How to Use and Misuse History in Cold War II With China
如何在第二次对华冷战中利用和误用历史
Eight examples — from the triumphs of populism to failures of economics — show how analyzing past experience can improve your forecasting and decision-making.
从民粹主义的胜利到经济学的失败，八个实例展示了分析过去的经验如何改善您的预测和决策。
Herodotus knew how to use history.
Source: Hulton Archive/Getty Images
希罗多德懂得如何利用历史。资料来源：Hulton Archive/Getty Images赫顿档案馆/盖蒂图片社
“Men learn from history only how to make new mistakes.” That line by the great English historian A.J.P. Taylor once very much depressed me. In 1981, I applied to study modern history at Oxford precisely to learn lessons from the past. It was rather crushing to be advised by a scholar whom I idolized that this was a futile enterprise.
"人们从历史中学到的只是如何犯新的错误"。伟大的英国历史学家泰勒（A.J.P. Taylor）的这句话曾让我非常沮丧。1981 年，我申请到牛津大学学习现代史，正是为了从过去的历史中吸取教训。一位我崇拜的学者告诉我，这是一项徒劳无益的事业。
Taylor was only half right. Yes, most of those policymakers who purport to be learning from history are doing so in such a slapdash way that they are almost guaranteed to make new mistakes. A good illustration of this was the jumble of terrible historical analogies bandied about between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, by applying historical knowledge rigorously to contemporary problems, we can do better. The devil is in the details of how exactly one goes about this.
泰勒只说对了一半。是的，那些声称要以史为鉴的政策制定者中的大多数人都是在以如此草率的方式进行学习，以至于他们几乎肯定会犯下新的错误。一个很好的例证就是，在 9/11 恐怖袭击和入侵伊拉克之间，人们胡乱地进行着可怕的历史类比。然而，通过将历史知识严格地应用于当代问题，我们可以做得更好。魔鬼就在具体如何去做的细节中。
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Looking back over more than a dozen years of trying to learn from history for a living, I offer the following eight lessons. Disclaimer: While I use more than the usual number of first-person pronouns below, it’s hard to avoid when trying to assess how effective my use of history has been. I’m as interested in what I got wrong as what I got right.
回顾十多年来以史为鉴的经历，我总结出以下八条经验。免责声明：虽然我在下文中使用的第一人称代词超过了通常的数量，但在试图评估我对历史的使用效果时，这是难以避免的。我对自己的错误和正确同样感兴趣。
Lesson 1: We have passed from the “foothills” to the “mountain passes” of Cold War II.
第一课：我们已从第二次冷战的 "山麓 "进入 "山口"。
At Bloomberg’s New Economy Forum in Beijing in November 2019, I asked Henry Kissinger the question: “Are we in a new Cold War, this time with China?” His reply is justly famous: “We are in the foothills of a cold war.” The following year, he raised that to “mountain passes” of a cold war. In an interview we did in late 2022, he went even further, telling me that the second cold war would be even more dangerous than the first.
在2019年11月于北京举行的彭博新经济论坛上 我向亨利-基辛格提出了一个问题"我们是否正处于一场新的冷战中，这次是与中国的冷战？"他的回答名不虚传："我们正处于冷战的山脚下"。次年，他又将其提升为冷战的 "山口"。在 2022 年底的一次采访中，他更进一步告诉我，第二次冷战将比第一次冷战更加危险。
For me, this was vindication. After all, who was better qualified to recognize a cold war than Henry Kissinger, who had spent eight years orchestrating the US policy of détente with the Soviet Union? And who was less likely to overstate the deterioration of US-China relations? After all, one of his greatest historic achievements had been to begin the process of establishing diplomatic communications between Washington and the People’s Republic.
对我来说，这就是平反。毕竟，亨利-基辛格曾花了八年时间策划美国与苏联的缓和政策，谁能比他更有资格承认冷战？还有谁比他更不会夸大中美关系的恶化呢？毕竟，他最大的历史性成就之一就是开启了华盛顿与中华人民共和国之间建立外交沟通的进程。
Today, the idea of Cold War II is fast becoming conventional wisdom. David Sanger of the New York Times has a new book out with the title New Cold Wars. The first part of Dmitri Alperovitch’s World on the Brink is “Cold War II, a New Era.” How did the lessons of history bring me so early to this party?
如今，"冷战二 "的观点正迅速成为传统智慧。纽约时报》的戴维-桑格（David Sanger）出版了一本新书，书名为《新冷战》。德米特里-阿尔佩罗维奇《濒临崩溃的世界》的第一部分是 "第二次冷战，一个新时代"。历史的教训怎么会让我这么早就来到这个聚会？
Insight came in a series of stages. The first was to understand the true nature of President Xi Jinping’s regime, and to see that his strategy for reasserting the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party over an increasingly unruly society would include the first overt assertion of Chinese economic and military power since the time of Mao. This was a sea change from Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strength and bide your time.”
洞察力是分一系列阶段产生的。首先是了解习近平主席政权的真实性质，并认识到他的战略是重新确立中国共产党对日益躁动不安的社会的主导地位，其中包括自毛泽东时代以来首次公开宣示中国的经济和军事实力。这与邓小平的 "隐藏实力，韬光养晦 "大相径庭。
Stage 2 was to see in 2018 that President Donald Trump’s initial trade war against China was evolving into a tech war — and more. I vividly remember a world map highlighting which countries were buying Huawei’s 5G hardware and which had banned it precisely because it was so obviously a cold war map of two blocs, with a third group of non-aligned countries. Another epiphany was realizing with amazement that in 2018 China spent more money on imported semiconductors than on imported oil.
第二阶段是在2018年看到唐纳德-特朗普总统最初对中国发动的贸易战正在演变成一场技术战--而且还不止于此。我清楚地记得一张世界地图，上面突出显示了哪些国家购买了华为的 5G 硬件，哪些国家禁止了华为的 5G 硬件，正是因为这张地图是如此明显地由两个集团组成的冷战地图，还有第三组不结盟国家。另一个顿悟是惊奇地发现，2018 年中国花在进口半导体上的钱比进口石油还多。
The escalation to full cold war was exemplified by Vice President Mike Pence’s remarkable speech to the Hudson Institute that October:
副总统迈克-彭斯当年 10 月在哈德逊研究所发表的重要讲话体现了冷战的全面升级：
Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence. … Chinese security agencies have masterminded the wholesale theft of American technology — including cutting-edge military blueprints. … China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies. But they will fail.
北京正在采用一种整体政府方法，利用政治、经济和军事工具以及宣传来推进其影响力。......中国安全机构策划了大规模窃取美国技术--包括尖端军事蓝图。......中国只想把美国从西太平洋挤出去，并试图阻止我们援助我们的盟友。但他们将失败。
Stage 3 was the insight that this reaction against China was to be bipartisan — the exception that proved the rule of partisan polarization on every other issue.
第三阶段是洞察到这种针对中国的反应将是两党的--这是一个例外，证明了在其他所有问题上党派两极分化的规律。
This cold war, like the last one, is partly ideological, not least because Xi made it so by explicitly hailing a Marxist-Leninist “struggle for a new era” against corrupt Western notions such as the rule of law. Like the last cold war, the current one is also partly technological but extending beyond nuclear missiles and satellites to include hypersonic missiles, drone swarms, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.
这场冷战与上一场冷战一样，部分原因在于意识形态，尤其是因为习近平明确号召马列主义 "奋进新时代"，反对法治等腐朽的西方理念。与上一次冷战一样，当前的冷战也有一部分是技术性的，但已超越核导弹和卫星的范畴，包括高超音速导弹、无人机群、人工智能和量子计算。
It is economic, too, with two profoundly different economic systems competing over not only semiconductors but also solar cells, batteries and electric vehicles. The US floods the world in dollars; China floods the world in hardware.
这也是经济问题，两种截然不同的经济体系不仅在半导体领域，而且在太阳能电池、蓄电池和电动汽车领域展开竞争。美国以美元充斥全球，中国则以硬件充斥全球。
And, like Cold War I, Cold War II is a classically geopolitical contest over particular territories and seas, notably Taiwan and the South China Sea, as well as the vast regions China sought to tie to Beijing with its One Belt One Road and “safe cities” surveillance initiatives.
与第一次冷战一样，第二次冷战也是对特定领土和海域的经典地缘政治争夺，尤其是台湾和南海，以及中国试图通过 "一带一路 "和 "安全城市 "监控计划将其与北京联系在一起的广大地区。
Lesson 2: Politics > economics.
第 2 课：政治 > 经济。
One reason that some were slow to discern the drift to a new cold war was that it seemed economically irrational from the point of view of a “Washington consensus” that for years had prioritized free trade, global capital flows and open borders, not to forget the wishful thought that greater economic integration between the US and China would magically lead to political liberalization in the latter.
一些人之所以迟迟没有发现新冷战的苗头，一个原因是，从 "华盛顿共识 "的角度来看，这似乎在经济上是不合理的，因为多年来，"华盛顿共识 "一直将自由贸易、全球资本流动和开放边界放在首位，更不用说人们一厢情愿地认为，中美两国加强经济融合会神奇地导致后者的政治自由化。
The tendency to elevate economics above politics often leads pundits into error. An early example of this was the widespread belief that the European Monetary Union (EMU) would fall apart in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-09, especially when it became apparent that the Greeks had been egregiously understating their public-sector deficit. I was emotionally attracted to the breakup of the euro area, as I had been against the idea of monetary union in the 1990s. Part of me wanted the euro to blow up just for me to be right. But that wasn’t the right call.
将经济凌驾于政治之上的倾向往往会让学者们陷入误区。早期的一个例子是，人们普遍认为欧洲货币联盟（EMU）会在2008-09年全球金融危机后解体，尤其是当希腊人明显低估了其公共部门赤字时。欧元区的解体在感情上吸引了我，因为我曾在 20 世纪 90 年代反对过货币联盟的想法。我希望欧元区解体，以证明我是对的。但这并不是正确的决定。
However sub-optimal EMU might be as a currency area, it still made political sense for both the Germans and the countries on the periphery because the former got a weaker exchange rate than they would otherwise have had, and the latter got lower interest rates. If the Germans went back to the mark, their country would become Switzerland; if the Greeks went back to the drachma, they would become Argentina. Voters would not enjoy these outcomes.
无论欧洲货币联盟作为一个货币区是多么次优，它对德国人和外围国家来说仍然具有政治意义，因为前者获得了比原来更弱的汇率，后者获得了更低的利率。如果德国人回到马克，他们的国家就会变成瑞士；如果希腊人回到德拉克马，他们就会变成阿根廷。选民不会喜欢这些结果。
Thus, when the German Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schaüble declared, “The euro zone can survive a Greek exit,” it seemed clear he was either bluffing or holding an erroneous view that he would soon have to abandon.
因此，当德国财政部长沃尔夫冈-舍布尔宣称 "希腊退出欧元区后欧元区仍能生存 "时，很明显他要么是在虚张声势，要么是持有一种他很快就不得不放弃的错误观点。
Conversely, I understood from an early stage that economic interdependence between the US and China would not prevent a drift toward cold war. If anything, it was asymmetric interdependence that led to Cold War II. China’s share of the total US trade deficit peaked at 48% in 2015. It wasn’t hard to understand why sentiment toward China began to sour during President Barack Obama’s second term. The economic payoffs of “Chimerica” were too asymmetrically in China’s favor as manufacturing jobs were sucked from the US heartland to Shenzhen and Chongqing. Predictably, the percentage of Americans who had an unfavorable view of China rose from 35% in 2002 to 52% in 2013 to 82% in 2022.
相反，我很早就明白，中美之间的经济相互依存并不能阻止冷战的发生。如果说，正是不对称的相互依存导致了第二次冷战。2015年，中国在美国贸易逆差总额中所占份额达到48%的峰值。这也就不难理解为什么在美国总统奥巴马的第二任期内，对中国的情绪开始变坏。随着制造业工作岗位从美国中心地带被吸入深圳和重庆，"嵌合体 "的经济回报过于不对称地对中国有利。可以预见的是，对中国持不利看法的美国人比例从2002年的35%上升到2013年的52%，再到2022年的82%。
Lesson 3: Populism is potent.
第三课：民粹主义是强大的。
However, what many of us missed in 2016 was that the populist backlash would shatter the liberal or centrist political establishments, first in Britain, then in the US, as well as in countries as different as Brazil and India. As a committed Remainer, I was decidedly wrong on Brexit (though I course-corrected thereafter and called Trump’s victory in November).
然而，我们许多人在2016年错过的是，民粹主义的反弹将打破自由主义或中间派的政治体制，首先是在英国，然后是在美国，以及巴西和印度等不同国家。作为一名坚定的留欧派，我在英国脱欧问题上明显错了（不过我随后进行了修正，并预测特朗普将在11月获胜）。
Why the bad call on Brexit, when there was ample historical reason to think the English would choose a costly divorce over slow absorption into a continental federation? The answer, looking back, is that I became too personally engaged, actively campaigning for Remain, and lost the dispassionate spirit that is a prerequisite for learning from history. I was right that the economic costs of Brexit would exceed the benefits but wrong to think that this would be decisive in the minds of English voters. The mistake was to underestimate the appeal of unserious arguments such as, “Brexit will work because we’ll get a great free-trade deal with the US.” This was patently delusional, but populism is partly the politics of delusion.
既然有充分的历史理由认为英国人会选择代价高昂的离婚，而不是缓慢地融入欧洲大陆联邦，为什么在英国脱欧问题上却做出了错误的决定？现在回过头来看，答案是我过于个人化，积极为英国脱欧奔走呼号，失去了从历史中吸取教训的冷静精神。我认为英国脱欧的经济成本将超过收益，这一点是对的，但我错误地认为这将在英国选民心中起到决定性作用。我的错误在于低估了 "脱欧将会成功，因为我们将与美国达成一项伟大的自由贸易协议 "等不严肃论调的吸引力。这显然是痴心妄想，但民粹主义在一定程度上就是痴心妄想的政治。
Lesson 4: A pandemic of a highly contagious respiratory virus is a big deal, even if most of the fatalities are seniors.
第 4 课：高传染性呼吸道病毒大流行是一件大事，即使死亡的大多数是老年人。
That wasn’t obvious to many people in January 2020, but that was because very few people had studied the 1918-19 Spanish influenza pandemic, just over a century before, and no living person could remember it. My early warning is here. Sometimes learning from history involves nothing harder than knowing the basics about low-frequency, high-impact disasters such as plagues.
在 2020 年 1 月，很多人并不清楚这一点，但那是因为很少有人研究过一个多世纪前的 1918-19 年西班牙流感大流行，也没有人记得那场大流行。我的预警就在这里。有时，从历史中汲取教训的难度不亚于了解瘟疫等低频率、高影响灾难的基本知识。
Lesson 5: Tariffs, plus talk of decoupling, plus fiscal excess, is likely to be inflationary.
教训 5：关税加上脱钩言论，再加上财政过剩，很可能会引发通货膨胀。
Which Federal Reserve chair does Jerome Powell more closely resemble — Paul Volcker or his predecessor, Arthur Burns? Volcker triumphed over the inflation that Burns had allowed to surge in the 1970s. Powell would like to be remembered as a second Volcker but remains in danger of being remembered as Burns 2.0.
杰罗姆-鲍威尔更像保罗-沃尔克还是他的前任阿瑟-伯恩斯？沃尔克战胜了伯恩斯在 20 世纪 70 年代允许激增的通货膨胀。鲍威尔希望被人们记住的是第二个沃尔克，但仍有可能被人们记住的是伯恩斯 2.0。
That there would be an inflation problem in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic was not difficult to foresee. Fiscal stimulus ought to have been curtailed after efficacious vaccines were rapidly discovered and deployed. Instead, the Biden administration poured kerosene on the barbecue with a third stimulus package, while the Fed looked the other way. It is astonishing how few economists agreed with former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers when, in February 2021, he correctly predicted an inflation breakout. This was elementary macroeconomics.
我们不难预见，在 Covid-19 大流行之后会出现通货膨胀问题。在迅速发现并部署有效疫苗之后，本应减少财政刺激。相反，拜登政府却在烧烤架上浇上了煤油，推出了第三个刺激计划，而美联储却视而不见。2021 年 2 月，前财政部长拉里-萨默斯（Larry Summers）正确预测了通胀爆发，但令人惊讶的是，很少有经济学家同意他的观点。这是基本的宏观经济学。
It has been much more difficult to predict the consequences of the interest rate increases since the Fed woke up to its responsibilities in 2022. I was one of those who argued that the impact of higher real rates on leveraged players would ultimately be not only disinflationary but also recessionary. To date, that recession has not materialized, arguably because fiscal policy has remained expansionary and because higher rates have not translated into tighter financial conditions.
自从美联储在 2022 年意识到自己的责任以来，预测加息的后果就变得困难得多。我曾认为，提高实际利率对杠杆参与者的影响最终不仅会导致通货紧缩，还会导致经济衰退。迄今为止，经济衰退并未出现，这可以说是因为财政政策仍然是扩张性的，而且利率的提高并未转化为金融条件的收紧。
Lesson 6: In a cold war, you should expect multiple proxy wars.
教训 6：在冷战中，你应该预料到会有多场代理战争。
With the expert help of my former student and colleague Chris Miller, I saw the Russian invasion of Ukraine coming when that was very far from consensus in early 2022. Readers of this column were provided with two valuable analogies to help think about the war. While the median pundit whipsawed from “Putin will topple Zelenskiy in days” to “Heroic Ukraine will win in no time,” in March 2022 I (along with my Bloomberg Opinion colleague James Stavridis) pointed to the 1939-40 Winter War, in which Finland started strongly only to be ground down by the sheer scale of the Soviet Red Army. The other parallel was the 1950-53 Korean War — the first hot war of Cold War I — which opened with a year of huge maneuvers only to degenerate into grinding attrition in years two and three.
在我以前的学生和同事克里斯-米勒（Chris Miller）的专业帮助下，我在 2022 年初还远未达成共识时就预见到了俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵。本专栏的读者可以通过两个有价值的类比来思考这场战争。2022 年 3 月，当一般的专家学者从 "普京将在数天内推翻泽连斯基 "到 "英雄的乌克兰将很快获胜 "时，我（与彭博观点栏目的同事詹姆斯-斯塔夫里迪斯）指出了 1939-40 年冬季战争，在这场战争中，芬兰开局强劲，但最终被规模庞大的苏联红军击溃。另一场类似的战争是 1950-53 年的朝鲜战争--冷战时期的第一场热战--这场战争以一年的大规模演习拉开序幕，但在第二年和第三年却陷入了惨烈的消耗战。
The implication of the former analogy is that, without sustained Western aid, Ukraine is doomed to defeat. The implication of the latter is that there will be an armistice in 2025, which will leave Russia still controlling Donbas and much of its “land bridge” to Crimea. But an armistice is no peace, and Ukraine’s eastern border will become like South Korea’s northern one: a nasty, dangerous place.
前一个比喻的含义是，如果没有西方的持续援助，乌克兰注定要失败。后者的含义是，2025 年将会停战，俄罗斯仍将控制顿巴斯及其通往克里米亚的大部分 "陆桥"。但停战并不意味着和平，乌克兰的东部边境将变得像韩国的北部边境一样：一个肮脏、危险的地方。
Lesson 7: If Cold War II is here, proxy wars are continuing, and the economy might yet slow, then you probably shouldn’t underestimate Trump’s chances in 2024.
第七课：如果冷战二期已经到来，代理人战争仍在继续，经济可能还会放缓，那么你可能就不应该低估特朗普在 2024 年的机会。
I’ll leave the political commentary to others, but the latest swing state polling speaks for itself.
政治评论留给别人去说吧，但最新的摇摆州民调结果不言自明。
Lesson 8: Don’t bet against US technological leadership.
第八课：不要与美国的技术领先地位打赌。
I can’t believe I ever thought that China would win the artificial intelligence race with the US, but I did, along with many people with greater expertise, and that was just stupid. I underestimated the extent to which reliance on foreign suppliers for the most sophisticated semiconductors was China’s Achilles’ heel, just as the Soviets could compete on nukes but not semis — a key point in Miller’s outstanding book Chip War.
我不敢相信自己曾认为中国会在人工智能竞赛中战胜美国，但我确实这么想了，还有很多更专业的人也这么想，这实在是太愚蠢了。我低估了中国在多大程度上依赖外国供应商提供最尖端的半导体产品，而这正是中国的致命弱点，就像苏联可以在核武器上竞争，却无法在半导体上竞争一样--这正是米勒的杰出著作《芯片战争》（Chip War）中的一个关键点。
To sum up these lessons from history about learning lessons from history, let me make clear that there will never be a science of highly predictive “psychohistory” of the sort imagined by Isaac Asimov in Foundation. The best we can do is somewhat fuzzy pattern recognition, taking advantage of our access to two forms of data unavailable to large language models: non-digitized archival sources and non-public oral testimony (also known as “humint”).
在总结从历史中吸取教训的经验教训时，我要明确指出，永远不会有艾萨克-阿西莫夫（Isaac Asimov）在《基金会》（Foundation）中设想的那种高度预测性的 "心理史学 "科学。我们所能做的最好的事情就是模糊模式识别，利用我们所掌握的两种大型语言模型无法获得的数据形式：非数字化档案资料和非公开口头证词（也称为 "humint"）。
My six takeaways for would-be applied historians are these:
我对未来的应用史学家有以下六点启示：
- Be emotionally disengaged from the protagonists. Just because a prime minister is talking to you doesn’t mean you should become invested in his success.
在情感上脱离主角。首相与你交谈，并不意味着你就应该为他的成功投入感情。 - Understand the protagonists’ Weltanschauungen (world views). There are no substitutes for ground truth and the horse’s mouth.
了解主人公的世界观（Weltanschauungen）。事实真相和马嘴是无法替代的。 - Cast the net as widely as you can for possible analogies. Do not fall back on the overused 1930s every time you see a demagogue you don’t like the look of.
尽可能广泛地寻找可能的类比。不要每次看到你不喜欢的蛊惑人心的人，就用那些被过度使用的 20 世纪 30 年代的说法。 - Formulate your hypothesis so that there can be some empirical verification. You can’t learn from history without doing at least some number-crunching.
提出你的假设，以便进行一些经验验证。如果不做一些数字计算，你就无法从历史中吸取教训。 - Solve simultaneously for macroeconomics, markets, politics and geopolitics. Many errors stem from siloed thinking.
同时解决宏观经济、市场、政治和地缘政治问题。许多错误源于各自为政的思维方式。 - Finally, develop “an intuitive understanding of how things do not happen,” to quote another great English historian of the mid-20th century, Lewis Namier. Many wrong predictions are of events that, when you think carefully about them, have vanishingly small probabilities.
最后，引用 20 世纪中期另一位伟大的英国历史学家刘易斯-纳米尔（Lewis Namier）的话说，要培养 "对事情如何不会发生的直觉理解"。许多错误的预测都是对一些事件的预测，而当你仔细思考时，这些事件发生的概率却微乎其微。
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A cheap reproduction of Titian’s Allegory of Prudence (1550-65) hangs in the study in Montana where I worked during the Plague Year of 2020. It depicts six faces: those of three men and, below them, three beasts. The figures above represent the three ages of man: a grizzled elder looks to the left, a black-bearded man in his prime gazes at the viewer, and a callow youth looks to the right. The animals that correspond to the three ages are a wolf, a lion and a dog. Just discernible on the dark background is an inscription in Latin: “EX PRÆTERITO PRÆSENS PRVDENTER AGIT NI FVTVRA ACTIONĒ DETVRPET”— “Learning from Yesterday, Today acts prudently lest by his action he spoil Tomorrow.”
在 2020 瘟疫年期间，我在蒙大拿工作的书房里挂着一幅提香的《箴言寓言》（1550-65 年）的廉价复制品。这幅画描绘了六张脸：三张人脸，下面是三张野兽的脸。上面的人物代表了人的三个年龄段：一位白发苍苍的长者向左望去，一位正值壮年的黑须男子凝视着观者，而一位稚气未脱的青年则向右望去。对应三个年龄段的动物分别是狼、狮子和狗。深色背景上的拉丁文铭文清晰可辨："EX PRÆTERITO PRÆSENS PRVDENTER AGIT NI FVTVRA ACTIONĒ DETVRPET"--"向昨天学习，今天谨慎行事，以免自己的行为破坏明天"。
Quite so. 没错。
Ferguson is also the founder of Greenmantle, an advisory firm; FourWinds Research; Hunting Tower, a venture capital partnership; and the filmmaker Chimerica Media.
弗格森还是咨询公司 Greenmantle、FourWinds Research、风险投资合伙公司 Hunting Tower 和电影制片人 Chimerica Media 的创始人。
More From Niall Ferguson at Bloomberg Opinion:
更多内容来自 Niall Ferguson 在 Bloomberg Opinion 上的文章：
- The Second Cold War Is Escalating Faster Than the First
第二次冷战比第一次冷战升级更快 - From Deepfakes to Arms Races, AI Politics Is Here
从深度伪造到军备竞赛，人工智能政治已经到来 - If You Think World War III Is Unimaginable, Read This
如果您认为第三次世界大战难以想象，那就读读这个吧
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