Tt is still midmorning in Malawi when we arrive at a small village, Nthandire, about an hour outside of Lilongwe, the capital. We have come over dirt roads, passing women and children walking barefoot with water jugs, fuel wood, and other bundles. The midmorning temperature is sweltering. In this subsistence maize-growing region of an impoverished landlocked country in southern Africa, households eke out survival from an unforgiving terrain. This year has been a lot more difficult than usual because the rains have failed, probably the result of an El Niño cycle. Whatever the cause, the crops are withering in the fields that we pass.
当我们抵达马拉维的一个小村庄恩桑迪尔时，时间还是中午，距离首都利隆圭约一小时车程。我们走过土路，路过妇女和儿童，赤脚提着水罐、薪柴和其他包裹行走。中午的气温很闷热。在南部非洲一个贫穷的内陆国家的这个自给自足的玉米种植区，家庭在严酷的地形中勉强生存。今年比往年困难得多，因为没有下雨，这可能是厄尔尼诺现象周期的结果。不管是什么原因，我们经过的田野里的庄稼正在枯萎。

If the village were filled with able-bodied men who could have built small-scale water harvesting units on rooftops and in the fields to collect what little rain had fallen in the preceding months, the situation would not be as dire as it is this morning. But as we arrive in the village, we see no able-bodied young men at all. In fact, older women and dozens of children greet us, but there is not a young man or woman of working age in sight. Where, we ask, are the workers? Out in the fields? The aid worker who has led us to the village shakes his head sadly and says no. They are nearly all dead. The village has been devastated by AIDS, which has ravaged this part of Malawi for several years now. There are just a few men between twenty and forty years of age left in the village. They are not there this morning because they are all attending the funeral of a fellow villager who died of AIDS the day before.
如果村里都是身强力壮的男人，他们可以在屋顶和田野里建造小型集水装置来收集前几个月下的少量雨水，情况就不会像今天早上那么可怕。但当我们到达村子时，根本看不到身体健全的年轻人。事实上，年长的妇女和几十个孩子在迎接我们，但看不到一个处于工作年龄的年轻男女。我们问，工人在哪里？在田野里？带我们到村子的救援人员悲伤地摇头说不。他们几乎都死了。这个村庄已经被艾滋病摧毁了，艾滋病已经在马拉维的这一地区肆虐了好几年。村子里二十岁到四十岁的男人就只剩下几个了。他们今天早上不在那里，因为他们都要去参加前一天死于艾滋病的一位村民的葬礼。

The presence of death in Nthandire has been overwhelming in recent years. The grandmothers whom we meet are guardians for their orphaned grandchildren. Each woman has her own story of how her sons and daughters have died, leaving her to bear the burden of raising and providing for five or ten, sometimes fifteen, orphaned grandchildren. These women have reached an age where, in more prosperous places, they would be the revered matriarchs enjoying a well-earned rest from a lifetime of toil. But there is no break now, no chance for even a moment’s respite, because the grandmothers of this village, and countless others like it, know that if they let up for a moment, these young children will die.
近年来，恩桑迪尔的死亡人数一直居高不下。我们遇到的祖母是她们孤儿孙辈的监护人。每个女人都有自己的故事，讲述她的儿子和女儿如何死去，让她承担起抚养和供养五到十个，有时是十五个孤儿孙辈的重担。这些女性已经到了这样的年龄，在更繁荣的地方，她们将是受人尊敬的女族长，享受着一生辛苦劳作后应有的休息。但现在没有休息，甚至连片刻喘息的机会都没有，因为这个村子的老奶奶们，以及无数喜欢这个村子的人，都知道，如果他们有片刻的松懈，这些年幼的孩子就会死去。

The margin of survival is extraordinarily narrow; sometimes it closes entirely. One woman we meet in front of her mud hut, shown in photograph 1 with her own and some neighbors’ children, has lost four of nine children to disease. As she begins to explain her situation to us, she first points to the withered crops that have died in the fields next to her hut. Her small plot, perhaps a half hectare (a little more than an acre) in all, would be too small to feed her family even if the rains had been plentiful. The problems of small farm size and drought are compounded by yet another problem: the soil nutrients have been depleted so significantly in this part of Malawi that crop yields reach only about one ton of maize per hectare with good rains, compared with three tons per hectare that would be typical of healthy soils.
生存的余地极其狭窄；有时它会完全关闭。我们在她的泥屋前遇到的一位妇女（如图 1 所示）和她自己的孩子以及一些邻居的孩子一起，九个孩子中有四个因病去世。当她开始向我们解释她的情况时，她首先指着她小屋旁边田地里已经枯死的庄稼。她的小块土地总共可能有半公顷（一英亩多一点），即使雨水充足，也太小了，无法养活她的家人。农场规模小和干旱的问题还因另一个问题而变得更加复杂：马拉维这一地区的土壤养分严重枯竭，在降雨充足的情况下，农作物产量仅为每公顷约一吨玉米，而相比之下，每公顷产量为三吨这将是健康土壤的典型特征。

A half a ton of grain from a half-hectare field would not be sufficient for proper nutrition and would provide precious little, if any, market income. This year, because of the drought, she will get almost nothing. She reaches into her apron and pulls out a handful of semirotten, bug-infested millet, which will be the basis for the gruel she will prepare for the meal that evening. It will be the one meal the children have that day.
半公顷土地上的半吨谷物不足以提供适当的营养，并且只能提供很少的市场收入（如果有的话）。今年，因为干旱，她几乎一无所获。她把手伸进围裙，掏出一把半腐烂、长满虫子的小米，这将是她那天晚上准备的稀粥的基础。这将是孩子们当天吃的一顿饭。

I ask her about the health of the children. She points to a child of about four and says that the small girl contracted malaria the week before. Her mother had carried her child on her back for the ten kilometers or so to the local hospital. When they got there, there was no quinine, the antimalarial medicine, available that day. With the child in high fever, the mother and child were sent home and told to return the next day.
我向她询问孩子们的健康状况。她指着一个大约四岁的孩子说，这个小女孩在一周前感染了疟疾。她的母亲背着孩子走了十多公里才到当地医院。当他们到达那里时，当天没有抗疟药奎宁可用。由于孩子发高烧，母子俩被送回家，并被告知第二天再回来。
In a small miracle, when they returned the next day after another ten-kilometer trek, the quinine had come in, and the child responded to treatment and survived. It was a close call, though. When malaria is untreated over the course of a day or two, a child may slip into cerebral malaria, followed by coma and then death. More than one million African children, and perhaps as many as three million, succumb to malaria each year. This horrific catastrophe occurs despite the fact that the disease is partly preventable-through the use of bed nets and other environmental controls that do not
奇迹出现了，第二天，当他们又经过十公里的长途跋涉返回时，奎宁已经进来了，孩子对治疗产生了反应并活了下来。不过，这是一次千钧一发的机会。如果疟疾在一两天内得不到治疗，儿童可能会患上脑型疟疾，然后昏迷，最后死亡。每年有超过 100 万（甚至可能多达 300 万）非洲儿童死于疟疾。尽管这种疾病在一定程度上是可以预防的，但这种可怕的灾难还是发生了——通过使用蚊帐和其他无法预防的环境控制措施。
reach the impoverished villages of Malawi and most of the rest of the continent - and completely treatable. There is simply no conceivable excuse for this disease to be taking millions of lives each year. Our guide to Nthandire is a Christian aid worker, a dedicated and compassionate Malawian working for a local nongovernmental organization (NGO). He and his colleagues work against all odds to help villages such as this one. The NGO has almost no financing available and survives from meager contributions. Its big effort in the village, including this particular household, is to provide a piece of plastic tarpaulin to put under the thatch of each hut’s roof. The tarp keeps the children from being completely exposed to the elements, so that when the rains do come, the roof will not leak on the of plastic tarpaulin to put under the thatch of each hut’s roof. The tarp keeps the children from being completely exposed to
到达马拉维的贫困村庄和非洲大陆的大部分其他地区 - 并且完全可以治疗。这种疾病每年夺走数百万人的生命，根本没有任何合理的理由。我们前往恩桑迪尔的导游是一名基督教援助工作者，他是一位热心且富有同情心的马拉维人，为当地的一个非政府组织 (NGO) 工作。他和他的同事们排除万难，努力帮助像这样的村庄。该非政府组织几乎没有可用资金，靠微薄的捐款生存。它在村里（包括这个特殊家庭）所做的巨大努力就是提供一块塑料防水布，放在每个小屋屋顶的茅草下面。防水布可以防止孩子们完全暴露在自然环境中，这样当下雨的时候，屋顶就不会漏水了，塑料防水布放在每个小屋屋顶的茅草下面。防水布可以防止孩子们完全接触到
fifteen grandchildren sleeping below. This contribution of a few cents per household is all the aid organization can muster.
十五个孙子睡在下面。每个家庭的几美分的捐款是援助组织所能筹集到的全部。

As we proceed through the village, other grandmothers share similar stories. Each has lost sons and daughters; those who remain fight for survival. There are only poor in this village. No clinic nearby. No safe water source. No crops in the fields. And notably, no aid. I stoop down to ask one of the young girls her name and age. She looks about seven or eight, but is actually twelve, stunted from years of undernutrition. When I ask her what her dreams are for her own life, she says that she wants to be a teacher, and that she is prepared to study and work hard to achieve that. I know that her chances of surviving to go on to secondary school and a teacher’s college are slim under the circumstances in which she lives. Attending school now is a hit-and-miss affair. Children are in and out of school with illness. Their attendance depends on how urgently they are needed at home to fetch water and firewood, or to care for siblings or cousins; on whether they can afford to buy supplies, a uniform, and pay local fees; and on the safety of walking several kilometers to the school itself.
当我们穿过村庄时，其他祖母也有类似的故事。每个人都失去了儿子和女儿；那些留下来的人为生存而战。这个村子里只有穷人。附近没有诊所。没有安全水源。田里没有庄稼。值得注意的是，没有援助。我弯下腰询问其中一位年轻女孩的名字和年龄。她看起来大约七八岁，但实际上十二岁，因常年营养不良而发育不良。当我问她自己的人生梦想是什么时，她说她想成为一名教师，并准备通过学习和努力来实现这一目标。我知道，就她现在的生活环境而言，她能继续读中学和师范学院的机会微乎其微。现在上学是一件碰碰运气的事情。孩子们因病进出学校。他们的出勤率取决于他们在家取水和柴火或照顾兄弟姐妹或表兄弟姐妹的紧急程度；他们是否有能力购买用品、制服并支付当地费用；以及步行几公里到学校的安全性。

We leave the village and fly later that day to the second city of the country, Blantyre, where we visit the main hospital in Malawi, Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital. There we experience our second shock of the day. This hospital is the place where the government of Malawi is keen to begin a treatment program for the roughly nine hundred thousand Malawians infected with the HIV virus and currently dying of AIDS because of lack of treatment. The hospital has set up a walk-in clinic for people who can afford to pay the dollar a day cost of the antiretroviral combination therapy, based on Malawi’s arrangements with the Indian generic drug producer Cipla, which has pioneered the provision of low-cost antiretroviral drugs to poor countries. Since the government is too impoverished to be able to afford a dollar a day for all those in need, the program has begun for those few Malawians who can afford to pay out of pocket. At the time of our visit, this treatment site is providing anti-AIDS drugs on a daily basis to about four hundred people who can afford it-four hundred people in a country where nine hundred thousand are infected. For the rest, there is essentially no access to antiAIDS medicines.
我们离开村庄，当天晚些时候飞往该国第二大城市布兰太尔，在那里我们参观了马拉维的主要医院伊丽莎白女王中央医院。在那里我们经历了今天的第二次震惊。马拉维政府热衷于在这家医院为大约 90 万感染艾滋病毒且目前因缺乏治疗而死于艾滋病的马拉维人启动治疗计划。根据马拉维与印度仿制药生产商 Cipla 的安排，该医院为那些有能力支付每天 1 美元抗逆转录病毒联合疗法费用的人设立了一个无需预约的诊所，Cipla 是提供低成本抗逆转录病毒药物的先驱。向贫穷国家提供药品。由于政府太穷，无法为所有有需要的人提供每天一美元的费用，因此该计划已为少数有能力自掏腰包的马拉维人启动。在我们访问时，该治疗点每天向大约四百名有能力的人提供抗艾滋病药物——在一个有九十万人感染的国家中有四百人。对于其他人来说，基本上无法获得抗艾滋病药物。

We duck into a conference room with the doctor who is overseeing the outpatient service and medical wards. He describes to us the small miracles of the patients on anti-AIDS drug treatment. The response has been dramatic. The success rate of the medicines is nearly 100 percent. The HIV strains do not exhibit drug resistance because the Malawian people have never had access to the drugs before. The doctor also reports that his patients’ adherence to this twice-daily regimen has been very high. His patients surely want to stay alive. In short, the doctor is extremely pleased with the results. Just as his briefing is encouraging us, the doctor stands up and suggests that we visit the medical ward, which lies just across the hall. “Medical ward” is, in fact, a shocking euphemism, because in truth it is not a medical ward at all. It is the place where Malawians come to die of AIDS. There is no medicine in the medical ward. The room has a posted occupancy rate of 150 beds. There are 450 people in the ward. These 450 people are fit into a room with 150 beds by putting three people in or around each bed. In most cases, two people are lying head to toe, toe to head-strangers sharing a people in the Alongside or underneath the bed there is somebody on the ground, sometimes literally on the ground or sometimes on a piece of cardboard, dying beneath the bed
我们和负责门诊服务和内科病房的医生一起躲进会议室。他向我们讲述了患者抗艾滋病药物治疗的小奇迹。反应是戏剧性的。药物的成功率接近100%。 HIV病毒株不表现出耐药性，因为马拉维人民以前从未获得过这些药物。医生还报告说，他的患者对这种每天两次的治疗方案的依从性非常高。他的病人肯定想活下去。简而言之，医生对结果非常满意。正当他的简报让我们感到鼓舞时，医生站了起来，建议我们去参观位于大厅对面的内科病房。 “内科病房”实际上是一个令人震惊的委婉说法，因为实际上它根本不是内科病房。这是马拉维人死于艾滋病的地方。内科病房没有药。该房间的公布入住率为 150 个床位。病房有450人。这 450 人被安置在一个有 150 张床的房间里，每张床内或周围放置 3 个人。在大多数情况下，两个人头对脚、头对头地躺着——陌生人共用一个人，床边或床下有一个人躺在地上，有时是真的在地上，有时是在一块纸板上，在床下死去。床
The room is filled with moans. This is a dying chamber where three quarters or more of the people this day are in late-stage AIDS without medicines. Family members sit by the bed, swabbing dried lips and watching their loved ones die. The same doctor who is treating patients across the hall is the doctor in charge of this service. He knows what could be done. He knows that each of these patients lips and watching their loved ones die. The same doctor who is treating patients across the hall is the doctor in charge of this service. He knows what could be done. He knows that each of these patients
房间里充满了呻吟声。这是一个垂死的房间，今天四分之三或更多的人都处于艾滋病晚期，没有药物治疗。家人坐在床边，擦拭着干燥的嘴唇，看着亲人死去。负责这项服务的医生就是对面大厅里正在治疗病人的同一位医生。他知道可以做什么。他知道这些病人中的每一个都亲眼看着自己的亲人死去。负责这项服务的医生就是对面大厅里正在治疗病人的同一位医生。他知道可以做什么。他知道这些病人中的每一个
could rise from the deathbed but for the want of a dollar a day. He knows the problem is not one of infrastructure or logistics or adherence. He knows that the problem is simply that the world has seen fit to look away as hundreds of impoverished Malawians die this day as a result of their poverty.
如果每天只需要一美元，他就能从临终的床上爬起来。他知道问题不在于基础设施、物流或遵守情况。他知道问题很简单，因为今天数百名贫困的马拉维人因贫困而死亡，世界认为不应该对此视而不见。
to look away as hundreds of impoverished Malawians die this day as a result of their poverty.
今天，数百名贫困的马拉维人因贫困而死亡。
I have come to know Malawi relatively well after several visits. A few years earlier, I had been contacted by the vice president of Malawi, Justin Malewezi, a remarkably fine individual, a dignified,
经过多次访问，我对马拉维有了比较了解。几年前，马拉维副总统贾斯汀·马莱韦齐 (Justin Malewezi) 联系了我，他是一位非常优秀的人，一位有尊严、
eloquent, and popular figure in what is against all odds a multiparty democracy. The odds are long because democracy is bound to be fragile in an impoverished country where incomes are around 50 eloquent, and popular figure in what is against all odds a multiparty democracy. The odds are long because democracy is bound to be fragile in an impoverished country where incomes are around
在克服重重困难的多党民主制中，他是一位雄辩且受欢迎的人物。可能性很小，因为在一个收入在 50 左右的贫困国家，民主注定是脆弱的，而在多党民主制中，尽管困难重重，但受欢迎的人物。可能性很小，因为在一个收入水平不高的贫困国家，民主注定是脆弱的。
cents per person per day, or around $\mathrm{\$}180$$\mathrm{\$}180$$180\$ 180 per person per year, and where the stresses of mass disease, famine, and climate shock are pervasive. Amazingly, the Malawians have done it, while the cents per person per day, or around $\mathrm{\$}180$$\mathrm{\$}180$$180\$ 180 per person per year, and where the
每人每天美分或左右 $\mathrm{\$}180$$\mathrm{\$}180$$180\$ 180 每年每人的损失，以及大规模疾病、饥荒和气候冲击的压力普遍存在的地区。令人惊讶的是，马拉维人做到了，而每人每天的美分或大约 $\mathrm{\$}180$$\mathrm{\$}180$$180\$ 180 每人每年，以及其中
international community has largely stood by through all of this suffering. international community has largely stood by through all of this suffering.
国际社会在很大程度上对所有这些苦难袖手旁观。国际社会在很大程度上对所有这些苦难袖手旁观。
Vice President Malewezi himself has lost several family members to AIDS. The first time we talked about AIDS, he spoke to me through mournful eyes about his new responsibilities as head of the
副总统马莱韦齐本人也因艾滋病失去了几位家人。我们第一次谈论艾滋病时，他用悲伤的眼神向我讲述了他作为艾滋病防治中心负责人的新职责。
National AIDS Commission. He has led a team of experts to design a national AIDS strategy that could begin to meet this horrific challenge. That team has traveled throughout the world-to Harvard, National AIDS Commission. He has led a team of experts to design a national AIDS strategy that could begin to meet this horrific challenge. That team has traveled throughout
国家艾滋病委员会。他领导了一个专家团队设计了一项国家艾滋病战略，该战略可以开始应对这一可怕的挑战。该团队走遍了世界各地，包括哈佛大学、国家艾滋病委员会。他领导了一个专家团队设计了一项国家艾滋病战略，该战略可以开始应对这一可怕的挑战。该团队已走遍各地
Johns Hopkins, Liverpool, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and the World Health Organization - to discuss ideas for scaling up the fight against AIDS.
约翰·霍普金斯大学、利物浦大学、伦敦卫生和热带医学学院以及世界卫生组织 - 讨论加强抗击艾滋病的想法。
a new system of drug delivery, patient counseling and education, community outreach, and the financial flows that would accompany the process of training doctors. On that basis, Malawi made proposals to the international community to help Malawians try to reach about a third of the total infected population (about three hundred thousand people) with anti-AIDS drug treatment within a fiveyear scale-up period.
一个新的药物输送系统、患者咨询和教育、社区外展以及伴随培训医生过程的资金流动。在此基础上，马拉维向国际社会提出建议，帮助马拉维人争取在五年扩大期内为大约三分之一的感染人口（约三十万人）提供抗艾滋病药物治疗。
Yet international processes are cruel. The donor governments-including the United States and Europeans-told Malawi to scale back its proposal sharply because the first proposal was “too ambitious and too costly.” The next draft was cut back to a mere hundred thousand on treatment at the end of five years. Even that was too much. In a tense five-day period, the donors prevailed on Malawi to cut another 60 percent from the proposal, down to forty thousand on treatment. This atrophied plan was submitted to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria. Incredibly, the donors that run that fund saw fit to cut back once again. After a long struggle, Malawi received funding to save just twenty-five thousand at the end of five years - a death warrant from the international community for the people of this country.
然而国际进程是残酷的。包括美国和欧洲在内的捐助国政府要求马拉维大幅缩减其提案，因为第一个提案“过于雄心勃勃且成本过高”。五年后，下一次征兵的待遇被削减到仅仅十万。即使这样也太过分了。在紧张的五天时间里，捐助者说服马拉维将治疗费用再削减 60%，降至 4 万人。这个萎缩的计划被提交给全球抗击艾滋病、结核病和疟疾基金。令人难以置信的是，管理该基金的捐助者认为有必要再次削减资金。经过长期斗争，马拉维在五年后仅获得了拯救两万五千人的资金——这是国际社会对该国人民发出的死刑令。

Carol Bellamy of UNICEF has rightly described Malawi’s plight as the perfect storm, a storm that brings together climatic disaster, impoverishment, the AIDS pandemic, and the long-standing burdens of malaria, schistosomiasis, and other diseases. In the face of this horrific maelstrom, the world community has so far displayed a fair bit of hand-wringing and even some high-minded rhetoric, but precious little action.
联合国儿童基金会的卡罗尔·贝拉米正确地将马拉维的困境描述为一场完美风暴，这场风暴汇集了气候灾难、贫困、艾滋病流行以及疟疾、血吸虫病和其他疾病的长期负担。面对这场可怕的漩涡，国际社会迄今表现出相当多的忧虑，甚至发表了一些高尚的言论，但几乎没有采取宝贵的行动。

A few thousand miles away from this perfect storm is another scene of poverty. This is poverty in retreat, where the fight for survival is gradually being won, although still with horrendous risks and huge unmet needs. This struggle is being waged in Bangladesh, one of the most populous countries in the world, with 140 million people living in the flood plains of the deltas of the two great rivers, the Brahmaputra and the Ganges, that flow through Bangladesh on their way to the Indian Ocean.
距离这场完美风暴几千英里的是另一处贫困景象。这是撤退中的贫困，生存之战正在逐渐取得胜利，尽管仍然面临着可怕的风险和巨大的未满足的需求。这场斗争正在孟加拉国进行，孟加拉国是世界上人口最多的国家之一，有 1.4 亿人生活在雅鲁藏布江和恒河这两条大河的三角洲冲积平原上，这两条河流经孟加拉国流经孟加拉国。印度洋。
Bangladesh was born in a war for independence against Pakistan in 1971. That year, it experienced massive famine and disarray, leading an official in Henry Kissinger’s State Department to famously label it an “international basket case.” Bangladesh today is far from a basket case. Per capita income has approximately doubled since independence. Life expectancy has risen from forty-four years to sixty-two years. The infant mortality rate (the number of children who die before their first birthday for every 1,000 born) has declined from 145 in 1970 to 48 in 2002 . Bangladesh shows us that even in circumstances that seem the most hopeless there are ways forward if the right strategies are applied, and if the right combination of investments is made.
孟加拉国诞生于 1971 年针对巴基斯坦的独立战争中。那一年，该国经历了大规模饥荒和混乱，导致亨利·基辛格的国务院一名官员将其称为“国际废案”。今天的孟加拉国远非一文不值。自独立以来，人均收入大约翻了一番。预期寿命从四十四岁增加到六十二岁。婴儿死亡率（每 1000 名新生儿中一岁前死亡的儿童人数）已从 1970 年的 145 人下降到 2002 年的 48 人。孟加拉国向我们表明，即使在看似最绝望的情况下，如果采用正确的战略并进行正确的投资组合，也有前进的道路。

Still, Bangladesh is not out of the grip of extreme poverty. Although it has escaped the worst of the ravages of famine and disease in the past generation, it faces some profound challenges today. A few months after my visit to Malawi, I was up at dawn one morning in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to see a remarkable sight: thousands of people walking to work in long lines stretching from the outskirts of Dhaka and from some of its poorest neighborhoods. Looking more closely, I noticed that these workers were almost all young women, perhaps between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. These are the workers of a burgeoning garment industry in Dhaka who cut, stitch, and package millions of pieces of apparel each month for shipment to the United States and Europe.
尽管如此，孟加拉国仍未摆脱极端贫困的困扰。尽管它在过去一代人中躲过了饥荒和疾病最严重的蹂躏，但今天仍面临着一些深刻的挑战。访问马拉维几个月后，有一天黎明时分，我在孟加拉国达卡起床，看到了一幅引人注目的景象：成千上万的人从达卡郊区和一些最贫困的社区排着长队步行去上班。仔细一看，我发现这些工人几乎都是年轻女性，年龄大概在十八岁到二十五岁之间。这些是达卡蓬勃发展的服装行业的工人，他们每月裁剪、缝合和包装数百万件服装，然后运往美国和欧洲。
Over the years, I have visited garment factories all over the developing world. I have grown familiar with the cavernous halls where hundreds of young women sit at sewing machines, and men at cutting tables, where the fabrics move along production lines and the familiar labels of GAP, Polo, Yves Saint Laurent, Wal-Mart, J. C. Penney, and others are attached as the clothing reaches the final stages of production. There is nothing glamorous about this work. The women often walk two hours each morning in long quiet files to get to work. Arriving at seven or seven-thirty, they may be in their seats for most of the following twelve hours. They often work with almost no break at all or perhaps a very short lunch break, with little chance to go to the lavatory. Leering bosses lean over them, posing a threat of sexual harassment. After a long, difficult, tedious day, the young women trudge back home, when they are again sometimes threatened with physical assault.
多年来，我参观了发展中国家各地的服装工厂。我已经熟悉了那些宽敞的大厅，那里有数百名年轻女性坐在缝纫机前，男性坐在裁剪台前，布料沿着生产线移动，还有 GAP、Polo、Yves Saint Laurent、沃尔玛、JC Penney 等熟悉的品牌。 ，以及其他在服装到达生产的最后阶段时附加的。这项工作并没有什么光鲜亮丽的地方。这些妇女每天早上常常排着长长的安静的队伍步行两个小时去上班。七点或七点三十分到达时，他们可能会在接下来的十二个小时的大部分时间里坐在座位上。他们经常工作时几乎没有休息，或者午休时间很短，几乎没有机会去洗手间。斜视的老板俯身在他们身上，构成性骚扰的威胁。经过漫长、艰难、乏味的一天后，年轻女性艰难地回到家，有时她们会再次受到人身攻击的威胁。

These sweatshop jobs are the targets of public protest in developed countries; those protests have helped to improve the safety and quality of the working conditions. The rich-world protesters, however, should support increased numbers of such jobs, albeit under safer working conditions, by protesting the trade protectionism in their own countries that keeps out garment exports from countries such as Bangladesh. These young women already have a foothold in the modern economy that is a critical, measurable step up from the villages of Malawi (and more relevant for the women, a step up from the villages of Bangladesh where most of them were born). The sweatshops are the first rung on the ladder out of extreme poverty. They give lie to the Kissinger state department’s forecast that Bangladesh is condemned to extreme poverty.
这些血汗工厂的工作是发达国家公众抗议的目标；这些抗议活动有助于改善工作条件的安全和质量。然而，富裕国家的抗议者应该通过抗议本国的贸易保护主义（阻止孟加拉国等国家的服装出口）来支持增加此类工作，尽管是在更安全的工作条件下。这些年轻女性已经在现代经济中站稳了脚跟，这是比马拉维村庄迈出的关键的、可衡量的一步（对于妇女来说更重要，比她们大多数人出生的孟加拉国村庄迈出的一步）。血汗工厂是摆脱极端贫困的第一步。他们欺骗了基辛格国务院有关孟加拉国注定陷入极端贫困的预测。

On one visit to Bangladesh, I picked up an English-language morning newspaper, where I found an extensive insert of interviews with young women working in the garment sector. These stories were poignant, fascinating, and eye-opening. One by one, they recounted the arduous hours, the lack of labor rights, and the harassment. What was most striking and unexpected about the stories was the repeated affirmation that this work was the greatest opportunity that these women could ever have imagined, and that their employment had changed their lives for the better.
有一次访问孟加拉国时，我拿起一份英文早报，其中插入了大量对服装行业年轻女性的采访。这些故事令人心酸、引人入胜、令人大开眼界。他们一一讲述了艰苦的工作时间、缺乏劳工权利和骚扰。这些故事中最引人注目和意想不到的是，反复确认这项工作是这些女性所能想象到的最好的机会，她们的工作让她们的生活变得更好。

Nearly all of the women interviewed had grown up in the countryside, extraordinarily poor, illiterate and unschooled, and vulnerable to chronic hunger and hardship in a domineering, patriarchal society. Had they (and their forebearers of the 1970s and 1980s) stayed in the villages, they would have been forced into a marriage arranged by their fathers, and by seventeen or eighteen, forced to conceive a child. Their trek to the cities to take jobs has given these young women a chance for personal liberation of unprecedented dimension and opportunity.
几乎所有接受采访的女性都在农村长大，她们极其贫穷、文盲、没有上过学，在专横的父权社会中很容易遭受长期饥饿和苦难。如果他们（以及他们 20 世纪 70 年代和 1980 年代的祖先）留在村庄，他们就会被迫接受父亲安排的婚姻，并在十七、十八岁的时候被迫生下孩子。她们长途跋涉到城市打工，给了这些年轻女性前所未有的个人解放机会和机会。

The Bangladeshi women told how they were able to save some small surplus from their meager pay, manage their own income, have their own rooms, choose when and whom to date and marry, The Bangladeshi women told how they were able to save some small surplus from their meager pay, manage their own income, have their own rooms, choose when and whom to date and marry,
孟加拉国妇女讲述了她们如何能够从微薄的工资中节省一些小额盈余，管理自己的收入，拥有自己的房间，选择何时何地约会和结婚，孟加拉国妇女讲述了她们如何能够节省一些小额盈余从微薄的工资中，管理自己的收入，拥有自己的房间，选择约会和结婚的时间和对象，
choose to have children when they felt ready, and use their savings to improve their living conditions and especially to go back to school to enhance their literacy and job-market skills. As hard as it is, choose to have children when they felt ready, and use their savings to improve their living conditions and especially
选择在他们觉得准备好的时候生孩子，并用他们的积蓄来改善他们的生活条件，特别是重返学校以提高他们的识字率和就业市场技能。尽管很难，但还是选择在自己准备好的时候生孩子，并用积蓄来改善生活条件，尤其是
this life is a step on the way to economic opportunity that was unimaginable in the countryside in generations past. this life is a step on the way to economic opportunity that was unimaginable in the countryside in generations past.
这种生活是通向经济机会的一步，这在过去几代人的农村是难以想象的。这种生活是通向经济机会的一步，这在过去几代人的农村是难以想象的。
Some rich-country protesters have argued that Dhaka’s apparel firms should either pay far higher wage rates or be closed, but closing such factories as a result of wages forced above worker
一些富裕国家的抗议者认为，达卡的服装公司要么支付更高的工资，要么关闭，但由于工资被迫高于工人而关闭这些工厂
productivity would be little more than a ticket for these women back to rural misery. For these young women, these factories offer not only opportunities for personal freedom, but also the first rung on productivity would be little more than a ticket for these women back to rural misery. For these young women, these factories offer not only opportunities for personal freedom, but also the first run
生产力只不过是这些妇女重返农村苦难的一张门票。对于这些年轻女性来说，这些工厂不仅提供了个人自由的机会，而且生产力的第一级提升只不过是这些女性回到农村苦难的一张门票。对于这些年轻女性来说，这些工厂不仅提供了个人自由的机会，还提供了第一次跑步的机会。
the ladder of rising skills and income for themselves and, within a few years, for their children. Virtually every poor country that has developed successfully has gone through these first stages of the ladder of rising skills and income for themselves and, within a few years, for their children. Virtually every poor country that has developed successfully has gone through these first stages of
他们自己以及几年内他们的孩子的技能和收入不断提高的阶梯。事实上，每一个成功发展的贫穷国家都经历了为自己以及在几年内为他们的孩子提高技能和收入的阶梯的第一阶段。几乎每一个成功发展的贫穷国家都经历过这些最初阶段
industrialization. These Bangladeshi women share the experience of many generations of immigrants to New York City’s garment district and a hundred other places where their migration to toil in industrialization. These Bangladeshi women share the experience of many generations of immigra
工业化。这些孟加拉国妇女分享了几代移民到纽约市服装区和其他一百个地方的经历，她们在工业化过程中辛苦劳作。这些孟加拉国女性分享了几代移民的经历
garment factories was a step on the path to a future of urban affluence in succeeding generations.
服装厂是后代通往城市富裕未来道路上的一步。
Not only is the garment sector fueling Bangladesh’s economic growth of more than 5 percent per
服装行业不仅推动孟加拉国经济每年增长 5% 以上
Not only is the garment sector fueling Bangladesh’s economic growth of more than 5 percent per year in recent years, but it is also raising the consciousness and power of women in a society that was long brazenly biased against women’s chances in life. As part of a more general and dramatic process of change throughout Bangladeshi society, this change and others give Bangladesh the opportunity in the next few years to put itself on a secure path of long-term economic growth. The countryside that these women have left is also changing quickly, in part because of the income remittances and ideas that the young women send back to their rural communities, and in part because of the increased travel and temporary migration between rural and urban areas, as families diversify their economic bases between rural agriculture and urban manufacturers and services.
近年来，服装行业不仅推动了孟加拉国每年超过 5% 的经济增长，而且还提高了长期公然歧视女性生活机会的社会中女性的意识和力量。作为整个孟加拉国社会更普遍、更戏剧化的变革进程的一部分，这一变化和其他变化使孟加拉国有机会在未来几年走上长期经济增长的安全道路。这些妇女离开的农村也在迅速发生变化，部分原因是年轻妇女将收入汇款和想法送回农村社区，部分原因是农村和城市地区之间的旅行和临时移徙增加，家庭的经济基础多样化，既有农村农业，也有城市制造商和服务业。

In 2003, my colleagues at Columbia and I visited a village near Dhaka with one of the leaders of an inspiring nongovernmental organization, the Bangladeshi Rural Advancement Committee, now known universally as BRAC. There we met representatives from a village association, which BRAC had helped to organize, in which women living about an hour outside the city were engaged in smallscale commercial activities-food processing and trade-within the village and on the roads between the village and Dhaka itself. These women presented a picture of change every bit as dramatic as that of the burgeoning apparel sector.
2003 年，我和哥伦比亚大学的同事与孟加拉国农村发展委员会（现普遍称为 BRAC）这一鼓舞人心的非政府组织的领导人之一一起参观了达卡附近的一个村庄。在那里，我们会见了 BRAC 帮助组织的一个村庄协会的代表，该协会居住在距城市约一小时车程的地方，从事小规模商业活动——食品加工和贸易——在村庄内以及村庄和达卡之间的道路上本身。这些女性呈现出一幅与新兴服装行业一样戏剧性的变化图景。

Wearing beautiful saris, the women sat on the ground in six rows, each with six women, to greet us and answer questions. Each row represented a subgroup of the local “microfinance” unit. The woman in the front of the row was in charge of the borrowing of the whole group behind her. The group in each line was mutually responsible for repayments of the loans taken by any member within the line. BRAC and its famed counterpart, Grameen Bank, pioneered this kind of group lending, in which impoverished recipients (usually women) are given small loans of a few hundred dollars as working capital for microbusiness activities. Such women were long considered unbankable, simply not creditworthy enough to bear the transaction costs to receive loans. Group lending changed the repayment dynamics: default rates are extremely low, and BRAC and Grameen have figured out how to keep other transaction costs to a minimum as well.
妇女们穿着漂亮的纱丽，坐在地上，排成六排，每排有六名妇女，向我们打招呼并回答问题。每行代表当地“小额信贷”单位的一个子组。排在前面的那个女人负责她后面整个小组的借钱。每个行的小组共同负责偿还行内任何成员所借的贷款。 BRAC 及其著名的同行格莱珉银行 (Grameen Bank) 首创了这种团体贷款，向贫困接受者（通常是妇女）提供几百美元的小额贷款，作为微型企业活动的营运资金。长期以来，这些女性被认为无法获得银行贷款，她们的信用度不足以承担获得贷款的交易成本。团体贷款改变了还款动态：违约率极低，BRAC 和 Grameen 也找到了将其他交易成本降至最低的方法。

Perhaps more amazing than the stories of how microfinance was fueling small-scale businesses were the women’s attitudes to child rearing. When Dr. Allan Rosenfield, dean of Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health and one of the world’s leading experts on reproductive health, asked the women how many had five children, no hands went up. Four? Still no hands. Three? One
也许比小额信贷如何推动小规模企业发展的故事更令人惊奇的是妇女对抚养孩子的态度。当哥伦比亚大学梅尔曼公共卫生学院院长、世界领先的生殖健康专家之一艾伦·罗森菲尔德博士询问妇女们有多少人有五个孩子时，没有人举手。四个？还是没有手。三？一
nervous woman, looking around, reluctantly put her hand in the air. Two? About 40 percent of the women. One? Perhaps another 25 percent. None? The remainder of the women. Here was a group nervous woman, looking around, reluctantly put her hand in the air. Two? About 40 percent of
紧张的女人环顾四周，不情愿地将手举在空中。二？大约40%是女性。一？也许还有 25%。没有任何？剩下的都是女人。这是一群紧张的女人，环顾四周，不情愿地将手举在空中。二？大约 40%
where the average number of children for these mothers was between one and two children.
这些母亲的平均孩子数量在一到两个孩子之间。

Rosenfield then asked them how many they wanted in total. He again started at five-no hands. Four? No hands. Three? No hands. Two? Almost all the hands went up. This social norm was new, a demonstration of a change of outlook and possibility so dramatic that Rosenfield dwelt on it throughout the rest of our visit. He had been visiting Bangladesh and other parts of Asia since the 1960s, and demonstration of a change of outlook and possibility so dramatic that Rosenfield dwelt on it throughout the rest of
罗森菲尔德然后问他们总共想要多少。他再次从五手无牌开始。四个？没有手。三？没有手。二？几乎所有的手都举了起来。这种社会规范是新的，它展示了观点和可能性的巨大变化，以至于罗森菲尔德在我们访问的其余时间里一直在思考它。自 20 世纪 60 年代以来，他一直访问孟加拉国和亚洲其他地区，并展示了他的观点和可能性发生了如此巨大的变化，以至于罗森菲尔德在接下来的时间里一直在关注这一点。
he remembered vividly the days when Bangladeshi rural women would typically have had six or seven children.
他清楚地记得孟加拉国农村妇女通常会生六七个孩子的日子。

The jobs for women in the cities and in rural off-farm microenterprises; a new spirit of women’s rights and independence and empowerment; dramatically reduced rates of child mortality; rising The jobs for women in the cities and in rural off-farm microenterprises; a new spirit of women’s rights and independence and empowerment; dramatically reduced rates of child mortality; rising
妇女在城市和农村非农微型企业的就业；妇女权利、独立和赋权的新精神；儿童死亡率大幅降低；城市和农村非农微型企业中妇女的就业机会不断增加；妇女权利、独立和赋权的新精神；儿童死亡率大幅降低；上升
literacy of girls and young women; and, crucially, the availability of family planning and contraception have made all the difference for these women. There is no single explanation for the dramatic, literacy of girls and young women; and, crucially, the availability of family planning and contraception have made all the difference for these women. There is no single explanation for the dramatic,
女孩和年轻妇女的识字率；更重要的是，计划生育和避孕措施的普及给这些妇女带来了巨大的改变。对于女孩和年轻女性的显着识字率，没有单一的解释。更重要的是，计划生育和避孕措施的普及给这些妇女带来了巨大的改变。对于这一戏剧性的事件，没有单一的解释，
indeed historic, reduction in desired rates of fertility: it is the combination of new ideas, better public health for mothers and children, and improved economic opportunities for women. The reduced indeed historic, reduction in desired rates of fertility: it is the combination of new ideas, better public health for mothers and children, and improved economic opportunities for women. The reduced
事实上，期望生育率的降低是历史性的：它是新思想、母亲和儿童更好的公共卫生以及妇女经济机会改善的结合。预期生育率的下降确实是历史性的下降：这是新思想、母亲和儿童更好的公共卫生以及妇女经济机会改善的结合。减少的
fertility rates, in turn, will fuel Bangladesh’s rising incomes. With fewer children, a poor household can invest more in the health and education of each child, thereby equipping the next generation with the health, nutrition, and education that can lift Bangladesh’s living standards in future years.
反过来，生育率将推动孟加拉国收入的增长。由于孩子数量较少，贫困家庭可以对每个孩子的健康和教育进行更多投资，从而为下一代提供健康、营养和教育，从而提高孟加拉国未来几年的生活水平。

Bangladesh has managed to place its foot on the first rung of the ladder of development, and has achieved economic growth and improvements of health and education partly through its own heroic efforts, partly through the ingenuity of NGOs like BRAC and Grameen Bank, and partly through investments that have been made, often at significant scale, by various donor governments that rightly viewed Bangladesh not as a hopeless basket case but as a country worthy of attention, care, and development assistance.
孟加拉国成功地踏上了发展阶梯的第一级，实现了经济增长以及健康和教育的改善，部分是通过其自身的英勇努力，部分是通过 BRAC 和格莱珉银行等非政府组织的聪明才智，部分是通过各个捐助国政府进行了大规模投资，这些政府正确地将孟加拉国视为一个值得关注、照顾和发展援助的国家，而不是一个无药可救的烂摊子。

NDIA: CENTER OF AN EXPORT SERVICES REVOLUTION

If Bangladesh has one foot on the ladder, India is already several steps up the ladder. The young woman whose computer screen I peered over, in an information technology center in Chennai, is a prototypical employee of the new India. She is twenty-five years old and a graduate of a local teacher’s college where she obtained a two-year degree following high school. Now she works as a transcriber of data for a new Indian information technology (IT) company operating in the capital of the southern state of Tamil Nadu. Chennai is a center of India’s IT revolution, one that is beginning
如果孟加拉国迈出了一步，那么印度已经领先了好几级。我在金奈的一个信息技术中心凝视着电脑屏幕上的那位年轻女士，她是新印度的典型员工。她今年二十五岁，毕业于当地一所师范学院，高中毕业后获得了两年制学位。现在，她在一家新成立的印度信息技术 (IT) 公司担任数据转录员，该公司在南部泰米尔纳德邦首府运营。金奈是印度 IT 革命的中心，这场革命刚刚开始
to fuel unprecedented economic growth in this vast country of one billion people. The IT revolution is creating jobs that are unknown in Malawi and still largely unthinkable in Bangladesh, but that are becoming the norm for educated young women in India.
推动这个拥有十亿人口的幅员辽阔的国家前所未有的经济增长。信息技术革命正在创造一些就业机会，这在马拉维是闻所未闻的，在孟加拉国也是难以想象的，但在印度，这正在成为受过教育的年轻女性的常态。

This company has a remarkable arrangement with a hospital in Chicago, where doctors dictate their charts and transmit them by satellite to India as voice files at the end of each work day in Chicago. Because of the ten-and-a-half-hour time zone difference, the end of each work day in Chicago is the beginning of another in Chennai. When the voice files are received, dozens of young women who have taken a special course in medical data transcription sit in front of computer screens with headphones in place and speedily type in the medical charts of patients almost ten thousand miles away. I listened, for a short bit, to the transcription. The workers there know the medical jargon much better than I do because of their intensive training course and experience. They earn about $\mathrm{\$}250$$\mathrm{\$}250$$250\$ 250 to $\mathrm{\$}500$$\mathrm{\$}500$$500\$ 500 a month, depending on their level of experience, between a tenth and a third of what a medical data transcriber might earn in the United States. Their income is more than twice the earnings of a lowskilled industrial worker in India and perhaps eight times the earnings of an agricultural laborer.
该公司与芝加哥的一家医院达成了一项非凡的协议，医生在芝加哥的每个工作日结束时口述图表，并通过卫星将其作为语音文件传输到印度。由于十个半小时的时差，芝加哥每个工作日的结束都是金奈另一个工作日的开始。当收到语音文件时，数十名接受过医疗数据转录特殊课程的年轻女性戴着耳机坐在电脑屏幕前，快速输入近万英里外患者的医疗图表。我听了一小会转录。那里的工作人员比我更了解医学术语，因为他们接受过强化培训并拥有丰富的经验。他们的收入约为 $\mathrm{\$}250$$\mathrm{\$}250$$250\$ 250 到 $\mathrm{\$}500$$\mathrm{\$}500$$500\$ 500 根据他们的经验水平，每月的收入是美国医疗数据转录员的十分之一到三分之一。他们的收入是印度低技能产业工人收入的两倍多，或许是农业工人收入的八倍。

The entrepreneur who started up this firm has close relatives in the United States who made the business connections on the U.S. side. Now the business is thriving. It is moving from data transcription to financial record keeping, and soon into financial consulting and advising for American companies, as well as back-office processing operations, or BPO in the new jargon of the global economy. Its employees work in gleaming buildings with broadband Internet facilities, satelite hookups, and videoconferencing capability for the heads of operations who have to be in face-to-face contact with their counterparts in the United States. They have access to hygienic facilities. They are women whose mothers, typically, were the first in the family to become literate and to gain a foothold in the urban economy (perhaps as seamstresses in the sweatshops), and whose grandmothers were almost without a doubt rural laborers in the overwhelmingly village economy of two generations before.
创办这家公司的企业家在美国有近亲，他们在美国方面建立了商业联系。现在生意兴隆。它正在从数据转录转向财务记录保存，并很快进入为美国公司提供财务咨询和建议，以及后台处理业务（全球经济新术语中的 BPO）。它的员工在闪闪发光的大楼里工作，那里配备了宽带互联网设施、卫星连接和视频会议功能，以便运营负责人与美国的同行进行面对面的接触。他们可以使用卫生设施。她们的母亲通常是家里第一个识字并在城市经济中站稳脚跟的女性（也许是血汗工厂的裁缝），而她们的祖母几乎毫无疑问是农村经济中的农村劳动力。两代人之前。
India is vast. Many parts of India, particularly in the north, are still caught in the same back-breaking rural poverty that grips Malawi and parts of Bangladesh. Much of urban India resembles Dhaka. Only a few leading “growth poles” share the cutting-edge feel of IT-driven Chennai. Throughout the Ganges Valley of northern India, home to two hundred million Indians living in the vast plains of India’s greatest river, the IT revolution has been slow to emerge, if it has emerged at all. Yet so powerful are the new trends in India, not only in IT but also in textiles and apparel, electronics, pharmaceuticals, automotive components, and other sectors, that the overall economic growth of India is reliably now 6 percent or more per year. India is beginning to nip at the heels of China’s growth rates, and investors around the world are warming to the notion of establishing operations, from IT to manufacturing to research and development, in the fast-growing Indian economy.
印度幅员辽阔。印度的许多地区，特别是北部地区，仍然陷入与马拉维和孟加拉国部分地区相同的令人疲惫不堪的农村贫困之中。印度的大部分城市与达卡相似。只有少数领先的“增长极”具有 IT 驱动型钦奈的前沿感觉。在印度北部的恒河谷，两亿印度人生活在印度最大河流的广阔平原上，IT 革命即使真的出现了，也进展缓慢。然而，印度的新趋势是如此强大，不仅在 IT 领域，而且在纺织服装、电子、制药、汽车零部件和其他领域，印度的总体经济增长率目前可靠地达到每年 6% 或更高。印度正开始追赶中国的增长率，世界各地的投资者都热衷于在快速增长的印度经济中建立从 IT 到制造再到研发的业务。
Progress is hard enough to achieve in the world without being perceived as a danger. One of the ironies of the recent success of India and China is the fear that has engulfed the United States that success in these two countries comes at the expense of the United States. These fears are fundamentally wrong and, even worse, dangerous. They are wrong because the world is not a zero-sum struggle in which one country’s gain is another’s loss, but is rather a positive-sum opportunity in which improving technologies and skills can raise living standards around the world. Not only are the Indian IT workers providing valuable goods and services to United States consumers, but they are also sitting at terminals with Dell computers, using Microsoft and SAP software, Cisco routers, and dozens of
世界上要取得进步而不被视为危险是很困难的。印度和中国最近取得的成功的讽刺之一是，美国担心这两个国家的成功是以牺牲美国为代价的。这些担忧从根本上来说是错误的，而且更糟糕的是，是危险的。他们错了，因为世界不是一个国家的收益就是另一个国家的损失的零和斗争，而是一个正和机会，提高技术和技能可以提高世界各地的生活水平。印度 IT 员工不仅为美国消费者提供有价值的商品和服务，而且他们还坐在配有戴尔计算机的终端前，使用微软和 SAP 软件、思科路由器以及数十种设备。
other empowering pieces 其他赋权作品
homes and businesses. 家庭和企业。

Following another visit to India, I continued on to Beijing, China, where economic development is speeding ahead at full throttle. Beijing has emerged not only as a major capital of the developing world, but also as one of the world’s economic capitals. It is now a booming city of eleven million. Annual income has surpassed $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 per capita, and the Chinese economy continues to soar at above 8 percent growth per annum.
继再次访问印度之后，我又来到了经济高速发展的中国北京。北京不仅成为发展中国家的主要首都，而且成为世界经济首都之一。现在它是一座拥有一千一百万人口的蓬勃发展的城市。年收入已超 $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 人均经济增速继续保持在8%以上。

On one particular night, I was the guest of two young couples, truly young urban professionals, who took me to one of the trendiest nightspots of the city. I tried to listen to them over the operatic duet taking place on the stage, a kind of retrochic performance in which a Mao-era revolutionary opera was being performed for a room filled with very well-dressed young business executives. Every table had at least one, and usually half a dozen, cell phones lying on it in case any of the hotshot young businessmen and -women received calls from clients or the office. As I peered at the opera out of a had at least one, and usually half a dozen, cell phones lying on it in case any of the hotshot young businessmen and - women received calls from clients or the office. As I peered at the opera out of a
在一个特别的夜晚，我是两对年轻夫妇的客人，他们是真正年轻的城市专业人士，他们带我去了这座城市最时尚的夜总会之一。我试图在舞台上上演的歌剧二重唱中聆听他们的声音，这是一种复古的表演，在房间里为穿着考究的年轻企业高管表演毛泽东时代的革命歌剧。每张桌子上都至少放着一部，通常是六部手机，以防那些炙手可热的年轻商人接到客户或办公室打来的电话。当我凝视歌剧院时，歌剧院里至少放着一部，通常是六部手机，以防任何炙手可热的年轻商人和女性接到客户或办公室的电话。当我从窗户里凝视歌剧时
corner of my eye, my hosts showed me the new cell phones they had just purchased that were also digital cameras. They demonstrated them by sending a picture of me from one phone to the other. This was a gadget that I had not yet seen back home.
我眼角的余光，主人向我展示了他们刚刚购买的新手机，同时也是数码相机。他们通过将我的照片从一部手机发送到另一部手机来演示。这是我在国内还没见过的小玩意。
I would not have been so stunned had I been in London or New York or Paris or Tokyo. But I was in a country that twenty-five years ago was still emerging from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and decades of turmoil under Mao Tse-tung. Within a single generation, China has become one of the most important economies and trading powers of the world.
如果我在伦敦、纽约、巴黎或东京，我就不会如此震惊。但二十五年前，我所在的国家仍处于文化大革命的混乱和毛泽东统治下数十年的动乱之中。在一代人的时间里，中国已成为世界上最重要的经济体和贸易大国之一。

These young Chinese men and women have the chance to attain tremendous affluence, to travel the world, and to enjoy the other benefits of the high living standards available to them because of the powers of globalization. China’s great advance during the past twenty-five years reflects the fact that within two decades, it has gone from being a virtually closed society and economy to one of the great export powers of the world. Its exports have been fueled by a vast inflow of foreign investment and technology, which brought the money to build modern factories together with the machinery and techniques to run them, in combination with relatively low-cost Chinese workers who are increasingly proficient in skills of all sorts. The result has been the rise, in one industry after another, of highly competitive enterprises that have increased China’s exports from around $\mathrm{\$}20$$\mathrm{\$}20$$20\$ 20 billion in 1980 to around $\mathrm{\$}400$$\mathrm{\$}400$$400\$ 400 billion in 2004
由于全球化的力量，这些年轻的中国男女有机会获得巨大的富裕，环游世界，并享受高生活水平带来的其他好处。中国过去25年的巨大进步反映了这样一个事实：在20年之内，它已经从一个几乎封闭的社会和经济发展成为世界出口大国之一。大量外国投资和技术的流入推动了中国的出口，这些投资和技术带来了建设现代化工厂的资金以及运营这些工厂的机械和技术，再加上成本相对较低的中国工人，他们越来越精通所有技能。排序。结果是一个又一个行业中竞争激烈的企业崛起，这些企业增加了中国的出口 $\mathrm{\$}20$$\mathrm{\$}20$$20\$ 20 1980 年 10 亿左右 $\mathrm{\$}400$$\mathrm{\$}400$$400\$ 400 2004年 亿元

What do these four widely divergent images of the globe show us? We see an almost unimaginable divide between the richest and poorest parts of the world, with all the gradations in between. We glimpse the pivotal roles that science and technology play in the development process. And we sense a progression of development that moves from subsistence agriculture toward light manufacturing and urbanization, and on to high-tech services. In Malawi, 84 percent of the population lives in rural areas; in Bangladesh, 76 percent; in India, 72 percent; and in China, 61 percent. In the United States, at the other upper end of the development spectrum, it is just 20 percent. Services account for under 25 percent of employment in Malawi, whereas in the United States, they account for 75 .
这四种截然不同的地球图像向我们展示了什么？我们看到世界上最富有的地区和最贫穷的地区之间存在着几乎难以想象的鸿沟，其间存在着各种等级。我们看到科学技术在发展过程中发挥的关键作用。我们感受到了发展的进步，从自给农业转向轻工业和城市化，再到高科技服务业。在马拉维，84%的人口生活在农村地区；在孟加拉国，76%；印度为 72%；在中国，这一比例为 61%。在处于发展范围另一高端的美国，这一比例仅为 20%。在马拉维，服务业占就业的比例不到 25%，而在美国，这一比例为 75%。
If economic development is a ladder with higher rungs representing steps up the path to economic well-being, there are roughly one billion people around the world, one sixth of humanity, who live as the Malawians do: too ill, hungry, or destitute even to get a foot on the first rung of the development ladder. These people are the “poorest of the poor,” or the “extreme poor” of the planet. They all live the Malawians do: too ill, hungry, or destitute even to get a foot on the first rung of the development ladder. These people are the “poorest of the poor,” or the “extreme por” of the planet. They all live
如果经济发展是一个阶梯，更高的梯级代表通往经济福祉的阶梯，那么全世界大约有十亿人，占人类的六分之一，过着与马拉维人一样的生活：病重、饥饿，甚至赤贫。踏上发展阶梯的第一级。这些人是地球上的“穷人中的穷人”或“赤贫者”。他们都过着马拉维人的生活：病重、饥饿、贫困，甚至无法踏上发展阶梯的第一级。这些人是地球上“穷人中的穷人”或“极端穷人”。他们都活着
in developing countries (poverty does exist in rich countries, but it is not extreme poverty). Of course, not all of these one billion people are dying today, but they are all fighting for survival each day. If in developing countries (poverty does exist in rich countries, but it is not extreme poverty). Of course, not all of these one billion people are dying today, but they are all fighting for survival each day. If
在发展中国家（富裕国家确实存在贫困，但不是赤贫）。当然，今天这十亿人并非全部都在死亡，但他们每天都在为生存而战。如果在发展中国家（富裕国家确实存在贫困，但不是赤贫）。当然，今天这十亿人并非全部都在死亡，但他们每天都在为生存而战。如果
they are the victims of a serious drought or flood, or an episode of serious illness, or a collapse of the world market price of their cash crop, the result is likely to be extreme suffering and perhaps even they are the victims of a serious drough
他们是严重干旱或洪水的受害者，或者是严重疾病的受害者，或者其经济作物的世界市场价格暴跌，结果可能是极度痛苦，甚至可能他们是严重干旱的受害者
A few rungs up the development ladder is the upper end of the low-income world, where roughly another 1.5 billion people face problems like those of the young women in Bangladesh. These people are “the poor.” They live above mere subsistence. Although daily survival is pretty much assured, they struggle in the cities and countryside to make ends meet. Death is not at their door, but chronic are “the poor.” They live above mere subsistence. Although daily survival is pretty much assured, they struggle in the cities and countryside to make ends meet. Death is not at their door, but chronic
发展阶梯的上层是低收入世界的高端，那里大约还有 15 亿人面临着孟加拉国年轻女性所面临的问题。这些人就是“穷人”。他们的生活高于单纯的生存。虽然日常生活基本有了保障，但他们在城市和乡村却为维持生计而挣扎。死亡还没有到他们家门口，但慢性病却是“穷人”。他们的生活高于单纯的生存。虽然日常生活基本有了保障，但他们在城市和乡村却为维持生计而挣扎。死亡并非临到他们家门口，而是慢性的
financial hardship and a lack of basic amenities such as safe drinking water and functioning latrines are part of their daily lives. All told, the extreme poor (at around 1 billion) and the poor (another 1.5 financial hardship and a lack of basic amenities s.
经济困难和缺乏安全饮用水和正常使用的厕所等基本设施是他们日常生活的一部分。总而言之，极端贫困人口（约 10 亿）和贫困人口（另外 1.5 % 存在经济困难且缺乏基本设施）。
Another 2.5 billion people, including the Indian IT workers, are up yet another few rungs, in the middle-income world. These are middle-income households, but they would certainly not be recognized as middle class by the standards of rich countries. Their incomes may be a few thousand dollars per year. Most of them live in cities. They are able to secure some comfort in their housing, perhaps even indoor plumbing. They can purchase a scooter and someday even an automobile. They have adequate clothing, and their children go to school. Their nutrition is adequate, and some are even falling into the rich-world syndrome of unhealthy fast food.
包括印度 IT 工人在内的另外 25 亿人在中等收入世界中又上升了几个档次。这些是中等收入家庭，但按照富裕国家的标准，他们肯定不会被视为中产阶级。他们的收入每年可能有几千美元。他们大多数居住在城市。他们能够在自己的住房中获得一些舒适感，甚至可能获得室内管道系统。他们可以购买一辆踏板车，有一天甚至可以购买一辆汽车。他们有足够的衣服，他们的孩子也能上学。他们的营养充足，有的甚至陷入了不健康快餐的富国综合症。
Still higher up the ladder are the remaining one billion people, roughly a sixth of the world, in the high-income world. These affluent households include the billion or so people in the rich countries, but also the increasing number of affluent people living in middle-income countries - the tens of millions of high-income individuals in such cities as Shanghai, São Paolo, or Mexico City. The young professionals of Beijing are among the fortunate one sixth of the world enjoying twenty-first-century affluence.
排名更高的是剩下的 10 亿人，大约占世界的六分之一，属于高收入国家。这些富裕家庭包括富裕国家的十亿左右人口，也包括生活在中等收入国家的越来越多的富裕人群——上海、圣保罗或墨西哥城等城市的数千万高收入人群。 。北京的年轻专业人士是世界上六分之一的幸运者，享受着二十一世纪的富裕。
The good news is that well more than half of the world, from the Bangladesh garment worker onward, broadly speaking, is experiencing economic progress. Not only do they have a foothold on the development ladder, but they are also actually climbing it. Their climb is evident in rising personal incomes and the acquisition of goods such as cell phones, television sets, and scooters. Progress is also evident in such crucial determinants of economic well-being as rising life expectancy, falling infant mortality rates, rising educational attainment, increasing access to water and sanitation, and the like.
好消息是，从广义上讲，从孟加拉国服装工人开始，世界上一半以上的人正在经历经济进步。他们不仅在发展阶梯上站稳了脚跟，而且实际上还在攀登。他们的进步体现在个人收入的增加以及手机、电视机和摩托车等商品的购买上。在经济福祉的关键决定因素方面也取得了明显的进展，例如预期寿命的延长、婴儿死亡率的下降、教育程度的提高、获得水和卫生设施的机会的增加等。

The greatest tragedy of our time is that one sixth of humanity is not even on the development ladder. A large number of the extreme poor are caught in a poverty trap, unable on their own to escape from extreme material deprivation. They are trapped by disease, physical isolation, climate stress, environmental degradation, and by extreme poverty itself. Even though life-saving solutions exist to increase their chances for survival - whether in the form of new farming techniques, or essential medicines, or bed nets that can limit the transmission of malaria-these families and their governments simply lack the financial means to make these crucial investments. The world’s poor know about the development ladder: they are tantalized by images of affluence from halfway around the world. But they are not able to get a first foothold on the ladder, and so cannot even begin the climb out of poverty.
我们这个时代最大的悲剧是，六分之一的人类甚至没有进入发展阶梯。大量赤贫者陷入贫困陷阱，无法独自摆脱物质上的极度匮乏。他们受到疾病、物理隔离、气候压力、环境退化以及极端贫困本身的困扰。尽管存在拯救生命的解决方案来增加他们的生存机会——无论是以新的农业技术、基本药物还是可以限制疟疾传播的蚊帐的形式——但这些家庭及其政府只是缺乏财政手段来实现这一目标。这些重要的投资。世界上的穷人了解发展阶梯：他们被来自世界另一端的富裕形象所吸引。但他们无法在阶梯上站稳脚跟，甚至无法开始摆脱贫困。

WHO AND WHERE ARETHEPOOR

There are many definitions, as well as intense debates, about the exact numbers of the poor, where they live, and how their numbers and economic conditions are changing over time. It is useful to start with what is agreed, and then to mention some of the areas of debate. As a matter of definition, it is useful to distinguish between three degrees of poverty: extreme (or absolute) poverty, moderate poverty, and relative poverty. Extreme poverty means that households cannot meet basic needs for survival. They are chronically hungry, unable to access health care, lack the amenities of safe drinking water and sanitation, cannot afford education for some or all of the children, and perhaps lack rudimentary shelter-a roof to keep the rain out of the hut, a chimney to remove the smoke from the cook stove-and basic articles of clothing, such as shoes. Unlike moderate and relative poverty, extreme poverty occurs only in developing countries. Moderate poverty generally refers to conditions of life in which basic needs are met, but just barely. Relative poverty is generally construed as a household income level below a given proportion of average national income. The relatively poor, in high-income countries, lack access to cultural goods, entertainment, recreation, and to quality health care, education, and other perquisites for upward social mobility.
关于穷人的确切人数、他们居住的地方以及他们的人数和经济状况如何随着时间的推移而变化，有许多定义，也存在激烈的争论。从达成一致的内容开始，然后提及一些争论的领域是有用的。作为定义问题，区分三种贫困程度是有用的：极端（或绝对）贫困、中等贫困和相对贫困。极端贫困意味着家庭无法满足基本生存需求。他们长期处于饥饿状态，无法获得医疗保健，缺乏安全饮用水和卫生设施，无法承担部分或全部儿童的教育费用，或许还缺乏基本的住所——遮雨的屋顶、棚屋、用于去除炉灶和基本衣物（例如鞋子）中的烟雾的烟囱。与中等贫困和相对贫困不同，极端贫困只发生在发展中国家。中度贫困通常是指基本需求得到满足但只是勉强得到满足的生活条件。相对贫困通常被解释为家庭收入水平低于平均国民收入的特定比例。高收入国家的相对贫困人口缺乏获得文化产品、娱乐、休闲、优质医疗保健、教育和其他社会向上流动的福利的机会。
The World Bank has long used a complicated statistical standard-income of $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 per day per person, measured at purchasing power parity-to determine the numbers of extreme poor around the world. Another World Bank category, income between $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 per day and $\mathrm{\$}2$$\mathrm{\$}2$$2\$ 2 per day, can be used to measure moderate poverty. These measures feature prominently in public policy circles, and most recently were estimated by World Bank economists Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion. They estimated that roughly 1.1 billion people were living in extreme poverty in 2001 , down from 1.5 billion in 1981. Figure 1a shows the distribution of the world’s extreme poor by region. Each bar signifies the number of poor in the region, with the first bar indicating the number in 1981, the second bar, in 2001. The overwhelming share of the world’s extreme poor, 93 percent in 2001, live in three regions: East Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1981, the numbers of extreme poor have risen in sub-Saharan Africa, but have fallen in East Asia and South Asia.
世界银行长期以来一直采用复杂的统计标准——收入 $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 按购买力平价衡量的每人每天的收入，以确定世界各地极端贫困人口的数量。世界银行的另一个类别，收入介于 $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 每天和 $\mathrm{\$}2$$\mathrm{\$}2$$2\$ 2 每天，可以用来衡量中等贫困。这些措施在公共政策界占据显着地位，最近由世界银行经济学家陈少华和马丁·拉瓦利恩进行了估计。他们估计，2001 年大约有 11 亿人生活在极端贫困中，而 1981 年这一数字为 15 亿。图 1a 显示了世界极端贫困人口按地区的分布情况。每个条形表示该地区的贫困人口数量，第一个条形表示 1981 年的数字，第二个条形表示 2001 年的数字。世界上绝大多数赤贫人口（2001 年为 93%）生活在三个地区：东亚、南亚和撒哈拉以南非洲。自1981年以来，撒哈拉以南非洲的极端贫困人口数量有所增加，但东亚和南亚的极端贫困人口数量有所下降。
Figure 1b repeats the same measurement, but now shows the proportion of the region’s population in extreme poverty, rather than the absolute number. Almost half of Africa’s population is deemed to live in extreme poverty, and that proportion has risen slightly over the period. The proportion of the extreme poor in East Asia has plummeted, from 58 percent in 1981 to 15 percent in 2001 ; in South Asia the progress has also been marked, although slightly less dramatically, from 52 percent to 31 percent. Latin America’s extreme poverty rate is around 10 percent, and relatively stuck; Eastern Europe’s rose from a negligible level in 1981 to around 4 percent in 2001 , the result of the upheavals of communist collapse and economic transition to a market economy.
图 1b 重复了相同的测量，但现在显示了该地区极端贫困人口的比例，而不是绝对数量。近一半的非洲人口被认为生活在极端贫困之中，并且这一比例在此期间略有上升。东亚地区极端贫困人口的比例大幅下降，从1981年的58%下降到2001年的15%；南亚的进步也很显着，虽然幅度不大，但从 52% 上升到 31%。拉丁美洲的极端贫困率约为10%，且相对陷入困境；东欧的这一比例从 1981 年的微不足道的水平上升到 2001 年的 4% 左右，这是共产主义崩溃和经济向市场经济转型的剧变的结果。
Figures 2 a and 2 b show the calculations for the moderate poor, those living between $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 and $\mathrm{\$}2$$\mathrm{\$}2$$2\$ 2 per day. East Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa continue to dominate the picture, with 87 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion moderately poor. The numbers of moderate poor in East Asia and South Asia have actually risen as the poorest households have improved their circumstances from extreme poverty to moderate poverty. Some 15 percent of Latin Americans live in moderate poverty, a rate that has been fairly constant since 1981.
图 2a 和 2b 显示了对中等贫困人口（即生活在 $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 和 $\mathrm{\$}2$$\mathrm{\$}2$$2\$ 2 每天。东亚、南亚和撒哈拉以南非洲继续占据主导地位，全球 16 亿人口中有 87% 属于中等贫困人口。东亚和南亚地区的中度贫困人口数量实际上有所增加，因为最贫困家庭的处境已从极端贫困转变为中度贫困。约 15% 的拉丁美洲人生活在中度贫困中，这一比例自 1981 年以来一直相当稳定。

Map 1 gives us yet another perspective on these data, on a country-by-country basis. Each country is shaded according to the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty and moderate poverty. A country as a whole is deemed to suffer from extreme poverty if the proportion of the population in extreme poverty is at least 25 percent of the total. A country is categorized as suffering from
地图 1 为我们提供了按国家/地区划分的对这些数据的另一个视角。每个国家都根据生活在极端贫困和中等贫困的人口比例进行阴影化。如果一个国家的极端贫困人口占总人口的比例至少达到25%，则该国家整体上被视为处于极端贫困状态。一个国家被归类为遭受
moderate poverty if it is not in extreme poverty, but at least 25 percent of the households are extremely poor or moderately poor, that is, living under $\mathrm{\$}2$$\mathrm{\$}2$$2\$ 2 per day. Most of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are in extreme poverty (and even more would be in this category but for lack of reliable data), as are the countries of South Asia. East Asia and Latin America include many countries in moderate poverty, but also many that have risen beyond moderate poverty in recent decades.
中度贫困：不属于极端贫困，但至少有25%的家庭属于极端贫困或中度贫困，即生活在贫困线以下。 $\mathrm{\$}2$$\mathrm{\$}2$$2\$ 2 每天。大多数撒哈拉以南非洲国家都处于赤贫状态（如果没有可靠的数据，更多的国家将属于这一类别），南亚国家也是如此。东亚和拉丁美洲有许多国家处于中等贫困状态，但也有许多国家在近几十年来已经摆脱了中等贫困。

The precision of the World Bank figures have been questioned in heated debates. The World Bank has relied on household surveys, while other researchers have relied on national income accounts, which tend to show somewhat faster progress in the reduction of Asian poverty. The details need not detain us here, except to say that the general picture remains true in either case: extreme poverty is concentrated in East Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. It is rising in Africa in absolute numbers and as a share of the population, while it is falling in both absolute numbers and as a proportion of the population in the Asian regions.
世界银行数据的准确性在激烈的争论中受到质疑。世界银行依赖于家庭调查，而其他研究人员则依赖于国民收入账户，这些账户往往显示亚洲在减少贫困方面取得了更快的进展。我们不必在这里拘泥于细节，只是要说，无论哪种情况，总的情况都是如此：极端贫困集中在东亚、南亚和撒哈拉以南非洲。非洲的绝对人数和占人口比例都在上升，而亚洲地区的绝对人数和占人口比例都在下降。

We will have many occasions to discuss the specific circumstances of the poorest of the poor. They are mainly in rural areas, though with a growing proportion in the cities. They face challenges almost unknown in the rich world today-malaria, massive droughts, lack of roads and motor vehicles, great distances to regional and world markets, lack of electricity and modern cooking fuelschallenges that are at first harrowing to contemplate, but on second thought encouraging, precisely because they also lend themselves to practical solutions.
我们将有很多机会讨论最贫困人口的具体情况。他们主要分布在农村地区，但城市中所占比例不断增加。他们面临着当今富裕世界几乎闻所未闻的挑战——疟疾、大规模干旱、缺乏道路和机动车辆、距离区域和世界市场很远、缺乏电力和现代烹饪燃料，这些挑战乍一看令人痛苦，但仔细想想令人鼓舞，正是因为它们也有助于找到切实可行的解决方案。

The very hardest part of economic development is getting the first foothold on the ladder. Households and countries at the very bottom of the world’s income distribution, in extreme poverty, tend to be stuck. Countries already on the ladder of development, such as Bangladesh and India, are generally making progress, even if it is uneven and sometimes painfully slow. Our generation’s challenge is to help the poorest of the poor to escape the misery of extreme poverty so that they may begin their own ascent up the ladder of economic development. The end of poverty, in this sense, is not only the end of extreme suffering but also the beginning of economic progress and of the hope and security that accompany economic development.
经济发展最难的部分是在阶梯上站稳脚跟。处于世界收入分配最底层、陷入极端贫困的家庭和国家往往会陷入困境。孟加拉国和印度等已经处于发展阶梯上的国家总体上正在取得进展，尽管进展不平衡，有时甚至缓慢得令人痛苦。我们这一代人面临的挑战是帮助最贫困的人摆脱赤贫的痛苦，以便他们能够开始自己的经济发展阶梯。从这个意义上说，贫困的结束不仅是极端苦难的结束，也是经济进步以及伴随经济发展而来的希望和安全的开始。

When I speak of the “end of poverty,” therefore, I will be speaking of two closely related objectives. The first is to end the plight of one sixth of humanity that lives in extreme poverty and struggles daily for survival. Everybody on Earth can and should enjoy basic standards of nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter, and other minimum needs for survival, well-being, and participation in daily for survival. Everybody on Earth can and should enjoy basic standards of nutrition, health, water and sanitation, shelter, and other minimum needs for survival, well-being, and participation
因此，当我谈到“消除贫困”时，我将谈到两个密切相关的目标。首先是结束六分之一的人类生活在极端贫困中、每天为生存而挣扎的困境。地球上的每个人都可以而且应该享受基本标准的营养、健康、水和卫生设施、住房以及其他生存、福祉和参与日常生存的最低需求。地球上的每个人都可以而且应该享受营养、健康、水和卫生设施、住房以及其他生存、福祉和参与的最低需求的基本标准
society. The second is to ensure that all of the world’s poor, including those in moderate poverty, have a chance to climb the ladder of development. As a global society, we should ensure that the society. The second is to ensure that all of the world’s poor, including those in moderate poverty, have a chance to climb the ladder of development. As a global society, we should ensure that the
社会。二是确保世界上所有贫困人口，包括中度贫困人口，都有机会登上发展阶梯。作为一个全球社会，我们应该确保这个社会。二是确保世界上所有贫困人口，包括中度贫困人口，都有机会登上发展阶梯。作为一个全球社会，我们应该确保
international rules of the game in economic management do not advertently or inadvertently set snares along the lower rungs of the ladder in the form of inadequate development assistance, protectionist international rules of the game in economic management do not advertently or inadvertently set snares along the lower rungs of the ladder in the form of inadequate development assistance, prot
经济管理中的国际游戏规则不会有意或无意地以发展援助不足的形式在阶梯的较低梯级上设置陷阱，经济管理中的保护主义国际游戏规则不会有意或无意地在较低的梯级上设置陷阱阶梯的发展援助不足，保护
trade barriers, destabilizing global financial practices, poorly designed rules for intellectual property, and the like, that prevent the low-income world from climbing up the rungs of development. The end of extreme poverty is at hand-within our generation-but only if we grasp the historic opportunity in front of us. There already exists a bold set of commitments that is halfway to that target the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the eight goals that all 191 UN member states unanimously agreed to in 2002 by signing the United Nations Millennium Declaration. These goals are important targets for cutting poverty in half by the year 2015, compared with a baseline of 1990 . They are bold but achievable, even if dozens of countries are not yet on track to achieve them. They represent a crucial midstation on the path to ending extreme poverty by the year 2025. And the rich countries have repeatedly promised to help the poor countries to achieve them through increased development assistance and improved global rules of the game.
贸易壁垒、破坏全球金融惯例的稳定、设计不当的知识产权规则等等，阻碍了低收入世界攀登发展的阶梯。在我们这一代人之内，消除极端贫困就指日可待了，但前提是我们要抓住摆在我们面前的历史性机遇。目前已经存在一系列大胆的承诺，距离千年发展目标 (MDG) 目标已完成一半，这八个目标是所有 191 个联合国成员国在 2002 年签署《联合国千年宣言》时一致同意的。这些目标是到 2015 年将贫困人口比 1990 年的基线减少一半的重要目标。这些目标是大胆的，但也是可以实现的，尽管有数十个国家尚未走上实现这些目标的轨道。它们是到2025年消除极端贫困道路上的关键中间站。富裕国家一再承诺通过增加发展援助和改善全球游戏规则来帮助贫穷国家实现这些目标。

These, then, are the economic possibilities of our time:
那么，这些就是我们这个时代的经济可能性：

To meet these challenges, we first have to understand how we got to where we are, for in that understanding we will also find the way forward.
为了应对这些挑战，我们首先必须了解我们是如何走到现在的位置的，因为在这种了解中我们也将找到前进的道路。

TThe move from universal poverty to varying degrees of prosperity has happened rapidly in the span of human history. Two hundred years ago the idea that we could potentially achieve the end of extreme poverty would have been unimaginable. Just about everybody was poor, with the exception of a very small minority of rulers and large landowners. Life was as difficult in much of Europe as it was in India or China. Our great-great-grandparents were, with very few exceptions, most likely poor and living on a farm. One leading economic historian, Angus Maddison, puts the average income per person in Western Europe in 1820 at around 90 percent of the average income of Africa today. Life expectancy in Western Europe and Japan as of 1800 was about forty years.
在人类历史上，从普遍贫困到不同程度繁荣的转变迅速发生。 200 年前，我们无法想象我们有可能消除极端贫困。除了极少数统治者和大地主之外，几乎每个人都很贫穷。欧洲大部分地区的生活与印度或中国一样困难。我们的曾曾祖父母，除了极少数例外，很可能很穷，住在农场里。一位著名的经济历史学家安格斯·麦迪逊 (Angus Maddison) 认为，1820 年西欧的人均收入约为当今非洲平均收入的 90%。截至 1800 年，西欧和日本的预期寿命约为四十岁。

A few centuries ago, vast divides in wealth and poverty around the world did not exist. China, India, Europe, and Japan all had similar income levels at the time of European discoveries of the sea routes to Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Marco Polo marveled at the sumptuous wonders of China, not at its poverty. Cortés and his conquistadores expressed astonishment at the riches of Tenochtitlán, the capital of the Aztecs. The early Portuguese explorers were impressed with the well-ordered towns of West Africa.
几个世纪前，世界各地并不存在巨大的贫富差距。在欧洲发现通往亚洲、非洲和美洲的海上航线时，中国、印度、欧洲和日本的收入水平都相似。马可·波罗惊叹于中国的华丽奇迹，而不是其贫穷。科尔特斯和他的征服者对阿兹特克首都特诺奇蒂特兰的财富表示惊讶。早期的葡萄牙探险家对西非井然有序的城镇印象深刻。

THE NOVELTY OF MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH
现代经济增长的新奇之处
If we are to understand why a vast gap between rich and poor exists today, we must return to the very recent period of human history when this divide emerged. The past two centuries, since around 1800 , constitute a unique era in economic history, a period the great economic historian Simon Kuznets famously termed the period of modern economic growth. Before then, indeed for thousands of years, there had been virtually no sustained economic growth in the world, and only gradual increases in the human population. The world population had risen gradually from around 230 million people at the start of the first millennium in a.d. 1 , to perhaps 270 million by a.d. 1000 , and 900 million people by a.d. 1800 . Real living standards were even slower to change. According to Maddison, there wa no discernible rise in living standards on a global scale during the first millennium, and perhaps a 50 percent increase in per capita income in the eight-hundred-year period from a.d. 1000 to a.D. 1800 . In the period of modern economic growth, however, both population and per capita income came unstuck, soaring at rates never before seen or even imagined. As shown on figure 1 , the global population rose more than sixfold in just two centuries, reaching an astounding 6.1 billion people at the start of the third millennium, with plenty of momentum for rapid population growth still ahead. The world’s average per capita income rose even faster, shown in figure 2, increasing by around nine times between 1820 and 2000. In today’s rich countries, the economic growth was even more astounding. The U.S. per capita income increased almost twenty-five-fold during this period, and Western Europe’s increased fifteen-fold. Total worldwide food production more than kept up with the booming world population (though large numbers of chronically hungry people remain until today). Vastly improved farm yields were achieved on the basis of technological advances. If we combine the increases in world population and world output per person, we find an astounding forty-ninefold increase in total economic activity in the world (the gross world product, or GWP) over the past 180 years
如果我们要理解为什么今天存在巨大的贫富差距，我们必须回到人类历史上出现这种差距的最近时期。 1800年左右以来的过去两个世纪，构成了经济史上一个独特的时代，伟大的经济史学家西蒙·库兹涅茨将这个时期称为现代经济增长时期。在此之前，实际上几千年来，世界上几乎没有持续的经济增长，只有人口的逐渐增加。世界人口从公元第一个千年之初的大约2.3亿人逐渐增加到公元1000年的大约2.7亿人，到公元1800年达到9亿人。实际生活水平的变化甚至更慢。麦迪森认为，在第一个千年期间，全球范围内的生活水平没有明显的提高，而在从公元1000年到公元1800年的八百年期间，人均收入可能增加了50%。然而，在现代经济增长时期，人口和人均收入都出现了问题，并以前所未有、甚至无法想象的速度飙升。如图1所示，全球人口在短短两个世纪内增长了六倍多，在第三个千年之初达到了惊人的61亿，人口快速增长的势头仍然强劲。世界人均收入增长得更快，如图2所示，从1820年到2000年增长了约9倍。在今天的富裕国家，经济增长更加惊人。在此期间，美国的人均收入增长了近二十五倍，西欧的人均收入增长了十五倍。 全球粮食总产量远远赶不上世界人口的增长（尽管直到今天仍有大量人口长期处于饥饿状态）。在技​​术进步的基础上，农业产量大幅提高。如果我们将世界人口和人均产出的增长结合起来，我们会发现过去 180 年来世界经济活动总量（世界生产总值，GWP）增长了惊人的四十九倍
The gulf between today’s rich and poor countries is therefore a new phenomenon, a yawning gap that opened during the period of modern economic growth. As of 1820, the biggest gap between the rich and poor-specifically, between the world’s leading economy of the day, the United Kingdom, and the world’s poorest region, Africa-was a ratio of four to one in per capita income (even after adjusting for differences in purchasing power). By 1998, the gap between the richest economy, the United States, and the poorest region, Africa, had widened to twenty to one. Since all parts of the world had a roughly comparable starting point in 1820 (all very poor by current standards), today’s vast inequalities reflect the fact that some parts of the world achieved modern economic growth while others did not. Today’s vast income inequalities illuminate two centuries of highly uneven patterns of economic growth.
因此，当今富国与穷国之间的鸿沟是一种新现象，是现代经济增长时期出现的巨大差距。截至 1820 年，贫富之间的最大差距——具体来说，当时世界领先经济体英国与世界最贫穷地区非洲之间的人均收入之比为四比一（即使在 2000 年之后）。根据购买力差异进行调整）。到 1998 年，最富裕的经济体美国和最贫穷的地区非洲之间的差距已扩大到二十比一。由于世界各地在 1820 年的起点大致相当（按照当前标准，都非常贫穷），今天的巨大不平等反映了这样一个事实：世界上一些地区实现了现代经济增长，而另一些地区却没有。今天巨大的收入不平等揭示了两个世纪以来高度不平衡的经济增长模式。

This inequality is evident in the bar chart in figure 3. The height of the first bar indicates the level of per capita income in 1820, and the second in 1998, using Maddison’s estimates. The number in parentheses at the top of the second bar is the average annual growth rate of the region (between 1820 and 1998). Three main points stand out:
这种不平等在图 3 的条形图中很明显。第一个条形的高度表示 1820 年的人均收入水平，第二个条形的高度表示 1998 年的人均收入水平（使用麦迪逊的估计）。第二条顶部括号中的数字是该地区的平均年增长率（1820 年至 1998 年）。突出三个要点：

What do I mean by “highly uneven” economic growth across regions between 1820 and 1998 ? Even small differences in annual economic growth rates, if sustained for decades or centuries, eventually lead to huge differences in the levels of economic well-being (as measured here by the average per capita income in a society). The per capita gross national product of the United States, for example, grew at an annual rate of around 1.7 percent per year during the period 1820 to 1998 . This led to a twenty-five-fold increase in living standards, with per capita incomes rising from around $\mathrm{\$}1,200$$\mathrm{\$}1,200$$1,200\$ 1,200 per person in 1820 to around $\mathrm{\$}30,000$$\mathrm{\$}30,000$$30,000\$ 30,000 today (in 1990 dollars). The key for the United States to become the world’s richest major economy was not spectacularly fast growth, such as China’s recent achievement of 8 percent growth per year, but rather steady growth at a much more modest 1.7 percent per year. The key was consistency, the fact that the United States maintained that income growth rate for almost two centuries.
1820 年至 1998 年间各地区经济增长“高度不平衡”是什么意思？即使年度经济增长率的微小差异，如果持续数十年或数百年，最终也会导致经济福祉水平（此处以社会人均收入衡量）的巨大差异。例如，1820年至1998年期间，美国的人均国民生产总值每年以1.7%左右的速度增长。这导致生活水平提高了二十五倍，人均收入从大约 $\mathrm{\$}1,200$$\mathrm{\$}1,200$$1,200\$ 1,200 1820年左右每人 $\mathrm{\$}30,000$$\mathrm{\$}30,000$$30,000\$ 30,000 今天（以 1990 年美元计算）。美国成为世界上最富有的主要经济体的关键并不在于惊人的快速增长，例如中国最近实现的每年8%的增长，而是以每年1.7%的温和得多的速度稳定增长。关键是一致性，即美国近两个世纪以来一直保持这样的收入增长率。

By contrast, the economies of Africa have grown at an average of 0.7 percent per year. This difference may not seem like much compared with 1.7 percent per year in the United States, but over a period of 180 years a small difference in annual growth leads to huge differences in income levels. With growth of 0.7 percent per annum, Africa’s initial income (roughly $\mathrm{\$}400$$\mathrm{\$}400$$400\$ 400 per capita) increased by
相比之下，非洲经济平均每年增长0.7%。与美国每年 1.7% 的增长率相比，这一差异似乎并不大，但在 180 年的时间里，年增长率的微小差异会导致收入水平的巨大差异。非洲的初始收入（大约为每年 0.7%）增长 $\mathrm{\$}400$$\mathrm{\$}400$$400\$ 400 人均）增加了
little more than threefold, to roughly $\mathrm{\$}1,300$$\mathrm{\$}1,300$$1,300\$ 1,300 per capita as of the year 1998, compared with an almost twenty-five-fold increase in the United States. Today’s twenty-fold gap in income between the
略多于三倍，大致 $\mathrm{\$}1,300$$\mathrm{\$}1,300$$1,300\$ 1,300 截至 1998 年，美国的人均增长了近 25 倍。今天男女收入差距达二十倍
United States and Africa, therefore, results from a three-fold gap as of 1820 , which was magnified seven times by the difference in annual growth rates of 1.7 percent in the United States versus 0.7 United States and
因此，截至 1820 年，美国和非洲的差距是原来的三倍，而美国的年增长率为 1.7%，而美国和非洲的年增长率为 0.7%，这一差距又被放大了七倍。
The crucial puzzle for understanding today’s vast inequalities, therefore, is to understand why different regions of the world have grown at different rates during the period of modern economic The crucial puzzle for understanding today’s vast inequalities, therefore, is to understand why different regions of the world have grown at different rates during the period of modern economic
因此，理解当今巨大不平等的关键难题是理解为什么世界不同地区在现代经济时期以不同的速度增长。因此，理解当今巨大不平等的关键难题是理解为什么世界不同地区在现代经济时期以不同的速度增长。在现代经济时期，世界经济以不同的速度增长
growth. Every region began the period in extreme poverty. Only one sixth of the world’s population achieved high-income status through consistent economic growth. Another two thirds have risen to
生长。每个地区在这个时期都处于极度贫困之中。世界上只有六分之一的人口通过持续的经济增长达到了高收入地位。另外三分之二已上升至
middle-income status with more modest rates of economic growth. One sixth of humanity is stuck in extreme poverty, with very low rates of economic growth during the whole period. First we must middle-income status with more modest rates of economic growth. One sixth of humanity is stuck in extreme poverty, with very low rates of economic
中等收入水平，经济增长率较为温和。六分之一的人类陷入极端贫困，整个时期经济增长率非常低。首先，我们必须以更温和的经济增长率进入中等收入地位。人类六分之一陷入极端贫困，经济增长率极低
understand why growth rates differ over long periods of time so that we can identify the key ways to raise economic growth in today’s lagging regions.
了解为什么增长率在长期内会出现差异，以便我们能够确定提高当今落后地区经济增长的关键方法。
Let me dispose of one idea right from the start. Many people assume that the rich have gotten rich because the poor have gotten poor. In other words, they assume that Europe and the United States used military force and political strength during and after the era of colonialism to extract wealth from the poorest regions, and thereby to grow rich. This interpretation of events would be plausible if gross world product had remained roughly constant, with a rising share going to the powerful regions and a declining share going to the poorer regions. However, that is not at all what happened. Gross world product rose nearly fifty-fold. Every region of the world experienced some economic growth (both in terms of the overall size of the economy, and even when measured per person), but some regions experienced much more growth than others. The key fact of modern times is not the transfer of income from one region to another, by force or otherwise, but rather the overall increase in world income, but at a different rate in different regions.
让我从一开始就放弃一个想法。许多人认为富人变得富有是因为穷人变得贫穷。换句话说，他们认为欧洲和美国在殖民主义时代及其之后利用军事力量和政治力量从最贫困地区榨取财富，从而致富。如果世界生产总值大致保持不变，即强国地区的份额上升，穷地区的份额下降，那么对事件的这种解释是合理的。然而，事实并非如此。世界生产总值增长了近五十倍。世界每个地区都经历了一定的经济增长（无论是从经济总体规模来看，还是按人均衡量），但有些地区的增长速度远高于其他地区。现代的关键事实不是通过武力或其他方式将收入从一个地区转移到另一个地区，而是世界收入的总体增长，但不同地区的增长速度不同。
This is not to say that the rich are innocent of the charge of having exploited the poor. They surely have, and the poor countries continue to suffer as a result in countless ways, including chronic problems of political instability. However, the real story of modern economic growth has been the ability of some regions to achieve unprecedented long-term increases in total production to levels never before seen in the world, while other regions stagnated, at least by comparison. Technology has been the main force behind the long-term increases in income in the rich world, not exploitation of the poor. That news is very good indeed because it suggests that all of the world, including today’s laggard regions, has a reasonable hope of reaping the benefits of technological advance. Economic development is not a zero-sum game in which the winnings of some are inevitably mirrored by the losses of others. This game is one that everybody can win.
这并不是说富人对于剥削穷人的指控是无辜的。他们肯定已经这样做了，而且穷国继续遭受无数方面的痛苦，包括政治不稳定的长期问题。然而，现代经济增长的真实情况是，一些地区有能力实现总产量前所未有的长期增长，达到世界上前所未有的水平，而其他地区则停滞不前，至少相比之下是这样。技术一直是富裕世界收入长期增长的主要力量，而不是对穷人的剥削。这个消息确实非常好，因为它表明全世界，包括今天的落后地区，都有合理的希望从技术进步中获益。经济发展不是一场零和游戏，一些人的胜利不可避免地会导致另一些人的损失。这场比赛是一场人人都能赢的比赛。

Until the mid-1700s, the world was remarkably poor by any of today’s standards. Life expectancy was extremely low; children died in vast numbers in the now rich countries as well as the poor countries. Many waves of disease and epidemics, from the black death of Europe to smallpox and measles, regularly washed through society and killed mass numbers of people. Episodes of hunger and extreme weather and climate fluctuations sent societies crashing. The rise and fall of the Roman Empire, for famed twentieth-century historian Arnold Toynbee, was much like the rise and decline of all other civilizations before and since. Economic history had long been one of ups and downs, with growth followed by decline rather than sustained economic progress.
直到 1700 年代中期，按照今天的标准来看，世界都非常贫穷。预期寿命极低；现在的富裕国家和贫穷国家都有大量儿童死亡。从欧洲的黑死病到天花和麻疹，许多疾病和流行病经常席卷社会并造成大量人员死亡。饥饿、极端天气和气候波动的爆发导致社会崩溃。对于二十世纪著名历史学家阿诺德·汤因比来说，罗马帝国的兴衰很像之前和之后所有其他文明的兴衰。长期以来，经济史一直是一部起起落落的历史，先是增长，然后是衰退，而不是持续的经济进步。

John Maynard Keynes wrote about this virtual stagnation of human economic progress in his 1930 essay on the Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren:
约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯 (John Maynard Keynes) 在 1930 年发表的题为《我们的子孙的经济可能性》的文章中谈到了人类经济进步的这种实际停滞：
From the earliest times from which we have record, that, say, the two thousand years before Christ, down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was no really great change in the standard of living of the average man living in the civilized centers of the earth. Ups and downs, certainly visitations of plague, famine and war, golden intervals, but no progressive violent change. Some periods perhaps fifty percent better than others, at the utmost a hundred percent better in the four thousand years that ended, say, in A.D. 1700 .
从我们有记录的最早的时​​代，即公元前两千多年，一直到十八世纪初，生活在文明中心的普通人的生活水平并没有发生真正的巨大变化。地球的。起起落落，当然有瘟疫、饥荒和战争的降临，黄金时期，但没有渐进的剧烈变化。某些时期也许比其他时期好百分之五十，最多是在公元 1700 年结束的四千年里好一百个百分点。

He also pinpointed technology as the reason for this long-term stasis:
他还指出技术是这种长期停滞的原因：
The absence of important technological inventions between the prehistoric age and comparatively modern times is truly remarkable. Almost everything which really matters, and which the world possessed at the commencement of the modern age, was already known to man at the dawn of history: language, fire, the same domestic animals which we have today, wheat, barley,
史前时代和相对现代之间缺乏重要的技术发明，这确实值得注意。几乎所有真正重要的东西，以及世界在现代开始时所拥有的东西，在历史之初就已经为人类所知：语言、火、我们今天拥有的相同的家畜、小麦、大麦、
the vine and the olive, the plow and the wheel, the oar, the sail, leather, linen and cloth, bricks and pots, gold and silver, copper, tin, and lead-and iron was added to the list before one thousand B.C.-banking, statecraft, mathematics, astronomy, and religion. There is no record when we first possessed these …
葡萄树和橄榄树、犁和轮子、桨、帆、皮革、亚麻和布、砖和罐、金和银、铜、锡、铅和铁在公元前一千年前就被添加到了清单中-银行、治国、数学、天文学和宗教。没有记录我们何时第一次拥有这些……

What changed was the onset of the Industrial Revolution, supported by a rise in agricultural productivity in northwestern Europe. Food yields rose with systematic improvements in agronomic practice, including the management of soil nutrients through improved crop rotations. The dramatic breakthrough came in England around 1750, when Britain’s nascent industry first mobilized new forms of energy for production at scales that had never before been achieved. The steam engine marked the decisive turning point of modern history. By mobilizing a vast store of primary energy, fossil fuels, the
改变的是工业革命的爆发，这得益于西北欧农业生产力的提高。随着农艺实践的系统改进，包括通过改进作物轮作对土壤养分的管理，粮食产量有所提高。 1750 年左右，英国出现了戏剧性的突破，当时英国的新兴工业首次利用新能源进行生产，其规模是前所未有的。蒸汽机标志着现代历史的决定性转折点。通过调动大量的一次能源、化石燃料，
steam engine unlocked the mass production of goods and services on a scale beyond the wildest dreams of the preindustrial era. Modern energy fueled every aspect of the economic takeoff. Food production soared as fossil fuel energy was used to produce chemical fertilizers; industrial production skyrocketed as vast inputs of fossil fuel energy created equally vast powerhouses of steel, transport
蒸汽机开启了商品和服务的大规模生产，其规模超出了前工业时代最疯狂的梦想。现代能源推动了经济腾飞的各个方面。由于化石燃料能源被用来生产化肥，粮食产量猛增；随着化石燃料能源的大量投入创造了同样庞大的钢铁、交通运输强国，工业生产猛增
equipment, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, textile and apparels, and every other modern manufacturing sector. By the early twentieth century, the service industries, including modern information and communications technologies, were powered by electrification, itself a breakthrough of the fossil-fuel age.
设备、化学品和制药、纺织和服装以及其他所有现代制造业。到二十世纪初，包括现代信息和通信技术在内的服务业都由电气化提供动力，这本身就是化石燃料时代的突破。

As coal fueled industry, so, too, industry fueled political power. The British Empire became the global political manifestation of the Industrial Revolution. Britain’s industrial breakthrough, unique in the world as of the early nineteenth century, created a huge military and financial advantage that allowed Britain to expand its control over one sixth of humanity at the peak of the empire during the Victorian era.
正如煤炭推动了工业一样，工业也推动了政治权力。大英帝国成为工业革命的全球政治表现。英国的工业突破在十九世纪初期在世界上是独一无二的，创造了巨大的军事和金融优势，使英国在维多利亚时代的帝国鼎盛时期能够将其控制范围扩大到六分之一的人类。

Why was Britain first? Why not China, which was the world’s technological leader for about a thousand years, between A.D. 500 and a.d. 1500? Why not other centers of power on the European continent or in Asia? This question is much debated among economic historians, but a few good answers are evident, and they provide clues to the deeper underpinnings of the Industrial Revolution. First, British society was relatively open, with more scope for individual initiative and social mobility than most other societies of the world. The fixed social orders of the feudal era had weakened enormously or disappeared entirely by 1500 , at a time when serfdom was still the rule through much of Europe. Even more rigid social hierarchies, such as India’s caste system, were common in other narts of the world
为什么英国第一？为什么中国不呢？在公元 500 年到公元 1500 年间，中国在大约一千年的时间里一直处于世界技术领先地位。为什么不是欧洲大陆或亚洲的其他权力中心呢？这个问题在经济史学家中引起了很多争论，但有一些明显的好的答案，它们为了解工业革命的更深层次基础提供了线索。首先，英国社会相对开放，比世界上大多数其他社会有更大的个人主动性和社会流动性的空间。到1500年，封建时代固定的社会秩序已被极大削弱或完全消失，当时欧洲大部分地区仍以农奴制为统治。更严格的社会等级制度，例如印度的种姓制度，在世界其他国家也很常见

Second, Britain had strengthening institutions of political liberty. Britain’s parliament and its traditions of free speech and open debate were powerful contributors to the uptake of new ideas. They were also increasingly powerful protectors of private property rights, which in turn underpinned individual initiative.
其次，英国的政治自由制度得到了加强。英国议会及其言论自由和公开辩论的传统为新思想的吸收做出了强有力的贡献。他们也是私有财产权日益强大的保护者，这反过来又支撑了个人的主动性。
Third, and critically, Britain became one of the leading centers of Europe’s scientific revolution. After centuries in which Europe was mainly the importer of scientific ideas from Asia, European science made pivotal advances beginning in the Renaissance. Modern physics emerged from the astronomical discoveries of Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo. With Britain’s political openness, speculative scientific thinking was given opportunity to thrive, and the scientific advances on the Continent stimulated an explosion of scientific discovery in England. The decisive breakthrough came with Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathematica in 1687, one of the most important books ever written. By showing that physical phenomena could be described by mathematical laws, and by providing the tools of calculus to discover those laws, Newton set the stage for hundreds of years of scientific and technological discovery, and for the Industrial Revolution that would follow the scientific revolution. Fourth, Britain had several crucial geographical advantages. First, as an island economy close to continental Europe, Britain enjoyed low-cost sea-based trade with all parts of Europe. Britain also had extensive navigable river ways for internal trade and enjoyed a highly favorable environment for agriculture, with a combination of plentiful rainfall, an ample growing season, and good soils. Another crucial geographical advantage was Britain’s proximity to North America. The new settlements in North America provided vast new territories for food production and raw materials such as cotton for British industry, and they were the safety valve that facilitated the exodus of impoverished people from the British countryside. As England’s own agricultural productivity grew, with more food produced by fewer people, millions of landless poor went to North America.
第三，也是至关重要的一点，英国成为欧洲科学革命的主要中心之一。在欧洲主要从亚洲引进科学思想的几个世纪之后，欧洲科学从文艺复兴时期开始取得了关键的进步。现代物理学源于哥白尼、布拉赫、开普勒和伽利略的天文学发现。随着英国政治的开放，思辨性科学思维得到了蓬勃发展的机会，欧洲大陆的科学进步刺激了英国科学发现的爆炸式增长。决定性的突破来自艾萨克·牛顿 (Isaac Newton) 1687 年出版的《数学原理》(Principia Mathematica)，这是有史以来最重要的著作之一。通过证明物理现象可以用数学定律来描述，并通过提供微积分工具来发现这些定律，牛顿为数百年的科学和技术发现以及科学革命之后的工业革命奠定了基础。第四，英国拥有几个至关重要的地理优势。首先，作为靠近欧洲大陆的岛国经济体，英国与欧洲各地享有低成本的海上贸易。英国还拥有广阔的可通航河道用于内部贸易，并享有充沛的降雨、充足的生长季节和良好的土壤等非常有利的农业环境。另一个重要的地理优势是英国靠近北美。北美的新定居点为英国工业提供了广阔的粮食生产和棉花等原材料的新领域，它们是促进贫困人口逃离英国乡村的安全阀。 随着英国自身农业生产力的提高，用更少的人生产更多的粮食，数百万无地穷人流向北美。
In his seminal 1776 work, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith referred to Britain’s natural advantages:
亚当·斯密在其 1776 年的开创性著作《国富论》中提到了英国的天然优势：
England, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the great extent of the sea-coast in proportion to that of the whole country, and of the many navigable rivers which run through it and afford the conveniency of water carriage to some of the most inland parts of it, is perhaps as well fitted by nature as any large country in Europe to be the seat of foreign commerce, of manufactures for distant sale and of all the improvements which these can occasion.
英国由于土壤的自然肥力、海岸线的广阔（占整个国家的比例）以及众多可通航的河流流经英国，为一些国家提供了便利的水运。它的最内陆地区或许与欧洲任何大国一样天生就适合作为对外贸易、远距离销售的制造品以及由此带来的一切改进的所在地。

Fifth, Britain remained sovereign and faced lesser risk of invasion than its neighbors. Being an island helped considerably, much the same way that Japan’s insular geography allowed it to escape invasion despite numerous attempts from the Asian mainland. Indeed, with a one-century lag, Japan was to play a role similar to Britain’s as the leader of Asia’s takeoff to modern economic growth on the other side of the Eurasian land mass.
第五，英国仍然拥有主权，并且比邻国面临的入侵风险更小。作为一个岛屿有很大帮助，就像日本的岛屿地理使其能够逃脱来自亚洲大陆的多次入侵一样。事实上，在一个世纪的滞后之后，日本将扮演与英国类似的角色，成为欧亚大陆另一边亚洲腾飞到现代经济增长的领导者。
Sixth, Britain had coal, and with the invention of the steam engine, coal freed society from energy constraints that had limited the scale of economic production throughout human history. Before coal, economic production was limited by energy inputs, almost all of which depended on the production of biomass: food for humans and farm animals and fuel wood for heating and certain industrial processes. Wind power could also be harnessed for sea transport, and wind and water power could be harnessed for some industrial processes. None of these energy sources, however, could unleash the potential for mass production that coal did.
第六，英国拥有煤炭，随着蒸汽机的发明，煤炭使社会摆脱了人类历史上限制经济生产规模的能源限制。在煤炭出现之前，经济生产受到能源投入的限制，几乎所有能源投入都依赖于生物质的生产：人类和农场动物的食物以及用于加热和某些工业过程的薪材。风力发电还可以用于海上运输，风能和水力发电可以用于某些工业过程。然而，这些能源都无法像煤炭那样发挥大规模生产的潜力。
Britain’s advantages, in summary, were marked by a combination of social, political, and geographical factors. British society was relatively free and politically stable. Scientific thinking was dynamic. Geography enabled Britain to benefit from trade, productive agriculture, and energy resources in vast stocks of coal. Other parts of the world were not as fortunate to have this confluence of favorable factors. Their entry into modern economic growth would be delayed. In the most disadvantaged environments, modern economic growth has been delayed until today.
总而言之，英国的优势是社会、政治和地理因素综合作用的结果。英国社会相对自由，政治稳定。科学思维是动态的。地理位置使英国能够从贸易、高效农业和大量煤炭能源中受益。世界其他地区则没有如此幸运地拥有这些有利因素。他们进入现代经济增长的时间将会被推迟。在最不利的环境下，现代经济增长一直被推迟到今天。

The combination of new industrial technologies, coal power, and market forces created the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution, in turn, led to the most revolutionary economic events in human history since the start of agriculture ten thousand years earlier. Suddenly, economies could grow beyond long-accustomed bounds without hitting the biological constraints of food and timber production. Industrial production grew rapidly, and the power of economic growth spilled out from Great Britain to all parts of the world. Societies the world over were fundamentally changed, often tumultuously.
新工业技术、煤电和市场力量的结合创造了工业革命。反过来，工业革命引发了自一万年前农业诞生以来人类历史上最具革命性的经济事件。突然之间，经济增长可能会超出长期习惯的界限，而不会受到粮食和木材生产的生物限制。工业生产快速增长，经济增长动力从英国蔓延到世界各地。世界各地的社会都发生了根本性的变化，而且往往是动荡不安的。

The Industrial Revolution, and the modern economic growth that followed, has changed the way people live in every fundamental sense: where and how they live, what kind of work or economic activity they perform, how they form families. In Britain first, and then elsewhere, industrialization meant a shift of people from overwhelmingly agrarian activities to industrial activities, giving rise to urbanization, social mobility, new gender and family roles, a demographic transition, and specialization in labor.
工业革命以及随之而来的现代经济增长从各个基本意义上改变了人们的生活方式：他们在哪里生活、如何生活、他们从事什么样的工作或经济活动、他们如何组建家庭。首先在英国，然后在其他地方，工业化意味着人们从绝大多数的农业活动转向工业活动，从而引发城市化、社会流动性、新的性别和家庭角色、人口转变和劳动力专业化。
Modern economic growth is accompanied first and foremost by urbanization, that is, by a rising share of a nation’s population living in urban areas. There are two basic reasons why economic growth and urbanization go hand in hand. The first is rising agricultural productivity. As food production per farmer rises, an economy needs fewer and fewer farmers to feed the overall population. As food production per farmer rises, food prices fall, inducing farmers and especially their children to seek employment in nonfarm activities. The second is the advantage of high-density urban life for most nonfarm economic activities, especially the face-to-face demands of commerce and other parts of the service sector. Sparsely populated rural areas make good economic sense when each household needs a lot of land for farm production. But they make little sense when people are engaged mainly in manufacturing, finance, commerce, and the like. Once the labor force is no longer engaged mainly in food production, it is natural that the bulk of the population will relocate to cities, drawn by higher wages that in turn reflect the higher productivity of work in densely settled urban areas.
现代经济增长首先伴随着城市化，即居住在城市地区的国家人口比例不断增加。经济增长和城市化齐头并进有两个基本原因。首先是农业生产率的提高。随着农民人均粮食产量的增加，一个经济体需要越来越少的农民来养活总人口。随着农民人均粮食产量的增加，粮食价格下降，促使农民，特别是他们的孩子在非农活动中寻找就业机会。二是高密度的城市生活对于大多数非农经济活动，特别是商业和其他服务业部门的面对面需求具有优势。当每个家庭都需要大量土地进行农业生产时，人口稀少的农村地区具有良好的经济意义。但当人们主要从事制造业、金融、商业等行业时，它们就没有意义了。一旦劳动力不再主要从事粮食生产，大部分人口自然会被更高的工资吸引到城市，而更高的工资反过来又反映出人口稠密的城市地区更高的工作生产率。

Modern economic growth has also produced a revolution in social mobility. Established social rankings-such as the fixed hierarchical divisions between peasants and gentry, or within the Indian caste structure, or in the social orders of nobility, priests, merchants, and farmers that characterized many traditional Asian societies - all unravel under the forces of market-based modern economic growth. Fixed social orders depend on a static and largely agrarian economic setting where little changes in living standards or technologies from one generation to the next. They cannot withstand the sudden and dramatic bursts of technological change that occur during modern economic growth, in which occupations and social roles shift dramatically from one generation to the next, rather than being inherited by sons from fathers and daughters from mothers.
现代经济增长也引发了社会流动性的革命。既定的社会等级——例如农民和士绅之间固定的等级划分，或者印度的种姓结构，或者许多传统亚洲社会的贵族、牧师、商人和农民的社会秩序——都在市场的力量下瓦解。基础上的现代经济增长。固定的社会秩序依赖于静态的、主要是农业的经济环境，一代又一代的生活水平或技术几乎没有变化。他们无法承受现代经济增长过程中发生的突然而剧烈的技术变革，在这种变革中，职业和社会角色从一代人到下一代人发生了巨大的转变，而不是由儿子从父亲继承，女儿从母亲继承。

One aspect of changing social mobility requires special note, the change in gender roles. Traditional societies tend to be strongly differentiated in gender roles, with women almost always getting the short end of the deal. In settings where the total fertility rate-the average number of children per woman-is typically at least five, and often much higher, women spend most of their adult lives rearing children. Traditionally homebound, women live lives of back-breaking labor on the farm, endless walking to collect fuel wood and water, and child rearing. With modern economic growth, this dynamic changes. Women can avail themselves of urban-based employment, as in the case of the young women in the apparel factories of Dhaka, leading them ultimately toward social and political empowerment.
社会流动性变化的一个方面需要特别注意，那就是性别角色的变化。传统社会的性别角色往往存在很大差异，女性几乎总是吃亏。在总生育率（每个妇女的平均孩子数）通常至少为五个且往往更高的环境中，妇女成年后的大部分时间都在抚养孩子。传统上，妇女们足不出户，在农场里过着辛苦劳作、无休无止地步行去收集柴火和水以及抚养孩子的生活。随着现代经济的增长，这种动态发生了变化。妇女可以利用城市就业机会，就像达卡服装工厂的年轻妇女那样，最终引导她们获得社会和政治赋权。
The changes in living conditions and economic activities lead to new realities in family structure as well. The age of marriage is typically delayed, and sexual relations are transformed, with greater sexual freedom much less directly linked to child rearing. Fewer generations of family members live under one roof. And crucially, the desired number of children changes remarkably as families move from rural to urban settings. In rural societies, large families are almost always the norm. In urban societies, families choose to have fewer children. This is the crux of the demographic transition, one of the most fundamental of all social changes during the era of modern economic growth.
生活条件和经济活动的变化也导致了家庭结构的新现实。结婚年龄通常会被推迟，性关系也会发生变化，性自由的增加与抚养孩子的直接关系更小。少数几代家庭成员生活在同一屋檐下。至关重要的是，随着家庭从农村搬到城市，期望的孩子数量会发生显着变化。在农村社会，大家庭几乎总是常态。在城市社会，家庭选择少生孩子。这是人口转型的关键，也是现代经济增长时代所有社会变革中最根本的变革之一。

One more crucial element occurs with deep structural change: the division of labor increases, as people become more and more specialized in their skills. The talents of a poor rural farmer in Africa today, or in Scotland at the time of Adam Smith, are truly marvelous. These farmers typically know how to build their own houses, grow and cook food, tend to animals, and make their own clothing. They are, therefore, construction workers, veterinarians and agronomists, and apparel manufacturers. They do it all, and their abilities are deeply impressive.
随着深刻的结构变化，出现了另一个关键因素：随着人们的技能变得越来越专业化，劳动分工也在增加。无论是在今天的非洲，还是在亚当·斯密时代的苏格兰，贫困农民的才能确实令人惊叹。这些农民通常知道如何建造自己的房屋、种植和烹饪食物、饲养动物以及制作自己的衣服。因此，他们是建筑工人、兽医和农学家以及服装制造商。他们做到了这一切，他们的能力令人印象深刻。

They are also deeply inefficient. Adam Smith pointed out that specialization, where each of us learns just one of those skills, leads to a general improvement of everybody’s well-being. The idea is simple and powerful. By specializing in just one activity - such as food raising, clothing production, or home construction-each worker gains mastery over the particular activity. Specialization makes sense, however, only if the specialist can subsequently trade his or her output with the output of specialists in other lines of activity. It would make no sense to produce more food than a household needs unless there is a market outlet to trade that excess food for clothing, shelter, and so forth. At the same time, without the ability to buy food on the market, it would not be possible to be a specialist home builder or clothing maker, since it would be necessary to farm for one’s own survival. Thus Smith realized that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market (that is, by the ability to trade), whereas the extent of the market is determined by the degree of specialization (and hence, productivity).
他们的效率也很低。亚当·斯密指出，专业化，即我们每个人只学习其中一项技能，会导致每个人的福祉普遍改善。这个想法简单而有力。通过只专注于一项活动——例如粮食种植、服装生产或房屋建筑——每个工人都能掌握这项特定的活动。然而，只有当专家随后能够将他或她的产出与其他活动领域的专家的产出进行交易时，专业化才有意义。生产超出家庭需求的粮食是没有意义的，除非有一个市场渠道可以用多余的粮食换取衣服、住所等。同时，如果没有能力在市场上购买食物，就不可能成为专业的房屋建筑商或服装制造商，因为为了自己的生存必须务农。因此，斯密认识到，劳动分工受到市场范围（即贸易能力）的限制，而市场范围则由专业化程度（进而生产力）决定。

Modern economic growth first emerged in England because of the confluence of favorable conditions. However, these conditions were not unique to England, and once the Industrial Revolution was under way, the same combination of modern technologies and social organization could spread to other parts of the world. What started in one corner of Northern Europe would eventually reach almost the entire planet. In doing so, the forces of modern economic growth propelled a general increase in global production of unprecedented dimensions.
现代经济增长首先在英国兴起，是由于有利条件的综合作用。然而，这些条件并不是英国独有的，一旦工业革命开始，现代技术和社会组织的同样组合可能会传播到世界其他地区。始于北欧某个角落的疫情最终将蔓延到几乎整个地球。在此过程中，现代经济增长的力量推动了全球生产的普遍增长，达到了前所未有的规模。

On paper, the transition to modern economic growth might appear to be an unambiguous and straightforward benefit for the world. After all, new technologies enabled society to harness energy and ideas that raised labor productivity (economic output per person) to levels never before imagined. This productivity brought about a rise in living standards of unprecedented scale. Yet the transition was more tumultuous than not, involving vast social struggles and often war. Before turning to the historical record, it is worth considering for a moment why the transition was so difficult in so many places. Most important, modern economic growth was not only a question of “more” (output per person) but also “change.” The transition to modern economic growth involved urbanization, changing gender roles, increased social mobility, changing family structure, and increasing specialization. These were difficult transitions, involving multiple upheavals in social organization and in cultural beliefs. In addition, the spread of modern economic growth was also marked by a systematic and repeated confrontation between the world’s newly rich countries and the world’s still poor countries Since modern economic growth occurred at such different rates in different places, it created an extent of inequality of global wealth and power that was unique in human history. Britain’s industrial dominance-the result of Britain’s lead in industrialization-gave it a unique military dominance as well, which it in turn converted to empire. More generally, Europe’s early industrialization in the nineteenth century ended up fueling a vast European empire throughout Asia, Africa, and the Americas.
从表面上看，向现代经济增长的转型似乎对世界来说是明确而直接的好处。毕竟，新技术使社会能够利用能源和思想，将劳动生产率（人均经济产出）提高到前所未有的水平。这种生产力带来了生活水平前所未有的提高。然而，这种转变比没有发生时更加动荡，涉及广泛的社会斗争，而且经常发生战争。在回顾历史记录之前，值得思考一下为什么在如此多的地方转型如此困难。最重要的是，现代经济增长不仅是“更多”（人均产出）的问题，而且是“变化”的问题。向现代经济增长的转变涉及城市化、性别角色的变化、社会流动性的增加、家庭结构的变化以及专业化的提高。这些都是艰难的转变，涉及社会组织和文化信仰的多重剧变。此外，现代经济增长的蔓延还表现为世界上新兴富裕国家与世界上仍然贫穷的国家之间系统性的、反复的对抗。由于现代经济增长在不同地方的速度如此不同，这就造成了一定程度的不平等。全球财富和权力在人类历史上是独一无二的。英国的工业主导地位——英国工业化领先的结果——也赋予了它独特的军事主导地位，而这种主导地位又转化为帝国。更一般地说，十九世纪欧洲的早期工业化最终催生了一个横跨亚洲、非洲和美洲的庞大欧洲帝国。
Finally, the vast differences in power contributed to faulty social theories of these differences that are still with us today. When a society is economically dominant, it is easy for its members to assume that such dominance reflects a deeper superiority-whether religious, racial, genetic, cultural, or institutional - rather than an accident of timing or geography. Thus the inequality of power and economics of the nineteenth century in favor of Europe was accompanied by the spread of new forms of racism and “culturism,” which offered pseudoscientific justifications for the vast inequalities that had opened. These theories in turn justified brutal forms of exploitation of the poor through colonial rule, dispossession of the properties and lands of the poor by the rich, and even slavery. Still, despite these difficulties, the basic underlying forces that propelled the Industrial Revolution could be and were replicated elsewhere. As they were replicated, multiple sites of industrialization and economic growth took hold. Like a chain reaction, the more places that were undergoing this change, the more they interacted with each other and thereby created the bases for yet more innovations more economic growth, and more technological activity. Britain’s industrialization spread to other markets in several ways: by stimulating the demand for exports from Britain’s trading partners, by supplying those trading partners with British capital to make investments in infrastructure (for example, ports and railroads), and by spreading technologies first pioneered in Britain.
最后，巨大的权力差异导致了关于这些差异的错误的社会理论，这些理论至今仍然存在。当一个社会在经济上占据主导地位时，其成员很容易认为这种主导地位反映了更深层次的优越性——无论是宗教、种族、遗传、文化还是制度——而不是时间或地理的偶然。因此，十九世纪有利于欧洲的权力和经济不平等伴随着新形式的种族主义和“文化主义”的蔓延，这为已经出现的巨大不平等提供了伪科学的理由。这些理论反过来又证明了通过殖民统治、富人剥夺穷人的财产和土地、甚至奴隶制对穷人的残酷剥削形式是合理的。尽管如此，尽管存在这些困难，推动工业革命的基本潜在力量仍然可以在其他地方复制。随着它们的复制，工业化和经济增长的多个地点得以确立。就像连锁反应一样，经历这种变化的地方越多，它们之间的互动就越多，从而为更多的创新、更多的经济增长和更多的技术活动奠定了基础。英国的工业化通过多种方式传播到其他市场：刺激英国贸易伙伴的出口需求，向这些贸易伙伴提供英国资本以投资于基础设施（例如港口和铁路），以及传播英国首创的技术。英国。

This diffusion of modern economic growth occurred in three main forms. The first, and in some ways, most direct spread of the Industrial Revolution was from Britain to its colonies in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. All three regions are in temperate zones with conditions for farming and other economic activities similar in many ways to those of Britain. It was therefore relatively straightforward to transplant British technologies, food crops, and even legal institutions into these new settings. These new homes of modern economic growth were literally a “New England,” in the case of the North American seacoast, or a “Western offshoots” in the phrase of Angus Maddison. Ideologically, the imperial powers and colonizers considered North America and Oceania to be empty places, despite the presence of native inhabitants in both regions. By slaughtering, cornering, or removing these native inhabitants from their lands, England’s new colonizers fueled a huge expansion of population and subsequent economic growth of North America and Oceania.
现代经济增长的扩散主要表现为三种形式。工业革命最先、从某些方面来说也是最直接的传播是从英国传播到其在北美、澳大利亚和新西兰的殖民地。这三个地区都位于温带，农业和其他经济活动的条件在很多方面与英国相似。因此，将英国技术、粮食作物甚至法律制度移植到这些新环境中相对简单。这些现代经济增长的新家园，就北美海岸而言，实际上是“新英格兰”，或者用安格斯·麦迪逊的话来说，是“西方分支”。从意识形态上讲，帝国列强和殖民者认为北美和大洋洲是空旷的地方，尽管这两个地区都有土著居民。通过屠杀、逼迫或将这些土著居民从他们的土地上赶走，英国的新殖民者促进了北美和大洋洲人口的大幅增长以及随后的经济增长。
A second form of diffusion took place within Europe itself, broadly in a process that ran from Western Europe to Eastern Europe and from Northern Europe to Southern Europe during the nineteenth century. Northwestern Europe started with certain advantages over Eastern and Southern Europe. First, northwestern Europe is on the Atlantic side of the continent, and therefore had benefited more than Eastern Europe from the great explosion of ocean-based trade with the Americas and Asia. Second, northwestern Europe generally had more favorable natural resources, including coal, timber, rivers (for water-powered mills), and rainfall. Third, northwestern Europe generally benefited from a more benign disease environment, less vulnerable to tropical and subtropical diseases like malaria. Fourth, for a host of reasons, some understood and others much debated, the political and social conditions were more favorable. Serfdom had essentially disappeared in much of northwestern Europe by the for a host of reasons, some understood and others much debated, the political and social conditions were more favorable. Serfdom had essentially disappeared in much of northwestern Europe by the
第二种形式的传播发生在欧洲内部，大致是十九世纪从西欧到东欧、从北欧到南欧的过程。西北欧一开始就比东欧和南欧具有一定的优势。首先，西北欧位于欧洲大陆的大西洋一侧，因此比东欧从与美洲和亚洲的海洋贸易的大爆发中受益更多。其次，西北欧通常拥有更有利的自然资源，包括煤炭、木材、河流（用于水力磨坊）和降雨。第三，西北欧总体上受益于更良性的疾病环境，不易受到疟疾等热带和亚热带疾病的影响。第四，由于多种原因，政治和社会条件更加有利，一些人理解，另一些人争论不休。由于多种原因，农奴制在西北欧大部分地区基本上消失了，政治和社会条件更加有利，一些人理解，另一些人争论不休。农奴制在西北欧的大部分地区基本上消失了
seventeenth century, whereas serfdom and other social rigidities were far more intact in the south and east. Germany and Italy were still not nation states by the start of the Industrial Revolution, and they seventeenth century, whereas serfdom and other social rigidities were far more
十七世纪，而农奴制和其他社会僵化在南部和东部则完好无损。德国和意大利在工业革命开始时仍然不是民族国家，而且它们都在十七世纪，而农奴制和其他社会僵化程度却远远超过了工业革命。
suffered from extremely high barriers to trade among competing principalities.
相互竞争的公国之间的贸易壁垒极高。
When the Industrial Revolution began, and especially when it began to spread in the midst of and after the Napoleonic Wars, the obstacles to development in Southern and Eastern Europe began to diminish. Serfdom was abolished, fitfully, often violently, across Europe. Constitutional governance was introduced. Railways were established to link European regions. Ideas and technologies flowed diminish. Serfdom was abolished, fitfully, often violently, across Europe. Constitutional governance was introduced. Railways were established to link European regions. Ideas and techno
当工业革命开始时，特别是当工业革命在拿破仑战争期间和之后开始蔓延时，南欧和东欧的发展障碍开始减少。在整个欧洲，农奴制被断断续续地、常常是暴力地废除了。实行宪政。铁路的建立是为了连接欧洲地区。思想和技术的流动减少了。在整个欧洲，农奴制被断断续续地、常常是暴力地废除了。实行宪政。铁路的建立是为了连接欧洲地区。想法和技术
with ever greater speed and were backed by ever larger amounts of financial capital. By the end of the nineteenth century, industrialization was making itself felt throughout all of Europe.
其速度越来越快，并得到越来越多的金融资本的支持。到十九世纪末，整个欧洲都感受到了工业化的影响。
with ever greater speed and were backed by ever larger amounts of financial capital. By the end of the nineteenth century, industrialization was making itself felt throughout all of Europe.
其速度越来越快，并得到越来越多的金融资本的支持。到十九世纪末，整个欧洲都感受到了工业化的影响。
The third diffusion involved the spread of modern economic growth from Europe to Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The process was tumultuous everywhere, involving the confrontation of an
第三次扩散涉及现代经济增长从欧洲向拉丁美洲、非洲和亚洲的扩散。整个过程到处都是混乱的，涉及到双方的对抗。
The third diffusion involved the spread of modern economic growth from Europe to Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The process was tumultuous everywhere, involving the confrontation of an
第三次扩散涉及现代经济增长从欧洲向拉丁美洲、非洲和亚洲的扩散。整个过程到处都是混乱的，涉及到双方的对抗。
increasingly industrialized and rich Europe with nonindustrialized, largely rural, and militarily weak societies in other parts of the world. Some were ancient civilizations with grand traditions, like China increasingly industrialized and rich Europe with nonindustrialized, largely rural, and militarily weak societies in other parts of the world. Some were ancient civilizations with grand traditions, like
欧洲日益工业化和富裕，而世界其他地区则处于非工业化、主要是农村和军事薄弱的社会。其中一些是具有伟大传统的文明古国，比如日益工业化的中国和富裕的欧洲，而世界其他地区却是非工业化、以农村为主、军事力量薄弱的社会。有些是有着伟大传统的文明古国，比如
or Japan; some were sparsely populated regions like those in much of tropical Africa. But the great drama that ensued almost everywhere was the turmoil of confrontation between these different or Japan; some were sparsely populated regions like those in much of tropical Africa. But the great drama that ensued almost everywhere was the turmoil of confrontation between these different
或日本；有些是人口稀少的地区，比如热带非洲的大部分地区。但随之而来的大戏几乎无处不在，那就是这些不同的国家或日本之间的对抗的混乱。有些是人口稀少的地区，比如热带非洲的大部分地区。但随后几乎所有地方上演的伟大戏剧就是这些不同的人之间对抗的混乱。
societies, economies, and cultures. Even when it raised living standards, modern economic growth brought fundamental change to social organization and painful clashes with the more powerful societies, ec
社会、经济和文化。即使现代经济增长提高了生活水平，它也给社会组织带来了根本性的变化，并与更强大的社会发生了痛苦的冲突，例如

The confrontation between rich and poor was very stark because the gap of wealth also meant the gap of power, and power could be used for exploitation. Europe’s superior power was used repeatedly to compel actions by the weaker societies on behalf of the richer overlords. European imperial powers forced Africans to grow cash crops they chose. Colonial authorities imposed head taxes, compelling Africans to work in mines and on plantations, often hundreds of miles from their families and homes. European investors and governments commandeered natural resources, including mineral wealth and vast woodlands in Africa and Asia. Private European companies maintained private armies in the colonies to ensure compliance with company “law,” knowing as well that their national governments would back them up with military force in extremis.
贫富之间的对抗非常鲜明，因为财富的差距也意味着权力的差距，权力可以用来剥削。欧洲的优势力量被反复利用，迫使较弱的社会代表较富有的领主采取行动。欧洲帝国列强强迫非洲人种植他们选择的经济作物。殖民当局征收人头税，迫使非洲人在矿山和种植园工作，这些地方通常距离他们的家人和家园数百英里。欧洲投资者和政府征用了自然资源，包括非洲和亚洲的矿产财富和广阔的林地。欧洲私营公司在殖民地设有私人军队，以确保遵守公司“法”，并知道他们的国家政府会在极端情况下以军事力量支持他们。
The Cascade of Technological Change
技术变革的级联
Living standards began to rise in many parts of the world, even with all this brutality and suffering in places that had succumbed to colonial rule, and even in places where colonial masters, rather than the local populations, grabbed much of the increased economic output. Often the climb out of extreme poverty was very gradual and fitful, set back by war and famine. Occasionally it was rapid, such as Japan’s economic takeoff and industrialization in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
世界许多地方的生活水平开始提高，尽管在那些屈服于殖民统治的地方，甚至在殖民统治者而不是当地居民攫取了大部分增加的经济产出的地方，仍然存在着所有这些残酷和苦难。摆脱极端贫困的过程常常是渐进的、断断续续的，并因战争和饥荒而受挫。有时是快速的，例如日本在十九世纪最后二十五年的经济腾飞和工业化。

I believe that the single most important reason why prosperity spread, and why it continues to spread, is the transmission of technologies and the ideas underlying them. Even more important than having specific resources in the ground, such as coal, was the ability to use modern, science-based ideas to organize production. The beauty of ideas is that they can be used over and over again, without ever being depleted. Economists call ideas nonrival in the sense that one person’s use of an idea does not diminish the ability of others to use it as well. This is why we can envision a world in which everybody achieves prosperity. The essence of the first Industrial Revolution was not the coal; it was how to use the coal. Even more generally, it was about how to use a new form of energy. The lessons everybody achieves prospenity. The essence of the first Industrial Revolution was not the coal; it was how to use the coal. Even more generally, it was about how to use a new form of energy. The lesson
我相信，繁荣蔓延以及持续蔓延的最重要原因是技术及其背后的思想的传播。比拥有特定的地下资源（例如煤炭）更重要的是能够使用现代的、基于科学的理念来组织生产。创意的美妙之处在于它们可以被反复使用，而不会被耗尽。经济学家将想法称为非竞争性，因为一个人对某个想法的使用不会削弱其他人也使用该想法的能力。这就是为什么我们可以设想一个人人实现繁荣的世界。第一次工业革命的本质不是煤炭，而是煤炭。问题在于如何使用煤炭。更一般地说，它是关于如何使用一种新形式的能源。每个人都获得成功的教训。第一次工业革命的本质不是煤炭，而是煤炭。问题在于如何使用煤炭。更一般地说，它是关于如何使用一种新形式的能源。教训
of coal eventually became the basis for many other energy systems as well, from hydropower, oil and gas, and nuclear power to new forms of renewable energy such as wind and solar power converted to electricity. These lessons are available to all of humanity, not just for the first individuals who discovered them.
煤炭最终也成为许多其他能源系统的基础，从水力发电、石油和天然气、核电到新形式的可再生能源，如风能和太阳能转化为电力。这些教训可供全人类使用，而不仅仅是第一个发现它们的人。
The first wave of the Industrial Revolution was the development of the steam engine and related technologies, including the organization of large-scale factory production, new machinery in the textile and apparel sector, and new techniques to produce steel. A second wave of technological breakthroughs came in the middle of the nineteenth century with the rail, and even more notably the telegraph,
工业革命的第一波浪潮是蒸汽机和相关技术的发展，包括大规模工厂生产的组织、纺织和服装行业的新机械以及钢铁生产的新技术。第二波技术突破出现在十九世纪中叶，铁路，尤其是电报，

The second technological wave also included ocean steamers, global-scale trade, and two huge infrastructure projects: the Suez Canal, completed in 1869 , which significantly shortened the trade time The second technological wave also included ocean steamers, global-scale trade, and two huge infrastructure projects: the Suez Canal, completed in 1869 , which significantly shortened the trade time
第二次技术浪潮还包括远洋轮船、全球范围的贸易和两个巨大的基础设施项目：1869年竣工的苏伊士运河，大大缩短了贸易时间。巨大的基础设施项目：1869年竣工的苏伊士运河，大大缩短了贸易时间
between Europe and Asia, and the Panama Canal, completed in 1914, which dramatically reduced the trade time between the U.S. eastern seaboard and destinations in the western United States, much of
欧洲和亚洲之间的航线，以及 1914 年建成的巴拿马运河，极大地缩短了美国东海岸和美国西部目的地之间的贸易时间，
Latin America, and East Asia. Epidemics of yellow fever and malaria that killed thousands of workers delayed the first attempt to build the canal in the 1880s. Once scientists understood that mosquitoes Latin America, and East Asia. Epidemics of yellow fever and malaria that killed thousands of workers delayed the first attempt to build the canal in the 1880 s . Once scientists understood that mosquito
拉丁美洲和东亚。黄热病和疟疾的流行导致数千名工人死亡，推迟了 1880 年代首次修建运河的尝试。科学家们曾经了解到，蚊子存在于拉丁美洲和东亚。黄热病和疟疾的流行导致数千名工人死亡，导致 1880 年代首次修建运河的尝试被推迟。一旦科学家了解蚊子
were transmitting those killer diseases, the canal builders made a full-fledged effort to control the mosquito breeding alongside the construction of the canal and thereby completed the project in 1914. were transmitting those killer diseases, the canal builders made a full-fledged effort to control the mosquito breeding alongside the construction of the canal and thereby completed the project in 1914 .
在传播这些致命疾病的同时，运河建设者在修建运河的同时，全力控制蚊子的繁殖，从而于 1914 年完成了该工程。在传播这些致命疾病的过程中，运河建设者全力以赴，在修建运河的同时控制了蚊子的滋生，从而于1914年完成了该工程。
The third wave of technological advance involved electrification of industry and urban society at the end of the nineteenth century, including Edison’s invention of the incandescent bulb and other The third wave of technological advance involved electrification of industry and urban society at the end of the nineteenth century, including Edison’s invention of the incandescent bulb and other
第三波技术进步涉及十九世纪末工业和城市社会的电气化，包括爱迪生发明白炽灯泡等。 第三波技术进步涉及十九世纪末工业和城市社会的电气化，包括爱迪生发明白炽灯泡等
electronic appliances. Edison, Westinghouse, and others championed large power plants that could bring electricity into homes, office buildings, and factories by wire, which was the defining new electronic appliances. Edison, Westinghouse, and others championed large power plants that could bring electricity into homes, office buildings, and factories by wire, which was the defining new
电子电器。爱迪生、西屋公司和其他公司倡导大型发电厂，可以通过电线将电力输送到家庭、办公楼和工厂，这是定义新电子设备的方式。爱迪生、西屋公司和其他公司倡导大型发电厂，可以通过电线将电力输送到家庭、办公楼和工厂，这是定义新的
infrastructure of the early twentieth century. The development of the internal combustion engine was also critical, as was the pivotal advance in the chemical industry, mainly in Germany, with the new infrastructure of the early twentieth century. The development of the internal combustion engine was also critical, as was the pivotal advance in the chemical industry, mainly in Germany, with the new
二十世纪初的基础设施。内燃机的发展也至关重要，化学工业的关键进步也至关重要，主要是在德国，随着二十世纪初的新基础设施的建设。内燃机的发展也至关重要，化学工业的关键进步也是如此，主要是在德国，新的化学工业
process for taking atmospheric nitrogen and converting it into ammonia for fertilizer (the Haber-Bosch process). This use of fossil fuel energy to create nitrogen-based fertilizers was the breakthrough process for taking atmospheric nitrogen and converting it into ammonia for fertilizer (the Haber-Bosch process). This use of fossil fuel energy to create nitrogen-based fertilizers was the breakthrough
吸收大气中的氮并将其转化为氨作为肥料的过程（哈伯-博世过程）。这种利用化石燃料能源生产氮基肥料的方法是利用大气中的氮并将其转化为氨作为肥料的突破性方法（哈伯-博世法）。利用化石燃料能源制造氮基肥料是一项突破
advance in raising food production in the twentieth century, enabling a great proportion of humanity, though still not all of it, to overcome chronic hunger and the risks of famine that had forever plagued advance in rasis
二十世纪在提高粮食产量方面取得的进展，使大部分人类（尽管不是全部）克服了长期困扰粮食生产的长期饥饿和饥荒风险
humankind. 人类。
These waves of technological advance diffused around the world through the spread of trade and foreign investment; with it, economic prosperity spread to other parts of the world as well. But so, too,
这些技术进步的浪潮通过贸易和外国投资的传播传播到世界各地。随之而来的是，经济繁荣也蔓延到了世界其他地区。但同样如此，
did the global system of European political domination. This domination reflected the vast inequality of power that grew out of Europe’s head start in industrialization, a head start that we have seen is rooted in an advantageous confluence of politics, geography, and resource base.
欧洲政治统治的全球体系。这种统治反映了欧洲在工业化方面的领先地位所产生的巨大的权力不平等，我们所看到的这种领先地位植根于政治、地理和资源基础的有利融合。

By the early twentieth century, Europe largely dominated the world. European empires controlled essentially all of Africa and large parts of Asia, and loomed large in financing and organizing Latin America’s trade as well. This was the first age of globalization, an era of global trade, an era of global communications over telegraph lines, an era of mass production and industrialization - in short, what would seem to be an era of inevitable progress. And it was globalization under European domination. It was viewed as not only economically unstoppable, but also as the natural order of things. This imagined natural order gave rise to the infamous “white man’s burden,” the right and obligation of European and European-descended whites to rule the lives of others around the world, which they blithely did with a contradictory mix of naïveté, compassion, and brutality.
到二十世纪初，欧洲在很大程度上主宰了世界。欧洲帝国基本上控制了整个非洲和亚洲大部分地区，并且在融资和组织拉丁美洲贸易方面也发挥着重要作用。这是全球化的第一个时代，一个全球贸易的时代，一个通过电报线进行全球通信的时代，一个大规模生产和工业化的时代——简而言之，这似乎是一个不可避免的进步的时代。这是欧洲统治下的全球化。它不仅被认为在经济上是不可阻挡的，而且也是事物的自然秩序。这种想象中的自然秩序产生了臭名昭著的“白人负担”，即欧洲和欧洲后裔的白人有权利和义务统治世界各地其他人的生活，他们以一种天真、同情和同情的矛盾混合体轻松地做到了这一点。残酷。

At the beginning of the twentieth century, globalization was viewed as so inevitable that some thought war itself was probably passé, and certainly so irrational that no right-thinking leader in Europe would ever take his country to war. In 1910, a leading British pundit, Norman Angell, wrote The Great Illusion, which rightly argued that national economies had become so interdependent, so much part of a global division of labor, that war among the economic leaders had become unimaginably destructive. War, Angell warned, would so undermine the network of international trade that no military venture by a European power against another could conceivably lead to economic benefits for the aggressor. He surmised that war itself would cease once the costs and benefits of war were more clearly understood.
二十世纪初，全球化被认为是不可避免的，以至于一些人认为战争本身可能已经成为过去，而且毫无疑问，全球化是不合理的，以至于欧洲没有一个思想正确的领导人会带领自己的国家参战。 1910 年，英国著名专家诺曼·安格尔 (Norman Angell) 撰写了《伟大的幻觉》(The Great Illusion)，书中正确地指出，各国经济已经变得如此相互依存，成为全球劳动分工的重要组成部分，以至于经济领导人之间的战争已经变得具有难以想象的破坏性。安格尔警告说，战争将严重破坏国际贸易网络，以至于欧洲国家对另一个国家的军事冒险不可能为侵略者带来经济利益。他推测，一旦人们更清楚地了解战争的成本和收益，战争本身就会停止。
Angell tremendously underestimated the irrationalities and social processes that lead to devastating outcomes, even when they make no sense. Angell was therefore half right: war had become much too dangerous to use for economic gain. But it didn’t stop war from happening. The year 1914 began the great rupture of the twentieth century, even more dramatic a rupture than World War II would prove to be.
安吉尔极大地低估了导致毁灭性后果的非理性和社会过程，即使它们毫无意义。因此，安格尔说对了一半：战争已经变得太危险了，不适合用来获取经济利益。但这并没有阻止战争的发生。 1914 年开启了二十世纪的大决裂，这场决裂甚至比第二次世界大战还要剧烈。
Why was World War I so dramatic and so traumatic? It ended the era of European-led globalization. Its death toll was staggering, and it led to several cataclysmic events that cast their shadow over the rest of the century. The first side effect was that it destabilized the Russian czarist regime, unleashing the Bolshevik revolution. A relatively backward Russia, which had been the last country in Europe to come out of serfdom, fell into turmoil under the fiscal and human burdens of war. Vladimir Lenin and a small group of conspirators were able to seize power with very little popular support and institute a revolutionary doctrine that sent Russia on a seventy-five-year detour of enormous brutality and economic waste. At their maximum extent, the communist doctrines that Lenin and Joseph Stalin instituted in Russia ensnared roughly a third of the world’s population, including the former Soviet Union, China, the Eastern European states under Soviet domination, Cuba, North Korea, and other self-styled revolutionary states aligned with the Soviet Union.
为什么第一次世界大战如此戏剧性且造成如此严重的创伤？它结束了欧洲主导的全球化时代。它的死亡人数令人震惊，并引发了几起灾难性事件，给本世纪余下的时间蒙上了阴影。第一个副作用是它破坏了俄罗斯沙皇政权的稳定，引发了布尔什维克革命。相对落后的俄罗斯，是欧洲最后一个摆脱农奴制的国家，在战争的财政和人力负担下陷入了动乱。弗拉基米尔·列宁和一小群阴谋家在几乎没有民众支持的情况下夺取了政权，并制定了革命学说，使俄罗斯在七十五年的时间里摆脱了巨大的残暴和经济浪费。列宁和约瑟夫·斯大林在俄罗斯制定的共产主义学说在最大程度上笼络了世界上大约三分之一的人口，包括前苏联、中国、苏联统治下的东欧国家、古巴、朝鲜和其他自治国家。与苏联结盟的革命国家。

Another great consequence of World War I was the prolonged financial instability it created in Europe after the war. The war created a morass of interlocking financial and economic problems, including the mountain of debt incurred by combatant countries; the destruction and dismembering of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires and their replacement by small, unstable, and feuding successor states; and the Allied claims for reparation payments from Germany, which embittered the next generation of Germans and was one of the rallying points for Hitler’s rise to power.
第一次世界大战的另一个重大后果是战后欧洲造成的长期金融不稳定。战争造成了一系列相互关联的金融和经济问题，其中包括交战国欠下的巨额债务；奥斯曼帝国和哈布斯堡帝国被摧毁和肢解，并被小的、不稳定的、相互争斗的继承国所取代；盟军向德国索要赔款，这让下一代德国人感到愤怒，也是希特勒上台的凝聚力之一。
John Maynard Keynes understood that the world as he knew it had been brought to an end after World War I. In his famous essay on The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes masterfully captured all that had been lost:
约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯明白，他所知道的世界在第一次世界大战后已经走向终结。在他著名的《和平的经济后果》一文中，凯恩斯巧妙地捕捉到了失去的一切：

What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August 1914! The greater part of the population, it is true, worked hard and lived at a low standard of comfort, yet were, to all appearances, reasonably contented with this lot. But escape was possible, for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average, into the middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages. The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his servant to the neighbouring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would conside himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable.
1914 年 8 月结束的那个时代，是人类经济进步中多么非凡的一段插曲！确实，大多数人工作努力，生活舒适度较低，但从表面上看，他们对现状相当满意。但是，对于任何能力或品格都超过平均水平的人来说，逃脱是可能的，进入中上层阶级，对他们来说，生活以低廉的成本和最少的麻烦，提供了超出一般人范围的便利、舒适和便利。其他时代最富有、最有权势的君主。伦敦居民可以在床上喝着早茶，通过电话订购全世界的各种产品，数量按他认为合适的数量，并合理地期望它们早日送到他家门口；他可以在同一时刻以同样的方式在世界任何地方的自然资源和新企业中冒险他的财富，并毫不费力甚至不费力地分享它们的预期成果和优势；或者，他可以决定将他的财富安全与任何大陆上任何一个大城市的城镇居民的诚信结合起来，想象或信息可能会推荐。如果他愿意的话，他可以立即获得廉价而舒适的交通方式到任何国家或气候，无需护照或其他手续，可以派遣他的仆人到邻近的银行办事处，以获取看似方便的贵金属供应，然后，他可以在不了解他们的宗教、语言或习俗的情况下，带着自己创造的财富前往外国地区，并且会认为自己对最小的干扰感到非常愤慨和惊讶。 但最重要的是，他认为这种状况是正常的、确定的和永久的，除非有进一步改进的方向，任何偏离这种状况的行为都是异常的、可耻的和可以避免的。

The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalisation of which was nearly complete in practice.
军国主义和帝国主义、种族和文化竞争、垄断、限制和排斥的计划和政治，这些都是对这个天堂的毒蛇，只不过是他日报的娱乐，而且似乎几乎没有发挥任何作用。对社会和经济生活的正常进程产生了根本影响，其国际化实际上已接近完成。

The economic instability that followed World War I led to the Great Depression of the 1930s and then to World War II. The linkages are subtle and debated in detail, but undeniable in basic fact. The overhang of bad debts, shrunken trade within Europe, and overstretched budgets of the European powers meant that inflation, stabilization, and austerity were the orders of the day throughout the 1920 s. The European countries duly climbed one by one back to the gold standard, viewed at the time as the guarantor of long-term financial stability. Alas, the return to the gold standard did little more than exacerbate the conditions that had prevailed in the 1920s. Most important, the gold standard and its “rules of the game” for monetary management made it difficult if not impossible for the major economies to escape from a slide into deep depression in the early 1930s. The Great Depression, in turn, triggered a calamitous spread of trade protectionism and the rise of Nazism in Germany and military rule in Japan.
第一次世界大战后的经济不稳定导致了 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条，然后导致了第二次世界大战。这些联系是微妙的，并且在细节上存在争议，但基本事实是不可否认的。坏账积压、欧洲内部贸易萎缩以及欧洲列强预算过度紧张，意味着通货膨胀、稳定和紧缩成为整个 1920 年代的当务之急。欧洲国家一一回归金本位制，当时金本位制被视为长期金融稳定的保证。可惜的是，金本位的回归只不过加剧了 20 年代普遍存在的状况。最重要的是，金本位制及其货币管理“游戏规则”使得主要经济体在 20 世纪 30 年代初陷入深度萧条时，即使不是不可能，也很难摆脱困境。大萧条反过来引发了贸易保护主义的灾难性蔓延以及纳粹主义在德国的崛起和日本的军事统治。

By the end of World War II, the pre-1914 global system had gone to pieces. International trade was moribund. National currencies were not convertible one to another, so even the basic payments mechanisms for international commerce had broken down. Mercifully, the age of European imperialism was also coming to an end, although it would take decades longer, and many wars, for it to end decisively. Still, standing on the ruins of World War II, the benefits of a global marketplace-with a global division of labor, a peaceful spread of technology, and open international trade-looked long gone, buried under the rubble of two world wars and a great depression.
到第二次世界大战结束时，1914 年之前的全球体系已经分崩离析。国际贸易垂死挣扎。各国货币无法相互兑换，因此即使是国际贸易的基本支付机制也崩溃了。幸运的是，欧洲帝国主义时代也即将结束，尽管它需要更长的时间和许多战争才能彻底结束。尽管如此，站在第二次世界大战的废墟上，全球市场的好处——全球分工、技术的和平​​传播以及开放的国际贸易——看起来早已不复存在，被埋在两次世界大战的废墟和大萧条。

Much work between the end of World War II in 1945 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 went into reconstructing a new global economic system. The immediate struggle was physica reconstruction: to repair or rebuild the roads, bridges, power stations, and ports that underpinned national economic production and international trade. Yet the “plumbing” of the international economy also needed to be reconstructed, with currency arrangements and rules for international trade that would permit the market-based flow of goods and services, and the productivity gains that would emerge from a renewed global division of labor. This reconstruction effort took place in three steps.
从 1945 年第二次世界大战结束到 1991 年苏联解体，许多工作都致力于重建新的全球经济体系。当前的斗争是物质重建：修复或重建支撑国民经济生产和国际贸易的道路、桥梁、发电站和港口。然而，国际经济的“管道”也需要重建，货币安排和国际贸易规则将允许基于市场的商品和服务流动，以及新的全球分工将带来的生产力提高。此次重建工作分三步进行。
First, the countries already industrialized as of 1945-Europe, the United States, Japan-reconstructed a new international trading system under U.S. political leadership. Step by step, these countries reestablished currency convertibility (in which businesses and individuals could buy and sell foreign exchange at market rate) in order to create a payments system for international trade. The European currencies became convertible again in 1958. The yen became convertible again in 1964. At the same time, these countries agreed to reduce the trade barriers, including high tariffs and quotas, which they had put in place in the chaos of the Great Depression. The trade barriers came down in several rounds of international trade negotiations handled under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a set of rules that constituted the forerunner to today’s World Trade Organization. The rich world, soon called the first world, succeeded in reconstructing a market-based trading system. With it came a burst of rapid economic growth, a powerful recovery after decades of war, blocked trade, and financial instability.
首先，1945年已经实现工业化的国家——欧洲、美国、日本——在美国政治领导下重建了新的国际贸易体系。这些国家逐步重新建立了货币可兑换性（企业和个人可以按市场汇率买卖外汇），以建立国际贸易支付体系。欧洲货币于1958年再次实现自由兑换。日元于1964年再次实现自由兑换。与此同时，这些国家同意减少在大萧条混乱时期设置的贸易壁垒，包括高关税和配额。 。在关税及贸易总协定（GATT）的主持下进行的几轮国际贸易谈判中，贸易壁垒被取消，这套规则构成了当今世界贸易组织的前身。富裕国家，很快被称为第一世界，成功地重建了以市场为基础的贸易体系。随之而来的是经济的爆发性快速增长，以及数十年战争、贸易受阻和金融不稳定后的强劲复苏。

The restoration of trade in the first world did not, however, mean the restoration of a global economy. The divisions in the world economy after 1945 went deeper than currency inconvertibility and trade barriers. By the end of the World War II, the world had become starkly divided in political terms that mirrored the economic ruptures. These divisions would last for decades and are only now being healed.
然而，第一世界贸易的恢复并不意味着全球经济的恢复。 1945 年之后世界经济的分歧比货币不可兑换和贸易壁垒更加严重。到第二次世界大战结束时，世界在政治方面已经出现严重分裂，这也反映了经济的破裂。这些分歧将持续数十年，直到现在才得到弥合。

The second world was the socialist world, the world first forged by Lenin and Stalin in the wake of World War I. The second world remained cut off economically from the first world until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. At its peak, the second world included around thirty countries (depending on the criteria for inclusion), and included about a third of humanity. The overriding characteristics of the second world were state ownership of the means of production, central planning of production, one-party rule by communist parties, and economic integration within the socialist world (through barter trade) combined with economic separation from the first world.
第二世界是社会主义世界，这是第一次世界大战后由列宁和斯大林首先打造的世界。直到 1989 年柏林墙倒塌和苏联解体之前，第二世界在经济上一直与第一世界隔绝。 1991 年联合。在鼎盛时期，第二世界包括大约 30 个国家（取决于纳入标准），包括大约三分之一的人类。第二世界的首要特征是生产资料的国家所有、中央计划生产、共产党的一党统治、社会主义世界的经济一体化（通过易货贸易）以及与第一世界的经济分离。
The third world included the rapidly rising number of postcolonial countries. Today we use the term third world simply to mean poor. Earlier on, the third world had a more vivid connotation as a group of countries emerging from imperial domination that chose neither to be part of the capitalist first world nor the socialist second world. These were the true third-way countries. The ideas at the core of the third world were: “We will develop on our own. We will nurture industry, sometimes through state ownership, sometimes by giving subsidies and protection to private business, but we will do it without foreign multinationals. We will do it without open international trade. We do not trust the outside world. We want to stay nonaligned. The first world countries are not our heroes; they were our former colonial powers. The second world leaders are not to be trusted either. We do not want the Soviet Union to swallow us. Therefore, politically we are nonaligned, and economically we are selfsufficient.”
第三世界包括数量迅速增加的后殖民国家。今天，我们使用“第三世界”一词来简单地表示贫穷。早些时候，第三世界有一个更生动的含义，即一群摆脱帝国统治、既不选择成为资本主义第一世界，也不选择成为社会主义第二世界的国家。这些才是真正的第三条道路国家。第三世界的核心思想是：“我们将自行发展。我们将培育工业，有时通过国有企业，有时通过向私营企业提供补贴和保护，但我们将在没有外国跨国公司的情况下做到这一点。我们将在不开放国际贸易的情况下做到这一点。我们不相信外部世界。我们希望保持不结盟。第一世界国家不是我们的英雄；他们是我们的前殖民国家。第二世界领导人也不值得信任。我们不希望苏联吞并我们。因此，政治上我们是不结盟的，经济上我们是自给自足的。”
Thus, the post-World War II world evolved on three tracks. The fundamental problem, however, was that the second world and third world approaches did not make economic sense, and they both collapsed under a pile of foreign debt. Second world central planning was a bad idea, and so, too, was third world autarky, in both cases for reasons that Adam Smith had explained. By closing their economies, both the second world and third world countries also closed themselves off from global economic progress and the advance of technology. They created high-cost local industries that could not compete internationally even when they chose to try. The closed nature of these societies, in which domestic businesses were sheltered from competition, fostered a great deal of corruption. The nonaligned third world countries lost the chance to participate in the technological advance of the first world mainly because they did not trust the first world. They were understandably intent on protecting their hard-won sovereignty, even when that sovereignty was not really at risk.
因此，二战后的世界沿着三个轨道发展。然而，根本问题是第二世界和第三世界的做法在经济上没有意义，它们都在堆积如山的外债下崩溃了。第二世界的中央计划是一个坏主意，第三世界的自给自足也是一个坏主意，在这两种情况下，亚当·斯密都解释过原因。通过关闭经济，第二世界和第三世界国家也将自己与全球经济进步和技术进步隔离开来。他们创造了高成本的当地产业，即使他们选择尝试，也无法在国际上竞争。这些社会的封闭性，国内企业免受竞争，滋生了大量腐败。不结盟的第三世界国家失去参与第一世界技术进步的机会，主要是因为他们不信任第一世界。可以理解的是，他们决心保护来之不易的主权，即使这种主权并未真正受到威胁。
My own work as an economist began at a time when the second world and the third world economies were already economically moribund, and were falling into a deepening spiral of economic chaos. The early manifestations of that crisis, typically, were rising levels of foreign debt and increasing rates of inflation. My early work centered on macroeconomic stabilization-the end of high inflation-and this work brought me into contact with countries that were isolated from first world markets and technology. This early work involved technical monetary economics, but it brought me face to face with the more basic and fundamental choices of how countries should relate economically to the broader world.
我自己作为一名经济学家的工作开始于第二世界和第三世界经济体在经济上已经垂死挣扎并陷入经济混乱的螺旋式增长的时候。这场危机的早期表现通常是外债水平上升和通货膨胀率上升。我早期的工作集中在宏观经济稳定——高通胀的结束——上，这项工作让我接触到了那些与第一世界市场和技术隔绝的国家。这项早期工作涉及技术货币经济学，但它让我面对更基本和根本性的选择，即各国应如何在经济上与更广阔的世界建立联系。
By the early 1990s, the overwhelming majority of countries of the second world and third world were saying, “We need to be part of the global economy once again. We want our sovereignty; we want our self-determination, but we will abandon Leninist-Stalinist central planning because it doesn’t work. And we will abandon the idea of self-imposed autarky, because economic isolation makes no more sense for a country than it does for an individual.” In essence, one of my roles from the mid-1980s onward was to help countries to become sovereign members of a new international system. I repeatedly dealt with three big questions: What is the best way back to international trade? How do we escape from the barnacles of bad debts and inefficient industry? How do we negotiate new rules of the game to ensure that the emerging global economy would truly serve the needs of all of the countries of the world, not only the richest and most powerful?
到了 20 世纪 90 年代初，绝大多数第二世界和第三世界国家都在说：“我们需要再次成为全球经济的一部分。我们想要我们的主权；我们想要自决，但我们将放弃列宁主义-斯大林主义的中央计划，因为它行不通。我们将放弃自我强加的自给自足的想法，因为经济孤立对于一个国家来说并不比对于个人更有意义。”从本质上讲，从 20 世纪 80 年代中期开始，我的职责之一就是帮助各国成为新国际体系的主权成员。我反复思考三个大问题：回归国际贸易的最佳途径是什么？我们如何摆脱坏账和低效工业的困境？我们如何谈判新的游戏规则，以确保新兴的全球经济真正满足世界所有国家的需求，而不仅仅是最富有和最强大的国家的需求？

I have touched lightly and briefly on two hundred years of modern economic growth-complete with change, turmoil, conflict, and ideology. What has this era of modern economic growth brought the world? Higher living standards than were imaginable two centuries ago, a spread of modern technology to most parts of the world, and a scientific and technological revolution that still gains strength. Living standards are much higher in almost all places than they were at the start of the process, the major exception being the disease-ravaged parts of Africa.
我轻描淡写地谈到了两百年的现代经济增长——其中充满了变化、动乱、冲突和意识形态。这个现代经济增长的时代给世界带来了什么？生活水平比两个世纪前想象的要高，现代技术传播到世界大部分地区，科技革命仍在不断增强。几乎所有地方的生活水平都比这一过程开始时高得多，主要的例外是非洲受疾病蹂躏的地区。

But modern economic growth has also brought phenomenal gaps between the richest and poorest, gaps that were simply impossible when poverty gripped all of the world. The era of modern economic growth has bequeathed us an economic picture of the world as seen in map 2, where each country is shaded according to its per capita GDP (measured in purchasing-power adjusted prices) as of 2002. The rich world (above $\mathrm{\$}20,000$$\mathrm{\$}20,000$$20,000\$ 20,000 in per capita income) is shaded green, and includes the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The countries in the middleincome range (between $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 and $\mathrm{\$}20,000$$\mathrm{\$}20,000$$20,000\$ 20,000 ) are shaded in yellow, and include most of East Asia (such as Korea and Singapore), Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America. Countries within the upper end of the low-income range (between $\mathrm{\$}2,000$$\mathrm{\$}2,000$$2,000\$ 2,000 and $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 ) are shaded in orange, and include parts of South America, South Asia, and East Asia. The poorest countries (below $\mathrm{\$}2,000$$\mathrm{\$}2,000$$2,000\$ 2,000 ) are shaded in red, and are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. There is, of course, a striking similarity between this map of average GNP per person and the map showing the proportion of households in poverty (map 1): the low-income countries are, notably, the countries with high proportions of moderate and extreme poverty.
但现代经济增长也带来了最富有和最贫穷人口之间的巨大差距，当贫困席卷全世界时，这种差距是根本不可能存在的。现代经济增长的时代给我们留下了一幅世界经济图景，如图2所示，其中每个国家根据截至2002年的人均GDP（以购买力调整后的价格衡量）进行阴影化。 $\mathrm{\$}20,000$$\mathrm{\$}20,000$$20,000\$ 20,000 人均收入）呈绿色阴影，包括美国、加拿大、西欧、日本、澳大利亚和新西兰。中等收入国家（介于 $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 和 $\mathrm{\$}20,000$$\mathrm{\$}20,000$$20,000\$ 20,000 ）以黄色阴影显示，包括东亚大部分地区（例如韩国和新加坡）、中欧、前苏联和拉丁美洲。处于低收入范围上端的国家（介于 $\mathrm{\$}2,000$$\mathrm{\$}2,000$$2,000\$ 2,000 和 $\mathrm{\$}4,000$$\mathrm{\$}4,000$$4,000\$ 4,000 ）以橙色阴影显示，包括南美洲、南亚和东亚的部分地区。最贫穷国家（以下 $\mathrm{\$}2,000$$\mathrm{\$}2,000$$2,000\$ 2,000 ）呈红色阴影，集中在撒哈拉以南非洲和南亚。当然，这张人均国民生产总值地图与显示贫困家庭比例的地图（地图 1）之间存在惊人的相似之处：低收入国家尤其是中等和极端贫困比例较高的国家。贫困。
So why does a vast gulf divide one sixth of humanity today in the richest countries from the one sixth of the world barely able to sustain life? The richest countries were able to achieve two centuries of modern economic growth. The poorest did not even begin their economic growth until decades later, and then often under tremendous obstacles. In some cases, they faced the brutal exploitation of dominant colonial powers. They faced geographical barriers (related to climate, food production, disease, energy resources, topography, proximity to world markets) that had not burdened the early industrial economies like Great Britain and the United States. And they made disastrous choices in their own national policies, often until the past decade. All of this left them without the good fortune of two centuries of rapid economic growth, instead growing only sporadically during a few years.
那么，为什么今天最富裕国家的六分之一人口与几乎无法维持生命的世界六分之一人口之间存在着巨大的鸿沟呢？最富裕的国家能够实现两个世纪的现代经济增长。最贫穷的国家直到几十年后才开始经济增长，而且往往面临巨大的障碍。在某些情况下，他们面临着殖民统治国家的残酷剥削。他们面临着地理障碍（与气候、粮食生产、疾病、能源、地形、靠近世界市场有关），而这些障碍并没有给英国和美国等早期工业经济体带来负担。他们在自己的国家政策中做出了灾难性的选择，通常直到过去十年。所有这一切都让他们失去了两个世纪以来经济高速增长的好运，而只是在几年内零星地增长。

The key point for these countries is that there are practical solutions to almost all of their problems. Bad policies of the past can be corrected. The colonial era is truly finished. Even the geographical obstacles can be overcome with new technologies, such as those that control malaria or allow for large crop yields in marginal production areas. But as there is no single explanation for why certain parts of the world remain poor, there is also no single remedy. As I shall stress repeatedly in the pages ahead, a good plan of action starts with a good differential diagnosis of the specific factors that have shaped the economic conditions of a nation.
对这些国家来说，关键是他们的几乎所有问题都有切实可行的解决方案。过去的错误政策是可以纠正的。殖民时代真正结束了。即使是地理障碍也可以通过新技术来克服，例如控制疟疾或在边际生产地区实现高作物产量的技术。但由于对于世界某些地区为何仍然贫困没有单一的解释，因此也没有单一的补救措施。正如我将在下文中反复强调的那样，一个好的行动计划首先要对塑造一个国家经济状况的具体因素进行良好的鉴别诊断。

Othe world’s population of 6.3 billion, roughly 5 billion people have reached at least the first rung of economic development. Five sixths of the world’s population is at least one step above xtreme poverty. Moreover, approximately 4.9 billion people live in countries where average income-measured by GDP per person-increased between 1980 and 2000 . An even larger number, oughly 5.7 billion people, live in countries where life expectancy increased. Economic development is real and widespread. The extent of extreme poverty is shrinking, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the world’s population. That fact is why we can realistically envision a world without extreme poverty as soon as 2025.
在世界63亿人口中，大约有50亿人至少达到了经济发展的第一级。世界六分之五的人口至少比极端贫困高出一步。此外，大约有 49 亿人生活在平均收入（以人均 GDP 衡量）在 1980 年至 2000 年间有所增加的国家。更多的人，大约有 57 亿人，生活在预期寿命延长的国家。经济发展是真实而广泛的。无论是绝对数量还是占世界人口的比例，极端贫困的程度都在缩小。这一事实就是为什么我们可以现实地设想最早在 2025 年实现一个没有极端贫困的世界。
Precisely because economic development can and does work in so many parts of the world, it is all the more important to understand and solve the problems of the places where economic development is not working, where people are still off the ladder of development, or are stuck on its lowest rungs. To understand why economic growth succeeds or fails, we first need a conceptual framework that can account for changes over time in GDP per person. I have already discussed some of the factors that promote long-term development, but here I address them more systematically, including a discussion of why the process of economic development breaks down in many places, especially the poorest places. Perhaps it would be clearest to begin with a very specific case: a single farm household.
正是因为经济发展能够而且确实在世界上许多地方发挥作用，所以了解和解决经济发展不起作用的地方、人们仍然处于发展阶梯之外或处于发展阶段的地方的问题就显得尤为重要。停留在最低的水平。为了理解经济增长成功或失败的原因，我们首先需要一个概念框架来解释人均GDP随时间的变化。我已经讨论了一些促进长期发展的因素，但在这里我更系统地讨论它们，包括讨论为什么经济发展过程在许多地方特别是最贫困的地方崩溃。也许从一个非常具体的案例开始是最清楚的：一个农户。

Consider a household consisting of a husband, wife, and four children (two daughters and two sons) living on a two-hectare farm. The household grows maize and provides for its own shelter in an adobe hut. Being extremely poor, the family consumes its own maize harvest and earns no other cash income during most years. The children collect fuelwood in the vicinity of the farm for cooking, and fetch drinking water from a nearby spring.
考虑一个由丈夫、妻子和四个孩子（两个女儿和两个儿子）组成的家庭，住在一个两公顷的农场里。这家人种植玉米，并在土坯房里提供自己的住所。由于极度贫困，这个家庭在大多数年份里都吃自己收割的玉米，没有其他现金收入。孩子们在农场附近收集薪柴做饭，并从附近的泉水取饮用水。

This year the household produces two tons of maize per hectare, or four tons in total. Even though the household eats its own maize, the statisticians in the government will assign this household an income based on the market value of the maize. Suppose that each ton of maize sells in the local market for $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 per ton. The household’s imputed annual income will be $\mathrm{\$}600$$\mathrm{\$}600$$600\$ 600 ( $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 per ton times four tons), or $\mathrm{\$}100$$\mathrm{\$}100$$100\$ 100 per capita ( $\mathrm{\$}600$$\mathrm{\$}600$$600\$ 600 divided by six people). The government will add this figure to other household incomes to calculate the country’s gross national product.
今年，该家庭每公顷生产两吨玉米，总共四吨。即使该家庭吃自己的玉米，政府统计人员也会根据玉米的市场价值为该家庭分配收入。假设每吨玉米在当地市场的售价为 $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 每吨。该家庭的估算年收入为 $\mathrm{\$}600$$\mathrm{\$}600$$600\$ 600 ( $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 每吨乘以四吨），或 $\mathrm{\$}100$$\mathrm{\$}100$$100\$ 100 人均（ $\mathrm{\$}600$$\mathrm{\$}600$$600\$ 600 分成六人）。政府将把这个数字加上其他家庭收入来计算该国的国民生产总值。

The family’s income per capita can increase in at least four ways the following year.
第二年家庭人均收入至少可以在四个方面增加。
Saving 保存
The household might decide to consume only three out of the four tons of maize, and take one ton to market. With the $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150, the household invests in livestock (perhaps chickens or sheep or a bull or dairy cow). The livestock generate a new stream of income, whether from improved food yields by using the bull for manure and animal traction, or the cow for sales of milk, or the animals for meat, eggs, or hides. In economic jargon, the saving has led to capital accumulation (in the form of livestock), which in turn has raised household productivity.
该家庭可能决定只消耗四吨玉米中的三吨，并把一吨带到市场上。随着 $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 ，家庭投资牲畜（可能是鸡、羊、公牛或奶牛）。牲畜产生了新的收入来源，无论是通过使用公牛作为粪便和动物牵引来提高粮食产量，还是通过使用奶牛来销售牛奶，或者通过使用动物来获取肉、蛋或兽皮。用经济术语来说，储蓄导致了资本积累（以牲畜的形式），进而提高了家庭生产率。

Trade 贸易
In a different scenario, the household learns from a neighboring farmer that it has the right kind of farmland, climate, and soil to produce vanilla beans, with a much higher income. After some deliberation, the household decides to shift to vanilla as a cash crop. The next year the household earns $\mathrm{\$}800$$\mathrm{\$}800$$800\$ 800 in vanilla, and uses $\mathrm{\$}600$$\mathrm{\$}600$$600\$ 600 to buy four tons of grain for food. As more vanilla farmers arise in the region, a new group of trading firms also forms, specializing in shipping and storage of vanilla, food, and farm inputs.
在另一种情况下，该家庭从邻近的农民那里得知，他们拥有合适的农田、气候和土壤来生产香草豆，并且收入要高得多。经过深思熟虑，这家人决定改种香草作为经济作物。明年家庭收入 $\mathrm{\$}800$$\mathrm{\$}800$$800\$ 800 在香草中，并使用 $\mathrm{\$}600$$\mathrm{\$}600$$600\$ 600 购买四吨粮食作为食物。随着越来越多的香草种植者在该地区出现，一批新的贸易公司也随之形成，专门从事香草、食品和农业投入品的运输和储存。
This pattern exemplifies Adam Smith’s insight into the two-way link from specialization to expanded markets back to increased specialization. The farm household specializes in high-value vanilla farming because it lives in favorable ecological conditions for vanilla trees. It relies on the market to trade with other households, which instead specialize in producing food. As incomes rise, and the “extent of the market” increases, to use Smith’s phrase, there is room for further specialization, in this case in transport services. Later on, economic activities will be further divided among firms specializing in housing construction, clothing manufacturing, road maintenance, plumbing, electricity, water and sanitation systems, and so forth.
这种模式体现了亚当·斯密对从专业化到扩大市场再到增加专业化的双向联系的洞察力。该农户专门从事高价值香草种植，因为这里的生态条件对香草树有利。它依靠市场与其他专门生产粮食的家庭进行贸易。用史密斯的话来说，随着收入的增加和“市场范围”的扩大，就有进一步专业化的空间，在这种情况下是运输服务。随后，经济活动将进一步划分为专门从事住房建设、服装制造、道路维护、管道、电力、水和卫生系统等的公司。

Technology 技术
Alternatively, an agricultural extension officer teaches the farm household how to manage the soil nutrients in a new and improved manner by planting special nitrogen-fixing trees that replenish the vital nitrogen nutrients of the soil, and to multiply the benefits by using improved grains. The new cereal varieties are faster maturing and pest resistant, and they flourish with the replenished soil nutrients. As a result, the crop yield rises in a single year to three tons of maize per hectare, or six tons in total. The income per capita therefore rises to $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 (three tons per hectare times two hectares at $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 per ton divided by six people).
或者，农业推广官员教农户如何通过种植特殊的固氮树木来补充土壤重要的氮养分，以新的和改进的方式管理土壤养分，并通过使用改良谷物来增加效益。新的谷物品种成熟速度更快，抗虫害能力强，随着土壤养分的补充，它们会蓬勃发展。结果，农作物产量在一年内增加到每公顷 3 吨玉米，即总共 6 吨。因此人均收入上升至 $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 （每公顷三吨乘以两公顷 $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 每吨除以六人）。
Resource Boom 资源热潮
The farm household is able to move to a much larger and more fertile farm after the government’s success in controlling the breeding of black flies, which spread African river blindness. Suddenly there are thousands of hectares of new farmland and a significant expansion of production capacity as a result. Incomes rise and hunger falls as each household in the newly opened region is able to triple its previous food output.
在政府成功控制了传播非洲河盲症的黑蝇繁殖后，农户能够搬到更大、更肥沃的农场。突然之间出现了数千公顷的新农田，生产能力也随之大幅扩张。随着新开放地区的每个家庭的粮食产量能够比以前增加两倍，收入增加，饥饿减少。

These four pathways to higher income are the main ways that economies grow, albeit in much more complicated settings than I have just described. In actual economies, a rise in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is typically the result of most or all of these four processes simultaneously at work: saving and capital accumulation, increasing specialization and trade, technological advance (and a resulting rise in output for a given amount of inputs), and greater natural resources per person (and a resulting increase in the level of output per person). Although I have illustrated these pathways to rising income at the level of an individual household, in fact each of these processes operates through the interactions of thousands or millions of households linked together by markets and collective actions through public policies and public investments.
这四种提高收入的途径是经济增长的主要方式，尽管环境比我刚才描述的要复杂得多。在实际经济体中，人均国内生产总值 (GDP) 的增长通常是这四个过程的大部分或全部同时起作用的结果：储蓄和资本积累、专业化和贸易的增加、技术进步（以及由此产生的产出增加）对于给定量的投入），以及人均自然资源的增加（以及由此导致的人均产出水平的增加）。虽然我已经阐述了这些在单个家庭层面上增加收入的途径，但事实上，每一个过程都是通过成千上万个或数百万个家庭的相互作用来运作的，这些家庭通过市场和通过公共政策和公共投资的集体行动联系在一起。
What, instead, could lead to a reduction of household income per capita? In general, an economy can rewind the clock, moving backward rather than forward. Here are a number of ways that this might happen.
相反，什么会导致家庭人均收入减少？一般来说，经济可以让时钟倒转，倒退而不是前进。以下是可能发生这种情况的多种方式。

Lack of Saving 缺乏储蓄
Suppose that the household is chronically hungry and, therefore, consumes all of the four tons of maize, leaving nothing to sell to the market and no income to use to purchase a new plow. In fact, during the year, the existing plow breaks down. Next year’s crop falls below four tons, and household income per person declines. The broken plow counts as capital depreciation, or a fall in the amount of capital available per worker.
假设该家庭长期处于饥饿状态，因此消耗掉了所有四吨玉米，没有剩下任何东西可以卖给市场，也没有收入可以用来购买新犁。事实上，在这一年中，现有的犁发生了故障。明年的收成跌破四吨，家庭人均收入下降。坏掉的犁算作资本折旧，或者说每个工人可用资本的减少。

In another case, suppose the household hears about the vanilla opportunity, but is unable to make use of it. There may be no road linking the farm and the regional market, so it is not possible for the household to market the vanilla or to use the proceeds to buy food. As a result, the household passes up the opportunity to specialize in a cash crop and stays with the food crop on which it depends to stay alive. Trade can similarly be hampered, or blocked altogether, by violence (which impedes the reliable shipment of goods), monetary chaos (so that money is not a reliable medium of exchange), price controls, and other forms of government intervention that may impede specialization and trade.
在另一种情况下，假设该家庭听说了普通机会，但无法利用它。农场和区域市场之间可能没有道路连接，因此该家庭无法销售香草或用所得收入购买食物。结果，该家庭放弃了专门种植经济作物的机会，转而继续种植赖以生存的粮食作物。同样，贸易也会受到暴力（阻碍货物可靠运输）、货币混乱（货币不是可靠的交换媒介）、价格管制和其他可能阻碍专业化形式的政府干预的阻碍或完全阻碍。和贸易。

Technological Reversal 技术逆转
What if, as often happens in rural Africa, the children lose their mother and father to HIV/AIDS? The oldest child takes charge, but has not yet had time to master proper farming techniques. The next crop fails, and the children must depend on other households in the village. The family income has declined to zero because the level of technological knowledge has actually declined. Technological know-how is not automatically inherited. Each new generation must learn technological expertise.
如果像非洲农村经常发生的那样，孩子们因艾滋病毒/艾滋病而失去父母怎么办？最大的孩子掌管一切，但还没有时间掌握正确的耕作技术。下一季庄稼歉收，孩子们必须依靠村里的其他家庭生活。家庭收入下降到零，是因为科技知识水平实际上下降了。技术知识不会自动继承。每一代新人都必须学习技术专业知识。

Natural Resource Decline 自然资源减少
To illustrate another possibility, not only is there no additional land, but part of the existing farmland gives way to environmental decline. Specifically, the household has not been able to afford fertilizer and does not know about nitrogen-fixing trees, so the nitrogen in the farmland is seriously depleted. The result is that only one hectare remains in production, and household annual income falls to a devastating $\mathrm{\$}50$$\mathrm{\$}50$$50\$ 50 per capita (two tons times $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 per ton divided by six).
说明另一种可能性，不仅没有额外的土地，而且部分现有农田也被环境恶化所取代。具体来说，该户买不起化肥，又不了解固氮树，导致农田氮素严重枯竭。结果是只剩下一公顷土地可以生产，家庭年收入下降到毁灭性的水平。 $\mathrm{\$}50$$\mathrm{\$}50$$50\$ 50 人均（2吨次 $\mathrm{\$}150$$\mathrm{\$}150$$150\$ 150 每吨除以六）。
Adverse Productivity Shock
不利的生产力冲击
A natural disaster, perhaps a flood, drought, heat wave, frost, pests, or disease in the household (for example, a bout of malaria), or some combination, wipes out household income for the year.
自然灾害，可能是洪水、干旱、热浪、霜冻、害虫或家庭疾病（例如，疟疾）或某种组合，会导致家庭一年的收入消失。
Population Growth 人口增长
A generation passes. The parents die, and the two hectares are divided between the two sons. Each son now has a wife and four children. Assuming that crop yields of two tons per hectare remain unchanged, household income per capita has declined by half because the size of the population living on the same farm has doubled. This experience has been prevalent in rural Africa’s in the most recent generations.
一代人过去了。父母去世，两公顷土地分给两个儿子。现在每个儿子都有一个妻子和四个孩子。假设每公顷两吨的农作物产量保持不变，由于居住在同一农场的人口数量增加了一倍，家庭人均收入下降了一半。这种经历在最近几代人的非洲农村地区很普遍。
These simple illustrations show the many ways that even a simple one-household “economy” may grow, as well as the many ways that the household economy can decline. The first task of a development specialist looking at the conditions in any particular country is to understand which of these various processes is working and which is not. Knowing that an economy is in decline is not enough. We must know why the economy is failing to achieve economic growth if we are to take steps to establish or reestablish it.
这些简单的例子显示了即使是一个简单的单一家庭“经济”也可能以多种方式增长，以及家庭经济可能下降的多种方式。发展专家在研究任何特定国家的情况时，首要任务是了解这些不同的流程中哪些流程有效，哪些无效。仅仅知道经济正在衰退是不够的。如果我们要采取措施建立或重建经济增长，我们就必须知道为什么经济无法实现经济增长。

The most common explanation for why countries fail to achieve economic growth often focuses on the faults of the poor: poverty is a result of corrupt leadership and retrograde cultures that impede modern development. However, something as complex as a society’s economic system has too many moving parts to presume that only one thing can go wrong. Problems can occur in different parts of the economic machine and can sometimes cascade, bringing the machine to a near halt.
对于国家未能实现经济增长的最常见解释往往集中在穷人的过错上：贫困是腐败领导层和阻碍现代发展的倒退文化的结果。然而，像社会经济体系这样复杂的事物有太多的活动部件，因此不能假设只有一件事会出错。问题可能发生在经济机器的不同部分，有时甚至会级联，导致机器几乎停止运转。

In economic growth, eight major categories of problems can cause an economy to stagnate or decline. I have witnessed these kinds of disasters in many parts of the world. Each has its own different appropriate course of treatment; therefore, a good diagnosis is crucial.
在经济增长中，八大类问题可能导致经济停滞或衰退。我在世界许多地方目睹过此类灾难。每一种都有不同的适合的疗程；因此，良好的诊断至关重要。

The Poverty Trap: Poverty Itself as a Cause of Economic Stagnation
贫困陷阱：贫困本身就是经济停滞的原因
The key problem for the poorest countries is that poverty itself can be a trap. When poverty is very extreme, the poor do not have the ability-by themselves-to get out of the mess. Here is why: Consider the kind of poverty caused by a lack of capital per person. Poor rural villages lack trucks, paved roads, power generators, irrigation channels. Human capital is very low, with hungry, diseaseridden, and illiterate villagers struggling for survival. Natural capital is depleted: the trees have been cut down and the soil nutrients exhausted. In these conditions the need is for more capital-physical, human, natural-but that requires more saving. When people are poor, but not utterly destitute, they may be able to save. When they are utterly destitute, they need their entire income, or more, just to survive. There is no margin of income above survival that can be invested for the future.
最贫穷国家的关键问题是贫穷本身可能是一个陷阱。当贫困非常严重时，穷人没有能力依靠自己摆脱困境。原因如下：考虑一下由于人均资本缺乏而造成的贫困。贫困乡村缺乏卡车、铺好的道路、发电机、灌溉渠道。人力资本非常低，饥饿、疾病缠身、文盲的村民为生存而苦苦挣扎。自然资本耗尽：树木被砍伐，土壤养分耗尽。在这种情况下，需要更多的资本——物质的、人力的、自然的——但这需要更多的储蓄。当人们贫穷但不是完全赤贫时，他们也许能够储蓄。当他们完全赤贫时，他们需要全部收入或更多收入才能生存。除了生存之外，没有任何收入可以用来投资未来。
This is the main reason why the poorest of the poor are most prone to becoming trapped with low or negative economic growth rates. They are too poor to save for the future and thereby accumulate the capital per person that could pull them out of their current misery. Table 1 shows the rate of gross domestic saving as a share of GDP for countries at different income levels. Clearly, the poorest of the poor have the lowest saving rate because they are using their income merely to stay alive.
这是最贫困人口最容易陷入低经济增长率或负经济增长率的主要原因。他们太穷了，无法为未来储蓄，无法积累人均资本来摆脱当前的痛苦。表1显示了不同收入水平国家的国内总储蓄占GDP的比例。显然，最穷的人的储蓄率最低，因为他们只是用收入来维持生计。

In fact, the standard measures of domestic saving, based on the official national accounts, overstate the saving of the poor because these data do not account for the fact that the poor are depleting their natural capital by cutting down trees, exhausting soils of their nutrients, mining their mineral, energy, and metal deposits, and overfishing. These forms of natural capital are not monitored in the official national accounts data and, as a result, their “depreciation” or depletion is not recognized as a form of negative saving. When a tree is cut down and sold for fuelwood, and not replanted, the earnings to the logger are counted as income, but instead should be counted as a conversion of one capital asset (the tree) into a financial asset (money).
事实上，基于官方国民账户的国内储蓄标准衡量标准夸大了穷人的储蓄，因为这些数据没有考虑到穷人通过砍伐树木、耗尽土壤养分而耗尽自然资本的事实、开采矿物、能源和金属矿藏以及过度捕捞。这些形式的自然资本没有在官方国民账户数据中得到监测，因此，它们的“贬值”或消耗不被视为负储蓄的一种形式。当一棵树被砍伐并出售作为薪材而不是重新种植时，伐木者的收入被计为收入，但应计为一种资本资产（树）到金融资产（货币）的转换。
Physical Geography 自然地理学
Even if the poverty trap is the right diagnosis, it still poses the question of why some impoverished countries are trapped and others are not. The answer often lies in the frequently overlooked problems of physical geography. Americans, for example, believe that they earned their wealth all by themselves. They forget that they inherited a vast continent rich in natural resources, with great soils and of physical geography. Americans, for example, believe that they earned their wealth all by themselves. They forget that they inherited a vast continent rich in natural
即使贫困陷阱是正确的诊断，它仍然提出了一个问题：为什么一些贫困国家陷入困境而另一些国家却没有。答案往往在于经常被忽视的自然地理学问题。例如，美国人相信他们的财富都是靠自己赢得的。他们忘记了他们继承了一块广阔的大陆，自然资源丰富，土壤肥沃，自然地理优越。例如，美国人相信他们的财富都是靠自己赢得的。他们忘记了他们继承了一块自然资源丰富的广阔大陆
ample rainfall, immense navigable rivers, and thousands of miles of coastline with dozens of natural ports that provide a wonderful foundation for sea-based trade.
充沛的降雨量、广阔的通航河流、绵延数千英里的海岸线和数十个天然港口，为海上贸易提供了良好的基础。
ample rainfall, immense navigable rivers, and thousands of miles of coastline with dozens of natural ports that provide a wonderful foundation for sea-based trade.
充足的降雨量、浩瀚的通航河流、绵延数千英里的海岸线和数十个天然港口，为海上贸易提供了良好的基础。
Other countries are not quite so favored. Many of the world’s poorest countries are severely hindered by high transport costs because they are landlocked; situated in high mountain ranges; or lack Other countries are not quite so favored. Many of the world’s poorest countries are severely hindered by high transport costs because they are landlocked; situated in high mountain ranges; or lack
其他国家则没有那么受到青睐。世界上许多最贫穷的国家由于地处内陆而受到高昂运输成本的严重阻碍；位于高山山脉；其他国家则不太受青睐。世界上许多最贫穷的国家由于地处内陆而受到高昂运输成本的严重阻碍；位于高山山脉；或缺乏
navigable rivers, long coastlines, or good natural harbors. Culture does not explain the persistence of poverty in Bolivia, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, or Tibet. Look instead to the mountain geography of a navigable rivers, long coastlines, or good natural harbors. Culture does not explain the persistence of poverty in Bolivia, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, or Tibet. Look instead to the mountain geography of a
通航的河流、漫长的海岸线或良好的天然港口。文化并不能解释玻利维亚、埃塞俄比亚、吉尔吉斯斯坦或西藏持续存在的贫困。相反，您应该关注可通航的河流、漫长的海岸线或良好的天然港口的山区地理。文化并不能解释玻利维亚、埃塞俄比亚、吉尔吉斯斯坦或西藏持续存在的贫困。而是看看山区的地理
landlocked region facing crushing transport costs and economic isolation that stifle almost all forms of modern economic activity. Adam Smith was acutely aware of the role of high transport costs in landlocked region facing crushing transport costs and economic isolation that stifle almost all forms of modern economic activity. Adam Smith was acutely aware of the role of high transport costs in
内陆地区面临着沉重的运输成本和经济孤立，几乎所有形式的现代经济活动都受到抑制。亚当·斯密敏锐地意识到内陆地区高昂的运输成本所造成的影响，该地区面临着沉重的运输成本和经济孤立，几乎扼杀了所有形式的现代经济活动。亚当·斯密敏锐地意识到高运输成本在经济中的作用。
hindering economic development. He stressed, in particular, the advantages of proximity to low-cost, sea-based trade as critical, noting that remote economies would be the last regions to achieve hindering economic develom
阻碍经济发展。他特别强调，靠近低成本、海上贸易的优势至关重要，并指出偏远经济体将是最后实现阻碍经济发展的地区。

As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally begins to sub-divide and improve itself, and it is frequently not till a long time after that those improvements extend themselves to the inland part of the country.
由于水运为各种工业打开了比仅靠陆运所能提供的更广阔的市场，因此，在沿海和通航河流沿岸，各种工业都在发展。自然而然地开始细分和改进，往往要经过很长一段时间，这些改进才扩展到内陆地区。
Other kinds of geographical distress are also at play. Many countries are trapped in arid conditions with low agricultural productivity or vulnerability to prolonged droughts. Most of the tropics have ecological conditions that favor killer diseases like malaria, schistosomiasis, dengue fever, and dozens of others. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, has an ideal rainfall, temperature, and mosquito type that make it the global epicenter of malaria, perhaps the greatest factor in slowing Africa’s economic development throughout history. Jared Diamond, in his wonderful book Guns, Germs, and Steel, gives a magnificent account of how geography helped shape the early stages of human civilization. He offers scintillating insights into how the Americas, Africa, Europe, and Asia differed in terms of indigenous crop species, animals for domestication, ease of transport, possibilities for the spread of technology, disease ecology, and other geographically related factors in economic development. Some of these factors, of course, became much less or not at all important with the advent of modern transportation and communications and the resulting transfer of crops and animal species across different regions of the world.
其他类型的地理困境也在发挥作用。许多国家陷入干旱，农业生产力低下或容易遭受长期干旱。大多数热带地区的生态条件有利于疟疾、血吸虫病、登革热和其他数十种致命疾病的发生。尤其是撒哈拉以南非洲地区，拥有理想的降雨量、温度和蚊子类型，使其成为全球疟疾的中心，这也许是历史上阻碍非洲经济发展的最大因素。贾里德·戴蒙德（Jared Diamond）在他精彩的著作《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》中，精彩地讲述了地理如何帮助塑造人类文明的早期阶段。他对美洲、非洲、欧洲和亚洲在本土作物品种、驯化动物、交通便利性、技术传播的可能性、疾病生态学以及经济发展中的其他地理相关因素方面的差异提供了精彩的见解。当然，随着现代交通和通讯的出现以及农作物和动物物种在世界不同地区的转移，其中一些因素变得不那么重要或根本不重要。
Fortunately, none of these conditions is fatal to economic development. It is time to banish the bogeyman of geographical determinism, the false accusation that claims about geographical disadvantage are also claims that geography single-handedly and irrevocably determines the economic outcome of nations. The point is only that these adversities require countries to undertake additional investments that other, more fortunate, countries did not have to make. Roads can be built from a landlocked country to a port in another country. Tropical diseases can be controlled. Arid climates can be overcome with irrigation. Adverse geography poses problems that can be solved, typically through physical investments and good conservation management. But adverse geography raises the costs of solving the problems of farming, transport, and health, and thereby makes it much more likely that a country will be caught in a poverty trap.
幸运的是，这些条件对于经济发展都不是致命的。现在是消除地理决定论这个怪物的时候了，这种错误的指责认为，地理劣势的主张也是地理单枪匹马、不可逆转地决定国家经济结果的主张。问题只是在于，这些逆境要求各国进行额外的投资，而其他更幸运的国家则不必进行这些投资。可以修建从内陆国家到另一个国家港口的道路。热带疾病是可以控制的。干旱气候可以通过灌溉来克服。不利的地理位置带来的问题通常可以通过实物投资和良好的保护管理来解决。但不利的地理位置会增加解决农业、交通和健康问题的成本，从而使一个国家更有可能陷入贫困陷阱。

Fiscal Trap 财政陷阱
Even when the private economy is not impoverished, the government may lack the resources to pay for the infrastructure on which economic growth depends. Governments are critical to investing in public goods and services like primary health care, roads, power grids, ports, and the like. The government may lack the financial means to provide these public goods, however, for at least three reasons. First, the population itself may be impoverished, so taxation of the population is not feasible. Second, the government may be inept, corrupt, or incapacitated, and thereby unable to collect tax revenues. Third, the government may already be carrying a tremendous load of debt (for example, debt carried forward from an earlier decade), and must use its limited tax revenue to service the debt rather than to finance new investments. This third case is often called a debt overhang. Debt from the past crushes the prospects for growth in the future. In such circumstances, debt cancellation may be the only way to give the country a fresh start on a path of economic development.
即使私营经济没有陷入贫困，政府也可能缺乏资源来支付经济增长所依赖的基础设施。政府对于投资初级卫生保健、道路、电网、港口等公共产品和服务至关重要。然而，至少出于三个原因，政府可能缺乏提供这些公共产品的财政手段。首先，人口本身可能是贫困的，因此对人口征税是不可行的。其次，政府可能无能、腐败或无能力，从而无法征收税收。第三，政府可能已经背负着巨大的债务负担（例如，前十年结转的债务），并且必须利用其有限的税收收入来偿还债务，而不是为新的投资提供资金。第三种情况通常称为债务积压。过去的债务压垮了未来的增长前景。在这种情况下，取消债务可能是让该国重新走上经济发展道路的唯一途径。

Economic development requires a government oriented toward development. The government has many roles to play. It must identify and finance the high-priority infrastructure projects, and make the needed infrastructure and social services available to the whole population, not just a select few. The government must create an environment conducive to investments by private businesses. Those investors must believe that they will be allowed to operate their business and to keep their future profits. Government must exercise self-restraint in demanding bribes or side payments. Governments must also maintain internal peace and safety so the safety of persons and property is not unduly threatened, maintain judicial systems that can define property rights and honestly enforce contracts, and must also maintain internal peace and safety so the safety of
经济发展需要政府以发展为导向。政府可以发挥很多作用。它必须确定并资助高度优先的基础设施项目，并向全体人民而非少数人提供所需的基础设施和社会服务。政府必须创造有利于私营企业投资的环境。这些投资者必须相信他们将被允许经营自己的业务并保留未来的利润。政府在索要贿赂或附带报酬时必须保持自我克制。各国政府还必须维护国内和平与安全，使人身和财产安全不受到不当威胁；维护能够界定财产权和诚实执行合同的司法系统；还必须维护国内和平与安全，使人民的安全

When governments fail in any of these tasks - leaving huge gaps in infrastructure, or raising corruption to levels that impair economic activity, or failing to ensure domestic peace-the economy is sure to fail, and often to fail badly. Indeed, in extreme cases, when governments are unable to perform their most basic functions, we talk about “state failures,” which are characterized by wars, revolutions, coups, anarchy, and the like. We will see later on that state failures are often not only the cause of economic disaster, but also the last stage of it. State failure and economic failure can chase each other in a dizzying and terrifying spiral of instability.
当政府未能完成这些任务中的任何一项时——在基础设施方面留下巨大缺口，或者腐败程度上升到损害经济活动的程度，或者未能确保国内和平——经济肯定会失败，而且往往会严重失败。事实上，在极端情况下，当政府无法履行其最基本的职能时，我们谈论“国家失败”，其特征是战争、革命、政变、无政府状态等。我们稍后会看到，国家失灵往往不仅是经济灾难的原因，而且也是经济灾难的最后阶段。国家失败和经济失败可能会在令人眼花缭乱、可怕的不稳定螺旋中相互追逐。

Even when governments are trying to advance their countries, the cultural environment may be an obstacle to development. Cultural or religious norms in the society may block the role of women, for example, leaving half of the population without economic or political rights and without education, thereby undermining half of the population in its contribution to overall development. Denying women their rights and education results in cascading problems. Most important, perhaps, the demographic transition from high fertility to low fertility is delayed or blocked altogether. Poor households continue to have six or seven children because the woman’s role is seen mainly as child rearing, and her lack of education means that she has few options in the labor force. In these settings women often lack basic economic security and legal rights; when they are widowed, their social circumstances turn even more dreadful, and they are left completely impoverished without hope for improvement. Similar cultural barriers may apply to religious or ethnic minorities. Social norms may prevent certain groups from gaining access to public services (such as schooling, health facilities, or job training). These minorities may be blocked from entering universities or public sector jobs. They may face harassment in the community, including boycotts of their businesses and physical destruction of property. In extreme circumstances, as occurred in East Africa with the Indian community, wholesale “ethnic cleansing” may ensue, with many fleeing for their lives.
即使政府努力推动国家进步，文化环境也可能成为发展的障碍。社会中的文化或宗教规范可能会阻碍妇女的作用，例如，使一半人口没有经济或政治权利，也没有受教育，从而削弱一半人口对整体发展的贡献。剥夺妇女的权利和教育会导致一系列问题。也许最重要的是，人口从高生育率向低生育率的转变被推迟或完全受阻。贫困家庭仍然有六七个孩子，因为妇女的作用主要被视为抚养孩子，而她缺乏教育意味着她在劳动力市场上几乎没有选择。在这些环境中，妇女往往缺乏基本的经济保障和法律权利；当她们丧偶时，她们的社会处境就变得更加糟糕，她们陷入彻底的贫困，没有任何改善的希望。类似的文化障碍可能也适用于宗教或少数民族。社会规范可能会阻止某些群体获得公共服务（例如学校教育、医疗设施或职业培训）。这些少数族裔可能无法进入大学或进入公共部门工作。他们可能会在社区中面临骚扰，包括对其企业的抵制和对财产的物理破坏。在极端情况下，就像东非印第安人社区所发生的那样，大规模的“种族清洗”可能会随之而来，许多人会逃命。

Geopolitics 地缘政治
It takes two to trade. Trade barriers erected by foreign countries can impede a poor country’s economic development. These barriers are sometimes political, as when a powerful country imposes trade sanctions on a regime that it does not like. These sanctions may aim to weaken or topple a despicable regime, but often they simply impoverish the population of the targeted country without toppling the regime. Many factors in addition to trade that may affect a country’s development can be manipulated from abroad for geopolitical reasons.
交易需要两个人。外国设立的贸易壁垒可能会阻碍贫穷国家的经济发展。这些障碍有时是政治性的，例如一个强大的国家对其不喜欢的政权实施贸易制裁。这些制裁的目的可能是削弱或推翻一个卑鄙的政权，但它们往往只是使目标国家的人民陷入贫困，而没有推翻该政权。由于地缘政治原因，除了贸易之外，许多可能影响一国发展的因素都可以从国外操纵。

Consider the plight of inventors in an impoverished country. Even if these inventors are able to develop new scientific approaches to meet local economic needs, the chances of recouping investments in research and development through later sales in the local market are very low. The local purchasing power to buy a new product is tiny, and will not provide for sufficient profits if an invention is successfully brought to market, even if the impoverished country has state-of-the-art patent legislation. The problem is not the property rights to the invention, but the size of the market.
考虑一下贫困国家发明家的困境。即使这些发明者能够开发出新的科学方法来满足当地经济需求，通过随后在当地市场的销售来收回研发投资的机会也非常低。当地购买新产品的购买力很小，即使贫穷国家拥有最先进的专利立法，如果一项发明成功推向市场，也无法提供足够的利润。问题不在于发明的产权，而在于市场的规模。

There is, therefore, a huge difference between rich and poor countries in their tendency to innovate. Rich countries have a big market, which increases the incentive for innovation, brings new technologies to market, further raises productivity and expands the size of the market, and creates new incentives for innovation. This momentum creates, in effect, a chain reaction, which economists call endogenous growth. Innovation raises the size of the market; a larger market raises the incentives for innovation. Therefore, economic growth and innovation proceed in a mutually reinforcing process.
因此，富国和穷国的创新倾向存在巨大差异。富裕国家拥有大市场，增加了创新动力，将新技术推向市场，进一步提高生产率并扩大市场规模，为创新创造新的动力。这种势头实际上造成了连锁反应，经济学家称之为内生增长。创新扩大市场规模；更大的市场提高了创新的动力。因此，经济增长和创新是相辅相成的过程。

In the rich countries of North America, Western Europe, and East Asia, the process of massive investment in research and development, leading to sales of patent-protected products to a large market, stands at the core of economic growth. Advanced countries are typically investing 2 percent or more of their gross national product directly into the research and development process, and sometimes stands at the core of economic growth. Advanced countries are typically investing 2 percent or more of their gross national product directly into the research and development process, and sometimes
在北美、西欧和东亚等富裕国家，大量投资研发、将受专利保护的产品销售到广阔市场的过程是经济增长的核心。发达国家通常将国民生产总值的 2% 或更多直接投资于研发过程，有时甚至是经济增长的核心。发达国家通常将其国民生产总值的 2% 或更多直接投资于研发过程，有时
more than 3 percent of GDP. That investment is very sizable, with hundreds of billions of dollars invested each year in research and development activities. Moreover, these investments are not simply left to the market. Governments invest heavily, especially in the early stages of R and D (more in R, research, than in D, development, although government finance is present at both stages).
占GDP的3%以上。这项投资非常庞大，每年在研发活动上的投资达数千亿美元。此外，这些投资并不是简单地留给市场。政府投入大量资金，特别是在研发的早期阶段（R、研究多于D、开发，尽管政府财政在这两个阶段都有提供）。

In most poor countries, especially smaller ones, the innovation process usually never gets started. Inventors do not invent because they know that they will not be able to recoup those large, fixed costs of developing a new product. Impoverished governments cannot afford to back the basic sciences in government labs and in universities. And the scientists do not stay. The result is an inequality of innovative activity that magnifies the inequality of global incomes. Although today’s low-income countries have 37 percent of the world’s population and 11 percent of the world’s GDP (adjusted for innovative activity that magnifies the inequality of global incomes. Atthough today’s low-income countries have 37 percent of the world’s population and 11 percent of the world’s GDD (adjusted for
在大多数贫穷国家，尤其是较小的国家，创新过程通常永远不会启动。发明家之所以不发明，是因为他们知道他们将无法收回开发新产品的大量固定成本。贫困政府无力支持政府实验室和大学的基础科学。科学家们并没有留下来。其结果是创新活动的不平等，加剧了全球收入的不平等。尽管如今的低收入国家拥有世界人口的 37% 和 GDP 的 11%（根据放大全球收入不平等的创新活动进行调整。尽管今天的低收入国家拥有世界人口的 37% 和 GDP 的 11%）。世界 GDD（调整后
differences in purchasing power), these countries accounted for less than 1 percent of all of the U.S-registered patents taken out by inventors in the year 2000. The top twenty countries in patenting, all differences in purchasing power), these countries accounted
购买力差异），这些国家占 2000 年发明人在美国注册的专利总量的不到 1%。专利申请量排名前 20 的国家，全部是购买力差异），这些国家占
high-income countries, account for 98 percent of all patents.
高收入国家拥有所有专利的 98%。
high-income countries, account for 98 percent of all patents.
高收入国家拥有所有专利的 98%。
Over the span of two centuries, the innovation gap is certainly one of the most fundamental reasons why the richest and the poorest countries have diverged, and why the poorest of the poor have not been able to get a foothold on growth. The rich move from innovation to greater wealth to further innovation; the poor do not. Fortunately, there are a few opportunities for innovation, although these are been able to get a foothold on gr.
两个世纪以来，创新差距无疑是最富有国家和最贫穷国家出现分化、最贫穷国家无法在增长中站稳脚跟的最根本原因之一。富人从创新走向更大财富，再走向进一步创新；穷人则不然。幸运的是，尽管这些已经能够在市场上站稳脚跟，但仍有一些创新机会。
not as robust as we would hope.
没有我们希望的那么强大。
not as robust as we would hope.
没有我们希望的那么强大。
The first is the diffusion of technology. Even when countries are not inventors of technology, they can still be beneficiaries through the importation of technology. All countries today, without The first is the diffusion of technology. Even when countries are not inventors of technology, they can still be beneficiaries through the importation of technology. All countries today, without
首先是技术的传播。即使国家不是技术发明者，他们仍然可以通过技术进口成为受益者。当今所有国家，无一不是技术的扩散。即使国家不是技术发明者，他们仍然可以通过技术进口成为受益者。今天所有国家，没有
exception, are using personal computers, and cell phones are reaching most parts of the world as well, even very poor places. Innovations can be imported through consumer goods, capital imports by
例外的是，人们正在使用个人电脑，而手机也正在覆盖世界大部分地区，甚至是非常贫穷的地方。创新可以通过消费品进口，资本进口可以通过
business (in the form of machinery, for example), foreign direct investment (in which a high-tech firm sets up a factory in a poor country), or textbooks, word of mouth, and reverse engineering. History business (in the form of machinery, for example), foreign direct investment (in which a high-tech firm sets up a factory in
商业（例如，以机械的形式）、外国直接投资（高科技公司在贫穷国家设立工厂）或教科书、口碑和逆向工程。历史商业（例如，以机械形式）、外国直接投资（高科技公司在美国设厂）
is replete with examples in which new capital goods and blueprints were simply pilfered and brought to a new location.
充满了新的资本货物和蓝图被简单地偷走并带到新地点的例子。
is replete with examples in which new capital goods and blueprints were simply pilfered and brought to a new location.
充满了新的资本货物和蓝图被简单地偷走并带到新地点的例子。
However, the importation of technology can be frustrated in the poorest of the poor countries. These countries may be
然而，在最贫穷的国家，技术进口可能会受挫。这些国家可能是
However, the importation of technology can be frustrated in the poorest of the poor countries. These countries may be too poor to purchase the capital goods, and they may be unatractive as places for foreign investment, given their lack of infrastructure. But there is often a much deeper problem. Many of the key breakthroughs in technology developed in the rich countries are relevant for the
然而，在最贫穷的国家，技术进口可能会受挫。这些国家可能太穷而无法购买资本品，而且由于缺乏基础设施，它们作为外国投资地可能没有吸引力。但往往还有更深层次的问题。富裕国家开发的许多关键技术突破都与
particular ecological conditions of the rich countries, and are not especially useful in the tropical, or arid, or mountain environments where so many of the extreme poor live today. The massive particular ecological conditions of the rich countries, and are not especially yseful in the tropical, or arid, or mountain environments where so many of the extreme poor live today. The massive investments in biomedical research in the rich countries, more than $\mathrm{\$}70$$\mathrm{\$}70$$70\$ 70 billion, largely overlook the challenges of tropical diseases such as malaria. Rich-country funding is, not surprisingly, aimed at rich-country diseases.
富裕国家的特定生态条件，对于当今许多赤贫人口所生活的热带、干旱或山区环境来说并不是特别有用。富裕国家巨大的特殊生态条件，对于当今许多赤贫人口所生活的热带、干旱或山区环境来说，并不是特别有利。富裕国家对生物医学研究的巨额投资超过 $\mathrm{\$}70$$\mathrm{\$}70$$70\$ 70 亿美元，很大程度上忽视了疟疾等热带疾病的挑战。毫不奇怪，富裕国家的资金针对的是富裕国家的疾病。
Many poor East Asian countries were initially successful in raising technology not so much through home-grown innovation as through their success in attracting foreign investors who brought the technologies with them. As early as the late 1960s, Texas Instruments, National Semiconductor, and Hewlett Packard, among others, set up operations in Singapore, Penang Island (Malaysia), and other parts of East Asia. They saved a lot of money but also introduced what were otherwise very poor economies to sophisticated scientific technology and advanced management processes. If a poor country can become an attractive place for high-technology enterprises to conduct part of their production activities, then they can become a home, even at a low level of development, to quite sophisticated production and management techniques. Under the right circumstances, hosting such activities on the home turf can then lead to a diffusion of knowledge, and participation in modern production, so that those benefits can then be transferred to domestic firms.
许多贫穷的东亚国家最初在提高技术方面取得了成功，与其说是通过本土创新，不如说是通过成功吸引了带来技术的外国投资者。早在 20 世纪 60 年代末，德州仪器 (TI)、美国国家半导体 (National Semiconductor) 和惠普 (Hewlett Packard) 等公司就在新加坡、槟城岛（马来西亚）和东亚其他地区设立了业务。他们节省了大量资金，但也向原本非常贫穷的经济体引入了先进的科学技术和先进的管理流程。如果一个贫穷国家能够成为高科技企业进行部分生产活动的有吸引力的地方，那么它们即使在发展水平较低的情况下也可以成为相当先进的生产和管理技术的发源地。在适当的情况下，在本土举办此类活动可以促进知识的传播和现代生产的参与，从而将这些利益转移给国内企业。
The process even works in technologically humbler sectors like apparel. When foreign investors such as Wal-Mart, J. C. Penney, Yves Saint Laurent, and others outsource their production to Dhaka, they bring in the latest fashion designs and integrate the local production unit into a global supply chain. The local production units do the cutting, stitching, labeling, and packaging of the merchandise, which is designed and ultimately destined for the United States and Europe. These factories become important training grounds for climbing the technology ladder, moving from basic technology up to the next steps. A cutting and stitching company may take 100 percent of the fashion design orders from abroad at the beginning, but later on, once it gets the hang of it, it may start hiring its own designers, and start selling not only the labor of the assembly operation, but also the designs. That progression has happened over and over again throughout the world.
这一过程甚至适用于服装等技术水平较低的行业。当沃尔玛、JC Penney、Yves Saint Laurent 等外国投资者将生产外包到达卡时，他们引入了最新的时装设计，并将当地生产部门整合到全球供应链中。当地生产单位对商品进行裁剪、缝合、贴标签和包装，这些商品设计并最终销往美国和欧洲。这些工厂成为攀登技术阶梯、从基础技术迈向下一步的重要训练场。一家剪裁公司一开始可能100%来自国外的时装设计订单，但后来，一旦掌握了窍门，它可能会开始雇佣自己的设计师，并开始出售不仅仅是组装的劳动力操作，还有设计。这种进展在世界各地一再发生。
What prevents this process from taking hold everywhere in the world? Eventually it can, but in the early stages the process almost always starts right at a port. The accompanying maps, 3 and 4 , show the locations of multinational companies in the electronics sector and in textiles and garment manufacturing, illustrating the coastal location of these firms, especially in their operation in the poor countries. Hinterlands have lagged far behind in their ability to attract these kinds of industries.
是什么阻碍了这一进程在世界各地展开？最终可以实现，但在早期阶段，该过程几乎总是从端口开始。随附的地图 3 和 4 显示了电子行业以及纺织和服装制造领域的跨国公司的位置，说明了这些公司的沿海位置，特别是它们在贫穷国家的运营。腹地在吸引此类产业的能力方面远远落后。

It is no coincidence that booming sites for foreign investment-such as Penang Island (Malaysia), Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mauritius-are all islands on the Asia-Europe trade route. It is no coincidence that China’s leading economic city, Shanghai, sits right on the coast at the mouth of the Yangtze River. It is no coincidence that Mexico’s assembly sector is right along the Rio Grande
槟城岛（马来西亚）、新加坡、台湾、香港和毛里求斯等蓬勃发展的外国投资地点都是亚欧贸易路线上的岛屿，这并非巧合。中国领先的经济城市上海坐落在长江口沿岸，这并非巧合。墨西哥的装配业位于格兰德河沿岸并非巧合
River, since Mexico’s economically relevant “coast” is its border with the United States. The same geographical advantages are seen in many other places that have received substantial foreign River, since Mexico’s economically relevant “coast” is its border with the United States. The same geographical advantages are seen in many other places that have received substantial foreign
河流，因为墨西哥经济相关的“海岸”是其与美国的边界。同样的地理优势也出现在许多其他接收大量外国河流的地方，因为墨西哥与美国经济相关的“海岸”是其与美国的边界。同样的地理优势在许多其他接受大量外国投资的地方也有体现。
investments in recent years. Wroclaw, Poland, and Bratislava, Slovakia, and Lada Bolislav, CZech Republic, and Lubljiana, Slovenia, have all reaped an extra bonus of jobs and technology transfer by investments in recent years. Wroclaw, Poland, and Bratis
近年来的投资。近年来，波兰的弗罗茨瓦夫、斯洛伐克的布拉迪斯拉发、捷克共和国的拉达博利斯拉夫和斯洛文尼亚的卢布尔加纳都通过投资获得了就业和技术转让的额外红利。波兰弗罗茨瓦夫和布拉迪斯
virtue of their proximity to Western European markets.
由于靠近西欧市场。

Most countries have experienced a significant decline in fertility rates in recent decades. Half the world, including all of the rich world, is at or near the so-called replacement rate of fertility, in which each mother is raising one daughter on average to “replace” her in the next generation. The replacement rate is two children, one of whom, on average, is a girl. (In fact, the replacement rate is a little bit above two, to take into account the possibility that the daughter will not survive to reproductive age.) The poorest of the poor countries, by contrast, are stuck with fertility rates of five or more. On average, a mother is raising at least two girls, and in some cases three girls or more. In those circumstances, national populations double each generation.
近几十年来，大多数国家的生育率大幅下降。世界上一半的国家，包括所有富裕国家，都处于或接近所谓的生育更替率，即每个母亲平均抚养一个女儿，以在下一代“取代”她。替代率为两个孩子，其中平均有一个是女孩。 （事实上​​，考虑到女儿无法活到生育年龄的可能性，更替率略高于二。）相比之下，最贫穷国家的生育率则为五或更高。 。平均而言，一位母亲至少抚养两个女孩，在某些情况下抚养三个女孩或更多。在这种情况下，全国人口每一代都会增加一倍。

However, the demographic transition has occurred in most parts of the world. Moreover, although Western Europe’s demographic transition took a century or more, the transition among developing countries in the twentieth century has occurred over decades or just a few years. In Bangladesh, the total fertility rate fell from 6.6 in 1975 to just 3.1 in 2000 , as we saw plainly with the BRAC microfinance group in the village outside of Dhaka. In Iran following the 1979 Islamic revolution, the transformation was even faster, from 6.7 in 1980 to just 2.6 in 2000 . The Iranian revolution, it seems, brought a generation of young girls into the schools, and this boom in girls’ literacy has translated rapidly and dramatically into the desire for fewer children.
然而，世界大部分地区已经发生了人口转变。而且，虽然西欧的人口转变经历了一个世纪甚至更长的时间，但二十世纪发展中国家的人口转变却经历了几十年甚至几年的时间。在孟加拉国，总生育率从 1975 年的 6.6 下降到 2000 年的 3.1，正如我们在达卡郊外村庄的 BRAC 小额信贷集团所看到的那样。 1979 年伊斯兰革命后的伊朗，转变速度更快，从 1980 年的 6.7 下降到 2000 年的 2.6。伊朗革命似乎让一代年轻女孩进入了学校，而女孩识字率的激增迅速而戏剧性地转化为减少孩子数量的愿望。
One reason for a poverty trap is a demographic trap, when impoverished families choose to have lots of children. These choices are understandable, yet the results can be disastrous. When impoverished families have large numbers of children, the families cannot afford to invest in the nutrition, health, and education of each child. They might only afford the education of one child, and may send only one son to school. High fertility rates in one generation, therefore, tend to lead to impoverishment of the children and to high fertility rates in the following generation as well. Rapid population growth also puts enormous stresses on farm sizes and environmental resources, thereby exacerbating the poverty.
贫困陷阱的原因之一是人口陷阱，即贫困家庭选择生很多孩子。这些选择是可以理解的，但结果可能是灾难性的。当贫困家庭有大量孩子时，家庭无法承担对每个孩子的营养、健康和教育的投资。他们可能只能负担一个孩子的教育费用，并且只能送一个儿子上学。因此，一代人的高生育率往往会导致儿童贫困，并导致下一代人的高生育率。人口的快速增长也给农场规模和环境资源带来了巨大压力，从而加剧了贫困。
As with the other obstacles to economic growth, the demographic trap is avoidable. Girls’ education would allow women to more easily join the labor force, increasing their earning power and the “cost” of staying home to bear children. Education, law, and social action can empower women to more easily make fertility choices (instead of having those choices made solely by husbands or others in the family). Children can be treated for disease to better ensure their survival, meaning that parents can have fewer children, feeling secure that they will survive to take care of their parents in old age. Family planning and reproductive health services can be provided even in very poor communities. All of this requires money, however, and money is lacking in the poorest economies.
与经济增长的其他障碍一样，人口陷阱是可以避免的。女童教育将使妇女更容易加入劳动力队伍，提高她们的赚钱能力和留在家里生孩子的“成本”。教育、法律和社会行动可以使妇女更容易地做出生育选择（而不是仅由丈夫或家庭其他人做出这些选择）。儿童可以接受疾病治疗，以更好地确保他们的生存，这意味着父母可以少生孩子，因为他们可以放心地活着来照顾年老的父母。即使在非常贫困的社区也可以提供计划生育和生殖健康服务。然而，所有这些都需要资金，而最贫穷的经济体却缺乏资金。
Figure 1 shows how the total fertility rate in the year 2001 compares with the country’s national income per person. The total fertility rate, and hence the population growth rate, is stunningly high especially in the poorest parts of the world. Here is the demographic trap in vivid perspective: the poorest places, many with the greatest obstacles to modern economic growth, are also the places where families have the most numbers of children, and where the populations continue to soar. High population growth leads to deeper poverty, and deeper poverty contributes to high fertility rates.
图1显示了2001年总和生育率与国家人均国民收入的比较。总生育率以及人口增长率高得惊人，尤其是在世界最贫困地区。这是一个生动的人口陷阱：最贫穷的地方，许多地方对现代经济增长的障碍最大，但也是家庭拥有最多孩子的地方，也是人口持续飙升的地方。人口高增长会导致更深的贫困，而更深的贫困又导致高生育率。

Map 5 shows all of the countries in the world where per capita GDP declined during the twenty-year period between 1980 and 2000. Notice that not one single rich country in North America, Western Europe, or East Asia failed to achieve economic growth! All of the problems lie in the developing world. Forty-five countries had negative growth in GDP per capita. (Only countries with a population of at least two million people in 1980 were examined in order to avoid the idiosyncrasies of some very small countries.)
地图5显示了世界上所有在1980年至2000年的20年间人均GDP下降的国家。请注意，北美、西欧或东亚没有一个富裕国家未能实现经济增长！所有问题都出在发展中国家。 45个国家的人均GDP出现负增长。 （仅对 1980 年人口至少为 200 万的国家进行了审查，以避免出现一些非常小的国家的特殊情况。）

It is illuminating to divide the world’s economies into the following six categories, depending on their per capita income in 1980:
根据 1980 年的人均收入，将世界经济分为以下六类，颇具启发性：

The accompanying table 2 lists the countries in each category, divided into two columns: those that experienced positive economic growth and those that experienced outright economic decline. The numbers of countries in each category are shown in the two columns at the right of the table. There are several key points. First, the biggest problem with economic decline is indeed in the poorest countries, especially but not only in sub-Saharan Africa. The second observation is that except for oil-exporting and ex-Soviet countries, all high-income countries achieved economic growth, as did most middle-income countries. The only growth failure among high-income countries occurred in Saudi Arabia, an oil-exporting country. Among the middle-income countries, the vast proportion of growth failures were in the oil-exporting and postcommunist countries. In the rest of the middle-income countries, twelve out of fourteen countries enjoyed positive economic growth.
附表2列出了每个类别的国家，分为两列：经历经济正增长的国家和经历经济彻底衰退的国家。每个类别中的国家/地区数量显示在表右侧的两列中。有几个关键点。首先，经济衰退的最大问题确实是在最贫穷的国家，特别是但不仅限于撒哈拉以南非洲国家。第二个观察结果是，除了石油出口国和前苏联国家外，所有高收入国家都实现了经济增长，大多数中等收入国家也是如此。高收入国家中唯一的增长失败发生在石油出口国沙特阿拉伯。在中等收入国家中，增长失败的大部分发生在石油出口国和后共产主义国家。在其他中等收入国家中，十四个国家中有十二个实现了经济正增长。

The economic declines in the oil-producing and postcommunist countries reflect very unusual circumstances. The oil-rich states are, of course, not impoverished countries, but instead are middleincome and high-income countries where the economic activity depends overwhelmingly on oil exports. These economies rise and fall in line with the “real” price of oil, that is, the price of oil relative to the price of imported goods such as machinery and consumer goods. The real price of oil soared during the 1970s, leading to the massive growth in living standards of these economies, but during the 1980s and 1990s, the oil price fell sharply, leading to a collapse of living standards. If there is a lesson here, it is that an economy dependent on a single product (or a small number of products) for export is bound to experience high volatility as the relative price of the product fluctuates in world markets. Since oil is highly volatile, the real income of the oil economies has similarly been highly volatile.
石油生产国和后共产主义国家的经济衰退反映了非常不寻常的情况。当然，石油资源丰富的国家并不是贫困国家，而是经济活动主要依赖石油出口的中等收入和高收入国家。这些经济体的涨跌与石油的“实际”价格一致，即石油价格相对于机械和消费品等进口商品的价格。 20世纪70年代，石油的实际价格飙升，导致这些经济体的生活水平大幅提高，但在1980年代和90年代，石油价格急剧下跌，导致生活水平崩溃。如果说这里有一个教训的话，那就是依赖单一产品（或少量产品）出口的经济体必然会随着产品相对价格在世界市场上的波动而经历高度波动。由于石油的波动性很大，石油经济体的实际收入同样也波动很大。

The economic decline in postcommunist countries is even more of a special case. These countries have experienced a one-time decline in GDP per capita as they changed over from a failed communist system to a market economy. Even in the cases of the strongest of the so-called transition economies - the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland - there was a period of sharp reduction in GDP per capita for a few years as old heavy industries linked to the Soviet economy declined or disappeared in bankruptcy and new sectors took time to develop. The result was what economists called a transition recession. By the late 1990s, the postcommunist countries had resumed economic growth, but from a lower GDP per capita than before the Soviet collapse.
后共产主义国家的经济衰退更是一个特例。这些国家在从失败的共产主义制度转向市场经济的过程中，经历了人均GDP的一次性下降。即使在所谓的转型经济体中最强大的国家——捷克共和国、匈牙利和波兰——也有几年人均国内生产总值急剧下降的时期，因为与苏联经济相关的旧重工业衰退或因破产而消失，新行业的发展需要时间。结果就是经济学家所说的过渡性衰退。到20世纪90年代末，后共产主义国家恢复了经济增长，但人均GDP低于苏联解体前。

Poor countries have a significant chance of falling into a poverty trap. Out of the fifty-eight nonoil countries with per capita incomes below $\mathrm{\$}3,000$$\mathrm{\$}3,000$$3,000\$ 3,000, twenty-two (or 38 percent) experienced an outright decline. Yet the thirty-six other countries enjoyed economic growth. How is it that some very poor countries escaped the ravages of a poverty trap while the rest did not? Comparing those countries that made it and those that did not, the success stories show certain characteristics. The most important determinant, it seems, is food productivity. Countries that started with high cereal yields per hectare, and that used high levels of fertilizer input per hectare, are the poor countries that tended to experience economic growth. Countries that began with very low yields in 1980 are the countries that tended to experience economic decline between 1980 and 2000. Figure 2 illustrates this point: among low-income countries, high cereal yields in 1980 (measured on the horizontal axis) are associated with high economic growth rates (measured on the vertical axis). The poverty trap is mainly a rural phenomenon of peasant farmers caught in a spiral of rising populations and stagnant or falling food production per person.
贫穷国家很有可能陷入贫困陷阱。在人均收入低于以下的 58 个非石油国家中 $\mathrm{\$}3,000$$\mathrm{\$}3,000$$3,000\$ 3,000 ，22 人（或 38%）经历了彻底的下降。然而其他三十六个国家却实现了经济增长。为什么一些非常贫穷的国家摆脱了贫困陷阱的蹂躏，而其他国家却未能逃脱？比较那些成功的国家和那些没有成功的国家，成功的故事显示出某些特征。最重要的决定因素似乎是粮食生产力。开始时每公顷谷物产量较高且每公顷肥料投入量较高的国家往往是经济增长的贫穷国家。 1980 年开始时产量极低的国家往往在 1980 年至 2000 年间经历经济衰退。图 2 说明了这一点：在低收入国家中，1980 年谷物高产量（在横轴上测量）与高经济增长率（以纵轴衡量）。贫困陷阱主要是农民陷入人口螺旋式增长和人均粮食产量停滞或下降的农村现象。

The biggest difference between Africa and Asia is that Asia has had high and rising food production per capita during recent decades, whereas Africa has low and falling food production per capita. The Asian countryside is densely populated, with a relatively extensive road network that can carry fertilizer to the farms and farm output to the markets. Farmers use fertilizers and irrigation, and food yields are high. Donor agencies gave ample support to the development of new high-yield varieties in Asia. Under these conditions Asian farmers were able to adopt high-yield crop varieties that produced the famous Green Revolution of rising food production per farmer. The African countryside is much less densely populated, with an absence of roads to transport fertilizers and crops. Farmers do not use fertilizer on food crops, and depend on rainfall rather than irrigation. Donors have woefully underfunded the scientific efforts toward improved varieties appropriate for African conditions. Under these much harsher conditions, Africa’s farmers were not able to benefit much, if at all, from the Green Revolution development of high-yield varieties of food crops. Although both Asia and Africa were very poor in 1980, Asian agriculture was significantly outperforming African agriculture, as shown in table 3. This performance has provided a platform for Asia’s extraordinary growth since then.
非洲和亚洲最大的区别在于，亚洲近几十年来人均粮食产量较高且不断上升，而非洲人均粮食产量较低且不断下降。亚洲农村人口稠密，拥有相对广泛的道路网络，可以将肥料运送到农场，并将农产品运送到市场。农民使用化肥和灌溉，粮食产量很高。捐助机构为亚洲高产新品种的开发提供了充足的支持。在这些条件下，亚洲农民能够采用高产作物品种，从而引发了著名的绿色革命，提高了农民的人均粮食产量。非洲农村人口密度要低得多，缺乏运输化肥和农作物的道路。农民不对粮食作物使用化肥，依靠降雨而不是灌溉。不幸的是，捐助者为适合非洲条件的改良品种的科学努力提供的资金严重不足。在这些更加严峻的条件下，非洲农民无法从绿色革命开发的高产粮食作物品种中获益，甚至根本无法获益。尽管1980年亚洲和非洲都非常贫穷，但亚洲农业的表现明显优于非洲农业，如表3所示。这种表现为亚洲此后的非凡增长提供了平台。

There are other tendencies apparent in the data. The Asian countries that experienced growth started in 1980 with better social conditions: higher literacy, lower infant mortality, and lower total fertility rates. They were, therefore, less prone to fall into a demographic trap of rapidly rising populations pressing on a limited amount of farmland. Once again, the Asian peasants were somewhat better off than their African counterparts. Another tendency is that poor countries with large populations seem to have done better than poor countries with smaller populations. The larger population probably increased the size of the domestic market, making it more appealing to foreign and domestic investors. Perhaps it was easier to introduce key infrastructure such as roads and power supplies in countries with larger populations, since these infrastructure networks are characterized by large initial costs of construction that are more easily financed by larger and more densely populated economies.
数据中还存在其他明显的趋势。 1980年开始经历增长的亚洲国家拥有更好的社会条件：更高的识字率、更低的婴儿死亡率和更低的总生育率。因此，他们不太容易陷入人口迅速增长而占用有限农田的人口陷阱。亚洲农民的生活再次比非洲农民好一些。另一种趋势是，人口众多的贫穷国家似乎比人口较少的贫穷国家做得更好。人口的增加可能扩大了国内市场的规模，使其对国内外投资者更具吸引力。也许在人口较多的国家引入道路和电力供应等关键基础设施会更容易，因为这些基础设施网络的特点是初始建设成本较高，更容易由规模更大、人口更稠密的经济体提供融资。

The poverty trap of the poorest countries is less puzzling, in some ways, than the stagnation that gripped a number of countries in Central and South America during the 1980s and 1990s. Table 2 show that countries like Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru experienced outright economic declines. These are not, in general, destitute countries, though they have destitute populations within them. How can we account for their development failures?
在某些方面，最贫穷国家的贫困陷阱并不比 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代困扰中美洲和南美洲一些国家的经济停滞更令人费解。表 2 显示厄瓜多尔、危地马拉、巴拉圭和秘鲁等国家的经济出现了彻底下滑。一般来说，这些国家并不是贫困国家，尽管它们内部也有贫困人口。我们如何解释他们的开发失败？

I take up that question in more detail later. It will suffice here to note three characteristics of these economies. First, all of these economies face particular geographical difficulties. Ecuador and Peru are Andean countries, with populations divided between a lowland tropical environment and a mountainous highland environment. Transport conditions are hazardous and expensive. Paraguay, of course, is landlocked. Guatemala is a mix of mountains and low-lying tropical rain forests. Second, the Central American and Andean societies suffer from sharp social divisions, typically along ethnic lines. The European-descended population tends to be much richer than the indigenous and mestizo (mixed) populations. Europeans conquered the native populations, repressed them in many ways, and were generally uninterested in investing in heir human capiar until very recenty. Politics have therefore been highly conflict laden and often violent. Third, these countries are all vuinerable to extreme external shocks, both natural and economic. Natural hazards include earthquakes, droughts, floods, and landslides. Economic hazards include the huge instabilities in international prices for the leading commodity exports of these countries, such as copper, fish meal, coffee, bananas, and other agricultural and mining products.
我稍后会更详细地讨论这个问题。这里只需注意这些经济体的三个特征就足够了。首先，所有这些经济体都面临着特殊的地理困难。厄瓜多尔和秘鲁是安第斯国家，人口分为低地热带环境和山区高地环境。运输条件危险且昂贵。当然，巴拉圭是内陆国家。危地马拉是山脉和低洼热带雨林的混合体。其次，中美洲和安第斯社会存在严重的社会分歧，特别是种族分歧。欧洲人后裔往往比土著和混血人口富裕得多。欧洲人征服了当地居民，以多种方式镇压他们，直到最近才对投资人类鱼的继承人普遍不感兴趣。因此，政治充满了冲突，而且常常是暴力的。第三，这些国家都容易受到自然和经济方面的极端外部冲击。自然灾害包括地震、干旱、洪水和山体滑坡。经济风险包括这些国家主要出口商品的国际价格大幅不稳定，如铜、鱼粉、咖啡、香蕉以及其他农产品和矿产品。

Even among the poor countries in Asia that experienced marked economic growth, extreme poverty often continues to afflict significant parts of the population. Economic growth is rarely uniformly distributed across a country. China’s coastal provinces, linked to world trade and investment, have grown much more rapidly than the hinterland to the west of the country. India’s southern states, also deeply integrated in world trade, have experienced much faster economic development than the northern regions in the Ganges valley. Thus, even when average economic growth is high, parts of a country may be bypassed for years or decades.
即使在经济显着增长的亚洲贫穷国家中，赤贫也常常继续困扰着很大一部分人口。经济增长很少在一个国家内均匀分布。中国的沿海省份与世界贸易和投资息息相关，其增长速度远远快于该国西部的内陆地区。印度南部各邦也深深融入了世界贸易，其经济发展速度比恒河谷北部地区快得多。因此，即使平均经济增长率很高，一个国家的部分地区也可能会被忽视数年或数十年。
Another reason for persistent poverty is the failure of government. Growth may enrich households linked to good market opportunities, but it may bypass the poorest of the poor even within the same community. The very poor are often disconnected from market forces because they lack the requisite human capital-good nutrition and health, and an adequate education. It is vital that social expenditures directed at human capital accumulation reach the poorest of the poor, yet governments often fail to make such investments. Economic growth enriches households, but it is not taxed sufficiently to enable governments to increase social spending commensurately. Or even when governments have the revenue, they may neglect the poorest of the poor if the destitute groups are part of ethnic or religious minorities.
持续贫困的另一个原因是政府的失败。增长可能会使与良好市场机会相关的家庭富裕起来，但即使在同一社区内，它也可能会绕过最贫困的人。赤贫者往往与市场力量脱节，因为他们缺乏必要的人力资本——良好的营养和健康以及充分的教育。至关重要的是，旨在人力资本积累的社会支出惠及最贫困人口，但政府往往未能进行此类投资。经济增长使家庭富裕，但税收不足以使政府相应地增加社会支出。或者，即使政府有收入，如果贫困群体是少数民族或宗教少数群体的一部分，他们也可能会忽视穷人中的最贫困者。

A third possible reason for continued poverty in the midst of growth is cultural. In many countries, women face extreme cultural discrimination, whether or not those biases are embedded in the legal and political systems. In South Asia, for example, there are an overwhelming number of case studies and media reports of young women facing extreme undernutrition within the household even when there is enough to go around. The women, often illiterate, are poorly treated by in-laws and lack the social standing and perhaps legal protections to ensure their own basic health and well-being. In short, there are myriad possibilities for the persistence of poverty even in the midst of economic growth. Only a close diagnosis of particular circumstances will allow an accurate understanding. Policy makers and analysts should be sensitive, however, to geographical, political, and cultural conditions that may each play a role.
在增长过程中持续贫困的第三个可能原因是文化。在许多国家，妇女面临极端的文化歧视，无论这些偏见是否植根于法律和政治体系中。例如，在南亚，有大量的案例研究和媒体报道表明，即使家里有足够的食物，年轻女性也面临着极度营养不良的问题。这些妇女往往是文盲，受到姻亲的虐待，缺乏社会地位，或许还缺乏确保自身基本健康和福祉的法律保护。简而言之，即使在经济增长的情况下，贫困持续存在的可能性也有无数种。只有对特定情况进行仔细诊断才能准确理解。然而，政策制定者和分析人士应该对可能发挥作用的地理、政治和文化条件保持敏感。

When countries get their foot on the ladder of development, they are generally able to continue the upward climb. All good things tend to move together at each rising rung: higher capital stock, greater specialization, more advanced technology, and lower fertility. If a country is trapped below the ladder, with the first rung too high off the ground, the climb does not even get started. The main objective of economic development for the poorest countries is to help these countries to gain a foothold on the ladder. The rich countries do not have to invest enough in the poorest countries to make them rich; they need to invest enough so that these countries can get their foot on the ladder. After that, the tremendous dynamism of self-sustaining economic growth can take hold.
当国家踏上发展的阶梯时，它们通常能够继续向上攀登。所有美好的事物往往都会在每个上升的梯级中一起移动：更高的资本存量、更专业化、更先进的技术和更低的生育率。如果一个国家被困在阶梯之下，而第一级距离地面太高，那么攀登甚至无法开始。最贫穷国家经济发展的主要目标是帮助这些国家在阶梯上站稳脚跟。富裕国家不必对最贫穷国家进行足够的投资来使他们富裕；他们需要足够的投资，以便这些国家能够踏上阶梯。此后，自我维持的经济增长的巨大活力就能显现出来。

Economic development works. It can be successful. It tends to build on itself. But it must get started.
经济发展发挥作用。它可以成功。它倾向于建立在自身之上。但它必须开始。

literate industrial societies with metal tools, other parts developed only nonliterate farming societies, and still others retained societies of hunter-gatherers with stone tools. Those historical inequalities have cast long shadows on the modern world, because the literate societies with metal tools have conquered or exterminated the other societies. While those differences constitute the most basic fact of world history, the reasons for them remain uncertain and controversial. This puzzling question of their origins was posed to me 25 years ago in a simple, personal form.
有文字的工业社会使用金属工具，其他地区仅发展了无文字的农业社会，还有一些地区保留了使用石器的狩猎采集社会。这些历史上的不平等给现代世界投下了长长的阴影，因为拥有金属工具的有文化的社会征服或消灭了其他社会。虽然这些差异构成了世界历史最基本的事实，但其原因仍然不确定且存在争议。 25 年前，我以一种简单、个人的方式向我提出了关于它们起源的这个令人费解的问题。

In July 1972 I was walking along a beach on the tropical island of New Guinea, where as a biologist I study bird evolution. I had already heard about a remarkable local politician named Yali, who was touring the district then. By chance, Yali and I were walking in the same direction on that day, and he overtook me. We walked together for an hour, talking during the whole time.
1972 年 7 月，我沿着热带岛屿新几内亚的海滩散步，作为一名生物学家，我在那里研究鸟类的进化。我已经听说过一位名叫亚利的当地杰出政治家，当时他正在该地区巡视。那天偶然，亚力和我朝同一个方向走，他超越了我。我们一起走了一个小时，一路上都在说话。
Yali radiated charisma and energy. His eyes flashed in a mesmerizing way. He talked confidently about himself, but he also asked lots of probing questions and listened intently. Our conversation egan with a subject then on every New Guinean’s mind-the rapid pace of political developments. Papua New Guinea, as Yali’s nation is now called, was at that time still administered by Australia as a mandate of the United Nations, but independence was in the air. Yali explained to me his role in getting local people to prepare for self-government.
雅丽散发着魅力和活力。他的眼睛闪烁着迷人的光芒。他自信地谈论自己，但他也提出了很多探索性的问题，并聚精会神地倾听。我们的谈话开始于当时每个新几内亚人都在思考的一个话题——政治发展的快速步伐。巴布亚新几内亚（亚利的国家现在被称为巴布亚新几内亚）当时仍由澳大利亚作为联合国托管地管理，但独立的可能性很大。亚利向我解释了他在让当地人准备自治方面所扮演的角色。

After a while, Yali turned the conversation and began to quiz me. He had never been outside New Guinea and had not been educated beyond high school, but his curiosity was insatiable. First, he wanted to know about my work on New Guinea birds (including how much I got paid for it). I explained to him how different groups of birds had colonized New Guinea over the course of millions of years. He then asked how the ancestors of his own people had reached New Guinea over the last tens of thousands of years, and how white Europeans had colonized New Guinea within the last 200 years.
过了一会儿，雅丽话锋一转，开始考问我。他从未出过新几内亚，也没有受过高中以上的教育，但他的好奇心是无法满足的。首先，他想了解我在新几内亚鸟类方面的工作（包括我为此获得了多少报酬）。我向他解释了不同的鸟类群体如何在数百万年的时间里在新几内亚定居。然后他询问了他自己人民的祖先是如何在过去数万年里到达新几内亚的，以及欧洲白人如何在过去200年里殖民新几内亚的。

The conversation remained friendly, even though the tension between the two societies that Yali and I represented was familiar to both of us. Two centuries ago, all New Guineans were still “living in the Stone Age.” That is, they still used stone tools similar to those superseded in Europe by metal tools thousands of years ago, and they dwelt in villages not organized under any centralized political authority. Whites had arrived, imposed centralized government, and brought material goods whose value New Guineans instantly recognized, ranging from steel axes, matches, and medicines to clothing, soft drinks, and umbrellas. In New Guinea all these goods were referred to collectively as “cargo.”
尽管我和耶利所代表的两个社会之间的紧张关系我们都很熟悉，但谈话仍然很友好。两个世纪前，所有新几内亚人仍然“生活在石器时代”。也就是说，他们仍然使用类似于几千年前在欧洲被金属工具取代的石器，并且他们居住在没有任何中央集权政治权威组织的村庄中。白人抵达后，实行了中央集权政府，并带来了新几内亚人立即认识到其价值的物资，从钢斧、火柴、药品到衣服、软饮料和雨伞。在新几内亚，所有这些货物统称为“货物”。

Many of the white colonialists openly despised New Guineans as “primitive.” Even the least able of New Guinea’s white “masters,” as they were still called in 1972, enjoyed a far higher standard of living than New Guineans, higher even than charismatic politicians like Yali. Yet Yali had quizzed lots of whites as he was then quizzing me, and I had quizzed lots of New Guineans. He and I both knew perfectly well that New Guineans are on the average at least as smart as Europeans. All those things must have been on Yali’s mind when, with yet another penetrating glance of his flashing eyes, he asked me, “Why is it that you white people developed so much cargo and brought it to New Guinea, but we black people had little cargo of our own?”
许多白人殖民主义者公开鄙视新几内亚人，称其为“原始人”。即使是新几内亚最无能的白人“主人”（1972 年仍被称为“主人”），也享有比新几内亚人高得多的生活水平，甚至比像亚利这样有魅力的政治家还要高。然而，亚利考问了很多白人，就像他当时考考我一样，我也考考了很多新几内亚人。他和我都非常清楚，平均而言，新几内亚人至少和欧洲人一样聪明。所有这些事情一定都在亚利的脑海里，当他再次用他那双闪烁着洞察力的目光扫视我时，他问我：“为什么你们白人开发了这么多货物并将其运到新几内亚，而我们黑人却几乎没有我们自己的货物？”

It was a simple question that went to the heart of life as Yali experienced it. Yes, there still is a huge difference between the lifestyle of the average New Guinean and that of the average European or American. Comparable differences separate the lifestyles of other peoples of the world as well. Those huge disparities must have potent causes that one might think would be obvious. Yet Yali’s apparently simple question is a difficult one to answer. I didn’t have an answer then. Professional historians still disagree about the solution; most are no longer even asking the question.
这是雅丽所经历的一个简单的问题，却触及了生活的核心。是的，新几内亚人的平均生活方式与欧洲或美国人的平均生活方式之间仍然存在巨大差异。世界上其他民族的生活方式也存在类似的差异。这些巨大的差异一定有人们认为显而易见的强有力的原因。然而，雅丽看似简单的问题却很难回答。我当时没有答案。专业历史学家对于解决方案仍然存在分歧。大多数人甚至不再问这个问题。
In the years since Yali and I had that conversation, I have studied and written about other aspects of human evolution, history, and language. This book, written twenty-five years later, attempts to answer Yali.
自从我和耶利进行那次谈话以来，我研究并撰写了有关人类进化、历史和语言其他方面的文章。这本书是二十五年后写的，试图回答鸭梨。
Eurasian origin, especially those still living in Europe and eastern Asia, plus those transplanted to North America, dominate the modern world in wealth and power. Other peoples, including most Africans, have thrown off European colonial domination but remain far behind in wealth and power. Still other peoples, such as the aboriginal inhabitants of Australia, the Americas, and southernmost Africa, are no longer even masters of their own lands but have been decimated, subjugated, and in some cases even exterminated by European colonialists.
欧亚血统，尤其是那些仍然生活在欧洲和东亚的人，加上移居到北美的人，在财富和权力方面主宰着现代世界。其他民族，包括大多数非洲人，已经摆脱了欧洲的殖民统治，但在财富和权力方面仍然远远落后。还有一些民族，例如澳大利亚、美洲和非洲最南端的原住民，甚至不再是自己土地的主人，而是被欧洲殖民主义者屠杀、征服，在某些情况下甚至灭绝。

Thus, questions about inequality in the modern world can be reformulated as follows. Why did wealth and power become distributed as they now are, rather than in some other way? For instance, why weren’t Native Americans, Africans, and Aboriginal Australians the ones who decimated, subjugated, or exterminated Europeans and Asians?
因此，关于现代世界不平等的问题可以重新表述如下。为什么财富和权力会像现在这样分配，而不是以其他方式？例如，为什么美洲原住民、非洲人和澳大利亚原住民没有屠杀、征服或灭绝欧洲人和亚洲人？
We can easily push this question back one step. As of the year A.D. 1500 , when Europe’s worldwide colonial expansion was just beginning, peoples on different continents already differed greatly in technology and political organization. Much of Europe, Asia, and North Africa was the site of metal-equipped states or empires, some of them on the threshold of industrialization. Two Native American peoples, the Aztecs and the Incas, ruled over empires with stone tools. Parts of sub-Saharan Africa were divided among small states or chiefdoms with iron tools. Most other peoples-
我们可以轻松地将这个问题推后一步。到公元1500年，当欧洲在世界范围内的殖民扩张刚刚开始时，不同大陆上的人民在技术和政治组织上已经存在很大差异。欧洲、亚洲和北非的大部分地区都是拥有金属的国家或帝国的所在地，其中一些国家或帝国正处于工业化的门槛上。阿兹特克人和印加人这两个美洲原住民用石器统治着帝国。撒哈拉以南非洲的部分地区被拥有铁器的小国家或酋长国瓜分。大多数其他民族——
using stone tools. 使用石器。
Of course, those technological and political differences as of A.D. 1500 were the immediate cause of the modern world’s inequalities. Empires with steel weapons were able to conquer or exterminate tribes with weapons of stone and wood. How, though, did the world get to be the way it was in A.D. 1500?
当然，自公元 1500 年起，这些技术和政治差异是现代世界不平等的直接原因。拥有钢铁武器的帝国能够征服或消灭使用石头和木头武器的部落。然而，世界是如何变成公元 1500 年的样子的呢？
Once again, we can easily push this question back one step further, by drawing on written histories and archaeological discoveries. Until the end of the last Ice Age, around 11,000 B.C., all peoples
再一次，我们可以利用书面历史和考古发现，轻松地将这个问题推后一步。直到最后一个冰河时代结束，即公元前 11,000 年左右，所有民族
on all continents were still hunter-gatherers. Different rates of development on different continents, from 11,000 B.C. to A.D. 1500 , were what led to the technological and political inequalities of A.D. on all continents were still hunter-gatherers. Different rates of development on different continents, from 11,000 B.C. to A.D. 1500 , were what led to the technological and political inequalities of A.D.
各大洲仍然是狩猎采集者。从公元前11,000年到公元1500年，不同大陆的发展速度不同，导致了公元后各大陆仍然以狩猎采集为生的技术和政治不平等。从公元前 11,000 年到公元 1500 年，不同大陆的发展速度不同，导致了公元后的技术和政治不平等
1500 . While Aboriginal Australians and many Native Americans remained hunter-gatherers, most of Eurasia and much of the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa gradually developed agriculture, herding, metallurgy, and complex political organization. Parts of Eurasia, and one area of the Americas, independently developed writing as well. However, each of these new developments appeared earlier in Eurasia than elsewhere. For instance, the mass production of bronze tools, which was just beginning in the South American Andes in the centuries before A.D. 1500 , was already established
1500。虽然澳大利亚原住民和许多美洲原住民仍然以狩猎采集为生，但欧亚大陆的大部分地区、美洲的大部分地区以及撒哈拉以南非洲地区逐渐发展了农业、畜牧业、冶金业和复杂的政治组织。欧亚大陆的部分地区和美洲的一部分地区也独立发展了文字。然而，这些新发展在欧亚大陆的出现都比其他地方早。例如，在公元1500年之前的几个世纪里，南美安第斯山脉才开始大量生产青铜工具。
in parts of Eurasia over 4,000 years earlier. The stone technology of the Tasmanians, when first encountered by European explorers in A.D. 1642, was simpler than that prevalent in parts of Upper in parts of Eurasia over 4,000 years earlier. The ston
4000 多年前就出现在欧亚大陆的部分地区。欧洲探险家于公元 1642 年首次接触到塔斯马尼亚人的石材技术，该技术比 4,000 多年前欧亚大陆上部分地区流行的技术更为简单。石头
Paleolithic Europe tens of thousands of years earlier.
数万年前的旧石器时代欧洲。
Thus, we can finally rephrase the question about the modern world’s inequalities as follows: why did human development proceed at such different rates on different continents? Those disparate
因此，我们最终可以将有关现代世界不平等的问题重新表述如下：为什么不同大陆的人类发展速度如此不同？那些截然不同的
rates constitute history’s broadest pattern and my book’s subject.
利率构成了历史上最广泛的模式，也是我本书的主题。
While this book is thus ultimately about history and prehistory, its subject is not of just academic interest but also of overwhelming practical and political importance. The history of interactions among disparate peoples is what shaped the modern world through conquest, epidemics, and genocide. Those collisions created reverberations that have still not died down after many centuries, and that are actively continuing in some of the world’s most troubled areas today.
因此，虽然本书最终是关于历史和史前史的，但其主题不仅具有学术意义，而且具有压倒性的实践和政治重要性。不同民族之间的互动历史通过征服、流行病和种族灭绝塑造了现代世界。这些碰撞产生的影响在许多世纪后仍未平息，并且在当今世界上一些最麻烦的地区仍在积极地继续。
For example, much of Africa is still struggling with its legacies from recent colonialism. In other regions-including much of Central America, Mexico, Peru, New Caledonia, the former Soviet Union, and parts of Indonesia-civil unrest or guerrilla warfare pits still-numerous indigenous populations against governments dominated by descendants of invading conquerors. Many other indigenous populations - such as native Hawaiians, Aboriginal Australians, native Siberians, and Indians in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile-became so reduced in numbers by genocide and disease that they are now greatly outnumbered by the descendants of invaders. Although thus incapable of mounting a civil war, they are nevertheless increasingly asserting their rights.
例如，非洲大部分地区仍在与近期殖民主义的遗留问题作斗争。在其他地区，包括中美洲的大部分地区、墨西哥、秘鲁、新喀里多尼亚、前苏联和印度尼西亚的部分地区，内乱或游击战使仍然众多的土著居民反对由入侵征服者后裔统治的政府。许多其他土著人口——例如夏威夷原住民、澳大利亚原住民、西伯利亚原住民以及美国、加拿大、巴西、阿根廷和智利的印第安人——由于种族灭绝和疾病而数量大幅减少，以至于他们的后代数量现在大大超过了他们的数量。的侵略者。尽管因此无法发动内战，但他们仍然越来越多地主张自己的权利。
In addition to these current political and economic reverberations of past collisions among peoples, there are current linguistic reverberations-especially the impending disappearance of most of the modern world’s 6,000 surviving languages, becoming replaced by English, Chinese, Russian, and a few other languages whose numbers of speakers have increased enormously in recent centuries. All these problems of the modern world result from the different historical trajectories implicit in Yali’s question.
除了过去各国人民之间的冲突所造成的当前政治和经济影响之外，目前还存在着语言上的影响，特别是现代世界现存的 6000 种语言中的大多数语言即将消失，取而代之的是英语、汉语、俄语和其他一些语言，这些语言的历史背景是：近几个世纪以来，说话的人数急剧增加。现代世界的所有这些问题都是亚力问题所隐含的不同历史轨迹造成的。

Before seeking answers to Yali’s question, we should pause to consider some objections to discussing it at all. Some people take offense at the mere posing of the question, for several reasons.
在寻求亚里问题的答案之前，我们应该停下来考虑一些反对讨论这个问题的观点。有些人因为提出这个问题而感到生气，原因有几个。
One objection goes as follows. If we succeed in explaining how some people came to dominate other people, may this not seem to justify the domination? Doesn’t it seem to say that the outcome was inevitable, and that it would therefore be futile to try to change the outcome today? This objection rests on a common tendency to confuse an explanation of causes with a justification or acceptance of results. What use one makes of a historical explanation is a question separate from the explanation itself. Understanding is more often used to try to alter an outcome than to repeat or perpetuate it. That’s why psychologists try to understand the minds of murderers and rapists, why social historians try to understand genocide, and why physicians try to understand the causes of human disease. Those investigators do not seek to justify murder, rape, genocide, and illness. Instead, they seek to use their understanding of a chain of causes to interrupt the chain.
一种反对意见如下。如果我们成功地解释了一些人如何统治其他人，这似乎不能证明统治的合理性吗？这岂不是说，这个结果是必然的，今天想改变这个结果也是徒劳的吗？这种反对意见基于一种常见的倾向，即将对原因的解释与对结果的证明或接受相混淆。人们如何利用历史解释是一个与解释本身无关的问题。理解更常用于尝试改变结果，而不是重复或延续结果。这就是为什么心理学家试图了解杀人犯和强奸犯的想法，为什么社会历史学家试图了解种族灭绝，以及为什么医生试图了解人类疾病的原因。这些调查人员并不寻求为谋杀、强奸、种族灭绝和疾病辩护。相反，他们试图利用自己对一系列原因的理解来中断这个链条。
Second, doesn’t addressing Yali’s question automatically involve a Eurocentric approach to history, a glorification of western Europeans, and an obsession with the prominence of western Europe and Europeanized America in the modern world? Isn’t that prominence just an ephemeral phenomenon of the last few centuries, now fading behind the prominence of Japan and Southeast Asia? In fact, most of this book will deal with peoples other than Europeans. Rather than focus solely on interactions between Europeans and non-Europeans, we shall also examine interactions between different non-European peoples-especially those that took place within sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and New Guinea, among peoples native to those areas. Far from glorifying peoples of western European origin, we shall see that most basic elements of their civilization were developed by other peoples living elsewhere and were then imported to western Europe.
其次，解决耶利的问题难道不会自然而然地涉及以欧洲为中心的历史观、对西欧人的颂扬以及对西欧和欧洲化美国在现代世界中的突出地位的痴迷吗？这种突出地位难道不是过去几个世纪的短暂现象，现在已经被日本和东南亚的突出地位所掩盖了吗？事实上，本书的大部分内容将讨论欧洲以外的民族。我们不仅仅关注欧洲人和非欧洲人之间的互动，还应研究不同非欧洲民族之间的互动，特别是发生在撒哈拉以南非洲、东南亚、印度尼西亚和新几内亚的互动，以及这些国家的原住民之间的互动。地区。我们将看到，他们的文明的最基本要素是由生活在其他地方的其他民族发展起来的，然后被引入到西欧，而不是赞美西欧血统的民族。
Third, don’t words such as “civilization,” and phrases such as “rise of civilization,” convey the false impression that civilization is good, tribal hunter-gatherers are miserable, and history for the past 13,000 years has involved progress toward greater human happiness? In fact, I do not assume that industrialized states are “better” than hunter-gatherer tribes, or that the abandonment of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle for iron-based statehood represents “progress,” or that it has led to an increase in human happiness. My own impression, from having divided my life between United States cities and New Guinea villages, is that the so-called blessings of civilization are mixed. For example, compared with hunter-gatherers, citizens of modern industrialized states enjoy better medical care, lower risk of death by homicide, and a longer life span, but receive much less social support from friendships and extended families. My motive for investigating these geographic differences in human societies is not to celebrate one type of society over another but simply to understand what happened in history.
第三，不要用诸如“文明”之类的词语和“文明的崛起”之类的短语传达这样的错误印象：文明是美好的，部落狩猎采集者是悲惨的，过去13,000年的历史已经迈向更伟大的进步。人类的幸福？事实上，我并不认为工业化国家比狩猎采集部落“更好”，也不认为放弃狩猎采集生活方式而转向以铁为基础的国家代表着“进步”，或者它导致了人类人口的增加。幸福。我在美国城市和新几内亚乡村生活的经历给我留下的印象是，所谓文明的祝福是混杂的。例如，与狩猎采集者相比，现代工业化国家的公民享有更好的医疗保健、更低的杀人风险和更长的寿命，但从友谊和大家庭获得的社会支持要少得多。我研究人类社会中这些地理差异的动机并不是为了庆祝一种社会类型优于另一种社会类型，而只是为了了解历史上发生的事情。

Does Yali’s question really need another book to answer it? Don’t we already know the answer? If so, what is it?
雅丽的问题真的需要另一本书来回答吗？我们不是已经知道答案了吗？如果是这样，那是什么？
Probably the commonest explanation involves implicitly or explicitly assuming biological differences among peoples. In the centuries after A.D. 1500, as European explorers became aware of the wide differences among the world’s peoples in technology and political organization, they assumed that those differences arose from differences in innate ability. With the rise of Darwinian theory, explanations were recast in terms of natural selection and of evolutionary descent. Technologically primitive peoples were considered evolutionary vestiges of human descent from apelike ancestors. The displacement of such peoples by colonists from industrialized societies exemplified the survival of the fittest. With the later rise of genetics, the explanations were recast once again, in genetic terms. Europeans became considered genetically more intelligent than Africans, and especially more so than Aboriginal Australians.
最常见的解释可能是含蓄或明确地假设人与人之间存在生物学差异。公元 1500 年之后的几个世纪里，随着欧洲探险家意识到世界各国人民在技术和政治组织方面的巨大差异，他们认为这些差异源于先天能力的差异。随着达尔文理论的兴起，自然选择和进化起源的解释被重新诠释。技术上原始的民族被认为是类人猿祖先的人类血统的进化遗迹。来自工业化社会的殖民者使这些民族流离失所，体现了适者生存。随着后来遗传学的兴起，这些解释再次从遗传学的角度进行了重新诠释。人们认为欧洲人在基因上比非洲人更聪明，尤其是比澳大利亚原住民更聪明。
Today, segments of Western society publicly repudiate racism. Yet many (perhaps most!) Westerners continue to accept racist explanations privately or subconsciously. In Japan and many other countries, such explanations are still advanced publicly and without apology. Even educated white Americans, Europeans, and Australians, when the subject of Australian Aborigines comes up, assume that there is something primitive about the Aborigines themselves. They certainly look different from whites. Many of the living descendants of those Aborigines who survived the era of European colonization are now finding it difficult to succeed economically in white Australian society.
如今，西方社会的某些部分公开谴责种族主义。然而，许多（也许是大多数！）西方人仍然私下或潜意识地接受种族主义解释。在日本和许多其他国家，此类解释仍在公开提出，而且没有道歉。即使是受过教育的美国白人、欧洲人和澳大利亚人，当谈到澳大利亚原住民的话题时，也会认为原住民本身有些原始。他们看起来确实与白人不同。许多在欧洲殖民时代幸存下来的原住民后裔现在发现​​在澳大利亚白人社会中很难在经济上取得成功。
A seemingly compelling argument goes as follows. White immigrants to Australia built a literate, industrialized, politically centralized, democratic state based on metal tools and on food production, all within a century of colonizing a continent where the Aborigines had been living as tribal hunter-gatherers without metal for at least 40,000 years. Here were two successive experiments in human development, in which the environment was identical and the sole variable was the people occupying that environment. What further proof could be wanted to establish that the differences between Aboriginal Australian and European societies arose from differences between the peoples themselves?
一个看似令人信服的论点如下。来到澳大利亚的白人移民建立了一个以金属工具和粮食生产为基础的有文化、工业化、政治集权、民主的国家，这一切都是在殖民这片大陆的一个世纪内完成的，而在这块大陆上，原住民至少在没有金属的情况下以狩猎采集部落的方式生活了至少 40,000 年。 。这是人类发展的两个连续实验，其中环境是相同的，唯一的变量是占据该环境的人。还需要什么进一步的证据来证明澳大利亚原住民和欧洲原住民社会之间的差异源于人民本身之间的差异？

The objection to such racist explanations is not just that they are loathsome, but also that they are wrong. Sound evidence for the existence of human differences in intelligence that parallel human differences in technology is lacking. In fact, as I shall explain in a moment, modern “Stone Age” peoples are on the average probably more intelligent, not less intelligent, than industrialized peoples. Paradoxical as it may sound, we shall see in Chapter 15 that white immigrants to Australia do not deserve the credit usually accorded to them for building a literate industrialized society with the othe virtues mentioned above. In addition, peoples who until recently were technologically primitive-such as Aboriginal Australians and New Guineans-routinely master industrial technologies when given opportunities to do so.
对这种种族主义解释的反对不仅是因为它们令人厌恶，而且是因为它们是错误的。人类智力差异与人类技术差异的存在缺乏可靠的证据。事实上，正如我稍后将解释的那样，现代“石器时代”人民平均而言可能比工业化人民更聪明，而不是更差。尽管听起来有些矛盾，但我们将在第 15 章中看到，澳大利亚的白人移民并不值得通常给予他们的荣誉，因为他们建立了一个具有上述其他美德的有文化的工业化社会。此外，直到最近技术还处于原始状态的人们——例如澳大利亚原住民和新几内亚人——只要有机会就会经常掌握工业技术。

An enormous effort by cognitive psychologists has gone into the search for differences in IQ between peoples of different geographic origins now living in the same country. In particular, numerous white American psychologists have been trying for decades to demonstrate that black Americans of African origins are innately less intelligent than white Americans of European origins. However, as is well known, the peoples compared differ greatly in their social environment and educational opportunities. This fact creates double difficulties for efforts to test the hypothesis that intellectual differences underlie technological differences. First, even our cognitive abilities as adults are heavily influenced by the social environment that we experienced during childhood, making it hard to discern any influence of preexisting genetic differences. Second, tests of cognitive ability (like IQ tests) tend to measure cultural learning and not pure innate intelligence, whatever that is. Because of those undoubted effects of childhood environment and learned knowledge on IQ test results, the psychologists’ efforts to date have not succeeded in convincingly establishing the postulated genetic deficiency in IQs of nonwhite peoples.
认知心理学家付出了巨大的努力来寻找现在生活在同一国家的不同地理来源的人之间的智商差异。特别是，许多美国白人心理学家几十年来一直试图证明非洲裔美国黑人天生不如欧洲裔美国白人聪明。然而，众所周知，被比较的人们在社会环境和教育机会方面存在很大差异。这一事实给检验“智力差异是技术差异背后的假设”的努力带来了双重困难。首先，即使我们作为成年人的认知能力也受到童年时期经历的社会环境的严重影响，因此很难辨别预先存在的遗传差异的任何影响。其次，认知能力测试（如智商测试）倾向于衡量文化学习，而不是纯粹的先天智力，无论它是什么。由于童年环境和学到的知识对智商测试结果的影响不容置疑，心理学家迄今为止的努力尚未成功地证明非白人智商遗传缺陷的假设。

My perspective on this controversy comes from 33 years of working with New Guineans in their own intact societies. From the very beginning of my work with New Guineans, they impressed me as being on the average more intelligent, more alert, more expressive, and more interested in things and people around them than the average European or American is. At some tasks that one migh reasonably suppose to reflect aspects of brain function, such as the ability to form a mental map of unfamiliar surroundings, they appear considerably more adept than Westerners. Of course, New Guineans tend to perform poorly at tasks that Westerners have been trained to perform since childhood and that New Guineans have not. Hence when unschooled New Guineans from remote villages visit towns, they look stupid to Westerners. Conversely, I am constantly aware of how stupid I look to New Guineans when I’m with them in the jungle, displaying my incompetence at simple tasks (such as following a jungle trail or erecting a shelter) at which New Guineans have been trained since childhood and I have not.
我对这一争议的看法来自于与新几内亚人在他们自己完整的社会中工作了 33 年的经历。从我与新几内亚人一起工作的一开始，他们就给我留下了深刻的印象，他们平均比欧洲人或美国人更聪明、更警觉、更有表现力，对周围的事物和人更感兴趣。在某些人们可能合理地认为反映大脑功能方面的任务上，例如形成陌生环境的心理地图的能力，他们似乎比西方人更熟练。当然，新几内亚人在完成西方人从小就接受训练而新几内亚人没有接受的任务时往往表现不佳。因此，当来自偏远村庄的未受过教育的新几内亚人访问城镇时，西方人会认为他们很愚蠢。相反，我经常意识到，当我和新几内亚人一起在丛林中时，我在他们看来是多么愚蠢，在简单的任务（例如沿着丛林小道行走或搭建庇护所）方面表现出我的无能，而新几内亚人自那时起就接受了这些训练。童年和我都没有。

It’s easy to recognize two reasons why my impression that New Guineans are smarter than Westerners may be correct. First, Europeans have for thousands of years been living in densely populated societies with central governments, police, and judiciaries. In those societies, infectious epidemic diseases of dense populations (such as smallpox) were historically the major cause of death, while murders were relatively uncommon and a state of war was the exception rather than the rule. Most Europeans who escaped fatal infections also escaped other potential causes of death and proceeded to pass on their genes. Today, most live-born Western infants survive fatal infections as well and reproduce themselves, regardless of their intelligence and the genes they bear. In contrast, New Guineans have been living in societies where human numbers were too low for epidemic diseases of dense populations to evolve. Instead, traditional New Guineans suffered high mortality from murder, chronic tribal warfare, accidents, and problems in procuring food.
很容易认识到为什么我的新几内亚人比西方人聪明的印象可能是正确的有两个原因。首先，欧洲人几千年来一直生活在人口稠密的社会中，有中央政府、警察和司法机构。在这些社会中，人口稠密的传染病（如天花）历来是死亡的主要原因，而谋杀相对不常见，战争状态只是例外而不是普遍现象。大多数逃脱致命感染的欧洲人也逃脱了其他潜在的死亡原因，并继续传递他们的基因。如今，大多数西方活产婴儿都能在致命的感染中存活下来并自我繁殖，无论他们的智力和携带的基因如何。相比之下，新几内亚人一直生活在人口数量太少的社会中，人口稠密的流行病无法进化。相反，传统的新几内亚人因谋杀、长期部落战争、事故和获取食物的问题而遭受高死亡率。

Intelligent people are likelier than less intelligent ones to escape those causes of high mortality in traditional New Guinea societies. However, the differential mortality from epidemic diseases in traditional European societies had little to do with intelligence, and instead involved genetic resistance dependent on details of body chemistry. For example, people with blood group B or O have a greater resistance to smallpox than do people with blood group A. That is, natural selection promoting genes for intelligence has probably been far more ruthless in New Guinea than in more densely populated, politically complex societies, where natural selection for body chemistry was instead more potent.
在传统的新几内亚社会中，聪明的人比聪明的人更有可能摆脱高死亡率的原因。然而，传统欧洲社会流行病造成的死亡率差异与智力无关，而是与依赖于身体化学细节的遗传抵抗力有关。例如，B 型或 O 型血的人比 A 型血的人对天花的抵抗力更强。也就是说，在新几内亚，促进智力基因的自然选择可能比人口稠密、政治复杂的地区更加残酷。相反，身体化学的自然选择更为有效。

Besides this genetic reason, there is also a second reason why New Guineans may have come to be smarter than Westerners. Modern European and American children spend much of their time being passively entertained by television, radio, and movies. In the average American household, the TV set is on for seven hours per day. In contrast, traditional New Guinea children have virtually no such opportunities for passive entertainment and instead spend almost all of their waking hours actively doing something, such as talking or playing with other children or adults. Almost all studies of child development emphasize the role of childhood stimulation and activity in promoting mental development, and stress the irreversible mental stunting associated with reduced childhood stimulation. This effect surely contributes a non-genetic component to the superior average mental function displayed by New Guineans.
除了遗传原因之外，新几内亚人可能比西方人更聪明还有第二个原因。现代欧洲和美国的孩子大部分时间都在被动地接受电视、广播和电影的娱乐。在普通美国家庭中，电视机每天打开七个小时。相比之下，传统的新几内亚儿童几乎没有这种被动娱乐的机会，而是几乎所有醒着的时间都花在积极做某事上，例如与其他儿童或成人交谈或玩耍。几乎所有关于儿童发展的研究都强调童年刺激和活动在促进智力发展中的作用，并强调与童年刺激减少相关的不可逆转的智力发育迟缓。这种效应无疑为新几内亚人表现出的优越的平均心理功能提供了非遗传因素。

That is, in mental ability New Guineans are probably genetically superior to Westerners, and they surely are superior in escaping the devastating developmental disadvantages under which most children in industrialized societies now grow up. Certainly, there is no hint at all of any intellectual disadvantage of New Guineans that could serve to answer Yali’s question. The same two genetic and childhood developmental factors are likely to distinguish not only New Guineans from Westerners, but also hunter-gatherers and other members of technologically primitive societies from members of technologically advanced societies in general. Thus, the usual racist assumption has to be turned on its head. Why is it that Europeans, despite their likely genetic disadvantage and (in modern times) their undoubted developmental disadvantage, ended up with much more of the cargo? Why did New Guineans wind up technologically primitive, despite what I believe to be thei superior intelligence?
也就是说，在智力方面，新几内亚人可能在遗传上优于西方人，而且他们在摆脱工业化社会中大多数儿童现在成长的毁灭性发展劣势方面也肯定更胜一筹。当然，没有任何迹象表明新几内亚人有任何智力上的劣势可以用来回答耶利的问题。同样的两个遗传和儿童发育因素不仅可能将新几内亚人和西方人区分开来，而且可能将狩猎采集者和技术原始社会的其他成员与一般技术先进社会的成员区分开来。因此，通常的种族主义假设必须被彻底颠覆。为什么欧洲人尽管可能存在遗传劣势以及（在现代）无疑存在发育劣势，但最终却获得了更多的货物？尽管我相信新几内亚人智力超群，但为什么他们的技术却很原始？

A genetic explanation isn’t the only possible answer to Yali’s question. Another one, popular with inhabitants of northern Europe, invokes the supposed stimulatory effects of their homeland’s cold climate and the inhibitory effects of hot, humid, tropical climates on human creativity and energy. Perhaps the seasonally variable climate at high latitudes poses more diverse challenges than does seasonally constant tropical climate. Perhaps cold climates require one to be more technologically inventive to survive, because one must build a warm home and make warm clothing, whereas one can survive in the tropics with simpler housing and no clothing. Or the argument can be reversed to reach the same conclusion: the long winters at high latitudes leave people with much time in which o sit indoors and invent.
基因解释并不是耶利问题的唯一可能答案。另一种说法深受北欧居民的欢迎，它援引了祖国寒冷气候的假定刺激作用以及炎热、潮湿的热带气候对人类创造力和能量的抑制作用。也许高纬度地区季节性变化的气候比季节性恒定的热带气候带来了更多样的挑战。也许寒冷的气候要求人们在技术上更具创造力才能生存，因为人们必须建造一个温暖的家并制作保暖的衣服，而人们可以在热带地区以更简单的住房和没有衣服的方式生存。或者反过来论证也可以得出同样的结论：高纬度地区漫长的冬季让人们有很多时间坐在室内进行发明。
Although formerly popular, this type of explanation, too, fails to survive scrutiny. As we shall see, the peoples of northern Europe contributed nothing of fundamental importance to Eurasian civilization until the last thousand years; they simply had the good luck to live at a geographic location where they were likely to receive advances (such as agriculture, wheels, writing, and metallurgy) developed in warmer parts of Eurasia. In the New World the cold regions at high latitude were even more of a human backwater. The sole Native American societies to develop writing arose in Mexico south of the Tropic of Cancer; the oldest New World pottery comes from near the equator in tropical South America; and the New World society generally considered the most advanced in art, astronomy, and other respects was the Classic Maya society of the tropical Yucatán and Guatemala in the first millennium A.D.
尽管以前很流行，但这种解释也经不起推敲。正如我们将要看到的，直到最近一千年，北欧人民才对欧亚文明没有做出任何根本性的重要贡献。他们只是运气好，生活在一个可能获得欧亚大陆温暖地区发展的进步（如农业、轮子、书写和冶金）的地理位置。在新大陆，高纬度的寒冷地区更是人类的死水区。唯一发展文字的美洲原住民社会出现在北回归线以南的墨西哥。最古老的新大陆陶器产自南美洲热带赤道附近；普遍认为在艺术、天文学和其他方面最先进的新世界社会是公元一千年热带尤卡坦和危地马拉的经典玛雅社会
Still a third type of answer to Yali invokes the supposed importance of lowland river valleys in dry climates, where highly productive agriculture depended on large-scale irrigation systems that in urn required centralized bureaucracies. This explanation was suggested by the undoubted fact that the earliest known empires and writing systems arose in the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys of the Fertile Crescent and in the Nile Valley of Egypt. Water control systems also appear to have been associated with centralized political organization in some other areas of the world, including the Indus Valley of the Indian subcontinent, the Yellow and Yangtze Valleys of China, the Maya lowlands of Mesoamerica, and the coastal desert of Peru.
对雅礼的第三种回答提到了干旱气候下低地河谷的重要性，那里的高产农业依赖于大规模的灌溉系统，而这些系统实际上需要中央集权的官僚机构。这种解释是由一个毫无疑问的事实提出的，即已知最早的帝国和书写系统起源于新月沃地的底格里斯河和幼发拉底河谷以及埃及的尼罗河谷。水控制系统似乎也与世界其他一些地区的中央集权政治组织有关，包括印度次大陆的印度河流域、中国的黄河和长江流域、中美洲的玛雅低地以及秘鲁的沿海沙漠。
However, detailed archaeological studies have shown that complex irrigation systems did not accompany the rise of centralized bureaucracies but followed after a considerable lag. That is, politica centralization arose for some other reason and then permitted construction of complex irrigation systems. None of the crucial developments preceding political centralization in those same parts of the world were associated with river valleys or with complex irrigation systems. For example, in the Fertile Crescent food production and village life originated in hills and mountains, not in lowland rive valleys. The Nile Valley remained a cultural backwater for about 3,000 years after village food production began to flourish in the hills of the Fertile Crescent. River valleys of the southwestern United States eventually came to support irrigation agriculture and complex societies, but only after many of the developments on which those societies rested had been imported from Mexico. The rive valleys of southeastern Australia remained occupied by tribal societies without agriculture
然而，详细的考古研究表明，复杂的灌溉系统并不是伴随着中央集权官僚机构的兴起而出现的，而是在相当滞后之后才出现的。也就是说，政治集权是由于其他原因而出现的，然后允许建造复杂的灌溉系统。在世界这些地区，政治集权之前的关键发展都与河谷或复杂的灌溉系统无关。例如，在新月沃地，粮食生产和乡村生活起源于丘陵和山区，而不是低地河谷。在新月沃地山区的村庄粮食生产开始蓬勃发展之后，尼罗河谷在大约 3000 年的时间里仍然是文化上的死水。美国西南部的河谷最终支持了灌溉农业和复杂的社会，但前提是这些社会赖以发展的许多发展都是从墨西哥进口的。澳大利亚东南部的河谷仍然被没有农业的部落社会占据

Yet another type of explanation lists the immediate factors that enabled Europeans to kill or conquer other peoples-especially European guns, infectious diseases, steel tools, and manufactured products. Such an explanation is on the right track, as those factors demonstrably were directly responsible for European conquests. However, this hypothesis is incomplete, because it still offers only a proximate (first-stage) explanation identifying immediate causes. It invites a search for ultimate causes: why were Europeans, rather than Africans or Native Americans, the ones to end up with guns, the nastiest germs, and steel?
另一种解释列出了欧洲人能够屠杀或征服其他民族的直接因素——尤其是欧洲的枪支、传染病、钢铁工具和制成品。这样的解释是正确的，因为这些因素显然对欧洲的征服负有直接责任。然而，这个假设是不完整的，因为它仍然只提供了确定直接原因的近似（第一阶段）解释。它引发了对终极原因的探索：为什么欧洲人，而不是非洲人或美洲原住民，最终拥有了枪支、最讨厌的细菌和钢铁？

While some progress has been made in identifying those ultimate causes in the case of Europe’s conquest of the New World, Africa remains a big puzzle. Africa is the continent where protohumans evolved for the longest time, where anatomically modern humans may also have arisen, and where native diseases like malaria and yellow fever killed European explorers. If a long head start counts for anything, why didn’t guns and steel arise first in Africa, permitting Africans and their germs to conquer Europe? And what accounts for the failure of Aboriginal Australians to pass beyond the stage of hunter-gatherers with stone tools?
尽管在确定欧洲征服新大陆的最终原因方面已经取得了一些进展，但非洲仍然是一个大谜团。非洲是原始人类进化时间最长的大陆，解剖学上的现代人类也可能起源于此，疟疾和黄热病等本土疾病也导致了欧洲探险家的死亡。如果长期领先有什么意义的话，为什么枪支和钢铁没有首先在非洲出现，让非洲人和他们的细菌征服欧洲呢？是什么导致澳大利亚原住民未能超越使用石器的狩猎采集者阶段？

Questions that emerge from worldwide comparisons of human societies formerly attracted much attention from historians and geographers. The best-known modern example of such an effort was Arnold Toynbee’s 12-volume Study of History. Toynbee was especially interested in the internal dynamics of 23 advanced civilizations, of which 22 were literate and 19 were Eurasian. He was less interested in prehistory and in simpler, nonliterate societies. Yet the roots of inequality in the modern world lie far back in prehistory. Hence Toynbee did not pose Yali’s question, nor did he come to rips with what I see as history’s broadest pattern. Other available books on world history similarly tend to focus on advanced literate Eurasian civilizations of the last 5,000 years; they have a very brief treatment of pre-Columbian Native American civilizations, and an even briefer discussion of the rest of the world except for its recent interactions with Eurasian civilizations. Since Toynbee’s attempt, worldwide syntheses of historical causation have fallen into disfavor among most historians, as posing an apparently intractable problem.
人类社会的全球比较中出现的问题以前引起了历史学家和地理学家的广泛关注。这种努力最著名的现代例子是阿诺德·汤因比的 12 卷历史研究。汤因比对 23 个先进文明的内部动态特别感兴趣，其中 22 个文明是有文化的，19 个是欧亚文明。他对史前史和简单的、无文字的社会不太感兴趣。然而，现代世界不平等的根源可以追溯到史前时期。因此，汤因比没有提出亚利的问题，也没有对我所认为的历史最广泛的模式产生分歧。其他现有的世界历史书籍同样倾向于关注过去 5000 年先进的欧亚文明。他们对前哥伦布时代的美洲原住民文明进行了非常简短的讨论，对世界其他地区（除了最近与欧亚文明的互动）进行了更简短的讨论。自从汤因比的尝试以来，世界范围内对历史因果关系的综合已不再受到大多数历史学家的青睐，因为它提出了一个显然难以解决的问题。
Specialists from several disciplines have provided global syntheses of their subjects. Especially useful contributions have been made by ecological geographers, cultural anthropologists, biologists studying plant and animal domestication, and scholars concerned with the impact of infectious diseases on history. These studies have called attention to parts of the puzzle, but they provide only pieces of the needed broad synthesis that has been missing.
来自多个学科的专家提供了其学科的全球综合报告。生态地理学家、文化人类学家、研究动植物驯化的生物学家以及关注传染病对历史影响的学者做出了特别有用的贡献。这些研究引起了人们对这个难题的部分关注，但它们只提供了所缺失的广泛综合所需的部分内容。
Thus, there is no generally accepted answer to Yali’s question. On the one hand, the proximate explanations are clear: some peoples developed guns, germs, steel, and other factors conferring political and economic power before others did; and some peoples never developed these power factors at all. On the other hand, the ultimate explanations-for example, why bronze tools appeared early in parts of Eurasia, late and only locally in the New World, and never in Aboriginal Australia-remain unclear.
因此，对于雅丽的问题，没有一个普遍接受的答案。一方面，最直接的解释是明确的：一些民族先于其他民族开发了枪支、病菌、钢铁和其他赋予政治和经济权力的因素；有些民族根本就没有发展出这些力量因素。另一方面，最终的解释——例如，为什么青铜工具较早出现在欧亚大陆部分地区，较晚且仅出现在新大陆的局部地区，而从未在澳大利亚原住民出现——仍不清楚。

Our present lack of such ultimate explanations leaves a big intellectual gap, since the broadest pattern of history thus remains unexplained. Much more serious, though, is the moral gap left unfilled. It is perfectly obvious to everyone, whether an overt racist or not, that different peoples have fared differently in history. The modern United States is a European-molded society, occupying lands onquered from Native Americans and incorporating the descendants of millions of sub-Saharan black Africans brought to America as slaves. Modern Europe is not a society molded by sub-Saharan black Africans who brought millions of Native Americans as slaves.
我们目前缺乏这样的终极解释，留下了巨大的智力空白，因为最广泛的历史模式仍然无法解释。然而，更严重的是道德差距尚未填补。对于每个人来说，无论是否是公开的种族主义者，都很明显的是，不同民族在历史上的表现有所不同。现代美国是一个欧洲塑造的社会，占领着从美洲原住民那里夺来的土地，并吸收了数以百万计作为奴隶被带到美国的撒哈拉以南非洲黑人的后裔。现代欧洲不是一个由撒哈拉以南非洲黑人塑造的社会，他们把数百万美洲原住民当作奴隶。

These results are completely lopsided: it was not the case that 51 percent of the Americas, Australia, and Africa was conquered by Europeans, while 49 percent of Europe was conquered by Native Americans, Aboriginal Australians, or Africans. The whole modern world has been shaped by lopsided outcomes. Hence they must have inexorable explanations, ones more basic than mere details concerning who happened to win some battle or develop some invention on one occasion a few thousand years ago
这些结果完全是一边倒的：美洲、澳大利亚和非洲的51%并不是被欧洲人征服的，而欧洲的49%是被美洲原住民、澳大利亚原住民或非洲人征服的。整个现代世界都是由不平衡的结果塑造的。因此，他们必须有无情的解释，比几千年前谁碰巧赢得了一场战斗或发明了一些发明的单纯细节更基本的解释
It seems logical to suppose that history’s pattern reflects innate differences among people themselves. Of course, we’re taught that it’s not polite to say so in public. We read of technical studies claiming to demonstrate inborn differences, and we also read rebuttals claiming that those studies suffer from technical flaws. We see in our daily lives that some of the conquered peoples continue to form an underclass, centuries after the conquests or slave imports took place. We’re told that this too is to be attributed not to any biological shortcomings but to social disadvantages and limited opportunities
假设历史的模式反映了人们之间的内在差异，这似乎是合乎逻辑的。当然，我们被告知在公共场合这么说是不礼貌的。我们读到声称证明先天差异的技术研究，我们也读到声称这些研究存在技术缺陷的反驳。我们在日常生活中看到，在征服或奴隶进口发生几个世纪后，一些被征服的民族继续形成下层阶级。我们被告知，这也不能归因于任何生物学缺陷，而是归因于社会劣势和有限的机会

Nevertheless, we have to wonder. We keep seeing all those glaring, persistent differences in peoples’ status. We’re assured that the seemingly transparent biological explanation for the world’s inequalities as of A.D. 1500 is wrong, but we’re not told what the correct explanation is. Until we have some convincing, detailed, agreed-upon explanation for the broad pattern of history, most people will continue to suspect that the racist biological explanation is correct after all. That seems to me the strongest argument for writing this book
尽管如此，我们不得不怀疑。我们不断看到人们地位上所有那些明显的、持续存在的差异。我们确信，对于公元 1500 年世界不平等现象的看似显而易见的生物学解释是错误的，但我们不知道正确的解释是什么。在我们对历史的大致模式有一些令人信服的、详细的、一致同意的解释之前，大多数人将继续怀疑种族主义的生物学解释到底是正确的。在我看来，这似乎是写这本书的最有力的论据

Authors are regularly asked by journalists to summarize a long book in one sentence. For this book, here is such a sentence: “History followed different courses for different peoples because of differences among peoples’ environments, not because of biological differences among peoples themselves.”
记者经常要求作者用一句话总结一本长书。在这本书里，有这样一句话：“历史对不同民族走不同的道路，是因为各民族环境的差异，而不是因为各民族本身的生物学差异。”
Naturally, the notion that environmental geography and biogeography influenced societal development is an old idea. Nowadays, though, the view is not held in esteem by historians; it is
当然，环境地理学和生物地理学影响社会发展的观念是一个古老的观念。然而如今，这种观点并没有得到历史学家的尊重。这是
considered wrong or simplistic, or it is caricatured as environmental determinism and dismissed, or else the whole subject of trying to understand worldwide differences is shelved as too difficult. Yet geography obviously has some effect on history; the open question concerns how much effect, and whether geography can account for history’s broad pattern.
被认为是错误的或简单化的，或者被讽刺为环境决定论并被驳回，或者试图理解世界范围差异的整个主题因太困难而被搁置。然而地理显然对历史有一定的影响。悬而未决的问题涉及影响有多大，以及地理是否可以解释历史的广泛模式。

The time is now ripe for a fresh look at these questions, because of new information from scientific disciplines seemingly remote from human history. Those disciplines include, above all, genetics, molecular biology, and biogeography as applied to crops and their wild ancestors; the same disciplines plus behavioral ecology, as applied to domestic animals and their wild ancestors; molecular biology of human germs and related germs of animals; epidemiology of human diseases; human genetics; linguistics; archaeological studies on all continents and major islands; and studies of the histories of technology, writing, and political organization.
现在，重新审视这些问题的时机已经成熟，因为来自看似远离人类历史的科学学科的新信息。这些学科首先包括应用于农作物及其野生祖先的遗传学、分子生物学和生物地理学；与应用于家畜及其野生祖先的相同学科加上行为生态学；人类细菌和相关动物细菌的分子生物学；人类疾病流行病学；人类遗传学；语言学;对各大洲和主要岛屿的考古研究；以及技术、写作和政治组织史的研究。

This diversity of disciplines poses problems for would-be authors of a book aimed at answering Yali’s question. The author must possess a range of expertise spanning the above disciplines, so that relevant advances can be synthesized. The history and prehistory of each continent must be similarly synthesized. The book’s subject matter is history, but the approach is that of science-in particular, that of historical sciences such as evolutionary biology and geology. The author must understand from firsthand experience a range of human societies, from hunter-gatherer societies to modern space-age civilizations.
这种学科的多样性给想要写一本旨在回答耶利问题的书的作者带来了问题。作者必须拥有涵盖上述学科的一系列专业知识，以便能够综合相关进展。每个大陆的历史和史前史必须类似地综合起来。这本书的主题是历史，但方法是科学的——特别是进化生物学和地质学等历史科学的方法。作者必须从第一手经验中了解一系列人类社会，从狩猎采集社会到现代太空时代文明。

These requirements seem at first to demand a multi-author work. Yet that approach would be doomed from the outset, because the essence of the problem is to develop a unified synthesis. That consideration dictates single authorship, despite all the difficulties that it poses. Inevitably, that single author will have to sweat copiously in order to assimilate material from many disciplines, and will require guidance from many colleagues.
这些要求乍一看似乎要求多作者合作。然而，这种方法从一开始就注定要失败，因为问题的本质是开发一个统一的综合体。这种考虑决定了单一作者身份，尽管它带来了种种困难。不可避免的是，单个作者必须付出大量的汗水才能吸收来自多个学科的材料，并且需要许多同事的指导。
My background had led me to several of these disciplines even before Yali put his question to me in 1972. My mother is a teacher and linguist; my father, a physician specializing in the genetics of childhood diseases. Because of my father’s example, I went through school expecting to become a physician. I had also become a fanatical bird-watcher by the age of seven. It was thus an easy step, in my last undergraduate year at university, to shift from my initial goal of medicine to the goal of biological research. However, throughout my school and undergraduate years, my training was mainly in languages, history, and writing. Even after deciding to obtain a Ph.D. in physiology, I nearly dropped out of science during my first year of graduate school to become a linguist.
甚至在亚利 1972 年向我提出问题之前，我的背景就已经引导我涉足其中几个学科。我的父亲是一位专门研究儿童疾病遗传学的医生。由于父亲的榜样，我上学时希望成为一名医生。七岁时我也成为了一名狂热的观鸟者。因此，在大学本科的最后一年，从最初的医学目标转向生物研究目标是很容易的一步。然而，在我的学校和本科阶段，我的训练主要是语言、历史和写作。即使在决定获得博士学位之后。在生理学方面，我在研究生院的第一年几乎放弃了科学，成为一名语言学家。

Since completing my Ph.D. in 1961, I have divided my scientific research efforts between two fields: molecular physiology on the one hand, evolutionary biology and biogeography on the other hand. As an unforeseen bonus for the purposes of this book, evolutionary biology is a historical science forced to use methods different from those of the laboratory sciences. That experience has made the difficulties in devising a scientific approach to human history familiar to me. Living in Europe from 1958 to 1962, among European friends whose lives had been brutally traumatized by 20th-century European history, made me start to think more seriously about how chains of causes operate in history’s unfolding.
自从完成我的博士学位以来。 1961年，我将科学研究工作分为两个领域：一方面是分子生理学，另一方面是进化生物学和生物地理学。作为本书的一个意外收获，进化生物学是一门历史科学，被迫使用与实验室科学不同的方法。这段经历让我对设计研究人类历史的科学方法所面临的困难更加熟悉。 1958年至1962年在欧洲生活，与那些生活受到20世纪欧洲历史残酷创伤的欧洲朋友在一起，让我开始更认真地思考历史发展中的一系列原因是如何运作的。

For the last 33 years my fieldwork as an evolutionary biologist has brought me into close contact with a wide range of human societies. My specialty is bird evolution, which I have studied in South America, southern Africa, Indonesia, Australia, and especially New Guinea. Through living with native peoples of these areas, I have become familiar with many technologically primitive human
在过去的 33 年里，我作为一名进化生物学家的田野工作使我与广泛的人类社会有了密切的联系。我的专业是鸟类进化，我在南美洲、南部非洲、印度尼西亚、澳大利亚，尤其是新几内亚进行过研究。通过与这些地区的原住民一起生活，我熟悉了许多技术原始的人类
societies, from those of hunter-gatherers to those of tribal farmers and fishing peoples who depended until recently on stone tools. Thus, what most literate people would consider strange lifestyles of societies, from those of hunter-gatherers to those of tribal farmers and fishing peoples who depended until recently on stone tools. Thus, what most literate people would consider strange lifestyles of
从狩猎采集社会到直到最近还依赖石器的部落农民和渔民社会。因此，大多数有文化的人都会认为社会的生活方式很奇怪，从狩猎采集者的生活方式到直到最近还依赖石器的部落农民和捕鱼人的生活方式。因此，大多数有文化的人会认为奇怪的生活方式
remote prehistory are for me the most vivid part of my life. New Guinea, though it accounts for only a small fraction of the world’s land area, encompasses a disproportionate fraction of its human remote prehistory are for me the most vivid part of my life. New Guinea, though it accounts for only a small fraction of the world’s land area, encompasses a disproportionate fraction of its human
对我来说，遥远的史前时期是我一生中最生动的部分。新几内亚虽然只占世界陆地面积的一小部分，但却包含了其人类遥远史前史的不成比例的一部分，对我来说，这是我一生中最生动的部分。新几内亚虽然只占世界陆地面积的一小部分，但其人口却占了不成比例的比例。
diversity. Of the modern world’s 6,000 languages, 1,000 are confined to New Guinea. In the course of my work on New Guinea birds, my interests in language were rekindled, by the need to elicit diversity. Of the modern world’s 6,000 languages, 1,000 are confined to New Guines
多样性。现代世界有 6,000 种语言，其中 1,000 种仅限于新几内亚语。在我对新几内亚鸟类的研究过程中，由于需要激发多样性，我对语言的兴趣被重新点燃。现代世界有 6,000 种语言，其中 1,000 种仅限于新几内亚语
lists of local names of bird species in nearly 100 of those New Guinea languages.
用近 100 种新几内亚语言列出的当地鸟类名称列表。

Out of all those interests grew my most recent book, a nontechnical account of human evolution entitled The Third Chimpanzee. Its Chapter 14, called “Accidental Conquerors,” sought to understand the outcome of the encounter between Europeans and Native Americans. After I had completed that book, I realized that other modern, as well as prehistoric, encounters between peoples raised similar questions. I saw that the question with which I had wrestled in that Chapter 14 was in essence the question Yali had asked me in 1972, merely transferred to a different part of the world. And so at last, with the help of many friends, I shall attempt to satisfy Yali’s curiosity-and my own.
在所有这些兴趣中，我最近出版了一本关于人类进化的非技术性的书，书名为《第三只黑猩猩》。它的第 14 章名为“意外的征服者”，试图了解欧洲人和美洲原住民之间相遇的结果。读完那本书后，我意识到其他现代以及史前人民之间的接触也提出了类似的问题。我发现我在第 14 章中苦苦思索的问题本质上就是耶利在 1972 年问我的问题，只不过转移到了世界的另一个地方。因此，最后，在许多朋友的帮助下，我将尝试满足雅丽和我自己的好奇心。
ThIS воoк’s chapters are divided into four parts. Part 1, entitled “From Eden to Cajamarca,” consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 provides a whirlwind tour of human evolution and history, extending from our divergence from apes, around 7 million years ago, until the end of the last Ice Age, around 13,000 years ago. We shall trace the spread of ancestral humans, from our origins in Africa to the other continents, in order to understand the state of the world just before the events often lumped into the term “rise of civilization” began. It turns out that human development on some continents got a head start in time over developments on others.
这本书的章节分为四个部分。第 1 部分的标题为“从伊甸园到卡哈马卡”，由三章组成。第一章对人类进化和历史进行了旋风式的游览，从大约 700 万年前我们与猿类的分化开始，一直到大约 13,000 年前最后一个冰河时代的结束。我们将追踪人类祖先的传播，从我们的起源非洲到其他大陆，以便了解在经常被归为“文明崛起”一词的事件开始之前世界的状况。事实证明，某些大陆的人类发展在时间上比其他大陆的发展领先。

Chapter 2 prepares us for exploring effects of continental environments on history over the past 13,000 years, by briefly examining effects of island environments on history over smaller time scales and areas. When ancestral Polynesians spread into the Pacific around 3,200 years ago, they encountered islands differing greatly in their environments. Within a few millennia that single ancestral Polynesian society had spawned on those diverse islands a range of diverse daughter societies, from hunter-gatherer tribes to proto-empires. That radiation can serve as a model for the longer, larger-scale, and less understood radiation of societies on different continents since the end of the last Ice Age, to become various hunter-gatherer tribes and empires.
第二章通过简要考察岛屿环境在较小时间尺度和区域内对历史的影响，为探索过去 13,000 年来大陆环境对历史的影响做好准备。大约 3,200 年前，当波利尼西亚人的祖先扩散到太平洋时，他们遇到了环境截然不同的岛屿。在几千年的时间里，单一祖先​​波利尼西亚社会在这些不同的岛屿上产生了一系列不同的子社会，从狩猎采集部落到原始帝国。这种辐射可以作为一个模型，说明自上一个冰河时代结束以来，不同大陆上社会的长期、大规模和鲜为人知的辐射，形成各种狩猎采集部落和帝国。

The third chapter introduces us to collisions between peoples from different continents, by retelling through contemporary eyewitness accounts the most dramatic such encounter in history: the capture of the last independent Inca emperor, Atahuallpa, in the presence of his whole army, by Francisco Pizarro and his tiny band of conquistadores, at the Peruvian city of Cajamarca. We can identify the chain of proximate factors that enabled Pizarro to capture Atahuallpa, and that operated in European conquests of other Native American societies as well. Those factors included Spanish identify the chain of proximate factors that enabled Pizarro to capture Atahuallpa, and that operated in European conquests of other Native American societies as well. Those factors included Spanish
第三章通过当代目击者的叙述，向我们介绍了来自不同大陆的人民之间的冲突：历史上最戏剧性的遭遇：最后一位独立的印加皇帝阿塔瓦尔帕在他的整个军队在场的情况下，被弗朗西斯科·皮萨罗和他在秘鲁城市卡哈马卡的一小群征服者。我们可以确定使皮萨罗捕获阿塔瓦尔帕以及欧洲征服其他美洲原住民社会的一系列直接因素。这些因素包括西班牙语确定了使皮萨罗捕获阿塔瓦尔帕以及欧洲征服其他美洲原住民社会的一系列直接因素。这些因素包括西班牙语
germs, horses, literacy, political organization, and technology (especially ships and weapons). That analysis of proximate causes is the easy part of this book; the hard part is to identify the ultimate germs, horses, literacy, political organization, and technology (especially ships and weapons). That analysis of proximate causes is the easy part of this book; the hard
细菌、马、识字、政治组织和技术（特别是船舶和武器）。对近因的分析是本书中比较容易的部分。困难的部分是确定最终的细菌、马匹、识字率、政治组织和技术（特别是船只和武器）。对近因的分析是本书中比较容易的部分。困难的
causes leading to them and to the actual outcome, rather than to the opposite possible outcome of Atahuallpa’s coming to Madrid and capturing King Charles I of Spain.
导致它们和实际结果的原因，而不是阿塔瓦尔帕来到马德里并捕获西班牙国王查理一世的相反可能结果。
Part 2, entitled “The Rise and Spread of Food Production” and consisting of Chapters 4-10, is devoted to what I believe to be the most important constellation of ultimate causes. Chapter 4 Part 2, entitled “The Rise and Spread of Food Production” and consisting of Chapters 4-10, is devoted to what I believe to be the most important constellation of ultimate causes. Chapter 4
第二部分题为“粮食生产的兴起和传播”，由第 4 章至第 10 章组成，专门讨论我认为最重要的最终原因。第 4 章第 2 部分题为“粮食生产的兴起和传播”，由第 4 章至第 10 章组成，专门讨论我认为最重要的最终原因。第4章
sketches how food production-that is, the growing of food by agriculture or herding, instead of the hunting and gathering of wild foods-ultimately led to the immediate factors permitting Pizarro’s
概述了粮食生产——即通过农业或畜牧生产粮食，而不是狩猎和采集野生食物——最终如何导致皮萨罗的直接因素
triumph. But the rise of food production varied around the globe. As we shall see in Chapter 5, peoples in some parts of the world developed food production by themselves; some other peoples triumph. But the rise of food production varied around the globe. As we shall see in Chapter 5, peoples in some parts of the world developed food production by themselves; some other peoples
胜利。但全球粮食产量的增长情况各不相同。正如我们将在第五章中看到的，世界上某些地区的人民自己发展了粮食生产；其他一些民族的胜利。但全球粮食产量的增长情况各不相同。正如我们将在第五章中看到的，世界上某些地区的人民自己发展了粮食生产；其他一些民族
acquired it in prehistoric times from those independent centers; and still others neither developed nor acquired food production prehistorically but remained hunter-gatherers until modern times. Chapter 6 explores the numerous factors driving the shift from the hunter-gatherer lifestyle toward food production, in some areas but not in others.
它是在史前时期从那些独立的中心获得的；还有一些人在史前既没有发展也没有获得粮食生产，而是一直以狩猎采集为生，直到现代。第六章探讨了在某些地区（但在其他地区）从狩猎采集生活方式向粮食生产转变的众多因素。

Chapters 7,8 , and 9 then show how crops and livestock came in prehistoric times to be domesticated from ancestral wild plants and animals, by incipient farmers and herders who could have had no vision of the outcome. Geographic differences in the local suites of wild plants and animals available for domestication go a long way toward explaining why only a few areas became independent centers of food production, and why it arose earlier in some of those areas than in others. From those few centers of origin, food production spread much more rapidly to some areas than to others. A major factor contributing to those differing rates of spread turns out to have been the orientation of the continents’ axes: predominantly west-east for Eurasia, predominantly north-south for the Americas and Africa (Chapter 10).
第 7,8 和 9 章随后展示了史前时期农作物和牲畜如何由祖先的野生动植物驯化而来，由早期的农民和牧民驯化，而他们可能对结果没有任何预见。当地可供驯化的野生动植物群的地理差异在很大程度上解释了为什么只有少数地区成为独立的粮食生产中心，以及为什么其中一些地区比其他地区更早出现粮食生产。粮食生产从这几个起源中心向某些地区传播的速度比向其他地区传播的速度要快得多。造成这些不同传播速度的一个主要因素是大陆轴的方向：欧亚大陆主要是东西向，美洲和非洲主要是南北向（第10章）。

Thus, Chapter 3 sketched the immediate factors behind Europe’s conquest of Native Americans, and Chapter 4 the development of those factors from the ultimate cause of food production. In Part 3 (“From Food to Guns, Germs, and Steel,” Chapters 11-14), the connections from ultimate to proximate causes are traced in detail, beginning with the evolution of germs characteristic of dense human populations (Chapter 11). Far more Native Americans and other non-Eurasian peoples were killed by Eurasian germs than by Eurasian guns or steel weapons. Conversely, few or no distinctive lethal germs awaited would-be European conquerors in the New World. Why was the germ exchange so unequal? Here, the results of recent molecular biological studies are illuminating in linking germs to the rise of food production. in Eurasia much more than in the Americas.
因此，第三章概述了欧洲征服美洲原住民背后的直接因素，第四章则从粮食生产的最终原因出发阐述了这些因素的发展。在第 3 部分（“从食物到枪炮、病菌和钢铁”，第 11-14 章）中，从人口稠密的细菌特征的进化开始，详细追踪了从根本原因到近因的联系（第 11 章）。被欧亚细菌杀死的美洲原住民和其他非欧亚民族比被欧亚枪支或钢铁武器杀死的人数要多得多。相反，在新大陆等待欧洲征服者的却是很少或根本没有独特的致命细菌。为什么细菌交换如此不平等？在这里，最近的分子生物学研究结果在将细菌与粮食产量的增长联系起来方面具有启发性。欧亚大陆比美洲多得多。

Another chain of causation led from food production to writing, possibly the most important single invention of the last few thousand years (Chapter 12). Writing has evolved de novo only a few times in human history, in areas that had been the earliest sites of the rise of food production in their respective regions. All other societies that have become literate did so by the diffusion of writing systems or of the idea of writing from one of those few primary centers. Hence, for the student of world history, the phenomenon of writing is particularly useful for exploring another important constellation of causes: geography’s effect on the ease with which ideas and inventions spread.
另一条因果链从粮食生产延伸到书写，这可能是过去几千年来最重要的单一发明（第 12 章）。在人类历史上，文字从头进化的次数很少，而且都是在各自地区最早出现粮食生产的地区发生的。所有其他已经有识字的社会都是通过书写系统或书写观念从这几个主要中心之一的传播来实现的。因此，对于世界历史的学生来说，写作现象对于探索另一个重要的原因特别有用：地理对思想和发明传播容易程度的影响。
What holds for writing also holds for technology (Chapter 13). A crucial question is whether technological innovation is so dependent on rare inventor-geniuses, and on many idiosyncratic cultural actors, as to defy an understanding of world patterns. In fact, we shall see that, paradoxically, this large number of cultural factors makes it easier, not harder, to understand world patterns of technology. By enabling farmers to generate food surpluses, food production permitted farming societies to support full-time craft specialists who did not grow their own food and who developed technologies.
适用于写作的也适用于技术（第 13 章）。一个关键问题是，技术创新是否如此依赖于稀有的发明天才和许多独特的文化参与者，以至于违背了对世界格局的理解。事实上，我们将会看到，矛盾的是，大量的文化因素使得理解技术的世界模式变得更容易，而不是更困难。通过使农民能够产生粮食剩余，粮食生产使农业社会能够支持不自己种植粮食并开发技术的全职手工艺专家。
Besides sustaining scribes and inventors, food production also enabled farmers to support politicians (Chapter 14). Mobile bands of hunter-gatherers are relatively egalitarian, and their political sphere is confined to the band’s own territory and to shifting alliances with neighboring bands. With the rise of dense, sedentary, food-producing populations came the rise of chiefs, kings, and bureaucrats. Such bureaucracies were essential not only to governing large and populous domains but also to maintaining standing armies, sending out fleets of exploration, and organizing wars of conquest.
除了养活抄写员和发明家之外，粮食生产还使农民能够支持政客（第 14 章）。狩猎采集者的流动群体相对平等，他们的政治范围仅限于群体自己的领土以及与邻近群体的不断变化的联盟。随着人口密集、定居、生产粮食的人口的增加，酋长、国王和官僚也随之崛起。这些官僚机构不仅对于管理幅员辽阔、人口众多的领域至关重要，而且对于维持常备军、派遣探险舰队和组织征服战争也至关重要。

Part 4 (“Around the World in Six Chapters,” Chapters 15-20) applies the lessons of Parts 2 and 3 to each of the continents and some important islands. Chapter 15 examines the history of Australia itself, and of the large island of New Guinea, formerly joined to Australia in a single continent. The case of Australia, home to the recent human societies with the simplest technologies, and the sole continent where food production did not develop indigenously, poses a critical test of theories about intercontinental differences in human societies. We shall see why Aboriginal Australians remained hunter-gatherers, even while most peoples of neighboring New Guinea became food producers.
第 4 部分（“六章环游世界”，第 15-20 章）将第 2 部分和第 3 部分的经验教训应用到各个大陆和一些重要岛屿。第十五章考察了澳大利亚本身以及新几内亚大岛的历史，新几内亚岛以前与澳大利亚连为一体。澳大利亚是近代人类社会技术最简单的发源地，也是唯一一个没有本土发展粮食生产的大陆，它的例子对人类社会洲际差异的理论提出了严峻的考验。我们将了解为什么澳大利亚原住民仍然以狩猎采集为生，尽管邻国新几内亚的大多数民族都成为了粮食生产者。

Chapters 16 and 17 integrate developments in Australia and New Guinea into the perspective of the whole region encompassing the East Asian mainland and Pacific islands. The rise of food production in China spawned several great prehistoric movements of human populations, or of cultural traits, or of both. One of those movements, within China itself, created the political and cultural
第16章和第17章将澳大利亚和新几内亚的发展纳入包括东亚大陆和太平洋岛屿在内的整个地区的视角。中国粮食生产的兴起引发了数次大规模的史前人口迁移、文化特征迁移或两者兼而有之。其中一项运动在中国内部创造了政治和文化
phenomenon of China as we know it today. Another resulted in a replacement, throughout almost the whole of tropical Southeast Asia, of indigenous hunter-gatherers by farmers of ultimately South phenomenon of China as we know it today. Another resulted in a replacement, throughout almost the whole of tropical Southeast Asia, of indigenous hunter-gatherers by farmers of ultimately South but was unable to colonize Australia and most of New Guinea. To the student of world history, all those collisions among East Asian and Pacific peoples are doubly important: they formed the but was unable to colonize Australia and most of New Guinea. To the student of world history, all those collisions among East Asian and Pacific peoples are doubly important: they formed the
我们今天所知道的中国现象。另一个结果是，在几乎整个热带东南亚，土著狩猎采集者被我们今天所知的中国最终南方现象的农民所取代。另一次的结果是，几乎整个热带东南亚地区的土著狩猎采集者被最终来自南方的农民所取代，但他们无法殖民澳大利亚和新几内亚的大部分地区。对于世界历史的研究者来说，东亚和太平洋地区人民之间的所有这些冲突都具有双重重要性：他们形成了澳大利亚和新几内亚大部分地区，但未能殖民化。对于世界历史的研究者来说，东亚和太平洋地区人民之间的所有这些冲突都具有双重重要的意义：它们形成了
countries where one-third of the modern world’s population lives, and in which economic power is increasingly becoming concentrated; and they furnish especially clear models for understanding the countries where one-third of the modern wo
居住着现代世界三分之一人口且经济实力日益集中的国家；他们提供了特别清晰的模型来理解那些拥有三分之一现代世界人口的国家。
histories of peoples elsewhere in the world.
世界其他地方人民的历史。

Chapter 18 returns to the problem introduced in Chapter 3, the collision between European and Native American peoples. A summary of the last 13,000 years of New World and western Eurasian history makes clear how Europe’s conquest of the Americas was merely the culmination of two long and mostly separate historical trajectories. The differences between those trajectories were history makes clear how Europe’s conquest of the Americas was merely the culmination of two long and mostly separate historical trajectories. The
第十八章回到了第三章中介绍的问题，即欧洲人和美洲原住民之间的冲突。对新大陆和欧亚大陆西部过去 13,000 年历史的总结清楚地表明，欧洲对美洲的征服只不过是两条漫长且基本独立的历史轨迹的顶峰。这些轨迹之间的差异是历史清楚地表明欧洲对美洲的征服仅仅是两条漫长且基本独立的历史轨迹的顶峰。这
stamped by continental differences in domesticable plants and animals, germs, times of settlement, orientation of continental axes, and ecological barriers.
其特点是在可驯化动植物、细菌、定居时间、大陆轴线方向和生态屏障方面存在大陆差异。

The history of sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 19) offers striking similarities as well as contrasts with New World history. The same factors that molded Europeans’ encounters with Africans molded their encounters with Native Americans as well. But Africa also differed from the Americas in all these factors. As a result, European conquest did not create widespread or lasting European settlement of sub-Saharan Africa, except in the far south. Of more lasting significance was a large-scale population shift within Africa itself, the Bantu expansion. It proves to have been triggered by many of the same causes that played themselves out at Cajamarca, in East Asia, on Pacific islands, and in Australia and New Guinea.
撒哈拉以南非洲的历史（第十九章）与新世界的历史有着惊人的相似之处和对比。塑造欧洲人与非洲人的遭遇的相同因素也塑造了他们与美洲原住民的遭遇。但非洲在所有这些因素上也与美洲不同。结果，欧洲的征服并没有在撒哈拉以南非洲建立广泛或持久的欧洲定居点，除了最南端。具有更持久意义的是非洲内部的大规模人口迁移，即班图人的扩张。事实证明，引发这一事件的原因与卡哈马卡、东亚、太平洋岛屿、澳大利亚和新几内亚的许多原因相同。
I harbor no illusions that these chapters have succeeded in explaining the histories of all the continents for the past 13,000 years. Obviously, that would be impossible to accomplish in a single book even if we did understand all the answers, which we don’t. At best, this book identifies several constellations of environmental factors that I believe provide a large part of the answer to Yali’s question. Recognition of those factors emphasizes the unexplained residue, whose understanding will be a task for the future.
我不抱任何幻想，这些章节已经成功地解释了过去 13,000 年来所有大陆的历史。显然，即使我们确实理解了所有答案，但我们并没有理解，这也是不可能通过一本书来实现的。本书充其量指出了环境因素的几个星座，我相信这些因素为耶利的问题提供了很大一部分答案。对这些因素的认识强调了无法解释的残留物，其理解将是未来的任务。

The Epilogue, entitled “The Future of Human History as a Science,” lays out some pieces of the residue, including the problem of the differences between different parts of Eurasia, the role of cultural factors unrelated to environment, and the role of individuals. Perhaps the biggest of these unsolved problems is to establish human history as a historical science, on a par with recognized historical sciences such as evolutionary biology, geology, and climatology. The study of human history does pose real difficulties, but those recognized historical sciences encounter some of the same challenges. Hence the methods developed in some of these other fields may also prove useful in the field of human history.
结语的标题是“人类历史作为一门科学的未来”，列出了一些残留的部分，包括欧亚大陆不同地区之间的差异问题、与环境无关的文化因素的作用以及个人的作用。也许这些未解决的问题中最大的问题是将人类历史确立为一门历史科学，与进化生物学、地质学和气候学等公认的历史科学同等重要。人类历史的研究确实带来了真正的困难，但那些公认的历史科学也遇到了一些同样的挑战。因此，在其他一些领域开发的方法也可能在人类历史领域有用。

Already, though, I hope to have convinced you, the reader, that history is not “just one damn fact after another,” as a cynic put it. There really are broad patterns to history, and the search for their explanation is as productive as it is fascinating.
不过，我希望已经让读者相信，历史并不像一位愤世嫉俗者所说的那样“只是一个又一个该死的事实”。历史确实存在广泛的模式，对它们的解释的探索既富有成效又令人着迷。

Of equal importance in wars of conquest were the germs that evolved in human societies with domestic animals. Infectious diseases like smallpox, measles, and flu arose as specialized germs of humans, derived by mutations of very similar ancestral germs that had infected animals (Chapter 11). The humans who domesticated animals were the first to fall victim to the newly evolved germs, but those humans then evolved substantial resistance to the new diseases. When such partly immune people came into contact with others who had had no previous exposure to the germs, epidemics resulted in which up to 99 percent of the previously unexposed population was killed. Germs thus acquired ultimately from domestic animals played decisive roles in the European conquests of Native Americans, Australians, South Africans, and Pacific islanders.
在征服战争中同样重要的是在人类社会中与家畜一起进化的细菌。天花、麻疹和流感等传染病是作为人类的特殊细菌而出现的，是由感染动物的非常相似的祖先细菌突变而来的（第 11 章）。驯养动物的人类首先成为新进化细菌的受害者，但这些人类随后进化出了对新疾病的强大抵抗力。当这些部分免疫的人与以前没有接触过这种细菌的人接触时，就会导致流行病，导致之前未接触过这种细菌的人群中高达 99% 的人死亡。最终从家畜中获得的细菌在欧洲征服美洲原住民、澳大利亚人、南非人和太平洋岛民的过程中发挥了决定性作用。

In short, plant and animal domestication meant much more food and hence much denser human populations. The resulting food surpluses, and (in some areas) the animal-based means of transporting those surpluses, were a prerequisite for the development of settled, politically centralized, socially stratified, economically complex, technologically innovative societies. Hence the availability of domestic plants and animals ultimately explains why empires, literacy, and steel weapons developed earliest in Eurasia and later, or not at all, on other continents. The military uses of horses and camels, and the killing power of animal-derived germs, complete the list of major links between food production and conquest that we shall be exploring.
简而言之，植物和动物的驯化意味着更多的食物，因此人口也更加密集。由此产生的粮食剩余，以及（在某些地区）以动物为基础的运输这些剩余的手段，是发展定居的、政治集中的、社会分层的、经济复杂的、技术创新的社会的先决条件。因此，驯养植物和动物的存在最终解释了为什么帝国、文化和钢铁武器最早在欧亚大陆发展起来，而在其他大陆则发展得较晚，或者根本没有发展。马和骆驼的军事用途，以及动物源性细菌的杀灭能力，构成了我们将要探索的粮食生产和征服之间的主要联系清单。

Fortunately, the Fertile Crescent is by far the most intensively studied and best understood part of the globe as regards the rise of agriculture. For most crops domesticated in or near the Fertile Crescent, the wild plant ancestor has been identified; its close relationship to the crop has been proven by genetic and chromosomal studies; its wild geographic range is known; its changes under domestication have been identified and are often understood at the level of single genes; those changes can be observed in successive layers of the archaeological record; and the approximate place and time of domestication are known. I don’t deny that other areas, notably China, also had advantages as early sites of domestication, but those advantages and the resulting development of crops can be specified in much more detail for the Fertile Crescent.
幸运的是，就农业的兴起而言，新月沃地是迄今为止全球研究最深入、了解最透彻的地区。对于在新月沃地或附近驯化的大多数作物来说，野生植物的祖先已经被确定；它与作物的密切关系已被遗传和染色体研究证明；其野生地理范围是已知的；它在驯化过程中的变化已被识别，并且通常在单基因水平上得到理解；这些变化可以在考古记录的连续层中观察到；驯化的大致地点和时间是已知的。我不否认其他地区，尤其是中国，作为早期驯化地点也具有优势，但这些优势和由此产生的农作物发展可以在新月沃地中得到更详细的说明。

As a teenager, I Spent the summer of 1956 IN Montana, working for an elderly farmer named Fred Hirschy. Born in Switzerland, Fred had come to southwestern Montana as a teenager in the 1890s and proceeded to develop one of the first farms in the area. At the time of his arrival, much of the original Native American population of hunter-gatherers was still living there.
1956 年夏天，我在蒙大拿州度过了青少年时期，为一位名叫弗雷德·赫希 (Fred Hirschy) 的老年农民工作。 Fred 出生于瑞士，十几岁的时候于 1890 年代来到蒙大拿州西南部，并开始开发该地区最早的农场之一。当他到达时，大部分美洲原住民狩猎采集者仍然居住在那里。

My fellow farmhands were, for the most part, tough whites whose normal speech featured strings of curses, and who spent their weekdays working so that they could devote their weekends to squandering their week’s wages in the local saloon. Among the farmhands, though, was a member of the Blackfoot Indian tribe named Levi, who behaved very differently from the coarse minersbeing polite, gentle, responsible, sober, and well spoken. He was the first Indian with whom I had spent much time, and I came to admire him.
我的农场工人同伴大部分都是强硬的白人，他们平常的讲话都是一连串的咒骂，他们在工作日工作，这样他们就可以利用周末在当地的酒吧挥霍一周的工资。不过，在农场工人中，有一位名叫利维的黑脚印第安部落成员，他的行为举止与粗俗的矿工截然不同，他彬彬有礼、温柔、负责、清醒、谈吐得体。他是第一个和我相处很长时间的印度人，我开始钦佩他。
It was therefore a shocking disappointment to me when, one Sunday morning, Levi too staggered in drunk and cursing after a Saturday-night binge. Among his curses, one has stood out in my memory: “Damn you, Fred Hirschy, and damn the ship that brought you from Switzerland!” It poignantly brought home to me the Indians’ perspective on what I, like other white schoolchildren, had been taught to view as the heroic conquest of the American West. Fred Hirschy’s family was proud of him, as a pioneer farmer who had succeeded under difficult conditions. But Levi’s tribe of hunters and famous warriors had been robbed of its lands by the immigrant white farmers. How did the farmers win out over the famous warriors?
因此，在一个周日的早上，利维在周六晚上的狂欢之后，也喝醉了，咒骂着，摇摇晃晃，这让我感到非常失望。在他的咒骂中，有一个令我印象深刻：“该死的，弗雷德·赫希，该死的，那艘把你从瑞士带来的船！”它让我深刻地认识到印第安人对我和其他白人学童一样的看法，即对美国西部的英勇征服。弗雷德·赫希 (Fred Hirschy) 的家人为他感到自豪，他是一位在困难条件下取得成功的先锋农民。但莱维部落的猎人和著名战士的土地被移民白人农民抢走了。农民是如何战胜著名武士的？

For most of the time since the ancestors of modern humans diverged from the ancestors of the living great apes, around 7 million years ago, all humans on Earth fed themselves exclusively by hunting wild animals and gathering wild plants, as the Blackfeet still did in the 19th century. It was only within the last 11,000 years that some peoples turned to what is termed food production: that is, domesticating wild animals and plants and eating the resulting livestock and crops. Today, most people on Earth consume food that they produced themselves or that someone else produced for is, domesticating wild animals and plants and eating the resulting livestock and crops. Today, most people on Earth consume food that they produced themselves or that someone else produced for commitment to the hunter-gatherer lifestyle.
自从现代人类的祖先与现存类人猿的祖先分道扬镳以来，大约700万年前，地球上的所有人类都只靠狩猎野生动物和采集野生植物来养活自己，就像黑脚人仍然在做的那样。十九世纪。直到最近 11,000 年，一些民族才转向所谓的粮食生产：即驯化野生动物和植物，并食用由此产生的牲畜和农作物。今天，地球上的大多数人消费他们自己生产的食物或别人生产的食物，驯化野生动物和植物并食用由此产生的牲畜和农作物。如今，地球上的大多数人都食用自己生产的食物或其他人为追求狩猎采集生活方式而生产的食物。

Different peoples acquired food production at different times in prehistory. Some, such as Aboriginal Australians, never acquired it at all. Of those who did, some (for example, the ancient Chinese) developed it independently by themselves, while others (including ancient Egyptians) acquired it from neighbors. But, as we’ll see, food production was indirectly a prerequisite for the development of guns, germs, and steel. Hence geographic variation in whether, or when, the peoples of different continents became farmers and herders explains to a large extent their subsequent contrasting fates. of guns, germs, and steel. Hence geographic variation in whether, or when, the peoples of different continents became farmers and herders explains to a large extent their subsequent contrasting fates. advantages that enabled Pizarro to capture Atahuallpa, and Fred Hirschy’s people to dispossess Levi’s (Figure 4.1).
不同的民族在史前的不同时期获得了粮食生产。有些人，例如澳大利亚原住民，根本没有获得过它。在那些这样做的人中，有些人（例如古代中国人）自己独立开发了它，而另一些人（包括古埃及人）则从邻居那里获得了它。但是，正如我们将看到的，粮食生产间接是枪支、细菌和钢铁发展的先决条件。因此，不同大陆的人民是否或何时成为农民和牧民的地理差异在很大程度上解释了他们后来截然不同的命运。枪支、病菌和钢铁。因此，不同大陆的人民是否或何时成为农民和牧民的地理差异在很大程度上解释了他们后来截然不同的命运。这些优势使皮萨罗能够俘获阿塔瓦尔帕，使弗雷德·赫希的人民能够剥夺李维斯（图 4.1）。

The first connection is the most direct one: availability of more consumable calories means more people. Among wild plant and animal species, only a small minority are edible to humans or worth hunting or gathering. Most species are useless to us as food, for one or more of the following reasons: they are indigestible (like bark), poisonous (monarch butterflies and death-cap mushrooms), low hunting or gathering. Most species are useless to us as food, for one or more of the following reasons: they are indigestible (like bark), poisonous (monarch butterflies and death-cap mushrooms), low
第一个联系是最直接的：更多的可消耗卡路里意味着更多的人。在野生动植物物种中，只有一小部分可供人类食用或值得狩猎或采集。大多数物种对我们来说作为食物是无用的，原因有以下一个或多个：它们难以消化（如树皮）、有毒（帝王蝶和毒帽蘑菇）、狩猎或采集程度较低。大多数物种对我们来说作为食物是无用的，原因有以下一个或多个：它们难以消化（如树皮）、有毒（帝王蝶和毒帽蘑菇）、低
in nutritional value (jellyfish), tedious to prepare (very small nuts), difficult to gather (larvae of most insects), or dangerous to hunt (rhinoceroses). Most biomass (living biological matter) on land is in the form of wood and leaves, most of which we cannot digest.
营养价值低（水母）、准备繁琐（非常小的坚果）、难以采集（大多数昆虫的幼虫）或狩猎危险（犀牛）。陆地上的大多数生物质（活的生物物质）都是木材和树叶的形式，其中大部分我们无法消化。

Figure 4.1.Schematic overview of the chains of causation leading up to proximate factors (such as guns, horses, and diseases) enabling some peoples to conquer other peoples, from ultimate factors (such as the orientation of continental axes). For example, diverse epidemic diseases of humans evolved in areas with many wild plant and animal species suitable for domestication, partly because the resulting crops and livestock helped feed dense continental axes). For example, diverse epidemic diseases of humans evolved in areas with many wild plant and animal species suitable for dome
图 4.1.从最终因素（例如大陆轴的方向）导致一些民族能够征服其他民族的近因（例如枪支、马匹和疾病）的因果链的示意图。例如，人类的多种流行病在有许多适合驯化的野生动植物物种的地区进化，部分原因是由此产生的农作物和牲畜帮助喂养了密集的大陆轴线。例如，人类的多种流行病是在有许多适合穹顶生长的野生动植物物种的地区进化而来的。
societies in which epidemics could maintain themselves, and partly because the diseases evolved from germs of the domestic animals themselves.
在这样的社会中，流行病能够自我维持，部分原因是这些疾病是由家畜本身的细菌进化而来的。

By selecting and growing those few species of plants and animals that we can eat, so that they constitute 90 percent rather than 0.1 percent of the biomass on an acre of land, we obtain far more edible calories per acre. As a result, one acre can feed many more herders and farmers-typically, 10 to 100 times more-than hunter-gatherers. That strength of brute numbers was the first of many military advantages that food-producing tribes gained over hunter-gatherer tribes.
通过选择和种植少数几种我们可以食用的植物和动物，使它们占一英亩土地上生物量的 90%，而不是 0.1%，我们在每英亩土地上获得了更多的可食用热量。因此，一英亩土地可以养活更多的牧民和农民——通常是狩猎采集者的 10 到 100 倍。野蛮的数量优势是粮食生产部落相对于狩猎采集部落获得的众多军事优势中的第一个。

In human societies possessing domestic animals, livestock fed more people in four distinct ways: by furnishing meat, milk, and fertilizer and by pulling plows. First and most directly, domestic animals became the societies’ major source of animal protein, replacing wild game. Today, for instance, Americans tend to get most of their animal protein from cows, pigs, sheep, and chickens, with game such as venison just a rare delicacy. In addition, some big domestic mammals served as sources of milk and of milk products such as butter, cheese, and yogurt. Milked mammals include the cow, sheep, goat, horse, reindeer, water buffalo, yak, and Arabian and Bactrian camels. Those mammals thereby yield several times more calories over their lifetime than if they were just slaughtered and consumed as meat.
在拥有家畜的人类社会中，牲畜以四种不同的方式养活了更多的人：提供肉类、牛奶和肥料以及拉犁。首先也是最直接的是，家畜取代了野生动物，成为社会动物蛋白的主要来源。例如，如今，美国人倾向于从牛、猪、羊和鸡中获取大部分动物蛋白，而鹿肉等野味只是一种罕见的美味。此外，一些大型家养哺乳动物也是牛奶和黄油、奶酪和酸奶等奶制品的来源。挤奶哺乳动物包括牛、绵羊、山羊、马、驯鹿、水牛、牦牛、阿拉伯骆驼和双峰驼。因此，这些哺乳动物在其一生中产生的卡路里比它们被屠宰并作为肉类食用时多出几倍。

Big domestic mammals also interacted with domestic plants in two ways to increase crop production. First, as any modern gardener or farmer still knows by experience, crop yields can be greatly increased by manure applied as fertilizer. Even with the modern availability of synthetic fertilizers produced by chemical factories, the major source of crop fertilizer today in most societies is still animal manure-especially of cows, but also of yaks and sheep. Manure has been valuable, too, as a source of fuel for fires in traditional societies.
大型家养哺乳动物还通过两种方式与家养植物相互作用以增加农作物产量。首先，正如任何现代园丁或农民通过经验仍然知道的那样，通过施用粪便作为肥料可以大大提高作物产量。即使现代可以使用化工厂生产的合成肥料，当今大多数社会中作物肥料的主要来源仍然是动物粪便，尤其是牛的粪便，但也有牦牛和羊的粪便。在传统社会中，粪便作为火灾的燃料来源也很有价值。

In addition, the largest domestic mammals interacted with domestic plants to increase food production by pulling plows and thereby making it possible for people to till land that had previously been uneconomical for farming. Those plow animals were the cow, horse, water buffalo, Bali cattle, and yak / cow hybrids. Here is one example of their value: the first prehistoric farmers of central Europe, the so-called Linearbandkeramik culture that arose slightly before 5000 в.C., were initially confined to soils light enough to be tilled by means of hand-held digging sticks. Only over a thousand years later, with the introduction of the ox-drawn plow, were those farmers able to extend cultivation to a much wider range of heavy soils and tough sods. Similarly, Native American farmers of the North American Great Plains grew crops in the river valleys, but farming of the tough sods on the extensive uplands had to await 19th-century Europeans and their animal-drawn plows.
此外，最大的家养哺乳动物与家养植物相互作用，通过拉犁来增加粮食产量，从而使人们能够耕种以前不经济的耕地。这些耕犁动物是牛、马、水牛、巴厘岛牛和牦牛/牛的杂交种。以下是其价值的一个例子：中欧的第一批史前农民，即所谓的 Linearbandkeramik 文化，大约在 5000 ℃之前出现，最初局限于轻质土壤，可以通过手持式挖掘棒进行耕种。直到一千多年后，随着牛拉犁的引入，这些农民才能够将耕种范围扩大到更广泛的重质土壤和坚硬的草皮。同样，北美大平原的美洲原住民农民在河谷种植庄稼，但在广阔的高地上耕种坚韧的草皮则必须等待 19 世纪的欧洲人和他们的畜力犁。

All those are direct ways in which plant and animal domestication led to denser human populations by yielding more food than did the hunter-gatherer lifestyle. A more indirect way involved the consequences of the sedentary lifestyle enforced by food production. People of many hunter-gatherer societies move frequently in search of wild foods, but farmers must remain near their fields and orchards. The resulting fixed abode contributes to denser human populations by permitting a shortened birth interval. A hunter-gatherer mother who is shifting camp can carry only one child, along with her few possessions. She cannot afford to bear her next child until the previous toddler can walk fast enough to keep up with the tribe and not hold it back. In practice, nomadic hunter-gatherers space their children about four years apart by means of lactational amenorrhea, sexual abstinence, infanticide, and abortion. By contrast, sedentary people, unconstrained by problems of carrying young children on treks, can bear and raise as many children as they can feed. The birth interval for many farm peoples is around two years, half that of hunter-gatherers. That higher birthrate of food producers, together with their ability to feed more people per acre, lets them achieve much higher population densities than hunter-gatherers.
所有这些都是植物和动物驯化通过产生比狩猎采集生活方式更多的食物而导致人口密度更大的直接方式。一种更间接的方式涉及粮食生产所强制的久坐生活方式的后果。许多狩猎采集社会的人们经常搬家寻找野生食物，但农民必须留在他们的田地和果园附近。由此产生的固定住所允许缩短出生间隔，从而有助于人口密度的增加。一位正在转移营地的狩猎采集母亲只能带着一个孩子和她为数不多的财产。她无法承担下一个孩子的负担，除非前一个孩子能够走得足够快，能够跟上部落而不是阻碍它。实际上，游牧狩猎采集者通过哺乳闭经、禁欲、杀婴和堕胎等手段将孩子间隔大约四年。相比之下，久坐的人不受携带幼儿长途跋涉的问题的限制，可以生育和抚养尽可能多的孩子。许多农耕民族的出生间隔约为两年，是狩猎采集民族的一半。粮食生产者的较高出生率，加上他们每英亩养活更多人的能力，使他们的人口密度比狩猎采集者高得多。

A separate consequence of a settled existence is that it permits one to store food surpluses, since storage would be pointless if one didn’t remain nearby to guard the stored food. While some nomadic hunter-gatherers may occasionally bag more food than they can consume in a few days, such a bonanza is of little use to them because they cannot protect it. But stored food is essential for feeding non-food-producing specialists, and certainly for supporting whole towns of them. Hence nomadic hunter-gatherer societies have few or no such full-time specialists, who instead first appear in sedentary societies.
定居存在的另一个后果是，它允许人们储存剩余的食物，因为如果人们不留在附近看管储存的食物，储存就毫无意义。虽然一些游牧狩猎采集者有时可能会收集比他们几天内消耗的食物更多的食物，但这样的财富对他们来说没有什么用处，因为他们无法保护它。但储存的食物对于养活非粮食生产专家至关重要，当然对于支持他们的整个城镇也是如此。因此，游牧狩猎采集社会很少或没有这样的全职专家，他们首先出现在定居社会中。

Two types of such specialists are kings and bureaucrats. Hunter-gatherer societies tend to be relatively egalitarian, to lack full-time bureaucrats and hereditary chiefs, and to have small-scale political organization at the level of the band or tribe. That’s because all able-bodied hunter-gatherers are obliged to devote much of their time to acquiring food. In contrast, once food can be stockpiled, a political elite can gain control of food produced by others, assert the right of taxation, escape the need to feed itself, and engage full-time in political activities. Hence moderate-sized agricultural societies are often organized in chiefdoms, and kingdoms are confined to large agricultural societies. Those complex political units are much better able to mount a sustained war of conquest than is an egalitarian band of hunters. Some hunter-gatherers in especially rich environments, such as the Pacific Northwest coast of North America and the coast of Ecuador, also developed sedentary societies, food storage, and nascent chiefdoms, but they did not go farther on the road to kingdoms.
此类专家有两类：国王和官僚。狩猎采集社会往往相对平等，缺乏全职官僚和世袭酋长，并且在部落或部落层面上有小规模的政治组织。这是因为所有身体健全的狩猎采集者都必须投入大量时间来获取食物。相比之下，一旦可以储存食物，政治精英就可以控制其他人生产的食物，维护征税权，摆脱养活自己的需要，并全职参与政治活动。因此，中等规模的农业社会通常以酋长管辖地的形式组织起来，而王国则仅限于大型农业社会。这些复杂的政治单位比平等主义的狩猎团体更有能力发动一场持续的征服战争。一些环境特别丰富的狩猎采集者，例如北美太平洋西北海岸和厄瓜多尔海岸，也发展了定居社会、食物储存和新生的酋邦，但他们并没有在通往王国的道路上走得更远。

A stored food surplus built up by taxation can support other full-time specialists besides kings and bureaucrats. Of most direct relevance to wars of conquest, it can be used to feed professional soldiers. That was the decisive factor in the British Empire’s eventual defeat of New Zealand’s well-armed indigenous Maori population. While the Maori achieved some stunning temporary victories, they could not maintain an army constantly in the field and were in the end worn down by 18,000 full-time British troops. Stored food can also feed priests, who provide religious justification for wars of conquest; artisans such as metalworkers, who develop swords, guns, and other technologies; and scribes, who preserve far more information than can be remembered accurately.
通过税收积累起来的储存粮食盈余可以养活国王和官僚之外的其他全职专家。与征服战争最直接相关的是，它可以用来养活职业士兵。这是大英帝国最终击败新西兰装备精良的土著毛利人的决定性因素。虽然毛利人取得了一些令人惊叹的暂时胜利，但他们无法在战场上长期维持一支军队，最终被 18,000 名全职英国军队疲惫不堪。储存的食物还可以供牧师食用，他们为征服战争提供宗教理由；工匠，如金属工人，他们开发剑、枪和其他技术；还有抄写员，他们保存的信息远远多于我们能准确记住的信息。

So far, I’ve emphasized direct and indirect values of crops and livestock as food. However, they have other uses, such as keeping us warm and providing us with valuable materials. Crops and livestock yield natural fibers for making clothing, blankets, nets, and rope. Most of the major centers of plant domestication evolved not only food crops but also fiber crops-notably cotton, flax (the source of linen), and hemp. Several domestic animals yielded animal fibers-especially wool from sheep, goats, llamas, and alpacas, and silk from silkworms. Bones of domestic animals were important raw materials for artifacts of Neolithic peoples before the development of metallurgy. Cow hides were used to make leather. One of the earliest cultivated plants in many parts of the Americas was grown for nonfood purposes: the bottle gourd, used as a container.
到目前为止，我已经强调了农作物和牲畜作为食物的直接和间接价值。然而，它们还有其他用途，例如为我们保暖并为我们提供有价值的材料。农作物和牲畜产生天然纤维，用于制作衣服、毯子、网和绳索。大多数主要的植物驯化中心不仅进化出粮食作物，还进化出纤维作物，特别是棉花、亚麻（亚麻布的来源）和大麻。一些家畜产生动物纤维，尤其是绵羊、山羊、美洲驼和羊驼的羊毛，以及蚕的丝。在冶金术尚未发展之前，家畜的骨头是新石器时代人们制作器物的重要原料。牛皮被用来制造皮革。美洲许多地区最早栽培的植物之一是为了非食品目的而种植的：葫芦，用作容器。

Big domestic mammals further revolutionized human society by becoming our main means of land transport until the development of railroads in the 19th century. Before animal domestication, the sole means of transporting goods and people by land was on the backs of humans. Large mammals changed that: for the first time in human history, it became possible to move heavy goods in large quantities, as well as people, rapidly overland for long distances. The domestic animals that were ridden were the horse, donkey, yak, reindeer, and Arabian and Bactrian camels. Animals of those same five species, as well as the llama, were used to bear packs. Cows and horses were hitched to wagons, while reindeer and dogs pulled sleds in the Arctic. The horse became the chief means of long-distance transport over most of Eurasia. The three domestic camel species (Arabian camel, Bactrian camel, and llama) played a similar role in areas of North Africa and Arabia, Central Asia, and the Andes, respectively.
大型家养哺乳动物成为我们陆上运输的主要交通工具，进一步彻底改变了人类社会，直到 19 世纪铁路的发展。在动物驯化之前，陆路运输货物和人员的唯一手段是在人类的背上。大型哺乳动物改变了这一点：人类历史上第一次，可以通过陆路快速长距离运输大量重物和人员。骑乘的家畜有马、驴、牦牛、驯鹿、阿拉伯骆驼和双峰驼。这五个物种的动物，以及美洲驼，都被用来背负背包。牛和马被拴在马车上，而驯鹿和狗则在北极拉雪橇。马成为欧亚大陆大部分地区长途运输的主要交通工具。三种家养骆驼品种（阿拉伯骆驼、双峰驼和美洲驼）分别在北非和阿拉伯、中亚和安第斯山脉地区发挥着类似的作用。

The most direct contribution of plant and animal domestication to wars of conquest was from Eurasia’s horses, whose military role made them the jeeps and Sherman tanks of ancient warfare on that continent. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, they enabled Cortés and Pizarro, leading only small bands of adventurers, to overthrow the Aztec and Inca Empires. Even much earlier (around 4000 B.C.), at a time when horses were still ridden bareback, they may have been the essential military ingredient behind the westward expansion of speakers of Indo-European languages from the Ukraine. Those atione when horses were still riden bareback, they may have been the essential military ingredient behind the westward expansion of speakers of Indo-European languages from the Ukraine. Those languages eventually replaced all earlier western European languages except Basque. When horses later were yoked to wagons and other vehicles, horse-drawn battle chariots (invented around 1800
动植物驯化对征服战争最直接的贡献来自欧亚大陆的马，它们的军事作用使它们成为该大陆古代战争中的吉普车和谢尔曼坦克。正如我在第三章中提到的，他们让科尔特斯和皮萨罗只带领一小群冒险家推翻了阿兹特克帝国和印加帝国。甚至在更早的时候（大约公元前 4000 年），当马匹仍然不用鞍骑的时候，它们可能是来自乌克兰的印欧语使用者向西扩张的重要军事因素。当马还没有鞍的时候，它们可能是乌克兰印欧语系国家向西扩张的重要军事因素。这些语言最终取代了除巴斯克语之外的所有早期西欧语言。当马后来被拴在马车和其他车辆上时，马拉战车（发明于 1800 年左右）
в.c.) proceeded to revolutionize warfare in the Near East, the Mediterranean region, and China. For example, in 1674 b.c., horses even enabled a foreign people, the Hyksos, to conquer then horseless B.C.) proceeded to revolutionize warfare in the Near East, the
в.c.）开始彻底改变近东、地中海地区和中国的战争。例如，公元前 1674 年，马甚至使外国民族喜克索斯人征服了当时没有马的公元前），并开始彻底改变近东的战争，

Egypt and to establish themselves temporarily as pharaohs.
埃及并暂时确立自己的法老地位。
Still later, after the invention of saddles and stirrups, horses allowed the Huns and successive waves of other peoples from the Asian steppes to terrorize the Roman Empire and its successor states, culminating in the Mongol conquests of much of Asia and Russia in the 13th and 14th centuries a.D. Only with the introduction of trucks and tanks in World War I did horses finally become supplanted as the main assault vehicle and means of fast transport in war. Arabian and Bactrian camels played a similar military role within their geographic range. In all these examples, peoples with domestic horses (or camels), or with improved means of using them, enjoyed an enormous military advantage over those without them.
再后来，在马鞍和马镫发明之后，马让匈奴人和来自亚洲草原的其他民族不断地恐吓罗马帝国及其继承国，最终导致蒙古人在公元13世纪和13世纪征服了亚洲和俄罗斯的大部分地区。公元14世纪直到第一次世界大战中卡车和坦克的引入，马才最终取代了战争中主要的突击车辆和快速运输工具。阿拉伯骆驼和双峰驼在其地理范围内发挥着类似的军事作用。在所有这些例子中，拥有家养马（或骆驼）或拥有改进的使用它们的手段的民族比没有它们的民族享有巨大的军事优势。

Of equal importance in wars of conquest were the germs that evolved in human societies with domestic animals. Infectious diseases like smallpox, measles, and flu arose as specialized germs of humans, derived by mutations of very similar ancestral germs that had infected animals (Chapter 11). The humans who domesticated animals were the first to fall victim to the newly evolved germs, but those humans then evolved substantial resistance to the new diseases. When such partly immune people came into contact with others who had had no previous exposure to the germs, epidemics resulted in which up to 99 percent of the previously unexposed population was killed. Germs thus acquired ultimately from domestic animals played decisive roles in the European conquests of Native Americans, Australians, South Africans, and Pacific islanders.
在征服战争中同样重要的是在人类社会中与家畜一起进化的细菌。天花、麻疹和流感等传染病是作为人类的特殊细菌而出现的，是由感染动物的非常相似的祖先细菌突变而来的（第 11 章）。驯养动物的人类首先成为新进化细菌的受害者，但这些人类随后进化出了对新疾病的强大抵抗力。当这些部分免疫的人与以前没有接触过这种细菌的人接触时，就会导致流行病，导致之前未接触过这种细菌的人群中高达 99% 的人死亡。最终从家畜中获得的细菌在欧洲征服美洲原住民、澳大利亚人、南非人和太平洋岛民的过程中发挥了决定性作用。

In short, plant and animal domestication meant much more food and hence much denser human populations. The resulting food surpluses, and (in some areas) the animal-based means of transporting those surpluses, were a prerequisite for the development of settled, politically centralized, socially stratified, economically complex, technologically innovative societies. Hence the availability of domestic plants and animals ultimately explains why empires, literacy, and steel weapons developed earliest in Eurasia and later, or not at all, on other continents. The military uses of horses and camels, and the killing power of animal-derived germs, complete the list of major links between food production and conquest that we shall be exploring.
简而言之，植物和动物的驯化意味着更多的食物，因此人口也更加密集。由此产生的粮食剩余，以及（在某些地区）以动物为基础的运输这些剩余的手段，是发展定居的、政治集中的、社会分层的、经济复杂的、技术创新的社会的先决条件。因此，驯养植物和动物的存在最终解释了为什么帝国、文化和钢铁武器最早在欧亚大陆发展起来，而在其他大陆则发展得较晚，或者根本没有发展。马和骆驼的军事用途，以及动物源性细菌的杀灭能力，构成了我们将要探索的粮食生产和征服之间的主要联系清单。

Much of human history has consisted of unequal conflicts between the haves and the have-nots: between peoples with farmer power and those without it, or between those who acquired it at different times. It should come as no surprise that food production never arose in large areas of the globe, for ecological reasons that still make it difficult or impossible there today. For instance, neither farming nor herding developed in prehistoric times in North America’s Arctic, while the sole element of food production to arise in Eurasia’s Arctic was reindeer herding. Nor could food production spring up spontaneously in deserts remote from sources of water for irrigation, such as central Australia and parts of the western United States.
人类历史的大部分内容都是由富人和穷人之间的不平等冲突组成的：拥有农民权力的民族与没有农民权力的民族之间，或者在不同时期获得农民权力的民族之间。毫不奇怪，全球大部分地区从未出现过粮食生产，因为生态原因至今仍然使粮食生产变得困难或不可能。例如，史前时期北美北极地区的农业和畜牧业都没有发展起来，而欧亚大陆北极地区唯一出现的粮食生产要素是驯鹿放牧。在远离灌溉水源的沙漠中，例如澳大利亚中部和美国西部部分地区，粮食生产也无法自发产生。
Instead, what cries out for explanation is the failure of food production to appear, until modern times, in some ecologically very suitable areas that are among the world’s richest centers of agriculture and herding today. Foremost among these puzzling areas, where indigenous peoples were still hunter-gatherers when European colonists arrived, were California and the other Pacific states of the United States, the Argentine pampas, southwestern and southeastern Australia, and much of the Cape region of South Africa. Had we surveyed the world in 4000 в.C., thousands of years after the rise of food production in its oldest sites of origin, we would have been surprised too at several other modern breadbaskets that were still then without it-including all the rest of the United States, England and much of France, Indonesia, and all of subequatorial Africa. When we trace food production back to its beginnings, the earliest sites provide another surprise. Far from being modern breadbaskets, they include areas ranking today as somewhat dry or ecologically degraded: Iraq and Iran, Mexico, the Andes, parts of China, and Africa’s Sahel zone. Why did food production develop first in these seemingly rather marginal lands, and only later in today’s most fertile farmlands and pastures?
相反，需要解释的是，直到现代，一些生态非常适宜的地区才出现粮食生产，而这些地区是当今世界上最富裕的农业和畜牧业中心之一。这些令人费解的地区中最重要的是加利福尼亚州和美国其他太平洋州、阿根廷潘帕斯草原、澳大利亚西南部和东南部以及南非开普地区的大部分地区，当欧洲殖民者到达时，土著人民仍然以狩猎采集为生。如果我们在公元前 4000 年（即在其最古老的起源地粮食生产兴起数千年后）对世界进行调查，我们也会对其他几个当时还没有粮食生产的现代粮仓感到惊讶，包括所有其他国家。美国、英国、法国大部分地区、印度尼西亚以及整个非洲赤道以南地区。当我们追溯粮食生产的起源时，最早的遗址又带来了另一个惊喜。它们远非现代粮仓，而是包括当今有些干旱或生态退化的地区：伊拉克和伊朗、墨西哥、安第斯山脉、中国的部分地区以及非洲的萨赫勒地区。为什么粮食生产首先在这些看似相当边缘的土地上发展起来，后来才在今天最肥沃的农田和牧场上发展起来？
Geographic differences in the means by which food production arose are also puzzling. In a few places it developed independently, as a result of local people domesticating local plants and animals. In most other places it was instead imported, in the form of crops and livestock that had been domesticated elsewhere. Since those areas of nonindependent origins were suitable for prehistoric food production as soon as domesticates had arrived, why did the peoples of those areas not become farmers and herders without outside assistance, by domesticating local plants and animals?
粮食生产方式的地理差异也令人费解。在一些地方，它是由于当地人驯化当地动植物而独立发展起来的。在大多数其他地方，它是以在其他地方驯化的农作物和牲畜的形式进口的。既然那些非独立起源的地区一旦驯化物到来就适合史前粮食生产，那么为什么这些地区的人民在没有外来援助的情况下没有通过驯化当地动植物而成为农民和牧民呢？

Among those regions where food production did spring up independently, why did the times at which it appeared vary so greatly-for example, thousands of years earlier in eastern Asia than in the castern United States and never in eastern Australia? Among those regions into which it was imported in the prehistoric era, why did the date of arrival also vary so greatly-for example, thousands of years earlier in southwestern Europe than in the southwestern United States? Again among those regions where it was imported, why in some areas (such as the southwestern United States) did local hunter-gatherers themselves adopt crops and livestock from neighbors and survive as farmers, while in other areas (such as Indonesia and much of subequatorial Africa) the importation of food production involved a cataclysmic replacement of the region’s original hunter-gatherers by invading food producers? All these questions involve developments that determined which peoples became history’s have-nots, and which became its haves.
在那些独立出现粮食生产的地区中，为什么粮食生产出现的时间差异如此之大——例如，东亚地区比美国东部地区早数千年，而澳大利亚东部却从未出现过？在史前时代输入的那些地区中，为什么到达的日期也相差如此之大——例如，欧洲西南部比美国西南部早数千年？同样，在进口的地区中，为什么在某些地区（例如美国西南部）当地狩猎采集者自己从邻居那里采用农作物和牲畜并以农民的身份生存下来，而在其他地区（例如印度尼西亚和赤道以南的大部分地区）非洲）粮食生产的输入导致了该地区最初的狩猎采集者被入侵的粮食生产者所取代？所有这些问题都涉及决定哪些民族成为历史上的穷人、哪些民族成为历史上的富人的事态发展。
${\mathbf{B}}_{\text{EFORE WE CAN}}$${\mathbf{B}}_{\text{EFORE WE CAN }}$B_("EFORE WE CAN ")\mathbf{B}_{\text {EFORE WE CAN }} hope to answer these questions, we need to figure out how to identify areas where food production originated, when it arose there, and where and when a given crop or animal was first domesticated. The most unequivocal evidence comes from identification of plant and animal remains at archaeological sites. Most domesticated plant and animal species differ morphologically from their wild ancestors: for example, in the smaller size of domestic cattle and sheep, the larger size of domestic chickens and apples, the thinner and smoother seed coats of domestic peas, and the corkscrew-twisted rather than scimitar-shaped horns of domestic goats. Hence remains of domesticated plants and animals at a dated archaeological site can be recognized and provide strong evidence of food production at that place and time, whereas finding the remains only of wild species at a site fails to provide evidence of food production and is compatible with hunting-gathering. Naturally, food producers, especially early ones, continued to gather some wild plants and hunt wild animals, so the food remains at their sites often include wild species as well as domesticated ones.
${\mathbf{B}}_{\text{EFORE WE CAN}}$${\mathbf{B}}_{\text{EFORE WE CAN }}$B_("EFORE WE CAN ")\mathbf{B}_{\text {EFORE WE CAN }} 为了回答这些问题，我们需要弄清楚如何确定粮食生产的起源地、粮食生产的时间以及特定作物或动物首次驯化的地点和时间。最明确的证据来自对考古遗址植物和动物遗骸的鉴定。大多数驯化植物和动物物种在形态上与其野生祖先有所不同：例如，家养牛和羊的体型较小，家养鸡和苹果的体型较大，家养豌豆的种皮更薄且更光滑，以及螺旋状扭曲的家养豌豆。而不是家山羊的弯刀形角。因此，在一个年代久远的考古遗址中发现驯化植物和动物的遗骸可以被识别，并提供该地点和时间粮食生产的有力证据，而在某个地点仅发现野生物种的遗骸则不能提供粮食生产的证据，并且与狩猎采集。当然，食物生产者，尤其是早期的食物生产者，继续采集一些野生植物并猎杀野生动物，因此他们所在地的食物遗存通常包括野生物种和驯化物种。
carbon, the ubiquitous building block of life, into the nonradioactive isotope nitrogen 14. Carbon 14 is continually being generated in the atmosphere by cosmic rays. Plants take up atmospheric carbon, which has a known and approximately constant ratio of carbon 14 to the prevalent isotope carbon 12 (a ratio of about one to a million). That plant carbon goes on to form the body of the herbivorous animals that eat the plants, and of the carnivorous animals that eat those herbivorous animals. Once the plant or animal dies, though, half of its carbon 14 content decays into nitrogen 14 every 5,700 years, until after about 40,000 years the carbon 14 content is very low and difficult to measure or to distinguish from contamination with small amounts of modern materials containing carbon 14. Hence the age of material from an archaeological site can be calculated from the material’s carbon $14/$$14/$14//14 / carbon 12 ratio.
碳，生命的普遍组成部分，转化为非放射性同位素氮 14。碳 14 在大气中不断地由宇宙射线产生。植物吸收大气中的碳，其中碳 14 与普遍存在的同位素碳 12 的比例已知且大致恒定（比例约为一比一百万）。植物碳继续形成以植物为食的草食动物的身体，以及以这些草食动物为食的肉食动物的身体。然而，一旦植物或动物死亡，其碳 14 含量的一半每 5,700 年就会衰变成氮 14，直到大约 40,000 年之后，碳 14 含量非常低，难以测量或与少量现代材料的污染区分开来含有碳 14. 因此，考古遗址材料的年龄可以根据材料的碳来计算 $14/$$14/$14//14 / 碳12比率。

Radiocarbon is plagued by numerous technical problems, of which two deserve mention here. One is that radiocarbon dating until the 1980s required relatively large amounts of carbon (a few grams), much more than the amount in small seeds or bones. Hence scientists instead often had to resort to dating material recovered nearby at the same site and believed to be “associated with” the food remains-that is, to have been deposited simultaneously by the people who left the food. A typical choice of “associated” material is charcoal from fires.
放射性碳受到许多技术问题的困扰，其中有两个问题值得在此提及。一是 20 世纪 80 年代之前的放射性碳测年需要相对大量的碳（几克），远多于小种子或骨头中的碳量。因此，科学家们常常不得不求助于在同一地点附近发现的材料的年代测定，这些材料被认为与食物残骸“相关”，也就是说，是由留下食物的人同时沉积的。 “相关”材料的典型选择是来自火的木炭。
But archaeological sites are not always neatly sealed time capsules of materials all deposited on the same day. Materials deposited at different times can get mixed together, as worms and rodents and other agents churn up the ground. Charcoal residues from a fire can thereby end up close to the remains of a plant or animal that died and was eaten thousands of years earlier or later. Increasingly today, archaeologists are circumventing this problem by a new technique termed accelerator mass spectrometry, which permits radiocarbon dating of tiny samples and thus lets one directly date a single small seed, small bone, or other food residue. In some cases big differences have been found between recent radiocarbon dates based on the direct new methods (which have their own problems) and those based on the indirect older ones. Among the resulting controversies remaining unresolved, perhaps the most important for the purposes of this book concerns the date when food production originated in the Americas: indirect methods of the 1960 s and 1970 s yielded dates as early as 7000 в.с., but more recent direct dating has been yielding dates no earlier than 3500 в.с.
但考古遗址并不总是整齐密封的时间胶囊，其中的材料全部在同一天沉积。不同时间沉积的物质可能会混合在一起，因为蠕虫、啮齿动物和其他介质会搅动地面。因此，火灾产生的木炭残留物最终可能会接近数千年前或之后死亡并被吃掉的植物或动物的遗骸。如今，考古学家越来越多地通过一种称为加速器质谱法的新技术来规避这个问题，该技术可以对微小样品进行放射性碳测年，从而使人们可以直接测定单个小种子、小骨头或其他食物残渣的年代。在某些情况下，基于直接新方法（有其自身问题）的最新放射性碳测年法与基于间接旧方法的放射性碳测年法之间存在很大差异。在由此产生的尚未解决的争议中，也许对本书而言最重要的是粮食生产起源于美洲的日期：1960 年代和 1970 年代的间接方法得出的日期早在公元 7000 年，但更多最近的直接约会得出的日期不早于 3500 в.с。
A second problem in radiocarbon dating is that the carbon 14 / carbon 12 ratio of the atmosphere is in fact not rigidly constant but fluctuates slightly with time, so calculations of radiocarbon dates based on the assumption of a constant ratio are subject to small systematic errors. The magnitude of this error for each past date can in principle be determined with the help of long-lived trees laying down annual growth rings, since the rings can be counted up to obtain an absolute calendar date in the past for each ring, and a carbon sample of wood dated in this manner can then be analyzed for its carbon 14 / carbon 12 ratio. In this way, measured radiocarbon dates can be “calibrated” to take account of fluctuations in the atmospheric carbon ratio. The effect of this correction is that, for materials with apparent (that is, uncalibrated) dates between about 1000 and 6000 в.c., the true (calibrated) date is between a few centuries and a thousand years earlier. Somewhat older samples have more recently begun to be calibrated by an alternative method based on another radioactive decay process and yielding the conclusion that samples apparently dating to about 9000 b.c. actually date to around 11,000 в.C.
放射性碳测年的第二个问题是，大气中的碳 14 / 碳 12 比率实际上并不是严格恒定的，而是随时间略有波动，因此基于恒定比率假设的放射性碳测年法的计算会受到较小的系统误差的影响。原则上，可以借助形成年轮的长寿树来确定每个过去日期的误差大小，因为可以对年轮进行计数以获得每个年轮过去的绝对日历日期，并且可以通过计算年轮来确定每个年轮过去的绝对日历日期。然后可以分析以这种方式测年的木材碳样品的碳 14 /碳 12 比率。通过这种方式，可以“校准”测量的放射性碳日期，以考虑大气碳比率的波动。这种修正的效果是，对于表观（即未校准）日期在大约 1000 到 6000 之间的材料，真实（校准）日期在几个世纪到一千年前之间。最近，一些较旧的样本开始通过基于另一种放射性衰变过程的替代方法进行校准，并得出结论，表面上可追溯到公元前 9000 年左右的样本实际上可追溯到 11,000 ℃左右。

Archaeologists often distinguish calibrated from uncalibrated dates by writing the former in upper-case letters and the latter in lower-case letters (for example, 3000 в.c. vs. 3000 b.c., respectively). However, the archaeological literature can be confusing in this respect, because many books and papers report uncalibrated dates as B.c. and fail to mention that they are actually uncalibrated. The
考古学家经常通过用大写字母书写前者和用小写字母书写后者来区分校准日期和未校准日期（例如，分别为 3000 в.c. 和 3000 bc）。然而，考古文献在这方面可能会令人困惑，因为许多书籍和论文将未经校准的日期报告为公元前，而没有提及它们实际上是未经校准的。这
in some standard reference books on early food production.
在一些有关早期粮食生产的标准参考书中。
Once one has recognized and dated ancient remains of domestic plants or animals, how does one decide whether the plant or animal was actually domesticated in the vicinity of that site itself, rather than domesticated elsewhere and then spread to the site? One method is to examine a map of the geographic distribution of the crop’s or animal’s wild ancestor, and to reason that domestication rather than domesticated elsewhere and then spread to the site? One method is to examine a map of the geographic distribution of the crop’s or animal’s wild ancestor, and to reason that domestication
一旦人们认识到了古代家养植物或动物的遗骸并确定了年代，我们如何确定该植物或动物是否实际上是在该地点附近被驯化的，而不是在其他地方驯化然后传播到该地点的？一种方法是检查农作物或动物野生祖先的地理分布地图，并推断是驯化而不是在其他地方驯化然后传播到该地点？一种方法是检查农作物或动物野生祖先的地理分布图，并推断驯化
must have taken place in the area where the wild ancestor occurs. For example, chickpeas are widely grown by traditional farmers from the Mediterranean and Ethiopia east to India, with the latter must have taken place in the area where the wild ancestor occurs. For example, chickpeas are widely grown by traditional farmers from the Mediterranean and Ethiopia east to India, with the latter
一定发生在野生祖先出现的地区。例如，传统农民从地中海和埃塞俄比亚东部到印度广泛种植鹰嘴豆，而后者一定是在野生祖先出现的地区种植的。例如，传统农民从地中海和埃塞俄比亚向东到印度广泛种植鹰嘴豆，而后者
country accounting for 80 percent of the world’s chickpea production today. One might therefore have been deceived into supposing that chickpeas were domesticated in India. But it turns out that country accounting for 80 percent of the world’s chickpea production today. One might therefore have been deceived into supposing that chickpeas were domesticated in India. But it turns out that
该国的鹰嘴豆产量占当今世界的 80%。因此，人们可能会被欺骗，认为鹰嘴豆是在印度驯化的。但事实证明，该国的鹰嘴豆产量占当今世界鹰嘴豆产量的 80%。因此，人们可能会被欺骗，认为鹰嘴豆是在印度驯化的。但事实证明
ancestral wild chickpeas occur only in southeastern Turkey. The interpretation that chickpeas were actually domesticated there is supported by the fact that the oldest finds of possibly domesticated ancestral wild chickpeas occur only in southeastern Turkey. The interpretation that chickpeas were actually domesticated there is supported by the fact that the oldest finds of possibly domesticated
祖先野生鹰嘴豆仅出现在土耳其东南部。鹰嘴豆实际上是在那里被驯化的这一解释得到了以下事实的支持：最古老的可能驯化祖先野生鹰嘴豆的发现仅出现在土耳其东南部。鹰嘴豆实际上在那里被驯化的解释得到了以下事实的支持：最古老的发现可能是驯化的
chickpeas in Neolithic archaeological sites come from southeastern Turkey and nearby northern Syria that date to around 8000 B.C.; not until over 5,000 years later does archaeological evidence of
新石器时代考古遗址中的鹰嘴豆来自土耳其东南部和附近的叙利亚北部，其历史可以追溯到公元前 8000 年左右；直到 5000 多年后，考古证据才证实

A second method for identifying a crop’s or animal’s site of domestication is to plot on a map the dates of the domesticated form’s first appearance at each locality. The site where it appeared earliest may be its site of initial domestication-especially if the wild ancestor also occurred there, and if the dates of first appearance at other sites become progressively later with increasing distance earliest may be its site of initial domestication-especially if the wild ancestor also occurred there, and if the dates of first appearance at other sites become progressively later with increasing distance
识别农作物或动物驯化地点的第二种方法是在地图上标出驯化形式在每个地点首次出现的日期。它最早出现的地点可能是它最初驯化的地点，特别是如果野生祖先也出现在那里，并且如果随着距离的增加，在其他地点首次出现的日期逐渐变晚，最早出现的地点可能是它最初驯化的地点，特别是如果野生祖先也出现在那里，如果其他地点首次出现的日期随着距离的增加而逐渐变晚
from the putative site of initial domestication, suggesting spread to those other sites. For instance, the earliest known cultivated emmer wheat comes from the Fertile Crescent around 8500 b.c. Soon from the putative
来自假定的最初驯化地点，表明传播到了其他地点。例如，已知最早的栽培二粒小麦来自公元前 8500 年左右的新月沃地，很快就从假定的
thereafter, the crop appears progressively farther west, reaching Greece around 6500 в.с. and Germany around 5000 в.с. Those dates suggest domestication of emmer wheat in the Fertile Crescent, a thereafter, the crop appears progressively farther west, reaching Greece around 6500 в.C. and Germany around 5000 в.C. Those dates sugg
此后，作物逐渐向西移动，到达希腊海拔 6500 米左右。德国大约 5000 в.с。这些日期表明二粒小麦在新月沃地被驯化，此后，该作物逐渐向西移动，在 6500 ℃左右到达希腊。德国大约 5000 ℃这些日期表明
conclusion supported by the fact that ancestral wild emmer wheat is confined to the area extending from Israel to western Iran and Turkey.
这一结论得到了以下事实的支持：祖先野生二粒小麦仅限于从以色列延伸到伊朗西部和土耳其的地区。

However, as we shall see, complications arise in many cases where the same plant or animal was domesticated independently at several different sites. Such cases can often be detected by analyzing the resulting morphological, genetic, or chromosomal differences between specimens of the same crop or domestic animal in different areas. For instance, India’s zebu breeds of domestic cattle possess humps lacking in western Eurasian cattle breeds, and genetic analyses show that the ancestors of modern Indian and western Eurasian cattle breeds diverged from each other hundreds of thousands of years ago, long before any animals were domesticated anywhere. That is, cattle were domesticated independently in India and western Eurasia, within the last 10,000 years, starting with wild Indian and western Eurasian cattle subspecies that had diverged hundreds of thousands of years earlier.
然而，正如我们将看到的，在许多情况下，当同一种植物或动物在几个不同的地点独立驯化时，就会出现复杂的情况。此类病例通常可以通过分析不同地区同一作物或家畜样本之间所产生的形态、遗传或染色体差异来发现。例如，印度的瘤牛品种拥有欧亚西部牛品种所缺乏的驼峰，遗传分析表明，现代印度牛品种和欧亚西部牛品种的祖先在数十万年前就彼此分化，远在任何动物被驯化之前任何地方。也就是说，在过去的一万年内，牛在印度和欧亚大陆西部被独立驯化，始于数十万年前分化的野生印度和西部欧亚牛亚种。
${\mathrm{Let}}_{\mathrm{Et}}$${\mathrm{Let}}_{\mathrm{Et}}$Let_(Et)\mathrm{Let}_{\mathrm{Et}} NOW RETURN to our earlier questions about the rise of food production. Where, when, and how did food production develop in different parts of the globe?
${\mathrm{Let}}_{\mathrm{Et}}$${\mathrm{Let}}_{\mathrm{Et}}$Let_(Et)\mathrm{Let}_{\mathrm{Et}} 现在回到我们之前关于粮食生产增长的问题。全球不同地区的粮食生产是在哪里、何时以及如何发展的？
At one extreme are areas in which food production arose altogether independently, with the domestication of many indigenous crops (and, in some cases, animals) before the arrival of any crops or animals from other areas. There are only five such areas for which the evidence is at present detailed and compelling: Southwest Asia, also known as the Near East or Fertile Crescent; China; Mesoamerica (the term applied to central and southern Mexico and adjacent areas of Central America); the Andes of South America, and possibly the adjacent Amazon Basin as well; and the eastern United States (Figure 5.1). Some or all of these centers may actually comprise several nearby centers where food production arose more or less independently, such as North China’s Yellow River valley and South China’s Yangtze River valley.
一种极端是粮食生产完全独立产生的地区，在来自其他地区的任何作物或动物到来之前，许多本土作物（在某些情况下还有动物）已被驯化。目前只有五个这样的地区有详细且令人信服的证据：西南亚，也称为近东或新月沃土；中国;中美洲（该术语适用于墨西哥中部和南部以及中美洲的邻近地区）；南美洲的安第斯山脉，可能还有邻近的亚马逊盆地；和美国东部（图 5.1）。这些中心的部分或全部实际上可能包括几个附近的粮食生产中心，这些中心或多或少独立地产生粮食生产，例如华北的黄河流域和华南的长江流域。

In addition to these five areas where food production definitely arose de novo, four others-Africa’s Sahel zone, tropical West Africa, Ethiopia, and New Guinea-are candidates for that distinction. However, there is some uncertainty in each case. Although indigenous wild plants were undoubtedly domesticated in Africa’s Sahel zone just south of the Sahara, cattle herding may have preceded agriculture there, and it is not yet certain whether those were independently domesticated Sahel cattle or, instead, domestic cattle of Fertile Crescent origin whose arrival triggered local plant domestication. It remains similarly uncertain whether the arrival of those Sahel crops then triggered the undoubted local domestication of indigenous wild plants in tropical West Africa, and whether domestication. It remains similarly uncertain whether the arrival of those Sahel crops then triggered the undoubted local domestication of indigenous wild plants in tropical West Africa, and whether
除了粮食生产肯定从头开始的这五个地区外，其他四个地区——非洲萨赫勒地区、热带西非、埃塞俄比亚和新几内亚——也有资格获得这一殊荣。然而，每种情况都存在一些不确定性。尽管本土野生植物无疑是在撒哈拉以南的非洲萨赫勒地区驯化的，但那里的牛群放牧可能早于农业，目前还不确定这些是独立驯化的萨赫勒牛，还是起源于新月沃地的家牛，它们的到来引发了当地植物的驯化。同样，仍然不确定这些萨赫勒作物的到来是否引发了西非热带地区本土野生植物无疑的本地驯化，以及是否驯化。同样，我们仍然不确定这些萨赫勒作物的到来是否随后引发了西非热带地区对本土野生植物的毫无疑问的本地驯化，以及是否
the arrival of Southwest Asian crops is what triggered the local domestication of indigenous wild plants in Ethiopia. As for New Guinea, archaeological studies there have provided evidence of early the arrival of Southwest Asian crops is what triggered the local domestication of indigenous wild plants in Ethiopia. As
西南亚作物的到来引发了埃塞俄比亚本地野生植物的驯化。至于新几内亚，考古研究提供的证据表明，西南亚作物的早期到来引发了埃塞俄比亚本地野生植物的驯化。作为
agriculture well before food production in any adjacent areas, but the crops grown have not been definitely identified.
在任何邻近地区，农业早于粮食生产，但所种植的作物尚未明确确定。

Table 5.1 summarizes, for these and other areas of local domestication, some of the best-known crops and animals and the earliest known dates of domestication. Among these nine candidate areas Table 5.1 summarizes, for these and other areas of local domestication, some of the best-known crops and animals and the earliest known dates of domestication. Among these nine candidate areas
表 5.1 总结了这些地区和其他当地驯化地区的一些最著名的农作物和动物以及最早的已知驯化日期。在这九个候选地区中，表 5.1 总结了这些地区和其他当地驯化地区的一些最著名的农作物和动物以及已知最早的驯化日期。在这九个候选领域中
for the independent evolution of food production, Southwest Asia has the earliest definite dates for both plant domestication (around 8500 в.C.) and animal domestication (around 8000 b.c.); it also has for the independent evolution of food production, Southwest Asia has the earliest definite dates for both plant domestication (around 8500 в.C.) and animal domestication (around 8000 B.C.); it also has
就粮食生产的独立演化而言，西南亚有最早确定的植物驯化（约公元前8500年）和动物驯化（约公元前8000年）的日期；就粮食生产的独立演化而言，西南亚有最早确定的植物驯化（约公元前8500年）和动物驯化（约公元前8000年）的日期；它还有
by far the largest number of accurate radiocarbon dates for early food production. Dates for China are nearly as early, while dates for the eastern United States are clearly about 6,000 years later. For by far the largest number of accurate radiocarbon dates for early food production. Dates for China are nearly as early, while dates for the eastern United States are clearly about 6,000 years later. For
迄今为止，早期粮食生产的准确放射性碳测年数量最多。中国的日期几乎同样早，而美国东部的日期显然晚了大约 6,000 年。迄今为止，为早期食品生产提供了数量最多的准确放射性碳测年数据。中国的日期几乎同样早，而美国东部的日期显然晚了大约 6,000 年。为了
the other six candidate areas, the earliest well-established dates do not rival those for Southwest Asia, but too few early sites have been securely dated in those six other areas for us to be certain that the other six candidate areas, the earliest well-established dates do nged behind Southwest Asia and (if so) by how much.
在其他六个候选地区，最早确定的年代并不与西南亚的年代相媲美，但是在这六个其他地区，被确定年代的早期遗址太少，我们无法确定其他六个候选地区，最早确定的年代确定的日期落后于西南亚以及（如果是的话）落后了多少。
they 他们

Figure 5.1. Centers of origin of food production. A question mark indicates some uncertainty whether the rise of food production at that center was really uninfluenced by the spread of food production from other centers, or (in the case of New Guinea) what the earliest crops were.
图 5.1。粮食生产的起源中心。问号表明了一些不确定性，该中心粮食生产的增长是否真的不受其他中心粮食生产扩散的影响，或者（就新几内亚而言）最早的作物是什么。

The next group of areas consists of ones that did domesticate at least a couple of local plants or animals, but where food production depended mainly on crops and animals that were domesticated elsewhere. Those imported domesticates may be thought of as “founder” crops and animals, because they founded local food production. The arrival of founder domesticates enabled local people to become sedentary, and thereby increased the likelihood of local crops’ evolving from wild plants that were gathered, brought home and planted accidentally, and later planted intentionally.
下一组地区至少驯化了几种当地植物或动物，但粮食生产主要依赖于其他地方驯化的农作物和动物。这些进口的驯化作物可能被认为是农作物和动物的“奠基者”，因为它们开创了当地的粮食生产。创始人驯化植物的到来使当地人得以定居，从而增加了当地农作物从野生植物进化而来的可能性，这些野生植物是被采集、带回家、偶然种植、后来有意种植的。
In three or four such areas, the arriving founder package came from Southwest Asia. One of them is western and central Europe, where food production arose with the arrival of Southwest Asian In three or four such areas, the arriving founder package came from Southwest Asia. One of them is western and central Europe, where food production arose with the arrival of Southwest Asian
在三四个这样的地区，抵达的创始人包裹来自西南亚。其中之一是西欧和中欧，那里的粮食生产是随着西南亚的到来而兴起的。在三四个这样的地区，抵达的创始人包裹来自西南亚。其中之一是西欧和中欧，那里的粮食生产随着西南亚的到来而兴起。
crops and animals between 6000 and 3500 в c., but at least one plant (the poppy, and probably oats and some others) was then domesticated locally. Wild poppies are confined to coastal areas of the crops and animals between 6000 and 3500 B.C., but at least one plant (the poppy, and probably oats and some others) was then domesticated locally. Wild poppies are confined to coastal areas of the
农作物和动物的温度在 6000 至 3500 摄氏度之间，但至少有一种植物（罂粟，可能还有燕麦和其他一些植物）在当地被驯化。公元前 6000 至 3500 年间，野生罂粟仅限于农作物和动物的沿海地区，但至少有一种植物（罂粟，可能还有燕麦和其他一些植物）在当地被驯化。野生罂粟仅限于沿海地区
western Mediterranean. Poppy seeds are absent from excavated sites of the earliest farming communities in eastern Europe and Southwest Asia; they first appear in early farming sites in western western Mediterranean. Poppy seeds are absent from excavated sites of the earliest farming communities in eastern Europe and Southwest Asia; they first appear in early farming sites in western
西地中海。东欧和西南亚最早的农业社区的出土遗址中没有罂粟种子；它们首先出现在西地中海西部的早期农业地区。东欧和西南亚最早的农业社区的出土遗址中没有罂粟种子；它们首先出现在西部地区的早期农业地区
Europe. In contrast, the wild ancestors of most Southwest Asian crops and animals were absent from western Europe. Thus, it seems clear that food production did not evolve independently in western Europe. In contrast, the wild ancestors of most Southwest Asian crops and animals were absent from western Europe. Thus, it seems clear that food production did not evolve independently in western
欧洲。相比之下，大多数西南亚农作物和动物的野生祖先并不存在于西欧。因此，显然西欧的粮食生产并不是独立发展的。相比之下，大多数西南亚农作物和动物的野生祖先并不存在于西欧。因此，很明显，西方的粮食生产并不是独立发展的。
Europe. Instead, it was triggered there by the arrival of Southwest Asian domesticates. The resulting western European farming societies domesticated the poppy, which subsequently spread eastward Europe. In a crop.
欧洲。相反，它是由西南亚驯化动物的到来引发的。由此产生的西欧农业社会驯化了罂粟，随后将其传播到东欧。在作物中。

Another area where local domestication appears to have followed the arrival of Southwest Asian founder crops is the Indus Valley region of the Indian subcontinent. The earliest farming communities there in the seventh millennium B.C. utilized wheat, barley, and other crops that had been previously domesticated in the Fertile Crescent and that evidently spread to the Indus Valley through Iran. Only later did domesticates derived from indigenous species of the Indian subcontinent, such as humped cattle and sesame, appear in Indus Valley farming communities. In Egypt as well, food production began in the sixth millennium B.C. with the arrival of Southwest Asian crops. Egyptians then domesticated the sycamore fig and a local vegetable called chufa.
西南亚创始作物到来后，当地驯化的另一个地区似乎是印度次大陆的印度河谷地区。公元前七千年，那里最早的农业社区利用小麦、大麦和其他农作物，这些农作物先前在新月沃地驯化，并且显然通过伊朗传播到印度河谷。直到后来，来自印度次大陆本土物种的驯化物，例如驼峰牛和芝麻，才出现在印度河流域的农业社区中。在埃及，粮食生产也是在公元前六千年随着西南亚农作物的到来而开始的。随后，埃及人驯化了无花果和当地一种名为 chufa 的蔬菜。

The same pattern perhaps applies to Ethiopia, where wheat, barley, and other Southwest Asian crops have been cultivated for a long time. Ethiopians also domesticated many locally available wild species to obtain crops most of which are still confined to Ethiopia, but one of them (the coffee bean) has now spread around the world. However, it is not yet known whether Ethiopians were cultivating these local plants before or only after the arrival of the Southwest Asian package.
同样的模式或许也适用于埃塞俄比亚，那里长期以来一直种植小麦、大麦和其他西南亚作物。埃塞俄比亚人还驯化了许多当地的野生物种来获取农作物，其中大部分仍仅限于埃塞俄比亚，但其中一种（咖啡豆）现已传播到世界各地。然而，目前尚不清楚埃塞俄比亚人是在西南亚包裹抵达之前还是之后才种植这些当地植物。

In these and other areas where food production depended on the arrival of founder crops from elsewhere, did local hunter-gatherers themselves adopt those founder crops from neighboring farming peoples and thereby become farmers themselves? Or was the founder package instead brought by invading farmers, who were thereby enabled to outbreed the local hunters and to kill, displace, or outnumber them?
在这些和其他地区，粮食生产依赖于来自其他地方的创始作物的到来，当地狩猎采集者自己是否采用了来自邻近农业民族的创始作物，从而自己成为了农民？或者，创始人的包裹是由入侵的农民带来的，从而使他们能够超越当地猎人并杀死、取代或超过他们？

In Egypt it seems likely that the former happened: local hunter-gatherers simply added Southwest Asian domesticates and farming and herding techniques to their own diet of wild plants and animals, then gradually phased out the wild foods. That is, what arrived to launch food production in Egypt was foreign crops and animals, not foreign peoples. The same may have been true on the Atlantic coast of Europe, where local hunter-gatherers apparently adopted Southwest Asian sheep and cereals over the course of many centuries. In the Cape of South Africa the local Khoi hunterAtlantic coast of Europe, where local hunter-gatherers apparently adopted Southwest Asian sheep and cereals over the course of many centuries. In the Cape of South Africa the local Khoi hunter-
在埃及，似乎发生了前者：当地的狩猎采集者只是将西南亚的驯化和农牧技术添加到他们自己的野生动植物饮食中，然后逐渐淘汰野生食物。也就是说，来到埃及启动粮食生产的是外国农作物和动物，而不是外国人民。欧洲大西洋沿岸的情况也可能如此，当地的狩猎采集者显然在几个世纪的时间里采用了西南亚的绵羊和谷物。在南非开普敦，当地的科伊族猎人在欧洲大西洋沿岸，当地的狩猎采集者显然在几个世纪的时间里采用了西南亚的绵羊和谷物。在南非开普敦，当地的科伊猎人——
gatherers became herders (but not farmers) by acquiring sheep and cows from farther north in Africa (and ultimately from Southwest Asia). Similarly, Native American hunter-gatherers of the U.S. gatherers became herders (but not farmers) by acquiring sheep and cows from farther north in Africa (and ultimately from Southwest Asia). Similarly, Native American hunter-gatherers of the U.S.
采集者通过从非洲更北部（最终是从西南亚）获取羊和牛而成为牧民（但不是农民）。同样，美国采集者中的美洲原住民狩猎采集者通过从非洲更北部（最终是从西南亚）获取羊和牛而成为牧民（但不是农民）。同样，美国原住民的狩猎采集者
Southwest gradually became farmers by acquiring Mexican crops. In these four areas the onset of food production provides little or no evidence for the domestication of local plant or animal species, Southwest gradually became farmers by acquiring Mexican crops. In the
西南航空通过收购墨西哥农作物逐渐成为农民。在这四个地区，粮食生产的开始很少或根本没有提供当地植物或动物物种驯化的证据，西南航空通过收购墨西哥作物逐渐成为农民。在

At the opposite extreme are regions in which food production certainly began with an abrupt arrival of foreign people as well as of foreign crops and animals. The reason why we can be certain is that the arrivals took place in modern times and involved literate Europeans, who described in innumerable books what happened. Those areas include California, the Pacific Northwest of North that the arrivals took place in modern times and involved literate Europeans, who described in innumerable books what happened. Those areas include California, the Pacific Northwest of North
另一个极端是，在这些地区，粮食生产肯定是随着外国人以及外国农作物和动物的突然到来而开始的。我们之所以可以确定，是因为这些人的到来发生在现代，并且涉及有文化的欧洲人，他们在无数的书籍中描述了所发生的事情。这些地区包括加利福尼亚州、太平洋西北地区，这些地区发生在现代，并涉及有文化的欧洲人，他们在无数书籍中描述了所发生的事情。这些地区包括加利福尼亚州、太平洋西北地区
America, the Argentine pampas, Australia, and Siberia. Until recent centuries, these areas were still occupied by hunter-gatherers - Native Americans in the first three cases and Aboriginal Australians America, the Argentine pampas, Australia, and Siberia. Until recent centuries, these areas were still occupied by hunter-gatherers-Native Americans in the first three cases and Aboriginal Australians
美洲、阿根廷潘帕斯草原、澳大利亚和西伯利亚。直到近几个世纪，这些地区仍然被狩猎采集者占据——前三个例子中的美洲原住民以及美国、阿根廷潘帕斯、澳大利亚和西伯利亚的澳大利亚原住民。直到最近几个世纪，这些地区仍然被狩猎采集者占据——前三个案例中的美洲原住民和澳大利亚原住民
or Native Siberians in the last two. Those hunter-gatherers were killed, infected, driven out, or largely replaced by arriving European farmers and herders who brought their own crops and did not
或后两者中的西伯利亚原住民。这些狩猎采集者被杀害、感染、驱逐，或者大部分被抵达的欧洲农民和牧民所取代，他们带来了自己的农作物，但没有
domesticate any local wild species after their arrival (except for macadamia nuts in Australia). In the Cape of South Africa the arriving Europeans found not only Khoi hunter-gatherers but also Khoi herders who already possessed only domestic animals, not crops. The result was again the start of farming dependent on crops from elsewhere, a failure to domesticate local species, and a massive modern replacement of human population.
在任何当地野生物种抵达后对其进行驯化（澳大利亚坚果除外）。在南非开普敦，到达的欧洲人不仅发现了科伊人的狩猎采集者，还发现了只拥有家畜而不拥有农作物的科伊牧民。其结果是，农业再次开始依赖其他地方的作物，当地物种驯化失败，以及现代人口的大规模替代。

Finally, the same pattern of an abrupt start of food production dependent on domesticates from elsewhere, and an abrupt and massive population replacement, seems to have repeated itself in many areas in the prehistoric era. In the absence of written records, the evidence of those prehistoric replacements must be sought in the archaeological record or inferred from linguistic evidence. The bestattested cases are ones in which there can be no doubt about population replacement because the newly arriving food producers differed markedly in their skeletons from the hunter-gatherers whom they replaced, and because the food producers introduced not only crops and animals but also pottery. Later chapters will describe the two clearest such examples: the Austronesian expansion from South China into the Philippines and Indonesia (Chapter 17), and the Bantu expansion over subequatorial Africa (Chapter 19).
最后，同样的模式，即粮食生产突然开始依赖于其他地方的驯化物，以及突然大规模的人口更替，似乎在史前时代的许多地区重演。在缺乏书面记录的情况下，这些史前替代品的证据必须在考古记录中寻找或从语言证据中推断。最充分的例子是人口更替是毫无疑问的，因为新到来的粮食生产者的骨骼与他们所取代的狩猎采集者明显不同，而且因为粮食生产者不仅引进了农作物和动物，还引进了陶器。后面的章节将描述两个最明显的例子：南岛人从华南扩张到菲律宾和印度尼西亚（第 17 章），以及班图人在非洲赤道以南的扩张（第 19 章）。

Southeastern Europe and central Europe present a similar picture of an abrupt onset of food production (dependent on Southwest Asian crops and animals) and of pottery making. This onset too probably involved replacement of old Greeks and Germans by new Greeks and Germans, just as old gave way to new in the Philippines, Indonesia, and subequatorial Africa. However, the skeletal differences between the earlier hunter-gatherers and the farmers who replaced them are less marked in Europe than in the Philippines, Indonesia, and subequatorial Africa. Hence the case for population replacement in Europe is less strong or less direct.
东南欧和中欧也呈现出类似的景象：粮食生产（依赖于西南亚的农作物和动物）和陶器制作的突然开始。这一爆发也可能涉及到新的希腊人和德国人取代了旧的希腊人和德国人，就像菲律宾、印度尼西亚和赤道以南非洲的旧人让位于新人一样。然而，早期狩猎采集者和取代他们的农民之间的骨骼差异在欧洲没有菲律宾、印度尼西亚和赤道以南非洲那么明显。因此，欧洲人口更替的理由不那么有力或不那么直接。
learned food production, and peoples of other neighboring areas were replaced by invading food producers from the nuclear areas-again at widely differing times. Finally, peoples of some areas ecologically suitable for food production neither evolved nor acquired agriculture in prehistoric times at all; they persisted as hunter-gatherers until the modern world finally swept upon them. The peoples of areas with a head start on food production thereby gained a head start on the path leading toward guns, germs, and steel. The result was a long series of collisions between the haves and the have-nots of history.
人类学会了粮食生产，其他邻近地区的人民也被来自核地区的入侵粮食生产者所取代——同样是在不同的时间。最后，一些生态上适合粮食生产的地区的人们在史前时期根本没有进化或获得农业；他们坚持以狩猎采集为生，直到现代世界最终席卷他们。粮食生产领先地区的人民因此在通向枪支、病菌和钢铁的道路上取得了先机。其结果是历史上一系列富人和穷人之间的冲突。
How can we explain these geographic differences in the times and modes of onset of food production? That question, one of the most important problems of prehistory, will be the subject of the next five chapters.
我们如何解释粮食生产开始的时间和模式的地理差异？这个问题是史前史最重要的问题之一，将是接下来五章的主题。

Formerly, all people on earth were hunter-gatherers. Why did any of them adopt food production at all? Given that they must have had some reason, why did they do so around 8500 b.c. in Mediterranean habitats of the Fertile Crescent, only 3,000 years later in the climatically and structurally similar Mediterranean habitats of southwestern Europe, and never indigenously in the similar Mediterranean habitats of California, southwestern Australia, and the Cape of South Africa? Why did people of the Fertile Crescent wait until 8500 b.c., instead of becoming food producers around 18,500 ог 28,500 в.с. 6
以前，地球上的所有人都是狩猎采集者。为什么他们中的任何人都采用粮食生产？鉴于它们肯定有某种原因，为什么它们在公元前 8500 年左右在新月沃土的地中海栖息地这样做，而仅仅 3000 年后，在气候和结构相似的西南部欧洲的地中海栖息地，却从未在类似的地中海栖息地本土出现加利福尼亚州、澳大利亚西南部和南非海角？为什么新月沃地的人们要等到公元前 8500 年，而不是在公元前 18,500 年或 28,500 年左右成为粮食生产者。 6
From our modern perspective, all these questions at first seem silly, because the drawbacks of being a hunter-gatherer appear so obvious. Scientists used to quote a phrase of Thomas Hobbes’s in order to characterize the lifestyle of hunter-gatherers as “nasty, brutish, and short.” They seemed to have to work hard, to be driven by the daily quest for food, often to be close to starvation, to lack such elementary material comforts as soft beds and adequate clothing, and to die young.
从我们现代的角度来看，所有这些问题乍一看似乎很愚蠢，因为作为狩猎采集者的缺点显得如此明显。科学家们常常引用托马斯·霍布斯的一句话来形容狩猎采集者的生活方式“肮脏、野蛮和短暂”。他们似乎必须努力工作，每天对食物的追求驱使着他们，常常接近饥饿，缺乏柔软的床和足够的衣服等基本的物质享受，并且英年早逝。

In reality, only for today’s affluent First World citizens, who don’t actually do the work of raising food themselves, does food production (by remote agribusinesses) mean less physical work, more comfort, freedom from starvation, and a longer expected lifetime. Most peasant farmers and herders, who constitute the great majority of the world’s actual food producers, aren’t necessarily better off than hunter-gatherers. Time budget studies show that they may spend more rather than fewer hours per day at work than hunter-gatherers do. Archaeologists have demonstrated that the first farmers in many areas were smaller and less well nourished, suffered from more serious diseases, and died on the average at a younger age than the hunter-gatherers they replaced. If those first farmers could have foreseen the consequences of adopting food production, they might not have opted to do so. Why, unable to foresee the result, did they nevertheless make that choice?
事实上，只有对于今天富裕的第一世界公民来说，他们自己实际上并不从事种植粮食的工作，粮食生产（由偏远的农业企业）才意味着更少的体力劳动、更多的舒适、免于饥饿和更长的预期寿命。大多数农民和牧民构成了世界上实际粮食生产者的绝大多数，他们的生活并不一定比狩猎采集者更好。时间预算研究表明，他们每天工作的时间可能比狩猎采集者多而不是少。考古学家已经证明，许多地区的第一批农民比他们所取代的狩猎采集者身材矮小，营养不良，患有更严重的疾病，平均死亡年龄更小。如果第一批农民能够预见到采用粮食生产的后果，他们可能不会选择这样做。为什么在无法预见结果的情况下，他们却做出了这样的选择呢？

There exist many actual cases of hunter-gatherers who did see food production practiced by their neighbors, and who nevertheless refused to accept its supposed blessings and instead remained hunter-gatherers. For instance, Aboriginal hunter-gatherers of northeastern Australia traded for thousands of years with farmers of the Torres Strait Islands, between Australia and New Guinea. California Native American hunter-gatherers traded with Native American farmers in the Colorado River valley. In addition, Khoi herders west of the Fish River of South Africa traded with Bantu farmers east of the Fish River, and continued to dispense with farming themselves. Why?
有许多狩猎采集者的实际案例，他们确实看到邻居进行粮食生产，但他们拒绝接受所谓的祝福，而是继续狩猎采集。例如，澳大利亚东北部的原住民狩猎采集者与澳大利亚和新几内亚之间托雷斯海峡群岛的农民进行了数千年的贸易往来。加利福尼亚州美洲原住民狩猎采集者与科罗拉多河谷的美洲原住民农民进行贸易。此外，南非鱼河以西的科伊牧民与鱼河以东的班图农民进行贸易，并继续放弃耕作。为什么？
Still other hunter-gatherers in contact with farmers did eventually become farmers, but only after what may seem to us like an inordinately long delay. For example, the coastal peoples of northern Germany did not adopt food production until 1,300 years after peoples of the Linearbandkeramik culture introduced it to inland parts of Germany only 125 miles to the south. Why did those coastal Germans wait so long, and what led them finally to change their minds?
还有一些与农民接触的狩猎采集者最终成为了农民，但只是在我们看来经历了极其漫长的延迟之后。例如，直到 1,300 年后，德国北部沿海民族才开始采用粮食生产，直到 Linearbandkeramik 文化的民族将粮食生产引入距其南部仅 125 英里的德国内陆地区。为什么那些沿海的德国人等了这么久，又是什么让他们最终改变了主意？
food production, nor an invention, as we might first assume. There was often not even a conscious choice between food production and hunting-gathering. Specifically, in each area of the globe the first people who adopted food production could obviously not have been making a conscious choice or consciously striving toward farming as a goal, because they had never seen farming and had no way of knowing what it would be like. Instead, as we shall see, food production evolved as a by-product of decisions made without awareness of their consequences. Hence the question that we have to ask is why food production did evolve, why it evolved in some places but not others, why at different times in different places, and why not instead at some earlier or later date.
食品生产，也不是我们首先假设的发明。人们甚至常常没有在粮食生产和狩猎采集之间做出有意识的选择。具体来说，在全球各个地区，第一批采用粮食生产的人显然不可能有意识地选择或有意识地以农业为目标，因为他们从未见过农业，也无法知道农业会是什么样子。 。相反，正如我们将看到的，粮食生产的演变是在没有意识到其后果的情况下做出的决定的副产品。因此，我们要问的问题是，为什么粮食生产确实进化了，为什么它在某些地方进化了，但在其他地方却没有进化，为什么在不同的时间在不同的地方进化了，为什么不在更早或更晚的日期进化。

Another misconception is that there is necessarily a sharp divide between nomadic hunter-gatherers and sedentary food producers. In reality, although we frequently draw such a contrast, huntergatherers in some productive areas, including North America’s Pacific Northwest coast and possibly southeastern Australia, became sedentary but never became food producers. Other huntergatherers, in Palestine, coastal Peru, and Japan, became sedentary first and adopted food production much later. Sedentary groups probably made up a much higher fraction of hunter-gatherers 15,000 years ago, when all inhabited parts of the world (including the most productive areas) were still occupied by hunter-gatherers, than they do today, when the few remaining hunter-gatherers survive only in unproductive areas where nomadism is the sole option.
另一个误解是，游牧狩猎采集者和定居的粮食生产者之间必然存在明显的分歧。事实上，尽管我们经常进行这样的对比，但在一些生产地区，包括北美太平洋西北海岸和可能的澳大利亚东南部，狩猎采集者成为了定居者，但从未成为粮食生产者。巴勒斯坦、秘鲁沿海和日本的其他狩猎采集者首先开始定居，很久以后才开始进行粮食生产。 15,000年前，定居群体在狩猎采集者中所占的比例可能比今天高得多，当时世界上所有有人居住的地区（包括生产力最高的地区）仍然被狩猎采集者占据，而今天，仅存的少数狩猎者——采集者只能在生产力低下的地区生存，游牧是唯一的选择。

Conversely, there are mobile groups of food producers. Some modern nomads of New Guinea’s Lakes Plains make clearings in the jungle, plant bananas and papayas, go off for a few months to live again as hunter-gatherers, return to check on their crops, weed the garden if they find the crops growing, set off again to hunt, return months later to check again, and settle down for a while to harvest and eat if their garden has produced. Apache Indians of the southwestern United States settled down to farm in the summer at higher elevations and toward the north, then withdrew to the south and to lower elevations to wander in search of wild foods during the winter. Many herding peoples of Africa and Asia shift camp along regular seasonal routes to take advantage of predictable seasonal changes in pasturage. Thus, the shift from hunting-gathering to food production did not always coincide with a shift from nomadism to sedentary living.
相反，食品生产者也有流动群体。新几内亚湖区平原的一些现代游牧民族在丛林中开辟了空地，种植香蕉和木瓜，离开几个月，再次以狩猎采集者的身份生活，回来检查他们的庄稼，如果发现庄稼在生长，就给花园除草，再次出发去打猎，几个月后回来再次检查，并安顿一段时间，如果他们的花园有收获，就可以收获和食用。美国西南部的阿帕奇印第安人在夏季定居在海拔较高的地区和北部耕作，然后在冬季撤退到南部和海拔较低的地区，四处游荡寻找野生食物。非洲和亚洲的许多牧民沿着定期的季节性路线转移营地，以利用牧场可预测的季节变化。因此，从狩猎采集到粮食生产的转变并不总是与从游牧生活到定居生活的转变同时发生。

Another supposed dichotomy that becomes blurred in reality is a distinction between food producers as active managers of their land and hunter-gatherers as mere collectors of the land’s wild produce. In reality, some hunter-gatherers intensively manage their land. For example, New Guinea peoples who never domesticated sago palms or mountain pandanus nevertheless increase production of these wild edible plants by clearing away encroaching competing trees, keeping channels in sago swamps clear, and promoting growth of new sago shoots by cutting down mature sago trees. Aboriginal Australians who never reached the stage of farming yams and seed plants nonetheless anticipated several elements of farming. They managed the landscape by burning it, to encourage the growth of edible seed plants that sprout after fires. In gathering wild yams, they cut off most of the edible tuber but replaced the stems and tops of the tubers in the ground so that the encourage the growth of edible seed plants that sprout after fires. In gathering wild yams, they cut off most of the edible tuber but replaced the stems and tops of the tubers in the ground so that the and remaining attached tubers home and similarly replace them in soil at their camp.
另一个在现实中变得模糊的假设二分法是，粮食生产者是其土地的积极管理者，而狩猎采集者只是土地野生产品的收集者。事实上，一些狩猎采集者集中管理他们的土地。例如，从未驯化西米棕榈树或山露兜树的新几内亚人民却通过清除入侵的竞争树木、保持西米沼泽中的通道畅通以及通过砍伐成熟的西米树促进新西米芽的生长来增加这些野生食用植物的产量。尽管澳大利亚原住民从未达到种植山药和种子植物的阶段，但他们仍然期待农业的几个要素。他们通过焚烧来管理景观，以促进火灾后发芽的可食用种子植物的生长。在采集野生山药时，他们砍掉了大部分可食用块茎，但将块茎的茎和顶部重新埋入地下，以促进火灾后发芽的可食用种子植物的生长。在采集野生山药时，他们切掉了大部分可食用块茎，但将块茎的茎和顶部放回地下，以便剩余的附着块茎回家，并同样将它们放回营地的土壤中。
and animals that were eventually domesticated in a given area were domesticated simultaneously. Even in the cases of the most rapid independent development of food production from a hunting gathering lifestyle, it took thousands of years to shift from complete dependence on wild foods to a diet with very few wild foods. In early stages of food production, people simultaneously collected wild foods and raised cultivated ones, and diverse types of collecting activities diminished in importance at different times as reliance on crops increased.
最终在特定地区被驯化的动物同时被驯化。即使在粮食生产从狩猎采集生活方式中独立发展得最快的情况下，从完全依赖野生食物到很少野生食物的饮食也需要数千年的时间。在粮食生产的早期阶段，人们同时采集野生食物和种植栽培食物，随着对农作物依赖的增加，不同类型的采集活动的重要性在不同时期逐渐减弱。

The underlying reason why this transition was piecemeal is that food production systems evolved as a result of the accumulation of many separate decisions about allocating time and effort. Foraging humans, like foraging animals, have only finite time and energy, which they can spend in various ways. We can picture an incipient farmer waking up and asking: Shall I spend today hoeing my garden (predictably yielding a lot of vegetables several months from now), gathering shellfish (predictably yielding a little meat today), or hunting deer (yielding possibly a lot of meat today, but more likely nothing)? Human and animal foragers are constantly prioritizing and making effort-allocation decisions, even if only unconsciously. They concentrate first on favorite foods, or ones that yield the highest payoff. If these are unavailable, they shift to less and less preferred foods.
这种转变是零碎的，根本原因是粮食生产系统的演变是许多关于分配时间和精力的单独决策积累的结果。觅食的人类，就像觅食的动物一样，只有有限的时间和精力，他们可以通过多种方式花费这些时间和精力。我们可以想象一个刚刚起步的农民醒来并问：我今天应该花时间锄我的花园（预计几个月后会产生大量蔬菜），收集贝类（预计今天会产生一点肉），还是狩猎鹿（可能会产生很多肉）今天有肉，但更可能没有肉）？人类和动物采集者不断地确定优先顺序并做出努力分配决策，即使只是无意识的。他们首先关注最喜欢的食物，或者那些能带来最高回报的食物。如果无法获得这些食物，他们就会转向越来越不喜欢的食物。

Many considerations enter into these decisions. People seek food in order to satisfy their hunger and fill their bellies. They also crave specific foods, such as protein-rich foods, fat, salt, sweet fruits, and foods that simply taste good. All other things being equal, people seek to maximize their return of calories, protein, or other specific food categories by foraging in a way that yields the most return with the greatest certainty in the least time for the least effort. Simultaneously, they seek to minimize their risk of starving: moderate but reliable returns are preferable to a fluctuating lifestyle with a high time-averaged rate of return but a substantial likelihood of starving to death. One suggested function of the first gardens of nearly 11,000 years ago was to provide a reliable reserve larder as insurance in case wild food supplies failed.
这些决定需要考虑很多因素。人们寻找食物是为了充饥、填饱肚子。他们还渴望特定的食物，例如富含蛋白质的食物、脂肪、盐、甜水果和味道好的食物。在所有其他条件相同的情况下，人们寻求通过以最少的时间、最少的努力、以最大的确定性获得最大回报的方式采食，从而最大化卡路里、蛋白质或其他特定食物类别的回报。同时，他们力求将挨饿的风险降到最低：中等但可靠的回报比波动的生活方式更可取，这种生活方式的时间平均回报率很高，但饿死的可能性很大。有人建议，近 11,000 年前第一个花园的功能是提供可靠的储备食品储藏室，作为野生食物供应失败时的保险。

Conversely, men hunters tend to guide themselves by considerations of prestige: for example, they might rather go giraffe hunting every day, bag a giraffe once a month, and thereby gain the status of great hunter, than bring home twice a giraffe’s weight of food in a month by humbling themselves and reliably gathering nuts every day. People are also guided by seemingly arbitrary cultural preferences, such as considering fish either delicacies or taboo. Finally, their priorities are heavily influenced by the relative values they attach to different lifestyles-just as we can see today. For instance, in the 19th-century U.S. West, the cattlemen, sheepmen, and farmers all despised each other. Similarly, throughout human history farmers have tended to despise hunter-gatherers as primitive, hunter-gatherers have despised farmers as ignorant, and herders have despised both. All these elements come into play in people’s separate decisions about how to obtain their food.
相反，男性猎人则倾向于以声望为指导：例如，他们宁愿每天去猎长颈鹿，每月捕获一次长颈鹿，从而获得伟大猎人的地位，也不愿带回家两倍于长颈鹿重量的食物在一个月内谦卑自己并每天可靠地收集坚果。人们还受到看似任意的文化偏好的引导，例如将鱼视为美味佳肴或禁忌。最后，正如我们今天所看到的，他们的优先事项很大程度上受到他们对不同生活方式的相对价值观的影响。例如，在19世纪的美国西部，牧民、牧羊人和农民都互相鄙视。同样，在整个人类历史中，农民往往鄙视狩猎采集者，认为他们是原始的，狩猎采集者则鄙视农民，认为他们无知，而牧民则鄙视两者。所有这些因素都会影响人们如何获取食物的单独决定。

As we already noted, the first farmers on each continent could not have chosen farming consciously, because there were no other nearby farmers for them to observe. However, once food production had arisen in one part of a continent, neighboring hunter-gatherers could see the result and make conscious decisions. In some cases the hunter-gatherers adopted the neighboring system of food production virtually as a complete package; in others they chose only certain elements of it; and in still others they rejected food production entirely and remained hunter-gatherers.
正如我们已经指出的，每个大陆上的第一批农民不可能有意识地选择耕作，因为附近没有其他农民可供他们观察。然而，一旦粮食生产在大陆的某一地区出现，邻近的狩猎采集者就可以看到结果并做出有意识的决定。在某些情况下，狩猎采集者实际上采用了邻近的粮食生产系统作为一个完整的系统。在另一些作品中，他们只选择了其中的某些元素；还有一些地区，他们完全拒绝粮食生产，仍然以狩猎采集为生。

For example, hunter-gatherers in parts of southeastern Europe had quickly adopted Southwest Asian cereal crops, pulse crops, and livestock simultaneously as a complete package by around 6000 For example, hunter-gatherers in parts of southeastern Europe had quickly adopted Southwest Asian cereal crops, pulse crops, and livestock simultaneously as a complete package by around 6000
例如，东南欧部分地区的狩猎采集者很快就采用了西南亚谷类作物、豆类作物和牲畜作为一个整体，大约 6000 人。 例如，东南欧部分地区的狩猎采集者很快采用了西南亚谷类作物、豆类作物和牲畜作为一个完整的包同时提供约 6000
B.C. All three of these elements also spread rapidly through central Europe in the centuries before 5000 в.C. Adoption of food production may have been rapid and wholesale in southeastern and central B.C. All three of these elements also spread rapidly through central Europe in the centuries before 5000 B.C. Adoption of food production may have been rapid and wholesale in southeastern and central
公元前 5000 年之前的几个世纪里，所有这三种元素也在中欧迅速传播。在公元前 5000 年之前的几个世纪里，所有这三个元素在中欧也迅速传播。在东南部和中部，粮食生产的采用可能是快速和批发的。
Europe because the hunter-gatherer lifestyle there was less productive and less competitive. In contrast, food production was adopted piecemeal in southwestern Europe (southern France, Spain, and Europe because the hunter-gatherer lifestyle there was less productive and less competitive. In contrast, food production was adopted piecemeal in southwestern Europe (southern France, Spain, and
欧洲是因为那里的狩猎采集生活方式生产力较低，竞争力较差。相比之下，西南部欧洲（法国南部、西班牙和欧洲）的粮食生产是零敲碎打的，因为那里的狩猎采集生活方式生产力较低，竞争力较差。相反，西南部欧洲（法国南部、西班牙、和
Italy), where sheep arrived first and cereals later. The adoption of intensive food production from the Asian mainland was also very slow and piecemeal in Japan, probably because the hunter-gatherer Italy), where sheep arrived first and cereals later. The adoption of in
意大利），羊首先到达，谷物随后到达。日本对亚洲大陆集约化粮食生产的采用也非常缓慢且零散，这可能是因为狩猎采集国家意大利的缘故，绵羊先到达，谷物随后到达。通过在
lifestyle based on seafood and local plants was so productive there.
那里以海鲜和当地植物为基础的生活方式非常富有成效。

Just as a hunting-gathering lifestyle can be traded piecemeal for a food-producing lifestyle, one system of food production can also be traded piecemeal for another. For example, Indians of the Just as a hunting-gathering lifestyle can be traded piecemeal for a food-producing lifestyle, one system of food production can also be traded piecemeal for another. For example, Indians of the
正如狩猎采集生活方式可以逐渐转变为粮食生产生活方式一样，一种粮食生产体系也可以逐渐转变为另一种粮食生产体系。例如，印第安人可以将狩猎采集生活方式零碎地换成粮食生产生活方式，一种粮食生产系统也可以零碎地换成另一种粮食生产系统。例如，印度人
eastern United States were domesticating local plants by about 2500 b.c. but had trade connections with Mexican Indians who developed a more productive crop system based on the trinity of corn, eastern United States were domesticating local plants by about 2500 B.C. but had trade connections with Mexican Indians who developed a more productive crop system based on the trinity of corn,
美国东部在公元前约 2500 年就开始驯化当地植物，但与墨西哥印第安人有贸易联系，墨西哥印第安人在玉米三位一体的基础上开发了生产力更高的作物系统，美国东部在公元前约 2500 年就开始驯化当地植物，但与墨西哥印第安人有贸易联系他开发了一种以玉米三位一体为基础的生产力更高的作物系统，
squash, and beans. Eastern U.S. Indians adopted Mexican crops, and many of them discarded many of their local domesticates, piecemeal; squash was domesticated independently, corn arrived from squash, and beans. Eastern U.S. Indians adopted Mexican crops, and many of them discarded many of their local domesticates, piecemeal; squash was domesticated independently, corn arrived from
南瓜和豆类。美国东部印第安人采用了墨西哥作物，其中许多人零碎地丢弃了许多当地的驯化作物；南瓜是独立驯化的，玉米来自南瓜，还有豆类。美国东部印第安人采用了墨西哥作物，其中许多人零碎地丢弃了许多当地的驯化作物；南瓜是独立驯化的，玉米是从
Mexico around A.D. 200 but remained a minor crop until around A.D. 900 , and beans arrived a century or two later. It even happened that food-production systems were abandoned in favor of huntingMexico around A.D. 200 but remained a minor crop until around A.D. 900, and beans arrived a century or two later. It even happened that food-production systems were abandoned in favor of hunting-
墨西哥在公元 200 年左右出现，但直到公元 900 年左右一直是一种小作物，一两个世纪后豆类传入。甚至在公元 200 年左右，墨西哥放弃了粮食生产系统，转而进行狩猎，但直到公元 900 年左右，墨西哥仍然是一种小作物，一两个世纪后，豆类传入了墨西哥。甚至发生了粮食生产系统被放弃以支持狩猎的情况——
gathering. For instance, around 3000 B.C. the hunter-gatherers of southern Sweden adopted farming based on Southwest Asian crops, but abandoned it around 2700 b.c. and reverted to huntinggathering for 400 years before resuming farming.
采集。例如，公元前3000年左右，瑞典南部的狩猎采集者采用了以西南亚作物为基础的农业，但在公元前2700年左右放弃了这种农业，并在恢复农业之前恢复了狩猎采集400年。

All these considerations make it clear that we should not suppose that the decision to adopt farming was made in a vacuum, as if the people had previously had no means to feed themselves. Instead, we must consider food production and hunting-gathering as alternative strategies competing with each other. Mixed economies that added certain crops or livestock to hunting-gathering also competed against both types of “pure” economies, and against mixed economies with higher or lower proportions of food production. Nevertheless, over the last 10,000 years, the predominant result has been a shift from hunting-gathering to food production. Hence we must ask: What were the factors that tipped the competitive advantage away from the former and toward the latter?
所有这些考虑都清楚地表明，我们不应该认为采用农业的决定是在真空中做出的，就好像人们以前没有办法养活自己一样。相反，我们必须将粮食生产和狩猎采集视为相互竞争的替代战略。在狩猎采集中添加某些作物或牲畜的混合经济体也与两种类型的“纯粹”经济体以及粮食生产比例较高或较低的混合经济体竞争。然而，在过去的一万年里，主要的结果是从狩猎采集转向粮食生产。因此我们必须问：是什么因素导致竞争优势从前者转向后者？

That question continues to be debated by archaeologists and anthropologists. One reason for its remaining unsettled is that different factors may have been decisive in different parts of the world nother has been the problem of disentangling cause and effect in the rise of food production. However, five main contributing factors can still be identified; the controversies revolve mainly around their relative importance.
考古学家和人类学家仍在争论这个问题。其仍然悬而未决的原因之一是，在世界不同地区，不同的因素可能起到决定性作用，此外，粮食产量增长的因果关系问题也是存在的。然而，仍然可以确定五个主要影响因素；争议主要围绕它们的相对重要性。

One factor is the decline in the availability of wild foods. The lifestyle of hunter-gatherers has become increasingly less rewarding over the past 13,000 years, as resources on which they depended (especially animal resources) have become less abundant or even disappeared. As we saw in Chapter 1, most large mammal species became extinct in North and South America at the end of the Pleistocene, and some became extinct in Eurasia and Africa, either because of climate changes or because of the rise in skill and numbers of human hunters. While the role of animal extinctions in eventually (after a long lag) nudging ancient Native Americans, Eurasians, and Africans toward food production can be debated, there are numerous incontrovertible cases on islands in more recent
因素之一是野生食物供应量的减少。在过去的一万三千年里，狩猎采集者的生活方式变得越来越没有回报，因为他们赖以生存的资源（特别是动物资源）变得越来越不丰富，甚至消失了。正如我们在第一章中看到的，更新世末期，大多数大型哺乳动物物种在北美和南美灭绝，而欧亚大陆和非洲的一些哺乳动物物种灭绝，要么是因为气候变化，要么是因为人类技能和数量的增长。猎人。虽然动物灭绝最终（经过长时间的滞后）推动古代美洲原住民、欧亚人和非洲人走向粮食生产的作用尚有争议，但最近在岛屿上出现了许多无可争议的案例。
islands, did they intensify their food production. For instance, although the Polynesians who colonized Easter Island around A.D. 500 brought chickens with them, chicken did not become a major food islands, did they intensify their food production. For instance, although the Polynesians who colonized Easter Island around A.D. 500 brought chickens with them, chicken did not become a major food until wild birds and porpoises were no longer readily available as food. Similarly, a suggested contributing
岛屿，他们是否加强了粮食生产？例如，虽然公元500年左右殖民复活节岛的波利尼西亚人带来了鸡，但鸡并没有成为主要的食物岛，他们是否强化了粮食生产。例如，尽管公元 500 年左右殖民复活节岛的波利尼西亚人带来了鸡，但直到野鸟和鼠海豚不再容易作为食物时，鸡才成为主要食物。同样，建议贡献

A second factor is that, just as the depletion of wild game tended to make hunting-gathering less rewarding, an increased availability of domesticable wild plants made steps leading to plant domestication more rewarding. For instance, climate changes at the end of the Pleistocene in the Fertile Crescent greatly expanded the area of habitats with wild cereals, of which huge crops could be harvested in a short time. Those wild cereal harvests were precursors to the domestication of the earliest crops, the cereals wheat and barley, in the Fertile Crescent.
第二个因素是，正如野生动物的减少往往会使狩猎采集的回报减少一样，可驯化野生植物的增加使植物驯化的步骤变得更有价值。例如，新月沃地更新世末期的气候变化极大地扩大了野生谷物的栖息地面积，可以在短时间内收获大量农作物。这些野生谷物收成是新月沃地驯化最早的谷物小麦和大麦的前身。

Still another factor tipping the balance away from hunting-gathering was the cumulative development of technologies on which food production would eventually depend-technologies for collecting, processing, and storing wild foods. What use can would-be farmers make of a ton of wheat grains on the stalk, if they have not first figured out how to harvest, husk, and store them? The necessary methods, implements, and facilities appeared rapidly in the Fertile Crescent after 11,000 B.C., having been invented for dealing with the newly available abundance of wild cereals.
打破狩猎采集平衡的另一个因素是粮食生产最终依赖于的技术的不断发展——收集、加工和储存野生食物的技术。如果未来的农民没有首先弄清楚如何收割、去壳和储存小麦，那么他们能利用秸秆上的一吨小麦籽粒来做什么呢？公元前 11,000 年之后，新月沃地迅速出现了必要的方法、工具和设施，这些方法、工具和设施是为了处理新出现的大量野生谷物而发明的。

Those inventions included sickles of flint blades cemented into wooden or bone handles, for harvesting wild grains; baskets in which to carry the grains home from the hillsides where they grew; mortars and pestles, or grinding slabs, to remove the husks; the technique of roasting grains so that they could be stored without sprouting; and underground storage pits, some of them plastered to make them waterproof. Evidence for all of these techniques becomes abundant at sites of hunter-gatherers in the Fertile Crescent after 11,000 в.c. All these techniques, though developed for the exploitation of wild cereals, were prerequisites to the planting of cereals as crops. These cumulative developments constituted the unconscious first steps of plant domestication.
这些发明包括将燧石刀片粘在木柄或骨柄上的镰刀，用于收割野生谷物；用来将谷物从生长的山坡带回家的篮子；研钵和研杵，或研磨板，以去除外壳；烘烤谷物的技术，使它们可以储存而不发芽；以及地下储藏坑，其中一些还涂有灰泥以防水。公元 11,000 年后，在新月沃地的狩猎采集地，所有这些技术的证据都变得丰富起来。所有这些技术虽然是为了开发野生谷物而开发的，但却是种植谷物作为农作物的先决条件。这些累积的发展构成了植物驯化无意识的第一步。

A fourth factor was the two-way link between the rise in human population density and the rise in food production. In all parts of the world where adequate evidence is available, archaeologists find evidence of rising densities associated with the appearance of food production. Which was the cause and which the result? This is a long-debated chicken-or-egg problem: did a rise in human population density force people to turn to food production, or did food production permit a rise in human population density?
第四个因素是人口密度的增加和粮食产量的增加之间的双向联系。在世界上所有有足够证据的地方，考古学家都发现了密度上升与粮食生产的出现有关的证据。哪个是因，哪个是结果？这是一个长期争论的先有鸡还是先有蛋的问题：人口密度的增加是迫使人们转向粮食生产，还是粮食生产允许人口密度的增加？

In principle, one expects the chain of causation to operate in both directions. As I’ve already discussed, food production tends to lead to increased population densities because it yields more edible calories per acre than does hunting-gathering. On the other hand, human population densities were gradually rising throughout the late Pleistocene anyway, thanks to improvements in human technology for collecting and processing wild foods. As population densities rose, food production became increasingly favored because it provided the increased food outputs needed to feed all those people.
原则上，人们期望因果链是双向运作的。正如我已经讨论过的，粮食生产往往会导致人口密度增加，因为它每英亩产生的可食用热量比狩猎采集更多。另一方面，由于人类采集和加工野生食物技术的进步，在整个更新世晚期，人口密度逐渐上升。随着人口密度的增加，粮食生产越来越受到青睐，因为它提供了养活所有人口所需的增加的粮食产量。

That is, the adoption of food production exemplifies what is termed an autocatalytic process-one that catalyzes itself in a positive feedback cycle, going faster and faster once it has started. A gradual rise in population densities impelled people to obtain more food, by rewarding those who unconsciously took steps toward producing it. Once people began to produce food and become sedentary, they could shorten the birth spacing and produce still more people, requiring still more food. This bidirectional link between food production and population density explains the paradox that food production, while increasing the quantity of edible calories per acre, left the food producers less well nourished than the hunter-gatherers whom they succeeded. That paradox developed because human population densities rose slightly more steeply than did the availability of food.
也就是说，食品生产的采用体现了所谓的自催化过程，即在正反馈循环中自我催化，一旦开始，速度就会越来越快。人口密度的逐渐上升迫使人们获得更多的食物，奖励那些无意识地采取措施生产食物的人。一旦人们开始生产食物并变得久坐，他们就可以缩短生育间隔并生产更多的人口，从而需要更多的食物。粮食生产和人口密度之间的这种双向联系解释了这样一个悖论：粮食生产在增加每英亩可食用热量的同时，却使粮食生产者的营养状况不如他们所继承的狩猎采集者。这一悖论之所以出现，是因为人口密度的上升幅度略高于食物供应量的上升幅度。

Taken together, these four factors help us understand why the transition to food production in the Fertile Crescent began around 8500 в.C., not around 18,500 or 28,500 в.с. At the latter two dates hunting-gathering was still much more rewarding than incipient food production, because wild mammals were still abundant; wild cereals were not yet abundant; people had not yet developed the inventions necessary for collecting, processing, and storing cereals efficiently; and human population densities were not yet high enough for a large premium to be placed on extracting more calories per acre.
总而言之，这四个因素帮助我们理解为什么新月沃地开始向粮食生产过渡是在公元 8500 年左右，而不是公元 18,500 或 28,500 年左右。在后两个时期，狩猎采集仍然比早期的粮食生产更有价值，因为野生哺乳动物仍然丰富。野生谷物尚未丰富；人们还没有开发出有效收集、加工和储存谷物所需的发明；人口密度还不够高，无法在每英亩土地上获取更多卡路里。

A final factor in the transition became decisive at geographic boundaries between hunter-gatherers and food producers. The much denser populations of food producers enabled them to displace or kill hunter-gatherers by their sheer numbers, not to mention the other advantages associated with food production (including technology, germs, and professional soldiers). In areas where there were kill hunter-gatherers by their sheer numbers, not to mention the other advantages associated with food production (including
转变中的最后一个因素在狩猎采集者和粮食生产者之间的地理边界上变得具有决定性。粮食生产者的人口密度大得多，使他们能够凭借数量优势取代或杀死狩猎采集者，更不用说与粮食生产相关的其他优势（包括技术、细菌和​​职业士兵）。在那些狩猎采集者因数量众多而被杀死的地区，更不用说与粮食生产相关的其他优势（包括
only hunter-gatherers to begin with, those groups of hunter-gatherers who adopted food production outbred those who didn’t.
首先，只有狩猎采集者，那些从事粮食生产的狩猎采集者群体的繁殖能力超过了那些不从事粮食生产的群体。

As a result, in most areas of the globe suitable for food production, hunter-gatherers met one of two fates: either they were displaced by neighboring food producers, or else they survived only by adopting food production themselves. In places where they were already numerous or where geography retarded immigration by food producers, local hunter-gatherers did have time to adopt farming in prehistoric times and thus to survive as farmers. This may have happened in the U.S. Southwest, in the western Mediterranean, on the Atlantic coast of Europe, and in parts of Japan. However, in in prehistoric times and thus to survive as farmers. This may have happened in the U.S. Southwest, in the western Mediterranean, on the Atlantic coast of Europe, and in parts of Japan. However, in
结果，在全球大多数适合粮食生产的地区，狩猎采集者遇到了两种命运之一：要么被邻近的粮食生产者取代，要么只能靠自己从事粮食生产而生存。在人口众多或地理因素阻碍粮食生产者移民的地方，当地狩猎采集者确实有时间在史前时期采用农业，从而以农民的身份生存。这种情况可能发生在美国西南部、地中海西部、欧洲大西洋沿岸以及日本部分地区。然而，在史前时代并因此以农民的身份生存。这种情况可能发生在美国西南部、地中海西部、欧洲大西洋沿岸以及日本部分地区。然而，在
Indonesia, tropical Southeast Asia, most of subequatorial Africa, and probably in parts of Europe, the hunter-gatherers were replaced by farmers in the prehistoric era, whereas a similar replacement Indonesia, tropical Southeast Asia, most of subequatorial Africa, and probably
印度尼西亚、热带东南亚、非洲赤道以南的大部分地区，可能还有欧洲的部分地区，在史前时代，狩猎采集者被农民取代，而类似的替代印度尼西亚、热带东南亚、非洲赤道以南的大部分地区，可能还有欧洲的部分地区。
took place in modern times in Australia and much of the western United States.
发生在现代的澳大利亚和美国西部大部分地区。
Only where especially potent geographic or ecological barriers made immigration of food producers or diffusion of locally appropriate food-producing techniques very difficult were huntergatherers able to persist until modern times in areas suitable for food production. The three outstanding examples are the persistence of Native American hunter-gatherers in California, separated by deserts from the Native American farmers of Arizona; that of Khoisan hunter-gatherers at the Cape of South Africa, in a Mediterranean climate zone unsuitable for the equatorial crops of nearby Bantu farmers; and that of hunter-gatherers throughout the Australian continent, separated by narrow seas from the food producers of Indonesia and New Guinea. Those few peoples who remained hunter-gatherers into the 20th century escaped replacement by food producers because they were confined to areas not fit for food production, especially deserts and Arctic regions. Within the present decade, even they will have been seduced by the attractions of civilization, settled down under pressure from bureaucrats or missionaries, or succumbed to germs.
只有在特别强大的地理或生态障碍使得粮食生产者移民或传播适合当地的粮食生产技术非常困难的情况下，狩猎采集者才能够在适合粮食生产的地区坚持到现代。三个突出的例子是加利福尼亚州美洲原住民狩猎采集者的坚持，他们与亚利桑那州的美洲原住民农民被沙漠隔开；南非开普敦的科伊桑狩猎采集者处于地中海气候带，不适合赤道附近班图农民的农作物；以及整个澳大利亚大陆的狩猎采集者，与印度尼西亚和新几内亚的粮食生产国隔着狭窄的海洋。那些在 20 世纪仍然以狩猎采集为生的少数民族没有被粮食生产者取代，因为他们被限制在不适合粮食生产的地区，特别是沙漠和北极地区。在现在的十年里，即使是他们也会被文明的诱惑所诱惑，在官僚或传教士的压力下安定下来，或者屈服于细菌。

IF YOU’RE a HIKER WHOSE APPETITE IS JADED BY FARM-grown foods, it’s fun to try eating wild foods. You know that some wild plants, such as wild strawberries and blueberries, are both tasty and safe to eat. They’re sufficiently similar to familiar crops that you can easily recognize the wild berries, even though they’re much smaller than those we grow. Adventurous hikers cautiously eat mushrooms, aware that many species can kill us. But not even ardent nut lovers eat wild almonds, of which a few dozen contain enough cyanide (the poison used in Nazi gas chambers) to kill us. The forest is full of many other plants deemed inedible
如果您是一名徒步旅行者，对农场种植的食物感到厌倦，那么尝试吃野生食物会很有趣。您知道，一些野生植物，例如野草莓和蓝莓，既美味又安全。它们与熟悉的作物非常相似，您可以轻松识别野生浆果，尽管它们比我们种植的小得多。喜欢冒险的徒步旅行者小心翼翼地吃蘑菇，因为他们知道许多物种都会杀死我们。但即使是狂热的坚果爱好者也不会吃野生杏仁，其中几十颗含有足够杀死我们的氰化物（纳粹毒气室中使用的毒药）。森林里长满了许多其他被认为不可食用的植物

Yet all crops arose from wild plant species. How did certain wild plants get turned into crops? That question is especially puzzling in regard to the many crops (like almonds) whose wild progenitors are lethal or bad-tat?
然而所有农作物都源自野生植物物种。某些野生植物是如何变成农作物的？这个问题尤其令人费解，因为许多农作物（如杏仁）的野生祖先是致命的或有害的？

Plant domestication may be defined as growing a plant and thereby, consciously or unconsciously, causing it to change genetically from its wild ancestor in ways making it more useful to human consumers. Crop development is today a conscious, highly specialized effort carried out by professional scientists. They already know about the hundreds of existing crops and set out to develop yet another one. To achieve that goal, they plant many different seeds or roots, select the best progeny and plant their seeds, apply knowledge of genetics to develop good varieties that breed true, and
植物驯化可以定义为种植植物，从而有意识或无意识地使其从野生祖先的基因上发生变化，使其对人类消费者更有用。如今，作物开发是由专业科学家有意识地、高度专业化的努力。他们已经了解了数百种现有作物，并开始开发另一种作物。为了实现这一目标，他们种植许多不同的种子或根，选择最好的后代并种植它们的种子，应用遗传学知识来开发真正繁殖的优良品种，并
perhaps even use the latest techniques of genetic engineering to transfer specific useful genes. At the Davis campus of the University of California, an entire department (the Department of Pomology) perhaps even use the latest techniques of genetic engineering to transfer specific useful genes. At the
甚至可能使用最新的基因工程技术来转移特定的有用基因。在加州大学戴维斯分校，整个系（果树学系）甚至可能使用最新的基因工程技术来转移特定的有用基因。在
But plant domestication goes back over 10,000 years. Early farmers surely didn’t use molecular genetic techniques to arrive at their results. The first farmers didn’t even have any existing crop as a model to inspire them to develop new ones. Hence they couldn’t have known that, whatever they were doing, they would enjoy a tasty treat as a result.
但植物驯化可以追溯到一万多年前。早期的农民肯定没有使用分子遗传技术来获得结果。第一批农民甚至没有任何现有的作物作为模型来激励他们开发新作物。因此，他们不可能知道，无论他们在做什么，他们最终都会享受到美味佳肴。
How, then, did early farmers domesticate plants unwittingly? For example, how did they turn poisonous almonds into safe ones without knowing what they were doing? What changes did they actually make in wild plants, besides rendering some of them bigger or less poisonous? Even for valuable crops, the times of domestication vary greatly: for instance, peas were domesticated by 8000 B.C., olives around 4000 в.C., strawberries not until the Middle Ages, and pecans not until 1846. Many valuable wild plants yielding food prized by millions of people, such as oaks sought for their edible acorns in many parts of the world, remain untamed even today. What made some plants so much easier or more inviting to domesticate than others? Why did olive trees yield to Stone Age farmers, whereas oak trees continue to defeat our brightest agronomists?
那么，早期农民是如何在不知不觉中驯化植物的呢？例如，他们如何在不知道自己在做什么的情况下将有毒的杏仁变成安全的杏仁？除了使某些野生植物变得更大或毒性更小之外，它们实际上对野生植物产生了哪些变化？即使是有价值的作物，驯化的时间也有很大差异：例如，豌豆在公元前 8000 年被驯化，橄榄在公元前 4000 年左右被驯化，草莓直到中世纪才被驯化，山核桃直到 1846 年才被驯化。许多珍贵的野生植物产生食物而受到重视。数百万人，例如世界许多地方寻找可食用橡子的橡树，至今仍未被驯服。是什么让某些植物比其他植物更容易或更容易驯化？为什么橄榄树屈服于石器时代的农民，而橡树却继续击败我们最聪明的农学家？

Like all animal species (including humans), plants must spread their offspring to areas where they can thrive and pass on their parents’ genes. Young animals disperse by walking or flying, but plants don’t have that option, so they must somehow hitchhike. While some plant species have seeds adapted for being carried by the wind or for floating on water, many others trick an animal into carrying their seeds, by wrapping the seed in a tasty fruit and advertising the fruit’s ripeness by its color or smell. The hungry animal plucks and swallows the fruit, walks or flies off, and then spits out or defecates the seed somewhere far from its parent tree. Seeds can in this manner be carried for thousands of miles.
与所有动物物种（包括人类）一样，植物必须将其后代传播到能够繁衍生息并传递父母基因的地区。幼小的动物通过步行或飞行来分散，但植物没有这种选择，所以它们必须以某种方式搭便车。虽然有些植物物种的种子适合随风携带或漂浮在水面上，但许多其他植物物种通过将种子包裹在美味的果实中并通过其颜色或气味来宣传果实的成熟度，从而欺骗动物携带种子。饥饿的动物采摘并吞下果实，行走或飞走，然后将种子吐出或排泄到远离母树的地方。种子可以通过这种方式携带数千英里。
It may come as a surprise to learn that plant seeds can resist digestion by your gut and nonetheless germinate out of your feces. But any adventurous readers who are not too squeamish can make he test and prove it for themselves. The seeds of many wild plant species actually must pass through an animal’s gut before they can germinate. For instance, one African melon species is so well adapted to being eaten by a hyena-like animal called the aardvark that most melons of that species grow on the latrine sites of aardvarks.
植物种子可以抵抗肠道消化，但仍能从粪便中发芽，这可能会让人感到惊讶。但任何不太神经质、有冒险精神的读者都可以让他自己测试和证明这一点。许多野生植物的种子实际上必须通过动物的肠道才能发芽。例如，一种非洲甜瓜品种非常适合被一种叫做土豚的类似鬣狗的动物吃掉，以至于该品种的大多数瓜都生长在土豚的厕所里。
As an example of how would-be plant hitchhikers attract animals, consider wild strawberries. When strawberry seeds are still young and not yet ready to be planted, the surrounding fruit is green, sour, and hard. When the seeds finally mature, the berries turn red, sweet, and tender. The change in the berries’ color serves as a signal attracting birds like thrushes to pluck the berries and fly off, eventually to spit out or defecate the seeds.
作为植物搭便车如何吸引动物的一个例子，可以考虑一下野草莓。当草莓种子还很年轻，还没有准备好种植时，周围的果实是绿色的、酸的、硬的。当种子最终成熟时，浆果会变成红色、甜而嫩。浆果颜色的变化是一种信号，吸引画眉等鸟类采摘浆果并飞走，最终吐出或将种子排出体外。

Naturally, strawberry plants didn’t set out with a conscious intent of attracting birds when, and only when, their seeds were ready to be dispersed. Neither did thrushes set out with the intent of domesticating strawberries. Instead, strawberry plants evolved through natural selection. The greener and more sour the young strawberry, the fewer the birds that destroyed the seeds by eating berries before the seeds were ready; the sweeter and redder the final strawberry, the more numerous the birds that dispersed its ripe seeds.
当然，草莓植物并没有在它们的种子准备好传播时有意识地吸引鸟类。画眉鸟也不是为了驯化草莓而出发的。相反，草莓植物是通过自然选择进化而来的。年轻的草莓越绿、越酸，在种子成熟之前通过吃浆果来破坏种子的鸟类就越少。最后的草莓越甜、越红，传播成熟种子的鸟类就越多。

Countless other plants have fruits adapted to being eaten and dispersed by particular species of animals. Just as strawberries are adapted to birds, so acorns are adapted to squirrels, mangos to bats, and some sedges to ants. That fulfills part of our definition of plant domestication, as the genetic modification of an ancestral plant in ways that make it more useful to consumers. But no one would seriously describe this evolutionary process as domestication, because birds and bats and other animal consumers don’t fulfill the other part of the definition: they don’t consciously grow plants. In the same way, the early unconscious stages of crop evolution from wild plants consisted of plants evolving in ways that attracted humans to eat and disperse their fruit without yet intentionally growing them. Human latrines, like those of aardvarks, may have been a testing ground of the first unconscious crop breeders.
无数其他植物的果实适合被特定物种的动物食用和传播。正如草莓适合鸟类一样，橡子适合松鼠，芒果适合蝙蝠，某些莎草适合蚂蚁。这满足了我们对植物驯化的部分定义，即对祖先植物进行基因改造，使其对消费者更有用。但没有人会认真地将这一进化过程描述为驯化，因为鸟类、蝙蝠和其他动物消费者并不满足定义的另一部分：它们不会有意识地种植植物。同样，野生植物作物进化的早期无意识阶段包括植物以吸引人类食用和传播其果实的方式进化，但尚未有意种植它们。人类的厕所，就像土豚的厕所一样，可能是第一批无意识作物育种者的试验场。

Latrines are merely one of the many places where we accidentally sow the seeds of wild plants that we eat. When we gather edible wild plants and bring them home, some spill en route or at our houses. Some fruit rots while still containing perfectly good seeds, and gets thrown out uneaten into the garbage. As parts of the fruit that we actually take into our mouths, strawberry seeds are tiny and inevitably swallowed and defecated, but other seeds are large enough to be spat out. Thus, our spittoons and garbage dumps joined our latrines to form the first agricultural research laboratories.
厕所只是我们无意中播撒野生植物种子的众多地方之一。当我们采集可食用的野生植物并将其带回家时，有些植物会在途中或家里溢出。有些水果在含有完美种子的情况下就腐烂了，没有吃完就被扔进垃圾桶。作为我们实际放入口中的水果的一部分，草莓种子很小，不可避免地会被吞咽和排泄，但其他种子则足够大，可以被吐出来。因此，我们的痰盂和垃圾场与厕所一起形成了第一个农业研究实验室。
and inevitably swallowed and defecated, but other seeds are large enough to be spat out. Thus, our spittoons and garbage dumps joined our latrines to form the first agricultural research laboratories. picking days, you know that you select particular berries or berry bushes. Eventually, when the first farmers began to sow seeds deliberately, they would inevitably sow those from the plants they had
不可避免地会被吞咽和排泄，但其他种子大到足以被吐出来。因此，我们的痰盂和垃圾场与厕所一起形成了第一个农业研究实验室。在采摘日，您知道自己选择了特定的浆果或浆果丛。最终，当第一批农民开始刻意播种时，他们不可避免地会从他们拥有的植物中播种这些种子。

chosen to gather, even though they didn’t understand the genetic principle that big berries have seeds likely to grow into bushes yielding more big berries.
尽管他们不了解大浆果的种子可能长成灌木丛并产生更多大浆果的遗传原理，但他们还是选择了采集。
So, when you wade into a thorny thicket amid the mosquitoes on a hot, humid day, you don’t do it for just any strawberry bush. Even if unconsciously, you decide which bush looks most So, when you wade into a thorny thicket amid the mosquitoes on a hot,
因此，当你在炎热潮湿的日子涉入蚊虫丛生的荆棘丛时，你并不是为了任何草莓丛而这样做。即使是无意识地，你也会决定哪一个灌木丛看起来最漂亮，所以，当你在炎热的天气里涉入蚊虫丛生的荆棘丛时，
promising, and whether it’s worth it at all. What are your unconscious criteria?
有前途，以及是否值得。你无意识的标准是什么？
promising, and whether it’s worth it at all. What are your unconscious criteria?
有前途，以及是否值得。你无意识的标准是什么？
One criterion, of course, is size. You prefer large berries, because it’s not worth your while to get sunburned and mosquito bitten for some lousy little berries. That provides part of the explanation why many crop plants have much bigger fruits than their wild ancestors do. It’s especially familiar to us that supermarket strawberries and blueberries are gigantic compared with wild ones; those differences arose only in recent centuries
当然，标准之一是尺寸。你更喜欢大浆果，因为为了一些糟糕的小浆果而被晒伤和蚊子叮咬是不值得的。这部分解释了为什么许多农作物的果实比其野生祖先的果实大得多。我们尤其熟悉的是，超市里的草莓和蓝莓比野生的要大；这些差异是最近几个世纪才出现的

Such size differences in other plants go back to the very beginnings of agriculture, when cultivated peas evolved through human selection to be 10 times heavier than wild peas. The little wild peas had been collected by hunter-gatherers for thousands of years, just as we collect little wild blueberries today, before the preferential harvesting and planting of the most appealing largest wild peasthat is, what we call farming-began automatically to contribute to increases in average pea size from generation to generation. Similarly, supermarket apples are typically around three inches in diameter, wild apples only one inch. The oldest corn cobs are barely more than half an inch long, but Mexican Indian farmers of A.D. 1500 already had developed six-inch cobs, and some modern cobs are one and a half feet long.
其他植物的这种大小差异可以追溯到农业诞生之初，当时栽培豌豆通过人类选择进化到比野生豌豆重 10 倍。小野豌豆已经被狩猎采集者采集了数千年，就像我们今天采集小野生蓝莓一样，在优先收获和种植最具吸引力的最大野生豌豆之前，即我们所说的农业，开始自动开始为人类做出贡献。平均豌豆大小一代又一代地增加。同样，超市苹果的直径通常约为三英寸，而野苹果的直径仅为一英寸。最古老的玉米棒子只有半英寸长，但公元 1500 年的墨西哥印第安农民已经培育出六英寸长的玉米棒子，一些现代玉米棒子长一英尺半。
Another obvious difference between seeds that we grow and many of their wild ancestors is in bitterness. Many wild seeds evolved to be bitter, bad-tasting, or actually poisonous, in order to deter animals from eating them. Thus, natural selection acts oppositely on seeds and on fruits. Plants whose fruits are tasty get their seeds dispersed by animals, but the seed itself within the fruit has to be bad-tasting. Otherwise, the animal would also chew up the seed, and it couldn’t sprout.
我们种植的种子与它们的许多野生祖先之间的另一个明显区别是苦味。许多野生种子进化为苦味、难闻甚至有毒，以阻止动物食用它们。因此，自然选择对种子和果实的作用相反。果实美味的植物通过动物传播种子，但果实中的种子本身味道一定很差。否则，动物也会把种子嚼碎，种子就无法发芽。

Almonds provide a striking example of bitter seeds and their change under domestication. Most wild almond seeds contain an intensely bitter chemical called amygdalin, which (as was already mentioned) breaks down to yield the poison cyanide. A snack of wild almonds can kill a person foolish enough to ignore the warning of the bitter taste. Since the first stage in unconscious domestication involves gathering seeds to eat, how on earth did domestication of wild almonds ever reach that first stage?
杏仁提供了苦味种子及其在驯化过程中的变化的一个引人注目的例子。大多数野生杏仁种子含有一种叫做苦杏仁苷的强烈苦味化学物质，它（如前所述）会分解产生有毒的氰化物。一个愚蠢到忽视苦味警告的人，吃野杏仁可能会致命。既然无意识驯化的第一阶段涉及收集种子来吃，那么野生杏仁的驯化到底是如何达到第一阶段的呢？