The interaction of multiple drivers of intra-organizational change in ministerial administrations: A study of three decades of structural reforms in the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture
部长级行政管理中组织内部变革的多种驱动因素的相互作用：奥地利农业部三十年结构性改革的研究

Christina Lichtmannegger
克里斯蒂娜·利希特曼格

Leibniz University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany
莱布尼茨大学，德国 汉诺威

Tobias Bach
托比亚斯·巴赫

Abstract
抽象

Public Policy and Administration
公共政策与管理

2023, Vol. 38(3) 287–308 ! The Author(s) 2020
2023 年，第 38 卷第 3 期，第 287-308 页！作者 2020

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Administrative reform policies cutting across several sectors are commonplace in the public sector. However, reform policies do not necessarily result in organizational change. This article examines intra-organizational change within the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture in a longitudinal case study covering a period of three decades, which allows us to study short-term and long term-effects of administrative reforms. Whereas existing research mainly uses single-factor explanations for inter- and intra-organizational change, this article emphasizes the interplay of various drivers of organizational change within government organizations. In analytical terms, we draw on the multiple streams framework to study intra-organizational decision-making which is embedded in government-wide administrative reform policies. We find that reform leads to intra-organizational change when a political entrepreneur is able to couple
跨越多个部门的行政改革政策在公共部门很常见。然而，改革政策不一定会导致组织变革。本文通过涵盖三十年的纵向案例研究研究了奥地利农业部内部的组织内部变化，这使我们能够研究行政改革的短期和长期影响。虽然现有的研究主要使用单因素解释组织间和组织内化变化，但本文强调政府组织内部组织变革的各种驱动因素的相互作用。在分析方面，我们利用多流框架来研究嵌入政府行政改革政策的组织内部决策。我们发现，当政治企业家能够结合时，改革会导致组织内部的变化

Corresponding author:
通讯作者：

Christina Lichtmannegger, Leibniz University of Hannover, Schneiderberg 50, 30167 Hannover, Germany.
Christina Lichtmannegger，汉诺威莱布尼茨大学，德国汉诺威 Schneiderberg 50 号，30167。

Email: c.lichtmannegger@ipw.uni-hannover.de
电子邮件： c.lichtmannegger@ipw.uni-hannover.de

solutions and problems in a decision window, which may happen decades after the initial reform attempts, underscoring that short-term reform failure may turn into success in a long-term perspective.
决策窗口中的解决方案和问题，这可能发生在最初的改革尝试几十年后，强调短期改革的失败可能会从长期角度转变为成功。

Keywords
关键字

Europeanization, ministerial administration, multiple streams approach, reform implementation, organizational change
欧洲化、部长级行政、多流方法、改革实施、组织变革

Introduction
介绍

The last decades have witnessed changing reform doctrines in the public sector and different waves of structural changes. Administrative reforms have become an everyday activity in the public sector. There is an increasing body of knowledge about structural changes in ministerial departments (Davis et al., 1999; Derlien, 1996; Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2015; Pollitt, 1984). In contrast, few scholars have paid attention to the dynamics of intra-organizational changes in ministerial departments (Christensen 1997; Hustedt, 2013). Moreover, most authors focus on single-factor explanations of structural change, such as administrative reforms (Rolland and Roness, 2012), Europeanization (Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007; Zubek and Staronova ´ , 2012), or political explanations such as political turnover (Holmgren, 2018; James et al., 2016) and changes in political attention (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2015). These studies are important, yet they potentially disregard the interplay of various drivers of structural change in government organizations.
过去几十年见证了公共部门改革理论的变化和不同的结构变革浪潮。行政改革已成为公共部门的日常活动。关于部长级部门结构变化的知识越来越多（Davis et al.， 1999;Derlien， 1996;Mortensen 和 Green-Pedersen，2015 年;Pollitt， 1984）。相比之下，很少有学者关注部长级部门组织内部变化的动态（Christensen 1997;Hustedt，2013 年）。此外，大多数作者专注于结构变化的单因素解释，例如行政改革（Rolland 和 Roness，2012 年）、欧洲化（Dimitrova 和 Toshkov，2007 年;Zubek 和 Staronova' ，2012 年），或政治解释，例如政治更替（Holmgren，2018 年;James et al.， 2016） 和政治关注度的变化 （Mortensen and Green-Pedersen， 2015）。这些研究很重要，但它们可能忽视了政府组织中结构变化的各种驱动因素的相互作用。

Much of the literature takes a macro perspective on the entire population of a specific type of organization such as ministerial departments (Davis et al., 1999; Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2015; Pollitt, 1984), while case studies of longterm dynamics of structural changes unfolding within the same organization are largely missing (but see Corbett and Howard, 2017). Despite governments’ ubiquitous reform efforts, we know little about the short- and long-term effects of structural reform policies (but see Christensen, 1997; March and Olsen, 1983). As we argue in more detail below, a longitudinal case study design is suitable to address those challenges, namely to investigate several explanatory factors for structural change within a single organization. This allows us to assess their interactions and the conditions under which different explanations provide most analytical leverage (MacCarthaigh et al., 2012).
许多文献对特定类型组织（如部长级部门）的整个人口采取了宏视角（Davis et al.， 1999;Mortensen 和 Green-Pedersen，2015 年;Pollitt，1984 年），而关于同一组织内部展开的结构变化的长期动态的案例研究在很大程度上缺失（但参见 Corbett 和 Howard，2017 年）。尽管政府的改革努力无处不在，但我们对结构性改革政策的短期和长期影响知之甚少（但见 Christensen，1997 年;March 和 Olsen，1983 年）。正如我们在下面更详细地论述的那样，纵向案例研究设计适合应对这些挑战，即调查单个组织内结构变化的几个解释因素。这使我们能够评估它们的相互作用以及不同解释提供最大分析杠杆的条件（MacCarthaigh et al.， 2012）。

Another challenge for analyzing the determinants of structural change is the gap between the time horizon of theoretical explanations and the dynamics of structural change. Although organizational studies show that change is a long-term process (Donaldson, 1996), it is striking that structural changes in public organizations are primarily studied as short-term processes (Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007). We argue that scholars should differentiate between explanatory factors that immediately affect change, and factors that unfold their explanatory power over time. To illustrate, Derlien (1996) shows that political factors such as changes in the governing coalition increase the size of ministries, whereas ministerial structures are adjusted over time as response to intra-organizational coordination problems. In a similar vein, we lack sound theoretical explanations and empirical studies addressing the timing of structural change responding to internal dysfunctions. For example, contingency theory assumes that environmental change leads to internal dysfunctions (“misfit”) which will result in structural adaptation (Donaldson, 1996). However, contingency theory does not elaborate on the timing of structural change.
分析结构变化的决定因素的另一个挑战是理论解释的时间范围与结构变化的动态之间的差距。尽管组织研究表明变革是一个长期的过程（Donaldson， 1996），但令人惊讶的是，公共组织的结构变化主要作为短期过程进行研究（Dimitrova 和 Toshkov， 2007）。我们认为，学者们应该区分立即影响变化的解释因素和随着时间的推移展开其解释力的因素。为了说明这一点，Derlien （1996） 表明，政治因素（例如管理联盟的变化）增加了部委的规模，而部长结构则随着时间的推移而调整，以应对组织内部的协调问题。同样，我们缺乏合理的理论解释和实证研究来解决结构变化对内部功能障碍的反应时间。例如，权变理论假设环境变化会导致内部功能障碍（“不合适”），这将导致结构适应（Donaldson，1996）。然而，权变理论并没有详细说明结构变化的时间。

In order to fill these gaps, this article asks when and how deliberate administrative reforms lead to structural changes, as well as how they interact with other theoretically relevant drivers of structural change. More specifically, we ask how administrative reforms, intra-organizational coordination problems, changes in political priorities, and external pressure shape both the timing and the extent of structural changes inside ministries. Those structural changes are operationalized as (changes in) the allocation of tasks inside the ministry and (changes in) the number of distinct types of organizational units as a result of the creation of new units, the merger of existing units, or the splitting-up of existing units.
为了填补这些空白，本文询问了深思熟虑的行政改革何时以及如何导致结构性变化，以及它们如何与结构性变化的其他理论相关驱动因素相互作用。更具体地说，我们询问了行政改革、组织内部协调问题、政治优先事项的变化和外部压力如何影响各部委内部结构变化的时间和程度。这些结构性的变化作为由于创建新单位、合并现有单位或分割现有单位而导致的事工内部任务分配的（变化）和不同类型的组织单位数量的（变化）。

We study these questions through an in-depth analysis of the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture between 1986 and 2015. This case is highly insightful since the country’s European Union (EU) accession in 1995 resulted in various coordination problems, with wholesale administrative reform initiatives taking place at the same time. External pressure for change was particularly high for this portfolio given the high degree of EU integration in agricultural policy. However, despite a substantial change of the ministry’s environment, several attempts at internal reorganization failed, but eventually resulted in a major reorganization. Those dynamics make this ministry an interesting case to study the conditions for successful reforms. The aim of this article is to understand the dynamics behind (un)successful reforms of government organizations.
我们通过对 1986 年至 2015 年间奥地利农业部的深入分析来研究这些问题。本案具有很强的洞察力，因为该国于 1995 年加入欧盟 （EU） 导致了各种协调问题，同时又发生了大规模的行政改革举措。鉴于欧盟在农业政策中的高度一体化，该投资组合的外部变革压力尤其大。然而，尽管 ministry 的环境发生了重大变化，但几次内部重组的尝试都失败了，但最终导致了一次重大重组。这些动态使该部成为研究成功改革条件的有趣案例。本文的目的是了解政府机构改革（不）成功背后的动力。

The article draws on multiple data sources, including 15 interviews with seasoned employees and document analysis (reform proposals, organizational charts, etc.) gathered during a one-month stay by Lichtmannegger in the ministry. In theoretical terms, the article applies central insights of the multiple streams framework (Herweg et al., 2017; Kingdon, 2003) for explaining structural change in a dynamic perspective, while simultaneously drawing on existing studies of changes in the machinery of government. We make a novel contribution by adjusting the multiple streams framework to explain intra-organizational change. The existing literature applying the multiple streams framework associates the decision-making stage of the policy process with parliamentary decision-making (Herweg et al., 2017). We expand the scope of the multiple streams framework by studying decisions that largely remain within the executive sphere. The next section introduces the article’s analytical model and highlights the distinct contribution of the multiple streams perspective on structural changes. After introducing methods and data, we provide an account of four key episodes of intra-organizational structural change. Finally, we discuss theoretical implications of our findings.
本文利用了多个数据来源，包括对经验丰富的员工的 15 次采访以及 Lichtmannegger 在该部逗留一个月期间收集的文件分析（改革提案、组织结构图等）。在理论上，本文应用了多流框架的核心见解（Herweg et al.， 2017;Kingdon，2003 年），从动态的角度解释结构变化，同时借鉴了对政府机器变化的现有研究。我们通过调整多流框架来解释组织内部的变化，做出了新的贡献。应用多流框架的现有文献将政策过程的决策阶段与议会决策联系起来（Herweg et al.， 2017）。我们通过研究主要保留在执行范围内的决策来扩展多流框架的范围。下一节介绍了本文的分析模型，并强调了多流视角对结构变化的不同贡献。在介绍方法和数据之后，我们提供了组织内部结构变化的四个关键事件的解释。最后，我们讨论了我们发现的理论意义。

Administrative reforms and structural changes: A modified multiple streams model
行政改革和结构变化：改进的多流模型

The machinery of government literature identifies three important drivers of reorganization (Davis et al., 1999; Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2015; Pollitt, 1984): policy challenges that result from adaptation to external pressure such as EU membership; administrative challenges such as a perceived lack of efficiency and coordination; and political motives like marking a change of political priorities or the distribution of portfolios in coalition bargaining. In this article, we link these categories to the different elements of the multiple streams model (Herweg et al., 2015; Kingdon, 2003). This model was originally developed to explain agenda setting processes in the United States and was subsequently applied to various other political systems, e.g. parliamentary systems and the European Union (Herweg et al., 2017). Recent scholarship also uses the model to analyze the decision-making stage of the policy processes (Herweg et al., 2015). However, so far no adaptions have been made for agenda setting and decision processes which do not leave the executive sphere. The present article draws on the expanded multiple streams framework suggested by Herweg et al. (2017) and broadens the framework’s scope by analyzing the conditions under which government-wide reform policies lead to intra-organizational change.
政府文献的机制确定了重组的三个重要驱动因素（Davis et al.， 1999;Mortensen 和 Green-Pedersen，2015 年;Pollitt， 1984）：适应外部压力（如欧盟成员资格）导致的政策挑战;行政挑战，例如被认为缺乏效率和协调;以及政治动机，例如标志着政治优先事项的改变或在联盟谈判中分配投资组合。在本文中，我们将这些类别与多流模型的不同元素联系起来（Herweg et al.， 2015;Kingdon， 2003）。该模型最初是为了解释美国的议程设置过程而开发的，随后被应用于其他各种政治制度，例如议会制度和欧盟（Herweg et al.， 2017）。最近的学术研究还使用该模型来分析政策过程的决策阶段（Herweg et al.， 2015）。然而，到目前为止，还没有对不离开行政领域的议程设置和决策过程进行调整。本文借鉴了 Herweg 等人（2017 年）提出的扩展多流框架，并通过分析政府范围内的参考政策导致组织内部变化的条件来扩大框架的范围。

Administrative reforms can be defined as “deliberate attempts by political and administrative leaders” to change structures of organizations (Christensen et al., 2007: 122). Typically, administrative reforms are attempts to improve government organizations in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, or user-friendliness, targeting the entire government bureaucracy (March and Olsen, 1983). In consequence, reform decisions at the governmental (cabinet) level tend to be fairly general, and require subsequent decisions at the organizational level. This is particularly relevant under conditions of high ministerial autonomy, which is commonplace in parliamentary democracies. Against this background, organizational change is what “actually happens to such features” (Christensen et al., 2007: 122), i.e. organizational structures. Major administrative reforms can result in organizational changes, but these changes often are minor when compared to reform ambitions (March and Olsen, 1983). In the language of policy analysis, administrative reforms are comparable with policy proposals, and organizational change with the final policy output. In the following, we outline the core elements of the multiple streams framework, elaborate on the model’s adaptation to the decision-making stage of the policy process (Herweg et al., 2015), and combine this literature with the literature on the main drivers of reorganizations.
行政改革可以定义为“政治和行政领导人的蓄意尝试”，以改变组织结构（Christensen et al.， 2007： 122）。通常，行政改革是针对整个政府官僚机构，试图在有效性、效率或用户友好性方面改进政府组织（March 和 Olsen，1983）。因此，政府（内阁）层面的改革决策往往相当笼统，需要组织层面的后续决策。这在议会民主国家普遍存在的高度部长自主权的条件下尤为重要。在这种背景下，组织变革是“这些特征实际发生的情况”（Christensen et al.， 2007： 122），即组织结构。重大的行政改革可以导致组织的变化，但与改革雄心相比，这些变化往往是微不足道的（March 和 Olsen，1983）。在政策分析的语言中，行政改革与政策提案类似，组织变革与最终政策产出类似。在下文中，我们概述了多流框架的核心要素，详细说明了该模型对政策过程决策阶段的适应（Herweg et al.， 2015），并将这些文献与有关重组主要驱动因素的文献相结合。

The multiple streams framework conceptualizes policymaking as consisting of three independent streams—societal problems, policy alternatives, and political support (Kingdon, 2003). According to the model, major policy change results from the coupling of the three different streams by policy entrepreneurs under favorable conditions (“window of opportunity”). An important implication of the model is that policy alternatives exist independently from policy problems. They are linked to societal problems as a result of being available at a given point of time, rather than as a result of an instrumental problem-solving process.¹
多流框架将政策制定概念化为由三个独立的流组成——社会问题、政策选择和政治支持（Kingdon，2003）。根据该模型，重大政策变化是政策创业者在有利条件（“机会之窗”）下将三种不同流类耦合的结果。该模型的一个重要含义是，政策替代方案独立于政策问题而存在。它们与社会问题相关联，是因为在特定时间点可用，而不是工具性解决问题过程的结果。¹

In its original version, the multiple streams framework aims at explaining changes on the policy agenda. In a recent contribution, Herweg et al. (2015) distinguish between agenda and decision windows. They argue that a successful coupling of the streams by a policy entrepreneur opens up an “agenda window” which subsequently results in a “decision window” (Herweg et al., 2015). The final policy output will result from the successful coupling of the three different streams by political entrepreneurs at the decision-making stage (Zohlnhofer, 2016: 89). While€ a policy entrepreneur will try to frame a problem as urgent and to attract support for a policy proposal, a political entrepreneur—i.e. a policy entrepreneur with formal decision-making powers, such as an elected official—will take over at the decision-making stage and try to find a majority in parliament for the policy alternative. In order to gain a majority, the political entrepreneur may try to frame the proposal as highly necessary to ensure the support of potential veto players (Zohlnhofer, 2016: 89). This implies that the political stream plays a€ more decisive role in the decision stage compared to the agenda stage (Herweg et al., 2017).
在原始版本中，多流框架旨在解释政策议程的变化。在最近的一篇文章中，Herweg et al. （2015） 区分了议程窗口和决策窗口。他们认为，政策企业家成功地将流耦合 打开了一个“议程窗口”，随后导致了一个“决策窗口”（Herweg et al.， 2015）。最终的政策产出将来自政治企业家在决策阶段将三个不同的流派成功耦合 的结果（Zohlnhofer，2016：89）。当政策企业家试图将问题描述为紧迫问题并吸引对政策提案的支持时，政治企业家——即拥有正式决策权的政策企业家，例如高级官员——将在决策阶段接管，并试图在议会中为政策替代方案找到多数。为了获得多数，政治企业家可能会试图将提案构建为非常必要，以确保潜在否决权参与者的支持（Zohlnhofer，2016：89）。这意味着与议程阶段相比，政治流在决策阶段起着更决定性的作用（Herweg et al.， 2017）。

However, while parliamentary support may be needed to enact major administrative reforms cutting across multiple policy sectors, the final decision about intraorganizational changes will be taken at the ministry level. Those policy decisions require the support of the minister in charge who is the key political actor. For intraorganizational change, no formal veto players exist, yet bureaucrats are typically consulted before structures are changed. The latter have been found to have a strong self-interest in preserving the status quo (Christensen, 1997). The minister’s successful framing of structural changes as necessary to address a given problem is a key aspect of reducing bureaucratic resistance to change (Fernandez and Rainey, 2006). In the following, we develop an analytical framework linking the different elements of the modified multiple streams model—problems, solutions, politics, and political entrepreneurs—to the literature on the politics of structural reform.
然而，虽然可能需要议会的支持来实施跨越多个政策部门的重大行政改革，但关于组织内部变化的最终决定将在部委层面做出。这些政策决定需要主管部长的支持，他是关键的政治行为者。对于组织内部变革，不存在正式的否决权，但在结构变更之前通常会咨询官僚。后者被发现在维持现状方面具有强烈的自身利益（Christensen，1997 年）。部长成功地将结构性变革视为解决特定问题所必需的，这是减少官僚机构对变革的抵制的一个关键方面（Fernandez 和 Rainey，2006 年）。在下文中，我们开发了一个分析框架，将修改后的多流模型的不同元素（问题、解决方案、政治和政治企业家）与结构性改革政治的文献联系起来。

There are always several problems politicians or public officials could pay attention to. However, the question is why some problems get attention and some do not (Kingdon, 2003). A common indicator of a potential problem is budgetary deficits. In addition, focusing events (e.g. crises) sometimes lead to the immediate prominence of a problem, pushing other problems off the agenda. However, problems are not fully self-evident. The framing of a “condition” as a problem is important for attracting attention, and for the solution that is chosen. The literature on structural changes emphasizes external problem pressure as a driver of structural changes (MacCarthaigh et al., 2012: 847). There are many changes in a ministry’s environment potentially leading to internal reorganization. For instance, we know that the process of EU integration (“Europeanization”) is one of the main drivers of organizational change within EU countries and therefore a “problem maker” (MacCarthaigh et al., 2012). As shown by Lichtmannegger (2017, 2019), major changes of the EU context, e.g. the revision of the EU founding Treaties, lead to new EU-related tasks for national ministries and the subsequent creation of new organizational structures to accommodate increased environmental complexity. Likewise, EU integration may involve the delegation of decision-making powers to EU institutions, leading to a loss of existing tasks for ministries. However, following the idea that pressure for change depends on the (mis)fit of a member state’s policy with EU legislation (Padgett, 2003), we expect that a change of the task portfolio within ministries takes place only if there is a misfit between the national and EU policy. In the light of major changes in the ministry’s task portfolio, we expect policy makers to consider the present organizational structure as problematic and propose the following hypothesis:
政治家或公职人员总是可以注意几个问题。然而，问题是为什么有些问题得到关注而有些没有（Kingdon，2003）。潜在问题的一个常见指标是预算赤字。此外，聚焦事件（例如危机）有时会导致问题立即突出，从而将其他问题排除在议程之外。然而，问题并不完全不言而喻。将 “条件” 构建为问题对于吸引注意力和选择的解决方案非常重要。关于结构变化的文献强调外部问题压力是结构变化的驱动力（MacCarthaigh et al.， 2012： 847）。事工环境的许多变化可能会导致内部重组。例如，我们知道欧盟一体化过程（“欧洲化”）是欧盟国家内部组织变革的主要驱动力之一，因此是“问题制造者”（MacCarthaigh et al.， 2012）。正如 Lichtmannegger （2017， 2019） 所表明的那样，欧盟环境的重大变化，例如欧盟创始条约的修订，导致国家部委承担新的欧盟相关任务，并随后创建新的组织结构以适应日益增加的环境复杂性。同样，欧盟一体化可能涉及将决策权下放给欧盟机构，从而导致各部委失去现有任务。然而，遵循变革压力取决于成员国政策与欧盟立法的契合（Padgett，2003 年）的观点，我们预计只有在国家和欧盟政策不匹配的情况下，部委内部任务组合的改变才会发生。鉴于该部任务组合的重大变化，我们预计政策制定者会认为目前的组织结构存在问题，并提出以下假设：

H1: Europeanization which results in a misfit between national and EU level policies increases pressure for intra-organizational change because of changes in the organizational task portfolio.
H1：由于组织任务组合的变化，欧洲化导致国家和欧盟层面的政策不匹配，这增加了组织内部变革的压力。

The relationship between organizational environment and organizational structure is at the heart of contingency theory (Donaldson, 1996). A key assumption of contingency theory is that environmental change leads to an adjustment of the kind and degree of specialization (Kieser and Walgenbach, 2007). However, without further structural adaptations, coordination problems are likely to emerge. For example, if overlapping tasks and units continue to exist side by side, intra-organizational conflicts about competences and policy substance will increase (Kassim et al., 2013; Scharpf, 1977). We consider coordination problems resulting from this misfit between organizational environment and internal structure as part of the problem stream, which will manifest themselves through different indicators such as the perception of increasing coordination problems by ministry bureaucrats.
组织环境和组织结构之间的关系是权变理论的核心（Donaldson，1996）。权变理论的一个关键假设是环境变化导致专业化类型和程度的调整（Kieser 和 Walgenbach，2007 年）。然而，如果不进行进一步的结构调整，可能会出现协调问题。例如，如果重叠的任务和单元继续并存，组织内部关于竞争和政策实质的冲突将会增加（Kassim et al.， 2013;Scharpf， 1977）。我们认为，由于组织环境和内部结构之间的不匹配而导致的协调问题，是问题流的一部分，这将通过不同的指标表现出来，例如部委官僚对协调问题日益增加的看法。

H2: The more an indicator changes to the negative, the more likely a political entrepreneur will be able to frame a condition as a problem.
H2：指标变为负数的次数越多，政治企业家就越有可能将某个条件定义为问题。

March and Olsen (1983) compare administrative reforms to garbage cans, in which solutions wait for problems to be solved. The idea is that, unlike in rational models of decision-making, solutions can have a “life on their own,” rather than being one of many alternatives to solve a particular problem. Reform ideas will regularly be considered in choice opportunities and evaluated in terms of their broader implications. Kingdon (2003: 127–131) describes the repetition, recombination, and modification of ideas over time as “softening up process” which increases their legitimacy and eventually enhances the chances of implementation. At the organizational level, this suggests that reform ideas will regularly be considered over time within an organization, and may at some point be coupled to a problem in case the solution is considered a viable solution to a given policy problem. This also means that reforms will typically consist of familiar elements, instead of fully new ideas (March and Olsen, 1983). We propose the following hypothesis regarding the policy stream:
March 和 Olsen （1983） 将行政改革比作垃圾桶，在垃圾桶中，解决方案等待问题得到解决。这个想法是，与理性的决策模型不同，解决方案可以“独立存在”，而不是成为解决特定问题的众多替代方案之一。改革理念将定期在选择机会中被考虑，并根据其更广泛的影响进行评估。Kingdon （2003： 127–131） 将想法随着时间的推移的重复、重组和修改描述为“软化过程”，这增加了它们的合法性，并最终增加了实施的机会。在组织层面，这表明改革想法将随着时间的推移在组织内定期考虑，并且如果解决方案被认为是给定政策问题的可行解决方案，则可能会在某个时候与问题相结合。这也意味着改革通常由熟悉的元素组成，而不是全新的想法（March 和 Olsen，1983 年）。我们提出了以下关于策略流的假设：

H3: The longer reform ideas are softened up, the higher the chance that they are adopted.
H3：改革想法被软化的时间越长，被采纳的机会就越大。

The political stream plays a central role in order to explain decision-making about policy outputs in decision windows. For typical policymaking processes, the main question is how to gain a parliamentary majority for a given policy alternative (Herweg et al., 2017). This is different for intra-organizational change, which takes place in the executive sphere. In this context, bureaucrats must be considered as informal veto players. Based on the findings of Christensen (1997) that ministry bureaucrats have a strong preference for preserving the status quo, we assume that bureaucrats’ opposition to change is invariably high.
政治流在解释决策窗口中有关政策输出的决策方面发挥着核心作用。对于典型的政策制定过程，主要问题是如何为给定的政策替代方案获得议会多数（Herweg et al.，2017）。这与发生在执行领域的组织内部变革不同。在这种情况下，必须将官僚视为非正式的否决者。根据 Christensen （1997） 的发现，部委官僚非常倾向于维持现状，我们假设官僚对变革的反对总是很高的。

For intra-organizational reforms, however, the role of the minister is decisive, who has the formal authority to decide on change. Therefore, intra-organizational change depends on the attention of the minister to coordination problems, and his willingness to implement reforms addressing those problems against ministry bureaucrats’ opposition. Public management scholars underline the importance of leadership to successfully conduct reforms (Fernandez and Rainey, 2006). According to this literature, it is essential that leaders care about reforms (Harokopus, 2001), and that they express the necessity for reforms to reduce employees’ resistance against change (Fernandez and Rainey, 2006). However, even though ministers may have the formal authority to push through administrative reforms, they are extremely busy people, and reforming administrations is usually not high on their agenda. They may simply be distracted from reorganization efforts by more salient policy problems (March and Olsen, 1983), or they may get frustrated by civil servants’ zealous defense of the status quo (Christensen, 1997). Therefore, for the timing and extent of intraorganizational change, the role of the minister as political entrepreneur is decisive.
然而，对于组织内部的改革，部长的作用是决定性的，他拥有决定变革的正式权力。因此，组织内部的变革取决于部长对协调问题的关注，以及他是否愿意实施改革来解决这些问题，而反对部委官僚的反对。公共管理学者强调了领导力对成功进行改革的重要性（Fernandez 和 Rainey，2006 年）。根据这些文献，领导者必须关心改革（Harokopus，2001），并且他们表达了改革的必要性，以减少员工对变革的抵制（Fernandez 和 Rainey，2006）。然而，尽管部长们可能拥有推动行政改革的正式权力，但他们都是非常忙碌的人，改革政府通常不是他们议程上的重点。他们可能只是被更突出的政策问题分散了对重组工作的注意力（March and Olsen， 1983），或者他们可能对公务员对现状的热心捍卫感到沮丧（Christensen， 1997）。因此，对于组织内部变革的时间和程度，部长作为政治企业家的角色是决定性的。

H4: Intra-organizational change requires the attention and willingness of a minister to implement reform ideas.
H4：组织内部的变革需要部长的关注和意愿来实施改革理念。

The ambition of this article is to theorize the conditions under which wholesale administrative reform policies result in intra-organizational change. The overall analytical framework is summarized in Figure 1. Following central insights from the multiple streams framework, we can formulate a general hypothesis about the conditions for intra-organizational change to occur:
本文的目标是将大规模行政改革政策导致组织内部变化的条件理论化。图 1 总结了整个分析框架。根据多流框架的核心见解，我们可以制定一个关于组织内部变化发生条件的一般假设：

H5: Administrative reform leads to intra-organizational change if (1) organizationspecific problem pressure is perceived as high, if (2) a viable policy solution exists; and
H5：如果 （1） 组织特定的问题压力被认为很高，如果 （2） 存在可行的政策解决方案;和

(3) if a minister supports intra-organizational change.
（3） 如果部长支持组织内部变革。

Figure 1. Adapting the multiple streams model for intra-organizational change. Source: Own further model development based on the extensions of the multiple streams approach by Herweg et al. (2017).
图 1.调整多流模型以适应组织内部变革。来源：Herweg 等人（2017 年）基于多流方法的扩展进一步开发模型。

Data and methods
数据和方法

This article analyses intra-organizational change in the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture over three decades (1986–2015) as the dependent variable. The first explanatory variable is administrative reform, which is operationalized by different national wholesale reform initiatives between 1986 and 2015. Next, Europeanization is studied as external pressure and operationalized as Austria’s EU accession in 1995 and major reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). We operationalize coordination problems as explicit complaints by respondents about coordination problems or explicit reference to coordination problems in policy documents. Finally, in terms of the political entrepreneur, we analyze ministerial turnover as well as minister’s attention to problems and reform ambitions, as indicated by interview respondents and document analysis. The longitudinal research design allows us to study the long-term effects and interactions of different explanatory factors, whereas a shorter period would most likely provide a biased picture regarding which factors were instrumental for causing change (Pettigrow, 1990). Since administrative structures are sticky, it can take decades until organizational change comes about (Donaldson, 1996).
本文以奥地利农业部三十年（1986-2015 年）的组织内部变化为因变量进行分析。第一个解释变量是行政改革，1986 年至 2015 年期间由不同的国家批发改革举措实施。接下来，作为外部压力研究欧洲化，并随着奥地利于 1995 年加入欧盟和共同农业政策 （CAP） 的重大改革而实施。我们将协调问题作为受访者对协调问题的明确投诉或政策文件中明确提及协调问题来操作。最后，从政治企业家的角度来看，我们分析了部长的更替以及部长对问题的关注和改革雄心，如访谈受访者和文件分析所示。纵向研究设计使我们能够研究不同解释因素的长期影响和相互作用，而较短的时期很可能会提供关于哪些因素有助于引起变化的偏见（Pettigrow，1990）。由于行政结构具有粘性，组织变革可能需要几十年的时间才能实现（Donaldson，1996）。

The study employs several instruments for data collection, including retrospective expert interviews, internal documents, stenographic protocols, news articles, and secondary literature. Most data were gathered during a one-month stay by the first author in the ministry in September 2015 to become conversant with the policy field, to identify informants, and to get access to internal documents. Fourteen semistructured interviews were conducted with heads of sections, and one interview with an external consultant. Informants were selected based on length of service— several individuals have worked in the ministry since the 1970s—as well as dispersion across different units. Moreover, access was given to schedules of responsibility and organizational charts for each year between 1986 and 2015, as well as decisive reorganization documents describing and explaining planned changes.
该研究采用多种工具进行数据收集，包括回顾性专家访谈、内部文件、速记协议、新闻文章和二手文献。大多数数据是第一作者于 2015 年 9 月在该部逗留一个月期间收集的，目的是熟悉政策领域，确定线人，并获取内部文件。与各科长进行了 14 次半结构化访谈，并与外部顾问进行了 1 次访谈。线人的选择是基于服务年限——有几个人自 1970 年代以来一直在该部工作——以及在不同单位的分散程度。此外，还可以访问1986 年至 2015 年期间每年的责任时间表和组织结构图，以及描述和解释计划变更的决定性重组文件。

The organizational charts were compared from year to year to check when actual change took place prior to the interviews. Likewise, internal documents explaining reforms were consulted before conducting interviews. In addition, these documents were used during most interviews to inform the conversation. Moreover, we systematically searched stenographic protocols of parliamentary debates for keywords such as reorganization, the name of the ministry, the ministers’ names, and European Union, between 1986 and 2015. In addition, we consulted news articles of the widely read “Kronen Zeitung” between 2002 and 2015 (other periods were not available) and collected bibliographical information on the ministers from the parliament’s webpages.
每年对组织结构图进行比较，以检查在访谈之前实际变化的时间。同样，在进行访谈之前，也查阅了解释改革的内部文件。此外，这些文件在大多数访谈中被用来为对话提供信息。此外，我们系统地检索了 1986 年至 2015 年间议会辩论的速记协议，以查找诸如重组、部委名称、部长姓名和欧盟等关键词。此外，我们还查阅了 2002 年至 2015 年间（其他时期不可用）广泛阅读的《Kronen Zeitung》的新闻文章，并从议会的网页上收集了部长的书目信息。

Before moving to the empirical analysis, we introduce key features of the Austrian machinery of government. In Austria, a parliamentary democracy with frequent coalition cabinets, the Federal Chancellor determines the number of ministers and decides about their portfolio. The ministries’ internal organization, however, is within the individual ministers’ sphere of responsibility (Strehl and Hugl, 1997). We therefore suggest that our analytical framework can inform studies in similar contexts characterized by a combination of parliamentary government, coalition cabinets, and high degrees of ministerial autonomy (e.g. Germany). Austrian ministries have a standard hierarchical structure, with subsections as hierarchically lowest unit, followed by sections, subdivisions, and divisions as the highest-level units below the political leadership (Figure 2).
在进行实证分析之前，我们介绍了奥地利政府机器的主要特征。在奥地利，议会民主制国家经常举行联合内阁，联邦总理决定部长的人数并决定他们的职务。然而，各部委的内部组织属于各个部长的职责范围（Strehl 和 Hugl，1997 年）。因此，我们建议我们的分析框架可以为类似背景下的研究提供信息，这些背景的特点是议会政府、联合内阁和高度部长自治（例如德国）的组合。奥地利各部委采用标准的等级结构，子部门是等级最低的单位，其次是部门、分部和分部作为政治领导层以下的最高级别单位（图 2）。

Analysis: Administrative reform and structural change in an Austrian ministry
分析：奥地利某部委的行政改革和结构性变革

Administrative reform, coalition change, and looming EU membership (1986–1993)
行政改革、联盟更迭和即将成为欧盟成员国（1986-1993 年）

The empirical analysis focuses on four episodes characterized by different dynamics of reform and change: whereas intra-organizational units increased significantly despite cutback reform policies in two episodes, the others are characterized by substantial decreases in intra-organizational units.
实证分析侧重于以不同的改革和变化动态为特征的四个事件：尽管有两集中削减了改革政策，但组织内单位显着增加，而其他事件的特点是组织内单位大幅减少。

The first episode illustrates how political factors and external pressure may turn deliberate reforms upside down, leading to a mismatch between governmental reform objectives and what is happening inside the ministry. Between 1980 and
第一集说明了政治因素和外部压力如何使深思熟虑的改革发生翻天覆地的变化，从而导致政府改革目标与该部内部发生的事情不匹配。1980 年至 1980 年间

Figure 2. Stylized organizational structure of Austrian ministries. Source: Own research.
图 2.奥地利各部委的程式化组织结构。来源：自己的研究。

1987, Austria’s net deficit of public finances more than doubled (Dearing, 1998). The government’s diagnosis was a lack of efficiency and effectiveness in the administration (Dearing, 1998; Strehl and Hugl, 1997). In response, the government Vranitzky I embarked on an ambitious, wholesale administrative reform program to reduce organizational units, reorganize tasks, and cutback staff numbers in 1986. Shortly after entrusting a special unit in the Austrian Federal Chancellery to coordinate the encompassing “Verwaltungsmanagement” (“administrative management”) reform in 1986, an election resulted in a coalition change in 1987. The government changed from the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPO)€ and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) to the SP€ O and the Peoples’ Party€ (OVP). This led to the replacement of a social-democratic minister in the€ Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
1987 年，奥地利的公共财政净赤字增加了一倍多（Dearing，1998 年）。政府的诊断是政府缺乏效率和有效性（Dearing，1998 年;Strehl 和 Hugl，1997 年）。作为回应，政府 Vranitzky I 于 1986 年开始了一项雄心勃勃的大规模行政改革计划，以减少组织单位、重组任务并削减员工人数。1986 年，奥地利联邦总理府委托一个特别部门协调全面的“Verwaltungsmanagement”（“行政管理”）改革后不久，1987 年的选举导致了联盟的更迭。政府从奥地利社会民主党 （SPO） 和奥地利自由党 （FPO） 转变为 SP€ O 和人民党 （OVP）。这导致农业和林业部的一位社会民主党部长被取代。

The new minister came from the conservative party, which subsequently controlled the ministry throughout the entire period under scrutiny. This political turnover resulted in the reshuffling of senior bureaucrats loyal to the socialdemocratic party to positions where they had no real influence anymore, allowing for the promotion of officials who were loyal to the minister’s conservative party (Interview#1; NR-PlPr. 17/24: 2777). An informant explains this as follows:
新部长来自保守党，该党随后在整个审查期间控制了该部。这种政治更替导致忠于社会民主党的高级官僚重新洗牌到他们不再有实际影响力的职位上，从而允许提拔忠于部长的保守党的官员（访谈#1;NR-PlPr. 17/24：2777）。一位线人对此的解释如下：

There has been a certain backlog for civil servants related to the [conservative party] and the reorganization has been bloated in my opinion. This was done by creating subdivisions. The heads of subdivisions, which did not have any real responsibilities, even partly became free-floating (Interview#1).
在我看来，与 [保守党] 相关的公务员积压了一定的工作，重组工作已经变得臃肿。这是通过创建细分来完成的。没有任何实际责任的部门负责人甚至部分变得自由浮动（访谈#1）。

Figure 3. Number of organizational units in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (1986– 2000)/Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Environment and Water Management (2000–2014). Source: Own data, based on organizational charts, schedules of responsibilities, and internal documents. Data were available for 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2014.
图 3.农林部（1986-2000年）/农林、环境和水管理部（2000-2014年）的组织单位数量。来源：自己的数据，基于组织结构图、职责时间表和内部文档。数据包括 1986 年、1988 年、1990 年、1992 年、1993 年、1994 年、1995 年、1997 年、1999 年、2000 年、2002 年、2003 年、2004 年、2005 年、2006 年、2007 年、2009 年、2010 年、2012 年和 2014 年。

As can be gleaned from Figure 3, the number of units in the ministry—in particular subsections—increased significantly between 1986 and 1988. In 1990, the minister changed from Josef Riegler to Franz Fischler, both OVP, followed by a fair degree€ of structural consolidation.
从图 3 中可以看出，在 1986 年至 1988 年期间，该事工的单位数量——特别是子部门——显着增加。1990 年，部长从 Josef Riegler 改为 Franz Fischler，都是 OVP，随后进行了相当程度的结构整合。

However, the reduction of the number of units inside the ministry was shortlived, except at the subdivision level. Austria’s looming EU membership posed new challenges to the ministry, with preparations for negotiations with the EU starting in 1993. Those negotiations made the recruitment of new employees necessary, since the existing ones could not speak any of the EU working languages, English and French (Interview#2). To allow for the recruitment of new employees, the number of statutory posts (as defined in the national budget) was raised from 703 to 732 between 1992 and 1994, and several units were created in 1993 (Figure 3). According to an internal document from 1995, the creation of an additional EU division increased the already existing strong fragmentation of tasks within the ministry (BMLF, 1995) (see Table 1 for a detailed overview of structural changes). The diagnosis was that it had become almost impossible for external stakeholders to find out who was responsible for what. In addition, the document underlines that coordination requirements had increased especially for EU affairs at all hierarchical levels.
然而，该部内部单位数量的减少是短暂的，除了在细分层面。奥地利即将成为欧盟成员国，这给该部带来了新的挑战，从 1993 年开始准备与欧盟谈判。这些谈判使得招聘新员工成为必要，因为现有员工不会说任何欧盟工作语言，即英语和法语（采访#2）。为了能够招聘新员工，1992 年至 1994 年期间，法定职位（如国家预算中所定义）的数量从 703 个增加到 732 个，并在 1993 年设立了几个单位（图 3）。根据 1995 年的一份内部文件，创建一个额外的欧盟部门增加了该部内部已经存在的严重任务碎片化（BMLF，1995 年）（结构变化的详细概述见表 1）。诊断结果是，外部利益相关者几乎不可能找出谁负责什么。此外，该文件强调，协调要求有所增加，尤其是对于所有层级的欧盟事务。

At the same time, Europeanization also resulted in a loss of tasks. An executive agency “Agrarmarkt Austria” was created due to the EU accession in 1993, which
与此同时，欧洲化也导致了任务的流失。由于 1993 年加入欧盟，成立了一个执行机构“Agrarmarkt 奥地利”，该机构

Table 1. Internal changes over time.
表 1.内部随时间变化。

Period 1: 1986–1993
第 1 期：1986 年至 1993 年

Creation of five subdivisions (creation of parallel structures) [1987]
创建五个细分（创建平行结构） [1987]

Reduction of 20 subsections, 1 section, 1 subdivision [1990]
减少 20 个小节、1 个部分、1 个小节 [1990]

Increase of nine subsections, one section, one division, and decrease of one subdivision
增加 9 个小节，1 个部分，1 个部门，减少 1 个小节

(increased fragmentation of tasks and responsibility problems) [1993]
（任务碎片化和责任问题增加）[1993]

Transfer of tasks to the new agency “Agrarmarkt Austria” (creation of overlapping structures in agency and ministry) [1993]
将任务移交给新机构“Agrarmarkt 奥地利”（在机构和部委中创建重叠结构）[1993]

Processing of EU aids were transferred to the Ministry for Economic Affairs (loss of autonomy regarding market regulation) [1993]
欧盟援助的处理被移交给经济事务部（失去市场监管的自主权）[1993]

Period 2: 1994–1996
第 2 期：1994 年至 1996 年

Dividing one division (Market Organization) into three subdivisions mirroring the respective DG [1995]
将一个部门（市场组织）划分为三个细分，以反映各自的总干事 [1995]

Period 3: 1997–2002
第 3 期：1997-2002

Reduction of 23 subsections, 14 sections, 14 subdivisions (creation of bigger sections, reduction of the subdivision level) [2002]
减少 23 个小节、14 个小节、14 个小节（创建更大的小节，减少小节级别）[2002 年]

Merger with Ministry of Environment [2002]
与环境部合并 [2002]

Period 4: 2003–2014
第 4 期：2003 年至 2014 年

Reduction of 9 subsections, 14 sections, 2 divisions [2013]
减少 9 个小节、14 个章节、2 个部门 [2013]

Division of legal affairs abolished [2013]
废除法务司 [2013]

Merge of two divisions mirroring the two pillars of the CAP [2013]
反映 CAP 两大支柱的两个部门合并 [2013]

More intense mirroring of the structure of the respective DG [2013]
更强烈地反映了相应 DG 的结构 [2013]

Section for EU coordination becomes part of a staff unit [2013]
欧盟协调科成为工作人员单位的一部分 [2013]

Source: Own research.
来源：自己的研究。

involved the delegation of various tasks to the agency (NR-PlPr. 19/34: 61). In consequence, several overlapping structures emerged, since sections in the ministry were not abolished despite their loss of responsibilities (NR-PlPr. 19/34: 43). In addition, the processing of EU aids was transferred to the Ministry for Economic Affairs (NR-PlPr. 19/9: 221). Ultimately, the ministry itself lost substantial autonomy in terms of market regulation. Another indicator for the loss of formal powers can be found in parliamentary debates, where legislators claimed that the ministry would have “almost no tasks” and would be therefore become “superfluous” (NR-PlPr. 19/9: 221) and “full of white elephants” (NR-PlPr. 19/34: 43). However, despite the loss of tasks, the number of units and staff increased (NR-PlPr. 19/34: 44).
涉及将各种任务委派给该机构 （NR-PlPr. 19/34： 61）。结果，出现了几个重叠的结构，因为尽管他们失去了责任，但该部的各个部门并没有被废除（NR-PlPr. 19/34：43）。此外，欧盟援助的处理被移交给经济事务部 （NR-PlPr. 19/9： 221）。最终，该部本身在市场监管方面失去了实质性的自主权。在辩论中可以找到正式权力丧失的另一个指标，立法者声称该部将“几乎没有任务”，因此将变得“多余”（NR-PlPr. 19/9：221）和“满是白象”（NR-PlPr. 19/34：43）。然而，尽管任务丢失，但单位和工作人员的数量却增加了 （NR-PlPr. 19/34： 44）。

Next to the organization of EU affairs, another major problem is the concentration of legal affairs in one division, which existed already before EU accession (Interview#2). This specialization resulted in perceived task overlap, double work, and an increase of coordination at higher hierarchical levels (BMLF, 1995).
除了欧盟事务的组织之外，另一个主要问题是法律事务集中在一个部门，这在加入欧盟之前就已经存在（访谈#2）。 这种专业化导致了感知到的任务重叠、双重工作以及更高层次结构的协调性增加（BMLF，1995）。

In sum, this episode illustrates how new organizational units were added to the ministry, instead of reducing them, which was the objective of the wholesale administrative reform policy at that time. The reasons for the significant increase of units were competing problems at the organizational level, namely the creation of patronage positions and the creation of new units and positions due to EU membership. These ad hoc structural solutions increased existing coordination problems, such as those between legal affairs and line units (see below).
总而言之，这一事件说明了该部是如何增加新的组织单位的，而不是减少它们，这是当时大规模行政改革政策的目标。单位显着增加的原因是组织层面的竞争问题，即由于欧盟成员身份而创建赞助职位和创建新单位和职位。这些临时的结构性解决方案增加了现有的协调问题，例如 legal 事务和直线单位之间的协调问题（见下文）。

Joining the EU (1994–1996)
加入欧盟 （1994–1996）

The second episode shows that the capacity enlargement and simultaneous loss of tasks following EU accession increased the ministry’s perceived ineffectiveness and therefore pressure for change. In addition, the problems of fiscal pressure remained stable. As determined within the reform project at the end of the 1980s, detailed plans for how to reorganize the ministry were made, which eventually were only realized to a small extent.
第二个事件表明，加入欧盟后能力的扩大和同时失去的任务增加了该部的低效感，从而增加了变革的压力。此外，财政压力问题保持稳定。正如 1980 年代末的改革项目所确定的那样，制定了如何重组该部的详细计划，但最终仅在很小程度上实现了。

After EU accession, a reorganization plan was developed, which included key reform ideas to address coordination problems within the ministry (BMLF, 1995). The aim of the reorganization was to adapt the ministry’s internal structure to the new requirements of EU membership by concentrating strongly dispersed EUrelated tasks. In addition, the aim was to abolish organizational units which had lost their tasks due to EU accession and to merge small units. For example, the plan included the creation of three EU-related sections and to divide the division responsible for “Market Organization” into three subdivisions, thereby mirroring the structure of the respective EU Directorate-General. The reorganization also projected the abolishment of the division for legal affairs and to transfer these tasks to line sections, e.g. moving forestry law to the division for forestry. A quote from the reorganization plan of 1995, paraphrasing the comments of bureaucrats from neighboring Germany, underlines the importance of this element for effective coordination:
加入欧盟后，制定了一项重组计划，其中包括解决部委内部协调问题的关键改革思路（BMLF，1995 年）。重组的目的是通过集中高度分散的欧盟相关任务，使该部的内部结构适应欧盟成员资格的新要求。此外，其目的是废除因加入欧盟而失去任务的组织单位，并合并小单位。例如，该计划包括设立三个与欧盟相关的部门，并将负责“市场组织”的部门划分为三个部门，从而反映相应欧盟总局的结构。重组还计划取消法律事务司，并将这些任务转移到各部门，例如将林业法移至林业司。引用 1995 年重组计划中的一句话，转述了邻国德国官僚的评论，强调了这一要素对有效协调的重要性：

The German colleagues expressed their bewilderment and amazement regarding the construction of a division for legal affairs as they discussed about the reorganization of the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry (BMLF, 1995: 11).
德国同事在讨论农林部的重组时，对法务司的建设表示困惑和惊讶（BMLF，1995：11）。

The plan for how to reorganize the ministry was comprehensive, and key actors were aware of the need for a major reorganization. However, by far not all suggestions were implemented, not least because of the difficulties involved in reshuffling (senior) officials’ tasks (Interview#1). For instance, the subdivisions mirroring EU structures were established, whereas the legal affairs division remained untouched (Table 1). In addition, despite substantial losses of tasks to the Agrarmarkt Austria executive agency and the EU Commission, the overall number of units remained stable (Figure 3).
如何重组该部的计划是全面的，主要参与者意识到进行重大重组的必要性。然而，到目前为止，并非所有建议都得到实施，尤其是因为重新安排（高级）官员的任务所涉及的困难（访谈#1）。例如，建立了反映欧盟结构的细分，而法律事务部门保持不变（表 1）。此外，尽管 Agrarmarkt 奥地利行政长官和欧盟委员会的任务损失很大，但单位总数保持稳定（图 3）。

Wilhelm Molterer was minister during this reform. He entered office in November 1994 and had been personal adviser to two of his predecessors in office, thus having in-depth knowledge about the ministry. He was a political heavyweight and was elected head of his party a few years later. He had also been director of the Austrian Farmer’s Association between 1990 and 1993, which possibly contributed to the fact that he kept sections without substantial responsibilities intact and accepted double structures. One informant explained that farmers were against abolishing the section for milk marketing since they would lose “their” section for lobbying (Interview#1).
Wilhelm Molterer 在这项改革期间担任部长。他于 1994 年 11 月上任，曾担任两位前任的私人顾问，因此对该部有深入的了解。他是政治上的重量级人物，几年后当选为该党的领袖。他还在 1990 年至 1993 年期间担任奥地利农民协会的主任，这可能是他保持没有实质性责任的部分完整并接受双重结构的原因。One 线人解释说，农民反对取消牛奶营销部分，因为他们会失去“他们”的游说部分（采访#1）。

This episode shows that the country’s EU accession resulted in new responsibilities and the loss of existing ones. In the light of this significant change of responsibilities, only small internal reorganizations were made, despite more comprehensive reform ambitions. In addition, the concentration of legal affairs issues in one division remained. As we will see below, several of the abovementioned reorganization ideas were realized up to twenty years later. Therefore, despite growing pressure in the problem stream, intra-organizational change hardly reflected reform ideas. In the light of our theoretical expectations, those ambitious reorganization plans had not been softened up. The plans encountered resistance of bureaucrats, and the minister did not embrace those plans either, which possibly was related to his professional background.
这一事件表明，该国加入欧盟导致了新的责任和现有责任的丧失。鉴于这一重大的责任变化，尽管有更全面的改革雄心，但只进行了小规模的内部重组。此外，法律事务问题仍然集中在一个部门。正如我们将在下面看到的，上述几个重组想法是在长达 20 年后实现的。因此，尽管问题流的压力越来越大，但组织内部的变化几乎无法反映改革理念。根据我们的理论预期，那些雄心勃勃的重组计划并没有被软化。这些计划遇到了官僚的抵制，部长也不接受这些计划，这可能与他的专业背景有关。

Departmental merger and coalition change (1997–2002)
部门合并和联盟变更 （1997–2002）

The following episode provides insights into when pressure ends up in realizing recurring reform ideas. After EU accession, fiscal pressure and rising costs found their way back onto the political agenda in 1998. The government embarked on another reform of the federal bureaucracy inspired by New Public Management reforms (Hammerschmid and Meyer, 2005). Its main elements related to structural changes were critical assessment of tasks, process evaluation, and effective personnel management (Dearing, 1998). The reform was projected for a short period only (1998–1999) and limited to a few ministries. Structural changes in the ministry of agriculture are hardly worth mentioning in this short period (Figure 3). In 2000, however, the SPO left government for the first time after 56years, and detailed€ reorganization proposals were developed for the ministry of agriculture. The prospect of reorganization was not only increased by the new coalition of the OVP and€ the populist FPO, but also by the opportunity to give golden handshakes to top€ officials (Interview#2), and not the least due to a merger with the ministry of environment.
以下剧集将深入探讨何时会给实现反复出现的改革想法带来压力。加入欧盟后，财政压力和不断上涨的成本在 1998 年重新回到了政治议程上。受新公共管理改革的启发，政府开始了另一项联邦官僚机构改革（Hammerschmid 和 Meyer，2005 年）。它与结构变化相关的主要要素是对任务的批判性评估、过程评估和有效的人员管理（Dearing，1998）。改革的预测只是短期的（1998-1999 年），并且仅限于少数几个部委。在这么短的时间内，农业部的结构性变化几乎不值得一提（图 3）。然而，在 2000 年，SPO 在 56 年后首次离开政府，并为农业部制定了详细的重组提案。OVP 和民粹主义 FPO 的新联盟不仅增加了重组的前景，而且还增加了与高级官员握手的机会（采访#2），尤其是由于与环境部的合并。

In addition to fiscal pressure and political turnover, the lack of encompassing adaptations due to EU accession had resulted in pressing problems of organizational design. “It would have been absolutely necessary to have a huge reorganization after EU accession” (Interview#1). However, in 2000, the necessity for reform “became too obvious, it was unavoidable, it has been visible for everybody that the structure did not work anymore” (Interview#1). In 1999, the EU agreed upon the “Agenda 2000” reform of the CAP, which replaced support prices by direct payments, put a greater emphasis on environmental aims, and defined rural development as the second pillar of the CAP (Snyder, 2012). These changes in priorities increased adaptation pressure (Interview#4).
除了财政压力和政治更替之外，由于加入欧盟而缺乏包容性的适应也导致了组织设计的紧迫问题。“在加入欧盟后进行大规模重组是绝对必要的”（采访#1）。然而，在 2000 年，改革的必要性“变得太明显了，这是不可避免的，每个人都可以看到这种结构不再有效”（访谈#1）。1999 年，欧盟同意了 CAP 的“2000 年议程”改革，该改革以直接支付取代支持价格，更加强调环境目标，并将农村发展定义为 CAP 的第二支柱（Snyder，2012 年）。这些优先事项的变化增加了适应压力（访谈#4）。

Wilhelm Molterer (OVP) remained in office and commissioned a reform plan to€ a consultancy (Interview#5). According to an internal document, a key objective of the reform was to improve processes cutting across sections such as the coordination of international, EU, and law responsibilities through the increase of section size and the abolishment of subdivisions. He framed the reform as unavoidable: “Minister Molterer said, if I remember correctly, ‘if I do not reorganise, the finance minister will do it for me’.” (Interview#1).
Wilhelm Molterer （OVP） 继续留任，并委托一家咨询公司制定一项改革计划（访谈#5）。根据一份内部文件，改革的一个关键目标是通过增加部门规模和取消细分来改进跨部门的流程，例如协调国际、欧盟和法律责任。他将改革描述为不可避免的：“如果我没记错的话，莫尔特勒部长说过，'如果我不重组，财政部长会替我做'。（采访#1）。

The reform objective to create bigger sections and to reduce one hierarchical level led to a substantial reduction of ministerial units in the merged ministry in 2000/2001 (see also Figure 2, which only includes units related to agriculture, excluding units belonging to the former ministry of environment). The reorganization also terminated all subdivisions, including those created in 1987 to provide patronage positions for the coalition partner. The plan to create bigger sections and to abolish those subdivisions had been discussed repeatedly, but was implemented following the ministry merger only (Table 1). Moreover, the reorganization entailed several mergers at lower levels, e.g. of the sections for “milk processing” and “milk marketing.” According to one informant, milk marketing had lost most of its responsibilities already in 1995 (Interview#1). Likewise, the idea to merge the environmental and agricultural ministry was mentioned for the first time in 1995. The argument was that both ministries hardly had any substantial responsibilities (NR-PlPr. 15/30: 92). The ministry of environment had always been a ministry with few tasks and the ministry of agriculture lost many tasks due to EU accession.
2000/2001 年，为了创建更大的部门并减少一个等级的改革目标，导致合并后的部委单位大幅减少（另见图 2，其中仅包括与农业相关的单位，不包括属于前环境部的单位）。重组还终止了所有分支机构，包括 1987 年为联盟合作伙伴提供赞助职位而创建的分支机构。创建更大部分和取消这些细分的计划已经被反复讨论过，但仅在部委合并后才实施（表 1）。此外，重组还涉及几个较低级别的合并，例如“牛奶加工”和“牛奶营销”部分。据一位线人称，牛奶营销在 1995 年就已经失去了大部分职责（采访#1）。同样，合并环境和农业部的想法在 1995 年首次被提及。争论点是这两个部委几乎没有任何实质性的责任（NR-PlPr. 15/30： 92）。环境部一直是一个任务很少的部委，由于加入欧盟，农业部失去了许多任务。

This episode shows that it may take several years or even decades until obvious inefficiencies are addressed by structural change and until recurrently discussed reform ideas are implemented. This was possible due to several factors which were not present in the former episodes. The minister framed internal coordination as a major problem. In addition, five years had passed since EU accession, during which bureaucrats had experienced increasing coordination problems. Furthermore, several conditions facilitated change, such as governmental turnover, which resulted in the merger with another ministry. Nevertheless, the reorganization was not entirely successful (judged by its own objectives), since some allegedly superfluous units remained and the legal affairs division remained untouched.
这一事件表明，可能需要几年甚至几十年的时间才能通过结构性变革来解决明显的低效率问题，并且要实施反复讨论的改革理念。这是可能的，因为前几集中不存在几个因素。这位部长将内部协调视为一个主要问题。此外，自加入欧盟以来已经过去了五年，在此期间，官僚们遇到了越来越多的协调问题。此外，一些条件促进了变革，例如政府更替，这导致了与另一个部委的合并。然而，重组并不完全成功（根据其自身的目标来判断），因为一些据称多余的单位仍然存在，而法律事务部门仍然没有受到影响。

Major change at last (2003–2014)
终于发生了重大变化（2003-2014 年）

The above episodes showed that reform implementation is seldom in accordance with reform plans. The plans for how to reorganize internally due to newly emerging tasks and obsolete tasks following EU membership were not fully realized. This final episode covers a long period of inaction and finally radical reform, where both old and new problems were solved. In addition, this episode provides evidence of the importance of a political entrepreneur to explain major structural change.
上述事件表明，改革的实施很少符合改革计划。由于加入欧盟后新出现的任务和过时的任务而如何进行内部重组的计划并未完全实现。最后一集涵盖了长期的无所作为和最终的激进改革，新旧问题都得到了解决。此外，这一事件还证明了政治企业家解释重大结构性变化的重要性。

In between 2003 and 2013, hardly any structural changes took place in the ministry (Figure 3). In 2003, following a change of the government coalition, Josef Proll (€ OVP) replaced Wilhelm Molterer. Pr€ oll had already been involved€ in the reform in 2000/2001 as chief advisor of the minister and was director of the Austrian Farmer’s Association. These two aspects are plausible explanations for why he did not choose to reorganize the ministry. In 2007, following another change in coalition, Nikolaus Berlakovich became the new minister. In contrast to Proll, Berlakovich was known as a poorly performing minister (NR-PlPr. 24/€ 187: 230, 284; Kronen Zeitung, 21 May 2009). As one informant pointed out, this minister would have never dared to reorganize the ministry substantially (Interview#7).
在 2003 年至 2013 年期间，该部几乎没有发生任何结构变化（图 3）。2003 年，随着政府联盟的变更，Josef Proll （€ OVP） 取代了 Wilhelm Molterer。Pr€ oll 已经在 2000/2001 年作为部长的首席顾问参与了改革，并担任奥地利农民协会的董事。这两个方面是他为什么没有选择重组该部的合理解释。2007 年，在联盟再次发生变化后，尼古拉斯·贝拉科维奇 （Nikolaus Berlakovich） 成为新任部长。与普罗尔相反，贝拉科维奇被称为表现不佳的部长（NR-PlPr. 24/€ 187： 230， 284;Kronen Zeitung，2009 年 5 月 21 日）。 正如一位线人指出的那样，这位部长从来不敢对该部进行实质性重组（采访#7）。

In December 2013, Andr€a Rupprechter (OVP) became Minister of Agriculture€ and Forestry, Environment and Water Management in the wake of a government turnover. He was considered as a brave person who likes to be in the center of attention and takes fast decisions (Die Zeit, 2014). In the context of a next round of comprehensive administrative reform in Austria, Rupprechter described himself as a pioneer of administrative reform (Kurier, 2014). Putting words into action, he pushed for an encompassing reorganization in his ministry, which according to an informant in another ministry could never have taken place in the latter’s own ministry (Interview#6). Again, the aim was to consolidate organizational units, tasks, and personnel, as well as the expression of new priorities through structure, and addressing cross-sectional coordination issues. This episode stands out by the minister’s approach to explain the need for reform to create efficient structures and reduce budgetary pressure in public (Interview#3). However, while some informants question that fiscal pressure triggered the reform, they agree that pertinent problems regarding coordination and control were the reason for change (Interview#1, #4).
2013 年 12 月，在政府更替后，Andr€a Rupprechter （OVP） 成为农业和林业、环境和水资源管理部长。他被认为是一个勇敢的人，喜欢成为关注的焦点并迅速做出决定（Die Zeit，2014 年）。在奥地利下一轮全面行政改革的背景下，Rupprechter 将自己描述为行政改革的先驱（Kurier，2014 年）。他将言语付诸行动，推动在他的事工中进行全面的重组，根据另一个部委的线人的说法，这在后者自己的事工中是不可能发生的（采访#6）。同样，目标是整合组织单位、任务和人员，以及通过结构表达新的优先事项，并解决跨部门协调问题。这一事件的突出之处在于部长解释了改革的必要性，以建立有效的结构并减少公众的预算压力（访谈#3）。然而，虽然一些 INFormants 质疑财政压力引发了改革，但他们同意有关协调和控制的相关问题是变革的原因（访谈#1、#4）。

In the field of agriculture, you have to adapt automatically. Well, if the EU changes the CAP, then I [the ministry] get a problem if I do not change. Then it happens that I create structures that have nothing to do with reality. If tasks are abolished [due to Europeanization], then I can chose to do nothing, but I really get an efficiency problem (Interview#4).
在农业领域，您必须自动适应。好吧，如果欧盟改变了 CAP，那么如果我不改变，我 [该部] 就会遇到问题。然后，我创造了与现实无关的结构。如果任务被取消 [由于欧洲化]，那么我可以选择什么都不做，但我真的遇到了效率问题（采访 #4）。

As to the EU context, in 2003 and 2013 further CAP reforms took place (Snyder, 2012), thus increasing the potential mismatch of the ministries’ structure with its policy environment. The two pillars of the CAP were linked more closely, resulting in a more integrated approach for the funding policy, and the EU DirectorateGeneral changed its name to “agriculture and rural development” in 2005.
至于欧盟背景，在 2003 年和 2013 年发生了进一步的 CAP 改革（Snyder，2012 年），从而增加了各部委结构与其政策环境的潜在不匹配。CAP 的两大支柱联系得更紧密，从而为资助政策采取了更加综合的方法，欧盟总局于 2005 年更名为“农业和农村发展”。

While external and fiscal pressure figured prominently in reform talk, interviews revealed political motives, too. These include gaining a profile as a new minister, and reshuffling personnel (Interview#3). In addition, the minister arguably scored high in terms of understanding the problem pressure in the ministry. He had spent most of his career as a bureaucrat in the Ministry for Agriculture, among others being a member of the negotiation group for EU accession and later head of division for “Agriculture and Nutrition” where he was responsible for concentrating EU and international affairs in 2000/2001. Before becoming a minister, he had been a senior official in the Council of the European Union for several years.
虽然外部和财政压力在改革讨论中占据突出地位，但采访也揭示了政治动机。这些措施包括获得新部长的形象，以及改组人事（访谈#3）。此外，这位部长在理解该部的问题压力方面可以说得分很高。他职业生涯的大部分时间都在农业部担任官僚，其中包括加入欧盟谈判小组的成员，后来担任“农业和营养”部门负责人，负责在 2000/2001 年集中精力处理欧盟和国际事务。在成为部长之前，他曾在欧盟理事会担任高级官员数年。

Like in the former episode, a comprehensive reduction of organizational units took place (see also Figure 3). The reorganization of tasks even resulted in personnel taking over completely new tasks, which were not even closely related to their old ones (Interview#3). The two divisions “Sustainability and Rural Areas” and “Agriculture and Nutrition” were merged into a new division “Agriculture and Rural Development”. Like in the previous episode, several mergers and terminations took place at the level of sections. For instance, mirroring the EU’s division for wine, fruits, vegetables, and special crops had already been suggested in 1995 and had only been partially implemented, yet the full merger took place only in 2014. Moreover, the section once responsible for negotiating with the WTO was merged with another section, as it had lost important competencies due to EU accession (Interview#5). The unit for EU coordination became a staff unit directly reporting to the minister, including the sections “EU coordination agriculture” and “EU coordination environment” previously allocated in different divisions. In addition, the legal affairs division was eventually abolished, and legal affairs were decentralized in 2014 after two decades of fruitless reform efforts and persisting coordination problems (Table 1). These latter reorganizations allegedly enhanced the effective coordination of EU affairs (Interview#2).
与前一集一样，组织单位的全面减少（另见图 3）。任务的重组甚至导致人员接管了全新的任务，这些任务甚至与旧任务没有密切关系（采访#3）。“可持续发展和农村地区”和“农业和营养”两个部门合并为一个新的“农业和农村发展”部门。与上一集一样，在部门级别发生了几次合并和终止。例如，1995 年就已经提出了与欧盟类似的葡萄酒、水果、蔬菜和特殊作物的划分，并且仅部分实施，但直到 2014 年才进行了全面合并。此外，曾经负责与 WTO 谈判的部门与另一个部门合并，因为它因加入欧盟而失去了重要的能力（访谈#5）。欧盟协调单位成为直接向部长报告的人员单位，包括之前分配给不同部门的“欧盟协调农业”和“欧盟协调环境”部分。此外，法律事务司最终被废除，经过二十年徒劳的改革努力和持续的协调问题，法律事务于 2014 年下放（表 1）。据称，这些后一种重组加强了欧盟事务的有效协调（访谈#2）。

This final episode demonstrates that major intra-organizational change is possible. The conditions for change to occur are the willingness and attention of a political entrepreneur, the availability of viable policy solutions, and high problem pressure. Moreover, the comparison of all episodes shows that structures can only be streamlined in the absence of competing problems that are addressed by creating new structures.
最后一集表明，重大的组织内部变革是可能的。变革发生的条件是政治企业家的意愿和关注、可行的政策解决方案的可用性以及高问题压力。此外，对所有事件的比较表明，只有在没有通过创建新结构来解决的竞争问题的情况下，才能简化结构。

Discussion
讨论

The discussion is organized along the different hypotheses. A first result is that Europeanization which results in a misfit between national and EU level policies increases pressure for intra-organizational change because of changes in the organizational task portfolio (H1). We find that additional organizational units were created as negotiations for EU accession started and after EU accession, since the ministry had to perform new tasks. In line with existing research (Lichtmannegger, 2017, 2019), we see that the number of units increases either shortly before or after major changes of the EU context. Yet Europeanization also leads to a loss of tasks due to delegation to the Commission (Mu¨ ller and Wright, 1994). However, the analysis shows that it takes time until this loss of tasks translates into new organizational structures.
讨论按照不同的假设进行组织。第一个结果是，由于组织任务组合 （H1） 的变化，导致国家和欧盟层面政策不匹配的欧洲化增加了组织内部变革的压力。我们发现，随着加入欧盟的谈判开始，以及加入欧盟之后，由于该部必须执行新的任务，因此创建了额外的组织单位。根据现有研究（Lichtmannegger，2017 年、2019 年），我们看到单位数量在欧盟环境发生重大变化之前或之后不久都会增加。然而，欧洲化也导致了由于委托给委员会而失去任务（Mu ̈ ller 和 Wright，1994 年）。然而，分析表明，这种任务损失转化为新的组织结构需要时间。

We find that EU accession initially leads to increasing specialization by adding new units, which over time are adjusted (merged, abolished) to address coordination problems. Before Austria started EU membership negotiations, severe coordination problems already existed, e.g. due to the specialized legal affairs division.
我们发现，加入欧盟最初通过添加新单位导致专业化程度的提高，随着时间的推移，这些单位会进行调整（合并、废除）以解决协调问题。 在奥地利开始欧盟成员资格谈判之前，已经存在严重的协调问题，例如由于专门的法律事务部门。

In addition, EU negotiations and accession exacerbated coordination problems at higher hierarchical levels. Coordination problems resulted from several units’ loss of functions to the EU Commission and the newly created executive agency, as well as the additional hierarchical layer created in the wake of the 1987 coalition change. Moreover, CAP reforms led to the continuing change of priorities and therefore pressure for change. These issues were addressed only when a substantial proportion of bureaucrats perceived them as pressing coordination problems, which can be gleaned from the reforms initiated by minister Molterer in 2000. As suggested by H2, the more obvious coordination problems became, the more likely a political entrepreneur will be successful in framing this condition as a problem.
此外，欧盟谈判和加入欧盟加剧了更高等级的协调问题。协调问题是由于几个单位失去了欧盟委员会和新成立的执行机构的职能，以及在 1987 年联盟变更后创建的额外等级。此外，CAP 改革导致优先事项不断变化，因此也带来了变革的压力。只有当相当一部分官僚认为这些问题是紧迫的协调问题时，这些问题才能得到解决，这可以从 Molterer 部长在 2000 年发起的改革中收集到。正如 H2 所建议的，协调问题越明显，政治企业家就越有可能成功地将这种情况定义为一个问题。

The third hypothesis suggested that ideas have to soften up through repeated discussions to gain legitimacy (March and Olsen, 1983). Hence, reforms will typically consist of old ideas, rather than new solutions. This study showed that the first reorganization plan resulted in incremental change only, and reform results were disappointing. In line with H3, we find that those reform ideas were implemented after several years (e.g. creation of bigger sections, merger of ministries) and even decades (e.g. dispersal of legal affairs). This also means that wholesale administrative reforms are unlikely to result in immediate changes, but they are important and meaningful activities in their own right that may pave the way for structural changes in the future (March and Olsen, 1983).
第三个假设表明，想法必须通过反复讨论来软化才能获得合法性（March 和 Olsen，1983）。因此，改革通常由旧的想法组成，而不是新的解决方案。这项研究表明，第一个重组计划只导致了增量变化，而改革结果令人失望。与 H3 一致，我们发现这些改革想法是在几年（例如创建更大的部门、合并各部委）甚至几十年后（例如法律事务的分配）后实施的。这也意味着大规模的行政改革不太可能立即导致变化，但它们本身就是重要而有意义的活动，可能为未来的结构性变化铺平道路（March 和 Olsen，1983）。

According to H4, we expect that structural changes require a substantial commitment by the responsible minister. This explanation directed our attention to the potential effects of ministerial turnover on structural changes (Holmgren, 2018; James et al., 2016), as well as to assessments of ministers’ commitment to reform. Our analysis shows that major structural changes occurred both after a new minister had come into office (2014) and after a long-term minister’s reappointment (2000). This suggests that reform commitment, rather than turnover, as such contributes toward explaining intra-organizational change. Overall, our analysis indicates that only few ministers in the period under study were committed to structural changes.
根据 H4 的说法，我们预计结构性变化需要负责部长的实质性承诺。这种解释将我们的注意力引向了部长更替对结构变化的潜在影响（Holmgren，2018 年;James et al.， 2016），以及对部长们对改革承诺的评估。我们的分析表明，在新部长上任后（2014 年）和长期部长连任后（2000 年），都发生了重大的结构性变化。这表明重新形成承诺，而不是人员流动，因此有助于解释组织内部的变化。总体而言，我们的分析表明，在研究期间，只有少数部长致力于结构性改革。

Finally, we hypothesized that the combination of a viable solution that has been softened up, high organization-specific problem pressure, and a committed minister is required for major intra-organizational change. In particular, the last episode showed the decisive role of a dedicated minister as political entrepreneur in order to bring about decisive intra-organizational change. Rupprechter was responsible for parts of the reform in 2000/2001 (as evidenced by internal documents) and had worked in Brussels before assuming the post as minister. Hence, this minister was not only committed to structural reform; he also had in-depth knowledge about persistent coordination problems inside the ministry, which arguably is not a common situation for incoming ministers. Rupprechter framed budget problems as highly pressing and proposed structural reforms that had been discussed since 1995. In contrast, long-time minister Molterer evokes the impression of a less committed political entrepreneur in 2000/2001. He commissioned a reorganization proposal in 1995 and again in 2000/2001 to a consultancy. However, in 1995, hardly any changes took place, but in 2000/2001 internal pressure for change was so compelling that he had to commit to several reform measures.
最后，我们假设，一个已经软化的可行解决方案、高组织特定问题压力和一位忠诚的牧师的结合是组织内部重大变革的必要条件。特别是，最后一集展示了一位敬业的部长作为政治企业家的决定性作用，以带来决定性的组织内部变革。Rupprechter 负责 2000/2001 年的部分改革（内部文件证明），并在担任部长之前曾在布鲁塞尔工作。因此，这位部长不仅致力于结构性改革;他还对内政部内部持续存在的协调问题有深入的了解，这可以说不是新任部长的常见情况。Rupprechter 将预算问题定义为高度紧迫的问题，并提出了自 1995 年以来一直在讨论的结构性改革。相比之下，长期担任部长的莫尔特勒在 2000/2001 年给人的印象是一个不那么坚定的政治企业家。他在1995 年和 2000/2001 年向一家咨询公司提出了重组提案。然而，在 1995 年，几乎没有发生任何变化，但在 2000/2001 年，内部变革的压力如此迫切，以至于他不得不承诺采取几项改革措施。

Conclusion
结论

This article analyzed the interplay of various theoretically relevant drivers of structural change and tracked actual structural change inside a ministry in a parliamentary democracy over a period of 30years. In addition to its empirical contribution, it demonstrated how the multiple streams framework can be leveraged to analyze decision windows about intra-organizational administrative reforms. What does the case teach us about theories of reform and change? For instance, research on the influence of Europeanization explains that intra-organizational effects are few, ambiguous, and indirect (Bulmer and Burch, 1998; Jordan, 2003). In contrast, this article demonstrates various short-term and long-term impacts of Europeanization on intra-organizational structures. We show that the implementation of reform ideas on how to respond to a mismatch between internal structure and organizational environment takes time. Administrative reforms may be unsuccessful in the short run, but reform ideas have a life of their own and may be coupled to new reforms at a later point of time after they have been softened up (Kingdon, 2003).
本文分析了结构变化的各种理论相关驱动因素的相互作用，并跟踪了 30 年议会民主制部门内部的实际结构变化。除了实证贡献外，它还展示了如何利用多流框架来分析有关组织内部行政改革的决策窗口。这个案子对我们关于改革和变革的理论有什么启示？例如，关于欧洲化影响的研究解释说，组织内部的影响很少、模糊和间接（Bulmer 和 Burch，1998 年;Jordan，2003 年）。相比之下，本文展示了欧洲化对组织内部结构的各种短期和长期影响。我们表明，关于如何应对内部结构和组织环境之间不匹配的改革思想的实施需要时间。行政改革可能在短期内不成功，但改革思想有其生命力，并且可能在软化后与新的改革相结合（Kingdon，2003 年）。

This is the first article that studies reform processes and adjustment of structural intra-organizational dysfunctions through the analytical lens of a modified multiple streams framework. In line with Herweg et al. (2017), we differentiate between a decision and an agenda window. However, in order to explain when reform ideas end up in intra-organizational change, we focused on and adapted the concept of the decision window. In our context of structural reforms the key political entrepreneur is the minister. Therefore, in order to bring about change, he (or she) does not have to gain a majority in parliament, but has to be willing to push through change in a context where ministry officials will typically prefer the status quo (Christensen, 1997). That being said, while we did not find any indications for variation in employees’ resistance to change, this may be different in other empirical settings.
这是第一篇文章，通过修改后的多流框架的分析镜头来研究改革过程和结构性组织内功能障碍的调整。根据 Herweg et al. （2017），我们区分了决策窗口和议程窗口。然而，为了解释改革思想何时最终导致组织内部变革，我们关注并调整了决策窗口的概念。在我们结构性改革的背景下，关键的政治企业家是ministe r。因此，为了实现变革，他（或她）不必在议会中获得多数席位，但必须愿意在部委官员通常倾向于维持现状的情况下推动变革（Christensen， 1997）。话虽如此，虽然我们没有发现任何迹象表明员工对变革的抵制存在差异，但这在其他实证环境中可能会有所不同。

This article made a novel contribution to the multiple streams framework literature by adapting the framework to decision-making processes that remain in the executive sphere. The theory underlines that reform ideas have to be softened up and that intra-organizational change consists of “old solutions” and “old problems” of administrative coordination. The multiple streams model allowed us to specify conditions under which internal dysfunctions are addressed by structural changes in a systematic way. Public organizations often are perceived as inflexible and resistant to reform. We showed that change is possible through a complex interplay of problem pressure, policy solutions, and political entrepreneurship.
本文通过将框架应用于保留在执行领域的决策过程，对多流框架文献做出了新的贡献。该理论强调，改革思想必须被软化，而组织内部的变革包括行政协调的“旧解决方案”和“旧问题”。多流模型使我们能够指定条件，在哪些条件下，结构变化以系统的方式解决内部功能障碍。公共组织通常被认为不灵活且抵制改革。我们表明，通过问题压力、政策解决方案和政治创业的复杂相互作用，变革是可能的。

Declaration of conflicting interests
利益冲突声明

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
作者声明与本文的研究、作者身份和/或出版没有潜在的利益冲突。

Funding
资金

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
作者没有获得本文的研究、作者身份和/或出版的财务支持。

ORCID iD

Christina Lichtmannegger
克里斯蒂娜·利希特曼格

Note
注意

1. The multiple streams framework draws upon the garbage can model of organizational choice, which also builds upon assumptions of temporal instead of instrumental coupling of problems and solutions (Cohen et al., 1972; March and Olsen, 1983).
1. 多流框架借鉴了组织选择的垃圾桶模型，该模型也建立在问题和解决方案的时间性耦合而不是工具耦合的假设之上（Cohen et al.， 1972;March 和 Olsen，1983 年）。

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