On January 15, 1993, the Washington State Health Department alerted Robert Nugent, president of Jack in the Box, that the E. coli outbreak they had been informed of two days earlier, was at least partly attributed to hamburgers purchased at Jack in the Box restaurants (Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995). “Within a month, three children in the Seattle area, all under three, died of E. coli 0157:H7 poisoning - the strain linked to Jack in the Box” (p. 138).
1993 年 1 月 15 日，华盛顿州卫生部门通知了 Jack in the Box 的总裁罗伯特·纽金特，之前两天他们获悉的 E. coli 疫情至少部分归因于在 Jack in the Box 餐厅购买的汉堡（Sellnow 和 Ulmer，1995 年）。“在一个月内，西雅图地区的三名三岁以下儿童因 E. coli 0157:H7 中毒而死亡——这种菌株与 Jack in the Box 有关”（第 138 页）。

One child had eaten at Jack in the Box, it was thought another was infected by a child who became ill after eating at Jack in the Box, and a cause for the third child’s infection was unknown. In total, 400 people were infected with the bacteria in Washington State, Idaho and Nevada. “As a result of this crisis, the Jack in the Box fast-food chain was not only in danger of losing sales, the company’s very existence was threatened by the crisis as well” (p. 138).
一名儿童在 Jack in the Box 用餐，另一个儿童被认为是感染了在 Jack in the Box 用餐后生病的儿童，而第三名儿童的感染原因尚不清楚。总共有 400 人在华盛顿州、爱达荷州和内华达州感染了这种细菌。“由于这场危机，Jack in the Box 快餐连锁不仅面临销售损失的危险，公司本身的生存也受到危机的威胁”（第 138 页）。

Primary Evidence. From the beginning of the crisis, Jack in the Box emphasized they were not solely responsible for the outbreak, pointing to the fact that customers not only ate at Jack in the Box, but other establishments as well. Although not accepting blame for the crisis, Jack in the Box tried to bolster their credibility by announcing in their first press release, January 18, 1993, they had taken measures to ensure all their menu items were prepared in accordance with an advisory issued by the Washington State Department of Health (Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995).
主要证据。从危机开始，Jack in the Box 强调他们并不完全对疫情负责，指出顾客不仅在 Jack in the Box 用餐，还在其他餐饮场所用餐。尽管没有为危机承担责任，Jack in the Box 试图通过在 1993 年 1 月 18 日的首次新闻稿中宣布他们已采取措施确保所有菜单项的准备符合华盛顿州卫生部发布的建议，从而增强他们的可信度（Sellnow 和 Ulmer，1995）。

It wasn’t until January 21 that Jack in the Box took some responsibility for the crisis by announcing that the source of the problem was, in fact, contaminated meat. They explained they were reluctant to speculate before results from state tests came back which now indicated the problem was due to contaminated hamburger. Jack in the Box now pointed the finger at their meat supplier.
直到 1 月 21 日，Jack in the Box 才对危机承担了一些责任，宣布问题的源头实际上是受污染的肉。他们解释说，在州测试结果出来之前，他们不愿意进行推测，而现在的结果表明问题是由于受污染的汉堡肉。Jack in the Box 现在将责任指向他们的肉类供应商。

Robert Nugent also pointed the finger at the Washington Health Department and their apparent lack of passing out information in regards to new regulations, he also addressed corrective action the company was taking. His January 21, 1993 memo announced Jack in the Box would increase cooking times so the internal temperature of all hamburger products would exceed the new state regulations, check all grills to insure proper operating temperatures, and retrain all grill personnel on proper procedures.
罗伯特·纽金特还指责华盛顿卫生部门明显未能传达有关新规的信息，他还提到了公司正在采取的纠正措施。他在 1993 年 1 月 21 日的备忘录中宣布，Jack in the Box 将增加烹饪时间，以确保所有汉堡产品的内部温度超过新的州法规，检查所有烤架以确保正常操作温度，并对所有烤架人员进行正确程序的再培训。

Jack in the Box, on January 22, 1993, pledged “to do everything that is morally right for those individuals who had experienced illness after eating at Jack in the Box restaurants as well as their families” (Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995, p. 146). Jack in the Box dropped their criticism of the Washington State Health Department’s information distribution procedures February 12, 1993, and further emphasized their explanation of corrective measures (Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995).
杰克盒子公司在 1993 年 1 月 22 日承诺“为那些在杰克盒子餐厅用餐后经历疾病的个人及其家庭做一切道德上正确的事情”（Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995, p. 146）。杰克盒子公司于 1993 年 2 月 12 日停止了对华盛顿州卫生部门信息分发程序的批评，并进一步强调了他们对纠正措施的解释（Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995）。

Waiting a week to talk with the media is what really hurt the company’s reputation. “At the time I thought they were being unfair,” says Nugent. “It seemed to me they were more interested in placing blame than in really understanding what happened here” (p. 157). The story was prevalent for weeks, filled with accounts of organ damage and hospitalized kids. Foodmaker did not comment. “We had developed an attitude about PR that was something like, ‘Keep our mouth shut and if you want to talk with the press, have them call us,’” recalls Nugent (p. 157). Faced with negative
等待一周与媒体交谈是对公司声誉造成真正伤害的原因。“当时我觉得他们不公平，”Nugent 说。“在我看来，他们更关心的是指责，而不是了解这里发生了什么”（第 157 页）。这个故事持续了几周，充满了关于器官损伤和住院儿童的报道。Foodmaker 没有发表评论。“我们对公关的态度是这样的，‘保持沉默，如果你想和媒体交谈，就让他们给我们打电话，’”Nugent 回忆道（第 157 页）。面对负面

publicity for a month, Robert Nugent replaced his public relations firm with President Jimmy Carter’s former press secretary, Joseph (Jody) Powell, who helped turn things around.
一个月的宣传，罗伯特·纽金特将他的公关公司更换为总统吉米·卡特的前新闻秘书约瑟夫（乔迪）·鲍威尔，他帮助扭转了局面。

Secondary Evidence. Although officials at Foodmaker Inc., Jack in the Box’s parent company, claimed they first learned of the potential contamination on January 17, their initial response to destroy 20,000 pounds of potentially contaminated meat; to switch meat suppliers; to set up a tollfree number for complaints; and to raise cooking temperatures was seen as a positive move. (Soeder, 1993).
次要证据。尽管 Foodmaker Inc.（杰克盒子的母公司）的官员声称他们在 1 月 17 日首次得知潜在污染，但他们最初的反应是销毁 20,000 磅可能受污染的肉类；更换肉类供应商；设立投诉免费电话；并提高烹饪温度，这被视为积极的举措。（Soeder, 1993）。

Not so positive though was the fact that they didn’t publicly accept responsibility for the food poisonings until the crisis was nearly a week old, and they partially blamed suppliers and state health officials. They also sought full recovery of losses and damages from their meat supplier, Vons. In response, the supplier issued this statement: “While we expected Foodmaker to sue its suppliers, we continue to be confident that Vons processing did not contaminate the meat. Health authorities have made it clear that proper cooking would have prevented this tragedy.” (Soeder, 1993).
不过，他们直到危机发生近一周后才公开承认对食物中毒事件的责任，这一点并不那么积极，他们还部分地将责任归咎于供应商和州卫生官员。他们还寻求从他们的肉类供应商 Vons 处全额赔偿损失和损害。对此，供应商发表了以下声明：“虽然我们预料到 Foodmaker 会起诉其供应商，但我们仍然相信 Vons 的加工没有污染肉类。卫生当局已明确表示，适当的烹饪可以防止这一悲剧。”（Soeder, 1993）。

According to Goff, (1999) “Foodmaker did the right things and did them swiftly…But when it came to communicating with the public, Nugent proved amazingly inept” (p. 157). Jack in the Box immediately suspended their hamburger sales, recalled meat from distributors, increased cooking times and temperatures, and pledged to pay all medical costs related to the disaster. Jack in the Box also hired a Dr. David Theno, a prominent food-safety consultant, to design an entirely new food-handling system (Goff, 1999).
根据 Goff（1999 年）所说：“Foodmaker 做了正确的事情，并且迅速地做了……但在与公众沟通时，Nugent 表现得令人惊讶地无能”（第 157 页）。Jack in the Box 立即暂停了汉堡销售，从分销商那里召回肉类，增加了烹饪时间和温度，并承诺支付与此次灾难相关的所有医疗费用。Jack in the Box 还聘请了食品安全顾问 David Theno 博士，设计一个全新的食品处理系统（Goff，1999 年）。

Scholarly Journals. Jack in the Box, although still not taking responsibility for the crisis, was able to bolster their public image by emphasizing their willingness to alter the cooking procedures used in their restaurants and insisting their role in the crisis was speculative. (Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995). They emphasized the fact that they were taking actions to improve safeguards, while insisting that the crises was system-wide rather than specific to their organization. Although they insisted their products were not the source of many infections for which they were suspected, they offered to pay hospital bills of those who had eaten at their restaurants (Sellnow and Ulmer, 1995).
学术期刊。虽然 Jack in the Box 仍然没有对危机负责，但他们通过强调愿意改变餐厅的烹饪程序来提升公众形象，并坚持认为他们在危机中的角色是推测性的。（Sellnow 和 Ulmer，1995）。他们强调了采取措施改善安全保障的事实，同时坚持认为危机是系统性的，而不是特定于他们的组织。尽管他们坚称他们的产品不是许多被怀疑感染的源头，但他们愿意支付在其餐厅就餐者的医院账单（Sellnow 和 Ulmer，1995）。

January 21, 1993, marked the day when Jack in the Box took some responsibility for the crisis. In a prepared statement by Robert Nugent, he addressed the contaminated meat and cooking temperatures, but also managed to shift the blame away from Jack in the Box. He explained that their investigation "traced the contaminated hamburger to a single supplier (Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995). “He also explained that the company had taken the ‘extraordinary step’ of replacing all hamburger patties in every restaurant in Washington and Idaho - despite the fact that health officials indicated this step was unnecessary” (p. 143).
1993 年 1 月 21 日，标志着 Jack in the Box 对危机承担了一些责任。在罗伯特·纽金特的准备声明中，他提到了受污染的肉类和烹饪温度，但也设法将责任转移出 Jack in the Box。他解释说，他们的调查“将受污染的汉堡追溯到一个单一的供应商（Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995）。”他还解释说，公司采取了“非同寻常的措施”，在华盛顿和爱达荷州的每家餐厅更换所有汉堡饼——尽管卫生官员表示这一措施是没有必要的”（第 143 页）。

Despite the fact Jack in the Box generated the argument of denial, the fact remained that their product had resulted in multiple deaths, and the public was still very skeptical. When Jack in the Box focused on external problems that contributed to the crisis, they tried to de-emphasize internal problems by focusing on the company’s history and their compliance with cooking regulations. “In fact, the history of our company’s compliance with those regulations is verified through numerous evaluations conducted by federal, state and local governments” (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000, p. 151). In response to Jack in the Box’s failure to meet higher temperature guidelines imposed by the state,
尽管 Jack in the Box 提出了否认的论点，但事实仍然是他们的产品导致了多起死亡事件，公众仍然非常怀疑。当 Jack in the Box 专注于导致危机的外部问题时，他们试图通过关注公司的历史和遵守烹饪法规来淡化内部问题。“事实上，我们公司遵守这些法规的历史通过联邦、州和地方政府进行的多次评估得到了验证”（Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000, p. 151）。作为对 Jack in the Box 未能满足州政府施加的更高温度标准的回应，

Nugent said the message had not reached his office. If Jack in the Box grills had been at the higher state standard, it is unlikely that the crisis would have occurred (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).
纽金特表示，这个消息没有传达到他的办公室。如果 Jack in the Box 的烤架达到了更高的州标准，那么危机发生的可能性就不大了（Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000）。

Discussion. The Jack in the Box crisis falls under Coomb’s ‘accident’ category - “unintentional and happen during the course of normal organizational operations” (Coombs, 1995, p. 454). The crisis was devastating to Jack in the Box in the short-term. They had projected losses of between $\mathrm{\$}20$$\mathrm{\$}20$$20\$ 20 and $\mathrm{\$}30$$\mathrm{\$}30$$30\$ 30 million by March 24, 1993, resulting from the E. coli crisis. However, by the end of the year, they were able to slow their losses substantially.
讨论。Jack in the Box 危机属于 Coomb 的“事故”类别 - “无意的，并在正常组织运营过程中发生”（Coombs，1995，第 454 页）。这场危机在短期内对 Jack in the Box 造成了毁灭性的影响。他们预计到 1993 年 3 月 24 日，由于大肠杆菌危机，损失将在 $\mathrm{\$}20$$\mathrm{\$}20$$20\$ 20 到 $\mathrm{\$}30$$\mathrm{\$}30$$30\$ 30 百万之间。然而，到年底，他们能够大幅减缓损失。

Jack in the Box used several strategies to weather the E. coli storm. They began with a combination of avoidance and attachment strategies. When they issued their first press release explaining the source of the illness was unclear; and that some, but not all of the people being treated had eaten at their restaurant they employed two types of avoidance strategies - denial of intention and denial of volition. They also used an attachment strategy - bolstering - in the same press release when they announced the extra measures they were taking to ensure all food was cooked in accordance with a new state advisory that was issued.
Jack in the Box 采用了几种策略来应对大肠杆菌风波。他们首先采取了回避和附加策略的结合。当他们发布第一份新闻稿时，解释疾病的来源尚不明确；并且一些但不是所有接受治疗的人曾在他们的餐厅就餐，他们采用了两种回避策略——否认意图和否认意志。他们还在同一份新闻稿中使用了一种附加策略——增强，当时他们宣布采取额外措施以确保所有食品按照新发布的州建议进行烹饪。

They also employed scapegoating, a form of denial of volition (avoidance strategy) when they first took some responsibility for the crisis January 21 , but blamed their meat supplier for the contaminated meat. They also used forgiveness strategies, more specifically remediation, when they announced they would pay all the medical bills for people who became ill during the E. coli crisis. Another forgiveness strategy, rectification, was used when Jack in the Box announced several corrective actions they were taking in regards to cooking temperatures.
他们还采用了替罪羊策略，这是一种否认意愿（回避策略），当他们在 1 月 21 日首次对危机承担一些责任时，却将受污染的肉归咎于他们的肉类供应商。他们还使用了宽恕策略，更具体地说是补救，当他们宣布将支付在大肠杆菌危机期间生病的所有人的医疗费用时。另一种宽恕策略，纠正，在 Jack in the Box 宣布他们在烹饪温度方面采取的几项纠正措施时被使用。

Although Foodmaker, Jack in the Box’s parent company, continued to be in the news for years following the crisis - every time E. coli came up the whole Jack in the Box story would resurface - the company survived. By referring reporters to articles regarding Foodmaker’s food-safety innovations, the company regained credibility. In 1994, they instituted the fast-food industry’s first comprehensive food-safety program, the Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Points system. Today, they are considered the leader in food safety in the fast-food industry (Liddle, 1997) and they are the country’s fifth-largest burger chain (Goff, 1999).
尽管 Foodmaker（杰克盒子的母公司）在危机后多年仍然频频上新闻——每当大肠杆菌事件出现，整个杰克盒子的故事就会重新浮出水面——但公司依然存活下来。通过向记者提供有关 Foodmaker 食品安全创新的文章，公司重新获得了信誉。1994 年，他们实施了快餐行业首个全面的食品安全计划，即危害分析与关键控制点系统。如今，他们被认为是快餐行业食品安全的领导者（Liddle, 1997），并且是全国第五大汉堡连锁店（Goff, 1999）。

1)Evaluate the effectiveness of Jack in the Box’s initial communication strategy during the E. coli crisis. What impact did their delayed response to the media have on public perception, and how could this have been handled differently to mitigate reputational damage?
1) 评估 Jack in the Box 在大肠杆菌危机期间初始沟通策略的有效性。他们对媒体的延迟回应对公众认知产生了什么影响，以及如何以不同的方式处理以减轻声誉损害？
2)Discuss the role of transparency in Jack in the Box’s communication with stakeholders (customers, employees, suppliers, and health authorities). How did the company’s decision to partially shift blame to external parties (e.g., meat suppliers and health authorities) affect its credibility and trustworthiness?
2) 讨论透明度在 Jack in the Box 与利益相关者（客户、员工、供应商和卫生当局）沟通中的作用。公司部分将责任转移给外部方（例如，肉类供应商和卫生当局）的决定如何影响其可信度和可信性？
3)Analyze the ethical implications of Jack in the Box’s approach to taking responsibility for the crisis. Was their use of bolstering and scapegoating appropriate? How might a more proactive and accountable communication strategy have influenced the public’s reaction?
3) 分析 Jack in the Box 在危机中承担责任的伦理影响。他们使用的增强和替罪羊策略是否恰当？更积极和负责任的沟通策略可能如何影响公众的反应？
4)Jack in the Box implemented a comprehensive food-safety program after the crisis and referred reporters to articles highlighting their innovations. How can businesses effectively use post-crisis communication to rebuild trust and establish themselves as industry leaders in safety and reliability?
4)杰克盒子在危机后实施了一项全面的食品安全计划，并向记者推荐了突出其创新的文章。企业如何有效利用危机后的沟通来重建信任，并确立自己在安全和可靠性方面的行业领导地位？