LEE KUAN YEW: THE STRATEGY OF EXCELLENCE
李光耀：卓越的策略
A VISIT TO HARVARD
哈佛之行
On November 13, 1968, Lee Kuan Yew, the then forty-five-year-old prime
在 1968 年 11 月 13 日，當時四十五歲的李光耀，總理
minister of Singapore, arrived at Harvard University for what he described
新加坡的總理，抵達哈佛大學，為他所描述的
as a month-long ‘sabbatical’.[1] Singapore had become independent only
作為為期一個月的「休假」。新加坡剛剛獨立
three years earlier, but Lee had been its prime minister since 1959, when the
三年前，但李光耀自 1959 年起就擔任新加坡的總理，當時
city gained autonomy in the twilight of British rule.
城市在英國統治的黃昏中獲得自治。
Lee told the Harvard Crimson – the student newspaper – that his aims
李對哈佛克里姆森報（學生報紙）表示，他的目標
were ‘to get fresh ideas, to meet stimulating minds, to go back enriched
是「獲取新想法，結識激勵人心的人，回去時充實自己」
with a fresh burst of enthusiasm for what I do’, adding, in a touch of self-
對我所做的事情充滿了新的熱情，並補充道，帶著一絲自我
effacement, ‘I intend to study all the things I’ve been doing ad hoc without
抹去，‘我打算研究我一直在隨意做的所有事情，沒有
the proper tutoring the past 10 years.’[2] [*]
過去十年的適當輔導。
He was soon invited to a meeting by the faculty of Harvard’s Littauer
他很快就被哈佛大學利陶爾學院的教職員邀請參加一個會議
Center (now the Kennedy School of Government), which comprised
中心（現在的甘迺迪政府學院），包括
professors of government, economics and development. At the time,
政府、經濟和發展的教授。當時，
Americans knew little about Lee – or the tiny, newly established country he
美國人對李光耀和這個剛成立的小國家知之甚少
represented. The essence of the faculty’s understanding was that our guest
代表。該系的理解本質是我們的客人
led a semi-socialist party and a post-colonial state. As such, when he sat
領導一個半社會主義政黨和一個後殖民國家。因此，當他坐下
down at the large oval table, he was warmly welcomed as a kindred spirit
在那張大型橢圓形桌子旁，他受到熱情的歡迎，彷彿是一位志同道合的朋友
by my predominantly liberal colleagues assembled for the occasion.
由我主要是自由派的同事們為此次活動聚集在一起。
Compact, and radiating energy, Lee wasted no time on small talk or
緊湊且充滿活力，李光耀沒有浪費時間在寒暄上或
introductory remarks. Instead, he asked for the faculty’s views on the war in
引言發言。相反，他詢問了教職員對於戰爭的看法。
Vietnam.[3] My colleagues, voicing passionate opposition to the conflict
越南。[3] 我的同事們對這場衝突表達了熱烈的反對。
and to America’s part in it, were divided primarily over whether President
和美國在其中的角色，主要分歧在於總統
Lyndon B. Johnson was a ‘war criminal’ or merely a ‘psychopath’. After a
林登·B·約翰遜是一位「戰犯」或僅僅是「精神病患者」。在一個
number of the professors had spoken, the dean of the Littauer faculty
數位教授已經發言，利陶爾學院的院長
invited Lee to express his views, smiling in a way that clearly anticipated
邀請李表達他的看法，微笑的方式顯然預示著
approbation.
認可。
With his first words, Lee went straight to the point: ‘You make me sick.’
他一開口就直截了當地說：「你讓我感到厭惡。」
Then, without making any attempt to ingratiate himself, he proceeded to
然後，他沒有試圖迎合自己，便繼續進行
explain that Singapore, as a small country in a tumultuous part of the world,
解釋新加坡作為一個位於動盪世界的小國，
depended for its survival on an America confident in its mission of
依賴於對其使命充滿信心的美國生存
providing global security and powerful enough to counter the communist
提供全球安全並有足夠的力量來對抗共產主義
guerrilla movements that were then seeking, with support from China, to
游擊運動當時正在尋求中國的支持，去
undermine the young nations of Southeast Asia.
削弱東南亞年輕國家。
Neither a supplication for assistance nor an appeal to virtue, Lee’s
李的
response was instead a dispassionate analysis of the geopolitical realities of
回應則是對地緣政治現實的冷靜分析
his region. He described what he believed was Singapore’s national interest:
他的區域。他描述了他認為新加坡的國家利益：
to achieve economic viability and security. He made clear that his country
以實現經濟可行性和安全。他明確表示他的國家
would do what it could in pursuit of both objectives, aware that America
會盡其所能追求這兩個目標，意識到美國
would make its own decisions about any assistance for its own reasons. He
將根據自己的理由自行決定任何援助。 他
invited his interlocutors to join him less in a common ideology than in a
邀請他的對話者與他一起參與的不是共同的意識形態，而是一個
joint exploration of the necessary.
必要的共同探索。
To the astonished Harvard faculty, Lee articulated a worldview free of
對於驚訝的哈佛教職員，李光耀闡述了一種不受限制的世界觀
anti-American animus and post-imperial resentment. He neither blamed the
反美情緒和後帝國主義的怨恨。他既不責怪
United States for Singapore’s challenges nor expected it to solve them.
美國對新加坡的挑戰既沒有提供解決方案，也沒有期望其能解決這些問題。
Rather, he sought American goodwill so that Singapore, lacking oil and
相反，他尋求美國的善意，以便新加坡缺乏石油和
other natural riches, could grow through the cultivation of what he said was
其他自然資源，可以通過他所說的培育來增長
its principal resource: the quality of its people, whose potential could
其主要資源：其人民的素質，他們的潛力可以
develop only if they were not abandoned to communist insurgency, invasion
只有在不被拋棄於共產主義叛亂和入侵的情況下才能發展
by neighboring countries or Chinese hegemony. Earlier that year, British
由鄰國或中國霸權。該年早些時候，英國
Prime Minister Harold Wilson had announced the withdrawal of all forces
哈羅德·威爾遜首相已宣布撤回所有部隊
‘east of Suez’, requiring the closure of the massive Royal Navy base that
‘蘇伊士以東’，需要關閉龐大的皇家海軍基地
had been a pillar of Singapore’s economy and security. Lee was therefore
一直是新加坡經濟和安全的支柱。因此，李
seeking an American hand to help counter the difficulties he saw looming.
尋求美國的援助以幫助應對他所看到的困難。
He framed this task less in terms of the prevailing moral categories of the
他將這項任務的框架較少以當前的道德類別來看待
Cold War than as an element in the construction of a regional order – in the
冷戰比作為區域秩序建構中的一個元素更為重要 – 在
sustaining of which America should develop its own national interest.
美國應該發展自身的國家利益以維持這一點。
One of the essential qualities of a statesman is the ability to resist being
一位政治家的基本素質之一是抵抗被
swept along by the mood of the moment. Lee’s performance in that long-
隨著當下的情緒而推進。李的表現在那段漫長的
ago Harvard seminar was instructive not only for the clarity of his
哈佛研討會不僅對他的清晰度具有啟發性
analysis – of both America’s and Singapore’s positions in the world – but
分析 - 包括美國和新加坡在世界上的地位 - 但
also for his courage in going against the grain. It was a quality which he
也因為他勇於逆流而上。這是一種他所擁有的特質。
would display many times in his career.
將在他的職業生涯中多次顯示。
THE GIANT FROM LILLIPUT
來自小人國的巨人
Lee’s achievements were distinct from those of the other leaders described
李的成就與其他領導者的成就截然不同
in this volume. Each of them represented a major country with a culture
在這本書中。他們每一位都代表了一個擁有文化的主要國家
formed over centuries, if not millennia. For such leaders, as they attempt to
形成了幾個世紀，甚至幾千年。對於這樣的領導者，當他們試圖去
guide their society from a familiar past to an evolving future, success is
引導他們的社會從熟悉的過去走向不斷演變的未來，成功是
measured by their ability to direct their society’s historical experience and
根據他們引導社會歷史經驗的能力來衡量
values so that its potential may be fulfilled.
價值觀，以便實現其潛力。
The statesmanship practiced by Lee Kuan Yew developed from different
李光耀所實踐的政治家風範源於不同
origins. When he became leader of independent Singapore in August 1965,
起源。當他在 1965 年 8 月成為獨立新加坡的領導人時，
he took charge of a country that had never before existed – and hence, in
他接管了一個從未存在過的國家——因此，在
effect, had no political past except as an imperial subject. Lee’s
效果，除了作為一個帝國的臣民外，沒有任何政治過去。李的
achievements were to overcome his nation’s experience, to establish a
成就在於克服他國的經歷，建立一個
distinct conception of itself by conjuring up a dynamic future from a society
通過從一個社會中喚起一個充滿活力的未來，形成其獨特的自我概念
composed of divergent ethnic groups and to transform a poverty-ridden city
由不同族群組成，並將一個貧困的城市轉變為
into a world-class economy. In the process, he grew into a world statesman
成為一個世界級經濟體。在這個過程中，他成長為一位世界級的政治家。
and sought-after adviser to the great powers. Richard Nixon said he showed
和受人追捧的顧問。理查德·尼克松說他展現了
the ‘ability to rise above the resentments of the moment and of the past and
超越當下和過去的怨恨的能力和
think about the nature of the new world to come’.[4] Margaret Thatcher
思考即將到來的新世界的本質。[4] 瑪格麗特·撒切爾
called him ‘one of the twentieth century’s most accomplished practitioners
稱他為「二十世紀最傑出的實踐者之一」
of statecraft’.[5]
的治國之道’。[5]
Lee accomplished all this in the face of seemingly crippling
李在看似令人無法承受的情況下完成了這一切
disadvantages. Singapore’s territory was ‘some 224 square miles at low
劣勢。新加坡的領土約為 224 平方英里。
tide’, as he was wont to say – smaller than that of Chicago.[6] It lacked the
潮流，正如他所習慣說的那樣——比芝加哥小。[6] 它缺乏
most basic natural resources, including sufficient drinking water. Even the
最基本的自然資源，包括足夠的飲用水。即使是
tropical rains – Singapore’s main domestic source of drinking water at the
熱帶雨 – 新加坡的主要國內飲用水來源在於
time of independence – were an ambiguous gift, leaching the soil of
獨立的時期——是一份模糊的禮物，浸蝕著土壤的
nutrients and making productive agriculture impossible.[7] Singapore’s
新加坡的
population of 1.9 million was, by global standards, minuscule and rent by
190 萬的人口在全球標準下是微不足道的，並且受到
tension among three distinct ethnic groups: Chinese, Malay and Indian. It
三個不同族群之間的緊張關係：華人、馬來人和印度人。它
was surrounded by much larger and more powerful states, particularly
被更大且更強大的國家包圍，特別是
Malaysia and Indonesia, that envied its deep-water port and strategic
馬來西亞和印尼，羨慕其深水港和戰略
location along maritime trading routes.
位於海上貿易路線上的位置。
From this inauspicious genesis, Lee initiated an epic of leadership that
從這個不吉利的起源，李光耀開始了一段領導的史詩，
transformed Singapore into one of the world’s most successful countries. A
將新加坡轉變為世界上最成功的國家之一。
malarial island off the southernmost tip of the Malay peninsula became – in
馬來半島最南端的瘧疾島變成了 – 在
the span of a single generation – Asia’s wealthiest country on a per capita
在單一世代的時間內 – 亞洲人均最富有的國家
basis and the de facto commercial center of Southeast Asia. Today, by
基礎和事實上的東南亞商業中心。今天，通過
almost every measure of human well-being, it ranks globally in the highest
幾乎每一項人類福祉的指標，它在全球排名最高
percentile.
百分位數。
In contrast to countries whose persistence through the convulsions of
與那些在動盪中堅持不懈的國家相比，
history is taken for granted, Singapore would not survive unless it
歷史被視為理所當然，新加坡不會生存下去，除非它
performed at the highest possible level – as Lee relentlessly warned his
在最高可能的水平上進行——正如李光耀不斷警告他的
compatriots. As he put it in his memoirs, Singapore was ‘not a natural
同胞們。正如他在回憶錄中所說，新加坡並不是一個自然的
country but man-made’.[8] Precisely because it had no past as a nation, there
國家卻是人造的。[8] 正因為它沒有作為一個國家的過去，這裡
was no assurance it would have a future; its margin for error thus remained
沒有保證它會有未來；因此它的錯誤容忍度仍然保持
perpetually close to zero. ‘I’m concerned that Singaporeans assume
永遠接近於零。‘我擔心新加坡人假設
Singapore is a normal country,’ he would say several times later in his life.
「新加坡是一個正常的國家，」他在生命中的幾個時期會這樣說。
[9] ‘If we do not have a government and a people that differentiate
[9] ‘如果我們沒有一個能夠區分的政府和人民
themselves from the rest of the neighborhood . . . Singapore will cease to
他們自己與周圍的其他地方隔離開來……新加坡將停止
exist.’[10]
存在。[10]
In Singapore’s struggle to form itself and survive as a nation, domestic
在新加坡努力形成自身並作為一個國家生存的過程中，國內
and foreign policy had to be closely intertwined. There were three
和外交政策必須緊密相連。這裡有三個
requirements: economic growth to sustain the population, sufficient
要求：經濟增長以維持人口，足夠
domestic cohesion to permit long-range policies, and a foreign policy
國內凝聚力以允許長期政策，以及外交政策
nimble enough to survive among international behemoths such as Russia
足夠靈活以在俄羅斯等國際巨頭中生存
and China and covetous neighbors such as Malaysia and Indonesia.
和中國以及貪婪的鄰國如馬來西亞和印尼。
Lee also had the historical awareness necessary for real leadership. ‘City
李也具備真正領導所需的歷史意識。‘城市
states do not have good survival records,’ he observed in 1998.[11] ‘The
「國家並沒有良好的生存紀錄，」他在 1998 年觀察到。
island of Singapore will not disappear, but the sovereign nation it has
新加坡這個島嶼不會消失，但它擁有的主權國家
become, able to make its way and play its role in the world, could
成為，能夠在世界上立足並發揮其作用，能夠
vanish.’[12] In his mind, Singapore’s trajectory had to be a steep upward
消失。[12] 在他心中，新加坡的軌跡必須是急劇上升的
curve with no end in sight; otherwise, it would risk being engulfed by its
無止境的曲線；否則，它將面臨被其吞噬的風險
hinterland or by the severity of its economic and social challenges. Lee
內陸或其經濟和社會挑戰的嚴重性。李
taught a kind of global physics in which societies must constantly strive to
教授一種全球物理學，社會必須不斷努力去
avoid entropy. Leaders are tempted by pessimism, he observed to a private
避免熵增。他觀察到，領導者容易受到悲觀情緒的誘惑，對一位私人的
gathering of world leaders in May 1979, when Singapore was in the early
1979 年 5 月的世界領袖會議，當時新加坡正處於早期
stages of growth, but ‘we have to fight our way out of it. You have to show
成長的階段，但「我們必須奮力掙脫。你必須展示
a credible, plausible way that we can keep our head above water.’[13]
一個可信且合理的方法，讓我們能夠保持生存。
Parallel to Lee’s dire warnings about the threat of extinction lay an
與李光耀對滅絕威脅的嚴重警告並行的是一個
equally vivid imagination of his country’s potential. If every great
同樣生動的想像他國家的潛力。如果每個偉大的
achievement is a dream before it becomes a reality, Lee’s dream was
成就是一個夢想，然後才變成現實，李的夢想是
breathtaking in its audacity: he envisioned a state that would not simply
驚人於其大膽：他設想了一個不僅僅是
survive but flourish through an insistence on excellence. In Lee’s
生存並茁壯成長，堅持卓越。在李的
perception, excellence meant much more than individual performance: the
感知，卓越意味著遠超過個人表現：這
quest for it needed to permeate the entire society. Whether in government
對於它的追求需要滲透整個社會。無論是在政府
service, business, medicine or education, mediocrity and corruption were
服務、商業、醫療或教育，平庸和腐敗是
not acceptable. There was no second chance in case of transgressions, very
不可接受。若有違規行為，將不會有第二次機會，非常
little tolerance for failure. In this manner, Singapore achieved a worldwide
對失敗的容忍度極低。透過這種方式，新加坡實現了全球性的
reputation for collectively outstanding performance. A sense of shared
共同卓越表現的聲譽。共享的感覺
success, in Lee’s view, could help to knit his society together despite the
成功，在李光耀看來，可以幫助將他的社會凝聚在一起，儘管
lack of a universally shared religion, ethnicity or culture.
缺乏普遍共享的宗教、民族或文化。
Lee’s ultimate gift to his multi-ethnic people was his unremitting faith
李對他多元民族人民的最終贈禮是他不懈的信念
that they were their own greatest resource, that they had the capacity to
他們是自己最大的資源，他們有能力去
unlock possibilities in themselves that they had not known existed. He also
解鎖他們自己未曾知道存在的可能性。他還
devoted himself to encouraging a comparable confidence in his foreign
致力於在他的外國夥伴中培養相似的信心
friends and acquaintances. He was persuasive not only because he was a
朋友和熟人。他之所以有說服力，不僅因為他是一位
subtle observer of the regional politics of Southeast Asia but because his
東南亞地區政治的微妙觀察者，但因為他的
Chinese heritage, combined with his Cambridge University education, gave
中國遺產，加上劍橋大學的教育，賦予了
him exceptional insight into the dynamics of the interaction between East
他對東方之間互動的動態有著卓越的洞察力
and West – one of the essential fulcrums of history.
和西方——歷史的基本支點之一。
Throughout his life, Lee insisted on describing his contributions as
李光耀一生中堅持將他的貢獻描述為
merely the unlocking of his society’s existing capabilities. He knew that to
僅僅是解鎖他社會現有的能力。他知道要
succeed, his quest had to become the enduring pattern, not a personal tour
成功，他的追求必須成為持久的模式，而不是個人的旅程
de force. ‘Anybody who thinks he’s a statesman needs to see a psychiatrist,’
強制。‘任何自認為是政治家的人都需要去看精神科醫生，’
he once said.[14]
他曾說過。[14]
In time, Singapore’s success under Lee moved even China to study his
隨著時間的推移，新加坡在李光耀的領導下的成功甚至使中國開始研究他的
approach and emulate his designs. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping came to the
接近並模仿他的設計。1978 年，鄧小平來到
city-state expecting to see a backwater and to be cheered by throngs of
城市國家期待看到一個偏僻之地，並受到人群的歡呼
ethnic Chinese. Deng had spent two days in Singapore on his way to Paris
華裔。鄧小平在前往巴黎的途中在新加坡待了兩天。
in 1920, and in the intervening years his information on the city had largely
在 1920 年，並且在這段時間內，他對這座城市的資訊大部分已經
been provided by an obsequious entourage prone to paint the Singaporean
leadership as the ‘running dogs of American imperialism’.[15] Instead, the
領導層被視為「美國帝國主義的跑狗」。
ethnic Chinese Deng met in Singapore were firm in their allegiance to their
在新加坡會面的華裔鄧對他們的忠誠堅定不移
young nation. The gleaming skyscrapers and immaculate avenues Deng
年輕的國家。閃閃發光的摩天大樓和整潔的街道鄧
encountered provided him with both an impetus and a blueprint for China’s
遭遇為他提供了中國的動力和藍圖
own post-Mao reforms.
自己的後毛改革。
IMPERIAL YOUTH
帝國青年
Lee Kuan Yew was born in September 1923, scarcely more than a century
李光耀於 1923 年 9 月出生，距今不過一個世紀
after Sir Stamford Raffles, lieutenant-governor of the British colony in
在英國殖民地的副省長史丹福·拉斐爾之後，
Sumatra, established a trading post on the small island near the Strait of
蘇門答臘，在海峽附近的小島上建立了一個貿易站
Malacca known to locals as ‘Singa Pura’, meaning ‘Lion City’ in Sanskrit.
馬六甲在當地人中被稱為「Singa Pura」，在梵語中意為「獅子城」。
Founded by Raffles in 1819, Singapore was technically ruled from Calcutta
由拉斐尔於 1819 年創立，新加坡在技術上由加爾各答統治
as part of ‘further India’, although the limited communications technology
作為「進一步的印度」的一部分，儘管有限的通信技術
of the day allowed considerable leeway to locally based colonial
當天給予本地殖民地相當大的自由度
administrators. Declared a free port by London – and enriched by natural-
管理者。被倫敦宣告為自由港——並因自然而豐富。
resource exports from the Malayan mainland – the new outpost grew
來自馬來半島的資源出口 – 新的前哨基地增長
swiftly, drawing traders and fortune-seekers from Southeast Asia and
迅速地，吸引了來自東南亞的商人和尋求財富的人士
beyond. From 1867, Singapore was placed under the direct jurisdiction of
超越。自 1867 年起，新加坡被置於直接管轄之下
the Colonial Office in London as a crown colony.
倫敦的殖民地辦事處作為一個皇家殖民地。
[16]
Ethnic Chinese in particular flocked to Singapore and soon became its
華裔特別湧向新加坡，並很快成為其
majority – some coming from the nearby Malay peninsula and Indonesian
大多數 – 一些來自附近的馬來半島和印尼
archipelago, others fleeing from turmoil and poverty in crisis-racked
群島，其他人逃離動盪和貧困的危機四伏
nineteenth-century China. Among the latter group was Lee’s great-
十九世紀的中國。在後者中有李的偉大-
grandfather, who traveled to Singapore from the southern Chinese province
祖父，從中國南方省份旅行到新加坡
of Guangdong in 1863. Malays, Indians, Arabs, Armenians and Jews
廣東的 1863 年。馬來人、印度人、阿拉伯人、亞美尼亞人和猶太人
likewise settled in the freewheeling entrepot, giving the city a polyglot
同樣地，定居在這個自由貿易的中轉港，使這座城市成為一個多語種的地方
character. By the 1920s, Malaya produced almost one-half of the world’s
馬來亞在 1920 年代生產了世界上幾乎一半的
rubber and one-third of its tin, exporting both via Singapore’s port.[17]
橡膠和三分之一的錫，通過新加坡的港口出口。
By the time of Lee’s birth, Singapore had also become a cornerstone of
在李光耀出生時，新加坡也已成為一個基石
British military strategy in Asia. Britain had been an ally of Japan since
英國在亞洲的軍事戰略。英國自此以來一直是日本的盟友
1902, going so far as to call in Japanese marines to help crush an Indian
1902，甚至不惜召喚日本海軍陸戰隊來協助鎮壓印度人
army mutiny in Singapore in 1915.[18] But by 1921, the Admiralty had
新加坡在 1915 年的軍隊叛變。[18] 但到 1921 年，海軍部已經
become anxious about Japan’s growing power and resolved to build a
對日本日益增長的實力感到焦慮，並決心建立一個
substantial naval base in Singapore, with the aim of turning it into ‘the
新加坡的重大海軍基地，目的是將其轉變為「the
Gibraltar of the East’.[19] Despite the rise of Japan, the world of Lee’s
「東方直布羅陀」。儘管日本崛起，李的世界
childhood was one in which the British Empire appeared both invincible
童年是一個英國帝國看似無敵的時期
and eternal. ‘There was no question of any resentment,’ he recalled decades
和永恆的。他回憶道：「根本沒有任何怨恨的問題。」
later; ‘the superior status of the British in government and society was
後來；‘英國人在政府和社會中的優越地位是
simply a fact of life.’[20]
僅僅是生活的事實。
Lee’s family prospered during the boom years of the 1920s. Influenced
李的家庭在 1920 年代的繁榮時期蓬勃發展。受到影響
by a particularly Anglophilic grandfather, Lee’s parents also took the
由一位特別崇英的祖父撫養，李的父母也帶著
unusual step of giving their sons English names in addition to their Chinese
給他們的兒子除了中文名字外還取英文名字的不同做法
ones. Lee’s was ‘Harry’. From the age of six, he was educated in English-
language schools.[21]
語言學校。[21]
Despite these English influences, Lee’s upbringing was traditionally
儘管有這些英語影響，李光耀的成長背景仍然是傳統的
Chinese. He was raised with his extended family – including seven
中文。他與他的大家庭一起長大——包括七個
cousins – in his maternal grandfather’s house, where his parents shared a
表兄弟 – 在他外祖父的家裡，他的父母共享一個
single room with their five children. From these childhood experiences and
與他們的五個孩子共用的單人房。從這些童年經歷和
Confucian cultural influences, filial piety, frugality and a prizing of
儒家文化影響、孝道、節儉和重視
harmony and stability were early imprints on his mind.
和諧與穩定是他心中早期的印記。
His parents were not educated professionals and suffered when the Great
他的父母不是受過教育的專業人士，並在大蕭條時期遭受了痛苦
Depression struck in 1929. Lee wrote in his memoirs that his father, a
抑鬱症在 1929 年襲來。李在他的回憶錄中寫道，他的父親，一位
storekeeper for Shell Oil Company, would often ‘come home in a foul
Shell Oil Company 的店員，經常會「帶著惡劣的情緒回家」
mood after losing at blackjack . . . and demand some of my mother’s
失去二十一點後的心情……並要求一些我母親的
jewellery to pawn so that he could go back to try his luck again’.[22] She
珠寶典當，以便他能夠回去再試一次運氣。
always refused, safeguarding the education of the children, who, in turn,
始終拒絕，保護孩子們的教育，他們反過來，
adored her and felt a lifelong obligation to meet her high expectations.[23]
崇拜她並感到終身有責任滿足她的高期望。[23]
A clever but at times rebellious student, the twelve-year-old Lee
一位聰明但有時叛逆的學生，十二歲的李
graduated at the top of his primary-school class, thereby gaining admission
以優異的成績畢業於小學班級，從而獲得入學資格
to the Raffles Institution, alongside 150 of the best students of all ethnicities
到拉夫斯學院，與 150 名各族裔的優秀學生一起
and classes in Singapore and Malaya who had been admitted exclusively on
和在新加坡和馬來亞的班級，這些班級的入學資格僅限於
the basis of merit – including Miss Kwa Geok Choo, who was the only
以優才為基礎 – 包括郭玉珠小姐，她是唯一的
female student.[24] Then as now, the Raffles Institution was the most
女學生。[24] 當時和現在，萊佛士學院是最
rigorous English-language secondary school in Singapore and the training
新加坡的嚴格英語中學及其培訓
ground of the city’s future elite. It aimed at preparing the ablest colonial
城市未來精英的基礎。它旨在培養最優秀的殖民地人才。
subjects for the entrance examinations to British universities. Later in life,
英國大學入學考試的科目。後來在生活中，
upon meeting Commonwealth leaders from around the world, Lee
在與來自世界各地的英聯邦領袖會晤時，李
invariably ‘discovered that they also had gone through the same drill with
總是「發現他們也經歷過相同的過程」
the same textbooks and could quote the same passages from Shakespeare’.
相同的教科書，並且能夠引用莎士比亞的相同段落。
[25] They were all part of ‘the easy old-boy network . . . nurtured by the
[25] 他們都是「輕鬆的老男孩網絡的一部分……由……培養」
British colonial education system’.[26]
英國殖民教育制度。
Cognizant of their son’s academic promise, and regretting that they had
考慮到他們兒子的學業潛力，並對他們曾經的遺憾感到遺憾
not made more of their own careers, Lee’s parents encouraged him to
李的父母鼓勵他不要對自己的事業有更多的追求，
pursue medicine or law. He dutifully made plans to study law in London,
攻讀醫學或法律。他認真地計劃在倫敦學習法律，
being placed first in Singapore and Malaya in the senior Cambridge
在新加坡和馬來亞的劍橋高級考試中名列第一
examinations.[27] But in 1940, with the outbreak of another world war in
考試。[27] 但在 1940 年，隨著另一場世界大戰的爆發
Europe, Lee decided it would be better to remain in Singapore and study at
歐洲，李決定留在新加坡學習於
Raffles College (now the National University of Singapore), where he had
拉夫爾斯學院（現為新加坡國立大學），他曾在那裡
been awarded a full scholarship.[28]
已獲得全額獎學金。[28]
Lee excelled academically during his freshman year, competing with
李在大一時學業表現優異，與
Miss Kwa for first place in various subjects. Returning to his dream to
郭小姐在各科目中名列前茅。回到他的夢想去
study law in England, he set his sights on attaining a Queen’s scholarship,
在英國學習法律，他的目標是獲得女王獎學金，
which would cover the costs of a university education in Britain. Since only
這將涵蓋在英國大學教育的費用。由於只有
two students in the Straits Settlements (Malacca, Penang and Singapore)
在海峽殖民地的兩名學生（馬六甲、檳城和新加坡）
were awarded a Queen’s scholarship every year, Lee was perpetually
每年都獲得女王獎學金，李始終
anxious that Miss Kwa and a top student from another school would take
擔心郭小姐和另一所學校的優秀學生會參加
the first two places, leaving him behind in Singapore.[29]
前兩個地方，將他留在新加坡。[29]
There were greater anxieties to come. In December 1941, the Japanese
接下來會有更大的焦慮。1941 年 12 月，日本
bombed the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and simultaneously
轟炸了美國太平洋艦隊在夏威夷的珍珠港，並同時
attacked British Malaya, Hong Kong and Singapore. Two months later, in
攻擊了英屬馬來亞、香港和新加坡。兩個月後，在
February 1942, the city was conquered by Japan in what Winston Churchill
1942 年 2 月，這座城市在溫斯頓·邱吉爾所說的情況下被日本征服
would call ‘the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history’.
會被稱為「英國歷史上最糟糕的災難和最大的投降」。
Lee, then eighteen years old, later described this as ‘the first turning point
李，當時十八歲，後來形容這是「第一個轉折點」
of my life’, contrasting the panicked departure of bourgeois British families
我生命中的一部分，對比了資產階級英國家庭的驚慌逃離
with the stoic suffering of their colonial subjects and the 80,000 British,
與他們的殖民地臣民的堅忍痛苦以及 80,000 名英國人，
Australian and Indian soldiers who had been captured by the Japanese. For
被日本人俘虜的澳大利亞和印度士兵。
Lee and countless other Singaporeans, ‘the aura of overwhelming
李和無數其他新加坡人，‘壓倒性的光環
superiority with which the British held us in thrall was broken, never to be
英國對我們的優越感被打破，再也無法恢復
restored’.[30]
A brutal occupation followed, as Singapore’s trade-dependent economy
隨之而來的是殘酷的佔領，因為新加坡的貿易依賴型經濟
was choked by war and its population demoralized by conditions of near-
被戰爭窒息，人口因接近的條件而士氣低落
starvation. Japanese authorities renamed streets and public buildings, took
饑荒。日本當局重新命名街道和公共建築，採取
down the bronze statue of Raffles from Empress Place and imposed their
將位於女皇廣場的拉斐爾銅像拆除並強加他們的
imperial calendar.
帝國曆法。
[31] Lee himself narrowly avoided death after being
李本人在被...後險些喪命
arbitrarily rounded up by Japanese troops in a mass detention of Chinese
被日本軍隊隨意圓整的中國人群體拘留
men, most of whom were summarily executed – especially those with soft
男人，大多數人被迅速處決——尤其是那些軟弱的
hands or spectacles, singled out as ‘intellectuals’ whose loyalties might lie
手或眼鏡，被選為“知識分子”，其忠誠可能在於
with Britain. Tens of thousands were massacred.[32] Lee was spared, took a
與英國。數萬人被屠殺。[32] 李光耀得以倖免，接受了一個
three-month Japanese language course and found work – first as a clerk at a
三個月的日語課程並找到工作——首先是一名文員在一個
Japanese company, then as an English translator in the Japanese propaganda
日本公司，然後作為日本宣傳的英語翻譯員
department, and finally as a black-market jewelry broker.
部門，最後作為黑市珠寶經紀人。
[33] During the
[33] 在期間
war years, Lee learned that ‘the key to survival was improvisation’ – a
戰爭年代，李光耀了解到「生存的關鍵在於即興應變」——一
lesson that would shape his pragmatic, experimental approach to governing
塑造他務實、實驗性治理方法的課程
Singapore.[34]
新加坡。[34]
With the war’s end, Lee at last achieved a Queen’s scholarship to study
隨著戰爭結束，李終於獲得了女王獎學金以進行學習
law at Cambridge, graduating with a first-class degree. Miss Kwa, whom
劍橋的法律，畢業時獲得一級榮譽學位。夸小姐，誰
Lee had begun courting during the war, followed the same path, and in
李在戰爭期間開始約會，走上了同樣的道路，並在
December 1947 the two were quietly married in Stratford-upon-Avon.[35]
1947 年 12 月，他們在斯特拉特福德-阿 pon-艾馮靜靜地結婚。
‘Choo’, as Lee called her, was an extraordinary woman, with an unusual
‘Choo’，正如李所稱呼的，是一位非凡的女性，擁有不尋常的
combination of brilliance and sensitivity. She became the indispensable
才華與敏感的結合。她成為不可或缺的
anchor of his life, not only in a day-to-day sense but above all as a
他生活的支柱，不僅在日常生活中，更重要的是作為一個
pervasive emotional and intellectual support throughout his public
在他公共生活中普遍存在的情感和智力支持
activities. At Raffles College, she had majored in literature, reading from
活動。在拉夫爾斯學院，她主修文學，閱讀來自
‘Jane Austen to JRR Tolkien, from Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian Wars to
《簡·奧斯汀》到《JRR·托爾金》，從《修昔底德》 的《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭》到
Virgil’s Aeneid’, as Lee reflected later.
維吉爾的《埃涅阿斯紀》, 李光耀後來反思道。
[36] After their success at Cambridge,
[36] 在劍橋的成功之後，
they returned to Singapore and co-founded a law firm, Lee & Lee.
他們回到新加坡並共同創辦了一家律師事務所，李氏律師事務所。
Lee’s views during his Cambridge years were firmly socialist and anti-
李在劍橋時期的觀點堅定地偏向社會主義並反對-
colonialist, even anti-British. Some of this was personal: he was
殖民者，甚至反英。這其中有些是個人的：他是
occasionally turned away from hotels in England because of the color of his
因為他的膚色而偶爾被英國的酒店拒之門外
skin,[37] but much more of it was to do with what he later called the
皮膚，[37] 但更多的是與他後來所稱的有關
‘ferment in the air’. The independence struggles of India, Burma and other
「空氣中的發酵」。印度、緬甸及其他國家的獨立鬥爭
colonies were leading Lee to ask: ‘Why not Malaya, which then included
殖民地使李光耀開始思考：‘為什麼不選擇馬來亞，當時包括
Singapore?’[38] Convinced that ‘the welfare state was the highest form of
新加坡？'[38] 確信「福利國家是最高形式的
civilised society’, Lee was an admirer of the postwar reforms of Prime
文明社會，李光耀是戰後改革的支持者
Minister Clement Attlee’s Labour government as well as Indian Prime
克萊門特·艾特利部長的工黨政府以及印度總理
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s statist economic policies.[39]
尼赫魯總理的國家主義經濟政策。
Lee first entered the public eye while in Britain, campaigning on behalf
李在英國首次進入公眾視野，為...進行競選
of a Labour Party friend who was running for parliament. Standing on the
一位正在參加國會選舉的工黨朋友的。站在
back of a truck in the small town of Totnes in Devon, Lee delivered one of
在德文郡的小鎮托特尼斯的一輛卡車後面，李發表了其中一篇
his first public speeches, trading on his identity as a British subject to
他第一次公開演講，利用他作為英國公民的身份來
advocate for Malaya’s self-governance. His arguments foreshadowed his
倡導馬來亞的自我治理。他的論點預示了他的
later style, more practical than ideological: independence would be most
後來的風格，比起意識形態更具實用性：獨立將是最重要的
successful if achieved cooperatively and incrementally between the
成功如果在之間以合作和漸進的方式實現
independence movement and the mother country. Lee closed his speech
獨立運動和母國。李光耀結束了他的演講
with an appeal to British reason and self-interest:
以對英國理性和自身利益的呼籲：
Even if you care nothing for fairness or social justice to the colonial peoples,
即使你對殖民地人民的公平或社會正義毫不在意，
then for the sake of your own self-interest, your own economic well-being,
然後為了你自己的利益，你自己的經濟福祉，
for the sake of the dollars you get out of Malaya and your other colonies,
為了你從馬來亞和其他殖民地獲得的美元，
return a government that has the confidence of these peoples, who will then
返回一個擁有這些人民信任的政府，然後他們將
gladly cooperate with and be happy to grow up within the British
樂意與英國合作並在其中快樂成長
Commonwealth and Empire.[40]
英聯邦與帝國。[40]
BUILDING A STATE
建立國家
While Lee was studying in England, Singapore was suffering wrenching
當李光耀在英國學習時，新加坡正遭受劇烈的痛苦
postwar disruptions. Well into the spring of 1947, food was rationed and
戰後的混亂。直到 1947 年春季，食物仍然受到配給，
tuberculosis rampant. The Malayan Communist Party and its trade union
結核病猖獗。馬來亞共產黨及其工會
allies were organizing strikes that further damaged the economy.
盟友們正在組織罷工，進一步損害經濟。
[41]
By the time of Lee’s return to Singapore in August 1950, two major
李光耀於 1950 年 8 月返回新加坡時，兩個主要
problems lingered: housing and corruption. Only one-third of Singaporeans
問題仍然存在：住房和貪污。只有三分之一的新加坡人
had adequate housing, and construction was not keeping pace with demand.
有足夠的住房，而建設未能跟上需求。
After stores closed for the day, it was common for employees to sleep on
商店關閉後，員工在上面睡覺是很常見的
the floor.
地板。
[42] Corruption, untamed under British rule, had been exacerbated
[42] 在英國統治下失控的貪污問題已經惡化
by wartime conditions.[43] Inflation eroded the purchasing power of civil
因戰爭條件而造成的通貨膨脹侵蝕了民眾的購買力。
servants’ salaries, creating greater temptations for graft.[44]
公務員的薪水，造成更大的貪污誘惑。[44]
Lee had returned with the intention of practicing law but was quickly
李回國的目的是從事法律工作，但很快就
drawn into Singapore’s politics. His gifts were immediately rewarded: in
被捲入新加坡的政治中。他的才能立即得到了回報：在
1954, at the age of thirty-one, he founded the People’s Action Party (PAP);
1954 年，三十一歲的他創立了人民行動黨（PAP）；
within five years, galvanized by Lee’s fearsome energy, it dominated the
在五年內，受到李光耀可怕的精力激勵，它主導了
island’s political landscape. Cyril Northcote Parkinson, the Raffles
島嶼的政治格局。西里爾·諾思科特·帕金森，拉夫爾斯
Professor of History at the University of Malaya in Singapore, described
新加坡馬來亞大學的歷史教授，描述了
Lee’s political positioning during these years as ‘as far to the left as
李在這些年中的政治立場是「盡可能向左」
possible, short of Communism, and further to the left in words than action’.
可能，除了共產主義之外，言辭上比行動更向左。
[45] With a strong social democratic message, the PAP emphasized the
[45] 以強烈的社會民主主義訊息，人民行動黨強調了
failure of colonial authorities to provide decent public services and clean,
殖民當局未能提供體面的公共服務和清潔的
efficient government. PAP candidates campaigned without ties, in white
有效的政府。人民行動黨候選人穿著白色服裝進行競選，沒有打領帶。
short-sleeved shirts – intended at once as a no-nonsense accommodation to
短袖襯衫 – 同時旨在作為一種不拘小節的適應
Singapore’s tropical climate and a symbol of their commitment to honest
新加坡的熱帶氣候和他們對誠實的承諾的象徵
governance.[46] [*] In May 1959, the city was granted self-government by
治理。[46] [*] 1959 年 5 月，該城市獲得了自我治理權。
London in all matters except foreign policy and defense. After the PAP
倫敦在所有事務上，除了外交政策和國防。 在人民行動黨之後
secured a parliamentary majority in elections that month, Lee was
在該月的選舉中獲得了議會多數，李氏
appointed prime minister, a position he held until he stepped down in
任命為總理，這個職位他一直擔任直到他辭職在
November 1990, more than three decades later.
1990 年 11 月，三十多年後。
[47]
In the immediate aftermath of self-government, Singapore had three
在自我治理的直接後果中，新加坡有三個
distinct constitutional arrangements within the space of a few years: as a
在幾年內的不同憲法安排：作為一個
British crown colony from 1959 to 1963, as part of a new confederation
1959 年至 1963 年的英國皇家殖民地，作為新聯邦的一部分
called Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, and as an independent sovereign state
稱為馬來西亞，從 1963 年到 1965 年，並作為一個獨立的主權國家
after 1965. It was during this period near the end of colonial rule that the
在 1965 年之後。正是在這段接近殖民統治結束的時期，
foundations of the modern Singaporean state were laid. Lee assembled an
現代新加坡國家的基礎已經奠定。李光耀召集了一個
impressive cabinet – including the economist Goh Keng Swee (appointed
令人印象深刻的內閣 – 包括經濟學家吳慶瑞（被任命
minister of finance) and the journalist S. Rajaratnam (appointed minister of
財政部長）和記者 S. Rajaratnam（被任命為部長的）
culture) – who drew up plans to ameliorate the city’s social conditions.[*]
文化) – 他們制定了改善城市社會條件的計劃。[*]
The new Housing and Development Board (HDB) soon began
新的房屋發展局（HDB）很快開始
constructing high-rise residential projects on a massive scale, with the goal
大規模建設高層住宅項目，目標
of giving all Singaporeans access to affordable housing of essentially the
讓所有新加坡人都能夠獲得負擔得起的住房的基本上
same type; residents had the right to purchase their apartments from the
相同類型；居民有權從中購買他們的公寓
HDB at established rates. Lee appointed a competent and dynamic
HDB 以既定價格。李光耀任命了一位能幹且充滿活力的
businessman, Lim Kim San, to lead the board; at Lim’s direction, it built
商人林金山擔任董事會主席；在林的指導下，它建立了
more housing in three years than the British had in the preceding thirty-two.
在三年內建造的住房比英國在前面三十二年內建造的還要多。
[48] In time, Singapore grew into a fully urban society of homeowners,
隨著時間的推移，新加坡發展成為一個完全的城市擁有者社會，
providing every family with a stake in Singapore’s future in the form of
為每個家庭提供在新加坡未來中的一份利益，形式為
property.
財產。
[49] As Lee pointed out in his memoirs, closely linking individual
[49] 正如李光耀在他的回憶錄中指出的，緊密聯繫個人
economic prosperity to the state’s well-being also ‘ensured political
經濟繁榮對國家的福祉也“確保了政治
stability’, which in turn reinforced economic growth.[50] At the same time,
穩定性，這反過來又加強了經濟增長。[50] 同時，
a system of racial and income quotas on Singapore’s housing districts first
新加坡住房區的種族和收入配額制度首先
put a limit on ethnic segregation and then progressively eliminated it. By
對族裔隔離設置限制，然後逐步消除它。透過
living and working together, Singaporeans from disparate ethnicities and
生活和工作在一起，來自不同族裔的新加坡人和
religions began to develop a national consciousness.
宗教開始發展出國家意識。
Lee moved just as quickly to eradicate corruption. Within a year of
李迅速採取行動根除貪污。在一年內
taking office, his government passed the Prevention of Corruption Act,
上任後，他的政府通過了《防止貪污法》
which imposed severe penalties for corruption at every level of government
對政府各級腐敗行為施加嚴厲的懲罰
and limited due process for suspected bribe-takers. Under Lee’s leadership,
和對涉嫌受賄者的有限正當程序。在李光耀的領導下，
corruption was swiftly and ruthlessly suppressed.[51] Lee also put all
貪污迅速而無情地被鎮壓。[51] 李也將所有
foreign investments under intense scrutiny, personally performing some of
外國投資受到嚴格審查，親自執行一些
his administration’s uncompromising due diligence. His rigorous
他政府的毫不妥協的盡職調查。他的嚴格
enforcement of Singapore’s laws buttressed its reputation as an honest, safe
新加坡法律的執行增強了其作為一個誠實、安全的地方的聲譽
place to do business.
商業場所。
To achieve his objectives, Lee relied on penalizing civil servants for
為了實現他的目標，李光耀依賴於懲罰公務員以達到
failure rather than encouraging them by raising their salaries; in fact, his
失敗而不是通過提高他們的薪水來鼓勵他們；事實上，他的
government initially slashed them.[52] Only in 1984, when Singapore had
政府最初削減了它們。[52] 只有在 1984 年，當新加坡有
become wealthier, did Lee adopt his signature policy of pegging civil
變得更富有，李光耀才採取了他標誌性的政策，將公務員薪資掛鉤
servants’ salaries at 80 percent of comparable private-sector rates.[53] As a
公務員的薪資為可比私營部門薪資的 80%。[53] 作為一個
result, government officials in Singapore became some of the best
結果，新加坡的政府官員成為了一些最優秀的
compensated in the world. Success against corruption remains the ‘moral
在世界上獲得補償。對抗腐敗的成功仍然是“道德
basis of [PAP] rule’, as a prominent Singaporean academic has observed.
「[PAP] 執政的基礎」，正如一位著名的新加坡學者所觀察到的。
[54]
Corruption in Singapore is understood not only as a moral failing of the
新加坡的貪污不僅被理解為道德上的失敗
individuals involved but also as a transgression against the ethical code of
涉及的個體，但也違反了道德準則的越界行為
the community – which emphasizes meritocratic excellence, fair play and
社區 – 強調精英主義的卓越、公平競爭和
honorable conduct.[55] Singapore has regularly been ranked as one of the
光榮的行為。[55] 新加坡經常被評為其中之一的
least corrupt countries in the world, fulfilling Lee’s goals for his country.
世界上最不腐敗的國家，實現了李光耀對他國家的目標。
[56]
[*] As Lee observed later: ‘You want men with good character, good mind,
[*] 李光耀後來觀察到：「你需要品德良好、頭腦聰明的人，
strong convictions. Without that Singapore won’t make it.’[57]
堅定的信念。沒有這一點，新加坡將無法成功。
Reducing corruption made it possible to invest in government programs
減少貪污使得能夠投資於政府計劃
that ensured substantial improvement in Singaporeans’ lives and provided a
確保新加坡人生活顯著改善並提供了一個
fair playing field based on equality of opportunity. Between 1960 and 1963,
基於機會平等的公平競爭環境。在 1960 年至 1963 年間，
Singapore’s educational expenditure rose nearly seventeen-fold, while the
新加坡的教育支出幾乎增長了十七倍，而
school population increased by 50 percent.[58] In the PAP’s first nine years
學校人口增加了 50%。[58] 在人民行動黨的前九年
in power, Lee set aside nearly one-third of Singapore’s budget for
在執政期間，李光耀將新加坡預算的近三分之一撥出用於
education – an astonishing proportion in relation to neighboring countries,
教育 - 與鄰近國家相比，驚人的比例，
or indeed any country in the world.[59]
或實際上是世界上任何國家。[59]
Emphasis on the quality of life turned into a defining aspect of
生活品質的重視成為了...的定義性特徵
Singapore’s style. Beginning with a 1960 X-ray campaign against
新加坡的風格。始於 1960 年的 X 光檢查運動對抗
tuberculosis, Singapore made public health a major priority.
結核病，新加坡將公共衛生作為主要優先事項。
[60] As George
Shultz and Vidar Jorgensen have observed, ‘The city-state spends only 5
舒爾茨和維達·約根森觀察到，「這個城邦只花費 5
percent of GDP on medical care but has considerably better health
醫療保健的 GDP 百分比，但健康狀況卻好得多
outcomes than the U.S., which spends 18 percent of GDP on health. Life
結果比美國好，美國在健康上花費 18%的 GDP。生命
expectancy in Singapore is 85.2 years, compared with 78.7 in the U.S.’[61]
新加坡的預期壽命為 85.2 年，而美國為 78.7 年。[61]
Within one generation, Singapore transformed itself from a disease-ridden
在一代人之內，新加坡從一個疾病肆虐的地方轉變為一個繁榮的國家
slum into a first-world metropolis – all the while steadily shrinking the
貧民窟變成一個第一世界的大都市——同時穩步縮小
government’s share of costs.[62]
政府的成本分擔比例。[62]
To orchestrate this revolution in governance, Lee established a network
為了策劃這場治理革命，李光耀建立了一個網絡
of what he called ‘parapolitical institutions’ to serve as a transmission belt
他所稱的「準政治機構」作為傳輸帶
between the state and its citizens. Community centers, citizens’ consultative
在國家與其公民之間。社區中心，公民諮詢
committees, residents’ committees and, later, town councils provided
委員會、居民委員會以及後來的市鎮議會提供
recreation, settled small grievances, offered such services as kindergartens
娛樂，解決小爭議，提供幼兒園等服務
and disseminated information about government policies.[63] The PAP
並傳播有關政府政策的信息。[63] 人民行動黨
played an important role in these institutions, blurring the boundaries
在這些機構中扮演了重要角色，模糊了界限
between party, state and people.[64] For example, Lee established almost
政黨、國家與人民之間。[64] 例如，李建立了幾乎
400 kindergartens that were exclusively staffed by PAP members.[65]
400 所完全由人民行動黨成員擔任職務的幼稚園。[65]
Through a combination of public service and what Lee described as
通過公共服務和李所描述的
skilled political ‘street fighting’, the PAP steadily entrenched itself
熟練的政治「街頭鬥爭」，人民行動黨穩步鞏固自身地位
following the 1959 elections and then again around the 1963 elections.[66]
隨著 1959 年選舉的進行，然後在 1963 年選舉前後。
By 1968, Lee had largely crushed his competitors; the opposition boycotted
到 1968 年，李光耀已經基本上壓制了他的競爭對手；反對派抵制
those elections, and the PAP won nearly 87 percent of the vote and all fifty-
那些選舉中，人民行動黨獲得了近 87%的選票和所有五十個
eight legislative seats. After that, the PAP maintained itself largely
八個立法會席位。之後，人民行動黨基本上保持了自身的地位。
unchallenged. One source of its continuing strength was Singapore’s first-
不容置疑。其持續強大的來源之一是新加坡的首位-
past-the-post electoral system, a British legacy which makes no provisions
單一選區制，英國遺產，未作任何規定
for minority votes. Another was that Lee used the legal system to isolate his
為了少數族裔的選票。另一個是李光耀利用法律系統來孤立他的
political opponents and curtail unfriendly media outlets.[67] He described
政治對手並限制不友好的媒體機構。[67] 他描述
his struggles with opposition figures as ‘unarmed combat with no holds
他與反對派人物的鬥爭被形容為「沒有任何限制的徒手搏鬥」
barred, in a contest where the winner took all’.[68]
禁止，在一場贏者全拿的比賽中。
Lee was passionately concerned about public order. When he first came
李對公共秩序充滿熱情的關注。當他第一次來到
to power, the counterculture and general relaxation of morals had not yet
對權力而言，反文化和道德的普遍放鬆尚未
arisen in the West, but later Lee would reflect on this as freedom run amok.
在西方出現，但後來李光耀會將此視為自由失控。
‘As a total system, I find parts of it totally unacceptable’, he told Fareed
「作為一個整體系統，我發現其中的某些部分完全不可接受。」他告訴法里德
Zakaria in 1994:
扎卡里亞在 1994 年：
The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he
個人行為或不當行為的權利擴張
pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object
滿足的代價是有序社會的損失。在東方，主要目標
is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum
是要有一個有序的社會，以便每個人都能獲得最大的
enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state
享受他的自由。這種自由只能存在於有序的狀態中。
and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.
而不是處於一種自然的對立和無政府狀態。
[69]
As Lee was building Singapore, he did not believe a city-state could
隨著李光耀在建設新加坡，他並不相信一個城邦可以
stand on its own. His major effort was therefore to safeguard Singapore’s
獨立自主。因此，他的主要努力是保護新加坡的
impending independence from Britain by joining in federation with Malaya.
即將從英國獨立，通過與馬來亞聯合成為聯邦。
Believing that ‘geography, economics, and ties of kinship’ created the basis
相信「地理、經濟和親屬關係」構成了基礎
for a natural unity between the two territories, Lee called a snap referendum
李光耀為了兩個地區之間的自然統一，召開了臨時公投
on the merger for September 1962.[70] To rally the Singaporean populace,
在 1962 年 9 月的合併上。[70] 為了團結新加坡民眾，
he made a series of thirty-six radio broadcasts in the course of a single
他在短短的一段時間內進行了三十六次廣播
month: twelve scripts, each recorded in three languages – Mandarin, Malay
月份：十二篇稿件，每篇以三種語言錄製——普通話、馬來語
and English.[71] His oratorical talents produced an overwhelming
和英語。[71] 他的演講才能產生了壓倒性的
endorsement of his plan in the popular vote. A year later, on September 16,
對他計劃的支持在公眾投票中。一年後，於 9 月 16 日，
1963 – Lee’s fortieth birthday – Singapore and Malaya combined in the
1963 年 – 李光耀的四十歲生日 – 新加坡和馬來亞合併於
Malaysian Federation.
馬來西亞聯邦。
The union was immediately challenged from within and without.
工會立即受到內部和外部的挑戰。
Covetous of the augmented Malaysia’s potential, dreaming of uniting the
渴望擴張的馬來西亞潛力，夢想著統一
Malay peoples in a single country and enjoying the support of both Moscow
馬來民族在一個國家中，並享有莫斯科的支持
and Beijing, Indonesian President Sukarno launched the Konfrontasi – an
和北京，印尼總統蘇卡諾發起了對抗政策——一個
undeclared war involving jungle combat and terrorism that left hundreds
未宣戰的叢林戰鬥和恐怖主義，造成數百人傷亡
dead on both sides. For Singapore, the most dramatic event of the conflict
雙方皆死。對新加坡來說，這場衝突中最戲劇性的事件
was the bombing on March 10, 1965 of MacDonald House – the first air-
是 1965 年 3 月 10 日對麥當勞大廈的轟炸——第一次空襲
conditioned office building in Southeast Asia – by Indonesian marines,
東南亞的條件化辦公大樓 – 由印尼海軍陸戰隊
which killed three people and injured more than thirty.
造成三人死亡，三十多人受傷。
Within Malaysia, many Malay politicians distrusted Lee, despite the
在馬來西亞，許多馬來政治家對李光耀不信任，儘管
PAP’s efforts to reduce communal tensions in Singapore and promote
人民行動黨在新加坡減少社區緊張局勢和促進的努力
Malay as the national language.[72] They feared that his dynamic
馬來語作為國語。[72] 他們擔心他的活力
personality and evident political gifts would outshine their own, leading to
個性和明顯的政治才能將超越他們自己，導致
ethnic Chinese dominance of the new federation.
新聯邦的華人主導地位。
Malay leaders opposed to Lee stoked violent ethnic riots in Singapore,
反對李光耀的馬來領袖在新加坡煽動了暴力的種族騷亂，
first in July and then again in September 1964, resulting in dozens killed
1964 年 7 月首次和 9 月再次發生，導致數十人喪生
and hundreds injured. The ostensible trigger for the riots was the demolition
和數百人受傷。騷亂的表面原因是拆除
of Malay villages (kampongs) to make way for public housing, but there
馬來村莊（kampongs）以騰出空間給公共住房，但那裡
was clearly opportunism by ethnic chauvinists and communists at work as
顯然是民族沙文主義者和共產主義者在運作的機會主義
well.[73]
好。[73]
As a result, less than two years after they had been joined, Singapore and
因此，在他們加入不到兩年後，新加坡和
Malaysia separated again, ripped apart by intense partisanship and ethnic
馬來西亞再次分裂，因激烈的黨派之爭和種族問題而撕裂
tensions. Singapore’s independence came about in August 1965 not as a
緊張局勢。新加坡的獨立是在 1965 年 8 月實現的，而不是作為一個
result of a homegrown liberation struggle but due to Malaysia’s
馬來西亞的
unceremonious decision to cut its tiny southern neighbor loose.
不拘形式的決定將其微小的南方鄰國割席斷交。
Expulsion left the island country entirely on its own, an outcome that
驅逐使這個島國完全獨立，這一結果
Lee had neither expected nor sought. Announcing the failure of the merger
李既沒有預期也沒有尋求。宣布合併失敗
brought him to the edge of tears. ‘Every time we look back on this
讓他感動得快要流淚。‘每次我們回顧這個
moment . . . it will be a moment of anguish,’ he said at a press conference in
“那將是一個痛苦的時刻，”他在新聞發布會上說。
which he uncharacteristically struggled to keep his composure, nearly
他不尋常地努力保持冷靜，差點
overwhelmed by the enormous task now before him. In his memoirs, Lee
被眼前這個龐大的任務所壓倒。在他的回憶錄中，李
wrote that Singapore had become ‘a heart without a body’ as a result of the
寫道新加坡已成為「一顆沒有身體的心」作為結果的
separation. ‘We were a Chinese island in a Malay sea,’ he continued. ‘How
分離。他繼續說：「我們是一個位於馬來海中的中國島嶼。」如何
could we survive in such a hostile environment?’[74] It was the memory of
我們能在如此敵對的環境中生存嗎？[74] 這是對...的記憶
this nadir which, for the rest of his life, gave Lee the sense that his country
這個低谷，對於他餘生而言，讓李感受到他的國家
needed to overachieve because it was walking a perpetual tightrope
需要超越成就，因為它在不斷地走鋼絲
between survival and catastrophe.
在生存與災難之間。
BUILDING A NATION
建立國家
Writing in 1970, five years after Singapore’s independence, the historian
在 1970 年，即新加坡獨立五年後，歷史學家
Arnold Toynbee predicted that the city-state in general had ‘become too
阿諾德·湯因比預測，這個城邦一般已經「變得太
small a political unit to be practicable any longer’, and that Singapore in
小型政治單位不再可行，並且新加坡在
particular was unlikely to last as a sovereign state.[75] Much as Lee
特別是作為一個主權國家不太可能持久。[75] 李
respected Toynbee, he did not share the scholar’s fatalism.[76] His response
尊敬的湯因比，他並不認同這位學者的宿命論。[76] 他的回應
to Toynbee’s challenge was to create a new nation out of the disparate
對於湯因比的挑戰是從這些不同的元素中創造一個新國家
peoples that the tides of history had deposited on the shores of Singapore.
歷史潮流將人民沉積在新加坡的海岸上。
Only what Lee deemed ‘a tightly knit, rugged, and adaptable
只有李光耀認為的「緊密結合、堅韌且適應性強」
people’[77] – a people united by national feeling – could endure the
人民[77] – 一個由民族情感團結起來的人民 – 能夠忍受這個
manifold tests of independence and guard against his two daunting
多樣的獨立性測試，並防範他面對的兩個艱鉅挑戰
nightmares: internal disorder and foreign aggression. His challenge was not
噩夢：內部混亂和外部侵略。他的挑戰不是
primarily a technocratic task. Sacrifices might be imposed by force, but
主要是一項技術官僚的任務。犧牲可能會被強加，但
they could be sustained only by a sense of common belonging and shared
它們只能通過共同歸屬感和共享來維持
destiny.
命運。
‘We didn’t have the ingredients of a nation, the elementary factors,’ Lee
「我們沒有一個國家的要素，基本因素。」李
later reflected: ‘a homogeneous population, common language, common
後來反思：‘一個同質化的人口，共同的語言，共同的
culture and common destiny.’[78] To will the Singaporean nation into being,
文化和共同命運。’[78] 為了使新加坡國家成形，
he acted as if it already existed and reinforced it with public policy. At the
他表現得好像這已經存在，並通過公共政策加以強化。
end of the press conference on August 9, 1965, announcing independence,
1965 年 8 月 9 日宣布獨立的記者會結束，
Lee laid out an elevated mission for his people:
李為他的人民提出了一個崇高的使命：
There is nothing to be worried about . . . Many things will go on just as usual.
沒有什麼好擔心的……許多事情將照常進行。
But be firm, be calm.
但要堅定，保持冷靜。
We are going to have a multi-racial nation in Singapore. We will set the
我們將在新加坡建立一個多種族的國家。我們將設立
example. This is not a Malay nation; this is not a Chinese nation; this is not an
例子。這不是一個馬來國；這不是一個中國國；這不是一個
Indian nation. Everybody will have his place . . .
印度民族。每個人都會有他的地位……
And finally, let us, really Singaporeans – I cannot call myself a Malaysian
最後，讓我們，真正的新加坡人——我不能稱自己為馬來西亞人
now – . . . unite, regardless of race, language, religion, culture.[79]
現在 – . . . 團結，不論種族、語言、宗教、文化。[79]
Lee’s immediate concern was to build a military capable of deterring
李的首要關切是建立一支能夠威懾的軍隊
further Indonesian aggression.[80] Separation from Malaysia had left
進一步的印尼侵略。[80] 與馬來西亞的分離使得
Singapore without a single loyal regiment of its own, and it had no leaders
新加坡沒有一支忠誠的軍團，也沒有領導者
who knew how to build a military from scratch; the able Goh Keng Swee,
誰知道如何從零開始建立軍隊；能幹的吳慶瑞，
now minister of defense, had been only a corporal in the Singapore
現在的國防部長，在新加坡只是一名下士
Volunteer Corps at the British surrender to the Japanese in 1942.[81] (When
志願軍在 1942 年英國向日本投降時。[81] (當
Lee rode to the opening of the first Singaporean parliament in December
李乘車前往新加坡第一屆國會的開幕式，時間是十二月
1965, Malaysian troops had ‘escorted’ him from his office to the session.)
1965 年，馬來西亞軍隊曾「護送」他從辦公室到會議室。
[82] Compounding the challenge, the island’s Chinese majority did not have
[82] 加劇挑戰的是，該島的華人多數並沒有
a tradition of soldiering – a profession that in Singapore had been
一種軍人的傳統 – 在新加坡曾經是一種職業
historically dominated by ethnic Malays – potentially turning defense into a
歷史上由馬來族主導的 – 可能將防禦轉變為一個
racial powder keg.
種族火藥庫。
Immediately after independence, Lee appealed to President Gamal Abdel
獨立後不久，李光耀向總統賈馬爾·阿卜杜勒呼籲
Nasser of Egypt and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India to send
埃及的納賽爾和印度的拉爾·巴哈杜爾·沙斯特里總理發送
military trainers. Reluctant to antagonize Indonesia and Malaysia, both
軍事訓練者。由於不願激怒印尼和馬來西亞，兩者都
declined the request. In response, Lee made the audacious decision to
拒絕了請求。作為回應，李作出了大膽的決定去
accept an offer of assistance from Israel, despite the backlash this risked
接受來自以色列的援助提議，儘管這可能引發反彈
among the significant Muslim population in Singapore and the region. To
在新加坡及該地區的穆斯林人口中。要
head off that threat, Lee simply decided not to announce the Israelis’
為了阻止那個威脅，李簡單地決定不宣布以色列人的
presence. To anyone who asked, Singapore’s new military advisors would
存在。對任何詢問的人，新加坡的軍事顧問將會
instead be described as ‘Mexicans’.[83]
而應被描述為「墨西哥人」。[83]
It proved to be an inspired combination, as Singapore’s security
這被證明是一個靈感的結合，因為新加坡的安全
dilemmas roughly mirrored those of Israel. Both were resource-poor
困境大致上與以色列相似。兩者都資源匱乏。
countries without strategic depth, surrounded by bigger countries with
缺乏戰略深度的國家，周圍被更大國家包圍，
revanchist temptations. Lee adopted the Israeli practice of a small but
復仇主義的誘惑。李採用了以色列的做法，進行小規模但
highly professional standing army, backed by a whole-of-society reserve
高度專業的常備軍，並由全社會的後備力量支持
capable of rapid mobilization. All young male Singaporeans, regardless of
能夠迅速動員。所有年輕男性新加坡人，不論
background, had to perform a period of military service and then regularly
背景，必須服役一段時間，然後定期
conduct in-camp training as reservists. Lee saw ‘political and social
作為後備軍人進行營內訓練。李看到「政治和社會
benefits’ in national service, as contributing to a feeling of national unity
在國民服役中的「好處」，有助於增強國家團結感
and social equality across ethnic divides.[84]
和跨族群的社會平等。
In 1966, Indonesia extended diplomatic recognition to Singapore, which
在 1966 年，印尼對新加坡擴大了外交承認，這
had proven resilient against the Konfrontasi.[85] By 1971, Singapore had
已經證明對抗對抗運動具有韌性。[85] 到 1971 年，新加坡已經
built up seventeen national service battalions and an additional fourteen
建立了十七個國民服役營和另外十四個
reserve battalions. Despite enormous budget pressure, Lee found funding
預備營。儘管面臨巨大的預算壓力，李克強找到資金
for the rapid acquisition of air and naval forces required for credible
為了快速獲得所需的空軍和海軍力量以確保可信性
deterrence against Singapore’s neighbors. He would go on to emphasize the
對新加坡鄰國的威懾。他接著強調了
latest technology and rigorous training as ‘force multipliers’ to compensate
最新技術和嚴格訓練作為「力量倍增器」以彌補
for the island’s limited space and manpower. Within a generation,
對於這個島嶼有限的空間和人力。在一代之內，
Singapore’s armed forces emerged as the most capable in Southeast Asia –
新加坡的武裝部隊成為東南亞最具能力的部隊 –
a source of national pride and unity as well as foreign admiration, including
一個國家自豪感和團結的來源，以及外國的讚賞，包括
by the United States Department of Defense.
由美國國防部。
Unlike many other post-colonial leaders, Lee did not seek to strengthen
與許多其他後殖民領袖不同，李並未尋求加強
his position by pitting the country’s diverse communities against each other.
他的位置是通過將該國的多元社區彼此對立來維持的。
To the contrary, he relied on Singapore’s ability to foster a sense of national
相反，他依賴新加坡培養國家認同感的能力
unity out of its conflicting ethnic groups. Despite the intense inter-ethnic
在其衝突的族群中實現團結。儘管族際之間的緊張關係
violence that preceded independence, he defied the centrifugal forces
在獨立之前的暴力中，他挑戰了離心力量
intrinsic in Singapore’s composition and developed a cohesive national
新加坡組成中的內在因素，並發展出一個凝聚的國家
identity. As he put it in 1967:
身份。正如他在 1967 年所說：
It is only when you offer a man – without distinctions based on ethnic,
只有當你給予一個人——不基於種族的區別，
cultural, linguistic, and other differences – a chance of belonging to this great
文化、語言及其他差異——屬於這個偉大的機會
human community, that you offer him a peaceful way forward to progress and
人類社群，讓你為他提供一條和平的前進道路以促進發展和
to a higher level of human life.[86]
提升人類生活的更高水平。[86]
Lee’s approach was neither to repress Singapore’s diversity nor to discount
李的做法既不是壓制新加坡的多樣性，也不是忽視
it, but to channel and manage it. Any other course, he affirmed, would make
它，而是要引導和管理它。他堅信，任何其他做法都會使
governance impossible.[87]
治理不可能。[87]
Lee’s most innovative initiative was his language policy. How to govern
李最具創新性的舉措是他的語言政策。如何治理
a city-state where 75 percent of the population spoke various Chinese
一個 75%人口講各種中文的城市國家
dialects, 14 percent spoke Malay, and 8 percent spoke Tamil? After the
方言，14%的人講馬來語，8%的人講泰米爾語？在這之後
failure of the merger with Malaysia, Lee no longer favored making Malay
與馬來西亞合併的失敗，李光耀不再支持將馬來語
the national language. Making Mandarin the official language, however,
國家語言。然而，將普通話定為官方語言，
was ‘out of the question’, in Lee’s view, as ‘the 25 per cent of the
在李的看法中，這是「不可能的」，因為「25% 的」
population who were not Chinese would revolt’.[88] English had long been
「非華裔人口將會叛變。」英語早已成為
the working language of government, but few Singaporeans spoke it as their
政府的工作語言，但很少新加坡人以它作為他們的
mother tongue, as Lee did.[89] [*] His solution was a policy of bilingual
母語，正如李所做的。[89] [*] 他的解決方案是一項雙語政策
education – requiring English-language schools to teach Mandarin, Malay
教育 – 要求英語學校教授普通話和馬來語
and Tamil while mandating English classes in all other schools. Singapore’s
和泰米爾語，同時要求所有其他學校開設英語課程。新加坡的
constitution enshrined four official languages: Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and
憲法確立了四種官方語言：馬來語、普通話、泰米爾語和
English.[90] As Lee said in 1994:
英語。[90] 李光耀在 1994 年說：
If I had tried to foist the English language on the people of Singapore I would
如果我試圖將英語強加於新加坡人民，我會
have faced rebellion all around . . . But I offered every parent a choice of
面對四面八方的叛亂……但我給每位父母提供了一個選擇
English and their mother tongue, in whatever order they chose. By their free
英語和他們的母語，無論他們選擇什麼順序。通過他們的自由
choice, plus the rewards of the marketplace over a period of 30 years, we
選擇，加上市場在 30 年期間的獎勵，我們
have ended up with English first and the mother tongue second. We have
已經以英語為主，母語為次。我們已經
switched one university already established in the Chinese language from
已經在中文中建立的一所大學轉換了
Chinese into English. Had this change been forced in five or ten years instead
將中文翻譯成英文。如果這一變化在五年或十年後被迫發生
of being done over 30 years – and by free choice – it would have been a
的完成超過 30 年 - 並且是自由選擇的 - 這將是一個
disaster.
災難。
[91]
Being an English-speaking country provided an economic benefit as
作為一個英語國家帶來了經濟利益，因為
well. In the 1960s, Singapore stood out from rival developing economies by
好。在 1960 年代，新加坡在競爭對手的發展中國家中脫穎而出，因為
its distinct Anglophilic orientation. Lee’s decision to retain the statue of
其獨特的英語文化取向。李光耀決定保留這座雕像的
Raffles preserved a non-sectarian figure from Singapore’s past as a unifying
拉惹勒斯保留了新加坡過去一個非宗派的形象作為統一的象徵
national symbol.[92] It also signaled to the world that Singapore was open
國家象徵。[92] 這也向世界發出了新加坡開放的信號
for business and not in the business of recriminations.[93]
為了商業，而不是互相指責的事業。
‘LET HISTORY JUDGE’
「讓歷史來評判」
The rupture with Malaysia obliged Lee to reorient his initially socialist
與馬來西亞的斷裂迫使李光耀重新調整他最初的社會主義
approach toward pragmatic essentials. For Singapore to survive as a state,
對於新加坡作為一個國家生存，必須採取務實的基本要素。
its economy had to grow. For it to succeed as a nation, the fruits of that
其經濟必須增長。要使其作為一個國家成功，這些成果必須
growth had to be shared equitably among its people, regardless of ethnic
增長必須在其人民之間公平分享，無論種族如何
origin. And for it to persist as an international presence, it had to build
起源。為了持續作為國際存在，它必須建立
influence among the major powers – especially the US and China.
在主要大國之間的影響力——特別是美國和中國。
‘There are books to teach you how to build a house, how to repair
「有書籍教你如何建造房屋，如何修理」
engines, how to write a book’, Lee would recall many years later:
引擎，如何寫一本書，李多年後會回憶道：
But I have not seen a book on how to build a nation out of a disparate
但我還沒有看到一本關於如何從一個分散的社會建立一個國家的書
collection of immigrants from China, British India, the Dutch East Indies, or
來自中國、英屬印度、荷蘭東印度群島的移民群體，或
how to make a living for its people when its former economic role as the
如何為其人民謀生，當其以前的經濟角色作為
entrepôt of the region is becoming defunct.[94]
該地區的轉口港正變得無效。[94]
Lee’s experiences in the Second World War, in the contest for political
李在第二次世界大戰中的經歷，在政治競爭中
power in Singapore and in the separation from Malaysia had given him
在新加坡的權力以及與馬來西亞的分離給了他
convictions about the proper governance of states that no formal course of
對於國家適當治理的信念，沒有正式的課程
instruction could have offered. His travels and conversations with foreign
指導可能提供的。他的旅行和與外國的對話
leaders were consequential; by 1965, he had visited more than fifty
領導者是重要的；到 1965 年，他已經訪問了五十多位
countries and developed strong views about the reasons for their varying
國家並對其變化的原因形成了強烈的看法
performance.[95] ‘A nation is great not by its size alone,’ he said in 1963. ‘It
表現。[95] ‘一個國家偉大不僅僅在於其規模，’他在 1963 年說。‘它
is the will, the cohesion, the stamina, the discipline of its people and the
是人民的意志、凝聚力、耐力和紀律，以及
quality of their leaders which ensures it an honorable place in history.’[96]
他們領導者的素質確保了它在歷史上佔有一席之地。
This is why Lee adopted ‘Let history judge’ as his operating maxim. He
這就是李光耀採用「讓歷史來評判」作為他的運作格言的原因。他
rejected communism because it meant dismantling existing institutions that
拒絕共產主義，因為這意味著拆除現有的制度
were working. Similarly, his preference for market economics was derived
正在運作。同樣地，他對市場經濟的偏好是源自
from the observation that it produced higher growth rates.[97] When, at a
從觀察到它產生了更高的增長率。[97] 當，在一個
dinner years later in my home, an American guest complimented him on
多年後在我家的一次晚餐上，一位美國客人稱讚他
including feminist principles in the development of Singapore, Lee
包括女性主義原則在新加坡的發展中，李
disagreed. He had brought women into the labor force for practical reasons,
他出於實際原因將女性引入勞動力市場，
he said. Singapore would not have been able to achieve its development
他說，新加坡不可能實現其發展。
goals without them. The same, he added, was true with respect to his
沒有它們的目標。他補充說，對於他的情況也是如此。
immigration policy, which sought to convince talented foreigners to settle in
移民政策，旨在說服有才華的外國人定居在
Singapore. The purpose was not a theoretical notion of the benefits of
新加坡。目的是不是對於好處的理論概念
multiculturalism but the requirements of Singapore’s growth and its
多元文化主義，但新加坡成長的需求及其
otherwise stubborn demographics.
否則固執的人口統計。
Lee’s thinking shows a strong utilitarian streak, as he demonstrated in his
李的思維顯示出強烈的功利主義傾向，正如他在他的
1981 May Day address:
1981 勞動節演說：
Every rational government wants the maximum well-being and progress for
每個理性的政府都希望實現最大的福祉和進步
the largest numbers of their citizens. To bring this about, the systems or
他們公民的最大數量。為了實現這一點，系統或
methods, and the principles or ideologies on which their policies are based,
方法，以及其政策所基於的原則或意識形態，
differ. Since the industrial revolution, two centuries ago, a kind of Darwinism
不同。自工業革命以來，兩個世紀前，一種達爾文主義
between systems of government is at work. It is sorting out which
在政府體系之間的運作。它正在篩選出哪一個
ideological–religious–political–social–economic–military system will prevail
意識形態–宗教–政治–社會–經濟–軍事體系將會佔上風
because of its efficacy in providing the maximum good to the maximum
因為它能為最多人提供最大的利益
numbers of a nation.[98]
一個國家的數字。[98]
BUILDING AN ECONOMY
建立經濟
One of the first major tests of Singapore’s adaptability came in January
新加坡適應能力的第一次重大考驗之一發生在一月
1968, when Britain, rattled by the devaluation of the pound and sapped by
1968 年，當英國因英鎊貶值而感到不安，並受到削弱
conflicts in the Middle East, decided to abandon its military presence east
中東的衝突，決定放棄其在東部的軍事存在
of Suez. In the House of Commons debate the previous year, Prime
蘇伊士運河。在前一年的下議院辯論中，首相
Minister Harold Wilson had quoted Rudyard Kipling’s ‘Recessional’ in a
哈羅德·威爾遜部長曾引用魯德亞德·基普林的《退場曲》中的一句話
vain attempt to defend the existence of the British base in Singapore; now it
徒勞地試圖捍衛英國在新加坡基地的存在；現在它
read as a prophecy of Britain’s imperial decline:
被解讀為英國帝國衰退的預言：
Far-called, our navies melt away;
遠方呼喚，我們的海軍漸漸消失；
On dune and headland sinks the fire:
在沙丘和岬角上，火焰熄滅：
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
看啊，我們昨日的華麗
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre![99]
與尼尼微和泰爾同在！[99]
The closure of the naval base and departure of British troops, planned for
海軍基地的關閉和英軍的撤離，計劃於
1971, threatened to result in the loss of one-fifth of Singapore’s gross
1971 年，威脅將導致新加坡五分之一的總產值損失
national product.[100]
國民生產總值。[100]
Seeking outside advice, Lee turned to Dr Albert Winsemius, a Dutch
李光耀尋求外部建議，轉向荷蘭的阿爾伯特·溫塞米烏斯博士，
economist who had first visited Singapore in 1960 at Goh Keng Swee’s
經濟學家於 1960 年首次造訪新加坡，當時在高更瑞的地方
invitation as part of a UN Development Program mission.[101] Compared
作為聯合國發展計劃任務的一部分的邀請。[101] 相較於
with Western countries, Singapore was poor. But in the 1960s, its wages
與西方國家相比，新加坡當時貧窮。但在 1960 年代，它的工資
were the highest in Asia.[102] Winsemius advised that, for Singapore to
為了新加坡能夠
industrialize, it needed to depress wages and make manufacturing more
工業化，它需要壓低工資並使製造業更具競爭力
efficient by embracing technology and training workers. He proposed
透過擁抱科技和培訓工人來提高效率。他提議
prioritizing textile manufacturing, followed by simple electronics and ship
優先發展紡織製造，其次是簡單電子產品和船舶
repair, a stepping stone to shipbuilding. Lee and Goh (finance minister
修理，造船的踏腳石。李光耀和吳作棠（財政部長）
again from 1967 to 1970) followed his advice.[103] With the British on their
再次從 1967 年到 1970 年）遵循了他的建議。[103] 隨著英國人在他們的
way out, Winsemius warned that Singapore could neither aspire to total
出路，溫塞米烏斯警告新加坡無法渴望完全
self-reliance nor depend on regional ties. Unable to count on a common
自力更生，也不依賴區域聯繫。無法依賴共同
market with Malaysia, as it had from 1963 to 1965, it would have to operate
與馬來西亞的市場，如同 1963 年至 1965 年期間一樣，它將必須運作
in a wider sphere.
在更廣泛的範疇中。
Over the following years, Lee, Goh and Winsemius worked in tandem to
在接下來的幾年裡，李光耀、吳作棱和溫西米烏斯攜手合作，來
recalibrate the Singaporean economy. While other leaders of newly
重新校準新加坡經濟。當其他新興國家的領導人
independent countries rejected multinational corporations, Lee recruited
獨立國家拒絕跨國公司，李光耀招募
them. Asked later whether such foreign investment constituted ‘capitalist
他們。稍後被問及這種外國投資是否構成「資本主義」
exploitation’, Lee retorted unsentimentally: ‘All we had was labor . . . So
剝削，李冷靜地反駁道：‘我們所擁有的只有勞動 . . . 所以
why not, if they want to exploit our labor? They’re welcome to it.’[104] To
為什麼不呢，如果他們想要剝削我們的勞動？他們隨便。
attract foreign investment, Singapore embarked on a project to raise the
吸引外國投資，新加坡著手進行一項提高的計劃
quality of its workforce while giving itself the appearance and the facilities
其勞動力的素質，同時給自己提供外觀和設施
of a first-class city. As Lee remarked to me in 1978: ‘Others will not invest
一個一流城市的經濟可行性。李光耀在 1978 年對我說：‘其他人不會投資
in a losing cause, it must look to be a winning cause.’[105]
在一個失敗的事業中，它必須看起來像是一個成功的事業。
Greening the city became a high priority: reducing air pollution, planting
綠化城市成為高優先事項：減少空氣污染，種植
trees and designing infrastructure to incorporate natural light. Lee also saw
樹木和設計基礎設施以融入自然光。李光耀還看到了
to it that high-quality services were provided to visiting tourists and
確保為來訪的遊客提供高品質的服務和
investors. The government mounted public-enlightenment campaigns
投資者。政府發起了公共啟蒙運動
promoting appropriate dress, comportment and hygiene. Singaporeans (or
促進適當的穿著、舉止和衛生。新加坡人（或
foreigners, for that matter) could be fined for jaywalking, neglecting to
外國人（就此而言）可能因為闖紅燈而被罰款，忽視了
flush a toilet or littering. Lee even requested a weekly report on the
沖馬桶或亂丟垃圾。李甚至要求每週報告一次有關
cleanliness of the restrooms at Changi Airport – which, for many travelers,
樟宜機場的洗手間清潔度 – 對於許多旅客來說，
would provide a first impression of Singapore.[106]
將會提供對新加坡的第一印象。[106]
The strategy worked. Decades afterward, Lee would recount that once he
這個策略奏效了。數十年後，李會回憶起他曾經
was able to convince Hewlett-Packard to set up a Singapore office, which
能說服惠普在新加坡設立辦事處，這
opened in April 1970, other international businesses followed.[107] [*]
於 1970 年 4 月開幕，其他國際企業隨之而來。[107] [*]
By 1971, Singapore’s economy was growing at more than 8 percent per
到 1971 年，新加坡的經濟增長率超過 8%
year.
年。
[108] By 1972, multinationals employed more than half of Singapore’s
[108] 到 1972 年，跨國公司雇用了新加坡一半以上的
labor force and accounted for 70 percent of its industrial production.[109] By
勞動力，佔其工業生產的 70%。[109] 由
1973, Singapore had become the world’s third-largest oil refining hub.[110]
1973 年，新加坡已成為世界第三大石油煉製中心。[110]
Within ten years of independence, foreign investment in manufacturing had
在獨立十年內，製造業的外國投資已經
risen from $157 million to more than $3.7 billion.[111]
從 1.57 億美元上升至超過 37 億美元。[111]
In early 1968, the mood in the Singaporean parliament had been gloomy
在 1968 年初，新加坡國會的氣氛一直很陰鬱
and fearful. No one believed that the island could survive the British
和害怕。沒有人相信這個島嶼能夠在英國的統治下生存。
military’s departure. Lee later admitted that the years from 1965 to the
軍隊的撤離。李光耀後來承認，1965 年至
scheduled withdrawal in 1971 were the most nerve-racking of his tenure.
1971 年的預定撤軍是他任期內最令人緊張的時刻。
[112] Yet by the time the British departed, Singapore was able to absorb the
[112] 然而在英國人離開時，新加坡已經能夠吸收這些
economic shock; unemployment did not rise.[113] Against all expectation
經濟衝擊；失業率並未上升。[113] 出乎所有人的意料
and conventional wisdom, Lee’s determination to adapt to change launched
和傳統智慧，李光耀的適應變化的決心啟動了
Singapore on an astonishing trajectory.
新加坡正處於驚人的軌跡上。
To continue to attract investment, Singapore’s productivity needed to
為了繼續吸引投資，新加坡的生產力需要提高
keep climbing. To this end, Lee at first asked workers to accept temporarily
繼續攀登。為此，李首先要求工人們暫時接受
reduced wages in the interest of long-term growth.[114] He gave urgent
為了長期增長而降低工資。[114] 他發出了緊急呼籲
priority to education. And he frequently revised the nation’s industrial and
優先考慮教育。他經常修訂國家的工業和
social targets upwards. As Lee said in his 1981 May Day message:
社會目標向上。正如李光耀在 1981 年五一勞動節的訊息中所說：
The greatest achievement of the Singapore labour movement has been to
新加坡工人運動最大的成就是
transform revolutionary fervor during the period of anti-colonialism (i.e.
在反殖民時期轉化革命熱情（即
antagonism towards expat employers) in the 1950s to productivity
對外籍雇主的對立情緒）在 1950 年代到生產力
consciousness (cooperation with management, both Singaporean and expat)
意識（與管理層的合作，包括新加坡人和外籍人士）
in the 1980s.[115]
在 1980 年代。[115]
Over three decades, Lee drove Singapore to ever higher levels of
在三十多年中，李光耀將新加坡推向更高的水平
development: from subsistence to manufacturing, and from manufacturing
發展：從自給自足到製造業，從製造業
to financial services, tourism and high-tech innovation.[116] By 1990, when
到金融服務、旅遊和高科技創新。[116] 到 1990 年，當
Lee stepped down as prime minister, Singapore was in an enviable
李光耀卸任總理時，新加坡正處於令人羨慕的狀態
economic position. In 1992, looking back, he said to me that if I had asked
經濟地位。1992 年，回顧時，他對我說，如果我曾經問過
him as late as 1975 – by which time he had already attracted substantial
他最遲在 1975 年時——到那時他已經吸引了大量
amounts of foreign investment to Singapore – he still would not have
對新加坡的外國投資金額 - 他仍然不會
predicted the scope of his country’s eventual success.
預測了他國最終成功的範圍。
LEE AND AMERICA
李與美國
Lee stunned my Harvard colleagues in 1968 with his defense of American
李光耀在 1968 年以他對美國的辯護震驚了我的哈佛同事
involvement in Indochina. Had the political evolution of Southeast Asia
在印度支那的參與。東南亞的政治演變是否
attracted their attention earlier, they would have noticed that he had been
如果他們早些時候引起了他們的注意，他們會注意到他已經
propounding the same message for years. In fact, it was Lee’s conviction of
多年來一直在傳達相同的信息。事實上，這是李光耀的信念
Washington’s indispensable role for the future of Asia that had brought him
華盛頓對亞洲未來不可或缺的角色使他感到驚訝
to pay two important visits to America in as many years.
在兩年內對美國進行兩次重要訪問。
On Lee’s first state visit to Washington in October 1967, President
在李光耀 1967 年 10 月首次國事訪問華盛頓時，總統
Johnson introduced him at a White House dinner as ‘a patriot, a brilliant
約翰遜在白宮晚宴上介紹他為「一位愛國者，一位才華橫溢的人」
political leader, and a statesman of the New Asia’.[117] Lee, with his
政治領袖，以及「新亞洲的政治家」。李，與他的
habitual bluntness, took the opportunity of his high-level meetings to
習慣性的直言不諱，利用他高層會議的機會來
instruct his hosts about how the Vietnam drama had its antecedents in
指導他的主人有關越南戲劇的前因如何在
American decisions dating back over a decade and a half. To Vice President
美國十多年來的決策。致副總統
Hubert Humphrey, Lee likened the Vietnam crisis to a long bus ride: the
休伯特·漢弗萊，李將越南危機比作一段漫長的巴士旅程：
United States had missed all of the stops at which it could have gotten off;
美國錯過了所有可以下車的站
the only option now was to stay on until the final destination.[118]
現在唯一的選擇是繼續待到最終目的地。[118]
In the decades to come, Lee would be admired for his candor as much as
在接下來的幾十年裡，李光耀將因其坦率而受到讚賞
for his intelligence by presidents and prime ministers around the world. The
為他在世界各地的總統和首相所讚譽的智慧。
subtlety and precision of his analysis and the reliability of his conduct
他分析的微妙性和精確性以及他行為的可靠性
turned him into a counselor to many on whom he himself was dependent.
使他成為許多他自己依賴的人的顧問。
How did the leader of a small and vulnerable city-state manage to exercise
一個小而脆弱的城邦的領導者是如何成功行使的
so significant an influence on so many leaders abroad? What was his
如此對許多國外領袖產生如此重要的影響？他的
perspective, and how was such a framework applied at moments of crisis?
視角，以及在危機時刻如何應用這樣的框架？
In a sense, Lee Kuan Yew was on a permanent quest for world order. He
在某種意義上，李光耀一直在尋求世界秩序。
understood that the global balance of power was a product not only of
理解到全球權力平衡不僅是產物
anonymous forces but of living political entities, each replete with
匿名勢力，而是活生生的政治實體，每個都充滿了
individual histories and culture, and each obliged to make a judgment of its
個別歷史和文化，每個人都必須對其做出判斷
opportunities. The maintenance of equilibrium, on which Singapore’s own
機會。維持平衡，這是新加坡自身
flourishing as a trading nation depended, required not only the balancing of
作為一個繁榮的貿易國，依賴的不僅是平衡
the major countries against each other but a degree of comprehension of
主要國家之間的對抗，但對於某種程度的理解
their diverse identities and the perspectives that followed from them. For
他們多元的身份及由此而來的觀點。對於
example, Lee observed in 1994:
例如，李光耀在 1994 年觀察到：
if you look at societies over the millennia you find certain basic patterns.
如果你觀察千年來的社會，你會發現某些基本模式。
American civilization from the Pilgrim Fathers on is one of optimism and the
美國文明自朝聖者父親以來是一種樂觀的
growth of orderly government. History in China is of dynasties which have
有序政府的增長。中國的歷史是朝代的更迭，這些朝代
risen and fallen, of the waxing and waning of societies. And through all that
興起與衰落，社會的興盛與衰退。透過這一切
turbulence, the family, the extended family, the clan, has provided a kind of
動盪，家庭，大家庭，宗族，提供了一種
survival raft for the individual. Civilizations have collapsed, dynasties have
個人的生存筏。文明已經崩潰，王朝已經
been swept away by conquering hordes, but this life raft enables [Chinese]
被征服的部隊所沖走，但這個救生筏使得[Chinese]
civilization to carry on and get to its next phase.[119]
文明得以延續並進入下一階段。[119]
Lee was respected by leaders of states far more powerful than his own to
李受到比他自己國家更強大國家的領導人的尊重
a unique degree because he furnished insights that enabled them to grasp
一個獨特的學位，因為他提供了見解，使他們能夠理解
their own essential challenges. Lee’s reading of foreign affairs was, like his
他們自身的基本挑戰。李光耀對外交事務的解讀就像他的
analysis of Singapore’s domestic requirements, based on his perception of
對新加坡國內需求的分析，基於他的看法
objective reality. Subjective preference did not enter into his assessments,
客觀現實。主觀偏好並未進入他的評估，
which invariably cut to the heart of the matter. Some leaders seek to
這些問題總是切中要害。一些領導者尋求
impress interlocutors by demonstrating their command of minute details;
通過展示他們對細節的掌握來給對話者留下深刻印象；
Lee, whose own factual knowledge was considerable, possessed a more
李，擁有相當的事實知識，擁有更高的
precious quality: the capacity to distill a subject to its essence.
珍貴的品質：將主題提煉至其本質的能力。
Just as the obstacles attending Singapore’s birth had been defining
正如新加坡誕生所面臨的障礙一樣，這些障礙是具有決定性的
experiences in Lee’s political life, so, for the rest of his career, he placed
李光耀的政治生涯中的經歷，因此，在他職業生涯的其餘時間裡，他將
special emphasis on the domestic evolution of other countries in evaluating
特別強調在評估其他國家的國內演變
their relevance to world order. Two countries were central to Lee’s
他們與世界秩序的相關性。兩個國家對李光耀的
assessment of Singapore’s survival and its place in the world: the United
對新加坡生存及其在世界中的地位的評估：美國
States and China. Lee defined the American relationship unpretentiously in
美國和中國。李光耀坦率地定義了美國的關係
a toast to President Richard Nixon at a White House dinner in April 1973:
在 1973 年 4 月的白宮晚宴上，向理查德·尼克松總統敬酒：
We are a very small country placed strategically at the southernmost tip of
我們是一個非常小的國家，位於最南端的戰略位置
Asia, and when the elephants are on the rampage, if you are a mouse there
亞洲，當大象在狂暴時，如果你是一隻老鼠在那裡
and you don’t know the habits of the elephants, it can be a very painful
而且如果你不知道大象的習性，這可能會非常痛苦
business.[120]
商業。[120]
A May 1981 speech likewise captures his prescience and clarity with
1981 年 5 月的演講同樣展現了他的先見之明和清晰度，
respect to the Soviet system:
對於蘇聯體系的尊重：
Thirty-six years after the end of World War II we know that in the contest of
第二次世界大戰結束三十六年後，我們知道在這場競賽中
Western free-enterprise/free-market democracy versus communist command
西方自由企業/自由市場民主與共產主義指揮
economy/controlled distribution, the communist system is losing. It cannot
經濟/控制分配，共產主義體系正在失敗。它無法
deliver the goods . . .
交付貨物 . . .
Unless this contest ends in mutual destruction by nuclear weapons, the
除非這場比賽以核武器的相互毀滅結束，否則
outcome will see the survival of that system which is superior in providing
結果將會看到在提供方面優越的系統的生存
both more security and more economic/spiritual well-being to its members. If
為其成員提供更多的安全感以及更多的經濟/精神福祉。如果
the West can prevent the Soviets from gaining easy spoils through their
西方可以阻止蘇聯輕易獲得戰利品通過他們的
military superiority, the free-market system of personal initiatives and
軍事優勢，個人創意的自由市場體系和
incentives will be clearly proved superior to the centrally planned/controlled
激勵措施將明顯優於中央計劃/控制的方式
market system.[121]
市場系統。[121]
Ten years later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lee’s perspective
十年後，蘇聯解體後，李的觀點
would become the conventional wisdom; at the time, few perceived the
將成為傳統智慧；當時，少數人意識到
imminence of Soviet decay.
蘇聯衰退的迫在眉睫。
In the American people, Lee discerned an unusual generosity and
在美國人民中，李光耀察覺到一種不尋常的慷慨和
openness of spirit, reminiscent of elements in his own Confucian
心靈的開放，讓人想起他自己儒家思想中的元素
commitments. In the immediate postwar period, he observed, America did
承諾。在戰後初期，他觀察到，美國確實
not abuse its nuclear monopoly:
不濫用其核武壟斷：
Any old and established nation would have ensured its supremacy for as long
任何一個古老且建立已久的國家都會確保其霸權持續存在
as it could. But America set out to put her defeated enemies on their feet to
如同它所能做到的那樣。但美國開始著手讓她的戰敗敵國重新站起來。
ward off an evil force, the Soviet Union, brought about technological change
抵禦邪惡勢力，蘇聯，帶來技術變革
by transferring technology generously and freely to Europeans and to
通過慷慨而自由地將技術轉移給歐洲人和
Japanese, and enabled them to become challengers within 30 years . . . There
日本人，使他們在 30 年內成為挑戰者……那裡
was a certain greatness of spirit born out of the fear of Communism plus
是一種出於對共產主義的恐懼而產生的某種偉大精神加上
American idealism that brought that about.[122]
美國理想主義促成了這一切。[122]
As his geopolitical attention shifted in the aftermath of the Deng reforms
隨著鄧小平改革後他的地緣政治關注轉變
from the threat of Maoist subversion to the more complicated grand-
從毛主義顛覆的威脅到更複雜的宏觀
strategic interplay among China, the Soviet Union and the United States –
中國、蘇聯和美國之間的戰略互動 –
and later still to the management of China as a greatly empowered
並且後來還對中國的管理作為一個大大增強的
economic and political force – Lee’s assessments shifted accordingly. But
經濟和政治力量 – 李的評估隨之改變。 但
he never altered the theme of the indispensable role of America in the
他從未改變美國在其中不可或缺的角色主題
security and progress of the world and especially Southeast Asia.
世界的安全與進步，特別是東南亞。
It was not that Lee was sentimentally ‘pro-American’ – he was not
李並不是感情上「親美」——他並不是
sentimental at all. He could find a healthy amount to criticize in America’s
情感。 他能夠找到足夠的理由來批評美國的
approach to politics and to geopolitics. He recorded his early views of
對政治和地緣政治的看法。他記錄了他早期的觀點
Americans as ‘mixed’:
美國人被稱為「混合」：
I admired their can-do approach but shared the view of the British
我欣賞他們的積極態度，但與英國人有相同的看法
establishment of the time that the Americans were bright and brash, that they
當時美國人聰明而大膽，這一點的建立
had enormous wealth but often misused it. It was not true that all it needed to
擁有巨大的財富，但經常濫用它。並不是說它所需要的全部是
fix a problem was to bring resources to bear on it . . . They meant well but
解決問題的方法是將資源投入其中……他們是出於好意，但
were heavy-handed and lacked a sense of history.[123]
過於強硬，缺乏歷史感。[123]
With the Vietnam War, Lee refined his view: it became important not
隨著越南戰爭，李光耀修正了他的觀點：變得重要的是不
only to match support for American power with understanding and
僅僅是為了與對美國力量的支持相匹配，並理解和
encouragement of American purposes; it was now imperative to enlist
鼓勵美國的目的；現在必須徵募
America in the defense of stability in Asia. Britain’s exit from Asia had
美國在維護亞洲穩定方面的角色。英國退出亞洲後
made America essential as a balancer of the complicated and violent forces
使美國成為平衡複雜和暴力力量的必要角色
inimical to the region’s equilibrium. The Cambridge-educated Lee, who had
對該地區的平衡不利。劍橋大學教育背景的李，曾經
once been told by British Foreign Secretary George Brown that he was ‘the
曾被英國外相喬治·布朗告知，他是「這位
best bloody Englishman east of Suez’,[124] adopted an attitude toward the
最佳的英國人，位於蘇伊士以東，採取了對於
United States that bore a resemblance to that of Churchill in establishing
與邱吉爾在建立方面相似的美國
Britain’s ‘special relationship’. Lee made himself, so far as he could, part of
英國的「特殊關係」。李光耀盡其所能地使自己成為其中的一部分
the American decision-making process on matters of concern to Southeast
美國在東南亞關注事項上的決策過程
Asia. Yet in his case, the relationship would be formed by an Asian leader
亞洲。然而在他的情況下，這種關係將由一位亞洲領導人形成。
of a tiny post-colonial city-state.
一個微小的後殖民城市國家。
In Lee’s view, the great American qualities of magnanimity and idealism
在李的看法中，美國偉大的特質是寬宏大量和理想主義
were insufficient on their own; geopolitical insight was required as a
僅靠這些是不夠的；需要地緣政治的洞察作為一個
supplement to enable America to fulfill its role. Sensitivity to the tension
補充以使美國能夠履行其角色。對緊張局勢的敏感性
between national ideals and strategic realities was essential. Lee feared that
在國家理想與戰略現實之間的平衡是必不可少的。李光耀擔心
America’s tendency toward moralistic foreign policy might turn into neo-
美國對道德主義外交政策的傾向可能會轉變為新-
isolationism when faced with disappointment with the ways of the world.
在面對對世界的失望時，孤立主義。
An overemphasis on democratic aspirations might hamper America’s ability
過度強調民主願望可能會妨礙美國的能力
to empathize with less-developed countries which, by necessity, gave
同情較不發達國家，這是出於必要，給予
priority to economic progress over ideology.
優先考慮經濟進步而非意識形態。
Lee advanced these views in his characteristic style: a combination of
李以他特有的風格提出了這些觀點：一種結合
history, culture and geography honed for relevance to contemporary
歷史、文化和地理經過磨練，以符合當代的相關性
concerns; an awareness of the interests of his interlocutor; and eloquent
關注；對他對話者利益的認識；以及雄辯
delivery stripped of small talk, extraneous matters or any hint of
交付去除了寒暄、無關事項或任何暗示的
supplication. In 1994, he insisted that realism needed to be based on a clear
懇求。1994 年，他堅持現實主義需要建立在清晰的
moral distinction between good and evil:
善與惡的道德區別：
Certain basics about human nature do not change. Man needs a certain moral
人性的一些基本特徵是不會改變的。人需要某種道德
sense of right and wrong. There is such a thing called evil, and it is not the
是非感。確實存在一種叫做邪惡的東西，而它不是
result of being a victim of society. You are just an evil man, prone to do evil
成為社會受害者的結果。你只是一個邪惡的人，容易做出邪惡的事。
things, and you have to be stopped from doing them.[125]
事情，而你必須被阻止去做這些事情。[125]
Lee presented his leadership to the world as operating within its cultural
李向世界展示了他的領導風格，並在其文化中運作
context and capable of relating regional developments to the wider world.
背景，並能將區域發展與更廣泛的世界聯繫起來。
Habitually analytic and prescriptive, he used the insights garnered from his
習慣性地分析和建議，他利用從中獲得的見解
network of contacts and extensive travels to answer questions and proffer
人脈網絡和廣泛的旅行以回答問題並提供建議
advice. ‘When I travel,’ Lee wrote, ‘I am watching how a society, an
建議。‘當我旅行時，’李寫道，‘我在觀察一個社會，一個
administration, is functioning. Why are they good?’[126]
行政運作良好。為什麼他們會好呢？[126]
After Lee stepped down from the premiership in 1990, reminding the
李光耀在 1990 年卸任總理後，提醒了
United States of its responsibilities became a preoccupation. During the
美國的責任成為了一種關注。在這段時間內
Cold War, Lee had been primarily concerned that America play a major role
冷戰，李光耀主要擔心美國扮演重要角色
in maintaining the global equilibrium in the face of the Russian threat. After
在面對俄羅斯威脅時維持全球平衡。之後
the collapse of the Soviet Union, his attention shifted to America’s crucial
蘇聯的崩潰，他的注意力轉向了美國的關鍵
importance in defining and maintaining the Asian equilibrium. Speaking at
在定義和維持亞洲平衡方面的重要性。發言時
Harvard in 1992, at the very peak of American post-Cold War
1992 年的哈佛，正值美國冷戰後的巔峰時期
triumphalism, he warned that the geopolitical balance would be vastly
勝利主義，他警告說地緣政治平衡將會大幅改變
impaired were the United States to turn inward, cash the post-Cold War
如果美國轉向內部，現金化冷戰後的情況將受到影響
‘peace dividend’ and weaken in its global responsibilities:
「和平紅利」並削弱其全球責任：
My generation of Asians, who have experienced the last war, its horrors and
我這一代的亞洲人，經歷了上一次戰爭，它的恐怖和
miseries, and who remember the U.S. role in the phoenix-like rise from the
苦難，並記得美國在如鳳凰般崛起中的角色
ashes of that war to the prosperity of Japan, the newly industrializing
那場戰爭的灰燼轉化為日本的繁榮，這個新興工業化的
economies, and ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], will feel a
經濟，以及東南亞國家聯盟（ASEAN），將會感受到一個
keen sense of regret that the world will become so vastly different because the
對於世界將變得如此不同的強烈遺憾
U.S. becomes a less central player in the new balance.[127]
美國在新的平衡中成為一個不那麼核心的角色。[127]
In 2002, he pointed out that global ‘firefighting’ was not the same as
在 2002 年，他指出全球的「消防」並不等同於
America understanding and using its considerable leverage to produce
美國理解並利用其相當的影響力來產生
lasting global stability.
持久的全球穩定。
[128] Viewing foreign policy in terms of strategic
[128] 從戰略的角度看待外交政策
design, he defined great-power balance as the key to international order
他將大國平衡定義為國際秩序的關鍵
and, above all, to the security and prosperity of Singapore. ‘We just want
和最重要的是，新加坡的安全與繁榮。‘我們只想
maximum space to be ourselves,’ he said in 2011. ‘And that is best
「最大限度地做自己，」他在 2011 年說。「這是最好的」
achieved when big “trees” allow space for us, between them we have space.
當大“樹”讓我們有空間時，我們之間就有空間。
[When] you have one big tree covering us, we have no space.’[129]
「當」你有一棵大樹覆蓋我們時，我們就沒有空間。」
Lee admired America and was made uneasy by its oscillations. He
李欣賞美國，但對其波動感到不安。他
respected and feared China because of its single-minded pursuit of
尊重且畏懼中國，因為它專注於追求
objectives. Out of historic proximity to China and necessary friendship with
目標。由於與中國的歷史接近和必要的友誼，
the United States, Lee distilled the security and future of Singapore.
美國，李光耀提煉了新加坡的安全與未來。
LEE AND CHINA
李與中國
Lee foresaw China’s potential for hegemony in Asia. In 1973 – when China
李光耀預見了中國在亞洲的霸權潛力。1973 年——當中國
was considered economically backward – he was already saying: ‘China
被認為經濟落後——他已經在說：‘中國
will make the grade. It is only a matter of time.’[130] As late as 1979,
會達到標準。這只是時間問題。’[130] 直到 1979 年，
however, he was still expecting China to remain comparatively weak for the
然而，他仍然期望中國保持相對的弱勢
medium term:
中期：
The world imagines China as a giant. It’s more like a flabby jellyfish. We
世界想像中國是一個巨人。它更像是一隻鬆弛的水母。我們
have to see how something can be made of their resources [and] their two
必須看看如何利用他們的資源[和]他們的兩者
weaknesses: the Communist system, and the lack of training and know-how.
弱點：共產主義體制，以及缺乏訓練和專業知識。
Now, I fear they may not be sufficiently strong to play the role we want [for]
現在，我擔心他們可能不夠強大，無法扮演我們所希望的角色
them, balancing off the Russians. I do not fear a strong China; I fear the
他們，平衡俄羅斯。我不害怕強大的中國；我害怕的是
Chinese may be too weak. A balance is necessary if we are to be free to
中文可能太弱。如果我們要自由地
choose our partners in progress. It will take them 15–20, 30–40 years.[131]
選擇我們的進步夥伴。這將需要他們 15 至 20 年，30 至 40 年。[131]
At the time, Lee’s attitude toward China’s rise was ambivalent, as
當時，李光耀對中國崛起的態度是矛盾的，因為
Singapore had ‘conflicting objectives’: to make China strong enough to
新加坡有“矛盾的目標”：使中國變得足夠強大以便
intimidate communist Vietnam (which Lee thought would provide ‘relief’),
恐嚇共產主義越南（李光耀認為這會提供「緩解」），
but not so strong that it might aggress against Taiwan.[132] Yet even at that
但不至於強到可能對台灣發動攻擊。[132] 然而即使在那時
moment of relative weakness in China, Lee warned of the country’s
中國相對弱勢的時刻，李光耀警告該國的
determination and the upheaval it could unleash: ‘I don’t know if the
決心以及它可能引發的動盪：‘我不知道如果
[Chinese] leadership can fully comprehend the nature of the transformation
[Chinese] 領導層可以充分理解轉型的本質
that is due them if they succeed. One thing is certain: they want to
如果他們成功，這是他們應得的。有一件事是確定的：他們想要
succeed.’[133] His prediction aligned closely with the way a great strategist
成功。[133] 他的預測與一位偉大戰略家的方式密切相關
of a previous era, Napoleon, is said to have viewed China: ‘Let China sleep;
曾經的時代，拿破崙據說曾這樣看待中國：「讓中國沉睡；
for when she wakes, she will shake the world.’[134]
當她醒來時，她將震撼世界。
But when? By 1993, Lee’s views had evolved. China’s rise was no
但什麼時候？到 1993 年，李的觀點已經演變。中國的崛起並不是
longer a far-off event; it had become the overriding challenge of the era.
不再是遙遠的事件；它已成為這個時代的主要挑戰。
‘The size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the
‘中國對世界平衡的影響力之大是如此，以至於
world must find a new balance in 30 to 40 years,’ he said. ‘It’s not possible
「世界必須在 30 到 40 年內找到新的平衡，」他說。「這是不可能的。」
to pretend that this is just another big player,’ he added. ‘This is the biggest
假裝這只是另一個大玩家，’他補充道。‘這是最大的
player in the history of man.’[135] He elaborated on this view a few years
人類歷史上的玩家。[135] 他在幾年後詳細闡述了這一觀點
later:
稍後：
Short of some major unforeseeable disaster which brings chaos or breaks up
短缺一些重大的不可預見災難，導致混亂或分裂
China once again into so many warlord fiefdoms, it is only a question of time
中國再次陷入如此多的軍閥封地，這只是時間問題
before the Chinese people reorganize, reeducate, and train themselves to take
在中國人民重新組織、再教育和訓練自己之前
full advantage of modern science and technology.[136]
充分利用現代科學和技術。[136]
Lee’s approach to China, like his analysis of America, was
李對中國的看法，與他對美國的分析一樣，是
unsentimental. If America’s challenge, in Lee’s view, lay in its fluctuations
無情。如果李的看法是，美國的挑戰在於其波動
between insufficiently reflective idealism and habitual bouts of self-doubt,
在不足夠反思的理想主義與習慣性的自我懷疑之間，
the problem posed by China was the resurgence of a traditional imperial
中國所帶來的問題是傳統帝國的復甦
pattern. The millennia during which China conceived of itself as the
模式。中國在千年期間將自己視為
‘Middle Kingdom’ – the central country in the world – and classified all
「中華」－ 世界的中心國家－ 並將所有分類
other states as tributaries were bound to have left a legacy in Chinese
其他國家作為朝貢國必然在中國留下了遺產
thinking and to encourage a tendency toward hegemony. ‘At this moment, I
思考並鼓勵朝向霸權的傾向。‘在這一刻，我
think the American outcome is best for us,’ he told an interviewer in 2011:
我認為美國的結果對我們來說是最好的，」他在 2011 年告訴一位採訪者
I don’t see the Chinese as a benign power as the Americans. I mean, they say
我不認為中國是一個像美國人那樣的良性力量。我是說，他們說
bu cheng ba (won’t be a hegemon). If you are not ready to be a hegemon,
不成霸 (不會成為霸權)。如果你還沒有準備好成為霸權，
why do you keep on telling the world you are not going to be a hegemon?[137]
你為什麼不斷告訴世界你不會成為霸權？
Determined to resist China’s destabilizing policies during the Mao era,
決心抵抗中國在毛澤東時代的破壞性政策，
and afterward to ward off any impression that majority-Chinese Singapore
並且隨後以避免給人留下新加坡以華人為主的印象
should be viewed as naturally aligned with the motherland, Lee had long
應被視為與祖國自然對齊，李已經很久
proclaimed that Singapore would be the last ASEAN country to establish
宣稱新加坡將是最後一個建立的東協國家
diplomatic relations with Beijing. (Singapore had also relied on Taiwanese
與北京的外交關係。（新加坡也依賴台灣
investments and knowhow to develop its industries, beginning with textiles
投資和技術以發展其產業，從紡織業開始
and plastics.)[138] Following the opening to China by the West during the
和塑膠。）[138] 隨著西方對中國的開放在
1970s, Lee was true to his word. He defined Singapore as autonomous
1970 年代，李光耀言行一致。他將新加坡定義為自主的
toward both neighbors and superpowers. In 1975, he ignored an invitation
對於鄰國和超級大國。在 1975 年，他忽視了一個邀請
from Zhou Enlai to visit China – a decision which ensured that Lee and the
從周恩來訪問中國——這一決定確保了李和
ailing Zhou would never meet. Singapore officially recognized the PRC
新加坡正式承認中華人民共和國
only in 1990.
只有在 1990 年。
In November 1978, however, Lee welcomed China’s paramount leader,
然而，在 1978 年 11 月，李克強歡迎了中國的最高領導人，
Deng Xiaoping, to Singapore. That event marked the beginning of the
鄧小平，前往新加坡。該事件標誌著……
contemporary Singapore–China relationship. To symbolize the importance
當代新加坡與中國的關係。為了象徵其重要性
Lee attached to this visit, he arranged for an ashtray and spittoon to be
李在這次訪問中，為了準備了一個煙灰缸和吐痰桶
placed in front of China’s then-leader, who was an avid smoker, despite
放在當時中國領導人面前，他是一位熱愛吸煙的人，儘管
Singapore’s laws against smoking (and Lee’s strong allergy to smoke).
新加坡的禁煙法（以及李光耀對煙霧的強烈過敏）。
Deng’s agenda on that trip was to build opposition to the Soviet Union
鄧小平在那次旅行中的議程是建立對蘇聯的反對
and unified Vietnam among Southeast Asian countries; Lee was primarily
和東南亞國家之間的統一越南；李主要是
concerned with easing domineering tendencies in Chinese policy toward
關注緩解中國政策中的專橫傾向
Singapore. He explained to Deng that China’s radio broadcasts aimed at
新加坡。他向鄧解釋，中國的廣播針對
radicalizing Southeast Asia’s Chinese diaspora made it difficult to
使東南亞的華人僑民激進化變得困難
cooperate with Beijing. Lee asked that Deng halt the propaganda; within
與北京合作。李要求鄧停止宣傳；在此之內
two years it was gradually stopped.[139] Years later, Lee identified Deng as
兩年後，它逐漸停止了。[139] 幾年後，李確定鄧是
one of the three world leaders he most admired (the other two being Charles
他最崇拜的三位世界領袖之一（另外兩位是查爾斯）
de Gaulle and Winston Churchill). Deng, in Lee’s view, ‘was a great man
德高爾和溫斯頓·邱吉爾）。在李的看法中，鄧是一位偉人
because he changed China from a broken-backed state, which would have
因為他將中國從一個破敗的國家改變為一個
imploded like the Soviet Union, into what it is today, on the way to
如同蘇聯一樣崩潰，變成今天的樣子，朝著
becoming the world’s largest economy’.[140]
成為世界上最大的經濟體。
According to the distinguished Sinologist and Deng biographer Ezra
根據著名的漢學家和鄧小平傳記作者以斯拉
Vogel, Deng was still undecided with respect to his economic policies when
沃戈，鄧在他的經濟政策方面仍然未作出決定當
he visited Singapore, but the visit ‘helped strengthen Deng’s conviction of
他訪問了新加坡，但這次訪問「幫助加強了鄧的信念」
the need for fundamental reforms’.[141] The following month, he announced
對根本改革的需求。[141] 隨後的月份，他宣布
his Open Door policy, which created Special Economic Zones in coastal
他的開放政策，在沿海地區創造了特別經濟區
China to welcome foreign direct investment. As Vogel observed, ‘Deng
中國將歡迎外國直接投資。正如沃格爾所觀察的，‘鄧
found orderly Singapore an appealing model for reform’ and dispatched
發現有序的新加坡是一個吸引人的改革模型’並派遣
emissaries there ‘to learn about city planning, public management, and
使者們在那裡「學習城市規劃、公共管理，以及
controlling corruption’.[142]
控制貪污。
During Deng’s period of preeminence, Lee began to pay annual visits to
在鄧小平的主導時期，李開始每年造訪
China – even before full recognition – to examine its urban development
中國 – 即使在完全承認之前 – 也要檢視其城市發展
and agricultural reform and establish contacts with its leading officials. Lee
和農業改革，並與其主要官員建立聯繫。李
advised Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese premier and later general secretary of the
建議趙紫陽，中國總理及後來的總書記
Chinese Communist Party, that the openness required for economic growth
中國共產黨，經濟增長所需的開放性
did not have to come at the expense of ‘Confucian values’. In a later
不必以「儒家價值」為代價。 在後來
reflection beginning with a riff on Deng Xiaoping’s phrase ‘crossing the
反思始於對鄧小平的話“過河”的即興演奏
river by feeling the stones’, Zhao said that Lee had ‘shortened this river
「通過觸摸石頭來感受河流」，趙說李「縮短了這條河」
crossing for us’.[143]
Lee’s advice would be manifested in the creation of a Singaporean
李的建議將體現在創建一個新加坡人上
industrial park in Suzhou, an ancient Chinese city near Shanghai famous for
蘇州工業園區，這是一座位於上海附近的古老中國城市，以其著名的
its many beautiful traditional Chinese gardens. Opened in 1994, the park
其許多美麗的傳統中國花園。公園於 1994 年開放，
was designed to integrate Singaporean management practices with local
旨在將新加坡的管理實踐與當地整合
labor, thereby accelerating industrialization and attracting foreign capital to
勞動，從而加速工業化並吸引外資到
China. Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds, Temasek Holdings and GIC
中國。新加坡的主權財富基金，淡馬錫控股和政府投資公司
(formerly Government of Singapore Investment Corporation), became
（前新加坡政府投资公司），成为
major investors in China.
中國的主要投資者。
In 1989, Lee joined most of the West in condemning the Chinese
在 1989 年，李光耀與大多數西方國家一起譴責中國
leadership’s suppression of the student protests in Tiananmen Square. He
領導層對天安門廣場學生抗議活動的鎮壓。他
decried the brutality of the methods and called their human cost
譴責這些方法的殘酷，並呼籲其人道成本
unacceptable.[144] But he was also convinced that a political implosion in
不可接受。[144] 但他也深信，政治崩潰在
China would be a terrible risk for the world – posing a variety of dangers
中國對世界來說將是一個可怕的風險——帶來各種危險
that the Soviet Union’s own disintegration would soon illustrate. As Lee
蘇聯自身的解體將很快顯示出這一點。李
later put it, comparing the two cases:
後來將其與這兩個案例進行比較：
Deng was the only leader in China with the political standing and strength to
鄧是中國唯一擁有政治地位和實力的領導人，可以
reverse Mao’s policies . . . A veteran of war and revolution, he saw the
逆轉毛澤東的政策……一位戰爭和革命的老兵，他看到了
student demonstrators at Tiananmen as a danger that threatened to throw
天安門的學生示威者被視為一種威脅，可能會使局勢失控
China back into turmoil and chaos, prostrate for another 100 years. He had
中國再次陷入動亂和混亂，屈服於另一個 100 年。他曾經
lived through a revolution and recognized the early signs of one at
經歷了一場革命，並認識到一場革命的早期跡象
Tiananmen. Gorbachev, unlike Deng, had only read about revolution, and did
天安門。戈爾巴喬夫與鄧小平不同，他只是讀過有關革命的書籍，並沒有
not recognize the danger signals of the Soviet Union’s impending collapse.
未能識別蘇聯即將崩潰的危險信號。
[145]
After Tiananmen, China’s economic reforms appeared to be faltering,
天安門事件後，中國的經濟改革似乎出現了停滯
and they were revived only following Deng’s 1992 ‘Southern Tour’ – an
而它們僅在鄧小平 1992 年的「南巡」之後復甦——一
epic and highly influential month-long trip through several southern cities
史詩般且極具影響力的為期一個月的旅行，途經幾個南方城市
in which the eighty-seven-year-old and nominally retired Deng persuasively
在這位八十七歲的名義上退休的鄧小平的說服下
restated the case for economic liberalization.
重申了經濟自由化的理由。
BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA
美國與中國之間
For the United States, Lee’s message about China was sobering and, in its
對於美國來說，李光耀關於中國的信息令人警醒，並且在其
deepest sense, unwelcome: America would be obliged to share its
最深層的意義，不受歡迎：美國將被迫分享其
preeminent position in the Western Pacific, and perhaps in the wider world,
在西太平洋的卓越地位，甚至可能在更廣泛的世界中，
with a new superpower. ‘It just has to live with a bigger China,’ Lee said in
與一個新的超級大國。「它只需要與一個更大的中國共存，」李說。
2011, and this would prove ‘completely novel for the U.S., as no country
2011，這對美國來說將是「完全新穎的，因為沒有任何國家」
has ever been big enough to challenge its position. China will be able to do
從來沒有任何國家能夠挑戰它的地位。中國將能夠做到
so in 20 to 30 years.’[146]
所以在 20 到 30 年內。
Such an evolution would be painful for a society with America’s own
對於擁有美國自身特徵的社會來說，這樣的演變將是痛苦的
sense of exceptionalism, Lee warned. But American prosperity was itself
例外主義的感覺，李警告道。但美國的繁榮本身
due to exceptional factors: ‘geopolitical good fortune, an abundance of
由於特殊因素：‘地緣政治的好運，豐富的
resources and immigrant energy, a generous flow of capital and technology
資源和移民的活力，充足的資本和技術流入
from Europe, and two wide oceans that kept conflicts of the world away
來自歐洲，還有兩片寬廣的海洋將世界的衝突隔絕在外
from American shores’.[147] In the approaching world, as China became a
從美國海岸出發的。[147] 在即將到來的世界中，隨著中國成為一個
formidable military power with cutting-edge technology, geography would
強大的軍事力量與尖端技術，地理將會
provide no hedge for the United States.
對美國沒有任何對沖。
Lee anticipated that the impending change would challenge the
李預期即將到來的變化將會挑戰
prevailing international equilibrium and make the position of intermediate
現行的國際平衡，並使中介的地位
states precarious. Julius Nyerere, the former prime minister of Tanzania,
狀態不穩定。前坦尚尼亞總理朱利葉斯·尼雷爾，
had warned Lee, ‘When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled.’ To which
曾警告李光耀：「當大象打鬥時，草會被踩踏。」對此
Lee, who as we have seen was himself fond of elephant analogies, had
李，正如我們所見，他自己也喜歡用大象作比喻，曾經
responded: ‘When elephants make love, the grass gets trampled, too.’[148]
回應：‘當大象交配時，草也會被踩踏。’[148]
[*] Singapore’s aims of stability and growth would be best served by a
[*] 新加坡的穩定與成長目標將最能得到一個
cordial but cool relationship between the two superpowers, Lee believed.
李認為兩個超級大國之間的關係是親切但冷淡的。
Yet in his own interactions with Washington and Beijing, Lee acted less as a
然而，在他與華盛頓和北京的互動中，李的行為較少像一個
national advocate for Singapore than as a philosophical guide to the two
比起作為兩者的哲學指導，更像是新加坡的國家倡導者
awesome giants.
驚人的巨人。
In his meetings with Chinese leaders, Lee tended to marshal arguments
在與中國領導人的會議中，李傑恩傾向於組織論據
attuned to their historical traumas and delivered with an otherwise rare
與他們的歷史創傷相契合，並以其他罕見的方式傳達
emotion. In 2009, he cautioned the rising generation of Chinese leaders who
情感。2009 年，他警告了新一代的中國領導人，
had not experienced the deprivations and cataclysms of their elders but felt
未經歷過他們長輩的剝奪和災難，但感受到
a deep-seated resentment about their place in the world:
對於他們在世界中的地位有著根深蒂固的怨恨：
This [older] generation has been through hell: Great Leap Forward, hunger,
這一代人經歷了地獄：大躍進、饑荒，
starvation, near collision with the Russians . . . the Cultural Revolution gone
飢餓，與俄羅斯人近乎碰撞……文化大革命已經結束
mad . . . I have no doubt that this generation wants a peaceful rise. But the
瘋狂……我毫不懷疑這一代人想要和平崛起。但這個
grandchildren? They think that they have already arrived, and if they begin to
孫子？他們認為自己已經到達了，如果他們開始
flex their muscles, we will have a very different China . . . Grandchildren
展現他們的實力，我們將會有一個非常不同的中國 . . . 孫子們
never listen to grandfathers.
永遠不要聽祖父的話。
The other problem is a more crucial one: if you start off with the belief that
另一個問題則更為關鍵：如果你一開始就抱持著這種信念，
the world has been unkind to you, the world has exploited you, the
世界對你不仁，世界剝削了你，
imperialists have devastated you, looted Beijing, done all this to you . . . this
帝國主義者摧毀了你，掠奪了北京，對你做了這一切……這
is no good . . . You are not going back to the old China, when you were the
沒有好處……你不會回到舊中國，當時你是
only power in the world as far as you knew . . . Now, you are just one of
你所知道的世界上唯一的力量……現在，你只是其中之一
many powers, many of them more innovative, inventive, and resilient.[149]
許多國家，其中許多更具創新性、發明性和韌性。[149]
As a counterpart to this advice, Lee counseled America not to ‘treat
作為對這個建議的對應，李光耀勸告美國不要「對待」
China as an enemy from the outset’, lest it ‘develop a counterstrategy to
中國從一開始就是敵人，以免它「發展出反制策略來」
demolish the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific’. He warned that, in fact, the Chinese
摧毀美國在亞太地區。他警告說，事實上，中國
could already envision such a scenario, but that an inevitable ‘contest
已經可以想像這樣的情景，但不可避免的「競爭」
between the two countries for supremacy in the western Pacific . . . need not
在兩國之間爭奪西太平洋的霸權……不必
lead to conflict’.[150] Accordingly, Lee advised Washington to integrate
導致衝突。因此，李光耀建議華盛頓整合
Beijing into the international community and accept ‘China as a big,
北京進入國際社會並接受「中國作為一個大國，
powerful, rising state’ with ‘a seat in the boardroom’. Rather than
強大、崛起的國家'，擁有'董事會中的一席之地'。而不是
presenting itself as an enemy in Chinese eyes, the United States should
在中國眼中，作為敵人的美國應該
‘acknowledge [China] as a great power, applaud its return to its position of
‘承認[中國]為一個大國，讚揚其重返其地位的
respect and restoration of its glorious past, and propose specific concrete
尊重和恢復其輝煌的過去，並提出具體的建議
ways to work together’.[151]
合作的方式。[151]
Lee considered that the Nixon administration had practiced this type of
李認為尼克森政府實行了這種型態的
approach, describing President Nixon as ‘a pragmatic strategist’. In the
方法，形容尼克森總統為「一位務實的策略家」。在
world ahead, America’s posture should be to ‘engage, not contain, China’,
面對未來的世界，美國的立場應該是「接觸，而非遏制中國」
but in a way that ‘would also quietly set pieces into place for a fallback
但以一種「也會靜靜地為備用方案安排好局勢」的方式
position should China not play according to the rules as a good global
如果中國不按照規則行事，應該處於什麼位置作為一個良好的全球參與者
citizen’. In this way, should the countries of the region ever feel compelled
公民」。這樣一來，如果該地區的國家曾經感到有必要
‘to take sides, America’s side of the chessboard should include Japan,
‘站在一邊，美國的棋盤應該包括日本，
Korea, ASEAN, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the Russian
韓國、東南亞國家聯盟、印度、澳大利亞、新西蘭和俄羅斯
Federation’.[152]
聯邦’。[152]
I was present during presentations by Lee on both sides of the Pacific.
我在李光耀在太平洋兩岸的演講中在場。
His American interlocutors, while generally receptive to Lee’s geopolitical
他的美國對話者雖然普遍對李的地緣政治
analysis, tended to inquire after his views on immediate issues, such as the
分析，傾向於詢問他對當前問題的看法，例如
North Korean nuclear program or the performance of Asian economies.
北韓核計劃或亞洲經濟的表現。
They were also imbued with an expectation that China in the end would
他們也懷有一種期望，即中國最終會
achieve an approximation of American political principles and institutions.
實現對美國政治原則和制度的近似。
Lee’s Chinese interlocutors, for their part, welcomed his arguments that
李的中國對話者則歡迎他的論點，認為
China should be treated as a great power, and that differences, even in the
中國應被視為一個大國，即使在差異上，
long term, did not necessitate conflict. But beneath their smoothly polite
長期來看，並不需要衝突。但在他們平滑的禮貌之下
manners, one also sensed a discomfort at being instructed by an overseas
在禮儀方面，人們也感受到被海外人士指導的不適
Chinese about principles of Chinese conduct.
中國有關中國行為原則。
Lee envisioned an apocalyptic scenario for war between the US and
李預見了美國與之間的末日戰爭情景
China. Weapons of mass destruction guaranteed devastation; beyond that,
中國。大規模毀滅性武器保證造成毀滅；除此之外，
no meaningful war aims – including especially the characteristics of
沒有有意義的戰爭目標——尤其包括特徵
‘victory’ – could be defined. So it is no accident that, toward the end of his
「勝利」——可以被定義。因此，這並不是偶然，在他生命的最後階段
life, Lee’s appeals to China were persistently addressed to the generation
生活，李的呼籲持續針對中國的世代
that had never experienced the turmoil of his generation and that might be
從未經歷過他那一代動盪的國家，並且可能是
too reliant on its technology or power:
過於依賴其技術或權力：
It is vital that the younger generation of Chinese, who have only lived during
在中國年輕一代中，生活在這段時間的人至關重要
a period of peace and growth in China and have no experience of China’s
中國的和平與成長時期，並且對中國的經驗毫無了解
tumultuous past, are made aware of the mistakes China made as a result of
動盪的過去，讓人意識到中國因為所犯的錯誤而造成的後果
hubris and excesses in ideology. They have to be imbued with the right values
傲慢和意識形態的過度。他們必須灌輸正確的價值觀。
and attitudes to meet the future with humility and responsibility.[153]
和態度以謙遜和負責的方式迎接未來。[153]
Lee never tired of reminding his interlocutors that globalization meant
李從不厭倦地提醒他的對話者，全球化意味著
that every nation – including (perhaps especially) those that had created the
每個國家——包括（或許尤其是）那些創造了的
system and written its rules – would have to learn to live in a competitive
系統並制定其規則 - 必須學會在競爭中生活
world.[154] Globalization had developed its ultimate form only in his
世界。[154] 全球化只有在他的
lifetime with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. In that
隨著蘇聯的崩潰和中國的崛起，終身。 在那個
world, great prosperity in close proximity to great want would generate
世界，繁榮與貧困的近距離將產生
flammable passions.[155] ‘Regionalism is no longer the ultimate solution,’
易燃的激情。[155] ‘區域主義不再是最終解決方案，’
he said in 1979. ‘Interdependence is the reality. It’s one world.’[156] Global
他在 1979 年說。「相互依賴是現實。這是一個世界。」
interconnection, he believed, could benefit everyone if handled wisely.
他相信，互聯互通如果妥善處理，可以使每個人受益。
After all, as he said to me in 2002, Singapore’s own engagement with the
畢竟，正如他在 2002 年對我所說的，新加坡自身與
world was the main reason its development had outpaced China’s.[157] In
世界是其發展超越中國的主要原因。
Lee’s view, the end of the Cold War had produced two contradictory
李的觀點是，冷戰的結束產生了兩種矛盾的情況
phenomena: globalization and potential strategic rivalry between the US
現象：全球化及美國之間潛在的戰略競爭
and China with the risk of a catastrophic war. Where many detected only
和中國面臨著災難性戰爭的風險。在許多人只察覺到的地方
peril, Lee asserted the indispensability of mutual restraint. It was the
危險，李光耀強調了相互克制的重要性。這是
essential obligation of both the US and China to invest both hope and action
美國和中國的基本義務是投資希望和行動
in the possibility of a successful outcome.
在成功結果的可能性中。
As few others, Lee foretold at an early stage the dilemmas that China’s
李光耀在早期預見了中國的困境，這是少數人能做到的
evolution would present for both China and the US. Inevitably the two
演變將對中國和美國帶來的挑戰。不可避免地，這兩個
nations would impinge on each other. Would this new relation lead to
國家之間會相互影響。這種新關係會導致
growing confrontation, or would it be possible to transform adversarial
日益增長的對抗，或者是否有可能轉變敵對
conduct into joint analysis of the requirements of peaceful coexistence?
進行和平共處需求的聯合分析？
For decades, Washington and Beijing proclaimed the latter goal. But
幾十年來，華盛頓和北京宣稱後者的目標。但
today, in the third decade of the twenty-first century, both appear to have
今天，在二十一世紀的第三個十年，兩者似乎都已經
suspended efforts to give coexistence an operational expression and are
暫停了將共存付諸實踐的努力，並且
turning instead toward sharpening rivalry. Will the world slide toward
轉而加劇競爭。世界會滑向
conflict as in the run-up to the First World War, when Europe inadvertently
衝突就像第一次世界大戰前夕，當時歐洲無意中
constructed a diplomatic doomsday machine that made each succeeding
建構了一個外交末日機器，使每一個接下來的
crisis progressively more difficult to solve until, finally, it blew up –
危機逐漸變得越來越難以解決，直到最後，爆發了 –
destroying civilization as it was then perceived? Or will the two behemoths
摧毀當時所認知的文明？還是這兩個巨頭會
rediscover a definition of coexistence that is meaningful in terms of each
重新發現一個在每個方面都有意義的共存定義
side’s conception of its greatness and of its core interests? The fate of the
一方對其偉大及核心利益的概念是什麼？命運的
modern world depends on the answer.
現代世界取決於這個答案。
Lee was one of the few leaders respected on both sides of the Pacific for
李是少數在太平洋兩岸都受到尊敬的領袖之一，因為
both his insight and his achievements. Starting his career by developing a
他對新加坡的洞察力和成就。以發展一個
concept of order for a tiny speck of an island and its neighborhood, he spent
對於一個微小島嶼及其周邊的秩序概念，他花費
his last years appealing for wisdom and restraint on the part of the countries
他最後幾年呼籲各國的智慧和克制
capable of wreaking a global catastrophe. Though he would never have
能夠造成全球災難。雖然他永遠不會有
made such a claim for himself, the old realist had assumed a role as world
為自己做出這樣的聲明，這位老現實主義者已經擔任了世界的角色
conscience.
良知。
LEE’S LEGACY
李光耀的遺產
After his long tenure, Lee resigned the office of prime minister in
李光耀在長期任期後辭去了總理職位
November 1990. In order to provide for a steady, managed transition, he
1990 年 11 月。為了提供穩定、受控的過渡，他
gradually separated himself from day-to-day governance. With the titles
逐漸與日常治理脫離。隨著這些頭銜
first of senior minister and then minister mentor, he remained influential but
首先是資深部長，然後是部長導師，他仍然具有影響力，但
progressively less visible through two prime ministerial successors.[*]
逐漸在兩位總理接任者中變得不那麼明顯。
An assessment of Lee’s legacy must begin with the extraordinary growth
對李光耀的遺產評估必須從非凡的增長開始
of Singapore’s per capita gross domestic product from $517 in 1965 to
新加坡的人均國內生產總值從 1965 年的 517 美元增至
$11,900 in 1990 and $60,000 at present (2020).[158] Annual GDP growth
1990 年的 11,900 美元和目前（2020 年）的 60,000 美元。[158] 年度 GDP 增長
averaged 8 percent well into the 1990s.[159] It is one of the most remarkable
平均達到 8％，直到 1990 年代。[159] 這是最引人注目的之一
economic success stories of modern times.
現代經濟成功故事。
In the late 1960s, it was received wisdom that post-colonial leaders
在 1960 年代末，後殖民領導者被認為是公認的智慧
ought to shield their economies from international market forces and
應該保護他們的經濟免受國際市場力量的影響並
develop autonomous local industries through intensive state intervention.
透過強烈的國家干預發展自主的地方產業。
As an expression of their newfound liberation and out of nationalist and
作為他們新獲得的解放的表現，以及出於民族主義和
populist impulses, some even felt compelled to harass foreigners who had
民粹主義衝動，有些人甚至感到有必要騷擾外國人
taken up residence on their soil during colonial days. The result, as Richard
在殖民時期定居在他們的土地上。結果，如理查德
Nixon wrote, was that:
尼克森寫道：
We live in a time when leaders are often judged more by the stridency of their
我們生活在一個時代，領導者常常被評價更多的是他們的激烈程度
rhetoric and the coloration of their politics than by the success of their
修辭和他們政治的色彩，而不是他們的成功
policies. Especially in the developing world, too many people have gone to
政策。尤其在發展中國家，太多人已經去到
bed at night with their ears full but their stomachs empty.
晚上躺在床上，耳朵充滿聲音，但肚子卻是空的。
[160]
Lee took Singapore in the opposite direction, attracting multinational
李將新加坡帶向相反的方向，吸引跨國公司
corporations by embracing free trade and capitalism and insisting on the
企業，通過擁抱自由貿易和資本主義，並堅持
enforcement of business contracts. He prized its ethnic diversity as a special
商業合約的執行。他珍視其民族多樣性作為一種特別
asset, working assiduously to prevent outside forces from intervening in
資產，努力防止外部勢力干預
domestic disputes – and thus also helping to preserve his country’s
國內爭端 – 從而也有助於維護他國的
independence. While most of his peers adopted a posture of non-alignment
獨立。雖然他的同儕大多採取不結盟的姿態
in the Cold War – which in practice often meant de facto acquiescence in
在冷戰期間——這在實際上往往意味著事實上的默許
Soviet designs – Lee staked his geopolitical future on the reliability of the
蘇聯設計 – 李光耀將他的地緣政治未來寄託於可靠性上
US and its allies.
美國及其盟友。
In charting a path for his new society, Lee attached decisive importance
在為他的新社會規劃道路時，李克強賦予了決定性的重視
to the centrality of culture. He rejected the belief – held in the liberal
對文化的中心性。他拒絕了這種信念——在自由主義者中流行的信念
democracies of the West as well as in the Soviet-led communist bloc – that
西方的民主國家以及蘇聯主導的共產主義集團 – 這
political ideologies were paramount in defining the evolution of a society
政治意識形態在定義社會的演變中至關重要
and that all societies would modernize in the same way. To the contrary,
而且所有社會都會以相同的方式現代化。相反，
said Lee: ‘The West believes the world must follow [its] historical
李說：「西方認為世界必須遵循[其]歷史」
development. [But] democracy and individual rights are alien to the rest of
發展。[但] 民主和個人權利對其他地方來說是陌生的
the world.’[161] The universality of liberal claims was as inconceivable to
世界。[161] 自由主義主張的普遍性對於
him as the notion that Americans would someday choose to follow
他作為美國人有朝一日會選擇追隨的觀念
Confucius.
孔子。
But neither did Lee believe that such civilizational differences were
但李光耀也不認為這些文明差異是
insurmountable. Cultures should coexist and accommodate each other.
不可逾越。文化應該共存並相互包容。
Today, Singapore remains an authoritarian state, but authoritarianism per se
今天，新加坡仍然是一個威權國家，但威權主義本身
was not Lee’s goal – it was a means to an end. Nor was family autocracy.
這不是李的目標——這是一種達成目的的手段。家族專制也不是。
Goh Chok Tong (no relation of Goh Keng Swee) served as prime minister
吳作棠（與吳慶瑞無關）擔任總理
from November 1990 to August 2004. Lee’s son Lee Hsieng Loong –
從 1990 年 11 月到 2004 年 8 月。李的兒子李顯龍 –
whose competence no one questions – succeeded Goh and is now engaged
其能力無人質疑 – 接替了吳作棠，現在正參與
in withdrawing from the premiership so that a successor can be determined
在辭去總理職位以便可以確定接班人
in the next election cycle. They led Singapore further down the path on
在下一次選舉周期中。他們使新加坡進一步走上了這條道路
which Lee had set it.
李所設定的。
Elections in Singapore are not democratic, but they are not without
新加坡的選舉並不民主，但也並非沒有
significance. While in democracies discontent expresses itself through the
重要性。在民主國家中，不滿情緒通過
possibility of electoral change, in Singapore Lee and his successors have
新加坡李光耀及其繼任者已經有選舉變革的可能性，
used voting as a performance evaluation to inform those in power of the
將投票作為績效評估，以告知掌權者的
efficacy of their actions, thereby giving them the opportunity to adjust their
行動的有效性，從而給予他們調整的機會
policies depending on their judgment of the public interest.
根據他們對公共利益的判斷制定政策。
Was there an alternative? Might a different approach, more democratic
有替代方案嗎？是否可以採取不同的方法，更加民主？
and pluralist, have succeeded? Lee did not think so. He believed that at the
和多元主義已經成功了嗎？李並不這麼認為。他認為在這個
beginning, as Singapore moved toward independence, it was in danger from
隨著新加坡邁向獨立，當時面臨著危險來自
the sectarian forces that tore apart many other post-colonial countries. As he
撕裂許多其他後殖民國家的宗派力量。當他
saw it, democratic states with significant ethnic divisions run the risk of
看到它，具有重大族裔分歧的民主國家面臨風險
succumbing to identity politics, which tend to accentuate sectarianism.[*] A
屈從於身份政治，這往往會加劇宗派主義。[*] A
democratic system functions by enabling a majority (variously defined) to
民主制度的運作是通過使多數（各種定義）能夠
create a government through elections, and then to create another
透過選舉建立一個政府，然後再建立另一個政府
government when political opinion shifts. But when political opinions – and
政府在政治意見轉變時。然而，當政治意見——和
divisions – are determined by immutable definitions of identity rather than
劃分 – 是由不變的身份定義所決定，而不是
by fluid policy differences, the prospects for any such outcome decline in
由於政策差異的流動性，任何此類結果的前景都在下降
proportion to the extent of the division; majorities tend to become
與分割的程度成比例；多數往往會變成
permanent, and minorities seek to escape their subjugation through
永久的，少數民族試圖通過逃避他們的壓迫來尋求
violence. In Lee’s view, governance operated most effectively as a
暴力。在李光耀看來，治理最有效的運作方式是作為一個
pragmatic unit of close associates untethered to ideology, prizing technical
務實的緊密夥伴單位，不受意識形態束縛，重視技術
and administrative competence and ruthlessly pursuing excellence. The
和行政能力，無情地追求卓越。
touchstone for him was a sense of public service:
對他來說，試金石是公共服務的意識：
Politics demands that extra of a person, a commitment to people and ideals.
政治要求一個人付出更多，對人民和理想的承諾。
You are not just doing a job. This is a vocation; not unlike the priesthood. You
你不僅僅是在做一份工作。這是一種職業；與神職人員並無不同。你
must feel for people, you must want to change society and make lives better.
必須關心人們，必須想要改變社會，讓生活變得更好。
[162]
What, then, of tomorrow? The key issue for Singapore’s future is
那麼，明天呢？新加坡未來的關鍵問題是
whether continuing economic and technological progress will lead to a
是否持續的經濟和技術進步將導致一個
democratic and humanistic transition. Should the country’s performance
民主和人文的過渡。若該國的表現
falter – causing voters to seek protection in ethnic identity – elections in the
動搖 – 使選民尋求民族身份的保護 – 在選舉中
Singaporean system could run the risk of turning into authentications of
新加坡系統可能面臨轉變為認證的風險
one-party ethnic rule.
一黨民族統治。
For idealists, the test of a structure is its relation to immutable criteria;
對於理想主義者來說，結構的考驗在於它與不變標準的關係；
for statesmen, it is adaptability to historical circumstance. By the latter
對於政治家來說，適應歷史環境是至關重要的。通過後者
standard, Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy has thus far succeeded. But statesmen
標準，李光耀的遺產迄今為止已經成功。但政治家
must also be judged by the evolution of their founding models. Scope for
也必須根據其創始模式的演變來評判。範圍為
popular change will sooner or later become an essential component of
受歡迎的變革遲早會成為……的必要組成部分
sustainability. Can a better balance be devised between popular democracy
可持續性。是否可以在民眾民主與
and modified elitism? This will be Singapore’s ultimate challenge.
和修正的精英主義？這將是新加坡的終極挑戰。
As in the mid-1960s, when Singapore first came into being, the world is
正如在 1960 年代中期，新加坡首次成立時，世界是
today once again in a period of ideological uncertainty about how to build a
今天再次處於一個意識形態不確定的時期，關於如何建立一個
successful society. Free-market democracy, which in the wake of the Soviet
成功的社會。自由市場民主，隨著蘇聯
Union’s collapse proclaimed itself the most viable arrangement, is
聯盟的崩潰宣告了自己是最可行的安排
simultaneously facing alternative external models and declining internal
同時面對替代的外部模式和內部的衰退
confidence. Other societal arrangements are asserting themselves as better
信心。其他社會安排正在表現出更好的效果
at unlocking economic growth and instilling social harmony. Singapore’s
在解鎖經濟增長和培養社會和諧方面。新加坡的
transformation under Lee’s leadership bypassed such struggles. He avoided
李的領導下的轉型避開了這些掙扎。他避免了
the rigid dogmas he decried as ‘pet theories’. Rather, he devised what he
他譴責的僵化教條被稱為「寵物理論」。相反，他設計了他所
insisted was Singaporean exceptionalism.[163]
堅持新加坡例外主義。[163]
Lee was a relentless improviser, not a theoretician of government. He
李是一位不斷即興創作的人，而不是政府的理論家。他
adopted policies that he thought stood a chance of working and revised
採取了他認為有可能奏效的政策並進行了修訂
them if he saw that they did not. He experimented constantly, borrowing
他如果看到他們沒有這樣做，就會對他們進行實驗。他不斷地實驗，借用
ideas from other countries and trying to learn from their mistakes.
來自其他國家的想法，並試圖從他們的錯誤中學習。
Nonetheless, he made sure that he was never mesmerized by the example of
儘管如此，他確保自己從未被...的例子所迷住
others; rather, Singapore had to ask itself constantly whether it was
其他；相反，新加坡必須不斷問自己是否
achieving goals imposed by its unique geography and enabled by its special
實現其獨特地理所帶來的目標並由其特殊情況所促成
demographic makeup. As he himself would put it, ‘I was never prisoner of
人口結構。正如他自己所說的，「我從來不是……的囚徒」
any theory. What guided me were reason and reality. The acid test I applied
任何理論。指導我的是理性和現實。我所應用的酸性測試
to every theory or science was, would it work?’[164] Perhaps Kwa Geok
對每一個理論或科學來說，都是「它會有效嗎？」[164] 或許是郭玉華
Choo had taught him the adage of Alexander Pope: ‘For forms of
Choo 教他亞歷山大·蒲柏的諺語：「對於形式的
government let fools contest; whatever is best administered is best.’[165]
政府讓愚者競爭；無論什麼管理得最好就是最好。
Lee both founded a nation and laid down the pattern of a state. In the
李既創立了一個國家，也奠定了一個國家的模式。在
categories established in the Introduction, he was both a prophet and a
在引言中建立的類別，他既是一位先知也是一位
statesman. He conceived the nation and then he strove to create incentives
政治家。他構思了這個國家，然後努力創造激勵措施
for his state to develop through exceptional performance in an evolving
為了讓他的國家在不斷演變中通過卓越的表現發展
future. Lee succeeded in institutionalizing a creative process. Will it be
未來。李光耀成功地將創造性過程制度化。這會是
adapted to evolving notions of human dignity?
適應不斷演變的人類尊嚴觀念？
The Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset asserted that man ‘has no
西班牙哲學家奧爾特加·伊·加塞特主張，人“沒有
nature; what he has is . . . history’.[166] In the absence of a national history,
自然；他所擁有的是……歷史’。[166] 在缺乏國家歷史的情況下，
Lee Kuan Yew invented Singapore’s nature from his vision of the future
李光耀從他對未來的願景中創造了新加坡的本質
and wrote its history as he went along. In doing so, he demonstrated the
並在此過程中撰寫了它的歷史。這樣做，他展示了
cogency of his conviction that the ultimate test of a statesman lies in the
他堅信的說服力在於，政治家的最終考驗在於
application of judgment as he journeys ‘along an unmarked road to an
在他沿著一條未標記的道路前行時，判斷的應用
unknown destination’.[167]
unknown destination’.
LEE THE PERSON
李這個人
‘It was circumstances that created me,’ Lee told an interviewer three years
「是環境造就了我，」李光耀在三年前告訴一位採訪者
before his death.[168] In particular, he explained, it was his upbringing in a
在他去世之前。[168] 特別是，他解釋說，這是他在一個
traditional Chinese family that explained his personality and made him ‘an
傳統的中國家庭解釋了他的個性，使他成為「一個」
unconscious Confucianist’:[169]
無意識的儒家主義者：[169]
The underlying philosophy is that for a society to work well, you must have
社會運作良好的基本哲學是，你必須擁有
the interests of the mass of the people, that society takes priority over the
大眾的利益，社會優先於
interests of the individual. This is the primary difference with the American
個人的利益。這是與美國的主要區別。
principle, [which stresses] the primary rights of the individual.[170]
原則，[強調]個人的基本權利。[170]
For Lee, the Confucian ideal was to be a junzi, or gentleman, ‘loyal to
對李來說，儒家理想是成為君子，或稱紳士，「忠於
his father and mother, faithful to his wife, [who] brings up his children well,
他的父親和母親，忠於他的妻子，[她]很好地撫養他的孩子，
[and] treats his friends properly’, but who is most of all a ‘good loyal
[and] treats his friends properly’，但誰最重要的是一個「好忠誠的」
citizen of his emperor’.[171]
他的皇帝的公民。[171]
Lee resolutely refused to engage in social chatter. He believed he was put
李堅決拒絕參與社交閒聊。他認為自己被放置在
into this world to accomplish progress for his society and, to the extent
進入這個世界以為他的社會實現進步，並且在某種程度上
possible, for the world at large. He was disinclined to waste the time
對於整個世界來說，他不願意浪費時間
allotted to him. On his four visits to our weekend house in Connecticut, he
分配給他的。在他四次造訪我們位於康涅狄格州的週末別墅時，他
would always bring his wife and generally one of his daughters. I would, by
他總是會帶著妻子，通常還會帶著其中一個女兒。我會，通過
prior agreement, arrange meals with leaders and thinkers who were working
事先協議，安排與正在工作的領導者和思想家共進餐
on issues of concern to Lee, as well as some mutual personal friends. Lee
關於李所關心的議題，以及一些共同的朋友。李
used these occasions to inform himself on American affairs. Twice, at his
利用這些場合來了解美國事務。兩次，在他的
request, I took him to local political events: one, a fundraiser for a
請求，我帶他參加當地的政治活動：一個為一個籌款活動
congressional candidate; the other, a town-hall meeting. I introduced him,
國會候選人；另一個是市政廳會議。我介紹了他，
as he asked, simply as a friend from Singapore.
他只是像一位來自新加坡的朋友一樣詢問。
On the occasions when I visited Lee, he would invite leaders from
在我拜訪李的時候，他會邀請來自
neighboring countries as well as senior associates for a series of seminars.
鄰國以及高級夥伴參加一系列研討會。
There would be a dinner and a discussion with him alone, the duration of
將會有一個晚餐和與他單獨的討論，持續時間為
which depended on the subjects that most moved either of us at the moment
這取決於當時最觸動我們兩個的主題
but was never brief. The meetings took place at the Istana, a stately
但從未簡短。會議在伊斯坦納舉行，這是一座莊嚴的
government building in the center of Singapore. In my many trips to
新加坡市中心的政府大樓。在我多次前往
Singapore, Lee never invited me to his home; neither have I ever
新加坡，李從未邀請我到他家；我也從未
encountered or heard of any recipient of this gesture – an attitude similar to
遇到或聽說過任何接受這種姿態的人 - 一種類似的態度
de Gaulle’s at Colombey, to which Adenauer’s visit was the single
德高爾在科隆貝，阿登納的訪問是唯一的
exception.
例外。
Our friendship also came to include another secretary of state, George
我們的友誼還包括另一位國務卿，喬治
Shultz, and Helmut Schmidt, who served as chancellor of Germany from
舒爾茨和赫爾穆特·施密特，曾擔任德國總理
1974 to 1982.[*] We met as a group (sometimes only three of us when
1974 年至 1982 年。[*] 我們作為一個團體會面（有時只有我們三個人當
Shultz’s or Schmidt’s schedules interfered): first in Iran in 1978, and then in
舒爾茨或施密特的日程干擾）：首先是在 1978 年的伊朗，然後在
Singapore in 1979, in Bonn in 1980, and on the porch of Shultz’s house in
新加坡在 1979 年，1980 年在波恩，以及在舒尔茨的房子前廊上
Palo Alto shortly after his appointment as secretary of state in 1982.[172]
帕洛阿爾托在他 1982 年被任命為國務卿後不久。
The four of us also attended a retreat in the redwood forests north of San
我們四個人也參加了位於舊金山北部紅木森林中的一次靜修會
Francisco: Schmidt, who incidentally shared Lee’s disdain for small talk, as
弗朗西斯科：施密特，順便提一下，他和李對閒聊的輕視相同，因為
a guest of Shultz and Lee at my invitation. Though our views on specific
我邀請的舒爾茨和李的客人。儘管我們對具體問題的看法
policies were not always congruent, we shared a commitment: ‘We always
政策並不總是一致，但我們有一個共同的承諾：‘我們始終
tell each other the absolute truth,’ as Schmidt put it to a German journalist.
「告訴彼此絕對的真相，」施密特對一位德國記者說。
[173] Conversations with Lee were a personal vote of confidence; they
[173] 與李光耀的對話是一種個人的信心投票；他們
signaled an interlocutor’s relevance to his otherwise monastically focused
標示出對話者在他其他專注於修道院般的事務中的重要性
existence.
存在。
In May 2008, Choo, Lee’s beloved wife and companion of sixty years,
在 2008 年 5 月，李光耀心愛的妻子和六十年的伴侶朱女士，
was felled by a stroke that left her a prisoner in her own body, unable to
中風使她成為自己身體的囚徒，無法
communicate. This ordeal lasted for more than two years. Every evening
溝通。這場磨難持續了兩年多。每個晚上
when he was in Singapore, Lee sat by her bedside reading to her aloud from
當他在新加坡時，李坐在她的床邊大聲為她朗讀
books, and sometimes poems including Shakespeare’s sonnets that he knew
書籍，有時還包括他所熟知的莎士比亞的十四行詩
she cherished.[174] Despite the absence of any evidence, he had faith that
她珍惜。[174] 儘管沒有任何證據，他仍然相信
she understood. ‘She keeps awake for me,’ he said to an interviewer.
她明白了。‘她為我保持清醒，’他對一位採訪者說。
[175]
In the months that followed her death in October 2010, Lee took the
在她於 2010 年 10 月去世後的幾個月裡，李採取了
unprecedented step of initiating several phone conversations with me in
與我進行幾次電話交談的前所未有的舉措
which he made reference to his grief – and specifically to the void left in his
他提到了他的悲傷——特別是他所留下的空虛
life by Choo’s passing. I asked whether he ever discussed his solitude with
生活因朱的去世而改變。我問他是否曾經與人討論過他的孤獨。
his children. ‘No,’ replied Lee, ‘as head of the family, it is my duty to
他的孩子們。李說：「不，作為家中的長者，我有責任去」
support them, not lean on them.’ After Choo’s death, Lee’s effervescence
支持他們，而不是依賴他們。」在朱的去世後，李的活力
diminished. His intelligence remained, but his driven quality essentially
減弱了。他的智慧依然存在，但他的進取品質基本上
disappeared. To the very end, he carried out what he considered his duties
消失了。直到最後，他都履行了他認為的職責。
but, without his ultimate inspiration, joy had gone out of his life.
但沒有了他最終的啟發，生活中的快樂已經消失。
Though I considered Lee a friend for nearly half a century, he was
雖然我將李光耀視為近半個世紀的朋友，但他是
restrained in expressing any personal ties. The closest he came was in the
在表達任何個人關係時保持克制。他最接近的是在
form of an unsolicited dedication that he inscribed in 2009 on a photograph
他在 2009 年於一張照片上題寫的自發獻辭
of himself and Choo: ‘Henry, Your friendship and support after our
的自己和朱：‘亨利，你的友誼和支持在我們之後
fortuitous meeting in Harvard, Nov. 1968, made a huge difference in my
在哈佛的偶然會面，1968 年 11 月，對我產生了巨大的影響
life. Harry.’ In friendship as in politics, Lee let the significant speak for
生活。哈利。 在友誼和政治中，李讓重要的事物發聲。
itself; verbal elaboration would only diminish its magnitude.
本身；口頭的詳細說明只會減少其重要性。
When Lee Kuan Yew died in March 2015, twenty-five years after
李光耀於 2015 年 3 月去世，距離他去世已經二十五年
stepping down as prime minister, dignitaries from all over the world
卸任總理，來自世界各地的貴賓
converged on Singapore to offer their final respects. Many Asian heads of
匯聚在新加坡以表達他們的最後敬意。許多亞洲國家的領袖
government attended, including the prime ministers of Japan, India,
政府出席，包括日本和印度的首相，
Vietnam and Indonesia, as well as the president of South Korea. China was
越南和印尼，以及南韓總統。中國是
represented by Vice President Li Yuanchao; the United States by former
由副總統李克強代表；美國由前
President Bill Clinton, former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and
總統比爾·克林頓，前國家安全顧問湯姆·多尼倫和
myself. All of us had frequently encountered Lee on consequential
我自己。我們所有人都經常遇到李光耀，這對我們來說是重要的。
questions in political life.
政治生活中的問題。
The most moving aspect of the obsequies was its demonstration of the
葬禮中最感人的一面是其對於
bond that had grown between the people of Singapore and their nation’s
新加坡人民與他們國家之間的聯繫
founder. For the three days of Lee’s lying-in-state, hundreds of thousands
創辦人。在李光耀的靈堂前，三天內有數十萬人
defied drenching monsoons to stay in line and pay homage at his bier.
不顧滂沱大雨，堅持排隊向他的靈柩致敬。
Television news channels carried chyrons informing mourners of how long
電視新聞頻道播放了滾動字幕，告知哀悼者持續了多久
they would have to wait to pay their respects; it was never less than three
他們必須等著致敬；這從來不會少於三個
hours. Out of an amalgam of races, religions, ethnicities and cultures, Lee
小時。在種族、宗教、民族和文化的融合中，李
Kuan Yew had forged a society that transcended his own life.
光耀已經鑄造了一個超越他自己生命的社會。
Lee meant his legacy to inspire, rather than inhibit, progress. That is why
李希望他的遺產能夠激勵進步，而不是抑制進步。這就是為什麼
he requested that his home on Oxley Road be demolished after his death to
他要求在他去世後拆除他位於奧克斯利路的家
avoid its becoming a memorial shrine.[176] His aim was for Singapore to
避免其成為紀念聖地。[176] 他的目標是讓新加坡
develop the leaders and institutions relevant to the challenges ahead and to
發展與未來挑戰相關的領導者和機構，並且
concentrate on its future rather than on worship of its past. ‘All I can do’, he
專注於未來，而不是崇拜過去。‘我能做的只有’他
told an interviewer, ‘is to make sure that when I leave, the institutions are
告訴一位採訪者，「確保當我離開時，這些機構是」
good, sound, clean, efficient, and there is a government in place that knows
良好、健全、清潔、高效，並且有一個了解的政府在運作
what it has got to do.’[177]
它與此有什麼關係。
Regarding his own legacy, Lee was as always unsentimentally analytical.
關於他自己的遺產，李克強一如既往地冷靜分析。
He allowed for regrets, including for some of his own actions as national
他對遺憾持開放態度，包括對自己作為國家領導者的一些行為感到遺憾
leader. ‘I am not saying that everything I did was right,’ he told the New
領導者。他對《新》雜誌說：「我並不是說我所做的一切都是正確的。」
York Times, ‘but everything I did was for an honorable purpose. I had to do
York Times，「但我所做的一切都是出於高尚的目的。我必須這樣做」
some nasty things, locking fellows up without trial.’[178] Citing a Chinese
一些可怕的事情，將人關押而不進行審判。[178] 引用一位中國人
proverb – a man cannot be judged until his coffin is closed – Lee said,
諺語 – 一個人不能在他的棺材關閉之前被評判 – 李說，
‘Close the coffin, then decide.’[179]
「關上棺材，然後再決定。」
Today, the name of Lee Kuan Yew is falling into obscurity in the West.
今天，李光耀的名字在西方逐漸被遺忘。
Yet history is longer than contemporary biography, and the lessons of Lee’s
然而，歷史比當代傳記更長，而李的教訓
experience remain urgent.
經驗仍然迫切。
World order today is being challenged simultaneously from two
當今的世界秩序正同時受到兩方面的挑戰
directions: the unraveling of entire regions where sectarian passions have
方向：整個地區的解體，宗派熱情已經
overwhelmed traditional structures, and the intensifying antagonism of
壓倒了傳統結構，以及日益加劇的對立
great powers with conflicting claims of legitimacy. The former threatens to
大國之間存在著相互矛盾的合法性主張。前者威脅到
create an expanding field of chaos; the latter, a cataclysmic bloodletting.
創造一個擴展的混亂領域；後者是一場災難性的流血事件。
Lee’s statesmanship is relevant to both of these circumstances. His life’s
李光耀的政治才能與這兩種情況都相關。他的一生
work is a testament to the possibility of evoking progress and sustainable
工作是喚起進步和可持續性的可能性的證明
order out of the least promising of conditions. His conduct in Singapore and
在最不利的條件下創造秩序。他在新加坡的行為和
on the world stage alike is a tutorial in how to foster comprehension and
在世界舞台上同樣是一個如何促進理解的教程和
coexistence amidst diverse perspectives and backgrounds.
在多元觀點和背景中共存。
Most significantly, Lee’s statesmanship illustrates that the best
最重要的是，李光耀的政治才能顯示出最佳
determinants of a society’s fate are neither its material wealth nor other
一個社會命運的決定因素既不是其物質財富，也不是其他
conventional measures of power but rather the quality of its people and the
傳統的權力衡量標準，而是其人民的素質和
vision of its leaders. As Lee said, ‘if you are just realistic, you become
領導者的願景。正如李光耀所說，「如果你只是現實主義者，你就會變得」
pedestrian, plebeian, you will fail. Therefore you must be able to soar above
行人，平民，你將失敗。因此你必須能夠高飛。
the reality and say, “This is also possible.” ’[180]
現實並說：“這也是可能的。”