Here’s a bit of news: I’ve written my first book! Well, half a book, really. Half of it is a series of republished blog posts that I’ve written about the Japanese economy over the years, while the other half is a new section I wrote. It’s coming out in Japan on March 19th; if you want a copy, you can order one here. The title is Weeb Economy: ウイーブが日本を救う, which translates to “Weeb Economy: The Weebs Will Save Japan”.¹ It was translated from English by the excellent Kataoka Hirohito, who has been translating my blog posts for over a decade.
這裡有一點消息：我寫了我的第一本書！其實，真的只有半本。它的一半是我多年來寫的有關日本經濟的重新發表的博客文章，而另一半是我寫的新部分。它將於 3 月 19 日在日本出版；如果你想要一本，可以在這裡訂購。書名是《Weeb Economy: ウイーブが日本を救う》，翻譯成英文是「Weeb Economy: The Weebs Will Save Japan」。¹ 這是由優秀的片岡宏仁翻譯的，他已經翻譯我的博客文章超過十年。
I have to admit, publishing a book on the Japanese economy with the word “weeb” in the title is pretty on brand for me.
我必須承認，以“weeb”這個詞作為標題出版一本關於日本經濟的書對我來說非常符合我的風格。
Yes, it’s a funny title. But surprisingly, almost nobody in Japan knows the word “weeb”,² so I’m hoping that the novelty will be eye-catching, and that teaching the country a fun and important new word will provide a good excuse to expound my own ideas about how to revive Japan’s stagnant economy.
是的，這是一個有趣的標題。但令人驚訝的是，幾乎沒有人在日本知道“weeb”這個詞，所以我希望這個新奇的詞彙能引起注意，並且教導這個國家一個有趣且重要的新詞將為我闡述自己關於如何振興日本停滯經濟的想法提供一個很好的理由。
The new half of the book is all about how Japan can leverage its global cultural appeal to get more foreign direct investment. As things stand, most FDI into Japan comes in the form of mergers and acquisitions — foreign companies buying Japanese companies in the hope of using them as beachheads to sell into the Japanese market. Japanese people are understandably wary of this type of investment, since it doesn’t really create jobs, and the acquired companies are often mismanaged.
這本書的新一半完全是關於日本如何利用其全球文化吸引力來獲得更多外國直接投資。就目前而言，進入日本的大部分外國直接投資以併購的形式出現——外國公司購買日本公司，希望將其作為進入日本市場的跳板。日本人對這種投資類型自然感到警惕，因為這並不真正創造就業機會，而被收購的公司往往管理不善。
But what Japan really needs is more greenfield platform FDI — companies building factories or research facilities in Japan in order to make and sell products to the rest of the world, or foreign entrepreneurs starting export-oriented startups in Japan. That kind of investment has been used to supercharge the economy of Poland, which is due to overtake Japan in terms of living standards in the near future. As a country, Japan’s exports are surprisingly weak, it has fallen out of many key global supply chains, and its technological ecosystem is often isolated from the rest of the world. Greenfield platform FDI can help fix that, by reintegrating Japan with the global economy, bringing in foreign technology, and pumping up exports.
但日本真正需要的是更多的綠地平台外國直接投資——公司在日本建造工廠或研究設施，以便製造和銷售產品給世界其他地方，或外國企業家在日本創辦以出口為導向的初創公司。這種投資已被用來大幅提升波蘭的經濟，波蘭在不久的將來將超越日本的生活水平。作為一個國家，日本的出口出奇地疲弱，已經脫離了許多關鍵的全球供應鏈，其技術生態系統往往與世界其他地方隔絕。綠地平台外國直接投資可以幫助解決這個問題，通過將日本重新融入全球經濟，引入外國技術，並提升出口。
The basic thesis of Weeb Economy is that the world would love to invest more in Japan, because technologists, entrepreneurs, and businesspeople all over the world would love to live in Japan. Over the last decade or so, there has been a general realization that Japan is a great place for tourism; the country is friendly to foreigners and is easy to navigate. But what most people still don’t realize is how easy it is for foreigners to live and work in Japan.
Weeb Economy 的基本論點是，世界將樂於在日本投資更多，因為全球的技術專家、企業家和商業人士都希望能夠在日本生活。在過去十年左右，人們普遍意識到日本是一個適合旅遊的好地方；這個國家對外國人友好，且易於導航。但大多數人仍然沒有意識到外國人在日本生活和工作的難易程度。
Once they realize that key fact, I believe that lots of people will choose to move and invest. Already, there are some encouraging examples — TSMC fabs in Kumamoto, AI startups in Tokyo, and so on. This is no coincidence. Japan’s culture — not its traditional culture, but its modern way of life — carries a unique appeal that has captivated the hearts of untold millions around the world, including a disproportionate number of people working in high-tech industries. And Japan’s cities are some of the best places to live on Earth.
一旦他們意識到這一關鍵事實，我相信很多人會選擇搬遷和投資。已經有一些令人鼓舞的例子——位於熊本的台積電廠、東京的人工智慧初創公司等等。這並非巧合。日本的文化——不是其傳統文化，而是其現代生活方式——擁有獨特的吸引力，吸引了全球無數人的心，包括在高科技行業工作的比例過高的人們。而日本的城市是地球上最適合居住的地方之一。
So I think there’s a huge opportunity here for Japan to add a whole new piece to its economic machine, which can bolster and enhance all the other pieces. In the book, I offer some ideas on how the Japanese government and businesses can speed up the development of the “weeb economy”.
所以我認為日本在這裡有一個巨大的機會，可以為其經濟機器增添一個全新的部分，這可以加強和提升其他所有部分。在書中，我提供了一些關於日本政府和企業如何加快“網絡經濟”發展的想法。
OK, now for the bad news: The book is only available in Japanese right now, so odds are you probably can’t read it yet (unless you feel like using an AI translation app and a smartphone camera). It’ll eventually come out in English at some point, but I don’t know exactly when.
好的，現在壞消息是：這本書目前只有日文版，所以你可能還無法閱讀（除非你想使用人工智慧翻譯應用程式和智能手機相機）。它最終會在某個時候推出英文版，但我不確定具體時間。
But now for more good news: Since half of the book consists of translated blog posts that I’ve already published on this blog, you can just go read the originals! Here are some posts that got included in the book:
但現在有更多好消息：由於這本書的一半是我已經在這個博客上發表的翻譯博客文章，因此你可以直接去閱讀原文！以下是一些被納入書中的文章：
| | | | | January 24, 2023 2023 年 1 月 24 日 |
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| | | | | May 23, 2022 2022 年 5 月 23 日 |
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| | | | | July 17, 2023 2023 年 7 月 17 日 |
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| | | | | October 21, 2024 2024 年 10 月 21 日 |
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| | | | | April 10, 2021 2021 年 4 月 10 日 |
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| | | | | February 21, 2022 2022 年 2 月 21 日 |
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And here is a short excerpt from my initial English-language draft. Enjoy!
這裡是我最初英文草稿的一段簡短摘錄。享受吧！
Part I: I want the Japanese future back!
第一部分：我想要回日本的未來！
Japan lost the future in 2008, not in 1990
日本在 2008 年失去了未來，而不是在 1990 年
When I lived in Japan in the mid-2000s, it still felt very much like “the future”. 3g flip-phones with grainy cameras were far more advanced than anything I had encountered in the U.S. Japanese people had LCD or plasma TVs, while most Americans were still using old cathode-ray machines. Their kitchens had automatic rice-cookers and other appliances I had never seen, and their laptops were higher-performance and far more durable than the ones I had used in the U.S. Their toilets were like something from a spaceship, and their showers could dry clothing. Some people even had digital SLR cameras that could shoot movie-quality video — a miraculous technology I had never even dreamed was possible.
當我在 2000 年代中期住在日本時，仍然感覺非常像是「未來」。3G 翻蓋手機配有顆粒感的相機，遠比我在美國遇到的任何東西都要先進。日本人擁有液晶或等離子電視，而大多數美國人仍在使用舊的陰極射線機。它們的廚房裡有自動電飯煲和我從未見過的其他電器，而它們的筆記本電腦性能更高，耐用性遠超我在美國使用的那些。它們的馬桶就像來自太空船的東西，而它們的淋浴可以烘乾衣物。有些人甚至擁有可以拍攝電影質量視頻的數位單反相機——這是一種我從未夢想過的奇蹟技術。
And the cities! Giant screens adorned the sides of buildings, like something out of science fiction. There was always a train station within walking distance that would take me anywhere I wanted to go. The trains were clean and fast and they ran on time, and they even had electronic screens that told you when the train would arrive at the next station. Japanese cars and even motorcycles glided along quietly, where in America they roared and grumbled. Even in the U.S., of course, the most revolutionary, futuristic car — the Toyota Prius — was a Japanese model.
而那些城市！巨大的螢幕裝飾著建築物的側面，就像科幻小說中的場景。總有一個火車站在步行距離內，可以帶我去任何我想去的地方。火車乾淨、快速，準時發車，甚至還有電子螢幕告訴你下一站的火車何時到達。日本的汽車甚至摩托車靜靜地滑行，而在美國則是轟鳴和抱怨。當然，即使在美國，最具革命性、未來感的汽車——豐田普銳斯——也是一款日本車型。
In the 21st century’s opening decade, Japan felt like it had embraced that new century while America was still lingering in the 20th. William Gibson, the celebrated creator of the cyberpunk science fiction genre, wrote this in 2001:
在 21 世紀的開端十年，日本感覺像是已經擁抱了新世紀，而美國仍然徘徊在 20 世紀。著名的賽博朋克科幻小說創作者威廉·吉布森在 2001 年寫道：
The world's second-richest economy, after nearly a decade of stagflation…still looks like the world's richest place, but energies have shifted…yet it feels to me as though all that crazy momentum has finally arrived…[T]onight, watching the Japanese do what they do here, amid all this electric kitsch, all this randomly overlapped media, this chaotically stable neon storm of marketing hoopla, I've got my answer: Japan is still the future, and if the vertigo is gone, it really only means that they've made it out the far end of that tunnel of prematurely accelerated change. Here, in the first city to have this firmly and this comfortably arrived in this new century - the most truly contemporary city on earth - the center is holding…Home at last, in the 21st century.
世界第二富裕的經濟體，在經歷了近十年的停滯通脹後……仍然看起來像是世界上最富裕的地方，但能量已經轉移……然而在我看來，所有那種瘋狂的動力終於來臨了……[T]今晚，看到日本人在這裡做他們所做的事情，在這所有電氣的華而不實中，所有這些隨意重疊的媒體，這場混亂而穩定的霓虹燈行銷風暴中，我找到了我的答案：日本仍然是未來，如果眩暈消失了，那真的只意味著他們已經走出了那條過早加速變化的隧道的另一端。在這裡，在第一個在這個新世紀中如此堅定和舒適地到達的城市——地球上最真正的當代城市——中心依然穩固……終於回家，在 21 世紀。
Now realize that the Japan of my earliest memories — the early and mid-2000s — was a full decade and a half after the famous bursting of Japan’s economic bubble. I am not hearkening back to the go-go days of the 1980s. By the time Koizumi Junichiro was in office, Japan’s “lost decade” had come and passed, full employment had been restored, and the country had returned to slow but steady economic growth. Despite the overhang of the bubble era, Japanese per capita incomes, measured at international price levels, grew by a respectable 20% between 1990 and 2007:
現在意識到我最早的記憶中的日本——2000 年代初期和中期——是在日本經濟泡沫破裂的著名事件後整整十年半。 我並不是在回憶 1980 年代的繁榮時期。 到小泉純一郎上任時，日本的“失落十年”已經過去，就業率已經恢復，國家回到了緩慢但穩定的經濟增長。 儘管泡沫時代的影響仍在，但在 1990 年至 2007 年間，日本的人均收入（以國際價格水平計算）增長了可觀的 20%。
This was slower than the U.S. or West Europe, but that was mainly due to Japan’s more rapid population aging, which was increasing the percentage of retirees. In terms of GDP per worker, Japan kept pace with other rich countries over this time period, and even outgrew the United States:
這比美國或西歐慢，但這主要是由於日本人口老化速度較快，導致退休人員比例增加。在這段時間內，就每位工人的 GDP 而言，日本與其他富裕國家保持同步，甚至超越了美國：
And this growth was being felt by regular Japanese people. It wasn’t just fancy gadgetry and big screens. Japanese houses were getting steadily bigger, growing from the tiny “rabbit hutches” of the postwar period into something similar to what Europeans enjoyed:
而這種增長正被普通日本人所感受到。這不僅僅是華麗的電子產品和大螢幕。日本的房屋正穩步變大，從戰後時期的小型“兔子籠”變成類似於歐洲人所享受的東西：
Japanese people were eating better, too, as local chefs and entrepreneurs took advantage of imported food to create the world’s best restaurant scene, and big new grocery stores like Aeon revolutionized home cooking. Gyms, cafes, and all kinds of public spaces were improving in quality and quantity. Culturally, Japan still felt at the cutting edge, with a vibrant street fashion scene, a golden age of anime and manga, a burst of musical creativity, and an explosion of online culture driven by websites like Niconico.
日本人也在飲食上有所改善，當地的廚師和企業家利用進口食品創造出世界上最好的餐廳場景，而像永旺這樣的大型新超市則徹底改變了家庭烹飪。健身房、咖啡館和各種公共空間的質量和數量都在提升。在文化上，日本仍然感覺處於前沿，擁有充滿活力的街頭時尚場景、動畫和漫畫的黃金時代、音樂創造力的爆發，以及由 Niconico 等網站推動的網絡文化的爆炸。
Given all this, it’s reasonable to ask whether Japan’s so-called “lost decades” after the bubble era were really lost at all. Japan’s catch-up growth had ended, and its living standards were still a bit below the very richest countries like Switzerland or Singapore, but it was solidly within the first rank of nations, and it was still upwardly mobile. It was innovative and vital, at the cutting edge of both technology and culture. And it had accomplished all of this without the kind of deep wrenching disruptions that America experienced after its own real estate bust.
鑑於這一切，問日本在泡沫時代之後所謂的“失落的十年”是否真的失落是合理的。日本的追趕增長已經結束，其生活水平仍然略低於瑞士或新加坡等最富裕的國家，但它穩固地位於國家的第一梯隊，並且仍然具有向上的流動性。它是創新且充滿活力的，處於技術和文化的最前沿。而且它在沒有經歷美國在自身房地產崩潰後所經歷的那種深刻劇烈的動盪的情況下實現了這一切。
But in the years since 2007, it feels like that Japanese future has been lost. Living standards grew only 6.5% between 2007 and 2022.:
但自 2007 年以來，感覺那個日本的未來已經失落。2007 年至 2022 年間，生活水平僅增長了 6.5%。
And even that meager amount of growth was entirely due to increased labor input — women, old people, and young people going to work — rather than to productivity increases. In fact, Japanese workers produced less per hour in 2019 than in 2007, falling well behind other advanced nations:
而即使那微薄的增長也完全是由於勞動投入的增加——女性、老年人和年輕人參加工作——而不是生產力的提高。事實上，2019 年日本工人的每小時產出比 2007 年還要少，遠遠落後於其他先進國家：
Why did Japan stagnate starting in 2008? It’s not clear. Potential culprits include the global financial crisis, the big earthquake and nuclear accident of 2011, the subsequent shutdown of nuclear power, rapid aging, the retirement of the Baby Boom generation, and the ramping up of Chinese competition. Perhaps it was all of these combined. But whatever the reason, 2008 was the turning point.
為什麼日本從 2008 年開始停滯不前？這並不明確。潛在的罪魁禍首包括全球金融危機、2011 年的大地震和核事故、隨後的核電關閉、快速老齡化、嬰兒潮一代的退休，以及中國競爭的加劇。也許這些因素都是綜合起來的。但無論原因是什麼，2008 年都是轉折點。
This doesn’t mean Japan has stagnated in every regard. Its big cities continue to build themselves up, and its restaurants and shops have continued to improve. But when I go back to Japan each year, I can clearly feel the loss of that futuristic vitality that I felt 17 years ago. Japan’s consumer electronics are no longer the cutting edge, having long ago been supplanted by Apple and various other brands. Its auto companies have been caught flat-footed by the switch to battery EVs, and are now — like most Western brands — are in danger of losing the global market to innovative Chinese competitors.
這並不意味著日本在各方面都停滯不前。它的大城市繼續發展，而它的餐廳和商店也持續改善。但是每年我回到日本時，我能清楚地感受到 17 年前那種未來主義活力的喪失。日本的消費電子產品不再是尖端技術，早已被蘋果和其他各種品牌取代。它的汽車公司在轉向電池電動車的過程中措手不及，現在——就像大多數西方品牌一樣——面臨著將全球市場拱手讓給創新的中國競爭對手的危險。
America’s household appliances have caught up and surpassed Japan’s — plenty of American homes now sport Instant Pots, air fryers, sous vide cookers, video doorbells, smart speakers, and so on. Japan still has much better toilets, and there have been some locally specific innovations such as better air purifiers. But for the most part, Japanese homes still feel like they’re stuck in 2007. And that’s not even considering furniture, which tends to be much higher-quality in the U.S.
美國的家用電器已經趕上並超越了日本——許多美國家庭現在擁有即食鍋、空氣炸鍋、真空低溫烹調器、視頻門鈴、智能音箱等等。日本的馬桶仍然要好得多，並且有一些當地特有的創新，例如更好的空氣淨化器。但大多數情況下，日本的家庭仍然感覺像是停留在 2007 年。而且這還不包括家具，家具在美國的質量往往要高得多。
This does not mean Japan is a bad place to live, or that it’s no longer a rich country. Far from it. In fact, the amenities of life — the safety and friendliness, the visual beauty, the infrastructure, the unparalleled retail experience, and so on — make it extremely pleasant in ways that richer countries often fail to match. And if, like me, you’re a foreigner with an American salary who works remotely and sets his own hours, Japan can feel like a paradise. (In fact, this will be important for my argument in a bit.)
這並不意味著日本是一個不好的居住地，或者它不再是一個富裕的國家。遠非如此。事實上，生活的便利性——安全和友好、視覺美感、基礎設施、無與倫比的零售體驗等等——使得它在許多方面極其愉快，而這些方面往往是更富裕的國家無法比擬的。如果你像我一樣，是一位擁有美國薪水的外國人，遠程工作並自行安排工作時間，那麼日本可以感覺像是一個天堂。（事實上，這對我稍後的論點將是重要的。）
But for average Japanese people, life in Japan is hard to afford. Average real wages have actually decreased since 1996:
但對於普通日本人來說，生活在日本是難以負擔的。自 1996 年以來，平均實際工資實際上已經下降：
The situation is actually not quite that bad, since it involves substantial composition effects — falling labor hours, the retirement of highly paid Baby Boomers, the entry of more part-time workers into the labor force, and so on. In fact, hourly wages have increased by a modest amount. And the rise of women’s employment since 2002 has taken some financial pressure off of many families by adding a second income, just as it did in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s.
實際情況並沒有那麼糟，因為它涉及到實質的組成效應——勞動時間下降、高薪的嬰兒潮一代退休、更多兼職工作者進入勞動力市場等等。事實上，時薪已經有所增加。而自 2002 年以來女性就業的上升，通過增加第二收入，減輕了許多家庭的財務壓力，就像 1980 年代和 1990 年代的美國一樣。
But the shift to dual-income households can only happen once. Ultimately, stagnant productivity and low overall growth will continue to make life a slog for the average Japanese family. The weak yen, which is caused in part by Japan’s slow growth, will continue to make imports expensive. And as the percentage of the elderly continues to steadily increase, Japan’s working-age citizens will have to toil more and more simply to afford the same standards of living — unless productivity can be raised.
但雙薪家庭的轉變只能發生一次。最終，停滯的生產力和低整體增長將繼續使普通日本家庭的生活變得艱難。由於日本的緩慢增長，導致日元疲弱，將繼續使進口變得昂貴。隨著老年人比例穩步上升，日本的勞動年齡公民將不得不更加努力工作，才能負擔相同的生活水平——除非生產力能夠提高。
Because being “the future” isn’t just about having fancy gadgets and cool screens on buildings. Technological progress — the development of new products and better production processes — is the ultimate font of a nation’s quality of life. If Japan can reclaim the mantle of “the future” — if it can reach the technological cutting edge across a wider array of products — it can secure an easier, more fulfilling life for its people.
因為成為「未來」不僅僅是擁有華麗的設備和建築上的酷炫螢幕。技術進步——新產品的開發和更好的生產過程——是國家生活品質的最終來源。如果日本能夠重新獲得「未來」的地位——如果它能在更廣泛的產品中達到技術的前沿——那麼它就能為其人民確保更輕鬆、更充實的生活。
Ultimately that is why I want the Japanese future back.
最終上，這就是為什麼我想要日本的未來回來。
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1The official title is actually just ウィーブが日本を救う: 日本大好きエコノミストの経済論, which translates to “The Weebs Will Save Japan: Economic Theory From a Japan-Loving Economist”. But “Weeb Economy: The Weebs Will Save Japan” is what’s actually on the cover. Japanese publishing is…a bit different.
正式標題實際上是ウィーブが日本を救う: 日本大好きエコノミストの経済論，翻譯為「御宅族將拯救日本：來自一位熱愛日本的經濟學家的經濟理論」。但封面上實際上寫的是「御宅經濟：御宅族將拯救日本」。日本出版業……有點不同。
2In the general sense, a weeb is a non-Japanese person who likes Japanese culture. Usually, it’s used to refer specifically to people who are obsessed with Japanese animation and comics, but in my book I use it to just mean anyone who thinks Japan is an especially cool place. By that standard, most of us are weebs.
在一般意義上，weeb 是指喜愛日本文化的非日本人。通常，它特別用來指那些對日本動畫和漫畫著迷的人，但在我的書中，我用它來指任何認為日本是一個特別酷的地方的人。按照這個標準，我們大多數人都是 weeb。
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