How Likely Is War Over Taiwan? Watch These Three Numbers
就台湾开战的可能性有多大？关注这三个数字

Senior US officials and military commanders have offered a wildly varying range of predictions for when Chinese President Xi Jinping might order an invasion of Taiwan. Such speculation captures headlines but doesn’t much help businesses looking to ascertain the real probability of war. It would be far simpler — and probably more accurate — for them to track three crucial data points.
美国高级官员和军事指挥官对中国国家主席习近平何时可能下令入侵台湾的预测大相径庭。这些猜测吸引了众多头条新闻，但对那些希望确定战争真实可能性的企业却没有多大帮助。对企业来说，跟踪三个关键数据点可能会简单得多，也可能准确得多。

One lesson China has learned from Russia’s botched invasion of Ukraine is how poorly President Vladimir Putin prepared for the conflict. In spite of having had eight years to fortify the Russian economy after annexing Crimea in 2014, Putin left many critical vulnerabilities exposed.
中国从俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的失败中吸取的一个教训是，普京总统为这场冲突所做的准备是多么的不充分。尽管在2014年吞并克里米亚之后，普京用八年时间巩固了俄罗斯的经济，但他还是暴露了许多关键漏洞。

On the eve of the invasion, for example, Russia parked $300 billion , about half of its total foreign exchange reserves, in Western financial institutions, where they were promptly frozen. Blinded by optimistic assumptions of a blitzkrieg victory, he did not stock up on enough artillery shells or components for weapons to wage a protracted war of attrition.
例如，在入侵前夕，俄罗斯将 3,000 亿美元（约占其外汇储备总额的一半）存入西方金融机构，并迅速被冻结。他被闪电战胜利的乐观假设蒙蔽了双眼，没有储备足够的炮弹或武器部件来发动一场持久的消耗战。

Chinese leaders are not likely to make the same mistakes. To put China in a better position for a potentially drawn-out conflict with the US, they will pay particular attention to three measures of self-sufficiency: the levels of China’s foreign exchange reserves held in Western financial institutions, its strategic food stocks, and its oil reserves.
中国领导人不可能重蹈覆辙。为了使中国在与美国可能发生的旷日持久的冲突中处于更有利的地位，他们将特别关注自给自足的三个衡量标准：中国在西方金融机构持有的外汇储备水平、战略粮食储备和石油储备。

Ahead of any war, China can be expected to shrink its exposure to Western financial pressure, selling off US Treasuries and using the proceeds to buy gold or other assets beyond Washington’s reach. Simultaneously, China will likely divest its euro, yen, and pound holdings.
在任何战争爆发之前，可以预期中国将缩小其在西方金融压力下的风险敞口，抛售美国国债，并用所得资金购买黄金或其他华盛顿无法触及的资产。与此同时，中国很可能会减持欧元、日元和英镑。

China’s holdings of US Treasuries have shrunk from $1.17 trillion at the end of January 2018 (right before the US-China trade war began) to just over $770 billion now. Geopolitical tensions have contributed to the decline, as China has apparently been selling Treasuries to buy gold . The slumping Chinese economy has also resulted a weaker renminbi. As a result, China does not need to buy Treasuries to keep its currency from appreciating.
中国持有的美国国债已从2018年1月底（就在中美贸易战开始之前）的1.17万亿美元缩水到现在的7700多亿美元。地缘政治紧张局势促成了这一下降，因为中国显然一直在抛售国债购买黄金。中国经济下滑也导致人民币走软。因此，中国不需要购买国债来防止货币升值。

Thus far, the numbers reflect a gradual decline, not a precipitous fall. If China dumps most of its holdings in a very short period of time, on the other hand, a war over Taiwan is likely imminent. Although selling off holdings in a rush would entail severe financial losses, Beijing would at least avoid losing everything.
到目前为止，这些数字反映的是逐步下降，而不是急剧下降。另一方面，如果中国在很短的时间内抛售其持有的大部分股份，那么台湾战争很可能一触即发。虽然匆忙抛售会带来严重的经济损失，但中国政府至少可以避免倾家荡产。

Another number worth watching is China’s food self-sufficiency ratio. In 2000, the country was able to source 94% of its food supplies domestically. The ratio fell to 66% in 2020, implying that China relies on imports for about a third of its needs.
另一个值得关注的数字是中国的粮食自给率。2000 年，中国 94% 的粮食供应来自国内。到 2020 年，这一比例将降至 66%，这意味着中国约有三分之一的粮食需求依赖进口。

In a major conflict, the US navy could cut off China’s trading routes. That is why the government passed an unprecedented law in March that declares food self-sufficiency a top priority. While it’s unclear how high the self-sufficiency ratio will need to be for Xi to feel comfortable, it’s almost certain to be much greater than 66%.
在重大冲突中，美国海军可能会切断中国的贸易路线。正因如此，中国政府在三月份通过了一项史无前例的法律，宣布粮食自给自足是重中之重。虽然目前还不清楚自给率需要达到多高才能让习近平感到放心，但几乎可以肯定的是，自给率将远远高于 66%。

Similarly, the US may interdict Chinese seaborne oil imports should a war break out. Total Chinese crude stockpiles (including both commercial stocks and government reserves) stood at 934 million barrels in January this year, enough for about two months of consumption . Obviously, China will need to build up those reserves if it wants to fight a war.
同样，如果爆发战争，美国可能会阻止中国的海运石油进口。今年 1 月，中国的原油库存总量（包括商业库存和政府储备）为 9.34 亿桶，足够大约两个月的消费量。显然，如果中国想打一场战争，就需要增加这些储备。

All this means China will telegraph its intentions far in advance of a deliberate attack. Building up oil stocks and increasing food security will be costly and require years of work. Even then, no conflict is likely to be launched until China drastically reduces its Treasury holdings, which will be visible to all.
所有这一切都意味着，中国将在蓄意攻击之前提前发出信号，表明自己的意图。建立石油储备和加强粮食安全将耗资巨大，需要多年的努力。即便如此，在中国大幅减持国债之前，也不可能发动冲突，而这将是有目共睹的。

The probability of an all-out war over Taiwan is thus currently very low. The more pressing danger — as demonstrated by this week’s detention of a Taiwanese fishing vessel by the Chinese Coast Guard — will be an accidental conflict, a crisis originating in miscalculations or provocations by Beijing, Washington, or Taipei. That’s what all sides should be preparing for — and striving to prevent.
因此，目前就台湾问题爆发全面战争的可能性非常低。更紧迫的危险--正如本周中国海警扣留台湾渔船事件所显示的--将是意外冲突，即由北京、华盛顿或台北的误判或挑衅引发的危机。这是所有各方都应做好准备并努力防止的。

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