Conditions of Knowledge
An Introduction to Epistemology and Education 知识的条件 认识论与教育导论
Israel Scheffiler 以色列-谢菲勒
“This book is more striking as an example of good teaching than as merely an achievement in literary excellence . . . the reader feels that he is caught up in the exciting pursuit of new knowl-edge even when the author is merely recounting well-beaten paths of predecessors.” -Rena Foy, Teachers College Record The development and transmission of knowledge are fundamental tasks of eduçation, while analysis of itš nature and warrant falls to that branch of philosophy known as epistemology, or theory of knowledge. An adequate educational philosophy must not only address itself to epistemological problems in their general form but must also strive to view these problems frem the perspective of educational tasks and purposes. It is this aim which défines the direction and emphasis of Conditions of Knqwledge. "本书作为优秀教学的典范，比单纯的文学成就更引人注目......即使作者只是在叙述前人走过的康庄大道，读者也会感到自己被卷入了对新知识的激动人心的追求之中。-知识的发展和传承是教育的基本任务，而对其性质和正当性的分析则属于哲学的一个分支，即认识论或知识论。适当的教育哲学不仅要解决一般形式的认识论问题，还必须努力从教育任务和目的的角度来看待这些问题。正是这一目标确定了《知识条件》的方向和重点。
Israel Scheffler’s conyicfiòn that epistemologictal analysis is an important ingredient of educational philosophy lead’s him to investigate selected issues against a background of educational interests and problems. The author discusses three conditions of propositional knowledge-truth, evidence, and belief. He also relates knowledge to teaching and to skill, concluding with comments about rationality as a central goal of education. 以色列-谢弗勒（Israel Scheffler）认为，认识论分析是教育哲学的重要组成部分，这促使他以教育利益和问题为背景，对选定的问题进行研究。作者讨论了命题知识的三个条件--真理、证据和信念。他还将知识与教学和技能联系起来，最后评论了作为教育核心目标的理性。
His book contains an excellent discussion of epistemological problems relating to knowledge, belief, and evidence. He makes a number of contributions to current debates; he offers careful critiques of contemporary philosophers; and, in general, writes as if he had in mind his fellow philosophers, who, by the way, can hardly afford to overlook this bopk."-J. W. Yolton, Harvard Educational Review 他在书中对有关知识、信仰和证据的认识论问题进行了精彩的讨论。他对当前的争论做出了许多贡献；他对当代哲学家进行了细致的批评；总之，他在写作时考虑到了他的哲学家同行，顺便说一句，他们很难忽视这本书。W. Yolton，《哈佛教育评论》。
Israel Scheffiler is the Victor S. Thomas Professor of Education and Philosophy at Harvard University. His numerous publications include The Language of Education; The Anatomy of Inquiry: Philosophical Studies in the Theory of Science; Science 'and Subjectivity; Reason and Teaching; and Four Pragmatists. Israel Scheffiler 是哈佛大学维克多-托马斯教育学和哲学教授。他的著作包括《教育的语言》、《探究的解剖学》、《科学理论的哲学研究》、《科学与主体性》、《理性与教学》以及《四个教育家》：科学理论的哲学研究》、《科学'与主观性》、《理性与教学》和《四位实用主义者》。
Paper ISBN: 0-226-73668-7 纸质 ISBN：0-226-73668-7
A Phoenix Book published by the University of Chicago "PFess 芝加哥大学出版的《凤凰》一书 "PFess
CONDITIONS OF
KNOWLEDGE 知识条件
AN INTRODUCTION TO EPISTEMOLOGY AND EDUCATION 认识论与教育导论
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO AND LONDON 芝加哥大学出版社 芝加哥和伦敦分社
The author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of the following publishers for permission to reprint material in this book: 作者感谢以下出版商的合作，允许作者在本书中重印资料：
American Philosophical Association: for excerpt from “Rational Action” by Carl G. Hempel. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XXXV. 《美国哲学协会：Carl G. Hempel 的 "理性行动 "节选。美国哲学协会论文集和演讲》，XXXV.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.: for excerpts from The Concept of Mind by Gilbert Ryle. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.：摘自吉尔伯特-赖尔（Gilbert Ryle）的《心灵的概念》。
The Clarendon Press, Oxford: for excerpts from Philosophical Papers by J. L. Austin. Reprinted by permission of The Clarendon Press, Oxford. 牛津克拉伦登出版社：摘自 J. L. 奥斯汀的《哲学论文集》。经牛津克拉伦登出版社许可转载。
David McKay Co., Inc., formerly Longmans, Green and Co.: for excerpts from Pragmatism by William James. Permission to reprint granted by Paul R. Reynolds. David McKay Co., Inc., formerly Longmans, Green and Co.：摘自威廉-詹姆斯的《实用主义》。Paul R. Reynolds 授权转载。
Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.: for British rights for excerpts from The Concept of Mind by Gilbert Ryle. Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.：关于吉尔伯特-赖尔（Gilbert Ryle）所著《心灵的概念》（The Concept of Mind）节选的英国版权。
In memory of my father Leon Scheffler 1885-1964 纪念我的父亲莱昂-谢弗勒（1885-1964 年
TABLE OF CONTENTS 目录
PREFACE. 前言
INTRODUCTION 引言
F EPISTEMOLOGY AND EDUCATION 认识论与教育
Purpose of the Book 本书的目的
Three Philosophies of Knowledge 三种知识哲学
Alternative Questions Concerning Knowledge 关于知识的另类问题
CHAPTER ONE 第一章
KNOWLEDGE AND TEACHING 知识与教学
Cognitive and Educational Terms Related 认知与教育相关术语
Ranges of Cognitive and Educational Terms 认知和教育术语范围
Illustrative Definition of Propositional Knowledge 命题知识的说明性定义
CHAPTER TWO 第二章
KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH 知识与真理
The Truth Condition of Propositional Knowledge 命题知识的真理条件
Knowing As an Achievement 认识是一种成就
Avoiding the Belief in Certainty 避免相信确定性
The Attack on Infallible Method 对无懈可击方法的攻击
Fallibilism and Absolute Truth 费边主义与绝对真理
The Absoluteness of Truth 真理的绝对性
CHAPTER THREE 第三章
KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE 知识和证据
Motivation for the Evidence Condition 证据条件的动机
Appraising Evidential Adequacy 评估证据的充分性
Limits of Evidence and the Right To Be Sure 证据的限制与确定的权利
Subjective Certainty and the Timid Student 主观确定性与胆小的学生
The Possession of Adequate Evidence 掌握充分的证据
CHAPTER FOUR 第四章
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF 知识和信念
The Problem of Interpreting Belief 解读信仰的问题
The Verbal Theory of Belief and Its Difficulties 信仰的言语理论及其困难
Difficulties in the General Dispositional Account 一般处理账户的困难
The Theoretical Character of Belief Attributions 信念归因的理论特征
CHAPTER FIVE 第五章
KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL 知识技能
Propositional Knowledge and Norm Statements 命题知识和规范声明
Knowing How and Being Able 知道如何做和有能力做
Competence, Proficiency, and Mastery 能力、熟练和精通
Critical Skill and the Ambiguity of “Practice” 关键技能与 "实践 "的模糊性
EPILOGUE. 尾声。
INTELLECT AND RATIONALITY 智力和理性
FOOTNOTES 注释
INDEX 索引
the study of she method a grounds of knowledye its limits and validty 研究她的方法--知识的基础--其局限性和有效性
Conditions of Knowledge is intended as an introduction to epistemology, from the perspective of education. I have tried to present some of the major issues in the theory of knowledge, as developed particularly in recent philosophy, and to deal analytically with these issues in the context of educational interests. 《知识的条件》旨在从教育的角度介绍认识论。我试图介绍知识理论中的一些主要问题，特别是在近代哲学中的发展，并结合教育利益对这些问题进行分析。
My approach has not been purely expository. I have selected topics that have seemed to me both interesting and important, and have expressed my own judgments in the course of my treatment. My hope has been to engage the reader himself in the process of philosophical reflection on the nature and conditions of knowledge, to encourage him to develop his own solutions to the problems and his own evaluation of their educational bearings. 我的方法并非纯粹的论述。我选择了在我看来既有趣又重要的主题，并在论述过程中表达了自己的判断。我希望读者自己也能参与到对知识的本质和条件的哲学思考过程中来，鼓励他对这些问题提出自己的解决方案，并对其教育意义做出自己的评价。
I wish here to express my thanks to Mrs. Dorothy Spotts for her typing, to Peter F. Carbone, Jr. for comments and help with bibliography and footnotes, and to David Halfen, Mrs. Betty Leake, and Miss Judy Gregg for editorial suggestions. I am grateful for support from the William F. Milton Fund, which facilitated the preparation of the manuscript. 在此，我要感谢多萝西-斯波茨女士（Mrs. Dorothy Spotts）的打字工作，感谢小彼得-卡本（Peter F. Carbone, Jr.）在书目和脚注方面提供的意见和帮助，感谢戴维-哈芬（David Halfen）、贝蒂-莱克（Betty Leake）女士和朱迪-格雷格（Judy Gregg）小姐提出的编辑建议。我感谢威廉-米尔顿基金（William F. Milton Fund）的资助，该基金为手稿的编写提供了便利。
Israel Scheffler 以色列 谢弗勒
Epistemology and Education 认识论与教育
PURPOSE OF THE BOOK 本书的目的
The development and transmission of knowledge are fundamental tasks of education, while analysis of its nature and warrant falls to that branch of philosophy known as epistemology, or theory of knowledge. An adequate educational philosophy must not only address itself to epistemological problems in their general form but must also strive to view these problems from the perspective of educational tasks and purposes. 知识的发展和传承是教育的基本任务，而对知识的性质和正当性的分析则属于被称为认识论或知识论的哲学分支。适当的教育哲学不仅要解决一般形式的认识论问题，还必须努力从教育任务和目的的角度来看待这些问题。
It is this aim which defines the direction and emphasis of the present book. In the conviction that epistemological analysis is itself an important ingredient of educational philosophy, we shall Investigate selected issues in the general theory of knowledge, especially as they arise in recent and contemporary discussions. 2 Moreover, we shall examine these issues throughout against a fixed background of educational interests, exploring whatever bearings they may appear to have on the analysis of specifically educational concepts and considerations. The book may thus be taken to be at once an introduction to the theory of knowledge and an introduction to educational philosophy. Perhaps it is best thought of as an introduction to epistemology in educational perspective. 正是这一目标确定了本书的方向和重点。我们深信，认识论分析本身就是教育哲学的一个重要组成部分，因此，我们将对知识的一般理论中的某些问题进行研究，特别是在最近和当代的讨论中出现的问题。2 此外，我们还将以教育利益为固定背景来研究这些问题，探讨它们对具体教育概念和考虑因素的分析可能产生的影响。因此，本书既可以被视为知识理论入门，也可以被视为教育哲学入门。或许，最好将其视为从教育角度对认识论的介绍。
THREE PHILOSOPHIES OF KNOWLEDGE 三种知识哲学
It will be well to survey, at the very outset, some of the complexities of our subject. For if the task of epistemology can be simply put as the logical analysis of knowledge, knowledge is itself far from simple. First of all, the range of the everyday concept of knowing 我们最好从一开始就对我们课题的一些复杂性进行研究。如果说认识论的任务可以简单地归结为对知识的逻辑分析，那么知识本身却远非如此简单。首先，"认识 "这一日常概念的范围
is very wide, including familiarity with things, places, persons, and subjects, competence in a variety of learned performances, and possession of ostensible truths on matters of fact as well as faith, the fallible items of science and everyday experience as well as the alleged certainties of mathematics and metaphysics. 它的范围非常广泛，包括对事物、地点、人物和主题的熟悉程度，对各种学问表演的能力，以及对事实和信仰、科学和日常经验的易错之处以及数学和形而上学的所谓确定性的表面真理的掌握。
Secondly, the concept of knowing is related in important ways to other fundamental and difficult ideas. It is, for example, closely associated with notions of understanding and controlling nature so as to sustain and enhance civilized life; it is also associated with ideas of contemplation, absorption, and appreciation, prized for themselvesends rather than means of civilized life. In educational contexts, the term knowledge is frequently intended as embracing both sets of ideas: the accumulated skill and lore pertaining to technological control of the environment, and those intellectual arts and experiences whose value is intrinsic to themselves. Knowledge, in such contexts, marks the whole content of our intellectual heritage, which education is concerned to pass on to succeeding generations. 其次，"认识 "这一概念与其他基本的、难以理解的观念有着重要的联系。例如，它与理解和控制自然以维持和提高文明生活的观念密切相关；它还与沉思、吸收和欣赏的观念相关，这些观念因其本身而非文明生活的手段而备受推崇。在教育语境中，知识一词通常包含这两种思想：与环境技术控制相关的技能和知识的积累，以及那些本身具有内在价值的知识艺术和经验。在这种情况下，知识标志着我们的知识遗产的全部内容，而教育就是要把这些知识遗产传给后代。
Finally, attributions of knowledge are not, in typical cases, simply descriptive of bodies of lore or types of experience; they express our standards, ideals, and tastes as to the scope and proper conduct of the cognitive arts. They reflect, for example, our conceptions of truth and evidence, our estimates of the possibilities of secure belief, our preferences among alternative strategies of investigation. To describe someone as knowing is as much to appraise and approve as it is to report. Correspondingly, education is concerned to transmit not only what we know, but our manner of knowing, that is, our approved standards of competence in performance, in inquiry, and in intellectual criticism. 最后，在通常情况下，知识的归属并不只是对知识体系或经验类型的描述；它们表达了我们对认知艺术的范围和适当行为的标准、理想和品味。例如，它们反映了我们对真理和证据的概念、我们对可靠信仰可能性的估计、我们对其他调查策略的偏好。描述一个人的知识，既是评价和认可，也是报告。相应地，教育不仅要传递我们的知识，还要传递我们的认知方式，即我们在表现、探究和知识批判方面的能力标准。
It is hardly surprising, then, that the concept of knowledge should have given rise to a variety of traditions of full-blown philosophical interpretation. For not only does the mere breadth of the concept lend itself to alternative emphases, but its intimate association with variable - ideals of civilization and with changing technologies and scientific models invites correspondingly varying evaluations. We shall sketch, - by way of illustration, three broad philosophical approaches to knowledge, the rationalistic, the empiricistic, and the pragmatic. ^(1){ }^{1} 因此，知识的概念产生了各种全面的哲学解释传统也就不足为奇了。因为，不仅是这个概念的广泛性使其本身可以有不同的侧重点，而且它与不同的文明理想以及不断变化的技术和科学模式之间的密切联系也导致了相应的不同评价。作为说明，我们将勾勒出三种广义的知识哲学方法，即理性主义、经验主义和实用主义。 ^(1){ }^{1}
For the rationalistic tradition, mathematics is the model science. Mathematical truths are general and necessary, and may be established by deductive chains linking them with self-evident basic truths. Demonstration forges the chains, intuition discloses the basic truths. Intuition, moreover, guarantees each link in the chain of demonstration. Whoever understands a mathematical truth knows it to be necessary and not contingent on facts of nature. A diagram may well be used to illustrate a geometrical theorem, but it cannot be construed as evidence for the theorem. Should precise measurement of the diagram 对于理性主义传统来说，数学是模范科学。数学真理具有普遍性和必然性，可以通过将它们与不言而喻的基本真理联系起来的演绎链来确立。证明铸就链条，直觉揭示基本真理。此外，直觉保证了证明链中的每个环节。谁理解了数学真理，谁就知道它是必然的，而不是取决于自然界的事实。一幅图可以用来说明一个几何定理，但它不能被理解为定理的证据。图表的精确测量
show that it failed to embody the relations asserted by the theorem, the latter would not be falsified. We should rather say that the physical diagram was only an approximation or a suggestion of the truth embodied in the theorem. Physical points have spread and physical lines have width, but mathematical points and lines are ideal, not physical objects-they can be understood, but not exemplified in the natural world. Natural objects only approximate, to a greater or lesser degree, the ideal objects of mathematics, and to the extent that they do approximate these ideal objects, they also can be understood. [Statements, however, which directly describe natural objects are only more-or-less in character; they are contingent rather than necessary, dependent on the evidence of observed particulars for their substantiation, and subject to falsification through experience. ]] 如果说物理图示未能体现定理所断言的关系，那么定理就不会被证伪。我们更应该说，物理图只是定理所体现的真理的一种近似或暗示。物理上的点有展开，物理上的线有宽度，但数学上的点和线是理想的，而不是物理对象--它们可以被理解，但不能在自然世界中得到体现。自然物只是在或多或少的程度上近似于数学的理想物，只要它们确实近似于这些理想物，它们也是可以被理解的。[然而，直接描述自然对象的陈述只是或多或少地具有这种性质；它们是偶然的，而不是必然的，依赖于所观察到的具体事物的证据来证实它们，并且会被经验所证伪。 ]]
Mathematical truths are not dependent on experience, though an awareness of them may be suggested by experience. Mathematicians do not need laboratories or experiments; they conduct no surveys and collect no statistics. They work with pencil and paper only, and yet they arrive at the firmest of all truths, incapable of being overthrown by experience. In Plato’s dialogue, Meno, an untutored slave boy is led, through a skillful series of questions centered around a diagram, to an acknowledgment of the geometrical truth that a double square is the square of the diagonal. ^(2){ }^{2} Plato, drawing upon such examples, supposes the source of genuine knowledge to be within, and the knowledge itself to be capable of elicitation by questioning and suggestion which merely draw the mind’s attention to that which it already possesses. The ideal education, for Plato, is a mathematical education, in which the mind comes to an apprehension of necessary truths concerning ideal forms, and which equips the student to grasp the natural world as an approximate embodiment of these forms. 数学真理并不依赖于经验，尽管经验可能暗示着对数学真理的认识。数学家不需要实验室或实验；他们不进行调查，也不收集统计数据。他们只用纸笔工作，却能得出最坚实的真理，无法被经验推翻。在柏拉图的对话《美诺》中，一个不谙世事的奴隶男孩通过围绕一幅图巧妙地提出一系列问题，最终承认了 "双正方形是对角线的平方 "这一几何真理。 ^(2){ }^{2} 柏拉图借鉴这些例子，假定真正知识的源泉就在内部，而知识本身能够通过提问和暗示激发出来，这些提问和暗示只是把人们的注意力吸引到它已经拥有的知识上。在柏拉图看来，理想的教育是一种数学教育，在这种教育中，心灵能够理解关于理想形式的必要真理，并使学生能够把握作为这些形式近似体现的自然世界。
In the empiricistic tradition, natural science is taken as the basio model. Natural phenomena are revealed by experience; they are not disclosed by intuition, nor are their interrelationships derivable from self-evident axioms. A person deprived of visual experience from birth * may be fully rational and in possession of his logical faculties, but he will be unable to intuit or even imagine the color green. Neither this color nor any other elementary phenomenal component is initially present in the mind, to be drawn up by introspection; it must be gained by observation in the course of experience. Furthermore, the relationships among elementary phenomena-their typical clustering and their patterning through time-cannot be inferred by logic from selfevident basic truths; they are natural associations tentatively projected as generalizations from our limited past experience. The mind, in Locke’s phrase, is a tabula rasa (a blank slate) at birth, and it is dependent upon experience both for the content of its elementary ideas and for their interrelationships. 在经验主义传统中，自然科学被视为基础模式。自然现象是通过经验揭示出来的，而不是通过直觉揭示出来的，它们之间的相互关系也不是可以通过不证自明的公理推导出来的。一个从出生*起就被剥夺了视觉经验的人可能是完全理性的，拥有逻辑能力，但他无法直觉或甚至想象出绿色。无论是这种颜色还是任何其他基本现象成分，最初都不存在于头脑中，无法通过内省得出；它必须在经验过程中通过观察获得。此外，基本现象之间的关系--它们的典型聚类和它们在时间中的模式化--无法通过逻辑从不言而喻的基本真理中推断出来；它们是从我们有限的过去经验中初步概括出来的自然联想。用洛克的话说，心灵一出生就是一张白纸，它的基本观念的内容及其相互关系都依赖于经验。
The mind must, of course, be construed as having the power to compare, combine, analyze, and generalize upon the materials furnished to it by experience, as well as the ability to perform logical operations upon its concepts./ Mathematics may be understood to represent either “internal” logical relationships among concepts, or very abstract, though still empirical, generalizations based upon experience. In any event, all knowledge which reaches beyond the circle of the mind’s own concepts and refers to the world must be based upon observation of what lies beyond, of what is not innate in the mind itself. The ideal education suggested by the empiricist view is one which supplies abundant and optimally ordered phenomenal experiences to the student so that his powers of observation and association may take hold and enable him to grasp the natural order among events. The ideal education, further, trains the student not only in proper logical habits but in traits requisite for learning from experience-accurate observation, reasonable generalization, willingness to revise or relinquish purported laws which fail to anticipate the actual course of events. 当然，思维必须被理解为具有对经验所提供的材料进行比较、组合、分析和概括的能 力，以及对其概念进行逻辑运算的能力。数学可以被理解为代表概念之间的 "内部 "逻辑关 系，也可以被理解为代表基于经验的非常抽象但仍然是经验性的概括。无论如何，所有超越思维自身概念圈并指向世界的知识，都必须建立在对超越概念圈的事物、对思维本身并非与生俱来的事物的观察基础之上。经验主义观点所提出的理想教育，是为学生提供丰富而有序的现象经验，使他的观察力和联想力得以形成，并使他能够掌握事件之间的自然秩序。此外，理想的教育不仅训练学生养成正确的逻辑习惯，而且训练他们从经验中学习的必备品格--准确的观察、合理的概括、愿意修正或放弃未能预见事件实际进程的所谓规律。
The pragmatic view stresses the experimental character of empirical science, putting great emphasis upon the active phases of experimentation. To learn something significant about the world, we must do more than operate logically upon basic truths that appear to us self-evident, and we must go beyond reasonable generalization of observed phenomenal patterns in our past experience. Experimentation involves active transformation of the environment, in a manner dictated by leading ideas put forward in response to problems and directed toward the resolution of these problems. The problem provides the occasion and enduring focus of experimental inquiry; it supplies the initial questions, furnishes controlling standards of relevance, and defines success in the undertaking. Thought provides hypothetical ideas in response to the problem, ideas which need not mirror past experience so long as they are directed to the questions at stake and are capable of providing relevant answers. These hypothetical ideas are tested in action; using them as instruments for controlled operations upon nature, the experimenter finds that not all of them are equally effective. Some raise expectations that are not fulfilled by experimental outcomes, others accurately foretell the responses of nature. In Dewey’s words, the process is one of trying and undergoing-trying an idea in practice, and learning from the consequences undergone as a result of such trial. ^(3){ }^{3} 实用主义观点强调实证科学的实验性质，非常重视实验的积极阶段。要想对世界有所了解，我们必须做的不仅仅是在我们看来不言而喻的基本真理上进行逻辑操作，我们还必须超越对过去经验中观察到的现象模式的合理概括。实验涉及对环境的积极改造，其方式由针对问题提出的主导思想所决定，并以解决这些问题为目标。问题为实验探究提供了契机和持久的焦点；它提出了最初的问题，提供了相关的控制标准，并界定了实验的成功与否。思维针对问题提供假设性的想法，这些想法不一定要照搬过去的经验，只要它们是针对相关问题的，并能提供相关的答案。这些假设的想法在行动中得到检验；实验者把它们作为对自然进行有控制操作的工具，发现并非所有想法都同样有效。有的实验结果没有达到人们的期望，有的则准确地预示了大自然的反应。用杜威的话说，这个过程是一个尝试和经历的过程--在实践中尝试一种想法，并从这种尝试的结果中学习。 ^(3){ }^{3}
Mathematical knowledge is continuous with logic in the pragmatist’s scheme. It is an apparatus useful for elaborating the import of hypothetical ideas, for showing their connections with practical consequences and exhibiting their mutual relationships. It does not itself tell us anything directly about the world, but in bringing order to our 在实用主义者的计划中，数学知识与逻辑学是相辅相成的。它是一种有用的工具，可以阐述假设思想的内涵，显示它们与实际后果的联系，并展示它们之间的相互关系。它本身并不直接告诉我们关于世界的任何事情，但在使我们的生活有序化的过程中
array of concepts and in generating their consequence regulative instrument of inquiry. Inquiry itself is acta regulated by logic, sparked by theory, and issuing in answers to … vating problems of practice. 在研究过程中，我们需要对一系列概念进行分析，并产生相应的规范性研究工具。探究本身是由逻辑调节的行为，由理论引发，并在回答不断变化的实践问题时产生。
The process of learning from experience is thus an active process for the pragmatist. The mind is conceived neither as a deep well of necessary truths nor as a blank slate upon which experience writes. Rather, it is viewed as a capacity for active generation of ideas whose function it is to resolve the problems posed to an organism by its environment. The ideal education is thus one that connects general ideas with real problems and that stresses their practical bearings. It encourages imaginative theorizing by the student but at the same time insists upon control of súch theorizing by the outcomes’ of active experimentation. 因此，对于实用主义者来说，从经验中学习的过程是一个积极的过程。思想既不是必然真理的深井，也不是经验书写的白板。相反，它被视为一种积极生成思想的能力，其功能是解决环境给有机体带来的问题。因此，理想的教育是将一般观念与现实问题联系起来，并强调它们的实用性。它鼓励学生进行富有想象力的理论分析，但同时坚持用积极实验的结果来控制理论分析。
CONCENIN KNOWLEDGE 知识
The three approaches just sketched exemplify certain of the contrasting emphases among broad philosophical interpretations of knowledge. They also serve to illustrate the variety of questions to which schools of interpretation have been addressed. Thus, each approach we have presented treats not only of the nature and warrant of knowledge, but also of its genesis and its proper development. It will be worthwhile to distinguish schematically several questions pertaining to knowledge, so that the main focus of our ensuing discussions may be clearly indicated. 刚刚概述的三种方法体现了广义的知识哲学解释中某些截然不同的侧重点。它们也说明了各种解释流派所涉及的各种问题。因此，我们介绍的每一种方法不仅涉及知识的本质和正当性，而且还涉及知识的起源及其适当的发展。我们有必要以图示的方式区分与知识有关的几个问题，以便清楚地指出我们接下来讨论的重点。
First, we may consider the epistemological question: “What is knowledge?” To seek to answer this question is to strive for a general description or definition, a statement of criteria of knowledge which may serve to clarify its logical status. Secondly, there is the evaluative question: “What knowledge is most reliable or important?” To address oneself to this question is to ask for a classification of sorts of knowing and a ranking of these sorts by reference to some reasonable standard of worth. Thirdly, we may note the genetic question: “How does knowledge arise?” To answer this question is to give an account of the processes or mechanisms by which knowledge develops; it is, typically, to provide some model of the mind that may render learning processes intelligible. Fourthly, there is the methodological question: “How ought the search for knowledge to be conducted?” To answer this question is to offer some conception of proper methods to be employed in inquiry, together with a justification of these methods. Fifthly, we may consider the pedagogical question: “How is knowledge best taught?” To answer this question is to say how teaching ought ideally to proceed in the transmission of knowledge. 首先，我们可以考虑认识论问题："什么是知识？要回答这个问题，就必须努力寻求一种一般性的描述或定义，一种关于知识标准的陈述，以澄清知识的逻辑地位。其次是评价性问题："什么知识最可靠或最重要？回答这个问题就是要求对各种知识进行分类，并根据某种合理的价值标准对这些知识进行排序。第三，我们可以注意到基因问题："知识是如何产生的？回答这个问题，就是要说明知识发展的过程或机制；一般来说，就是要提供某种心智模型，使学习过程变得可以理解。第四，方法论问题："应该如何探索知识？要回答这个问题，就必须对探究中应采用的适当方法提出一些概念，并对这些方法进行论证。第五，我们可以考虑教学问题："如何最好地传授知识？回答这个问题，就是要说明在传授知识的过程中，理想的教学应该如何进行。
These questions have often been insufficiently distinguished from one another. It is, however, important to see that they are logically distinct, even though they are intimately related within broad philosophical interpretations and are all indeed essential for any comprehensive philosophy of education. We shall focus specifically on the epistemological question and shall not directly address ourselves to evaluative, genetic, methodological, or pedagogical issues. We shall, however, also attempt to relate the epistemological question, wherever this seems possible, to analyses of educational concepts and situations. In the next chapter, we shall introduce some general comparisons of cognitive and educational terms and discuss the ranges of these terms; we shall then present a definition of propositional knowledge which will serve as a basis for our discussion in later chapters. 这些问题往往没有得到充分的区分。然而，重要的是要看到它们在逻辑上是不同的，尽管它们在广义的哲学解释中是密切相关的，而且对于任何全面的教育哲学来说都是必不可少的。我们将特别关注认识论问题，而不会直接讨论评价、遗传、方法或教学问题。不过，只要有可能，我们也将尝试把认识论问题与对教育概念和情况的分析联系起来。在下一章中，我们将介绍认知术语和教育术语的一些一般性比较，并讨论这些术语的范围；然后，我们将提出命题知识的定义，作为我们后面几章讨论的基础。
Knowledge and Teaching . 知识与教学 .
COGNITIVE AND EDUCATIONAL TERMS RELATED 相关的认知和教育术语
How are the cognitive terms knowing and believing related to the educational terms learning and teaching? The question is not as simple as it may seem, and our consideration of it in this section will introduce several points of relevance throughout our discussions. 认知术语 "知 "和 "信 "与教育术语 "学 "和 "教 "有什么关系？这个问题并不像看起来那么简单，我们在本节中对它的思考将为我们整个讨论引入几个相关要点。
We might, as a result of attending to certain simple cases, suppose learning that to imply knowing that. If a student, for example, has learned that Boston is the capital of Massachusetts, we should normally say he has come to know that Boston is the capital of Massachusetts. Yet we cannot generalize from such cases that whenever a person XX has learned that QQ he has come to know that QQ. 我们可以根据某些简单的情况，认为 "学会 "意味着 "知道"。例如，如果一个学生学会了波士顿是马萨诸塞州首府，我们通常应该说他已经知道波士顿是马萨诸塞州首府。然而，我们不能从这种情况中归纳出，只要一个人 XX 已经知道了 QQ ，他就已经知道了 QQ 。
Consider a student in some distant age or culture in which disease has been attributed to the action of evil spirits. Such a student may well have learned from his tutors that disease is caused by evil spirits, but we should not be willing to describe him as having come to know that disease is caused by evil spirits. He may, to be sure, have been perfectly willing to say “I know that evil spirits cause disease,” but nonetheless we will not wish to describe him as having come to know that evil spirits cause disease, for we should then ourselves be admitting that evil spirits do cause disease. For us to say that some person knows that such and such is the case is, in general, for us to commit ourselves to the embedded substantive assertion that such and such is the case. Where such a commitment is repug-distasfol nant to us, we will accordingly avoid attributing knowledge, though we may still attribute belief. In the present case, we will deny that the student in question has come to know that evil spirits cause disease, but we may safely describe him as having come to believe 试想一下，在某个遥远的时代或文化中，疾病是由邪灵造成的。这样的学生可能已经从老师那里知道疾病是由邪灵引起的，但我们不应该说他已经知道疾病是由邪灵引起的。当然，他可能完全愿意说 "我知道邪灵会导致疾病"，但我们还是不愿意把他说成是 知道邪灵会导致疾病，因为我们自己也承认邪灵确实会导致疾病。一般来说，如果我们说某个人知道这样那样的情况，我们就会对这样那样的情况这一内 含的实质性断言作出承诺。如果这种承诺对我们来说是令人反感的，我们就会相应地避免归因于知识，尽管我们仍然可以归因于信念。在本例中，我们否认该学生已经知道邪灵会导致疾病，但我们可以说他已经相信
that evil spirits cause disease, for our belief attribution does not commit us to the substantive assertion in question. In our earlier example, by contrast, since we were perfectly willing to agree that Boston is the capital of Massachusetts, the stronger attribution of knowledge to the student did not commit us to an embedded substantive claim we found repugnant. 邪灵会导致疾病，因为我们的信念归因并没有使我们对有关的实质性断言作出承诺。相比之下，在我们前面的例子中，由于我们完全同意波士顿是马萨诸塞州首府的说法，对学生知识的更强归因并没有使我们对我们认为令人厌恶的内含实质性主张产生依赖。
We are thus led to contrast learning that and knowing that in the following way: To say that someone has come to know that QQ commits us generally to the substantive assertion represented by " QQ." For example, if we say of a pupil that he has come to know that Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, we are ourselves committed to the substantive assertion, “Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown.” To say that someone has learned that QQ does not so commit us; we are, in general, limited only to the claim that he has come to believe that 因此，我们将 "学会 "与 "知道 "作如下对比：如果说某人已经知道 QQ ，我们一般就会同意" QQ "所代表的实质性断言。例如，如果我们说一个学生已经知道康沃利斯在约克镇投降了，那么我们自己就承诺了 "康沃利斯在约克镇投降 "这一实质性断言。如果说某人已经知道了 QQ ，我们并没有这样做；一般来说，我们只限于声称他已经相信：" QQ "。
There are, to be sure, certain uses of learning that which do, in fact, commit us substantively in the manner we have been discussing. Consider the following statement, for example: “Reporters, after extensive investigation, learned that secret negotiations had been in progress for three weeks before the agreement was announced publicly.” The force of “learned that” in this statement approximates that of “found out that” or “discovered that,” which do commit us substantively. We may label such a use of “learn that,” a discovery use, and contrast it with the tutorial use, in which the expression refers (without committing us substantively) to what people come to believe in consequence of schooling. The existence of the tutorial use suffices to show that a learn that attribution does not, in general, commit us to the embedded substantive assertion. And as we saw earlier, this is sufficient to block the generalization that what XX has learned he has come to know, permitting only the weaker generalization that what XX has learned he has come to believe. 可以肯定的是，"学习 "的某些用途实际上会以我们一直在讨论的方式使我们做出实质性的承诺。例如，请看下面这段话："记者们经过广泛调查，了解到在协议公开宣布之前，秘密谈判已经进行了三个星期"。在这段陈述中，"得知 "一词的力度近似于 "发现 "或 "发现"，而 "发现 "或 "发现 "在实质上是对我们的承诺。我们可以把 "得知 "的这种用法称为 "发现用法"，并将其与 "教程用法 "进行对比。"教程用法 "指的是人们通过学校教育而逐渐相信的东西（并不使我们作出实质性的承诺）。教程用法的存在足以说明，一般来说，"学会 "的归属并不使我们对嵌入的实质性断言做出承诺。正如我们在前面所看到的，这足以阻止" XX 学到了什么，他就知道了什么 "这样的概括，而只允许" XX 学到了什么，他就相信了什么 "这样较弱的概括。
The weaker generalization, in other words, unlike the stronger one, frees us from commitment to repugnant substantive claims in all those cases where we attribute learning that tutorially but reject the content learned. The student mentioned earlier may well be admitted to have learned, and to have believed, that evil spirits cause disease, but he cannot well be admitted to have come to know this. Suppose, now, that we consider all and only those cases where (i) XX has learned that QQ and where (ii) we concur with the substantive assertion represented by " QQ." Should we be willing in all these cases, at least, to say that XX has indeed come to know (and not merely to believe) that QQ ? 换句话说，与较强的概括不同，较弱的概括使我们在归因于学习但拒绝所学内容的所有情况下，都能摆脱对令人反感的实质性主张的承诺。前面提到的那个学生可以被承认学习并相信邪灵会导致疾病，但他不能被承认知道这一点。现在，假设我们考虑所有且仅考虑以下情况：(i) XX 学习了 QQ ；(ii) 我们同意" QQ "所代表的实质性断言。在所有这些情况下，我们是否至少应该愿意说， XX 确实已经知道（而不仅仅是相信） QQ ？
This question raises a point of general importance regarding the attribution of knowledge: Some writers on the subject have recognized a weak and a strong sense of know that. ^(2){ }^{2} The answer to our ques- 这个问题提出了一个关于知识归属的具有普遍意义的问题：一些研究这个问题的作家认为，"知道 "的意义有强有弱。 ^(2){ }^{2} 我们的问题的答案是
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tion will depend on which sense we have in mind. In the weak sense, knowing that depends solely on having true belief; in the strong sense, it requires something further-for example, the ability to back up the belief in a relevant manner, to bring evidence in its support, or to show that one is in a position to know what it affirms. If we take the weak sense of know that, we shall then answer our question in the affirmative. If XX has learned that QQ and has therefore come to believe that QQ, and if, further, we are willing to concur with the claim made by " QQ ", (i.e., to affirm it as true), we must acknowledge that XX has come to believe truly, hence to know (in the weak sense) that QQ. 这取决于我们所考虑的是哪种意义。在弱的意义上，"知道 "只取决于拥有真正的信念；而在强的意义上，"知道 "需要更多的东西--例如，以相关的方式支持信念的能力，提供支持信念的证据，或者表明一个人有能力知道它所肯定的东西。如果我们把 "知道 "理解为弱意义上的 "知道"，那么我们的问题就可以得到肯定的回答。如果 XX 已经知道了 QQ 并因此相信了 QQ ，而且，如果我们愿意同意 " QQ "提出的主张（即肯定它为真），我们就必须承认 XX 已经真正相信了，因此（在弱的意义上）知道了 QQ 。
If we take the strong sense of know that, however, we must answer our question in the negative. For a person may believe correctly or truly that QQ, and yet lack the ability to provide adequate backing for his belief or to show that he is in a position to know that QQ. Though he has learned that QQ and has come to believe truly that QQ he will then not really know, or know in the strong sense, 然而，如果我们采用 "知道 "这一强烈的含义，我们就必须对问题做出否定的回答。因为一个人可能正确地或真正地相信 QQ ，但却没有能力为他的信念提供足够的支持，也没有能力证明他有能力知道 QQ 。尽管他已经知道了 QQ ，并开始真正相信 QQ ，但他还不是真正的知道，或者说不是强意义上的知道、
to be 成为
that QQ. He has, for example, learned in school that E=mc^(2)E=\mathrm{mc}^{2}, but cannot, unless he can supply suitable supporting reasons, be said to know (in the strong sense) that E=mc^(2)\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{mc}^{2}. 例如，他在学校学到了 E=mc^(2)E=\mathrm{mc}^{2} ，但除非他能提供适当的支持理由，否则不能说他知道（在强意义上） E=mc^(2)\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{mc}^{2} 。
We may summarize our discussion to this point as follows: If XX has learned that QQ he has come to believe that QQ. If we deny " QQ " we will directly rule out that XX has also come to know that QQ, no matter how well XX is able to support " QQ." On the other hand, if we grant that " QQ " is true, it is not directly ruled out that we shall say XX has come to know that QQ. We shall, indeed, say this immediately if we employ the weak sense of know, but only upon the satisfaction of further conditions if we employ the strong sense of knowe. 我们可以将到此为止的讨论总结如下：如果 XX 知道了 QQ ，他就会相信 QQ 。如果我们否认 " QQ "，我们就会直接排除 XX 也已经知道了 QQ 的可能性，无论 XX 能够多么好地支持 " QQ "。另一方面，如果我们承认" QQ "是真实的，那么并不直接排除我们会说 XX 已经知道了 QQ 。事实上，如果我们使用弱意义的 "知道"，我们就会立即说出这句话，而如果我们使用强意义的 "知道"，则只有在满足进一步的条件后才会说出这句话。
Often, perhaps typically, however, we do not make a direct test to determine whether these further conditions have indeed been satisfied; we operate rather on general presumptions that seem to us plausible. The presumption that the relevant conditions have been satisfied varies, for example, with the difficulty, technicality, or complexity of the subject. Thus, it seemed quite natural to us earlier to say that a student who has learned that Boston is the capital of Massachusetts has indeed come to know this. Nor does this seem to be simply a result of using the weak sense of know. The question “He has learned it, but does he really know it?” springs less easily to our lips in this case than in the case of " E=mc^(2)\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{mc}^{2}." For what sort of complex technical backing could possibly be needed here? Granted that the strong sense of know is operative, we are more likely to presume, on general grounds, that a student who has learned a “simple” fact can support it appropriately than we are likely to make the same presumption for a relatively “complex” or technical affirmation. 然而，我们通常（也许是典型地）并不直接检验这些进一步的条件是否确实得到了满足；而是根据我们认为合理的一般推定来行事。例如，对相关条件是否得到满足的推定会随着问题的难度、技术性或复杂性而变化。因此，我们早先似乎很自然地说，一个学生如果知道波士顿是马萨诸塞州首府，他就确实知道了这一点。这似乎也不仅仅是使用 "知道 "的弱意义的结果。与" E=mc^(2)\mathrm{E}=\mathrm{mc}^{2} "的情况相比，"他学会了，但他真的知道吗？"的问题在这种情况下就不那么容易出现在我们的嘴边了。因为这里还需要什么复杂的技术支撑呢？尽管 "知道 "这个强烈的意义是有效的，但我们更有可能根据一般的理由推定，一个已经学会了一个 "简单 "事实的学生能够恰当地支持这个事实，而不是对一个相对 "复杂 "或技术性的肯定做出同样的推定。 qquad\qquad qquad\qquad qquad\qquad
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Another source of variation seems to be the method by which the belief has been acquired. To have merely been made aware or informed by somebody that QQ leaves open the practical possibility that one does not really know (in the strong sense) that QQ even where " QQ " is true. To have found out for oneself that QQ, lends greater credence to the presumption that one really has come to know that ℓ\ell for it suggests, though it does not strictly imply, that one has been in a good position to realize that QQ either relatively directly or on the basis of clues or reasons pointing to " QQ." 造成差异的另一个原因似乎是获得信念的方法。如果一个人只是从别人那里知道或了解到 QQ ，那么即使" QQ "是真的，他也不可能真正知道（从强意义上说） QQ 。如果一个人自己发现了 QQ ，那么他就更有理由推定他真的已经知道了 ℓ\ell ，因为这表明（尽管并不严格意味着）他已经处于有利的地位，能够相对直接地或根据指向 " QQ "的线索或理由认识到 QQ 。
This suggests why the discovery use of learning that seems to imply knowing that in the strong sense. Consider again our reporters, who learned (found out) after extensive investigation that the negotiations had been in progress for three weeks before the publicly announced agreement. The question “Granted they found out, but did they really know?” does not strike us as immediately relevant or natural. Those educators who stress so-called discovery and problemsolving methods in schooling may, in fact, be operating upon the general presumption that such methods lead to strong knowing as an outcome. And emphasis on teaching, with its distinctive connotations of rational explanation and critical dialogue, may have the same point: to develop a sort of learning in which the student will be capable of backing his beliefs by appropriate and sufficient means. To have learned that QQ as a consequence of genuine teaching, given that " QQ " is true, does seem to lend some weight to the presumption that one has come to know. 这就说明了为什么 "发现 "中的 "获悉 "似乎意味着 "知道"。再想想我们的记者，他们经过广泛的调查得知（发现），在公开宣布协议之前，谈判已经进行了三个星期。"当然，他们发现了，但他们真的知道吗？"这个问题在我们看来并不贴切，也不自然。那些在学校教育中强调所谓的发现和解决问题方法的教育者，实际上可能是基于这样一种普遍的假设，即这种方法会导致强烈的 "知道 "这一结果。而强调教学，其独特的理性解释和批判性对话的内涵，可能也是出于同样的目的：培养一种学习方法，使学生能够通过适当和充分的手段来支持自己的信念。在" QQ "为真的情况下，作为真正教学的结果， QQ 已经学会了，这似乎给 "一个人已经知道了 "的假设增加了一些分量。
The notion of “teaching,” unlike “learning,” has, typically, intentional as well as success uses. ^(3){ }^{3} That is to say, teaching normally involves trying, whereas learning does not. To say of a child that he is learning to walk, that he is learning several new words every day, that he is learning how to conduct himself socially, that he is learning to express himself well in speech, does not in itself normally convey that he is trying to accomplish these things. It does not even convey that he is engaged or occupied in them, in the sense of thinking of what is going on, focusing his attention, and acting with care. Learning, it might thus be said, is not an activity but rather more nearly a process. We may surely distinguish the different stages of a process, and we may separate those situations in which the process has run its course to completion from those in which it has not. But such analyses do not presuppose either deliberateness or intention, although the latter may, in particular circumstances, be involved. We can try to learn this or that, but we often learn without trying at all; there is, moreover, no general presumption that any given case of learning is intentional. 与 "学 "不同，"教 "的概念通常既有有意的用途，也有成功的用途。 ^(3){ }^{3} 也就是说，"教 "通常需要尝试，而 "学 "则不需要。说一个孩子正在学习走路、每天学习几个新单词、学习如何社交、学习如何用语言表达自己，这本身通常并不表示他正在努力完成这些事情。它甚至不能说明他在从事或专注于这些事情，即思考正在发生的事情，集中注意力，谨慎行事。因此可以说，学习不是一种活动，而更像是一个过程。我们当然可以区分过程的不同阶段，我们也可以区分过程已经完成和尚未完成的情况。但这种分析并不预设蓄意或意图，尽管在特定情况下可能涉及后者。我们可以尝试学习这个或那个，但我们常常根本不需要尝试就能学习；此外，也不存在任何特定的学习情况是有意为之的普遍假设。
Teaching appears quite different, by comparison. To say of someone that he is teaching conveys normally that he is engaged in 相比之下，教学似乎截然不同。说一个人在教书，通常意味着他在从事以下工作
an activity, rather than caught up in a process. It is to imply contextually that what he is doing is directed toward a goal and involves intention and care. He is, in short, trying, and what he is trying to bring about represents success in the activity, rather than simply the end-state of a process. We can, to be sure, speak of so-called “unintentional teaching,” in which a person actually brings about a certain sort of learning, although without trying or even awareness on his part. But such reference will require that the word teaching be suitably qualified (e.g., by the word unintentional), or that supplementary explanation of the case be offered. Without such further information, a bare ascription of teaching contextually implies intention, whereas a success use of the verb (e.g., “Jones has taught his son how to swim”) signifies intention brought to successful fruition. 是一种活动，而不是一个过程。从上下文来看，这意味着他正在做的事情是为了一个目标，包含着意图和关怀。简言之，他在努力，而他努力实现的目标代表着活动的成功，而不仅仅是过程的最终状态。当然，我们也可以谈论所谓的 "无意教学"，在这种教学中，一个人虽然没有尝试，甚至没有意识到，但实际上带来了某种学习。但是，这种提法需要对 "教学 "一词进行适当的限定（例如，用 "无意 "一词），或者对情况进行补充解释。如果没有这些进一步的信息，"教 "这个词在上下文中就意味着 "有意"，而动词的成功使用（如 "琼斯教儿子游泳"）则意味着 "有意 "的成功实现。
What does teaching have as its goal? What does a person engaged in teaching intend or try to bring about? Obviously, an appropriate bit of learning. In the particular case of teaching that with which we have so far been concerned, a person XX teaching YY that QQ, is trying to bring about YY 's learning that QQ. As we have seen, this involves YY 's coming to accept " QQ " or to believe that QQ. If XX has been successful in teaching rr that QrQ r has indeed learned that QQ has come to believe that QQ. 教学的目标是什么？从事教学的人打算或试图带来什么？很显然，是适当的学习。在我们迄今为止一直关注的教学这一特殊案例中，一个 XX 教授 YY 即 QQ 的人，试图让 YY 学会 QQ 。正如我们所看到的，这涉及到 YY 开始接受 " QQ " 或相信 QQ 。如果 XX 成功地教会 rrQrQ r 确实学会了 QQ 开始相信 QQ .
The converse, of course, does not hold: One may learn that QQ without having been taught it by anyone. Furthermore, we must not suppose that teaching can be reduced to trying to achieve someone’s coming to believe something. One may try to propagate a belief in numerous ways other than teaching-for example, through deception, insinuation, advertising, hypnosis, propaganda, indoctrination, threats, bribery, and force. Nor must we be quick to identify teaching with schooling generally, for formal agencies of schooling have employed and often do employ methods other than teachingfor example, indoctrination, suggestion, threats, and force. Thus, if we think of learning that as referring to the acquisition of belief just in the context of schooling, we still cannot take teaching as simply directed toward learning as its goal, although teaching does have learning as its goal. 当然，反过来也不成立： QQ 可以在没有人教导的情况下学会。此外，我们不能认为教导可以简化为试图让某人相信某件事情。除了教之外，人们还可以通过许多其他方式来传播一种信念，例如，通过欺骗、暗示、广告、催眠、宣传、灌输、威胁、贿赂和武力。我们也不能一概而论地将教学与学校教育相提并论，因为正规的学校教育机构曾经使用过，而且经常使用教学以外的方法，例如灌输、暗示、威胁和武力。因此，如果我们把 "学习 "仅仅理解为在学校教育的背景下获得信仰，那么我们就不能把 "教学 "简单地理解为以 "学习 "为目标，尽管 "教学 "确实以 "学习 "为目标。
What distinguishes teaching, as we remarked earlier, is its special connection with rational explanation and critical dialogue: with the enterprise of giving honest reasons and welcoming radical questions. The person engaged in teaching does not merely want to bring about Belief, but to bring it about through the exercise of free rational judgment by the student. This is what distinguishes teaching from propaganda or debating, for example. In teaching, the teacher is revealing his reasons for the beliefs he wants to transmit and is thus, in effect, submitting his own judgment to the critical scrutiny and evaluation of the student; he is fully engaged in the dialogue by which 正如我们前面所说，教学的与众不同之处在于它与理性解释和批判性对话的特殊联系：与提出诚实的理由和欢迎激进的问题的事业的特殊联系。从事教学的人并不仅仅是为了实现 "信仰"，而是通过学生自由的理性判断来实现 "信仰"。这就是教学与宣传或辩论等不同之处。在教学过程中，教师揭示了他想要传播的信仰的理由，因此，实际上是将自己的判断提交给学生进行批判性的审查和评价；他完全参与了对话，通过对话，学生可以提出自己的问题。
he hopes to teach, and is thus risking his own beliefs, in lesser or greater degree, as he teaches. 因此，在教学过程中，他或多或少都要冒着自己信仰的风险。
Teaching, it might be said, involves trying to bring about learning under severe restrictions of manner-that is to say, within the limitations imposed by the framework of rational discussion. Since teaching that QQ presupposes that the teacher takes " QQ " to be true (or at least within the legitimate range of truth approximation allowable for purposes of pedagogical simplification and facilitation) and since the activity of teaching appeals to the free rational judgment of the student, we might say that the teacher is trying to bring about knowledge, in the strong sense earlier discussed. For the presumption is that a person who is encouraged to form his beliefs through free rational methods is likely to be in a position to provide proper backing for them. The teacher does not strive merely to get the student to learn that QQ but also to get him to learn it in such a way as to know it-i.e., to be able to support it properly. 可以说，教学是在严格的方式限制下--也就是说，在理性讨论框架所施加的限制下--努力实现学习。既然" QQ "教学的前提是教师认为" QQ "是真实的（或至少在出于简化教学和促进教学的目的而允许的合理的真理近似范围内），既然教学活动诉诸于学生的自由理性判断，我们可以说，教师是在试图带来知识，这是在前面讨论过的强烈意义上的知识。因为我们可以假定，一个人如果被鼓励通过自由理性的方法形成自己的信念，那么他就有可能为这些信念提供适当的支持。教师不仅要让学生学会 QQ ，而且要让他以这样一种方式学会，即能够正确地支持 QQ 。
We must, however, admit that there will generally be differences of opinion as to the success or failure of the whole teaching operation. Cross-cultural cases provide the clearest illustrations. Consider the teacher of a distant age who strove to teach that evil spirits cause disease. He was (we have said) trying to get his students really to know this. Now we may admit that he was successful in * getting them to believe that evil spirits cause disease and even in supporting this belief in a way that may have been reasonable in their cultural environment. We cannot, however, admit his success in getting his students to know that evil spirits cause disease, for we hold this doctrine to be false. 不过，我们必须承认，对于整个教学活动的成败，通常会有不同的看法。跨文化案例提供了最清晰的说明。远古时代的一位教师努力传授邪灵致病的知识。他（我们已经说过）试图让他的学生真正了解这一点。现在我们可以承认，他成功地*让学生们相信邪灵会导致疾病，甚至以一种在他们的文化环境中可能是合理的方式来支持这种信念。然而，我们不能承认他成功地让他的学生知道邪灵会导致疾病，因为我们认为这一学说是错误的。
Is there not a difficulty here from the point of view of appraisal of teaching? We want to distinguish successful from unsuccessful teaching in this ancient era, but our present analysis forces us to judge all of it (at least with respect to such false doctrines as we have been considering) to have been uniformly unsuccessful. To meet this problem, we may propose a secondary or “subjective” notion of success to supplement the primary or “objective” notion we have been using. According to this secondary or subjective notion of success, we assume that the truth of the doctrine taught is to be judged from the teacher’s point of view; we also judge the question of proper backing in a way that makes allowances for the prevalent standards and available data in the culture in question. Then we judge success in the normal manner. We can now make the wanted cross-cultural distinctions between successful and unsuccessful teaching even where, from an objective point of view and judged from our standpoint, it has been unsuccessful. 从评价教义的角度来看，这难道不是一个难题吗？我们想要区分这个古老时代成功与不成功的教导，但我们目前的分析却迫使我们判断所有的教导（至少就我们所考虑的这些错误教义而言）都是一律不成功的。为了解决这个问题，我们可以提出一个次要或 "主观 "的成功概念，以补充我们一直使用的主要或 "客观 "概念。根据这种次要的或主观的成功概念，我们假定所传授的教义的真理性应从教师的角度来判断；我们也要根据有关文化中的流行标准和现有数据来判断适当的支持问题。然后，我们再以正常的方式判断成功与否。现在，我们可以对成功和不成功的教学进行必要的跨文化区分，即使从客观角度和我们的立场来看，教学是不成功的。
Any teaching is geared to what the teacher takes to be true, and his aim is not merely that his student learn what he takes to be true 任何教学都是针对教师所认为的真理，而教师的目的不仅仅是让学生学会他所认为的真理。
(but that he be able to support it by criteria of proper backing taken to be authoritative. Insofar as the teacher is teaching, he is, in any event, risking his own particular truth judgments, for he is exposing them to the general critique of these criteria and to the free critical judgment of the student’s mind. (但他必须能够用被认为具有权威性的适当支持标准来支持它）。就教师的教学而言，他无论如何都要冒着自己对真理的特殊判断的风险，因为他要把这些判断暴露在这些标准的普遍批判之下，暴露在学生心灵的自由批判判断之下。
One point of general importance should be especially noted. Knowing that attributions reflect the truth judgments and critical standards of the speaker; they commit him substantively to the beliefs he is assigning to others, and they hinge on the particular criteria of backing for beliefs, which he adopts. Thus, unlike attributions of belief, learning that, and teaching that, they reveal his own epistemological orientation to the items of belief in question; in this sense, they do more than merely describe the person to whom knowledge is being attributed. 有一点具有普遍意义，应特别注意。知道 "和 "教导 "的归因反映了说话者对真理的判断和批判的标准；它们使说话者对他归因于他人的信念做出了实质性的承诺，它们取决于说话者对信念所采用的特定的支持标准。因此，与 "信念"、"学习 "和 "传授 "的归因不同，"知道"、"学习 "和 "传授 "的归因揭示了他自己对有关信念项目的认识论取向；从这个意义上说，它们不仅仅是描述知识归因于谁。
We have, in sum, connected the educational ideas of learning and teaching with the cognitive ideas of knowledge and belief, as follows: Learning that QQ involves coming to believe that QQ. Under certain further conditions (truth of " QQ " and, for the strong sense of knowing, proper backing of " QQ "), it also involves coming to know that QQ. Teaching that QQ involves trying to bring about learning that (and belief that) QQ, under characteristic restrictions of manner, and, furthermore, knowing that QQ, as judged by the teacher from his own standpoint. 总之，我们把 "学 "和 "教 "的教育思想与 "知识 "和 "信念 "的认知思想联系起来，具体如下：学习 QQ 涉及相信 QQ 。在某些进一步的条件下（" QQ "的真理性，以及" QQ "的适当支持），它还涉及到" QQ "。 QQ 的教学包括在特定的方式限制下，努力让学生学习（并相信） QQ ，以及教师从自己的角度判断出的对 QQ 的认识。
Now, there are certain classes of counterexamples that might be offered in opposition to these generalizations. A student might say, in reporting what he had learned on a certain day, “I learned that the gods dwelt on Olympus,” or, if a student of philosophy, “I learned that the world of sense is an illusion.” These reports might indeed be true, without the student’s actually coming to believe that the gods dwelt on Olympus or that the world of sense is an illusion. Such reports are, however, plausibly interpreted as elliptical. What is really intended is, “I learned that it was believed (by the Greeks) that the gods dwelt on Olympus,” or, “I learned that it was said (by such and such a philosopher) that the world of sense is an illusion.” 现在，我们可以举出一些反例来反对这些概括。一个学生在汇报他某天的收获时可能会说："我知道了众神居住在奥林匹斯山。"如果是哲学系的学生，他可能会说："我知道了感官世界是一种幻觉。"这些报告可能确实是真实的，但学生并没有真正相信众神居住在奥林匹斯山上或感官世界是幻觉。然而，这些报告可以被解释为省略句。真正的用意是："我知道了（希腊人）相信诸神居住在奥林匹斯山上"，或者 "我知道了（这样那样的哲学家）说感官世界是幻觉"。
Another sort of counterexample is provided by the case of XX, who is teaching YY that metals expand when heated but who does not really care whether YY believes this or not. He is not trying to get rr to believe or to qualify (from his point of view) as knowing that metals expand when heated. He is only preparing YY to do what is necessary to pass the end-term examination. He may not even care about that; he may only be trying to get through the day. First, as to the latter case, it is quite possible for a teacher not to be engaged in teaching at a given time. To be called a teacher is, typically, to be described as having a certain institutional role in the process of 另一个反例是 XX ，他正在教 YY 金属受热膨胀，但他并不关心 YY 是否相信这一点。他并不是要让 rr 相信或有资格（从他的角度）知道金属受热膨胀。他只是在为 YY 做通过期末考试所必需的准备。他可能根本不关心这个问题；他可能只是想熬过这一天。首先，就后一种情况而言，教师在某一特定时间不从事教学工作是完全可能的。被称为教师，通常是指在教学过程中扮演一定的机构角色。
schooling, rather than as engaging in teaching activity; we must avoid the assumption that whatever a teacher does on the job is properly describable as teaching. Secondly (as to the former case), we might well differentiate teaching rr that metals expand when heated from teaching YY how to handle examination questions relating to this subject in order to facilitate passing. It is, in fact, possible to do one of these without doing the other; from the time of the Sophists (at least), it has been recognized that teaching might be geared not toward knowledge of propositions taken as true but rather toward the acquisition of skills in handling the outward manifestations of such knowledge. There are analogous cases, moreover, where the latter aim is quite respectable-for example, where teaching is geared toward the development of skills in handling and applying theories rather than toward acceptance of these theories as true. ^(4){ }^{4} 我们必须避免这样一种假设，即教师在工作中做的任何事情都可以恰当地描述为教学。其次（就前一种情况而言），我们完全可以把教授 rr 金属在加热时膨胀与教授 YY 如何处理与这一科目有关的考题以便通过考试区分开来。事实上，二者可以缺一不可；至少从诡辩家的时代起，人们就认识到，教学的目的可能不是为了传授被认为是真的命题的知识，而是为了获得处理这些知识的外在表现的技能。此外，在一些类似的情况下，后一种目的也是值得尊敬的--例如，教学的目的是培养处理和应用理论的技能，而不是接受这些理论为真。 ^(4){ }^{4} .
RANGES OF COGNITIVE AND EDUCATIONAL TERMS 认知和教育术语的范围
Our discussion of the previous section dealt with certain general connections between the educational terms learning and teaching and the cognitive terms knowing and believing. Our discussion was restricted, however, to comparable uses of these terms-i.e., learning that, teaching that, knowing that, and believing that. We must now turn to the question of their several ranges of use, which differ in important ways. We shall then have a clearer idea of the landscape within which our previous considerations may be located. Further, we shall find reason to avoid identifying the range of education with the range of knowledge. Following our exploration of the larger territory, we shall turn to detailed analyses of the region where educational and cognitive ranges overlap. 上一节的讨论涉及教育术语 "学 "和 "教 "与认知术语 "知 "和 "信 "之间的某些一般联系。不过，我们的讨论仅限于这些术语的可比用法，即 "学"、"教"、"知 "和 "信"。现在，我们必须转而讨论它们的几种使用范围问题，它们在一些重要方面是不同的。这样，我们就可以更清楚地了解我们前面所考虑的问题。此外，我们还有理由避免将教育范围与知识范围混为一谈。在对更广阔的领域进行探索之后，我们将转而对教育范围和认知范围重叠的区域进行详细分析。
We may begin by suggesting that know is a term of wider range than believe. We can speak not only of knowing that but also of knowing how to; we can speak only of believing that. We may say not only " XX knows that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo" but also " XX believes that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo." However, though we may say " XX knows how to ride a bicycle," we cannot say " XX believes how to ride a bicycle." This fact may be conveniently formulated by labeling the that use propositional and the how to use procedural, and saying that whereas there is a propositional use of both know and believe, there is a procedural use only of know. 首先，我们可以说，"知道 "是一个比 "相信 "范围更广的术语。我们不仅可以说 "知道"，还可以说 "知道如何去做"；我们只能说 "相信"。我们不仅可以说" XX 知道拿破仑在滑铁卢战败"，还可以说" XX 相信拿破仑在滑铁卢战败"。然而，尽管我们可以说" XX 知道如何骑自行车"，我们却不能说" XX 相信如何骑自行车"。这一事实可以方便地表述为："知道 "和 "相信 "都是命题用法，而 "如何 "是程序用法。
It must immediately be acknowledged, to be sure, that we have the construction believing in but not knowing in. XX may be said to believe in God, in God’s benevolence, in the future of the U.N., in democracy, or in John Jones. However, it seems possible to suggest plausible interpretations of believing in as propositional, in context: To believe in God is, in many typical contexts, for example, to believe 我们必须立即承认，我们有 "相信 "但 "不知道 "的结构。 XX 可以说相信上帝、相信上帝的仁慈、相信联合国的未来、相信民主或相信约翰-琼斯。不过，根据上下文，我们似乎可以把 "相信 "解释为命题：例如，在许多典型的语境中，"相信上帝 "就是 "相信"。
that there is a God; to believe in God’s benevolence is to believe that God is benevolent; to believe in the future of the U.N. is to believe that the U.N. has a future; to believe in democracy is to believe that democracy is good or that it has a future; to believe in Jones is to believe that Jones will satisfy the trust placed in him or the hopes for his good performance or achievement. There is, it would appear, no single formula of reduction for believing in statements; yet, with the help of contextual clues, it does seem plausible to suppose that reduction can be carried through along the lines just suggested, singly or in combination. 相信上帝的仁慈，就是相信上帝是仁慈的；相信联合国的未来，就是相信联合国是有前途的；相信民主，就是相信民主是好的，或者民主是有前途的；相信琼斯，就是相信琼斯会满足人们对他的信任，或者对他的良好表现或成就的希望。看来，相信语句并没有单一的还原公式；然而，借助上下文的线索，我们确实有理由认为，可以按照刚才提出的思路，单独或结合地进行还原。
Assuming such reduction, belief will be construable as solely propositional, while knowing will clearly be not only propositional but also procedural. Nor is an extra procedural use the only prima facie indication of a wider range for know as contrasted with believe. We can speak, first of all, of knowing why there are tides but not of believing why there are tides, of knowing who committed the murder, or how or when it was committed, but not of believing who did it nor of believing how or when it was done. We can, to take a second set of examples, speak of knowing chess, music, or Scrabble but not of believing chess, music, or Scrabble. The 'first set of cases involves implicit reference to questions of one or another sort (“Why are there tides?” “Who committed the murder?” etc.); we will tag these as question uses. The second set we will label as subject uses, since they refer to the “subjects” chess, music, etc. 假定有这样的还原，"相信 "将被解释为纯粹的命题，而 "知道 "显然不仅是命题性的，而且是程序性的。额外的程序性使用也不是 "知道 "与 "相信 "相比范围更广的唯一初步迹象。首先，我们可以说知道为什么会有潮汐，但不能说相信为什么会有潮汐；我们可以说知道谁杀了人，或知道杀人的方式或时间，但不能说相信谁杀了人，也不能说相信杀人的方式或时间。举第二组例子，我们可以说知道国际象棋、音乐或拼字游戏，但不能说相信国际象棋、音乐或拼字游戏。第一组例子隐含着这样或那样的问题（"为什么会有潮汐？""谁犯了谋杀罪？"等等）；我们将把这些例子标记为问题用法。第二组我们将标记为主题用法，因为它们指的是国际象棋、音乐等 "主题"。
It is true that for some subjects we can also apply belief notions. For example, we can speak not only of knowing the theory of evolution but of believing the theory of evolution. Nonetheless, we cannot apply belief notions analogously throughout the whole category of knowable subjects-e.g., to chess or music. 的确，对于某些主题，我们也可以应用信念概念。例如，我们不仅可以说知道进化论，还可以说相信进化论。然而，我们不能在整个可知主题类别中类比地应用信念概念--例如，象棋或音乐。
Moreover, even in cases of subjects where belief does apply, it is propositional where the corresponding knowing is not; it is, furthermore, not implied by (nor included in) the corresponding knowing, as is the case with propositional uses. That is to say, knowing that metals expand when heated implies believing that metals expand when heated, but knowing the theory of evolution does not imply believing the theory of evolution. To say that someone believes the theory of evolution is to say he accepts it or takes it as true. To say he knows it is, normally, to say not more than this but something different: it is to say rather that he is acquainted with this theory or that he can recognize, handle, and perhaps state it. To believe a theory is, in short, to believe that it is correct or true; to know a theory is not to know that it is correct or true. The relevant sense of know is different from that of the propositional use we-have discussed. 此外，即使在信念确实适用的主题情况下，它也是命题性的，而相应的认识则不是；而且，它并不像命题性使用那样被相应的认识所隐含（也不包含在相应的认识中）。也就是说，知道金属受热膨胀意味着相信金属受热膨胀，但知道进化论并不意味着相信进化论。说某人相信进化论，是说他接受进化论或将其视为真理。说他知道进化论，通常不是说他知道进化论，而是说他了解进化论，或者说他能够认识、处理进化论，也许还能阐述进化论。简而言之，相信一种理论就是相信它是正确的或真实的；知道一种理论并不是知道它是正确的或真实的。知道 "的相关意义不同于我们讨论过的命题用法。
Now it may, in fact, be suggested that subject and question uses of know are reducible to procedural ones: To know a theory is to know 事实上，我们可以认为，"知道 "的主语和问题用法可以归结为程序用法：知道一种理论就是知道
how to formulate and possibly work with it; to know why there are tides is to know how to answer correctly the question why there are tides. Alternatively one might propose to reduce question uses, at least, to propositional ones, taking " XX knows who the murderer is" as “There is a true answer to the question ‘Who is the murderer?’ and XX knows that this answer is true.” These suggestions may be thought plausible or they may not, but we need not decide whether they are adequate, at least for our present purposes. It is sufficient if we recognize that belief may be interpreted as, in any event, propositional. On the other hand, knowing is not always propositional; it is not always, nor always reducible to, knowing that. Even if the above mentioned reductions were to be carried out, we should still be left with a procedural as well as a propositional use of know. Nor could it be plausibly proposed to reduce the procedural use itself to the propositional: To what knowing that expression would “knowing how to type” correspond? 知道为什么会有潮汐，就是知道如何正确回答 "为什么会有潮汐 "这个问题。或者，我们也可以建议至少把问题的使用简化为命题的使用，把" XX 知道凶手是谁 "理解为"'凶手是谁'这个问题有一个真实的答案，而且 XX 知道这个答案是真实的"。这些建议可能被认为是可信的，也可能是不可信的，但我们不需要决定它们是否足够，至少对我们现在的目的来说是如此。只要我们承认信念无论如何都可以解释为命题性的，这就足够了。另一方面，"知道 "并不总是命题性的；它并不总是，也不总是可以还原为 "知道"。即使进行了上述还原，我们仍然会发现 "知道 "既有程序用法，也有命题用法。把 "知道 "的程序性用法本身还原为 "知道 "的命题性用法也是说不通的：知道如何键入 "与 "知道 "表达式对应的是什么呢？
The range of knowing may thus be said to be larger than that of believing. If we now turn to the terms learning and teaching, we find that they are applicable in all the cases so far discussed; they are not limited to simply propositional uses. The student may learn or be taught that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo. He may learn or be taught how to ride a bicycle or how to type. He may learn or be taught why there are tides. He may learn or be taught chess or the theory of evolution. Since, however, the notion of belief is not applicable in any but the first and the last of these cases (i.e., believing that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, believing the theory of evolution), it cannot be generally tied to learning and teaching as it was in the specifically propositional cases earlier discussed. Taking learning first, we cannot say, for example, that if XX has learned how to type, he has come to believe how to type, as we can say that if he has learned that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, he has come to believe it. We cannot say that if XX has learned why there are tides, he has come to believe why there are tides. Nor can we say he has come to believe chess if he has learned chess. Rather, we need to say that if he has learned how to type, he has come to know how to type; if he has learned why there are tides, he has come to know why there are tides; if he has learned chess, he has come to know chess. Moreover, even though it is possible to speak of believing the theory of evolution, as it is not possible to speak of believing chess, it is false to say that if XX has learned the theory, he has come to believe it; we should rather say he has come to know the theorywhich, as we have seen, is a different thing from coming to accept the theory as true. 因此，可以说 "知 "的范围大于 "信"。如果我们现在来谈谈 "学习"（learning）和 "教学"（teaching）这两个词，我们会发现它们适用于迄今为止讨论过的所有情况；它们并不局限于命题用途。学生可以学习或被教导拿破仑在滑铁卢战败。他可以学习或学习如何骑自行车或打字。他可以学习或了解为什么会有潮汐。他可以学习或学习国际象棋或进化论。然而，除了第一种和最后一种情况（即相信拿破仑在滑铁卢战败、相信进化论）之外，"信念 "这一概念并不适用于其他任何情况，因此，它不能像在前面讨论的具体命题情况中那样被普遍地与学习和教学联系在一起。以学习为例，我们不能说，如果 XX 学会了如何打字，他就相信了如何打字，就像我们可以说，如果他学会了拿破仑在滑铁卢战败，他就相信了拿破仑战败一样。我们不能说，如果 XX 知道了为什么会有潮汐，他就会相信为什么会有潮汐。我们也不能说，如果 XX 学会了国际象棋，他就相信了国际象棋。相反，我们需要说，如果 XX 学会了打字，他就知道了如何打字；如果 XX 学会了为什么会有潮汐，他就知道了为什么会有潮汐；如果 XX 学会了国际象棋，他就知道了国际象棋。 此外，尽管可以说相信进化论，就像不可能说相信象棋一样，但如果说 XX 学会了进化论，他就相信了进化论，那是错误的；我们应该说他了解了进化论，正如我们已经看到的，这与接受进化论为真理是两码事。
Analogously, we cannot introduce belief into our general account of teaching as we did earlier. For example, we cannot say that, in 同样，我们也不能像前面那样把信念引入我们对教学的一般描述中。例如，我们不能说，在
teaching YY how to type, the teacher is trying to bring about rr 's believing how to type. Rather, we need to say he is trying to get rr to know how to type. Similarly, he wants the student to know the theory of evolution, or chess, or why there are tides. 在教 YY 如何打字时，教师试图让 rr 相信如何打字。相反，我们需要说，他是想让 rr 知道如何打字。同样，他希望学生了解进化论、国际象棋或潮汐的原因。
The main result to be noted is that, while the range of knowing is larger than that of belief, learning and teaching are at least as large in range as knowing. Education outstrips belief in its range, we might say, concerned as it also is with the development of skills, procedural techniques, subject familiarity-in short, with everything that might be characterized in terms of knowing. Nonetheless, we must not suppose that the range of education coincides with that of knowing. In fact, it goes beyond it; the concepts of learning and teaching are applicable in cases where knowing is not. 需要指出的主要结果是，虽然 "知 "的范围大于 "信"，但 "学 "和 "教 "的范围至少与 "知 "一样大。我们可以说，教育的范围超过了信仰的范围，因为教育也涉及技能的发展、程序技巧、学科熟悉程度，总之，涉及一切可以用 "知 "来描述的东西。然而，我们不能认为教育的范围与 "知 "的范围是一致的。事实上，教育的范围远远超出了 "知 "的范围；学习和教学的概念适用于 "知 "不适用的情况。
This point may be introduced by the consideration that learning to and teaching to have no counterparts such as believing to or knowing to. The child, for example, may learn to be punctual or be taught to be punctual, but he cannot then be said to believe or know to be punctual. His learning here is best thought of not in terms of knowledge but rather in terms of active propensities, tendencies, or habits of conduct. He has not necessarily nor simply come to believe something new, nor has he simply or necessarily achieved a new procedural facility or a new subject familiarity. He has, rather, acquired a new trait or pattern of action. His conduct now, though not before, is characterizable as generally displaying punctuality. 这一点可以从 "学会 "和 "教会 "没有 "相信 "或 "知道 "这样的对应词引入。例如，孩子可以学会守时或被教导守时，但不能说他相信或知道自己守时。他在这里的学习最好不是从知识的角度，而是从积极的倾向、趋势或行为习惯的角度来考虑。他并不一定也不简单地相信了一些新东西，也不简单或必然地掌握了一种新的程序技巧或熟悉了一个新的主题。相反，他获得了一种新的行为特征或模式。他现在的行为，尽管以前不是这样，可以说是普遍表现出守时的特点。
The learning to and teaching to expressions are, furthermore, not limited to the case of active propensities; they extend also to other cases, which are difficult to classify but which might perhaps be here labeled attainments: The child might, for instance, learn to appreciate music or to understand the relation between multiplication and addition, but he could not be said to believe or to know to appreciate or understand. So in respect of attainments as well as propensities our educational terms outstrip knowing in range. 此外，"学会表达 "和 "教会表达 "并不局限于主动倾向的情况；它们还延伸到其他情况，这些情况很难归类，但也许可以在这里被称为 "成就"：例如，儿童可能学会欣赏音乐或理解乘法和加法之间的关系，但不能说他相信或知道欣赏或理解。因此，就成就和倾向而言，我们的教育术语在范围上超过了 "知道"。
But perhaps to understand something is reducible to knowing it, so learning to understand XX is learning to know XX. While, however, there may indeed be contexts in which knowing XX conveys the connotation of understanding XX, it does not seem plausible to make the proposed general reduction. A person may say without contradiction, “I know the doctrines of the existentialists, but I don’t understand them.” Or we may say of a child, “He knows Newton’s laws (or Shakespeare’s plays) but doesn’t yet understand them.” The limits of such knowing are perhaps elastic, involving at times familiarity, recognition, acquaintance, and ability to formulate, paraphrase, and use but not in every case including understanding. What constitutes understanding if it is not simply familiarity or skill of a certain sort is a separate question. Some have suggested that understanding 但是，也许 "理解 "可以还原为 "知道"，因此学习理解 XX 就是学习知道 XX 。然而，在某些情况下，知道 XX 可能确实传达了理解 XX 的内涵，但进行拟议的一般还原似乎并不靠谱。一个人可以毫不矛盾地说："我知道存在主义者的学说，但我不理解它们。我们也可以这样说一个孩子："他知道牛顿定律（或莎士比亚戏剧），但还不理解它们。这种 "知道 "的限度也许是有弹性的，有时包括熟悉、认识、了解，以及表述、转述和使用的能力，但并非在任何情况下都包括理解。如果不是简单的熟悉或某种技能，那么什么才是理解，这是另外一个问题。有人认为，理解
involves something analogous to perception: seeing the point. Or it might be construed to include having explained or paraphrased the doctrine in question in special terms, initially intelligible to the person. Or, again, it might be thought to require a certain degree of experience or maturity (as in understanding Shakespeare’s plays). However we interpret it, it seems not to reduce to the subject use of know. 这涉及类似于感知的东西：看到要点。或者，它可能被解释为包括用特殊的术语解释或诠释了有关学说，而这些术语最初是为人们所理解的。或者，它也可能被认为需要一定程度的经验或成熟（如理解莎士比亚的戏剧）。无论我们如何解释它，它似乎都不会简化为 "知道 "的主语用法。
It might now be suggested that, although there are no believing to or knowing to locutions, a certain kind of believing that or knowing that accompanies learning to. The idea, in effect, may be to reduce the latter to learning that: The child who has learned to be punctual has come to believe or know that he ought to be punctual; the child who has learned to appreciate music has come to believe or know that he ought to appreciate music; having learned to understand multiplication, he has come to know that he ought to understand multiplication. 现在可以说，虽然没有 "相信到 "或 "知道到 "的语句，但某种 "相信 "或 "知道 "伴随着 "学会到"。实际上，我们可以把后者简化为 "学会"：学会守时的孩子开始相信或知道他应该守时；学会欣赏音乐的孩子开始相信或知道他应该欣赏音乐；学会理解乘法之后，他开始知道他应该理解乘法。
This suggestion does not, however, seem to be tenable. Certainly, the converses fail even though in some contexts we interpret, for example, the child’s knowing that he ought to be punctual as implying that he is punctual. But even the inferences from learning to statements to the proposed believing that or knowing that statements break down. A boy may learn to bite his nails or to smoke without coming to believe or to know that he ought to bite his nails or to smoke. A person may come to appreciate a painting or to understand the concepts of atomic theory without holding that he ought to; indeed, the question may be raised whether it can meaningfully be said that one ought to appreciate or understand, as distinct from trying to appreciate or understand. Nor, in coming to appreciate a painting, does a person always come to believe that it is a good painting; and surely the converse here fails also. (Appreciation may, to be sure, involve liking, but liking is itself not reducible to a belief in the goodness of the object.) 然而，这种说法似乎站不住脚。当然，即使在某些情境中，我们把孩子知道他应该守时解释为意味着他守时，对话也是失败的。但是，即使是从学习到陈述再到拟议的相信或知道陈述的推论也是失败的。一个男孩可能学会了咬指甲或抽烟，但他并不相信或知道他应该咬指甲或抽烟。一个人可能会欣赏一幅画或理解原子理论的概念，但他并不认为自己应该这样做；事实上，人们可能会提出这样一个问题：是否可以有意义地说，一个人应该欣赏或理解，而不是试图欣赏或理解。一个人在欣赏一幅画的过程中，也并不总是相信它是一幅好画；反之亦然。(当然，欣赏可能包含喜欢，但喜欢本身并不能归结为相信对象是好的）。
Finally, it might be suggested that learning to is really procedural, a matter of acquiring more or less complex skills or techniques, describable in terms of knowing how. There are some examples in which this suggestion seems to find a plausible interpretation: To say that someone has learned to swim or to drive a car is indeed to say that he has come to know how to swim or to drive-he has acquired swimming or driving skills. These are, however, cases in which the learning to expression could well be supplanted by learning how to: To have learned to swim or to drive is to have learned how to swim or to drive. Not every case of learning to can, however, be thus rewritten in terms of learning how to, nor can it be interpreted as a matter of acquiring some relevant bit of know-how. To learn to be a good neighbor or citizen is not the same as learning how to 最后，有人可能会说，"学会 "实际上是程序性的，是一个掌握或多或少复杂的技能 或技巧的问题，可以用 "知道如何 "来描述。在一些例子中，这种说法似乎可以得到合理的解释：说一个人学会了游泳或开车，的确是说他已经知道如何游泳或开车--他已经掌握了游泳或开车的技能。然而，在这些情况下，"学会 "的表述完全可以被 "如何学会 "所取代：学会游泳或开车就是学会如何游泳或开车。然而，并不是每一个 "学会 "的例子都可以用 "学会如何 "来改写，也不能把它解释为掌握一些相关的诀窍。学会做一个好邻居或好公民并不等于学会如何
be a good neighbor or citizen. To learn to pay one’s debts is not the same as learning how to pay one’s debts; it is not, for example, simply the sort of thing that is involved in learning the proper use of a checkbook. ^(5){ }^{5} Learning various techniques for ensuring one’s punctuality is not yet learning to be punctual. To acquire a skill is one thing, to acquire a habit or propensity quite another. 成为一个好邻居或好公民。学会偿还债务并不等于学会如何偿还债务；例如，学会正确使用支票簿并不是简单的事情。 ^(5){ }^{5} 学习各种确保自己守时的技巧还不是学会守时。掌握一种技能是一回事，养成一种习惯或倾向则是另一回事。
The case seems even stronger with respect to what we have called attainments. For, whereas active propensities often have strictly associated techniques (e.g., a person who enjoys swimming and swims regularly knows how to swim), attainments do not have strictly associated techniques. A person who appreciates music is not properly said to know how to appreciate music; one who understands quantum theory is not well described as knowing how to understand quantum theory. (It would certainly seem strange if someone said that he knew very well how to appreciate music but didn’t choose to, or that he knew how to understand quantum theory but hadn’t in fact understood it lately.) Certainly there are techniques embedded in attainments: One who understands quantum theory knows how to read, and one who appreciates music knows how to listen. But these bits of know-how are not strictly associated; they are not equivalent to knowing how to understand, and knowing how to appreciate, respectively. Understanding and appreciation cannot, it would seem, readily be said to be exercises of technique or know-how, as swimming might be said to be an exercise of swimming know-how. For there seems to be no such thing as an understanding know-how or an appreciating know-how. Much less can learning to understand or to appreciate be suggested to reduce to mere acquisition of such know-how. 对于我们所说的 "成就 "来说，情况似乎更加严重。因为，主动倾向往往有严格相关的技巧（例如，一个喜欢游泳并经常游泳的人知道如何游泳），而成就则没有严格相关的技巧。一个欣赏音乐的人并不能被恰当地描述为知道如何欣赏音乐；一个理解量子理论的人也不能被恰当地描述为知道如何理解量子理论。(如果有人说他非常懂得如何欣赏音乐，但却没有选择欣赏音乐，或者说他懂得如何理解量子理论，但实际上最近并没有理解量子理论，这肯定会显得很奇怪）。当然，成就中蕴含着技巧：理解量子理论的人知道如何阅读，欣赏音乐的人知道如何聆听。但这些诀窍并没有严格的联系，它们并不等同于懂得如何理解和懂得如何欣赏。理解和欣赏似乎不能轻易地被说成是技术或诀窍的练习，就像游泳可能被说成是游泳诀窍的练习一样。因为似乎不存在理解的诀窍或欣赏的诀窍。更不能把学习理解或欣赏归结为仅仅掌握这些诀窍。
Skills, or procedures and elements of know-how, carry with them a cluster of associated notions that do not all apply either in the case of propensities or in the case of attainments. First of all, a skill or element of know-how, once acquired, may or may not be exercised, given the relevant opportunities; a person may be said to have a skill or the relevant know-how even though he never (or very rarely) exercises it after having acquired it, although he has ample opportunity to do so. There are many people who have learned and who know how to swim but who do not any longer swim at all, or only very rarely, though they have the chance. We may conjecture that their technique is rusty, but we do not feel compelled to deny that they can swim. By contrast, a person who has the habit or trait of punctuality is a person who is generally punctual on relevant occasions. If a person who had been punctual began to show up late for all, or nearly all, of his appointments and continued thus consistently for an appreciable length of time, we should wish to say he had lost the habit of punctuality. A person could not claim still 技能，或诀窍的程序和要素，带有一系列相关的概念，这些概念并不都适用于倾向或成就的情况。首先，一种技能或诀窍要素一旦获得，在有相关机会的情况下，可以行使，也可以不行使；一个人在获得技能或相关诀窍后，尽管有充分的机会去行使，但他从未（或很少）行使过，也可以说他拥有了这种技能或诀窍。有许多人学会了游泳，也知道如何游泳，但他们根本不再游泳，或者很少游泳，尽管他们有机会游泳。我们可以猜测他们的技术已经生疏，但我们并不否认他们会游泳。相比之下，有守时习惯或特质的人是指在相关场合一般都很守时的人。如果一个一向守时的人开始在所有或几乎所有约会中迟到，并持续了相当长的一段时间，我们应该说他已经失去了守时的习惯。一个人不能说他仍然
to be punctual on the grounds that he had once been, though for a long time he had never, or hardly ever, arrived anywhere on time. In short, it is quite possible to say that XX knows how to swim but never does; it would, however, strike us as self-contradictory to say that XX has the habit of punctuality but never shows up on time. For attainments, the very notion of repeated performance is suspect: We may speak of one who knows how to swim as swimming every Tuesday, of a punctual student as showing up on time to class twenty times in a row. But what would it mean to say of a person who understands the quantum theory that he had understood it every Tuesday last month, or of a person who appreciates modern art that he had appreciated it twenty times in a row? XX 以自己曾经准时为由，认为自己准时，尽管在很长一段时间里，他从未或几乎从未准时到达过任何地方。简而言之，我们完全可以说 XX 会游泳，但从未游过泳；然而，如果说 XX 有守时的习惯，但从未准时出席，我们会觉得这是自相矛盾的。就成就而言，重复表现这一概念本身就值得怀疑：我们可以说一个会游泳的人每周二都会游泳，也可以说一个守时的学生连续二十次准时到校上课。但是，如果说一个理解量子理论的人上个月每个星期二都理解量子理论，或者说一个欣赏现代艺术的人连续二十次欣赏现代艺术，那又意味着什么呢？
Secondly, in the case of skill or know-how a person may clearly decide not to exercise it. There is nothing puzzling in saying that a man knows how to play tennis but chooses not to. An analogous description is indeed possible also for habits, for a man may deliberately control his own propensities on particular occasions; a smoker may decide not to smoke now, for example. There seems, however, to be no such analogue for attainments: A person with an understanding of quantum theory cannot choose not to understand it; one who appreciates poetry cannot decide not to appreciate poetry on Mondays. Even for habits, moreover, the analogy is limited; where control goes far enough, it turns into elimination of the habit in question. 其次，就技能或诀窍而言，一个人显然可以决定不运用它。一个人知道如何打网球，但却选择不打，这并没有什么令人费解的。习惯也可以有类似的描述，因为一个人可以在特定场合有意控制自己的倾向；例如，吸烟者可以决定现在不吸烟。然而，对于成就，似乎没有类似的描述：一个理解量子理论的人不能选择不理解量子理论；一个欣赏诗歌的人不能决定在周一不欣赏诗歌。此外，即使是对习惯而言，这种类比也是有限的；如果控制的程度足够大，就会变成消除有关习惯。
Thirdly, the notion of practice seems clearly relevant to skills Jand know-how; they are, indeed, typically built up through repeated trials or performances. Analogously, we may speak of habits, too, as being formed through repeated trials; through smoking again and again one may, for example, develop a genuine smoking habit. A parallel description seems, however, out of the question in the case of attainments. One cannot develop an understanding of the quantum theory by understanding it over and over again, nor can one strengthen or deepen one’s understanding by repeated performances of understanding; the very notion of repeated performances is here suspect, as argued above. It makes sense to tell a student to practice playing a certain piece of music; it makes no sense to tell him to practice appreciating what he plays. 第三，"实践 "这一概念似乎与技能和诀窍明显相关；事实上，技能和诀窍通常是通过反复试验或表演而形成的。同样，我们也可以把习惯说成是通过反复试验形成的；例如，一个人可以通过反复吸烟养成真正的吸烟习惯。然而，对于成就来说，类似的描述似乎是不可能的。一个人不可能通过反复理解量子理论来形成对它的理解，也不可能通过反复表演理解来加强或加深对它的理解；如上所述，反复表演这一概念本身就值得怀疑。告诉学生练习演奏某一首乐曲是有意义的，但告诉他练习欣赏他所演奏的乐曲则毫无意义。
Finally, the notions of proficiency or mastery seem peculiarly applicable to skills. One may attain proficiency in driving or become a master in chess, but one cannot well be described as proficient in punctuality or honesty nor as having become a master of the habit of taking a walk before breakfast. Neither can one be said to be proficient in understanding a theory nor to have mastered the appreciation of Bach. A person may have more or less understanding of a topic, he may appreciate a poem less or more, but he cannot be 最后，熟练或精通的概念似乎特别适用于技能。一个人可以精通驾驶或成为国际象棋高手，但却不能说他精通守时或诚实，也不能说他养成了早餐前散步的习惯。一个人既不能说精通了某种理论，也不能说掌握了欣赏巴赫的技巧。一个人对某一主题的理解可能多一些或少一些，他对某一首诗的欣赏可能少一些或多一些，但他不可能是
called a good understander or appreciator as he might be called a good driver, typist, or chess-player. Similarly, a person’s habit of smoking or of fingernail-biting may be weak or strong, deeply or less deeply ingrained, easy or difficult to break, but he cannot well be described as a good smoker or fingernail-biter. 就像一个人可以被称为好司机、好打字员或好棋手一样，他也不能被称为一个好的理解者或欣赏者。同样，一个人吸烟或咬指甲的习惯可能很弱或很强，可能根深蒂固或不那么根深蒂固，可能容易改掉或很难改掉，但他不可能被称为一个好的吸烟者或咬指甲者。
The upshot is that neither propensities nor attainments can well be assimilated to the category of skills or know-how, nor can learning to and teaching to be construed as really procedural. It follows that the range of educational concepts is not only larger than that of belief, as we saw earlier; it is also larger than that of knowing. Education outstrips cognitive notions altogether in its range, embracing, as we have seen, also the formation of propensities and traits, and the development of understanding and appreciation. 结果是，无论是倾向性还是成就，都不能很好地归入技能或诀窍的范畴，"学 "和 "教 "也不能被解释为真正的程序性。由此可见，教育概念的范围不仅大于我们前面所看到的信仰概念，也大于认知概念。教育的范围完全超越了认知概念，正如我们所看到的，它还包括倾向和特质的形成，以及理解和鉴赏能力的发展。
illustrative definition of propositional knowledge 命题知识的说明性定义
Having seen the wide range of educational notions, we now turn to a consideration of that part of the range which overlaps the range of knowing. The case of knowing that has figured most prominently in classical discussions in epistemology is the propositional case, and to this we address ourselves first. We shall find it convenient to introduce here a sample definition of knowing that as an anchor for our future discussions of the propositional case. This definition sets three conditions for knowing that, and we shall refer to these as the belief condition, the evidence condition, and the truth condition. ^(6){ }^{6} 在了解了教育概念的广泛范围之后，我们现在来探讨与 "知 "的范围相重叠的部分。在认识论的经典讨论中最为突出的知性是命题知性，我们首先讨论命题知性。我们会发现，在这里介绍一个关于 "知性 "的定义样本很方便，它可以作为我们今后讨论命题情况的基础。这个定义为 "知道 "设定了三个条件，我们将把它们称为 "信念条件"、"证据条件 "和 "真理条件"。 ^(6){ }^{6} XX knows that QQ XX 知道 QQ
if and only if 当且仅当
(i) XX believes that QQ (i) XX 认为 QQ
(ii) XX has adequate evidence that QQ (ii) XX 有充分证据表明 QQ
(iii) QQ. (iii) QQ 。
This definition takes all three stated conditions as jointly defining knowing that and thus corresponds to the “strong sense” of know discussed early in the first section of the present chapter. The “weak sense” is easily gotten by simply omitting condition (ii). In each of the following three chapters we shall take one of the above conditions and discuss certain outstanding issues relating to its interpretation. We turn first to truth. 这个定义将所有三个条件都视为 "知道 "的共同定义，因此与本章第一节早先讨论的 "知道 "的 "强意义 "相对应。只要省略条件（ii），就很容易得到 "弱意义"。在接下来的三章中，我们将分别选取上述条件中的一个，讨论有关其解释的某些悬而未决的问题。我们首先讨论真理。
CHAPTER TWO 第二章
Knowledge and Truth 知识与真理
THE TRUTH CONDITION OF PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 命题知识的真理性条件
At the end of the last chapter, we referred to the third condition of our definition as a truth condition. The point is that when we assert that a person XX knows that QQ we are not only (in effect) affirming the truth of our whole assertion, but we are committing ourselves also to the truth of the embedded substantive statement, " QQ." We may, of course, be mistaken in both claims, for it may, in fact, be the case neither that XX knows that QQ nor that QQ. We might also be mistaken in just one of these claims, for XX may, in fact, not know that QQ even though the statement " QQ " is true. But what is ruled out by the truth condition is the remaining possibility: that we are right in holding XX to know that QQ but mistaken about the truth of " QQ." The truth condition thus is to be understood as asserting: If it is true that XX knows that QQ then it is true that QQ. Further, the notion of truth in the foregoing exposition is only a convenience; the content of the relevant assertion can, for example, also be put as follows: If XX knows that QQ then QQ (no matter what statement is put in place of both occurrences of " QQ "). The important point in any event is that in asserting, or taking it as true, that XX knows that QQ we are committed also to asserting, or taking it as true, that QQ for the latter is a “necessary condition” of the former. 在上一章的结尾，我们把定义的第三个条件称为真理条件。问题在于，当我们断言一个人 XX 知道 QQ 时，我们（实际上）不仅肯定了我们整个断言的真实性，而且还承诺了嵌入的实质性陈述" QQ "的真实性。当然，我们可能在这两个断言上都犯了错误，因为事实上， XX 可能既不知道 QQ ，也不知道 QQ 。我们也可能只弄错了其中一个说法，因为 XX 事实上可能不知道 QQ ，即使" QQ "是真的。但是，真理条件所排除的是剩下的可能性：我们认为 XX 知道 QQ 是正确的，但对 " QQ "的真假却有误解。因此，真理条件应被理解为断言：如果 XX 知道 QQ 是真的，那么 QQ 就是真的。此外，上述论述中的 "真 "概念只是为了方便起见；例如，相关断言的内容也可以表述为：如果 XX 知道 QQ 为真，那么 QQ 为真：如果 XX 知道 QQ ，那么 QQ （无论用什么语句来代替" QQ "的两次出现）。无论如何，重要的一点是，在断言 XX 知道 QQ 或将其视为真实时，我们也承诺断言 QQ 知道 QQ 或将其视为真实，因为后者是前者的 "必要条件"。
To say we are committed to asserting that QQ does not of course mean that we need to have this commitment in the forefront of our consciousness whenever we judge XX to know that QQ. The truth condition does not reflect what goes on in the consciousness of the person attributing knowledge; rather, it purports to reflect an objective commitment of such attribution, evidenced indirectly in the way specific 说我们致力于断言 QQ ，当然并不意味着每当我们判断 XX 知道 QQ 时，我们的意识中就需要有这种承诺。真理条件并不反映归因知识的人的意识中发生了什么；相反，它意图反映这种归因的客观承诺，并以具体的方式间接地证明了这一点。
attributions are critically evaluated: In particular, a knowledge attribution will be withdrawn or rejected if it is denied that QQ. 对归因进行严格评估：特别是，如果否认 QQ .
We discussed a relevant example in the first section of Chapter I. The student claiming to know that evil spirits cause disease will not be acknowledged by us to know any such thing, for we deny that evil spirits do cause disease. We may, however, if we accept the sincerity of the claim, admit that this student believes that evil spirits cause disease, though he believes it mistakenly. If you were to hear me say I knew the play would begin at eight o’clock, and you had just been informed by the box office that it would start at eight-thirty, you would suppose me to be mistaken in my belief. You would surely not describe me as knowing that the play would begin at eight, if you accepted the official word of the box office. 我们在第一章第一节讨论了一个相关的例子。我们不会承认声称知道邪灵会导致 疾病的学生知道任何这类事情，因为我们否认邪灵确实会导致疾病。但是，如果我们承认他的说法是真诚的，我们可以承认这个学生相信邪灵会导致疾 病，尽管他相信的是错误的。如果你听到我说我知道这出戏将在 8 点钟开始，而售票处刚刚通知你这出戏将在 8 点半开始，你会认为我相信错了。如果你接受票房的官方说法，你肯定不会说我知道演出将在八点开始。
In general, if you think I am mistaken in my belief, you will deny that I know, no matter how sincere you judge me to be and no matter how strong you consider my conviction. For XX to be judged mistaken is sufficient basis for rejecting the claim that he knows. It follows that if XX is admitted to know, he must be judged not to be mistaken, and this is the point of the truth condition. 一般来说，如果你认为我的信念有误，你就会否认我知道，无论你认为我多么真诚，无论你认为我的信念多么坚定。如果 XX 被判定为是错误的，这就足以成为否定他 "知道 "这一说法的依据。由此可见，如果承认 XX 知道，就必须判定他没有弄错，这就是真理条件的意义所在。
Additional grounds for this condition may be found in our common forms of speech. Whereas we may describe someone as mistakenly believing that whales are fish, we could not well describe him as mistakenly knowing that whales are fish. We may say a person is wrong in believing that water contracts upon freezing, but we would not say he is wrong in knowing that water contracts upon freezing. I don’t contradict myself in saying, “Most people believe it’s hard to learn symbolic logic, but they’re wrong.” I do, in contrast, seem clearly to contradict myself in saying, “Most people know it’s hard to learn symbolic logic, but they’re wrong.” I may once have said, “I know I will never learn to type.” Having learned, I do not say, “I once knew I would never learn to type, but I was wrong”; I say, rather, “I once believed I would never learn to type, but I was wrong.” Having come to the realization that I was wrong, I withdraw the claim to have known. Finally, I may well say, “I believe that man’s name is Jones, but I may be mistaken’”; I cannot well say, “I know that man’s name is Jones, but I may be mistaken.” 在我们常用的语言形式中，还可以找到这种情况的其他依据。我们可以说某人错误地认为鲸鱼是鱼，但我们不能说他错误地知道鲸鱼是鱼。我们可以说一个人错误地认为水在结冰时会收缩，但我们不会说他错误地知道水在结冰时会收缩。我说 "大多数人认为符号逻辑很难学习，但他们错了"，这并不矛盾。相比之下，我说 "大多数人都知道符号逻辑难学，但他们错了 "似乎明显自相矛盾。我可能曾经说过，"我知道我永远学不会打字"。在学会之后，我不会说："我曾经知道我永远学不会打字，但我错了"；而是说："我曾经相信我永远学不会打字，但我错了"。在意识到自己错了之后，我收回了 "我知道 "的说法。最后，我可以说："我相信那个人叫琼斯，但我可能搞错了"；但我不能说："我知道那个人叫琼斯，但我可能搞错了"。
Knowing, it would appear, is incompatible with being wrong or mistaken, and when I describe someone as knowing, I commit myself to his not being mistaken. In discussing other people’s opinions, I may thus reveal my own by use of the word know, rather than concealing them by use of the word believe. If, for example, I say, “Plato believes there are ideal forms,” you may well ask if I agree with him. If, by contrast, I say, “Dewey knowṣ that inquiry arises out of problems,” I have already indicated I agree with him. 看来，"知道 "与 "错误 "是不相容的，当我说某人 "知道 "时，我就承诺他没有错误。因此，在讨论他人的观点时，我可以通过使用 "知道 "一词来揭示自己的观点，而不是通过使用 "相信 "一词来掩盖自己的观点。例如，如果我说："柏拉图认为存在理想的形式"，你很可能会问我是否同意他的观点。相反，如果我说："杜威知道探究产生于问题"，我就已经表明我同意他的观点。
We must now, however, recognize certain apparent counter- 然而，我们现在必须认识到某些明显的反面情况。
examples to the truth condition. Earlier, we saw that the student who said, “I learned that the gods dwelt on Olympus” could be taken as saying, “I learned that it was believed that the gods dwelt on Olympus.” Now this same student, having done well in his examination, might be described by his teacher as knowing that the gods dwelt on Olympus, without any commitment on the teacher’s part to assert that the gods did dwell on Olympus. The truth condition would, in such a case, be violated. The teacher’s description might, however, also plausibly be interpreted as elliptical, the student being said to know it was believed that the gods dwelt on Olympus. Given such an interpretation, the truth condition would again be preserved, for the teacher is committed to the assertion that it was believed the gods dwelt on Olympus. 举例说明真理条件。前面我们看到，学生说 "我知道众神居住在奥林匹斯山"，可以理解为 "我知道人们相信众神居住在奥林匹斯山"。现在，这个学生在考试中取得了好成绩，他的老师可能会说他知道众神居住在奥林匹斯山上，但老师并没有承诺断言众神确实居住在奥林匹斯山上。在这种情况下，就违反了真实条件。然而，教师的描述也可以被解释为省略句，即学生知道人们相信众神居住在奥林匹斯山上。在这样的解释下，真实条件将再次得到保留，因为教师承诺了 "人们相信众神居住在奥林匹斯山 "这一断言。
A somewhat analogous treatment accounts. for the apparent counterexample, “John knows that Hamlet was a prince of Denmark,” which may be taken as “John knows that Shakespeare’s play asserts Hamlet to be a prince of Denmark.” Here, too, the truth condition is preserved by spelling out the supposed content of knowledge, “knowing that” being understood, in effect, as “knowing it to be asserted that.” 对于 "约翰知道哈姆雷特是丹麦王子 "这个明显的反例，可以采用有点类似的处理方法，将其理解为 "约翰知道莎士比亚的戏剧断言哈姆雷特是丹麦王子"。同样，在这里，"知道 "被理解为 "知道......被断言"，通过明确知识的假定内容，真理条件得以保留。
Another sort of apparent counterexample to the truth condition is presented by our description, not of the student, but of the Greeks themselves, in the sentence “The Greeks knew the gods dwelt on Olympus.” Here the previous remedy fails, for we clearly do not mean that the Greeks knew it was believed that the gods dwelt on Olympus. What is intended here is rather that they believed they knew that the gods dwelt on Olympus, or that they were sure the gods dwelt on Olympus. The point is often expressed in such a formula as: “For the Greeks, the gods dwelt on Olympus.” Under such interpretation, the truth condition is again preserved, for it applies only to knowing, not to belief in knowing. 在 "希腊人知道众神居住在奥林匹斯山 "这句话中，我们对希腊人本身的描述，而不是对学生的描述，是对真理条件的另一种明显的反例。在这里，前面的补救办法失败了，因为我们的意思显然不是说希腊人知道人们相信众神居住在奥林匹斯山上。这里的意思是，他们相信他们知道众神居住在奥林匹斯山上，或者他们确信众神居住在奥林匹斯山上。这一点经常用这样的公式来表达："对希腊人来说，众神就住在奥林匹斯山上："对希腊人来说，众神居住在奥林匹斯山"。在这种解释下，真理的条件再次得到保留，因为它只适用于知道，而不是相信知道。
Aside from apparent exceptions of the sorts we have just considered, which may be explained away by appropriately expanded expressions, we may take the truth condition as holding directly: The statement " XX knows that QQ " commits the speaker to the assertion represented by " QQ." If he says, " XX mistakenly believes that QQ “’ he commits himself, on the other hand, to the denial of " QQ.” He remains neutral as between " QQ " and “not- QQ " if he merely says, " XX believes that QQ.” Further, if he denies rather than attributes knowledge, he also retains his neutrality. For example, “He does not know that the car is in the garage” implies neither that it is nor that it is not. It may be that the car is in the garage, and to deny that he knows is to say that he does not think it is, or is not in a position to be sure that it is. Or, it may be that the car is not in the garage, and to deny that he knows is to say simply that he does not, because he cannot, know what is not the case. 除了我们刚才考虑过的那种明显的例外情况（这些例外情况可以用适当扩展的表达方式来解释），我们可以直接认为真值条件成立：" XX 知道 QQ "这句话使说话者承诺" QQ "所代表的断言。如果他说：" XX 错误地认为 QQ "'，那么他就承诺否认" QQ "。如果他只说：" XX 相信 QQ "，那么他在" QQ "和 "不是 QQ "之间保持中立。此外，如果他否认而不是归因于知识，他也会保持中立。例如，"他不知道汽车在车库里 "既不意味着汽车在车库里，也不意味着汽车不在车库里。汽车可能就在车库里，否认他知道汽车在车库里就是说他不认为汽车在车库里，或者说他无法确定汽车在车库里。或者，汽车可能不在车库里，而否认他知道，只是说他不知道，因为他无法知道什么不在车库里。
KNOWING AS AN ACHIEVEMENT 自知之明
The truth condition suggests that knowledge attributions have a double function which may be characterized as follows: In attributing knowledge to XX, I not only describe XX but say something about the world. I characterize his state of mind in terms of belief that such and such is the case, and I further add that such and such is the case. These two component assertions are logically independent. Certainly, we cannot generally assume that if XX believes that QQ then QQ nor vice versa. The category of mistake is surely applicable to belief in just such cases in which the belief content " QQ " is negated by the actual fact that not- QQ. 真理条件表明，知识归因具有双重功能，其特点如下：在将知识归因于 XX 时，我不仅描述了 XX ，还说出了关于这个世界的一些事情。我用 "相信......就是这样 "来描述他的心理状态，并进一步补充说"......就是这样"。这两个断言在逻辑上是独立的。当然，我们不能笼统地认为，如果 XX 相信 QQ ，那么 QQ 就相信 QQ ，反之亦然。在这种情况下，" QQ "的信念内容就会被 "不是- QQ "这一实际事实所否定。
Belief descriptions of XX are descriptions with embedded, though unasserted, substantive sentences-i.e., those represented by " QQ." A person may, for instance, be described as believing that the world is flat; his state of mind has here been characterized by means of the embedded sentence, “The world is flat,” though this sentence is surely not asserted by the belief description itself. We can, however, independently raise the question whether or not the world is flatthat is, whether or not the facts are such as to render the embedded belief-content sentence true. If the answer is no, the belief is mistaken; otherwise, not. To say, " XX knows that QQ " is then to affirm not merely that XX believes that QQ but also that " QQ " is independently true, that XX 's belief is, as a matter of fact, not mistaken. Knowing is thus incompatible with mistake. If " QQ " is, in fact, false, then XX 's sincerity and strength of conviction may be as great as you like, but he does not know that QQ, for such knowing requires not only the proper state of XX 's mind but the proper state of the world. One might say, not too misleadingly, that believing aims at the truth while knowing that succeeds in this aim. XX 的信念描述是内含实体句子的描述，尽管这些实体句子未被断言，即" QQ "所代表的句子。例如，一个人可能被描述为相信世界是平的；他的心理状态在这里是通过嵌入句子 "世界是平的 "来表征的，尽管这个句子肯定不是信念描述本身所断言的。然而，我们可以独立地提出 "世界是否是平的 "这一问题，即事实是否能使嵌入的信念内容句子成为现实。如果答案是否定的，那么这个信念就是错误的；反之，则不是。那么，说" XX 知道 QQ "就不仅是肯定 XX 相信 QQ ，而且也是肯定" QQ "是独立真实的，即 XX 的信念事实上并没有错误。因此，"知道 "与 "错误 "是不相容的。如果" QQ "事实上是假的，那么 XX 的真诚和信念的力量可以随心所欲，但他并不知道 QQ ，因为这种知道不仅需要 XX 的心灵处于适当的状态，而且需要世界处于适当的状态。有人可能会说，"相信 "的目的是 "真理"，而 "知道 "的目的则是 "真理"。
Another way of putting the matter is to say (perhaps more misleadingly) that whereas believing that has a purely psychological reference, requiring only some appropriate state of mind, knowing that does not, in general, have purely psychological reference, for it also makes independent reference to an appropriate state of the world. Unlike the traditional view that knowing and believing are related forms of mental activity, the present idea leads us to differentiate sharply between them, in denying that knowing is simply a mental 另一种说法是（也许更容易引起误解），"相信 "具有纯粹的心理指向，只需要某种适当的心理状态，而 "知道 "一般来说并不具有纯粹的心理指向，因为它也独立地指向世界的适当状态。与认为知与信是心理活动的相关形式的传统观点不同，现在的观点引导我们将它们截然区分开来，否认知仅仅是一种心理
Many modern writers have defended this thesis from differing standpoints and have brought various auxiliary considerations in its support. R. M. Chisholm, for example, writes, "We must not think of knowing as being, in any sense, a ‘species of’ believing or accepting. A man can be said to believe firmly, or reluctantly, or hesitatingly, but no one can be said to know firmly, or reluctantly, or hesitatingly. ^("" "){ }^{\text {" }} J. L. Austin, in a widely quoted passage, stresses the oddness of 许多现代作家从不同的立场为这一论点辩护，并提出各种辅助性的考虑来支持这一论点。例如，R. M. Chisholm 写道："我们绝不能认为认识在任何意义上都是相信或接受的'一种'。可以说一个人坚定地、勉强地或犹豫不决地相信，但不能说一个人坚定地、勉强地或犹豫不决地知道。 ^("" "){ }^{\text {" }} J.L.奥斯汀在一段被广泛引用的文字中强调了以下奇怪之处
classifying knowing and believing as cognitive acts along the same continuum: “Saying ‘I know,’” he writes, "is not saying ‘I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite sure’: for there is nothing in that scale superior to being quite sure. ^(''2){ }^{\prime \prime 2} 他把 "知道 "和 "相信 "归类为同一连续统一体中的认知行为："他写道："说'我知道'，并不是说'我完成了一项特别引人注目的认知壮举，在与相信和确信相同的尺度上，它甚至优于仅仅相当确信'：因为在这个尺度上，没有什么比相当确信更优越的了。 ^(''2){ }^{\prime \prime 2}
Austin also points to differences in the way first-person assertions of belief and of knowledge are challenged. We ask, “How do you know?” and “Why do you believe?” but not vice versa. "And in this . . . not merely such other words as ‘suppose’, ‘assume’, etc., but also the expressions ‘be sure’ and ‘be certain’, follow the example of ‘believe’, not that of ‘know’ " (p. 46). Furthermore, as Austin notes, a challenge that is unsuccessfully met is treated quite differently in the case of knowledge and in the case of belief. If the belief challenge is not met to the satisfaction of the ehallenger, he will say “something such as ‘That’s very poor evidence to go on: you oughtn’t to believe it on the strength of that alone’” (p. 46). On the other hand, if the knowledge challenge is not properly met, the answer will be “something such as ‘Then you don’t know any such thing’, or ‘But that doesn’t prove it: in that case you don’t really know it at all.’ . . . The ‘existence’ of your alleged belief is not challenged, but the ‘existence’ of your alleged knowledge is challenged. If we like to say that ‘I believe’, and likewise ‘I am sure’ and ‘I am certain’, are descriptions of subjective mental or cognitive states or attitudes, or what not, then ‘I know’ is not that, or at least not merely that: it functions differently in talking” (pp. 46-47). 奥斯汀还指出，第一人称的信念断言和知识断言受到质疑的方式不同。我们会问 "你怎么知道？"和 "你为什么相信？"，但反之亦然。"在这一点上......不仅仅是'假设'、'假定'等词语，就连'确信'和'肯定'这样的表达也是效仿'相信'，而不是'知道'"（第 46 页）。此外，正如奥斯汀所指出的，在知识和信念的情况下，挑战失败的处理方式是完全不同的。如果信念的质疑没有得到令质疑者满意的回应，他就会说"'这个证据太差了：你不应该仅凭这个就相信它'"（第 46 页）。另一方面，如果知识挑战没有得到适当的回应，答案将是 "诸如'那你就不知道任何这样的事情'，或'但这并不能证明它：在这种情况下，你根本就不真正知道它'......"。. .你所谓的信念的'存在'没有受到质疑，但你所谓的知识的'存在'却受到了质疑。如果我们说'我相信'、'我确信'和'我肯定'是对主观心理或认知状态或态度的描述，那么'我知道'就不是这样，或者至少不仅仅是这样：它在说话时起着不同的作用"（第 46-47 页）。
In denying that there is sufficient reason to hold that your belief is correct, or that it squares with the facts, I conclude only that your belief is not well-grounded, not that it does not exist. To find good reason to say it does not exist is, of course, theoretically possible: I should need to find appropriate indications about your “internal” or psychological state, however. For example, I might have adequate indication to suppose that, in making your belief statement, you were insincere, lying, joking, or fooling yourself. In any event, I could not rely merely on showing your belief to be factually wrong. By contrast, in the case of knowing, without having any comparable indication about your “internal” or psychological state, and merely by showing cause to hold your knowledge claim untrue to the facts, I am able to conclude that you do not know. The conclusion seems to be that knowing, unlike believing, has independent factual reference. The truth condition, which makes explicit this factual reference, thus seems to rule out the traditional (and still current) notion that knowing is simply and purely a cognitive task, faculty, activity, state, process, or performance. 在否认有足够的理由认为你的信念是正确的，或者它与事实相符时，我的结论只是你的信念没有充分的依据，而不是它不存在。当然，从理论上讲，找到充分的理由说它不存在是可能的：不过，我需要找到关于你的 "内在 "或心理状态的适当迹象。例如，我可能会有足够的迹象来假设，你在做出信念声明时是不真诚的、撒谎、开玩笑或自欺欺人。无论如何，我不能仅仅依靠证明你的信念在事实上是错误的。相比之下，在 "知道 "的情况下，在没有任何关于你的 "内在 "或心理状态的类似迹象的情况下，仅仅通过证明你的 "知道 "说法与事实不符，我就能得出你不知道的结论。结论似乎是，"知道 "与 "相信 "不同，它有独立的事实参照。因此，真理条件明确了这种事实参照，似乎排除了传统的（而且仍然是当前的）观念，即 "知道 "只是一种纯粹的认知任务、能力、活动、状态、过程或表现。
That knowing is an achievement and, in particular, not a kind of mental performance or activity has been argued by Gilbert Ryle. ^(3){ }^{3} 吉尔伯特-赖尔认为，认识是一种成就，尤其不是一种心理表现或活动。 ^(3){ }^{3}
Ryle begins by introducing the general notion of a category-mistake, which he illustrates as follows: A visitor to Oxford or Cambridge is shown various colleges, libraries, offices, museums, etc., and then he asks “Where is the University?” mistakenly assigning the University to the same category as the things he has already been shown. Ryle offers no definition of what he intends by category, but his guiding idea seems to be that members of the same category should be subject to the same sorts of qualification, and accessible to the same sorts of question. The urgent theoretical problem for any definition of category is to say what is meant by the same sorts in each case, but let us here waive this problem and follow Ryle in using our unanalyzed, intuitive notions of relevant sameness. 赖尔首先介绍了 "类别错误 "的一般概念，并作了如下说明：一位牛津或剑桥的游客在参观了各种学院、图书馆、办公室、博物馆等之后，问道："大学在哪里？"他误以为大学与他已经参观过的事物属于同一类别。赖尔没有对他所说的 "类别 "下定义，但他的指导思想似乎是，同一类别中的成员应受到同样的限定，并能回答同样的问题。对于任何范畴的定义而言，亟待解决的理论问题是如何说明在每一种情况下相同种类的含义，但让我们在此放弃这个问题，跟随赖尔使用我们未经分析的、直观的相关同一性概念。
If we do so, it appears plausible that knowing does belong in a different category from activities or performances. For example, to the question, “What are you doing?” one might answer, “Reading a book,” “Eating dinner,” “Studying my notes,” “Listening to the radio.” But one could not well answer, “Knowing that 2 and 7 are 9.” If you ask someone to go for a walk, he might say, “I’m too busy studying to join you,” or “I’d rather study,” or “I’m occupied in studying,” but he could not very well say, “I’m too busy knowing,” or “I’d rather know than come for a walk,” or “I’m occupied in knowing something at the moment.” In general, one can say, “I am swimming,” or “I am reading,” or “I am typing,” but not “I am knowing.” A person may read quickly or slowly, carefully or carelessly, attentively or distractedly, but he cannot know either slowly or quickly, carefully or carelessly, attentively or distractedly. 如果我们这样做，那么 "知道 "与 "活动 "或 "表演 "属于不同的类别似乎是有道理的。例如，对于 "你在做什么？"这个问题，人们可能会回答："看书"、"吃晚饭"、"学习笔记"、"听收音机"。但不能回答 "知道 2 和 7 是 9"。如果你约一个人出去散步，他可能会说："我学习太忙了，不能和你一起去。"或者说："我更愿意学习。"或者说："我正忙着学习。"但他不可能说："我正忙着知道。"或者说："我更愿意知道而不是去散步。"或者说："我现在正忙着知道一些事情。"一般来说，人们可以说 "我在游泳"、"我在读书 "或 "我在打字"，但不能说 "我在了解"。一个人可以快速或缓慢地阅读，可以仔细或粗心地阅读，可以专心或分心地阅读，但他不能缓慢或快速地了解，不能仔细或粗心地了解，不能专心或分心地了解。
Performances are well or ill done and subject, as a rule, to qualification by the adjectives competent, good, or skilled. A person may be said to be a competent typist, a good dancer, a skilled mechanic, but neither a competent, nor a good, nor a skilled knower. A performance or activity may be interrupted: A telephone call may, for example, interrupt someone while he is reading a book and prevent him from finishing it; no student can, however, claim that he had been similarly interrupted in the course of knowing that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and had been prevented from completing the job. Performances can generally be improved through practice, but one cannot practice knowing that 7 and 6 are 13. One can decide whether or not to perform, if one knows how; one cannot analogously be described as deciding whether or not to know that 7 and 6 are 13, if one knows how to know this. As in the case of understanding and appreciation discussed earlier (in the second section of Chapter I), knowing does not seem to fit performance, activity, or skill categories at all, nor does it belong with propensities, for which the notions of decision and repeated trial are also relevant. Knowing appears to resemble rather those things that fit the categories of 表演有好坏之分，通常可以用称职、优秀或熟练等形容词来限定。一个人可以说是称职的打字员、优秀的舞蹈家、熟练的技工，但既不是称职的，也不是优秀的，更不是熟练的知识分子。表演或活动可能被打断：例如，当一个人正在看书时，一个电话可能会打断他，使他无法看完一本书；但是，没有一个学生可以声称，他在知道拿破仑在滑铁卢战败的过程中也同样被打断，从而无法完成作业。一般来说，表演可以通过练习得到提高，但一个人不可能在知道 7 和 6 是 13 的情况下进行练习。如果一个人知道如何去做，他就可以决定是否去做；如果一个人知道如何知道 7 和 6 是 13，他就不能被类比为决定是否知道 7 和 6 是 13。正如前面（第一章第二节）讨论的理解和鉴赏的情况一样，"知道 "似乎完全不符合表演、活动或技能的范畴，也不属于倾向性，而决定和反复试验的概念也与倾向性相关。知性似乎更像那些符合 "行为"、"活动 "或 "技能 "类别的事物。
