此,我们可以说 是由三个名字、名词 "朋友 "和表达式组成的

and , who are of 's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries.
的 和 坐在花园里吃草莓。

This time we can use the label "F" to say that, in S, "friends" is in the F-position of this formula. "F" is a noun variable, just as " " is a variable for names. So we can generalize the idea of an open sentence to mean anything produced by replacing words with variables.
这一次,我们可以用标签 "F "来表示,在 S 中,"朋友 "位于这个公式的 F 位置。F "是一个名词变量,就像 " "是一个人名变量一样。因此,我们可以将开放式句子的概念推广到用变量替换词语所产生的任何意思。
Notice that when we remove a word from a sentence to replace it with a variable, the open sentence we are left with can be used to make a different sentence. So we could make
请注意,当我们从句子中去掉一个词,用一个变量取而代之时,剩下的开放句子可以用来造一个不同的句子。因此,我们可以用

: Peter and Mary, who are friends of John's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries
彼得和马利亚是约翰的朋友,他们坐在花园里吃草莓。

from and the same names, if we just put the names in different variable positions. What and have in common is the fact that they are composed from the open sentence . When we say that sentences share a certain form, we mean they can be composed from the same open sentence. In other words, we can use the idea of being composed from the same open sentence to describe aspects of the syntax that certain sentences share.
如果我们只是将名称放在不同的变量位置上,就可以从 中找到相同的名称。 的共同点在于它们都是由开放句 组成的。当我们说句子共享某种形式时,我们的意思是它们可以由同一个开放句组成。换句话说,我们可以用 "由同一个开放句组成 "来描述某些句子共享的句法方面。
Among the less interesting facts about the form of is the fact that it is a sentence. This simply means that we could remove all the words and replace them with the single variable that we earlier called a sentential variable. All sentences share this formal feature: they can all be composed by replacing a string of blanks with a string of words. We can make an open sentence by removing all the words from a sentence of English and then make another sentence by putting in another lot of words (though, of course, the rules of English syntax determine which strings of words make up meaningful sentences).
关于 的形式,一个不太有趣的事实是它是一个句子。这仅仅意味着我们可以去掉所有的单词,代之以我们之前称之为句式变量的单一变量。所有句子都有这个形式特征:它们都可以通过用一串词替换一串空来组成。我们可以通过去掉英语句子中的所有单词来组成一个开放式句子,然后通过放入另一批单词来组成另一个句子(当然,英语句法规则决定了哪些单词串可以组成有意义的句子)。
But sentences share more interesting aspects of form than the fact that they are sentences: for example, the formal property shared by all the sentences that can be made from by replacing the variables with names.
但是,句子除了是句子这一事实之外,还有更多有趣的形式方面:例如,所有句子都有一个共同的形式属性,那就是通过将变量替换为名称,可以从 生成句子。
We can now reexamine the argument from
我们现在可以重新审视以下论点
S: John and Mary, who are friends of Peter's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries
S:约翰和玛丽是彼得的朋友,他们坐在花园里吃草莓
to
T: Somebody ate strawberries
T:有人吃了草莓
in the light of this discussion of form. What aspect of the form of the premise and the conclusion makes the argument valid? The sentence is composed of three names (let's call them " , , " ," and " "), two one-place predicates (let's call them " ", for "sat in the garden," and "A", for "ate strawberries), and a two-place predicate ("F" for "is a friend of".) What it says is, in effect,
根据对形式的讨论。前提和结论的哪方面形式使论证有效?这个句子由三个名称(分别是 " , , ," 和 " ")、两个一格谓词(分别是表示 "坐在花园里 "的 " "和表示 "吃草莓 "的 "A")和一个两格谓词(表示 "是......的朋友 "的 "F")组成。这个句子实际上是说:
and .
和 。
Since we can replace any sentence of the form " " with a sentential variable (because every conjunction of sentences is itself a sentence), repeated applications of this rule will allow us to say that this sentence is of the form
由于我们可以用一个句子变量来替换任何形式为 " "的句子(因为每个句子的连词本身就是一个句子),所以反复应用这一规则,我们就可以说这个句子的形式是

where " " is a sentential variable, " " is a predicate, and " " is a name. So one very general answer is that the inference we are analyzing is an example of an inference from a sentence of the form
其中 " " 是一个句式变量," " 是一个谓词," " 是一个名称。因此,一个非常笼统的答案是,我们正在分析的推理是一个从以下形式的句子中推理出来的例子
Premise:  前提是
to a sentence of the form
的句子
Conclusion: Somebody P. 结论:有人 P.
Now, the reason why the argument is valid is that every argument of this form is valid. This allows us to record a very broad generalization about many possible arguments.
现在,论证之所以有效,是因为这种形式的每个论证都是有效的。这样,我们就可以对许多可能的论证进行非常广泛的概括。
This is not the only way in which an argument of this form can be shown to be valid, however. Thus, any inference from a sentence of the form of
然而,这并不是证明这种形式的论证有效的唯一方法。因此,从以下形式的句子中得出的任何推论都是有效的
and , who are friends of Z's, sat in the garden and ate strawberries
和 是 Z 的朋友,他们坐在花园里吃草莓
to
Conclusion: Somebody ate strawberries
结论有人吃了草莓
is valid too. However we fill in the , and places, if the resulting sentence is true, the conclusion must be true also. So this is one way of making a narrower generalization about which arguments are valid. But logicians focus their interest on a special group of formal properties of sentences and study how the presence of those formal properties affects the validity of arguments.
也是有效的。无论我们如何填写 ,以及 ,如果得出的句子是真的,那么结论也一定是真的。因此,这是对哪些论证有效进行狭义概括的一种方法。但是,逻辑学家将他们的兴趣集中在一组特殊的句子形式属性上,并研究这些形式属性的存在如何影响论证的有效性。
One example of this sort of study is sentential logic (or propositional logic), which makes generalizations about how the presence of the words "and," "not," "or," and "if" in sentences affects arguments. To do this, sentential logic uses sentential variables of the sort I introduced just now, but it also moves further in the direction of a purely artificial language by replacing the English words "and," "or," and "not" with the symbols " ", "V", and " ", and the words "If . . then ... " with " ". A typical (and not very exciting) claim of sentential logic is that every argument of the form
这种研究的一个例子是句式逻辑(或命题逻辑),它对句子中 "和"、"不"、"或 "和 "如果 "等词的存在如何影响论证进行了概括。为此,句式逻辑使用了我刚才介绍过的那种句式变量,但它也进一步朝着纯人工语言的方向发展,用符号 " "、"V "和 " " 代替了英语单词 "和"、"或 "和 "不",用 " If ... then ... " 代替了 "If ."用 " " 表示。句法逻辑的一个典型(但并不令人兴奋)说法是,每一个形式为
Premises:  房舍:
S
Conclusion:  结论
is valid. This form of argument actually has a name. It's called "modus ponens." Whatever sentences you put in place of "S" and
是有效的。这种论证方式其实是有名字的。叫做 "模态论证"。无论你用什么句子来代替 "S "和
"T," provided you follow this rule, if the premises are true, the conclusion is also. (If you replace " " in the first premise with a sentence, you must replace it with the same sentence in the second premise and the conclusion.) "And," "or," and "if" are called connectives, because they are used to connect sentences to each other. "S and " is called the conjunction of " " and " "; " or " is called the disjunction of " " and "T"; and "If , then " is called a conditional with " " as antecedent and " " as consequent.
"T",只要你遵循这个规则,如果前提是真的,结论也是真的。(如果把第一个前提中的 " "换成一个句子,那么在第二个前提和结论中也必须换成同样的句子)。"而且"、"或者 "和 "如果 "被称为连接词,因为它们用于将句子相互连接起来。"S 和 "称为 " "和 " "的连词;" "称为 " "和 "T "的析词;"如果 ,那么 "称为条件句," "是前件," "是后件。
"Not," of course, isn't literally a connective: it applies to one sentence at a time, so there isn't a second sentence to connect. But it is a natural generalization of the idea of a connective that there are one-place (or unary) connectives, corresponding to the two-place (or binary) connectives like "and." Among the other unary connectives will be "It's necessary that," for example. We can also call unary connectives "sentence-forming operators on sentences": if you put "not" into one sentence in the right place, thus operating on that sentence, you get another, different sentence. Thus, we can go from "It's snowing" to "It's not snowing." "It's not snowing" is called the negation of "It's snowing." Since, in English, you can get a sentence equivalent to the negation of any sentence, , by writing "It is not true that-" in front of , we often write "not-S" as shorthand for the form of the negation of . But, of course, in the artificial language of propositional logic we can simply write " S."
当然,"不是 "并不是字面上的连接词:它一次只适用于一个句子,因此没有第二个句子可以连接。但是,连接词的概念可以自然地概括为单位(或一元)连接词,与 "和 "这样的双位(或二元)连接词相对应。例如,"有必要这样做 "就是其他的一元连接词。我们也可以把一元连接词称为 "句子上的造句运算符":如果把 "不 "放在一个句子的适当位置,从而对该句子进行运算,就会得到另一个不同的句子。因此,我们可以从 "下雪了 "变成 "没下雪"。"It's not snowing "被称为 "It's snowing "的否定。在英语中,只要在 前面写上 "It is not true that--",就可以得到一个相当于任何句子的否定的句子 ,因此,我们经常写 "not-S "来速记 的否定形式。当然,在命题逻辑的人工语言中,我们可以简单地写成 " S"。
Predicate logic builds on sentential logic. It studies the way in which the quantifiers "all" and "some" affect validity. Thus, the inference
谓词逻辑以句法逻辑为基础。它研究量词 "所有 "和 "一些 "影响有效性的方式。因此,推理
Premise: X P
Conclusion: Somebody P,
is an instance of a simple result in predicate logic. Here we have variables for names and for predicates, not for sentences, and the quantifier "somebody." First-order predicate logic involves quantifiers whose variables refer to individuals; in second-order logic we deal with quantifiers that refer to sets of individuals, or predicates, as well. We were using the ideas of second-order logic in Chapter 1, when we constructed the Ramsey-sentences using the existential quantifier "There exists an such that ...," because some of the
是谓词逻辑中一个简单结果的实例。在这里,变量指的是名字和谓词,而不是句子,还有量词 "某人"。一阶谓词逻辑涉及变量指代个体的量词;在二阶逻辑中,我们处理的量词也指代个体集合或谓词。在第 1 章中,当我们使用存在量词 "存在一个 ,这样 ...... "来构造拉姆齐句子时,我们使用的就是二阶逻辑的思想,因为有些

variables here referred not to individuals but to properties such as "being-in-pain." (This turns out to be important because secondorder logic is rather less straightforward in many ways that firstorder logic.)
这里的变量指的不是个体,而是诸如 "痛苦 "之类的属性。(这一点很重要,因为二阶逻辑在很多方面都不如一阶逻辑那么简单明了)。
Now, not every valid argument gives you a reason to believe the conclusion. Even if the argument is valid, it only gives you a reason to support the conclusion if the premises are true. A valid argument whose premises are true is called a sound argument. The task of logic, therefore, is to try to give a theory that will allow us to identify which arguments are valid. Once we know which arguments are valid, we can see then whether we should believe their conclusions by deciding if we have reason to believe the premises. If an argument is valid and sound, then it does offer good reason to believe its conclusion.
现在,并不是每个有效的论证都能给你一个相信结论的理由。即使论证是有效的,也只有在前提为真的情况下,它才能给你支持结论的理由。前提为真的有效论证被称为合理论证。因此,逻辑学的任务就是试图给出一种理论,让我们能够确定哪些论证是有效的。一旦我们知道哪些论证是有效的,我们就可以通过判断我们是否有理由相信其前提,来了解我们是否应该相信其结论。如果一个论证是有效的、合理的,那么它确实提供了相信其结论的充分理由。
Notice that it follows that there is another way in which we can use valid forms of argument in arriving at new beliefs. In a valid argument, it can't happen that the premises are true and the conclusion false, so if the conclusion is false, the premises aren't all true. Sometimes, therefore, if we recognize that a form of argument is valid and know that the conclusion is false, we can infer that at least one of the premises is false. This is the logical truth we have relied on whenever we have used reductio arguments.
请注意,我们还可以通过另一种方式使用有效的论证形式来得出新的信念。在一个有效的论证中,不可能出现前提为真而结论为假的情况,所以如果结论是假的,前提就不全是真的。因此,有时候,如果我们认识到某种形式的论证是有效的,并且知道结论是假的,我们就可以推断出至少有一个前提是假的。这就是我们每次使用归谬法论证时所依赖的逻辑真理。

3.10 Using logic: Truth preservation, probability, and the lottery paradox
3.10 使用逻辑:保真、概率和彩票悖论

I defined a valid argument as one where the conclusion must be true if the premises are. Another way of putting this would be to say that in a valid argument it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. This is the very notion of possibility that we used in talking about possible worlds. So in terms of possible-world semantics we could say that a valid form of argument is one where a sentence of the form of the conclusion is true in every possible world where sentences of the forms of the premises are true. One shorthand way of saying this is to say that valid arguments are truthpreserving: if you've got true premises and you use a valid form of argument, you'll get a true conclusion.
我给有效论证下的定义是,如果前提为真,那么结论就一定为真。另一种说法是,在有效论证中,不可能出现前提为真而结论为假的情况。这正是我们在谈论可能世界时使用的可能性概念。因此,从可能世界语义学的角度来看,我们可以说,一个有效的论证形式是,在每一个前提形式的句子为真的可能世界中,结论形式的句子都是真的。一种简略的说法是,有效论证是保真论证:如果前提为真,使用有效的论证形式,就能得到真结论。
I mentioned earlier, when we were looking at Descartes' cogito in 2.3, that Descartes wanted an argument that transmitted not just
我在前面提到,当我们在 2.3 中研究笛卡尔的 "cogito "时,笛卡尔想要的论证不只是传递

truth but certainty from premises to conclusion. And, in fact, if you defined certainty as having a 100 percent probability of being true, then it turns out that arguments that preserve truth also preserve certainty. So Descartes was right to think that if he could find an argument that was valid-as the cogito certainly is - and its premise was certain, then the conclusion would be certain too. It also turns out, however, that a valid argument whose premises are merely probable can have a conclusion that's much less probable than any of its premises. So when you're using logically valid arguments, you need to keep track of probability as well as truth.
真理,而是从前提到结论的确定性。事实上,如果你把确定性定义为有百分之百的可能性是真的,那么事实证明,保持真理的论证也会保持确定性。因此,笛卡尔认为,如果他能找到一个有效的论证--"cogito "当然也是有效的--并且其前提是确定的,那么结论也将是确定的,这种想法是正确的。然而,事实也证明,一个有效论证的前提仅仅是可能的,它的结论却可能比它的任何前提都更不可能。因此,当你使用逻辑上有效的论证时,你需要跟踪概率和真理。
This fact is important in contexts where we are making an argument that has many premises. To see this, let's think about the socalled lottery paradox. Consider, for example, Mary Jo, who is thinking about lottery tickets in a ten-thousand-ticket lottery where each ticket has the same chance of winning. As each ticket comes into her hand, she thinks, "That one won't win," because it is indeed highly improbable that any particular ticket will win. Suppose she sits there for days, going through all the thousands of tickets, and in the end she has said to herself about each of them, "That one won't win." That's certainly a perfectly reasonable thing to think about each of them given that the probability that any of them will win is only one in ten thousand. She also concludes, at the end, of her survey, "Well, those are all the tickets." But from the premises:
在我们进行有许多前提的论证时,这一事实非常重要。要了解这一点,让我们想想所谓的彩票悖论。举例来说,玛丽-乔正在考虑一张一万元的彩票,每张彩票的中奖概率都是一样的。当每张彩票到她手里时,她都会想:"这张不会中奖的。"因为任何一张彩票中奖的可能性都非常小。假设她坐了好几天,把几千张彩票都看了一遍,最后她对每张彩票都说:"那张不会中奖。"鉴于任何一张彩票中奖的概率都只有万分之一,她对每一张彩票的看法当然都是完全合理的。她还在调查的最后总结道:"好吧,这些就是所有的彩票。"但从前提来看
1: Ticket 1 won't win
1: 1 号票不会中奖
2: Ticket 2 won't win
2: 2 号票不会中奖
3: Ticket 3 won't win
3: 3 号票不会中奖
up to 
10,000: Ticket 10,000 won't win
10,000: 10,000 票不会中奖
she can conclude 她可以得出结论
Conclusion: Tickets 1 to 10,000 won't win.
结论:1 到 10,000 张彩票不会中奖。
From this, of course, given the further premise,
当然,这要有进一步的前提、
10,001: Tickets 1 to 10,000 are all the tickets
10,001: 1 至 10,000 张门票为所有门票
it follows that 由此可见
None of the tickets will win!
没有一张票会中奖!
And we certainly don't want her concluding that.
我们当然不希望她得出这样的结论。
This paradox-that, in considering a lottery, it can be reasonable to believe that each ticket won't win, but not reasonable to think that they all won't win-is less worrying once you realize that, because each of the premises is less than certain, there is no logical guarantee that the conclusion will be as probable as each premise is. The argument preserves truth but not probability. (The rule, in fact, is that if you have premises and the least likely premise has a probability of (1-e), then the conclusion can have a probability as low as ( 1 -ne). Since, in this case, is around 0.0001 and is 10,000 , ( 1 ne) is 0 - so the probability of the conclusion can be as low as 0 !)
这个悖论--在考虑彩票时,相信每张彩票都不会中奖是合理的,但认为所有彩票都不会中奖就不合理了--一旦你意识到,由于每个前提都不那么确定,因此无法从逻辑上保证结论会像每个前提一样可能,就不那么令人担忧了。这个论证保留了真理,但没有保留概率。(事实上,规则是,如果你有 个前提,而最不可能的前提的概率为(1-e),那么结论的概率可以低至(1-ne)。由于在本例中, 大约是 0.0001,而 是 10,000 , ( 1 ne) 是 0 - 所以结论的概率可以低至 0!)

3.11 Logical truth and logical properties
3.11 逻辑真理和逻辑性质

If a sentence can be seen to be true simply because of its syntax, independently of the particular names and predicates it contains, we can say it is formally or logically true. Formally true sentences are always necessarily true as well: they will be true in every possible world. Thus, "Snow is white or snow isn't white" is logically true, because every sentence of the form " or not- " is true in every possible world. It follows from these definitions of validity and consequence that any string of sentences leading up to a logical truth is a valid argument, and that a logical truth is a consequence of any string of sentences at all. The reason is that since a logical truth is true in every possible world, whatever premises we put in front of it in an argument, it will be true in every world where they are true. Logical truths, then, are necessary truths, which can be identified as true by their form.
如果一个句子仅仅因为它的句法就可以被认为是真的,而与它所包含的特定名称和谓词无关,我们就可以说它在形式上或逻辑上是真的。形式上真实的句子也总是必然真实的:它们在每一个可能的世界中都是真实的。因此,"雪是白的或雪不是白的 "在逻辑上是真的,因为每一个形式为 " or not- "的句子在每一个可能的世界中都是真的。根据有效性和结果的这些定义,任何一串导致逻辑真理的句子都是有效的论证,逻辑真理是任何一串句子的结果。原因在于,既然逻辑真理在每一个可能的世界中都是真的,那么无论我们在论证中把什么前提放在它前面,它在它们为真的每一个世界中都是真的。因此,逻辑真理是必然真理,可以通过其形式确定其为真。
We already know that some necessary truths cannot be identified by their form as true. For, as we saw, every true identity statement is necessary. But these truths cannot be seen to be true simply by looking at their syntax. They are necessary but not logically true. Some identity statements-say, "Mars is the Evening Star"-are
我们已经知道,有些必然真理无法通过其形式确定为真。因为,正如我们所看到的,每一个真正的同一性陈述都是必然的。但是,这些真理不能仅仅通过观察它们的语法就被认为是真的。它们是必然的,但在逻辑上却不是真的。有些同一性陈述--例如 "火星是黄昏之星"--是

false; some, like "The Morning Star is Venus," are true. But there is no guarantee that you will know which such sentences are true and which false just because you both understand the language and know that they have the syntactic property of being identity statements between names.
而有些句子,如 "晨星是金星",则是真的。但是,我们不能保证,仅仅因为你既理解这种语言,又知道这些句子的句法特性是名称之间的同一性陈述,你就能知道哪些句子是真的,哪些句子是假的。
As I have already said, logicians have concentrated on systems of logic, such as sentential or predicate logic, that identify valid arguments because of the presence of certain words such as "and" and "all." We can say that these logics examine the logical properties of such words. To study the logical properties of a word is to see how its presence in a sentence affects the validity of arguments with that sentence as premise or conclusion. Of course, most words cannot be fully understood in terms simply of their logical properties. However much you knew about the logical properties of the word "red," for example, you wouldn't understand it if you didn't know what red things look like. To understand "red" you need to know the sense of the word. But there are words - such as "all" and "and"whose whole meaning can be given by specifying their logical properties. Such words are called logical constants, and logicians take a special interest in them.
正如我已经说过的,逻辑学家们专注于逻辑系统,如句法逻辑或谓词逻辑,这些逻辑系统因存在某些词语(如 "和 "和 "所有")而确定有效论证。我们可以说,这些逻辑学研究了这些词语的逻辑属性。研究一个词的逻辑属性,就是研究它在句子中的存在如何影响以该句子为前提或结论的论证的有效性。当然,大多数词都不能仅仅从逻辑属性上完全理解。例如,无论你对 "红色 "一词的逻辑属性了解多少,如果你不知道红色的东西是什么样子,你就无法理解它。要理解 "红色",你需要知道这个词的意义。但是,有些词,比如 "所有 "和 "和",只要说明它们的逻辑属性,就能给出它们的全部含义。这些词被称为逻辑常量,逻辑学家对它们特别感兴趣。
But in recent years a great deal of new work in logic has focused on the logical properties of other words: epistemic logic, for example, looks at the logical properties of "know," and modal logic studies the logical properties of "necessary" and "possible." Thus, we can have modal sentential logic, which includes these words along with sentential variables, negation, and the connectives; and modal predicate logic, where we add variables for names and predicates as well. Possible-world semantics is, of course, particularly useful for modal logic, but we shall also be using possible-world semantics in the next chapter to examine some issues about the necessity of laws of nature. (You might have thought that "necessary" and "possible" were logical constants, that they could be defined simply by looking at their role in arguments. But the existence of different kinds of necessity-including the kind we shall look at in the next chaptermeans that modal logic is not all you need to explain the idea of necessity.)
但近年来,逻辑学的大量新研究都集中在其他词的逻辑属性上:例如,认识论逻辑研究 "知道 "的逻辑属性,模态逻辑研究 "必要 "和 "可能 "的逻辑属性。因此,我们可以有模态句法逻辑,其中包括这些词以及句法变量、否定和连接词;我们还可以有模态谓词逻辑,其中包括名称和谓词的变量。当然,可能世界语义对模态逻辑特别有用,但我们也将在下一章使用可能世界语义来研究自然规律的必然性问题。(你可能以为 "必然 "和 "可能 "是逻辑常量,只要看看它们在论证中的作用就可以定义了。但是,不同种类的必然性--包括我们将在下一章讨论的那种必然性--的存在意味着,模态逻辑并不是解释必然性概念所需要的全部)。
Recent formal logic has increased our understanding of validity, necessity, and logical truth. But the interest of these questions is not
最近的形式逻辑加深了我们对有效性、必然性和逻辑真理的理解。但这些问题的意义并不在于

simply that we want to make valid arguments or find logical truths. Philosophers are interested in logic not just because they want to make valid arguments but because they want to know what makes an argument valid; not just because they want to discover necessary truths, but because they want to understand the idea of necessity.
只是因为我们想提出有效的论证或发现逻辑真理。哲学家对逻辑感兴趣,不仅仅是因为他们想提出有效的论证,而是因为他们想知道是什么使论证有效;不仅仅是因为他们想发现必然的真理,而是因为他们想理解必然性的理念。
So far I have suggested three reasons why philosophers have been interested in language:
到目前为止,我已经提出了哲学家对语言感兴趣的三个原因:
a) because it is their primary tool,
a) 因为这是他们的主要工具、
b) because, unlike thoughts and ideas, it is public, and
b) 因为与思想和观念不同,它是公开的,而且
c) because it is the medium in which we express truths.
c) 因为它是我们表达真理的媒介。
But many of the ideas that we have discussed in this chapter will come up in later chapters, and some of them came up when we were discussing philosophy of mind and epistemology. That brings me to the last reason I want to suggest: that philosophers have found again and again that starting with questions about language can lead to new insights in every area of the subject.
但是,我们在本章中讨论的许多观点会在后面的章节中出现,其中有些观点是在我们讨论心灵哲学和认识论时出现的。这就引出了我想说的最后一个原因:哲学家们一再发现,从有关语言的问题入手,可以为这一学科的各个领域带来新的见解。

3.12 Conventions of language
3.12 语言习惯

If we say that understanding a sentence is knowing what it means, then it's natural to think that someone who knows what the sentence means knows that means , where is some specification of the meaning. Thus, on the Fregean view, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its sense, which is to know the conditions under which it would be true. So you know what the German sentence "Es regnet" means if you know that the sentence would be true just in case it was raining. So you have a belief that captures your knowledge of the meaning of the sentence: you believe that "Es regnet" is true just in case it's raining.
如果我们说理解一个句子就是知道它的意思,那么我们自然会认为,知道句子 意思的人知道 意思是 ,其中 是对意思的某种说明。因此,根据弗雷格的观点,知道一个句子的意思就是知道它的意义,也就是知道在什么条件下它是真的。因此,如果你知道德语句子 "Es regnet "在下雨的情况下才会成立,那么你就知道这个句子的意思。因此,你有一个信念,它包含了你对句子意义的认识:你相信 "Es regnet "在下雨的情况下是真的。
I used a German sentence here not out of homage to Frege, but because if I'd used an English one, it might have seemed vacuous. I'd have said that you know what "It's raining" means if you knew that that very sentence was true just in case it was raining. But the fact is that this wouldn't be vacuous at all. Of course, the only way I can specify the truth conditions of "It's raining" in English is to use English words that mean the same as "It's raining." And you will need to understand English to understand that specification. But
我在这里使用德语句子,并不是出于对弗雷格的敬意,而是因为如果我使用英语句子,可能会显得空洞无物。我会说,如果你知道 "It's raining"(下雨了)这个句子是真的,你就知道 "It's raining"(下雨了)是什么意思。但事实上,这一点也不空洞。当然,我唯一能用英语说明 "It's raining "的真实条件的方法,就是使用与 "It's raining "意思相同的英语单词。而你需要懂英语才能理解这种说明。但是

knowing that a sentence would be true just in case it was raining is something that you can know without knowing English. Frege knew this about the German sentence "Es regnet." What that makes plain, I think, is that your specification of the meaning of the sentence in your own mind can't be in English. Let's suppose, then, you have an internal language: the language of thought (as the title of a book by the American philosopher of language Jerry Fodor called it).
在不懂英语的情况下也能知道一个句子 是真的。弗雷格就知道德语句子 "Es regnet "的含义。我认为,这就说明,你在自己头脑中对句子含义的描述不可能是用英语表达的。那么,让我们假设你有一种内部语言:思想语言(美国语言哲学家杰里-福多在一本书中称之为思想语言)。
So your knowledge of the truth conditions of must be specified in the translation of into the language of thought. Let's call that translation "internal S." It can't be that your understanding of the language of thought consists in knowing the truth-conditions of internal S, for these would have to be translated further into some other language, and we would be on our way to an infinite regress. What makes it true that internal allows you to specify the truth conditions of is that the right connection obtains between internal and the states of the world that obtain when it is true. That is, the relationships between our mental states and things in the world that give the states their contents--that make, for example, our beliefs have truth conditions-must be different in kind from the relations between language and mental states that give sentence their truth conditions.
因此,你对 的真理条件的认识,必须在将 翻译成思维语言时加以明确。让我们把这种翻译称为 "内部 S"。你对思维语言的理解不可能包含在对内部 S 的真理条件的认识中,因为这些真理条件必须进一步翻译成其他语言,这样我们就会走向无限的倒退。内部 之所以能让你指明 的真理条件,是因为内部 与它为真时的世界状态之间存在着正确的联系。也就是说,我们的心理状态与世界上的事物之间的关系赋予了这些状态以内容--例如,使我们的信念具有真理条件--在种类上必须不同于语言与心理状态之间的关系赋予句子以真理条件。
This is, in fact, just what you would expect. If I currently have a belief that has the content it's raining, then, following on our discussions in Chapter 1, we would expect this to be a consequence of the functional role of the belief: the fact that it's the sort of state that's produced in me when I look out of the window and see rain pouring from the heavens and that makes me take my umbrella to avoid getting wet. On the other hand, what makes the sentence "It's raining" have the content it does is, presumably, the fact that this is a convention of the English language. If the conventions of English had been like those of German, for example, then the right sentence to express that content would be "Es regnet" instead.
事实上,这正是我们所期望的。如果我现在有一个信念,它的内容是 "下雨了",那么,根据我们在第一章的讨论,我们会认为这是信念的功能作用的结果:当我向窗外望去,看到大雨倾盆而下,我就会产生这种状态,从而撑起雨伞避免淋雨。另一方面,"It's raining"(下雨了)这句话之所以有这样的内容,大概是因为这是英语的一种习惯。举例来说,如果英语的习惯与德语相同,那么表达该内容的正确句子应该是 "Es regnet"。
If we remember Frege's discovery of the primacy of the sentence, we shall want to ask, first, what the convention is that gives sentences their truth conditions and their truth values. The natural answer is that the convention that gives sentences truth conditions is the convention that you should use declarative sentences to say
如果我们还记得弗雷格发现了句子的首要地位,那么我们首先要问的是,是什么约定俗成的东西赋予了句子它们的真理条件和真理价值。答案自然是,赋予句子真值条件的约定就是你应该用陈述句来表达以下意思的约定:"......"。

what is true. The philosopher H. P. Grice has proposed that what this amounts to is that we all expect someone who understands a sentence to use to get other people to believe that is true. So now we see why there's an intimate connection between the contents-the truth conditions- of beliefs and of sentences. A sentence is a conventional means of trying to get other people to have a particular belief: the belief with the same truth conditions as the sentence. Starting with this basic idea, you can go on to look at sentences that are not declarative, among them orders and questions.
什么是真的。哲学家 H. P. 格莱斯(H. P. Grice)提出,这相当于我们都期望一个理解句子的人 ,用 ,让其他人相信 。现在我们明白为什么信念的内容--真理条件--与句子之间有密切联系了吧。句子是一种传统的手段,它试图让其他人拥有一种特定的信念:与句子具有相同真理条件的信念。从这个基本概念出发,我们可以继续研究非陈述句,其中包括命令句和疑问句。
In using declarative sentences we make assertions. In using imperative sentences, we give orders. In each case we are producing a complete meaningful utterance, we are performing what linguists call a "speech act," though the particular types of speech act differ in their particular functions. Despite these differences, however, we can use the ideas of Frege's semantic theory-the ideas that we used to explain the utterance of declarative sentences in the speech act of assertion-to explain the contents of other speech acts as well. For every one of the central speech acts-assertion, questioning, and ordering-Frege's idea of the truth condition can be used.
在使用陈述句时,我们做出断言。在使用命令句时,我们下达命令。在每种情况下,我们都在发出一个完整的有意义的语句,我们在进行语言学家所说的 "言语行为",尽管言语行为的特定类型在其特定功能上有所不同。不过,尽管存在这些差异,我们还是可以用弗雷格语义理论的观点--我们用来解释断言这一言语行为中的陈述句--来解释其他言语行为的内容。对于每一种核心言语行为--断言、提问和排序--都可以使用弗雷格的真理条件思想。
We say that the truth conditions of a declarative sentence hold if the sentence is true. In assertion we try to get others to believe that the truth conditions of the sentence we assert hold; in ordering we try to get someone to make the truth conditions hold; in questioning we try to get someone to tell us what truth conditions hold. In Chapter 5, I shall look in more detail at orders in the context of discussing the philosophical theory about moral language that is called prescriptivism.
如果一个陈述句是真的,我们就说这个陈述句的真理条件成立。在断言中,我们试图让别人相信我们断言的句子的真理条件成立;在命令中,我们试图让别人使真理条件成立;在质询中,我们试图让别人告诉我们什么真理条件成立。在第 5 章中,我将在讨论道德语言的哲学理论(即规定主义)时更详细地探讨命令。
So Grice's theory tells us what it is to understand sentences as we use them in these many speech acts. To know the meaning of a sentence is to understand how it is used in speech acts. But if we combine it with Frege's discovery of the primacy of the sentence, Grice's theory can also tell us what it is to understand the meanings of words. To understand the meaning of a word is to know how it contributes to determining the meanings of sentences. So to understand a word, , is to know how it contributes to fixing what speech acts you can carry out with sentences that contain .
因此,格莱斯的理论告诉我们,当我们在众多言语行为中使用句子时,如何理解句子。理解句子的意义就是理解它在言语行为中是如何被使用的。但是,如果我们将格莱斯理论与弗雷格关于句子首要地位的发现结合起来,格莱斯理论还能告诉我们什么是理解词的意义。理解一个词的意义,就是要知道它是如何决定句子的意义的。因此,要理解一个词, ,就是要知道它如何有助于确定你可以用包含 的句子进行哪些言语行为。
Notice that Frege's theory and Grice's are thus not inconsistent
请注意,弗雷格的理论和格莱斯的理论并不矛盾

with each other. In fact, they are really complementary. Frege's theory says we have to know the sense of a word to understand it, and that knowing the sense of a word just is knowing how it determines the sense of a sentence. To know the sense of a sentence is to know what it would be for it to be true. But that is precisely what you have to know on Grice's theory. For if you know the truth conditions of a sentence you know which belief people using it are trying to communicate: namely, the belief with the same truth conditions. You could say that Frege tells us what the meanings of sentences arenamely, truth conditions - and Grice tells us what the truth conditions are for.
相辅相成。事实上,它们是相辅相成的。弗雷格的理论认为,我们必须知道一个词的意义才能理解它,而知道一个词的意义只是知道它如何决定一个句子的意义。知道一个句子的意义就是知道这个句子的真实含义。但根据格莱斯的理论,这恰恰是你必须知道的。因为如果你知道了一个句子的真实条件,你就知道了使用这个句子的人想要传达的信念:即具有相同真实条件的信念。可以说,弗雷格告诉了我们句子的意义,也就是真理条件,而格莱斯则告诉了我们真理条件的目的。
Thus, on Grice's theory, someone understands "It is raining" if she both
因此,根据格莱斯的理论,如果某人同时具备以下条件,她就能理解 "下雨了 "这句话
a) uses those words to try to get people to believe that the truth conditions of "It is raining" hold and
a) 使用这些词语试图让人们相信 "下雨了 "的事实条件成立,并且
b) expects people to use those words to try to get her (and others) to believe those truth conditions hold also.
b) 期望人们用这些话试图让她(和其他人)相信这些真理条件也成立。
And, of course, to believe that the truth conditions of "It is raining" hold is just to believe that it is raining. As far as orders are concerned, you understand the command "Peel me a grape!" if you both
当然,相信 "下雨了 "的真实条件成立,也只是相信下雨了而已。就命令而言,如果你同时理解了 "给我剥颗葡萄!"这个命令,那么你就理解了 "给我剥颗葡萄!"这个命令。
a) use those words to try to get people to make that sentence's truth conditions hold and also
a) 用这些词语试图让人们相信这句话的真理条件成立,同时还
b) expect people to use them to try to get you (and others) to make them hold.
b) 期望人们利用它们来试图让你(和其他人)使它们保持不变。
To make those truth conditions hold, of course, is just to peel the speaker a grape.
当然,要使这些真理条件成立,只是给说话者剥个葡萄皮而已。

3.13 The paradox of analysis
3.13 分析的悖论

In the last chapter, I raised this question: If we know what the word "know" means, why can't we just say what it means? Now that we have an account of meaning under our belts, so to speak, we can reconsider this question. To know what "know" means, according to the thesis of the primacy of the sentence, is to know how to work out
在上一章中,我提出了这个问题:如果我们知道 "知道 "这个词的意思,为什么不能直接说出它的意思呢?既然我们已经有了关于 "意义 "的解释,我们就可以重新考虑这个问题了。根据句子至上论,知道 "知道 "的意思就是知道如何解决

the meaning of sentences containing that word. According to the Fregean account, that will mean knowing under what circumstance sentences containing that word would be true. Well, suppose that knowledge is true belief produced by a reliable process. Then, presumably, anyone who knows English knows under what circumstances the sentence "Knowledge is true belief produced by a reliable process" is true. So far, so good. But now we seem to be caught on the horns of a dilemma.
这就意味着知道包含该词的句子在什么情况下为真。根据弗雷格的说法,这意味着知道在什么情况下包含该词的句子是真的。那么,假设知识是由可靠过程产生的真实信念。那么,任何懂英语的人大概都知道 "知识是由可靠过程产生的真实信念 "这句话在什么情况下是真的。到目前为止,一切顺利。但现在我们似乎陷入了两难的境地。
Every true sentence must either be analytic or synthetic (this follows from the fact that "synthetic" was just defined as "not analytic"). Suppose that "Knowledge is true belief produced by a reliable process" is analytic, true solely in virtue of the meanings of the words it contains. Then there seems to be no need to reflect on anything other than meanings in order to decide whether it is true. Indeed, this follows from the compositionality thesis for meanings. If "know" and "believe truly by a reliable process" mean the same, then we should be able to substitute them for each other and preserve meaning. So
每一个真句子要么是分析句,要么是合成句(这是由 "合成句 "刚刚被定义为 "非分析句 "这一事实得出的)。假设 "知识是由可靠的过程产生的真实信念 "是分析性的,仅凭它所包含的词的意义就是真实的。那么,似乎就没有必要为了判断它是否为真而去思考词义以外的任何东西了。事实上,这是从意义的构成性论题中得出的结论。如果 "知道 "和 "通过可靠的过程真正相信 "的意思是一样的,那么我们就应该能够将它们相互替代,并保留意义。那么

K: Somebody knows something if they know it
K:有人知道什么,如果他们知道的话

and
: Somebody knows something if they believe it correctly by a reliable process
如果某人通过可靠的程序正确地相信某件事情,那么他就知道这件事。
should mean the same. But if they mean the same, how come people who understand English can immediately understand that is true but can't immediately understand that ' is? Surely if two sentences mean the same, then if one is obviously true, the other should be. And if that is so, why didn't the first philosopher to think about it immediately see that reliabilism was correct? After all, according to the hypothesis we are now considering, he had all the knowledge he needed: he knew the meanings of the words. Since he didn't see reliabilism was correct, we must conclude that the sentence is not analytic.
的意思应该是一样的。但是,如果它们的意思相同,为什么懂英语的人可以立刻明白 是真的,却不能立刻明白 ' 是真的呢?当然,如果两个句子的意思相同,那么如果其中一个明显是真的,另一个也应该是真的。既然如此,为什么第一个思考这个问题的哲学家没有立刻发现可靠论是正确的呢?毕竟,根据我们现在所考虑的假设,他已经拥有了他所需要的所有知识:他知道词语的含义。既然他没有发现可靠论是正确的,我们就必须得出结论:这个句子不是分析性的。
But if it is synthetic, then there must be some other analytic truth that defines the meaning of the term "know." And then that truth is
但是,如果它是合成的,那么就必须有其他的分析真理来定义 "知道 "一词的含义。那么这个真理就是

the one we are after in a philosophical analysis. Call some Englishlanguage sentence that states that truth " " We can now ask about the question we asked about reliabilism just now: If it is analytic, why hasn't anyone recognized it to be true, given that its truth follows from the meanings of the words it contains and everyone who understands English understands the words in ?
这就是我们在哲学分析中所追求的真理。把某个陈述真理的英语句子称为 " ",我们现在可以就 提出我们刚才就可靠论提出的问题:如果它是分析性的,为什么没有人承认它是真的呢?既然它的真理来自于它所包含的单词的含义,而且每个懂英语的人都懂 中的单词?
This problem is an instance of what G. E. Moore called the "paradox of analysis." In general, Moore pointed out, in a philosophical analysis, one ends up saying something like "To know is to believe correctly on the basis of a reliable method." But if this is true, the concepts of knowledge and reliably produced true belief are the same and therefore should be intersubstitutable. In other words, "To know is to know" must state the same proposition as "To know is to believe correctly on the basis of a reliable method." The paradox, of course, is that one of these statements looks informative and the other does not: yet, if the analysis is correct, they are the same statement.
这个问题是 G. E. 摩尔所说的 "分析悖论 "的一个实例。摩尔指出,一般来说,在哲学分析中,人们最终会说 "知识就是在可靠方法的基础上正确地相信"。但如果这是真的,那么 "知识 "和 "可靠地产生真实信念 "这两个概念就是相同的,因此应该是可以相互替代的。换句话说,"知之为知之 "必须与 "知之为知之 "是同一个命题,"知之为知之 "必须与 "知之为知之 "是同一个命题。当然,悖论在于这些陈述中的一个看起来有信息量,而另一个则没有:然而,如果分析是正确的,它们就是同一个陈述。
There is only one assumption in this argument that looks like a candidate for being given up, and that is that the assumption that there is some analytic truth that can be stated in English that defines knowledge. If the meaning of the word "know" cannot be given (except, vacuously, by saying "'Know' means 'know"), then it isn't surprising that no one has yet found a way to state it! Perhaps surprisingly, a number of philosophers in the twentieth century, W.V.O. Quine most prominent among them, did in fact argue that there were no analytic truths. Quine argued (though not for these reasons) that any sentence at all could, in principle, be given up in the face of experience, even a logical or mathematical sentence. No sentences were true solely in virtue of meaning.
在这个论证中,只有一个假设看起来像是可以放弃的,那就是假设存在某种可以用英语表述的分析真理来定义知识。如果无法给出 "know "一词的含义(除了空洞地说"'Know'就是'知道'"),那么没有人找到陈述它的方法也就不足为奇了!也许令人惊讶的是,二十世纪的一些哲学家,其中最著名的是奎因(W.V.O. Quine),事实上确实认为不存在分析真理。奎因认为(尽管不是出于这些原因),原则上任何句子都可以在经验面前被放弃,即使是逻辑句子或数学句子。没有任何句子仅仅因为意义而真实。
But there is a much less radical way out of the problem. The fact that we have the tools for working out whether a sentence is true does not mean that we will do so or that we will do so correctly. I know how to carry out the reasoning necessary to decide whether 2 to the power of 10 is 1024 . There is nothing more that I need to know to work this out; but until I have done so and done so correctly, I will find the information that it is, in fact, 1024 informative.
但是,还有一种更不激进的方法来解决这个问题。我们有工具来推理一个句子是否为真,但这并不意味着我们会这样做,或者我们会正确地这样做。我知道如何进行必要的推理,以确定 2 到 10 的幂是否为 1024。我不需要再知道什么就能算出这个结果了;但在我算出并正确算出之前,我会觉得 "事实上是 1024 "这个信息很有参考价值。
When I defined "analyticity," I said that someone who knows the meaning of an analytic sentence must know (or be able to work out) that that sentence is true without relying on any nonsemantic infor-
当我给 "分析性 "下定义时,我曾说过,知道一个分析句子含义的人必须知道(或能够算出)这个句子是真的,而无需依赖任何非语义信息。

mation. Now, we don't ordinarily say that two expressions have the same meaning unless it is obvious to all competent speakers of the language that they are equivalent. But sentences can be true in virtue of their meaning and it can still be very hard to see that they are. All you need to know how to figure out whether
意思。现在,我们通常不说两个表达具有相同的意义,除非所有有能力的语言使用者都能明显看出它们是等价的。但是,句子可以根据其意义而为真,而且仍然很难看出它们是真句。您只需知道如何弄清楚
is what " 2 " means, what " 1024 " means, and what it means to raise a number to the tenth power. But it can still take a bit of thought to check that it's true. So we might want to distinguish between two senses of analytic. In one sense, it's a sentence that's obviously true in virtue of its meaning. (I gave earlier the philosopher's favorite example: "A bachelor is an unmarried male.") In another, it's a sentence that you can work out is true without relying on nonsemantic information. That analytic truths in this second sense can be informative follows from the fact that it may take a lot of intellectual effort to work out what follows from a sentence's meaning.
2 "是什么意思,"1024 "是什么意思,以及将一个数字提升到十次幂是什么意思。但是,我们仍然需要花点心思来验证它是否正确。因此,我们可能需要区分分析的两种意义。在一种意义上,它是一个根据其意义显然为真的句子。(我之前举过一个哲学家最喜欢的例子:"单身汉就是未婚男性。)在另一种意义上,它是一个你无需依赖非语义信息就能得出其为真的句子。第二种意义上的分析性真理可以是信息性的,这是因为从句子的意义中推导出什么可能需要很多智力努力。
Notice that, if this is right, the compositionality thesis for meanings needs to be interpreted carefully. The thesis says:
请注意,如果这是对的,那么就需要仔细解释意义的构成性论题。这个论点是这样说的:
CT: If two words or phrases have the same meaning, then we should be able to replace one of them with the other in any sentence without changing the meaning of .
CT:如果两个词或短语具有相同的含义,那么我们应该能够在任何句子 中用另一个词或短语替换其中一个词或短语,而不改变 的含义。
If by "have the same meaning" we mean "obviously have the same meaning," then CT applies. But two expressions can have the same meaning in a less obvious way. "E" and "F" can mean the same in the sense that " is F" is analytic but not obviously so. CT won't be true if we interpret "meaning" in this way. For in this sense, " and "1024" mean the same. But we won't be able to check whether a replacement of with has changed the truth conditions simply by comparing the resulting sentences. For it isn't obvious that they mean the same. That means that someone can believe that is 512 (because they miscalculated, failing to multiply by 2 enough times) but not believe that 1024 is 512. And so, of course, replacing " with "1024" into the open sentence "Joe believes that__is 512" certainly changes meanings.
如果 "具有相同的含义 "是指 "显然具有相同的含义",那么 CT 就适用。但是,两个表达式可以以不那么明显的方式具有相同的含义。E "和 "F "可以在 " is F "这个意义上具有相同的含义,这是可以分析的,但并不明显。如果我们这样解释 "意义",CT 就不是真的了。因为在这个意义上," "和 "1024 "的意思是一样的。但是,我们不能仅仅通过比较所得到的句子来检查用 替换 是否改变了真值条件。因为它们的意思并不明显相同。也就是说,有人可以相信 是 512(因为他们计算错误,没有乘以足够多的 2),但不相信 1024 是 512。因此,当然,把" "换成 "1024 "到开放式句子 "Joe believes that__is 512 "中肯定会改变意思。
In many arguments, philosophers have assumed that if something is true in virtue of meaning, we must be able to tell that it is true pretty easily. I am just pointing out that this isn't so. And, to the extent that philosophical work involves discovering analytic truths, it does not follow from the fact that they are analytic that they are trivial or easy to discover. We already had some evidence of that in the search for a definition of knowledge in Chapter 2. If we define "analytic" in this way, it is also less clear that even complex mathematical theorems are not analytic. For while a mathematical proof may be a very difficult thing to discover or construct, it may still be true that the materials for its construction are available to all those who understand the terms used in stating them. But mathematicians have now shown that there are mathematical truths that are not provable, so they may not be analytic even in this extended sense.
在许多论证中,哲学家们都假定,如果某件事因其意义而为真,那么我们一定能够很容易地判断出它是真的。我只是指出事实并非如此。而且,就哲学工作涉及发现分析性真理而言,并不能因为它们是分析性的,就认为它们是微不足道或容易发现的。在第二章寻找知识定义的过程中,我们已经有了一些这方面的证据。如果我们这样定义 "分析性",那么即使是复杂的数学定理也不是分析性的,这一点就不那么清楚了。因为,尽管数学证明可能是非常难以发现或构建的东西,但所有理解其术语的人可能仍然可以获得构建它的材料。但是,数学家们现在已经证明,有些数学真理是无法证明的,因此,即使在这种扩展的意义上,它们也可能不是分析的。

3.14 Conclusion 3.14 结论

We have traveled in this chapter along some of the main highways of the philosophy of language. Starting with Hobbes' Cartesian theory of language-which I showed was open to Wittgenstein's criticism of private languages - we moved on to Frege's theory of meaning. Using some of Frege's ideas, we were then able to explore some of the basic questions of semantics, and we were able to connect these questions with the ideas of recent possible-world semantics. This led us to a consideration of some of the basic ideas of formal logic. Finally, I looked at the way Grice had suggested we could connect the ideas of semantic theory with the use of language in practical communication. Along the way I have introduced and explained many of the central ideas that are distinctive of philosophical discussion in the English-speaking world in the twentieth century. As I have already said, many of these ideas will continue to be useful as we discuss other questions.
在本章中,我们沿着语言哲学的一些主干道行进。从霍布斯的笛卡尔语言理论开始--我表明,这一理论可以接受维特根斯坦对私人语言的批判--我们接着讨论弗雷格的意义理论。利用弗雷格的一些观点,我们得以探讨语义学的一些基本问题,并将这些问题与近代可能世界语义学的观点联系起来。这使我们开始思考形式逻辑的一些基本思想。最后,我研究了格莱斯提出的将语义理论与实际交流中的语言使用联系起来的方法。在这一过程中,我介绍并解释了二十世纪英语世界哲学讨论中的许多核心思想。正如我已经说过的,其中许多观点在我们讨论其他问题时仍将有用。
The last two chapters dealt with questions that arise because there are conscious beings in the universe, reflecting on their own situation, creatures with minds seeking to know the world they live in. They are questions that could be asked about any creatures whose minds were sufficiently complex, though of course there is no reason to suppose that they would be asked by every such creature. But the concerns of this chapter have focused on what is (so far as
最后两章讨论的问题是因为宇宙中存在着有意识的生物,这些生物反思自身的处境,试图了解自己所处的世界。任何思想足够复杂的生物都可以提出这些问题,当然,我们没有理由认为每个生物都会提出这些问题。但本章所关注的重点是什么(就目前而言

we know) a specifically human institution-language-even though there is nothing in principle that rules out the use of languages by other animals. In a sense, we have been focusing on questions that are more and more narrowly about our own cultural situation. Without minds, no knowledge; without knowledge (of meaning), no language. In the next chapter we shall consider an institution that is even more specific than language, one that occurs only in the modern era and only in certain cultures: science.
我们知道)一种专门属于人类的制度--语言--尽管原则上没有任何东西可以排除其他动物使用语言的可能性。从某种意义上说,我们所关注的问题越来越狭隘地与我们自身的文化状况有关。没有思想,就没有知识;没有知识(意义),就没有语言。在下一章中,我们将探讨一种比语言更为特殊的制度,一种只出现在现代和某些文化中的制度:科学。
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CHAPTER 4 第 4 章

Science 科学

What makes an explanation scientific?
怎样的解释才算科学?
How can we justify scientific theories?
我们如何证明科学理论的正确性?
What is a law of nature?
什么是自然法则?

4.1 Introduction 4.1 导言

Every day, in newspapers all around the world, astrologers tell people what life has in store for them. Under each of the star signs, which go with birthdates, there is a short message telling, say, Taureans to take special care in financial matters or Librans to expect progress in affairs of the heart. People make many kinds of criticism of these horoscopes: that they are vague, or that they are inaccurate, or that they make people fatalistic. All of these criticisms could have been made of astrological predictions any time in the last 2,500 years, anytime since Socrates. But there is one kind of criticism that is relatively modern and that is made very often nowadays. It is that astrology is unscientific.
每天,在世界各地的报纸上,占星家都会告诉人们生活中会发生什么。在每个与出生日期对应的星座下面,都有一条简短的信息,告诉人们,比如,金牛座的人要特别注意财务问题,或者天秤座的人要期待在心事上有所进展。人们对这些星座运势的批评有很多种:含糊不清、不准确,或者让人产生宿命论。所有这些批评在过去 2500 年里的任何时候,自苏格拉底以来的任何时候,都可能对占星术的预测提出过。但有一种批评相对比较现代,而且现在也经常有人提出。那就是占星术不科学。
It is an important fact that this criticism is relatively modern. Until the seventeenth century most intellectuals in the West thought that there was something to astrology, and even those who did not believe in it would not have criticized it in this way. Of course, there is a simple enough reason for this. Science, in the modern sense, has only developed since the seventeenth century. As a result, in the philosophy of science-unlike philosophical psychology, epistemology and the philosophy of language-most of the problems are less than three centuries old.
一个重要的事实是,这种批评是相对现代的。直到十七世纪,西方的大多数知识分子都认为占星术是有道理的,即使那些不相信占星术的人也不会这样批评占星术。当然,原因很简单。现代意义上的科学是从 17 世纪才开始发展起来的。因此,与哲学心理学、认识论和语言哲学不同,科学哲学中的大多数问题都不足三个世纪。
Though criticism of theories as unscientific has become relatively familiar in the last three hundred years, it is not obvious what the force of this criticism is. If, after all, a particular astrologer often gets things right, people who read the horoscope might not care very
尽管在过去的三百年里,批评理论不科学的声音已经变得相对耳熟能详,但这种批评的力量到底有多大却并不明显。毕竟,如果某位占星家经常预测正确,那么看星座的人可能并不太在意

much whether the predictions were scientific. What they want of astrological predictions is not that they should be scientific but that they should be true. My friend Peter, who believes that astrology works, worries more about the vagueness of predictions and about their accuracy; and Mary, who believes in them too, worries, because she is a Christian, about whether she ought to make use of them.
预测是否科学。他们对占星术预测的要求不是科学性,而是真实性。我的朋友彼得相信占星术有效,但他更担心预测的模糊性和准确性;玛丽也相信占星术,但她担心,因为她是基督徒,她是否应该利用占星术。
But people who criticize astrology as unscientific are not just saying that they don't believe these horoscopes, and they are not just saying that it is morally wrong to rely on them. Indeed, someone could criticize astrology as unscientific and still believe that a particular astrologer was a reliable guide to stock market prices. So what does it mean to say that a theory is unscientific?
但是,批评占星术不科学的人并不仅仅是说他们不相信这些占星术,也不仅仅是说依赖这些占星术在道德上是错误的。事实上,有人可以批评占星术不科学,但仍然相信某个占星家是股市价格的可靠指南。那么,说一种理论不科学是什么意思呢?
This question is one of the central problems of the philosophy of science, which I am going to discuss in this chapter. Indeed, it has received so much attention that it has a name. Karl Popper, one of the most influential philosophers of science of our century, has called this the "demarcation problem." What is it that distinguishes between science and nonscience? How are we to demarcate the boundary between them?
这个问题是我将在本章讨论的科学哲学的核心问题之一。事实上,这个问题备受关注,以至于有了一个名字。卡尔-波普尔是本世纪最有影响力的科学哲学家之一,他把这个问题称为 "分界问题"。是什么将科学与非科学区分开来?我们该如何划分它们之间的界限?
Though this is a central problem of the philosophy of science, there are many reasons why understanding the nature of science has been important to philosophers. Logic has led to new work in the sciences of mathematics and linguistics; and the philosophy of mind exists in intimate relation with the science of psychology. Functionalism was prompted by the development of computers and computer science. As we shall see at the end of the chapter, these are not the only places where the interests of scientists and philosophers overlap, and computer science, linguistics, mathematics, and psychology are not the only sciences that raise philosophical questions.
尽管这是科学哲学的一个核心问题,但理解科学的本质对哲学家来说一直很重要,原因有很多。逻辑学引发了数学和语言学领域的新工作;心灵哲学与心理学密切相关。计算机和计算机科学的发展推动了功能主义的发展。正如我们将在本章末尾看到的,科学家和哲学家的兴趣重叠之处并非只有这些,计算机科学、语言学、数学和心理学也并非只有这些科学会提出哲学问题。
These philosophical issues about particular sciences are interesting and important. But there is a much more general reason why understanding science is important to philosophy. We saw in Chapter 2 that questions about what and how we know are a central philosophical concern. Philosophy has a general interest in science because science is an organized search for knowledge. After all, what better way to find out about knowledge than to examine the theories and institutions in our society that have made the greatest contribution to expanding our knowledge of the world?
这些关于特定科学的哲学问题既有趣又重要。但是,理解科学对哲学的重要性还有一个更为普遍的原因。我们在第二章中看到,关于我们知道什么和如何知道的问题是哲学关注的核心问题。哲学对科学有着普遍的兴趣,因为科学是对知识的有组织的探索。毕竟,还有什么比研究我们社会中那些为拓展我们对世界的认识做出了最大贡献的理论和机构更好的方法呢?

4.2 Description and prescription
4.2 说明和处方

As we saw in earlier chapters, philosophers do not only try to understand concepts and theories, they also criticize many of our ordinary beliefs. Skeptics, for example, challenge our ordinary claims to knowledge, arguing that we know much less than we think, and Wittgenstein and the behaviorists challenged our ordinary unreflective belief that we might have Hobbesian "twinges." Philosophers not only try to understand what we do believe, but also argue about what we should believe. As I said in Chapter 2, claims about what we should say, think, or do are prescriptive: they prescribe courses of thought and action. In the philosophy of science too, description and prescription go hand in hand.
正如我们在前面几章中所看到的,哲学家不仅试图理解概念和理论,他们还批判我们的许多普通信念。例如,怀疑论者挑战我们对知识的普通主张,认为我们知道的比我们想象的要少得多,而维特根斯坦和行为主义者则挑战我们普通的不加反思的信念,即我们可能会有霍布斯式的 "抽痛"。哲学家不仅试图理解我们确实相信什么,而且还争论我们应该相信什么。正如我在第 2 章中所说,关于我们应该说什么、想什么或做什么的主张是规定性的:它们规定了思想和行动的方向。在科学哲学中,描述和规定也是相辅相成的。
But in the philosophy of science, unlike the philosophy of mind or epistemology or the philosophy of language, the object of study is an institution-science-that developed in particular societies in the relatively recent past. All human societies have had minds and knowledge and languages, yet only recently have most societies come to have science. For this reason the descriptive task of trying to say what science is like is one that philosophers share with historians and sociologists of science. As philosophers, however, we want to ask the epistemological question whether science really does provide us with the knowledge it seems to, to address the prescriptive question whether we should accept some or any of the claims of scientific theories. If we do accept them, especially those that challenge our commonsense beliefs, then we want to have a proper understanding of them and to investigate their significance. But in order to make this sort of philosophical assessment of science, we must first try to see what it is really like.
但在科学哲学中,与心智哲学、认识论或语言哲学不同的是,研究的对象是一种制度--科学--它是在相对较近的过去的特定社会中发展起来的。所有人类社会都有思想、知识和语言,然而大多数社会只是在最近才有了科学。因此,试图描述科学是什么样的,是哲学家与科学历史学家和社会学家共同承担的描述性任务。然而,作为哲学家,我们要问的是认识论问题,即科学是否真的为我们提供了它似乎能提供的知识,要解决的是规定性问题,即我们是否应该接受科学理论的某些或任何主张。如果我们接受它们,尤其是那些挑战我们常识性信念的理论,那么我们就希望对它们有一个正确的理解,并研究它们的意义。但是,为了对科学进行这样的哲学评估,我们必须首先尝试了解科学的真实面貌。
This is why the philosophy of science and the history of science are often studied together-indeed, many universities have programs or departments of the history and philosophy of science, where the two kinds of study are carried out together. If we look at science in this historical way, we can ask both, descriptively, how scientists construct their theories and, prescriptively, how they should create theories and find evidence that supports them. Because this approach looks at the development of science through time, we can call it a "diachronic" approach.
这就是科学哲学和科学史经常被放在一起研究的原因--事实上,许多大学都设有科学史和科学哲学专业或系,在那里这两种研究是一起进行的。如果我们以这种历史的方式来研究科学,我们就可以从描述性的角度来询问科学家是如何构建他们的理论的,也可以从规定性的角度来询问他们应该如何创建理论并找到支持这些理论的证据。由于这种方法是通过时间来观察科学的发展,因此我们可以称之为 "非同步 "方法。
Philosophers of science also discuss questions that have to do not
科学哲学家们还讨论了与下列问题无关的问题

with the way science develops but with the theories of science at a particular stage in its development. On this approach, we ask, descriptively, about the structure of scientific theories and what they say about the world and, prescriptively, about what justifies our belief in them. This way of studying science we can call "synchronic"; it has to do with issues about the state of science at a particular time.
科学发展的方式,而是科学发展特定阶段的科学理论。根据这种方法,我们会描述性地询问科学理论的结构及其对世界的描述,并规定性地询问我们相信这些理论的理由。我们可以把这种研究科学的方式称为 "同步";它涉及的是特定时期的科学状况问题。
The logical positivists made an important distinction that runs in parallel with the distinction between diachronic and synchronic questions. Some issues, they said, have to do with the context of discovery. These are questions about how to set about deepening our scientific understanding of the world. Thus, questions about how we should design experiments-questions of experimental methodology - belong to the context of discovery. But there are other questions that arise, which have to do with how we organize the evidence, the data we collect from experiment and observation, in order to decide whether it supports our theories. The issue here is not how we develop our theories but how we defend and justify them, and such questions are said to belong to the context of justification.
逻辑实证主义者做了一个重要的区分,这个区分与对时问题和同步问题的区分并行不悖。他们说,有些问题与发现的背景有关。这些问题涉及如何着手加深我们对世界的科学认识。因此,关于我们应该如何设计实验的问题--实验方法论问题--属于发现的范畴。但还有其他一些问题,它们与我们如何组织证据有关,即我们从实验和观察中收集的数据,以便决定这些数据是否支持我们的理论。这里的问题不在于我们如何发展我们的理论,而在于我们如何为这些理论辩护和证明。
We should not assume in advance that the answer to the demarcation problem will have to do only with synchronic matters or only with diachronic ones: it might require considerations of either or both kinds. Nor should we assume at the start that what makes a theory scientific is either how you set about developing it or how you justify it: perhaps solving the demarcation problem will involve considerations about both the context of discovery and the context of justification.
我们不应该事先假定,分界问题的答案只与同步问题有关或只与异步问题有关:它可能需要考虑任何一种或两种问题。我们也不应该一开始就假定,使一个理论具有科学性的因素要么是你如何着手发展它,要么是你如何证明它的合理性:也许解决分界问题既需要考虑发现的背景,也需要考虑证明的背景。
I didn't set out to introduce you to philosophy by trying to define "philosophy." And I'm not going to begin discussing science by trying to define "science" either. Rather, I want to begin by discussing some of the distinguishing features of scientific theories. This is most easily done in terms of a specific example. So I shall start out with a simplified example of a scientific theory with which you may already be familiar. When we have spent some time discussing some of the characteristics of scientific theory, we shall be in a better position to return to the demarcation problem.
我并没有试图通过定义 "哲学 "来向你们介绍哲学。我也不会通过试图定义 "科学 "来开始讨论科学。相反,我想从讨论科学理论的一些显著特征开始。通过一个具体的例子最容易做到这一点。因此,我将从一个简化的科学理论例子开始,你可能已经对这个例子很熟悉了。当我们花了一些时间讨论了科学理论的一些特征之后,我们将能够更好地回到划分问题上来。

4.3 An example: Gregor Mendel's genetic theory
4.3 一个例子格雷戈尔-孟德尔的遗传理论

In the middle of the nineteenth century, in Brno, in what is now the Czech Republic, a monk named Gregor Mendel developed a new
19 世纪中叶,在现在的捷克共和国布尔诺,一位名叫格雷戈尔-孟德尔的修道士发明了一种新的

theory of biological inheritance. Most biologists of his day believed that plants and animals inherited their characteristics from their parents by a blending of genetic material, rather like the mixing of fluids. It was supposed, for example, that when the pollen from a white-flowering pea fertilized a red-flowering pea, the seeds would usually produce peas with pink flowers, because the material that made the flowers white in one plant blended with the material that made the other flowers red to produce this intermediate coloring.
生物遗传理论。他那个时代的大多数生物学家都认为,植物和动物通过遗传物质的混合,就像液体的混合一样,从它们的父母那里继承了它们的特征。例如,当一株开白花的豌豆的花粉与一株开红花的豌豆受精时,种子通常会结出开粉红色花的豌豆,因为使一株植物的花朵变白的物质与使另一株植物的花朵变红的物质混合,从而产生了这种中间色。
Mendel suggested that this theory was quite wrong. He proposed that the genetic material that offspring inherited from the germ cells of their parents persisted unchanged in the next generation. (In animals, the germ cells-or gametes - are the spermatozoa and the unfertilized eggs.) To each of the characteristics of the offspring there corresponded, he said, units of heredity that came to be called "genes." The characteristic appearance of an organism is called its "phenotype." The genes that affect a particular phenotypic characteristic of an organism come, according to Mendel's theory, in various types. Genes that affect the same phenotypic characteristic are called "alleles." On Mendel's theory, when a male and female mate, they each contribute one allele of each gene to their gametes. These gametes join to form the fertilized egg, which develops into the adult organism. So while the gametes have just one allele of each gene, the new organism has two alleles of each gene once more, one from each parent. The complete collection of all the genes of an organism is called its genotype.
孟德尔认为这一理论是完全错误的。他提出,后代从父母生殖细胞中继承的遗传物质在下一代中保持不变。(在动物中,生殖细胞或配子是精子和未受精的卵子)。他说,后代的每一个特征都有相应的遗传单位,这些单位后来被称为 "基因"。生物体的特征外观被称为 "表型"。根据孟德尔的理论,影响生物体特定表型特征的基因有多种类型。影响相同表型特征的基因称为 "等位基因"。根据孟德尔的理论,当雌雄交配时,它们的配子中各有一个等位基因。这些配子结合形成受精卵,受精卵发育成成虫。因此,配子中每个基因只有一个等位基因,而新的生物体中每个基因又有两个等位基因,父母双方各一个。生物体所有基因的完整集合称为基因型。
Let's see how Mendel's theory would work out for the genetics of the flower color of peas, assuming a much-simplified version of his theory of inheritance. Suppose peas with red flowers have two redmaking alleles for petal color, and peas with white flowers have two white-making alleles. We'll call the red-making alleles and the white-making ones . So when these red- and white-flowering peas are crossed, each of their offspring will get one and one allele. Let's suppose that this is what makes them have pink flowers.
假定孟德尔的遗传理论是一个非常简化的版本,让我们来看看孟德尔的理论在豌豆花色的遗传学中是如何应用的。假设开红花的豌豆在花瓣颜色上有两个造红等位基因,而开白花的豌豆有两个造白等位基因。我们将红色等位基因称为 ,白色等位基因称为 。因此,当这些开红花的豌豆和开白花的豌豆杂交时,它们的后代将分别得到一个 和一个 等位基因。假设这就是它们开粉色花的原因。
Organisms with two alleles of the same gene, like the red and the white peas, are called homozygous. The pink peas, with different alleles, are called heterozygous. If the blending theory had been correct, then crossing one of the heterozygous pink-flowering peas with a red-flowering pea should have produced offspring all of the
具有相同基因的两个等位基因的生物,如红豌豆和白豌豆,称为同基因生物。具有不同等位基因的粉红豌豆称为杂合子。如果混合理论是正确的,那么杂合的粉红色花豌豆与红色花豌豆杂交后,其后代应该都是红色花豌豆。

same color. The pink-making genetic material would have blended with an equal quantity of the red-making material to produce a pea that was, say, a deeper, redder shade of pink. But what actually happened, according to Mendel, if you did cross red and pink peas, was that you got two sorts of offspring. Some were pink; others were just as red as the red parent.
同样的颜色。产生粉红色的遗传物质会与等量的产生红色的遗传物质混合,从而产生出更深、更红的粉红色豌豆。但孟德尔认为,如果将红色豌豆和粉红色豌豆杂交,实际上会产生两种后代。有些是粉红色的,有些则和红色亲本一样红。
His theory explained this. For, if he was right, the original alleles, and , were still fully present in the pink peas; their genotype was . When they were crossed they gave one allele to each offspring, so that half of their offspring got and half got . The red peas were homozygous; their genotype was . They could only give one allele to each offspring. Half of the offspring of this cross between pink and red plants got two R's and half got one and one . The offspring had exactly the same genetic constitution, so far as petal color was concerned, as one or other of the parents. They were all either or .
他的理论解释了这一点。因为,如果他是对的,原来的等位基因 仍然完全存在于粉红豌豆中;它们的基因型是 。当它们杂交时,每个后代得到一个等位基因,因此它们的后代一半得到 ,一半得到 。红豌豆是同源基因,它们的基因型是 。他们只能给每个后代一个 等位基因。粉红和红色植株杂交的后代中,一半得到两个 R,一半得到一个 和一个 。就花瓣颜色而言,后代的遗传结构与亲本中的一个或另一个完全相同。它们都是
In this case, the heterozygous plant was intermediate in phenotype between the parents, which were homozygous in the respective alleles. But Mendel also proposed that some alleles had a property called "dominance" over other alleles. One allele, A, was dominant over another, , if its presence in the genotype made an organism have the same phenotype as a homozygote both of whose alleles were . The other allele, a, was called the "recessive" member of the pair. (By convention, we often use an upper-case letter for the dominant allele and the same letter in lower-case for the recessive. But where I name alleles with different letters, I'll use upper case.) Thus, suppose purple-making alleles, , dominated alleles. Then there'd be two kinds of purple pea, and , but you could tell them apart because the PP plants would produce only purple offspring when crossed with each other. So we can call the PP variety "pure-breeding purple" plants. All the offspring of a cross between a pure-breeding purple pea and a white pea would have purple flowers. Even where one allele was dominant and the other recessive, however, the recessive allele was still present. So if you crossed two purple peas that were heterozygous and each had one allele, those offspring that got a allele from both parents would be white. In this case the cross between two purple-flowering peas, both with genotype PW, would produce one-quarter offspring, which would be white.
在这种情况下,杂合子植株的表型介于各自等位基因同源的亲本之间。但孟德尔还提出,有些等位基因对其他等位基因有一种叫做 "显性 "的特性。一个等位基因 A 对另一个等位基因 是显性的,如果它在基因型中的存在使生物的表型与等位基因均为 的同源基因相同。另一个等位基因 a 被称为这对等位基因中的 "隐性 "成员。(按照惯例,我们通常用大写字母表示显性等位基因,用小写字母表示隐性等位基因。但在我用不同字母命名等位基因时,我会使用大写字母)。因此,假设紫色等位基因 支配了 等位基因。那么就会有两种紫色豌豆: ,但你可以把它们区分开来,因为 PP 植物在杂交时只会产生紫色的后代。因此,我们可以把 PP 品种称为 "纯种紫色 "植株。纯种紫色豌豆 和白色豌豆 杂交的所有后代都开紫色花。即使一个等位基因是显性的,另一个是隐性的,隐性等位基因仍然存在。因此,如果将两株杂合的紫色豌豆杂交,每株豌豆都有一个 等位基因,那么从双亲那里得到 等位基因的后代就会是白色的。在这种情况下,基因型均为 PW 的两粒开紫花的豌豆杂交,会产生四分之一的 后代,即白色后代。
Mendel supported his theory of dominance with the results of some experiments. He showed, for example, that if you crossed pure-breeding purple peas with white ones, all the members of the first generation were purple. What that meant in terms of the theory, as we have just seen, was that a cross between and could produce only offspring, and since dominates , these all look like their parents. Then he crossed these first-generation hybrids with each other and found that some of the offspring were purple and some were white. Translating once more into terms of Mendel's theory, we can say why this was. Crossing the PWs with each other would produce onequarter , one-half , and one-quarter offspring. The first two genotypes would produce purple flowers, but the last one would produce white ones. So Mendel's theory got all of these cases right.
孟德尔用一些实验结果支持了他的显性理论。例如,他证明,如果将纯种的紫色豌豆与白色豌豆杂交,第一代的所有成员都是紫色的。正如我们刚才所看到的,就理论而言,这意味着 杂交只能产生 后代,而由于 占优势,所以这些后代看起来都像它们的 亲本。然后,他将这些第一代杂交种相互杂交,发现有些后代是紫色的,有些是白色的。根据孟德尔的理论,我们可以知道这是为什么。PW杂交会产生四分之一的 、二分之一的 和四分之一的 后代。前两个基因型会开出紫色的花,而最后一个基因型会开出白色的花。因此,孟德尔的理论对所有这些情况都是正确的。
Every organism has many genes, according to Mendel's theory. Since the genes persist and do not blend, once you know the genotype of the parents you should be able to predict all the possible phenotypes that could be produced by a cross. But Mendel wondered whether the genes that determined different characteristics were linked together, so that if a pea got a gene for white flowers it also got, say, the gene for hairy stems.
根据孟德尔的理论,每种生物都有许多基因。由于基因持续存在且不会混合,一旦知道了亲本的基因型,就可以预测杂交后可能产生的所有表现型。但孟德尔想知道,决定不同特征的基因是否联系在一起,因此,如果豌豆获得了开白花的基因,它是否也获得了例如长毛茎的基因。
If the genes for different characteristics were not connected, then they would be assigned to offspring independently of each other. Suppose that the hairy-stem allele, , dominated the smoothstem allele, , just as dominates in the gene for the color of the petals. Consider a pea that was heterozygous for both petal color and stem surface. It would have, say one and one allele of the color gene, and one and one allele of the stem gene. Its genotype, then, is WP HS. If these genes were inherited independently of each other then this plant would be able to contribute four different combinations of genes to its offspring: WH, WS, PH, PS.
如果不同特征的基因之间没有联系,那么它们就会被独立地分配给后代。假设毛茎等位基因 主导光滑茎等位基因 ,就像花瓣颜色基因 主导 一样。考虑一种花瓣颜色和茎表面都是杂合的豌豆。例如,它的花色基因有一个 和一个 等位基因,茎的基因有一个 和一个 等位基因。那么,它的基因型就是 WP HS。如果这些基因是独立遗传的,那么这株植物就能为后代提供四种不同的基因组合:WH、WS、PH、PS。
Suppose we crossed this plant, with genotype WP HS, with one that was homozygous for both white petals and smooth stems (i.e., of genotype WW SS), so each of its offspring got the combination W S. The resultant offspring would have one of the following four genotypes:
假设我们将这株基因型为 WP HS 的植物与一株既有白色花瓣又有光滑茎干的同源植物(即基因型为 WW SS)杂交,那么它的每个后代都会得到 W S 组合:

and these genotypes should come in roughly equal numbers. These four kinds of plant would have the following phenotypes:
而这些基因型的数量大致相等。这四种植物的表型如下:

1: White petals, hairy stems
1: 白色花瓣,毛茎

2: White petals, smooth stems
2: 白色花瓣,光滑的茎

3: Purple petals, hairy stems
3: 紫色花瓣,多毛的茎

4: Purple petals, smooth stems.
4: 紫色花瓣,光滑的茎。
If, on the other hand, was linked somehow to , genotype 1 would not exist: the cross would produce no white-flowering hairystemmed peas. Similarly, if was linked to , then genotype 4 would not exist; the cross would produce no purple-flowering smooth-stemmed peas.
另一方面,如果 有某种联系,基因型 1 就不存在了:杂交后不会产生开白花的毛茎豌豆。同样,如果 相连,那么基因型 4 就不存在了;杂交后不会产生开紫色花的平滑茎豌豆。
In a series of experiments, Mendel showed that, in fact, for several pairs of characteristics you got all the four possible combinations. And so he proposed two laws of genetics.
在一系列实验中,孟德尔发现,事实上,对于几对特征,你可以得到所有四种可能的组合。因此,他提出了两条遗传学定律。
Mendel's first law, the law of segregation of characteristics, says that in the gametes, there is only one allele, as opposed to the normal two in the adult organism. (So if a plant has a gene for purple petals and one for white petals, they are segregated in the gametes.)
孟德尔的第一定律,即特性分离定律,指出在配子中只有一个等位基因,而在成体中通常有两个等位基因。(因此,如果一株植物有一个紫色花瓣基因和一个白色花瓣基因,它们在配子中是分离的)。
Mendel's second law was the law of independent assortment of genes. This says that both when different genes in an organism separate to form the gametes and when they join together again to make the fertilized egg, they do so independently. As a result, genes are inherited independently. We can see what this means in practice if we consider an organism that is heterozygous for two genes. Suppose it is for one gene and for another. If allele ends up in a gamete, it is just as likely to be accompanied at the other locus by as with . And if a male gamete has allele , it is just as likely to fertilize an egg with allele of the other gene as it is to fertilize one with allele .
孟德尔的第二定律是基因独立分类定律。这就是说,当生物体内的不同基因分离形成配子时,以及当它们再次结合形成受精卵时,它们都是独立进行的。因此,基因是独立遗传的。如果我们考虑一下两种基因都是杂合子的生物,就会明白这在实践中意味着什么。假设它的一种基因是 ,另一种基因是 。如果等位基因 最终出现在配子中,那么它在另一个位点上出现 的可能性与出现 的可能性一样大。如果一个雄性配子带有等位基因 ,那么它与带有另一个基因的等位基因 的卵子受精的可能性与带有等位基因 的卵子受精的可能性一样大。
Because the separation of alleles and their recombination were basically random processes, Mendel's experiments were more complex than this. His results were statistical, and by using very basic statistical ideas he was able to make rough predictions not only of the variety of phenotypes that could result from a cross, but also of their frequencies.
由于等位基因的分离及其重组基本上是随机过程,孟德尔的实验比这更复杂。他的结果是统计性的,通过使用非常基本的统计思想,他不仅能够粗略预测杂交后可能产生的各种表型,还能预测它们的频率。
Let's summarize the main propositions of Mendel's theory of the gene.
让我们来总结一下孟德尔基因理论的主要命题。
  1. Certain aspects of the phenotype of an organism are determined by its genes. (These are the genetically determined characteristics).
    生物体表型的某些方面由其基因决定。(这些是由基因决定的特征)。
  2. These genes may come in various types, called alleles, which differ in the consequences that their presence has for the genetically determined characteristics.
    这些基因可能有各种类型,称为等位基因,它们的存在对基因决定的特征所产生的后果各不相同。
  3. Each of these genetically determined characteristics may exist in different forms-different colors of petals, for example, or textures of stem.
    每种基因决定的特征都可能以不同的形式存在--例如不同颜色的花瓣或不同质地的茎。
  4. Genetically determined characteristics are produced by pairs of alleles of the gene that corresponds to them.
    由基因决定的特征是由相应基因的一对等位基因产生的。
  5. Every organism gets two alleles of each gene, one from each parent.
    每个生物体的每个基因都有两个等位基因,父母各一个。
  6. If an organism gets identical alleles from each of its parents, it is homozygous for that allele; otherwise it is heterozygous.
    如果一个生物从其父母那里获得的等位基因完全相同,它就是该等位基因的同种生物;否则,它就是异种生物。
  7. If an organism is heterozygous for an allele , it has the genetically determined phenotypic characteristic corresponding to , which we call the phenotype.
    如果一个生物是等位基因 的杂合子,它就具有与 相对应的遗传决定的表型特征,我们称之为 表型。
  8. An allele, , must exist in one of three relations to any other allele, . A can either
    等位基因 与其他等位基因 必须存在三种关系之一。A 可以是
a) be dominant with respect to , or
a) 相对于 占主导地位,或
b) be recessive with respect to , or
b) 相对于 是隐性的,或
c) interact with .
c) 与 互动。
  1. If is dominant with respect to , then an organism that is heterozygous and has the genotype will have the phenotype.
    如果 相对于 是显性的,那么具有 基因型的杂合子生物将具有 表型。
  2. If is recessive with respect to , then an organism that is heterozygous and has the genotype will have the phenotype.
    如果 相对于 是隐性的,那么具有 基因型的杂合子生物将具有 表型。
  3. If interacts with , then an organism that is heterozygous and has the genotype will have neither the nor the phenotype, but some other phenotype (not necessarily intermediate between and ) that is determined by and together.
    如果 相互作用,那么基因型为 的杂合子生物既不会有 也不会有 表型,而会有 共同决定的其他表型(不一定介于 之间)。
Along with these claims about how genes behave go the laws of segregation and independent assortment of genes.
除了这些关于基因行为的说法之外,还有基因的分离和独立分类法。
  1. Segregation: Each gamete bears only one of the two alleles of the adult organism.
    分离:每个配子只携带成体两个等位基因中的一个。
  2. Assortment: When two different genes separate to form gametes and join together again to form the new genotype, they do so independently.
    配子:当两个不同的基因分离形成配子并再次结合形成新的基因型时,它们是独立进行的。

4.4 Theory and observation
4.4 理论与观察

This simplified version of Mendelian genetic theory will allow us to examine many of the features of scientific theories that philosophers of science have discussed. The first important thing to say about Mendel's theory is that it was a great feat of creative imagination. He couldn't see (or touch or hear or taste) genes, so he had to postulate them in order to try to explain the results of his experiments. To postulate the existence of entities is to hypothesize that they exist.
孟德尔遗传理论的简化版将使我们能够研究科学哲学家们所讨论的科学理论的许多特征。关于孟德尔的理论,首先要说明的是,它是创造性想象力的伟大壮举。他看不到(或摸不到、听不到或尝不到)基因,所以他不得不假设基因的存在,以试图解释他的实验结果。假设实体的存在就是假设它们存在。
What, exactly, was involved in hypothesizing that genes exist? Certainly Mendel had to do more than say that he thought there were things called "genes." What he had to do as well was to say what some of their properties were. Frege's theory of meaning can show us why he had to do this. In order for us to understand a term like "gene" it has to have a sense, which is, as you will remember, an associated mode of presentation. So Mendel had to say what something would have to be like in order to be a gene. You understand the name "the Morning Star" because you know that something is the Morning Star if and only if it is a heavenly body that usually appears at a certain point on the horizon in the morning. Mendel had to associate a similar sense with his word "gene."
假设基因的存在究竟涉及到什么?孟德尔要做的当然不仅仅是说他认为有一种东西叫做 "基因"。他还必须说出基因的某些特性。弗雷格的意义理论可以告诉我们为什么他必须这样做。为了让我们理解像 "基因 "这样的术语,它必须有意义,正如你们记得的那样,意义是一种相关的表述方式。因此,孟德尔必须说明,要成为基因,某种东西必须是什么样的。你能理解 "晨星 "这个名字,是因为你知道,如果并且只有当一个天体通常出现在清晨地平线上的某一点时,它才是晨星。孟德尔必须将类似的意义与他的 "基因 "一词联系起来。
Because the word "gene" had no established sense associated with it, the outline of the theory I presented above is a sort of implicit definition of the word. To make it an explicit definition we have to remove the word "gene" from the theory as I summarized it above. We can then introduce the idea of a gene in a way that is equivalent to using a Ramsey-sentence, just like the one we used in chapter one to develop functionalism. Once more, we write out Mendel's theory as a single conjunction of the eleven claims and the laws: call this very long sentence MG (for "Mendelian genetics"). Then we replace the word "gene" throughout with a variable, " ", and other new terms, such as "allele," with other variables. Let's suppose that these were the only new terms. We can now define
由于 "基因 "一词并没有与之相关的既定意义,我在上文提出的理论大纲是对该词的一种隐含定义。为了使其成为一个明确的定义,我们必须从我上面总结的理论中删除 "基因 "一词。然后,我们就可以用一种相当于拉姆齐句式的方式引入基因的概念,就像我们在第一章中用来发展功能主义的拉姆齐句式一样。再一次,我们把孟德尔的理论写成 11 个主张和定律的单一连接词:称这个很长的句子为 MG("孟德尔遗传学 "的意思)。然后,我们用一个变量 " "来代替整个句子中的 "基因 "一词,并用其他变量来代替 "等位基因 "等其他新词。假设只有这些新词。现在我们可以定义

genes and alleles, quite simply, as the two kinds of thing that satisfy this complex open sentence, . Genes and alleles are, so to speak, any X's and Y's that make all thirteen of Mendel's propositions true at once. This way we can define the word "gene" in terms of notions that we already understand: notions such as phenotype (which just means the visible characteristics of the organism), organism, and parent. Of course, this isn't like an ordinary definition, where we define one word only in terms of others we already understand. There is the other term-"allele"-that we don't already understand. But just as the Ramsey-sentence of 1.7 allowed us to interpret "pain" even though the definition involved the concept of "worry," so here we have replaced the words "allele" and "gene" by variables at the same time, and come to understand "allele" along with the term "gene." Mendel's theory that there are genes and alleles thus amounts to saying that there are two kinds of entity that together satisfy .
简单地说,基因和等位基因是满足这个复杂的开放句子的两种东西, 。可以说,基因和等位基因就是能使孟德尔的 13 个命题同时成立的任何 X 和 Y。这样,我们就可以用我们已经理解的概念来定义 "基因 "一词:如表型(仅指生物体的可见特征)、生物体和亲代等概念。当然,这并不像普通定义那样,我们只能根据我们已经理解的其他概念来定义一个词。还有一个词--"等位基因"--我们还没有理解。但是,正如 1.7 中的拉姆齐句子让我们能够解释 "痛苦",尽管这个定义涉及到 "忧虑 "的概念一样,在这里,我们同时用变量替换了 "等位基因 "和 "基因 "这两个词,并在理解 "基因 "的同时理解了 "等位基因"。因此,孟德尔关于存在基因和等位基因的理论等于说,有两种实体共同满足
The reason all of this is necessary, of course, is the fact that I mentioned at the beginning of this section: Mendel couldn't see or otherwise sense genes. They were not observable. Because of this he could not introduce the term "gene" in the way we can define the name "the Evening Star" or the predicate "is red," by pointing to something. (This was what Wittgenstein meant by an "ostensive definition" in 1.3.) That is why unobservable entities have to have their names introduced in terms of things that we can observe. For if we didn't connect their names in this way with things we could observe, we could never use the names. There would be no role for the names in our language because there would be no circumstances in which experience would lead us to use them.
当然,这一切之所以必要,是因为我在本节开头提到了一个事实:孟德尔无法看到或感知基因。基因是无法观察到的。正因为如此,他无法像我们定义 "黄昏之星 "或 "是红色的 "这一谓词那样,通过指向某物来引入 "基因 "一词。(这就是维特根斯坦在 1.3 中所说的 "ostensive definition "的意思)这就是为什么不可观察的实体必须用我们可以观察到的事物来命名。因为如果我们不把它们的名称与我们可以观察到的事物联系起来,我们就永远无法使用这些名称。这些名称在我们的语言中就没有任何作用,因为在任何情况下,经验都不会引导我们使用这些名称。
The term "gene" refers to something that Mendel couldn't observe, but it is also what is called a "theoretical term." It is a theoretical term because it is introduced by way of a theory, in this case MG. Philosophers have sometimes thought that all unobservable things had to be referred to by theoretical terms. Whether this is true is partly a question of definition. If any set of propositionssuch as (1) to (13) in MG- that plays the role of introducing a term can be called a "theory," then all names for things we can't observe will be theoretical terms, by definition. But if we restrict the word "theory" to relatively complex sets of propositions, or to propositions
基因 "一词指的是孟德尔无法观察到的东西,但它也是所谓的 "理论术语"。说它是理论术语,是因为它是通过一种理论引入的,这里指的是 MG。哲学家们有时会认为,所有无法观察到的事物都必须用理论术语来指称。这是否正确,在一定程度上是一个定义问题。如果任何一组命题,如 MG 中的(1)至(13)--起到引入术语的作用,都可以被称为 "理论",那么所有我们无法观察到的事物的名称,根据定义都将是理论术语。但是,如果我们把 "理论 "一词局限于相对复杂的命题集,或局限于命题

that we still regard as speculative, then some terms for unobservables won't be theoretical. Until we developed manned space flight, for example, we couldn't see the other side of the moon. Some astronomer might have introduced the term "Moonback Mountains" to refer to mountains on the other side of the moon. Thus "There is a Moonback Mountain" would be explained by a simple Ramsey-sentence:
那么,一些不可观测的术语就不是理论上的了。例如,在我们发展出载人太空飞行之前,我们无法看到月球的另一面。一些天文学家可能会引入 "月背山 "一词来指代月球另一侧的山脉。这样,"有一座月背山 "就可以用一个简单的拉姆齐句子来解释了:
MM: There exists an such that is a mountain on the other side of the moon.
MM:存在一个 ,这样 就是月球另一面的一座山。
Moonback Mountains would have been unobservable, but in one sense, their name wouldn't have been terribly theoretical. Normally, we call a term "theoretical" only when the sentence by which we introduce it is complex or hypothetical. Is it a theory that the large circular source of light that we see in the sky is a large heavenly body that radiates light? If it is, "sun" is a theoretical term. If it isn't, "sun" isn't a theoretical term. It's as simple as that.
月背山本来是无法观测到的,但从某种意义上说,它的名字并不太理论化。通常,只有当我们引入一个术语的句子是复杂的或假设性的,我们才把它称为 "理论性的"。我们在天空中看到的大型圆形光源是一个大型天体,它能辐射出光线,这是一种理论吗?如果是,"太阳 "就是一个理论术语。如果不是,"太阳 "就不是一个理论术语。就是这么简单。
The issue is complicated by the fact that as we get used to theories we are less and less aware that they are theories at all. When the earliest astronomers first proposed that the little yellow disk in the daytime sky was a large spherical object, this was a theory. But gradually, over time, it has become part of common sense. Every child (in our society) learns that the sun is a large three-dimensional body and not just a disk in the sky.
问题的复杂性在于,当我们习惯于理论时,就会越来越意识不到它们是理论。当最早的天文学家首次提出白天天空中的黄色小圆盘是一个大球体时,这只是一种理论。但随着时间的推移,它逐渐成为常识的一部分。在我们的社会中,每个孩子都知道太阳是一个巨大的三维物体,而不仅仅是天空中的一个圆盘。
The point is that even commonsense beliefs often were once new theories. Indeed, philosophers of science have tended to argue that common sense on any particular matter is just another theory. If we don't call the view that the sun is a heavenly body a "theory," it is because we are not aware of the fact that this was once an exciting and original discovery. In ordinary life, we tend to use the word "theory" to refer to claims that we are still unsure about or that we know we were once unsure about. We tend not to use it for beliefs that we have come to take for granted. In this usage, the distinction between theoretical and nontheoretical terms belongs to the context of discovery: it has to do less with how we came by the terms and more with how secure we have become in our use of them. But philosophers use the word "theory" to mean any set of beliefs about
问题的关键在于,即使是常识性的信念,往往也曾经是新的理论。事实上,科学哲学家倾向于认为,在任何特定问题上,常识只是另一种理论。如果我们不把 "太阳是一个天体 "的观点称为 "理论",那是因为我们没有意识到这曾经是一个激动人心的独创性发现。在日常生活中,我们往往用 "理论 "这个词来指代那些我们仍然不确定的说法,或者我们知道我们曾经不确定的说法。我们往往不会用它来指那些我们认为理所当然的信念。在这种用法中,理论术语与非理论术语之间的区别属于发现的范畴:它与我们如何获得这些术语的关系不大,而与我们在使用这些术语时的稳妥程度关系更大。但是,哲学家们用 "理论 "一词来指关于以下方面的任何一套信念

how the world is, even if those beliefs are relatively simple or obvious or familiar. The point about a theory is that it is a set of propositions that might or might not be true. The way philosophers think about the question, whether something is a theory is an issue about the context of justification.
即使这些信念相对简单、显而易见或耳熟能详。理论的关键在于它是一组可能是真的也可能不是真的命题。哲学家们思考这个问题的方式是,某物是否是一种理论,是一个关于论证背景的问题。
Even if the question whether all terms for unobservable entities are theoretical is partly a definitional question, however, there is no doubt at all that some highly theoretical terms refer to things that are perfectly observable. The term "electron microscope" describes a perfectly observable thing. You can observe one in many biology laboratories. But it is certainly a theoretical term. It can be understood only by way of a theory about electrons.
然而,即使是否所有不可观测实体的术语都是理论性的这个问题在一定程度上是一个定义问题,但毫无疑问,一些高度理论化的术语指的是完全可以观测到的事物。电子显微镜 "一词描述的是完全可以观察到的事物。你可以在许多生物学实验室观察到电子显微镜。但它无疑是一个理论术语。只有通过关于电子的理论才能理解它。
Many philosophers of science, especially since the logical positivists, assumed that all unobservable entities are referred to by theoretical terms, and all theoretical terms refer to unobservable entities. You can see why they might have been led to think this. If we are to refer to unobservable entities, we have to introduce them by way of sentences such as MM. Because of the way philosophers use the word "theory," they would say that it is a theory that there were mountains on the other side of the moon. That makes "Moonback Mountain" a theoretical term. You should keep in mind that, on this usage, when I say that a term is theoretical I do not mean that it can be understood only in terms of an elaborate or complicated theory.
许多科学哲学家,尤其是逻辑实证主义者以来的科学哲学家,都假定所有不可观测的实体都是由理论术语所指称的,而所有理论术语都是指不可观测的实体。你可以理解他们为什么会这样想。如果我们要指称不可观察的实体,我们就必须通过诸如 MM 这样的句子来介绍它们。由于哲学家使用 "理论 "一词的方式,他们会说,月亮的另一面有山是一种理论。这就使得 "月背山 "成为一个理论术语。你应该记住,在这种用法上,当我说一个词是理论性的,我并不是说它只能用一种精致或复杂的理论来理解。
Because of this, the connection between the question whether a belief is theoretical and the epistemological concern that our beliefs be based on observation is not a simple one. It was simply a mistake to suppose that because a term was introduced by way of a theory the thing it referred to could not be observed. This mistake shows up in the case of Mendel's theory. Though Mendel couldn't see genes, when light microscopes and staining techniques improved in the early twentieth century, geneticists came to believe that they could see them. It turned out that some genes (in the salivary glands of fruit flies, for example) were much bigger than others and could be stained so as to reflect light under a microscope. They looked like colored bands on the chromosome. This didn't make the term "gene" any less theoretical, but it did make genes observable.
正因为如此,一个信念是否理论化的问题与我们的信念必须以观察为基础这一认识论问题之间的联系并不简单。如果认为一个术语是通过理论提出的,那么它所指的事物就无法被观察到,这根本就是一个错误。这个错误在孟德尔的理论中就有所体现。虽然孟德尔看不到基因,但当 20 世纪初光学显微镜和染色技术得到改进后,遗传学家开始相信他们可以看到基因。事实证明,有些基因(例如果蝇唾液腺中的基因)比其他基因大得多,可以染色,从而在显微镜下反射光线。它们看起来就像染色体上的色带。这并没有让 "基因 "这个词变得不那么理论化,但它确实让基因变得可以被观察到。
Philosophers call things that we can observe phenomena. A
哲学家把我们能观察到的事物称为现象。A

phenomenon is something like a phenotype (which, as you may have guessed, shares with the word "phenomenon" a Greek root meaning "show" or "appear"). A phenomenon is something you can experience with your senses. As far as Mendel was concerned, the claims he made about genes were not just about phenomena, they were about unobservable reality.
现象 "类似于 "表型"(你可能已经猜到,"表型 "与 "现象 "一词的希腊语词根相同,意为 "显示 "或 "出现")。现象是你可以用感官体验到的东西。就孟德尔而言,他关于基因的主张不仅仅是关于现象,而是关于无法观察到的现实。
Nevertheless, there is an important connection between theoretical terms and observability. As I said just now, if there were no connection between a theoretical term and observable things, we would have no way of using it to refer to things in the world. As the empiricists (whom we discussed in Chapter 2) argued, it is only through experience that we can justify our beliefs about the world.
然而,理论术语与可观测性之间存在着重要的联系。正如我刚才所说,如果一个理论术语与可观察事物之间没有联系,我们就无法用它来指称世界上的事物。正如经验主义者(我们在第二章讨论过他们)所认为的,只有通过经验,我们才能证明我们对世界的信念是正确的。
When I began my discussion of empiricism in Chapter 2, I said that its rise came along with the rise of science. Because of this, empiricism has often been the unofficial philosophy of scientists. One of the reasons that philosophers of science have insisted on a connection between theoretical terms and the observable world is that they have mostly been empiricists who were impressed by the considerations that led to the development of foundationalist epistemologies. You will remember that I also said in Chapter 2 that foundationalist epistemologists insist
当我在第二章开始讨论经验主义时,我曾说过它是伴随着科学的兴起而兴起的。正因为如此,经验主义常常成为科学家的非官方哲学。科学哲学家之所以坚持理论术语与可观察世界之间的联系,原因之一是他们大多是经验主义者,他们对导致基础主义认识论发展的各种考虑印象深刻。你们应该记得,我在第二章中也说过,基础主义认识论者坚持
a) that we must find some class of beliefs of which we have secure knowledge; and
a) 我们必须找到某一类我们有可靠知识的信念;以及
b) that once we find this class, we can then honor some of our other beliefs with the special status of knowledge by showing that they are properly supported by the members of this class of foundational beliefs.
b) 一旦我们找到了这一类信念,我们就可以通过证明我们的一些其他信念得到了这一类基础信念成员的适当支持,从而使这些信念具有知识的特殊地位。
For most traditional empiricists, the foundational class of beliefs encompasses beliefs about the observable world, expressed in observational terms. That is why it is important for empiricists that we can introduce those theoretical terms that refer to things we cannot observe by way of Ramsey-sentences that connect them with objects and properties that we can observe. For then we have some prospect of being able to justify our theoretical beliefs by reference to observation, in exactly the way empiricism requires, even if our theoretical terms refer to unobservable entities. Connecting theo-
对于大多数传统的经验主义者来说,信念的基础类别包括关于可观察世界的信念,这些信念用观察术语来表达。因此,对于经验主义者来说,重要的是我们可以通过拉姆齐句式引入那些我们无法观察到的事物的理论术语,将它们与我们可以观察到的对象和属性联系起来。因为这样一来,即使我们的理论术语指的是无法观察到的实体,我们也有希望通过参照观察来证明我们的理论信念是正确的,这正是经验主义所要求的。将理论

retical terms with observation offers empiricists the prospect that science can lead to genuine knowledge.
从观察的角度来看科学,为经验主义者提供了科学能够带来真正知识的前景。

4.5 The received view of theories
4.5 接受的理论观点

Empiricists, then, place great importance on the thesis that the foundational class of beliefs, the class that justifies all our knowledge, is the class of observational beliefs. As a result, when they come to discuss the structure of scientific theories, they make a strong distinction between terms that are and terms that are not observational. This is a different-though related-distinction from the one that I have made between observable and unobservable entities. The example of the electron microscope shows why it is important to distinguish between the two questions
因此,经验主义者非常重视这样一个论点,即信念的基础类别,即证明我们所有知识的类别,是观察信念的类别。因此,当他们讨论科学理论的结构时,他们会对具有观察性质的术语和不具有观察性质的术语进行严格区分。这与我在可观察实体和不可观察实体之间所作的区分是不同的,但又是相关的。电子显微镜的例子说明了为什么区分这两个问题很重要
a) Is it observable?
a) 是否可以观察到?
b) Do we use observational terms to refer to it?
b) 我们是否使用观测术语来指代它?
Observability is an attribute of things and properties, not of terms. So empiricists need to give a definition of observational terms.
可观察性是事物和属性的属性,而不是术语的属性。因此,经验主义者需要给出观察术语的定义。
The obvious way to do this is to say that a term is observational if we can tell whether it applies simply by observation, without relying on any theory. Thus, "red" is an observational term because we can tell whether something is red just by looking, and "loud" is an observational term because we can tell whether a sound is loud just by listening. The reason "electron microscope" isn't an observational term is not that we cannot observe electron microscopes. Rather, it is that when we look at a piece of apparatus, we need some theory to interpret what we see and allow us to tell whether it is an electron microscope or not. To tell whether something is an electron microscope, you have to be able to find out whether it forms an image of an object by reflecting electrons to a detector, and to do this requires a good deal of theoretical knowledge. In other words, it looks as though the distinction between observational and nonobservational terms is really the distinction between nontheoretical terms and theoretical ones.
要做到这一点,显而易见的方法是,如果我们不依赖任何理论,而仅仅通过观察就能判断一个术语是否适用,那么这个术语就是观察型术语。因此,"红色 "是一个观察术语,因为我们可以通过观察来判断一个东西是否是红色的;"响亮 "是一个观察术语,因为我们可以通过聆听来判断一个声音是否响亮。电子显微镜 "之所以不是一个观察术语,并不是因为我们无法观察电子显微镜。相反,当我们观察一个仪器时,我们需要一些理论来解释我们所看到的,让我们能够判断它是否是电子显微镜。要判断某件东西是否是电子显微镜,就必须能够找出它是否通过将电子反射到探测器来形成物体的图像,而要做到这一点,就需要大量的理论知识。换句话说,观察术语和非观察术语之间的区别,实际上就是非理论术语和理论术语之间的区别。
I shall return to this issue again in the next section. For the
我将在下一节再次讨论这个问题。对于

moment, I am going to assume that we can make a distinction between observational terms, which we apply by using our senses alone, and theoretical terms, which we apply on the basis of observations as interpreted by theory.
现在,我假定我们可以区分观察术语和理论术语,前者是我们仅凭感官来使用的,而后者则是我们根据理论解释的观察结果来使用的。
Given a distinction between theoretical and observational terms, we can divide all the terms in a theory into three, for along with observational terms and theoretical terms, we shall need logical terms, such as the connectives, the quantifiers, and, as we shall see, the modal terms "necessary" and "possible." With these three kinds of terms we can build our theories; the logical positivists (who called themselves, you remember, "consistent empiricists") developed an account of the structure of scientific theories that was based on these distinctions. That model has been so influential that Hilary Putnam, an American philosopher, once called it the "received view" of theories.
鉴于理论术语和观察术语之间的区别,我们可以把理论中的所有术语分为三种,因为除了观察术语和理论术语之外,我们还需要逻辑术语,如连接词、量词,以及我们将要看到的模态术语 "必然 "和 "可能"。有了这三种术语,我们就可以建立我们的理论;逻辑实证主义者(他们自称为 "一贯经验主义者",你们还记得吧)根据这些区别对科学理论的结构进行了阐述。这一模式影响深远,美国哲学家希拉里-普特南(Hilary Putnam)曾将其称为理论的 "公认观点"。
On the received view, a theory is stated in a language that contains, along with the logical terms, a vocabulary of observational terms and of theoretical terms. The observation language consists of sentences containing only observational and logical terms. The theoretical language contains only theoretical terms and logical terms. There will also be mixed sentences, containing both theoretical and observational terms along with logical ones.
根据这种观点,理论是用一种语言表述的,这种语言除了逻辑术语外,还包含观察术语和理论术语。观察语言由只包含观察术语和逻辑术语的句子组成。理论语言只包含理论术语和逻辑术语。也有混合句子,既包含理论术语和观察术语,也包含逻辑术语。
The theory itself will contain two parts. One part, the theoretical postulates, will be stated entirely in the theoretical language and will describe the relations between the entities and properties that the theory postulates. But if we are to use the theory, we must be able to connect these theoretical postulates with observation. So we need as well some mixed sentences called "correspondence rules," which will connect the entities postulated by the theory with things we are able to observe. These rules explain how theoretical sentences correspond to observational ones. Together, the theoretical postulates and the correspondence rules constitute the theory.
理论本身包括两个部分。一部分是理论假设,完全用理论语言表述,描述理论假设的实体和属性之间的关系。但是,如果我们要使用该理论,就必须能够将这些理论假设与观察联系起来。因此,我们还需要一些被称为 "对应规则 "的混合句子,它们将理论假设的实体与我们能够观察到的事物联系起来。这些规则解释了理论句子如何与观察句子相对应。理论假设和对应规则共同构成了理论。
We can see how this model works in the case of MG. The theoretical postulates of MG will include, as we saw earlier:
我们可以在 MG 的案例中看到这种模式是如何运作的。如前所述,MG 的理论假设包括
  1. An allele, , must exist in one of three relations to any other allele, B. A can either
    等位基因 必须与其他等位基因 B 存在三种关系之一。A 可以是
a) be dominant with respect to , or
a) 相对于 占主导地位,或

b) be recessive with respect to , or
b) 相对于 是隐性的,或
c) interact with .
c) 与 互动。
This proposition certainly is not one we can confirm simply by direct observation. To connect it with observation, we have to include correspondence rules such as:
这个命题当然不是我们通过直接观察就能确认的。为了将它与观察联系起来,我们必须加入以下对应规则:
  1. If is dominant with respect to , then an organism that is heterozygous and has the genotype will have the phenotype.
    如果 相对于 是显性的,那么具有 基因型的杂合子生物将具有 表型。
The following two correspondence rules, (10) and (11), will also be important if we want to apply (8).
如果我们要应用 (8),下面两条对应规则 (10) 和 (11) 也很重要。
  1. If is recessive with respect to , then an organism that is heterozygous and has the genotype will have the phenotype.
    如果 相对于 是隐性的,那么具有 基因型的杂合子生物将具有 表型。
  2. If interacts with , then an organism that is heterozygous and has the genotype will have neither the nor the phenotype, but some other phenotype that is determined by and together.
    如果 相互作用,那么基因型为 的杂合子生物既不会有 也不会有 表型,而会有由 共同决定的其他表型。
But even these will not be enough, by themselves, to apply the theory in any particular case. To do that, we would need to replace the variables "A" and "B" with the names of specific genes and phenotypes. So we could say
但即使是这些,也不足以在任何特定情况下应用该理论。为此,我们需要用特定基因和表型的名称来代替变量 "A "和 "B"。因此,我们可以说
Flower color in peas is determined by a gene that has alleles , , and , which produce red, white, and purple flowers in the heterozygous plant. and interact to produce pink flowers. is dominant with respect to . .
豌豆的花色由一个基因决定,该基因有等位基因 ,在杂合子植株中产生红色、白色和紫色花。 相互作用,产生粉红色花。 是显性的。
and so on. Correspondence rules such as these connect the theoretical postulates with observation and make it possible to see what the theory says will happen in particular cases.
等等。诸如此类的对应规则将理论假设与观察联系起来,使我们有可能看到理论所说的在特定情况下会发生的事情。
The empiricist philosophers of science who developed the received view spent a great deal of effort trying to characterize the structure and functioning of theories. They did this because they
提出公认观点的经验主义科学哲学家们花费了大量精力,试图描述理论的结构和功能。他们之所以这样做,是因为他们

were concerned with the epistemological problem of how we know about entities-like genes-that we cannot experience with our unaided senses. But they were interested in theories for another reason. Theories are one of science's most distinctive products. Of course, science has other important products as well. Airplanes and antibiotics, barometers and bazookas, cars and computers-the whole alphabet of modern technology depends for its development on the work of scientists. But we could imagine a (rather strange!) culture that pursued scientific research without much interest in its technological possibilities. What seems impossible is to conceive of science without theory. The development of theories about how different parts of the world work is what science is for. If you don't want scientific theories, you don't want science.
他们关注的是认识论问题,即我们如何认识我们无法用感官体验的实体(如基因)。但他们对理论感兴趣还有另一个原因。理论是科学最独特的产品之一。当然,科学还有其他重要产品。飞机和抗生素、气压计和火箭筒、汽车和计算机--整个现代技术字母表的发展都依赖于科学家的工作。但是,我们可以想象一种(相当奇怪的!)文化,它追求科学研究,却对其技术可能性不感兴趣。没有理论的科学似乎是不可能存在的。科学的目的就是发展关于世界不同部分如何运作的理论。如果你不需要科学理论,你就不需要科学。
To understand how theories work is to understand a large part of what science is about. But why do scientists want to construct theories? What are they for?
了解理论是如何运作的,就等于了解了科学的大部分内容。但科学家为什么要构建理论?它们是用来做什么的?
One empiricist answer to this question is that we want theories in order to make reliable predictions. Our ordinary experience and the observations it yields do not always provide us with the ability to make predictions. You could go on breeding peas for years, noticing that crossing purple and white peas sometimes produces purple and sometimes produces white peas but never noticing that there is the subtle and reliable pattern of results that Mendel discovered. Once you have the theory, however, you can set about reliably predicting when the offspring will be white and when they will be purple; you can even predict the frequencies with which the two colors will result.
经验主义对这个问题的一个回答是,我们需要理论,以便做出可靠的预测。我们的普通经验及其产生的观察结果并不总能为我们提供做出预测的能力。你可能多年来一直在培育豌豆,注意到紫色豌豆和白色豌豆杂交有时会产生紫色豌豆,有时会产生白色豌豆,但却从未注意到孟德尔发现的微妙而可靠的结果模式。然而,一旦你掌握了这一理论,你就可以着手可靠地预测后代什么时候会是白色,什么时候会是紫色;你甚至可以预测两种颜色产生的频率。
Now, most people would say that the reason that Mendel's theory enables us to make these predictions is that it is true. There really are genes with alleles, which are transferred from parents to offspring. The reason that Mendelian genetics gets predictions of flower colors right is that it is part of the correct explanation of how flowers get their colors.
现在,大多数人会说,孟德尔的理论之所以能让我们做出这些预测,是因为它是真实的。确实有基因和等位基因,它们从父母传给后代。孟德尔遗传学之所以能正确预测花朵的颜色,是因为它是对花朵如何获得颜色的正确解释的一部分。
This view of theories is called the realist interpretation of theories. It says that the entities the theory talks about are real and the theoretical postulates and the correspondence rules of a good theory are as true as the sentences of the observation language. Of course, we can't observe the theoretical entities directly, so it is
这种理论观被称为理论的现实主义解释。它说理论所谈论的实体是真实的,好理论的理论假设和对应规则就像观察语言的句子一样真实。当然,我们无法直接观察理论实体,所以它是

harder to get to know about them than it is to get to know about observable things. But because we have the correspondence rules that connect the theory with observation, we can find out about theoretical entities in an indirect way. After all, doesn't the fact that Mendel's theory allowed us to predict the outcome of breeding experiments entitle us to think that genes exist? Or, to put the question another way, doesn't the success of Mendelian predictions give us reason to think that his theory provides the right explanation of how inheritance works, which requires the existence of the entities it postulates?
要了解理论实体比了解可观察事物更难。但是,由于我们拥有将理论与观察联系起来的对应规则,我们可以通过间接的方式了解理论实体。毕竟,孟德尔的理论能让我们预测育种实验的结果,难道这还不能让我们认为基因是存在的吗?或者,换一种说法,孟德尔预测的成功难道不能让我们有理由认为,他的理论为遗传的原理提供了正确的解释,而这需要它所假设的实体的存在吗?
The close connection between successful prediction and explanation has led to the received account of how theoretical explanation works in science. This account of explanation starts from the received view of theories. It's called the deductive-nomological model of explanation, or the "DN model" for short; and it was developed by another member of the school of logical positivism, Carl Hempel.
成功的预测与解释之间的密切联系,导致了对科学中理论解释如何运作的公认说法。对解释的这一解释始于对理论的公认看法。它被称为解释的演绎-名词模型,简称 "DN模型";由逻辑实证主义学派的另一位成员卡尔-亨普尔(Carl Hempel)提出。

4.6 The deductive-nomological model of explanation
4.6 演绎--名词解释模式

We can explain many sorts of things in terms of scientific theory. Mendel's theory explains particular events (this cross produced purple offspring) or general regularities (all the offspring of a red-white cross will be red or pink). Hempel's theory is meant to apply to explanations of both these kinds. He calls the sentence that describes the fact we are trying to explain the "explanandum" (which is Latin for "what is to be explained"). And the sentences that we use in making the explanation he calls the "explanans" (which is Latin for "what does the explaining").
我们可以用科学理论来解释很多事情。孟德尔的理论可以解释特殊事件(这个杂交产生了紫色后代),也可以解释一般规律(红白杂交的所有后代都是红色或粉红色)。亨普尔的理论旨在适用于这两种解释。他把描述我们试图解释的事实的句子称为 "explanandum"(拉丁语,意为 "要解释的东西")。而我们在解释时使用的句子,他称之为 "解释者"(拉丁语,意为 "解释什么")。
Let's take, as our example, Mendel's explanation of the outcome of a particular cross.
让我们以孟德尔对特定杂交结果的解释为例。
(It's worth pointing out that this isn't an observation sentence, because "homozygous" is a theoretical term. To find out if a pea plant is homozygous red we'll have to see if it breeds true.)
(值得指出的是,这不是一个观察句,因为 "同种 "是一个理论术语。要想知道一株豌豆是否是同卵红豆,我们就得看看它是否能繁殖出真正的豌豆)。
The explanans will contain two sorts of sentences. One sort will state
解释性说明将包含两种句子。一种是

antecedent conditions, which describe the setup in which the explanandum occurred. In this case, the antecedent conditions are just:
前因条件,即描述解释词发生的环境。在这种情况下,前因条件是公正的:
C: We crossed a pink pea with a homozygous red one.
C:我们将一粒粉红豌豆与一粒同型红色豌豆杂交。
The other sentences in the explanans represent general laws. I shall return to the issue of what makes a generalization into a law in a later section. For the moment, let's work with the definition that a law is a generalization that the theory says must be true. Thus, we have
解释部分的其他句子代表一般规律。我将在后面的章节中再来讨论是什么使概括成为定律的问题。现在,让我们先按照 "定律是理论认为必须为真的概括 "这一定义来工作。因此,我们有
: A pea has pink flowers if and only if it has genotype .
豌豆:当且仅当基因型为 时,豌豆开粉红色的花。
: A homozygous pea has red flowers if and only if it has genotype .
注:当且仅当基因型为 时,同型豌豆开红花。
along with MG and the laws of segregation and independent assortment. So the explanans consists of , and , along with Mendel's theory and its laws. These laws allow us to deduce that
以及孟德尔遗传学、分离定律和独立分类法。因此,解释者包括 , 和 , 以及孟德尔理论及其定律。通过这些定律,我们可以推断出
: A cross between and must produce some offspring that are and some that are .
注: 和 杂交,后代中一定有 和 。
Together , and allow us to deduce
, 和 一起,我们可以推导出
E: The cross must produce red and pink offspring.
E:杂交后代必须是红色和粉红色。
And from and we can deduce
我们可以推导出
EXPLANANDUM: We crossed a pink pea with a (homozygous) red one and the cross produced both red and pink offspring.
解释:我们用一粒粉红色豌豆与一粒(同基因)红色豌豆杂交,杂交后代既有红色也有粉红色。
(In this deduction we first draw from the consequence
(在这一推导中,我们首先从 得出结果
: The cross produced red and pink offspring,
杂交后代:杂交后代为红色和粉红色、
using the law of modal logic that says that if something must be so, it is so, and then draw the explanandum as a consequence by using the elementary law of sentential logic that says from two sentences (C and ) you can deduce their conjunction.)
使用模态逻辑定律(即如果事情必须如此,那么它就是如此),然后使用句式逻辑的基本定律(即从两个句子(C 和 )可以推导出它们的连词),得出解释词作为结果)。
Hempel says that this explanation is sound if it satisfies three conditions:
亨普尔说,如果这种解释满足三个条件,那么它就是合理的:
I. Logical conditions of adequacy
I.适当性的逻辑条件
(R1) The explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans.
(R1) 解释者必须是被解释者的逻辑结果。
(R2) The explanans must contain general laws.
(R2) 解释性说明必须包含一般规律。
II. Empirical condition of adequacy
II.充分性的经验条件
The sentences constituting the explanans must be true.
构成解释者的句子必须是真实的。
We can summarize Hempel's view like this. There's an explanans:
我们可以这样概括亨普尔的观点。有一个解释者:
Statements of antecedent conditions
先决条件声明
General laws  一般法律
from which we derive by logical deduction the explanandum:
从中我们通过逻辑演绎得出解释词:
E Description of the empirical phenomenon to be explained.
E 说明要解释的经验现象。
Now you can see why this is called the deductive-nomological model. "Nomological" comes from the Greek word "nomos," meaning law. Hempel thinks that the explanation is correct if you can deduce the explanandum from the laws of the theory and the antecedent conditions.
现在你可以明白为什么这被称为演绎-名词模型了吧。"名词学 "来自希腊语 "nomos",意为规律。亨普尔认为,如果能从理论定律和先验条件中推导出解释体,那么解释就是正确的。
It's important that Hempel needed not only the logical conditions of adequacy but the empirical condition as well. To see why, let's suppose we tried to do without it. Now consider Mendel's explanation of some crosses that involve just two alleles of one gene. Remember, Mendel didn't know about chromosomes. So his explanation simply says that there are factors in the organism (genes) that are handed down from the parents to the offspring. Now, suppose that Mendel had a colleague-call him Wilhelm-who thought these factors were little spherical objects inside the plant's cells. If Mendel's explanation meets the logical conditions of adequacy, then Wilhelm's theory does, too. But surely the explanation in terms of little spherical objects is just wrong. Someone who thinks that this is why the crosses turned out the way that they did is just mistaken.
重要的是,亨普尔不仅需要充分性的逻辑条件,还需要经验条件。为了了解原因,让我们假设不需要这个条件。现在请看孟德尔对一些杂交的解释,这些杂交只涉及一个基因的两个等位基因。请记住,孟德尔当时还不知道染色体。因此,他的解释只是说,生物体内有一些因子(基因)会从父母传给后代。现在,假设孟德尔有一位同事--叫他威廉--认为这些因子是植物细胞内的小球体。如果孟德尔的解释符合适当性的逻辑条件,那么威廉的理论也符合。但是,用小球体来解释肯定是错误的。如果有人认为这就是十字架结果的原因,那他就错了。

4.7 Theory reduction and instrumentalism
4.7 理论还原与工具主义

I said that we can explain not only particular events but also general truths and that Hempel's theory takes account of this. There is a variety of general truths we might want to explain, among them some laws. There are observational laws, for example, which are generalizations that the theory says must be true, but which are stated in the observation language. (Sometimes these are called phenomenological laws because they are laws about the phenomena.)
我说过,我们不仅可以解释特定事件,也可以解释一般真理,亨普尔的理论考虑到了这一点。我们可能想要解释各种各样的一般真理,其中包括一些定律。例如,有一些观察定律,它们是理论认为必须为真的概括,但却是用观察语言表述的。(有时这些定律被称为现象学定律,因为它们是关于现象的定律)。
Purple and white peas, when crossed, give rise to purple and white peas
紫豌豆和白豌豆杂交后会产生紫豌豆和白豌豆
is an observational law. This too can be derived logically from MG, along with the two laws and correspondence rules, which tell us that is dominant over . We can deduce laws in the mixed language, such as the law that
是一个观测定律。这也可以从 MG 以及两个定律和对应规则中逻辑地推导出来,这两个定律和对应规则告诉我们, 占主导地位。我们可以用混合语言推导出一些定律,如
Homozygous red peas crossed with white peas will have only pink offspring.
同型红色豌豆与白色豌豆杂交,后代只有粉红色。
Finally, of course, we can deduce theoretical laws from MG, such as that
最后,我们当然可以从 MG 中推导出理论定律,例如
Two homozygous genotypes of distinct alleles will produce only heterozygous genotypes in the first generation.
两个不同等位基因的同源基因型在第一代只会产生杂合基因型。
The fact that we can explain generalizations on this model is of very great significance for the received view: it allows us to tell a story about how science can develop. One of the striking features of the history of science is the way in which earlier theories get superseded by later ones. Sometimes, of course, we just discover the old theory was wrong. It makes false predictions. But sometimes we discover that we can keep much or all of the old theory while the new theory develops, because the new theory explains the old theory.
我们可以根据这个模型来解释一般化,这对我们所接受的观点具有非常重要的意义:它使我们能够讲述科学如何发展的故事。科学史的一个显著特点是,早期的理论会被后来的理论所取代。当然,有时我们只是发现旧理论是错误的。它做出了错误的预测。但有时我们会发现,在新理论发展的同时,我们可以保留大部分或全部旧理论,因为新理论可以解释旧理论。
Something like this happened in the history of genetic theory. It was discovered that genes were in fact segments of the chromosomes-the bodies in the nuclei of cells that carry hereditary infor-
在遗传理论的发展史上,也曾发生过类似的事情。人们发现,基因实际上是染色体的片段--染色体是细胞核中携带遗传信息的机构。

mation. It was possible, therefore, to explain why all of the first eleven of Mendel's claims were true. They were true because small portions of the chromosome obeyed these eleven principles. For example, every cell of the organism, except the gametes, had two chromosomes, one from each parent, and that was why there were two alleles at each chromosomal locus in each cell. Thus, according to the DN model, these eleven claims of Mendel's theory could be explained by the chromosome theory, because they could be derived logically from it.
因此,有可能解释为什么孟德尔的前 11 个说法都是真的。因此,我们可以解释为什么孟德尔的前 11 条理论都是正确的。它们之所以成立,是因为染色体的一小部分遵守了这 11 条原则。例如,除配子外,生物体的每个细胞都有两条染色体,父母各一条,这就是为什么每个细胞的每个染色体位点都有两条等位基因。因此,根据 DN 模型,孟德尔理论的这 11 项主张可以用染色体理论来解释,因为它们可以从染色体理论中逻辑地推导出来。
But some genes failed to obey the laws of independent assortment. They were not inherited independently. This was because, if two genes were on the same chromosome, when the chromosomes came to be divided between the gametes, the genes were bound together and so were inherited together. If the genes for stem texture and flower color had been like this, for example, then, as we saw, Mendel might have got only two out of the four theoretically possible kinds of offspring.
但是,有些基因并不遵守独立分类的法则。它们不是独立遗传的。这是因为,如果两个基因在同一条染色体上,当染色体在配子间分裂时,这两个基因就会结合在一起,从而一起遗传。例如,如果茎的质地和花的颜色的基因是这样的,那么,正如我们所看到的,孟德尔可能只得到了理论上可能出现的四种后代中的两种。
Nevertheless, where genes were on different chromosomes, they did obey Mendel's second law of independent assortment. So, as it turned out, the second law, which was one of the most significant parts of Mendel's theory, was in fact true only in special cases: the cases where the genes were on different chromosomes. Not only was the law true of pairs of genes on different chromosomes, the discovery of the chromosome allowed one to see immediately why the law was not obeyed by genes on the same chromosome and to predict what would happen in that case.
然而,当基因位于不同的染色体上时,它们确实遵守了孟德尔的第二独立配种定律。因此,事实证明,作为孟德尔理论最重要部分之一的第二定律,实际上只在特殊情况下才是正确的:即基因在不同染色体上的情况。该定律不仅适用于不同染色体上的成对基因,而且染色体的发现使人们能够立即发现为什么同一条染色体上的基因不遵守该定律,并预测在这种情况下会发生什么。
Thus, when chromosomes were discovered, genetic theory was able to build on Mendel's theory. On the received view of theories, we can see how science can be progressive. When we make new discoveries we do not always have to start all over again; and the new theories actually make it possible to explain why the old ones worked, when they worked.
因此,当染色体被发现后,遗传学理论得以在孟德尔理论的基础上更上一层楼。从接受理论的角度,我们可以看到科学是如何进步的。当我们有了新的发现时,我们并不总是要从头开始;新的理论实际上可以解释为什么旧的理论在起作用时会起作用。
The process of showing that an old theory can be derived from a new one as a special case is called theory reduction. We can derive the old theory from a new one, using the special conditions under which the old theory works as the antecedent conditions of the explanation. On the DN model the successes of the old theory are, thereby, explained. Thus, in the case of genetics, the fact that
证明旧理论可以作为特例从新理论中推导出来的过程叫做理论还原。我们可以利用旧理论发挥作用的特殊条件作为解释的先验条件,从新理论推导出旧理论。在 DN 模型中,旧理论的成功之处由此得到了解释。因此,就遗传学而言,以下事实
Mendel's theory was superseded by the chromosome theory didn't mean that all the explanations it had made possible had to be given up. The old explanations were still adequate in all those cases that didn't depend on the second law, just because all the other laws were still true. And even those Mendelian explanations that presupposed the second law could easily be salvaged in any case that involved only pairs of genes on different chromosomes.
孟德尔的理论被染色体理论所取代,并不意味着必须放弃它所提供的所有解释。在所有不依赖于第二定律的情况下,旧的解释仍然是充分的,只是因为所有其他定律仍然是正确的。即使是那些以第二定律为前提的孟德尔解释,在只涉及不同染色体上成对基因的情况下,也很容易被挽救。
This view of theoretical progress also accounts for an important fact about the many so-called crucial experiments in scientific history-those experiments that play a decisive role in the changeover from one theory to another. On this view of scientific progress, such crucial experiments play the role of showing where an old theory breaks down. But, because the old theory usually works in many cases, the circumstances of the crucial experiment are important in defining the antecedent conditions under which the old theory does work. The crucial experiment contributes to the progress of science not simply by getting us to jettison the old theory, but by showing something about its limitations. Thus the experiments that demonstrated that not all genes were independent showed that Mendel's theory was limited in its application, a fact that the chromosome theory was able to explain.
这种理论进步观还解释了科学史上许多所谓关键实验的一个重要事实--这些实验在一种理论向另一种理论的转换中起着决定性的作用。根据这种科学进步观,这些关键实验的作用是显示旧理论的崩溃之处。但是,由于旧理论通常在很多情况下都行之有效,因此关键实验的情况对于确定旧理论确实行之有效的先决条件非常重要。关键实验对科学进步的贡献不仅仅在于让我们抛弃旧理论,还在于显示了旧理论的局限性。因此,证明并非所有基因都是独立的实验表明,孟德尔的理论在应用上受到了限制,而染色体理论能够解释这一事实。
The received view of explanation and of theory reduction was realist. It assumed that the theoretical entities of an explanatory theory really existed. Hempel's realism came out in the empirical condition of adequacy, which requires that the laws be actually true. If Mendel's theory, including its laws, is true, then genes exist. But other empiricists were so impressed with the way in which theories make prediction possible that they suggested this was all they were for. If they were right, then a good theory was one that made reliable predictions and a bad one was one that made unreliable ones. The theoretical entities did not have to exist for the theory to give good explanations. In short, the theory doesn't have to be true; it just has to make the right observational predictions.
人们对解释和理论还原的看法是现实主义的。它假定解释理论的理论实体确实存在。亨普尔的现实主义体现在 "充分性 "这一经验条件上,它要求定律必须是真实的。如果孟德尔的理论(包括其定律)是真实的,那么基因就存在。但其他经验主义者对理论使预测成为可能的方式印象深刻,他们认为这就是理论的全部意义。如果他们是对的,那么能做出可靠预测的理论就是好理论,而做出不可靠预测的理论就是坏理论。理论实体不一定存在,理论就能给出好的解释。简而言之,理论不一定是真的,它只需要做出正确的观测预测。
This view of theories is called "instrumentalism." Instrumentalism, then, holds that theories are just instruments that allow us to predict phenomena. But instrumentalism, though it is quite consistent with the fact that scientific theories have led to a great increase in our capacity to predict (and thus sometimes con-
这种理论观被称为 "工具论"。工具论认为,理论只是让我们预测现象的工具。但是,工具论虽然与科学理论极大地提高了我们的预测能力(有时也因此提高了预测能力)这一事实相吻合,但它也有其局限性。

trol) what happens in our world, certainly doesn't seem to capture what most scientists think they are doing. After all, according to the instrumentalist view, Mendel's theory wasn't really about unobservable entities called genes at all. The only part of Mendel's theory that matters for the instrumentalist is the observation language. Indeed, any theory that made exactly the same predictions as MG in the observation language would be just as good. That's because the instrumentalist gives up the empirical condition of adequacy for explanations.
当然,这似乎并不符合大多数科学家的想法。毕竟,根据工具论者的观点,孟德尔的理论根本不是真正关于不可观测的实体--基因的。对工具论者来说,孟德尔理论中唯一重要的部分就是观察语言。事实上,任何用观察语言做出与 MG 完全相同的预测的理论都一样好。这是因为工具论者放弃了解释充分性的经验条件。
One of the major arguments for instrumentalism is epistemological. Instrumentalists, like logical positivists, are radical empiricists. They want to say that beliefs are justified only if they have empirical support, only if there are observations that lead you to believe them. We can see why this might lead you to think that you ought not to believe in unobservable entities.
工具论的主要论据之一是认识论。工具论者与逻辑实证主义者一样,都是激进的经验主义者。他们想说,只有当信念得到经验支持时,只有当观察结果导致你相信信念时,信念才是合理的。我们可以理解为什么这会让你认为不应该相信无法观察到的实体。
Consider any theory, such as MG, that refers to unobservable things. The instrumentalist can say that whatever evidence you have for MG is exactly as good as the evidence for a different theory: the theory that says that the world appears to behave as if there were genes. Call this theory the "instrumentalist alternative to MG." The instrumentalist alternative to MG makes exactly the same claims in the observation language as MG does. But you cannot possibly get evidence that favors MG over the instrumentalist alternative to MG: the only difference between them is in what they say about things that cannot be experienced.
任何理论,比如 MG,都是指无法观察到的事物。工具论者可以说,无论你有什么证据证明 MG,都与另一种理论的证据一样好:这种理论认为,世界的行为似乎就像有基因一样。把这种理论称为 "MG 的工具论替代理论"。替代 MG 的工具论在观察语言上提出了与 MG 完全相同的主张。但是,你不可能得到证据,证明 MG 比 MG 的工具主义替代理论更有优势:它们之间唯一的区别在于它们对无法体验的事物的说法。
This epistemological argument for instrumentalism amounts to a challenge: the instrumentalist wants us to show why we should care about matters to which no possible evidence is relevant. That most of us do care is obvious enough. It is one thing to suggest that we can only use terms that connect with things we can observe, which is what the received view says, and another to say, with the instrumentalists, that we have no reason to believe that there are things we could not, under any circumstances, observe. Indeed-we can respond to the instrumentalist's challenge-surely, whether or not we can observe a thing is just a fact about us. And why should the furniture of universe depend on us? The issue here is essentially the one that came up in the private-language argument and in the argument for verificationism. Wittgenstein said that we must be able to
工具论在认识论上的这一论点相当于一个挑战:工具论者希望我们证明,为什么我们应该关心那些没有可能的证据与之相关的问题。我们大多数人确实关心这些问题,这一点显而易见。提出我们只能使用与我们能够观察到的事物相关联的术语是一回事,这也是人们所接受的观点,而与工具论者一起说我们没有理由相信存在着我们在任何情况下都无法观察到的事物则是另一回事。事实上,我们可以回应工具论者的质疑--当然,我们能否观察到某一事物只是我们的一个事实。为什么宇宙的存在要取决于我们呢?这里的问题基本上就是在私人语言论证和验证主义论证中出现的问题。维特根斯坦说,我们必须能够

check that we are referring to a thing properly if it is to exist. The verificationist says we must be able to know about something if it is to exist. And the instrumentalist says we must be able to observe a thing if it is to exist. All these views are to some extent idealist: they hold, in opposition to realism, that the existence of an object depends in some way on our ideas, on its relationship with our minds.
如果一个事物要存在,就必须检查我们是否正确地提到了它。验证论者认为,要想让某一事物存在,我们就必须能够了解它。而工具论者则认为,如果一个事物要存在,我们就必须能够观察到它。所有这些观点在某种程度上都是唯心主义的:它们与现实主义相反,认为物体的存在在某种程度上取决于我们的观念,取决于它与我们思想的关系。
Not only is instrumentalism idealist, its consequences are in other ways counterintuitive. If instrumentalism were right, for example, the astrologer who makes successful predictions of how the stock market will move would have to be regarded as giving a good scientific explanation of why the prices move the way they do. And surely even if such an astrologer were always right, we could still doubt that the theory gave the correct explanation of why the stock market behaves as it does. But the instrumentalist could reply that the reason why we reject this explanation is that astrology also makes other predictions that are not true. If astrologers could limit their theory so that it only made predictions about the stock market, and provided those predictions were correct, the instrumentalist would be happy to say that their explanations were correct, too. I shall argue in a moment that there is another objection to instrumentalism, an objection that will then lead us to a serious argument against the received view.
工具论不仅是唯心主义的,其后果在其他方面也是反直觉的。举例来说,如果工具论是正确的,那么对股市走势做出成功预测的占星家就必须被视为对价格走势的原因做出了很好的科学解释。当然,即使这样的占星家总是正确的,我们仍然会怀疑该理论是否正确地解释了股市的行为方式。但工具论者可以回答说,我们之所以拒绝这种解释,是因为占星术还做出了其他不正确的预测。如果占星家能够限制他们的理论,使其只对股票市场做出预测,只要这些预测是正确的,工具论者就会很高兴地说他们的解释也是正确的。稍后我将论证,工具论还存在另一种反对意见,这种反对意见将引导我们对所接受的观点进行严肃的论证。

4.8 Theory-ladenness 4.8 理论倾向性

Instrumentalists believe only in the existence of observable things and their observable properties. But the distinction between what we can and cannot observe is relative. As the philosopher of science, Grover Maxwell, has written:
工具论者只相信可观察事物的存在及其可观察的属性。但是,我们能观察到和观察不到的东西之间的区别是相对的。科学哲学家格罗弗-麦克斯韦曾写道:
This continuum is not very worrying in itself. But it is rather troubling to suppose, as the instrumentalists do, that whether we should say that something exists depends on the apparently arbitrary question of where in this continuum we draw the line.
这个连续体本身并不令人担忧。但是,如果像工具论者那样,认为我们是否应该说某种事物存在,取决于我们在这个连续体中的哪个位置划线这个显然是武断的问题,那就相当令人担忧了。
This objection to instrumentalism is one of the reasons that many philosophers have given it up. But a much more basic objection than this has been developed in recent years, one that grows out of the work of the American philosopher Russ Hanson. His objection, put at its simplest, is that there is no such thing as an observation language! If Hanson is right, then the idea that we should regard only the sentences of the observation language as true would have the consequence that we would have to regard all theories as untrue. And that would, surely, be a reductio of the instrumentalist position.
对工具论的这种反对是许多哲学家放弃工具论的原因之一。不过,近年来出现了一种比这更基本的反对意见,它源于美国哲学家拉斯-汉森(Russ Hanson)的研究。他的反对意见最简单地说,就是根本不存在观察语言!如果汉森是对的,那么我们只应把观察语言的句子视为真实的想法,就会导致我们不得不把所有理论都视为不真实。这无疑是对工具论立场的还原。
To understand Hanson's view, we must remember how we defined the distinction between observational and theoretical terms. An observational term, I said, is one that we can apply by using our senses without the help of theory. A theoretical term is one that we apply on the basis of observations, but observations that we need theories to interpret. But suppose that every statement we made on the basis of observation, however simple and easy it was to make, in fact depended on theory. Then this distinction would break down. Russ Hanson argued that this was in fact the case. According to him, every empirical statement that says anything about the world depends on theory.
要理解汉森的观点,我们必须记住我们是如何定义观察术语和理论术语之间的区别的。我说过,观察术语是我们可以通过感官来应用的术语,不需要理论的帮助。理论术语是我们根据观察结果来使用的术语,但我们需要理论来解释观察结果。但是,假设我们根据观察所做的每一个陈述,无论多么简单易行,实际上都依赖于理论。那么这种区分就会被打破。拉斯-汉森认为,事实的确如此。根据他的观点,每一个关于世界的经验陈述都依赖于理论。
To see why Hanson thought this, it helps to begin by noticing that whenever we see something we also see that something. When I see a ripe apple, I see that there is a ripe apple before me. You cannot observe something without observing that a certain state of affairs obtains. But when I see that something is an apple, this commits me to believing something beyond what I have actually observed. It commits me to believing that, if I stretch out my hand, I will be able to touch it, for example; it also commits me to believing that it grew on an apple tree. (You might like to consider how this fact is connected with Frege's discovery of the primacy of the sentence; see 3.4. We can't use names except in sentences; we can't experience the referents of names except in the context of facts.)
要想知道汉森为什么会这么想,首先要注意到,每当我们看到某样东西时,我们也会看到那样东西。当我看到一个熟透的苹果时,我就看到我面前有一个熟透的苹果。如果没有观察到某种事态的存在,你就无法观察到某种事物。但是,当我看到某物是一个苹果时,这就意味着我相信了一些超出我实际观察到的东西。例如,它让我相信,如果我伸出手,我就能摸到它;它还让我相信,它长在一棵苹果树上。 你也许想考虑一下,这一事实与弗雷格发现的句子优先性有什么联系;见 3.4。除了在句子中,我们无法使用名称;除了在事实的语境中,我们无法体验名称的所指)。
Now, though we would not normally say that
虽然我们通常不会说
Things that look like this apple are ripe apples and grow on trees
像这个苹果的东西是成熟的苹果,长在树上
is a theory, it is a theory in the philosopher's sense. It says something about the world, something that might or might not be true. To make the observation statement "This is a ripe apple," on the basis of this experience, you have to suppose that this little theory is correct.
是一种理论,它是哲学家意义上的理论。它说的是关于这个世界的一些事情,一些可能是真的也可能不是真的事情。要根据这一经验做出 "这是一个成熟的苹果 "这样的观察陈述,你必须假设这个小理论是正确的。
The instrumentalists might argue, at this point, that I have cheated. What they have in mind as an observation statement is, by definition, something that you can make without theory. All I have done is to show that "This is a ripe apple" isn't an observation statement. But surely, they will insist, there are some observation statements, in this sense. To suppose that there are some such observation statements is to espouse what the American philosopher Wilfred Sellars has called the "myth of the given," the idea that there must be some experiences that give us knowledge independently of any theory at all.
在这一点上,工具论者可能会说我欺骗了他们。他们心目中的观察陈述,顾名思义,就是不需要理论也能做出的东西。我所做的只是证明 "这是一个熟透的苹果 "并不是一个观察陈述。但是,他们肯定会坚持说,在这个意义上,是有一些观察陈述的。假定存在这样一些观察陈述,就是支持美国哲学家威尔弗雷德-塞拉斯(Wilfred Sellars)所说的 "给定的神话",即认为一定有一些经验能独立于任何理论而给予我们知识。
Sellars attacked the myth of the given, arguing that belief in this myth results from a confusion between having a sense experience and making a judgment on the basis of it. (This is a distinction that goes back at least to Immanuel Kant.) When I see something red, I have a certain experience, and the experience might indeed be independent of any other experiences. But I also make the judgment that I am seeing something red. It is that judgment on the basis of which I make further judgments (the stoplight is shining, say). To make that judgment, however, I must be able to apply the concept red not just on this occasion but on others. (Otherwise I am not using the concept correctly.) That capacity is not independent of other experiences, and the connection between different experiences it presupposes requires some theory.
塞拉斯抨击了 "给定 "的神话,认为对这一神话的信仰源于混淆了感官经验与根据感官经验做出判断之间的关系(这一区别至少可以追溯到伊曼纽尔-康德)。(当我看到红色的东西时,我有了某种体验,这种体验可能确实独立于任何其他体验。但我也会做出判断,我看到的是红色的东西。正是在这一判断的基础上,我做出了进一步的判断(比如说,红绿灯在闪烁)。然而,要做出这样的判断,我必须能够运用 "红色 "这个概念,不仅在这个场合,而且在其他场合。(否则,我就没有正确使用这个概念。)这种能力并不独立于其他经验,它所预设的不同经验之间的联系需要某种理论。
These arguments are difficult but, I think, persuasive. Still, even if they were not, there is an overwhelming reason not to require observation statements untainted by theory as the basis for your philosophy of science. For even if there were things we could know on the basis of no theory at all, they would not be the sorts of things
这些论点很难,但我认为是有说服力的。不过,即使不是这样,也有压倒性的理由不要求把没有理论污染的观察陈述作为科学哲学的基础。因为,即使有些东西我们可以在完全没有理论的基础上知道,它们也不会是这样的东西

that science is concerned about. To see why this is, consider a sentence, , which is supposed to be one that we can make on the basis of observation without any theory at all. Suppose that you are having the experience that justifies you in believing is true. Since commits you to no theory at all, it cannot by itself commit you to believing that other people will gain evidence for the truth of if they make observations. But then, whatever is like, it cannot be part of the public world of things that science is supposed to be about. For if a public object exists, then other people can come to experience it. (If you remember the private-language argument of 1.3 , you will be able to see that we could use it to argue that there could be no such sentence as ; in fact, that is exactly one of the arguments against the myth of the given that philosophers have made.)
科学所关注的。要想知道为什么会这样,请看一个句子, ,这个句子应该是我们不需要任何理论就可以根据观察得出的。假设你的经验使你相信 是真的。由于 完全没有让你相信任何理论,因此它本身并不能让你相信其他人如果进行观察就会获得 的真实性的证据。但是,不管 是什么样的,它都不可能是科学应该涉及的公共事物世界的一部分。因为如果一个公共事物存在,那么其他人就可以来体验它。(如果你还记得 1.3 中的私语论证,你就会发现我们可以用它来论证不可能有 这样的句子;事实上,这正是哲学家们反对给定神话的论证之一)。
Hanson's view that every observation statement depends on some theory, however simple it is and however convinced we are that it is true, is called the view that observation is theory-laden. (Hanson actually used the term "theory-loaded," but it didn't stick!) Observation is theory-laden, because whenever we make a judgment on the basis of our sensory experience, the judgment commits us to the existence of objects, events or properties that go beyond that evidence. This fact, that evidence always leads us to make claims beyond the evidence, is called the "underdetermination of empirical theory." The contents of our empirical beliefs are not fully determined by the evidence we have for them. There is an obvious connection between the underdetermination of empirical theory and the defeasibility that we noticed (in 2.3) as a characteristic of our judgments about the world. Just because our empirical claims always go beyond the evidence, they could always turn out later to be wrong. The sight of an (illusory) apple could fail to be followed by the feel of an apple when you stretch out a hand.
汉森认为,每一个观察陈述都依赖于某种理论,无论它多么简单,也无论我们多么相信它是真的,这种观点被称为 "观察带有理论负载"。(汉森实际上用的是 "理论负载 "这个词,但它并不常用!)观察是理论负载的,因为每当我们根据感官经验做出判断时,这个判断就会让我们承诺存在超出证据范围的对象、事件或属性。证据总是引导我们提出超越证据的主张,这一事实被称为 "经验理论的欠确定性"。我们经验信念的内容并不完全由我们所掌握的证据决定。经验理论的欠确定性与我们(在 2.3 中)注意到的作为我们对世界的判断的一个特征的可击败性之间存在着明显的联系。正因为我们的经验主张总是超越证据,所以它们后来总是可能被证明是错误的。当你看到一个(虚幻的)苹果时,伸出手就会感觉到苹果的存在。
The theory-ladenness of observation threatens the received view because the received view depends on making a distinction between the observation language, on one hand, and the theoretical language, on the other. If there is no such distinction, the received view cannot be maintained. Notice, however, that the fact that observation is theory-laden doesn't threaten the idea that we need to be able to connect our theories with experience if we are to have a use
观察的理论倾向性威胁着公认的观点,因为公认的观点依赖于区分观察语言和理论语言。如果没有这种区分,接受的观点就无法成立。然而,请注意,观察带有理论色彩这一事实并不威胁我们的观点,即如果我们要使用观察语言,就必须能够将我们的理论与经验联系起来。

for them. Even if we have to have theories to make any observations at all, we still need to be able to have grounds for believing theoretical propositions, and if empiricism is right, such grounds are provided by experience. What is threatened is not the empiricist view that theory needs to be connected with observation, but the received view that observation is possible without theory. Thus, we can simply reconstruct the received view without relying on an absolute distinction between an observation language and a theoretical language. We won't worry exactly about where we draw the boundary. All we will insist on is a practical distinction between sentences that we are able in practice to check fairly easily by using our senses, on one hand, and sentences that require more time or apparatus or calculation to decide about, on the other. We'll call the first sort of sentence "observational" and the second "theoretical," wherever we draw the boundary, and it will still be true that we need to be able to connect theoretical sentences with observational ones if we want to put a theory to use.
为它们提供依据。即使我们必须有理论才能进行任何观察,我们仍然需要有理由相信理论命题,而如果经验主义是正确的,这种理由就是由经验提供的。受到威胁的不是经验主义关于理论需要与观察相联系的观点,而是关于没有理论观察也是可能的这一公认观点。因此,我们可以简单地重建已接受的观点,而不必依赖观察语言和理论语言之间的绝对区别。我们不会担心边界到底划在哪里。我们所要坚持的,只是在实践中区分两种句子,一种是我们在实践中能够相当容易地通过感官来检验的句子,另一种是需要更多时间、仪器或计算来决定的句子。我们把第一种句子称为 "观察句",把第二种句子称为 "理论句",无论我们把边界划在哪里,如果我们想把理论用于实践,我们就必须能够把理论句与观察句联系起来,这一点仍然是正确的。
But Hanson made a more radical suggestion than this one. He suggested that even those sentences whose truth value we can decide easily by using our senses change their meaning when we use them in connection with new theories. I suggested that terms such as "gene" got their meaning from something like a Ramseysentence-in other words, that their meaning is fixed by their relationships with terms for things that we can observe. Hanson suggested that the converse holds: what observational terms mean depends on their connections with theoretical terms also. Whenever there is a change of theory, all terms, including relatively observational ones, change their meaning. Thus, he suggested that when Copernicus realized that the Earth went round the Sun, and not the Sun round the Earth, the word "Sun" changed its meaning. This view is called the "meaning-variance hypothesis."
但汉森提出了一个比这更激进的建议。他认为,即使是那些我们可以通过感官轻易判断其真值的句子,当我们把它们与新理论联系起来使用时,它们的意义也会发生变化。我认为,诸如 "基因 "之类的术语是从类似拉姆齐斯句子的东西中获得意义的--换句话说,它们的意义是由它们与我们可以观察到的事物的术语之间的关系固定下来的。汉森认为反过来也成立:观察术语的含义也取决于它们与理论术语之间的关系。每当理论发生变化时,所有术语,包括相对观察术语,都会改变其含义。因此,他认为,当哥白尼意识到是地球绕着太阳转,而不是太阳绕着地球转时,"太阳 "一词的含义就发生了变化。这种观点被称为 "意义变异假说"。
The meaning-variance hypothesis, if true, would threaten the DN model of theory reduction. For example, when we came to use the chromosome theory to derive, say, an observational law of MG, we would be trying to derive a sentence that used "pea" to mean one thing from a theory that used "pea" to mean something different! And, obviously, in a valid deduction you have to keep the meanings of words constant throughout the argument. (Not to do so is a mis-
如果意义差异假说成立,它将威胁到理论还原的 DN 模型。例如,当我们用染色体理论来推导 MG 的观察定律时,我们将试图从一个用 "豌豆 "表示不同意思的理论中推导出一个用 "豌豆 "表示一个意思的句子!显然,在有效的推导中,你必须在整个论证过程中保持词义不变。(不这样做是错误的

take that has a name: it's called a "fallacy of ambiguity.") It would follow that we could not give the rather natural explanation of how science progresses that went with the received view.
这有一个名称:叫做 "模棱两可的谬误")。这样一来,我们就无法对科学是如何发展的做出符合公认观点的自然解释。
Fortunately, there are serious problems with the meaning-variance hypothesis. The main objection to the meaning-variance view is that Hanson offers no grounds for thinking that every term must change its meaning with a change in our theories about that thing. If this were right, then every time we changed our beliefs about anything, that would involve changing the meanings of all the sentences about that thing. Someone who came to believe that water is would have to mean something different by "Fill the bath with water, please" from someone who didn't believe it. But this is a reductio of Hanson's position. For it follows from his view that you and I would mean different things by most of the words we use, since we certainly differ in some of our views on almost every subject.
幸运的是,意义变异假说存在严重问题。对意义变异观点的主要反对意见是,汉森没有提供任何理由让我们认为,每一个术语都必须随着我们关于该事物的理论的改变而改变其意义。如果这种观点是正确的,那么每当我们改变对任何事物的信念时,都会涉及改变关于该事物的所有句子的含义。如果有人相信水是 ,那么 "请给浴缸加满水 "的意思就会与不相信水是 的人的意思不同。但这是对汉森立场的还原。因为根据他的观点,你和我使用的大多数词语的含义都是不同的,因为我们在几乎每一个话题上的某些观点肯定都是不同的。
Nevertheless, Hanson's position does make us conscious of the possibility that as our theories change, some of our words do change their meanings. Mendel may have meant the laws of segregation and independent assortment to be part of the definition of a gene. If that is so, then his theory is not true of what we call "genes." For, on our meaning of the word "gene," some genes do not obey both these laws. We would have to say that Mendel's views were about genes on different chromosomes. But we could still say both that the chromosome theory was an addition to the knowledge acquired by Mendel and that the chromosome theory explained his theory's successes. For, if we said that his word "gene" referred to what we call "genes on different chromosomes," we would be able to derive his laws from our theory.
尽管如此,汉森的立场确实让我们意识到,随着我们理论的变化,我们的一些词语确实会改变其含义。孟德尔的意思可能是,基因的定义中包含了分离和独立分类的法则。如果是这样的话,那么他的理论对于我们所说的 "基因 "来说就不正确了。因为,按照我们对 "基因 "一词的理解,有些基因并不遵守这两条定律。我们不得不说,孟德尔的观点是关于不同染色体上的基因的。但我们仍然可以说,染色体理论是对孟德尔所获知识的补充,染色体理论也解释了孟德尔理论的成功之处。因为,如果我们说他的 "基因 "一词指的是我们所说的 "不同染色体上的基因",我们就能从我们的理论中得出他的定律。

4.9 Justifying theories I: The problem of induction
4.9 论证理论 I:归纳问题

The problems I have been discussing about the structure of theories and the logic of explanation are central to the philosophy of science. But, as you will quickly see, they do not settle the issue of what makes a theory scientific. They do not settle the demarcation problem. The reason is simple. That a theory satisfies all the conditions of the received view and is used to make explanations according to the DN model doesn't by itself make it scientific. Suppose Jim
我一直在讨论的理论结构和解释逻辑问题是科学哲学的核心。但是,正如你们很快就会看到的,它们并没有解决怎样的理论才是科学的问题。它们并没有解决分界问题。原因很简单。一种理论满足了公认观点的所有条件,并被用来按照 DN 模式做出解释,但这本身并不能使它具有科学性。假设吉姆

turned up with a theory of the gene exactly like Mendel's. If he had no evidence to support it and felt, in fact, that it didn't need experimental support, we would be impressed, no doubt. But we would hardly regard him as a scientist.
如果他提出了与孟德尔完全相同的基因理论。如果他没有任何证据来支持他的理论,而且事实上他认为这个理论不需要实验的支持,毫无疑问,我们会对他刮目相看。但我们很难将他视为科学家。
What would have made this theory scientific would have been the way he set about justifying and developing the theory. Mendel's theory is not scientific just because it is true. After all, it isn't true! Nor is it scientific just because it can be stated in terms of the received view (modified to take account of theory-ladenness) as we have just seen, someone could offer Mendel's theory in a way that wasn't scientific. It looks as though the answer to the demarcation problem is going to depend not on the structure of the theories but on the way we develop or support them. These are issues in the contexts of discovery and justification.
使这一理论具有科学性的是他论证和发展这一理论的方式。孟德尔的理论并不因为它是真的就科学。毕竟,它不是真的!正如我们刚才所看到的,有人可能会以一种不科学的方式提出孟德尔的理论。看来,分界问题的答案并不取决于理论的结构,而是取决于我们发展或支持理论的方式。这些都是发现和论证方面的问题。
So how do we develop and justify our scientific theories? The obvious answer is that scientists support their theories by gathering evidence in exactly the sort of way Mendel did. We then use the theory to make predictions and then we see, through experiment and observation, whether those predictions come out right.
那么,我们如何发展和证明我们的科学理论呢?答案显而易见,科学家通过收集证据来支持他们的理论,这与孟德尔的做法如出一辙。然后,我们利用理论做出预测,再通过实验和观察,看看这些预测是否正确。
The process of gathering evidence and using it to justify general propositions is called "induction." And in the early days of modern science, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume argued that there was a serious difficulty in justifying induction. He posed what we now call the "problem of induction."
收集证据并利用证据证明一般性命题的过程被称为 "归纳法"。在现代科学的早期,18 世纪苏格兰哲学家大卫-休谟(David Hume)认为,要证明归纳法的合理性存在严重困难。他提出了我们现在所说的 "归纳问题"。
To see the force of the problem, it helps to begin with a simple picture of how you might go about supporting a scientific generalization. How, for example, would you go about supporting the generalization that purple genes dominate white ones in peas? The answer seems obvious. You would see whether purple genes dominated white ones in a whole series of crosses. The general idea, then, is that to find out if the generalization "All A's are B's" is true, you must look at a lot of A's and see if they are B's. If you find that they are, that supports the generalization. This process of arguing from many cases of A's that are B's to the conclusion that all A's are B's is called enumerative induction. It is the most basic kind of inductive argument. An A that is a B is an instance of the law "All A's are B's." And if the existence of something gives us grounds for believing a sentence, we can say that it supports the sentence. So
要了解问题的力量,不妨先简单了解一下如何支持科学概括。例如,你如何去支持豌豆中紫色基因主导白色基因这一概括呢?答案似乎显而易见。你可以在一系列杂交中观察紫色基因是否主导白色基因。总的来说,要想知道 "所有的 A 都是 B "这一概括是否正确,就必须研究大量的 A,看看它们是否是 B。如果你发现它们是,那就支持了这个概括。这种从许多 A 是 B 的情况中论证出所有 A 都是 B 的结论的过程叫做枚举归纳法。这是最基本的归纳论证。一个A是一个B,就是 "所有A都是B "定律的一个实例。如果某个事物的存在让我们有理由相信一个句子,我们就可以说它支持了这个句子。那么

we can say that the view that we develop and justify laws by enumerative induction is the view that laws are supported by their instances. The position that science does and should develop in this way is called inductivism. (Because Sir Francis Bacon, the English Renaissance courtier and philosopher, suggested in the early seventeenth century that science proceeded by generalizing from experience, the view that science proceeds in this way is sometimes called
我们可以说,我们通过枚举归纳法来发展和证明定律的观点,就是定律由其实例所支持的观点。认为科学确实并且应该以这种方式发展的观点被称为归纳主义。(由于英国文艺复兴时期的朝臣和哲学家弗朗西斯-培根爵士(Sir Francis Bacon)在十七世纪初提出,科学是通过从经验中归纳出来的,因此科学以这种方式发展的观点有时也被称为 "归纳主义"。

"Baconian.") "巴科尼")。

Here is a passage from Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding where he argues that enumerative induction is unjustified. He considers the problem of how we should confirm the generalization that bread provides nourishment.
下面是休谟《关于人类理解的探询》中的一段话,他在这段话中论证了枚举归纳法是不合理的。他考虑的问题是,我们应该如何确认 "面包提供营养 "这一概括。
From a body of like color and consistence with bread, we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, similar sensible qualities will always be joined with similar secret powers; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless.
从一个与面包同样颜色、同样质地的躯体中,我们期待得到同样的营养和支持。但这肯定是思维的一个步骤或进步,需要加以解释。当一个人说,我在过去的所有事例中都发现,这样的感性品质与这样的秘密力量结合在一起:而当他说,类似的感性品质总会与类似的秘密力量结合在一起时,他并没有犯同义反复的错误,这些命题在任何方面都是相同的。你说一个命题是从另一个命题推论出来的。但你必须承认,这个推论不是直观的,也不是证明性的:那它属于什么性质呢?说它是实验性的,那是在乞求问题。因为所有从经验得出的推论,其基础都是假定未来会与过去相似,相似的能力会与相似的感官品质结合在一起。如果怀疑大自然的进程会发生变化,怀疑过去不能作为未来的准则,那么所有的经验都会变得毫无用处。
Hume's question is what justifies the inference, the "step or progress of the mind":
休谟的问题是,"心灵的阶梯或进步 "这一推论的合理性何在:
I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers.
在过去的所有事例中,我都发现了这种感性品质与这种秘密力量的结合。
So: Similar sensible qualities will always be joined with similar secret powers.
所以:相似的理智品质总会与相似的秘密力量结合在一起。
He says that it isn't a tautology—by which he means that it isn't an
他说这不是同义反复--他的意思是这不是一个

analytic truth-that these two sentences are equivalent, so that the inference is not logically valid or "demonstrative." That is certainly true. For there are possible worlds where bread is nourishing until today and then not nourishing tomorrow, because, for example, all of us lose the enzymes for digesting the carbohydrates in bread after the Earth is irradiated by intense cosmic rays. And he says that it isn't intuitive: we don't know that it is true by intuition.
分析真理--这两个句子是等价的,因此推论在逻辑上是不成立的,也不是 "示范性的"。这当然是对的。因为在有些可能的世界里,面包今天还很有营养,明天就没有营养了,例如,在地球受到强烈的宇宙射线照射后,我们所有人都失去了消化面包中碳水化合物的酶。他说,这不是直觉:我们不能凭直觉知道这是真的。
But, as he points out, it looks as though it would be a valid inference if we added a further premise:
但是,正如他所指出的,如果我们再加上一个前提,这似乎就是一个有效的推论:
UNIFORMITY: The future will resemble the past.
一致性:未来将与过去相似。
That is, it looks as though, if we add this principle of the uniformity of nature, we can reason like this:
也就是说,如果我们加上这个自然统一性原则,似乎就可以这样推理了:
INDUCTION: In the past bread was nourishing. The future will resemble the past.
诱导:过去,面包有营养。未来将与过去相似。
So: In the future bread will be nourishing.
所以:未来的面包会很有营养。
Hume thought that the problem of induction was that the principle of the uniformity of nature was neither a logical truth nor intuitive and that there was therefore no obvious reason why we should believe it. After all, it is itself a generalization. If the only way to justify a generalization were to use an argument of this form, we would have to argue for the principle of the uniformity of nature like this:
休谟认为,归纳法的问题在于,自然界的统一性原则既不是逻辑真理,也不是直觉,因此没有明显的理由让我们相信它。毕竟,它本身就是一种概括。如果证明一个概括的唯一方法就是使用这种形式的论证,那么我们就不得不这样论证自然统一性原理:
In the past the future resembled the past. The future will resemble the past.
过去,未来与过去相似。未来将与过去相似。
So: The future will resemble the past.
那么未来将与过去相似。
But this is obviously a question-begging argument! It has its conclusion as one of its premises. Nobody who wasn't already convinced that nature was uniform could be persuaded by this argument.
但这显然是一个问题论证!它把结论作为前提之一。如果不是已经确信自然界是统一的,没有人会被这个论证说服。
The major problem with the sort of inference that is involved in INDUCTION is that, unlike deductive inferences, which are logically valid, the conclusion says more than the premises. We call such inferences "ampliative"; they amplify or go beyond the premises. One way of seeing that the inductive inference, is ampliative is to
归纳推理(INDUCTION)所涉及的那种推理的主要问题在于,与逻辑上有效的演绎推理不同,它的结论比前提说得更多。我们称这种推论为 "放大 "推论;它们放大或超越了前提。要知道归纳推理是放大推理,一种方法是

notice that the conclusion is not true in all of the possible worlds where the premises are. As we saw in the last chapter, in a logically valid inference the conclusion is true in every possible world where the premises are true. So in a deductive inference we can reliably draw the conclusion because it is true in all of the worlds where the premises are true. But in an inductive inference, we start with premises that show we are in a certain class of worlds and draw a conclusion that is true in only some of those worlds. Since the information in the conclusion is more than the information in the premises, we seem to have manufactured some information out of thin air!
请注意,结论并不是在前提为真的所有可能世界中都是真的。正如我们在上一章中看到的,在逻辑上有效的推理中,结论在前提为真的所有可能世界中都是真的。因此,在演绎推理中,我们可以可靠地得出结论,因为结论在所有前提为真的世界中都是真的。但在归纳推理中,我们从前提出发,前提表明我们处于某一类世界中,然后得出结论,结论只在其中一些世界中为真。由于结论中的信息多于前提中的信息,我们似乎凭空制造了一些信息!
In a sense, the problem of induction is the first problem in epistemology that was raised by the development of science. For making empirical generalizations-some of them, like Newton's theory of gravitation, generalizations about the whole universe-is absolutely central to the natural sciences.
从某种意义上说,归纳问题是科学发展在认识论中提出的第一个问题。因为根据经验进行归纳--其中有些归纳,如牛顿的万有引力理论,是对整个宇宙的归纳--绝对是自然科学的核心。

4.10 Goodman's new riddle of induction
4.10 古德曼的新归纳之谜

Many attempts have been made since Hume's day to say what justifies induction as a form of ampliative inference. Some of them have relied on a principle of the uniformity of nature. But all these suggestions were called into question when the American philosopher Nelson Goodman showed in 1955 that even if the principle of the uniformity of nature were correct, it would not solve the problem of justifying these inferences. Goodman's work thus poses what he called the "new riddle of induction."
自休谟时代以来,人们曾多次尝试说明归纳法作为一种放大推理的合理性。其中一些尝试依赖于自然统一性原则。但是,当美国哲学家纳尔逊-古德曼(Nelson Goodman)在 1955 年指出,即使自然统一性原则是正确的,它也不能解决证明这些推论合理性的问题时,所有这些建议都受到了质疑。因此,古德曼的研究提出了他所说的 "归纳法的新谜题"。
Any solution to Hume's problem that requires a principle of the uniformity of nature supposes that we understand what it means for the future to be like the past. Goodman's new riddle shows that this is not such a clear idea. The problem, remember, is how to justify conclusions of the form "All A's are B's" on the basis of lots of evidence of the form "This A is a B." Goodman produced examples where we had lots of evidence of the form "This A is a B" but we would certainly not think that the conclusion that all such A's were B's was reasonable.
要解决休谟的问题,就必须要有一个自然统一性原则,而这一原则的前提是我们理解未来与过去相似的含义。古德曼的新谜语表明,这并不是一个如此清晰的概念。记住,问题是如何在大量证据的基础上证明 "所有 A 都是 B "这种形式的结论是正确的。古德曼举出的例子中,我们有很多 "这个 A 是 B "的证据,但我们肯定不会认为 "所有这样的 A 都是 B "的结论是合理的。
Here is his most famous example. Suppose all the emeralds in the world that have been examined up until now have been green. Since we have discovered that each emerald we have observed is green at
下面是他最著名的例子。假设到目前为止,世界上所有经过检验的祖母绿都是绿色的。既然我们已经发现,我们观察到的每块祖母绿都是绿色的,那么在

each time we have looked at it, we are entitled to infer by enumerative induction that
我们每看一次,就有权通过枚举归纳法推断出
All emeralds are always (i.e., at all times) green.
所有祖母绿都是绿色的。
Consider, now, the invented predicate "is grue." We define it as follows:
现在,请看我们发明的谓词 "is grue"。我们将其定义如下
Something is grue if and only if it has been examined before January 1, 2100, and is green, or has not been examined before January 1,2100 , and is blue.
当且仅当某物在 2100 年 1 月 1 日之前被检验过并且是绿色的,或者在 2100 年 1 月 1 日之前未被检验过并且是蓝色的,该物才是胶状物。
You will notice that it follows from this definition that all the emeralds observed so far are grue. The time is before January 2100, and all the ones we have observed so far have been green each time we have looked at them. So we are entitled by the same argument to infer that
你会注意到,根据这个定义,目前观察到的所有祖母绿都是绿色的。时间是 2100 年 1 月之前,而我们迄今为止观察到的所有祖母绿每次都是绿色的。因此,根据同样的论证,我们有权推断出
All emeralds are always grue.
所有的祖母绿都是赝品。
So far there may seem to be no problem. But what will happen on New Year's Day 2100? If all the emeralds we find after then are blue, then they will indeed have been grue all along; but if the emeralds we find after then aren't blue, then they were never grue. In that case enumerative induction will have led us badly astray. If they are all blue, then enumerative induction will not have led us astray by getting us to infer that emeralds are always grue, but it will have led us astray by getting us to infer that they are always green. Either way, then, enumerative induction will have led us astray.
目前看来似乎没有问题。但是,2100 年元旦那天会发生什么呢?如果我们在那之后找到的所有祖母绿都是蓝色的,那么它们确实一直都是假的;但如果我们在那之后找到的祖母绿不是蓝色的,那么它们从来就不是假的。在这种情况下,枚举归纳法就会把我们引入歧途。如果它们都是蓝色的,那么枚举归纳法就不会因为让我们推断出祖母绿总是假的而误入歧途,而是会因为让我们推断出祖母绿总是绿色的而误入歧途。无论如何,枚举归纳法都会把我们引入歧途。
Goodman's own suggestion for dealing with the new riddle of induction is that we should only rely on enumerative induction in certain cases, cases where the predicates involved, unlike "is grue," are what he calls "entrenched." A predicate is entrenched if it has frequently and successfully been used in other inductions. He says that predicates that are well entrenched are projectible; we can rely on them when we project them into the future.
古德曼自己提出的处理归纳法新谜题的建议是,我们只应在某些情况下依赖枚举归纳法,即所涉及的谓词与 "is grue "不同,是他所说的 "根深蒂固 "的谓词。如果一个谓词在其他归纳法中经常被成功使用,那么这个谓词就是根深蒂固的。他说,根深蒂固的谓词是可以投射的;当我们把它们投射到未来时,我们可以依赖它们。
The difficulty with this answer is that it looks as though it begs the question in exactly the way that Hume originally pointed out.
这个答案的难点在于,它似乎恰恰以休谟最初指出的方式提出了问题。
For Goodman seems to be recommending that we project those predicates that we have successfully projected in the past. But that seems to rely on the inference:
因为古德曼似乎建议我们推测那些我们过去成功推测过的谓词。但这似乎依赖于推理:
This predicate has been successfully projected in the past.
这一谓词在过去曾被成功预测过。
So: This predicate will be successfully projected in the future.
所以:这个谓词将在未来被成功预测。
And that is just another enumerative induction!
这只是另一种枚举归纳法!
These problems with induction raise the question whether inductively based beliefs can provide a form of knowledge, which is obviously an important epistemological question. There is, in fact, a connection between Goodman's proposal and reliabilism. Goodman's argument is, in essence, that induction is not a generally reliable method of belief formation because it can be seen to lead us astray with predicates such as "is grue." One way of justifying his proposal that we should use only some predicates in induction and not others is to observe that induction is reliable with some predicates and not others. If we use induction with a predicate that is reliable, we are using a reliable belief-forming process, and so, according to reliabilism, we are acquiring knowledge. So we can't guarantee that a particular induction, using particular projectible predicates, will work; but if it does, then, the argument suggests, induction can provide knowledge.
归纳法的这些问题提出了一个问题,即以归纳法为基础的信念能否提供一种知识,这显然是一个重要的认识论问题。事实上,古德曼的提议与可靠论之间存在联系。古德曼的论点实质上是说,归纳法并不是一种普遍可靠的信念形成方法,因为我们可以看到归纳法会把我们带入 "是格鲁 "这样的谓词的歧途。要证明他关于归纳法只应使用某些谓词而不应使用其他谓词的提议是正确的,一种方法是观察归纳法在使用某些谓词时是可靠的,而在使用其他谓词时则不可靠。如果我们在使用归纳法时使用的谓词是可靠的,那么我们就是在使用一个可靠的信念形成过程,因此,根据可靠论,我们就是在获取知识。因此,我们不能保证使用特定可投射谓词的特定归纳法会奏效;但如果它奏效了,那么,根据论证,归纳法就能提供知识。
This argument has something of the same air of paradox about it as the argument that we know what is going on in the world and the brain in the vat does not, even though we could not tell whether we were brains in vats if we were. Here, Goodman is saying that induction with projectible predicates is a source of knowledge, even though we can't tell in advance whether a particular predicate is projectible. Someone who wanted a guarantee that the procedures of science would be reliable would be no more satisfied with this response than they would be with the objective (or externalist) account of justification I suggested in 2.8.
这个论证与 "我们知道世界上发生了什么,而缸中的大脑却不知道,尽管我们无法判断我们是否是缸中的大脑 "的论证有着同样的悖论气息。在这里,古德曼说的是,使用可投射谓词的归纳法是知识的来源,尽管我们无法事先知道某个谓词是否可投射。如果有人想保证科学的程序是可靠的,那么他对这个回答的满意程度不会超过我在 2.8 中提出的客观(或外部主义)的理由说明。

4.11 Justifying theories II: Popper and falsification
4.11 证明理论的合理性之二:波普尔与证伪

The problem of induction arose because we supposed that scientific generalizations were supported by their instances. But Karl Popper, who, like many of the twentieth-century philosophers I have
归纳问题之所以产生,是因为我们认为科学概括是由其实例支持的。但是,卡尔-波普尔,就像我所见过的许多二十世纪哲学家一样

mentioned, was associated (though rather antagonistically!) with the Vienna Circle, argued that this was a mistake. Hume, Popper argued, was absolutely right. Laws are not supported by their instances. What happens in the sciences is that people such as Mendel creatively invent hypotheses. They then set out to examine their instances, not because the instances support the laws but because they know that if the instances don't support the laws, the hypotheses are false. Science, in Popper's view, does not proceed by induction and the verification of true theories. Rather, we go on with the hypotheses we make until they are falsified, until, that is, experience shows that they are not true.
波普尔认为这是一个错误。波普尔认为,休谟是完全正确的。定律没有实例支持。科学界的情况是,孟德尔等人创造性地提出假设。然后,他们开始研究其实例,这并不是因为实例支持定律,而是因为他们知道,如果实例不支持定律,那么假设就是错误的。在波普尔看来,科学不是通过归纳法和验证真理论来进行的。相反,我们继续我们所做的假设,直到它们被证伪,也就是说,直到经验表明它们不是真的。
Popper relies here on a simple logical fact, a fact about predicate logic. The problem of induction arises, in his view, because for the law that "All A's are B's" to be true, there must not be one single A that is not a B. It follows that until we have examined every single A, we cannot be sure that the law is true. But, by the same token, we only have to find one that is not a in order to show that a law is false. So, while we can never be sure that a law is true, we can, apparently, be sure that a law is false.
波普尔在这里依据的是一个简单的逻辑事实,一个关于谓词逻辑的事实。在他看来,归纳法的问题之所以产生,是因为要使 "所有的A都是B "这一定律为真,就不能有一个A不是B。但是,同样的道理,我们只需要找到一个不是 ,就能证明定律是假的。因此,虽然我们永远无法确定一个定律是真的,但我们显然可以确定一个定律是假的。
Popper, then, doesn't solve the problem of induction, but, as he says, he dissolves it by showing there never was such a problem. There is no problem of induction in science because scientists do not proceed by induction. Rather, they proceed by conjecturethat is, imaginatively inventing new theories - and then make observations and do experiments that may lead, in the end, to refutation. Then they try out new theories, and another cycle of conjecture and refutation begins.
因此,波普尔并没有解决归纳法的问题,但正如他所说的,他通过证明从来就不存在这样一个问题而解决了归纳法的问题。科学中不存在归纳法问题,因为科学家不是通过归纳法进行研究的。相反,他们是通过猜想--即富有想象力地发明新理论--然后进行观察和实验,最终可能导致反驳。然后,他们尝试新的理论,另一个猜想和反驳的循环又开始了。
Popper's rejection of inductivism is radical. He denies that we are ever justified in believing that scientific theories are true. Science does not produce knowledge because it does not produce justification; and so we shouldn't really believe scientific theories. We may accept them until they are falsified; but accepting a theory, for Popper, is not the same as believing it to be true. To accept a theory is to keep using it provisionally in the knowledge that at any moment observation or experiment may force us to give it up. One way of putting Popper's view is to say that he takes fallibilism very seriously.
波普尔对归纳法的否定是激进的。他否认我们有理由相信科学理论是真的。科学不会产生知识,因为它不会产生合理性;因此,我们不应该真正相信科学理论。我们可以接受它们,直到它们被证伪为止;但在波普尔看来,接受一种理论并不等于相信它是真的。接受一种理论就是继续暂时使用它,因为我们知道观察或实验随时可能迫使我们放弃它。波普尔观点的一种表述方式是,他非常严肃地对待 "弱点论"。
Because Popper places such emphasis on the fact that scientists give up theories that are false, rather than insisting, as classical
由于波普尔如此强调科学家放弃错误理论的事实,而不是像经典理论那样坚持认为

empiricism did, on trying to find theories that are true, his position is called "falsificationism." Indeed, Popper's answer to the demarcation problem is that what makes a statement scientific is just that it is possible to falsify it.
波普尔的立场被称为 "证伪主义"。事实上,波普尔对分界问题的回答是,使一个陈述具有科学性的原因只是有可能证伪它。
Popper's position has won a good deal of support among scientists, who have the experience all the time of having to give up theories because experiments show them wrong. They probably also find flattering the fact that Popper insists on the importance of the creative process of conjecture! More important, the fact that scientific theory making is, indeed, not a simple matter of generalizing from examples you have collected fits well with Popper's view. No amount of hard work collecting instances will lead to a new theory, in Popper's view, without the original creative act of the human mind. Popper's claim is, in essence, that we are justified in using theories not because we have evidence that they are true, but until we have evidence that they are false.
波普尔的立场在科学家中赢得了广泛的支持,因为他们经常会因为实验表明理论是错误的而不得不放弃理论。波普尔坚持猜想这一创造性过程的重要性,这可能也让他们感到受宠若惊!更重要的是,事实上,科学理论的形成并不是简单地从收集到的实例中归纳出来,这与波普尔的观点不谋而合。在波普尔看来,如果没有人类头脑的原始创造性行为,无论收集多少实例的艰苦工作都不会导致新理论的产生。波普尔的主张实质上是,我们有理由使用理论,不是因为我们有证据证明它们是真的,而是直到我们有证据证明它们是假的。
Despite its popularity among scientists, there are certainly problems with Popper's view. To begin with, the simple logical point I made just now is really not so simple as it seems. It is true that whenever we have evidence that one is not a , we have evidence that it is false that all A's are B's. But in order to find out that one A is not a , we always have to rely on other generalizations. (This fact, which was pointed out by the French philosopher-physicist Pierre Duhem and built on by the American philosopher W. V. O. Quine, is sometimes called the "Duhem-Quine problem.") Thus, to find a homozygous purple pea that does not produce purple offspring when crossed with a homozygous white pea, I have to rely on such generalizations as the (rather elementary) law that homozygous WW peas look white. If I am not entitled to assume that this law is true, then I am not entitled to believe that I have found a white offspring of such a cross.
尽管波普尔的观点在科学家中很受欢迎,但它肯定存在一些问题。首先,我刚才提出的简单逻辑观点其实并不像看起来那么简单。诚然,只要我们有证据证明一个 不是 ,我们就有证据证明所有的 A 都是 B 是假的。但是,为了找出一个 A 不是 ,我们总是不得不依赖其他的概括。(这一事实由法国哲学家兼物理学家皮埃尔-杜亨(Pierre Duhem)指出,并由美国哲学家W-V-O-奎因(W. V. O. Quine)加以发展,有时被称为 "杜亨-奎因问题")。因此,要想找到一种与同种白豌豆杂交不会产生紫色后代的同种紫豌豆,我就必须依靠诸如同种 WW 豌豆看起来是白色的定律(相当基本)这样的概括。如果我无权假定这一定律是正确的,那么我也就无权相信我已经找到了这种杂交的白色后代。
Of course, this particular law is one that we are rather sure of. But in many crucial experiments we rely on a whole lot of highly theoretical laws in order to show that an old theory was wrong. Many of the experiments that showed that Mendel's laws of segregation and independent assortment were wrong involved theoretical assumptions about what was going on in particular crosses.
当然,这一特殊定律是我们相当确信的。但是,在许多重要的实验中,我们依赖大量高度理论化的定律来证明旧理论是错误的。许多证明孟德尔的分离定律和独立变异定律是错误的实验都涉及对特定杂交中发生的事情的理论假设。
Moreover, Popper's theory makes it difficult to understand why
此外,波普尔的理论让人很难理解为什么

science seems to progress. On the DN theory of explanation, old theories are often reduced to new ones, so that we show that the old theory is a special case of the new one. But on Popper's view, all that we are entitled to keep from the old theory are the instances where it succeeded and not any of the laws. Once the old conjecture is falsified, we are free to make any new conjecture that is consistent with the existing data. The claim that this is how science actually proceeds-throwing out the old theories and starting again from scratch—is hardly consistent with the historical evidence.
科学似乎在进步。根据DN解释理论,旧理论往往被还原为新理论,这样我们就可以证明旧理论是新理论的特例。但在波普尔看来,我们有权从旧理论中保留的只是它成功的实例,而不是任何规律。一旦旧的猜想被证伪,我们就可以自由地提出任何与现有数据相一致的新猜想。声称科学就是这样进行的--抛开旧理论,从头开始--这与历史证据很难吻合。
A final difficulty with Popper's view is that it is highly counterintuitive to say that we never have any reason to think that theories are true. For the Popperian, the relevance of experimental evidence is not that it confirms the truth of our theories. Indeed, Popper explicitly rejects all inductivist talk of scientists confirming theories. Rather, evidence is relevant because theories that have survived rigorous testing are what Popper calls better "corroborated" than those that have not. But if corroboration provides no reason for thinking a theory is true, why is it a reason for accepting it at all?
波普尔观点的最后一个难点在于,说我们从来没有理由认为理论是正确的,是非常反直觉的。对于波普尔主义者来说,实验证据的意义并不在于它证实了我们理论的真实性。事实上,波普尔明确反对所有关于科学家证实理论的归纳主义言论。相反,证据之所以重要,是因为那些经过严格检验的理论比那些没有经过检验的理论更能得到波普尔所说的 "确证"。但是,如果确证并不能成为人们认为某种理论为真的理由,那么它又何尝不是人们接受这种理论的理由呢?
This question is especially urgent because for any well-corroborated theory-any theory, that is, that has survived rigorous testing-there are infinite numbers of different and incompatible theories that have not been tested but which are consistent with all the existing evidence. Of course, no one has even thought of most of them, and many of them are likely to seem just silly. But the point is that so far as Popper is concerned, they have just the same chance of being true as the well-corroborated theory. If the evidence of experiments does not give us reason to think that our theories are true, why should we prefer theories that have survived experimental testing to other as-yet-unfalsified theories that have not?
这个问题尤为紧迫,因为对于任何经过严格检验的理论来说,都存在着无数种不同的、互不相容的理论,它们虽然没有经过检验,但却与现有的所有证据相吻合。当然,这些理论中的大多数甚至都没有人想到过,而且其中很多理论可能看起来都很愚蠢。但问题是,在波普尔看来,这些理论与得到充分证实的理论一样,都有可能成为真理。如果实验证据不能让我们有理由认为我们的理论是正确的,那么我们为什么要偏爱那些经过实验检验的理论,而不是其他尚未被证伪的理论呢?
This question is a very serious challenge to Popper's philosophy of science. Nevertheless, without a solution to the problem of induction, Popper's theory at least provides a way of explaining what we do in science that does not depend on a form of argument, induction, that seems to be unjustifiable.
这个问题是对波普尔科学哲学的一个非常严峻的挑战。尽管如此,在没有解决归纳法问题的情况下,波普尔的理论至少提供了一种解释我们在科学中所做的事情的方法,而这种方法并不依赖于归纳这种似乎无法自圆其说的论证形式。
Popper's theory and inductivism each offer an answer to the demarcation problem. Inductivists say that theories are scientific if they are based on inductive evidence. This means that the criterion of demarcation belongs to the context of discovery. It has to do with
波普尔理论和归纳主义各自为分界问题提供了答案。归纳主义者认为,如果理论是建立在归纳证据的基础上,那么它们就是科学的。这意味着划分标准属于发现的范畴。它与

how we come to believe the theory. An inductivist would say that the astrological beliefs I mentioned at the start are unscientific because they were not properly derived from and supported by inductive evidence.
我们是如何相信这一理论的。一个归纳主义者会说,我在开头提到的占星学信仰是不科学的,因为它们并不是从归纳证据中正确推导出来的,也没有得到归纳证据的支持。
But Popper's view is that how we came to believe our laws has nothing to do with what makes them scientific. Rather, what makes them scientific is that they are always open to falsification. For Popper, astrologers are unscientific because their theories are so vaguely formulated and so hedged with qualifications that they could never be shown to be false. So Popper's demarcation criterion belongs to the context of justification.
但波普尔认为,我们是如何相信我们的定律的,这与定律的科学性无关。相反,它们之所以是科学的,是因为它们总是可以被证伪的。在波普尔看来,占星家是不科学的,因为他们的理论表述得太含糊不清,而且充满了各种限制条件,以至于永远无法证明它们是错误的。因此,波普尔的划分标准属于正当性的范畴。

4.12 Justifying theories III: Inference to the best explanation
4.12 证明理论的合理性 III:推论出最佳解释

The basic problem facing both falsificationists, such as Popper, and inductivists is that we appear to need to make ampliative inferences that take us from evidence about a body of data to claims that go far beyond that evidence. We would like to be justified in thinking that these claims are likely to be true. The problem of induction suggests that we have no such justification; Popper's response is unsatisfactory in part because it declares that we don't need such a justification. Is there another way out?
波普尔等证伪论者和归纳论者都面临的一个基本问题是,我们似乎需要进行放大推论,从有关一组数据的证据推导出远远超出这些证据的主张。我们希望有理由认为这些主张很可能是真的。归纳法的问题表明,我们没有这样的理由;波普尔的回答不能令人满意,部分原因在于它宣称我们不需要这样的理由。还有其他出路吗?
One possibility that has been explored by philosophers of science in recent years is that neither induction nor conjecture is the best way to understand what we are doing when we move from data to theory. Instead, the American philosopher Gil Harman suggested, what we are doing when we construct a theory on the basis of data is that we are trying to find the theory that best explains our data. So this view of the relationship between data and theory is called "inference to the best explanation"; I'll call this suggestion the "ITBE model" for short.
近年来,科学哲学家们探讨了一种可能性,即归纳或猜想都不是理解我们从数据到理论的过程的最佳方式。相反,美国哲学家吉尔-哈曼(Gil Harman)认为,当我们在数据的基础上构建理论时,我们所做的是试图找到最能解释我们的数据的理论。因此,这种关于数据与理论之间关系的观点被称为 "最佳解释推论";我将这种建议简称为 "ITBE 模型"。
Let's consider Mendel's experiments again. What Mendel noticed was a series of patterns in the results of plant-breeding experiments. For example, if you crossed a white-flowering pea with a redflowering one, you sometimes got just pink offspring and sometimes you got both red and pink. Furthermore, when there were red and pink flowers in the offspring, the plants that had them came in about equal numbers. What Mendel showed was that if you supposed
让我们再来看看孟德尔的实验。孟德尔注意到了植物育种实验结果中的一系列规律。例如,如果用开白花的豌豆和开红花的豌豆杂交,有时后代只有粉红色,有时后代既有红色又有粉红色。此外,当后代中有红色和粉红色花朵时,开红色和粉红色花朵的植株数量大致相同。孟德尔的研究表明,如果你认为

that red plants were either or and that white plants were WW, you could explain these results. So he proposed his theory of genes, according to the inference to the best explanation model, as the best explanation of the data. As a result, the ITBE model must draw on a theory of explanation.
红色植物是 ,白色植物是 WW,就可以解释这些结果。于是,他根据最佳解释模型推论,提出了他的基因理论,作为对数据的最佳解释。因此,ITBE 模型必须借鉴解释理论。
We saw earlier that, on the DN view of explanation, if a theory explains the data, then the occurrence of the data could have been predicted (given a description of the initial conditions). This is because the explanandum is a logical consequence of the theory and the specification of the initial conditions. On the DN model, then, a body of data is explained by any theory from whose laws it can be derived, provided that the theory is true. This last proviso was Hempel's "empirical adequacy condition." Hempel insisted on this condition because any finite body of data can be shown to be the logical consequence of an indefinitely large number of incompatible theories. (And, of course, being finite beings, we always have a finite body of data.) His idea was that you had an explanation only if you had a true theory from which your explanandum could be derived.
我们在前面已经看到,根据 DN 解释观,如果一个理论能解释数据,那么数据的发生是可以预测的(给定初始条件的描述)。这是因为解释体是理论和初始条件说明的逻辑结果。因此,在 DN 模型中,只要理论是真实的,那么数据体就可以用任何理论来解释,只要该理论的规律是可以推导出来的。最后一个限制性条件就是亨普尔的 "经验充分性条件"。亨普尔之所以坚持这一条件,是因为任何有限的数据体都可以被证明是无限多不相容理论的逻辑结果。(当然,作为有限的存在,我们总是有有限的数据。)他的想法是,只有当你有一个真正的理论,而你的解释可以从这个理论中推导出来时,你才有解释。
But now you can see that we can't use Hempel's account of explanation if we are going to use the ITBE model. For Hempel's empirical adequacy condition means that we have an explanation of something only if the theory is true. But then we couldn't use the ITBE model to give us reason for believing that a theory was true because we'd have to know that the theory was true before we could tell whether it provided any explanation (never mind the best explanation) of the data; thus we'd have to know whether it was true in order to find out whether we had an explanation that gave us a reason to believe it was true! So we had better drop the empirical adequacy condition. Instead, then, of requiring that a candidate explanation relies on a true theory, we can say that a candidate explanation is one that would explain the explanandum if it were true.
但现在你可以看到,如果我们要使用 ITBE 模型,就不能使用亨普尔的解释论。因为亨普尔的经验充分性条件意味着,只有当理论为真时,我们才有对某事的解释。但这样一来,我们就不能用 ITBE 模型来提供理由让我们相信某个理论是真的了,因为我们必须先知道这个理论是真的,然后才能知道它是否对数据提供了任何解释(更不用说最好的解释了);因此,我们必须先知道它是否是真的,才能知道我们是否有一个解释,让我们有理由相信它是真的!因此,我们最好放弃经验充分性条件。那么,我们就可以说,候选解释就是如果解释体是真的,它就能解释解释体的解释,而不是要求候选解释依赖于一个真实的理论。
Then the ITBE model amounts to this: you have a reason to believe a theory if you can derive a true explanandum, , from T's laws (and a specification of initial conditions) and this derivation provides the best available explanation of . The major task for the ITBE model is thus to specify how we are to compare explanations in order to decide which of a class of candidate explanations is the
那么,ITBE模型就相当于:如果你能从T的定律(和初始条件的说明)推导出一个真正的解释, ,而且这个推导提供了对 ,你就有理由相信一个理论 。因此,ITBE 模型的主要任务是规定我们如何对解释进行比较,以决定在一类候选解释中,哪一个是最好的解释。

best. And the right way to do that is to give some criteria for deciding which of two explanations is better, since if there is a best available explanation, it will just be the explanation that's better than any others that are available.
最好。而正确的做法是给出一些标准来决定两个解释中哪个更好,因为如果有一个最好的可用解释,它就会是比其他任何可用解释都更好的解释。
Two criteria for preferring explanations that have been proposed are simplicity and power. Using simplicity as a criterion means that if you have two candidate explanations for a phenomenon, the simpler one provides the better explanation, and (according to the IBTE model) the theory it uses is thus more likely to be true. It's not entirely obvious what it means for one explanation to be simpler than another. But there is an old principle, known as Ockham's Razor (which is named for the fourteenth-century English philosopher William of Ockham), that says you should not multiply entities beyond necessity. What it means, in effect, is that if you can construct a theory without postulating an entity, then you should do so. So we could follow this lead and argue that an explanation that appeals to fewer entities (and is, presumably, therefore less complex) is simpler than an explanation that appeals to more.
有人提出了两个优先选择解释的标准,即简单性和力量。用简单性作为标准意味着,如果对某一现象有两种候选解释,那么更简单的解释提供了更好的解释,而且(根据 IBTE 模型)它所使用的理论因此更有可能是真的。一种解释比另一种解释简单的含义并不十分明显。但有一条古老的原则,即 "奥卡姆剃刀"(以十四世纪英国哲学家威廉-奥卡姆(William of Ockham)的名字命名),说的是你不应该超越必要性地重复实体。实际上,它的意思是,如果你可以在不假设实体的情况下构建理论,那么你就应该这样做。因此,我们可以顺着这个思路,认为诉诸较少实体的解释(大概因此也就不那么复杂)比诉诸较多实体的解释要简单。
As for explanatory power, a theory is more powerful if it explains more phenomena (or more kinds of phenomena) than another. So an explanation that uses a theory is preferable to an explanation that uses a theory if explains more phenomena (or kinds of phenomena) than .
至于解释力,如果一种理论比另一种理论能解释更多的现象(或更多种类的现象),那么它的解释力就更强。因此,如果 能解释更多的现象(或更多种类的现象),那么使用一种理论 的解释 比使用一种理论 的解释 更可取。
Notice that both Popperians and inductivists will accept this latter claim. For a theory that we know explains a wide range of phenomena has been exposed to a wide range of potential falsifications-which will satisfy the Popperians that it is corroborated — and has a large number of supporting instances-which will please the inductivists. But the ITBE model does not hold that a theory covering a wide range of phenomena gives a better explanation because it is more likely to be true: rather, it holds that the theory is more likely to be true because it provides a better explanation. This must be so if the ITBE model is to be a competitor to inductivism and falsificationism.
请注意,波普尔主义者和归纳主义者都会接受后一种说法。因为一个我们知道能解释广泛现象的理论,已经暴露在广泛的潜在证伪之下--这会让波普尔主义者满意,认为它得到了确证--并且有大量的支持实例--这会让归纳主义者满意。但是,ITBE模型并不认为,涵盖广泛现象的理论之所以能提供更好的解释,是因为它更有可能成真:相反,它认为,理论更有可能成真,是因为它提供了更好的解释。如果 ITBE 模式要成为归纳主义和证伪主义的竞争者,就必须如此。
To see why, consider whether the ITBE model is a real alternative to inductivism. We can argue by reductio. Suppose the ITBE theorist agrees that the reason that an explanation is better than an explanation is that has greater inductive support than .
为了弄清原因,请考虑一下 ITBE 模式是否真的可以替代归纳法。我们可以用还原法来论证。假设 ITBE 理论者同意,解释 比解释 好的原因是 有更大的归纳支持。
Then, while it might then be true that a good explanation gave you reason to believe the theory that it used, this would only be because the theory already had good inductive support: and then that would be the real reason why the explanation gave you reason to believe the theory. So if the ITBE model is to be a competitor to inductivism, it must deny that the reason that is better than ' is that has greater inductive support. (A similar argument shows that the ITBE theorist must deny that the reason that an explanation is a better explanation is that it is more highly corroborated.)
那么,尽管一个好的解释让你有理由相信它所使用的理论,这可能是真的,但这只是因为该理论已经有了很好的归纳支持:而这才是解释让你有理由相信该理论的真正原因。因此,如果 ITBE 模型要成为归纳主义的竞争者,它就必须否认 好的原因是 有更大的归纳支持。(一个类似的论证表明,ITBE 理论家必须否认一个解释之所以是更好的解释,是因为它得到了更多的证实)。
This fact draws attention to a first major challenge for the ITBE model. Why should the fact that a theory would provide a simple or a powerful explanation if it were true be reason to believe that it is true? Aren't we at risk of making the assumption we rejected when discussing verificationism in 2.6, namely, that the universe is organized for our epistemic convenience? After all, some very complicated theories-the quantum theory, relativity theory, the DNA theory of inheritance - are now believed to be correct. So why assume that simplicity is a sign of truth? Isn't it an empirical question whether or not the universe is simple? And if so, doesn't the ITBE model just stack the cards in favor of a particular answer to that empirical question?
这一事实引起了人们对 ITBE 模型的第一个重大挑战的关注。为什么说如果一个理论是真的,它就能提供一个简单或有力的解释,这就能成为我们相信它是真的理由呢?我们不是有可能做出我们在 2.6 中讨论验证主义时所拒绝的假设吗,即宇宙是为了我们的认识论方便而组织起来的?毕竟,一些非常复杂的理论--量子理论、相对论、DNA 遗传理论--现在都被认为是正确的。那么,为什么要认为简单就是真理呢?宇宙是否简单难道不是一个经验问题吗?如果是这样的话,ITBE模型不就是在为这个经验问题的特定答案堆砌牌吗?
Similarly, why should the fact that an explanation covers a wide range of phenomena that we have looked at be grounds for thinking it is true? The ITBE model, recall, denies that inductive evidence gives grounds for believing a theory. So it can't rely on the idea that a powerful theory has lots of confirming instances. And it denies that corroboration gives grounds for believing a theory. So it can't rely on the idea that a powerful theory has survived a wide range of possible disconfirmations. Once more, we can say that there is ample empirical evidence that some powerful theories are false: Newtonian physics is false (that is why it was replaced by relativity and quantum theory). Explanatory power is thus clearly consistent with falsehood. So why should we take it sometimes to be reason for thinking that a theory is true?
同样,为什么一个解释涵盖了我们研究过的各种现象,就能成为我们认为它是真的理由呢?回想一下,ITBE模型否认归纳证据是相信理论的理由。因此,它不能依赖于一个强大的理论拥有大量确证实例的观点。它也否认确证是相信理论的依据。因此,它不能依赖于这样一种观点,即一个强大的理论经受住了各种可能的不证实。我们还可以说,有充分的经验证据表明,一些强大的理论是错误的:牛顿物理学就是错误的(这就是它被相对论和量子论取代的原因)。因此,解释力显然与谬误是一致的。那么,为什么我们有时要把它当作认为理论是真的理由呢?
So the ITBE model has some work to do to explain why a theory's providing good explanations is grounds for thinking it is true. And there's another set of problems for the ITBE model: simplicity and power seem to pull in opposite directions. You can usually make a
因此,要解释为什么一个理论提供了很好的解释,就有理由认为它是真的,ITBE模型还需要做一些工作。ITBE模型还存在另一系列问题:简单性和力量似乎是背道而驰的。您通常可以通过

theory more powerful by making it less simple. For one of the easiest ways of expanding a theory to account for more phenomena is to add to the theoretical entities that it makes use of. (Chemical theories, for example, gained explanatory power as new elements were postulated, producing a chemistry that had greater explanatory power but that was also, at the same time, more complex.) So a second major challenge for the ITBE model is how to decide whether to put more weight on simplicity or on power.
让理论变得不那么简单,从而使理论更加强大。因为扩展理论以解释更多现象的最简单方法之一,就是增加理论所使用的理论实体。(例如,随着新元素的提出,化学理论的解释力不断增强,从而产生了一种解释力更强但同时也更复杂的化学理论)。因此,ITBE 模型面临的第二个主要挑战是如何决定是更看重简单性还是更看重解释力。
The ITBE model has a certain plausibility. It does seem right to say that one reason for believing that there are genes, which behave as Mendel proposed, is that this hypothesis provides a simple, powerful explanation for a great range of data about biological inheritance. Certainly, as I said when I was introducing Mendel's theory, that's one of the reasons why people came to believe it. And, more generally, scientists often appeal to the simplicity and power of the explanations a theory provides when they are seeking to defend it. But we have seen that there is another possible explanation for this fact, namely, that simple, powerful explanations usually have higher inductive support or greater corroboration. So inference to the best explanation may not be a real alternative to inductivism and falsificationism.
ITBE 模型具有一定的合理性。如果说,人们之所以相信存在孟德尔提出的基因行为,其中一个原因是,这一假说为有关生物遗传的大量数据提供了一个简单而有力的解释,这似乎是对的。当然,正如我在介绍孟德尔理论时所说,这也是人们相信孟德尔理论的原因之一。一般来说,科学家在为某一理论辩护时,往往会诉诸于该理论所提供的简单而有力的解释。但我们已经看到,对这一事实还有另一种可能的解释,即简单有力的解释通常具有更高的归纳支持或更大的确证。因此,推论最佳解释可能并不是归纳主义和证伪主义的真正替代方案。

4.13 Laws and causation
4.13 法律与因果关系

We have seen that the crucial issues in the justification of scientific theory have to do with how to justify the generalizations that theories make. This question remains an active topic in the philosophy of science in the study of confirmation theory. But I have so far said very little about the contents of the generalizations that science makes and, in particular, about what is meant by a scientific law. The aim of science, as we have seen, includes the creation of theories that contain laws-laws that, when true, we call "laws of nature."
我们已经看到,科学理论论证的关键问题在于如何论证理论所作的概括。在科学哲学的确认理论研究中,这个问题仍然是一个活跃的话题。但是,到目前为止,我对科学概括的内容,特别是科学定律的含义知之甚少。正如我们所看到的,科学的目的包括创建包含定律的理论--当定律成立时,我们称之为 "自然法则"。
I have been assuming that natural laws say simply that all A's of some kind are B's. But, as Hume realized, scientific laws say more than that. You will remember that when he introduced the problem of induction he talked about the "secret powers" of bread. What he meant by this was that to say that bread is nutritious is not just to say something about what it does, but also to say something about what it can do. To have a power is to have the ability to do something.
我一直认为,自然法则只是说,所有某种 A 都是 B。但是,正如休谟所意识到的,科学定律的含义远不止于此。你一定记得,当他提出归纳法的问题时,他谈到了面包的 "秘密力量"。他的意思是,说面包有营养,不仅仅是说面包的作用,也是说面包的能力。有力量就是有能力做某事。
Hume is pointing out that the law that bread nourishes us is not simply the generalization that
休谟指出,"面包滋养我们 "这一定律并不是简单地概括为
GENERALIZATION: All people who eat bread are nourished by it.
概括:所有吃面包的人都能从中得到营养。
It also has the consequence
其后果还包括
LAW: Anyone who ate bread would be nourished by it.
法律:任何人吃了面包都会得到滋养。
We can bring out the difference between these propositions by taking up again the idea of a possible world. The generalization says only that all the people who eat bread in the actual world gain nourishment from it. But the law says that all the people who eat bread in other possible worlds are nourished as well, so it applies, in some sense, to people who don't exist in this world. It even applies to people in the actual world who are not bread eaters.
我们可以通过再次使用 "可能的世界 "这一概念来说明这两个命题之间的区别。概括说的只是在现实世界中所有吃面包的人都从中获得了营养。但定律却说,在其他可能的世界里,所有吃面包的人也都得到了营养,所以在某种意义上,它适用于不存在于这个世界的人。它甚至适用于现实世界中那些不爱吃面包的人。
Of course, the law doesn't mean that people who eat bread in every possible world are nourished. There are worlds where the law does not hold; otherwise it would be a necessary truth that bread nourishes. Nevertheless, in all the worlds where the law does hold, all the bread eaters are nourished. The class of worlds where natural laws hold is called the class of "nomically possible worlds." ("Nomically" means "having to do with laws" and comes, like "nomologically," from the Greek word for law.)
当然,这个定律并不意味着在每一个可能的世界里吃面包的人都会得到营养。在有些世界里,定律是不成立的;否则,面包滋养人就是必然的真理。然而,在所有自然法则成立的世界里,所有吃面包的人都得到了营养。自然法则成立的世界被称为 "名义上可能存在的世界"。(nomically "的意思是 "与规律有关",和 "nomologically "一样,来自希腊语中的 "规律 "一词)。
The key fact, then, is the necessity of laws. Just as metaphysically necessary truths are true in every possible world, so natural laws are true in every nomically possible world. One thing that you cannot explain without a sense of the necessity of laws is the fact that because it is a law of nature that hot air rises, a body of air would have risen if heated, even if, in fact, it wasn't heated.
那么,关键的事实就是规律的必然性。正如形而上学的必然真理在每一个可能的世界中都是真实的一样,自然法则在每一个名义上可能的世界中也是真实的。如果不了解规律的必然性,你就无法解释这样一个事实:因为热空气上升是自然规律,所以空气体如果受热就会上升,即使事实上它并没有受热。
This fact has serious epistemological consequences. The problem of induction shows that it is hard to justify going from the fact that some of the A's in the actual world are B's to the belief that all of them are. But, to justify the law that all A's are B's, we have to show not only that all the A's in the actual world are B's, but that all of the A's in the nomically possible worlds are B's also. When Mendel claimed that it was a law of nature that purple alleles dominated
这一事实会带来严重的认识论后果。归纳法的问题表明,从实际世界中某些 A 是 B 的事实到认为所有 A 都是 B 的信念是很难成立的。但是,为了证明 "所有的 A 都是 B "这一定律的合理性,我们不仅要证明现实世界中所有的 A 都是 B,还要证明名义上可能存在的世界中所有的 A 也都是 B。当孟德尔宣称紫色等位基因占优势是自然法则时

white ones, he was committed not just to a view about the outcomes of all actual crosses, but also to a view about what the outcomes would have been of crosses nobody ever made. If there is a problem about justifying the former inference, there must be more of a problem about justifying the latter.
他不仅坚持关于所有实际十字架结果的观点,而且坚持关于从未有人做过十字架的结果的观点。如果说前一种推论的合理性存在问题,那么后一种推论的合理性问题肯定更大。
We can consider the problem at its clearest in a simple case. Consider some cross that Mendel never made, between a particular homozygous purple pea plant and a particular homozygous white one. Mendel was committed to this proposition:
我们可以通过一个简单的例子来最清楚地考虑这个问题。考虑一下孟德尔从未做过的某种杂交,在一株特定的同源紫色豌豆和一株特定的同源白色豌豆之间进行杂交。孟德尔致力于这一命题:
If I had made that cross, the offspring would all have been purple.
如果我进行了杂交,后代肯定都是紫色的。
A sentence like this is called a contrary-to-fact conditional or a counterfactual. It says what would have happened if something that didn't happen had happened.
这样的句子叫做 "相反事实条件句 "或 "反事实条件句"。它说的是如果没有发生的事情发生了,会发生什么。
Counterfactuals are extremely important to science, for two reasons. First of all, one way of describing the difference between generalizations and laws is to say that generalizations don't, but laws do, support counterfactuals. The true generalization
反事实对科学极为重要,原因有二。首先,描述概括与定律之间区别的一种方法是,概括不支持反事实,但定律支持反事实。真正的概括
All the coins in my pocket are silver
我口袋里的硬币都是银的
is not a law, which is reflected in the fact that it is not true that this penny would be silver if it were in my pocket. Generalizations, like this, that are not lawlike are called accidental generalizations. They do not support counterfactuals. Laws, on the other hand, do support counterfactuals, as we have seen.
不是定律,这体现在 "如果这一分钱在我的口袋里,它就会是银币 "这一事实中。像这样不符合规律的概括被称为偶然概括。它们不支持反事实。而规律则支持反事实,正如我们已经看到的那样。
The second reason that counterfactuals are important is that when we say, for example, that having two purple alleles causes a pea to be purple, we are committed, among other things, to the counterfactual
反事实之所以重要的第二个原因是,比如说,当我们说有两个紫色等位基因会导致豌豆是紫色的时候,除其他外,我们就承诺了反事实
If this pea had had two purple alleles, it would have been purple.
如果这颗豌豆有两个紫色等位基因,它就会是紫色的。
We can understand what this counterfactual means in possibleworlds terms: it says that in all the nomically possible worlds where
我们可以用可能世界的术语来理解这种反事实的含义:它是说,在所有名义上可能的世界中,如果

the pea has two purple alleles, it has purple flowers. All causal sentences entail counterfactuals in this way. And much of natural science is about causality. Justifying the claim that science gives us knowledge requires that we be justified in having such counterfactual beliefs. The issue of how these beliefs are to be understood and justified is also a topic of current concern in logic and the philosophy of science.
豌豆有两个紫色等位基因,它就开紫色花。所有因果关系句子都以这种方式蕴含反事实。而自然科学的大部分内容都是关于因果关系的。要证明 "科学为我们提供了知识 "这一说法是正确的,我们就必须有理由相信这种反事实的信念。如何理解这些信念并证明其合理性,也是逻辑学和科学哲学当前关注的话题。

4.14 Conclusion 4.14 结论

In this chapter, we have seen how philosophers have approached some of the central questions about science. What is a theory? How do we explain the events that happen in our world? How do we justify scientific claims? What is a law of nature? And, finally, what do we mean when we say that A causes B? Of course, there are many important questions in the philosophy of science that I have not discussed, and starting from the work we have done in this chapter, you can go on to look at some of these questions.
在本章中,我们看到了哲学家是如何探讨科学的一些核心问题的。什么是理论?我们如何解释世界上发生的事件?我们如何证明科学主张的合理性?什么是自然法则?最后,当我们说 A 导致 B 时,是什么意思?当然,科学哲学中还有许多我没有讨论的重要问题,从我们在本章所做的工作开始,你可以继续研究其中的一些问题。
Whichever questions you choose to follow up, you will find again and again, as we have seen once more in this chapter, that questions in one area of philosophy impinge on another. The private language argument of 1.3 is relevant to the myth of the given; foundationalist epistemology, from 2.5, came to be relevant to the theory-observation distinction; reliabilism from 2.7 raised the issue whether induction provides knowledge; Frege's theory of meaning, from 3.4, helped explain why theoretical terms have to be introduced by something like a Ramsey-sentence.
无论你选择跟进哪个问题,你都会一再发现,正如我们在本章中再次看到的那样,哲学中一个领域的问题会影响到另一个领域。1.3 中的私人语言论证与给定的神话有关;2.5 中的基础主义认识论与理论-观察的区别有关;2.7 中的可靠论提出了归纳法是否能提供知识的问题;3.4 中弗雷格的意义理论有助于解释为什么理论术语必须用类似拉姆齐句子的东西来引入。
But I want to end this chapter by making a point about the continuity not just between different parts of philosophy, but between philosophy and science. To make this point, I need to say a little more about causation.
不过,在本章的最后,我想说的是,不仅哲学的不同部分之间,而且哲学与科学之间都存在着连续性。为了说明这一点,我需要再谈谈因果关系。
Causation is important, in part, because the kind of understanding science offers us is an understanding of the causes of events in our universe. To know what caused an event is to know why it happened, and that is to understand the event. Indeed, it has been suggested that what it means to understand an event scientifically is to understand its causes. Many philosophers of science up to our own century held that every event had its causes and that the task of science was to find out what they were. The thesis that every event is
因果关系之所以重要,部分原因在于科学为我们提供的理解是对宇宙中事件起因的理解。知道了事件的起因,也就知道了事件发生的原因,也就理解了事件。事实上,有人认为,科学地理解一个事件就是理解它的原因。直到本世纪的许多科学哲学家都认为,每个事件都有其原因,科学的任务就是找出原因。每个事件都是

caused is called "determinism." If determinism is true, then once the universe started, everything that happened afterward was determined by natural laws. Given the initial properties and positions of all the particles, there is only one nomically possible world. Many philosophers in the past believed that because determinism was true, if we discovered the true laws of nature we would be able, in principle, to understand every event that happened.
这就是所谓的 "决定论"。如果决定论是真的,那么宇宙一旦开始,之后发生的一切都是由自然规律决定的。鉴于所有粒子的初始属性和位置,只有一个名义上可能存在的世界。过去的许多哲学家认为,由于决定论是真的,如果我们发现了真正的自然规律,原则上我们就能够理解发生的每一件事。
But scientists have argued in this century that determinism is not true. Quantum theory, which is the theory that most physicists now believe, says that there are some events that do not have causes. (''ll say a little more about this in 9.10.) The theory says what the probability is at any time of certain events-such as the emission of a particle by a radioactive substance. But it often does not say why any particular particle is emitted when it is. (And string theory, which is the current major candidate to succeed quantum theory, agrees with quantum theory here.) If understanding an event scientifically means knowing what caused it, then this means that scientists believe they have scientific evidence that some things cannot be scientifically understood! Thus quantum theory denies the philosophical thesis that reality can be fully understood; and it rejects the philosophical principle of sufficient reason, which goes back to classical Greek philosophy and says that every event has a cause. It does look as though, just as we cannot isolate one branch of philosophy from the others, so we cannot isolate philosophy from our scientific beliefs.
但本世纪的科学家们认为,决定论并不正确。量子理论是目前大多数物理学家都相信的理论,它认为有些事件是没有原因的(这一点我们将在 9.10 节中详细阐述)。(该理论指出了某些事件--比如放射性物质发射粒子--在任何时候发生的概率。但它往往没有说明为什么某个粒子会在什么时候发射。(弦理论是目前继承量子理论的主要候选理论,它在这方面与量子理论是一致的)。如果科学地理解一个事件意味着知道它是由什么引起的,那么这就意味着科学家们相信他们有科学证据证明有些事情是无法用科学的方法来理解的!因此,量子理论否定了 "现实是可以被完全理解的 "这一哲学论点,也否定了 "充分理由 "这一哲学原理。"充分理由 "可以追溯到古典希腊哲学,它认为每个事件都是有原因的。看起来,就像我们不能把哲学的一个分支与其他分支分开一样,我们也不能把哲学与我们的科学信仰分开。
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CHAPTER 5 第 5 章

Morality 道德

What do moral judgments mean?
道德判断意味着什么?
How can we tell what is right?
我们如何分辨什么是正确的?
When, if ever, is it right to kill someone?
什么时候杀人才是正确的?

5.1 Introduction 5.1 导言

Suppose I asked you to pick one kind of action that was clearly and obviously wrong. You might well suggest, as an uncontroversial example, killing an innocent person. One reason why terrorism in the modern world is so shocking is that its victims are usually ordinary, apparently innocent people. There is no reason to believe they are responsible for the wrongs that terrorists claim they are trying to put right. Most people share this reaction. Most would agree, at least to begin with, that killing innocent people is clearly and obviously wrong. But by now you have done enough philosophy to know that this obvious answer to an apparently straightforward question hides many difficulties. Let us consider just two of those difficulties for the principle:
假设我让你选择一种明显错误的行为。作为一个没有争议的例子,你很可能会提出杀害无辜的人。现代世界的恐怖主义之所以如此令人震惊,原因之一是其受害者通常都是普通人,显然是无辜的。没有理由相信他们对恐怖分子声称要纠正的错误负有责任。大多数人都有同感。大多数人都会同意,至少在一开始,杀害无辜的人显然是错误的。但是,现在你们已经学了足够多的哲学,知道这个看似简单明了的问题的明显答案隐藏着许多困难。让我们仅从原则的角度来考虑其中的两个难题:
K: Killing innocent people is wrong.
K:杀害无辜的人是不对的。
First: what do we mean when we say that someone is "innocent"? The very same people who will agree that killing innocent people is wrong will often agree that it is not wrong for an airman to bomb a military target in wartime, even when he knows that there is a good chance that civilians will be killed as a result. Some of those civilians might well be opposed to the war or to the government of their country and might therefore be playing no part in military action against the airman's country. If you believe but also think that the airman is right, you have to argue that these civilians are not innocent. If that
首先:当我们说某人 "无辜 "时,我们指的是什么?同意杀害无辜是错误的人往往也同意,飞行员在战时轰炸军事目标并没有错,即使他知道平民很有可能因此丧生。其中一些平民很可能反对战争或本国政府,因此可能不会参与针对该飞行员所在国家的军事行动。如果你相信 ,但又认为飞行员是对的,那么你就必须认为这些平民并非无辜。如果

is so, you have to decide why they are not innocent. Many answers have been given to this complex question, a question that has become especially urgent for us because we have weapons of warfare that we know are bound, if we were ever forced to use them, to kill enormous numbers of civilians. We thought it was clearly wrong to kill innocent people, but that depends on believing that it is clear who is innocent. Reflecting on the question of killing in warfare can easily lead you to wonder whether this is, indeed, so clear.
如果是这样,你就必须确定他们为什么不是无辜的。对于这个复杂的问题,人们给出了许多答案,这个问题对我们来说变得尤为紧迫,因为我们拥有战争武器,我们知道,如果我们被迫使用这些武器,势必会杀死大量平民。我们认为,杀害无辜的人显然是错误的,但这取决于我们是否相信谁是无辜的。反思战争中的杀戮问题,很容易让人怀疑这一点是否真的如此清晰。
But there is a second kind of difficulty with the proposition that it is wrong to kill innocent people. It is that some morally serious, caring people have felt that there is at least one sort of case where killing clearly innocent people is not only not wrong and not undesirable but actually desirable and right. That case is when a seriously ill person, in great pain, asks us to kill them. Killing someone in these cases is called "euthanasia," which comes from a Greek word meaning "a good death." Reflection on euthanasia can easily lead you to wonder whether it is always wrong to kill even the innocent.
但是,"杀死无辜的人是错误的 "这一命题还存在第二种困难。这就是,一些在道义上严肃认真、富有爱心的人认为,至少在一种情况下,杀死明显无辜的人不仅不是错的,也不是不可取的,而且实际上是可取和正确的。这种情况就是重病患者在极度痛苦中请求我们杀死他们。在这种情况下杀人被称为 "安乐死",它来自希腊语,意思是 "美好的死亡"。对 "安乐死 "的反思很容易让你产生这样的疑问:即使是杀害无辜的人,是否也总是错误的?
The two kinds of difficulties with the principle, , exemplify two of the major kinds of issue that are central to ethics, which is the name we give to philosophical reflection on morality. The first problem had to do with the analysis of a concept-innocence-that we make use of in forming our moral decisions. It was a question that forced us to try to define the concept clearly. The second question had to do not with understanding and defining a concept but with whether a particular moral belief, K, was true. Obviously we should want to have a good understanding of the concept of innocence before we decided whether was correct, so that the questions of definition are prior to questions about truth. But even once the questions of definition are settled, the substantial questions remain.
这一原则遇到的两种困难体现了伦理学的两大核心问题,伦理学是我们对道德进行哲学思考的名称。第一个问题涉及对一个概念--"无知"--的分析,我们在做出道德决定时会用到这个概念。这个问题迫使我们试图明确界定这个概念。第二个问题与理解和定义一个概念无关,而是与特定的道德信念 K 是否真实有关。显然,我们应该先充分理解 "无罪 "的概念,然后再决定 是否正确,因此,定义问题先于真理问题。但是,即使定义问题解决了,实质性问题依然存在。
Whether or not is true is a very important question, and people have very strong feelings about it. It is surely right to feel strongly about such questions. But because they are so important, we should try not to let our feelings get in the way of deciding about them. Precisely because we care deeply about human life, it would be a tragedy to let the strength of our feeling lead us into error.
是否真实是一个非常重要的问题,人们对此有非常强烈的感受。对这些问题有强烈的感受当然是对的。但是,正因为这些问题如此重要,我们才不应该让我们的感情妨碍我们对这些问题做出决定。正因为我们非常关心人的生命,所以如果让我们的强烈感情把我们带入误区,那将是一个悲剧。
How, then, should we try to settle these issues? With scientific questions, as we saw in the last chapter, we set about developing theories and look to see whether, by experiment and observation, we
那么,我们应该如何解决这些问题呢?对于科学问题,正如我们在上一章中所看到的,我们要着手发展理论,并通过实验和观察,看看我们能否

can find reasons for thinking they are true—or, if we follow Popper, no reasons at least for thinking they are false. But observation and experiment are not, by themselves, likely to allow us to settle whether it is ever right to kill the innocent. Only a moral monster would want to test the claim that innocent people should not be killed by killing some innocent people to "see if it was wrong."
我们可以找到认为它们是真的理由,或者,如果我们遵循波普尔的观点,至少没有理由认为它们是假的。但是,观察和实验本身并不能让我们确定杀害无辜者是否正确。只有道德怪物才会想通过杀死一些无辜者来验证 "不应该杀死无辜者 "的说法,"看看这样做是否错了"。
Even if such a monster did carry out this horrible test, however, that would obviously not settle the matter. What are we supposed to look for when we see an innocent person dying that will show us that the killing is wrong? Even if seeing such a thing convinced you that it was wrong, there seems to be nothing about the killing that you can observe and which you could point to in order to persuade someone else that the killing was wrong. If someone could not see that the outcome of a Mendelian crossing experiment was that some of the peas were purple and some white, we could conclude that there was something wrong with their eyes. On the other hand, a psychopath who did not believe that a killing was wrong would not need to have anything wrong with his or her senses. (Unless we have a special moral sense, a possibility I'll discuss in 5.4.)
然而,即使这样一个怪物真的进行了这一可怕的试验,显然也不能解决问题。当我们看到一个无辜的人死去时,我们应该寻找什么来证明杀戮是错误的呢?即使看到这样的事情能让你相信这是错误的,但似乎也没有任何关于杀戮的事情是你可以观察到的,并且你可以指出来说服其他人杀戮是错误的。如果有人看不出孟德尔杂交实验的结果是有些豌豆是紫色的,有些是白色的,我们就可以得出结论,他们的眼睛出了问题。另一方面,如果一个心理变态者不认为杀人是错误的,那么他或她的感官就不需要有任何问题。(除非我们有一种特殊的道德感,这种可能性我将在 5.4 中讨论)。
But we do not need to experience actual killings to judge that they are wrong. Simply thinking about a possible killing of an innocent person would lead most of us to judge that we should not carry it out. Someone who carried out this sort of test would display a serious misunderstanding of the status of moral claims, because such tests are simply not relevant. Moral claims seem to be, in this respect, like formal ones: we decide them not by experience but by thought.
但是,我们并不需要亲身经历杀戮,就能判断杀戮是错误的。只要想一想可能会杀害无辜的人,我们大多数人就会判断我们不应该这样做。进行这种测试的人会对道德主张的地位产生严重的误解,因为这种测试根本没有意义。在这方面,道德主张似乎与形式主张一样:我们不是通过经验而是通过思考来决定它们。
Notice that we have been led from thinking about whether an action is right or wrong to thinking about how we should decide whether an action is right or wrong. We are now asking questions about the status of moral judgments, as well as about which judgments we should assent to.
请注意,我们已经从思考一个行为是对还是错转向思考我们应该如何判断一个行为是对还是错。我们现在要问的是道德判断的地位问题,以及我们应该同意哪些判断的问题。
Questions about what is right and wrong, good and bad, we call "first-order" moral questions. They are questions about which moral beliefs we should accept. Questions about the nature, structure, and status of first-order moral views, on the other hand, we call "metaethical." They are questions about our first-order moral views. This distinction is crucial in the philosophical discussion of
关于什么是对什么是错,什么是好什么是坏的问题,我们称之为 "一阶 "道德问题。它们是关于我们应该接受哪些道德信念的问题。另一方面,关于一阶道德观的性质、结构和地位的问题,我们称之为 "元道德"。它们是关于我们的一阶道德观的问题。这一区别在哲学讨论中至关重要。

moral questions. People who have very different metaethical theories can agree about which actions are wrong; and people who share the same metaethical theories can disagree about it. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there are many occasions where our metaethics and our morals interact.
道德问题。拥有截然不同的元伦理学理论的人可以在哪些行为是错误的问题上达成一致;而拥有相同元伦理学理论的人也可以在这个问题上产生分歧。然而,正如我们将要看到的那样,在许多情况下,我们的元伦理学和我们的道德观是相互影响的。

5.2 Facts and values
5.2 事实与价值观

We have already come across an important metaethical discovery: whatever your moral beliefs, settling moral questions has to involve something over and above the kind of observation that is so central to science. Empiricism, as the view that questions are to be settled by observation and experiment, doesn't seem a plausible view about morality. But, though beliefs about moral questions are in this way like a priori beliefs, we cannot settle moral questions simply by logic, either. For even if I offer you a proof that killing innocent people is wrong, you may be able to follow every step in the argument and still disagree with my conclusion. You may reject my conclusion simply because you do not accept the premises of my argument. Furthermore, I shall not be able to show you that my premises are true without other premises, and there is no guarantee that you will accept these either. As we saw in Chapter 3, a priori truths, such as
我们已经发现了一个重要的元伦理学发现:无论你的道德信仰如何,解决道德问题都必须超越科学的核心观察。经验主义认为问题应该通过观察和实验来解决,这种观点在道德问题上似乎是站不住脚的。不过,虽然关于道德问题的信念在某种程度上类似于先验信念,但我们也不能仅仅通过逻辑来解决道德问题。因为即使我给你提供了一个证据,证明杀害无辜的人是错误的,你可能会遵循论证的每一个步骤,但仍然不同意我的结论。你可能仅仅因为不接受我的论证前提而拒绝接受我的结论。此外,如果没有其他前提,我也无法向你证明我的前提是正确的,而且也不能保证你会接受这些前提。正如我们在第 3 章中所看到的,先验真理,如
If John is eating strawberries, then someone is eating strawberries
如果约翰在吃草莓,那么就有人在吃草莓
can be established, in a sense, without relying on any premises at all. Just as they differ from empirical judgments, moral truths are not, in this crucial epistemological respect, like the a priori truths we have already met. So if we are to adopt moral rationalism - the view that moral questions are to be decided by reason-we need some way of using reason to establish moral premises.
从某种意义上说,道德真理的确立完全不需要任何前提。正如道德真理不同于经验判断一样,道德真理在这一关键的认识论方面也不同于我们已经见过的先验真理。因此,如果我们要采用道德理性主义--即道德问题应由理性来决定--我们就需要某种方法来利用理性来确立道德前提。
The kinds of questions that observation and experiment or proof alone can help us to settle are factual questions. There is a matter of fact about whether they are true or not, and logic and experience are ways of finding out what is true. But moral questions are matters of value, and matters of value do not seem to be settled by experience or logic alone.
只有观察、实验或证明才能帮助我们解决的问题都是事实问题。它们是真是假是一个事实问题,而逻辑和经验是找出事实真相的方法。但道德问题是价值问题,而价值问题似乎不能仅靠经验或逻辑来解决。
This is not to say that logic and experience are irrelevant to moral
这并不是说逻辑和经验与道德无关。

decisions. If I were trying to decide whether to help my mortally sick friend by killing him, I would need to know whether he really wanted to die and whether he really was in great pain. To find that out I would need some empirical evidence. And, as we shall see again later in this chapter, logic plays an important role in moral thought, because our moral beliefs need to be consistent. It was because it was inconsistent to hold both
决定。如果我想决定是否通过杀死我的病入膏肓的朋友来帮助他,我需要知道他是否真的想死,他是否真的非常痛苦。为了弄清这一点,我需要一些经验证据。而且,我们在本章后面还会看到,逻辑在道德思想中扮演着重要的角色,因为我们的道德信念需要前后一致。因为同时持有以下两种观点是不一致的
Killing innocent people is always wrong
滥杀无辜永远是错误的
and
Killing innocent civilians in warfare is sometimes right
在战争中杀害无辜平民有时是正确的
that the case of the airman raised a problem for our moral beliefs.
这位飞行员的案例给我们的道德信仰提出了一个问题。
One way of making the distinction between factual and evaluative questions is to point out that when you accept an evaluative claim it commits you to certain courses of action. You cannot reasonably both accept that killing innocent people is wrong and go ahead and kill an innocent person. When you judge that something is the right thing for you to do, you are committed to thinking that you ought to do it. On many occasions, therefore, "I ought to do it" commits you to a course of action.
区分事实性问题和评价性问题的一种方法是指出,当你接受一个评价性主张时,就意味着你必须采取某些行动。你不可能既接受杀害无辜是错误的,又去杀害无辜。当你判断某件事对你来说是正确的时候,你就承诺认为你应该这样做。因此,在许多情况下,"我应该这样做 "使你承诺采取某种行动。
I say "on many occasions" because we sometimes say "I ought to do it" in the course of discussing reasons for doing something and then go on to give other reasons against doing it. Thus, if I have promised my godchild, Liza, to take her to the zoo, I might say
我说 "在许多场合",是因为我们有时在讨论做某事的理由时会说 "我应该这样做",然后又提出其他反对这样做的理由。因此,如果我答应我的教子莱莎带她去动物园,我可能会说
I ought to take Liza to the zoo because I promised her I would.
我应该带莉莎去动物园,因为我答应过她。
but then go on to add that, unfortunately, I cannot take her, because I have to attend an important meeting. But when all of the relevant reasons for and against acting have been considered, and I say
但接着又说,很遗憾,我不能带她去,因为我要参加一个重要会议。但是,在考虑了所有赞成和反对采取行动的相关理由之后,我说
All things considered, I ought to go to the meeting
综上所述,我应该去参加会议
that commits me to a course of action. This kind of all-thingsconsidered "ought" is central to our moral thinking.
使我承诺采取某种行动。这种全盘考虑的 "应该 "是我们道德思维的核心。
David Hume, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher who invented the problem of induction, was also one of the first people to put the difference between factual and evaluative questions in terms of the distinction between questions about what is so and those about what ought to be so. In the following famous passage from his Treatise of Human Nature he argues that once we recognize this distinction, we shall have to reject all the "vulgar" - that is, common or ordinary-"systems of morality."
大卫-休谟(David Hume)是十八世纪苏格兰哲学家,他发明了归纳法,也是最早将事实性问题与评价性问题的区别归结为 "什么是这样 "的问题与 "什么应该是这样 "的问题的人之一。他在《人性论》中有一段著名的论述:一旦我们认识到这种区别,我们就必须摒弃所有 "庸俗的"--即普通的或平凡的--"道德体系"。
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but it is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers and am persuaded, that this small attention could subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is founded not merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
对于这些推理,我不能不补充一点看法,也许会发现它有一定的重要性。在我迄今为止遇到的每一个道德体系中,我总是注意到,作者按照普通的推理方式进行了一段时间的推理,确立了上帝的存在,或对人类事务进行了观察;突然,我惊讶地发现,我遇到的命题不是通常的 "是 "和 "不是",而是没有一个命题不与 "应该 "或 "不应该 "相关联。这种变化是难以察觉的,但它却产生了最后的结果。因为 "应当 "或 "不应当 "表达了某种新的关系或肯定,所以有必要对其加以观察和解释;同时,还应当给出一个理由,说明为什么这种新的关系可以从与之完全不同的其他关系中演绎出来,这似乎是完全不可想象的。但是,由于作者们通常不使用这种预防措施,我将冒昧地向读者们推荐,我相信,这一点小小的注意就可以颠覆所有庸俗的道德体系,让我们看到,罪恶和美德的区别不仅仅建立在物体的关系上,也不是通过理性感知的。
The conclusion of this passage is just Hume's way of saying that moral questions are not questions of fact. For he thought that all empirical truths were about "relations of objects" and all logical truths could be "perceived by reason." (In traditional logic the subject, , and the predicate, , were said to be connected by the copula "is" or "is not" to produce a sentence that said " is " or " is not ", which is why Hume calls these the "usual copulations.")
这段话的结论只是休谟在说道德问题不是事实问题。因为他认为所有的经验真理都是关于 "对象的关系",而所有的逻辑真理都可以 "通过理性感知"。(在传统逻辑学中,主语 和谓语 可以用 "是 "或 "不是 "来连接,从而产生这样的句子:" "或 " 不是 ",这就是为什么休谟称这些为 "通常的连接词")。
The distinction between fact and value is central to all discussion of metaethics since Hume's day, and his argument in this passage has been summarized in a famous slogan: you can't derive an "ought" from an "is." One reason this distinction is so important is that it is relevant to both of the two great questions in metaethics:
事实与价值之间的区别是自休谟时代以来所有元伦理学讨论的核心,他在这段话中的论点被概括为一句著名的口号:你无法从 "是 "中推导出 "应当"。这一区别之所以如此重要,是因为它与元伦理学中的两个重大问题都相关:

a) What do moral judgments mean?
a) 道德判断意味着什么?
b) What justifies them?
b) 它们的理由是什么?
Let us call the first of these the "moral content question." To answer the second question, we have to do some moral epistemology. Once we accept the fact-value distinction, we are committed to the view that the meaning of moral judgments has to be explained in such a way that moral claims cannot be derived from factual ones alone. And we are also committed to finding a moral epistemology that shows that moral beliefs are justified in different ways from factual ones.
我们把第一个问题称为 "道德内容问题"。要回答第二个问题,我们必须做一些道德认识论的工作。一旦我们接受了事实与价值的区别,我们就会致力于这样一种观点,即道德判断的意义必须以这样一种方式来解释,即道德主张不能仅仅从事实主张中推导出来。我们还致力于寻找一种道德认识论,以说明道德信念的合理性与事实信念的合理性是不同的。

5.3 Realism and emotivism
5.3 现实主义与情感主义

The moral content question is, of course, a question in philosophical semantics. As we saw in Chapter 3, one plausible way to say what a sentence means is to say what the world would have to be like for it to be true-that is, to give its truth conditions. So a first stab at an account of the meaning of moral judgments would be to say what their truth conditions are. When I judge, say, that
当然,道德内容问题是一个哲学语义学问题。正如我们在第 3 章中所看到的,要说明一个句子的含义,一个可信的方法就是说,如果这个句子是真的,那么这个世界会是怎样的,也就是说,给出它的真理条件。因此,要解释道德判断的意义,首先要说明它们的真实条件是什么。比如说,当我判断
the words "killing innocent people" have the same sense and reference as they do in the factual sentence
滥杀无辜 "与事实句中的 "滥杀无辜 "具有相同的意义和所指
Killing innocent people is common (or I have seen someone killing innocent people).
杀害无辜的人是常有的事(或者说我见过有人杀害无辜的人)。
The new questions, therefore, are about the meaning of "I ought not to" and "is wrong." Let's try to see what a truth-conditional semantics for "is wrong" might look like.
因此,新的问题是关于 "我不应该 "和 "是错的 "的含义。让我们试着看看 "是错的 "的真理条件语义可能是什么样的。
Our explanation of what a predicate such as "is red" meant involved saying what it referred to. We said that its reference was its extension, which was a class of objects. Since is equivalent to the class of things in the extension of "is wrong" is a class of actions. So far, so good.
我们在解释 "是红色的 "这样的谓词的含义时,涉及到它的所指。我们说它的所指是它的外延,也就是一类对象。既然 等同于 "是错的 "的外延中的一类事物,那么 "是错的 "的外延就是一类行为。到此为止,一切顺利。
But we then went on to give the sense of "is red" by saying that it was a way of determining that reference. How are we to determine which acts are in the extension of "is right"?
但是,我们接着又赋予了 "是红色的 "意义,说它是确定这一参照的一种方法。我们如何确定哪些行为属于 "是正确的 "的外延呢?
Anyone who believes that the way this extension, in particular, and the truth values of moral claims, in general, are determined is not importantly different from the way the truth values of factual claims are determined, we call a "moral realist." Moral realists think that, just as there are ordinary facts "out there" in the real world that determine whether factual claims are true or false, so there are moral facts in the world that determine the truth values of moral claims.
如果有人认为,这种延伸,特别是道德主张的真值的确定方式,与事实主张的真值的确定方式并无重要区别,我们就称之为 "道德现实主义者"。道德现实主义者认为,正如现实世界中 "存在着 "决定事实主张真假的普通事实一样,世界上也存在着决定道德主张真值的道德事实。
One major difficulty for the moral realist arises because moral beliefs cause us to take action in a way that factual ones do not. It is instructive to examine this difference in a little more detail.
道德现实主义者面临的一个主要困难是,道德信念会促使我们采取行动,而事实信念不会。我们不妨更详细地研究一下这种差异。
We certainly do act on the basis of factual beliefs: in Chapter 1, I suggested a functionalist theory of beliefs that explained why that was. But when we act on the basis of a factual belief we do so because we already have preferences or desires that make the belief relevant to deciding what to do. If I want to eat a strawberry, then I need to find out where there are strawberries, which is a matter of fact, before I can set about the action of eating them. But believing that there are strawberries in the kitchen doesn't commit me to going there to eat them. What does commit me to that action is the combination of the belief that there are strawberries in the kitchen and the desire to get strawberries to eat.
我们当然会根据事实信念采取行动:在第一章中,我提出了一种功能主义信念理 论,解释了为什么会这样。但是,当我们根据事实信念行事时,我们之所以这样做,是因为我们已经有了偏好或欲望,这些偏好或欲望使得信念与决定做什么相关。如果我想吃草莓,那么我需要先找到哪里有草莓,这是一个事实问题,然后我才能开始吃草莓的行动。但是,相信厨房里有草莓并不意味着我要去那里吃草莓。让我去做这件事的,是 "厨房里有草莓 "这个信念和 "想吃草莓 "这个愿望的结合。
If, however, for some bizarre reason, I decided that I ought, all things considered, to eat the strawberries in the kitchen, then I would be committed to doing so whether I wanted to or not. Whereas factual beliefs commit us to action only in conjunction with our preferences or desires, moral beliefs commit us to action whatever our preferences or desires. The terminology I shall use to mark this difference is that moral beliefs are action-guiding, while factual beliefs are not. Always remember, however, that beliefs guide action too, but in a different way. The moral realist's view-that there's no difference between the ways the truth values of factual and of moral beliefs are determined-has to explain why there is, nevertheless, this important difference between them.
然而,如果出于某种奇怪的原因,我决定无论如何都要吃掉厨房里的草莓,那么无论我是否愿意,我都会致力于吃掉草莓。事实信念使我们只有在与我们的偏好或愿望相结合时才会采取行动,而道德信念则使我们无论有什么偏好或愿望都会采取行动。我将用一个术语来标明这种区别,即道德信念是行动指南,而事实信念不是。但请记住,信念也能指导行动,只是方式不同而已。道德现实主义者认为,事实信念和道德信念的真值确定方式并无不同,这就需要解释为什么它们之间会有这种重要的区别。
Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher of the Enlightenment, was one of the first people to identify this sort of action-guiding "ought." He called it a "categorical imperative" and contrasted it with what he called "hypothetical imperative," such as the "ought" in the sentence
伊曼纽尔-康德是德国启蒙运动时期伟大的哲学家,他是最早确定这种指导行动的 "应该 "的人之一。他将其称为 "绝对命令",并与他所称的 "假设命令 "形成对比,例如句子中的 "应该"
If you want to get there quickly, you ought not to walk but to take a taxi.
如果您想尽快到达那里,您不应该步行,而应该乘坐出租车。
This "ought" is hypothetical because it depends on a hypothesis about what you want. Even if someone just said:
这个 "应该 "是假设性的,因为它取决于关于你想要什么的假设。即使有人说
You should not walk. You ought to take a taxi.
你不应该步行。您应该乘坐出租车。
the "ought" would still be hypothetical because it would still be based on this hypothesis about your wants. So you cannot identify a hypothetical imperative simply by seeing whether it is preceded by "If you want to ... " Instead you must consider whether the speaker would withdraw the "ought" sentence if you said that you didn't have the desire he or she seemed to be supposing you to have. If someone would still say you ought to do something whatever you said your wants and desires were, then the "ought" would be categorical.
应该 "仍然是假设性的,因为它仍然是建立在对你的愿望的假设之上的。因此,你不能简单地通过看它前面是否有 "如果你想...... "来识别假设性命令句。"相反,你必须考虑,如果你说你没有他或她似乎假设你有的愿望,说话者是否会收回 "应该 "句子。如果有人仍然说,无论你说你的愿望和欲望是什么,你都应该做某事,那么这个 "应该 "就是绝对的。
We can express one challenge for moral realism simply by asking how it is to explain the categorical nature of moral imperatives. The force of this challenge becomes clearer if we recall the way in which we connected the idea of a truth condition with the idea of communication at the end of Chapter 3. Because of the connection between the truth conditions of sentences and the contents of beliefs, we were able to say that we use the speech act of assertion to communicate our beliefs. Thus, we said that someone who understands "It is raining" uses it to get other people to believe that the truth conditions of the sentence hold.
我们可以简单地通过询问如何解释道德命令的绝对性来表达道德现实主义所面临的一个挑战。如果我们回顾一下我们在第三章末尾将真理条件的概念与交流的概念联系起来的方式,那么这一挑战的力量就会变得更加清晰。由于句子的真理条件与信念内容之间的联系,我们可以说,我们使用断言这一言语行为来传达我们的信念。因此,我们说,理解 "下雨了 "的人可以用它来让其他人相信句子的真实条件成立。
In the normal case of the speech act of assertion, I get you to believe that it is raining because you think that I believe it and that I am in a position to know. That is why we call Mary's asserting that it is raining the expression of her belief that it is raining, for she gets us to believe it by giving us reason to think that she does. The moral realist, then, regards the assertion of as a way of expressing the
在断言这一言语行为的正常情况下,我让你们相信下雨了,是因为你们认为我相信,而且我有资格知道。这就是为什么我们称玛丽断言 "下雨了 "是她相信 "下雨了 "的表达,因为她让我们有理由认为她相信 "下雨了"。因此,道德现实主义者认为 的断言是表达 "我相信 "的一种方式。

belief that killing innocent people is wrong. The problem is that if it is an ordinary belief that is being expressed, it is hard to see how it can also be action-guiding: beliefs, as I said, guide action only in concert with desires.
相信杀害无辜的人是错误的。问题是,如果表达的是一种普通的信念,就很难看出它还能指导行动:正如我所说的,信念只有在与欲望一致的情况下才能指导行动。
So the fact that moral assertion commits us directly to action might lead you to suppose that moral sentences do not express beliefs but feelings, preferences, or desires. For, unlike having factual beliefs, having feelings, preferences or desires can lead directly to action. As the English philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe once said: "The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get"!
因此,道德断言让我们直接付诸行动这一事实可能会让你认为,道德句子表达的不是信念,而是情感、偏好或欲望。因为,与拥有事实信念不同,拥有情感、偏好或欲望可以直接导致行动。英国哲学家伊丽莎白-安斯科姆曾说过"想要的最原始表现就是试图得到"!
I shall call the view that moral sentences express not beliefs but feelings, preferences, or desires, "emotivism." Strictly, as the term suggests, emotivism would be the view that moral sentences express feelings or emotions. But the view that moral sentences express action-guiding states of mind rather than beliefs is the core of emotivism even in this stricter sense. I shall call action-guiding mental states that dispose you towards doing something "pro-attitudes." Those that dispose you against some action, I shall call "conattitudes." Pro-attitudes and con-attitudes together I shall call just "attitudes."
我把认为道德句子表达的不是信念,而是情感、偏好或欲望的观点称为 "情感主义"。严格地说,正如这个词所暗示的,情感主义就是认为道德句子表达的是感情或情绪的观点。但是,道德句子表达的是指导行动的心理状态,而不是信念,即使在这种更严格的意义上,这种观点也是情感主义的核心。我将把使你倾向于做某事的行动指南心理状态称为 "赞成态度"。那些让你反对某种行动的心理状态,我称之为 "反对态度"。赞成态度和反对态度合在一起,我称之为 "态度"。
Moral realism and emotivism represent the extreme poles of views on the moral content question, and these views tend to produce polar positions in moral epistemology. The moral realist will say that since moral sentences express beliefs that can be true or false, and since they can be justified or unjustified, moral beliefs are candidates for knowledge. The emotivist, on the other hand, will say that, since moral sentences express attitudes, which cannot be true or false, they are not candidates. So in moral epistemology, realism and emotivism, as views about the moral content issue, tend respectively to go with cognitivism-the view that we can have moral knowledge-and noncognitivism - the view that we cannot.
道德现实主义和情感主义代表了道德内容问题上的极端观点,这些观点往往会在道德认识论中产生两极立场。道德现实主义者会说,既然道德句子表达的信念可真可假,既然这些信念可以是合理的,也可以是不合理的,那么道德信念就是知识的候选者。另一方面,情感主义者会说,由于道德句子表达的是态度,而态度不可能是真或假,因此它们不是候选知识。因此,在道德认识论中,现实主义和情感主义作为关于道德内容问题的观点,分别倾向于认知主义--我们可以拥有道德知识的观点和非认知主义--我们不能拥有道德知识的观点。
In Chapter 3, we saw that issues about the sense of words and sentences were cognitive: they had to do with knowledge. So it is not surprising that different views about the content of moral judgments are associated with different views about moral epistemology. Now we have characterized the range of views on the moral content question, we can look in more detail at the views about moral epistemology that are associated with them.
在第三章中,我们看到关于词句意义的问题是认知性的:它们与知识有关。因此,关于道德判断内容的不同观点与关于道德认识论的不同观点相关联也就不足为奇了。现在我们已经描述了关于道德内容问题的各种观点,我们可以更详细地研究与之相关的关于道德认识论的观点。

5.4 Intuitionism 5.4 直觉主义

Moral realists, then, tend to be cognitivists, but they do not have to be cognitivists. The reason is that even if moral beliefs can be true and justified, whether that is sufficient for knowledge will depend on your view of knowledge. In Chapter 2, you will remember, I suggested that we might want to defend a view of knowledge in which it is true belief produced by a reliable method. Now, production is a causal process, and if moral properties are not causal properties, then, on this causal theory of knowledge, you could be a moral realist and a noncognitivist as well.
因此,道德现实主义者往往是认知主义者,但他们并不一定是认知主义者。原因在于,即使道德信念可以是真实和合理的,但这是否足以构成知识,将取决于你对知识的看法。大家应该还记得,在第二章中,我提出我们可能要捍卫一种知识观,即通过可靠的方法产生真实的信念。现在,产生是一个因果过程,如果道德属性不是因果属性,那么,根据这种知识的因果理论,你可能是一个道德现实主义者,也可能是一个非认知主义者。
But the best-known recent realist position is that of the English philosopher G. E. Moore. Moore combined moral realism on the content issue with cognitivism in his moral epistemology. His particular form of cognitivism is called intuitionism. An intuitionist in ethics holds that we have a faculty that allows us to perceive moral qualities, just as we have the faculty of vision that allows us to see colors. That faculty is called moral intuition. For the intuitionist, then, we justify our moral beliefs in the way we justify all our beliefs: by evidence and reasoning from it.
但最近最著名的现实主义立场是英国哲学家 G. E. 摩尔的立场。摩尔在道德认识论中将内容问题上的道德现实主义与认知主义相结合。他的认知主义的特殊形式被称为直觉主义。伦理学中的直觉主义者认为,我们有一种能力使我们能够感知道德品质,就像我们有视觉能力使我们能够看到颜色一样。这种能力被称为道德直觉。因此,对于直觉主义者来说,我们证明自己道德信念正确的方式与证明我们所有信念正确的方式相同:通过证据并据此进行推理。
In his book Principia Ethica Moore took as the basic moral concept not rightness or duty but goodness. According to Moore, an action is one's duty "if it will cause more good to exist in the universe than any other possible kind of alternative." The central problem of moral epistemology for Moore is to discover how we can know which of the possible consequences of our actions are good.
摩尔在《伦理学原理》一书中将 "善 "作为基本的道德概念,而不是 "正确 "或 "义务"。摩尔认为,"如果一个行为会比任何其他可能的选择在宇宙中造成更多的善,那么这个行为就是一个人的责任"。对摩尔来说,道德认识论的核心问题是发现我们如何才能知道我们的行为可能产生的后果中哪些是善的。
Moore held that goodness is what he called an "unanalyzable" property. It is unanalyzable because you cannot explain what "good" means in terms of any other concepts. Moore pointed out that some philosophers-the hedonists-had identified goodness with the property of making people happy. But, he said, even if the extension of the predicate "is good" is the same as the extension of the predicate "makes people happy," these two predicates have different meanings. Moore claimed that an objection like this could be made for any proposed definition, which said that something was good if and only if it was . He thought that, provided was not itself a moral predicate, you could always intelligibly ask
摩尔认为,"善 "是他所谓的 "不可分析 "的属性。说它不可分析,是因为你无法用任何其他概念来解释 "善 "的含义。摩尔指出,一些哲学家--享乐主义者--将 "善 "认定为使人快乐的属性。但是,他说,即使 "是善的 "这个谓词的外延与 "使人快乐 "这个谓词的外延相同,这两个谓词的含义也是不同的。摩尔声称,可以对任何提议的定义提出这样的反对意见,即如果并且只有当某物是 ,它才是好的。他认为,只要 本身不是一个道德谓词,你总是可以明白地提出以下问题
(That is why this argument is called the "open question argument": Moore says it is always open to us to ask about any such whether it was really good.)
(这就是为什么这一论证被称为 "开放问题论证":摩尔说,对于任何这样的 ,我们总是可以追问它是否真的是好的)。
The fact that "good" was in this sense unanalyzable was one of the reasons why Moore thought there was a strong similarity between seeing something was yellow and seeing it was good. For even if a physicist were to tell us that
从这个意义上说,"好 "是不可分析的,这也是摩尔认为 "看到某物是黄色的 "和 "看到某物是好的 "之间有很强的相似性的原因之一。因为即使物理学家告诉我们
is yellow 是黄色的
and
emits or reflects light in wavelength
发射或反射光的波长
were coextensive predicates, so that something was yellow if and only if it emitted or reflected light of that wavelength, we could still understand the question
因此,如果且仅当某物发射或反射该波长的光时,它才是黄色的,我们仍然可以理解这个问题: "如果且仅当某物发射或反射该波长的光时,它才是黄色的"。
But are all things that emit in wavelength really yellow?
但是,所有以 波长发光的东西真的都是黄色的吗?
To understand what "yellow" means, you need to know more than the wavelength of light that causes yellow sensations. You need to know what it is like to have a yellow sensation, and no definition in words can tell you that.
要理解 "黄色 "的含义,你需要知道的不仅仅是引起黄色感觉的光波长。你需要知道黄色感觉是什么样子的,而任何文字定义都无法告诉你这一点。
Goodness, then, for Moore, is a property of people, things, and events that we cannot define in terms of any other notions. We experience the nature of goodness by moral intuition as we experience the nature of yellowness directly by the faculty of vision. But Moore also recognized that there was a difference between yellowness, which he called a "natural" property, and goodness, which he said was a "non-natural" property.
因此,在摩尔看来,善是人、事、物的一种属性,我们无法用任何其他概念来定义它。我们通过道德直觉体验善的本质,就像我们通过视觉能力直接体验黄的本质一样。但摩尔也认识到,他称之为 "自然 "属性的 "黄 "与他称之为 "非自然 "属性的 "善 "是有区别的。
It is not entirely clear what Moore meant by this term, but he certainly thought of natural properties as being the sorts of properties, like yellowness, that could be studied by natural scientists. Not surprisingly, many people have taken the distinction between natural and non-natural properties to be another way of making the distinction between facts and values. Certainly, at least one thing that Moore held to follow from the non-naturalness of goodness was that
我们并不完全清楚摩尔对这一术语的理解,但他肯定认为自然属性是自然科学家可以研究的属性,比如黄度。毫不奇怪,许多人把自然属性和非自然属性的区分当作是区分事实和价值的另一种方式。当然,摩尔认为善的非自然性至少可以得出以下结论

you could not derive a claim that something was good from statements about its possessing other natural properties, such as color or shape or even the capacity to give people pleasure. In other words, one thing he meant by saying that goodness was non-natural was that, just as you cannot derive an ought from an is, so you cannot identify good with any natural property. Moore said that any attempt to identify a natural and a non-natural property committed the naturalistic fallacy; this term is now often used to refer to any attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is."
你不能从关于某物具有其他自然属性(如颜色或形状,甚至给人带来快乐的能力)的陈述中得出某物是善的主张。换句话说,他说 "善 "是非自然的,意思是说,就像你不能从 "是 "推导出 "应当 "一样,你也不能把 "善 "与任何自然属性相提并论。摩尔说,任何试图辨别自然属性和非自然属性的行为都犯了自然主义谬误;这个词现在经常用来指任何试图从 "是 "中推导出 "应当 "的行为。
The hedonists held that, once we knew something gave people pleasure, we could infer that it was good. Their moral epistemology, then, required us to be able to tell what would give pleasure. Hedonists think we find out about goodness indirectly, by finding what gives pleasure. But, according to Moore, we know what is good directly by moral intuition, just as we know what is yellow by vision: and that, for Moore, is all there is to moral epistemology.
享乐主义者认为,一旦我们知道什么东西能给人带来快乐,我们就能推断出它是好的。因此,他们的道德认识论要求我们能够知道什么会给人带来快乐。享乐主义者认为,我们是通过寻找能给人带来快乐的东西来间接发现善的。但是,摩尔认为,我们通过道德直觉直接知道什么是善,就像我们通过视觉知道什么是黄色一样:对摩尔来说,这就是道德认识论的全部内容。
This may seem to be an attractive position. After all, it gives a simple answer to the basic question "How do you justify moral beliefs?" But there are certainly many differences between the perception of colors and the perception of, say, the goodness of friendship.
这一立场似乎很有吸引力。毕竟,它对 "如何证明道德信念的合理性?"这个基本问题给出了一个简单的答案。但是,对颜色的感知与对友谊善恶的感知之间肯定存在许多差异。
One difference comes out when we remember that moral beliefs are fundamentally action-guiding. This means that we need to decide on the moral properties of actions before we carry them out. The fact that Anne experiences the rightness of an action A can hardly be supposed to cause her perception of its rightness and her consequent decision to do , for cannot cause anything until it exists. In general, in fact, since moral beliefs are action-guiding, we need to have a clear grasp of the properties actions would have if we carried them out, before we decide what to do.
当我们记住道德信念从根本上说是行动指南时,就会发现其中的区别。这就意味着,我们需要在行动之前就行动的道德属性做出决定。安妮体验到行动 A 的正确性这一事实很难被认为是导致她感知到行动 A 的正确性并因此决定去做 ,因为 在它存在之前不可能导致任何事情。事实上,一般来说,由于道德信念是行动指南,所以我们在决定做什么之前,需要清楚地了解如果我们实施这些行动,这些行动将具有哪些属性。
The intuitionist can argue, however, that what we learn from experience is that actions with certain properties are right, and that we judge that an action is right because we have grounds for thinking it will have those properties. Thus, the intuitionist might say, experience shows us that causing people pain is wrong. Our moral faculty allows us to recognize, through experience, the wrongness of such actions. This judgment is confirmed every time we carry out an action, A, intended to avoid causing pain, and discover, through moral intuition, that is right.
然而,直觉论者可以说,我们从经验中学到的是,具有某些特性的行动是正确的,我们判断一个行动是正确的,是因为我们有理由认为它具有这些特性。因此,直觉论者可能会说,经验告诉我们,给人造成痛苦是错误的。我们的道德能力使我们能够通过经验认识到这种行为的错误性。每当我们实施一项旨在避免造成痛苦的行动 A,并通过道德直觉发现 是正确的,这一判断就得到了证实。
But there are serious problems with this view of moral experience. First of all, as I have already mentioned, the way we actually make our moral decisions is to reflect on the outcomes of the actions that are within our power. In trying to decide whether I should go to the meeting or let my godchild down, I think about her disappointment, her loss of confidence in my promises, and the fact that I shall be weakening her understanding of the importance of keeping one's word. The fact that these consequences would - if they were likely to occur-be relevant reasons for not letting her down is something I learn not by experiencing her disappointment or loss of confidence but by imagining them. In imagination we do not experience real events; rather, we contemplate possible events. If moral intuition is like experience at all, it is not like perception of happenings in the actual world, but like perception of happenings in other possible worlds.
但这种道德经验观存在严重问题。首先,正如我已经提到的,我们做出道德决定的实际方式是对我们力所能及的行动的结果进行反思。在决定我应该去参加会议还是让我的教子失望时,我想到的是她的失望、她对我的承诺失去信心,以及我会削弱她对遵守诺言的重要性的理解。这些后果--如果有可能发生的话--会成为我不让她失望的相关理由,这一点我不是通过体验她的失望或失去信心,而是通过想象了解到的。在想象中,我们不会经历真实的事件,而是思考可能发生的事件。如果说道德直觉像经验的话,那它就不是对现实世界中发生的事情的感知,而是对其他可能世界中发生的事情的感知。
But talk of perception of other possible worlds is at best a metaphor. Perception is a causal process, in which things in the world interact with our sense organs to give rise to beliefs. For something to be perceived it must actually exist: and the only things that actually exist are things in the actual world. If talk of a faculty of moral intuition is to be taken seriously, we have to suppose that we really can intuit the moral properties of actual objects by exercising the faculty. Simply put, you can't interact with a merely possible event; you can interact only with an actual one.
但是,谈论对其他可能世界的感知充其量只是一种比喻。感知是一个因果过程,在这个过程中,世界上的事物与我们的感觉器官相互作用,从而产生信念。被感知的事物必须实际存在:而实际存在的唯一事物就是现实世界中的事物。如果要认真对待道德直觉能力的说法,我们就必须假设我们真的能够通过行使这种能力来直觉到实际事物的道德属性。简单地说,你不能与仅仅可能发生的事件发生互动,你只能与实际发生的事件发生互动。
There are two major objections to this view of moral intuition. One is a straight rejection of the idea of moral perception, because it comes without a proper account of how moral perception would work. Moore claims that seeing that something is good is like seeing that it is yellow. But there are lots of ways in which this is simply false. Unlike yellowness, for example, goodness is not something we can just recognize again once we have experienced an instance of it. I can't tell a French-speaker what "good" means simply by showing that person a few good deeds. In the perception of a yellow thingto give another difference-the yellowness causes us to have certain experiences that are the basis for judgment; things can "look yellow." But it is doubtful that my judgment that someone is a good person is simply caused by my sensing his or her goodness; it is doubtful too that there is any particular experience that is produced
对这种道德直觉的观点有两大反对意见。其一是直接否定道德感知的观点,因为它没有正确解释道德感知是如何运作的。摩尔声称,看到某样东西是好的,就像看到它是黄色的一样。但在很多方面这都是错误的。举例来说,与黄色不同,善并不是我们经历过一次之后就能再次认识到的。我无法通过给一个说法语的人看几件善事就告诉他 "善 "是什么意思。在对黄色事物的感知中,黄色会使我们产生某些经验,这些经验是判断的基础;事物可以 "看起来是黄色的"。但是,我对某人是好人的判断是否仅仅是因为我感觉到了他或她的好,这一点是值得怀疑的;是否有任何特定的体验产生了这种判断,这一点也值得怀疑

in us by good acts and good people. An intuitionist, who speaks of moral perception, owes us an explanation of these significant epistemological differences.
善行和好人对我们的影响。直觉主义者在谈论道德感知时,欠我们一个对这些重大认识论差异的解释。
The second objection to Moore's view of moral intuition has been well put by another British philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre argues that Moore's view fails to explain the action-guiding character of moral judgment.
另一位英国哲学家阿拉斯戴尔-麦金太尔(Alasdair MacIntyre)对摩尔的道德直觉观点提出了第二个反对意见。麦金太尔认为,摩尔的观点无法解释道德判断的行动指南特性。
Moore's account leaves it entirely unexplained and inexplicable why something's being good should ever furnish us with a reason for action. The analogy with yellow is as much a difficulty for his thesis at this point as it is an aid to him elsewhere. One can imagine a connoisseur with a special taste for yellow objects to whom somethings being yellow would furnish him with a reason for acquiring it; but something's being "good" can hardly furnish a reason for action only to those with a connoisseur's interest in goodness. Any account of good that is to be adequate must connect it intimately with action, and explain why to call something good is always to provide a reason for acting in respect of it in one way rather than another.
摩尔的论述完全没有解释和说明为什么 "好 "会成为我们行动的理由。在这一点上,与黄色的类比对他的论点来说是一个难题,但在其他方面却对他有所帮助。我们可以想象一个对黄色物品有特殊品味的鉴赏家,对他来说,某物是黄色的,就为他提供了获取黄色物品的理由;但某物是 "善 "的,却很难只为那些对善有鉴赏家兴趣的人提供行动的理由。对 "善 "的任何适当解释都必须将其与行动紧密联系起来,并解释为什么称某物为 "善 "总是为以某种方式而不是以另一种方式对其采取行动提供理由。
MacIntyre's point is that Moore cannot explain why the moral "ought" is categorical. For the imagined moral connoisseur is someone who happens to have wants and desires that turn her desire to do good into a hypothetical imperative.
麦金太尔的观点是,摩尔无法解释为什么道德 "应当 "是绝对的。因为想象中的道德鉴赏家是一个恰好有愿望和欲望的人,这些愿望和欲望将她行善的愿望变成了一种假定的命令。
If you want to be good, you ought to do this
如果你想变得优秀,就应该这样做
would certainly appeal to the connoisseur as a reason to act. But it would not be a recognizably moral reason, since the imperative here is hypothetical.
这对行家来说无疑是一个采取行动的理由。但这并不是一个公认的道德理由,因为这里的命令是假设性的。

5.5 Emotivism again 5.5 再次情感激励

Emotivists, by contrast, face neither of these objections. The actionguiding character of pro-attitudes means that they have an automatic answer to the second objection. The reason why moral demands are categorical is that they express attitudes. So you do not have to have desires over and above those attitudes in order for them to be actionguiding: they are action-guiding in themselves already. Nor can we object to emotivism on the basis of its views about moral perception,
相比之下,情感主义者既不会遇到这些反对意见,也不会遇到这些反对意见。赞成态度的行动指南特性意味着它们可以自动回答第二种反对意见。道德要求之所以是绝对的,是因为它们表达的是态度。因此,你不需要在这些态度之外再有欲望,它们就能成为行动指南:它们本身就已经是行动指南了。我们也不能根据情感主义关于道德认知的观点来反对情感主义、

since emotivists do not think that there is any such thing. Indeed, the major difficulty for emotivists is precisely that they do not have very much to say about moral epistemology. On the simplest emotivist view, knowing what you think on a moral question is simply a matter of finding out what you really feel.
因为情感主义者并不认为存在这样的东西。事实上,情感主义者的主要困难恰恰在于他们在道德认识论方面没有太多可说的。在最简单的情感主义者看来,要知道自己对道德问题的看法,只需找出自己的真实感受即可。
Emotivism is often associated with moral relativism, which is the view that what is good depends on who you are (or in what culture or when you live). For if moral sentences are expressions of attitudes and not of beliefs, then which moral beliefs you assent to will depend on what attitudes you (or your community) happen to have.
情感主义常常与道德相对主义联系在一起,道德相对主义认为,什么是好的,取决于你是谁(或生活在什么文化或时代)。因为如果道德句子表达的是态度而不是信仰,那么你认同哪种道德信仰将取决于你(或你的群体)碰巧拥有什么样的态度。
It is not obvious, however, that an emotivist has to be a relativist. It is indeed natural to suppose, to begin with, that what you feel is simply up to you. How you feel about swimming in cold water does indeed depend on you and your circumstances, and it doesn't usually make much sense to suppose that it is either correct or incorrect to have the feelings one has on this topic. But, on the other hand (as I shall show in a moment), there is a whole range of feelings where an assessment of their correctness does make sense. And if it does make sense to justify or criticize feelings, then emotivism might have scope for being nonrelativist, even if it didn't justify feelings in the way we justify our beliefs. We normally justify beliefs about matters of fact by finding perceptual evidence in their favor. But some feelings can be justified by means other than finding evidence for them, and this is a reason to hope that there could be similar ways of justifying moral beliefs other than by finding evidence for them. This argument would be circular if the only feelings we normally sought to justify were moral feelings, but they aren't.
然而,情感主义者必须是相对主义者这一点并不明显。首先,认为自己的感受完全取决于自己确实是很自然的。你在冷水中游泳的感受确实取决于你自己和你所处的环境,因此,认为在这个问题上有正确或错误的感受通常没有多大意义。但是,另一方面(正如我稍后要说明的那样),有一系列的感受,对其正确性的评估确实是有意义的。如果为情感辩护或批评情感确实有意义,那么情感主义就有可能成为非相对论,即使它不像我们为信仰辩护那样为情感辩护。我们通常会通过找到对事实有利的感知证据来证明有关事实的信念。但是,有些感受可以通过找到证据之外的其他方式来证明,这就使我们有理由希望,除了为道德信念找到证据之外,还可以有类似的方式来证明道德信念的合理性。如果我们通常寻求证明的唯一感受是道德感受,那么这个论点就是循环论证,但事实并非如此。
There are, in fact, two sorts of criticism of desires that we can make. One way to criticize desires is to show that the desire is based on false beliefs. My desire to take my godchild to the zoo can be criticized by pointing out that she hates animals. I want to take her to the zoo in order to give her an enjoyable afternoon. But if she hates animals, she won't enjoy the visit. This sort of criticism involves only the assessment of the truth value of the belief on which the desire is based. The possibility of criticizing desires in this way does not help answer the relativist, however. For moral attitudes are categorical imperatives: they do not depend, in this way, on beliefs.
事实上,我们可以对欲望进行两种批评。批评欲望的一种方法是指出欲望是建立在错误的信念之上的。我想带我的教子去动物园的愿望可以通过指出她讨厌动物而受到批评。我想带她去动物园是为了让她度过一个愉快的下午。但如果她讨厌动物,她就不会喜欢去动物园。这种批评只涉及对欲望所基于的信念的真理价值的评估。然而,以这种方式批判欲望的可能性无助于回答相对主义者的问题。因为道德态度是绝对命令:它们并不以这种方式依赖于信念。
Some nonmoral desires, however, do not depend in this way on
然而,有些非道德的欲望并不以这种方式依赖于

beliefs, either. My desire to give my godchild an enjoyable afternoon is not based on beliefs. Whereas taking Liza to the zoo is a means to the end of giving her an enjoyable afternoon, giving her an enjoyable afternoon is something I want to do for its own sake. (And even those who would claim that the desire to give a child some fun was in some sense a moral desire would surely admit that there need be nothing moral in Liza's craving for chocolate!) So a second way to criticize desires is to say not that they depend on false beliefs about the means to some end, but that the ends themselves are irrational. Let us call a desire that is not dependent in this way on a belief a "basic desire." People who are pleased when they are offered buckets of mud for which they have no use are likely to be criticized as irrational. We would naturally be inclined to suppose that someone with a basic desire for buckets of mud needs not tolerance but treatment. Indeed, such a desire might seem to be evidence that they did not know how to reason. One way to resist relativism, then, is just to hold that some attitudes-even though logically consistent-are irrational. As we shall see, this was Kant's view.
信仰也是如此。我想让我的教子度过一个愉快下午的愿望并非基于信仰。带 Liza 去动物园是为了让她度过一个愉快的下午,而让她度过一个愉快的下午则是我想做的事情本身。(即使是那些声称给孩子一些乐趣的愿望在某种意义上是一种道德愿望的人,也肯定会承认莉莎对巧克力的渴望不需要什么道德!)。因此,批评欲望的第二种方法不是说它们依赖于对达到某种目的的手段的错误信念,而是说目的本身是不合理的。我们把不依赖于信念的欲望称为 "基本欲望"。当人们得到一桶对他们毫无用处的泥巴时,他们会感到高兴,这种人很可能会被批评为非理性。我们自然会倾向于认为,对泥桶有基本欲望的人需要的不是宽容,而是治疗。事实上,这种欲望似乎是他们不懂推理的证据。那么,抵制相对主义的一种方法就是认为某些态度--即使在逻辑上是一致的--是非理性的。我们将会看到,康德就是这样认为的。
But many philosophers have felt that rejecting attitudes or desires that we don't share by calling them "irrational" is simply an expression of a prejudice. Unless we can say why it is irrational to want useless buckets of mud, rejecting such a desire may just be a reaction to the fact that we do not share it.
但是,许多哲学家认为,把我们不认同的态度或欲望称为 "非理性 "而加以拒绝,只是一种偏见的表现。除非我们能说出为什么想要一桶无用的泥巴是非理性的,否则拒绝这种欲望可能只是对我们不认同这一事实的反应。
How else might we combine the view that moral sentences express not beliefs but attitudes with the claim that morality is not simply a matter of what you happen to feel? Perhaps we should begin with a more sophisticated version of emotivism, which gives a richer view of the content of moral judgments.
道德句子表达的不是信念而是态度,我们还能如何将这一观点与 "道德不仅仅是你碰巧感觉到了什么 "这一主张结合起来呢?也许我们应该从情感主义的一个更复杂的版本开始,它对道德判断的内容提出了更丰富的看法。
In a more sophisticated emotivism we need to say more exactly what sorts of pro-attitudes are expressed by saying "Doing A is right." The American philosopher C. L. Stevenson developed one influential answer to this question under the name "emotivism."
在更复杂的情感主义中,我们需要更准确地说出 "做 A 是正确的 "这句话表达了什么样的支持态度。美国哲学家 C. L. 史蒂文森(C. L. Stevenson)以 "情感主义"(emotivism)为名,对这一问题提出了一个颇具影响力的答案。
Stevenson saw that if you said that people who made moral claims were just expressing their feelings, then two people who made apparently opposed moral claims would not be disagreeing with each other. If I say and Cynthia says
史蒂文森看到,如果你说提出道德主张的人只是在表达自己的感受,那么两个提出明显相反道德主张的人就不会有分歧了。如果我说,而辛西娅说
not-T: It's not true that Tom ought to be kinder to his dog,
不是汤姆应该对他的狗好一点,这不是真的、
then if is simply a fancy way of saying
那么,如果 只是一种花哨的说法
: I don't like the way Tom treats his dog
我不喜欢汤姆对待他的狗的方式
and not- is simply a fancy way of saying
而非 只是一种花哨的说法
not-T': I don't mind the way Tom treats his dog,
不我不介意汤姆对待他的狗的方式、
then Cynthia and I are not really disagreeing. and not- look as though one is the negation of the other, so they cannot both be true. But and Not- are just the expressions of two different attitudes. Of course, the same person could not agree to both and not- , because one person cannot both approve and disapprove of the same acts. Two different people can assent to them at the same time, however, without there being any inconsistency between their utterances. In fact, people very generally differ in what they like and dislike.
那么辛西娅和我并没有真正的分歧。 和 not- 看起来好像一个是另一个的否定,所以它们不可能都是真的。但 和 not- 只是两种不同态度的表达。当然,同一个人不可能既同意 ,又不同意 ,因为一个人不可能既同意又不同意同一种行为。但是,两个不同的人可以同时赞同这些行为,而他们的言论之间不会有任何不一致。事实上,人们喜欢什么和不喜欢什么通常是不同的。
Of course, Cynthia and I might utter not-T and T, respectively, because we were in disagreement about the facts. Perhaps she had not seen Tom dragging his dog on its chain or heard the dog howling when Tom forgot to feed it. But even if we were agreed on all the facts, she could still continue saying not-T and I could go on saying . At this point, if meant ' and not- meant not- ', our "disagreement" would amount simply to the fact that we had different attitudes.
当然,辛西娅和我可能会分别说出 "不是 "和 "T",因为我们对事实有分歧。也许她没有看到汤姆用链子拖着他的狗,也没有听到汤姆忘记喂狗时狗的嚎叫。但是,即使我们对所有事实的看法一致,她仍然可以继续说 not-T,而我可以继续说 。这时,如果 的意思是 ' ,而 not- 的意思是 not- ' ,我们的 "分歧 "就仅仅是我们的态度不同而已。
But Stevenson suggested that there was more to it than that. When I say T, I am not simply expressing my feelings. What I mean is not so much as
但史蒂文森认为,事情远不止如此。我说 "T",并不是简单地表达我的感受。我的意思与其说是 ,不如说是
: I don't like the way Tom treats his dog and I want everybody else to adopt the same attitude.
我不喜欢汤姆对待他的狗的方式,我希望其他人也采取同样的态度。
My objection to Cynthia's position is based on the fact that when I make a moral claim I am expressing an attitude that I want every-
我之所以反对辛西娅的立场,是因为当我提出道德主张时,我表达了一种态度,即我希望每个人都

body to share. So whereas on the simple emotivist view that moral sentences express our attitudes to things Cynthia and I are disagreeing only in the sense that we have incompatible attitudes, on Stevenson's view we are disagreeing in a more fundamental way. For Stevenson, what Cynthia says means
身体共享。因此,按照简单的情感主义观点,道德句子表达了我们对事物的态度,辛西娅和我的分歧仅仅在于我们的态度不一致,而按照史蒂文森的观点,我们的分歧则更为根本。在史蒂文森看来,辛西娅所说的话意味着
Not-T": I don't mind the way Tom treats his dog and I want everybody else to adopt the same attitude
不-T":我不介意汤姆对待他的狗的方式,我希望其他人也采取同样的态度
and the second conjunct here expresses a desire that I want herand everybody else-not to have. Though my moral judgment is not inconsistent with hers, her having the judgment is itself something I am opposed to.
而这里的第二连词表达的是我希望她和其他人都不要有的愿望。虽然我的道德判断与她的并不矛盾,但她拥有这种判断本身就是我所反对的。
This element of universality, the desire that everyone should share our moral attitudes, is what differentiates moral sentences, on Stevenson's view, from simple expressions of feeling. And it also means that someone who is a metaethical emotivist need not be a moral relativist. For metaethical emotivists can say that their own moral claims make demands on other people, whatever those people happen to feel and wherever they live. Thus, when I say "Kindness is good," according to the sophisticated emotivist I am expressing a pro-attitude to kindness and expressing a pro-attitude to everyone else's having that pro-attitude. I am not saying, as the relativist would require, that I only want everyone who happens to share my feelings (or my culture) to have this attitude.
斯蒂文森认为,这种普遍性因素,即希望每个人都能分享我们的道德态度,是道德句子与简单的情感表达的区别所在。这也意味着元伦理情感主义者不一定是道德相对主义者。因为元伦理情感主义者可以说,他们自己的道德主张对其他人提出了要求,无论这些人碰巧感觉如何,也无论他们生活在哪里。因此,当我说 "仁慈是好的 "时,根据成熟的情感主义者的观点,我是在表达对仁慈的支持态度,并表达对其他人拥有这种支持态度的支持态度。我并不是像相对主义者所要求的那样,我只是希望每个碰巧与我有相同感受(或文化)的人都抱有这种态度。
Many people hold, however, that even sophisticated emotivism makes it very difficult to resist relativism. Of course you can tell people that you want them to share your attitudes; but why should the mere fact that you want this give them a reason to come to share them? And if it gives them no reason to agree with you, then even if you are not a relativist, you will still have to accept that whether people will agree with you will depend on what attitudes, pro and con, they happen to have. You will have to accept that what principles people hold does depend on what they feel, even if, not being a relativist, you do not think that it ought to depend on what they feel.
然而,许多人认为,即使是复杂的情感主义也很难抵制相对主义。当然,你可以告诉人们,你希望他们认同你的态度;但为什么仅仅因为你希望这样,他们就有理由来认同你的态度呢?如果你没有理由让他们同意你的观点,那么即使你不是相对主义者,你也不得不接受这样的事实:人们是否同意你的观点,取决于他们碰巧持有什么样的态度,无论是赞成还是反对。即使你不是相对主义者,你并不认为人们所持的原则应该取决于他们的感受,你也必须接受这一点。
Now, Stevenson in fact argued that we utter moral sentences in order to try to get other people to share our attitudes, just as we
现在,史蒂文森实际上认为,我们说出道德句子是为了试图让其他人认同我们的态度,就像我们

utter factual sentences in order to get them to share our beliefs. Thus, on his view,
为了让他们认同我们的信念,我们必须说出事实性的句子。因此,他认为
A is the right thing for to do
A 是 应该做的事情
is not so much equivalent to
并不等同于
I want to do and want everybody else to want it too
我希望 希望其他人也这样做
as to 至于
I want to do . Please want it too.
我希望 。请你也这样做。
Moral remarks are not so much expressions of my feelings as attempts to get others to feel the same.
道德言论与其说是表达我的感受,不如说是试图让别人也有同样的感受。
This aspect of Stevenson's theory is much less satisfactory than his basic recognition of the universality of moral claims. For it still leaves the major challenge of relativism unanswered: why should the mere fact that I ask you to share my attitude lead you to come to share it? When I express my factual belief that something is yellow, you have a reason to come to believe it too, provided that
斯蒂文森理论的这一方面远不如他对道德主张普遍性的基本认识令人满意。因为它仍然没有回答相对主义的主要挑战:为什么仅仅是我要求你赞同我的态度这一事实就会导致你赞同我的态度?当我表达我对某物是黄色的这一事实的信念时,你也有理由相信它,前提是
a) you think that I am in a position to know—because, for example, I have seen it-and
a) 你认为我有资格知道--因为,比如说,我见过它,而且
b) you think that I don't want to deceive you (or, at any rate, you don't think that I do want to deceive you).
b) 你认为我不想欺骗你(或者,无论如何,你认为我不想欺骗你)。
But when I ask or order you to share my feelings, you can have no analogous reasons for coming to share my attitude. On Stevenson’s view, there is no such thing as knowing that something is right or wrong, and so you cannot have a reason like (a). Nor can you have a reason like (b), in his view, since deceiving someone is getting them to believe something false, and he has no way of explaining how moral statements could have truth values.
但是,当我要求或命令你分享我的感受时,你不可能有类似的理由来分享我的态度。根据史蒂文森的观点,并不存在知道某件事情是对是错这样的事情,因此你不可能有类似(a)的理由。在他看来,你也不可能有(b)那样的理由,因为欺骗别人就是让别人相信一些虚假的东西,而他无法解释道德陈述怎么会有真值。
Nevertheless, as I say, the recognition of the claim to universality of moral sentences is a very important insight about the content of moral judgments. It was central to the moral philosophy of
尽管如此,正如我所说的那样,承认道德句子的普遍性是对道德判断内容的一个非常重要的见解。它是
Immanuel Kant, who suggested that moral claims had two distinguishing marks:
伊曼纽尔-康德(Immanuel Kant)提出,道德主张有两个显著标志:
a) they were action-guiding-in fact, they were categorical imperatives-and
a) 它们是行动指南,事实上,它们是绝对命令,而且
b) they were in a very specific way addressed universally to all rational people.
b) 它们是以非常具体的方式向所有理性的人发出的普遍呼吁。
This second mark of the moral claim is expressed in the principle of universalizability, which we shall discuss next.
道德主张的第二个标志体现在普遍性原则中,我们接下来将讨论这一原则。

5.6 Kant's universalizability principle
5.6 康德的普遍性原则

We have already seen that Kant held that it was a distinguishing mark of moral propositions that they were categorical imperatives. This is an observation about the form of moral judgments, since it doesn't tell us anything about the content of morality, about which particular categorical imperatives we should accept. Kant's universalizability principle was intended to allow us to test any moral judgment by the use of our reason and decide whether we should assent to it. It was a way of using reason to give the content of morality.
我们已经看到,康德认为道德命题的一个显著标志就是它们是绝对命令。这是关于道德判断形式的观察,因为它并没有告诉我们任何关于道德内容的东西,也没有告诉我们应该接受哪些特定的绝对命令。康德的普遍性原则旨在让我们用理性检验任何道德判断,并决定我们是否应该认同它。这是一种用理性来给出道德内容的方法。
According to Kant, the universalizability principle that allows us to give content to morality is this categorical imperative:
康德认为,使我们能够赋予道德以内容的普遍性原则就是这种绝对命令:
UNIVERSALIZABILITY: You ought to act only on maxims that you can at the same time will should become universal laws of nature.
普遍性:你应该只根据那些你能够同时希望成为普遍自然法则的格言行事。
In fact, Kant argued in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals that this was the only categorical imperative, from which all of the principles of morality derived. It is important, therefore, to understand what Kant means by this principle. To see what it means, we can consider how Kant applies it in a particular case.
事实上,康德在《道德形而上学基础》中认为,这是唯一的绝对命令,所有道德原则都源于此。因此,理解康德这一原则的含义非常重要。为了理解其含义,我们可以考虑康德是如何将其应用于特定案例的。
He considers a man who is in desperate need of money and is deciding whether he should take a loan. This person knows that he will not be able to pay the loan back. He knows, Kant says, that acting in this way is "perhaps quite compatible with my own entire future welfare." But he then applies the test of universalizability.
他认为一个人急需用钱,正在决定是否要贷款。这个人知道自己无力偿还贷款。康德说,他知道这样做 "也许与我自己未来的全部福利是完全一致的"。但是,他随后又运用了普遍性的检验标准。
This leads him to see that he cannot act morally this way. For in so acting, he is following this maxim:
这让他明白,他不能以这种方式行事。因为他这样做就是在遵循这条格言:
Whenever I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, though I know this will never be done.
每当我认为自己缺钱的时候,我就会借钱,并承诺会还钱,尽管我知道这永远做不到。
And if this maxim became a universal law of nature and everybody followed it, then no one would ever believe in promises "but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty shams."
如果这句格言成为普遍的自然法则,每个人都遵守它,那么就不会有人相信承诺,"而会嘲笑这种言论是空洞的骗局"。
The crucial idea of the universalizability test, then, is this. When deciding what to do, you consider what your general reason is for acting in this particular way. That is what is meant by discovering the maxim of your action. Then you see what would happen if this maxim became a law of nature. Now, we saw in the previous chapter that a law of nature is a generalization that must be true. Thus, if your maxim became a law of nature, everybody would have to act on it. If our reasons allow us to accept this possibility, then we may act according to the maxim. Otherwise, we may not.
那么,普遍性检验的关键思路是这样的。在决定做什么时,你要考虑以这种特定方式行事的一般理由是什么。这就是发现行动格言的意义所在。然后,你再看看如果这句格言成为自然法则会发生什么。我们在上一章中看到,自然法则是一种概括,它必须是真实的。因此,如果你的格言成为了自然法则,那么每个人都必须按照它行事。如果我们的理性允许我们接受这种可能性,那么我们就可以按照格言行事。否则,我们可能不会这样做。
There is one central idea here, which is crucial to the way Kant thought about morality. It is that the principles of morality should be impersonal: they should apply to everybody. Of course, since a maxim will generally be of the form
这里有一个中心思想,对康德思考道德的方式至关重要。这就是,道德原则应该是非个人的:它们应该适用于每一个人。当然,由于格言的形式通常是
When conditions C obtain, you ought to do A,
当条件 C 出现时,你应该做 A、
it may never apply to me because I never get to be in those conditions. But moral rules, according to Kant, apply to us all equally. In any possible world where you are in the conditions that make the maxim operative, you ought to obey it.
它可能永远不适用于我,因为我永远不会处于那样的环境中。但康德认为,道德规则对我们所有人都同样适用。在任何可能的世界里,只要你处于使格言生效的条件中,你就应该遵守它。
This idea is one that fits very well with the ideas we all have about morality. You may disagree with me about whether a principle is morally correct, but if you agree with me on the principle, you have to accept that it governs both of us.
这一观点与我们所有人的道德观非常契合。你可能不同意我的某项原则在道德上是否正确,但如果你同意我的原则,你就必须接受它支配着我们两个人。
Kant's moral philosophy is extremely complex and connects very closely with his views on the nature of the mind and the role of reason in our lives. The universalizability principle, which is perhaps his most famous contribution to moral philosophy, has built into it a
康德的道德哲学极其复杂,与他关于心灵本质和理性在我们生活中的作用的观点紧密相连。普遍性原则可能是他对道德哲学最著名的贡献,其中包含了一个

very important role for reason in our moral thought. For, according to Kant, applying the universalizability principle involves the exercise only of our capacity to reason.
在我们的道德思想中,理性扮演着非常重要的角色。因为,康德认为,运用普遍性原则只涉及我们的理性能力。
Though the universalizability principle certainly does capture a feature of our moral thought, the claim that it derives solely from reason is not easy to accept. For the principle refers to what you can will. And it is not obvious that there has to be anything wrong with the reason of someone who accepts that moral principles have to be universalizable but disagrees with our normal moral ideas, because they are willing to accept consequences we are not. The case of promising, in this way, is rather misleading. For the institution of promising is, in the context of human social life, one that everyone can benefit from, whatever they happen to want. Perhaps only someone who couldn't reason properly would be unable to recognize this.
尽管普遍性原则确实抓住了我们道德思想的一个特点,但认为它完全源于理性的说法并不容易被接受。因为该原则指的是你所能意愿的东西。如果有人接受道德原则必须具有普遍性,但却不同意我们通常的道德观念,那么他的理性就一定有问题,因为他愿意接受我们不愿意接受的后果,这一点并不明显。从这个角度看,许诺的情况颇具误导性。因为在人类社会生活中,许诺制度是一种人人都能从中受益的制度,无论他们想要什么。也许只有不懂推理的人才会认识不到这一点。
But consider a rather different principle, from which some of us can expect to benefit more than others:
但是,考虑一下一个相当不同的原则,我们中的一些人可能会比其他人从中获益更多:
It is wrong to kill innocent people against their will simply because it pleases you.
仅仅因为自己高兴而违背他人意愿杀害无辜的人是错误的。
Consider someone who is a certain kind of psychopath. He is strong and well-armed and enjoys killing people. Call him "Attila the Hun." Attila the Hun might be willing that it should become a universal law that you may kill innocent people for fun, because he is quite sure that no one is likely to be able to kill him. He could say that he is quite happy to accept the possibility that other people would try to kill him for fun if the maxim became a law of nature. "But," he would add, "just let them try."
试想一个人是某种精神病患者。他身强力壮,武器精良,喜欢杀人。称他为 "匈奴王阿提拉"。匈奴王阿提拉可能愿意让 "你可以为取乐而杀死无辜的人 "成为一条普遍的法律,因为他非常确信没有人能杀死他。他可以说,如果这句格言成为自然法则,他很乐意接受其他人试图杀他取乐的可能性。"但是,"他会补充说,"就让他们试试吧"。
The only way Kant can get round the fact that Attila the Hun does not see that his proposed maxim is morally unacceptable is to say that he is being unreasonable: to say that no reasonable person could will that this maxim should become a universal law. To get any moral substance out of the universalizability principle, in other words, you not only have to make assumptions about human lifethat promising is something we can all benefit from, for examplebut you also have to suppose that there are constraints, beyond consistency, placed by reason on what you can will to become a law of nature.
匈奴王阿提拉并没有意识到他提出的格言在道德上是不可接受的,康德绕过这一事实的唯一办法就是说他是不合理的:他说没有一个理性的人能够希望这条格言成为普遍的法律。换句话说,要想从普遍性原则中获得任何道德内涵,你不仅要对人类生活做出假设,比如说,有前途是我们所有人都能从中受益的事情,而且你还必须假设,除了一致性之外,理性还对你能让什么成为自然法则做出了限制。
Kant's derivation of content for moral principles, then, requires both
那么,康德对道德原则内容的推导既需要
a) that we make substantial assumptions about human life, and
a) 我们对人类生活做了大量假设,以及
b) that we rule out as unreasonable some things that a person could will to become a law of nature.
b) 我们排除了一些人可能希望成为自然法则的不合理之处。
The first requirement, (a), is not too troublesome. It makes morality depend on contingent facts about how the world happens to be. But Kant does not need to be worried by this. For it is surely reasonable that human morality should be tailored to the needs of human life. It is because he does not explicitly recognize this fact that he can regard the moral principles he derives both as a prioriknowable by reason alone- and yet synthetic-not true simply as a matter of meaning. For, in fact, like other synthetic truths, the moral principles depend on empirical assumptions and are thus not really a priori at all. Indeed, because of (b), the moral principles Kant derives depend also on an assumption about what a reasonable person can will: for this reason also, the content of the moral rules depends on more than facts about meanings. But even if Kant's theory did not face these problems, it would also face another serious difficulty.
第一个要求(a)并不太麻烦。它使道德依赖于关于世界如何发生的偶然事实。但康德并不需要为此担心。因为人类的道德应该适应人类生活的需要,这肯定是合理的。正因为他没有明确承认这一事实,所以他才能把他所推导出的道德原则既视为先验的--仅凭理性就可以知道的--又视为合成的--而不是仅仅作为意义问题的真实的。因为,事实上,与其他合成真理一样,道德原则依赖于经验假设,因而根本不是真正的先验。事实上,由于(b)的原因,康德推导出的道德原则也依赖于一个关于有理性的人能够意愿什么的假设:也正因为如此,道德规则的内容所依赖的不仅仅是关于意义的事实。但是,即使康德的理论不面临这些问题,它也会面临另一个严重的困难。
In order to apply the universalizability principle, you have first to identify the maxim of your action. But someone who is both uncaring about others and sufficiently ingenious can always describe the maxim of his or her action in such a way that he or she would be willing to universalize it. Consider a Nazi, such as Hitler, who thinks it is all right to kill members of what he regards as inferior races. Hitler, who regards himself as an "Aryan," could agree that he was not willing to universalize the principle
要应用普遍性原则,首先要确定自己行动的格言。但是,一个既不关心他人又足够聪明的人,总能以一种他或她愿意将其普遍化的方式来描述其行动的格言。想想希特勒这样的纳粹分子,他认为杀死他认为是劣等种族的成员是正确的。自诩为 "雅利安人 "的希特勒可以同意,他不愿意将这一原则普遍化
You may kill innocent people if it suits you
如果适合你,你可以滥杀无辜
but simply add that he was willing to universalize the principle
而只是补充说,他愿意普及这一原则
You may kill innocent people if it suits you, provided they are not Aryans.
如果适合你,你可以杀死无辜的人,只要他们不是雅利安人。
Even if we think it is unreasonable for Hitler to universalize the first principle, because it would put his own life unnecessarily at risk, it is hard to see that it is unreasonable - as opposed to just plain wrong-to universalize the second one. He might even agree that if he had been a Gypsy, a Jew, or an African, it would be quite permissible to kill him if it suited you.
即使我们认为希特勒普及第一条原则是不合理的,因为这会使他自己的生命受到不必要的威胁,但很难看出普及第二条原则是不合理的,而不是纯粹错误的。他甚至可能会同意,如果他是吉普赛人、犹太人或非洲人,那么只要适合你,杀死他是完全可以的。
Despite first appearances, then, Kant's rather abstract universalizability principle is not going to be enough to get us a content for morality. It will certainly rule out, as a matter of pure reason, any maxims whose universalization will lead to inconsistency. Thus Kant will be able to explain why you cannot both accept the maxim that killing innocent people is wrong and allow that it is all right to engage in indiscriminate bombing in warfare. If we are to give a philosophical foundation to our moral beliefs, consistency will be a very important beginning. But we need more than that if we are to have principles with substantial moral content. Just to apply Kant's principle, we need to know some general facts about human life; and even people who agree with us about these facts might be able to get round the universalizability principle by gerrymandering the maxims on which they acted.
因此,尽管乍看起来如此,康德相当抽象的普遍性原则并不足以为我们提供道德的内容。作为一个纯粹的理性问题,它肯定会排除任何普遍化会导致不一致的格言。因此,康德能够解释为什么你不能既接受 "滥杀无辜是错误的 "这一格言,又允许在战争中进行狂轰滥炸。如果我们要为我们的道德信念奠定哲学基础,一致性将是一个非常重要的开端。但是,如果我们要制定具有实质性道德内容的原则,我们需要的还不止这些。仅仅为了应用康德的原则,我们就需要了解一些有关人类生活的普遍事实;即使是那些在这些事实上与我们意见一致的人,也可能通过对他们据以行事的格言进行 "偷梁换柱 "来绕过普遍性原则。

5.7 Dealing with relativism
5.7 处理相对主义问题

I said that the fundamental challenge of relativism to the emotivist was that there seemed to be no reason why the mere fact that I recommended a certain attitude should lead someone else to accept it. Kant tried, in effect, to face this problem by saying that, provided the attitudes I recommended were ones that appealed simply to reason, any reasonable person would accept them. But, as we have seen, the universalizability principle requires more than reason to lead to substantial moral principles. Now, Kant thought, in fact, that you could derive from the universalizability principle a version of the Golden Rule that we find in many moral systems around the world: the rule that we should "do unto others as we would have them do unto us." In a sense, Hitler could be said to be following this rule, if he was willing to say that you would have been entitled to kill him if he hadn't been Aryan. But that is not, of course, what the Golden Rule means. What it means is that you shouldn't treat anybody in a way you would not like to be treated, whatever their
我说过,相对主义对情感主义者的根本挑战在于,似乎没有理由仅仅因为我推荐了某种态度,就会导致其他人接受它。康德实际上试图面对这个问题,他说,只要我推荐的态度是简单地诉诸理性的态度,任何有理智的人都会接受它们。但是,正如我们所看到的那样,普遍性原则要求的不仅仅是理性,还需要有实质性的道德原则。现在,康德认为,事实上,你可以从普遍性原则中推导出我们在全世界许多道德体系中都能找到的 "黄金法则 "的一个版本:我们应该 "己所不欲,勿施于人"。从某种意义上说,希特勒可以说是遵循了这一规则,如果他愿意说,如果他不是雅利安人,你就有权杀了他。但这当然不是黄金法则的意思。它的意思是,你不应该以你不希望被对待的方式对待任何人,无论他们是什么人。

race (or sex or age, and so on). A principle that treats people who belong to one race differently from the way it treats others is not an acceptable moral principle. To explain why, however, we have to say something other than that it cannot be universalized.
种族(或性别或年龄等)。以不同的方式对待属于某一种族的人与对待其他人的方式的原则,不是可以接受的道德原则。然而,要解释其原因,我们只能说它不能普遍化。
One of the most important recent moral philosophers, the British philosopher R. M. Hare, has taken up this challenge. He starts, like Kant, with the recognition that moral claims are categorical imperatives and that they must be universalizable. But he also recognizes that these two formal demands on moral principles need to be added to, if we are to end up with a really substantial moral view. And he deals with the problems raised both by Attila the Hun and by Hitler, in two different ways.
近期最重要的道德哲学家之一、英国哲学家 R. M. Hare 接受了这一挑战。他与康德一样,首先承认道德主张是绝对命令,必须具有普遍性。但他也认识到,如果我们要最终形成真正实质性的道德观,就需要对道德原则的这两项形式要求加以补充。他以两种不同的方式处理了匈奴王阿提拉和希特勒提出的问题。
Hare's way of dealing with the problems raised by someone such as Hitler is to restrict the kinds of features of actions and situations that we are allowed to take into account in universalizing our categorical imperatives. In particular, he says, we should consider "the likely effects of possible actions in those situations on people (ourselves and others); that is to say, on their experiences." And he goes on to suggest that we should also consider the effects on other sentient beings: creatures that are capable, like us, of having experiences.
对于希特勒这样的人提出的问题,黑尔的处理方法是限制我们在普遍化我们的绝对命令时可以考虑的行动和情况的特征种类。他特别指出,我们应该考虑 "在这些情况下可能采取的行动对人们(我们自己和其他人)可能产生的影响;也就是说,对他们的经验可能产生的影响"。他接着建议,我们还应该考虑对其他有知觉的生物的影响:这些生物和我们一样,能够拥有经验。
The idea that we should treat everybody equally and the idea that we should consider the consequences for them of what we do together rule out the principles of racists such as Hitler as moral principles. These basic ideas are the parts of the Golden Rule that the universalizability principle leaves out. Hare sometimes suggests that we should not call a principle that discriminates, as Hitler's did, between different kinds of people a "moral principle." Given the way most of us use the word "moral," this is probably right. But even if we would not call it a moral principle (but, perhaps, an immoral one), this doesn't really get to the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem is that even if we wouldn't call this principle "moral," the mere fact that Hitler espoused the principle does not show that he had a defective reason. So we are still left with the problem of relativism: the problem that we don't seem to have any reason to expect Hitler to come to agree with us simply because we announce our con-attitude to racial discrimination.
我们应该平等地对待每一个人,我们应该考虑我们共同所做的事情对他们造成的后果,这些想法排除了希特勒等种族主义者的道德原则。这些基本思想正是 "普遍性原则 "所忽略的 "黄金法则 "的组成部分。黑尔有时会建议,我们不应该把希特勒那样区别对待不同类型的人的原则称为 "道德原则"。从我们大多数人使用 "道德 "一词的方式来看,这也许是对的。但即使我们不称其为道德原则(也许是不道德的原则),这也没有真正触及问题的核心。问题的核心在于,即使我们不把这一原则称为 "道德",希特勒信奉这一原则的事实也不能说明他的理由有缺陷。因此,我们仍然面临着相对主义的问题:我们似乎没有任何理由期待希特勒仅仅因为我们宣布了对种族歧视的反对态度就会同意我们的观点。
In other words, even though Hitler himself was wrong about the facts-Jewish people did not cause Germany's problems-and
换句话说,尽管希特勒本人对事实的看法是错误的--犹太人并没有造成德国的问题,而且

probably not a very sound reasoner, neither of these deficiencies seems to account for his moral errors. I shall get back to the question of how we should react to this fact in a moment. For now, let us return to Attila the Hun and see what Hare has to say about him.
他可能不是一个很好的推理者,但这两个缺陷似乎都不能解释他的道德错误。关于我们应该如何应对这一事实的问题,我稍后再谈。现在,让我们回到匈奴王阿提拉身上,看看哈雷是如何评价他的。
Hare calls someone like Attila the Hun a "fanatic." Fanatics are people who are willing to universalize maxims that allow them to do things to other people that they would not like done to themselves. Hare says that someone like this is not engaging in successful moral thinking; that, in fact, there is something wrong with the fanatic's imagination. The argument goes like this.
哈雷把匈奴王阿提拉这样的人称为 "狂热分子"。狂热分子是那些愿意将格言普遍化的人,这些格言允许他们对别人做他们自己不愿意对自己做的事情。黑尔说,这样的人并没有进行成功的道德思考;事实上,狂热分子的想象力出了问题。这个论点是这样的
In order to decide whether you can universalize a maxim, you should consider what the effects would be of the maxim's being universalized to apply equally to everybody. Suppose the consequences of your act would be that some people would suffer terribly and nobody would derive much benefit. Then, if you really exercise your imagination and consider what it would be like for you to suffer terribly, you are bound to come to prefer that this should not occur. This means that you cannot consistently will that the maxim should be universalized, for if it were universalized, you would have to be willing to accept that the same thing should (or could) be done to you.
为了决定你是否可以普及一条格言,你应该考虑这条格言被普及到平等地适用于所有人会产生什么影响。假设你的行为的后果是,有些人会遭受巨大的痛苦,而没有人会得到多少好处。那么,如果你真的发挥你的想象力,考虑一下你自己会遭受怎样的痛苦,你一定会希望这种情况不会发生。这就是说,你不可能始终如一地希望这句格言得到普及,因为如果它得到普及,你就必须愿意接受同样的事情应该(或可能)发生在你身上。
This argument is really quite convincing: once we get Attila the Hun to universalize in the right way, he would have to be most unreasonable to accept that it was all right for people to do to him what he was willing to do to others.
这个论点确实很有说服力:一旦我们让匈奴王阿提拉以正确的方式普遍化,他就必须是最不合理的人,才能接受人们对他做他愿意对别人做的事。
Some philosophers have insisted that a problem remains: how, they ask, should we react to the fact that Attila the Hun and Hitler will not universalize in the right way? But why, exactly, is this a problem? When I introduced the idea of relativism I said that a relativist held that what was good depended on who you were or what society you lived in. But, as we have seen, if the sophisticated emotivist account of moral content is correct, when I say "Kindness is good," I am saying that I have a pro-attitude to kindness and that I want everyone else to have that pro-attitude. I am not just saying, as the relativist would require, that I want everyone who shares my feelings or my culture to have this attitude. It does not follow from the fact that people who disagree with us morally need not be wrong about the empirical facts and may not be incapable of reasoning that
一些哲学家坚持认为仍然存在一个问题:他们问,我们应该如何应对匈奴王阿提拉和希特勒不会以正确的方式普遍化这一事实?但这究竟为什么会成为一个问题呢?我在介绍相对主义思想时说过,相对主义者认为,什么是好的,取决于你是谁,或者你生活在哪个社会。但是,正如我们所看到的,如果关于道德内容的复杂的情感主义观点是正确的,那么当我说 "仁慈是好的 "时,我是在说我对仁慈持赞成态度,而且我希望其他人也持这种赞成态度。我并不是像相对主义者所要求的那样,只是说我希望每个与我有相同感受或文化的人都有这种态度。在道德上与我们意见相左的人不一定在经验事实上是错误的,也不一定没有能力推理,但这并不能说明

we have to accept their moral claims. What does follow is that, just as we have to give factual grounds for rejecting factual mistakes, and logical grounds for rejecting errors of reasoning, so we have to give moral grounds for rejecting their moral errors. What is wrong with Attila the Hun and Hitler is that they are wicked; they lack sympathy for others, and they do not have a pro-attitude to treating people equally. The fact that these are neither errors of reasoning nor errors of fact does not make them any the less wrong.
我们必须接受他们的道德主张。然而,正如我们必须给出否定事实错误的事实依据和否定推理错误的逻辑依据一样,我们也必须给出否定他们道德错误的道德依据。匈奴王阿提拉和希特勒的错误在于他们是邪恶的,他们缺乏对他人的同情,没有平等待人的态度。这些既不是推理上的错误,也不是事实上的错误,但这并不意味着他们的错误更少。
Why, then, do so many people think that the fact that moral judgments express attitudes means that whether you should accept them depends on where you live or who you happen to be? One answer, I think, is that they confuse two different senses in which judgments can be subjective. The view that moral judgments express attitudes means that they are, in one sense, subjective. Which judgments you will agree to depends on what attitudes you have, which is a fact about you. But, in this sense, factual judgments are subjective also. Which ones you will accept depends on what beliefs you have. From the fact that they are subjective in this sense, therefore, it does not follow that they are subjective in the sense that you are entitled to make any judgments you like.
那么,为什么有那么多人认为,道德判断表达态度这一事实意味着你是否应该接受道德判断取决于你住在哪里或你碰巧是谁呢?我认为,答案之一是他们混淆了判断可能具有主观性的两种不同意义。道德判断表达态度的观点意味着,在某种意义上,道德判断是主观的。你会同意哪种判断取决于你有什么样的态度,这是关于你的事实。但从这个意义上说,事实判断也是主观的。你会接受哪些判断取决于你有哪些信念。因此,从它们在这个意义上是主观的这一事实出发,并不能得出它们在你有权做出任何你喜欢的判断这一意义上是主观的这一结论。
Once we have seen this, we can answer what I called the real challenge of relativism: to explain why you should expect someone to share your pro-attitudes. The answer to this question is simply that if someone does not have the right pro-attitudes, then she may well not come to agree with you, however many facts you show her or arguments you make. The error is to react to this fact by supposing that it obliges us to give up either the universality or the categorical nature of our moral claims. Someone who reacts in this way is trying to derive an "ought" - You ought not to make universal or categorical claims"-from an "is"-"No amount of argument will force someone to share your pro-attitudes."
一旦我们看到了这一点,我们就可以回答我所说的相对主义的真正挑战:解释为什么你应该期待别人赞同你的态度。这个问题的答案很简单:如果某人没有正确的支持态度,那么无论你向她展示多少事实或提出多少论据,她都很可能不会同意你的观点。错误在于,对这一事实的反应是假定它迫使我们放弃我们道德主张的普遍性或绝对性。做出这种反应的人试图从 "是"--"无论如何争论都不会迫使别人赞同你的态度"--推导出一个 "应该"--"你不应该提出普遍或绝对的主张"。

5.8 Prescriptivism and supervenience
5.8 规定论与超验论

Hare calls his account of moral contents a version of "prescriptivism." This is because he holds that the meaning of moral terms is never equivalent to any descriptive or factual terms. Moral sentences prescribe rather that describe. The reason this is so, he claims, is that in saying something has a certain moral property we
黑尔把他对道德内容的解释称为 "规定主义"。这是因为他认为,道德术语的含义绝不等同于任何描述性或事实性术语。道德句子是规定而不是描述。他认为,之所以如此,是因为在说某物具有某种道德属性时,我们

are expressing not just beliefs but attitudes. People such as Hitler or Attila the Hun can share all our descriptive beliefs and disagree, nevertheless, with our moral ones because they do not share our attitudes. But Hare also points out that though two people can share all their descriptive beliefs and still not share their moral judgments, they must share all their moral beliefs about a subject if they share all their factual ones. The technical way of expressing this fact is to say that moral properties are supervenient on nonmoral ones: two actions or situations that are identical in their nonmoral features must, as a matter of necessity, share their moral ones. Many kinds of properties are, in this way, supervenient on properties in other classes. Chemical properties, for example, are supervenient on physical ones. No two things that have all the same physical properties can differ in their chemical ones.
他们表达的不仅是信仰,更是态度。希特勒或匈奴王阿提拉等人可以认同我们所有的描述性信念,但却不认同我们的道德信念,因为他们不认同我们的态度。但是,黑尔也指出,尽管两个人可以分享他们所有的描述性信念,但仍然不能分享他们的道德判断,如果他们分享他们所有的事实性信念,他们就必须分享他们关于一个主题的所有道德信念。表达这一事实的技术方法是说,道德属性是对非道德属性的监督:两个在非道德特征上相同的行为或情境,必然共享其道德特征。通过这种方式,许多种类的属性对其他类别的属性具有监督作用。例如,化学属性是物理属性的上位属性。没有任何两个具有相同物理特性的事物会在化学特性上有所不同。
This important fact about moral judgments is one that prescriptivists are in a very good position to explain. For an attitude, whether pro or con, is, by definition, a state that disposes you for or against action. Because it is a universalizable attitude, a moral judgment always has the form
关于道德判断的这一重要事实,规定论者可以很好地加以解释。因为一种态度,无论是赞成还是反对,顾名思义,都是一种让你支持或反对行动的状态。因为它是一种可普遍化的态度,所以道德判断总是具有以下形式

M: In circumstance C, I and everyone else ought (or ought not) to do A.
男:在 C 情况下,我和其他人都应该(或不应该)做 A。

The term "C," which specifies the circumstances, has to be a factual term: it has to characterize states of the world. Suppose, for the purposes of reductio, that it did not characterize a factual state of affairs. Then it could not lead you to do anything at all. For in order to apply , you must be able to discover whether, in fact, obtains.
C "一词是对情况的具体描述,它必须是一个事实性术语:它必须描述世界的状态。为了归纳的目的,假设它并不描述事实状态。那么,它根本无法引导你做任何事情。因为为了应用 ,你必须能够发现 事实上是否存在。
All my moral judgments, then, will be of the form of M. Given that I have these moral judgments, what I believe I and others ought and ought not to do is determined by what I believe the facts to be. This is precisely the respect in which our moral judgments are like our desires: given our desires, what we want to do is also determined by what we believe the facts to be.
那么,我的所有道德判断都将是 M 形式的。鉴于我有这些道德判断,我认为我和其他人应该做什么和不应该做什么就取决于我认为事实是什么。这正是我们的道德判断与我们的欲望的相似之处:鉴于我们的欲望,我们想要做什么也是由我们所相信的事实决定的。

5.9 Problems of utilitarianism I: Defining "utility"
5.9 功利主义的问题 I:定义 "效用

So far we have largely discussed metaethical questions. These are, like most philosophical questions, fundamentally theoretical: they
到目前为止,我们主要讨论了元伦理问题。与大多数哲学问题一样,这些问题从根本上说是理论性的:它们

have to do with what we should think. But morality is practical; it has to do centrally with what we should do. And Hare's work provides a natural transition from purely metaethical questions to moral questions and the application of metaethical theory to them. For Hare is not only a metaethical prescriptivist but also someone who has the substantive moral view that is called "utilitarianism." Indeed, he argues that, if you first
与我们应该想什么有关。但道德是实用的,它的核心是我们应该做什么。哈雷的著作自然地从纯粹的元伦理学问题过渡到了道德问题以及元伦理学理论在这些问题上的应用。因为哈雷不仅是元伦理学的规定论者,也是一个拥有被称为 "功利主义 "的实质性道德观的人。事实上,他认为,如果你首先
a) consider what maxims you are willing to universalize, and then
a) 考虑你愿意普及哪些格言,然后
b) make sure they meet the conditions
b) 确保他们符合条件
i) that we treat everybody equally and
i) 我们平等对待每个人,并且
ii) that we take into account the consequences of our actions for sentient beings,
ii) 我们要考虑到我们的行为对众生造成的后果、
you will find that you are drawn to accept utilitarian principles. Hare's metaethics thus leads him to his first-order moral principles.
你会发现你被吸引去接受功利主义原则。因此,黑尔的元伦理学将他引向了他的一阶道德原则。
Utilitarianism is composed of two basic claims. One is called "consequentialism": this is the view that an act should be assessed purely by its consequences. Its opposite is moral absolutism, for absolutists hold that certain kinds of acts are wrong and right, whatever the consequences. (Absolutism is also often called "deontology.") Consequentialism does not yield substantial moral principles, however, until it says both which consequences you should consider and how they should affect your actions.
功利主义包含两个基本主张。其一是 "后果论":即纯粹根据行为的后果来评价行为。它的对立面是道德绝对主义,因为绝对主义者认为,无论后果如何,某些行为都是错误和正确的(绝对主义通常也被称为 "道义论")。(绝对主义也常被称为 "道义论"。)然而,后果主义并不能产生实质性的道德原则,除非它指出你应该考虑哪些后果以及这些后果应该如何影响你的行为。
The first utilitarians, nineteenth-century British philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, believed that the consequences you should consider were simply the happiness or unhappiness that your actions would cause. They thought you should seek to maximize the amount of happiness, which means they were hedonists-hence their famous slogan "The greatest happiness of the greatest number." They thought we should act in such a way that as many people as possible were as happy as possible.
最早的功利主义者是十九世纪英国哲学家杰里米-边沁(Jeremy Bentham)和詹姆斯-密尔(James Mill),他们认为你应该考虑的后果仅仅是你的行为会导致的幸福或不幸福。他们认为你应该追求最大化的幸福,这意味着他们是享乐主义者--因此他们提出了著名的口号 "最大多数人的最大幸福"。他们认为我们的行为应该让尽可能多的人幸福。
This certainly looks like a very generous-hearted principle. But this form of utilitarianism immediately has to answer a question. Suppose you have the choice between making some people a little happy or a few people very happy. Which should you choose? In order to answer this question we need to be able to have some sort
这看起来当然是一个非常慷慨的原则。但是,这种形式的功利主义必须立即回答一个问题。假设你可以在让一些人有一点快乐或让少数人非常快乐之间做出选择。你应该选择哪一个?为了回答这个问题,我们需要能够有某种

of way of measuring happiness. The measure the utilitarians suggested they called "utility" - hence the name of their view. They held that it made sense to say such things as
衡量幸福的方法。功利主义者提出的衡量标准被称为 "效用"--这也是他们观点的名称由来。他们认为,以下说法是有道理的

U: Sarah would get twice as much utility as James from eating this bar of chocolate.
U:莎拉吃这块巧克力的效用是詹姆斯的两倍。

Because of this, they felt they could answer the problem. All you had to do was to add up the amount of utility each person affected would get from each of the actions you were able to perform, and choose the action that created the most utility.
正因为如此,他们认为自己可以解决这个问题。你所要做的就是把每个受影响的人从你所能采取的每个行动中获得的效用加起来,然后选择能创造最大效用的行动。
It soon emerged, however, that this view of utility faced a number of very difficult problems. First of all, is it really clear that we know what it means to say that James gets half the amount of utility that Sarah gets? We may sometimes have a sense that one person is happier than another; but
然而,这种关于效用的观点很快就出现了一些非常棘手的问题。首先,我们是否真的清楚,詹姆斯得到的效用是萨拉的一半意味着什么?我们有时可能会觉得一个人比另一个人更幸福,但是
a) we do not know how to tell in general which of any two people is happier, and
a) 我们一般不知道如何判断两个人中谁更幸福,而且
b) we certainly do not normally think, even when we do know who is happier, that it makes sense to suppose that the difference in their happiness can be measured precisely.
b) 即使我们知道谁更幸福,我们通常也不会认为可以精确测量他们幸福感的差异。
Because of their interest in measuring utility, the utilitarians made important contributions to economics. For classical economics sought to explain how economies worked by supposing that every individual was trying to maximize his or her own utility. Indeed, the problem of measuring utility has been central to economics ever since the utilitarians. Since "happiness" is a rather vague notion, economists have tried to make the idea of utility rather more precise, and they have done this essentially by defining utility as a measure of the satisfaction of your desires. Roughly speaking, what they suggested was that the stronger your desires, the more utility you got from their satisfaction. If you wanted coffee twice as much as you wanted tea, then you got twice as much utility from a cup of coffee as from a cup of tea.
由于对衡量效用感兴趣,功利主义者对经济学做出了重要贡献。因为古典经济学试图通过假设每个人都试图最大化自己的效用来解释经济是如何运行的。事实上,自功利主义者以来,衡量效用的问题一直是经济学的核心问题。由于 "幸福 "是一个相当模糊的概念,经济学家们试图使效用的概念更加精确,他们基本上是通过将效用定义为满足个人欲望的一种衡量标准来实现这一目标的。粗略地说,他们认为你的欲望越强烈,你从欲望的满足中获得的效用就越大。如果你想喝咖啡的次数是想喝茶的次数的两倍,那么你从一杯咖啡中得到的效用就是一杯茶的两倍。
If we remind ourselves of the discussions of the first chapter, we shall see why it is a very challenging problem to develop a scientific
如果我们回顾一下第一章的讨论,我们就会明白,为什么要开发一个科学的、具有 挑战性的问题。

theory of utility. Such a theory must allow us to measure desires precisely enough to make it possible to apply the utilitarian principle that you should seek to maximize human utility. The reason why this is a challenging problem, of course, is that utility is a mental state that has all the epistemological problems that come under the heading of the problem of other minds.
效用理论。这种理论必须让我们能够足够精确地衡量欲望,以便能够应用功利主义原则,即你应该寻求人类效用的最大化。当然,之所以说这是一个具有挑战性的问题,是因为效用是一种精神状态,它具有其他思想问题标题下的所有认识论问题。
Because of this, economists attempted to find first behaviorist and, later, functionalist accounts of utility. (In fact, Ramsey, who invented functionalism about mental states, also made important contributions to the foundations of economics, for just this reason.) But it turned out to be very difficult-some would say impossibleto find a functionalist account of utility that made sense of claims such as U. You could give a functionalist account of desire and belief that made sense of the idea of Sarah wanting, say, coffee twice as much as she wanted tea, though such measurements only made sense given some rather arbitrary-looking assumptions. But you could not develop a theory that made sense of Sarah wanting coffee twice as much as James did.
正因为如此,经济学家们首先试图找到行为主义的效用解释,后来又试图找到功能主义的效用解释。(事实上,发明了关于心理状态的功能主义的拉姆齐也正是出于这个原因对经济学的基础做出了重要贡献)。你可以给出一个关于欲望和信念的功能主义解释,让莎拉想要的咖啡是她想要的茶的两倍,尽管这种测量只有在一些看起来相当武断的假设下才有意义。但是,你不可能提出一种理论来说明莎拉想要的咖啡是詹姆斯想要的两倍。
This problem of the interpersonal comparison of utility is very important to the philosophy of economics and to utilitarian morality, but it requires a good deal of technical apparatus to discuss it. Suffice it to say here that unless interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, utilitarianism cannot be applied.
效用的人际比较问题对经济学哲学和功利主义道德观都非常重要,但讨论这个问题需要大量的技术手段。这里只需指出,除非可以进行效用的人际比较,否则功利主义就无法应用。

5.10 Problems of utilitarianism II: Consequentialism versus absolutism
5.10 功利主义的问题二:后果主义与绝对主义

But this basic problem of defining and measuring utilities is by no means the only challenge that faces the utilitarian. Let us put to one side the question of how to measure utility and simply suppose that it can be solved. There are still two major sorts of objection to utilitarianism. One sort of objection starts with hunches about what people's utilities might be and shows that utilitarianism recommends actions that seem quite plainly immoral.
但是,定义和衡量效用的这一基本问题绝不是功利主义者面临的唯一挑战。让我们把如何衡量效用的问题放在一边,简单地假设这个问题是可以解决的。对功利主义的反对主要有两种。一种反对意见从人们的效用可能是什么的直觉出发,指出功利主义建议采取的行动显然是不道德的。
But how are we to judge whether what seems immoral really is immoral? In developing our moral views in a philosophical way, we take into account our metaethical views. But, as we have seen, metaethics does not, by itself, settle substantial moral questions. When we consider a substantive moral theory such as utilitarianism,
但是,我们如何判断看似不道德的行为是否真的不道德呢?在以哲学的方式发展我们的道德观时,我们会考虑到我们的元伦理学观点。但是,正如我们所看到的,元伦理学本身并不能解决实质性的道德问题。当我们考虑一种实质性的道德理论,如功利主义时、

we have to require not only that it be consistent with our metaethics, but also that it be consistent with our existing basic moral beliefs. No amount of philosophical argument is likely to persuade us to give up our deepest moral beliefs. We might find ourselves changing some of our moral views as a result of reflection, not merely in order to make them logically consistent, but because, for example, we see that certain principles that we have held in the past would lead, once universalized, to horrible consequences. But, in the end, there will be a kind of movement back and forth between the moral beliefs we start with, and moral theory. I shall discuss this process in a little more detail in 6.12. For the moment, let us just proceed in this way.
我们不仅要求它符合我们的元伦理学,而且要求它符合我们现有的基本道德信念。任何哲学论证都不可能说服我们放弃最深刻的道德信念。我们可能会发现自己在反思中改变了一些道德观点,这不仅仅是为了使它们在逻辑上保持一致,而是因为,比如说,我们发现我们过去所坚持的某些原则一旦普遍化,就会导致可怕的后果。但是,归根结底,我们开始时的道德信念与道德理论之间会有一种来回的运动。我将在 6.12 中更详细地讨论这一过程。目前,让我们先这样进行。
Consider the simple and familiar moral principle that one should not lie. Utilitarians, because they are consequentialists, are not likely to accept this principle. They will say that sometimes telling a lie may have better consequences for human utility than telling the truth. We should consider in each case what the consequences would be and act accordingly. Provided it has the best consequences for human happiness, lying may sometimes be the right thing to do.
请看一个简单而熟悉的道德原则:人不应该撒谎。功利主义者因为是结果论者,不可能接受这一原则。他们会说,有时说假话可能比说真话对人类的效用产生更好的后果。我们应该考虑每种情况的后果,并据此行事。如果撒谎能给人类幸福带来最好的后果,那么撒谎有时可能是正确的做法。
An absolutist will say, on the other hand, that lying is always wrong. It does not follow that the absolutist will never tell a lie. For, an absolutist can say, though lying is always wrong, some things are a good deal worse than lying. Thus, suppose Theresa lives in a totalitarian state. She is helping to hide an opponent of the regime, who risks being tortured if he is caught, though all he has done is to speak out against torture and oppression. Suppose a police officer comes to the door asking whether she is hiding that person. Even if Theresa is an absolutist about lying, she does not have to tell the truth. To do this would not only be a betrayal of trust but lead to the suffering of a noble individual.
另一方面,绝对主义者会说,撒谎永远是错误的。这并不意味着绝对主义者永远不会撒谎。因为,绝对主义者可以说,虽然撒谎永远是错的,但有些事情比撒谎更糟糕。因此,假设特蕾莎生活在一个极权国家。她正在帮助藏匿一个政权的反对者,这个反对者一旦被抓就有可能遭受酷刑,尽管他所做的一切都是为了反对酷刑和压迫。假设有警察上门询问她是否藏匿了这个人。即使特蕾莎是一个绝对不撒谎的人,她也没有必要说出真相。这样做不仅是背信弃义,还会导致一个高尚的人遭受痛苦。
Theresa will say not that lying, in these circumstances, is right but that it is the lesser of two evils. Fate has dealt her a choice between principles. Her view, as a moral agent, is that lying in this situation is obviously the lesser evil.
特蕾莎不会说在这种情况下撒谎是对的,而是说这是两害相权取其轻。命运给了她一个在原则之间做出选择的机会。作为一个道德主体,她认为在这种情况下撒谎显然是两害相权取其轻。
But what is the content of Theresa's judgment that it is wrong to lie even in this case? She would certainly agree that in this case, she ought, all things considered, to lie. The difference between Theresa and the consequentialist here is not in the actions they carry out but in the attitude they take to them. Theresa will regret having to lie.
但是,特蕾莎认为即使在这种情况下撒谎也是不对的这一判断的内容是什么呢?她肯定会同意,在这种情况下,从各方面考虑,她都应该撒谎。在这里,特蕾莎与结果论者的区别不在于他们所采取的行动,而在于他们对行动所持的态度。特蕾莎会后悔不得不撒谎。
The utilitarian will not. In this sort of case, many people will agree with the utilitarian that Theresa has the wrong response. She simply has nothing to regret, they will say. If Theresa agrees with this, we shall have no answer to the question what the content is of her judgment that the act was wrong.
功利主义者不会这样做。在这种情况下,很多人都会同意功利主义者的观点,认为特蕾莎的反应是错误的。他们会说,她根本没有什么可后悔的。如果特丽莎同意这种说法,我们就无法回答她关于该行为是错误的判断的内容是什么。
It is because many people believe that it is simply right to lie in such cases that they find the consequentialist position very plausible in the case of lying. But the consequentialist surely owes us some explanation of why we all have the intuition that there is something wrong about lying. The answer will be that
正是因为许多人认为在这种情况下撒谎是完全正确的,所以他们认为后果论者在撒谎问题上的立场非常可信。但是,结果论者肯定还欠我们一些解释,为什么我们都有一种直觉,认为撒谎是不对的。答案是
a) the practice of truth telling contributes to human happiness in most cases-which is why we all begin by thinking of lying as wrong; but also,
a) 在大多数情况下,说真话有助于人类的幸福--这就是为什么我们一开始都认为撒谎是错误的;但同时也是、
b) individual lies are justified if telling the truth would lead to more harm than good.
b) 如果说真话弊大于利,那么个别谎言就是合理的。
Indeed, a consequentialist can argue that feelings of regret, such as Theresa may feel, can themselves be given a consequentialist justification. Hare says:
事实上,结果论者可以说,特蕾莎可能会感到的后悔情绪本身就可以被赋予结果论的理由。黑尔说
Nobody who actually uses moral language in his practical life will be content with a mere dismissal of the paradox that we can feel guilty for doing what we think we ought to do.
在实际生活中真正使用道德语言的人都不会满足于仅仅否定这样一个悖论,即我们会因为做了我们认为应该做的事情而感到内疚。
And he suggests a number of reasons why a consequentialist should actually want us to have such reactions. First of all, he takes it for granted, surely correctly, that such feelings help us keep to our principles. Without them, many of us would be constantly slipping into doing what we believed was wrong. So the feelings are essential. Now, we could try to develop a sophisticated set of feelings that went exactly with our moral beliefs. But to do that, we should have to attach the feelings, so to speak, to very complex principles. Once we start on this process with our principles, Hare argues, we will end up with moral principles of tremendous complexity. We start with a principle that says, "One ought never to do an act that is G" (where G is, say, "a lie"); then we consider Theresa's problem. So, as Hare says, we modify our principle. Instead of reading "One ought
他还提出了一系列理由,说明为什么结果论者实际上希望我们有这样的反应。首先,他理所当然地认为,这种感觉有助于我们坚持原则,这一点肯定是正确的。如果没有这种感觉,我们中的许多人就会不断地去做我们认为是错误的事情。因此,情感是必不可少的。现在,我们可以尝试发展一套与我们的道德信念完全一致的复杂情感。但要做到这一点,我们就必须把这种感觉与非常复杂的原则联系起来。哈雷认为,一旦我们从原则开始这个过程,我们最终会得到非常复杂的道德原则。我们从 "一个人永远都不应该做出 G 的行为"(这里的 G 是指 "谎言")这一原则开始,然后考虑特丽莎的问题。因此,正如黑尔所说,我们修改了我们的原则。我们不应该把 "一个人应该

never to do an act that is G," it now reads "One ought never to do an act that is G, unless it is necessary to avoid an act that is F."
永远不做属于 G 的行为",现在改为 "永远不应该做属于 G 的行为,除非有必要避免属于 F 的行为"。
Here F might be "the betrayal of a noble individual." Reflection on other cases will soon have us adding that even if it is necessary to do to avoid , we should not do so in circumstances unless-as another case might make us think-it is also I. And so on.
在这里,F 可能是 "一个高尚的人的背叛"。对其他案例的反思很快会让我们补充说,即使有必要做 以避免 ,我们也不应该在 的情况下这样做,除非--正如另一个案例可能让我们想到的--它也是 I。等等。
But once we get to principles of this complexity, it is hard to get our feelings attached to them in the right way. Hare's point, then, is that our moral feelings must, as a matter of psychological fact, attach to manageable principles, and that having the feelings is itself something that has a consequentialist justification. What is right and what is wrong are determined by utilitarian principles, but our moral feelings cannot run precisely in parallel with those principles. So it is better overall to have the feelings, even if they sometimes lead us astray.
但是,一旦我们掌握了如此复杂的原则,就很难将我们的情感以正确的方式依附于这些原则。因此,黑尔的观点是,作为一个心理学事实,我们的道德情感必须依附于可管理的原则,而拥有情感本身就是具有结果论理由的事情。什么是对,什么是错,是由功利主义原则决定的,但我们的道德情感不可能与这些原则完全一致。因此,总的来说,有感觉更好,即使它们有时会把我们引入歧途。
Nevertheless, there are cases where most people think that consequentialism about lying is simply wrong. Suppose, for example, Ben is dying of a rare disease. Someday soon he will just drop dead, and nothing he or anyone else does can change that. Jane, a utilitarian doctor, might well feel that she should just not tell him, because it will only make him unhappy. Yet many of us think that, in these circumstances, Ben would have a right to know that he was going to die.
然而,在有些情况下,大多数人认为关于撒谎的后果论是完全错误的。例如,假设本患有一种罕见的疾病,生命垂危。不久的某一天,他就会死去,而他或其他人所做的一切都无法改变这一事实。简,一个功利主义的医生,很可能会觉得她不应该告诉他,因为这只会让他不开心。然而,我们中的许多人都认为,在这种情况下,本有权知道自己即将死去。
This sort of case is a more challenging problem for the utilitarian because it suggests not only that our moral feelings do not fit utilitarian principles but also that our moral judgments do not fit them either. We can give a utilitarian explanation of why we might want to have nonutilitarian feelings, but it would be just inconsistent to give a utilitarian explanation of why utilitarian principles were wrong.
这种情况对功利主义者来说是一个更具挑战性的问题,因为它不仅表明我们的道德情感不符合功利原则,而且表明我们的道德判断也不符合功利原则。我们可以用功利主义来解释为什么我们可能想要拥有非功利主义的情感,但如果用功利主义来解释为什么功利主义原则是错误的,那就是前后矛盾了。
The intuition that we cannot accept consequentialism as a moral theory is even stronger in cases where more is obviously at stake: in cases, for example, which involve killing people against their will. Jonathan Glover, a British philosopher, has suggested just such a case. He asks us to consider a man in prison.
我们不能接受结果论作为一种道德理论的直觉,在明显涉及更多利害关系的情况下会更加强烈:例如,在涉及违背他人意愿杀人的情况下。英国哲学家乔纳森-格洛弗(Jonathan Glover)就提出了这样一种情况。他要求我们考虑一个被关在监狱里的人。
His life in prison is not a happy one, and I have every reason to think that over the years it will get worse. In my view, he will most of the time have a quality
他在狱中的生活并不快乐,而且我完全有理由认为,随着时间的推移,情况会越来越糟。在我看来,他大部分时间都会过得很好。

of life some way below the point at which life is worth living. I tell him this, and offer to kill him. He, irrationally as I think, says that he wants to go on living. I know that he would be too cowardly to kill himself even if he eventually came to want to die, so my offer is probably his last chance of death. I believe that in the future his backward-looking preference for having been killed will be stronger than his present preference for going on living.
我告诉他这一点,并提出要杀了他。我告诉他这一点,并提出要杀了他。他却不理智地说,他想继续活下去。我知道,即使他最终想死,也会因为太懦弱而不敢自杀,所以我的提议可能是他最后的死亡机会。我相信,将来他对被杀的后向偏好会比现在对继续活下去的偏好更强烈。
This case constitutes an objection to utilitarianism, indeed to most forms of consequentialism. It looks as though the consequentialist will here have to agree that I should kill the prisoner, for the consequences of doing so will be better for him. But Glover suggests that the consequentialist might argue that drawing this conclusion ignores two important considerations.
这种情况构成了对功利主义的反对,实际上也是对大多数形式的结果论的反对。在这里,结果论者似乎不得不同意我应该杀死囚犯,因为这样做的后果对他更有利。但格洛弗认为,结果主义者可能会说,得出这个结论忽略了两个重要的考虑因素。
First, such a killing may have many side effects that have so far not been mentioned. Thus, for example, the man's family might regret his death, even if they knew that his life would have been unpleasant. And, for another example, if it came to be known what you had done, this would have a terrible effect on the morale of other prisoners in the prison. They might well fear that you would make such a judgment about them. This is especially likely to worry them because of the second consideration that the consequentialist may say we have ignored: namely, that it is not, in fact, very easy to predict what the future course of a person's mental states will be. As Glover says: "If a man wants to go on living, although this does not force me to accept that his life is worth living, I would have to be very optimistic about my own judgment to be sure that he is wrong."
首先,这种杀戮可能会产生许多迄今为止尚未提及的副作用。因此,举例来说,即使他的家人知道他的生活会很不愉快,他们也可能会对他的死感到遗憾。再比如,如果你的所作所为广为人知,会对监狱里其他囚犯的士气产生可怕的影响。他们很可能会担心你会对他们做出这样的判断。这尤其可能会让他们担心,因为后果论者可能会说我们忽略了第二个考虑因素:即事实上,预测一个人未来的心理状态并不容易。正如格洛弗所说:"如果一个人想继续活下去,虽然这并不强迫我接受他的生命是值得活下去的,但我必须对自己的判断非常乐观,才能确定他是错的"。
But drawing attention to these considerations does not really allow us to accept the utilitarian's claims. For we can simply construct a case where these considerations do not apply. Suppose we were sure that no one would find out, sure that the prisoner had no family, and sure about his current and future mental states. The utilitarian would then have to accept that it is right to kill the prisoner. Yet many of us would think that it was still quite wrong to kill him against his will.
但是,关注这些因素并不能让我们真正接受功利主义者的主张。因为我们可以简单地构建一个这些考虑因素并不适用的案例。假设我们确信没有人会发现,确信囚犯没有家人,确信他现在和将来的精神状态。那么功利主义者就不得不承认杀死犯人是正确的。然而,我们中的许多人都会认为,违背囚犯的意愿将其杀害仍然是非常错误的。
The view that it would be quite wrong to kill the prisoner will be defended by any philosopher who believes that it is a central moral principle that we should respect a person's autonomy. Respecting people's autonomy means placing a very great deal of weight in our
任何哲学家都会为杀死囚犯是大错特错的观点辩护,因为他们认为尊重人的自主性是一项核心道德原则。尊重人的自主性意味着我们要高度重视

decisions about them on what they themselves judge to be important. For "autonomy" means, in essence, the capacity for self-rule. (There's the word "nomos" again, from the Greek for "law": an autonomous person is bound by his or her own laws.) Kant expressed this idea when he said that it followed from his universalizability principle that we should never treat people merely as means but always as ends in themselves. To kill the prisoner is to regard his utility as more important than his wishes, and thus, in a sense, to treat him as a means to the end of maximizing utility.
因为 "自主 "本质上意味着自我管理的能力。因为 "自主 "本质上是指自我统治的能力。(又是 "nomos "这个词,源自希腊语中的 "法律":一个自主的人受他或她自己的法律约束)。康德表达了这一观点,他说,根据他的普遍性原则,我们决不能把人仅仅当作手段,而应始终把人本身当作目的。杀死囚犯就是把他的效用看得比他的愿望更重要,因此,从某种意义上说,就是把他当作实现效用最大化这一目的的手段。
If Kant was right, and we must respect people's autonomy, then consequentialism-the claim that we should always judge actions simply by their consequences-must be wrong. Even if we think that it is generally a good thing to maximize utility, the application of this principle must be subject to constraints. In particular, we may maximize people's utility only in contexts where this is consistent with respecting their autonomy. In the end, consequentialists cannot explain why many of us regard respect for other people's autonomy as important.
如果康德是对的,我们必须尊重人们的自主权,那么后果论--即我们应该总是简单地根据行为的后果来判断行为的主张--就一定是错误的。即使我们认为效用最大化通常是件好事,但这一原则的应用必须受到限制。尤其是,我们只有在尊重人们自主权的情况下才能最大化他们的效用。归根结底,结果论者无法解释为什么我们许多人认为尊重他人的自主权很重要。

5.11 Rights 5.11 权利

I have been discussing moral issues largely from the standpoint of someone who has to decide what to do. So I have been focusing on the question of what principles we should use in making these decisions. Approaching moral issues this way, you are bound to begin by focusing on the question of which acts are right and which ones are wrong. Utilitarianism provides a simple answer to this question. But it is an answer that is inconsistent with some very basic features of our moral thinking.
我主要是从一个必须决定做什么的人的角度来讨论道德问题的。因此,我一直在关注我们在做出这些决定时应遵循哪些原则的问题。以这种方式探讨道德问题,你必然会首先关注哪些行为是正确的,哪些行为是错误的。功利主义为这个问题提供了一个简单的答案。但这个答案却与我们道德思维的一些基本特征不符。
What it leaves out of account is the fact that we think of people as having rights that should be respected, as well as having the capacity for happiness, pleasure, and pain. Respect for a person's autonomy, which explained why the prisoner's feelings mattered, derives from the view that he has a right to that respect. And it is respect for autonomy that also explains why many people believe that euthanasia is sometimes morally right in cases where a rational person has asked to be killed.
它忽略了一个事实,那就是我们认为人拥有应该受到尊重的权利,以及拥有幸福、快乐和痛苦的能力。尊重一个人的自主权(这也解释了为什么囚犯的感受很重要)源于这样一种观点,即他有权获得这种尊重。正是因为尊重自主权,所以许多人认为,在理性的人要求被杀死的情况下,安乐死有时在道德上是正确的。
The notion of a right is thus central to much of our moral thinking. Recently moral philosophers have clarified the nature and status of
因此,权利的概念是我们大部分道德思考的核心。最近,道德哲学家们澄清了权利的性质和地位。

rights a good deal. The term "right" is used in two main sorts of cases. In the first sort of case, which involves what we call "negative rights," I have a right to do something if I am morally free to do it, and other people have the obligation not to hinder me if I do choose to do it. This is the sense in which we speak of the right of free speech. When we say that people have a right to speak freely, we mean not only that they may do so, but also that it would be wrong to stop them.
权利 "一词主要用于两种情况。权利 "一词主要用于两种情况。在第一种情况下,即我们所说的 "消极权利",如果我在道义上有做某事的自由,我就有做某事的权利;如果我选择做某事,其他人就有不妨碍我的义务。这就是我们所说的言论自由权。当我们说人们有权自由发表言论时,我们不仅指他们可以这样做,还指阻止他们是错误的。
On the other hand, we also speak of rights where people have not only a negative obligation not to hinder me in doing something but a positive duty to help me. This is the sense in which people sometimes speak of a right to an education. For they mean that everybody is free to pursue an education and someone-often the government-has a duty to help an individual if he or she makes that choice. In cases such as this we speak of "positive rights."
另一方面,我们也谈到权利,即人们不仅有不妨碍我做某事的消极义务,而且有帮助我的积极责任。这就是人们有时所说的受教育权。因为他们的意思是,每个人都有接受教育的自由,而某个人--通常是政府--有责任帮助做出这种选择的人。在这种情况下,我们称之为 "积极权利"。
Each kind of right entails corresponding duties. Sometimes, especially with positive rights, these are duties for specific people: children have the right to be fed and clothed by their parents or guardians. Sometimes, and especially with negative rights, these duties are duties for everyone. Everybody is obliged not to hinder me in the free expression of my opinions.
每种权利都包含相应的义务。有时,尤其是在积极权利方面,这些义务是对特定的人而言的:儿童有权得到父母或监护人的供养和衣物。有时,尤其是消极权利,这些义务是对所有人的义务。每个人都有义务不妨碍我自由表达意见。
Once we reject consequentialism as the basis for morality, it is natural to start thinking about rights, just because, where a right imposes a duty upon us, we cannot ignore that duty and look simply to the consequences of our actions. Because the prisoner had a right to have his autonomy respected, we could not kill him, even though we thought that he would be much better off dead. His autonomy requires us positively to take into account what he says.
一旦我们拒绝将结果论作为道德的基础,我们就会自然而然地开始思考权利问题,这是因为,当一项权利要求我们承担义务时,我们就不能忽视这项义务,而仅仅考虑我们行为的后果。因为囚犯有权让他的自主权得到尊重,所以我们不能杀他,即使我们认为他死了会好得多。他的自主权要求我们积极考虑他所说的话。
Many people would claim that there is a much more basic bar to killing this prisoner. They would say that people have a right to life, a negative right that creates a corresponding duty in all of us not to kill them. Such people are absolutists about killing. They would say that this is the basis of the widespread belief, with which I started the chapter, that
许多人会说,杀死这名囚犯还有一个更基本的限制。他们会说,人有生命权,这是一种消极的权利,因此我们所有人都有相应的义务不杀他们。这些人是杀人的绝对主义者。他们会说,这就是我在本章开头提到的普遍信念的基础,即

: Killing innocent people is wrong.
:杀害无辜的人是错误的。

You will recall from my discussion of Theresa, the absolutist about lying, that the fact that an absolutist thinks something is wrong does
大家应该还记得,我在讨论关于撒谎的绝对论者特蕾莎时曾说过,绝对论者认为某件事情是错误的这一事实并不意味着

not mean that she will never think she ought, all things considered, to do it. So my argument about the airman need not worry an absolutist who thinks that people have a right to life. The absolutist can say that though it is indeed wrong to kill innocent civilians in warfare, it may be even worse not to fight for your country in a just cause.
但这并不意味着她永远不会认为她应该这样做。因此,我关于飞行员的论点不必让认为人有生命权的绝对主义者担心。这位绝对主义者可以说,虽然在战争中杀害无辜平民确实是错误的,但不为国家的正义事业而战可能更糟糕。
Because rights and duties can conflict in this way, we will need to know not only what rights and duties there are, but also which ones are most important. And, just as the utilitarians faced problems with measuring utility in order to find a common currency for trading one person's happiness against another's, so rights theorists face problems in finding a way of adjudicating between competing rights and duties. These issues are complex, but they reflect the complexity of our moral lives, and they are central to the philosophical consideration of morality. In the next two chapters I will consider some more specific rights and duties, in the context of political philosophy and the philosophy of law. We shall see that in politics and law consequentialism does not fit with our basic conceptions of right and wrong.
由于权利和义务会以这种方式发生冲突,我们不仅需要知道有哪些权利和义务,还需要知道哪些权利和义务是最重要的。正如功利主义者面临着如何衡量效用的问题,以便找到一种共同的货币来交换一个人的幸福与另一个人的幸福,权利理论家也面临着如何在相互竞争的权利与义务之间找到一种裁决方法的问题。这些问题很复杂,但它们反映了我们道德生活的复杂性,也是道德哲学思考的核心。在接下来的两章中,我将从政治哲学和法律哲学的角度来探讨一些更为具体的权利和义务。我们将看到,在政治和法律领域,结果主义与我们的基本是非观念并不相符。

5.12 Self and others
5.12 自我与他人

When I began this chapter I assumed that you knew what I meant by "morality." I didn't try to explain what sorts of judgments or attitudes were moral. In the course of the chapter, however, we have considered some attempts to define the range of morality. For if prescriptivism is correct, then morality consists of all our universalizable action-guiding judgments; if Kant is correct, then morality consists of all the universalizable categorical imperatives. These ways of defining morality are purely formal. They specify what moral judgments are without saying what they are about. More precisely, these metaethical theories tell us that moral judgments are judgments of a certain form about what we should do, but the theories do not tell us what those judgments say we should do.
当我开始写这一章时,我假定你们知道我所说的 "道德 "是什么意思。我并没有试图解释什么样的判断或态度是道德的。不过,在本章的讨论过程中,我们已经考虑了一些界定道德范围的尝试。如果规定论是正确的,那么道德就包含我们所有可普遍化的行动指南判断;如果康德是正确的,那么道德就包含所有可普遍化的绝对命令。这些定义道德的方法纯粹是形式上的。它们规定了道德判断是什么,却没有说明它们是关于什么的。更确切地说,这些元伦理学理论告诉我们,道德判断是关于我们应该做什么的某种形式的判断,但这些理论并没有告诉我们这些判断说我们应该做什么。
When it comes to thinking about the content of morality, however, it helps to make a distinction between two different sorts of reasons for action. On one hand are those-like K, the proscription of the killing of the innocent-that are other-regarding. They have to do with what sorts of treatment we owe to other people. The sorts of questions about rights we have just been discussing are otherregarding questions.
然而,在思考道德的内容时,区分两种不同的行动理由是有帮助的。一方面是那些与他人相关的理由,如 K,禁止杀害无辜者。它们与我们应该给予他人什么样的待遇有关。我们刚才讨论的关于权利的问题都是与他人有关的问题。
On the other hand are self-regarding considerations that have to do with what we owe to ourselves. Many of the more familiar moral virtues and vices-kindness and cruelty, generosity and stinginess, thoughtfulness and lack of consideration - have to do with how we treat others. And much of what morality prohibits-theft, murder, lying, adultery, breaking one's promises - consists of actions that affect others. But it is important that we also evaluate our own and other people's behavior in contexts where we or they owe nothing to anyone else. Johnny, who procrastinates, need not be doing any harm to anyone else. He may simply be making a mess of his own life. Yet it seems reasonable to say that he ought not to do it, at least if by "procrastination" you mean something like: doing things at the last minute, when they're harder to do than they would have been if he'd done them earlier. And this judgment looks universalizable. What's wrong about procrastination is wrong not just for Johnny but also for anyone else similarly situated. So too, Mary, who take absurd risks with her own life-everything from not bothering to prepare for important exams to stepping into the street without looking - may be harming no one else in doing what she does. She is being, as we say, imprudent. And, once again, we are inclined to say that she is acting wrongly, and that anyone who acts as she does would be acting wrongly also.
另一方面,自律则与我们对自己的要求有关。许多我们比较熟悉的道德美德和恶行--善良和残忍、慷慨和吝啬、体贴和不体贴--都与我们如何对待他人有关。道德所禁止的许多行为--偷窃、谋杀、撒谎、通奸、违背诺言--都是影响他人的行为。但重要的是,我们也要评估自己和他人在我们或他们不欠任何人的情况下的行为。拖延时间的约翰尼不需要对其他人造成任何伤害。他可能只是把自己的生活搞得一团糟。然而,说他不应该这样做似乎是合理的,至少如果你所说的 "拖延 "是指:在最后一刻才做事情,而此时做这些事情比他早做要困难得多。而这种判断看起来具有普遍性。拖延症的错误不仅是强尼的错误,也是其他处境相似的人的错误。玛丽也是如此,她用自己的生命冒着荒唐的风险--从不屑于准备重要的考试,到不经意地走到街上--她所做的一切可能并没有伤害到其他人。正如我们所说的那样,她是轻率的。我们再次倾向于说,她的行为是错误的,任何像她这样做的人也是错误的。
Aristotle, Plato's student, who is in may ways the first great Western moral philosopher, wrote two books on the ethics, called the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics, and these books deal both with other-regarding and self-regarding practical considerations. Aristotle's aim, in the Nicomachean Ethics, is to say what it is to live one's life well; he uses the Greek word eudaemonia to describe the state of someone who is living well. (Eudaemonia has often been translated as "happiness." But this, as we shall see, is misleading.) Among the things that Aristotle thinks we need if we are to live well is
亚里士多德是柏拉图的学生,他可能是西方第一位伟大的道德哲学家,他写了两本关于伦理学的书,名为《尼各马可伦理学》和《尤德米亚伦理学》,这两本书既涉及他律,也涉及自律的实际考虑。在《尼各马可伦理学》中,亚里士多德的目的是说明什么是好好生活;他用希腊语 eudaemonia 来描述一个人好好生活的状态。(Eudaemonia通常被翻译为 "幸福")。但正如我们将要看到的,这是一种误导)。亚里士多德认为,要想生活得好,我们需要具备以下条件
a) a good character (which means, for example, courage, temperance, and a sense of justice);
a) 良好的品格(例如,勇气、节制和正义感);
but he also mentions
但他也提到
b) money, friends, children, pleasure, and good looks.
b) 金钱、朋友、子女、享乐和美貌。
While most sensible modern people might agree that the things on list (b) can contribute to living a good life, we would not ordinarily think of them as having much to do with morality. In fact, we'd probably be inclined to think that morality recommended us to count good looks as morally irrelevant, friendship as desirable but not especially moral, and children, pleasure, and money as things that stand a good chance of getting in the way of doing what is right.
虽然大多数理智的现代人可能会同意,清单(b)上的东西有助于过上美好的生活,但我们通常不会认为它们与道德有多大关系。事实上,我们可能会倾向于认为,道德建议我们把美貌视为与道德无关的东西,把友谊视为可取但并不特别道德的东西,而把孩子、快乐和金钱视为很有可能妨碍我们做正确事情的东西。
Nevertheless, it is important, in thinking about how we should behave, to bear in mind that each of us has one life to live and that living that life well-making a success of one's life-is important. And the fact that it is important to make a success of one's life provides a connection between self-regarding and other-regarding considerations. For among the most important things that we owe to other people is that we should recognize that they have a life whose success matters. It is in part because I recognize that many goods are important to me if I am to make a success of my life that I can see that I should not deprive you of the goods you need for your success. Theft, murder, lying, adultery, breaking one's promises: all of these are things that interfere with other people's abilities to make a success of their lives. The Golden Rule urges us to "do as we would have done unto us." But in order to make sense of this command, we need to have a sense of what sorts of things matter to people and their search for eudaemonia. In that sense, when it comes to thinking about the content of morality, it is important to reflect on the social and material circumstances within which human beings conduct that search. That is why we can still learn from Aristotle's approach, which considers moral questions in the light of what he called "ethics," which is the study of what it is to live a successful life. In recent moral theory, the study of ethics, in this broader sense, has become central again. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, this has important consequences for political philosophy.
然而,在思考我们应该如何做人时,重要的是要牢记我们每个人都有自己的一生,过好自己的一生--使自己的一生取得成功--是非常重要的。成功地度过一生非常重要,这一事实为我们提供了自律与他律之间的联系。因为我们对他人最重要的责任之一,就是我们应该承认他们的生活是成功的,他们的成功是重要的。正是因为我认识到,如果我的生活要取得成功,许多物品对我来说都是重要的,所以我才知道,我不应该剥夺你取得成功所需的物品。偷窃、谋杀、撒谎、通奸、违背诺言:所有这些都会影响他人成功地生活。黄金法则敦促我们 "己所不欲,勿施于人"。但是,为了理解这条命令,我们需要了解哪些事情对人们及其对 "幸福 "的追求至关重要。从这个意义上说,在思考道德的内容时,重要的是要反思人类进行这种探索时所处的社会和物质环境。这就是为什么我们仍然可以借鉴亚里士多德的方法,即从他所谓的 "伦理学 "的角度来思考道德问题,也就是研究什么是成功的生活。在最近的道德理论中,这种广义的伦理学研究再次成为核心。我们将在下一章看到,这对政治哲学有着重要的影响。

5.13 Conclusion 5.13 结论

In this chapter, I have only scratched the surface of ethics. But I have tried to give an overview both of the main areas of metaethics-the question of the meaning of moral judgments and
在本章中,我仅仅触及了伦理学的表面。但是,我试图概述元伦理学的主要领域--道德判断的意义问题和伦理学的基本原理。

the problem of moral epistemology - and of some philosophical approaches to first-order moral questions. I argued that these questions were not independent, that the main themes of metaethics interact with some issues in first-order morality. Thus, for example, the basic difference between factual and evaluative beliefs-that the latter but not the former are action-guiding-seems to raise the issue of relativism, the possibility that the truth of a moral belief depends essentially on whose it is.
道德认识论问题--以及解决一阶道德问题的一些哲学方法。我认为,这些问题并不是独立的,元伦理学的主要主题与一阶道德中的一些问题相互影响。例如,事实性信念与评价性信念之间的基本区别--后者而非前者是行动指南--似乎提出了相对主义问题,即道德信念的真伪在本质上取决于它是谁的信念。
I have suggested that the route to relativism depends on confusing two different issues. One is the moral-content issue, which divides emotivists and prescriptivists, on one hand, from moral realists, on the other. On this question I sided with the prescriptivists. I argued that people who do not share our basic moral attitudes cannot be offered reasons and evidence that are bound to lead them to agree with us.
我曾提出,通往相对主义的道路取决于混淆两个不同的问题。一个是道德内容问题,它将情感主义者和规定主义者与道德现实主义者区分开来。在这个问题上,我站在规定主义者一边。我认为,不能向那些不认同我们基本道德态度的人提供必然会使他们认同我们的理由和证据。
But the other issue is not an issue about moral content but a substantive moral dispute: a dispute between those-relativists-who think that we cannot say that people who disagree with us about basic moral questions are just wrong, and those-nonrelativistswho hold that we can. And here I sided with the nonrelativists. To argue from prescriptivism to moral relativism, I suggested, is to confuse two different senses in which moral judgments could be said to be subjective.
但另一个问题不是道德内容的问题,而是实质性的道德争议:那些认为我们不能说在基本道德问题上与我们意见相左的人就是错的人--相对论者,与那些认为我们可以这样说的人--非相对论者之间的争议。在这里,我站在非相对论者一边。我认为,从规定论到道德相对主义,是混淆了道德判断可以说是主观的两种不同意义。
I then turned to a debate about first-order morals between consequentialists, who think that whether an act is right or wrong should be decided by looking only to its results, and absolutists, who believe that the fact that something has consequences that are good overall does not always mean that it is right. As I said a little while ago, I shall follow up this question in the next two chapters.
然后,我谈到了结果论者和绝对论者之间关于一阶道德的争论,结果论者认为,一个行为是对是错,应该只看其结果,而绝对论者则认为,一件事的结果总体上是好的,并不总是意味着它是对的。正如我刚才所说,我将在接下来的两章中继续探讨这个问题。
Most recently, I suggested that it was important for our moral thinking that we should reflect not only on how we should treat others but also on what it is to lead a successful life. Self-regarding considerations can be as universalizable as other-regarding considerations: we owe things to ourselves as well as to others.
最近,我提出,对于我们的道德思考来说,重要的是我们不仅要反思我们应该如何对待他人,还要反思什么是成功的人生。自律与他律同样具有普适性:我们既要对自己负责,也要对他人负责。
But I have not discussed some of the central concepts of our moral thought: freedom and responsibility, for example, or praise and blame. (I will, however, say something about these in 9.10.) What I have tried to do is to give you a sense of a range of views on
但我还没有讨论我们道德思想中的一些核心概念:比如自由与责任,或者褒贬。(不过,我会在第 9.10 节中讨论这些问题。

what moral judgments mean and on how we should decide which judgments to accept. Clarity about these questions is an important first step in making up your mind about morality. But, as we have seen in discussing utilitarianism, rights, and what we owe ourselves, it is only the first step.
道德判断意味着什么,以及我们应该如何决定接受哪些判断。弄清这些问题是对道德下定决心的重要第一步。但是,正如我们在讨论功利主义、权利和我们欠自己什么的时候所看到的,这只是第一步。
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CHAPTER 6 第 6 章

Politics 政治

What is a state?
什么是国家?
Do governments have a right to be obeyed?
政府有被服从的权利吗?
What is justice? 什么是正义?

6.1 Introduction 6.1 导言

In the forests of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, right at the heart of Africa, lives a pygmy people called the Mbuti. They move about the forest in small groups of several families, gathering honey and hunting antelope, and sometimes joining together with other groups for a communal hunt. The Mbuti think of themselves as belonging to bands that are defined by the territories in which they were born. But they do not necessarily live with the band to which they "belong," and they move freely, when they marry, to live with other small groups of families. The Mbuti have religious and moral ideas, ideas about marriage and hunting, beliefs about the forest they live in and the other people-whether pygmies or not-who share the forest with them. They cooperate in hunting and in building the small houses they set up each time they settle for a period in a particular part of the forest.
在位于非洲中心的刚果民主共和国森林里,生活着一个名叫姆布提的侏儒民族。他们以几个家庭为一小群,在森林中活动,采集蜂蜜,猎杀羚羊,有时也与其他群体一起集体狩猎。姆布蒂人认为自己属于根据出生地划分的部落。但他们并不一定与自己 "所属 "的部落生活在一起,他们可以自由迁移,结婚后可以与其他小群家庭生活在一起。姆布蒂人有宗教和道德观念,有关于婚姻和狩猎的观念,有关于他们生活的森林和与他们共同生活在森林里的其他人(无论是否是俾格米人)的观念。他们在狩猎和建造小房子时相互合作,每次他们都在森林的某个地方定居一段时间。
There is no doubt, then, that we can speak of the Mbuti as forming a society. Their language, customs, and beliefs bind them together and make their culture distinctive. Yet what is extraordinary about this society, for us and for people from most other societies, is that the Mbuti have no political organization. Of course, they are now citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and they have social relations with the taller farming peoples who live on the edge of the forest. But among themselves they live pretty much as they did before there was a modern state around them. They do without the apparatus that regulates most societies. They have no
毫无疑问,我们可以说姆布提人组成了一个社会。他们的语言、习俗和信仰将他们联系在一起,使他们的文化独具特色。然而,对于我们和其他大多数社会的人来说,这个社会的特别之处在于姆布提人没有政治组织。当然,他们现在是刚果民主共和国的公民,与生活在森林边缘的高大农耕民族有社会关系。但在他们自己中间,他们的生活方式与周围没有现代国家之前的生活方式基本相同。他们没有管理大多数社会的机构。他们没有

chiefs or kings, no laws or courts, no government of any kind: in short, the Mbuti have no politics.
没有酋长或国王,没有法律或法庭,也没有任何形式的政府:总之,姆布蒂人没有政治。
Since political philosophy examines the concepts we use to think about politics, it may seem strange to begin this chapter by discussing the Mbuti. But their society, like other stateless societies, provides us with the occasion to ask what it is that turns a group of people into a state. Because political life is the life of people organized in states, we need to answer this question if we are to define the scope of political philosophy.
政治哲学研究的是我们用来思考政治的概念,因此,本章一开始就讨论姆布蒂人似乎有些奇怪。但他们的社会和其他无国家的社会一样,为我们提供了一个机会,让我们去思考是什么把一群人变成了一个国家。因为政治生活是组织在国家中的人们的生活,如果我们要界定政治哲学的范围,就必须回答这个问题。
Why, then, does Mbuti society not constitute a small state? They clearly have social conventions (including those of language), and they are able to settle disputes and regulate their common life. So we cannot say that a state is just any collection of people, with shared conventions, organized in such a way that they are able to regulate their lives together. Rather, the key distinction between the Mbuti and societies organized into states has to do with the way they settle disputes and organize their communal life.
那么,为什么姆布提社会不构成一个小国家呢?他们显然有社会习俗(包括语言习俗),他们能够解决争端,调节共同生活。因此,我们不能说一个国家只是一群人的集合体,他们有共同的习俗,他们的组织方式使他们能够共同管理自己的生活。相反,姆布蒂人与组织成国家的社会之间的主要区别在于他们解决争端和组织共同生活的方式。
Mbuti methods of hunting require the cooperation of many individuals; without the hunting they would not be able to feed themselves adequately. When one of them behaves antisocially, therefore, by disrupting a hunt or failing to play his or her part in it, something needs to be done to get that person to change his or her behavior. In many societies, this would be done by the state. If you or I fail to carry out our duties as citizens, we may first be ordered to obey the law by police officers or other officials, and then tried in a court and punished if we refuse. In most earlier societies, a chief or a king or queen could have ordered you to carry out your duty, and would have ordered you to be punished if you disobeyed. But the Mbuti gain each other's cooperation in a way that is much more like the way we persuade our friends to help us. Sometimes, for example, they tease those who fail to live up to their obligations. On other occasions, they try to persuade antisocial men and women by reminding them of the obligations that all Mbuti acknowledge, or they point out how important cooperation is if they are to survive. What they cannot do, because they do not have the necessary institutions, is punish someone-by locking them up or executing them or ordering them to do community service.
姆布提的狩猎方法需要许多人的合作;没有狩猎,他们就无法养活自己。因此,当其中一个人做出反社会的行为,破坏狩猎或不参与狩猎时,就需要采取一些措施让这个人改变自己的行为。在许多社会中,这将由国家来完成。如果你或我未能履行公民义务,警察或其他官员可能会首先命令我们遵守法律,如果我们拒绝,就会受到法庭审判和惩罚。在大多数早期社会中,酋长或国王或王后可以命令你履行义务,如果你不服从,他们也会命令你接受惩罚。但姆布蒂人获得彼此合作的方式更像我们说服朋友帮助我们的方式。例如,有时他们会取笑那些不履行义务的人。在其他情况下,他们会试图说服那些反社会的男人和女人,提醒他们所有姆布蒂人都承认的义务,或者指出合作对于他们的生存是多么重要。由于没有必要的机构,他们做不到的是惩罚某个人--将他们关起来、处死或命令他们从事社区服务。
The key difference between Mbuti society and a state, therefore,
因此,姆布提社会与国家之间的主要区别在于

is that among the Mbuti there is no single recognized person or group that has the authority to gain compliance with its rulings through the use of force.
这是因为在姆布蒂人中,没有一个公认的个人或团体有权通过使用武力来获得对其裁决的服从。
It was the great German sociologist Max Weber who had the fundamental insight that what distinguishes the state is the monopoly of the authority to use force. In order to understand the full significance of Weber's view, we need to understand the notion of authority that is involved here. And the first thing we must recognize is that having authority involves meeting both factual and evaluative conditions.
德国伟大的社会学家马克斯-韦伯(Max Weber)提出了一个基本观点,即国家的区别在于对使用武力的权力的垄断。为了理解韦伯观点的全部意义,我们需要理解这里涉及的权威概念。我们首先必须认识到,拥有权威需要满足事实条件和评价条件。
Let us take the factual conditions first. If you are to have authority, as some monarchs and the assemblies of democracies do, you need both to be able to enforce rulings- to have the capacity to police them - and to have fairly widespread acceptance, within the society, of the exercise of that capacity. However much we feel that leaders who have been removed by an illegitimate military coup d'état ought to be regarded as having the authority to govern a country, if they are simply unable to enforce any rulings, we would not say that they have authority in that country. To have authority you need to have some degree of power.
我们先来看看事实条件。如果你要像某些君主和民主国家的议会那样拥有权威,你既需要有能力执行裁决--有能力对裁决进行监督--又需要在社会中得到相当广泛的认可,接受行使这种能力。无论我们如何认为,被非法军事政变罢免的领导人应该被视为具有治理国家的权力,但如果他们根本无法执行任何裁决,我们就不会说他们在该国具有权力。要有权威,就必须有一定程度的权力。
That, then, is the factual condition for having authority. But if a group of bandits takes over an area and is able to enforce its rulings by the simple threat of force, that does not constitute an exercise of authority. To call such control the exercise of authority, we would need also to believe that the bandits had the right to exercise it. People may disagree substantially on what gives someone the right to exercise control over others; they may dispute the moral basis of authority. They may also disagree about who has that right in a particular case, even if they agree about its moral basis. But unless a person has some right to be obeyed, what they have is not authority but bare power.
这就是拥有权力的事实条件。但是,如果一伙强盗占领了一个地区,并能够通过简单的武力威胁来执行其统治,这并不构成行使权力。要将这种控制称为行使权力,我们还需要相信强盗有权行使权力。人们可能对什么赋予某人对他人行使控制的权利存在重大分歧;他们可能对权力的道德基础存在争议。即使他们在道德基础上达成一致,他们也可能会对在特定情况下谁拥有这种权利产生分歧。但是,除非一个人拥有某种被服从的权利,否则他所拥有的就不是权威,而是赤裸裸的权力。
It follows that Mbuti society would not turn into a state simply because someone among them was able to control the actions of the Mbuti by threat of force. A bandit leader who could control the Mbuti would satisfy the factual condition for authority without satisfying the evaluative condition. Thus, the primary conceptual question of political philosophy — what is a state?-leads immediately to the primary moral question of political philosophy-under what
因此,姆布提社会不会仅仅因为其中有人能够通过武力威胁控制姆布提人的行动而变成一个国家。能够控制姆布提人的土匪首领满足了权威的事实条件,却没有满足评价条件。因此,政治哲学的首要概念问题--什么是国家?

circumstances does a person or group have the right to control a society? This is the question of the justification of political authority.
在什么情况下一个人或一个团体有权控制一个社会?这就是政治权力的正当性问题。

6.2 Hobbes: Escaping the state of nature
6.2 霍布斯摆脱自然状态

One obvious answer to this question is simply "under no circumstances." The view that control of a society by a government is never morally justifiable is anarchism: the claim that the state never has legitimate authority. As we shall see toward the end of the chapter, anarchists can certainly offer arguments for their position, but it has never been widely supported either among ordinary people or among philosophers.
对于这个问题,一个显而易见的答案就是 "在任何情况下"。无政府主义认为,政府对社会的控制在道德上从来都是不合理的:国家从来都没有合法的权力。正如我们将在本章末尾看到的,无政府主义者当然可以为他们的立场提供论据,但这一立场从未在普通人或哲学家中得到广泛支持。
One of the best-known answers to the question of justification of authority was given by Thomas Hobbes, the English philosopher whose work I have mentioned already, in his classic book Leviathan. Unlike anarchism, Hobbes' answer is one that many philosophers have found compelling.
托马斯-霍布斯是英国哲学家,我已经提到过他的作品,他在其经典著作《利维坦》中对权力的正当性问题给出了最著名的答案之一。与无政府主义不同,霍布斯的答案是许多哲学家都认为令人信服的答案。
Hobbes began by considering what life would be like if we didn't recognize any authority, and he derived his answer from his view of human nature. Because he was concerned with the basic question of why we need states, Hobbes needed to consider those aspects of human nature that most affect our social lives. So he divided his attention, in effect, between the human tendencies that work for cooperation and those that work for conflict.
霍布斯首先考虑的是,如果我们不承认任何权威,生活会是什么样子,他的答案来自于他对人性的看法。由于霍布斯关注的是 "为什么我们需要国家 "这一基本问题,因此他需要考虑人性中对我们的社会生活影响最大的那些方面。因此,他实际上将自己的注意力划分为有利于合作的人类倾向和有利于冲突的人类倾向。
On one hand, Hobbes said, human beings have a "desire of Ease, and sensual Delight" and a "fear of death, and wounds," which, along with a "desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace," make us want to cooperate socially. But, on the other hand, we have tendencies, which Hobbes plainly thought more significant, that make us work against each other. These tendencies derive from the circumstances of human life.
霍布斯说,一方面,人类有 "对安逸和感官愉悦的渴望 "以及 "对死亡和伤痛的恐惧",再加上 "对知识和和平艺术的渴望",使我们希望进行社会合作。但另一方面,我们也有一些倾向,霍布斯显然认为这些倾向更为重要,它们使我们彼此敌对。这些倾向源于人类的生活环境。
Hobbes's consideration of the circumstances of human life began with the claim that human beings are very close to being equal in their physical and mental capacities.
霍布斯对人类生活环境的思考始于这样一种主张,即人类在身体和精神能力方面非常接近于平等。
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others.
至于身体的力量,最弱小的人也有足够的力量杀死最强大的人,无论是通过秘密的阴谋,还是通过与他人的联盟。
Because of this rough equality of capacities, all of us have more or less the same chances of achieving our goals; and, Hobbes said, since our goals conflict-sometimes I want something you want and we can't share it-we become enemies. We become enemies because we have to "destroy or subdue one another" if we are to get what we want. Since this is so, we have every reason to be suspicious of each other - and this is a second source of conflict. Finally, Hobbes says, we all want to be respected by others (Hobbes calls this the "desire for glory"), yet people often undervalue or even despise others. These three factors-competition for scarce resources, the mistrust that follows from it, and our desire to be respected — are what Hobbes calls the "principal causes of quarrel." Competition leads us to use violence to get what we want; mistrust leads us to use violence to protect what we fear others want; and the desire for "glory" leads us to use violence against those who do not respect us.
霍布斯说,由于我们的目标相互冲突--有时我想要的东西你也想要,但我们无法分享--我们就成了敌人。我们之所以成为敌人,是因为我们必须 "互相摧毁或征服",才能得到我们想要的东西。既然如此,我们就完全有理由互相猜疑--这是冲突的第二个根源。最后,霍布斯说,我们都希望得到他人的尊重(霍布斯称之为 "荣耀欲"),但人们往往低估甚至鄙视他人。这三个因素--对稀缺资源的竞争、由此产生的不信任以及我们希望得到尊重--就是霍布斯所说的 "争吵的主要原因"。竞争导致我们使用暴力来获取我们想要的东西;不信任导致我们使用暴力来保护我们担心别人想要的东西;对 "荣耀 "的渴望导致我们对不尊重我们的人使用暴力。
Because we are involved in a struggle against others, all of us have
因为我们参与了与他人的斗争,所以我们每个人都有
a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in
对权力的渴望永无止境、躁动不安,这种渴望只有在
Death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.
死亡。造成这种情况的原因,并不总是因为一个人希望得到比他已经达到的程度更强烈的快乐;也不总是因为他不能满足于适度的力量;而是因为他不能保证,如果不获得更多的力量和手段,他就不能很好地生活下去。
It may seem, at first, that many people simply do not have this lust for power. But we must bear in mind that by power Hobbes means only the possession of the capacity to get what you want. In that sense of "power," we all would probably like to have more power than we do.
乍看起来,许多人似乎根本没有权力欲。但我们必须牢记,霍布斯所说的权力只是指拥有得到你想要的东西的能力。在 "权力 "的这个意义上,我们可能都希望拥有比现在更多的权力。
Given this picture of human life and human nature, Hobbes goes on to ask what life would be like in a stateless society, without a recognized authority, without someone able to maintain control, if necessary, by force. Hobbes calls the condition of people without government a "state of nature." He argues that, given the
鉴于人类生活和人性的这幅图景,霍布斯继续追问,在一个没有国家、没有公认的权威、没有能够在必要时以武力维持控制的人的社会中,生活会是什么样子。霍布斯将这种没有政府的状态称为 "自然状态"。他认为,鉴于

circumstances of human life that he has described, we cannot hope for security in a state of nature. For why should someone who wants something we have not take it, killing us in the process if it is necessary?
在他所描述的人类生活环境中,我们无法指望在自然状态下获得安全。因为如果有人想要我们的东西,他为什么不能拿走,如果有必要,还可以在这个过程中杀死我们呢?
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time when men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called War; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. . . In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.
由此可见,当人们生活在没有一个共同的力量让他们敬畏的时代时,他们就处于一种被称为战争的状态;而这种战争,是每个人对每个人的战争。..在这种情况下,没有地方进行工业生产,因为工业生产的成果是不确定的:因此,也就没有地球的文化;没有航海,也不能使用从海上进口的商品;没有商品化的建筑;没有移动和移走需要很大力量的东西的工具;没有对地球表面的了解;没有时间的计算;没有艺术;没有文学;没有社会;最糟糕的是,持续的恐惧和暴力死亡的危险;人的生命是孤独、贫穷、肮脏、野蛮和短暂的。
That is Hobbes's famous and rather bleak picture of what life would be like without government. But Hobbes believed that any reasonable person could recognize that if we followed certain principles, which he called (rather misleadingly, as we shall see) "laws of nature," we should be able to escape these perils of the state of nature.
这就是霍布斯对没有政府的生活所描绘的一幅著名而又相当暗淡的图景。但霍布斯认为,任何有理智的人都能认识到,如果我们遵循某些原则,即他所说的(我们将会看到的)"自然法则",我们就能摆脱自然状态的这些危险。
Among the "laws" are such principles as these, which Hobbes called the first four "laws of nature."
在这些 "法则 "中,有这样一些原则,霍布斯称之为前四条 "自然法则"。
  1. You should seek peace wherever it is possible; but if you cannot achieve peace, you should defend yourself by all means at your disposal.
    只要有可能,你就应该寻求和平;但如果无法实现和平,你就应该用尽一切手段保护自己。
  2. You should give up the right to defend yourself to the extent that it is necessary to achieve peace, provided other people accept the same limitations.
    在实现和平所必需的范围内,你应该放弃自卫的权利,前提是其他人也接受同样的限制。
  3. You should keep your promises.
    你应该信守诺言。
  4. You should not give other people who keep their promises reason to regret doing so.
    你不应该给其他信守承诺的人后悔的理由。
It is not hard to see why Hobbes's calling these principles "laws of nature" was misleading. In his day, the laws of nature were thought of as moral rules, with divine authority, which everyone was obliged
不难理解为什么霍布斯称这些原则为 "自然法则 "是一种误导。在他的时代,自然法则被认为是具有神圣权威的道德规则,每个人都有义务

to obey even outside the constraints of the state. These laws were essentially conceived of as the moral laws that governed relations between people-and, in particular, between subjects and their monarchs-preexisting and overriding the laws of any state. We knew them by reason, because God, who made us, had given us, in reason, the capacity to recognize His will.
即使在国家的约束之外也必须遵守。这些法律本质上被认为是调节人与人之间关系的道德法则,尤其是臣民与君主之间的关系,它们先于任何国家的法律而存在,并凌驾于任何国家的法律之上。我们通过理性认识这些法律,因为创造我们的上帝赋予了我们理性认识其意志的能力。
Now just as Hobbes' use of the term "power" was rather special, so we must bear in mind that his use of the idea of a "law of nature" was distinctive. For his natural laws involve no moral ideas at all: they are, as he sometimes said, "maxims of prudence," rules that our reason reveals to us it would be in our own interests to follow. Indeed, Hobbes thought that in the state of nature there are no moral principles. Morality is made possible by the state.
正如霍布斯对 "权力 "一词的使用相当特别一样,我们必须记住,他对 "自然法则 "这一概念的使用也是与众不同的。因为他的自然法则根本不涉及道德观念:正如他有时所说的那样,它们是 "审慎的格言",是我们的理性告诉我们遵守会符合我们自身利益的规则。事实上,霍布斯认为,在自然状态中不存在道德原则。国家使道德成为可能。
The view that moral considerations cannot apply outside a state is one that Hobbes does not seem to defend, and it is certainly not one that most of us would agree with. It is a natural view that moral principles not only do but also should operate among the Mbuti. They think certain actions are right and others are wrong, they criticize those who are unkind or irresponsible. And even if they did not, that would not mean that we could not criticize people in those circumstances for those vices.
霍布斯似乎没有为道德因素不能适用于国家之外的观点辩护,当然我们大多数人也不会同意这种观点。人们自然会认为,道德原则不仅适用于姆布蒂人,而且应该适用于姆布蒂人。他们认为某些行为是对的,另一些行为是错的,他们批评那些不友善或不负责任的人。即使他们不这样做,也并不意味着我们就不能批评在这种情况下的人们的这些恶行。
Hobbes's defense of his laws of nature, then, is not that they are morally right, but simply that any reasonable person can see that we would be better off if everybody obeyed them. But he also believed that even once we did see this, we would not obey the laws of nature without the threat of sanctions.
因此,霍布斯为他的自然法则所做的辩护并不是说它们在道德上是正确的,而只是说任何一个有理智的人都能看到,如果每个人都遵守自然法则,我们会过得更好。但他也相信,即使我们看到了这一点,如果没有制裁的威胁,我们也不会遵守自然法则。
All of us, for example, may seek to avoid obeying the laws of nature where it suits us, provided we think we can get away with it. This is because what reason shows is not strictly that we will profit if we obey these rules, but rather that we have reasons for wanting everybody else to obey them. If we all agreed to obey these rules as long as everybody else did, I might try to get the benefits from your obeying the rules by appearing to obey them myself, while secretly deviating from them whenever I thought no one would find out. Pretending that I would go along with the rules might be enough to get everybody else to keep obeying them, as long as I wasn't caught. Provided I can get the benefits of your obeying a rule by simply appearing to obey it myself, I have no special reason actually to obey
例如,我们每个人都可能试图在适合自己的地方避免遵守自然法则,只要我们认为可以逃脱。这是因为,严格来说,理性所表明的并不是我们遵守这些规则就会获利,而是我们有理由希望其他人都遵守这些规则。如果我们都同意遵守这些规则,只要其他人都遵守,我可能会试图从你们遵守规则中获得好处,我自己表面上遵守规则,但只要我认为没有人会发现,我就会偷偷偏离规则。只要我不被发现,假装我遵守规则就足以让其他人继续遵守规则。只要我自己表面上遵守规则,就能从你的遵守规则中得到好处,我就没有什么特别的理由去真正遵守规则。

it; I would have no reason at all if I was as purely self-interested as Hobbes supposed all human beings to be.
如果我像霍布斯认为的那样纯粹为自己的利益着想,我就根本没有理由。
Without effective policing, then, Hobbes doubted that human beings would ever obey the laws of nature; thus, he thought, we would remain in a state of nature unless these (and other) laws could be enforced. It is for this reason that Hobbes held that it was essential to establish a state, with somebody exercising a monopoly of ultimate authority. We need a "common power" that will force us to keep the laws of nature if we are to achieve the benefits that reason shows us we can gain from keeping to them.
因此,霍布斯认为,除非这些(和其他)法律能够得到执行,否则我们将继续处于自然状态。正是出于这个原因,霍布斯认为必须建立一个国家,由某个人垄断最终权力。我们需要一种 "共同的力量",迫使我们遵守自然法则,这样我们才能获得理性告诉我们的遵守自然法则所能带来的好处。
By making such an agreement or covenant a group of people is "united in one Person . . . called a COMMON-WEALTH."
通过签订这样的协议或盟约,一群人 "合而为一......称为共同财富"。
Hobbes went on to argue that reasonable people would agree to such a covenant only if it gave the sovereign the right amount of power to do the job of securing the peace. And, he argued, to be able to do this job, the sovereign must have absolute power. The only exception he made was that we have the right to defend our own lives against the sovereign, because our lives are the major thing that the sovereign is supposed to protect.
霍布斯进而指出,只有当盟约赋予君主适当的权力以确保和平时,有理智的人才会同意这样的盟约。他认为,为了能够完成这项工作,君主必须拥有绝对的权力。他提出的唯一例外是,我们有权保护自己的生命不受君主侵犯,因为我们的生命是君主应该保护的主要东西。
Thus, to give someone sovereign power, for Hobbes, is both to allow that person to regulate society by any methods he or she deems appropriate, including the use of force against citizens, and to recognize their right to do so.
因此,在霍布斯看来,赋予某人主权权力,既是允许此人以他或她认为适当的任何方式管理社会,包括对公民使用武力,也是承认他们这样做的权利。
Once we give someone sovereign power, we enter into civil soci-
一旦我们赋予某人主权,我们就进入了公民社会。

ety, society organized in the form of a state. Hobbes, who lived in England when it was an absolute monarchy, suggested that we ought to give this power to a monarch, a king or queen. We are better off, he argued, handing it over to a monarch, even though we then run the risk of the monarch's using the power thus acquired to rob, bully, or kill us. But because the justification for the sovereign's power, which we each accept as a matter of self-interest, is that our lives would be at risk without it, we can reasonably rebel against a king or queen who so abuses the power that authority brings as to put our lives at risk. So long as we are better off under the sovereign than we would be in the state of nature, however, we have no basis for complaint.
权力,即以国家形式组织起来的社会。霍布斯生活在君主专制的英国,他建议我们应该把这种权力交给君主,国王或王后。他认为,把权力交给君主,我们会过得更好,尽管君主可能会利用由此获得的权力抢劫、欺凌或杀害我们。但是,我们每个人都从自身利益出发,接受君主拥有权力的理由是,如果没有权力,我们的生命就会受到威胁,因此我们可以合理地反抗国王或王后,因为他们滥用权力,使我们的生命受到威胁。然而,只要我们在君主统治下比在自然状态下过得更好,我们就没有理由抱怨。
Notice that on Hobbes' view, there is a very intimate connection between the factual and the evaluative conditions for authority. For it is only if sovereigns satisfy the factual condition and are able to enforce rulings that they can protect us from our fellow citizens and thus meet the evaluative condition by protecting us from a life that is "nasty, brutish and short." This feature of Hobbes's theory is a very important one, for it shows that the connection between the factual and the evaluative conditions is not arbitrary. Hobbes' view does seem to set minimum conditions on what can be called a state. For a government to be legitimate it must both try to make the lives of citizens better than they would be in a state of nature, and have some success in the attempt. Someone who failed even to try to improve on the state of nature could not legitimately claim, according to Hobbes, to be a sovereign, with the right to govern.
请注意,在霍布斯看来,权威的事实条件和评价条件之间有着非常密切的联系。因为只有当主权者满足了事实条件并能够执行裁决时,他们才能保护我们免受同胞之害,从而满足评价条件,保护我们免受 "肮脏、野蛮和短暂 "的生活之害。霍布斯理论的这一特点非常重要,因为它表明,事实条件与评价条件之间的联系并不是任意的。霍布斯的观点似乎确实为什么可以被称为国家设定了最低条件。一个政府要想合法,就必须努力使公民的生活比在自然状态下更好,并在这一努力中取得一定的成功。根据霍布斯的观点,一个连改善自然状态的努力都失败的人,是不能合法地声称自己是一个主权者,有权治理国家。
Though this seems to be right, there are many problems with Hobbes' view. If he has correctly identified a minimum condition for being a government at all, he has not established that the only demand we can make of government is that it should improve on the state of nature. Let us consider some of the reasons why.
尽管这似乎是正确的,但霍布斯的观点存在许多问题。如果说他正确地指出了作为一个政府的起码条件,那么他并没有确定我们对政府的唯一要求就是它应该在自然状态的基础上有所改进。让我们考虑一下其中的一些原因。

6.3 Problems for Hobbes
6.3 霍布斯的问题

Because Hobbes derives the authority of the state not from moral considerations but from considerations that are meant to appeal to the rational self-interest of each of us, his view can be called "prudentialist." We would be prudent, according to Hobbes, to confer on an absolute sovereign the power to regulate everybody's lives.
由于霍布斯不是从道德角度,而是从我们每个人的理性自利角度来考虑国家的权威,他的观点可以被称为 "审慎主义"。霍布斯认为,我们应该审慎地将管理每个人生活的权力赋予一个绝对的君主。
Hobbes makes a number of crucial steps in the long argument to his prudentialist conclusion. First, because the covenant is among the citizens and not between the citizens and the sovereign (whether the sovereign is one person or an assembly), he holds that the sovereign has no obligations to the citizens.
在通往其审慎结论的漫长论证过程中,霍布斯采取了若干关键步骤。首先,由于盟约是公民之间的,而不是公民与君主(无论君主是一个人还是一个团体)之间的,因此他认为君主对公民没有义务。
Second, he assumes that once you enter into the meeting to decide whether you should set up such a covenant, you are obliged to accept the majority verdict, whether you voted for it or not.
其次,他假定一旦你参加了决定是否应制定这样一项公约的会议,你就有义务接受多数人的裁决,无论你是否投了赞成票。
Third, he assumes that because we ought to keep our promises, once we have entered into such a covenant, we are bound by it, so that we should not break it under any circumstances short of a direct assault by the sovereign on our lives.
第三,他假定,因为我们应该信守诺言,所以一旦我们签订了这样的盟约,我们就受到了它的约束,因此在任何情况下,除非君主直接攻击我们的生命,否则我们都不应该违背它。
Fourth, he assumes that the sovereign can protect us from the dangers of the state of nature only by having absolute power, that is, by being unrestrained by any constitutional checks and balances.
第四,他假定君主只有拥有绝对权力,即不受任何宪法制衡,才能保护我们免受自然状态的危险。
Finally, as I have already said, he assumes that outside a state moral considerations do not apply.
最后,正如我已经说过的,他假定在国家之外道德因素并不适用。
I shall consider some objections to the first three assumptions in a moment, and I have already argued that the last assumption is unjustified. But many of us would surely want to follow up our objection to the last assumption by objecting very strongly to Hobbes's claim that the sovereign must have absolute power.
我稍后将考虑对前三个假设的一些反对意见,我已经论证过最后一个假设是不合理的。但是,我们中的许多人肯定希望在反对最后一个假设的基础上,强烈反对霍布斯关于主权者必须拥有绝对权力的主张。
The existence of the Mbuti suggests that, at least in a society with a very simple level of material life, Hobbes' view of the dangers of the state of nature is somewhat exaggerated. The dangers of a tyrannous sovereign with no obligations to the citizenry look considerably less attractive than the dangers of Mbuti life. So long as the Mbuti get along without the protection of a sovereign, they would have no reason to enter into a Hobbesian absolute state. It is surely reasonable to suggest that most people with a little familiarity with the history of humanity would not willingly enter into a covenant to create an absolute sovereign, with all the attendant risks of tyranny, if the alternative was the free, if simple, life of the Mbuti.
姆布蒂人的存在表明,至少在物质生活水平非常简单的社会中,霍布斯关于自然状态危险的观点有些夸大其词。与姆布提人生活的危险相比,对公民不负任何义务的专制君主的危险看起来吸引力要小得多。只要姆布蒂人在没有君主保护的情况下生活,他们就没有理由进入霍布斯式的绝对国家。我们有理由相信,只要对人类历史稍有了解,大多数人都不会心甘情愿地缔结盟约,建立一个绝对的主权国家,并承担随之而来的暴政风险。
Nevertheless, it does seem clear that, on the whole, we profit enormously from the existence of settled government. But, of course, we have achieved a system-democracy-that substantially reduces the risk of abuse of sovereign power. It does not guarantee that majorities will not oppress minorities, but it makes it less likely
尽管如此,总体而言,定居政府的存在确实让我们获益匪浅。当然,我们已经实现了一种制度--民主,它大大降低了主权权力被滥用的风险。它并不能保证多数人不会压迫少数人,但却降低了以下可能性

that a minority, let alone a majority, will ever be oppressed. Even if we do not need an absolute sovereign to protect us from the perils that Hobbes imagined in a state of nature, we all have something to gain from the existence of a government, provided it is not too oppressive. So a more reasonable reaction than Hobbes' would be to argue for a covenant that gave the sovereign effective powers but restricted his or her rights to just those powers that were necessary for enabling us to escape the perils of the state of nature. Which rights the sovereign should have is a question to which we shall return.
少数人不会受到压迫,更不用说多数人了。即使我们不需要一个绝对的主权者来保护我们免受霍布斯所想象的自然状态下的危险,只要政府不是过于压迫,我们都能从政府的存在中获益。因此,比霍布斯更合理的反应是主张制定一项盟约,赋予君主有效的权力,但将其权利限制在使我们能够摆脱自然状态的危险所必需的权力范围内。至于主权者应该拥有哪些权利,这个问题我们会再讨论。
But this is only the first problem with Hobbes' argument. For his whole view depends, as we have seen, upon supposing that a political arrangement has been set up by agreement. Once we have made this agreement, according to Hobbes, we should stick to it. But not everyone is likely to find this argument convincing, for four sorts of reasons.
但这只是霍布斯论证的第一个问题。因为正如我们所看到的,他的整个观点都取决于假设政治安排是通过协议建立起来的。霍布斯认为,一旦我们达成了协议,我们就应该坚持下去。但并非每个人都会认为这一论点具有说服力,原因有四。
First of all, while we might have agreed to a covenant in a state of nature, we certainly didn't freely enter into one. Most of us were simply born citizens of our countries. And even those who were naturalized were not offered a contract they could enter into freely, for there was no negotiation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States simply says, as the Congress required it to, "take it or leave it." And "it" includes the Constitution and all the laws of the United States. Since no one anywhere in the world is free nowadays to choose to live entirely outside any state, the fact that people accept citizenship of a country as their best option does not necessarily mean that he would prefer it to living in no state at all (or, of course, in some state that won't admit them).
首先,虽然我们可能在自然状态下同意缔结盟约,但我们肯定没有自由缔结盟约。我们中的大多数人只是生来就是我们国家的公民。即使是那些归化入籍的人,他们也没有得到可以自由缔结的契约,因为没有任何协商。美国移民和归化局只是按照国会的要求说:"要么接受,要么离开"。而 "它 "包括《宪法》和美国的所有法律。由于如今世界上没有人可以自由选择完全生活在任何一个州之外,人们接受一个国家的公民身份作为其最佳选择的事实,并不一定意味着他宁愿选择这个国家,而不是生活在任何一个州(当然,也可能是生活在某个不接纳他们的州)。
If Hobbes answered this objection by saying that the fact that we would have accepted the covenant is a reason to do what it requires, then we could ask whether this is true of agreements in general. And the answer is plainly no. Otherwise, if I would have agreed to buy your car if you'd offered it to me for , then, by a similar argument, I would owe you if you gave me your car, even if I hadn't agreed to buy it! So the first objection is that since we didn't enter freely into a covenant, it is hard to see why it should be binding on us.
如果霍布斯在回答这一反对意见时说,我们本应接受盟约这一事实是我们按照盟约要求行事的理由,那么我们就可以问,这是否适用于一般的协议。答案显然是否定的。否则,如果你以 的价格把车给我,我就会同意买你的车,那么,根据类似的论证,如果你把车给我,我就欠你 ,即使我没有同意买它!因此,第一个反对意见是,既然我们没有自由地订立盟约,就很难理解为什么盟约对我们有约束力。
The second sort of objection, however, is even more damaging.
然而,第二种反对意见更具破坏性。
Even if we had agreed to a covenant, there is no reason to suppose that reasonable people would have accepted the particular covenant that Hobbes suggests. We have already seen that there is reason to doubt that any of us would willingly have instituted an absolute sovereign, one who had no obligations to the citizens. We thus have good reason to question Hobbes' first assumption.
即使我们同意订立盟约,也没有理由认为通情达理的人会接受霍布斯所建议的那种盟约。我们已经看到,有理由怀疑我们中的任何一个人是否会心甘情愿地建立一个对公民不负有任何义务的绝对君主。因此,我们有充分的理由质疑霍布斯的第一个假设。
But the third objection is that there is a further reason for doubting that we would have accepted the terms of Hobbes' covenant. Even if we had agreed to set up a meeting to agree to a covenant, we would be most unlikely to have agreed to the meeting being governed by the rules he suggests. Why, for example, should we have agreed that the meeting to make the covenant should be governed by a majority vote? If we were out to protect our own self-interests, for example, we might have insisted on a rule of unanimity; as we shall see, other philosophers have thought that unanimity is preferable to being governed by the views of a majority. That is a reason for rejecting his second assumption.
但第三个反对意见是,我们还有理由怀疑我们是否会接受霍布斯盟约的条款。即使我们同意召开会议来商定盟约,我们也不太可能同意会议受他建议的规则制约。比如说,我们为什么要同意订立盟约的会议应由多数票决定呢?例如,如果我们是为了保护自己的利益,我们可能会坚持一致同意的规则;正如我们将要看到的,其他哲学家认为一致同意比受多数人的意见支配更可取。这就是拒绝他的第二个假设的理由。
Finally, Hobbes' claim that we would be bound by the agreement we made, whatever happened, is unconvincing. For Hobbes' justification for the state appeals-because it is prudentialist-simply to our self-interest. If, once we had set up the covenant, we discovered that there was a way of getting around it that was in our self-interest, why would it not be prudent to use that way out? That is a basis for rejecting his third assumption. We now have reason to doubt every one of the five Hobbesian assumptions we began with.
最后,霍布斯声称,无论发生什么,我们都将受到我们所达成的协议的约束,这种说法并不令人信服。因为霍布斯为国家辩护的理由--因为它是审慎主义的--只是诉诸于我们的自身利益。如果我们一旦立下盟约,就发现有一种方法可以绕过盟约,这符合我们的自身利益,那么为什么不谨慎地使用这种方法呢?这就是否定他的第三个假设的依据。现在,我们有理由对霍布斯的五个假设一一表示怀疑。
Nevertheless, there is at the heart of Hobbes' argument a recognition of an important truth: that we usually gain from the existence of settled government advantages that it would be most imprudent either to give up once we have them or to refuse if, like the Mbuti, we do not. By and large, the existence of the state is, for most people in most societies, better than no state at all.
然而,霍布斯论证的核心是承认一个重要的真理:我们通常会从固定政府的存在中获得好处,而一旦我们拥有了这些好处,放弃这些好处是最不明智的;如果像姆布提人一样,我们没有这些好处,拒绝这些好处也是不明智的。总的来说,对于大多数社会中的大多数人来说,国家的存在总比没有国家要好。

6.4 Game theory I: Two-person zero-sum games
6.4 博弈论 I:两人零和博弈

It would be interesting and important if we could make more precise the sort of argument Hobbes offered, so that we could say just why it is that the advantages of civil society over the state of nature ought to appeal to anyone. It would be especially interesting if we could do this in a way that was not open to the sorts of objections I
如果我们能够更准确地论证霍布斯提出的论点,从而说明为什么公民社会相对于自然状态的优势会吸引任何人,这将是非常有趣和重要的。特别有意思的是,如果我们能够以一种不会受到我所提出的那些反对意见的方式来做到这一点的话

have made against Hobbes. To do this, we should first need to show why it was a reasonable strategy to enter into negotiations with other people in the state of nature, in order to gain certain important advantages. Then we would need to show what sort of agreements rational people would come to in those circumstances. As the American philosopher Robert Nozick put it:
霍布斯的观点。要做到这一点,我们首先需要说明,为什么在自然状态下与其他人进行谈判是一种合理的策略,以便获得某些重要的好处。然后,我们需要说明在这种情况下,理性的人会达成什么样的协议。正如美国哲学家罗伯特-诺齐克所说:

Abstract 摘要

A theory of a state of nature that begins with fundamental general descriptions of morally permissible and impermissible actions, and of deeply based reasons why some persons in any society would violate those moral constraints, and goes on to describe how a state would arise from that state of nature will serve our explanatory purposes, even if no actual state ever arose in that way.
关于自然状态的理论,首先要对道德上允许和不允许的行为进行基本的一般性描述,并对任何社会中的某些人会违反这些道德约束的原因进行深刻的描述,然后再描述一个国家如何从自然状态中产生,这样的理论就能达到我们的解释目的,即使实际的国家从来没有以这种方式产生过。

Unlike Hobbes, we would not be assuming that there are no moral principles that apply outside the state; we would not be relying on the fiction that we really did make a covenant; we need not be committed in advance to the particular form of absolute sovereign that Hobbes advocates, or to majority voting in the design of the state; and we could have a more plausible view than Hobbes' about when the state ceases to be advantageous and rebellion is in order.
与霍布斯不同的是,我们不会假定在国家之外没有适用的道德原则;我们不会依赖于 "我们确实缔结了盟约 "的虚构;我们不必事先承诺采用霍布斯所主张的绝对主权者的特定形式,也不必在设计国家时采用多数投票制;对于国家何时不再有利,何时应该反叛,我们可以有比霍布斯更合理的看法。
Many recent philosophers, Nozick among them, have tried to refine the sort of argument Hobbes offered by making use of a very powerful modern theory about how rational people should deal with problems of this kind. This mathematical theory has been put to use in many areas of the social sciences, including, most importantly, economics. It is called game theory because it was first applied to some simple games, but game theory can be a very serious matter.
近代许多哲学家,包括诺齐克,都试图利用一种非常强大的现代理论来完善霍布斯提出的论点,即理性人应该如何处理这类问题。这一数学理论已被用于社会科学的许多领域,其中最重要的是经济学。它之所以被称为博弈论,是因为它最初被应用于一些简单的博弈,但博弈论可以是一个非常严肃的问题。
Game theory advances our understanding of rational decision making in the way that formal logic deepens our grasp of rational argument. That, in itself, gives it a philosophical interest over and above its importance for recent political theory. But game theory is not only of theoretical importance: nowadays it is used by corporations to make corporate decisions and by strategic planners working out how to conduct nuclear defense policy. Still, it remains easiest to explain the central ideas of game theory in terms of some (rather simple-minded) games.
博弈论加深了我们对理性决策的理解,就像形式逻辑加深了我们对理性论证的理解一样。这本身就赋予了博弈论超越其对最新政治理论重要性的哲学意义。但是,博弈论不仅在理论上具有重要意义:如今,企业在制定公司决策时使用博弈论,战略规划者在制定核防御政策时也使用博弈论。不过,用一些(思想相当简单的)博弈来解释博弈论的中心思想仍然是最容易的。
For the purposes of game theory, a game is any setup in which there are people-called, naturally enough, "players"-who are
就博弈论而言,博弈是指任何一种设置,在这种设置中,有一些人,自然也就是所谓的 "玩家",他们是

choosing strategies for their dealings with each other, in a way that determines what each of them gets as a payoff. Thus, in chess there are two players; a strategy for each player consists of a (very complicated) set of rules about how he or she will react to any sequence of moves by the other player; and the payoff is a win, a draw, or a loss.
选择彼此交易的策略,以确定各自的回报。因此,在国际象棋中,有两名棋手;每名棋手的策略由一套(非常复杂的)规则组成,其中规定了他或她将如何对另一名棋手的任何一连串棋步做出反应;而回报则是赢、平或输。
One way to represent a game that has two players, A and B, each with two strategies, is by drawing a matrix like this:
要表示一个有两个玩家(A 和 B)的游戏,每个玩家都有两种策略,一种方法是画出这样一个矩阵:
(Obviously this game is massively less complicated than chess!) Here, the pairs of values in the matrix represent what the players get as payoff if they adopt the strategies at the left of the row (for A) or the top of the column (for B). Thus, if A does and B does , the payoffs are for and for .
(显然,这个游戏没有国际象棋那么复杂!)在这里,矩阵中的一对数值代表了棋手采用该行左边(对 A 来说)或该列顶端(对 B 来说)的策略所得到的回报。因此,如果 A 采用 ,B 采用 ,那么 代表 代表
Consider, for the sake of an example, this simple game. We both, put a dollar on the table. Then you hide a marble behind your back, in either your right or your left hand. I now have to say either "left" or "right." If I guess correctly, I get both dollars; if I guess wrong, you get them both. The matrix for this game looks like this:
举个简单的例子。我们都在桌子上放一块钱。然后你把一颗弹珠藏在背后 左右手各一颗现在我必须说 "左 "或 "右"如果我猜对了,两块钱都归我;如果我猜错了,两块钱都归你。这个游戏的矩阵是这样的
YOU
RIGHT LEFT
R
I
G
H
T
This simple game has a very important feature: if I win something, you lose it, and if you lose something, I win it. The total amount of payoff available is constant. For this reason games like this are usually known as zero-sum games: anything one player wins from the game the other loses, so that the sum of one player's losses (a negative amount) and the other's gains (a positive amount) will be zero. A zero-sum game is a game in which the players are most directly in competition; every cent or dollar or point I lose is a cent or dollar or point you win, and vice versa.
这个简单的游戏有一个非常重要的特点:如果我赢了,你就输了,如果你输了,我就赢了。可获得的总回报是不变的。因此,这样的游戏通常被称为零和游戏:一方从游戏中赢得的任何东西,另一方都会失去,因此一方的损失(负数)和另一方的收益(正数)之和为零。零和游戏是指玩家之间最直接的竞争游戏;我失去的每一分钱、每一美元或每一分点数都是你赢得的一分钱、每一美元或每一分点数,反之亦然。
In zero-sum games, we only need to write one of the entries in the box, usually the amount won by the player with his or her name down the left-hand side of the matrix, since if it is a zero-sum game, every figure for one player's winnings implies an equal amount lost by the other. So we could just have written for the marble-guessing game:
在零和游戏中,我们只需在方框中写入一个条目,通常是矩阵左侧写有玩家姓名的玩家赢取的金额,因为如果是零和游戏,一方玩家赢取的每一个数字都意味着另一方玩家输掉的金额相等。因此,我们可以把猜弹珠游戏写成:
YOU
RIGHT LEFT
R
I
G $1
H
T
L
E
F $1
In games with more than two players, of course, even if there's a fixed pot of money or points to be handed out, what one person loses doesn't necessarily go to any particular other person; so we can't define a sum that one player wins as a positive value and what the another wins as a negative value. Only two-person games, then, can be zero-sum. (So when I talk about zero-sum games from now on, I usually won't bother to mention that they are two-person games.) As a result, with games where there are more than two players, the equivalent to being zero-sum-that is, to having a fixed pot-is being constant-sum: if you add up what goes to all the players, the total will be the same, no matter what strategies they adopt. The phrase "zero-sum game" is often used loosely to refer to constant-sum games.
当然,在有两个以上玩家的游戏中,即使有固定的奖金或积分,一个人输掉的钱也不一定归另一个人所有;所以我们不能把一个玩家赢的钱定义为正值,而把另一个玩家赢的钱定义为负值。因此,只有两人游戏才是零和游戏。(因此,以后我在谈论零和游戏时,通常不会再提及它们是两人游戏)。因此,在有两个以上玩家的游戏中,与零和--即有一个固定的彩池--等价的是恒和:如果你把所有玩家的所得加起来,无论他们采取什么策略,总和都是一样的。零和博弈 "一词经常被用来泛指恒和博弈。
Because the marble game is just a guessing game, there is really no question of choosing a strategy. Since I do not know where you will hide the marble, I might as well pick sides at random. (Though, of course, if we played often and I discovered a pattern in the way
因为弹珠游戏只是一个猜谜游戏,所以不存在选择策略的问题。既然我不知道你会把弹珠藏在哪里,那还不如随意选边。(当然,如果我们经常玩,我发现了你藏弹珠的方式有规律可循的话

you hid the marble, I might adopt a strategy conforming to that pattern.) But there are games in which there is a distinct advantage in sticking to one of your available strategies.
如果你把弹子藏起来,我可能会采取符合这种模式的策略)。但在有些游戏中,坚持使用你现有的一种策略会有明显的优势。
Here is such a game. Each of us puts on the table, so there is available in prize money for the payoff. There are three marbles, two white and one blue. You write either "blue" or "white" secretly on a piece of paper. I am then allowed to remove either both of the white marbles or the blue one. If I remove the white marbles, you get the blue marble. But suppose I take the blue marble. Then, if you had written "white," you get both the white marbles; and if you had written "blue," I get all the marbles. The payoff each of us gets is a dollar back from the pot of on the table for each marble we win. Since each marble ends up being won by somebody, this is a zero-sum game: every marble you don't get, I do. Now, you might think that I ought to take the blue marble in the
下面就是这样一个游戏。我们每个人在桌上放 ,因此有 作为奖金。有三个弹珠,两个白色,一个蓝色。你在一张纸上偷偷写上 "蓝色 "或 "白色"。然后允许我取出两颗白色弹珠或蓝色弹珠。如果我取出白色弹珠,你就得到蓝色弹珠。但假设我拿走了蓝色弹珠。那么,如果你写的是 "白色",你就能得到两颗白色弹珠;如果你写的是 "蓝色",我就能得到所有弹珠。我们每个人得到的回报是,每赢得一颗弹珠,就能从桌上的 花盆里拿回一美元。由于每颗弹珠最终都会被某人赢走,所以这是一个零和游戏:你没有得到的每颗弹珠,我都得到了。现在,你可能会认为我应该拿走蓝色弹珠。
YOU
White Blue
Take
both
white
marbles
2 marbles 2 marbles
Take
the
blue
marble
1 marble 3 marbles
hope that you had written "blue." But we are considering the game playing of rational people, and I should take your reasoning into account in deciding what to do. And from your point of view, it is clear what you should do. If you write "white," the best that can happen is that you will get two marbles, because I take the blue marble, and the worst that can happen is that you get one marble, because I took the two white ones. If you write "blue," on the other hand, the best that can happen is that you get one marble, and the worst that can happen is that you get none at all. Since the best that can happen from your point of view if you choose "white" is better than the best that can happen if you choose "blue," and the worst that can happen if you choose "white" is the same as the best that can happen if you choose "blue," it seems obvious that, if you are reasonable, you will write "white." Since that is so, I should take both the white marbles (assuming you are reasonable) and leave you with just the blue one. For if I took the blue marble, you would get both the white ones.
希望你写的是 "蓝色"。但我们考虑的是理性人的博弈,我在决定怎么做时应该考虑你的理由。而从你的角度来看,你应该做什么是显而易见的。如果你写 "白色",最好的结果是你会得到两颗弹珠,因为我拿走了蓝色弹珠;最坏的结果是你得到一颗弹珠,因为我拿走了两颗白色弹珠。另一方面,如果你写的是 "蓝色",最好的结果是你得到一颗弹珠,最坏的结果是你一颗弹珠也得不到。从你的角度来看,如果你选择 "白色",最好的结果也会比你选择 "蓝色 "的结果好,而如果你选择 "白色",最坏的结果也会和你选择 "蓝色 "的结果一样。既然如此,我就应该拿走两颗白色弹珠(假设你是讲道理的),只给你留下一颗蓝色弹珠。因为如果我拿走蓝色弹珠,你就会得到两颗白色弹珠。
The strategies in which you write "white" and I take the white marbles are called an equilibrium strategy pair, because if either of us unilaterally deviates from that strategy, we will be no better off than we would be if we had stuck to it. If you adopted your equilibrium strategy and wrote "white" but I deviated from my equilibrium strategy and took the blue marble, then instead of getting two white marbles (and two of the three available dollars) I would get only the blue marble (and only one dollar). I would actually be worse off. And if I chose my equilibrium strategy, and took the white balls, but you had deviated from equilibrium by writing "blue," then you would get no more marbles than if you stuck with "white." So you would be no better off. At equilibrium each of us is doing as well as we can expect, assuming the other person is rational.
你写 "白色",我拿白色弹珠的策略被称为一对均衡策略,因为如果我们中的任何一方单方面偏离该策略,我们的结果不会比坚持该策略的结果更好。如果你采用了你的均衡策略,写了 "白色",但我偏离了我的均衡策略,拿了蓝色弹珠,那么我将只得到蓝色弹珠(和一美元),而不是得到两颗白色弹珠(和三美元中的两美元)。实际上,我的情况会更糟。如果我选择了我的均衡策略,拿了白球,但你偏离了均衡策略,写了 "蓝色",那么你得到的弹珠不会比你坚持写 "白色 "的多。因此,你的情况也不会好到哪里去。在均衡状态下,假设对方是理性的,那么我们每个人的结果都是一样好的。
In zero-sum games, if there is more than one pair of equilibrium strategies, then what each player gets is the same in each of them. In fact, if an equilibrium exists in the sort of game we have been considering, it is easy to find. The American mathematician and game theorist Morton Davis has explained very clearly some of the main points about equilibrium strategies.
在零和博弈中,如果存在一对以上的均衡策略,那么每个玩家在每对策略中的所得都是一样的。事实上,在我们所考虑的这种博弈中,如果存在均衡,是很容易找到的。美国数学家和博弈理论家莫顿-戴维斯(Morton Davis)非常清楚地解释了关于均衡策略的一些要点。
We start by looking at the question from the point of view of one of the players, Michael, and we consider what follows from the assumption that Michael has to tell Marina in advance what strategy
我们首先从棋手之一迈克尔的角度来研究这个问题,并考虑迈克尔必须事先告诉玛丽娜什么策略这一假设的结果。

he has chosen. Let's suppose that Michael's strategies are on the left of the matrix and correspond to rows, while Marina's are across the top and correspond to columns. Michael knows that, since Marina is rational, she will choose a strategy that minimizes his payoff. So he knows that Marina will choose the strategy corresponding to the minimum value of the row in the game matrix that Michael chooses. As Davis says, Michael should therefore "choose a strategy that yields [for him] the maximum of those minimum values; this value is called the maximin, and it is the very least that [Michael] can be sure of getting."
他所选择的策略。假设迈克尔的策略在矩阵的左边,对应于行,而玛丽娜的策略横在上面,对应于列。迈克尔知道,由于玛丽娜是理性的,她会选择一种使他的收益最小的策略。因此,他知道玛丽娜会选择与迈克尔选择的博弈矩阵中行的最小值相对应的策略。因此,正如戴维斯所说,迈克尔应该 "选择一个能使他获得这些最小值中最大值的策略;这个值被称为最大值,它是迈克尔能确保获得的最小值"。
We can now consider what would happen if the situation was the other way round and Marina was deciding what strategy to choose if she had to tell Michael what she had chosen. Michael would choose for himself the row in the column Marina has picked that gave him the maximum, so her obvious choice is the column that minimizes this maximum. That outcome is called the "minimax." When the minimax is the same matrix entry as the maximin, the payoff is called an "equilibrium point" and we call the players' strategies an "equilibrium strategy pair."
现在我们可以考虑一下,如果情况反过来,玛丽娜决定选择什么策略,如果她必须告诉迈克尔她的选择。迈克尔会选择玛丽娜所选列中给他带来最大值的那一行,所以她的选择显然是使最大值最小的那一列。这种结果被称为 "最小值"。当最小值与最大值为同一矩阵条目时,收益被称为 "均衡点",我们称玩家的策略为 "均衡策略对"。
Where there is an equilibrium point to a zero-sum game, there is a compelling reason for both players to opt for it: each player wants to maximize his or her gains and thus, since the game is zero-sum, to minimize the gains of the other player. Provided player A knows this fact about the other player, B, A has a reason to expect B to look for a strategy that maximizes the minimum can get, whatever strategy A chooses; and, of course, vice versa. If there is a pair of strategies where both players maximize the minimum they can get, then each of them will want to stick with that pair of strategies.
在零和博弈存在均衡点的情况下,双方都有理由选择均衡点:每个博弈者都想使自己的收益最大化,因此,既然博弈是零和的,就应该使对方的收益最小化。如果棋手 A 知道另一名棋手 B 的这一事实,那么无论 A 选择什么策略,A 都有理由期望 B 寻找一种能使 所能获得的最小收益最大化的策略;当然,反之亦然。如果有一对策略,两个棋手都能最大化他们能得到的最小值,那么他们每个人都会想坚持使用这对策略。
In fact, a maximin strategy seems like a good idea in any zerosum game, whether it has an equilibrium or not. For in a zero-sum game you can assume your opponent is trying to minimize what you get and so maximize his or her own payoff. The maximin strategy minimizes the harm that your opponent can do you. As game theorists have often pointed out, the appeal of the maximin strategy in the zero-sum game lies in the fact that it offers security. If your opponent is irrational or takes risks, you might be able to do better than the maximin strategy: but the only way to do better is to risk something worse than the maximin strategy guarantees.
事实上,在任何零和博弈中,无论是否存在均衡,最大化策略似乎都是一个好主意。因为在零和博弈中,你可以假设你的对手正试图使你得到的最小化,从而使他或她自己的收益最大化。最大化策略则是尽量减少对手对你造成的伤害。正如博弈理论家经常指出的,零和博弈中的最大化策略的魅力在于它提供了安全感。如果对手不理智或冒险,你可能会比最大化策略做得更好:但要想做得更好,唯一的办法就是冒比最大化策略所保证的更坏的风险。
These simple ideas are at the basis of the theory of games. In order to apply the theory to any interesting problems, however, things have to be complicated a little. There are four main kinds of additional complexity in the full theory of games.
这些简单的想法是博弈论的基础。然而,为了将这一理论应用于任何有趣的问题,事情必须变得复杂一些。在完整的博弈论中,主要有四种额外的复杂性。
First of all, in the games I have been considering, the players consider only what are called pure strategies: strategies in which nothing is left to chance. With so-called mixed strategies, on the other hand, players do not decide among the options of getting A, B, C, and so on. Rather, each strategy corresponds to a (specified) chance of getting A plus a chance of getting B plus a chance of getting C, and so on, where, of course, all the chances add up to 1 .
首先,在我所考虑的游戏中,棋手们只考虑所谓的纯粹策略:在这些策略中,没有任何偶然因素。另一方面,在所谓的混合策略中,玩家并不是在得到 A、B、C 等选项中做出决定。相反,每种策略都对应着得到 A 的(特定)机会加上得到 B 的机会再加上得到 C 的机会,以此类推,当然,所有机会加起来都是 1。
It might seem crazy to suggest that you would do better adopting a mixed strategy than adopting a pure one. "Surely," someone could say, "making a rational decision will always be better than leaving things to chance." But there are situations where the case for a mixed strategy is compelling.
如果说采取混合策略比采取纯粹的策略要好,这似乎有些疯狂。"当然,"有人会说,"做出理性的决定总比听天由命要好"。但在有些情况下,采取混合策略是很有说服力的。
Suppose, for example, that you are playing a modified version of the first marble-guessing game as part of an experiment in a computer science lab. When other people have played against the computer they have lost all the time, because it has correctly predicted which hand they will choose to put the marble in. You are not so easily caught out. You toss a coin and put the marble in your right hand if it turns up heads, and into your left if it turns up tails. Since the coin is a chance device, the computer cannot predict how it will turn out: it has to "guess" at random. So, unlike all the others, you win 50 percent of the time.
举个例子,假设你在计算机科学实验室里做实验,玩的是第一个猜弹珠游戏的改进版。当其他人与电脑对弈时,他们总是输,因为电脑正确地预测出了他们会选择把弹珠放在哪只手中。你可没那么容易被发现。你抛一枚硬币,如果正面,就把弹珠放在右手;如果反面,就把弹珠放在左手。由于硬币是一种偶然的装置,计算机无法预测其结果:它只能随机 "猜测"。因此,与其他所有游戏不同的是,你有 50% 的机会获胜。
It turns out not only that there are good reasons for adopting mixed strategies on some occasions, but also that introducing mixed strategies allows the development of a very elegant mathematical theory of two-person zero-sum games. In particular, once you allow mixed strategies, there is always a solution to zero-sum games: a pair of strategies that maximize the minimum each player can expect to get by playing that strategy over and over again. So that is the first complication.
事实证明,在某些情况下采用混合策略不仅有很好的理由,而且引入混合策略可以发展出一种非常优雅的两人零和博弈数学理论。特别是,一旦允许采用混合策略,零和博弈总会有一个解决方案:一对策略可以最大化每个博弈者通过重复使用该策略所期望得到的最小值。这就是第一个复杂问题。
A second complication arises because not every situation can be seen as a game that has payoffs in dollars and cents, and if we are going to use the idea of a game to help us understand the process of coming to settle on a system of government, we shall want to have
第二个问题之所以复杂,是因为并不是每一种情况都可以被看作是以美元和美分为报酬的博弈。

some measure of payoff that takes into account such things as security from attack, which are difficult, if not impossible, to measure in monetary terms. The way to do this is to use the notion of utility I mentioned in the last chapter. The entries in the payoff matrices are now not dollars but units of utility.
在衡量收益时,要考虑到免受攻击的安全性等因素,而这些因素是很难甚至不可能用货币来衡量的。这样做的方法就是使用我在上一章中提到的效用概念。现在,报酬矩阵中的条目不是美元,而是效用单位。
I mentioned in the last chapter that it is not very easy to make sense of the notion of interpersonal comparisons of utility, so that you might reasonably doubt that we can make sense of a zero-sum game in terms of utilities. After all, if we can't compare our utility values, how can we know that when I gain some utility you lose an equivalent amount?
我在上一章中提到,要理解人际间的效用比较这一概念并不容易,因此你可能会有理由怀疑我们能否从效用的角度来理解零和博弈。毕竟,如果我们不能比较我们的效用值,我们怎么能知道当我获得一些效用时,你也会失去等量的效用呢?
This is a serious difficulty for an attempt to define the difference between constant-sum games and non-constant-sum games, where the payoffs in both are utilities. But, fortunately for us, it is a problem we can avoid. For, as I have said, even if we could make sense of the idea of other people getting as payoff an amount of utility equivalent to the amount I have lost, the "game" of political life is not one we would expect to be constant-sum. Furthermore, in the theory of two-person games, as it turns out, we can often avoid making comparisons between the amounts of utility the two players get from the various strategies; all we need to do, instead, is to consider whether each of them gets more from one strategy than another. And that is something you can do without interpersonal comparison of utilities. As we shall see later, however, some answers-and in particular, John Rawls' answer - to the question of the justification of political authority presuppose that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible.
对于试图界定恒和博弈与非恒和博弈之间的区别来说,这是一个严重的难题,因为两者的报酬都是效用。但幸运的是,我们可以避免这个问题。因为,正如我所说的那样,即使我们能够理解其他人得到的报酬等同于我所损失的效用,政治生活中的 "博弈 "也不是我们所期望的恒和博弈。此外,在两人博弈的理论中,我们往往可以避免对两个博弈者从不同策略中获得的效用进行比较;我们需要做的,只是考虑他们是否每个人从一种策略中获得的效用都比另一种策略多。而这是不需要进行人际效用比较就能做到的。然而,正如我们稍后将看到的,对于政治权威的正当性问题,一些答案--尤其是约翰-罗尔斯的答案--预先假定了人际间的效用比较是可能的。
But two further kinds of complication, which are of importance in the application of game theory to political philosophy, are also necessary. These are
但是,在将博弈论应用于政治哲学的过程中,还有两类复杂因素是非常重要的,它们也是必要的。它们是
a) that we should consider games that are not zero-sum; and
a) 我们应该考虑非零和游戏;以及
b) that we should be able to consider, in particular, games with more than two players, which are called n-person games.
b) 我们尤其应该能够考虑有两个以上参与者的博弈,这种博弈被称为 n 人博弈。
It is obvious why (b) is important; all real societies consist of more than two people. But to see why (a) is important, we can consider a very well known non-zero-sum two-person game.
显而易见,(b) 项非常重要;所有现实社会都由两个以上的人组成。但是,要想知道(a)为什么重要,我们可以考虑一个非常著名的非零和两人博弈。

6.5 Game theory II: The prisoners' dilemma
6.5 博弈论 II:囚徒困境

In a two-person non-zero-sum game, we must obviously mark each element of the matrix with two numbers, representing the utility of each outcome to each player. This is because the sum of their utilities is not constant, so that we cannot tell what one player's payoff is just by knowing the other's. Consider the following non-zero-sum two-person game, one that has been very widely discussed.
在两人非零和博弈中,我们显然必须在矩阵的每个元素上标注两个数字,代表每个结果对每个博弈者的效用。这是因为他们的效用之和并不是恒定的,所以我们不能仅仅通过知道另一方的收益就知道一方的收益是多少。请看下面这个非零和两人博弈,这个博弈已经被广泛讨论过。
Two suspects, Carrie and Larry, are being questioned about their role in an armed robbery. The police suspect that they committed the crime together, so the prisoners are kept apart, unable to communicate with each other. The police already have the evidence to convict each of them of a less serious offense-say, resisting arrestbut without a confession, they do not have the evidence to get convictions for the more serious offense. So they offer each of the suspects the same deal. The deal is this:
两名犯罪嫌疑人卡莉和拉里因在一起持枪抢劫案中扮演的角色而接受审问。警方怀疑他们是一起作案的,因此将这两名囚犯分开关押,使他们无法相互交流。警方已经掌握了证据,可以判定他们各自犯有较轻的罪行--比如拒捕,但如果没有供词,他们就没有证据判定他们犯有较重的罪行。因此,他们向每个嫌疑人提出了同样的交易。交易是这样的
a) If one suspect confesses, and the other does not, the one who confesses goes free, and the other gets fifteen years in jail for armed robbery.
a) 如果一名嫌疑人招供,另一名不招供,招供的人无罪释放,另一人则因持枪抢劫被判入狱 15 年。
b) If they both confess, they both go to jail for five years.
b) 如果两人都认罪,则都要坐牢五年。
c) If they both remain silent, they will both go to jail for six months on the charge of resisting arrest.
c) 如果两人都保持沉默,他们都将因拒捕罪入狱六个月。
Here is the matrix that represents Carrie and Larry's options:
下面是表示 Carrie 和 Larry 选择的矩阵:
CARRIE
Confess
Don't
Confess
L Confess
(5 years,
(Freedom,
A years)
15 years)
Don't (15 years, (6 months,
Y Confess Freedom)
If we look at the situation from Larry's point of view, we should conclude that the right strategy is to confess. If Carrie confesses, Larry can either get five years by confessing or fifteen years if he doesn't confess. So if Carrie confesses, Larry is better off confessing, too. But suppose Carrie doesn't confess. Then if Larry confesses, he will get off scotfree, whereas if he doesn't, he'll have to spend six months in jail. Either way, then, Larry is better off confessing. Since the situation is symmetrical, Carrie has exactly the same reasons for confessing also.
如果我们站在拉里的角度看问题,我们应该得出结论:正确的策略是坦白。如果嘉莉坦白,拉里要么坦白被判 5 年,要么不坦白被判 15 年。因此,如果嘉莉坦白,拉里最好也坦白。但假设嘉莉不认罪。那么如果拉里坦白,他就可以逍遥法外,而如果他不坦白,他就必须在监狱里呆六个月。那么,无论如何,拉里最好还是认罪。既然情况是对称的,那么卡莉也有完全相同的理由坦白。
That is game theory's solution to the prisoners' dilemma, and, given certain assumptions, it seems to be the right one. Acting rationally without communicating and with no reason to trust each other, they will both get five years. But most people who have thought about this case notice immediately an important fact about the situation: if Carrie and Larry had some reason to trust each other, they could both keep quiet and both get away with just six months. The "rational" solution to the problem gives them each five years, but this so-called co-operative solution, which they would both prefer, gives them both a shorter sentence.
这就是博弈论对囚徒困境的解决方案,而且在某些假设条件下,似乎是正确的。在没有沟通、没有理由相信对方的情况下,他们理性地行动,都将被判五年。但大多数思考过此案的人都会立即注意到一个重要的事实:如果卡莉和拉里有理由相信对方,他们就可以保持沉默,都只需服刑 6 个月。这个问题的 "合理 "解决方案是让他们各被判五年,但这个所谓的合作解决方案,他们都更喜欢,却让他们都被判了更短的刑期。
The dilemma for Larry is whether to trust Carrie in the hope they will both get the six-month sentence while risking for himself a very long sentence if she confesses, or whether to refuse to trust her and probably get the five-year sentence, gaining the advantage that he avoids the risk of that long sentence altogether.
拉里面临的两难选择是:是相信卡莉,希望两人都能被判 6 个月的刑期,但如果卡莉认罪,自己将面临长期服刑的风险;还是拒绝相信卡莉,很可能被判 5 年的刑期,这样做的好处是可以完全避免长期服刑的风险。
For this dilemma to arise it is essential that the game not be a zero-sum game. In a zero-sum game, since I win what you lose and vice versa, each of us can only lose by helping the other.
要出现这种两难局面,游戏就不能是零和游戏。在零和游戏中,由于我赢你输,反之亦然,所以我们每个人都只能通过帮助对方来输掉比赛。
If we reconsider the Hobbesian state of nature, we can apply the game theory analysis to see why the choice of a state is one way of avoiding some of the situations that make life without government "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Without the state, deciding whether to cooperate may be like the prisoners' dilemma.
如果我们重新考虑霍布斯的自然状态,就可以运用博弈论的分析方法来理解为什么选择国家是避免某些情况的一种方式,而这些情况使得没有政府的生活变得 "孤独、贫穷、下流、残酷和短暂"。没有国家,决定是否合作可能就像囚犯的两难选择。
Suppose, for example, in the state of nature, I am trying to grow bananas. There is only one other person around - call her Eve-and she, like me, loves bananas. So we both grow them. In the state of nature, as Hobbes conceives of it, we shall each make raids on the other's banana plantations. In the ensuing skirmishes, some bananas will be damaged. More importantly-since we are, as Hobbes supposes, roughly equal in strength-we will each sometimes get hurt.
例如,假设在自然状态下,我正在尝试种植香蕉。周围只有一个人--叫她夏娃--她和我一样喜欢香蕉。所以我们都种香蕉。在霍布斯所设想的自然状态下,我们将各自袭击对方的香蕉园。在接下来的冲突中,一些香蕉会受损。更重要的是,由于霍布斯认为我们的力量大体相当,我们有时会受伤。
Suppose we get fed up with this situation and both agree to observe a covenant: I won't steal Eve's bananas if she won't steal mine, and vice versa. Each of us is now considering whether to keep this covenant. (For the sake of simplicity I'll consider only two strategies-keeping and breaking the covenant-so a strategy of waitand-see, of keeping the covenant until the other player breaks it, is ruled out.) Here is the matrix:
假设我们对这种情况感到厌倦,双方同意遵守一个约定:如果夏娃不偷我的香蕉,我就不偷她的香蕉,反之亦然。现在我们每个人都在考虑是否遵守这个约定(为了简单起见,我只考虑两种策略--遵守约定和破坏约定--因此排除了观望策略,即遵守约定直到对方破坏约定)。下面是矩阵:
Eve's Options 夏娃的选择
Make a deal but
达成协议,但
don't keep it 别留
Make a deal
and keep it
My
Options
Make a
deal but
don't
keep it
Each of us gets most of
我们每个人都能获得大部分
our own bananas, loses
我们自己的香蕉,失去了
some to the other person,
给对方一些、
and steals some of theirs
并偷走他们的一些东西
in return; since some
作为回报;因为有些
bananas get damaged in
香蕉在
fighting, we get less than
战斗中,我们得到的比
our own full crops, and
我们自己的全部作物,以及
we also risk getting hurt
我们也有受伤的危险
in our banana raids.
在我们的香蕉袭击中。
I get all my
bananas plus
some of Eve's 夏娃的一些
plus freedom
from her attacks. 她的攻击。
She gets many of
她得到了许多
her own bananas 她自己的香蕉
but loses some in
但在
my raids and also
我的突袭,还
risks getting hurt 有可能受伤
when I attack. 当我攻击时。
Make a
deal and
keep it
I get many of my bananas
我的很多香蕉都是
but lose some in Eve's
但在夏娃那里会损失一些
raids and also risk being
也有可能被
hurt in her attacks. She
在她的攻击中受伤。她
gets all her own bananas
自己的香蕉自己摘
plus some of mine along
加上我的一些
with freedom from my
与我的自由
attacks.
We each get all
我们每个人都能获得所有
our own
bananas plus
freedom from
attacks by the 的攻击
other.
If Hobbes is right and we are both self-interested in the state of nature, then we are now in a situation like the prisoners' dilemma. If Eve keeps her word, then I shall do better if I break my word: not only will I get freedom from her attacks and all my bananas, but I'll get some of her bananas as well. If she doesn't keep her word, then I shall still do better if I break mine: we'll both continue to risk being hurt, but at least I'll get back some of the bananas Eve steals from me by stealing from her.
如果霍布斯是对的,在自然状态下我们都是自利的,那么我们现在就陷入了囚徒困境。如果夏娃遵守诺言,那么如果我违背诺言,我将会得到更好的结果:我不仅可以从她的攻击和我所有的香蕉中获得自由,还可以得到她的一些香蕉。如果她不守信用,那么我食言也会更好:我们都将继续冒着受伤的危险,但至少我可以从伊芙那里偷回一些香蕉。
Since the situation is symmetrical, Eve has just as much reason not to keep her word, so both of us choose the strategy of making the covenant and then breaking it-and that puts us immediately back where we were, in the state of nature without the covenant. Notice that this matrix has exactly the structure of the prisoners' dilemma: we will end up in the top left-hand box of the matrix, when we would both rather be in the bottom right.
由于情况是对称的,夏娃同样有理由不遵守她的诺言,所以我们都选择了立约然后毁约的策略--这让我们立刻回到了原来的位置,回到了没有立约的自然状态。请注意,这个矩阵与囚徒困境的结构如出一辙:我们最终都会在矩阵的左上方,而我们都宁愿在右下方。
That was Hobbes' great insight, expressed in game-theory terms: he saw that if we human beings were self-interested in the state of nature, we needed to change the rules of the game before we had an incentive to cooperate. To see that this is correct, we need only consider a matrix for the same situation once the Hobbesian sovereign is in control.
这就是霍布斯用博弈论术语表达的伟大洞察力:他看到,如果我们人类在自然状态下是自利的,我们就需要改变游戏规则,然后才有合作的动力。为了证明这一观点的正确性,我们只需考虑一下霍布斯主权者控制后的相同情况的矩阵。
Suppose that the sovereign punishes banana thieves by taking away all their bananas, and suppose that the sovereign usually detects thefts. Then, as you can easily work out, Eve and I are now both better off if we keep the covenant we have made with each other, for whatever the other person does, the risks of being punished outweigh the advantages. Game theory allows us to see very clearly why Hobbes thought self-interested people could not escape the state of nature unless they had a sovereign to enforce their agreements with each other.
假设君主惩罚偷香蕉的人,拿走他们所有的香蕉,假设君主通常会发现偷窃行为。那么,正如你很容易想到的,如果我们遵守彼此间的约定,夏娃和我现在都会过得更好,因为无论对方做什么,被惩罚的风险都大于好处。博弈论让我们非常清楚地看到,为什么霍布斯认为自利的人们无法摆脱自然状态,除非他们有一个君主来强制执行他们之间的协议。

6.6 The limits of prudence
6.6 谨慎的限度

I suggested at the end of 6.3 that there was a problem for Hobbes that followed from the fact that his theory was what I called "prudentialist." The problem was that if, once we had set up the covenant, we discovered that there was a way of getting around it that was in our self-interest, nothing would stop us from using that way out. Even after setting up the state and installing the sovereign,
我在第 6.3 节末尾提出,霍布斯的理论是我所说的 "审慎主义",这给他带来了一个问题。这个问题是,如果我们一旦建立了盟约,发现有一种方法可以绕过盟约,符合我们的自身利益,那么没有什么可以阻止我们使用这种方法。即使是在建立了国家和君主之后也是如此、
Eve's Options 夏娃的选择
Make a deal but
达成协议,但
don't keep it 别留
Make a deal
and keep it
My
Options
Make a
deal but
don't
keep it
Each of us gets most
我们每个人都能获得最多
of our own bananas,
我们自己的香蕉、
loses some to the
损失了一些
other person, and 其他人,以及
steals some of theirs
偷一些他们的
in return; since some
作为回报;因为有些
bananas get damaged 香蕉受损
in fighting, we get
在战斗中,我们得到
less than our own full
不到我们自己的全部
crops, and we also
我们还
risk getting hurt in our
在我们的
banana raids. We also
香蕉突袭。我们还
both get punished 两败俱伤
regularly for stealing. 定期偷窃。
I get all my bananas
我所有的香蕉
plus some of Eve's
加上夏娃的一些
plus freedom from 加上免受
her attacks.
However, I also get
不过,我也得到了
punished whenever 无论何时
I am caught steal-
我被偷了
ing. She gets most
是的。她得到最多的是
of her bananas, but
她的香蕉,但
she loses some to
她失去了一些
me and also risks
也有风险
being hurt when I
当我
attack. However, she 攻击。然而,她
is never punished. 永远不会受到惩罚。
Make a
deal and
keep it
I get most of my
我的大部分
bananas but lose some
香蕉,但会损失一些
in Eve's raids and also
在夏娃的突袭中,还
risk being hurt in her
冒着受伤的危险
attacks. However, I am
攻击。不过,我
never punished. She 从未受到过惩罚。她
gets all her bananas
得到她所有的香蕉
plus some mine, but
加上我的一些,但
she also gets punished
她也会受到惩罚
whenever she is 每当她
caught stealing. 偷窃被抓。
We each get all our
我们每个人的
own bananas plus 自有香蕉加
freedom from
attacks by the 的攻击
other. Neither of us
其他。我们都没有
is ever punished. 受到过惩罚。
we cannot suppose that the sovereign would be infallibly able to detect wrongdoing; sometimes, even once the state is in place, a purely self-interested person would have reasons to disobey the law. It would be no use for Hobbes to appeal, at this point, to a general
我们不能假定君主就一定能够发现不法行为;有时,即使国家已经建立,纯粹出于自身利益的人也有理由不遵守法律。在这一点上,霍布斯诉诸一般的

moral obligation to keep promises. For, as we have seen, Hobbes' argument is explicitly not meant to depend on moral principles. If we were allowed to draw on moral principles in defending the institution of the state, we could say a good deal more in its defense than Hobbes actually does. The institution of a state and of enforceable regulations can allow us to achieve many good things other than security. It can allow the maintenance of moral ideals - such as the ideal of helping those in suffering-which Hobbes refuses to consider. Hobbes' argument provides no basis for these ideas.
遵守诺言的道德义务。因为,正如我们所看到的,霍布斯的论证显然不是为了依赖道德原则。如果允许我们在为国家制度辩护时借鉴道德原则,那么我们为其辩护的内容就会比霍布斯实际所做的要多得多。国家制度和可强制执行的法规可以让我们实现安全之外的许多好处。它可以维护道德理想--比如帮助受苦受难者的理想--而霍布斯却拒绝考虑这一点。霍布斯的论证没有为这些想法提供任何依据。
More than this, if the principle that we should keep our promises were the basis of our duty to obey, then we should have to face up to a fact that I pointed out in the last chapter, namely, that we normally suppose that the duty to obey promises can be overridden by other considerations. Far from leading to Hobbes' conclusion that we should obey the sovereign except when our lives are at risk, basing our duty as citizens on keeping promises as a moral principle would suggest that our duty was severely limited by other moral obligations.
不仅如此,如果我们应该信守承诺的原则是我们服从义务的基础,那么我们就应该正视我在上一章中指出的一个事实,即我们通常认为服从承诺的义务可以被其他考虑因素所推翻。霍布斯的结论是,除非我们的生命受到威胁,否则我们应该服从君主,而将遵守诺言作为我们公民责任的道德原则,则表明我们的责任受到其他道德义务的严重限制。
But there is a deeper objection to Hobbes' appeal only to selfinterest: his argument completely fails to capture the sense of allegiance to their states that many people have. Many people think not only that they would give their lives for their countries, but also that this would sometimes be the right thing to do. To make sense of this belief, we need to appeal to something more than self-interest. Unless you are guaranteed a place in heaven, it is surely never, in your self-interest to die (at least where the alternative is living a life that is not unbearably distressing).
但是,霍布斯只诉诸自身利益的做法遭到了更深层次的反对:他的论点完全没有抓住许多人效忠国家的意识。许多人认为,他们不仅会为自己的国家献出生命,而且有时这样做是正确的。要理解这种信念,我们需要诉诸比自身利益更多的东西。除非你能保证在天堂有一席之地,否则去死肯定永远不会符合你的自身利益(至少在其他选择是活得不那么痛苦的情况下)。
So other political philosophers have suggested answers to the question of justification that offer some prospect of explaining a moral identification with the state you belong to that lies beyond self-interest. And one way to do this is to give up an assumption of Hobbes' that I have already suggested we should reject: the assumption, that there are no moral principles that apply prior to the formation of the state. The two most important recent works of political philosophy both try, in different ways, to start from moral principles in a state of nature and derive from them an answer to the question of the justification of political authority. The first such proposal is in the works of the American philosopher John Rawls, whose most famous book is called A Theory of Justice.
因此,其他政治哲学家提出了对正当性问题的答案,这些答案提供了某种解释你对所属国家的道德认同的前景,这种认同超越了自我利益。要做到这一点,一个办法就是放弃霍布斯的一个假设,我已经建议我们应该摒弃这个假设,即在国家形成之前没有适用的道德原则。最近两部最重要的政治哲学著作都试图以不同的方式,从自然状态下的道德原则出发,从中得出政治权威正当性问题的答案。第一个此类提议出自美国哲学家约翰-罗尔斯(John Rawls)之手,他最著名的著作是《正义论》(A Theory of Justice)。

6.7 Rawls' theory of justice
6.7 罗尔斯的正义理论

Rawls claims that a society is just-and that the authority of the state is therefore justified — if two conditions obtain:
罗尔斯认为,如果满足两个条件,社会就是公正的,国家的权威就是合理的:
First Principle: Each person has an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
第一项原则:每个人都有平等的权利,享有与所有人的类似自由制度相容的最广泛的平等基本自由制度。
Second Principle: If there are inequalities in liberty or in income,
第二项原则:如果自由或收入不平等、
a) they work out to the advantage of the worst-off, and
a) 它们对最贫困者有利,而且
b) the positions that are better off are open to all qualified people.
b) 条件较好的职位向所有合格人员开放。
Rawls defends this theory by arguing that people in a suitably constructed bargaining game would choose his conception of justice over the other available options, including the state of nature. The bargaining game is an n-person non-constant-sum game involving rational players who make decisions on the basis of self-interest. The players share a desire to find some basis for reasonable cooperation-so that they are not, for example, people who enjoy the thrill of fighting so much that they actually prefer the "war of all against all" in the state of nature. Further, Rawls, like Hobbes, requires that no one is powerful enough to guarantee that he or she can dominate the others "when all is reckoned together." These requirements on the participants are broadly similar to the requirements that Hobbes insisted on.
罗尔斯为这一理论辩护,认为在一个适当构建的讨价还价博弈中,人们会选择他的正义观,而不是其他可供选择的方案,包括自然状态。讨价还价博弈是一个由 n 人组成的非恒量和博弈,参与者都是理性的,他们根据自身利益做出决定。博弈者们都希望找到某种合理合作的基础--比如说,他们不会因为太享受战斗的快感而宁愿选择自然状态下的 "所有人对所有人的战争"。此外,罗尔斯和霍布斯一样,要求任何人都不能强大到足以保证 "当所有人都被计算在一起时",他或她可以支配其他人。这些对参与者的要求与霍布斯坚持的要求大致相同。
But Rawls adds two more requirements, which move his theory away from prudentialism - away, that is, from the assumption that the justification of the state can appeal only to rational self-interest. These further requirements characterize what Rawls calls the "original position," which is the situation of the people playing his bargaining game.
但是,罗尔斯又增加了两个要求,这两个要求使他的理论脱离了审慎主义--即脱离了国家的正当性只能诉诸理性自利的假设。这些进一步的要求是罗尔斯所谓的 "原初立场 "的特征,也就是玩他的讨价还价游戏的人的处境。
There are, broadly speaking, two ways in which you might bring moral considerations into play in using this route to get from the state of nature to the state. One would be to forbid any strategy in which a player acted immorally — and I shall return to this possibility again in considering the work of Robert Nozick. But another,
概括地说,在利用这一途径从自然状态走向国家的过程中,有两种方式可以让道德因素发挥作用。其一是禁止玩家采取任何不道德的策略--我将在讨论罗伯特-诺齐克的著作时再次谈到这种可能性。但还有一种可能、

perhaps more subtle way would be to construct the bargaining game in such a way that people were forced to take certain moral principles into account. John Rawls' proposal involves extra constraints of both these kinds.
也许更微妙的方法是在构建讨价还价游戏时,迫使人们考虑某些道德原则。约翰-罗尔斯(John Rawls)的建议涉及上述两种额外的限制。
The first constraint, which Rawls calls the "veil of ignorance," effectively forces self-interested bargainers to consider other people's interests. It is the requirement that the participants do not know what their own position — or anyone else's-will be in the society that results from the bargaining game, and know very little about their own talents and abilities either. Not only are players in the bargaining game ignorant of their own skills and capacities, they do not know what their interests, their goals, or their conception of the good life will be. Apart from these limitations on their knowledge of their own position, the players in the bargaining game are extremely well informed: "They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology." But all this is general knowledge; what they lack is specific information about themselves. Let us reduce this requirement to a formula and say that behind the veil of ignorance all people are ignorant of their goals and their relative positions.
第一种约束被罗尔斯称为 "无知的面纱",它有效地迫使自利的谈判者考虑他人的利益。它要求参与者不知道自己--或其他人--在讨价还价博弈所产生的社会中将处于什么地位,对自己的才能和能力也知之甚少。讨价还价游戏的参与者不仅不了解自己的技能和能力,也不知道自己的兴趣、目标或对美好生活的理解是什么。除了对自身地位的了解有限之外,讨价还价游戏中的参与者都非常了解情况:"他们了解政治事务和经济理论的原则;他们知道社会组织的基础和人类心理的规律"。但所有这些都是一般知识,他们所缺乏的是关于自己的具体信息。让我们把这一要求简化为一个公式,即在无知的面纱背后,所有人都对自己的目标和相对地位一无所知。
The reason for this requirement is that self-interested bargainers who knew too much about their own goals and positions would obviously seek to set up the rules so that they could profit from them. If I knew that I was going to be one of the laziest people in the society or one of the tallest, I might try to get especially good treatment for the lazy or especially bad treatment for short people. If I knew that owning property was going to be especially important in my idea of the good life, I might build in very strong property rights. The veil of ignorance thus tempers the consequences of the assumption that the bargainers are self-interested: it requires us in a sense to take into account the interests of others, because, for all we know, we might end up in any position. We could say, in fact, that the veil of ignorance forces the participants to adopt the universalizing perspective that Kant identified as the mark of morality.
之所以有这样的要求,是因为自利的讨价还价者太了解自己的目标和地位,显然会设法制定规则,以便从中获利。如果我知道我将是社会中最懒惰的人之一,或者是个子最高的人之一,我可能会试图为懒惰的人争取特别好的待遇,或者为个子矮的人争取特别差的待遇。如果我知道,在我的美好生活理念中,拥有财产将特别重要,我可能会建立非常强大的财产权。因此,"无知 "这层面纱缓和了 "讨价还价者都是自利者 "这一假设的后果:它在某种意义上要求我们考虑他人的利益,因为就我们所知,我们最终可能会处于任何境地。事实上,我们可以说,无知的面纱迫使参与者采取普遍化的视角,而康德认为这是道德的标志。
This, then, is a way of getting a certain moral principle
那么,这就是让某种道德原则
EQUALITY: Everybody should be taken equally into account
平等:每个人都应得到平等考虑

built into the outcome of the bargaining game-by constraining the players' knowledge, while still allowing them enough information to make some sort of choice between theories of justice. But, as I said, Rawls also builds into the bargaining game a requirement that rules out any strategy that fails to conform to a certain moral principle, namely, the principle that the participants should not be envious. He does this not directly, by ruling out strategies motivated by envy, but indirectly, by saying that the participants in the game are not subject to envy.
罗尔斯在讨价还价博弈的结果中,通过限制参与者的知识,同时仍然允许他们有足够的信息在正义理论之间做出某种选择。但是,正如我所说,罗尔斯还在讨价还价博弈中加入了一项要求,即排除任何不符合特定道德原则的策略,即参与者不应嫉妒的原则。他这样做并不是直接排除出于嫉妒动机的策略,而是间接地指出博弈的参与者不受嫉妒的影响。
One reason Rawls makes this requirement is, of course, that we do not want envy, which is an emotion that most of us think is morally reprehensible, to be part of the basis for judging the political institutions of the state. If we are ruling out morally unacceptable emotions in the participants in the game, however, we would surely also not want bare self-interest, which is also morally reprehensible, to be the basis for judgment either. Rawls needs a special reason for ruling out envy. And, as the American philosopher Robert Paul Wolff has argued, there is a much more telling reason why Rawls has to require that his bargainers are not envious. Explaining what that reason is allows us to see some of the advantages and problems of Rawls's theory.
当然,罗尔斯提出这一要求的一个原因是,我们不希望嫉妒这种我们大多数人都认为在道德上应受到谴责的情绪成为评判国家政治体制的依据之一。然而,如果我们要排除游戏参与者中道德上不可接受的情感,我们肯定也不希望赤裸裸的私利(这在道德上也应受到谴责)成为判断的依据。罗尔斯需要一个特殊的理由来排除嫉妒。正如美国哲学家罗伯特-保罗-沃尔夫(Robert Paul Wolff)所论证的那样,罗尔斯之所以要求他的交易者不嫉妒,还有一个更能说明问题的理由。解释了这个原因,我们就能看到罗尔斯理论的一些优点和问题。

6.8 The difference principle and inequality surpluses
6.8 差额原则和不平等盈余

Part (a) of Rawls' second principle is usually called the "difference principle." It is a principle that can apply only if a society organized into a state is not a constant-sum game. To see why, consider a society that is a constant-sum game. We start from a position of equality, since every deviation from equal distribution has to be justified by the difference principle. But if it is a constant-sum game, then any inequalities that gave one person or group more goods or liberties than another would be bound to be unacceptable, since Jane's gain would have to have come from John's loss. If we were starting from equality, giving something to Jane would immediately make at least one person worse off.
罗尔斯第二原则的(a)部分通常被称为 "差异原则"。只有当一个国家组织起来的社会不是一个恒和博弈的社会时,这一原则才能适用。要知道为什么,请考虑一个恒和博弈的社会。我们从平等的立场出发,因为任何偏离平等分配的行为都必须以差异原则为依据。但是,如果这是一个恒和博弈,那么任何给予一个人或一个群体比另一个人或另一个群体更多的物品或自由的不平等必然是不可接受的,因为简的收益必须来自约翰的损失。如果我们的出发点是平等的,那么给简一些东西就会立即使至少一个人的情况变得更糟。
As Wolff points out, however, we know very well that societies are not like this, because in many of our social practices there is what Wolff calls an inequality surplus. He explains this idea in terms of a very clear case.
然而,正如沃尔夫所指出的,我们很清楚,社会并非如此,因为在我们的许多社会实践中,存在着沃尔夫所说的不平等盈余。他用一个非常明显的案例来解释这一观点。
Consider a factory in which sixty people work to make shoes. There are six basic tasks involved in the business: tanning the leather, cutting it, stitching, gluing, packing, and selling. Suppose that the net receipts (before wages) each year are , which is distributed equally to the workers, who therefore get a year each.
假设有一家工厂,里面有六十个人在制鞋。这项业务涉及六项基本工作:鞣革、裁剪、缝合、粘合、包装和销售。假设每年的净收入(未扣除工资)为 ,平均分配给工人,因此每人每年可获得
Let us also suppose that if the tanners and the sales staff were to work harder, sales and profits would rise markedly. The tanners limit the rate of the production of shoes because their work is difficult and tiring, and the sales staff limit profits because they tend to work only hard enough to keep the inventory down below the level where it would fill up the storeroom. If we paid the tanners and the sales staff not but , productivity increases would lead to net receipts of . But since the extra tanning and selling are hard work, the tanners and sales people will not do the extra work for less.
我们还假设,如果制革工人和销售人员更加努力地工作,销售额和利润就会显著增加。制革工人限制了鞋子的生产速度,因为他们的工作又苦又累,而销售人员限制了利润,因为他们往往只努力工作,使存货量低于会填满储藏室的水平。如果我们支付给制革工人和销售人员的工资不是 ,而是 ,生产率的提高将使净收入达到 。但是,由于额外的制革和销售工作很辛苦,制革工人和销售人员不会为了更少的报酬而去做额外的工作。
Since is the minimum wage necessary to get the salespeople and tanners to increase their productivity, trying to give the others more than in these circumstances will actually lead to a reduction in total productivity. It won't leave enough money to pay the tanners and the sales people what it takes to increase their productivity. In situations where there is an inequality surplus the worst-off will be better off than they would be without the inequality.
由于 是让销售人员和制革工人提高生产率所需的最低工资,在这种情况下,如果试图给其他人高于 的工资,实际上会导致总生产率下降。这样就没有足够的钱来支付制革工人和销售人员提高生产率所需的费用。在存在不平等盈余的情况下,最贫困者的境况会比没有不平等的情况下更好。
Now, as Wolff points out, we can see immediately why Rawls needs to have his assumption that the bargainers are not envious. If one of the stitchers-say, Joe-was envious, he might prefer the original, less productive arrangement, even though he would get less, because he was willing, in effect, to pay to avoid being in a situation where someone was better off than he. In effect,
现在,正如沃尔夫所指出的,我们马上就能明白为什么罗尔斯需要假设讨价还价者并不嫉妒。如果其中一个缝合者--比如乔--心怀妒忌,他可能宁愿选择原来的、生产率较低的安排,即使他得到的 ,因为他实际上愿意付出 ,以避免处于有人比他更富裕的境地。实际上就是这样、

for Joe, the envious stitcher, the entry in the payoff matrix looks like this:
对于妒忌的缝纫工乔来说,报酬矩阵中的条目是这样的
NEW SCHEME OLD SCHEME
ENVIOUS
STITCHER
plus the
pain of seeing 眼痛
others get . 其他
plus the
pleasure of knowing 相知之乐
nobody gets more 无人能及
than vou.
Provided the utility Joe attaches to the payoff in the old scheme is greater than in the new one, Rawls' difference principle would rule out the new scheme if he did not have the requirement that the players were not envious. Because of this requirement that there be no envy, however, Rawls need never consider an objection to inequality of this sort.
只要乔在旧方案中对报酬的效用大于新方案,罗尔斯的差异原则就会排除新方案,如果他没有要求参与者不嫉妒的话。然而,由于不存在嫉妒这一要求,罗尔斯根本不需要考虑对这种不平等的反对意见。
Now, many people believe that the existence of inequalities is a large part of what gives rise to the tremendous productivity of modern economies. Rawls is saying, in effect, that provided these inequalities are just what is necessary to create the incentives that produce extra goods, even the worst-off person can be seen to be profiting from them: and if that is true, only envy-which is, after all, a disreputable feeling!- - could account for even the worst-off objecting to those inequalities.
现在,许多人认为,不平等的存在是现代经济产生巨大生产力的主要原因。罗尔斯实际上是在说,只要这些不平等是产生额外产品的激励机制所必需的,那么即使是最贫困的人也可以从中获利:如果这是真的,那么只有嫉妒--毕竟这是一种不光彩的感情!--才能解释为什么即使是最贫困的人也反对这些不平等。

6.9 Criticizing Rawls I: The structure of his argument
6.9 对罗尔斯的批评 I:罗尔斯论证的结构

Those are the constraints on the players in the original position: they are self-interested but not envious, and they operate behind the veil of ignorance. The game requires them to agree unanimously on a system of ground rules for the state, those rules being the principles of justice. We need now to consider the argument for the claim that the two principles would be unanimously chosen by self-interested, nonenvious rational people behind the veil of ignorance in the original position.
这就是处于原始地位的参与者所受到的限制:他们自利但不嫉妒,他们在无知的面纱下运作。游戏要求他们一致同意国家的基本规则体系,这些规则就是正义原则。我们现在需要考虑的是,在原来的立场上,在无知的面纱下,自利的、不嫉妒的理性人会一致选择这两个原则的论据。
Rawls' arguments for this claim are long and complex. They depend, in essence, on comparing his two principles with other principles of justice-such as utilitarianism, which says that what is just
罗尔斯对这一主张的论证既冗长又复杂。从本质上讲,这些论证依赖于将他的两个原则与其他正义原则进行比较--比如功利主义,它认为什么是正义的?

is what maximizes utility-that have been offered. He then shows why the players in the original position would prefer his two principles both to these other options, and, of course, to the state of nature.
即效用最大化。然后,他说明了为什么处于原始位置的参与者会选择他的两个原则,而不是这些其他选择,当然也不是自然状态。
But the core of his argument is that maximin considerations require people behind the veil of ignorance, who are ignorant of their own position, to accept only principles that protect the worst-off; that way they will be maximizing the worst that can happen to them once the veil of ignorance is lifted and they discover what their position is to be. That is why they will want to guarantee themselves equality with others, unless protecting the worst-off requires some inequality.
但他论证的核心是,最大化的考虑要求蒙着无知面纱的人们(他们对自己的处境一无所知)只接受保护处境最差者的原则;这样,一旦无知面纱被揭开,他们发现自己的处境如何,他们就会最大限度地减少可能发生在自己身上的最坏情况。这就是为什么他们希望保证自己与他人平等,除非保护最贫困者需要某种不平等。
Many kinds of criticisms can be raised of Rawls' defense of his two principles. Some of them have to do with detailed aspects of his presentation, and these I shall not consider. But there are crucial objections that can be made to his arguments, objections that go right to the heart of his project.
对于罗尔斯为他的两项原则所做的辩护,可以提出多种批评。其中一些与他的陈述的细节方面有关,这些我将不作考虑。但是,对他的论证可以提出一些至关重要的反对意见,这些反对意见直指他的计划的核心。
I shall mention one preliminary criticism only to put it aside: given the difference principle, Rawls is committed to interpersonal comparisons of utilities. This is because we are to consider all the possible social institutions and see which one does best for the worst off. But since different people will be worst off in different institutions, Rawls must be able to compare the utilities of different people. I have already said that there is reason to doubt that this can be done, but, for the moment, let us suppose that it can.
我将提到一个初步的批评,只是为了把它搁置一边:鉴于差异原则,罗尔斯致力于人与人之间的效用比较。这是因为我们要考虑所有可能的社会制度,看看哪一种对处境最差的人最有利。但是,由于不同的人在不同的制度中处境最差,罗尔斯必须能够比较不同人的效用。我已经说过,我们有理由怀疑能否做到这一点,但现在,让我们假设它能做到。
Rawls' argument is 罗尔斯的论点是
a) that his principles would be chosen as the result of a certain n-person non-constant-sum bargaining game and
a) 他的原则将作为某个 n 人非恒和讨价还价博弈的结果来选择,以及
b) that, once we understand why that game is constructed as it is, we shall see that this offers grounds for thinking that his principles are indeed just.
b) 一旦我们理解了游戏的构造原因,我们就会发现,这为我们认为他的原则确实是公正的提供了依据。
There are, therefore, two major sorts of criticism we can make of his work. First, we can argue-against (a)-that he has not shown that his principles would be chosen by rational people in the game he describes; second, we can argue-against (b) - that they would not be justified, even if we could show that they would be chosen in that game.
因此,我们可以对他的著作提出两大类批评。首先,我们可以论证--反对(a)--他没有证明他的原则在他所描述的博弈中会被理性人选择;其次,我们可以论证--反对(b)--即使我们能够证明这些原则在该博弈中会被选择,它们也是不合理的。
Let me start with an objection to (a).
让我首先反对(a)项。

6.10 Criticizing Rawls II: Why maximin?
6.10 批判罗尔斯之二:为什么要最大化?

Rawls claims that his principles would be chosen in the bargaining game because the players will find that they are preferable to the various alternative theories of justice he considers, provided they apply the maximin criterion. But there is no reason to suppose, as Rawls requires, that all reasonable people will adopt maximin as their rule in this game.
罗尔斯声称,在讨价还价的博弈中会选择他的原则,因为博弈者会发现这些原则比他所考虑的各种可供选择的正义理论更可取,只要他们采用最大限度标准。但是,我们没有理由像罗尔斯所要求的那样,假设所有有理智的人都会在这场博弈中采用最大限度原则作为他们的规则。
Let me try to explain why. I said earlier, in 6.4, that there were reasons for choosing a maximin strategy in two-person zero-sum games. The basic reason was that in a zero-sum game you can assume that your opponent is out to get you; thus, you should act in such a way as to make you least vulnerable to your opponent's choices. But in non-zero-sum games, especially those involving more than one person, it is not at all clear why we should use the maximin rule. There is no reason to suppose your fellow players are out to get you, since
让我试着解释一下原因。我在前面的 6.4 中说过,在两人零和博弈中选择最大化策略是有原因的。其基本原因是,在零和博弈中,你可以假定你的对手是要对付你;因此,你的行动方式应该使你最不容易受到对手选择的影响。但在非零和博弈中,尤其是那些涉及多人的博弈中,我们根本不清楚为什么要使用最大化规则。我们没有理由假定你的同伴是要对付你,因为
a) they are not envious, and
a) 他们不嫉妒,而且
b) because the game is not constant-sum, getting you won't necessarily do them any good anyway.
b) 因为游戏不是恒和的,所以无论如何,得到你也不一定对他们有什么好处。
Now, I also argued earlier that the idea of a constant-sum game couldn't be made to apply in cases where the payoffs are, as Rawls requires, in utilities. But the point remains that in the sort of bargaining game we are considering, there is generally no reason to think that you will prefer outcomes in which I have less utility to outcomes in which I have more.
现在,我在前面也论证过,恒和博弈的观点不能适用于罗尔斯所要求的以效用为单位的报酬的情况。但问题是,在我们所考虑的这种讨价还价博弈中,一般来说,没有理由认为你会更喜欢我的效用较小的结果,而不是我的效用较大的结果。
Thus, suppose that we cannot make interpersonal comparisons of utility, so that we cannot compare Fay's utilities with Ray's. We can represent this state of affairs by using different units for each of us: call Fay's utilities f's and Ray's r's. If we cannot make interpersonal comparisons of utility, we cannot say how many f's are worth one r. Fay and Ray might be involved in a situation where the payoffs are like this:
因此,假设我们不能进行人际间的效用比较,因此我们不能比较费伊和雷的效用。我们可以用不同的单位来表示这种情况:把费伊的效用称为 f,把雷的效用称为 r。如果我们不能进行人际间的效用比较,我们就不能说多少个 f 值 1 个 r:
Option 1 Option 2
(10 f's, 5 r's)
(10个F,5个R)
(20 f's, 8 r's)
(20个F,8个R)。
In this case, even though we cannot compare the utilities of the two players, we can see that Fay has no reason to think that Ray will prefer outcomes where she has less to outcomes where she has more. To put it another way, if we had any way of measuring how many units of Fay's utility were worth one unit of Ray's, whatever the ratio of to , this would not be a zero-sum game. It is hard to see why, in circumstances where this sort of noncompetitive outcome is possible, reasonable people should adopt the maximin rule. And if the people in the original position would not adopt the maximin rule, it is not at all obvious that they would prefer Rawls' principles to other ways of deciding whether a state is just; for example, utilitarianism. Self-interested people if they are applying maximin, will accept rules, such as Rawls' two principles, that protect the worst-off people, because they want to make sure that if they turn out to be the worst-off, their lives will be as good as they can be. But if they are not applying maximin-instead gambling, for example, that they will not be the worst off-they might very well opt for a system of social justice that is less concerned for the poorest. And unless Rawls can show that any reasonable person in the original position will adopt maximin principles, there is no reason to suppose that they will all agree on his two principles.
在这种情况下,尽管我们无法比较两位博弈者的效用,但我们可以看到,费伊没有理由 认为雷会更喜欢她拥有较少效用的结果,而不是她拥有较多效用的结果。换一种说法,如果我们有办法衡量费伊多少单位的效用值雷一个单位的效用,无论 的比例是多少,这就不是一个零和博弈了。很难看出为什么在这种非竞争性结果可能出现的情况下,理智的人应该采用最大化规则。而且,如果处于原初立场的人不会采用最大公约数规则,那么,与决定一个国家是否公正的其他方法(例如功利主义)相比,他们是否会更倾向于罗尔斯的原则,这一点并不明显。自利的人如果采用最大化原则,就会接受保护处境最差的人的规则,如罗尔斯的两个原则,因为他们想确保即使他们的处境最差,他们的生活也会尽可能好。但是,如果他们不采用最大限度原则--例如,赌他们不会成为最贫困的人--他们很可能会选择一种不太关心最贫困者的社会正义体系。除非罗尔斯能够证明,任何处于原初立场的合理的人都会采取最大化原则,否则我们没有理由认为他们都会同意他的两条原则。
There is, indeed, a reason for thinking that reasonable people in the original position might well do a different sort of calculation, a reason why someone might indeed be willing to gamble on an outcome different from Rawls'. In the original position, you are provided with a very great deal of general knowledge about people, so that though you do not know how any particular person will actbecause you are ignorant of everybody's goals and relative positions-you can make statistical predictions about the sorts of ways in which people will behave.
事实上,我们有理由认为,处于原初立场的有理智的人很可能会进行另一种计算,这就是为什么有人可能确实愿意赌一个与罗尔斯的结果不同的结果。在最初的立场中,你获得了大量关于人的常识,因此,尽管你不知道任何特定的人会如何行动,因为你对每个人的目标和相对立场一无所知,但你可以对人们的行为方式做出统计预测。
Suppose, in particular, your general knowledge told you that very few people would be really badly off if your society was run not according to Rawls' principles, but according to the utilitarian principle that we should maximize average utility. (To do this, we should have to continue to assume, with Rawls, that interpersonal comparisons of utility were possible.) And suppose it also told you that if you adopted Rawls' principles, the worst-off would be better off, but everybody else would be worse off. Why should a self-interested
特别是,假设你的常识告诉你,如果你的社会不是按照罗尔斯的原则,而是按照功利主义原则来管理,即我们应该最大化平均效用,那么很少有人会过得非常糟糕。(要做到这一点,我们就必须和罗尔斯一样,继续假设人与人之间的效用比较是可能的)。假设它还告诉你,如果你采用罗尔斯的原则,最穷的人会过得更好,但其他人都会过得更糟。为什么一个自利的

person who knows this seek to protect the interests of the worst-off when he or she is very unlikely to be one of them? To adopt maximin in this case would be to assign a very great deal of weight to an extremely unlikely outcome.
一个知道这一点的人,在他或她极不可能成为最贫困者之一的情况下,会寻求保护最贫困者的利益吗?在这种情况下采用最大化原则,就等于把极不可能的结果看得很重。
To make this question vivid, suppose, that one of the rules being considered in the original position would set up a compulsory lottery that made a few people who had the bad luck to get the wrong ticket into slaves who had to do some nasty but necessary jobs. Suppose, too, that the economists told us that this would produce a massive increase in the goods available to everybody else, and nobody would volunteer to do these jobs for the sorts of pay that our society could afford. If there were enough people, the chances of any particular person getting caught by the lottery could be very small indeed, and everyone might accept the lottery. (Rational people often take small risks for large benefits; nobody would think it irrational to take the small risk of dying in a car accident to drive to fetch a million-dollar lottery prize.) Since no moral considerations prohibit the players in the original position from adopting this rule - and remember, the only requirement on them is that they mustn't be envious - there would, apparently, be no reason in these circumstances for Rawls to reject this option.
为了使这个问题更加生动,假设在原来的立场上所考虑的规则之一是建立一个强制性的彩票,使少数运气不好买错彩票的人成为奴隶,不得不从事一些肮脏但必要的工作。另外,假设经济学家告诉我们,这样做会使其他人可以获得的商品大量增加,而没有人会自愿以我们的社会所能承受的报酬来从事这些工作。如果有足够多的人,任何一个人被抽中的几率都可能非常小,每个人都可能接受抽签。(理性的人往往会冒着小风险去获取大利益;没有人会认为冒着死于车祸的小风险开车去领取百万美元的彩票奖金是不理性的)。由于没有任何道德因素禁止处于原始位置的参与者采用这一规则--请记住,对他们的唯一要求就是不能嫉妒--在这种情况下,罗尔斯显然没有理由拒绝这一选择。
The general point is this: maximin may save you from the worst that can happen, but-especially in conditions of scarcity-it may also reduce your chances for a really worthwhile life once the veil of ignorance is lifted.
总的来说就是:最大限度原则可能会让你避免可能发生的最坏情况,但是--特别是在匮乏的条件下--一旦揭开无知的面纱,它也可能会减少你真正过上有价值生活的机会。

6.11 Criticizing Rawls III: The status of the two principles
6.11 对罗尔斯的批判 III:两项原则的地位

A second kind of objection to Rawls' theory focuses, as I have said, on the question of why the fact that the two principles could be derived in this sort of way would show that they were justified. We posed a similar problem to Hobbes' theory when we asked why the fact that we would have accepted certain arrangements in the state of nature should bind us now. As we saw, there were two main reasons why Hobbes was unable to reply with "Because you ought to keep your word." One was that we didn't give our word. The other was that there was no reason to think a purely self-interested person would be impressed by the claim that promises are binding-and
对罗尔斯理论的第二种反对意见,正如我所说的那样,集中在这样一个问题上:为什么以这种方式推导出这两项原则这一事实会表明它们是合理的。我们曾对霍布斯的理论提出过类似的问题,当时我们问,为什么在自然状态下我们会接受某些安排,而现在却要约束我们。正如我们所看到的,霍布斯无法回答 "因为你们应该信守诺言 "有两个主要原因。一个原因是我们没有遵守诺言。另一个原因是,我们没有理由认为一个纯粹从自身利益出发的人会被 "诺言具有约束力 "的说法所打动,而且我们也没有理由认为一个纯粹从自身利益出发的人会被 "诺言具有约束力 "的说法所打动。
Hobbes rules out appeal to moral principles in the state of nature, anyway.
无论如何,霍布斯排除了在自然状态下诉诸道德原则的可能性。
But, unlike Hobbes, Rawls is free to make appeal to moral ideas in defense of his principles; in fact, he offers two sorts of reason for thinking that the fact that the two principles would be chosen in the bargaining game is an argument in favor of them. One is a moral reason, which depends on a conception of a fair bargain:
但与霍布斯不同的是,罗尔斯可以自由地诉诸道德观念来为他的原则辩护;事实上,他提出了两种理由,认为在讨价还价的博弈中会选择这两个原则这一事实是支持它们的论据。一种是道德理由,它取决于公平交易的概念:

Abstract 摘要

Since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated.
既然每个人的福祉都取决于合作计划,没有这种计划,任何人都无法过上令人满意的生活,那么利益的分配就应该能够吸引每个参与其中的人,包括那些条件较差的人,都愿意合作。

The less well situated will quite reasonably refuse to cooperate if they think the way in which resources are allocated in the society is unfair. So only a system where the costs are fairly distributed is morally appealing. But, as Robert Nozick has pointed out, if we examine the way the deal looks from the point of view of the better situated, we may wonder whether the two principles really do reflect a fair deal. Nozick imagines the less well situated (or, as he says, "endowed") making their pitch:
条件较差的人如果认为社会资源的分配方式不公平,拒绝合作也是情理之中的。因此,只有成本得到公平分配的制度才具有道德吸引力。但是,正如罗伯特-诺齐克(Robert Nozick)所指出的,如果我们从处境较好的人的角度来审视交易的方式,我们可能会怀疑这两个原则是否真的反映了公平交易。诺齐克想象了处境较差者(或如他所说的 "被赋予者")进行推销的情景:
Nozick points out that if it is fair for the least well-off to argue like this, it would seem to be fair for the better-endowed to do likewise. But that would lead to a radically different arrangement from the one suggested by Rawls. On this scheme, we should allow an increase in wages for the poorest only if it benefited the richest: and that sounds not like justice but like exploitation!
诺齐克指出,如果最不富裕的人这样争论是公平的,那么条件较好的人这样做似乎也是公平的。但这将导致一种与罗尔斯所建议的完全不同的安排。在这个方案中,只有当最富有的人受益时,我们才应该允许最贫穷的人增加工资:这听起来不像是正义,而像是剥削!
Indeed, the very words that the worse-endowed have to utter sound not so much like the offer of a fair-minded person as the threats of a blackmailer: "We can spoil the whole system," the worse-endowed are saying, "so if we don't get everything we can,
事实上,条件较差的人不得不说的话,听起来与其说是一个有正义感的人的提议,不如说是一个敲诈者的威胁:"我们可以破坏整个制度,"条件较差的人说,"所以,如果我们不能得到我们所能得到的一切、

we'll bring down the whole house of cards." Rawls' argument here is unconvincing.
我们将推倒整个纸牌屋"。罗尔斯在这里的论证缺乏说服力。
A second way to try to justify the principles - a way we considered in the case of Hobbes-is to argue that they are principles you would choose if you were having to decide what principles to accept in getting out of the state of nature. I said about Hobbes that this argument seemed simply unsound: I, at least, would not choose Hobbes' potentially tyrannical sovereign over the life of the Mbuti pygmies. But the reason why this sort of argument will not work for Rawls is rather different.
试图证明这些原则合理性的第二种方法--我们在霍布斯的案例中考虑过的一种方法--是争辩说,如果你必须决定在摆脱自然状态时接受什么原则,你会选择这些原则。我在谈到霍布斯时说过,这个论点似乎根本站不住脚:至少我不会在姆布提侏儒的生命面前选择霍布斯可能暴虐的君主。但这种论证对罗尔斯不起作用的原因却截然不同。
In the original position we are behind a veil of ignorance, which deprives us of knowledge of our own goals and our relative positions. In a certain sense, the veil of ignorance eliminates everything that makes me distinctive. Rawls cannot say that would have chosen the two principles in the original position, because the veil of ignorance wipes me out. The fact that someone like me in the original position would choose a certain set of principles for regulating society gives me no special reason to like those principles, for that person doesn't know enough about me to take my interests properly into account.
在最初的位置上,我们被蒙上了一层无知的面纱,这让我们无法了解自己的目标和相对位置。从某种意义上说,无知的面纱消除了使我与众不同的一切。罗尔斯不能说, ,在原来的立场上会选择这两个原则,因为无知的面纱把我抹去了。像我这样的人在原来的立场上会选择某一套原则来规范社会,这并没有给我特别的理由去喜欢这些原则,因为这个人对我的了解不够,无法正确地考虑我的利益。
It is a good thing, therefore, that Rawls does not offer the argument that we would choose the two principles if we were getting out of the state of nature. The reason why he doesn't is that his official explanation of the role of the original position is very different from Hobbes' discussions of the meetings in the assembly that gathers in the state of nature to institute the commonwealth.
因此,罗尔斯没有提出这样的论点,即如果我们要摆脱自然状态,我们会选择这两个原则,这是一件好事。他之所以没有这样做,是因为他对原初立场的作用的正式解释与霍布斯对在自然状态下为建立大同世界而召开的议会中的会议的讨论大相径庭。

6.12 Reflective equilibrium
6.12 反射平衡

What Rawls says is roughly this: the role of these reflections is to provide a way of organizing our moral intuitions about political life. Our basic ideas about politics are disorganized and often inconsistent. We need, therefore, to find a way of systematizing them in order to deal with the inconsistencies and root them out. One way to do this is to find a theory-such as Rawls' account of the original position-that allows us to derive our central moral ideas about political life, and then to make our ideas consistent by eliminating notions that are inconsistent with that theory. We should move in our thinking back and forth between particular intuitions and the
罗尔斯大致是这样说的:这些思考的作用是提供一种组织我们关于政治生活的道德直觉的方法。我们关于政治的基本观念是杂乱无章的,而且往往是不一致的。因此,我们需要找到一种将其系统化的方法,以处理不一致之处并将其根除。其中一种方法就是找到一种理论--比如罗尔斯关于原初立场的论述--使我们能够得出关于政治生活的核心道德观念,然后通过消除与该理论不一致的观念来使我们的观念保持一致。我们应该在特定的直觉与

general theory, trimming each to the other, until we reach what Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium." At reflective equilibrium our intuitions and our theory will coincide.
在这个过程中,我们的直觉和我们的理论将相互依存、相互促进,直到我们达到罗尔斯所说的 "反思的平衡"。在反思的平衡点上,我们的直觉和我们的理论将不谋而合。
The difficulty with this view is not with the idea of reflective equilibrium; it is rather with the particular sort of theory that Rawls wants to bring into equilibrium with our intuitions. For unless there is some reason to think that the general theory supports the particular claims that are derived from it, there is no reason to eliminate from our inconsistent set of intuitions just those that don't fit with the theory.
这种观点的难点不在于反思性均衡的理念,而在于罗尔斯想要使之与我们的直觉达到均衡的那种特定理论。因为除非有理由认为一般理论支持从它引申出来的特殊主张,否则就没有理由从我们不一致的直觉中剔除那些与理论不符的直觉。
Suppose we have a theory, , from which we can derive all our moral intuitions except intuition I. We can always construct a different theory, , from which we could derive all our moral intuitions, including I, except those that are inconsistent with I. (To do this, we simply look at the class of possible worlds in which is satisfied-the class, W, of worlds that are morally good according to -and construct as a theory that is satisfied in all the members of in which is true.) We cannot say I is to be rejected because it cannot be derived from a theory: it can be derived from . True, may not deliver some of our other intuitions, the ones inconsistent with I, but since our intuitions are inconsistent, we have to give some of them up anyway. Still, just as there is no reason to reject I because it cannot be derived from , there is no reason to accept it just because it can be derived from . To reject I on the basis that it can't be derived from , we need to have a reason for preferring to in the first place.
假设我们有一个理论, ,从这个理论我们可以推导出我们所有的道德直觉,除了直觉I。我们总是可以构建一个不同的理论, ,从这个理论我们可以推导出我们所有的道德直觉,包括I,除了那些与I不一致的直觉。(要做到这一点,我们只需查看满足 的那类可能世界--即根据 在道德上是善的那类世界(W)--并将 构建为一种理论,它满足 的所有成员,其中 为真)。我们不能说因为 I 不能从一个理论中推导出来,所以就要拒绝它:它可以从 中推导出来。的确, 可能无法提供我们的一些其他直觉,即与 I 不一致的直觉,但既然我们的直觉是不一致的,我们无论如何都得放弃其中的一些直觉。不过,正如我们没有理由因为 "我 "不能从 得出而拒绝接受它一样,我们也没有理由因为 "我 "可以从 得出而接受它。要想以它不能从 得出为由拒绝 I,我们首先需要有一个更喜欢 而不是 的理由。
We can apply this analysis to Rawls' argument. Consider Jerry, who is a utilitarian. He derives his ideas of justice from considering what will maximize human utility: call this view . Rawls advocates the two principles, deriving them from his bargaining game: call this . These theories both fit with our moral intuitions in many cases, as Rawls would admit. Consider now some intuition that is derivable from Rawls' theory, , but not from Jerry's theory, : the intuition, say, that it is right to limit the income of the richest person in order to make the poorest off slightly better off, even if the result is to make everybody in between much worse off also. Now, as I have just argued, to accept this intuition on the basis of , we should need to have a reason for preferring Rawls' theory. But, as we have just seen,
我们可以将这一分析应用于罗尔斯的论证。想想杰里,他是一个功利主义者。他的正义观源于对人类效用最大化的思考:将这一观点称为 。罗尔斯主张两个原则,从他的讨价还价游戏中得出:称之为 。这些理论在很多情况下都符合我们的道德直觉,罗尔斯也承认这一点。现在,请考虑一些可以从罗尔斯的理论 ,但不能从杰里的理论 得出的直觉:比如说,限制最富有者的收入,以使最贫穷者的境况稍好一些,这是正确的,即使这样做的结果是使处于两者之间的每个人的境况也大为恶化。现在,正如我刚才所论证的,要在 的基础上接受这种直觉,我们应该有理由倾向于罗尔斯的理论。但是,正如我们刚才所看到的、

we have no good reason in Rawls' case to suppose that the derivation of the two principles from his bargaining game offers any independent reason for supposing those principles to be right.
在罗尔斯的案例中,我们没有充分的理由认为,从他的讨价还价游戏中推导出的两个原则提供了任何独立的理由来假定这些原则是正确的。

6.13 Are the two principles right?
6.13 这两个原则是否正确?

I have been concentrating on Rawls' derivation of his two principles. But even if his derivation of them was unsuccessful, they might still be correct. Anyone who finds utilitarianism attractive, however, will doubt that Rawls' theory can be right. Rawls would require us to avoid increasing the utility of everybody except the very worst-off group in the society a great deal if it would not increase the utility of the worst-off. This is inconsistent with a very deeply ingrained moral idea: the idea that, all things considered, it is better that people have more rather than less of what they want.
我一直专注于罗尔斯对其两项原则的推导。但是,即使他对这两个原则的推导不成功,它们仍然可能是正确的。然而,任何认为功利主义有吸引力的人都会怀疑罗尔斯的理论是否正确。罗尔斯要求我们避免大幅增加社会中除最贫困群体之外的所有人的效用,如果这样做不会增加最贫困群体的效用的话。这与一种根深蒂固的道德观念不符,这种观念认为,考虑到所有因素,人们最好拥有更多而不是更少他们想要的东西。
There is, however, a more fundamental respect in which Rawls' theory can be challenged. Rawls' full theory has a feature that I have not so far mentioned. It is that he has, over and above the two principles, a rule for the priority of liberty. This says, in essence, that certain fundamental rights-which, taken together, he calls "liberty" - cannot be limited for the sake of anything else. Liberty, Rawls says, can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. This can occur in two ways:
然而,罗尔斯的理论在一个更根本的方面可以受到挑战。罗尔斯的完整理论有一个我至今尚未提及的特点。这就是,在两个原则之外,他还有一个自由优先的规则。这实质上是说,某些基本权利--他把它们合在一起称为 "自由"--不能为了其他任何东西而受到限制。罗尔斯说,只有为了自由才能限制自由。这可以通过两种方式发生:
a) "a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all;
a) "范围较小的自由必须加强所有人共享的总体自由体系;
b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty."
b) 不那么平等的自由必须为那些拥有较少自由的人所接受"。
Thus, suppose-rather implausibly!-that everybody would be richer if freedom of speech was restricted to politicians. Rawls would say that, in those circumstances, we could not limit freedom of speech, however much better off everybody would become. Suppose, on the other hand, that if everybody was free to say what he or she knew about a country's defenses, then an enemy would be able to take over, and that would lead to the abolition of free speech altogether. Restricting freedom of speech would be allowed in this case because it was necessary to protect the system of liberty.
因此,假设--相当不可思议!--如果言论自由仅限于政治家,每个人都会变得更富有。罗尔斯会说,在这种情况下,我们不能限制言论自由,无论大家会变得多么富裕。另一方面,假设如果每个人都可以自由地说出他或她所知道的关于一个国家防御的情况,那么敌人就能够占领这个国家,这将导致完全废除言论自由。在这种情况下,限制言论自由是允许的,因为这是保护自由制度所必需的。
There is no doubt then that Rawls intends us to take certain rights-the ones that he calls "liberty"-very seriously. But, as
毫无疑问,罗尔斯希望我们认真对待某些权利--他称之为 "自由 "的权利。但是,正如
Robert Nozick has argued, Rawls' way of thinking about these rights goes against the grain of some of our deepest moral ideas. The reason is that Rawls" principles are what Nozick calls "end-result principles": for Rawls, a society with a certain system of liberty and a particular distribution of goods is just provided it fits a certain pattern, independently of how it came about. Nozick argues that most of us favor what he calls "historical principles" of justice. A historical principle is one that holds "that past circumstances or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts."
罗伯特-诺齐克(Robert Nozick)认为,罗尔斯关于这些权利的思考方式与我们一些最深刻的道德观念背道而驰。原因在于,罗尔斯的原则是诺齐克所说的 "最终结果原则":对罗尔斯来说,一个拥有某种自由制度和特定物品分配的社会,只要符合某种模式,就是公正的,而与它是如何产生的无关。诺齐克认为,我们大多数人都赞成他所说的正义的 "历史原则"。所谓历史原则,是指 "人们过去的环境或行为会造成不同的权利或不同的损失"。
It is easy to give examples of historical principles. Thus, as Nozick points out, if there are people in prison for war crimes, we don't assess the justice of the punishment by looking only at what resources the criminals have and comparing them with everybody else's share. We think it relevant to ask whether they did something to deserve a lesser share of the good things of life.
我们很容易举出历史原则的例子。因此,正如诺齐克所指出的,如果有人因战争罪而被关进监狱,我们在评估惩罚的公正性时,不会只看罪犯拥有哪些资源,并将其与其他人的份额进行比较。我们认为,我们应该问一问他们是否做了什么,以至于他们应该少分一些生活中的美好事物。
A familiar, and less serious, historical principle governs our thinking about the fairness of certain lotteries. Lotteries organized by state or national governments to raise funds change the distribution of goods in the society. Furthermore, they do so without regard for the desert of the winners, allocating money simply on the basis of a random process. But, provided the lottery is fairly conducted, most people hold that the resulting redistribution of goods is as fair as the original distribution.
我们在思考某些彩票的公平性时,会遵循一个熟悉的、不那么严肃的历史原则。州政府或国家政府为筹集资金而组织的彩票活动改变了社会物品的分配。此外,它们在这样做的时候并不考虑中奖者的荒废情况,只是根据随机过程来分配资金。但是,只要彩票是公平进行的,大多数人都认为由此产生的物品再分配与原来的分配一样公平。
This sort of historical principle is often invoked in assessing the justice of certain legal institutions, as we shall see in the next chapter. But its importance here is that if some of the principles of justice are historical principles, then Rawls' two principles are certainly not the whole story. In particular, if some of our rights-say, our rights to property-derive from history-say, from the way we acquired the property-then Rawls' theory of justice would fail to capture this important fact. Robert Nozick's contribution to recent political philosophy has been to provide a vigorous defense of historical principles of justice.
我们将在下一章中看到,在评估某些法律制度的正义性时,经常会援引这类历史原则。但它在这里的重要性在于,如果某些正义原则是历史原则,那么罗尔斯的两个原则肯定不是故事的全部。特别是,如果我们的某些权利--比如说,我们的财产权--来自于历史,比如说,来自于我们获得财产的方式,那么罗尔斯的正义理论将无法捕捉到这一重要事实。罗伯特-诺齐克对近代政治哲学的贡献在于为正义的历史原则提供了有力的辩护。

6.14 Nozick: Beginning with rights
6.14 诺齐克从权利开始

Though Rawls insists on the priority of liberty, the major thrust of his book deals with questions about when allocations of money and goods are just. He is concerned mostly to argue about what is called
尽管罗尔斯坚持自由的优先地位,但他书中的主要内容是关于金钱和物品的分配何时才是公正的问题。他主要关注的是论证所谓的

"distributive justice," which is the set of issues that have to do with what makes the distribution of resources - who has what goods-in a society right or wrong. Nozick's main concern, however, is with rights. The first sentence of his book Anarchy, State and Utopia runs:
"分配正义 "是一系列与社会资源分配--谁拥有什么物品--的对错有关的问题。然而,诺齐克主要关注的是权利。他在《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》一书中的第一句话是:
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).
个人拥有权利,任何人或团体都不能对他们做某些事情(否则就侵犯了他们的权利)。
Nozick's aim in the book is to consider the question of the justification of political authority from the starting point of this claim. Once we know what rights people have, we can ask whether a state could be set up without violating those rights. If it could not, then the justification for the state would require at least that we showed that it offered us something morally valuable to outweigh these rights violations. But even if it could, that would still not show that any actual state is justified, since it might have been set up in a way that violated people's rights.
诺齐克在书中的目的就是从这一主张出发来思考政治权威的正当性问题。一旦我们知道人们有哪些权利,我们就可以问,是否可以在不侵犯这些权利的情况下建立一个国家。如果不能,那么国家的正当性至少需要我们证明,它为我们提供了一些道德上有价值的东西,足以抵消对这些权利的侵犯。但是,即使能够做到这一点,也不能说明任何实际的国家都是合理的,因为它可能是以一种侵犯人们权利的方式建立起来的。
Like Hobbes, Nozick begins with a state of nature, but unlike Hobbes, it is a state of nature in which people should and do respect certain moral ideas. In fact, Nozick's state of nature is patterned after the one conceived by the English empiricist John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government, which was first published in 1690. In this essay, Locke wrote that the state of nature was a state of perfect freedom and equality.
与霍布斯一样,诺齐克也从自然状态出发,但与霍布斯不同的是,在这种自然状态中,人们应该而且确实尊重某些道德观念。事实上,诺齐克的自然状态是以英国经验主义者约翰-洛克(John Locke)在 1690 年首次发表的《政府论》(Second Treatise on Government)中构想的自然状态为蓝本的。在这篇文章中,洛克写道,自然状态是一种完全自由和平等的状态。
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence... The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. . . Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
尽管这是一种自由状态,但它不是一种许可状态......自然状态有自然法则的约束,每个人都有义务遵守:而作为自然法则的理性则教导全人类:人人平等、独立,任何人都不应该伤害他人的生命、健康、自由或财产。. ..每个人都有义务保护自己,不得故意离开自己的岗位,同样的道理,当他自己的保护不受到竞争时,他也应该尽可能地保护其他人,除非是为了对罪犯伸张正义,否则不得剥夺或损害他人的生命,或有助于保护他人生命、自由、健康、肢体或财产的东西。
Nozick's list of rights also includes the right not to be attacked or
诺齐克的权利清单还包括不被攻击或不被诽谤的权利。

killed when you are doing no harm and the right to keep your property and to do with it what you like so long as you don't violate anyone else's rights in the process.
当你没有造成任何伤害时,你有权保留自己的财产,并随心所欲地处置它,只要你在此过程中没有侵犯其他人的权利。
Nozick agrees with Locke-and disagrees with Hobbes-that even without government these rights exist and that we have the right to enforce them in this way. But he and Locke also agree that there are many "inconveniences of the state of nature." Locke immediately argues that the "proper remedy" for these inconveniences is "civil government," but Nozick sets out to ask whether there is anything less than the institution of a state that will do the job.
诺齐克同意洛克的观点,但不同意霍布斯的观点,即即使没有政府,这些权利也是存在的,我们有权以这种方式行使这些权利。但他和洛克也同意,"自然状态 "有许多 "不便之处"。洛克立即认为,对这些不便的 "适当补救 "是 "文官政府",但诺齐克开始追问,除了国家制度之外,是否还有其他东西可以做到这一点。
One reason that Nozick adopts this more conservative approach is that he takes anarchism-the claim that the state can never be justified - to be a serious option. Against an anarchist, especially one who agrees with Locke that we have many rights in the state of nature, it would be important to show how a state of a certain sort could arise without violating anyone's rights. Otherwise the anarchists really might be right in thinking that the state was morally unjustifiable.
诺齐克采用这种较为保守的方法的一个原因是,他认为无政府主义--国家永远不可能合理的主张--是一种严肃的选择。面对无政府主义者,尤其是认同洛克关于我们在自然状态下拥有许多权利的无政府主义者,重要的是要证明某种国家如何能够在不侵犯任何人权利的情况下出现。否则,无政府主义者可能真的会正确地认为国家在道义上是不合理的。
Since you know how Hobbes and Rawls justified the state, you might expect Nozick to defend his theory by arguing, like them, that people would choose in the state of nature to hand over certain rights to the state, and come by agreement to "institute the common-wealth." But Nozick proceeds in a different way.
既然你知道霍布斯和罗尔斯是如何为国家辩护的,你可能会期待诺齐克为自己的理论辩护,像他们一样论证人们在自然状态下会选择将某些权利交给国家,并通过协议 "建立公有制"。但诺齐克却以另一种方式进行论证。
He begins by considering how rational and self-interested people in the Lockean state of nature could come to make deals with each other to form what he calls "protective associations." These are groups of people who agree to help each other to deal with anyone outside the organization who poses a threat to anyone within it, and to settle conflicts between members of the association where necessary. The key point that distinguishes protective associations from organized banditry is that such associations seek to enforce rights that people have in the state of nature and to enforce them according to the laws of nature. Unlike a protection racket, a protective association has a basis in morality.
他首先考虑了在洛克的自然状态下,理性和自利的人们如何能够彼此达成交易,形成他所说的 "保护性协会"。这些群体同意互相帮助,对付组织外对组织内构成威胁的任何人,并在必要时解决协会成员之间的冲突。保护协会有别于有组织的强盗行为的关键在于,这种协会旨在落实人们在自然状态下拥有的权利,并根据自然法则来行使这些权利。与敲诈勒索不同,保护协会有道德基础。
Using the idea of a protective association, Nozick offers an explanation of the origins of the state in the state of nature. He seeks to show how
诺齐克运用保护性联合体的思想,解释了国家起源于自然状态。他试图说明

without anyone having this in mind, the self-interested and rational actions of persons in a Lockean state of nature will lead to single protective agencies dominant over geographical territories.
如果没有人考虑到这一点,洛克自然状态下人们的自利和理性行为就会导致单一的保护机构在地域上占主导地位。
The dominant protective association of a region will claim, according to Nozick, a monopoly of the sort of authority that I said at the beginning of this chapter characterizes the state. A dominant protective association of Nozick's kind he calls a "minimal state." It is minimal because it is "limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts and so on." This puts it in stark contrast with Rawls' ideal state, where the government spends a lot of its time on issues of distribution of income in order to ensure that the difference principle is obeyed.
诺齐克认为,一个地区占统治地位的保护性协会将声称垄断了我在本章开头所说的那种作为国家特征的权威。诺齐克称之为 "最小国家"。说它是最小国家,是因为它 "仅限于防止武力、盗窃、欺诈、执行契约等狭隘的职能"。这与罗尔斯的理想国形成了鲜明对比,在罗尔斯的理想国中,政府将大量时间花在收入分配问题上,以确保差异原则得到遵守。
Now, the reason why Nozick seeks to show that something very like a state can develop in this way is that he is convinced that a theory of justice must be based on historical principles. And the only way you can tell if a state is justified on historical principles is to see whether it was produced by a just process.
现在,诺齐克之所以试图证明,非常类似于国家的东西可以以这种方式发展,是因为他确信,正义理论必须以历史原则为基础。而判断一个国家是否符合历史原则的唯一方法,就是看它是否是由一个正义的过程产生的。
Plainly, if Nozick is correct in saying what our rights are in the state of nature, and correct in arguing that we could end up with a state without violating those rights, then he has made a convincing case against anarchism. He has not shown that any particular actual state is justified, but he has shown that the anarchist is wrong to claim that no state could be justified.
显然,如果诺齐克正确地指出了我们在自然状态下的权利,并且正确地论证了我们可以在不侵犯这些权利的情况下建立一个国家,那么他就提出了一个令人信服的反对无政府主义的理由。他没有证明任何特定的实际国家是合理的,但他证明了无政府主义者声称任何国家都不可能是合理的是错误的。
But Nozick also claims that the sort of state that would be derived in this way from the Lockean state of nature is the only sort of state that can be justified, and that is a much more doubtful claim. Even if we conceded that any other, nonminimal state involved the violation of rights, it would only follow that the state was unjustified, all things considered, if there were no compelling moral points in the state's favor. If a nonminimal state offered us things that were morally valuable and outweighed the violations of rights, then we might still think it right to develop and defend it. In saying that only a minimal state is justified, Nozick supposes that only a very restricted class of moral considerations can be brought to bear in deciding whether a state is just.
但是,诺齐克也声称,从洛克的自然状态以这种方式衍生出来的那种国家是唯一一种可以被证明是合理的国家,而这种说法更令人怀疑。即使我们承认任何其他非最小国家都涉及对权利的侵犯,但如果没有令人信服的有利于国家的道德观点,那么从所有方面考虑,这种国家都是不合理的。如果一个非最小国家为我们提供了道德上有价值的东西,并且超过了对权利的侵犯,那么我们可能仍然认为发展和捍卫它是正确的。诺齐克认为,只有最低限度的国家才是合理的,这就意味着在决定一个国家是否公正时,只能考虑非常有限的道德因素。
Just how minimal the minimal state is-and just how restricted are the moral considerations that Nozick brings to bear-becomes
最低限度的国家究竟有多小,诺齐克提出的道德考量又有多大局限,这才是问题的关键所在。

clear if we turn from Nozick's account of the minimal state to his theory of distributive justice.
如果我们从诺齐克关于最小国家的论述转向他的分配正义理论,就会明白这一点。

6.15 The entitlement theory
6.15 权利理论

Nozick's theory of distributive justice is very different from Rawls'. He calls his view of distributive justice an "entitlement theory" of justice. In outline it consists of four claims:
诺齐克的分配正义理论与罗尔斯的截然不同。他将自己的分配正义观称为正义的 "权利论"。概括地说,它包括四个主张:
  1. A person who acquires property in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
    根据收购公正原则收购财产的人有权持有该财产。
  2. A person who acquires property in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
    根据转让公正原则,从有权持有财产的其他人处获得财产的人有权持有该财产。
  3. A person who acquires property in accordance with the principle of rectification of holdings is entitled to that property.
    根据财产更正原则获得财产的人有权获得该财产。
  4. No one is entitled to property except by (repeated) applications of 1,2 , and 3 .
    除非(重复)应用 1、2 和 3,否则任何人都无权获得财产。
The principle of justice in acquisition tells you what entitles you to come to possess something that does not already belong to anybody else; the principle of justice in transfer tells you what entitles you to possess something that used to be owned by somebody else; and the principle of rectification of holdings tells you how you can become entitled to something because someone else got it from you in violation of justice in acquisition or transfer. Nozicks treatment of these principles is rather sketchy, but he does say enough to suggest a plausible line of objection.
获取正义原则告诉你,什么东西还不属于别人,你就有权拥有它;转让正义原则告诉你,什么东西曾经属于别人,你就有权拥有它;所有权纠正原则告诉你,你怎么能因为别人违反获取或转让正义而从你那里得到它,就有权拥有它。诺齐克对这些原则的论述相当粗略,但他确实说了足够多的话,提出了一个貌似合理的反对思路。
We can begin by asking what consequences Nozick draws from the fact that an action would violate somebody's rights. He suggests that we could interpret this as meaning not that avoiding these violations is a goal of our moral lives but that it is what he calls a "sideconstraint" on our actions. Side-constraints are boundaries that it is always morally wrong to cross. We may pursue all sorts of goals, both moral and personal, but on this view, we may do so only in ways that avoid violating the rights of others.
我们可以先问一下诺齐克,一个行为会侵犯某人的权利,会产生什么后果。他认为,我们可以将其理解为,避免这些侵权行为并不是我们道德生活的目标,而是他所说的对我们行为的 "侧面约束"。所谓 "边际约束",是指在道德上总是不能逾越的界限。我们可以追求各种目标,包括道德目标和个人目标,但根据这种观点,我们只能以避免侵犯他人权利的方式来追求这些目标。
If that is so, and given his entitlement theory, he is committed to some fairly surprising claims about what anyone, let alone a
如果是这样的话,考虑到他的权利理论,他对任何人,更不用说是一个

government, can do. Thus, for example, suppose you are entitled to the drugs in your medicine cabinet-you got them justly from someone who was entitled to them-and they are the only drugs in town that can save a child with a serious biochemical disorder. You are out of town. If respect for property rights constitutes a side-constraint on action, then it would be wrong for anyone, including a judge, to order that the drugs be taken and used to save the child without your consent. The child has no right to the drug, nor has the judge. In a minimal state the child would have to be allowed to die in order not to offend against property rights. It won't do to say that the child has a right to life, which we would be ignoring if we respected your property rights, as Nozick himself points out.
政府能做什么?因此,举例来说,假设你有权使用药箱里的药物--你从有权使用这些药物的人那里正当地得到了它们--而且这些药物是城里唯一能够挽救患有严重生化紊乱症的孩子的药物。你已经出城了。如果对财产权的尊重构成了对行动的附带约束,那么任何人,包括法官,在未经你同意的情况下,命令将这些药物拿去救治孩子都是错误的。孩子无权使用药物,法官也无权使用药物。在最低限度的状态下,为了不侵犯财产权,必须允许孩子死亡。说孩子有生命权是不行的,如果我们尊重你的财产权,我们就会忽视生命权,诺齐克自己也指出了这一点。
A right to life is not a right to whatever one needs to live; other people may have rights over these other things. At most, a right to life would be the right to strive for whatever one needs to live, provided that having it does not violate anyone else's rights.
生命权并不是获得生活所需任何东西的权利;其他人可能对这些其他东西拥有权利。充其量,生命权是一个人争取生存所需的任何东西的权利,前提是拥有这些东西不会侵犯其他人的权利。
(Along with, of course, the right not to be killed when you pose no threat to others.)
(当然,还有在不对他人构成威胁的情况下不被杀害的权利)。
This objection to Nozick's view was raised by the American philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson. It is a crucial objection because it undermines one of the most startling claims that Nozick makes in his book, which is that any taxation which is intended to even out inequalities in resources-any purely redistributive taxation-is morally indefensible. For this conclusion depends on the assumption that it is always wrong to disregard property rights for any purpose whatsoever. For Nozick, respect for property rights is a sideconstraint on the state's actions.
美国哲学家朱迪斯-贾维斯-汤姆森(Judith Jarvis Thomson)对诺齐克的观点提出了反对意见。这是一个至关重要的反对意见,因为它破坏了诺齐克在书中提出的一个最惊人的主张,即任何旨在均衡资源不平等的税收--任何纯粹的再分配税收--在道德上都是站不住脚的。因为这一结论取决于这样一个假设,即出于任何目的无视财产权都是错误的。在诺齐克看来,对财产权的尊重是对国家行为的一种附带限制。
Thomson points out also that Nozick is not entirely consistent in his application of the idea of rights as side-constraints. Thus she observes that when he is discussing the rights of animals, Nozick leaves open the possibility that we can "save 10,000 animals from excruciating suffering by inflicting some slight discomfort" on an innocent person. But if innocent people have a right not to have to endure discomfort against their will, and this right is a side-constraint on our actions, then we ought never to consider saving these animals (provided not saving them does not infringe on their animal
汤姆森还指出,诺齐克在运用权利作为侧面制约的思想时并不完全一致。因此,她观察到,在讨论动物权利时,诺齐克留下了这样一种可能性,即我们可以 "通过给一个无辜的人带来一些轻微的不适,使一万只动物免受极度痛苦"。但是,如果无辜的人有权不必违背自己的意愿忍受不适,而这一权利又是对我们行为的侧面约束,那么我们就不应该考虑拯救这些动物(只要不拯救它们不会侵犯它们的动物权利)。

rights). If rights are side-constraints, then they cannot be violated to achieve otherwise desirable goals. This makes them, in effect, as Thomson says, infinitely stringent: that is, no moral consideration, however weighty (apart, perhaps, from another right) will justify overriding a person's rights to their property.
权利)。如果权利是附带约束,那么就不能为了实现其他理想目标而侵犯权利。这就如汤姆森所说,权利实际上是无限严格的:也就是说,任何道德上的考虑,无论多么重要(也许除了另一种权利之外),都不能成为凌驾于一个人的财产权之上的理由。
This wobbling in the degree of stringency of rights . . makes it very unclear just how Nozick is to get from his starting point, which is that we have rights, to his thesis that a government which imposes taxes for the purpose of redistribution violates the rights of its citizens. . . [For] surely it is plain as day that property rights are not infinitely stringent.
这种在权利的严格程度上的摇摆不定......使得诺齐克如何从他的出发点,即我们拥有权利,到他的论点,即政府为了再分配而征税侵犯了公民权利,变得非常不清楚。......使得诺齐克如何从他的出发点--我们拥有权利--到他的论点--一个为再分配而征税的政府侵犯了其公民的权利--变得非常不清楚。. .[因为]财产权并不是无限严格的,这一点显而易见。
And if they are not infinitely stringent, Nozick has lost the basis of his claim that only the minimal state can be morally justified. For it is the infinite stringency of property rights that restricts the state's justifiable uses of taxation to the support of the limited tasks that Nozick allows.
如果产权不是无限严格的,那么诺齐克就失去了其主张的基础,即只有最低限度的国家才能在道义上是正当的。因为正是财产权的无限严格性将国家征税的正当用途限制在支持诺齐克所允许的有限任务上。
This is only the beginning of a discussion of Nozick's work, which includes, not incidentally, some very interesting applications of game theory. But it does suggest that Nozick would need to offer more arguments before we should accept his claim that our fundamental rights include rights to use our property that cannot be overridden by any other moral purpose. That is, perhaps, a good thing: if Nozick were right, every state in the present world would be in serious violation of its citizens' rights, just because it uses tax revenue to pay for education!
这只是讨论诺齐克著作的开端,其中还包括博弈论的一些非常有趣的应用。但这确实表明,诺齐克需要提供更多的论据,我们才能接受他的主张,即我们的基本权利包括使用财产的权利,这些权利不能被任何其他道德目的所推翻。这也许是件好事:如果诺齐克是对的,那么当今世界上的每一个国家都会因为将税收用于支付教育费用而严重侵犯其公民的权利!

6.16 Ethics and politics
6.16 道德与政治

Rawls concludes, in A Theory of Justice, that rational, unenvious people behind the veil of ignorance in the original position would all opt for a political system that recognized certain rights and gave them priority. Nozick's theory of justice, as we saw, also assumes that we have certain fundamental rights, though he says less about why we have these rights. This is surely an important question. Most contemporary people agree that each of us has the right not to be tortured, say, or not to be killed (if innocent), and that we should be allowed freedom of speech and of association. But on what basis do we believe this?
罗尔斯在《正义论》中得出结论,在原初立场中,理性的、不嫉妒的、蒙着无知面纱的人们都会选择承认某些权利并给予这些权利优先权的政治制度。正如我们所看到的,诺齐克的正义理论也假定我们拥有某些基本权利,尽管他较少提及我们为什么拥有这些权利。这无疑是一个重要的问题。大多数当代人都同意,我们每个人都有权不被折磨,比如说,或不被杀害(如果是无辜的),而且我们应该享有言论自由和结社自由。但我们相信这些的依据是什么呢?
In the last chapter, toward the end, we looked at Aristotle's idea of eudaemonia, his notion of a successful life. I said that it was important, in thinking about how we should treat others, to think of each person as having the task of making a success of his or her life. This consideration is particularly important in thinking about political arrangements, and it suggests why any acceptable political system must recognize certain rights. For if each of us is and ought to be engaged in the project of making a successful life, then a government that gets in the way of that project is doing something wrong, and a government that aids us is doing something right. Because a society is a common cooperative project, it must operate fairly, and so any aid a government offers, it must offer on fair terms to everybody; and that presumably means it must do so, in some sense, equally. Starting with these two basic ideas-that each of us has a life to make, and that a fair political system will offer us equal opportunities for making a success of the very different lives we are making-many recent political philosophers have sought to establish what sorts of rights we should have in a just society and what limits on their exercise are reasonable. Some so-called communitarians believe that because you can make a success of a human life only in a community, there are obligations you have to your community that limit your freedom to make your own life. You are not simply free to set goals for yourself and pursue them as long as you respect the rights of others. Rather, you must aim, in making your life, to give to your community the service that is required if it is to be a community within which you and others can make successful lives.
在上一章快结束时,我们探讨了亚里士多德的 "成功人生"(eudaemonia)思想。我说过,在思考我们应该如何对待他人时,重要的是要把每个人都看成是有任务让自己的人生取得成功的人。在思考政治安排时,这种考虑尤为重要,它说明了为什么任何可接受的政治制度都必须承认某些权利。因为,如果我们每个人都在参与并应该参与创造成功人生的计划,那么妨碍这一计划的政府就是在做错事,而帮助我们的政府就是在做正确的事。因为社会是一个共同合作的项目,它必须公平地运作,所以政府提供的任何援助都必须以公平的条件提供给每个人;这大概意味着它必须在某种意义上平等地提供援助。从这两个基本观点出发--我们每个人都有自己的生活,公平的政治制度将为我们提供平等的机会,使我们在迥然不同的生活中取得成功--近代许多政治哲学家试图确定,在一个公正的社会中,我们应该拥有什么样的权利,以及对这些权利的行使施加什么样的限制才是合理的。一些所谓的社群主义者认为,因为你只有在一个社群中才能使你的人生获得成功,所以你对你的社群负有一些义务,这些义务限制了你创造自己人生的自由。只要你尊重他人的权利,你就不能简单地自由地为自己设定目标并追求这些目标。相反,你在创造自己的生活时,必须致力于为你的社区提供必要的服务,只有这样,你的社区才能成为一个让你和其他人都能过上成功生活的社区。
Consider, for example, the question of whether we have obligations to others that are a consequence neither of our having promised to do something nor of their having rights that we must not infringe upon. Many philosophers in the liberal tradition to which Rawls and Nozick belong have held that the government can use force to get us to respect the rights of others, to stop us actively harming them, and to enforce contracts that we have freely entered into. But that would mean that we had few obligations to our parents or to the communities in which we grew up, for we did not freely enter into a contract with our parents or our societies-we were just born into them. No one asked us whether we wanted to be
例如,我们是否对他人负有义务,这既不是我们承诺做某事的结果,也不是我们不得侵犯他人权利的结果。罗尔斯和诺齐克所属的自由主义传统中的许多哲学家都认为,政府可以使用武力让我们尊重他人的权利,阻止我们主动伤害他人,并强制执行我们自由签订的契约。但这意味着我们对父母或我们成长的社区几乎没有义务,因为我们并没有自由地与父母或我们的社会签订契约--我们只是出生在他们之中。没有人问我们是否愿意

born to these parents or into this society because, of course, no one could have asked. But perhaps we owe our parents and our societies something for giving us life and raising us, even though this was not a contract. After all, no one could have a successful human life without parents and a community that raised them. Here, thinking about what is required for eudaemonia can help us decide what the state ought to do: whether, in particular, it should require us to do certain things we do not want to do (such as looking after aging parents or serving in the military) because doing these things is required if our society is to be able to provide a context for all of us to have successful human lives.
当然,没有人会要求我们生在这样的父母身边,生在这样的社会里。但是,也许我们欠我们的父母和社会一些东西,因为他们给予了我们生命,养育了我们,尽管这并不是一种契约。毕竟,没有父母和社会的养育,任何人都不可能拥有成功的人生。在这里,思考 "平等"(eudaemonia)的要求可以帮助我们决定国家应该做什么:尤其是,国家是否应该要求我们做某些我们不想做的事情(比如照顾年迈的父母或服兵役),因为如果我们的社会要能够为我们所有人提供一个成功的人类生活环境,就必须做这些事情。
So ethics, in Aristotle's sense, needs to be part of the background to our thinking about political philosophy.
因此,亚里士多德意义上的伦理学需要成为我们思考政治哲学背景的一部分。

6.17 Conclusion 6.17 结论

In this chapter, I have looked at some questions about the overarching institutions of the state. From the very earliest times, philosophers have asked such questions about the nature and the justification of the institutions of their own societies. We have seen that the question of the justification of political authority was raised naturally by the question What is a state? Hobbes and Rawls and Nozick all agree that there are certain demands that we should make of a state if it is to be justified in its monopoly of coercive power. But Rawls' and Nozick's conditions for a just state are goals to aim at, not conditions that must be met if there is to be a state at all. I shall take up again in the next chapter the question whether any system that meets Hobbes' very minimal demands can be called a "state." Even if we reject his claim that the sovereign may do anything, provided the citizens are better off than they would be in the state of nature, we might still be able to accept his view that a system that meets this condition deserves to be called a "state."
在本章中,我探讨了一些关于国家总体制度的问题。从很早以前开始,哲学家们就提出了关于本国社会制度的性质和正当性的问题。我们看到,政治权威的正当性问题是由 "什么是国家?霍布斯、罗尔斯和诺齐克都同意,如果要证明国家垄断强制权力的正当性,我们就应该对国家提出某些要求。但是,罗尔斯和诺齐克对公正国家的条件是目标,而不是如果要有一个国家就必须满足的条件。我将在下一章再次讨论满足霍布斯最低要求的任何制度能否被称为 "国家 "的问题。即使我们拒绝他的主张,即只要公民比在自然状态下过得更好,主权者就可以做任何事情,我们也许仍然能够接受他的观点,即满足这一条件的制度值得被称为 "国家"。
In the next chapter I will look at an institution within the state, namely, the legal system. With a grasp of the central issues of political philosophy, we can turn now to the philosophy of law.
下一章我将探讨国家内部的一个机构,即法律体系。在掌握了政治哲学的核心问题之后,我们现在可以转向法律哲学。
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CHAPTER 7 第 7 章

Law

What is a law?
什么是法律?
When should we obey the law?
我们何时应该遵守法律?
When is punishment morally justified?
什么时候惩罚在道德上是合理的?

7.1 Introduction 7.1 导言

Governments in many countries and at many times have made laws that are morally repugnant. Many governments, for example, have wanted their citizens to obey laws that were racist, discriminating against some citizens simply on the basis of their supposed "racial" origins. Sometimes-regrettably, not often enough-citizens of these countries have been so outraged by these racist laws that they have sought to have them changed. And when legal means of changing the law have been exhausted, some have chosen to resist their governments by civil disobedience. That is, they have set out to resist these evil laws by deliberate acts of lawbreaking. In civil disobedience lawbreaking is usually undertaken in order to draw attention to the evil law, to express a citizen's repugnance to it, and to create political pressure to get it repealed. Sometimes civil disobedience involves breaking the hated law itself: laws segregating public transport were broken by their opponents, both as an expression of their rejection of racial segregation, and in an attempt to force states and municipalities to change their laws.
许多国家的政府在许多时候都制定了在道德上令人厌恶的法律。例如,许多国家的政府希望本国公民遵守种族主义法律,仅仅因为某些公民的所谓 "种族 "出身而歧视他们。有时,这些国家的公民被这些种族主义法律激怒,要求修改这些法律,但遗憾的是,这种情况并不常见。在用尽法律手段改变法律之后,一些人选择以非暴力反抗的方式来抵制政府。也就是说,他们通过故意违法的行为来抵制这些邪恶的法律。在公民抗命中,违法行为通常是为了引起人们对恶法的关注,表达公民对恶法的反感,并施加政治压力使恶法被废除。有时,公民不服从行为涉及破坏令人憎恶的法律本身:反对者破坏公共交通隔离法,既表达了他们对种族隔离的反对,又试图迫使各州和市政府修改法律。
But there are some evil laws we cannot oppose by breaking those very laws. If, for example, you thought that a law requiring capital punishment for thefts above a certain value (which was common in Europe until quite recently) was evil, there was no obvious way you could break that law. You might have tried to stop the government from executing convicts, but this probably would have been too difficult and too dangerous. Even where you can break the evil law
但是,有些邪恶的法律我们无法通过破坏这些法律来反对。例如,如果你认为一项要求对超过一定价值的偷窃行为处以死刑的法律(直到最近,这种法律在欧洲还很普遍)是邪恶的,那么你就没有明显的办法去破坏这项法律。你可能会试图阻止政府处决罪犯,但这可能太困难、太危险了。即使在可以打破恶法的地方

itself, doing so may not be enough to force the government to change. So civil disobedience often involves breaking laws-for example, laws against blocking highways-that most citizens generally respect and regard as justified.
但这样做本身可能不足以迫使政府做出改变。因此,公民不服从往往涉及违反法律--例如禁止堵塞高速公路的法律--而大多数公民一般都尊重这些法律,并认为它们是合理的。
As we saw in the last chapter, philosophers have sought to justify the existence of the state by arguments that appeal to moral ideas: the ideas, for example, of keeping your word (in Hobbes) or of equality (in Rawls) or of rights (in Nozick). We did not come to a simple conclusion about when the state is justified. But-unless you are an anarchist-you will accept, in the end, that sometimes a government meets the general conditions that entitle it to a monopoly of the justified use of force. So if a government is justified in using force to coerce citizens into meeting their political obligations, then those citizens have a duty to obey the laws it promulgates . . . at least until they have a good countervailing reason not to do so.
正如我们在上一章所看到的,哲学家们试图通过诉诸道德观念的论证来证明国家的存在是合理的:例如,遵守诺言(霍布斯)、平等(罗尔斯)或权利(诺齐克)等观念。我们并没有就国家何时是正当的得出简单的结论。但是--除非你是一个无政府主义者--你最终会接受,有时一个政府满足了使其有权垄断合理使用武力的一般条件。因此,如果政府有理由使用武力胁迫公民履行其政治义务,那么这些公民就有责任遵守政府颁布的法律......至少在他们有了自己的政治立场之前是这样。......至少在他们有充分的反驳理由不这么做之前是这样。
It follows, then, that anyone who undertakes civil disobedience in a society whose government meets the conditions of justification for the exercise of coercive power ought to think carefully about whether his or her actions are justified. For in such a state every citizen gains benefits from the state's existence, and, as Rawls argued, fairness requires that the burdens of a system be shared as well as the benefits.
因此,在一个政府符合行使强制权力的正当性条件的社会中,任何进行公民抗命的人都应该仔细思考他或她的行为是否正当。因为在这样的国家里,每个公民都能从国家的存在中获益,而正如罗尔斯所言,公平要求在分享利益的同时也要分担制度的负担。
Now, in many real cases, it is doubtful that the state meets even minimal conditions of justification. Indeed, a state with many racially discriminatory laws is likely to lose its justification on any view that says, with Rawls and Nozick, that a state must give equal recognition to every citizen's basic political rights. So one answer to the question "When is civil disobedience justified?" is to say that civil disobedience is justified where a government has ceased to be justified, because it fails to meet the minimum conditions for legitimacy. Many people felt that the Nazi government in Germany did not meet those minimum conditions necessary to make its laws morally binding on its citizens. Civil disobedience is justified in such a state because the government lacks overall legitimacy: it has no moral call on the citizen's obedience.
现在,在许多真实的案例中,国家是否符合最起码的正当性条件都值得怀疑。事实上,一个拥有许多种族歧视性法律的国家,如果按照罗尔斯和诺齐克的观点,认为一个国家必须平等承认每个公民的基本政治权利,那么这个国家就很可能失去其正当性。因此,对 "公民抗命何时是正当的?"这个问题的一个回答是,当一个政府不再是正当的,因为它不符合合法性的最低条件时,公民抗命就是正当的。许多人认为,德国纳粹政府没有满足使其法律对公民具有道德约束力所需的最低条件。在这种情况下,公民不服从是合理的,因为政府缺乏整体合法性:它在道德上无法要求公民服从。
We may still, of course, have moral reasons for doing what the regulations enforced in such a state require: the fact that your government lacks legitimacy is no reason to feel free to commit murder.
当然,我们可能仍然有道德理由去做在这种状态下执行的法规所要求的事情:你的政府缺乏合法性这一事实并不是你可以随意杀人的理由。
We may also feel that it is prudent to obey a wicked government, because it carries out its threats. If, however, the government lacks legitimacy, we have no moral duty to obey a law simply because it is the law.
我们也可能认为,服从一个邪恶的政府是明智之举,因为它在执行自己的威胁。但是,如果政府缺乏合法性,我们就没有道德义务仅仅因为它是法律而服从它。
But this is a rather extreme case. Not everybody who believes some particular law is wicked thinks that the whole state that made the law is so morally bankrupt as to have lost all justification. Those Americans who marched in the great civil rights marches of the sixties largely maintained their faith in the rightness of the American Constitution and the legitimacy of the American state. They believed that racially discriminatory laws were not only wrong but inconsistent with what was best in the American political system: many of them thought-rightly, as it turned out-that the government and the courts would eventually act to overturn segregationist laws, provided there was enough continuing political pressure.
但这是一个相当极端的例子。并不是每一个认为某条法律是邪恶的人都认为制定这条法律的整个国家道德沦丧,丧失了一切正当性。那些参加六十年代民权大游行的美国人,基本上都坚信美国宪法的正确性和美国国家的合法性。他们认为,种族歧视的法律不仅是错误的,而且不符合美国政治体制的优点:他们中的许多人认为--事实证明他们的想法是正确的--只要有足够的持续的政治压力,政府和法院最终会采取行动推翻种族隔离的法律。
The civil rights marchers would have disagreed, no doubt, about what it was that made civil disobedience in defiance of racist laws right. But some of them argued that some rules are so bad that they cannot be regarded as laws at all. The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. wrote in his famous "Letter from a Birmingham Jail":
毫无疑问,民权游行者们会对什么才是无视种族主义法律的非暴力反抗行为的正确性产生分歧。但他们中的一些人认为,有些规则是如此糟糕,以至于根本不能被视为法律。牧师小马丁-路德-金博士在其著名的《伯明翰监狱来信》中写道:
One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws.
遵守公正的法律不仅是法律责任,也是道德责任。
Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all."
反之,一个人有道德责任不遵守不公正的法律。我同意圣奥古斯丁的观点,"不公正的法律根本就不是法律"。
A law, on such a view, is a regulation that is legitimately promulgated by a legitimate state. Civil disobedience can be justified, these people claimed, not only when the state lacks overall legitimacybecause it fails to meet certain minimum moral standards-but also where particular rules, proposed as laws, are illegitimate-because they fail to meet certain minimum moral standards. In these cases, they said, it can be proper to practice civil disobedience in order to get the state to acknowledge that these particular rules do not count as laws.
根据这种观点,法律是由合法国家合法颁布的法规。这些人认为,公民不服从不仅在国家缺乏整体合法性(因为它不符合某些最低道德标准)的情况下是合理的,而且在作为法律提出的特定规则不合法(因为它们不符合某些最低道德标准)的情况下也是合理的。他们说,在这种情况下,为了让国家承认这些特定规则不能算作法律,采取公民不服从的做法可能是恰当的。
The view that a rule has to meet certain moral conditions before it can be regarded as a law at all is the central tenet of what have been called "natural law" theories. They are called "natural law" theories because they are associated with the view that valid laws in
一项规则必须满足某些道德条件才能被视为法律,这种观点是所谓 "自然法 "理论的核心信条。它们之所以被称为 "自然法 "理论,是因为它们与以下观点相关联,即在以下情况下,有效的法律才是真正的法律

human societies are justified by their being based on something more fundamental than social customs or human agreements. For natural law theorists valid laws are natural in the sense that they are not man-made. Natural law theorists have usually held, as did St. Thomas Aquinas, the most influential European theologian and philosopher of the Middle Ages, that the contents of natural law, the moral boundaries within which legitimate laws must fall, can be discovered by reason. Laws, Aquinas said, must be ordinances of reason; that is, they must be rules that we can see, by using those capacities for reasoning that all normal human beings have by nature, to be right. Indeed, Aquinas defined a law as "nothing other than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by whatever authority has the community in its care." For Aquinas the contents of natural law were the "laws of nature" that I discussed in connection with Hobbes.
人类社会的合理性在于其所依据的是比社会习俗或人类协议更为根本的东西。对于自然法理论家来说,有效的法律是自然的,因为它们不是人为的。自然法理论家通常与中世纪欧洲最有影响力的神学家和哲学家圣托马斯-阿奎那一样,认为自然法的内容,即合法法律必须遵守的道德界限,可以通过理性发现。阿奎那说,法律必须是理性的法令;也就是说,它们必须是我们通过使用所有正常人天生具有的推理能力就能发现是正确的规则。事实上,阿奎那将法律定义为 "由社会所关心的任何权威所制定的为共同利益服务的理性法令"。对阿奎那来说,自然法的内容就是我在讨论霍布斯时提到的 "自然法则"。
Now, many people who supported the civil rights marches and were even in favor of civil disobedience in order to induce the Congress and the president to enforce the civil rights of AfroAmericans would have rejected a natural law theory. They would have said that some segregationist laws were perfectly valid as laws and that the fact that they were unjust, because they were racist, was an argument for getting them changed, not a reason for denying that they were laws in the first place.
现在,许多支持民权游行,甚至赞成以非暴力反抗的方式促使国会和总统落实非裔美国人的民权的人,都会反对自然法理论。他们会说,一些种族隔离法律作为法律是完全有效的,它们是不公正的,因为它们是种族主义的,这是促使它们改变的论据,而不是否认它们首先是法律的理由。
In arguing thus, these supporters of the civil rights movement were following in the steps of the philosophy of legal positivism. For a positivist, the task of analytic jurisprudence, which is the systematic study of laws and legal institutions, is to discover what the laws of a country are, independently of whether or not they meet moral standards. Generally, the positivists have argued that the laws of a state are those regulations issued by the government and enforced by its monopoly on coercion.
这些民权运动的支持者如此论证,是在追随法律实证主义哲学的脚步。在实证主义者看来,分析法学是对法律和法律制度的系统研究,其任务是发现一个国家的法律是什么,而与这些法律是否符合道德标准无关。一般来说,实证主义者认为,一个国家的法律是由政府颁布并由政府垄断强制力来执行的法规。
The nineteenth-century English legal philosopher John Austin, who was one of the leading figures in the development of legal positivism, defined laws simply as the "commands of the sovereign." Since Austin defined a command as an order accompanied by a threat, any rule that was promulgated by the legitimate government- the sovereign power in a state- and was enforced by the use of the state's monopoly on coercion was a law, however good or bad
十九世纪英国法律哲学家约翰-奥斯汀是法律实证主义发展的领军人物之一,他将法律简单定义为 "主权者的命令"。由于奥斯汀将命令定义为伴随着威胁的命令,因此任何由合法政府--一个国家的主权权力机构--颁布并通过使用国家垄断的强制力来执行的规则都是法律,无论其好坏。

it was. As Austin said in a famous passage from his book The Province of Jurisprudence Determined:
就是这样。正如奥斯汀在其《确定的法理学范畴》一书中的一段著名论述:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it.
法律的存在是一回事,其优劣又是另一回事。是否存在是一个问题,是否符合假定的标准则是另一个问题。实际存在的法律就是法律,尽管我们碰巧不喜欢它。
It might seem that this dispute is simply a matter of definition, and a definition of a word is to be decided by asking how competent speakers of the language use it. But, as we shall see, there may be reasons for preferring one definition-reasons more complex than the fact that it reflects the way the word is ordinarily used.
这种争论似乎只是一个定义问题,而一个词的定义应该由合格的语言使用者如何使用它来决定。但是,正如我们将要看到的那样,我们可能有理由倾向于一种定义--比它反映了该词通常的使用方式这一事实更为复杂的理由。

7.2 Defining "law" I: Positivism and natural law
7.2 "法律 "的定义 I:实证主义与自然法

Nevertheless, we must still start by trying to find a definition that accurately reflects the way the word is used. So let us ask how we do in fact decide whether a rule is a law. Like many philosophical questions, this question seems very difficult in theory, even though we appear to know how to answer it in practical cases. We all think we can recognize the laws of our own society with no difficulty. Yet, presented with an imagined society very different from ours, we may be unclear whether we want to call something a law or not.
尽管如此,我们仍然必须首先设法找到一个能够准确反映该词使用方式的定义。因此,让我们问一问,我们实际上是如何决定一条规则是否是法律的。与许多哲学问题一样,这个问题在理论上似乎非常困难,尽管我们似乎知道如何在实际案例中回答这个问题。我们都认为,我们可以毫不费力地识别我们自己社会的法律。然而,当我们面对一个与我们的社会截然不同的假想社会时,我们可能会不清楚我们是否要把某些东西称为法律。
Consider, for example, the following case, suggested by R. A. Duff in his book Trials and Punishments:
例如,考虑一下 R. A. Duff 在其《审判与惩罚》一书中提出的以下案例:
The Oligarch family seized power in Doulia twenty years ago: they have consolidated their power over the unwilling but terrified populace with the help of the well-paid thugs who make up the "army" and the "police"; and they now enforce a system of. . . . rules whose sole aim is, they openly admit, to further their own interests.
二十年前,寡头家族夺取了杜利亚的政权:他们在组成 "军队 "和 "警察 "的高薪打手的帮助下,巩固了对不情愿但又惊恐万分的民众的权力;他们现在执行的是一套.......规则,而他们公开承认,这些规则的唯一目的就是谋取他们自己的利益。
It seems to me that we would not want to call these rules "laws," even if the threats the Oligarchs made were carried out by "courts." And, given the discussion of the previous chapter, we can say why.
在我看来,即使寡头们的威胁是由 "法院 "来执行的,我们也不想把这些规则称为 "法律"。鉴于上一章的讨论,我们可以说出原因。
The reason is that there are certainly some minimum moral standards that anyone must meet if the rules he or she issues are to be regarded as laws. For there are some minimal standards that people
原因在于,如果要将任何人发布的规则视为法律,那么他或她就必须达到一些最低的道德标准。因为人们

must meet if they are to be regarded as forming a government at all. As we saw in our discussion of the idea of the state, the bare power to enforce your wishes, without any right to do so, does not make you a legitimate government; certainly, the bare power to enforce its wishes does not distinguish government from successful banditry.
如果他们要被视为组成了一个政府,就必须满足这些条件。正如我们在讨论国家的概念时所看到的,光有执行自己意愿的权力,而没有任何这样做的权利,并不能使你成为一个合法的政府;当然,光有执行自己意愿的权力,也不能将政府与成功的强盗行为区分开来。
But positivists can still say that even conceding that moral questions are involved in deciding who has the authority to govern, once we have identified the government, any rules they promulgate, however morally repugnant, are still laws.
但实证主义者仍然可以说,即使承认在决定谁有权治理国家时涉及道德问题,一旦我们确定了政府,他们颁布的任何规则,无论在道德上多么令人厌恶,仍然是法律。
It is important that this is a concession. For it means that in deciding whether some rule is a law, we must rely on at least some moral claims, namely, the claims that are needed in order to distinguish between power, which is a purely factual question, and authority, which is an evaluative one.
重要的是,这是一种让步。因为这意味着,在决定某些规则是否是法律时,我们至少必须依赖于一些道德主张,即区分权力(这是一个纯粹的事实问题)和权威(这是一个评价问题)所需的主张。
Of course, if we accept the positivist's concession, we do not have to go so far as the natural law theorists. For once it is clear that a government does not lack overall legitimacy, we certainly call some of the rules it promulgates and enforces "laws," even if they are quite evil. Even those of us who think that the laws of slavery were morally appalling still recognize that they were laws. Like Austin, we can say that "the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit another."
当然,如果我们接受实证主义者的让步,就不必像自然法理论家那样走得那么远。因为一旦明确一个政府并不缺乏整体合法性,我们当然会把它颁布和执行的一些规则称为 "法律",即使这些规则是相当邪恶的。即使是那些认为奴隶制法律在道德上骇人听闻的人,也仍然承认它们是法律。与奥斯汀一样,我们可以说 "法律的存在是一回事,其优劣则是另一回事"。
How, then, could the Oligarchs change their way of controlling Doulia in order to make themselves a legitimate government, so that their rules might become valid laws? If Hobbes was right, the minimum they need to do is to succeed in ensuring that their citizens are better off than they would be in a state of nature. But it seems pretty clear that this would not be enough. Even in the case as I originally described it, the Oligarchs might truly claim that the citizens were better off than without any government at all. There is no reason to think that the interests of the Oligarchs conflict with guaranteeing some degree of good order: an ordered citizenry is easier to keep under control. All they require, perhaps, is that everybody should give a few days of unpaid service in the Doulian gold mines each year. So their "police" might enforce rules against murder, just to ensure the supply of orderly labor.
那么,寡头们如何改变他们控制杜利亚的方式,使自己成为合法政府,从而使他们的规则成为有效的法律呢?如果霍布斯是对的,那么他们最起码需要做的就是成功地确保他们的公民比在自然状态下过得更好。但似乎很明显,这还不够。即使在我最初描述的情况下,寡头们也可能真的声称,公民的生活比没有任何政府的情况下都要好。我们没有理由认为寡头集团的利益与保证一定程度的良好秩序相冲突:有秩序的公民更容易受到控制。他们所要求的,也许只是每个人每年都要在杜廉金矿无偿服务几天。因此,他们的 "警察 "可能会执行禁止谋杀的规定,以确保有序的劳动力供应。
Even if the Oligarchs met Hobbes' condition, then, they could still be in no position to claim that their orders were laws. But it is also true that we would probably not say that what the Oligarchs
那么,即使寡头政治满足了霍布斯的条件,他们仍然无法声称自己的命令就是法律。但是,我们可能也不会说寡头们的

were running was a state. Now we can see that Hobbes' minimum conditions for being a state are too undemanding.
这就是一个国家。现在我们可以看到,霍布斯提出的成为国家的最低条件过于宽松。
So what else would they have to do? One answer to this question is provided by Aquinas, in the passage I cited earlier: he said, you will recall, that a law was "nothing other than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by whatever authority has the community in its care." The key thing that is lacking in the case of the Oligarchs is any concern for the common good. Their rules are intended entirely for their own convenience. Even their enforcement of good order is intended only to make their own lives easier. They do not even pretend that their rules are made "for the common good."
那么,他们还需要做什么呢?阿奎那在我前面引用的那段话中给出了一个答案:你应该记得,他曾说过,法律 "无非是为共同利益而制定的理性法令,由任何关心社会的权威制定"。寡头们所缺乏的关键是对共同利益的关注。他们的规则完全是为了自己的方便。甚至他们对良好秩序的执行也只是为了让自己的生活更轻松。他们甚至不假装他们的规则是 "为了共同利益 "而制定的。
Our definition of the state, then, must require not only that a legitimate government should have the power to enforce its rules but also that its authority to do so should derive from the fact that at least some of its regulations aim at the common good.
因此,我们对国家的定义必须不仅要求合法政府应有权执行其规则,还要求其执行规则的权力应来自于这样一个事实,即其至少有一些规定是以共同利益为目标的。
We do not require, however, that the laws the Oligarchs make should actually succeed in promoting the common good. Perhaps the Oligarchs believe, wrongly, that the gods will bring misfortune on Doulia if they allow people to sing on Wednesdays. A rule against singing on Wednesdays will not promote the general good. All it will do is to deprive people of the pleasure of song one day a week. Perhaps the Oligarchs are so incompetent that almost every rule they make fails to contribute to the common good. Still, if they genuinely believed their rules were for the common good, we might call their rules "laws."
然而,我们并不要求寡头们制定的法律能够真正促进共同利益。也许寡头们错误地认为,如果允许人们在周三唱歌,诸神就会给杜利亚带来不幸。禁止在周三唱歌的规定不会促进普遍利益。它只会剥夺人们每周一天唱歌的乐趣。也许寡头们太无能了,以至于他们制定的几乎每一条规则都无法促进共同利益。不过,如果他们真的相信他们的规则是为了共同利益,我们还是可以称他们的规则为 "法律"。
If we do not require that the Oligarchs' rules should succeed in promoting the common good, neither do we require that the only aim that they pursue with the power of the state should be the common good. There are many states with systems of law that are strongly biased in favor of one sectional interest; there are some, though fewer, where this is acknowledged to be so. But provided at least a significant part of what the Oligarchs do is aimed at the common good, we can say that Doulia is a state and they are its legitimate government.
如果我们不要求寡头统治者的规则成功地促进共同利益,我们也不要求他们利用国家权力追求的唯一目标是共同利益。有许多国家的法律体系严重偏向于某一部门的利益;还有一些国家,尽管数量较少,但也承认存在这种情况。但只要寡头所做的事情至少有很大一部分是为了公共利益,我们就可以说杜利亚是一个国家,他们是这个国家的合法政府。
Of course, they are not a very good government. And Rawls and Nozick would both insist that we can make moral demands of them beyond simply doing the minimum to ensure legitimacy. But it seems that now they not only have the power to control the citizens
当然,它们并不是一个很好的政府。罗尔斯和诺齐克都坚持认为,我们可以对他们提出道德要求,而不仅仅是做最起码的事来确保合法性。但现在看来,他们不仅有权控制公民

of Doulia, but also meet enough conditions to be recognized as the political authority there.
但也要满足足够的条件,才能被承认为杜利亚的政治当局。
We might suggest, then, with this understanding of "legitimacy":
因此,我们可以说,有了对 "合法性 "的这种理解:
Laws are rules, backed by the threat of force, promulgated by a legitimate government to regulate the behavior of people subject to its authority.
法律是以武力威胁为后盾的规则,由合法政府颁布,以规范受其权威约束的人们的行为。
What this means is that all that is morally required to turn a system of rules into a legal system is that it should be enforced by people who both have the power to enforce them and seek to exercise that power, at least sometimes, for the common good. But there are compelling reasons for thinking this is too simple an answer.
这意味着,从道义上讲,将一个规则体系转化为法律体系所需的一切条件是,它应当由那些既有权力执行这些规则,又寻求行使这种权力(至少有时是为了共同利益)的人来执行。但是,我们有令人信服的理由认为这个答案过于简单。
Suppose that the Oligarchs, recognizing and regretting that they are not legitimate, want to take the first steps in the direction of legitimacy. They announce some rules that they claim are aimed at the common good: murder is proscribed, theft is banned, and forced labor is to be replaced with taxes. From time to time they announce more such rules, and they say what the penalties will be for breaking them. When people are found to be disobeying these rules and the Oligarchs hear of it, they have them locked up or beaten, usually exacting the penalties that they originally threatened.
假设寡头们认识到自己并不合法,并对此感到遗憾,他们希望朝着合法化的方向迈出第一步。他们宣布了一些他们声称是为了共同利益的规则:禁止谋杀,禁止偷窃,用税收取代强迫劳动。他们不时宣布更多这样的规则,并说明违反这些规则的惩罚措施。一旦发现有人违反这些规定,而寡头们又听说了,他们就会把这些人关起来或痛打一顿,通常会实施他们最初威胁要实施的惩罚。
But these rules are not systematically enforced, and there is no system for investigating when the rules have been broken, no way of objecting that a punishment is not the one that they announced, and no procedure for trying to persuade them that you did not commit the offense they are punishing you for. Furthermore, some of the rules are inconsistent with each other, and the Oligarchs are inclined to punish someone who breaks one rule in order to keep another. Doulia might still be a state, but these rules would not be laws.
但是,这些规则并没有得到系统地执行,也没有系统来调查规则是否被违反,没有办法对他们宣布的惩罚提出异议,也没有程序来试图说服他们你并没有犯他们要惩罚你的罪行。此外,有些规则之间并不一致,寡头们倾向于惩罚一个违反规则的人,以维持另一个规则。杜利亚可能仍然是一个国家,但这些规则不会成为法律。
The reason is that laws have to be part of a legal system, and to be a system of laws a set of rules has to be both
原因在于,法律必须是法律体系的一部分,而要成为法律体系,一套规则必须同时具备以下条件
a) systematically organized and
a) 系统地组织和
b) systematically enforced.
b) 系统地执行。
The unsystematic character of the Doulian system shows that my first attempt at a definition of law needs to be modified to take unto account the systematic character of law.
杜林体系的非系统性特征表明,我对法律定义的首次尝试需要加以修改,以考虑到法律的系统性特征。
But my definition is inadequate for another reason. When we think of laws, we very generally think first of criminal laws. In the legal systems with which we are familiar, however, there are many other sorts of laws, some of which are not backed with threats at all. There are two very important kinds of such laws.
但是,由于另一个原因,我的定义是不充分的。提到法律,我们一般首先想到的是刑法。然而,在我们所熟悉的法律体系中,还有许多其他类型的法律,其中有些法律根本不以威胁为后盾。其中有两种非常重要的法律。
First of all, there are laws such as the laws governing the writing of wills. These laws-which I shall call "constitutive" laws-allow people to do things (in this case, make a will), but they do not punish anyone who does not choose to take advantage of them. There is no penalty for not writing a will. Of course, if you do not write a will, the state will take it upon itself to allocate your property when you die. But this is not a punishment (and it is certainly not a threat of force against a dead person!), simply an activity that is required because the property of a dead person must belong to somebody. Once you do write a will, and provided it is properly drafted, the state will recognize it; and if anybody tries to take away the property you have left to your children, they will be punished by the criminal laws against theft. But the regulations about the making of wills govern only people who choose to be governed by them.
首先,有一些法律,比如关于立遗嘱的法律。这些法律--我称之为 "构成性 "法律--允许人们做事(这里指的是立遗嘱),但不会惩罚任何不选择利用这些法律的人。不写遗嘱不会受到惩罚。当然,如果你不立遗嘱,国家会在你死后自行分配你的财产。但这并不是一种惩罚(当然也不是对死人的武力威胁!),只是因为死人的财产必须归属于某人而必须进行的一项活动。一旦你写了遗嘱,只要起草得当,国家就会承认;如果有人试图夺走你留给子女的财产,他们将受到反盗窃刑法的惩罚。但是,有关立遗嘱的规定只适用于选择受其约束的人。
Laws that govern wills allow citizens to enter into legally defined relationships-they constitute those relationships. In essence, they allow people to use the state to help regulate their relations with each other. Many areas of civil law, such as the laws of marriage and contract, are in this respect like the regulations that tell you how you must draft a will.
规范遗嘱的法律允许公民缔结法律界定的关系--它们构成了这些关系。从本质上讲,它们允许人们利用国家来帮助调节他们之间的关系。民法的许多领域,如婚姻法和合同法,在这方面就像告诉你必须如何起草遗嘱的法规一样。
Notice that even though we do not have to make wills or contracts or marriages, if we do, we place legal obligations on ourselves and on others, and those obligations may be enforced by threats. Nevertheless, the laws that tell you how to get married, or make a will or a contract, differ importantly from criminal laws, because they largely govern the behavior of people who have chosen to accept certain legal responsibilities - the executor of a will, the married couple, the parties to a contract-and are not binding on citizens who do not choose to accept them.
请注意,尽管我们不必立遗嘱、签订合同或结婚,但如果我们这样做了,我们就对自己和他人承担了法律义务,而且这些义务可以通过威胁来强制执行。然而,告诉你如何结婚、如何立遗嘱或签订合同的法律与刑事法律有很大不同,因为它们在很大程度上是对选择接受某些法律责任的人--遗嘱执行人、已婚夫妇、合同当事人--的行为的约束,而对不选择接受这些责任的公民没有约束力。
The second class of rules that are not backed by force either are the
第二类也没有武力支持的规则是

laws that determine how certain legal institutions should operate. There are many such laws-one class, for example, says which courts should deal with which sorts of problems. These are laws governing jurisdiction. If a state judge tries a case that should really be decided under federal law, he or she will not be punished. Rather, a higher court will simply set the judgment aside. The rules about how judges should try cases are certainly laws, but they are not all backed by threat of force. (Of course, some laws governing the behavior of judges-those against taking bribes, for example - are backed by the state's coercive power.) Let us call laws that regulate how courts should act, but that are not backed by threat of force, "institutional" laws.
决定某些法律机构应如何运作的法律。此类法律有很多--例如,规定哪些法院应处理哪些类型的问题。这些都是关于管辖权的法律。如果州法官审理了本应由联邦法律裁决的案件,他或她不会受到惩罚。相反,上级法院只会将判决搁置一旁。关于法官如何审理案件的规则当然是法律,但它们并不都以武力威胁为后盾。(当然,有些规范法官行为的法律--例如禁止受贿的法律--是以国家强制力为后盾的)。我们姑且把规范法院行为但不以武力威胁为后盾的法律称为 "制度性 "法律。
The English philosopher H.L.A. Hart, one of the modern defenders of legal positivism, has developed a theory of the kinds of structure we require in a system of rules if they are to be properly regarded as laws. That theory both recognizes the systematic character of the legal system and allows for the existence of constitutive and institutional laws.
英国哲学家哈特(H.L.A. Hart)是现代法律实证主义的捍卫者之一,他提出了一套理论,说明如果要将规则正确地视为法律,我们需要在规则体系中建立何种结构。该理论既承认法律体系的系统性,又允许存在构成性法律和制度性法律。
Hart begins by asking us to imagine a society very like Mbuti society. There are many rules that govern Mbuti life, rules that are recognized and largely obeyed by most Mbuti people. But there are no officially organized sanctions for breaches of these rules. People who disobey them regularly will be criticized and, perhaps, in the end, ostracized. But there are no judges, no police officers, no courts. These basic rules-rules that are necessary if people are to live together in a society at all-Hart calls "primary rules." They say what a member of the society may or may not do. Typically, there will be primary rules against taking other people's property, against using unnecessary violence in disputes, and against breaking one's freely made promises. Primary rules include more than the precepts of morality: for example, morality does not determine exactly how property should be transferred between generations. But many of the primary rules will be moral rules: rules against murder and lying, for example. According to Hart, this minimum structure of primary rules captures the truth in natural law theories; any group of people that failed to recognize even these basic rules would hardly constitute a society at all.
哈特首先让我们想象一个与姆布提社会非常相似的社会。管理姆布提生活的规则有很多,这些规则得到了大多数姆布提人的认可和遵守。但是,对于违反这些规则的行为,却没有官方组织的制裁措施。经常违反这些规则的人会受到批评,也许最终会被排斥。但这里没有法官,没有警察,也没有法庭。这些基本规则--人们在社会中共同生活所必需的规则--被哈特称为 "基本规则"。它们规定社会成员可以做什么,不可以做什么。通常情况下,基本规则包括不得侵占他人财产、不得在争执中使用不必要的暴力、不得违背自由许下的诺言。主要规则不仅仅包括道德戒律:例如,道德并不决定财产在代际之间如何转移。但许多基本规则都是道德规则:例如,禁止谋杀和说谎的规则。哈特认为,这种最低限度的基本规则结构体现了自然法理论的真理;任何群体如果连这些基本规则都不承认,就根本不可能构成一个社会。
Primary rules are not enforced by officials; as in the case of the Mbuti, there may be no state to enforce them. And, in a society with only primary rules, there is plainly no legal system.
初级规则不是由官员执行的;就姆布提人而言,可能没有国家来执行这些规则。而且,在一个只有初级规则的社会中,显然不存在法律制度。
Now, the Doulians certainly have more than primary rules, because they do have some officials-what they call "police officers," for example. But, as we have seen, they still do not have a legal system. Hart argues that what we need to add to the system of primary rules in order to create a legal system is not merely a set of sanctions enforced by officials-otherwise the Doulian system would be a system of law—but a number of other kinds of rules. These other rules he calls secondary rules.
现在,杜里安人当然不止有初级规则,因为他们确实有一些官员--比如他们称之为 "警官 "的人。但是,正如我们所看到的,他们仍然没有法律体系。哈特认为,要建立一个法律体系,我们需要在主要规则体系之外添加的,不仅仅是一套由官员执行的制裁措施--否则杜里安体系就会是一个法律体系--而是一些其他类型的规则。他把这些其他规则称为次要规则。
Secondary rules, Hart says, "are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to" primary rules.
哈特说,次要规则 "在某种意义上寄生于 "主要规则或次要规则。
For they provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in other ways determine their incidence or control their operations.
因为它们规定,人类可以通过做某些事或说某些话,引入新的主要规则,废除或修改旧的规则,或以其他方式决定其发生或控制其运行。
Hart sees secondary rules as introduced to meet a number of deficiencies in the system of purely primary rules that the Mbuti have-deficiencies that would need to be remedied if the Mbuti were to move from a society organized in small groups to the larger scale of society in which almost all human beings now live.
哈特认为次要规则的引入是为了弥补姆布蒂人纯粹的主要规则体系中的一些缺陷--如果姆布蒂人要从一个小群体组织的社会转变为现在几乎所有人类都生活在其中的更大规模的社会,就需要弥补这些缺陷。
The first deficiency that Hart identifies is that a system of primary rules is uncertain. What he means by this can be made clear enough in the Mbuti case. A system of primary rules has two kinds of uncertainty. One kind of uncertainty arises when it is not clear, on the basis of the evidence available, which of two rules actually applies in a given case.
哈特指出的第一个缺陷是主要规则体系不确定。在姆布提案例中,他的意思已经很清楚了。主要规则体系有两种不确定性。一种不确定性是,根据现有证据,不清楚两条规则中哪一条实际适用于某一案件。
Suppose, for example, that the Mbuti held that a man's bow and arrows should be inherited by the son who is the best hunter. And suppose they also held that a person could give away (or sell) his own bow and arrows. Then when a man died, it would not always be clear whom his bow and arrows should go to.
例如,假设姆布提族人认为,一个人的弓箭应该由最会打猎的儿子继承。又假设他们还认为,一个人可以赠送(或出售)自己的弓箭。那么当一个人死后,他的弓箭应该归谁就不一定了。
Now suppose that in some particular case everybody knew that the best hunter in a certain family was the eldest son. If one of the younger sons claimed that he had been given the bow and arrows before his father died, then this younger son could claim that the rule
现在,假设在某种特殊情况下,大家都知道某个家庭中最好的猎手是长子。如果其中一个小儿子声称,他在父亲去世前就得到了弓箭,那么这个小儿子就可以声称,这条规则

of inheritance need not be invoked. For, at the moment of death, the bow and arrows no longer belonged to the father. There would now be a dispute between the two sons about who owned the bow, and there would be no mechanism for deciding who should get it.
因为在死亡的那一刻,弓和箭就不再属于父亲了。因为,在父亲去世的那一刻,弓和箭就不再属于父亲了。现在,两个儿子之间会就弓箭归谁所有发生争执,而且也没有任何机制来决定弓箭归谁所有。
But systems of primary rules are open to another sort of uncertainty, an uncertainty of an even more troubling kind. For in a system of primary rules, even if the facts are agreed, there is no way of deciding, in a disputed case, what rules actually apply.
但是,主要规则体系也有另一种不确定性,一种更令人担忧的不确定性。因为在主要规则体系中,即使事实是一致的,在有争议的案件中,也无法决定究竟适用什么规则。
For example, if the eldest son claimed that there was a rule that said that a father could not give his bow and arrows away on his deathbed - that it was wrong, by Mbuti custom, to do so-there would be no way of checking to see whether this was, in fact, a rule of their society. There would also be nobody who could decide definitively whether the oldest son was right and then enforce that decision.
例如,如果长子声称有一条规定,父亲在临终前不能把弓箭送给别人--按照姆布提的习俗,这样做是不对的--那么就没有办法核实这是否真的是他们社会的一条规定。此外,也没有人能够确定长子的做法是否正确,并执行这一决定。
The first kind of secondary rule, therefore, that Hart argues a legal system must have is what he calls a "rule of recognition." A rule of recognition is a rule that tells us how the question whether a rule is a law in our society is to be decided. In the United States, for example, as in all modern societies, there is a highly complex set of rules of recognition. The rules of recognition of the United States say, very roughly, that a rule is a federal law if it is either
因此,哈特认为法律体系必须具备的第一种次要规则就是他所说的 "承认规则"。承认规则是一种告诉我们如何决定一项规则在我们的社会中是否是法律的规则。以美国为例,与所有现代社会一样,美国有一套非常复杂的承认规则。美国的承认规则大致是这样规定的:如果一项规则符合以下任一条件,那么它就是联邦法律
a) a constitutional provision or
a) 宪法规定或
b) a law created by the constitutionally defined process of lawmaking, or
b) 根据宪法规定的立法程序制定的法律,或
c) a rule that was established by the courts in the common law tradition that grows out of the legal tradition that predated the Constitution and which has not been explicitly cancelled or superseded by rules made under the Constitution.
c) 法院根据普通法传统制定的规则,该传统源于《宪法》之前的法律传统,且未被根据《宪法》制定的规则明确取消或取代。
Similar considerations determine whether a rule is a law in the states. It also tells us which laws are to be applied in cases where there is conflict; in some matters, federal laws take precedence, and in others, state laws do.
类似的考虑决定了一项规则在各州是否是法律。它还告诉我们在发生冲突时应适用哪些法律;在某些问题上,联邦法律优先,而在另一些问题上,州法律优先。
The rules of recognition of a society, even of a modern industrial society, do not need to be written; British judges do not rely on a written document telling them to apply laws made by the British
一个社会,甚至是一个现代工业社会的认可规则并不需要成文;英国法官并不依赖于书面文件,告诉他们适用英国制定的法律。

parliament and signed by the queen. The role of the rules of recognition in the British system depends on the fact that judges have learned, in the course of their education and their practice as lawyers, how the legal system decides whether a rule is a valid rule of law.
议会通过并由女王签署。承认规则在英国制度中的作用取决于法官在接受教育和律师执业过程中了解到法律制度是如何决定一项规则是否是有效的法律规则的。
But rules of recognition are not the only secondary rules that are needed to turn a collection of primary rules into a legal system. A second class of secondary rules is needed to remedy a second defect of the Mbuti system, namely, that there is no way for the Mbuti to change their rules explicitly. Rules of this kind-"rules of change," Hart calls them-are embodied in the American Constitution in the sections setting out the powers of the president, the legislature, and the judiciary. Once more the position is complex and can only be very roughly described in a brief compass: but one rule of change says, roughly, that if a rule has
但是,要将一系列主要规则转化为法律制度,所需的次要规则并非只有承认规则。还需要第二类次要规则来弥补姆布提制度的第二个缺陷,即姆布提人无法明确改变他们的规则。这种规则--哈特称之为 "变更规则"--体现在美国宪法中规定总统、立法机构和司法机构权力的章节中。此外,这一立场也很复杂,只能用简短的罗盘非常粗略地描述。
a) been through the procedures necessary to be passed by the legislature, and
a) 经过必要的程序,获得立法机构的通过,并且
b) been signed by the president (or returned to the legislature and passed by a majority sufficient to override a presidential veto),
b) 总统签署(或交回立法机构并以足以推翻总统否决的多数票通过)、
it will be recognized by the courts, provided it is not in conflict with the Constitution. If, in interpreting these laws, the courts declare that certain rules follow either from the statutes explicitly passed by the Congress or from the Constitution itself, then
只要不与《宪法》相抵触,法院将予以承认。如果法院在解释这些法律时,宣布某些规则来自国会明确通过的法规或宪法本身,那么
c) those rules become incorporated in the law also.
c) 这些规则也纳入法律。
Finally, Hart argues, there is one other deficiency in the system of primary rules exemplified in Mbuti society: it is highly inefficient. When there is a dispute about whether a rule applies, there is no settled procedure for determining the issue; and even if it is clear which rule applies, there is no one who is given the job of stopping offenders or punishing them.
最后,哈特认为,姆布提社会的主要规则体系还有一个缺陷:效率极低。当对某项规则是否适用存在争议时,没有一个确定的程序来决定这个问题;即使明确了哪项规则适用,也没有人负责制止或惩罚违法者。
The addition of rules of recognition and rules of change would not, by themselves, remedy this deficiency. The reason is obvious enough. I have already talked of which rules courts recognize;
增加承认规则和更改规则本身并不能弥补这一缺陷。原因显而易见。我已经谈到了法院承认哪些规则;

obviously, what is needed to gain the advantages of the other secondary rules is a set of rules that create something like courts. These rules should determine which individuals have the task of deciding, in which cases, which rules apply. This third sort of secondary rule Hart calls a "rule of adjudication."
显然,要想获得其他次要规则的优势,需要有一套规则来创建类似法院的东西。这些规则应决定哪些人有任务决定在哪些情况下适用哪些规则。哈特将第三种次要规则称为 "裁决规则"。
In most societies it will also be thought necessary to assign to somebody the task of enforcing the decisions in those cases, since there is an obvious advantage in having officials - such as bailiffs, police officers, and prison guards-who make sure both that the decisions of the courts are carried out and that those who ignore the rules are punished. But Hart says that these further officials are not essential to the existence of a legal system. In a small-scale society it might simply be that once the courts had decided that someone was to be punished, anybody could punish them. What is required for a legal system is only that there be officials charged — by the rules of adjudication — with determining what the rules are, and a relatively clear set of principles - the rules of recognition and change-by which they make those decisions.
在大多数社会中,人们还认为有必要指派专人负责执行这些案件中的判决,因为由法警、警察和狱警等官员来确保法院判决得到执行,并确保那些无视规则的人受到惩罚,显然是有好处的。但哈特说,这些官员并不是法律制度存在的必要条件。在一个小规模的社会中,法院一旦决定惩罚某人,任何人都可以惩罚他。一个法律体系所需要的,仅仅是有一些官员--根据裁决规则--负责确定规则是什么,以及一套相对明确的原则--他们据以做出这些决定的承认和变更规则。
If you believe that the element of coercion by the government is central to the idea of law, then you will want to add to Hart's claims the thesis that the rules the courts decide are applicable should be enforced by the government, through its agents. And so you might want to add a fourth kind of rule-"rules of enforcement," I'll call them - that creates a class of officials who have the responsibility of punishing offenders and enforcing the judgments of the courts. But you can still agree with Hart's basic definition of a legal system as "the union of primary and secondary rules."
如果你认为政府的强制因素是法律观念的核心,那么你就会想在哈特的主张中加入这样的论点,即法院决定适用的规则应由政府通过其代理人来执行。因此,你可能想要增加第四种规则--我称之为 "执行规则"--即设立一类官员,负责惩罚违法者和执行法院判决。但你仍然可以同意哈特关于法律体系的基本定义,即 "主要规则和次要规则的结合"。
In line with Hart's proposals, then, we can thus modify my original definition of laws:
因此,根据哈特的建议,我们可以修改我最初对法律的定义:
Institutional laws, governing the way courts should operate, are secondary rules of adjudication; constitutive laws, such as the laws governing the creation of wills, are, in effect, part of the system of rules
规范法院运作方式的制度性法律是次要的裁决规则;构成性法律,如规范遗嘱设立的法律,实际上是规则体系的一部分。

of change. For such laws allow people to create rules-my property should go to my designated heirs- that will then be applied by the courts.
的变化。因为此类法律允许人们制定规则--我的财产应归我指定的继承人--然后由法院来执行。
If the Doulians were to change their system in such a way as to create rules of recognition, change, adjudication, and enforcement, and if these rules were actually operative in Doulia, then many people would surely say that Doulia had — at last! — achieved a legal system. Once there was such a system, generally directed to the common good, they would say, with Austin, that even a bad law that was not aimed at the common good was nevertheless a valid law of the Doulian legal system. But this would not mean that they had agreed entirely with the positivist tradition, for this second definition makes it a condition of being a legitimate government (and thus a condition of being a source of valid law) that you should have instituted a system of rules aimed at the common good.
如果杜利亚人以这样一种方式改变他们的制度,创造出承认、变更、裁决和执行的规则,而且如果这些规则在杜利亚实际运作,那么许多人肯定会说,杜利亚--终于--实现了法律制度!- 法律制度。一旦有了这样一个普遍以公共利益为目标的体系,他们就会和奥斯汀一样说,即使是不以公共利益为目标的恶法,也是杜利亚法律体系中的有效法律。但这并不意味着他们完全同意实证主义的传统,因为第二个定义把建立一个以共同利益为目标的规则体系作为成为合法政府的一个条件(因而也是成为有效法律来源的一个条件)。
This second definition is much closer to the natural law position than is Hart's, because it requires that the system of laws be enforced by a legitimate government; it implies some moral constraints on the content of a legal system because a legitimate government must aim to promote the common good. But some philosophers have argued that this is not the only way in which moral ideals play a part in determining what sorts of rules and procedures can be recognized as part of legal systems. They have argued, following the natural law tradition, that there are certain moral constraints, internal to the idea of law, that mean that the rules and procedures of a legal system must answer to certain moral ideals. So I propose now to examine this claim in the case of one particular kind of procedure, namely, the institution of criminal punishment. If, as I have suggested, any legal system must have rules of enforcement, then any moral ideals that constrain punishment are part of the concept of law.
第二个定义比哈特的定义更接近自然法的立场,因为它要求法律体系由合法政府执行;它意味着对法律体系内容的一些道德约束,因为合法政府必须以促进共同利益为目标。但一些哲学家认为,这并不是道德理想在决定何种规则和程序可被认可为法律体系一部分的唯一方式。他们秉承自然法的传统,认为法律思想中存在某些内在的道德约束,这意味着法律体系的规则和程序必须符合某些道德理想。因此,我现在提议就一种特殊的程序,即刑事处罚制度,来研究这一主张。如果如我所言,任何法律制度都必须有执行规则,那么任何约束惩罚的道德理想都是法律概念的一部分。

7.5 Punishment: The problem
7.5 惩罚:问题

Before we take up these questions, however, it will help to say a little more about why the nature and justification of punishment is so central a question in the philosophy of law. We can begin, once more, with an attempt at a rough definition of how the term is used. We call "punishment" the infliction of penalties on offenders, by
不过,在讨论这些问题之前,我们不妨先了解一下为什么惩罚的性质和正当性会成为法哲学的一个核心问题。首先,我们可以再一次尝试对这一术语的用法下一个粗略的定义。我们称 "惩罚 "为通过以下方式对罪犯施加惩罚

people in authority over them, for offenses they have committed. This rough definition will cover both the punishment of children by parents and teachers and the punishment of criminals by courts. In each case there is a class of people who are entitled to punish-those in charge of children, courts-and they inflict a penalty of some kind because of an offense the offender has committed. Inflicting a penalty involves doing something to someone that they have a right not to have done to them for no reason. We may not spank children just for the fun of it; we may not lock people up or take their money (as a "fine") without offering an explanation of why the normal moral rule against doing so does not apply in this case.
是指那些对他们有权威的人对他们所犯的罪行进行的惩罚。这个粗略的定义既包括父母和教师对儿童的惩罚,也包括法院对罪犯的惩罚。在每种情况下,都有一类人有权受到惩罚--负责儿童的人和法院--他们因罪犯所犯的罪行而施加某种惩罚。施加惩罚是指无缘无故地对某人做了他有权不做的事。我们不能为了好玩而打孩子的屁股;我们不能把人关起来或拿走他们的钱(作为 "罚款")而不解释为什么禁止这样做的正常道德规则不适用于这种情况。
So what makes criminal punishment cry out for justification is the fact that it involves inflicting on people either some suffering or the deprivation of some liberty (or-in the extreme case-of life), and that each of these is, in itself, is something we should normally avoid. When Jeremy Bentham, one of the founding utilitarians and a great nineteenth-century British philosopher and social reformer, said that all punishment in itself was evil, that was what he meant.
因此,刑事处罚之所以需要辩解,是因为它涉及到给人们带来一些痛苦或剥夺一些自由(或在极端情况下剥夺生命),而这两者本身都是我们通常应该避免的。功利主义创始人之一、十九世纪英国伟大的哲学家和社会改革家杰里米-边沁(Jeremy Bentham)说,所有惩罚本身都是邪恶的,这就是他的意思。
He did not mean that all punishment was wrong. Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, Bentham developed in great detail one of the main philosophical accounts of how the infliction of punishment could be justified. But one of the major reasons why we ought to be concerned about the morality of punishment is that it does involve using the coercive apparatus of the state to treat people in ways that would be quite wrong without justification.
他并不是说所有的惩罚都是错误的。事实上,正如我们稍后将看到的那样,边沁详细阐述了施以惩罚如何才能合理的主要哲学观点之一。但是,我们之所以应该关注惩罚的道德性,其中一个重要原因就是惩罚确实涉及到使用国家的强制机器来对待人们,而如果没有正当理由,这种方式是非常错误的。

7.6 Justifying punishment: Deterrence
7.6 惩罚的正当性:威慑

Bentham thought that the reason why punishment, though evil in itself, was justified was fairly clear. it, we perceive that the punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a source of security to all.
边沁认为,尽管惩罚本身是邪恶的,但其合理性的原因是相当明确的。
The position that Bentham puts here is called the "deterrence theory of punishment." It says that punishment is justified to the extent that it succeeds in discouraging or deterring crime.
边沁在此提出的立场被称为 "惩罚的威慑理论"。该理论认为,只要惩罚能够成功地阻止或威慑犯罪,惩罚就是合理的。
Bentham was a utilitarian. It follows that he thought that the punishment should be of the minimum severity necessary to avoid the harm done by crime. If the severity of the punishment produced more disutility in the offender than the disutility of the offenses it was meant to deter, then it could not be justified. Making lifetime imprisonment with hard labor the punishment for all crimes would, no doubt, reduce the disutility caused by criminals very substantially: but, according to Bentham, it would have too high a cost.
边沁是一个功利主义者。因此,他认为惩罚的严厉程度应是避免犯罪造成伤害所必需的最低程度。如果惩罚的严厉程度对犯罪者造成的不利影响超过了惩罚所要阻止的犯罪的不利影响,那么这种惩罚就是不正当的。毫无疑问,将终生监禁加苦役作为对所有罪行的惩罚,会大大减少罪犯造成的不益:但边沁认为,这样做的代价太高了。
First of all (and granting, for the sake of argument, that it is possible to compare the utilities of different people), the total disutility caused by people stealing small sums of money is nothing like as great as the disutility that would be caused by punishing many people so severely.
首先(为了论证起见,我们姑且认为可以比较不同人的效用),人们偷窃小额钱财所造成的总效用远不及对许多人进行严厉惩罚所造成的效用大。
Second, any criminal justice system will make some mistakes. We saw in Chapter 2 that there were good reasons for accepting fallibilism-the view that any of our beliefs about the world might be incorrect. If that is so, then however careful we are in our criminal trials, sometimes we will punish innocent people. The disutility caused to these innocent people must be taken into account along with the disutility suffered by criminals.
其次,任何刑事司法系统都会犯一些错误。我们在第二章中看到,我们有充分的理由接受谬误论--即我们对世界的任何信念都可能是不正确的。如果是这样的话,那么无论我们在刑事审判中多么小心谨慎,有时我们还是会惩罚无辜的人。在考虑罪犯所遭受的损失的同时,也必须考虑到这些无辜者所遭受的损失。
There is something very appealing, I think, in the idea that punishment is justified by its deterrent effect. However much we may disapprove of criminals or dislike them, and however strong the desire we sometimes feel for revenge, it would surely be a good thing if the harm done to convicted offenders-and especially to innocent people wrongly convicted-was justified by its contributing to the common good. Certainly, many people would think that if it could be shown that the threat of punishment made no difference-that people would commit no more crimes even if there were no more punishments-there was something wrong with a system that inflicted so much harm to no positive effect.
我认为,惩罚因其威慑作用而具有正当性这一观点是非常吸引人的。无论我们多么不赞成或讨厌罪犯,也无论我们有时会有多么强烈的复仇欲望,但如果对已定罪的罪犯,尤其是对被误判的无辜者所造成的伤害,能够以其对公共利益的贡献而得到证明,那肯定是件好事。当然,许多人都会认为,如果能够证明惩罚的威胁没有任何作用--即使不再有惩罚,人们也不会再犯罪--那么一个造成如此大的伤害却没有任何积极作用的制度就有问题了。

7.7 Retributivism: Kant's objections
7.7 报应论康德的反对意见

Yet there are at least two major kinds of objection to Bentham's view, and one of them begins by denying exactly this last claim. This first objection was put very forcefully by Immanuel Kant.
然而,对边沁的观点至少有两种主要的反对意见,其中一种正是从否认最后一种说法开始的。伊曼纽尔-康德非常有力地提出了第一种反对意见。
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself-as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island resolved to separate and scatter themselves through the world - the last Murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before that resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every one may realize the just desert of his deeds.
即使一个公民社会决心自我解散--就像居住在一个岛屿上的人民决心分离并分散到世界各地一样--在这一决心付诸实施之前,最后一个躺在监狱里的杀人犯也应该被处死。这样做是为了让每个人都能认识到他的行为是对自己的惩罚。
What Kant is saying here is that, quite irrespective of the supposed deterrent effects of punishment, offenders ought to be punished because they deserve to be punished. Unlike Bentham, Kant thinks that punishment is justified not by its consequences but by the fact (and to the degree) that the offender has offended. Any view that says we may punish people only for their offenses is called "retributivism"; such people see punishment as retribution for crime. Kant's position is stronger than this; though he is a retributivistbecause he thinks we may not punish the innocent-he also holds that we must punish the guilty.
康德在这里所说的是,无论惩罚是否具有所谓的威慑作用,犯罪者都应该受到惩罚,因为他们理应受到惩罚。与边沁(Bentham)不同,康德认为,惩罚的合理性不在于其后果,而在于犯罪者犯罪的事实(和程度)。任何认为我们只能根据犯罪事实对人进行惩罚的观点都被称为 "报应主义";这类人认为惩罚是对犯罪的报应。康德的立场比这更坚定;尽管他是一个报应论者,因为他认为我们不能惩罚无辜的人,但他也认为我们必须惩罚有罪的人。
As I have already said, many people would object to this conclusion. They would do so, in part, on the grounds that it reflected only a primitive desire for revenge on the offender. "Surely," they would say, "two wrongs don't make a right." The world is a worse place because Kant's murderer has deprived a person of life, but if our revulsion against murder derives from a belief in the value of human life, how can taking another life improve the situation, except by making other killings less likely?
正如我已经说过的,许多人会反对这一结论。他们反对的部分理由是,这只是反映了一种原始的报复犯罪者的欲望。"当然,"他们会说,"两个错误不等于一个正确"。因为康德的凶手剥夺了一个人的生命,世界变得更糟了,但如果我们对谋杀的反感源于对人的生命价值的信仰,那么夺走另一个人的生命除了使其他杀人事件更不可能发生之外,又怎么能改善现状呢?
If we wish to see the force of Kant's view, however, we should consider the second major objection to Bentham's theory. Bentham says that punishment is justified if, on balance, it produces more utility than the disutility it creates. But if that is the only reason why punishment is justified, then why limit ourselves to trying to punish the guilty? Suppose it turned out that we could deter crime by flogging people at random, or by punishing people we knew to be innocent while claiming, dishonestly, that they were guilty. If the disutility produced in this way were outweighed by the utility produced by
然而,如果我们希望看到康德观点的力量,我们就应该考虑一下对边沁理论的第二个主要反对意见。边沁说,如果从总体上看,惩罚所产生的效用大于它所造成的不效用,那么惩罚就是合理的。但是,如果这就是惩罚合理的唯一原因,那么为什么要局限于惩罚有罪的人呢?假设我们可以通过随意鞭打人,或者通过惩罚我们知道是无辜的人,却不诚实地声称他们有罪,来遏制犯罪。如果这样做所产生的效用大于以下做法所产生的效用

the reduction in the crime rate, Bentham's utilitarian principles would lead us to do these things. And, surely, that would be wrong.
本瑟姆的功利主义原则会引导我们去做这些事情。而这肯定是错误的。
Let us follow a suggestion made by the philosopher Ted Honderich and call the practice of doing harm to innocent people in order to increase overall utility "victimization." Kant's first objection to victimization would be that, however much good it did, victimization would be wrong because the victim didn't deserve the punishment.
让我们按照哲学家特德-洪德里奇的建议,把伤害无辜者以增加整体效用的做法称为 "加害"。康德对 "加害 "的第一种反对意见是,无论这种做法有多少好处,"加害 "都是错误的,因为受害者不应该受到惩罚。
But he would go on to say that to treat people in this way is to fail to respect their autonomy. To flog victims is to treat them as means to the end of reducing crime; it is to take no account of the fact of their innocence, or of the fact that the crimes we are hoping to prevent are not their fault.
但他接着说,以这种方式对待人们就是不尊重他们的自主权。鞭打受害者就是把他们当作达到减少犯罪目的的手段;就是不考虑他们无罪的事实,也不考虑我们希望防止的犯罪不是他们的错。

7.8 Combining deterrence and retribution
7.8 威慑与惩罚相结合

Some philosophers recently have suggested a sort of halfway position between Bentham and Kant. Respect for the distinction between guilt and innocence means that we must not inflict penalties on the innocent. But even if someone is guilty, we may punish him or her only if the penalty is inflicted by a system that succeeds in deterring crime. It might be argued that if people were not deterred by punishments, then no good would be achieved by punishing them, so we ought not to do it. The middle way is to say that punishment may be carried out for its deterrent effects, but only when it is applied to the guilty.
最近,一些哲学家提出了一种介于边沁和康德之间的中间立场。尊重罪与非罪的区别意味着我们绝不能对无辜者施以惩罚。但是,即使某人有罪,我们也只有在刑罚是由一种能够成功遏制犯罪的制度所施加的情况下,才可以对其进行惩罚。有人可能会说,如果惩罚不能威慑人们,那么惩罚他们也不会有任何好处,所以我们不应该惩罚他们。中庸之道是说,惩罚可以起到威慑作用,但只适用于有罪的人。
This middle way between Bentham and Kant is initially attractive. But Bentham's way of justifying punishment by reference to overall utility also suggests another reason why it might be justified, even if deterrence were ineffective. Once a person has committed a crime, we might decide to lock them up, not because this would deter anyone else, but because it would stop them from doing it again. Once more, the disutility to offenders would be justified by the utility to potential victims of their potential future offenses.
这种介于边沁和康德之间的中间道路最初很有吸引力。但边沁以整体效用来证明惩罚的合理性,同时也提出了另一个原因,即即使威慑无效,惩罚也可能是合理的。一个人一旦犯了罪,我们可能会决定把他关起来,不是因为这样做可以威慑其他人,而是因为这样做可以阻止他再犯。再一次,犯罪者的无用性将被他们未来可能的犯罪行为对潜在受害者的有用性所证明是合理的。
Even this rationale is open, however, to the same sort of Kantian objection. If we lock criminals up because they are a danger to the public and call this "punishment," why should we not lock up people who are a danger to the public before they have committed any crime? As psychological theory gets better it may become possible
然而,即使是这种理由也会遭到康德式的反对。如果我们因为罪犯对公众构成威胁而把他们关起来并称之为 "惩罚",那么我们为什么不能把那些在犯罪之前就对公众构成威胁的人关起来呢?随着心理学理论的不断完善,也许有可能

to predict who will commit crimes. We could try to treat such people, but if the treatment failed, what objection could Bentham have to locking them up? (Once more, there's a film that is based on this idea: Steven Spielberg's Minority Report.)
我们可以尝试治疗这些人,但如果治疗失败,边沁又怎么会反对把他们关起来呢?我们可以尝试治疗这些人,但如果治疗失败,边沁又怎么会反对把他们关起来呢?史蒂文-斯皮尔伯格的《少数派报告》)。
It is plain that Kant would have an objection to this sort of policy, too. For a person who is going to commit a crime has not yet done anything to deserve punishment. It is one thing to punish someone for planning a crime or for conspiring to commit crimes with others, another to penalize a person who is going to commit a crime but has not yet formed an intention to do so. To inflict a penalty on such a person would, once more, be to treat him or her as a means to the public good, ignoring the question of whether the person was guilty of any offense.
显然,康德也会反对这种政策。因为一个将要犯罪的人还没有做出任何值得惩罚的事情。惩罚一个计划犯罪或与他人共谋犯罪的人是一回事,而惩罚一个将要犯罪但尚未形成犯罪意图的人则是另一回事。对这样的人进行惩罚,也就是把他或她当作实现公共利益的一种手段,而忽略了他或她是否犯有任何罪行的问题。
We could modify the middle way, then, to say that we may punish offenders in any way that contributes to the public good-by protecting the innocent or in some other way-and not just in ways that produce deterrence. We would thus keep the core of retributivism — only the guilty may be punished — while taking into account the deterrence theorist's basic idea that we should do this only if some good comes from it.
因此,我们可以修改中间道路,即我们可以通过保护无辜者或其他方式,而不仅仅是产生威慑的方式,以任何有助于公共利益的方式惩罚罪犯。这样,我们就保留了报应论的核心--只有有罪的人才能受到惩罚--同时又考虑到威慑论者的基本观点,即我们只有在这样做带来一些好处的情况下才应该这样做。
But this concession will not satisfy the retributivist. For the retributivist insists that punishment is retribution for an offense: not only can we punish only offenders, but we can punish them only for their offenses. And that means that, in some sense, the penalty inflicted must reflect the nature of the crime.
但这一让步并不能让报应论者满意。因为报应论者坚持认为,惩罚是对罪行的报应:我们不仅只能惩罚罪犯,而且只能惩罚他们的罪行。这意味着,在某种意义上,所施加的惩罚必须反映犯罪的性质。
There are at least two ways in which it can be thought that the punishment must "fit" the crime. I shall consider one less obvious way later. But the obvious way in which punishments may fit crimes is that there may be some proportion between punishment and offense.
至少有两种方式可以认为惩罚必须 "适合 "罪行。我稍后会考虑一种不太明显的方式。但惩罚与犯罪相适应的明显方式是,惩罚与犯罪之间可能存在某种比例关系。
Thus, suppose that Virginia has parked her car illegally and that a police car chasing an assassin has hit her car and thus allowed the assassin to escape. Suppose the assassin has killed a much-loved public figure. Then many of us might gain a great deal of relief if Virginia is severely punished, even though what she did-parking illegally — is not a serious offense. Even if it would produce a great deal of utility for many people if an offender was severely punished (because, say, it satisfied a desire for revenge), it would be wrong, the retributivist says, to punish her more than she deserves.
因此,假设弗吉尼亚违章停车,一辆追捕刺客的警车撞上了她的车,从而使刺客得以逃脱。假设刺客杀害了一位备受公众喜爱的人物。那么,如果弗吉尼亚受到严惩,尽管她所做的事--违章停车--并不是什么严重的罪行,我们中的许多人可能会感到非常欣慰。报应论者认为,即使严惩罪犯会给许多人带来巨大的好处(因为,比如说,这满足了人们复仇的欲望),但对她的惩罚超过她应得的惩罚也是错误的。
Most people, I think, would accept these retributivist claims about punishment. However much good it may do for the rest of us, the degree of suffering we may impose on an offender must be limited by the seriousness of the wrong he or she has done. More than this, a harm inflicted on a person who is innocent, or that is out of all proportion to the offense, should not be called a punishment at all. There are certain moral constraints internal to the concept of punishment-constraints captured in the idea of desert-just as the natural law theorists claimed there were certain moral constraints internal to the concept of law. Even if it is a good thing that punishment deters-even if there are reasons for increasing the efficiency of its deterrent effects, such as by publicizing trials and sentencesthese are goals that we can use the criminal justice system to pursue only if we first respect the rule that the penalties must be deserved.
我想,大多数人都会接受这些关于惩罚的报应主义主张。无论惩罚对我们其他人有多大好处,我们对罪犯施加的痛苦程度必须受到其所犯罪行的严重性的限制。不仅如此,对一个无辜的人造成的伤害,或者与罪行完全不相称的伤害,根本就不应该被称为惩罚。正如自然法理论家声称法律概念中存在某些内在的道德约束一样,惩罚概念中也存在某些内在的道德约束--"遗弃 "概念中就包含了这些约束。即使刑罚能起到威慑作用是件好事,即使有理由提高刑罚威慑作用的效率,例如将审判和判决公之于众,但我们只有首先尊重刑罚必须是罪有应得这一规则,才能利用刑事司法制度来实现这些目标。
The difference between retributivists and deterrence theorists is another example of a dispute between the two types of moral principle that Nozick called end result and historical principles. Retributivists, unlike Bentham and deterrence theorists, require that we look beyond the end result of our system of punishment, beyond the allocation of utility that it produces; they require us to respect the historical principle that punishment should be given only to those who have done something to deserve it.
报应论者与威慑论者之间的分歧是诺齐克所谓的最终结果原则和历史原则这两类道德原则之争的另一个例子。与边沁(Bentham)和威慑论者不同,报应论者要求我们超越惩罚制度的最终结果,超越它所产生的效用分配;他们要求我们尊重历史原则,即惩罚只应给予那些做出了应受惩罚之事的人。

7.9 Deterrence theory again
7.9 再次威慑理论

Deterrence theorists are not without resources to respond to the retributivists' objections. They have argued, for example, that the requirement that we should punish only the guilty comes from the fact that there would be much disutility associated with the fear we would all feel if we knew that our society practiced random victimization. The retributivist can counter that this effect could be avoided by keeping the practice secret. (Needless to say, we couldn't keep it secret from the innocent people we victimized or the guilty people who escaped punishment.) Even if we did keep it secret from most people, so that most people escaped the disutility of fearing arbitrary victimization, victimization would still be wrong. But the deterrence theorist can reply that even if it were possible to keep this secret from most people, having a secret system risks very serious abuses. If we had a system that allowed victimization to
威慑论者并非没有资源来回应报应论者的反对意见。例如,他们认为,我们只应惩罚有罪的人这一要求源于这样一个事实,即如果我们知道我们的社会实行的是随机伤害,我们所有人都会感到恐惧,而这种恐惧会带来很大的无用性。报应论者可以反驳说,只要对这种做法保密,就可以避免这种影响。(不用说,我们不可能对无辜受害的人或逃脱惩罚的有罪之人保密)。即使我们真的对大多数人保密,使大多数人摆脱了害怕任意加害的无用性,加害仍然是错误的。但威慑论者可以回答说,即使有可能对大多数人保密,秘密制度也有可能被严重滥用。如果我们有一个允许受害

masquerade as punishment, then officials of the system could use the law to exercise their private grudges. If we want to maintain a democracy, official secrecy is simply very dangerous.
如果我们不把保密作为惩罚的一种手段,那么该系统的官员就可以利用法律来公报私仇。如果我们要维护民主,官方保密简直是非常危险的。
Just as deterrence theorists can try to explain in this way why only the guilty should be punished, so they can explain why we believe there should be some proportion between crime and punishment. The reason, of course, is that deterrence theory is based on the recognition that "punishment in itself is evil." It follows, as I have already pointed out, that a deterrence theorist will not allow the penalties for crimes to exceed the minimum necessary to avoid the harm of offenses.
正如威慑论者可以试图用这种方式来解释为什么只有有罪的人才应该受到惩罚,他们也可以解释为什么我们认为犯罪和惩罚之间应该有一定的比例。当然,原因在于威慑理论的基础是承认 "惩罚本身是邪恶的"。因此,正如我已经指出的那样,威慑论者不会允许对犯罪的惩罚超过避免犯罪危害所必需的最低限度。
But each of these replies depends on the deterrence theorist being right about very complex social facts: How much fear would really be created by a system of publicized victimization? Would that really be worse than the offenses it might deter? Is the harm done by those offenses we think should be punished seriously always greater than the harm done by those offenses that we regard as trifling?
但这些回答都取决于威慑论者对非常复杂的社会事实的判断是否正确:公开的受害制度究竟会造成多大的恐惧?这真的会比它可能威慑的违法行为更糟糕吗?我们认为应该受到严厉惩罚的犯罪行为所造成的伤害是否总是大于我们认为微不足道的犯罪行为所造成的伤害?
There are many factual conditions that would have to hold if the deterrence theorist's views are to fit with what we normally believe to be right. Let us call these conditions the "presuppositions of deterrence." Then one important factual question to consider is whether the presuppositions of deterrence are true.
如果威慑论者的观点与我们通常认为的正确观点相吻合,就必须具备许多事实条件。我们把这些条件称为 "威慑的前提条件"。那么,需要考虑的一个重要事实问题就是威慑的前提假设是否属实。
The answer to this question is almost certainly no. But even if the deterrence theorist's factual claims were true, they still would not establish that the deterrence theorist was right. For, as we have repeatedly seen, most of us believe that the retributivist's constraints on punishments should be respected even if the presuppositions of deterrence is false. Our moral views are views about what would be right not just in this world but also in other possible worlds where the facts are different.
这个问题的答案几乎肯定是否定的。但是,即使威慑论者的事实主张是真实的,它们仍然不能证明威慑论者是正确的。因为,正如我们反复看到的那样,我们大多数人都认为,即使威慑论的前提假设是错误的,也应该尊重报应论者对惩罚的限制。我们的道德观不仅是关于在这个世界上什么是正确的,也是关于在事实不同的其他可能世界上什么是正确的。
What this means is that it is no defense of the utilitarian view of punishment to show that, given the way the world actually is, it will lead us to do just what retributivists require. For in thinking about the justice of punishment we are trying to understand not only which punishments are right but also why they are right. And to decide that, it is necessary to consider what we would do if the facts were different.
这意味着,功利主义的惩罚观并不能证明,鉴于世界的实际情况,它将引导我们去做报应主义者所要求的事情。因为在思考惩罚的正义性时,我们不仅要理解哪些惩罚是正确的,还要理解为什么这些惩罚是正确的。而要确定这一点,就必须考虑如果事实不同,我们会怎么做。
I mentioned earlier two ways in which a punishment might fit a crime, but I gave only one of them. We can see, finally, how different the basic conceptions of punishment held by deterrence theorists and retributivists are if we consider this second way in which punishments and crimes might fit each other.
我在前面提到了惩罚与犯罪相适应的两种方式,但我只给出了其中一种。最后,如果我们考虑一下惩罚和犯罪可能相互契合的第二种方式,我们就可以看到威慑论者和惩罚论者对惩罚的基本概念有多么不同。
Suppose offenders were obliged to compensate the victims of their offenses. Not every crime has a victim-who is the victim of my speeding on an empty highway?- and not every harm can be compensated-you can't give someone back his or her life. But, some retributivists have said, where possible it is a virtue in a legal system if offenders make reparation to their victims. Being obliged to make reparation to your victims is an especially fitting punishment where it is a practical possibility.
假设罪犯有义务赔偿其犯罪行为的受害者。并不是每项犯罪都有受害者--谁是我在空旷的高速公路上超速行驶的受害者?但是,一些报应主义者说过,在可能的情况下,如果罪犯对受害者做出赔偿,这在法律制度中是一种美德。在有实际可能的情况下,有义务向受害者作出赔偿是一种特别恰当的惩罚。
The retributivist will see compensation as internal to the system of punishment, as flowing from the very meaning of the idea. But Bentham, who would agree that the compensation of victims is desirable, would say that it was a separate question how they should be compensated. Maybe it would be more efficient if the government took on the task of compensating victims, using taxes or perhaps fines and the proceeds of prisoner's labor to pay for it. If that were true, Bentham would see no advantage in making the offender compensate the victim directly. There are deep differences between the views of those who see moral ideas as internal to the very idea of law and punishment-the natural law theorists - and those positivists who do not, and these have very different consequences for social policy.
报应论者认为补偿是惩罚制度的内在要求,是惩罚理念的本义。但本瑟姆虽然同意对受害者进行补偿是可取的,但他会说,如何补偿受害者是一个单独的问题。如果由政府来承担赔偿受害者的任务,用税收或罚金以及囚犯的劳动所得来支付,也许会更有效率。如果真是这样的话,边沁就不会认为让罪犯直接赔偿受害者有什么好处了。那些认为道德观念是法律和惩罚观念的内在组成部分的人--自然法理论家--与那些不这样认为的实证主义者之间存在着深刻的分歧,这些分歧对社会政策产生了截然不同的影响。

7.10 Why do definitions matter?
7.10 为什么定义很重要?

I said, at the end of section 7.1, that there might be reasons for preferring a definition of a complex term such as "law" other than that it is simply the one that competent speakers of the language seem to use. Many terms have a certain open texture to them, which means that ordinary usage does not determine precisely how they should be applied in every case. One task of a philosophical definition is to try to explain not just how we use a term but why there are good reasons to use it that way. Such an explanation allows us to fill in the gaps where ordinary usage leaves this open texture. The dispute between natural law and legal positivism reflects two such competing
我在第 7.1 节的末尾说过,对于 "法律 "这样一个复杂的术语,我们可能有理由倾向于选择一个定义,而不是仅仅因为它是有能力的语言使用者似乎使用的定义。许多术语都有某种开放的质地,这意味着普通用法并不能精确地决定它们在每种情况下应如何应用。哲学定义的任务之一就是不仅要解释我们如何使用一个术语,还要解释为什么我们有充分的理由这样使用它。这种解释使我们能够填补普通用法留下的空白。自然法与法律实证主义之间的争论反映了这样两种相互竞争的观点

explanations of why we have a concept of law, and these two different explanations have different consequences for how we should fill in the open texture of our everyday use of the words "law" and "punishment."
这两种不同的解释对我们如何在日常使用 "法律 "和 "惩罚 "这两个词时填充开放的质地有着不同的影响。
Thus, the natural law theorist's objection to the positivist view is not that the positivists have misdescribed the way people ordinarily use the word "law," but that their view has serious moral and political dangers. Unless we insist that law must have a certain moral content, we may find ourselves accepting as legal-and, therefore, in some sense, binding-horribly immoral laws, such as the racist laws of Nazi Germany.
因此,自然法理论家反对实证主义观点,并不是因为实证主义者错误地描述了人们通常使用 "法律 "一词的方式,而是因为他们的观点具有严重的道德和政治危险。除非我们坚持认为法律必须具有一定的道德内容,否则我们可能会发现自己接受了非常不道德的法律,例如纳粹德国的种族主义法律。
The positivist's reply is that the law is indeed a question of fact and not of value. Far from obliging us to respect bad laws, their view forces us, once we have decided the factual question of what the law is, to face the separate normative question of whether we should obey it. We can best keep our eyes open to the possibility that laws should not be obeyed by keeping clear the distinction between two questions:
实证主义者的回答是,法律确实是一个事实问题,而不是价值问题。他们的观点非但没有迫使我们尊重糟糕的法律,反而迫使我们在决定了法律是什么这个事实问题之后,去面对是否应该遵守法律这个单独的规范问题。我们只有明确两个问题之间的区别,才能更好地看待法律不应被遵守的可能性:
a) Is this rule operating in this society?
a) 这一规则在这个社会中是否有效?
b) Is it a good thing that this rule is operating?
b) 这一规则的实施是好事吗?
Indeed, positivists have argued that it is the natural law theorists who risk giving bad laws respect they do not deserve. Building too much of morality into your definition of law can confuse people into thinking that they ought to obey even bad laws, because it leads them to identify law and morality.
事实上,实证主义者认为,正是自然法理论家冒着给坏法律以不应有的尊重的风险。在法律的定义中加入过多的道德因素会使人们产生困惑,认为即使是糟糕的法律他们也应该遵守,因为这会导致他们将法律与道德相提并论。
One problem with the natural law view, then, is that it may lead people to think that every law is morally binding. But equally worrying for the positivists is the possibility that a conflation of law and morals can lead people to think that every moral rule should be legally binding.
因此,自然法观点的一个问题是,它可能会让人们认为每条法律都具有道德约束力。但同样令实证主义者担忧的是,将法律与道德混为一谈可能会导致人们认为每一条道德规则都应该具有法律约束力。
Thus, for example, someone might be led to defend censorship laws that said that people may not look at pornography (irrespective of whether it leads them to do harm to anyone else), even if their enforcement involved a substantial interference in the private lives of citizens. Keeping law and morals apart allows us to entertain the possibility that some of our moral ideas should not be imposed on
因此,举例来说,有人可能会为那些规定人们不得观看色情制品(无论是否会对他人造成伤害)的审查法辩护,即使这些法律的实施涉及对公民私生活的实质性干涉。将法律与道德分开,可以让我们考虑这样一种可能性,即我们的某些道德观念不应该强加给他人。

others-that some moral rules should not be legally enforced because to enforce them is to fail to respect the citizen's autonomy.
还有人认为,有些道德规则不应在法律上强制执行,因为强制执行这些规则就是不尊重公民的自主权。
Yet this hardly seems to be a fair objection to the position of the natural law theorist. People who see the criminal law as Bentham did, regarding it simply as a device for maximizing utility, have no special reason to respect autonomy; all that they require is that we maximize utility. It is the natural law theorist who argues that a system that fails to respect the citizen's autonomy is not a system of law, and that victimization is not a form of punishment. They argue this precisely because they hold that respect for certain moral ideals, among them autonomy, is internal to the concept of law. And in claiming this, they are not simply expressing a disagreement with positivism about the word "law" (or "punishment"), but appealing to a different view about the proper function of government.
然而,这似乎并不能公正地反对自然法理论家的立场。像边沁(Bentham)那样看待刑法的人,仅仅将其视为实现效用最大化的一种手段,并没有特别的理由要尊重自主性;他们所要求的只是我们实现效用最大化。自然法理论家认为,不尊重公民自主权的制度不是法律制度,受害不是一种惩罚形式。他们之所以这样说,正是因为他们认为尊重某些道德理想(其中包括自主权)是法律概念的内在要求。他们的这一主张并不只是表达了与实证主义在 "法律"(或 "惩罚")一词上的分歧,而是诉诸于一种关于政府适当职能的不同观点。
At the end of Chapter 5 I argued that autonomy was an important value; as we have seen, respect for autonomy is important in distinguishing between the justified use of punishment and bare coercion. Building the idea of desert into the very definition of punishment reflects a commitment to the value of autonomy. For respect for the distinction between those who do and those who do not deserve punishment flows from a recognition that we should treat each other as responsible agents.
在第 5 章末尾,我认为自主是一种重要的价值观;正如我们所看到的,尊重自主对于区分合理使用惩罚和赤裸裸的胁迫非常重要。在惩罚的定义中加入 "遗弃 "的概念反映了对自主价值的承诺。因为尊重那些应受惩罚和不应受惩罚的人之间的区别,源于我们应将彼此视为负责任的行为主体这一认识。
But autonomy is an important issue not only in the enforcement of law but also in its creation. If we respect people's autonomy, we may wish to enforce only those criminal laws that are necessary to protect citizens from each other. Suppose there was no evidence that pornography led people to do harm to others. If we thought that the desire for pornography was, nevertheless, immoral, making someone avoid pornography would still not make him or her a better person; what would make the person better would be to persuade him or her that looking at it was wrong. Even if you think that looking at pornography is intrinsically wrong, therefore, you might still agree that simply forcing someone not to look at it with the threat of punishment, even though the person wants to and does not see that it is wrong, is an abuse of the powers of the state.
但是,自主权不仅是执法中的一个重要问题,也是法律制定中的一个重要问题。如果我们尊重人们的自主权,我们可能只希望执行那些保护公民免受彼此伤害所必需的刑事法律。假设没有证据表明色情制品会导致人们伤害他人。如果我们认为对色情制品的欲望是不道德的,那么让某人避免观看色情制品仍然不会让他或她成为一个更好的人;让他或她变得更好的办法是说服他或她观看色情制品是错误的。因此,即使你认为看色情制品本质上是错误的,你可能仍然会同意,简单地以惩罚相威胁迫使某人不看色情制品,即使这个人想看,也不认为这是错误的,这就是滥用国家权力。
The view that the heart of a system of law is respect for the citizen's autonomy has powerful consequences. If we respect the autonomy even of the offender, we must insist that criminal trials
法律制度的核心是尊重公民的自主权,这一观点具有强大的影响力。如果我们甚至尊重罪犯的自主权,我们就必须坚持刑事审判

and punishments should be able to show the offender why he or she is being punished, and to offer him or her a justification for the severity of the punishment. If this is to be possible, the courts must be able to argue that the offense was an offense against a rule that can be justified because it is aimed at the common good, that the punishment is consistent with our moral view of the offense, and that the court has taken into account the offender's reasons for doing what he or she did. A system of courts that did not meet these conditions would not deserve the respect of offenders, because it could not seek to show them why they were being punished.
因此,法院和惩罚机构应能向犯罪者说明为什么要惩罚他或她,并为惩罚的严厉性提供正当理由。如果要做到这一点,法院就必须能够证明犯罪是违反规则的行为,而违反规则的行为是合理的,因为它的目的是为了公共利益,惩罚符合我们对犯罪的道德看法,而且法院已经考虑到犯罪者这样做的原因。不符合这些条件的法院系统不会得到罪犯的尊重,因为它无法向他们说明为什么要惩罚他们。
These are difficult and important questions. And it is important also to see that these sorts of questions can be central to the reasons why people adopt one or the other position in the debate between natural law and positivism. In thinking about the merits of the various views I have discussed, I hope you will keep in mind the fact that they are not just arguments about the meanings of words. At the heart of the dispute are some of the most important questions about how we should conduct our lives together.
这些问题既困难又重要。同样重要的是要看到,在自然法与实证主义的争论中,这些问题可能是人们采取这种或那种立场的核心原因。在思考我所讨论的各种观点的优劣时,我希望你们牢记一个事实,即它们不仅仅是关于词义的争论。争论的核心是关于我们应该如何共同生活的一些最重要的问题。

7.11 Conclusion 7.11 结论

In this chapter we have seen how the dispute between natural law and positivism has widespread consequences for our understanding not just of the nature of law itself, but also of the institution of criminal punishment and of the nature of the state. Positivists believe law is a descriptive notion and leave the question of evaluation to be settled after the legal system has been identified. Natural law theorists, on the other hand, see law as an essentially moral idea and so demand of a system of rules that it satisfy certain moral constraints if it is to be called a legal system at all.
在本章中,我们看到自然法与实证主义之间的争论不仅对我们理解法律本身的性质,而且对我们理解刑事处罚制度和国家的性质产生了广泛的影响。实证主义者认为法律是一个描述性的概念,评价问题要在确定法律制度之后才能解决。而自然法理论者则认为法律本质上是一种道德理念,因此要求规则体系必须满足某些道德约束,这样才能称之为法律体系。
This belief flows through into their view of punishment, which they hold is a moral idea as well, and victimization, which is no more a punishment than a system of rules aimed at the private satisfaction of the Oligarchs is a system of law. Retributivism's objection to victimization stems from the natural law theorist's recognition that there are constraints - constraints that deterrence theorists fail to recognize - on the proper use of the coercive power of the state. Reflecting on these issues also leads to the view that Hobbes' positivist view of the state is wrong and that Aquinas was surely right
他们认为,惩罚也是一种道德观念,而受害则是一种惩罚,就像旨在满足寡头私人利益的规则体系是一种法律体系一样。报应论反对加害,是因为自然法理论家认识到,在适当使用国家强制力方面存在着制约因素--威慑论者没有认识到的制约因素。对这些问题的反思也导致了这样一种观点,即霍布斯的实证主义国家观是错误的,阿奎那肯定是正确的

when he said that to be a government you must have not only power but also the purpose of aiming at the common good.
他说,要成为一个政府,不仅要有权力,还要有以共同利益为目标的宗旨。
We have also seen that the dispute between positivism and natural law is not simply an argument about words: underlying the disagreement about what "law" means are deep differences about politics and morality. The idea of autonomy that is central to the natural law theorist's conception of courts and trials is the same notion as the one that played so central role in Kant's conception of morality. And respect for autonomy in legal philosophy leads to the rejection of consequentialism, a rejection that I argued was at the heart of Kant's ethics. This interconnectedness of issues is inevitable. In thinking about the law, as a specific set of institutions within the state, our views are bound to be connected with more general questions about the state-with political philosophy-and, in the end, with the most fundamental questions of morality.
我们还看到,实证主义与自然法之间的争论并不只是文字上的争论:关于 "法 "的含义的分歧背后是关于政治与道德的深刻分歧。在自然法理论家的法院和审判概念中占据核心地位的自治理念,与在康德的道德概念中占据核心地位的理念如出一辙。法律哲学中对自主性的尊重导致了对结果主义的摒弃,而我认为摒弃结果主义正是康德伦理学的核心。这些问题之间的相互联系是不可避免的。在思考法律作为国家内部的一套特定制度时,我们的观点必然会与关于国家的更普遍的问题、政治哲学以及最根本的道德问题联系在一起。
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CHAPTER 8 第 8 章

Metaphysics 形而上学

What is existence? 什么是存在?
Do numbers exist? 数字存在吗?
Does God exist? 上帝存在吗?
Is God's existence a necessary truth?
上帝的存在是必然的真理吗?

8.1 Introduction 8.1 导言

This is the first chapter of this book whose title is a technical philosopher's word. That word-"metaphysics" w was first used as the name of a book by Aristotle, and what it means takes a certain amount of explanation. But it's important to say something about metaphysics in any introduction to philosophy, because this subject is central to the Western philosophical tradition.
这是本书的第一章,书名是一个哲学家的专业术语。这个词--"形而上学"--最早被亚里士多德用作一本书的名字,它的含义需要一定的解释。但是,在任何哲学导论中都必须谈及形而上学,因为这个主题是西方哲学传统的核心。
The origin of the word "metaphysics" seems to have been this. The Greek adverb "meta" can mean "beyond." Aristotle had written a book called the Physics, which was about what we would call "natural science." Aristotle (or his students) called the book that followed his Physics "the book beyond the Physics." So, etymologically at least, metaphysics is the subject that comes after natural science.
形而上学 "一词的起源似乎是这样的。希腊副词 "meta "的意思是 "超越"。亚里士多德曾写过一本名为《物理学》的书,内容就是我们所说的 "自然科学"。亚里士多德(或他的学生)把《物理学》之后的那本书称为"《物理学》之外的书"。因此,至少从词源学上讲,形而上学是自然科学之后的学科。
But that, I fear, doesn't tell you very much. Certainly Aristotle did not think that he had invented the questions he was asking in the Metaphysics; he quotes and discusses the arguments of many previous philosophers and poets. Still, much of this discussion, especially at the start of the book, is about the elements of which material things are made, and so it recapitulates some of the subject matter of the Physics. And, indeed, since physics in Aristotle's sense is the study of the natural world, it may seem to be rather difficult to see what else there is to study "after" or "beyond" physics. What, after all, is there except the natural world?
但恐怕这并不能说明什么。当然,亚里士多德并不认为他在《形而上学》中提出的问题是他自己发明的;他引用并讨论了许多前辈哲学家和诗人的论点。不过,这本书的大部分论述,尤其是开头部分,都是关于物质构成的元素,因此它重述了《物理学》的一些主题。事实上,既然亚里士多德意义上的物理学是对自然世界的研究,那么似乎很难理解在物理学 "之后 "或 "之外 "还有什么可研究的。毕竟,除了自然世界,还有什么呢?
Aristotle himself, in the second book of the Metaphysics (which
亚里士多德本人在《形而上学》第二卷(其中

may originally have been intended to be a preface to the Physics), discusses some concepts that we need before we can begin to think about the natural world at all, among them the notion of a cause. In other places he discusses such concepts as element, nature, necessity, unity, being, identity, potentiality, and truth, as well as many other concepts. Is there something that these many topics have in common?
物理学》的序言),讨论了我们在开始思考自然世界之前所需要的一些概念,其中包括 "原因 "的概念。在其他地方,他还讨论了元素、性质、必然性、统一性、存在、同一性、潜在性和真理等概念,以及许多其他概念。这些话题有什么共同点吗?
Well, in 4.13, in our discussion of causality, we noticed that in the sciences we try to discover laws, generalizations that are true neither, at one extreme, just in the actual possible world nor, at another extreme, in all the possible worlds, but rather in the class of nomically possible worlds. The laws of physics aren't necessary in the sense of true in every possible world: the gravitational constant, , could presumably have had a different value from the one that it does, and then falling bodies would have accelerated faster or slower toward the Earth. So, clearly, one possible subject matter that goes beyond natural science is what general truths obtain not just in the nomically possible worlds-the worlds with the same natural laws as the actual world-but in larger classes of worlds and, perhaps, in the end, in all of the possible worlds. (I'm going to need to be able to talk about possible worlds where the laws of nature don't hold, so I'll call them the "nomically impossible worlds.")
那么,在4.13关于因果关系的讨论中,我们注意到,在科学中,我们试图发现一些定律和概括,这些定律和概括既不是在一个极端中,仅仅在实际的可能世界中是真的,也不是在另一个极端中,在所有的可能世界中是真的,而是在名义上的可能世界中是真的。物理定律并不是在每一个可能的世界中都是真实的:引力常数 可能会有一个与现在不同的值,那么坠落的物体就会以更快或更慢的速度冲向地球。因此,很显然,超越自然科学的一个可能的主题是,不仅在名义上可能的世界--与现实世界具有相同自然规律的世界--中,而且在更大类的世界中,也许最终在所有可能的世界中,会得到什么一般真理。(我需要能够谈论自然法则不成立的可能世界,所以我称之为 "名义上不可能的世界")。

8.2 An example: the existence of numbers
8.2 一个例子:数的存在

We've already discussed one large group of propositions that are true in all the possible worlds: they are the logical truths and all the other necessary truths. In 3.11, I pointed out both that logical truths were necessary and that some necessary truths-"the Morning Star is the Evening Star," for example-are not logical truths. So there's more to what is true in all the possible worlds than just logic. Most philosophers think, for example, that the truths of mathematics are necessary; but, despite serious attempts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to prove that all mathematics was really logic, it is now widely agreed among mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics that that is not so. Logicism, which is the name for the position that tries to derive all mathematics from logic (plus definitions), has not been successful.
我们已经讨论过一大类在所有可能世界中都为真的命题:它们就是逻辑真理和所有其他必然真理。在 3.11 中,我既指出了逻辑真理是必然的,也指出了某些必然真理--例如 "晨星就是晚星"--并不是逻辑真理。因此,在所有可能的世界中,除了逻辑之外,还有更多的真理。例如,大多数哲学家都认为数学的真理是必然的;但是,尽管十九世纪末二十世纪初有人曾认真地试图证明所有数学其实都是逻辑,但现在数学家和数学哲学家们普遍认为事实并非如此。逻辑主义是试图从逻辑(加上定义)推导出所有数学的立场的名称,但并未取得成功。
If mathematical truths are necessary, then since it's true that
如果数学真理是必然的,那么既然

there's a prime number between 17 and 23 (it's 19), it's also true that there's a prime number between 17 and 23 in every possible world. I can prove that there is a prime number between 17 and 23 by proving that 19 is a prime number-which I can do by showing that it's not divisible without remainder by any whole number between 2 and 10 - and then by proving that 19 is greater than 17 and less than 23. Investigating the nature of numbers, then, isn't a matter for physics-because the numbers exist in nomically impossible worlds-and so maybe that could be a possible metaphysical subject. And, in fact, it is: the nature of numbers-what it means to say that numbers exist-is one central metaphysical question.
如果说在 17 和 23 之间有一个质数(是 19),那么在每一个可能的世界中,在 17 和 23 之间也都有一个质数。我可以通过证明 19 是一个质数来证明 17 和 23 之间有一个质数--我可以通过证明它不能被 2 和 10 之间的任何整数无余数整除来做到这一点--然后再通过证明 19 大于 17 小于 23 来证明这一点。那么,研究数字的本质就不是物理学的问题了--因为数字存在于名义上不可能存在的世界中--所以这也许是一个可能的形而上学课题。事实上,它就是:数字的本质--数字存在的意义--是一个核心的形而上学问题。
It's important to insist here that when I say "numbers" I don't mean the numerals-that is, the signs, like the symbol " 9 " or the Roman "IX" that we use to talk about numbers. As I said in the introduction, we shouldn't confuse using a word with mentioning it. If I were to say that " 9 " existed, that would be plainly true. Obviously numerals exist. The interesting question is whether the numerals refer to actual objects and, if so, what kinds of objects they are. Whether 9 exists and whether " 9 " exists are very different questions. (Hobbes, you will recall, got this right, in the passage I quoted in 3.2, when he distinguished "number" and "the names of numbers.")
这里有必要说明,我说的 "数字 "并不是指数字,也就是我们用来表示数字的符号,如 "9 "或罗马字母 "IX"。正如我在导言中所说的,我们不应该把使用一个词和提及一个词混为一谈。如果我说 "9 "是存在的,这显然是正确的。显然,数字是存在的。有趣的问题是,这些数字是否指代实际的物体,如果是,它们是哪种物体。9 "是否存在和 "9 "是否存在是两个完全不同的问题。(你们应该记得,霍布斯在我在 3.2 中引用的那段话中,把 "数 "和 "数的名称 "区分开来时,就说对了)。
Our normal ways of speaking are not very helpful here. We use the word "number" to refer both to the numeral and to the mathematical object, both " 9 " and 9 . And we also use it both to refer to individual inscriptions of the numeral, like the " 9 " on the next line,
我们通常的说话方式在这里并没有什么帮助。我们用 "数字 "一词既指数字,也指数学对象,既指 "9",也指 "9"。我们还用它来指数字的单个刻度,比如下一行的 "9"、
and to make claims about all such inscriptions, such as the observation
并对所有这些碑文提出主张,如观察到
The upright stroke of " 9 " is often written at right angles to the top of the page.
"9 "的竖写笔画通常与页面顶部成直角。
Each inscription of the numeral " 9 " is a token of " 9 " the general type of inscription, just as each individual man is a token of the type man. This distinction is helpful in sorting out some possible confusions about numerals. For example, it makes sense to ask where an
每个数字 "9 "的铭文都是 "9 "这一一般铭文类型的标记,就像每个人都是 "人 "这一类型的标记一样。这种区别有助于理清数字可能引起的一些混淆。例如,如果要问一个 "9 "在哪里?

individual token of the type " 9 " is - there's one to the left of the last quotation mark-but it doesn't make sense to ask where the type is, at least until you've said a bit more about how to characterize a type. You might, for example, want to identify the type with the class of all the tokens - all the objects that share the property of being the same numeral; and then you might want to say that a class was an abstract object distinct from its members and thus that it didn't have a spatial location at all, even though there is nothing mysterious about the spatial location of each inscription.
在最后一个引号的左边有一个 "9 "类型的单个标记--但是,至少在你对如何描述一个类型有了更多的了解之前,问这个类型在哪里是没有意义的。举例来说,你可能想用所有标记的类来确定类型--所有具有相同数字属性的对象;然后你可能想说,类是一个抽象对象,不同于其成员,因此它根本没有空间位置,尽管每个铭文的空间位置并不神秘。
Numbers and other mathematical objects are not the only things that one might suppose to exist in worlds other than the nomically possible worlds. One other obvious candidate for metaphysical examination is the possible worlds themselves. What is it for a possible world to exist? Are there any impossible worlds, worlds, say, in which it rains and doesn't rain at the same time? These are also important and challenging metaphysical questions.
数字和其他数学对象并不是人们可能认为存在于名义上可能的世界之外的唯一事物。可能世界本身就是形而上学研究的另一个显而易见的候选对象。什么是可能存在的世界?有没有不可能的世界,比如说,同时下雨又不下雨的世界?这些也是重要而具有挑战性的形而上学问题。
But there are also many other things that exist in the nomically impossible worlds about which philosophical exploration looks enticing. There are, for example, people, objects, events, times, and places in nomically impossible worlds. So the nature of people, events, objects, times, and places is not a matter just for natural science. Furthermore, as I said a little while ago, there are nomically impossible worlds where is different, but there's no reason to think that any of the objects mentioned just now couldn't exist in some of those worlds. The mere fact that gravity was slightly different surely wouldn't have guaranteed that there would be no people or no material objects. You and I could still have existed, for example, and so could that tree. So there are possible worlds in which we exist but has a different value. But what is it for a person or a material object to exist? Or for it to endure through time, to occupy a place, and participate in events?
但是,在 "名义上不可能的世界 "中还存在着许多其他事物,哲学探索看起来很有吸引力。例如,在名义上不可能的世界中存在着人、物、事件、时间和地点。因此,人、事、物、时间和地点的性质并不仅仅是自然科学的问题。此外,正如我刚才所说,在一些名义上不可能存在的世界里, ,但没有理由认为刚才提到的任何物体不可能存在于其中的某些世界。仅仅因为重力略有不同,肯定不能保证没有人或物质。比如,你和我仍然可能存在,那棵树也可能存在。因此,在一些可能的世界里,我们存在,但 的价值不同。但是,人或物质存在的意义是什么呢?或者说,它能够穿越时间,占据一个地方,参与事件?
I argued just now, in effect, that since there is a prime number between 17 and 23 , it follows that there exists at least one number. There are lots of interesting arguments of this form, and some of them imply the existence of persons. It's true, for example, that Romeo loved Juliet, isn't it? So presumably it's true that there was someone that Romeo loved (namely, Juliet). But that means that the person Juliet existed! Now, most of us think that Juliet didn't exist,
我刚才实际上是在论证,既然在 17 和 23 之间有一个质数,那么就说明至少存在一个数。这种形式的有趣论证有很多,其中有些意味着人的存在。例如,罗密欧爱朱丽叶是真的,不是吗?所以,罗密欧爱过一个人(即朱丽叶),这应该是真的。但这意味着朱丽叶这个人是存在的!现在,我们大多数人都认为朱丽叶并不存在、

because she's a fictional character. But if she didn't exist, how can there be any truths about her? Do fictional characters exist in some other possible worlds? And if so, is that what determines what's true about them?
因为她是一个虚构的人物。但如果她不存在,又怎么会有关于她的真相呢?虚构人物是否存在于其他可能的世界?如果是的话,这是否决定了他们的真实性?
Questions such as these-about what persons or objects are or whether numbers or fictional entities exist somewhere-are ontological questions. They are questions about what exists-what there is - and about the nature of that existence. We have already discussed a number of ontological questions in the course of this book: in 4.7 and 4.8, for example, we asked whether we have reason to believe that postulated theoretical entities exist. And just now I assumed that a mathematical proof that there was a prime number between 17 and 23 showed that that number existed. Many mathematicians and philosophers do think that mathematical entities, such as numbers, exist, Plato, famously, among them-which is why this ontological view about mathematical objects is called "Platonism." Plato thought that numbers and many other abstract things - such as goodness, Truth, and Beauty, for example-existed in a sort of perfect realm of their own as Ideas or Forms. Good things and true things and beautiful things in the world that we experience were pale reflections of these Ideas of the Good and the True and the Beautiful. (Plato's critics had some fun with this, because the theory seemed also to require that actual mud, say, was a pale reflection of the Idea of Mud; and that made the realm of Ideas seem somehow less pure!) What made it true that I had five physical fingers was that the fingers of my hand participated somehow in the Idea of Five. Modern Platonists do not tend to think of numbers or any other abstract entities as existing in a special sort of place; they don't suppose that goodness or 9 are anywhere, any more than Descartes supposed that our thoughts had spatial locations. But they follow Plato in insisting that we can only make sense of the world if we suppose that numbers (and other mathematical objects) are in some sense real.
诸如此类的问题--关于人或物是什么,或者数字或虚构的实体是否存在于某个地方--都是本体论问题。它们是关于什么存在--存在什么--以及存在的性质的问题。在本书中,我们已经讨论过一些本体论问题:例如,在 4.7 和 4.8 中,我们问到我们是否有理由相信假设的理论实体是存在的。刚才我又假设了一个数学证明,证明在 17 和 23 之间有一个质数,表明这个质数是存在的。许多数学家和哲学家确实认为数学实体(如数字)是存在的,柏拉图就是其中著名的一位--这就是为什么这种关于数学对象的本体论观点被称为 "柏拉图主义"。柏拉图认为,数字和其他许多抽象的东西,比如善、真和美,作为理念或形式,存在于一种自己的完美境界中。柏拉图的批评家们对此颇有微词,因为这一理论似乎还要求实际的泥土,比如说,是 "泥土 "这一理念的苍白反映;这就使得 "理念 "的境界在某种程度上显得不那么纯粹了。我之所以有五根有形的手指,是因为我手上的手指在某种程度上参与了 "五 "的理念。现代柏拉图主义者并不倾向于认为数字或任何其他抽象实体存在于某种特殊的地方;他们不认为 "善 "或"9 "存在于任何地方,就像笛卡尔认为我们的思想具有空间位置一样。但他们追随柏拉图,坚持认为只有当我们认为数字(和其他数学对象)在某种意义上是真实的,我们才能理解这个世界。
Many philosophers, however, have doubted that numbers really exist, at least in the way that tables and chairs do. And so they have sought to show that when we say, "There is a number ... "what we mean can be translated into some other sentence that doesn't imply that numbers exist. The American philosopher W.V.O. Quine
然而,许多哲学家怀疑数字是否真的存在,至少是以桌椅的方式存在。因此,他们试图证明,当我们说 "有一个数字...... "时"我们的意思可以被翻译成其他句子,而这些句子并不意味着数字的存在。美国哲学家 W.V.O. 奎因

argued that you were committed to the existence of anything about which you said (or believed) that it satisfied an open sentence. Or, as he put it, "to be is to be the value of a variable." (I introduced this terminology in 3.5. An object that satisfies an open sentence is a value of the variable that replaces the blank.) So if, to use an example of Quine's, I asked you what the number of the planets was and you said "9," then you would be committed to the existence of the number 9 because you are saying that 9 satisfies the open sentence
他争辩说,只要你说(或相信)它满足一个开放的句子,你就承诺了它的存在。或者,正如他所说,"存在就是变量的值"。(我在 3.5 中介绍了这个术语。满足开放式句子的对象就是替代空白的变量值)。因此,如果用奎因的一个例子来说,我问你行星的数目是多少,你说 "9",那么你就承诺了数字 9 的存在,因为你是说 9 满足了开放句子
_ is the number of the planets.
是行星的数量。
As a result, if you don't think numbers really exist you have to find a way of translating
因此,如果你不认为数字真的存在,你就必须找到一种翻译的方法。
P: 9 is the number of the planets
P:9 是行星的编号
that doesn't have this ontological commitment. One simple way to do this would be to say that just means
而不具有这种本体论承诺。一种简单的做法是, 只是指
: There are nine planets.
行星:有九个行星。
But then, of course, you would have to explain what means in a way that didn't bring numbers in again by the back door! Obviously, for example, it wouldn't do to say that means: There are as many planets as there are numbers between 1
当然,在解释 的含义时,不能再走后门!显然,举例来说,如果说 的意思是 "有多少颗行星,就有多少个介于 1 和 1 之间的数字: 有多少颗行星,就有多少个 1 之间的数字

and 9 . 和 9 .
For then someone could say that that the open sentence
因为这样一来,有人就会说,这个开放式句子
: There are as many planets as there are numbers between 1 and
行星的数量与 1 到 1 之间的数字一样多。
was satisfied by the number 9 , which could be so only if 9 existed.
只有在 9 存在的情况下,数字 9 才能满足这一要求。
Along with Frege, Bertrand Russell, the great twentieth-century British philosopher and mathematician, developed an account of what "there are "s" means (where " " is replaced by a numeral) that was meant to avoid commitment to numbers. If you had asked
与弗雷格一样,二十世纪英国伟大的哲学家和数学家伯特兰-罗素(Bertrand Russell)也对 "有 "s "的含义进行了解释(其中 " "由数字代替),以避免对数字的承诺。如果你问
Russell how to say there were exactly two planets, without using the numeral " 2 ", he would have offered the following translation:
如果罗素不使用数字 "2",而是用 "正好有两颗行星 "来表示,那么他会给出如下译文:

FR: There exists an and there exists a such that is a
FR:存在一个 ,也存在一个 ,这样 是一个
planet and is a planet and is not the same thing as and
行星,而 是行星, 并不相同,而且
every planet is identical to or to .
每个星球都与 相同。

If you develop a general method of getting rid of any natural numeral, like " 2 " or " 17 ," in this sort of way, then you have avoided ontological commitment to numbers. The basic idea of Frege and Russell's treatment of numbers was to identify one with the class of all one-membered classes, two with the set of two-membered classes, and so on. They proposed this as an analysis of what numbers really were. But you might start from this idea and develop instead the view that the fact that we could eliminate reference to numbers by formulas such as FR entitled you to conclude that numbers didn't exist. This would be a form of nominalism about numbers: it would hold that while the numerals made sense, they didn't refer to anything. So the numerals were real ("nominalism" comes from the Latin word "nomen," which means "name"), but the numbers were not.
如果您开发出一种通用方法,以这种方式摆脱任何自然数,如 "2 "或 "17",那么您就避免了对数的本体论承诺。弗雷格和罗素处理数的基本思路是把一确定为所有一元类的类,把二确定为二元类的集合,以此类推。他们提出这一点,是为了分析数到底是什么。但是,你可能会从这个想法出发,发展出这样一种观点,即我们可以通过诸如 FR 这样的公式来消除对数的指称,从而得出数并不存在的结论。这将是一种关于数字的唯名论:它认为虽然数字是有意义的,但它们并不指称任何东西。因此,数字是真实的("唯名论 "源于拉丁语 "nomen",意为 "名称"),但数字并不真实。
Once you start thinking about it, in fact, there seem to be very many questions like these about the natures of things-including many ontological questions - that are not about the nomically possible worlds alone. And I'm going to be able to introduce you to discussions of only a few of the many interesting and important topics in metaphysics. I have chosen, in fact, to consider some of the questions that arise in the context of thinking about an issue that has been central to philosophical discussions for more than two thousand years: namely, the nature and existence of God.
事实上,一旦你开始思考,就会发现似乎有很多类似的关于事物本质的问题--包括很多本体论问题--并不只是关于名义上的可能世界。在形而上学众多有趣而重要的话题中,我只能向你们介绍其中几个话题的讨论。事实上,我选择的是在思考一个两千多年来一直是哲学讨论核心的问题时出现的一些问题:即上帝的本质和存在。

8.3 "God" as a proper name
8.3 作为专有名词的 "上帝"

Most people, even those who don't believe in God, think that there could have been a God. So they will concede that there are some possible worlds in which something like the Jewish, Christian, or Moslem God exists. But in the Christian philosophical tradition, which drew on Aristotle's ideas, it has often been claimed not just that God exists in some possible worlds (including, of course, the
大多数人,即使是不信神的人,也认为可能存在一个神。因此,他们会承认,在某些可能的世界里,存在着类似犹太教、基督教或伊斯兰教的上帝。但是,在借鉴了亚里士多德思想的基督教哲学传统中,人们往往不仅声称上帝存在于某些可能的世界(当然包括

actual world) but that he exists in all of them. It is claimed, then, that God is a necessary being. Now, someone who says, "God is a necessary being" and someone who says, "God is not even an actual being" disagree about something that is conceptually even more fundamental than the existence of God. For they have different conceptions of God: in a certain sense, they are not disagreeing about the same thing. A conception of a person (or thing) is a way of thinking of that person (or thing). And there is an important lesson here, which is that when we are discussing whether somebody exists, we need to have some way of thinking of that person in order to be able to evaluate the arguments for his existence.
但他存在于所有这些世界中。因此,有人声称,上帝是一种必然的存在。现在,说 "上帝是一个必然的存在 "的人和说 "上帝甚至不是一个实际的存在 "的人,在比上帝的存在更根本的概念问题上存在分歧。因为他们对上帝有不同的概念:从某种意义上说,他们并不是对同一件事持不同意见。对一个人(或一件事)的概念是对这个人(或这件事)的一种思维方式。这里有一个重要的启示,那就是当我们讨论某个人是否存在时,我们需要对这个人有某种思维方式,以便能够评估他是否存在的论据。
This does not just apply to discussions of God's existence. We made a parallel observation about genes in 4.4: if you can't observe them directly, you need some way of associating the term "gene" with things you can observe. And a similar point applies to proper names other than "God" as well. If I say, "Dorothy exists," there's a sense in which you don't understand what I've said until you have some idea whom it is I'm talking about. And there are two ways in which we are normally introduced to a personal name, such as "Dorothy"-two ways, that is, in which we normally know who it is a name names.
这不仅适用于讨论上帝的存在。我们在 4.4 中也对基因提出了类似的看法:如果你不能直接观察到它们,你就需要用某种方法把 "基因 "这个词与你能观察到的事物联系起来。类似的观点也适用于 "上帝 "以外的专有名词。如果我说 "多萝西是存在的",那么在某种意义上,除非你知道我说的是谁,否则你是不会理解我说的话的。我们通常会通过两种方式来了解一个人的名字,比如 "多萝西"--也就是说,我们通常会通过两种方式来知道这个名字指的是谁。
One way of learning a name is by being introduced to the person, Dorothy herself. Here, in the normal case, you are physically in Dorothy's presence and you see her and learn her name at the same time. Now you have a conception of her as a person who looks and acts a certain way, and provided you remember the meeting, you can associate that person with a certain look, by which you will be able to reidentify her. (Of course, she may have been disguised when you met her and she may change her look later, so there's no guarantee that you'll be able to recognize her again. Still, you do have a conception of her as the person who looked a certain way at the point you were introduced or on other, later, occasions when you saw her again.) Bertrand Russell, whom I mentioned a little while back, called the kind of knowledge you have of a thing that you have directly perceived "knowledge by acquaintance." It's the sort of knowledge you have of people with whom you are acquainted, people you've met.
学习名字的一种方法是通过介绍多萝西本人。在通常情况下,你会亲眼看到多萝西,同时知道她的名字。当然,你见到她时,她可能已经乔装打扮过了,以后她也可能会改变容貌,所以不能保证你能再次认出她。尽管如此,你还是对她有一个概念,即在你被介绍给她的时候,或者在后来你再次见到她的其他场合,她都是以某种方式出现的)。我刚才提到过的伯特兰-罗素把你对直接感知过的事物所拥有的知识称为 "熟知知识"。这是你对你熟悉的人,你见过的人的知识。
A second way of learning a name is by being told some facts about
学习一个名字的第二种方法是,让别人告诉你一些关于这个名字的事实。

a person along with the name. So if I say, "Dorothy is coming," and you say, "Who's Dorothy?" I might reply, "She's the woman who wrote that very good book on metaphysics." Here you come to know of someone not by acquaintance but, as Russell put it, "by description." Knowledge by description is knowledge of a person or thing acquired without direct perception of them. Now, the description I just gave you of Dorothy doesn't look like it is enough to identify her uniquely. There might have been several women who have written very good books on metaphysics. (There are!) And though you know this one is called "Dorothy," there might be several Dorothys who were excellent metaphysical authors. (There are!) But I said that this Dorothy was "the woman who wrote that very good book on metaphysics." And this implies that I think you know which book I am talking about and that there is only one woman I could mean. If that book has only one author, then you do indeed have a piece of information that is uniquely true of the Dorothy I'm talking about. Normally, in fact, when someone introduces a person to you by description, the introducer will usually try to associate with the name a piece of information that picks the introducee out uniquely. To pick something out uniquely is to individuate it. So we can say that normally, when someone introduces a new name to you in the absence of the person named, he or she tries to give you some individuating information about them. He or she tries, that is, to provide an individuating description.
一个人的名字。所以如果我说 "多萝西来了" 你会问 "谁是多萝西?"我可能会回答 "她是写那本形而上学好书的女人"在这里,你对一个人的了解不是通过熟识,而是如罗素所说,"通过描述"。"通过描述 "的知识是指在没有直接感知的情况下获得的关于人或事物的知识。现在,我刚才给你的关于多萝西的描述 看起来并不足以确定她的独特性。可能有好几个女人都写过很好的形而上学书籍。(有的!)虽然你知道这个人叫 "多萝西",但可能有好几个多萝西都是优秀的形而上学作家。(有的!)但我说这个多萝西是 "写了那本非常好的形而上学著作的女人"。这就意味着,我想你知道我说的是哪本书,我指的可能只有一个女人。如果那本书只有一个作者,那么你确实掌握了我所说的桃乐茜的唯一信息。事实上,通常情况下,当有人通过描述向你介绍一个人的时候,介绍者通常会试图在名字中加入一条信息,将被介绍者独特地挑出来。独特地挑出某样东西,就是使它个性化。因此,我们可以说,通常情况下,当有人在被介绍人不在场的情况下向你介绍一个新名字时,他会试图向你提供一些关于被介绍人的个性化信息。也就是说,他或她试图提供一种个性化的描述。
If you have an individuating description of a thing, then you associate something like a Fregean sense with the name of the thing. For, as I said in 3.4, a sense is a way of identifying the referent. And if you have an identifying description, you have a way of identifying the referent. The reason such an individuating description isn't a Fregean sense is that senses are shared among all speakers of the language. But each person can associate a different individuating description with the same name. This is why we don't speak of the "meaning" of a proper name: they don't have shared meanings in this sense, only shared references. When we discussed Frege's "On Sense and Reference," in 3.4, I went along with Frege's idea that "the Morning Star" had a sense. That was easy to do because this is a rather unusual name in that it has, so to speak, a conception of the referent built into it. You can tell from the name that the object in question is supposed
如果你有一个关于事物的个性化描述,那么你就会把类似弗雷格意义的东西与事物的名称联系起来。因为,正如我在 3.4 中所说的,意义是识别所指的一种方式。如果你有一个识别性描述,你就有了一种识别所指的方法。这种识别性描述之所以不是弗雷格意义,是因为意义是所有语言使用者共有的。但每个人都可以将不同的个性化描述与同一个名称联系起来。这就是为什么我们不谈论专有名称的 "意义":在这个意义上,它们没有共享的意义,只有共享的指称。当我们在 3.4 中讨论弗雷格的《论意义与指称》时,我同意了弗雷格关于 "晨星 "具有意义的观点。这很容易做到,因为这是一个相当不寻常的名字,可以说,它包含了一个关于所指的概念。从名字中可以看出,这个物体应该是

to appear near the horizon in the morning. So this is an example of a name that has a public, shared conception associated with it, which is why it was a good example for Frege to use. But, as I say, for names more generally, we don't require that every user have the same conception. Still, everybody needs some conception of a person about whom they are thinking or talking, even if each of us can have a different conception of the same person.
在早晨出现在地平线附近。因此,这是一个与名称相关的公共、共享概念的例子,这也是弗雷格使用它作为例子的原因。但是,正如我所说,对于更一般的名称,我们并不要求每个使用者都有相同的概念。尽管如此,每个人都需要对他们正在思考或谈论的人有一些概念,即使我们每个人对同一个人的概念都可能不同。
One reason it is a good idea to have an individuating description is that since many people can have the same name, there is the possibility of confusion unless you know which Dorothy (or John or Mary) I'm talking about. We can make an analogy here with filing systems on a computer's hard drive. When I say something about a named person to you, you, as it were, store that information in a file labeled with that name. If you think you didn't know the person beforeeither by acquaintance or description-you open a new file.
有一个个性化的描述是个好主意,原因之一是由于很多人都可能有相同的名字,除非你知道我说的是哪个多萝西(Dorothy)(或约翰(John)或玛丽(Mary)),否则就有可能造成混淆。我们可以用电脑硬盘上的文件系统来做类比。当我对你说起某个人的名字时,你就会把这些信息存储在标有这个名字的文件中。如果你认为你以前不认识这个人,无论是通过熟人还是描述,你就会打开一个新的文件。
There are thus three major kinds of possible confusion about names:
因此,在地名方面可能出现的混淆主要有三种:
  1. You can file information about two different people in the same file.
    您可以在同一个文件中归档两个不同人的信息。
  2. You can file information about the same person in different files.
    您可以在不同的文件中归档同一个人的信息。
  3. You can mistakenly open a file when there isn't a person at all.
    您可能会在根本没有人的情况下错误地打开文件。
But if you have a piece of (true) individuating information in the file, you have a way in which, at least in principle, you can sort these confusions out.
但是,如果你在文件中有一条(真正的)个性化信息,你就有办法,至少在原则上,你可以把这些混淆的地方理清。
Take the first kind of confusion: mixing information about two distinct people. This happens quite often, just because names are shared. I hear you saying something about someone called "Michael" and I file it away in the file for Michael Jordan; but in fact you were talking about Michael Jackson. If I have an individuating description of Michael Jordan-"the world's best basketball player," say-then all I need to do to avoid mixing these two people up is to find out whether the person you're talking about fits the description. Of course, I may not be able to find this out: but if I have no individuating description of a person, then there's no way I can keep my files from getting muddled up even in principle.
就拿第一种混淆来说:把两个不同的人的信息混在一起。这种情况经常发生,因为名字是共用的。我听到你在说一个叫 "迈克尔 "的人,我就把它归入迈克尔-乔丹的档案;但事实上,你说的是迈克尔-杰克逊。如果我对迈克尔-乔丹有一个个性化的描述--比如说 "世界上最好的篮球运动员"--那么要避免把这两个人混为一谈,我所需要做的就是找出你所说的那个人是否符合这个描述。当然,我可能无法找出这一点:但如果我对一个人没有个性化的描述,那么即使在原则上,我也无法避免我的文件被弄混。
There's a similar reason for wanting individuating descriptions: to avoid filing information about the same person in two files. Again, this is something that can easily happen. Somebody might be introduced to you on one occasion (by acquaintance, let's suppose) as "Professor Moriarty" and on another occasion by the description "Jane, my mother's best friend." As you collect more information about Jane and about Professor Moriarty, you might notice that they have a lot in common. If you have an individuating description of Professor Moriarty - and you do because you met her-you can ask whether Jane has some of these individuating properties. If she does, you can merge the files! And the way you record that merger in English is to say, "Ah, I see. Jane is Professor Moriarty."
需要个性化描述还有一个类似的原因:避免将同一个人的信息归档到两个文件中。同样,这种情况也很容易发生。某个人可能在某个场合(假设是熟人介绍)被称为 "莫里亚蒂教授",而在另一个场合则被描述为 "简,我母亲最好的朋友"。随着你收集更多关于简和莫里亚蒂教授的信息,你可能会发现他们有很多共同点。如果你有关于莫里亚蒂教授的个性化描述--因为你见过她,所以你有--你可以问问简是否也有其中的一些个性化特征。如果她有,你就可以合并文件!你用英语记录合并的方式就是说:"啊,我明白了。简就是莫里亚蒂教授"
Finally, if you have a piece of information that is uniquely satisfied by one person, then you know that you aren't opening a file for someone who doesn't exist. It's because names work like file labels in this sort of way that we don't often say things like "Dorothy exists." I wouldn't have opened a file for information if I didn't think the person existed; and until I have a file, I won't really understand whom you're talking about. And you couldn't introduce me to someone by acquaintance or by an individuating description unless they existed. So the very use of a name ordinarily commits you to the existence of the person named.
最后,如果你有一个唯一满足一个人的信息,那么你就知道你并没有为一个不存在的人打开文件。正是因为名字以这种方式像文件标签一样起作用,我们才不会经常说 "多萝西存在 "这样的话。如果我认为这个人不存在,我就不会为他打开档案;而在我拿到档案之前,我也不会真正明白你说的是谁。你不可能通过熟人或个性化的描述向我介绍一个人,除非他确实存在。因此,名字的使用本身就意味着被命名者的存在。
Bertrand Russell's analysis suggests that when people say, "Soand-so exists," what they really mean is that there's something that satisfies a certain individuating description. So, for example, I might tell you a very sad story about someone called "Mary," as if it were fictional. Suppose at the end of the tale I looked extremely glum. You might seek to cheer me up by saying, "Come on, it's only a story. Mary doesn't exist." And if I replied, "Oh yes she does," you would take me to be saying that there was an actual person about whom the story I had just told was true. If we took all the references to Mary out of my story and replaced them with a variable, "X," and then wrote in front of the story "There is something, X, such that ... "we would have captured what I learn when you say, "Yes, she does exist." (Notice that this is just our old friend the Ramsey-sentence again. We have just written the Ramsey-sentence of my sad story.) Now you can open a file for Mary and put this information in it.
伯特兰-罗素的分析表明,当人们说 "某某存在 "时,他们真正的意思是有某种东西满足了某种个性化的描述。因此,举例来说,我可能会给你讲一个关于一个叫 "玛丽 "的人的非常悲伤的故事,就好像这个故事是虚构的一样。假设在故事的结尾,我看起来非常沮丧。你可能会安慰我说:"别这样,这只是个故事。玛丽并不存在"。如果我回答说:"哦,她确实存在。"你就会认为我是在说,我刚才讲的故事中确实有一个人。如果我们从我的故事中删除所有关于玛丽的内容,代之以一个变量 "X",然后在故事前面写上 "有一件事,X,比如......",我们就能捕捉到我所学到的东西。"当你说 "是的,她确实存在 "时,我们就能捕捉到我学到的东西了。(注意,这又是我们的老朋友拉姆齐句式。我们刚刚写下了我悲伤故事的拉姆齐句)。现在你可以为玛丽打开一个文件,把这些信息放进去。
This consideration of how we use ordinary proper names, such as
对我们如何使用普通专有名词,如
"Jane" and "Dorothy," suggests a way to proceed with thinking about the name "God." When somebody says, "God exists," we need to ask what conception of God, what individuating description (or descriptions) of God we should rely on in evaluating this claim. And we can understand the person to be saying that there exists something that satisfies that individuating description.
"简 "和 "多萝西 "提出了一种思考 "上帝 "这个名字的方法。当有人说 "上帝是存在的 "时,我们需要问的是,在评价这一说法时,我们应该依据什么样的上帝概念、什么样的上帝个性化描述(或描述)。我们可以理解为,这个人是在说,存在着某种符合这种个性化描述的东西。
This is a point that David Hume puts in the mouth of Cleanthes, a character in his famous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, first published in 1779. Cleanthes says very near the beginning of Part IV of the Dialogues.
这是大卫-休谟在其著名的《自然宗教对话录》(Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion)(1779 年首次出版)中借克莱恩特斯(Cleanthes)之口提出的观点。克里安特斯在《对话录》第四部分的开头说:
The Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which we can have no comprehension; but, if our ideas, so far as they go, be not just and adequate and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on.
我很乐意承认,神灵拥有许多我们无法理解的力量和属性;但是,如果我们的想法,就其本身而言,不公正、不充分、不符合神灵的真实本性,我就不知道在这个问题上还有什么值得坚持的。
Cleanthes is arguing that unless we have some conception of God, it is hard to see what point there is in saying we believe in him.
克利安提斯认为,除非我们对上帝有某种概念,否则很难说我们相信上帝有什么意义。
Because "God" is a proper name, it doesn't have a fixed sense associated with it, so different people may identify God in different ways. As we saw with Dorothy, that need not lead to trouble as long as everybody is in fact talking about the same person. But as we also saw, with the mixed-up Michaels and Professor Moriarty just now, we should be on the lookout for two possible confusions. One is that different people are using the word "God" to talk about different persons. The other is that God is known to us in many different ways, but we have not recognized that he is, in fact, only one person.
因为 "上帝 "是一个专有名词,它没有固定的含义,所以不同的人会用不同的方式来称呼上帝。正如我们在多萝西身上看到的那样,只要大家谈论的其实是同一个人,这就不会带来麻烦。但是,正如我们刚才从混淆的迈克尔斯和莫里亚蒂教授身上所看到的,我们应该警惕两种可能的混淆。一是不同的人在用 "上帝 "一词谈论不同的人。另一种情况是,上帝以许多不同的方式为我们所知,但我们却没有认识到他其实只有一个人。
And, of course, there is always the possibility that we opened a file for God in error, and there is no such being at all.
当然,还有一种可能是,我们错误地打开了上帝的档案,而根本不存在这样的存在。

8.4 The necessary being
8.4 必要条件

I mentioned earlier one of the great divides in metaphysical thinking about God in the Western philosophical tradition, namely the divide between those who think God is a necessary being and those who do not. This distinction is related to another, epistemological, distinction: some people think that God's existence can be proved a priori by reason alone; others think that our knowledge of God's existence is a posteriori. These distinctions are connected because if
我在前面提到过西方哲学传统中关于上帝的形而上学思想的一个巨大分歧,即认为上帝是必然存在的人与不认为上帝是必然存在的人之间的分歧。这种分歧与认识论上的另一种分歧有关:一些人认为上帝的存在可以仅凭理性先验地证明;另一些人则认为我们对上帝存在的认识是后验的。这些区别是相互关联的,因为如果

we can know of God's existence a priori, then the arguments for God's existence do not depend on any particular matters of fact about the actual world. But then it seems likely that those arguments would apply in any possible world. And if God exists in any possible world, then he is, indeed, a necessary being.
我们可以先验地知道上帝的存在,那么上帝存在的论证就不依赖于现实世界的任何特定事实。但这样看来,这些论证很可能适用于任何可能的世界。如果上帝存在于任何可能的世界,那么他确实是一个必然的存在。
The best-known of the a priori arguments for the existence of God-which goes back to the great eleventh-century Christian philosopher St. Anselm, who was archbishop of Canterbury in England - is called the ontological argument. The argument is deceptively simple. In the famous version Anselm gave in his Proslogion, it reads as follows:
在关于上帝存在的先验论证中,最著名的论证可追溯到十一世纪伟大的基督教哲学家圣安瑟伦,他曾任英国坎特伯雷大主教,被称为本体论论证。这个论证非常简单。安瑟伦在其《箴言》(Proslogion)中给出了著名的版本,内容如下:

Abstract 摘要

So even the foolish person is convinced that that than which nothing greater can be conceived is in his understanding, because what he hears he understands, and what is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it actually only existed in the understanding, it could be conceived to exist in reality, which would be greater. If therefore that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists only in the understanding, then that than which nothing greater can be conceived is something than which something greater can be conceived. But certainly that cannot be. There exists therefore, without doubt, something than which nothing greater can be conceived, both in the understanding and in reality.
因此,即使是愚笨的人也会相信,没有比这更伟大的东西存在于他的理解之中,因为他所听到的他就能理解,而理解的东西就存在于理解之中。当然,再伟大的东西也不可能只存在于理解之中。因为,如果它实际上只存在于理解之中,那么它就可以被想象为存在于现实之中,这将是更伟大的。因此,如果没有比它更大的东西只能存在于理解之中,那么没有比它更大的东西就只能存在于更大的东西之中。但这肯定是不可能的。因此,毫无疑问,无论是在认识中还是在现实中,都存在着某种东西,它是任何东西都无法比拟的。

(The foolish person Anselm has in mind is the fool in Isaiah 7:9, who has "said in his heart that there is no God.")
(安瑟伦心目中的愚人是以赛亚书 7:9 中的愚人,他 "心里说没有神")。
Let me lay this argument out just a little more formally. The idea of God is the idea of the greatest conceivable being. Let us call the greatest conceivable being "Alpha." Alpha is greater, by this definition, than all other beings. Now we argue, as Anselm does, by reductio.
让我再正式地阐述一下这个论点。上帝的概念就是可以想象的最伟大存在的概念。我们把最伟大的存在称为 "阿尔法"根据这个定义,阿尔法比所有其他存在都伟大。现在,我们像安瑟伦一样,用还原法来论证。
Suppose Alpha doesn't exist.
假设阿尔法不存在。
Then there's another conceivable being exactly like Alpha, except that he exists. Call that being "Beta."
那么还有一种可以想象的存在,与阿尔法一模一样,只不过他是存在的。我们称之为 "Beta"
G: What exists is greater than what doesn't exist.
G:存在的大于不存在的。
So: Beta is greater than Alpha.
那么Beta 大于 Alpha。
Alpha is greater than all other beings.
阿尔法比其他一切生命都伟大。
Alpha is greater than Beta.
阿尔法大于贝塔。
So: Beta is not greater than Alpha.
所以Beta 不大于 Alpha。
Our assumption that Alpha doesn't exist has led to a contradiction.
我们认为阿尔法不存在的假设导致了一个矛盾。
So: Alpha does exist.
那么阿尔法确实存在
Q.E.D.
If proving the existence of God were this straightforward, there would probably be fewer nonbelievers! So, as you would anticipate, many difficulties can be and have been raised for the ontological argument. One of the most obvious difficulties lies with the assumption that I labeled "G" above: the claim that what exists is greater than what doesn't exist. Is this really a reasonable claim? What does it mean to say that Beta is greater than Alpha because it exists? Before accepting this argument, we should surely want to understand this premise better.
如果证明上帝的存在这么简单,那么不信神的人可能就会减少!因此,正如你所预料的那样,本体论论证可能会遇到很多困难,而且已经遇到了很多困难。其中一个最明显的困难在于我上面标注为 "G "的假设:存在的东西比不存在的东西大。这种说法真的合理吗?说 Beta 大于 Alpha 是因为它存在,这是什么意思?在接受这个论点之前,我们肯定想更好地理解这个前提。
Descartes offered, in the fourth discourse of The Discourse on Method, a different version of the ontological argument, which might help us to understand this premise. He relies on his basic assumption that we may believe anything that we conceive clearly and distinctly to be true. Here is how he made the argument:
笛卡尔在《方法论》的第四篇论述中提出了一个不同版本的本体论论证,这或许有助于我们理解这一前提。他所依据的基本假设是:我们可以相信任何我们清晰明确地认为是真的东西。他是这样提出论证的:
For example, I could see very well that, if one considered a triangle, its three angles had to be equal to two right angles, but I could see nothing of the same sort that assured me that there would be any actual triangle in the world: whereas returning to the examination of the idea that I had of a perfect being, I found that existence was included in that idea in the same way that it is included in the idea of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles or in the idea of a sphere that all its parts are equally distant from its center, or even more obviously so; and that, as a consequence, it is at least as certain that God, who is this so perfect being, is or exists, as any demonstration in geometry can be.
例如,我可以很清楚地看到,如果考虑一个三角形,它的三个角必须等于两个直角,但我看不到任何同类的东西能让我确信世界上会有任何真实的三角形:然而,当我重新审视我对完美存在的想法时,我发现存在包含在这个想法中,就像存在包含在三角形的想法中,即三角形的三个角等于两个直角,或者存在在球体的想法中,即球体的所有部分离球心的距离相等,甚至更明显;因此,至少可以肯定,上帝--这个如此完美的存在--是或存在着,就像几何学中的任何证明一样。
Here the argument is phrased not in terms of greatness but in terms of perfection. The idea is that existence is an aspect of perfection, so that a perfect being must exist. This is also a possible elucidation of Anselm's thought, since by a perfect being we might just mean one than which none greater could be conceived.
这里的论点不是从伟大的角度,而是从完美的角度来表述的。这个观点认为,存在是完美的一个方面,因此完美的存在必须存在。这也是对安瑟伦思想的一种可能的阐释,因为我们所说的完美存在可能只是指一个无法想象的更伟大的存在。
Unfortunately, however, Descartes' notion that existence is conceptually included in perfection is not really much clearer (despite what he says!) than the idea that what exists is "greater" than what does not. There are two elements to the claim that something is the greatest or the most perfect thing of a certain sort. One is that nothing is greater or more perfect than it is; this is the "comparative claim." And the other is a "uniqueness claim": there is nothing else that is as great or perfect as it is. If "great" means just large in size, then there's nothing larger than the whole universe: everything else is a part of it and, therefore, smaller. And it's unique. Clearly if anything at all exists, then the universe-understood as the sum of all there is-exists.
然而,遗憾的是,笛卡尔关于存在在概念上包含在完美之中的观点,其实并不比存在的东西比不存在的东西 "更伟大 "的观点更清晰(尽管他是这么说的!)。说某种东西是最伟大或最完美的东西有两个要素。一个是没有什么比它更伟大或更完美;这是 "比较主张"。另一个是 "唯一性主张":没有任何其他事物能像它一样伟大或完美。如果 "伟大 "只是指体积大,那么就没有比整个宇宙更大的东西了:其他一切都只是宇宙的一部分,因此也更小。它是独一无二的。显然,如果有任何事物存在,那么宇宙--理解为所有事物的总和--就存在。
That the physical universe exists is not quite a necessary truth, however; there could have been nothing at all, apart from whatever abstract objects exist necessarily. But since a possible world is defined by what is true in it, and since the truths about the necessary existents are the only things that are true in that possible world, there's only one possible world in which the universe doesn't exist. (Some metaphysicians will think I should say there are two: the universe also doesn't exist in the impossible world, which is the one world where everything is true and everything is false . . but, of course, it does exist there as well! Others might think that the impossible world, though it turns out to be a useful technical device in modal logic, isn't something that exists in the way that other possible worlds do.) In short, if the ontological proof is taken to show that the universe exists, it doesn't quite do the job of showing that it's a necessary being, though it gets about as close as you can get. But Anselm would have said so if he thought that his proof had the lessthan-stunning conclusion that the universe existed!
然而,物理宇宙的存在并不完全是必然的真理;除了必然存在的抽象对象之外,可能什么都不存在。但是,既然一个可能的世界是由它的真谛所定义的,既然关于必然存在者的真理是该可能世界中唯一的真谛,那么宇宙不存在的可能世界就只有一个。(有些形而上学者会认为我应该说有两个:宇宙在不可能世界中也不存在,而不可能世界是一个万物皆真、万物皆假的世界......当然,宇宙在那里也确实存在!还有一些人可能认为,不可能世界虽然是模态逻辑中一个有用的技术手段,但它并不像其他可能世界那样存在(the impossible world, though it turns out to be a useful technical device in modal logic, isn't something that exists in the way that other possible worlds do)。简而言之,如果本体论证明是为了证明宇宙的存在,那么它并不能完全证明宇宙是一个必然的存在,尽管它已经尽可能地接近了。但是,如果安瑟伦认为他的证明得出了 "宇宙存在 "这个不那么惊人的结论,他就会这么说!
Descartes' talk of "perfection" implies not just great size, however, but also some more substantial properties, perhaps even moral or aesthetic ones. (And presumably that's what Anselm meant, too.) But then there are reasons to doubt premise G. Suppose we take
然而,笛卡尔所说的 "完美 "不仅意味着巨大的体积,还意味着一些更实质性的属性,甚至可能是道德或审美属性(安瑟伦大概也是这个意思)。(安瑟伦大概也是这个意思吧)但我们有理由怀疑前提 G。

"perfect" to mean morally or aesthetically as good as can be. (And from now on in this discussion, I'll use "good" as shorthand for "morally or aesthetically good.") Consider a person in the actual world - call her Jane Actual-and another good person in some other possible world - call her Jane Possible. Suppose that everything that Jane Actual does, Jane Possible does also, that they look identical, and that everything that happens to Jane Actual happens to Jane Possible. (So I shall say the two Janes are "cross-world twins.") G says, in effect, that Jane Actual is better than Jane Possible just because she exists. But why?
"完美 "的意思是在道德或美学上尽善尽美。(从现在起,在本讨论中,我将使用 "好 "作为 "道德上或美学上的好 "的简称)。考虑一个现实世界中的人--称她为 "现实简"(Jane Actual)--和另一个可能世界中的好人--称她为 "可能简"(Jane Possible)。假设 "现实的简 "所做的一切,"可能的简 "也会做,她们看起来一模一样,"现实的简 "所发生的一切,"可能的简 "也会发生。(所以我说这两个简是 "跨世界双胞胎"。)G 实际上是说,"现实简 "比 "可能简 "更好,仅仅因为她存在。但为什么呢?
Imagine Dorothy Possible, a metaphysician in Jane Possible's world, thinking about this question. In her world, of course, Jane Possible will be better than Jane Actual by this argument, because from where Dorothy Possible sits it is Jane Possible who exists, not Jane Actual! Interpreting G requires that we should be able to compare people in different possible worlds and say absolutely which of them is closer to perfection. But if is right, then in every possible world each person is better than his or her identical cross-world twins in other possible worlds. Judgments of which is better and which is worse cannot be made, then, except relative to a particular world. So if G (understood as making a claim about what is morally best) is right, we can't make the very comparisons requires.
想象一下,在简-可能的世界里,形而上学家多萝西-可能正在思考这个问题。当然,在她的世界里,根据这个论点,简-可能比简-实际要好,因为从多萝西-可能所处的位置来看,存在的是简-可能,而不是简-实际!解释《G》要求我们能够比较不同可能世界中的人,并绝对说出哪一个更接近完美。但是,如果 是正确的,那么在每一个可能的世界中,每个人都比他或她在其他可能世界中的同卵双胞胎更好。那么,除了相对于某个特定的世界之外,就无法判断哪个更好,哪个更坏了。因此,如果G(被理解为对什么是道德上最好的主张)是对的,我们就不能进行 所要求的比较。
I should be clear that I've been using "exists" in two senses. In one sense something exists if it exists in a possible world: but, as you know, to say that is just to say that it might have existed. In this sense, golden mountains exist. In another sense, it exists if it exists in the actual world. In this sense, Mount Everest exists. Now, the word "exists" in
我应该清楚,我一直在两种意义上使用 "存在 "一词。在一种意义上,如果一个事物存在于一个可能的世界中,它就是存在的:但是,正如你们所知,这么说只是说它可能存在过。在这个意义上,金山是存在的。在另一种意义上,如果它存在于现实世界中,它就是存在的。从这个意义上说,珠穆朗玛峰是存在的。现在,"存在 "一词在
G: What exists is greater than what doesn't exist
G:存在的大于不存在的
really means "exists in the actual world." So the claim is that a thing is better if it exists in the actual world than if it just exists in some other worlds. One way of putting the problem for is to ask why we should think what is in the actual world is superior in some moral or aesthetic way to other possible worlds.
的真正意思是 "存在于现实世界中"。因此,我们的主张是,如果一件事物存在于现实世界中,它就比仅仅存在于其他世界中更好。 解决这个问题的一种方法是,我们为什么要认为现实世界中的事物在道德或美学方面优于其他可能的世界。
There seem, at any rate, to be reasons for doubting that the ontological argument, at least as I have reconstructed it above, is sound,
无论如何,我们似乎有理由怀疑本体论的论证,至少是我在上文所重构的论证,是否合理、

however we understand G. For this form of argument allows us to conclude that many rather surprising things exist: for example, the greatest conceivable television soap opera! Let us call the greatest conceivable TV soap "Alpha." Alpha is greater, by this definition, than all other TV soaps. Now we argue, as Anselm does, by reductio.
无论我们如何理解 G,这种论证方式都能让我们得出结论,许多令人惊讶的事物是存在的:例如,可以想象的最伟大的电视肥皂剧!让我们把最伟大的电视肥皂剧称为 "阿尔法"。根据这个定义,阿尔法比其他所有电视剧都伟大。现在,我们就像安瑟伦那样,用还原法来论证。
Suppose Alpha doesn't exist.
假设阿尔法不存在。
Then there's another conceivable TV soap exactly like Alpha, except that it exists. Call that possible TV soap opera "Beta."
那么,还有一个可以想象的电视肥皂剧与《阿尔法》一模一样,只不过它存在。把这个可能的电视肥皂剧叫做 "Beta"。
G: What exists is greater than what doesn't exist.
G:存在的大于不存在的。
So: Beta is greater than Alpha.
那么Beta 大于 Alpha。
Alpha is greater than all other soap operas.
阿尔法》比其他所有肥皂剧都伟大。
Alpha is greater than Beta.
阿尔法大于贝塔。
So: Beta is not greater than Alpha.
所以Beta 不大于 Alpha。
Our assumption that Alpha doesn't exist has led to a contradiction.
我们认为阿尔法不存在的假设导致了一个矛盾。
So: Alpha does exist.
那么阿尔法确实存在

Q.E.D.

Somewhere there's a perfect television soap opera, so why can't I find it? An objection pretty much like this was made in St Anselm's own day. An eleventh-century monk named Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, who was a contemporary of Anselm's, argued, by way of a reductio of Anselm's proof that a similar argument showed that there was an ideal island somewhere. Gaunilo concluded:
在某个地方有一部完美的电视肥皂剧,为什么我找不到呢?在圣安瑟伦的时代,就有人提出过类似的反对意见。十一世纪一位名叫马穆蒂耶的高尼洛的修道士是安瑟伦的同时代人,他通过对安瑟伦的证明进行还原,认为类似的论证表明在某个地方存在一个理想的岛屿。高尼洛的结论是
If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly exists, and that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should believe that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard as the greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose that he had established with any certainty the existence of this island.
如果有人试图用这样的推理向我证明,这个岛真的存在,而且它的存在不应再受到怀疑,那么,要么我相信他是在开玩笑,要么我不知道我应该把谁看成是更大的傻瓜:是我自己,假定我允许这种证明;还是他,如果他假定他已经肯定地证实了这个岛的存在。
Since the rest of the argument seems to depend only on definitions, we might be inclined to conclude that it is G that is doing the damage here, and then we could say that, whatever Anselm meant by "greater," G just isn't true.
由于论证的其余部分似乎只依赖于定义,我们可能会倾向于得出结论:是 G 在这里造成了破坏,然后我们可以说,不管安瑟伦所说的 "更大 "是什么意思,G 就是不正确的。

8.5 Hume: No a priori proofs of matters of fact
8.5 休谟事实问题没有先验证明

Both Hume and Kant raised specific objections to the structure of the ontological argument. In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Cleanthes makes the following objection:
休谟和康德都对本体论论证的结构提出了具体的反对意见。在《关于自然宗教的对话》中,克莱恩特斯提出了如下反对意见:
I shall begin with observing that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any argument a priori. Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose nonexistence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.
我首先要指出,假装证明一个事实,或用任何先验论证来证明它,显然是荒谬的。除非相反的东西意味着矛盾,否则没有任何东西是可以证明的。任何明显可以想象的事物都不意味着矛盾。凡是我们认为存在的,我们也可以认为不存在。因此,没有任何存在的不存在意味着矛盾。因此,没有任何存在是可以证明的。我认为这个论证是完全决定性的,我愿意把整个争论建立在这个论证之上。
What Hume is saying here is that you can never establish the matter-of-fact existence of a particular thing by way of an a priori argument. (Remember that by "demonstration" Hume means proof, so "demonstrable" means provable.)
休谟在这里说的是,你永远无法通过先验论证的方式确定某一事物的事实存在。(请记住,休谟所说的 "论证 "是指证明,所以 "可论证 "就是可证明的意思)。
Hume's argument is a little more controversial than this rather breezy formulation suggests, because, as we have already seen, some people suppose we can establish the existence of certain things-a prime number between 17 and 23 , for example-by way of proof. Numbers therefore seem to exist in every possible world. If that is the case, their existence refutes Hume's observation in the next paragraph that "the words necessary existence have no meaning." But Hume actually didn't believe numbers existed - he thought mathematical truths were "relations of ideas," not "matters of fact"-so that wouldn't impress him. And he is discussing not mathematical or abstract entities here but what he calls "matters of fact." The existence of matter-of-fact entities-things such as people and planetsdoes seem to be something that cannot be decided a priori.
休谟的论证比这种轻描淡写的表述更具争议性,因为正如我们已经看到的,有些人认为我们可以通过证明的方式来确定某些事物的存在--例如,17 到 23 之间的质数。因此,数字似乎存在于每一个可能的世界中。如果是这样的话,它们的存在就反驳了休谟在下一段中的观点,即 "必然存在这个词没有任何意义"。但休谟实际上并不相信数字的存在--他认为数学真理是 "观念关系",而不是 "事实问题"--所以这不会给他留下深刻印象。他在这里讨论的不是数学或抽象实体,而是他所说的 "事实问题"。事实问题的实体--比如人和行星--的存在似乎是无法先验决定的。
Now, St. Anselm or Descartes could reply that Hume was begging the question here, for if the ontological argument is correct,
现在,圣安瑟伦或笛卡尔可以回答说,休谟在这里是在乞求问题,因为如果本体论论证是正确的、
God, like the number 19, exists in every possible world and his existence is not just a "matter of fact." If God is a necessary existence, then he's certainly unlike people and planets, so the fact that you can't prove the existence of planets and people a priori is neither here nor there. Still, Hume's objection captures something of our initial reluctance to accept Anselm's argument, I think: it just looks like you couldn't get an interesting conclusion from such a swift a priori argument.
上帝就像数字 19 一样,存在于每一个可能的世界中,他的存在不仅仅是一个 "事实问题"。如果上帝是一种必然的存在,那么他肯定不同于人和行星,所以你无法先验地证明行星和人的存在这一事实既不在这里,也不在那里。不过,休谟的反对意见还是捕捉到了我们最初不愿意接受安瑟伦论证的一些原因:看起来你无法从如此迅速的先验论证中得到一个有趣的结论。
In any case, most religious people have a conception of God that is not just the rather arid conception of a "being greater than which none can be conceived." So that even if there were such a being, it isn't clear that it would do as the object of religious faith. For, at least in the West, most people who have believed in God have thought of him as a person. In fact, the ontological argument doesn't seem to have moved many people from disbelief to belief. And St. Thomas Aquinas, who was the leading Christian thinker of the Middle Ages, rejected Anselm's arguments, even though, as we shall see soon, he thought that there were other sound arguments for the existence of God.
无论如何,大多数信教的人对上帝的概念并不只是 "没有人能想象的更伟大的存在 "这种相当空洞的概念。因此,即使真有这样一个存在,也不一定能成为宗教信仰的对象。因为,至少在西方,大多数信仰上帝的人都认为上帝是一个人。事实上,本体论的论证似乎并没有让很多人从不信到信。圣托马斯-阿奎那是中世纪基督教的主要思想家,他拒绝接受安瑟伦的论证,尽管我们很快就会看到,他认为上帝的存在还有其他合理的论证。

8.6 Kant: "Existence" is not a predicate
8.6 康德"存在 "不是谓词

Kant's objection to the ontological argument was grounded in a logical point about the idea of existence. He argued that "existence" wasn't really a predicate at all, certainly not a predicate like "being red" or "weighing 200 pounds." For one thing, something can't be red or weigh 200 pounds unless it exists. You can't discuss what color or weight something is and then go on to consider, as a further question, whether it has the property of existing.
康德反对本体论论证的依据是关于 "存在 "这一概念的逻辑观点。他认为,"存在 "并不是一个真正的谓词,当然也不是像 "红色 "或 "重 200 磅 "那样的谓词。首先,除非某物存在,否则它不可能是红色的,也不可能有 200 磅重。你不能先讨论某物是什么颜色或重量,然后再进一步考虑它是否具有存在的属性。
Both Anselm's and Descartes' arguments effectively proceed by saying something like this:
安瑟伦和笛卡尔的论证实际上都是这样进行的:
It follows from the conception of God that he has (the property) existence.
根据上帝的概念,他具有(存在的属性)。
Kant was arguing that, while it could be part of the conception of a thing that it was red or heavy, it couldn't be part of the conception of an individual thing that it had Existence, for there is no such property for individual things to have.
康德认为,虽然 "红 "或 "重 "可以是事物概念的一部分,但 "存在 "不可能是单个事物概念的一部分,因为单个事物并不具备这样的属性。
This claim is bound to seem paradoxical, since we do say that individual things exist. Didn't I say, in 3.5, that a predicate corresponded to an open sentence with one blank? And isn't “ exists" a perfectly good open sentence that is satisfied by you, me, and the postman? Indeed, didn't we discuss in Chapter 2, an argument of Descartes' whose conclusion was "I exist"?
这种说法必然显得自相矛盾,因为我们确实说过个别事物是存在的。我在 3.5 中不是说过,一个谓词对应于一个有一个空白的开放句子吗?而 "存在 "不正是一个很好的开放式句子吗?事实上,我们在第 2 章中不是讨论过笛卡尔的一个论证,其结论是 "我存在 "吗?
You can see what is going on here more clearly if you recall the idea of the existential quantifier that I introduced in Chapter 3. I said there that "There exists an X such that X F" means something satisfies the open sentence "__F." Now we can see the force of Kant's objection. Both Anselm and Descartes say that it's part of the definition, part of the concept, of God that he exists. So they want to say something like this:
如果回顾一下我在第 3 章中介绍的存在量词的概念,就能更清楚地了解这里发生了什么。我在那里说过,"存在一个 X,使得 X F "意味着某物满足开放句"__F"。现在我们可以看到康德反对意见的力量了。安瑟伦和笛卡尔都说,上帝存在是上帝定义的一部分,是上帝概念的一部分。所以他们想这样说
ANSELM: If there is an and a such that and have the same properties except that has Existence and doesn't, then is greater than .
答案:如果有一个 和一个 ,使得 除了 存在而 不存在之外,具有相同的属性,那么 大于
DESCARTES: If there is an such that is perfect, then has Existence.
DESCARTES:如果有一个 ,使 完美无缺,那么 就存在。
But Existence isn't something that you have: rather, to exist is to satisfy some open sentence. So these premises of the two versions of the ontological argument aren't true. And so, the argument, even if it were valid, isn't sound.
但是,"存在 "并不是你所拥有的东西:相反,"存在 "就是满足某个开放的句子。因此,本体论论证的两个版本的前提都不成立。因此,这个论证即使成立,也是不靠谱的。
Frege, who invented the modern treatment of the existential quantifier, put this by saying that "Existence" wasn't a first-order predicate-that is, one expressing a property of things-but rather a second-order predicate, that is, one expressing a property of firstorder properties. (Thus "is red" is a first-order predicate, and "is common" is acting as a second-order predicate when we say, "Redness is common.")
弗雷格发明了现代存在量词的处理方法,他认为 "存在 "不是一阶谓词,即表达事物属性的谓词,而是二阶谓词,即表达一阶属性的谓词。(因此,"是红色的 "是一个一阶谓词,而当我们说 "红色是常见的 "时,"是常见的 "就充当了一个二阶谓词)。
To say that something exists, on this view, is to say that some firstorder properties, such as redness, have instances - that is, to claim that an open sentence, such as "——is red," is satisfied. You can't just be, in other words; you have to be something or other. "X exists" isn't, strictly speaking, meaningful. As we saw with Mary (of the sad story in 8.3), when we say someone exists, what we're really saying is that some individuating description is satisfied.
根据这种观点,说某物存在,就是说某些一阶属性,比如红色,有实例--也就是说,声称一个开放的句子,比如"--是红色的",得到了满足。换句话说,你不能只是 "是",你必须是某物或其他。严格来说,"X 存在 "并没有意义。正如我们在玛丽(8.3 中的悲伤故事)身上看到的,当我们说某人存在时,我们真正要说的是某种个性化描述得到了满足。
There are some significant reasons for wanting to avoid treating "Existence" as a first-order predicate. One I have already mentioned. It just doesn't seem right to say that an object has the property of existing (the property I have been calling "Existence," with a capital "E") in the way in which it can have the property of being red or heavy.
要避免将 "存在 "视为一阶谓词,有一些重要的原因。其中一个我已经提到过。说一个物体具有 "存在 "的属性(我一直称其为 "存在",大写的 "E"),就像说它具有 "红色 "或 "重 "的属性一样,这似乎是不对的。
A second problem comes when we think about nonexistence. The idea of nonexistence is somewhat paradoxical, as the following argument shows.
当我们思考 "不存在 "时,第二个问题就出现了。正如下面的论证所示,不存在的概念有些自相矛盾。
The argument has two premises. The first is an assumption about the relationship between properties and their "opposites." Ordinarily, when something has a property, it makes sense to suppose that there might have been something that didn't have the property. Ordinarily, that is, if being-F is a property, then not-being is a property, too. So our first assumption is:
这个论证有两个前提。第一个前提是关于属性与其 "对立面 "之间关系的假设。通常情况下,当某个事物具有某种属性时,假设可能存在不具有该属性的事物是合理的。通常,如果存在-F 是一种属性,那么不存在 也是一种属性。因此,我们的第一个假设是
E: If Existence is a property, Nonexistence is a property.
E:如果 "存在 "是一种属性,那么 "不存在 "也是一种属性。
The second assumption is that when a sentence of the form
第二个假设是,当一个句子的形式为
A has the property
A 具有以下性质
is true, then we may infer
为真,那么我们可以推断出
There exists something that has F.
有 F 的存在。
This assumption is the logical principle of existential generalization. Now, given E, we suppose that when we say, "Romeo doesn't exist," what we're saying is equivalent to:
这个假设就是存在性概括的逻辑原则。现在,给定 E,我们假设当我们说 "罗密欧不存在 "时,我们所说的等同于:
Romeo has the property of Nonexistence.
罗密欧具有不存在的特性。
By existential generalization we get:
通过存在性概括,我们得到
C: There exists something that has the property of Nonexistence.
C:存在某种具有 "不存在 "属性的东西。
But this just looks contradictory: how can there exist something that doesn't exist?
但这看起来自相矛盾:不存在的东西怎么可能存在呢?
If isn't a contradiction, then "exists" must have two different meanings: one in the existential quantifier, and another one when we say Romeo does or doesn't exist. Casting about among the options, you might, for example, propose that the first "exists," the one in the existential quantifier, means exists in some possible world or other. Then if Romeo exists in a possible world-one of the worlds in which the story of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet is not a fiction but truth—we can say that means:
如果 不矛盾,那么 "存在 "就一定有两个不同的含义:一个是存在量词的含义,另一个是我们说罗密欧存在或不存在时的含义。举例来说,你可能会提出,第一个 "存在",即存在量词中的 "存在",是指存在于某个可能的世界或其他世界。那么,如果罗密欧存在于一个可能的世界--在这个世界里,莎士比亚的《罗密欧与朱丽叶》的故事不是虚构的,而是真实的,我们就可以说 意思是:
There is something in some possible world that has the property of Nonexistence in the actual world.
在某个可能的世界中,有些东西在现实世界中具有不存在的特性。
But that interpretation doesn't go with the logical principle of existential generalization. For when we infer
但这种解释并不符合存在性概括的逻辑原则。因为当我们推断
There exists something that has
有一种东西
from "John has F," we mean that something in the actual world has F (namely, of course, John). While it is certainly also true that something in some possible world has -because the actual world is a possible world, too-that is a much less interesting claim. So that can't be what we ordinarily mean by the existential quantifier.
从 "约翰有 F "中,我们指的是现实世界中的某物有 F(当然就是约翰)。当然,某个可能世界中的某物也有 - 因为现实世界也是一个可能世界,但这是一个不那么有趣的说法。因此,这不可能是我们通常所说的存在量词。
Yet this does suggest a more serious possibility. When somebody talks about Romeo or Juliet, he or she does so in a way that you only really understand if you recognize that the person is talking about characters in a story. Suppose to each story there corresponds a set of possible worlds, the ones where the story is not fiction but truth. We can call these the "story worlds" of that fiction. Then we can think of people who say
然而,这确实暗示了一种更严重的可能性。当有人谈论罗密欧或朱丽叶时,只有当你意识到他是在谈论故事中的人物时,你才能真正理解他或她这样做的方式。假设每个故事都对应着一组可能的世界,在这些世界里,故事不是虚构的,而是真实的。我们可以称这些世界为该小说的 "故事世界"。那么我们就可以认为有人会说
Romeo loves Juliet 罗密欧爱朱丽叶
as wanting us to take them as having said
希望我们认为他们说过
In the story worlds of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, Romeo loves Juliet.
在莎士比亚的《罗密欧与朱丽叶》的故事世界里,罗密欧深爱着朱丽叶。
Now, in those story worlds Romeo has lots of properties and satis-
现在,在这些故事世界里,罗密欧有很多特性和满足感。

fies lots of predicates. Someone who said in one of those story worlds "Romeo exists" could be taken to be saying, as we saw earlier, that someone in that world satisfies some of the individuating descriptions of Romeo. In that sense, Romeo exists in the story worlds of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. But in the actual world nobody satisfies the individuating descriptions that are true of Romeo in all the story worlds of Romeo and Juliet. And so when we say "Romeo doesn't exist," we're essentially pointing to that fact.
它包含许多谓词。在这些故事世界中,如果有人说 "罗密欧是存在的",那么正如我们前面所看到的,他可能是在说,这个世界中的某个人符合罗密欧的某些个性化描述。从这个意义上说,罗密欧存在于莎士比亚的《罗密欧与朱丽叶》的故事世界中。但在现实世界中,没有人能够满足罗密欧在《罗密欧与朱丽叶》所有故事世界中的个性化描述。因此,当我们说 "罗密欧不存在 "时,本质上就是在指出这一事实。
If Frege is right and we don't, strictly speaking, ever ascribe the property of Existence to an individual thing, then we need to explain why we say things like "Dorothy exists." (So Frege would agree with Wittgenstein's suggestion, which I discussed in 3.3, that sometimes the superficial grammar of a sentence can be misleading.) If we can give an explanation of such sentences that is consistent with Frege's treatment, like the sketch I just gave for claims about Romeo's existence, then we will, indeed, have reason to reject the ontological argument.
如果弗雷格是对的,严格来说,我们并没有把 "存在 "这一属性归属于一个单独的事物,那么我们就需要解释为什么我们会说 "多萝西存在 "这样的话。(所以弗雷格会同意维特根斯坦的建议(我在 3.3 中讨论过),即有时句子的表面语法会误导人)。如果我们能对这类句子做出与弗雷格的处理方法一致的解释,就像我刚才对罗密欧存在的说法所做的概述,那么我们就确实有理由拒绝本体论论证。
Now, "exists" is something of a philosopher's word. We could certainly do without it as a predicate, provided we were allowed the existential quantifier. (Just for the record, and to avoid a verbal issue, the existential quantifier doesn't really need to be translated with the word "exist." You can just say: "There is an X such that ...") In what circumstances do we say things like "Such and such exists," and can we restate all of them?
现在,"存在 "是一个哲学家的词汇。如果允许使用存在量词,我们当然可以不用它作为谓词。(为了避免口语问题,存在量词其实不需要翻译成 "存在")。你可以直接说"有一个 X 这样的......")。在什么情况下,我们会说 "这样这样的存在 "这样的话,我们能重述所有的存在吗?
One uncontroversial use of "exists," the one that Frege permits, is when we say something like "Purple marigolds exist." Here what we're saying is that something satisfies both the predicate "is purple" and the predicate "is a marigold." When we say things like "Merlin exists," there are at least two possibilities. One is that we are affirming that someone who used to exist still exists. Here there's no problem about existence being a property. It's just a way of referring to the property of being alive. The other is that, as in the sad story of Mary I mentioned earlier, what we're saying is that a name that we took to be a fictional name is in fact a real name. Here, the function of saying that someone exists is to communicate the status of the name: it's not assigning a property to a person, it's clarifying the status of a word. Here "exists" is equivalent to "is not fictional" or "is not imaginary" and "does not exist" is equivalent to "is fictional" or
弗莱热允许使用 "存在 "这个词,其中一个没有争议的用法是,当我们说 "紫色金盏花存在 "这样的话时。在这里,我们说的是某物同时满足谓词 "是紫色的 "和谓词 "是金盏花"。当我们说 "梅林存在 "这样的话时,至少有两种可能性。一种可能是,我们肯定某个曾经存在的人仍然存在。这里不存在 "存在 "是一种属性的问题。它只是一种指代 "活着 "这一属性的方式。另一种情况是,就像我前面提到的玛丽的悲惨故事一样,我们所说的是一个我们认为是虚构的名字其实是一个真实的名字。在这里,"某人存在 "这一说法的作用是传达名字的地位:这并不是给一个人赋予某种属性,而是澄清一个词的地位。在这里,"存在 "相当于 "不是虚构的 "或 "不是想象的",而 "不存在 "相当于 "是虚构的 "或 "不是想象的"。

"is imaginary." Our ordinary ways of speaking, then, are ontologically misleading.
"是想象的"。因此,我们普通的说话方式在本体论上是有误导性的。
If we accept Frege's account, we must suppose either that there are no other uses of "exists" to apply to individual things or that they can be similarly explained away. Whether or not that is so is still a topic of controversy.
如果我们接受弗雷格的说法,我们就必须假设,要么 "存在 "没有其他的用法适用于个别事物,要么它们可以被类似地解释掉。事实是否如此,仍然是一个有争议的话题。

8.7 A posteriori arguments
8.7 事后论证

The ontological argument provides, as we have seen, an opening onto many important metaphysical questions about possibility, necessity, and existence. But, as I have already remarked, it has not played a major role in actually persuading anyone of the existence of the Jewish, Christian, or Moslem God. As I mentioned earlier, St. Thomas Aquinas, whose combination of Aristotle and Christianity is the foundation of Roman Catholic philosophical theology, rejected the ontological argument. But in his Summa Theologiae he offered five arguments that he did accept. The first two of these go back to Aristotle's Metaphysics. Aristotle had argued that
正如我们所看到的,本体论论证为探讨许多关于可能性、必然性和存在的重要形而上学问题提供了一个开端。但是,正如我已经说过的,它在实际说服任何人相信犹太教、基督教或伊斯兰教上帝的存在方面并没有发挥重要作用。正如我在前面提到的,圣托马斯-阿奎那(他将亚里士多德与基督教相结合,是罗马天主教哲学神学的基础)拒绝接受本体论论证。但在《神学总论》中,他提出了五个他确实接受的论点。其中前两个可以追溯到亚里士多德的《形而上学》。亚里士多德认为
there can be no infinite regress in the production of things from their materials, as flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire, and so ad infinitum. Nor in the agencies whereby changes are effected, as a man is moved by air, air by the sun, the sun by strife, and so ad infinitum.
事物从其材料中产生,如肉从土中产生,土从空气中产生,空气从火中产生,以此类推,不可能无限倒退。人被空气移动,空气被太阳移动,太阳被纷争移动,如此等等,无穷无尽。
Aquinas says that it follows from the impossibility of an infinite regress that there must be a primum movens immobile (a first mover that is itself not moved) and that that is God. The conception of God here, then, is as the prime mover. This is the first of the famous arguments. In a parallel way, he argues that every sequence of cause and effect must have a beginning, and so there must be a first cause that is itself not caused. That is the second argument, often called the "cosmological argument."
阿奎那说,根据无限倒退的不可能性,必须有一个不动的原动者(本身不动的第一推动者),这就是上帝。那么,上帝在这里的概念就是原动者。这是著名论证中的第一个。与此类似,他认为每一个因果序列都必须有一个起点,因此必须有一个本身不是起因的第一因。这是第二个论证,通常被称为 "宇宙论论证"。
The third argument is that the existence of contingent beingsbeings that might not have existed-implies the existence of a necessary being. And the fourth is that there must be some absolute standard with which to compare the relatively imperfect beings that make up the created universe. I shall return to Aquinas's final argument in a little while.
第三个论点是,偶然存在物的存在意味着必然存在物的存在。第四个论点是,必须有某种绝对的标准来比较构成被造宇宙的相对不完美的生命。稍后我将回到阿奎那的最后论证。
These four arguments share one difficulty with the ontological argument: if successful, they establish the existence only of a very abstract entity, something rather different from the God conceived of by most believers. We should also ask whether the prime mover and the first cause, the necessary being, and the standard of perfection are the same person (or thing). And that might prompt us to wonder further whether he (she? it?) is the same as the being that many believers have some conception of. We have, that is, with these arguments the possibility of confusing different things that happen to have the same name, as happened with Michael Jordan and Michael Jackson. In addition to these proofs, then, we should like to have some argument that they establish the existence of the same person (or thing).
这四个论证与本体论论证有一个共同的难点:如果成功的话,它们只能证明一个非常抽象的实体的存在,与大多数信徒心目中的上帝大相径庭。我们还应该问,原动力和第一因、必然的存在和完美的标准是否是同一个人(或事)。这可能会促使我们进一步思考,他(她?也就是说,通过这些论证,我们有可能会把名字相同的不同事物混淆起来,就像迈克尔-乔丹和迈克尔-杰克逊一样。因此,除了这些证明之外,我们还希望有一些论据来证明他们确定了同一个人(或同一件事)的存在。
These arguments are, however, also unlike the ontological argument in an important way: they are a posteriori. They begin with premises about the actual world: that there are things that move one another, causal chains, contingent and imperfect beings. It is starting from these facts that we proceed to the conclusion that God exists: God conceived of as prime mover, first cause, necessary ground of contingent being, and perfect standard. Aquinas saw this as essential to any valid argument for the existence of God, because he thought all valid arguments would have to argue from God's effects to his existence as their cause.
然而,这些论证在一个重要方面也与本体论论证不同:它们是后验论证。它们以现实世界的前提为起点:存在着相互移动的事物、因果链、偶然和不完美的存在。正是从这些事实出发,我们得出了上帝存在的结论:上帝被视为原动力、第一原因、偶然存在的必然基础和完美标准。阿奎那认为这对任何关于上帝存在的有效论证都是至关重要的,因为他认为所有有效的论证都必须从上帝的影响论证到他作为其原因的存在。
Aquinas's first four arguments have not had many philosophical defenders recently. The first two arguments seem to suppose something like the principle of sufficient reason, which I mentioned at the end of Chapter 4- the thesis that every event has a cause. Given the fact that modern physics appears to proceed without the principle of sufficient reason, we have reason to doubt that it is an a priori truth; we have reason to doubt that it is a truth at all. (They also rely on the controversial assumption that there cannot be an infinite series.) The third argument has all the problems with necessary existence that we saw in dealing with the ontological argument. And the fourth just does not seem very convincing.
阿奎那的前四个论证最近并没有多少哲学辩护者。前两个论证似乎假定了类似于充分理由原则的东西,我在第四章末尾提到过这一原则,即每个事件都有一个原因。鉴于现代物理学似乎是在没有充分理由原则的情况下进行的,我们有理由怀疑它是否是一个先验真理;我们有理由怀疑它是否是一个真理。(他们还依赖于一个有争议的假设,即不可能存在无限序列)。第三个论证存在着我们在处理本体论论证时所看到的所有关于必然存在的问题。第四个论证似乎并不令人信服。
But Aquinas's fifth argument lives on, and it is not only the subject of lively philosophical discussion, but also the foundation for the religious beliefs of many people now and throughout human history. It is called the "teleological argument" or "the argument from design."
但是,阿奎那的第五个论证依然存在,它不仅是热烈的哲学讨论的主题,也是现在和整个人类历史上许多人的宗教信仰的基础。它被称为 "目的论论证 "或 "设计论证"。

8.8 The argument from design
8.8 设计论证

In the Summa Contra Gentiles St. Thomas sketches the argument like this:
在《外邦人论》中,圣托马斯是这样论证的:
This argument goes further than the earlier arguments, because the conception of God that it relies on is as the ruler of the universe ("governance" here just means control). And the idea of God as the ruler of the universe comes closer to the conceptions of God that most believers seem to have had.
这个论证比前面的论证更进一步,因为它所依赖的上帝概念是宇宙的统治者(这里的 "统治 "只是控制的意思)。上帝是宇宙的统治者这一观点更接近大多数信徒对上帝的概念。
Now, with any argument, as I pointed out in 3.9, we can distinguish between the question of whether it is valid-which it is if the conclusion would follow if the premises were true-and the question of whether it is sound — which it is if the premises are true as well. In considering whether we should believe the conclusion of an argument, we need, then, to keep track both of the truth of the premises and of the validity of the form of the argument.
现在,对于任何论证,正如我在 3.9 中指出的,我们可以区分它是否有效的问题(如果前提为真,结论就会成立)和它是否合理的问题(如果前提也为真,结论就会成立)。因此,在考虑我们是否应该相信一个论证的结论时,我们需要同时关注前提的真实性和论证形式的有效性。
What exactly is the argument? Well, like all a posteriori arguments for God's existence, it will have among its premises at least one (alleged) matter of fact. That fact is that things in the universe harmonize. So let's call this first premise "the harmony of nature." A second claim, whose status is a little less clear, is that only governance produces harmony. I say that it's a little less clear because, in this outline of the argument, Aquinas doesn't indicate whether he thinks this is something that we know a priori or a posteriori. Let's call this premise "the necessity of a creative intelligence."
这个论证到底是什么呢?嗯,就像所有关于上帝存在的后验论证一样,它的前提中至少有一个(所谓的)事实问题。这个事实就是宇宙中的事物是和谐的。因此,我们把这第一个前提称为 "自然的和谐"。第二个前提的地位就不那么明确了,那就是只有治理才能产生和谐。我说它不太明确,是因为在这个论证大纲中,阿奎那没有说明他认为这是我们先验的还是后验的知识。让我们把这个前提称为 "创造性智慧的必然性"。
So we have:  所以我们有
  1. The necessity of a creative intelligence
    创造性智慧的必要性
Harmony is always the product of a creative intelligence with a mind.
和谐总是有思想的创造性智慧的产物。
So: The universe is the product of a creative intelligence with a mind.
那么宇宙是有思想的创造性智慧的产物。
This looks like a valid argument. If the premises are true, the conclusion will be. So what about those premises?
这看起来是一个有效的论证。如果前提是真的,结论也会是真的。那么这些前提是什么呢?

8.9 The harmony of nature
8.9 自然的和谐

Aquinas takes the harmony of nature not to need much argument. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the argument from design was increasingly developed by so-called natural theologians, a great deal of evidence was assembled for the harmony of nature. David Hume, in the late eighteenth century, put in the mouth of Cleanthes, in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a fairly representative summary of that evidence.
阿奎那认为自然的和谐并不需要太多的论证。但在十八和十九世纪,随着所谓的自然神学家越来越多地提出设计论证,人们为自然和谐收集了大量证据。十八世纪末,大卫-休谟(David Hume)在《关于自然宗教的对话》(Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion)一书中,以克莱恩特斯(Cleanthes)之口,对这些证据进行了颇具代表性的总结。
Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human faculties can trace or explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence.
环顾世界:思考世界的整体和每个部分:你会发现,它不过是一台巨大的机器,又被细分为无数台较小的机器,而这些机器的细分程度又超出了人类的能力所能追溯或解释的范围。所有这些不同的机器,甚至是它们最微小的部分,都能精确地相互调整,令所有欣赏过它们的人叹为观止。在整个自然界中,手段与目的之间的奇妙配合,与人类的设计、思想、智慧和聪明才智的结晶十分相似,尽管远远超过。
Hume didn't literally mean that the world was composed of machines; to say that would be begging the question, since a machine is by definition something made to a design. Presumably what he had in mind was that, like an enormously intricate watch-but to a very much greater degree-the world was made of parts that fitted together and functioned as if each were made to work with the others. One of the most obvious examples of this, which the great nineteenth-century natural theologian William Paley made famous, is in the mutual adaptation of parts that we see in an animal organ like the eye.
休谟的意思并不是说世界是由机器组成的;如果这么说,那就是在乞求问题,因为根据定义,机器就是按照设计制造出来的东西。他的意思大概是说,世界就像一块极其复杂的钟表--只不过复杂得多--由各个部件组成,这些部件相互配合,发挥着各自的功能,就好像每一个部件都是为了与其他部件协同工作而制造的。十九世纪伟大的自然神学家威廉-佩利(William Paley)在他的著作中提到的一个最明显的例子,就是我们在眼睛这样的动物器官中看到的各部分之间的相互适应。
Its coats and humors, constructed as the lenses of a telescope are constructed, for the refraction of rays of light to a point, which forms the proper action of
它的外衣和表皮,就像望远镜的镜片一样,是为了让光线折射到一个点上,从而形成适当的作用力

the organ; the provision in its muscular tendons for turning its pupil to the object, similar to that which is given the telescope by screws, and upon which power of direction in the eye the exercise of its office as an optical instrument depends; . . these provisions compose an apparatus, a system of parts, a preparation of means so manifest in their design, so exquisite in their contrivance, so successful in their issue, so precious, and so infinitely beneficial in their use, as in my opinion, to bear down all doubt that can be raised upon this subject.
......这些规定构成了一个仪器、一个部件系统、一种手段的准备,其设计如此明显,其设计如此精巧,其设计如此成功,其设计如此珍贵,其使用如此受益无穷,以至于在我看来,可以消除在这个问题上提出的所有疑问。
There seem to me to be two lines of thought running together here. One is the general notion that we can find in nature many things, like eyes, that have obvious functions, and whose parts are very finely adapted to making them work. These things are not made by human or other animal designers. But they are, in this respect, strikingly like things such as telescopes, which were made by designers. Call this "the mutual adaptation of the parts of the world." That is the point of insisting on the "preparation of means so manifest in their design." (From now on, I'll feel free to use "harmony" as shorthand for this sort of mutual adaptation of parts.)
在我看来,这里有两条思路。其一是,我们可以在自然界中发现许多事物,比如眼睛,它们具有明显的功能,而且它们的各个部分都非常适合让它们工作。这些东西并不是人类或其他动物设计出来的。但在这一点上,它们却与望远镜等由设计者制造的东西有着惊人的相似之处。这就是 "世界各部分的相互适应"。这就是坚持 "手段的准备在它们的设计中如此明显 "的意义所在。(从现在起,我可以随意使用 "和谐 "作为这种各部分相互适应的简称)。
The other, more specific line of thought is that many things in the universe-eyes, among them-appear to have been especially designed to be beneficial, that is, to be useful to us. Cleanthes, in the passage I cited, was only making the first argument; he was not addressing the issue of whether the harmony in nature suggested a creative intelligence who was favorably disposed toward . But, in fact, the ways in which the world contains things that are useful to human beings might be thought to be an instance of the mutual adaptation of the parts of the world. Not only do eyes work to allow us to see, and thus to move about in the world, but the existence of plants that we can eat, materials from which we can make clothing and housing, and the like is also, perhaps, a mutual adaptation of parts.
另一个更具体的思路是,宇宙中的许多事物--其中包括眼睛--似乎都是为了有益于我们而特别设计的,也就是说,是为了对我们有用。在我引用的这段话中,克利安特斯只是提出了第一个论点;他并没有讨论自然界的和谐是否表明有一种创造性智慧对 有好感。但事实上,世界上对人类有用的事物的存在方式可以被认为是世界各部分相互适应的一个例子。不仅眼睛可以让我们看见,从而在这个世界上走动,而且我们可以吃的植物、我们可以用来制作衣服和住房的材料等等的存在,或许也是各部分相互适应的一种表现。
So the claim seems to be that there is a significant similarity between the ways in which parts of a watch or a telescope fit together and the ways in which parts of the eye, and parts of the world more generally, fit together. And it is supposed to be an a posteriori claim, which will figure in an argument whose conclusion is that there is a God who designed the universe. But if it is an a pos-
因此,这种说法似乎是说,手表或望远镜的零件组合方式与眼睛的零件以及更广泛意义上的世界的零件组合方式之间存在着显著的相似性。这应该是一个后验的说法,在结论是有一位设计了宇宙的上帝的论证中会有所体现。但是,如果这是一个前

teriori thesis, then we ought to be able to say what it would be like for it to be false. A posteriori claims are claims that, if true, can be known to be true only by examining evidence of how things actually are. They divide the possible worlds into two: those where they are true and those where they are false. If we understand the thesis of the mutual adaptation of parts, we should be able to imagine some worlds where it doesn't obtain. So what would a world be like that did not exhibit this mutual adaptation? What would a world look like where nature was not in harmony?
那么,我们就应该能够说出它如果是假的会是什么样子。后验论断是指只有通过考察事物实际情况的证据,才能知道其为真的论断。它们将可能的世界分为两种:一种是真的世界,另一种是假的世界。如果我们理解了 "各部分相互适应 "这一论点,就应该能够想象出一些不存在这一论点的世界。那么,一个不存在相互适应的世界会是怎样的呢?一个自然界不和谐的世界会是什么样的呢?
Paley's discussion of the eye does not seem very helpful here. If you are going to have an eye that works, its parts must be in some sense mutually adapted. So, perhaps the thought is that a universe without mutual adaptation would contain nothing with a function. For it is only by reference to its function as an instrument of vision that we can say that the parts of the eye are mutually adapted. But then it seems wrong to say that the parts of the universe as a whole are mutually adapted, since most things in the universe don't appear to have a function like the eye's. That is, Paley's argument seems like an argument for the view not that the universe was made but that some of the things in it-the ones well adapted for their functionswere. And it is, of course, open to the objection that Darwin's theory of evolution provides an equally compelling explanation of how parts well adapted for their functions in organisms could come into being without a designer.
帕利对眼睛的讨论在这里似乎没有什么帮助。如果你要有一只能工作的眼睛,那么它的各个部分必须在某种意义上相互适应。因此,也许我们的想法是,一个没有相互适应的宇宙将不包含任何具有功能的东西。因为只有参照眼睛作为视觉工具的功能,我们才能说眼睛的各个部分是相互适应的。但是,如果说宇宙的各个部分作为一个整体是相互适应的,这似乎是错误的,因为宇宙中的大多数事物似乎并不具有眼睛那样的功能。也就是说,帕利的论证似乎并不是在论证宇宙是被造出来的,而是在论证宇宙中的某些事物--那些非常适合其功能的事物--是被造出来的。当然,也有反对意见认为,达尔文的进化论提供了同样令人信服的解释,说明了生物体中适应其功能的部分是如何在没有设计者的情况下产生的。
Cleanthes' argument, on the other hand, is about all of nature. It is not open to the Darwinian response. So the widespread view that Darwin's theory of evolution refutes the argument from design just seems wrong. Cleanthes' point, like Aquinas', is not that there are things in the world that appear to be well adapted for their functions; it is that the universe exhibits an extraordinary degree of order.
另一方面,克利安特斯的论点是关于整个自然界的。达尔文并没有对此作出回应。因此,认为达尔文的进化论驳斥了设计论证的普遍观点似乎是错误的。克莱恩特斯的观点与阿奎那的观点一样,并不是说世界上有一些事物似乎非常适合其功能;而是说宇宙呈现出非同寻常的秩序。
This may seem evidently true. But is this claim as clear as it at first appears? After all, what would a universe look like that contained no order? Or, at least, so little order that it would be reasonable to think it was not the result of intelligent design? I think it is very hard to say.
这似乎显然是正确的。但这一说法是否如初看起来那么清晰呢?毕竟,一个没有秩序的宇宙会是什么样子呢?或者,至少是秩序少到让人有理由认为它不是智能设计的结果?我认为这很难说。
Perhaps there could be a universe with literally no regularities, a possible world where there were no patterns at all. I find it hard to
也许宇宙中根本就没有规律可循,一个可能的世界根本就没有模式可言。我觉得很难

see what this would mean, but let me concede the possibility for the purposes of argument. Still, there certainly could not be a universe where we noticed that there were no patterns. For noticing is a causal process, which depends on regularities that connect how things seem to us with how they are. No patterns, no noticing. And so, putting it the other way round, if there is noticing, there are patterns. As we saw in Chapter 2, we could not come to know anything at all about the universe if we did not have reliable senses, least of all how orderly it was. From this it follows that any creature in any possible world that could explore the a posteriori question whether the universe was orderly would be bound to discover some order. Noticing this, a skeptic could respond to Cleanthes like this:
虽然我不明白这意味着什么,但为了论证的目的,还是让我承认这种可能性吧。不过,我们肯定不可能在一个宇宙中注意到没有任何模式。因为 "注意 "是一个因果过程,它依赖于规律性,这些规律性将我们眼中的事物与它们的实际情况联系在一起。没有规律,就没有注意。因此,反过来说,如果有注意,就有模式。正如我们在第二章中所看到的,如果我们没有可靠的感官,我们就不可能知道宇宙的任何事情,更不用说宇宙的有序性了。由此可见,在任何可能的世界里,任何能够探索宇宙是否有序这个后验问题的生物,都必然会发现一些秩序。注意到这一点,怀疑论者就可以这样回应克里安特斯了:
Let's call the possible worlds where there are people and there's enough order for people to notice it the "noticeably orderly worlds." Surely there could be a noticeably orderly world where the order was not the product of God's design. But then it follows that the mere fact that we notice order doesn't mean that we're in a possible world where God exists. So, contrary to the second premise of the argument from design, a creative intelligence is not necessary.
让我们把有人存在并且有足够秩序让人们注意到的可能世界称为 "明显有序的世界"。当然,可能会有一个明显有序的世界,而这个世界的秩序并不是上帝设计的产物。但是,我们注意到秩序这一事实并不意味着我们处在一个上帝存在的世界里。因此,与设计论证的第二个前提相反,创造性智慧并不是必要的。
Let's call this "the argument against the necessity of design."
我们姑且称之为 "反对设计必要性的论证"。
You might think that Cleanthes should reply to this argument that there couldn't really be a noticeably orderly world that wasn't produced by a creative intelligence. But remember, Cleanthes is offering an a posteriori argument because he rejects the ontological argument. He doesn't think that God's existence is necessary. So, just as the atheist will normally admit that there might have been a God, so Cleanthes must agree that there might not have been one. And that establishes that Cleanthes must agree that there are possible worlds where God doesn't exist. Let's call these "the Godless worlds." Now Cleanthes is caught on the horns of a dilemma.
你可能会认为克利安特斯应该回答这个论点,即不可能真的存在一个不是由创造性智慧创造出来的明显有序的世界。但请记住,克里安特斯提出的是一个后验论证,因为他拒绝本体论论证。他不认为上帝的存在是必要的。因此,正如无神论者通常会承认上帝可能存在一样,克利安特斯也必须同意上帝可能不存在。这样一来,克莱恩特斯就必须同意存在上帝不存在的可能世界。我们姑且称之为 "无神世界"现在克莱恩特斯陷入了两难的境地
If he insists that none of the noticeably orderly worlds is Godless, then he has made the wrong argument. For his argument proceeds from the premise that the universe is harmonious. But now he is saying that any order at all, even a disharmonious order, is evidence for the existence of God. This is an interesting view, but it is much less plausible than the argument from design. For it requires some
如果他坚持认为没有一个明显有序的世界是无神的,那么他就提出了错误的论点。因为他的论证是以宇宙是和谐的为前提的。但现在他却说,任何秩序,哪怕是不和谐的秩序,都是上帝存在的证据。这是一个有趣的观点,但它远不如设计论证那么可信。因为它需要一些

argument, I think, to establish that an amount of order just sufficient for humans to notice would establish the existence of an intelligent creator.
我认为,这个论点是要证明,只要有足够的秩序让人类注意到,就能证明智慧造物主的存在。
So suppose he concedes, on the other horn of the dilemma, that some of the noticeably orderly worlds are Godless. Then he has to offer some special reason for thinking that the actual world displays a degree of order sufficient to warrant belief in a designer. We already have a name for that amount of order, of course: it is "harmony." So now the question is: How much order does there have to be for the universe to be said to be harmonious?
因此,假设他在两难的另一面承认,一些明显有序的世界是没有上帝的。那么,他就必须提出一些特别的理由,让我们相信实际世界所显示的秩序程度足以让我们相信有设计者。当然,我们已经有了这种有序程度的名称:"和谐"。那么现在的问题是:究竟要有多少秩序,宇宙才能被称为和谐?
This seems to me a harder question that either Cleanthes or Aquinas acknowledges in the passages we have been discussing. After all, though there is plenty of evidence of things working together in the world, there is also plenty of evidence of things working against each other. Aristotle, who rejected the form of the argument from design that his teacher Plato had developed, observed that the earlier philosopher Empedocles
在我看来,这似乎是一个更难回答的问题,无论是克莱恩特斯还是阿奎那,都没有在我们所讨论的段落中承认这一点。毕竟,尽管有大量证据表明世界上的事物是相互协作的,但也有大量证据表明事物是相互对立的。亚里士多德拒绝接受他的老师柏拉图提出的设计论证形式,他指出,早先的哲学家恩培多克勒
Most eyes work, more or less, it is true; but many people are nearsighted, farsighted, or blind. Does that count against the claim that the parts of the universe are mutually adapted? While the laws of motion that Newton discovered could be claimed to have reduced the apparent chaos of the heavens to an expression of orderly laws, the current laws of physics, which represent humanity's best understanding of the order in the universe, are, frankly, rather complex by comparison. Is that evidence against the harmony of nature?
大多数人的眼睛或多或少都能工作,这是事实;但许多人都有近视、远视或失明。这是否有悖于宇宙各部分相互适应的说法?牛顿发现的运动定律可以说是将天体表面的混沌还原成了有序规律的表达,而目前的物理定律则代表了人类对宇宙秩序的最佳理解,坦率地说,与之相比,物理定律是相当复杂的。难道这就是反对自然和谐的证据吗?
Without answers to these questions, we do not really understand the first premise of the argument from design. And if we do not understand it, how can we be sure that it is true?
不回答这些问题,我们就无法真正理解设计论证的第一个前提。如果我们不理解它,又怎么能确定它是真的呢?

8.10 The necessity of a creative intelligence
8.10 创造性智慧的必要性

Perhaps we can learn something about what Cleanthes means when he supposes that the universe is harmonious by seeing how he
也许,我们可以从克利安特斯如何假定宇宙是和谐的,来了解他的意思

understands the second premise of the argument, which is the necessity of a creative intelligence. The passage from Hume I cited at the beginning of the last section continues like this:
我们理解了论证的第二个前提,即创造性智慧的必要性。我在上一节开头引用的休谟的一段话是这样写的:
Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.
因此,既然果实彼此相似,我们就可以根据所有的类比规则推断出原因也相似,自然的创造者与人类的思想有些相似,尽管他拥有与他所完成的伟大工程相称的更大的能力。通过这个后验论证,也只有通过这个论证,我们就能同时证明神的存在及其与人类思想和智慧的相似性。
What Cleanthes is arguing here is that just as we know, from experience, that certain kinds of harmony are the product of human intelligence, so we may infer, by analogy, that other kinds of harmony are the product of a similar intelligence.
克莱恩特斯在这里提出的论点是,正如我们从经验中知道某些和谐是人类智慧的产物一样,我们也可以通过类比推断出其他和谐也是类似智慧的产物。
Here, then, the argument for the necessity of a creative intelligence is an a posteriori argument by analogy whose conclusion is that nature's harmony, like the harmony of things made by human beings, is the result of intentional design. Does this help us to see more clearly what Cleanthes means when he says that means and ends are adapted to one another in nature? A little, I think. For it means that Cleanthes holds that there are many mutual adaptations in the universe that are very like the mutual adaptations in artifacts, such as watches and telescopes, that are made by human beings. The crucial thing, then, is that the kind of order that there is in the universe is sufficiently like the order displayed in human artifacts, which is why it is fitting that Cleanthes says, in effect, that the universe is like an enormous machine, made up of smaller machines. This argument, whatever it is, is not the same as Aquinas' because it does not suppose that harmony must be the result of design. So it is not open to the objection I made in 8.8 against the necessity of a creative intelligence. (I called it the "argument against the necessity of design.") Cleanthes is only arguing that it is probable (or perhaps more probable than not) that the universe was made by an intelligent designer. That means that Cleanthes' argument is rather different from Aquinas', because it doesn't assume the necessity of design.
那么,在这里,关于创造性智慧必要性的论证是一种类比的后验论证,其结论是:自然界的和谐,就像人类创造的事物的和谐一样,是有意设计的结果。这是否有助于我们更清楚地理解克莱恩泰斯所说的手段和目的在自然界中相互适应的意思呢?我认为有一点。因为这意味着克里安特斯认为,宇宙中有许多相互适应的现象,就像人类制造的手表和望远镜等人工制品中的相互适应现象一样。因此,最关键的是,宇宙中存在的那种秩序与人类制造的器物所显示的秩序非常相似,这就是为什么克里安特斯说宇宙就像一台由更小的机器组成的巨大机器,实际上是恰如其分的。这个论证,不管它是什么,都与阿奎那的论证不同,因为它不认为和谐一定是设计的结果。因此,我在第 8.8 节中对创造性智慧的必要性提出了反对意见,但这一论证并不成立(我称之为 "反对论证")。(我把它称为 "反对设计必然性的论证")克利安特斯只是在论证宇宙有可能是由智能设计者创造的(或者说比不可能更有可能)。这意味着克莱恩特斯的论证与阿奎那的论证相当不同,因为它并不假定设计的必然性。

8.11 Hume's argument from design: The argument from experience
8.11 休谟的设计论证:经验论证

It will help if we make a little clearer the structure of Cleanthes' argument. The argument aims to conclude that the universe is an artifact, that is, something made by an intelligent designer. Hume proceeds in three steps.
如果我们把克莱恩特斯的论证结构说得更清楚一些,会有所帮助。该论证旨在得出结论:宇宙是一种人工制品,即由智能设计者创造的东西。休谟分三步进行论证。
First he introduces the idea of an argument from experience.
首先,他提出了经验论证的概念。
When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one whenever I see the existence of the other; and I call this an argument from experience.
当人们总是观察到两种物体结合在一起时,只要我看到另一种物体的存在,我就能根据习惯推断出其中一种物体的存在;我把这叫做经验论证。
Thus, suppose I regularly find a strong cheese in the kitchen when I smell a particular odor in the dining room. The odors are one "species" (i.e., sort) of thing; the cheeses are another. Provided that this is so, when I experience that odor again, I may infer, by way of the argument from experience, that there is cheese in the kitchen. This is reasonable even if, occasionally, the cheese has been eaten and only the odor remains. And it is reasonable even if, sometimes, the cheese is present but the odor is not. So the real principle is more like this:
因此,假设我经常在厨房里发现一种浓烈的奶酪,而我在餐厅里闻到一种特殊的气味。气味是一种 "物种"(即种类),而奶酪则是另一种 "物种"。既然如此,当我再次闻到这种气味时,我就可以通过经验论证推断厨房里有奶酪。即使偶尔奶酪被吃掉了,只剩下气味,这也是合理的。即使有时奶酪在而气味不在,这也是合理的。因此,真正的原则是这样的
AE: If, usually, when you have experienced an A in the past, you experience a in association with it, then, if you experience another A, you may infer that there's likely to be a B in association with it.
AE: 如果通常情况下,当你过去经历过一个 A 时,你会经历一个与之相关的 ,那么,如果你经历过另一个 A,你可能会推断出可能会有一个 B 与之相关。
When two things are related in this way, so that when you have experienced an A in the past, you have usually experienced a B in association with it, we can say that there is a strong empirical correlation between A's and B's.
当两件事情以这种方式联系在一起时,当你过去经历过 A 时,你通常会经历与之相关的 B,我们可以说 A 和 B 之间存在着强烈的经验相关性。
If the principle is right, then Hume's statement of the argument from experience is too strong: he shouldn't have said "always" ("very often" would have done), and he shouldn't have required them to be conjoined, since, as we saw, it's the fact that A's are associated with B's (odors with cheese), not that B's are associated with A's (cheese with odors) that matters. And, in fact, it's the more moderate principle that Cleanthes relies on.
如果 这一原则是正确的,那么休谟关于经验论证的陈述就过于强烈了:他不应该说 "总是"("经常 "就可以了),也不应该要求它们连在一起,因为正如我们所看到的,重要的是 A 与 B(奶酪的气味)相关联,而不是 B 与 A(奶酪的气味)相关联。事实上,克莱恩特斯所依赖的是更为温和的原则
You will notice that the principle AE looks awfully like a statement of the validity of enumerative induction, which I defined in 4.9 as the process of arguing from many cases of A's that are B's to the conclusion that all A's are B's. (Since Hume was interested, as we know, in induction, this isn't too surprising, of course!) But AE can be used more widely than enumerative induction, because it doesn't require that there are no counterexamples, that is, no A's that are not B's. In this sense, is a stronger principle than enumerative induction. Given the difficulties with enumerative induction that we have already discussed, that is some grounds for concern about relying on AE. Nevertheless, as I say, AE looks reasonable enough. Someone who said that they thought there was a strong cheese in the kitchen because the odor they could smell in the dining room was just like the odor that had been associated with strong cheeses in the past would not normally be thought to be unreasonable!
你会注意到,AE 原则看起来非常像对枚举归纳法有效性的陈述,我在 4.9 中将枚举归纳法定义为从许多 A 是 B 的情况中论证出所有 A 都是 B 的结论的过程。(我们都知道,休谟对归纳法很感兴趣,所以这并不奇怪。)但AE比枚举归纳法的应用范围更广,因为它不要求没有反例,也就是说,不要求A不是B。从这个意义上说, 是比枚举归纳法更强的原则。鉴于我们已经讨论过的枚举归纳法的困难,我们有理由对依赖枚举归纳法表示担忧。然而,正如我所说,AE 看起来足够合理。如果有人说,他认为厨房里有一种浓烈的奶酪,因为他在餐厅里闻到的气味就像过去浓烈的奶酪所散发出的气味一样,这通常不会被认为是不合理的!
What Cleanthes does-this is Hume's second step-is to argue that there is a strong empirical correlation between exhibiting a mutual adaptation of parts and being an artifact. The argument goes:
克利安特斯所做的--这是休谟的第二步--就是论证,在表现出各部分之间的相互适应与成为人工制品之间,存在着强烈的经验关联。这个论点是这样的:
  1. The world contains many things that exhibit a mutual adaptation of parts.
    世界上有许多事物,它们的各个部分相互适应。
  2. Some of these things - machines, for example-we know a posteriori to be made by intelligent designers. Call these the "known artifacts."
    其中有些东西--比如机器--我们事后知道是由智能设计者制造的。我们称之为 "已知人工制品"。
  3. Others of them-eyes, for example—we do not know not to be made by intelligent designers. Call these the "possible artifacts."
    还有一些--比如眼睛--我们不知道是不是由智能设计者制造的。我们称这些为 "可能的人工制品"。
So:
  1. There is a strong empirical correlation between exhibiting a mutual adaptation of parts and being an artifact.
    根据经验,各部分之间的相互适应与人工制品之间存在很强的相关性。
It is now easy, putting the results of the first two steps of the argument together, for Cleanthes to produce an argument from experience whose conclusion is that the universe is an artifact. All he needs is the further premise that:
现在,把前两步论证的结果放在一起,克莱恩泰斯就可以很容易地提出一个经验论证,其结论是宇宙是一个人工制品。他所需要的进一步前提是:
The universe exhibits a mutual adaptation of parts,
宇宙的各个部分相互适应、
which is, of course, just a version of the harmony of nature.
当然,这只是自然和谐的一个版本。
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, there is, along with Cleanthes, who proposes the argument from design, and Demea, the character who defends the ontological argument, a third character, named Philo, who, though he is a religious believer, is also a philosophical skeptic. Philo objects to Cleanthes' argument from experience on the grounds that the evidence for the harmony of nature is not very good. This is not because he thinks that nature is not harmonious; Philo is a skeptic, so he is more inclined to insist on what we don't know than on what we do. But he thinks we haven't really got enough evidence about the universe as a whole to suppose that it exhibits a mutual adaptation of parts. As Philo says: "A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us."
在《关于自然宗教的对话录》中,除了提出设计论证的克利安特斯和为本体论论证辩护的德米亚之外,还有第三个人物,名叫斐洛,他虽然是一个宗教信徒,但同时也是一个哲学怀疑论者。菲洛反对克利安特斯的经验论证,理由是自然和谐的证据并不充分。这并不是因为他认为自然不和谐;斐洛是一个怀疑论者,所以他更倾向于坚持我们不知道的东西,而不是我们知道的东西。但他认为,我们对整个宇宙还没有足够的证据来假设它是由各个部分相互适应的。正如斐洛所说:"这个伟大系统的一小部分,在很短的时间内,并没有被我们完全发现"。
I have already insisted that it is far from clear what the content is of the claim that the universe displays a mutual adaptation of parts. Nevertheless, we have been offered examples of things that do: watches and eyes among them. Since it is not clear how to apply this idea to other cases, we do not really know how many others of the things in the universe are also harmonious. Cleanthes' talk of a universe "subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines" suggests that he thinks that most things are. But now we can follow Philo's hint about the smallness of our sample and catch Cleanthes on the horns of a dilemma.
我已经坚持认为,"宇宙显示出各部分之间的相互适应 "这一说法的内涵并不清楚。尽管如此,我们还是得到了一些这样的例子:手表和眼睛就是其中之一。由于不清楚如何将这一观点应用于其他情况,我们并不真正知道宇宙中还有多少其他事物也是和谐的。克利安特斯说宇宙 "被细分为无限多的小机器",这表明他认为大多数事物都是和谐的。但是,现在我们可以根据斐洛关于我们的样本太小的提示,让克莱恩泰斯陷入进退两难的境地。
Suppose most things we know do indeed display mutual adaptation. Still, only a very tiny, almost infinitesimal proportion of the things in the world are known artifacts. The vast majority of them are just possible artifacts. And the argument from experience seems very far from compelling when you have established that A's are B's in only a tiny sample of the available cases of A's. (Imagine a world containing a myriad of swans and someone who claims that they are all white on the basis of examination of a very few.)
假设我们所知道的大多数事物确实显示出相互适应性。然而,世界上只有极少数几乎微乎其微的事物是已知的人工制品。绝大多数都只是可能的人工制品。而当你只在极少数A的可用样本中确定了A就是B时,经验的论证似乎就很难令人信服了。(试想一下,世界上有无数的天鹅,而有人仅凭对极少数天鹅的研究就说它们都是白色的。)
So suppose it's false that most things display mutual adaptation. Then there seems no reason to grant that the universe as a whole displays mutual adaptation of parts.
因此,假设大多数事物都表现出相互适应是错误的。那么,似乎就没有理由承认宇宙作为一个整体会显示出各部分之间的相互适应。
Either way, the argument fails.
无论如何,这个论点都是失败的。

8.12 The problem of evil and inference to the best explanation
8.12 邪恶问题与最佳解释的推论

The upshot of our discussion so far is this: there is some unclarity in the idea of harmony, the idea that the universe displays a mutual adaptation of parts. But however we interpret it, it seems unlikely that we have sufficient evidence to support the premise of the harmony of nature that is required for Cleanthes' argument from experience.
我们讨论到此为止的结果是:和谐的概念,即宇宙显示出各部分相互适应的概念,有一些不明确之处。但是,无论我们如何解释,我们似乎都不可能有足够的证据来支持克里安特斯的经验论证所需要的自然和谐的前提。
We have also seen, however, that Cleanthes' argument relies on something very like induction, which Hume elsewhere subjected to such powerful criticism. Perhaps, then, we should draw the conclusion that the argument from design is better construed as a form of scientific hypothesis. It is suggestive, for example, that Isaac Newton, the great physicist, was among the most prominent developers of the argument in the seventeenth century, and Hume called Cleanthes' position "experimental theism." So we might want to examine whether the hypothesis that the universe was created by a divine intelligence could be established as reasonable on the same sorts of grounds as other scientific theories. We could, for example, try to reconfigure experimental theism in Popperian terms. Or we could propose that God's existence was the best explanation of all the available data.
然而,我们也看到,克莱恩特斯的论证所依赖的东西很像归纳法,而休谟在其他地方曾对归纳法提出过强烈的批评。因此,我们也许应该得出这样的结论:从设计出发的论证最好被理解为一种科学假设。举例来说,伟大的物理学家艾萨克-牛顿(Isaac Newton)是 17 世纪这一论证最著名的提出者之一,而休谟则把克里安特斯的立场称为 "实验神论",这一点很有启发性。因此,我们可能想研究一下,宇宙是由神的智慧创造的这一假设是否能像其他科学理论一样,以同样的理由被证明是合理的。例如,我们可以尝试用波普尔的术语来重构实验有神论。我们也可以提出,上帝的存在是对所有可用数据的最佳解释。
Popper himself would have objected to the view that experimental theism was a scientific theory, because the hypothesis in question is not a set of laws but a claim about the existence of a particular individual. Real theories, on Popper's view, make universal claimsthat is why they can be falsified. They are universally quantified conditionals, whose form is
波普尔本人也会反对实验神论是一种科学理论的观点,因为有关的假设并不是一套定律,而是关于一个特定个体存在的主张。在波普尔看来,真正的理论提出的是普遍性的主张,这就是它们能够被证伪的原因。它们是普遍量化的条件式,其形式是

: For all , if is , then is ,
:对于所有 ,如果 是 ,那么 就是 、

not existential claims of the form
而不是形式为
: There exists an that is and .
:存在一个 ,它是 和 。
A single that isn't a falsifies . If I claim it's a natural law that if something is a swan, it is white, then a single black swan shows I'm wrong. But no amount of producing F's that aren't G established
一只不是天鹅的 证明了 。如果我说如果某物是天鹅,它就是白色的,这是自然法则,那么一只黑天鹅就说明我错了。但是,再多的 "F "也不能证明 "G "是正确的。

decisively that is false. I can show you white swans until I am blue in the face and I still won't have proved that there isn't a black swan somewhere.
是错误的。我可以给你看白天鹅,直到我的脸都青了,但我仍然无法证明某个地方没有黑天鹅。
But this is a rather weak objection against the idea that the claim that God exists is a scientific hypothesis, I think, since whether or not it is a theory, it is surely a hypothesis. And, in any case, scientists , of course, postulate the existence of particular things. The outer planets were originally postulated to explain perturbations in the paths of other celestial bodies; pathologists postulate the existence of new disease organisms. In the course of arguing for these existence claims, they draw on laws and on known facts about other particular things. But the postulation of God is rather unlike these standard existential hypotheses, because it is meant to explain not particular things in the light of general laws but everything, including the fact that there are any laws of nature at all.
但我认为,这是对 "上帝存在 "是一种科学假说这一观点的一种相当薄弱的反对,因为无论它是否是一种理论,它都肯定是一种假说。而且,无论如何,科学家 ,当然会假设一些特定事物的存在。假设外行星的存在,最初是为了解释其他天体运行轨迹的扰动;病理学家假设新的疾病有机体的存在。在论证这些存在主张的过程中,他们借鉴了有关其他特定事物的规律和已知事实。但对上帝的假设与这些标准的存在论假设截然不同,因为它不是要根据一般规律来解释特定事物,而是要解释一切事物,包括存在任何自然规律这一事实。
So let us explore briefly the question whether postulating the existence of a creator God provides the best explanation of the totality of the evidence available. Answering that question depends, as usual, on what conception of God you are proposing. Philo raises objections to Cleanthes' experimental theism that rely, in effect, on just such a consideration.
因此,让我们简单探讨一下,假设造物主上帝的存在是否是对现有全部证据的最佳解释。像往常一样,回答这个问题取决于你提出的上帝概念是什么。斐洛反对克利安特斯的实验神论,实际上就是基于这样的考虑。
At the beginning of the tenth of the Dialogues, the three philosophers discuss the great amount of suffering and misery there is in the world. Cleanthes entertains the possibility (which, as I mentioned in 3. 7, had actually been proposed by Leibniz) that this is an illusion —-that, in fact, this is "the best of all possible worlds." But Philo pretty quickly persuades him that this is not a plausible empirical claim. And so all of them agree that evil exists in the actual world. But once it is conceded that suffering exists, Philo says, we must face these questions about what God is like.
在《对话录》第十章的开头,三位哲学家讨论了世界上存在的巨大痛苦和不幸。克莱恩特斯认为这是一种幻觉的可能性(正如我在 3.7 中提到的,这种可能性实际上是莱布尼茨提出来的)--事实上,这是 "所有可能的世界中最好的世界"。但菲洛很快就说服了他,说这不是一个可信的经验之谈。因此,他们都同意现实世界中存在着邪恶。菲洛说,一旦承认苦难的存在,我们就必须面对上帝是什么样的这些问题。
This argument is offered, then, against those theists who claim, like traditional theologians, that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. Traditional theologians held that God could do
因此,这个论点是针对那些像传统神学家一样声称上帝无所不能、无所不知、完全良善的有神论者提出的。传统神学家认为,上帝可以

anything that was logically possible, that he knew everything that happened in the universe, and that he would never do what was morally wrong. Philo is arguing that this is not consistent with the existence of evil.
他知道宇宙中发生的一切,他永远不会做道德上错误的事。斐洛认为,这与邪恶的存在并不一致。
Now, as the American philosopher Nelson Pike has correctly pointed out, this argument assumes that "an omnipotent and omniscient being could have no morally sufficient reason for allowing instances of suffering." And many Christian theologians have denied this. They have argued, for example, that without free will our actions would be morally worthless, and that if we have free will, then the suffering that is caused by our exercise of it is not something that God does. What it is for us to have free will is itself a substantial philosophical question, which I will discuss in 9.10. But the argument here will go something like this:
现在,正如美国哲学家纳尔逊-派克所正确指出的,这一论点假定 "一个无所不能、无所不知的存在不可能有任何道德上充分的理由来允许痛苦的发生"。许多基督教神学家否认了这一点。例如,他们认为,如果没有自由意志,我们的行为在道德上就毫无价值;如果我们有自由意志,那么我们行使自由意志所造成的痛苦就不是上帝所为。什么是我们的自由意志,这本身就是一个实质性的哲学问题,我将在 9.10 中讨论这个问题。但这里的论证将是这样的:
In order for the world to be good, we must be free.
为了让世界美好,我们必须自由。
For us to be free, God must not interfere in our choices.
要让我们自由,上帝就不能干涉我们的选择。
So: If we choose to cause suffering, he can only intervene at the cost of depriving us of our freedom, which is, in itself, a good.
所以:如果我们选择造成痛苦,那么他只能以剥夺我们的自由为代价进行干预,而自由本身就是一种善。
If a world without both freedom and suffering would be worse than a world with both of them, then the existence of suffering caused by freedom would be consistent with God's being perfectly good.
如果一个既无自由又无苦难的世界比一个同时拥有自由和苦难的世界更糟糕,那么由自由造成的苦难的存在就与上帝的完全善意是一致的。
You could reply to this argument that there might be a possible world in which free people always chose to avoid creating suffering. Such a world does not seem, at first glance, to be a conceptual impossibility. And if so, why didn't a perfectly good and all-powerful God bring that world into being? You could also object that there are many forms of suffering that do not seem to flow from human freedom. Is malaria or spina bifida a necessary concomitant of freedom, for example? But to this a religious believer might reply, with the philosopher John Hick, that we (or, rather, our souls) are made better through suffering. Disease, for example, makes it possible for people to express kindness by looking after the sick. There would be no opportunities for charity in a world without suffering. And, more
对于这个论点,你可以回答说,可能存在这样一个世界,在这个世界里,自由的人们总是选择避免制造痛苦。乍一看,这样的世界在概念上并不存在。如果是这样的话,为什么一个完美善良、无所不能的上帝不把这个世界创造出来呢?你也可以反对说,有许多形式的痛苦似乎并不是源于人类的自由。例如,疟疾或脊柱裂是自由的必然结果吗?对此,宗教信徒可能会像哲学家约翰-希克(John Hick)一样回答说,我们(或者说,我们的灵魂)在苦难中变得更加美好。例如,疾病使人们有可能通过照顾病人来表达善意。在一个没有苦难的世界里,就不会有施舍的机会。更多

generally, Hick argues, in a world without suffering there would be "no need for the virtues of self-sacrifice, care for others, devotion to the public good, courage, perseverance, skill, or honesty." The name for attempts to resolve the problem of evil while maintaining that God is both omnipotent and good is "theodicy." Hick calls his theodicy a "theodicy of soul-making"; it is only, he argues, through living in a world of suffering that we can come to be the morally developed souls that the Christian God wants us to be.
一般来说,希克认为,在一个没有苦难的世界里,"就不需要自我牺牲、关爱他人、献身公益、勇气、毅力、技巧或诚实等美德"。在坚持上帝是全能和善的同时,试图解决邪恶问题的尝试被称为 "神论"。希克称他的神道论为 "塑造灵魂的神道论";他认为,只有生活在苦难的世界中,我们才能成为基督教上帝希望我们成为的道德高尚的灵魂。
Clearly, these are difficult questions on which many people, both religious and nonreligious, are divided. I mention them here to illustrate the fact that once a moral conception of God is assumed, the question whether or not postulating his existence provides the best available explanation of all the data may lead one to consider the metaphysics of morality as well as the degree of (nonmoral) order in the world. Not only is the totality of the evidence vast-anything that happens is potentially relevant—but it also requires both moral and nonmoral judgment. Furthermore, particularly since the Reformation, many Christians have said that they experienced a direct encounter with God in prayer, maintaining, in effect, that they are acquainted, in Russell's sense, with him. So different people think they have access to very different kinds of data. It is not surprising, I think, in these circumstances, that "Is there a God" and "What is God like?" are not questions on which there is consensus either within or outside philosophy. Perhaps, then, that provides some support for the view that one way of understanding the argument from design is, indeed, as a proposed inference to the best explanation.
显然,这些问题都很棘手,许多人,包括信教和不信教的人,在这些问题上意见不一。我在此提及这些问题是为了说明这样一个事实,即一旦假定了上帝的道德概念,那么假设上帝的存在是否为所有数据提供了最好的解释,这个问题可能会导致人们考虑道德的形而上学以及世界(非道德)秩序的程度。证据的整体性不仅是巨大的--任何发生的事情都可能与之相关--而且还需要道德和非道德的判断。此外,特别是自宗教改革以来,许多基督徒都说,他们在祷告中经历了与上帝的直接相遇,实际上,他们坚持认为,在罗素的意义上,他们与上帝相识。因此,不同的人认为他们能够获得的数据是截然不同的。我认为,在这种情况下,"是否存在上帝 "和 "上帝是什么样的?"这两个问题在哲学内外都没有达成共识,也就不足为奇了。也许,这就为这样一种观点提供了某种支持,即理解 "设计论证 "的一种方式,就是将其作为对最佳解释的一种拟议推论。

8.13 Conclusion 8.13 结论

We have seen that exploring one central ontological question-the question whether there is a God-leads you into the heart of metaphysics. You must think about necessity and possibility, about the nature of existence, about free will. You are drawn into questions in logic and epistemology, in ethics and the philosophy of science. Metaphysics impinges on other areas of philosophy; every area of philosophy has its metaphysical dimensions.
我们已经看到,探讨一个核心的本体论问题--是否存在上帝--会把你带入形而上学的核心。你必须思考必然性和可能性,思考存在的本质,思考自由意志。你会被卷入逻辑学和认识论、伦理学和科学哲学的问题中。形而上学影响着哲学的其他领域;哲学的每个领域都有其形而上学的层面。
In the early part of the twentieth century, metaphysics fell into disrepute because the logical positivists argued that metaphysical
二十世纪初,形而上学声名狼藉,因为逻辑实证主义者认为形而上学

questions, since they could not be settled by logic or scientific method, were vacuous, empty of content. The verification principle, which we discussed in chapter two, requires that metaphysical questions should be decided on the basis of evidence, if they are to be regarded as being real questions. I have tried to show in this chapter that both argument and evidence can play a central role in metaphysical discussion, so that the positivists were wrong. That is why metaphysical debate, which began centuries before Aristotle, is still going strong.
形而上学问题既然不能用逻辑或科学方法来解决,那么它们就是空洞的、没有内容的。我们在第二章中讨论过的验证原则要求,形而上学问题若要被视为真正的问题,就应在证据的基础上做出决定。我在本章中试图说明,论证和证据都可以在形而上学讨论中发挥核心作用,因此实证主义者是错误的。这就是为什么形而上学的辩论早在亚里士多德之前几个世纪就开始了,而且至今仍在继续。

CHAPTER 9 第 9 章

Philosophy 哲学

How does formal philosophy differ from folk philosophy?
形式哲学与民间哲学有何不同?
Or from religion and science?
还是来自宗教和科学?
Can there be equally adequate but incompatible ways of
会不会有同样适当但不相容的方法来
conceptualizing the world?
将世界概念化?
Do we have free will?
我们有自由意志吗?

9.1 Introduction 9.1 导言

In many a village around the world, in societies traditional and industrialized, people gather in the evenings to talk. In pubs and bars, under trees in the open air in the tropics, and around fires in the far north and south of our globe, people exchange tales, tell jokes, discuss issues of the day, argue about matters important and trivial. Listening to such conversations in cultures other than your own, you learn much about the concepts and theories people use to understand their experience, and you learn what values they hold most dear.
在世界各地的许多村庄,在传统社会和工业化社会,人们晚上都会聚在一起聊天。在酒馆和酒吧里,在热带地区露天的树下,在地球遥远的北方和南方,人们围着火堆交流故事、讲笑话、讨论当天的问题、争论重要或琐碎的事情。聆听这些不同文化背景下的对话,你可以学到很多关于人们用来理解自身经历的概念和理论,也可以了解他们最珍视的价值观。
It would be natural enough, as we built a picture of those values, theories, and concepts in another culture, to describe what we were doing as coming to understand the philosophy of that culture. In one sense, the philosophy of a person or a group is just the sum of the beliefs they hold about the central questions of human lifeabout mind and matter, knowledge and truth, good and bad, right and wrong, human nature, and the universe we inhabit.
当我们建立起另一种文化中的价值观、理论和概念的图景时,把我们正在做的事情描述为理解该文化的哲学是很自然的。从某种意义上说,一个人或一个群体的哲学只是他们对人类生活的核心问题所持信念的总和,这些核心问题涉及心灵与物质、知识与真理、好与坏、对与错、人性以及我们所居住的宇宙。
At their most general, as I say, these beliefs are naturally called "philosophy," and there is nothing wrong in using the word this way. There is much continuity between conversation about these universal questions-what we might call "folk philosophy" - and the kind of discussion that has filled the chapters of this book.
正如我所说的那样,在最一般的情况下,这些信仰自然被称为 "哲学",这样使用这个词并没有什么不妥。关于这些普遍性问题的对话--我们可以称之为 "民间哲学"--与本书各章所讨论的问题之间存在着很大的连续性。
All human cultures, simple or complex, large or small, industrial
所有人类文化,无论简单或复杂,规模或大小,工业化

or preindustrial, have many of the concepts we have discussed-or, at least, concepts much like them. Issues about what is good and right, what we know and mean, what it is to have a mind and to think, can arise for people living in the simplest of societies (and, alas, can be ignored in the most complex ones). At least some of the problems of the philosophy of mind, of epistemology, and of ethics surely do arise naturally for any curious member of our species. We might suppose, as a result, that people have reflected on these questions everywhere and always. If any thought about these questions counts as philosophy, then philosophy is likely to be found in every human society, past and present-wherever there are people struggling to live (and make sense of) their lives.
或前工业化时代的人们,拥有我们讨论过的许多概念--或至少是与它们很相似的概念。生活在最简单社会中的人们也会遇到关于什么是善和正确、我们知道什么和意味着什么、什么是心灵和思想的问题(可惜,在最复杂的社会中也会被忽视)。至少心灵哲学、认识论和伦理学的某些问题肯定会自然而然地出现在我们这个物种的任何好奇成员身上。因此,我们可以认为,人们无时无刻不在思考这些问题。如果对这些问题的任何思考都算得上是哲学的话,那么在过去和现在的每一个人类社会中--只要有人努力生活(并使自己的生活有意义)的地方--都有可能发现哲学的踪迹。
But it is important, too, that there are discontinuities between folk philosophy and the discussions of this book. Philosophy, as it is practiced and taught in modern Western universities, is a distinctive institution that has evolved along with Western societies. I mentioned toward the start of Chapter 4 that science-unlike minds and knowledge and language-has not existed in every human culture. The problems of the philosophy of science occur only in cultures that have the institution of science; and just so, most of the questions raised in political philosophy and the philosophy matter only if you live-as not all human beings have lived - in a society organized as a state with a legal system.
但同样重要的是,民间哲学与本书的讨论之间存在着不连续性。现代西方大学所实践和教授的哲学,是一种与西方社会共同发展的独特制度。我在第 4 章开头提到,科学--不同于思想、知识和语言--并非存在于每一种人类文化中。科学哲学的问题只出现在拥有科学制度的文化中;同样,政治哲学和哲学中提出的大多数问题也只有当你生活在--并非所有人类都生活在--一个以国家为组织形式、拥有法律制度的社会中时,才会变得重要。
The differences between folk philosophy and the discussions of this book are not, however, simply differences in subject matter. Along with the new problems of the philosophy of science and law, social change has also produced new ways of tackling the old problems. One way to focus on what we have learned about the character of modern Western philosophy, the kind of philosophy that I have tried to introduce in this book, is to contrast it both with the folk philosophy of other cultures and with other styles of thought in our own culture. In doing this, it will help to have a name for the style of philosophical thought that I have been engaged in. I suggest that we call it "formal philosophy," to contrast it with the informal style of folk philosophy.
然而,民间哲学与本书讨论的不同之处不仅仅在于主题的不同。伴随着科学哲学和法哲学的新问题,社会变革也产生了解决旧问题的新方法。关注我们所了解的现代西方哲学(我在本书中试图介绍的那种哲学)特征的一种方法,就是将其与其他文化的民间哲学以及我们自己文化中的其他思想风格进行对比。在这样做的过程中,为我所从事的哲学思考风格命名会有所帮助。我建议将其称为 "正式哲学",以与民间哲学的非正式风格形成对比。
In the next few sections I am going to contrast formal philosophy with the traditional thought of nonliterate cultures, with Western religious thought, and with science. Each of these contrasts will
在接下来的几节中,我将把正规哲学与非文盲文化的传统思想、西方宗教思想以及科学进行对比。这些对比将

allow us not only to learn more about philosophy but also to ask some important philosophical questions.
我们不仅可以学习更多的哲学知识,还可以提出一些重要的哲学问题。

9.2 Traditional thought 9.2 传统思想

If you have ever read any anthropology, you are bound, I think, to be struck by the astonishing range of ways in which human beings have tried to understand our world. The Mbuti, for example, whom I have mentioned often already, think of the forest around them as a person — what we might call a "god" - and they think that the forest will take care of them. If they have a run of bad luck in their hunting, they suppose not that the forest is trying to harm them but that it has lost interest in them-that it has, as they say, "gone to sleep." When this happens they try to waken the forest by singing for it, and they believe that if their songs please the forest, their luck will turn.
如果你读过任何人类学著作,我想你一定会被人类试图理解我们世界的惊人方式所震撼。例如,我经常提到的姆布蒂人,他们把周围的森林当作一个人--我们可以称之为 "神"--他们认为森林会照顾他们。如果他们在打猎时运气不佳,他们会认为不是森林要伤害他们,而是森林对他们失去了兴趣--用他们的话说,森林 "睡着了"。他们相信,如果他们的歌声能唤醒森林,他们的运气就会好转。
Not only do most Westerners find such beliefs surprising, they are likely to think that they are unreasonable. Why should a forest care about anything, let alone human singing? And even if it did, how could it determine the success of a hunt for honey or for game?
大多数西方人不仅对这种信念感到惊讶,而且很可能认为它们是不合理的。森林为什么要关心任何事情,更不用说人类的歌声了?即使它在乎,它又怎么能决定狩猎蜂蜜或猎物的成败呢?
This sense that Mbuti beliefs are unreasonable is likely to grow when you are told that the Mbuti know very well that other people who live nearby, people with whom they have complex social relationships, believe quite different things. Their neighbors, in the villages on the edge of the Ituri rain forest where they live, believe that most bad luck is due to witchcraft-the malevolent action of special people whom they regard as witches. In these circumstances, it is surely very curious that the Mbuti do not worry about whether they are right.
如果有人告诉你,姆布蒂人非常清楚,生活在附近的其他人,与他们有着复杂社会关系的人,所相信的东西却截然不同,那么这种认为姆布蒂人的信仰不合理的感觉就会更加强烈。在他们居住的伊图里热带雨林边缘的村庄里,他们的邻居认为大多数厄运都是巫术造成的--被他们视为女巫的特殊人群的恶意行为。在这种情况下,姆布蒂人并不担心自己是否正确,这无疑是非常奇怪的。
The fact that the Mbuti know that other people believe different things and this does not seem to concern them marks their way of thinking off from that of Western cultures. Most Westerners would worry if they discovered that people in the next town got on very well without believing in electricity. We think our general beliefs can be justified, and if others challenge our beliefs, we are inclined to seek evidence and reasons for our position and to challenge their reasons and their evidence in response. The anthropologist and philosopher Robin Horton has used the term "adversarial" to describe this feature of Western cultures. We tend to treat our
姆布蒂人知道其他人相信不同的东西,但这似乎与他们无关,这标志着他们的思维方式不同于西方文化。大多数西方人会担心,如果他们发现隔壁镇上的人不相信有电也能生活得很好。我们认为自己的一般信念是有道理的,如果别人质疑我们的信念,我们倾向于为自己的立场寻找证据和理由,并质疑他们的理由和证据。人类学家兼哲学家罗宾-霍顿(Robin Horton)曾用 "对抗性 "一词来形容西方文化的这一特征。我们倾向于把我们的

intellectual disputes like our legal disputes, trading evidence and argument in a vigorous exchange, like adversaries on a field of intellectual battle. Horton uses this word to contrast this Western approach to argument with what the Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka calls the "accommodative" style of many traditional cultures. Traditional people are often willing to accept and accommodate the different views of other groups.
知识争端就像我们的法律争端一样,在激烈的交锋中交换证据和论点,就像在知识战场上的对手一样。霍顿用这个词将西方的这种争论方式与尼日利亚诺贝尔奖获得者沃莱-索因卡(Wole Soyinka)所说的许多传统文化中的 "包容 "风格进行对比。传统的人们往往愿意接受和包容其他群体的不同观点。
Indeed, the Mbuti, like many traditional peoples, tend not to give the justification of their general beliefs much thought at all. If we asked them why they believed in the god-forest, they would probably tell us, as many people in many cultures have told many anthropologists, that they believe it because it is what their ancestors taught them. Indeed many traditional cultures have proverbs that say, in effect, "Everything we know was taught us by our ancestors."
事实上,姆布蒂人和许多传统民族一样,往往根本不考虑他们一般信仰的理由。如果我们问他们为什么相信森林之神,他们可能会告诉我们,就像许多文化中的许多人告诉许多人类学家的那样,他们相信森林之神是因为这是祖先教给他们的。事实上,许多传统文化都有这样的谚语:"我们所知道的一切都是祖先教给我们的"。
Justifying beliefs by saying they have the authority of tradition is one of the practices that demarcates traditional cultures from formal philosophy. Even where I have cited distinguished philosophical authorities from the past-the "ancestors" of Western philosophy, such as Plato and Descartes - I have considered their arguments and tried to understand and criticize them. The fact that Plato or Descartes or Kant said something is not, by itself, a reason to believe it.
用传统的权威来证明信仰的正确性,是传统文化与正规哲学的区别之一。即使我引用了过去杰出的哲学权威--西方哲学的 "祖先",如柏拉图和笛卡尔--我也考虑了他们的论点,并试图理解和批判它们。柏拉图、笛卡尔或康德说过的话本身并不能成为我们相信它们的理由。
We should be careful, however, not to exaggerate the differences in the way Mbuti people and Westerners ordinarily justify their beliefs. Most of what you and I believe, we too believe because our parents or teachers told it to us. Some of the differences between the Mbuti and formal philosophy reflect differences not so much between traditional and Western people as between formal and informal thought.
不过,我们应该注意,不要夸大姆布蒂人和西方人通常为自己的信仰辩护的方式的差异。你我所相信的大多数东西,也都是因为父母或老师告诉我们的。姆布提哲学与正规哲学之间的一些差异,反映的与其说是传统人与西方人之间的差异,不如说是正规思想与非正规思想之间的差异。
Nevertheless, Westerners (and Western-trained people generally) are more likely to ask even their parents and teachers not just what they believe but why they believe it. And when Westerners ask why we should believe something, what they want is not just an authority but some evidence or argument. This is especially true in formal philosophy. Throughout this book I have tried to offer and examine reasons for believing the claims I have made, and the philosophers I have discussed have done the same.
尽管如此,西方人(以及受过西方训练的人)甚至更倾向于询问他们的父母和老师,不仅问他们相信什么,还问他们为什么相信。当西方人问我们为什么要相信某件事时,他们想要的不仅仅是权威,而是一些证据或论据。在形式哲学中尤其如此。在整本书中,我一直在努力提供和研究相信我所提出的主张的理由,我所讨论的哲学家们也是这样做的。
I have also tried to proceed systematically. I have tried, that is, to connect arguments made on one subject-fallibilism, for example-
我还试图有条不紊地开展工作。也就是说,我试图把就某一主题提出的论点--比如说 "无过错论"--联系起来。

with other apparently remote questions-such as the inevitability that our courts will sometimes punish the innocent, the underdetermination of empirical theory. And this shows up another contrast with traditional thought. Though anthropologists often try to make a system out of the thought of traditional peoples, they do not usually get much help from the people whose thought they study.
与其他看似遥远的问题--例如,我们的法院有时会不可避免地惩罚无辜者,经验理论的决定性不足。这也显示了与传统思想的另一种对比。虽然人类学家经常试图从传统民族的思想中建立一个体系,但他们通常不会从他们所研究的民族那里得到多少帮助。
Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, one of the founders of modern cultural anthropology, attempted in his book Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande to explain the theory of witchcraft implicit in the practice of the Azande people of southern Sudan. But when he discovered inconsistencies in their claims-it turned out that if you followed the Zande beliefs about the inheritance of witchcraft through, everybody was a witch!--they didn't seem to be very concerned about it.
爱德华-埃文斯-普里查德爵士是现代文化人类学的奠基人之一,他曾在《阿赞德人的巫术、神谕和魔法》一书中试图解释苏丹南部阿赞德人习俗中隐含的巫术理论。但当他发现他们的说法前后矛盾时--原来,如果你按照赞德人关于巫术传承的信仰去做,每个人都是巫师!--他们似乎对此并不十分在意。
The urge to give arguments and evidence for what you believe, and to make your beliefs consistent with each other so that they form a system, is one of the marks of formal philosophy. We can say that formal philosophy aims to be systematic. But though this urge to theorize is important to philosophy, it is also central, as we saw, to science, and it is not hard to see that it is central to the whole range of modern intellectual life. In short, the systematic character of philosophy is not special to the subject. It is an outgrowth of the systematic nature of our current modes of thought.
为自己的信念提供论据和证据,并使自己的信念相互一致,从而形成一个体系,这是形式哲学的标志之一。我们可以说,形式哲学的目标是系统化。不过,尽管这种理论化的冲动对哲学很重要,但正如我们所看到的,它也是科学的核心,而且不难看出,它是整个现代知识生活的核心。简而言之,哲学的系统性并不是哲学学科所特有的。它是我们当前思维模式的系统性的产物。
The reason why the Azande did not theorize systematically about witchcraft in the way that Evans-Pritchard did is that they did not want to. Their lives made sense to them in terms of the theories they had, and, so far as they could see, there was plenty of evidence for their beliefs. The evidence that witchcraft exists was as obvious to them as the evidence that electricity exists no doubt seems to you. People who were ill got better after the application of spiritual medicines; people died regularly after their enemies had appealed to powerful spirits. Of course, not everyone who is treated with spiritual medicine gets better; but then the lights don't always go on when you turn on a switch! The reason why the Zande did not think much about the evidence for their theories, in other words, is that they had no reason to suspect that they might be wrong.
阿赞德人之所以没有像埃文斯-普里查德那样对巫术进行系统的理论研究,是因为他们不想这样做。他们的生活在他们的理论中是有意义的,而且在他们看来,他们的信仰有大量的证据。巫术存在的证据对他们来说显而易见,就像电力存在的证据对你来说也显而易见一样。生病的人在服用灵药后会好起来;人们经常在敌人求助于强大的神灵后死去。当然,并不是每一个接受灵药治疗的人都会好起来,但并不是打开开关灯就会亮!换句话说,赞德人之所以没有过多地考虑其理论的证据,是因为他们没有理由怀疑自己的理论可能是错误的。
Now, I imagine that you have been supposing that it is quite obvious that the Azande not only might be wrong but are. You probably
现在,我想你们已经认为,很明显,阿赞德人不仅可能错了,而且错得很离谱。你可能

also think that your belief that they are wrong is one that you can justify with evidence and reason, and that Azande people who respected rational argumentation and sensible principles of evidence would eventually come to agree with you.
我还认为,你认为他们是错的,是可以用证据和理性来证明的,尊重理性论证和合理证据原则的阿赞德人最终会同意你的观点。
If I had started not with Zande beliefs about witchcraft but with their moral beliefs, by contrast, I suspect you would suppose that the same would not apply. I suspect, in other words, that you probably believe there is some truth in moral relativism but none in relativism about such factual questions as whether there are any witches. Yet just as moral relativists hold that what is good depends on who you are (or where or in what culture or when you live), some people have recently argued that what is true about factual questions depends on who you are (or in what culture or when you live).
相比之下,如果我不是从赞德人对巫术的信仰出发,而是从他们的道德信仰出发,我怀疑你会认为同样的情况并不适用。换句话说,我怀疑你可能认为道德相对主义有一定的真理,但对于是否存在女巫这样的事实问题,相对主义却没有真理。然而,正如道德相对主义者认为,什么是好的取决于你是谁(或你生活在什么地方或什么文化中或什么时候)一样,最近有人认为,关于事实问题,什么是真的取决于你是谁(或你生活在什么文化中或什么时候)。
Relativism about factual matters is usually called "cognitive relativism," and if you are not a cognitive relativist, then it is an important philosophical question whether you can defend your position. Relativism is important because its truth would set limits on the role of evidence and reason, and evidence and reason are central to formal philosophy. So it is important, too, that it turns out to be harder than you might think to defend the nonrelativity of factual beliefs. If we imagine what it would be like to argue with a convinced Azande, we shall see why.
关于事实问题的相对主义通常被称为 "认知相对主义",如果你不是认知相对主义者,那么你能否捍卫自己的立场就是一个重要的哲学问题。相对主义之所以重要,是因为它的真理会对证据和理性的作用设限,而证据和理性是形式哲学的核心。因此,同样重要的是,事实证明为事实信念的非相对性辩护比你想象的要难。如果我们想象一下与一个深信不疑的阿赞德人争论会是什么样子,我们就会明白为什么了。

9.3 Arguing with the Azande
9.3 与阿赞德人争论

Azande beliefs about witchcraft were rich and complex, but it does not take more than a brief summary to get to the heart of the difficulty I want to address. So let me try to give you an idea of their main beliefs in a brisk summary.
阿赞德人对巫术的信仰是丰富而复杂的,但只需简单概括就能触及我想解决的难题的核心。因此,让我试着用简短的概括让你们了解他们的主要信仰。
The Azande believed that mangu-which is the word that EvansPritchard translated as "witchcraft" - was a substance in the bodies of witches. Mangu produced a spiritual power that could cause ill health or other misfortune to its victims, even without the conscious intention of the witch. Mangu's physical manifestation was supposed to be a black substance-perhaps in the gallbladder-which could be detected at autopsy, and this substance was passed on from males to males and females to females.
阿赞德人认为,"曼古"--埃文斯-普里查德将其翻译为 "巫术"--是女巫体内的一种物质。Mangu 能产生一种精神力量,即使女巫没有意识到,也能给受害者带来健康问题或其他不幸。曼古的身体表现形式应该是一种黑色物质--可能存在于胆囊中--尸检时可以检测到,这种物质会在男性和女性之间传递。
Witches were supposed to do their evil in two major ways. Sometimes the "soul" of a witch traveled through the air-visible in
女巫应该通过两种主要方式作恶。有时,女巫的 "灵魂 "会在空气中游荡--在以下情况中可见

the daytime only to other witches but at night visible to all as a flame-and devoured the "soul of the flesh" of the victim. On other occasions, witches projected "witchcraft things" into their victims, causing pain in the relevant place, but this substance could be removed by the professional healers and seers whom EvansPritchard called "witch-doctors."
白天,只有其他女巫能看到,但到了晚上,所有人都能看到火焰,并吞噬受害者的 "肉体灵魂"。在其他情况下,女巫会将 "巫术之物 "投射到受害者体内,造成相关部位的疼痛,但这种物质可以被埃文斯-普里查德称为 "巫医 "的专业治疗师和预言家清除。
These witch-doctors were experts in the use of various kinds of Zande magic, but most ordinary Zande people knew many spells and rituals that were intended to help them control their world by, for example, bringing rain, curing disease, ensuring success in hunting or in farming, or guaranteeing the fertility of men and women.
这些巫医是使用各种赞德魔法的专家,但大多数普通赞德人都知道许多咒语和仪式,这些咒语和仪式的目的是帮助他们控制自己的世界,例如降雨、治病、确保狩猎或耕作的成功,或保证男人和女人的生育能力。
Witchcraft, for the Azande, was involved in the explanation of all those unfortunate happenings that do people harm. But the Azande did not deny the role of other kinds of influence. They understood the interaction of witchcraft and other causes of harm through an analogy with hunting. When they went elephant hunting, they called the man who plunged in the second spear "umbaga"; he and the man who plunged in the first spear were held to be jointly responsible for the elephant's death. The Azande compared witchcraft to umbaga. When, for example, a man was killed by a spear in war, they said that witchcraft was the "second spear"-for sometimes a spear thrust does not kill its victim and the "second spear" is needed to explain why, in this case, the man died.
对阿赞德人来说,巫术可以解释所有那些对人们造成伤害的不幸事件。但阿赞德人并不否认其他影响因素的作用。他们通过狩猎来理解巫术和其他伤害原因之间的相互作用。当他们去猎杀大象时,他们把刺入第二支长矛的人称为 "umbaga";他和刺入第一支长矛的人被认为对大象的死亡负有共同责任。阿赞德人将巫术比作 umbaga。例如,当一个人在战争中被长矛刺死时,他们说巫术就是 "第二支长矛"--因为有时刺入的长矛并没有杀死受害者,这时就需要 "第二支长矛 "来解释为什么这个人死了。
If you asked the Azande what evidence they had for the existence of witchcraft, they would point, first, to many of the misfortunes of human life, and ask how else they could be explained. But they would also tell you that they had a number of ways of discovering more precisely how witchcraft operated: and these various ways of finding out about witchcraft they called "soroka," which EvansPritchard translated as "oracles."
如果你问阿赞德人他们有什么证据证明巫术的存在,他们会首先指出人类生活中的许多不幸,并询问还能如何解释这些不幸。但他们也会告诉你,他们有许多方法可以更准确地发现巫术是如何运作的:这些发现巫术的各种方法被他们称为 "索罗卡",埃文斯-普里查德将其翻译为 "神谕"。
The Zande used many kinds of oracles-ways of finding out what was going on in the world of spirits, in general, and witchcraft, in particular. They regarded dreams about witchcraft as oracles, for example. But the highest in the hierarchy of oracles, in terms of reliability, was their "poison oracle," and they used it regularly in their attempts to discover who had bewitched them.
赞德人使用多种神谕--了解神灵世界发生的事情,尤其是巫术。例如,他们将有关巫术的梦视为神谕。但在神谕的等级中,可靠性最高的是他们的 "毒药神谕",他们经常用它来发现谁迷惑了他们。
The oracle involved administering a special poison to young chicks; questions were put to it, and whether the chicken died determined
甲骨文涉及给小鸡注射一种特殊的毒药;向它提问,并确定鸡是否死亡。

the answer. In a typical case, an Azande man - and, in Zandeland, it always was an adult male-would administer the poison to a chicken and ask the oracle whether so-and-so had bewitched them. If the fowl died, the accusation was confirmed, but the question had now to be put the other way round, so that, on the second test, it was the fowl's survival that confirmed that there had been witchcraft. Thus, on the first test, the oracle's operator might say: "Have I been bewitched, oracle? If so, kill the chicken." And on the second test, he would say, "Have I been bewitched? If so, save the chicken."
答案。在一个典型的案例中,一名阿赞德男子--在赞德,他总是一名成年男子--会给一只鸡下毒,然后问神谕者某某是否迷惑了他们。如果鸡死了,指控就得到了证实,但现在问题必须反过来问,因此,在第二次测试中,鸡的存活证实了巫术的存在。因此,在第一次测试时,神谕的操作者可能会说:"我中邪了吗,神谕?如果是,就把鸡杀了。"在第二次测试时,他会说:"我中邪了吗?如果是,救救这只鸡
Even given this little sketch of some Zande beliefs, you might think that you had enough to begin to persuade a reasonable Zande person that they were wrong. After all, surely on many occasions the oracle would give contradictory answers. Suppose someone put the two questions I just suggested to an oracle and the chicken died both times? Wouldn't that show the oracle was unreliable?
即便是对赞德人的一些信仰略作了解,你也可能会认为,你已经有足够的理由开始说服一个通情达理的赞德人,让他相信他们是错的。毕竟,在很多情况下,神谕肯定会给出相互矛盾的答案。假设有人向神谕提出了我刚才建议的两个问题,结果鸡两次都死了?这难道不能说明甲骨文不可靠吗?
Unfortunately, things are not so simple. Like many traditional people, the Azande believed that there were many taboos that should be observed in every important area of their lives, and the oracle was no exception. If the operator had broken a taboo-for example, by eating certain prohibited foods-the oracle was supposed to lose its power. So if an oracle proved unreliable, they could say that one of the operators had broken a taboo. But they also believed that powerful witchcraft could undermine the working of the oracle; that would be another possible explanation for the failure. In short, when an oracle failed, the Azande had plenty of resources within their theories to explain it.
遗憾的是,事情并非如此简单。像许多传统民族一样,阿赞德人认为生活中的每一个重要领域都有许多禁忌需要遵守,甲骨文也不例外。如果占卜者触犯了禁忌,比如吃了某些禁忌食物,神谕就会失去力量。因此,如果甲骨文证明不可靠,他们就可以说是其中一位操作者触犯了禁忌。但他们也相信,强大的巫术可能会破坏甲骨文的工作,这也是甲骨文失灵的另一种可能的解释。总之,当甲骨文失灵时,阿赞德人的理论中有很多资源可以解释。
Evans-Pritchard noticed this feature of Zande thought, and he said that the reason why they didn't notice that their oracles were unreliable was that they were able to make these explanatory moves, which he called "secondary elaborations." Evans-Pritchard observed, "The perception of error in one mystical notion in a particular situation merely proves the correctness of another and equally mystical notion." The problem is that it is not so clear that the Zande were being unreasonable in making these secondary elaborations.
埃文斯-普里查德注意到了赞德思想的这一特点,他说他们之所以没有注意到他们的神谕是不可靠的,是因为他们能够做出这些解释性的举动,他称之为 "二次阐述"。埃文斯-普里查德指出:"在特定情况下,对一个神秘概念错误的感知仅仅证明了另一个同样神秘的概念的正确性"。问题在于,赞德人在进行这些二次阐述时是否不合理并不那么清楚。
As Evans-Pritchard noticed, the system of witchcraft, oracles, and other kinds of magic formed a coherent system of mutually supporting beliefs.
正如埃文斯-普里查德所注意到的,巫术、神谕和其他种类的魔法形成了一个相互支持的连贯信仰体系。
Death is proof of witchcraft ... The results which magic is supposed to produce actually happen after the rites are performed . . . . Hunting-magic is made and animals are speared.... Magic is only made to produce events which are likely to happen in any case-e.g. rain is produced in the rainy season and held up in the dry season . ... [Magic] is seldom asked to produce a result by itself but is associated with empirical action that does in fact produce it-e.g. a prince gives food to attract followers and does not rely on magic alone.
死亡是巫术的证据.巫术应该产生的结果在仪式完成后就会发生.............狩猎--魔法被施展,动物被矛射杀....。魔法只是为了产生在任何情况下都有可能发生的事件--例如,雨季下雨,旱季不下雨......。[魔法]本身很少被要求产生结果,而是与实际产生结果的经验行动联系在一起--例如,王子提供食物来吸引追随者,而不是仅仅依靠魔法。
And he also gave many more examples of the ways in which they can explain failures when they occur.
他还举出了更多的例子,说明当失败发生时,他们可以用什么方法来解释。
Consider, for the sake of comparison, what you would say if you did a simple experiment in chemistry that came out differently on two successive occasions. You would say, quite reasonably, that you had probably not done the experiment quite the same way both times. Perhaps, for example, one of your test tubes wasn't quite clean, perhaps you hadn't measured the reagents quite carefully enough, and so on. In other words, it would take systematic observation, experimentation (where possible), and thought.
比较一下,如果你做了一个简单的化学实验,但两次实验的结果都不一样,你会怎么说?你会很有理由地说,你两次做实验的方法可能不太一样。例如,也许是你的试管不太干净,也许是你对试剂的测量不够仔细,等等。换句话说,这需要系统的观察、实验(在可能的情况下)和思考。
Now, why shouldn't an Azande say to you that your explanation here is just as much a case of defending one mystical notion-the idea of chemical reactions-in terms of another-the idea that there is an invisible quantity of some reagent in the test tube? Your theory, too, constitutes a set of "mutually supporting beliefs," and that-far from being an argument against it-seems to be a point in its favor. Nevertheless, unless you already have some faith that the world is made of atoms and molecules that react according to definite rules, there is no obvious reason why a few experiments should persuade you of this general theory. And, similarly, there is no reason why the failure of even a good number of experiments should make you give it up.
现在,一个阿赞德人为什么不能对你说,你在这里的解释是在为一种神秘的观念--化学反应的观念--辩护,而不是为另一种观念--试管里有看不见的某种试剂的观念--辩护呢?你的理论也构成了一套 "相互支持的信念",而这不仅不是反对它的论据,反而似乎是对它有利的一点。尽管如此,除非你已经相信世界是由原子和分子组成的,而这些原子和分子会按照明确的规则发生反应,否则没有明显的理由让你相信这个普遍理论。同样,即使大量实验的失败也没有理由让你放弃这一理论。
At this point you may recall something I said in the chapter on science. I said there that our theories are underdetermined by the evidence for them. This meant that the contents of our empirical beliefs are not fully determined by the evidence we have for them. I argued also that much of the language we use for describing the world is theory-laden: the ways we commit ourselves to the existence of objects and properties beyond our sensory evidence is
说到这里,你可能会想起我在关于科学的那一章里说过的话。我在那里说过,我们的理论是由证据决定的。这意味着,我们的经验信念的内容并不完全由我们所掌握的证据决定。我还争辩说,我们描述世界的许多语言都带有理论色彩:我们承诺我们的感官证据之外的物体和属性存在的方式是

partly determined by the theories we happen to have. What EvansPritchard noticed was, in effect, a consequence of the fact that Zande observation was theory-laden also. They interpreted what they heard and saw in terms of their belief in witchcraft. But if theory-ladenness is a feature their theories share with our scientific beliefs, that fact is not, by itself, an argument against them.
部分取决于我们碰巧拥有的理论。埃文斯-普里查德所注意到的,实际上是赞德人的观察也充满理论的结果。他们根据自己对巫术的信仰来解释自己的所闻所见。但是,如果他们的理论与我们的科学信仰有共同之处,那么这一事实本身并不能成为反对他们的论据。
In practice, then, we should have to do more than point to a few cases where the oracle seemed to give inconsistent results if we were to persuade a reasonable Azande person that his or her theory was wrong. What more would it take?
那么,在实践中,如果我们要说服一个通情达理的阿赞德人相信他或她的理论是错误的,我们所要做的应该不仅仅是指出甲骨文似乎给出了不一致结果的几个案例。还需要做什么呢?
The answer, surely, is that it would take the collection of a lot of data on oracles; examining carefully the question whether anyone had broken a taboo; looking to see if we could find grounds to support the claim that witchcraft was interfering in those cases where the oracle failed and no one had broken a taboo; checking to see that the reason one chicken died and the other did not was not that different quantities of poison had been administered; and so on. (This is the sort of way we should set about evaluating a medical procedure in our own society; the medical journals suggest that establishing effectiveness and ineffectiveness can be quite difficult.)
答案肯定是,这需要收集大量有关神谕的数据;仔细研究是否有人触犯了禁忌;看看我们是否能找到理由支持这样的说法,即在神谕失灵而无人触犯禁忌的情况下,巫术在起干扰作用;检查一只鸡死而另一只鸡没死的原因是不是因为下了不同剂量的毒;等等。(在我们自己的社会中,我们应该用这种方法来评估医疗程序;医学期刊表明,确定有效和无效可能相当困难)。
Notice that we could do all this while still using the language of the Azande to describe what we were doing. We would not need to assume our own theories were correct. We could use our theories in order to see if we could construct cases where the oracle would fail, but we would still leave it up to the actual experiments to decide whether we were right. Because we share with the Azande some of the concepts we use for describing the world-chicken, person, death-we could agree that, in some cases, the results had come out in ways that didn't fit Zande theory; in others, that it had come out in ways that didn't fit ours.
请注意,我们可以做到这一切,同时仍然使用阿赞德语言来描述我们正在做的事情。我们不需要假设自己的理论是正确的。我们可以使用我们的理论来判断我们是否能构造出甲骨文会失效的情况,但我们仍然要让实际实验来决定我们是否正确。因为我们与阿赞德人共享一些我们用来描述世界的概念--鸡、人、死亡--所以我们可以同意,在某些情况下,实验结果与阿赞德人的理论不符;而在另一些情况下,实验结果与我们的理论不符。
In the long run, after much experimentation of this kind, some Azande might come to give up their theory. But there is no guarantee that this would happen. Just as it is always possible for us to explain away experimental results by supposing that somethingthough we are not sure what-went wrong, so this move is open to the Azande also.
从长远来看,经过多次这样的实验,一些阿赞德人可能会放弃他们的理论。但这并不能保证一定会发生。就像我们总是有可能通过假设某些事情(虽然我们并不确定是什么出错了)来解释实验结果一样,阿赞德人也有可能采取这种做法。
Nothing I have suggested presupposes that it has to be we who raise doubts about Azande beliefs. Because the problem of consis-
我提出的任何建议都没有预设必须由我们来对阿赞德信仰提出质疑。因为

tency with the evidence can be put without presupposing that Zande theory is false, it would have been open to them to carry out these experiments. So, perhaps, if the Azande were wrong, they could have found it out for themselves.
在不假定赞德理论是错误的前提下,他们本可以进行这些实验,从而与证据保持一致。因此,如果阿赞德人错了,他们也许可以自己发现。
I shall return in section 9.5 to the question of whether we should expect the Azande to come, after experiment and systematic thought, to agree with us, and not simply to assume a development of their own witchcraft theory. But it is worth spending a little time first to consider why it is unlikely that the Azande would have done either of these things if they had been left alone. For even if the Azande of Evans-Pritchard's day had started to worry about their beliefs, they would have been severely limited in their ability to theorize about them and to carry out these sorts of experiments-not because they were not clever enough, but because they lacked at least one essential tool. For the Azande did not have writing. And, as we shall see, much of what we take to be typical of formal philosophy derives in large measure from the fact that formal philosophy, unlike folk philosophy, is written.
我将在第 9.5 节中再次讨论我们是否应该期望阿赞德人在经过实验和系统思考后同意我们的观点,而不是简单地假设发展他们自己的巫术理论。不过,我们还是应该先花一点时间考虑一下,为什么如果放任阿赞德人不管,他们不可能做出上述任何一件事。因为即使埃文斯-普里查德时代的阿赞德人开始担心自己的信仰,他们在理论上和进行这类实验的能力也会受到严重限制--不是因为他们不够聪明,而是因为他们至少缺少一种必要的工具。因为阿赞德人没有文字。而且,正如我们将要看到的,我们认为形式哲学的许多典型特征在很大程度上都源于这样一个事实,即形式哲学不同于民间哲学,它是书面的。

9.4 The significance of literacy
9.4 扫盲的意义

It is very striking that the fathers of Western philosophy-Socrates and Plato-stand at the beginning of the development of Western writing. There is something emblematic in the fact that Plato, the first philosopher whose writings are still important to us, wrote dialogues that reported in writing the oral discussions of Socrates. Plato made Socrates important to us by writing his thought down. The fact that formal philosophy is written is tremendously important, and it pays to think about why this is.
令人震惊的是,西方哲学之父--苏格拉底和柏拉图--站在了西方文字发展的起点上。柏拉图是第一位哲学家,他的著作对我们仍然很重要,他写的对话录以书面形式报告了苏格拉底的口头讨论,这一事实具有象征意义。柏拉图把苏格拉底的思想写下来,从而使他对我们具有重要意义。正式的哲学是书面的这一事实极为重要,我们应该思考一下为什么会这样。
Imagine yourself in a culture without writing and ask yourself what difference it would make to your thought. Consider, for example, how you would think about some of the questions we have discussed in this book. Could you remember every step in any of the arguments I gave for the claim that knowledge is not justified true belief if you were not able to read and reread the examples, to think about them and then read them again? Could you check, without written words to look at, that what you had decided about the nature of the mind was consistent with what you thought about knowledge?
想象自己身处一个没有文字的文化中,问问自己文字会给你的思想带来什么不同。例如,考虑一下你将如何思考我们在本书中讨论过的一些问题。如果你不能阅读和重读这些例子,不能思考然后再阅读,你能记住我为 "知识不是正当的真实信念 "这一主张所做论证的每一步吗?在没有书面文字的情况下,你能检查出你对心灵本质的判断与你对知识的看法是否一致吗?
Writing makes possible a kind of consistency that nonliterate culture cannot demand. Write down a sentence and it is there, in principle, forever; and if you write down another sentence inconsistent with it, you can be caught out. It is this fact that is at the root of the possibility of the sort of extended philosophical argument that I have made again and again in this book. Philosophical argument, as I said in the introduction, is rooted in a philosophical tradition. But this is possible only because we can reread-and thus rethink-the arguments of our philosophical forebears.
书写使一种非文学文化无法要求的一致性成为可能。写下一个句子,原则上它就永远存在;如果你写下另一个与之不一致的句子,你就会被发现。正是这一事实是我在本书中一再提出的扩展哲学论证的可能性的根源。正如我在引言中所说,哲学论证植根于哲学传统。但这之所以可能,只是因为我们可以重读--从而重新思考--我们哲学先辈的论证。
That written record is what grounds our adversarial style. Think of the lawyer in the TV drama who asks the stenographer to read back from the record. In the traditional culture the answer can only be: "What record?" In the absence of writing, it is not possible to compare our ancestors' theories in their actual words with ours. Given the limitations of quantity imposed by oral transmission, we do not even have a detailed knowledge of what those theories were. We know more of Plato's thought more than two millennia ago about epistemology than we know about the views of any single Azande person a century ago about anything.
书面记录是我们对抗式辩论的基础。想想电视剧中要求速记员回读记录的律师吧。在传统文化中,答案只能是:"什么记录?"在没有文字的情况下,我们无法将祖先的理论与我们的理论进行比较。由于口耳相传的数量限制,我们甚至无法详细了解这些理论是什么。我们对两千多年前柏拉图关于认识论的思想的了解,要多于我们对一个世纪前任何一个阿赞德人关于任何事情的观点的了解。
The Azande would have had great difficulty in testing their system of beliefs in the way I have suggested because they had no way of recording their experiments and their theorizing about the world. That is the main reason why systematic theorizing of the kind that we have been engaged in would have been difficult for the Azande.
阿赞德人很难按照我建议的方式检验他们的信仰体系,因为他们没有办法记录他们的实验和对世界的理论研究。这就是阿赞德人难以进行我们所从事的那种系统理论研究的主要原因。
But literacy does not matter only for our ability to examine arguments over and over again and to record the results of experiment and experience. It has important consequences also for the style of the language that we use. Those of us who read and write learn very quickly how different in style written communication is from oral. Indeed, we learn it so early and so well that we need to be reminded of some of the really important differences.
但是,读写能力不仅关系到我们反复研究论点以及记录实验和经验结果的能力。它对我们使用的语言风格也有重要影响。我们这些会读会写的人很快就知道书面交流与口头交流的风格有多么不同。事实上,我们学得很早,也学得很好,以至于需要提醒我们注意一些真正重要的不同之处。
Consider, for example, the generality and abstractness of many of the arguments I have offered and how much these features depend upon writing. A simple example will help make this dependence clear.
例如,考虑一下我提出的许多论点的普遍性和抽象性,以及这些特点在多大程度上依赖于写作。一个简单的例子就能让我们明白这种依赖性。
Suppose you found a scrap of paper, that contained the following words:
假设你发现了一张废纸,上面写着以下文字:
On Sundays here, we often do what Joe is doing over there. But it is not normal to do it on this day. I asked the priest whether it was permissible to do it today and he just did this.
在这里的星期天,我们经常做乔在那边做的事情。但在这一天这样做是不正常的。我问牧师今天是否可以这样做,他就这样做了。
A reasonable assumption would be that someone had transcribed what someone was saying. And why? Because all these words-"I," "here," "there," "this," "today," and even "Joe" and "the priest" - are what logicians call "indexicals." You need the context in which the sentence is uttered to know what they are referring to: you need to know who the speaker or writer was to know what " " refers to, you need to know where that speaker was to know where "here" refers to, and so on.
一个合理的假设是,有人抄录了某人所说的话。为什么呢?因为所有这些词--"我"、"这里"、"那里"、"这个"、"今天",甚至 "乔 "和 "牧师"--都被逻辑学家称为 "索引词"。你需要根据句子的上下文才能知道它们指的是什么:你需要知道说话者或作者是谁,才能知道 " "指的是什么;你需要知道说话者在哪里,才能知道 "这里 "指的是哪里,等等。
When we write we have to fill in much of what context provides when we speak. We must do this not only so that we avoid the uncertainty of indexicals, but also because we cannot assume that our readers will share our knowledge of our situation, and because if they do not, they cannot ask us. We can now see why trying to avoid these possibilities for misunderstanding is bound to move you toward abstract and general questions and away from questions that are concrete and particular. The need for generality becomes clear if we consider the difference between the judgments of a traditional Zande oracle and those of experts in a written tradition. A traditional thinker can get away with saying that if three oracles have answered that the carver Kisanga has stolen a chicken, then he has. But in a written tradition, all sorts of problems can arise.
当我们写作时,我们必须填补说话时上下文所提供的大部分内容。我们必须这样做,不仅是为了避免索引的不确定性,还因为我们不能假定我们的读者会和我们一样了解我们的情况,如果他们不了解,他们就无法向我们提问。我们现在可以明白,为什么试图避免这些误解的可能性必然会使你倾向于抽象和一般的问题,而远离具体和特殊的问题。如果我们考虑一下传统赞德甲骨文的判断与书面传统中专家的判断之间的区别,对一般性的需求就会变得很清楚。传统思想家可以说,如果三个神谕都回答雕刻师基桑加偷了一只鸡,那么他就是偷了。但在书面传统中,就会出现各种各样的问题。
After all, everybody knows of cases where the oracles have been wrong three times because they were interfered with by witchcraft. On a particular occasion, where the possibility of witchcraft has not been raised, it will seem silly to raise this objection. But if we are trying to write an account of the oracle, we shall have to take other cases into account. The literate theorist has to formulate principles not just for the particular case, but more generally. Rather than saying
毕竟,每个人都知道神谕因为受到巫术干扰而三次出错的情况。在没有提出巫术可能性的特定场合,提出这种反对意见似乎很愚蠢。但是,如果我们试图写一篇关于神谕的文章,我们就必须考虑到其他情况。有文化的理论家不仅要为特定情况制定原则,还要为更广泛的情况制定原则。而不是说
Three oracles have spoken: it is so.
三位神谕者说过:事实如此。
he or she will have to say something like this:
他或她将不得不这样说:
Three oracles constitute good prima facie evidence that something is so; but they may have been interfered with by witchcraft. This is to be revealed by
三个神谕构成了很好的初步证据,证明某些事情就是这样;但它们可能受到了巫术的干扰。这可以通过

such and such means. If they have been interfered with by witchcraft, it is necessary first to purify the oracle ...
这样或那样的手段。如果它们受到巫术的干扰,首先必须净化甲骨文......
Literate theorists, in other words, will have to list those qualifying clauses that we recognize as the mark of written scholarship.
换句话说,有文化的理论家必须列出那些我们认为是书面学术标志的限定性条款。
Literacy forces you to consider general claims, because it requires you to make claims that are relevant beyond the particular conversation you are having. And it is easy to see that literacy also encourages abstraction in your language. Consider a traditional proverb that has been orally transmitted, such as this proverb from the Akan region of Ghana:
读写能力迫使你考虑一般性的主张,因为它要求你提出超越你正在进行的特定对话的主张。不难看出,识字还能促进语言的抽象性。考虑一下口口相传的传统谚语,比如加纳阿坎地区的这句谚语:
If all seeds that fall were to grow, then no one could follow the path under the trees.
如果所有掉落的种子都能生长,那么就没有人能沿着树下的小路走下去了。
When someone says this, they are usually expressing the view that if everyone were prosperous, no one would work. But the proverb is about seeds, trees, and paths through the forest. The message is abstract, but the wording is concrete. The concreteness makes the proverb memorable - and in oral tradition nothing is carried on but what is carried in memory. But it also means that to understand the message-as I am sure only Akan-speaking people did before I explained it-you have to share with the speaker a knowledge of his or her background assumptions.
当有人说这句话时,他们通常表达的观点是,如果人人都富裕了,就没有人工作了。但这句谚语说的是种子、树木和穿过森林的道路。信息是抽象的,但措辞却是具体的。这种具体性使谚语令人难忘--而在口头传统中,除了记忆中的东西,没有任何东西可以传承下去。但这也意味着,要理解这句谚语--在我解释之前,我确信只有讲阿坎语的人才能理解--就必须与说话者分享他或她的背景假设知识。
The proverb works because in traditional societies you talk largely with people you know; all the assumptions that are needed to interpret a proverb are shared. And it is because they are shared that the language of oral exchange (including, of course, the conversation of literate people) can be indexical, metaphorical, and context-dependent.
谚语之所以有效,是因为在传统社会中,人们主要是与熟人交谈;解释谚语所需的所有假设都是共同的。正是因为这些假设是共同的,所以口头交流的语言(当然也包括识字的人的谈话)可以是索引性的、隐喻性的、依赖语境的。
Once you are writing, by contrast, the demands imposed by trying to cater to an unknown reader move you toward both greater generality and greater abstraction. Because readers may not share the cultural assumptions of writers, written language becomes less metaphorical in contexts where communication of information is important. This is another reason we are less able to get away with the inconsistencies of our informal thought.
与此相反,一旦你开始写作,为了迎合未知读者而提出的要求就会使你变得更加概括和抽象。由于读者可能并不认同写作者的文化假设,在信息交流非常重要的语境中,书面语言的隐喻性就会降低。这也是我们无法摆脱非正式思维中前后矛盾的另一个原因。
For if we speak metaphorically, then what we say can be taken
因为如果我们用比喻的方式说话,那么我们所说的话就可以被理解为

and reinterpreted in a new context; the same proverb, precisely because its message is not fixed, can be used again and again. And if we can use it again and again with different messages, we may fail to notice that the messages are inconsistent with each other. After all, the proverb is being used in this situation, and why should we think now of those other occasions of its use?
同一句谚语,正因为它所传达的信息并不固定,所以可以反复使用。如果我们可以用不同的信息反复使用它,我们可能就不会注意到这些信息是不一致的。毕竟,这个谚语是在这种情况下使用的,我们现在为什么要考虑它在其他场合的使用呢?
Evans-Pritchard wrote: 埃文斯-普里查德写道:
a) [Although] Azande often observed that a medicine is unsuccessful, they do not generalize their observations. Therefore the failure of a single medicine does not teach them that all medicines of this type are foolish. Far less does it teach them that all magic is useless
a) [虽然]阿赞德人经常观察到某种药物不成功,但他们不会将观察结果一概而论。因此,一种药物的失败并不能告诉他们所有此类药物都是愚蠢的。更不会因此就认为所有魔法都是无用的
b) Contradictions between their beliefs are not noticed by the Azande because beliefs are not all present at the same time but function in different situations . . .
b) 阿赞德人不会注意到信仰之间的矛盾,因为信仰并不是同时存在的,而是在不同的情况下发挥作用.. .
c) Each man and each kinship group acts alone without cognizance of the actions of others. People do not pool their ritual experiences.
c) 每个人和每个亲属群体都单独行动,不考虑其他人的行动。人们不汇集他们的仪式经验。
But we can now see that, without literacy, it would be very hard indeed to generalize in this way, or to bring beliefs from different situations together to check their consistency, or to share the full range of Zande ritual experience.
但我们现在可以看到,如果不识字,就很难用这种方式进行归纳,也很难将不同情况下的信仰汇集在一起以检验其一致性,或分享赞德仪式的全部经验。
Neither the impulse toward universality and abstraction and away from metaphorical language nor the recognition of inconsistencies of the traditional worldview leads automatically to formal philosophy. But without literacy it is hard to see how formal philosophy could have got started; it is not a sufficient condition for formal philosophy, but it certainly seems to be necessary. And, as we have seen, it is literacy that explains some of the features of formal philosophy.
无论是对普遍性和抽象性的追求以及对隐喻语言的摒弃,还是对传统世界观不一致性的认识,都不会自动导致形式哲学的产生。但是,如果没有读写能力,很难想象形式哲学是如何起步的;读写能力并不是形式哲学的充分条件,但似乎确实是必要条件。而且,正如我们所看到的,正是扫盲解释了形式哲学的某些特征。

9.5 Cognitive relativism
9.5 认知相对主义

The problem of cognitive relativism would not be solved even once the Azande had writing and all that it entails. Indeed, it would become more acute. For suppose they had come to develop a view that was abstract, general, and systematic in exactly the ways that formal philosophy is. We could still ask whether they would have any reason to end up agreeing with us. The Chinese did, after all,
即使阿赞德人拥有了文字及其带来的一切,认知相对主义的问题也不会得到解决。事实上,这个问题会变得更加尖锐。因为假设他们已经形成了一种观点,这种观点具有抽象性、概括性和系统性,与形式哲学的观点如出一辙。我们仍然可以问,他们是否有理由最终同意我们的观点。毕竟,中国人做到了、

develop writing before any contact with the West, and their theories were abstract, general, systematic, and quite different from ours.
他们的理论抽象、笼统、系统,与我们的理论大相径庭。
Suppose, then, that history had been different and the Azande had invented writing for themselves. Suppose, too, that they had started the process of systematic critical theorizing on their own. And suppose they had come to develop a theory, based still on belief in mangu but modified, as a result of their accumulated experimental experience, to deal with the cases where the old theory seemed to have failed. We began our consideration of the Azande in order to address the question of whether cognitive relativism was true. So we must now ask ourselves whether, even if the Azande had developed in this way, we have good reason to believe that we could still persuade them that they were wrong.
那么,假设历史有所不同,阿赞德人自己发明了文字。又假设他们自己开始了系统的批判理论化进程。假设他们发展出了一套理论,这套理论仍然基于对曼古的信仰,但根据他们积累的实验经验进行了修改,以应对旧理论似乎失效的情况。我们开始研究阿赞德人,是为了解决认知相对主义是否成立的问题。因此,我们现在必须扪心自问,即使阿赞德人是这样发展起来的,我们是否有充分的理由相信,我们仍然可以说服他们,让他们相信自己是错的。
Some philosophers (and many anthropologists) have argued recently that we have no reason to believe that we could. In other words, they have defended versions of cognitive relativism. And their reasons for defending this view have to do with very general considerations about the nature of our theories of the world.
最近,一些哲学家(和许多人类学家)认为,我们没有理由相信我们可以这样做。换句话说,他们为认知相对主义辩护。他们为这种观点辩护的理由与我们对世界的理论的性质的一般性考虑有关。
Begin with the fact that the concepts we use to organize our sensory and perceptual experience are themselves theory-laden. Terms such as "gene," as we saw in Chapter 4, get their meaning from their place in a complex network of beliefs - a theory. Recent cognitive relativists have started with this fact and gone on to argue that because our terms gain their meaning from such networks of beliefs, we can ask only whether a claim is true relative to some such network. These networks of beliefs that define our concepts are usually called "conceptual frameworks" or "conceptual schemes."
首先,我们用来组织感官和知觉经验的概念本身就充满了理论。正如我们在第 4 章中看到的,"基因 "等术语的意义来自于它们在复杂的信念网络--理论--中的位置。最近的认知相对论者从这一事实出发,进而论证说,由于我们的术语是从这样的信念网络中获得意义的,因此我们只能问一个主张相对于这样的网络是否真实。这些定义我们概念的信念网络通常被称为 "概念框架 "或 "概念方案"。
If you agree that our concepts gain their meaning from such conceptual schemes, you might argue as follows. The Azande have one conceptual scheme, we have another. As they develop their ideas, to eradicate some of the inconsistencies between their theories and their observations, their theories will become better by the standards set within their conceptual scheme. The same is true of us. But if meaning, and thus truth, applies only with respect to a conceptual scheme, there is no point in saying that their theories are false by our standards.
如果你同意我们的概念是从这种概念体系中获得意义的,那么你可以这样论证:阿桑德人有一种概念体系,我们有另一种。阿赞德人有一种概念方案,我们有另一种。随着他们发展自己的思想,消除他们的理论与他们的观察之间的一些不一致,他们的理论就会按照他们的概念体系所设定的标准变得更好。我们也是如此。但是,如果意义,也就是真理,只适用于一种概念方案,那么说他们的理论按照我们的标准是错误的,就没有意义了。
Some of their theories may be false by their standards, and they might discover this by experimentation. But they are no more under
按照他们的标准,他们的某些理论可能是错误的,他们可能会通过实验发现这一点。但是,他们不再受

an obligation to test their theories by our standards than we are obliged to test our theories by theirs. Since this is so, we have no reason to believe that they must come to accept our theories in the long run, just as they have no reason to expect that we shall end up believing theirs.
他们有义务用我们的标准检验他们的理论,而我们则有义务用他们的标准检验我们的理论。既然如此,我们就没有理由相信,从长远来看,他们一定会接受我们的理论,正如他们没有理由期待我们最终会相信他们的理论一样。
There may seem, at first glance, to be little to worry about in the possibility of cognitive relativism. But I think a little reflection suggests that we should not be complacent about this possibility. Suppose the cognitive relativists are correct. Then reasonable people, on the basis of reasonable interpretations of their experience, can come to have different and apparently incompatible theories of the world, and there may be no evidence or argument that can show which of them is right. What is true relative to one scheme may be false relative to another.
乍一看,认知相对主义的可能性似乎没什么好担心的。但我认为,只要稍加思考,我们就不应该对这种可能性沾沾自喜。假设认知相对论者是正确的。那么,通情达理的人在对自己的经验进行合理解释的基础上,可能会对世界产生不同的、显然互不相容的理论,而且可能没有任何证据或论据能够证明哪一种理论是正确的。相对于一种方案而言是正确的,相对于另一种方案而言可能是错误的。
Before we go on to discuss this view, it is important to notice that I have moved between a weaker and a stronger version of cognitive relativism in the last few paragraphs. The strong version holds that what is true is relative to a conceptual scheme and that what is true for one may be false for another; the weak version, that what it is reasonable to believe is relative to a conceptual scheme, and that what it is reasonable to believe in one conceptual scheme it may not be reasonable to believe in another. Weak relativism follows logically from strong relativism but not vice versa.
在我们继续讨论这一观点之前,重要的是要注意到,我在最后几段在认知相对主义的较弱版本和较强版本之间进行了转换。强相对主义认为,真实的东西是相对于概念方案而言的,对一个概念方案而言真实的东西对另一个概念方案而言可能是虚假的;弱相对主义认为,合理的信仰是相对于概念方案而言的,在一个概念方案中合理的信仰在另一个概念方案中可能是不合理的。从逻辑上讲,弱相对主义源于强相对主义,反之亦然。
I think that there is a simple and powerful argument against strong relativism that draws on Frege's insights about meaning. If the argument is right, then, since strong relativism is not a logical consequence of weak relativism, weak cognitive relativism might still be correct. But I want to begin by putting strong relativism behind us.
我认为,有一个简单而有力的论据可以反对强相对主义,这个论据借鉴了弗雷格关于意义的见解。如果这个论证是正确的,那么,既然强相对主义不是弱相对主义的逻辑结果,那么弱认知相对主义可能仍然是正确的。但我想先把强相对主义抛在脑后。

9.6 The argument against strong relativism
9.6 反对强相对主义的论点

It is essential to the form of relativism that I have been discussing that different theories that are true with respect to different conceptual schemes can nevertheless be incompatible with one another. Nobody worries about the possibility that what is true relative to the conceptual scheme of genetic theory might be different from what is true relative to the conceptual scheme of meteorology. Genetics and meteorology are about different subject matters. They
对于我一直在讨论的相对主义形式来说,至关重要的是,就不同的概念体系而言,不同的理论是真实的,但它们之间可能互不相容。没有人会担心,相对于遗传学理论的概念体系而言,真实的理论可能与相对于气象学概念体系而言真实的理论不同。遗传学和气象学涉及不同的主题。它们

are not incompatible with each other; they are merely mutually irrelevant. The argument against strong relativism begins with the recognition that the troubling kind of cognitive relativism-like the troubling kind of moral relativism-has to do with views that make incompatible claims about the same subjects.
它们并非互不相容,而只是互不相关。反对强相对主义的论点首先要认识到,令人不安的认知相对主义与令人不安的道德相对主义一样,都是针对同一主题提出不相容主张的观点。
One way of seeing what is involved here is to recognize that if two theories are incompatible, then they make competing claims about the universe. But there is only one universe-and all of us inhabit it. It follows that at most one of us is right. Strong cognitive relativists seem to want to deny this. They seem to think that two people in the same universe could both rightly make opposing claims about the truth. This view is apparently absurd; can we offer an argument that makes it clear why?
要看清这里涉及的问题,一种方法是认识到,如果两种理论互不兼容,那么它们就会对宇宙提出相互竞争的主张。但宇宙只有一个,而且我们所有人都居住在其中。因此,我们中最多只有一个人是对的。强烈的认知相对论者似乎想否认这一点。他们似乎认为,同一个宇宙中的两个人都可以正确地对真理提出相反的主张。这种观点显然是荒谬的;我们能提出一个论证来说明为什么吗?
Consider two conceptual schemes, ENGLISH and AZANDE, associated with two languages, say English and Zande. The strong relativist says that there could be a sentence, , which was true relative to ENGLISH and whose translation, , into Zande, was false relative to AZANDE. Now, as we saw in the chapter on language, Frege argued that the meaning of a sentence in effect determined what the universe would have to be like if it were true. Suppose this is right. Since a sentence of Zande is a translation of an English sentence if and only if they mean the same, there are two ways in which a strong relativist could now apply Frege's theory.
考虑两个概念方案,ENGLISH 和 AZANDE,与两种语言相关联,比如英语和赞德语。强相对主义者说,可能有一个句子, ,相对于ENGLISH是真的,而翻译成赞德语, ,相对于赞德语是假的。现在,正如我们在语言一章中所看到的,弗雷格认为,一个句子的意义实际上决定了如果它是真的,宇宙会是什么样子。假设这是正确的。由于赞德语句子是英语句子的译文,当且仅当它们的意思相同时,一个强相对论者现在有两种方法来应用弗雷格的理论。
On one of them, we would say that in order for to be a translation of , it would have to be a sentence that would be true relative to AZANDE in the same circumstances that would be true relative to ENGLISH. But that would make strong relativism impossible. For there could be no sentence that was both true relative to AZANDE-and thus a translation of , which is true relative to ENGLISH; and false relative to AZANDE- and thus evidence of strong cognitive relativism. There could be no such sentence, that is, unless Zande contains sentences that are both true and false at once!
在其中一种情况下,我们会说,为了使 成为 的译文,它必须是一个相对于 AZANDE 而言为真的句子,就像 相对于 ENGLISH 而言为真的一样。但这样一来,强相对主义就不可能成立了。因为不可能有这样一个句子,它既是相对于 AZANDE 而言的真句--因此是 的翻译,相对于 ENGLISH 而言是真句;又是相对于 AZANDE 而言的假句--因此是强认知相对主义的证据。也就是说,除非赞德语包含同时为真和为假的句子,否则不可能有这样的句子!
The other way to apply Frege's theory would be to say that, in order for to be a translation of , it would have to be a sentence that would be true relative to AZANDE in the same circumstances that would be true relative to AZANDE. But until we know how to translate into Azande, how are we
应用弗雷格理论的另一种方法是,为了使 成为 的译文,它必须是一个相对于 AZANDE 而言为真的句子,就像 相对于 AZANDE 而言为真的一样。但是,在我们知道如何将 翻译成阿赞德语之前,我们怎么能

supposed to be able to tell whether it is true or false with respect to the Zande conceptual scheme? If Frege's theory of meaning is right, the Azande could only decide what meant if they knew what it would be for it to be true for them. But there seems to be no way that we can explain this to them. In particular, because strong relativists believe truth is always relative to a conceptual scheme, they cannot, at this point, try to explain what it would be for to be not true-relative-to-ENGLISH or true-relative-to-AZANDE, but, simply, true. For if truth is not always relative to a conceptual scheme, then strong relativism is just false.
就赞德人的概念方案而言,他们应该能够辨别它的真假吗?如果弗雷格的意义理论是正确的,那么阿赞德人只有在知道 对他们来说是真的情况下,才能确定它的含义。但我们似乎无法向他们解释这一点。特别是,由于强烈的相对主义者认为真理总是相对于概念方案而言的,因此,在这一点上,他们无法解释 不是相对于英语或相对于阿赞德语而言是真实的,而仅仅是真实的。因为,如果真理并不总是相对于概念方案而言的,那么强相对主义就是错误的。
The general point is this. For two sentences, and , to be incompatible, it must be possible for us to recognize that says what denies. But the only way of translating a sentence, , in one language into a sentence, , in another, so as to be in a position to confirm this incompatibility, is to suppose-as a minimum-that and would be true in the same circumstances. Any reason for supposing that is a translation of will be grounds for doubting that denies what says. It follows that strong relativism-the claim that we have reason to suppose that there are different conceptual schemes in one of which some sentence, , is true and in another relative to which its translation, , is false-is incoherent. For there could be no evidence that this was so.
总的来说是这样的。要使 这两个句子互不相容,我们必须能够认识到 说的是 所否认的。但是,要把一种语言的句子 翻译成另一种语言的句子 ,从而能够确认这种不相容,唯一的办法就是--至少--假设 在同样的情况下是真实的。任何假定 的译文的理由,都是怀疑 否认 所言的理由。由此可见,强相对主义--我们有理由认为存在着不同的概念方案,在其中一个方案中,某个句子 是真的,而在另一个方案中,相对于它的译文 则是假的--是不连贯的。因为没有任何证据可以证明这一点。

9.7 The argument for weak relativism
9.7 弱相对主义的论点

But although there is an argument against strong relativism, the argument against weak relativism is harder to make. We could come to learn that the Azande had a concept of the soul, or mbisimo, of a person, which operated in certain ways, and that they took the behavior of conscious people to be evidence for the existence of that mbisimo. There seems to be, at least prima facie, no difficulty in understanding this claim. Nor does it seem difficult to understand that in their way of thinking-their conceptual scheme-what we took to be evidence that someone wanted meat was evidence that their mbisimo wanted meat. These seem to be different claims, and we might eventually feel that we understood what each of them meant. After learning English (and ENGLISH, with it) we could learn Azande (and AZANDE) in the way Zande children learn the language - not by translation, but directly. But we might still be able
不过,虽然有反对强相对主义的论据,但反对弱相对主义的论据却很难提出。我们可以了解到,阿赞德人有一个关于人的灵魂(或 mbisimo)的概念,它以某种方式运作,而且他们认为有意识的人的行为就是 mbisimo 存在的证据。至少从表面上看,理解这一说法似乎并不困难。我们也不难理解,在他们的思维方式--他们的概念方案--中,我们认为某人想吃肉的证据就是他们的 "姆比西莫 "想吃肉的证据。这些似乎是不同的说法,我们最终可能会觉得我们理解了它们各自的含义。在学习英语(以及英语)之后,我们可以用赞德儿童学习语言的方式学习阿赞德语(以及 AZANDE)--不是通过翻译,而是直接学习。但我们仍然可以

to think of no way of marshaling evidence that discriminated between these two ways of thinking about human mentality and behavior.
我想不出有什么办法可以收集证据,来区分这两种关于人类心理和行为的思维方式。
We might also agree that you could only use one of these conceptual schemes at a time, but that nothing in the evidence forced you to use one or the other. As Evans-Pritchard found, it is possible to get used to using extremely alien forms of thought.
我们也可能同意,你在同一时间只能使用其中一种概念方案,但证据中没有任何东西强迫你使用其中一种。正如埃文斯-普里查德发现的那样,习惯于使用极其陌生的思维形式是有可能的。
I want now to argue that this sort of weak cognitive relativism is possible. I shall argue, more precisely, that it is possible, as Kant thought, that the way we think about the world-our conceptual scheme-helps to determine what it is reasonable for us to believe. I shall also argue, however, that this is not too surprising.
我现在要论证的是,这种弱认知相对主义是可能的。更确切地说,我将论证,正如康德所认为的那样,我们思考世界的方式--我们的概念方案--有助于决定我们相信什么是合理的。不过,我还将论证,这并不太令人惊讶。
To see why weak relativism is less puzzling than it might at first appear, all we need to do is to begin with a simple case. In Middle German, the language spoken in Germany in the Middle Ages, there was no word that translated our word "brown." The only word Middle German speakers had that covered brown things covered purple things also. They called things that were brown-or-purple "braun." These people could certainly tell brown and purple things apart by looking at them. But if you had asked them to put marbles together into natural groupings, they would have put all the brown and purple marbles - all the braun ones-together.
我们只需从一个简单的例子入手,就能明白为什么弱相对主义没有初看起来那么令人费解。在中世纪德国使用的中古德语中,没有一个词可以翻译成我们所说的 "棕色"。中古德语中唯一一个涵盖棕色事物的词也涵盖紫色事物。他们称棕色或紫色的东西为 "Braun"。这些人当然可以通过观察来区分棕色和紫色的东西。但是,如果你让他们把弹珠自然分组,他们会把所有棕色和紫色的弹珠--所有 "braun "的弹珠--放在一起。
This difference is connected systematically with other differences between Middle German and modern English, for it follows that they did not have a word that accurately translated "color," for example. They had the word "Farbe" instead. If "Farbe" translated "color," then every truth about color would correspond to a truth about Farbe. But they did not think that brown and purple marbles were of two Farben; they thought they were of one Farbe.
这一差异与中古德语和现代英语之间的其他差异有着系统性的联系,例如,他们没有一个能准确翻译 "颜色 "的词。相反,他们有 "Farbe "一词。如果 "Farbe "可以翻译成 "颜色",那么关于颜色的每一条真理都将对应于关于 "Farbe "的真理。但他们并不认为棕色和紫色的大理石是两种 "Farben",他们认为它们是一种 "Farbe"。
Still, it is not too hard to see how we would translate this language. "Braun" translates as "brown or purple"; "Farbe" refers to colors, excluding brown and purple, but including brown-or-purple.
不过,我们还是不难理解如何翻译这种语言。"Braun "翻译为 "棕色或紫色";"Farbe "指颜色,不包括棕色和紫色,但包括棕色或紫色。
There would be a difference between operating these two conceptual schemes. Middle German speakers might have remembered the Farbe of many things but not-or not so easily-their color. We would continue to remember colors. Each of us could work out what the other would remember and take to be important about the looks of things, but different things would continue to
这两种概念方案在操作上是有区别的。说中古德语的人可能会记住许多东西的颜色,但却记不住--或者说不那么容易记住--它们的颜色。我们将继续记住颜色。我们每个人都可以找出对方会记住的、认为重要的事物的外观,但不同的事物将继续被我们记住。

strike each of us as important. Now there might be reasons for preferring one scheme to another: perhaps all the brown mushrooms in our country are edible and all the purple ones poisonous. Sensitivity to color would help here, and Farbe-sensitivity might be lethal. But the problem would not be that one scheme said that something was true that the other said was false. These would be different ways of looking at the world; and evidence would lead them to say that brown things were "braun" and us to say that they were "brown." And it would not be a matter of evidence which way of looking at the world was right.
我们每个人都认为这很重要。现在,我们可能有理由偏爱一种方案而非另一种方案:也许我们国家所有的棕色蘑菇都是可食用的,而所有的紫色蘑菇都是有毒的。对颜色的敏感性在这方面会有帮助,而对颜色的敏感性可能是致命的。但问题并不在于一个方案说的是真的,而另一个方案说的是假的。这些都是观察世界的不同方式;证据会让他们说棕色的东西是 "布劳恩",而让我们说它们是 "棕色"。至于哪种看待世界的方式是正确的,这就不是证据的问题了。
This simple case leads naturally into the more complex case of Zande belief in the mbisimo. Remember what I said in Chapter 1 about a functionalist theory of the mental. If there can be a functionalist theory of the mind, why could there not be a functionalist theory of the mbisimo? Indeed, if you remember what I said about functionalism in Chapter 1, you can argue that there must be such a theory. In Chapter 1 I said that, at the most general level, a functionalist theory explains the internal states of a system by fixing how they interact with input, and with other internal states, to produce output. But the only things we know about directly are the inputs and outputs. That is all the evidence there is. There seem, therefore, to be the same reasons for thinking that there must be a functionalist theory of the mbisimo as there are for believing there must be a functionalist theory of the mind.
这个简单的例子很自然地引出了赞德人对 "姆比西莫 "的信仰这个更复杂的例子。请记住我在第一章中所说的关于心理的功能主义理论。如果可以有一种功能主义的心智理论,为什么不能有一种功能主义的 "姆比西莫 "理论呢?事实上,如果你还记得我在第一章中关于功能主义的论述,你就可以说一定有这样一种理论。我在第一章中说过,在最一般的层面上,功能主义理论通过确定系统的内部状态如何与输入以及其他内部状态相互作用以产生输出,来解释系统的内部状态。但我们直接知道的只有输入和输出。这就是全部证据。因此,我们似乎有同样的理由认为必须有一种功能主义的 "比西莫 "理论,正如我们有同样的理由认为必须有一种功能主义的 "心智 "理论一样。
If the Zande theory of the mbisimo and our theory of the mind made exactly the same predictions about what inputs would lead to what outputs, no amount of evidence would distinguish them. You might argue that this just showed that mbisimo meant the same as mind. But I think this would be wrong. For the internal states that the two theories proposed could operate in different ways. To put it in the terms of Chapter 1, the Ramsey-sentences of the two theories could have different structures, even if their consequences for input and output were the same.
如果赞德的 "mbisimo "理论和我们的 "心智 "理论对哪些输入会导致哪些输出做出了完全相同的预测,那么再多的证据也无法将它们区分开来。你可能会说,这只是表明mbisimo和心灵的意思是一样的。但我认为这是错误的。因为这两种理论所提出的内部状态可能以不同的方式运作。用第一章的术语来说,这两种理论的拉姆齐句子可能具有不同的结构,即使它们对输入和输出的结果是相同的。
The two theories might then differ, in the ways that Middle German and English differ. Classifications of states of the mbisimo that struck the Azande as natural might correspond to no natural classifications of ours. Perhaps, over time, the Azande would find that our theory suited them better; perhaps we could take a cue
这两种理论可能会有不同,就像中古德语和英语的不同一样。阿赞德人认为自然的 mbisimo 状态分类可能与我们的自然分类不一致。也许,随着时间的推移,阿赞德人会发现我们的理论更适合他们;也许我们可以借鉴

from theirs. Most likely, however, as our understanding of the world developed, both of us would change our theories. And there would be nothing to guarantee that we would end up with the same theory, at least so long as we continued to speak different languages.
他们的理论。不过,很可能随着我们对世界认识的发展,我们双方都会改变自己的理论。没有什么能保证我们最终会得出相同的理论,至少只要我们继续说着不同的语言。
If I am right, evidence and reason cannot, by themselves, lead us to one truth. There may be different ways of conceptualizing the one reality. To say this is to say more than that our knowledge of the world is fallible. We do, indeed, know that our own theories are not perfect. Many of the things that happen in our world we cannot explain; many others are actually inconsistent with our best current theories. But we also usually suppose that with time and effort we could make our theories better-explaining what could not be explained before, and modifying the theories to avoid their false consequences. Even those who believe that, because fallibilism is true, we are always at risk of being wrong think that it is possible to use evidence to get reasonable evidence that one theory-say, our everyday theory of belief and desire-is less adequate to the facts than another-say, neurophysiological theories of the mind.
如果我是对的,证据和理性本身并不能引导我们找到一个真理。我们可能有不同的方式来概念化唯一的现实。这样说不仅仅是说我们对世界的认识是错误的。我们确实知道,我们自己的理论并不完美。我们无法解释世界上发生的许多事情;还有许多事情实际上与我们目前最好的理论不一致。但我们通常也认为,只要付出时间和努力,我们就能让自己的理论变得更好--解释以前无法解释的事情,修改理论以避免错误的后果。即使是那些认为,由于 "弱点论 "是真的,所以我们总是有可能犯错的人也认为,我们有可能利用证据来获得合理的证据,证明一种理论--比如说,我们日常的信仰与欲望理论--不如另一种理论--比如说,心灵的神经生理学理论--更适合事实。
But if I am right, this is not so. Relative to one conceptual scheme, it might be natural to say, "Jane believes that it's raining"; relative to another, it might be better to say, "Jane is in neural state "; or even "Jane's mbisimo is in state Y." And it might be impossible for one person to make all of these equally their natural way of reacting to the evidence, so that, in that sense, these conceptual schemes were incompatible. The choice between the three "realities" would be settled not by evidence but by asking: "Which conceptual scheme is it easier to live with?" There is no reason to suppose that two people in the same culture, let alone in different ones, would be bound to agree on the answer to this question. Nevertheless, of course, reasons and evidence are essential tools of thought in every conceptual scheme.
但如果我是对的,情况并非如此。相对于一种概念方案,说 "简相信下雨了 "可能是自然的;相对于另一种概念方案,说 "简处于神经状态 "可能更好;甚至说 "简的 mbisimo 处于 Y 状态 "也可能更好。一个人可能不可能把所有这些都同样作为自己对证据做出反应的自然方式,因此,从这个意义上说,这些概念方案是不相容的。要在这三种 "现实 "之间做出选择,不是通过证据,而是通过询问:"哪一种概念方案更容易被接受?"我们没有理由认为,处于同一文化中的两个人,更不用说处于不同文化中的两个人,一定会就这个问题的答案达成一致。尽管如此,理由和证据当然是每一种概念方案中必不可少的思维工具。

9.8 Philosophy and religion
9.8 哲学与宗教

The distinguishing marks of formal philosophy that I have so far identified are marks of intellectual inquiry in a literate culture. Like all such intellectual inquiry, it involves systematic, abstract, general theorizing, with a concern to think critically and consistently, sometimes in the company of thinkers long dead. These features reflect
我迄今为止所指出的形式哲学的显著标志,是有文化的文化中智力探索的标志。与所有此类智力探索一样,它涉及系统、抽象、概括的理论化,注重批判性和连贯性思考,有时还与早已逝去的思想家为伴。这些特征反映了

the fact that formal philosophy involves not just a way of thinking, but also a way of writing. The systematic character of philosophy shows up quite clearly as we think philosophically about philosophy's own character. Metaphilosophy-systematic critical reflection on the nature of philosophy-is itself part of the philosophical enterprise.
形式哲学不仅是一种思维方式,也是一种写作方式。当我们对哲学自身的特征进行哲学思考时,哲学的系统性特征就会非常明显地显现出来。隐喻哲学--对哲学本质的系统批判性思考--本身就是哲学事业的一部分。
I have argued that evidence and reasons are central to this systematic enterprise, even if they are not sufficient to pick one conceptual scheme as the only correct one. Even as the Azande became literate, they might have developed a style of thought with the marks of literate intellectual life while still having a conceptual scheme different from ours.
我认为,证据和理由是这一系统性事业的核心,即使它们不足以选择一种概念方案作为唯一正确的方案。即使阿赞德人开始识字,他们也可能发展出一种带有识字知识生活印记的思想风格,同时仍然拥有与我们不同的概念方案。
But the development of literacy would almost certainly have one other important consequence for them, which it has had for the Western intellectual tradition. It would lead to an intellectual division of labor. Just as, in industrialized societies, there has been an increasing specialization of material production-think how many different skills go into the design, the making, the distribution and the sale of a car-so there are many different skills, trainings and institutions involved in the production and transmission of ideas. Even within, say, physics, there are not only many subdivisions of subject matter-astronomy, particle physics, condensed-matter theory-but also many jobs within each of the fields-laboratory technicians, theorists, experimentalists, teachers, textbook authors, and so on. The division of labor in the West is so highly developed that, as the American philosopher Hilary Putnam has pointed out, we even leave the task of understanding some parts of our language to experts: it is because words like "electron" have precise meanings for physicists that I, who have no very good grasp of their meaning, can use them, and the same goes for the word "contract" and lawyers. I take my saw to the hardware store for sharpening from time to time. Similarly, these words, as my tools, only do their business for me, because others keep their meanings honed.
但是,扫盲的发展几乎肯定会给他们带来另一个重要的后果,这也是西方知识传统所面临的后果。它将导致智力分工。正如在工业化社会中,物质生产的专业化程度越来越高--想想一辆汽车的设计、制造、分销和销售需要多少种不同的技能--思想的生产和传播也涉及许多不同的技能、培训和机构。即使在物理学中,不仅有许多细分学科--天文学、粒子物理学、凝聚态物质理论,而且每个领域中都有许多工作--实验室技术人员、理论家、实验家、教师、教科书作者等等。西方的分工如此发达,以至于正如美国哲学家希拉里-普特南(Hilary Putnam)所指出的,我们甚至把理解语言中某些部分的任务留给了专家:正是因为 "电子 "等词对物理学家来说有精确的含义,所以我这个对其含义掌握得并不好的人才能使用它们,"合同 "一词和律师也是如此。我时常把锯子拿到五金店去磨。同样,这些词作为我的工具,也只是为我服务,因为别人一直在打磨它们的含义。
One of the ways in which our high degree of intellectual division of labor shows up is in comparison, once more, with the intellectual life of the Azande. They did not have this substantial proliferation of kinds of theoretical knowledge. Though they did have what EvansPritchard called "witch-doctors," any adult male could conduct an
与阿赞德人的知识生活相比,我们的高度知识分工是显现的方式之一。他们的理论知识种类并不丰富。尽管他们有埃文斯-普里查德(EvansPritchard)所说的 "巫医",但任何成年男子都可以进行 "巫术 "治疗。

oracle or perform magic or hunt, because most people shared the same concepts and beliefs. Any senior person in Zande society would be a source of information about their beliefs about gods, spirits, witchcraft, oracles, and magic.
因为大多数人都有相同的观念和信仰。赞德社会的任何一位长者都可以提供有关神灵、巫术、神谕和魔法信仰的信息。
In the Western tradition, by contrast, many of our central intellectual projects are carried out by specialists. Questions about God-which, if there is a God, are as important as any questions could be for us-are studied in our culture by a variety of different sorts of experts. Though metaphysics, for example, addresses theological questions, as we have seen, it shares that task with theology and with other kinds of Western religious thought. Similarly, theories of the ultimate constitution of nature are central to any folk philosophy; once more, though metaphysics and the philosophy of science address these questions, they share them with the natural sciences.
相比之下,在西方传统中,我们的许多核心知识项目都是由专家完成的。在我们的文化中,各种不同类型的专家都在研究关于上帝的问题--如果真有上帝的话,这些问题对我们的重要性不亚于任何问题。例如,尽管形而上学研究的是神学问题,但正如我们所看到的,形而上学与神学和其他类型的西方宗教思想共同承担着这一任务。同样,关于自然终极构成的理论也是任何民间哲学的核心;再者,尽管形而上学和科学哲学解决的是这些问题,但它们与自然科学共同解决这些问题。
But, unlike Zande religion, Western religions-Christianity and Judaism—are deeply bound up with writing, and without writing, physics would be impossible. If literacy and its consequences mark formal philosophy off from traditional thought, how can we distinguish Western philosophy from Western religion and Western science?
但是,与赞德宗教不同,西方宗教--基督教和犹太教--与文字有着深刻的联系,而没有文字,物理学也就无从谈起。如果说文字及其后果将形式哲学与传统思想区分开来,那么我们又如何将西方哲学与西方宗教和西方科学区分开来呢?
It is easy enough to point to one thing that distinguishes formal philosophy from Western religion as a whole. Religion involves not only theories about how the world is and should be, but also specific rituals-the Jewish seder, the Catholic Mass, the Protestant Lord's Supper-and practices such as prayer. These are all practices a philosopher could engage in; but in doing so, he or she would not be acting as a philosopher but as a believer.
要指出形式哲学与整个西方宗教的区别,其实很容易。宗教不仅涉及关于世界是怎样和应该是怎样的理论,还涉及具体的仪式--犹太教的降神节、天主教的弥撒、新教的主的晚餐--以及祈祷等实践。这些都是哲学家可以参与的实践活动;但这样做,他或她就不是作为哲学家,而是作为信徒行事了。
But there is, of course, a reason why it is so natural to think of philosophy and religion together, a reason that is connected with what I said at the beginning of this chapter. All religions-even those, like Buddhism, that believe neither in God nor in systematic theory-are associated with a view of human life, of our place in the world, and of how we ought to live. And such a connected set of views is often called a "philosophy of life." The philosophy of life of a modern woman or man is, in effect, the folk philosophy of a literate culture.
当然,把哲学和宗教放在一起思考是很自然的,这是有原因的,这个原因与我在本章开头所说的话有关。所有宗教--即使是像佛教这样既不相信上帝也不相信系统理论的宗教--都与对人类生活、我们在世界上的位置以及我们应该如何生活的看法相关联。这种相互关联的观点通常被称为 "人生哲学"。现代女性或男性的人生哲学实际上就是一种有文化的民间哲学。
The questions formal philosophers ask are relevant to these
形式哲学家提出的问题与这些问题相关

issues; studying formal philosophy can change your philosophy of life. For a literate intellectual, it is natural to think systematically about these questions. But if one is also religious, that systematic thought will involve not only the sorts of philosophical question I have raised in this book but questions of theology also. It is important, therefore, to distinguish philosophy from theology, the critical intellectual activity that is a part-but only a part-of modern religion, as, indeed, it was only a part of the religion of the European Middle Ages.
问题;学习形式哲学可以改变你的人生哲学。对于一个有文化的知识分子来说,系统地思考这些问题是很自然的。但是,如果一个人也有宗教信仰,那么他的系统思考就不仅涉及我在本书中提出的哲学问题,还涉及神学问题。因此,重要的是要将哲学与神学区分开来,神学是批判性的智力活动,是现代宗教的一部分,但也只是一部分,事实上,它只是欧洲中世纪宗教的一部分。
One crucial difference between philosophy and most theology is that, in philosophy, we do not usually presuppose the truth of any particular religious claims. When philosophers address questions central to Christianity-the existence of God, or the morality of abortion - they do so in the light of their religious beliefs, but with a concern to defend even those claims that can be taken, within a religious tradition, for granted. But theologians, too, offer evidence and reasons for many of the claims they make about God. They are often concerned not only with setting out religious doctrines, but with systematizing them and relating them, through the use of reason, to our beliefs about the natural world. When this happens it is hard to tell where theology ends and the philosophy of religion begins.
哲学与大多数神学的一个重要区别是,在哲学中,我们通常不预先假定任何特定宗教主张的真实性。当哲学家们探讨基督教的核心问题--上帝的存在或堕胎的道德性--时,他们会根据自己的宗教信仰,但即使是那些在宗教传统中可以被视为理所当然的主张,他们也会为之辩护。但神学家也会为他们提出的许多关于上帝的主张提供证据和理由。他们往往不仅关注阐述宗教教义,而且关注将其系统化,并通过运用理性将其与我们对自然世界的信仰联系起来。在这种情况下,很难说神学在哪里结束,宗教哲学在哪里开始。
Though there are, then, some ways of distinguishing most theology from most philosophy of religion, they have not so much to do with subject matter as with issues that have, in the end, to do with the way in which philosophy and theology have been institutionalized as professions. Philosophy of religion addresses religion with the training of philosophers. That means, in part, that it uses the same tools of logic and semantics, the same concepts of epistemology and ethics, that philosophers use outside the philosophy of religion. Christian theology, on the other hand, is closely bound both to traditions of interpreting a central text, the Bible, and to the experience of the Christian church in history. Jewish religious writing is similarly tied to the Torah and to other texts and rooted, similarly, in Judaism's history. Islam, too, draws on a tradition of texts, judgments, and interpretations. But because the central questions of theology are crucially relevant to the central questions of human life, it should not be a surprise that philosophers and theologians often come to ask the
虽然有一些方法可以将大多数神学与大多数宗教哲学区分开来,但这些方法与其说是与主题有关,不如说是与哲学和神学作为专业被制度化的方式有关。宗教哲学通过对哲学家的培训来研究宗教。这在一定程度上意味着,它使用的逻辑学和语义学工具、认识论和伦理学概念,与哲学家在宗教哲学之外使用的相同。另一方面,基督教神学与解释中心文本《圣经》的传统以及基督教会的历史经验紧密相连。犹太教的宗教著作同样与《圣经》和其他文本紧密相连,同样植根于犹太教的历史。伊斯兰教也借鉴了文本、判断和解释的传统。但是,由于神学的核心问题与人类生活的核心问题息息相关,哲学家和神学家经常提出以下问题也就不足为奇了。

same questions. Someone who cares-as, surely, we should-about whether religious claims are true may want to follow both these routes to a deeper understanding of religion.
同样的问题。一个关心宗教主张是否真实的人--我们当然也应该关心--可能希望通过这两种途径来加深对宗教的理解。

9.9 Philosophy and science
9.9 哲学与科学

The distinction between philosophy and science is sometimes held to be, by comparison, a simple matter. Though Isaac Newton called his Principia, the first great text of modern theoretical physics, a work of "natural philosophy," many philosophers since would have said that it was not a work of what I have called "formal philosophy." The reason they would have given is that Newton's work was about (admittedly, very abstract) empirical questions-questions to which the evidence of sensation and perception is relevant. Formal philosophy, on the other hand, deals with questions that are conceptualhaving to do not with how the world happens to be but with how we conceive of it.
哲学与科学之间的区别有时被认为是一个简单的问题。虽然艾萨克-牛顿称他的现代理论物理学的第一部伟大著作《原理》是一部 "自然哲学 "著作,但后来的许多哲学家都会说,它不是我所说的 "形式哲学 "著作。他们给出的理由是,牛顿的著作是关于经验问题(诚然,非常抽象)--感觉和知觉的证据与之相关的问题。另一方面,形式哲学涉及的问题是概念性的,它与世界如何存在无关,而是与我们如何构想世界有关。
But this way of making the distinction between philosophy and science seems to me to be too simple. Much theoretical physics is very difficult to connect in any straightforward way with empirical evidence, and much philosophy of mind depends on facts about how our human minds happen to be constituted. It will not do, either, to say that the use of empirical evidence in science involves experiments, while in philosophy it does not. For thought experiments play an important role in both science and philosophy, and many branches of the sciences-cosmology, for example-have to proceed with very few, if any, experiments, just because experiments would be so hard to arrange. (Imagine trying to organize the explosion of a star!)
但在我看来,这种区分哲学与科学的方式似乎过于简单。许多理论物理学很难直接与经验证据相联系,而许多心灵哲学则依赖于关于人类心灵如何构成的事实。如果说在科学中使用经验证据需要实验,而在哲学中则不需要,这也是不行的。因为思想实验在科学和哲学中都发挥着重要作用,而科学的许多分支--例如宇宙学--即使有实验也很少,因为实验很难安排。(试想一下,要组织一颗恒星的爆炸!)。
Nevertheless, there is a difference-which, like the difference between philosophy and theology, is by no means absolutebetween philosophy and physics, and it has to do with the fact that the kind of empirical evidence that is relevant to the sciences must usually be collected a good deal more systematically than the evidence that is sometimes relevant in philosophy.
尽管如此,哲学与物理学之间还是有区别的--就像哲学与神学之间的区别一样,这种区别绝不是绝对的,它与这样一个事实有关,即与科学相关的经验证据通常必须比有时与哲学相关的证据更系统地收集。
Even this difference is a matter of degree, however. In the philosophy of language-in semantics, for example-we need to collect systematic evidence about how our languages are actually used if our theories of meaning are to be useful. As we saw in Chapter 2,
然而,即便是这种差异也只是程度问题。在语言哲学--例如语义学--中,我们需要收集有关语言实际使用情况的系统证据,这样我们的意义理论才会有用。正如我们在第 2 章中所看到的、

the discovery of cases such as the ones that Gettier thought up can play a crucial role in epistemology. But there is a pattern in the history of Western intellectual life, in which problems that are central at one time to philosophy become the basis of new, more specialized sciences. Thus, modern linguistics grows out of philosophical reflection on language, just as economics and sociology grew out of philosophical reflection on society, and physics grew out of Greek, Roman, and medieval philosophical reflection on the nature of matter and motion. As these special subjects develop, some of the problems that used to concern philosophers move out of the focus of philosophical attention. But the more conceptual problems remain.
发现像盖蒂埃(Gettier)所想的那种情况,可以在认识论中发挥至关重要的作用。但是,西方知识生活史上有一种模式,即在某一时期对哲学至关重要的问题,会成为新的、更专业的科学的基础。因此,现代语言学是从对语言的哲学思考中发展起来的,正如经济学和社会学是从对社会的哲学思考中发展起来的,而物理学则是从对物质和运动的本质的希腊、罗马和中世纪哲学思考中发展起来的。随着这些特殊学科的发展,过去哲学家们关注的一些问题不再是哲学关注的焦点。但概念性更强的问题依然存在。
This pattern is reflected in the fact that where philosophy and the specialized sciences address the same problem, the more empirical questions are usually studied by the scientists and the less empirical ones by the philosophers. That is the sense in which philosophy really is a primarily conceptual matter.
这种模式反映在这样一个事实中,即在哲学和专门科学处理同一问题时,经验性较强的问题通常由科学家研究,而经验性较弱的问题则由哲学家研究。从这个意义上说,哲学确实主要是一个概念问题。
The division of labor between science and philosophy has been productive. While philosophical work has often generated new sciences, new philosophical problems are also generated by the development of science. Some of the most interesting philosophical work of our day, for example, involves examining the conceptual problems raised by relativity and quantum theory. To do this work-or, at least, to do it well-it is necessary to understand theoretical physics. But it also requires the tools and training of the philosopher.
科学与哲学之间的分工是富有成效的。虽然哲学工作经常会产生新的科学,但科学的发展也会产生新的哲学问题。例如,当今一些最有趣的哲学工作涉及研究相对论和量子论提出的概念问题。要完成这项工作--或者说,至少要做好这项工作--就必须理解理论物理学。但这也需要哲学家的工具和训练。

9.10 An example: Free will and determinism
9.10 一个例子:自由意志与决定论

I have been arguing that philosophical questions run into other areas-religion and science, in particular-so that they cross boundaries between subjects. Before I go on to draw some final, more general conclusions about the nature of philosophy, I want to take up one further philosophical question: freedom of the will. One reason I didn't discuss this topic earlier is that it doesn't fit easily into any of the broad areas of the subject that I have discussed until now. You could say that it crosses boundaries within the subject.
我一直在论证哲学问题与其他领域--尤其是宗教和科学--的联系,因此它们跨越了学科之间的界限。在我继续就哲学的本质得出一些更具普遍性的最终结论之前,我想再讨论一个哲学问题:意志自由。我之前没有讨论这个话题的一个原因是,它并不容易归入我之前讨论过的任何一个广泛的学科领域。可以说,它跨越了本学科的界限。
The basic problem of freedom of the will, which I will be spelling out more fully in a moment, can be simply stated: If everything we do is caused by earlier things that we didn't do, how can we be morally responsible for our actions? This isn't just a question in the
关于意志自由的基本问题,我稍后将作更全面的阐述,这个问题可以简单地说 明:如果我们所做的一切都是由之前我们没有做的事情造成的,那么我们又如何对自己的行为负道德责任呢?这不仅仅是一个

philosophy of mind, because it involves morality, and it isn't just a question in ethics, because it involves problems in the philosophy of mind. It also obviously involves the truth of determinism-whether everything that happens was in fact caused by other things that happened earlier-which came up in the chapter on philosophy of science. But questions about freedom of action raise issues about what it is possible for us to do, and questions about possibility and necessity lead, as we saw in Chapter 8, straight into metaphysics. Furthermore, since there are versions of the free-will problem that arise from thinking about the compatibility of human freedom with God's knowing in advance what we are going to do, the issues raised by freedom of the will can lead us into epistemology and philosophy of religion as well. Finally, since it's presumably wrong to punish someone who isn't responsible for their acts, free will is a central issue in the philosophy of law, and thus of political philosophy. If my frequent appeals to the idea of autonomy are to defensible, it must be possible for people to be responsible for their decisions and thus for their lives.
它不仅仅是伦理学中的问题,因为它涉及到心灵哲学中的问题。显然,它还涉及决定论的真理--发生的一切事实上是否都是由之前发生的其他事情造成的--这在科学哲学一章中有所涉及。但是,关于行动自由的问题提出了我们有可能做什么的问题,而关于可能性和必然性的问题,正如我们在第 8 章中看到的,直接导致了形而上学。此外,由于有一些自由意志问题是在思考人的自由与上帝预先知道我们要做什么之间的兼容性时产生的,因此意志自由所引发的问题也会把我们带入认识论和宗教哲学。最后,既然惩罚一个不对自己行为负责的人大概是错误的,那么自由意志就是法律哲学的一个核心问题,因此也是政治哲学的一个核心问题。如果我经常呼吁的自主权思想是站得住脚的,那么人们就必须有可能对自己的决定负责,从而对自己的生命负责。
So, as I say, the cluster of problems about freedom of the will is an important example of the way in which some philosophical questions cross boundaries within the subject, just as - in the ways we have just seen-many questions cross the boundary between philosophy and other disciplines. Many of the questions that we have discussed in this book start in one broad area - philosophy of mind, say-and end up drawing on others-logic or epistemology, for example. But freedom of the will is a question that begins at an intersection: it starts at the junction of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and ethics.
因此,正如我所说的那样,关于意志自由的问题群是一个重要的例子,它说明了一些哲学问题在学科内部跨越界限的方式,就像我们刚刚看到的那样,许多问题在哲学与其他学科之间跨越界限。我们在本书中讨论的许多问题都始于一个广泛的领域--比如说心灵哲学,但最终又借鉴了其他领域--比如说逻辑学或认识论。但意志自由是一个始于交叉点的问题:它始于形而上学、心灵哲学和伦理学的交界处。
Because the problem of free will has so many ramifications, you can start to explore it in many places. One possible point of entry is with the functionalist picture of the mind from Chapter 1 . The basic idea of functionalism, you'll remember, is that the mind is a system of causal relationships: to have a mind is to have states that have characteristic causes and effects. "Pain is caused by pinpricks and causes brow wrinkling," said the simple-minded theory of pain in section 1.7. Among the most important characteristic effects of a mental event are the things we do, our actions. Now, ordinarily, our actions are caused by our beliefs, our desires, and our intentions. I
由于自由意志的问题有如此多的影响,你可以从很多地方开始探讨。一个可能的切入点是第一章中的功能主义心灵图景。你应该还记得,功能主义的基本观点是,心灵是一个因果关系系统:有心灵就意味着有具有特征因果关系的状态。"疼痛是由针刺引起的,并导致眉头皱起,"1.7 节中头脑简单的疼痛理论如是说。心理事件最重要的特征效应包括我们所做的事情,即我们的行动。通常,我们的行为是由我们的信念、欲望和意图引起的。I

go to the kitchen because I want to make myself a cup of coffee. So my desire for coffee, my belief that there is some coffee in the kitchen, and so on produce in me a desire to go the kitchen. I then form an intention to go there, and that's what sets me walking. The fact that my mental states caused me to move by this sort of process makes this movement an action of mine.
去厨房是因为我想给自己煮一杯咖啡。因此,我对咖啡的渴望、我相信厨房里有咖啡的信念等等,都会让我产生去厨房的欲望。然后,我就产生了去厨房的意向,这就是我开始行走的原因。我的心理状态促使我通过这样的过程移动,这一事实使这一移动成为我的行动。
Sometimes, by contrast, a person's body moves, and this isn't an action. If my hand closes because you put a-small, please!-electric current into the muscles of my arm, that closing-of-the-hand isn't something I did. Rather, it's something that happened to me.
相比之下,有时一个人的身体在移动,这并不是一个动作。如果我的手合上是因为你向我手臂的肌肉中注入了一小股电流,那么手的合上并不是我做了什么。相反,它是发生在我身上的事情。
Notice, however, that on the functionalist view, even when I do something as a result of my own mental states, those states themselves will have causes. That's part of the picture, too. And if we trace the causes back far enough, eventually we'll get to something outside me. My desires are shaped by my genes and my environment, and so (though in different ways) are my beliefs. As a result, there's a sense in which every action of mine, though caused by mental states and events of mine, is ultimately caused by things outside me as well.
不过,请注意,根据功能主义的观点,即使我的行为是我自己的心理状态的结果,这些状态本身也是有原因的。这也是问题的一部分。如果我们把原因追溯到足够远的地方,最终我们会找到我以外的东西。我的欲望是由我的基因和环境形成的,我的信念也是如此(虽然方式不同)。因此,从某种意义上说,我的每一个行为虽然是由我的心理状态和事件造成的,但最终也是由我之外的事物造成的。
So far, of course, no problem. But now let's add some moral ideas to this set of ideas in the philosophy of mind. Consider, once more, the two ways that my hand might close: as the result of my intentions and as the result of an electric current turned on by you. Suppose that my hand is holding a detonator switch, and if it closes, some dynamite will go off, blowing up a dam, which will flood a valley. Now, for moral purposes, it matters very much which way my hand closes. Suppose we both know that this is the setup: know, that is, about the dynamite, the dam, and the valley. If my hand closes because I choose to close it, because it's my intention to close it and so to set off the explosion, then the flooding of the valley is my responsibility. If my hand closes because you turn on the current that contracts my arm muscles, then it's your responsibility. Generally speaking, we seem to accept something like the following principle of moral responsibility:
到目前为止,当然没有问题。但现在,让我们在心灵哲学的这套观点中加入一些道德观点。再考虑一下我的手闭合的两种方式:一种是我的意图造成的,另一种是你打开的电流造成的。假设我的手握着一个雷管开关,如果它合上了,一些炸药就会爆炸,炸毁一个大坝,淹没一个山谷。现在,出于道德目的,我的手往哪边合非常重要。假设我们都知道这是一个设置:即知道炸药、大坝和山谷。如果我的手合上是因为我选择合上它,因为我有意合上它从而引发爆炸,那么山谷被淹就是我的责任。如果我的手合上是因为你打开了电流,使我的手臂肌肉收缩,那么这就是你的责任。一般来说,我们似乎接受类似以下的道德责任原则:
MR: If you are to be morally responsible for something that happens, that happening must be (or be the result of) an action of yours.
先生:如果你要对发生的事情负道德责任,那么这件事就必须是(或由)你的行为造成的。
So, on one hand, all of our mental states and events have earlier ultimate causes outside our minds; on the other, we're responsible only for what is caused by our own mental states or events. Doesn't it follow that we're not ultimately responsible for our own mental states or events?
因此,一方面,我们所有的心理状态和事件都有我们心灵之外的终极原因;另一方面,我们只对由我们自己的心理状态或事件引起的事情负责。这不就意味着我们对自己的心理状态或事件不负最终责任吗?
But if that is so, we can reason as follows. True, when I clenched my hand and, in effect, flooded the valley, that was the result of my intention. My intention, however, was itself the result of earlier mental states of mine whose ultimate causes were outside me. So while I was responsible for my act, according to the principle of moral responsibility, MR, I wasn't responsible for my intention. But if I wasn't responsible for the intention, why am I responsible for the act? It seems very odd indeed that I can be responsible for the consequences of my intention even though, by MR, I am not responsible for the intention itself.
但如果是这样的话,我们可以做如下推理。诚然,当我握紧我的手,实际上淹没了山谷,这是我的意图的结果。然而,我的意图本身是我先前心理状态的结果,而这些心理状态的最终原因并不在我身上。因此,虽然根据道德责任原则,我对我的行为负责,但我并不对我的意图负责。但是,如果我不对意图负责,为什么我要对行为负责呢?根据 "道德责任 "原则,我对我的意图本身并不负责,但我却要对我的意图的后果负责,这看起来确实很奇怪。
There is a further problem, which comes out if we consider another fundamental principle governing moral responsibility.
如果我们再考虑一下道德责任的另一个基本原则,就会发现还有一个问题。
: You are morally responsible for an outcome only if you do something that caused that outcome and you could have done otherwise.
道德责任:只有当你所做的事情导致了某一结果,而你本可以不这么做时,你才对该结果负 有道德责任。
But I could have done otherwise only if I could have had a different intention, and (if determinism is true) the intention was, in fact, the result of earlier events - both inside my mind and, ultimately, outside it-over which I had no control. So I am not morally responsible for my acts.
但是,只有当我有不同的意图时,我才有可能不这样做,而且(如果决定论是真的),这种意图实际上是先前事件的结果--无论是在我的头脑中,还是最终在我的头脑之外,我都无法控制这些事件。因此,我对自己的行为不负道德责任。
The view that the fact that our mental states are causally determined means that we do not have free will is called "incompatibilism." Incompatibilists say that free will is incompatible with determinism. If we don't have free will, we aren't responsible for our acts, and so incompatibilism leads to the view that our conventional ways of assigning moral responsibility are misguided. If that is right, then, of course, it will have far-reaching consequences for such practices as punishment. I argued in Chapter 7 that just punishment has to be deserved, but can it be deserved if we are not morally responsible for what we do?
有一种观点认为,我们的精神状态是由因果决定的,这意味着我们没有自由意志,这种观点被称为 "不相容论"。不相容论者认为,自由意志与决定论是不相容的。如果我们没有自由意志,我们就不需要为自己的行为负责,因此不相容论导致了这样一种观点,即我们分配道德责任的传统方式是错误的。如果这种观点是正确的,那么它当然会对惩罚等做法产生深远的影响。我在第 7 章中论证过,公正的惩罚必须是罪有应得,但如果我们对自己的行为不负道德责任,惩罚还能是罪有应得吗?
Many philosophers have held, however, as we shall see later, that
然而,正如我们稍后将看到的,许多哲学家认为

we can still be held responsible for our acts, even if we are causal systems whose ultimate causes lie outside us. This position is called "compatibilism," and there are many steps in the argument I just gave for incompatibilism that a compatibilist might want to question.
即使我们是因果系统,其终极原因在我们之外,我们仍然要对我们的行为负责。这种立场被称为 "兼容论",在我刚才为不兼容论所做的论证中,有许多步骤是兼容论者可能想要质疑的。
MR, for example, seems much too strong. People can be responsible for things they didn't do as well as for things they did. And not doing something isn't an action. Thus, for example, people can be responsible for something that happens because they had a responsibility to stop it happening. If I was in charge of the dam and it flooded because I failed to open a sluice to run off some excess water, then I could be responsible for the flooding even if I was fast asleep at the time. So, perhaps we should modify MR to read:
例如,"责任 "一词似乎过于强烈。人们可以为自己没做的事负责,也可以为自己做了的事负责。而不做某事并不是一种行为。因此,举例来说,人们可以对发生的事情负责,因为他们有责任阻止它发生。如果我是水坝的负责人,而水坝被淹是因为我没有打开水闸放掉多余的水,那么即使我当时睡着了,我也要对水坝被淹负责。因此,也许我们应该把 MR 修改为:
: If you are to be morally responsible for something that happens, that happening must either
道德责任:如果你要对所发生的事情负道德责任,那么所发生的事情必须是
a) be (or be the result of) an action of yours, or
a) 是(或由于)你的行为,或
b) be the result of your failure to act in circumstances where you ought to have acted.
b) 由于您在应该采取行动的情况下没有采取行动。
We could summarize the ideas here by saying that you are responsible for what happens only if either - this is (a) - it was (or was the result of) something you did or - this is (b) - it was the result of your negligence. In a slogan, we are responsible only for our acts and for our negligence. And we can now modify as well to read:
我们可以这样概括:只有在以下两种情况下,你才要对所发生的事情负责--这是(a)--是你所做的事情(或其结果),或者--这是(b)--是你的疏忽造成的。用一句口号来说,我们只对自己的行为和过失负责。现在我们也可以把 修改为:
: You are responsible for an action only if you could have
注意:只有在下列情况下,你才对某一行为负责
done otherwise, and you are responsible for a failure to act only if you could have acted.
只有在你可以采取行动的情况下,你才对未采取行动负责。
But these modifications of the principle of moral responsibility don't really help get us out of the difficulty we are in. For surely my intentions are ultimately neither the result of my acts nor of my negligence. I didn't make either my genes or the environment into which I was born. So they weren't the results of my acts. I couldn't have been responsible for making either of them, since I didn't exist when my genes were put together and my environment was made. And so they were not the result of my negligence either. But if
但是,对道德责任原则的这些修改并不能真正帮助我们摆脱困境。因为我的意图最终肯定既不是我的行为的结果,也不是我的疏忽的结果。我的基因和出生环境都不是我创造的。所以,它们不是我行为的结果。我不可能对制造它们中的任何一个负责,因为当我的基因被组合在一起、我的环境被创造出来时,我并不存在。所以它们也不是我疏忽的结果。但是,如果

determinism is true, my current mental states were fixed once my environment and my genes were fixed. So, once more, we can say: if I wasn't responsible for the intention, why am I responsible for the act?
如果决定论是真的,那么一旦我的环境和基因固定下来,我现在的精神状态也就固定下来了。因此,我们可以再说一遍:如果我不对意图负责,为什么我要对行为负责?
There's another point at which this argument might seem vulnerable, however. For it depends explicitly on the assumption of determinism. But, as I suggested in Chapter 4, contemporary science suggests that determinism isn't true. So, does the falsity of determinism-the truth of indeterminism-offer a way to escape the conclusion that I am not responsible for flooding the valley?
不过,这个论点还有一个弱点。因为它明确依赖于决定论的假设。但是,正如我在第 4 章中所说,当代科学表明决定论并不是真的。那么,决定论的虚假性--不决定论的真实性--是否提供了一种方法来逃避 "我对山谷被水淹没没有责任 "这一结论呢?
Contemporary physics in fact offers two reasons for thinking that, even given a full specification of the past states of the universe, you cannot predict everything that will happen in the future. One of these is what is called technically (and entirely appropriately!) "chaos." There are many processes in the world-the weather among them-that are governed by laws that have the following property: given a finite difference in initial conditions, however small, you can get very large differences in outcome. Such systems are said to be "chaotic." So, to use an example that has often been invoked in discussing the weather, the difference between a hurricane and a lovely sunny day in Jamaica could be the result of the fact that a butterfly flapped its wings in West Africa some days ago. Chaos is an extremely important phenomenon, but it isn't relevant to the truth of determinism. For you can have chaos in systems that are entirely deterministic. What chaos shows is that it is wrong to assume that because a system is deterministic you can know how it will develop in advance. For, given chaos, that would require the ability to know every relevant fact to an arbitrary degree of precision, which isn't possible.
事实上,当代物理学提供了两个理由来说明,即使对宇宙过去的状态有一个完整的描述,你也无法预测未来会发生的一切。其中之一就是技术上所谓的(完全恰当的!)"混沌"。世界上有许多过程--天气就是其中之一--都受具有以下特性的规律支配:在初始条件差异有限的情况下,无论差异有多小,结果都会有非常大的差异。这种系统被称为 "混沌系统"。因此,用讨论天气时经常引用的一个例子来说,牙买加的飓风和晴朗天气之间的差异,可能是几天前西非一只蝴蝶扇动翅膀的结果。混沌是一种极其重要的现象,但它与决定论的真理无关。因为在完全决定论的系统中也会出现混沌。混沌现象表明,因为一个系统是决定论的,所以你就可以事先知道它将如何发展,这种假设是错误的。因为,考虑到混沌,这就要求有能力把每一个相关的事实都知道到任意精确的程度,而这是不可能的。
The claim of modern physics that is relevant to the truth of determinism is not that the world is chaotic-in the technical sense-but that the fundamental laws of nature, the laws embodied in the quantum theory, are irreducibly probabilistic. The fundamental laws, that is, state not that (an effect) will happen if (its cause) does, but that has a certain probability of happening if does. Suppose, for example, that the quantum theory says that the probability that a certain -particle will be emitted from a radioactive sample in a certain interval of time is 50 percent. That will mean that in a sufficiently
现代物理学中与决定论的真理相关的主张并不是技术意义上的世界是混沌的,而是自然界的基本规律,即量子理论所体现的规律,是不可还原的概率论。也就是说,基本定律并不是说如果 (其原因)发生, (结果)就会发生,而是说如果 发生, 有一定的发生概率。例如,假设量子理论认为,在一定的时间间隔内,从放射性样本中发射出某种 - 粒子的概率是 50%。这就意味着,在足够长的

large sample of emissions, we will find -particles emitted in that interval roughly half the time. But quantum theory says that there is no physical difference between the cases where a particle is emitted in that time interval and those where it isn't. The difference, then, is not the result of some so-called hidden variable; it's just a fact that the world contains events that have a certain probability of happening in a certain time interval, and that's all that can be said about it. Fundamental physical processes are thus sometimes randomwhat happens is not determined by earlier events.
在大量的发射样本中,我们会发现 - 大约有一半的粒子是在这个时间间隔内发射的。但量子理论认为,粒子在该时间间隔内发射和不发射的情况并没有物理上的区别。那么,这种差异并不是某个所谓的隐藏变量造成的;这只是一个事实,即世界包含的事件在某个时间间隔内发生的概率是一定的,这就是我们能说的一切。因此,基本物理过程有时是随机的,所发生的事情并不是由先前的事件决定的。
Now, whether this claim is true or not is a question for physics (though there is a good deal for philosophers of physics to say about how the physics should be interpreted). So let's suppose that the physicists are right and the world really is indeterministic. Does this help with the problem of free will?
现在,这个说法是真是假是物理学的问题(尽管物理学哲学家对如何解释物理学也有很多话要说)。那么,让我们假设物理学家是对的,世界真的是不确定的。这对自由意志问题有帮助吗?
Unfortunately, I think the answer must be no. To see why, remember that indeterminism means that there can be two kinds of events. Some are fully determined by earlier events: the quantum laws say their probability, given the earlier states of the world, is 1 . It may be that there are, in fact, none of these in this possible world, but if there are any, they are the determined events. Other events have probabilities less than 1 . These events, we can say, are "partially random": they are not fully determined by earlier events. So, according to modern physics, when I form my intentions (if they are the results of physical events, as functionalism supposes) that process is either determined or partially random. If they are determined, we are still in trouble. But if they are partially random, we are left with a new problem.
遗憾的是,我认为答案肯定是否定的。要想知道为什么,请记住,不确定性意味着可能存在两种事件。有些事件是完全由先前的事件决定的:量子定律说,考虑到世界先前的状态,它们的概率是1。事实上,在这个可能的世界中可能没有这些事件,但如果有的话,它们就是确定的事件。其他事件的概率小于 1 。我们可以说,这些事件是 "部分随机 "的:它们并不完全由先前的事件决定。因此,根据现代物理学,当我形成我的意图时(如果它们是物理事件的结果,正如功能主义所假设的那样),这个过程要么是确定的,要么是部分随机的。如果它们是确定的,我们仍然有麻烦。但如果它们是部分随机的,我们就会遇到新的问题。
For if my intentions are partially random, then whatever made me form the intention, it wasn't something that was under my control. According to the indeterminist, it just happened — and it could just not have happened. Talk of what "could have happened" should remind us that we can express the matter here in terms of possible worlds. If my forming my intention was partially random, there are some physically possible worlds that are exactly the same until the moment where I formed the intention, in which I didn't form the intention. Those are the worlds that make it true that I could have failed to form the intention.
因为如果我的意图部分是随机的,那么无论我形成了什么意图,都不是我所能控制的。根据不确定论者的观点,它就这样发生了--它也可能没有发生。说到 "可能发生",我们应该想到,我们可以用可能世界来表达这个问题。如果我形成意向的过程部分是随机的,那么有一些物理上可能存在的世界,在我形成意向的那一刻之前是完全一样的,而在那一刻我并没有形成意向。在这些世界里,我可能没有形成意图。
Philosophers going as far back as Epicurus (who died in 270 B.C.)
最早可追溯到伊壁鸠鲁(卒于公元前 270 年)的哲学家们

have thought that there is a place here for free will. Lucretius, in Book II of his De Rerum Natura (On the nature of things) asked, following Epicurus:
他们认为自由意志在这里占有一席之地。卢克莱修在他的《论事物的本质》(Deerum Natura)第二卷中,追随伊壁鸠鲁提出了这样的问题:"自由意志是什么?
If atoms never swerve and make beginning Of motions that can break the bonds of fate And foil the infinite chain of cause and effect What is the origin of this free will ... ?
如果原子从来都不会改变方向,也不会开始运动,从而打破命运的束缚,破坏无限的因果链条,那么这种自由意志的起源是什么......?
We could imagine a modern Lucretius supposing that a person's mind could step in and provide the explanation for the difference between the possible worlds where a particular action happens and the ones where it doesn't. But the intervention of the mind in this way would raise at least two problems.
我们可以想象一个现代的卢克莱修,假定一个人的思想可以介入,并为某一特定行为发生的可能世界与不发生的可能世界之间的差异提供解释。但是,心灵以这种方式介入至少会带来两个问题。
First, this proposal requires mental events that intervene in physical processes from, as it were, "outside" the physical realm: and this raises all the difficulties of interactionism that we identified when discussing Descartes' views in 1.2. Do we really want to be driven to take up the difficulties of dualism in order to avoid the problem of free will?
首先,这一提议要求精神事件从 "物理领域之外 "介入物理过程:这就提出了我们在 1.2 中讨论笛卡尔观点时所指出的交互作用论的所有难题。难道我们真的希望为了避免自由意志的问题而不得不接受二元论的困难吗?
Second, because the quantum laws say that the probability of events is fixed, this sort of mental intervention could produce events that were more and more unlikely. If the mind can intervene in the process, then it would be possible in principle for a person to intervene repeatedly in a way that ended up producing a sequence of events that the laws of physics said were fantastically improbable. There is in fact a device that was designed by people interested in investigating extrasensory perception that is meant to test this possibility. It is called the "Schmidt machine," because it was invented by an engineer of that name. The basic idea is simple. You set up a device with four lights; which light goes on depends on when a radioactive sample emits particles. When the machine is left running alone, each of the lights is on one-quarter of the time. Because a radioactive sample emits radiation in a way that quantum theory says is irreducibly probabilistic, quantum theory says that which light is on at any time is not determined in advance. Now you give a person the chance to press one of four buttons, depending on which light she wants to go on. If there is a statistically significant correla-
其次,由于量子定律认为事件发生的概率是固定的,因此这种精神干预可能会产生越来越不可能发生的事件。如果心灵可以干预这个过程,那么原则上一个人就有可能以一种反复干预的方式,最终产生一连串物理定律认为不可能发生的事件。事实上,对研究超感官知觉感兴趣的人设计了一种装置来测试这种可能性。它被称为 "施密特机器",因为它是由一位名叫施密特的工程师发明的。基本原理很简单。你设置一个有四盏灯的装置;哪盏灯亮取决于放射性样本何时发射粒子。当机器单独运行时,每盏灯会亮四分之一的时间。量子理论认为,放射性样本发出辐射的方式是不可还原的概率性,因此量子理论认为,在任何时候哪盏灯亮都不是事先确定的。现在,你给一个人机会,让她按下四个按钮中的一个,这取决于她想亮哪盏灯。如果在统计学上有显著的相关性

tion between the button pressed and the light that goes on, then we have evidence that this process, which is random when there is no one around, can be affected by thought. (Of course, there are many other possible explanations: remember the discussion of theoryladenness in 4.8.).
那么,我们就有证据表明,这个在无人时随机发生的过程是可以受思维影响的。(当然,还有许多其他可能的解释:请记住 4.8 中关于理论平庸性的讨论)。
Now suppose that someone were to postulate a sort of inner Schmidt machine, where mental events directed physical events that were otherwise random. Then minds would be sites of deviations from the basic laws of nature. And, in fact, it would follow that these supposedly basic laws were not basic, since these events would no longer in fact be random. So this possibility is just inconsistent with the idea that the world is fundamentally indeterministic.
现在,假设有人提出了一种内在施密特机器的假设,在这种机器中,精神事件引导着原本随机的物理事件。那么,思维将成为偏离自然基本规律的场所。而事实上,这些所谓的基本规律并不是基本的,因为这些事件事实上不再是随机的。因此,这种可能性与 "世界从根本上说是不确定的 "这一观点是不一致的。
The idea that the mind can intervene to opt between otherwise random processes is no help. And that means we are left with only two options. If my intentions are causally determined, they're not my responsibility. But if they're not causally determined, then they aren't determined, in particular, by me; and so they're not my responsibility either. In what follows, I shall conduct the argument as if determinism were true, since, as we have just seen, it wouldn't help if it weren't.
心灵可以在原本随机的过程中进行选择的想法是无济于事的。这意味着我们只有两个选择。如果我的意图是因果决定的,那就不是我的责任。但如果它们不是因果决定的,那么它们就不是由我决定的,所以它们也不是我的责任。在下文中,我将以决定论是真的来进行论证,因为正如我们刚才所看到的,如果决定论不是真的,那也无济于事。

9.11 Compatibilism and moral responsibility
9.11 相容论与道德责任

At a key point in the argument for incompatibilism, I asked this rhetorical question: "If I wasn't responsible for the intention, why am I responsible for the act?" One powerful contemporary form of compatibilism argues that the right answer here is just "Why not?" Why should anyone think that the fact that I'm not responsible for having the mental states I do means that I'm not responsible for the acts I perform as a result of my mental states?
在论证不共戴天论的关键时刻 我提出了这样一个反问"如果我不对意图负责 为什么我要对行为负责?"当代一种强有力的兼容论认为 正确的答案应该是 "为什么不呢?"为什么有人会认为,我不对我的心理状态负责,就意味着我不对我的心理状态所导致的行为负责呢?
One reason, of course, is that sometimes we say people aren't responsible for what they did because we know someone else has manipulated their mental states. Suppose, for example, a hypnotist gives me a posthypnotic suggestion that I will have an irresistible desire to close my hand when she flicks her fingers. Knowing this, you might want to hold her and not me responsible for the flooding of the valley, when-after her flicking her fingers-I close my hand. This form of intervention, early in the causal chain that leads from my interior states to the contraction of my muscles, seems as exculpating
当然,其中一个原因是,有时我们说人们对自己的行为不负责任,是因为我们知道别人操纵了他们的心理状态。例如,假设一位催眠师给了我一个催眠后暗示,当她弹动手指时,我会有一种不可抗拒的欲望想要合上我的手。了解到这一点后,你可能会想让她而不是我对山谷洪水负责,因为当她弹动手指后,我就会把手合上。从我的内心状态到肌肉收缩的因果链条的早期,这种形式的干预似乎可以开脱罪责

as the more straightforward intervention of making my muscles contract by an electric impulse-or, for that matter, just squeezing my hand closed by force. So it's certainly true that sometimes the fact that others produce our mental states provides an excuse. And this is true sometimes even when it is not someone else but something else that does the work. Suppose that the desire to close my hand was caused by a brain tumor. Wouldn't that excuse me, too?
就像通过电脉冲让我的肌肉收缩这种更直接的干预一样,或者说,就像用力把我的手捏紧一样。因此,有时别人制造了我们的精神状态,这当然是个借口。即使有时不是别人,而是其他东西在起作用,情况也是如此。假设我想把手合上的愿望是由脑瘤引起的。这不也是我的借口吗?
But, the compatibilist will say, from the fact that some causes of our mental states relieve us of moral responsibility it doesn't follow that all causes of our mental states relieve us of moral responsibility. If you aren't hypnotized, don't have a brain tumor, and so on, then you are responsible for what you do (or fail to do). This claim might even be made consistent with some version of the principle of moral responsibility.
但是,兼容论者会说,从我们精神状态的某些原因可以免除我们的道德责任这一事实出发,并不能推导出我们精神状态的所有原因都可以免除我们的道德责任。如果你没有被催眠,没有得脑瘤等等,那么你就应该对你所做的(或没做的)事情负责。这种说法甚至可以与某种版本的道德责任原则相一致。
To see how, consider again the example of my closing my hand and flooding the valley. Suppose I close my hand of my own volition. Then you might rightly say that I ought not to have done it. In defending myself, I might draw on the widely accepted idea, which is one version of the principle of moral responsibility, that:
要想知道如何做到这一点,请再看一次我合上我的手并淹没山谷的例子。假设我是自愿合手的。那么你可能会正确地说,我不应该这样做。在为自己辩护时,我可以借鉴广为接受的观点,即道德责任原则的一个版本,即:
OC: Someone ought to do only if he or she can do .
OC:一个人只有在他或她能做 的情况下,才应该做
(This is sometimes abbreviated as "'Ought' implies 'can.' ") So I could say, "Well, if I ought not to have done it, then, according to OC, I must have been able not to do it. But, surely, if determinism is true, I couldn't have done otherwise." But a compatibilist could reply: "That doesn't follow. You certainly could have done otherwise; in fact, you would have done otherwise if you'd had a different intention. The sense of 'can,' in which " "ought" implies "can" - and " "ought to have" implies "could have" - is only that: you would have done otherwise if you had chosen to. And the truth of determinism gives us no reason to doubt that. For there are surely many possible worlds where you chose otherwise and acted differently." So far, I think, an incompatibilist is likely to find this rather unconvincing. For how does it help that I would have acted differently had I chosen to if I couldn't have chosen to?
(这有时被缩写为"'应该'意味着'能够'")因此,我可以说:"好吧,如果我不应该这样做,那么,根据决定论,我一定能够不这样做。但是,如果决定论是真的,我就不可能不这么做。但兼容论者可以回答说:"这不符合逻辑。你当然可以不这么做;事实上,如果你有不同的意图,你就会不这么做。在'可以'的意义上,""应该 "意味着 "可以"--而 "应该有 "意味着 "可能有"--仅仅是指:如果你选择不这样做,你就会不这样做。决定论的真理让我们没有理由怀疑这一点。因为在许多可能的世界里,你肯定会做出不同的选择,采取不同的行动"。我认为,到目前为止,不相容自由论者很可能会认为这很难令人信服。因为如果我不能选择,我选择了就会采取不同的行动,这又有什么用呢?
Rather than answering this question directly, let me reframe the challenge of determinism in a different way. (I will get back to the
与其直接回答这个问题,不如让我以另一种方式重构决定论的挑战。(我会回到

question I just asked eventually!) The basic idea of incompatibilism is something like this: we are responsible only for what is under our control, and determinism shows that we don't control anything. But, as Robert Nozick once pointed out, nobody ever argued that because determinism is true, thermostats don't control temperature. If a thermostat is working-controlling the temperature-and the heat is off, it's still true that if the temperature had been below its set point (the temperature it is designed to maintain), it would have switched on the heater. If determinism is true, the temperature couldn't have been lower. Nevertheless, the thermostat would have turned on the heater if it had been. Suppose that a thermostat is indeed working in this sense and the temperature drops below the set point. It will turn on the heater. And the heater will have been turned on under the thermostat's control, even though the thermostat is a deterministic system. Analogously, then, I am in control of whether the valley floods if, if I were to choose, I would close my hand and set in motion the process that releases the water. So, if I choose to close my hand, then the flooding is under my control. If determinism is true, I could not have chosen otherwise: but that doesn't mean that the flooding isn't under my control.
不相容论的基本观点是这样的:我们只对我们所控制的事物负责,而决定论表明我们无法控制任何事物。但是,正如罗伯特-诺齐克(Robert Nozick)曾经指出的那样,从来没有人说过,因为决定论是真的,所以恒温器就不能控制温度。如果恒温器在工作--控制温度--而暖气已经关闭,那么如果温度低于其设定点(恒温器设计用来维持的温度),恒温器就会打开暖气,这仍然是正确的。如果决定论成立,温度就不可能更低。尽管如此,恒温器还是会打开加热器。假设恒温器确实是在这个意义上工作的,并且温度降到了设定点以下。自动调温器就会打开加热器。尽管恒温器是一个确定性系统,但加热器还是在恒温器的控制下打开了。同样,如果我选择合上我的手,并启动释放水的过程,我就能控制山谷是否被洪水淹没。因此,如果我选择合上我的手,那么洪水就是在我的控制之下。如果决定论是真的,我就不可能做出其他选择:但这并不意味着洪水不受我的控制。
To see why this might help motivate the compatibilist's response, let's fill in the story of the closing hand and the flooding valley a little more. Suppose the reason I have my hand round the detonator switch is that I work for a hydroelectric company. The dam I can blow up, if I choose, is one of two through which the water drops through two turbines into two valleys. One valley is highly populated; the other is not. There has been a great deal more rainfall than any of the engineers predicted when the dam was designed, and the result is that the overflow pipes are not sufficient to carry away the excess water that is surging down river toward the dam. If I blow up this dam, then the water level will fall fast enough to stop water flowing over the other dam. And the dam with the dynamite is the one that drops into the less populated valley. So if I do nothing, water will flood both valleys, drowning many people; but if I blow up this one, only the less populated valley will be flooded, and very many fewer people-perhaps, if I am lucky, none-will die.
为了理解为什么这可能有助于激发兼容论者的反应,让我们把合上的手和洪水泛滥的山谷的故事再补上一点。假设我之所以把手放在雷管开关上,是因为我在一家水电公司工作。如果我选择的话,我可以炸掉的水坝是两个水坝中的一个,水流通过两个涡轮机流入两个山谷。一个山谷人口稠密,另一个则不然。降雨量比设计大坝时工程师们预测的要多得多,结果是溢流管不足以将多余的水流走,这些水流顺着河道涌向大坝。如果我炸掉这个大坝,水位就会迅速下降,足以阻止水流过另一个大坝。而装有炸药的大坝是落在人口较少的山谷里的大坝。因此,如果我什么都不做,水会淹没两个山谷,淹死很多人;但如果我炸掉这个水坝,只有人口较少的山谷会被淹没,死的人也会减少很多,如果我幸运的话,也许一个人都不会死。
I have done everything I can to warn people in the less-populated valley to prepare. Now I must take responsibility for risking the lives
我已经尽我所能警告人烟稀少的山谷中的人们做好准备。现在,我必须为冒着生命危险

of a few people in order to save many. If there were no people in the other valley (and I had been aware of the fact), I would have blown up the other dam. So there's at least one circumstance in which I would have chosen otherwise. True, if determinism is correct, there couldn't have been fewer people in the other valley. But surely, the compatibilist will say, the fact that I chose as I did because of what I knew and because I was trying to minimize loss of life makes me responsible for what happened. And, in fact, I should be praised for having made the correct, if tragic, choice. What matters, in other words, is that I formed my intentions and acted in response to my understanding of the facts and my aims. Let us call my understanding of the facts and my aims, taken together, "my reasons." It is simply irrelevant whether those reasons were the result of inexorable causal processes. If I had made my decision as a result of a hypnotist's flicking her fingers or of a brain tumor, my act would not have been responsive to my reasons. What makes me responsible, in short, is that I acted on my reasons.
为了拯救许多人,我不惜牺牲几个人的生命。如果另一个山谷里没有人(我也知道这个事实),我就会炸掉另一个大坝。因此,至少在一种情况下,我会做出相反的选择。的确,如果决定论是正确的,那么另一个山谷里的人就不可能少。但是,兼容论者肯定会说,我之所以做出这样的选择,是因为我知道什么,因为我想把生命损失降到最低,这让我对所发生的一切负有责任。而且,事实上,我应该因为做出了正确的选择(尽管是悲剧性的选择)而受到表扬。换句话说,重要的是我根据我对事实的理解和我的目标形成了我的意图并采取了行动。让我们把我对事实和目标的理解合在一起称为 "我的理由"。至于这些理由是否是不可避免的因果过程的结果,这根本无关紧要。如果我的决定是催眠师手指弹动的结果,或者是脑肿瘤的结果,那么我的行为就不是对我的理由的回应。简而言之,使我负责任的是我根据我的理由行事。
So we can return to the question I left hanging a while ago: How does it help that I would have acted differently, had I chosen to, if I couldn't have chosen to? It helps because the reason I couldn't have chosen otherwise is sometimes that what I chose to do was required by the reasons I had. When that happens, when what necessitates my action is my reasons, then I am responsible. My acts are under the control of my reasons. And that is very different from the case where what necessitates my action is force, or a tumor, or hypnosis.
因此,我们可以回到我刚才悬而未决的问题上:如果我选择了不同的行为,如果我不能选择不同的行为,这对我有什么帮助?这有帮助,因为我之所以不能选择其他方式,有时是因为我选择做的事情是我所拥有的理由所要求的。当这种情况发生时,当我的行为是我的理由所要求时,我就得负责任。我的行为受到我的理由的控制。而这与我的行为是出于武力、肿瘤或催眠的情况截然不同。
Notice that, on this view, if I am responsible only where I act for reasons, then the practice of holding people responsible-of blaming and praising them for what they do, and punishing sometimes what is blameworthy and rewarding sometimes what is praiseworthy-is appropriate only in cases where they are acting for reasons. And that makes the practice of holding people responsible one that will be appropriate only in cases where the fact that the agent will be held responsible might have an effect: in the cases, that is, where fear of blame and punishment, or anticipation of praise or reward, might make a difference by adding to the reasons that the agent is responding to. If I am responding to an electric impulse or a tumor, there's no role for anticipation of reward or punishment in shaping my action.
请注意,根据这一观点,如果只有在我出于某种原因行事的情况下,我才是负责任的,那么,要求人们负责--对他们的所作所为进行指责和表扬,有时惩罚应受指责的行为,有时奖励应受表扬的行为--只有在他们出于某种原因行事的情况下才是适当的。因此,只有在行为人将被追究责任这一事实可能产生影响的情况下,追究责任的做法才是适当的:也就是说,在这些情况下,对指责和惩罚的恐惧,或对表扬或奖励的期待,可能会增加行为人做出反应的理由,从而使情况发生变化。如果我是对电脉冲或肿瘤做出反应,那么对奖惩的预期就不会对我的行动产生影响。
This is only, of course, a beginning of an exploration of how compatibilists seek to make space for free will-understood as having your actions under the control of your reasons - in a world in which what we do is ultimately caused by events outside us. There are contemporary incompatibilists who are skeptical of this solution and who believe that our ways of ascribing moral responsibility should be abandoned or, at least, revised. (Of course, if they are determinists, they should presumably think that we can't help ascribing moral responsibility, even if we shouldn't!) So the debate goes on. But I hope this preliminary introduction to the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism confirms what I said at the start of 9.10: the problem of free will exemplifies the way in which some philosophical questions belong not to the specialized subfields-epistemology, philosophical psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, ethics, and so on-but bring them all together. I think it is because it requires all the intellectual resources of the subject that the problem of free will is so challenging.
当然,这只是一个开端,我们要探讨的是,在一个我们的所作所为最终是由我们之外的事件造成的世界里,兼容自由论者是如何为自由意志留出空间的--自由意志被理解为你的行为受你的理由的控制。当代有一些不相容自由论者对这一解决方案持怀疑态度,他们认为我们赋予道德责任的方式应该放弃,或者至少应该修改。(当然,如果他们是决定论者,他们就应该认为我们不能不赋予道德责任,即使我们不应该这样做!)。争论还在继续。但我希望这篇关于兼容论与非兼容论之争的初步介绍能够证实我在9.10开头所说的话:自由意志问题体现了这样一种方式,即有些哲学问题并不属于专门的子领域--认识论、哲学心理学、语言哲学、形而上学、伦理学等等--而是将它们汇集在一起。我认为,自由意志问题之所以如此具有挑战性,正是因为它需要所有学科的智力资源。

9.12 The special character of philosophy
9.12 哲学的特殊性

What can we say we have learned, finally, about the distinctive style of philosophical work? The first lesson, as I argued in section 9.9, is that philosophy, even when it is answering apparently particular questions-"What is the difference between and my mother?"approaches them in the light of broadly conceptual, abstract considerations, even though it would be foolish to do philosophy without one eye on the empirical world. That is why philosophical reasoning is so often a priori: truths about conceptual matters can be discovered by reason alone. Nevertheless, as I have insisted, there is no sharp line between philosophical questions and those of other specialized areas of thought, such as theology or the sciences.
最后,关于哲学工作的独特风格,我们可以说学到了什么?正如我在第 9.9 节中所论述的,第一条经验是,哲学即使是在回答表面上特定的问题--" 和我母亲有什么区别?"时,也要从广义的概念性、抽象的考虑出发来处理这些问题,尽管不着眼于经验世界而从事哲学是愚蠢的。这就是为什么哲学推理常常是先验的:关于概念性问题的真理可以仅仅通过理性来发现。尽管如此,正如我所坚持的那样,哲学问题与神学或科学等其他专门思想领域的问题之间并没有明显的界限。
Another lesson, confirmed many times in this book, is that there is no area of philosophy that is independent of all the others. The subject is not a collection of separate problems that can be addressed independently. Issues in epistemology and the philosophy of language reappear in discussions of mind, morals, politics, law, science, and - in this chapter and the last-of religion. Questions in morals-such as, when may we take somebody's property against their will?-depend on issues in the philosophy of
本书多次证实的另一个教训是,没有一个哲学领域是独立于所有其他领域的。哲学并不是一个可以独立解决的单独问题的集合。认识论和语言哲学中的问题会在有关思想、道德、政治、法律、科学,以及本章和最后一章有关宗教的讨论中再次出现。道德方面的问题--比如,什么时候我们可以违背某人的意愿夺取其财产?

mind-such as, Are interpersonal comparisons of utility possible? and are further dependent on metaphysical questions - such as, What is consciousness? I have just argued in sections 9.10 and 9.11 that the question of free will and determinism illustrates this interdependence of the different areas of the subject very well.
此外,这些问题还取决于形而上学问题,如什么是意识?我刚才在第 9.10 和 9.11 节中已经论证过,自由意志和决定论问题很好地说明了这一主题不同领域之间的这种相互依存关系。
What is at the root of the philosophical style is a desire to give a general and systematic account of our thought and experience, one that is developed critically, in the light of evidence and argument. You will remember that John Rawls used the notion of reflective equilibrium to describe the goal of philosophical thought. We start with an intuitive understanding of a problem, seeing it "through a glass, darkly"; and from these intuitions we build a little theory. The theory sharpens and guides our intuitions, and we return to theorizing. As we move back and forth from intuition to theory, we approach, we hope, a reflective equilibrium where theory and intuition coincide.
哲学风格的根源在于,人们希望对我们的思想和经验做出一般性的、系统性的解释,这种解释是根据证据和论证批判性地发展出来的。大家应该还记得,约翰-罗尔斯(John Rawls)曾用 "反思平衡"(reflective equilibrium)这一概念来描述哲学思考的目标。我们从对问题的直观理解开始,"透过玻璃 "看问题;然后从这些直观理解中建立起一点理论。理论使我们的直觉更加敏锐,并为我们的直觉提供指导,然后我们再回到理论化。当我们在直觉与理论之间来回穿梭时,我们希望能接近一种反思的平衡,在这种平衡中,理论与直觉不谋而合。
If the history of philosophy is anything to go by, one person's reflective equilibrium is another person's state of puzzlement. Cartesianism seemed to many seventeenth-century thinkers a reasonable way of understanding the mind and its place in the world. To modern behaviorists, on the other hand, and to functionalists it seems to raise too many philosophical difficulties. Perhaps the history of the subject is better represented by the picture suggested by the great German philosopher George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
从哲学史来看,一个人的反思平衡就是另一个人的困惑。对许多十七世纪的思想家来说,笛卡尔主义似乎是理解心智及其在世界中的位置的一种合理方式。另一方面,对于现代行为主义者和功能主义者来说,它似乎提出了太多哲学难题。或许,伟大的德国哲学家乔治-威廉-弗里德里希-黑格尔(George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)所描绘的图景更能代表这一主题的历史。
Hegel thought that the life of reason proceeded by a continuing sequence of ideas, in which the opposition between two positions might eventually be resolved by moving the debate to a new level. First, someone develops a systematic theory-which Hegel's predecessor, Fichte, called a "thesis." Then it is challenged, Fichte said, by those who support the antithesis; finally, a new view develops that takes what is best of each to produce a new synthesis. Hegel's suggestion is that the new idea can be said to "transcend" the old debate, moving it to a higher level. That is arguably what we saw in the movement from Cartesianism to behaviorism to functionalism in the philosophy of mind; or from realism to emotivism to prescriptivism in moral philosophy. But this is not the end of the process. On an Hegelian view, a synthesis can itself become the thesis for some new anti-thesis.
黑格尔认为,理性的生命是由一连串持续不断的观念构成的,在这些观念中,两种立场之间的对立最终可能会通过将辩论推向一个新的层次而得到解决。首先,有人提出了一个系统的理论--黑格尔的前辈费希特称之为 "论题"。费希特说,然后,它受到那些支持对立面的人的质疑;最后,形成一种新的观点,汲取各自的精华,产生一种新的综合。黑格尔的建议是,新的观点可以说是 "超越 "了旧的争论,将其提升到了一个更高的层次。可以说,这就是我们在心智哲学中看到的从笛卡尔主义到行为主义再到功能主义的运动;或者在道德哲学中看到的从现实主义到情感主义再到规定主义的运动。但这并不是这一过程的终点。在黑格尔看来,综合本身可以成为某些新的反综合的论题。
Hegel also thought, however, that this process was tending toward a final goal, in which philosophy approached ever closer to the absolute truth. But if, as I have argued, both fallibilism and weak relativism are true, we need not accept this part of his view. As our understanding of the world changes, as we find new ways to live our lives, there will be new problems to address, new questions to ask, new syntheses to be created. Because fallibilism is (probably!) true, we will never be sure that our theories are right. And because weak relativism is true, it really will be a task of creation-the invention of concepts - as well as a voyage of discovery. As a result, philosophy, along with other intellectual specializations, can change both its tools and its problems.
不过,黑格尔也认为,这一过程正趋向于一个最终目标,即哲学越来越接近绝对真理。但是,如果正如我所论证的那样,谬误论和弱相对主义都是真实的,我们就不必接受他的这部分观点。随着我们对世界的理解发生变化,随着我们找到新的生活方式,将会有新的问题需要解决,新的问题需要提出,新的综合方法需要创造。因为谬误论是(可能是!)真实的,所以我们永远无法确定我们的理论是正确的。而且,由于弱相对主义是真的,这确实将是一项创造性的任务--概念的发明--同时也是一次发现之旅。因此,哲学与其他知识专业一样,既可以改变其工具,也可以改变其问题。
Since I have made use of Ramsey's idea of a Ramsey-sentence a number of times in this book, I am tempted to use it now one more time. For this whole book is an attempt to say what philosophy is by showing you what it is to do philosophy. So if you took the conjunction of all I have said in this book, removed the word "philosophy" from the book, and replaced it with a variable, "x," you could write "Philosophy is the x such that ..." in front of that conjunction and you'd have my answer to the question, "What is philosophy?" But perhaps that would be taking Ramsey's idea too far!
既然我在本书中多次使用了拉姆齐的 "拉姆齐句子 "这一概念,我现在很想再使用一次。因为整本书都在试图通过向你展示什么是哲学来说明什么是哲学。因此,如果你把我在本书中所说的一切连在一起,从书中删除 "哲学 "一词,代之以一个变量 "x",你就可以在这个连词前面写下 "哲学是这样的 x......",你就得到了我对 "哲学是什么 "这个问题的答案。但也许这样就把拉姆齐的想法说得太远了!

9.13 Conclusion 9.13 结论

In this chapter I have looked at the character of philosophy, as we have learned about it earlier in the book, and suggested some contrasts between it and traditional thought, religion, and the sciences. But the problems we have discussed in this book are explored with all the resources of literate culture. Thus literature, too, examines moral and political ideas: it explores the nature of human experience in society, and sometimes - as in some science fiction-our understanding of the natural world. To claim that philosophy is important and enjoyable is not to say that we should not learn from and enjoy these other styles of thought, these other kinds of writing.
在本章中,我探讨了哲学的特点,正如我们在本书前面所了解到的那样,并提出了哲学与传统思想、宗教和科学之间的一些对比。但是,我们在本书中讨论的问题是利用文学文化的所有资源来探讨的。因此,文学也审视道德和政治观念:探讨人类社会经验的本质,有时--如在某些科幻小说中--探讨我们对自然世界的理解。说哲学是重要的和令人愉快的,并不是说我们不应该学习和享受这些其他的思想风格,这些其他类型的写作。
The questions I have asked in this book are some of those that are important to contemporary philosophy. I have addressed them with some of the intellectual tools that philosophers now find useful. If you share our vision of a general and systematic understanding of the central problems of human life, they are questions you will want
我在本书中提出的问题是当代哲学的一些重要问题。我用哲学家们现在认为有用的一些思想工具来解决这些问题。如果你赞同我们的观点,希望对人类生活的核心问题有一个普遍而系统的理解,那么这些问题就是你想要的

to ask also. And faced with any of these questions, or a new one, you will now be able to take the ideas and the techniques you have learned in this book and think it through for yourself.
的问题。面对这些问题中的任何一个,或者是一个新的问题,你现在就可以利用你在本书中学到的想法和技巧,自己去思考。

NOTES 注释

As anyone who reads this book will see, a great deal of my thinking about many topics has been shaped by the work of Frank Ramsey. I should like to acknowledge here my teacher Hugh Mellor, who introduced me to Ramsey (and to so much else in philosophy). I also owe a great debt of gratitude to a number of readers for Oxford University Press, who commented, often in very helpful detail, on my earlier textbook Necessary Questions and persuaded me to have another go; and to Neil Tennant and David Sosa, who read and commented in helpful detail on the penultimate version of this book. My colleague Jim Pryor helped me refine the discussion of free will in the last chapter. I am very much in his debt. But none of these philosophers can be held responsible for the flaws that remain.
读过本书的人都会发现,我对许多话题的思考都是在弗兰克-拉姆齐的著作中形成的。在此,我要感谢我的老师休-梅勒(Hugh Mellor),是他让我认识了拉姆齐(以及哲学中的许多其他方面)。我还要感谢牛津大学出版社的一些读者,他们对我早期的教科书《必要的问题》(Necessary Questions)发表了评论,常常是非常有益的细节,并说服我再写一本;还要感谢尼尔-坦南特(Neil Tennant)和大卫-索萨(David Sosa),他们阅读了本书的倒数第二版,并发表了有益的细节评论。我的同事吉姆-普赖尔(Jim Pryor)帮助我完善了最后一章关于自由意志的讨论。我非常感激他。但这些哲学家都不能为本书的缺陷负责。
I am grateful, too, to many students on whom I have tried out these ideas over the last couple of decades. And, finally, I am grateful to Larry King, whose idea that earlier book was.
我还要感谢许多学生,在过去的几十年里,我在他们身上尝试了这些想法。最后,我还要感谢拉里-金,之前那本书就是他的主意。
The sources for the material cited in the chapters are given here, with the sections in which the citations occur.
各章中引用的资料来源在此列出,并注明引用的章节。
It is always a good idea to check in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig, ed. (Routledge, London and New York, 2000) if you want to get either a reliable introduction to a topic or advice about further reading. This is also available on CD-ROM and on the Web. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich, ed. (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1995), is a wonderful source of introductory discussions. I also highly recommend the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, in particular those that I list below. There are many good introductions to various fields of philosophy in the Foundations of Philosophy series (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey); and most of the individual philosophers of the period before the twentieth century that I have discussed are well introduced in the Past Masters series (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford).
如果您想获得某个主题的可靠介绍或进一步阅读的建议,最好查阅 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig, ed. (Routledge, London and New York, 2000)。该书还有光盘版和网络版。The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich, ed. (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1995) 是介绍性讨论的绝佳来源。我还强烈推荐《布莱克威尔哲学指南》(Blackwell Companions to Philosophy),特别是我在下面列出的那些。哲学基础》(Foundations of Philosophy)丛书(Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey)中有许多关于哲学各领域的优秀介绍;《过去的大师》(Past Masters)丛书(牛津大学出版社,纽约和牛津)中对我所讨论的 20 世纪之前的大多数哲学家都有很好的介绍。

Blackwell Companions 布莱克威尔同伴

Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, A Companion to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1992).
乔纳森-丹西(Jonathan Dancy)和欧内斯特-索萨(Ernest Sosa),《认识论指南》(Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1992)。
Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, A Companion to Contemporary Political
罗伯特-E.-古丁和菲利普-佩蒂特,《当代政治学指南》(A Companion to Contemporary Political
Philosophy (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1993).
哲学》(布莱克威尔出版社,牛津和马萨诸塞州新马尔登,1993 年)。
Samuel Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell Publishers,
塞缪尔-古滕普兰:《心灵哲学指南》(布莱克威尔出版社,2011 年)、
Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1996).
牛津和马萨诸塞州新马尔登,1996 年)。
Dennis Patterson, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1999).
丹尼斯-帕特森,《法律哲学与法律理论指南》(布莱克威尔出版社,牛津和马萨诸塞州新马 尔登,1999 年)。
Peter Singer, A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1993).
Crispin Wright and Bob Hale, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1999).
克里斯平-赖特和鲍勃-黑尔:《语言哲学指南》(布莱克威尔出版社,马萨诸塞州牛津和新马尔登,1999 年)。

Introduction 导言

The quote from Williams comes in the following passage, which is worth citing in full: "What distinguishes analytical philosophy from other contemporary philosophy (though not from much philosophy of other times) is a certain way of going on, which involves argument, distinctions, and, so far as it remembers to try to achieve it and succeeds, moderately plain speech. As an alternative to plain speech, it distinguishes sharply between obscurity and technicality. It always rejects the first, but the second it sometimes finds a necessity. This feature peculiarly enrages some of its enemies. Wanting philosophy to be at once profound and accessible, they resent technicality but are comforted by obscurity." Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana, London; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985), p. 6.
威廉斯的这段话值得全文引用:"分析哲学与其他当代哲学(尽管与其他时代的许多哲学并无区别)的不同之处在于它的某种进行方式,其中包括论证、区分,以及,只要它还记得要努力做到这一点并取得了成功,适度的平实言辞。作为平实言辞的替代,它对晦涩和技术性进行了鲜明的区分。它总是拒绝前者,但有时却认为后者是必要的。这一特点特别激怒了它的一些敌人。他们希望哲学既深刻又通俗易懂,因此对技术性深恶痛绝,却对晦涩感到欣慰"。伯纳德-威廉斯,《伦理学与哲学的局限》(Fontana,伦敦;哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1985 年),第 6 页。

Chapter 1: Mind 第 1 章:心灵

1.2 I have translated the passages from Descartes myself. (This is much easier to do now, since the French text is easily available on the Web!) The long quotation from the fourth part of the Discourse (it is the second paragraph) runs as follows in French:
1.2 我自己翻译了笛卡尔的段落。(现在翻译起来容易多了,因为法文本很容易在网上找到!)。论语》第四部分的长引文(即第二段)法文如下
Puis, examinant avec attention ce que j'étois, et voyant que je pouvois feindre que je n'avois aucun corps, et qu'il n'y avoit aucun monde ni aucun lieu où je fusse; mais que je ne pouvois pas feindre pour cela que je n'étois point; et qu’au contraire de cela même que je pensois à douter de la vérité des autres choses, il suivoit très évidemment et très certainement que j'étois; au lieu que si j'eusse seulement cessé de penser, encore que tout le reste de ce que j'avois jamais imaginé eût été vrai, je n’avois aucune raison de croire que j'eusse été; je connus de là que j'étois une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser, et qui pour être n'a besoin d'aucun lieu ni ne dépend d'aucune chose matérielle; en sorte que ce moi, c'est-à-dire l'âme, par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entièrement distincte du corps, et même qu'elle est plus aisée à connoître que lui, et qu'encore qu'il ne fût point, elle ne lairroit pas d'être tout ce qu'elle est.
然后,我仔细研究了我是什么,发现我可以假装我没有身体,也没有我所在的世界或地方;但我不能因此假装我什么都不是;相反,即使我怀疑其他事物的真实性,我也会非常明显、非常肯定地认为我是存在的;而如果我停止思考,即使我曾经想象过的所有其他事物都是真实的,我也没有理由相信我是存在的;由此我知道,我是一种物质,它的全部本质或本性只是思考,为了存在,它不需要任何地方,也不依赖于任何物质;因此,这个我,也就是灵魂,通过它我才是我,它与肉体完全不同,甚至比后者更容易认识,即使它不存在,它也不会不成为它的全部。
In these notes I give page references to F. E. Sutcliffe's easily available translation Discourse on Method and the Meditations (Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968). This passage is on page 54.
在这些注释中,我给出了 F. E. Sutcliffe 的译本《方法论与沉思录》(Discourse on Method and the Meditations)(Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968 年)的页码参考。这段话在第 54 页。
1.3 References to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Macmillan, New York; Blackwell, Oxford, 1953), are usually made to the numbered sections. The quotation is section 258 .
1.3 在引用路德维希-维特根斯坦的《哲学研究》(G. E. M. Anscombe 译,麦克米伦出版社,纽约;布莱克威尔出版社,牛津,1953 年)时,通常使用章节编号。引文为第 258 节。
1.4 There is an excellent discussion of functionalism in Jerry Fodor, "The Mind Body Problem," Scientific American 244.1 (1981): 114-123.
1.4 杰里-福多(Jerry Fodor)的《身心问题》("The Mind Body Problem")对功能主义进行了精彩的讨论,《科学美国人》第 244.1 期(1981 年):114-123.
1.7 The "simple theory of pain" is from Ned Block's "Introduction: What Is Functionalism?" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Ned Block, ed. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980), Volume I, p. 174.
1.7 "简单疼痛理论 "出自奈德-布洛克的《功能主义是什么?内德-布洛克主编的《心理学哲学读本》(哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1980 年)第一卷,第 174 页。
1.9 The phenomenological objection to functionalism is well articulated in Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology op. cit., Volume I, pp. 159-168.
1.9 托马斯-纳格尔(Thomas Nagel)在《心理学哲学读本》(Readings in Philosophy of Psychology)(前引,第一卷,第 159-168 页)中明确阐述了现象学对功能主义的反对。
1.11 Hugh Mellor's proposal about second-order beliefs is in "Higher Order Degrees of Belief," in D. H. Mellor, ed., Prospects for Pragmatism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980).
1.11 休-梅洛关于二阶信念的建议载于《信念的高阶程度》,载于 D. H. 梅洛编著的《实用主义的前景》(剑桥大学出版社,剑桥,1980 年)。
1.11 Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Bradford Books/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983).
1.11 斯蒂芬-斯蒂奇:《从民间心理学到认知科学》:The Case Against Belief》(Bradford Books/MIT Press,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1983 年)。
1.11 Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Bradford Books/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987).
1.11 丹尼尔-丹尼特:《意向立场》(Bradford Books/MIT Press,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1987 年)。
1.12 The argument of this section was suggested to me by Galen Strawson's Mental Reality (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994).
1.12 本节的论点是盖伦-斯特劳森的《心理现实》(麻省理工学院出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1994 年)向我提出的。

Chapter 2: Knowledge 第 2 章:知识

2.1 Why Albert and Marie? Well, Albert for Einstein (the Brain) and Marie for Curie (the great scientist)! But I don't want to suggest that Marie Curie was unscrupulous.
2.1 为什么是阿尔伯特和玛丽?阿尔伯特代表爱因斯坦(大脑),玛丽代表居里(伟大的科学家)!但我并不想说玛丽-居里不择手段。
2.2 The passage from Plato's Theaetetus is slightly modified from John McDowell's excellent translation (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1973), p. 94.
2.2 柏拉图《Theaetetus》中的这段话根据约翰-麦克道尔(John McDowell)的优秀译本(克拉伦登出版社,纽约和牛津,1973 年)第 94 页略作修改。
2.3 Irving Thalberg's "In Defense of Justified True Belief' (referred to here) is in the Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969).
2.3 Irving Thalberg 的 "In Defense of Justified True Belief"(此处提及)载于《哲学杂志》第 66 期(1969 年)。
2.3 The long passages are from the First Meditation (Sutcliffe, p. 100) and the Second Meditation (Sutcliffe, p. 103), respectively. In French they read:
2.3 这两段长文分别出自《第一次默想》(苏特克利夫,第 100 页)和《第二次默想》(苏特克利夫,第 103 页)。法文本如下
Je supposerai donc qu'il y a, non point un vrai Dieu, qui est la souveraine source de vérité, mais un certain mauvais génie, non moins rusé et trompeur que puissant qui a employé toute son industrie à me tromper. Je penserai que le ciel, l'air, la terre, les couleurs, les figures, les sons et toutes les choses extérieures que nous voyons, ne sont que des illusions et tromperies, dont il se sert pour surprendre ma crédulité.
因此,我将假定,不是有一个真正的上帝,他是真理的至高无上的源泉,而是有一个邪恶的天才,他的狡猾和欺骗不亚于强大的力量,他动用了所有的力量来欺骗我。我会认为,天空、空气、大地、颜色、数字、声音以及我们所看到的一切外在事物,都只是幻觉和骗局,他用这些幻觉和骗局来让我的轻信大吃一惊。
And
Mais je me suis persuadé qu'il n'y avait rien du tout dans le monde, qu'il n'y avait aucun ciel, aucune terre, aucuns esprits, ni aucuns corps; ne me suis-je donc pas aussi persuadé que je n'étais point? Non certes, j'étais sans doute, si je me suis persuadé, ou seulement si j’ai pensé quelque chose. Mais il y a un je ne sais quel trompeur très puissant et très rusé, qui emploie toute son industrie à me tromper toujours. Il n'y a donc point de doute que je suis, s'il me trompe; et qu'il me trompe tant qu'il voudra il ne saurait jamais faire que je ne sois rien, tant que je penserai être quelque chose. De
但我说服自己,世界上什么都没有,没有天,没有地,没有灵魂,没有身体;我不也说服自己,我什么都不是吗?不,当然不是;如果我说服了自己,或者说只有在我有所思有所想的时候,我无疑是什么都不是。但是,有一个我不知道是什么的非常强大而狡猾的骗子,他用他所有的技巧一次又一次地欺骗我。因此,如果他欺骗了我,毫无疑问,我是存在的;不管他怎么欺骗我,只要我认为我是存在的,他就永远无法让我变成虚无。从

sorte qu’après y avoir bien pensé, et voir soigneusement examiné toutes choses, enfin il faut conclure, et tenir pour constant que cette proposition: Je suis, j'existe, est nécessairement vraie, toutes les fois que je la prononce, ou que je la conçois en mon esprit.
因此,在经过深思熟虑并仔细研究了所有事情之后,我们最终必须得出结论,并认为它是恒定不变的,即 "我是,我存在 "这个命题无论何时在我口中念出,或在我脑海中构想,都必然是真实的。
2.4, The quotations from Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the
2.4, 引自洛克的《关于人类理解的论述》、《关于 "人的理解 "的论述》和《关于 "人的理解 "的论述》。
2.5 Everyman edition, John Yolton, ed. (Dutton, New York; Dent, London, 1961) are: Book Two, Chapter One, Section 2, Volume I, p. 77; Book Two, Chapter One, Sections 3 and 4, Volume I, pp. 77-78; Book Four, Chapter Eleven, Section 6, Volume II, p. 230; Book Four, Chapter Eleven, Section 7, Volume II, p. 230; Book Four, Chapter Eleven, Section 10, Volume II, p. 233.
2.5 约翰-约尔顿编的 Everyman 版(纽约达顿出版社;伦敦丹特出版社,1961 年)如下:第二卷,第一章,第二节,第一卷,第 77 页;第二卷,第一章,第三和第四节,第一卷,第 77-78 页;第四卷,第十一章,第六节,第二卷,第 230 页;第四卷,第十一章,第七节,第二卷,第 230 页;第四卷,第十一章,第十节,第二卷,第 233 页。
2.6 For a discussion of the verification principle by one of the founders of logical positivism, see Moritz Schlick, "Meaning and Verification," Philosophical Review 45 (1936): 146-170, reprinted in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1948).
2.6 关于逻辑实证主义创始人之一对验证原则的讨论,见 Moritz Schlick, "Meaning and Verification," Philosophical Review 45 (1936):146-170, reprinted in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1948).
2.7 Gettier's "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" appeared originally in the journal Analysis 23.6 (1963). It is widely reprinted.
2.7 Gettier 的 "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? "最初发表于《分析》杂志第 23.6 期(1963 年)。该文被广泛转载。
2.7 Alvin I. Goldman's paper "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," which appeared originally in The Journal of Philosophy 73.20 (1976), is reprinted in G. Pappas and M. Swain, eds., Knowledge and Justification (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978). The quotation is in Knowledge and Justification, p. 122.
2.7 Alvin I. Goldman 的论文 "歧视与知觉知识 "最初发表于《哲学杂志》第 73.20 期(1976 年),现重印于 G. Pappas 和 M. Swain 编著的《知识与正义》(康奈尔大学出版社,伊萨卡和伦敦,1978 年)。引文见《知识与正义》,第 122 页。
2.9 The quotation is from Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 82. Quine's comments about the analogy with engineering are in his "Reply to Morton White" in The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp, eds. (Open Court, La Salle, 1986), pp. .
2.9 引文摘自《本体论相对性及其他论文》(纽约,哥伦比亚大学出版社,1969 年),第 82 页。奎因关于与工程学类比的评论见他的 "对莫顿-怀特的答复",载于《W. V. 奎因的哲学》,L. E. Hahn 和 P. A. Schilpp 编辑(Open Court, La Salle, 1986 年),第 页。
2.10 For examples of the range of evidence from cognitive psychology about the respects in which our ways of forming beliefs are not in fact such as to maximize the chance of their being true, see Massimo Piatelli-Palmerini, Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our Minds (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1996).
2.10 认知心理学提供了一系列证据,说明我们形成信念的方式在哪些方面并没有使其成真的机 会最大化,见 Massimo Piatelli-Palmerini, Inevitable Illusions:理性的错误如何支配我们的思想》(John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1996 年)。

Chapter 3: Language 第 3 章:语言

3.2 Ian Hacking's Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975), which I mention in this section, was very helpful to me in thinking about the first part of this chapter.
3.2 Ian Hacking 的《语言为何对哲学重要?(剑桥大学出版社,剑桥,1975 年),对我思考本章的第一部分大有帮助。
3.2 Richard Rorty's The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophic Method (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967) has a useful introduction that discusses the rise of linguistic philosophy.
3.2 理查德-罗蒂的《语言学转向》(The Linguistic Turn:近期哲学方法论文集》(芝加哥大学出版社,芝加哥,1967 年)的导言讨论了语言哲学的兴起。
3.2 The three quotations from Thomas Hobbes' The Elements of Philosophy: Concerning Body are from Chapter Two, Sections 1 and 3, reprinted in Hobbes Selections, F.J.E. Woodbridge, ed. (Scribner's, New York, 1958), pp. 13-15.
3.2 这三段引文出自托马斯-霍布斯的《哲学要素》:关于身体》第二章第 1 节和第 3 节,重印于《霍布斯选集》,F.J.E. Woodbridge 编辑(斯克里布纳出版社,纽约,1958 年),第 13-15 页。
3.3 The quotation is from section 293 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, (op. cit.).
3.3 引文出自维特根斯坦的《哲学研究》第 293 节(前引)。
3.3 My account of Frege is very much based on Michael Dummett's in his Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York, Harper and Row, 1973). Frege's paper, enti-
3.3 我对弗雷格的论述在很大程度上是以迈克尔-杜梅特在其《弗雷格:语言哲学》(纽约,哈珀出版社,1973 年)中的论述为基础的:语言哲学》(纽约,Harper and Row 出版社,1973 年)。弗雷格的论文

tled "Über Sinn und Bedeutung," was first published in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, NF 100, 1892, 25-50. I have made my own translation of Gottlob Frege's "On Sense and Reference," with assistance from Max Black's translation in The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney, ed. (Blackwell Publishers Limited, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1997). Unlike that translation, I have capitalized the initial letters of "Morning Star" and "Evening Star," to make it clear that these are names and not shorthand descriptions. The quotation is on page 29 (compare Black, op. cit., p. 154). The original German reads:
关于 Sinn und Bedeutung "首次发表于《哲学与哲学批判》杂志,NF 100,1892 年,25-50 页。我自己翻译了戈特洛布-弗雷格的《论意义与参照》,参考了马克斯-布莱克在《弗雷格读本》(The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney, ed., Blackwell Publishers Limited, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1997)中的译文。与该译本不同的是,我将 "晨星 "和 "晚星 "的首字母大写,以明确它们是名称而非速记描述。引文在第 29 页(比较 Black,同前,第 154 页)。德文原文如下
Von der Bedeutung und dem Sinne eines Zeichens ist die mit ihm verknüpfte Vorstellung zu unterscheiden. Wenn die Bedeutung eines Zeichens ein sinnlich wahrnehmbarer Gegenstand ist, so ist meine Vorstellung davon ein aus Erinnerungen von Sinneseindrücken, die ich gehabt habe, und von Tätigkeiten, inneren sowohl wie äußeren, die ich ausgeübt habe, entstandenes inneres Bild. Dieses ist oft mit Gefühlen getränkt; die Deutlichkeit seiner einzelnen Teile ist verschieden und schwankend. Nicht immer ist, auch bei demselben Menschen, dieselbe Vorstellung mit demselben Sinne verbunden. Die Vorstellung ist subjektiv: die Vorstellung des einen ist nicht die des anderen. Damit sind von selbst mannigfache Unterschiede der mit demselben Sinne verknüpften Vorstellungen gegeben. Ein Maler, ein Reiter, ein Zoologe werden wahrscheinlich sehr verschiedene Vorstellungen mit dem Namen "Bucephalus" verbinden.
一个符号的意义和感觉必须与与之相关的观念区分开来。如果说一个符号的意义是一个可感知的对象,那么我对它的概念则是由我对感官印象的记忆和我所进行的内外活动所产生的内在形象。这种形象往往充满感情,其各个部分的清晰度也各不相同,时好时坏。即使在同一个人身上,同一个形象也不总是与同一种感觉相联系。感知是主观的:一个人的感知不是另一个人的感知。因此,与同一感官相连的观念之间存在着多方面的差异。一个画家、一个骑手、一个动物学家可能会对 "bucephalus "这个名字产生截然不同的联想。
3.4 The Frege quotation is from page 32. (Compare Black, op. cit., p. 156). The original German reads:
3.4 弗雷格的引文出自第 32 页。(比较布莱克,同前,第 156 页)。德文原文如下
Wir fragen nun nach Sinn und Bedeutung eines ganzen Behauptungssatzes. Ein solcher Satz enthält einen Gedanken. Ist dieser Gedanke nun als dessen Sinn oder als dessen Bedeutung anzusehen? Nehmen wir einmal an, der Satz habe eine Bedeutung! Ersetzen wir nun in ihm ein Wort durch ein anderes von derselben Bedeutung, aber anderem Sinne, so kann dies auf die Bedeutung des Satzes keinen Einfluß haben. Nun sehen wir aber, daß der Gedanke sich in solchem Falle ändert; denn es ist z.B. der Gedanke des Satzes "der Morgenstern ist ein von der Sonne beleuchteter Körper" verschieden von dem des Satzes "der Abendstern ist ein von der Sonne beleuchteter Körper". Jemand, der nicht wüßte, daß der Abendstern der Morgenstern ist, könnte den einen Gedanken für wahr, den anderen für falsch halten. Der Gedanke kann also nicht die Bedeutung des Satzes sein, vielmehr werden wir ihn als den Sinn aufzufassen haben.
我们现在要问的是整个断言句子的含义和意义。这样的句子包含一个思想。这个思想应被视为其意义还是其含义呢?让我们假定这个句子是有意义的!如果我们现在把句子中的一个词换成另一个意义相同但不同的词,这不会对句子的意义产生任何影响。但现在我们看到,在这种情况下,思想发生了变化;例如,"晨星是被太阳照亮的物体 "这一命题的思想与 "晚星是被太阳照亮的物体 "这一命题的思想是不同的。一个不知道 "黄昏之星是晨星 "的人可能会认为一个想法是真的,而另一个想法是假的。因此,这个想法不可能是句子的意思,相反,我们必须把它理解为句子的意思。
3.4 Footnote 5 contains the remark about thought's being objective: "Ich verstehe unter Gedanken nicht das subjektive Tun des Denkens, sondern dessen objektiven Inhalt, der fähig ist, gemeinsames Eigentum von vielen zu sein."
3.4 脚注 5 中包含了关于思想客观性的评论:"我在思想中看到的并不是思想的下层内容,而是思想的上层内容,是许多人的共同本体"。
3.4 The definition of a truth value is from page 34. (Compare Black, op. cit., pp. 157-158.) The original German reads: "Ich verstehe unter dem Wahrheitswerte
3.4 真值的定义见第 34 页。(德文原文为"Ich verstehe unter dem Wahrheitswerte

eines Satzes den Umstand, da er wahr oder da er falsch ist. Weitere Wahrheitswerte gibt es nicht."
eines Satzes den Umstand, da er wahr or or da er falsch ist.没有其他的真相"。
3.4 The Frege quotation is from pages 37-38. (Compare Black, op. cit., p. 161.) The original German reads: "Mit Recht kann man nur folgern . . . da 'Morgenstern' nicht immer den Planeten Venus bedeutet."
3.4 弗雷格的引文出自第 37-38 页。(参见布莱克,同前,第 161 页)德文原文为:"Mit Recht kann man nur folgern ... da 'Morgenstern' nicht immer den Planeten Venus bedeutet"。
3.12 Jerry Fodor's The Language of Thought (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1975), which I mention here, was a major influence on my discussion in this chapter and in Chapter 1.
3.12 我在此提及的杰里-福多的《思想的语言》(哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1975 年)对我在本章和第一章的讨论产生了重大影响。
3.13 G. E. Moore's "A Reply to My Critics," in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, P. A. Schillp, ed. (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1942), pp. 319-43, contains Moore's latest discussion of the paradox of analysis.
3.13 G. E. Moore 的 "A Reply to My Critics," in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, P. A. Schillp, ed. (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1942), pp.
3.13 Quine's arguments against analyticity are to be found in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," which is in From a Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1953.)
3.13 奎因反对分析性的论点见《经验主义的两个教条》,收录于《从逻辑的角度看问题》(哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1953 年)。

Chapter 4: Science 第 4 章:科学

4.5 Hilary Putnam introduced the expression "the received view" in "What Theories Are Not" in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski, eds. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1962).
4.5 希拉里-普特南在《逻辑、方法论与科学哲学》(E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski, eds., Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1962)中的 "理论不是什么 "一文中提出了 "接受的观点 "这一说法。
4.5 Frederick Suppe, ed., The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd ed. (University of Illinois Press, Chicago and London, 1977) provides a very good advanced introduction to recent philosophy of science, including the "received view," its problems, and major alternatives, in Suppe's critical introduction and afterword.
4.5 Frederick Suppe 编著的《科学理论的结构》,第二版(伊利诺伊大学出版社,芝加哥和伦敦,1977 年)在 Suppe 的批判性导言和后记中,对近代科学哲学进行了很好的高级介绍,包括 "公认观点"、其问题和主要替代方案。
4.7 The quotation from Grover Maxwell is from "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities," in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science III (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962), p. 7.
4.7 格罗弗-麦克斯韦的引文摘自《理论实体的本体论地位》,载于 H. Feigl 和 G. Maxwell 编著的《明尼苏达科学哲学研究 III》(明尼苏达大学出版社,明尼阿波利斯,1962 年),第 7 页。
4.7 For N. R. Hanson's discussion of theory-ladenness, see his Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge, 1965).
4.7 N. R. Hanson 关于理论滞后性的论述,见其《发现的模式》(剑桥大学出版社,纽约和剑桥,1965 年)。
4.7 Sellars makes his arguments against the myth of the given in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception, and Reality (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.) There's a good brief discussion of the issue in the article on "The Given," in A Companion to Epistemology, Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds. (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1992), pp. 159-62.
4.7 塞拉斯在《科学、知觉与现实》(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963)中的 "经验主义与心灵哲学 "一文中提出了反对 "给定 "神话的论点。
4.8 The quotation from Hume is from Section Four, Part II of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Eric Steinberg, ed. (Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1984), p. 24.
4.8 休谟的话引自《关于人类理解的探究》第二部分第四节,埃里克-斯坦伯格编(哈克特出版公司,印第安纳波利斯,1984 年),第 24 页。
4.8 Goodman's "grue" arguments are to be found in Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1951).
4.8 古德曼的 "狡猾 "论点见 Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast(哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1951 年)。
4.9 Karl Popper's main ideas in philosophy of science are to be found in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchinson, London, 1959) and in Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963).
4.9 卡尔-波普尔在科学哲学方面的主要观点见《科学发现的逻辑》(The Logic of Scientific Discovery,Hutchinson,London,1959 年)和《猜想与反驳》(Conjectures and Refutations,Routledge and Kegan Paul,London,1963 年)。
4.12 Inference to the best explanation was first explored by Gil Harman in "The Inference to the Best Explanation," Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 88-95.
4.12 吉尔-哈曼在《最佳解释的推论》(The Inference to the Best Explanation)一文中首次探讨了最佳解释的推论,《哲学评论》第 74 期(1965 年):88-95.
Chapter 5: Morality 第 5 章:道德
5.2 The quotation from Hume is from Book III, Part 1, Section 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1978), pp. 469-70.
5.2 休谟的引文出自《人性论》第三卷第一部分第一节,L. A. Selby-Bigge 编辑,P. H. Nidditch 修订本(克拉伦登出版社,纽约和牛津,1978 年,第 469-70 页)。P. H. Nidditch (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1978), pp.
5.3 The quotation from G.E.M. Anscombe is from Intention (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000).
5.3 G.E.M. 安斯科姆的引文出自《意图》(哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,2000 年)。
5.4 The quotation from G. E. Moore is from Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903), p. 148.
5.4 G. E. Moore 的引文摘自《伦理学原理》(剑桥大学出版社,剑桥,1903 年),第 148 页。
5.4 The quotation is from Alasdair MacIntyre's A Short History of Ethics (Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1966; Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967), pp. 252-53.
5.4 引文出自阿拉斯戴尔-麦金太尔的《伦理学简史》(麦克米伦出版公司,纽约,1966 年;Routledge and Kegan Paul,伦敦,1967 年),第 252-53 页。
5.6 The quotations from Kant are from pp. 88-90 of The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analyzed by H. J. Paton (Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1964).
5.6 康德的话引自《道德形而上学基础》第 88-90 页,由 H. J. Paton 翻译和分析(纽约 Harper Torchbooks 出版社,1964 年)。
5.7 The quotation from R. M. Hare is from Moral Thinking (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1981), p. 90.
5.7 R. M. Hare 的引文摘自《道德思考》(克拉伦登出版社,纽约和牛津,1981 年),第 90 页。
5.9 Frank Ramsey's work is collected in his Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics, D. H. Mellor, ed. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978).
5.9 弗兰克-拉姆齐的著作收录于《基础》(Foundations:D. H. Mellor 编辑(Routledge and Kegan Paul,伦敦,1978 年)。
5.10 The quotations from R. M. Hare are from sections 2.3 and 2.4 of Moral Thinking, cited above.
5.10 R. M. Hare 的引文来自上文引用的《道德思考》第 2.3 和 2.4 节。
5.10 The quotations from Jonathan Glover's Causing Death and Saving Lives (Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977) are from pp. 73 and 79.
5.10 引自乔纳森-格洛弗(Jonathan Glover)的《制造死亡与拯救生命》(企鹅出版社,纽约和哈蒙兹沃思,米德尔塞克斯,1977 年)第 73 页和第 79 页。
5.12 My brief account of some aspects of Aristotle's ethics is based on J. O. Urmson, Aristotle's Ethics (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1988), which I highly recommend.
5.12 我对亚里士多德伦理学某些方面的简要介绍是以 J. O. Urmson 的《亚里士多德伦理学》 (Blackwell 出版社,牛津,1988 年)为基础的,我强烈推荐这本书。

Chapter 6: Politics 第 6 章:政治

6.1 My somewhat idealized account of the Mbuti is based on Colin Turnbull's Wayward Servants: The Two Worlds of the African Pygmies (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1976) and The Forest People (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1968).
6.1 我对姆布提人有些理想化的描述是基于科林-特恩布尔的《迷途的仆人》(Wayward Servants:The Two Worlds of the African Pygmies》(格林伍德出版社,康涅狄格州西港,1976 年)和《The Forest People》(西蒙舒斯特出版社,纽约,1968 年)。
6.2 The quotations from Thomas Hobbes are all from Part I, Chapters 11 (pp. 160-168), 13 (pp. 183-88), and 15 (pp. 201-17), of Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson, ed. (Penguin, New York & Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1985).
6.2 所引托马斯-霍布斯的话均出自《利维坦》第一部分第 11 章(第 160-168 页)、第 13 章(第 183-88 页)和第 15 章(第 201-17 页),C.B. Macpherson 编(企鹅出版社,纽约和 Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1985 年)。
6.4 The quotation is from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic books, New York, 1974), p. 7.
6.4 引文摘自罗伯特-诺齐克的《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》(Basic books, New York, 1974 年),第 7 页。
6.4 My exposition is based on Morton Davis's Game Theory: A Non-Technical Introduction, rev. ed. (Basic Books, New York, 1983). The quotation is from p. 13.
6.4 我的论述基于莫顿-戴维斯的《博弈论》:A Non-Technical Introduction, rev. ed. (Basic Books, New York, 1983)。引文来自第 13 页。
6.7 The quotation is from John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), p. 137.
6.7 引文摘自约翰-罗尔斯的《正义论》(哈佛大学贝尔克纳普出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥;克拉伦登出版社,牛津,1971 年),第 137 页。
6.8 The quotation from Robert Paul Wolff is from Understanding Rawls (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1977), pp. 31-32.
6.8 罗伯特-保罗-沃尔夫的引文出自《理解罗尔斯》(普林斯顿大学出版社,新泽西州普林斯顿,1977 年),第 31-32 页。
6.9 This section, like the last, is much influenced by Wolff's Understanding Rawls. I am grateful, too, for his help in revising the version of this section that appeared in Necessary Questions, on which this section is very closely based.
6.9 本节与上一节一样,深受沃尔夫的《理解罗尔斯》的影响。我也要感谢他帮助我修改了《必要的问题》(Necessary Questions)一书中的本节内容,而本节内容正是以《必要的问题》为基础的。
6.11 The quotation from John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is from p. 15.
6.11 引自约翰-罗尔斯《正义论》第 15 页。
6.11 The quotation is from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 195.
6.11 引文摘自罗伯特-诺齐克的《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》,第 195 页。
6.13 The quotation from John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is from p. 302.
6.13 引自约翰-罗尔斯《正义论》第 302 页。
6.13 The short quotation defining historical principles is from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 155.
6.13 界定历史原则的简短引文摘自罗伯特-诺齐克的《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》,第 155 页。
6.14 The quotations from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia are from pp. ix, 118 , and ix again.
6.14 引自罗伯特-诺齐克的《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》第 ix 页、第 118 页和第 ix 页。
6.14 C. B. Macpherson has a good edition of John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, IN, 1980). The quotations are from Chapter 2, Section 6 (p. 9 of Macpherson's edition).
6.14 C. B. Macpherson 有一本很好的约翰-洛克《政府论》第二版(Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, IN, 1980)。引文摘自第 2 章第 6 节(Macpherson 版第 9 页)。
6.15 Lawrence Davis formulates the outline I give of Nozick's theory in "Nozick's Entitlement Theory," which appeared in The Journal of Philosophy 73.21 (1976) and is reprinted in Reading Nozick, Jeffrey Paul, ed. (Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p. 345 .
6.15 劳伦斯-戴维斯(Lawrence Davis)在《诺齐克的权利理论》("Nozick's Entitlement Theory")一文中提出了我对诺齐克理论的概述,该文发表于《哲学杂志》73.21(1976 年),并在《阅读诺齐克》(Reading Nozick, Jeffrey Paul, ed., Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1981 年)中重印,第 345 页。
6.15 The quotation from Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia is from the footnote on p. 179.
6.15 引自罗伯特-诺齐克(Robert Nozick)的《无政府状态、国家与乌托邦》(Anarchy, State and Utopia)一书第 179 页脚注。
6.16 I rely heavily on Judith Jarvis Thomson's "Some Ruminations on Rights," which appeared originally in The University of Arizona Law Review 19 (1977), reprinted in Reading Nozick (op. cit.). The quotations are from pp. 137-38 of Reading Nozick.
6.16 我在很大程度上依赖于 Judith Jarvis Thomson 的 "Some Ruminations on Rights",该文原载于《亚利桑那大学法律评论》第 19 期(1977 年),后转载于《阅读诺齐克》(前引)。引文摘自《阅读诺齐克》第 137-38 页。

Chapter 7: Law 第 7 章:法律

7.1 The quote from Dr. King is in The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. Clayborne Carson (Warner Books, New York, 1998), p. 193.
7.1 金博士的这段话出自《小马丁-路德-金自传》(The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr.Clayborne Carson》(华纳图书公司,纽约,1998 年),第 193 页。
7.1 The quotation is from St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, 1a 2ae 90.4; cited in R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge, 1986), p. 74.
7.1 引文出自圣托马斯-阿奎那的《神学总论》,1a 2ae 90.4;转引自 R. A. 达夫,《审判与惩罚》(剑桥大学出版社,纽约和剑桥,1986 年),第 74 页。
7.1 The quotation from John Austin is from The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart, ed. (The Humanities Press, New York, 1965; Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1954), p. 184.
7.1 约翰-奥斯汀的引文摘自《确定的法理学范畴和法理学研究的用途》,H.L.A. Hart 编(人文出版社,纽约,1965 年;魏登菲尔德与尼科尔森出版社,伦敦,1954 年),第 184 页。
7.2 The quotation is from p. 81 of R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (op. cit.), which has much influenced this chapter.
7.2 引文出自 R. A. 达夫的《审判与惩罚》(同上)第 81 页,该书对本章影响很大。
7.4 Chapters 5 and 6 of Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1961) are relevant to section 7.4. The quotations are from pp. 70-79.
7.4 赫伯特-哈特的《法律的概念》(克拉伦登出版社,纽约和牛津,1961 年)第 5 章和第 6 章与第 7.4 节相关。引文摘自第 70-79 页。
7.6 The quotation from Bentham is cited from Ted Honderich's Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1984), pp. 51-52.
7.6 本瑟姆的引文引自特德-洪德里奇的《惩罚》:The Supposed Justifications (Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1984), pp.
7.7 The quotation from Kant is cited from Honderich's book (op. cit.), p. 22.
7.7 康德的引文引自昂德里希的书(前引),第 22 页。

Chapter 8: Metaphysics 第 8 章:形而上学

8.3 I have used the version of David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to be found in Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Nelson Pike, ed. (Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1970). The quotation here is from p. 40.
8.3 我使用的是大卫-休谟《关于自然宗教的对话》的版本,见休谟:《关于自然宗教的对话》,纳尔逊-派克编(鲍勃斯-梅里尔,纽约,1970 年):关于自然宗教的对话》,Nelson Pike 编(纽约 Bobbs-Merrill,1970 年)。此处的引文来自第 40 页。
8.4 Anselm's argument is to be found in Chapters 2 and 3 of his Proslogion, which is available in English in the Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, trans. (The Arthur J. Banning Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2000). The passage I have quoted corresponds to a section on page 93 of this translation, but I have translated it somewhat more literally myself. The Latin reads:
8.4 安瑟伦的论证见其《箴言》第 2 章和第 3 章,英文本见《坎特伯雷的安瑟伦哲学与神学论著全集》,Jasper Hopkins 和 Herbert Richardson 译,明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯,2000 年。(亚瑟-J-班宁出版社,明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯,2000 年)。我引用的这段话与该译本第 93 页的一节相对应,但我自己翻译得更直白一些。拉丁文如下
Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest, quia hoc cum audit intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur in intellectu est. Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.
因此,"在智力中 "和 "在智力中 "都是 "maius cogitari "无法做到的,因为 "审计 "和 "理解 "都是 "智力 "中的 "理解"。当然,我们的大脑所不能理解的东西,也不能存在于我们的智力中。因此,如果他的智力只存在于一个人的智力中,那么他就可以在另一个人的智力中思考。因此,"我 "不能思考的东西,就在 "我 "的智力中:"我 "不能思考的东西,就在 "我 "能思考的东西中。因此,"不可能 "是肯定的。因此,"我们的大脑和我们的身体 "之间存在着一个共同的疑问。
8.4 The quotation is from Descartes' Fourth Discourse (Sutcliffe 57). The French reads as follows:
8.4 引文出自笛卡尔的《第四篇论述》(Sutcliffe 57)。法文如下
... car, par exemple, je voyois bien que, supposant un triangle, il falloit que ses trois angles fussent égaux à deux droits, mais je ne voyois rien pour cela qui m'assurât qu'il y eût au monde aucun triangle: au lieu revenant à examiner l'idée que j'avois d'un être parfait, je trouvois que l'existence y étoit comprise en même façon qu'il est compris en celle d'un triangle que ses trois angles sont égaux à deux droits, ou en celle d'une sphère que toutes ses parties sont également distantes de son centre, ou même encore plus évidemment; et que par conséquent il est pour le moins aussi certain que Dieu, qui est cet être si parfait, est ou existe, qu'aucune démonstration de géométrie le sauroit être.
...例如,我可以看到,假设有一个三角形,它的三个角必须等于两个直角,但我却看不到任何东西能让我确信世界上不存在三角形:相反,当我回过头来研究我对完美存在的想法时,我发现对存在的理解就像对三角形的理解一样,即三角形的三个角等于两个直角,或者对球体的理解一样,即球体的所有部分与球心的距离相等,或者甚至更明显;因此,至少可以肯定,上帝--这个如此完美的存在--是或存在着,这是几何学无法证明的。
8.4 Gaunilo's argument can be found in On Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo, on p. 117 of Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury (op. cit). I have used the translation made available on the Web at the Internet Medieval Sourcebook: www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-gaunilo.html. The passage comes just before the end of the sixth section. The source for this online translation is St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo; and Cur Deus Homo, Sidney Norton Deane, trans. (The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1903; reprinted 1926).
8.4 高尼洛的论点见《坎特伯雷的安瑟伦哲学与神学论著全集》(同上)第 117 页高尼洛的《论愚人》(On Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo)。我使用的是互联网 Medieval Sourcebook 上的译文:www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-gaunilo.html。这段话出现在第六节结尾之前。该在线翻译的来源是圣安瑟伦:Proslogium;Monologium;An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo;and Cur Deus Homo,Sidney Norton Deane,trans.(The Open Court Publishing Company,芝加哥,1903 年;1926 年再版)。
8.5 The quotation is from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.), p. 77.
8.5 引文出自休谟的《关于自然宗教的对话》(同上),第 77 页。
8.6 The idea of a story world here is not the same as the one used by the designers of interactive games. A story world here is one of the infinite number of fully specified possible worlds where the things that are true in the fiction are true.
8.6 这里的故事世界概念与互动游戏设计者使用的概念不同。这里的故事世界是无限多个完全指定的可能世界之一,在这些世界中,虚构中的事情都是真实的。
There are many of them because fictions leave some things undetermined. So there are things that are true in Romeo and Juliet (they're in love), things that are false (their families are happy about it), and things that are indeterminate (they both love peaches). The true things are true in all of the story worlds, the false things in none of them, and the indeterminate things are true in some of the story worlds. There is a number of different ways in which you might take up and develop these ideas; see, for example, Thomas Pavel, Fictional Worlds (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986).
因为小说中有些事情是无法确定的,所以有很多这样的事情。因此,在《罗密欧与朱丽叶》中,有些事情是真的(他们相爱了),有些事情是假的(他们的家人为此感到高兴),还有些事情是不确定的(他们都爱吃桃子)。真实的事情在所有故事世界中都是真实的,虚假的事情在所有故事世界中都不是真实的,而不确定的事情在某些故事世界中是真实的。您可以采用多种不同的方法来接受和发展这些观点;例如,请参阅托马斯-帕维尔:《虚构世界》(哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1986 年)。
8.7 The quotation is from Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book Alpha the less (ii.2.994a2), at page 36 of Aristotle Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1960).
8.7 引文出自亚里士多德的《形而上学》,Book Alpha the less (ii.2.994a2),载于亚里士多德《形而上学》第 36 页,译者:理查德-霍普(密歇根大学出版社,1960 年,密歇根州安堡)。Richard Hope(密歇根大学出版社,密歇根州安阿伯市,1960 年)第 36 页。
8.8 The translation of Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles is from Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, Ralph McInerny, ed. and trans. Penguin, New York and London, 1998), p. 255.
8.8 阿奎那的《与外邦人论》译自《托马斯-阿奎那文选》,拉尔夫-麦金尼编和译:Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, Ralph McInerny, ed. and trans., Penguin, New York and London, 1998), p. 255.企鹅出版社,纽约和伦敦,1998 年),第 255 页。
8.9 See Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.), p. 22.
8.9 见休谟的《关于自然宗教的对话》(同上),第 22 页。
8.9 I quote Paley as cited on pp. 148-49 of Pike's commentary in Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.).
8.9 我引用了派克在《休谟评注》第 148-49 页引用的帕利的话:关于自然宗教的对话》(引用如前)。
8.9 The passage from the Metaphysics is on p. 13 of Richard Hope's translation (op. cit.), i.4.985a.
8.9 《形而上学》中的这段话见理查德-霍普译本第 13 页(前引),i.4.985a。
8.11 The explanation of "argument from experience" is from p. 30 of Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.). My discussion of Hume's argument follows Nelson Pike's very helpful treatment in Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit), pp. 148-57.
8.11 对 "经验论证 "的解释来自休谟的《关于自然宗教的对话》(同上)第 30 页:关于自然宗教的对话》(同前)第 30 页。我对休谟论证的讨论遵循了 Nelson Pike 在《休谟:关于自然宗教的对话》(同上)中的有益论述:关于自然宗教的对话》(同上),第 148-57 页。
8.11 Philo's remark about the limited range of our knowledge of the universe is on p. 29.
8.11 Philo 关于我们对宇宙的认识范围有限的说法见第 29 页。
8.12 The statement of the argument from evil is from Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.), p. 88. The quotation from John Hick is from p. 324 of his Evil and the God of Love (Harper and Row, San Francisco, CA, 1978).
8.12 邪恶论证的陈述来自休谟:关于自然宗教的对话》(同上),第 88 页。约翰-希克的引文出自他的《恶与爱神》(Harper and Row, San Francisco, CA, 1978 年)第 324 页。
8.12 For recent work on God and free will, see God, Foreknowledge and Freedom, John Martin Fischer, ed. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1989).
8.12 有关上帝与自由意志的近作,见《上帝、预知与自由》,约翰-马丁-费舍尔编(斯坦福大学出版社,斯坦福,加利福尼亚,1989年)。
8.12 The quote from Nelson Pike toward the end of this section is on p. 189 of Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.).
8.12 本节末尾对纳尔逊-派克的引用见《休谟全集》第 189 页:关于自然宗教的对话》(同上)第 189 页。

Chapter 9: Philosophy 第 9 章:哲学

9.3. & 9.4 The quotations from Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande are from Eva Gillies' abridged edition (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1976), pp. 201-3.
9.3 和 9.4 引自 Edward Evans-Pritchard 爵士的《阿桑德人的巫术、神谕和魔法》,出自 Eva Gillies 的节略本(牛津大学出版社,纽约和牛津,1976 年),第 201-3 页。
9.10 The issue as to whether modern physics is indeterministic is actually a good deal more intricate than my discussion in the text can suggest: Jeremy Butterfield's article "Determinism and Indeterminism" in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (op. cit.) provides a helpful starting point for this difficult topic.
9.10 现代物理学是否是非决定论的问题实际上比我在文中的讨论要复杂得多:杰里米-巴特菲尔德(Jeremy Butterfield)在《路特里奇哲学百科全书》(Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy)中的文章《决定论与非决定论》(同前)为这一难题提供了一个有益的切入点。
9.10 The translation of Lucretius is from Book II, lines 251-57, p. 43 of the translation by Sir Ronald Melville, Of the Nature of Things (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), as cited by Simon Blackburn in his excellent discussion of free will
9.10 卢克莱修的译文出自罗纳德-梅尔维尔爵士翻译的《事物的本质》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,1997 年)第二卷第 251-57 行,西蒙-布莱克本在其关于自由意志的精彩论述中引用了该译文。

in Chapter 3 of Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
载于《思考》第 3 章:令人信服的哲学导论》(牛津:牛津大学出版社,1999 年)第 3 章。
9.10 Schmidt's experiments are discussed in "The Anomaly Called Psi: Recent Research and Criticism," by K. Ramakrisna Rao and John Palmer, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (1987): 539-643. In the Schmidt experiment subjects were actually asked to anticipate which light was going to go on, rather than to try to affect the result. But clearly the machine could be used for psychokinesis (moving things by thought) as well as precognition (seeing the future).
9.10 K. Ramakrisna Rao 和 John Palmer 合著的 "The Anomaly Called Psi:K. Ramakrisna Rao 和 John Palmer 合著的 "The Anomaly Called Psi:Recent Research and Criticism "一文中讨论了施密特的实验,载于《行为与脑科学》10(1987 年),第 539-643 页:539-643.在施密特实验中,受试者实际上是被要求预测哪盏灯会亮,而不是试图影响结果。但很明显,这台机器可以用于精神动力(通过意念移动物体)和预知(预见未来)。
9.11 A good deal of recent literature on moral responsibility is collected in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993). There is an excellent introduction by the editors.
9.11 有关道德责任的大量最新文献收录于《道德责任的视角》(Perspectives on Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds.)(康奈尔大学出版社,伊萨卡和伦敦,1993 年)。编者撰写了一篇出色的导言。
9.10 Robert Nozicks observation about the thermostat is made in Philosophical Explanations (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1981), p. 315.
9.10 罗伯特-诺齐克斯在《哲学解释》(哈佛大学出版社,马萨诸塞州剑桥,1981 年)第 315 页中提出了关于恒温器的观点。

INDEX 索引

A posteriori truth, 105, 106, 310,
后验真理, 105, 106, 310、
322-23, 324, 326-27, 328, 330. See also Ontological arguments
322-23, 324, 326-27, 328, 330.另见本体论论据
A priori truth, 105-6, 180, 310-13,
先验真理,105-6,180,310-13、
Absolutism, 206 绝对主义,206
consequentialism v., 206, 208-13, 218
结果主义 v., 206, 208-13, 218
rights and, 214-15 权利与 214-15
Abstraction, 56 抽象,56
Accommodative style, 342
适应性风格,342
Acquaintance, knowledge by, 306, 309
相识,知识,306,309
Action 行动
-guiding, 184, 186, 189, 191, 215
-指导,184,186,189,191,215
judgment, morality and, 181-83, 189, 191, 209, 366
判断力、道德与 181-83、189、191、209、366
maxim of, 198, 200, 201
格言》,198、200、201
moral assertion and, 185-86
道德主张与 185-86
moral beliefs v. facts influence on, 184
道德信念对事实的影响, 184
Adequacy, empirical conditions of, 147
充足性,经验条件,147
Adjudication, rule of, 284, 285
裁决规则, 284, 285
Adversarial style, 341-42, 350
对抗式风格,341-42,350
Alleles, 131-32, 135, 137
等位基因,131-32,135,137
Ambiguity, fallacy of, 156-57
模糊性,谬误,156-57
Analytic jurisprudence, 274
分析法学,274
Analytic truth, 104-6, 121, 122-24
分析真理,104-6、121、122-24
Anarchism, 224, 263, 264
无政府主义,224、263、264
Anarchy, State and Utopia (Nozick), 262
无政府、国家与乌托邦》(诺齐克),262 页
Animal rights, 266-67 动物权利,266-67
Anscombe, Elizabeth, 186
伊丽莎白-安斯科姆 186
Anselm, St., 311, 314, 315-16, 317-18
圣安瑟伦,311、314、315-16、317-18
Antecedent, 112 前置词,112
Antecedent conditions, 146
先决条件,146
Anthropology, 341-42, 343, 344-49
人类学,341-42,343,344-49
Antithesis, 378 对立面,378
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 274, 296-97
圣托马斯-阿奎那,第 274、296-97 页
God's existence and, 317, 322-29
上帝的存在与 317、322-29
harmony of nature and, 324-29
自然和谐,324-29

Argument(s), 11, 106, 110
论据,11、106、110
from design,  从设计、
formally valid, 107 正式有效,107
"modus ponens," 111-12 "方式论",111-12
open question, 188 未决问题,188
reductio, 113 归纳,113
sound, 113 声音,113
valid, 107, 110-11, 113, 117
有效、107、110-11、113、117
Aristotle, 106, 299, 338
亚里士多德,106、299、338
metaphysics of, 299-300 形而上学, 299-300
precision of, xvi 精确度,xvi
on successful life, 216-17, 268-69
关于成功的人生,216-17,268-69
Artifact 艺术品
infinitesimal, 333 无穷小,333
known v. possible, 33, 332
已知与可能,33,332
universe as, 331-32 宇宙,331-32
Assertions, 119 断言,119
Astrology, 127-28, 152, 167
占星术,127-28,152,167
Attila the Hun, 199, 203-4, 205
匈奴王阿提拉,199,203-4,205
Attitude(s), 186 态度, 186
con-, 186, 205 con-,186,205
irrational, 193 非理性,193
pro-, 186, 191-92, 193, 195, 203, 204, 205
赞成,186,191-92,193,195,203,204,205
propositional, 98 命题,98
reason and, 201 理性与 201
sentential, 98-99 句式,98-99
universalizability and, 203, 205, 249
普遍性与 203、205、249
Austin, John, 274-75, 285
奥斯汀,约翰,274-75,285
Authority, 223, 229 权力,223,229
power v., 276 权力诉,276
Autonomy, 212-13 自治,212-13
citizen, 295-96, 297 公民,295-96,297
Azande, 343, 345-49, 350, 353, 356-57, 361-62
阿赞德语,343、345-49、350、353、356-57、361-62
Bacon, Francis, 159 弗朗西斯-培根,159
Baconian, 159 巴科尼,159
Bargaining game 讨价还价游戏
equality in, 249-50, 253
平等,249-50,253
ignorance of position in, 249, 252-53,
对地位的无知,249,252-53、
participants not envious in, 250 ,
参与者不嫉妒, 250 、
251-52, 254
procedures of, 248-49 程序,248-49
unanimous agreement in, 252
一致同意,252
Beauty, 303 美容, 303
Begging the question argument, 18
引出问题的论点,18
Behaviorism, 2-4, 11, 18, 208, 378
行为主义,2-4、11、18、208、378
Descartes v., 11, 19, 28
笛卡尔诉, 11, 19, 28
private language argument and, 18-19, 83
私人语言论证与, 18-19, 83
verificationism, private mental states and, 64
验证主义、私人心理状态与 64
Belief(s), 2, 11, 18, 185
信仰,2、11、18、185
case against, 34-36 反对案,34-36
circumstances of ascription and, 64
归属和情况,64
cognitive psychology and, 34-35
认知心理学与 34-35
commonsense, 138-39 常识,138-39
conscious, 31-32, 34 有意识、31-32、34
deductive closure principle and, 49-50, 51
演绎封闭原则与, 49-50, 51
from experience, 55,56 经验,55,56
expression of, 185-86 表达,185-86
factual, 184, 196 事实、184、196
fallibilist, 59-60 不可靠主义者,59-60
false, 66 错误,66
first order v. second order, 31-32, 33
一阶与二阶,31-32,33
of folk psychology, 26-27
民间心理学,26-27
foundational, 57, 72, 140
基础性,57,72,140
functionalism and, 23-25, 28, 64, 118, 184
功能主义与 23-25、28、64、118、184
inductively based, 163 归纳法,163
justification of, 53, 68, 75, 192, 342
理由, 53, 68, 75, 192, 342
moral, 189, 209 道德、189、209
mutually supporting, 347
相互支持,347
networks of, 354-55 网络,354-55
observational, 141 观察,141
probable, 59-60 可能,59-60
reliable, 75,77 可靠、75、77
of traditional cultures, 342-45, 346, 353
传统文化,342-45,346,353
true, 41-44, 121, 187
真实,41-44,121,187
true, and oughts,
真,还有 "绪"、
unconscious, 31, 32 无意识、31、32
Bentham, Jeremy, 206, 286-89, 291
杰里米-边沁,第 206、286-89、291 页
Best explanation, interference to the
最好的解释,干扰

(ITBE), 167-71, 334-37
Bettle in the box, 84-87
盒子里的贝特尔,84-87
Binary connectives, 112 二元连接词, 112
Block, Ned, 25, 85
布洛克,奈德,25,85
Body, mind separate/different from, 6-7. See also Mind-body problem
身体、心灵分离/不同于身体,6-7。另见身心问题
Brain, 39-40 大脑,39-40
British legal system, 282-83
英国法律制度,282-83
Buddhism, 362 佛教,362
Capital punishment, 271-72
死刑,271-72
Cartesianism, 13, 19, 22, 48, 51-52, 64, 82,378
笛卡尔主义, 13, 19, 22, 48, 51-52, 64, 82,378
Categorical imperative, 185, 191, 192, 197, 202, 215
绝对命令,185、191、192、197、202、215
Causal account of location,
位置的因果关系、
Causal theories of knowledge,
知识的因果理论、
(traditional) justification v., 70-73, 77
(传统)理由 v., 70-73, 77
as reliable in circumstances, 70,72
70,72
skepticism and, 66-70 怀疑论与 66-70
Causation, 171-75, 300, 367
因果关系,171-75,300,367
Certainty, 44-53, 58, 60, 61, 71, 114
确定性,44-53,58,60,61,71,114
Chance, 240 机会,240
Change, rule of,
变革,规则、
Chaos,  混乱
Chinese, 353-54 中文,353-54
Christian philosophy, 305, 337, 362, 363
基督教哲学,305、337、362、363
Chromosomes, 147, 148-50, 157
染色体,147、148-50、157
Circumstances of ascription, 64
归属情况,64
Citizens 公民
autonomy, 295-96, 297 自治,295-96,297
not free in becoming, 231
不自由成为,231
sovereign and, 230 主权和 230
Civil disobedience,
非暴力反抗、
against laws, 271-72 反对法律,271-72
minimum moral conditions and, 272-73
最低道德条件与, 272-73
Civil Rights 公民权利
civil disobedience for, 273, 274
非暴力反抗,273,274
Civil society, 228-29 民间社会,228-29
Cleanthes, 310, 316, 325-35
cogito, the, 46, 48, 58, 113, 114
Cognitive idea, 104 认知理念,104
Cognitive psychology, 34-36
认知心理学,34-36
folk psychology v., 34-35
民间心理学 v., 34-35
sociology of knowledge and, 74
知识社会学与, 74
Cognitive relativism, 344, 353-55, 356
认知相对主义,344、353-55、356
Cognitivism, 186-87 认知主义,186-87
intutitionism's form of, 187-91
直觉主义的形式,187-91
Common sense 常识
beliefs, 138-39 信仰,138-39
mentalist v. behaviorist, 2-3
心理学家与行为学家,2-3
Commonwealth, 228, 258, 263
英联邦、228、258、263
Compatibilism, 369 兼容并包论,369
determinism and, 369, 376
决定论与 369、376
free will and, 369, 376-77
自由意志与 369、376-77
moral responsibility and, 373-77
道德责任与,373-77
Competition, 225 竞争,225
Compositionality thesis (CT), 89-90, 91, 93, 96
构成论文 (CT), 89-90, 91, 93, 96
Computers, 73, 128 计算机,73,128
as model of mind, 1, 19, 21-22, 24, 28
作为思维模式, 1, 19, 21-22, 24, 28
programming of, 21-22 计划编制,21-22
speech recognition by, 2
语音识别,2
as thinking machines, 4
作为思维机器,4
understanding by,
理解、
Con-attitudes, 186 反对态度,186
Conceptual frameworks/schemes,
概念框架/方案、
variation of truth in, 359,360
真理的变化,359,360
Conclusion, 106, 112, 113
结论、106、112、113
Conditional, 112 条件式,112
contrary-to-fact,
与事实相反、
Confirmation theory, 171
确认理论,171
Conjecture, 164, 166, 167
猜想,164、166、167
Conjunction, 112 连接,112
Connectives, 112, 142 连接词,112,142
Consciousness 意识
belief, case against, 34-36
信仰,反对案例,34-36
cognitive psychology and, 34-36
认知心理学与 34-36
folk psychology and, 34-35
民间心理学与 34-35
functionalism and, 32-33
功能主义与 32-33
intentional stance towards, 35-36
意向性姿态, 35-36
linguistic communication and, 32
语言交流与,32
mind and, 31-36 思想与 31-36
phenomenologist, inner life and, 28-31
现象学家,内心生活与 28-31
shared presupposition of, 33
共同的预设,33
thought experiments and, 33-34
思想实验与 33-34
time and, 32 时间与 32
Consequence, 107 后果,107
Consequent, 112 后果,112
Consequentialism, 203, 206
结果论,203,206
absolutism v., 206, 208-13, 215, 218
专制主义诉, 206, 208-13, 215, 218
autonomy v., 212-13 自主权 v., 212-13
justification in, 210-11
理由,210-11
rights and, 214 权利与 214
as wrong, 213, 214 错误,213,214
Constant-sum game, 236, 241, 250
恒和博弈,236、241、250
Constitution, 231, 282-83
宪法》,231,282-83
Context(s), 153 背景,153
of discovery, 130, 158
发现,130,158
extensional, 97-98 扩展性,97-98
intensional, 97-99, 101 内在性, 97-99, 101
of justification, 130, 139, 158, 167
正义性,130、139、158、167
Contingent truth, 104, 106
或然真理,104,106
Contrary-to-fact conditional,
与事实相反的条件、
Co-operative solution,
合作解决方案、
Copula, 182
Correspondence rules, 142-43, 144-45
通信规则,142-43,144-45
Corroboration, 166, 170, 171
确证,166、170、171
Cosmological argument, 322-23
宇宙论证,322-23
Counterfactuals, 173-74 反事实,173-74
Courts, 343 法院,343
offenders, moral view and, 296
罪犯、道德观与 296
rule of adjudication for, 284, 285
裁定规则, 284, 285
rules approved by, 282-83
批准的规则,282-83
Covenant, 228 公约》,228
bound to (agreement of), 230, 244-45
受(协议)约束,230,244-45
nonacceptance of, 231-32
不接受, 231-32
Creative intelligence, 326,328
创造性智慧,326,328
necessity of, 324-25, 328, 329-30
必要性,324-25,328,329-30
probability v. necessity of, 326,330
可能性与必要性,326,330
Criterion of correctness, 12-14, 16
正确性标准,12-14,16
rules without, 17 没有规则,17
Cross-world twins, 314 跨世界双胞胎,314
Culture(s), 339-40. See also Western culture
文化,339-40。另见西方文化
accommodative style,
通融的风格、
adversarial, 341-42 对抗性,341-42
beliefs of (traditional), 342-45, 346, 353
传统)信仰,342-45,346,353
moral relativism for, 192, 195, 201-4, 218, 344
道德相对主义, 192, 195, 201-4, 218, 344
traditional, 343, 345-49, 351-52
传统,343,345-49,351-52
verbal communication and shared, 352
口头交流和共享,352
Zande (traditional), 344-49, 353
赞德(传统),344-49,353
Darwin, Charles, 76, 79, 327
达尔文、查尔斯、76、79、327
Davis, Morton, 238-39 戴维斯、莫顿,238-39
Deductive closure principle, 49-50, 51, 66-67
演绎封闭原则, 49-50, 51, 66-67
Deductive-nomological (DN) model,
演绎-名词模型(DN)、
Demarcation problem, 128, 130, 157 , 165, 166-67
划界问题,128、130、157、165、166-67
Demonstration, 55 示范,55
Dennett, Daniel, 35-36 丹尼尔-丹尼特,35-36
Deontology, 206 道义论,206
Descartes, René, 38, 60, 303, 342. See
笛卡尔,勒内》,38、60、303、342 页。参见
also Cartesianism 笛卡尔主义
behaviorism v., 11, 19, 28
行为主义 v., 11, 19, 28
causal account of location problem of, 9-10
定位问题的因果关系,9-10
the cogito of, 46, 48, 58, 113, 114
cogito of, 46, 48, 58, 113, 114
conscious mind for, 31, 36
有意识思维,31,36
as dualist,  作为二元论者、
evil demon and, 45-46, 48, 51, 64
邪魔与 45-46、48、51、64
God as benevolent, omnipotent for,
上帝是仁慈的、无所不能的、
on God's existence, 312-14, 316-17
关于上帝的存在,312-14,316-17
justification requires certainty, knowledge and, 44-53, 58, 60, 61, 71
理由要求确定性、知识和 44-53、58、60、61、71
on language, 82-84 关于语言,82-84
mind-body problem of,
的身心问题、
modern philosophy of mind begun with, 5
现代心智哲学的开端, 5
others' minds problem of, 6-7, 10-11
他人的思想问题,6-7,10-11
principle of deduction for (PDJ),
扣减原则(PDJ)、
rationalism of, 52, 54, 57-58, 76
理性主义, 52, 54, 57-58, 76
relevance of,  的相关性、
skepticism and, 48, 52-53, 58, 61, 64-65
怀疑论与 48、52-53、58、61、64-65
Description, 129-30 说明,129-30
individuating of, 231, 307-9, 310, 318
个性化, 231, 307-9, 310, 318
knowledge by, 306-7 知识,306-7
Design of universe, 323, 324-25, 326
宇宙的设计, 323, 324-25, 326
argument against necessity of,
反驳必要性的论据、
intelligent designer and, 331, 332, 334
智能设计器与 331、332、334
Desire 愿望
basic, 193 基本,193
criticisms of, 192-93 批评,192-93
Determined events,
确定的事件、
Determinism, 175 决定论,175
chaos, physics and, 370
物理学与混沌,370
compatibilism and, 369, 376
相容论与 369、376
free will and, 365-73
自由意志与,365-73
incompatibilism and, 369, 374-75, 377
不自由主义与, 369, 374-75, 377
indeterminism and, 370-71
不确定性与, 370-71
laws irreducibly probabilistic in
在以下情况中,法律具有不可低估的概率性
physics and, 370-71, 372
物理学与,370-71,372
Deterrence 威慑
presuppositions of, 292 预设,292
punishment justified with, 286-87 retributions and, 289-91, 296
惩罚的合理性, 286-87 报复与, 289-91, 296
theory of punishment,
惩罚理论、
theory revisited for, 291-93
重新审视理论,291-93
Diachronic approach, 129-30
异时空方法,129-30
Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion
关于自然宗教的对话
(Hume), 310, 316, 325, 333, 335
(休谟),310,316,325,333,335
Difference principle, 250-52, 253
差异原则,250-52,253
Discourse of Method (Descartes), 5-6, 312
方法论》(笛卡尔),5-6,312 页
Disjunction, 112 析取,112
Disputes, settlement of, 222
争端的解决,222
Division of labor, 361-62, 365
分工,361-62,365
DN. See Deductive-nomological (DN) model
DN。见演绎-名词模型 (DN)
Dreams, 45 梦想,45
Dualism,  二元论
Duff, R.A., 275 达夫,R.A.,275
Duhem, Pierre, 165 皮埃尔-杜亨 165
Duhem-Quine problem, 165
杜恒-奎因问题,165
Duties, 214-15 职责,214-15
Economics, 207-8 经济学》,207-8
Emotivism, 218, 378 情感主义,218,378
criticism of desire and, 192-93
对欲望的批评,192-93
disagreement of attitudes in, 194-95
态度分歧,194-95
metaethical, 195 元伦理,195
morality and, 186, 191-97
道德与,186,191-97
reason and, 196 理性与 196
Empedocles, 329 恩培多克勒,329
Empirical conditions of adequacy, 147
适当性的经验条件,147
Empiricism, 54-57, 58-59
经验主义,54-57,58-59
consistent,  一致、
foundationalist, 76 基础主义者,76
morality and, 180 道德与 180
observability for, 141 可观测性,141
radical, 151 激进,151
science, theory and, 140, 144
科学、理论与 140、144
underdeterminiation of, 155, 347
确定不足,155,347
verification principle of, 62
核查原则,62
End-result principles, 261, 291
最终结果原则,261,291
Enforcement, rules of, 284-85, 295
执行规则,284-85,295
English, 356-58 英语,356-58
Enquiry Concerning Human
关于人类的询问
Understanding (Hume), 159
理解(休谟),159
Entitlement theory, 265-67
权利理论,265-67
Envy, 250, 251-52, 254
嫉妒,250,251-52,254
Epicurus, 371-72 伊壁鸠鲁,371-72
Epistemology, 4, 41 认识论》,4,41
evolutionary,  演变、
Epistemology (contimued)
认识论(续)
foundationalist, 56-61, 72, 140
基础主义, 56-61, 72, 140
functionalism and, 28-29, 63, 78
功能主义与 28-29、63、78
induction and, 161 诱导和,161
instrumentalism and, 151-52
工具主义与 151-52
moral, 183, 186, 187, 189
道德、183、186、187、189
naturalized, 74-77 归化,74-77
other minds problem and, 7-8
其他思想问题,7-8
"ought" from, 75 "应该",75
phenomenological, 71, 77
现象学,71,77
psychology and, 74-76 心理学与 74-76
as starting point, xiii, 7
作为起点, xiii, 7
Western philosophy based on, 5
以西方哲学为基础, 5
Equality, 248, 249-50, 253, 272
平等,248,249-50,253,272
in state of nature, 262
在自然状态下,262
Equilibrium 平衡
point, 239 点,239
reflective, 258, 259, 260, 378
反射、258、259、260、378
strategy, 238-39 战略,238-39
Essay Concerning Human 关于人类的论文
Understanding (Locke), 54-55
理解(洛克),54-55
Essence, 6-7 精华》,6-7
Ethics, 178, 216-17. See also Morality
伦理,178,216-17。另见道德
Eudemian Ethics (Aristotle), 216, 268
尤德米伦理学》(亚里士多德),216、268 页
Euthanasia, 178, 213 安乐死,178,213
Evans-Pritchard, Edward, 343, 344-49, 358,361
爱德华-埃文斯-普里查德,第 343、344-49、358、361 页
Events 活动
determined, 371 确定,371
mind's effect on, 372-73
心灵的影响,372-73
partially random, 371 部分随机,371
probability of, 372 概率,372
Evidence 证据
defeasible, 45, 56, 61, 66, 342
可击败性,45、56、61、66、342
experimental, 167 实验性,167
good, 45-46 好,45-46
indefeasible,
不灭、
not leading to truth, 360
不通向真理,360
perceptual, 192 感知,192
relativism and, 344 相对主义与,344
Evil, 335-37 邪恶,335-37
Evil demon, 45-46, 48, 51, 64
邪魔,45-46、48、51、64
Existence 存在
of contingent beings, 322,323
或然存在,322,323
of God, 310-16, 317-23, 334, 337-38
上帝,310-16、317-23、334、337-38
names and, 321-22 名称与,321-22
nonexistence and, 319-20
不存在与 319-20
not as predicate (for God), 317-22 of numbers, 300-305
不作为谓词(对神而言), 317-22 数字, 300-305
open sentence satisfied by, 318
开庭审理,318
of possible worlds, 313-14
可能世界,313-14
two possibilities of, 321
两种可能性,321
Existential generalization, 319-20
存在性概括,319-20
Existential quantifier, 96, 112-13, 318, 320,321
存在量词, 96, 112-13, 318, 320,321
Experience 经验
argument from (Hume), 331-33
论证(休谟),331-33
consistency of., 59,71 一致性, 59,71
as involuntary., 59-60 59-60
judgment with, 154 判决,154
moral, 189-90 道德,189-90
sensation v., 55 感觉诉,55
strong empirical correlation between, 331, 332
之间的强经验相关性,331,332
Experimental theism, 334
实验有神论,334
Experiments, 179. See also Observation crucial, 150
实验,179。另请参阅 "至关重要的观察",150
Explanadum, 145-46 解释性说明,145-46
Explanans, 145
Explanation, inference to the best (ITBE), 167-71
解释、最佳推论 (ITBE), 167-71
Explanatory power, 169 解释力,169
Extension, 93, 97, 100-101, 183-84
扩展,93,97,100-101,183-84
Extensional context, 97-98
扩展背景,97-98
Externalism (in epistemology), 71
外在论(认识论), 71
Extrasensory perception, 372-73
超感知,372-73
Fact(s) 事实
matter of, 316-17 问题,316-17
moral, 183, 196, 201
道德、183、196、201
values v., 180-83 价值 v., 180-83
Faculty, moral, 187, 189
教师,道德,187,189
Fallacy 谬误
of ambiguity, 156-57 模糊性,156-57
naturalistic, 189 自然主义,189
Fallibilism, 59-60, 164, 342-43, 360, 379
法利本主义,59-60,164,342-43,360,379
Falsificationism, 163, 164, 165-67, 171, 179
证伪主义, 163, 164, 165-67, 171, 179
Falsity, 52, 60, 63, 66-67, 113
虚假性,52、60、63、66-67、113
relative, 355 亲属,355
sentence, 91-92, 96 判决,91-92,96
true consequence from, 70
真正的后果,70
Fanatic, 203 狂热者,203
Feelings, xvii, 31 感觉,xvii,31
moral, 210-11 道德,210-11
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 378
约翰-戈特利布-费希特,378
First-order predicate logic, 112
一阶谓词逻辑, 112
Fodor, Jerry, 118 福多、杰里、118
Folk philosophy, 339-40, 349, 362
民间哲学,339-40、349、362
Folk psychology, 26-27 民间心理学,26-27
cognitive psychology v., 34-35
认知心理学 v., 34-35

Forms, 303 表格,303

Foundationalism, epistemological, 56-61
基础主义,认识论,56-61
Free will, 336 自由意志,336
chaos, physics and, 370
物理学与混沌,370
compatibilism and, 369, 376-77
兼容性与, 369, 376-77
determinism and, 365-73 决定论与 365-73
evil, God and, 336-37
邪恶、上帝与 336-37
incompatibilism and, 368-69, 377
不自由主义与, 368-69, 377
indeterminism and, 370-71
不确定性与, 370-71
Frege, Gottlob, 153, 174, 304
language and, 81, 86-92, 93-98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 117, 119-20, 121, 124, 307-8, 321-22
语言与 81、86-92、93-98、100、102、103、104、107、108、117、119-20、121、124、307-8、321-22
numbers and, 304-5 数字与 304-5
Functional role, 21, 23, 24
功能作用,21、23、24
Functionalism, 19-22, 95, 208, 366-67, 378
功能主义,19-22,95,208,366-67,378
arguments for and against, 33, 37-38
支持和反对的论点,33,37-38
beliefs and, 23-25, 28, 64, 118, 184
信仰与 23-25、28、64、118、184
computer model of, 21-22, 28
计算机模型,21-22,28
epistemological view of, 28-29, 63
认识论观点, 28-29, 63
first problem of, 23-25, 26-28
第一个问题,23-25,26-28
inner life and, 28-30, 367
内心生活与,28-30,367
input and output for, 20, 28
输入和输出,20,28
machine and, 29-31, 128
机器与,29-31,128
mind-body problem and, 22
身心问题,22
other people's mind and, 22-23, 27-28
他人的思想与 22-23、27-28
private mind and, 83
私人思想与 83
Ramsey's solution to first problem of, 26-28
拉姆齐对第一个问题的解答, 26-28
second problem of, 28-29
第二个问题,28-29
soul (mbisimo) and, 359-60
灵魂(mbisimo)与,359-60
theory of pain and, 25-26, 366
疼痛与理论,25-26,366
thermostat function and, 19-20
恒温器功能和,19-20
verificationism, private mental states and, 64
验证主义、私人心理状态与 64
Game theory, 233 博弈论,233
bargaining, 248-58 谈判,248-58
complexity in,  复杂性、
constant-sum game in, 236, 241, 250
恒和博弈,236,241,250
game defined in, 233-34
游戏定义,233-34
game rules of, 245-46
游戏规则,245-46
guessing game, no strategy and, 235-36
猜谜游戏,无策略,235-36
maximin value in, 239, 253 non-zero-sum two-person game in, 241-45
最大值, 239, 253 非零和两人博弈, 241-45
n-person non-constant-sum game in,
中的 n 人非恒和博弈、
payoff for, 234, 237, 239, 240-41, 242
报酬,234,237,239,240-41,242
players in, 233-34, 242, 248
球员,233-34,242,248
the prisoners' dilemma in,
囚犯的困境:
rational decision making understood in, 233, 238
理性决策的理解,233,238
strategy in, 238-40 战略,238-40
two person zero-sum game in, 234-42, 254
两人零和博弈,234-42,254
utility payoff in, 241, 242
效用回报,241,242
Gametes, 131, 134, 149
配子,131、134、149
Generalization, 146, 148, 158-59, 161, 172,378
泛化,146,148,158-59,161,172,378
accidental,  意外、
existential, 319-20 存在主义,319-20
as law of nature, 198
作为自然法则,198
laws v., 173 法律诉,173

Genes, 131 基因,131

Genetic theory (MG), 146-47, 148, 156, 171
遗传理论 (MG),146-47,148,156,171
alleles, phenotype and, 131-32, 135, 137
等位基因、表型与 131-32、135、137
of chromosomes, 147, 148-50, 157
染色体,147,148-50,157
definition of genes and, 136-37
基因的定义,136-37
dominant/recessive genes in, 132-33, 135
显性/隐性基因,132-33,135
genes' definition in, 136-37, 157
基因的定义,136-37,157
heterozygous organisms in, 131-32, 134,135
杂合生物,131-32,134,135
homozygous organisms in, 131, 133,
131, 133、
independent assortment of genes in, 134, 136, 149, 157
基因的独立变异,134,136,149,157
instrumentalist alternative to-152, 151
工具主义替代方案--152,151
main propositions of, 135-36, 142-43, 149
主要命题,135-36,142-43,149
predictability, truth and, 144, 148-49
可预测性、真理与 144、148-49
as progressive, 149 作为进步,149
segregation of characteristics in, 134, 136, 157, 165
特征隔离,134,136,157,165
Genotype, 131 基因型,131
German, 358-59 德语,358-59
Gettier, Edmund, 66-68
Glover, Jonathan, 211-12
乔纳森-格洛弗,211-12
God
a posteriori existence of, 310, 322-24, 326-27, 328, 330
后验存在, 310, 322-24, 326-27, 328, 330
God (continued) 上帝(续)
a priori existence of, 310-15
先验存在,310-15
as (necessary) being/existence,
作为(必要的)存在/存在、
as benevolent, 48,51 仁慈,48,51
best explanation of all data and, 334-37
对所有数据的最佳解释,334-37
choice of actual world by, 99-100
实际世界的选择, 99-100
conceptions of, 306 概念,306
as designer/ruler of universe, 324-25, 326
作为宇宙的设计者/主宰者,324-25,326
evil and, 335-37 邪恶与 335-37
existence not as predicate, 317-22
存在不是谓词,317-22
as first cause,
作为第一原因、
free will and, 366
自由意志与,366
free will, evil and, 336-37
自由意志、邪恶与 336-37
as greatest conceivable being, 311-12, 317, 323, 335-36
作为最大的可想象存在, 311-12, 317, 323, 335-36
guarantee of senses by, 49, 51
感官保证,49,51
individuating description of, 310
个性化描述,310
known in different ways, 310
310
no a priori matter-of-fact proofs of, 316-17
没有先验事实证明, 316-17
no fixed sense with, 310
无固定意义,310
non existence of, 53
不存在,53
omnipotence of, 48-49, 51, 335-37
全能, 48-49, 51, 335-37
personal, 317, 323 个人,317,323
as prime mover, 322-23
作为原动力,322-23
as proper name,
作为专有名称、
religious claims of, 363
宗教诉求,363
as scientific hypothesis, 335
作为科学假设,335
teleological argument for, 324-25
目的论论据,324-25
theodicy and, 337 神论与 337
as uniqueness claim, 313-14
作为唯一性主张,313-14
as universe, 312-13 作为宇宙,312-13
Gods, 341, 342 众神、341、342
Golden Rule, 201-2, 217
黄金法则》,201-2,217
Goldman, Alvin, 69, 71-72, 74
戈德曼、阿尔文,69、71-72、74
Good, 187-88, 249 良好,187-88,249
common, 285 常见,285
dependent on person/culture, 192
因人/文化而异,192
hedonism and, 187, 189
享乐主义与, 187, 189
Ideas of, 303 思想,303
life, 216-17, 268-69 生命,216-17,268-69
non-naturalness of, 188-89
非自然性, 188-89
unanalyzable, 187-88 无法分析,187-88
Goodman, Nelson, 161-63 古德曼、纳尔逊,第 161-63 页
Government 政府
morally repugnant, 271-73, 294
道德上令人厌恶,271-73,294

Grammar, 321 语法,321
Grice, H. P., 119-20, 124
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (Kant), 197
道德形而上学基础》(康德),197 页
Guanilo of Marmoutiers, 315
马尔穆蒂耶的瓜尼洛,315
Guilty, 288, 289, 291-92
有罪,288,289,291-92
Hacking, Ian, 81 哈金,伊恩,81
Hallucinations, 51, 76 幻觉,51,76
Hanson, Russ, 153, 156-57
Happiness, 187, 206-7, 210, 215, 216
幸福,187,206-7,210,215,216
Hare, R. M., 202-4, 206, 210-11
Harman, Gil, 167 哈曼,吉尔,167
Hart, H.L.A., 280-85 哈特,H.L.A.,280-85
Hedonist, 187, 189 享乐主义者,187,189
Hegel, G.W.F., 378-79 黑格尔,G.W.F.,378-79
Hempel, Carl, 145-47, 168
亨普尔、卡尔、145-47、168
Heterozygous, 131 杂合子, 131
Hick, John, 336-37 希克、约翰、336-37
Hidden variable theory,
隐变量理论
Historical principles, 261, 264, 291
历史原则,261、264、291
Hitler, Adolf, 200, 201-3, 204, 205
希特勒、阿道夫、200、201-3、204、205
Hobbes, Thomas, 11-12, 129, 272, 296
托马斯-霍布斯,11-12,129,272,296
circumstances of human life and, 224-26, 243, 245-47, 248
人类生活环境与 224-26、243、245-47、248
Common-weath, sovereign power and, 228-29, 231-32, 245, 258, 263, 269
公共财产、主权与 228-29、231-32、245、258、263、269
laws of nature and, 226-27, 274
自然规律与 226-27、274
power and, 225, 229
权力与 225、229
private v. public language and, 11-15,
私人语言与公共语言,11-15、
problems for, 229-33, 245-47, 256-57
问题,229-33,245-47,256-57
as prudentialist, 229-30, 245-46
作为审慎主义者,229-30,245-46
state of nature and, 225-26, 228, 230-31, 233, 243, 245, 257, 258
自然状态与 225-26、228、230-31、233、243、245、257、258
word v. sentence and, 88
单词与句子,88
Homozygous, 131 同卵,131
Honderich, Ted, 289 洪德里希,特德,289
Horton, Robert, 341-42 罗伯特-霍顿,341-42
Human being (life), xviii
人(生命),xviii
circumstances of, 224-26, 243, 245
情况,224-26,243,245
language for, 79-80 语言,79-80
as one kind of animal, 79
作为一种动物,79
as self-interested, 224-25, 245-47, 249
自利,224-25,245-47,249
Hume, David, 310. See also Cleathes argument from experience (and design) of metaphysics and, 331-34
休谟,大卫,310。另见 Cleathes argument from experience (and design) of metaphysics and, 331-34
fact, value and, 182-83 事实、价值与 182-83
harmony of nature argument by, 325-30
自然和谐论证,325-30
inference to best explanation and, 334-35
对最佳解释的推断,334-35
no a priori matter-of-fact proofs and, 316-17
无先验事实证明, 316-17
problem of induction by, 158-59, 161, 164, 171-72
归纳问题, 158-59, 161, 164, 171-72
Idea(s), 303 想法, 303
clear and distinct, 51
泾渭分明,51
cognitive, 104 认知,104
collection of, 54-55 收集,54-55
from experience, 55,56 经验,55,56
of good, 303 好的,303
language signifying, 86 语言符号,86
Idealist, 152 理想主义者, 152
Identity statements, 103, 116
身份声明,103,116
Ignorance, of goals/positions, 249,
对目标/位置的无知,249、
Imagination, 190 想象力,190
Immoral, 208 不道德,208
Imperative 当务之急
categorical, 185, 191, 192, 197, 202, 215
绝对、185、191、192、197、202、215
hypothetical, 185 假设,185
Incompatibilism, 368, 374-75, 377
不相容论, 368, 374-75, 377
Indeterminism, 370-71 不确定性,370-71
Indexicals, 351 索引,351
Individuate, 307-8 独立,307-8
Induction, 158. See also Inference
归纳,158。另见推理
enumerative, 158, 162-63, 332
枚举法,158、162-63、332
justifying theories and, 157-61, 167
论证理论与, 157-61, 167
new riddle of, 161-63
新谜语,161-63
problem of, 158, 171-72
问题,158,171-72
reliable, 163 可靠,163
Inequality surpluses, 248, 250-52, 253, 255-56, 260
不平等盈余,248,250-52,253,255-56,260
Inference, 159-60 推论,159-60
ampliative, 160-61 姑息治疗,160-61
to best explanation (ITBE Model), 167-71, 334-37
最佳解释(ITBE 模型),167-71,334-37
deductive, 160, 161 演绎法,160,161
valid, 160, 161 有效、160、161
Infinite regress (argument), 15-16
无限倒退(论点),15-16
Inheritance, uncertainty of law and, 281-82
继承,法律的不确定性,281-82
Innocence, 177-79, 181, 199, 214-15, 287 punishment and, 291
清白, 177-79, 181, 199, 214-15, 287 惩罚与, 291
victimization of, 287, 289, 291-92
受害情况,287、289、291-92
Input, 20, 24, 28
输入、20、24、28
sensation, 23 感觉,23
Instrumentalism, 150-53, 154
工具主义,150-53,154
Instrumentalist alternative, 151
另类乐器演奏家,151
Intellectual division of labor, 361-62
智力分工,361-62
Intelligence, 330. See also Creative intelligence
智力,330。另见创造性智力
Intelligent designer, 331, 332, 334
智能设计器,331、332、334
Intension 意图
as meaning, 102-3 作为意义,102-3
possible worlds and, 102, 103
可能世界与, 102, 103
sense v., 102, 104
意义 v., 102, 104
Intensional context, 97-98, 101
内在语境, 97-98, 101
Intensionality, 96-99 内在性,96-99
Intentional stance, 35-36
有意的立场,35-36
Interactionism,
互动主义、
Internalist, 71 内部主义者,71
Intuition, 258-59, 378 直觉,258-59,378
Intuitionism, 187 直觉主义,187
Intuitionism, moral, 187
道德直觉主义, 187
experience and, 189-90 经验与,189-90
goodness as unanalyzable for, 187-88
良性不可分析,187-88
naturalistic fallacy and, 189
自然谬误与,189
objections to, 190-91 反对意见,190-91
Irrational attitudes, 193, 239
非理性态度,193,239
Islam, 363 伊斯兰教,363
ITBE model. See Inference
ITBE 模型。参见推理
Judaism, 305, 362, 363
犹太教,305、362、363
Judges, 280 法官,280
Judgment 判决
action, morality and, 181-83, 189, 191, 205, 209
行动、道德与 181-83、189、191、205、209
with experience, 154 有经验,154
subjective, 204 主观性,204
of traditional v. Western culture, 351
传统文化对西方文化的影响,351
Jurisdiction, 280 管辖权,280
Justice 司法
in acquisition, 265 在收购中,265
distributive, 261-62, 265-67
分配,261-62,265-67
fundamental rights for, 261-65, 267
基本权利, 261-65, 267
historical principles of, 261, 264, 291
历史原则, 261, 264, 291
principles of, 248-50, 252
原则,248-50,252
of punishment, 291-93 惩罚,291-93
in transfer, 265 转让,265
Justification. See also Evidence
理由。另见证据
of beliefs, 41-44, 53, 68, 75, 76, 192,
信仰,41-44,53,68,75,76,192、
342
causal theories v., 68, 70-73
因果理论 v., 68, 70-73
certainty and, 44-53, 58, 60, 61, 71, 114
确定性与 44-53、58、60、61、71、114
condition, 43-44 条件,43-44
consequentialist,
结果主义者、
context of, 130, 139, 158, 167
背景,130,139,158,167
by experience, 55 根据经验,55
foundationalist, 72,76 基础主义,72,76
foundationalist epistemology and, 57, 72,140
基础主义认识论与, 57, 72,140
indefeasible, 50, 53, 61, 71, 72
不灭性,50、53、61、71、72
less certainty and, 53-57, 60, 61, 71, 73, 77
确定性较低,53-57、60、61、71、73、77
nonfoundationalist, 72 非基础主义者, 72
objective (externalist), 71, 72-73, 163
客观(外部主义), 71, 72-73, 163
phenomenological (internalist), 71, 73, 76,77
现象学(内在论), 71, 73, 76,77
of power in politics, 224, 241
政治中的权力,224,241
principle of deduction for (PDJ),
扣减原则(PDJ)、
50-51, 60, 66-68, 70
probability and, 60 概率与 60
of punishment, 286-87 惩罚,286-87
reliabilism for, 70,72 可靠性,70,72
of sovereign power, 228-29
主权,228-29
of state, 248 国家,248
state's minimum conditions for,
国家的最低条件是:
true belief and, 41-44, 76, 77, 121
真实信仰与, 41-44, 76, 77, 121
unjustified, 60 不合理,60
Kant, Immanuel, 75, 104, 153, 185, 193, 213, 215, 342
康德,伊曼纽尔,第 75、104、153、185、193、213、215、342 页
existence not as predicate and, 317-22
不作为谓词的存在,317-22
retributivism, punishment and, 288-90, 297
惩罚与报应主义,288-90,297
universalizability principle of, 197-202, 249
普遍性原则,197-202,249
Killing 杀戮
euthanasia as, 178, 213
安乐死,178,213
of innocent person, 177-79, 181, 199, 214-15
无辜者,177-79,181,199,214-15
morality and, 177-80, 183
道德与,177-80,183
side effects of, 212
副作用,212
against will of individual, 211-13, 214, 262-63, 266, 267
违背个人意愿,211-13,214,262-63,266,267
King, Martin Luther, 273
马丁-路德-金,273
Know, 81, 104, 116, 120-22, 124-25
了解、81、104、116、120-22、124-25

Knowledge. See also Epistemology
知识。另见认识论
by acquaintance, 306, 309
相识,306,309
causal theories of, 66-70
因果理论, 66-70
causal theories of justification and, 70-73
理由的因果理论与 70-73
the cogito of, 46, 48, 113, 114
cogito of, 46, 48, 113, 114
deductive closure principle for, 49-50,
演绎封闭原则, 49-50、
defeasible evidence and, 45, 56, 61, 66
败诉证据与, 45, 56, 61, 66
by description, 306-7 通过描述,306-7
empiricism of, 54-57, 77
经验主义, 54-57, 77
epistemology naturalized for, 74-77
归化的认识论, 74-77
foundationalist epistemology of, 56-57, 72
基础主义认识论, 56-57, 72
foundations of, 57-61 基础,57-61
indefeasible evidence and, 45-47, 49,
不可推翻的证据与, 45-47, 49、
introduction for, 39-41 导言,39-41
justification condition of, 43-44
理由条件,43-44
justification less certain, Locke and,
理由不太确定的是,洛克和.....、
justification requiring certainty, Descartes and, 44-53, 58, 60, 61, 71,114
笛卡尔与需要确定性的理由, 44-53, 58, 60, 61, 71,114
justified true belief, Plato and, 41-44,
有理由的真实信念,柏拉图与, 41-44、
logical positivism in, 62, 63
逻辑实证主义, 62, 63
materials of, 54-55 材料,54-55
nature of, 42 性质,42
necessary truths of, 47-48, 51-52, 54, 104-6, 116
必要的真理, 47-48, 51-52, 54, 104-6, 116
from other than reasoning, 55-56
来自推理之外,55-56
of physical world, 58
物质世界,58
principle of deduction for justification
理由演绎原则
(PDJ) and, 50-51, 66-68, 70
(PDJ) 和,50-51,66-68,70
rationalism and, 52, 54, 76, 77
理性主义与 52、54、76、77
reductio ad adsurdum of, 52-53, 62
归谬法, 52-53, 62
senses, hallucinations and, 51, 76
感官、幻觉和 51、76
skepticism and causal theories of, 66-70
怀疑论与因果理论, 66-70
skepticism, verificationism and, 61-65
怀疑论、验证论与, 61-65
sociology of, 74 社会学,74
Socratic method of, 41-42, 74
苏格拉底方法, 41-42, 74
as true belief with justification, 43, 121 analytic-synthetic, necessary-contin-
作为有理由的真实信念, 43, 121 分析-合成、必要-连续
gent and, 102-6, 121, 122-24
绅士和,102-6,121,122-24
artificial, 108, 111 人工、108、111
bettle in the box and, 84-87
箱中的槟榔和,84-87
consciousness and, 32, 80
意识与 32,80
conventions of, 117-20 公约,117-20
criterion of correctness for, 12-14, 16-17
正确性标准, 12-14, 16-17
English, German and Azande, 356-60
英语、德语和阿赞德语,356-60
grammar of, 85-86, 321
语法, 85-86, 321
human being's proclivity for, 79-80
人类的嗜好,79-80
intensionality problems of, 96-99
无维性问题, 96-99
introduction for, 80-81 导言,80-81
language-game and, 12 语言游戏与, 12
logic used in, 113-15
使用的逻辑,113-15
logical form and natural, 106-13
逻辑形式和自然,106-13
logical truth, logical properties and, 115-17
逻辑真理、逻辑属性和, 115-17
lottery paradox and, 114-15
彩票悖论与 114-15
mathematical, 87 数学,87
meaning, theory of, and, 87-88
意义理论,87-88
modal terms of, 142
模态术语,142
moderately plain, xvi 中度平原,xvi
natural, 108 自然,108
objective v. subjective value of, 86-87
客观价值与主观价值, 86-87
observational, 141-42, 148, 153, 156
观察,141-42,148,153,156
open sentences and, 94-96, 97, 108-9
开放句和,94-96,97,108-9
ostentive definition of, 14
激励的定义,14
paradox of analysis of, 120-24
分析的悖论,120-24
philosopher's reasons for, 117
哲学家的理由,117
philosophy's linguistic turn and, 80-84, 364-65
哲学的语言转向与, 80-84, 364-65
predicates, open sentences and, 92-96
谓词、开放句和 92-96
private,  私人
private language argument and,
私人语言参数和、
private v. public,
私人与公共、
probability and, 114-15 概率与,114-15
reference in, 86, 88-92, 93, 96-97, 98, 100
参考文献, 86, 88-92, 93, 96-97, 98, 100
remembering of thoughts through,
通过思想记忆、
rules of, 62-63, 74, 142
规则,62-63,74,142
sensation and, 13-17, 156
感觉与,13-17,156
sense and, 86, 90-92, 93, 96, 98,
感觉与, 86, 90-92, 93, 96, 98、
101-2, 104, 117, 120, 136
signifying idea in, 86
表意思想, 86
technical,  技术性、
theoretical, 142, 153, 156 as tool, 81
理论、142、153、156 作为工具、81
translation of, 357-59 翻译,357-59
truth conditions, possible worlds and, 92, 99-102
真理条件、可能世界与, 92, 99-102
truth preservation and, 114-15
真理的维护,114-15
verification principle and, 81
核查原则和,81
word v. sentence use in, 88
词与句的用法, 88
writing and style of, 349-50
写作和风格,349-50
Law(s), 296-97. See also Rules
法律,296-97。另见规则
analytic jurisprudence for,
分析法学、
appearing to obey, 227-28
似乎服从,227-28
British legal system and, 282-83
英国法律制度与,282-83
causation and, 171-74, 174-75
因果关系,171-74,174-75
citizen autonomy with, 295-96, 297
公民自治,295-96,297
civil disobedience against, 271-72
非暴力反抗,271-72
for common good, 285
共同利益,285
constitutive,  构成性、
deductive-nomological model for, 146-47, 168
演绎-命名模型,146-47,168
definitions' importance of, 293-96
定义的重要性,293-96
elements of legal system and, 280-85, 296
法律制度的要素与, 280-85, 296
federal v. state, 282
联邦诉州,282
generalization v., 173 概括性 v., 173
instance of, 158 实例,158
institutional, 280 机构,280
jurisdiction for, 280 管辖权,280
legal systems and defining of, 278-80, 284, 285
法律制度与界定, 278-80, 284, 285
legitimacy of, 277-78 合法性,277-78
merit of, 275,276 优点,275,276
minimum moral conditions for, 272-73, 275-76, 294
最低道德条件, 272-73, 275-76, 294
morality and, 294-96 道德与,294-96
natural, 226-28, 273-74, 275-78, 280, 282, 293-94
自然,226-28,273-74,275-78,280,282,293-94
of nature, 171-72, 175, 197-98, 199-200, 226-28, 274, 370
自然,171-72,175,197-98,199-200,226-28,274,370
observational, 148, 153 观察,148,153
open texture of, 293-94
开放式纹理,293-94
phenomenological, 148 现象学,148
positivism, natural law and defining
实证主义、自然法和定义
of, 274-78, 285, 293-94, 296-97
274-78, 285, 293-94, 296-97
primary rules for,
主要规则:
punishment, deterrence and, 286-87, 291-93
惩罚、威慑与 286-87、291-93
punishment, deterrence with retribution and, 289-91, 296
惩罚、威慑与报应,289-91,296
punishment's problem with, 285-86
惩罚的问题,285-86
Law(s) (continued) 法律(续
retributivism, Kant objections and, 288-89
报应主义,康德的反对意见和,288-89
secondary rules for, 281-85
二级规则,281-85
threats v., 275 威胁诉,275
variety of, 279-80 种类,279-80
wicked government and, 271-73
邪恶政府与 271-73
Legal positivism, 274-78, 285, 293-94, 296-97
法律实证主义,274-78,285,293-94,296-97
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 99-102, 335
莱布尼兹、戈特弗里德-威廉、99-102、335
Leviathan (Hobbes), 224 利维坦》(霍布斯),第 224 页
Liberty 自由
end-result principles and, 261, 291
最终结果原则,261,291
priority of,  的优先权、
punishment and deprivation of, 286
惩罚和剥夺,286
Life, unexamined, xviii 未经审视的生命,xviii
Literacy 扫盲
development of, 361 发展,361
significance for philosophy, 349-53
对哲学的意义,349-53
Western religion and, 362
西方宗教与 362
Locke, John 约翰-洛克
empiricism of, 53-57, 58-59, 71
经验主义, 53-57, 58-59, 71
knowledge, justification less certain, and, 53-57, 66, 71, 73
知识、不太确定的理由和 53-57、66、71、73
probable beliefs of, 59-60
可能的信仰, 59-60
state of nature of, 262
自然状态,262

Logic, 106 逻辑,106

epistemic, 116 认识论,116
first-order, 112-13 一阶,112-13
formal, 107, 115, 116
正式、107、115、116
modal, 116 模态,116
predicate, 112, 164 谓词,112,164
propositional, 111 命题,111
second-order, 112-13 二阶,112-13
sentential, 111, 112, 116
句式,111,112,116
Logical conditions of adequacy, 147
适当性的逻辑条件,147
Logical constraints, 116
逻辑限制,116
Logical form, natural language and, 106-13
逻辑形式、自然语言和 106-13
Logical positivism, 62, 63, 130, 139, 142
逻辑实证主义, 62, 63, 130, 139, 142
Logical properties, language and, 115, 116, 117
逻辑属性、语言和 115、116、117
Logical truth, 115-17 逻辑真理,115-17
Logicism, 300 逻辑主义,300
Lottery, 256, 261 彩票,256,261
paradox, 114-15 悖论,114-15
Lucretius, 372 卢克莱修,372
Lying, 209-10, 211 撒谎,209-10,211
Machines (M) 机器 (M)
functionalism, mind and, 29-31, 37
功能主义、思维与 29-31, 37
Machines. See Computers 机器参见计算机
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 191
Majority, 230, 232 多数票,230,232
Mangu (Zande withcraft substance), 344
曼古(赞德巫术物质),344
Marks, 12, 15, 82. See also Name
标记,12、15、82。另见名称
Mathematical language, 87
数学语言,87
Mathematical truth, 55-56, 122-23, 300-301, 316
数学真理,55-56,122-23,300-301,316
Matter. See also Physical world
物质。另请参阅 "物理世界
mind and, 1, 7, 36-37
心灵与,1,7,36-37
mind separate from, 7
心智分离,7
Maximin, 239, 253-56
Maxwell, Grover, 152
Mbisimo (Zande soul), 357, 359-60
姆比西莫(赞德灵魂),357,359-60
Mbuti, 221-23, 230, 280-84, 341-42
姆布提,221-23,230,280-84,341-42
Meaning. See also Name compositionality thesis (CT) of, 89-90, 91, 93, 96
意义。另请参阅 "名称构成论(CT)", 89-90, 91, 93, 96
proper name and,
正名和
theory of, 87-88, 92, 100, 102
理论, 87-88, 92, 100, 102
word v. sentence for, 88
词与句的关系,88
Meaning-variance hypothesis, 156-57
意义方差假说,156-57
Means v. ends, 213
手段与目的,213
Mellor, Hugh, 31-32
Mendel, Gregor, 130-40, 144, 145-47,
孟德尔、格雷戈尔、130-40、144、145-47、
Mendel's first laws, 134
孟德尔第一定律,134
Mendel's second laws, 134
孟德尔第二定律,134
Mental theory (MT), 27
心理理论(MT),27
Mentalist, 2-3 心理学家,2-3
Mention, use and, xviii
提及、使用和 xviii
Metaphilosophy, 361 隐喻哲学,361
Metaphysics, 338 形而上学,338
a posteriori arguments for, 322-23,
后验论据,322-23、
a priori arguments for, , 316-17
先验论据, , 316-17
argument from experience (and design) of, 331-33
经验(和设计)论证,331-33
argument from design (teleological argument) of, 323-25
设计论证(目的论论证), 323-25
creative intelligence and, 324-25, 326, 328, 329-30
创造性智力与,324-25,326,328,329-30
definition of, 299 定义,299
evil, inference to best explanation and, 334-37
邪恶,最佳解释的推论,334-37

existence not as predicate and, 317-22
存在不是谓词,317-22
existence of numbers and, 300-305
数的存在与,300-305
God as necessary being in, 310-16
上帝是必要的存在,310-16
God as proper name in, 305-10
上帝作为专有名词,305-10
harmony of nature of, 324, 325-29, 333, 334
自然的和谐,324、325-29、333、334
no a priori matter-of-fact proofs and, 316-17
无先验事实证明, 316-17
Metaphysics (Aristotle), 299-300, 322
形而上学(亚里士多德),299-300,322
Methodology, 130 方法,130
MG. See Genetic theory (MG)
MG.见遗传理论(MG)
Mill, James, 206 米尔,詹姆斯,206
Mind(s) 思想
beginnings of modern philosophy of,
现代哲学的开端、
behaviorist approach to, 2-4
行为主义方法,2-4
as collection of ideas, 54
作为思想的集合,54
computers as model of, 1, 19, 21-22, 24,28
计算机作为模型, 1, 19, 21-22, 24,28
consciousness and, 31-36
意识与 31-36
events affected by, 372-73
受影响的事件,372-73
experience in, 15 经验,15
figment of imagination of, 6
臆想
functionalist's first problem of, 23-25, 26-28
功能主义者的第一个问题, 23-25, 26-28
functionalist's second problem of, 28-29
功能主义者的第二个问题,28-29
functionalist's theory needed for, 22-23
需要功能主义理论, 22-23
functionalist's theory of pain and, 25-26
功能主义者的疼痛理论,25-26
human brain's interaction with, 8
人脑的交互作用,8
inner life of, 4
内在生命,4
internal states of, 23, 27, 28, 34
内部状态,23、27、28、34
introduction to,
简介:
machines and, 29-31, 37
机器与,29-31,37
matter and, 1, 7, 36-37, 48
物质与 1、7、36-37、48
(one) mental state of, 25-26
(一种)精神状态,25-26
mentalist approach to, 2-3
2-3
as not taking up space, 7, 9
不占空间,7,9
other,  其他、
other people's, , 27-28
其他人, , 27-28
philosophy of,  的哲学、
private,  私人
private language and, 12-19, 63, 83
私人语言与, 12-19, 63, 83
public, 11, 19 公共、11、19
puzzle of physical and, 36-37
物理难题与 36-37
Ramsey's solution to first problem of functionalism and, 26-28
拉姆齐对功能主义第一个问题的解决方案,26-28
ridiculously simple theory of,
简单得可笑的理论、
as separate/different from body/matt-
作为独立于/不同于身体/马特
ter, 6-7, 10 之三、六至七、十
thoughts of, 6-8, 37
思想,6-8,37
wrong thinking in, 48
错误思想,48
Mind-body problem,
身心问题、
causal account of location problem for, 9-11
定位问题的因果关系,9-11
distinguishing of mind and matter in, 10
区分心与物, 10
functionalism and, 22 功能主义与,22
human brain point of interaction for, 8
人脑互动点, 8
interactionism and, 9 互动论与,9
monism and, 10 一元论和,10
psychophysical parallelism and, 9-10
心理物理平行性,9-10
separation in, 6-7, 10
分离,6-7,10
thoughts origination in, 7-8
思想的起源,7-8
Minimal state, 264-65, 267
最小状态,264-65,267
Minimax, 239 最小值,239
Mistrust, 225 不信任,225
Monarch, 229 君主,229
Monism, 10-11 一元论,10-11
Moore, G. E., 52-53, 122, 187-91
Moral claim, 196-97 道德主张,196-97
Moral errors, 204 道德错误,204
Morality, 177-80, 181, 217-19
道德,177-80,181,217-19
action-guiding, moral beliefs and, 184, 186, 189, 191
行动指南、道德信念与 184、186、189、191
assertion and, 185-86 主张和,185-86
compatibilism, responsibility and, 373-77
责任与兼容并包论, 373-77
consequentialism v. absolutism and, 208-13, 218
结果主义与绝对主义,208-13,218
content of, 200, 201, 215
内容,200,201,215
(moral) content question for, 183
(道德)内容问题,183
emotivism and, 186, 191-97, 218
情感主义与, 186, 191-97, 218
epistemology and, 183, 186, 187, 189
认识论与, 183, 186, 187, 189
experience and, 189-90 经验与,189-90
feelings of, 210-11 感受,210-11
first-order moral questions for,
的一阶道德问题、
179-80, 218
as impersonal, 198 非人格化,198
innocence, guilt and, 177-79, 181
无罪、罪责与, 177-79, 181
intuitionism and, 187-91
直觉主义与, 187-91
judgment, action and, 181, 183, 189, 191, 205, 209
判断、行动与 181、183、189、191、205、209
killing and, 177-81, 183, 199, 211-15, 262-63, 266, 267
杀戮与,177-81,183,199,211-15,262-63,266,267
Morality (continued) 道德(续)
knowledge and, 186 知识与 186
law and, 294-96 法律与,294-96
laws with minimum, 272-73, 275-76, 294
最低限度的法律,272-73,275-76,294
metaethical questions for, 179-80,
元伦理学问题,179-80、
minimum conditions of, 272-73
最低条件,272-73
open question argument in, 188
开放性问题论证,188
from politics, 227, 230, 247, 257
来自政治的影响,227、230、247、257
with politics, 248-50, 257-58
与政治的关系,248-50,257-58
as practical, 206 根据实际情况,206
prescriptivism and, 204-5, 206, 215, 218
规定主义与 204-5、206、215、218
primary rules and, 280
主要规则和 280
principle of, 202, 209
原则,202,209
(moral) rationalism for, 180-81
(道德)理性主义, 180-81
(moral) realism and, 183-87
(道德)现实主义与, 183-87
reflection on, 209 反思,209
relativism and, 192, 195, 201-4, 218, 344
相对主义与, 192, 195, 201-4, 218, 344
responsibility and, 367-69
责任与,367-69
rights of, 213-15 权利,213-15
self, others and, 215-17
自我、他人与 215-17
supervenience and, 205 超验与 205
system of, 182 系统,182
theoretical questions of, 205-6
理论问题,205-6
universalizability principle (of Kant) for, 197-202, 203, 205, 249
普遍性原则(康德),197-202、203、205、249
utilitarianism, utility defined and, 205-8
功利主义,效用的定义与 205-8
values, facts, empiricism and, 180-83, 201
价值观、事实、经验主义与 180-83, 201
Mutual adaptation 相互适应
of parts of world, 326, 332
世界部分地区,326,332
of universe,  的宇宙、
Myth of the given, 154, 155, 174
被赋予的神话,154、155、174
Name(s), 102, 110, 111, 153
姓名,102,110,111,153
confusion of, 308-9 混乱,308-9
co-referential, 91 共同参照,91
existence and, 321-22 存在与,321-22
"God" as proper, 305-10
"上帝 "作为专有名词,305-10
knowledge by acquaintance and, 306, 309
熟人知识与 306、309
knowledge by description and, 306-10
描述知识, 306-10
proper, 90, 91, 306-10
适当、90、91、306-10
remembrance helped in, 15
有助于纪念,15
shared, public conception of, 308
共享,公众概念,308

Natural law, 226-28, 273-74, 285
自然法,226-28,273-74,285
positivism and, 275-78, 293-94, 296-97
实证主义与, 275-78, 293-94, 296-97
truth in, 280 真理,280
Natural property, 188 自然财产,188
Naturalism, 74-76, 78 自然主义,74-76,78
Nature 自然
harmony of, 324, 325-30, 333, 334
和谐,324,325-30,333,334
uniformity of,  统一性、
Nature, state of,
自然状态、
Hobbesian, 225-26, 228, 230-31, 233, 243, 245, 257-58, 276
霍布斯理论,225-26,228,230-31,233,243,245,257-58,276
inconveniences of, 263 不便之处,263
Nozick/Locke's, 262-63, 264
诺齐克/洛克的观点,262-63,264
to state (government), 248-49, 263-64
国家(政府),248-49,263-64
Necessary, 104 必要,104
Necessary and sufficient condition, 6-7
必要和充分条件,6-7
Necessary truths, 47-48, 51-52, 104-6, 115-16, 142
必要的真理,47-48、51-52、104-6、115-16、142
Necessity of identity,
身份的必要性、
Negation, 112 否定,112
Negligence, 269 疏忽,269
Newton, Isaac, 56, 329, 364
牛顿、艾萨克、56、329、364
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 216
尼各马可伦理学》(亚里士多德),第 216 页
Nomically impossible worlds, 300, 302
名义上不可能的世界, 300, 302
Nomically possible worlds, 174-75, 300, 302
名义上可能的世界, 174-75, 300, 302
Nominalism, 305 唯名论,305
Noncognitivism, 186 非认知主义,186
Non-constant-sum game, 241, 248, 250, 253, 254
非恒和博弈,241、248、250、253、254
Non-natural property, 188-89
非自然财产,188-89
Non-zero-sum two-person game. See Prisoners' Dilemma
非零和两人游戏。参见囚徒困境
Nozick, Robert, 157, 233, 249, 268-69, 291, 375
罗伯特-诺齐克,第 157、233、249、268-69、291、375 页
entitlement theory of, 265-67
权利理论,265-67
rights and, 261-65, 272, 277
权利与 261-65、272、277
-person non-constant-sum game, 241,
-人与人之间的非恒和博弈,241、
Number(s) 编号
existence of, xviii, 300-305
存在,xviii,300-305
inscription as token of, 301-2
作为象征的铭文,301-2
natural, 305 自然,305
nine "9," 301, 303-4
九个 "9",301,303-4
nominalism and, 305 唯名论与 305
prime, 301, 302, 316
type, 301-2 类型,301-2
Obligations, 268-69, 279
义务,268-69,279
Observation, 141 观察,141
interpreted by theory, 142-43,
理论解释,142-43、
language of, 141-42, 148, 153, 156
语言,141-42,148,153,156
meaning-variance hypothesis influence on, 156-57
意义方差假说的影响,156-57
of phenomenon, 139-41, 179-80
现象,139-41,179-80
theory v., 137-41, 151, 152-54, 306,
理论五,137-41,151,152-54,306、
theory-laden, 155-57, 347-48, 354, 373
以理论为导向,155-57,347-48,354,373
Ockham, William, 169 威廉-奥卡姆 169
Ockham's Razor, 169 奥卡姆剃刀,169
Oligarchs,  寡头
Ontological arguments, 310, 311-15, 317
本体论论据,310、311-15、317
rejection of, 317, 321, 322-23, 328
拒绝,317,321,322-23,328
Ontological commitment, 304
本体论承诺,304
Ontological questions, 303
本体论问题,303
Open question argument, 188
开放性问题论证,188
Oracles, 345-46, 348, 351, 362
神谕,345-46,348,351,362
Ordered pair, 94-95 订购了一对,94-95 年
Original position, 248, 252-53, 255, 256, 258, 267
最初立场,248,252-53,255,256,258,267
Other-regarding, 215, 217
其他方面,215,217
"Ought" "应该"
from epistemology, 75 从认识论出发,75
guilt and, 210 内疚与 210
as hypothetical, 185 作为假设,185
implying "can," 374 意指 "可以",374
"is" v., 182, 189, 204
是 "诉,182,189,204
moral (categorical), 75, 181, 191, 204
道德(绝对), 75, 181, 191, 204
Output, 20, 21 输出、20、21
action/responses, 23, 27
行动/反应,23,27
Pain, 25-26, 27, 84-86, 366
疼痛,25-26,27,84-86,366
Paley, William, 325, 327
威廉-佩利,325,327
Paradox of analysis, 120-21, 122, 123-24
分析悖论,120-21、122、123-24
Parents, 268-69 父母,268-69
Partially random events,
部分随机事件、
Payoff, 234, 237 回报,234,237
equilibrium point, 239 平衡点,239
more than,  不止、
security from attack as, 241
免受攻击,241
in utility, 241, 242
实用性,241,242
PDJ. See Principle of deduction for justification (PDJ)
PDJ.见 "正当理由演绎原则"(PDJ)
Perception, 190, 192 感知,190,192
extrasensory, 372-73 超感觉,372-73
Perfect standard, 322, 323
完美标准,322,323

Phenomenology, 4 现象学,4
arguments for and against significance of, 33, 37-38
支持和反对其重要性的论点,33, 37-38
inner (conscious) life and, 28-31
内在(意识)生命与 28-31
Phenomenon, 139-40 现象,139-40
Phenotype, 131-32, 137 表型,131-32,137
Philosopher 哲学家
first modern, 5 第一现代,5
as guru, ix,  作为大师,ix、
Philosophical Investigations
哲学探究
(Wittgenstein), 12, 18, 41, 81, 84
(维特根斯坦),12、18、41、81、84
Philosophical psychology,
哲学心理学、
Philosophical semantics,
哲学语义学
Philosophy 哲学
of cognitive relativism, 353-55
认知相对主义,353-55
compatibilism, moral responsibility and, 373-77
相容论、道德责任与, 373-77
of culture, 339-40 文化,339-40
difference between religion and, 363-64
宗教与宗教之间的差异,363-64
folk, 339-40, 349, 362
民间,339-40,349,362
formal, 36, 340-41, 342.343, 349, 362-63
正式,36,340-41,342.343,349,362-63
free will, determinism and, 365-73
自由意志、决定论与 365-73
literacy's significance on, 349-53, 361
扫盲的意义,349-53,361
metaphilosophy and, 361 形而上学与 361
normal introduction to, xiv
正常导言,xiv
oral v. written, 349-50
口头与书面,349-50
other fields mixing with, 365-66,
与其他领域的混合,365-66、
reasons for coming to, xiii
来这里的原因, xiii
religion and, 360-64 宗教与 360-64
science and, 364-65 科学与,364-65
special character of, 377-80
特殊性,377-80
traditional (culture's) thought v., 341-44
传统(文化)思想 v., 341-44
traditional v. Western beliefs and, 344-49
传统信仰与西方信仰,344-49
Physical world. See also Matter; Property
物理世界。另请参阅 "物质";"属性
knowledge of, 58 知识,58
not organized for our epistemic convenience, 63-64
不是为我们的认识论方便而组织的,63-64
objective justification and, 71
客观理由与 71
physics and, xvi-xvii 物理学和,xvi-xvii
skepticism of, 48, 52-53, 58-59, 60-61
怀疑论, 48, 52-53, 58-59, 60-61
universe, God and, 313-14
宇宙、上帝与 313-14
Physics, xvi-xvii, 175, 370-72, 373
物理学,xvi-xvii、175、370-72、373
Pike, Nelson, 336 派克,纳尔逊,336
Plato, 74, 216, 303, 329, 342, 349
柏拉图,74、216、303、329、342、349
dialogues of, 41 对话,41
knowledge as justified true belief and, 41-44
知识作为合理的真实信念, 41-44
relevance of,  的相关性、
Platoism, 303 柏拉图主义,303
Players, 233-34, 242, 248
球员,233-34,242,248
Pleasure, 187, 189 快乐,187,189
Point of view, different, 14
观点,不同,14
Poison,  毒药
Police, 276 警察,276
Politics. See also Government; State absolute state for, 229-30
政治。另见政府;国家 绝对国家,229-30
authority, power in, 223, 229, 230
权力,权力,223、229、230
bargaining game and, 248-52
谈判博弈与 248-52
benefit of, 232 好处,232
civil society established with, 228-29, 230, 233
与民间社会建立联系,228-29,230,233
common-wealth for, 228, 258, 263
共同财产,228、258、263
covenant for, 228, 230, 231-32, 244-45
公约》,228、230、231-32、244-45
democracy for, 230-31 民主,230-31
difference principle, inequality surpluses, Rawls and, 248, 250-52, 253, 255-56
差异原则、不平等盈余、罗尔斯与 248、250-52、253、255-56
entitlement theory of, 265-67
权利理论,265-67
ethics and, 267-69 伦理与 267-69
game theory, the prisoners' dilemma and, 242-45
博弈论、囚徒困境与 242-45
game theory, two person zero-sum game and, 232-41
博弈论,两人零和博弈,232-41
goals for, 269 目标,269
Hobbes, escaping from state of nature and, 224-29
霍布斯:摆脱自然状态, 224-29
Hobbes, problem for and, 229-32, 233
霍布斯的问题与 229-32、233
introduction to, 221-24 导言,221-24
justice theory, Rawls and, 248-50
正义理论,罗尔斯与,248-50
morality from, 227, 230, 247, 257
道德,227,230,247,257
morality with, 248-50, 257-58
道德,248-50,257-58
non-constant-sum game and, 241,
非恒和博弈与, 241、
obligations to others and, 268-69
对他人的义务,268-69
power's justification in, 224, 241
权力的正当性, 224, 241
protective associations and, 263-64
保护性协会与,263-64
prudentialism's limits in, 245-47, 248
谨慎主义的局限性, 245-47, 248
Rawls, maximin and, 253-56
罗尔斯、格言与 253-56
Rawls, status of two principles and,
罗尔斯,两个原则的地位和、

Rawls, structure of argument, 252-53
罗尔斯,论证结构,252-53
reflective equilibrium and, 258-60
反射平衡与,258-60
rights, Nozick and, 261-65
诺齐克与权利, 261-65
sovereign power in, 228-30, 232, 245
主权,228-30,232,245
state of nature and, 225-26, 228, 230-31, 233, 243, 245, 257-58, 262, 276
自然状态与 225-26、228、230-31、233、243、245、257-58、262、276
state of nature to state (government) for, 248-49, 263-64
从自然状态到国家(政府),248-49,263-64
two principles (of Rawls) and, 255-58, 260-61
两个原则(罗尔斯)和,255-58,260-61
Popper, Karl, 128, 163-67, 169, 179, 334
波普尔,卡尔,第 128、163-67、169、179、334 页
Pornography, 295 色情,295
Positivism 实证主义
legal, 274, 275-78, 285, 293-94, 296-97
法律,274,275-78,285,293-94,296-97
logical, 62,63 逻辑、62、63
Possible, 142 可能,142
Possible artifact, 33, 332
可能的文物,33,332
Possible worlds, 99-102, 106, 113, 116, 372
可能的世界,99-102、106、113、116、372
best of, 335 最佳,335
cross-world twins and,
跨世界双胞胎和
existence of, 313-14 存在,313-14
Godless, 328-29 无神,328-29
intention and, 102-3 意图与 102-3
mutual adaptation of, 327, 329
相互适应,327,329
nomically, 174-75, 300 名义上,174-75,300
nomically impossible worlds and, 300 , 302
名义上不可能的世界与, 300 , 302
perceptions in other, 190
其他方面的看法,190
reference, sense and, 101-2
参照、意义和 101-2
story worlds of, 320-21
故事世界, 320-21
Postulate, 136, 142 假设,136,142
Power, 225 功率,225
absolute, 230 绝对值,230
authority v., 276 权威诉,276
coercive, 272, 274, 280, 284, 286, 296
强制性,272、274、280、284、286、296
common, 228 常见,228
Hobbesian definition of, 225
霍布斯的定义,225
of justification, 224, 241
正当性,224,241
sovereign, 228-29, 230, 232, 245, 275
主权,228-29,230,232,245,275
Predicates, 92-96, 110 谓词,92-96,110
entrenched, 162 根深蒂固,162
existence and not, 317-22
存在与不存在,317-22
extension of, 93, 97, 100-101, 102,
扩展, 93, 97, 100-101, 102、
first-order, 112, 319 一阶,112,319
intension of, 93 意图,93
projectible, 162-63 可预测,162-63
reference of, 96, 97, 100
参考文献,96、97、100
satisfaction of (truth) of, 93
满足(真理),93
subject, 92-94 主题,92-94
Predictions, 144, 150-51
预测,144,150-51
false, 148-49 错误,148-49
Premises, 106-7, 112-13 房舍,106-7,112-13
Prescription, 129-30 处方,129-30
Prescriptivism, 119, 204, 378
规定主义,119、204、378
morality and, 204-5, 206, 215.218
道德与 204-5、206、215.218
Presupposition(s) 预设
of deterrence, 292 威慑,292
shared, 33 共享,33
Primary rules, 280 初级规则,280
inefficiency of, 283 效率低下,283
uncertainty of, 281-82 不确定性,281-82
Prime mover, 322-23 原动力,322-23
Principia Ethica (Moore), 187
伦理学原理》(摩尔),187 页
Principle of deduction for justification (PDJ), 50-51, 60
理由演绎原则 (PDJ),50-51,60
incorrectness of, 66-68, 70
不正确性,66-68,70
Prisoners' dilemma, 243 囚犯的困境,243
co-operative solution/strategy in, 243, 245
合作解决方案/战略,243,245
as non-zero-sum two person game, 241, 242
作为非零和两人游戏, 241, 242
rational approach to, 243
理性方法,243
strategy of wait-and-see for, 244-45
观望战略,244-45
utility payoff for, 242
效用回报,242
Private language argument, 12-19, 22,
私人语言的争论,12-19,22、
behaviorist approach to, 18-19
行为主义方法,18-19
Pro-attitudes, 186, 191-92, 193, 195, 203, 204, 205
支持态度,186、191-92、193、195、203、204、205
Probability, 59 概率,59
language and, 114-15 语言与 114-15
Problems 问题
philosophical understanding of, xiv of philosophy changing over time, xiv-xv
对哲学的理解,xiv 哲学随时间而变化,xiv-xv
seeing around, xiv 环顾四周,xiv
Proof, 316 证明,316
Property 物业
circumstances of ascription and, 64
归属和情况,64
natural, 188-89 自然,188-89
non-natural, 188-89 非自然,188-89
Proposition, attitudes and, 91
命题、态度与 91
Protective associations, 263-64
保护性协会,263-64
dominant (minimal state), 264
主导(最小状态),264

Proverb, 352-53 谚语,352-53
Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Austin), 275
确定的法理学范围(奥斯汀),275
Prudentialism, 229-30, 232
谨慎主义,229-30,232
limits of,  的限制、
maxims of, 227 格言,227
Psychology 心理学
cognitive, 34-36, 74 认知,34-36,74
epistemology and, 74-76 认识论与 74-76
folk, 26-27, 34-35 民间、26-27、34-35
philosophical, 4 哲理,4
Psychophysical parallelism, 9-10
心理物理平行,9-10
Public mind, 11, 19
公众意识,11,19
Punishment 惩罚
compensation to victims of, 293
对受害者的赔偿,293
before crime, 289-90 犯罪前,289-90
deterrence and justifying, 286-87, 291-93
威慑与合理性,286-87,291-93
deterrence theory of,
威慑理论、
as evil, 286 邪恶,286
as fitting the crime, 290-91
290-91
of guilty, 288, 289, 291-92
288, 289, 291-92
innocence and, 287, 289, 291
清白与 287、289、291
justice of, 291-93 司法,291-93
mistakes of, 287 错误,287
problem of, 285-86 问题,285-86
retributivism and, 288-91, 296
报应主义与, 288-91, 296
utilitarianism and, 286-88, 289, 291-92, 294
功利主义与 286-88、289、291-92、294
Putnam, Hilary, 142, 361
普特南、希拉里、142、361
Puzzle of physical, 36-37
物理之谜,36-37
Quantifier, 95-96, 112, 142
量词,95-96,112,142
existential, 96, 112-13, 318, 320, 321
存在主义, 96, 112-13, 318, 320, 321
universal, 96 通用,96
Quantum theory, 175, 370-71, 372
量子理论,175、370-71、372
Quarrel, principal causes of, 225
争吵,主要原因,225
Quine, W.V.O., 74-76, 122, 165, 303-4
Racism, 201-3, 271, 273
种族主义,201-3、271、273
Ramsey, Frank, 26-28, 95, 96, 112, 136, 137, 140, 156, 174, 208, 309, 359, 379
拉姆齐,弗兰克,26-28,95,96,112,136,137,140,156,174,208,309,359,379
Rational people 理性的人
decision making for, 233, 238
决策,233,238
prisoners' dilemma and, 243
囚犯的困境与 243
self-interested, 244, 248, 252, 255-56, 263-64, 267
利己主义,244、248、252、255-56、263-64、267
Rationalism, 52, 54, 57-58, 76, 105
理性主义,52、54、57-58、76、105
moral, 180, 181 道德,180,181
Rawls, John, 241, 265, 267-68, 269, 272, 277
约翰-罗尔斯,第 241、265、267-68、269、272、277 页
criticism of structure of, 252-53
对结构的批评,252-53
difference principle, inequality surpluses and, 248, 250-52, 253,
差异原则、不平等盈余与 248、250-52、253、
justice theory for, 247-50
正义理论,247-50
maximin and criticism of, 254-56
格言与批评, 254-56
reflective equilibrium and, 258-60, 378
反射平衡与,258-60,378
two principles and, 255-58, 260-61
两个原则和,255-58,260-61
Realism, 378 现实主义,378
moral, 183, 184-87 道德,183,184-87
Reason, 55-56 理由》,55-56
attitudes and, 201 态度与 201
emotivism and, 196 情感主义与,196
natural light of, 76
自然光,76
not leading to truth, 360
不通向真理,360
relativism and, 344 相对主义与,344
sufficient, 175, 323 充足、175、323
universalizability from, 198-99, 200
普遍性,198-99,200
Recognition, rules of, 282-83, 285
承认,规则,282-83,285
Rectification of holdings, 265
持股更正,265
Reductio ad adsurdum, 52-53, 62, 89-90, 102, 103, 113, 153, 157,
Reductio adsurdum, 52-53, 62, 89-90, 102, 103, 113, 153, 157、
Reference 参考资料
compositionality thesis of, 93, 96
构成论, 93, 96
co-referential, 91, 96, 97, 98
共同参照,91、96、97、98
in language,  在语言方面:
possible worlds and, 100-102
可能的世界与, 100-102
of predicate, 96, 97, 100
谓词, 96, 97, 100
shared, 307 共享,307
truth value and, 92, 97, 98
真理价值与 92、97、98
Reflection, 55, 56, 58
反射,55、56、58
Refutation, 164 反驳,164
Regret, 210 遗憾,210
Relativism 相对主义
cognitive, 344, 353-55, 356
认知,344,353-55,356
moral, 192, 195, 201-4, 218, 344
道德、192、195、201-4、218、344
reasonable to believe and, 355
合理相信和,355
strong, 355-57 强,355-57
true v. false in, 355
真与假,355
weak, 355, 357-60 弱,355,357-60
Reliabilism, 70, 72, 75, 121-22, 163
可靠性,70、72、75、121-22、163
Religion 宗教
difference between philosophy and, 363-64 literacy and, 362
哲学与扫盲的区别, 363-64, 362
philosophy and, 360-64 哲学与 360-64
rituals of, 362 仪式,362
view of life from, 362
人生观,362
Respect, 213, 225 尊重、213、225
Responsibility, morality and, 367-69
责任、道德与 367-69
Retributivism, 292 报应主义,292
compensation to victims of, 293
对受害者的赔偿,293
deterrence and, 289-91, 296
威慑与,289-91,296
punishment, Kant objections and, 288-89
惩罚,康德的反对与,288-89
Rights, 213-15, 272 权利,213-15,272
animal, 266-67 动物,266-67
duties with, 214-15 职责,214-15
end-result principles and, 261, 291
最终结果原则,261,291
equal, 248 平等,248
individual, 262 个人,262
to life, 262-63, 266, 267
生命,262-63,266,267
negative, 214 负数,214
political, 223 政治,223
positive, 214 正面,214
priority of, 260, 267
优先权,260,267
as side-constraints, 265-67
作为侧约束,265-67
without government, 262-63
没有政府,262-63
Rorty, Richard, 82 理查德-罗蒂,82
Rule(s) 规则
of adjudication, 284, 285
裁决的权利, 284, 285
of change,  的变化、
correspondence, 142-43, 144-45
通信,142-43,144-45
of enforcement, 284-85, 295
执行,284-85,295
primary,  初级、
of recognition, 282-83, 285
承认,282-83,285
secondary, , 282-85
中学, , 282-85
Russell, Bertrand, 304-5, 306-7, 309, 337
罗素、伯特兰,第 304-5、306-7、309、337 页
Ryle, Gilbert, 11 吉尔伯特-赖尔 11
Scare-quotes, xvii 危言耸听,xvii
Schlick, Moritz, 62
Schmidt machine, 372-73 施密特机器,372-73
Science, 175. See also Theory
科学,175。另见理论
causation, laws and, 171-74
因果关系、法律与 171-74
crucial experiments of, 150
关键实验,150
culture and, 340 文化与 340
deductive-nomological model of explanation and, 145-47, 168
演绎-名词解释模式和,145-47,168
demarcation problem of, 128, 130,
分界问题,128,130、

description and prescription of, 129-30
描述和处方,129-30
diachronic approach to, 129-30
非同步方法,129-30
empiricism and, 56, 140
经验主义与 56, 140
induction's new riddle, Goodman and, 161-63
归纳法的新谜语,古德曼与, 161-63
introduction to, 127-28 导言,127-28
justifying theories, falsification,
为理论辩护、证伪、
Popper and, 163-67 波普尔与,163-67
justifying theories, induction and, 157-61
证明理论的合理性、归纳和 157-61
justifying theories, inference to best explanation (ITBE) and, 167-71
证明理论合理性,最佳解释推论(ITBE)和,167-71
Mendel's genetic theory and, 130-36
孟德尔的遗传理论与 130-36
methodology of, 130 方法,130
naturalized epistemology and, 74-76
归化认识论与, 74-76
philosophy and, 364-65 哲学与,364-65
as progressive, 149 作为进步,149
"received view" of theories for,
理论的 "公认观点"、
specialization of, 361-62, 365
专业化,361-62,365
synchronic approach to,
同步方法、
theory as product of, 144
理论的产物, 144
theory, observation and, 136-41, 151,
理论、观察与 136-41、151、
theory reduction, instrumentalism and, 148-53, 154, 156
理论还原、工具主义与 148-53、154、156
theory-ladenness and, 152-57, 372-73
理论惰性与,152-57,372-73
Science fiction, 39-41 科幻小说,39-41
Second Treatise on Government (Locke), 262
政府论第二篇》(洛克),262 页
Secondary elaborations, 346
二次阐述,346
Secondary rules,
辅助规则、
rule of adjudication for, 284, 285
裁定规则, 284, 285
rule of change for, 283, 284, 285
变化规则, 283, 284, 285
rule of enforcement for, 284-85, 295
执行规则, 284-85, 295
rule of recognition for, 282-83, 285
承认规则,282-83,285
Second-order predicate logic, 112
二阶谓词逻辑, 112
Self, morality, others and, 215-17
自我、道德、他人与 215-17
Self-interest, 224-25, 245-47
自利,224-25,245-47
considering of other by, 249
考虑到其他国家,249
moral identification to state beyond, 247
超越国家的道德认同, 247
not as envious, 252
不羡鸳鸯,252
rational decisions with, 244, 248, 252, 255-56, 263-64, 267
理性决策,244,248,252,255-56,263-64,267
Self-regarding, 216 自律 216
Sellars, Wilfred, 154 塞勒斯、威尔弗雷德,154
Semantics possible-world, 101, 113
语义学可能世界, 101, 113
theory of, 87 理论,87
Sensation, 34, 37 感觉,34,37
experience v., 55 经验 v., 55
input, 23 输入,23
language and, 13-17, 156
语言与,13-17,156

Sense 感觉

compositionality thesis of, 96
构成论, 96
intension v., 102, 104
mode of presentation of object as, 86, 90-91, 93, 117, 136
对象的呈现方式, 86, 90-91, 93, 117, 136
possible worlds and, 101-2
可能的世界与, 101-2
truth condition/value and, 92, 98, 120
真理条件/价值与, 92, 98, 120
Senses, 23-24 感官,23-24
God's guarantee of, 49,51
上帝的保证,49、51
hallucination of, 51,76 幻觉,51,76
Sentence(s) 句子
analytic, 104-6 分析,104-6
argument, 106-7, 110 论据,106-7,110
assertions in, 119 断言,119
composed from, 108-9 108-9
connectives of, 112 连接词,112
consistent, 44 一致,44
contrary-to-fact conditional, 173
相反事实条件, 173
co-referential, 98 共同参照,98
counterfactual, 173-74 反事实,173-74
declarative, , 62, 63, 106, 118-19
声明式, , 62, 63, 106, 118-19
evidence-, 44-45, 47 证据,44-45,47
false,  假的
formally true, 115 形式上属实,115
grammar of, 85-86, 321
语法, 85-86, 321
imperative, 119 当务之急,119
meaning of, 101, 103, 117, 123, 356
含义, 101, 103, 117, 123, 356
mixed, 142 混合,142
moral, 195, 204 道德、195、204
open, 94-96, 97, 108-9, 304, 318
开放式,94-96,97,108-9,304,318
premises, 106-7, 112-13 房舍,106-7,112-13
primacy of, 88-89, 90, 118, 121, 153
至高无上, 88-89, 90, 118, 121, 153
proposition expressed in, 91
表达的命题,91
Ramsey, 27-28, 95, 96, 112, 136, 137 , 140, 156, 174, 309, 359, 379
拉姆齐,27-28,95,96,112,136,137 ,140,156,174,309,359,379
rules of, 62-63 规则,62-63
sentence-forming operators on, 112
句子成分操作符, 112
supports of, 158 支架,158
synthetic, 104-6 合成,104-6
translation of, 357 翻译,357
true, 102-4 真,102-4
truth conditions of, 92
真理的条件,92
truth value of, 91-92, 97, 98, 99
真值,91-92,97,98,99
Sentence(s) (continued) 句子(续
variables and open, 95
变量和开放性,95
verifiable, 62 可核查,62
Side-constraints, 265-67
侧面制约因素,265-67
Skepticism, 48, 129, 333
怀疑论,48、129、333
causal theories of knowledge and, 66-70
知识的因果理论与, 66-70
grammar and, 86 语法和,86
of physical world, 48, 52-53, 58-59, 60-61
物理世界, 48, 52-53, 58-59, 60-61
verificationism and, 61-65
核查主义与 61-65
Socrates, 41-43, 349 苏格拉底,41-43,349
Socratic method, 41-42, 74
苏格拉底方法,41-42,74
Soul (mbisimo), 344-45, 357, 359-60
灵魂(mbisimo),344-45,357,359-60
Sovereign 主权
citizens and, 230 公民与 230
power, 228-30, 232, 245, 274
权力,228-30、232、245、274
Soyinka, Wole, 342 索因卡,沃莱,342
Specialization, 361-62 专业化,361-62
Speech 发言
belief displayed through, 18-19
通过展示信仰,18-19
computer's recognition of, 2
计算机的识别,2
freedom of, 260 自由,260
Speech act, 119 言语行为,119
State. See also Politics
国家。另见政治
goals for, 269 目标,269
justification of, 248 理由,248
minimal, 264-65, 267 最低限度、264-65、267
minimum conditions of justification for, 272-73
理由的最低条件,272-73
nonminimal, 264 非极小,264
State of nature. See Nature
自然状态。参见自然
Stateless society, 221-22
无国籍社会,221-22
Stevenson, C. L., 193-96
史蒂文森,C.L.,193-96
Stich, Stephen, 34-36 斯蒂芬-斯蒂奇,34-36
Story worlds, 320-21 故事世界,320-21
Strategy 战略
co-operative solution as, 243
合作解决,243
equilibrium, 238-39 平衡,238-39
equilibrium strategy pair, 239
均衡战略对,239
immorality and, 248 不道德与 248
maximin, 239, 253 最大值,239,253
minimax, 239 最小值,239
mixed, 240-41 混合,240-41
with morality taken into account, 249
考虑道德因素,249
pure v. mixed, 240
纯种与混合,240
of wait-and-see, 244-45 观望,244-45
Strong empirical correlation, 331, 332
强经验相关性,331,332
Subject, 93 主题,93
Substance, 6 物质,6
Suffering, 335-37 苦难,335-37
Sufficient reason, 175, 323
充分理由,175,323
Summa Theologiae (Aquinas), 322, 324
神学总论》(阿奎那),322、324 页
Supervenience, 205 监督,205
Synchronic approach, 130
同步方法,130
Syntax, 107, 109, 115-16
语法,107、109、115-16
Synthesis, 378 合成,378
Synthetic truth, 104-6, 121, 202
合成真理,104-6,121,202
Systematizing, 342-43, 378
系统化,342-43,378
Taxation, purely redistributive, 266
税收,纯粹的再分配,266
Teleological argument, 323-25
目的论论据,323-25
Thalberg, Irving, 50-51 塔尔伯格、欧文、50-51
Theaetetus (Plato), 41-43, 74, 77
Theaetetus 》(柏拉图),41-43,74,77
Theism, experimental, 334
有神论,实验性,334
Theodicy, 337 神论》,337
Theologian, natural, 325
神学家,自然,325
Theorists, literate, 351-52
理论家、文学家,351-52
Theory 理论
common sense beliefs and, 138-39
常识信念,138-39
confirmation, 171 确认,171
context of justification for, 139, 158
理由的背景,139,158
correspondence rules for, 142-43,
通信规则,142-43、
corroborated, 166, 170, 171
确证,166、170、171
development v. justification of, 130
发展与理由,130
instrumentalism of, 150-53, 154
工具主义,150-53,154
judgment with, 154 判决,154
-ladenness, 152-57, 347-48, 354, 373
-亵渎,152-57,347-48,354,373
language of, 142, 153, 156
语言,142,153,156
meaning-variance hypothesis, 156-57
意义方差假说,156-57
observation v., 136-41, 151, 152-57,
观察 v.,136-41,151,152-57、
postulates of, 136, 142
假设,136,142
as product of science, 144
作为科学的产物,144
progressive nature of, 149-50
渐进性,149-50
realist interpretation of, 144-45, 150
现实主义解释, 144-45, 150
"received view" of, 141, 142-45, 148,
"接受的观点",141,142-45,148、
reduction, 148-50, 156 减少,148-50,156
reflective equilibrium and, 258-60, 378
反射平衡与,258-60,378
skeptical value of, 138
怀疑价值,138
theoretical, 205 理论,205
theoretical term for, 137-38
理论术语,137-38
underdetermined, 37, 155
未确定,37,155
as universal quantified conditionals, 334-35
作为普遍量化条件句, 334-35
without cause, 175 无缘无故,175
Theory of Justice, A (Rawls), 247, 267
正义论》(罗尔斯),247、267
Thermostat function, 19-20
恒温器功能,19-20
Thesis,  论文、
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 266-67
汤姆森,朱迪斯-贾维斯,266-67
Thought experiments, 33-34
思想实验,33-34
Thoughts 感想
causal account of location of, 9
位置的因果关系,9
language as remembering of, 82-83
语言的记忆, 82-83
marks of, 12, 15, 82
标记,12,15,82
in mind, 6-8, 37
在心中,6-8,37
objective, 91 客观,91
private,  私人
wrong, 48 错误,48
Token, 301-2 代币,301-2
Treatise of Human Nature (Hume), 182
人性论》(休谟),182 页
Truth(s), 93, 303 真理,93,303
a posteriori, 105, 106, 310, 322-23,
后验,105,106,310,322-23、
a priori, 105-6, 180, 310-13, 316-17, 377
先验性,105-6,180,310-13,316-17,377
absolute, 379 绝对,379
analytic, 104-6, 121, 122-24
分析,104-6,121,122-24
beliefs and conditions of, 119-21
信仰和条件, 119-21
conceptual scheme and, 359, 360
概念方案与 359、360
conditions, 92, 99-102, 118-20, 183, 185
条件,92,99-102,118-20,183,185
contingent, 104, 106 特遣队、104、106
evidence and reason not leading to, 360
证据和理由不能导致,360
formal, 115 正式,115
logical, 115-17 逻辑,115-17
mathematical, 55-56, 122-23, 300-301, 316
数学,55-56,122-23,300-301,316
in natural law, 280
在自然法中,280
necessary, 47-48, 51-52, 54, 104-6,
必要,47-48,51-52,54,104-6、
obvious, 123 明显,123
preservation, 113-15 保护,113-15
-preserving, 113 -保留,113
story worlds of, 320
故事世界,320
synthetic, 104-6, 121, 200
合成、104-6、121、200
value, 91-92, 97, 98, 99, 101, 118-19, 156,196
价值,91-92,97,98,99,101,118-19,156,196
Two person zero-sum game, 232-41
两人零和游戏,232-41
Type, 301-2 类型,301-2
Unanimity, 232 一致同意,232
Unary connectives, 112 一元连接词,112
Unfair distribution, 257
不公平分配,257
Unger, Peter, 68 恩格尔,彼得,68
Uniformity of nature, principle of, 160, 161
自然的统一性原则, 160, 161
Universality, 195, 196 普遍性,195,196
Universalizability, 197, 202, 203, 215
通用性,197、202、203、215
attitude and, 203, 205
态度与 203、205
means v. ends in, 213
手段与目的,213
from reason, 198-99, 200
来自理性,198-99,200
unreasonableness and, 199-200, 201, 203
不合理性与 199-200、201、203
Universe 宇宙
as artifact, 331-32 作为文物,331-32
competing claims about, 356
相互冲突的主张,356
design of, 324-25, 326, 328, 334
设计,324-25,326,328,334
mutual adaptation in, 330, 332, 333
相互适应,330、332、333
physical world, God and, 312-14
物质世界、上帝与 312-14
Unreasonableness, 199-200, 201, 203
不合理,199-200,201,203
Use and mention, xviii
使用和提及,xviii
Utilitarianism, 206, 259-60
功利主义,206,259-60
attitude of, 209-10 态度,209-10
consequentialism v. absolutism and, 208-13, 215
结果主义与绝对主义,208-13,215
disutility, punishment and, 287-88, 289, 291
无效性、惩罚与 287-88、289、291
economics influenced by, 207-8
经济学的影响,207-8
feelings and, 210-11 感情与,210-11
happiness and, 206-7, 215
幸福与 206-7、215
interpersonal comparison of utility in, 208, 241, 253, 254-55, 287
人际间的效用比较,208,241,253,254-55,287
objections to, 208-9 反对意见,208-9
punishment and, 286-88, 289, 291-92, 294
惩罚与,286-88,289,291-92,294
utility defined in, 207-8, 215
实用性的定义,207-8,215
Valid argument, 107, 110-11, 115, 117
有效论据,107、110-11、115、117
Valid form, 107 有效表格,107
Valid, formally, 107 有效,正式,107
Value(s) 价值
maximin, 239 最大值,239
morality and, 180-83, 196
道德与,180-83,196
truth, 91-92, 97, 98, 99, 101, 118-19, 156, 196
真理, 91-92, 97, 98, 99, 101, 118-19, 156, 196
Variables 变量
of beliefs, 26-27 信仰,26-27
as labels, 109 作为标签,109
open sentences and, 95
开放句和,95
satisfying value of, 95-96
令人满意的价值,95-96
sentential, 107, 109, 110, 111
句式,107、109、110、111
Veil of ignorance, , 267
无知的面纱, , 267
Verificationism, 23, 30, 61, 81, 84, 151, 338
验证主义,23、30、61、81、84、151、338
circumstances of ascription with, 64-65
与订阅有关的情况,64-65
skepticism and, 61-65 怀疑论与 61-65
verifiable principle and,
可验证的原则和、
verifiable sentences in, 62
可核实的句子,62
Victimization, 287, 289, 291-92, 296
受害情况,287、289、291-92、296
Victims, compensation to, 293
对受害者的赔偿,293
Virtues, 337 美德,337
Weber, Max, 223 韦伯,马克斯,223
Western culture 西方文化
adversarial, 341-42, 350
对抗性,341-42,350
science and, 341 科学与 341
specialization in, 361-62
专业化,361-62
writing and nonshared, 352-53
写作与非共享,352-53
Will, 279
Williams, Bernard, xvi, 382n
Witchcraft, 343-44, 361 巫术,343-44,361
explanations of harm with, 345
对伤害的解释,345
magic , experience and, 347
魔术、经验和,347
oracles of, 345-46, 348, 351, 362
神谕,345-46,348,351,362
poison and, 345-46 毒药与, 345-46
secondary elaborations, 346
二次阐述,346
ways of, 344-45 方式,344-45
Witchdoctors, 345 巫医,345
Wittenstein, Ludwig, 11-18, 22, 41, 63,
路德维希-威滕斯坦,第 11-18、22、41、63 页、
Wolff, Robert Paul, 250-51
沃尔夫、罗伯特-保罗,250-51

Word 字词
keeping of, 272 保存,272
meaning, sentence and, 88, 119
意义、句子和 88、119
sense (mode of presentation) of, 86 , 90-92, 117
感觉(呈现方式), 86 , 90-92, 117
World(s). See also Possible worlds
世界。另请参阅 "可能的世界
actual, 100, 314, 323, 335
实际、100、314、323、335
mutual adaptation of parts of, , 332
各部分的相互适应, , 332
nomically impossible, 300
不可能,300
possible, 99-102, 104 可能,99-102,104
story, 320-21 故事,320-21
Worst-off, 257 最不发达国家,257
protection of, 248, 250-52, 253,
保护,248,250-52,253、
Writing 写作
development of, 361 发展,361
oral tradition v., 349-50, 352-53
口头传统 v., 349-50, 352-53
Zande. See Azande 赞德。参见阿赞德
Zero-sum game, 234-41 零和游戏,234-41
constant-sum, non-constant sum and, 234, 236, 241, 250, 253, 254
常数和、非常数和、234、236、241、250、253、254
equilibrium point in, 239
平衡点,239
equilibrium strategy in, 238-39
均衡战略, 238-39
maximin strategy in, 239, 254
最大化策略,239,254
mixed strategies in,
混合战略、
non-zero-sum game v., 241-45
非零和博弈 v., 241-45
pure v. mixed strategies in, 240
纯战略与混合战略,240

  1. Then, examining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no place where I was; but that I could not pretend in the same way that I did not exist; and that, to the contrary, just because I was thinking to doubt the truth of other things, it followed quite obviously and quite certainly that I did exist; whereas if I had just ceased to think, although everything else that I had ever imagined had been true, I
    然后,我仔细观察了自己,发现自己可以假装没有身体,也没有自己所在的世界和地方;但我不能以同样的方式假装自己不存在;恰恰相反,正因为我在思考,怀疑其他事情的真实性,所以很明显、很肯定地,我确实存在;而如果我停止思考,尽管我曾经想象过的其他事情都是真实的,但我
  2. SOCRATES: But if true belief and knowledge were the same thing, then the jury would never make correct judgments without knowledge; and, as things are, it seems that the two [knowledge and true belief] are different.
    索克拉特但是,如果真正的信念和知识是一回事,那么陪审团就永远不会在没有知识的情况下做出正确的判断;而现在的情况是,这两者[知识和真正的信念]似乎是不同的。
    THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, there's something I once heard someone saying, which I'd forgotten, but it's coming back to me now. He said that true
    是的,苏格拉底,我曾听人说过一句话,我已经忘了,但现在又想起来了。他说,真正的
  3. I will suppose therefore that there is not a true God, who is the sovereign source of truth, but a certain evil spirit, who is no less devious and deceitful than he is powerful, and that he has set about with all his ingenuity to deceive me. I will imagine that the sky, the earth, and the colors, shapes, sounds, and
    因此,我要假定,世上并不存在一个真正的上帝,他是真理的至高源泉,而是一个邪恶的精灵,他的狡猾和欺骗不亚于他的力量,他用他所有的聪明才智来欺骗我。我会想象天空、大地,还有颜色、形状、声音和其他一切。
  4. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, experience. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself.
    一切观念都来自感觉或反射。那么,让我们把心灵假定为一张白纸,没有任何文字,没有任何思想:它是如何构成的呢?它从何而来,是人类忙碌而无边无际的想象力在其上描绘出的几乎无穷无尽的巨大储藏吗?理性和知识的所有材料从何而来?对此,我的回答只有一个字:经验。我们所有的知识都是建立在经验之上的,而知识最终也是来源于经验。
  5. He that in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly.
    在平常的生活中,除了直接明了的证明,他什么都不承认,那么在这个世界上,他什么都不能保证,只能很快灭亡。
  6. V: For every declarative sentence, there must be some sort of evidence that would provide grounds either for believing or for disbelieving it.
    五:对于每一个陈述句,都必须有某种证据,为相信或不相信它提供依据。
  7. Suppose we are told that, unknown to Henry, the district he has just entered is full of papier-mâché facsimiles of barns. These facsimiles look just like barns, but are really just facades, without back walls or interiors, quite incapable of being used as barns. They are so cleverly constructed travelers invariably mistake them for barns. Having just entered the district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; the object he sees is a genuine barn. But if the object on that site were a facsimile, Henry would mistake it for a barn. Given this new information, we would be strongly inclined to withdraw the claim that Henry knows the object is a barn.
    假设我们被告知,亨利并不知道,他刚刚进入的地区到处都是纸糊的谷仓摹本。这些赝品看起来就像谷仓,但实际上只是外墙,没有后墙或内部结构,根本无法用作谷仓。它们的构造非常巧妙,旅行者总会误以为是谷仓。亨利刚刚进入这个地区,没有遇到任何仿制品,他看到的是一个真正的谷仓。但如果那个地方的东西是赝品,亨利就会误以为是谷仓。鉴于这一新信息,我们强烈倾向于撤回亨利知道该物体是谷仓的说法。
  8. How unconstant and fading men's thoughts are, and how much the recovery of them depends upon chance, there is none but knows by infallible experience in himself. For no man is able to remember . . colors without sensible and present patterns, nor number without the names of numbers disposed in order and learned by heart. . . From which it follows that, for the acquiring of philosophy, some sensible moniments are necessary, by which our past thoughts may not only be reduced, but registered every one in its own order. These moniments I call MARKS.
    人的思想是多么不稳定,多么容易消逝,它们的恢复在多大程度上取决于偶然性,没有人知道,只有他自己的经验才是无懈可击的。因为没有感性和现成的图案,就没有人能记住......颜色,没有按顺序排列并熟记于心的数字名称,就没有人能记住数字。. ..由此可见,为了掌握哲学,一些感性的符号是必要的,通过这些符号,我们过去的思想不仅可以被还原,而且可以按照自己的顺序一一记录下来。这些符号我称之为标记。
  9. the nature of a name consists principally in this, that it is a mark taken for memory's sake; but it serves by accident to signify and make known to others what we remember ourselves.
    名字的性质主要在于:它是为了记忆而留下的记号;但它却意外地起到了向他人表明和宣传我们自己所记得的东西的作用。
  10. Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle." No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.-Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.-But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?-If so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty-_No, one can "divide through" by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
    现在有人告诉我,他只从自己的案例中知道什么是痛苦!假设每个人都有一个盒子,里面装着某种东西:我们称之为 "甲虫"。没有人可以看别人的盒子,每个人都说他只通过看自己的甲虫就知道甲虫是什么。但假设 "甲虫 "这个词在这些人的语言中还有用呢?盒子里的东西在语言游戏中根本没有用武之地;甚至不能作为一个东西:因为盒子甚至可能是空的--_不,人们可以用盒子里的东西 "划分";不管它是什么,它都会抵消。
    That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of "object and designation" the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
    这就是说:如果我们按照 "对象与指称 "的模式来解释感觉表达的语法,那么对象就会被视为无关紧要而被排除在外。
  11. One should distinguish between the reference and the sense of a sign, on the one hand, and the associated idea, on the other. If the reference of a sign is an
    我们应该区分符号的参照和意义与相关的观念。如果一个符号的所指是一个
  12. We now ask after the sense and reference of a whole assertoric sentence. Such a sentence contains a thought. Is this thought now to be regarded as its sense or its reference? Let us suppose for the moment that the sentence has a reference! Now replace a word in that sentence with another word with the same
    我们现在要探究的是整个断言式句子的意义和所指。这样的句子包含一个思想。这个思想现在应该被视为它的意义还是它的所指呢?我们暂且假定这个句子有所指!现在把句子中的一个词换成另一个词,同样的
  13. EXPLANANDUM: We crossed a pink pea with a (homozygous) red one and the cross produced red and pink offspring.
    解释:我们用一粒粉红色豌豆与一粒(同基因)红色豌豆杂交,杂交后代产生了红色和粉红色。
  14. There is, in principle, a continuous series beginning with looking through a vacuum and containing these as members: looking through a windowpane, looking through glasses, looking through binoculars, looking through a lowpower microscope, looking through a high-power microscope, etc., in the order given. The important consequence is that, so far, we are left without criteria that would enable us to draw a non-arbitrary line between "observation" and "theory."
    原则上说,有一个连续的系列,从 "透过真空看 "开始,依次包括:"透过窗玻璃看"、"透过眼镜看"、"透过双筒望远镜看"、"透过低倍显微镜看"、"透过高倍显微镜看 "等。重要的后果是,到目前为止,我们还没有能够在 "观察 "和 "理论 "之间划出一条非任意界线的标准。
  15. : Killing innocent people is wrong (or I ought not go about killing innocent people)
    :杀死无辜的人是错误的(或者说我不应该去杀死无辜的人)。
  16. : Every action that is a killing of an innocent person is wrong
    每一个杀害无辜者的行为都是错误的
  17. But are all P things really good?
    但是,所有的 P 都真的好吗?
  18. T: Tom ought to be kinder to his dog
    T:汤姆应该对他的狗好一点
  19. Though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet, when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.
    虽然有时会发现一个人的身体明显比另一个人强壮,思维也比另一个人敏捷;但是,如果把所有的人都算在一起,人与人之间的差别并没有那么大,以至于一个人可以据此为自己主张任何好处,而另一个人却可以和他一样,不自称有任何好处。
  20. The only way to erect such a Common Power . . is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will.
    建立这种共同权力的唯一方法......就是将他们的所有权力和力量赋予一个人,或一个人的大会,让他们通过多种声音将自己的意愿转化为一个意愿。
  21. A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, . . every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorize all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.
    当许多人达成协议,每个人与每个人立约,多数人给予任何一个人或任何一个人的大会以代表他们所有人的权利,......就可以说建立了一个共同体。......每一个人,无论是投赞成票的人,还是投反对票的人,都将以同样的方式,授权该人或该大会的一切行动和判断,就像他们自己的行动和判断一样,以便在他们之间和平相处,并受到保护,不受其他人的侵害。
  22. After the fifty regular workers are paid their each, and the [tanners and the sales staff] are paid each, there will be a pot of left over, which can be spread around among the fifty regular workers, raising their wages to each. That is an inequality surplus-it is the surplus income remaining after all the occupants of the roles of an unequally rewarded practice have been paid enough to draw them into the several roles.
    在 50 名正式工人每人获得 ,[制革工人和销售人员]每人获得 之后,会有 的剩余,可以在 50 名正式工人之间分配,将他们每人的工资提高到 ,这就是不平等盈余--它是在报酬不平等的实践中,所有角色的任职者都获得了足够的报酬,以吸引他们担任不同角色后剩余的收入。
  23. "Look, better endowed: you gain by cooperating with us. If you want our cooperation you'll have to accept reasonable terms. We suggest these terms: We'll cooperate with you only if we get as much as possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us that maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we'd end up with less."
    "听着,条件较好的人:与我们合作,你们会得到好处。如果你们想得到我们的合作,就必须接受合理的条件。我们建议这些条件:只有当我们获得尽可能多的利益时,我们才会与你们合作。也就是说,我们的合作条件应该给我们最大的份额,如果试图给我们更多,我们最终得到的会更少。
  24. Laws are rules, backed by the threat of force, promulgated by a legitimate government to regulate the behavior of people subject to its authority, and which belong to a system containing both primary rules and secondary rules of recognition, change, adjudication, and enforcement.
    法律是以武力威胁为后盾的规则,由合法政府颁布,以规范受其权威约束的人们的行为,属于一个包含主要规则和次要规则的体系,包括承认、变更、裁决和执行。
  25. General prevention ought to be the chief aim of punishment and is its real justification. If we could consider an offense which has been committed as an isolated fact, the like of which would never recur, punishment would be useless. It would only be adding one evil to another. But when we consider that an unpunished crime leaves the path of crime open, not only to the same delinquent but also to all those who may have the same motives for entering upon
    普遍预防应该是惩罚的主要目的,也是惩罚的真正理由。如果我们可以把已经犯下的罪行看作是一个孤立的事实,类似的罪行永远不会再次发生,那么惩罚就毫无用处。它只会是恶上加恶。但是,如果我们考虑到,不受惩罚的犯罪不仅会给同一个犯罪者,而且会给所有可能出于同样动机走上犯罪道路的人,留下犯罪的隐患。
  26. It is impossible that contrary and dissonant things can harmonize in one order always or usually except by someone's governance, by which each and all are made to tend to a certain end. But in the world we see things of diverse natures harmonize in one order, not rarely and by chance, but always or for the most part. Therefore it is necessary that there be someone by whose providence the world is governed, and him we call God.
    相反的、不和谐的事物不可能总是或通常以一种顺序和谐相处,除非有人通过治理,使每个人和所有的人都趋向于某种目的。但在这个世界上,我们看到各种不同性质的事物和谐地统一在一个秩序中,这并不是很少见的偶然现象,而是始终或大部分情况下都是如此。因此,必须有一个人,由他来管理这个世界,我们称他为上帝。
    1. The harmony of nature
      自然的和谐
    Many things in the universe work together in harmony.
    宇宙中的许多事物都是和谐共存的。
  27. was aware that the stark opposites to the goods are likewise present in nature, not only order and beauty, but also disorder and the ugly, and more evils than goods, more vile things than noble; therefore he introduced both love and strife, each to account for one of the two opposites.
    他意识到,自然界中同样存在与美好事物截然相反的事物,不仅有秩序和美,也有混乱和丑陋,而且邪恶多于美好,卑鄙多于高尚。
  28. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?
    如果他愿意阻止邪恶,但没有能力,那么他就是无能的。他有能力但不愿意,那么他就是邪恶的。难道他既有能力又有意愿?
  29. Language, 86, 124-25. See also Meaning;
    语言,86,124-25。另见 "意义";
    Sentences; Speech 句子;演讲