Routledge 劳特利奇
Taylor & Francis Group 泰勒与弗朗西斯集团 R==R==
Objectivity and the supernormal: the limitations of bracketing approaches in providing neutral accounts of supernormal claims 客观性与超常现象：括号化方法在提供超常主张中立叙述方面的局限性
Jeremy Northcote 杰里米·诺思科特
To cite this article: Jeremy Northcote (2004) Objectivity and the supernormal: the limitations of bracketing approaches in providing neutral accounts of supernormal claims, Journal of Contemporary Religion, 19:1, 85-98, DOI: 10.1080/1353790032000165131 引用本文：Jeremy Northcote (2004) 《客观性与超常：括号方法在提供超常主张中中立叙述的局限性》，《当代宗教杂志》，19:1，85-98，DOI: 10.1080/1353790032000165131
Objectivity and the Supernormal: The Limitations of Bracketing Approaches in Providing Neutral Accounts of Supernormal Claims 客观性与超常现象：括号化方法在提供超常主张中立叙述方面的局限性
JEREMY NORTHCOTE 杰里米·诺思科特
Abstract 摘要
This paper contends that bracketing approaches to the sociological study of supernatural, paranormal, and occult proponents do not truly ‘bracket’ the reality-claims made by those being studied, but instead impose ontological limits on what can be considered ‘supernormal’. It is argued that such boundaries and definitions tend to rule out alternative ontological perspectives of the kind that researchers typically encounter among religious, paranormal, and occult proponents. It is also argued that, unlike earlier reductionist approaches to the supernormal, the bias of bracketing approaches is not necessarily based on an underlying sceptical outlook of researchers, but rather reflects an inherent ontological limitation within the sociological enterprise itself. It is recommended that bracketing should be replaced by a reflexive, dialogical approach that emphasises the ontological positioning of social analyses with respect to supernormal claims. 本文认为，对超自然、超常和神秘主义倡导者的社会学研究采用的括号方法并没有真正“括起”被研究者所提出的现实主张，而是对可以被视为“超常”的事物施加了本体论的限制。文章指出，这种边界和定义往往排除了研究者在宗教、超常和神秘主义倡导者中通常遇到的替代本体论视角。还认为，与早期的还原主义超常方法不同，括号方法的偏见并不一定基于研究者的怀疑态度，而是反映了社会学事业本身固有的本体论限制。建议用一种反思性、对话式的方法取代括号方法，强调社会分析在超常主张方面的本体论定位。
Introduction 介绍
For many years social analysts investigating religion, the occult, and the paranormal tended to be sceptical of ‘supernormal’ claims. Investigators sometimes openly stated such scepticism in their accounts, but more often than not, their scepticism operated in a more subtle manner, taking the form of symbolic or functional perspectives that tended to (often implicitly) reduce supernormal conceptions purely to psychological or social constructs. However, in recent years researchers of the occult, the paranormal, religion, and various ‘alternative’ religions have increasingly championed the notion that social analysts can, and should, avoid taking a position on the validity of supernormal ideas. This perspective is generally referred to as the ‘bracketing’ approach. 多年来，研究宗教、神秘学和超自然现象的社会分析师往往对“超常”主张持怀疑态度。调查者有时在他们的报告中公开表达这种怀疑，但更多时候，他们的怀疑以更微妙的方式运作，表现为象征性或功能性的视角，往往（通常是隐含地）将超常观念纯粹简化为心理或社会构造。然而，近年来，研究神秘学、超自然现象、宗教和各种“替代”宗教的学者越来越倡导一种观点，即社会分析师可以并且应该避免对超常思想的有效性采取立场。这种观点通常被称为“括号”方法。
Despite the apparent progress made by recent social analysts in moving away from positioned accounts, I contend that current bracketing approaches, like past approaches, do not offer a solution to the problem of bias in sociological accounts of the supernormal. The problem is that bracketing approaches, which claim to only deal with the social aspects of religious and quasi-religious activities and to leave the empirical validity of such activities an open question, inevitably make a demarcation between ‘social’, ‘physical’, and ‘supernormal’ reality that invalidates certain ontological claims (such as those that make little distinction between social, physical, and paraphysical reality). However, I will argue that this bias is not necessarily a problem of analysts being unable to remain impartial (although this can sometimes be the case), but that-despite 尽管最近的社会分析者在摆脱定位叙述方面取得了明显进展，但我认为当前的括号方法与过去的方法一样，并未解决社会学对超常现象叙述中的偏见问题。问题在于，括号方法声称只处理宗教和准宗教活动的社会方面，并将这些活动的实证有效性留作开放问题，必然会在“社会”、“物理”和“超常”现实之间划定界限，这使得某些本体论主张失效（例如，那些对社会、物理和超物理现实几乎没有区分的主张）。然而，我将论证这种偏见并不一定是分析者无法保持公正的问题（尽管有时确实如此），而是尽管如此。
their best intentions-bias is built into the very assumptions that underlie social analysis itself. I will contend that there is no easy way out of this dilemma, but that a more reflexive and dialogical approach can at least highlight the limits of impartiality inherent in any particular analytical approach and acknowledge alternative, ‘emic’ perspectives concerning the supernormal. 他们的最佳意图——偏见根植于社会分析本身的基本假设中。我将主张，摆脱这一困境并没有简单的方法，但更具反思性和对话性的方式至少可以突出任何特定分析方法中固有的公正性局限，并承认关于超常现象的替代“内在”视角。
From Sceptical Bias to Bracketing 从怀疑偏见到括号化
In order to understand the bracketing approach and its limitations, it is necessary first to examine the more blatant ‘positioned’ perspectives that the bracketing approach sought to replace. Of these perspectives, the most dominant has been that of the ‘Humanist’ social analysts who, in either an open or veiled manner, present sceptical accounts of supernormal claims. ^(1){ }^{1} The sceptical bias that such analysts exhibit towards the supernormal can be seen on the occasions when, having not ignored the area altogether or reduced it to a curious oddity, they adopt a general pattern of discrediting proponents of such ideas, portraying them as irrational, gullible, fantasy prone, pseudoscientific or downright fraudulent (Eglin, 1974: 324). 为了理解括号法及其局限性，首先有必要考察括号法试图取代的更明显的“定位”视角。在这些视角中，最主导的是“人文主义”社会分析者的观点，他们以开放或隐晦的方式，对超常主张提出怀疑的论述。这些分析者对超常现象表现出的怀疑偏见，可以在他们没有完全忽视这一领域或将其简化为一种好奇的奇异现象时看到，他们通常采取一种普遍的模式来贬低这些观点的支持者，将他们描绘为不理性、轻信、幻想倾向、伪科学或彻头彻尾的欺诈者（Eglin, 1974: 324）。
Even the more sympathetic treatments of supernormal proponents have tended to be characterised by a reductionist tendency that treats supernormal ideas as purely social or psychological constructs without a basis in objective reality. Such reductionist approaches have been common since the early days of sociology and anthropology. For example, nineteenth-century social theorist Karl Marx regarded supernatural ideas as a ‘false consciousness’-referring to them, in fact, as the “opium of the people” (Marx, 1957 [1844]: 42). Marx argued that the dominant class has long employed such ideas as tools of manipulation to subordinate the masses. Another influential social theorist, Edward B. Tylor, saw modern-day beliefs in ghosts and other such phenomena as survivals of our primitive past and held that people in our society who believed in such things were just as irrational, ignorant, and childlike as the natives of less advanced cultures (Tylor, 1979 [1871]). 即使是对超常现象倡导者更具同情心的论述，也往往表现出一种还原主义倾向，将超常思想视为纯粹的社会或心理构造，而没有客观现实的基础。这种还原主义的方法自社会学和人类学早期以来就很常见。例如，19 世纪的社会理论家卡尔·马克思将超自然思想视为“虚假的意识”，实际上称其为“人民的鸦片”（马克思，1957 [1844]：42）。马克思认为，统治阶级长期以来利用这些思想作为操控工具，以使大众处于从属地位。另一位有影响力的社会理论家爱德华·B·泰勒则认为，现代人对鬼魂和其他现象的信仰是我们原始过去的遗留，认为我们社会中相信这些事物的人与较不发达文化的土著一样不理性、无知和幼稚（泰勒，1979 [1871]）。
Although the cultural relativism that emerged in the field of anthropology in the 1920s and 1930s signalled a shift away from the application of these evolutionary perspectives to native peoples, supernormal proponents do not seem to have benefited from this new-found respect for traditional, non-Western, ‘spiritual’ beliefs. Perhaps the reason they did not benefit was because-unlike their ‘native’ contemporaries-supernormal proponents were regarded as part of our own society, not of some foreign cultural system, and they were consequently expected to know better (Dolby, 1979: 28). 尽管在 20 世纪 20 年代和 30 年代出现在人类学领域的文化相对主义标志着对土著人民的进化观点应用的转变，但超常现象的支持者似乎并没有从这种对传统、非西方“精神”信仰的新尊重中受益。也许他们没有受益的原因在于——与他们的“土著”同时代人不同——超常现象的支持者被视为我们自己社会的一部分，而不是某种外国文化体系，因此人们期望他们更懂得这些（Dolby, 1979: 28）。
However, even in studies of non-Western societies, the impression one gets of most cultural relativists, even contemporary ones, is that their mode of analysis tends to undermine the supernormal truth-claims made by those being studied. They are undermined because of the way these analysts tend to reduce supernormal ideas to entirely symbolic, structural or functional constructs, thereby giving the impression that such claims have no basis whatsoever in objective reality. ^(2){ }^{2} 然而，即使在对非西方社会的研究中，大多数文化相对主义者，甚至是当代的文化相对主义者，给人的印象是，他们的分析方式往往削弱了被研究者所提出的超常真理主张。这些主张之所以被削弱，是因为这些分析者倾向于将超常观念简化为完全象征性的、结构性的或功能性的构造，从而给人一种这样的印象：这些主张在客观现实中毫无依据。
Sociologist Peter Berger makes some insightful observations concerning the ontological bias evident in reductionist approaches, arguing that they provide “quasiscientific legitimations of a secularized world view” (Berger, 1974: 128). 社会学家彼得·伯杰对还原主义方法中明显存在的本体偏见做了一些深刻的观察，认为它们提供了“世俗化世界观的准科学合法化”（伯杰，1974：128）。
He contends that functionalist explanations, for example, “flatten out” supernatural phenomena to the point that 他认为功能主义解释，例如，将超自然现象“扁平化”到这样的程度
… any manifestations of transcendence are, strictly speaking, meaningless, and therefore can only be dealt with in terms of social or psychological functions that can be understood without reference to transcendence. (Berger, 1974: 129) …任何超越的表现，从严格意义上讲，都是无意义的，因此只能通过社会或心理功能来处理，这些功能可以在不涉及超越的情况下理解。（伯杰，1974：129）
Berger argues that functionalist explanations should be employed only in certain types of inquiry, such as in “investigations of the social-psychological mechanisms by which this or that worldview is maintained as plausible in the minds of its adherents” (Berger, 1974: 128). The application of such theories as total explanations for the origin and nature of those claims is in Berger’s view illegitimate. Instead, Berger calls for approaches that ‘bracket’ such reality-claims, leaving the question of their validity open within the account. Berger asserts: 伯杰认为，功能主义解释应仅在某些类型的研究中使用，例如在“调查这种或那种世界观在其信奉者心中如何被维持为可信的社会心理机制”时（伯杰，1974：128）。在伯杰看来，将这些理论作为对这些主张的起源和性质的全面解释是不合法的。相反，伯杰呼吁采取“括号化”这种现实主张的方法，在叙述中保留其有效性的问题。伯杰断言：
The scientific study of religion must bracket the ultimate truth claims implied by its subject… Anyone engaged in the scientific study of religion will have to resign himself to this intrinsic limitationregardless of whether, in his extrascientific existence, he is a believer, an atheist or a skeptic. (Berger, 1974: 125) 宗教的科学研究必须将其主题所暗示的终极真理主张排除在外……任何从事宗教科学研究的人都必须接受这一内在的局限，无论在他科学之外的存在中，他是信徒、无神论者还是怀疑论者。(伯杰, 1974: 125)
Ideally, a bracketing approach does not make a judgement one way or the other about the ontological status of a supernormal claim, but simply presents a perspective on the phenomenon “from within” (Berger 1974: 129), that is from the point of view of proponents. Such an approach had earlier been recommended by anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard, who wrote: 理想情况下，括号法并不对超常主张的本体论地位做出任何判断，而是简单地从支持者的角度“从内部”呈现现象（Berger 1974: 129）。这种方法早在之前就得到了人类学家爱德华·埃文斯-普里查德的推荐，他写道：
As I understand the matter, there is no possibility of knowing whether the spiritual beings of primitive religions or of any others have any existence or not, and since that is the case he cannot take the question into consideration… It was precisely because so many anthropological writers did take up a theological position albeit a negative and implicit one, that they felt that an explanation of primitive religious phenomena in causal terms was required, going, it seems to me, beyond the legitimate bounds of the subject. (Evans-Pritchard, 1965: 17) ^(3){ }^{3} 据我理解，无法知道原始宗教或其他宗教的精神存在是否真实，因此他无法考虑这个问题……正是因为许多人类学作家采取了一个神学立场，尽管是消极和隐含的，他们才觉得需要用因果关系来解释原始宗教现象，这在我看来超出了该主题的合理范围。(埃文斯-普里查德, 1965: 17)
Social analyst Graham Watson also calls on analysts to “suspend judgment on the status of informants’ knowledge claims” with respect to magical and religious conceptions, lest we “find ourselves accounting for what we take to be our informants’ true beliefs in terms of their correspondence to what we hold to be real” (Watson, 1991: 83). ^(4){ }^{4} He warns: 社会分析师格雷厄姆·沃森还呼吁分析师“暂停对信息提供者知识主张状态的判断”，以免我们“发现自己在解释我们认为信息提供者的真实信仰时，依据的是我们所认为的现实”（沃森，1991：83）。他警告说：
Our anthropology of knowledge would then become merely the anthropology of erroneous belief, while the work done in constituting ‘true knowledge’ as ‘true knowledge’ would remain hidden from us. (Watson, 1991: 83) 我们的知识人类学将仅仅成为错误信念的人类学，而将“真知识”构成“真知识”的工作将对我们保持隐秘。（沃森，1991：83）
Watson declares, however, that this position “does not entail judgmental relativism”, for the bracketing approach does not preclude the possibility that there may ultimately be either an empirical or non-empirical basis for informants’ reality claims. ^(5){ }^{5} Instead, the emphasis should be on the manner in which participants express and debate those claims irrespective of their empirical basis. 沃森声明，然而，这一立场“并不意味着判断相对主义”，因为括号法并不排除信息提供者的现实主张可能最终有经验或非经验基础的可能性。相反，重点应放在参与者表达和辩论这些主张的方式上，而不论其经验基础。
The call to bracket judgements about the truth or falsity of supernormal claims has been made by Andrew Greeley (1975), Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch (1982: 184), and David Hess (1993), among others. However, there are inherent ontological biases in bracketing approaches that have not generally been acknowledged by analysts, which I shall now outline in some detail. 对超常主张的真伪进行括号处理的呼吁已由安德鲁·格里利（1975 年）、哈里·柯林斯和特雷弗·平奇（1982 年：184 页）、大卫·赫斯（1993 年）等人提出。然而，括号处理方法中存在固有的本体论偏见，这一点通常未被分析者所承认，我将在此详细阐述。
The Limitations of Bracketing 括号的局限性
I hold that there is a fundamental bias in bracketing approaches that arises from the fact that an analyst taking such an approach must inevitably make a decision about where to place the ‘brackets’ and must define some aspects of supernormal belief or activity as being social in nature and the remainder as not, which is itself an ontological claim. For example, Peter Berger declares: 我认为括号方法存在一种根本偏见，这源于分析师在采用这种方法时不可避免地必须决定将“括号”放置在哪里，并且必须将某些超常信念或活动的某些方面定义为社会性质，而将其余部分定义为非社会性质，这本身就是一种本体论主张。例如，彼得·伯杰宣称：
Whatever else these phenomena may be, they will also be human projections, products of human history, social constructions undertaken by human beings. (Berger, 1990 [1969]: 52, emphasis in the original) 无论这些现象还有什么其他特征，它们也将是人类的投射，是人类历史的产物，是人类进行的社会建构。（伯杰，1990 [1969]：52，原文强调）
The problem lies in the fact that, according to many supernormal proponents, even the apparently socio-cultural aspect of supernormal-related activities are ultimately constituted by supernormal factors. For example, during my research into the controversies that surround paranormal and occult ideas (see Northcote, 2001), several proponents told me that their interest in various supernormal phenomena had been shaped by supernormal experiences and some even claimed that it was ‘guided’ by supernormal forces. Wicca enthusiasts, for example, sometimes cited a ‘calling’ (usually via visions and dreams) from ‘the Goddess’ who outlined their life’s mission and in some cases granted them special powers. One self-declared witch and medium told me: 问题在于，许多超常现象的支持者认为，即使是超常相关活动的表面社会文化方面，最终也都是由超常因素构成的。例如，在我研究围绕超自然和神秘思想的争议时（见 Northcote，2001），几位支持者告诉我，他们对各种超常现象的兴趣是由超常经历塑造的，有些甚至声称这是由超常力量“引导”的。例如，威卡爱好者有时会提到来自“女神”的“召唤”（通常通过幻象和梦境），她为他们勾勒了人生使命，并在某些情况下赋予他们特殊的能力。一位自称是女巫和灵媒的人告诉我：
I had a dream where the spirit of the Goddess came to me and told me the purpose of my life. This was at a major crisis in my life and became a great turning point for me. I found out that my purpose in life is to help others and help in any way I can, and that is what I’ve been doing ever since. (quoted in Northcote, 2001: 138-39) 我做了一个梦，女神的灵魂来找我，告诉我我生命的目的。这是在我生活中的一个重大危机时刻，成为了我人生的一个重要转折点。我发现我生命的目的就是帮助他人，尽我所能地提供帮助，从那时起我一直在这样做。
The notion of ‘a calling’ has a long tradition in Western Christianity and has also been embraced by a whole range of alternative religious and quasi-religious proponents. Some UFO enthusiasts also cite guidance (in their case, guidance by extraterrestrial beings) as an important factor underlying their involvement in UFO research and influencing their life generally. Indeed, sociologist Charles Emmons notes that many ufologists “come to be aware that they are being chosen and perhaps directed by the UFO phenomenon” (Emmons, 1997: 68). “召唤”的概念在西方基督教中有着悠久的传统，并且也被一系列替代宗教和准宗教的倡导者所接受。一些 UFO 爱好者还将指导（在他们的情况下，是外星生物的指导）视为他们参与 UFO 研究和影响他们生活的一个重要因素。实际上，社会学家查尔斯·埃蒙斯指出，许多 UFO 研究者“意识到他们被 UFO 现象所选择，甚至可能被引导”（埃蒙斯，1997：68）。
Many proponents see apparently indisputable ‘sociological’ aspects of involvement, such as social organisation and social status as being determined or manipulated by supernormal forces. Social analysts, for example, are familiar with the claim often made by religious and quasi-religious leaders that their authority and the organisational structure of their social groups have been divinely ordained. Such claims are often employed to justify the ecclesiastical and patriarchal hierarchy that prevails in some established churches, ^(6){ }^{6} and also with the ‘charismatic’ authority ^(7){ }^{7} held by some ‘sect’ leaders and the segregated group structures they construct. ^(8){ }^{8} Similar notions concerning the divine foundation of social structures can be found among paranormal adherents. For 许多支持者认为，参与的明显无可争辩的“社会学”方面，如社会组织和社会地位，是由超自然力量决定或操控的。例如，社会分析家熟悉宗教和准宗教领袖常常声称他们的权威以及其社会团体的组织结构是神圣所赋予的。这种说法常常被用来为一些既定教会中盛行的教会和父权等级制度辩护， ^(6){ }^{6} 以及一些“教派”领袖所持有的“魅力”权威 ^(7){ }^{7} 和他们所构建的隔离群体结构。 ^(8){ }^{8} 关于社会结构神圣基础的类似观念也可以在超自然信徒中找到。
example, I have heard UFO proponents claim that the growing ‘movement’ of popular interest in UFOs is being orchestrated by extraterrestrials in order to prepare the citizens of Earth for official extraterrestrial contact. Similarly, some New Agers I spoke to believed that the burgeoning interest in spiritual ideas is the result of a general evolutionary awakening of humankind’s ‘spiritual consciousness’. ^(9){ }^{9} Meanwhile, some Christian evangelists/fundamentalists attributed popular interest in spiritual and occult matters to demonic manipulation-part of Satan’s ongoing battle with God. 例如，我听说 UFO 支持者声称，日益增长的公众对 UFO 的兴趣“运动”是由外星人 orchestrated，以准备地球公民与外星人的正式接触。同样，我与一些新纪元主义者交谈时，他们认为对精神思想的日益兴趣是人类“精神意识”普遍进化觉醒的结果。与此同时，一些基督教传教士/原教旨主义者将公众对精神和神秘事务的兴趣归因于恶魔的操控——这是撒旦与上帝持续斗争的一部分。
An approach that demands that the ontological basis of claims be bracketed can run into trouble at this point, because such claims challenge the very notion that social processes are involved at all or at least they challenge orthodox social scientists’ views that distinguish between natural (or supernatural) processes and social processes. Consequently, the extent to which socio-cultural factors are involved becomes one of the ‘ontological’ issues in dispute and it, too, should rightly be bracketed. 一种要求将主张的本体基础括起来的方法在这一点上可能会遇到麻烦，因为这样的主张挑战了社会过程是否涉及的基本概念，或者至少挑战了正统社会科学家区分自然（或超自然）过程与社会过程的观点。因此，社会文化因素涉及的程度成为了一个有争议的“本体”问题，这也应该被正确地括起来。
The problem is not only that a bracketing approach generally fails to eliminate ‘clashes’ between the analyst’s perspective and the perspectives of those being studied, but it may also undermine the strength of the analysis by providing, at best, a very limited perspective and, at worst, one that has completely misrepresented the processes involved. Consider, for example, the possibility that people’s thinking and behaviour are indeed based on various supernormal forces, but that this factor has been bracketed out of the analysis. In this scenario, a bracketing approach will falsely attribute mundane sociological explanations to behaviour that is in actuality shaped by supernormal forces. Alternatively, we could consider the possibility that sceptics are correct in identifying processes, such as mass delusion, irrational tendencies, and myth making as the basis of supernormal knowledge/belief. In this scenario, a bracketing approach will miss the elements of self-deception and/or ‘irrationality’ that are involved in social processes related to belief in the supernormal. 问题不仅在于括号法通常无法消除分析者的视角与被研究者视角之间的“冲突”，而且它可能通过提供最多非常有限的视角，最糟糕的情况是完全误解所涉及的过程，从而削弱分析的力度。例如，考虑人们的思维和行为确实基于各种超常力量的可能性，但这一因素在分析中被排除。在这种情况下，括号法将错误地将平凡的社会学解释归因于实际上受到超常力量影响的行为。或者，我们可以考虑怀疑论者在识别诸如集体错觉、非理性倾向和神话创造等过程作为超常知识/信仰基础时是正确的可能性。在这种情况下，括号法将错过与对超常信仰相关的社会过程中的自我欺骗和/或“非理性”元素。
For these reasons I question Collins and Pinch’s declaration that it “would make not one jot of difference to the analysis” (Collins & Pinch, 1982: 184) to know whether psychic phenomena are ‘real’ or not. Rather it seems to me that a bracketing approach does make particular ontological assumptions about reality that fundamentally shape the analysis and are often in conflict with the claims made by those being studied. 出于这些原因，我质疑柯林斯和平奇的声明，即知道超心理现象是否“真实”对分析“没有丝毫影响”（柯林斯和平奇，1982：184）。相反，在我看来，括号法确实对现实做出了特定的本体论假设，这些假设从根本上塑造了分析，并且常常与被研究者所提出的主张相冲突。
In general, I see such bias as unavoidable, for it is built into the very foundations of social analysis. The heart of the problem lies in the demarcation of socio-psychological reality as a sphere distinct from other kinds of realityparticularly from physical reality (Latour, 1993). In fact, it appears to be the case that intrinsic to any social analysis is the imposition of boundaries that define socio-psychological processes as distinct from natural-physical processes (and certainly as distinct from any supposed ‘supernormal’ processes). The construction of ontological difference lies therefore at the heart of the social scientific enterprise. Moreover, there is a fairly clear-cut division of labour that prevails in academia: natural reality is regarded as the province of the natural sciences, who are granted sole authority to define the attributes of the physical world; and what is not of nature is designated as the field of inquiry for the social sciences. ^(10){ }^{10} The only issue that seems to be in dispute with regard to this division is where natural reality ends and socio-psychological reality begins. 一般来说，我认为这种偏见是不可避免的，因为它根植于社会分析的基础之中。问题的核心在于将社会心理现实划分为与其他类型现实，特别是与物理现实不同的领域（Latour，1993）。事实上，任何社会分析中固有的特征是设定界限，以将社会心理过程定义为与自然物理过程不同（当然也与任何所谓的“超常”过程不同）。因此，本体差异的构建正是社会科学事业的核心。此外，学术界普遍存在一个相对明确的分工：自然现实被视为自然科学的领域，后者被授予定义物理世界属性的唯一权威；而非自然的事物则被指定为社会科学的研究领域。关于这种划分，唯一似乎存在争议的问题是自然现实的终结点和社会心理现实的起始点在哪里。
In most cases, analysts have followed the lead of orthodox scientists in delineating the boundary between the natural and the social. As sociologist Roy Wallis writes: “Sociologists maintained a deferential attitude towards prevailing scientific orthodoxy, accepting that in respect of the esoteric content of science, scientists knew best.” (Wallis, 1979: 5) ^(11){ }^{11} This deference is reflected in the way in which social scientists tend to treat established scientific ideas as ‘natural’ and supernormal ideas as ‘social’. Therefore, they have tended to exercise ‘selective relativism’ in their examination of supernormal ideas. With selective relativism only deviations from accepted knowledge are viewed as being socially constructed (and supernormal claims are usually seen to fit this category), whereas commonly accepted ‘facts’ about reality-defined within a Western scientific framework-are not (Latour, 1993: 105; Brown, 1995: 7). Sociologist Bruno Latour notes this relativistic bias in past analyses of supernormal ideas when he remarks: 在大多数情况下，分析师遵循正统科学家的领导，划定自然与社会之间的界限。正如社会学家罗伊·沃利斯所写：“社会学家对现有的科学正统持有一种尊重的态度，接受在科学的深奥内容方面，科学家最了解。”（沃利斯，1979：5）这种尊重反映在社会科学家倾向于将既定科学观念视为“自然”，而将超常观念视为“社会”的方式。因此，他们在审视超常观念时往往采取“选择性相对主义”。在选择性相对主义中，只有偏离公认知识的观点被视为社会构建的（而超常主张通常被视为符合这一类别），而在西方科学框架内定义的关于现实的普遍接受的“事实”则不被视为如此（拉图尔，1993：105；布朗，1995：7）。社会学家布鲁诺·拉图尔在评论超常观念的过去分析时指出了这种相对主义偏见：
It was certainly possible to analyze a belief in flying saucers, but not the knowledge of black holes; we could analyze the illusions of parapsychology, but not the knowledge of psychologists. (Latour, 1993: 92) 分析对飞碟的信仰当然是可能的，但分析黑洞的知识则不然；我们可以分析超心理学的幻觉，但无法分析心理学家的知识。(拉图尔, 1993: 92)
Anthropologist Greg Myers (1990) is critical of such selective approaches. He writes: 人类学家格雷格·迈尔斯（1990）对这种选择性的方法持批评态度。他写道：
One should use the same modes of explanation for belief in witchcraft or phrenology as for belief in electromagnetic waves or neuroendocrinology. The particular explanations behind these beliefs may, of course, be different, but one can’t say, in this approach, that the nineteenth-century public believed in phrenology for cultural reasons, whereas we believe in neuroendocrinology because it is true. (Myers, 1990: 20) 人们在解释对巫术或颅相学的信仰时，应使用与对电磁波或神经内分泌学的信仰相同的方式。当然，这些信仰背后的具体解释可能不同，但在这种方法中，人们不能说，十九世纪的公众是出于文化原因相信颅相学，而我们相信神经内分泌学是因为它是真实的。（迈尔斯，1990：20）
As a consequence of the questionable nature of such selectivity, some analysts have begun to urge a more radical form of relativism that does not privilege truth-claims made by scientists over others. ^(12){ }^{12} Sociologists Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch (1982) can be considered the principal advocates of this approach to the sociology of the paranormal. However, I would consider even their relativist position to constitute a distinct bias. On the one hand, they make a significant concession to parapsychologists in their study by treating their experiments (or some of them at least) as scientific and rational-a bias for which sociologists Michael Mulkay, Jonathan Potter, and Steven Yearley (1983) have criticised Collins and Pinch. On the other hand, whatever concession Collins and Pinch allow parapsychologists in terms of ‘scientific’ status, they tend to take away when they argue that empirical reality has no bearing on the content and form of scientific ideas. This is a radical application of the ‘underdetermined thesis’, which holds that any number of interpretations of a single ‘fact’ are possible (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983: 3) and thus universal factors do not determine the interpretations that people make. ^(13){ }^{13} 由于这种选择性的可疑性质，一些分析师开始呼吁一种更激进的相对主义形式，不再优先考虑科学家所提出的真理主张。社会学家哈里·柯林斯和特雷弗·平奇（1982）可以被视为这种超自然社会学方法的主要倡导者。然而，我认为即使他们的相对主义立场也构成了一种明显的偏见。一方面，他们在研究中对超心理学家做出了重大让步，将他们的实验（至少是其中一些）视为科学和理性的——这一偏见受到社会学家迈克尔·穆尔凯、乔纳森·波特和史蒂文·耶尔利（1983）的批评。另一方面，无论柯林斯和平奇在“科学”地位上给予超心理学家的任何让步，他们在论证经验现实与科学思想的内容和形式无关时，往往会收回这些让步。 这是对“欠确定论”的激进应用，该论点认为对单一“事实”可以有多种解释（Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983: 3），因此普遍因素并不决定人们所做的解释。 ^(13){ }^{13}
The perception that relativist approaches dismiss objective reality as a foundation of people’s knowledge prompted one paranormal enthusiast/ academic to discourage me from taking a ‘relativist’ or ‘postmodern’ approach in my own research into the politics surrounding paranormal ideas (Northcote, 2001). Such a perspective, he claimed, undermined any notion of paranormal claims having an empirical validity. The inference here seemed to be that he 相对主义方法被认为否定客观现实作为人们知识基础的看法，促使一位超自然现象爱好者/学者劝我在自己对超自然思想周围政治的研究中不要采取“相对主义”或“后现代”方法（Northcote, 2001）。他声称，这种观点削弱了超自然主张具有经验有效性的任何概念。这里的推论似乎是他
wanted paranormal ideas to be judged in the same way that scientific ideas are typically judged-that is as empirically valid. In other words, he did not want science to be demoted, but rather, paranormal research to be promoted. 希望超自然的想法能够以与科学想法通常被评判的方式相同的标准进行评判——即作为经验上有效的。换句话说，他并不希望科学被贬低，而是希望超自然研究得到提升。
We can see, therefore, that attempts by relativist theorists to dismiss the influence of the ‘natural world’ on social behaviour altogether does not represent a significant step towards constructing a ‘neutral’ position with regard to the study of supernormal ideas. In fact, I have come to accept that “in a postconstructivist world there are no neutral positions” (Hess, 1993: 155). 因此，我们可以看到，相对主义理论家试图完全否定“自然世界”对社会行为的影响，并不代表在研究超常思想时构建“中立”立场的重大进展。事实上，我已经接受了“在后建构主义的世界中没有中立立场”（Hess, 1993: 155）。
Towards a Reflexive, Dialogical Account of the Supernormal 朝向一种反思性、对话性的超常现象解释
Given my contention that ontological bias is unavoidable in bracketing approaches, we might wonder how social scientists who endeavour to present a fair-minded account of supernormal ideas can proceed in such circumstances. Firstly, in my opinion, it is possible for analysts to be both biased and fairminded in their accounts, as long as other ontological possibilities (particularly those that accord with the views of the people being studied) are described and given due respect. In this way a balance can be achieved between emic perspectives and analysts’ own positioned perspectives. In fact, a recognition and declaration of the analyst’s lack of neutrality and the inclusion of alternative positions and voices is, in my opinion, not only the best course for the analyst to take in order to produce a fair-minded account of the people being studied, but it also helps analysts and readers alike to understand better the assumptions underlying the positions of both the analyst and those being studied. What is required, in other words, is the exercise of reflexivity through a dialogical approach to social inquiry. 鉴于我认为本体偏见在括号方法中是不可避免的，我们可能会想知道，努力公正地呈现超常思想的社会科学家在这种情况下该如何进行。首先，在我看来，分析者在其叙述中可以既有偏见又保持公正，只要描述并给予其他本体可能性（特别是那些与被研究者观点一致的可能性）应有的尊重。通过这种方式，可以在内生视角和分析者自身的定位视角之间实现平衡。事实上，我认为，承认和声明分析者缺乏中立性，并纳入替代立场和声音，不仅是分析者为了产生公正叙述而采取的最佳途径，也有助于分析者和读者更好地理解分析者和被研究者立场背后的假设。换句话说，所需的是通过对话式的社会探究方法来进行反思性思考。
A reflexive approach to the study of paranormal enthusiasts is in fact precisely the path suggested by Hess, who proposes that the analyst’s own position should be subject to the same degree of critical examination that the positions of enthusiasts themselves are subject to. He states: 对超自然爱好者研究的反思性方法实际上正是赫斯所建议的路径，他提议分析者自身的立场应受到与爱好者自身立场相同程度的批判性审视。他指出：
I am advocating a form of reflexivity that goes beyond textual experimentation to a critique of the social, cultural, and political assumptions of both the discourse of the Self and that of the Other. (Hess, 1993: 155) 我提倡一种超越文本实验的反身性形式，旨在批判自我话语和他者话语的社会、文化和政治假设。（赫斯，1993：155）
Hess argues that reflexivity must not be restricted to purely epistemological and representational issues, but must encompass “a critique of the political and ideological assumptions of one’s own discursive community” (Hess, 1993: 156). The need to subject the analyst’s own position to critical scrutiny relates, I contend, to two issues: firstly, that analysts themselves are embedded within academic discourses that, as I have argued, are prone to certain biases; and secondly, that analysts-indeed, the entire scientific enterprise-are part of the wider culture and thus subject to the same ‘cultural politics’ as that which surrounds the controversy over supernormal ideas. ^(14){ }^{14} 赫斯认为，反身性不应仅限于纯粹的认识论和表征问题，而应包括“对自身话语共同体的政治和意识形态假设的批判”（赫斯，1993：156）。我认为，分析者自身立场需要接受批判性审视与两个问题有关：首先，分析者自身嵌入在学术话语中，正如我所论证的，这些话语容易产生某些偏见；其次，分析者——实际上，整个科学事业——是更广泛文化的一部分，因此也受到与超常思想争议相同的“文化政治”的影响。
The importance of reflexivity has also been emphasised by social theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas (1984) and Pierre Bourdieu (1977), who argue that through the exercise of reflexivity, ^(15){ }^{15} unquestioned ‘doxic’ elements can be exposed. However, these theorists proceed to the erroneous conclusion that the 反身性的重要性也得到了社会理论家们的强调，如尤尔根·哈贝马斯（1984 年）和皮埃尔·布迪厄（1977 年），他们认为通过反身性的运用，可以揭示出不容置疑的“教条”元素。然而，这些理论家得出了错误的结论，认为
influence of these unquestioned elements can be negated through bracketing. Habermas, for example, talks of a “hypothetical approach to phenomena and experiences”, which are “isolated from the complexity of their life-world contexts and analyzed under experimentally varied conditions” (Habermas, 1985: 206-207). However, as I have argued, it is naïve to think that any utterances can be isolated from the complexity of people’s ‘life-world’. This is because life-world assumptions not only underlie the conceptual frameworks through which ideas are expressed, but also the implicit rules that govern reflective thought and even the desire to engage in reflection in the first place. 这些不容置疑的元素的影响可以通过括号化来消除。例如，哈贝马斯谈到一种“对现象和经验的假设性方法”，这些现象和经验“与其生活世界背景的复杂性隔离，并在实验变化的条件下进行分析”（哈贝马斯，1985：206-207）。然而，正如我所论证的，认为任何言论可以与人们的“生活世界”的复杂性隔离是天真的。这是因为生活世界的假设不仅构成了表达思想的概念框架，还构成了支配反思思维的隐性规则，甚至是最初参与反思的愿望。
Such are the realisations made by ‘Foucaultian’ scholars, who focus on the way that all thought and practices-including self-critiques-are embedded in complex networks of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980). In fact, some theorists suggest that subtle, pre-existing biases and interests can obstruct a reflexive analysis to such a degree that analysts are not able to transcend their position in order to ‘objectively’ examine their biases at all. Steve Woolgar makes the point, for example, that the claims produced by a reflexive approach should rightly be subject to critique themselves, and so on, resulting in an ‘infinite regress’ (Woolgar, 1983: 254). 这样的认识是“福柯派”学者所做的，他们关注所有思想和实践（包括自我批评）是如何嵌入复杂的知识和权力网络中的（福柯，1980）。事实上，一些理论家建议，微妙的、先前存在的偏见和利益可能会阻碍反思性分析，以至于分析者无法超越自己的立场，完全“客观”地审视自己的偏见。例如，史蒂夫·伍尔加指出，反思性方法所产生的主张本身应该受到批评，等等，导致“无限回归”（伍尔加，1983：254）。
While I agree that it is not possible to transcend one’s bias to the point of neutrality, I hold that it is possible to be sufficiently aware of one’s bias-at least relationally (that is in relation to other ideas), if not objectively-that one can at least understand the limitations of one’s perspective. By recognising the partiality of his/her account in relation to alternative perspectives in this manner, the analyst can stake out the ontological assumptions that characterise his/her position (as much as their reflexive capacity allows) and proceed, somewhat experimentally, with what amounts to a positioned account. 虽然我同意超越个人偏见到达中立的状态是不可能的，但我认为至少在关系上（即与其他观点相关）能够充分意识到自己的偏见是可能的，甚至在某种程度上也能客观地理解自己观点的局限性。通过以这种方式认识到自己叙述的片面性与替代观点的关系，分析者可以明确出构成其立场的本体论假设（在其反思能力允许的范围内），并以一种实验性的方式继续进行相应的叙述。
In my view, the main problem with the types of analyses discussed above is not that the analysts conducting them adopt certain biased positions, but that they generally fail to present their analysis as a positioned one. Instead, the implication often is that theirs is a neutral treatment of the supernormal question. However, a declaration of one’s positioning constitutes the first step towards avoiding this problem, even if the study itself tends to undermine the ontological validity of participants’ positions or makes moral judgements about those positions. This is where reflexivity must be employed, not as a means of ridding social analysis of bias, but as a means of making the analyst’s own position overt. If such a ‘reflexive partiality’ is employed, the analyst should ideally be able to construct his/her account without any hidden agenda or false pretensions. 在我看来，上述分析类型的主要问题不在于进行分析的分析师持有某种偏见立场，而在于他们通常未能将自己的分析呈现为一种有立场的分析。相反，通常暗示他们对超常问题的处理是中立的。然而，声明自己的立场是避免这个问题的第一步，即使研究本身倾向于削弱参与者立场的本体有效性或对这些立场做出道德判断。在这里，反思性必须被运用，不是作为消除社会分析偏见的手段，而是作为使分析师自身立场显而易见的手段。如果采用这种“反思性偏见”，分析师理想情况下应该能够在没有任何隐性议程或虚假伪装的情况下构建自己的论述。
However, if all analytical positions are biased and all that is required of analysts is that they make their biases as explicit as possible, does this mean that analysts can take any position they please? Some analysts would answer in the affirmative. Social analyst Daniel Hodges (1974), for example, goes so far as to advocate an approach that openly incorporates assumptions about the supernatural, either positive or negative, into the analysis. Further, Hodges argues that the inclusion of various assumptions in the analysis serves to generate new propositions about the nature of belief. 然而，如果所有的分析立场都是有偏见的，而分析师所需做的只是尽可能明确他们的偏见，这是否意味着分析师可以随意采取任何立场？一些分析师会肯定地回答这个问题。例如，社会分析师丹尼尔·霍奇斯（1974）甚至主张一种方法，公开将关于超自然的假设（无论是积极的还是消极的）纳入分析。此外，霍奇斯认为，在分析中纳入各种假设有助于产生关于信仰本质的新命题。
Of course, there will be those who reject the incorporation of supernormal assumptions in social analysis. Anthropologist Jacques Maquet, for example, writes: 当然，也会有人拒绝在社会分析中纳入超常假设。例如，人类学家雅克·马凯特写道：
Anthropology is neither a spiritual path, nor a search for nonordinary powers; it is a discursive discipline of knowledge. The warrior’s quest and the sorcerer’s endeavour belong to other realms and thus cannot provide guidance for anthropology… (Maquet, 1978: 362) 人类学既不是一种精神道路，也不是对非凡力量的追求；它是一门知识的论述性学科。战士的追求和巫师的努力属于其他领域，因此无法为人类学提供指导……（Maquet, 1978: 362）
While Maquet seems to be setting limits in terms of where the experimental boundaries of social analysis lie, to me this seems a somewhat arbitrary matter, although one that I will leave for others to debate. At any rate, in my opinion, Hodges’s argument is not so much a call for radical experimentalism in social analysis as it is an affirmation of what analysis already is-namely, an experimental account that is based upon certain ontological assumptions that the analyst has made. I would stress, however, that I am not necessarily advocating that social analysts incorporate supernormal or sceptical assumptions in their mode of analysis, but rather that they understand that their own position could be just as biased and experimental as that taken by less ‘neutral’ theorists. 虽然 Maquet 似乎在设定社会分析的实验边界方面设定了限制，但在我看来，这似乎是一个有些任意的问题，尽管我会把这个问题留给其他人去辩论。无论如何，在我看来，霍奇斯的论点并不是对社会分析进行激进实验主义的呼吁，而是对分析本质的确认——即基于分析者所做的某些本体论假设的实验性叙述。然而，我要强调的是，我并不一定主张社会分析者在其分析模式中纳入超常或怀疑的假设，而是希望他们理解自己的立场可能与那些不那么“中立”的理论家一样有偏见和实验性。
Recognising the ‘bias’ of one’s position is only the first step in constructing a fair-minded account. The second step is to acknowledge the viewpoints of ‘insiders’ in the account. This has the effect of putting the analyst’s own position in perspective and providing some ‘balance’ between the analyst’s ‘etic’ perspective and insiders’ ‘emic’ perspectives. The inclusion of such emic perspectives constitutes the ‘dialogical’ aspect of analysis. ^(16){ }^{16} 认识到自己立场的“偏见”只是构建公正叙述的第一步。第二步是承认叙述中“内部人士”的观点。这有助于将分析者自身的立场放在一个更广阔的视角中，并在分析者的“外部”视角与内部人士的“内部”视角之间提供一些“平衡”。纳入这些内部视角构成了分析的“对话”方面。
Precisely what social analysts mean by a ‘dialogical’ account varies, ^(17){ }^{17} and can be taken to indicate such aspects as: (1) the dialogical manner in which data is gathered (for example, discussions and interviews with informants); (2) the dialogue between researcher and informants over the way in which data is collated and interpreted; (3) the dialogical form in which etic and emic views are presented in the account; and (4) the manner in which the final account ‘speaks’ to different positions (in terms of the assumptions and judgements the analyst makes about his/her own position and those of others). A dialogical approach that incorporates these various aspects can go a long way towards presenting the kind of ‘balanced’ account of the supernormal that I am recommending. I will now explain these points in a more detail. 社会分析家所说的“对话式”叙述的确切含义各不相同， ^(17){ }^{17} 可以指以下几个方面：(1) 收集数据的对话方式（例如，与信息提供者的讨论和访谈）；(2) 研究者与信息提供者之间关于数据整理和解释的对话；(3) 在叙述中呈现的外部视角和内部视角的对话形式；以及 (4) 最终叙述“对”不同立场的表达方式（就分析者对自己和他人立场的假设和判断而言）。一种包含这些不同方面的对话式方法可以在很大程度上呈现我所推荐的关于超常现象的“平衡”叙述。我将更详细地解释这些观点。
The first aspect-concerning the dialogical manner in which data is gathered-is important because it can help illuminate the view “from within” (as Berger puts it), for it is generally through talking to people that the analyst comes to understand alternative points of view (although in saying this, I do not mean to play down the importance of other fieldwork methods, such as participant-observation and the reading of folk narratives). The second aspectconcerning the dialogue between researcher and informant over the construction of the analysis-can be an important aid, not only in the effective design of ethnographies, surveys, and other research genres during the methodological phase, but also in evaluating the analyst’s findings from an insider perspective during the analytical phase. ^(18){ }^{18} The third aspect-concerning the dialogical form in which etic and emic views are presented within the account-is important in terms of offsetting the analyst’s own position against the positions of those being studied, so that the reader can easily discern between the analyst’s etic position and the insider’s emic position. ^(19){ }^{19} 第一方面——关于数据收集的对话方式——很重要，因为它有助于揭示“内部”的视角（正如伯杰所说），因为分析者通常通过与人交谈来理解替代观点（尽管这样说并不是要贬低其他田野研究方法的重要性，例如参与观察和阅读民间叙事）。第二个方面——关于研究者与信息提供者在分析构建上的对话——可以成为一个重要的帮助，不仅在方法论阶段有效设计民族志、调查和其他研究类型时，而且在分析阶段从内部视角评估分析者的发现时。第三个方面——关于在叙述中呈现外部视角和内部视角的对话形式——在抵消分析者自身立场与被研究者立场之间的关系时非常重要，以便读者能够轻松区分分析者的外部立场和内部视角。
Before I address the fourth aspect of dialogical analysis, I want to point out that I am fully aware that those social analysts who do not seek to explore 在我讨论对话分析的第四个方面之前，我想指出，我完全意识到那些不寻求探索的社会分析者
‘insider’ views on the supernormal in their studies might question the usefulness of incorporating the dialogical techniques outlined above. This is where the fourth, more general, aspect of dialogical analysis has relevance, because it emphasises the way that all accounts intrinsically ‘speak’ to alternative perspectives, even if what the analyst says does not explicitly address those perspectives or is principally intended for proponents of those perspectives. It is when the analyst is aware of this dialogical aspect of his/her account and this awareness is made manifest through acknowledgement of alternative perspectives (through the kinds of dialogical techniques outlined above) that the account can be framed in a more open-ended, rather than definitive, manner-or at least this is how the account will tend to be interpreted by its readers. “内部”视角对超常现象的研究可能会质疑上述对话技巧的实用性。这就是对话分析的第四个、更一般的方面相关的地方，因为它强调所有叙述本质上都“对话”于替代视角，即使分析者所说的内容并未明确涉及这些视角，或主要是针对这些视角的支持者。当分析者意识到其叙述的这种对话特性，并通过承认替代视角（通过上述对话技巧）使这种意识显现时，叙述就可以以一种更开放而非确定的方式进行框架构建——至少这就是读者倾向于解读该叙述的方式。
By acknowledging that alternative points of view exist, proponents are at least given some space for reply. The provision for this space is particularly important given the power wielded by social analysts, whose authority in society-particularly in comparison to that held by many ‘fringe’ proponents of supernormal ideas-is generally such that they can (and indeed, as I have indicated, often do) effectively invalidate the claims of proponents altogether. In a sense, I am suggesting that social analysts have an ethical responsibility to at least acknowledge alternative viewpoints in their studies because of the considerable authority that they hold in the wider society. 通过承认存在替代观点，支持者至少有一些回应的空间。考虑到社会分析师所拥有的权力，这种空间的提供尤为重要，社会分析师在社会中的权威——尤其是与许多“边缘”超常思想的支持者相比——通常如此之大，以至于他们可以（实际上，正如我所指出的，他们经常这样做）有效地完全否定支持者的主张。从某种意义上说，我建议社会分析师在他们的研究中至少承认替代观点，因为他们在更广泛的社会中拥有相当大的权威。
Conclusion 结论
The main aim in this paper has been to examine the bias that has characterised social analyses of supernormal ideas. I have argued that, due to the particular discursive orderings that underpin academic inquiry, most accounts produced by social analysts will inevitably reflect certain ontological biases and that even bracketing or relativist approaches are not immune to such problems. Given these difficulties, I have recommended, firstly, that analysts construct their positions reflexively; secondly, that they represent their work as a positioned experiment rather than as an objective, definitive account; and thirdly, that they view their accounts as something of a dialogue with alternative positionspositions that, as far as possible, are acknowledged within the account. I contend that it is only when such steps are taken that supernormal claims can be fairly represented in an analysis. 本文的主要目的是考察在超常观念的社会分析中所表现出的偏见。我认为，由于支撑学术研究的特定话语秩序，大多数社会分析者所产生的叙述不可避免地会反映出某些本体论偏见，即使是括号化或相对主义的方法也无法免于此类问题。鉴于这些困难，我建议，首先，分析者应反思性地构建自己的立场；其次，他们应将自己的工作视为一种有立场的实验，而不是客观、权威的叙述；第三，他们应将自己的叙述视为与替代立场之间的对话，这些替代立场在叙述中尽可能得到承认。我认为，只有采取这些步骤，超常主张才能在分析中得到公正的呈现。
Precisely how the recommendations I have suggested in this paper might be achieved in practice requires further discussion. For example, how could even the best intentioned ‘dialogical’ researcher take into account the multiplicity of perspectives that tend to exist on matters such as the supernormal, even within the confines of small groups or communities? Another issue is how much space is reasonable to reserve within the account for a discussion of insider perspectives in order to give them a fair hearing (particularly if the study does not principally set out to explore such perspectives). Is a paragraph or section in an article sufficient? Should a book set aside an entire chapter for this purpose? 如何在实践中实现我在本文中建议的建议需要进一步讨论。例如，即使是最有善意的“对话式”研究者如何考虑在超常现象等问题上存在的多种观点，即使在小组或社区的范围内也是如此？另一个问题是，在叙述中为讨论内部视角保留多少空间是合理的，以便给予它们公正的听取（特别是如果研究并不主要旨在探索这些视角）。文章中的一段或一节是否足够？一本书是否应该为此目的专门留出一个章节？
Clearly there are many issues to be considered regarding the manner in which, and the extent to which, a reflexive, dialogical treatment of supernormal perspectives might feature in analytical accounts. However, the recommendations I have put forward in this paper should serve as useful 显然，在分析性叙述中，关于超常视角的反思性、对话性处理的方式和程度有许多问题需要考虑。然而，我在本文中提出的建议应当作为有用的参考。
guidelines to the manner in which social analysts can go about constructing their accounts so that some form of inclusive dialogue can be achieved. 社会分析师构建其叙述的方式指南，以便实现某种形式的包容性对话。
As I have indicated in my discussion, the advantages of taking such an approach lie not only in the extension of charity to supernormal proponents, but also in the improved understanding it should give analysts regarding the ontological limits of the social scientific enterprise more generally. Indeed, I hold that the understanding that can be gained from such an approach has broad relevance to all facets of social inquiry and not just those areas dealing with supernormal ideas, for it can help illuminate the modus operandi upon which all social analysts engage their subject matter. 正如我在讨论中所指出的，采取这种方法的优势不仅在于对超常倡导者的慈善延伸，还在于它应能改善分析师对社会科学事业本体论限制的理解。实际上，我认为从这种方法中获得的理解对社会研究的所有方面都有广泛的相关性，而不仅仅是涉及超常思想的领域，因为它可以帮助阐明所有社会分析师处理其研究对象的运作方式。
In this respect, it is important to realise that the issues I have discussed here are not unique to the study of supernormal claims, for the problems of dealing fairly and accurately with emic perspectives and defining the relationship of social inquiry to ‘ultimate reality’ are two of the central issues that social analysts must deal with, whatever their area of study. Yet the areas of religion, the occult, and the paranormal present a particularly clear platform for addressing these issues, for they are arenas where some of the most basic ‘truths’ that underlie Western thought (including the social scientific enterprise itself) are contested in a relatively ‘raw’ fashion. They are arenas, therefore, that can expose the limits and excesses of knowledge-claims in a most transparent manner. 在这方面，重要的是要意识到我在这里讨论的问题并不是超常主张研究所特有的，因为公平和准确地处理内在视角以及定义社会研究与“终极现实”之间关系的问题，是社会分析者必须面对的两个核心问题，无论他们的研究领域是什么。然而，宗教、神秘学和超自然现象的领域为解决这些问题提供了一个特别清晰的平台，因为这些领域是一些最基本的“真理”在相对“原始”的方式中受到质疑的场所，这些真理构成了西方思想的基础（包括社会科学事业本身）。因此，这些领域能够以最透明的方式揭示知识主张的局限性和过度。
Rather than shying away from these thorny issues, social analysts studying supernormal claims could take the opportunity to enrich their analyses through an active engagement with these issues, even if they risk undermining the foundations of their own inquiry. Recognising that social analysis is fundamentally dialogical in character rather than a ‘neutral’ inquiry represents, I contend, the first step towards such an engagement. 社会分析师在研究超常主张时，不应回避这些棘手问题，而应借此机会通过积极参与这些问题来丰富他们的分析，即使这可能会危及他们自己研究的基础。我认为，认识到社会分析本质上是对话性的，而不是“中立”的探究，代表了这种参与的第一步。
Dr. Jeremy Northcote completed a B.A. at the University of Western Australia in 1993 and a B.A. (Hons) degree at Curtin University of Technology in 1994. In 2001, he completed his Ph.D. thesis, “The Paranormal and the Politics of Truth”, at Murdoch University. He is currently carrying out research into the ‘politics’ of chronographic practices of ancient Jewish religious writers. CORRESPONDENCE: 11 Silverton Ave, Butler W.A. 6036, Australia, e-mail: jnorthct@hotmail.com 杰里米·诺思科特博士于 1993 年在西澳大利亚大学获得文学学士学位，并于 1994 年在科廷科技大学获得荣誉文学学士学位。2001 年，他在默多克大学完成了博士论文《超自然与真相的政治》。他目前正在研究古代犹太宗教作家的年代学实践的“政治”。通讯地址：澳大利亚，巴特勒，银顿大道 11 号，邮政编码 6036，电子邮件：jnorthct@hotmail.com
NOTES 笔记
Examples of ‘open’ scepticism can be seen in the work of Marvin Harris (1974) and James Lett (1991). “开放”怀疑主义的例子可以在马文·哈里斯（1974 年）和詹姆斯·莱特（1991 年）的作品中看到。
A good recent example of such reductionism is the sociological account of crashed saucer beliefs by Saler, Ziegler and Moore (1997). See Northcote, 1999. 一个最近的好例子是 Saler、Ziegler 和 Moore（1997）对飞碟坠毁信仰的社会学解释。见 Northcote，1999。
This is in contrast to some sceptical comments Evans-Pritchard made earlier in his career in his 1976 [1937] study, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande, in which he stated that “Witches, as Azande conceive them, cannot exist” (Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 18). As anthropologist Basil Sansom suggested to me at an ethnographic forum (in Fremantle, Perth, May 1998), where I presented an early draft of this paper, Evans-Pritchard’s earlier work on Azande magical and supernatural beliefs may have been influenced by the more atheistic Oxford school, while his later work on Nuer religion (1956) came under the influence of Robertson-Smith and the divinity scholars at Cambridge, who held that primitive beliefs were ‘refractions of divinity’ (Sansom, 1998, personal communication). 这与埃文斯-普里查德在他职业生涯早期所做的一些怀疑性评论形成对比，他在 1976 年[1937]的研究《阿赞德人的巫术、神谕和魔法》中指出：“阿赞德人所理解的巫师是无法存在的”（埃文斯-普里查德，1976：18）。正如人类学家巴兹尔·桑索姆在 1998 年 5 月我在弗里曼特尔（珀斯）的一次民族志论坛上向我提出的，当时我展示了这篇论文的早期草稿，埃文斯-普里查德早期关于阿赞德人魔法和超自然信仰的研究可能受到更无神论的牛津学派的影响，而他后来的关于努尔宗教的研究（1956）则受到罗伯逊-史密斯和剑桥的神性学者的影响，他们认为原始信仰是“神性的折射”（桑索姆，1998，个人通讯）。
Watson uses the example of the Azande’s belief in witchcraft, which Evans-Pritchard studied in his famous (1976) monograph. In his discussion, Watson makes the telling point that “To the Azande, witches are as real as express trains are to me” (Watson, 1991: 83). 沃森以阿赞德人对巫术的信仰为例，这一信仰是埃文斯-普里查德在他著名的（1976 年）专著中研究的。在他的讨论中，沃森指出了一个重要的观点：“对阿赞德人来说，巫师就像对我来说特快列车一样真实”（沃森，1991 年：83）。
‘Judgmental relativism’ is to be understood in contrast to ‘epistemic relativism’, which sociologists Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay distinguish as follows: “Epistemic relativism asserts that knowledge is rooted in a particular time and culture. … On the other hand, judgmental relativism appears to make the additional claims that all forms of knowledge are ‘equally valid’, and that we cannot compare different forms of knowledge and discriminate among them.” (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983: 5) “判断相对主义”应与“认识相对主义”相对照理解，社会学家卡琳·克诺尔-切蒂纳和迈克尔·穆尔凯对此作出了如下区分：“认识相对主义主张知识根植于特定的时间和文化……另一方面，判断相对主义似乎还提出了额外的主张，即所有形式的知识都是‘同样有效的’，而且我们无法比较不同形式的知识并对其进行区分。”（克诺尔-切蒂纳与穆尔凯，1983：5）
See, for example, the defence mounted by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1987) against criticism of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Catholic Church. The ‘headship’ exercised by bishops is, they claim, consistent with (and is in fact directly descended from) the authority Jesus Christ gave to his apostles. 例如，参见天主教主教全国会议（1987 年）对天主教教会教阶批评的辩护。他们声称，主教所行使的“领导权”与耶稣基督赋予其使徒的权威是一致的（实际上是直接源自于此）。
Max Weber defines ‘charismatic authority’ as the authority recognised in leaders who are seen to be “holders of special gifts of the body and spirit”-gifts that are “believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody” (Weber, 1991: 245). 马克斯·韦伯将“魅力权威”定义为在被视为“拥有特殊身体和精神天赋”的领导者中被认可的权威——这些天赋被“认为是超自然的，不是每个人都能获得的”（韦伯，1991：245）。
The authority that sectarian leaders possess can also be validated in a more direct manner by alleged supernormal factors. It may be proclaimed, for example, by a particular revelation, message or prophecy. 宗教领袖所拥有的权威也可以通过所谓的超常因素以更直接的方式得到验证。例如，可以通过特定的启示、信息或预言来宣称。
This perspective is one of the central ideas developed in James Redfield’s (1994) best-selling ‘New Age’ novel, The Celestine Prophecy. 这一观点是詹姆斯·雷德菲尔德（1994）畅销的“新时代”小说《塞勒斯廷预言》中发展出的核心思想之一。
As sociologist Barry Barnes puts it, “Culture can explain only what nature does not explain” (Barnes, 1983: 34). 正如社会学家巴里·巴恩斯所说：“文化只能解释自然无法解释的事物”（巴恩斯，1983：34）。
Wallis adds: “To question the ‘scientific method’ was to undermine the foundation upon which one’s own argument was built.” (Wallis, 1979: 5) 沃利斯补充道：“质疑‘科学方法’就是在削弱自己论点所建立的基础。”（沃利斯，1979：5）
Such a perspective has become more tenable in recent decades, partly as a result of the doubt cast on the positivistic basis of scientific knowledge by philosophers, such as Popper, Lakatos, and-more vigorously-by Kuhn and Feyerabend (Wallis, 1979; Dolby, 1979). 这种观点在最近几十年变得更加可行，部分原因是哲学家们对科学知识的实证主义基础提出了质疑，例如波普尔、拉卡托斯，以及更为激烈的库恩和费耶拉本德（Wallis, 1979; Dolby, 1979）。
Less radical applications of the underdetermined thesis propose that ‘facts’ do influence interpretation to some degree, but are still culturally mediated. As such, although they will produce different interpretations, they will not be ones that are independent of an external reality. Social analyst Sergio Sismondo (1996: 108) refers to this less radical approach as ‘perspectivalism’. 较不激进的未确定论应用提出，“事实”在某种程度上确实影响解释，但仍然受到文化的调节。因此，尽管它们会产生不同的解释，但这些解释并不独立于外部现实。社会分析家塞尔吉奥·西斯蒙多（1996: 108）将这种较不激进的方法称为“视角主义”。
Similarly, social analyst Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued: “I contend that the internal tropes of anthropology matter much less than the larger discursive field within which anthropology operates and upon whose existence it is premised. A cultural critique of anthropology requires a historicization of that entire field.” (Trouillot, 1991: 17) 同样，社会分析家米歇尔-罗尔夫·特鲁伊洛特曾辩称：“我认为，人类学的内部隐喻远不如人类学所运作的更大话语领域重要，而人类学的存在正是基于这一领域的存在。对人类学的文化批判需要对整个领域进行历史化。”（特鲁伊洛特，1991：17）
The notion of reflexivity that Habermas has in mind is one that is intersubjectively produced through mutual critique, in contrast to the Kantian notion of self-reflection exercised by the individual (see Habermas, 1974: 144-145). 哈贝马斯所指的反身性概念是通过相互批评而产生的主体间性，与康德所提到的个体自我反思的概念形成对比（见哈贝马斯，1974：144-145）。
In fact, social theorist Jürgen Habermas argues that it is only through dialogue or “communicative action” that reflexive insight can be achieved (Habermas, 1974: 144-145). 事实上，社会理论家尤尔根·哈贝马斯认为，只有通过对话或“交际行动”，才能实现反思性洞察（哈贝马斯，1974：144-145）。
See, for example, Dennis Tedlock (1979), James Clifford (1983), and Elaine Lawless (1992) for various formulations of what constitutes a ‘dialogical’ mode of social analysis. 例如，参见丹尼斯·泰德洛克（1979 年）、詹姆斯·克利福德（1983 年）和伊莱恩·劳利斯（1992 年）对“对话”社会分析模式的各种表述。
Such a dialogue between researcher and informant has been recommended by ethnographers, such as Jeff Titon (1988), Elaine Lawless (1992), Joke Schrijvers (1995), and Luke Lassiter (2001). Elaine Lawless, for example, remarks that she came to value such an approach after experiencing some fundamental disagreements with one of her informants over certain key interpretations in her study, Handmaidens of the Lord: Pentecostal Women Preachers and Traditional Religion (1988). In one disagreement that is particularly relevant to the present discussion, Lawless concluded that her informant, a female preacher, had a great deal of inner strength that Lawless attributed to personal factors. This contradicted her informant’s claim that her strength derived from God—a claim that the feminist-oriented Lawless viewed as “self-denial” (Lawless, 1992: 304). 这样的研究者与信息提供者之间的对话已被民族志学者推荐，例如杰夫·提顿（1988 年）、伊莱恩·劳利斯（1992 年）、约克·施赖弗斯（1995 年）和卢克·拉西特（2001 年）。例如，伊莱恩·劳利斯指出，在与她的一位信息提供者在她的研究《主的女仆：五旬节女性传教士与传统宗教》（1988 年）中的某些关键解释上发生根本分歧后，她开始重视这种方法。在一个与当前讨论特别相关的分歧中，劳利斯得出结论，她的信息提供者，一位女性传教士，拥有很强的内在力量，而劳利斯将这种力量归因于个人因素。这与她的信息提供者声称的力量源于上帝的说法相矛盾——这一说法被以女性主义为导向的劳利斯视为“自我否定”（劳利斯，1992 年：304）。
I have left the question open of whether such a dialogical format should reproduce an actual, ‘historical’ dialogue between the analyst and his/her informants (as recommended by Dennis Tedlock, 1979) or whether it should offer an ‘improvised’ dialogue involving a plurality of voices that aims to evoke rather than to represent (as recommended by Stephen Tyler, 1987). The 我对这种对话格式是否应该再现分析师与其信息提供者之间的实际“历史”对话（正如丹尼斯·泰德洛克在 1979 年所建议的）或是否应该提供一种涉及多种声音的“即兴”对话，旨在唤起而非再现（正如斯蒂芬·泰勒在 1987 年所建议的）这个问题保持开放。
debate over which format is preferable largely revolves around the issue of whether or not ethnographic writing can validly function as a form of ‘mimesis’ (see Pool, 1991). 关于哪种格式更可取的辩论主要围绕着民族志写作是否可以有效地作为一种“模仿”的形式这一问题（见 Pool，1991）。
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