情感

一种关于意识、身体感觉和行为的复杂体验，反映了事物、事件或事态的个人意义。

情感的多样性和复杂性

亚里士多德（公元前 384-322 年）写道：“情绪是所有那些改变人以影响他们的判断力的情感，也伴随着痛苦或快乐。这就是愤怒、怜悯、恐惧等，以及它们的对立面。情感确实是一个异质的类别，它包含了各种各样的 重要的心理现象。有些情绪是非常具体的，因为它们与特定的人、物体或 情况。其他的，如痛苦、喜悦或抑郁，则非常普遍。有些情绪非常短暂，几乎没有意识，例如突然的尴尬或爆发 愤怒。其他的，例如持久的爱或酝酿的怨恨，是旷日持久的、持续数小时、数月甚至数年 （在这种情况下，它们可以成为个人个性的持久特征）。情绪可能有明显的身体伴奏，例如面部表情，或者观察者可能看不到。情绪可能涉及有意识的体验和反思，例如当一个人“沉溺”在 它，或者它可能几乎不被受试者注意到和承认。一种情感可能是深刻的，因为它 对一个人的身体生存或心理健康至关重要，或者可能是微不足道的或功能失调的。情绪可能是社会性的 适当或不适当。它甚至可能是社会义务的——例如，在犯罪后感到懊悔或在葬礼上感到悲伤。

因此，存在着巨大的情感范围，即使在同一个 “情感家族” 中也存在相当大的差异。 例如，恐慌和恐惧通常被认为是相似的情绪，但恐慌之间存在显着差异 这表现为非理性的恐惧或恐惧症和聪明的恐惧——例如对核战争的恐惧——这需要大量的信息和分析。恐怖和恐怖，另外两种相似的情感，仍然是 与恐惧不同。或者考虑类似于愤怒的敌对情绪大家庭：愤怒、愤怒、仇恨、怨恨、蔑视、 厌恶和轻蔑，仅举几例。所有这些情绪在结构和 适当的背景，“自我批评家庭”的成员也是如此，其中包括羞耻、尴尬、内疚、懊悔和遗憾。情感的多样性和丰富性表明，情感的类别可能不是单一的 心理现象的类别，但是一个松散相关的心理状态和过程的大家族。

为了简单起见，研究人员和外行人都经常将情绪分为“积极”的情绪和“积极”的情绪 是 “负面的”。（科学研究人员将情感的这些品质称为“情感效价”。但情感的复杂性使这种对立变得可疑。例如，尽管爱与恨经常被构思 作为对立面，值得注意的是（正如许多小说和戏剧的情节所表明的那样），它们经常不是作为对立面共存，而是作为互补共存。此外，爱往往是痛苦的和破坏性的。 而仇恨，有时，可能是积极的。（正如美国心理学家舒拉·索默斯 （Shula Sommers） 所问的那样，“对邪恶的仇恨是一种负面情绪吗？ 但是像愤怒这样的情绪，另一种所谓的负面情绪，表明这种分类是徒劳的。愤怒确实是 针对另一个人的负面情绪（如果不是敌对情绪），但它对生气的人来说可能是启发性的。 而且，在适当的语境中——一个人应该生气的语境——它可以对某种情况产生有益的影响，或者 一种关系。因此，当女性意识到她们有权生气并且有很多值得生气的地方时，女权主义运动向前迈出了一大步。可能是 亚里士多德指出，情绪伴随着快乐或痛苦（通常两者兼而有之），但它们太复杂了，而且往往太微妙了 仅根据该基础进行分类。
为了简单起见，研究人员和外行人都经常将情绪分为 “积极 ”的情绪和 “消极的 ”情绪。（科学研究人员将情感的这些品质称为“情感效价”。但情感的复杂性使这种对立变得可疑。例如，尽管爱和恨通常被认为是截然相反的对立面，但值得注意的是（正如许多小说和戏剧的情节所表明的那样），它们经常不是作为对立面共存，而是作为互补共存。此外，爱往往是痛苦的和破坏性的，而仇恨有时可能是积极的。（正如美国心理学家舒拉·索默斯 （Shula Sommers） 所问的那样，“对邪恶的仇恨是一种负面情绪吗？但是像愤怒这样的情绪，另一种所谓的负面情绪，表明这种分类是徒劳的。愤怒确实是一种针对另一个人的负面情绪（如果不是敌对情绪），但它可以造就生气的人，而且，在适当的情况下——一个人应该生气的背景——它可以对情况或关系产生有益的影响。因此，当女性意识到她们有权生气并且有很多值得生气的地方时，女权主义运动向前迈出了一大步。正如亚里士多德所指出的，情绪可能伴随着快乐或痛苦（通常两者兼而有之），但它们太复杂了，而且往往太微妙了，不能单独根据这个基础进行分类。

长期以来，情感研究一直是伦理学的领域。情感是亚里士多德美德伦理学的核心，也是中世纪经院哲学家对罪恶、美德和罪恶的关注的重要组成部分。对亚里士多德来说，在正确的情况下拥有适量的正确情感是美德行为的关键。 圣托马斯·阿奎那（St. Thomas Aquinas，约 1224-74 年）区分了“高”和“低”的情绪，前者以信仰和爱为代表，后者以愤怒为代表 和嫉妒。尽管关于情绪的道德思考一直关注情绪的极端和畸形，如 精神病理学和疯狂，这些现象从来都不是人们对情绪感兴趣的主要原因。作为亚里士多德和中世纪 道德家们非常明白，情感对于健康的人类生存至关重要，正是由于这个原因，他们的 故障太严重了。
长期以来，情感研究一直是伦理学的领域。情感是亚里士多德美德伦理学的核心，也是中世纪经院哲学家对罪恶、美德和罪恶的关注的重要组成部分。对亚里士多德来说，在正确的情况下拥有适量的正确情感是美德行为的关键。圣托马斯·阿奎那（St. Thomas Aquinas，约 1224-74 年）区分了“高”和“低”的情绪，前者以信仰和爱为代表，后者以愤怒和嫉妒为代表。尽管对情绪的道德思考一直关注情绪的极端和畸形，就像精神病理学和疯狂一样，但这些现象从来都不是对情绪感兴趣的主要原因。正如亚里士多德和中世纪的道德家们所理解的那样，情感对于健康的人类生存至关重要，正因为如此，情感的故障才如此严重。

情绪的适当发展和功能使人们能够过上美好的生活并快乐。爱、尊重和同情， 例如，是人际关系和关注的基本情感成分。情感激发道德（如 以及不道德的）行为，它们在创造力和科学好奇心中起着至关重要的作用。对许多人来说，情感是由艺术和自然中的美来激发和挑衅的，没有情感就没有审美敏感性。情感和身体感官塑造了感知和记忆的基本过程，并影响着人们构思和解释周围世界的方式（心理学家早就知道 一个人注意到和记住在很大程度上取决于一个人关心什么）。虽然有些情绪可能会失控，并且 损害一个人的个人幸福和社会关系，大多数情绪是功能性和适应性的。尽管如此，事实 这么多人在他们的生活中遭受“情绪问题”的折磨，这使得理解情绪的病理学成为一种持久的 社会关注。
情绪的适当发展和功能使人们能够过上美好的生活并快乐。例如，爱、尊重和同情心是人际关系和关注的基本情感成分。情绪会激发道德（以及不道德）的行为，它们在创造力和科学好奇心中起着至关重要的作用。对许多人来说，情感是由艺术和自然中的美来激发和挑衅的，没有情感就没有审美敏感性。情感和身体感官塑造了感知和记忆的基本过程，并影响人们构想和解释周围世界的方式（心理学家很早就知道，一个人注意到和记住什么在很大程度上取决于他关心什么）。虽然有些情绪会失控并损害一个人的个人幸福和社会关系，但大多数情绪都是功能性和适应性的。然而，如此多的人在生活中遭受“情绪问题”的事实使得理解情绪的病理学成为一个持久的社会问题。

情绪的结构
情绪的结构

情绪已经在多个科学学科中进行了研究，例如生物学、心理学、神经科学、精神病学、人类学和社会学，以及商业管理、广告和传播。因此，出现了与情感的复杂性和多样性相适应的独特情感观点 他们自己。然而，重要的是，不要把这些不同的观点看作是竞争性的，而是要看作互补的，每个观点都有可能 深入了解可以称为情绪的不同“结构”的东西。要说情绪有结构（或 一个结构）就是拒绝认为它们只是无定形的“感觉”，或者它们没有秩序、逻辑或理性的观点。相反，情绪以多种方式构建：根据其基础 神经学，通过进入它们的判断和评价，通过表达或表现它们的行为，以及 它们发生的更大社会背景。因此，人们可能会说情绪是“综合的神经-生理-行为-评价-体验-社会 现象。不同的情绪会以不同的程度和不同的方式表现出这种结构，这取决于 特定的情绪、它的类型和情况。
情绪已经在多个科学学科中进行了研究，例如生物学、心理学、神经科学、精神病学、人类学和社会学，以及商业管理、广告和传播。因此，出现了对情感的独特观点，这些观点与情感本身的复杂性和多样性相适应。然而，重要的是，不要把这些不同的观点看作是竞争性的，而是要看作是互补的，每个观点都有可能产生对所谓的不同情绪“结构”的洞察力。说情绪有结构（或结构）就是拒绝它们只是无定形的“感觉”或它们没有秩序、逻辑或理性的观点。相反，情绪以多种方式构建：通过其潜在的神经学、进入它们的判断和评估、表达或表现它们的行为，以及它们发生的更大社会背景。因此，人们可能会说情绪是一种“综合的神经-生理-行为-评价-经验-社会现象”。不同的情绪会以不同的程度和不同的方式表现出这种结构，这取决于特定的情绪、类型和情况。

在本文的其余部分，不同情绪的结构将在三个标题下进行考虑（尽管 应该记住，任何情感的结构总是整合成一个有机的整体）：（1） 物理结构， 包括显性行为、神经学和生理学;（2） 体验结构，或者说 主题;（3） 社会结构，包括文化原因和环境、情感的社会意义和功能 表达方式、情绪行为的社会影响、情绪行为的政治原因和影响，以及道德 决定情绪的性质和适当性的考虑因素。
在本文的其余部分，不同情绪的结构将在三个标题下进行考虑（尽管应该记住，任何情绪的结构总是整合到一个有机的整体中）：（1） 物理结构，包括显性行为、神经学和生理学;（2） 体验结构，或主体如何体验情感;（3） 社会结构，包括文化原因和环境、情绪表达的社会意义和功能、情绪行为的社会影响、情绪行为的政治原因和影响，以及决定情绪性质和适当性的道德考虑。

情感的物理结构

在 20 世纪上半叶，行为主义心理学派的成员试图严格根据其公开可观察的因果关系来研究心理现象。根据行为主义者的说法， 任何对情绪的真正科学描述都必须局限于对唤起情绪的可观察情况的描述 （“刺激”）以及由此产生的可观察到的物理变化和行为（“反应”），尤其包括 言语行为。尽管行为主义不再被认为是一种可行的方法，但应该注意其维度有多大 的 Public Observable 包括。刺激和反应情况不仅包括 体验情绪和他们所做的任何动作、手势或声音的人，以及他们的神经、神经化学、 和生理状态，例如，包括激素水平和自主神经系统活动的变化，自主神经系统控制和调节内脏器官。

情绪的神经生物学

在行为主义出现之前，当神经学科学仍处于起步阶段时，美国哲学家和心理学家威廉·詹姆斯（William James，1842-1910 年）在他的情绪理论中将一些因素整合在一起，并在他的基础研究《心理学原理》（1890 年）中阐述了这一点。在几十页的篇幅中，詹姆斯列举了一些情绪所涉及的各种生理变化： 自主神经系统活动（心跳加速、血管扩张、膀胱和肠道收缩、呼吸不自主变化，以及“咽部有某种东西迫使吞咽、清嗓子或轻微咳嗽”）、特征性的“情绪”大脑过程、“神经预期”和明显的身体表情和动作——颤抖、哭泣、奔跑和打击。 对詹姆斯来说，这种情绪是伴随着某些生理变化的身体感觉，这些变化本身是由一些 “令人不安 ”的感知引起的。因此，在一条著名的建议中，他敦促那些希望改善情绪状态的人“抚平眉毛， 提亮眼睛，收缩框架的背侧而不是腹侧，用大调说话，传递亲切的赞美。

此后，研究区分了詹姆斯考虑的身体变化。自主神经系统活动有时被认为是詹姆斯理论的核心，当然与随意肌活动不同。 当代神经学已经开始更多地关注大脑活动本身，并将所有其他身体变化严格视为次要变化。神经科学 研究表明，不仅情绪起源于大脑中的神经活动，而且不同的情绪表现出来 神经活动模式截然不同。情绪大脑活动的核心似乎是边缘前脑：丘脑、下丘脑、网状结构和杏仁核，所有这些都是皮质下（大脑皮层以下）。下丘脑与快乐和痛苦有着重要的联系，而 网状结构可能与抑郁症有重要联系。美国神经科学家 Joseph E. LeDoux 已经证明，恐惧的听觉刺激涉及声音的传递 信号通过听觉通路到达丘脑（传递信息），然后到达背侧杏仁核（评估 信息）。这样的研究表明，通过丘脑-杏仁核通路激活的情绪是评价性的结果 快速、最小和自动的处理。但情感也可以通过来自 丘脑到新皮层（大脑皮层的外部），这个回路是认知评价和事件评价的神经基础。因此，有两条神经通路参与情绪的激活：皮层和皮层下。 通过丘脑-杏仁核通路激活情绪解释了婴儿和非常年幼的儿童如何对疼痛做出情绪反应，以及为什么成年人在有意识地认识到行为之前就表达了强烈的偏好并做出情绪判断 所以。人们通常在形成拥有这些情绪的理由之前就体验到情绪。

大脑的两个半球与情绪过程的关系不同。右半球可能比左半球更擅长区分 情绪化的表达。此外，有人认为右半球可能更多地参与处理负数 情绪和左半球更多地参与处理积极情绪。焦虑、愤怒或抑郁的人 显示杏仁核和右前额叶皮层的活动增加。情绪积极的人表现出左前额叶皮层的活动增加，而 杏仁核和右前额叶皮层保持安静。当然，大多数人都会经历这两种情绪和情绪，尽管个人似乎也或多或少具有固定的快乐或焦虑的生物学倾向。即使在好运或坏运之后，人们最终也倾向于回到他们典型的日常生活 情绪。（然而，有一些证据表明，像冥想这样的运动可以将典型的情绪转向积极的情绪。多年来，关于 情绪的神经基础是谎言。但最合理的理论坚持认为，大脑功能通常涉及复杂的相互作用 在不同部分之间;因此，对情感“中心”的追求可能会被误导。

对大脑在情绪中的作用的强调提出了情绪反应的先天性论点，查尔斯·达尔文（Charles Darwin，1809-82 年）和詹姆斯都为这一论点进行了辩护。一些当代理论认为，情绪，或者至少是“基本”情绪，植根于个人的生理 构成和基因是每种基本情绪的阈值和特征强度水平的重要决定因素。其他理论的说法 遗传因素是无关紧要的，而情绪是认知建构的或源自经验的，特别是 来自社会化和学习（见下文情感的社会结构）。但很明显，情感生活是遗传倾向和评价信念相互作用的功能 通过经验获得。这甚至包括基本的情绪，这些情绪很可能具有与生俱来的神经核心，但尽管如此 只有在文化经验提供的社会约束下才会表现出来。

In early human development, most emotions and their expressions derive from automatic, subcortical processing, with minimal cortical involvement. As cognitive capacities increase with maturation and learning, the neocortex and the cortico-amygdala pathway become increasingly more involved. By the time children acquire language and the capacity for long-term memory, they may process events in either or both pathways, with the subcortical pathway specializing in events requiring rapid response and the cortico-amygdala pathway providing evaluative information necessary for cognitive judgment and more complex coping strategies.

The physical expression of emotion

There has been a great deal of research on emotional expression, particularly on those expressions that are most immediate, most evident, and typically most spontaneous or automatic and thus often unknown to the subject who displays them. Darwin observed the striking similarity between the emotional expressions of many mammals and humans; he thus postulated both an evolutionary explanation of the similarity and an anthropological thesis that facial expressions of emotion, such as those of anger, surprise, and fear, are universal in human beings. In the 1960s the American psychologist Paul Ekman set out to disprove Darwin’s anthropological thesis but found, to his initial consternation, that it was confirmed by mounting cross-cultural evidence. Since then, studies of the characteristic facial expressions of various emotions and their recognition have been a dominant topic of psychological research. Not all emotions have characteristic facial expressions, of course, and so studies tend to concentrate upon a small set of basic emotions—e.g., anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise. Each of these emotions, according to many theorists, consists of an “affect program”—a complex set of facial expressions, vocalizations, and autonomic and skeletal responses. It is still a matter of debate whether emotions that are supposedly basic can be captured in terms of affect programs; thus, it is also controversial whether the recognition and production of typical facial expressions are indeed universal and “hardwired.”

One of the fascinating features of spontaneous facial expressions is how difficult it is for most people to “fake” a sincere expression. This is perhaps most evident in the case of smiling (as an expression of delight or being pleased). Psychologists have long recognized the Duchenne smile (named for the French neurologist Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne [1806–75]), a sincere and spontaneous smile that is characterized not only by the stretching of the mouth but also by the elevation of the cheeks and the distinctive contraction of the muscles around the eye. In a false or non-Duchenne smile, these other elements are lacking and, for that reason, it is easy to recognize a false smile even if one has no idea what it is that gives it away.

The behavioral expression of emotion also includes conscious and unconscious gestures, postures and mannerisms, and overt behaviour that can be either spontaneous or deliberate. One might hesitate to call deliberate behaviour an “expression” because of the intervening conscious activity it involves. One might speak instead of such behaviour as being “out of” the emotion (as in, “he acted out of anger”). Yet the difference between the two cases is often very slight. Acting out of anger may be immediate, as in the case of a spontaneous insult, or it may be protracted or delayed. It may be expressed in a series of punitive actions that go on for months or years or in vengeful acts that follow the provoking occurrence and the anger by an equally lengthy period of time. But even the immediate expression of emotion in overt action may be (and usually is) protracted in time and not merely momentary. Running from danger in fear may go on for as long as it needs to (as long as the threat is evident). The expression of profound love, many people would say, goes on for a lifetime, though it may also consist of any number of both spontaneous and deliberate acts and gestures.

Verbal expressions are of particular interest. They can be spontaneous and immediate, as are the hoots and cheers of sports fans, but they can obviously be more eloquent, articulate, and deliberate. A funeral oration may be heartfelt and expressive of the emotion of grief; an apology can also be heartfelt and expressive of the emotions of shame and remorse. And of course the recitation of a love poem can serve as an expansive “I love you.”

Experiential structures of emotion

James introduced his theory of emotions with an important qualification: “I should say first of all that the only emotions I propose expressly to consider here are those that have a distinct bodily expression.” Although there are emotions that do not have any such expression, James insisted that all emotions have a mental or conscious dimension.

The initiating cause of emotion, according to James, is a perception. James did not take perception to be a constituent of emotion, but he clearly recognized its importance. To put the matter in a way that he did not, James recognized that an emotion must be “about” something. It is not just a feeling based on a physiological disturbance. Thus, James alluded to intentionality, the feature of some mental processes in virtue of which they are essentially about or directed toward an object. Many theorists following James have revised his analysis by including perception, and with it intentionality, as an essential part of emotion. Indeed, some theorists have claimed that an emotion is just a special kind of perception. The concept of emotional experience, accordingly, has been considerably enriched to include not only physical sensations of what is going on in one’s body but also perceptual experiences of what is going on the world. In the study of emotion, of course, that perspective is an emotional perspective, “coloured” by the various emotions as well as by the unique perspective of the subject. But the common metaphor of colour does not do justice to emotional experience. Emotion is not something that is distinct from and somehow overlays an experience; the experience is part of the structure of the emotion itself.

The experiential structures of emotion include, first and foremost, intentionality and what the emotion is about—a person, an act, an event, or a state of affairs. But intentionality is structured in turn by the subject’s beliefs and evaluative judgments about the person, act, event, or state of affairs in question. The importance of belief in emotion has prompted many theorists to formulate “cognitive” theories of emotion, while an emphasis on evaluation has led others to formulate “appraisal” theories. Such theories are often very similar, varying mainly in their emphasis on the primary importance of belief as opposed to evaluative judgment. They do not challenge the importance of what is generally referred to as “feeling” in emotion, but they do make the nature of those feelings much more complex and intriguing than in the Jamesian view. Emotions involve knowledge, beliefs, opinions, and desires about the world. Thus, feeling must include not only bodily feelings but the cognitively rich experiences of knowing, engaging, and caring.

The experiential dimension of an emotion includes not only physical sensations but the experience of an object and its environment through the unique perspective provided by that emotion. The experience of being angry at Smith, for example, consists to a large extent in the experience of Smith from a certain perspective—e.g., as being offensive, hateful, or deserving of punishment. The experience of being in love with Jones consists to a large extent in the experience of Jones from another perspective—e.g., as being lovable, special, or uniquely deserving of care. The experiences of anger and love also include various thoughts and memories and intentions to act in certain ways.

Emotional experience also includes pleasure and pain, as Aristotle insisted, but rarely as isolated feelings. More often, different aspects of an emotion are pleasurable or painful, as thoughts or memories may be pleasurable or painful. The emotion as such may be pleasurable or painful (e.g., pride or remorse), and so may one’s acknowledgement of the fact that one has a certain emotion (delighted to be in love again, upset with oneself for getting angry or envious). But, again, emotional matters are not always so straightforward. It is common to have “mixed emotions,” when the countercurrents of pleasure and pain make it difficult to settle on a single state of mind.

Social structures of emotion

Although Darwin thought that some emotional expressions are due to “the constitution of the nervous system” and play a role in adaptation and survival, he believed that others serve a different purpose: the communication of emotion to others. Indeed, the ubiquity and uniformity of facial expressions of emotion would be hard to fathom if it were not for the fact that they communicate an individual’s emotions to other members of his group or species. By smiling one indicates friendliness and perhaps lack of intent to cause harm; by frowning one conveys the opposite. The emotional expressions that are so evident in the face and body serve as the first means of communication between a mother and her infant. As Darwin noted, “We readily perceive sympathy in others by their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated. We laugh together and our mutual good humour increases and strengthens our pleasure.” The social aspect of emotion, accordingly, is most obvious in public displays of emotion, which directly affect the behaviour of other people. But this aspect includes much more than communication. It also includes the social constitution, or social construction, of emotions with and through other people. The social structures of emotion consist of the ways in which the larger social context determines an emotion’s causes, content, modes of expression, and meaning. Even the basic emotions, which are generally assumed to have a neurological core, are shaped to a large extent by social factors.

Social context determines the causes of emotions in an obvious sense: different circumstances provoke different emotions in different cultures. A Vodou (Voodoo) curse, for example, produces terror in one society but only bemusement in another. A husband who sees his wife in the company of another man becomes jealous in one society but may be indifferent in another. All emotions involve cognition, and all are influenced by moral values and evaluative concepts, many (if not all) of which are learned. The concepts of right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate and their proper application are learned in the specific circumstances of each group or society.

Emotions are subject to social shaping in their modes of expression in the sense that most expressions, perhaps even those that are more or less hardwired, are subject to local “display rules,” which govern which emotions and which expressions are appropriate in which circumstances. An expression of anger is utterly inappropriate in most public circumstances in Japan, but it is quite to be expected at an urban intersection in the United States. The cultural meaning of an emotion is also (and obviously) socially determined. In Tahiti anger is considered extremely dangerous and is even demonized; in the Mediterranean it is often a sign of virility, suggesting righteousness. This is not to say that the social influences on emotion are limited to their cultural interpretations. The emotions themselves are constituted, at least in part, by such interpretations. The socially constituted part of an emotion may be smaller in basic emotions than in cognitively rich emotions such as moral indignation and romantic love, but culture as well as biology, social differences as well as individual differences, determine what emotions there are and whether, where, and when it is appropriate to have them.

Emotions and rationality

The fact that emotions involve behaviour, thoughts, and culture raises the question of whether or to what extent emotions are rational. For philosophers such as Plato (c. 428–c. 348 bce) and David Hume (1711–76), who conceived of emotion and rationality as conflicting opposites, such a question was inappropriate from the start. But behaviour and thoughts can be rational or irrational, and culture imposes its own standards of rationality. To that extent, at least, overt emotional expressions and thoughts can be judged according to such standards. In anger, people often act and think irrationally. But what is less often emphasized is that anger can result in behaviour and thoughts that are quite rational, in the sense that they are strategically successful in articulating or channeling the emotion into constructive action. The thoughts that one has in anger may also be accurate and insightful—e.g., remembering previous slights and a pattern of offensive behaviour. And culture, of course, imposes its own criteria for deciding which expressions and thoughts are rational, as well as which emotions it is rational to have in which circumstances. To be jealous in certain cultures and in certain circumstances may be perfectly appropriate and therefore rational. But in other cultures or other circumstances jealousy is inappropriate and therefore irrational.

An emotion can also be rational or irrational in two more specific senses: (1) it can be more or less accurate in the perception or understanding of the situation it involves; and (2) it can be more or less warranted in its evaluation of the situation. An example of (1) is: Smith is angry at Jones for saying something offensive, when in fact Jones said no such thing and there is no good reason to think that he did. An example of (2) is: Smith is angry at Jones for saying something offensive, but in fact what Jones said was not offensive because it was not intentional or because it was an accurate and constructive criticism of Smith, for which Smith should not be offended or angry. In the first example the anger is irrational because it is based on a false belief about the situation; in the second it is irrational because it involves an unjust or unfair evaluation.

In yet another sense, emotions can be rational insofar as they are functional. It has become something of a platitude in contemporary psychology that emotions have evolved along with human beings and are therefore the product of natural selection. It does not follow, however, that any particular emotion was individually selected for, or that emotions still serve, the functions that may have made them valuable in the past. Anger may have been a useful stimulus of aggression in prehistoric times, but it can be deleterious or generally dysfunctional in a modern urban environment. Moreover, emotions (or particular emotions) may well be byproducts of other evolved traits. Nevertheless, as a general rule, emotions do play an important role in people’s personal and social lives. Indeed, Hume insisted that reason by itself provides no motivation to moral behaviour; only the emotions can do that. Modern neuroscience has come to much the same conclusion.

Finally, emotions can be rational in the sense that they can be used to achieve certain basic human goals and aspirations. Getting angry may be an important step in motivating oneself to face obstacles and overcome them. Falling in love may be an important step in developing the capacity to form and maintain intimate relationships. By the same token, getting angry at one’s boss may be thoroughly warranted but still irrational insofar as it frustrates one’s career goals. A Buddhist monk may be fully justified in being jealous of a fellow monk, but his jealousy is nevertheless irrational insofar as it is incompatible with his conception of himself as a Buddhist. In this sense, emotions provide both the substance of a good life and its ends. In a similar vein, the French existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) argued that emotions are strategies. People use them to manipulate others and, more important, to maneuver themselves into ways of thinking and acting that suit their goals and their self-image.

Because emotions are the product not only of culture but also of one’s behaviour and attitudes over time, one is to a certain extent responsible for them. Emotions can be consciously developed or discouraged by training oneself to react more or less emotionally—or with more of one kind of emotion and less of another—in certain circumstances. For Aristotle, this kind of training is part of the process of cultivating a good moral character in oneself. Having the right emotions in the right amounts and in the right circumstances, as he argued, is the essence of virtue and the key to human flourishing.

Additional Reading