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THINKING THROUGH
AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
思考当代哲学导论

Kwame Anthony Appiah 夸梅-安东尼-阿皮亚

Thinking It Through  深思熟虑

AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
当代哲学导论

Kwame Anthony Appiah 夸梅-安东尼-阿皮亚

OXFORD 奥克斯

UNIVERSITY PRESS 大学出版社
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CONTENTS  目 录

Preface ix 序言 ixIntroduction: A Few Preliminaries xi
导言:序言 xi

CHAPTER 1: MIND 1
第 1 章:思维 1
1.1 Introduction. 1. 1.2 Descartes: The beginnings of modern philosophy of mind. 5. 1.3 The private-language argument. 12. 1.4 Computers as models of the mind. 19. 1.5 Why should there be a functionalist theory? 22.
1.1 引言 1.1.2 笛卡尔:现代心灵哲学的开端 5.5.1.3 私语论证12.1.4 作为心智模型的计算机19.1.5 为什么要有功能主义理论?22.
1.6 Functionalism: A first problem. 23. 1.7 A simple-minded functionalist theory of pain. 25. 1.8 Ramsey's solution to the first problem. 26. 1.9 Functionalism: A second problem. 28. 1.10 M again. 29. 1.11 Consciousness. 31. 1.12 The puzzle of the physical. 36. 1.13 Conclusion. 37.
1.6 功能主义:第一个问题。23.1.7 一种头脑简单的疼痛功能主义理论25.1.8 拉姆齐对第一个问题的解决方案。26.1.9 功能主义:第二个问题28.1.10 M again.29.1.11 意识31.1.12 物质之谜36.1.13 结论37.

CHAPTER 2: KNOWLEDGE 39
第 2 章 知识知识 39

2.1 Introduction. 39. 2.2 Plato: Knowledge as justified true belief. 41.
2.1 导言39.2.2 柏拉图:知识是合理的真实信念41.
2.3 Descartes' way: Justification requires certainty. 44. 2.4 Locke's way: Justification can be less than certain. 53. 2.5 The foundations of knowledge. 57. 2.6 Ways around skepticism I: Verificationism. 61. 2.7 Ways around skepticism II: Causal theories of knowledge. 66. 2.8 Causal theories contrasted with traditional accounts of justification. 70. 2.9 Epistemology naturalized. 74. 2.10 Conclusion. 77.
2.3 笛卡尔的方法:正义需要确定性44.2.4 洛克的方式:正义可以不那么确定。53.2.5 知识的基础57.2.6 绕过怀疑论的方法 I.验证论61.2.7 摆脱怀疑论的途径之二:知识的因果理论。66.2.8 因果理论与传统理由论的对比。70.2.9 认识论的自然化。74.2.10 Conclusion.77.
3.1 Introduction. 79. 3.2 The linguistic turn. 80. 3.3 The beetle in the box. 84. 3.4 Frege's "sense" and "reference." 87. 3.5 Predicates and open
3.1 导言79.3.2 语言学转向80.3.3 盒子里的甲虫84.3.4 弗雷格的 "意义 "与 "指称"87.3.5 谓词与开放

sentences. 92. 3.6 Problems of intensionality. 96. 3.7 Truth conditions and possible worlds. 99. 3.8 Analytic-synthetic and necessary-contingent. 102.
句子。92.3.6 内在性问题。96.3.7 真理条件与可能世界.3.8 分析-综合与必要-条件。102.
3.9 Natural language and logical form. 106. 3.10 Using logic: Truth preservation, probability, and the lottery paradox. 113. 3.11 Logical truth and logical properties. 115. 3.12 Conventions of language. 117.
3.9 自然语言和逻辑形式106.3.10 使用逻辑:保真、概率和彩票悖论。113.3.11 逻辑真理与逻辑性质。115.3.12 语言的约定117.
3.13 The paradox of analysis. 120. 3.14 Conclusion. 124.
3.13 分析的悖论120.3.14 结论124.

CHAPTER 4: SCIENCE 127
第 4 章:科学 127

4.1 Introduction. 127. 4.2 Description and prescription. 129. 4.3 An example: Gregor Mendel's genetic theory. 130. 4.4 Theory and observation. 136. 4.5 The received view of theories. 141. 4.6 The deductive-nomological model of explanation. 145. 4.7 Theory reduction and instrumentalism. 148. 4.8 Theory-ladenness. 152. 4.9 Justifying theories I: The problem of induction. 157. 4.10 Goodman's new riddle of induction. 161. 4.11 Justifying theories II: Popper and falsification. 163. 4.12 Justifying theories III: Inference to the best explanation. 167. 4.13 Laws and causation. 171. 4.14 Conclusion. 174.
4.1 导言127.4.2 说明和处方129.4.3 一个例子:格雷戈尔-孟德尔的遗传理论130.4.4 理论与观察136.4.5 接受的理论观141.4.6 阐释的演绎-名词模型145.4.7 理论还原与工具主义148.4.8 理论滞后性152.4.9 证明理论的合理性 I:归纳问题157.4.10 古德曼的归纳法新谜。161.4.11 证明理论的合理性之二:波普尔与证伪。163.4.12 证明理论的合理性之三:最佳解释的推论。167.4.13 规律与因果关系171.4.14 结论174.

CHAPTER 5: MORALITY 177
第 5 章:道德 177

5.1 Introduction. 177. 5.2 Facts and values. 180. 5.3 Realism and emotivism. 183. 5.4 Intuitionism. 187. 5.5 Emotivism again. 191. 5.6 Kant's universalizability principle. 197. 5.7 Dealing with relativism. 201. 5.8 Prescriptivism and supervenience. 204. 5.9 Problems of utilitarianism I: Defining "utility." 205. 5.10 Problems of utilitarianism II: Consequentialism versus absolutism. 208.
5.1 导言177.5.2 事实与价值180.5.3 现实主义与情感主义183.5.4 直觉主义187.5.5 再次情感主义191.5.6 Kant's universalizability principle.197.5.7 处理相对主义.201.5.8 规定论与超验性.204.5.9 功利主义的问题 I.功利主义的问题 I:"功利 "的定义205.5.10 功利主义的问题二:后果主义与绝对主义。208.
5.11 Rights. 213. 5.12 Self and others. 215. 5.13 Conclusion. 217.
5.11 Rights.213.5.12 自我与他人215.5.13 结论217.

CHAPTER 6: POLITICS 221
第 6 章:政治 221

6.1 Introduction. 221. 6.2 Hobbes: Escaping the state of nature. 224.
6.1 导言221.6.2 Hobbes:摆脱自然状态224.
6.3 Problems for Hobbes. 229. 6.4 Game theory I: Two-person zero-sum games. 232. 6.5 Game theory II: The prisoners' dilemma. 242. 6.6 The limits of prudence. 245. 6.7 Rawls's theory of justice. 248. 6.8 The difference principle and inequality surpluses. 250. 6.9 Criticizing Rawls I: The structure of his argument. 252. 6.10 Criticizing Rawls II: Why maximin? 254.
6.3 霍布斯的问题。229.6.4 博弈论 I:两人零和博弈.232.6.5 博弈论 II:囚徒困境。242.6.6 谨慎的限度245.6.7 罗尔斯的正义理论248.6.8 差异原则与不平等盈余 250.250.6.9 對羅爾斯的批判 I. 羅爾斯的論證結構:罗尔斯论证的结构252.6.10 对罗尔斯二的批评:为什么是最大限度原则?254.
6.11 Criticizing Rawls III: The status of the two principles. 256.
6.11 对罗尔斯的批评 III:两个原则的地位。256.
6.12 Reflective equilibrium. 258. 6.13 Are the two principles right? 260.
6.12 反射平衡258.6.13 这两个原则正确吗?260.
6.14 Nozick: Beginning with rights. 261. 6.15 The entitlement theory. 265.
6.14 诺齐克从权利开始261.6.15 权利理论265.
6.16 Ethics and politics. 267. 6.17 Conclusion. 269.
6.16 道德与政治267.6.17 结论269.
CHAPTER 7: LAW 271
第 7 章:法律 271
7.1 Introduction. 271. 7.2 Defining "law" I: Positivism and natural law. 275.
7.1 导言271.7.2 "法律 "的定义 I. 实证主义与自然法 271:实证主义与自然法275.
7.3 Defining "law" II: Legal systems and the variety of laws. 278.
7.3 "法律 "的定义之二:法律体系和法律的多样性。278.
7.4 Hart: The elements of a legal system. 280. 7.5 Punishment: The problem. 285.
7.4 哈特:法律制度的要素。280.7.5 惩罚:问题285.
7.6 Justifying punishment: Deterrence. 286. 7.7 Retributivism: Kant's objections. 288. 7.8 Combining deterrence and retribution. 289.
7.6 惩罚的正当性:威慑286.7.7 报应主义:康德的反对意见288.7.8 威慑与惩罚的结合。289.
7.9 Deterrence theory again. 291. 7.10 Why do definitions matter? 293.
7.9 再次威慑理论。291.7.10 为什么定义很重要?293.
7.11 Conclusion. 296. 7.11 结论296.

CHAPTER 8: METAPHYSICS 299
第 8 章:形而上学 299

8.1 Introduction. 299. 8.2 An example: The existence of numbers. 300. 8.3 "God" as a proper name. 305. 8.4 The necessary being. 310. 8.5 Hume: No a priori proofs of matters of fact. 316. 8.6 Kant: "Existence" is not a predicate. 317. 8.7 A posteriori arguments. 322. 8.8 The argument from design 324. 8.9 The harmony of nature. 325. 8.10 The necessity of a creative intelligence. 329 .
8.1 导言299.8.2 一个例子:数字的存在.300.8.3 作为专有名词的 "上帝"305.8.4 必然的存在310.8.5 休谟事实问题没有先验证明。316.8.6 康德"存在 "不是谓词。317.8.7 后验论证。322.8.8 设计论证 324.8.9 自然的和谐325.8.10 创造性智慧的必然性329 .
8.11 Hume's argument from design: The argument from experience. 331.
8.11 休谟的设计论证:经验论证331.
8.12 The problem of evil and inference to the best explanation. 334.
8.12 邪恶与最佳解释的推论问题。334.
8.13 Conclusion. 337. 8.13 结论337.

CHAPTER 9: PHILOSOPHY 339
第 9 章:哲学 339

9.1 Introduction. 339. 9.2 Traditional thought. 341. 9.3 Arguing with the Azande. 344. 9.4 The significance of literacy. 349. 9.5 Cognitive relativism. 353. 9.6 The argument against strong relativism. 355. 9.7 The argument for weak relativism. 357. 9.8 Philosophy and religion. 360. 9.9 Philosophy and science. 364. 9.10 An example: Free will and determinism. 365.
9.1 导言339.9.2 传统思想341.9.3 与阿赞德人争论344.9.4 扫盲的意义349.9.5 认知相对主义353.9.6 反对强相对主义的论据 355.355.9.7 弱相对主义的论据357.9.8 哲学与宗教360.9.9 哲学与科学364.9.10 一个例子:自由意志与决定论365.
9.11 Compatibilism and moral responsibility. 373. 9.12 The special character of philosophy. 377. 9.13 Conclusion. 379.
9.11 兼容性与道德责任.373.9.12 哲学的特殊性377.9.13 結論379.

PREFACE 前言

You learn a lot about your subject when you set out to introduce the range of it to people who are approaching it for the first time. That is a good part of the reason I set out to write an introduction to contemporary philosophy. After a while, as you do the detailed work of professional research, you risk losing sight of the forest for the trees. Stepping back for a bit, to think again about the shape of the subject and where your own work fits into it, allows you not just to rediscover connections but also to make new ones. That is why undergraduate teaching is so invigorating.
当你着手向第一次接触该学科的人介绍该学科的范围时,你会对自己的学科有很多了解。这也是我着手撰写当代哲学导论的主要原因。经过一段时间的专业研究工作后,你可能会迷失方向。退后一步,重新思考学科的形态以及自己的工作在其中的位置,不仅能重新发现联系,还能建立新的联系。这就是为什么本科教学如此令人振奋。
What I have tried to write is a reliable and systematic introduction to the central questions of current philosophical interest in the English-speaking world. (I have also pursued some less mainstream questions because I think they should be more mainstream!) A philosophy textbook can't be a record of current answers to the central questions, because philosophy is as much about deepening our understanding of a question as it is about finding an answer. So my task has been to prepare the reader to enter into contemporary debates by delineating the conceptual territory within which the many answers currently in play are located. I hope I have succeeded in making it possible for a newcomer to navigate that territory and that I have also made the navigation seem engaging, for that will mean that some of my readers will want to read more deeply in the subject. An introduction can be the beginning of a lifelong romance.
我试图写的是一本可靠而系统的入门书,介绍当前英语世界感兴趣的哲学核心问题(我也探讨了一些不那么主流的问题,因为我认为它们应该更主流!)。(我也探讨了一些不那么主流的问题,因为我认为它们应该更主流!)。哲学教科书不可能记录当前对中心问题的答案,因为哲学既要加深我们对问题的理解,也要找到答案。因此,我的任务是为读者进入当代争论做好准备,为读者勾勒出当前众多答案所处的概念领域。我希望我已经成功地让一个新读者能够浏览这一领域,而且我也让浏览看起来引人入胜,因为这意味着我的一些读者会想要更深入地阅读这一主题。一篇导读可能是一段终生浪漫的开始。
I find I have now taught philosophy on three continents, and it is astonishing how the same questions arise in such culturally disparate circumstances. I am grateful to all of my students, in Ghana, in England, and in the United States: Almost every one of them has taught me a new argument or-what is much the same-shown me an old one in a new light. This book is dedicated to them.
我发现自己现在已经在三大洲教授哲学,令人惊讶的是,在如此不同的文化环境中,竟然会出现同样的问题。我非常感谢我在加纳、英国和美国的所有学生:他们中的几乎每一个人都教会了我一个新的论点,或者--同样的--从一个新的角度向我展示了一个旧的论点。这本书就是献给他们的。

INTRODUCTION 引言

A Few Preliminaries 一些前言

People come to philosophy by many different routes. The physicist Schrödinger, who developed some of the key concepts of modern quantum theory, was drawn into philosophy by the profoundly puzzling nature of the world he and others discovered when they started to examine things on the scale of the atom. One of my friends came to philosophy when, as a teenager, he was first developing adult relationships of friendship and love. He was perplexed about how easy it was to think you understood somebody and then discover that you had not understood her at all. This led him to wonder whether we ever really know what is going on in other people's minds. And many people come to philosophy when they are trying, as we say, to "find themselves": to make sense of their lives and to decide who they are.
人们学习哲学的途径多种多样。物理学家薛定谔提出了现代量子理论的一些关键概念,他和其他人在开始研究原子尺度上的事物时,发现了这个世界令人深感困惑的本质,从而被吸引到哲学中来。我的一位朋友是在青少年时期开始接触哲学的,那时他刚刚建立起成人的友谊和爱情关系。他感到困惑的是,以为自己理解了某人,却发现自己根本没有理解她,这是多么容易的事情。这让他开始思考,我们是否真的了解别人的想法。正如我们所说的,许多人在试图 "找到自我 "的时候都会接触哲学:了解自己的生活,决定自己是谁。
If, for these or any other reasons, you come to have an interest in philosophy, it is natural to turn to the works of great philosophers. But for most people the content of these works is rather a shock. Instead of offering direct answers to these questions-What is physical reality really like? Can we ever be sure we know what other people are thinking? Who am I? - a philosopher is likely to start with questions that seem to him or her more basic than these . . . but which may seem to others far less interesting. Instead of beginning by asking what we can know about other people's thoughts, a philosopher is likely to start by asking what it is to know anything at all-thus beginning with epistemology, which is the philosophical examination of the nature of knowledge. Despite the natural disappointment it produces, I think that starting with these fundamental questions makes sense. Let me suggest an image that might help you to see why.
如果出于这些原因或其他原因,你对哲学产生了兴趣,自然会去阅读伟大哲学家的作品。但对大多数人来说,这些著作的内容却让人大跌眼镜。我们并没有直接回答这些问题--物理现实到底是什么样的?我们能确定自己知道别人在想什么吗?我是谁?- 哲学家很可能会从对他或她来说比这些问题更基本......但对其他人来说可能远没那么有趣的问题开始。与其一开始就问我们能知道别人的想法是什么,哲学家很可能一开始就问知道任何东西是什么--这就是从认识论开始,也就是对知识本质的哲学审视。尽管这自然会令人失望,但我认为从这些基本问题入手是有意义的。让我举个形象的例子,也许能帮助你理解其中的原因。
Imagine you are lost in a large old city in Africa or Asia or Europe. Every way you turn there is interest and excitement. But
想象一下,你迷失在非洲、亚洲或欧洲的一座古老大城市中。每转一圈,你都会感到兴趣盎然、兴奋不已。但是

you'd like to know where you are. The trouble is that just when you think you have found your way out of one maze of alleys, you are plunged into another. If, in your wanderings, you climb to the top of a tall tower, you can look down over the streets you have been lost in, and suddenly everything begins to make sense. You see where you should have turned one way but went another; you realize that the little shop you walked past, with the cat in the window, was only yards away from the garden in the next street, which you found hours later. And when you get back down into the maze you find your way easily. Now you know your way about.
你想知道自己身在何处。问题是,当你以为自己已经找到了走出迷宫的道路时,却又陷入了另一个迷宫。如果你在游荡中爬上了一座高塔的顶端,你就可以俯瞰你曾经迷失过的街道,突然间一切都变得有意义了。你会发现自己本该拐向一条路,却走了另一条路;你会意识到,你走过的那家橱窗里有只猫的小店,离下一条街的花园只有几码之遥,而你几小时后就找到了花园。当你回到迷宫中时,你很容易就能找到自己的路。现在,你对自己的路了如指掌。
In this book we shall find ourselves discussing the nature of morality, when we set out to decide whether it is always wrong to kill an innocent person; we shall end up talking about what it is for a theory to be scientific when we started out wondering about the claims of astrologers. And when this happens, I think it will help to bear in mind this image of being lost in an old city. When we move to these abstract questions, apparently remote from the practical concerns we started with, what we are doing is like climbing up that tower. From up there we can see our way around the problems. So that when we get back down into the city, back to the concrete problems that started us out, we should find it easier to get around.
在这本书中,当我们开始讨论杀死无辜的人是否总是错误时,我们会发现自己在讨论道德的本质;当我们开始怀疑占星家的说法时,我们最终会讨论什么是科学的理论。当这种情况发生时,我认为牢记 "迷失在古城中 "这一形象会有所帮助。当我们转向这些抽象的问题时,我们所做的事情就像是爬上了那座塔。在上面,我们可以看到问题的来龙去脉。这样,当我们回到城市,回到一开始的具体问题时,我们就会发现绕过去会更容易。
People are normally introduced to philosophy by one of two routes. The first is through reading the more accessible of the great historical texts of philosophy-Plato's dialogues, for example, or Descartes' Meditations. The second is by examining some central philosophical question: "What is knowledge?" say, or "Is morality objective?" In this book I shall be following this second route, but I shall discuss the views of some of the great philosophers on the central questions on the way. Still, it is important to keep in mind that I will always be trying to move toward a philosophical understanding of the problem I am looking at, rather than trying to give a historically accurate account of a past philosopher.
人们通常通过两种途径之一接触哲学。第一种是通过阅读比较通俗易懂的哲学史巨著--比如柏拉图的对话录或笛卡尔的沉思录。第二种是通过研究某个核心哲学问题:比如 "知识是什么?"或者 "道德是客观的吗?"在本书中,我将遵循第二条路线,但我会在途中讨论一些伟大哲学家对核心问题的看法。不过,重要的是要记住,我将始终努力从哲学角度理解我正在研究的问题,而不是试图对过去的哲学家进行历史性的准确描述。
It is fashionable, at the moment, to stress the way that the central problems of philosophy change over time. People say that no one nowadays can really be concerned with all of the problems that worried Plato. There is some truth in this. There are things in Plato that it is hard to understand or get excited by: much of the theory in the
强调哲学的核心问题会随着时间的推移而发生变化,是当下的一种时尚。人们说,如今没有人能够真正关心柏拉图担心的所有问题。这种说法有一定道理。柏拉图的有些东西很难理解,也很难让人感到兴奋:《柏拉图哲学》中的许多理论都是如此。
Symposium about the nature of love, for example, is likely to seem to a modern reader hopelessly wrong. Fortunately, however, a good deal more in Plato is extremely interesting and relevant: his Theaetetus, which is a dramatic dialogue about the nature of knowledge, remains one of the great classics of philosophy, and I shall discuss it in Chapter 2.
例如,在现代读者看来,《神曲》中关于爱的本质的论述很可能是无可救药的错误。不过,幸运的是,柏拉图中还有很多内容都非常有趣且具有现实意义:他的《泰阿泰德篇》(Theaetetus)是关于知识本质的戏剧性对话,至今仍是伟大的哲学经典之一,我将在第二章中讨论它。
So the reason we philosophers continue to read Plato and many other philosophers between his time and ours is not simple curiosity about the history of our subject. Rather, we find in the great works of the past clues to a deeper understanding of the philosophical questions that trouble us now. That's why mentioning Plato and Descartes isn't some kind of concession to the proponents of the historical route into philosophy. It isn't even just a concession to old habits in the teaching of philosophy. It is simply a reflection of the facts that make the historical route work.
因此,我们哲学家之所以继续阅读柏拉图以及从他的时代到我们的时代之间的许多其他哲学家的作品,并不是因为对我们学科的历史感到好奇。相反,我们从过去的伟大作品中找到了一些线索,从而更深入地理解困扰我们的哲学问题。这就是为什么提到柏拉图和笛卡尔并不是对历史哲学路线支持者的某种让步。这甚至不仅仅是对哲学教学中的旧习惯的让步。它只是反映了使历史路线行之有效的事实。
My aim in this book is twofold, then: First, I would like anyone who reads it carefully to be able to go on to read contemporary philosophical discussions. Second, I would like such a reader to be able when he or she comes to read Plato, say, or Descartes, to see why their work remains an enduring contribution to our understanding of the central problems of philosophy. I shall always have in mind a beginning philosophy student who knows none of the technical language of philosophy but is, nevertheless, willing to think through difficult questions. There are bibliographical notes and some advice on further reading at the end of the book; and there is also an index, which gives in bold type the page number of the page where a term is introduced or defined. Finally, because I often need to refer you back or forward to a discussion of a related issue, I have numbered the sections of each chapter. So sometimes I'll refer to section 5 of chapter 3, for example, as 3.5. Together, these various tools - the notes, the index, the further reading, and the numbered sections-are meant to help you find your way around.
我写这本书有两个目的:首先,我希望认真阅读本书的读者能够继续阅读当代哲学讨论。其次,我希望这样的读者在阅读柏拉图或笛卡尔的著作时,能够明白为什么他们的著作对我们理解哲学的核心问题仍有持久的贡献。我始终认为,初学哲学的学生不懂哲学的专业语言,但他们愿意思考棘手的问题。书末有书目注释和一些进一步阅读的建议;还有一个索引,用粗体字标出了介绍或定义某个术语的页码。最后,由于我经常需要让你回溯或向前查阅相关问题的讨论,因此我对每一章的章节进行了编号。因此,有时我会把第 3 章第 5 节称为 3.5。这些不同的工具--注释、索引、进一步阅读和章节编号--都是为了帮助你找到方向。
You will learn a lot of new words in the course of reading this book. Philosophy, like all scholarly disciplines, has its own technical terms. We use them because technical language allows you to keep track of important distinctions and to speak and write in ways that are
在阅读本书的过程中,你会学到很多新词。与所有学术学科一样,哲学也有自己的专业术语。我们使用这些专业术语,是因为专业术语可以让你掌握重要的区别,并在说话和写作时

somewhat more precise than our everyday talk. The important thing is to grasp the ideas these terms express and the distinctions they make and to see how these distinctions and ideas can be used in arguments that deepen our understanding. And one general rule to keep in mind was set out by the Greek philosopher Aristotle about twenty-five hundred years ago: he insisted that we should adopt the degree of precision appropriate to the subject matter. We could say, more generally, that distinctions are worth making only if they do some work in an argument or help us to see something we wouldn't otherwise see. The technical terms are tools for a purpose, not the point of the exercise. As far as possible, contemporary philosophers actually prefer to use what the English philosopher Bernard Williams once called "moderately plain speech." So while philosophy has a technical vocabulary, doing philosophy means more than knowing and throwing around those special terms.
这些术语比我们的日常用语更为精确。重要的是要掌握这些术语所表达的思想和它们所做的区分,并了解如何在论证中使用这些区分和思想来加深我们的理解。希腊哲学家亚里士多德在大约 2500 年前提出了一条需要牢记的一般规则:他坚持认为,我们应该采用与主题相适应的精确度。我们可以更笼统地说,只有当区别在论证中起到一定作用或帮助我们看到一些我们无法看到的东西时,才值得进行区分。专业术语是达到目的的工具,而不是工作的重点。当代哲学家实际上更喜欢尽可能使用英国哲学家伯纳德-威廉姆斯(Bernard Williams)曾称之为 "适度平实的语言"。因此,虽然哲学有专业词汇,但做哲学不仅仅意味着知道和使用这些专门术语。
The book is organized around eight central areas of the subject: mind, knowledge, language, science, morality, politics, law, and metaphysics. (Only the last of these, as you see, has a technical name. When we get to the chapter on metaphysics, I'll explain why it has to be there.) In the chapter on language I say something about logic; in the chapter on metaphysics I discuss the existence of God.
全书围绕该学科的八个核心领域展开:心智、知识、语言、科学、道德、政治、法律和形而上学。(如你所见,只有最后一个领域有一个专业名称。当我们讲到形而上学这一章时,我会解释为什么要把它放在这里)。在关于语言的那一章里,我将谈谈逻辑学;在关于形而上学的那一章里,我将讨论上帝的存在。
Now I'm going to start straight in with Mind and this may seem surprising. You might have supposed that a good question to answer at the beginning of an introductory philosophy book is: "What is philosophy?" But I think that is a mistake, and if we consider the same question about a different subject, I think you will see why.
现在,我要直接从 "心智 "开始讲起,这可能会让人感到意外。你可能认为,在哲学入门书的开头,一个好的问题应该是:"哲学是什么?"但我认为这是一个错误,如果我们换一个主题来思考同样的问题,我想你就会明白为什么了。
So consider the question: "What is physics?" If you asked what physics was, you might well get the answer that it is the study of the physical world. In some ways this isn't a very helpful answer. One trouble is that if you take the answer broadly, then biology is a branch of physics: living organisms are part of the physical world. But this just shows that not every part of the physical world gets studied in physics. Which aspects are the physical aspects? Well, if you knew that, and were thus able to rule out biological questions, you would already be well on the way to knowing what physics is.
那么请考虑一下这个问题"物理学是什么?"如果你问物理学是什么,你很可能会得到这样的答案:物理学是对物理世界的研究。在某些方面,这并不是一个非常有用的答案。麻烦之一在于,如果你从广义上理解这个答案,那么生物学就是物理学的一个分支:生物体是物理世界的一部分。但这恰恰说明,物理学并不是对物理世界的每一部分都进行研究。哪些方面是物理方面?好吧,如果你知道这一点,从而能够排除生物学问题,那么你就已经在了解物理学是什么的道路上走得很顺利了。
Nevertheless, there is a reason why most of us don't find this answer just unhelpful. We learned some physics in high school, and
尽管如此,我们中的大多数人并不觉得这个答案毫无用处,这是有原因的。我们在高中时学过一些物理知识,而且

so we already have lots of examples of physical experiments and problems to draw on. These examples allow us to understand what is meant by "the physical world": it consists of those aspects of the world that are like the ones we studied in high school physics. If we tell someone who has never done any physics that physics is the systematic study of the physical world, we should not be surprised if they find our answer rather unhelpful.
因此,我们已经有很多物理实验和问题的例子可以借鉴。通过这些例子,我们可以理解 "物理世界 "的含义:它包括世界的那些方面,就像我们在高中物理中学习的那些方面一样。如果我们告诉一个从未学过物理的人,物理学是对物理世界的系统研究,那么如果他们觉得我们的回答毫无帮助,我们也不应该感到惊讶。
There is a lesson here for how we should begin to develop an understanding of what philosophy is. What it suggests is that rather than tackling the question head on, we should look at some examples of philosophical work. With these examples in mind it won't be so unhelpful to be given an answer like the one we got to "What is physics?" For if we end up by saying that philosophy is the study of philosophical problems, that won't be uninformative if we have an idea of what some of the major philosophical problems are. So I'm not going to start this book by telling you what I-or anyone elsethink philosophy is. I'm going to start by doing some. Just as you are in a better position to understand what physics is when you have done some, so you will be better able to see how philosophy fits into our thought and our culture when you have a "feel" for how philosophers argue and what they argue about.
这为我们如何开始理解哲学提供了启示。它告诉我们,与其直面问题,不如看看哲学工作的一些实例。有了这些例子,我们在回答 "物理学是什么 "时就不会那么无助了。因为如果我们最后说哲学是研究哲学问题的,如果我们知道一些主要的哲学问题是什么,那就不会一无所获了。因此,我不会在本书一开始就告诉你我或其他人认为哲学是什么。我打算从做一些事情开始。就像当你研究过物理学之后,你就能更好地理解物理学是什么一样,当你 "感觉 "到哲学家们是如何争论以及他们争论什么的时候,你就能更好地理解哲学是如何融入我们的思想和文化的。
Before we start I need, finally, to introduce a couple of conventions that I'm going to use. I shall use quotation marks to do two different jobs. One job-exemplified in the last sentence of the previous paragraph - is to indicate that a word is being used in a nonstandard way. Philosophers call these "scare quotes." The other job is to allow me to refer to words, sentences and other expressions, as when I say that the word "word" has four letters. The sentence
最后,在我们开始之前,我需要介绍一下我将要使用的几个惯例。我将使用引号来完成两项不同的工作。一项工作--上一段的最后一句就是例子--是表示某个词的使用方式不规范。哲学家称之为 "恐吓引号"。另一个作用是允许我指代单词、句子和其他表达方式,比如我说 "word "这个词有四个字母。句子
A: There are nine letters in "most words." is true. The sentence
答:"大多数单词 "中有九个字母。句子
B: There are nine letters in most words.
B:大多数单词都有九个字母。
is false. ("False," for example, has only five letters!) And I've just exemplified one other convention. When I display a sentence or expression indented on a line by itself, I will not put it in quotes; the fact of displaying it in this way is an alternative convention for allowing
是假的。(例如,"False "只有五个字母!)我刚才还举例说明了另一个惯例。当我显示一个单独缩进一行的句子或表达式时,我不会把它放在引号里。

me to refer to words and other linguistic expressions. If I put a letter at the start of the line, I'll use that letter as the name of the sentence later. So here, for example, I can say that A and B have very different meanings. In A, we say, I am mentioning the words "most words." In B, I am using them. This distinction between use and mention may seem obvious. But sometimes, in a complex argument, we may get into a muddle if we don't keep use and mention distinct. In chapter eight, for example, we'll discuss the existence of numbers. There it will be important to distinguish between asking whether the numeral (i.e., the word or symbol) " 9 " exists, and whether 9 itself exists. The answer to the first question is obviously Yes. But the answer to the second question is not nearly so simple.
我可以用它来指代单词和其他语言表达方式。如果我在行首写上一个字母,稍后我就会用这个字母作为句子的名称。因此,比如在这里,我可以说 A 和 B 的含义截然不同。在 A 中,我们可以说,我提到了 "大多数单词"。而在 B 中,我在使用它们。使用和提及之间的区别看似显而易见。但有时,在复杂的论证中,如果我们不把 "使用 "和 "提及 "区分开来,就会陷入困境。例如,在第八章中,我们将讨论数字的存在。在那里,重要的是要区分 "9 "这个数字(即单词或符号)是否存在,以及 "9 "本身是否存在。第一个问题的答案显然是肯定的。但第二个问题的答案就没那么简单了。
If I were to follow this convention strictly, then, when I introduced a term (as I often will) by saying "I will call something ," I would have to put the " " in quotes. But here the boldface type can do the job of the quotes-which is to show that I'm mentioning a term and not using it-so I won't usually bother. The convention is meant to help avoid confusion: it's not an obsession to be pursued for its own sake! (For the record, terms occur in boldface only at the point where I introduce or define them.)
如果我严格遵守这一惯例,那么,当我在介绍一个术语时(我经常这样做)说:"我将把某物称为 ,"我就必须把 " "加上引号。但在这里,粗体字可以完成引号的工作--即表明我是在提及一个术语,而不是在使用它,所以我通常不会去麻烦它。这个惯例的目的是避免混淆,而不是为了追求它而追求它!(为了记录在案,只有在我介绍或定义术语时,才会用黑体字表示)。
I began this introduction by mentioning various questions that might lead you to philosophy in the first place; but perhaps you have never been bothered by any such questions. That is no reason to think that philosophy is not for you. Many people do, of course, live their lives without ever thinking systematically about philosophy. But I shall be arguing that many problems that trouble us in ordinary life-down in the city, rather than up in the tower-can only be answered if we first ask the more fundamental questions that are the hallmark of philosophy. Doing philosophy, then, enlarges your capacity to think about the life you are leading and what matters in it. Socrates famously said that the unexamined life was not worth living. Philosophy is one way to enrich your ability to examine the assumptions and ambitions that guide your life.
在这篇导言的开头,我提到了可能会让你首先接触哲学的各种问题;但也许你从未被任何此类问题困扰过。但这并不能成为你认为哲学不适合你的理由。当然,许多人在生活中从未系统地思考过哲学。但我要论证的是,许多困扰我们普通生活的问题,只有在我们首先提出作为哲学标志的更基本的问题时,才能得到解答。因此,学习哲学可以提高你思考生活和生活中重要问题的能力。苏格拉底有句名言:未经审查的生活是不值得过的。哲学就是一种丰富你审视指导你生活的假设和抱负的能力的方法。

CHAPTER 1 第 1 章

Mind 思想

What is a mind?
什么是思想?
Could we make a machine with a mind? What is the relationship between minds and bodies?
我们能制造出有思想的机器吗?思想和身体之间的关系是什么?

1.1 Introduction 1.1 导言

In countless movies, computers play a starring role. Some talk in synthesized voices; others write a stream of words on a screen. Some manage spaceships; others, the "brains" of robots, manage their own "bodies." People converse with them, are understood by them, exchange information and greetings with them. Much of this is still science fiction. But real computers advise lawyers on relevant cases, doctors on diagnoses, engineers on the state of atomic reactors. Both the fantasy and the fact would have astonished our grandparents. Their grandparents might have thought that this could only be achieved by magic. Yet most of us are getting used to it, taking the silicon age for granted.
在无数电影中,计算机都是主角。有的用合成声音说话,有的在屏幕上书写文字。有的管理着宇宙飞船;有的则是机器人的 "大脑",管理着自己的 "身体"。人们与它们交谈,被它们理解,与它们交换信息和问候。这些在很大程度上还是科幻小说。但真正的计算机会就相关案件向律师提供建议,就诊断向医生提供建议,就原子反应堆的状态向工程师提供建议。无论是幻想还是事实,都会让我们的祖辈感到惊讶。他们的祖辈可能会认为,这只有通过魔法才能实现。然而,我们中的大多数人却对此习以为常,认为硅时代的到来是理所当然的。
Still, a suspicion remains. We human beings have always thought of ourselves as special. We all assume some contrast between the world of material things and the world of spiritual things. If the computer really is a "material mind," then not only must we rethink this distinction, but we have broken it with our own creations. We should be careful to avoid such an important conclusion until we have really thought it through. However natural it seems to take it for granted that computers can think and act, then, we shouldn't just assume it. In philosophy we often find that what we normally take for granted - the "commonsense" point of view-gets in the way of a proper understanding of the issues. So let's see if the way I spoke about computers in the first paragraph is accurate.
尽管如此,一种怀疑依然存在。我们人类总是认为自己很特别。我们都假定物质世界和精神世界之间存在某种对比。如果计算机真的是一种 "物质心灵",那么我们不仅必须重新思考这种区别,而且我们自己的创造也打破了这种区别。在我们真正想清楚之前,我们应该小心避免得出这样一个重要的结论。无论我们认为计算机能够思考和行动是理所当然的,但我们都不应该只是假设。在哲学中,我们经常会发现,我们通常认为理所当然的东西--"常识 "观点--会妨碍我们对问题的正确理解。所以,让我们看看我在第一段中谈到计算机的方式是否准确。
I said that they talk. But do they really talk in the sense that
我说它们会说话。但它们真的会说话吗?

people do? It isn't enough to say that they produce something that sounds like speech. Tape recorders do that, but they don't talk. When people talk they mean something by what they say. To mean something, they need to be able to understand sentences. Now I also said that computers understand what we say to them. But do they really? The sounds of our speech are turned into electrical impulses. The impulses pass through the circuits of the machine. And that causes the speech synthesizer to produce sounds. It may be very clever to design a machine that does this, but what evidence do we have that the machine understands?
人做什么?光说他们发出听起来像说话的声音是不够的。录音机可以做到这一点,但它们不会说话。当人们说话时,他们所说的话是有意义的。为了表达某种意思,他们必须能够理解句子。我还说过,电脑能听懂我们对它们说的话。但它们真的能听懂吗?我们说话的声音会变成电脉冲。这些脉冲通过机器的电路。这样,语音合成器就会发出声音。设计出这样的机器也许非常聪明,但我们有什么证据能证明机器听得懂呢?
Well, could a machine understand? There are two obvious responses to this question. The first response I'll call mentalist, for the sake of a label. It's the response you make if you think that understanding what people say involves having a mind. The mentalist says:
那么,机器能听懂吗?对于这个问题,有两种显而易见的回答。第一种回答,为了贴标签起见,我称之为 "心智学家"。如果你认为理解人们所说的话需要有思想,你就会这样回答。心理学家说:
Computers can't really understand anything. To understand they would have to have conscious minds. But we made them from silicon chips and we programmed them. We didn't give them conscious minds. So we know they don't have them.
计算机无法真正理解任何事物。要想理解,它们必须拥有有意识的思维。但我们用硅芯片制造了它们,并给它们编程。我们并没有赋予它们意识所以我们知道它们没有意识
At the other extreme is the response I'll call behaviorist. The behaviorist says:
另一个极端是我称之为行为主义者的反应。行为主义者说:
Naturally, everyone should agree that some computers don't understand. But there's no reason why a computer couldn't be made that does understand. If a machine responds in the same ways to speech as a person who understands speech, then we have just as much reason to say that the machine understands as we have to say that the person does. A machine that behaves in every way as if it understands is indistinguishable from a machine that understands. If it behaved in the right way, that would show that it had a mind.
当然,每个人都应该同意,有些计算机听不懂。但是,我们没有理由不制造出一台听得懂话的计算机。如果一台机器对言语的反应与一个理解言语的人相同,那么我们就有理由说这台机器理解言语,就像我们有理由说这个人理解言语一样。如果一台机器在各方面的表现都像是听懂了,那么它与一台听懂了的机器是没有区别的。如果它的行为方式是正确的,那就说明它有思想。
It is clear why I call this response "behaviorist." For the behaviorist says that to understand is to behave as if you understand.
很显然,我为什么称这种反应为 "行为主义"。因为行为主义者说,理解就是要表现得好像你理解了一样。
What we have here is a situation that is quite familiar in philosophy. There are two opposing views-mentalist and behaviorist, in this case-each of which seems to have something in its favor, but neither of which looks completely right. Each of these views has a
这里的情况在哲学中很常见。有两种对立的观点--在这里是唯心主义观点和行为主义观点--每种观点似乎都有其有利之处,但看起来都不完全正确。每种观点都有一个

bit of common sense on its side. The mentalist relies on the common sense claim that machines can't think. The behaviorist relies on the common sense claim that all we know about other people's minds we know from what they do. It looks as though common sense here isn't going to tell us if the mentalist or the behaviorist is right.
常识。心智论者依据的常识是,机器不会思考。行为主义者依据的常识是,我们对他人思想的了解都是从他们的行为中得知的。看起来,常识并不能告诉我们是心理学家还是行为主义者是对的。
In fact, if you hold either of these views you can face difficult intellectual choices. Let's start with a problem you get into if you are a mentalist. Suppose the computer in question is in a robot, which, like androids in science fiction, looks exactly like a person. It's a very smart computer, so that its "body" responds exactly like a particular person: your mother, for example. For that reason I'll call the robot "M." Wouldn't you have as much reason for thinking that M had a mind as you have for thinking that your mother does? You might say, "Not if I know that it's got silicon chips in its head." But did you ever check that your mother has got brain tissue in her head? You didn't, of course, because it wouldn't prove anything if you did. Your belief that your mother has a mind is based on what she says and does. What's in her head may be an interesting question, the behaviorist will say, but it isn't relevant to deciding whether she has thoughts. And if it doesn't matter what is in your mother's head, why should it matter what's in M's?
事实上,如果你持有这两种观点中的任何一种,你都会面临困难的智力选择。让我们先来看看心理学家会遇到的一个问题。假设问题中的计算机是一个机器人,就像科幻小说中的机器人一样,它看起来和人一模一样。它是一台非常聪明的电脑,因此它的 "身体 "的反应完全像一个特定的人:比如你的母亲。因此,我称这个机器人为 "M"。难道你没有理由认为 M 和你母亲一样有思想吗?你可能会说,"如果我知道它脑袋里有硅芯片就不会"但你有没有检查过你妈妈的脑袋里有没有脑组织呢?你当然没有,因为就算你检查了也证明不了什么。你认为你妈妈有思想是基于她的言行。行为学家会说,她脑子里有什么可能是个有趣的问题,但这与判断她是否有思想无关。如果你母亲脑子里有什么并不重要,那么 M 脑子里有什么又有什么关系呢?
That's a major problem if you're a mentalist: how to explain why you wouldn't say an android had a mind, even if you had the same evidence that it had a mind as you have that your mother does. Surely it would be absurd to believe your mother has a mind on the basis of what she does and says, yet refuse to believe has a mind on the very same evidence. If it's the evidence of what your mother does that entitles you to believe she has a mind (and not, say, an innate prejudice), then the very same evidence about something else would entitle you to believe that it had a mind. This is one line of thought that might lead you to behaviorism.
如果你是一个唯心主义者,这就是一个大问题:如何解释为什么你不会说一个机器人有思想,即使你有同样的证据证明它有思想,就像你有证据证明你母亲有思想一样。根据你母亲的一言一行就相信她有思想,而根据同样的证据却拒绝相信 有思想,这无疑是荒谬的。如果是你母亲的所作所为让你有资格相信她有思想(而不是天生的偏见),那么关于其他事物的同样证据也会让你有资格相信它有思想。这种思路可能会把你引向行为主义。
But if you decide to be a behaviorist, you have problems too. You and I both know, after all, since we both do have minds, what it is like to have a mind. So you and I both know there's a difference between us and a machine that behaves exactly like us but doesn't have any experiences. Unless has experiences, it hasn't got a mind. The difference between having a mind and operating as if
但如果你决定成为一名行为主义者,你也有问题。毕竟,你和我都知道,因为我们都有思想,有思想是什么感觉。所以,你我都知道,我们和一台行为与我们一模一样,但却没有任何经验的机器之间是有区别的。除非 有经验,否则它就没有思想。有思想和仿佛有思想一样运作之间的区别是

you've got one seems as clear as the difference between being conscious and being unconscious.
就像有意识和无意识之间的区别一样明显。
The upshot is this: If you look at the question from the outside, comparing M with other people, behaviorism looks tempting. From the point of view of the evidence you have, and your mother are the same. Looked at from the inside, however, there is all the difference in the world. You know you have a mind because you have conscious experiences, an "inner life." M may have experiences, for all we know. But if it doesn't, no amount of faking is going to make it true that it has a mind.
结果就是这样:如果你从外部来看待这个问题,将 M 与其他人进行比较,行为主义看起来很有诱惑力。从你所掌握的证据来看, 和你的母亲是一样的。然而,从内心来看,他们却有着天壤之别。你知道自己有思想,因为你有有意识的体验,有 "内在生命"。就我们所知,"M "也可能有体验。但如果它没有,那么再怎么伪装也无法让人相信它有思想。
We started with a familiar fact: computers are everywhere and they're getting smarter. It looks as though there will soon be intelligent machines, machines that will understand what we say to them. But when we look a little closer, things are not so simple. On the one hand, there is reason to doubt that behaving like a person with a mind and having a mind are the same thing. On the other, once we start asking what and how we know about the minds of other people, it seems that our conviction that people have minds is no better based than the belief that there could be understanding computers. We call someone who asks philosophical questions about what and how we know an epistemologist. And if we ask how we know about the minds of other people it seems plain that it is from what they say and do. We simply have no direct way of knowing what-if anything - is going on in other people's minds. But then, if what people say and do is what shows us they have minds, a machine that says and does the same things shows us that it has a mind also. From the epistemologist's point of view, other people's minds and the "minds" of computers are in the same boat.
我们从一个熟悉的事实开始:计算机无处不在,而且越来越智能。似乎很快就会出现智能机器,这些机器能听懂我们对它们说的话。但是,当我们再仔细观察一下,事情就不那么简单了。一方面,我们有理由怀疑,行为像一个有思想的人和有思想是一回事。另一方面,一旦我们开始追问我们对其他人的思想了解多少以及如何了解,我们相信人有思想的信念似乎并不比相信有理解力强的计算机更有根据。我们把追问 "我们知道什么 "和 "我们如何知道 "的哲学问题的人称为认识论者。如果我们要问我们是如何了解他人的思想的,那么似乎很明显,我们是从他们的言行中了解的。我们根本无法直接了解他人的思想到底是怎么回事。但是,如果人们的一言一行能让我们知道他们有思想,那么一台说着同样的话、做着同样的事的机器也能让我们知道它有思想。从认识论者的角度来看,其他人的思想和计算机的 "思想 "是一脉相承的。
When we look at the question from the inside, as we have seen, the picture looks different. Someone who looks from the inside we can call a phenomenologist. "Phenomenology" is the philosopher's word for reflecting on the nature of our conscious mental life. From the phenomenologist's point of view, , and all machines, however good they are at behaving like people, may well turn out not to have minds.
正如我们所看到的,当我们从内部来看待这个问题时,情况就会有所不同。我们可以称从内部观察问题的人为现象学家。"现象学 "是哲学家对我们有意识的精神生活的本质进行反思的术语。从现象学家的角度来看, ,以及所有的机器,无论它们表现得多么像人,很可能都没有思想。
From thinking about computers in science fiction we have found our way to the center of the maze of problems that philosophers call the philosophy of mind or philosophical psychology.
从科幻小说中对计算机的思考出发,我们找到了通往问题迷宫中心的道路,哲学家们称之为心灵哲学或哲学心理学。
As I said in the introduction, philosophical perplexity is a little like being lost in an old city. It is time now to find our way up that tower to have a look around. We have already been forced back to two of the most fundamental philosophical questions, "What is it to have a mind?" and "How do we know that other people have minds?" So let us put aside the question about and take up these more fundamental questions directly. At the end of the chapter I'll get back to , and we'll see then if our trip up the tower has indeed helped us to find our way about.
正如我在导言中所说,哲学的困惑有点像迷失在一座古城中。现在是时候找到上塔的路,四处看看了。我们已经被迫回到了两个最基本的哲学问题:"什么是有思想?"和 "我们怎么知道其他人有思想?"因此,让我们抛开关于 的问题,直接讨论这些更基本的问题。在本章结尾,我将回到 ,到时我们再看看我们的登塔之旅是否真的帮助我们找到了方向。

1.2 Descartes: The beginnings of modern philosophy of mind
1.2 笛卡尔:现代心灵哲学的开端

The dominant view of the mind for the last three hundred years of Western philosophy has been one that derives from the French philosopher René Descartes, one of the most influential philosophers of all time. His method is to start looking at questions by asking how an individual can acquire knowledge. He starts, that is, by asking how he knows what he knows; and if you want to see the force of his arguments, you will have to start by asking yourself how you know what you know. The fact that Descartes starts with how he knows things marks him as one of the first modern philosophers. For, since Descartes, much of Western philosophy has been based on epistemological considerations.
在过去三百年的西方哲学中,关于心灵的主流观点源自法国哲学家勒内-笛卡尔,他是有史以来最具影响力的哲学家之一。他的方法是从个人如何获取知识开始研究问题。也就是说,他先问自己是如何知道自己知道什么的;如果你想了解他的论点的力量,你就必须先问自己是如何知道自己知道什么的。笛卡尔从如何认识事物入手,这标志着他是最早的现代哲学家之一。因为,自笛卡尔以来,西方哲学的大部分内容都是基于认识论的考虑。
Descartes' best-known work, the Discourse on Method-its full title is actually Discourse on the Method for Properly Conducting Reason and Searching for Truth in the Sciences-is written in a clear, attractive style. This may make what he is saying seem simpler and more obvious than it really is, so we need to consider what he says very carefully. Here is a passage from the fourth part of the Discourse, published in 1637, where he sets out very clearly his view of the nature of his own self: would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I knew from this that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature was only to think, and that had no need for any place to exist and did not depend on any material thing; so that this "I," which is to say my mind, through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from my body, and even that it is easier to know than my body, and further that even if my body did not exist at all, my mind would not cease to be all that it is.
笛卡尔最著名的作品《方法论》--全名实际上是《关于在科学中正确地进行理性思辨和探求真理的方法的论述》--是用一种清晰、吸引人的风格写成的。这可能会让他所说的话看起来比实际情况更简单、更明显,因此我们需要仔细斟酌他所说的话。下面是 1637 年出版的《论语》第四部分中的一段话,他在这段话中非常清楚地阐述了他对自我本质的看法:我没有理由相信我是存在的;我知道我是一种物质,它的全部本质或性质只是思考,它不需要任何地方存在,也不依赖于任何物质;因此,这个 "我",也就是我的思想,通过它我才是我,它完全不同于我的身体,甚至它比我的身体更容易被认识,而且,即使我的身体根本不存在,我的思想也不会停止它的存在。
This passage contains practically every central component of Descartes' philosophy of mind.
这段话几乎包含了笛卡尔心灵哲学的所有核心内容。
First, Descartes is a dualist. This means he believes that a mind and a body are two quite distinct sorts of thing, two kinds of what he calls "substance."
首先,笛卡尔是二元论者。这意味着他认为心灵和身体是两种截然不同的东西,是他所谓的 "物质 "的两种。
Second, what he thinks you really are, your self, is a mind. Since you are your mind, and minds are totally independent of bodies, you could still exist, even without a body.
其次,他认为你真正的自我是一种思想。既然你就是你的思想,而思想完全独立于身体,那么即使没有身体,你也可以存在。
Third, your mind and your thoughts are the things you know best. For Descartes it is possible, at least in principle, for there to be a mind without a body, unable, however hard it tries, to become aware of anything else, including any other minds. Descartes knew, of course, that the way we do in fact come to know what is happening in other minds is by observing the speech and actions of "other bodies." But for him there were two serious possibilities, each of which would mean that our belief in the existence of other minds was mistaken. One is that these other bodies could be mere figments of our imagination. The other is that, even if bodies and other material things do exist, the evidence we normally think justifies our belief that other bodies are inhabited by minds could have been produced by automata, by mindless machines.
第三,你的心灵和思想是你最了解的东西。在笛卡尔看来,至少在原则上,存在一个没有身体的心灵是可能的,无论它如何努力,都无法意识到任何其他事物,包括任何其他心灵。当然,笛卡尔知道,我们事实上是通过观察 "其他身体 "的言行来了解其他心灵的。但对他来说,有两种严重的可能性,每一种都意味着我们对其他心灵存在的信念是错误的。一种可能是,这些其他身体可能只是我们的想象。另一种可能是,即使身体和其他物质确实存在,我们通常认为证明我们相信其他身体有思想的证据也可能是由自动机、无意识的机器制造出来的。
Fourth, the essence of a mind is to have thoughts, and by "thoughts" Descartes means anything that you are aware of in your mind when you are conscious. (The essence of a kind of thing, , is the property — or set of properties-whose possession is a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in . That is, if something has the essential property , then it belongs to - so is sufficient for membership in ; anything that doesn't have doesn't belong to -so is necessary for membership.) In other places Descartes says that the essence of a material thing - the property, in other
第四,心灵的本质是有思想,而笛卡尔所说的 "思想 "是指当你有意识时你头脑中意识到的任何东西。(一种事物的本质, ,是指属性--或一组属性--它的拥有是成为 成员的必要和充分条件。也就是说,如果某物具有 这一本质属性,那么它就属于 --所以 的充分条件;任何不具有 的东西都不属于 --所以 是加入的必要条件)。在其他地方,笛卡尔说,物质的本质--属性,换句话说--是"......"。

words, every material thing must have-is that it occupies space. This means that for Descartes the two essential differences between material things and minds are (1) that minds think, whereas matter does not, and (2) that material things take up space, whereas minds do not. Descartes' claim, then, is that what distinguishes the mind from the body is the negative fact that the mind is not in space and the positive fact that the mind thinks.
换句话说,每种物质都必须具备--那就是它占据空间。这意味着,在笛卡尔看来,物质与心灵的两个本质区别是:(1)心灵会思考,而物质不会;(2)物质占据空间,而心灵不占据空间。因此,笛卡尔的主张是,心灵与肉体的区别在于:消极的事实是心灵不在空间中,而积极的事实是心灵会思考。
It is not surprising that Descartes believed that matter does not think. Very few people suppose that stones or tables or atoms have thoughts. But why did he think that minds were not in space? After all, you might think that my mind is where my body is. But if I had no body, as Descartes thought was possible, I would still have a mind. So he couldn't say that a mind must be where its body is, simply because it might not have a body at all. Still, if I do have a body, why shouldn't I say that that is where my mind is? If I didn't have a body, that would be the wrong answer; but, as it happens, I do.
笛卡尔认为物质不会思考,这并不奇怪。很少有人认为石头、桌子或原子有思想。但为什么他认为思想不在空间里呢?毕竟,你可能会认为我的思想就在我身体所在的地方。但如果我没有身体,就像笛卡尔认为的那样,我仍然会有思想。因此,他不能说心灵一定在身体所在的地方,因为它可能根本没有身体。尽管如此,如果我有一个身体,我为什么不能说那就是我的思想所在呢?如果我没有身体,那就是错误的答案;但事实上,我有。
I think the main reason for thinking that minds are not in space is that it does really seem strange to ask, "Where are your thoughts?" Even if you answered this question by saying "In my head," it would not be obvious that this was literally true. For if they were in your head, you could find out where they were in your head, and how large a volume of space they occupied. But you cannot say how many inches long a particular thought is, or how many centimeters wide, or whether it is currently north or south of your cerebral cortex.
我认为,认为思想不在空间的主要原因是,问 "你的思想在哪里?"确实显得很奇怪。即使你回答这个问题说 "在我的脑袋里",也不一定就真的如此。因为如果它们在你的脑袋里,你就可以知道它们在你脑袋里的什么位置,以及它们占据了多大的空间。但是,你无法知道某个想法有几英寸长,几厘米宽,也无法知道它目前是在你大脑皮层的北面还是南面。
There is a fifth and final characteristic of this passage that is typical of Descartes' philosophy of mind: throughout the argument Descartes insists on beginning with what can be known for certain, what cannot be doubted. He insists, that is, on beginning with an epistemological point of view.
这段话的第五个也是最后一个特点是笛卡尔心灵哲学的典型特征:在整个论证过程中,笛卡尔坚持从可以确定知道的、不容置疑的东西入手。也就是说,他坚持从认识论的角度出发。
These are the major features of Descartes' philosophy of mind, and, as I said, this has been the dominant view since his time. So dominant has it been, in fact, that by the mid-twentieth century the central problems of the philosophy of mind were reduced, in effect, to two. The first was a problem M made us think about, the problem of other minds: What justifies our belief that other minds exist at all? And the second is the mind-body problem: How are we to explain the relations of a mind and its body? The first of these
这些就是笛卡尔心智哲学的主要特征,正如我所说的,自笛卡尔时代以来,这一直是主流观点。事实上,这种观点一直占据主导地位,以至于到了二十世纪中叶,心灵哲学的核心问题实际上被简化为两个。第一个问题是 M 让我们思考的问题,即其他心灵的问题:我们有什么理由相信其他心灵的存在?第二个问题是身心问题:我们如何解释心灵与其身体的关系?其中第一个

questions reflects Descartes' epistemological outlook; the second reflects his dualism.
问题反映了笛卡尔的认识论观点;第二个问题反映了他的二元论。
Now, it is just this dualism that raises some of the major difficulties of Descartes' position. For anyone who thinks of mind and body as totally distinct needs to offer an answer to two main questions. First, how do mental events cause physical events? How, for example, do our intentions, which are mental, lead to action, which involves physical movements of our bodies? Second, how do physical events cause mental ones? How, for example, is it possible for physical interaction between our eyes and the light to lead to the sensory experiences of vision, which is mental? And, as we shall see, the answer Descartes gives to these questions seems not to be consistent with his explanation of the essential difference between body and mind.
现在,正是这种二元论为笛卡尔的立场提出了一些主要难题。因为任何认为身心完全不同的人都需要回答两个主要问题。首先,精神事件如何导致身体事件?例如,我们的意图是精神性的,它如何导致行动,而行动涉及我们身体的物理运动?第二,物理事件如何导致心理事件?例如,我们的眼睛与光线之间的物理相互作用如何可能导致视觉的感官体验,而视觉是精神体验?正如我们将要看到的,笛卡尔对这些问题的回答似乎与他对身体和心灵之间本质区别的解释并不一致。
Descartes' answer to these questions seems clear and simple enough. The human brain, he thought, was a point of interaction between mind and matter. Indeed, Descartes suggested that the pineal gland, in the center of your head, was the channel between the two distinct realms of mind and matter. That was his answer to the mind-body question.
笛卡尔对这些问题的回答看似简单明了。他认为,人脑是精神与物质的互动点。事实上,笛卡尔认为,位于头部中央的松果体是心灵与物质两个不同领域之间的通道。这就是他对身心问题的回答。
But this theory comes into conflict with Descartes' claim that what distinguishes the mental from the material is that it is not spatial. For if mental happenings cause happenings in the brain, then doesn't that mean that mental events occur in the brain? How can something cause a happening in the brain unless it is another happening in (or near) the brain? Normally, when one event-call it "A"-causes another event-call it "B"-A and B have to be next to each other, or there has to be a chain of events that are next to each other which runs from to . The drama in the television studio causes the image on my TV screen miles away. But there is an electromagnetic field that carries the image from the studio to me, a field that is in the space between my TV and the studio. Descartes' view has to be that my thoughts cause changes in my brain and that these changes then lead to my actions. But if the thoughts aren't in or near my brain, and if there's no chain of events between my thoughts and my brain, then this is a very unusual brand of causation.
但这一理论与笛卡尔的说法相冲突,笛卡尔认为精神与物质的区别在于它不具有空间性。因为如果精神事件导致大脑中的事件发生,那不就意味着精神事件发生在大脑中吗?除非是大脑中(或附近)发生的另一个事件,否则怎么会导致大脑中发生的事件呢?通常,当一个事件--称之为 "A"--引起另一个事件--称之为 "B "时,A 和 B 必须紧挨着,或者必须有一连串紧挨着的事件,从 。电视演播室里的戏剧导致我电视屏幕上的图像出现在数英里之外。但是,有一个电磁场将图像从演播室传送到我这里,这个电磁场就在我的电视机和演播室之间。笛卡尔的观点是,我的思想会导致我的大脑发生变化,而这些变化又会导致我的行为。但是,如果思想不在我的大脑中或附近,如果在我的思想和大脑之间没有事件链,那么这就是一种非常不寻常的因果关系。
Descartes wants to say that thoughts aren't anywhere. But, according to him, at least some of the effects of my thoughts are in
笛卡尔想说思想无处不在。但是,根据他的说法,我的思想的影响至少有一部分存在于

my brain, and none of the direct effects of my thoughts are in anybody else's brain. My thoughts regularly lead to my actions and never lead directly to someone else's. We have now reached one central problem for Descartes' position. For it is normal to think that things are where their effects originate. (We can call this the causal account of location.) And on this view my thoughts are in my brain, which is the origin of my behavior. But if mental events occur in the brain, then, since the brain is in space, at least some mental events are in space also. And then Descartes' way of distinguishing the mental and the material won't work. Let's call this apparent conflict between
我的思想不会直接影响其他人的大脑。我的思想经常导致我的行为,而绝不会直接导致别人的行为。现在我们已经找到了笛卡尔立场的一个核心问题。因为人们通常会认为,事物是其影响的起源。(根据这种观点,我的思想在我的大脑中,而大脑是我行为的起源。但如果心理事件发生在大脑中,那么,既然大脑在空间中,至少某些心理事件也在空间中。这样一来,笛卡尔区分精神和物质的方法就行不通了。让我们把这两者之间的明显冲突称为
a) the fact that mind and matter do seem to interact causally and
a) 心灵与物质似乎确实存在因果关系,而且
b) Descartes' claim that the mind is not in space
b) 笛卡尔关于心灵不在空间中的主张
Descartes' problem. Once you accept the causal account of location, there are four main ways you might try to deal with this problem.
笛卡尔的问题一旦你接受了位置的因果关系,你可以尝试用四种主要方法来解决这个问题。
The first would be to deny that causes and their effects have to be in space. Descartes' is only one of the possible dualist solutions to the mind-body question that takes this approach. Because he thinks that mental and material events interact, even if only in the brain, his view is called interactionism. But if you want to keep Descartes' view that the mind is not in space, and if you do not think that causes and effects of events in space have themselves to be in space, you might also try one of the other forms of dualism. There are two kinds of dualism you might try in which the causation goes only one way. You could hold either that mental events have bodily causes but not bodily effects, or that mental events have material effects but no material causes. Each of these positions deserves consideration. But each of these two kinds of dualism claims that minds are both causally active in space and yet somehow not in space themselves. As a result, they need to offer some way of thinking about causation that is very unlike the way we normally think about it.
第一种方法是否认因果必须在空间。笛卡尔只是采用这种方法解决心身问题的二元论者之一。因为他认为精神和物质事件是相互作用的,即使只是在大脑中,所以他的观点被称为相互作用论。但是,如果你想保留笛卡尔关于心灵不在空间中的观点,如果你不认为空间事件的因果本身必须在空间中,那么你也可以尝试其他形式的二元论。你可以尝试两种二元论,其中的因果关系只有一种。你可以认为精神事件有身体原因而无身体结果,或者精神事件有物质结果而无物质原因。这两种观点都值得考虑。但这两种二元论都声称,思维既在空间中具有因果活动,但又在某种程度上不在空间中。因此,它们需要提供某种与我们通常思考因果关系的方式截然不同的思维方式。
A second way out of Descartes' problem is to deny that there are any causal connections between mind and matter at all. On this view there are corresponding material and mental realms, which run in
解决笛卡尔问题的第二个办法是否认精神与物质之间存在任何因果联系。根据这种观点,存在着相应的物质领域和精神领域,它们以如下方式运行

parallel, without any causal interaction. Psychophysical parallelism, as this theory is called, certainly escapes Descartes' problem. But we are left with a mystery: why do the mind and the body work together if there is no interaction between them? Psychophysical parallelism says mind and body run in parallel without explaining why.
平行,没有任何因果互动。这种被称为 "心理物理平行论 "的理论当然可以解决笛卡尔的问题。但我们仍然有一个谜团:如果心灵和身体之间没有相互作用,为什么它们会一起工作呢?心理物理平行说认为心灵和身体是平行运行的,但没有解释原因。
The third way out of Descartes' problem would be to try a different way of distinguishing mind and matter. If you think that both causes and their effects have to be in space and that mental events have material causes or effects, you cannot maintain Descartes' claim that minds are not spatial. Starting with some new way of distinguishing mind and matter, however, you might still be able to keep dualism, while taking into account the fact that causes have to be in space if their effects are.
解决笛卡尔问题的第三条出路是尝试用另一种方法来区分心灵和物质。如果你认为因和果都必须在空间中,而且精神事件有物质的因和果,那么你就不能坚持笛卡尔关于心灵不是空间的说法。然而,从某种区分心与物的新方法出发,你也许仍然能够保留二元论,同时考虑到这样一个事实,即如果因果都在空间,那么因就必须在空间。
But however you distinguish the mental and the material, if you believe they are two different kinds of thing you will have to face the other-minds problem. If your mind and body are utterly distinct kinds of thing, how can I know anything about your mind, since all I can see (or hear or touch) is your body? You brush off the fly, and I judge that you want to get rid of it. But if there is no necessary connection between what your body does and what is going on in your mind, how is this judgment justified? How can I know your body isn't just an automaton, a machine that reacts mechanically, with no intervening mental processes? If you find this thought compelling, you might want to try a solution to Descartes' problem that is not dualist at all.
但是,无论你如何区分精神和物质,如果你认为它们是两种不同的东西,你就不得不面对另一种精神的问题。如果你的心灵和身体是完全不同的两类事物,那么我怎么能了解你的心灵,因为我能看到(或听到或触摸到)的只是你的身体?你赶走了苍蝇,我判断你想摆脱它。但是,如果你的身体所做的事情与你的思想之间没有必然联系,那么这种判断又是如何成立的呢?我怎么知道你的身体不只是一台自动机,一台机械地做出反应,没有任何心理过程介入的机器?如果你觉得这种想法很有说服力,不妨试试笛卡尔问题的解决方案,它根本不是二元论的。
So the fourth and last way out of Descartes' problem is just to give up the idea that mind and matter really are distinct kinds of thing, and thus to become what philosophers call a "monist." Monism is the view that reality consists of only one kind of thing. For monists, beliefs and earthquakes are just things in the world. Things in the world can interact causally with each other, so there's nothing surprising about my belief that there's a table in my way causing me to move the table. The movement of the table is partly caused by the belief. That's no more surprising than a movement of the table caused by an earthquake.
因此,解决笛卡尔问题的第四条,也是最后一条出路,就是放弃心灵和物质确实是不同种类事物的想法,从而成为哲学家所说的 "一元论者"。一元论认为现实只由一种事物组成。对于一元论者来说,信仰和地震只是世界上的事物。世界上的事物可以因果地相互作用,所以我相信有一张桌子挡住了我的路,导致我移动桌子,这并不奇怪。桌子的移动部分是由信念引起的。这并不比地震引起的桌子移动更令人惊讶。
I've suggested that thinking about the other-minds problem might lead you to give up dualism. And if you consider the very evident fact that we do know that other people have minds you may be
我曾建议过,思考 "他心 "问题可能会让你放弃二元论。如果你考虑到一个非常明显的事实,即我们确实知道其他人有思想,你可能会

led, with many twentieth-century philosophers and psychologists to the form of monism called "behaviorism." Behaviorism, which we noticed as one possible response to the problem of deciding whether a computer could have a mind, is simply the identification of the mind with certain bodily dispositions. A behaviorist, then, is someone who believes that to have a mind is to be disposed to behave in certain ways in response to input. On one behaviorist view, for example, for English-speakers to believe that something is red is for them to be disposed to say, "It is red," or to reply with a "Yes" if asked the question "Is it red?" And dispositions like this are a familiar part of the world. Being sharp is (roughly) being disposed to cut if pressed against a surface; being fragile is (roughly) being disposed to break if dropped.
二十世纪的许多哲学家和心理学家将这种一元论形式称为 "行为主义"。我们注意到,行为主义是对计算机是否有思想这一问题的一种可能的回应,它只是将思想与身体的某些倾向性相联系。因此,行为主义者认为,有思想就是会对输入的信息做出某种反应。例如,根据一种行为主义者的观点,说英语的人如果相信某样东西是红色的,他们就会说 "它是红色的",或者在被问到 "它是红色的吗?"这个问题时回答 "是的"。像这样的倾向性是我们所熟悉的世界的一部分。锋利(大致)是指如果被压在表面上就会被切开;易碎(大致)是指如果掉在地上就会被摔碎。
There's a strong contrast between behaviorism and Descartes' view. Descartes thought belief was a private matter. That had two consequences. First, that you know for sure what you believe. Second, that only you know for sure what you believe. And the trouble with Descartes' view of the mind is that it makes it very hard to see how we can know about other minds at all. For the behaviorist, on the other hand, belief is a disposition to act in response to your environment. If you respond in the way that is appropriate for someone with a certain belief, that's evidence that you have it. Since your response is public-visible and audible-others can find out what you believe. Indeed, as the English philosopher Gilbert Ryle argued in his book The Concept of Mind, we sometimes find out what we ourselves believe by noticing our own behavior.
行为主义与笛卡尔的观点形成了强烈的对比。笛卡尔认为信仰是私事。这有两个后果。第一,你确定自己相信什么。第二,只有你自己知道你相信什么。而笛卡尔的心灵观的问题在于,它让我们很难了解其他心灵。另一方面,对于行为主义者来说,信念是一种对环境做出反应的行为倾向。如果你的反应方式适合于有某种信念的人,这就是你有这种信念的证据。由于你的反应是公开的--可见的、可听的--其他人可以发现你的信念。事实上,正如英国哲学家吉尔伯特-赖尔(Gilbert Ryle)在他的著作《心灵的概念》(The Concept of Mind)中所指出的,我们有时会通过注意自己的行为来发现自己的信念。
It is a big step from saying that some of our mental states are things that other people can know about, to saying, with the behaviorists, that all of them must be in this way public. Yet one of the most influential philosophical arguments of recent years has just this conclusion. The argument was made by the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose work we will discuss again in the chapter on language.
从说我们的某些心理状态是其他人可以知道的事情,到与行为主义者一样说所有的心理状态都必须以这种方式公开,这是一个很大的进步。然而,近年来最有影响力的哲学论证之一就得出了这样的结论。这个论点是由奥地利出生的哲学家路德维希-维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)提出的,我们将在有关语言的章节中再次讨论他的著作。
Wittgenstein began by supposing that anyone who believed in the essentially private thoughts of Descartes' philosophy of mind would find it quite acceptable to suppose that someone could name a private experience-one, that is, that nobody else could know about. And indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 3, Thomas Hobbes,
维特根斯坦一开始就假定,任何相信笛卡尔心灵哲学本质上的私人思想的人都会认为,假定有人可以说出一种私人经验--也就是说,别人不可能知道的经验--是完全可以接受的。事实上,我们将在第 3 章中看到托马斯-霍布斯的观点、

who was an English philosopher who reacted against some of Descartes' ideas, thought that we used words as names of our private thoughts in order to remember them. He called them "marks" of our thoughts. To use marks in this way, someone would have to have a rule that they should use the name just on the occasions where that private experience occurred. Wittgenstein argued that obeying such a rule required more than that there should be both circumstances when it was and circumstances when it wasn't appropriate to use the name. He thought that it also required that it should be possible to check whether you were using the name in accordance with the rule. And he offered a very ingenious argument that was supposed to show that such checking was impossible. If Wittgenstein was right, there could be no such "private languages." And his argument is called, for that reason, the privatelanguage argument.
他认为,我们使用词语作为私人思想的名称,以便记住它们。他将其称为我们思想的 "标记"。要以这种方式使用 "标记",就必须有一个规则,规定只有在发生私人经历的场合才可以使用这个名称。维特根斯坦认为,遵守这样一条规则所需要的不仅仅是在适当和不适当的情况下使用名字。他认为,这还要求能够检查你是否按照规则使用了名字。他提出了一个非常巧妙的论证,试图证明这种检查是不可能的。如果维特根斯坦是对的,就不可能有这样的 "私人语言"。因此,他的论证被称为 "私人语言论证"。

1.3 The private-language argument
1.3 私语参数

Wittgenstein's objection to a Hobbesian private language depends, as I have said, on a claim about what is involved in following a rule. His Philosophical Investigations begins by introducing the idea of a language-game, which is any human activity where there is a systematic rule-governed use of words. One of the conclusions Wittgenstein suggests we should draw from his consideration of language-games is that the notion of following a rule can only apply in cases where it is possible to check whether someone is following it correctly. If someone uses a word or a sentence in a rule-governed way, Wittgenstein argues, it must make sense to ask how we know that they are using the rule correctly; or, as he puts it, there must be a "criterion of correctness."
维特根斯坦反对霍布斯式的私人语言,正如我所说的,取决于他对遵守规则的主张。维特根斯坦的《哲学研究》一开始就提出了 "语言游戏 "这一概念。"语言游戏 "是指任何人类活动,在这种活动中,词语的使用是有系统的、受规则制约的。维特根斯坦认为,我们应该从他对语言游戏的思考中得出这样一个结论:遵守规则的概念只适用于可以检查某人是否正确遵守规则的情况。维特根斯坦认为,如果有人以一种受规则制约的方式使用一个词或一个句子,我们就必须要问,我们是如何知道他们是在正确地使用规则的;或者,正如他所说,必须要有一个 "正确性标准"。
Suppose, for example, Mary claims to be using the word "tonk" in a language-game. We watch her for a while, and she says the word "tonk" from time to time but we cannot detect any pattern to the way she uses the word. So we ask her what rule she is following. If Mary claims simply to know when it is appropriate to use the word but we cannot discover what it is that makes her use of the word appropriate, then we have no reason to think she is following a rule. Unless we can check on whether it is appropriate for Mary to use the word "tonk," we cannot say that there is a difference between
例如,假设玛丽声称她在语言游戏中使用了 "tonk "一词。我们观察了她一会儿,她时不时地会说 "tonk "这个词,但我们无法发现她使用这个词的任何规律。于是我们问她在遵循什么规则。如果玛丽只是说她知道什么时候使用这个词合适,但我们却无法发现她使用这个词的合适之处,那么我们就没有理由认为她在遵循一条规则。除非我们能确认玛丽使用 "tonk "这个词是否合适,否则我们就不能说 "tonk "和 "Mary "之间有区别。
Marys following a rule, on the one hand, and Mary's simply uttering a sound at random from time to time, on the other.
一方面,玛丽在遵循规则,另一方面,玛丽只是不时地随意发出一种声音。
Let us now see how Wittgenstein can put the claim that rule following involves a criterion of correctness to use in attacking the Hobbesian private language.
现在,让我们来看看维特根斯坦如何将规则遵循涉及正确性标准的说法用于攻击霍布斯的私人语言。
We can start by considering in a little more detail the kind of private use of language that Hobbes thought was possible. Suppose I have an experience that I have never had before. For a Cartesian (this is the adjective from "Descartes") there can be no doubt in my mind either that I am having the experience or what the experience is. Still, since it is new, I might want to give it a name, just so that if it ever comes along again, I can remember that I have had it before. So I call the experience a "twinge." I know exactly what a twinge is like, and I just decide to refer to things like that as "twinges." Of course, I cannot show you a twinge and, since I don't know what caused it in me, I don't know how to produce one in you either. My twinge is essentially private: I know about it and nobody else can.
我们可以先更详细地考虑一下霍布斯认为可能存在的那种私人使用语言的情况。假设我有一种从未有过的体验。对于一个笛卡尔主义者(这是来自 "笛卡尔 "的形容词)来说,我心中不会有任何疑问,无论是我有了这种体验,还是这种体验是什么。不过,既然是新的体验,我还是想给它起个名字,这样如果它再次出现,我就能记得我曾经有过这种体验。所以,我把这种体验叫做 "绞痛"。我很清楚 "绞痛 "是什么感觉,所以我决定把这种感觉称为 "绞痛"。当然,我不能给你看 "绞痛",因为我不知道是什么让我产生了 "绞痛",所以我也不知道如何让你产生 "绞痛"。我的痛苦本质上是隐私:我知道,别人不知道。
This story seems to make sense. But Wittgenstein thought that if we analyzed the matter a little further, we could see that it does not. Here is the passage where Wittgenstein makes his objection to the sort of Hobbesian private language that I have described.
这个故事似乎很有道理。但维特根斯坦认为,如果我们再进一步分析,就会发现它并不合理。下面是维特根斯坦反对我所描述的那种霍布斯式私人语言的段落。
Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign " " and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.-I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated.-But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.-How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.-But what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.-Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connection between the sign and the sensation.-But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about "right."
让我们设想一下下面的情况。我想写一本日记,记录某种感觉的反复出现。为此,我把它与 " "这个符号联系起来,并在日历上写下这个符号,记下我有这种感觉的每一天。--我首先要指出的是,这个符号的定义是无法确定的。--但是,我仍然可以给自己下一个表层定义。--怎么下?我能指出感觉吗?普通意义上不能。但我在说话或写下符号的同时,会把注意力集中在感觉上--就像这样,在内心指向它!定义当然是为了确定一个符号的意义--嗯,这正是通过集中我的注意力来实现的;因为通过这种方式,我给自己留下了符号和感觉之间联系的印象--但 "我给自己留下了印象 "只能是指:这个过程使我在未来正确地记住了这种联系。但在目前的情况下,我没有正确与否的标准。有人会说:在我看来正确的东西就是正确的。这只能说明在这里我们无法谈论 "正确"。
Before we try to work out what the argument is that Wittgenstein is making here, we should notice a number of features of the way this passage is written. This passage is rather like a dialogue in a play. Some philosophers, such as Plato, whom we'll discuss in the next chapter, actually wrote philosophical dialogues in order to make their arguments. Wittgenstein doesn't give different names to the people expressing different points of view. Nevertheless you can see that what is going on here is, in effect, a discussion between someone who believes that Hobbes's story makes sense and someone who does not. This means that we have to be careful to decide which of the positions is the one that Wittgenstein is actually defending. In fact, he was defending the point of view of the position which has the last word in this passage: the point of view of the person who says that "this means that here we can't talk about 'right.' " We must try to see what Wittgenstein means by this claim and how he argues for it.
在我们试图弄清维特根斯坦在这里提出的论点是什么之前,我们应该注意到这段文字写作方式的一些特点。这段话颇像戏剧中的对话。有些哲学家,比如我们将在下一章讨论的柏拉图,实际上是通过写哲学对话来表达他们的论点的。维特根斯坦并没有给表达不同观点的人起不同的名字。尽管如此,你可以看到,这里实际上是一个认为霍布斯的故事有道理的人与不相信霍布斯的故事有道理的人之间的讨论。这就意味着,我们必须谨慎判断维特根斯坦究竟是在捍卫哪种立场。事实上,他是在为这段话中占最后发言权的立场的观点辩护:即说 "这意味着在这里我们不能谈论'权利'"的人的观点。" 我们必须试着看看维特根斯坦的这个说法是什么意思,以及他是如何论证的。
So how does he get to this conclusion? Let's make explicit the fact that two opposed positions are represented here, by identifying each of them with a character. We might as well call one of these characters "Hobbes" and the other "Wittgenstein." Then we can paraphrase this passage as if it were a philosophical dialogue; and, for the sake of concreteness, let's call the sensation a "twinge," as we did before, rather than using Wittgenstein's rather neutral term "S."
那么,他是如何得出这一结论的呢?让我们明确一个事实,即这里代表了两种截然相反的立场,将它们分别用一个人物来表示。我们不妨称其中一个人物为 "霍布斯",另一个为 "维特根斯坦"。然后,我们可以把这段话当作哲学对话来解析;为了具体起见,让我们像以前一样把这种感觉称为 "刺痛",而不是使用维特根斯坦的中性词 "S"。
HOBBES: For there to be a private language, all that is required is that I associate some word, "twinge," with a sensation and use that word to record the occasions when the sensation occurs.
霍布斯:要有一种私人语言,只需要我把 "绞痛 "这个词与某种感觉联系起来,并用这个词来记录这种感觉出现的场合。
WITTGENSTEIN: But how can you define the term "twinge"?
维特根斯坦:但你如何定义 "绞痛 "一词?
HOBBES: I can give a kind of ostensive definition. In an ostensive definition, we show what a term means by pointing to the thing it refers to. Thus, suppose we were trying to explain to someone-a person who didn't know English—what "red" meant. We could point to some red things and say "red" as we pointed to them. That would be an ostensive definition of the word "red."
霍布斯:我可以给出一种表层定义。在表层定义中,我们通过指出一个词所指的事物来说明这个词的含义。因此,假设我们要向某人--一个不懂英语的人--解释 "红色 "是什么意思。我们可以指着一些红色的东西说 "红色"。这就是 "红色 "一词的表层定义。
WITTGENSTEIN: But for an ostensive definition to be possible, one must be able to point to something, and in this case pointing is not possible. I cannot point to my own sensations.
维特根斯坦:但要使表层定义成为可能,人们必须能够指向某物,而在这种情况下,指向是不可能的。我无法指向我自己的感觉。
HOBBES: Naturally, you cannot literally point to a sensation, but you can direct your attention to it; and if, as you concentrate on the sensation, you say or write the name, then you can impress on yourself the connection between the name, "twinge," and the sensation.
霍布斯:当然,你不能真的指向一种感觉,但你可以把注意力引向它;如果当你集中注意力于这种感觉时,你能说出或写出这个名字,那么你就能给自己留下 "绞痛 "这个名字与这种感觉之间的联系。
WITTGENSTEIN: What do you mean by saying you "impress the connection on yourself"? All you can mean is that you do something whose consequence is that you remember the connection correctly in future. But what does it mean, in this case, to say that you have remembered it correctly? In order to be able to make sense of saying that you have remembered it correctly, you must have a way of telling whether you have remembered it correctly, a criterion of correctness. And how would you check, in this case, that you had remembered it right?
维特根斯坦:你说 "给自己留下联系的印象 "是什么意思?你只能说你做了一件事,而这件事的后果就是你将来能正确地记住这个联系。但在这种情况下,说你正确地记住了它又是什么意思呢?为了让 "你已经正确地记住了它 "这句话有意义,你必须有一种方法来判断你是否正确地记住了它,也就是正确与否的标准。那么,在这种情况下,你如何检查自己是否记对了呢?
This is the key step in the argument. Wittgenstein asks Hobbes in effect to consider the question "How do you know, when you say 'Aha, there's another twinge,' that it is the same experience you are having this time?" "Well," Hobbes might answer, "since nothing is more certain than what is going on in your own mind, there can be no doubt that you know."
这是论证的关键一步。维特根斯坦实际上要求霍布斯思考这样一个问题:"当你说'啊哈,又有一阵刺痛'时,你怎么知道这次你所经历的是同一种体验?""好吧,"霍布斯可能会回答,"既然没有什么比你自己心中的想法更确定,那么毫无疑问,你是知道的。"
But if it is possible for you to remember correctly, then it must be possible that you remember incorrectly. After all, according to Hobbes, it is the fact that we may forget an experience that makes names useful as marks. So suppose you have misremembered. Suppose that this experience is in fact not the same experience at all. How could you find out that this was so? And, if you can't find out, what use is the word "twinge"? The name gives you no guarantee that you have remembered correctly, if you have no guarantee that you know what the name refers to.
但是,如果你有可能记错,那么你也一定有可能记错。毕竟,根据霍布斯的观点,正是因为我们可能会忘记某段经历,所以名字才成为有用的标记。所以,假设你记错了。假设这段经历实际上根本不是同一段经历。你怎样才能发现这一点呢?如果你无法发现,"绞痛 "这个词又有什么用呢?如果你不能保证自己知道这个名字指的是什么,那么这个名字就不能保证你的记忆是正确的。
In order to bring out the force of Wittgenstein's argument, you might argue as follows. Hobbes's idea is that the name can help you remember that you have had the experience before. If it is possible that you have forgotten the experience of the twinge, however, then it is surely possible that you have forgotten the experience of naming the twinge. Do you need another "mark" that names the experience of naming the twinge? If every memory needs a name to help us remember it, then we seem to be caught in an infinite regress. Hobbes's use of marks seems to be like the old Indian theory that the world is supported on the back of an elephant. If the world
为了突出维特根斯坦论证的力度,你可以做如下论证。霍布斯的观点是,名字可以帮助你回忆起曾经有过的经历。然而,如果你有可能忘记了 "绞痛 "的体验,那么你肯定也有可能忘记了为 "绞痛 "命名的体验。你还需要另一个 "标记 "来命名 "绞痛 "的经历吗?如果每段记忆都需要一个名称来帮助我们记忆,那么我们似乎就陷入了无限的倒退之中。霍布斯对 "标记 "的使用似乎就像印度人的古老理论:世界是由大象的背支撑着的。如果世界

needs supporting, then the elephant needs supporting too. And if the elephant doesn't need support, then why does the world?
那么大象也需要支持。如果大象不需要支持,那么世界为什么需要支持呢?
An infinite regress argument like this shows
这样的无限倒退论证表明
a) that a proposed solution to a problem - in this case the problem of how the world stays in place-only creates another one-in this case, the problem of how the elephant stays in place, and
a) 一个问题的拟议解决方案--在这里是 "世界如何保持原位 "的问题--只会产生另一个问题--在这里是 "大象如何保持原位 "的问题,而且
b) that every time we use the proposed solution to deal with the new problem there will automatically be yet another one to solve.
b) 每次我们用提出的解决方案来处理新问题时,就会自动出现另一个需要解决的问题。
This shows that the proposed solution leads to the ridiculous position where we accept a strategy for solving a problem that creates a new problem for every problem it solves. In other words, it isn't a solution at all.
这表明,所提出的解决方案会导致一种荒谬的局面,即我们接受一种解决问题的策略,而这种策略每解决一个问题,就会产生一个新的问题。换句话说,这根本不是一种解决方案。
This infinite regress argument is the one that shows that there is no possibility in this case of checking that you are using the term "twinge" correctly. And, once this point is established, we have reached the heart of Wittgenstein's line of reasoning. Using the word "twinge" to refer to a private state involves conforming to the rule that you should say to yourself "twinge" only when you experience that private state. But the idea of trying to conform to a rule essentially involves the possibility that you might fail to apply it correctly, and in this case there is no such possibility. "Whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right." If we have mental states that are private, the argument shows that we can't talk about them, even to ourselves! Since it doesn't make sense to talk about such private states, Wittgenstein drew the conclusion that there could not be any: after all, if the sentence "There are private states" makes no sense, it certainly can't be true!
这个无限倒退的论证表明,在这种情况下,根本不可能检查你是否正确地使用了 "twinge "一词。这一点一旦确立,我们就进入了维特根斯坦推理思路的核心。使用 "twinge "一词来指代一种私人状态,就需要遵守这样一条规则:只有当你体验到这种私人状态时,你才应该对自己说 "twinge"。但是,试图遵守规则的想法本质上涉及到你可能无法正确运用规则的可能性,而在这种情况下,不存在这种可能性。"我认为正确的就是正确的。这只能说明在这里我们不能谈论'正确'。"如果我们的心理状态是私人的,那么这个论证就表明我们不能谈论它们,即使是对我们自己!既然谈论这种私人状态毫无意义,维特根斯坦就得出了 "不可能有私人状态 "的结论:毕竟,如果 "有私人状态 "这个句子毫无意义,它当然就不可能是真的!
We might be able to turn the strategy of the infinite regress argument against Wittgenstein at this point, however. For the idea of a criterion of correctness is, presumably, the idea of some standard against which we can check whether we are following the rule properly. But isn't this the idea that we are applying the rule: check your use of the first rule against the standard? And if so, don't we
不过,在这一点上,我们或许可以用无限倒退论证的策略来反驳维特根斯坦。因为 "正确性标准 "的概念大概就是 "某种标准 "的概念,我们可以对照这个标准来检查我们是否正确地遵循了规则。但这不就是我们在应用规则:对照标准检查你对第一条规则的使用吗?如果是这样的话,我们

need a criterion of correctness to apply this second rule? Once this chain begins, there's no stopping it. So perhaps we shouldn't let it begin. Perhaps there can, in fact, be rules that we apply without criteria of correctness.
应用第二条规则是否需要一个正确性标准?这个链条一旦开始,就无法停止。所以,也许我们不应该让它开始。也许,事实上,我们可以在没有正确性标准的情况下应用一些规则。
Actually, Wittgenstein himself pointed something like this out. For he argued that when we continue a numerical series (such as 1 , it doesn't help to say that we are following a rule, because any way we go on conforms to some rule or other. So he seems to have concluded that it was just a fact that human beings presented with a series eventually just start to "go on in the same way."
事实上,维特根斯坦本人也指出了类似的问题。因为他认为,当我们继续一个数列(如 1 , )时,说我们是在遵循一个规则并没有用,因为我们继续下去的任何方式都符合某种规则或其他规则。因此,他似乎得出了这样的结论:人类面对一个数列,最终会开始 "以同样的方式继续",这只是一个事实。
Notice that these problems about following rules don't seem to have anything special to do with the point about privacy. If I had introduced the word "twingle" to refer to a kind of marble, there would need to be some criterion of correctness to decide whether I was using the word correctly. It would not be enough for me to say "Yes, a twingle" or "No, not a twingle" when each marble is shown to me: that could be like Mary's using the word "tonk." You would only be persuaded I was following a rule if there was something about each twingle - that it had more green than red in it, or that it was of a certain size, or something of the sort-that made me pick it from other marbles. It would not be satisfactory if "whatever was going to seem right to me was right."
请注意,这些关于遵守规则的问题似乎与关于隐私的观点没有什么特别的关系。如果我用 "twingle "这个词来指一种大理石,那么就需要有某种正确性标准来判定我是否正确地使用了这个词。当每块弹珠展示给我看时,我说 "是的,一块 twingle "或 "不,不是一块 twingle "是不够的:这可能就像玛丽使用 "tonk "这个词一样。只有当每颗弹珠都有一些特点--绿色多于红色,或者有一定的大小,或者类似的东西--让我从其他弹珠中挑出它,你才会相信我是在遵守规则。如果 "在我看来对的就是对的",那就不令人满意了。
Now, this may seem persuasive when it's applied to kinds of marble, but what about the concepts in terms of which you check my use of a rule like "Call it 'a twingle' only if it's green and large." What criterion of correctness is there for the use of the word "green" here? You could say the rule I'm following is:
现在,当这适用于大理石的种类时,似乎很有说服力,但如果你检查我使用 "只有当它又绿又大时,才称它为'捻子'"这样的规则所依据的概念呢?这里使用 "绿色 "一词的正确性标准是什么?你可以说我遵循的规则是:

G: Call it "green" only if it's green.
G:只有绿色的才叫 "绿色"。

But if that will do as a criterion of correctness, why won't
但是,如果这样就能作为正确性的标准,为什么不能
T: Call it a "twinge" only if it's a twinge
T:"绞痛 "才叫 "绞痛
do as a criterion of correctness in the original case? The difference between and seems only to be that is a rule that other people can check that I am using correctly, whereas T isn't.
作为原始情况下的正确性标准? 之间的区别似乎只是 是一条别人可以检查我是否正确使用的规则,而 T 则不是。
But that suggests that the problem of the mental twinge isn't so
但这表明,精神痛苦的问题并不那么

much that I can't check on myself, but that other people can't check on me. And if that is what Wittgenstein thinks is the problem, then he seems to be begging the question. (An argument begs the question if it assumes what it sets out to prove.) For the private-language argument was meant to show that there couldn't be mental states that are knowable only by the person who has them; but now it looks as though that is one of the premises of the argument!
我不能检查我自己,而是其他人不能检查我。如果这就是维特根斯坦认为的问题所在,那么他似乎是在乞求问题。(如果一个论证假设了它想要证明的东西,那么这个论证就是在乞求问题。)因为私人语言论证的本意是要证明,不可能存在只有拥有心理状态的人才能知道的心理状态;但现在看来,这似乎是论证的前提之一!
There has been a good deal of philosophical discussion about whether Wittgenstein was right to make his claim about rule following. As I have said, much of the first part of his Philosophical Investigations is concerned with an attempt to defend this claim. If it is right, this seems to be a very powerful argument against the Hobbesian view that the primary function of language is to help us remember our own experiences. So you might want to think about whether you should accept Wittgenstein's view that following a rule requires a criterion of correctness. If you do accept Wittgenstein's claim about rules, you have good reason to prefer behaviorism to Cartesianism. (Though it's worth insisting at this point that Wittgenstein himself did not endorse behaviorism.)
关于维特根斯坦提出 "遵循规则 "的主张是否正确,哲学界已经进行了大量的讨论。正如我所说的,维特根斯坦《哲学研究》第一部分的大部分内容都在试图为这一主张辩护。如果它是正确的,那么这似乎是一个非常有力的论据,可以反驳霍布斯的观点,即语言的主要功能是帮助我们记住自己的经验。因此,你可能需要思考一下,你是否应该接受维特根斯坦的观点,即遵循规则需要一个正确性标准。如果你接受维特根斯坦关于规则的主张,你就有充分的理由选择行为主义,而不是笛卡尔主义。(尽管在这一点上值得坚持的是,维特根斯坦本人并不赞同行为主义)。
The behaviorist view of belief solves Descartes' problem: there is no difficulty for the behaviorist about the causal relations of mind and body. So the view has an answer to the mind-body question, namely, that having a mind is having a body with certain specific dispositions. And behaviorism certainly isn't open to the privatelanguage argument. So it solves the other-minds problem because it says that we can know about other people's minds just as easily as we know about any dispositions. We can know about your pain just as easily as we can know that a glass is fragile.
行为主义的信念观解决了笛卡尔的问题:行为主义者在心与身的因果关系上没有任何困难。因此,该观点对身心问题有了一个答案,即拥有心灵就是拥有一个具有某些特定倾向的身体。行为主义当然不会接受私语论证。因此,它解决了 "他心 "问题,因为它说,我们可以知道别人的心,就像我们知道任何处置一样容易。我们可以知道你的痛苦,就像我们知道玻璃杯易碎一样容易。
But behaviorism seems to create new problems as it solves these old ones. Here is one of them. The behavior that most obviously displays belief is speech: if you want to know what I believe, the first step is to ask me. So, as I've said, some behaviorists have held that to believe something is to be disposed (in certain specific sorts of circumstances) to say certain sorts of words-the words, in fact that would ordinarily be taken to be the expression of that belief. The trouble is that this theory makes it impossible, for example, to explain the beliefs of nonspeaking creatures (including infants) and has led some philosophers to deny that such creatures can have
但行为主义在解决这些老问题的同时,似乎又制造了新的问题。下面就是其中之一。最能体现信念的行为是说话:如果你想知道我相信什么,第一步就是问我。因此,正如我所说的,一些行为主义者认为,相信某件事就是(在某些特定的情况下)愿意说某些话--事实上,这些话通常会被认为是这种信念的表达。问题在于,这种理论无法解释不说话的生物(包括婴儿)的信念,并导致一些哲学家否认这类生物可以有

beliefs at all. Though there is something rather unsatisfactory about the privacy of the Cartesian mind, there is something simply crazy about the publicness of the behaviorist one. "Hello; you're fine. How am I?" says the behaviorist in a well-known cartoon, and the cartoonist has a point. We do know better than others about at least some aspects of our mental life. And the question for behaviorism is: why? It isn't just that we witness more of our actions than others. For in interpreting the minds of others we rely very much on their facial expressions; but we hardly ever see our own facial expressions at all. And, in fact, it seems obvious that I can tell what I am going to do next-what my current dispositions are-because I know (by, as it were, "looking inward") something of my own beliefs, desires and intentions.
信念。虽然笛卡尔思想的私密性有些令人不满意,但行为主义思想的公开性简直令人抓狂。"你好,你很好。我怎么样?"在一幅著名的漫画中,行为主义者如是说。至少在心理生活的某些方面,我们确实比别人更了解自己。行为主义的问题是:为什么?这不仅仅是因为我们比别人目睹了更多自己的行为。因为在解读他人的心理时,我们非常依赖于他们的面部表情;但我们却几乎看不到自己的面部表情。而且,事实上,我能知道自己下一步要做什么--我现在的倾向是什么--这似乎是显而易见的,因为我知道(通过 "向内看")我自己的一些信念、欲望和意图。
Neither behaviorism nor Descartes' theory seems to be quite right.
行为主义和笛卡尔的理论似乎都不太正确。

1.4 Computers as models of the mind
1.4 作为思维模型的计算机

In recent years, a new alternative to behaviorism has been suggested, which treats the mind neither as absurdly public, in the way behaviorism does, nor as completely private, in the way Cartesianism did. It is, in other words, a halfway house between behaviorism and Cartesianism, and it is called functionalism. Its recent appeal derives from the development of the very computers with which we began. For one way of expressing what functionalism claims is to say that it is the view that having a mind, for a body, is like having a program, for a machine.
近年来,有人提出了行为主义的新替代方案,它既不像行为主义那样把心智视为荒谬的公共性,也不像笛卡尔主义那样把心智视为完全的私人性。换句话说,它是介于行为主义和笛卡尔主义之间的中庸之道,被称为功能主义。它最近的吸引力来自计算机的发展,而我们正是从计算机开始的。表达功能主义主张的一种方式是,功能主义认为,对于身体而言,拥有思想就像拥有机器的程序一样。
A good way to start thinking about functionalist theories, however, is to look at similar theories of a simpler kind. Consider, then, what sort of theory you would need to give if you were trying to explain the workings not of something really complex, like a mind, but of something fairly simple and familiar, like a thermostat designed to keep the temperature above a certain level. What should a theory of such a thermostat say?
然而,开始思考功能主义理论的一个好方法,就是看看更简单的类似理论。那么,考虑一下,如果你要解释的不是真正复杂的东西(比如头脑)的运作,而是相当简单和熟悉的东西(比如旨在将温度保持在一定水平之上的恒温器)的运作,你需要给出什么样的理论?关于这种恒温器的理论应该怎么说呢?
It should say, of course, that a thermostat is a device that turns a heater on and off in such a way as to keep the temperature above a certain level. Consider a thermostat that keeps the temperature above 60 degrees. An analysis of what something has to be like to do this job can be stated in a little theory of the thermostat.
当然,应该说自动调温器是一种开启和关闭加热器以保持温度高于某一水平的装置。考虑一下将温度保持在 60 度以上的恒温器。关于恒温器的一个小理论,可以分析一下完成这项工作的东西必须是什么样的。
A thermostat has to have three working parts. The first, which is the heat sensor, has to have two states: in one state the heat sensor is , in the other it is OFF. It should be ON when the external temperature is below 60 degrees and OFF when it is above. It doesn't matter how the heat sensor is made. If it is a bimetallic strip, then maybe whether it is ON or OFF will depend on how bent the strip is; if it is a balloon of gas that expands and contracts as the temperature changes, then ON will be below a certain volume, OFF will be above. The second part is the switch, which needs to have two states also. It should go into the ON state if the heat sensor goes into its ON state and into its OFF state if the heat sensor goes OFF. Finally, we need the heat source, which should produce heat when the switch goes ON and stop producing heat when the switch goes OFF. (What I said about the heat sensor applies to the other parts too: it doesn't matter what they are made of as long as they do the job I have just described.)
自动调温器必须有三个工作部件。第一个是热传感器,它必须有两种状态:一种状态是热传感器处于 ,另一种状态是处于关闭状态。当外部温度低于 60 度时,它应该处于打开状态;当外部温度高于 60 度时,它应该处于关闭状态。热传感器的制造方式并不重要。如果是双金属条,那么接通还是断开可能取决于双金属条的弯曲程度;如果是气体气球,随着温度的变化会膨胀和收缩,那么低于一定体积时接通,高于一定体积时断开。第二部分是开关,它也需要有两种状态。如果热传感器进入 "开 "的状态,开关就会进入 "开 "的状态;如果热传感器处于 "关 "的状态,开关就会进入 "关 "的状态。最后,我们还需要热源,它应该在开关接通时产生热量,在开关断开时停止产生热量。(我所说的关于热传感器的内容也适用于其他部件:只要它们能完成我刚才描述的工作,由什么材料制成并不重要)。
This explanation of the nature of a thermostat also shows what a functionalist theory is, for this little theory is a functionalist theory. And what makes it functionalist is that it has all of the following characteristics:
对恒温器性质的解释也说明了什么是功能主义理论,因为这个小理论就是功能主义理论。它之所以是功能主义的,是因为它具有以下所有特征:
It says how a thermostat functions by saying:
这句话道出了恒温器的功能:
a) what external events in the world produce changes inside the system-here, changes in temperature cause the sensor to go ON and OFF;
a) 世界上的哪些外部事件会导致系统内部发生变化--在这里,温度的变化会导致传感器 "开 "或 "关";
b) what internal events produce other internal events-here, changes from ON to OFF in the sensor produce changes from ON to OFF in the switch; and
b) 哪些内部事件会产生其他内部事件--在这里,传感器从 ON 到 OFF 的变化会导致开关从 ON 到 OFF 的变化;以及
c) what internal events lead to changes in the external world-here changes from OFF to ON in the switch lead to increased heat-output; changes from ON to OFF produced reduced heat-output.
c) 什么样的内部事件会导致外部世界发生变化--在这里,开关从 "关 "到 "开 "的变化会导致热量输出增加;从 "开 "到 "关 "的变化会导致热量输出减少。
Anything at all that meets these specifications functions as a thermostat, and anything that has parts that play these roles can be said to have a heat sensor, a switch, and a heat source of the appropriate kind. In other words, at the most general level, a functionalist theory says what the internal states of a system are by fixing how they interact with input, and with other internal states, to produce output. What I mean by saying that the theory says what states are, can be explained by way of an example: our thermostat theory says what a heat sensor is by saying that it
任何符合这些规格的东西都具有恒温器的功能,而任何具有发挥这些作用的部件的东西都可以说是具有热传感器、开关和适当类型的热源。换句话说,在最一般的层面上,功能主义理论通过确定系统的内部状态如何与输入以及其他内部状态相互作用以产生输出,来说明系统的内部状态是什么。我所说的理论说明状态是什么,可以用一个例子来解释:我们的恒温器理论说明热传感器是什么,就是说它

a) changes from ON to OFF (and back again) as the external temperature falls below (and rises above) 60 degrees, and
a) 当外部温度低于(或高于)60 度时,从 ON(开启)变为 OFF(关闭),以及
b) causes changes that lead to an increase in heat-output if it is , and to a decrease when it is OFF.
b) 在 时,会导致热量输出增加,而在关断时,会导致热量输出减少。
A heat sensor is thus characterized by its functional role, which is the way it functions in mediating between input and output in interaction with other internal states. And we can say, in general, that a functionalist theory says what a state is by saying how it functions in the internal working of a system.
因此,热传感器的特征在于它的功能作用,即它在与其他内部状态的相互作用中,在输入和输出之间发挥中介作用的方式。一般来说,我们可以说,功能主义理论通过描述一个状态在系统内部工作中的功能,来说明它是什么。
We can apply this general model to computers. They have large numbers of internal, usually electronic, states. Programming a computer involves linking up these states to each other and to the outside of the machine so that when you put some input into the machine, the internal states change in certain predictable ways, and sometimes these changes lead it to produce some output. So, in a simple case, you put in a string of symbols like " " at a terminal, and the machine's internal states change in such a way that it outputs " 4 " at a printer. We can now see why computer programs can be thought of as functionalist theories of the computer. For a computer program is just a way of specifying how the internal states of the computer will be changed by inputting signals from disk or tape or from a keyboard, and how those changes in internal state will lead to output from the computer.
我们可以将这一通用模型应用于计算机。计算机有大量的内部状态,通常是电子状态。计算机编程涉及将这些状态相互连接起来,并与计算机外部连接起来,这样当你向计算机输入一些信息时,内部状态就会以某些可预测的方式发生变化,有时这些变化会导致计算机产生一些输出结果。因此,在一个简单的例子中,你在终端输入一串符号,比如 " ",机器的内部状态就会发生变化,从而在打印机上输出 "4"。现在我们可以明白,为什么计算机程序可以被视为计算机的功能主义理论。因为计算机程序只是一种方式,它规定了从磁盘、磁带或键盘输入信号将如何改变计算机的内部状态,以及这些内部状态的变化将如何导致计算机的输出。
From one point of view-the engineer's-all that is going on in a computer is a series of electronic changes. From another-the programmer's-the machine is adding 2 and 2 to make 4 . People who are functionalists about the mind-which is what I shall mean by "functionalists" from now on-believe that there are similarly two ways of looking at the mind-brain. The neurophysiologist's way, which is like the engineer's, sees the brain in terms of electrical currents or biochemical reactions. The psychologist's way, which is like the programmer's, sees the mind in terms of beliefs, thoughts, desires, and other mental states and events. Yet just as there is only one computer, with two levels of description, so, the functionalist claims, there is only one mind-brain, with its two levels of description. In fact, just as we can say what electrical events in a computer correspond to its adding numbers, a functionalist can claim that we
从工程师的角度来看,计算机中发生的只是一系列电子变化。从另一个角度--程序员的角度--来看,机器正在把 2 加 2 变成 4。对心智持功能学派观点的人--也就是我现在所说的 "功能学派"--认为,看待心智-大脑同样有两种方法。神经生理学家的方法就像工程师的方法一样,从电流或生化反应的角度来看待大脑。心理学家的方式就像程序员的方式,从信念、思想、欲望以及其他心理状态和事件的角度来看待心智。然而,正如只有一台计算机,却有两个层次的描述,功能主义者也声称,只有一个心脑,却有两个层次的描述。事实上,正如我们可以说计算机中的哪些电子事件对应于它的数字加法一样,功能主义者也可以声称我们

can find out which brain events correspond to which thoughts. Functionalism thus leads to monism. There is only one kind of thing, even though there are different levels of theory about it.
可以找出哪些大脑事件与哪些思想相对应。因此,功能主义导致了一元论。事物只有一种,尽管对它有不同层次的理论。
Functionalism starts with an analogy between computers and minds. It doesn't say that computers have minds. But if we go carefully through the functionalist's arguments, we will see how you might end up holding that they could have minds, even if they don't yet.
功能主义首先将计算机与思维进行类比。它并没有说计算机有思想。但是,如果我们仔细研究功能论者的论证,我们就会发现,即使计算机还没有思想,你最终也会认为它们可能有思想。

1.5 Why should there be a functionalist theory?
1.5 为什么要有功能主义理论?

But before we look in more detail at some functionalist proposals, it will help if we consider why anyone should think that it ought to be possible to construct a functionalist theory.
不过,在我们更详细地研究一些功能主义的提议之前,我们不妨先考虑一下为什么有人会认为应该有可能构建一种功能主义理论。
In section 1.2 I raised two questions that a theory of the mind ought to answer: "What justifies our belief that other minds exist at all?" and "How are we to explain the relations of a mind and its body?" Functionalism answers the second question quite simply: a person's body is what has the states that function as his or her mind. Just as the physical parts that make up the "body" of the thermostat are what function as heat sensor, switch and heater, so the physical "hardware" of a computer is what has the states that function according to the program.
在第 1.2 节中,我提出了心灵理论应该回答的两个问题:"我们有什么理由相信其他心灵的存在?"以及 "我们如何解释心灵与其身体的关系?"功能主义对第二个问题的回答非常简单:一个人的身体具有作为其心灵的功能状态。就像构成恒温器 "身体 "的物理部件具有热传感器、开关和加热器的功能一样,计算机的物理 "硬件 "也具有根据程序运行的状态。
But consider now what functionalism implies in answer to the first question. To have a mind, functionalists claim, is to have internal states that function in a certain way, a way that determines how a person will react to input-in the form of sensations and perceptions. The answer to the other-minds problem must, therefore, be that we know about other minds because we have evidence that people have internal states that function in the right way. And, in fact, we do have such evidence, as the behaviorists pointed out. People with minds act in ways that are caused by what is going on in their minds, and what is going on in their minds is caused by things that happen around them. One reason for being a functionalist is, thus, that it allows you to deny the Cartesian claim that minds are essentially private, that only you can know what is going on in your mind. Wittgenstein's private-language argument gives us a reason for doubting that minds can be essentially private. We shall see in the next chapter why many philosophers have held that nothing that
但现在我们来看看功能主义在回答第一个问题时意味着什么。功能论者认为,拥有思想就是拥有以某种方式运作的内部状态,这种方式决定了一个人将如何对输入做出反应--以感觉和知觉的形式。因此,"其他心灵 "问题的答案必须是,我们之所以知道其他心灵,是因为我们有证据表明,人们拥有以正确方式运作的内部状态。事实上,我们确实有这样的证据,正如行为主义者所指出的那样。有思想的人的行为方式是由他们的思想所引起的,而他们的思想又是由周围发生的事情所引起的。因此,成为功能主义者的一个原因是,它允许你否认笛卡尔的主张,即思想本质上是私人的,只有你自己才能知道你的思想在发生什么。维特根斯坦的 "私人语言 "论证为我们提供了一个理由,使我们可以怀疑思维本质上是私人的。我们将在下一章中看到,为什么许多哲学家都认为,没有什么东西是

exists can be knowable by only one person. For the thesis that there are things that cannot, even in principle, be known by anyone appears inconsistent with some very basic facts about knowledge. To make these arguments now, I would have to step ahead of this chapter's topic. But when you have read what I say in the next chapter (2.6) about verificationism, you might want to think again about whether functionalists are right in holding that it is an advantage of their theory that it denies that the mind is essentially private.
只有一个人可以知道。因为有些东西即使在原则上也不可能为任何人所知,这一论点似乎与关于知识的一些非常基本的事实不符。现在要提出这些论点,我就必须超越本章的主题。不过,当你读完我在下一章(2.6)中所说的关于验证论的内容后,你也许会想再思考一下,功能主义者认为他们的理论的一个优点是否认心智本质上是私有的,这种观点是否正确。

1.6 Functionalism: A first problem
1.6 功能主义:第一个问题

So far what I have said about functionalism is very abstract. If we are to make it plausible, we will need a more concrete case to consider. Take beliefs.
到目前为止,我所说的功能主义是非常抽象的。如果我们要让它变得可信,就需要考虑一个更具体的案例。就拿信念来说吧。
Beliefs, for a functionalist, are characterized as states that are caused by sensations and perceptions of the appropriate kind, and that can cause other beliefs, and that interact with desires to produce action. Thus, for example, seeing a gray sky causes me to believe that the sky is gray, which may lead me to believe that it will rain, which may lead me to take my umbrella, because I desire not to get wet. Here the input is sensation and perception and the output is action; the internal states that mediate between the two are beliefs and desires.
在功能主义者看来,信念的特点是由适当类型的感觉和知觉引起的状态,这些状态可以引起其他信念,并与欲望相互作用产生行动。例如,看到灰蒙蒙的天空会让我相信天空是灰色的,这可能会让我相信会下雨,这可能会让我打伞,因为我不想被淋湿。在这里,输入是感觉和知觉,输出是行动;介于两者之间的内部状态是信念和欲望。
There is an immediate and obvious problem for anyone who wants to say what beliefs are in a theory of this kind. Remember that a functionalist says what an internal state of the system is by describing its functional role: by saying how it functions in mediating between input and output in interaction with other internal states. Suppose we try to do this for some particular belief-say, the belief that the sky is gray. You might think you can say fairly precisely what would cause this belief. Looking up, eyes open, fully conscious, at a gray sky ought to do it. But the trouble is that this is really neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for acquiring the belief. It isn't necessary, because you can acquire the belief in lots of other ways: looking at the sky's reflection in a pond, for example, or listening to a weather forecaster. It isn't sufficient, because, in suitably weird circumstances, you might reasonably believe that the sky wasn't gray when it looked gray. (Suppose, for example, I told you I had inserted gray contact lenses in your eye while you were asleep; suppose you
对于任何想在这种理论中说明信念是什么的人来说,都有一个直接而明显的问题。请记住,功能主义者是通过描述系统内部状态的功能作用来说明系统内部状态是什么的,即说明系统内部状态在与其他内部状态的相互作用中是如何在输入与输出之间发挥中介作用的。假设我们尝试对某种特定的信念--比如说,"天空是灰色的 "这一信念--进行这样的描述。你可能会认为你可以相当准确地说出是什么导致了这种信念。睁开眼睛,完全清醒地抬头仰望灰色的天空,应该就能做到这一点。但问题是,这其实既不是获得这种信念的必要条件,也不是充分条件。它不是必要条件,因为你可以通过很多其他方式获得这种信念:比如,看天空在池塘中的倒影,或者听天气预报员的预报。它不是充分条件,因为在适当的奇怪情况下,你可以合理地相信天空看起来是灰色的,但它并不是灰色的(例如,假设我告诉你,我在你睡觉的时候把灰色隐形眼镜塞进了你的眼睛;假设你

believed me. Then it would be very strange indeed if you came to believe the sky was gray when it looked gray.) The general point, so far as input goes, is that whether the evidence of your senses would lead you to some particular belief-here, that the sky is graydepends on what else you believe.
相信我。如果天空看起来是灰色的,你却相信它是灰色的,那就真的很奇怪了)。就输入而言,一般的观点是,你的感官证据是否会引导你产生某种特定的信念--在这里,天空是灰色的--取决于你还相信什么。
A similar problem arises with output, though here the issue is even more complex. For what you do on the basis of the belief that the sky is gray depends not only on what other beliefs you have-for example, do you believe that gray skies "mean" rain?-but also on what desires you have-for example, do you want to avoid getting wet? So whereas for a heat sensor in a thermostat the effect of input doesn't depend on an indefinitely large number of other internal states, in the case of belief in a mind it does.
输出也有类似的问题,不过这里的问题更加复杂。因为你基于 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念所做的事情,不仅取决于你还有哪些其他信念--例如,你是否相信灰色的天空 "意味着 "下雨--而且还取决于你有哪些欲望--例如,你是否想避免被淋湿?因此,对于恒温器中的热传感器来说,输入的效果并不取决于无限多的其他内部状态,而对于头脑中的信念来说,它则是如此。
In finding a way to handle this increased complexity, the analogy with the computer is helpful. For, in this respect, computers are more like minds than like thermostats. The results of inputting a number to a computer depend also on a complex array of internal states. If I put in a " " to an adding program after putting in " 2 " followed by " " followed by " 2 ", then the output will be " 4 "; but if I put in the same sign, " ", after putting in " 4 " followed by " + " followed by " 2 ", then the output will be " 6 ". Yet we can still give a functional role to each internal state of the system: we can do it by saying, for example, that when the adding program is in the functional state of having a " 2 " stored, entering " + " followed by any numeral, " ", followed by " " will result in outputting the numeral " ". The general strategy is this: we must specify the functional role of a state, A, by saying what will happen, for any input, if the computer is in state A, but in a way that depends on what the other internal states are.
在寻找处理这种日益增加的复杂性的方法时,与计算机的类比很有帮助。因为在这方面,计算机更像大脑,而不是恒温器。向计算机输入一个数字的结果也取决于一系列复杂的内部状态。如果我在输入 "2",然后是 " ",接着是 "2 "之后,再向加法程序输入一个 " ",那么输出结果将是 "4";但如果我在输入 "4",然后是 "+",接着是 "2 "之后,再输入同样的符号 " ",那么输出结果将是 "6"。然而,我们仍然可以给系统的每个内部状态赋予功能性作用:例如,当加法运算程序处于存储有 "2 "的功能状态时,输入 "+"后的任意数字 " ",然后输入 " ",就会输出数字 " "。一般的策略是这样的:我们必须说明一个状态 A 的功能作用,即如果计算机处于状态 A,对于任何输入都会发生什么,但其方式取决于其他内部状态。
So for a functionalist account of the belief that the sky is gray, we can say, at the level of input, that it will be caused by looking at gray skies, provided you don't believe that there's some reason why the sky should look gray when it isn't; and that it will also be caused by acquiring any other belief that you think is evidence that the sky is gray. And we can say, at the level of output, that having the belief will lead you to try to perform those actions that would best satisfy your desires - whatever they are-if the sky was in fact gray. Which actions you think those are will itself depend on your other beliefs.
因此,对于功能主义关于 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念的解释,我们可以说,在输入的层面上,只要你不相信天空看起来是灰色的,那么看灰色的天空就会导致你产生这种信念;如果你认为其他信念是天空是灰色的证据,那么产生这种信念也会导致你产生这种信念。在输出的层面上,我们可以说,如果天空真的是灰色的,那么有了这个信念,你就会尝试去做那些最能满足你的欲望的行为--不管它们是什么。你认为这些行动是什么,本身就取决于你的其他信念。
It may look as though we have still not solved the problem we started out with. For this definition of the belief that the sky is gray still seems to define it in terms of other states of belief and desire, and these other states are ones we want to give functionalist definitions also. So, you might ask, isn't this sort of definition going to be circular? We are going to define the belief that the sky is gray partly in terms of what it will lead you to do if you believe that gray skies mean rain; but aren't we going to have to define the belief that gray skies mean rain partly in terms of what it will lead you to do when you believe the skies are gray?
看起来,我们似乎仍然没有解决我们一开始提出的问题。因为 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念的定义似乎仍然是根据其他信念和欲望的状态来定义它的,而这些其他状态也是我们想要给予功能主义定义的。那么,你可能会问,这种定义难道不是循环论证吗?我们要定义 "天空是灰色的 "这一信念,部分原因在于,如果你相信灰色的天空意味着下雨,它会引导你做什么;但是,我们不是又要定义 "灰色的天空意味着下雨 "这一信念,部分原因在于,当你相信天空是灰色的时候,它会引导你做什么?
This is a genuine problem if you want to use functionalist definitions, but there is a procedure that allows us to solve it in a way that avoids this circularity. Applying it in the case of beliefs is extremely complex, so it will help, once more, to start with a simpler case.
如果你想使用功能主义的定义,这确实是一个问题,但有一个程序可以让我们以避免这种循环性的方式来解决这个问题。在信念的情况下应用这个程序是极其复杂的,所以我们还是从一个更简单的情况开始吧。

1.7 A simple-minded functionalist theory of pain
1.7 思想简单的功能主义疼痛理论

Pain is a mental state. Let's suppose we are trying to produce a functionalist theory of it. We begin by gathering together all the truths we normally suppose a mental state must satisfy if it is to be a pain. The American philosopher Ned Block has suggested how we might do it, for what he calls the "ridiculously simple theory," which we'll call " ", that
疼痛是一种精神状态。假设我们正试图提出一种功能主义理论。我们首先要把我们通常认为一种心理状态若要成为一种痛苦,就必须满足的所有真理集合起来。美国哲学家奈德-布洛克(Ned Block)建议我们这样做,他称之为 "简单得可笑的理论",我们称之为 " ",即
: "Pain is caused by pinpricks and causes worry and the emission of loud noises, and worry, in turn, causes brow wrinkling."
"针刺引起疼痛,引起忧虑和发出巨响,忧虑又引起眉头紧皱"。
is ridiculously simple. But we can still use it to elucidate some general points about functionalist theories of the mind. For with this simple theory we can see how the charge of circularity might be avoided.
简单得令人发指。但我们仍然可以用它来阐明关于功能主义心智理论的一些一般性观点。因为通过这个简单的理论,我们可以看到如何避免循环论的指控。
So, begin with . We write it as one sentence. Then, we replace every reference in the sentence to pain-whether actual or potential-by a letter, and each other, distinct, mental term by a different letter, to get
因此,从 开始。我们把它写成一个句子。然后,我们用一个字母替换句子中每一个提到疼痛(无论是实际的还是潜在的)的地方,并用不同的字母替换其他每一个不同的心理术语,得到
is caused by pinpricks and causes and the emission of loud noises, and Y, in turn, causes brow wrinkling.
是由针刺引起的,会导致 和发出巨响,而 Y 又会导致眉头皱起。
(In this case, since there is only one other mental term, "worry," we only need the one extra letter, ; but in other cases, as we'll see, we would need many more.) The next step is to write in front of this the words "There exists an , and there exists a , and there exists a ... which are such that" for as many letters as we introduced when we removed the mental terms. So, in this simple case, we get
(在这种情况下,由于只有一个心理术语 "担心",我们只需要一个额外的字母 ;但在其他情况下,正如我们将要看到的,我们需要更多的字母)。下一步是在前面写下 "存在一个 ,存在一个 ,存在一个......,它们是这样的",字母的数量与我们删除心理术语时引入的字母数量相同。因此,在这个简单的例子中,我们可以得到
R: There exists an , and there exists a , which are such that is caused by pinpricks and causes and the emission of loud noises, and , in turn, causes brow wrinkling.
R:存在一个 ,也存在一个 ,它们是这样的: 由针刺引起,并导致 和发出巨响,而 又会导致眉头紧皱。
Notice that we now have a sentence, , that has no mental terms in it. It allows us to say how pain works without relying circularly on knowing what "worry" is. It would be circular to rely on our understanding of what "worry" is, because, in a full functionalist theory, we would be going on to define worry later. Now, finally, we can define what it is for someone to be in pain. For we can say that someone-let's call her Mary-is in pain if there exist states of Mary's, , and , which are such that is caused by pinpricks and causes and the emission of loud noises, and , in turn, causes brow wrinkling, and Mary has X. If Mary has such a state, a state that functions in this way, she is in pain.
请注意,我们现在有一个句子 ,其中没有任何心理术语。它让我们能够说出疼痛是如何起作用的,而不必循环地依赖于我们对 "担心 "是什么的理解。如果依赖于我们对 "担心 "是什么的理解,那将是循环论证,因为在一个完整的功能主义理论中,我们会在后面继续定义 "担心"。现在,我们终于可以给 "痛苦 "下定义了。 因为我们可以说,如果存在这样的状态,即 由针刺引起并导致 和发出巨响,而 又反过来导致眉头皱起,并且玛丽有 X,那么这个人--让我们称她为玛丽--就处于痛苦之中。如果玛丽有这样的状态,一个以这种方式发挥作用的状态,她就处于痛苦之中。
Now, is, as I said, ridiculously simple. But it has allowed us to see how to define one mental state-pain-that can only be explained in terms of its interactions with another mental stateworry-without assuming that we can define the other mental state first.
现在,正如我所说, ,简单得令人发指。但它让我们看到了如何定义一种心理状态--"痛",而这种心理状态只能通过它与另一种心理状态 "忧 "的相互作用来解释--而不必假设我们可以先定义另一种心理状态。

1.8 Ramsey's solution to the first problem
1.8 拉姆齐对第一个问题的解答

Now that we have seen how to solve the problem of defining one mental state without circularly assuming that we have already defined some others, let's see if we can see how to do this for belief. If we were to try to do this for belief, we should need many more letters than "X" and "Y." We call these letters "variables," and they function in a way I shall explain in the chapter on language. But the procedure would be exactly the same. We would first write down all the claims about beliefs and desires and evidence and action that we think have to be satisfied by a creature that has a mind. This body of
既然我们已经看到了如何在不循环地假设我们已经定义了其他一些心理状态的情况下解决定义一种心理状态的问题,那么让我们来看看如何为信念做这件事。如果我们试图为信念下定义,我们需要的字母应该比 "X "和 "Y "多得多。我们称这些字母为 "变量",它们的作用我将在语言一章中解释。但程序是完全一样的。我们首先要写下所有我们认为有思想的生物必须满足的关于信念、欲望、证据和行动的要求。这些

ideas is what is sometimes called our "folk psychology": it's the shared consensus of our culture about how minds work, the "theory" we learn as we grow up. If we join all the claims of folk psychology together with "and's" we will have one very long sentence, and that will be our functionalist theory of the mind. Call that sentence MT (for "mental theory"). From MT, we would then take out all the mental terms referring to beliefs and desires and replace them with "variables." The result of this we can call . Finally, for each variable we should write "There exists a . . ." in front of MT", and we would have a new sentence, which didn't have any mental terms in it. That sentence is called the Ramsey-sentence of the theory MT, because the British philosopher Frank Ramsey invented this procedure. The Ramsey-sentence of MT says, in effect, that something that has a mind has a large number of internal states - one for each variable-that interact with input and with each other in certain specific ways, to produce behavior. (I called the final version of the simple-minded theory of pain " ," because it's the Ramsey-sentence of the simple-minded theory of pain.)
思想有时被称为我们的 "民间心理学":它是我们的文化中关于思维如何运作的共识,是我们在成长过程中学到的 "理论"。如果我们把民间心理学的所有主张用 "和 "连接起来,就会得到一个很长的句子,这就是我们的功能主义心智理论。把这句话称为 MT("心智理论 "的意思)。从 MT 中,我们可以去掉所有涉及信念和欲望的心理术语,代之以 "变量"。这样得到的结果我们可以称之为 。最后,对于每个变量,我们都应该在 MT 前面写上 "存在一个......",这样我们就有了一个新句子,其中没有任何心理术语。这个句子被称为 MT 理论的拉姆齐句(Ramsey-sentence),因为英国哲学家弗兰克-拉姆齐(Frank Ramsey)发明了这个程序。MT的拉姆齐句实际上是说,有思想的东西有大量的内部状态--每个变量有一个内部状态--这些状态以某些特定的方式与输入和其他状态相互作用,从而产生行为。(我把头脑简单的疼痛理论的最终版本称为 " ",因为它是头脑简单的疼痛理论的拉姆齐句)。
In 1.4 I said that many philosophers who have thought about the other-minds question have wanted to be able to define mental states in such a way that it was always possible, at least in principle, that somebody else should know what is going on in your mind. Notice that this functionalist theory, set up in the way Ramsey suggested, seems to make this possible. For Ramsey's method allowed us to define pain in terms of its causes and effects, its functional role, in such a way that if we have evidence that someone's internal states would make them react in certain public ways-brow wrinkling and the emission of loud noises - in response to certain public eventspinpricks - we have evidence that they are in pain. It allowed us to do this without requiring that we know anything about the other internal states - in this case, worry- except that they too would have certain causes and effects, which could, in the end, be seen to show up in what people do. For the Ramsey-sentence of MT is true of someone if and only if he or she has a system of internal states that produces the right pattern of responses in output-in this case, brow wrinkling and loud noises-to input-in this case, pinpricks.
我在 1.4 中说过,许多思考过他心问题的哲学家都希望能够以这样一种方式来定义心理状态,即至少在原则上,别人总是有可能知道你心里在想什么。请注意,以拉姆齐建议的方式建立起来的功能主义理论似乎可以做到这一点。因为拉姆齐的方法让我们能够根据疼痛的原因和影响、功能作用来定义疼痛,这样,如果我们有证据表明某人的内心状态会让他们在某些公共场合做出反应--皱眉头和发出巨大的声音--以回应某些公共事件--我们就有证据表明他们感到痛苦。它让我们能够做到这一点,而不需要我们对其他内部状态--在这种情况下是担心--有任何了解,只是它们也会有一定的原因和影响,而这些原因和影响最终会在人们的行为中显现出来。因为 MT 的拉姆齐句子是真实的,当且仅当他或她有一个内部状态系统,该系统在输出(本例中为皱眉和大声喧哗)中对输入(本例中为针刺)产生正确的反应模式。
In the more complex case of beliefs, as we saw, we can proceed in a similar way. But here, just because the case is more complex and
正如我们所看到的,在信念这一更为复杂的情况下,我们可以采用类似的方法。但在这里,正因为情况更复杂,而且

there are so many more internal states, it may be very hard, in practice, to discover that the right complex pattern of dispositions to respond to input exists. So, while allowing us to take mental states seriously, functionalism also allows us to believe that they might be very difficult-indeed, practically impossible-for anyone, except perhaps the person who has them, to find out about. (I'll say something about how a functionalist might explain our knowledge of our own states later, in section 1.11.) It is in this sense that functionalism is a halfway house between Descartes and behaviorism. For Descartes, as we saw, left open the possibility that someone could have mental states that no one else could know existed even in principle. Functionalism denies this. Any evidence of the existence of the right (extremely complex) pattern of dispositions will be evidence of your mental states. For behaviorism, every mental state is nothing more than a disposition to respond to input. Functionalism denies this also. What someone with a certain belief will do when stimulated depends, the functionalist claims, on other internal states as well.
由于有如此多的内部状态,在实践中可能很难发现存在着对输入做出反应的正确的复杂处置模式。因此,在允许我们认真对待心理状态的同时,功能主义也允许我们相信,除了拥有心理状态的人之外,任何人都很难--事实上,几乎不可能--发现心理状态。(我稍后会在第 1.11 节中谈谈功能论者如何解释我们对自身状态的了解)。正是在这个意义上,功能主义是笛卡尔与行为主义之间的中途站。正如我们所看到的,笛卡尔认为有人可能会有别人无法知道的心理状态,即使在原则上也是如此。功能主义否认了这一点。任何存在正确的(极其复杂的)处置模式的证据,都是你的心理状态的证据。在行为主义看来,每一种心理状态都不过是对输入做出反应的处置。功能主义也否认这一点。功能论者认为,拥有某种信念的人在受到刺激时会做什么,还取决于其他的内在状态。

1.9 Functionalism: A second problem
1.9 功能主义:第二个问题

I said, in 1.1, that from an epistemological point of view, it seemed plausible to say that had a mind. We have been looking, in the last three sections, at functionalism about minds from an essentially epistemological point of view. We have seen that functionalism offers a plausible answer to the other-minds question: we can know, at least in principle, what is going on in other peoples' minds. But from the phenomenological point of view, which denied that machines could have minds, functionalism doesn't look so attractive. For if functionalism is right and to have a mind is to have certain internal states that function in a certain way, then anything that has states that function in the right way has a mind. That seems to have the consequence that if a computer had internal states that functioned in the right way, it would have a mind. And, the phenomenologist says, that is quite wrong. It isn't enough to have internal states that lead you to respond in the right way; you must also have an inner life. That inner life has to have the sort of character that Descartes thought it had. It has to be conscious mental life. And a machine could quite well behave in the right way without having any mental life at all.
我在 1.1 中说过,从认识论的角度来看,说 有思想似乎是可信的。在过去的三节中,我们主要从认识论的角度探讨了关于心灵的功能主义。我们已经看到,功能主义为 "他心智 "问题提供了一个合理的答案:我们至少在原则上可以知道其他人的心智是怎么回事。但从现象学的角度来看,功能主义否认机器可能有思想,因此看起来并不那么有吸引力。因为如果功能主义是正确的,而拥有思想就是拥有以某种方式发挥作用的特定内部状态,那么任何拥有以正确方式发挥作用的状态的东西都拥有思想。这似乎会导致这样一个结果:如果计算机具有以正确方式运行的内部状态,那么它就会有思想。现象学家说,这是大错特错的。仅仅有导致你以正确方式做出反应的内部状态是不够的;你还必须有一种内在生活。这种内在生活必须具有笛卡尔所认为的那种特征。它必须是有意识的精神生活。机器完全可以在没有任何精神生活的情况下做出正确的行为。
If the phenomenologists are right, it follows that functionalism has failed to capture the essence of what it is to have a mind. For if they are right, a functionalist might say that a creature (or a machine) had a mind because it had internal states with the right functions, even though it did not, in fact, have a mind because it had no inner life. To understand this objection to functionalism, we must first try to make more precise what "having an inner life" means. The phenomenologist will usually explain this by saying that the difference between a creature with an inner life and one without an inner life is that there is something that it feels like to be a creature with an inner life, but nothing that it feels like to be a creature without one. If a person has an experience-say, seeing something redwe can ask what it feels like to have that experience. So, for example, if you, like me, are neither blind nor color-blind, then you know what it feels like to see red.
如果现象学家是对的,那么功能主义就没有抓住 "心灵 "的本质。因为如果他们是对的,那么功能主义者可能会说,一个生物(或机器)有思想,因为它有具有正确功能的内部状态,尽管事实上它并没有思想,因为它没有内在生命。要理解对功能主义的这一反对意见,我们必须首先明确 "具有内在生命 "的含义。现象学家通常会这样解释:有内在生命的生物与没有内在生命的生物之间的区别在于,有内在生命的生物有某种感觉,而没有内在生命的生物则没有任何感觉。如果一个人有了某种经历,比如看到了红色的东西,我们就可以问他这种经历是什么感觉。因此,举例来说,如果你和我一样既不是盲人也不是色盲,那么你就知道看到红色是什么感觉。
Suppose there was a machine that was sensitive to red things and had internal states that led it to say "That's red" and, generally, to do all the things that people do with visual information. The phenomenologist believes we could still not be sure that the machine knew what it felt like to see red. That is why the phenomenologist thinks that a functionalist might mistakenly think that a machine had a mind.
假设有一台机器对红色的东西很敏感,它的内部状态会让它说 "那是红色的",一般来说,它会做所有人们用视觉信息做的事情。现象学家认为,我们仍然无法确定这台机器知道看到红色是什么感觉。这就是为什么现象学家认为功能主义者可能会错误地认为机器有思想。
How are we to settle this dispute between the phenomenologist and the functionalist? It will help, I think, to consider it in the light of specific examples again; and, as we shall see, and your mother provide just the right kinds of examples.
我们该如何解决现象学家与功能学家之间的争论呢?我认为,再次从具体事例的角度来考虑这个问题会有所帮助;正如我们将会看到的, 和你的母亲提供了恰如其分的事例。

1.10 again 1.10 again

was a machine that would behave in every situation exactly like your mother. A machine that is made to have internal states that function like a human mind we can call functionally equivalent to a person. and your mother are functionally equivalent. But phenomenologists might have different attitudes to them. The phenomenologist might say:
是一台在任何情况下都能表现得和你母亲一模一样的机器。如果一台机器的内部状态与人的思维一样,我们就可以把它称为功能等同于人。 和你的母亲在功能上是等同的。但现象学家可能对它们持不同的态度。现象学家可能会说:
How do I know whether M knows, as your mother does, what it feels like to see red? Your mother, I believe, does know, because she, like me, is a human being. I have reason to think that human beings with normal vision know what
我怎么知道 M 是否和你母亲一样,知道看到红色是什么感觉?我相信,你妈妈是知道的,因为她和我一样,都是人。我有理由认为,视力正常的人类知道

seeing red feels like. For I know what it is like, and I believe that other human beings are like me.
看到红色的感觉。因为我知道那是什么感觉,我相信其他人也和我一样。
The functionalist replies:
功能主义者回答说
All the evidence you have that your mother knows what it is like to see red is from what she says and does. Since M does the same, it is unreasonable to believe that your mother has a mind and M does not.
你母亲知道看到红色是什么感觉的所有证据都来自她的言行。既然 M 也是这样做的,那么认为你妈妈有思想而 M 没有是不合理的。
Notice, first, that we cannot appeal to any evidence to settle the dispute. Even if we were discussing an actual machine instead of a hypothetical one, it wouldn't help, for example, to ask it if it knew what it felt like to see red. For any machine functionally equivalent to your mother would say "Yes" if you asked it if it knew what it felt like to see red, because that is what your mother would say. If you didn't believe that what the machine said was true, you might try to test it, just as you might try to test your mother, if you suspected that she was colorblind. But whatever she would do in the test the machine would do also. So no amount of such testing is going to give you a reason to say something about the machine that you wouldn't say about your mother. The phenomenologist's worry that may lack mental states will never be settled by the kind of evidence that normally persuades us that people have them.
首先请注意,我们不能诉诸任何证据来解决争议。即使我们讨论的是一台真实的机器而不是一台假设的机器,例如,问它是否知道看到红色是什么感觉也无济于事。因为如果你问一台功能等同于你母亲的机器是否知道看到红色是什么感觉,它肯定会说 "知道",因为你母亲也会这么说。如果你不相信机器说的是真的,你可以试着测试它,就像你怀疑你妈妈是色盲一样。但无论她在测试中做什么,机器也会做什么。因此,无论如何测试,你都没有理由对机器说一些你不会对你母亲说的话。现象学家担心 可能缺乏精神状态,但这种担心永远也不会通过通常说服我们相信人有精神状态的那种证据得到解决。
This is already a rather strange situation, since we normally think we can tell whether people know what it feels like, for example, to see red by testing their responses to red things. Nevertheless, despite the fact that no amount of evidence could settle the issue, the conviction that there is a real doubt about whether such a machine would have a mind is very widespread, including among philosophers. In the next chapter I shall be looking at arguments for the view that if no amount of evidence could decide an issue, there is no real issue. Someone who believes this is called a verificationist. And if verificationism is correct, then the phenomenologist must be wrong.
这已经是一种相当奇怪的情况了,因为我们通常认为,我们可以通过测试人们对红色事物的反应来判断他们是否知道看到红色是什么感觉。然而,尽管再多的证据也无法解决这个问题,但包括哲学家在内的许多人都深信,这样的机器是否会有思想确实存在疑问。在下一章中,我将探讨这样一种观点的论据,即如果没有任何证据能够决定一个问题,那么就不存在真正的问题。相信这种观点的人被称为验证论者。如果验证论是正确的,那么现象学家就一定是错的。
But even if the phenomenologist is right in thinking that some states, such as seeing that something is red, can be had only by someone with an inner life, there are other mental states for which this does not seem to be true.
但是,即使现象学家认为某些状态(比如看到某物是红色的)只有具有内在生命的人才能拥有,这也是正确的,但还有一些心理状态似乎并非如此。
Take beliefs once more. We do not normally talk of "knowing what it feels like to have a belief." Indeed, we can have beliefsunconscious ones - that we are unaware of altogether, and even our conscious beliefs do not have a special "feel" to them. What does it feel like to believe consciously that the president is in Washington, or that the rain in Spain stays mainly on the plain?
再以信念为例。我们通常不会说 "知道信念是什么感觉"。事实上,我们可能会有一些我们完全没有意识到的信念,甚至我们有意识的信念也没有特别的 "感觉"。有意识地相信总统在华盛顿,或者相信西班牙的雨主要下在平原上,会是什么感觉呢?
If this is so, then, even if the phenomenologist was right to be suspicious about the claim that knows what it feels like to see red, that would not give you a reason to doubt that it had beliefs. And, as the functionalist will insist, you would have all the same reasons for thinking that did have beliefs as you have for thinking that your mother has them. But beliefs are a pretty important feature of people's minds, and if having beliefs is enough to have a mind, then, as I said, we might end up holding that machines could have minds, even if they don't yet.
如果是这样的话,那么,即使现象学家对 知道看到红色是什么感觉的说法持怀疑态度是正确的,这也不会给你怀疑它有信念的理由。而且,正如功能主义者所坚持的那样,你认为 确实有信念的理由与你认为你母亲有信念的理由是一样的。但信念是人们思想的一个相当重要的特征,如果有信念就足以拥有思想,那么,正如我所说的,我们最终可能会认为机器可能拥有思想,即使它们现在还没有。

1.11 Consciousness 1.11 意识

The core of the dispute between functionalists and phenomenologists seems, then, to reside in their views of consciousness. Whether or not there are mental states-like unconscious beliefs- that are not in consciousness, there surely are conscious mental states. (If there are nonconscious mental states, then they will have to be picked out in some non-Cartesian manner. Since Descartes said that mental states were the contents of the conscious mind, for him the idea of an unconscious mental state would be a contradiction in terms.) What should the functionalist say is the characteristic feature of conscious mental states?
因此,功能主义者与现象主义者之间争论的核心似乎在于他们对意识的看法。无论是否存在不属于意识的精神状态--比如无意识的信念,但肯定存在有意识的精神状态。(如果存在非意识的精神状态,那么就必须以某种非笛卡尔的方式把它们挑出来)。既然笛卡尔说心理状态是有意识思维的内容,那么对他来说,无意识心理状态的观点就是自相矛盾的)。功能论者认为有意识精神状态的特征是什么?
One possibility, which was proposed by the British philosopher Hugh Mellor (who happens to have been one of my own teachers), is to say that conscious states are the states of our own minds about which we currently have beliefs; they are the ones we are currently aware of. So, in particular, a conscious belief that it is raining will be present, on this account, when I believe that I currently believe that it is raining. Let's call a belief about your own current mental state a "second-order" belief. A conscious sensation (of redness, say) will occur when I have the belief that I am currently seeing red.
英国哲学家休-梅洛(Hugh Mellor)(他恰好是我的老师之一)提出的一种可能性是,意识状态是我们目前拥有信念的心灵状态;它们是我们目前意识到的状态。因此,具体来说,当我相信我现在相信正在下雨时,"正在下雨 "这个有意识的信念就会出现。我们把对自己当前心理状态的信念称为 "二阶 "信念。当我相信我现在看到的是红色时,就会产生有意识的感觉(比如说红色)。
The functional role of these second-order states will be specified by saying that they are caused by first-order states-like seeing red
这些二阶状态的功能性作用,可以说是由一阶状态引起的,比如看到红光

or believing it's raining - and that they play a role in shaping our behavior, in particular, in relation to ourselves. For one central form of behavior that a belief about something — call it "A" - can produce is behavior aimed at affecting A. So one kind of behavior my beliefs about my own current states is likely to affect is behavior aimed at changing or maintaining my current state.
或相信正在下雨--它们在塑造我们的行为,尤其是与我们自身相关的行为方面发挥着作用。因此,我对自己当前状态的信念可能会影响的一种行为就是旨在改变或维持我当前状态的行为。
An obvious example is this. I believe there's a reliable clock in the kitchen. I also want to know what the time is. So I go to the kitchen in the belief that if I look at the clock, I will come to believe that the time is whatever the clock says it is and that that will be (roughly) right. In order for this line of reasoning to work, however, at some point I have to be aware that I am uncertain of the time, and for that to happen, on the functionalist view, I have to have a second-order belief about my (current) mental state. It follows that, on the functionalist view, it is only if I am conscious of my ignorance of the time that you can explain why I go to the kitchen to look at the clock. So here is a kind of behavior that can only occur with consciousness.
一个明显的例子是这样的。我相信厨房里有一个可靠的时钟。我也想知道现在几点了。因此,我去厨房时相信,如果我看了时钟,我就会相信时间就是时钟显示的时间,而且(大致)是正确的。然而,为了使这一推理行之有效,我必须在某个时刻意识到我对时间的不确定性,而要做到这一点,根据功能主义的观点,我必须有一个关于我(当前)心理状态的二阶信念。因此,根据功能主义观点,只有当我意识到自己对时间的无知时,你才能解释我为什么要去厨房看钟。所以,这里有一种行为只有在有意识的情况下才会发生。
On the other hand, if I am driving and a traffic light in front of me turns red, I can stop the car, as we say, "automatically": my belief that the red light is there and my desire to obey the traffic laws can operate directly without my coming to believe I believe anything. So, on this sort of functionalist view, some behavior can occur without consciousness.
另一方面,如果我正在开车,前方的交通灯变成了红灯,我可以 "自动 "停车:我相信红灯就在那里,我想遵守交通规则的愿望可以直接发挥作用,而不需要我相信自己相信什么。因此,根据这种功能主义观点,有些行为可以在没有意识的情况下发生。
There is another obvious kind of behavior that will require consciousness: telling you what I think or desire. For here, I need to form beliefs about my own mental states and then desire to communicate what I believe. Indeed, since, as we shall see in the chapter on language, communication is a matter of aiming to get people to believe things about your own beliefs, all communication will require second-order beliefs-beliefs about what I currently believe-and so will require consciousness.
还有一种明显需要意识的行为:告诉你我的想法或愿望。在这里,我需要对自己的心理状态形成信念,然后渴望传达我的信念。事实上,正如我们将在语言一章中看到的,交流的目的是让别人相信你自己的信念,因此所有的交流都需要二阶信念--关于我目前所相信的信念--因此需要意识。
The view that both going to find out what the time is and linguistic communication require consciousness is, I think, intuitively appealing, as is the view that we sometimes act on our beliefs without any conscious mediation. In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that people can act not just without conscious mediation but when they are not conscious at all. Unconscious people-people when they are asleep, for example — can do things like swat mosquitoes.
我认为,"查时间 "和 "语言交流 "都需要意识这一观点在直觉上很有吸引力,而我们有时在没有任何意识中介的情况下按照自己的信念行事这一观点也很有吸引力。事实上,我们可以合理地认为,人们不仅可以在没有意识中介的情况下行动,而且可以在完全没有意识的情况下行动。无意识的人--比如说睡着的人--可以做出打蚊子之类的事情。
An account of consciousness of this generally functionalist kind is likely to produce some impatience in the phenomenologist. For the apparatus of second-order states-states that are produced by other current states and that shape the behavior of a system by changing, or maintaining, its own mental states-could obviously be produced in an android: as I have already pointed out, certainly has the full range of behavior that your mother has, including answering questions and going to see what the time is. Perhaps, the phenomenologist could concede, the functionalists' account of consciousness captures something about consciousness, just as their account of belief-with its role in shaping behavior-captures something about belief. But it leaves out entirely the phenomenological character of consciousness-what it feels like to be your mother or me or anyone else with consciousness. And without that character what you have is just a very good fake.
这种泛功能主义的意识论很可能会让现象学家感到不耐烦。因为二阶状态的装置--由其他当前状态产生的状态,通过改变或维持系统自身的精神状态来塑造系统的行为--显然可以在机器人身上产生:正如我已经指出的, ,它肯定具有你母亲所具有的全部行为,包括回答问题和去看时间。也许,现象学家可以承认,功能论者关于意识的论述捕捉到了一些关于意识的东西,正如他们关于信念的论述--其在塑造行为中的作用--捕捉到了一些关于信念的东西。但它完全忽略了意识的现象学特征--作为你的母亲、我或其他任何具有意识的人是什么感觉。没有这种特征,你所拥有的只是一个很好的赝品。
We seem to have reached an impasse: a situation where arguments have run out and there is still no secure conclusion. Faced with an impasse such as this, it is often helpful to ask whether there is some assumption shared by both parties to the debate-what we call a shared presupposition - that needs to be examined. If there are good arguments for both sides and both sides can't be right, maybe it's because they're both wrong in some way we haven't noticed. One shared assumption in the debate so far is an assumption about philosophical method. It is that we can discover the essence of the mind or of consciousness by a purely conceptual inquiry. We have been proceeding by making arguments that are based on our understanding of key terms, such as "belief," "behavior," "feeling." I have mentioned no experimental explorations of the nature of the mind by psychologists. (Indeed, I suggested at the start, you will recall, that it was irrelevant whether your mother had brain tissue as opposed to silicon chips in her head!) The only experiments I have considered are thought experiments, where you think about an imaginary case and ask yourself what you would say if it actually occurred. But you might object to this procedure on various grounds.
我们似乎陷入了一个僵局:争论已经耗尽,却仍然没有可靠的结论。面对这样的僵局,我们通常会问,辩论双方是否有一些共同的假设--我们称之为共同的预设--需要加以研究。如果双方都有很好的论据,而双方又都不可能是对的,那也许是因为他们都错在了某些我们没有注意到的方面。迄今为止,辩论中的一个共同假设是关于哲学方法的假设。那就是,我们可以通过纯粹的概念探究来发现心灵或意识的本质。我们一直在根据对 "信念"、"行为"、"感觉 "等关键术语的理解进行论证。我没有提到心理学家对心灵本质的实验探索。(事实上,我在一开始就提出,你应该记得,你母亲的脑袋里是否有脑组织而不是硅芯片并不重要!)。我考虑过的唯一实验是思想实验,即你思考一个想象中的案例,然后问自己,如果它真的发生了,你会怎么说。但你可能会以各种理由反对这一程序。
For one thing, it might matter whether the thought experiments were about things that could in fact actually happen. It is not at all obvious, for example, that there could in fact be a creature like M.
首先,思想实验所涉及的事物是否真的可能发生可能很重要。例如,事实上是否存在 M 这样的生物并不明显。
(Perhaps the only sort of thing that could exactly reproduce your mother's behavior would have to be made pretty much, molecule for molecule, as your mother is. And then most of us would probably suppose that there was something that it was like to be her, so that she would meet both the functionalist and the phenomenological criteria for being mentally the same as your mother.) What significance should we attach to our response to being told that something might happen, when, in fact, it can't happen? Why should we assume, that is, that ways of thought that work well enough in a rough-and-ready way in ordinary life would work just as well in a very different world?
(也许只有一种东西能够完全再现你母亲的行为,那就是它的分子必须与你母亲的分子基本相同。然后,我们中的大多数人可能都会假定,有某种东西就像她一样,这样,她就既符合功能主义标准,也符合现象学标准,即在精神上与你母亲相同)。当我们被告知某件事情可能会发生,而事实上它不可能发生时,我们的反应应该具有什么意义呢?我们为什么要假定,在普通生活中粗略可行的思维方式,在一个截然不同的世界中也同样可行呢?
Another, more fundamental line of objection would be to ask why we take it for granted that we have such internal states as beliefs and sensations at all. We are normally inclined to take it as obvious that someone has beliefs when they act, or sensations when they open their eyes on a lighted world. But the fact that this is part of the package of regular commonsense assumptions doesn't guarantee that we are right. People used to think it was obvious that some people were witches and that there were ghosts. (As a matter of fact, as we shall see in the final chapter, there are still places where most people think something similar.) Perhaps the very fact that our ordinary ways of thinking can lead both to functionalism and to phenomenology suggests that those ways of thinking are muddled. (After all, if you can draw incompatible conclusions from a set of assumptions, that shows there's something wrong with them!) Perhaps, in fact, we should rethink the sources of behavior.
另一个更基本的反对理由是,我们为什么要想当然地认为我们有信念和感觉这样的内在状态。我们通常倾向于认为,一个人在行动时会有信念,或在睁开眼睛看到光亮的世界时会有感觉,这是显而易见的。但这是常识性假设的一部分,并不能保证我们是正确的。人们曾经认为,有些人是女巫,有些人是鬼,这些都是显而易见的。(事实上,正如我们将在最后一章看到的,在有些地方,大多数人仍然会有类似的想法)。也许,我们的普通思维方式既能导致功能主义,也能导致现象学,这一事实本身就表明这些思维方式是混乱的。(毕竟,如果你能从一系列假设中得出不相容的结论,那就说明这些假设有问题!)。也许,事实上我们应该重新思考行为的来源。
The contemporary American philosopher Stephen Stich has suggested that we may indeed have to do just this. He has examined a good deal of recent work in cognitive psychology, the branch of the subject that seeks to explain how we perceive, remember, reason, decide, and then act, by postulating internal processes very like those in a computer program. Stich argues that there is already a good deal of evidence from cognitive psychology that our folk psychological theory is just plain wrong. In fact, he thinks, it may eventually turn out that there is simply nothing at all inside our heads that operates in the way that our folk psychology of belief and desire supposes. If that is true, then there would be no beliefs or desires! And then we should have to proceed, guided by cognitive psychol-
当代美国哲学家斯蒂芬-斯蒂奇(Stephen Stich)认为,我们可能确实必须这样做。他研究了认知心理学的大量最新研究成果。认知心理学是这一学科的一个分支,旨在通过假设与计算机程序非常相似的内部过程,来解释我们是如何感知、记忆、推理、决定并采取行动的。斯蒂奇认为,认知心理学已有大量证据表明,我们的民间心理学理论是完全错误的。事实上,他认为,最终可能会发现,在我们的大脑中根本就没有什么东西是以我们关于信念和欲望的民间心理学所假定的方式运作的。如果这是真的,那么就不会有信念或欲望了!那么,我们就必须在认知心理学的指导下,继续研究我们的大脑。

ogy or neuroscience (or perhaps some new field of science), to try to understand the causes of behavior in terms of internal states quite unlike those we have gotten used to. That is why the subtitle of his book From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science is The Case Against Belief.
他的研究方向是心理学或神经科学(或许是某个新的科学领域),试图从与我们习以为常的内部状态截然不同的角度来理解行为的原因。这就是为什么他的《从民间心理学到认知科学》一书的副标题是《反对信仰的案例》。
One natural response to this possibility is to say that even if science does end up showing this, we would still want to continue with our folk psychological theory for everyday purposes. We would still, that is, want to treat other people as if they had beliefs and desires and the rest, even if our official position was that they didn't. Another American philosopher, Daniel Dennett, has given this strategy a name: he calls it "adopting the intentional stance" toward them. We adopt the intentional stance toward someone (or something) when we predict its behavior on the basis of what it would do if it had beliefs, desires, and intentions, while leaving open the possibility that it does not, in fact, have them. Many of us already adopt the intentional stance toward objects that we don't believe have minds. It's perfectly natural to talk about what a computer "thinks," or to explain a chess-playing machine's moves by saying it's "trying to ward off my rook." But it's also perfectly natural to deny that any existing computer or chess machine really has beliefs, desires, or intentions. (Analogously, most of us still speak of the sun going "up" and "down" in the sky, even though we know that, strictly speaking, we're actually rotating around .)
对这种可能性的一种自然反应是,即使科学最终证明了这一点,我们仍然希望在日常工作中继续使用我们的民间心理学理论。也就是说,即使我们的官方立场认为其他人没有信仰和欲望,我们仍然希望把他们当作有信仰和欲望的人对待。另一位美国哲学家丹尼尔-丹尼特(Daniel Dennett)给这一策略起了个名字:他称之为对他人 "采取意向立场"。当我们根据某人(或某物)如果有信念、欲望和意图会做什么来预测它的行为时,我们就会对它采取意向性立场,同时也保留了它事实上没有这些信念、欲望和意图的可能性。我们中的许多人已经对我们不相信有思想的物体采取了意向立场。谈论计算机 "在想什么",或者用 "试图抵挡我的车 "来解释下棋机器的走法,都是再自然不过的事了。但否认任何现存的计算机或国际象棋机器真的有信念、欲望或意图也是很自然的。(打个比方,尽管我们知道,严格来说,我们实际上是在围绕着 自转,但我们中的大多数人仍然会说太阳在天空中 "上 "和 "下")。
Stich argues that Dennett's proposal is intellectually irresponsible. What's the point of explaining the way people behave in terms of states they haven't got, once you develop a theory that explains how they behave in terms of states they have? But to this objection one might reply that there may be practical reasons why it is easier to use the folk psychological theory. Perhaps, for example, we are attached to this theory because it is programmed into us by evolution, so that, just as certain visual illusions persist, even once we know they are illusions, we will continue to think spontaneously of people as having beliefs, even once we realize they do not. Or perhaps the states that the new cognitive psychological theory postulates are rather difficult to identify, so that only a psychologist with special instrumentation can find out exactly what they are. (There is something odd about discussing what we should believe if there
斯蒂奇认为,丹尼特的提议在智力上是不负责任的。一旦你发展出一种理论,可以用人们已有的状态来解释他们的行为方式,那么用他们没有的状态来解释他们的行为方式还有什么意义呢?不过,对于这种反对意见,我们可以回答说,可能有一些实际原因,让我们更容易使用民间心理学理论。举例来说,也许我们之所以对这一理论情有独钟,是因为进化给我们设定了这一理论,因此,就像某些视觉幻觉即使在我们知道它们是幻觉之后仍然存在一样,我们会继续自发地认为人们有信仰,即使我们意识到他们没有信仰。或者,新的认知心理学理论所假设的状态很难确定,因此只有心理学家通过特殊的仪器才能准确地发现它们是什么。(讨论我们应该相信什么有些奇怪,如果有

aren't really any beliefs!) The rough-and-ready apparatus of folk psychology at least has the advantage that we can apply it pretty easily on the basis of looking and listening without special equipment.
其实并没有什么信仰!)。民间心理学的粗略工具至少有一个优点,那就是我们可以在没有特殊设备的情况下,通过观察和聆听就能很容易地运用它。
But there is a natural response to both Stich's proposal and Dennett's, a response that challenges a presupposition they seem to share. It is that both of them ignore the fact from which the phenomenologist starts: the fact that each of us knows very well in our own case that we have beliefs, desires, sensations, and so on. In response to Stich, one wants to say:
但是,对于斯蒂奇和丹尼特的提议,人们自然会有一种回应,这种回应是对他们似乎共享的一个预设前提的挑战。这就是,他们都忽略了现象学家的出发点:我们每个人都清楚地知道自己有信念、欲望、感觉等等。针对施蒂希,有人想说:
I grant that I might be wrong about how my mental states work, and about their causal relations. But I can't be wrong about whether I have mental states. They are, as Descartes rightly insisted, the one thing in the world I am most certain of. By "belief" I just mean something like the state I am in when I look at a vase and come to believe that it has a flower in it.
我承认,关于我的心理状态是如何运作的,以及它们之间的因果关系,我可能是错的。但在我是否有心理状态这一点上,我不会错。正如笛卡尔所坚持的那样,它们是世界上我最确定的一件事。我所说的 "信念 "指的是当我看着一个花瓶并相信里面插着一朵花时的状态。

And to Dennett one might say:
对于登尼特,人们可能会说

I can imagine taking the intentional stance toward somebody else, exactly because I can imagine that someone else doesn't really have beliefs and desires but only appears to do so. That is just the problem of other minds. But it's a problem of other minds; just because I have direct experience of my own internal states, I can't imagine taking the intentional stance toward myself.
我能想象对别人采取有意的立场,正是因为我能想象别人并没有真正的信念和欲望,而只是看起来有而已。这只是其他思维的问题。但这只是其他思维的问题;正因为我对自己的内心状态有直接体验,所以我无法想象对自己采取有意的立场。

1.12 The puzzle of the physical
1.12 物理之谜

I mentioned a little while ago that sometimes, in philosophy, it is important to examine the shared presuppositions of the parties to a debate, and I discussed a number of assumptions (some common to the functionalist and the phenomenologist, and one to Dennett and Stich) that might be questioned. I want to end this chapter by inviting you to think about another shared assumption: namely, that the puzzles about the relations between mind and body stem from the special character of the mind. After all, the idea that there is something special about the mind to be explained at all seems to presuppose that there is nothing much to be explained about the nonmental, the physical world. On the best current theories of nature, at one time the universe contained no minds, and they then evolved. One way of understanding how phenomenologists think about the mind-
我刚才提到,在哲学中,有时审视辩论双方的共同预设是很重要的,我讨论了一些可能受到质疑的假设(一些是功能论者和现象论者的共同假设,还有一个是丹尼特和斯蒂奇的共同假设)。在本章的最后,我想请大家思考另一个共同的假设:即关于身心关系的困惑源于心灵的特殊性。毕竟,认为心灵有什么特殊之处需要解释的想法似乎预先假定,非心灵的物理世界没有什么需要解释的。根据目前最好的自然理论,宇宙曾一度不包含思想,后来思想进化了。理解现象学家如何看待心智的一种方法是--"心智"。

body problem is to think of them as asking: "How could my mindwhich I know from direct experience-be made out of matter, which seems so different from it?"
身体的问题是把它们看作是在问:"我的思想是我从直接经验中认识的" "它怎么可能是由物质构成的?" "而物质似乎与思想大相径庭"
But why is it puzzling that minds are made out of matter? Stars, magnets, bacteria, and elephants are made out of matter, and each of these would have been hard to anticipate from the character of the universe before they emerged. We have learned about the properties of matter by seeing what can be made of it: we know that it is the kind of thing that magnets can be made out of, because we have found magnetic substances; we know that it is the kind of thing bacteria can be made out of, because we have found bacteria. Why is it especially hard to accept that it is the kind of thing minds can be made out of? Indeed, since the one thing of which each of us surely has the most extensive direct experience is our own mind, shouldn't we be puzzled, if we are puzzled by anything, by the nature of matter? How can it be, one might want to ask, that a world made of the sorts of things and governed by the sorts of laws that physicists now believe in should give rise to the astonishing range of experiences that each of us has every day?
但是,为什么思想是由物质构成的这一点令人费解呢?恒星、磁铁、细菌和大象都是由物质构成的,而每一种物质在出现之前都很难从宇宙的特性中预料到。我们通过观察物质的构成来了解物质的特性:我们知道磁铁是由磁性物质构成的,因为我们发现了磁性物质;我们知道细菌是由细菌构成的,因为我们发现了细菌。为什么我们特别难以接受 "思想 "是由这种物质构成的呢?事实上,既然我们每个人都对自己的思想有着最丰富的直接经验,那么我们难道不应该对物质的本质感到困惑吗?人们可能会问,一个由物理学家现在所相信的那种东西构成并受那种定律支配的世界,怎么会产生我们每个人每天都有的令人惊讶的各种体验呢?

1.13 Conclusion 1.13 结论

In this chapter we have discussed some of the central questions of the philosophy of mind. We started by asking, "Can machines have minds?" But that led us to ask how we know that people have minds, and to think about the special kind of knowledge we seem to have of our own minds. Because we asked these epistemological questions, we came, at the end, to a point where we could go no further until we had thought more about knowledge. We were also led to consider what the relationship is between a mind and its body. And because causation seems very important to this relationshipbecause thoughts seem to cause actions, and events in the world seem to cause sensations-we found at another point that we could go no further until we had thought some more about causation. That is one reason why I haven't been able to settle the central dispute of this chapter - between the functionalist and the phenomenologistdecisively in favor of one or the other. But even if I had given an explanation of the nature of causation and of knowledge, I should not have been able to settle that question decisively. For it is a question
在本章中,我们讨论了心灵哲学的一些核心问题。我们先问:"机器会有思想吗?"",但这又引出了一个问题:我们是如何知道人有思想的?因为我们提出了这些认识论问题,所以我们最后走到了这样一个地步:在我们对知识有了更多的思考之前,我们不能再往前走了。我们也开始思考心灵与身体之间的关系。由于因果关系似乎对这种关系非常重要,因为思想似乎会导致行动,而世界上的事件似乎会导致感觉,所以我们在另一个点上发现,除非我们对因果关系有更多的思考,否则我们就无法继续前进。这就是为什么我无法解决本章的核心争论--功能论者和现象论者之间的争论--决定性地支持其中一方的原因之一。不过,即使我对因果关系和知识的本质做出了解释,我也不可能决定性地解决这个问题。因为这个问题

that divides philosophers now, and there is something to be said in favor of both sides. If, when we have gone further with knowledge, you decide to join the phenomenologist, on one hand, or the functionalist, on the other, I hope you will keep in mind that there are good arguments in support of each of them.
这也是目前哲学家们的分歧所在,双方都有自己的观点。如果我们对知识有了进一步的了解,你决定加入现象学派或功能学派,我希望你能记住,支持这两种观点的论据都很充分。
But I hope you will also entertain the possibility that these tensions in our thought reveal that we may need entirely new ways of thinking in order to understand what our brains are doing-even, perhaps, that we may end up giving up the idea of the mind altogether. After all, when Descartes began modern philosophy of mind, he did so by treating as a single category everything of which we can be directly conscious: but perceptions, beliefs, hopes, twinges, anxieties, emotions, wishes and desires-even as we normally think of them - are a fairly diverse bunch of things. Perhaps it was a mistake to think that a single theory that covered all of them could be constructed. And, I have suggested, perhaps it was also a mistake to think that the deep puzzle is about the nature of the mind, rather than about the nature of matter. If, after all, as the best current theories of nature suggest, minds appear in the world through evolution in material organisms, then one of the facts about matter that needs explaining is that it can produce all the many diverse phenomena that we call "the mind."
但我希望你们也能接受这样一种可能性,即我们思维中的这些紧张关系揭示出,我们可能需要全新的思维方式才能理解我们的大脑在做什么--甚至,我们可能最终会完全放弃心灵的概念。毕竟,当笛卡尔开始研究现代心灵哲学时,他是把我们能够直接意识到的一切事物都视为一个单一的范畴:但知觉、信念、希望、痛苦、焦虑、情感、愿望和欲望--即使是我们通常认为的那样--是相当多样化的一群事物。也许,认为可以构建一种涵盖所有理论的单一理论是错误的。而且,我曾建议,也许认为深层谜题是关于心灵的本质而非物质的本质也是错误的。毕竟,如果正如目前最好的自然理论所表明的那样,心灵是通过物质有机体的进化而出现在这个世界上的,那么需要解释的关于物质的事实之一就是,它可以产生我们称之为 "心灵 "的所有各种现象。

CHAPTER 2 第 2 章

Knowledge 知识

What is knowledge? How can we justify our claims to knowledge?
什么是知识?我们如何证明自己的知识主张?
What can we know?
我们能知道什么?

2.1 Introduction 2.1 导言

Brain surgery is getting better all the time. Though we can't do brain transplants yet, one day we may well be able to. Let's imagine that we are living in a time when they are possible. Unlike other transplants, of course, the person who survives the operation is presumably the owner of the organ, not the owner of the body! But like all organ transplants, brain transplants involve an intermediate stage. For a while, a brain has to be stored outside its old body before it is connected into a new one. Now suppose that someone-call him Albert-is very badly injured in an accident. His body is hopelessly damaged. Fortunately, his brain was protected by a helmet, and it is unhurt. So a neurosurgeon sets about removing Albert's brain from his body in order to transplant it to a new one. Let's call this surgeon Marie. Marie carefully removes, along with the brain, both
脑外科技术日臻完善。虽然我们还不能进行大脑移植手术,但总有一天我们很可能可以做到。让我们想象一下,我们生活在一个可以进行脑移植的时代。当然,与其他移植手术不同的是,手术后存活下来的人可能是器官的主人,而不是身体的主人!但与所有器官移植一样,大脑移植也需要一个中间阶段。在将大脑连接到新身体之前,大脑必须暂时存放在旧身体之外。现在假设一个人--叫他阿尔伯特--在一次事故中受了重伤。他的身体已经严重受损。幸运的是,他的大脑受到头盔的保护,没有受伤。于是,一位神经外科医生开始将阿尔伯特的大脑从他的身体中取出,以便移植到一个新的大脑中。我们称这位外科医生为玛丽。玛丽小心翼翼地将艾伯特的大脑和两个
a) the sensory nerves that used to carry information from Albert's eyes, ears, nose, mouth and so on, about the looks, sounds, smells and tastes and the feel of the world around him; and
a) 从艾伯特的眼睛、耳朵、鼻子、嘴巴等处传来的关于他周围世界的外观、声音、气味、味道和感觉等信息的感觉神经;以及 b) 从艾伯特的眼睛、耳朵、鼻子、嘴巴等处传来的关于他周围世界的外观、声音、气味、味道和感觉等信息的感觉神经。
b) the motor nerves that used to carry messages from the brain to the muscles, "telling them" what to do.
b) 运动神经,用于从大脑向肌肉传递信息,"告诉它们 "该做什么。
Unfortunately, there isn't a spare body available just yet. So Marie puts Albert's brain into a vat of fluid and connects up the main blood vessels to a supply of blood. This is science fiction, so
遗憾的是,现在还没有备用躯体。于是,玛丽将艾伯特的大脑放入一桶液体中,并将主要血管与血液供应连接起来。这是科幻小说,所以

let's add interest by supposing that Marie is a mite unscrupulous. She's willing to do pretty much anything in the interest of knowledge. Here's a spare brain, and she just can't resist investigating it while she waits for a body. So she connects up the sensory nerve endings to an elaborate computer. The computer is designed to feed those nerve endings with electrical stimuli that are just like the stimuli that Albert got when his brain was properly connected to his body. Thus, when Albert's brain recovers consciousness, the computer feeds it electrical stimuli that produce in the nerves of his eyes the very same electrical signals that used to make him think he was looking around a room. If Marie connected the motor nerve endings to the computer too, she could tell what the brain was trying to do, and the computer could fake the experiences that the brain would have had in a body if it had succeeded in what it was trying to do.
让我们假设玛丽有点不择手段来增加趣味性。为了获取知识,她愿意做任何事。这里有一个空闲的大脑,在等待躯体的时候,她忍不住要对它进行研究。于是她把感觉神经末梢连接到了一台精密的电脑上。这台电脑的设计目的是给这些神经末梢提供电刺激,这些电刺激就像艾伯特的大脑与身体正常连接时受到的刺激一样。因此,当艾伯特的大脑恢复知觉时,计算机就会向其输入电刺激,在他的眼部神经中产生与过去让他以为自己在环顾房间时相同的电信号。如果玛丽把运动神经末梢也连接到电脑上,她就能知道大脑想做什么,电脑就能伪造大脑在身体中的体验,如果它成功地完成了它想做的事情。
Now here's a question. Is there any way Albert could tell that he was being fooled? Most people would say that the answer is no. But if Albert couldn't tell in that situation, then if you were in a similar situation, you couldn't tell either. So what makes you so sure you aren't being fooled right now? Maybe you're part of the first experimental program that will eventually lead to regular brain transplants. The researchers know that you would be very distressed to discover that you had lost your body, so they've deliberately wiped out all memories of the accident. They've faked your experience of reading this chapter in order to start you thinking about the idea of a new body! Later on, maybe, they'll tell you the truth about Marie and her computer, but for now you are "living" like Albert. Of course, if you are being fooled now, then all the things you think are going on around you are not happening at all. This book you think you are reading, for example, is just an illusion produced by a device like Marie's computer. (This is a favorite topic of science fiction in films such as The Matrix.)
现在有个问题艾伯特有办法看出自己被骗了吗?大多数人会说答案是否定的。但是,如果艾伯特在那种情况下都看不出来,那么如果你在类似的情况下,你也看不出来。那么,是什么让你如此确信自己现在没有被愚弄呢?也许你是第一个实验项目的一部分,这个项目最终会导致常规的大脑移植。研究人员知道,如果你发现自己失去了身体,一定会非常痛苦,所以他们故意抹去了你对事故的所有记忆。他们伪造了你阅读这一章的经历,目的是让你开始思考一个新身体的想法!以后,也许他们会告诉你玛丽和她的电脑的真相,但现在你还像艾伯特一样 "活着"。当然,如果你现在被愚弄了,那么你认为在你周围发生的所有事情根本就没有发生。比如,你以为自己正在阅读的这本书,其实只是玛丽的电脑等设备产生的幻觉。(这是电影《黑客帝国》等科幻小说最喜欢的主题)。
Philosophers are often caricatured as being worried about things that it is absurd to worry about. We are supposed to ask questions like "How do I know that the book in front of me is really there?" Without a context, that really can seem a pointless question. But once we place the question in the context of this science fiction possibility, it does not seem so obviously pointless. Maybe, one day not
哲学家常常被讽刺为担心一些荒谬的事情。我们应该问这样的问题:"我怎么知道我面前的书真的存在?"在没有语境的情况下,这确实是一个毫无意义的问题。但是,一旦我们把这个问题放在科幻小说的可能性背景下,它就不会显得那么明显无意义了。也许,有一天不

too far from now, people will find themselves asking this question in all seriousness. Once again a piece of science fiction has led us straight to the heart of a philosophical problem. How do we know about the existence of physical objects? Our maternal robot, M, raised the question of how we know that other people have minds. Now we have to ask an even more disturbing question: How do we know that other people have bodies? Indeed, how do we know that anything exists at all?
在不远的将来,人们会发现自己会认真地提出这个问题。一部科幻小说再一次把我们引向了哲学问题的核心。我们如何知道物理对象的存在?我们的母机器人 M 提出了一个问题:我们如何知道其他人有思想?现在,我们不得不提出一个更令人不安的问题:我们怎么知道其他人有身体?事实上,我们怎么知道有任何东西存在呢?
Questions like these, about the nature of knowledge, belong to epistemology - the philosophical examination of the nature of knowledge. And one way to set about answering the sorts of questions raised by this story is to start by asking what we mean by "knowledge." If we can answer that question, we'll be in a better position to discover whether-and if so, how-we know that we aren't just brains in fluid, the playthings of an unscrupulous scientist.
像这样关于知识本质的问题属于认识论--对知识本质的哲学研究。要回答这个故事所提出的问题,一种方法是先问一问我们所说的 "知识 "是什么意思。如果我们能回答这个问题,我们就能更好地发现,我们是否--如果是的话,我们如何--知道我们不只是流体中的大脑,不只是无良科学家的玩物。

2.2 Plato: Knowledge as justified true belief
2.2 柏拉图知识是合理的真实信念

Plato is the first Western philosopher who left us a substantial body of writing. But he didn't write philosophical treatises like Descartes' Discourse on Method. Instead he wrote dialogues: dramatic works in which different characters represent and argue for different philosophical positions. (He did this more explicitly than Wittgenstein, who doesn't actually give names and personalities to the exponents of the different positions that are canvassed in the Philosophical Investigations.) In Plato's dialogues the central character is usually his teacher, Socrates, whose philosophical technique was to proceed not by stating a position but by asking questions and leading those with whom he talked to their own answers. (This is sometimes called the Socratic method.) In the dialogue called the Theaetetus, Socrates discusses the question "What is knowledge?" with a young man called Theaetetus. Because Plato’s discussion of knowledge has been as central to the Western tradition as Descartes' view of mind has been to modern philosophical psychology, I want to begin considering what knowledge is by examining some of the ideas discussed by Socrates and Theaetetus in this famous dialogue.
柏拉图是第一位为我们留下大量著作的西方哲学家。但他并没有像笛卡尔的《方法论》那样写哲学论著。相反,他写的是对话:在戏剧作品中,不同的人物代表不同的哲学立场并为之争辩。(他比维特根斯坦更明确地做到了这一点,因为维特根斯坦实际上并没有为《哲学探究》中所阐述的不同立场的阐述者给出名字和人物)。在柏拉图的对话中,中心人物通常是他的老师苏格拉底,苏格拉底的哲学技巧不是通过陈述立场,而是通过提问,引导与他对话的人得出自己的答案(这有时被称为 "苏格拉底哲学")。(在《泰埃泰特斯》对话中,苏格拉底与一个名叫泰埃泰特斯的年轻人讨论了 "知识是什么?由于柏拉图对知识的讨论就像笛卡尔的心智观对现代哲学心理学的影响一样,一直是西方传统的核心,因此我想通过研究苏格拉底和泰厄泰图斯在这段著名对话中讨论的一些观点,来开始思考什么是知识。
Theaetetus begins answering Socrates' question "What is knowledge?" by giving examples of knowledge: geometry, for example, and the technical know-how of a shoemaker. But Socrates objects
在回答苏格拉底的问题 "什么是知识?"时,泰厄泰图斯首先举出了一些知识的例子:比如几何学和鞋匠的技术诀窍。但苏格拉底反对

that what he wants is not a bunch of examples of knowledge, but rather an explanation of the nature of knowledge. In answer to the philosophical question "What is knowledge?" what is wanted is a definition that we can use to decide whether any particular case really is a case where somebody knows something.
他想要的不是一堆知识的例子,而是对知识本质的解释。在回答 "什么是知识?"这个哲学问题时,我们需要的是一个定义,我们可以用这个定义来判断任何特定的情况是否真的是某人知道某些东西的情况。
Theaetetus then makes other attempts at answering the question that give definitions of this sort. But Socrates argues against all of them. Finally, Theaetetus suggests that to know something is just to believe something that is true. If you know that you are reading this book, for example, then, on Theaetetus's theory,
然后,泰厄泰图斯又试图回答这个问题, ,给出这类定义。但苏格拉底一一反驳。最后,泰厄泰图斯提出,知道某事就是相信某事是真的。举例来说,如果你知道你正在阅读这本书,那么,按照泰厄忒斯的理论、
a) you must believe you are reading this book, and
a) 你必须相信自己正在阅读这本书,并且
b) you must, in fact, be reading this book.
b) 事实上,你一定在读这本书。
Socrates points out that it follows from this theory of Theaetetus' that when a skilled lawyer persuades a jury that someone is innocent, then if the person is in fact innocent, the jury knows he or she is innocent, even if the lawyer has persuaded the jury by dishonest means. This consequence, Socrates argues, shows that Theaetetus' theory must be wrong, because in such circumstances we would not allow that the jurors knew that the accused person was innocent, even if they correctly believed it.
苏格拉底指出,根据泰埃特斯的这一理论,当一个熟练的律师说服陪审团相信某人是无辜的,那么如果这个人事实上是无辜的,陪审团就知道他或她是无辜的,即使律师是用不诚实的手段说服陪审团的。苏格拉底认为,这一结果表明泰厄忒斯的理论肯定是错误的,因为在这种情况下,我们不会允许陪审员知道被告是无辜的,即使他们正确地相信了这一点。
Socrates has a point. Suppose, for example, my lawyers believe that I am innocent and that I am being framed. They might decide that it was more important to protect someone from being framed than to respect the law, which the prosecutors are, after all, abusing. So they might fake "evidence" that undermines the fake "evidence" produced by the prosecutors. Suppose they persuaded the jury: the members of the jury would correctly believe I am innocent, but they certainly wouldn't know that I am innocent.
苏格拉底说得有道理。例如,假设我的律师认为我是无辜的,我是被陷害的。他们可能会认为,保护某人不被陷害比尊重法律更重要,毕竟检察官正在滥用法律。因此,他们可能会伪造 "证据",以破坏检察官提供的假 "证据"。假设他们说服了陪审团:陪审团成员会正确地相信我是无辜的,但他们肯定不会知道我是无辜的。
Here is the passage where Socrates summarizes his objection and Theaetetus responds: belief with a justification is knowledge, and the kind without a justification falls outside the sphere of knowledge.
苏格拉底在这段话中总结了他的反对意见,而忒亚提图斯则做出了回应:有理由的信念是知识,而没有理由的信念则不属于知识的范畴。
Theaetetus realizes that this case shows that we need some third condition for knowledge: knowing does involve believing, and it does involve the truth of what you believe, but it also requires something else. And, since he is nothing if not persistent, Theaetetus suggests that knowledge is true belief along with a justification. The rest of the Theaetetus is taken up with discussing what sort of justification is necessary. But the essential idea is that to know something,
Theaetetus 意识到,这种情况表明,我们需要知识的第三个条件:知道确实涉及相信,确实涉及你所相信的真理,但它还需要其他东西。鉴于他的坚持不懈,泰厄泰图斯提出,知识就是真实的信念和理由。Theaetetus 的其余部分都在讨论什么样的理由是必要的。但其基本思想是,要想知道某件事情、
a) you must believe it,
a) 你必须相信它、
b) it must be true, and
b) 它必须是真实的,并且
c) you must be justified in believing it.
c) 你必须有理由相信它。
It is the recognition that we need this third condition-which I'll call the justification condition - that is the Theaetetus' major legacy to epistemology. That the justification condition and the first two conditions, taken together, are necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge is a central philosophical claim of the Western tradition since Plato. This idea is often expressed in the slogan "Knowledge is justified true belief."
正是认识到我们需要这第三个条件--我称之为 "正当性条件"--才是《底伊特》留给认识论的主要遗产。自柏拉图以来,西方哲学传统的一个核心主张是,正义条件和前两个条件合在一起,是知识的必要和充分条件。这一观点经常被表述为 "知识是有理由的真实信念"。
Socrates never accepts any of Theaetetus' attempts to define exactly which kind of justification is necessary to turn true belief into knowledge, but the idea provides the starting point for many philosophical attempts to define knowledge since. Typically, philosophers have first argued for the view that knowledge is justified true belief and then gone on to ask the question "What kind of justification do you need in order to have knowledge?"
苏格拉底从未接受过忒耳忒斯试图准确定义哪种正当理由是将真实信念转化为知识的必要条件,但这一观点为此后许多试图定义知识的哲学活动提供了出发点。通常情况下,哲学家们首先论证了知识就是有正当理由的真实信念这一观点,然后继续追问 "你需要什么样的正当理由才能拥有知识?
Theaetetus' idea is suggested by a diagnosis of why the jurors don't really know I'm innocent. That diagnosis is, roughly, that though the jurors have a true belief, it isn't one that they are entitled to have, since my lawyers could have used the very same evidence to convince them I was innocent, even if I had been guilty. In other words, the evidence my lawyers gave the jury for the claim that I was innocent was consistent with my being guilty, even though it persuaded them that I was not. This diagnosis is at the root of the first of two major ways in which philosophers have tried to say
Theaetetus 的想法是通过对陪审员为何并不真正知道我无罪的诊断提出的。这个诊断大致是,虽然陪审员们有一个真实的信念,但这并不是他们有权拥有的信念,因为即使我有罪,我的律师也可以用同样的证据让他们相信我是无辜的。换句话说,我的律师向陪审团提供的关于我无罪的证据与我有罪是一致的,尽管这些证据说服了他们我无罪。这一诊断是哲学家们试图用两种主要方式中的第一种来说明

exactly what the justification condition amounts to. That account is found in the epistemology of Descartes.
究竟正当性条件相当于什么?这种说法可以在笛卡尔的认识论中找到。

2.3 Descartes' way: Justification requires certainty
2.3 笛卡尔的方法:正义需要确定性

To see how we might get to the first way of interpreting the justification condition-Descartes' way-let's start by examining more precisely what it means to say that the evidence my lawyers present in the hypothetical case we have been considering is consistent with my being guilty.
为了弄清我们如何能够以第一种方式--笛卡尔的方式--来解释正当性条件,让我们先更精确地研究一下,在我们一直在考虑的假设案件中,我的律师所提供的证据与我有罪是一致的,这意味着什么。
One way of putting more precisely what I mean by saying the evidence is consistent with my being guilty is this:
我说证据与我有罪是一致的,有一种说法可以更准确地表达我的意思:
a) there is a true sentence (call it " ") that reports all the evidence, and
a) 有一个真实的句子(称之为 " ")报告了所有证据,并且

b) is consistent with a sentence that says I am guilty.
b) 与 "我有罪 "的句子是一致的。
Two sentences are consistent just in case it is possible for them to be true at the same time. (Throughout this chapter, when I am discussing evidence I shall often talk about sentences that report the evidence. This doesn't mean that I think having evidence is simply a matter of believing sentences to be true. If I thought that, I'd have difficulty explaining how a creature that didn't know at least one language could know anything, even though I believe, say, that my dog's tail-wagging shows that she knows that I am at the door. It's just that putting it in terms of sentences makes it easier to express the points I want to make.)
如果两个句子有可能同时为真,那么这两个句子就是一致的。(在本章中,当我讨论证据时,我将经常谈论报告证据的句子)。这并不意味着我认为拥有证据仅仅是相信句子为真的问题。如果我这么想,我就很难解释一个至少不懂一种语言的生物怎么会知道任何事情,即使我相信,比如说,我的狗摇尾巴说明它知道我在门口。只是,用句子来表达更容易表达我想表达的观点)。
Suppose, then, that we have a sentence, and we're looking at the evidence for it. Let's call the sentence that reports the evidence the "evidence-sentence," and the sentence for which it is evidence "S." What we mean, then, by the evidence being consistent with the sentence being false is that it is possible that the evidence-sentence should be true and should be false at the same time. Thus, for example, the evidence-sentence "John is crying and looking downcast" is quite consistent with the falsehood of the sentence "John is unhappy", since John might be trying to fool us. So, if we wanted to drop the talk about sentences, we could say that having evidence that John is crying and looking downcast is consistent with John's being happy.
那么,假设我们有一个句子,我们正在研究它的证据。我们把报告证据的句子称为 "证据句",把它作为证据的句子称为 "S"。那么,我们所说的证据与句子 是假的相一致的意思是,证据-句子有可能是真的,而 有可能同时是假的。因此,举例来说,证据句 "约翰在哭泣,神情低落 "与句子 "约翰不快乐 "的虚假性是完全一致的,因为约翰可能在试图愚弄我们。因此,如果我们不想谈论句子,我们可以说,"约翰在哭泣,神情低落 "的证据句与 "约翰很快乐 "的假句是一致的。
Nevertheless, "John is crying and looking downcast" is good evidence that John is unhappy. Evidence like this, which is consistent with the falsity of the sentence it supports, is called "defeasible" evidence. ("Defeasible" because it could be defeated by later evidence that undermined it.) If, on the other hand, you have evidence for the truth of a sentence, , that is so good that it is not possible that should be false when the evidence-sentence is true, then you have what we call "indefeasible" evidence for S. The evidence-sentence "It looks red to me," for example, if true, would be taken by Descartes (and most people) as indefeasible evidence for the sentence "I am having a visual experience."
然而,"约翰在哭泣,神情低落 "是约翰不快乐的有力证据。这样的证据与它所支持的句子的虚假性是一致的,被称为 "可推翻 "证据("可推翻 "是因为它可以被后来破坏它的证据所推翻)。("可击溃 "是因为它可以被后来破坏它的证据所击溃)。另一方面,如果你有证据证明一个句子 是真的,而这个证据句子是真的时, 不可能是假的,那么你就有了我们所说的 S 的 "不可辩驳 "证据。例如,证据句子 "对我来说它看起来是红色的",如果是真的,笛卡尔(和大多数人)就会认为它是 "我正在经历视觉体验 "这个句子的不可辩驳证据。
The jury in my story plainly did not have indefeasible evidence that I was innocent: for, as I said, the evidence was consistent with my being guilty. One possible view, then, would be that what the jury in my story lacked was indefeasible evidence and that, if they had had that, they would have had knowledge. The justification condition for knowledge, on this view, means that you must have evidence that justifies your belief indefeasibly.
在我的故事中,陪审团显然没有不可辩驳的证据证明我是无辜的:因为正如我所说,证据与我有罪是一致的。那么,一种可能的观点是,我故事中的陪审团缺乏的是不可辩驳的证据,如果他们有了这种证据,他们就会有知识。根据这种观点,"知识 "的正当性条件意味着你必须拥有能够证明你的信念是正当的证据。
This was, as I say, essentially Descartes' view. Descartes didn't know much about how brains work. But he got to this conclusion by considering problems very much like the one raised by Marie, the unscrupulous neurosurgeon, with which I began. One problem he raised was how we could know that all our experiences were not just a dream. In many ways this is just like asking how we know that we are not Marie's victims. But his most convincing way of raising the question of our knowledge of the physical world, in terms that were natural and of immediate concern in his day, was to consider the possibility of an evil demon's fooling us into believing things by careful manipulation of our senses. This demon would be able, like Marie, to keep us from knowing what it was doing, while essentially fabricating all our experiences for us.
正如我所说,这基本上是笛卡尔的观点。笛卡尔并不了解大脑是如何工作的。但他是通过考虑与我开头提到的那个无良神经外科医生玛丽提出的问题非常相似的问题,才得出这个结论的。他提出的一个问题是,我们如何才能知道我们的所有经历并非只是一场梦。在很多方面,这就像我们问自己如何知道自己不是玛丽的受害者一样。不过,他提出的关于我们对物理世界的认识的问题,在他那个时代是自然而然的,也是我们最关心的问题,而他提出的最有说服力的方式,就是考虑一个邪恶的魔鬼通过精心操纵我们的感官来愚弄我们,让我们相信一些事情的可能性。这个恶魔就像玛丽一样,能够让我们不知道它在做什么,同时基本上为我们编造了我们所有的经历。
Here are two passages where Descartes first faces the possibility of the evil demon, and then considers how to respond to it. all external objects that we see, are nothing but illusions and tricks, which he uses to entrap my credulity.
在这两段文字中,笛卡尔首先面对了邪魔的可能性,然后思考了如何应对邪魔。"我们所看到的一切外物,都不过是幻象和诡计,他用这些幻象和诡计来诱骗我的轻信。
But were I persuaded that there was nothing at all in the world, that there was no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies; would I also be persuaded that I did not exist? No, surely, I would exist, without doubt, if I was persuaded, or even if I thought anything. "But there is some unknown deceiver, who is very powerful and very devious, who is using all his ingenuity to deceive me." Then there is no doubt at all that I exist, if he is deceiving me; and were he to deceive me as much as he wishes, he would never be able to make it true that I am nothing, so long as I am thinking that I am something. The result is that after having thought precisely about it and having carefully examined all things, in the end one must conclude, and hold as sound that this proposition: "I am," "I exist," is necessarily true on all occasions that I utter it or that I conceive it in my mind.
但是,如果我相信世界上什么都没有,没有天空,没有大地,没有思想,没有身体,我还会相信我不存在吗?不,毫无疑问,如果我被说服,甚至如果我有任何想法,我都会存在。"但是,有一个不知名的骗子,他非常强大,非常狡猾,正在用他所有的聪明才智来欺骗我"。那么,如果他在欺骗我,我的存在就毫无疑问了;即使他想怎么欺骗我都行,只要我在想我是存在的,他就永远无法让我真的什么都不是。结果是,在经过精确的思考和对所有事物的仔细研究之后,人们最终必须得出结论,并认为这个命题是正确的:"我是"、"我存在 "这个命题在我说出它或在我头脑中设想它的所有场合都必然是真实的。
This is a very persuasive argument: it is, indeed, one of the most famous arguments in the history of philosophy. What Descartes realized was that, however powerful the demon was, there was one thing the demon couldn't fool him about, namely, Descartes' own existence. The evidence each of us has of our own existence is indefeasible: it is obviously impossible both to be aware of yourself (or anything else) and not to exist. Descartes formulated this argument rather pithily in Latin in one of the best-known slogans in all philosophy: "Cogito ergo sum," which means "I think, therefore I am." (This argument is sometimes just called "the cogito.")
这是一个非常有说服力的论证:它的确是哲学史上最著名的论证之一。笛卡尔意识到,无论恶魔多么强大,有一件事恶魔是骗不了他的,那就是笛卡尔自己的存在。我们每个人都有自己存在的证据,这是不可辩驳的:显然,既不可能意识到自己(或其他任何事物),也不可能不存在。笛卡尔用拉丁语相当精辟地表述了这一论点,这也是所有哲学中最著名的口号之一:"Cogito ergo sum",意思是 "我思故我在"。(这个论点有时被称为 "cogito")。
Descartes thought he could escape the demon's tricks if he could find other beliefs that were as certain and indubitable for him as his own existence - the "I am" - and the fact that he had thoughts - the "I think." So long as he had any such certain and indubitable beliefs at all, he could claim these beliefs as knowledge, however hard the demon tried to confuse him.
笛卡尔认为,如果他能找到与他自身的存在--"我是"--和他有思想的事实--"我思 "一样确定无疑的其他信念,他就能逃脱魔鬼的诡计。只要他有任何这样确定和不可辩驳的信念,他就可以把这些信念说成是知识,无论魔鬼如何试图迷惑他。
Descartes, then, suggested that the right way to explain the justification condition was to insist that the evidence you possessed entitled you to be certain of what you believed. And by "certain" he meant that it had to be impossible to doubt it. This, after all, is a natural extension of the idea that we express by asking people who think they know something, "But are you sure?" We want them to consider whether they really have no doubt at all that they are right.
于是,笛卡尔提出,解释正当性条件的正确方法是坚持认为,你所拥有的证据使你有权确定你所相信的东西。他所说的 "确信 "是指不可能对其产生怀疑。毕竟,这是我们在问那些自以为知道什么的人 "但你确定吗?"时所表达的观点的自然延伸。我们希望他们考虑一下,他们是否真的毫不怀疑自己是对的。
It is only a short step from insisting that a belief that is to count as knowledge must be impossible to doubt to insisting that you must have indefeasible evidence for the belief. For if it is impossible for you to doubt , then you must have evidence that couldn't be true unless was true. And I defined "indefeasible evidence" as evidence for the truth of a sentence, , that is so good that it is not possible that should be false when the evidence-sentence is true. So Descartes is committed to the view that to know something you must have indefeasible evidence for it-or, equivalently, that your evidence must make the belief indubitable. To know something, for Descartes,
从坚持认为要算作知识的信念必须是不可能被怀疑的,到坚持认为你必须有不可辩驳的证据来证明你的信念,这只是很短的一步。因为如果你不可能怀疑 ,那么你就必须有证据证明 不可能是真的。我给 "不可辩驳的证据 "下的定义是:当证据句子为真时, ,它是如此之好,以至于 不可能是假的。因此,笛卡尔坚信,要想知道某件事情,就必须有不可辩驳的证据,或者说,你的证据必须使信念不可辩驳。对笛卡尔来说,要知道某件事情、
a) you must believe it,
a) 你必须相信它、
b) it must be true, and
b) 它必须是真实的,并且
c) you must have indefeasible evidence for the belief.
c) 你必须有不可辩驳的证据来证明你的信念。
Descartes' view has one surprising immediate consequence. Some sentences-such as "Nothing is both in New York and not in New York at the same time" - couldn't be false, and they are called "necessary truths." It turns out that, given the way indefeasible evidence is defined, any sentence at all is indefeasible evidence for a necessary truth. Take a sentence, , which is a necessary truth. By definition, it can't be false. Indefeasible evidence for is defined as evidence that couldn't be true if were false. Consider any other sentence at all; say, T. It certainly isn't possible for to be false if is true. For it isn't possible for to be false under any circumstances. So you have indefeasible evidence for any sentence that is a necessary truth, provided you believe anything at all!
笛卡尔的观点有一个令人惊讶的直接后果。有些句子--比如 "没有什么东西同时既在纽约又不在纽约"--不可能是假的,它们被称为 "必然真理"。事实证明,根据不可否认证据的定义方式,任何句子都是必然真理的不可否认证据。以一个句子 为例,它是一个必然真理。根据定义,它不可能是假的。 的不可否认的证据的定义是,如果 是假的,那么这个证据就不可能是真的。考虑任何其他句子,比如 T。如果 是真的, 当然不可能是假的。因为在任何情况下, 都不可能是假的。因此,只要你相信任何事情,你就有不可辩驳的证据证明任何句子都是必然真理!
It follows, of course, that, on Descartes' view, we know any necessary truths we believe. For necessary truths are, by definition, true under any circumstances, and, as we have seen, we automatically have indefeasible evidence for them.
当然,根据笛卡尔的观点,我们知道我们所相信的任何必然真理。因为根据定义,必然真理在任何情况下都是真实的,而且正如我们所看到的,我们自动拥有它们的不可辩驳的证据。
As far as necessary truths are concerned, then, Descartes' theory is very permissive. The difficulty with the theory is that it is, by contrast, very demanding when it comes to beliefs about the physical world. Indeed, it is so demanding that it is hard to think of any beliefs about physical objects that Descartes could claim to know. For, after all, as the story of Marie and Albert showed-as
因此,就必然真理而言,笛卡尔的理论是非常宽容的。该理论的难点在于,与之形成鲜明对比的是,它在涉及物理世界的信念时要求非常苛刻。事实上,它的要求之高,以至于很难想象笛卡尔可以声称知道任何关于物理对象的信念。毕竟,正如玛丽和阿尔伯特的故事所表明的那样
Descartes' own story of the demon shows-the evidence we actually have is consistent with our being wrong about almost everything we believe, except (as Descartes saw) what we believe about our own existence and our own thoughts. Nothing at all-save the existence of our own minds - is certain. So, on the Cartesian view, apart from necessary truths, we know nothing at all save the existence of our own minds. The philosophical position that we can know nothing about some kind of thing is known as skepticism about things of that kind. The Cartesian definition of knowledge leads swiftly to skepticism about the physical world.
笛卡尔自己关于恶魔的故事表明--我们实际掌握的证据表明,我们所相信的几乎所有东西都是错的,除了(正如笛卡尔所看到的)我们所相信的关于我们自己的存在和我们自己的思想的东西。除了我们自己的思想存在之外,没有任何东西是确定的。因此,根据笛卡尔的观点,除了必要的真理之外,除了我们自己的思想存在之外,我们什么都不知道。我们对某种事物一无所知的哲学立场被称为对该类事物的怀疑论。笛卡尔对知识的定义迅速导致了对物理世界的怀疑论。
Descartes thought he could escape the skeptical consequences of his definition of knowledge. His way of avoiding these consequences depends on the belief that there is an omnipotent, benevolent God who does not want us to be deceived. It is important to state as clearly as possible why this helps, because it allows us to make explicit one of Descartes' assumptions about the way we ought to seek justification for our beliefs. That assumption, as we shall see, is crucial to many philosophical views about justification.
笛卡尔认为他可以逃避他的知识定义所带来的怀疑论后果。他避免这些后果的方法依赖于这样一个信念,即存在着一个全能、仁慈的上帝,他不希望我们被欺骗。我们必须尽可能清楚地说明这一点,因为它让我们能够明确笛卡尔关于我们应该如何为自己的信念寻找理由的一个假设。正如我们将要看到的,这一假设对许多关于正当性的哲学观点都至关重要。
But before we go any further, we must notice another of Descartes' assumptions. Descartes thought that we could not be wrong about the contents of our own minds. He thought, for example, that if I think I am now thinking about oranges, then I must, in fact, be thinking about oranges. It is worth asking whether Descartes is right about this. For it might seem that sometimes, in fact, we make mistakes about what we are thinking. Certainly, it does not follow from the cogito argument alone. From the fact that, if I am thinking, I must exist it doesn't follow that I can't be wrong about what I'm thinking; it follows only that I can't be wrong in thinking that I exist. Nevertheless, there is at least some plausibility to the thought that I can't be wrong about the contents of my own mind, and many philosophers of his day thought that this was so.
不过,在继续深入之前,我们必须注意到笛卡尔的另一个假设。笛卡尔认为,我们对自己头脑中的内容不会有错。例如,他认为,如果我认为我现在在想橘子,那么我事实上就一定在想橘子。值得一问的是,笛卡尔的看法是否正确。因为事实上,我们有时可能会对自己在想什么犯错误。当然,这不能仅从 "cogito "论证中得出。根据 "如果我在思考,我就一定存在 "这一事实,并不能推导出我的思考不会出错,而只能推导出我在思考我的存在时不会出错。尽管如此,"我对自己思想内容的看法不会错 "这一观点至少还是有一定的可信度的,他那个时代的许多哲学家都这么认为。
Now, suppose I have a sensory experience that I can describe by saying:
现在,假设我有一种感官体验,我可以用一句话来描述这种体验:
E: It looks to me as though there is a book in front of me.
E:在我看来,我面前好像有一本书。
I call this sentence "E"-for "evidence." Since E is about my own mind, Descartes will allow that I can know it to be true: according
我称这句话为 "E"--"证据 "的意思。既然 E 是关于我自己的心灵的,笛卡尔就会允许我知道它是真的:根据

to him, as I have just pointed out, I can have indefeasible evidence of my own state of mind.
对他来说,正如我刚才指出的那样,我可以有自己思想状态的不可辩驳的证据。
But how can I come to know, on the basis of this state of mind, that there is, in fact, a book in front of me? Descartes says that if God is both benevolent and all-powerful, then He can make sure that the experiences we have correspond with the way the world really is. But even if my experience in fact corresponds with reality, because God has guaranteed it, I cannot know that it does unless I have indefeasible evidence. Suppose, however, that I have indefeasible evidence that God guarantees that sensory experience corresponds to how the world is. Then I know that if it looks, sounds, or, in general, seems to me that something is so, it is so. And so I know, in particular, that
但是,基于这种思维状态,我怎么能知道我面前其实有一本书呢?笛卡尔说,如果上帝既仁慈又万能,那么他就能确保我们的经验与世界的真实情况相符。但是,即使我的经验事实上与现实相符,因为上帝保证了这一点,除非我有不可辩驳的证据,否则我无法知道它是否与现实相符。然而,假设我有不可辩驳的证据,证明上帝保证感官经验与世界的真实情况相符。那么我就知道,如果在我看来,某件事情看起来是这样,听起来是这样,或者,一般来说,看起来是这样,那么它就是这样。因此,我特别知道
: If it looks to me as though there is a book in front of me, then there is a book in front of me.
如果在我看来面前有一本书,那么我面前就有一本书。
Now from the two sentences, and , it follows logically that there is a book in front of me. (We shall discuss what it means for something to follow logically in the next chapter; see 3.10.) Furthermore, I know, according to Descartes, that both and are true. Suppose that if something you believe follows logically from two things you know, then you know it, too. If that were true, Descartes could say that I knew that there was a book in front of me.
现在,根据 这两个句子,逻辑上可以得出结论:我面前有一本书。(我们将在下一章讨论逻辑上可以得出结论的含义,见 3.10)。此外,根据笛卡尔的观点,我知道 都是真的。假设如果你相信的东西在逻辑上是从你所知道的两件事中推导出来的,那么你也知道它。如果这是真的,笛卡尔就可以说,我知道我面前有一本书。
Descartes' claim that God's guarantee of our senses can form the basis of knowledge will be correct, therefore, if both
因此,笛卡尔认为上帝对我们感官的保证可以构成知识的基础,如果两者都是正确的,那么
a) we know about God's guarantee, and
a) 我们知道上帝的保证,以及
b) the following principle is correct: for any two sentences, A and B, if you know A and know B, and if from A and B, together, C follows logically, then if you believe C, you know C.
b) 下面的原则是正确的:对于任何两个句子 A 和 B,如果你知道 A 也知道 B,并且如果从 A 和 B 一起逻辑地得出 C,那么如果你相信 C,你就知道 C。
This principle is usually called the "deductive closure principle." For it says that the class of things you know includes all your beliefs that are logical (or "deductive") consequences of everything you know already.
这一原则通常被称为 "演绎封闭原则"。因为它说,你所知道的事物的类别包括你所有的信念,这些信念是你已经知道的一切事物的逻辑(或 "演绎")结果。
Notice that the deductive closure principle is really a consequence
请注意,演绎闭包原理实际上是一个结果

of Descartes' definition of knowledge. For, on Descartes' theory, if you know both and , then it is true of each sentence that
笛卡尔的知识定义。因为,根据笛卡尔的理论,如果你同时知道 ,那么每个句子都是真的,即
a) you believe it,
a) 你相信它、
b) it is true, and
b) 它是真实的,并且
c) you have indefeasible evidence for it.
c) 你有不可辩驳的证据。
Suppose you believe C, which follows logically from A and B. Since you do know A and B, it follows that your belief in C is true. (Here's the argument: If a conclusion follows logically from some assumptions, then the conclusion will be true if the assumptions are. From (b), it follows that if you know A and B, then A and B are both true. As I just said, if C follows logically from A and B, then C is true if they both are. So if you know A and B and if C follows from them, then is true.) That gives us conditions (a) and (b) for your belief C. So you know C, provided the justification condition (c) is satisfied as well. Does your knowing A and B mean you have indefeasible evidence for C, which follows from them? Obviously. For if C follows from and , then the evidence-sentence that makes and true makes true as well. (Here's the argument: Suppose is the indefeasible evidence for and ' is the indefeasible evidence for . Then is indefeasible evidence for . That just means that if is true, then must be. But if must be true then must be true, too, because it follows from ( . So, if ( is true, must be true. Which means that ( is indefeasible evidence for .) So the deductive closure principle is correct.
假设你相信由 A 和 B 逻辑推导出的 C,由于你确实知道 A 和 B,所以你相信 C 是真的:如果一个结论在逻辑上是由一些假设得出的,那么如果假设是真的,结论就是真的。根据(b),如果你知道 A 和 B,那么 A 和 B 都是真的。正如我刚才所说,如果 C 是由 A 和 B 逻辑推导出来的,那么如果它们都是真的,C 就是真的。因此,如果你知道 A 和 B,并且 C 从它们得出,那么 为真)。这就为你的信念 C 提供了条件 (a) 和 (b)。因此,你知道 C,前提是证明条件 (c) 也满足。你知道 A 和 B 是否意味着你对 C 有不可辩驳的证据,而 C 是由它们推导出来的?显然是的。因为如果 C 来自 ,那么使 成真的证据句子也使 成真。(论证如下:假设 的不可辩驳证据,而 ' 是 的不可辩驳证据。那么 就是 的不可辩驳证据。这就意味着,如果 是真的,那么 也一定是真的。但是,如果 一定为真,那么 也一定为真,因为它是从 ( 。因此,如果 ( 为真,那么 也一定为真。这意味着 ( 的不可推翻的证据。)所以演绎封闭原则是正确的。
The core of the argument here is expressed in the following principle:
论证的核心内容体现在以下原则中:
PDJ: If you take any two sentences, and , then, if you are justified in believing both A and B, and if from A and B together, C follows logically, then, if you believe C, you are justified in believing .
PDJ:如果你任意取两个句子, ,那么,如果你有理由同时相信 A 和 B,如果从 A 和 B 一起逻辑地得出 C,那么,如果你相信 C,你就有理由相信
The American philosopher Irving Thalberg has called this the "principle of deduction for justification" (PDJ, for short.) The PDJ is certainly correct if justification means "indefeasible justification."
美国哲学家欧文-塔尔伯格(Irving Thalberg)将此称为 "正当理由的演绎原则"(简称 PDJ)。
And, as we just saw, given the PDJ and Descartes' definition of knowledge, the deductive closure principle follows.
而且,正如我们刚才看到的,考虑到 PDJ 和笛卡尔对知识的定义,演绎闭合原理也就水到渠成了。
Descartes requires the deductive closure principle because, without it, even the existence of a benevolent God, attempting to do the opposite of the evil demon, would not allow us knowledge of the world. With both the principle and the knowledge that God guarantees that our senses will not deceive us, however, Descartes is able to allow that we have some knowledge of the physical world.
笛卡尔之所以需要演绎封闭原则,是因为如果没有这个原则,即使存在一个试图与恶鬼相反的仁慈的上帝,我们也无法了解这个世界。然而,有了这个原则和上帝保证我们的感官不会欺骗我们的知识,笛卡尔就能够允许我们对物理世界有一定的了解。
But there is a serious problem with the Cartesian position. It is that Descartes offers no convincing reason for thinking that we know that God guarantees the evidence of our senses. After all, it seems that our senses can sometimes deceive us: sometimes we seem to have hallucinations. And if we sometimes have hallucinations, then God doesn't always guarantee that the world is as it appears to be.
但是,笛卡尔的立场存在一个严重的问题。这就是,笛卡尔没有提供令人信服的理由,让我们认为上帝的存在是我们感官证据的保证。毕竟,我们的感官有时似乎会欺骗我们:有时我们似乎会产生幻觉。如果我们有时会产生幻觉,那么上帝就不会总是保证世界就是它所显示的那样。
It won't help here to say that God sometimes makes sure our senses don't deceive us, because to know anything, on Descartes' view, we would have to know when. Descartes was aware of this problem, and he proposed a solution to it. His idea was that God had given us a way of telling which of our ideas were in fact reliable. For he argued that we would never go wrong if we believed only those ideas that were "clear and distinct." But it is far from clear that we do in fact have a way of telling, from the character of our experiences, whether or not they are reliable, and Descartes' notion of "clear and distinct" ideas is not, in the opinion of many philosophers, a satisfactory solution to this problem. If they are right, then we do not, in fact, have a God-given guarantee that some of the evidence of our senses is correct.
在这里,说上帝有时会确保我们的感官不会欺骗我们是无济于事的,因为根据笛卡尔的观点,要想知道任何事情,我们就必须知道时间。笛卡尔意识到了这个问题,并提出了一个解决方案。他的想法是,上帝给了我们一种方法,告诉我们哪些想法实际上是可靠的。因为他认为,如果我们只相信那些 "清晰明确 "的想法,我们就不会出错。许多哲学家认为,笛卡尔关于 "清晰明确 "的观念并不能令人满意地解决这个问题。许多哲学家认为,笛卡尔 "清晰明确 "的观念并不能令人满意地解决这个问题。如果他们的观点是正确的,那么事实上,我们并没有得到上帝赋予的保证,即我们感官的某些证据是正确的。
Unless we know that God guarantees at least some of what our senses lead us to believe, then we don't have any indefeasible true beliefs about the physical world. So we know nothing about it. Still, as we saw earlier, we do have some knowledge, since we know any necessary truths we believe. The real reason that Descartes thought we knew necessary truths is that we do not need evidence from our senses to justify belief in them at all. His theory leads to skepticism about the physical world because all the evidence of our senses is defeasible. But we can work out necessary truths without relying on our unreliable senses.
除非我们知道上帝至少保证了我们感官所相信的某些东西,否则我们对物理世界就没有任何不可辩驳的真实信念。因此,我们对它一无所知。不过,正如我们前面所看到的,我们还是有一些知识的,因为我们知道我们所相信的任何必然真理。笛卡尔认为我们知道必然真理的真正原因是,我们根本不需要感官的证据来证明对它们的信念是正确的。他的理论导致了对物理世界的怀疑,因为我们感官的所有证据都是虚无的。但是,我们可以不依赖我们不可靠的感官,找出必然真理。
Because Cartesianism lays such stress on certainty, it leads to the conclusion that we know only those things that we can work out by reasoning, without appeal to sensory evidence, even though Descartes tried to avoid this consequence. The position that the most significant elements of what we know are derived by reasoning rather than experience is called "rationalism." We shall discuss the nature of necessary truths in the next chapter, where we shall see that the rationalist belief that all our knowledge of necessary truths comes solely from reasoning alone is mistaken.
由于笛卡尔主义如此强调确定性,它导致的结论是,我们只知道那些我们可以通过推理得出的东西,而不需要诉诸感官证据,尽管笛卡尔试图避免这种后果。我们所知道的最重要的内容是通过推理而非经验得出的,这一立场被称为 "理性主义"。我们将在下一章讨论必然真理的性质,我们将看到,理性主义认为我们对必然真理的所有认识都仅仅来自推理的观点是错误的。
The main objection to Cartesian rationalism, however, is that it leads to skepticism about the physical world. Isn't it just absurdthe worst sort of philosopher's nonsense-to claim that we don't know of the existence of any physical objects at all? The British philosopher G. E. Moore once held up his hands in an expression of exasperation with those who deny the existence of the "external world," the world "outside" our minds, and said that he certainly knew that his hands existed. He was, in effect, assuming that we should reject a theory that had so absurd a consequence as that he didn't know he had two hands. Very often in philosophy, we argue against a position by showing that it has absurd consequences: a procedure called reductio ad absurdum (or reductio, for short), which is just the Latin for "reducing to absurdity." Moore's point was that we should reject a philosophical theory of knowledge that leads us to conclude that we do not know that our own hands exist. We should reject such a theory because this consequence reduces it to absurdity.
然而,对笛卡尔理性主义的主要反对意见是,它导致了对物理世界的怀疑。声称我们根本不知道任何物理对象的存在,这难道不是最荒谬的哲学家无稽之谈吗?英国哲学家摩尔(G. E. Moore)曾举起双手,对那些否认 "外部世界"(我们头脑之外的世界)存在的人表示愤慨,并说他当然知道他的双手是存在的。实际上,他是在假设我们应该拒绝接受一种理论,因为这种理论会产生他不知道自己有两只手这样荒谬的结果。在哲学中,我们经常通过证明某个立场会产生荒谬的后果来反驳它:这个过程被称为 "归谬法"(reductio ad absurdum,简称 "归谬法"),拉丁文的意思就是 "归结为荒谬"。摩尔的观点是,我们应该拒绝一种关于知识的哲学理论,因为这种理论会让我们得出结论:我们不知道我们自己的手是否存在。我们应该拒绝这样的理论,因为这样的结果会使它归于荒谬。
It is important in a reductio proof that the consequence we draw should not merely strike us as absurd but actually be false. We shall discuss in the next chapter the fact that if you can draw a false conclusion from a position, the position must be false itself. Because it is the falsity of the conclusion that means that the position must be false, we sometimes refer to an argument as a reductio simply because it shows that a position leads to (what we believe is) a false conclusion.
在归谬法证明中,重要的是我们得出的结果不应该仅仅让我们觉得荒谬,而应该实际上是错误的。我们将在下一章讨论这样一个事实,即如果你能从一个立场得出一个虚假的结论,那么这个立场本身一定是虚假的。由于结论的虚假性意味着立场一定是虚假的,所以我们有时称一个论证为还原论证,仅仅因为它表明了一个立场导致了(我们认为的)一个虚假的结论。
There is no doubt that we have to be very careful with reductio ad absurdum as a form of argument. This is because it is not always clear that what we take to be absurd really is false. For a long time, for example, it might have been thought absurd to draw the conclu-
毫无疑问,我们必须非常谨慎地对待荒诞归谬法这种论证方式。这是因为,我们并不总是清楚我们认为荒谬的东西是否真的是错误的。例如,在很长一段时间里,人们可能会认为得出以下结论是荒谬的:"......"。

sion that God doesn't exist. Nowadays, even many believers agree that it is not absurd to suppose that there is no God (though, of course, they think that it is an error to believe this). So before we reject Descartes' position in Moore's way, we should consider seriously the possibility that it is not false that we know nothing of the external world.
认为上帝并不存在。如今,就连许多信徒也同意,认为没有上帝并不荒谬(当然,他们认为这样认为是错误的)。因此,在我们以摩尔的方式否定笛卡尔的立场之前,我们应该认真考虑这样一种可能性,即我们对外部世界一无所知并不是错误的。
But we have at least one strong motive for rejecting Descartes' extremely strict interpretation of the justification condition, if it does have the consequence that we know only of the existence of our own thoughts; namely, that a theory of knowledge that says that we can know nothing about the world in which we live makes the concept of knowledge rather uninteresting. We certainly have beliefs about the world, and some of them seem better justified than others. Even if knowledge is unavailable, we should still need the idea of justified beliefs. And whatever "justified" means, it cannot mean "indefeasibly justified" in this context, because, as we have seen, no beliefs about the physical world are indefeasibly justified.
但是,我们至少有一个强烈的动机来拒绝笛卡尔对合理性条件的极其严格的解释,如果它确实产生了我们只知道我们自己思想存在的结果的话;那就是,一种知识理论说,我们对我们生活的世界一无所知,这使得知识的概念变得相当无趣。我们当然有关于这个世界的信念,而且有些信念似乎比其他信念更有道理。即使没有知识,我们仍然需要 "合理信念 "这一概念。无论 "有理 "是什么意思,在这里都不可能是指 "不可辩驳的有理",因为正如我们所看到的,没有任何关于物理世界的信念是不可辩驳的。
We have, then, good reason for hoping that Descartes is wrong to insist on indefeasible justification, because this theory of knowledge leads to skepticism. But we may be able to develop a theory of knowledge that does not lead to skepticism if we find another way of interpreting the justification condition. Is there any way of interpreting the condition that is less demanding?
因此,我们有充分的理由希望笛卡尔坚持不可辩解的正当性是错误的,因为这种知识论会导致怀疑论。但是,如果我们找到另一种解释正当性条件的方法,我们也许能够发展出一种不会导致怀疑论的知识理论。有没有要求不那么高的解释该条件的方法呢?

2.4 Locke's way: Justification can be less than certain
2.4 洛克的方式:正义可以不那么确定

The obvious thing to do is to weaken the justification condition, to require not indefeasible evidence but just good evidence. As Moore pointed out, we normally take it that we know that we have hands, even though we do not have indefeasible evidence that we have them. The evidence that we have hands-which is the evidence of our senses-is strong evidence, even if it isn't strong enough to satisfy Descartes.
Let us examine the proposal, then, that to know something
那么,让我们来研究一下这样的建议,即要知道一些事情
a) you must believe it,
a) 你必须相信它、
b) it must be true, and
b) 它必须是真实的,并且
c) you must have good-but not necessarily indefeasibleevidence for the belief.
c) 你必须有很好的--但不一定是不可辩驳的--证据来证明你的信念。
On this theory, unlike Descartes', I can know, for example, that I have two hands, because I have very good evidence from experience for my true belief that I have two hands. Someone who believes that evidence of this sort is what we require for knowledge of the physical world is called an empiricist. Empiricism is the claim that most or all of our beliefs are justified by experience-by empirical evidence, as it is called. Such evidence comes from our senses: our sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, and so on. Just as rationalists regard necessary truths-sentences that must be true-as the model of knowledge, empiricists regard contingent truths-which might not have been true-as the model. (We shall discuss the idea of truths being necessary or contingent in the next chapter.) For a rationalist like Descartes, " " would be a very good example of something we know, because reasoning can give us indefeasible evidence that it is true. For an empiricist, a sentence such as "It is raining here," said by someone standing in the rain, would be a very good example of something someone knows.
与笛卡尔的理论不同,根据这一理论,例如,我可以知道我有两只手,因为我有很好的经验证据来证明我有两只手的真实信念。认为我们需要这种证据来了解物理世界的人被称为经验主义者。经验主义认为,我们的大部分或全部信念都是由经验--即所谓的经验证据--来证明的。这些证据来自我们的感官:视觉、听觉、味觉、嗅觉、触觉等等。正如理性主义者将必然真理--必须为真的句子--视为知识模型一样,经验主义者也将偶然真理--可能并不为真的句子--视为知识模型。(我们将在下一章讨论真理的必然性或偶然性)。对于像笛卡尔这样的理性主义者来说," "是我们所知道的事物的一个很好的例子,因为推理可以给我们提供不可辩驳的证据,证明它是真的。对于经验主义者来说,一个人站在雨中说出 "这里在下雨 "这样的句子,就是一个人知道什么的很好的例子。
Descartes was a leading rationalist. The English philosopher John Locke, who also wrote in the seventeenth century, was one of the founders of modern empiricism. In Book Two, Chapter One, Section 2, of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, one of the great classics of empiricism, he says:
笛卡尔是一位主要的理性主义者。英国哲学家约翰-洛克也写于 17 世纪,是现代经验主义的创始人之一。在他的经验主义经典著作之一《论人类的理解》的第二卷第一章第二节中,他说:
Though this is an apparently clear statement of the essentials of empiricism, what Locke is saying is not as simple as it seems. There are two main reasons.
虽然这表面上是对经验主义要义的明确阐述,但洛克所说的并不像看起来那么简单。主要原因有两个。
First, Locke held a special view about what our minds contain. Our knowledge, he believed, is stored in our minds in the form of collections of ideas. These ideas are what he calls the "materials" of knowledge: they are quite literally what our knowledge is made of.
首先,洛克对我们的思想所包含的内容持有一种特殊的观点。他认为,我们的知识是以思想集合的形式储存在我们的头脑中的。这些观念就是他所说的知识的 "材料":从字面上看,它们就是我们知识的构成。
When he says that all our knowledge is founded in experience, then, he does not mean that all of our knowledge is justified by experience. He means rather that we can have no ideas that are not derived from experience; and that, therefore, every piece of knowledge is made up of materials that come from experience. As we shall see in a moment, it is very important that Locke did not hold that all of our knowledge has to be justified by experience.
当他说我们所有的知识都建立在经验之上时,他并不是说我们所有的知识都是由经验证明的。他的意思是,我们不可能有不是来自经验的观念;因此,每一种知识都是由来自经验的材料构成的。我们稍后将看到,洛克并不认为我们所有的知识都必须由经验来证明,这一点非常重要。
A second reason why what Locke says here is not as simple as it seems is that Locke meant by "experience" something rather more than just sensation. In Book Two, Chapter One, Sections 3 and 4, he argues that there are two sources of ideas in experience:
洛克在这里所说的并不像看起来那么简单的第二个原因是,洛克所说的 "经验 "不仅仅是指感觉。在第二卷第一章第3节和第4节中,他认为经验中有两种观念来源:
The Objects of Sensation one Source of Ideas. First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. . . This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.
感官对象是观念的来源。首先,我们的感官与特定的感官对象相联系,会根据这些对象影响它们的不同方式,把对事物的几种不同的认识传入心灵。. .我们所拥有的大多数观念的这一伟大来源,完全依赖于我们的感官,并由感官衍生到理解,我称之为感觉。
The Operations of our Minds, the other Source of them. Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,the perception of the operations of our own mind, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; . . I I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. . . These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings.
我们心灵的运作,它们的另一个源泉。其次,经验为理解力提供观念的另一个源泉是,我们对自己心灵运作的感知,因为我们的心灵是在对它所获得的观念进行运作;......。......我把它叫做反思,它所提供的观念只是心灵通过反思它自身的运作而获得的。. ..我说,这两者,即作为感官对象的外部物质事物和作为反思对象的我们自己内心的思维活动,在我看来是我们所有观念起源的唯一原点。
All of our ideas, then, come from experience: either experience, in sensation, of the world outside us, or experience, in reflection, of the workings of our own minds. It is also true that most of our beliefs derive from experience. But, Locke holds, we can also come to know things - mathematical truths, for example, such as " 4 "-by reasoning, which he calls "demonstration." "Mathematical demonstration," he says, "depends not upon sense" (Book Three, Chapter Eleven, Section 6). Even here, however, our knowledge is founded in experience: for our ideas of the numbers 2 and 4 , or of addition and the equality of numbers, are just as much derived from experience, according to Locke, as our ideas of tables and chairs.
因此,我们所有的想法都来自于经验:或者是对我们外部世界的感官经验,或者是对我们自身思想运作的反思经验。我们的大部分信念也确实来自经验。但是,洛克认为,我们也可以通过推理(他称之为 "证明")来认识事物--例如数学真理,如 " 4"。他说,"数学证明""不依赖于感性"(第三卷,第十一章,第六节)。然而,即使在这里,我们的知识也是建立在经验之上的:因为洛克认为,我们对数字2和4的观念,或对数字加法和相等的观念,就像我们对桌子和椅子的观念一样,都是来自经验。
The idea of the number 2 , for example, he thought was derived by "abstraction" from our experiences of pairs of things.
例如,他认为数字 "2 "的概念是从我们对成对事物的经验中 "抽象 "出来的。
It follows, then, that though Locke stresses that our ideas come from or are "founded in" experience, he can agree that reason can be as much a source of knowledge as experience. Locke can, therefore, accept all the kinds of knowledge that Descartes' theory allowed: but he is not restricted to truths known indefeasibly. So he can hold that we sometimes come to know things other than by reasoning.
由此可见,尽管洛克强调我们的观念来自经验或 "建立在经验之上",但他同意理性与经验一样可以是知识的来源。因此,洛克可以接受笛卡尔理论所允许的所有类型的知识:但他并不局限于已知的真理。因此,他可以认为,我们有时不是通过推理来认识事物的。
Empiricism as an approach to epistemology has grown side by side with modern science. Locke was a contemporary of Sir Isaac Newton, the first great modern physicist. This connection between the growth of empiricism and the growth of science is not very surprising. Science depends a great deal on experience in its search for knowledge of the physical world. Even psychology, which sometimes relies on our experiences of our own mental life for its evidence, relies on experience, in Locke's sense. For, remember, Locke regarded "reflection," by which he meant our experience of our own mental lives, as a kind of experience.
经验主义作为一种认识论方法,是与现代科学同步发展的。洛克与现代第一位伟大的物理学家艾萨克-牛顿爵士同时代。经验主义的发展与科学的发展之间的这种联系并不十分令人惊讶。科学在探寻物理世界的知识时,在很大程度上依赖于经验。就连有时依赖于我们自身精神生活经验作为证据的心理学,也依赖于洛克意义上的经验。因为,请记住,洛克把 "反思"(他指的是我们对自己精神生活的体验)视为一种经验。
The basic idea that much of our knowledge derives from our experiences of the world is, as a result, an attractive one in an age of science. Mathematics is, of course, important to modern science too, and we learn mathematical facts not from experience but-as Locke pointed out-by using our powers of reasoning. But even in mathematical physics, which uses more mathematics than most other sciences, the evidence of experience is tremendously important.
因此,在科学时代,我们的大部分知识都来源于我们对世界的体验,这一基本理念很有吸引力。当然,数学对现代科学也很重要,我们不是从经验中学习数学事实,而是--正如洛克所指出的--利用我们的推理能力。但是,即使在数学物理学中,数学的应用也多于其他大多数科学,经验的证据也是非常重要的。
Nevertheless, it is one thing to say that we know only those things that we correctly believe and that experience-or demonstrationjustifies us in believing; it is another to say precisely how our experiences justify our beliefs. Indeed, we have already come across the fact that creates the main problem for empiricism: the evidence of experience is always defeasible. This means that the evidence we have could, in each case, be misleading us. So we have to ask whether there is any way of deciding which evidence we should actually rely on. In answering this question, empiricists have often tried to develop the idea that some of the knowledge we acquire in experience provides the basis for the rest of our knowledge. They have held, in effect, that all of our knowledge is founded on one
尽管如此,说我们只知道那些我们正确相信的东西,经验或证明证明我们相信是正确的,这是一码事;准确地说我们的经验如何证明我们的信念是正确的,这又是另一码事。事实上,我们已经遇到了一个给经验主义带来主要问题的事实:经验的证据总是可以被击败的。这意味着,我们所掌握的证据在每一种情况下都可能误导我们。因此,我们要问,是否有办法决定我们究竟应该依赖哪些证据。在回答这个问题时,经验主义者常常试图发展这样一种观点,即我们从经验中获得的某些知识为我们的其他知识提供了基础。实际上,他们认为我们所有的知识都建立在一个基础之上,那就是

basic class of things we know. This approach is called foundationalist epistemology.
我们所知道的事物的基本类别。这种方法被称为基础主义认识论。

2.5 The foundations of knowledge
2.5 知识的基础

According to all foundationalist epistemologies,
根据所有基础主义认识论、
a) we need to find some class of beliefs, of which we have secure knowledge; and
a) 我们需要找到某类信念,我们对这些信念有可靠的了解;以及
b) once we find this class, we can then honor some of our other beliefs with the special status of knowledge by showing that they are properly supported by the members of this class of foundational beliefs.
b) 一旦我们找到了这一类信念,我们就可以证明我们的一些其他信念得到了这一类基础信念成员的适当支持,从而使这些信念具有知识的特殊地位。
So every foundationalist epistemology needs to answer two main questions:
因此,每一种基础主义认识论都需要回答两个主要问题:
a) the nature of the foundations: what are the foundational beliefs? and
a) 基础的性质:基础信念是什么?
b) the nature of the justification: how do the foundational beliefs support the other, derivative, beliefs?
b) 理由的性质:基本信念如何支持其他派生信念?
If we could find the right foundational beliefs and the right explanation of how they support other beliefs, then we might be able to find a way around Marie, the unscrupulous scientist, and Descartes' demon. With the right answers to these two questions, we might be able to deal with the problems created by the fact that the evidence of experience is always defeasible. The possibility is worth investigating.
如果我们能找到正确的基础信念,并正确解释这些信念如何支持其他信念,那么我们或许就能找到一条绕过玛丽、无良科学家和笛卡尔恶魔的道路。有了这两个问题的正确答案,我们也许就能解决经验的证据总是可否定的这一事实所带来的问题。这种可能性值得研究。
I said just now that foundationalism has appealed to many empiricists. But it is a natural view for any rationalist as well. Rationalists believe that reasoning is the best source of knowledge; and, in the most rigorous sort of reasoning-namely, mathematical proof - we start with axioms, as our foundation, and proceed by logical steps to our conclusions. The axioms are certain: they are the foundations. And they support the consequences we draw in the strongest possible way: indefeasibly.
我刚才说过,基础主义吸引了许多经验主义者。但对于任何理性主义者来说,这也是一种自然而然的观点。理性主义者认为,推理是知识的最佳来源;而在最严格的推理中--即数学证明--我们以公理为基础,然后通过逻辑步骤得出结论。公理是确定的:它们是基础。它们以最有力的方式支持我们得出的结果:不可动摇。
Descartes is typical of rationalists in this respect. For him, the foundational class was just the class of thoughts that could not be
在这方面,笛卡尔是典型的理性主义者。对他来说,基础类只是思想中无法

doubted, because you had indefeasible evidence for them. His famous slogan "I think, therefore I am" was one thing he thought you couldn't doubt. You couldn't doubt it because you couldn't be fooled about it. Even someone as clever as Marie, our unscrupulous scientist, couldn't be fooling the brain if she got it to think that it was thinking; and if it thought that, it would know it existed, because you can't think without existing.
因为你有不容置疑的证据。他的名言 "我思故我在 "就是他认为你不能怀疑的一件事。你不能怀疑它,因为你不能被它愚弄。即使像玛丽这样聪明的人,我们肆无忌惮的科学家,如果她让大脑认为自己在思考,她也骗不了大脑;如果大脑这么想,它就会知道自己存在,因为没有存在就不可能思考。
It is worth noticing that there are many arguments of the form of the cogito that are equally valid. For example, "I laugh, therefore I am." It's true that you can't think if you don't exist, but you can't laugh unless you exist either. What is special about the cogito is that the premise-"I think"-is something that is not just true whenever I think it but also indubitable or certain, according to Descartes, whenever I think it. "I laugh," on the other hand, could be believed by someone who wasn't laughing (for example, by Albert in the vat). The reason Descartes wanted a premise that was indubitable was that he wanted to use the foundationalist strategy. He wanted a premise that was certain ("I think") from which to deduce his conclusion ("I exist") because he thought that a valid argument that has premises that are certain can transmit the certainty to the conclusion. (We'll learn more about valid arguments in the next chapter.)
值得注意的是,有许多 "cogito "形式的论证同样有效。例如,"我笑,所以我是"。的确,如果你不存在,你就不能思考,但如果你不存在,你也不能笑。笛卡尔认为,"我思 "的特殊之处在于,它的前提--"我思"--不仅在我思考的时候是真实的,而且在我思考的时候也是不可推翻或确定的。另一方面,"我笑了 "可能被一个没有笑的人(比如大桶里的阿尔伯特)所相信。笛卡尔之所以想要一个不可推翻的前提,是因为他想使用基础主义策略。他想要一个确定的前提("我认为"),并由此推导出他的结论("我存在"),因为他认为,一个有效的论证,如果前提是确定的,就能将确定性传递给结论。(我们将在下一章进一步了解有效论证)。
But, as we have seen, Descartes' foundational class was too small to provide us with a basis for knowledge of the physical world. For there is nothing at all-save our own minds-whose existence is certain. Since Descartes required that all knowledge should be certain, that led to the general attitude of doubt that is the most extreme form of skepticism about the physical world.
但是,正如我们所看到的,笛卡尔的基础阶级太小,无法为我们提供物理世界的知识基础。因为除了我们自己的思想之外,根本没有任何东西的存在是确定的。由于笛卡尔要求所有知识都应该是确定的,这就导致了普遍的怀疑态度,这是对物理世界最极端的怀疑论形式。
For Locke, on the other hand, the foundational class of beliefs, from which we derive our knowledge of the physical world, is the class of perceptual beliefs. Locke was, therefore, an exponent of a form of empiricist, foundationalist epistemology in which our beliefs about the world all have to be supported by sensory experience, just as our beliefs about our minds have to be supported by reflection. That was Locke's view of the nature of the foundations.
另一方面,在洛克看来,我们对物理世界的认识所依据的基础性信念是感知信念。因此,洛克是一种经验主义、基础主义认识论的倡导者,在这种认识论中,我们关于世界的信念都必须得到感官经验的支持,正如我们关于心灵的信念必须得到反思的支持一样。这就是洛克对基础性质的看法。
Locke was aware of Descartes' arguments and of the skepticism about the physical world to which they so easily lead. But he had an answer for them, which relies on two main claims:
洛克意识到笛卡尔的论点以及这些论点很容易导致的对物理世界的怀疑。但他对这些论点有一个答案,这个答案依赖于两个主要主张:

a) Our experiences are involuntary. We cannot simply choose what experiences we should have. I can decide whether or not to open my eyes. But I cannot choose whether I will see this book in front of me once I do open my eyes. So something other than my own mind must cause my experiences.
a) 我们的经历是不由自主的。我们不能简单地选择我们应该拥有什么样的体验。我可以决定是否睁开眼睛。但我无法选择睁开眼睛后是否会看到眼前的这本书。因此,除了我自己的思维之外,一定还有其他东西导致了我的体验。
b) Our experiences are consistent: "Our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report." For example, we can check on what our eyes tell us when we see a fire by using our hands to feel its warmth.
b) 我们的经验是一致的:"我们的感官在很多情况下都能见证彼此报告的真实性"。例如,当我们看到一团火时,我们可以用手去感受它的温度,从而验证眼睛所告诉我们的信息。
These are, indeed, arguments that might satisfy someone who was worried about whether some particular experiences were in fact reliable. If I was unsure whether a vision in the desert was a mirage, for example, it would help to check whether my other senses confirmed it. I might run to where the water seemed to be, to find out if I could touch or taste it. Similarly, it seems reasonable to think that if I could make an experience come and go simply by wishing, then that experience could not be evidence for the existence of a physical object. But notice that neither of these points really meets the skeptic's worry. For Albert, the brain in the vat, could think both (a) that his experiences were involuntary and (b) that his experiences were consistent; but he would still be wrong if he believed his senses. And the demon would make Descartes' experiences both consistent and involuntary too-or at least as consistent and involuntary as they actually are.
事实上,这些论点可以满足那些担心某些特定经历是否可靠的人。例如,如果我不确定沙漠中的幻象是否是海市蜃楼,那么检查一下我的其他感官是否证实了这一点会有所帮助。我可能会跑到似乎有水的地方,看看能否触摸到或尝到水的味道。同样,如果我仅仅通过许愿就能让某种体验来来去去,那么这种体验就不能作为实物存在的证据,这种想法似乎也是合理的。但请注意,这两点都没有真正满足怀疑论者的担忧。因为缸中的大脑阿尔伯特可以同时认为(a)他的经验是非自愿的,(b)他的经验是一致的;但如果他相信自己的感觉,他仍然是错的。而恶魔也会让笛卡尔的经验变得既一致又非自愿--或者至少像它们实际上一样一致又非自愿。
The problem is that though the involuntary nature of my experience may show that it must have some cause outside of my conscious mind, the story that I am a brain in a vat seems to account for the involuntary nature of my experience just as well as the story that I am experiencing a real world. And though the consistency of our experience does need explaining, it seems as if the story that I am a brain in a vat just could be the right explanation. It seems that to say our experience is only defeasible evidence for the existence of things in the world is just to admit that the suggestion that all our experience is faked is a real possibility. If that is right, whatever reason we give for trusting our senses cannot rule out the possibility that they are misleading us. Someone who believes that we have no right to
问题在于,虽然我的经验的非自主性可能表明它必须有我的意识之外的原因,但 "我是缸中之脑 "的故事似乎和 "我正在经历一个真实的世界 "的故事一样,都能解释我的经验的非自主性。尽管我们的经验的一致性确实需要解释,但 "我是缸中之脑 "的故事似乎就是正确的解释。如果说我们的经验是世界上存在事物的唯一可击败的证据,这似乎就是承认我们所有的经验都是伪造的这一说法是真实存在的。如果这是正确的,那么无论我们提出什么理由来相信我们的感官,都不能排除它们误导我们的可能性。认为我们无权

think that any of our beliefs about the world could not be wrong is called a fallibilist.
认为我们对世界的任何信念都不可能出错的人被称为 "不可靠论者"。
Locke followed this line of argument, and so he said that our senses provide us with grounds for probable beliefs, not for certain ones. But then he claimed that probability is all that we practically require.
洛克遵循了这一论证思路,因此他说,我们的感官为我们提供的是可能的信念,而不是确定的信念。但他又说,概率是我们实际所需的一切。
Certainty comes only with those truths of reason that we can establish by "direct plain demonstration." If you will accept only these truths and refuse to believe the evidence of your senses, Locke is saying, you will simply end up suffering the consequences. Skepticism may seem a real possibility in the study, but no one could survive as a skeptic in the real world.
只有那些我们可以通过 "直接明证 "确立的理性真理,才具有确定性。洛克说,如果你只接受这些真理,而拒绝相信感官的证据,那么你最终只会自食其果。怀疑论在研究中似乎是一种真实的可能性,但没有人能够作为一个怀疑论者在现实世界中生存。
Locke's definition of knowledge is closer than Descartes' to the one we normally assume, in the sense that he agrees with many of our commonsensical claims to know things. He allows, for example, that we know that we have hands, because we have consistent evidence from our experience that we have hands. We began our search for a definition of knowledge in the hope that we could answer the question whether-and if so, how-we know that we aren't just brains in fluid. Locke's answer has to be that we do know this. For, as we saw, the PDJ means that if we believe something and it is a logical consequence of something we know, then we know it too. And since it is a logical consequence of my knowledge that I am experiencing my two hands that my experience is not being faked by Marie, I must know that I am not a brain in Marie's vat.
洛克对知识的定义比笛卡尔的定义更接近我们通常的假设,因为他同意我们对事物的许多常识性认识。例如,他允许我们知道我们有双手,因为我们从经验中得到了我们有双手的一致证据。我们开始寻找 "知识 "的定义,是希望能够回答这样一个问题:我们是否知道--如果知道,我们又是如何知道--我们不仅仅是流体中的大脑。洛克的答案是,我们确实知道这一点。因为,正如我们所看到的,PDJ意味着,如果我们相信某件事情,而它又是我们所知道的某件事情的逻辑结果,那么我们也就知道它。既然我知道我正在体验我的两只手,而我的体验并不是玛丽伪造的,那么我就必须知道我不是玛丽大桶里的大脑。
As for Locke's explanation of why the brain in a vat does not know things about the physical world, it must be that the brain's beliefs are false, not that they are unjustified. For it is evidence that justifies beliefs, and a brain in a vat would have exactly the same evidence that its senses were not deceiving it as I now have that mine are not deceiving me. It follows that the brain is as justified in its beliefs as it would be if they were true, as mine are.
至于洛克关于为什么缸中的大脑不知道物理世界的事情的解释,那一定是大脑的信念是错误的,而不是它们没有理由。因为证明信念合理的是证据,而缸中的大脑会有完全相同的证据证明它的感官没有欺骗它,就像我现在有证据证明我的感官没有欺骗我一样。由此可见,如果大脑的信念是真的,那么它的信念也是合理的,就像我的信念一样。
Here is the problem with this explanation of why Albert's brain
关于阿尔伯特的大脑为什么会这样的解释,问题就在这里。

does not know things about the world. Suppose Marie allowed Albert's brain to have some true beliefs. Suppose she made him believe that the sun was shining on a day when it really was shining. Suppose she got him to believe it by giving him just the evidence I now have that the sun is shining (which in my case is produced by looking out of my window on this sunny day). Needless to say, Albert wouldn't know that the sun was shining. Yet Locke would have to say that he did know it, since the brain would have a justified true belief. (After all, Albert's belief is justified if mine is: we have the same evidence.) Descartes' view of knowledge-which required indefeasible evidence-led to skepticism. He had to deny that we knew anything about the physical world. So his theory led to the conclusion that we do not know some things that we do know. But if we simply weaken Descartes' justification condition to allow defeasible evidence, we get Locke's theory-which leads to the conclusion that the brain knows things that it doesn't know. If knowledge is justified true belief, skepticism is not so easily evaded.
不了解这个世界。假设玛丽允许艾伯特的大脑拥有一些真实的信念。假设她让阿尔伯特相信,在某一天太阳真的照耀着大地。假设她只给了他我现在拥有的太阳正在照耀的证据(在我的情况下,这个证据是在这个阳光明媚的日子里从我的窗户向外看而产生的),就让他相信了这一点。不用说,艾伯特不会知道太阳正在照耀。然而洛克却不得不说他确实知道,因为大脑会有一个合理的真实信念。(毕竟,如果我的信念是合理的,阿尔伯特的信念也是合理的:我们拥有相同的证据)。笛卡尔的知识观--它需要不可辩驳的证据--导致了怀疑论。他不得不否认我们对物理世界有任何了解。因此,他的理论得出了这样的结论:我们不知道我们所知道的某些事情。但是,如果我们简单地弱化笛卡尔的正当化条件,允许可击败的证据,我们就会得到洛克的理论--它导致的结论是,大脑知道它不知道的事情。如果知识是有理由的真实信念,那么怀疑论就不那么容易逃避了。

2.6 Ways around skepticism I: Verificationism
2.6 绕过怀疑论的方法 I.验证主义

I want to consider now a view of knowledge that was very influential in the twentieth century and that seems to offer a way out of the skeptical impasse. It is a view I mentioned in passing in the last chapter, namely, verificationism. I described it there as the view that if no amount of evidence could decide an issue, there is no real issue. To decide an issue, in this context, is to decide whether or not a particular state of affairs obtains in the world.
我现在想考虑一种在二十世纪非常有影响力的知识观,它似乎为摆脱怀疑论的僵局提供了一条出路。这是我在上一章中顺带提到的一种观点,即验证主义。我在那里把它描述为:如果没有任何证据能够决定一个问题,那么就不存在真正的问题。在这里,决定一个问题就是决定世界上是否存在某种特定的事态。
Since we are usually concerned with states of affairs that we can discuss in our language, verificationists usually express their position in terms of the sentences that describe states of affairs. Sentences that describe states of affairs and can therefore be true (if the state of affairs is as they say it is) or false (if it is not) we can call declarative sentences. They declare how the person who says them believes the world to be. So we can express verificationism like this:
由于我们通常关注的是可以用我们的语言讨论的事态,验证学家通常用描述事态的句子来表达他们的立场。描述事态的句子可以是真的(如果事态如其所说),也可以是假的(如果事态并非如此),我们可以称之为陈述句。它们宣告了说这些句子的人认为世界是怎样的。因此,我们可以这样表述验证论:
A sentence for which there is the possibility of evidence-either for or against-is called a verifiable sentence. Every declarative sentence, the verificationist says, must be verifiable. This thesis, which we call the verification principle, is a radical version of empiricism—radical because it says, in effect, that every sentence that makes a claim about the world has to be subject to the evidence of experience. Indeed, the Austrian philosopher Moritz Schlick, who was one of the leaders of the school of philosophy called logical positivism, which developed verificationism, called his view "consistent empiricism." But on the face of it, the verification principle seems to assume that the universe is arranged for our epistemological convenience. What reasons could there be for believing that this is so?
一个有可能得到证据--无论是支持还是反对--的句子被称为可验证的句子。验证论者说,每一个陈述句都必须是可验证的。这一论点,我们称之为验证原则,是经验主义的激进版本--激进是因为它实际上是说,每一个对世界提出主张的句子都必须接受经验证据的检验。事实上,奥地利哲学家莫里茨-施利克(Moritz Schlick)是发展了验证主义的逻辑实证主义哲学流派的领袖之一,他将自己的观点称为 "一贯经验主义"。但从表面上看,验证原则似乎假定宇宙是为了我们的认识论方便而安排的。有什么理由相信事实如此呢?
The best argument for the verification principle depends on some assumptions about language, which we shall be discussing in more detail in the next chapter. But I will outline the basic argument here:
验证原则的最佳论据取决于对语言的一些假设,我们将在下一章详细讨论这些假设。但我将在此概述基本论点:
For our sentences to have meanings, there must be rules for how we use them. A sound that you use without following any rule at all cannot be a meaningful sentence. A rule for a sentence will say when you should use it and when you should not. For example, the rule for using the sentence "I am hot" is, roughly, that you should use it when you want to communicate the fact that you are hot, and not otherwise.
我们的句子要有意义,就必须有如何使用它们的规则。完全不遵守规则而使用的声音不可能是一个有意义的句子。一个句子的规则会说明什么时候该用,什么时候不该用。例如,使用 "我很热 "这个句子的规则大致是,当你想表达你很热这一事实时,你应该使用这个句子,否则就不应该使用。
One way to defend a position is to show by reductio that it is wrong to deny that position. If we can show that denying a claim leads to a conclusion we can recognize as false, then the claim itself must be true. So let's suppose that the verification principle, , is false, and see if that leads to a false conclusion.
为立场辩护的一种方法是通过归纳法证明否认该立场是错误的。如果我们能证明,否认一个主张会导致一个我们可以认定为错误的结论,那么这个主张本身就一定是真的。因此,让我们假设验证原则 是假的,看看这是否会导致一个错误的结论。
Suppose, then, that there could be a declarative sentence, , that you could not in any circumstances find evidence for or against. So, of course, there would be no circumstances in which you could use it. But then there would be no rule that said under what circumstances you should use it and under what other circumstances you should not. But since, as I said, every sentence that is meaningful must be used in accordance with some rule, it follows that there cannot be a meaningful sentence like .
那么,假设有一个陈述句, ,你在任何情况下都找不到支持或反对它的证据。当然,在任何情况下都不能使用它。但这样一来,就没有规则规定在什么情况下应该使用,在其他什么情况下不应该使用了。但是,正如我所说,每一个有意义的句子都必须按照某种规则来使用,因此,不可能有像 这样有意义的句子。
Some argument of this sort led many philosophers to accept verificationism. Verificationism says that the only reality we can mean-
这类论证让许多哲学家接受了验证主义。验证主义认为,我们所能指代的唯一现实--

ingfully talk about consists of things that people are capable of detecting. Because they insist on every sentence being one for which we could have evidence, verificationists are particularly likely to adopt the epistemological point of view that led us to functionalism in the last chapter. Indeed, as you will have noticed, the argument for verificationism is very like Wittgenstein's private-language argument. That argument said we couldn't refer in a private language to things that people generally can't know about; this one says that we cannot refer to things that people generally can't know about in a public language. This similarity is not so surprising, since Wittgenstein was close to the Vienna Circle, the group of philosophers who founded logical positivism.
因为他们坚持每一句话都是我们可以找到证据的。由于他们坚持认为每个句子都是我们可以得到证据的句子,验证论者特别有可能采纳上一章中引导我们走向功能主义的认识论观点。事实上,正如你们已经注意到的,验证论的论证非常像维特根斯坦的私人语言论证。那个论证说,我们不能用私人语言来指称人们一般无法知道的事物;这个论证说,我们不能用公共语言来指称人们一般无法知道的事物。这种相似性并不奇怪,因为维特根斯坦与维也纳圈子关系密切,而维也纳圈子正是创立逻辑实证主义的哲学家团体。
There are two important things to notice about this argument for verificationism. First, it doesn't show that we must actually be able to find evidence for or against every declarative sentence. A rule must establish circumstances in which the sentence would be properly used. But for there to be a rule it does not have to be possible for us actually to get into one of those circumstances. I am not able to get to the nearest star, and I don't know how to measure the temperature of remote objects. But there is a perfectly good rule for when to use the sentence "The nearest star is hot": use it when you want to communicate the fact that the nearest star is hot. This is a sentence that you could have evidence for if you traveled 4.3 lightyears to Proxima Centauri with a thermometer, even if you can't actually get there now. It follows that if the verification principle is supported by this argument, we must interpret it as requiring that it should be possible for someone, somewhere, sometime to have gathered evidence for or against every declarative sentence, not as requiring that it should be possible for you or me to find evidence here and now.
关于验证论的这一论证,有两点值得注意。首先,它并不表明我们实际上必须能够找到支持或反对每一个陈述句的证据。规则必须确定在什么情况下该句子会被正确使用。但是,要想有一条规则,我们并不一定要真正进入其中的一种情况。我无法到达最近的恒星,也不知道如何测量远处物体的温度。但是,对于什么时候使用 "最近的恒星很热 "这个句子,有一个非常好的规则:当你想表达 "最近的恒星很热 "这个事实时,就可以使用这个句子。如果你带着温度计前往 4.3 光年外的比邻半人马座,即使你现在无法真正到达那里,你也能得到这句话的证据。由此可见,如果验证原则得到了这个论证的支持,我们就必须把它解释为要求某人、某地、某时收集到支持或反对每一个陈述句的证据,而不是要求你或我此时此地找到证据。
That brings us to the second important thing to notice about the argument, which is that it does not assume that the universe is organized for our epistemological convenience. The argument I have given depends on assumptions about what our language must be like, not on assumptions about what the universe must be like. But there is another way of making the argument that is based not on assumptions about language but on assumptions about our beliefs.
这就引出了关于这个论证的第二个重要问题,即它并没有假设宇宙是为了我们的认识论方便而组织起来的。我给出的论证依赖于对我们的语言必须是什么样的假设,而不是对宇宙必须是什么样的假设。但还有另一种论证方法,它不是基于对语言的假设,而是基于对我们信念的假设。
Consider any property, , about which we have beliefs. For to play any part in our lives we must be able to conceive of circumstances in which we would apply it. Call such circumstances P's "circumstances of ascription." Under a property's circumstances of ascription, a suitably situated observer may interact with the property in ways that give him or her knowledge that it obtains. Even if we don't actually know whether anything has this property, we can still imagine that if anything does have it, someone could have known this if its circumstances of ascription had obtained and if they had been in a position to perceive the circumstances of ascription. It follows that we cannot possess the idea of any property that no one could in any circumstances have known to hold.
考虑一下我们所相信的任何属性 。为了让 在我们的生活中发挥任何作用,我们必须能够设想出我们应用它的情况。我们称这种情况为 P 的 "归属情况"。在一个属性的归属环境下,一个处于适当位置的观察者可能会与该属性进行互动,从而使他或她知道该属性的存在。即使我们实际上不知道任何事物是否具有这种属性,我们仍然可以想象,如果任何事物确实具有这种属性,那么如果它的 "归属情形 "发生了,如果有人能够感知到 "归属情形",他(她)就会知道这一点。由此可见,我们不可能拥有在任何情况下都没有人知道的任何属性的概念。
This argument should be particularly appealing to someone who believes that the kind of functionalism I described in the last chapter is correct. For, if functionalism is correct, then for each belief there should be a way of saying what its functional role is, a way of saying what role it plays in determining what people with that belief will in response to the experiences they have. But if it is impossible for anyone to come to believe that something has the property , then the belief that something is has no functional role: there are no experiences that would cause the person with that belief to do anything.
如果有人认为我在上一章中描述的那种功能主义是正确的,那么这个论点应该特别有吸引力。因为,如果功能主义是正确的,那么对于每一种信念,都应该有一种方法来说明它的功能作用是什么,有一种方法来说明它在决定具有这种信念的人将 ,以回应他们所具有的经验方面所起的作用。但是,如果任何人都不可能相信某物具有 这一属性,那么相信某物是 这一信念就没有任何功能作用:没有任何经验会导致拥有这一信念的人做任何事情。
This line of thought might, if suitably elaborated, lead you to accept a version of verificationism: one that said that every property in a certain class must be one that could be known under some circumstances to obtain. A similar line of thought would lead to the view that every name must have circumstances in which some agent could know that the thing it named had some property.
如果对这一思路进行适当的阐释,它可能会让你接受一种版本的验证主义:即某一类别中的每一种属性都必须是在某种情况下可以知道的属性。类似的思路会导致这样一种观点,即每个名称都必须有某种情况,在这种情况下,某个代理人可以知道它所命名的事物具有某种属性。
If this argument is sound, we have reason to believe that the behaviorists and the functionalists were right to deny that there could be essentially private mental states. If there were such a state-call it "S" - someone could have the property of having-S even though nobody else could in any circumstances have known that she did.
如果这个论点是正确的,我们就有理由相信,行为主义者和功能主义者否认存在本质上私人的心理状态是正确的。如果存在这样一种状态--把它称作 "S"--那么即使在任何情况下其他人都不可能知道某人拥有 "S",他也可以拥有 "S "的属性。
Verificationism not only provides grounds for rejecting Cartesian philosophical psychology but also offers an answer to skepticism. The skeptical hypotheses of the evil demon and the brain in the vat are both designed to raise the possibility that there are states of
验证主义不仅为否定笛卡尔的哲学心理学提供了依据,也为怀疑论提供了答案。怀疑论的邪魔假说和缸中之脑假说都是为了提出这样一种可能性,即存在着这样一种状态,即 "我 "和 "我 "之间的关系。

affairs that no amount of evidence could detect. But the verification principle says that no sentences that purport to describe undetectable states of affairs can be meaningful, and the argument I have just offered is intended to show that nobody can have beliefs about undetectable states of affairs. So if the verification principle is correct, skepticism will not be a real possibility, because the skeptical stories literally will not make sense.
但是,验证原则指出,任何旨在描述无法检测的事态的句子都不可能是有意义的。但验证原则指出,任何旨在描述无法检测到的事态的句子都不可能是有意义的,而我刚才提出的论证旨在说明,没有人能对无法检测到的事态抱有信念。因此,如果验证原则是正确的,怀疑论就不会成为一种真正的可能性,因为怀疑论的故事从字面上讲是没有意义的。
But because we started with the story of Albert, the brain in the vat, the verification principle is likely to seem implausible. Albert was unable to tell the difference between the following two hypotheses:
但是,由于我们是从 "缸中之脑 "阿尔伯特的故事开始的,验证原则很可能显得难以置信。阿尔伯特无法区分以下两种假设:
a) that he was moving around in the world having experiences of real things; and
a) 他在世界上四处游荡,体验真实的事物;以及
b) that he was a brain in a vat with faked experiences.
b) 他是一个装在大桶里的大脑,有着伪造的经历。
And the story seems to make perfect sense. If it does make sense, it seems to be a clear case of something that the verificationist says is impossible: an issue that no evidence could decide.
而这个故事似乎完全说得通。如果它确实说得通,那么它似乎就是验证论者所说的不可能的事情的一个明显案例:一个没有证据可以决定的问题。
But is it really a case that the verificationist should accept as a counterexample? For example, suppose Marie found a new body for Albert. Couldn't she then reconnect him to his body and tell him that his experiences since the crash were all faked? And wouldn't he then have evidence that he used to be a brain in a vat? Of course, Albert has no control over whether Marie does provide him with this evidence. But the verificationist didn't say that we had to be able to produce the evidence by our own efforts, only that it had to be logically possible that there should be evidence. And the fact that Marie could reconnect the brain in the vat with a new body means that Albert could be given evidence that he was once a brain in a vat.
但这真的是验证论者应该接受的反例吗?例如,假设玛丽为艾伯特找到了一具新的躯体。难道她就不能把他和他的身体重新连接起来,并告诉他,他在坠机后的经历都是伪造的吗?这样一来,他不就有证据证明自己曾经是缸中之脑了吗?当然,艾伯特无法控制玛丽是否真的向他提供了这些证据。但验证论者并没有说,我们必须能够通过自己的努力获得证据,而只是说从逻辑上讲,必须有可能存在证据。玛丽可以将缸中的大脑与新的身体重新连接起来,这就意味着艾伯特可以得到证据,证明他曾经是缸中的大脑。
Verificationism doesn't help as a solution to skepticism. The skeptics want a way of checking whether their experience is misleading them, not the reassurance that evidence that they are being misled could eventually show up. And if verificationism is correct, it offers only this weaker sort of reassurance.
验证主义无助于解决怀疑论。怀疑论者想要的是一种检查他们的经验是否误导了他们的方法,而不是他们被误导的证据最终会出现的保证。如果验证主义是正确的,那么它只能提供这种较弱的保证。
But another way out of skepticism has been suggested recently. This new approach was prompted by a class of examples that undermined the long-established principle of deduction for justification.
但最近有人提出了另一种摆脱怀疑论的方法。这一新方法是由一类例子引发的,这些例子破坏了长期以来确立的演绎推理原则。

2.7 Ways around skepticism II: Causal theories of knowledge
2.7 摆脱怀疑论的途径之二:知识的因果理论

We saw that Descartes' definition of knowledge committed him to the deductive closure principle because he had to accept the principle of deduction for justification. But Locke is committed to the PDJ, too. In fact, everything that we are justified in believing on Descartes' strong interpretation of the justification condition, we are justified in believing on Locke's weaker interpretation. Indeed, most other epistemologists have assumed until recently that the PDJ is correct. Then, in 1963, in one of the few examples in the history of philosophy where a really new argument changes the course of the subject, the American philosopher Edmund Gettier provided examples that showed the PDJ to be wrong.
我们看到,笛卡尔对知识的定义使他致力于演绎封闭原则,因为他必须接受演绎原则来证明自己。但洛克也信奉演绎原则。事实上,根据笛卡尔对证明条件的强解释,我们有理由相信的一切,根据洛克的弱解释,我们也有理由相信。事实上,直到最近,大多数其他认识论学者都认为PDJ是正确的。1963年,美国哲学家埃德蒙-盖蒂埃(Edmund Gettier)提出了一个哲学史上为数不多的例子,一个真正的新论点改变了这一课题的研究方向。
Gettier prepared the ground for his examples by making explicit another important assumption that all empiricists had made. It was that one could be justified in believing what was, in fact, false. This is a simple corollary of Locke's empiricist view that your beliefs can be justified by defeasible evidence. For, remember, to say that defeasible evidence can justify a belief is to say that a belief can be supported by evidence that is consistent with its being false. If-as Locke supposed-what justifies your belief is the evidence, then you could have the same justification in the cases where the belief was false as you have in the cases where it is true.
盖蒂埃通过明确提出所有经验主义者都曾提出过的另一个重要假设,为他的例子奠定了基础。这就是,一个人可以有理由相信事实上是错误的东西。这是洛克经验主义观点的一个简单推论,即你的信念可以被可击败的证据所证明。因为,请记住,说可击败的证据可以证明一个信念是正确的,就是说一个信念可以得到与它是假的相一致的证据的支持。如果--正如洛克所假设的--证明你的信念是正确的证据,那么在信念是假的情况下,你可以拥有与在信念是真的情况下同样的正当性。
Here is one of Gettier's examples: We suppose that two people, Smith and Jones, have applied for a job. Smith has been reliably informed by the president of the company doing the hiring that in the end Jones will be selected. It also happens that a few minutes ago Smith counted the ten coins in Jones' jacket pocket. So Smith has very strong evidence in support of the following sentence:
下面是盖蒂埃的一个例子:我们假设有两个人,史密斯和琼斯,申请了一份工作。负责招聘的公司总裁可靠地告诉史密斯,琼斯最终会被选中。几分钟前,史密斯数了数琼斯上衣口袋里的十枚硬币。因此,史密斯有非常有力的证据支持下面的句子:
D: Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
D:琼斯将得到这份工作,琼斯的口袋里有十个硬币。
From (D) it follows that:
由 (D) 可知
E: The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
E:能得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币。
Now, Smith knows perfectly well that E follows from D, and accepts
现在,史密斯完全知道 E 是由 D 推导出来的,并且接受了
E precisely because he believes . Because he has strong evidence for , Smith is clearly justified by the PDJ in believing that is true.
E 正是因为他相信 。因为他有强有力的证据证明 ,所以根据 PDJ,史密斯显然有理由相信 是真的。
But now suppose also that, despite what the president said, Smith, not Jones, is going to get the job. Perhaps they decide he is just too impressive to turn down. And suppose, too, that Smith himself has ten coins in his pocket, even though he does not know it. Then is true, though , which was his sole reason for believing it, is false.
但现在又假设,尽管总统这么说,史密斯,而不是琼斯,会得到这份工作。也许他们认为他实在是太出色了,无法拒绝。再假设,史密斯自己口袋里也有十枚硬币,尽管他自己并不知道。那么 是真的,尽管 是假的,这是他相信它的唯一理由。
In Gettier's example, then, all of the following three conditions clearly hold:
那么,在格蒂埃的例子中,以下三个条件显然都成立:
a) E is true,
a) E 为真、
b) Smith believes that is true, and
b) 斯密认为 是真实的,并且
c) Smith is justified in believing that is true.
c) 斯密有理由相信 是真的。
Gettier concludes: 盖蒂尔总结道:

Abstract 摘要

But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true. For (e) is true because of the coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in his own pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, while falsely believing that Jones is the man who will get the job.
但同样清楚的是,史密斯并不知道(e)是真的。因为(e)是真的,因为史密斯口袋里有硬币,而史密斯不知道自己口袋里有多少硬币,他相信(e)的依据是数琼斯口袋里的硬币,同时错误地相信琼斯是会得到这份工作的人。

Because it requires the assumption that a false belief can be justified, this example only works against a theory that allows that justification is sometimes defeasible. It therefore poses no threat to the rationalist who believes that all evidence must be indefeasible. But it is not too hard to show that the PDJ is inconsistent with rationalist assumptions as well.
因为它需要假定一个错误的信念是可以被证明的,所以这个例子只对允许证明有时是不成立的理论有效。因此,它对那些认为所有证据都是不可辩驳的理性主义者并不构成威胁。但要证明PDJ与理性主义假设不一致也并不难。
Suppose, for example, I believe that some very complicated mathematical theorem is true, just because you told me and I had mistaken you for a very gifted mathematician. Let's suppose that, in fact, you are a very poor mathematician and just made the theorem up on the spur of the moment, but you happened, by pure chance, to come up with a truth. Suppose, furthermore, I know some mathematical truths from which this theorem follows logically even though I do not know that it follows from them. Still, Descartes'
例如,假设我相信某个非常复杂的数学定理是真的,只是因为你告诉了我,而我误以为你是一个非常有天赋的数学家。让我们假设,事实上你是一个非常差劲的数学家,只是一时兴起编造了这个定理,但纯属偶然,你碰巧得出了一个真理。再假设,我知道一些数学真理,从这些真理中可以逻辑地推导出这个定理,尽管我不知道从这些真理中可以推导出这个定理。尽管如此,笛卡尔的

theory is committed to the principle of deductive closure: anything I believe that follows from things I know, I also know. So on Descartes' account, I know that the theorem is true. But, of course, I know no such thing.
笛卡尔的理论信奉演绎封闭性原则:从我所知道的事物中得出的任何我相信的东西,我也都知道。因此,按照笛卡尔的说法,我知道定理是真的。但是,我当然不知道这样的事情。
How are we to react to the discovery that the PDJ is not right? We can begin by noticing that, in each of these cases, it is mere chance that the belief that the person has acquired is true. Though in each case the belief is true and justified, the fact that it is true plays no part in explaining why it is justified. It is the merest chance that Smith is correct in believing E or that I am correct in believing the mathematical theorem you told me. Perhaps, then, we should interpret the justification condition as requiring-as the American philosopher Peter Unger has suggested - that the fact that the belief is true should not be a mere accident.
当我们发现 "PDJ "并不正确时,我们该如何反应呢?首先,我们可以注意到,在上述每一种情况中,当事人所获得的信念都是真实的,这仅仅是一种偶然。尽管在每种情况下,信念都是真实的、合理的,但它是真实的这一事实并不能解释为什么它是合理的。史密斯相信 E 是正确的,或者我相信你告诉我的数学定理是正确的,这都是最偶然的。因此,也许我们应该像美国哲学家彼得-昂格尔(Peter Unger)所建议的那样,把合理性条件解释为:信念为真的事实不应该仅仅是一个偶然。
There are some recent theories, prompted in part by Gettier's problems, that try to say what knowledge is in a way that follows up this idea. And, as it happens, they also allow us to find a sort of solution to the skeptical problem with which we began. These theories are known collectively as causal theories of knowledge.
最近有一些理论,部分是由盖蒂埃的问题引发的,它们试图用一种跟进这种想法的方式来说明什么是知识。碰巧的是,这些理论也让我们找到了解决我们一开始提出的怀疑论问题的方法。这些理论统称为知识的因果理论。
The basic idea of causal theories of knowledge is that in order to know ,
因果知识理论的基本思想是,要想知道
a) you must believe ,
a) 你必须相信

b) must be true, and
b) 必须为真,并且
c) your belief in must be caused in an appropriate way.
c) 您对 的信仰必须以适当的方式产生。
The causal theory's interpretation of the justification condition amounts to this: your belief is justified if it is caused in the right sort of way.
因果理论对合理性条件的解释是:如果你的信念是以正确的方式产生的,那么它就是合理的。
Originally it was suggested that your belief must be caused-in an appropriate way—by the fact that is true. Theories of this sort deal with the example of Gettier's I cited just now. Though Smith correctly believed that the man who would get the job had ten coins in his pocket, he would still have believed it even if the man who had got the job had not had ten coins in his pocket. The fact that the man who was going to get the job had ten coins in his pocket was not part of the cause of Smith's believing it. So, on a theory of this sort, we should say that Smith did not know that the man who would get the
最初有人认为,你的信念必须以适当的方式由 是真的这一事实引起。这类理论涉及我刚才引用的盖蒂埃的例子。虽然斯密正确地相信那个会得到工作的人口袋里有十个硬币,但即使那个得到工作的人口袋里没有十个硬币,他也会相信。将得到这份工作的人口袋里有十枚硬币的事实,并不是史密斯相信这一事实的部分原因。因此,根据这种理论,我们应该说,史密斯并不知道将得到这份工作的人

job had ten coins in his pocket. But we have to give up the idea that the fact that makes the belief true should actually cause the belief. For we know many general facts - such as the fact that all men are mortal-and general facts cannot cause things. (Or, at least so many philosophers have thought!)
job 口袋里有十枚硬币。但是,我们必须放弃这样的想法,即使信念成真的事实应该是信念的真正原因。因为我们知道许多一般事实--比如人都是凡人--而一般事实不可能导致事情的发生。(至少许多哲学家是这么认为的!)。
Once we give up the idea that the fact that makes the belief true should actually cause the belief, the main problem for causal theories is that talk of a belief's being caused in an appropriate way is left rather vague. So we need to answer this question: How, exactly, do we decide which ways are appropriate?
一旦我们放弃了 "使信念成真的事实应该是导致信念产生的原因 "这一观点,因果理论的主要问题就在于,关于信念是以适当的方式产生的这一说法就变得相当模糊了。因此,我们需要回答这个问题:我们究竟该如何确定哪些方式是适当的?
We can provide an example at once that shows that not just any way will do. This example is one from the work of the American philosopher Alvin Goldman, who has played a leading part in developing causal theories. Someone called Henry is out driving and sees a barn. On this basis, he comes to believe correctly that there is a barn. Since there is a barn there and his seeing it is part of the explanation for why he truly believes it is there, this might seem to be a clear case of knowledge on the causal theory. Since there is little doubt that in this case, as described, we would say that Henry knew that there was a barn there, the theory does all right so far. But now Goldman expands the story with some extra details.
我们可以立即提供一个例子,说明并非任何方法都能解决问题。这个例子出自美国哲学家阿尔文-戈德曼(Alvin Goldman)之手,他在因果理论的发展方面发挥了重要作用。一个叫亨利的人开车出去,看到了一个谷仓。在此基础上,他正确地认为那里有一个谷仓。由于那里确实有一个谷仓,而他看到谷仓是他真正相信谷仓存在的部分原因,这似乎是一个关于因果理论知识的明显案例。毫无疑问,在这个案例中,我们可以说亨利知道那里有一个谷仓,所以到目前为止,这个理论是正确的。但现在,戈德曼又用一些额外的细节扩展了这个故事。
Goldman suggests that the reason we shouldn't say that Henry knows there is a barn there, is that in this district just looking at a barn from a car is not a way of finding out whether there is a barn there. For, in these special circumstances, just looking out of your car window will lead you to believe that there is a barn on many occasions when there isn't one. Just looking out of your car window
戈德曼认为,我们之所以不能说亨利知道那里有一个谷仓,是因为在这个地区,仅仅从车上看谷仓并不能确定那里是否有谷仓。因为,在这种特殊情况下,从车窗往外看,会让你误以为那里有一个谷仓,而在很多情况下,那里并没有谷仓。从车窗向外看

is, in these circumstances, an unreliable way of acquiring the belief that there is a barn.
在这种情况下,获得 "有一个谷仓 "的信念是不可靠的。
What this story suggests is that the appropriate way of getting a true belief, if you want to have knowledge, is to get it by a method that is reliable in the circumstances. One form of causal theory, then, says that knowledge is true belief produced by a means that is reliable in the circumstances. A view that replaces the phenomenological justification condition with an objective reliability condition, such as this one, is a form of reliabilism. Different forms of reliabilism spell out different ways in which the belief-forming process must be reliable for the resultant belief to count as knowledge if it is true.
这个故事告诉我们,如果你想拥有知识,获得真实信念的适当方法就是通过在当时情况下可靠的方法来获得。因此,一种因果理论认为,知识就是通过在当时情况下可靠的方法产生的真实信念。用客观可靠性条件取代现象学合理性条件的观点,如这种观点,就是一种可靠论。不同形式的可靠论阐述了形成信念的过程必须可靠的不同方式,这样产生的信念如果是真实的,就可以算作知识。
Notice that this theory explains why Smith didn't know that the man who would get the job had ten coins in his pocket and, more generally, why the PDJ is wrong. For Smith came to believe
请注意,这个理论解释了为什么史密斯不知道会得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币,而且更广泛地说,为什么 "PDJ "是错误的。因为史密斯开始相信
E: The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket
E:能得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币
by deducing it from
推导出
: Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
琼斯的口袋里有 10 个硬币。
But, in these circumstances, this was not a reliable way of coming to believe E. For if Smith himself had not happened, quite by chance, to have ten coins in his pocket, would have been false. We cannot accept the PDJ, because in many circumstances, like this one, deducing a consequence will cause you to have a true belief only by the merest chance. That is possible because you can draw a true consequence from a false assumption, a fact we shall discuss in the next chapter.
但是,在这种情况下,这种相信 E 的方法并不可靠。因为如果斯密本人不是碰巧口袋里有十个硬币, ,那么他的相信就会是错误的。我们不能接受 "PDJ",因为在很多情况下,比如在这种情况下,推导出一个结果会让你产生一个真实的信念,而这只是一个最偶然的机会。这是有可能的,因为你可以从一个错误的假设中推导出一个真实的结果,我们将在下一章讨论这个事实。

2.8 Causal theories contrasted with traditional accounts of justification
2.8 因果理论与传统的理由说明的对比

There are still many problems to be worked out before a causal theory can be accepted as an answer to our original question: What is knowledge? But causal theories are certainly one important response to Gettier's problems. More than that, however, proposals
在接受因果理论作为我们最初问题的答案之前,还有许多问题需要解决:什么是知识?但因果理论无疑是对盖蒂埃问题的一个重要回应。然而,建议

such as Goldman's represent a radical break with the kind of traditional epistemology that Descartes and Locke developed.
戈德曼等人的观点与笛卡尔和洛克提出的传统认识论截然不同。
There are two major ways in which these theories are unlike the sorts of traditional approaches we have considered. First of all, traditional epistemologies assume that the difference between people who are justified in believing something and people who are not must depend on states of which those people are consciously aware. Traditional epistemologies give what we can call phenomenological accounts of the justification condition. ("Phenomenological," remember, means having to do with the conscious aspects of our mental life.) Such accounts of justification are also sometimes called "internalist," because on these accounts what a person is justified in believing depends only on states internal to the believer's mind.
这些理论在两个主要方面与我们所考虑的传统方法不同。首先,传统认识论认为,有理由相信某事的人与没有理由相信某事的人之间的区别必须取决于这些人有意识意识到的状态。传统认识论对合理性条件给出了我们可以称之为现象学的描述。(记住,"现象学 "的意思是与我们精神生活中有意识的方面有关)。这种关于正当性的论述有时也被称为 "内在论",因为在这些论述中,一个人的正当信仰只取决于信仰者内心的状态。
Descartes and Locke, for example, both gave phenomenological theories of justification. Justification, for Descartes, had to be indefeasible, and if you have indefeasible evidence, you can tell that you have it simply by reflection on the contents of your own conscious mind. Locke's justifications came from experience, but experience too, as he conceived of it, is something you are aware you have whenever you have it.
例如,笛卡尔和洛克都提出了关于正当性的现象学理论。对笛卡尔来说,正当性必须是不可辩驳的,而如果你有不可辩驳的证据,你只需对自己意识中的内容进行反思,就能知道自己拥有这种证据。洛克的正当性来自经验,但经验也是如此,正如他所设想的那样,只要你拥有经验,你就会意识到你拥有它。
Goldman's causal theory of knowledge, on the other hand, is not phenomenological. It is not phenomenological because the facts that he told us about Henry-the facts that made us change from saying he knew there was a barn there to saying that he didn't know it-had nothing to do with the nature of his conscious mental life. Rather, they had to do with facts about Henry's relations with the world around him. If we replaced all the papier-mâché facsimiles of barns around Henry with real barns, then on Goldman's theory, we should now say that he did know that there was a barn there. And this means that whether or not Henry's true belief is justified can depend on facts of which he is unaware. Because causal theorists explain justification in a way that depends on facts about the world outside the mind of the knower, we can call their theories of justification "objective" theories. Such accounts of justification are also sometimes called "externalist," because on these accounts what a person is justified in believing may depend on states external to the believer's mind. The first break with traditional epistemology, then, is that causal theories of justification are objective (or externalist) and not phenomenological (or internalist).
另一方面,戈德曼的知识因果理论并不是现象学的。它不是现象学的,因为他告诉我们的关于亨利的事实--使我们从说他知道那里有一个谷仓到说他不知道的事实--与他有意识的精神生活的性质毫无关系。相反,这些事实与亨利与周围世界的关系有关。如果我们用真正的谷仓代替亨利周围所有的纸糊谷仓,那么根据戈德曼的理论,我们现在应该说,他确实知道那里有一个谷仓。这就意味着,亨利的真实信念是否合理可能取决于他不知道的事实。由于因果理论家解释正当性的方式取决于认识者头脑之外的世界事实,因此我们可以称他们的正当性理论为 "客观 "理论。这种对正当性的解释有时也被称为 "外部主义",因为在这些解释中,一个人的正当信仰可能取决于信仰者心灵之外的状态。因此,与传统认识论的第一个突破是,因果论证理论是客观的(或外部主义的),而不是现象学的(或内部主义的)。
The second break with tradition is that causal theories are not foundationalist. Causal theories do not, of course, deny that one belief can be the basis for reasonably believing another. But they do deny that whether a belief is justified depends on whether it is supported by beliefs in some foundational class. Provided the belief is produced by a reliable method, Goldman says, it is suitably justified.
与传统的第二个决裂是因果理论不是基础主义的。当然,因果理论并不否认一种信念可以作为合理相信另一种信念的基础。但它们否认一个信念是否合理取决于它是否得到某个基础类信念的支持。戈德曼说,只要信念是通过可靠的方法产生的,它就是合理的。
There are many cases where the causal theory works in a nonfoundationalist way. If, to use an example of Goldman's, I am able to tell the twins Trudy and Judy apart without knowing what it is about them that allows me to do it, then I have a reliable method of forming the belief that this one is Trudy. If I do form that belief correctly, then, the causal theory says-surely correctly-that I know it is Trudy. But since I am unable to say what it is about Trudy that allows me to tell her apart from Judy, I have no foundational beliefs that justify my claim that it is, in fact, she.
在很多情况下,因果理论以非基础主义的方式发挥作用。举个戈德曼的例子,如果我能够把双胞胎特鲁迪和朱迪区分开来,而不知道是什么原因让我能够做到这一点,那么我就有一种可靠的方法来形成这样的信念:这个是特鲁迪。如果我正确地形成了这个信念,那么,因果理论就会说--肯定是正确的--我知道它是特鲁迪。但是,由于我无法说明特鲁迪身上有什么东西能让我把她和朱迪区分开来,所以我没有任何基础信念能证明我的说法是正确的,那就是,事实上,她就是特鲁迪。
In recent years, many philosophers have become skeptical of foundationalism anyway. For once it is agreed that no beliefs about the world are indefeasible, there seems no point in looking for a secure foundation of beliefs that are certain. And if there is no foundation of certain beliefs, there is no clear way of distinguishing the foundational class. If both
近年来,许多哲学家对基础主义持怀疑态度。因为一旦人们同意,关于世界的任何信念都是不可辩驳的,那么寻找确定信念的安全基础似乎就没有意义了。而如果没有确定信念的基础,就没有明确的方法来区分基础类信念。如果两者都
a) the foundational class were certain, and
a) 基础课是确定的,而且
b) the process of justification could transfer the certainty to the derived beliefs,
b) 论证过程可以将确定性转移到派生信念上、
foundationalism would be very attractive. But beliefs about the physical world-unlike mathematical beliefs-satisfy neither of these conditions.
基础主义会非常有吸引力。但是,关于物理世界的信念--不同于数学信念--既不满足上述条件,也不满足上述条件。
Causal theories, then, are both objective and nonfoundationalist. These two features make theories such as Goldman's quite different from Locke's and Descartes'. But it is the fact that Goldman's theory is objective that allows it to provide an answer to the double question with which we began: Do you know that you aren't just a brain in a vat-and if so, how do you know it? To see why this is so, we must first provide the causal theory's answer to the question.
因此,因果理论既是客观的,也是非基础主义的。这两个特点使得戈德曼的理论与洛克和笛卡尔的理论截然不同。但正是因为戈德曼的理论是客观的,所以它能够为我们一开始提出的双重问题提供答案:你知道自己不是缸中的大脑吗?如果知道,你是怎么知道的?要想知道为什么会这样,我们必须首先提供因果理论对这个问题的答案。
That answer, of course, is that you know you aren't a brain in a vat, provided your true belief that you have a body that moves about in the physical world is produced by a process that is reliable in the circumstances. Since, in fact, you are not a brain in a vat, your beliefs about the world are produced by the reliable process of using your eyes, ears, and other senses, and therefore you do know that you are not a brain in a vat. Of course, if, like Albert, you were a brain in a vat, you would not know that you were. As a matter of fact, you would know practically nothing about the physical world. All your beliefs about it would be produced by something like Marie's computer, and that is an extremely unreliable way of forming beliefs, since Marie, you'll remember, faked all Albert's experiences.
答案当然是,你知道自己不是缸中之脑,只要你真正相信自己有一个在物理世界中活动的身体,而这个过程在当时的情况下是可靠的。由于事实上你不是缸中之脑,你对世界的信念是通过使用你的眼睛、耳朵和其他感官的可靠过程产生的,因此你确实知道你不是缸中之脑。当然,如果你像艾伯特一样是缸中之脑,你也不会知道自己是缸中之脑。事实上,你对物理世界几乎一无所知。你对物理世界的所有信念都是由类似玛丽的电脑产生的,而这种形成信念的方式是极其不可靠的,因为你应该记得,玛丽伪造了艾伯特的所有经历。
This solution to our original question has something of an air of paradox about it. For we have come to the conclusion that we know we aren't brains in a vat, even though we would have had exactly the same experiences if we were. But that, for the causal theory, is precisely the point. To be concerned only with the nature of our experiences-our phenomenology-without looking at whether our ways of getting beliefs are in fact reliable is just to refuse to adopt an objective theory of justification.
这个对我们最初问题的解答带有一些悖论的意味。因为我们得出的结论是,我们知道我们不是缸中之脑,尽管如果我们是缸中之脑,我们也会有完全相同的经历。但对于因果理论来说,这正是问题的关键所在。只关注我们经验的本质--我们的现象学--而不关注我们获得信念的方式是否可靠,这只是拒绝采用客观的正当性理论。
If you don't accept an objective theory of justification, then you are bound to allow that the brain in the vat is as justified as we are in believing that it is not in a vat, since it has exactly the same sort of experiences as a person who is living a normal human life. I objected to Locke's theory that if Marie gave Albert the true belief that the sun was shining, that still wouldn't mean that the brain in the vat knew the sun was shining. But any phenomenological theory of justification has to say either
如果你不接受客观的合理性理论,那么你就必然会允许缸中的大脑和我们一样有理由相信它不在缸中,因为它和过着正常人生活的人有着完全相同的经历。我反对洛克的理论,即如果玛丽让阿尔伯特真正相信太阳正在照耀,这仍然不意味着缸中的大脑知道太阳正在照耀。但是,任何关于正当性的现象学理论都必须说,要么
a) that Albert's belief is justified-and thus wrongly conclude that he knows that the sun is shining-or
a) 阿尔伯特的信念是合理的,因此错误地得出结论说他知道太阳正在发光;或 b) 阿尔伯特的信念是错误的,因此错误地得出结论说他知道太阳正在发光。
b) that Albert's belief is not justified - and thus wrongly draw the skeptical conclusion that my belief that the sun is shining is not justified either.
b) 阿尔伯特的信念是不成立的--从而错误地得出了我认为太阳正在发光的信念也是不成立的这一怀疑性结论。
Causal theorists say that since neither of these conclusions is correct, no phenomenological theory of knowledge can be accepted.
因果论者说,既然这两个结论都不正确,那么就不能接受任何关于知识的现象学理论。

2.9 Epistemology naturalized
2.9 认识论归化

We have been discussing the relationship between justification and knowledge on the assumption that we can decide the issue by thought experiments. Each time a proposal has been made, we have followed Socrates' example in the Theaetetus, testing the proposal against cases, like Goldman's Henry and the barns, or Gettier's Smith, Jones, and the coins in the pockets. This suggests that what we are doing is exploring the nature of our concepts of knowledge, belief and justification, on the assumption that we can always judge correctly whether these terms apply to particular cases. That is not an unreasonable assumption: anyone who knows English knows how to use the words "know," "believe" and "justify"-knows, that is, what those words mean. And surely someone who knows what those words mean knows when they can and cannot properly be applied. But if we know what these words mean, why can't we just say what they mean? Why, that is, has it been so hard to find an answer to Socrates' definitional question, "What is knowledge?" It looks as though, on one hand, we can tell when the word "know" applies in a case (provided we are told enough about it) but, on the other, we are not very good at uncovering and explaining how we tell whether it applies. If we could tell, then we would surely have agreed on an answer to the definitional question long ago.
我们一直在讨论理由与知识之间的关系,前提是我们可以通过思想实验来决定这个问题。每次提出建议时,我们都会效仿苏格拉底在《泰阿泰特》中的例子,用案例来检验建议,比如戈德曼的亨利和谷仓,或盖提尔的史密斯、琼斯和口袋里的硬币。这表明,我们正在探索知识、信念和正当性概念的本质,我们的假设是,我们总能正确判断这些术语是否适用于特定情况。这并不是一个不合理的假设:任何懂英语的人都知道如何使用 "知道"、"相信 "和 "证明 "这些词--也就是说,知道这些词的含义。当然,知道这些词含义的人也知道什么时候可以用,什么时候不能用。但是,如果我们知道这些词的意思,为什么我们不能直接说出它们的意思呢?苏格拉底的定义性问题 "知识是什么?"为什么一直难以找到答案?看起来,一方面,我们可以知道 "知道 "这个词在什么情况下适用(只要我们被告知了足够多的情况),但另一方面,我们并不擅长揭示和解释我们是如何判断它是否适用的。如果我们能够知道,那么我们肯定早就对定义问题的答案达成一致了。
I shall return to questions about the relationship between our knowledge of the meanings of the words in our language and our ability to spell out what we know in the next chapter; see 3.13. For now, however, I want to observe that we could have proceeded in a different way. We could have drawn not just on our intuitive understanding of the concepts of knowledge and justification but also on scientific study of the processes by which people come to believe things, on cognitive psychology, for example, or the sociology of knowledge. We could, that is, have taken up the study of knowledge not as a purely conceptual inquiry but alongside work done in the sciences. To take that approach to epistemology would be to follow the recommendation of the American philosopher W. V. O. Quine, who proposed in 1969 that we should "naturalize" epistemology. In a famous article, entitled "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine suggested that epistemology should be "a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science."
在下一章中,我将再次讨论我们对语言中词义的了解与我们表达自己所知的能力之间的关系问题;见 3.13。不过,现在我想说的是,我们本可以采用另一种方式。我们不仅可以利用我们对知识和理由概念的直观理解,还可以利用对人们相信事物的过程的科学研究,例如认知心理学或知识社会学。也就是说,我们可以不把知识研究作为纯粹的概念研究,而是与科学研究并驾齐驱。对认识论采取这种方法,就等于听从了美国哲学家奎因(W. V. O. Quine)的建议,他在 1969 年提出,我们应该将认识论 "自然化"。在一篇题为 "认识论自然化 "的著名文章中,奎因建议,认识论应该是 "心理学的一章,因而也是自然科学的一章"。
This is a slightly surprising proposal, because, as we have seen, inquiring into the nature of knowledge involves thinking about when and how our beliefs are justified. To claim that a belief is justified is not just to say when it will be believed but also to say when it ought to be believed. And we don't normally think of natural science as telling us what we ought to do. Science, surely, is about describing and explaining the world, not about what we should do?
这是一个略微令人吃惊的提议,因为正如我们所看到的,探究知识的本质涉及思考我们的信念何时以及如何是合理的。声称一个信念是合理的,不仅是说它何时会被相信,也是说它何时应该被相信。我们通常不会认为自然科学是在告诉我们应该做什么。科学当然是关于描述和解释世界,而不是关于我们应该做什么?
One way to reconcile these two ideas would be to build on the central idea of reliabilism and say that what psychology can teach us is which belief-forming processes are in fact reliable. So here epistemology and psychology would go hand in hand. Epistemology would tell us that we ought to form our beliefs in ways that are reliable, while psychology examines which ways these are: so the "ought" comes from epistemology, not from psychology, leaving us able to continue to think of natural science as free of "oughts." Claims about what people ought to do, say, or believe are prescriptive: they don't just describe what people do, they prescribe what they ought to do. So this way of dividing up the job between psychology and epistemology leaves epistemology the job of prescription and retains the view that psychology describes our mental processes. Quine suggested later that the "oughts" of epistemology are like the "oughts" of engineering: when Emma the engineer says that you ought to use steel of a certain strength in making a bridge, she means only that you should use that steel if you want the bridge to hold up under the load it is going to have to bear. The "ought" is conditional: it assumes a certain aim, in this case to build a bridge that will take a certain load. We shall see, later, when we come to discuss morality, that the German philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that moral "oughts" were not conditional-his term was "hypothetical" - in this way. Rather, they were what he called "categorical." (See 5.3.)
调和这两种观点的一种方法是以可靠论的核心思想为基础,说心理学能教给我们的是哪些信念形成过程实际上是可靠的。在这里,认识论和心理学将携手并进。认识论告诉我们,我们应该以可靠的方式形成我们的信念,而心理学则研究哪些方式是可靠的:因此,"应该 "来自认识论,而不是心理学,这样我们就可以继续认为自然科学不存在 "应该"。关于人们应该做什么、说什么或相信什么的说法是规定性的:它们不仅仅描述人们做了什么,还规定了他们应该做什么。因此,这种心理学与认识论之间的分工方式让认识论承担了规定性的工作,并保留了心理学描述我们心理过程的观点。奎因后来提出,认识论中的 "应该 "就像工程学中的 "应该":当工程师艾玛说,你应该使用某种强度的钢材来造桥时,她的意思只是说,如果你想让这座桥在必须承受的负荷下支撑得住,你就应该使用这种钢材。这个 "应该 "是有条件的:它假定了一个特定的目标,在这里是指建造一座能承受一定负荷的桥。我们稍后在讨论道德时会看到,德国哲学家伊曼纽尔-康德认为,道德 "应该 "不是有条件的,他的术语是 "假设"。相反,它们被他称为 "绝对的"。(见 5.3)。
So what is the aim upon which the "oughts" of epistemology are conditional?
那么,认识论的 "必须 "以什么目标为条件呢?
The obvious answer, as Quine proposed, is that epistemology says you ought to believe what you are justified in believing if you want to have true beliefs. And that suggests a way of formulating an understanding of what knowledge is: it is true belief produced by processes that normally produce true beliefs. Understood that way,
答案显而易见,正如奎因所提出的,认识论认为,如果你想拥有真正的信念,你就应该相信你有理由相信的东西。这就提出了一种理解知识的方式:知识是由通常产生真实信念的过程所产生的真实信念。可以这样理解、

we can see the tradition of phenomenological approaches to justification as a series of hypotheses about what processes are most likely to produce true belief. In the empiricist tradition, it was assumed that we are so constructed that we will usually get true beliefs if we believe our senses. Simply coming to believe what we are naturally disposed to believe on the basis of our senses is therefore justified, and so we do not need to study our own sensory systems in order to get closer to the truth. But the existence of hallucinations and illusions-both of which Descartes discussed-shows, of course, that our senses are not, in fact, so reliable that we cannot learn from studying them about better ways of forming beliefs. And once we see that, we can see that a foundationalist empiricism, which treats what our senses tell us as a secure foundation for all our other beliefs, is not warranted.
我们可以把现象学的正义论传统看作是一系列关于什么过程最有可能产生真实信念的假设。在经验主义传统中,人们假定我们的构造是这样的:如果我们相信我们的感官,我们通常会得到真正的信念。因此,根据我们的感官来相信我们自然倾向于相信的东西是合理的,所以我们不需要为了接近真理而研究我们自己的感官系统。当然,笛卡尔讨论过的幻觉和错觉的存在表明,我们的感官其实并不那么可靠,以至于我们无法通过研究它们来学习形成信念的更好方法。一旦我们明白了这一点,我们就会明白,把感官告诉我们的东西当作我们所有其他信念的可靠基础的基础主义经验主义是没有道理的。
Similarly, when rationalists say that reason is the major source of our knowledge, they are assuming that we are so constructed that we will usually get true beliefs if we follow what Descartes called the "natural light" of reason. But experience has taught us that our reasoning capacities are in fact quite limited: people regularly make elementary logical mistakes, for example. Furthermore (as Descartes, who was something of a scientist, knew very well), reason by itself cannot lead us to the truth about the world around us. So here too there are grounds for doubt that relying on this method will get us to the truth.
同样,当理性主义者说理性是我们知识的主要来源时,他们是在假定我们的构造是这样的:如果我们遵循笛卡尔所说的理性的 "自然之光",我们通常会得到真实的信念。但经验告诉我们,我们的推理能力实际上是非常有限的:例如,人们经常会犯一些基本的逻辑错误。此外(作为科学家的笛卡尔非常清楚),理性本身并不能引导我们找到周围世界的真相。因此,我们也有理由怀疑,依靠这种方法能否让我们找到真相。
As a result, then, of the development of naturalized epistemology, there has been increasing interest in using the insights gained from scientific study of the ways in which we acquire our beliefs to enhance our grasp of the nature of knowledge. This approach has led to the development of evolutionary epistemology, which draws on Darwin's ideas about evolution in two important-and importantly distinct-respects. First, evolutionary epistemology examines the consequences of the fact that our cognitive capacities are themselves the product of an evolutionary process. And second, it explores how ideas and theories compete with each other and are selected, in a way that is somewhat analogous to the process of the natural selection of biological traits. Here, then, the philosopher's interest in questions about knowledge comes into close interaction with the work of biologists and psychologists.
因此,归化认识论发展的结果是,人们越来越有兴趣利用从科学研究中获得的关于我们获取信念的方式的见解来加强我们对知识本质的把握。这种方法导致了进化认识论的发展,进化认识论在两个重要的方面借鉴了达尔文关于进化的思想,而这两个方面又是截然不同的。首先,进化认识论研究了我们的认知能力本身就是进化过程的产物这一事实的后果。其次,它探讨了思想和理论是如何相互竞争并被选择的,其方式有点类似于生物特征的自然选择过程。因此,哲学家对知识问题的兴趣与生物学家和心理学家的工作密切相关。

2.10 Conclusion 2.10 结论

In this chapter, we have discussed some of the central questions of epistemology. Starting with the question how we know that we aren't just brains in a vat, the playthings of an unscrupulous scientist, we were led to ask what knowledge is. We discussed the very different answers to this question given by Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism. But both of them shared the Theaetetus' assumption that knowledge was justified true belief: and both of them, as we have just seen, regarded justification as both phenomenological and foundational. The problem was that Descartes' theory led immediately to the impasse of skepticism, while Locke wrongly allowed knowledge to the brain in the vat.
在本章中,我们讨论了认识论的一些核心问题。从我们如何知道自己不是无良科学家玩弄的缸中之脑开始,我们开始追问知识是什么。我们讨论了笛卡尔理性主义和洛克经验主义对这个问题给出的截然不同的答案。但它们都赞同忒伊忒斯的假设,即知识是有正当理由的真实信念:正如我们刚才所看到的,它们都认为正当理由既是现象学的,也是基础性的。问题在于,笛卡尔的理论立即导致了怀疑论的僵局,而洛克则错误地将知识置于大脑之中。
Finally, we tried a radical way out. We gave up the idea that our theory of justification needed to be phenomenological. The resultant theory is that in order to know ,
最后,我们尝试了一条激进的出路。我们放弃了理由理论必须是现象学理论的想法。由此产生的理论是,为了了解
a) you must believe ,
a) 你必须相信

b) must be true, and
b) 必须为真,并且
c) your belief in must be caused in a way that is reliable in the circumstances.
c) 您对 的信任必须是在当时情况下可靠的。
This theory allows us to claim to know that we aren't brains in a vat even though our experiences could be the very same if we were brains in a vat. It also provides us with a reason for caring about whether other people's true beliefs are knowledge, for we have an interest in the reliability of the processes by which beliefs are acquired. If someone has a lot of knowledge about a certain subject matter, then he or she forms beliefs reliably. And that means we have a reason to rely on that person in the future.
这一理论使我们能够声称我们不是缸中之脑,尽管如果我们是缸中之脑,我们的经验可能是一样的。它还为我们提供了一个关心他人的真实信念是否是知识的理由,因为我们对获取信念的过程的可靠性很感兴趣。如果某人对某一主题有很多知识,那么他或她形成信念的过程就是可靠的。这就意味着我们有理由在未来依赖这个人。
The dispute between causal theory and traditional epistemology is a dispute between a theory that regards minds as causal systems in the world, on the one hand, and a theory that regards minds from the point of view of the individual "looking out" on the world, on the other. In this respect it is like the dispute between phenomenologist and functionalist that we discussed at the end of the last chapter. Just as Descartes is on the same side-against the "objective" view of mind-in both these disputes, so many philosophers who are functionalists are on the objective side in epistemology. To see mind
因果理论与传统认识论之间的争论,一方面是将心智视为世界中的因果系统的理论,另一方面是以个人 "眺望 "世界的视角看待心智的理论。在这方面,这就像我们在上一章末尾讨论的现象学家与功能学家之间的争论。正如笛卡尔在这两场争论中都站在同一阵营--反对 "客观 "的心灵观一样,许多功能主义者哲学家在认识论中也站在客观的一方。看待心灵

and knowledge in the way the functionalist and the causal epistemologist do - as a causal system in the world - is to support a form of naturalism. It is to see human beings with their philosophical problems as part of the wider world of nature, not as privileged observers somehow outside that natural world.
以功能主义者和因果认识论者的方式--作为世界中的因果系统--看待人类和知识,就是支持一种形式的自然主义。这是将人类及其哲学问题视为更广阔的自然世界的一部分,而不是在自然世界之外享有特权的观察者。

CHAPTER 3 第 3 章

Language 语言

What is meaning? 什么是意义?
How does language relate to reality?
语言与现实有什么关系?
How do written and spoken words express thoughts?
文字和口头语言如何表达思想?

3.1 Introduction 3.1 导言

Ever since Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species, biologists have increasingly seen human beings as just one kind of animal. Darwin's theory of evolution claims that we are descended from other, earlier kinds of animals by natural selection. Biologists are not surprised, therefore, that our respiration, nutrition, and reproduction are typically mammalian; and that our cells look very like the cells of other animals, with their nuclei and cytoplasm and the multiplicity of organelles that we can see under an electron-microscope. But even a biologist would have to agree that we have some important distinctive traits, and one of the most important is that we use language, to speak, to write, and, some would say, to think. So far as we know, we are the only animals, from the amoeba to the elephant, that naturally use language. Furthermore, many of the other distinguishing features of our species-our social organization, our arts and crafts and sciences - are inconceivable without language. Even if other animals do have languages, what they have done with them seems very limited by comparison. Imagine trying to coordinate a bank or an art gallery or an experiment in chemistry without being able to understand, speak, read, or write a word.
自从查尔斯-达尔文(Charles Darwin)出版了《物种起源》(Origin of Species)一书之后,生物学家越来越多地将人类视为动物的一种。达尔文的进化论认为,人类是其他更早的动物通过自然选择繁衍下来的。因此,生物学家们对我们的呼吸、营养和繁殖是典型的哺乳动物并不感到惊讶;我们的细胞看起来与其他动物的细胞非常相似,有细胞核、细胞质和多种细胞器,我们可以在电子显微镜下看到这些细胞。但是,即使是生物学家也不得不同意,我们有一些重要的与众不同的特征,其中最重要的特征之一就是我们会使用语言,会说话,会写字,有人会说,还会思考。据我们所知,从变形虫到大象,我们是唯一自然使用语言的动物。此外,我们这个物种的许多其他显著特征--我们的社会组织、我们的艺术、手工艺和科学--如果没有语言都是不可想象的。即使其他动物真的有语言,它们用语言所做的事情相比之下也非常有限。试想一下,如果不能听、说、读、写任何一个字,要想协调银行、美术馆或化学实验的工作是多么困难。
Human beings have been using language for at least a hundred thousand years, and most of us learned a language easily and naturally when we were very young. In Chapter 1 I mentioned how easily we have come to take computers, which are relatively new on the human scene, for granted; how much easier it is for us to take
人类使用语言的历史至少已有十万年之久,我们中的大多数人在很小的时候就能轻松自然地学会一种语言。在第 1 章中,我提到了我们是如何轻易地将计算机视为理所当然,而计算机在人类社会中还是相对较新的事物。

language for granted, along with all the distinctively human activities that it makes possible. But actually, what we can do with language is fairly remarkable. For example, we can put together strings of sounds or written symbols that connect us over unimaginable distances of space and time with other places and periods. Suppose I ask, "Are there creatures with consciousness on the other side of the galaxy?" Then I am in some sense connected, by those words, over hundreds of light-years with a place that I couldn't literally get to in many lifetimes of travel in a spaceship. If you speak of "when life on Earth began," you are talking about something that happened several thousand million years ago. And we make these connections simply by making sounds or writing letters on a piece of paper or typing them onto a computer. How does it come about that these words in our language-English-can be used to connect us to things both far away and near?
我们总是认为语言是理所当然的,语言所带来的人类活动也是理所当然的。但实际上,我们用语言所能做的事情是相当了不起的。例如,我们可以将声音或文字符号组合成串,在难以想象的时空距离内将我们与其他地方和其他时期联系起来。假设我问:"银河系的另一端是否存在有意识的生物?"那么在某种意义上,通过这些文字,我与数百光年之外的一个地方建立了联系,而这个地方是我乘坐宇宙飞船旅行几辈子也无法到达的。如果你说 "地球上的生命始于何时",你说的是几千万年前发生的事情。而我们只是通过发出声音、在纸上写字或在电脑上打字来建立这些联系。我们的语言--英语--中的这些词语是如何将我们与远近的事物联系起来的呢?
We can also use language to talk about things that we will never know about. Thus, we can say: "I wonder what Caesar's last thoughts were." But we'll never know the answer. Of course, we think we know what his last words were: "Et tu, Brute." And that raises another fascinating set of puzzles. For why is it that in his language, Latin, the way to say "You too, Brutus" is to say those famous Roman words? And how come different sounds and signs are used in other languages to make the same connections?
我们还可以用语言来谈论我们永远不会知道的事情。因此,我们可以说:"我想知道凯撒最后的想法是什么"但我们永远不会知道答案当然,我们自以为知道他的遗言是什么"等等,畜生"这又引发了另一系列令人着迷的谜题为什么在他的语言--拉丁语中,说 "你也是,布鲁图 "的方式是说那些著名的罗马词?在其他语言中,又是如何用不同的声音和符号来表达同样的意思呢?

3.2 The linguistic turn
3.2 语言学转向

Because there are these very general puzzles about how language works, puzzles that seem rather like the ones that are central to philosophy of mind and to epistemology, it should not be surprising that Western philosophy has been concerned from its very beginning with language. Philosophers, as we have already seen, ask fundamental questions about mind and knowledge: language seems at least as interesting, as puzzling, and as important. We have also seen that issues about how language works come up very naturally in the course of philosophical thinking about other issues. In Chapter 1, we found ourselves thinking about private languages and language games while reflecting on the nature of our mental lives. We also discussed the ways in which language seems to require consciousness. In Chapter 2 we found language central to thinking about the
由于存在着关于语言如何运作的这些非常普遍的困惑,这些困惑似乎与心灵哲学和认识论的核心问题颇为相似,因此,西方哲学从一开始就关注语言也就不足为奇了。正如我们已经看到的,哲学家们提出了关于心智和知识的基本问题:语言似乎至少同样有趣、同样令人困惑、同样重要。我们还看到,在对其他问题进行哲学思考的过程中,有关语言如何运作的问题会很自然地出现。在第 1 章中,我们在思考我们精神生活的本质时,发现自己在思考私人语言和语言游戏。我们还讨论了语言似乎需要意识的方式。在第 2 章中,我们发现语言在思考

verification principle. Then we ended up wondering about how it was possible for us to understand the word "know" and yet not be able to give a simple definition of its meaning. We'll see later that questions about language will come up in other ways in other areas of the subject. So in fact there are many answers to the question "Why does language matter to philosophy?" which is the title of a very engaging book by the Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking. As Hacking shows, in different eras of philosophy, different reasons for reflecting on language have seemed important.
验证原则。最后,我们不禁要问,我们怎么可能理解 "知道 "这个词,却又无法给出其含义的简单定义。稍后我们将看到,关于语言的问题还会以其他方式出现在本学科的其他领域。加拿大哲学家伊恩-哈金(Ian Hacking)写了一本非常吸引人的书,书名就是 "为什么语言对哲学很重要"。正如哈金所言,在哲学的不同时代,对语言进行反思的不同原因似乎都很重要。
Still, one perennial source of the appeal that language has for philosophers is the fact that language is the tool with which we do our work. The philosopher's product, in the Western tradition, is a text, a piece of writing. Philosophy, as we have already seen, is especially concerned with the careful exposition of arguments that illuminate the central concepts with which and through which we understand reality. It is natural, therefore, that philosophers should have attended very closely to how language works, and, more especially, to questions about how to use language in valid arguments.
尽管如此,语言对哲学家具有吸引力的一个长期根源是,语言是我们开展工作的工具。在西方传统中,哲学家的产品是文本,是一篇文章。正如我们已经看到的那样,哲学特别关注对论点的仔细阐述,这些论点阐明了我们理解现实的核心概念。因此,哲学家们自然会密切关注语言如何发挥作用,尤其是如何在有效论证中使用语言的问题。
But everybody has a reason for being concerned to understand language properly. Whoever you are, you will sometimes have to think through difficult questions. And when you do, you will almost certainly have to do it with language. Even if you believe you can do without language for your private thinking, you will need to use it if you want to discuss these problems with others, or to look for relevant information or argument in books. So that, though philosophers have to be very careful about language, the fact that language is the tool of their trade does not distinguish philosophy from most forms of other intellectual activity.
但是,每个人都有理由关心如何正确理解语言。无论你是谁,有时都需要思考一些棘手的问题。而当你这样做的时候,你几乎肯定要使用语言。即使你认为自己的私人思考可以不使用语言,但如果你想与他人讨论这些问题,或在书中寻找相关信息或论据,你还是需要使用语言。因此,尽管哲学家必须非常谨慎地对待语言,但语言是他们的职业工具这一事实并没有将哲学与其他大多数形式的智力活动区分开来。
Nor does this fact explain the tremendous importance that has been attached to philosophical questions about language in the last hundred or so years of European philosophy. From the work of the German philosopher Gottlob Frege, more than a hundred years ago, to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations in the middle of the twentieth century, some of the most influential philosophical writings have asked questions about how language works. In the philosophy of language, questions about language have been addressed not because care with words allows us to avoid confusion, but because the nature of linguistic meaning, or of what it is for
这一事实也无法解释,在过去一百多年的欧洲哲学史上,有关语言的哲学问题受到了极大的重视。从一百多年前德国哲学家戈特洛布-弗雷格(Gottlob Frege)的著作,到二十世纪中叶路德维希-维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)的《哲学研究》(Philosophical Investigations),一些最具影响力的哲学著作都提出了关于语言如何运作的问题。在语言哲学中,有关语言的问题之所以受到关注,并不是因为对词语的小心谨慎可以让我们避免混淆,而是因为语言意义的本质,或者说语言意义对于我们来说是什么。

sentences to be true or false, has come to be regarded as intrinsically philosophically important. Philosophy, whose traditional preoccupation is with concepts and ideas, has come, over the last century, to be centrally engaged with questions about words and sentences. In a phrase the American philosopher Richard Rorty has made famous, philosophy has taken a "linguistic turn."
在过去的一个世纪里,哲学的核心问题是关于词语和句子的问题。哲学的传统关注点是概念和观念,而在过去的一个世纪里,哲学的中心工作则是与词语和句子有关的问题。用美国哲学家理查德-罗蒂(Richard Rorty)的名言来说,哲学已经发生了 "语言学转向"。
It will help you to see why language came to be so important to recent philosophy if we begin before the "linguistic turn." So let's begin again with Cartesianism, which (as I have already said) has been the dominant philosophy of mind of the last three centuries. In particular, let's consider the view of language that went with it.
如果我们在 "语言学转向 "之前就开始研究语言,会有助于你理解为什么语言对近代哲学如此重要。因此,让我们从笛卡尔主义重新开始,它(我已经说过)是过去三个世纪占主导地位的心灵哲学。特别是,让我们考虑一下与之相伴的语言观。
For Descartes, you remember, your mind and the thoughts you have are the things you know best. In this framework-which we find, for example, in Descartes' English contemporary, Thomas Hobbes-public language is naturally seen as the expression of these private thoughts. As Hobbes puts it, with his characteristic directness: "Words so connected as that they become signs of our thoughts, are called SPEECH." Whether or not you share Descartes' view of thoughts, this is, surely, a very natural view of one of the major ways that language functions. But, for Hobbes, language had a more important function than its role in communication, one that I mentioned in Chapter 1.
对笛卡尔来说,你要记住,你的头脑和你的思想是你最了解的东西。在笛卡尔的同时代英国人托马斯-霍布斯(Thomas Hobbes)等人的这一框架中,公共语言自然被视为这些私人思想的表达。正如霍布斯以其特有的直截了当的方式所说的那样"言语相连,成为我们思想的标志,这就叫言语"。无论你是否赞同笛卡尔的思想观,这肯定是对语言功能的主要方式之一的一种非常自然的看法。但是,对霍布斯来说,语言除了在交流中的作用之外,还有一个更重要的功能,我在第一章中已经提到过。
Hobbes is saying that the major function of language is to help us remember our thoughts, and he says that language is a system of "sensible moniments"-reminders we can see and hear. Thus, he claims in this passage that no one could remember "number," that is, how many things there are of a certain kind, if they did not have the numerals, the written or spoken signs for numbers; and he
霍布斯说,语言的主要功能是帮助我们记住我们的思想,他说语言是一个 "感性符号 "系统--我们可以看到和听到的提醒。因此,他在这段话中声称,如果没有数字,即数字的书面或口头符号,没有人能记住 "数",也就是某类事物有多少;他还说:"如果没有数字,我们就不可能记住'数'。

implies that no one could count things unless they had learned the numerals in their proper order. He claims, too, that you could not remember what color things were if you did not have the names of the colors-the words "red" and "yellow" and so on-so that you could store away the memory of a sunset, for example, by storing away the words "The sunset was a spectacular red." In fact, Hobbes believed that almost every word was a name of a "thought"; and by a "thought," like Descartes, he meant anything that you are aware of in your mind when you are conscious. The heart of his view of language, then, was that
他的意思是说,除非学会了按正确顺序排列的数字,否则没有人会数数。他还声称,如果没有颜色的名称--"红"、"黄 "等字眼,就无法记住事物的颜色--例如,你可以通过储存 "夕阳是壮观的红色 "这样的字眼来储存对夕阳的记忆。事实上,霍布斯认为,几乎每一个词都是一个 "思想 "的名称;和笛卡尔一样,他所说的 "思想 "指的是当你有意识时,你头脑中意识到的任何东西。因此,他的语言观的核心是
As I argued in the chapter on mind, Cartesian thoughts are essentially a private matter. For Hobbes, it is just "by accident" that names also have a role in public language. So far as Hobbes was concerned, Robinson Crusoe would have had just as much use for language before Friday arrived in his life as afterward. So far as Hobbes was concerned, then, it was only an accident that human beings do not have private languages, consisting of systems of "marks" that allow each person to remember his or her own ideas and that are not used in communication at all. If Hobbes were right, the fact that chimpanzees in the wild do not appear to use signs to communicate would not show that they didn't use sounds or gestures as marks for their thoughts.
正如我在 "心智 "一章中所论证的,笛卡尔的思想本质上是私人问题。对霍布斯来说,名字在公共语言中也有作用只是 "偶然"。在霍布斯看来,《鲁滨逊漂流记》在 "星期五 "出现之前和之后对语言的使用都是一样的。因此,在霍布斯看来,人类没有私人语言只是一个意外,私人语言由 "标记 "系统组成,让每个人都能记住自己的想法,而这些 "标记 "根本不用于交流。如果霍布斯是对的,那么野外黑猩猩似乎不使用符号进行交流这一事实,并不能说明它们不使用声音或手势作为思想的标记。
You will remember that I argued in Chapter 1 that the extreme privacy of Cartesian thoughts raised serious problems for Descartes' theory. In particular, his theory raised in an especially acute way the problem of other minds. Wittgenstein's private-language argument brought this problem into sharp focus, and this led us to behaviorism and then to functionalism. Hobbes' theory is, in essence, that we use languages as private languages. Thus, behaviorists and functionalists are likely to object to Hobbes' view because they do not believe in the existence of the totally private states - the "thoughts" - that Hobbes, like Descartes, regarded as the one sort of thing that we each know for certain. Blaming the defects of the Cartesian view on its commitment to the existence of private mental states, behaviorists
大家应该还记得,我在第一章中指出,笛卡尔思想的极端私密性给笛卡尔的理论带来了严重的问题。特别是,他的理论以一种特别尖锐的方式提出了其他思想的问题。维特根斯坦的 "私人语言 "论证使这一问题变得尖锐起来,并将我们引向了行为主义,然后又引向了功能主义。霍布斯的理论本质上是,我们把语言当作私人语言来使用。因此,行为主义者和功能主义者很可能反对霍布斯的观点,因为他们不相信存在完全私人化的状态--"思想"--而霍布斯和笛卡尔一样,都认为这种状态是我们每个人都能确定知道的。行为主义者将笛卡尔观点的缺陷归咎于其对私人精神状态存在的承诺,他们认为

placed their confidence in the certain existence of public language. A significant part of the appeal that language has had for many recent philosophers as an object of philosophical study is that it is public. Spoken and written languages, unlike the minds of their speakers and writers, are open to the inspection of all.
他们对公共语言的确定存在充满信心。语言作为哲学研究的对象,对近代许多哲学家具有吸引力,其中很重要的一点就是它的公共性。口头语言和书面语言不同于说话者和书写者的思想,它们向所有人开放。
But there is another, connected reason why the study of language has come to occupy a central place in recent philosophy: philosophers have come to believe that it is not, as Hobbes thought, an accident that language is a public phenomenon. As we saw in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's private-language argument was supposed to show that Hobbes's notion that we use language as a "sensible moniment" was actually incoherent. But Wittgenstein also offered to show why Hobbes and Descartes might have come to make the mistake of thinking that a private language was possible. His explanation relies, like the verificationist argument of Chapter 2 , on an appeal to a fact about public language.
但是,语言研究之所以在近代哲学中占据中心位置,还有另一个相关的原因:哲学家们开始相信,语言是一种公共现象并不像霍布斯所认为的那样是一种偶然。正如我们在第一章中所看到的,维特根斯坦的私人语言论证旨在说明,霍布斯关于我们将语言作为一种 "感性媒介 "的观点实际上是不连贯的。但维特根斯坦也提出要说明为什么霍布斯和笛卡尔可能会误以为私人语言是可能的。他的解释与第二章的验证论论证一样,依赖于对公共语言事实的诉诸。

3.3 The beetle in the box
3.3 盒子里的甲虫

Here is the passage from Philosophical Investigations, section 293, where Wittgenstein examines one way in which we might conceive of a private language. He considers why we might think that we use the word "pain" as if it were the name of a private object. He considers, in other words, why we might think that the word "pain" was used like the word "twinge" in my story in Chapter 1.
下面是《哲学研究》第 293 节中的一段话,维特根斯坦在这段话中探讨了我们构想私人语言的一种方式。他探讨了为什么我们会认为我们使用 "疼痛 "这个词,就好像它是一个私人物品的名称。换句话说,他考虑的是,为什么我们会认为 "疼痛 "一词的使用就像我在第一章的故事中使用的 "抽痛 "一词。
The analogy between pain, on one hand, and the beetle in the box, on the other, is meant to reinforce the point of the private language argument. If you really could not, even in principle, get into someone else's box to see if there was a beetle, then whether there was a beetle in the box could not possibly matter to the language-game. Wittgenstein suggests at the end of this passage that we have been misled by the "grammar" of the sentence "I have a pain" into thinking that when John is in pain, there is a private object that he experiences, just as when Joanna has a beetle in a matchbox, there is a public object that she possesses. But Wittgenstein thinks that we should regard "I have a pain" as being like "I have a fever." It makes no more sense, he thinks, to say that there is some fever that I have than to say that there is some pain that I have. When I have a fever, there are not two things, me and the fever: there is just one thing, me, in a feverish state. So too when I have a pain, there are not two things involved - me and the pain-but only one thing-mewhich is in a certain state: the state of having-a-pain.
将疼痛与盒子里的甲虫进行类比,一方面是为了强化私人语言论证的观点。如果你真的不能,甚至原则上不能进入别人的盒子去看是否有甲虫,那么盒子里是否有甲虫对语言游戏来说就不可能有什么影响。维特根斯坦在这段话的末尾指出,我们被 "我很痛苦 "这个句子的 "语法 "所误导,以为当约翰感到痛苦时,他所体验到的是一个私人对象,就像当乔安娜在火柴盒里发现一只甲虫时,她所拥有的是一个公共对象一样。但维特根斯坦认为,我们应该把 "我感到疼痛 "看作是 "我发烧了"。他认为,说 "我发烧 "比说 "我疼痛 "更没有意义。当我发烧时,并不存在我和发烧这两个事物:只有一个事物,即处于发烧状态的我。同样,当我感到疼痛时,也不存在两个东西--我和疼痛,而只有一个东西--处于某种状态:疼痛的状态。
Having-a-pain is certainly not an essentially private state. If, for example, I stick a pin in you while you are awake and I see you wince, then, in the normal course of things, I know that you are in pain. (This was the basic idea behind Block's "simple-minded theory of pain" in 1.7.) If Wittgenstein is right, the problems generated by the privacy of pain are all dissolved. Indeed, if we could replace all the Cartesian talk of the allegedly private objects of experience by talk of the public (that is, in principle detectable) property of having-the-experience, the problem of other minds would disappear. Thus, even though Wittgenstein discusses the issue of privacy in terms of private language and not in terms simply of private objects of experience, his arguments, if successful, solve a central problem in the philosophy of mind.
疼痛当然不是一种本质上的私人状态。例如,如果我在你清醒的时候给你扎针,看到你抽搐,那么,在正常情况下,我就知道你在疼痛。(这就是布洛克在 1.7 中提出的 "头脑简单的疼痛理论 "的基本思想)。如果维特根斯坦是对的,那么由疼痛的隐私所产生的问题就都迎刃而解了。事实上,如果我们能用 "具有经验 "这一公共属性(即原则上可以被检测到)来取代笛卡尔关于所谓私人经验对象的所有论述,那么其他思维的问题也就不复存在了。因此,尽管维特根斯坦是从私人语言的角度而非简单地从私人经验对象的角度来讨论隐私问题的,但他的论证如果成功的话,就解决了心灵哲学中的一个核心问题。
Wittgenstein's talk of "grammar" here suggests he thinks that, in this case, clarity about how language works will allow us to avoid the philosophical error of thinking that there can be private states. So you might be led to conclude that Wittgenstein's interest in language was just the sort of interest in language as a tool that I said was not the main reason for philosophical concern with language in our own century. The reason why I think you should not draw this conclusion is that I believe Wittgenstein's concern for issues about
维特根斯坦在这里谈到 "语法",表明他认为,在这种情况下,弄清语言是如何运作的,将使我们避免认为可能存在私人状态的哲学错误。因此,你可能会得出这样的结论:维特根斯坦对语言的兴趣,正是我所说的那种把语言作为工具的兴趣,而这并不是我们这个世纪哲学关注语言的主要原因。我之所以认为你不应该得出这样的结论,是因为我相信维特根斯坦对有关语言的问题的关注,并不是因为他对语言的兴趣。

grammar is a consequence and not a cause of his skepticism about the usefulness of trying to explain human action, including human speech, by talking about private mental states. One reason for such skepticism becomes clear if we ask ourselves exactly what Hobbes would say if you asked him what was involved in understanding a sentence.
霍布斯对试图通过谈论私人心理状态来解释人类行为(包括人类言语)的有用性持怀疑态度,语法是其结果而非原因。如果我们扪心自问一下,如果你问霍布斯,理解一个句子涉及到什么,他会怎么说,那么这种怀疑态度的一个原因就很清楚了。
Hobbes' answer would be that to understand a sentence is to know "what thought the speaker had . . . before his mind." So, according to Hobbes, if I know what Joanna means by the word "table," I know that it "signifies" her idea of a table. There are at least two sorts of objection that one might make to this explanation. The first is that, far from helping us understand what Joanna means, it actually makes understanding Joanna impossible. After all, Hobbes thinks that I cannot know about Joanna's ideas since they are Joanna's private property. Yet if this explanation of meaning were right, I would have to know what Joanna's idea of a table was like in order to know what she meant by her word "table" - which, according to Hobbes, is impossible!
霍布斯的答案是,要理解一个句子,就必须知道 "说话者......脑海中有什么想法"。因此,按照霍布斯的说法,如果我知道乔安娜所说的 "桌子 "是什么意思,我就知道这个词 "表示 "她对桌子的想法。对于这种解释,至少有两种反对意见。第一种反对意见认为,这种解释非但不能帮助我们理解乔安娜的意思,反而会让我们无法理解乔安娜。毕竟,霍布斯认为我不可能知道乔安娜的想法,因为它们是乔安娜的私有财产。然而,如果这种对意义的解释是正确的,那么我就必须知道乔安娜对桌子的想法是什么样的,才能知道她所说的 "桌子 "是什么意思--按照霍布斯的说法,这是不可能的!
A second objection to Hobbes' theory is that it mistakes a fundamentally subjective question for an objective one. The question of what experiences go with Joanna's use of words is subjective. It depends on Joanna's particular psychology. But the question of what Joanna means is not, in this sense, subjective at all. What Joanna means by the word "table," if she understands English, is the same as what you or I mean by it; it is quite independent of her psychological peculiarities.
对霍布斯理论的第二个反对意见是,它把一个根本上主观的问题误认为是一个客观的问题。乔安娜在使用词语时会有哪些体验,这个问题是主观的。这取决于乔安娜的特殊心理。但从这个意义上说,乔安娜的意思根本不是主观的。如果乔安娜听得懂英语,那么她对 "桌子 "这个词的理解与你我的理解是一样的;这与她的心理特点完全无关。
This second objection was made by the German philosopher Gottlob Frege in a very well-known article called "On Sense and Reference." "Sense" and "reference" are the words that Frege used, as we shall see, to explain what is involved in understanding language. For the moment, let's just take "sense" to refer to meaning and "reference" to mean the thing that a name names. In this passage, he makes his point by considering what is involved in understanding what someone means when they use the name "Bucephalus," which was the name of Alexander the Great's horse. object that can be perceived by the senses, then my idea of it is an inner picture originating from memories of sensory impressions that I have had and from acts, both inner and outer, that I have carried out. This picture is often imbued with feelings; the clarity of its discrete parts is variable and fluctuating. Nor is the same idea always associated with the same sense, even in the same person. The idea is subjective: one person's idea is not the same as another's. As a result, there are multifarious differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a rider, and a zoologist will probably associate very differing ideas with the name "Bucephalus."
第二种反对意见是德国哲学家戈特洛布-弗雷格在一篇非常著名的文章《论意义与参照》中提出的。我们将会看到,弗雷格用 "意义 "和 "参照 "这两个词来解释理解语言所涉及的内容。我们暂且把 "感性 "理解为意义,把 "所指 "理解为名称所命名的事物。在这段话中,他通过考虑在理解某人使用 "Bucephalus"(亚历山大大帝的坐骑)这一名称时所涉及的含义来阐明自己的观点。"如果物体可以被感官所感知,那么我对它的概念就是一个内在的图景,它源于我对感官印象的记忆以及我所实施的内在和外在行为。这幅图景往往充满了感情;它的各个部分的清晰度是多变和波动的。即使在同一个人身上,同样的想法也不总是与同样的感觉联系在一起。观念是主观的:一个人的观念与另一个人的观念并不相同。因此,与同一感官相关联的观念存在着各种各样的差异。一个画家、一个骑手和一个动物学家可能会对 "Bucephalus "这个名字产生截然不同的想法。
One reasonable response to these two objections, both of which are arguments against the subjective character of the Hobbesian theory of meaning, is to try to explain what is going on in language not by saying how it relates to our inner subjective experiences but by saying how it relates to the outer objective world. And Frege was the pioneer of modern thought on this issue.
这两种反对意见都是反对霍布斯意义理论主观性的论据,对这两种反对意见的一个合理回应是,试图解释语言中发生的事情,不是说它如何与我们的内在主观经验相关,而是说它如何与外在客观世界相关。弗雷格是在这个问题上的现代思想先驱。

3.4 Frege's "sense" and "reference"
3.4 弗雷格的 "意义 "和 "参照"

Frege was a mathematician, and his interest in questions about how language works derived, originally, from a concern to give a precise account of how the signs used in mathematics worked. He thought that if we understood properly how mathematical language functioned, we should be able to avoid certain sorts of mathematical error. But he soon developed an independent interest in how languages function, and though he did a great deal of work on questions about how mathematical signs such as numerals (" 1 ," " 2 ," “ 3 ," and so on) operate, he also worked out a theory that covered proper names, like "Bucephalus," and various forms of words, such as "I doubt that," which are not used in mathematical proofs at all.
弗雷格是一位数学家,他对语言如何运作的问题感兴趣,最初源于对数学符号如何运作的精确解释。他认为,如果我们能正确理解数学语言的运作方式,就能避免某些数学错误。不过,他很快就对语言如何运作产生了独立的兴趣,尽管他做了大量关于数学符号(如数字 "1"、"2"、"3 "等)如何运作的工作,但他也提出了一套理论,涵盖了专有名词(如 "Bucephalus")和各种形式的词语(如 "我怀疑"),而这些词语在数学证明中根本用不上。
Frege's aim was to develop a theory of meaning, a philosophical account that would tell us what we had to know about the words and sentences of a language in order to understand the way people use them. His fundamental idea was that the meaning of a word is just what you have to know about it in order to understand how it is used in a language. Since the word "semantic" means "having to do with meaning," what Frege was doing is also called "philosophical semantics," and his theory is called a "semantic theory."
弗雷格的目标是发展一种意义理论,一种哲学解释,告诉我们为了理解人们使用语言的方式,我们必须了解语言中的词语和句子。他的基本观点是,一个词的意义就是你为了理解它在语言中的使用方式而必须了解的东西。由于 "语义 "一词的意思是 "与意义有关",弗雷格的工作也被称为 "哲学语义学",他的理论被称为 "语义学理论"。
One of Frege's most important insights was that previous theories
弗雷格最重要的见解之一是,以前的理论

of meaning had started in the wrong place. Hobbes, as we saw, started by trying to explain the meaning of individual words, such as names. Frege pointed out that, in a sense, words on their own do not mean anything at all. For the meaning of a word is what you have to know in order to understand proper uses of that word in the language; and just saying "dog" is not a proper use of a word in English. Only if I use the word "dog" with other words to form a sentence will I be saying something that you can understand. It is not that the word "dog" doesn't mean anything; it is simply that what it means depends on how it is used in sentences. This discovery of the primacy of the sentence is one of the basic insights of Frege's philosophy of language. You might put his discovery like this: to say what a word or phrase means, you have to say how it contributes to the meaning of complete sentences.
意义的起点是错误的。正如我们所看到的,霍布斯一开始就试图解释单个词的意义,比如名字。弗雷格指出,从某种意义上说,单词本身并没有任何意义。因为一个词的意义是你必须知道的,这样才能理解这个词在语言中的正确用法;而仅仅说 "狗 "在英语中并不是一个词的正确用法。只有当我把 "dog "这个单词和其他单词搭配在一起造句时,我说的话你们才能理解。并不是说 "dog "这个词没有任何意义,只是它的意义取决于它在句子中的用法。这一句子至上的发现是弗雷格语言哲学的基本见解之一。你可以这样理解他的发现:要想知道一个词或短语的意思,你就必须知道它是如何为完整句子的意思做出贡献的。
With this basic idea established, Frege sets out to discuss how we understand names like "Bucephalus." He says that we must think of them as referring to some object. Given the primacy of the sentence, we must now ask what this means in terms of how words contribute to sentence meaning. A simple, preliminary answer is that a word " " refers to an object, , if and only if " " is used in sentences to determine what those sentences are about. Thus, because the word "Bucephalus" refers to a certain horse, the sentence "Alexander rode Bucephalus" is about that horse. As we shall see, Frege had a better, more precise answer than this preliminary answer; but before I give it, we shall need some more of Frege's terminology.
有了这个基本思想,弗雷格开始讨论我们如何理解 "Bucephalus "这样的名字。他说,我们必须把它们看作是对某个对象的指称。鉴于句子的首要地位,我们现在必须要问,就词语如何促成句子意义而言,这意味着什么。一个简单而初步的答案是,当且仅当 " "被用于句子以确定句子的内容时," "这个词才指代一个对象,即 。因此,因为 "Bucephalus "指的是某匹马,所以 "Alexander rode Bucephalus "这个句子指的就是那匹马。我们将会看到,弗雷格有一个比这个初步答案更好、更精确的答案;但在我给出这个答案之前,我们还需要弗雷格的一些术语。
Once Frege has introduced the idea of reference, he points out immediately that we cannot say that the thing that a name refers to-its reference-is all you need to know in order to understand how that name functions in our language. For if it were all that you had to know, then the meaning of two words with the same reference would be identical; and he gives a famous example that shows that this is not so. Here is the example.
弗雷格一旦引入所指的概念,就立即指出,我们不能说一个名称所指的东西--它的所指--就是理解该名称在我们的语言中如何发挥作用所需的全部知识。他举了一个著名的例子来说明事实并非如此。下面就是这个例子。
The planet Venus is often observable near the horizon both at sunset and at sunrise. In antiquity, people called Venus "the Evening Star" when they saw it at sunset and "the Morning Star" when they saw it at dawn, without realizing that they were talking about the very same heavenly body. (As you can see from the names,
在日落和日出时,人们经常可以在地平线附近观测到金星。在古代,人们把日落时看到的金星称为 "黄昏之星",把黎明时看到的金星称为 "晨星",却不知道他们说的是同一个天体。(从名称中可以看出、

they didn't know it was not a star but a planet either.) In the course of the history of astronomy, it was discovered that the heavenly body people saw at sunset and the one they saw at sunrise were the same. This discovery could be reported by saying
他们也不知道那不是一颗恒星,而是一颗行星)。在天文学发展史上,人们发现日落时看到的天体和日出时看到的天体是一样的。这一发现的报告可以说是
F: The Morning Star is the Evening Star.
F:晨星就是晚星。
Now suppose we held that the meaning of "the Morning Star" was just its reference, and likewise for "the Evening Star." Then it would follow that, since these two names refer to the same thing, they must have the same meaning. If that were true, then the sentence, F, could not possibly be informative. For if the two words meant the same, then all you would have to know in order to know that was true was what the two words meant. But the discovery that was true is not something that people knew simply because they knew what the words meant; it was an astronomical discovery.
现在,假设我们认为 "晨星 "和 "黄昏之星 "的含义仅仅是指晨星和黄昏之星。那么,既然这两个名称指代的是同一事物,那么它们的含义就一定是相同的。如果这是真的,那么句子 F 就不可能有任何信息。因为如果这两个词的意思相同,那么要知道