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New Evidence Regarding Organizational Downsizing and a Firm's Financial Performance: A Long Term Analysis
关于组织裁员与企业财务绩效的新证据:一项长期分析

Article in Journal of Managerial Issues • January 2004
《管理问题杂志》文章 • 2004 年 1 月
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4 authors, including:  4 位作者,包括:
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New Evidence Regarding Organizational Downsizing and a Firm's Financial Performance: A Long-term Analysis*
关于组织裁员与企业财务绩效的新证据:一项长期分析*

Kenneth P. De Meuse  肯尼斯·P·德穆斯Professor of Management  管理学教授University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
威斯康星大学欧克莱尔分校
Thomas J. Bergmann  托马斯·J·伯格曼Professor of Management  管理学教授University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
威斯康星大学欧克莱尔分校

Paul A. Vanderheiden  保罗·A·范德海登Professor of Finance  金融学教授University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
威斯康星大学欧克莱尔分校

Catherine E. Roraff  凯瑟琳·E·罗拉夫Lecturer of Computer Sciences
计算机科学讲师
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
威斯康星大学拉克罗斯分校

During the current economic turbulence facing corporations, executives are searching for strategies that will enable the organization to survive and potentially grow. One approach many companies are employing to cope with the hostile and dynamic environment is organizational downsizing. Recently, international companies such as General Electric, Lucent Technologies, General Motors, Fu-
在当前企业面临的经济动荡中,管理层正在寻找能够使组织生存并有可能发展的策略。许多公司为应对充满敌意且动态变化的环境,采用的一种方法是组织裁员。最近,通用电气、朗讯科技、通用汽车、富—

jitsu, American Airlines, Boeing, and British Airways have announced major layoffs. Likewise, downsizing has spread to the “dot coms” (e.g., Priceline, AOL) and other high technology companies (e.g., Sun Microsystems, Hewlett-Packard, JDS Uniphase, Cisco Systems). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, downsizing activities in the United States have exceeded two million job
实际上,美国航空公司、波音公司和英国航空公司都宣布了大规模裁员。同样,裁员也蔓延到了“点 com”公司(例如 Priceline、AOL)以及其他高科技公司(例如 Sun Microsystems、惠普、JDS Uniphase、思科系统)。根据美国劳工统计局的数据,美国的裁员活动已经超过了两百万个职位。
cuts in both 2001 and 2002 (“Mass Layoff Statistics,” 2002).
2001 年和 2002 年均有裁员(“大规模裁员统计”,2002 年)。
Several articles in the business press have extolled the benefits of organizational downsizing (Byrne, 1994; Fuchsberg, 1993; Koretz, 1997). For example, it has been proposed that downsizing (a) reduces operating costs, (b) eliminates unnecessary levels of management, © streamlines operations, (d) enables an organization to prune deadwood, (e) enhances overall effectiveness, and (f) ultimately, makes a company more competitive in today’s marketplace (Collins and Rodrik, 1991; Jensen, 1986; McKinley et al., 1995; Neinstedt, 1989). However, several authors also maintain that downsizing can have a negative effect on organizations, such as (a) reducing profits, (b) slowing dividend growth, © lowering stock prices, (d) decreasing employee morale and satisfaction, (e) increasing tardiness, absence, and turnover, and (f) escalating employee workloads, stress, and company health care expenses (De Meuse and Tornow, 1990; Gombola and Tsetsekos, 1992; Mishra and Spreitzer, 1998; Noer, 1993; Pfeffer, 1998; Reich, 1993; Worrell et al., 1991). In addition, recent authors contend that downsizing disrupts or damages an organization’s ability to learn and adapt to the changing environment because the informal communication networks are adversely affected (Fisher and White, 2000; Lei and Hitt, 1995).
商业媒体中有多篇文章赞扬了组织裁员的好处(Byrne,1994;Fuchsberg,1993;Koretz,1997)。例如,有人提出裁员可以(a)降低运营成本,(b)消除不必要的管理层级,(c)简化操作,(d)使组织能够剔除无用人员,(e)提升整体效能,以及(f)最终使公司在当今市场中更具竞争力(Collins 和 Rodrik,1991;Jensen,1986;McKinley 等,1995;Neinstedt,1989)。然而,也有多位作者认为裁员可能对组织产生负面影响,如(a)减少利润,(b)减缓股息增长,(c)降低股价,(d)降低员工士气和满意度,(e)增加迟到、缺勤和员工流失,以及(f)加重员工工作负担、压力和公司医疗费用(De Meuse 和 Tornow,1990;Gombola 和 Tsetsekos,1992;Mishra 和 Spreitzer,1998;Noer,1993;Pfeffer,1998;Reich,1993;Worrell 等,1991)。 此外,近期的作者认为,裁员会破坏或损害组织学习和适应变化环境的能力,因为非正式的沟通网络受到不利影响(Fisher 和 White,2000;Lei 和 Hitt,1995)。
Despite the frequency in which downsizing has been implemented, there are very few, if any, scientific data organizational leaders can point to that support the efficacy of this strategy (see De Meuse and Marks, 2003). It may be that executives simply assume the overall benefits out-
尽管裁员被频繁实施,但几乎没有科学数据可以让组织领导者证明这一策略的有效性(参见 De Meuse 和 Marks,2003)。高管们可能只是简单地假设整体利益超过了-

weigh the costs. Or upper-level managers may perceive that they have no alternative (i.e., if they do not cut costs immediately, their companies will not survive). On the other hand, it may be that executives simply have jumped on the downsizing bandwagon, like they have done with so many other management fads (e.g., re-engineering, quality circles, cell manufacturing, t-group training). As researchers, collecting data in companies that downsize is exceedingly difficult. Executives frequently are unwilling to share their financial and operational data with outside parties. In addition, executives often are reluctant to have researchers scrutinize their managerial decisions. Legally, organizations are hesitant to make public information on personnel-related decisions. Consequently, many questions remain concerning the financial effectiveness of organizational downsizing. For example:
权衡成本。或者高层管理者可能认为他们别无选择(即如果他们不立即削减成本,公司将无法生存)。另一方面,也可能是高管们只是跟风裁员,就像他们曾经追随过许多其他管理潮流一样(例如,业务再造、质量圈、小组制造、团队培训)。作为研究人员,在裁员的公司中收集数据极为困难。高管们常常不愿意与外部人员分享他们的财务和运营数据。此外,高管们通常不愿意让研究人员审视他们的管理决策。从法律角度看,组织对公开与人事相关的决策信息持谨慎态度。因此,关于组织裁员的财务有效性仍有许多问题未解。例如:
  1. Does downsizing really work? That is, do companies that downsize financially out-perform companies which do not?
    裁员真的有效吗?也就是说,裁员的公司在财务表现上是否优于不裁员的公司?
  2. Do companies that implement a “deep cut” perform differently than those companies that implement a “small cut”?
    实施“大幅裁员”的公司与实施“小幅裁员”的公司表现是否不同?
  3. Do companies that downsize multiple times perform differently than those that do not?
    多次裁员的公司与未进行裁员的公司表现是否不同?

    The primary purpose of this study is to systematically examine the relationship between the strategy of downsizing and financial performance over an extended period of time. A secondary objective is to investigate the magnitude and frequency of downsizing and its impact on various financial indicators. In the following section, we examine the theoretical basis for organizational downsizing and propose three hypotheses. In the
    本研究的主要目的是系统地考察裁员策略与财务绩效之间在较长时间跨度内的关系。次要目标是调查裁员的规模和频率及其对各种财务指标的影响。接下来的部分,我们将探讨组织裁员的理论基础并提出三个假设。在
Methodology section, we describe the sample, define the variables employed in the study and how they were measured, and present the statistical techniques used to test the hypotheses. The final two sections present the results of the analyses and discuss the implications of this study.
方法论部分,我们描述样本,定义研究中使用的变量及其测量方法,并介绍用于检验假设的统计技术。最后两个部分呈现分析结果并讨论本研究的意义。

THEORETICAL BASIS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL DOWNSIZING
组织裁员的理论基础

Although there has been a great deal of discussion concerning the efficacy of downsizing on organizational performance in the media and professional literature, there have been relatively few empirical studies or theoretical papers published in the academic journals. There appears to be two different theoretical perspectives regarding the impact that downsizing will have on the financial performance of an organization. One perspective is the psychological contract theory and the other is economic theory. In the next few paragraphs, we will highlight both the psychological contract and the economic theoretical approaches.
尽管媒体和专业文献中关于裁员对组织绩效有效性的讨论很多,但在学术期刊上发表的实证研究或理论论文相对较少。关于裁员对组织财务绩效的影响,似乎存在两种不同的理论视角。一种是心理契约理论,另一种是经济理论。在接下来的几段中,我们将重点介绍心理契约和经济理论两种方法。
The psychological contract literature proposes that a mutual relationship emerges between employees and their organizations. Any organizational restructuring can have a potential effect on the organization’s ability and willingness to fulfill its obligation in that relationship. Specifically, employees will perceive organizational downsizing as a violation of the employer’s responsibility to provide stable employment and a positive work environment (cf. De Meuse and Tornow, 1990; Morrison and Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1995). Employees’ perception of a contract violation may have an adverse effect on their
心理契约文献提出,员工与其组织之间会形成一种相互关系。任何组织重组都可能影响组织履行其在该关系中义务的能力和意愿。具体来说,员工会将组织裁员视为雇主未能提供稳定就业和积极工作环境的责任违约(参见 De Meuse 和 Tornow,1990;Morrison 和 Robinson,1997;Rousseau,1995)。员工对契约违约的感知可能对其

job performance and correspondingly a negative impact on the financial performance of the organization.
工作表现产生不利影响,并相应地对组织的财务表现产生负面影响。
The psychological contract literature dates back to the early 1960s (Levinson et al., 1962). An abundance of literature in this area has found that employees and employers form an emotional bond over time. Denise Rousseau and her colleagues define the psychological contract as a set of mutual obligations that emerges during an employee’s tenure with an organization (Rousseau, 1989, 1990; Robinson et al., 1994). The relationship is based on the expectation that each party will fulfill its obligation. In terms of the employee, this denotes that individuals will work hard, will be committed to updating their job skills, and will support the organization’s goals. In contrast, the organization is expected to provide stable employment, offer competitive wages and benefits, and provide opportunities for individual development and promotion. If either party perceives that the other has violated this agreement, negative consequences can occur. For example, when employees experience organizational downsizing, they likely perceive a breach in the psychological contract and will alter their behavior and performance accordingly.
心理契约文献可追溯到 20 世纪 60 年代初(Levinson 等,1962 年)。大量相关文献发现,员工与雇主随着时间的推移会形成一种情感纽带。Denise Rousseau 及其同事将心理契约定义为员工在组织任职期间形成的一套相互义务(Rousseau,1989,1990;Robinson 等,1994)。这种关系基于双方都将履行其义务的期望。就员工而言,这意味着个人会努力工作,致力于更新其工作技能,并支持组织的目标。相反,组织则被期望提供稳定的就业,提供有竞争力的工资和福利,并提供个人发展和晋升的机会。如果任何一方认为另一方违反了该协议,可能会产生负面后果。例如,当员工经历组织裁员时,他们很可能会感知到心理契约的违背,并相应地改变其行为和绩效。
The literature suggests that individuals may reduce their organizational contributions (i.e., motivation to perform, long-term commitment to the organization) and/or neglect to engage in activities that will directly benefit organizational goals. In extreme instances, employees may even engage in sabotage or retaliatory behaviors (Buono, 2003). Overall, companies likely will experience a number of adverse consequences when they implement major organizational
文献表明,个体可能会减少他们对组织的贡献(即,工作动机、对组织的长期承诺),和/或忽视参与那些能直接促进组织目标的活动。在极端情况下,员工甚至可能从事破坏或报复行为(Buono,2003)。总体而言,当公司实施重大组织调整时,可能会经历许多不利后果。

change (e.g., lower employee morale and job satisfaction, additional employee stress, increased cynicism and distrust toward top management). These outcomes can directly escalate organizational health care costs, increase recruiting and selection efforts due to unwanted employee turnover, and lower product quality and productivity (cf. Kivimaki et al., 2000; Lester et al., 2003; Noer, 1993; Pfeffer, 1998). Joel Brockner and his colleagues published a series of studies demonstrating the adverse effects downsizing has on the “surviving” employees (Brockner et al., 1985, 1993). A recent study appearing in the British Medical Journal found that employees in work groups experiencing job cuts were more than twice as likely to take sick leave as those employees in a cohort work group not experiencing downsizing (Kivimaki et al., 2000). Consequently, the psychological contract literature theorizes that downsizing will have an adverse effect on the financial performance of organizations.
变化(例如,员工士气和工作满意度下降,员工额外压力增加,对高层管理的愤世嫉俗和不信任加剧)。这些结果会直接导致组织医疗保健成本上升,由于员工非自愿离职,招聘和选拔工作增加,以及产品质量和生产力下降(参见 Kivimaki 等,2000;Lester 等,2003;Noer,1993;Pfeffer,1998)。Joel Brockner 及其同事发表了一系列研究,证明裁员对“幸存”员工的负面影响(Brockner 等,1985,1993)。最近发表在《英国医学杂志》上的一项研究发现,经历裁员的工作组员工请病假的可能性是不经历裁员的同类工作组员工的两倍多(Kivimaki 等,2000)。因此,心理契约文献理论认为裁员将对组织的财务绩效产生不利影响。
An alternate theory views the effect of organizational downsizing primarily from an economic perspective. This theoretical approach is based on the assumption that executives engage in downsizing to reduce organizational costs while simultaneously enhancing financial performance. Such a perspective is built upon an “economic/rational paradigm” (McKinley et al., 2000). Economic theory proposes that organizational downsizing has a positive effect on a company’s financial performance, because it enables management to eliminate redundancies, streamline operations, and reduce labor costs. Up until this point, the literature has been largely based on managerial perceptions of downsizing effectiveness.
另一种理论主要从经济角度看待组织裁员的影响。这一理论方法基于这样一个假设:高管通过裁员来降低组织成本,同时提升财务绩效。这种观点建立在“经济/理性范式”(McKinley 等,2000)之上。经济理论认为,组织裁员对公司的财务绩效有积极影响,因为它使管理层能够消除冗余、简化运营并降低劳动力成本。到目前为止,相关文献主要基于管理者对裁员效果的认知。
For example, a national survey found that managers in 75 % 75 % 75%75 \% of those companies which downsized believed performance did not improve (“PinkSlip Productivity,” 1992). Cameron et al. (1991) investigated 30 firms in the automobile industry which had implemented downsizing and found that employees did not perceive an improvement in the effectiveness of their company. In contrast, their perception was that there was a decline in production quality, quantity, and employee morale (see also “Downsizing Hurts,” 1992; Knox, 1992; Lesly and Light, 1992; Mische, 2001; Pfeffer, 1998). While considerable research on downsizing has been conducted based on perceptions, very little has focused on actual measures of financial performance.
例如,一项全国性调查发现,在那些进行裁员的公司中,有 75 % 75 % 75%75 \% 的管理者认为绩效没有改善(“裁员生产力”,1992 年)。Cameron 等人(1991 年)调查了汽车行业中实施裁员的 30 家公司,发现员工并未感受到公司效能的提升。相反,他们认为生产质量、数量以及员工士气都有所下降(另见“裁员的伤害”,1992 年;Knox,1992 年;Lesly 和 Light,1992 年;Mische,2001 年;Pfeffer,1998 年)。尽管关于裁员的感知方面已有大量研究,但针对财务绩效的实际衡量研究却很少。
In one of the few investigations to directly assess financial performance, Cascio (1998) examined 311 companies in Standard and Poor’s 500 that downsized between 1981 and 1990. He measured the following financial indices: (a) return on assets, (b) cost of goods sold, © expenses to sales ratio, (d) profit margin, and (e) stock price. Cascio computed financial performance averages for the three years prior to the announced layoff (“predownsizing”) and three years following the year of downsizing (“postdownsizing”). The results indicated that none of those financial variables were significantly affected following downsizing. Further, financial performance during the pre-downsizing period was unrelated to the magnitude or frequency of downsizing conducted. Overall, Cascio concluded “downsizing per se did not appear to lead to improved company financial performance, nor did it have a detrimental effect on company financial performance” (1998: 69).
在为数不多的直接评估财务绩效的研究中,Cascio(1998)考察了 1981 年至 1990 年间在标准普尔 500 指数中进行裁员的 311 家公司。他测量了以下财务指标:(a)资产回报率,(b)销售成本,(c)费用与销售比率,(d)利润率,以及(e)股票价格。Cascio 计算了宣布裁员前三年(“裁员前”)和裁员当年后三年(“裁员后”)的财务绩效平均值。结果显示,裁员后这些财务变量均未受到显著影响。此外,裁员前的财务绩效与裁员的规模或频率无关。总体而言,Cascio 得出结论:“裁员本身似乎既未能提升公司的财务绩效,也未对公司的财务绩效产生不利影响”(1998:69)。
Another empirically-driven analysis of organizational downsizing over time was conducted by De Meuse et al. (1994). These researchers tracked several measures of financial performance of Fortune 100 companies over a five-year period-1987 through 1991. Specifically, the researchers examined 35 companies without layoffs and compared their financial performance to 17 firms which announced layoffs in 1989. They measured five indices of financial performance two years prior to the announced layoff, the same year, and two years following it. They found that the group of 17 companies with layoff announcements did not differ financially from the 35 without layoffs one and two years prior to the announcement. As expected, financial performance differences between the two groups of companies emerged during the 1989 announcement year and then surprisingly increased in magnitude each of the following two years. For example, mean profit margins for the group of companies with layoffs were 6 % , 6 % , 4 % , 2 % 6 % , 6 % , 4 % , 2 % 6%,6%,4%,2%6 \%, 6 \%, 4 \%, 2 \%, and 0 % 0 % 0%0 \% in 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991, respectively. In contrast, mean profit margins for the no-layoff companies were 6 % , 6 % , 7 % , 6 % 6 % , 6 % , 7 % , 6 % 6%,6%,7%,6%6 \%, 6 \%, 7 \%, 6 \%, and 5 % 5 % 5%5 \%, respectively, for those same years. Ttests revealed that the layoff firms had significantly lower means for profit margin, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and the mar-ket-to-book ratios for the announcement year, as well as each of the two subsequent years. The only exception to the pattern of results was the financial index, asset efficiency. Asset efficiency was not significantly different across the two groups of companies before, during, or after the announcement. Consequently, this study demonstrated that downsizing
De Meuse 等人(1994)进行了另一项基于实证的组织裁员时间分析。这些研究人员追踪了财富 100 强公司在 1987 年至 1991 年五年期间的多项财务绩效指标。具体来说,研究人员考察了 35 家未进行裁员的公司,并将其财务绩效与 1989 年宣布裁员的 17 家公司进行了比较。他们测量了宣布裁员前两年、宣布当年及随后两年的五项财务绩效指标。研究发现,宣布裁员的 17 家公司在宣布前一至两年内的财务表现与未裁员的 35 家公司无显著差异。正如预期的那样,两组公司之间的财务绩效差异在 1989 年宣布裁员当年开始显现,且在随后的两年中差异幅度意外地不断扩大。例如,裁员公司的平均利润率在 1987、1988、1989、1990 和 1991 年分别为 6 % , 6 % , 4 % , 2 % 6 % , 6 % , 4 % , 2 % 6%,6%,4%,2%6 \%, 6 \%, 4 \%, 2 \% 0 % 0 % 0%0 \% 。相比之下,同期未裁员公司的平均利润率分别为 6 % , 6 % , 7 % , 6 % 6 % , 6 % , 7 % , 6 % 6%,6%,7%,6%6 \%, 6 \%, 7 \%, 6 \% 5 % 5 % 5%5 \% 。 T 检验显示,裁员企业在公告年份及随后两年中的利润率、资产回报率(ROA)、股本回报率(ROE)和市净率均显著较低。唯一的例外是财务指标中的资产效率。资产效率在公告前、公告期间及公告后,两组公司之间无显著差异。因此,本研究表明裁员

had no apparent effect on either increasing profits or curbing the downward spiral of financial performance.
对提高利润或遏制财务表现的下滑趋势均无明显影响。
Although the Cascio (1998) and De Meuse et al. (1994) studies are informative, both have some significant limitations. Cascio investigated the effects of corporate downsizing on financial performance during the decade of the 1980s, whereas De Meuse et al. examined financial outcomes from 1987 to 1991. Both studies failed to examine the financial effects of downsizing during the turbulent decade of the 1990s. Further, the Cascio (1998) and De Meuse et al. (1994) studies only examined financial performance three and two years (respectively) after the downsizing occurred. Some individuals have contended that it may take several years before the positive effects of downsizing materialize (Byrne, 1994). Top executives also have claimed that the positive effects of some strategies are not realized for three-to-five years following implementation.
尽管 Cascio(1998)和 De Meuse 等人(1994)的研究具有一定的参考价值,但两者都存在一些显著的局限性。Cascio 研究了 1980 年代十年间企业裁员对财务绩效的影响,而 De Meuse 等人则考察了 1987 年至 1991 年的财务结果。两项研究均未能考察动荡的 1990 年代期间裁员对财务的影响。此外,Cascio(1998)和 De Meuse 等人(1994)的研究仅分别在裁员发生后三年和两年内考察了财务绩效。一些人认为,裁员的积极效果可能需要数年时间才能显现(Byrne,1994)。高层管理人员也声称,某些策略的积极效果在实施后三到五年内才会显现。
The economic perspective theorizes that managers implement downsizing because it will lead to a positive financial effect on the company (McKinley et al., 2000). However, the above literature is inconclusive in supporting this claim. The inconsistent findings between downsizing and changes in financial performance may be due to the relatively short period downsizing was investigated or due to the lack of objective indices that measure an organization’s financial effectiveness. In addition, the psychological contract literature brings into question the efficacy of downsizing. This literature proposes that downsizing violates the psychological contract, leading to several potential employee problems and, ultimately,
经济视角理论认为,管理者实施裁员是因为这将对公司产生积极的财务影响(McKinley 等,2000)。然而,上述文献并未得出支持这一观点的结论。裁员与财务绩效变化之间的不一致发现,可能是由于裁员研究的时间相对较短,或缺乏衡量组织财务效能的客观指标。此外,心理契约文献对裁员的有效性提出质疑。该文献认为,裁员违反了心理契约,导致多种潜在的员工问题,最终导致

lower financial performance. In an effort to address all the above issues, we directly examine the relative financial performance of downsizing companies over a protracted period using a variety of measures in various ways.
财务绩效下降。为了解决上述所有问题,我们直接使用多种指标和多种方式,长期考察裁员公司的相对财务绩效。
The present study tracks the financial performance of the same companies which downsized (or did not downsize) over a 12-year period from 1987 through 1998. This time frame represents a period of frequent downsizing in corporate America. This research expands the time frame in which organizations are studied, thus enabling the researchers to obtain measures of financial performance for up to nine years after the downsizing occurred. Such a protracted investigation enables one to better detect more accurately the long-term effects of downsizing. The first hypothesis of this study focuses on extending the earlier work of De Meuse et al. (1994). Their initial set of 35 companies which implemented no layoffs, and the 17 which did, were tracked for seven additional years (i.e., from 1992 through 1998). Given the nature, limitations, and findings of prior research, as well as alternative theoretical perspectives, no directionality of findings will be proposed. Hence, the following hypothesis is tested:
本研究追踪了同一批公司在 1987 年至 1998 年 12 年期间的财务表现,这些公司中有的进行了裁员,有的则没有。该时间段代表了美国企业频繁裁员的时期。本研究扩展了组织研究的时间范围,从而使研究人员能够获得裁员发生后长达九年的财务表现数据。如此长时间的调查使得更准确地检测裁员的长期影响成为可能。本研究的第一个假设侧重于扩展 De Meuse 等人(1994 年)的早期工作。他们最初追踪了 35 家未进行裁员的公司和 17 家进行了裁员的公司,随后又对这批公司进行了七年的跟踪(即 1992 年至 1998 年)。鉴于以往研究的性质、局限性和发现,以及不同的理论视角,本研究不对结果的方向性作出假设。因此,检验以下假设:
Hypothesis 1: The financial performance of companies which downsize will be significantly different than companies which do not downsize.
假设 1:进行裁员的公司的财务表现将显著不同于未进行裁员的公司。
In his study investigating the effect of downsizing on financial performance, Cascio (1998) examined only those companies which reduced their employment by three percent or more during a given year. He assumed that a minor change in employment (less than three percent) was unlikely to cause a significant dis-
在他关于裁员对财务绩效影响的研究中,Cascio(1998)仅考察了那些在某一年内裁员比例达到或超过 3%的公司。他假设,较小的就业变动(低于 3%)不太可能对公司的运营造成重大干扰;因此,也不太可能对财务绩效产生不利影响。

ruption in a company’s operations; therefore, it was unlikely to have an adverse impact on financial performance. In the hypothesis that was tested above, all firms were classified as engaging in downsizing regardless of the size of the reduction. If Cascio’s assumption is correct, the results found in Hypothesis 1 may be misleading.
在上述检验的假设中,所有公司均被归类为进行了裁员,无论裁员规模大小。如果 Cascio 的假设是正确的,那么假设 1 中得出的结果可能具有误导性。
In order to examine whether the magnitude of the downsizing is related to financial performance, the present study uses an expanded data base. De Meuse et al. (1994) examined only those Fortune 100 companies which laid-off employees in 1989 ( n = 17 n = 17 n=17n=17 ) and contrasted their performance with those companies which reported no downsizing whatsoever throughout the investigatory period of 1989 1991 ( n = 35 ) 1991 ( n = 35 ) 1991(n=35)1991(n=35). Although the original research design permitted the authors to isolate the financial performance of downsized companies over three years, it resulted in the elimination of 48 Fortune 100 firms that downsized in either 1990 or 1991. In the following hypotheses, all companies in the Fortune 100 are included and financial measures are tracked from 1987 to 1998.
为了检验裁员规模是否与财务绩效相关,本研究使用了一个扩展的数据基础。De Meuse 等人(1994)仅考察了 1989 年裁员的财富 100 强公司( n = 17 n = 17 n=17n=17 ),并将其绩效与在整个调查期间 1989 年内未进行任何裁员的公司( 1991 ( n = 35 ) 1991 ( n = 35 ) 1991(n=35)1991(n=35) )进行了对比。尽管原始研究设计允许作者在三年内隔离裁员公司的财务绩效,但这导致排除了在 1990 年或 1991 年裁员的 48 家财富 100 强公司。在以下假设中,所有财富 100 强公司均被纳入,财务指标的追踪时间为 1987 年至 1998 年。
It seems logical that when a large number of employees are laid-off, the amount of work required to be performed by the remaining employees (the so-called “survivors”) increases greatly (Pfeffer, 1998). Moreover, organizational stress and uncertainty likewise increase (Tombaugh and White, 1990). Many remaining employees may become dispirited, frustrated, and angry with management for terminating their friends, mentors, and protégés and thus may perceive a breach in the psychological contract. This breach may adversely affect employee behaviors and nega-
当大量员工被裁员时,剩余员工(所谓的“幸存者”)所需完成的工作量大幅增加,这似乎是合乎逻辑的(Pfeffer,1998)。此外,组织的压力和不确定性也随之增加(Tombaugh 和 White,1990)。许多剩余员工可能会感到沮丧、挫败,并对管理层因解雇他们的朋友、导师和被保护人而感到愤怒,因此可能会感知到心理契约的破裂。这种破裂可能会对员工行为产生不利影响,并对组织的财务绩效产生负面影响。

tively impact an organization’s financial performance. The overall pattern of behavior for survivors can adversely affect other employees as well as customers (Bastien et al., 1996). Joel Brockner and his colleagues have found that the downsizing environment can significantly influence the remaining employees’ job performance (Brockner et al., 1985, 1993).
幸存者的整体行为模式也可能对其他员工以及客户产生不利影响(Bastien 等,1996)。Joel Brockner 及其同事发现,裁员环境会显著影响剩余员工的工作表现(Brockner 等,1985,1993)。
When executives view labor as a cost rather than an asset, they likely will attempt to maximize the cost reduction, leading to larger layoffs (De Meuse et al., 1997). In contrast, when top management considers what is the appropriate number of employees required to perform effectively, they are likely to downsize more responsibly (Cascio, 1998; Morris et al., 1999). It would seem reasonable that when a large percentage of the work force is terminated, surviving employees will be affected to a greater extent due to a more pervasive breach in the psychological contract. Consequently, a company’s financial performance is more likely to be adversely affected. In order to examine this issue, the present study classified organizations into two groups: (a) those companies which did not downsize whatsoever or downsized less than three percent, and (b) those firms which downsized the work force more than three percent. Hence, the second hypothesis tested in this study is:
当高管将劳动力视为成本而非资产时,他们可能会试图最大化成本削减,导致大规模裁员(De Meuse 等,1997)。相反,当高层管理者考虑到有效执行所需的适当员工数量时,他们更有可能负责任地进行裁员(Cascio,1998;Morris 等,1999)。当大量员工被解雇时,幸存员工由于心理契约的更广泛破裂,受到的影响似乎会更大。因此,公司的财务表现更可能受到不利影响。为了研究这一问题,本研究将组织分为两组:(a)那些完全没有裁员或裁员比例低于 3%的公司,和(b)那些裁员比例超过 3%的公司。因此,本研究检验的第二个假设是:
Hypothesis 2: The financial performance of companies which terminated three percent or more of their work force in any one year will be significantly lower than companies which downsized less than three percent or did not downsize at all.
假设 2:在任何一年内裁员比例达到或超过 3%的公司的财务表现,将显著低于裁员比例低于 3%或未进行裁员的公司。
Another issue that may be relevant to downsizing and its impact on financial performance is the frequency with which a firm implements this strategy. Researchers have suggested
另一个可能与裁员及其对财务表现影响相关的问题是公司实施该策略的频率。研究人员提出

that downsizing in some companies has come to be taken for granted and, over time, becomes an accepted management practice in dealing with environmental uncertainty. When announcing downsizing, executives not only discuss the economic savings but also emphasize that it will make the organization more flexible, agile, and responsive to changing market conditions. McKinley et al. (2000) proposed an “institutional perspective” of organizational downsizing to explain the popular adoption of downsizing among corporations in the 1990s. These authors contended that downsizing takes on the status of an institutionalized norm and provides legitimacy to those companies implementing it. For example, De Meuse et al. (1994) found that 62 % 62 % 62%62 \% of the companies in their sample that downsized in 1989, likewise downsized in 1990. Further, 85 % 85 % 85%85 \% of the companies that downsized in 1989, downsized again in 1991. The frequent downsizing also might desensitize employees to the breach in the psychological contract. Thus, it appears that downsizing has become an acceptable management practice in some organizations despite the absence of compelling evidence of its financial effectiveness (O’Neill et al., 1998). Since the current theoretical literature makes no reference to what constitutes “frequent” downsizing, a standard of 33 % 33 % 33%33 \% or greater will be used in this study. That is, when a company implements downsizing at least once every three years, it will be considered frequent. The third hypothesis is:
在一些公司中,裁员已被视为理所当然,随着时间的推移,成为应对环境不确定性的公认管理实践。宣布裁员时,管理层不仅讨论经济节约,还强调这将使组织更加灵活、敏捷,并能更好地应对不断变化的市场环境。McKinley 等人(2000)提出了组织裁员的“制度视角”,以解释 20 世纪 90 年代企业普遍采用裁员的现象。这些作者认为,裁员已成为一种制度化的规范,并为实施裁员的公司提供了合法性。例如,De Meuse 等人(1994)发现,他们样本中 1989 年裁员的公司中有 62 % 62 % 62%62 \% 在 1990 年也进行了裁员。此外,1989 年裁员的公司中有 85 % 85 % 85%85 \% 在 1991 年再次裁员。频繁的裁员也可能使员工对心理契约的破裂变得麻木。因此,尽管缺乏其财务有效性的有力证据(O’Neill 等,1998),裁员似乎已成为某些组织中可接受的管理实践。 由于现有的理论文献中未对“频繁”裁员的定义作出说明,本研究将采用 33 % 33 % 33%33 \% 或以上作为标准。也就是说,当一家公司每三年内至少实施一次裁员时,即被视为频繁裁员。第三个假设是:

METHODOLOGY  方法论

Sample  样本

Data were collected from the following four public sources. Layoff announcements were obtained from Workplace Trends and The Wall Street Journal. Companies’ indices of financial performance were collected from Fortune Magazine’s annual survey of the largest corporations in the United States. Data on employment levels were gathered from Forbes’ annual survey of the 500 largest U.S. corporations. The study tracked announced layoffs and employment levels of the Fortune 100 companies for eight years, 1989 through 1996. Financial performance was measured for 12 years, 1987 through 1998 (i.e., two years before and nine years after the downsizing period). Since the Fortune listing of organizations is based on reported annual sales, firms are added and deleted from this list each year. Therefore, this study used those firms identified as Fortune 100 companies in 1989 (see Table 1).
数据来自以下四个公开来源。裁员公告来自 Workplace Trends 和《华尔街日报》。公司的财务绩效指标取自《财富》杂志对美国最大企业的年度调查。就业水平数据则来自《福布斯》对美国 500 大企业的年度调查。该研究追踪了财富 100 强公司从 1989 年到 1996 年八年的裁员公告和就业水平。财务绩效的测量时间为 12 年,即 1987 年至 1998 年(即裁员期前两年和后九年)。由于财富榜单是基于报告的年度销售额,每年都会有公司被加入或剔除。因此,本研究使用了 1989 年被认定为财富 100 强公司的企业(见表 1)。

Measure of Organizational Downsizing
组织裁员的衡量指标

Scholars define downsizing as an intentional management action involving a reduction in personnel designed to improve a company’s competitive position in the marketplace (Amabile and Conti, 1999; Freeman and Cameron, 1993). The literature often assesses the downsizing of a company in terms of “announced layoffs” (cf. De Meuse et al., 1994; Gombola and Tsetsekos, 1992; Wertheim and Robinson, 2000). The assumption made is that companies will implement the layoff strategy as announced. A random check of the employment data coded in this study
学者们将裁员定义为一种有意的管理行为,涉及减少人员,以提升公司在市场中的竞争地位(Amabile 和 Conti,1999;Freeman 和 Cameron,1993)。文献中通常以“宣布的裁员”来评估公司的裁员情况(参见 De Meuse 等,1994;Gombola 和 Tsetsekos,1992;Wertheim 和 Robinson,2000)。其假设是公司会按照宣布的裁员计划执行。本研究中对编码的就业数据进行了随机抽查

verified that firms that announced layoffs actually experienced a reduction in work force the following year. Given that the number of employees varies greatly across the Fortune 100 , a standardized measure was developed to provide a more accurate means to compare downsizing among companies. The organizational downsizing variable used in the study is the magnitude of the announced layoff divided by total number of employees in the company. Such a relative assessment of downsizing provides a more accurate means of examining the impact of a layoff on a company’s financial performance. For example, a 5,000 -employee layoff in a firm the size of Chrysler ( 362,000 employees) is likely very different from a 5 , 000 5 , 000 5,000-5,000- employee layoff at UNISYS ( 101,000 employees).
验证了宣布裁员的公司在次年确实经历了员工数量的减少。鉴于财富 100 强公司员工数量差异很大,研究开发了一种标准化的衡量方法,以便更准确地比较各公司之间的裁员情况。研究中使用的组织裁员变量是宣布裁员人数除以公司总员工数。这样的相对裁员评估方法能够更准确地考察裁员对公司财务绩效的影响。例如,克莱斯勒(员工数为 362,000)裁员 5,000 人,显然与 UNISYS(员工数为 101,000)裁员 5 , 000 5 , 000 5,000-5,000- 人有很大不同。

Dependent Variables  因变量

Five indices of financial performance were tracked for the 12-year period of the study. According to Brigham and Gapenski (1993), these five variables capture different perspectives in a company’s operations and represent some of the most fre-quently-used measures of financial performance.
研究期间追踪了五个财务绩效指标,时间跨度为 12 年。根据 Brigham 和 Gapenski(1993 年)的说法,这五个变量反映了公司运营的不同视角,并代表了一些最常用的财务绩效衡量指标。
Profit Margin. A company’s profit margin is calculated by dividing profits by sales. This ratio can be a reverse proxy for the cost of producing each dollar of sales. If the per unit labor cost decreases as a result of downsizing, profit margin will rise.
利润率。公司的利润率是通过将利润除以销售额计算得出的。该比率可以作为每销售一美元的生产成本的反向代理。如果由于裁员导致单位劳动成本下降,利润率将上升。
Return on Assets. A company’s return on assets (ROA) is computed by dividing profits by assets. This measure examines the profitability of a company in relation to dollars invested. It is an index of overall return
资产回报率。公司的资产回报率(ROA)是通过将利润除以资产计算得出的。该指标衡量公司相对于投资金额的盈利能力。它是整体回报的一个指标。
Table 1  表 1
Fortune 100 Companies Used in the Study
研究中使用的财富 100 强公司
Companies with No Layoff Announcements ( n = 14 n = 14 n=14n=14 )
未宣布裁员的公司( n = 14 n = 14 n=14n=14
Abbott Laboratories  雅培实验室
Archer Daniels Midland  阿彻丹尼尔斯米德兰公司
DANA  达纳公司
Georgia-Pacific  乔治亚太平洋
Stone Container  石材容器
Amerada Hess  阿美拉达·赫斯
Borden  博登
Dow Chemical  陶氏化学
James River Corporation  詹姆斯河公司
3M  3M 公司
American Brands  美国品牌公司
Coastal  沿海
General Mills  通用磨坊
Ralston Purina  Ralston Purina(雷尔斯顿普瑞纳)
Companies with Layoff Announcements ( n = 78 n = 78 n=78n=78 )
宣布裁员的公司( n = 78 n = 78 n=78n=78
Alcoa Allied Signal Amer. Home Products  美国家用产品公司
Apple Computer  苹果电脑 Amoco  阿莫科 Anheuser Busch  安海斯布希
Ashland Oil  阿什兰石油 Atlantic Richfield  大西洋里奇菲尔德 Baxter International  巴克斯特国际
Bethlehem Steel  贝塞勒姆钢铁 Boeing  波音 Bristol Myers Squibb  百时美施贵宝
Campbell Soup  金宝汤公司 Caterpillar  卡特彼勒公司 Champion Inter.  冠军国际公司
Chevron  雪佛龙公司 Chrysler  克莱斯勒 Coca Cola  可口可乐
Conagra  康尼格拉 Digital Equipment Corp.  数字设备公司 Du Pont  杜邦
Eastman Kodak  伊士曼柯达 Emerson Electric  艾默生电气 Exxon  埃克森
Ford  福特 General Dynamics  通用动力 General Electric  通用电气
General Motors  通用汽车 Goodyear Tire & Rubber
固特异轮胎与橡胶公司
Hewlett-Packard  惠普公司
H.J. Heinz  亨氏公司 Hoechst Celanese  霍奇斯特塞拉尼斯公司 Honeywell  霍尼韦尔
IBM International Paper  国际纸业 John Deere  约翰迪尔
Johnson & Johnson  强生 Kimberly Clark  金佰利克拉克 Litton Industries  利顿工业
Lockheed  洛克希德 Martin Marietta  马丁玛丽埃塔 McDonnell Douglas  麦克唐纳·道格拉斯
Merck  默克 Mobil  美孚 Monsanto  孟山都
Motorola  摩托罗拉 NCR Northorp  诺斯罗普
Occidental Petroleum  西方石油 Pepsico  百事公司 Pfizer  辉瑞
Phillip Morris  菲利普莫里斯 Phillips Petroleum  菲利普斯石油 PPG Industries  PPG 工业
Proctor & Gamble  宝洁公司 Quaker Oats  桂格燕麦 Raytheon  雷神公司
Reynolds Metals  雷诺兹金属公司 RJR Nabisco  RJR 纳贝斯科 Rockwell International  洛克希尔国际
Sara Lee  萨拉·李 Sun  周日 Tenneco  特内科
Texaco  德士古 Texas Instruments  德州仪器 Textron  泰克斯朗
Alcoa Allied Signal Amer. Home Products Apple Computer Amoco Anheuser Busch Ashland Oil Atlantic Richfield Baxter International Bethlehem Steel Boeing Bristol Myers Squibb Campbell Soup Caterpillar Champion Inter. Chevron Chrysler Coca Cola Conagra Digital Equipment Corp. Du Pont Eastman Kodak Emerson Electric Exxon Ford General Dynamics General Electric General Motors Goodyear Tire & Rubber Hewlett-Packard H.J. Heinz Hoechst Celanese Honeywell IBM International Paper John Deere Johnson & Johnson Kimberly Clark Litton Industries Lockheed Martin Marietta McDonnell Douglas Merck Mobil Monsanto Motorola NCR Northorp Occidental Petroleum Pepsico Pfizer Phillip Morris Phillips Petroleum PPG Industries Proctor & Gamble Quaker Oats Raytheon Reynolds Metals RJR Nabisco Rockwell International Sara Lee Sun Tenneco Texaco Texas Instruments Textron| Alcoa | Allied Signal | Amer. Home Products | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Apple Computer | Amoco | Anheuser Busch | | Ashland Oil | Atlantic Richfield | Baxter International | | Bethlehem Steel | Boeing | Bristol Myers Squibb | | Campbell Soup | Caterpillar | Champion Inter. | | Chevron | Chrysler | Coca Cola | | Conagra | Digital Equipment Corp. | Du Pont | | Eastman Kodak | Emerson Electric | Exxon | | Ford | General Dynamics | General Electric | | General Motors | Goodyear Tire & Rubber | Hewlett-Packard | | H.J. Heinz | Hoechst Celanese | Honeywell | | IBM | International Paper | John Deere | | Johnson & Johnson | Kimberly Clark | Litton Industries | | Lockheed | Martin Marietta | McDonnell Douglas | | Merck | Mobil | Monsanto | | Motorola | NCR | Northorp | | Occidental Petroleum | Pepsico | Pfizer | | Phillip Morris | Phillips Petroleum | PPG Industries | | Proctor & Gamble | Quaker Oats | Raytheon | | Reynolds Metals | RJR Nabisco | Rockwell International | | Sara Lee | Sun | Tenneco | | Texaco | Texas Instruments | Textron |
Table 1 (continued)  表 1(续)
Companies with Layoff Announcements ( n = 78 n = 78 n=78n=78 )
宣布裁员的公司( n = 78 n = 78 n=78n=78
TRW Unilever  联合利华 Union Carbide  联合碳化物
UNISYS United Technologies  联合技术公司 Unocal  优尼科尔
USX Westinghouse  西屋电气 Weyerhaeuser  韦耶豪泽
Whirlpool  惠而浦 W.R. Grace Xerox  施乐公司
TRW Unilever Union Carbide UNISYS United Technologies Unocal USX Westinghouse Weyerhaeuser Whirlpool W.R. Grace Xerox| TRW | Unilever | Union Carbide | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | UNISYS | United Technologies | Unocal | | USX | Westinghouse | Weyerhaeuser | | Whirlpool | W.R. Grace | Xerox |
Note: Companies in italics denote that they were classified as “layoff companies” in De Meuse et al. 's (1994) original study. The following eight companies announced no layoffs, but were excluded due to missing or unusable financial data: BASF, Hanson Industries, LTV, Lyonell Petrochemical, Miles, North American Phillips, Shell Oil, and Time Warner.
注:斜体字公司表示在 De Meuse 等人(1994 年)的原始研究中被归类为“裁员公司”。以下八家公司宣布没有裁员,但由于财务数据缺失或不可用而被排除:巴斯夫、汉森工业、LTV、莱昂内尔石化、迈尔斯、北美飞利浦、壳牌石油和时代华纳。

on investment and indicates how efficiently those dollars are utilized.
投资回报率,表明这些资金的利用效率。
Return on Equity. A company’s return on equity (ROE) is determined by dividing profits by stockholders’ equity. It is similar to ROA but focuses on the actual financial rate of return to the company’s owners. Therefore, ROE is the best measure in terms of determining whether the layoffs helped achieve the primary purpose of the company (i.e., improved the financial rate of return to its owners).
股本回报率。公司的股本回报率(ROE)是通过将利润除以股东权益来确定的。它类似于资产回报率(ROA),但更侧重于公司所有者的实际财务回报率。因此,ROE 是在确定裁员是否帮助实现公司主要目标(即提高所有者的财务回报率)方面的最佳衡量指标。
Asset Efficiency. The asset efficiency of a company is measured by dividing sales by assets. This measure identifies how efficiently a company is using its assets to produce its sales. If a firm can reduce its assets while eliminating employees and simultaneously maintain or increase sales, it will enhance its asset efficiency. In contrast, if sales significantly drop with the reduction in staff, asset efficiency could remain constant or even decrease.
资产效率。公司的资产效率通过将销售额除以资产总额来衡量。该指标反映了公司利用资产产生销售的效率。如果公司在裁员的同时能够减少资产并保持或增加销售额,就会提升其资产效率。相反,如果随着员工减少销售额大幅下降,资产效率可能保持不变甚至下降。
Market-to-Book Ratio. A company’s market-to-book ratio is calculated by dividing the market value of the equity of a firm by its value on the books. This measure more directly reflects the investors’ perceptions of fu-
市净率。公司的市净率是通过将公司股权的市场价值除以其账面价值计算得出的。该指标更直接反映了投资者对未完—

ture performance than current or past performance. Thus, if investors believe that the announced layoff will improve the future effectiveness of the company, the ratio should increase.
比当前或过去的表现更能反映未来的业绩。因此,如果投资者相信宣布的裁员将提升公司的未来效能,该比率应当上升。

Hypothesis Testing and Analysis
假设检验与分析

The means of the five financial indices for the two groups of companies were calculated and tested for statistically significant differences using Fisher’s t t tt-tests for examining differences between uncorrelated means (Guilford and Fruchter, 1978). This procedure enables one to ascertain whether the organizational downsizing strategy helped or hurt the financial performance of the respective companies relative to the non-downsizing companies during each year of the 12-year period of investigation. To test Hypothesis 1, the original set of companies investigated between 1987 and 1991 by De Meuse et al. (1994) was tracked an additional seven years (1992 to 1998). Because the time frame was extended, 21 of the original 35 companies in the nolayoff category were eliminated due
计算了两组公司五个财务指标的均值,并使用 Fisher 的 t t tt 检验对无相关均值差异进行了统计显著性检验(Guilford 和 Fruchter,1978)。该方法能够确定组织裁员策略在 12 年调查期间的每一年中,相较于未裁员公司,是否帮助或损害了相关公司的财务表现。为检验假设 1,追踪了 De Meuse 等人(1994)在 1987 年至 1991 年间调查的原始公司组,额外延长了七年(1992 年至 1998 年)。由于时间范围的延长,原无裁员类别中的 35 家公司中有 21 家被剔除,原因是

to subsequent layoffs. Thus, the present study contrasted the financial performance of the 14 companies remaining in the no-layoff set with the 17 layoff companies from the original study. It was hypothesized that the five financial indices of companies which downsized would be significantly different than companies which did not downsize.
因此,本研究将原始研究中未裁员的 14 家公司与裁员的 17 家公司进行了财务表现的对比。假设裁员公司的五项财务指标将显著不同于未裁员的公司。
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, all Fortune 100 companies initially were included in the analyses. In Hypothesis 2, a “base year” and “lagged years” were established to measure the effect that the layoff had during the year of announcement and subsequent years. Since companies laid off in different years, the “base year” includes financial data for all companies whether the initial layoff announcement occurred in 1989, 1990, 1991, etc. “Lagged years” are defined as the year or years following the initial announcement. For example, a “one-year lag” represents one year post-downsizing for all those companies which had layoffs, regardless of the year the layoff was announced. Specifically, if a company’s initial layoff was 1989, the one-year lag would be 1990; whereas, if another firm’s initial layoff was in 1993, its one-year lag would be 1994. Consequently, the sample sizes get smaller the further one is removed from the base year. This procedure reduced the effect that the overall economy might have had on the findings, because the initial year when a given company’s financial performance was analyzed could range from 1989 through 1998.
为了检验假设 2 和假设 3,最初将所有财富 100 强公司纳入分析。在假设 2 中,设定了“基准年”和“滞后年”来衡量裁员在公告当年及随后的年份中的影响。由于公司裁员发生在不同年份,“基准年”包括所有公司的财务数据,无论初次裁员公告是在 1989 年、1990 年、1991 年等哪一年。“滞后年”定义为初次公告之后的一年或几年。例如,“一年滞后”表示所有裁员公司的裁员后一年,无论裁员公告的具体年份。具体来说,如果某公司的初次裁员是在 1989 年,则一年滞后为 1990 年;而如果另一家公司初次裁员是在 1993 年,则其一年滞后为 1994 年。因此,随着距离基准年越远,样本量会逐渐减少。此程序减少了整体经济对研究结果可能产生的影响,因为分析某公司财务表现的初始年份可能在 1989 年至 1998 年之间。
For Hypothesis 3, those companies announcing layoffs three or more times between 1989 and 1996 were classified as “high-frequency” companies. In contrast, those companies that announced layoffs one or two
对于假设 3,在 1989 年至 1996 年间宣布裁员三次或以上的公司被归类为“高频”公司。相反,宣布裁员一至两次的公司被归类为“低频”公司。

times were classified as “low-frequency” companies. In order to examine the cumulative effect of downsizing, the financial indices were examined at the end of the eight-year period (1989-1996) in which downsizing was tracked (i.e., 1996). In addition, financial performance was measured one and two years following this downsizing period (1997 and 1998).
为了检验裁员的累积效应,财务指标在裁员跟踪的八年期间结束时(1989-1996 年,即 1996 年)进行了考察。此外,财务绩效还在该裁员期结束后的一年和两年(1997 年和 1998 年)进行了测量。

RESULTS  结果

Overall, 78 of the Fortune 100 companies downsized at least once during the period of investigation. Of these firms, 17 had downsized once, 12 had downsized twice, and the remaining companies had downsized three or more times. The cumulative amount of the work force downsized during the period of study was as follows: (a) 21 companies announced layoffs of 5 % 5 % 5%5 \% or less, (b) 14 companies announced layoffs of 6 10 % 6 10 % 6-10%6-10 \%, © 12 companies announced layoffs of 11 - 15 % 15 % 15%15 \%, (d) 10 companies announced layoffs of 16 25 % 16 25 % 16-25%16-25 \%, and (e) the remaining companies had layoff announcements of greater than 25 % 25 % 25%25 \%. An inspection of companies in the layoff group reveals that a wide variety of industries were involved in downsizing, including automotive, oil, chemical, entertainment, electronics, steel, pharmaceutical, food, defense, and consumer products. Likewise, companies in the no-layoff group represent a diversity of industries, including chemical, food, consumer products, oil, and pharmaceutical (see Table 1). Obviously, all the companies are very large entities with sales ranging upwards to $ 178 $ 178 $178\$ 178 billion and employment levels to 813,000 .
总体而言,在调查期间,财富 100 强公司中有 78 家公司至少裁员一次。在这些公司中,17 家公司裁员一次,12 家公司裁员两次,其余公司裁员三次或更多次。研究期间裁员的累计人数如下:(a)21 家公司宣布裁员人数为 5 % 5 % 5%5 \% 或以下,(b)14 家公司宣布裁员人数为 6 10 % 6 10 % 6-10%6-10 \% ,(c)12 家公司宣布裁员人数为 11 至 15 % 15 % 15%15 \% ,(d)10 家公司宣布裁员人数为 16 25 % 16 25 % 16-25%16-25 \% ,(e)其余公司宣布的裁员人数超过 25 % 25 % 25%25 \% 。对裁员组公司的检查显示,涉及裁员的行业种类繁多,包括汽车、石油、化工、娱乐、电子、钢铁、制药、食品、国防和消费品。同样,未裁员组的公司也代表了多样化的行业,包括化工、食品、消费品、石油和制药(见表 1)。显然,所有这些公司都是非常大型的实体,销售额高达 $ 178 $ 178 $178\$ 178 十亿美元,员工人数达到 813,000 人。
Table 2 displays the mean values of financial performance measures for no-layoff and layoff companies from
表 2 显示了无裁员和裁员公司财务绩效指标的平均值

Table 2  表 2
Performance Measure  绩效指标 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit Margin  利润率
No layoff  无裁员 . 06 . 07 .07* .06* .04* -. 01 . 02 . 03 . 05 . 06 . 07 . 08
Layoff  裁员 . 06 . 06 . 04 . 02 . 00 -. 01 . 01 . 03 . 05 . 05 . 03 . 05
ROA
No layoff  无裁员 . 08 . 08 .08* .06* . 05 . 02 . 04 . 03 . 06 . 06 . 08 . 07
Layoff  裁员 . 06 . 05 . 04 . 02 . 01 . 00 . 02 . 03 . 05 . 04 . 03 . 05
ROE
No layoff  无裁员 . 21 .22* .23* .21* .15* . 02 . 08 . 16 . 39 . 27 . 29 . 45
Layoff  裁员 . 14 . 13 . 10 . 05 -. 01 -. 21 . 04 . 10 . 15 . 15 . 12 . 20
Asset Efficiency  资产效率
No layoff  无裁员 1.29 1.25 1.20 1.15 1.09 1.02 1.04 1.13 1.21 1.11 1.10 1.01
Layoff  裁员 1.13 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.00 . 98 1.00 . 93
Market-to-Book Ratio  市净率
No layoff  无裁员 2.65 2.65* 2.81 3.40 3.18 3.21 2.84 3.91 8.33 5.86 7.20 11.21
Layoff  裁员 1.74 1.62 1.69 1.83 1.84 2.30 2.88 2.54 2.92 3.35 4.75 5.52
Performance Measure 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Profit Margin No layoff . 06 . 07 .07* .06* .04* -. 01 . 02 . 03 . 05 . 06 . 07 . 08 Layoff . 06 . 06 . 04 . 02 . 00 -. 01 . 01 . 03 . 05 . 05 . 03 . 05 ROA No layoff . 08 . 08 .08* .06* . 05 . 02 . 04 . 03 . 06 . 06 . 08 . 07 Layoff . 06 . 05 . 04 . 02 . 01 . 00 . 02 . 03 . 05 . 04 . 03 . 05 ROE No layoff . 21 .22* .23* .21* .15* . 02 . 08 . 16 . 39 . 27 . 29 . 45 Layoff . 14 . 13 . 10 . 05 -. 01 -. 21 . 04 . 10 . 15 . 15 . 12 . 20 Asset Efficiency No layoff 1.29 1.25 1.20 1.15 1.09 1.02 1.04 1.13 1.21 1.11 1.10 1.01 Layoff 1.13 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.00 . 98 1.00 . 93 Market-to-Book Ratio No layoff 2.65 2.65* 2.81 3.40 3.18 3.21 2.84 3.91 8.33 5.86 7.20 11.21 Layoff 1.74 1.62 1.69 1.83 1.84 2.30 2.88 2.54 2.92 3.35 4.75 5.52| Performance Measure | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Profit Margin | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No layoff | . 06 | . 07 | .07* | .06* | .04* | -. 01 | . 02 | . 03 | . 05 | . 06 | . 07 | . 08 | | Layoff | . 06 | . 06 | . 04 | . 02 | . 00 | -. 01 | . 01 | . 03 | . 05 | . 05 | . 03 | . 05 | | ROA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No layoff | . 08 | . 08 | .08* | .06* | . 05 | . 02 | . 04 | . 03 | . 06 | . 06 | . 08 | . 07 | | Layoff | . 06 | . 05 | . 04 | . 02 | . 01 | . 00 | . 02 | . 03 | . 05 | . 04 | . 03 | . 05 | | ROE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No layoff | . 21 | .22* | .23* | .21* | .15* | . 02 | . 08 | . 16 | . 39 | . 27 | . 29 | . 45 | | Layoff | . 14 | . 13 | . 10 | . 05 | -. 01 | -. 21 | . 04 | . 10 | . 15 | . 15 | . 12 | . 20 | | Asset Efficiency | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No layoff | 1.29 | 1.25 | 1.20 | 1.15 | 1.09 | 1.02 | 1.04 | 1.13 | 1.21 | 1.11 | 1.10 | 1.01 | | Layoff | 1.13 | 1.05 | 1.06 | 1.08 | 1.03 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.02 | 1.00 | . 98 | 1.00 | . 93 | | Market-to-Book Ratio | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No layoff | 2.65 | 2.65* | 2.81 | 3.40 | 3.18 | 3.21 | 2.84 | 3.91 | 8.33 | 5.86 | 7.20 | 11.21 | | Layoff | 1.74 | 1.62 | 1.69 | 1.83 | 1.84 | 2.30 | 2.88 | 2.54 | 2.92 | 3.35 | 4.75 | 5.52 |
Note: Mean values were rounded off to two decimal places; n = 14 n = 14 n=14n=14 companies which made no layoff announcements during 1989 through
注:均值四舍五入保留两位小数; n = 14 n = 14 n=14n=14 家公司在 1989 年至 1996 年期间未发布裁员公告
  • p < .05 p < .05 p < .05p<.05.

Mean Financial Performance Values for No-Layoff and Announced Layoff Companies
未裁员公司与发布裁员公告公司财务绩效均值

1996 and n = 17 n = 17 n=17n=17 companies which made layoff announcements in 1989 (highlighted in bold).
1996 年,以及 n = 17 n = 17 n=17n=17 家在 1989 年发布裁员公告的公司(以粗体显示)。
1987 through 1998. In the De Meuse et al. study (1994), it was found that layoff firms had significantly lower means for profit margin, ROA, ROE, and market-to-book ratios for the announcement year (1989), as well as for each of the two subsequent years (1990 and 1991). The present longitudinal analysis examined those differences for an additional seven years (1992-1998). No statistically significant differences between the two groups of companies for any of the additional years were found. Thus, the data suggest that firms which downsize appear to perform worse than firms which do not layoff, but the performance gap disappeared by 1992. A closer inspection of the data reveals that the layoff firms did not perform better than the no-layoff firms with regard to profit margin, ROA, and ROE for any of the additional years under study. Consistent with De Meuse et al. (1994), there were no differences in asset efficiency and market-to-book ratios throughout the entire period investigated. Overall, Hypothesis 1 was not supported, in that the financial performance of companies which downsized was not significantly different than companies which did not.
1987 年至 1998 年。在 De Meuse 等人(1994 年)的研究中发现,裁员企业在公告年份(1989 年)以及随后两年(1990 年和 1991 年)的利润率、资产回报率(ROA)、股本回报率(ROE)和市净率均显著低于未裁员企业。本次纵向分析对这些差异进行了额外七年(1992-1998 年)的考察。结果显示,在这额外的年份中,两组公司在任何指标上均无统计学显著差异。因此,数据表明,裁员的公司表现似乎不如未裁员的公司,但这种业绩差距在 1992 年后消失。对数据的进一步分析显示,裁员公司在研究的额外年份中,利润率、资产回报率和股本回报率方面均未优于未裁员公司。与 De Meuse 等人(1994 年)的结论一致,整个研究期间资产效率和市净率均无差异。总体而言,假设 1 未得到支持,即裁员公司的财务表现与未裁员公司无显著差异。
To examine the effect that the size of the announced layoff might have on a company’s financial performance, the five indices for companies which downsized less than three percent in any given year (or did not downsize at all) were compared to those of companies which downsized more than three percent in any year. Table 3 presents the mean financial values for the base year and for each of the subsequent seven lagged years through 1998. As can be observed, the only significant differences were found in the base year for profit mar-
为了检验宣布裁员规模对公司财务表现的影响,将每年裁员少于 3%(或未裁员)公司的五个指标与每年裁员超过 3%的公司进行了比较。表 3 展示了基准年及随后七个滞后年份(直到 1998 年)的平均财务数值。可以观察到,唯一显著的差异出现在基准年,涉及利润率、资产回报率(ROA)、股本回报率(ROE)和市净率。在每种情况下,裁员少于 3%的公司表现优于裁员 3%及以上的公司。

gin, ROA, ROE, and market-to-book ratios. In each case, the firms laying off less than three percent performed better than the firms which laid off three percent or more of the employees. Although for the majority of lagged years the small layoff firms out-performed the higher layoff companies, the difference was slight and non- significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 generally was not supported, in that companies which terminated three percent or more of the work force did not perform significantly lower than companies laying off less than three percent or not at all.
尽管在大多数滞后年份中,裁员较少的公司表现优于裁员较多的公司,但差异较小且不显著。因此,假设 2 总体上未被支持,即裁员 3%或以上的公司表现并未显著低于裁员少于 3%或未裁员的公司。
The relative size of an announced layoff can indicate the magnitude of financial turmoil a company is experiencing. Although a three-percent reduction in force might suggest the firm is in financial trouble, a larger announced cut (e.g., one in doubledigits) could convey the serious nature of the financial viability of the company. To examine whether such a large-scale layoff may affect financial performance more substantially than a smaller one, a post hoc analysis was conducted using a 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% criterion. Table 4 presents the mean values of financial performance measures contrasting those firms that laid off 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% or more employees in a single year versus those firms that laid off less than 10 % 10 % 10%10 \%. Since the post hoc analysis was exploratory in nature, a 0.10 level of significance was employed.
宣布裁员的相对规模可以反映公司所经历的财务动荡的程度。虽然三个百分点的裁员可能表明公司正处于财务困境,但较大规模的裁员(例如两位数的裁员)则可能传达公司财务可持续性面临严重问题的信息。为了检验如此大规模的裁员是否比小规模裁员对财务绩效有更显著的影响,采用 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 标准进行了事后分析。表 4 展示了财务绩效指标的平均值,对比了那些在一年内裁员 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 人或以上的公司与裁员少于 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 人的公司。由于事后分析具有探索性质,因此采用了 0.10 的显著性水平。
As can be observed, the general pattern of results suggests that firms announcing double-digit layoffs significantly under-perform those organizations announcing relatively fewer employees would be laid off. Financial differences were particularly evident in the base year. However, one year after the announced downsizing profit margin, ROA and ROE
如图所示,结果的总体模式表明,宣布两位数裁员的公司,其财务表现显著低于宣布裁员人数较少的公司。财务差异在基准年尤为明显。然而,在宣布裁员一年后,利润率、资产回报率(ROA)和股本回报率(ROE)

Table 3  表 3
Mean Financial Performance Values for Companies
公司平均财务绩效值

with Less Than Three Percent and Three Percent or More Layoff Announcements
裁员公告少于 3%和 3%及以上的公司
Performance Measure  绩效指标 Base Year  基准年 1-Year Lag  1 年滞后 2-Year Lag  2 年滞后 3-Year Lag  3 年滞后 4-Year Lag  4 年滞后 5-Year Lag  5 年滞后 6-Year Lag  6 年滞后 7-Year Lag  7 年滞后
Profit Margin  利润率
<3% Layoff  <3% 裁员 . 041 041 041^(****)041{ }^{* *} . 011 . 070 . 048 . 056 . 056 . 060 . 059
3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% Layoff   3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% 裁员 . 006 . 023 . 041 . 060 . 064 . 058 . 060 . 053
ROA
< 3% Layoff  < 3% 裁员 .049** . 025 . 068 . 053 . 064 . 060 . 065 . 056
3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% Layoff   3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% 裁员 . 006 . 023 . 042 . 057 . 064 . 052 . 049 . 059
ROE
< 3% Layoff  < 3% 裁员 .180** . 011 . 395 . 288 . 301 . 216 . 216 . 283
3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% Layoff   3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% 裁员 -. 034 -. 045 . 120 . 187 . 198 . 164 . 174 . 165
Asset Efficiency  资产效率
< 3% Layoff  < 3% 裁员 1.12 1.09 1.06 1.09 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.00
3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% Layoff   3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% 裁员 1.03 1.03 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.01
Market-to-Book Ratio  市值与账面价值比率
< 3% Layoff  < 3% 裁员 3.56* 3.28 3.35 5.32 6.48 5.03 5.05 7.23
3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% Layoff   3 % 3 % >= 3%\geq 3 \% 裁员 2.37 2.79 3.38 3.58 4.28 4.74 3.74 4.57
Performance Measure Base Year 1-Year Lag 2-Year Lag 3-Year Lag 4-Year Lag 5-Year Lag 6-Year Lag 7-Year Lag Profit Margin <3% Layoff . 041^(****) . 011 . 070 . 048 . 056 . 056 . 060 . 059 >= 3% Layoff . 006 . 023 . 041 . 060 . 064 . 058 . 060 . 053 ROA < 3% Layoff .049** . 025 . 068 . 053 . 064 . 060 . 065 . 056 >= 3% Layoff . 006 . 023 . 042 . 057 . 064 . 052 . 049 . 059 ROE < 3% Layoff .180** . 011 . 395 . 288 . 301 . 216 . 216 . 283 >= 3% Layoff -. 034 -. 045 . 120 . 187 . 198 . 164 . 174 . 165 Asset Efficiency < 3% Layoff 1.12 1.09 1.06 1.09 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.00 >= 3% Layoff 1.03 1.03 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.01 Market-to-Book Ratio < 3% Layoff 3.56* 3.28 3.35 5.32 6.48 5.03 5.05 7.23 >= 3% Layoff 2.37 2.79 3.38 3.58 4.28 4.74 3.74 4.57| Performance Measure | Base Year | 1-Year Lag | 2-Year Lag | 3-Year Lag | 4-Year Lag | 5-Year Lag | 6-Year Lag | 7-Year Lag | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Profit Margin | | | | | | | | | | <3% Layoff | . $041{ }^{* *}$ | . 011 | . 070 | . 048 | . 056 | . 056 | . 060 | . 059 | | $\geq 3 \%$ Layoff | . 006 | . 023 | . 041 | . 060 | . 064 | . 058 | . 060 | . 053 | | ROA | | | | | | | | | | < 3% Layoff | .049** | . 025 | . 068 | . 053 | . 064 | . 060 | . 065 | . 056 | | $\geq 3 \%$ Layoff | . 006 | . 023 | . 042 | . 057 | . 064 | . 052 | . 049 | . 059 | | ROE | | | | | | | | | | < 3% Layoff | .180** | . 011 | . 395 | . 288 | . 301 | . 216 | . 216 | . 283 | | $\geq 3 \%$ Layoff | -. 034 | -. 045 | . 120 | . 187 | . 198 | . 164 | . 174 | . 165 | | Asset Efficiency | | | | | | | | | | < 3% Layoff | 1.12 | 1.09 | 1.06 | 1.09 | 1.10 | 1.06 | 1.06 | 1.00 | | $\geq 3 \%$ Layoff | 1.03 | 1.03 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 1.02 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.01 | | Market-to-Book Ratio | | | | | | | | | | < 3% Layoff | 3.56* | 3.28 | 3.35 | 5.32 | 6.48 | 5.03 | 5.05 | 7.23 | | $\geq 3 \%$ Layoff | 2.37 | 2.79 | 3.38 | 3.58 | 4.28 | 4.74 | 3.74 | 4.57 |
Note: Mean values were rounded to three decimal places; n = 72 n = 72 n=72n=72 companies which made layoff announcements between 1989 through 1996.
注:均值四舍五入至小数点后三位; n = 72 n = 72 n=72n=72 家公司在 1989 年至 1996 年间发布了裁员公告。

p < .05 ; p < .01 p < .05 ; p < .01 ^(**)p < .05;^(****)p < .01{ }^{*} p<.05 ;{ }^{* *} p<.01.
1996.
p < .10 ; p < .05 ; p < .01 p < .10 ; p < .05 ; p < .01 ^(†)p < .10;^(**)p < .05;^(****)p < .01{ }^{\dagger} p<.10 ;{ }^{*} p<.05 ;{ }^{* *} p<.01.
Table 4  表 4

Mean Financial Performance Values for Companies
with Less Than Ten Percent and Ten Percent or More Layoff Announcements
裁员公告少于百分之十和百分之十及以上公司的平均财务表现值

Performance Measure  绩效指标 Base Year  基准年 1-Year Lag  滞后 1 年 2-Year Lag  滞后 2 年 3-Year Lag  滞后 3 年 4-Year Lag  4 年滞后 5-Year Lag  5 年滞后 6-Year Lag  6 年滞后 7-Year Lag  7 年滞后
Profit Margin  利润率
< 10% Layoff  < 10% 裁员 .025* . 020 . 051 + 051 + 051^(+)051{ }^{+} .070* .074* .068* . 064 + 064 + 064^(+)064{ }^{+} . 045
>=\geq 10% Layoff   >=\geq 10% 裁员 -. 016 . 025 . 027 . 047 . 044 . 041 . 036 . 069
ROA
< 10% Layoff  < 10% 裁员 .025* . 019 . 050 . 067 + 067 + 067^(+)067{ }^{+} . 072 f 072 072^("f ")072{ }^{\text {f }} . 064 064 064^(†)064{ }^{\dagger} . 063 + 063 + 063^(+)063{ }^{+} . 046
10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% Layoff   10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% 裁员 -. 011 . 031 . 033 . 048 . 048 . 038 . 030 . 085
ROE
< 10% Layoff  < 10% 裁员 . 033 + 033 + 033^(+)033{ }^{+} -. 087 . 151 .212* .223** .192* . 214 + 214 + 214^(+)214{ }^{+} . 140
10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% Layoff   10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% 裁员 -. 088 -. 076 . 074 . 149 . 131 . 113 . 067 . 200
Asset Efficiency  资产效率
< 10% Layoff  < 10% 裁员 . 98 + 98 + 98^(+)98{ }^{+} . 97 97 97^(†)97{ }^{\dagger} . 97 + 97 + 97^(+)97{ }^{+} . 97 .96* .95* 1.02 . 96 + 96 + 96^(+)96{ }^{+}
10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% Layoff   10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% 裁员 1.13 1.14 1.08 1.06 1.14 1.12 1.02 1.22
Market-to-Book Ratio  市值与账面价值比率
< 10% Layoff  < 10% 裁员 2.73 + 2.73 + 2.73^(+)2.73{ }^{+} 3.30** 4.00* 4.19 + 4.19 + 4.19^(+)4.19{ }^{+} 5.05 + 5.05 + 5.05^(+)5.05{ }^{+} 5.44 + 5.44 + 5.44^(+)5.44{ }^{+} 3.76 3.84
10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% Layoff   10 % 10 % >= 10%\geq 10 \% 裁员 2.05 2.10 2.46 2.89 3.11 3.40 3.40 5.79
Performance Measure Base Year 1-Year Lag 2-Year Lag 3-Year Lag 4-Year Lag 5-Year Lag 6-Year Lag 7-Year Lag Profit Margin < 10% Layoff .025* . 020 . 051^(+) .070* .074* .068* . 064^(+) . 045 >= 10% Layoff -. 016 . 025 . 027 . 047 . 044 . 041 . 036 . 069 ROA < 10% Layoff .025* . 019 . 050 . 067^(+) . 072^("f ") . 064^(†) . 063^(+) . 046 >= 10% Layoff -. 011 . 031 . 033 . 048 . 048 . 038 . 030 . 085 ROE < 10% Layoff . 033^(+) -. 087 . 151 .212* .223** .192* . 214^(+) . 140 >= 10% Layoff -. 088 -. 076 . 074 . 149 . 131 . 113 . 067 . 200 Asset Efficiency < 10% Layoff . 98^(+) . 97^(†) . 97^(+) . 97 .96* .95* 1.02 . 96^(+) >= 10% Layoff 1.13 1.14 1.08 1.06 1.14 1.12 1.02 1.22 Market-to-Book Ratio < 10% Layoff 2.73^(+) 3.30** 4.00* 4.19^(+) 5.05^(+) 5.44^(+) 3.76 3.84 >= 10% Layoff 2.05 2.10 2.46 2.89 3.11 3.40 3.40 5.79| Performance Measure | Base Year | 1-Year Lag | 2-Year Lag | 3-Year Lag | 4-Year Lag | 5-Year Lag | 6-Year Lag | 7-Year Lag | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Profit Margin | | | | | | | | | | < 10% Layoff | .025* | . 020 | . $051{ }^{+}$ | .070* | .074* | .068* | . $064{ }^{+}$ | . 045 | | $\geq$ 10% Layoff | -. 016 | . 025 | . 027 | . 047 | . 044 | . 041 | . 036 | . 069 | | ROA | | | | | | | | | | < 10% Layoff | .025* | . 019 | . 050 | . $067{ }^{+}$ | . $072{ }^{\text {f }}$ | . $064{ }^{\dagger}$ | . $063{ }^{+}$ | . 046 | | $\geq 10 \%$ Layoff | -. 011 | . 031 | . 033 | . 048 | . 048 | . 038 | . 030 | . 085 | | ROE | | | | | | | | | | < 10% Layoff | . $033{ }^{+}$ | -. 087 | . 151 | .212* | .223** | .192* | . $214{ }^{+}$ | . 140 | | $\geq 10 \%$ Layoff | -. 088 | -. 076 | . 074 | . 149 | . 131 | . 113 | . 067 | . 200 | | Asset Efficiency | | | | | | | | | | < 10% Layoff | . $98{ }^{+}$ | . $97{ }^{\dagger}$ | . $97{ }^{+}$ | . 97 | .96* | .95* | 1.02 | . $96{ }^{+}$ | | $\geq 10 \%$ Layoff | 1.13 | 1.14 | 1.08 | 1.06 | 1.14 | 1.12 | 1.02 | 1.22 | | Market-to-Book Ratio | | | | | | | | | | < 10% Layoff | $2.73{ }^{+}$ | 3.30** | 4.00* | $4.19{ }^{+}$ | $5.05{ }^{+}$ | $5.44{ }^{+}$ | 3.76 | 3.84 | | $\geq 10 \%$ Layoff | 2.05 | 2.10 | 2.46 | 2.89 | 3.11 | 3.40 | 3.40 | 5.79 |
Note: Mean values were rounded to three decimal places; n = 72 n = 72 n=72n=72 companies which made layoff announcements between 1989 through
注:均值四舍五入至小数点后三位; n = 72 n = 72 n=72n=72 指 1989 年至今宣布裁员的公司数量

differences were no longer statistically significant. Even though the large-scale layoff firms generally experienced improved financial performance, firms laying off less than 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% consistently out-performed them in subsequent years ( 2 - to 7 -year lags). Financially, firms laying off less than 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% of their work force significantly out-performed firms laying off more than 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% in 17 of the 30 possible lagged year comparisons ( p s < p s < ps <p s< .10 ; see Table 4). The “asset efficiency” financial index did not follow a similar pattern of results. In this instance, asset efficiency indices for firms implementing large-scale layoffs were consistently higher beginning with the base year and continuing up to seven years after the layoff. Although this does seem to support the idea that large layoff companies exhibited more sales per dollar of investment, an indicator of increased efficiency, it does not seem to have carried over to increased profitability. In contrast, the other four measures are more directly affected by a firm’s actual financial performance. Overall, this post hoc analysis supports the view that companies which layoff a larger percentage of their work force perform relatively poorer than those companies with smaller layoffs. These results bring in to question what cutoff constitutes a significant layoff (e.g., 3 % 3 % 3%3 \% or 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% ).
差异不再具有统计学显著性。尽管大规模裁员的公司通常经历了财务表现的改善,但裁员少于 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 的公司在随后的几年(2 至 7 年滞后期)中持续表现优于前者。从财务角度看,裁员少于 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 的公司在 30 个可能的滞后年份比较中,有 17 次显著优于裁员多于 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 的公司( p s < p s < ps <p s< .10;见表 4)。“资产效率”财务指标未呈现类似的结果模式。在这种情况下,实施大规模裁员的公司的资产效率指数从基准年开始一直持续到裁员后七年均较高。虽然这似乎支持大规模裁员公司每投资一美元的销售额更高,即效率提升的指标,但这种效率提升似乎并未转化为盈利能力的提高。相比之下,其他四项指标更直接反映了公司的实际财务表现。 总体而言,这一事后分析支持这样一种观点:裁员比例较大的公司,其表现相对较差,而裁员比例较小的公司表现较好。这些结果对裁员的显著界限(例如, 3 % 3 % 3%3 \% 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% )提出了质疑。
The frequency of layoff announcements also may influence a company’s financial performance. Of the 78 companies in the Fortune 100 that announced layoffs during the eightyear period of investigation, 47 announced layoffs three or more times. It was hypothesized that the financial performance of these companies would be lower than companies that laid off less frequently. Table 5 dis-
裁员公告的频率也可能影响公司的财务表现。在调查的八年期间,财富 100 强中有 78 家公司宣布了裁员,其中 47 家公司宣布裁员三次或更多次。假设这些公司财务表现会低于裁员频率较低的公司。表 5 显示——

plays the mean values of the five financial indices for “high-” and “lowfrequency” layoff companies. Both profit margin and ROA were statistically significant in 1996, the final year of the eight years layoffs were examined. In particular, it was found that companies laying off three or more times performed worse than companies laying off two or fewer times. Profit margin and ROA were not statistically significant in 1997 (one year later) and 1998 (two years later). Although the comparison of high- and low-frequency layoff companies failed to reach statistical significance, 13 of the 15 mean financial values were lower for firms downsizing more frequently. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported, in that the financial performance of companies which frequently downsized was consistently lower than those companies that downsized less often.
展示了“高频”和“低频”裁员公司的五个财务指标的平均值。1996 年,即裁员研究的最后一年,利润率和资产回报率(ROA)在统计上显著。特别是发现,裁员三次或以上的公司表现比裁员两次或以下的公司更差。利润率和资产回报率在 1997 年(一年后)和 1998 年(两年后)则未达到统计显著性。尽管高频和低频裁员公司的比较未达到统计显著性,但 15 个平均财务指标中有 13 个在频繁裁员的公司中较低。因此,假设 3 部分得到支持,即频繁裁员公司的财务表现持续低于较少裁员的公司。

DISCUSSION  讨论

The present study examined the long-term relationship of organizational downsizing on five commonlyused measures of financial performance from 1987 to 1998. In comparing companies which did and did not announce layoffs, it was found that downsizing companies performed significantly poorer up to two years following the announcement on several financial indices. However, beginning with the third year, none of the differences reached statistical significance. When analyzing the magnitude of the announced layoff, it was observed that companies that had laid off a relatively small number of employees (three percent or less) performed significantly better on four of the five financial indices in the year of the announcement (i.e.,
本研究考察了 1987 年至 1998 年间组织裁员与五项常用财务绩效指标的长期关系。通过比较宣布裁员与未宣布裁员的公司,发现裁员公司在宣布后的两年内,在多个财务指标上的表现显著较差。然而,从第三年开始,所有差异均未达到统计显著性。在分析宣布裁员规模时,观察到裁员人数较少(3%或以下)的公司在宣布当年,在五项财务指标中的四项表现显著更好(即,

Table 5   表 5
Mean Financial Performance Values for Companies with “Low” and “High” Frequency Layoff Announcements
低频率与高频率裁员公告公司的平均财务绩效值
Performance Measure   绩效指标 1996 1997 1998
Profit Margin  利润率
Low frequency  低频率 .077* . 074 . 071
High frequency  高频率 . 047 . 053 . 054
ROA
Low frequency  低频率 .079** . 076 . 068
High frequency  高频率 . 044 . 051 . 052
ROE
Low frequency  低频率 . 200 . 200 . 190
High frequency  高频率 . 150 . 170 . 200
Asset Efficiency  资产效率
Low frequency  低频率 1.03 1.05 1.00
High frequency  高频率 1.03 1.01 0.93
Market-to-Book Ratio  市净率
Low frequency  低频率 4.88 5.93 6.26
High frequency  高频率 3.34 4.55 5.11
Performance Measure 1996 1997 1998 Profit Margin Low frequency .077* . 074 . 071 High frequency . 047 . 053 . 054 ROA Low frequency .079** . 076 . 068 High frequency . 044 . 051 . 052 ROE Low frequency . 200 . 200 . 190 High frequency . 150 . 170 . 200 Asset Efficiency Low frequency 1.03 1.05 1.00 High frequency 1.03 1.01 0.93 Market-to-Book Ratio Low frequency 4.88 5.93 6.26 High frequency 3.34 4.55 5.11| Performance Measure | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | Profit Margin | | | | | Low frequency | .077* | . 074 | . 071 | | High frequency | . 047 | . 053 | . 054 | | ROA | | | | | Low frequency | .079** | . 076 | . 068 | | High frequency | . 044 | . 051 | . 052 | | ROE | | | | | Low frequency | . 200 | . 200 | . 190 | | High frequency | . 150 | . 170 | . 200 | | Asset Efficiency | | | | | Low frequency | 1.03 | 1.05 | 1.00 | | High frequency | 1.03 | 1.01 | 0.93 | | Market-to-Book Ratio | | | | | Low frequency | 4.88 | 5.93 | 6.26 | | High frequency | 3.34 | 4.55 | 5.11 |
Note: Mean values were rounded off to three decimal places. Low frequency companies ( n = 29 n = 29 n=29n=29 ) made one or two layoff announcements between 1989 and 1996. High frequency companies ( n = 47 n = 47 n=47n=47 ) made three or more layoff announcements during this time.
注:均值四舍五入至小数点后三位。低频率公司( n = 29 n = 29 n=29n=29 )在 1989 年至 1996 年间发布了一到两次裁员公告。高频率公司( n = 47 n = 47 n=47n=47 )在此期间发布了三次或更多裁员公告。

p < .05 ; p < .01 p < .05 ; p < .01 ^(**)p < .05;^(****)p < .01{ }^{*} p<.05 ;{ }^{* *} p<.01.
the base year). In contrast, there were no significant financial differences found after this initial base year. For companies that announced largescale layoffs (10% or higher), many statistically significant differences were observed throughout the eightyear period of investigation. It was found that companies laying off 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% or more of the work force significantly under-performed firms laying off less on profit margin, ROA, ROE, and market-to-book ratio. The study also investigated the frequency in which companies announced layoffs during the eight-year period. The results indicated that the frequency with which downsizing occurred had a slight negative relationship with financial performance (viz., those firms laying off more often reported lower financial performance).
基准年)。相比之下,在此初始基准年之后未发现显著的财务差异。对于宣布大规模裁员(10%或以上)的公司,在整个八年调查期间观察到了许多统计学上显著的差异。研究发现,裁员 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 或以上比例的公司在利润率、资产回报率(ROA)、股本回报率(ROE)和市净率方面显著表现不如裁员比例较低的公司。该研究还调查了公司在八年期间宣布裁员的频率。结果表明,裁员发生的频率与财务表现之间存在轻微的负相关关系(即,裁员频率较高的公司报告的财务表现较低)。
Many corporate executives believe that when a company gets into financial trouble due to lagging sales or rising costs, cutting the size of the organization to reduce fat and waste is a normal, effective response. In some ways the findings of this study support the assertion that downsizing works. The data clearly show that the firms which downsized were significantly under-performing the firms which did not downsize on several financial indices in the year of the announced layoff and each of the two subsequent years. However, three years after the announcement occurred and for the remaining years investigated, the firms that had laid off were no longer significantly under-performing their counterparts. It seems that downsizing helped those companies improve their financial success relative to the non-downsizing firms. This viewpoint would be consistent with the economic theory proposed by McKinley et al. (2000). That is, the decision by
许多企业高管认为,当公司因销售滞后或成本上升而陷入财务困境时,裁减组织规模以减少冗余和浪费是一种正常且有效的应对措施。在某种程度上,本研究的发现支持了裁员有效的说法。数据显示,在宣布裁员的当年及随后两年内,进行裁员的公司在多个财务指标上明显表现不如未裁员的公司。然而,在宣布裁员后三年及之后的调查年份中,裁员公司不再显著落后于其未裁员的同行。看来,裁员帮助这些公司相较于未裁员公司改善了财务表现。这一观点与 McKinley 等人(2000)提出的经济理论是一致的。也就是说,决策者通过...

the executives to layoff did result in a financial improvement. Further, it could be argued that the downsizing decisions implemented by executives may have saved the organization from continuing financial deterioration and possible bankruptcy.
裁员的高管确实带来了财务上的改善。此外,可以认为由高管实施的裁员决策可能挽救了组织,避免了持续的财务恶化和可能的破产。
The magnitude of the downsizing appears to have little effect on the financial performance of a firm, unless the size of the layoff is very large. Contrary to what Cascio (1998) proposed, the financial performance of firms laying off less than three percent of the work force were not significantly different than those companies laying off three percent or more. It is important to note that companies announcing large-scale ( 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% or higher) layoffs continued to significantly un-der-perform those companies with downsizing announcements less than 10 % 10 % 10%10 \%. Thus, the large-scale downsizing strategy implemented by executive management did not close the financial performance gap. The decision by executives to reduce the work force by 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% or more may be perceived by employees as a major violation of the psychological contract. The psychological contract literature would theorize that when employees believe there has been a serious breach it likely will adversely influence their attitudes, behaviors, and performance. Ultimately, the financial performance of the firm will be adversely impacted
裁员规模对企业财务绩效的影响似乎不大,除非裁员规模非常大。与 Cascio(1998)提出的观点相反,裁员人数少于 3%的企业的财务绩效与裁员人数达到或超过 3%的企业并无显著差异。值得注意的是,宣布大规模( 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 或以上)裁员的公司,其财务表现仍显著低于那些宣布裁员规模低于 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 的公司。因此,执行管理层实施的大规模裁员策略并未缩小财务绩效差距。高管决定裁员 10 % 10 % 10%10 \% 或以上,可能被员工视为对心理契约的重大违背。心理契约理论认为,当员工认为存在严重违约时,可能会对其态度、行为和绩效产生负面影响。最终,企业的财务绩效将受到不利影响。
The relationship between downsizing frequency and financial performance appears small. For those companies which have implemented a series of small job cuts, it appears that it does not have a deleterious effect on financial performance. This finding may be explained by the institutional perspective (McKinley et al., 2000). This approach suggests when
裁员频率与财务绩效之间的关系似乎较小。对于那些实施了一系列小规模裁员的公司来说,裁员似乎并未对财务绩效产生不利影响。这个发现可以通过制度视角来解释(McKinley 等,2000)。该方法表明,当

employees experience many layoffs they may begin to accept this organizational action as a legitimate strategy in a competitive, global marketplace. The gradual acceptance of downsizing may diminish the adverse feeling employees have toward management, lessening the negative effect on their performance. Consequently, this finding suggests that executives troubled with the prospect of frequent layoff announcements should not be overly concerned.
员工经历多次裁员时,他们可能开始接受这一组织行为,认为这是在竞争激烈的全球市场中的一种合理策略。对裁员的逐渐接受可能会减轻员工对管理层的负面情绪,从而减少对其绩效的负面影响。因此,这一发现表明,面对频繁裁员公告前景而感到困扰的高管不必过于担忧。
At the same time, executives should recognize that downsizing activities create a disruption within the organization’s culture that can affect employees as well as customers (Bastien et al., 1996; Shah, 2000). When implemented poorly, employees may perceive the downsizing as a violation of the psychological contract which may lead to several organizational problems. It likely takes something far more innovative than simply laying off employees to renew an organization and re-position it for profitability (De Meuse and Marks, 2003; Mische, 2001). Recently, several companies which were faced with cutting costs tried alternative measures to employee layoffs. At Hewlett Packard, employee raises were delayed for three months and top executives received no annual bonuses. Squeezed by a continuing decline in trading volume, Charles Schwab ordered half of its 26,000 employees to take three unscheduled days off during a fiveweek period. Employees could take the days as unpaid leave or as part of their allotted paid vacation. First Union Bank requested their work force to restrict first-class travel and limit their hotel expenses. Several other corporations have requested that their employees take sabbaticals, unpaid vacations, or time off to reduce
同时,管理层应认识到,裁员活动会在组织文化中造成干扰,影响员工和客户(Bastien 等,1996;Shah,2000)。如果执行不当,员工可能会将裁员视为对心理契约的违背,从而引发多种组织问题。要想重塑组织并重新定位以实现盈利,可能需要比简单裁员更具创新性的措施(De Meuse 和 Marks,2003;Mische,2001)。最近,一些面临削减成本压力的公司尝试了除裁员以外的替代措施。在惠普,员工加薪被推迟了三个月,高管则没有获得年度奖金。由于交易量持续下降,查尔斯·施瓦布公司命令其 26,000 名员工中的一半在五周内休三天非计划假期。员工可以选择无薪休假或将其计入带薪假期。第一联合银行要求员工限制头等舱旅行并控制酒店开支。 还有几家公司要求员工休长假、无薪假期或休假以降低

labor costs (e.g., Intel, Adobe Systems, Accenture). The effect of these measures on a company’s financial performance remains to be measured.
劳动力成本(例如,英特尔、Adobe 系统、埃森哲)。这些措施对公司财务绩效的影响尚待评估。
There are some limitations that may impact the generalizability of the findings of this study. Obviously, the sample size of companies investigated was small ( N = 100 N = 100 N=100N=100 ). Likewise, they represent some of the largest corporations in the U.S. One needs to be cautious when generalizing the effects of downsizing to other, smaller firms. When one examines Table 2, it becomes apparent that the overall economy likely influences the financial health of all companies to a large extent. It is easy to observe the financial decline bottoming out in 1992 and a subsequent gradual increase in corporate profits, ROA, and ROE. This trend is true whether a set of companies conducted downsizing or not. To reduce the effect of the economy on the financial data, we established the layoff year for a given company as the “base year” and each subsequent year as a “lag year.” Consequently, the financial performance for the “base year” and “lagged year” displayed in Tables 3 and 4 report financial performance irrespective of the specific year the downsizing occurred. Nevertheless, the overall time frame in which downsizing is examined in this study remains primarily in the 1990s. Finally, the reader should remember that “cause and effect” conclusions cannot be drawn. Do companies that layoff cause poor financial results, or do companies layoff because of poor financial performance? Certainly, the latter point is partially true. This study investigated the relationship of downsizing on financial performance. A number of factors affect the financial
本研究的发现存在一些可能影响其普遍适用性的局限性。显然,所调查的公司样本量较小( N = 100 N = 100 N=100N=100 )。同样,这些公司代表了美国一些最大的企业。在将裁员的影响推广到其他较小的公司时,需要保持谨慎。查看表 2 时,可以明显看出整体经济很大程度上影响了所有公司的财务状况。很容易观察到 1992 年财务状况触底,随后企业利润、资产回报率(ROA)和股本回报率(ROE)逐渐回升。这一趋势无论公司是否进行了裁员都适用。为了减少经济因素对财务数据的影响,我们将某公司裁员的年份设为“基准年”,之后的每一年设为“滞后年”。因此,表 3 和表 4 中显示的“基准年”和“滞后年”的财务表现反映的是不考虑具体裁员年份的财务状况。然而,本研究中裁员所考察的总体时间范围主要集中在 1990 年代。 最后,读者应当记住,不能得出“因果关系”的结论。是裁员导致了财务业绩不佳,还是公司因为财务表现不佳而裁员?当然,后者在一定程度上是正确的。本研究调查了裁员与财务业绩之间的关系。许多因素都会影响财务状况。

health of companies. Any field research, such as this one, must be careful to not overly dramatize the findings. Perhaps, the most appropriate conclusion that one can draw from this study is that downsizing appears to be somewhat related to the financial performance of a company. During the initial few years following downsizing, financial performance is poor but then improves. An obvious question for future research is whether those companies that had downsized would have turned themselves around more quickly if they had not downsized in the first place. One approach to examine this question might be to identify a pool of poor-performing firms and compare the subsequent performance of those
公司的健康状况。任何实地研究,如本研究,必须谨慎避免过度夸大其发现。或许,从本研究中可以得出的最恰当结论是,裁员似乎与公司的财务表现有一定关联。在裁员后的最初几年内,财务表现较差,但随后有所改善。未来研究的一个显而易见的问题是,那些进行了裁员的公司,如果一开始没有裁员,是否会更快实现转变。探讨这一问题的一种方法可能是识别一批表现不佳的公司,并比较这些公司随后表现的差异。

firms which did downsize and those that did not.
进行了裁员的公司与未进行裁员的公司。
This research investigation cannot evaluate the merits of downsizing for a specific company. The findings suggest that when a company implements downsizing it will take several years before its financial health will re-emerge. The uncertainty and turmoil created by downsizing will take time to dissipate. Nevertheless, the findings do suggest that after a “healing period,” the company likely will improve. The two prior empirically-based studies conducted by Cascio (1998) and De Meuse et al. (1994) simply may have not investigated the downsizing process long enough to observe an eventual increase in the financial performance of those companies.
本研究无法评估裁员对特定公司的优劣。研究结果表明,当公司实施裁员时,其财务状况需要数年时间才能恢复。裁员带来的不确定性和动荡需要时间来消散。然而,研究结果确实表明,在经历“恢复期”后,公司很可能会有所改善。Cascio(1998)和 De Meuse 等人(1994)之前的两项基于实证的研究,可能只是没有对裁员过程进行足够长时间的调查,因此未能观察到这些公司财务绩效最终的提升。

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    • This article is dedicated to the memory of our friend, Dr. Thomas J. Bergmann. Tom passed away May 30, 2003, after a short battle with cancer.
      本文献给我们的朋友 Thomas J. Bergmann 博士的纪念。Tom 于 2003 年 5 月 30 日因与癌症的短暂斗争去世。
  1. Hypothesis 3: The financial performance of companies which frequently downsize (i.e., three or more times during an eight-year period) will be significantly lower than companies which downsize less frequently.
    假设 3:频繁裁员的公司(即在八年期间裁员三次或以上)的财务表现将显著低于裁员较少的公司。