Table of Contents
目录
1. Plato The Republic
1. 柏拉图 《理想国》
Thrasymachus and Glaucon
色拉西马库斯和格劳孔
Rulers, Auxiliaries and Workers
统治者、辅助者和工人
The just state and the just individual
公正的国家与公正的个体
The three parts of the soul
灵魂的三个部分
Criticisms of The Republic
《理想国》的批评
2. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics
2. 亚里士多德《尼科马科伦理学》
Eudaimonia: a happy life
幸福：一种快乐的生活
The function of a human being
人类的功能
Akrasia: weakness of will
无能为力：意志的软弱
Criticisms of the Nicomachean Ethics
对《尼科马科伦理学》的批评
3. Boethius The Consolation of Philosophy
3. 博伊修斯 《哲学的安慰》
Criticism of The Consolation of Philosophy
对《哲学的安慰》的批评
4. Niccolò Machiavelli The Prince
4. 尼科洛·马基雅维利 《君主论》
Cesare Borgia versus Agathocles
切萨雷·博尔贾对抗阿卡托克利斯
Interpretations of The Prince
《君主论》的解读
Criticisms of The Prince
对《君主论》的批评
5. Michel Eyquem de Montaigne Essays
5. 米歇尔·艾克姆·德·蒙田 论文
Criticism of Montaigne’s Essays
对蒙田《随笔》的批评
6. René Descartes Meditations
6. 笛卡尔的沉思
The evidence of the senses
感官的证据
Criticisms of Meditations
对《沉思录》的批评
7. Thomas Hobbes Leviathan
7. 托马斯·霍布斯《利维坦》
Criticisms of Leviathan
对《利维坦》的批评
8. Baruch de Spinoza Ethics
8. 巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎 伦理学
Freedom and human bondage
自由与人类束缚
9. John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
9. 约翰·洛克 《人类理解论》
Primary and secondary qualities
主要和次要属性
Criticisms of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
对《人类理解论》的批评
10. John Locke Second Treatise of Government
10. 约翰·洛克《政府二论》
First and Second Treatises
第一和第二论著
The state of nature and laws of nature
自然状态和自然法则
Criticisms of Second Treatise of Government
对《政府第二论》的批评
11. David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
11. 大卫·休谟 《人类理解研究》
Criticisms of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
对《人类理解研究》的批评
12. David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
12. 大卫·休谟 自然宗教对话
Criticisms of the Design Argument
设计论的批评
13. Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract
13. 让-雅克·卢梭 社会契约
Three types of government
三种类型的政府
Criticisms of The Social Contract
对《社会契约论》的批评
14. Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason
14. 伊曼努尔·康德 《纯粹理性批判》
Appearances and the thing-in-itself
表象与物自身
The transcendental deduction
超越演绎
Criticism of the Critique of Pure Reason
对《纯粹理性批判》的批评
15. Immanuel Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
15. 伊曼努尔·康德 《道德形而上学的基础》
The categorical imperative
定言命令
Kant, Aristotle and Mill
康德、亚里士多德和穆尔
Criticisms of The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
《道德形而上学基础》的批评
16. Thomas Paine Rights of Man
16. 托马斯·潘恩 《人权论》
Criticisms of Rights of Man
对《人权宣言》的批评
17. Arthur Schopenhauer The World as Will and Idea
17. 亚瑟·叔本华 《作为意志和表象的世界》
Criticisms of The World as Will and Idea
对《作为意志和表象的世界》的批评
18. John Stuart Mill On Liberty
18. 约翰·斯图亚特·密尔 《论自由》
Criticisms of On Liberty
《论自由》的批评
19. John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism
19. 约翰·斯图亚特·密尔 功利主义
Bentham’s utilitarianism
边沁的功利主义
Mill on higher and lower pleasures
高尚与低俗的快乐
The ‘proof’ of utilitarianism
功利主义的“证明”
Criticisms of Utilitarianism
对功利主义的批评
20. Søren Kierkegaard Either/Or
20. 索伦·基尔凯郭尔 《非此即彼》
The aesthetic approach to life
生活的审美方式
The ethical approach to life
生活的伦理方法
Readings of Either/Or
《Either/Or》的阅读
Criticisms of Either/Or
《非此即彼》的批评
21. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The German Ideology, Part One
21. 卡尔·马克思和弗里德里希·恩格斯 《德意志意识形态》，第一部分
Criticisms of The German Ideology
对《德国意识形态》的批评
22. Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil
22. 弗里德里希·尼采 《超越善恶》
On the prejudices of philosophers
关于哲学家的偏见
Criticisms of Beyond Good and Evil
《超越善恶》的批评
23. Friedrich Nietzsche On the Genealogy of Morality
23. 弗里德里希·尼采 《道德的谱系》
First essay: ‘good and evil’ and ‘good and bad’
第一篇论文：‘善与恶’和‘好与坏’
Second essay: conscience
第二篇文章：良知
Third essay: asceticism
第三篇论文：禁欲主义
Criticisms of On the Genealogy of Morality
对《道德谱系》 的批评
24. Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy
24. 伯特兰·罗素 《哲学问题》
Knowledge by acquaintance and by description
通过熟悉和描述获得的知识
Criticisms of The Problems of Philosophy
对《哲学问题》的批评
25. A. J. Ayer Language, Truth and Logic
25. A. J. Ayer 语言、真理与逻辑
The Verification Principle
验证原则
Strong and weak senses of ‘verifiability’
“可验证性”的强和弱含义
Criticisms of Language, Truth and Logic
语言、真理与逻辑的批评
26. R.G. Collingwood The Principles of Art
26. R.G. Collingwood 艺术的原则
Who was R.G. Collingwood?
R.G. Collingwood 是谁？
The technical theory of art
艺术的技术理论
But doesn’t art involve craft?
但艺术难道不涉及工艺吗？
Criticisms of Collingwood’s theory of art
对科林伍德艺术理论的批评
27. Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness
27. 让-保罗·萨特 《存在与虚无》
Phenomenological approach
现象学方法
Existential psychoanalysis
存在主义心理分析
Criticisms of Being and Nothingness
对《存在与虚无》的批评
28. Jean-Paul Sartre Existentialism and Humanism
28. 让-保罗·萨特 《存在主义与人道主义》
What is existentialism?
什么是存在主义？
Criticisms of Existentialism and Humanism
存在主义和人本主义的批评
29. Karl Popper The Open Society and Its Enemies
29. 卡尔·波普尔 《开放社会及其敌人》
What did Popper mean by an open society?
波普所说的开放社会是什么意思？
Plato’s totalitarian tendencies
柏拉图的极权主义倾向
Criticism of The Open Society and Its Enemies
对《开放社会及其敌人》的批评
30. Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations
30. 路德维希·维特根斯坦 《哲学研究》
Relation to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
与《逻辑哲学论》的关系
Family resemblance terms
家庭相似性术语
The Private Language Argument
私人语言论
Criticisms of Philosophical Investigations
对《哲学研究》的批评
31. Thomas Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
31. 托马斯·库恩 《科学革命的结构》
What Kuhn was arguing against
库恩所反对的观点
Normal science and revolutions
常规科学与革命
Paradigm shifts transform what can be observed
范式转变改变了可观察的事物
Criticisms of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
对《科学革命的结构》的批评
32. John Rawls A Theory of Justice
32. 约翰·罗尔斯 《正义论》
The fair equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle
公平机会原则和差异原则
Criticisms of A Theory of Justice
对《正义理论》的批评
Index (including key concepts)
索引（包括关键概念）
PHILOSOPHY
哲学
THE CLASSICS
经典著作
Praise for the first edition:
对第一版的赞誉：
‘The challenge is to convey to the modern reader the perennial freshness of ideas which might otherwise be clouded by historical scholarship. Nigel Warburton rises to the challenge with admirable skill.’
“挑战在于向现代读者传达那些可能被历史学术所掩盖的思想的持久新鲜感。奈杰尔·沃伯顿以令人钦佩的技巧迎接了这一挑战。”
Roger Scruton, The Times
罗杰·斯克鲁顿，《泰晤士报》
Now in its fourth edition, Philosophy: The Classics is a brisk and invigorating tour through the great books of western philosophy. In his exemplary clear style, Nigel Warburton introduces and assesses thirty-two philosophical classics from Plato’s Republic to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. The fourth edition includes new material on:
现在是第四版，《哲学：经典》是对西方哲学伟大著作的快速而振奋人心的巡礼。在他清晰的风格中，奈杰尔·沃伯顿介绍并评估了从柏拉图的《理想国》到约翰·罗尔斯的《正义论》这三十二部哲学经典。第四版包括关于以下内容的新材料：
Montaigne The Essays
蒙田 论集
Thomas Paine The Rights of Man
托马斯·佩恩 《人权》
R.G. Collingwood The Principles of Art
R.G. Collingwood 艺术原理
Karl Popper The Open Society and Its Enemies
卡尔·波普尔 《开放社会及其敌人》
Thomas Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
托马斯·库恩 《科学革命的结构》
With a glossary and suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, this is an ideal starting point for anyone interested in philosophy.
每章末尾附有术语表和进一步阅读的建议，这是任何对哲学感兴趣的人的理想起点。
Nigel Warburton is a freelance philosopher, podcaster and writer. He is the author of many books including Philosophy: The Basics (5th edition), Thinking from A to Z (3rd edition) and The Basics of Essay Writing. With David Edmonds, he makes the popular philosophy podcast Philosophy Bites.
奈杰尔·沃伯顿是一位自由职业的哲学家、播客主持人和作家。他是多本书籍的作者，包括《哲学：基础》（第 5 版）、《从 A 到 Z 的思考》（第 3 版）和《论文写作基础》。与大卫·埃德蒙兹一起，他制作了受欢迎的哲学播客《哲学小品》。
Praise for the First Edition:
对第一版的赞誉：
‘Nigel Warburton gives a characteristically lucid account of twenty philosophical classics. Philosophy: The Classics is sure to be of wide interest and appeal.’
‘奈杰尔·沃伯顿对二十部哲学经典进行了典型的清晰阐述。《哲学：经典》必定会引起广泛的兴趣和吸引力。’
Andrew Pyle, University of Bristol
安德鲁·派尔，布里斯托大学
‘This is a lucid, engaging and eminently readable book …’
“这是一本清晰、引人入胜且极易阅读的书……”
Michael Clark, University of Nottingham
迈克尔·克拉克，诺丁汉大学
‘Philosophy: The Classics is a clear-minded and fluent introduction to philosophy …’
《哲学：经典著作》是对哲学的清晰而流畅的介绍……
Stephen Priest, University of Edinburgh
斯蒂芬·普里斯特，爱丁堡大学
‘This book will be a very useful addition to every philosophy student’s library …’
“这本书将是每位哲学学生图书馆中非常有用的补充……”
E. J. Lowe, University of Durham
E. J. Lowe，达勒姆大学
Other books by the same author
同一作者的其他书籍
Philosophy: The Basics
哲学：基础知识
Fifth Edition (2012)
第五版（2012）
Thinking from A to Z
从 A 想到 Z
Third Edition (2007)
第三版（2007）
Philosophy: Basic Readings
哲学：基础阅读
Second Edition (2005)
第二版（2005）
Freedom: An Introduction with Readings
自由：导论与阅读材料
(2001)
The Art Question
艺术问题
(2003)
Philosophy: The Essential Study Guide
哲学：必备学习指南
(2005)
The Basics of Essay Writing
论文写作基础
(2006)
with D. Matravers and J. Pike
与 D. Matravers 和 J. Pike
Reading Political Philosophy: Machiavelli to Mill
阅读政治哲学：从马基雅维利到密尔
(2001)
PHILOSOPHY
哲学
THE CLASSICS
经典著作
Fourth edition
第四版
Nigel Warburton
奈杰尔·沃伯顿
First edition published 1998
第一版出版于 1998 年
Reprinted 1999, 2000
再版于 1999 年，2000 年
Second edition published 2001
第二版出版于 2001 年
Reprinted 2002, 2004, 2005
重印于 2002 年、2004 年、2005 年
Third edition first published 2006
第三版首次出版于 2006 年
Reprinted 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
重印于 2007、2008、2009、2010 年
Fourth edition published 2014
第四版出版于 2014 年
by Routledge
由 Routledge 出版
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
牛津郡阿宾顿米尔顿公园公园广场 2 号 OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
并由 Routledge 出版
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
711 第三大道，纽约，NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
Routledge 是泰勒与弗朗西斯集团的一个品牌，属于 Informa 业务
© 1998, 2001, 2006, 2014 Nigel Warburton
The right of Nigel Warburton to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
奈杰尔·沃伯顿根据 1988 年《版权、设计和专利法》第 77 和 78 条主张其作为本作品作者的权利。
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
版权所有。未经出版商书面许可，本书的任何部分不得以任何形式或通过任何已知或今后发明的电子、机械或其他手段进行重印、复制或利用，包括复印和录音，或在任何信息存储或检索系统中使用。
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
商标声明：产品或公司名称可能是商标或注册商标，仅用于识别和说明，且无意侵犯。
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
英国图书馆出版数据编目
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
本书的目录记录可从英国图书馆获取
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
国会图书馆出版数据目录
Warburton, Nigel, 1962–
沃伯顿，奈杰尔，1962–
Philosophy: the classics/Nigel Warburton. – Fourth edition.
哲学：经典著作/奈杰尔·沃伯顿。– 第四版。
pages cm
页面厘米
Includes bibliographical references and index.
包括参考文献和索引。
1. Philosophy. I. Title.
1. 哲学。I. 标题。
B72.W37 2014
100–dc23
2013028411
ISBN: 978-0-415-53467-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-415-53466-6 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-84920-1 (ebk)
For Anna
给安娜
CONTENTS
内容
I am grateful to everyone who commented on parts or all of this book in its various editions, including Tony Bruce, Michael Clark, Caroline Dawnay, Jonathan Hourigan, Muna Khogali, Stephen Law, E.J. Lowe, Pauline Marsh, Derek Matravers, Anna Motz, Tom Stoneham, Charles Styles, Stephanie Warburton and Terence Wilkerson. This edition is substantially different from earlier ones, and includes five new chapters as well as revisions throughout. The chapter on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism and Humanism draws on my article ‘A Student’s Guide to Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism and Humanism’ which originally appeared in the magazine Philosophy Now.
我感谢所有在本书各个版本中对部分或全部内容发表评论的人，包括 Tony Bruce、Michael Clark、Caroline Dawnay、Jonathan Hourigan、Muna Khogali、Stephen Law、E.J. Lowe、Pauline Marsh、Derek Matravers、Anna Motz、Tom Stoneham、Charles Styles、Stephanie Warburton 和 Terence Wilkerson。本版与早期版本有很大不同，包含五个新章节以及全书的修订。关于让-保罗·萨特的存在主义与人道主义的章节参考了我在杂志《哲学现在》中发表的文章《学生指南：让-保罗·萨特的存在主义与人道主义》。
Nigel Warburton
奈杰尔·沃伯顿
Oxford 2013
牛津 2013
@philosophybites
This book consists of thirty-two chapters, each focused on a single great philosophical book. The point is to introduce each book, bringing out its most important themes. The books dealt with here are worth reading today because they engage with philosophical problems that are still worth discussing, and because they continue to offer insights. Apart from that, many of them hold their own as great works of literature.
这本书由三十二章组成，每一章都集中于一本伟大的哲学书籍。目的是介绍每本书，突出其最重要的主题。这里讨论的书籍今天仍然值得阅读，因为它们涉及的哲学问题仍然值得讨论，并且它们继续提供见解。除此之外，许多书籍本身也作为伟大的文学作品而独树一帜。
Ideally, reading this book should be a spur to your reading (or rereading) the books it treats. But not everyone has the time or the energy to do that. At least I hope this will guide you to the books among the thirty-two that you are likely to find most rewarding, and offer you some suggestions about how you might read them critically. I have tried to avoid recommending books which are unnecessarily obscure. This has led me to omit some acknowledged masterpieces, such as Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right and Heidegger’s Being and Time, for which I make no apology. At the end of each chapter I have given guidelines for further reading.
理想情况下，阅读这本书应该激励你去阅读（或重读）它所涉及的书籍。但并不是每个人都有时间或精力去做这件事。至少我希望这本书能引导你找到三十二本中最值得阅读的书，并为你提供一些关于如何批判性阅读它们的建议。我尽量避免推荐那些不必要晦涩的书籍。这使我省略了一些公认的杰作，例如黑格尔的《精神现象学》和《法哲学原理》以及海德格尔的《存在与时间》，对此我不感到抱歉。在每一章的末尾，我提供了进一步阅读的指南。
My choice of books is in some ways controversial, more for what I have left out than for what I have included, I suspect. What I have done is focused on books that I believe repay study today and which are amenable to the sort of treatment possible in three or four thousand words. This is a personal top thirty-two; other philosophers, though their choices would certainly overlap with mine, would come up with a different top thirty-two.
我选择的书在某种程度上是有争议的，我怀疑这更多是因为我遗漏的内容而不是我所包含的内容。我所做的是专注于我认为今天值得研究的书籍，并且这些书籍适合在三四千字的篇幅内进行处理。这是我个人的前三十二名；其他哲学家虽然他们的选择肯定会与我的重叠，但他们会提出不同的前三十二名。
I have included brief chronologies, but haven’t found space for any detailed historical background. My main aim is to introduce books rather than movements in the history of ideas. This doesn’t mean that I am advocating a completely ahistorical reading of these texts. However, I do believe that the best way to approach them is, in the first instance, by getting an overview of their major themes and emphases. Those who want more contextual information can find it in the recommendations for further reading.
我已经包含了简要的时间表，但没有找到空间提供详细的历史背景。我的主要目的是介绍书籍，而不是思想史上的运动。这并不意味着我提倡对这些文本进行完全的非历史性解读。然而，我确实相信，接近它们的最佳方式是首先了解它们的主要主题和重点。那些想要更多背景信息的人可以在进一步阅读的推荐中找到。
Don’t be afraid to dip into chapters out of order. I have written each chapter to stand on its own without presupposing any knowledge of those which have gone before.
不要害怕按顺序跳过章节。我写的每一章都是独立的，不需要预先了解之前的内容。
Further Reading
进一步阅读
My two books, Philosophy: The Basics (London: Routledge, 5th edn, 2012) and Thinking from A to Z (London: Routledge, 3rd edn, 2007) complement this one. The first is a topic-based introduction to the central areas of philosophy; the second an alphabetically arranged introduction to critical thinking, the techniques of argument that are central to philosophical method. I have also edited a collection of readings, Philosophy: Basic Readings (London: Routledge, 2nd edn, 2004) and an introduction to study skills in philosophy: Philosophy: The Essential Study Guide (London: Routledge, 2004).
我的两本书，《哲学：基础》（伦敦：劳特利奇，第五版，2012 年）和《从 A 到 Z 的思考》（伦敦：劳特利奇，第三版，2007 年）与这本书相辅相成。第一本是对哲学核心领域的主题导论；第二本是对批判性思维的按字母顺序排列的介绍，论证技巧是哲学方法的核心。我还编辑了一本阅读文集，《哲学：基础阅读》（伦敦：劳特利奇，第二版，2004 年）以及一本关于哲学学习技能的导论：《哲学：必备学习指南》（伦敦：劳特利奇，2004 年）。
Other general books on philosophy which you might find useful include:
其他您可能会觉得有用的哲学通用书籍包括：
John Cottingham (ed.) Western Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
约翰·科廷汉（编）《西方哲学：选集》（牛津：布莱克威尔，1996 年）。
Edward Craig (ed.) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2005).
爱德华·克雷格（编）《短版劳特利奇哲学百科全书》（伦敦：劳特利奇，2005 年）。
David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton (eds) Philosophy Bites Back (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
大卫·埃德蒙兹和奈杰尔·沃伯顿（编）《哲学反击》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2012 年）。
Anthony Flew A Dictionary of Philosophy (London: Pan, 1979).
安东尼·弗鲁 《哲学词典》（伦敦：潘出版社，1979 年）。
Ted Honderich (ed.) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
泰德·霍德里奇（编）《牛津哲学指南》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1995 年）。
Anthony Kenny A New History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
安东尼·肯尼 《西方哲学的新历史》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2012 年）。
Bryan Magee The Great Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
布莱恩·梅吉 《伟大的哲学家》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1988 年）。
Alan Ryan On Politics: A History of Political Thought from Herodotus to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013).
艾伦·瑞安《政治论：从希罗多德到现在的政治思想史》（纽约：W.W. 诺顿，2013 年）。
Roger Scruton A Short History of Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2nd edn, 1995).
罗杰·斯克鲁顿 《现代哲学简史》（伦敦：劳特利奇，第二版，1995 年）。
J. O. Urmson and Jonathan Rée The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers (London: Routledge, new edn, 1989).
J. O. Urmson 和 Jonathan Rée 《西方哲学与哲学家的简明百科全书》（伦敦：劳特利奇，新版，1989 年）。
Nigel Warburton A Little History of Philosophy (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).
奈杰尔·沃伯顿 《哲学简史》（伦敦和新哈芬：耶鲁大学出版社，2012 年）。
Mary Warnock (ed.) Women Philosophers (London: Dent, Everyman, 1995).
玛丽·沃诺克（编）《女性哲学家》（伦敦：登特，人人出版社，1995 年）。
Recommended Websites
推荐的网站
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a reliable source:
斯坦福哲学百科全书是一个可靠的来源：
Philosophy Bites: interviews (audio) with contemporary philosophers, many of them on the ideas of past philosophers:
哲学咬文：与当代哲学家的访谈（音频），许多关于过去哲学家的思想：
http://www.philosophybites.com
Early Modern Texts: paraphrases of many key philosophical texts designed to help readers negotiate the sometimes difficult language of the originals:
早期现代文本：许多关键哲学文本的释义，旨在帮助读者理解原文中有时困难的语言：
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/
In Our Time: an archive of the BBC Radio 4 programmes in this series that were devoted to philosophy:
在我们的时代：一个关于这一系列专注于哲学的 BBC Radio 4 节目的档案：
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/features/in-our-time/archive/philosophy/all
Plato The Republic
柏拉图 《理想国》
Imagine a cave. Prisoners are chained facing its far wall. They’ve been kept there all their lives and their heads are held fixed so that they can’t see anything except the wall of the cave. Behind them there is a fire and between the fire and their backs a road. Along the road various people walk casting their shadows on the cave wall; some of them carry models of animals which also cast shadows. The prisoners inside the cave only ever see shadows. They believe the shadows are the real things because they don’t know any better. But in fact they never see real people.
想象一个洞穴。囚犯们被锁链锁住，面朝远处的墙壁。他们一生都被关在这里，头被固定住，无法看到洞穴以外的任何东西。它们身后有一堆火，火与他们的背之间有一条路。沿着这条路，各种人走过，投射出他们的影子在洞穴的墙上；其中一些人还携带着动物模型，这些模型也投射出影子。洞穴里的囚犯们只看到影子。他们相信影子是真实的东西，因为他们不知道更好的情况。但实际上，他们从未见过真实的人。
Then one day one of the prisoners is released and allowed to look towards the fire. At first he is completely dazzled by the flames, but gradually he starts to discern the world around him. Then he is taken out of the cave into the full light of the sun, which again dazzles him. He slowly begins to realise the poverty of his former life: he had always been satisfied with the world of shadows when behind him lay the brightly lit real world in all its richness. Now as his eyes acclimatise to the daylight he sees what his fellow prisoners have missed and feels sorry for them. Eventually he becomes so used to the light that he can even look directly at the sun.
然后有一天，其中一个囚犯被释放，允许他朝火焰看去。起初，他被火焰完全眩晕，但渐渐地他开始辨认周围的世界。然后他被带出洞穴，进入阳光的明亮光线中，这又让他感到眩晕。他慢慢开始意识到自己过去生活的贫乏：他一直满足于阴影的世界，而在他身后则是光明照耀的真实世界，充满了丰富的色彩。现在，当他的眼睛适应了日光，他看到了他的同伴囚犯所错过的东西，并为他们感到遗憾。最终，他变得如此习惯于光线，以至于他甚至可以直接看着太阳。
Then he is taken back to his seat in the cave. His eyes are no longer used to this shadowy existence. He can no longer make the fine discriminations between shadows that his fellow prisoners find easy. From their point of view his eyesight has been ruined by his journey out of the cave. He has seen the real world; they remain content with the world of superficial appearances and wouldn’t leave the cave even if they could.
然后他被带回洞穴中的座位。他的眼睛已经不再适应这种阴暗的存在。他无法再像其他囚犯那样轻松地区分阴影。从他们的角度来看，他的视力因为离开洞穴而受到了损害。他已经看到了真实的世界；而他们仍然满足于表面现象的世界，即使有机会也不会离开洞穴。
This parable of the prisoners in the cave occurs halfway through Plato’s masterpiece, The Republic. It provides a memorable image of his theory of Forms, his account of the nature of reality. According to him the majority of humankind are, like the prisoners, content with a world of mere appearance. Only philosophers make the journey out of the cave and learn to experience things as they really are; only they can have genuine knowledge. The world of everyday perception is constantly changing and imperfect. But the world of the Forms to which philosophers have access is unchanging and perfect. It can’t be perceived with the five senses: it is only by means of thought that anyone can experience the Forms.
这个关于洞穴中囚徒的寓言出现在柏拉图的杰作《理想国》的中间部分。它提供了他关于形式理论的生动形象，以及他对现实本质的描述。根据他的说法，大多数人类就像囚徒一样，满足于仅仅是表象的世界。只有哲学家才能走出洞穴，学习以事物真实的样子去体验；只有他们才能拥有真正的知识。日常感知的世界是不断变化和不完美的。但哲学家所能接触的形式世界是永恒不变和完美的。它无法通过五感感知：只有通过思考，任何人才能体验到形式。
The life and death of his mentor, Socrates, was the main influence on Plato’s philosophy. Socrates was a charismatic figure who attracted a crowd of wealthy young Athenians around him. He did not leave any writing but exerted his influence through his conversations in the marketplace. He claimed not to have any doctrine to teach, but rather, through a series of pointed questions, would demonstrate how little those he talked to really knew about such things as the nature of piety, justice, or morality. While Plato was still a young man, Socrates was sentenced to death for corrupting the youth of the city and failing to believe in its gods. Socrates drank hemlock, the conventional method of execution for Athenian citizens.
他的导师苏格拉底的生死对柏拉图的哲学产生了主要影响。苏格拉底是一个富有魅力的人物，吸引了一群富有的年轻雅典人围绕在他身边。他没有留下任何著作，而是通过在市场上的对话施加影响。他声称自己没有任何教义可教，而是通过一系列尖锐的问题，展示了与他交谈的人对虔诚、正义或道德等事物的无知。当柏拉图还年轻时，苏格拉底因腐化城市青年和不信奉其神明而被判处死刑。苏格拉底饮下了毒芹，这是雅典公民的传统处决方式。
Plato gave Socrates a kind of afterlife in his dialogues. Yet the character called Socrates in Plato’s work probably differs considerably in his views from the real Socrates. Plato wrote as if he were recording conversations which had actually occurred; but by the time he came to write The Republic, Plato’s Socrates had become a mouthpiece for Plato’s own views.
柏拉图在他的对话中给了苏格拉底一种来世。然而，柏拉图作品中名为苏格拉底的角色在观点上可能与真实的苏格拉底有很大不同。柏拉图写作时仿佛在记录实际发生的对话；但到他写《理想国》时，柏拉图的苏格拉底已成为他自己观点的代言人。
The Republic provides a mixture of Plato’s two characteristic approaches to writing. In Book One, there is a conversation between Socrates and some friends which could have been the first scene in a play: we are told something of the setting and the reactions of the different characters. But in later sections, although Plato continues to write in dialogue form, the thrust of exposition is in Socrates’ voice, and the supporting cast simply agree with his pronouncements.
《理想国》结合了柏拉图两种典型的写作方式。在第一卷中，苏格拉底和一些朋友之间的对话可以看作是一出戏剧的第一场景：我们了解到一些背景和不同角色的反应。但在后面的部分，尽管柏拉图继续以对话的形式写作，阐述的重点却是以苏格拉底的声音进行的，配角们只是简单地同意他的论断。
Thrasymachus and Glaucon
色拉西马库斯和格劳孔
The main body of The Republic is a response to the challenges set by Thrasymachus and Glaucon. Thrasymachus maintains that what goes by the name of ‘justice’ is simply whatever happens to serve the interests of the strongest. Power is all that makes something right. Justice is simply a matter of obeying the self-serving rules set up by the strongest. At the level of individual behaviour, injustice pays much better than justice: those who help themselves to more than their fair share are happier than those who are just.
《理想国》的主体是对特拉西马库斯和格劳孔所提出挑战的回应。特拉西马库斯认为，所谓的“正义”不过是服务于最强者利益的事物。权力是使某事正确的唯一标准。正义仅仅是遵循最强者设定的自利规则。在个人行为层面上，不公正的行为比正义更有利：那些占有超过自己应得份额的人比那些公正的人更快乐。
Glaucon takes this further, suggesting that those who behave justly only do so as a form of self-preservation. Anyone who, like the mythical character Gyges, found a ring that made them invisible would lose any incentive for behaving justly since they could guarantee getting away with any crime, seduction or deception. He imagines a situation in which a just man is thought by everyone else to be unjust. He is tortured and executed: his life seems to have nothing to be said in its favour. Compare this with the life of a cunning wicked man who manages to seem just while being completely unscrupulous whenever he can get away with it. He leads a happy life, it seems, and is considered a model of respectability even though beneath his disguise he is thoroughly evil. This suggests that justice doesn’t pay, or at least that it doesn’t always pay. It also suggests that if Socrates wants to defend the just life he will have to show that the situation described isn’t the full story. In fact in the rest of the book Socrates attempts to do precisely that; he seeks to demonstrate that justice does pay, and that, besides, it is intrinsically worthwhile. It is good both for its consequences and in itself.
格劳孔进一步提出，行为公正的人只是出于自我保护的形式。任何像神话人物吉吉斯一样找到一个让他们隐形的戒指的人，都将失去公正行为的任何动机，因为他们可以保证逃脱任何罪行、诱惑或欺骗。他想象一个情境，在这个情境中，一个公正的人被其他人认为是不公正的。他被折磨并被处决：他的生活似乎没有任何值得称道的地方。与此相比，一个狡猾的恶人则设法在完全不择手段的情况下看起来公正。他似乎过着幸福的生活，并被视为尊重的典范，尽管在他的伪装下，他是彻底邪恶的。这表明，正义没有回报，或者至少并不总是有回报。这也表明，如果苏格拉底想要捍卫公正的生活，他必须证明所描述的情况并不是全部事实。实际上，在书的其余部分，苏格拉底试图正是这样做；他试图证明正义是有回报的，而且，除此之外，它本身就是有价值的。 它既因其后果而好，也因其本身而好。
Although The Republic is usually thought of as a work of political philosophy, and despite the fact that most of it is focused on the question of how Plato’s utopian state should be run, the discussion of the state is only introduced as a way of getting clearer about individual morality. Plato’s main concern is to answer the question ‘What is justice and is it worth pursuing?’ ‘Justice’ is a slightly strange word to use here, but it is the best translation of the Greek word dikaiosunē: it means, roughly, doing the right thing. Plato’s main concern is the question of what is the best way for a human being to live. His reason for looking at the organisation of the state at all is his belief that the state is equivalent to the individual writ large; that the best way of proceeding is to study justice in the state and then transfer our findings to the individual. Just as someone who is short-sighted finds it easier to read large letters so it is easier to look at justice in the state than on the smaller scale of an individual life.
尽管《理想国》通常被视为政治哲学的著作，并且尽管其大部分内容集中在如何管理柏拉图的乌托邦国家的问题上，但对国家的讨论只是为了更清楚地理解个人道德。柏拉图的主要关切是回答“什么是正义，追求正义是否值得？”这个问题。“正义”在这里是一个稍显奇怪的词，但它是希腊词 dikaiosunē的最佳翻译：大致上，它意味着做正确的事情。柏拉图主要关心的是人类生活的最佳方式。他之所以关注国家的组织，是因为他相信国家相当于个体的放大；最佳的做法是研究国家中的正义，然后将我们的发现转移到个体上。就像近视的人更容易阅读大字一样，研究国家中的正义比在个体生活的较小范围内更容易。
Human beings cannot easily live alone. There are many advantages in co-operation and communal living. As soon as people group together it makes sense to divide work according to different people’s skills: it is better for a tool maker to make tools all the year round and a farmer to farm than that the farmer stop his work to make new tools when the old ones wear out. The tool maker will be more skilled at tool making than the farmer. The same is true of all other professions which involve skill: skill requires practice.
人类不容易独自生活。合作和共同生活有许多好处。人们一旦聚在一起，就有必要根据不同人的技能来分工：工具制造者全年制作工具，农民耕作，这比农民在旧工具磨损时停下工作去制作新工具要好。工具制造者在工具制作方面会比农民更熟练。所有其他需要技能的职业也是如此：技能需要练习。
As the state grows and work becomes more specialised, the need for a full-time army to defend the state from attack becomes apparent. The Guardians of the state must, according to Plato, be strong and courageous, like good guard dogs. But they must also have a philosophical temperament. A significant part of The Republic is taken up with Plato’s training schedule for the Guardians.
随着国家的发展和工作变得更加专业化，保护国家免受攻击的全职军队的需求变得显而易见。根据柏拉图的说法，国家的守护者必须强壮而勇敢，像好的看门狗一样。但他们也必须具备哲学的气质。《理想国》中有相当一部分内容是关于柏拉图对守护者的训练计划。
Rulers, Auxiliaries and Workers
统治者、辅助者和工人
Plato divides his class of Guardians into two: Rulers and Auxiliaries. The Rulers are those who are to have the political power and who make all the important decisions; the Auxiliaries help the Rulers and provide defence against threats from outside. A third group, the Workers, will, as their name suggests, work, providing the necessities of life for all the citizens. Plato isn’t much interested in the lives of the Workers: most of The Republic concentrates on the Guardians.
柏拉图将他的守护者阶级分为两类：统治者和辅助者。统治者是那些拥有政治权力并做出所有重要决策的人；辅助者帮助统治者并提供对外部威胁的防御。第三组是工人，顾名思义，他们将工作，为所有公民提供生活必需品。柏拉图对工人的生活并不太感兴趣：《理想国》的大部分内容集中在守护者身上。
The Rulers are chosen as those who are most likely to devote their lives to doing what they judge to be in the best interests of the society. To weed out unsuitable candidates, Plato suggests that in the course of their education potential Rulers should be given various tests to see if they are likely to be bewitched by the pursuit of their own pleasure: their reactions to temptation will be closely monitored and only those who demonstrate complete devotion to the well-being of the community will be chosen to rule. They will be very few in number.
统治者被选为那些最有可能将自己的生命奉献给他们认为对社会最有利的事情的人。为了筛选不合适的候选人，柏拉图建议在他们的教育过程中，潜在的统治者应该接受各种测试，以观察他们是否可能被追求个人快乐的欲望所迷惑：他们对诱惑的反应将被密切监控，只有那些表现出对社区福祉完全奉献的人才会被选为统治者。他们的数量将非常少。
None of the Guardians will be allowed to own personal property, and even their children will be treated in common. In fact Plato provides a radical solution to the family: he wants to abolish it and replace it with state nurseries in which children are looked after unaware of who their parents are. This is supposed to increase loyalty to the state since children brought up in this way won’t have confusing loyalties to family members.
任何守护者都不允许拥有个人财产，甚至他们的孩子也将被共同抚养。事实上，柏拉图提供了一个激进的家庭解决方案：他想要废除家庭，取而代之的是国家托儿所，在那里孩子们在不知道自己父母是谁的情况下被照顾。这应该会增强对国家的忠诚，因为以这种方式抚养的孩子不会对家庭成员产生混淆的忠诚。
Even sexual intercourse is regulated: citizens are only allowed to have sex at special festivals when they are paired off by lot – or at least, that’s what the participants are led to believe. In fact the Rulers fix the outcome of the mating lottery so that only those of good breeding stock will be allowed to procreate. Thus Plato’s republic has its own form of eugenics designed to produce strong and courageous children. At birth all children are taken away from their mothers to be reared by specially appointed officers. Children of inferior Guardians and any ‘defective’ offspring of the Workers are disposed of.
甚至性行为也受到监管：公民只能在特殊节日中进行性交，当他们通过抽签配对时——或者至少，参与者被引导相信是这样。实际上，统治者操控配对抽签的结果，以便只有那些优秀血统的人才能繁殖。因此，柏拉图的理想国有其自身形式的优生学，旨在培养强壮和勇敢的孩子。所有孩子出生后都被带离母亲，由特别指定的官员抚养。劣质监护人的孩子和任何“缺陷”工人的后代都会被处理掉。
Not all of Plato’s proposals in The Republic are as offensive as these plans for selective breeding and infanticide. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he thought that women should be given the same education as men, should be allowed to fight alongside them, and become Guardians if they showed aptitude. It is true that he still believed that men would surpass women at every activity. Even so, his proposals were radical at a time when married middle-class women were virtual prisoners in their own homes.
并不是所有柏拉图在《理想国》中提出的建议都像这些选择性繁殖和婴儿杀害的计划那样令人反感。与他的大多数同时代人不同，他认为女性应该接受与男性相同的教育，应该被允许与他们并肩作战，并在表现出才能时成为守护者。确实，他仍然相信男性在每项活动中都会超越女性。即便如此，他的提议在当时已婚中产阶级女性几乎是囚徒般被禁锢在自己家中的情况下，显得非常激进。
The success of the state depends upon its citizens’ loyalty to the land and to each other. In order to assure this loyalty Plato suggests that all classes of society be encouraged to believe a myth about their origins. The ‘magnificent myth’ or ‘noble lie’, as it is sometimes translated, is as follows. Everyone sprang from the earth fully formed: memories of upbringing and education are just a dream. In fact all citizens are siblings since they are all the children of Mother Earth. This should make them loyal both to the land (their mother) and to each other (their brothers and sisters).
国家的成功依赖于公民对土地和彼此的忠诚。为了确保这种忠诚，柏拉图建议鼓励社会各阶层相信一个关于他们起源的神话。这个“宏伟的神话”或“高尚的谎言”，有时被翻译为如下：每个人都是从大地上完全形成的：对成长和教育的记忆只是一场梦。实际上，所有公民都是兄弟姐妹，因为他们都是大地母亲的孩子。这应该使他们对土地（他们的母亲）和彼此（他们的兄弟姐妹）都保持忠诚。
The myth has another aspect. God, when he created each individual, added metal to their composition. He added gold to the Rulers; silver to the Auxiliaries; and bronze and iron to the Workers. God instructed the Rulers to observe the mixture of metals in the characters of children. If a child with bronze in his or her composition is born of gold parents, then they must harden their hearts and consign him or her to the life of a Worker; if a Worker’s child has gold or silver in him or her, then the child must be brought up as a Ruler or Auxiliary as appropriate. This myth is intended to produce not only loyalty, but contentment with your station in life. The class that you belong to is determined by factors outside your control.
这个神话还有另一个方面。上帝在创造每一个个体时，给他们的构成中添加了金属。他给统治者添加了黄金；给辅助者添加了白银；给工人添加了青铜和铁。上帝指示统治者观察孩子们性格中的金属成分。如果一个含有青铜的孩子出生于黄金父母，那么他们必须硬化心肠，把他或她送入工人的生活；如果一个工人的孩子身上有黄金或白银，那么这个孩子必须被培养成统治者或辅助者，视情况而定。这个神话旨在产生不仅是忠诚，还有对自己生活地位的满足。你所属的阶级是由你无法控制的因素决定的。
The Just State and the Just Individual
公正的国家与公正的个体
Because the ideal state he describes is perfect, Plato believes it must possess the qualities of wisdom, courage, self-discipline and justice. He takes it for granted that these are the four cardinal virtues of any perfect state. Wisdom is due to the Rulers’ knowledge, which allows them to make wise decisions for the benefit of the state; courage is demonstrated by the Auxiliaries, whose training has made them brave and fearless in defence of the state; self-discipline arises from the harmony between the three classes, with the unruly desires of the majority being held in check by the wise decisions of the Rulers; and lastly, justice is evident in the state as a result of each person taking care of his or her own business in the sense of doing what he or she is naturally fitted for. Anyone who attempts social mobility is a potential threat to the state’s stability.
因为他所描述的理想状态是完美的，柏拉图认为它必须具备智慧、勇气、自律和正义这四种品质。他理所当然地认为这四种是任何完美国家的四个基本美德。智慧源于统治者的知识，使他们能够为国家的利益做出明智的决策；勇气由辅助者表现出来，他们的训练使他们在捍卫国家时变得勇敢无畏；自律源于三个阶级之间的和谐，绝大多数人的不羁欲望受到统治者明智决策的制约；最后，正义在国家中显而易见，因为每个人都在照顾自己的事务，做自己天生适合的事情。任何试图社会流动的人都是对国家稳定的潜在威胁。
The ideal state exhibits the four cardinal virtues because of its division into three classes and because of the harmonious balance between their assigned roles. Analogously, Plato insists, each individual consists of three parts, and the qualities of wisdom, courage, self-discipline and justice all depend on the harmonious interplay between these parts of the individual.
理想的国家展现出四种基本美德，因为它分为三个阶级，并且各自角色之间保持和谐的平衡。类似地，柏拉图坚持认为，每个个体由三个部分组成，而智慧、勇气、自律和正义的品质都依赖于这些个体部分之间的和谐互动。
The Three Parts of the Soul
灵魂的三部分
The word ‘soul’ suggests something more spiritual than is appropriate: although Plato believes in the immortality of the soul, what he writes about the three parts of the soul in The Republic doesn’t turn on the soul being separable from the body, or even on its being something distinct from the body. His interest here is really in the psychology of motivation. The three parts of the soul he identifies are Reason, Spirit and Desire.
“灵魂”这个词暗示着比适当的更为精神化的东西：尽管柏拉图相信灵魂的不朽，但他在《理想国》中关于灵魂三部分的论述并不依赖于灵魂与身体的可分性，甚至也不依赖于灵魂与身体的区别。他在这里真正感兴趣的是动机的心理学。他所识别的灵魂的三部分是理性、精神和欲望。
Reason corresponds to the role of the Rulers in the ideal state. Like the Rulers, Reason can plan for the good of the whole entity: unlike the other parts of the soul, it is not self-interested. Reason has the capacity to make plans about how best to achieve certain ends; but it also involves the love of truth.
理性对应于理想国家中统治者的角色。与统治者一样，理性可以为整个实体的利益进行规划：与灵魂的其他部分不同，它并不自私。理性有能力制定最佳实现某些目标的计划；但它也涉及对真理的热爱。
Spirit is that part of the personality which provides emotional motivation for action in the form of anger, indignation and the like. When subject to the proper training Spirit is the source of bravery and courage. Spirit corresponds to the role of the Auxiliaries.
精神是个性中提供情感动机以行动的部分，表现为愤怒、愤慨等。当经过适当的训练，精神是勇气和胆量的源泉。精神对应于辅助者的角色。
Desire is the pure appetite for particular things such as food, drink or sex. Desire can persist in direct opposition to Reason. Indeed the occurrence of conflicts between what people want and what they know is best for them is evidence Plato uses to support his distinction between the three parts of the soul. Desire corresponds to the role of the Workers.
欲望是对特定事物（如食物、饮料或性）的纯粹渴望。欲望可以与理性直接对立。实际上，人们想要的与他们知道对自己最好的之间的冲突的发生，是柏拉图用来支持他对灵魂三部分区分的证据。欲望对应于工人的角色。
The four virtues of wisdom, courage, self-discipline and justice can all be found in individuals as well as in states: Plato explains these virtues in terms of the parts of the soul. Someone who is wise makes decisions based on the dominance of Reason; someone who is brave gets the motivation to act in the face of danger from Spirit, which acts as the ally of Reason; someone who has self-discipline follows the dictates of Reason, keeping Desire under control. Most importantly, someone who is just acts so that all the parts of the soul are in harmony: each part functions in its appropriate role with Reason in command. So justice in the individual is a kind of psychic harmony. This is what makes it an intrinsically valuable condition.
智慧、勇气、自律和正义这四种美德既可以在个人身上找到，也可以在国家中找到：柏拉图通过灵魂的各个部分来解释这些美德。一个明智的人根据理性的主导地位做出决策；一个勇敢的人在面对危险时从精神中获得行动的动力，精神作为理性的盟友；一个有自律的人遵循理性的指令，控制欲望。最重要的是，一个公正的人使得灵魂的所有部分和谐相处：每个部分在理性的指挥下发挥其适当的角色。因此，个体的正义是一种心理和谐。这就是它成为一种内在有价值状态的原因。
Although Plato’s pretext for discussing justice in the state is in order to illuminate questions about the individual, he is clearly also deeply concerned with the utopian republic he has created. He addresses the question of how such a political system could ever come about and concludes that the only hope is to rest power in the hands of philosophers. Plato defends this surprising suggestion with another parable. Imagine a ship whose owner is short-sighted, a bit deaf and more or less ignorant of seamanship. The crew quarrel about who should take the helm of the ship. None of them have devoted any time to the study of navigation and in fact they don’t believe it can be taught. Factions compete to take control of the ship, and when they do they help themselves to the goods on board, turning the voyage into a kind of drunken pleasure cruise. None of them realise that a navigator needs to study the weather and the position of the stars. They think of anyone who acquires the relevant skills as a useless star-gazer.
尽管柏拉图讨论国家正义的借口是为了阐明关于个体的问题，但他显然也对他所创造的乌托邦共和国深感关切。他探讨了这样一种政治体系如何可能出现的问题，并得出结论，唯一的希望是将权力交给哲学家。柏拉图用另一个寓言来捍卫这个令人惊讶的建议。想象一艘船，其船主视力短浅，有点耳聋，并且对航海知识几乎一无所知。船员们争吵着谁应该掌舵。没有人花时间学习航海，实际上他们不相信航海可以被教授。派系争相控制这艘船，当他们这样做时，他们帮助自己获取船上的货物，把航行变成一种醉酒的游乐之旅。他们都没有意识到，导航员需要研究天气和星星的位置。他们认为任何获得相关技能的人都是无用的观星者。
The state in its present form is like the ship lurching around in the hands of the unskilled crew. Only in the hands of a skilled navigator will it be kept under control: and the philosopher, despised as he might be, is the only person in possession of the knowledge required to steer the state. Plato’s theory of Forms explains why philosophers are particularly well-equipped to rule.
现阶段的国家就像在无能的船员手中摇摆不定的船只。只有在熟练的导航员手中，它才能保持控制：而哲学家，尽管可能被轻视，却是唯一掌握引导国家所需知识的人。柏拉图的形式理论解释了为什么哲学家特别适合统治。
The parable of the cave with which I began this chapter illustrates in a memorable way Plato’s picture of the human condition. Most of humanity is content with mere appearance, the equivalent of the flickering shadows on the wall of the cave. Philosophers, however, since they love truth, seek knowledge of reality: they journey out of the cave and get access to the Forms.
我在本章开头提到的洞穴寓言以一种难忘的方式展示了柏拉图对人类状况的描绘。大多数人类满足于仅仅是表象，相当于洞穴墙上的闪烁阴影。然而，哲学家们由于热爱真理，寻求对现实的知识：他们走出洞穴，接触到理念。
The theory of Forms, although put forward by the character Socrates in The Republic, is generally recognised to be Plato’s own contribution to philosophy. When people speak of Platonism they usually mean this aspect of his work. To understand what Plato meant by ‘Form’ it is easiest to consider one of his examples.
形式理论虽然是由《理想国》中的角色苏格拉底提出的，但普遍认为这是柏拉图对哲学的贡献。当人们谈论柏拉图主义时，他们通常指的是他作品的这一方面。要理解柏拉图所说的“形式”，最简单的方法是考虑他的一个例子。
Many beds exist. Some are double, some single, some four-posted, and so on. Yet there is something they share which makes them all beds. What they share is a relation to an ideal bed, the Form of the bed. This Form actually exists: it is the only real bed. All other beds are imperfect copies of the Form of the bed. They belong to the world of appearance, not of reality. Consequently we can only have genuine knowledge of the Form of the bed: any information about actual beds is opinion, not knowledge. The everyday world we inhabit is constantly changing; the world of Forms is timeless and unchanging. Philosophers, with their love of wisdom, gain access to the world of Forms, and thus the possibility of knowledge, through thought; perception restricts us to the flux of the world of appearance.
许多床存在。有些是双人床，有些是单人床，有些是四柱床，等等。然而，它们有一个共同点，使它们都成为床。它们共享的是与理想床的关系，即床的形式。这个形式实际上是存在的：它是唯一真实的床。所有其他床都是床的形式的不完美复制品。它们属于表象的世界，而不是现实的世界。因此，我们只能对床的形式拥有真正的知识：关于实际床的任何信息都是观点，而不是知识。我们所居住的日常世界不断变化；形式的世界是永恒不变的。哲学家们凭借对智慧的热爱，通过思考获得了进入形式世界的机会，从而获得知识的可能性；感知则限制我们停留在表象世界的流动中。
Though he does not spell out precisely which things in the world have a corresponding Form, Plato does maintain that there is a Form of the Good. It is the Good which is the ultimate focus of philosophers’ quest for knowledge. He uses the simile of the sun to explain this idea. The sun makes sight possible and is the source of growth; the Form of the Good allows the mind’s eye to ‘see’ and understand the nature of reality. Without the illumination provided by the Form of the Good, we are condemned to live in a twilight world of appearance and opinion; in the light of the Good we can glean knowledge of how to live.
尽管他没有明确指出世界上哪些事物有对应的形式，但柏拉图确实坚持认为存在一个善的形式。善是哲学家追求知识的最终焦点。他用太阳的比喻来解释这个观点。太阳使视觉成为可能，并且是生长的源泉；善的形式使心灵之眼能够“看见”并理解现实的本质。如果没有善的形式所提供的光照，我们就注定要生活在一个外表和意见的黄昏世界中；在善的光辉下，我们可以获得如何生活的知识。
Having shown that a just state is one in which the different classes fulfil their appropriate roles, and a just individual one in whom the different motivations are in harmony, Plato turns to some examples of injustice in the state and the individual. He considers four types of unjust state and their corresponding personality type. The four are timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny. A timocracy is a state, such as Sparta, which is dominated by a drive for military honour; in an oligarchy wealth is the sign of merit; a democracy is a state which is ruled by the people as a whole; in a tyranny the ruler has absolute power.
在证明一个公正的国家是不同阶级履行各自适当角色的国家，而一个公正的个体是不同动机和谐的个体后，柏拉图转向了一些国家和个体的不公正例子。他考虑了四种不公正的国家及其对应的人格类型。这四种是：荣誉政治、寡头政治、民主和暴政。荣誉政治是一个如斯巴达那样的国家，主导力量是对军事荣誉的追求；在寡头政治中，财富是功绩的标志；民主是一个由全体人民统治的国家；在暴政中，统治者拥有绝对权力。
Again Plato exploits the alleged symmetry between the state and the individual. For instance, in his discussion of democracy he claims that state democracy ignores the principle of training to rule which he has shown to be so essential to the just state. The only prerequisite in a democratic ruler is that he professes to be the people’s friend. The corresponding democratic individual, like the democratic state, entertains a wide variety of pleasures, not distinguishing those which are based on good desires from those which have their source in evil. The result is psychic disharmony: the democratic individual does not permit Reason to rule over inappropriate desires. Idle whims dominate; injustice is inevitable.
再次，柏拉图利用了国家与个人之间所谓的对称性。例如，在他对民主的讨论中，他声称国家民主忽视了他所展示的对统治者进行训练的原则，而这一原则对公正的国家至关重要。民主统治者的唯一前提是他自称是人民的朋友。相应的民主个人，像民主国家一样，享有各种各样的快乐，不区分那些基于良好欲望的快乐与那些源于邪恶的快乐。结果是心理上的不和谐：民主个人不允许理性支配不当的欲望。闲散的幻想占据主导地位；不公正是不可避免的。
In his account of the Guardians’ education Plato argues that various kinds of poetry should be censored. Any writing which gives a false impression of gods or heroes, or which when read out loud by students will lead to an over-identification with unjust characters, is to be banned. In Book Ten of The Republic he returns to the subject of art and its place in an ideal society. He concentrates on mimetic art, that is, art which is meant to represent reality. His conclusion is that such art should have no place in his republic. There are two main reasons for this. First, it can only ever be a copy of an appearance and so tends to distance us from the world of the Forms. Second, it appeals to the irrational part of our souls and so tends to disrupt the psychic harmony necessary for justice.
在他对守护者教育的叙述中，柏拉图认为各种类型的诗歌应该受到审查。任何给人以错误印象的关于神或英雄的作品，或者在学生朗读时会导致对不公正角色的过度认同的作品，都应被禁止。在《理想国》第十卷中，他再次回到艺术及其在理想社会中的地位这一主题。他专注于模仿艺术，即旨在表现现实的艺术。他的结论是，这种艺术在他的共和国中没有立足之地。主要有两个原因。首先，它只能是外表的复制，因此往往使我们与形式的世界保持距离。其次，它吸引我们灵魂中非理性的部分，因此往往会破坏实现正义所必需的心理和谐。
To explain the first sort of criticism Plato takes the example of a painter painting a bed. God made the Form of the bed; a carpenter made a shadowy copy of that Form; an artist painted a copy of the carpenter’s copy, doing the equivalent of holding up a mirror to what was already an imperfect image of the one real bed. Consequently the artist obstructs rather than aids our knowledge of reality. The artist remains ignorant of the true nature of the bed and is content with copying the appearance of a particular bed. Plato takes poets to be doing more or less the same as the painter, and so extends his disapproval to the art of poetry.
为了说明第一种批评，柏拉图以画家画床的例子为例。上帝创造了床的形式；木匠制作了那个形式的影像；艺术家画了木匠复制品的副本，相当于对已经是不完美的真实床的影像进行反射。因此，艺术家阻碍了我们对现实的认识，而不是帮助我们。艺术家对床的真实本质一无所知，只满足于复制特定床的外观。柏拉图认为诗人所做的与画家大致相同，因此将他的不满扩展到诗歌艺术。
The work of mimetic artists is nevertheless seductive, as Plato recognises. It does not appeal to reason, but to the lower parts of the soul, an effect exacerbated by artists’ tendency to represent evil rather than good impulses. Mimetic artists can lead the unwary away from the path to knowledge. There is, then, no place for them in the republic.
模仿艺术家的作品尽管如此具有诱惑力，正如柏拉图所承认的。它并不诉诸理性，而是诉诸灵魂的低层部分，这种效果因艺术家倾向于表现邪恶而非善良冲动而加剧。模仿艺术家可能会使无防备者偏离通往知识的道路。因此，他们在理想国中没有立足之地。
Criticisms of the Republic
对《共和国》的批评
State/individual analogy
国家/个体类比
Plato’s whole project in The Republic relies on there being a strong analogy between justice in the state and justice in an individual. If the analogy is weak, then any conclusions about justice for an i ndividual derived from conclusions about the just state will be correspondingly weak. Plato treats it as obvious that his move from state to individual is a legitimate one. However, it is at least worth questioning whether or not this move is justified.
柏拉图在《理想国》中的整个项目依赖于国家的正义与个人的正义之间存在强烈的类比。如果类比较弱，那么从关于公正国家的结论推导出的关于个人正义的任何结论也将相应地较弱。柏拉图认为，从国家到个人的转变是显而易见的。然而，至少值得质疑这一转变是否是合理的。
Only Rulers can be just
只有统治者才能公正
Furthermore, Plato’s theory seems to have the consequence that only the Rulers can be just. After justice has been defined in terms of psychic harmony and each class in the republic in terms of their dominant source of motivation, it becomes clear that only those in whom Reason rules supreme will be capable of acting justly. The Rulers are the only class of people who are in this position. So it seems to follow that only the Rulers are capable of justice. Plato might not have seen this as a serious objection to his theory but rather as an illuminating consequence; for most readers today, however, it brings out the uncompromising elitism inherent in Plato’s thought.
此外，柏拉图的理论似乎导致只有统治者才能公正。在正义被定义为心理和谐，并且共和国中的每个阶级根据其主导动机来源进行分类后，显然只有理性占主导地位的人才能够公正地行事。统治者是唯一处于这种位置的人。因此，似乎可以得出结论，只有统治者才能实现正义。柏拉图可能并没有将此视为对其理论的严重反对，而是作为一种启发性的结果；然而，对于今天的大多数读者来说，这突显了柏拉图思想中固有的无情精英主义。
Equivocates about ‘justice’
对“正义”含糊其辞
When Plato tells us that justice is really a kind of mental health in which the three parts of the soul function harmoniously he seems to have discarded the ordinary sense of ‘justice’. He seems to have redefined the word arbitrarily to suit his purposes, or at the very least to have used it in two different senses. Why would anyone want to talk of ‘justice’ in this way?
当柏拉图告诉我们正义实际上是一种心理健康，其中灵魂的三个部分和谐运作时，他似乎抛弃了“正义”的普通意义。他似乎任意重新定义了这个词以适应他的目的，或者至少以两种不同的意义使用它。为什么会有人想以这种方式谈论“正义”？
Plato would no doubt respond to this criticism that his notion of justice does bring out what we ordinarily mean by justice. Plato’s just individual won’t steal or take more than his share because that would involve Reason’s yielding to lower desires. However, this seems to leave open the possibility that some people whom we might be tempted to label ‘just’ on account of their behaviour would not pass Plato’s test since their behaviour might stem from less than harmonious psychic functioning. They might simply have a desire to behave justly, but a very underdeveloped capacity to reason.
柏拉图无疑会回应这种批评，认为他的正义观确实体现了我们通常所理解的正义。柏拉图的正义个体不会偷窃或占有超过自己应得的份额，因为这将涉及理性屈服于低级欲望。然而，这似乎留下了一个可能性，即一些我们可能会因其行为而倾向于标记为“正义”的人，可能无法通过柏拉图的测试，因为他们的行为可能源于不太和谐的心理功能。他们可能只是有一种正义行为的愿望，但理性的能力却非常欠缺。
Involves deception
涉及欺骗
At several key points in his argument Plato advocates lying in order to preserve loyalty to the state and to fellow citizens. For instance, there is the so-called ‘noble lie’ of the myth of the metals; there is also the lie about the mating lottery. Many people find this unacceptable. An ideal state should not be founded on deception. Plato, however, seems unconcerned about this. His interest is in the end result and the best way to achieve it, not in moral questions about how this end result is achieved.
在他论证的几个关键点上，柏拉图主张为了维护对国家和同胞的忠诚而撒谎。例如，有所谓的“高尚的谎言”——金属的神话；还有关于配对抽签的谎言。许多人对此感到不可接受。一个理想的国家不应建立在欺骗之上。然而，柏拉图似乎对此并不在意。他关注的是最终结果和实现这一结果的最佳方式，而不是关于如何实现这一结果的道德问题。
Theory of Forms is implausible
形式理论是不可信的
Plato’s theory of Forms provides an important foundation for his arguments about the ideal republic. Yet it has little intuitive plausibility for most philosophers today. Perhaps hardest to stomach is the notion that the Forms actually exist and are the reality of which the observed world is simply a shadowy copy.
柏拉图的形式理论为他关于理想共和国的论点提供了重要基础。然而，对于今天的大多数哲学家来说，这一理论几乎没有直观的可信性。也许最难以接受的是，形式实际上存在，并且是观察世界的真实，而观察到的世界只是一个阴影般的复制品。
If we jettison the theory of Forms, then the metaphysical underpinning of many of Plato’s proposals would be removed. For instance, without the notion that philosophers are particularly good at gaining knowledge of reality, there would be no obvious justification for putting them in charge of the ideal state. Nor would there be an obvious reason for banning the mimetic arts from the state.
如果我们抛弃形式理论，那么许多柏拉图提议的形而上学基础将被移除。例如，如果没有哲学家特别擅长获得现实知识的观念，就没有明显的理由将他们置于理想国家的领导地位。也没有明显的理由禁止模仿艺术在国家中存在。
Justifies totalitarianism
为极权主义辩护
However, perhaps the most significant criticism of Plato’s Republic is that it provides a recipe for totalitarianism. With its plan for eugenics, its ‘noble lie’, its outlawing of the family and its censorship of art, the state intrudes into every area of life. Individuals in Plato’s world must be subservient to the requirements of the state and are expected to sacrifice every element of personal freedom to this end. Those of us who value individual liberty and freedom of choice find Plato’s vision a decidedly unattractive one.
然而，或许对柏拉图《理想国》最重要的批评是，它提供了一种极权主义的食谱。凭借其优生学计划、"高尚的谎言"、对家庭的禁止以及对艺术的审查，国家干预了生活的每一个领域。在柏拉图的世界中，个人必须服从国家的要求，并被期望为此牺牲每一个个人自由的元素。我们这些重视个人自由和选择自由的人发现柏拉图的愿景显得相当不吸引人。
427 | BC | Plato born into an aristocratic Athenian family. |
399 | BC | Socrates drinks hemlock. |
399 | BC | Plato writes more than twenty philosophical dialogues. |
347 | BC | Plato dies. |
Auxiliaries: Guardians who help the Rulers and provide defence from outside threats.
辅助者：帮助统治者并提供防御外部威胁的守护者。
democracy: a state ruled by the people.
民主：一个由人民统治的国家。
dikaiosunē: usually translated as ‘justice’, this has the sense of doing what is morally right.
公正：通常翻译为“正义”，这意味着做道德上正确的事情。
Forms: sometimes known as Ideas. The world of Forms is the real world of perfect entities: the world of appearance which most of us occupy most of the time consists of imperfect copies of the Forms.
形式：有时被称为理念。形式的世界是真实的完美实体的世界：我们大多数人大部分时间所处的外在世界由形式的不完美复制品组成。
Guardians: the class of citizens who protect and rule the state. They consist of Rulers and Auxiliaries.
守护者：保护和统治国家的公民阶级。他们由统治者和辅助者组成。
mimesis: imitation. This is the word Plato uses to describe what he takes to be the essence of artistic endeavour: mirroring nature.
模仿：模仿。这是柏拉图用来描述他认为艺术努力本质的词：反映自然。
oligarchy: a state ruled by a wealthy elite.
寡头政治：由富裕精英统治的国家。
philosopher kings: the Rulers in Plato’s ideal society. Philosophers were to be given this role because of their ability to perceive the Forms.
哲人国王：柏拉图理想社会中的统治者。哲学家之所以被赋予这个角色，是因为他们能够感知形式。
Rulers: the philosopher-kings who hold power in Plato’s republic.
统治者：在柏拉图的理想国中掌握权力的哲人国王。
timocracy: a state in which military honour is all important.
军政：一种军事荣誉至关重要的国家。
totalitarian state: a state in which everything is controlled and there is little or no scope for individual freedom.
极权国家：一种一切都受到控制且几乎没有个人自由空间的国家。
tyranny: a state ruled by a powerful leader.
暴政：由强大领导者统治的国家。
utopian: presenting a vision of an ideal society.
乌托邦：呈现理想社会的愿景。
Bernard Williams Plato (London: Phoenix, Great Philosophers series, 1998). This brief book provides the best available introduction to Plato’s work and includes some discussion of The Republic.
伯纳德·威廉姆斯《柏拉图》（伦敦：凤凰出版社，伟大哲学家系列，1998 年）。这本简短的书提供了对柏拉图作品的最佳介绍，并包括对《理想国》的讨论。
Julia Annas An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) and Nicholas Pappas Plato and The Republic (London: Routledge, 1995) are both excellent commentaries.
朱莉亚·安纳斯 《柏拉图的《理想国》导论》（牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1981 年）和尼古拉斯·帕帕斯 《柏拉图与《理想国》》（伦敦：劳特利奇，1995 年）都是优秀的评论。
Karl Popper The Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routledge, 1945) includes a convincing case against Plato’s republic, arguing that it would be a totalitarian nightmare. This serves as an antidote to the widespread tendency among Plato scholars to give his political proposals a more sympathetic treatment than they deserve. I discuss The Open Society and Its Enemies in Chapter 29, pp. 255–9.
卡尔·波普尔《开放社会及其敌人》（伦敦：劳特利奇，1945 年）对柏拉图的《理想国》提出了有力的反对意见，认为这将是一个极权主义的噩梦。这为柏拉图学者普遍倾向于对他的政治提案给予比其应得的更同情的对待提供了一个解药。我在第 29 章，第 255-259 页讨论了《开放社会及其敌人》。
Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics
亚里士多德《尼科马科伦理学》
Aristotle was a practical man. Though taught by Plato, he rejected his teacher’s idea that reality lay beyond the everyday world in the realm of the Forms. He did not believe in Plato’s myth of the Cave. In Raphael’s painting The School of Athens (1511), Plato points skywards to the Forms; Aristotle, in contrast, reaches forward into the world. His studies went far beyond what we now think of as philosophy: he was, for example, one of the first great biologists. In philosophy his interests were wide-ranging, taking in metaphysics, ethics, politics and aesthetics.
亚里士多德是一个务实的人。虽然受到柏拉图的教导，但他拒绝了老师关于现实存在于超越日常世界的形式领域的观点。他不相信柏拉图的洞穴神话。在拉斐尔的画作《雅典学院》（1511）中，柏拉图指向天空中的形式；而亚里士多德则向前伸手进入世界。他的研究远远超出了我们现在所认为的哲学：例如，他是第一位伟大的生物学家之一。在哲学方面，他的兴趣广泛，涵盖了形而上学、伦理学、政治学和美学。
Despite the fact that his Nicomachean Ethics is only a collection of lecture notes, is uneven in style, obscure in places, and was certainly never intended for publication, it remains one of the most important works in the history of ethics. Here Aristotle asks one of the fundamental questions for all human beings, ‘How should we live?’, a question which was at the heart of ancient ethical discussions, but has been sadly neglected by twentieth-century philosophers. His answer, though complex, and in places bizarre, is important, not just as a landmark in the history of civilisation, but also as a significant influence on current philosophical debate.
尽管他的《尼科马科伦理学》仅仅是一部讲义的集合，风格不均匀，某些地方晦涩，并且显然从未打算出版，但它仍然是伦理学历史上最重要的著作之一。在这里，亚里士多德提出了一个所有人类都必须面对的基本问题：“我们应该如何生活？”，这个问题曾是古代伦理讨论的核心，但在二十世纪的哲学家中却被遗忘了。他的回答虽然复杂，某些地方甚至奇异，但重要性不仅体现在文明史上的里程碑，也对当前的哲学辩论产生了重要影响。
The Nicomachean Ethics is a dense and complex work, and scholars quibble about its precise interpretation; nevertheless, the central themes are easy enough to follow. Some of the key terms Aristotle used do not translate easily into English. In fact most philosophers who discuss Aristotle have found it more straightforward to use transliterations of a number of the Greek words rather than rely on confusing English near equivalents. One of the most important of such terms is eudaimonia.
《尼科马可伦理学》是一部内容丰富且复杂的著作，学者们对其精确的解释存在争议；然而，中心主题相对容易理解。亚里士多德使用的一些关键术语并不容易翻译成英语。事实上，大多数讨论亚里士多德的哲学家发现，使用一些希腊词的音译比依赖令人困惑的英语近似词更为直接。其中一个最重要的术语是 eudaimonia。
Eudaimonia: A Happy Life
幸福：快乐的生活
Eudaimonia is often translated as ‘happiness’, but that can be very misleading. It is sometimes also translated as ‘flourishing’, which, although slightly awkward, has more appropriate connotations: it, for instance, suggests the analogy between the flourishing of plants and the flourishing of human beings. Aristotle believes that we all want eudaimonia, by which he means that we all want our lives to go well. A eudaimon life is a life that is successful. It is the kind of life that if we could achieve it we would all choose; the kind of life we would want for those we love. Eudaimonia is always pursued as an end, never a means to an end. We may seek money, for instance, because it provides a means to buy expensive clothes, and we may buy expensive clothes because we believe they will make us more attractive to people we want to attract; we want to attract these people because we believe that they have a capacity to make our lives go well. But it doesn’t make any sense to ask why we want our lives to go well. Eudaimonia can’t serve any other purpose: it is the place where this sort of chain of explanation finishes. It doesn’t make sense to ask ‘Why pursue eudaimonia?’ since, for Aristotle, it is a conceptual truth that this is what all human beings do. Eudaimonia is not the only thing pursued as an end in itself; we may, for instance, listen to music, or spend time with our children, not because we expect to get anything further out of these activities, but because these are the ways we want to while away our time on earth. However, in such cases, we pursue these things because we believe, rightly or wrongly, that they are ingredients in a eudaimon life.
幸福通常被翻译为“快乐”，但这可能会非常误导。有时它也被翻译为“繁荣”，虽然稍显笨拙，但更合适的含义：例如，它暗示了植物的繁荣与人类的繁荣之间的类比。亚里士多德认为我们都想要幸福，他的意思是我们都希望我们的生活过得好。幸福的生活是一种成功的生活。如果我们能够实现这种生活，我们都会选择；这是我们希望我们所爱的人拥有的生活。幸福总是作为一种目的追求，而不是达到目的的手段。例如，我们可能追求金钱，因为它提供了购买昂贵衣服的手段，而我们可能购买昂贵的衣服，因为我们相信它们会让我们对我们想吸引的人更有吸引力；我们想吸引这些人，因为我们相信他们有能力让我们的生活过得好。但问我们为什么想要生活过得好是没有意义的。幸福不能服务于其他目的：这是这种解释链条结束的地方。问“为什么追求幸福？”是没有意义的。因为对于亚里士多德来说，这是所有人类所做的事情的概念真理。幸福并不是唯一作为目的追求的事物；例如，我们可能会听音乐，或与孩子们共度时光，并不是因为我们期望从这些活动中获得更多，而是因为这些是我们想要在地球上消磨时间的方式。然而，在这种情况下，我们追求这些事物是因为我们相信，无论对错，它们是幸福生活的组成部分。
One aim of the Nicomachean Ethics is to illuminate the pursuit of eudaimonia. If we know more about what it is that we are seeking and how it is characteristically achieved then we will be more likely to achieve it ourselves, even if ultimately, as Aristotle believed, our early training and current material circumstances will determine to a great extent our capacity to follow the right path. Aristotle, unlike many subsequent moral philosophers, was realistic about the influence of events beyond our control on the success of our lives. He thought that having a certain amount of money, reasonable looks, good ancestry and children were prerequisites for any genuinely eudaimon life. Without the benefit of such assets we may not be able to achieve the highest state of eudaimonia, but should tailor our actions to the particular circumstances we find ourselves in. For Aristotle living well is not a matter of applying general rules to specific cases so much as adapting our behaviour to the particular circumstances of our lives.
尼科马科伦理学的一个目标是阐明对幸福的追求。如果我们更清楚自己在追求什么以及如何特征性地实现它，那么我们就更有可能自己实现它，即使最终，正如亚里士多德所相信的，我们的早期训练和当前的物质环境在很大程度上决定了我们走上正确道路的能力。与许多后来的道德哲学家不同，亚里士多德对超出我们控制的事件对我们生活成功的影响持现实态度。他认为，拥有一定数量的钱、合理的外貌、良好的血统和孩子是任何真正幸福生活的前提。没有这些资产的好处，我们可能无法实现最高的幸福状态，但应该根据我们所处的特定环境调整我们的行为。对亚里士多德来说，过上好生活并不是将一般规则应用于具体案例，而是将我们的行为适应于我们生活的特定环境。
It is, Aristotle says, a mark of intelligence only to pursue the kind of precision appropriate to the field in which you are working. Judgements about how to live are only true for the most part. They don’t hold for every individual in every circumstance, so there are no hard-and-fast rules. Ethics is not a precise subject like mathematics. A carpenter’s interest in a right angle is a practical one; this is very different from a geometer’s interest. It would be a mistake to treat ethics as anything but a practical subject with its own standards of generality. And, as a practical subject, it aims to show us how to become good people, not simply to provide us with a better theoretical understanding of what the good life amounts to.
亚里士多德说，追求适合你所从事领域的精确性是智慧的标志。关于如何生活的判断大多数情况下只是正确的。它们并不适用于每个个体在每种情况下，因此没有严格的规则。伦理学不是像数学那样精确的学科。木匠对直角的兴趣是实用的；这与几何学家对直角的兴趣截然不同。将伦理学视为除了具有自己一般性标准的实用学科以外的任何东西都是错误的。作为一门实用学科，它旨在向我们展示如何成为好人，而不仅仅是为我们提供对美好生活的更好理论理解。
Despite believing that we all do and should pursue eudaimonia, Aristotle was very far from being a hedonist in the sense of advocating a life of sensual indulgence. He thought that those who want nothing more than the pleasures of sex, eating and drinking lower themselves to the level of cattle. Eudaimonia is not a blissful mental state. It is rather an activity, a way of living, one which brings with it its own pleasures, but which cannot be assessed in particular actions. The whole life of an individual has to be taken into account before we can say for certain that that person achieved eudaimonia: as Aristotle memorably put it, one swallow doesn’t make a summer, nor does one happy day guarantee a happy life. A tragedy towards the end of your life could put a completely different slant on the question of whether or not your life as a whole went well. There is, then, some truth to the idea that we can’t call someone’s life eudaimon until they are dead. Aristotle even considers the ways in which events after your death can affect the assessment of whether or not your life went well; his answer was that the fortunes of your descendants after your death can affect your eudaimonia to a limited extent.
尽管相信我们都应该追求幸福，亚里士多德在倡导感官享乐的意义上与享乐主义者相去甚远。他认为，那些只想要性、饮食等快乐的人降低了自己到牛的水平。幸福不是一种愉悦的心理状态。它更是一种活动，一种生活方式，带来了自身的快乐，但无法通过特定的行为来评估。在我们能够确定一个人是否达到了幸福之前，必须考虑到个人的整个生活：正如亚里士多德所说，一只燕子并不能代表夏天，也不是一天的快乐就能保证幸福的生活。你生命末期的一场悲剧可能会对你整个人生是否过得好产生完全不同的看法。因此，有一种观点是正确的，那就是在某人去世之前，我们不能称其生活为幸福。 亚里士多德甚至考虑了你死后事件如何影响对你生活是否美好的评估；他的回答是，你死后后代的命运在一定程度上可以影响你的幸福。
The Function of a Human being
人类的功能
Aristotle thought that human beings have a characteristic function or activity (an ergon). In other words, just as carpenters are recognisable by their characteristic activity (making things with wood), so human beings as a whole have a distinctive activity that makes us what we are. The word ‘function’ suggests that human beings were designed for a particular purpose, but this is not the connotation that Aristotle intends. He isn’t claiming the existence of a wise deity responsible for the construction of the species, but rather drawing our attention to the distinctive powers that we have that make us what we are and not something else. This human ergon can’t be bodily growth, since that is shared with plants. Bodily growth doesn’t distinguish a human being from a geranium. Nor could it be capacity for perception, because other animals have that: horses, for instance. The ergon of human beings is rational activity; this is what is most central to our lives as human beings.
亚里士多德认为人类具有一种特征性的功能或活动（ergon）。换句话说，就像木匠通过他们的特征活动（用木头制作东西）而被识别一样，人类整体上也有一种独特的活动，使我们成为我们自己。“功能”一词暗示人类是为了特定目的而设计的，但这并不是亚里士多德所意图的含义。他并不是在主张存在一个负责物种构造的智慧神，而是引起我们对使我们成为我们自己的独特能力的关注。这种人类的 ergon 不能是身体的生长，因为这与植物共享。身体的生长并不能区分人类和天竺葵。它也不可能是感知能力，因为其他动物也具备这一点：例如马。人类的 ergon 是理性活动；这正是我们作为人类生活中最核心的部分。
The good human being is someone who excels in this characteristic activity. Excellence at being human involves virtuous action. Aristotle’s conclusion is that the good life for human beings is a life of rational virtuous activity. It is not enough to have the potential to act virtuously. The winners at the Olympic Games are chosen only from the competitors and not from those who might have run faster had they entered the events. Similarly, only those who act win the reward in life. And the reward in life is true happiness. Roses flourish in a well-manured soil, growing strongly and flowering profusely; human beings flourish when living lives of rational virtuous activity. Much of the Nicomachean Ethics is taken up with spelling out what such lives might be like, what sort of character you need in order to live the good life. Central to this is an analysis of the virtues and how they are acquired.
优秀的人类是那些在这一特征活动中表现出色的人。成为人类的卓越涉及到美德行为。亚里士多德的结论是，人的美好生活是理性美德活动的生活。仅仅具备美德行为的潜力是不够的。奥林匹克运动会的获胜者仅从参赛者中选出，而不是从那些如果参加比赛可能跑得更快的人中选出。同样，只有那些付诸行动的人才能在生活中获得奖励。而生活中的奖励是真正的幸福。玫瑰在施肥良好的土壤中茁壮成长，强壮地生长并繁花似锦；人类在过着理性美德活动的生活时也会茁壮成长。《尼各马科伦理学》的大部分内容都在阐明这样的生活可能是什么样的，以及你需要什么样的品格才能过上美好的生活。中心内容是对美德的分析以及它们是如何获得的。
A virtue is a feature of one’s character: a disposition to act in a certain way in relevant circumstances. It is important to realise that the term ‘virtue’ used today has moral connotations: to call someone virtuous is to make a positive assessment of their moral character. But for Aristotle, the phrase translated as ‘virtue’, ethikai aretai, simply meant ‘excellence of character’ and had no moral implications in our sense of ‘moral’. Being virtuous in his sense is simply possessing and acting upon excellences of character, some of which may be completely irrelevant to estimates of your moral worth. In fact some commentators have even questioned the extent to which the Nicomachean Ethics is a work of moral philosophy in the sense that we now understand ‘moral’. Morality is usually thought to involve at least some concern for the interests of others: it wouldn’t make sense to say (using the present-day understanding of ‘morality’) ‘I have developed my own private morality which is entirely selfish.’ Aristotle’s main interest, however, was not in our concern for other people but in what it takes to make a success of your own life. In some ways the Nicomachean Ethics is like one of those practical manuals for self-development and greater personal efficiency that are so popular with managers today.
美德是一个人性格的特征：在相关情况下以某种方式行事的倾向。重要的是要意识到，今天使用的“美德”一词具有道德含义：称某人为有美德是对其道德品格的积极评估。但对亚里士多德而言，翻译为“美德”的短语 ethikai aretai 仅仅意味着“品格的卓越”，在我们理解的“道德”意义上没有道德含义。在他看来，有美德仅仅是拥有并践行品格的卓越，而其中一些可能与对你道德价值的评估完全无关。事实上，一些评论者甚至质疑《尼科马科伦理学》在我们现在理解的“道德”意义上是否是一部道德哲学作品。道德通常被认为至少涉及对他人利益的某种关心：用现在对“道德”的理解来说，称“我发展了完全自私的私人道德”是没有意义的。然而，亚里士多德的主要兴趣并不在于我们对他人的关心，而在于如何使自己的生活取得成功。 在某些方面，《尼科马科伦理学》就像那些如今在管理者中非常受欢迎的自我发展和提高个人效率的实用手册。
Aristotle describes several key virtues. Someone who is brave, for instance, is never so overcome with fear that he cannot act in the right way. A brave soldier will risk his own life to save his comrade and will not be reduced to inaction by fear; a brave dissident will stand up to government opposition and pronounce her beliefs even though this will mean certain imprisonment and possible torture or death. Someone who is generous will gladly give money or time to those who need it.
亚里士多德描述了几个关键美德。例如，一个勇敢的人从不会被恐惧压倒到无法以正确的方式行动。一个勇敢的士兵会冒着自己的生命危险去拯救战友，不会因恐惧而无所作为；一个勇敢的异议人士会勇敢地对抗政府的反对，表达她的信仰，即使这意味着必然的监禁和可能的酷刑或死亡。一个慷慨的人会乐意把金钱或时间给予那些需要帮助的人。
Aristotle distinguishes two types of virtue: the moral and the intellectual. Moral virtues, such as temperance, are acquired through early training and reinforced to become a matter of habit rather than conscious decision; intellectual virtues, such as intelligence, on the other hand, can be taught. The moral virtues are shaped by the non-rational elements of the individual; the intellectual virtues by the rational. Aristotle identifies a common structure to all the virtues: they fall between two extremes. This is the basis of his doctrine of the Golden Mean.
亚里士多德区分了两种美德：道德美德和智力美德。道德美德，如节制，是通过早期训练获得的，并被强化为习惯，而不是意识的选择；智力美德，如智力，则可以被教授。道德美德受到个体非理性元素的影响；智力美德则受到理性的影响。亚里士多德确定了所有美德的共同结构：它们介于两个极端之间。这是他黄金中庸理论的基础。
It is easiest to understand Aristotle’s notion of the Mean by considering some of his examples. The virtue of courage lies between two vices: a deficiency of courage is cowardice; an excess of it is rashness. The virtue of wittiness lies between the vices of boorishness and buffoonery; modesty between shyness and shamelessness. Notice that wittiness and modesty are not usually considered moral virtues, though courage might be.
理解亚里士多德的中庸概念最简单的方法是考虑他的一些例子。勇气的美德介于两种恶习之间：缺乏勇气是懦弱；过度的勇气是鲁莽。机智的美德介于粗俗和滑稽之间；谦逊介于害羞和无耻之间。请注意，机智和谦逊通常不被视为道德美德，尽管勇气可能被视为。
A common misinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Mean is that it is a counsel of moderation. As the mean always lies between two extremes of behaviour, it seems that Aristotle is advocating moderation in all things. However, just because the mean is between over-reacting and under-reacting, it doesn’t follow that the virtuous person always acts in a moderate way. For instance, if you were to see someone attacking a child, a moderate reaction would clearly be inappropriate. Aristotle’s theory, however, would probably support aggressive intervention in such circumstances. Such behaviour would lie between the extremes of indifference and vengeful violence.
对中庸之道的一个常见误解是它是温和的劝告。由于中庸总是位于两种行为的极端之间，因此似乎亚里士多德主张在所有事情上都要适度。然而，仅仅因为中庸介于过度反应和不足反应之间，并不意味着有德之人总是以适度的方式行事。例如，如果你看到有人攻击一个孩子，适度的反应显然是不合适的。然而，亚里士多德的理论可能会支持在这种情况下的积极干预。这种行为将介于冷漠和复仇性暴力的极端之间。
Virtuous action is always a mean of a kind that would be chosen by a person of practical wisdom, the phronimos. The phronimos is sensitive to the features of particular circumstances and an excellent judge of how to behave.
美德行为总是由具有实践智慧的人，即 phronimos 所选择的一种中庸之道。phronimos 对特定情况的特征非常敏感，并且是如何行为的优秀判断者。
Aristotle is particularly interested in action rather than just behaviour. Human beings can be said to act rather than just behave since in many areas of our lives we have a capacity for choice; in contrast, an ant simply behaves because it cannot deliberate on what it might or might not do. We usually only hold individuals responsible for their actions: if they could not help doing what they did, then it would be strange to blame them. Aristotle distinguishes intentional actions from two other forms of behaviour: involuntary and non-voluntary.
亚里士多德特别关注行动而不仅仅是行为。人类可以被认为是行动而不仅仅是行为，因为在我们生活的许多领域，我们有选择的能力；相比之下，蚂蚁只是行为，因为它无法考虑自己可能做或不做的事情。我们通常只对个人的行为负责：如果他们无法控制自己所做的事情，那么指责他们就显得奇怪。亚里士多德将有意的行动与另外两种行为区分开来：非自愿和非自发。
Involuntary behaviour results from either compulsion or ignorance. For instance, if someone pushes you through a window, you aren’t likely to be held responsible for breaking the glass, particularly if you didn’t want to break it. If you accidentally ate a toadstool, through ignorance, thinking it was a mushroom, this too would be involuntary. You might well regret the outcome in both cases, but in neither case do you have any direct control over what happens. These things happen against your will and you would not have done them if you could have prevented yourself from doing them. But some forced actions are different in that they still allow you to make a kind of choice. For instance, if the only way of saving a ship in a gale is to jettison the cargo, then when the captain orders this to be done it may seem that his action is voluntary in that he chooses to perform it. However, in another sense, it is forced by the extreme circumstances. In a different context the act of throwing your cargo overboard would be blameworthy, but in the particular circumstances it is forced by events.
非自愿行为源于强迫或无知。例如，如果有人把你推过窗户，你不太可能因为打破玻璃而被追究责任，特别是如果你并不想打破它。如果你因为无知而误食了毒蘑菇，以为它是普通蘑菇，这也是非自愿的。在这两种情况下，你可能会对结果感到后悔，但在这两种情况下，你都无法直接控制发生的事情。这些事情是在你意愿之外发生的，如果你能够阻止自己这样做，你是不会这样做的。但某些强迫行为则有所不同，因为它们仍然允许你做出某种选择。例如，如果在暴风中拯救一艘船的唯一方法是抛弃货物，那么当船长下令这样做时，他的行为似乎是自愿的，因为他选择去执行它。然而，从另一个角度来看，这种行为是被极端情况所迫。在不同的情况下，抛弃货物的行为是值得指责的，但在特定情况下，它是被事件所迫。
Aristotle considers, and rejects, the idea that you could be forced by desire for pleasure to behave in certain ways; for instance, that your lust might compel you to become a serial seducer, and so remove your responsibility for your actions. If you take this line, then, as Aristotle points out, consistency demands that you shouldn’t be praised for your good actions, since, if they arise from desire, they are equally outside your control.
亚里士多德考虑并拒绝了这样一种观点：你可能会被对快乐的渴望迫使以某种方式行事；例如，你的欲望可能会驱使你成为一个连续的诱惑者，从而免除你对自己行为的责任。如果你采取这种观点，那么，正如亚里士多德所指出的，一致性要求你不应因自己的善行而受到赞扬，因为如果这些行为源于欲望，它们同样超出了你的控制。
Non-voluntary or non-intentional behaviour differs from involuntary or unintentional in that you do not regret it. Regret of the consequences of unintentional behaviour shows that if you had had full control you would not have done what you did: you would not have let yourself be pushed through the window; or if you had had full knowledge you would never have eaten a toadstool. It is only external factors which led you to do what you did. If I tread on your toe without intending to, but don’t regret my action, then my action was non-voluntary.
非自愿或非故意的行为与非自发或无意的行为不同，因为你对此并不感到后悔。对无意行为后果的后悔表明，如果你完全控制了局面，你就不会做出你所做的事情：你不会让自己被推到窗外；或者如果你完全了解情况，你永远不会吃蘑菇。只有外部因素导致你做了你所做的事情。如果我无意中踩到你的脚趾，但并不后悔我的行为，那么我的行为就是非自愿的。
Akrasia: Weakness of will
无能为力：意志的软弱
Akrasia is usually translated as ‘incontinence’, a term which to most modern readers suggests a specific and often embarrassing loss of bodily self-control; but Aristotle meant something more general by the word. It is the familiar situation when you know what you should do, what would make your life more successful, yet you stubbornly choose what you know to be the worse option. Unlike incontinence in the medical sense, it is a voluntary action. For instance, you might know that marital infidelity will undermine your eudaimonia. Yet, faced with an attractive and willing adulterer, you may be overcome by your desire for immediate pleasure and succumb to temptation even though you are well aware that adultery will harm your prospects of eudaimonia and even though you, like all human beings, seek eudaimonia. You choose what you know to be worse for you. Aristotle, influenced by Plato, sees a problem in the idea that you might really know what would be the best course of action yet not choose it. For Plato, if you really know the Good, that is, have knowledge of the Form, then you automatically act in accordance with it. According to Plato, genuine akrasia cannot exist: any apparent instance of it must really be a case of ignorance of the Good. In contrast Aristotle maintains that the phenomenon of akrasia does actually occur. Those who suffer from it know in a general way that certain types of action are not good for them, and won’t make them flourish. They may even pay lip service to the idea that what they are doing in a particular case is wrong; but when they do this they don’t really feel it, but are simply reciting learnt lines. They are overcome by their appetite and they succumb to the temptation of immediate pleasures rather than acting in a way that is conducive to long-term flourishing. Even though they know at some level what is good for them, they don’t choose it because they don’t make the inference from the general principle to the particular case.
阿克拉西亚通常被翻译为“失禁”，这个术语对大多数现代读者来说暗示着一种特定且常常令人尴尬的身体自控力丧失；但亚里士多德对这个词的含义更为广泛。这是一个熟悉的情境，当你知道自己应该做什么，什么会让你的生活更成功时，你却固执地选择你知道的更糟糕的选项。与医学意义上的失禁不同，这是一种自愿的行为。例如，你可能知道婚外不忠会破坏你的幸福感。然而，面对一个有吸引力且愿意的通奸者时，你可能会被对即时快乐的渴望所压倒，屈服于诱惑，尽管你清楚地知道通奸会损害你获得幸福感的前景，尽管你和所有人类一样，追求幸福感。你选择了你知道对自己更糟糕的选项。亚里士多德受到柏拉图的影响，认为如果你真的知道什么是最佳的行动方案，却不选择它，这就是一个问题。对柏拉图来说，如果你真的知道善，即拥有对形式的知识，那么你就会自动按照它行事。 根据柏拉图的说法，真正的无能为力是不存在的：任何表面上的例子实际上都必须是对善的无知。相反，亚里士多德认为无能为力的现象确实存在。那些受到无能为力影响的人一般知道某些类型的行为对他们不好，也不会让他们繁荣。他们甚至可能口头上承认在特定情况下他们所做的事情是错误的；但当他们这样做时，他们并没有真正感受到，而只是简单地在背诵学到的台词。他们被欲望所压倒，屈服于即时享乐的诱惑，而不是以有利于长期繁荣的方式行事。尽管他们在某种程度上知道什么对他们是好的，但他们并没有选择它，因为他们没有将一般原则推断到特定案例中。
Towards the end of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes the kind of activity which he considers the most important ingredient in a good life: theoretical or contemplative activity. Despite devoting most of his book to questions of practical virtue with an emphasis on the kinds of action which would bring about flourishing, he reveals that reflecting on what you know is the supreme activity possible for human beings. His reasoning is as follows. Since the characteristic activity of human beings is rational activity, and since the excellence of anything at all arises from its fulfilment of its distinctive function, then it must be true that human excellence is achieved in rational activity. However, only gods would be able to sustain a life of uninterrupted philosophical contemplation; for human beings such contemplation is a vital ingredient, but can’t constitute the whole of the good life. Nevertheless, it is the highest form of activity open to us.
在《尼科马科伦理学》的结尾，亚里士多德描述了他认为良好生活中最重要的活动：理论或沉思活动。尽管他将书的大部分内容用于讨论实践美德的问题，并强调能够带来繁荣的行动类型，但他揭示了反思你所知道的事物是人类可能进行的最高活动。他的推理如下。由于人类的特征活动是理性活动，并且任何事物的卓越性都源于其对其独特功能的实现，那么人类的卓越性必然是在理性活动中实现的。然而，只有神才能维持不间断的哲学沉思生活；对于人类来说，这种沉思是一个重要的组成部分，但不能构成良好生活的全部。尽管如此，它仍然是我们能够进行的最高形式的活动。
Criticisms of the Nicomachean Ethics
对《尼科马科伦理学》的批评
Human nature
人性
The whole of Aristotle’s discussion of human excellence and character is based on the idea that there is such a thing as human nature and that what is most central to our humanity is our rational capacity. There are various ways in which Aristotle’s assumptions about human nature can be challenged.
亚里士多德关于人类卓越和品格的讨论完全基于这样一个观点：人性是存在的，而我们人性中最核心的部分是我们的理性能力。亚里士多德关于人性的假设可以通过多种方式受到挑战。
One radical approach is to deny that there is anything which merits the name ‘human nature’. This is the view of some existential philosophers, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, who think that any attempt to declare in advance what human beings must be is doomed to failure, since we create ourselves by our choices rather than conform to some pre-existing template.
一种激进的观点是否认有任何东西值得被称为“人性”。这是一些存在主义哲学家的看法，例如让-保罗·萨特，他们认为任何试图提前宣称人类必须是什么的尝试都是注定要失败的，因为我们是通过选择来创造自己的，而不是遵循某种预先存在的模板。
A second way of challenging this aspect of Aristotle’s approach is to criticise the particular account of human nature he gives and from which he derives the rest of his conclusions. Is a capacity for rational activity really what separates us from other animals? Why this and not our capacity to kill each other using weapons? Or perhaps our capacity to play musical instruments?
挑战亚里士多德方法的第二种方式是批评他所给出的关于人性的特定论述，并由此推导出他其余的结论。理性活动的能力真的是什么让我们与其他动物区分开来的吗？为什么是这个，而不是我们使用武器互相杀戮的能力？或者也许是我们演奏乐器的能力？
Incommensurability of values
价值的不可比性
For Aristotle there is one supreme form of life, the life of contemplation, which can be measured against other forms of life and found superior. But is this obviously so? Some philosophers have argued that many of the things which human beings value are simply incommensurable, that is, there is absolutely no way in which they can be compared, no form of measurement which would allow us to judge them comparatively. On this view, the contemplative life might be one valuable approach to living; but the life of the active participant in daily affairs might be another. There is no place from which we can sit back and judge the comparative merits of the two lives and no common currency of value in which they can be measured.
对于亚里士多德来说，唯一的至高无上的生活形式是沉思的生活，这种生活可以与其他生活形式进行比较并被认为更优越。但这显然是这样吗？一些哲学家认为，人类所重视的许多事物是根本无法比较的，也就是说，绝对没有任何方式可以对它们进行比较，没有任何测量形式可以让我们进行相对判断。在这种观点下，沉思的生活可能是一种有价值的生活方式；但参与日常事务的积极生活可能是另一种。我们没有一个可以坐下来评判这两种生活相对优劣的地方，也没有一种共同的价值标准可以用来衡量它们。
Egoistical
自私的
A further criticism of Aristotle’s ethics is that it only provides a recipe for an individual’s eudaimonia and shows no concern for the wellbeing of other people. It is an egoistical approach teaching its readers how to pursue their own best interests.
对亚里士多德伦理学的进一步批评是，它仅提供了个人幸福的配方，而对他人的福祉毫不关心。这是一种自私的方式，教导读者如何追求自己的最佳利益。
One response to this sort of criticism is that it simply fails to appreciate what the ancient Greeks understood by ethics. Individual character development was precisely the focus of Greek ethics. Another response is that the virtues Aristotle champions are, for the most part, precisely those needed by individuals if a society is to flourish.
对这种批评的一个回应是，它根本没有理解古希腊人对伦理的理解。个体品格的发展恰恰是希腊伦理的重点。另一个回应是，亚里士多德所倡导的美德在很大程度上正是个体在社会繁荣时所需要的。
Virtues seem arbitrary
美德似乎是任意的
From our perspective, the particular portfolio of virtues that Aristotle put together in the Nicomachean Ethics can be seen as a product of his environment. Aristotle did not challenge the status quo, but rather enshrined the pre-existing values of his society in the form of a philosophical treatise. For instance, he thought slavery an acceptable practice. His is a defence of the values esteemed by the nobility of ancient Athens. Yet he presents these values as if they were obviously part, not just of an ancient Athenian’s nature, but of human nature itself. He treats them as universal features of the human condition, albeit adaptable to particular circumstances.
从我们的角度来看，亚里士多德在《尼科马科伦理学》中所提出的特定美德组合可以被视为他所处环境的产物。亚里士多德并没有挑战现状，而是将他社会中已有的价值观以哲学论文的形式加以确立。例如，他认为奴隶制是一种可接受的做法。他为古雅典贵族所推崇的价值观辩护。然而，他将这些价值观呈现得仿佛它们不仅是古雅典人本性的组成部分，更是人性本身的组成部分。他将它们视为人类状况的普遍特征，尽管可以适应特定的情况。
However, the choices and omissions of virtues and vices appear arbitrary to many readers. Why, for instance, has he nothing to say about sympathy or altruism? His account of virtuous activity looks parochial. And if it is parochial, its relevance to present-day moral theorising must be diminished.
然而，许多读者认为美德和恶习的选择和遗漏显得任意。例如，为什么他对同情或利他主义没有任何评论？他对美德活动的描述看起来狭隘。如果它是狭隘的，那么它与当今道德理论的相关性必然会减弱。
Elitism
精英主义
Furthermore, Aristotle’s theory is unashamedly elitist in several ways. First, there is no sense that eudaimonia is available to everyone: you need good looks, children, a moderate income and a certain amount of good luck. Unlike many moral theories, with Aristotle’s there is no presumption that you can achieve the highest state by will power alone. External factors determine whether or not you lead a good life. Second, if we are to take seriously the suggestion that the good life is a life dominated by philosophical contemplation, then it is clear that only those fortunate enough to have time on their hands to engage in this sort of thought can lead a supremely good life.
此外，亚里士多德的理论在多个方面毫不掩饰地表现出精英主义。首先，没有任何迹象表明幸福是对每个人都可获得的：你需要良好的外貌、孩子、适度的收入和一定的好运。与许多道德理论不同，亚里士多德的理论并不假设你可以仅凭意志力达到最高境界。外部因素决定你是否过上好生活。其次，如果我们认真对待“美好生活是由哲学思考主导的生活”这一建议，那么显然，只有那些幸运到有时间进行这种思考的人才能过上极其美好的生活。
Aristotle would not have been bothered by the charge of elitism. However, it is an important feature of his theory and needs to be made explicit. Many present-day readers will feel that in its elitist elements the theory fails to capture something important about the nature of morality.
亚里士多德不会因为精英主义的指控而感到困扰。然而，这是他理论的一个重要特征，需要明确指出。许多现代读者会觉得，在其精英主义的元素中，这一理论未能捕捉到道德本质中的某些重要内容。
Vagueness
模糊性
Perhaps the most telling criticism of a theory explicitly intended to help us become better people is its vagueness about precisely how we are to behave. The doctrine of the Mean doesn’t provide much in the way of guidance. To say that we should act as the phronimos would act is uninformative unless we happen to have a phronimos with us to ask what he would do in the circumstances. Even within the theory there seems to be a conflict: are we supposed to commit ourselves to a life of virtuous action (the view which Aristotle expresses through large sections of the Nicomachean Ethics), or are we supposed to aim at one which includes substantial philosophical contemplation, the way of life endorsed towards the end of the book? Scholars try to reconcile these apparently opposed views, but it cannot be denied that Aristotle conspicuously fails to provide clear guidelines about how to live.
或许对一个明确旨在帮助我们成为更好人的理论最具说明性的批评是它对我们应该如何行为的模糊性。《中庸》教义并没有提供太多指导。说我们应该像 phronimos 那样行动是没有信息量的，除非我们恰好有一个 phronimos 在身边，可以询问他在这种情况下会怎么做。即使在理论内部，似乎也存在冲突：我们是应该致力于过一种美德行动的生活（这是亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》中大量章节中表达的观点），还是应该追求一种包括实质性哲学思考的生活方式，这是书末所倡导的生活方式？学者们试图调和这些明显对立的观点，但不可否认的是，亚里士多德显然未能提供关于如何生活的明确指导。
384 | BC | Aristotle born in Stagira. |
Student of Plato in Athens. | ||
Tutor to Alexander the Great. | ||
Publishes on numerous topics including politics, tragedy and biology. | ||
322 | BC | Dies in Chalcis. |
akrasia: weakness of will: knowing what is best, but still choosing to do something else. Aristotle, unlike Plato, believes that weakness of will does genuinely occur.
无能为力：意志的弱点：知道什么是最好的，但仍然选择做其他事情。亚里士多德与柏拉图不同，他认为意志的弱点确实存在。
egoism: concern only with your own interests. The opposite of altruism.
自私：只关心自己的利益。与利他主义相对。
ergon: the characteristic function of anything.
ergon：任何事物的特征函数。
eudaimonia: happiness. For Aristotle this wasn’t a transient blissful mental state, but rather flourishing over the course of a whole life.
幸福。对亚里士多德来说，这不是一种短暂的幸福心理状态，而是整个生命过程中的繁荣。
Golden Mean: Aristotle’s doctrine that right action lies between two extremes.
中庸：亚里士多德的理论，认为正确的行为介于两个极端之间。
incommensurability: the impossibility of comparing two things because of the lack of a common currency in which comparison can be made.
不可比性：由于缺乏可以进行比较的共同标准，比较两件事的不可行性。
incontinence: akrasia, or weakness of will.
失禁：无能为力，或意志薄弱。
phronimos: the man of practical wisdom or prudence who is sensitive to particular circumstances and is a good judge of what to do.
phronimos：具有实践智慧或谨慎的男人，能够敏感地对待特定情况，并且善于判断该做什么。
virtue: a disposition to behave in a way that will make you a good person.
美德：一种倾向于以使你成为好人的方式行事的性格。
J. L. Ackrill Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) is a good general introduction to Aristotle’s philosophy.
J. L. Ackrill 《哲学家亚里士多德》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1981 年）是一本关于亚里士多德哲学的良好通用介绍。
J. O. Urmson Aristotle’s Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988) is a clear and very useful commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.
J. O. Urmson 的《亚里士多德伦理学》（牛津：布莱克威尔，1988）是对《尼科马科伦理学》的清晰且非常有用的评论。
Amelie O. Rorty (ed.) Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) is an excellent anthology of articles on this book.
阿梅莉·O·罗提（编）《亚里士多德伦理学论文集》（伯克利：加利福尼亚大学出版社，1980 年）是一本关于此书的优秀文章选集。
Boethius the Consolation of Philosophy
博伊提乌斯《哲学的安慰》
As The Consolation of Philosophy opens, Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius is in a prison cell bemoaning his condition. He wants to die. He has nothing to hope for. Fortune, who gave him his wealth and freedom, has now taken both away. Then, as he is giving vent to his sorrow in the form of a poem, he becomes aware of a woman standing over him. Her height seems to fluctuate from average size to immeasurably tall. Her dress is embroidered at the bottom of the hem with the Greek letter pi; at the top is the letter theta; in between them is embroidered a ladder. Her dress is torn in places; she carries some books and a sceptre. This woman is Philosophy personified. The letter pi stands for practical philosophy (including ethics); the letter theta stands for contemplative philosophy (metaphysics and science).
《哲学的安慰》开篇时，安修斯·曼利乌斯·塞维里努斯·博伊修斯正坐在监狱的牢房里哀叹自己的境遇。他想要死去。他没有任何希望。曾经给予他财富和自由的命运，现在却夺走了这两样东西。然后，当他以诗歌的形式倾诉自己的悲伤时，他注意到一个女人站在他身边。她的身高似乎在平均身材和无可估量的高大之间波动。她的裙子底边绣有希腊字母π；顶部是字母θ；它们之间绣着一把梯子。她的裙子在某些地方破损；她手里拿着一些书和一个权杖。这个女人是哲学的化身。字母π代表实践哲学（包括伦理学）；字母θ代表沉思哲学（形而上学和科学）。
Philosophy rebukes Boethius for forsaking her. Through her dialogue with Boethius she offers him the consolation he is seeking. Although he has been unjustly condemned to death and has lost his great wealth, reputation, and the comforts of freedom, she points out the inner strength that she, Philosophy, can give him. She diagnoses his despair and provides soothing medicine in the form of reason. Philosophy in this form is a kind of self-help, a consolation to the mind. Boethius sometimes refers to Philosophy as his nurse.
哲学责备博伊修斯背弃了她。通过与博伊修斯的对话，她为他提供了他所寻求的安慰。尽管他被不公正地判处死刑，失去了巨大的财富、声誉和自由的舒适，但她指出了她，哲学，可以给予他的内在力量。她诊断了他的绝望，并以理性的形式提供了安慰的药物。在这种形式下，哲学是一种自助，是对心灵的安慰。博伊修斯有时称哲学为他的护士。
As far as we can tell, The Consolation of Philosophy was written in around 524, while Boethius was imprisoned in Pavia, awaiting execution for an alleged act of treason against the Gothic emperor Theodoric. This was a dramatic fall from eminence: Boethius had been one of the most respected and honoured members of Theodoric’s government. Boethius was subsequently tortured and bludgeoned to death, an ignominious way to die that a citizen of his standing might have hoped to have avoided.
据我们所知，《哲学的安慰》大约是在 524 年写成的，当时博伊提乌斯在帕维亚被监禁，等待因被指控对哥特皇帝狄奥多里克的叛国行为而处决。这是一个戏剧性的堕落：博伊提乌斯曾是狄奥多里克政府中最受尊敬和荣誉的成员之一。博伊提乌斯随后被折磨并打死，这是一种耻辱的死法，一个像他这样地位的公民本可能希望避免。
Although he published other books on a wide range of subjects, including music, and translated a substantial part of Aristotle’s works into Latin, it is for The Consolation of Philosophy, his last work, that he is now remembered. It is a compelling book written in a mixture of prose, poetry and dialogue. During the medieval and Renaissance periods it was one of the most widely read books; Chaucer translated it, as did Elizabeth I. Its philosophical content is not wholly original, but the manner in which the ideas are communicated makes it an entertaining as well as a stimulating book to read.
尽管他出版了其他关于广泛主题的书籍，包括音乐，并将亚里士多德的部分作品翻译成拉丁文，但他现在被人们铭记的却是他的最后一部作品《哲学的安慰》。这是一本以散文、诗歌和对话混合写成的引人入胜的书。在中世纪和文艺复兴时期，它是最广泛阅读的书籍之一；乔叟和伊丽莎白一世都翻译过它。它的哲学内容并非完全原创，但思想传达的方式使其成为一本既有趣又发人深省的读物。
Philosophy, personified as a woman, as we have seen, comes to visit Boethius in his prison cell. But what did Boethius mean by Philosophy? He was a Neo-Platonist, that is, his view of philosophy was deeply influenced by Plato’s. In particular, he followed Plato in believing that philosophical contemplation takes us away from the misleading world of appearances to a true experience of reality. He repeatedly uses the image of the shadowy world of appearances which is contrasted with the light of truth. This is an allusion to Plato’s image of the Sun as the symbol of the Form of the Good in the parable of the cave that Plato uses in The Republic.
哲学，拟人化为一位女性，正如我们所见，来探访博伊提乌斯在监狱牢房中的生活。但博伊提乌斯所指的哲学是什么呢？他是一位新柏拉图主义者，也就是说，他的哲学观深受柏拉图的影响。特别是，他跟随柏拉图的观点，认为哲学的沉思使我们远离误导性的表象世界，进入对现实的真实体验。他反复使用表象的阴影世界这一意象，与真理的光明形成对比。这是对柏拉图在《理想国》中使用的洞穴寓言中，太阳作为善的形式象征的暗示。
Philosophy teaches Boethius – or rather reminds him – that as a philosopher he should be immune from the effects of good or bad fortune. The fact that Philosophy jogs Boethius’ memory is probably meant, again, as an allusion to a doctrine of Plato’s: the view that knowledge is a kind of recollection.
哲学教导博伊修斯——或者说提醒他——作为一名哲学家，他应该免受好运或坏运的影响。哲学唤起博伊修斯记忆的事实，可能再次暗指柏拉图的一种学说：知识是一种回忆的观点。
A true philosopher is impervious to chance. The wheel of Fortune inevitably turns, and those who are at the top find themselves very soon at the bottom. That is the nature of Fortune: to be fickle. In fact, Philosophy tells him, it is when she is adverse that Fortune best serves humanity. Good fortune dupes us, because it gives us the illusion of true happiness; but when Fortune takes off her mask and shows us how treacherous she can be, that is when we learn most. Adversity teaches us the frailty of the sorts of happiness that wealth, fame and pleasure can inspire. It teaches us which of our friends are true friends.
真正的哲学家对偶然无动于衷。命运之轮不可避免地转动，那些处于顶端的人很快就会发现自己处于底部。这就是命运的本质：多变。事实上，哲学告诉他，正是当命运逆境时，命运最能服务于人类。好运欺骗我们，因为它给了我们真正幸福的错觉；但当命运摘下面具，向我们展示她是多么的背叛时，我们才学到最多。逆境教会我们财富、名声和快乐所能激发的幸福是多么脆弱。它教会我们哪些朋友是真正的朋友。
Boethius had indeed been blessed with good fortune: his two sons were made consuls on the same day as a public demonstration of gratitude for his contribution to the running of the state. His imprisonment, though, takes his happiness away. Philosophy tells him that he is being foolish: true happiness can’t be found in anything that is governed by chance such as wealth or fame. It must come from within. Here Boethius is influenced by aspects of Stoicism, a philosophy which emphasises the need for equanimity in the face of external trouble. For a Stoic, happiness comes from inner resources and is immune to the effects of chance and misfortune.
博伊修斯确实曾受到好运的眷顾：他的两个儿子在同一天被任命为执政官，以此作为对他为国家运作所作贡献的公开感谢。然而，他的监禁却夺走了他的幸福。哲学告诉他，他在愚蠢：真正的幸福不能在财富或名声等偶然支配的事物中找到。它必须来自内心。在这里，博伊修斯受到斯多噶主义的影响，这是一种强调在外部困扰面前保持平静的哲学。对于斯多噶主义者来说，幸福来自内在资源，不受偶然和不幸的影响。
Boethius laments the fact that there doesn’t seem to be justice in the world. Evil people often flourish, while the good and virtuous suffer. In response Philosophy claims that it is the virtuous who are truly rewarded since they have the power to attain the ultimate end, genuine happiness, through their pursuit of the good. The evil only appear to flourish: in fact by abandoning their reason they become subhuman and are more deserving of pity and remedial treatment than of retributive punishment.
博伊修斯哀叹世界似乎没有正义。邪恶的人常常繁荣，而善良和有德行的人却遭受痛苦。对此，哲学声称，真正得到回报的是那些有德行的人，因为他们有能力通过追求善来获得最终的目标——真正的幸福。邪恶的人看似繁荣：实际上，通过放弃理智，他们变得不再是人，更值得同情和救助，而不是应受惩罚。
Having reminded Boethius that true happiness, which everyone seeks, comes from philosophical contemplation, not from fame, fortune or pleasure, and that, despite appearances, the wicked cannot genuinely flourish, Philosophy engages him in debate about God and human free will. Here the book becomes a serious philosophical dialogue in the style of Plato’s dialogues. Boethius takes on the role of questioner, and Philosophy explains the nature of God to him, leading him with the aid of reason away from mere appearances to a world of purity and light.
在提醒博厄修斯，真正的幸福是每个人所追求的，它来自于哲学的沉思，而不是名声、财富或享乐，并且尽管表面上看起来如此，邪恶的人无法真正繁荣之后，哲学与他展开了关于上帝和人类自由意志的辩论。在这里，这本书变成了类似于柏拉图对话的严肃哲学对话。博厄修斯扮演提问者的角色，哲学向他解释上帝的本质，借助理智引导他走出表象，进入一个纯净和光明的世界。
Much of the discussion focuses on the question of how humans could have free will, the capacity for genuine choice over what they do, and yet at the same time there could be a God who knows in advance precisely what they will in fact do. Without free will there cannot be rational action; yet if God can see what we are going to do, it is not at all clear in what sense we are genuinely free to exercise choice.
许多讨论集中在一个问题上：人类如何能够拥有自由意志，即对自己所做的事情有真正的选择能力，而与此同时又可能存在一个上帝，能够提前确切知道他们实际上会做什么。如果没有自由意志，就不可能有理性的行动；然而，如果上帝能够看到我们将要做的事情，那么我们在什么意义上真正自由地行使选择就不那么清楚了。
Philosophy’s answer to this conundrum in part turns on the distinction between predestination and foreknowledge. Those who believe in predestination argue that God has brought it about that certain events will inevitably happen in the future; foreknowledge is simply knowing in advance what will happen. Philosophy argues that God’s knowing that certain choices will be made does not cause those things to happen – human beings can still make choices. So divine foreknowledge is compatible with genuine choice for humans since knowing what will happen does not predestine it to happen.
哲学对这个难题的回答部分取决于预定论和先知知的区别。相信预定论的人认为，上帝使得某些事件在未来必然发生；先知知只是提前知道将会发生什么。哲学认为，上帝知道某些选择将被做出并不会导致这些事情发生——人类仍然可以做出选择。因此，神圣的先知知与人类的真实选择是兼容的，因为知道将会发生什么并不意味着它注定会发生。
And yet it might seem that if God knows in advance what we will choose, our apparent choice is an illusion, not really free will, but the fantasy of it. Philosophy’s response to this line of criticism is that our idea of foreknowledge erroneously, but understandably, rests on human experience of time. But God is not like us in important respects. In particular God is outside time and lives in an eternal present. Because God stands outside time, His foreknowledge is comparable to our knowledge of the present: past, present and future are all as one to Him. Our perception of what is happening now doesn’t make what is happening happen. Nor then does God’s foreknowledge wipe out the possibility of genuine free choice about what we do. Our mistake is to think of God’s relation to time as like our own. God is aware of everything that has happened, is happening, and will happen.
然而，似乎如果上帝预先知道我们将选择什么，那么我们表面的选择就是一种幻觉，而不是真正的自由意志，而是这种自由意志的幻想。哲学对这一批评的回应是，我们对预知的理解错误地但可以理解地基于人类对时间的经验。但上帝在重要方面与我们不同。特别是，上帝超越时间，生活在一个永恒的现在。因为上帝站在时间之外，他的预知可以与我们对现在的知识相比较：过去、现在和未来对他而言都是一体的。我们对现在发生的事情的感知并不会使正在发生的事情发生。因此，上帝的预知也并不会消除我们在行动上做出真正自由选择的可能性。我们的错误在于将上帝与时间的关系视为与我们自己的相似。上帝意识到一切已经发生、正在发生和将要发生的事情。
Philosophy ends the book by exhorting Boethius to virtue since he is living in the sight of a judge who, from a position outside time sees and knows everything. Thus in The Consolation of Philosophy Boethius’ intellectual journey retraces the path of the philosopher in Plato’s Republic. Boethius leaves behind the shadowy world of appearances – the equivalent of the flickering shadows on the wall of the cave – and achieves knowledge of the Form of the Good and ultimately of God.
哲学在书的结尾劝勉博伊修斯追求美德，因为他生活在一位法官的视线之中，这位法官从时间之外的位置看见并知道一切。因此，在《哲学的安慰》中，博伊修斯的智力旅程重走了柏拉图《理想国》中哲学家的道路。博伊修斯抛弃了模糊的表象世界——相当于洞穴墙壁上闪烁的影子——并获得了对善的形式以及最终对上帝的知识。
Criticism of the Consolation of Philosophy
对《哲学的安慰》的批评
Rationalisation?
合理化？
Boethius’ celebration of everything that is insulated from the effects of chance might be seen as a rationalisation. Given that he was in prison and facing torture and almost certain execution, with no hope of retrieving his former wealth and public esteem, is it surprising that he should celebrate rational activity above all else? Nothing else significant is left to him. Perhaps his rejection of wealth and fame as significant elements in a life that goes well, is just the self-serving argument of a desperate man.
博伊修斯对一切免受偶然影响的庆祝可能被视为一种合理化。考虑到他身处监狱，面临酷刑和几乎肯定的处决，且没有希望恢复他曾经的财富和公众声望，他庆祝理性活动高于一切，难道不令人惊讶吗？对他来说，别的什么重要的东西都已不复存在。也许他对财富和名声作为美好生活中重要元素的拒绝，只是一个绝望者的自利论点。
Even if it is true that Boethius saw the overriding value of rational deliberation because little else was left to him, as this criticism suggests, it doesn’t follow that he was wrong. The truth of the matter is independent of his motivation for believing it. An alternative interpretation is that Boethius was jolted from his complacency by having everything he had thought valuable to him removed. Only then could he come to understand (or rather recollect) Philosophy’s powerful message; only then could he return to the austere vision of self-sufficient happiness that Philosophy teaches. This interpretation is supported in the text by Philosophy’s insistence that adversity can draw people back to the true way of goodness, whereas the external trappings of success can lure them into believing that they have achieved true happiness.
即使波伊修斯看到理性思考的压倒性价值是因为他别无选择，正如这种批评所暗示的，这并不意味着他是错的。事实的真相独立于他相信这一点的动机。另一种解释是，波伊修斯因失去他认为有价值的一切而被迫从自满中觉醒。只有在那时，他才能理解（或者说回忆起）哲学的强大信息；只有在那时，他才能回归哲学所教导的自给自足幸福的严峻愿景。这种解释在文本中得到了支持，哲学坚持认为逆境可以将人们拉回真正的善之路，而成功的外在表象则可能诱使他们相信自己已经获得了真正的幸福。
So, even if Boethius’ motivation for believing what Philosophy taught him was suspect, it does not follow that her message is in error. What would be devastating to Philosophy’s doctrine, however, would be the discovery that in fact wealth, fame and other worldly goods are an essential part of happiness. Aristotle, for example, believed that a certain amount of wealth, and having children of one’s own, were important ingredients in happiness. If he was right, then Boethius’ attempt to gain true consolation from philosophy alone was destined to failure.
因此，即使博爱修斯相信哲学所教导的内容的动机值得怀疑，但这并不意味着她的信息是错误的。然而，哲学教义的毁灭性打击将是发现财富、名声和其他世俗财富实际上是幸福的一个重要部分。例如，亚里士多德认为，一定数量的财富和拥有自己的孩子是幸福的重要成分。如果他是对的，那么博爱修斯仅仅依靠哲学获得真正安慰的尝试注定要失败。
c. | 480 | born in Rome. |
c. | 524 | writes The Consolation of Philosophy and is executed. |
foreknowledge: knowing in advance what will happen.
预知：提前知道将会发生什么。
free will: the ability to make genuine choices; this is usually contrasted with determinism, which is the view that all our thoughts and actions are caused in such a way that we have no choice about what to think or do.
自由意志：做出真实选择的能力；这通常与决定论相对立，决定论认为我们所有的思想和行为都是以一种我们无法选择思考或行动的方式造成的。
Neo-Platonism: a modified version of Plato’s philosophy.
新柏拉图主义：柏拉图哲学的一个修订版。
Stoicism: the Ancient Greek school of philosophy which emphasised that honour and wealth should not be pursued for their own sake and that happiness can be achieved by elimination of the passions.
斯多葛主义：古希腊哲学学派，强调荣誉和财富不应为其本身而追求，幸福可以通过消除激情来实现。
V.E. Watts’ introduction to his translation of The Consolation of Philosophy (London: Penguin, 1969) gives a clear account of Boethius’ life and writing.
V.E. Watts 对他翻译的《哲学的安慰》（伦敦：企鹅出版社，1969 年）的介绍清晰地叙述了博伊提乌斯的生平和著作。
C.S. Lewis The Discarded Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) includes an interesting discussion of The Consolation of Philosophy.
C.S. 路易斯 《被遗弃的形象》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1964 年）中包含了对《哲学的安慰》的有趣讨论。
Niccolò Machiavelli the Prince
尼科洛·马基雅维利 《君主论》
Most readers of The Prince expect it to be a self-help manual for the ruthless. But the book is far subtler than that. Although Niccolò Machiavelli does advocate dissimulation and cruelty at times, he reserves his praise for those who know how and when to use force and guile. He explains how a strong and effective ruler can best serve the interests of the state. His advice is not meant for just anyone: it is advice for princes – rulers whose actions determine the fate of their subjects. Such people, he suggests should not be squeamish. They need to act swiftly and effectively to do what is best. And what is best for the state may be to ignore conventional morality.
《君主论》的大多数读者期望它是一本无情者的自助手册。但这本书远比那更微妙。尽管尼科洛·马基雅维利确实在某些时候提倡伪装和残酷，但他更赞赏那些知道如何以及何时使用武力和狡诈的人。他解释了一个强大而有效的统治者如何最好地服务于国家的利益。他的建议并不是针对任何人：这是给王子的建议——那些行动决定其臣民命运的统治者。他建议这样的人不应过于敏感。他们需要迅速而有效地采取行动，以做出最佳选择。而对国家来说，最佳选择可能是忽视传统道德。
Machiavelli had a successful career as a statesman in his native Florence. In 1513, however, he was accused of plotting against the powerful Medici family. He was imprisoned, tortured, and then sent into exile just outside the city. It seems that he wrote The Prince in order to demonstrate his suitability as an adviser to new princes. It was a kind of calling card intended to help him re-enter the fray of political life. In this respect it failed. He did not get the position he hoped for. First published in 1532, shortly after Machiavelli’s death, The Prince has always been a controversial book. Today it is frequently cited in discussions of the alleged inevitability of ‘dirty hands’ in politics and the adjective ‘machiavellian’ is used, misleadingly, to describe cunning pursuit of self-interest.
马基雅维利在他故乡佛罗伦萨的政治生涯非常成功。然而，在 1513 年，他被指控策划反对强大的美第奇家族。他被监禁、拷打，然后被流放到城市外。看来他写《君主论》是为了证明自己作为新君主顾问的适合性。这是一种名片，旨在帮助他重新进入政治生活的斗争。在这方面，它失败了。他没有得到他所希望的职位。《君主论》于 1532 年首次出版，正值马基雅维利去世不久，一直以来都是一本有争议的书。今天，它常常在关于政治中所谓“肮脏手段”不可避免性的讨论中被引用，而“马基雅维利式”这个形容词则被误用来形容狡猾地追求自我利益。
The Prince is written in the genre of ‘mirrors for princes’ – short tracts advising and inspiring rulers. These were popular in the Renaissance. Typically they would counsel such virtues as courage and compassion. In complete contrast, Machiavelli’s advice was that a successful prince needs to learn how not to be good, to take swift and sometimes cruel action when this is necessary. A successful prince will only honour his word when it suits him to do so, though it usually pays him to appear honest. He needs to act like a fox in order to recognise and avoid the traps others set for him, but also, sometimes as a lion to frighten off the wolves that surround him. The message is that a prince needs to know how to act like a beast: a challenge to the humanistic tradition in which princes were expected to act as moral exemplars to their people.
《君主论》属于“君主镜鉴”这一类型——短小的文章，旨在为统治者提供建议和启发。这在文艺复兴时期非常流行。通常，这些文章会劝告诸如勇气和同情等美德。与此完全相反，马基雅维利的建议是，一个成功的君主需要学习如何不做好人，在必要时采取迅速而有时残酷的行动。一个成功的君主只有在对自己有利时才会遵守诺言，尽管通常表现得诚实对他有利。他需要像狐狸一样行动，以识别和避免他人为他设下的陷阱，但有时也需要像狮子一样，以吓跑围绕他的狼。信息是，君主需要知道如何像野兽一样行动：这是对人文主义传统的挑战，在这种传统中，君主被期望作为道德榜样来对待他们的人民。
Machiavelli has a low view of human nature. Based on his own observation, and his knowledge of Florentine history and classical texts, he declares that people behave in predictably bad ways. They are fickle, they lie, they shun danger, and they are greedy. In these circumstances, a prince needs to use fear to achieve effective rule: being loved isn’t a reliable source of power, since people break bonds of gratitude when it suits them to do so. If you have a choice it is best to be both loved and feared; but if you have to choose one above the other, choose to be feared.
马基雅维利对人性持有低估的看法。根据他自己的观察，以及他对佛罗伦萨历史和古典文本的了解，他宣称人们的行为是可预测地恶劣的。他们善变，撒谎，逃避危险，并且贪婪。在这种情况下，王子需要利用恐惧来实现有效统治：被爱并不是一个可靠的权力来源，因为人们在适合自己的时候会打破感恩的纽带。如果有选择，最好既被爱又被惧；但如果必须在两者之间选择，选择被惧。
Machiavelli is interested in how people actually behave rather than in how they ought to behave. His point is that unless a prince recognises how fickle human beings really are and always have been, he is likely to come to grief. It is no use trusting people to keep their promises if they are in fact likely to break them. And the prince should not feel bound to keep his promises in such circumstances: that would be foolhardy. Machiavelli argues that the successful prince should follow a very different code from that advocated by traditional morality, whether that comes from a classical or Christian source.
马基雅维利关注的是人们实际的行为，而不是他们应该如何行为。他的观点是，除非一个王子认识到人类是多么善变，并且一直以来都是如此，否则他很可能会遭遇失败。如果人们实际上可能会违背承诺，那么信任他们遵守承诺是没有用的。在这种情况下，王子也不应该感到有义务遵守自己的承诺：那将是愚蠢的。马基雅维利认为，成功的王子应该遵循与传统道德所倡导的截然不同的准则，无论这些道德来自古典还是基督教的来源。
Appearance is everything for a prince. People react to superficial characteristics and rarely, if ever, perceive a prince as he really is. Consequently a prince must manipulate the way he appears, even if, behind the mask, he is something quite different.
外表对王子来说至关重要。人们对表面的特征作出反应，几乎从不真正理解王子的真实面貌。因此，王子必须操控自己的外在形象，即使在面具背后，他实际上是截然不同的。
The key concept in understanding The Prince is, in Italian, virtù, usually translated as ‘prowess’. Although it comes from the Latin word for virtue (virtus), it has, for Machiavelli, a very different meaning. Throughout the book Machiavelli’s aim is to explain how a prince can display this quality of virtù. Virtù is the ability to act swiftly and effectively to do whatever will secure the safety and continuing prosperity of the state. This may mean making false promises, murdering those who threaten you, even, where necessary, butchering your own supporters.
理解《君主论》的关键概念是意大利语中的 virtù，通常翻译为“才能”。尽管它源自拉丁语的美德（virtus），但对马基雅维利来说，其含义截然不同。在整本书中，马基雅维利的目标是解释一个君主如何展现这种 virtù的品质。Virtù是迅速有效地采取行动以确保国家安全和持续繁荣的能力。这可能意味着做出虚假的承诺，谋杀威胁你的人，甚至在必要时屠杀自己的支持者。
Virtù will increase his chances of success as a ruler, but even a virtuoso ruler (one who displays virtù) won’t necessarily flourish. Machiavelli believes that half of our lives are governed by chance events over which we have no control: no matter how well-prepared he may be, a prince’s projects can still be thwarted by misfortune. Fortune is like a river which floods its banks: once it is in full flood, there is nothing anyone can do to control it. But this doesn’t stop us from taking action before the river floods, so that the damage caused will be less severe. Chance events usually cause most damage where no precautions have been taken. Machiavelli does, however, believe that fortune favours the young and the bold. In a disturbing metaphor, fortune is a woman who responds to the advances of an audacious young man who beats and coerces her. Virtù is the manly quality he uses to subdue her.
Virtù将增加他作为统治者成功的机会，但即使是一个展现出 virtù的优秀统治者也不一定会繁荣。马基雅维利认为，我们生活的一半是由我们无法控制的偶然事件所支配：无论他准备得多么充分，王子的计划仍然可能被厄运所破坏。运气就像一条泛滥的河流：一旦洪水泛滥，任何人都无法控制它。但这并不妨碍我们在河流泛滥之前采取行动，以减少造成的损害。偶然事件通常在没有采取预防措施的地方造成最大的损害。然而，马基雅维利确实相信，运气偏爱年轻人和勇敢者。在一个令人不安的隐喻中，运气是一位女性，她回应一个大胆年轻人的追求，而这个年轻人则对她施加暴力和威逼。Virtù是他用来征服她的男性品质。
Machiavelli’s model of a prince who demonstrated virtù was Cesare Borgia. His prowess involved tricking the Orsini into coming to Sinigaglia where he had them murdered. However, the move of Borgia’s which Machiavelli seems to appreciate most was taken against one of his own employees. Once Borgia had taken control of Romagna he placed a cruel henchman, Remirro de Orco, in charge, who quickly pacified the region through violence. Borgia decided that such cruelties could grow intolerable, and in order to expunge the hatred that was beginning to be directed at him, Borgia had Remirro de Orco murdered, and his body left hacked in two halves in a public piazza. With this single brutal spectacle he kept the people of Romagna both appeased and stupefied. Machiavelli applauds Borgia’s actions as skilful uses of cruelty. He contrasts Borgia’s approach with that of the ruthless tyrant Agathocles who was little more than a thug and whose actions failed to display virtù.
马基雅维利所描述的展现美德的王子模型是切萨雷·博尔贾。他的才能包括欺骗奥尔西尼家族来到西尼加利亚，并在那里将他们谋杀。然而，马基雅维利似乎最欣赏博尔贾的举动是针对他自己的一名员工。当博尔贾控制了罗马涅后，他任命了一个残忍的爪牙雷米罗·德·奥尔科负责，该爪牙迅速通过暴力平息了该地区。博尔贾决定这种残酷可能会变得不可容忍，为了消除开始针对他的仇恨，博尔贾让雷米罗·德·奥尔科被谋杀，并将他的尸体分成两半，留在一个公共广场上。通过这一单一的残酷景象，他让罗马涅的人民既感到安抚又感到震惊。马基雅维利称赞博尔贾的行为是巧妙地运用了残酷。他将博尔贾的做法与无情的暴君阿卡托克利斯的做法进行了对比，后者不过是个流氓，其行为未能展现美德。
Cesare Borgia Versus Agathocles
切萨雷·博尔贾对抗阿卡托克勒斯
Agathocles became king of Syracuse by crime: he slaughtered the senators and richest citizens of Syracuse and simply seized power. He ruled and defended his country, but did so with cruelty and inhumanity. In Machiavelli’s eyes his actions should not be confused with virtù. What distinguished Borgia from Agathocles? Machiavelli is not completely clear about what sets them apart; however, the most plausible interpretation is this. They both used cruelty effectively and economically. Borgia’s actions, however, had they achieved their end, would have brought about a situation that was in the common interest (despite being almost certainly inspired by a lust for power). Agathocles, in contrast, was a brutal tyrant whose actions left Syracuse in a worse situation than before: his actions were nothing more than criminal. Hence Borgia demonstrated virtù; Agathocles did not.
阿伽托克利斯通过犯罪成为锡拉库萨的国王：他屠杀了锡拉库萨的参议员和最富有的市民，简单地夺取了权力。他统治并捍卫了他的国家，但却以残酷和不人道的方式进行。 在马基雅维利看来，他的行为不应与美德混淆。博尔贾与阿伽托克利斯有什么区别？马基雅维利并没有完全清楚地说明他们的区别；然而，最合理的解释是这一点。他们都有效且经济地使用了残酷。然而，博尔贾的行为如果达到了目的，将会带来一个符合共同利益的局面（尽管几乎可以肯定是出于对权力的渴望）。相比之下，阿伽托克利斯是一个残暴的暴君，他的行为使锡拉库萨的情况比之前更糟：他的行为无非是犯罪。因此，博尔贾展现了美德；阿伽托克利斯则没有。
The fact that Machiavelli condemns Agathocles’ actions should silence those who claim that Machiavelli simply approves of immorality. It is true that he approves of some actions which conventional morality would label ‘immoral’, such as Borgia’s treatment of Remirro de Orco; and it is certainly true that he had no respect whatsoever for what we would now see as basic human rights. He even seems to take delight in descriptions of bloodshed. However, there are actions, such as those of Agathocles, of which he disapproves.
马基雅维利谴责阿伽托克利斯的行为这一事实应该让那些声称马基雅维利只是赞同不道德行为的人闭嘴。确实，他赞同一些传统道德会标记为“非道德”的行为，比如博尔贾对雷米罗·德·奥尔科的处理；而且他对我们现在视为基本人权的东西毫无尊重。他甚至似乎对血腥场面的描述感到愉悦。然而，有些行为，比如阿伽托克利斯的行为，是他所不赞同的。
Interpretations of the Prince
王子的解读
Satirical?
讽刺的？
Some commentators have found Machiavelli’s approach to politics so extreme that they have assumed he must be satirising tyrannical princes. Surely, they argue, he can’t have seriously held up Cesare Borgia as a model of a good prince. By ironically championing the immoral actions of a ruthless prince, they claim, he was really criticising rather than endorsing that approach to statecraft. This seems to have been Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s view of The Prince.
一些评论家认为，马基雅维利对政治的看法极端到让他们假设他一定是在讽刺暴虐的王子。他们认为，他不可能认真地将切萨雷·博尔贾视为好王子的典范。他们声称，通过讽刺性地支持一个无情王子的非道德行为，他实际上是在批评而不是支持这种治国方式。这似乎是让-雅克·卢梭对《君主论》的看法。
There is very little evidence in support of such an interpretation apart from the fact that in his later book, Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli reveals his republican sympathies: a fact which might lend support to the view that he was fundamentally opposed to the idea that Florence should be ruled by a prince. The consensus of critical opinion, however, is that Machiavelli was writing in earnest in The Prince, and this explains why the work is so challenging.
除了他在后来的著作《论李维》中透露出自己的共和主义倾向这一事实外，几乎没有证据支持这种解释：这一事实可能支持他根本上反对佛罗伦萨由王子统治的观点。然而，批评界的共识是，马基雅维利在《君主论》中是认真写作的，这也解释了为什么这部作品如此具有挑战性。
Amoral?
非道德的？
An alternative interpretation of The Prince is that Machiavelli was giving instructions for those who wanted to retain power and didn’t care in the slightest about morality. On this interpretation Machiavelli is amoral, completely outside morality, and simply giving guidance to those who are prepared to act like psychopaths. This interpretation is implausible. As the comparison of Cesare Borgia and Agathocles shows, Machiavelli does not approve of unlimited cruelty exercised for purely selfish motives and without beneficial effect for the state. Nor is the book an uncritical ‘how to’ manual. In Machiavelli’s discussions cruelty always has a point, a moral point: it is to prevent even more cruel actions being taken later on; it is for the common good. The Prince, then, is far from an amoral book. It may advocate policies which are immoral by conventional standards, but these policies are themselves given moral and political justifications. It is, then, far more than a manual providing techniques by which the unscrupulous can become powerful.
《君主论》的另一种解读是，马基雅维利是在给那些想要保持权力而丝毫不在乎道德的人提供指导。在这种解读中，马基雅维利是非道德的，完全超脱于道德，只是给那些准备像精神病患者一样行事的人提供建议。这种解读是不可信的。正如切萨雷·博尔贾和阿卡托克利斯的比较所示，马基雅维利并不赞成出于纯粹自私动机而施加的无限残酷，而这种残酷对国家没有任何有益的影响。该书也不是一本不加批判的“如何做”手册。在马基雅维利的讨论中，残酷总是有其目的，有道德目的：是为了防止更残酷的行为在后期发生；是为了公共利益。因此，《君主论》远非一本非道德的书。它可能倡导在传统标准下被视为不道德的政策，但这些政策本身是有道德和政治正当性的。因此，它远不止是一本提供技巧的手册，让不择手段的人获得权力。
Machiavelli’s originality
马基雅维利的独创性
The historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) gives a far more subtle picture of Machiavelli’s contribution to political thought. On his interpretation, Machiavelli’s great originality and appeal lies in the fact that he recognised the shortcomings of classical and Christian morality when applied to the situation of a prince. A prince who displays the traditional virtues, such as honesty and compassion, is likely to play into the hands of his enemies, who are unlikely to be so scrupulous. Berlin’s point is that, far from being amoral, Machiavelli, perhaps unwittingly, introduced the notion that there could be more than one morality and that these moralities might not be compatible with one another. It’s not that one morality is the true one and all others false. Rather there are genuinely incompatible moralities that are each consistent from within.
思想史学家以赛亚·柏林（1909–1997）对马基雅维利对政治思想贡献的看法更加微妙。在他的解读中，马基雅维利的伟大原创性和吸引力在于他认识到古典和基督教道德在应用于王子的情况下的局限性。一个展现传统美德的王子，如诚实和同情，可能会落入敌人的圈套，而敌人往往不会如此谨慎。柏林的观点是，马基雅维利并非缺乏道德，或许是无意中引入了这样一个概念：可能存在不止一种道德，而这些道德可能彼此不兼容。并不是说一种道德是真实的，其他的都是虚假的。相反，确实存在彼此不兼容的道德，而每种道德在其内部都是一致的。
Berlin defends a position known as value pluralism, the idea that there can be many incompatible moral systems and no principles for deciding between the systems (though some systems can be recognisably superior to others). He sees a precursor of his own views in Machiavelli’s writings.
柏林捍卫一种被称为价值多元主义的立场，即可以存在许多不兼容的道德体系，并且没有原则可以用来在这些体系之间做出决定（尽管某些体系可以明显优于其他体系）。他在马基雅维利的著作中看到了自己观点的前身。
Dirty hands in politics
政治中的肮脏手段
One way in which Machiavelli’s ideas still inform present-day debate is in the area of ‘dirty hands’ in politics, the idea that some sorts of apparently immoral behaviour are an inevitable consequence of the role of being a political leader. Machiavelli’s account in The Prince seems to imply that any effective ruler will, necessarily, have to learn to be cruel, and, on occasion, to go directly against the dictates of conventional morality. This is not to say that behaviour such as telling lies or half-truths, breaking promises and so on, are for him genuinely immoral when done by political leaders with the interests of their people at heart. On Machiavelli’s account princes must follow a different, and (for them) a more appropriate moral code from the rest of humanity.
马基雅维利的思想在当今辩论中仍然影响着一个方面，即政治中的“肮脏的手”问题，即某些看似不道德的行为是作为政治领导者角色的不可避免的结果。马基雅维利在《君主论》中的论述似乎暗示，任何有效的统治者必然需要学会残忍，并且在某些情况下，直接违背传统道德的规范。这并不是说，像撒谎或半真半假的说法、违背承诺等行为，在他看来，当政治领导者出于人民利益而做时，就是真正的不道德。根据马基雅维利的说法，王子们必须遵循与人类其他部分不同的、更适合他们的道德准则。
Criticisms of the Prince
对《王子》的批评
Advocates immorality
提倡不道德行为
Machiavelli shows no respect for what we would now call human rights. For him, individuals can be sacrificed (literally if appropriate) in the interests of the state. State torture and murder are sometimes necessary; indeed he suggests that a ruler who is reluctant to use such methods swiftly and effectively when the occasion arises is in some sense a bad prince, since his squeamishness will very likely lead to more extensive bloodshed later.
马基雅维利对我们现在所称的人权毫无尊重。对他而言，个人可以为了国家的利益而被牺牲（如果合适的话，甚至是字面上的牺牲）。国家的酷刑和谋杀有时是必要的；事实上，他暗示一个在适当时机不愿迅速有效地使用这些手段的统治者在某种意义上是一个坏王子，因为他的胆怯很可能会导致后来的更大流血。
Recent history has shown the dangers of unleashing tyrants on unsuspecting populations. The consequences of giving such tyrants an apparent intellectual justification for their behaviour are likely to include intense suffering for at least some of their subjects. Given the human capacity for self-deception, it is easy to imagine such leaders telling themselves that what they are doing is really necessary if their country is to thrive. In fact this may be a self-serving rationalisation of appalling violence and far too high a price to pay for political stability. Machiavelli’s response to such a criticism would be that the effectiveness of such violence is always to be judged by its results: did the state become richer, more stable, more powerful, or didn’t it? For him there are no other relevant considerations.
最近的历史表明，释放暴君对毫无防备的民众的危险。给予这些暴君明显的智力辩解的后果，可能会导致他们的一些臣民遭受极大的痛苦。考虑到人类自我欺骗的能力，很容易想象这些领导者告诉自己，如果他们的国家要繁荣，他们所做的事情实际上是必要的。事实上，这可能是对可怕暴力的自私合理化，而为政治稳定付出如此高的代价实在是太过于沉重。马基雅维利对这种批评的回应是，这种暴力的有效性总是要通过其结果来判断：国家是否变得更富裕、更稳定、更强大，或者没有？对他来说，没有其他相关的考虑。
Too cynical
太愤世嫉俗了
Machiavelli has a very low view of human motives. Perhaps he is wrong about this. Many people are far more optimistic about the potential of human beings to care about one another’s plight than he is. If he is wrong about human fickleness, then rule by fear and clinically effective cruelty may not be necessary. If he is right, however, political leaders who unswervingly display the conventional virtues may be placing their people in jeopardy.
马基雅维利对人类动机的看法非常低。也许他在这方面是错的。许多人对人类关心彼此困境的潜力比他更乐观。如果他对人类的善变看法是错误的，那么通过恐惧和临床有效的残酷统治可能就不是必要的。然而，如果他是对的，那么那些坚定展现传统美德的政治领导者可能会将他们的人民置于危险之中。
1469 | born in Florence, Italy. |
1513 | tortured and sent into exile. Begins writing The Prince. |
1527 | dies, Florence. |
1532 | The Prince is published posthumously. |
amoral: completely outside the moral realm.
非道德的：完全超出道德领域。
fortune: chance or luck. Machiavelli believed that half of all human matters were governed by chance.
运气：机会或运气。马基雅维利认为，所有人类事务的一半是由偶然决定的。
immoral: going against an established moral system. Immorality is always measured against moral ideals or principles.
不道德：违反既定的道德体系。不道德行为总是以道德理想或原则为标准进行衡量。
virtù: the key concept for Machiavelli, usually translated as ‘prowess’. Not to be confused with ‘virtue’ as it is conventionally understood. For Machiavelli a display of virtù might involve deception or a swift and effective use of bloodshed.
virtù：马基雅维利的关键概念，通常翻译为“才能”。不应与传统意义上的“美德”混淆。对于马基雅维利来说，展现 virtù可能涉及欺骗或迅速有效地使用流血。
Quentin Skinner A Very Short Introduction to Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) is essential reading for anyone interested in finding out more about Machiavelli’s life and thought.
昆廷·斯金纳 《马基雅维利简明导论》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2000 年）是任何对马基雅维利的生活和思想感兴趣的人必读的书籍。
Isaiah Berlin’s classic essay ‘the Originality of Machiavelli’ is reprinted in Isaiah Berlin, ed. Henry Hardy The Proper Study of Mankind (London: Pimlico, 1998).
以赛亚·伯林的经典论文《马基雅维利的独创性》收录在以赛亚·伯林主编的亨利·哈迪《人类的适当研究》中（伦敦：皮姆利科，1998 年）。
Nigel Warburton, Derek Matravers and Jon Pike (eds) Reading Political Philosophy: Machiavelli to Mill (London: Routledge, 2001) includes a discussion of The Prince, and readings on Machiavelli by Skinner, Berlin and others.
奈杰尔·沃伯顿、德里克·马特拉弗斯和乔恩·派克（编）《政治哲学阅读：从马基雅维利到密尔》（伦敦：劳特利奇，2001 年）包括对《君主论》的讨论，以及斯金纳、柏林等人对马基雅维利的阅读。
Sebastian de Grazia Machiavelli in Hell (London: Macmillan, 1996) is a prize-winning biography of Machiavelli. Maurizio Viroli’s more recent biography Niccolò’s Smile (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000) provides a character portrait that relates Machiavelli’s rich life to his thought.
塞巴斯蒂安·德·格拉齐亚的《地狱中的马基雅维利》（伦敦：麦克米伦，1996）是一本获奖的马基雅维利传记。毛里齐奥·维罗利最近的传记《尼科洛的微笑》（纽约：法拉尔、斯特劳斯和吉鲁，2000）提供了一个人物肖像，将马基雅维利丰富的生活与他的思想联系起来。
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne Essays
米歇尔·艾克姆·德·蒙田 论文
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne invented the essay. Or, rather, he invented the ‘essai’ – the word in French means something a little different from what it means in English. In French it suggests trying something out, an attempt, a trial; whereas in English an ‘essay’, for most students at least, is a piece of writing with a clearly stated conclusion and arguments and evidence given in support of that conclusion. Usually such essays are for assessment purposes, a test of what you know and how well you can organise that material. For Montaigne, in contrast, the essay was an experimental form, and not necessarily conclusive. He wrote to explore ideas, combining references to classical authors with descriptions of quirky aspects of his day-to-day life. Unlike most student essay-writers he was happy to reveal how little he knew, as well as to describe with disconcerting honesty features of his life, including his sexual life, that few of his day would openly share. 107 of these essays survive on topics as diverse as death, skepticism and cannibalism. Some argue to a conclusion, others meander and digress.
米歇尔·艾凯姆·德·蒙田发明了散文。或者说，他发明了“essai”——这个法语单词的含义与英语中的含义略有不同。在法语中，它暗示着尝试某事，一种尝试，一次试验；而在英语中，“essay”对于大多数学生来说，至少是一个有明确结论的写作作品，并提供支持该结论的论据和证据。通常，这种散文是为了评估目的，是对你所知道的内容以及你如何组织这些材料的测试。相比之下，对于蒙田来说，散文是一种实验形式，并不一定是结论性的。他写作是为了探索思想，将对古典作者的引用与对他日常生活中古怪方面的描述结合在一起。与大多数学生散文作者不同，他乐于揭示自己知道的少，以及以令人不安的诚实描述他生活中的特征，包括他的性生活，这些在他那个时代很少有人会公开分享。这 107 篇散文涵盖了死亡、怀疑主义和食人等多种主题。有些散文得出结论，其他则漫无目的地游走和离题。
In contrast to the later philosopher Immanuel Kant, who in his famous Critique of Pure Reason (see Chapter 14) arranged his ideas in a highly systematic way, according to what he called his ‘architectonic’, Montaigne was open about the lack of plan, the eccentricity of his book’s arrangement: such tidiness did not reflect how life is lived, nor the style of Montaigne’s thought. If you want to understand and celebrate the messiness of life, the accumulation of details and apparently unconnected events, then Montaigne is likely to appeal to you. Where Kant presents himself as one who knows the answers and proceeds to tell you what they are more or less impersonally, Montaigne’s essays open a window on a remarkable man searching for answers, playing with questions and revealing the seemingly trivial aspects of his existence, not always reaching a conclusion, and not being unduly concerned by that.
与后来的哲学家伊曼努尔·康德形成对比，康德在他著名的《纯粹理性批判》（见第 14 章）中以高度系统化的方式安排他的思想，按照他所称的“建筑论”，蒙田则坦率地承认他的书的安排缺乏计划和古怪：这种整洁并不反映生活的真实状态，也不符合蒙田的思维风格。如果你想理解并庆祝生活的混乱、细节的积累和看似无关的事件，那么蒙田可能会吸引你。在康德呈现自己为一个知道答案的人，并以或多或少不带个人色彩的方式告诉你答案时，蒙田的散文则为你打开了一扇窗，展现了一个杰出的人在寻找答案、玩弄问题并揭示他存在中看似琐碎的方面，往往没有得出结论，也不对此过于担忧。
Montaigne’s essays include asides, many quotations (usually in Latin), references, and sometimes seem to imply completely contradictory views, even within a single essay. They often focus on something quite different from the stated topic – a digression can evolve into the main topic. Nevertheless they have inspired many generations of readers most of whom have felt that through his writing Montaigne was almost present in their lives, even when reading his essays centuries after his death. His open and perceptive self-revelations, no matter how specific, point at profound truths about the human condition that echo with the present. His essays were autobiographical in a time when autobiography was not a recognised and popular form: this was not how you were supposed to write philosophy. Montaigne thought that in a sense his essays were him – they revealed who he was, and were the place where he discovered that in the process of writing. The act of writing, the self-observation that it involved, made him live differently, and, he thought, better. He became more attentive to what was happening around him, more reflective.
蒙田的随笔包含插话、许多引用（通常是拉丁文）、参考资料，有时似乎在同一篇文章中暗示完全矛盾的观点。它们常常关注与所述主题截然不同的内容——一个离题的讨论可能演变为主要话题。尽管如此，它们激励了许多代读者，大多数人感到通过他的写作，蒙田几乎在他们的生活中存在，即使是在他去世几个世纪后阅读他的随笔。他开放而敏锐的自我揭示，无论多么具体，都指向关于人类状况的深刻真理，与当下产生共鸣。他的随笔是自传性的，而在那个自传尚未被认可和流行的时代：这并不是写哲学的方式。蒙田认为在某种意义上，他的随笔就是他自己——它们揭示了他是谁，并且是他在写作过程中发现自我的地方。写作的行为，以及它所涉及的自我观察，使他以不同的方式生活，他认为，这种生活更好。他变得更加关注周围发生的事情，更加反思。
When he discusses philosophy directly Montaigne is not particularly original, drawing as he does on ancient stoicism and scepticism, mostly quoting from authors who wrote in the Roman period such as Plutarch and Seneca, thinkers who themselves owed a great deal to Greek philosophers who had written centuries before them. Montaigne’s originality lies in his distinctive style, his percept ive remarks, his use of autobiography, and particularly his openness about aspects of life most keep private, such as his preferences in sex, and his mention of the fact that kings, philosophers and ladies all defecate. Ultimately his writing is driven by a desire to throw himself into the question of what it means to be human. Like Socrates he takes seriously the ancient injunction ‘know thyself’ and thinks hard about how to live and how to prepare for death.
当他直接讨论哲学时，蒙田并不是特别原创，他借鉴了古代的斯多噶主义和怀疑主义，主要引用了罗马时期的作者，如普鲁塔克和塞内卡，这些思想家本身也在很大程度上受益于几个世纪前的希腊哲学家。蒙田的原创性在于他独特的风格、敏锐的观察、对自传的运用，特别是他对大多数人保持私密的生活方面的开放态度，比如他在性方面的偏好，以及他提到国王、哲学家和女士们都要排便的事实。最终，他的写作是出于一种渴望，想要深入探讨什么是人类。像苏格拉底一样，他认真对待古代的箴言“认识你自己”，并深入思考如何生活以及如何准备面对死亡。
Montaigne was a sixteenth-century French nobleman who lived in South Western France near Bordeaux. He was from a wealthy family who owned large vineyards and he lived in a huge chateau. When he retired from public life, he would spend most of his time in a tower of this chateau writing and thinking. Indeed he used his writing as a way to focus his thinking.
蒙田是十六世纪的法国贵族，生活在西南法国的波尔多附近。他来自一个拥有大片葡萄园的富裕家庭，住在一座巨大的城堡里。当他退休后，他会在这座城堡的一个塔楼里花费大部分时间进行写作和思考。实际上，他将写作作为集中思考的一种方式。
Influenced by Phyrro, Montaigne embraced scepticism, believing that the only certainty is that nothing is certain – even reason itself may be unreliable. A favourite phrase of his was ‘What do I know?’ suggesting the answer ‘next to nothing, or possibly nothing at all’. Human beings know little or nothing. In an act of imagination he took on the perspective of his cat: ‘How do I know when I’m playing with my cat that my cat isn’t playing with me?’ he asked. He tried to understand what it would be like to be his dog, with its heightened sense of smell, too, thinking through the different perspectives these animals had on the ‘reality’ that Montaigne experienced. Montaigne’s own viewpoint was, then, one of uncertainty, and, unlike René Descartes (see Chapter 6) who although he engaged with the arguments for scepticism, was driven to find something certain, Montaigne embraced the lack of certainty that he believed to be characteristic of the human condition.
受到皮罗的影响，蒙田接受了怀疑主义，认为唯一的确定性就是没有什么是确定的——甚至理性本身也可能不可靠。他最喜欢的一句话是“我知道什么？”这暗示着答案是“几乎什么都不知道，或者可能根本一无所知”。人类知道的很少或根本不知道。在一次想象的行为中，他以猫的视角来看待问题：“我怎么知道在和我的猫玩的时候，我的猫不是在和我玩？”他问道。他试图理解作为他的狗是什么样的，狗有着更强的嗅觉，思考这些动物对蒙田所经历的“现实”的不同看法。因此，蒙田的观点是充满不确定性的，与勒内·笛卡尔（见第六章）不同，笛卡尔虽然参与了对怀疑主义的辩论，但他被驱使去寻找某种确定的东西，而蒙田则接受了他认为是人类状况特征的不确定性。
His desire to conquer himself, given that the world was resistant to human control, reflects what he took from stoicism: the philosophical position that emphasises that we are able to decide what we make of the misfortunes that happen to us, and that a true philosopher will be able to maintain a calm mind whatever the circumstances by detaching mentally from the pain and disturbance that most of us feel when things go wrong. The severest test for a Stoic is the question of how to approach death and the pain that often accompanies the process of dying. This was a subject that vexed Montaigne, and is a recurrent theme in his essays.
他渴望征服自己，因为世界对人类的控制充满抵抗，这反映了他从斯多葛主义中获得的东西：这一哲学立场强调我们能够决定如何看待发生在我们身上的不幸，真正的哲学家能够在任何情况下保持冷静的心态，通过在心理上与大多数人在事情出错时所感受到的痛苦和干扰保持距离。斯多葛主义者面临的最严峻考验是如何面对死亡以及通常伴随死亡过程的痛苦。这是蒙田所困扰的一个主题，也是他散文中的一个反复出现的主题。
Four out of five of Montaigne’s children died in childhood, his best friend died of plague, and his younger brother died from an accident when a tennis ball struck his head behind his ear – he died several hours later. Montaigne himself suffered a very severe fall from a horse after a collision with a servant on horseback at full gallop – the impact almost killed him. The theme of death occurs in a number of his essays, picking up from the ancient philosophers’ belief that to philosophise involves learning how to cope with death, or at least to distract the individual enough not to be worried any more about the inevitable end to come. It is central in the essay ‘that to study philosophy is to learn to die.’
蒙田的五个孩子中有四个在童年时期去世，他最好的朋友死于瘟疫，他的弟弟在一次意外中被网球击中耳后而死——他在几小时后去世。蒙田本人在与一名骑马仆人全速相撞后，从马背上摔下，遭受了非常严重的伤害——撞击几乎要了他的命。死亡的主题出现在他的多篇散文中，延续了古代哲学家们的信念，即哲学的学习涉及如何应对死亡，或者至少让个体分心，不再担心即将到来的不可避免的结局。在散文《学习哲学就是学习死亡》中，这一主题尤为核心。
Although Montaigne acknowledged fear of death, and suffered from it himself, his own experience led him to worry less about this. Death, he felt, is a natural phenomenon, and when the time comes, nature will take over. Rather than hide the fact of death from ourselves, we should think about it often, we should reflect on the brevity of life and the difficulty of knowing when our own death will arrive, and the uncertainty about the form it will take. Montaigne cites approvingly the Ancient Egyptian habit of bringing in a dried skeleton at the height of a feast as a memento mori. Not openly atheist, Montaigne nevertheless wrote as if death was final. Echoing Seneca, he declares that what matters is not how long you live, but what you do with your time on Earth. He suggested that one of the best ways of dealing with fear of our own death was to think about death every day. The process of reflecting on the possibility of our own death at any moment would, he believed, prepare us well for living and enjoying the time that we are lucky enough to have alive. He also described his own experience of near-death, and reflected that his fear of death itself was substantially less when it seemed imminent than when it seemed unlikely.
尽管蒙田承认对死亡的恐惧，并且自己也曾遭受这种恐惧，但他的个人经历使他对这一点担忧较少。他认为，死亡是一种自然现象，当时机来临时，自然会接管。与其对死亡的事实视而不见，我们应该经常思考它，反思生命的短暂以及我们何时会迎来自己死亡的难以知晓，以及它将以何种形式出现的不确定性。蒙田赞同古埃及人在盛宴高潮时带入一个干燥的骷髅作为死亡的警示。虽然他并不公开宣称无神论，但蒙田的写作方式仿佛死亡是终结。呼应塞内卡，他宣称重要的不是你活了多久，而是你在地球上如何利用你的时间。他建议应对自己死亡恐惧的最佳方法之一是每天思考死亡。他相信，反思我们随时可能面临自己死亡的可能性，将使我们更好地准备去生活和享受我们有幸活着的时光。 他还描述了自己濒死的经历，并反思道，当死亡似乎迫在眉睫时，他对死亡本身的恐惧明显减少，而当死亡似乎不太可能时，这种恐惧则更强。
Montaigne’s essays cover such a wide range of topics including cowardice, fear, cannibalism, prayer, solitude, drunkenness, cruelty and the resemblance of children to their fathers, that they defy simple summary. The common thread through them all is Montaigne’s presence, his willingness to explore the topic in question with honesty, drawing on quotations from ancient writers and his own experience.
蒙田的随笔涵盖了广泛的主题，包括懦弱、恐惧、食人、祈祷、孤独、酗酒、残忍以及孩子与父亲的相似性，因此难以简单总结。贯穿其中的共同线索是蒙田的存在，他愿意以诚实的态度探讨所讨论的主题，引用古代作家的名言和他自己的经验。
Criticism of Montaigne’s Essays
对蒙田《随笔》的批评
Too subjective
过于主观
Montaigne doesn’t always feature on philosophy syllabuses: his essays are more likely to be on the reading lists of those studying French literature. One reason for this is that, in comparison with, say David Hume, or Bertrand Russell, his writing is always intensely subjective: he begins from his own position and the minutiae of his actual existence. As he put it, when considering the fact that he changed his views, sometimes within an essay, ‘I may contradict myself, but the truth I never contradict.’ This emphasis on truth to the experience of the particularities of his own life, together with his quirky focus on the apparently trivial detail, can lead some to dismiss his essays as interesting and entertaining to read, but not really philosophical in any important sense. This sort of criticism misses the point and stems from a narrow viewpoint that treats philosophy as a quasiscientific discipline that is always aiming at generality and objectivity.
蒙田并不总是出现在哲学课程大纲中：他的散文更可能出现在学习法国语言文学的人的阅读清单上。原因之一是，与大卫·休谟或伯特兰·罗素相比，他的写作总是高度主观的：他从自己的立场和实际生活的细节出发。正如他所说，当考虑到他有时在一篇散文中改变观点的事实时，“我可能会自相矛盾，但我从不否认真理。”这种对自己生活特定经验的真实感的强调，加上他对看似琐碎细节的独特关注，可能导致一些人将他的散文视为有趣和娱乐的阅读，但在任何重要意义上并不真正属于哲学。这种批评忽视了要点，源于一种狭隘的观点，将哲学视为一种准科学学科，始终追求普遍性和客观性。
Lack philosophical originality
缺乏哲学原创性
Another criticism of Montaigne is that there is very little in his writing that has not been said before by other philosophers. Montaigne drew heavily from the work of Stoics and the Sceptics and his writings are interspersed with Latin quotations. Many of his ideas, such as his views on scepticism and on death were derived directly from ancient philosophy. Because of this his work may seem to lack philosophical originality. However, his peculiar style of thinking, his willingness to illustrate his thought with examples from his own life and experience, and his frank and open writing style are all highly distinctive and original. His real originality lies in the way he took his own individual existence and experience as the subject of his investigations and derived a general picture of human life and what matters from that: as he makes clear in the book’s note ‘to the Reader’, his main subject is Montaigne himself.
对蒙田的另一个批评是，他的著作中几乎没有什么是其他哲学家没有说过的。蒙田大量借鉴了斯多亚学派和怀疑主义者的作品，他的著作中夹杂着拉丁语引用。他的许多观点，例如对怀疑主义和死亡的看法，直接源自古代哲学。因此，他的作品可能显得缺乏哲学原创性。然而，他独特的思维风格、愿意用自己生活和经验中的例子来阐明思想的态度，以及坦率开放的写作风格都是非常独特和原创的。他真正的原创性在于他将自己个体的存在和经验作为研究的主题，并从中得出人类生活和重要事物的总体图景：正如他在书的“致读者”一节中明确指出的，他的主要主题就是蒙田本人。
1533 | born in Aquitaine region, France. |
1571 | retires from public life to think and write. |
1580 | first volume of his Essays published. |
1592 | dies. |
essay: a translation of the French word ‘essai’ which has connotations of ‘an attempt’. For Montaigne the essay was an exploratory literary form, a way of finding out what he thought.
论文：法语单词“essai”的翻译，具有“尝试”的含义。对于蒙田来说，论文是一种探索性的文学形式，是一种了解自己想法的方式。
scepticism: the philosophical stance of doubting, such as doubting the reliability of sensory evidence. Phyrronic sceptics doubted even the reliability of reason.
怀疑主义：一种怀疑的哲学立场，例如怀疑感官证据的可靠性。皮浪派怀疑者甚至怀疑理性的可靠性。
Sarah Bakewell How to Live: A Life of Montaigne in One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer (London: Vintage, 2011) is a superb introduction to Montaigne and his essays written in the spirit of its subject. The author’s website www.sarahbakewell.com provides links to several further resources on Montaigne.
莎拉·贝克威尔《如何生活：蒙田的一生与一个问题和二十次尝试的答案》（伦敦：Vintage，2011）是对蒙田及其散文的极佳介绍，书写风格与其主题相得益彰。作者的网站 www.sarahbakewell.com 提供了关于蒙田的多个进一步资源的链接。
Saul Frampton When I Am Playing with My Cat, How Do I Know She is Not Playing With Me?: Montaigne and Being in Touch With Life (London: Faber, 2012) is another interesting and wide-ranging book about this unusual thinker.
索尔·弗兰普顿《当我和我的猫玩耍时，我怎么知道她不是在和我玩？：蒙田与与生活保持联系》（伦敦：法伯，2012）是一本关于这个不寻常思想家的有趣且广泛的书。
Terence Cave How to Read Montaigne (London: Granta Books, 2007) is also useful as a preliminary guide to Montaigne’s major themes.
特伦斯·凯夫《如何阅读蒙田》（伦敦：格兰塔书籍，2007 年）也是了解蒙田主要主题的有用初步指南。
René Descartes Meditations
勒内·笛卡尔《沉思》
Descartes’s Meditations is a book designed to make you think. It is written in the first person in what seems to be an autobiography of six days’ thought. However, this is in fact a highly ingenious device for encouraging the reader to follow the twists of the argument. To read the book in the spirit in which it was written involves active engagement with its ideas, not just passive absorption. You are invited to become the ‘I’ in the text, moving through successive phases of doubt and enlightenment. As philosophical literature the Meditations remains unsurpassed and many of the ideas expressed in it have held sway over subsequent philosophers. Descartes is usually taken to be the father of modern philosophy.
笛卡尔的《沉思》是一本旨在让你思考的书。它以第一人称写成，似乎是六天思考的自传。然而，这实际上是一种极其巧妙的手法，鼓励读者跟随论证的曲折。以书中所写的精神来阅读这本书需要积极参与其思想，而不仅仅是被动吸收。你被邀请成为文本中的“我”，经历怀疑和启蒙的连续阶段。作为哲学文学，《沉思》仍然无与伦比，其中表达的许多思想对后来的哲学家产生了深远的影响。笛卡尔通常被认为是现代哲学的父亲。
In the Meditations Descartes sets out to establish what it is possible to know. Consequently, his principal concern in the book is with epistemology, the theory of knowledge. Establishing the limits of knowledge was not a merely academic exercise: he believed that if he could eliminate errors in his thinking and discover sound principles for acquiring true beliefs then this would provide a bedrock on which the edifice of scientific understanding of the world and our place within it could be built. The dominant view in France in 1640 when Descartes wrote his Meditations was that of the Catholic Church, which was in many ways hostile to science. Descartes was also struggling against a tradition of scholasticism in philosophy which tended to promote debating skills above the quest for truth. Returning to first principles and jettisoning received opinion was a radical move for Descartes to make in these circumstances.
在《沉思》中，笛卡尔旨在确立什么是可以知道的。因此，他在书中的主要关注点是认识论，即知识的理论。确立知识的界限并不是一个单纯的学术练习：他相信，如果他能够消除思维中的错误并发现获取真信念的可靠原则，那么这将为建立科学理解世界及我们在其中位置的基础提供支撑。1640 年，当笛卡尔写下《沉思》时，法国的主流观点是天主教会的立场，这在许多方面对科学持敌对态度。笛卡尔还在与一种哲学上的经院主义传统作斗争，该传统往往更重视辩论技巧而非追求真理。在这种情况下，回归第一原则并抛弃既有观点对笛卡尔来说是一个激进的举动。
Before he could begin the constructive stage of his work, Descartes believed that he needed, once in his lifetime, to rid himself of all his former beliefs since he was aware that many of them were false. He thought it sensible to rid himself of all his former beliefs in one go and then consider one by one prospective replacements for them rather than to attempt a piecemeal repair of his belief structure. In a reply to a critic of his work he explained this approach by means of an analogy: if you are worried about rotten apples in a barrel you will be well advised to tip out all the apples and examine each one before you replace it in the barrel. Only if you are certain that the apple you are considering is sound should you put it back in the barrel, since a single rotten apple could contaminate all the others. This analogy explains his method of radical doubt, often known as the Method of Cartesian Doubt (‘Cartesian’ being the adjective from ‘Descartes’).
在他开始工作的建设性阶段之前，笛卡尔认为他一生中需要一次性摆脱所有以前的信念，因为他意识到其中许多都是错误的。他认为一次性摆弃所有以前的信念是明智的，然后逐一考虑替代方案，而不是试图对他的信念结构进行零星修补。在对一位批评他工作的评论者的回复中，他通过一个类比解释了这种方法：如果你担心桶里的烂苹果，最好把所有苹果倒出来，逐一检查，然后再放回桶里。只有当你确信你考虑的苹果是好的时，才应该把它放回桶里，因为一个烂苹果可能会污染其他所有苹果。这个类比解释了他的激进怀疑方法，通常被称为笛卡尔怀疑法（“笛卡尔”是“笛卡尔”的形容词）。
The Method of Doubt involves treating all your former beliefs as if they were false. You should only believe something if you are absolutely certain that it is true: the slightest doubt about its truth should be sufficient to reject it. The fact that you can doubt it doesn’t prove that it is false; it may well turn out to be true. However, the merest suspicion that it might be false is enough to render it unsuitable as a foundation for the edifice of knowledge. That has to be built on indubitable knowledge. Obviously this method is not a practical one for day-to-day living, as Descartes himself recognised; he advocated it as a once in a lifetime exercise. The point of this method was that it might allow Descartes to discover some beliefs which were immune from doubt and which would thus serve as foundations for his reconstruction of knowledge on sound principles. At worst it would show him that everything could be doubted; that nothing was certain.
怀疑的方法涉及将你所有以前的信念视为虚假。你只有在绝对确信某事为真时才应该相信它：对其真实性的丝毫怀疑都足以将其拒绝。你能够怀疑它并不证明它是虚假的；它可能最终被证明为真。然而，最轻微的怀疑它可能是虚假的足以使其不适合作为知识大厦的基础。这必须建立在无可置疑的知识之上。显然，这种方法并不适合日常生活，正如笛卡尔自己所认识的那样；他提倡将其作为一生中一次的练习。这种方法的要点在于，它可能使笛卡尔发现一些不受怀疑的信念，从而作为他在可靠原则上重建知识的基础。最糟糕的情况是，它会让他看到一切都可以被怀疑；没有什么是确定的。
The Evidence of the Senses
感官的证据
In the First Meditation Descartes introduces this Method of Doubt and applies it rigorously to his former beliefs, beginning with those he has acquired through the five senses. His senses have sometimes deceived him. For instance, he has made mistakes about what he could see in the distance. On the principle that it is wise never to trust what has once deceived you, he resolves not to trust the evidence of his senses. But, despite sometimes being deceived about objects in the distance, surely he couldn’t be deceived about some facts acquired through the senses, such as that he is sitting in front of a fire in a dressing gown holding a piece of paper?
在《第一沉思》中，笛卡尔引入了怀疑的方法，并严格地将其应用于他以前的信念，首先是那些通过五种感官获得的信念。他的感官有时欺骗了他。例如，他在远处看到的事物上犯过错误。基于“永远不要相信曾经欺骗过你的事物”的原则，他决定不再相信自己的感官证据。但是，尽管有时在远处的物体上被欺骗，他肯定不会在一些通过感官获得的事实上被欺骗，比如他坐在火炉前，穿着浴袍，手里拿着一张纸？
Descartes’s response to this is that, on the contrary, he might be mistaken even about something so apparently certain as this. Since in the past he had dreamt that he was sitting by the fire when in fact he was lying in bed asleep, he can’t be sure that he is not now dreaming. But even in dreams things such as heads, hands, eyes and so on appear, which must be likenesses of things in the real world. So surely we can be certain that these types of object exist. The existence of more abstract notions such as size, shape and extension (by which he means the quality of taking up space) seems even more certain. Whether you are asleep or awake, 2 + 3 = 5 and a square never has more than four sides. These things do indeed seem certain. But Descartes shows all these to be only apparent certainties. To do so he uses the thought experiment of the evil demon.
笛卡尔对此的回应是，相反，他可能连这样看似确定的事情都搞错了。因为在过去，他曾梦见自己坐在火边，而实际上他却躺在床上睡觉，所以他不能确定自己现在不是在做梦。但即使在梦中，头、手、眼睛等事物也会出现，这些必定是现实世界中事物的 likeness。因此，我们当然可以确定这些类型的物体是存在的。更抽象的概念，如大小、形状和延伸（他所指的是占据空间的特性）的存在似乎更为确定。无论你是睡着还是醒着，2 + 3 = 5，正方形永远不会有超过四条边。这些事情确实看起来是确定的。但笛卡尔表明所有这些只是表面的确定性。为此，他使用了邪恶恶魔的思想实验。
What if there is a powerful and malicious demon who constantly manipulates what you experience and understand? Every time you look at an object in the world what is really happening might be that the demon is producing an illusory experience which you take to be reality but which is really his creation. If you find this difficult to imagine, think of what would happen if someone plugged you into a very sophisticated virtual reality machine without your realising what was going on. Now every time you add 2 and 2 together it comes to 5. But how can you be sure that this isn’t because the evil demon, or the operator of the virtual reality machine, is tricking you? Perhaps the demon has introduced a ‘bug’ into your calculations so that you always get the wrong result. This might sound farfetched, but that doesn’t affect Descartes’s argument. All that is important is that it is possible that you are now being deceived. If you apply the Method of Cartesian Doubt, the slightest possibility that your belief is false provides sufficient doubt for you to reject it. In everyday life, of course, we need much stronger evidence of the falsity of a fundamental belief before we will so readily jettison it, and that is as it should be. But when we are searching for a belief which is immune from doubt, the thought experiment of the evil demon provides a very strong test. Any belief which can pass this test, which you are sure hasn’t been misleadingly implanted by the demon, must be certain indeed.
如果有一个强大而恶意的恶魔不断操控你所经历和理解的事物，那会怎样？每当你看着世界中的一个物体时，实际上发生的事情可能是恶魔正在制造一种虚幻的体验，而你将其视为现实，但这实际上是他的创造。如果你觉得这很难想象，可以想象一下，如果有人在你不知情的情况下将你连接到一个非常复杂的虚拟现实机器上，会发生什么。现在每当你将 2 和 2 相加时，结果是 5。但是你怎么能确定这不是因为邪恶的恶魔，或者虚拟现实机器的操作者在欺骗你呢？也许恶魔在你的计算中引入了一个“错误”，以至于你总是得到错误的结果。这听起来可能很牵强，但这并不影响笛卡尔的论点。重要的是，你现在被欺骗的可能性是存在的。如果你应用笛卡尔怀疑法，任何你信念为假的微小可能性都足以让你产生怀疑，从而拒绝它。 在日常生活中，当然，我们需要更强有力的证据来证明一个基本信念的虚假，才能如此轻易地抛弃它，这也是理所应当的。但是，当我们在寻找一个不受怀疑的信念时，邪恶魔鬼的思想实验提供了一个非常强有力的测试。任何能够通过这个测试的信念，如果你确信它没有被魔鬼误导性地植入，必须确实是可靠的。
At this stage in his Meditations Descartes is tempted to believe that absolutely everything can be doubted. However, in the Second Meditation his doubt is revealed as pre-emptive. That is, he is pushing sceptical arguments to their very limit so as to demonstrate that there are some beliefs about which it is not possible to be sceptical. Another way of putting this is that he sets out to beat the sceptics at their own game: giving the strongest form of sceptical argument he can imagine and then showing that it would not prevent him from establishing at least one certainty.
在他的《沉思》中，笛卡尔在这个阶段倾向于相信绝对一切都可以被怀疑。然而，在第二沉思中，他的怀疑被揭示为先发制人。也就是说，他将怀疑论的论点推向极限，以证明有一些信念是无法怀疑的。换句话说，他的目标是以怀疑论者的游戏来击败他们：给出他能想象的最强怀疑论论证，然后展示这并不会阻止他确立至少一个确定性。
The certainty which he discovers, the turning point in his philosophy, has come to be known as the Cogito, from the Latin Cogito ergo sum (‘I think, therefore I am’), although it doesn’t occur in the Meditations in quite this form. In the Meditations he says ‘I am, I exist, is necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive of it in my mind.’
他所发现的确定性，他哲学中的转折点，被称为“我思故我在”（Cogito），源自拉丁语“Cogito ergo sum”，尽管在《沉思》中并没有以这种形式出现。在《沉思》中他说：“我在，我存在，这在每次我在心中表达或构思它时都是必然真实的。”
Descartes’s point is that even if the evil demon does actually exist and is constantly deceiving him, there is still something about which he cannot be tricked, namely his own existence. It is impossible for him, Descartes, to doubt his own existence; and Descartes believes that his readers, on reflection, will come to the same conclusion about their own existence. Any thought that you have indicates that you, the thinker, exist. This is true even if you are completely confused about the content of your thought. You might think you are standing on the top floor of the Empire State Building admiring the view when in fact you are waiting on a station platform in Sidcup, but that doesn’t matter: as long as you are having a thought at all, then this shows that you must exist.
笛卡尔的观点是，即使邪恶的恶魔确实存在并且不断欺骗他，他仍然有一些事情是无法被欺骗的，即他自己的存在。笛卡尔不可能怀疑自己的存在；而笛卡尔相信，他的读者在反思后也会得出关于自己存在的相同结论。你所拥有的任何思想都表明你，作为思考者，存在。这一点是正确的，即使你对自己思想的内容感到完全困惑。你可能认为自己正站在帝国大厦的顶层欣赏风景，而实际上你却在西德卡普的一个车站月台上等候，但这并不重要：只要你有任何思想，这就表明你必须存在。
Notice that the ‘I’ that Descartes believes he has shown to exist whenever he is thinking is not to be identified with his body. At this stage he can still raise all his former doubts about whether or not his body actually exists, or exists in the form he thinks it does. Only thinking is inseparable from his existence. The most that he can show from the Cogito is that he is essentially a thinking thing.
请注意，笛卡尔认为他在思考时所显示的“我”并不等同于他的身体。在这个阶段，他仍然可以提出他之前所有的怀疑，即他的身体是否真的存在，或者是否以他认为的形式存在。只有思考与他的存在是不可分割的。他从“我思故我在”中所能证明的最多是他本质上是一个思考的存在。
Descartes’s belief that he can be more certain of the existence of himself as a thinking thing than as a body suggests a division between the mind and the body. The mind is the real Descartes (or whoever) whose body may or may not exist. The mind can outlive the body. This sharp separation between mind and body has come to be known as Cartesian Dualism. Descartes believes that mind and body, although in principle separable, interact, and consequently his view is sometimes also known as interactionism.
笛卡尔相信他对自己作为思考者的存在的确定性比对自己作为身体的存在更强，这暗示了心灵与身体之间的分离。心灵是真正的笛卡尔（或其他人），他的身体可能存在也可能不存在。心灵可以超越身体。这种心灵与身体之间的明显分离被称为笛卡尔二元论。笛卡尔认为，心灵与身体虽然在原则上是可分的，但却是相互作用的，因此他的观点有时也被称为互动论。
Descartes describes a piece of wax taken from a honeycomb: it still has a faint taste of honey, smells of flowers, and is hard and cold. As he puts it close to the fire its taste and smell are lost and its colour, shape and size all change. It becomes liquid and hot to the touch. The point of this example is to demonstrate that although we might think that we get an understanding of what the wax is via our sensory experience of it, in fact all the information we get about the wax in this way can change. Yet it remains the same piece of wax despite the changes. Descartes’s explanation of how this is possible is that understanding the essence of the wax, what it is that makes it this piece of wax and not another thing, involves a judgement which goes beyond sensory experience. And this judgement, which is a thought, once again demonstrates to Descartes the greater certainty he has about his own existence as a thinking thing than about the nature and existence of the material world. This example reveals Descartes’s rationalism, that is, his belief that we can acquire knowledge of the nature of the world by reason alone, a view which contrasts sharply with empiricism, which in its strongest form is the view that all our knowledge of the world must be acquired via the senses.
笛卡尔描述了一块从蜂巢中取出的蜡：它仍然有淡淡的蜂蜜味，散发着花香，坚硬而冰冷。当他把它靠近火时，它的味道和气味消失了，颜色、形状和大小都发生了变化。它变得液态且触感热。这个例子的重点在于，尽管我们可能认为通过感官体验可以理解蜡是什么，但实际上我们通过这种方式获得的关于蜡的所有信息都可能会改变。然而，尽管发生了变化，它仍然是同一块蜡。笛卡尔解释这种可能性的方法是，理解蜡的本质，即是什么使它成为这块蜡而不是其他东西，涉及一种超越感官体验的判断。而这种判断，作为一种思想，再次向笛卡尔证明了他对自己作为思考者的存在的更大确定性，而不是对物质世界的本质和存在的确定性。 这个例子揭示了笛卡尔的理性主义，即他相信我们可以仅通过理性获得对世界本质的知识，这种观点与经验主义形成鲜明对比，后者在其最强形式上认为我们对世界的所有知识必须通过感官获得。
The Cogito is the first step that Descartes takes towards rebuilding the edifice of knowledge that he demolished with his Method of Doubt. From this point onwards he is entirely constructive. Yet at first it seems that he won’t be able to get beyond the conclusions that he exists just so long as he is thinking, and that he is in essence a thinking thing. Such a position would be little better than the whirlpool of doubt that he felt himself drawn into at the end of the First Meditation.
Cogito 是笛卡尔在重建他用怀疑方法拆毁的知识大厦时迈出的第一步。从这一点开始，他完全是建设性的。然而，起初似乎他无法超越这样的结论：他只要在思考，就证明他存在，而他的本质是一个思考的存在。这样的立场与他在第一次沉思结束时感到自己被卷入的怀疑漩涡几乎没有什么区别。
However, Descartes has a strategy to avoid getting trapped at the Cogito. He undertakes to prove God’s existence and to prove that God would not deceive us. He uses two arguments to do this, the socalled Trademark Argument and the Ontological Argument, which appear in the Third and Fifth Meditations respectively. Both arguments are controversial, and were thought so even in his day.
然而，笛卡尔有一个策略来避免在我思故我在的困境中陷入。他着手证明上帝的存在，并证明上帝不会欺骗我们。他使用了两个论证来做到这一点，即所谓的商标论证和本体论证，这两个论证分别出现在《第三沉思》和《第五沉思》中。这两个论证都是有争议的，在他那个时代就被认为是如此。
The Trademark Argument
商标论证
Descartes points out that he had an idea of God in his mind. This idea must have come from somewhere since something can’t come from nothing. Moreover, he thinks that there must be as much reality in any effect as in its cause: in this case the idea is the effect and the cause presumed to be God. Although Descartes didn’t use the analogy, it is as if God had left a trademark on his work revealing his existence. This is a variant of a traditional argument for God’s existence known as the Cosmological Argument.
笛卡尔指出，他心中有一个关于上帝的观念。这个观念必须来自某个地方，因为无物不能生有。此外，他认为任何效果中必须有与其原因相同的现实性：在这种情况下，观念是效果，而原因被假定为上帝。尽管笛卡尔没有使用这个类比，但就好像上帝在他的作品上留下了一个商标，揭示了他的存在。这是一个传统的关于上帝存在的论证的变体，称为宇宙论证。
Descartes’s idea of God was that of a benevolent being, and such a God would not want to deceive humankind in a systematic way. Deception is a mark of malice, not of benevolence. Consequently, Descartes concludes that God exists and is no deceiver. The result of this is that he has confidence that whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly must be true. God would not have created us in such a way that we would feel certain when misled. The notion that whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly must be true plays a crucial role in the constructive phase of Descartes’s philosophy.
笛卡尔对上帝的看法是一个仁慈的存在，这样的上帝不会以系统的方式欺骗人类。欺骗是恶意的标志，而不是仁慈的标志。因此，笛卡尔得出结论，上帝存在且不是欺骗者。结果是，他对自己清晰而明确的感知充满信心，认为这些感知一定是真实的。上帝不会以这样的方式创造我们，使我们在被误导时感到确定。他认为自己清晰而明确的感知一定是真实的这一观念在笛卡尔哲学的构建阶段中起着至关重要的作用。
The Ontological Argument
本体论论证
In the Fifth Meditation Descartes presents a version of what is known as the Ontological Argument. This is an a priori argument for God’s existence, which means that it is not based on any evidence acquired through the senses, but rather on analysis of the concept of God. The interior angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees. This conclusion follows logically from the concept of ‘triangle’. It is an aspect of the essence of a triangle that the sum of its interior angles is 180 degrees. Similarly, according to Descartes, it follows from the concept of God as a supremely perfect being that he exists. It is part of God’s essence that he exists. If God didn’t exist, then he wouldn’t be a supremely perfect being: existence is, according to Descartes, one of his perfections. So it follows from the concept of God alone that he necessarily exists.
在《第五沉思》中，笛卡尔提出了被称为本体论论证的一个版本。这是一个关于上帝存在的先验论证，这意味着它不是基于通过感官获得的任何证据，而是基于对上帝概念的分析。三角形的内角和为 180 度。这个结论是从“三角形”的概念中逻辑推导出来的。三角形的本质之一是其内角和为 180 度。同样，根据笛卡尔的说法，从上帝作为至善完美存在的概念中可以推导出他存在。上帝的本质之一就是他存在。如果上帝不存在，那么他就不是至善完美的存在：存在是笛卡尔所说的他的完美之一。因此，仅从上帝的概念出发，可以得出他必然存在的结论。
Once Descartes has established to his satisfaction that God exists and is not a deceiver, he begins to reconstruct the material world. He still has to explain the fact that his senses at least on occasion deceive him, and address the question of whether he can ever be sure that he is not dreaming. He can be sure that he, that is, his mind, is intimately attached to a particular body (his own), since God would not deceive him about the existence of something which he perceives so clearly and distinctly. But what about the material world which he seems to see, touch, taste, smell and hear?
一旦笛卡尔满意地确立了上帝的存在并且上帝不是一个欺骗者，他就开始重建物质世界。他仍然需要解释他的感官至少在某些情况下欺骗了他这一事实，并解决他是否能确定自己并不是在做梦的问题。他可以确定他，也就是他的思想，与一个特定的身体（他自己的身体）紧密相连，因为上帝不会在他如此清晰和明确地感知到的事物的存在上欺骗他。但是他似乎看到、触摸、品尝、嗅闻和听到的物质世界又如何呢？
His common sense beliefs about the world are all derived from his ideas. When he sees a tower in the distance, for example, and perceives it as round, he has an idea of the round tower. Before reflecting on it, he assumes that objects in the world exist and resemble the ideas they cause. However, the case of optical illusions makes clear that he can have an idea of an object which gives the object different properties from those it actually possesses. The tower, for example, may in fact be square. Descartes’s conclusion by the Sixth Meditation is that the existence of a God who is no deceiver guarantees that there are objects in the material world but that it would be foolish simply to accept all the evidence of the senses since they obviously do deceive on occasion. A benevolent God would not, however, have created us in such a way that we were systematically deceived about the existence of objects. Moreover, he has certainly provided us with the means to make accurate judgements about the nature of the world. But it does not follow that the objects in the world are exactly like our ideas of them. We can make mistakes about qualities such as the size, shape and colour of things. Ultimately if we want to understand what the world is really like we need to resort to a mathematical and geometrical analysis of it.
他对世界的常识信念都源于他的想法。例如，当他在远处看到一座塔，并将其视为圆形时，他就有了圆塔的概念。在反思之前，他假设世界中的物体存在，并且与它们所引起的想法相似。然而，光学错觉的例子清楚地表明，他可以对一个物体有一个想法，而这个想法赋予该物体与其实际特性不同的属性。例如，这座塔实际上可能是方形的。笛卡尔在《第六沉思》中得出的结论是，一个不欺骗的上帝的存在保证了物质世界中有物体，但仅仅接受所有感官的证据是愚蠢的，因为它们显然有时会欺骗。然而，一个仁慈的上帝不会以这样的方式创造我们，使我们系统性地被关于物体存在的事情所欺骗。此外，他肯定已经为我们提供了准确判断世界本质的手段。但这并不意味着世界中的物体与我们对它们的想法完全相同。我们可能会在事物的大小、形状和颜色等特性上犯错误。 最终，如果我们想要理解世界的真实面貌，我们需要对其进行数学和几何分析。
In the sceptical phase of the Meditations one of the most powerful arguments Descartes used was that we might be dreaming and unable to recognise that we were doing so. In the Sixth Meditation he declares that we do have at least two ways of telling dreams from waking life. Memory can never connect dreams up one with another as it can in waking life: the different stages of our life fit into a coherent pattern of memory, whereas our dream life does not cohere in the same way. The second way of telling a dream from waking life is that strange phenomena occur in dreams that do not occur in normal life: for instance, if someone were to vanish into air before my eyes as I was talking to him then I would have a very strong suspicion that I was dreaming.
在《沉思录》的怀疑阶段，笛卡尔使用的最有力的论据之一是我们可能在做梦而无法意识到这一点。在第六沉思中，他宣称我们至少有两种方法可以区分梦境和清醒生活。记忆无法像在清醒生活中那样将梦境连接在一起：我们生活的不同阶段融入一个连贯的记忆模式，而我们的梦境生活则没有以相同的方式连贯。区分梦境和清醒生活的第二种方法是梦中会出现一些在正常生活中不会发生的奇怪现象：例如，如果有人在我与他交谈时突然消失在空气中，那么我会非常怀疑我在做梦。
Criticisms of Meditations
对《沉思录》的批评
Does he call everything into doubt?
他是否对一切都产生怀疑？
Although the Method of Doubt seems to raise doubts about everything that could possibly be doubted, this is not the case. Descartes relies on the accuracy of his memory, for instance, never doubting that he has dreamt in the past, or that his senses have deceived him on occasion; he does not doubt that the meanings he associates with particular words are the same as they were when he last used them.
尽管怀疑的方法似乎对一切可能被怀疑的事物提出了质疑，但事实并非如此。笛卡尔依赖于他记忆的准确性，例如，他从未怀疑自己过去做过梦，或者他的感官曾在某些时候欺骗过他；他不怀疑他与特定词汇关联的意义与他上次使用时是相同的。
However, this is not a serious problem for Descartes. Cartesian Doubt remains a strong form of scepticism: he only undertook to doubt what it was possible for him to doubt. Stronger forms of scepticism might have undermined his power to do philosophy at all.
然而，这对笛卡尔来说并不是一个严重的问题。笛卡尔怀疑仍然是一种强烈的怀疑主义：他只怀疑他能够怀疑的事物。更强烈的怀疑主义可能会削弱他进行哲学思考的能力。
Criticism of the Cogito
对自我意识的批评
One criticism sometimes made of Descartes’s Cogito, particularly when it is given in the form ‘I think, therefore I am’, is that it assumes the truth of the general statement ‘All thoughts have thinkers’, an assumption which Descartes never attempts to establish or make explicit. This criticism is based on the assumption that Descartes was presenting the conclusion ‘I am’ as the result of a logically valid inference of the following kind:
对笛卡尔的“我思故我在”这一命题，有时会提出一个批评，即它假设了普遍陈述“所有思想都有思想者”的真实性，而这一假设笛卡尔从未试图建立或明确说明。这个批评基于这样的假设：笛卡尔将结论“我在”呈现为以下类型的逻辑有效推理的结果：
All thoughts have thinkers
所有思想都有思想者
There are thoughts now
现在有一些想法
So the thinker of these thoughts must exist.
所以这些思想的思考者必须存在。
However, this criticism does not affect the Cogito as presented in the Meditations since there is no suggestion there that there is a logical inference; rather Descartes seems to be advocating introspection on the part of the reader and challenging him or her to doubt the truth of the assertion ‘I am, I exist.’
然而，这种批评并不影响《沉思》中所呈现的我思，因为那里并没有暗示存在逻辑推理；相反，笛卡尔似乎是在倡导读者进行内省，并挑战他或她去怀疑“我在，我存在”这一断言的真实性。
Cartesian Circle
笛卡尔圆
Once Descartes has established his own existence as a thinking thing by means of the Cogito, the whole of his reconstructive project depends upon two foundations: the existence of a benevolent God and the fact that whatever we believe clearly and distinctly is true. Both are in themselves contentious. However, there is a more fundamental charge which is often raised against Descartes’s strategy, namely that when he argues for the existence of God he relies on the notion of clear and distinct ideas; and when he argues for the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas he presupposes the existence of God. In other words he argues in a circle. Both the Trademark and the Ontological Arguments for God’s existence presuppose an idea of God that Descartes knows to be accurate because he perceives it clearly and distinctly: without the idea of God neither argument could begin. On the other hand, the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas being true relies entirely on the supposition that a benevolent God exists and so would not allow us to be systematically deceived. So the argument is circular.
一旦笛卡尔通过“我思故我在”确立了自己作为思考者的存在，他的重建项目完全依赖于两个基础：一个仁慈的上帝的存在和我们所清晰而明确相信的事物都是真实的这一事实。这两者本身都是有争议的。然而，针对笛卡尔策略的一个更根本的指控是，当他论证上帝的存在时，他依赖于清晰和明确的观念的概念；而当他论证清晰和明确的观念的教义时，他又预设了上帝的存在。换句话说，他是在循环论证。上帝存在的商标论证和本体论证都预设了一个笛卡尔知道是准确的上帝的观念，因为他清晰而明确地感知到它：没有上帝的观念，这两个论证都无法开始。另一方面，清晰和明确的观念为真的教义完全依赖于一个仁慈的上帝存在的假设，因此不会允许我们被系统性地欺骗。所以这个论证是循环的。
Some of Descartes’s contemporaries noted this problem at the heart of Descartes’s project; it has come to be known as the Cartesian Circle. It is a powerful criticism of the whole constructive enterprise in the Meditations, and there is no obvious way for Descartes to escape it, short of finding an alternative justification for his belief in God, or else an independent justification for his belief that whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly is true. Nevertheless, his sceptical arguments and the Cogito retain all their force even if the charge of circularity holds.
笛卡尔的一些 contemporaries 注意到这个问题在笛卡尔的项目核心；它被称为笛卡尔圆。它是对《沉思》中整个建设性事业的有力批评，笛卡尔没有明显的方法来逃避它，除非找到对他对上帝信仰的替代证明，或者对他认为无论他清晰而明确地感知的事物都是真实的信仰的独立证明。尽管如此，即使循环论证的指控成立，他的怀疑论论证和我思故我在仍然保留了所有的力量。
Criticisms of arguments for God’s existence
对上帝存在论证的批评
Even if Descartes could somehow escape the charge of circularity, the two arguments that he uses to establish God’s existence are notoriously vulnerable to criticism.
即使笛卡尔能够以某种方式逃避循环论证的指控，他用来证明上帝存在的两个论点也 notoriously 容易受到批评。
First, both arguments rely on the assumption that we all have within us an idea of God which is not simply derived from early indoctrination. This assumption can be challenged.
首先，这两个论点都依赖于这样一个假设：我们每个人心中都有一个关于上帝的观念，这个观念并不仅仅源于早期的灌输。这个假设是可以被质疑的。
Second, the Trademark Argument relies on a further assumption, namely that there must be at least as much reality in the cause of something as is present in the effect. This assumption is needed for Descartes to move from the reality of his idea of God to the reality of God. But this assumption too can be challenged. For example, today’s scientists can explain how life evolved from inanimate matter: we don’t find it obvious that life can only be caused by living things.
其次，商标论证依赖于一个进一步的假设，即某事的原因中必须至少有与其效果中存在的现实一样多的现实。这个假设是笛卡尔从他对上帝的观念的现实性推向上帝的现实性所需要的。但这个假设也可以受到挑战。例如，今天的科学家可以解释生命是如何从无生命物质中演化而来的：我们并不认为生命只能由生物引起。
The Ontological Argument is particularly unconvincing as a proof of God’s existence. It seems like a logical trick, an attempt to define God into existence. The most serious criticism of it is that it assumes that existence is just another property, like being all-powerful, or benevolent, rather than what it is: the condition of having these properties at all. A further problem with the Ontological Argument is that it seems to allow us to conjure into existence all kinds of entities. For instance, I have in my mind an idea of the perfect philosopher; but it seems absurd to say that because I have an idea of such a philosopher that philosopher must therefore exist on the grounds that (arguably) a non-existent philosopher could not be perfect.
本体论证作为证明上帝存在的论据特别不令人信服。它看起来像是一个逻辑把戏，试图通过定义上帝来使其存在。对它最严重的批评是，它假设存在只是另一种属性，就像全能或仁慈，而不是它本身：拥有这些属性的条件。另一个本体论证的问题是，它似乎允许我们召唤出各种实体的存在。例如，我脑海中有一个完美哲学家的概念；但说因为我有这样的哲学家的想法，所以这个哲学家必须存在，这似乎是荒谬的，因为（可以说）一个不存在的哲学家不可能是完美的。
Dualism is a mistake
二元论是一个错误
Descartes’s mind/body dualism finds few supporters amongst present-day philosophers. One of the most serious problems it raises is that of explaining how interaction between an immaterial mind and a physical body is possible. Descartes was aware of the difficulty and even went so far as to identify a place in the brain, the pineal gland, where he thought mind/body interaction took place. But locating where it occurs does not solve the difficulty of how something that is non-physical can bring about changes in the physical world.
笛卡尔的心身二元论在当今哲学家中几乎没有支持者。它提出的一个最严重的问题是如何解释非物质的心灵与物质的身体之间的互动是如何可能的。笛卡尔意识到了这个困难，甚至进一步指出大脑中的一个地方，即松果体，他认为心身互动发生在这里。但确定其发生的地点并不能解决非物质的东西如何引起物质世界变化的困难。
Generally, some form of monism, that is, a theory which says that there is only one kind of substance (the physical), rather than a dualistic theory (which says there are two sorts of substance), seems to raise fewer difficulties, even though the task of explaining the nature of human consciousness remains an intractable one.
一般来说，某种形式的唯物主义，即一种认为只有一种物质（物理的）而不是二元论（认为有两种物质）的理论，似乎引发的困难较少，尽管解释人类意识的本质仍然是一个棘手的任务。
1596 | born in La Haye (now named Descartes), France. |
1641 | publishes Meditations. |
1649 | moves to Stockholm, Sweden to teach Queen Christina. |
1650 | dies in Stockholm. |
a priori: knowable independently of sense-perception.
先验的：可独立于感知而知晓。
Cartesian: the adjective from ‘Descartes’.
笛卡尔的：来自“笛卡尔”的形容词。
Cartesian Circle: the name sometimes given to a particular difficulty with Descartes’s system. Clear and distinct ideas are reliable sources of knowledge because they are vouchsafed by a benevolent God who is no deceiver; but God’s existence is only proved by relying on the knowledge given from clear and distinct ideas. So Descartes is caught in a vicious circle.
笛卡尔圆：有时用来指代笛卡尔系统中的一个特定困难。清晰而明确的观念是可靠的知识来源，因为它们是由一位仁慈的上帝所保证的，而这位上帝并非欺骗者；但上帝的存在仅通过依赖于清晰而明确的观念所提供的知识来证明。因此，笛卡尔陷入了一个恶性循环。
Cartesian Doubt: Descartes’s sceptical method in which, for the purposes of his argument, he treats as if false any belief about which he is not absolutely certain.
笛卡尔怀疑：笛卡尔的怀疑方法，在这个方法中，为了论证的目的，他将任何他不绝对确定的信念视为虚假。
Cogito: Latin for ‘I think’; short for ‘Cogito ergo sum’, which is usually translated as ‘I think, therefore I am.’ However, since according to Descartes at this stage of his argument I can only be sure of my existence while I am actually thinking, it is probably better translated as ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist.’
Cogito：拉丁语“我思考”；是“Cogito ergo sum”的缩写，通常翻译为“我思考，因此我存在”。然而，由于根据笛卡尔在他论证的这个阶段，我只能在实际思考时确信自己的存在，因此更好的翻译可能是“我在思考，因此我存在”。
Cosmological Argument: an argument which purports to demonstrate God’s existence. It usually takes the form: there must have been a first cause of everything that exists; that uncaused cause was God.
宇宙论证：一种声称证明上帝存在的论证。它通常采取以下形式：一切存在的事物必须有一个第一因；这个无因的原因就是上帝。
dualism: the view that there are two sorts of fundamentally different substances in the world: mind or soul and body or matter.
二元论：认为世界上存在两种根本不同的物质：心灵或灵魂和身体或物质。
empiricism: the view that knowledge of the world comes from sensory input rather than being innate and discoverable by reason alone.
经验主义：知识来自感官输入，而不是天生的或仅通过理性发现的观点。
epistemology: the branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge and its justification.
认识论：研究知识及其正当性的哲学分支。
interactionism: the view that mind and body interact with each other: events in the mind bring about events in the body and vice versa.
互动主义：心灵和身体相互作用的观点：心灵中的事件引发身体中的事件，反之亦然。
monism: the view that there is only one type of substance in the universe (a view incompatible with dualism).
一元论：认为宇宙中只有一种物质类型的观点（与二元论不兼容的观点）。
Ontological Argument: an argument which purports to prove God’s existence on the basis of the definition of God as a perfect being. A perfect being which didn’t exist wouldn’t be totally perfect; so God must exist.
本体论证：一种声称基于对上帝作为完美存在的定义来证明上帝存在的论证。一个不存在的完美存在就不算完全完美；因此，上帝必须存在。
rationalism: a philosophical approach which contrasts with empiricism. Rationalists believe that important truths about the nature of reality can be deduced by reason alone, without the need for observation.
理性主义：一种与经验主义相对立的哲学方法。理性主义者相信，关于现实本质的重要真理可以仅通过理性推导得出，而无需观察。
scepticism: philosophical doubt.
怀疑主义：哲学怀疑。
Trademark Argument: an argument that Descartes uses to attempt to prove God’s existence. We have an idea of God in our minds. But where did this idea come from? It must have been implanted there by God as a kind of trademark.
商标论证：笛卡尔用来试图证明上帝存在的论证。我们心中有一个关于上帝的观念。但这个观念来自哪里呢？它一定是上帝作为一种商标植入我们心中的。
Bernard Williams’ interview ‘Descartes’, in Bryan Magee The Great Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), gives a brief yet illuminating overview of Descartes’s thought. This interview is reprinted in my anthology Philosophy: Basic Readings (London: Routledge, 2nd edn, 2004).
伯纳德·威廉姆斯的访谈《笛卡尔》，收录在布莱恩·麦基的《伟大的哲学家》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1988 年）中，对笛卡尔的思想进行了简要而深刻的概述。该访谈在我的选集《哲学：基础阅读》（伦敦：劳特利奇，第二版，2004 年）中重印。
John Cottingham Descartes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) provides a more detailed, yet accessible, introduction to Descartes’ philosophical work.
约翰·科廷汉姆《笛卡尔》（牛津：布莱克威尔，1986）提供了对笛卡尔哲学作品更详细但易于理解的介绍。
For information about Descartes’ life, see Stephen Gaukroger Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) and Anthony Grayling Descartes (London: Free Press, 2005).
有关笛卡尔生平的信息，请参见斯蒂芬·高克罗杰的《笛卡尔：一部知识分子传记》（牛津：克拉伦登，1995 年）和安东尼·格雷林的《笛卡尔》（伦敦：自由出版社，2005 年）。
Thomas Hobbes Leviathan
托马斯·霍布斯 《利维坦》
The frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan is one of the few memorable pictorial representations of a philosophical idea. A huge man, whose body is composed of thousands of smaller people, towers above the well-ordered city below. The church spire is dwarfed by this giant who wears a crown and wields a sword in one hand, a sceptre in the other. This is the great Leviathan, the ‘mortal god’ described by Hobbes. The Leviathan, which appears in the Old Testament as a sea monster, is Hobbes’ image for the powerful sovereign who represents the people and is in a sense their embodiment: the multitude united in the form of an artificially created giant.
托马斯·霍布斯的《利维坦》的扉页是哲学思想中为数不多的令人难忘的图像表现之一。一个巨人，他的身体由成千上万的小人组成，耸立在井然有序的城市之上。教堂的尖塔在这个戴着王冠、手持剑和权杖的巨人面前显得渺小。这就是伟大的利维坦，霍布斯所描述的“凡人之神”。利维坦在《旧约》中作为海怪出现，是霍布斯对强大主权者的形象，代表着人民，并在某种意义上是他们的化身：以人为基础的人工巨人。
In Leviathan Hobbes diagnoses the general causes of strife and conflict and identifies a cure. The central arguments of the book address the question of why it is reasonable for individuals to consent to be ruled by a powerful sovereign (which could be either a single figure or an assembly). Peace can only be achieved if everyone accepts a social contract. Hobbes’ discussion of these issues is at the heart of Leviathan, but the book touches on numerous other topics from psychology to religion. In fact more than half of Leviathan is devoted to detailed discussion of religion and Christian scripture: the half that is seldom read today. Here I focus on the main theme of the book, the contract which free individuals make to give up some of their natural freedom in return for protection from each other and from outside attack. Hobbes begins his account of this contract with an analysis of what life would be like if no society or commonwealth existed.
在《利维坦》中，霍布斯诊断了冲突和争斗的一般原因，并提出了解决方案。书中的中心论点探讨了为什么个人同意被强大的主权者统治是合理的（这个主权者可以是一个单独的人物或一个集体）。只有当每个人都接受社会契约时，才能实现和平。霍布斯对这些问题的讨论是《利维坦》的核心，但这本书还涉及从心理学到宗教的许多其他主题。事实上，《利维坦》一半以上的内容专门讨论宗教和基督教经典：这一部分在今天很少被阅读。在这里，我专注于书的主要主题，即自由个体为了获得彼此和外部攻击的保护而放弃部分自然自由所达成的契约。霍布斯以对没有社会或共同体存在的生活状况的分析开始了对这一契约的叙述。
Rather than describing actual societies, Hobbes breaks society down into its most basic elements: individuals fighting for their survival in a world of limited resources. He invites the reader to imagine the conditions of life in a state of nature, the condition in which we would find ourselves if all state protection were removed. In this imagined world there would be no right or wrong since there would be no laws, there being no supreme power to impose them. Nor would there be any property: everyone would be entitled to whatever they could acquire and hold on to. For Hobbes morality and justice are the creations of particular societies. There are no absolute values which hold independently of particular societies. Right, wrong, justice, injustice are values determined by the sovereign powers within a state, rather than somehow discovered pre-existing in the world. So, in the state of nature there would be no morality whatsoever.
与其描述实际社会，霍布斯将社会分解为其最基本的元素：个体在有限资源的世界中为生存而斗争。他邀请读者想象在自然状态下的生活条件，即如果所有国家保护被移除，我们将处于的状态。在这个想象的世界中将没有对与错，因为没有法律，也没有至高无上的权力来强加法律。也不会有任何财产：每个人都有权获得和保留他们能够获取的任何东西。对霍布斯而言，道德和正义是特定社会的产物。没有任何独立于特定社会的绝对价值。对、错、正义、不正义是由国家内的主权力量决定的价值，而不是以某种方式在世界上被发现的先存价值。因此，在自然状态下将根本没有道德。
Hobbes’ account of the state of nature is a thought experiment designed to clarify the limits of political obligation. If you find the state of nature unattractive, then you have an excellent reason for doing whatever it takes to avoid ending up in it. The state of nature is a state of perpetual war of every individual against everyone else. Since there is no powerful law-giver or law-keeper, no co-operation between individuals is possible. Without such power no one need keep any promises they make since it is always in their interest to break the promises when it suits them. Assuming that you have a strong desire to survive, it is simple prudence to break agreements when it suits you in the state of nature. If you don’t seize what you need when you can get away with it, you run the risk of someone else stealing what little you have. In this situation of direct competition for meagre resources essential for survival, it makes sense to mount pre-emptive attacks against anyone who you think might pose a threat to your safety. This is the most effective strategy for survival. Even if there isn’t any fighting going on, Hobbes says, this is still a state of war, since there is the constant threat of violence breaking out.
霍布斯对自然状态的描述是一个思想实验，旨在阐明政治义务的界限。如果你觉得自然状态不可取，那么你就有充分的理由去做任何事情以避免陷入其中。自然状态是每个人与其他人之间的持续战争状态。由于没有强有力的立法者或执法者，个人之间无法进行合作。在没有这种权力的情况下，没人需要遵守他们所做的任何承诺，因为在适合他们的时候，违背承诺总是符合他们的利益。假设你有强烈的生存欲望，在自然状态下，适时违背协议是简单的谨慎。如果你在可以逃脱的时候不抓住你所需要的东西，你就有可能面临别人偷走你所拥有的微薄财物的风险。在这种对生存至关重要的稀缺资源的直接竞争中，针对任何你认为可能对你安全构成威胁的人发起先发制人的攻击是有意义的。这是生存的最有效策略。 即使没有任何战斗发生，霍布斯说，这仍然是一种战争状态，因为始终存在暴力爆发的威胁。
In a state of nature there can be no human projects which require co-operation, such as extensive agriculture or architecture. Even the weakest can potentially kill the strongest, so no one is safe, and everyone is a possible threat. Hobbes memorably described life in the state of nature as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’. If you are faced with the possibility of such a life, giving up some of your freedom seems a small price to pay for peace and safety. Hobbes explains what individuals in a state of nature must do to escape their unattractive predicament. Fear of a violent death and desire for the benefits of peace provide strong motives for doing so.
在自然状态下，不可能有需要合作的人类项目，例如大规模农业或建筑。即使是最弱者也有可能杀死最强者，因此没有人是安全的，每个人都是潜在的威胁。霍布斯生动地描述了自然状态下的生活为“孤独、贫穷、肮脏、野蛮且短暂”。如果你面临这样的生活可能性，放弃一些自由似乎是为了和平与安全而付出的微不足道的代价。霍布斯解释了自然状态下的个人必须做些什么才能逃脱他们不吸引人的困境。对暴力死亡的恐惧和对和平利益的渴望提供了强烈的动机。
In the state of nature everyone has a natural right to selfpreservation, and they continue to have this right even after other rights have been given up in the social contract. Hobbes contrasts this natural right with natural laws. A right identifies something which you are free to do should you so wish, but are not obliged to do; a law compels you to follow its dictates.
在自然状态下，每个人都有自我保护的自然权利，即使在社会契约中放弃了其他权利，他们仍然拥有这一权利。霍布斯将这种自然权利与自然法则进行对比。权利指的是你可以自由选择做的事情，但并不强迫你去做；而法律则强制你遵循其规定。
Even in the state of nature there are laws of nature: these are laws which follow from the use of reason. They are not like the present-day law against drink-driving: Hobbes used the term ‘civil law’ to refer to this kind of proscription (the content of civil laws is determined by the sovereign or by people acting on his behalf). Laws of nature, in contrast, are principles that any rational person is bound by. In the state of nature everyone has a right to everything. The inevitable consequence of this is, as we have seen, lack of security and a state of constant war. The law of nature which reason gives in these circumstances is Seek peace wherever possible. A second law of nature is When others are prepared to do the same, give up the rights you have in the state of nature and be content with as much freedom in relation to others as you would grant them in relation to you (this is a version of the religious prescription to Do as you would be done by). Hobbes constructs quite a long list of laws of nature, the consequence of which is that, provided that others are prepared to do likewise, it is rational for anyone in the state of nature to give up their unlimited freedom in return for security.
即使在自然状态下也存在自然法则：这些是源于理性使用的法则。它们不同于现代针对酒后驾驶的法律：霍布斯使用“民法”一词来指代这种禁令（民法的内容由主权者或代表他行事的人决定）。相比之下，自然法则是任何理性人都必须遵循的原则。在自然状态下，每个人都有权利拥有一切。这不可避免的结果是，如我们所见，缺乏安全感和持续的战争状态。在这种情况下，理性所给予的自然法则是尽可能寻求和平。第二条自然法则是当他人准备这样做时，放弃你在自然状态下的权利，并在与他人关系中满足于与你对他们所给予的自由一样多（这是一种宗教教义的版本，意为“己所不欲，勿施于人”）。 霍布斯列出了相当长的自然法则清单，其结果是，只要其他人也愿意这样做，在自然状态下，任何人放弃他们的无限自由以换取安全是合理的。
The rational course of action is to make a social contract, yielding freedoms to a powerful sovereign. The sovereign must be powerful enough to be able to enforce any promises made, because, as Hobbes points out, ‘covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’. The sovereign’s power guarantees that the people will do what they have undertaken to do. The result is peace.
理性的行动方案是制定一个社会契约，向一个强大的主权者让渡自由。主权者必须足够强大，以便能够执行所作的任何承诺，因为正如霍布斯所指出的，“没有剑的契约只是空话，根本无法保障一个人”。主权者的权力保证了人民会履行他们所承诺的事情。结果就是和平。
It is true that some animals, such as bees and ants, appear to live in societies which run smoothly without the need for any coercive direction from above. Hobbes points out that the human situation is very different from that of bees and ants. Human beings are constantly in competition for honour and dignity, which leads to envy and hatred and eventually war; ants and bees have no sense of honour and dignity. Human beings have the power of reason, which equips them to find fault with the way they are governed, and this gradually brings about civil unrest; ants and bees have no such power of reason. Human beings only form societies by means of covenants; ants and bees have a natural agreement with each other. Consequently human beings need the threat of force to guarantee that they will not break their promises, even though ants and bees don’t.
确实，一些动物，如蜜蜂和蚂蚁，似乎生活在一个运作顺畅的社会中，无需来自上方的任何强制性指导。霍布斯指出，人类的情况与蜜蜂和蚂蚁截然不同。人类不断竞争荣誉和尊严，这导致了嫉妒和仇恨，最终引发战争；而蚂蚁和蜜蜂没有荣誉和尊严的意识。人类拥有理性的能力，这使他们能够挑剔治理方式，这逐渐导致了社会动荡；而蚂蚁和蜜蜂没有这样的理性能力。人类只能通过契约形成社会；而蚂蚁和蜜蜂之间有一种自然的协议。因此，人类需要以武力威胁来保证他们不会违背承诺，即使蚂蚁和蜜蜂并不需要。
For Hobbes the social contract is a contract made with other individuals in a state of nature to give up your natural rights in exchange for protection. This contract need not have historical reality: Hobbes is not claiming that at a certain point in the history of each state, everyone suddenly agreed that fighting wasn’t worth the energy and that it would make more sense to co-operate. Rather he provides a way of understanding, justifying and changing political systems. One way of reading Leviathan is to take Hobbes to be saying that if the existing conditions of an implicit contract were to be removed, then we would find ourselves in a state of nature with its war of everyone against everyone. If Hobbes’ argument is sound, and his portrayal of the state of nature accurate, then Leviathan provides compelling reasons for maintaining peace under the rule of a powerful sovereign.
对于霍布斯来说，社会契约是与其他个体在自然状态下达成的契约，以放弃你的自然权利以换取保护。这个契约不必具有历史现实性：霍布斯并不是在声称在每个国家历史的某个时刻，每个人突然同意斗争不值得花费精力，而合作更有意义。相反，他提供了一种理解、辩护和改变政治系统的方法。解读《利维坦》的一个方式是认为霍布斯在说，如果现有的隐性契约条件被移除，那么我们将发现自己处于一种人人对抗的自然状态。如果霍布斯的论点是合理的，他对自然状态的描绘是准确的，那么《利维坦》为在强大主权者统治下维持和平提供了令人信服的理由。
The sovereign, whether an individual or an assembly, becomes an artificial person. Once the wills of all have been bound together by the social contract then the sovereign is the living embodiment of the state. Although Hobbes allows for the possibility of a sovereign assembly (that is, a group such as a parliament rather than an allpowerful individual), his sympathies are with a strong monarchy. However, he had little respect for the then widely held view known as the divine right of kings, according to which God approved of succession to the throne and gave sacred rights to royal heirs.
主权者，无论是个人还是集体，都会成为一个人工人。 一旦所有人的意志通过社会契约结合在一起，主权者便成为国家的活生生的体现。尽管霍布斯允许主权集体的可能性（即一个像议会这样的团体，而不是一个全能的个人），但他更倾向于强大的君主制。然而，他对当时广泛持有的“君权神授”观点几乎没有尊重，按照这一观点，上帝批准了王位的继承，并赋予了王室继承人神圣的权利。
The social contract does not remove the natural right of selfprotection that individuals have in the state of nature. Hobbes went so far as to say that everyone has a natural right to save themselves, even if attacked by people acting on behalf of the sovereign. The condemned man on the way to his execution, even if he had agreed to abide by the law, and had had a fair trial, would not act unjustly if he resisted the soldiers charged with taking him to the scaffold. However, no one has the right to intervene to help someone else in such circumstances. You can only struggle to save your own skin.
社会契约并没有剥夺个人在自然状态下的自我保护的自然权利。霍布斯甚至说，每个人都有自然权利拯救自己，即使是被代表主权者行事的人攻击。在前往行刑的路上，尽管被定罪的人同意遵守法律，并且经过了公正的审判，但如果他抵抗负责将他带到绞刑架的士兵，他的行为也不会是不公正的。然而，在这种情况下，没有人有权干预去帮助其他人。你只能挣扎以拯救自己。
Some present-day commentators on Hobbes’ work point out the similarity between his discussion of the state of nature and what is known as the prisoners’ dilemma, an imaginary situation designed to illustrate certain problems about co-operation with other people. Imagine that you and your partner in crime have been caught, but not red-handed; you are being interrogated in separate cells. You don’t know what your partner has or hasn’t owned up to.
一些当代评论家指出，霍布斯的自然状态讨论与所谓的囚徒困境之间的相似性，囚徒困境是一个旨在说明与他人合作某些问题的假想情境。想象一下，你和你的同伙被抓住了，但并没有被当场抓住；你们在不同的牢房里接受审讯。你不知道你的同伙承认了什么或没有承认什么。
The situation is this: if neither of you confesses, then both will go free, because the police don’t have enough evidence to convict you. At first thought this seems the best course of action. However, the catch is that if you remain silent and your partner confesses and thereby incriminates you, he will be rewarded for his collaboration and also set free, whereas you will get a long prison sentence. You too can have a reward if you confess but he doesn’t. If it turns out that you both confess, you both get a short sentence. In this situation, whatever your partner in crime does, it makes sense for you to confess (assuming that you want to maximise your own benefit). This is because if he doesn’t confess, you stand to get the reward as well as being released; and if he does confess, then it is far better for you to go to prison for a short while than end up there for a long time because he has incriminated you. So if you are both out to maximise your rewards and minimise your sentences, you will both confess. Unfortunately this produces a worse outcome for each of you than if you had both remained silent.
情况是这样的：如果你们两个都不认罪，那么两人都会被释放，因为警方没有足够的证据定罪你们。乍一看，这似乎是最佳的行动方案。然而，问题在于如果你保持沉默而你的伙伴认罪并因此指控你，他将因合作而获得奖励并被释放，而你将面临长时间的监禁。如果你认罪而他不认罪，你也可以获得奖励。如果你们两个都认罪，你们都会得到短期的刑罚。在这种情况下，无论你的同伙做什么，认罪对你来说都是有意义的（假设你想最大化自己的利益）。这是因为如果他不认罪，你将获得奖励并被释放；而如果他认罪，那么你去监狱短暂的时间总比因为他指控你而长时间待在那里要好。因此，如果你们都想最大化自己的奖励并最小化自己的刑期，你们都会认罪。不幸的是，这会导致你们每个人的结果都比如果你们都保持沉默要糟糕。
Hobbes’ state of nature is similar in that, in it, it always makes sense for you (and everyone else) to break a contract when you stand to gain from it. Keeping the contract is risky: the worst scenario occurs if you keep the contract and someone else breaks it. If the other person keeps it, then you will most likely profit by breaking it. If the other person breaks it, then you should cut your losses by breaking it too. So either way you should not keep your contract. There is, in this situation, no incentive for a rational individual intent on getting the best result for him or herself to keep any contract. This is why Hobbes has to introduce the notion of the sovereign, since without such a powerful enforcer of contracts, no one would have an incentive to keep any promise they made. The contract with others to concede your rights to the sovereign is different from other contracts in that if you break it then you will be punished for this, probably severely. So in this case you have a strong incentive to keep the basic social contract.
霍布斯的自然状态类似于，在这种状态下，破坏合同总是对你（和其他人）有利。遵守合同是有风险的：最糟糕的情况是你遵守合同而其他人违反它。如果对方遵守合同，那么你很可能会通过违反合同获利。如果对方违反合同，那么你也应该通过违反合同来减少损失。因此，无论如何你都不应该遵守合同。在这种情况下，理性个体为了获得最佳结果而遵守任何合同没有激励。这就是为什么霍布斯必须引入主权者的概念，因为如果没有这样一个强有力的合同执行者，没有人会有动力去遵守他们所做的任何承诺。与他人达成的将你的权利让渡给主权者的合同与其他合同不同，因为如果你违反它，你将受到惩罚，可能是严厉的。因此，在这种情况下，你有强烈的动力去遵守基本的社会契约。
Criticisms of Leviathan
对《利维坦》的批评
Mistaken view of human nature?
对人性错误的看法？
A frequent criticism of Hobbes’ description of the state of nature is that it paints an unduly bleak picture of human nature outside the civilising influence of the state. Hobbes believes that at heart we are all egoists, constantly seeking to satisfy our desires. He is a strict materialist, believing that the whole universe and everything in it can be explained in terms of matter in motion. Human beings are like sophisticated machines. In contrast to his somewhat pessimistic view that it is inevitable that human beings will compete and fight when the veneer of civilisation is stripped away, some more optimistic philosophers have claimed that altruism is a relatively common human trait, and that co-operation between individuals is possible without the threat of force.
对霍布斯对自然状态的描述的一个常见批评是，它描绘了一个过于阴暗的人性图景，认为在国家的文明影响之外，人性是如此。霍布斯认为，归根结底，我们都是自私的，不断寻求满足我们的欲望。他是一个严格的唯物主义者，认为整个宇宙及其中的一切都可以用运动中的物质来解释。人类就像复杂的机器。与他那种悲观的观点相对，即当文明的表象被剥去时，人类竞争和斗争是不可避免的，一些更乐观的哲学家声称利他主义是相对常见的人类特质，个体之间的合作在没有暴力威胁的情况下是可能的。
However, in Hobbes’ defence, his theory does seem to describe the sorts of rivalries and aggression that hold between countries in international relations. If it weren’t for mutual mistrust there would be no need to stockpile nuclear weapons. But if Hobbes’ theory does apply between states as well as within them then the future is even bleaker, for it is unlikely that a sovereign powerful enough to enforce covenants made between states will emerge, and so we can expect a perpetual war of all against all (even if this is not a literal war, only a state of potential conflict).
然而，在霍布斯的辩护中，他的理论似乎确实描述了国际关系中国家之间的竞争和攻击。如果没有相互的不信任，就没有必要囤积核武器。但如果霍布斯的理论适用于国家之间以及国家内部，那么未来将更加黯淡，因为不太可能出现一个足够强大的主权国家来执行国家之间达成的契约，因此我们可以预期一场所有人对所有人的永久战争（即使这不是一场字面上的战争，只是一种潜在冲突的状态）。
Social parasites
社会寄生虫
A further criticism of Hobbes’ account is that he doesn’t provide any reasons for someone to abide by the social contract when they can get away with breaking it. Why should a pickpocket abide by civil laws against theft declared by the sovereign if he is sure he won’t be caught? If, as Hobbes argues, force is needed to make people in the state of nature keep their covenants, then, presumably, the same people will need to be forced to keep civil laws. But no state can watch everyone all the time, not even one equipped with closed-circuit television cameras.
对霍布斯理论的进一步批评是，他没有提供任何理由让人们遵守社会契约，尤其是在他们可以逃避违反契约的情况下。一个扒手如果确信自己不会被抓住，为什么要遵守主权者所宣告的反盗窃的民法呢？如果霍布斯所说的那样，强制是让处于自然状态的人遵守契约所必需的，那么，显然，同样的人也需要被强制遵守民法。但是，没有哪个国家能够时刻监视每一个人，即使是配备了闭路电视摄像头的国家也不行。
Hobbes would probably answer this criticism by maintaining that it is a law of nature that you should not accept the state’s protection without accepting the obligation to keep the state’s civil laws. However, this answer is not really adequate.
霍布斯可能会通过坚持自然法则来回答这一批评，即你不应在不接受遵守国家民法的义务的情况下接受国家的保护。然而，这个回答并不充分。
State of nature pure fiction
自然状态纯粹虚构
A fundamental criticism of Hobbes’ methodology is that his state of nature is a meaningless fiction which bears no relation to history and is set up in such a way that it allows him to smuggle in his monarchist prejudices as if they were the conclusions of rational arguments.
对霍布斯方法论的一个根本批评是，他的自然状态是一个毫无意义的虚构，与历史没有关系，并且以一种方式设定，使他能够将自己的君主主义偏见悄悄带入，仿佛这些是理性论证的结论。
On the first point, although he does think that some native Americans lived in a state approximating the state of nature, it is generally agreed that Hobbes doesn’t intend his account to be anything more than hypothetical. He points out what life would be like if there were no sovereign power, or if a sovereign power were removed. However, as we have seen, his assumptions about what that state would actually be like can be challenged, as can the value of a thought experiment which is so unlike what actually happens.
在第一点上，尽管他确实认为一些美洲土著人生活在接近自然状态的状态中，但普遍认为霍布斯并不打算将他的论述视为任何超出假设的东西。他指出，如果没有主权力量，或者如果主权力量被移除，生活会是什么样子。然而，正如我们所看到的，他关于那个状态实际上会是什么样子的假设是可以受到挑战的，类似地，像这样与实际发生的情况如此不同的思想实验的价值也可以受到质疑。
On the question of smuggled prejudices, it is interesting that Hobbes allows that the sovereign may be an assembly rather than just a monarch. If Hobbes is simply revealing his monarchist prejudices, the inclusion of this possibility seems beside the point; unless, of course, Hobbes was rationally considering his own selfpreservation (which would be consistent with his philosophical views about human nature), not wanting to commit himself in public to too extreme a form of monarchism.
关于走私偏见的问题，霍布斯允许主权者可以是一个集会而不仅仅是一个君主，这一点很有趣。如果霍布斯只是揭示他的君主主义偏见，那么包括这种可能性似乎没有意义；当然，除非霍布斯理性地考虑到自己的自我保护（这与他关于人性的哲学观点是一致的），不想在公众面前承诺过于极端的君主主义形式。
Totalitarian?
极权主义？
Like Plato before him, Hobbes seems content to reduce citizens’ freedom considerably in his ideal state. For instance, he thinks censorship by the sovereign entirely acceptable, and indeed desirable: no book should be published before its doctrines have been examined and assessed for their tendency to promote peace. The commonwealth is an intolerant place, and individuals’ consciences are not to be taken seriously. It is for the sovereign to declare what is right or wrong, and the individual should not attempt to make such judgements. Many of us would find this aspect of Hobbes’ alternative to the state of nature particularly unattractive. Even though Hobbes set limits on the power of the sovereign to do whatever he or she likes, these limits are not sufficiently stringent to prevent the commonwealth becoming a totalitarian state with all that that involves.
像之前的柏拉图一样，霍布斯似乎满足于在他理想的国家中大幅减少公民的自由。例如，他认为主权者的审查完全可以接受，甚至是可取的：在书籍的教义经过审查和评估其促进和平的倾向之前，不应出版任何书籍。联邦是一个不宽容的地方，个人的良知不应被认真对待。由主权者来宣告什么是对的或错的，个人不应试图做出这样的判断。我们中的许多人会发现霍布斯对自然状态的替代方案的这一方面特别不吸引人。尽管霍布斯对主权者随心所欲的权力设定了限制，但这些限制并不足够严格，无法防止联邦变成一个极权国家，及其所涉及的一切。
Hobbes’ probable response to this sort of criticism is given in one of his section headings: ’sovereign power not so hurtful as the want of it’. Yet, at a certain point even the rigours of the state of nature would seem preferable to life under some totalitarian regimes. Some might opt for a solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short life in preference to one of virtual enslavement.
霍布斯对这种批评的可能回应在他的一个章节标题中给出：“主权权力并不像缺乏它那样有害”。然而，在某些时候，即使是自然状态的严酷似乎也比某些极权政权下的生活更可取。有些人可能宁愿选择孤独、贫穷、肮脏、野蛮且短暂的生活，而不是一种虚拟奴役的生活。
1588 | born in Malmesbury, Wiltshire. |
1641 | writes objections to Descartes’s Meditations. |
1651 | publishes Leviathan. |
1679 | dies in Hardwick, Derbyshire. |
civil laws: rules created by human beings (contrasted with natural laws).
民法：由人类创造的规则（与自然法相对）。
commonwealth: a group of individuals joined together by a social contract to form a political body.
联邦：一群通过社会契约联合在一起形成政治实体的个体。
divine right of kings: the notion that the succession of rulers through birth is God’s will.
君权神授：通过出生继承统治者的观念是上帝的意志。
Leviathan: an Old Testament sea monster, taken by Hobbes as a metaphor for the great body of the state composed of all its members joined together by a social contract.
利维坦：旧约中的海怪，被霍布斯视为由所有成员通过社会契约结合在一起的国家整体的隐喻。
natural laws: rules which are given by reason and which hold even in the state of nature. Any rational person is bound by them. They include the law: seek peace wherever possible.
自然法则：由理性所赋予的规则，即使在自然状态下也适用。任何理性的人都受其约束。它们包括法律：尽可能寻求和平。
prisoners’ dilemma: a type of thought experiment designed to bring out important features of situations of co-operation and conflict. It involves the notion of two prisoners in separate cells each calculating whether or not it is rational to reveal the other’s guilt.
囚徒困境：一种思想实验，旨在揭示合作与冲突情境的重要特征。它涉及两个囚犯在不同牢房中各自计算是否理性地揭露对方的罪行。
rights of nature: basic rights, which entitle you to act according to them if you so wish. An example of a right of nature is the right to self-preservation, which we all have in virtue of being human and which can’t be overridden by socially constructed laws.
自然权利：基本权利，赋予你根据这些权利行事的权利。自然权利的一个例子是自我保护权，这是我们作为人类所拥有的权利，不能被社会构建的法律所覆盖。
social contract: an agreement to give up some freedoms in return for protection by a sovereign. The social contract permits the move from a state of nature to a civil society.
社会契约：一种同意放弃部分自由以换取主权者保护的协议。社会契约允许从自然状态转变为公民社会。
sovereign: a powerful individual or group of individuals acting as one person who provides protection for members of society in return for their giving up some of the freedoms they have in a state of nature. The sovereign enforces contracts made between members of the society.
主权：一个强大的个体或个体群体作为一个人行事，为社会成员提供保护，以换取他们放弃在自然状态下拥有的一些自由。主权者执行社会成员之间达成的合同。
state of nature: a hypothetical situation in which we would find ourselves if society broke down. It is a state of perpetual war with every individual ready to attack every other.
自然状态：一种假设情况，如果社会崩溃，我们将发现自己处于这种状态。这是一个持续战争的状态，每个人都准备攻击其他人。
Richard Tuck Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Past Masters series, 1989) is excellent. Tuck sets Hobbes in his historical context and demonstrates his importance as a philosopher. He also provides a useful overview of the wide range of interpretations that have been made of Hobbes’ political theory.
理查德·塔克《霍布斯》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，Past Masters 系列，1989 年）非常出色。塔克将霍布斯置于他的历史背景中，并展示了他作为哲学家的重要性。他还提供了对霍布斯政治理论的广泛解读的有用概述。
Richard Peters Hobbes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956) is a well-written and interesting account of Hobbes’ thought, including his work on science and religion.
理查德·彼得斯·霍布斯（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅出版社，1956 年）是一本写得很好且有趣的关于霍布斯思想的著作，包括他在科学和宗教方面的工作。
A. P. Martinich A Hobbes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) is a useful reference book which includes a short biography of Hobbes.
A. P. Martinich 《霍布斯词典》（牛津：布莱克威尔，1995 年）是一本有用的参考书，其中包括霍布斯的简短传记。
Baruch de Spinoza Ethics
巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎 伦理学
Baruch de Spinoza’s Ethics is a strange book. It bristles with all the jargon of Euclidian geometry: definitions, axioms, numbered propositions, corollaries and scholia. Yet, if you get beyond this intimidating technical apparatus, you will find a fascinating and, in places, profound attempt to understand our place in the universe.
巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎的《伦理学》是一本奇特的书。它充满了欧几里得几何的所有术语：定义、公理、编号命题、推论和学注。然而，如果你超越这种令人畏惧的技术装置，你会发现这是一个迷人且在某些地方深刻的尝试，旨在理解我们在宇宙中的位置。
The full title of the book is Ethics Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner. Why, you might ask, would anyone attempt to write a philosophical treatise in the form of a geometry textbook? One answer is that Spinoza was impressed by the way in which Euclid deduced his conclusions logically from the various explicit assumptions that he made. The conclusions followed inexorably from the premises and were derived with transparency and elegance. Spinoza’s conclusions spell out what the true implications of various definitions are. If you accept his premises, then you must accept his conclusions, provided that his reasoning is good.
这本书的完整标题是《以几何方式证明的伦理学》。你可能会问，为什么有人会尝试以几何教科书的形式写一部哲学论文？一个答案是斯宾诺莎对欧几里得如何从他所做的各种明确假设中逻辑推导出结论的方式印象深刻。这些结论不可避免地从前提中得出，并且以透明和优雅的方式推导出来。斯宾诺莎的结论阐明了各种定义的真实含义。如果你接受他的前提，那么你必须接受他的结论，前提是他的推理是正确的。
Despite the jargon of geometry with which this book is liberally sprinkled, Spinoza’s arguments never quite achieve the purity of those found in geometrical treatises. Within the pages of this difficult book, however, are philosophical and psychological insights of great power.
尽管本书中大量使用几何学的术语，斯宾诺莎的论点却始终无法达到几何论文中那种纯粹的程度。然而，在这本艰深的书页中，蕴含着强大的哲学和心理洞察。
Spinoza is usually described as a rationalist. He believed that knowledge about our place in the universe could be achieved by the power of reason alone. In this his emphasis was very different from empiricists who believed that the basic source of knowledge is experience and observation. Spinoza believed not only that reason could discover the nature of the universe, but also that this was because the universe was arranged in a rational order. The structure of the universe is no accident; it is necessarily as it is. Sense experience, which is imperfect, could never give us an adequate understanding of the universe. This is not to say that Spinoza denigrated scientific research: he earned his living as a lens-grinder, work which depended on the science of optics. The lenses he made would have been used in microscopes and telescopes, instruments used to increase scientific knowledge.
斯宾诺莎通常被描述为一个理性主义者。他相信，关于我们在宇宙中的位置的知识可以仅通过理性的力量来实现。在这一点上，他的强调与经验主义者非常不同，后者认为知识的基本来源是经验和观察。斯宾诺莎不仅相信理性可以发现宇宙的本质，而且这也是因为宇宙是以理性的秩序排列的。宇宙的结构并非偶然；它必然是这样的。感官经验是不完美的，永远无法给我们对宇宙的充分理解。这并不是说斯宾诺莎贬低科学研究：他以磨镜片为生，这项工作依赖于光学科学。他制作的镜片将用于显微镜和望远镜，这些仪器用于增加科学知识。
It is accurate, as we have seen, to describe this book as ‘Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner’. However, not all of the contents of the book discuss what we would now think of as ethics. Much of the first part of the book is about substance and God, which turn out to be the same thing. We would now classify this discussion as metaphysics. Spinoza’s theme is the universe and our place in it – the nature of reality. For him metaphysics and ethics were not separable. The nature of reality determines how we ought to live.
正如我们所看到的，称这本书为“以几何方式证明”是准确的。然而，这本书的所有内容并不都讨论我们现在所认为的伦理学。书的前半部分大多是关于实体和上帝，这两者实际上是同一回事。我们现在会将这部分讨论归类为形而上学。斯宾诺莎的主题是宇宙及我们在其中的位置——现实的本质。对他来说，形而上学和伦理学是不可分割的。现实的本质决定了我们应该如何生活。
In the early sections of Ethics Spinoza sets out to prove from his definition of substance that there can only be one substance (a position known as monism) and that this substance is God. The consequence of this is that everything that exists is somehow in God. God didn’t create nature, He is nature. Spinoza writes of ‘God or Nature’, apparently equating the two. Thought and extension (the occupying of physical space) are simply two of God’s infinite attributes, the two attributes that we have access to. Spinoza’s argument for this position is complex. His conclusion that everything is somehow in God is often taken to be a species of pantheism. More subtle interpreters stress that Spinoza is only saying that all God’s attributes are expressed in the world, not that God is nothing more than the world. So if Spinoza is a pantheist, his is not the crude pantheism which declares that the world simply is identical with God.
在《伦理学》的早期部分，斯宾诺莎试图从他对实体的定义出发，证明只能有一个实体（这一观点被称为一元论），而这个实体就是上帝。其结果是，所有存在的事物在某种程度上都在上帝之中。上帝并没有创造自然，他就是自然。斯宾诺莎写到“上帝或自然”，显然将二者等同起来。思想和延展（占据物理空间）只是上帝无限属性中的两个属性，而这两个属性是我们可以接触到的。斯宾诺莎对此立场的论证是复杂的。他得出的结论是，所有事物在某种程度上都在上帝之中，这常常被视为一种泛神论。更微妙的解释者强调，斯宾诺莎只是说上帝的所有属性在世界中得以体现，并不是说上帝仅仅是世界。因此，如果斯宾诺莎是一个泛神论者，他的泛神论并不是那种简单地宣称世界与上帝完全相同的粗糙泛神论。
Whatever the correct interpretation of Spinoza’s theological position, it is evident that it was very far from Christian and Jewish orthodoxy about the nature of God. Of Portuguese descent, Spinoza was born in Amsterdam in 1632 and raised as a Jew. He was excommunicated in 1656 because he had abandoned orthodox Jewish beliefs. It is easy to see why he could only have his Ethics published posthumously and why some of his contemporaries were convinced that he had ceased to believe in God at all.
无论斯宾诺莎的神学立场的正确解释是什么，很明显它与基督教和犹太教的正统观念在上帝的本质上相去甚远。斯宾诺莎是葡萄牙裔，1632 年出生于阿姆斯特丹，成长为犹太人。由于他放弃了正统的犹太信仰，他在 1656 年被逐出教门。很容易理解为什么他的《伦理学》只能在他去世后出版，以及为什么他的某些同时代人坚信他已经完全不再相信上帝。
Spinoza had an interesting solution to the mind/body problem, the problem of explaining the relationship between the mental and the physical aspects of our existence. He knew his contemporary Descartes’ work well and even published a book about his philosophy. Much of Spinoza’s philosophy specifically opposes Descartes’ views. Unlike Descartes, who argued that mind and body were entirely distinct, Spinoza maintained that the mental and the physical were inseparable aspects of the same thing. The mind is the same thing as the body. We can conceive this thing as either physical or mental. Mind is not itself a substance but rather a mode of substance. Mind and body do not interact in the way that Descartes described: they are just two aspects of the same thing. A consequence of this view, that Spinoza accepts, is that all physical things can have mental aspects.
斯宾诺莎对心灵/身体问题提出了一个有趣的解决方案，即解释我们存在的心理和物理方面之间的关系。他对同时代的笛卡尔的工作非常了解，甚至出版了一本关于他哲学的书。斯宾诺莎的哲学在很大程度上明确反对笛卡尔的观点。与笛卡尔认为心灵和身体完全不同的观点不同，斯宾诺莎认为心理和物理是同一事物不可分割的两个方面。心灵与身体是同一事物。我们可以将这个事物视为物理的或心理的。心灵本身不是一种实体，而是一种实体的模式。心灵和身体并不像笛卡尔所描述的那样相互作用：它们只是同一事物的两个方面。斯宾诺莎接受的这一观点的一个结果是，所有物理事物都可以具有心理方面。
Freedom and Human Bondage
自由与人类束缚
The idea of freedom lies at the heart of Spinoza’s moral teaching. Yet he denies that we can ever be free from chains of cause and effect. All our actions, and everything that happens in the universe, are determined by prior causes. You picked up this book and are reading it, but on Spinoza’s account your decision was determined by prior decisions, physical events and so on. Your decision did not arise spontaneously from nowhere, even if it felt that way. Only God can be truly free in the sense that God’s actions do not have prior causes.
自由的理念是斯宾诺莎道德教义的核心。然而，他否认我们能够摆脱因果链的束缚。我们所有的行为，以及宇宙中发生的一切，都由先前的原因决定。你拿起这本书并在阅读，但根据斯宾诺莎的说法，你的决定是由先前的决定、物理事件等决定的。即使感觉如此，你的决定并不是自发地从无到有产生的。只有上帝才能在某种意义上真正自由，因为上帝的行为没有先前的原因。
So in the sense of being outside of the chain of cause and effect, there is no hope of human freedom. Yet Spinoza does argue that we can save ourselves from enslavement to the passions. This will make us free in the only sense in which we can be free, which is acting from internal rather than external causes. Moral action is acting for oneself rather than being in the grip of passions. The passions are forces which push us one way or another leaving us as helpless victims. When we can liberate ourselves from the passivity of being the vehicles of such passions and come to understand our actions we become free.
因此，从超越因果链的角度来看，人类自由是没有希望的。然而，斯宾诺莎确实认为我们可以拯救自己免于对激情的奴役。这将使我们在唯一能够自由的意义上获得自由，即从内在而非外在原因出发进行行动。道德行为是为自己而行动，而不是被激情所控制。激情是推动我们朝某个方向前进的力量，使我们成为无助的受害者。当我们能够从被这些激情所驱动的被动状态中解放出来，并理解我们的行为时，我们就获得了自由。
Human bondage is the condition of those who are ignorant of the causes of their actions. People in this condition are moved by external causes alone: they are incapable of acting freely in the sense just described. They are like stones pushed around by forces they don’t comprehend. It is only by forming an adequate idea of the causes of our behaviour that we can escape this bondage, and make the causes of our action internal rather than external. Once we recognise the causes of an emotion it ceases to hold us in its grip as a passion. The Ethics is designed in part to teach the reader to attain this kind of agency, to become more fully human.
人类的束缚是那些对自己行为原因无知的人的状态。处于这种状态的人仅仅受到外部原因的驱动：他们无法像刚才描述的那样自由行动。他们就像被他们无法理解的力量推动的石头。只有通过形成对我们行为原因的充分理解，我们才能摆脱这种束缚，使我们行动的原因变为内部而非外部。一旦我们认识到一种情感的原因，它就不再像激情那样控制我们。《伦理学》部分旨在教导读者获得这种能力，成为更完整的人。
In this respect, then, Spinoza’s thought recommends a kind of psychotherapy. To achieve freedom from the passions we must understand the true causes of our actions. Yet this doesn’t mean that free decisions cease to have causes. When understanding is achieved these causes are internalised. They are transformed by being understood. But the actions they give rise to remain determined. So Spinoza sees human free will in this particular sense as compatible with our actions being causally determined.
在这方面，斯宾诺莎的思想推荐了一种心理治疗。要实现对激情的自由，我们必须理解我们行为的真实原因。然而，这并不意味着自由决策不再有原因。当理解实现时，这些原因被内化。它们通过被理解而转化。但它们所引发的行为仍然是确定的。因此，斯宾诺莎在这个特定意义上将人类的自由意志视为与我们的行为因果决定相兼容。
In the later sections of the Ethics Spinoza presents an almost mystical picture of the wise way to live. We should strive to make sense of ourselves and our place in the universe. That is the path to wisdom. It is also the path to joy as the mind becomes more active and attains a higher degree of perfection. Although Spinoza makes the intellectual love of God a central aspect of his philosophy, this is not the love of any personal God concerned with our well-being. Indeed, Spinoza’s philosophy has no room for the God described in traditional Christianity and Judaism: Spinoza’s God is as impersonal as the geometrical arguments he uses to deduce God’s existence and scope.
在《伦理学》的后面部分，斯宾诺莎呈现了一幅几乎是神秘的智慧生活方式的图景。我们应该努力理解自己和我们在宇宙中的位置。这是通往智慧的道路。这也是通往快乐的道路，因为心智变得更加活跃，达到更高的完美程度。尽管斯宾诺莎将对上帝的智性之爱作为其哲学的核心方面，但这并不是对任何关心我们福祉的个人上帝的爱。实际上，斯宾诺莎的哲学没有容纳传统基督教和犹太教中描述的上帝：斯宾诺莎的上帝与他用来推导上帝的存在和范围的几何论证一样是无个人性的。
Criticisms of Ethics
伦理的批评
No need for God
不需要上帝
Once Spinoza had dispensed with the idea of a personal God and had, as far as he was concerned, proved that the natural world somehow expressed God’s attributes, he could have taken a further step and embraced an atheistic philosophy. The God he describes is so different from the God of orthodox Christianity and Judaism, that it scarcely merits the name ‘God’ at all. Indeed, some of Spinoza’s contemporaries believed that his philosophy was tantamount to atheism. Yet he was convinced that he had proved God’s existence, and that the good life was a life expressing love of God.
一旦斯宾诺莎摆脱了个人神的观念，并且在他看来证明了自然界以某种方式表达了上帝的属性，他本可以进一步采取一个无神论的哲学。他所描述的上帝与正统基督教和犹太教的上帝截然不同，以至于几乎不值得被称为“上帝”。事实上，斯宾诺莎的一些同时代人认为他的哲学等同于无神论。然而，他坚信自己证明了上帝的存在，并且美好生活就是一种表达对上帝爱的生活。
Denies genuine freedom
否认真正的自由
The picture of the human condition that Spinoza paints in the Ethics leaves no room for the spontaneity of uncaused choice that some philosophers, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, see as the essence of free will. The best that we can achieve is that our actions be brought about by internal rather than external causes according to Spinoza. And yet the bleaker account of human freedom that Spinoza provides is persuasive, and may be more accurate. Perhaps it is just wishful thinking to believe that we can make uncaused choices about what we think and do. Spinoza saw himself as exposing the delusion of free will.
斯宾诺莎在《伦理学》中描绘的人类状况的图景，毫无余地地否定了某些哲学家（如让-保罗·萨特）所认为的无因选择的自发性，这被视为自由意志的本质。根据斯宾诺莎，我们所能达到的最好状态是我们的行为是由内在原因而非外在原因引起的。然而，斯宾诺莎提供的人类自由的更为悲观的描述是有说服力的，可能更为准确。也许相信我们可以对自己的思想和行为做出无因选择，只是一种一厢情愿的想法。斯宾诺莎认为自己是在揭露自由意志的幻觉。
Over-optimistic about reason
对理由过于乐观
Spinoza, like many philosophers before and since, saw the human capacity for reason as the path to wisdom and happiness. The intellectual contemplation of God was for him the highest form of happiness possible and brought its own rewards. This sounds like the convenient conclusion of an intellectual who happened to find solace in his own thought. Perhaps he was over-optimistic about reason and its capacity to bring us happiness. And yet he is surely right that by coming to understand some of the causes of our states of mind we can gain greater control over our lives.
斯宾诺莎和许多之前和之后的哲学家一样，将人类的理性能力视为通往智慧和幸福的道路。对上帝的智力沉思对他来说是可能的最高幸福形式，并带来了自身的回报。这听起来像是一个知识分子的方便结论，他恰好在自己的思想中找到了安慰。也许他对理性及其带给我们幸福的能力过于乐观。然而，他无疑是正确的，通过理解我们心态的一些原因，我们可以对自己的生活获得更大的控制。
1632 | born in Amsterdam. |
1675 | completes the Ethics. |
1677 | dies in The Hague. The Ethics is published posthumously. |
monism: the view that there is only one type of substance in the world.
一元论：认为世界上只有一种物质类型的观点。
pantheism: the view that God is everything. It is debatable whether or not Spinoza really was a pantheist.
泛神论：上帝就是一切的观点。斯宾诺莎是否真的是一个泛神论者尚有争议。
rationalism: the belief that knowledge can be acquired through the power of reasoning. This contrasts with the empiricists’ view that knowledge comes from observation.
理性主义：相信知识可以通过推理的力量获得。这与经验主义者的观点形成对比，后者认为知识来自观察。
Roger Scruton Spinoza (London: Phoenix, Great Philosophers series, 1998) is a brief sympathetic treatment of the major themes of the Ethics. A slightly longer book by the same author is Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Past Master series, 1986).
罗杰·斯克鲁顿《斯宾诺莎》（伦敦：凤凰出版社，伟大哲学家系列，1998 年）是对《伦理学》主要主题的简要同情性论述。同一作者的稍长一些的书是《斯宾诺莎》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，过去大师系列，1986 年）。
For a critical survey of interpretations of the Ethics, see Genevieve Lloyd Spinoza and the Ethics (London: Routledge, Philosophy Guidebook series, 1996).
有关《伦理学》解释的关键调查，请参见 Genevieve Lloyd 的《斯宾诺莎与伦理学》（伦敦：劳特利奇，哲学指南系列，1996 年）。
Steven Nadler Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Margaret Gullan-Whur Within Reason: A Life of Spinoza (London: Pimlico, 2000) are two recent biographies.
史蒂文·纳德勒《斯宾诺莎：一个生命》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1999 年）和玛格丽特·古兰-沃尔《理性之内：斯宾诺莎的一生》（伦敦：皮姆利科，2000 年）是两部最近的传记。
Steven Nadler’s A Book Forged in Hell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011) is a very readable account of Spinoza’s life and particularly his Theological-Political Treatise, a book that was thought scandalous when published. Highly recommended.
史蒂文·纳德勒的《炼狱铸就的书》（普林斯顿，新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社，2011 年）是一本非常易读的关于斯宾诺莎生活的书，特别是他的《神学政治论》，这本书在出版时被认为是丑闻。强烈推荐。
John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
约翰·洛克 《人类理解论》
Is a newborn’s mind a blank slate? Or do we come into the world armed with knowledge? John Locke addressed these questions in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. His answer was that all our knowledge is derived ultimately from the information we receive from the five senses. We come into this world knowing nothing whatsoever. Experience teaches us everything we know. This view is usually known as empiricism, in contrast to innatism (the theory that some of our knowl edge is inborn), and to rationalism (the contention that we can achieve knowledge of the world by the power of reason alone). There was lively debate about the origins of our knowledge when Locke was writing in the seventeenth century, and this has continued, in a somewhat altered form, to the present day.
新生儿的思维是空白的吗？还是我们带着知识来到这个世界？约翰·洛克在他的《人类理解论》中探讨了这些问题。他的回答是，我们所有的知识最终都源于我们从五种感官获得的信息。我们来到这个世界时一无所知。经验教会我们所有的知识。这种观点通常被称为经验主义，与先天主义（认为我们的一些知识是与生俱来的理论）和理性主义（认为我们可以仅凭理性之力获得对世界的知识的主张）相对。在洛克于十七世纪写作时，关于我们知识的起源有着激烈的辩论，这种辩论在某种程度上延续到了今天。
Locke’s Essay, published in 1689, soon became a philosophical bestseller. He produced four editions of it in his lifetime, and it had already reached its eleventh by 1735. It is a complex and wide-ranging work; its main focus is the origin and limits of human knowledge. What can we know? What is the relation between thought and reality? These are the perennial questions of the branch of philosophy called epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Locke’s answers to them had a lasting influence on the course of the subject, and many great philosophers, including George Berkeley (1685–1753) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) defined their own positions in relation to them.
洛克的《论人类理解》，于 1689 年出版，很快成为哲学畅销书。他在生前出版了四个版本，到 1735 年时已经达到了第十一版。这是一部复杂而广泛的著作；其主要关注点是人类知识的起源和界限。我们能知道什么？思想与现实之间的关系是什么？这些是被称为认识论或知识理论的哲学分支的永恒问题。洛克对这些问题的回答对该学科的发展产生了持久的影响，许多伟大的哲学家，包括乔治·贝克莱（1685–1753）和戈特弗里德·莱布尼茨（1646–1716），都在与之相关的基础上定义了自己的立场。
Locke described his role as that of an ‘underlabourer’ clearing away conceptual confusions so that the scientists, or natural philosophers, as they were then known, could carry on their important work of adding to human knowledge. This slightly self-deprecatory remark shouldn’t blind us to the difficulty of the task which Locke set himself, which was nothing less than to explain the origins and nature of human knowledge. This involved a rejection of a whole philosophical tradition which had been built on the assumption that whatever was written by an authority such as Aristotle must be true. Locke took great pleasure in overthrowing received opinion and replacing it with reasoned hypothesis. His aim was to shed light on what had until then been obscure. His motivation came from a love of truth, and the exhilaration of thinking for oneself about some of the most profound questions we can ask. He was under no illusion that his would be the last word on any of the topics he discussed. Nor was he particularly optimistic about human understanding in general: he believed that God had given us the wherewithal to achieve knowledge of God, of our moral duty and of whatever was necessary to get through life, but that, ultimately, the powers of reason were limited.
洛克将自己的角色描述为“助手”，清除概念上的混淆，以便科学家或当时被称为自然哲学家的人能够继续他们对人类知识的重要贡献。这句略显自谦的评论不应掩盖洛克所设定任务的困难，这个任务无异于解释人类知识的起源和本质。这涉及到对一个建立在权威如亚里士多德所写的内容必然真实的假设基础上的整个哲学传统的拒绝。洛克乐于推翻既有观点，并用经过推理的假设取而代之。他的目标是阐明直到那时仍然模糊的事物。他的动机源于对真理的热爱，以及对一些我们能提出的最深刻问题进行独立思考的兴奋。他并没有幻想自己会是讨论的任何主题的最终权威。 他对人类理解的普遍性也并不特别乐观：他认为上帝赋予了我们获得对上帝、道德责任以及生活所需知识的能力，但最终，理性的力量是有限的。
Many seventeenth-century philosophers believed in the existence of God-given innate principles, that is, principles that every human being is born knowing. These might either be what Locke called speculative principles, such as the obviously true statement ‘Whatever is, is’; or else practical principles, such as the moral claim ‘Parents have a duty to look after their children’ or ‘Everyone ought to keep their promises.’ Locke used a range of arguments to show that neither sort of principle was innate. Most of these arguments rely on his fundamental assumption that the contents of the human mind are transparent to itself: that is, if you are having a thought, then it must be possible for you to get access to the content of that thought. Locke does not believe that it makes sense to say that someone could be having a thought without their knowing what that thought was about. He rejects any notion of unconscious thoughts as nonsensical.
许多十七世纪的哲学家相信上帝赋予的先天原则的存在，也就是说，每个人出生时就知道的原则。这些原则可能是洛克所称的推测性原则，例如显然真实的陈述“无论是什么，都是”；或者是实践原则，例如道德主张“父母有责任照顾他们的孩子”或“每个人都应该遵守他们的承诺”。洛克使用了一系列论据来表明这两种原则都不是先天的。这些论据大多依赖于他基本的假设，即人类心智的内容对其自身是透明的：也就是说，如果你正在思考，那么你必须能够获取该思维的内容。洛克不相信说某人可以在不知道自己在想什么的情况下进行思考是有意义的。他拒绝任何无意识思维的概念，认为这是无稽之谈。
One argument he uses to support his claim that there are no innate principles is that it is obvious that there is not total agreement about what the supposedly innate principles might be. If we were all born knowing that, for example, ‘We should keep our promises’, then everyone would recognise this as a fundamental principle. But, as Locke points out, there is no such general agreement. Some people see no obligation whatsoever to keep their promises. Nor do children immediately recognise the principle as one that is binding on them; rather the principle is one that has to be taught and learnt. The same holds for any principle you care to examine, moral or otherwise.
他用来支持自己关于没有先天原则的主张的一个论点是，显然对于所谓的先天原则可能是什么，并没有完全的共识。如果我们都天生就知道，例如，“我们应该遵守承诺”，那么每个人都会将其视为一个基本原则。但是，正如洛克所指出的，并没有这样的普遍共识。有些人根本不认为有义务遵守承诺。孩子们也并不立即将这一原则视为对他们有约束力的原则；相反，这一原则是需要教授和学习的。任何你愿意考察的原则，无论是道德的还是其他的，都是如此。
Furthermore, we would expect the supposedly innate principles to be more evident in children than in adults because children will have been less affected by local customs and will have had less experience of the world. The innate principles should be clearly recognisable in them. But they aren’t.
此外，我们预计这些所谓的天生原则在儿童身上会比在成年人身上更明显，因为儿童受到地方习俗的影响较小，世界经验也较少。这些天生原则应该在他们身上清晰可辨。但实际上并不是这样。
The notion that there are innate moral principles shared by all human beings is, for Locke, a complete non-starter since a glimpse at history reveals the immense diversity of moral principles that have been held by societies and individuals. It is simply implausible to think that this would result from identical principles implanted in everyone’s mind.
洛克认为，所有人类共享的先天道德原则的概念完全不可行，因为历史的回顾揭示了社会和个人所持有的道德原则的巨大多样性。认为这会源于植入每个人心中的相同原则是完全不可信的。
These and other arguments lead Locke to reject the view that there are any innate principles. However, this leaves him with the task of explaining how it is that the human mind comes to be furnished with thoughts, beliefs and knowledge of the world. His answer is that all our ideas come from experience.
这些和其他论点使洛克拒绝了存在任何先天原则的观点。然而，这使他面临着解释人类思维是如何获得对世界的思想、信念和知识的任务。他的回答是，我们所有的观念都来自经验。
Locke uses the word ‘idea’ to mean whatever it is that anyone thinks about. When you look out of your window, what you see – a tree perhaps, or a sparrow – is not the tree or sparrow itself, but rather a representation of it, an idea, something like a picture in your head. What you see is not just a product of what is out there in the world, but is also in part a creation of your sensory system. But not all our ideas are received from immediate sensation of the world. Some of them are ideas of reflection, such as when we reason, or remember or will something.
洛克使用“观念”一词来指代任何人所思考的事物。当你从窗外看时，你所看到的——也许是一棵树，或者一只麻雀——并不是树或麻雀本身，而是它的一个表现，一个观念，类似于你脑海中的一幅图画。你所看到的并不仅仅是世界上存在的事物的产物，还是你感官系统的一部分创造。但并不是我们所有的观念都是来自对世界的直接感知。其中一些是反思的观念，比如当我们推理、记忆或意愿某事时。
Locke believes that all our ideas ultimately come from experience, so that the contents of our thoughts, even when we are reflecting rather than perceiving, all come from sensation. A child locked away from the world who had only had sensations of black and white would have no more idea of scarlet and green than he would of the taste of oysters or pineapple if he had never tried them.
洛克认为我们所有的想法最终都来自经验，因此我们思维的内容，即使在我们反思而不是感知的时候，也都是来自感觉。一个被锁在世界之外的孩子，如果只经历过黑白的感觉，就对猩红色和绿色没有比对生蚝或菠萝的味道更清楚的概念，如果他从未尝试过它们的话。
Ideas can be combined in various ways, so that once we have the idea of scarlet and the idea of a coat, we can imagine a scarlet coat, even if we’ve never actually seen one. But the simpler ideas from which the complex ones are built all originate in perception by one or more of the five senses.
想法可以以各种方式结合，因此一旦我们有了猩红色的概念和外套的概念，我们就可以想象出一件猩红色的外套，即使我们从未真正见过它。但构成复杂概念的简单想法都源于通过五种感官之一或多种感官的感知。
Primary and Secondary Qualities
主要和次要特性
When we say that a snowball is greyish-white and cold and round, what we mean is that it can produce in us ideas of these properties. Locke distinguishes primary and secondary qualities, giving a very different account of each.
当我们说雪球是灰白色、寒冷和圆形时，我们的意思是它能在我们心中产生这些属性的想法。洛克区分了主要特性和次要特性，对每种特性给出了非常不同的解释。
Primary qualities are inseparable from objects. The primary qualities of a snowball would include its shape and solidity, but not its colour or its coldness. Here Locke was very much influenced by the science of his day, and in particular by the corpuscularian hypothesis put forward by Robert Boyle (1627–1691). Boyle suggested that all matter is composed of minute particles, or ‘corpuscles’, which are grouped together in various ways. A single corpuscle alone in the universe would still possess the primary qualities of shape, size and solidity. The ideas that we have of an object’s primary qualities, Locke believes, resemble those qualities. So, for example, if a snowball has the primary qualities of roundness and a certain size, then the ideas we have of these features resemble these aspects of the actual snowball: they are accurate representations of these qualities.
主要特性与物体是不可分割的。雪团的主要特性包括其形状和坚固性，但不包括其颜色或寒冷感。在这里，洛克受到他那个时代科学的很大影响，特别是受到罗伯特·波义耳（1627–1691）提出的粒子假说的影响。波义耳建议，所有物质都是由微小的粒子或“粒子”组成，这些粒子以不同的方式组合在一起。宇宙中单独存在的一个粒子仍然会具有形状、大小和坚固性的主要特性。洛克认为，我们对物体主要特性的想法与这些特性相似。因此，例如，如果一个雪团具有圆形和一定的大小这两个主要特性，那么我们对这些特征的想法就类似于实际雪团的这些方面：它们是这些特性的准确表现。
Secondary qualities are powers to produce ideas. But secondary qualities do not resemble their objects; they are, rather, a consequence of the texture of corpuscles (i.e. the microstructure) out of which the objects are composed, the particular conditions under which they are perceived and the sensory system of the perceiver. Secondary qualities, unlike primary ones, aren’t properties that the corpuscles themselves have independently of observers. Take colour, for instance: the snowball appears greyish-white. Colour is a secondary quality. What this means is that the actual snowball does not really have colour in the sense that it has shape and size. I have an idea of the snowball as greyish-white. However, under different lighting conditions it might appear to be a completely different colour, blue, for instance. But in this case the blueness would no more be in the snowball than is the greyish-whiteness. The colour of the snowball derives from the arrangement of the corpuscles from which it is composed; the primary qualities of the corpuscles give rise to my ideas of it. The same is true of the snowball’s coldness, and its taste. These are not strictly properties found in the snowball but rather secondary qualities of the object dependent on its primary qualities.
次要品质是产生观念的能力。但次要品质并不类似于它们的对象；相反，它们是构成对象的微粒（即微观结构）的纹理、感知它们的特定条件以及感知者的感官系统的结果。与主要品质不同，次要品质不是微粒独立于观察者所具有的属性。以颜色为例：雪球看起来是灰白色的。颜色是一种次要品质。这意味着实际的雪球并没有颜色，像它有形状和大小那样。我对雪球的想法是灰白色的。然而，在不同的光照条件下，它可能看起来是完全不同的颜色，比如蓝色。但在这种情况下，蓝色并不比灰白色更存在于雪球中。雪球的颜色源于构成它的微粒的排列；微粒的主要品质引发了我对它的观念。雪球的寒冷和味道也是如此。 这些并不是严格意义上在雪球中发现的属性，而是依赖于其主要属性的对象的次要特性。
Locke’s discussion of primary and secondary qualities makes clear his realism: his unquestioned belief in the existence of real objects in the external world which give rise to our experience. This may just sound like common sense, but many philosophers then, before and since have been led to sceptical views about the nature of whatever it is that causes our experience.
洛克对主要品质和次要品质的讨论清楚地表明了他的现实主义：他对外部世界中真实物体存在的毫无疑问的信念，这些物体引发了我们的体验。这听起来可能只是常识，但许多哲学家在那时、之前和之后都对导致我们体验的事物的本质产生了怀疑的观点。
One part of Locke’s Essay which has set the framework for most subsequent discussion on the topic and continues to exert an influence in the late twentieth century is the chapter ‘Identity and Diversity’. This was only added to the work in the second edition. It contains a discussion of the problem of personal identity, the question of what it is that makes someone the same person after a period of time in which they may have changed quite significantly, both bodily and psychologically.
洛克的《论文》中有一部分为后续关于该主题的大多数讨论奠定了框架，并在二十世纪末继续产生影响，这一部分是“身份与多样性”章节。这一章节仅在第二版中添加。它讨论了个人身份的问题，即在一段时间内一个人可能在身体和心理上发生了显著变化的情况下，是什么使得他们仍然是同一个人。
Locke’s answer to this question involves a discussion of three separate but related questions: (1) What constitutes sameness of substance? (2) What makes someone at a later date the same man? and finally (3) What makes someone at a later date the same person?
洛克对这个问题的回答涉及三个独立但相关的问题的讨论：（1）什么构成物质的同一性？（2）是什么使得某人在后来的时间仍然是同一个人？最后（3）是什么使得某人在后来的时间仍然是同一个个体？
We would say that we were dealing with the same substance if none of the particles of which an object is composed have changed or been removed. Clearly with a living organism this never occurs, since, at least at a microscopic level, parts are continually being lost and renewed. So sameness of physical substance won’t be a useful criterion for determining personal identity over time, since no living human being ever maintains precisely the same physical constituents from moment to moment.
我们会说如果一个物体所组成的粒子没有变化或被移除，我们就处理的是相同的物质。显然，对于一个活生生的有机体，这种情况从未发生，因为至少在微观层面上，部分不断被丢失和更新。因此，物质的相同性不会成为确定个人身份随时间变化的有用标准，因为没有任何活着的人类在每一时刻都保持完全相同的物理成分。
For Locke a ‘man’ is a particular biological organism, a member of the species we call homo sapiens. A man is like an oak tree or a horse in this respect. A huge spreading oak tree is still the same oak it was twenty years ago, despite having doubled in size and shed its leaves twenty times. It is not the same substance, but it is the same oak, in virtue of the continued function of its living parts. In the same way, I am the same man I was ten years ago, despite both physical and psychological changes which anyone would be able to notice.
对于洛克来说，“人”是一个特定的生物有机体，是我们称之为智人（homo sapiens）物种的成员。在这方面，一个人就像一棵橡树或一匹马。一棵巨大的橡树尽管已经长大了一倍并且掉落了二十次叶子，但它仍然是二十年前的那棵橡树。它不是同样的物质，但由于其活体部分的持续功能，它仍然是同样的橡树。同样，尽管我在身体和心理上都发生了变化，任何人都能注意到，但我仍然是十年前的我。
Part of Locke’s originality on this topic lay in separating questions about the identity of a man from those of a man’s personal identity. But what exactly is a person if it is not the same as a man? According to Locke, a person is ‘a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places’. In other words, a person isn’t simply a member of our species, since some human beings lack the power of reason and self-consciousness. Furthermore, in principle, some nonhuman creatures could be considered persons. Locke cites a report of a rational parrot that was able to answer quite detailed questions in a convincing way. He points out that we would be unlikely to call it a man, despite its intelligence: it would always be a rational parrot, but it might also be considered a person if it had the appropriate level of rationality and self-consciousness.
洛克在这个话题上的独创性部分在于将关于一个人身份的问题与一个人个人身份的问题分开。但如果一个人与一个男人不同，那么一个人究竟是什么呢？根据洛克的说法，一个人是“一个有思维的智能存在，具有理性和反思能力，能够将自己视为自己，在不同的时间和地点都是同一个思考的存在”。换句话说，一个人不仅仅是我们物种的成员，因为一些人类缺乏理性和自我意识的能力。此外，原则上，一些非人类生物也可以被视为人。洛克引用了一只能够以令人信服的方式回答相当详细问题的理性鹦鹉的报告。他指出，尽管这只鹦鹉很聪明，我们不太可能称它为一个人：它始终是一只理性鹦鹉，但如果它具备适当的理性和自我意识水平，它也可能被视为一个人。
What, according to Locke, is the criterion of personal identity over time? Not simply bodily continuity, since that does not guarantee us that we are dealing with the same person. Rather personal identity stretches only so far as consciousness will stretch: memory and continuing recognition of being responsible for one’s past actions are the conditions of personal identity. No matter how much I’ve changed physically, if I can remember my past actions as my own, then I am the same person that I was.
根据洛克的说法，个人身份随时间的标准是什么？不仅仅是身体的连续性，因为这并不能保证我们在处理同一个人。相反，个人身份仅在意识能够延伸的范围内延伸：记忆和持续承认对自己过去行为的责任是个人身份的条件。无论我在身体上改变了多少，如果我能将自己的过去行为记忆为自己的，那么我就是我曾经的同一个人。
Locke illuminates this notion with a thought experiment. Imagine that one day a prince wakes up to find that he has all the memories of a cobbler, and none of his own. His body remains unchanged. On the same morning a cobbler wakes up to find that he has all the prince’s memories. Locke maintains that, although the prince-bodied individual remains the same man, he is not the same person that he was when he went to sleep. It would not be fair to hold the princebodied person responsible for the prince’s former actions, since he would not have any recollection of having performed them. This farfetched example is intended to bring out the important difference between the terms ‘man’ and ‘person’.
洛克通过一个思想实验阐明了这个概念。想象有一天，一个王子醒来发现自己拥有一个鞋匠的所有记忆，而没有自己的记忆。他的身体没有改变。在同一天早上，一个鞋匠醒来发现自己拥有王子的所有记忆。洛克认为，尽管这个王子身体的人仍然是同一个人，但他不是在入睡时的那个同一个人。将王子身体的人追究王子以前的行为是不公平的，因为他不会记得自己曾经做过这些事情。这个离奇的例子旨在突出“人”和“个体”这两个术语之间的重要区别。
But where does this leave us with cases of memory loss? It would seem that on Locke’s account we should never punish people for what they can’t remember doing since in an important sense they would not be the same persons who committed the misdemeanours. ‘Person’ for Locke is a forensic term, by which he means that it is one which is particularly relevant to legal questions which relate to responsibility for one’s actions. It would seem then that we should never punish a murderer who can’t remember killing. Locke’s view on this is that in cases of memory loss or alleged memory loss, we tend to assume that if we have identified the man who performed the actions, then this must be the same person who committed them. We punish drunks for their actions even if they claim not to be able to remember what they did. However, this is simply a result of the difficulty of anyone proving their ignorance of what they did. The law has to be practical and so rarely accepts memory loss as an excuse. However, Locke suggests, on the day of judgement, God will not hold anyone responsible for actions which they can’t remember performing.
但是，这对我们在记忆丧失的情况下意味着什么呢？根据洛克的观点，我们不应该惩罚那些无法记得自己所做事情的人，因为在某种重要意义上，他们将不再是那些犯下轻罪的同一个人。对洛克来说，“人”是一个法庭术语，他的意思是这个术语与涉及个人行为责任的法律问题特别相关。那么，我们似乎不应该惩罚那些无法记得自己杀人的谋杀犯。洛克对此的看法是，在记忆丧失或声称记忆丧失的情况下，我们倾向于假设如果我们已经确认了执行这些行为的人，那么这必定是同一个犯下这些行为的人。即使醉酒者声称无法记得自己所做的事情，我们仍然会惩罚他们。然而，这仅仅是因为任何人都很难证明他们对自己所做事情的无知。法律必须是实用的，因此很少接受记忆丧失作为借口。然而，洛克建议，在审判日，神不会对那些无法记得自己所做行为的人追究责任。
Locke is interested both in the nature of language and in its use in effective communication. Language, for him, is not simply a matter of making intelligible sounds: parrots (even non-rational ones) can do that. Rather, words are signs of ideas: they signify them. Because words are signs for ideas and all our ideas come from experience, all our language and thought using language is intimately connected with our experience.
洛克对语言的本质以及其在有效沟通中的使用都很感兴趣。对他来说，语言不仅仅是发出可理解的声音：鹦鹉（即使是非理性的）也能做到这一点。相反，词语是思想的标志：它们表示这些思想。因为词语是思想的标志，而我们所有的思想都来自经验，所以我们所有的语言和使用语言的思维与我们的经验密切相关。
By using words we can communicate our thoughts to others. But Locke believes that we do not necessarily all attach the same ideas to the same words. For instance, my particular associations for the word ‘albatross’ may be very different from yours on account of our different experience of individual albatrosses. You may have had no experience of an albatross, or only of a picture of one, and yet feel confident in using the word. The idea you have associated with the word would be very different from the idea held by someone who saw albatrosses on a daily basis. If you have no clear idea of an albatross you may just end up making sounds like a parrot that has been taught to mimic or a young child, signifying nothing. So although words are uttered in public, what they signify can still be private and idiosyncratic. This can be a source of confusion and misunderstanding.
通过使用语言，我们可以将我们的思想传达给他人。但洛克认为，我们并不一定都将相同的想法与相同的词汇联系在一起。例如，我对“albatross”这个词的特定联想可能与你的非常不同，因为我们对个别信天翁的经历不同。你可能没有接触过信天翁，或者只见过一张信天翁的图片，但仍然自信地使用这个词。你与这个词相关联的想法将与那些每天看到信天翁的人的想法截然不同。如果你对信天翁没有清晰的概念，你可能最终只会发出像被教会模仿的鹦鹉或幼儿那样的声音，毫无意义。因此，尽管词语是在公共场合中发出的，但它们所代表的意义仍然可以是私人的和特有的。这可能会导致混淆和误解。
There are far fewer nouns than there are things to which they refer. This is not surprising, since if there were a name for every particular thing it would be impossible to communicate effectively. We use the general term ‘albatross’ to refer to a whole species of bird. Locke maintains that we acquire such general words on the basis of abstracting from our particular experiences.
名词的数量远少于它们所指代的事物。这并不令人惊讶，因为如果每个特定事物都有一个名称，那么有效沟通将变得不可能。我们使用“信天翁”这个通用术语来指代整个鸟类物种。洛克认为，我们是通过从特定经验中抽象出来来获得这些通用词的。
Criticisms of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
对《人类理解论》的批评
Innate knowledge
先天知识
Research by the linguist Noam Chomsky (1928–) has resurrected the debate about innate knowledge in the twentieth century. From close analysis of the sentences used by children when learning to speak he concluded that the best explanation for the universally shared grammatical structures of different languages and the patterns of children’s grammatical mistakes was an innate framework for interpreting and using language that all children are born with, what he called a Language Acquisition Device. This view provides a serious challenge to Locke’s belief that a newborn’s mind is like a blank piece of paper waiting to be written on by experience. It is much closer to Gottfried Leibniz’s belief that the mind is like a block of marble which has various fault-lines along which it is predisposed to break to reveal a well-designed sculpture.
语言学家诺姆·乔姆斯基（1928 年–）的研究重新引发了关于先天知识的辩论。从对儿童学习说话时使用的句子的细致分析中，他得出结论，解释不同语言普遍共享的语法结构和儿童语法错误模式的最佳解释是所有儿童天生具备的解释和使用语言的先天框架，他称之为语言习得装置。这一观点对洛克认为新生儿的心智像一张等待经验书写的空白纸张的信念构成了严峻挑战。它更接近于戈特弗里德·莱布尼茨的信念，即心智像一块大理石，沿着各种缺陷线倾向于破裂，以揭示出精心设计的雕塑。
Do ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects?
初级品质的观念是否与它们的对象相似？
Locke’s account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities sounds plausible at first reading, and is lent support by the various sensory illusions that suggest that secondary qualities are qualities of objects as they appear to us, rather than actually being somehow in the objects themselves. However, as George Berkeley pointed out, Locke’s claim that ideas of primary qualities resemble the objects themselves is unsupportable.
洛克对主要品质和次要品质区别的论述乍一看似乎很合理，并且得到了各种感官错觉的支持，这些错觉表明次要品质是物体在我们眼中呈现的特性，而并非实际上存在于物体本身。然而，正如乔治·贝克莱所指出的，洛克关于主要品质的观念与物体本身相似的说法是无法支持的。
On Locke’s account, objects as they really are are hidden behind a veil of perception. We only get direct access to ideas, not what those ideas are of. So for Locke to maintain that ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects is nonsensical. In order to ascertain whether one thing resembles another we need access to both of them. But on Locke’s account of the mind, we only ever have access to one side: our own ideas. Berkeley went further than this, arguing that because, strictly speaking, we only have access to the contents of our own minds, we cannot even prove the existence of anything independent of the mind. Locke, in contrast, simply assumes that the mind could not produce our ideas without there being an external world.
在洛克的观点中，物体的真实状态被感知的面纱所掩盖。我们只能直接接触到观念，而不是这些观念所指代的事物。因此，洛克认为主要特质的观念与其对象相似是毫无意义的。为了确定一种事物是否与另一种事物相似，我们需要接触到它们两个。但在洛克的心智理论中，我们只能接触到一方：我们自己的观念。贝克莱对此进一步论证，认为因为严格来说，我们只能接触到自己心灵的内容，所以我们甚至无法证明任何独立于心灵的事物的存在。相比之下，洛克则简单地假设心灵不能在没有外部世界的情况下产生我们的观念。
Homunculus problem
人造人问题
Locke’s account of ideas makes them very like pictures in the head. But this doesn’t really explain much about the processes of thought, because in order to appreciate what a picture is of, it seems to require a little person (a homunculus) inside your head to interpret the pictures, and then one inside his head, and so on. This infinite series of ever smaller homunculi apparently implied by his account of the mind is clearly an unacceptable consequence. It suggests that there is something wrong with Locke’s account.
洛克对观念的描述使它们非常像脑海中的图像。但这并没有真正解释思维的过程，因为为了理解一幅图像所代表的内容，似乎需要在你脑海中有一个小人（一个小人儿）来解释这些图像，然后在他脑海中再有一个小人，依此类推。显然，他对心智的描述所暗示的这一无限系列越来越小的小人儿是一个不可接受的结果。这表明洛克的理论存在问题。
Memory loss doesn’t always sever personal identity
记忆丧失并不总是切断个人身份
The philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–1796) countered Locke’s claim that memory provides an adequate criterion of personal identity with the following example. Imagine a brave officer who was once flogged at school for stealing from an orchard. In his first campaign as a young soldier he succeeded in capturing a standard from the enemy. When he captured the standard he could remember that he had been flogged as a boy. Later, he was made a general. But by that time, although he could remember capturing the standard, he could no longer remember being flogged at school. The person who captured the standard is, on Locke’s account, the same person who was flogged, because of the memory link. Similarly, the memory link makes the general the same person as the young officer who captured the standard. Logic seems to tell us that if the boy is the same person as the young officer, and the officer the same person as the old general, then the boy must be the same person as the old general. Locke, however, would have to deny this on the grounds that the old general can’t remember being flogged, and so this link with the past is severed. Reid’s point is that this is a logical absurdity, because Locke’s account gives us two contradictory conclusions: both that the boy and the general are the same person, and that they are not. Any theory which leads to such an obvious contradiction must be false.
哲学家托马斯·里德（1710–1796）用以下例子反驳了洛克关于记忆提供个人身份充分标准的说法。想象一个勇敢的军官，他曾因从果园偷东西而在学校被鞭打。在他作为年轻士兵的第一次战役中，他成功地从敌人那里夺取了一面旗帜。当他夺取旗帜时，他能记得自己小时候被鞭打。后来，他被晋升为将军。但到那时，尽管他能记得夺取旗帜，但他已不再记得在学校被鞭打。根据洛克的说法，夺取旗帜的人就是被鞭打的人，因为有记忆的联系。同样，记忆的联系使得将军与夺取旗帜的年轻军官是同一个人。逻辑似乎告诉我们，如果这个男孩与年轻军官是同一个人，而军官与老将军是同一个人，那么这个男孩必须与老将军是同一个人。然而，洛克必须否认这一点，因为老将军无法记得被鞭打，因此与过去的联系被切断。 里德的观点是，这是一种逻辑上的荒谬，因为洛克的论述给出了两个矛盾的结论：既认为那个男孩和将军是同一个人，又认为他们不是。任何导致如此明显矛盾的理论都必须是错误的。
Locke’s response to this sort of criticism would have to be that the boy and the general are the same man but not the same person, and that it would be wrong to hold the general responsible for what the boy did. Locke would have to deny that the pattern of overlapping memories described by Reid leads to the conclusion that the boy is the same person as the general.
洛克对这种批评的回应必须是，男孩和将军是同一个人，但不是同一个个体，并且将军不应为男孩所做的事情负责。洛克必须否认里德所描述的重叠记忆模式导致男孩与将军是同一个人的结论。
1632 | born in Wrington, Somerset. |
1689 | publishes An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Two Treatises of Government (although the date printed on the books is 1690). |
1704 | dies in Oates, Essex. |
corpuscularian hypothesis: Boyle’s theory that all matter is composed of minute particles (corpuscles).
粒子假说：博伊尔的理论认为所有物质由微小粒子（粒子）组成。
empiricism: the view that our knowledge is derived from our sensory experience.
经验主义：认为我们的知识源于我们的感官经验。
epistemology: the branch of philosophy which investigates questions about knowledge and how it is achieved.
认识论：研究知识及其获得方式的问题的哲学分支。
homunculus: a little person. Locke’s theory of the mind seems to have the consequence that there would have to be a homunculus inside the head interpreting ideas (and one inside that homunculus’s head, and so on).
小人：一个小人。洛克的心智理论似乎意味着头脑中必须有一个小人在解读思想（而这个小人头脑中又有一个小人，依此类推）。
idea: for Locke, any thought whatsoever, including a perception. The seventeenth-century use of ‘idea’ was much broader than ours.
思想：对于洛克来说，任何思想，包括感知。十七世纪对“思想”的使用比我们现在的要广泛得多。
innatism: the view that our knowledge, or at least a substantial part of it, is inborn.
先天主义：认为我们的知识，或至少其中相当一部分，是与生俱来的。
personal identity: what makes someone the same person despite bodily or psychological changes.
个人身份：尽管身体或心理发生变化，是什么使一个人仍然是同一个人。
primary qualities: properties of objects including shape and solidity, but not colour and coldness (which are secondary qualities). The ideas of primary qualities resemble those qualities (not so with secondary qualities). The corpuscles of which an object consists themselves have primary qualities but not secondary qualities.
主要特性：物体的属性，包括形状和坚固性，但不包括颜色和寒冷（这些是次要特性）。主要特性的观念类似于这些特性（次要特性则不然）。构成物体的微粒本身具有主要特性，但不具有次要特性。
rationalism: the belief that we can acquire knowledge simply through the exercise of our reason.
理性主义：相信我们可以仅通过运用理性来获得知识。
secondary qualities: powers to produce ideas. Secondary qualities are a product of the corpuscular texture of objects and the sensory faculties of the perceiver. Unlike ideas of primary qualities, ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the qualities themselves. Secondary qualities include such qualities as colour and coldness.
次要品质：产生观念的能力。次要品质是物体的粒子结构和感知者的感官能力的产物。与主要品质的观念不同，次要品质的观念并不类似于这些品质本身。次要品质包括颜色和寒冷等品质。
Stephen Priest The British Empiricists (London: Penguin, 1990) is a clear, well-structured book. It includes a chapter on Locke.
斯蒂芬·普里斯特 《英国经验主义者》（伦敦：企鹅出版社，1990 年）是一本清晰、结构良好的书。它包括关于洛克的一章。
E. J. Lowe Locke on Human Understanding (London: Routledge, 1995) provides a detailed examination of the main themes of Locke’s Essay, bringing out the continuing relevance of much of his thought.
E. J. Lowe 的《洛克的人类理解》（伦敦：劳特利奇，1995）详细探讨了洛克《论文》的主要主题，突显了他许多思想的持续相关性。
J. L. Mackie Problems from Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) is a series of essays on the most important topics raised in the Essay.
J. L. Mackie 的《洛克问题》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1976 年）是一系列关于《论人类理解》中的重要主题的论文。
For information about Locke’s life, see Maurice Cranston John Locke: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
有关洛克生平的信息，请参见莫里斯·克兰斯顿的《约翰·洛克：传记》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1985 年）。
John Locke Second Treatise of Government
约翰·洛克《政府二论》
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness … that whenever any government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it.
我们认为这些真理是不言而喻的：所有人都是平等创造的，他们被创造者赋予了某些不可剥夺的权利，其中包括生命、自由和追求幸福……无论何时，任何政府如果破坏这些目标，人民有权改变或废除它。
These resounding lines from the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 paraphrase the message at the heart of John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, written almost a century earlier. Locke published his Two Treatises of Government anonymously in 1689, but there is evidence that he wrote them in the early 1680s when the idea that the people had a right to overthrow an unjust government would have been considered radical treason and could easily have incurred the death penalty. Much of the detail of the Two Treatises is directed at the turbulent political events of the 1680s; but the Second Treatise, with its attempt to establish basic human rights, has had an influence which extends well beyond the concerns of the seventeenth century.
这些来自 1776 年美国独立宣言的响亮文字，概括了约翰·洛克《政府论第二篇》核心信息，该书几乎在一个世纪前写成。洛克于 1689 年匿名出版了他的《政府论两篇》，但有证据表明他在 1680 年代初期就已撰写这些作品，当时认为人民有权推翻不公正的政府被视为激进的叛国行为，可能会轻易招致死刑。《政府论两篇》的许多细节针对的是 1680 年代动荡的政治事件；但《政府论第二篇》试图确立基本人权，其影响远远超出了十七世纪的关切。
First and Second Treatises
第一和第二论著
Of the Two Treatises, the second is by far the more interesting. The First Treatise is almost entirely negative: it is a critical attack on the ideas of Sir Robert Filmer. Filmer argued that the monarchy’s power was God-given and had nothing whatsoever to do with the consent of the people, a view known as the divine right of kings. Adam, the first man, had been given authority over the whole earth by God; the authority of present-day rulers could then be traced back to this initial gift. The people’s duty to obey their rulers was a duty to God since the rulers were there by God’s will as a result of a subdivision of the world since the time of Adam. What the people wanted was beside the point. Everyone had an absolute duty to obey the monarch and this duty was, indirectly, a duty to obey God.
在《两篇论著》中，第二篇无疑更有趣。第一篇几乎完全是消极的：它对罗伯特·菲尔默爵士的观点进行了批判性攻击。菲尔默认为君主的权力是上帝赋予的，根本与人民的同意无关，这种观点被称为君权神授。亚当，作为第一个人，被上帝赋予了对整个地球的权威；当今统治者的权威可以追溯到这一最初的恩赐。人民服从统治者的义务是对上帝的义务，因为统治者是根据上帝的意志存在的，这可以追溯到亚当时代以来世界的划分。人民的愿望无关紧要。每个人都有绝对的义务服从君主，而这一义务间接地是对上帝的义务。
In the First Treatise Locke demolishes the detail of Filmer’s argument; in the Second Treatise he outlines his positive account of government. The question that Locke addresses there is, ‘What are the sources and limits of legitimate political authority?’ Or, to put it in a more practical form, ‘Why should we obey our rulers, and under what circumstances might we be justified in opposing them?’
在《第一论》中，洛克驳斥了菲尔默论点的细节；在《第二论》中，他概述了自己对政府的积极看法。洛克在这里提出的问题是：“合法政治权威的来源和限制是什么？”或者，更实际地说，“我们为什么要服从统治者，在什么情况下我们可能有理由反对他们？”
The State of Nature and Laws of Nature
自然状态与自然法则
In order to answer these questions, Locke, like many political philosophers before and since, imagined what life would be like in a state of nature, that is, in a world with no government-imposed laws and no organised society. This sort of thought experiment is not usually intended to give an account of what life was actually like at some particular point in time, but rather is a story invented to bring out the philosophical justifications for forming a society with a government and laws. Hobbes thought that in a state of nature we would be in a state of permanent war against each other, competing for scarce resources; Locke’s state of nature, in contrast, is a far more attractive prospect. For Hobbes individuals in the state of nature would be driven by their appetites and desires, and for them prudence would dictate that they took pre-emptive action against any wouldbe competitors. Locke, however, believes that even in a state preexisting any organised society human beings would be bound by what he calls the laws of nature, and that these prohibit harming others.
为了回答这些问题，洛克像许多之前和之后的政治哲学家一样，想象了在自然状态下的生活，即在一个没有政府强加法律和没有组织社会的世界中。这种思想实验通常并不是为了描述某个特定时间点的生活实际情况，而是为了构建一个故事，以阐明形成一个有政府和法律的社会的哲学理由。霍布斯认为，在自然状态下，我们将处于一种永久的战争状态中，彼此竞争稀缺资源；而洛克的自然状态则是一个更具吸引力的前景。对于霍布斯来说，自然状态中的个体将被他们的欲望和渴望驱动，而对于他们来说，谨慎将决定他们对任何潜在竞争者采取先发制人的行动。然而，洛克认为，即使在任何组织社会之前的状态中，人类也会受到他所称的自然法则的约束，而这些法则禁止伤害他人。
The laws of nature are God-given laws which any human being is capable of discovering by reflection. In Locke’s state of nature individuals are both equal and free. There is no natural hierarchy that sets one human being higher than another: everyone counts the same as everyone else and is equal before God. Individuals are also free, but this liberty should not be confused with licence (freedom to do whatever you want). Your freedom, even in a state of nature, is limited by the self-evident God-given laws of nature which prohibit you from committing suicide (since God clearly intended you to live out your natural lifespan), and from harming other people (since God created us as equals not to be used by one another).
自然法则是上帝赋予的法则，任何人都可以通过反思来发现。在洛克的自然状态中，个体既平等又自由。没有自然等级将一个人置于另一个人之上：每个人的价值与其他人相同，在上帝面前是平等的。个体也是自由的，但这种自由不应与许可（随心所欲的自由）混淆。即使在自然状态下，你的自由也受到自明的上帝赋予的自然法则的限制，这些法则禁止你自杀（因为上帝显然希望你活到自然寿命），以及伤害他人（因为上帝创造我们是平等的，而不是让我们相互利用）。
One reason why Locke’s state of nature appears so much more congenial than Hobbes’ brutal war of all against all is that Locke believes that the laws of nature can be enforced by any individual. This includes meting out punishment for breaking the laws of nature. Even outside society the God-given laws hold and are enforceable. If, for example, you were to attack me without good reason, then, since the law of nature forbids harming anyone without justification, I would be within my natural rights to punish you, both in order to get some kind of reparation and to restrain you from further violence. This right to punish extends to those who are not directly involved. Someone else might learn that you had attacked me, and choose to punish you accordingly. Obviously in the state of nature there would be a danger that individuals would be biased in the ways they upheld the laws of nature. They would tend to promote their own interests under the guise of applying the laws of nature. That is one of the reasons why joining together and forming a government is an improvement on the natural state, since a government can set up an independent judiciary.
洛克的自然状态看起来比霍布斯的所有人对所有人的残酷战争要更为宜人，原因之一是洛克相信自然法则可以由任何个人执行。这包括对违反自然法则的惩罚。即使在社会之外，上帝赋予的法则依然有效并且可以执行。例如，如果你在没有正当理由的情况下攻击我，那么，由于自然法则禁止在没有正当理由的情况下伤害任何人，我有权惩罚你，以获得某种赔偿并制止你进一步的暴力。这种惩罚的权利扩展到那些没有直接参与的人。其他人可能会得知你攻击了我，并选择相应地惩罚你。显然，在自然状态下，个人在维护自然法则的方式上可能会存在偏见。他们可能会以应用自然法则的名义来促进自己的利益。这就是为什么团结在一起并成立政府是对自然状态的一种改善，因为政府可以建立一个独立的司法机构。
One of the fundamental rights that everyone in the state of nature has is a right to property. Locke sometimes uses the word ‘property’ to cover more than what we would understand by the word (land, buildings, personal belongings and so on). For Locke we also have a property in ourselves, that is, we own ourselves and have a right to do what we will provided that we don’t harm others or take our own lives. Locke’s account of the origin of property in the state of nature only deals with property in the familiar sense, and principally with land and the fruits of agriculture. Unfortunately he doesn’t explain how it is that each of us has a property in ourselves.
在自然状态下，每个人拥有的基本权利之一就是财产权。洛克有时使用“财产”一词来涵盖比我们理解的更广泛的内容（如土地、建筑物、个人物品等）。对洛克来说，我们也拥有对自己的财产权，也就是说，我们拥有自己，并有权做我们想做的事情，只要不伤害他人或自杀。洛克关于自然状态下财产起源的论述仅涉及我们熟悉的财产概念，主要是土地和农业的产物。不幸的是，他并没有解释我们每个人是如何拥有自己财产的。
How, then, do individuals acquire rightful claims on land, particularly in view of the religious doctrine that God handed the world over to Adam to be held in common by all humanity? The essence of Locke’s answer is that human labour, which adds to the value of the land, gives a right of property in the state of nature, provided that no one else has a prior claim on the land. The labourer who ‘mixes’ his or her labour with the land is entitled to that land. Imagine someone in the state of nature who lives by foraging for nuts and seeds from wild trees and plants. If he collects a bag full of this meagre food, then it rightfully belongs to him in virtue of the work he has put into gathering the foodstuff. Similarly, someone who mixes her labour with the land, who digs, plants and reaps a harvest, has a rightful entitlement to the land and its crop. However, there are strict limits on the quantity of goods which can be acquired in this way: the limit set by the law of nature is that no one should take more than they can actually use. If the forager’s nuts and seeds go mouldy before he gets round to consuming them, or the planter stores away crops which spoil, then they are both liable to punishment for transgressing the law of nature which limits an individual’s property to what he or she can use. In effect, the forager or planter who takes too much encroaches on his or her neighbour’s share.
那么，个人如何获得对土地的正当权利，特别是考虑到宗教教义认为上帝将世界交给亚当，由全人类共同拥有？洛克的回答的本质是，人类劳动增加了土地的价值，在自然状态下赋予了财产权，前提是没有其他人对土地有优先权。将其劳动与土地“混合”的劳动者有权拥有该土地。想象一下，在自然状态下，有人靠从野生树木和植物中觅食坚果和种子为生。如果他收集了一袋这种微薄的食物，那么根据他为收集这些食物所付出的劳动，这些食物理应属于他。同样，某个将她的劳动与土地混合的人，挖掘、种植并收获的人，对土地及其作物有正当的权利。然而，以这种方式获得的商品数量是有严格限制的：自然法则设定的限制是，任何人都不应获取超过他们实际能够使用的数量。 如果觅食者的坚果和种子在他消费之前发霉，或者种植者储存的作物变质，那么他们都可能因违反自然法则而受到惩罚，该法则限制个人的财产为他或她可以使用的部分。实际上，过度采集的觅食者或种植者侵犯了邻居的份额。
However, because of the inherent perishability of so many of the necessities of human existence, particularly food, human beings typically agree to give value to some less perishable objects such as gold or silver. By mutual consent, individuals in the state of nature undertake to exchange perishable goods for these non-perishable objects. Thus money is invented. And money transforms the possibilities of property-acquisition in the state of nature since it allows individuals to amass large amounts of property without risking spoilage. For example, a farmer can grow large amounts of corn and then exchange anything that he doesn’t eat for money. Thus he acquires a valuable and lasting commodity which can be exchanged for the necessities of life as required. He also helps to feed other members of the community. By tacitly agreeing to the institution of money, Locke believes, we have all accepted the material inequality between individuals which almost inevitably follows from it.
然而，由于人类生存所需的许多物品，特别是食物，具有固有的易腐性，人类通常同意赋予一些不易腐烂的物品如黄金或白银以价值。在自然状态下，个人通过相互同意，承诺用易腐烂的商品交换这些非易腐烂的物品。因此，货币被发明出来。货币改变了自然状态下财产获取的可能性，因为它允许个人在不冒腐烂风险的情况下积累大量财产。例如，农民可以种植大量玉米，然后用他不吃的任何东西换取货币。因此，他获得了一种有价值且持久的商品，可以根据需要用来交换生活必需品。他还帮助养活社区的其他成员。洛克认为，通过默默同意货币制度，我们都接受了几乎不可避免地随之而来的个人之间的物质不平等。
So far we have just looked at what Locke has to say about the state of nature, a situation governed by God-given laws of nature. However, one of his main aims is to show how what he calls a civil society or a commonwealth (he uses the terms interchangeably) can come into being, and how the members of such a society stand to benefit by its existence.
到目前为止，我们只看了洛克关于自然状态的论述，这是一种由上帝赋予的自然法则所支配的情况。然而，他的主要目标之一是展示他所称的公民社会或联邦（他交替使用这两个术语）是如何形成的，以及这样的社会的成员如何从其存在中受益。
The principal motivation for leaving the state of nature is a need for protection: protection of life, liberty and property, and especially the last of these. Although in the state of nature everyone is entitled to punish anyone who breaks a law of nature, inevitably self-interest affects the partiality of those who are asked to judge their neighbours. In order to guarantee a peaceful life it is necessary to move from the state of nature into an organised society. This involves giving up some of the rights you have in the state of nature. In particular it involves waiving the right to mete out punishment for transgressions of the laws of nature. By mutual agreement members of a society give up this right because of the greater safety they stand to gain by doing so. They put the power of making and enforcing laws in the hands of some individual or group of people entrusted to act for the common good.
离开自然状态的主要动机是对保护的需求：对生命、自由和财产的保护，尤其是最后一点。虽然在自然状态下，每个人都有权惩罚任何违反自然法则的人，但不可避免地，自利会影响那些被要求判断邻居的人的偏见。为了保证和平的生活，有必要从自然状态转向一个有组织的社会。这涉及放弃你在自然状态下拥有的一些权利。特别是，它涉及放弃对违反自然法则的惩罚权。通过相互协议，社会成员放弃这一权利，因为这样做可以获得更大的安全。他们将制定和执行法律的权力交给一些被委托为公共利益行事的个人或团体。
The only way in which individuals can give up some of the freedoms of the state of nature is by giving their consent. Locke writes of the ‘compact’ that individuals make one with another, by which he means the agreement or contract: it is his term for what is usually known as the social contract. If this compact is entered into freely and explicitly, it is what he calls an express agreement; when the compact is simply implied by behaviour rather than explicitly agreed on, it is a tacit agreement.
个人放弃自然状态下某些自由的唯一方式是通过给予他们的同意。洛克写到个体之间所达成的“契约”，他所指的是协议或合同：这是他对通常所称的社会契约的术语。如果这个契约是自愿和明确地达成的，他称之为明示协议；当契约仅仅通过行为暗示而不是明确同意时，它就是默示协议。
You might object that you weren’t born into a state of nature, but rather found yourself in the midst of an organised society with laws and government already in place. How, then, can you have consented to giving up some of your basic rights? The notion of government by consent might seem implausible, given that you have never consciously consented to the present situation. Locke’s response is that anyone who benefits from the protection of their property in a civil society, or enjoys the other benefits which such an organisation can bring, has thereby made a tacit agreement to give up some natural rights. Once the social compact has been made, the individual implicitly agrees to be bound by the decision of the majority.
你可能会反对说你并不是生于自然状态，而是发现自己身处一个已经建立法律和政府的有组织社会中。那么，你怎么能同意放弃一些基本权利呢？考虑到你从未自觉同意当前的状况，基于同意的政府概念似乎不太可信。洛克的回应是，任何在文明社会中受益于其财产保护的人，或享受这种组织所能带来的其他好处的人，已经默默同意放弃一些自然权利。一旦社会契约达成，个人就隐含地同意受多数人的决定约束。
This, however, doesn’t mean that individuals in civil society put themselves under an obligation to obey the dictates of arbitrary tyrants. The most controversial aspect of Locke’s Second Treatise at the time of publication, and no doubt one of the reasons why he chose to publish it anonymously, was his view that it can sometimes be right for citizens to overthrow and replace their rulers.
然而，这并不意味着公民社会中的个人有义务服从任意暴君的命令。洛克《第二论》在出版时最具争议的方面，毫无疑问也是他选择匿名出版的原因之一，是他认为有时公民推翻并更换统治者是正确的。
The whole point of joining together to form a civil society is the protection of life, liberty and property. When a ruthless government or ruler oversteps its legitimate role and ceases to act for the public good in these respects, then, Locke argues, it is acceptable for the people to rise up and overthrow that government or ruler. The government or ruler is given a position of trust; when that trust is betrayed all obligation on the part of the people is dissolved. By failing to act for the public good the government or ruler forfeits the power which the people bestowed upon it by their social compact. This follows from Locke’s belief that all legitimate government is government by consent. To the accusation that this sounds like an incitement to rebellion, Locke replies that it surely cannot be right to defer to robbers and pirates: the implication being that those who rule without the people’s consent and act contrary to the common good are the equivalent of criminals and do not deserve to be obeyed. On Locke’s account, no government or ruler has any right to absolute power over its citizens. The limits on power are the limits of serving the common good.
组成公民社会的整个意义在于保护生命、自由和财产。当一个无情的政府或统治者超越其合法角色，并在这些方面不再为公众利益行事时，洛克认为，人民起来推翻该政府或统治者是可以接受的。政府或统治者被赋予信任的位置；当这种信任被背叛时，人民的所有义务就被解除。通过未能为公众利益行事，政府或统治者失去了人民通过社会契约赋予它的权力。这源于洛克的信念，即所有合法的政府都是基于同意的政府。对于这种听起来像是煽动叛乱的指控，洛克回应说，显然不应该屈从于强盗和海盗：其含义是，那些在没有人民同意的情况下统治并且违背公共利益的人相当于罪犯，不值得被服从。在洛克的观点中，任何政府或统治者都没有对其公民拥有绝对权力的权利。权力的限制就是服务于公共利益的限制。
Criticisms of Second Treatise of Government
对《政府第二论》的批评
Role of God
上帝的角色
One obvious criticism of Locke’s position is that it is heavily dependent on the existence of the Christian, or at least the Old Testament, God. The notion of a law of nature, which is fundamental to his theory of government, is derived from orthodox Christian doctrine. Without God’s existence we might expect the state of nature to be something much closer to the state of war of everyone against everyone described by Hobbes. Whilst atheism was a comparatively rare phenomenon when Locke wrote his Treatises, it is a common position today. Many people are convinced that there is no god, Christian or otherwise. For such atheists Locke’s account will be unconvincing unless non-theological premises can be found for it.
对洛克立场的一个明显批评是，它严重依赖于基督教，或至少是旧约中的上帝。自然法的概念是他政府理论的基础，源于正统基督教教义。如果没有上帝的存在，我们可能会期望自然状态更接近霍布斯所描述的人人对抗的战争状态。虽然在洛克撰写《论政府》时，无神论是一种相对罕见的现象，但在今天却是一种普遍的立场。许多人坚信没有上帝，无论是基督教的还是其他的。对于这样的无神论者来说，除非能找到非神学的前提，否则洛克的论述将显得不具说服力。
No consensus about laws of nature
对自然法则没有共识
Even Christians might have worries about Locke’s account of the laws of nature. These are supposed to be God-given and readily discoverable simply by reflecting on what it would be rational to do. But it is by no means obvious that such laws exist. Locke assumes that they exist and that they are easily discerned. Yet the range of incompatible principles of action that various philosophers have claimed to discover by reflection suggests that there is little agreement about what the supposed laws of nature actually dictate. If there are no laws of nature, or if there is serious confusion about what they are, then Locke’s theory of government will founder.
即使是基督徒也可能对洛克关于自然法则的论述感到担忧。这些法则应该是上帝赋予的，并且通过反思理性应做的事情可以轻易发现。但这些法则是否存在并不明显。洛克假设它们存在，并且容易被辨别。然而，各种哲学家通过反思声称发现的相互不兼容的行动原则的范围表明，对于所谓的自然法则实际上规定了什么，几乎没有一致意见。如果没有自然法则，或者对它们是什么存在严重混淆，那么洛克的政府理论将会失败。
Class bias?
阶级偏见？
Some of Locke’s critics have singled out his discussion of property for special attention. They argue that it reveals him to have been concerned to justify the status quo in relation to land ownership, serving the interests of the property-owning classes at the expense of those who had nothing to sell but their labour. There is some textual support for this position, particularly when Locke comments that the land which has been worked by his servant becomes his (rather than his servant’s). Indeed, despite his insistence that in the state of nature everyone is free and equal, the Second Treatise seems to be a justification for extreme inequalities of property ownership.
洛克的一些批评者特别关注他对财产的讨论。他们认为这表明他关心的是为土地所有权的现状辩护，服务于拥有财产阶级的利益，而以那些除了劳动外没有任何可以出售的东西的人为代价。对此立场有一些文本支持，特别是当洛克评论说他仆人所耕作的土地变成了他的（而不是他仆人的）时。事实上，尽管他坚持在自然状态下每个人都是自由和平等的，但《第二论》似乎是在为极端的不平等财产所有权辩护。
See previous chapter.
请参见前一章。
civil society: another term for ‘commonwealth’.
公民社会：另一个“共同体”的术语。
commonwealth: a group of individuals who have, either explicitly or implicitly, given up some of their freedoms in return for protection by the state.
联邦：一群个人，他们或明或暗地放弃了一些自由，以换取国家的保护。
divine right of kings: the belief that monarchs have a God-given authority to rule.
君权神授：相信君主拥有上帝赋予的统治权。
laws of nature: God-given laws which apply to all human beings even in the state of nature.
自然法则：上帝赋予的适用于所有人类的法则，即使在自然状态下也是如此。
licence: complete freedom to do as you desire with no constraints whatsoever.
许可证：完全自由地按照您的意愿行事，没有任何限制。
social contract: an agreement to give up certain freedoms in return for state protection.
社会契约：一种放弃某些自由以换取国家保护的协议。
state of nature: the hypothetical state of humanity before any social contract has been made. The laws of nature supposedly apply even in the state of nature.
自然状态：指人类在任何社会契约达成之前的假设状态。自然法则据说即使在自然状态下也适用。
John Dunn Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Past Masters series, 1984) is an excellent short introduction to Locke’s life and work, focusing on his political thought. D. A. Lloyd Thomas Locke on Government (London: Routledge, 1995) provides a more detailed examination of Locke’s Second Treatise.
约翰·邓恩·洛克（牛津：牛津大学出版社，Past Masters 系列，1984）是一本关于洛克的生活和工作的优秀简短介绍，重点关注他的政治思想。D. A. Lloyd Thomas 的《洛克论政府》（伦敦：劳特利奇，1995）对洛克的《第二论》进行了更详细的研究。
Ian Hampsher-Monk ‘John Locke’, chapter 2 of A History of Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), sets Locke’s Two Treatises of Government in their historical context, as does Maurice Cranston’s biography of Locke (see Further Reading, p. 90).
伊恩·汉普舍-蒙克《约翰·洛克》，《现代政治思想史》第 2 章（牛津：布莱克威尔，1992 年），将洛克的《政府的两篇论文》置于其历史背景中，莫里斯·克兰斯顿的洛克传记也是如此（见进一步阅读，第 90 页）。
David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
大卫·休谟 人类理解研究
Hume was a sceptic. But, unlike some ancient Greek sceptics, he did not advocate suspending judgement on every issue. He believed that nature had equipped us well for life, and that at a certain point instinct and feeling take over and philosophical doubts, rightly, seem absurd. Hume questioned the traditional view that human beings are essentially rational. He argued that the role of reason in human life is very limited, far more limited than most previous philosophers had supposed.
休谟是一个怀疑论者。但与一些古希腊怀疑论者不同，他并不主张对每个问题都暂停判断。他相信自然赋予我们良好的生活能力，并且在某个时刻，直觉和感觉会接管，而哲学上的怀疑在此时似乎是荒谬的。休谟质疑了传统观点，即人类本质上是理性的。他认为理性在人的生活中的作用非常有限，远比大多数之前的哲学家所认为的要有限得多。
The rigour and originality of his work are startling, but particularly so in the light of the fact that he had worked out and published most of his philosophical ideas by the time he was 25 years old. His first book, A Treatise of Human Nature, received far less attention than he had hoped; he described it as having fallen ‘dead-born from the press’. The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is a rewritten and extended version of the Treatise intended to make its content more accessible. He felt that readers had been put off by his style of expression, but was, for the most part, happy with the content of the Treatise. It is difficult to imagine a present-day philosopher going to such lengths for the sake of the reader.
他的作品的严谨性和原创性令人震惊，尤其考虑到他在 25 岁时就已经完成并发表了大部分哲学思想。他的第一本书《人性论》没有得到他所希望的关注；他形容它为“死胎从印刷机中诞生”。《人类理解研究》是对《人性论》的重写和扩展版本，旨在使其内容更易于理解。他觉得读者被他的表达风格所排斥，但对《人性论》的内容大部分还是感到满意。很难想象当今的哲学家会为了读者而付出如此大的努力。
Like Locke, Hume is usually described as an empiricist; like Locke he believes that the entire contents of the mind are ultimately derived from experience. Hume is an empiricist, not just in terms of his conclusions about the origins of our thoughts, but also in his methodology. Rather than attempting to deduce from first principles what human beings must be like, he relies on observation, usually in the form of introspection. His aim is to produce a coherent scientific view of humanity.
像洛克一样，休谟通常被描述为经验主义者；和洛克一样，他认为心灵的全部内容最终源于经验。休谟不仅在关于我们思想起源的结论上是经验主义者，在他的方法论上也是如此。他并不是试图从第一原则推导出人类必须是什么样子，而是依赖于观察，通常以内省的形式进行。他的目标是产生一个连贯的人性科学观点。
Many of his views on the mind and its relation to the world are influenced by Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, but Hume took them a stage further. One aspect of his philosophy which is very similar to Locke’s is his reliance on the theory of ideas. Hume, however, introduced several new terms. Where Locke just used the word ‘idea’, Hume talks of ‘perceptions’, ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’.
他对心智及其与世界关系的许多看法受到洛克的《人类理解论》的影响，但休谟将这些观点推向了更深的层次。他的哲学中有一个与洛克非常相似的方面是他对观念理论的依赖。然而，休谟引入了几个新术语。洛克只是使用“观念”这个词，而休谟则谈到“感知”、“印象”和“观念”。
Hume uses the word ‘perception’ for any contents of experience: the equivalent of Locke’s ‘idea’. Perceptions occur when we are seeing, feeling, remembering, imagining and so on: a much wider range of mental activity than is covered by our present-day use of the word. For Hume perceptions are of two basic kinds: impressions and ideas.
休谟使用“感知”一词来指代任何经验内容：相当于洛克的“观念”。感知发生在我们看到、感觉、记忆、想象等时：这比我们今天对这个词的使用涵盖了更广泛的心理活动。对休谟来说，感知有两种基本类型：印象和观念。
Impressions are the experiences we get when we see, feel, love, hate, desire or will anything. Hume describes them as more ‘lively’ than ideas, by which he seems to mean that they are clearer and more detailed. Ideas are copies of impressions; they are the objects of our thought when we recollect our experience or exercise our imagination.
印象是我们在看到、感受、爱、恨、渴望或意愿任何事物时所获得的体验。休谟将它们描述为比观念更“生动”，他似乎是指它们更清晰、更详细。观念是印象的复制品；它们是我们在回忆经验或运用想象力时思考的对象。
So, for example, I now have an idea of my pen moving across my page and of someone turning the pages of a book behind me in the library. I also have an impression of the texture of the paper underneath my hand. These sensory experiences are vivid: it would be difficult to convince me that I am simply remembering previous experiences, or that I am dreaming. Later, when I type these lines into my computer, I will no doubt think back to this moment and recollect my impressions. Then I will be having ideas rather than impressions, ideas which won’t have the same vividness (or ‘liveliness’ in Hume’s terminology) as do the present sensory impressions of which they are copies.
所以，例如，我现在有一个想法，感觉到我的钢笔在纸上移动，以及有人在我身后的图书馆翻书。我还感受到手下纸张的质感。这些感官体验非常生动：要让我相信我只是回忆以前的经历，或者我在做梦，都是很困难的。稍后，当我把这些文字输入到我的电脑时，我无疑会回想起这一刻，并回忆起我的印象。那时，我将拥有想法而不是印象，这些想法不会像现在的感官印象那样生动（或者用休谟的术语来说是“活泼”）。
Hume recasts Locke’s assertion that there are no innate ideas as all our ideas are copies of impressions. In other words, it is impossible for us to have an idea of something which we have not first experienced as an impression.
休谟重新阐述了洛克的主张，即没有先天观念，因为我们所有的观念都是印象的复制。换句话说，我们不可能对某样东西有观念，除非我们首先将其作为印象体验过。
How, then, would Hume cope with my ability to imagine a golden mountain even though I have never seen one and so never had an impression of one? His answer relies on a distinction between simple and complex ideas. Simple ideas are all derived from simple impressions. They are ideas of such things as colours and shape, ideas which cannot be broken down into composite parts. Complex ideas are combinations of simple ideas. So, my idea of a golden mountain is just a complex idea composed of the simpler ideas of ‘a mountain’ and of ‘golden’. And these simple ideas are ultimately derived from my experience of mountains and of golden things.
那么，休谟将如何应对我想象一个金色山脉的能力，尽管我从未见过它，因此也从未对它有过印象？他的回答依赖于简单观念和复杂观念之间的区别。简单观念都是源于简单印象。它们是关于颜色和形状等事物的观念，这些观念无法被分解为复合部分。复杂观念是简单观念的组合。因此，我对金色山脉的观念只是由“山脉”和“金色”这两个简单观念组成的复杂观念。而这些简单观念最终源于我对山脉和金色事物的经验。
Support for the belief that all our ideas derive from earlier impressions comes from the suggestion that any of our ideas can on reflection be broken down into its component parts which can then be seen to have come from impressions. Further support for this account comes from the observation that a man who had been completely blind from birth would be incapable of having an idea of the colour red since he would have had no visual impression of the colour. Similarly, and more contentiously, Hume declares that someone who was selfish wouldn’t be able to form an idea of feelings of generosity.
支持所有我们的想法源于早期印象的信念的证据来自于这样的建议：我们的任何想法在反思时都可以被分解为其组成部分，而这些组成部分可以被看作是来自印象的进一步支持。这一观点的进一步支持来自于观察到一个从出生起就完全失明的人将无法形成对红色的想法，因为他没有对该颜色的视觉印象。同样，更具争议的是，休谟宣称一个自私的人将无法形成慷慨情感的想法。
However, though Hume thinks that, for the most part, his refinement of Locke’s theory of ideas will be able to explain the origin of any particular idea, he does nevertheless identify an exception to this principle. The exception is the missing shade of blue. Someone who has seen a wide range of shades of blue may never have had an impression of one particular shade. Despite this, he can form an idea of this missing shade of blue. According to Hume’s theory this should be impossible since he will have had no simple impression to which the idea of the colour corresponds. However, he is not unduly worried about this apparent counterexample because it is so exceptional and hence he does not refine his basic principles in the light of it.
然而，尽管休谟认为，在大多数情况下，他对洛克的观念理论的细化能够解释任何特定观念的起源，但他确实识别出这一原则的一个例外。这个例外是缺失的蓝色阴影。一个见过多种蓝色阴影的人可能从未对某种特定的阴影产生过印象。尽管如此，他仍然可以形成对这种缺失的蓝色阴影的观念。根据休谟的理论，这应该是不可能的，因为他没有与该颜色的观念相对应的简单印象。然而，他并不太担心这个明显的反例，因为它是如此特殊，因此他并没有根据它来细化他的基本原则。
Hume suggests three types of link between ideas. These provide an explanation of how it is that we move from one thought to another. They are: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect.
休谟提出了三种思想之间的联系。这些联系解释了我们如何从一个想法转移到另一个想法。它们是：相似性、接近性和因果关系。
If two things resemble each other, then our thought of one naturally leads us to thoughts of the other. So, for example, when I look at a picture of my daughter, my thoughts are naturally led to my daughter herself. If two things are contiguous in time or place, that is, if they occur close to one another, then, similarly, an idea of one will lead to an idea of the other. So, if I think about my kitchen, then my thought will move easily to the adjoining living room because they are close together. Lastly, if two things are related because one is the cause of the other, then thoughts about the cause will lead us to thoughts about the effect. For instance, if I have an idea of stubbing my toe, then, as this is the cause of pain, my thoughts will move easily to ideas of pain.
如果两件事物彼此相似，那么我们对其中一件的思考自然会引导我们想到另一件。因此，例如，当我看着我女儿的照片时，我的思绪自然会转向我女儿本人。如果两件事物在时间或地点上是相邻的，也就是说，如果它们发生得很接近，那么同样，一个想法会引导我们想到另一个想法。因此，如果我想到我的厨房，那么我的思绪会轻松转向相邻的客厅，因为它们很靠近。最后，如果两件事物是因为一个是另一个的原因而相关的，那么关于原因的思考会引导我们想到结果。例如，如果我想到撞到我的脚趾，那么，由于这会引起疼痛，我的思绪会轻松转向疼痛的想法。
Armed with his distinction between ideas and impressions and the three principles of the association of ideas, Hume believes he can account for all the workings of our conscious minds.
休谟凭借他对观念和印象的区分以及观念联想的三个原则，相信他可以解释我们意识心智的所有运作。
One billiard ball strikes another and causes it to move. That is what we see and that is how we describe it. But what does it mean to say that one thing causes another? This is a fundamental question for Hume since, as he points out, all our thinking about matters of fact involves arguing from known causes to expected effects, or from perceived effects to probable causes. For instance, if I found a watch on a desert island I would assume that the cause of its being there was that someone had once left it on the island. If I heard a voice speaking in the dark I would assume there was someone there. These are examples of reasoning from effects to their causes. When I see one billiard ball rolling towards another, I anticipate its effect when it makes contact, thus reasoning from cause to probable effect. Scientific reasoning too is based on reasoning about cause and effect.
一颗台球撞击另一颗台球并使其移动。这就是我们所看到的，也是我们描述它的方式。但是，说一个事物导致另一个事物是什么意思呢？这是休谟的一个基本问题，因为正如他所指出的，我们对事实问题的所有思考都涉及从已知原因推导出预期效果，或从感知效果推导出可能原因。例如，如果我在一个荒岛上发现了一只手表，我会假设它在那里存在的原因是曾经有人把它留在了岛上。如果我在黑暗中听到一个声音，我会假设那里有一个人。这些都是从效果推导其原因的推理例子。当我看到一颗台球朝另一颗台球滚去时，我预期它接触时的效果，从而从原因推导出可能的效果。科学推理也是基于对因果关系的推理。
Yet, rather than take the relations between cause and effect for granted, as we inevitably do most of the time, Hume questions where we get our idea of it from. No matter how many times I watch collisions of billiard balls, I will not be able to discern anything in the first ball that means that the second ball must move in a certain direction. Hume believes that the source of all our knowledge about causal relations is experience. Until we have observed two billiard balls colliding (or at least some similar event), we will have no idea about what will happen. Adam, the first man, wouldn’t have been able to tell that the effect of submerging his head in water would be that he would drown. Until he had experience of water he would not have had any way of knowing its effects.
然而，与其理所当然地接受因果关系，正如我们大多数时候不可避免地所做的那样，休谟质疑我们从何而来对它的理解。无论我看多少次台球的碰撞，我都无法从第一颗球中辨别出第二颗球必须朝某个方向移动的任何迹象。休谟认为，我们对因果关系的所有知识来源于经验。在我们观察到两颗台球碰撞（或至少某种类似事件）之前，我们对将会发生的事情毫无概念。亚当，第一人，无法预见将头浸入水中的结果是他会溺水。在他没有水的经验之前，他无法知道水的影响。
Once Adam learnt something about the effects of water, he would have predicted that it would continue to behave in the same way. This type of reasoning about the future based on past regularities is known as induction. Similar causes produce similar effects, and we cannot help assuming that in this respect the future will be like the past. However, it is at this point that the so-called problem of induction becomes apparent. Our justification for assuming that the future will be like the past is flimsy. Yet it is the basis of all our thought. I can’t use the fact that the assumption of regularity in nature has served me well in the past as a justification of inductive reasoning about the future: that would be a viciously circular argument using induction to justify induction. The fact is that it is just a habit that human beings have, albeit one that, on the whole, serves us well. It is custom and habit that guide us through life, not our powers of reason.
一旦亚当了解到水的影响，他就会预测它将继续以相同的方式表现。这种基于过去规律对未来的推理被称为归纳。相似的原因产生相似的结果，我们无法不假设在这方面未来将与过去相似。然而，正是在这一点上，所谓的归纳问题变得明显。我们假设未来将与过去相似的理由是脆弱的。然而，这正是我们所有思维的基础。我不能用自然规律的假设在过去对我有利这一事实作为对未来进行归纳推理的理由：那将是一个恶性循环的论证，用归纳来证明归纳。事实是，这只是人类的一种习惯，尽管总体上，这种习惯对我们有益。引导我们生活的不是我们的推理能力，而是习俗和习惯。
Our knowledge of cause and effect, when closely examined, amounts to an assumption that if two things are constantly found together with one occurring prior to the other then we will call the first a cause of the second the effect. Beyond what Hume calls ‘constant conjunction’ and priority in time of cause to effect, there is no necessary connection between a cause and its effect. It’s not that Hume wants us to abandon our trust in relations between causes and effects: that would be impossible for us anyway. Rather he is demonstrating how little our behaviour is dependent on reason, and how much on our inherited nature and habits.
我们对因果关系的认识，经过仔细审视，实际上是一种假设：如果两件事总是一起出现，并且一件事发生在另一件事之前，那么我们就会称第一件事为第二件事的原因，第二件事为结果。除了休谟所称的“恒常联结”和因果关系中原因优先于结果的时间顺序外，原因与其结果之间并没有必要的联系。休谟并不是想让我们放弃对因果关系的信任：这对我们来说无论如何都是不可能的。相反，他是在展示我们的行为在多大程度上依赖于我们的理性，以及在多大程度上依赖于我们继承的天性和习惯。
Traditionally human free will has been thought to be incompatible with all our actions being caused. If every human action is simply the effect of some prior cause, then our sense of having control over our actions is misleading. Free will on this view is just an illusion. And without free will there can be no room for moral responsibility and culpability: if all our actions are caused and are thus outside our control, it cannot be appropriate to praise or blame us for them.
传统上，人类的自由意志被认为与我们所有的行为都是由原因引起的这一观点不相容。如果每一个人类行为仅仅是某种先前原因的结果，那么我们对自己行为的控制感就是误导性的。在这种观点下，自由意志只是一种幻觉。而没有自由意志，就没有道德责任和过失的空间：如果我们所有的行为都是由原因引起的，因此超出了我们的控制，那么赞扬或责备我们就不合适。
Hume opposed this way of thinking, arguing both that all our actions are in some sense caused and that we have free will. This view is usually known as compatibilism. Hume’s argument is somewhat sketchy. He stresses that human beings are just as much subject to natural laws as is physical matter. For instance, similar motives tend to produce similar actions: there is the same sort of constant conjunction of cause and effect found in the human world as in the material one. Someone who leaves a purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross would no more expect to find it there when he returns than he would expect it to sprout wings and fly. There is a predictable regularity in human behaviour, and this is evident throughout history and in every nation. This regularity in human nature in no way undermines the possibility of each of us choosing what we will do. There is, then, for Hume no contradiction involved between our actions being predictable and their being freely chosen.
休谟反对这种思维方式，认为我们的所有行为在某种意义上都是有原因的，同时我们也拥有自由意志。这种观点通常被称为兼容论。休谟的论点有些粗略。他强调，人类同样受到自然法则的支配，就像物质一样。例如，相似的动机往往会产生相似的行为：在人的世界中与物质世界中一样，因果关系的恒常结合是相同的。一个在查令十字路口的人如果把装满黄金的钱包留在路上，他回来的时候不会指望能在那里找到它，就像他不会指望它长出翅膀飞走一样。人类行为中存在可预测的规律，这在历史和每个国家中都显而易见。这种人性中的规律性并不以任何方式削弱我们每个人选择自己所做事情的可能性。因此，对于休谟来说，我们的行为可预测与自由选择之间并不存在矛盾。
Hume considers the suggestion that his account of human behaviour has the consequence that either none of our actions are wrong, since they can be traced back to God as their cause; or else our evil actions ultimately spring from God. With a certain amount of irony Hume rejects both options as obviously absurd and suggests that the answer to this problem is beyond the scope of his philosophy. However, most of his readers would have appreciated that he was presenting a thinly concealed attack on the notion of God. If there is no God, or if God is not as the theologians describe him, then there may be no problem about attributing responsibility for evil human actions.
休谟考虑了这样的建议：他的关于人类行为的论述导致的结果是，要么我们的所有行为都没有错，因为它们可以追溯到上帝作为其原因；要么我们的邪恶行为最终源于上帝。休谟带着一定的讽刺拒绝了这两种选择，认为它们显然是荒谬的，并暗示这个问题的答案超出了他的哲学范围。然而，他的大多数读者会意识到，他实际上是在对上帝的概念进行微妙的攻击。如果没有上帝，或者上帝并不像神学家所描述的那样，那么在归责于邪恶人类行为时可能就没有问题。
His scepticism about various arguments for the existence of God continues in two important chapters, one on the so-called Argument from Design, and the other on miracles. These chapters were not included in the Treatise. They were considered extremely controversial when published in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and the discussion of miracles was the subject of many pamphlets from enraged theologians. As the chapter on the Argument from Design overlaps substantially with the argument in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (the subject of the next chapter in this book), I will not discuss it here.
他对各种关于上帝存在的论证的怀疑在两个重要章节中继续，一个是关于所谓的设计论证，另一个是关于奇迹。这些章节没有包含在《论述》中。当它们在《人类理解的探讨》中发表时，被认为极具争议，关于奇迹的讨论引发了愤怒的神学家们撰写了许多小册子。由于关于设计论证的章节与他在《自然宗教对话》中提出的论证有很大重叠（这是本书下一章的主题），我在这里不讨论它。
The basic principle that Hume asks us to accept is that a wise person will always proportion his or her belief to the evidence available on any issue. This uncontroversial principle is the starting point for his dismissal of the suggestion that we should believe sincere accounts by those who claim to have witnessed miracles.
休谟要求我们接受的基本原则是，明智的人总是会根据任何问题上可用的证据来调整自己的信念。这个不具争议性的原则是他驳斥那些声称目睹奇迹的人所提供的真诚叙述应该被相信的建议的出发点。
Hume is very clear about what a miracle is. It is a transgression of a law of nature, and one which is usually presumed to have been caused by God. Miracles should not be confused with merely extraordinary occurrences. For example, it would be a miracle if I suddenly began to hover two feet above the ground with no support and nothing physically keeping me there. It would be merely extraordinary if I were to win the lottery. Hovering above the ground involves defying the established laws of physics; winning the lottery is no miracle (unless, perhaps, I were to win it without holding a ticket): it is just a relatively unlikely occurrence given the massive odds against its happening to me.
休谟对奇迹的定义非常清晰。奇迹是对自然法则的违反，通常被认为是由上帝造成的。奇迹不应与仅仅是非凡的事件混淆。例如，如果我突然在没有任何支撑和物理条件的情况下悬浮在离地面两英尺的地方，那将是一个奇迹。如果我中了彩票，那仅仅是非凡的事件。悬浮在空中涉及到违背已建立的物理法则；中奖并不是奇迹（除非，也许，我在没有持有彩票的情况下中奖）：这只是一个相对不太可能发生的事件，因为发生在我身上的几率极小。
Many people claim to have witnessed miracles in the above sense. However, Hume argues that we should never believe their testimony unless it would be more miraculous that they were lying or deceived than that the miracle occurred. We should always believe the lesser miracle, and always prefer an explanation that relies on the merely extraordinary to one which is based on the occurrence of something miraculous. This is the sensible policy of someone who proportions belief to the available evidence.
许多人声称在上述意义上目睹了奇迹。然而，休谟认为，我们不应该相信他们的证词，除非他们撒谎或被欺骗的可能性比奇迹发生的可能性更为奇妙。我们应该始终相信较小的奇迹，并始终优先考虑依赖于仅仅是非凡的解释，而不是基于奇迹发生的解释。这是一个根据可用证据来调整信念的人的明智政策。
Hume suggests that the evidence should always incline us to believe that no miracle has happened. This is because any law of nature has been confirmed by numerous observations of it holding. Given the principle of believing in proportion to the available evidence, Hume maintains that particular eye-witness testimony of miracles is insufficient evidence on which to base the view that a law of nature has been transgressed. His position is bolstered by facts of psychology such as that human beings get a great deal of pleasure from emotions of amazement and wonder, the kinds of emotions that are typically aroused by reports of miracles. This can be a stimulus to self-deception about whether what you are witnessing is a miracle or not. Most of those who claim to have witnessed miracles stand to gain a great deal: they are likely to be given special treatment and to be thought of as specially chosen by God. This can act as a strong incentive to deceive either others or themselves.
休谟认为，证据应该始终倾向于让我们相信没有奇迹发生。这是因为任何自然法则都已通过无数次观察得到确认。根据根据可用证据的比例相信的原则，休谟认为，关于奇迹的特定目击证据不足以支持自然法则被违反的观点。他的立场得到了心理学事实的支持，例如人类从惊奇和敬畏的情感中获得了极大的快乐，这些情感通常是由奇迹的报道引发的。这可能成为自我欺骗的刺激，让人怀疑自己所目睹的是否是奇迹。大多数声称目睹奇迹的人都能获得很大的利益：他们可能会受到特殊待遇，并被认为是上帝特别选择的人。这可能成为欺骗他人或自我的强大动力。
All these factors combine to make it much more likely in any particular case that a miracle didn’t take place than that it did. Hume does not rule out the logical possibility of miracles occurring; but he does suggest that a wise person should never believe a report of one.
所有这些因素结合在一起，使得在任何特定情况下，奇迹没有发生的可能性远大于发生的可能性。休谟并不排除奇迹发生的逻辑可能性；但他确实建议，一个明智的人永远不应该相信关于奇迹的报告。
Hume ends his Enquiry with a forceful condemnation of philosophical writing which does not meet up to his strict empirical principles. Of any book he asks two questions. The dichotomy set up by these two questions has come to be known as Hume’s Fork. The two questions are: first, does it contain any abstract reasoning of the sort found in mathematics or geometry? If not, does it contain any factual statements of a kind that can be observed or tested? If neither, he declares, ‘Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.’
休谟在他的《研究》中以强烈的谴责结束了那些不符合他严格经验原则的哲学著作。他对任何一本书提出两个问题。这两个问题所建立的二分法被称为休谟的分叉。这两个问题是：第一，它是否包含任何类似于数学或几何的抽象推理？如果没有，它是否包含任何可以观察或测试的事实陈述？如果两者都没有，他宣称：“那么就把它投入火中吧；因为它只能包含诡辩和幻觉。”
Criticisms of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
对《人类理解研究》的批评
Presupposes theory of ideas
假设思想理论
Hume’s philosophy, especially his account of induction, has been remarkably resilient in the face of criticism. However, one part of it which has been rejected by almost all present-day philosophers is the theory of ideas. Hume did not really argue for this account of the mind, but rather took it for granted and refined it. Yet, there are numerous difficulties which arise for this sort of representative theory, some of which were mentioned in the chapter on Locke’s Essay, such as the homunculus problem.
休谟的哲学，特别是他对归纳法的论述，在面对批评时表现出惊人的韧性。然而，几乎所有当代哲学家都拒绝了其中的一个部分，即观念理论。休谟并没有真正为这种心智的论述辩护，而是理所当然地接受并加以完善。然而，这种代表性理论出现了许多困难，其中一些在关于洛克《论文》的章节中提到过，例如小人问题。
The missing shade of blue presents a counterexample
缺失的蓝色阴影提供了一个反例
As we have seen, Hume does consider the example of the missing shade of blue as a possible counterexample to his view that all our ideas come from prior impressions, but he dismisses it as an exceptional case. However, the same sort of example could be constructed for any of the five senses: the missing note in a musical scale, the missing taste between two known tastes, the missing texture, the missing smell that falls between two perfumes. This sort of example, if taken seriously, presents a greater threat to Hume’s account of the mind than he seems to realise.
正如我们所看到的，休谟确实考虑了缺失的蓝色阴影作为对他认为我们所有的观念都来自先前印象的观点的一个可能反例，但他将其视为一个例外。然而，对于五种感官中的任何一种，都可以构造出类似的例子：音乐音阶中的缺失音符、两个已知味道之间缺失的味道、缺失的质感、两个香水之间缺失的气味。如果认真对待这种例子，它对休谟的心智理论构成的威胁比他似乎意识到的要大。
There are, however, at least two ways in which Hume might respond to this sort of criticism. First, he could simply deny the possibility of having an idea of the missing shade of blue (or any of its equivalents). He chose not to do this. Second, he might consider the idea of the missing shade a complex idea, perhaps a combination of the ideas of blue and of the relation of being lighter than. However, because of a commitment to the supposition that ideas of colours are always simple ideas, he chooses not to do this either.
然而，休谟可能有至少两种方式来回应这种批评。首先，他可以简单地否认对缺失的蓝色阴影（或其任何等价物）有想法的可能性。他选择不这样做。其次，他可能会考虑缺失的阴影的想法是一个复杂的想法，也许是蓝色的想法和“比……更浅”的关系的结合。然而，由于他坚持认为颜色的想法总是简单的想法，他也选择不这样做。
1711 | born in Edinburgh, Scotland. |
1739–40 | Treatise of Human Nature published. |
1748 | Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding published. |
1776 | dies in Edinburgh. |
1779 | Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (see next chapter) published posthumously. |
compatibilism: the belief that all our actions have prior causes and yet that we do genuinely have free will and not just an illusion of it.
兼容论：相信我们所有的行为都有先前的原因，但我们确实拥有自由意志，而不仅仅是这种自由意志的幻觉。
constant conjunction: when two or more things are always found together.
恒常结合：当两个或多个事物总是一起出现时。
contiguity: closeness, for example, in time or in space.
接近性：在时间或空间上的紧密性。
idea: a copy of an impression. Notice that Hume’s use of this term is more restricted than Locke’s.
观点：印象的一个副本。请注意，休谟对这个术语的使用比洛克的更为有限。
impression: any direct perception, including of our own feelings. Impressions are, according to Hume, more vivid (‘lively’) than the ideas they give rise to.
印象：任何直接的感知，包括我们自己的感受。根据休谟，印象比它们所引发的观念更生动（“生动”）。
induction: generalising on the basis of a limited range of cases. You use induction when you predict the future on the basis of what has happened in the past.
归纳：基于有限范围案例的概括。当你根据过去发生的事情预测未来时，你使用归纳。
miracle: a transgression of a law of nature attributed to God’s intervention.
奇迹：一种被归因于上帝干预的自然法则的违反。
perception: Hume’s term for any thought, whether an impression or an idea.
感知：休谟对任何思想的术语，无论是印象还是观念。
scepticism: philosophical doubt.
怀疑主义：哲学怀疑。
John Passmore’s interview with Bryan Magee in Bryan Magee The Great Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), provides a clear overview of some of Hume’s central themes, as does the relevant chapter of Stephen Priest’s The British Empiricists (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990).
约翰·帕斯莫与布莱恩·麦基的访谈收录在布莱恩·麦基的《伟大的哲学家》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1988 年）中，清晰地概述了休谟的一些核心主题，斯蒂芬·普里斯特的《英国经验主义者》（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅出版社，1990 年）相关章节也是如此。
Barry Stroud Hume (London: Routledge, Arguments of the Philosophers series, 1977) is a more advanced book that emphasises the constructive as well as sceptical aspects of Hume’s philosophical project.
巴里·斯特劳德《休谟》（伦敦：劳特利奇，哲学家论证系列，1977）是一本更高级的书，强调了休谟哲学项目的建设性和怀疑性方面。
E. C. Mossner’s biography David Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1980) makes fascinating reading.
E. C. Mossner 的传记《大卫·休谟》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，第二版，1980 年）非常引人入胜。
David Edmonds and John Eidnow Rousseau’s Dog (London: Faber, 2006) is a fascinating account of David Hume’s very public quarrel with Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
大卫·埃德蒙兹和约翰·艾德诺的《卢梭的狗》（伦敦：法伯，2006）是关于大卫·休谟与让-雅克·卢梭之间非常公开争吵的迷人叙述。
David Hume Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
大卫·休谟 自然宗教对话
Apart from Plato, very few philosophers have written successfully in dialogue form. David Hume is the most impressive exception. His Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a masterpiece both of philosophical argument and literary execution. Unlike Plato, who gave Socrates all the best lines, Hume shares the good arguments between the three main speakers, Demea, Cleanthes and Philo, though it is clear that his sympathies, on the whole, lie with the last of these. The effect is to draw the reader into the debate. The ‘correct’ view is not clearly labelled as such, and must be discovered through the cut and thrust of the dialogue, a technique he borrowed from the Latin author Cicero.
除了柏拉图，极少有哲学家成功地以对话形式写作。大卫·休谟是最令人印象深刻的例外。他的《自然宗教对话》是哲学论证和文学表现的杰作。与柏拉图将所有精彩台词都给了苏格拉底不同，休谟在三位主要发言者德梅亚、克伦提斯和菲洛之间分享了好的论点，尽管很明显，他的同情总体上倾向于最后一位。其效果是将读者引入辩论。‘正确’的观点并没有明确标记出来，而是必须通过对话的切磋琢磨来发现，这是一种他从拉丁作家西塞罗那里借来的技巧。
Hume did not publish this work in his lifetime: he feared persecution from the religious authorities. However, he took great pains to make sure that it was published posthumously. The central topic of the book is the Design Argument for the existence of the Christian God. The Design Argument was the mainstay of advocates of natural religion, that is, those who based their religious beliefs on scientific evidence. Natural religion was usually contrasted with revelation. Revelation was the supposed proof of God’s existence and attributes provided by the Gospels, with their accounts of miracles performed by Christ, and in particular his resurrection. Hume had already mounted a sustained attack on the claims of revelation in his controversial essay ‘Of Miracles’, which appeared in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (discussed in the previous chapter). In the Dialogues, natural religion comes under fire, though in a more oblique way since the arguments are given by fictional characters rather than in Hume’s own voice.
休谟在生前并未出版这部作品：他担心受到宗教当局的迫害。然而，他非常努力地确保这部作品能够在他去世后出版。书中的中心主题是基督教上帝存在的设计论证。设计论证是自然宗教倡导者的支柱，即那些基于科学证据建立宗教信仰的人。自然宗教通常与启示相对立。启示是指福音书提供的上帝存在和属性的假定证明，其中包括基督所行的奇迹的记载，尤其是他的复活。休谟已经在他有争议的论文《奇迹论》中对启示的主张进行了持续的攻击，该论文出现在他的《人类理解研究》中（在前一章中讨论过）。在《对话录》中，自然宗教受到攻击，尽管以更间接的方式，因为论点是由虚构角色提出的，而不是以休谟自己的声音。
Although five characters are mentioned by name in the Dialogues, the debate is all carried by the three main speakers: Cleanthes, Demea and Philo. The whole conversation is reported by Pamphilus to his friend Hermippus, but neither of them joins in the philosophical discussion.
尽管在对话中提到了五个角色的名字，但整个辩论都是由三位主要发言人进行的：克伦提斯、德梅亚和菲洛。整个对话是由潘菲卢斯向他的朋友赫米普斯报告的，但他们两人都没有参与哲学讨论。
Each of the three main characters defends a recognisable position. Cleanthes believes in the Design Argument, the view that the apparent design in the universe proves the existence of God. He is, then, a defender of natural religion. Demea is a fideist: that is, he does not put his trust in reason, but makes a commitment of faith that God exists and that he has the attributes ascribed to him. However, he also believes that the so-called First Cause Argument provides conclusive proof of God’s existence. Philo, whose arguments are, with one possible exception, the arguments that Hume himself would have been happy to use, is a mitigated sceptic. His principal role in the Dialogues is to criticise the positions put forward by the other two main characters and thereby demonstrate that reason can reveal nothing significant about God’s attributes. In particular, his critique of the Design Argument and the conclusions which can be drawn from it is devastating. For most of the book it would be easy to take Philo to be an atheist. Nevertheless, he does state that he thinks it is obvious that God exists and that the important questions are about which attributes he has. Whether this was simply an ironic touch added by Hume to avoid accusations of racism is unclear.
三个主要角色各自捍卫一个可识别的立场。克伦提斯相信设计论，即宇宙中明显的设计证明了上帝的存在。因此，他是自然宗教的捍卫者。德梅亚是一个信仰主义者：也就是说，他不依赖理性，而是对上帝的存在及其所具备的属性做出信仰承诺。然而，他也相信所谓的第一因论提供了上帝存在的确凿证据。菲洛的论点，除了一个可能的例外，都是休谟自己会乐于使用的论点，他是一个温和的怀疑论者。他在《对话录》中的主要角色是批评其他两个主要角色提出的立场，从而证明理性无法揭示关于上帝属性的任何重要内容。特别是，他对设计论及其可以得出的结论的批评是毁灭性的。在书的大部分时间里，很容易将菲洛视为无神论者。然而，他确实表示，他认为上帝的存在是显而易见的，重要的问题是关于他具备哪些属性。 这是否只是休谟为了避免种族主义指控而添加的讽刺性修饰尚不清楚。
Cleanthes puts forward the ‘argument a posteriori’ which is now better known as the Design Argument. A posteriori arguments are arguments from experience. This is the argument that we can prove the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, benevolent God by considering the natural world. If we look around us we find that every aspect of the natural world bears the marks of apparent design. It all fits together like a machine. For instance, the human eye is brilliantly suited to seeing; the lens, cornea and retina seem to have been thought up by a superior intelligence and the design and construction of the eye is more skilful than anything made by human hands. The conclusion that Cleanthes draws from this sort of observation is that the natural world must have been designed by an intelligent creator. This creator must have had an intelligence in proportion to the magnitude and grandeur of his work and so must have been God as traditionally conceived. In other words, Cleanthes draws an analogy between nature and human artifacts, and on the basis of this concludes not only that God exists, but that he is all-powerful, all-knowing and benevolent.
克伦提斯提出了“后验论证”，现在更为人所知的是设计论证。后验论证是基于经验的论证。这是一个通过考虑自然世界来证明全能、全知、仁慈的上帝存在的论证。如果我们环顾四周，会发现自然世界的每一个方面都带有明显设计的痕迹。一切都像机器一样运转。例如，人眼非常适合视觉；镜头、角膜和视网膜似乎是由一种更高智慧构思出来的，眼睛的设计和构造比人类的任何手工艺品都更为精巧。克伦提斯从这种观察中得出的结论是，自然世界一定是由一个智能创造者设计的。这个创造者的智慧必须与他工作的规模和宏伟成正比，因此他必须是传统意义上的上帝。换句话说，克伦提斯在自然和人造物之间建立了类比，并基于此得出结论，不仅上帝存在，而且他是全能、全知和仁慈的。
To lend further support to his argument, Cleanthes uses several memorable examples. If we were to hear a voice speaking intelligently in the dark we would certainly, and quite reasonably, conclude that there was somebody there. The articulate voice in the dark would be sufficient evidence for this conclusion. The works of nature provide, according to Cleanthes, at least as much evidence for God’s existence as would an articulate voice speaking in the dark prove the presence of a speaker.
为了进一步支持他的论点，克伦提斯使用了几个令人难忘的例子。如果我们在黑暗中听到一个聪明的声音说话，我们肯定会，并且相当合理地，得出那里有人的结论。黑暗中的清晰声音足以作为这个结论的证据。根据克伦提斯的说法，自然的作品提供的证据至少与黑暗中说话的清晰声音证明说话者的存在一样多。
Another example Cleanthes uses is the vegetating library. Imagine books were living things which could reproduce like plants. If we discovered a book with its markings (words arranged in a meaningful order), then we would treat this as conclusive proof of its having been written by an intelligent being. Even if books reproduced themselves, this would not detract from the evidence they present that they contain the traces of thought. Similarly, Cleanthes alleges, we can read intelligence and design in the works of nature. Only a blind dogmatist would deny the evidence that nature provides for God’s existence and attributes. Or so Cleanthes believes. However, much of the Dialogues is taken up with Philo, and to a certain extent Demea, attacking Cleanthes’ argument.
另一个克伦提斯使用的例子是生长的图书馆。想象一下，书籍是可以像植物一样繁殖的生物。如果我们发现一本书及其标记（有意义排列的词语），那么我们会将其视为由智能生物所写的确凿证据。即使书籍能够自我繁殖，这也不会削弱它们所呈现的证据，即它们包含思想的痕迹。同样，克伦提斯声称，我们可以在自然的作品中读出智能和设计。只有盲目的教条主义者才会否认自然为上帝的存在和属性提供的证据。克伦提斯是这样认为的。然而，《对话录》的大部分内容是由菲洛以及在某种程度上是德梅亚来攻击克伦提斯的论点。
Criticisms of the Design Argument
设计论的批评
Weakness of analogy
类比的弱点
One argument that Philo uses against the Design Argument is that it rests on a relatively weak analogy between the natural world, or parts of it, and human creations. Arguments from analogy rely on there being pronounced similarities between the two things being compared. If the similarities are relatively superficial, then any conclusion drawn on their basis will be weak and will require independent evidence or argument as support.
菲洛反对设计论的一个论点是，它建立在自然世界或其部分与人类创造物之间相对薄弱的类比上。类比论证依赖于被比较的两个事物之间存在明显的相似性。如果这些相似性相对表面，那么基于它们得出的任何结论都将是薄弱的，并且需要独立的证据或论证作为支持。
If we examine a house, then it is quite reasonable to conclude from its structure that it has been designed by a builder or an architect. This is because we have had experience of similar effects (other buildings) being brought about by this sort of cause (being designed by a builder or an architect). So far we are on firm ground when we use an argument from analogy. But when the entire universe is compared to something like a house the dissimilarity between the things compared is so striking that any conclusions based on the alleged analogy between the two can be nothing more than guesswork. Yet Cleanthes treats just this sort of argument from analogy as conclusive evidence for God’s existence and attributes.
如果我们检查一座房子，那么从其结构得出它是由建筑商或建筑师设计的结论是相当合理的。这是因为我们有类似效果（其他建筑）是由这种原因（由建筑商或建筑师设计）造成的经验。到目前为止，当我们使用类比论证时，我们是站在坚实的基础上。但是，当整个宇宙与房子这样的东西进行比较时，被比较事物之间的不同之处是如此显著，以至于基于两者之间所谓类比的任何结论都无非是猜测。然而，克里安西斯将这种类比论证视为上帝存在和属性的确凿证据。
Limitations on the conclusion
结论的限制
The basic principle that underlies the Design Argument is that similar effects are produced by similar causes. Because the parts and whole of the natural world resemble a machine in some respects, it is reasonable to conclude that they originate from the same sort of cause as does a machine, namely intelligent design. However, if this principle is applied rigorously, as Philo points out, Cleanthes would be forced into an extreme form of anthropomorphism (the tendency to attribute human characteristics to non-human things, in this case to God).
设计论的基本原则是相似的效果是由相似的原因产生的。由于自然界的部分和整体在某些方面类似于机器，因此合理地得出结论，它们源自与机器相同类型的原因，即智能设计。然而，正如菲洛所指出的，如果严格应用这一原则，克伦提斯将被迫陷入一种极端的人类中心主义（将人类特征归于非人类事物的倾向，在这种情况下是指上帝）。
For instance, traditional theology teaches that God is perfect. But if we take the analogy between divine and human designers seriously, we can’t be justified in claiming that God is perfect, since human designers, manifestly, are not perfect. In which case, even if the design argument does prove the existence of a creator, it is spectacularly uninformative about his attributes.
例如，传统神学教导我们上帝是完美的。但是，如果我们认真对待神圣设计者和人类设计者之间的类比，我们就不能合理地声称上帝是完美的，因为人类设计者显然并不完美。在这种情况下，即使设计论确实证明了创造者的存在，它对他的属性也极其无信息。
To take another example: traditional theology is monotheistic. However, most complicated large-scale human projects are achieved as a result of teams of designers and builders working together. If we make strict use of analogy when trying to explain the creation of the universe, then we will have to take seriously the suggestion that the universe was created by a team of gods.
再举一个例子：传统神学是单神论的。然而，大多数复杂的大规模人类项目是由设计师和建筑师团队合作完成的。如果我们在试图解释宇宙的创造时严格使用类比，那么我们就必须认真对待宇宙是由一组神创造的这个建议。
Alternative explanations
替代解释
Philo also suggests several alternative explanations of the apparent order and design in the world. Some of these are deliberately farfetched. His point is that if we scrutinise the evidence provided by the Design Argument it can’t rule out these alternatives. There is at least as much evidence for them as there is that the Christian God is the source of order and design in the universe.
菲洛还提出了几种对世界中明显秩序和设计的替代理论。其中一些故意显得牵强。他的观点是，如果我们仔细审视设计论提供的证据，它无法排除这些替代方案。对于这些替代方案的证据至少与基督教上帝是宇宙中秩序和设计的来源的证据一样多。
For instance, at one point Philo gets very close to suggesting a theory of evolution on the lines of natural selection. He conjectures that apparent design could have arisen from the fact that those animals not well adapted to the environment in which they find themselves simply die. Thus we should not be surprised to find animals well-adapted to their surroundings. After Darwin put forward his ideas about evolution, almost a century after Hume’s Dialogues, most scientists have taken the theory of an impersonal natural selection as the best available explanation of the apparent design exhibited by animals and plants.
例如，在某个时刻，菲洛非常接近于提出一种基于自然选择的进化理论。他推测，明显的设计可能源于那些不适应其所处环境的动物会自然死亡。因此，我们不应感到惊讶，发现动物与其周围环境适应良好。在达尔文提出他的进化思想后，几乎在休谟的《对话录》发表近一个世纪后，大多数科学家将无个人色彩的自然选择理论视为对动物和植物所表现出的明显设计的最佳解释。
Another explanation that Philo toys with is that of a gigantic spider spinning the universe from its abdomen. His point is that order and apparent design don’t necessarily stem from an intelligent brain. Spiders spin webs with order and design, yet they spin from their abdomens. The analogy between a spider and a creator of the universe may seem absurd, Philo agrees. But if there were a planet inhabited solely by spiders, then it would seem the most natural explanation of order, as natural as it seems to us that all apparent design stems from human-like thought.
另一个菲洛玩味的解释是，一个巨大的蜘蛛从它的腹部编织宇宙。他的观点是，秩序和明显的设计不一定源于一个聪明的大脑。蜘蛛以有序和设计的方式编织网，但它们是从腹部编织的。菲洛同意，蜘蛛与宇宙创造者之间的类比可能显得荒谬。但如果有一个星球仅由蜘蛛居住，那么这似乎是秩序的最自然解释，就像我们认为所有明显的设计都源于类人思维一样自然。
Evil
邪恶
The most destructive criticism of the Design Argument is provided by the problem of evil. How could a benevolent God have designed a world in which there is so much suffering? Philo paints a picture of human life beset with pain. Cleanthes’ response is that such pain might be the lesser of two evils. His claim is that the reason God designed a world with so much potential for pain and suffering built into it was that any alternative world would have been even worse. But, as Philo insists, an omnipotent God could have created a better world. Or at least that’s how it seems to mere mortals. Philo identifies four principal causes of suffering, none of which seem necessary, but all of which are part of the human condition.
设计论的最具破坏性的批评来自于恶的问题。一个仁慈的上帝怎么可能设计出一个充满如此多痛苦的世界？菲洛描绘了一个充满痛苦的人类生活的画面。克伦提斯的回应是，这种痛苦可能是两种恶中的较小者。他的主张是，上帝设计一个潜在充满痛苦和苦难的世界的原因在于，任何替代世界都会更糟。但正如菲洛所坚持的，全能的上帝本可以创造一个更好的世界。或者至少在凡人看来是这样的。菲洛确定了四个主要的痛苦原因，这些原因似乎没有必要，但都是人类状况的一部分。
First, we are so constituted that pain as well as pleasure is in some cases needed to stir us into action. We seem to have been designed so that, for instance, the discomfort of extreme thirst gives us a strong incentive to find some water; whereas, Philo thinks, we could have been driven purely by the desire for pleasure of varying degrees. Second, the world, including the human world, strictly follows what he calls ‘general laws’. These are the laws of physics. A direct result of this is that all sorts of calamities occur. Yet surely a good and omnipotent God could intervene to stop such events. A few minor adjustments (such as in the present century removing a few parts of Stalin’s and Hitler’s brains) would have produced a much better world with far less suffering in it. But God chose not to intervene. Third, nature equips us with the bare minimum that we need to survive. This makes us vulnerable to the slightest fluctuation in our circumstances. Philo suggests that a benevolent parent-like God would have provided more generously for us in such things as food and natural strength. Fourth, Philo points to the bad workmanship evident in the design of the universe, at least when it is seen from a human perspective. Thus we find that although rain is necessary to help plants grow and to give us drink, it frequently rains so hard that flooding results. This and many other ‘design faults’ lead Philo to the conclusion that the creator of the universe must have been indifferent to human suffering. Certainly the Design Argument does not provide sufficient evidence to warrant a belief in a benevolent creator.
首先，我们的构成使得在某些情况下，痛苦和快乐都是促使我们采取行动所必需的。我们似乎被设计成，例如，极度口渴的不适感给我们提供了强烈的动力去寻找水；而菲洛认为，我们本可以仅仅被不同程度的快乐欲望驱动。其次，世界，包括人类世界，严格遵循他所称的“普遍法则”。这些是物理法则。这直接导致了各种灾难的发生。然而，确实，一个善良而全能的上帝可以介入以阻止这些事件。只需进行一些小的调整（例如在本世纪去除斯大林和希特勒大脑中的一些部分），就可以创造一个更美好的世界，减少许多痛苦。但上帝选择不介入。第三，大自然只为我们提供了生存所需的最低限度。这使我们对环境中最轻微的波动变得脆弱。菲洛建议，一个仁慈的父母般的上帝会在食物和自然力量等方面更慷慨地为我们提供帮助。 第四，菲洛指出，从人类的角度来看，宇宙设计中明显存在糟糕的工艺。因此，我们发现，尽管雨水对植物生长和提供饮水是必要的，但它常常下得如此猛烈，以至于导致洪水。这以及许多其他“设计缺陷”使菲洛得出结论，宇宙的创造者一定对人类的痛苦漠不关心。显然，设计论证并没有提供足够的证据来支持对仁慈创造者的信仰。
Although most of the discussion in the Dialogues focuses on the Design Argument, this is not the only alleged proof of God’s existence and nature that is brought up. Demea is an ardent defender of what he calls the ‘simple and sublime argument a priori’, better known as the Cosmological or First Cause Argument. This is the argument which begins with the assumption that anything that exists must have had a prior cause which explains its existence. If we trace the chain of effects and causes back in time we must either keep on going back in what is known as an infinite regress; or else we will find an uncaused cause, one that necessarily exists. Demea thinks the first option absurd, and so concludes that the necessarily existing uncaused cause is the first cause of everything and is God. Cleanthes’ response includes the argument that if we are looking for a first cause of everything we needn’t go back further than to the universe itself: there is no need to postulate a cause preceding that. Or, to put it another way, even if the First Cause Argument proves that there is a necessarily existing being, it does not prove that that cause is God as traditionally conceived by Christians.
尽管《对话录》中大部分讨论集中在设计论上，但这并不是提出的唯一关于上帝存在和本质的证明。德梅亚是他所称的“简单而崇高的先验论证”的热心捍卫者，这个论证更为人所知的是宇宙论或第一因论证。这个论证的出发点是，任何存在的事物都必须有一个先前的原因来解释其存在。如果我们追溯因果链，我们要么继续回溯，进入所谓的无限回归；要么我们会发现一个无因的原因，一个必然存在的原因。德梅亚认为第一种选择是荒谬的，因此得出结论，必然存在的无因原因是万物的第一因，并且就是上帝。克伦提斯的回应包括这样的论点：如果我们在寻找万物的第一因，我们不需要追溯到宇宙本身之前：没有必要假设一个在此之前的原因。或者换句话说，即使第一因论证证明了存在一个必然存在的存在者，也并不能证明这个原因是基督教传统所设想的上帝。
I have already mentioned the difficulty of unravelling precisely what Hume believed about religion on the basis of the Dialogues. Philo, despite being the character closest intellectually to Hume, is not simply a mouthpiece for the philosopher. Many of Hume’s contemporaries took it for granted that he was an atheist, and no doubt if the Dialogues had been published during his lifetime it would have been treated as conclusive proof of this. However, it is interesting that Hume was genuinely shocked when he met unashamed atheists in Paris in the 1760s, though his views might have changed by the end of his life.
我已经提到过，根据《对话录》准确解开休谟对宗教的信仰的困难。菲洛，尽管是与休谟在智力上最接近的角色，但并不仅仅是哲学家的代言人。许多休谟的同时代人理所当然地认为他是一个无神论者，毫无疑问，如果《对话录》在他生前出版，它将被视为这一点的确凿证据。然而，有趣的是，休谟在 1760 年代在巴黎遇到毫不掩饰的无神论者时感到真正震惊，尽管到他生命的尽头，他的观点可能已经改变。
His official doctrine was mitigated scepticism: a moderate form of scepticism which takes nothing on trust but does not go to the absurdities of those sceptics who attempt to live as if nothing whatsoever could be taken for granted. Mitigated scepticism applied to questions of religion points in the direction of atheism, but stops short of it. The mitigated sceptic would not accept the Design Argument as proof of the Christian God’s existence or attributes. But saying that there is insufficient evidence on which to base a belief in God’s existence is not the same as asserting that God definitely does not exist. Hume might have considered atheism itself a dogmatic position, that is, one for which there is insufficient evidence. Perhaps, then, Hume really did believe, along with Philo, that the universe had some kind of intelligent creator. However, he certainly believed that human reason was insufficient to give us detailed knowledge of what that creator, if there was one, might be like. He died without holding out any hope of an afterlife.
他的官方教义是缓和的怀疑主义：一种温和的怀疑主义形式，它不轻信任何事物，但也不走向那些试图生活得好像没有任何事情可以被视为理所当然的怀疑者的荒谬境地。缓和的怀疑主义应用于宗教问题时，指向无神论，但并未完全达到。缓和的怀疑者不会接受设计论作为基督教上帝存在或属性的证明。但说没有足够的证据来支持对上帝存在的信仰，并不等同于断言上帝肯定不存在。休谟可能认为无神论本身就是一种教条立场，也就是说，这种立场缺乏足够的证据。因此，休谟或许真的相信，和菲洛一样，宇宙有某种智能创造者。然而，他确实相信人类的理性不足以让我们详细了解那个创造者（如果存在的话）可能是什么样子。他去世时并没有对来世抱有任何希望。
See previous chapter.
请参见前一章。
analogy: a comparison between two things. Arguments from analogy rely on the supposition that if two things are alike in some respects, they are likely to be alike in others.
类比：对两件事物的比较。类比论证依赖于这样的假设：如果两件事物在某些方面相似，那么它们在其他方面也可能相似。
anthropomorphism: attributing human qualities to non-humans, in this case to God.
拟人化：将人类特质赋予非人类，这里指的是上帝。
argument a posteriori: argument from experience. In the Dialogues Hume uses this phrase to refer to the Design Argument.
后验论证：经验论证。在《对话录》中，休谟使用这个短语来指代设计论证。
argument a priori: argument from reason rather than experience. In the Dialogues Hume uses this phrase to refer to the First Cause or Cosmological Argument.
先验论证：基于理性而非经验的论证。在《对话录》中，休谟使用这个短语来指代第一因或宇宙论论证。
atheism: the belief that no God or gods exist.
无神论：相信没有神或神灵存在。
Cosmological Argument: an argument for God’s existence based on the notion that if God didn’t exist nothing would exist.
宇宙论证：基于这样一个观念的论证，认为如果上帝不存在，那么什么都不会存在。
Design Argument: an argument for God’s existence based on the evidence of design in the natural world.
设计论证：基于自然界中设计证据的上帝存在论证。
fìdeism: the position of those who rely on faith in God’s existence rather than on reason and argument.
信仰主义：依赖于对上帝存在的信仰而非理性和论证的立场。
First Cause Argument: an argument for God’s existence based on the claim that there must have been a first uncaused cause of everything and that that is God.
第一因论：一种关于上帝存在的论证，基于这样的主张：一切事物必须有一个首个无因的原因，而这个原因就是上帝。
monotheism: belief in the existence of one God.
一神论：相信只有一个神的存在。
natural religion: the belief that there is scientific evidence for God’s existence; usually contrasted with revealed religion.
自然宗教：相信有科学证据证明上帝的存在；通常与启示宗教相对。
polytheism: belief in the existence of more than one god.
多神教：相信存在多个神。
revealed religion: the belief that God’s existence is demonstrated by the testimony of miracles, especially in the scriptures.
启示宗教：相信上帝的存在通过奇迹的见证，特别是在经文中得以证明。
theism: belief in the existence of one God who is all-knowing, all-powerful and supremely benevolent.
有神论：相信存在一位全知、全能和至善的上帝。
J. C. A. Gaskin Hume’s Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan, 2nd edn, 1988) provides a clear overview of this aspect of Hume’s philosophy and contains extended discussion of the arguments used in the Dialogues.
J. C. A. Gaskin 的《休谟的宗教哲学》（伦敦：麦克米伦，第二版，1988 年）清晰地概述了休谟哲学的这一方面，并对《对话录》中使用的论点进行了详细讨论。
J. L. Mackie The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) provides an excellent introduction to the philosophy of religion and includes a discussion of Hume’s Dialogues.
J. L. Mackie 的《神论的奇迹》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1982）提供了对宗教哲学的优秀介绍，并包括对休谟的《对话》的讨论。
Hume’s ‘Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State’, which is chapter XI of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, overlaps significantly with the discussion of the Design Argument in the Dialogues, in terms of both content and literary technique.
休谟的《论特定的天意与未来的状态》，即《人类理解研究》第十一章，在内容和文学技巧上与《对话录》中关于设计论的讨论有显著重叠。
Michael Ignatieff gives a moving account of Hume’s death in ‘Metaphysics and the Marketplace’, in his The Needs of Strangers (London: Vintage, 1994).
迈克尔·伊格纳提夫在《形而上学与市场》中生动地描述了休谟的死亡，出自他的《陌生人的需求》（伦敦：Vintage，1994）。
Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract
让-雅克·卢梭 社会契约
‘Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains.’ This, the opening line of The Social Contract, has stirred the heart of many a revolutionary over the past two hundred years. Yet it is balanced in the same book by the disconcerting thought that those who fail to act for the general good of the state should be ‘forced to be free’. This sounds like a licence for oppression given the difficulty of working out what is genuinely for the good of the state. Both these ideas convey the uncompromising nature of Rousseau’s philosophy: he was never afraid to express controversial and even dangerous thoughts. In an age when the convention was to publish such views anonymously, Rousseau wrote under his own name. As a result many of his works were banned and he lived in constant fear of persecution, several times having to flee his home for safety. In the circumstances it is not surprising he became paranoid, ending up believing that he was the victim of an international conspiracy.
“人是生而自由的，但无处不在都被锁链束缚。”这是《社会契约》的开篇句，过去两百年间激励了无数革命者。然而，在同一本书中，这一思想被一个令人不安的观点所平衡：那些未能为国家的整体利益而行动的人应该“被迫获得自由”。考虑到真正为国家利益而行动的困难，这听起来像是对压迫的许可。这两个观点都传达了卢梭哲学的无情本质：他从不害怕表达有争议甚至危险的思想。在一个习惯于匿名发表此类观点的时代，卢梭以自己的名字写作。因此，他的许多作品被禁，他生活在对迫害的持续恐惧中，几次不得不逃离家园以求安全。在这种情况下，他变得偏执也就不足为奇，最终相信自己是国际阴谋的受害者。
Rousseau’s central aim in The Social Contract is to explain the sources and limits of legitimate authority. He believes that our duties towards the state stem from a social contract, or ‘social pact’, by means of which groups of individuals are transformed into a body politic: a whole which has its own general will which isn’t necessarily just a sum of the individual wills of the people of which it is composed.
卢梭在《社会契约》中的核心目标是解释合法权威的来源和限制。他认为我们对国家的义务源于社会契约或“社会 pact”，通过这个契约，个体群体被转变为一个政治体：一个拥有自己一般意志的整体，这种意志不一定只是其组成人民个体意志的总和。
Like most writers in the social contract tradition, including Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau describes the social contract as if it were a historical event. However, this isn’t meant as a claim about how actual states must have been created; rather it is a device to bring out the underlying structure of the state. He is not saying that there was a moment in history when people actually got together and made a deal with each other, but only that the relations between citizens and the state can best be understood by considering the hypothetical origins of the association.
像霍布斯和洛克等大多数社会契约传统的作家一样，卢梭将社会契约描述为一个历史事件。然而，这并不是对实际国家如何被创造的主张；而是一种揭示国家基本结构的手段。他并不是在说历史上有一个时刻，人们实际上聚在一起达成协议，而只是说，公民与国家之间的关系最好通过考虑这种假设的协会起源来理解。
The basic agreement made by members of a state is that they shall unite for their common good. There is a great deal to be gained by co-operating as part of a society rather than living alone. Society can provide protection of life and property. So individuals have a very strong incentive to collaborate and form a state.
一个国家成员达成的基本协议是，他们应为共同利益而团结。作为社会的一部分进行合作，而不是独自生活，可以获得很多好处。社会可以提供生命和财产的保护。因此，个人有很强的动力去合作并形成一个国家。
At first glance it might seem that Rousseau entertains two incompatible ideals since he both praises the freedom that all humans have, even outside society, and at the same time emphasises the great benefits of life within society. Our natural freedom is a necessary part of our humanity: if we give up our freedom entirely, or become slaves, then we cease to be fully human. If society were to take away our freedom entirely then there would be no point in joining it, since in the process we would lose our humanity. Rousseau sets himself the task of explaining how we can form a state without sacrificing our freedom. This may seem impossible since the essence of life in society is that you give up most of your natural freedoms in order to reap the benefits of protection. However, Rousseau believes that his particular version of social contract theory does provide a formula that combines genuine freedom with the fruits of society. Central to his account is his doctrine of the general will.
乍一看，卢梭似乎持有两种不相容的理想，因为他既赞美所有人类的自由，即使在社会之外，同时又强调生活在社会中的巨大好处。我们的自然自由是我们人性的必要部分：如果我们完全放弃自由，或成为奴隶，那么我们就不再是完全的人。如果社会完全剥夺我们的自由，那么加入社会就没有意义，因为在这个过程中我们会失去人性。卢梭的任务是解释我们如何在不牺牲自由的情况下形成一个国家。这看起来可能是不可能的，因为生活在社会中的本质是你放弃大部分自然自由，以获得保护的好处。然而，卢梭相信，他特定版本的社会契约理论确实提供了一种将真正自由与社会成果结合的公式。他的论述的核心是他的一般意志学说。
Once individuals have transformed themselves into a state by means of a social contract, they are united by common goals. The general will is the wish of the state as a whole: the general will aims at the common good.
一旦个人通过社会契约将自己转变为一个国家，他们就会因共同的目标而团结在一起。一般意志是国家整体的愿望：一般意志旨在追求共同利益。
The concept of the general will is probably easier to understand when it is compared with that of the will of all. It may be that all the individuals who together make up the state desire a certain outcome because they stand to gain individually by it: for instance, they might all desire a reduction in taxation. Thus the will of all the individuals is to lower taxes. However, if the whole state stands to gain by keeping taxes high, then that is the general will, even though the individuals with their combined personal interests do not wish to pursue this policy. For the common good, taxes should be kept high and anyone who resists this should be ‘forced to be free’. Similarly, I might as an individual have a vested interest in a new road not being built through my back garden. However, if the new route turns out to be the best one for the common good, then as part of the state I must at some level will this.
一般意志的概念可能在与全体意志进行比较时更容易理解。所有组成国家的个体可能因为各自的利益而希望某个结果：例如，他们可能都希望减税。因此，所有个体的意志是降低税收。然而，如果整个国家通过保持高税收而获益，那么这就是一般意志，即使个体的个人利益不希望追求这一政策。为了公共利益，税收应该保持在高位，任何抵制这一点的人都应该被“强迫自由”。同样，作为个体，我可能对不在我后花园修建新道路有既得利益。然而，如果新路线被证明是对公共利益最好的选择，那么作为国家的一部分，我在某种程度上必须愿意接受这一点。
Rousseau’s philosophy draws a sharp distinction between individuals with their personal interests and desires, which are largely self-serving, and those same individuals as parts of the state. In the latter public role, there is no scope for dissent from the general will: that would be like turning against your own better self. The self-interested desires that you have as an individual should always be subservient to the higher aims of the general will. The general will is for the common good, and the continued existence of the state depends upon its members setting aside their private interests where they conflict with the state’s interests.
卢梭的哲学明确区分了个人的个人利益和欲望，这些利益和欲望在很大程度上是自私的，以及这些个人作为国家的一部分。在后者的公共角色中，无法对一般意志表示异议：这就像是背叛你自己更好的自我。作为个体所拥有的自私欲望应始终服从于一般意志的更高目标。一般意志是为了共同利益，国家的持续存在依赖于其成员在与国家利益冲突时放弃个人利益。
This might seem to leave little room for freedom, at least as the term is generally understood. If you have to sacrifice your personal desires for the greater good of the state, then it seems that your freedom to act will often be limited. We have already seen that Rousseau is happy to advocate forcing people to be free when they refuse to acknowledge the general will. However, Rousseau maintains that far from diminishing freedom, this organisation of the state provides it. Acting in accordance with the general will is the most important form of freedom. It is civil freedom, as opposed to the mere desire-satisfaction permissible outside society. For him there is nothing paradoxical about achieving such freedom by means of force.
这似乎在一定程度上限制了自由，至少按照一般理解的定义。如果你必须为了国家的更大利益而牺牲个人的欲望，那么你的行动自由似乎常常会受到限制。我们已经看到，卢梭乐于主张在人民拒绝承认一般意志时强迫他们获得自由。然而，卢梭认为，这种国家的组织不仅没有减少自由，反而提供了自由。按照一般意志行事是最重要的自由形式。这是公民自由，与社会外允许的单纯欲望满足相对立。对他来说，通过强制手段实现这样的自由并没有什么矛盾。
The success and longevity of a state depend on the nature of its constitution. Good and appropriate laws are essential for its continued survival. Rousseau suggests that these laws should be created by a legislator. The good legislator is a remarkable individual who brings about a transformation of the people by making a flourishing state possible. Rousseau argues that the legislator’s only function should be to write the laws of the state. A legislator who was also a sovereign might be tempted to skew the laws in the direction of his own interests, knowing that he would have the power to gain by this. Nor should the legislator draw up an ideal set of laws without taking into account the nature of the people and land for whom he is working. Laws have to be tailored to circumstances.
一个国家的成功和长久依赖于其宪法的性质。良好和适当的法律对其持续生存至关重要。卢梭认为，这些法律应该由立法者制定。优秀的立法者是一个杰出的人物，通过使繁荣的国家成为可能来改变人民。卢梭认为，立法者的唯一职能应该是制定国家的法律。一个同时也是主权者的立法者可能会受到诱惑，倾向于将法律偏向于自己的利益，因为他知道自己有权从中获利。立法者也不应在不考虑他所服务的人民和土地的性质的情况下制定一套理想的法律。法律必须根据具体情况量身定制。
Government should be clearly distinguished from the sovereign. Government’s role is purely executive. This means that the government is the group of individuals who put into action the general policies that have been provided by the sovereign. The sovereign is the name Rousseau gives to the state when it is actively pursuing the general will. In less than perfect states the sovereign may take another form, but in Rousseau’s ideal state it is composed of every citizen. His use of the word ‘sovereign’ can be quite confusing because for us it can simply mean ‘monarch’. But Rousseau was thoroughly opposed to the idea that sovereign power should rest with a monarch. One reason why The Social Contract was considered to be subversive was its defence of rule by the people and its open attacks on the idea of a hereditary monarchy.
政府应与主权者明确区分。政府的角色纯粹是执行性的。这意味着政府是将主权者提供的一般政策付诸实践的一群人。主权者是卢梭赋予国家的名称，当国家积极追求一般意志时。在不完美的国家中，主权者可能采取另一种形式，但在卢梭的理想国家中，它由每个公民组成。他使用“主权”一词可能会让人感到困惑，因为对我们来说，它可以简单地意味着“君主”。但卢梭彻底反对主权权力应归于君主的观点。《社会契约论》之所以被认为是颠覆性的一个原因是它对人民统治的辩护以及对世袭君主制的公开攻击。
Three Types of Government
三种类型的政府
Rousseau considers three possible types of government, though he recognises that most actual states employ a mixture of types. The three basic types are democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. Unlike many political theorists, Rousseau does not prescribe one form of government for every state: a certain flexibility is appropriate, taking into account the circumstances, the size of the state, the nature and customs of the people, and so on. However, he does rank the types of government and clearly prefers an elective aristocracy over the rest.
卢梭考虑了三种可能的政府类型，尽管他承认大多数实际国家采用的是混合类型。这三种基本类型是民主、贵族制和君主制。与许多政治理论家不同，卢梭并不为每个国家规定一种政府形式：考虑到情况、国家的规模、人民的性质和习俗等，某种灵活性是合适的。然而，他确实对政府类型进行了排名，并明确偏好选举产生的贵族制。
Democracy
民主
Although the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States are often described as ‘democratic’, for Rousseau they would more likely be counted as elective aristocracies. By ‘democracy’ he meant direct democracy, that is, the system by which every citizen is entitled to vote on every issue. Clearly such a system could only work in a very small state and with relatively simple business to decide, otherwise the logistics of getting the whole citizenship together and getting through the business of government would overwhelm all other activity. Rousseau recognises the attractiveness of such direct democracy when the practical difficulties can be overcome, but points out that ‘so perfect a government’ is better suited to gods than mortals.
尽管英国和美国的政府常被描述为“民主”，但对于卢梭来说，它们更可能被视为选举贵族制。他所说的“民主”是指直接民主，即每个公民都有权对每个问题投票的制度。显然，这样的制度只能在非常小的国家和相对简单的事务中运作，否则将整个公民集合在一起并处理政府事务的后勤将压倒所有其他活动。卢梭认识到当实际困难可以克服时，这种直接民主的吸引力，但指出“如此完美的政府”更适合神而非凡人。
Aristocracy
贵族阶层
Rousseau recognises three types of aristocracy: natural, elective and hereditary, though we usually only use the word to describe the last of these. He thinks hereditary aristocracy the worst kind of aristocracy, and elective the best. Elective aristocracy is government by a group of individuals who have been elected on grounds of their suitability for the job. Elections minimise the risk of those who put private interests before the common good exercising their power for long.
卢梭承认三种贵族类型：自然贵族、选举贵族和世袭贵族，尽管我们通常只用这个词来描述最后一种。他认为世袭贵族是最糟糕的贵族类型，而选举贵族是最好的。选举贵族是由一群因其适合该职位而被选举出来的个人进行管理。选举最小化了那些将私利置于公共利益之上的人长期行使权力的风险。
Monarchy
君主制
Monarchy puts the power of government into the hands of an individual. This system has many inherent dangers. For instance, Rousseau maintains that monarchs tend not to appoint competent officers, but select on the basis of making a good impression at court rather than aptitude for the job. The result is bad government. He is particularly scathing about hereditary monarchies, which, he says, always run the risk of handing over supreme power to children, monsters or imbeciles, a view that would not have been sympathetically heard by those who believed in the divine right of kings, the idea that an inherited monarchy was God’s will.
君主制将政府的权力交给个人。这种制度有许多固有的危险。例如，卢梭认为君主往往不任命称职的官员，而是根据在朝廷上留下良好印象的标准进行选择，而不是根据工作能力。结果就是糟糕的治理。他对世袭君主制特别尖锐地批评，他说，这种制度总是有将最高权力交给儿童、怪物或傻瓜的风险，这种观点不会受到那些相信君权神授的人们的同情，他们认为世袭君主制是上帝的意志。
Criticisms of The Social Contract
对《社会契约论》的批评
Freedom
自由
One common criticism of Rousseau’s The Social Contract is that it seems to legitimise oppression of an extreme kind; that far from providing the conditions for freedom, it gives totalitarian governments a justification for removing them. This view is lent support not just by the sinister implications of the phrase ‘forced to be free’ but also by Rousseau’s suggestion that the state should employ a censor whose responsibility it is to enforce morality. The civil freedom that Rousseau celebrates may turn out to be extreme oppression; it certainly needn’t include the toleration that the word ‘freedom’ promises. Whether this is or is not so will depend on the nature of the general will.
对卢梭的《社会契约》的一个常见批评是，它似乎为极端压迫提供了合法性；远非提供自由的条件，它为极权政府剥夺自由提供了理由。这种观点不仅得到了“被迫自由”这一短语的阴险含义的支持，还得到了卢梭建议国家应雇佣一名负责执行道德的审查员的支持。卢梭所赞美的公民自由可能最终变成极端压迫；它当然不需要包括“自由”一词所承诺的宽容。这是否如此将取决于一般意志的性质。
This is not to say that Rousseau was deliberately promoting a framework for oppression. His sincere aim was to describe a situation which would provide both freedom and the benefits of society. It is, however, a weakness of his system that it could support oppression.
这并不是说卢梭故意在推动一种压迫的框架。他真诚的目的是描述一种既能提供自由又能带来社会利益的情况。然而，他的体系有一个弱点，那就是它可能支持压迫。
How do we discover the general will?
我们如何发现普遍意志？
Even if we concede that we should sacrifice our individual interests for the sake of the general will, there still remains the problem of discovering what that general will is. Rousseau suggests that if the people were to vote on any issue without consulting each other, then the majority vote would be in the direction of the general will, minor differences of interest, as it were, cancelling each other out. This, however, seems implausible: it would at the very least require a fully informed populace. Besides, to expect the people to vote without forming factions is unrealistic. So we are left with the practical problem of deciding what is for the common good. Without the possibility of discovering the common good, Rousseau’s entire theory would crumble.
即使我们承认应该为了公共意志牺牲个人利益，仍然存在发现公共意志是什么的问题。卢梭建议，如果人民在任何问题上投票而不相互咨询，那么多数票将朝着公共意志的方向发展，利益的细微差异将相互抵消。然而，这似乎不太可信：至少这需要一个充分知情的民众。此外，期望人民在不形成派系的情况下投票是不现实的。因此，我们面临着决定什么是公共利益的实际问题。如果无法发现公共利益，卢梭的整个理论将崩溃。
1712 | born in Geneva, Switzerland. |
1762 | publishes The Social Contract. |
1778 | dies in Ermenonville, France. |
aristocracy: an elite group of rulers who may owe their position to nature, election, or else heredity.
贵族：一个精英统治者群体，他们的地位可能源于自然、选举或遗传。
democracy: for Rousseau this usually means the direct participation of all citizens in any major decision.
民主：对卢梭来说，这通常意味着所有公民直接参与任何重大决策。
executive: those responsible for putting state policies into action.
执行者：负责将国家政策付诸实践的人。
general will: whatever is in the common good. Not to be confused with the will of all.
一般意志：任何符合共同利益的事物。不要与全体意志混淆。
legislator: the exceptional individual entrusted to write the state’s constitution.
立法者：被委托撰写国家宪法的杰出个人。
monarchy: a state which entrusts its fate to a monarch, usually selected on the basis of heredity. Rousseau strongly opposed monarchy.
君主制：一种将其命运托付给君主的国家，通常基于世袭原则选拔君主。卢梭强烈反对君主制。
social contract: the agreement of individuals to come together to form a state held together by their common interests.
社会契约：个人达成的协议，以共同利益为基础，聚集在一起形成一个国家。
sovereign: not to be confused with a monarch. For Rousseau the sovereign is, ideally, the state pursuing the general will.
主权：不要与君主混淆。对卢梭而言，主权理想上是追求普遍意志的国家。
will of all: the sum of what particular citizens happen to desire. This need not coincide with the general will: the will of all may not be in the general interest as individuals often choose selfishly.
全体意志：特定公民所希望的总和。这不一定与普遍意志一致：全体意志可能不符合一般利益，因为个人往往选择自私。
Robert Wokler Rousseau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Past Masters series, 1995) is a brief introduction to Rousseau’s thought.
罗伯特·沃克勒·卢梭（牛津：牛津大学出版社，Past Masters 系列，1995）是对卢梭思想的简要介绍。
Timothy O’Hagan Rousseau (London: Routledge, Arguments of the Philosophers series, 2000) is a more substantial analysis of Rousseau’s philosophy.
蒂莫西·奥哈根·卢梭（伦敦：劳特利奇，《哲学家论证系列》，2000 年）是对卢梭哲学的更深入分析。
N. J. H. Dent A Rousseau Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) is a very useful reference book which gives clear explanations of all Rousseau’s major philosophical concepts.
N. J. H. Dent 的《卢梭词典》（牛津：布莱克威尔，1992 年）是一本非常有用的参考书，清晰地解释了卢梭所有主要哲学概念。
Rousseau’s autobiography, Confessions (first published in 1782, several translations available), gives some remarkable insights into his life.
卢梭的自传《忏悔录》（首次出版于 1782 年，有多种翻译版本）提供了对他生活的一些显著见解。
Leo Darmosch Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Restless Genius (New York: Mariner, 2007) is an excellent biography which relates Rousseau’s ideas to his life.
莱奥·达莫施 让-雅克·卢梭：不安的天才（纽约：马里纳，2007）是一本优秀的传记，将卢梭的思想与他的生活联系起来。
David Edmonds and John Eidnow Rousseau’s Dog (London, Faber, 2006) reveals Rousseau’s character through his famous quarrel with David Hume. Both Darmosch’s and Edmonds and Eidnow’s books are highly recommended.
大卫·埃德蒙兹和约翰·艾德诺的《卢梭的狗》（伦敦，法伯，2006）通过他与大卫·休谟的著名争吵揭示了卢梭的性格。达莫什和埃德蒙兹及艾德诺的书籍都强烈推荐。
Immanuel Kant Critique of Pure Reason
伊曼努尔·康德 纯粹理性批判
Immanuel Kant described his approach as a ‘Copernican Revolution’ in philosophy. Copernicus put forward the theory that the earth moves round the sun rather than vice versa. Kant’s revolutionary idea is that the world that we inhabit and perceive depends on qualities of the perceiver’s mind, rather than simply existing independently of us.
伊曼努尔·康德将他的哲学方法描述为“哥白尼革命”。哥白尼提出了地球围绕太阳运动而不是反之的理论。康德的革命性思想是，我们所居住和感知的世界依赖于感知者心灵的特质，而不仅仅是独立于我们的存在。
If you look at the world through rose-tinted spectacles, then everything will appear pink. Before Kant, many philosophers assumed that we were, for the most part, passive recipients of informat ion about the world. Kant, in contrast, argued that as perceivers of the world we impose certain features on all our experience. It is a condition of having any experience at all that we experience the world as including relations of cause and effect, being ordered in time, and that the objects we perceive are related spatially to each other. Cause and effect, and time and space, are contributed by the perceiving subject rather than being out there in the world, existing independently of us. These ‘spectacles’ that we wear colour all our experience. To carry the analogy further, we would not be able to experience anything at all if we somehow removed the ‘spectacles’.
如果你通过玫瑰色眼镜看世界，那么一切都会显得粉红色。在康德之前，许多哲学家认为我们在很大程度上是关于世界信息的被动接受者。相反，康德认为，作为世界的感知者，我们在所有的经验中施加某些特征。拥有任何经验的前提是我们体验世界时包括因果关系、时间的有序性，以及我们感知的物体在空间上彼此相关。因果关系、时间和空间是由感知主体贡献的，而不是存在于世界中，独立于我们。这些我们所戴的“眼镜”给我们所有的经验上色。进一步类比，如果我们以某种方式去掉这些“眼镜”，我们将无法体验任何事物。
The Critique of Pure Reason is, as its title suggests, an attack on the idea that by reason alone we can discover the nature of reality. Kant’s conclusion is that knowledge requires both sensory experience and concepts contributed by the perceiver. Either without the other is useless. In particular, metaphysical speculation about what lies beyond the realm of appearances is worthless unless it is grounded in experience. Pure reason will not provide the key to the ultimate nature of a transcendent reality.
《纯粹理性批判》顾名思义，是对仅凭理性就能发现现实本质这一观点的攻击。康德的结论是，知识既需要感官经验，也需要感知者所贡献的概念。缺一不可。特别是，关于超越表象领域的形而上学推测是毫无价值的，除非它以经验为基础。纯粹理性无法提供通向超越现实的终极本质的钥匙。
The book is complex and difficult to follow despite its carefully designed ‘architectonic’ or structure. Part of the difficulty stems from the intrinsic difficulty of the subject matter, the fact that Kant is investigating the limits of human knowledge; but much of it is a direct consequence of his use of technical language and his convoluted style. Another feature which makes it difficult to read is the interconnectedness of the parts; a full understanding of the work would involve knowing all its parts and how they interrelate. Here there is only space to sketch some of its major themes.
这本书复杂且难以理解，尽管它的“建筑性”或结构设计得很精巧。困难的部分源于主题本身的内在复杂性，康德正在探讨人类知识的界限；但其中很大一部分是他使用技术语言和复杂风格的直接结果。另一个使其难以阅读的特点是各部分之间的相互关联；要全面理解这部作品，需要了解它的所有部分及其相互关系。在这里，只能简要概述一些主要主题。
Empiricist philosophers, such as David Hume, distinguished two sorts of knowledge: relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas gave knowledge that was true by definition, such as that all kangaroos are animals. We can be sure of the truth of this independently of having any experience of kangaroos. It simply follows from the definition of ‘kangaroo’. If someone claims to have discovered a kangaroo that isn’t an animal, we know in advance of checking their story that they are confused about the meaning of ‘kangaroo’. Kant calls statements like ‘all kangaroos are animals’ ‘analytic’.
经验主义哲学家，如大卫·休谟，区分了两种知识：观念的关系和事实的问题。观念的关系提供了根据定义为真的知识，例如所有袋鼠都是动物。我们可以在没有任何关于袋鼠的经验的情况下确信这一点。这仅仅是从“袋鼠”的定义中得出的。如果有人声称发现了一只不是动物的袋鼠，我们在检查他们的故事之前就知道他们对“袋鼠”的含义感到困惑。康德称像“所有袋鼠都是动物”这样的陈述为“分析性”。
An example of the other sort of knowledge that Hume recognised is ‘some bachelors have collections of etchings’. The way to determine whether or not such a statement is true is to make some sort of observation. You can’t tell whether or not it is true independently of such observation. It is a statement about an aspect of the world. For Hume there are only these two possibilities: statements have to be either analytic or empirical. If they are neither, they make no contribution to human knowledge.
休谟所承认的另一种知识的例子是“有些单身汉拥有版画收藏”。确定这样的陈述是否真实的方法是进行某种观察。你无法在没有这种观察的情况下判断它是否真实。这是关于世界某个方面的陈述。对休谟来说，只有这两种可能性：陈述要么是分析性的，要么是经验性的。如果它们都不是，那么它们对人类知识没有任何贡献。
Kant, who describes himself as having been roused from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’ by reading Hume’s work, recognises a third type of knowledge, knowledge of what he calls the synthetic a priori. ‘synthetic’ is used in contrast with ‘analytic’. If a statement is not true by definition, then it is synthetic. A priori is a Latin phrase which Kant uses to refer to any knowledge which is known to be true independently of experience; it is contrasted with the phrase a posteriori, which means acquired from experience. For an empiricist like Hume, the notion of the synthetic a priori would seem strange. He took it as obvious that if a statement was a priori it must be analytic. Kant thought otherwise.
康德自称在阅读休谟的著作后被唤醒，摆脱了他的“教条沉睡”，他认识到第三种知识，即他所称的综合先验知识。“综合”与“分析”相对。如果一个陈述不是根据定义为真，那么它就是综合的。先验是一个拉丁短语，康德用它来指代任何独立于经验而被认为为真的知识；它与后验（a posteriori）这个短语相对，后者意味着从经验中获得。对于像休谟这样的经验主义者来说，综合先验的概念似乎很奇怪。他认为，如果一个陈述是先验的，那么它必须是分析的。康德则持不同看法。
It is perhaps easiest to understand what Kant means by looking at some more examples. Where Hume allowed for only two possibilities, Kant allowed for three: the analytic a priori, the synthetic a posteriori and the synthetic a priori. The analytic a priori includes judgements such as that all kangaroos are animals; it does not give us new knowledge about the world. The idea of being an animal is, as Kant puts it, ‘contained’ in the idea of a kangaroo. The synthetic a posteriori, in contrast, is the realm of empirical judgements such as that all philosophers wear glasses. This requires observation in order to verify or falsify it. The synthetic a priori, Kant’s main interest in the Critique of Pure Reason, consists of judgements which are necessarily true, and can be known to be true independently of experience, yet which give us genuine knowledge of aspects of the world. Kant’s examples of the synthetic a priori include most of mathematics (such as, for instance, the equation 7 + 5 = 12) and ‘every event must have a cause’. Kant claimed that ‘every event must have a cause’ and ‘7 + 5 = 12’ are both necessarily true; yet they are informative about the world, so neither of them is analytic. The aim of the Critique of Pure Reason is to investigate how such synthetic a priori judgements are possible. The answer amounts to an explanation of what must be true if we, or any other conscious beings, are to have any experience at all.
或许通过查看一些更多的例子，最容易理解康德的意思。休谟只允许两种可能性，而康德则允许三种：分析的先验、综合的后验和综合的先验。分析的先验包括诸如“所有袋鼠都是动物”的判断；它并没有给我们关于世界的新知识。正如康德所说，作为动物的概念“包含”在袋鼠的概念中。相反，综合的后验是经验判断的领域，例如“所有哲学家都戴眼镜”。这需要观察来验证或证伪。综合的先验是康德在《纯粹理性批判》中主要关注的内容，它由必然为真的判断组成，这些判断可以独立于经验被认知为真实，但却能让我们获得关于世界某些方面的真实知识。康德的综合先验的例子包括大多数数学（例如，方程式 7 + 5 = 12）和“每个事件必须有一个原因”。 康德声称“每个事件必须有一个原因”和“7 + 5 = 12”都是必然真实的；然而它们对世界是有信息量的，因此它们都不是分析性的。《纯粹理性批判》的目的是调查这种合成先验判断是如何可能的。答案相当于对如果我们或其他任何有意识的生物要有任何经验，必须真实的内容进行解释。
Appearances and the Thing-in-Itself
表象与物自身
Kant distinguishes between the world we experience (the world of phenomena), and the underlying reality behind it. The underlying reality consists of noumena, about which we can say nothing at all because we have no access to them. We are restricted to knowledge of phenomena; noumena must for ever remain mysterious to us. Hence most metaphysical speculation about the ultimate nature of reality is misguided, since it purports to describe features of the noumenal world, and our lot is to dwell entirely in the phenomenal one.
康德区分了我们所经历的世界（现象世界）和其背后的基本现实。基本现实由物自体组成，而我们对此无法说任何事情，因为我们无法接触到它们。我们只能了解现象；物自体对我们来说将永远保持神秘。因此，大多数关于现实终极本质的形而上学推测都是误导性的，因为它试图描述物自体世界的特征，而我们的处境是完全生活在现象世界中。
However, we are not simply passive recipients of sensory information about the world. Perceiving involves more than receiving data. What is received has to be recognised and organised. In Kant’s terminology, intuitions are brought under concepts. Without concepts experience would be meaningless; as he puts it, ‘thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’. I couldn’t have knowledge of the word-processor in front of me without the intuition (the sensory experience of it); but I also need to be able to recognise and re-recognise it for what it is, and that involves bringing it under a concept. The faculty of my mind which deals with intuitions is the sensibility; the one which deals with concepts is the understanding. It is through the collaboration of the sensibility and the understanding that knowledge is possible at all.
然而，我们并不是单纯被动地接收关于世界的感官信息。感知不仅仅是接收数据。所接收到的内容必须被识别和组织。在康德的术语中，直观被纳入概念之下。没有概念，经验将毫无意义；正如他所说，“没有内容的思想是空洞的，没有概念的直观是盲目的”。如果没有直观（对它的感官体验），我无法了解眼前的文字处理器；但我也需要能够识别并重新识别它的本质，这涉及将其纳入一个概念。处理直观的心智能力是感性；处理概念的则是理解。正是通过感性和理解的协作，知识才有可能存在。
Space and time are, in Kant’s terminology, forms of intuition. They are necessary features of our experience rather than qualities found in the thing-in-itself. They are contributed by the perceiver. In other words, when I look out of the window at the street and see children playing, although it seems to me that the space in which the children are playing is simply a feature of reality, rather than something I contribute, Kant’s point is that in order to have knowledge of what is going on I have to organise my perception in terms of space. I couldn’t have a non-spatial perception. Similarly, the ordering of events in time is something that I bring to bear on intuitions rather than an intrinsic quality of what I perceive.
空间和时间在康德的术语中是直观的形式。它们是我们经验的必要特征，而不是事物本身所具有的属性。它们是由感知者所贡献的。换句话说，当我从窗户向外看街道，看到孩子们在玩耍时，尽管我觉得孩子们玩耍的空间只是现实的一个特征，而不是我所贡献的东西，康德的观点是，为了了解正在发生的事情，我必须以空间的方式组织我的感知。我无法拥有非空间的感知。同样，事件在时间上的排序是我对直观施加的，而不是我所感知的事物的内在特质。
Kant identifies twelve categories, including those of substance and of cause and effect. These are what allow us to bring our intuitions under concepts. They are a priori concepts. They are the contribution of the perceiver to experience. It is not just a matter of fact that all our experience, for instance, can be understood in terms of causes and effects; this is a necessary condition of having experience at all, and something that we, as perceiving subjects, contribute rather than simply discover in the world. The categories together with the forms of intuition (space and time) are the rose-tinted spectacles that we all must wear if we are to have any experience at all; but they don’t exist as a feature of the world independent of all subjects of experience. They are contributed by conscious subjects, not real features of the thing-in-itself or noumenal world.
康德识别出十二个范畴，包括实体和因果关系的范畴。这些范畴使我们能够将直觉归入概念。它们是先验概念。它们是感知者对经验的贡献。并不是说所有的经验，例如，可以仅仅通过因果关系来理解；这是拥有经验的必要条件，而是我们作为感知主体所贡献的，而不是简单地在世界中发现的。范畴与直觉形式（空间和时间）一起，是我们必须佩戴的玫瑰色眼镜，以便能够拥有任何经验；但它们并不存在于独立于所有经验主体的世界特征中。它们是由有意识的主体贡献的，而不是事物本身或物自体世界的真实特征。
The Transcendental Deduction
超越演绎
One of the most important sections of the Critique of Pure Reason is, unfortunately, also one of the most obscure and difficult to unravel. This is the transcendental deduction of the categories. If successful, this argument demonstrates that scepticism about the external world (the philosophical doubt about whether anything that we perceive exists objectively) is self-defeating. What Kant attempts is to prove that any experience whatsoever must conform to the categories and that the experience that is thus produced is of an objective world, not a merely personal subjective creation of each individual. Sceptics about the external world begin from their own experience and argue that they can’t prove that it is really experience of an external world rather than a pure illusion. Kant argues that because they begin from experience, such sceptics undermine their own approach: the existence of an objective external world, always perceived in terms of the categories, is a condition of our having any experience at all.
《纯粹理性批判》中最重要的部分之一，不幸的是，也是最晦涩和难以解开的部分。这就是范畴的先验推导。如果成功，这一论证表明对外部世界的怀疑（即对我们所感知的事物是否客观存在的哲学怀疑）是自我反驳的。康德试图证明，任何经验都必须符合范畴，而由此产生的经验是一个客观世界的经验，而不是每个个体的单纯个人主观创造。对外部世界持怀疑态度的人从他们自己的经验出发，认为他们无法证明这确实是对外部世界的经验，而不是纯粹的幻觉。康德认为，由于他们从经验出发，这些怀疑者削弱了自己的方法：客观外部世界的存在，总是以范畴的方式被感知，是我们拥有任何经验的前提。
The transcendental deduction of the categories is an example of the type of argument that Kant uses throughout the book, namely a transcendental argument. It is important not to confuse it with the word ‘transcendent’, which Kant uses to mean what lies beyond appearance. A transcendental argument is one which moves from some aspects of our experience to conclusions about what must necessarily be so if we are to have this sort of experience. In other words, it brings out what is presupposed by the very fact that we have the sorts of experiences that we do.
范畴的超越推导是康德在整本书中使用的一种论证类型的例子，即超越论证。重要的是不要将其与“超越”一词混淆，康德用这个词来指代超出表象的事物。超越论证是指从我们经验的某些方面推导出关于如果我们要有这种经验，必须必然如此的结论。换句话说，它揭示了我们拥有这种经验的事实所预设的内容。
Criticism of the Critique of Pure Reason
对《纯粹理性批判》的批评
Transcendental deduction fails through incomprehensibility
超越论证因不可理解而失败
Despite the attentions of numerous interpreters and reconstructors, Kant’s transcendental deduction and its conclusion remain hopelessly obscure. This is unfortunate. If Kant had succeeded in refuting scepticism about our experience and its sources, and had done this in a way intelligible to mortals, then this would have been of immense significance.
尽管有众多翻译者和重建者的关注，康德的先验推导及其结论仍然令人困惑。这是令人遗憾的。如果康德成功地驳斥了对我们经验及其来源的怀疑，并以人类能够理解的方式做到这一点，那么这将具有巨大的意义。
Inconsistent about metaphysics
对形而上学态度不一致
Much of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is directed against rationalist metaphysics, that is, speculation about reality based on the assumption that you can glean knowledge about a transcendent reality by pure thought alone. Yet Kant is in places guilty of the very charge he lays against other metaphysicians. He postulates the existence of noumena; but that is, as Berkeley had shown, going beyond what can reasonably be concluded from our experience. In other words, by supposing that noumena exist behind the veil of appearance, Kant was unwittingly indulging in the sort of speculative metaphysics which he elsewhere makes clear that he abhors.
康德的《纯粹理性批判》大部分是针对理性主义形而上学的，即基于假设通过纯粹思维可以获得关于超越现实的知识的推测。然而，康德在某些地方犯了他对其他形而上学家所指责的错误。他假设了物自体的存在；但正如贝克莱所示，这超出了我们经验中可以合理得出的结论。换句话说，通过假设物自体存在于现象的面纱背后，康德无意中沉溺于他在其他地方明确表示厌恶的那种投机性形而上学。
Although this inconsistency might seem a devastating criticism of Kant’s interconnected system of thought, several recent commentators have suggested that a great many of Kant’s philosophical insights are salvageable and can be reconstructed in a consistent and enlightening form.
尽管这种不一致似乎对康德相互关联的思想体系构成了毁灭性的批评，但一些最近的评论者建议，康德的许多哲学见解是可以挽救的，并且可以以一致且启发性的形式重建。
1724 | born in Königsberg, Prussia. |
1781 | publishes Critique of Pure Reason. |
1785 | publishes Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. |
1804 | dies in Königsberg. |
a posteriori: that which is discovered empirically.
后验：通过经验发现的事物。
a priori: whatever we know independently of experience.
先验：我们独立于经验所知道的任何事物。
analytic: true by definition.
分析：根据定义为真。
the categories: very general concepts which (unlike many more ordinary concepts) have to be applied to experience. For Kant there are twelve such categories including cause and effect, and substance.
范畴：非常一般的概念（与许多更普通的概念不同），必须应用于经验。对于康德来说，有十二个这样的范畴，包括因果关系和实体。
concepts: classification-rules which allow us to recognise similar intuitions and to make sense of our experience.
概念：分类规则，使我们能够识别相似的直觉并理解我们的经验。
the forms of intuition: space and time.
直觉的形式：空间和时间。
intuitions: the raw data of experience.
直觉：经验的原始数据。
noumena: things-in-themselves. The inaccessible reality which lies behind appearances.
本体：事物本身。隐藏在表象背后的不可接触的现实。
phenomena: the things which we can perceive. The phenomenal world is the world as it appears to us. It is contrasted with the noumenal world, the world as it really exists behind appearances.
现象：我们可以感知的事物。现象世界是我们所感知的世界。它与本体世界形成对比，本体世界是事物在表象背后真实存在的世界。
synthetic: not true by definition.
合成：根据定义不真实。
transcendental argument: any argument from what actually exists to what therefore must exist.
超越论证：任何从实际存在的事物推导出因此必须存在的事物的论证。
transcendental deduction: Kant’s argument which is supposed to demonstrate the existence of an objective reality independent of perceivers.
超越演绎：康德的论证，旨在证明独立于感知者的客观现实的存在。
T. E. Wilkerson Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Commentary for Students (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976; 2nd, revised edn, London: Thoemmes, 1998) is a very useful introduction to this book. It is lucid and stimulating and relates Kant’s ideas to recent debates.
T. E. Wilkerson 的《康德的纯理性批判：学生评论》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1976 年；第二版，修订版，伦敦：Thoemmes，1998 年）是一本非常有用的入门书籍。它清晰而富有启发性，并将康德的思想与最近的辩论联系起来。
Roger Scruton Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Past Masters series, 1982) and S. Körner Kant (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955) are both good introductions to Kant’s philosophy as a whole.
罗杰·斯克鲁顿《康德》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，过去大师系列，1982 年）和 S. Körner《康德》（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅，1955 年）都是对康德哲学整体的良好介绍。
Sebastian Gardner Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge, Philosophy Guidebook Series, 1999) is a more thorough introduction to The Critique of Pure Reason.
塞巴斯蒂安·加德纳《康德与纯粹理性批判》（伦敦：劳特利奇，哲学指南系列，1999）是对《纯粹理性批判》的更全面的介绍。
Immanuel Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
伊曼努尔·康德 《道德形而上学的基础》
Good intentions count. The morality of an action is not determined by its consequences, only by the intentions behind it. Morality is objective: it’s not a matter of taste or culture, but applies equally to all rational beings. The point of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals is to make these claims plausible by establishing what he calls ‘the supreme principle of morality’, namely the categorical imperative. The book was written as a short prelude to his more complex and detailed work on moral philosophy. It has stood the test of time as a succinct statement of a duty-based or deontological moral theory.
善意是重要的。一个行为的道德性并不是由其后果决定的，而是由其背后的意图决定的。道德是客观的：这不是品味或文化的问题，而是同样适用于所有理性存在的。伊曼努尔·康德的《道德形而上学的基础》的要点在于通过建立他所称的“最高道德原则”，即绝对命令，使这些主张变得可信。该书作为他更复杂和详细的道德哲学著作的简短前言而写成。它经受住了时间的考验，成为一种基于义务或义务论道德理论的简明陈述。
The only thing in the world which is good without qualification is a good will. What Kant means by this is that good intentions are good unconditionally. Everything else which is good is only good under certain circumstances. So, for example, courage might be considered a good attribute to have, but on its own, it is not necessarily good: it requires good intentions, that is, a good will, to guarantee its goodness. Power, wealth and honour may be good; but equally without a good will, they can all serve evil ends.
世界上唯一无条件好的东西是善意。康德所指的是，善意本身就是无条件好的。其他一切好的东西仅在特定情况下才是好的。因此，例如，勇气可能被视为一种好的品质，但单靠它本身并不一定是好的：它需要善意，即善意，来保证其善良。权力、财富和荣誉可能是好的；但同样，如果没有善意，它们都可能服务于邪恶的目的。
A good will is good in itself, not because of anything else that it gives rise to. So, Kant tells us, provided that we have good intentions, it doesn’t matter from a moral point of view if a ‘niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature’ prevents us achievi ng what we set out to do. Even when all our good intentions are thwarted by events outside our control the good will still shines like a jewel.
善意本身就是好的，并不是因为它引发了其他任何事情。因此，康德告诉我们，只要我们有善意，从道德的角度来看，如果“吝啬的继母般的天赋”阻止我们实现我们所设定的目标，这并不重要。即使我们所有的善意都被我们无法控制的事件所挫败，善意仍然像宝石一样闪耀。
This view contrasts sharply with consequentialist moral theories, such as John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism (discussed in a later chapter). These judge the moral worth of an action by its actual or probable consequences. For Kant, however, this is a mistake. Consequences are irrelevant to assessments of moral worth, though they are, of course, relevant to most other aspects of life.
这种观点与结果主义道德理论形成鲜明对比，例如约翰·斯图亚特·密尔的功利主义（将在后面的章节中讨论）。这些理论通过行为的实际或可能后果来判断其道德价值。然而，对于康德来说，这是一个错误。后果与道德价值的评估无关，尽管它们当然与生活的其他大多数方面相关。
The only appropriate motive for moral action is a sense of duty. Some people’s actions conform outwardly with their duties, but inwardly they are acting only from self-interest. So, for example, a shrewd shopkeeper won’t overcharge an inexperienced customer because he knows that ultimately this is bad for business. This is not acting from duty, but only from prudence: enlightened self-interest. Acting from a motive of duty is acting simply because you know that this is the right thing to do, not from any other motive.
道德行为唯一适当的动机是责任感。有些人的行为在外表上符合他们的责任，但内心深处他们只是出于自利而行动。因此，例如，一个精明的店主不会对一个缺乏经验的顾客多收费，因为他知道这最终对生意不好。这不是出于责任感，而仅仅是出于谨慎：开明的自利。出于责任感的行为是因为你知道这是正确的事情，而不是出于其他任何动机。
Duty stands in contrast to mere inclination. Some people happen to have compassionate natures; if they see others in need, they are moved to help them. Kant says that actions done solely from compassionate inclinations have no moral worth whatsoever. The motive of duty is all-important. Someone who has no natural inclinations to sympathy or compassion, yet who helps others out of a sense of duty, is morally praiseworthy; those who act purely out of inclinations, no matter how admirable those inclinations happen to be, are not acting morally at all.
责任与单纯的倾向形成对比。有些人恰好具有同情的天性；如果他们看到他人有需要，他们会被感动去帮助他们。康德说，单纯出于同情倾向而做的行为没有任何道德价值。责任的动机是至关重要的。那些没有自然同情或怜悯倾向的人，然而出于责任感去帮助他人，是道德上值得赞扬的；那些纯粹出于倾向而行动的人，无论这些倾向多么令人钦佩，实际上并没有道德行为。
Kant’s reason for these surprising statements is that morality is open to every rational being; yet our inclinations are outside our conscious control. Ultimately it is a matter of luck whether or not you happen to have a compassionate nature. He reinterprets the Christian ‘love thy neighbour’, arguing that here the relevant kind of love is what he calls a practical one, that is, acting out of a sense of duty, rather than pathological love, which is the emotional attitude which more usually goes by that name. In other words, Jesus Christ wasn’t telling you how you should feel about your neighbour when he said ‘love thy neighbour’, but rather instructing you to act from your sense of duty.
康德对这些令人惊讶的陈述的理由是，道德对每个理性存在都是开放的；然而，我们的倾向超出了我们的意识控制。最终，是否拥有同情心的天性是一个运气问题。他重新诠释了基督教的“爱你的邻居”，认为这里相关的爱是一种他所称之为的实践之爱，即出于责任感的行动，而不是病态的爱，后者是通常被称为的情感态度。换句话说，耶稣基督在说“爱你的邻居”时并不是在告诉你应该如何对待你的邻居，而是在指示你要出于责任感去行动。
It is the underlying principles motivating an action which determine its moral worth, not the end result. Kant calls such principles maxims. The same behaviour could be the outcome of very different maxims. You might tell the truth on a particular occasion while acting on the maxim ‘Always tell the truth’; but your behaviour would on this occasion be indistinguishable if you were acting on the maxim ‘Always tell the truth unless you are sure you can get away with telling a lie.’ Only the first maxim is a moral one. Kant provides a way of distinguishing moral from other maxims with his categorical imperative.
推动行动的基本原则决定了其道德价值，而不是最终结果。康德称这些原则为格言。同样的行为可能是非常不同的格言的结果。你可能在某个特定场合说真话，同时遵循“总是说真话”的格言；但如果你遵循“除非你确定可以逃避说谎，否则总是说真话”的格言，你的行为在这个场合上将无法区分。只有第一个格言是道德的。康德提供了一种通过他的绝对命令来区分道德格言和其他格言的方法。
The Categorical Imperative
定言命令
Our moral duty arises from our respect for the moral law. The moral law is determined by what Kant calls the categorical imperative. A hypothetical imperative is a statement such as ‘If you want to get other people’s respect, then you should keep your promises’: it is a conditional statement. A categorical imperative, in contrast, is a command such as ‘Keep your promises’: it applies unconditionally, irrespective of your goals. Kant thinks that there is one basic categorical imperative fuelling all our moral actions. He provides several formulations of this imperative.
我们的道德义务源于我们对道德法则的尊重。道德法则由康德所称的绝对命令决定。假设命令是这样的陈述：“如果你想获得他人的尊重，那么你应该遵守你的承诺”：这是一种条件性陈述。相反，绝对命令是一种命令，例如“遵守你的承诺”：它无条件适用，与您的目标无关。康德认为，有一个基本的绝对命令推动我们所有的道德行为。他提供了这个命令的几种表述。
Universal moral law
普遍道德法则
The first formulation of the categorical imperative is ‘Only act on a maxim that you could will should become a universal law.’ ‘Will’ here is very different from ‘want’: it means rationally intend. By ‘law’ he means a moral rather than a legal law (many actions which transgress moral laws are perfectly legal). The idea is that if a maxim is a genuinely moral one, then it ought to apply to everyone in relevantly similar circumstances: it should be universalisable. It should also be impersonal inasmuch as it shouldn’t make a special exception for you. If an action is morally wrong, it is morally wrong for everyone, including you. If an action is morally right, it is morally right for anyone in relevantly similar circumstances.
第一种范畴命令的表述是“只在你能够希望成为普遍法则的格言上行动。”这里的“希望”与“想要”非常不同：它意味着理性地意图。这里的“法则”指的是道德法则，而不是法律法则（许多违反道德法则的行为在法律上是完全合法的）。这个观点是，如果一个格言是真正的道德格言，那么它应该适用于所有在相关相似情况下的人：它应该是普遍适用的。它还应该是非个人化的，因为它不应该为你做出特殊例外。如果一个行为在道德上是错误的，那么对每个人来说都是道德上的错误，包括你自己。如果一个行为在道德上是正确的，那么在相关相似情况下的任何人都是道德上的正确。
In order to explain the implications of this formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant uses the example of making promises you don’t intend to keep. You might find it convenient to make such promises sometimes, but, he says, you could not rationally will the maxim ‘Break your promises when you are hard pressed’ for everyone. If the maxim were taken up universally, then the whole institution of promising would be undermined. This would be self-defeating. You wouldn’t be able to trust anyone to keep their promises. So the maxim can’t be a moral one; you could not will it as a universal law. Thus the categorical imperative provides a way of distinguishing between moral and non-moral maxims. If you can’t rationally universalise a maxim, it isn’t a moral one.
为了说明这种范畴命令的含义，康德使用了一个例子，即许下你不打算遵守的承诺。你可能会发现有时许下这样的承诺很方便，但他说，你不能理性地愿意让“在困难时打破承诺”这一准则适用于所有人。如果这一准则被普遍接受，那么整个承诺制度将会被破坏。这将是自我挫败的。你将无法信任任何人遵守他们的承诺。因此，这一准则不能是道德的；你不能将其作为普遍法则。因此，范畴命令提供了一种区分道德和非道德准则的方法。如果你不能理性地将一个准则普遍化，那么它就不是道德的。
Treat people as ends
把人视为目的
The second formulation of the categorical imperative is ‘Act so as to treat others and yourself always as ends, never simply means to ends.’ Rational beings are persons, that is, they are ends in themselves; they have their own lives to lead, and we should not simply use them for what happens to suit us. We should recognise them as individuals capable of leading their own lives. To treat someone merely as a means to my own ends is tantamount to denying their essential humanity. Another way of putting this is that we should respect other people’s autonomy. It would be treating someone as a means to an end if I promised to pay him back the money he leant me, even though I never really intended to do so. Recognising him as an end in himself would entail intending to and actually keeping my promise.
第二种范畴命令的表述是“行动时要始终将他人和自己视为目的，而不仅仅是达到目的的手段。”理性存在是人，即他们是目的本身；他们有自己的生活要过，我们不应该仅仅为了适合我们的事情而使用他们。我们应该承认他们是能够过自己生活的个体。仅仅将某人视为我自己目的的手段，相当于否认他们本质上的人性。换句话说，我们应该尊重他人的自主权。如果我承诺偿还他借给我的钱，即使我从未真正打算这样做，这将是将某人视为手段。将他视为目的本身意味着我必须打算并实际履行我的承诺。
The kingdom of ends
目的王国
A further formulation of the categorical imperative is expressed in terms of a kingdom of ends: ‘Act as if through your maxims you were a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.’ A kingdom of ends is an imaginary state whose laws protect individual autonomy, allowing everyone to be treated as an end rather than as a means to an end. Here Kant makes clear that morality is not just a matter of individual conduct, but also the foundation of societies. Kant’s approach is designed to discriminate between principles which rational agents would adopt for their ideal state and those which they would reject. A principle which you could not will to be a law in this ideal state fails to pass this test, and so is not a moral principle.
范畴命令的进一步表述是通过一个目的王国来表达的：“行动就好像通过你的格言你是一个目的王国的立法成员。” 目的王国是一个虚构的状态，其法律保护个人自主性，允许每个人被视为目的，而不是作为达到目的的手段。在这里，康德明确指出，道德不仅仅是个人行为的问题，也是社会的基础。康德的方法旨在区分理性主体为其理想状态所采纳的原则和他们所拒绝的原则。一个你无法愿意成为这个理想状态下法律的原则未能通过这个测试，因此不是道德原则。
Kant, Aristotle and Mill
康德、亚里士多德和穆尔
Kant’s approach to moral action contrasts sharply both with Aristotle’s and Mill’s. Kant treats emotions as either irrational or irrelevant to moral action; only the practical emotions, which aren’t emotions in the ordinary sense of the word, have any direct part to play in morality. Aristotle, in contrast, argues that the cultivation of appropriate emotional responses is a central aim of moral education. Aristotle’s philosophy is flexible, based on sensitivity to circumstances; Kant’s is rigid in its adherence to general principles which admit of no exceptions.
康德对道德行为的看法与亚里士多德和密尔的观点形成鲜明对比。康德将情感视为非理性或与道德行为无关；只有实践情感——在普通意义上并不是情感——在道德中有直接的作用。相反，亚里士多德认为，培养适当的情感反应是道德教育的一个核心目标。亚里士多德的哲学是灵活的，基于对环境的敏感性；而康德的哲学则在遵循一般原则上是严格的，不容许例外。
Kant’s approach to morality also contrasts with a utilitarian one such as Mill’s. Kant dismisses the consequences of actions as irrelevant to our moral assessment of them; whereas for Mill the consequences of an action determine its moral worth. Mill’s approach gives guidelines for discriminating between competing moral claims: assess the consequences and choose the option which will maximise aggregate happiness. Kant’s moral philosophy gives no method of choosing between two actions both of which are moral; or for that matter between two actions both of which are immoral.
康德的道德观与边沁的功利主义观形成对比。康德认为行为的后果与我们对其道德评估无关；而对于边沁来说，行为的后果决定了其道德价值。边沁的方法提供了区分竞争道德主张的指导原则：评估后果并选择能够最大化整体幸福的选项。康德的道德哲学没有提供在两种都是道德的行为之间选择的方法；或者说在两种都是不道德的行为之间选择的方法。
Aristotle, Kant and Mill provide three distinctively different approaches to morality. Like Aristotle’s and Mill’s, Kant’s theory is open to a number of criticisms.
亚里士多德、康德和穆尔提供了三种截然不同的道德观。与亚里士多德和穆尔的理论一样，康德的理论也受到了一些批评。
Criticisms of The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
《道德形而上学基础》的批评
It is empty
它是空的
A common criticism of Kant’s moral theory is that it doesn’t provide any content to ethics. It concentrates on the structure of moral judgements, their universalisability and impersonality, rather than helping us to discover precisely what we ought to do. Worse still, using Kant’s own test for moral judgements, it seems that we could quite easily universalise some quite obviously immoral principles, such as ‘Always use the most efficient means of farming regardless of animal welfare’: there is nothing inconsistent about willing this principle. Because most animals would fail to meet the appropriate threshold of rationality for Kant, the version of the categorical imperative which enjoins us to treat others as ends and not means would not save them here. So Kant would have to say that this maxim was a moral one.
对康德道德理论的一个常见批评是，它没有为伦理学提供任何内容。它集中于道德判断的结构、其普遍性和非个人性，而不是帮助我们准确发现我们应该做什么。更糟糕的是，使用康德自己对道德判断的测试，似乎我们可以相当容易地将一些显然不道德的原则普遍化，例如“无论动物福利如何，总是使用最有效的农业手段”：愿意这个原则并没有什么不一致之处。因为大多数动物无法达到康德所要求的理性门槛，要求我们将他人视为目的而非手段的绝对命令在这里并不能拯救它们。因此，康德必须说这个格言是一个道德的格言。
Even the example of promise-breaking that Kant uses seems open to criticism. If you have a maxim ‘Break your promises whenever you can get away with it’, then, provided that no one else knows that this is your policy, it might appear that there is nothing selfcontradictory in willing it. If everyone acted on the same maxim, the institution of promising could still survive. However, Kant’s response would be that breaking a promise is absolutely wrong and that you could not rationally will the maxim in question. This is because willing such a maxim would entail willing not only that I break promises when I can get away with it, but also that other people treat their promises to me in the same fashion. So I would, in willing the maxim, effectively be willing that I have promises broken to myself.
即使是康德所使用的破坏承诺的例子似乎也容易受到批评。如果你有一个准则“只要能逃脱就破坏你的承诺”，那么，只要没有其他人知道这是你的政策，似乎在意愿上并没有自我矛盾。如果每个人都遵循同样的准则，承诺的制度仍然可以存活。然而，康德的回应是，破坏承诺绝对是错误的，你无法理性地愿望这个准则。这是因为愿望这样的准则不仅意味着我在能够逃脱时破坏承诺，还意味着其他人以同样的方式对待他们对我的承诺。因此，在愿望这个准则时，我实际上是在愿望自己被破坏承诺。
The role of emotion
情感的角色
Kant’s moral philosophy treats the emotions and individual character traits as irrelevant to our moral assessments of individuals. It doesn’t matter for Kant if you are hard-hearted, provided that you act out of a reverence for the moral law. Yet, for many of us, genuine compassion is the core of morality, not a potentially distracting quirk of individual psychology. We admire people who have a special capacity for sympathy and compassion, and this admiration seems to be an admiration of qualities relevant to them as moral beings. Kant’s approach, which focuses on what any rational being should do, ignores the centrality of emotions to human moral interaction. The practical emotions which he wants to substitute for the pathological ones scarcely seem to merit the label ‘emotion’ at all.
康德的道德哲学将情感和个体性格特征视为与我们对个体的道德评估无关。对于康德来说，如果你是个冷酷无情的人，只要你是出于对道德法则的尊重而行动，这并不重要。然而，对于我们许多人来说，真正的同情心是道德的核心，而不是个体心理的潜在干扰特征。我们钦佩那些具有特殊同情和怜悯能力的人，这种钦佩似乎是对他们作为道德存在者的相关品质的钦佩。康德的方法专注于任何理性存在者应该做的事情，忽视了情感在人的道德互动中的中心地位。他想用的实践情感几乎根本不值得被称为“情感”。
A caricature of Kant’s attitude to emotions suggests that he always considers them obstacles to genuine moral action. However, in fact what he argues is that emotions and inclinations can cloud the issue of whether or not you are acting morally. This is particularly relevant if you find yourself in a situation in which you happen to feel a strong emotional inclination to act in the way that the categorical imperative indicates anyway.
对康德对情感态度的讽刺表明，他总是将情感视为真正道德行为的障碍。然而，实际上他所论证的是，情感和倾向可能会模糊你是否在道德上行动的问题。如果你发现自己处于一种情境中，恰好感到强烈的情感倾向去以绝对命令所指示的方式行动，这一点尤其相关。
For example, you might, when walking around London, be approached by someone begging for money. The sight of this person stirs up feelings of compassion that have you reaching for your purse; but you also recognise a moral duty, following from the categorical imperative, enjoining you to give money to this person. In such a situation it may be difficult or even impossible to tell what your real motivation for giving money is: is it an inclination, or is it reverence for the moral law? However, if your immediate response to being asked for money was revulsion and irritation, yet you still acted according to the categorical imperative, then you would have no trouble in knowing that you had acted morally. Kant doesn’t rule out the possibility that those who feel compassion also act from reverence for the moral law; what he does say is that acting from compassion alone will not make your action a moral one.
例如，当你在伦敦走路时，可能会有人来向你乞讨。这一幕激起了你内心的同情，让你想要掏出钱包；但你也意识到一种道德责任，源于绝对命令，要求你给这个人钱。在这种情况下，可能很难甚至不可能判断你给钱的真实动机：是出于倾向，还是对道德法则的尊重？然而，如果你对被要求给钱的直接反应是厌恶和恼怒，但你仍然按照绝对命令行事，那么你就不会对自己是否道德地行动感到困惑。康德并不排除那些感到同情的人也出于对道德法则的尊重而行动的可能性；他所说的是，仅仅出于同情的行动并不会使你的行为成为道德行为。
Nevertheless, Kant’s dismissal of emotion dehumanises moral relations. The coldly rational responses which he points to as models of moral behaviour seem to be less human and less desirable than appropriately emotional ones.
然而，康德对情感的否定使道德关系失去了人性。他所指出的作为道德行为模型的冷漠理性反应似乎比适当的情感反应更不人性化，也更不令人向往。
See previous chapter.
请参见前一章。
autonomous: being able to choose and act for oneself.
自主：能够为自己选择和行动。
categorical imperative: Kant’s term for our basic moral duty, which is absolute.
范畴命令：康德对我们基本道德义务的术语，这是绝对的。
consequentialism: any ethical theory which determines the rightness or wrongness of an action on the basis of the consequences which ensue from it rather than, say, the motivation with which it was carried out.
后果主义：任何一种伦理理论，它根据行动所产生的后果来判断该行动的正确性或错误性，而不是例如执行该行动的动机。
deontological ethical theory: a duty-based ethical theory. Duties rather than consequences determine the rightness or wrongness of an action.
义务论伦理理论：一种基于义务的伦理理论。义务而非后果决定了行为的正确或错误。
hypothetical imperative: any statement of the form ‘if you want x do y’.
假设命令：任何形式为“如果你想要 x，就做 y”的陈述。
kingdom of ends: an imaginary state whose laws protect individual autonomy.
目的王国：一个虚构的国家，其法律保护个人自主权。
maxim: the general principle underlying any action.
格言：任何行动背后的普遍原则。
pathological love: love consisting simply of emotion.
病态爱情：仅由情感构成的爱情。
practical love: a rational attitude based on respect for the moral law.
实用爱情：一种基于对道德法则尊重的理性态度。
universalisability: if a principle is universalisable, this means that it could consistently be willed in any other relevantly similar situation. For Kant all moral judgements are universalisable.
普遍化：如果一个原则是可普遍化的，这意味着它可以在任何其他相关相似的情况下被一致地意愿。对于康德来说，所有道德判断都是可普遍化的。
H.J. Paton’s translation of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, which is published under the title The Moral Law (London: Routledge, 1991) contains a useful section-by-section summary of Kant’s argument. H. B. Acton Kant’s Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1976) is worth consulting if you can find a copy of it.
H.J. Paton 翻译的《道德形而上学基础》，以《道德法则》（伦敦：劳特利奇，1991）为题出版，包含了康德论证的有用逐节总结。如果能找到 H. B. Acton 的《康德的道德哲学》（伦敦：麦克米伦，1976），也值得参考。
Roger Scruton Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Stephan Körner Kant (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955) are both good introductions to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. Both include discussions of his moral philosophy.
罗杰·斯克鲁顿《康德：非常简短的介绍》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2001 年）和斯特凡·科尔纳《康德》（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅出版社，1955 年）都是对康德哲学整体的良好介绍。两者都包括对其道德哲学的讨论。
Thomas Paine Rights of Man
托马斯·佩恩 《人权》
Thomas Paine lived dangerously in dangerous times. He played an active role in both the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1779, was imprisoned in France for ten months where he narrowly missed the guillotine through the incompetence of his jailors, and was widely (and wrongly) believed to be an atheist because of his attacks on organised religion at a time when publishing atheistic tracts attracted severe penalties under the law of blasphemous libel. He was in fact a deist, but was severely critical of the hypocrisies and absurdities of organised Christianity. His opposition to the idea of monarchy landed him in trouble in England, the country of his birth: he could never return there after leaving in middle age. Paine’s life was, then, never easy. He lived a precarious existence trying a range of careers that included corset-maker, customs officer, and bridge designer; but it was as a writer, thinker and self-styled ‘citizen of the world’ that he excelled. At the height of his fame he was well-known in England, France and the United States – and had fervent admirers and detractors in all three countries. Yet, largely because of his attacks on religion in his later book The Age of Reason, when he returned from France to the United States he was not welcome. Far from it. He ended his life in poverty and obscurity in New York. Only six people attended his funeral. Ten years after his death, William Cobbett exhumed his bones and brought them back to Britain where he intended to set up an appropriate monument for Paine. He was unable to raise the money to do this, and Paine’s bones remained in a trunk in his attic. After Cobbett’s death they disappeared.
托马斯·潘恩在危险的时代过着危险的生活。他在 1776 年的美国革命和 1779 年的法国革命中发挥了积极作用，在法国被监禁了十个月，因狱卒的无能而险些遭到断头台的处决，因他对有组织宗教的攻击而被广泛（且错误地）认为是无神论者，那时出版无神论小册子在亵渎诽谤法下会受到严厉惩罚。实际上，他是一个自然神论者，但对有组织基督教的虚伪和荒谬进行了严厉批评。他反对君主制的观点使他在出生地英格兰陷入麻烦：他在中年离开后再也无法返回那里。因此，潘恩的生活从来都不轻松。他过着不稳定的生活，尝试了包括紧身衣制造商、海关官员和桥梁设计师在内的多种职业；但他作为作家、思想家和自称“世界公民”的身份表现得尤为出色。在他声名显赫的巅峰时期，他在英格兰、法国和美国都广为人知——在这三个国家都有热情的崇拜者和反对者。 然而，主要因为他在后来的书《理性时代》中对宗教的攻击，当他从法国返回美国时并不受欢迎。远非如此。他在纽约以贫困和默默无闻的方式结束了自己的生命。只有六个人参加了他的葬礼。在他去世十年后，威廉·科贝特挖掘了他的遗骨，并将其带回英国，打算为佩恩建立一个合适的纪念碑。他未能筹集到资金来做到这一点，佩恩的遗骨一直放在他阁楼的一个箱子里。在科贝特去世后，这些遗骨消失了。
Paine wrote in a direct, witty and polemical style that found hundreds of thousands of readers in his lifetime. Unlike many philosophers before or since, he was immersed in the political struggles of his day, believing that each generation should assume responsibility for the way their nation is run rather than simply accept an inherited system from previous generations. This was the source of his radicalism. He believed that it was right to challenge the existing state of affairs wherever it produced inequality, and his dissatisfaction with the political world as he found it led him to formulate new ways for organising society. He wanted to reorganise society on rational principles. It is easy, then, to see why he was feared as a subversive revolutionary. His words were capable of inciting revolt. Many of his more conservative contemporaries were quite content with the way things were and emphasized the value of adhering to a slowly evolving tradition, but Paine was driven by a desire to improve life as soon as possible. He was keen to find better and more reasonable systems of government and to promote fairer ways of sharing wealth, and he was brave enough to make his views public even when it was dangerous to do so. Understandably those born into privilege and keen to keep the status quo sought to silence him. Many would have been happy to see him dead.
佩恩以直接、机智和争论的风格写作，在他的一生中吸引了数十万读者。与之前或之后的许多哲学家不同，他沉浸在他所处时代的政治斗争中，认为每一代人都应该对国家的运作方式承担责任，而不是仅仅接受前几代人遗留下来的制度。这是他激进主义的根源。他认为，挑战现有的状态是正确的，尤其是在它产生不平等的地方，他对政治世界的不满促使他制定新的社会组织方式。他希望在理性原则上重组社会。因此，很容易理解为什么他被视为一个颠覆性的革命者。他的话语能够煽动叛乱。他的许多更保守的同时代人对现状感到相当满意，并强调遵循缓慢演变的传统的价值，但佩恩则被改善生活的愿望驱动，渴望尽快实现改变。 他渴望找到更好和更合理的政府制度，并促进更公平的财富分配方式，他勇敢地公开表达自己的观点，即使这样做是危险的。可以理解的是，那些出生于特权阶层并渴望维持现状的人试图让他沉默。许多人会乐意看到他死去。
The first of two volumes of Paine’s most important book Rights of Man was published in 1791, but it was with his long pamphlet, Common Sense, that he first achieved fame. It quickly became a bestseller – more than 150,000 copies were sold in the year following its publication in 1776. Here he set out his arguments for the American colonies’ independence from British rule, in the process exploring ideas about freedom, equality and democracy. He also included some of his arguments against hereditary monarchy. The pamphlet inspired many readers to join the cause of independence and turned Paine into a hero for American would-be revolutionaries while at the same time making him an enemy of the British government.
帕恩最重要的书籍《人权》的两卷中的第一卷于 1791 年出版，但他首次成名是通过他的长篇小册子《常识》。它迅速成为畅销书——在 1776 年出版后的第一年内售出了超过 150,000 本。在这里，他阐述了美国殖民地脱离英国统治的独立论点，同时探讨了关于自由、平等和民主的思想。他还包括了一些反对世袭君主制的论点。这本小册子激励了许多读者加入独立事业，使帕恩成为美国革命者的英雄，同时也使他成为英国政府的敌人。
In his later Rights of Man, Paine developed and expanded the themes of Common Sense, introducing arguments about how welfare could be achieved in a monarch-free society. The immediate context of the Rights of Man was the French Revolution, but it had implications far beyond that.
在他后来的《人权论》中，潘恩发展并扩展了《常识》的主题，提出了关于如何在无君主的社会中实现福利的论点。《人权论》的直接背景是法国大革命，但其影响远不止于此。
A response to Edmund Burke
对爱德蒙·伯克的回应
The first of two parts of Rights of Man is a direct response to Edmund Burke’s book Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), which opposed almost every aspect of the revolution and attacked its English admirers. Burke, a London-based Irish politician and philosopher, who as a young man had written an outstanding book on the nature of the sublime, had been sympathetic to the American Revolution. Paine considered him a friend and an ally. So Burke’s vociferous opposition to the French Revolution and the ideas that inspired it came as a shock to Paine. It felt like a betrayal and a personal attack. Paine dismissed Burke’s Reflections as ‘darkness attempting to illuminate light’, even going so far as to accuse Burke of taking money to keep an Anglo-French antagonism going by defending a position he didn’t really believe in. Paine supported the French ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen’, and held out hopes for an English revolution. So his opponents were right to think him subversive.
《人权宣言》第一部分是对爱德蒙·伯克的著作《法国革命的反思》（1790 年）的直接回应，该书反对革命的几乎每一个方面，并攻击其在英国的支持者。伯克是一位居住在伦敦的爱尔兰政治家和哲学家，年轻时曾撰写过一本关于崇高本质的杰出著作，他对美国革命持同情态度。佩恩视他为朋友和盟友。因此，伯克对法国革命及其激励思想的强烈反对让佩恩感到震惊。这感觉像是背叛和个人攻击。佩恩将伯克的《反思》视为“黑暗试图照亮光明”，甚至指责伯克收钱维持英法对立，捍卫他并不真正相信的立场。佩恩支持法国的《人权和公民权宣言》，并对英国革命抱有希望。因此，他的对手认为他是颠覆者是有道理的。
Who decides for whom?
谁为谁做决定？
The conservative Burke argued that the French people were bound by decisions made by their ancestors about how their country should be ruled, and it wasn’t for them to break promises that had been made generations before. This included the decision to be governed by aristocrats and royalty. Paine’s response was that no one should be able to bind posterity by a promise, no matter how sincere. Each successive generation must decide for itself how it wants to be ruled. The dead can’t decide such important questions for the living. Whatever a nation as a whole chooses today should be enacted. Paine believed that laws derived their power from the consent of the living, not the promises of dead predecessors. This was a powerful message and one capable of stirring to action those who were undoubtedly oppressed by a wealthy and disproportionately powerful minority.
保守派的伯克认为，法国人民受制于他们的祖先关于国家应如何统治的决定，他们不应打破几代人之前所作的承诺。这包括由贵族和王室统治的决定。佩恩的回应是，没有人应该通过承诺来束缚后代，无论这个承诺多么真诚。每一代人都必须自己决定希望如何被统治。死者无法为活人决定如此重要的问题。一个国家整体今天所选择的应当被实施。佩恩认为，法律的权力源于活人的同意，而不是死去前辈的承诺。这是一个强有力的信息，能够激励那些无疑受到富有且权力不成比例的少数人压迫的行动。
A critique of monarchy
对君主制的批评
At the heart of Paine’s response to Burke was his attack on the idea of a hereditary monarchy having power over the people. In the eighteenth century, unlike today, European kings, queens, princesses, princes, and even quite removed members of royal families had excessive power and were actively involved in determining the fate of nations and of individual subjects. For Paine, who saw himself as a citizen of the world and who believed that all human beings are equal, this was a nonsensical way of organising society. He delighted in ridiculing the institutions of monarchy. He, for instance, poked fun at the idea of a hereditary legislator by describing it as absurd as that of a hereditary mathematician or a hereditary poet laureate. The attributes needed in a ruler are no more guaranteed by heredity than is the ability to do mathematics, or write verse. Why would anyone want a leader who was there simply because he or she happened to be descended from another leader? Surely it would be better to put someone in that position who had displayed an aptitude and capacity for playing that part well, or at least basic competence. Furthermore, in Paine’s view all monarchies are tyrannies which treat the people as a kind of property to be passed on to the monarch’s descendants. In response to Burke’s suggestion that attacks on Louis XVI, the reigning king of France, had been savage and unjustified by that king’s actions, Paine countered that Burke completely misunderstood the nature of the French Revolution: it was an attack on monarchy itself, not on any particular monarch. It was, in a sense, bad luck for Louis XVI that he happened to be in position when public opinion welled over into action. Paine’s point was that the power vested in the position was what was evil, even if the post was occupied by a relatively benevolent individual. Revolution followed from the rights of human beings (the ‘rights of man’) and in particular from basic rights to equality and justice.
佩恩对伯克的回应的核心是他对世袭君主拥有对人民权力这一观念的攻击。在十八世纪，与今天不同，欧洲的国王、女王、公主、王子，甚至与王室关系较远的成员都拥有过大的权力，并积极参与决定国家和个体臣民的命运。对于佩恩来说，他视自己为世界公民，并相信所有人类都是平等的，这是一种荒谬的社会组织方式。他乐于嘲笑君主制的制度。例如，他嘲讽世袭立法者的想法，称其与世袭数学家或世袭桂冠诗人一样荒谬。统治者所需的特质并不比数学能力或写诗的能力更能通过遗传来保证。为什么会有人希望选择一个仅仅因为他或她是另一位领导者的后代而成为领导者呢？当然，选择一个在这个角色中表现出才能和能力的人，或者至少具备基本能力的人，肯定会更好。 此外，在佩恩看来，所有的君主制都是暴政，它们将人民视为一种财产，传递给君主的后代。对于伯克提出的对法国现任国王路易十六的攻击是残忍且不公正的这一建议，佩恩反驳说伯克完全误解了法国大革命的本质：这是一场针对君主制本身的攻击，而不是针对任何特定的君主。从某种意义上说，路易十六的倒霉在于他恰好在公众舆论转化为行动时身处这个位置。佩恩的观点是，赋予这个职位的权力本身就是邪恶的，即使这个职位由一个相对仁慈的个人担任。革命源于人类的权利（“人权”），特别是源于平等和正义的基本权利。
Natural rights and equality
自然权利与平等
Paine believed that we are all born equal in our natural rights. These rights shape and enhance our existence. They exist prior to our coming together to form a civil society. These are the rights that we have simply by virtue of being human beings: a right to live, a right to our own beliefs, a right to express ourselves freely, and so on. We have to give up some of our freedoms to live in society and gain its benefits, and government is needed to protect the weak from exploitation by the strong, but our natural rights are the source of almost everything that is good about existence. In the second volume of Rights of Man Paine made many positive suggestions about how, practically, governments might guarantee basic welfare for all members of society, through old age pensions, marriage allowances, benefits for the poor, free education, and many other progressive policies funded by taxation that were far ahead of his day.
佩恩认为我们生来在自然权利上是平等的。这些权利塑造并增强我们的存在。它们在我们聚集在一起形成一个公民社会之前就已经存在。这些权利是我们作为人类所拥有的权利：生存权、信仰自由、自由表达自己的权利等等。为了在社会中生活并获得其利益，我们必须放弃一些自由，而政府的存在是为了保护弱者免受强者的剥削，但我们的自然权利几乎是存在中所有美好事物的源泉。在《人权论》的第二卷中，佩恩提出了许多积极的建议，关于政府如何在实践中为社会所有成员保障基本福利，通过养老金、婚姻津贴、贫困救助、免费教育以及许多其他由税收资助的进步政策，这些政策在他那个时代远远领先。
Criticisms of Rights of Man
对《人权宣言》的批评
Overoptimistic about human nature
对人性过于乐观
Burke’s position in Reflections on the Revolution in France was more subtle than Paine allowed. He did not share Paine’s optimism about humanity and was deeply sceptical about appeals to reason as the basis of social change. Human reason, Burke believed, is limited and it is dangerous to let individuals shape a society from scratch: far better to build on the wisdom of successive generations, a wisdom that is not necessarily conscious, than to attempt to design a new way of life with all the risks of violence and disruption that accompany that reorganisation of society. This wisdom is preserved in precedent and established ways of living. In other words, Burke had arguments against the sort of wholesale revolution that was going on in France, and large-scale social reorganisation in general. The descent into bloodshed and terror that resulted from the French Revolution was exactly the sort of consequence that Burke predicted and feared. He preferred a more gentle reform from generation to generation than the radical overhaul that Paine supported so enthusiastically. Burke’s conservatism about progress finds many modern day proponents, against the more idealistic, optimistic and passionate polemic for change that is embodied in Paine’s writings.
伯克在《法国革命反思》中的立场比佩恩所允许的更为微妙。他并不认同佩恩对人性的乐观态度，并对以理性作为社会变革基础的呼吁深感怀疑。伯克认为，人类理性是有限的，让个人从零开始塑造一个社会是危险的：基于历代智慧进行建设要远好于尝试设计一种新的生活方式，因为这种重组社会的过程伴随着暴力和动荡的风险。这种智慧保存在先例和既定的生活方式中。换句话说，伯克对法国正在进行的那种全面革命以及一般的大规模社会重组持有反对意见。法国革命导致的流血和恐怖正是伯克所预测和害怕的后果。他更倾向于代代相传的温和改革，而不是佩恩如此热情支持的激进改革。 伯克对进步的保守态度在现代有许多支持者，这与佩恩的著作中所体现的更理想主义、乐观和热情的变革辩论形成对比。
Relies on rhetoric rather than argument
依赖修辞而非论证
The Rights of Man is unashamedly a polemic and it relies heavily on rhetoric, and, as in the critique of the monarchy, on humour. Paine was self-taught in political theory, and his position lacks the complexity and sophistication of that of philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke. He ridicules and caricatures Burke, but rarely engages head-on with Burke’s reasoning – that’s not his style. He sometimes just asserts rather than argues for his own position. In his defence, though, Paine is never obscure, always interesting to read, and discovered a voice that was entirely appropriate for his wide readership. Furthermore, many of his points, such as those against monarchy, are far more memorable and effective for having been made through ridicule than they would have been had they been expressed in a systematic and detailed tome of political philosophy. His genre was the political tract, not the academic treatise.
《人权宣言》毫不掩饰地是一部论战作品，且在很大程度上依赖于修辞，正如对君主制的批判中一样，也依赖于幽默。潘恩在政治理论上是自学成才的，他的立场缺乏霍布斯和洛克等哲学家的复杂性和深刻性。他嘲笑并讽刺伯克，但很少正面与伯克的推理进行交锋——这不是他的风格。他有时只是断言，而不是为自己的立场辩论。然而，值得辩护的是，潘恩从不晦涩，始终引人入胜，并找到了一个完全适合他广泛读者群的声音。此外，他的许多观点，例如反对君主制的观点，通过嘲讽表达出来，远比如果以系统和详细的政治哲学著作表达要更令人难忘和有效。他的体裁是政治小册子，而不是学术论文。
1737 | Thomas Paine born in Thetford, Norfolk. |
1776 | publishes Common Sense. |
1790 | Edmund Burke publishes Reflections on the Revolution in France. |
1791–2 | Paine publishes Rights of Man (in two volumes). |
1807 | dies in poverty in New York City. |
deism: the belief that reason and experience prove the existence of God, rather than the religious authority of the Bible. Deists reject the authority of revelation through religious books and miracles.
自然神论：相信理性和经验证明上帝的存在，而不是《圣经》的宗教权威。自然神论者拒绝通过宗教书籍和奇迹的启示权威。
Christopher Hitchens Thomas Paine’s ‘Rights of Man’: a biography (London: Atlantic Books, 2007). In this short book Hitchens explains Paine’s ideas in the context of his precarious life and times.
克里斯托弗·希钦斯 《托马斯·潘恩的《人权》：传记》（伦敦：大西洋图书，2007 年）。在这本短书中，希钦斯在潘恩艰难的生活和时代背景下解释了他的思想。
John Keane Tom Paine: A Political Life (London: Bloomsbury, 1995) is a longer, more thoroughly researched biographical study than Hitchens’.
约翰·基恩《汤姆·佩恩：政治生活》（伦敦：布鲁姆斯伯里，1995）是一部比希钦斯的研究更长、更全面的传记研究。
Alan Ryan’s On Politics (London: Allen Lane, 2012) includes sections on both Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine.
艾伦·瑞安的《论政治》（伦敦：艾伦·莱恩，2012 年）包括关于爱德蒙·伯克和托马斯·潘恩的章节。
Arthur Schopenhauer The World as will and Idea
亚瑟·叔本华 《作为意志和表象的世界》
The World as Will and Idea has often been compared to a symphony in four movements. Each of its four sections has a distinctive mood and tempo, and Schopenhauer returns to and develops themes touched upon in earlier sections. The book opens with an abstract discussion of our relation to the world we experience, the world as we represent it to ourselves (the world as idea). In the second section this discussion broadens out, suggesting that there is a deeper reality than the world which science describes; this world, the thing-in-itself (the world as will), can be glimpsed when we observe our own willed bodily movements. The third section is an optimistic and detailed discussion of art. Here Schopenhauer develops his claim that art can provide an escape from the relentless willing that is the normal human condition, whilst revealing aspects of the deeper reality, the world as will. Finally, a darker pessimism takes over in the fourth section, in which he explains why we are doomed to suffering by our very nature. Yet there is a glimmer of hope if we are prepared to live a life of asceticism, relinquishing our desires.
《作为意志和观念的世界》常常被比作一部四乐章的交响曲。它的四个部分各具独特的情绪和节奏，叔本华在其中回归并发展了早期部分提到的主题。书的开头是对我们与所经历世界的关系的抽象讨论，即我们对世界的表述（作为观念的世界）。在第二部分，这一讨论进一步扩展，暗示存在一种比科学所描述的世界更深层的现实；这个世界，即事物本身（作为意志的世界），可以在我们观察自己意志驱动的身体运动时隐约感知到。第三部分是对艺术的乐观而详细的讨论。在这里，叔本华发展了他的观点，即艺术可以提供一种逃避无情意志的方式，这种无情意志是人类的正常状态，同时揭示了更深层现实的某些方面，即作为意志的世界。最后，在第四部分，阴暗的悲观主义占据主导地位，他解释了为什么我们注定要因自身的本性而遭受痛苦。然而，如果我们准备过一种禁欲的生活，放弃我们的欲望，仍然会有一线希望。
When Schopenhauer begins The World as Will and Idea with the line ‘the world is my idea’, he means that experience is always from the perspective of a perceiving consciousness. We represent the world to ourselves rather than have immediate access to the underlying nature of reality. But the world as idea doesn’t yield knowledge of the true nature of things. If we rest satisfied with appearances we are like a man who goes round a castle trying to find its entrance, stopping every now and then to sketch the walls. According to Schopenhauer, this is all philosophers until now have done. His philosophy, however, purports to give us knowledge about what lies behind the walls.
当叔本华以“世界是我的观念”这句话开始《作为意志和观念的世界》时，他的意思是经验总是来自于一个感知意识的视角。我们将世界呈现给自己，而不是直接接触现实的本质。然而，作为观念的世界并不能提供事物真实本质的知识。如果我们满足于表象，就像一个人绕着城堡转，试图找到入口，不时停下来素描墙壁。根据叔本华的说法，这就是迄今为止所有哲学家所做的。然而，他的哲学声称能够让我们了解墙后面隐藏的东西。
The question of the ultimate nature of reality is the central question of metaphysics. Schopenhauer accepts Immanuel Kant’s division between the world as we experience it, what Schopenhauer calls the world as idea, and the underlying reality of the thing-in-itself. Kant calls the reality behind experience the noumenal world; Schopenhauer calls it the world as will. We aren’t simply passive recipients of sensory information; rather, we impose the categories of time, space and causation on all our experience. But at the level of the thing-in-itself, the world as will, these categories do not apply. The world as will is an indivisible whole. What Schopenhauer calls the principium individuationis, the division into particular things, only occurs in the phenomenal world. The world as will is the entirety of all that exists.
现实的终极本质问题是形而上学的核心问题。叔本华接受伊曼努尔·康德对我们所经历的世界的划分，叔本华称之为观念世界，以及事物本身的潜在现实。康德称经验背后的现实为现象界；叔本华称之为意志世界。我们并不是感官信息的被动接受者；相反，我们将时间、空间和因果的范畴施加于我们所有的经验。但在事物本身的层面上，即意志世界，这些范畴并不适用。意志世界是一个不可分割的整体。叔本华所称的个体化原则，即对特定事物的划分，仅发生在现象界。意志世界是所有存在事物的整体。
It might seem that the world as will is by definition inaccessible to human beings, since it would seem not to be accessible through experience. However, Schopenhauer declares that in our experience of willing, the power we have to move our bodies, the world as will shows itself. The will is not separate from bodily movement: it is an aspect of that movement. When we are conscious of our own willing, we go beyond the world as idea and can get a glimpse of the thing-in-itself. We experience our own body both as idea, another object encountered in the world, and as will.
似乎世界作为意志从定义上来说对人类是不可接触的，因为它似乎无法通过经验来获取。然而，叔本华宣称，在我们意志的体验中，我们移动身体的能力，世界作为意志显现出来。意志与身体运动并不分离：它是那种运动的一个方面。当我们意识到自己的意志时，我们超越了作为观念的世界，并能瞥见事物本身。我们体验自己的身体，既作为观念，作为在世界中遇到的另一个对象，又作为意志。
For Schopenhauer it is not just human beings who are manifestations of will: ultimately everything is an expression of will. In other words, he uses the word ‘will’ in an extended sense. A lump of rock, for instance, is an expression of will. The will that he describes is not an intelligence; it is a blind, directionless striving which condemns most human beings to lives of suffering.
对于叔本华来说，不仅仅是人类是意志的表现：最终一切都是意志的表达。换句话说，他以扩展的意义使用“意志”这个词。例如，一块岩石就是意志的表现。他所描述的意志不是一种智慧；它是一种盲目的、无方向的追求，这使大多数人类注定要过上痛苦的生活。
Art has a pre-eminent position in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The contemplation of works of art allows us to escape momentarily from the relentless grind of willing that is otherwise inevitable. Art allows us a disinterested aesthetic experience. When we contemplate a work of art we can, and should, set aside any practical concerns and cares, any notion of the work of art serving a function for us. We lose ourselves in contemplation. The same is true of our experience of beauty in nature: we can achieve this state of peaceful contemplation looking at a waterfall or a mountain just as much as at a great painting.
艺术在叔本华的哲学中占据着卓越的地位。欣赏艺术作品使我们能够暂时逃离那不可避免的意志的无情磨砺。艺术让我们获得一种无私的审美体验。当我们沉思一件艺术作品时，我们可以并且应该抛开任何实际的担忧和关心，任何关于艺术作品为我们服务的功能的观念。我们在沉思中迷失了自己。我们在自然中体验美的感受也是如此：我们可以在观看瀑布或山脉时达到这种平和的沉思状态，就像欣赏一幅伟大的画作一样。
Artistic geniuses can achieve this state of disinterested contemplation of objects and events, and have the intellectual ability to communicate their emotion to audiences of their work. Such geniuses have the capacity for pure knowing: they can experience the Platonic Forms of what they perceive. Plato famously believes that the chair I’m sitting on is an imperfect copy of an ideal chair, the Form of the chair. For Plato, an artist who paints the chair puts the view at several removes from the real chair, the Platonic Form. This is one of his reasons for banning artists from his ideal republic: they deal in distant copies of reality, and distance us from the Forms. Schopenhauer, in contrast, believes that artistic geniuses can, through their work, reveal the Forms or Platonic Ideas of the particular things which they depict or describe. Thus artistic geniuses allow us to escape from the power of will and achieve an impersonal knowledge of the Platonic Forms.
艺术天才能够达到对物体和事件的无私沉思状态，并具备将他们的情感传达给观众的智力能力。这些天才具有纯粹的认知能力：他们能够体验他们所感知的柏拉图形式。柏拉图著名地认为，我坐的椅子是理想椅子的一个不完美的复制品，即椅子的形式。对柏拉图来说，画椅子的艺术家将视角与真实椅子、柏拉图形式相隔甚远。这是他禁止艺术家进入理想共和国的原因之一：他们处理的是现实的远距离复制品，使我们远离形式。与此相反，叔本华认为，艺术天才可以通过他们的作品揭示他们描绘或描述的特定事物的形式或柏拉图理念。因此，艺术天才使我们能够逃离意志的力量，实现对柏拉图形式的非个人知识。
Beautiful objects and scenes are well suited to jolt us out of the endless stream of desiring. Some depicted objects, however, are better suited to this than others. We can contemplate the beauty of depicted fruit, for example, but our practical interest may make it very difficult to remain disinterested, particularly if we are hungry. Similarly, some paintings of nudes are easier to contemplate disinterestedly than others; some tend to arouse the viewer sexually, thereby reasserting a practical interest.
美丽的物体和场景非常适合让我们摆脱无尽的欲望流。然而，某些描绘的物体比其他物体更适合这一点。例如，我们可以沉思描绘的水果之美，但我们的实际兴趣可能使我们很难保持不带偏见的态度，特别是当我们感到饥饿时。同样，某些裸体画比其他画更容易让人不带偏见地沉思；有些画倾向于激发观众的性欲，从而重新强调一种实际兴趣。
Sublime objects and scenes, in contrast to those which are simply beautiful, are ones which are in some way hostile to the human will. They threaten with their immensity or power. Black thunder-clouds, huge bare crags, a river rushing in torrent: all these can be sublime. The aesthetic experience of the sublime is achieved by consciously detaching yourself from the will, lingering pleasurably over what would otherwise be terrifying. This again reveals the Platonic Forms of the objects contemplated.
崇高的物体和场景，与那些仅仅美丽的物体和场景相比，是以某种方式对人类意志具有敌意的。它们以其巨大或力量威胁着人类。黑色的雷雨云、巨大的光秃秃的岩石、奔腾的河流：所有这些都可以是崇高的。崇高的美学体验是通过有意识地将自己与意志分离，愉悦地停留在那些本来会令人恐惧的事物上来实现的。这再次揭示了所思考对象的柏拉图形式。
The Platonic Forms revealed in the aesthetic contemplation of art and nature are important to Schopenhauer because they allow us a kind of knowledge of the thing-in-itself, the world as will. We can’t get direct knowledge of the thing-in-itself by this means; but the Platonic Forms give ‘the most adequate objectification of the will’. This simply means that the world they reveal is not subjectively distorted, but is as close as is possible to the thing-in-itself.
在艺术和自然的美学沉思中揭示的柏拉图形式对叔本华来说是重要的，因为它们让我们获得了一种对事物本身的知识，即意志的世界。我们无法通过这种方式直接获得对事物本身的知识；但柏拉图形式提供了“意志的最充分的客观化”。这仅仅意味着它们所揭示的世界并没有主观扭曲，而是尽可能接近事物本身。
Music differs from other arts in that it doesn’t represent the world as idea. It doesn’t usually represent anything at all. Yet it is undeniably a great art. Schopenhauer gives it a special place in his system. Music, he says, is a copy of the will itself. This explains its profundity: it can reveal to us the nature of reality.
音乐与其他艺术的不同之处在于，它并不以观念的形式表现世界。它通常并不表现任何事物。然而，它无疑是一门伟大的艺术。叔本华在他的体系中给予它一个特殊的位置。他说，音乐是意志本身的复制。这解释了它的深刻性：它可以向我们揭示现实的本质。
Music which is sad doesn’t express a particular person’s sadness, or suggest sadness in a particular context: it expresses sadness in its essential nature, removed from particular circumstances. Ultimately, though, it is a copy of the will. A consequence of this view is that music is a kind of unconscious metaphysics. It gives us a picture of the thing-in-itself, just as the metaphysician attempts to explain to us what lies behind the veil of appearance. Schopenhauer is well aware that his views on music and its relation to the thing-in-itself are unverifiable: there is no way of comparing a Beethoven string quartet with the thing-in-itself to see if he is correct. However, he presents his account as a plausible explanation of music’s power, and suggests that the reader should try listening to music bearing in mind the theory.
悲伤的音乐并不表达特定个人的悲伤，也不在特定情境中暗示悲伤：它在本质上表达悲伤，与特定环境无关。然而，归根结底，它是意志的一个复制品。这种观点的一个结果是，音乐是一种无意识的形而上学。它给我们提供了事物本身的图景，就像形而上学家试图向我们解释隐藏在表象背后的东西一样。叔本华清楚地知道，他对音乐及其与事物本身关系的看法是无法验证的：没有办法将贝多芬的弦乐四重奏与事物本身进行比较，以查看他的观点是否正确。然而，他将自己的论述呈现为对音乐力量的一个合理解释，并建议读者在聆听音乐时考虑这一理论。
All phenomena are bound by the principle of sufficient reason, the principle that for everything there is a reason why it is as it is. This applies as much to human beings as it does to rocks and plants. Our behaviour is, then, entirely determined by biology, past events, our character. We only have the illusion of acting freely. However, the will, the thing-in-itself, is entirely free. So human beings are both determined and free. The suggestion that we are, even if only at the phenomenal level, determined is a pessimistic one. The stream of pessimism that runs through the whole book becomes a raging torrent when Schopenhauer focuses on the nature of human suffering.
所有现象都受制于充足理由原则，即每件事都有其存在的理由。这一原则适用于人类，也适用于岩石和植物。因此，我们的行为完全由生物学、过去的事件和我们的性格决定。我们只是拥有自由行动的幻觉。然而，意志，作为事物本身，是完全自由的。因此，人类既是被决定的，又是自由的。即使在现象层面上，我们被决定的观点也是一种悲观的看法。当叔本华关注人类痛苦的本质时，贯穿整本书的悲观主义的潮流变成了汹涌的激流。
Here he draws heavily on a tradition of Asian philosophy, including Buddhist and Hindu teachings. Sustained periods of happiness are an impossibility for human beings. We are so constructed that our lives involve constant willing, seeking satisfaction. When we achieve what we desire, we may enjoy momentary happiness, which is nothing more than the relief from wanting what we were seeking. But this is inevitably short-lived. We either sink into a state of ennui (an intense state of boredom), or else find that we still have unfulfilled desires which drive us on to seek their satisfaction. All human life is, then, tossed backwards and forwards between pain and boredom.
在这里，他深受亚洲哲学传统的影响，包括佛教和印度教的教义。持续的幸福对人类来说是不可能的。我们被构造得如此，以至于我们的生活涉及不断的意愿，寻求满足。当我们实现所渴望的东西时，我们可能会享受短暂的幸福，这不过是从渴望中解脱出来的瞬间快乐。但这不可避免地是短暂的。我们要么陷入一种无聊的状态（一种强烈的无聊感），要么发现我们仍然有未满足的欲望，这驱使我们继续寻求满足。因此，整个人类生活在痛苦和无聊之间摇摆不定。
If, however, we gain insight into the true nature of reality, if we see through the veil of Maya (i.e. gain knowledge of the world as will), then there is a chance of salvation and of a permanent escape from suffering, a state which is at least as blissful as the temporary states of aesthetic contemplation which art can afford.
然而，如果我们洞察现实的真实本质，如果我们看透玛雅的面纱（即获得对世界作为意志的知识），那么就有可能获得救赎，并永久摆脱痛苦，这种状态至少与艺术所能提供的暂时美学沉思状态一样幸福。
A first step in this direction is the recognition that inflicting harm on others is a kind of self-injury, since at the level of will, the person who inflicts harm and the person who suffers it are one. It is only at the level of phenomena that we perceive them as different. If we see this, then we will recognise all suffering as in a sense our own, and be motivated to prevent such suffering. We will recognise that when one person harms another it is as if the will were a crazed beast which sinks its teeth into its own flesh, not realising that it was injuring itself.
朝这个方向迈出的第一步是认识到对他人造成伤害是一种自我伤害，因为在意志层面上，施加伤害的人和遭受伤害的人是一个整体。只有在现象层面上，我们才会将它们视为不同。如果我们看到这一点，那么我们将会在某种意义上将所有的痛苦视为我们自己的痛苦，并有动力去防止这种痛苦。我们将会认识到，当一个人伤害另一个人时，就好像意志是一头疯狂的野兽，咬住了自己的肉体，却没有意识到它正在伤害自己。
The more extreme move which Schopenhauer outlines at the end of The World as Will and Idea is asceticism, a deliberate denial of the will to life. The ascetic lives a life of sexual chastity and poverty, not in order to help others, but rather to extinguish desire, and ultimately to mortify the will. By this extreme policy, the ascetic escapes the otherwise inevitable suffering of the human condition.
在《作为意志和观念的世界》结尾，叔本华所描述的更极端的举动是禁欲主义，这是一种对生命意志的故意否定。禁欲者过着性贞洁和贫穷的生活，并不是为了帮助他人，而是为了熄灭欲望，最终使意志枯萎。通过这种极端的政策，禁欲者逃避了人类境况中不可避免的痛苦。
Criticisms of The World as will and Idea
对《作为意志和观念的世界》的批评
Fragile metaphysical foundations
脆弱的形而上学基础
Schopenhauer’s book sets out a system of thought which has fragile metaphysical foundations. The entire framework relies on our gaining knowledge of the thing-in-itself, or at least some access to it, via our awareness of our own willed bodily movements. But if Schopenhauer is mistaken about the possibility of such access to the world as will, then the entire work is undermined. It seems at times that Schopenhauer wants to have his cake and eat it: he wants to say both that the veil of Maya prevents us from knowing about the ultimate nature of reality and that we can see through this veil.
叔本华的书提出了一个思想体系，其基础是脆弱的形而上学。整个框架依赖于我们通过对自己意志驱动的身体运动的意识来获得对事物本身的知识，或者至少是某种接触。但是，如果叔本华对这种接触意志世界的可能性是错误的，那么整个作品就会受到削弱。有时似乎叔本华想要两全其美：他想说，玛雅的面纱阻止我们了解现实的终极本质，同时又想说我们可以透过这面纱。
However, even if we reject the metaphysical foundations of Schopenhauer’s thought, there are many insights about art, experience and suffering that can be gleaned from this book. The fact that the system as a whole may be flawed does not prevent Schopenhauer from providing us with a rich source of ideas and speculation. It is not surprising that practising artists have found Schopenhauer’s work inspirational.
然而，即使我们拒绝叔本华思想的形而上学基础，这本书中仍然可以汲取许多关于艺术、体验和痛苦的见解。整体系统可能存在缺陷并不妨碍叔本华为我们提供丰富的思想和推测来源。实践中的艺术家们发现叔本华的作品具有启发性，这并不令人惊讶。
Hypocrisy
虚伪
Schopenhauer preached asceticism as the route to salvation and an end to the suffering that would otherwise be an inevitable feature of the human condition. Yet he didn’t practise what he preached: he didn’t practise sexual chastity, and he enjoyed a good meal. So why should we take such a hypocrite seriously?
叔本华宣扬禁欲主义作为通往救赎的道路，以及结束人类境况中不可避免的痛苦。然而，他并没有践行自己的教义：他并不保持性贞洁，并且喜欢美食。那么，为什么我们应该认真对待这样一个伪君子呢？
This attack doesn’t seriously damage Schopenhauer’s philosophy: it is entirely possible for someone to recognise the route to salvation without actually pursuing it himself. Whilst hypocrisy is an unattractive character trait, it does not affect the strength of his arguments. If Schopenhauer was right that asceticism provides a way of eliminating suffering, then this is completely independent of how he actually chose to live his life.
这种攻击并没有严重损害叔本华的哲学：一个人完全可以认识到通往救赎的道路，而不必亲自追求它。虽然虚伪是一种不吸引人的性格特征，但它并不影响他论点的力量。如果叔本华是对的，禁欲主义提供了一种消除痛苦的方法，那么这与他实际选择的生活方式完全无关。
1788 | born in Danzig (now Gdansk). |
1819 | published The World as Will and Idea. |
1860 | dies in Frankfurt. |
asceticism: a way of living which involves extreme self-denial.
禁欲主义：一种极端自我克制的生活方式。
disinterestedness: the attitude of someone who has no practical motivation for looking at something.
无私：指一个人对某事物没有实际动机的态度。
ennui: boredom, listlessness.
厌倦：无聊，倦怠。
idea: the world as we represent it to ourselves. Contrasted with the world as will.
思想：我们向自己呈现的世界。与意志的世界形成对比。
Idea (Platonic): the perfect Form of anything. Plato believed that, for instance, the perfect Form of a chair exists. All the chairs we perceive are simply imperfect copies of this Form or Platonic Idea.
理念（柏拉图式）：任何事物的完美形式。柏拉图认为，例如，椅子的完美形式是存在的。我们所感知的所有椅子只是这个形式或柏拉图理念的不完美复制品。
metaphysics: the study of the ultimate nature of reality.
形而上学：对现实终极本质的研究。
phenomena: Kant’s term for the world we experience, in contrast to noumena, which lie behind appearances.
现象：康德用来指代我们所经历的世界的术语，与表象背后的本体相对。
principium individuationis: the division of reality into particular individual things: this does not occur at the noumenal level, the level of the world as will.
个体化原则：将现实划分为特定个体事物：这并不发生在物自体层面，即意志世界的层面。
sublime: that which is threatening to humanity yet which, when made the object of aesthetic experience, reveals its Platonic Idea. A thunderstorm, for example, can be sublime rather than merely beautiful.
崇高：对人类构成威胁的事物，但当其成为审美体验的对象时，揭示出其柏拉图式的理念。例如，雷暴可以是崇高的，而不仅仅是美丽的。
Veil of Maya: the barrier which prevents us perceiving the world as will, the world as it really is.
玛雅的面纱：阻止我们将世界视为意志的屏障，世界的真实样貌。
will: the thing-in-itself, the ultimate reality which lies behind phenomena, for the most part inaccessible to us, but which is glimpsed when we will bodily movements, and mirrored in music.
意志：事物本身，存在于现象背后的终极现实，在大多数情况下对我们来说是不可接触的，但当我们意志身体运动时，它会被一瞥而见，并在音乐中反映出来。
Christopher Janaway Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Past Masters series, 1994) and Patrick Gardiner Schopenhauer (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) are both good introductions to Schopenhauer’s work. Both concentrate on The World as Will and Idea.
克里斯托弗·贾纳威《叔本华》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，过去大师系列，1994 年）和帕特里克·加丁《叔本华》（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅出版社，1963 年）都是很好的叔本华作品入门书籍。两者都集中于《作为意志和表象的世界》。
Bryan Magee The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Clarendon, rev. edn, 1997) is particularly good on Schopenhauer’s influence on creative artists; it also provides a wide-ranging introduction to Schopenhauer’s work.
布莱恩·梅吉《叔本华的哲学》（牛津：克拉伦登，修订版，1997 年）特别好地探讨了叔本华对创作艺术家的影响；它还提供了对叔本华作品的广泛介绍。
John Stuart Mill on Liberty
约翰·斯图亚特·密尔论自由
My freedom to swing my fist ends where your face begins. That, in essence, is the message of Mill’s On Liberty. The only ground for preventing me from doing what I want to do, or forcing me to do something against my will, is that someone else would be harmed by my actions. My private life is my business, and as long as I don’t actually harm anyone else by what I do, then it is not for the state or society to interfere. Anyone who has reached adulthood and is capable of making informed decisions should be free to pursue their version of the good life without any interference. Even if I harm myself through my actions, this isn’t sufficient grounds for state intervention. I can, for example, decide to neglect my physical health and degenerate into a couch potato, and should be free to do this. Paternalism, that is, controlling what people do on the grounds that you know better than they do what is good for them, is only justified towards children and those who, because of mental illness, are incapable of making responsible decisions for themselves. Mill also, more controversially, believes that paternalism is justified towards ‘uncivilised’ peoples who are incapable of judging what is best for them. The rest of us, however, should be given a free rein because that’s the best way of increasing the overall level of happiness in the world.
我的拳头挥动的自由在于你的脸开始的地方。简而言之，这就是密尔在《论自由》中的信息。阻止我做我想做的事情，或强迫我做一些违背我意愿的事情的唯一理由，是因为我的行为会伤害到其他人。我的私生活是我的事，只要我所做的实际上没有伤害到其他人，那么国家或社会就没有干预的理由。任何成年并能够做出明智决定的人都应该自由追求他们心目中的美好生活，而不受任何干扰。即使我通过自己的行为伤害了自己，这也不足以成为国家干预的理由。例如，我可以选择忽视我的身体健康，变成一个沙发土豆，并且应该有自由去这样做。家长主义，即以你比他们更了解什么对他们好为理由来控制人们的行为，仅在对待儿童和因精神疾病而无法为自己做出负责任决定的人时才是合理的。 米尔还更具争议地认为，对“未开化”民族实施父权主义是合理的，因为他们无法判断什么对他们最好。然而，其他人应该被给予自由，因为这才是提高世界整体幸福水平的最佳方式。
Although On Liberty is always referred to as by John Stuart Mill, in his introduction to the book and in his autobiography he emphasises that it was in fact co-written with his wife, Harriet Taylor, who died before it was finished. Historians of philosophy dispute the degree of influence she had on the content of the finished book, but it is clear that Mill himself saw her role as co-author (though he didn’t go so far as to include her name on the title page).
尽管《论自由》总是被称为约翰·斯图亚特·密尔的作品，但在书的序言和他的自传中，他强调这实际上是与他的妻子哈丽特·泰勒共同创作的，她在书完成之前去世。哲学史学家对她对成书内容的影响程度存在争议，但显然密尔本人将她视为合著者（尽管他没有在封面上写上她的名字）。
In his autobiography Mill describes On Liberty as ‘a kind of philosophic textbook of a single truth’. The single truth is usually known as the Harm Principle or the Liberty Principle. This is the idea outlined above that potential harm to other people is the only acceptable ground for preventing me from doing whatever I want to do. This is very different from arguing for unlimited freedom. Mill thought that life in society would be impossible without imposing some restrictions on freedom: the question he addressed was where to draw the line between what should and should not be tolerated.
在他的自传中，密尔将《论自由》描述为“一个单一真理的哲学教科书”。这个单一真理通常被称为伤害原则或自由原则。这是上面提到的观点，即对他人潜在的伤害是阻止我做任何我想做的事情的唯一可接受理由。这与主张无限自由是非常不同的。密尔认为，生活在社会中如果不对自由施加一些限制将是不可想象的：他所探讨的问题是在哪里划定应该和不应该被容忍的界限。
The Harm Principle is underpinned by Mill’s commitment to utilitarianism, the view that the right action in any circumstances is determined by assessing its consequences: whatever is likely to give rise to the greatest happiness just is the morally right thing to do (though not all types of happiness are given equal weight in Mill’s calculation). Mill argues that if individuals are allowed space to pursue what interests them, the whole society benefits. I know better than other people the sort of life that is best for me. Even if I’m mistaken about this, choosing for myself is probably preferable to being forced to accept someone else’s conception of the good life ‘off the peg’. Mill believes that a situation in which individuals are allowed to pursue a wide range of incompatible lifestyles is far preferable to one in which they are coerced into a pattern of social conformity. He is an empiricist, and as such believes that the way to discover the truth on most matters is by experiment. Only by trying out different solutions to the human predicament will a society flourish; this was the route to social improvement. He approved of what he called ‘experiments of living’. In contrast, unthinking conformity leads to stagnation and a cramping of choice, the net result of which is misery and a stunting of human potential. It is important to realise that Mill is not arguing that we all have a natural right to liberty: he does not believe that the idea of natural rights makes sense at all. For convenience we might talk about a ‘right’ to freedom, but, for Mill, this must always be translatable into a generalisation about what is most likely to promote happiness. Utilitarianism rather than a natural rights theory underpins the policies of On Liberty.
伤害原则是建立在密尔对功利主义的承诺之上的，这种观点认为在任何情况下，正确的行动是通过评估其后果来决定的：无论什么行为可能导致最大的幸福，都是道德上正确的事情（尽管在密尔的计算中，并非所有类型的幸福都被赋予同等的权重）。密尔认为，如果个人被允许追求他们感兴趣的事物，整个社会都会受益。我比其他人更清楚什么样的生活对我最好。即使我对此有所误解，为自己做选择可能比被迫接受他人对美好生活的“现成”定义更可取。密尔相信，允许个人追求各种不兼容的生活方式的情况，远比被迫遵循社会一致性模式的情况要好。他是一个经验主义者，因此他认为发现大多数问题真相的方法是通过实验。只有通过尝试不同的解决方案来应对人类困境，社会才能繁荣；这就是社会改善的途径。他赞同他所称的“生活实验”。 相反，盲目的从众导致停滞和选择的压制，其最终结果是痛苦和人类潜力的扼杀。重要的是要意识到，密尔并不是在争论我们都有自然权利的自由：他并不认为自然权利的概念有任何意义。为了方便，我们可以谈论“自由的权利”，但对密尔来说，这必须始终转化为关于什么最有可能促进幸福的一般化。功利主义而不是自然权利理论支撑着《论自由》的政策。
On Liberty is partly directed at those who want to impose laws to restrict what consenting adults do in private (and consequently it has in recent years provided intellectual support for law reform on such issues as film censorship and homosexuality). But it is also directed at what Mill called ‘the tyranny of the majority’, the way that social pressures imposed by majority views can prevent some people from carrying out experiments of living even though there is no law which prohibits them from doing so. If my neighbours are affronted by the eccentric way I choose to live, even if nothing I do directly harms them, they may well make my life intolerable and thereby effectively prevent me from exercising the freedom I have within the law. The social pressure to conform can, Mill believed, undermine freedom and level everyone down to an unthinking mediocrity that is in the end worse for all.
《论自由》部分是针对那些想要制定法律来限制同意成年人在私下里所做事情的人（因此近年来它为电影审查和同性恋等问题的法律改革提供了智力支持）。但它也针对米尔所称的“多数人的暴政”，即多数观点施加的社会压力可以阻止一些人进行生活实验，即使没有法律禁止他们这样做。如果我的邻居对我选择的古怪生活方式感到不快，即使我所做的事情并没有直接伤害他们，他们也可能会使我的生活变得无法忍受，从而有效地阻止我在法律范围内行使我的自由。米尔认为，遵从的社会压力可能会破坏自由，并将每个人都降级到一种无思考的平庸状态，这最终对所有人来说都是更糟糕的。
This brings out clearly a point that some people who want to use Mill’s Harm Principle find convenient to ignore, namely that merely causing offence to other people doesn’t count as harming them. If you are offended by the knowledge that I choose to live in an unconventional way, with several homosexual partners, or as a nudist, perhaps, or maybe as a transvestite, then that doesn’t provide sufficient grounds for coercing me by law or by social pressure to behave otherwise. Mill’s principle would have been completely implausible if it had allowed offence to count as harm since almost every style of life is found offensive by someone or other. What exactly Mill does mean by ‘harm’ is not always clear and has been the focus of much discussion; but he is explicit in rejecting the idea that causing offence to others counts as harm. The sort of toleration that Mill advocates does not mean that you have to approve of other people’s eccentric life choices. You are entitled to be disgusted by how others live. You can try to educate them into making better choices; and the state is justified in imposing an education system on children that will make them less likely to pursue self-destructive lives as adults. But your disgust at the way other adults have chosen to live is never on its own enough to justify any intervention forcing them to behave differently. A mark of a civilised society is that it can tolerate diversity.
这清楚地指出了一个观点，即一些希望使用密尔的伤害原则的人方便地忽视的，即仅仅冒犯他人并不算对他们造成伤害。如果你因为我选择以不传统的方式生活而感到冒犯，比如与几个同性伴侣在一起，或者作为一个裸体主义者，或者可能作为一个变装者，那么这并不足以成为通过法律或社会压力强迫我以其他方式行为的充分理由。如果密尔的原则允许冒犯算作伤害，那么它将完全不可信，因为几乎每种生活方式都会被某些人视为冒犯。密尔所说的“伤害”究竟是什么意思并不总是清楚，并且一直是许多讨论的焦点；但他明确拒绝了冒犯他人算作伤害的观点。密尔所倡导的那种宽容并不意味着你必须赞同他人的古怪生活选择。你有权对他人的生活方式感到厌恶。 你可以尝试教育他们做出更好的选择；国家有理由对儿童施加一种教育系统，使他们在成年后更不可能追求自我毁灭的生活。但你对其他成年人选择生活方式的厌恶，单凭这一点永远不足以证明任何强迫他们以不同方式行为的干预是合理的。一个文明社会的标志是它能够容忍多样性。
Mill’s principle is not meant to be an abstract philosophical ideal with no relevance to real life. He wants to change the world for the better. To that end he focuses on applications of the principle. The most important of these is his discussion of freedom of thought and discussion, usually known as freedom of speech.
密尔的原则并不是一个与现实生活无关的抽象哲学理想。他想要让世界变得更好。为此，他专注于原则的应用。其中最重要的是他对思想和讨论自由的讨论，通常被称为言论自由。
Mill is a passionate defender of free speech. He argues that thought, speech and writing should only ever be censored when there is a clear risk of incitement to violence. The context in which words are uttered or written can affect their dangerousness. As Mill pointed out, it would be acceptable to print in a newspaper the view that corndealers starve the poor. However, if the same words were spoken to an angry mob outside a corn-dealer’s house then we would have good grounds for silencing the speaker. The high risk of inciting a riot would justify the intervention. Today’s debates about freedom of speech often focus on pornography or on racism; for Mill, writing in the nineteenth century, the central concern was with writing or speech which criticised orthodox views in religion, morality or politics. He thinks that greater damage is caused by suppressing a view, even if that view is false, than by allowing it to be freely expressed. In On Liberty he gives a detailed justification of this stance.
密尔是言论自由的热情捍卫者。他认为，思想、言论和写作只有在明确存在煽动暴力的风险时才应被审查。言语被表达或书写的背景会影响其危险性。正如密尔所指出的，在报纸上发表“谷物商让穷人挨饿”的观点是可以接受的。然而，如果同样的话语是在一个愤怒的暴徒聚集在谷物商家门外时说出的，那么我们就有充分的理由来制止说话者。煽动骚乱的高风险将证明干预是合理的。今天关于言论自由的辩论常常集中在色情或种族主义上；而对于生活在十九世纪的密尔来说，主要关注的是批评宗教、道德或政治正统观点的写作或言论。他认为，压制一种观点（即使该观点是错误的）所造成的伤害大于允许其自由表达所造成的伤害。在《论自由》中，他对此立场进行了详细的辩护。
If someone expresses a controversial opinion, there are two basic possibilities: that the view is true, or that it is false. There is also a less obvious third possibility: that, though false, it contains an element of truth. Mill considered each of these possibilities. If the view is true, then suppressing it involves denying us the opportunity of ridding ourselves of error. His assumption is that truth is better than falsehood. If the view is false, then to silence it without giving it a hearing undermines the possibility of providing a public refutation of the view in which, he believes, truth would be seen to be victor in its collision with error. So, for example, Mill would tolerate the expression of racist opinions, provided that they did not incite violence, because they can then receive a public refutation and be demonstrated to be false (assuming that the views were indeed false).
如果有人表达一个有争议的观点，基本上有两种可能性：这个观点是真的，或者这个观点是假的。还有一种不太明显的第三种可能性：虽然是假的，但它包含了一定的真理。密尔考虑了这些可能性。如果这个观点是真的，那么压制它就意味着剥夺了我们摆脱错误的机会。他的假设是，真理优于虚假。如果这个观点是假的，那么在没有听取它的情况下将其沉默，削弱了提供公众反驳该观点的可能性，而他相信，在与错误的碰撞中，真理将被视为胜利者。因此，例如，密尔会容忍种族主义观点的表达，前提是这些观点没有煽动暴力，因为它们可以接受公众的反驳并被证明是错误的（假设这些观点确实是错误的）。
If the view expressed contains an element of truth, silencing it can prevent the true part becoming known. For example, a racist might point to the fact that members of a particular ethnic group on average left school with fewer qualifications than the norm. The racist might take this as evidence that members of that ethnic group were innately inferior. However, even though this view is very probably false, the evidence might contain some truth: the truth here might be that members of this ethnic group do actually leave school with fewer qualifications. The true explanation of the evidence might be that they are discriminated against by the education system, not that they are innately inferior. Mill thinks that by silencing opinions that you are convinced are false you run the risk of overlooking the fact that even false opinions can contain elements of truth.
如果表达的观点包含某种真理，压制它可能会阻止真实部分被人们所知。例如，一个种族主义者可能会指出，某个特定民族群体的成员平均离校时获得的资格证书少于常规水平。种族主义者可能会将此视为该民族群体成员天生劣等的证据。然而，尽管这个观点很可能是错误的，但证据中可能包含一些真相：这里的真相可能是该民族群体的成员确实获得的资格证书较少。证据的真实解释可能是他们在教育系统中受到歧视，而不是他们天生劣等。密尔认为，通过压制你确信是错误的观点，你有可能忽视即使是错误的观点也可能包含真理的元素。
In order to silence a view you must be confident of your own infallibility (inability to make mistakes). But none of us can have complete confidence in this respect. No human being is immune from mistakes about what is true. History is brimming with examples of truth being suppressed by people who genuinely believed the suppressed view to be misguided nonsense. Think of the suppression by the Church of the view that the earth goes round the sun rather than vice versa. Galileo and his followers were persecuted for their beliefs; their persecutors were convinced that their own views were correct.
为了使一种观点沉默，你必须对自己的无误性（不犯错误的能力）充满信心。但我们没有人能在这方面拥有完全的信心。没有人类能够免于对真相的错误判断。历史充满了被那些真心相信被压制观点是误导性胡言的人的例子。想想教会对地球围绕太阳转而不是反之的观点的压制。伽利略和他的追随者因其信仰而受到迫害；他们的迫害者坚信自己的观点是正确的。
But surely censors are justified in making judgements on the basis of probability? They may not be infallible, but in some cases surely they can be almost certain that they are right? There are very few issues on which we can achieve absolute certainty: won’t a demand for certainty paralyse us into inaction? Mill’s response to this is that allowing others the freedom to contradict us is one of the principal ways in which we gain confidence in our judgements. We can be more confident about a view which survives scrutiny and criticism than one which has never been challenged. Besides, even if a view is obviously true, the act of defending it against false views keeps the true view alive and prevents it from becoming a dead dogma incapable of stirring anyone to action.
但审查者在基于概率做出判断时，难道不是合理的吗？他们可能并非万无一失，但在某些情况下，他们几乎可以肯定自己是正确的吧？我们能够达到绝对确定的议题非常少：对确定性的需求难道不会使我们陷入无所作为的状态吗？密尔对此的回应是，允许他人自由地反驳我们是我们在判断中获得信心的主要方式之一。我们对一个经得起审查和批评的观点的信心，往往比对一个从未受到挑战的观点的信心更强。此外，即使一个观点显然是正确的，捍卫它以抵御错误观点的行为也能使这个正确的观点保持活力，防止它变成一个无法激励任何人行动的死教条。
Criticisms of on Liberty
《论自由》的批评
Religious objections
宗教反对意见
Despite the fact that Mill was very keen to promote religious toleration, his views on liberty are sometimes attacked on religious grounds. Some religions teach that part of the state’s role is to enforce the God-given moral code. For members of such religions it may be inconceivable that they could be misled about their religious duty. If, for example, you are a member of a religion which dictates that all homosexual activity is a sin, and your religion is the official state religion, then you may believe that the state should prohibit all homosexual activity despite the fact that it does no direct harm to anyone. Whether or not this prohibition would be conducive to happiness is irrelevant, you might think. In contrast, Mill would argue that because this prohibition would tend to decrease happiness and restrict human potential it should not be imposed. The two views are in such direct contradiction that there is no obvious compromise between them.
尽管密尔非常热衷于促进宗教宽容，但他对自由的看法有时会因宗教原因受到攻击。一些宗教教导国家的角色部分是执行上帝赋予的道德规范。对于这些宗教的成员来说，他们可能无法想象自己会在宗教义务上被误导。例如，如果你是一个宗教的成员，该宗教规定所有同性恋行为都是罪恶，并且你的宗教是官方国教，那么你可能会认为国家应该禁止所有同性恋行为，尽管这对任何人都没有直接伤害。你可能会认为，这种禁令是否有助于幸福并不相关。相反，密尔会认为，由于这种禁令会倾向于减少幸福并限制人类潜力，因此不应该强加。这两种观点之间存在如此直接的矛盾，以至于它们之间没有明显的妥协。
Vague notion of harm
模糊的伤害概念
The Harm Principle provides the core of On Liberty, but Mill is vague about what he means by harm. He rules out being offended as not counting as being harmed. However, at one point in the book he allows that some acts which are permissible and harmless in private (presumably he is thinking of sexual acts) should be prevented from taking place in public. This seems inconsistent with what he says elsewhere in the book, since he argues there that only if an action causes harm is there any justification for intervention. And in the example mentioned the only possible harm that can occur would be that members of the public find it offensive. Furthermore, it is not clear, even with physical harms, what threshold of harm needs to be reached before intervention becomes justified.
伤害原则是《论自由》的核心，但密尔对他所指的伤害含糊不清。他排除了被冒犯作为伤害的标准。然而，在书中的某个地方，他允许一些在私人场合是允许且无害的行为（他大概在考虑性行为）在公共场合应当被阻止。这似乎与他在书中其他地方所说的内容不一致，因为他在那儿辩称，只有当某个行为造成伤害时，干预才有任何正当理由。而在提到的例子中，唯一可能发生的伤害就是公众成员觉得这令人反感。此外，即使是身体伤害，也不清楚在干预变得正当之前需要达到什么伤害阈值。
In Mill’s defence, his On Liberty was not intended as the last word on the subject.
在密尔的辩护中，他的《论自由》并不是对这个主题的最终论述。
Private immorality harms society
私人的不道德行为危害社会
One alleged justification for state intervention to prevent some activities which are carried out in private and harm no one or else only consenting adult participants is that a society only exists in virtue of a common underlying set of moral principles. If these principles are undermined, whether in public or private, then the society’s continued existence may be threatened. So intervention may be necessary, for the preservation of society, which is the basis of the possibility of individual happiness.
一种声称的国家干预理由是，为了防止一些在私人场合进行且不伤害任何人或仅伤害同意的成年参与者的活动，社会的存在依赖于一套共同的道德原则。如果这些原则受到破坏，无论是在公共场合还是私人场合，那么社会的持续存在可能会受到威胁。因此，为了维护社会的存在，干预可能是必要的，而社会的存在是个人幸福可能性的基础。
The assumption that this last sort of criticism is based on is controversial. There is a great deal of evidence that societies can tolerate moral diversity without disintegrating.
这种最后一种批评所基于的假设是有争议的。有大量证据表明，社会可以在不解体的情况下容忍道德多样性。
Not utilitarian
非功利主义
Mill is explicit about the theoretical justification of the doctrines of On Liberty: utilitarianism provides the ultimate justification for the Harm Principle. However, a number of critics have pointed out that, at times, Mill seems to be arguing for freedom as something having intrinsic value whether or not it contributes to overall happiness. Intrinsic value is usually contrasted with instrumental value. Intrinsic value is the value that something has in itself; instrumental value is the value that it has because it can be used to get something else (money, for example, has instrumental value because its value to us lies in its use rather than in the coins or notes themselves). A utilitarian believes that the only thing that has intrinsic value is human happiness: everything else which is of value is of instrumental value in bringing about human happiness. So, we would expect a utilitarian to say that the only value in freedom is that it is conducive to happiness. But such a view does not obviously lead to Mill’s conclusion that we should always preserve individual freedom except in cases where harm to others is likely. Indeed, a strict utilitarian might claim that, for example, regarding freedom of speech, in certain specific cases there might be good grounds for silencing some true views because happiness would thereby be increased. If I have reliable information that the whole of humanity will be destroyed by a comet which will collide with our planet in the next few weeks, you might have good utilitarian grounds for suppressing my freedom of speech. If it were generally known that our species was about to be wiped out it is fairly obvious that the overall level of human unhappiness would increase significantly as compared with a situation of ignorant bliss.
密尔明确阐述了《论自由》理论的正当性：功利主义为伤害原则提供了最终的正当性。然而，一些批评者指出，密尔有时似乎在主张自由本身具有内在价值，无论它是否有助于整体幸福。内在价值通常与工具价值相对立。内在价值是某物本身所具有的价值；工具价值是因为某物可以用来获取其他东西而具有的价值（例如，货币具有工具价值，因为它对我们的价值在于其使用，而不是硬币或纸币本身）。功利主义者认为，唯一具有内在价值的东西是人类幸福：其他所有有价值的东西都是在促进人类幸福方面的工具价值。因此，我们可以预期功利主义者会说，自由的唯一价值在于它有助于幸福。但这种观点显然并不导致密尔的结论，即我们应该始终维护个人自由，除非在可能对他人造成伤害的情况下。 确实，一个严格的功利主义者可能会声称，例如，在某些特定情况下，可能有充分的理由来压制某些真实观点，因为这样可以增加幸福。如果我有可靠的信息，知道整个人类将在接下来的几周内被一颗将与我们星球相撞的彗星摧毁，你可能有充分的功利主义理由来压制我的言论自由。如果普遍知道我们这个物种即将被消灭，那么与无知的幸福状态相比，人类整体的不幸水平显然会显著增加。
Mill suggests that freedom of speech is always for the best except in the situation where there is a serious risk of direct harm as a result. It is not obvious that utilitarianism provides a theoretical justification for such a strong position. This sort of objection doesn’t necessarily undermine Mill’s conclusions, but just points to the fact that he has not provided a convincing utilitarian justification for them.
密尔认为言论自由总是最好的，除非在可能导致直接伤害的严重风险情况下。功利主义是否为如此强烈的立场提供了理论上的正当性并不明显。这种反对意见并不一定削弱密尔的结论，但只是指出他没有为这些结论提供令人信服的功利主义正当性。
Over-optimistic
过于乐观
Many of Mill’s views about freedom and its consequences are optimistic, some, perhaps, over-optimistic. For example, he assumes that adults are generally in the best position to know what is likely to promote their own happiness. But is this obviously so? Many of us are experts at self-deception and easily seduced into short-term gratification at the expense of the chance of long-term happiness. We tell ourselves stories about what will make our lives go well which, on sober reflection, often turn out to be convenient fictions. If this is so, it’s possible that someone else, who is not so involved in the matter, might be better suited to assessing how I should live. But, of course, any benefits which might ensue from letting other people choose how I live will have to be offset against the accompanying loss of my own self-direction.
米尔关于自由及其后果的许多观点是乐观的，有些观点或许过于乐观。例如，他假设成年人通常处于最佳位置，知道什么可能促进他们自己的幸福。但这显然如此吗？我们中的许多人在自我欺骗方面是专家，容易被短期满足所诱惑，而牺牲了长期幸福的机会。我们告诉自己关于什么会让我们的生活顺利进行的故事，经过冷静反思，往往发现这些故事只是方便的虚构。如果是这样，可能有其他人，他们没有那么参与其中，可能更适合评估我应该如何生活。但当然，让其他人选择我生活方式所带来的任何好处，必须与我自我导向的相应损失相抵消。
Another area in which Mill is perhaps over-optimistic is that of freedom of speech. He assumes that in the collision between truth and error, truth will triumph. But this may not be the case. He underestimates the power of irrationality in human life. Many of us are strongly motivated to believe things which aren’t true. Allowing false views to circulate freely may actually allow them to take root amongst the gullible in a way that they would not have done had they been silenced. Also, changes in technology have resulted in a much wider dissemination of views. There is no evidence whatsoever that amongst the diverse and widely disseminated views there has been a strong tendency for truth to triumph over error. In the circumstances, some people might think that there are good grounds for censorship. However, any would-be censor will have to face up to Mill’s point that if you suppress someone else’s opinion this involves an assumption that you are infallible and that the beneficial effects of silencing the view outweigh the detrimental ones.
米尔可能过于乐观的另一个领域是言论自由。他假设在真理与错误的碰撞中，真理将会胜利。但情况可能并非如此。他低估了非理性在生活中的力量。我们中的许多人强烈倾向于相信不真实的事物。允许错误观点自由传播，实际上可能会让它们在轻信者中扎根，而如果它们被压制则不会如此。此外，技术的变化导致观点的传播范围大大扩大。没有任何证据表明，在多样化和广泛传播的观点中，真理有强烈的倾向战胜错误。在这种情况下，有些人可能认为有充分的理由进行审查。然而，任何想要审查的人都必须面对米尔的观点，即如果你压制了他人的意见，这就意味着你假设自己是无误的，并且压制观点的有益效果超过了有害效果。
Positive freedom
积极自由
A further criticism of Mill’s account of freedom is that, by concentrating on freedom from interference and by making the case for tolerance, he missed a more important sense of the term ‘freedom’. Mill provided an account of what is usually known as negative freedom, or freedom from; what is needed, some of his critics believe, is an account of positive freedom or freedom to. Those who defend positive freedom argue that since society is imperfect, simply allowing people space to get on with their lives isn’t sufficient to guarantee them freedom. There are numerous obstacles to achieving freedom, ranging from lack of material and educational resources to psychological obstacles to success. Those who argue for the positive sense of freedom believe that in order to fulfil your potential as a human being and thereby be genuinely free, all kinds of state intervention may be necessary, and at times this may result in individuals having their range of activity curtailed, even though it does not directly harm anyone else. Some of the more extreme defenders of positive freedom even believe that it is acceptable to force people to be free, and that there is no contradiction involved in this notion. In contrast, in Mill’s terminology, if you are forced to do something then you cannot, by definition, have done it freely.
对密尔自由观的进一步批评是，他专注于免受干扰的自由，并为宽容辩护，从而忽视了“自由”一词更重要的含义。密尔提供了通常被称为消极自由或自由免于的解释；一些批评者认为，需要的是积极自由或自由去的解释。捍卫积极自由的人认为，由于社会不完善，仅仅允许人们有空间去过自己的生活并不足以保证他们的自由。实现自由面临着许多障碍，从缺乏物质和教育资源到心理上的成功障碍。主张积极自由的人认为，为了实现作为人类的潜力，从而真正获得自由，各种国家干预可能是必要的，有时这可能导致个人的活动范围受到限制，即使这并不直接伤害其他人。 一些更极端的积极自由捍卫者甚至认为，强迫人们获得自由是可以接受的，并且这一概念并不存在矛盾。相反，在密尔的术语中，如果你被迫做某事，那么根据定义，你就不能自由地做这件事。
1806 | born in London. |
1859 | publishes On Liberty. |
1863 | publishes Utilitarianism. |
1873 | dies in Avignon, France. |
coercion: use of force to make someone do something.
强迫：使用武力使某人做某事。
fallibility: the fact that we are prone to make mistakes.
易错性：我们容易犯错误的事实。
the Harm Principle: the only justification for coercing another’s actions is that they are otherwise likely to harm someone else. Sometimes known as the Liberty Principle.
伤害原则：强迫他人行为的唯一理由是他们否则可能会伤害其他人。有时被称为自由原则。
negative freedom: freedom from constraints. The principal kind of freedom advocated by Mill.
消极自由：摆脱约束的自由。米尔所倡导的主要自由类型。
paternalism: forcing someone to do or refrain from something for their own good.
父权主义：强迫某人为了他们自己的利益去做或不做某事。
positive freedom: freedom actually to do what you really want to do. Obstacles to positive freedom can be internal as well as external: for instance, weakness of will can prevent you from being free in this sense.
积极自由：实际上是做你真正想做的事情的自由。积极自由的障碍可以是内部的，也可以是外部的：例如，意志薄弱可能会阻止你在这个意义上获得自由。
toleration: allowing people to conduct their lives as they wish, even though you disapprove of the choices they have made for themselves.
宽容：允许人们按照自己的意愿生活，即使你不赞同他们为自己所做的选择。
utilitarianism: the moral theory which declares that the morally right action in any circumstances is the one which is most likely to maximise happiness.
功利主义：一种道德理论，宣称在任何情况下，道德上正确的行为是最有可能最大化幸福的行为。
utility: for Mill ‘utility’ is a technical term meaning happiness rather than usefulness. If an action increases utility, this simply means that it increases happiness.
效用：对密尔来说，“效用”是一个技术术语，意味着幸福而不是有用性。如果一个行动增加了效用，这仅仅意味着它增加了幸福。
Isaiah Berlin ‘John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life’ and ‘two Concepts of Freedom’, both in Isaiah Berlin Four Essays on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) are two important essays which address the central issues raised in On Liberty.
以赛亚·伯林《约翰·斯图亚特·密尔与生活的目的》和《自由的两个概念》，均收录于以赛亚·伯林《自由的四篇论文》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1969 年）中，是两篇重要的论文，探讨了《论自由》中提出的核心问题。
Alan Ryan (ed.) Mill (New York: Norton, 1997) includes the texts of On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, together with a selection of commentaries. It also includes an annotated bibliography.
艾伦·瑞安（编）《米尔》（纽约：诺顿，1997）包括《论自由》和《女性的从属》的文本，以及一系列评论的选摘。它还包括一份注释书目。
John Skorupski John Stuart Mill (London: Routledge, Arguments of the Philosophers series, 1989) provides a detailed account of Mill’s philosophy as a whole and includes a discussion of On Liberty.
约翰·斯科鲁普斯基 约翰·斯图亚特·密尔（伦敦：劳特利奇，哲学家论证系列，1989）对密尔的整体哲学进行了详细的阐述，并包括了对《论自由》的讨论。
Nigel Warburton Freedom: An Introduction with Readings (London: Routledge and the Open University, 2001). This book, originally written as part of an Open University philosophy course, includes an examination of Mill’s arguments in On Liberty.
奈杰尔·沃伯顿《自由：导论与阅读》（伦敦：劳特利奇出版社与开放大学，2001 年）。本书最初作为开放大学哲学课程的一部分而写，包含对密尔在《论自由》中论点的考察。
The best biography of Mill is Richard Reeves John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand (London: Atlantic Books, 2007). This very readable book sets Mill in his historical context and is based on the most recent scholarship. You might also enjoy Mill’s own An Autobiography (first published in 1873, London: Penguin, 1989).
关于米尔的最佳传记是理查德·里夫斯的《约翰·斯图亚特·米尔：维多利亚的火品牌》（伦敦：大西洋出版社，2007 年）。这本非常易读的书将米尔置于他的历史背景中，并基于最新的学术研究。你也可能会喜欢米尔自己的《自传》（首次出版于 1873 年，伦敦：企鹅出版社，1989 年）。
John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism
约翰·斯图亚特·密尔 功利主义
Maximise happiness. That is a caricature of utilitarianism, but it does capture something true and central to the theory. John Stuart Mill is the most famous utilitarian philosopher; in his book Utilitarianism he develops and refines the cruder version of the theory which had been put forward by his mentor Jeremy Bentham. In order to understand Mill’s approach it is important to see how it differs from Bentham’s.
最大化幸福。这是对功利主义的夸张，但确实捕捉到了该理论中某些真实而核心的内容。约翰·斯图亚特·密尔是最著名的功利主义哲学家；在他的著作《功利主义》中，他发展并完善了他导师杰里米·边沁提出的更粗糙的理论版本。为了理解密尔的观点，重要的是要看到它与边沁的不同之处。
Bentham’s Utilitarianism
边沁的功利主义
For Bentham, the morally right action in any circumstances is the one that will tend to maximise total happiness. He conceives of happiness as a blissful mental state: pleasure and the absence of pain. The more of this that occurs in the world, the better. It doesn’t matter how the pleasure is produced: Bentham famously declared that pushpin (a pub game) was as worthwhile as poetry provided that they produced equal amounts of pleasure. Each individual counts equally in the calculation of how much pleasure is produced by an action, and the total of pleasurable states is summed to determine how we should act. This is utilitarianism in its most straightforward form.
对于边沁来说，在任何情况下，道德上正确的行为是能够最大化总幸福的行为。他将幸福视为一种幸福的心理状态：快乐和痛苦的缺失。世界上发生的这种状态越多，越好。快乐的产生方式并不重要：边沁著名地宣称，只要产生相等的快乐，推针（一个酒吧游戏）和诗歌同样有价值。每个个体在计算某一行为所产生的快乐时都同等重要，愉悦状态的总和被汇总以确定我们应该如何行动。这是功利主义最直接的形式。
So, for instance, if a utilitarian wanted to decide whether to leave her money to one poor relative or divide it between twenty reasonably well-off friends, she would calculate how much total pleasure would be produced by each. Although the inheritance might make the poor relative very happy, the total amount of happiness may still be less than making twenty reasonably well-off friends moderately happy. If this were true, the woman should leave the money to the friends rather than the relative.
因此，例如，如果一个功利主义者想决定是把钱留给一个贫穷的亲戚，还是把钱分给二十个相对富裕的朋友，她会计算每种选择所产生的总快乐量。尽管遗产可能会让贫穷的亲戚非常快乐，但总的幸福感可能仍然低于让二十个相对富裕的朋友适度快乐。如果这是事实，那么这个女人应该把钱留给朋友而不是亲戚。
Mill shared many of Bentham’s beliefs. Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle, for example, is simply ‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’. Both Bentham and Mill were hedonists in the sense that their approach to ethics was founded upon the pursuit of pleasure (not, however, merely the pursuit of individuals’ own pleasure, but rather the pursuit of the greatest overall pleasure). Actions for both philosophers were to be judged according to their probable consequences, not according to any religious code or set of binding principles to be followed whatever consequences ensued.
密尔分享了许多边沁的信念。例如，密尔的最大幸福原则简单地表述为“行动的正确性与其促进幸福的程度成正比，与其产生幸福的相反结果的程度成反比”。边沁和密尔都是享乐主义者，因为他们的伦理学方法建立在追求快乐的基础上（然而，这并不仅仅是追求个人的快乐，而是追求整体最大的快乐）。这两位哲学家的行动应根据其可能的后果进行判断，而不是根据任何宗教规范或一套无论后果如何都要遵循的约束原则。
The phrase ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ is sometimes used to describe the utilitarian approach to ethics, but this can be misleading. What both Bentham and Mill were interested in was achieving the greatest aggregate happiness (that is, the largest total sum of happiness) irrespective of how that happiness was distributed. It would be consistent with this approach to think that it would be better to make a few people extremely happy than to make a much larger number slightly happier, provided that the sum of happiness in the first case was larger than the sum in the second.
“最大多数人的最大幸福”这个短语有时用来描述功利主义的伦理观，但这可能会产生误导。边沁和穆尔所关注的是实现最大的总体幸福（即幸福的总和），而不考虑这种幸福的分配方式。根据这种观点，认为让少数人极其幸福比让更多人稍微幸福要好是合理的，前提是第一种情况的幸福总和大于第二种情况的幸福总和。
Mill’s utilitarianism differs from Bentham’s in that he gives a more sophisticated account of happiness. For Mill, there are qualitatively different sorts of pleasure: higher and lower pleasures. Higher pleasures are to be preferred to lower ones. Bentham, in contrast, treats all pleasures as on a par.
密尔的功利主义与边沁的不同之处在于他对幸福的更复杂的解释。对密尔来说，快乐有不同的质量：高层次的快乐和低层次的快乐。高层次的快乐应优于低层次的快乐。相反，边沁将所有快乐视为平等。
Mill on Higher and Lower Pleasures
高尚与低俗快乐的磨坊
One common criticism of simple versions of utilitarianism, such as Bentham’s, is that they reduce the subtleties of human life to a stark calculation of animal-like pleasures, with no concern for how these pleasures are produced. Utilitarianism of this kind was ridiculed as a doctrine only worthy of swine.
对简单版本的功利主义（如边沁的理论）的一种常见批评是，它将人类生活的细微差别简化为一种动物般的快乐的严酷计算，而不关心这些快乐是如何产生的。这种功利主义被嘲笑为只配猪的教义。
Mill meets such criticisms with his distinction between higher and lower pleasures. As he puts it, it is better to be a dissatisfied human being than a satisfied pig; and better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool. Human beings are capable of intellectual pleasures as well as the brute physical ones; pigs cannot have intellectual pleasures. Mill argues that the intellectual pleasures, those he calls higher pleasures, are intrinsically more valuable than the physical lower ones. His argument in support of this is that those who have felt both kinds of pleasure will certainly prefer the intellectual kind. This leaves him with the awkward fact that some people who are capable of experiencing sublime intellectual pleasures nevertheless throw themselves into lives of debauchery and sensual gratification. His response to this sort of case is that they are led astray by the temptation of immediate sensual gratification; they know full well that the higher pleasures are more worthwhile.
密尔通过区分高尚快乐和低级快乐来回应这些批评。他说，做一个不满足的人比做一个满足的猪要好；做一个不满足的苏格拉底比做一个满足的傻瓜要好。人类能够体验智力上的快乐以及粗野的身体快乐；而猪无法体验智力上的快乐。密尔认为，智力上的快乐，即他所称的高尚快乐，内在上比身体上的低级快乐更有价值。他支持这一观点的论据是，那些体验过两种快乐的人肯定会更喜欢智力上的快乐。这使他面临一个尴尬的事实，即一些能够体验崇高智力快乐的人仍然沉溺于放荡和感官享乐的生活。他对此类情况的回应是，他们被即时感官享乐的诱惑所误导；他们完全知道高尚的快乐更有价值。
The ‘Proof’ of Utilitarianism
功利主义的“证明”
The obvious question to ask is ‘Why maximise happiness?’ Mill’s answer is controversial, though it is important to realise that he never claims that it provides a conclusive justification for his theory: he does not believe that a theory such as utilitarianism can be proved to be true.
显而易见的问题是“为什么要最大化幸福？”密尔的回答颇具争议，尽管重要的是要意识到他从未声称这为他的理论提供了决定性的辩护：他并不相信像功利主义这样的理论可以被证明是真实的。
Happiness, he says, is pursued as an end in itself. The ultimate end of all human activity is happiness and the avoidance of pain. Everything else which is desirable is desirable because it contributes to such a life. If you spend your life collecting beautiful works of art, this activity is a way of getting pleasure. If someone, for example, argues against Mill by claiming that they pursue virtue as an end in itself independently of any happiness that might arise from it, Mill answers that virtue is then an ingredient in their happy life; it becomes part of that person’s happiness.
他说，幸福被追求作为一种目的。所有人类活动的最终目标是幸福和避免痛苦。其他一切可取之物之所以可取，是因为它有助于这样的生活。如果你花费一生收集美丽的艺术作品，这种活动就是获取快乐的一种方式。如果有人，例如，反对密尔，声称他们追求美德作为一种目的，而不依赖于可能由此产生的任何幸福，密尔回答说，美德则是他们幸福生活中的一个成分；它成为那个人幸福的一部分。
The Greatest Happiness Principle claims that the end or purpose of all human life is happiness and the avoidance of pain. These are the only things that are desirable as ends; everything else desirable is desirable as a means to these ends. So the question ‘Why maximise happiness?’ is really just a question about what makes happiness desirable. Mill suggests an analogy to answer this question. The only way that we can prove that an object is visible is by demonstrating that people actually can see it. Analogously, he claims, the only evidence we can give that happiness is desirable is that people actually do desire it. Each person finds his or her own happiness desirable, so general happiness is the sum of the individual happiness, and itself desirable.
最大幸福原则主张，所有人类生活的最终目的或目标是幸福和避免痛苦。这些是作为目的唯一值得追求的事物；其他一切值得追求的东西都是作为实现这些目的的手段。因此，“为什么要最大化幸福？”这个问题实际上只是关于什么使幸福值得追求的问题。密尔建议用一个类比来回答这个问题。我们证明一个物体是可见的唯一方法是展示人们实际上能够看到它。类似地，他声称，我们能提供的幸福值得追求的唯一证据是人们确实渴望它。每个人都认为自己的幸福是值得追求的，因此总体幸福是个体幸福的总和，而本身也是值得追求的。
Criticisms of Utilitarianism
对功利主义的批评
‘Proof’ is based on bad arguments
“Proof”是基于错误的论点
Mill’s attempt to justify the belief that we ought to maximise happiness contains some allegedly bad arguments. Most of these were pointed out by Henry Sidgwick. First, the move from what is visible to what is desirable is misleading. Mill suggests that because we can tell what is visible by identifying what is seen, it follows that we can tell what is desirable by identifying what people actually do desire. But on closer inspection the analogy between ‘visible’ and ‘desirable’ does not hold. ‘Visible’ means ‘can be seen’, but ‘desirable’ doesn’t usually mean ‘can be desired’; what it usually means is ‘should be desired’ or ‘is worthy of being desired’, and that is certainly the sense in which Mill employs it in his argument. Once the weakness of the analogy between the two words has been pointed out, it is difficult to see how describing what people actually do desire is likely to reveal anything about what people should desire.
米尔试图证明我们应该最大化幸福的信念包含一些 allegedly 不良的论点。大多数这些论点是亨利·西奇威克指出的。首先，从可见的事物转向可取的事物是误导性的。米尔建议，因为我们可以通过识别所见的事物来判断什么是可见的，因此我们可以通过识别人们实际渴望的东西来判断什么是可取的。但经过仔细检查，“可见”和“可取”之间的类比并不成立。“可见”意味着“可以被看到”，但“可取”通常并不意味着“可以被渴望”；它通常意味着“应该被渴望”或“值得被渴望”，这无疑是米尔在他的论证中所采用的含义。一旦指出这两个词之间类比的弱点，就很难看出描述人们实际渴望的东西如何可能揭示人们应该渴望的东西。
But even if Mill had established that happiness is desirable in the appropriate sense, this would lead logically to a form of egoism, each person pursuing his or her own happiness, rather than the more benevolent approach of utilitarianism which makes the greatest happiness possible its aim. Mill thinks that because each individual wants his or her own happiness, the total of all the individual happinesses can simply be added up to give an aggregate which would then itself be desirable. But this does not follow at all. He needs a far stronger argument to prove that the general happiness, rather than just our own individual happiness, is something that we all ought to pursue.
但即使密尔已经确立了幸福在适当意义上是可取的，这在逻辑上也会导致一种自我主义，每个人追求自己的幸福，而不是功利主义的更仁慈的方式，后者将最大幸福作为其目标。密尔认为，由于每个个体都想要自己的幸福，所有个体幸福的总和可以简单地相加，从而得出一个总和，这个总和本身也会是可取的。但这根本不成立。他需要一个更强有力的论据来证明一般幸福，而不仅仅是我们自己的个体幸福，是我们所有人都应该追求的东西。
Difficulties of calculation
计算的困难
Even if Mill had established that there were good grounds for adopting a utilitarian approach to ethics, there are still some objections to the theory and its application which he would need to meet. One practical difficulty is that of calculating which of the many possible actions is most likely to produce the most happiness overall. This might be a particularly vexing issue when you had to make a moral decision quickly – for instance, if you were faced with a dilemma about whom to save from a burning building, given that you could only save one person and there were three people trapped inside. In such a situation you just would not have time to sit down and calculate probable consequences.
即使密尔已经确立了采用功利主义伦理方法的良好理由，但仍然有一些对该理论及其应用的反对意见需要他去回应。一个实际的困难是计算众多可能的行动中，哪一个最有可能产生最大的整体幸福。当你必须迅速做出道德决策时，这可能是一个特别棘手的问题——例如，如果你面临一个关于从燃烧的建筑中救谁的两难选择，考虑到你只能救一个人，而里面有三个人被困。在这种情况下，你根本没有时间坐下来计算可能的后果。
Mill’s response to this sort of objection was that throughout human history people have been learning from their experience about the probable courses of different sorts of action. The solution is to come up with some general principles about which sorts of actions tend to maximise happiness, rather than to go back to the Greatest Happiness Principle whenever you are faced with a moral decision. Mill, then, suggests that the rational approach to life involves adopting such general principles rather than forever calculating possible consequences. Thus his utilitarianism has two stages: the derivation of general principles on utilitarian grounds, and then the application of those principles to particular cases.
米尔对这种反对意见的回应是，在人类历史上，人们一直在从经验中学习不同类型行动的可能结果。解决方案是提出一些关于哪些类型的行动倾向于最大化幸福的一般原则，而不是在面临道德决策时总是回到最大幸福原则。因此，米尔认为，理性的生活方式涉及采用这些一般原则，而不是永远计算可能的后果。因此，他的功利主义有两个阶段：基于功利主义的推导一般原则，然后将这些原则应用于具体案例。
Higher/lower pleasures
更高/更低的快乐
Mill’s division of pleasures into two categories creates problems of several sorts. Because these pleasures are different in kind rather than just degree it makes the calculation and comparison of consequences of actions far more complex. Higher and lower pleasures are incommensurable: that is, there is no common currency in which both can be measured and compared. So it is not at all clear how we are to apply Mill’s version of utilitarianism in circumstances where both higher and lower pleasures enter into the calculation.
米尔将快乐分为两类的划分产生了几种问题。因为这些快乐在种类上是不同的，而不仅仅是程度上的不同，这使得对行为后果的计算和比较变得更加复杂。高等快乐和低等快乐是不可比较的：也就是说，没有一种共同的标准可以用来衡量和比较两者。因此，在高等快乐和低等快乐都参与计算的情况下，我们如何应用米尔的功利主义版本并不清楚。
Furthermore, the higher/lower pleasure distinction looks like a self-serving one. It is no surprise to find an intellectual defending the idea that intellectual activity produces pleasures of a more satisfying kind than merely physical ones. This in itself doesn’t prove the theory is false; it just reveals the fact that Mill might have had a vested interest in the intellectual pleasures being intrinsically more valuable than others.
此外，高级/低级快乐的区分看起来像是自利的。发现一个知识分子为智力活动产生的快乐比单纯的身体快乐更令人满意的观点辩护并不奇怪。这本身并不能证明该理论是错误的；它只是揭示了米尔可能对智力快乐具有一种既得利益，认为其本质上比其他快乐更有价值。
Unpalatable consequences
难以接受的后果
The strict application of utilitarian principles in some cases has consequences which many people would find unacceptable. For example, if there had been a gruesome murder, and the police had found a suspect who they knew hadn’t committed the murder, there might be utilitarian grounds for framing him and punishing him accordingly. Presumably most members of the public would be very happy that the culprit had been caught and punished; they would remain happy just as long as no one found out that he was in fact innocent. The innocent man’s suffering would be great for him, but in the calculation of consequences would be far outweighed by the sum of pleasure that many millions of people would feel at seeing what they believe to be justice to have been done. Yet, this consequence of utilitarian morality would be unpalatable for most of us: our intuitions are that punishing the innocent is unjust and should not be permitted whatever the beneficial consequences of this practice.
在某些情况下，严格应用功利主义原则会产生许多人认为不可接受的后果。例如，如果发生了一起可怕的谋杀案，警方发现了一名他们知道没有犯下谋杀的嫌疑人，那么可能会有功利主义的理由来陷害他并相应地惩罚他。可以推测，大多数公众会非常高兴罪犯被抓住并受到惩罚；只要没有人发现他实际上是无辜的，他们就会保持高兴。无辜者的痛苦对他来说将是巨大的，但在后果的计算中，这种痛苦将远远被数百万人的快乐所抵消，他们认为正义得到了伸张。然而，这种功利主义道德的后果对我们大多数人来说是不可接受的：我们的直觉认为惩罚无辜者是不公正的，无论这种做法带来什么有益的后果，都不应该被允许。
One response to this sort of criticism is to modify utilitarianism into what is known as rule utilitarianism. Here general principles of conduct are worked out on utilitarian grounds, such as that in general punishing innocent people produces more unhappiness than happiness. These general principles are then adhered to even in the few particular cases in which, for example, punishing an innocent person would in fact produce the greatest sum of happiness possible from available options. Some have claimed that Mill is himself a rule utilitarian. However, it is more plausible that what Mill says about working out general guidelines of behaviour before you are faced with a situation in which you must act quickly (rather than having to do a calculation on the spot) is only intended to produce rules of thumb, generalisations which can be broken in particular cases and are not binding principles of conduct.
对这种批评的一种回应是将功利主义修改为所谓的规则功利主义。在这里，基于功利主义的原则制定了一般的行为准则，例如，通常惩罚无辜的人所产生的不幸比幸福更多。这些一般原则即使在少数特定情况下也会被遵循，例如，惩罚一个无辜的人实际上会从可用选项中产生最大的幸福总和。有些人声称密尔自己就是一个规则功利主义者。然而，更合理的解释是，密尔所说的在面临必须迅速行动的情况之前制定一般行为准则（而不是当场进行计算）仅仅是为了产生经验法则，这些概括可以在特定情况下被打破，并不是具有约束力的行为原则。
See previous chapter.
请参见前一章。
altruism: being helpful to others for their own sake rather than any more selfish motivation.
利他主义：为了他人的利益而帮助他们，而不是出于任何更自私的动机。
egoism: acting solely from one’s own interests.
自我主义：仅从自身利益出发行事。
Greatest Happiness Principle: the basic tenet of utilitarianism, namely that the morally right action in any circumstances is the one which is most likely to maximise happiness.
最大幸福原则：功利主义的基本信条，即在任何情况下，道德上正确的行为是最有可能最大化幸福的行为。
hedonism: pursuit of pleasure.
享乐主义：追求快乐。
higher pleasures: the more intellectual pleasures of thought and artistic appreciation. Mill assigns these much higher value than the lower physical pleasures.
更高的快乐：思考和艺术欣赏的更高智力快乐。密尔赋予这些快乐远高于低级的身体快乐。
lower pleasures: the physical pleasures which animals as well as humans can experience, such as those which come from eating, or from sex.
低级快乐：动物和人类都能体验的身体快乐，例如来自饮食或性行为的快乐。
rule utilitarianism: a variety of utilitarianism which, instead of focusing on particular actions, looks at the kinds of action which tend to maximise happiness.
规则功利主义：一种功利主义，侧重于那些倾向于最大化幸福的行动类型，而不是关注特定的行动。
utilitarianism: the moral theory which declares that the morally right action in any circumstances is the one which is most likely to maximise happiness.
功利主义：一种道德理论，宣称在任何情况下，道德上正确的行为是最有可能最大化幸福的行为。
utility: for Mill ‘utility’ is a technical term meaning happiness rather than usefulness. If an action increases utility, this simply means that it increases happiness.
效用：对密尔来说，“效用”是一个技术术语，意味着幸福而不是有用性。如果一个行动增加了效用，这仅仅意味着它增加了幸福。
Roger Crisp Mill on Utilitarianism (London: Routledge, 1997) is a clear critical study of Mill’s moral philosophy.
罗杰·克里斯普《功利主义》 (伦敦：劳特利奇，1997) 是对米尔道德哲学的清晰批判性研究。
Jonathan Glover (ed.) Utilitarianism and its Critics (New York: Macmillan, 1990) is an excellent selection of readings on the topic of utilitarianism. It contains relevant extracts from a variety of utilitarian writers, including Mill, and provides brief and lucid introductions to each reading.
乔纳森·格洛弗（编）《功利主义及其批评者》（纽约：麦克米伦，1990 年）是关于功利主义主题的优秀选读。它包含了来自多位功利主义作家的相关摘录，包括密尔，并为每篇阅读提供了简明清晰的介绍。
For further reading on Mill, see the recommendations at the end of the previous chapter.
有关米尔的进一步阅读，请参见上一章末尾的推荐。
Søren Kierkegaard Either/Or
索伦·基尔凯郭尔 《非此即彼》
Either/Or is more like a novel than a philosophical treatise. And like most novels it is resistant to paraphrase. Nevertheless, its central concern is clear: it is the question asked by Aristotle, ‘How should we live?’ Kierkegaard’s answer to this question is oblique enough to leave a trail of contradictory and sometimes confusing interpretations in its wake. On the surface, at least, it explores two fundamentally different ways of life, the aesthetic and the ethical. But it does this from within: the views are not summarised, but rather expressed by two characters who are the fictional authors of the work.
《或是/或不是》更像是一部小说而不是哲学论文。就像大多数小说一样，它抵抗改述。然而，它的中心关切是明确的：这是亚里士多德提出的问题，“我们应该如何生活？”基尔凯郭尔对这个问题的回答足够间接，以至于在其后留下了一系列矛盾和有时令人困惑的解释。至少在表面上，它探讨了两种根本不同的生活方式，审美的和伦理的。但它是从内部进行探讨的：这些观点不是被总结，而是通过两个角色表达，这两个角色是这部作品的虚构作者。
Kierkegaard’s writing has a playful quality. One aspect of this is his use of pseudonymous authorship: it is not just that Kierkegaard writes under a series of pseudonyms; rather he creates fictional characters, different from his own, in whose voices he writes.
基尔凯戈尔的写作具有一种玩味的特质。其中一个方面是他使用笔名的写作方式：不仅仅是基尔凯戈尔以一系列笔名写作；而是他创造了与自己不同的虚构角色，以他们的声音进行写作。
The tone of Either/Or is set in the preface. The narrator, who is called Victor Eremita, tells the story of how he came by the manuscripts which are published as Either/Or. He had bought a secondhand writing desk, an escritoire, which he had long admired in a shop window. One day, just as he was leaving for a holiday, a drawer of the desk jammed. In despair he kicked the desk, and a secret panel sprang open revealing a hoard of papers. These, which appeared to be written by two people whom he labelled ‘A’ and ‘B’, he put into order and published. It emerges that B is a judge called Wilhelm; we never learn the identity of A. This story is, of course, a fiction; and A and B are fictional characters. The story of the escritoire provides a metaphor for a central theme of the book: the discrepancy between appearances and reality, or as Kierkegaard usually puts it, ‘the inner is not the outer’.
《或/或》的基调在序言中设定。叙述者维克多·埃雷米塔讲述了他如何获得被出版为《或/或》的手稿的故事。他买了一张二手写字台，一个他在商店橱窗中长久欣赏的书桌。一天，就在他准备去度假时，书桌的一个抽屉卡住了。绝望中，他踢了书桌，结果一个秘密面板弹开，露出一堆文件。这些文件似乎是由两个他标记为“A”和“B”的人写的，他将其整理后出版。结果发现 B 是一个名叫威廉的法官；我们从未得知 A 的身份。这个故事当然是虚构的；A 和 B 是虚构的人物。书桌的故事为书中的一个中心主题提供了隐喻：表象与现实之间的差异，或者正如基尔凯郭尔通常所说的，“内在的不是外在的”。
The technique of using pseudonymous authors allows Kierkegaard to distance himself from the views explored and expressed in the book and to hide his own position behind that of his characters. But it also allows him to get inside the various positions he evokes; to investigate them from the point of view of the inner life of imagined individuals rather than by means of the cool abstractions which philosophers typically employ. This is an aspect of Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication: a self-conscious attempt to convey truths about living human beings by showing aspects of their lives rather than describing abstract and impersonal concepts.
使用假名作者的技巧使基尔凯郭尔能够将自己与书中探讨和表达的观点保持距离，并将自己的立场隐藏在角色的背后。但这也使他能够深入他所唤起的各种立场；从想象个体的内心生活的角度来研究它们，而不是通过哲学家通常使用的冷静抽象。这是基尔凯郭尔间接沟通方法的一个方面：一种自觉的尝试，通过展示人类生活的各个方面来传达关于活生生的人类的真理，而不是描述抽象和非个人的概念。
The first part of the book, called Either, is the part that is usually read. Most readers find that A’s writing is more interesting and diverse than the solid, somewhat laborious section written by B. Very few of those who enjoy Either bother to slog through every page of Or, even in the abridged versions in which it usually appears. Nevertheless, parts of Or provide a detailed if biased commentary on A’s approach to life, the aesthetic approach, while defending B’s own ethical approach. A’s writing does not provide a direct description of his approach to life; rather it exemplifies it through its concerns and style of writing.
本书的第一部分，称为《Either》，是通常被阅读的部分。大多数读者发现 A 的写作比 B 所写的那部分更有趣和多样化，后者显得相对扎实且有些繁琐。很少有喜欢《Either》的读者愿意费力地读完《Or》的每一页，即使是在通常出现的删节版中。尽管如此，《Or》的部分内容提供了对 A 生活方式的详细但有偏见的评论，审美方法，同时为 B 自己的伦理方法辩护。A 的写作并没有直接描述他对生活的看法；相反，它通过其关注点和写作风格来体现这一点。
The Aesthetic Approach to Life
生活的审美方式
In simple terms the aesthetic approach to life has at its heart the hedonistic pursuit of sensual pleasure. But this does not adequately characterise Kierkegaard’s use of the term, since it suggests a brutish craving after physical satisfaction; whereas for Kierkegaard the aesthetic approach includes the more refined pleasure-seeking of the intellectual aesthete. The aesthete’s pleasures may come from the contemplation of beauty, and the refined appreciation of works of art; or they may include delight in the sadistic exercise of power, an attitude revealed in the section of Either called ‘the Seducer’s Diary’. All these pleasures are sought by A.
简单来说，生活的美学方法的核心是享乐主义对感官愉悦的追求。但这并不足以准确描述基尔凯郭尔对这一术语的使用，因为它暗示了一种对身体满足的粗暴渴望；而对基尔凯郭尔而言，美学方法包括了知识分子审美者更为精致的寻求快乐。审美者的快乐可能来自对美的沉思，以及对艺术作品的精致欣赏；或者它们可能包括对施加权力的施虐快感的愉悦，这种态度在《或者》一书中名为“诱惑者的日记”的部分中得以体现。所有这些快乐都是 A 所追求的。
For Kierkegaard the aesthetic approach to life involves a restless seeking after new pleasures, since the worst that can happen to someone who adopts this way of life is that they become bored. Boredom for the aesthete is the root of all evil. So A suggests a half-serious strategy for avoiding boredom, which he jokingly labels ‘Crop Rotation’.
对于基尔凯戈尔，审美的生活方式涉及对新乐趣的不懈追求，因为对于采取这种生活方式的人来说，最糟糕的事情就是感到无聊。对审美者来说，无聊是所有邪恶的根源。因此，A 提出了一种半认真、半开玩笑的策略来避免无聊，他戏称之为“轮作”。
Crop Rotation involves arbitrarily changing your attitude to life, or to whatever you happen to be involved in. Like the method by which farmers replenish the soil’s nutrients, the arbitrary shifting of viewpoint should replenish the individual and help stave off boredom. A’s example is of having to listen to a bore: as soon as A started concentrating on the drops of sweat running down the bore’s nose the bore ceased to be boring. At this point Kierkegaard seems to sow the seeds of surrealism in his celebration of arbitrary and perverse approaches to life: he suggests just going to the middle of a play, or reading only the third part of a book, thereby getting a new and potentially stimulating angle on what could otherwise be tedious.
轮作涉及任意改变你对生活或你所参与的事物的态度。就像农民补充土壤养分的方法一样，观点的任意转变应该能补充个体并帮助抵御无聊。A 的例子是不得不听一个无聊的人：当 A 开始专注于流淌在无聊者鼻子上的汗水时，这个无聊者便不再无聊。在这一点上，基尔凯郭尔似乎在他对任意和反常生活方式的庆祝中播下了超现实主义的种子：他建议直接去看一出戏的中间部分，或只阅读一本书的第三部分，从而获得一个新的、潜在的刺激视角，来应对可能乏味的内容。
The restless shifting of topics and styles in the essays that make up Either reflects the constant search for new stimulation characteristic of the aesthetic approach to life. This is most apparent in the opening section, called Diapsalmata (Greek for ‘refrains’), which is a series of fragmentary comments and aphorisms. Other parts of Either are presented as quasi-academic papers, or else, most notably, in one case as a diary.
《Either》中主题和风格的不断变换反映了对新刺激的持续追求，这种追求是生活美学方法的特征。这在开头部分尤为明显，名为 Diapsalmata（希腊语意为“反复句”），它是一系列片段式的评论和格言。《Either》的其他部分则以准学术论文的形式呈现，或者在一个案例中，最显著的是以日记的形式。
‘The Seducer’s Diary’ is a novella within Either. It is a brilliantly written account of the cynical seduction of a young woman, Cordelia, incorporating, as the title suggests, a diary, but also letters from the woman to her seducer. It stands as a work of literature in its own right; but within Either/Or it provides a case study of one way of living within the aesthetic approach, an attempt to live life poetically rather than ethically.
《诱惑者的日记》是《非此即彼》中的一篇中篇小说。它生动地描绘了对年轻女性科尔德莉亚的愤世嫉俗的诱惑，正如标题所示，包含了日记，但也有她写给诱惑者的信件。它作为一部文学作品独立存在；但在《非此即彼》中，它提供了一种生活在审美方式中的案例研究，试图以诗意而非伦理的方式生活。
In the preface to Either/Or, Victor Eremita, the fictional editor of the whole work, introduces the diary, which he claims to have found amongst the papers in the escritoire; but there is a further level of concealment of authorship in that the diary itself has a preface, allegedly written by someone who knew the protagonists. Eremita draws attention to what he calls this Chinese box, suggesting that the diary’s editor might well be a fiction used by the seducer to distance himself from what it describes. Of course as readers of Either/Or we are immediately at a further level of remove from the events than was Eremita, well aware that Eremita is simply another mask worn by Kierkegaard, and that the events that the diary describes are almost certainly creations of the philosopher’s imagination rather than a description of something that actually happened. We might also take his account of this distancing technique to apply equally to Kierkegaard’s own use of pseudonyms and puzzles of authorship throughout Either/Or: Eremita describes A’s attitude to ‘the Seducer’s Diary’ as possibly being like someone who scares himself as he recounts a frightening dream, suggesting that this might be why he has to hide behind the mask of an imagined editor.
在《非此即彼》的前言中，虚构的全书编辑维克多·埃雷米塔介绍了他声称在写字台的文件中发现的日记；但在作者身份的进一步隐蔽层面上，这本日记本身也有一个前言， allegedly 是由一个了解主角的人所写。埃雷米塔提到他所称的这个中国盒子，暗示日记的编辑可能是一个由诱惑者使用的虚构角色，以使自己与所描述的内容保持距离。当然，作为《非此即彼》的读者，我们与事件的距离比埃雷米塔更远，清楚地知道埃雷米塔只是基尔凯郭尔所戴的另一个面具，而日记所描述的事件几乎肯定是哲学家想象的产物，而不是对实际发生的事情的描述。 我们也可以将他对这种疏离技巧的描述同样适用于基尔凯郭尔在《 Either/Or》中对笔名和作者身份之谜的使用：Eremita 将 A 对《诱惑者的日记》的态度描述为可能像是一个在讲述可怕梦境时吓到自己的人，这暗示了这可能是他为什么必须躲在一个想象中的编辑面具后面的原因。
The seducer’s aim is to get a particular young woman to fall in love with him. He succeeds in this, and then withdraws all affection. His pleasure is not a simple physical gratification but a kind of psychological sadism.
诱惑者的目标是让一个特定的年轻女性爱上他。他成功了，然后撤回所有的感情。他的快乐不是简单的身体满足，而是一种心理上的施虐狂。
Seduction is the quintessential pastime of those who adopt the aesthetic approach to life, and it is significant that an earlier essay in Either, ‘The Immediate Stages of the Erotic’, is devoted to an examination of Mozart’s Don Giovanni, an opera which follows the fortunes of a serial seducer. For A, Don Giovanni is the supreme achievement of a great composer. The underlying suggestion is that A is drawn to this opera because in important ways the central character’s lifestyle mirrors his own.
诱惑是那些采取审美生活方式的人的典型消遣，值得注意的是，早期在《Either》中的一篇文章《情色的直接阶段》专门探讨了莫扎特的《唐·乔凡尼》，这是一部讲述一个连续诱惑者命运的歌剧。对 A 来说，《唐·乔凡尼》是伟大作曲家的巅峰之作。潜在的暗示是，A 被这部歌剧所吸引，因为在重要方面，中心角色的生活方式反映了他自己的生活。
The Ethical Approach to Life
生活的伦理方法
Whereas in Either the reader has to work hard to extract a sense of the view that the writing illustrates and exemplifies, in Or views are stated explicitly and mostly directed against aspects of A’s lifestyle. The pseudonymous author of Or, B, or Judge Wilhelm, not only sets out his own approach to life, but also criticises A’s own: thus, a far clearer picture of Either’s meaning emerges when you read Or.
在《Either》中，读者必须努力提取写作所阐明和示范的观点，而在《Or》中，观点则明确陈述，并主要针对 A 的生活方式的各个方面。伪名作者 B 或法官威廉不仅阐述了他自己的人生观，还批评了 A 的生活方式：因此，当你阅读《Or》时，关于《Either》的意义会显得更加清晰。
In contrast to A’s life spent in pursuit of pleasure, B advocates a life in which the individual chooses his or her actions. As B describes it, the life of the aesthete puts the individual at the whim of outside events and circumstances, since we cannot simply choose the sources of our pleasure, but must rely on aspects of the world to stimulate us. The ethical approach, in contrast, is always motivated from within: it is not a matter of learning a set of rules and obeying them, but rather of transforming yourself into someone whose choices coincide with duty. From this point of view, the aesthete A is merely hiding behind a set of masks, shirking responsibility for his freedom. B believes that such an approach requires a kind of self-deception. The ethical approach requires self-knowledge. The point of adopting it is to transform yourself into what B calls ‘the universal individual’, that is, somehow to choose to become a model of humanity. This, B claims, reveals the true beauty of humanity, in a way that the aesthete’s purported pursuit of beauty never can.
与 A 追求享乐的生活形成对比，B 提倡一种个体选择自己行为的生活。正如 B 所描述的，审美主义者的生活使个体处于外部事件和环境的摆布之下，因为我们不能简单地选择快乐的来源，而必须依赖世界的某些方面来激发我们。相反，伦理方法总是源于内心的动机：这不是学习一套规则并遵守它们的问题，而是将自己转变为一个选择与责任相一致的人。从这个角度来看，审美主义者 A 仅仅是在一套面具后面隐藏，逃避对自己自由的责任。B 认为，这种方法需要一种自我欺骗。伦理方法需要自我认知。采用这种方法的目的是将自己转变为 B 所称的“普遍个体”，即以某种方式选择成为人性的典范。B 声称，这揭示了人性的真正美，而审美主义者所声称的对美的追求永远无法做到这一点。
Readings of Either/Or
《Either/Or》的阅读
An existentialist interpretation
存在主义的解读
According to the existentialist interpretation of Either/Or, the reader is faced with a radical choice between the two approaches to life. There are no guidelines which indicate how to choose: we must choose one or the other, and thereby create ourselves through that choice. However, contrary to the views which dominated the Enlightenment period, there is no such thing as a ‘right’ answer to the question ‘How should I live?’ The reasons for choosing the ethical above the aesthetic only make sense if you are already committed to the ethical approach to life; to suggest that the aesthetic approach is evil is to imply that you have already accepted that there is a good/evil distinction to be drawn.
根据存在主义对《非此即彼》的解读，读者面临着两种生活方式之间的激烈选择。没有任何指导方针表明如何选择：我们必须选择其中之一，从而通过这个选择来创造自己。然而，与主导启蒙时代的观点相反，关于“我应该如何生活？”这个问题并不存在所谓的“正确”答案。选择伦理而非美学的理由只有在你已经承诺于伦理生活方式时才有意义；暗示美学方式是邪恶的，意味着你已经接受了善恶之间的区分。
Similarly, the justifications for the aesthetic approach only appeal to the aesthete, and would be ruled out as inconsequential by one committed to the ethical way of life: the pleasures of seduction, for example, would count for nothing in Judge Wilhelm’s reckoning. On this reading Either/Or reflects the anguished position of all humanity. We find ourselves forced to choose, and through our choices we create what we are. That is the human condition. Existentialists have thus seen Either/Or as a key text in the history of the existentialist movement. On this view Kierkegaard was one of the first philosophers to recognise the importance of radical choice in the face of a world in which no pre-ordained value can be discerned, thereby anticipating many of the themes which would occupy Jean-Paul Sartre a century later. It is certainly true that most twentieth-century existentialists have been influenced by Kierkegaard’s writing.
同样，审美方法的辩护仅对审美者有吸引力，而对于致力于伦理生活方式的人来说则被视为无关紧要：例如，诱惑的乐趣在威廉法官的计算中毫无意义。从这个角度来看，《 Either/Or》反映了全人类的痛苦处境。我们发现自己被迫选择，通过我们的选择创造我们自己。这就是人类的状况。因此，存在主义者将《 Either/Or》视为存在主义运动历史上的关键文本。从这个观点来看，基尔凯郭尔是最早认识到在一个无法辨别任何预定价值的世界中，激进选择重要性的哲学家之一，从而预见了一个世纪后让-保罗·萨特所关注的许多主题。确实，二十世纪的大多数存在主义者都受到基尔凯郭尔著作的影响。
The case for the ethical
伦理的理由
Whilst there is much in Kierkegaard’s text which supports the existentialist reading, some interpreters have seen the book as a thinly veiled advocacy of the ethical above the aesthetic. B sees through A’s aestheticism and presents him with a solid, if staid, alternative. Only through seizing control of your life and putting it beyond contingent events can you fulfil your nature. The aesthete is more or less at the whim of what happens; the ethical approach ensures that the self remains intact, even if chance events thwart your goals and desires.
尽管基尔凯郭尔的文本中有许多支持存在主义解读的内容，但一些解读者认为这本书是对伦理优于美学的隐晦倡导。B 看透了 A 的美学主义，并向他提出了一个稳固但乏味的替代方案。只有通过掌控自己的生活并将其置于偶然事件之外，你才能实现你的本性。审美者或多或少地受制于发生的事情；伦理方法确保自我保持完整，即使偶然事件阻碍了你的目标和愿望。
One point against this interpretation of Either/Or is that it contradicts his claim that there is no didacticism in the book. A further objection is that so skilful a writer as Kierkegaard would not have presented his favoured approach to life in so dry and unpalatable a form. It is far from obvious why he would have given the aesthete A all the best lines, and invented the staid and pontificating Judge Wilhelm as the defender of his favoured view.
对这种《非此即彼》的解读有一个反对意见，那就是它与他声称书中没有说教主义的观点相矛盾。另一个反对意见是，像基尔凯郭尔这样技艺高超的作家，不会以如此枯燥和令人厌恶的形式呈现他所偏爱的生活方式。为什么他会把所有最佳台词都给美学家 A，并创造出严肃而自以为是的威廉法官作为他所偏爱观点的捍卫者，这一点远非显而易见。
Thinly veiled autobiography
薄面纱的自传
Kierkegaard met Regine Olsen when she was only 14; he was 21. Not unlike the seducer in ‘the Seducer’s Diary’ he befriended her family, and even her suitor. When Regine reached 17, Kierkegaard asked her to marry him and she accepted. However, Kierkegaard could not go through with the marriage and broke off the engagement in 1841, just two years before Either/Or was published, leaving Regine humiliated and in great distress. Some commentators have seen parts of Either/Or as a response to his situation: of more psychological than philosophical interest.
基尔凯戈尔在瑞吉娜·奥尔森只有 14 岁时遇见了她；他当时 21 岁。与《诱惑者的日记》中的诱惑者并无不同，他与她的家人，甚至她的追求者建立了友谊。当瑞吉娜 17 岁时，基尔凯戈尔向她求婚，她答应了。然而，基尔凯戈尔无法履行婚约，并在 1841 年解除订婚，就在《非此即彼》出版的两年前，留下瑞吉娜感到羞辱和极大的痛苦。一些评论者认为《非此即彼》的部分内容是对他处境的回应：更具心理学而非哲学的兴趣。
On this reading, Either presents the life of sensual pleasures that Kierkegaard had led in his youth and would have to relinquish if he married; Or, on the other hand, presents the case for marriage and the acceptance of social responsibilities that that entails. The book Either/Or can thus be seen as a literary expression of the torment that led to the broken engagement; the philosophical surface is simply another screen scarcely concealing the agonised soul in turmoil at the most significant choice he had to make in his life.
在这种解读中，《或》呈现了基尔凯郭尔在年轻时所过的感官享乐的生活，以及如果他结婚就必须放弃的生活；另一方面，呈现了婚姻及其所带来的社会责任的案例。因此，《或》这本书可以被视为导致未婚订婚破裂的痛苦的文学表达；哲学表面仅仅是另一个屏幕，几乎掩盖不了他在生活中必须做出的最重要选择时内心的痛苦。
This interpretation of Either/Or may well be accurate, but is entirely compatible with either of the two interpretations sketched above. It is interesting and informative to learn these biographical facts about the man Kierkegaard. But ultimately his writing stands or falls independently of its relation to his life and the psychological motivations which gave him the energy to write.
这种对《非此即彼》的解读可能是准确的，但与上述两种解读完全兼容。了解关于基尔凯郭尔的这些传记事实既有趣又富有启发性。但最终，他的写作独立于与他生活的关系以及给予他写作动力的心理动机而存在或消亡。
Criticisms of Either/Or
《非此即彼》的批评
False dichotomy?
虚假二分法？
It is not obvious that the two ways of life exemplified by A and B cover all the options. There may be C, D, E, F and G to take into account. In other words, Kierkegaard seems to suggest that if you reject the aesthetic the only option is the ethical, and vice versa. However, this is a simplistic reading of Kierkegaard’s position. Kierkegaard, or at least the character Victor Eremita, considers the possibility that one person has written the texts of both Either and Or, suggesting that perhaps the two positions need not be as incompatible as they initially seem. And Kierkegaard need not be read as suggesting that these are the only two options available: indeed, in subsequent writings he explicitly outlines a third approach, the religious attitude to life.
并不明显，A 和 B 所体现的两种生活方式涵盖了所有选项。可能还有 C、D、E、F 和 G 需要考虑。换句话说，基尔凯郭尔似乎暗示，如果你拒绝美学，唯一的选择就是伦理，反之亦然。然而，这对基尔凯郭尔立场的解读过于简单。基尔凯郭尔，或者至少是角色维克多·埃雷米塔，考虑到一个人可能写了《Either》和《Or》的文本，这暗示着这两种立场可能并不像最初看起来那样不兼容。而且基尔凯郭尔并不一定要被解读为暗示这仅仅是可用的两个选项：实际上，在后来的著作中，他明确概述了一种第三种方法，即对生活的宗教态度。
Indeterminacy
不确定性
It should be clear by now that Either/Or is open to a wide range of interpretations and that his original intentions are by no means easy to discern. It is a book which seems to have a profound message; yet critics are not agreed upon what that message is. Some say that this is because Kierkegaard is unacceptably indeterminate about what he means. This is a consequence of the style of writing he has chosen, with fictional characters exploring lived philosophical positions. Since characters exemplify rather than state their positions, there is some latitude for interpretation. Those who want simple views clearly stated in unambiguous prose will be disappointed by Kierkegaard’s more poetic approach to philosophy.
现在应该很清楚，《 Either/Or 》可以有广泛的解读，而他的原始意图绝非易于辨别。这是一本似乎有深刻信息的书；然而，评论家们对这个信息并没有达成一致。有些人说这是因为基尔凯郭尔对他所表达的意思过于模糊。这是他所选择的写作风格的结果，虚构的人物探索了生活中的哲学立场。由于角色是通过示范而不是陈述他们的立场，因此有一定的解读余地。那些希望以明确的散文表达简单观点的人将会对基尔凯郭尔更具诗意的哲学方法感到失望。
1813 | born in Copenhagen, Denmark. |
1843 | publishes Either/Or. |
1855 | dies in Copenhagen. |
aesthetic approach: a way of life built on the pursuit of sensual pleasure, including sensual pleasure of more intellectual kinds.
美学方法：一种建立在追求感官愉悦上的生活方式，包括更具智力性质的感官愉悦。
Crop Rotation: A’s technique for staving off boredom, involving arbitrarily changing your attitude to life.
轮作：A 的技巧，用于抵御无聊，涉及任意改变你对生活的态度。
ethical approach: the way of life advocated by Judge Wilhelm. A life of responsible choices.
伦理方法：威廉法官提倡的生活方式。负责任选择的生活。
hedonism: the pursuit of pleasure.
享乐主义：追求快乐。
pseudonymous authorship: Kierkegaard’s technique of attributing the various parts of his texts to fictional authors.
假名作者身份：基尔凯郭尔将其文本的各个部分归因于虚构作者的技巧。
Patrick Gardiner Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Past Masters series, 1988) gives a concise account of Kierkegaard’s work, including Either/Or, setting it in its philosophical background.
帕特里克·加丁纳·基尔凯郭尔（牛津：牛津大学出版社，Past Masters 系列，1988）对基尔凯郭尔的作品进行了简明的叙述，包括《非此即彼》，并将其置于哲学背景中。
Donald Palmer Kierkegaard for Beginners (London: Writers and Readers, 1996) provides a light-hearted, accessible and informative overview of the central themes of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.
唐纳德·帕尔默《基尔凯郭尔入门》（伦敦：作家与读者，1996）提供了一个轻松、易懂且信息丰富的基尔凯郭尔哲学核心主题概述。
Joakim Garff Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography trans. Bruce H. Kirmmse (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005) is a detailed account of Kierkegaard’s difficult life and bizarre character.
乔基姆·加夫《索伦·基尔凯郭尔：传记》翻译布鲁斯·H·基尔姆斯（普林斯顿和牛津：普林斯顿大学出版社，2005 年）详细描述了基尔凯郭尔艰难的生活和奇特的性格。
Bruce H. Kirmmse (ed.) Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998) is a fascinating collection of eyewitness accounts of Kierkegaard by his friends, family and acquaintances.
布鲁斯·H·基尔姆斯（编）《与基尔凯郭尔的邂逅： contemporaries 眼中的生活》（新泽西州：普林斯顿大学出版社，1998 年）是一本引人入胜的基尔凯郭尔的朋友、家人和熟人所作的目击者证言集。
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels The German Ideology, Part One
卡尔·马克思和弗里德里希·恩格斯 《德意志意识形态》 第一部分
We are what we are as a result of our position in the economic situation of our time; in particular, our relation to the means of material production shapes our lives and thoughts. There is no timeless, unchanging human nature. We are products of the historical period in which we find ourselves. This is the message at the heart of the first part of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ The German Ideology, a book which sets out the theory of historical materialism. Most of the book is negative, attacking almost line by line the work of some German reinterpreters of Hegel’s philosophy, the so-called Young Hegelians. Much of it is devoted to a discussion of Ludwig Feuerbach, a writer who, together with Georg Hegel, exercised a powerful influence on Marx’s intellectual development.
我们之所以成为我们，是因为我们在当时经济状况中的位置；特别是，我们与物质生产手段的关系塑造了我们的生活和思想。没有永恒不变的人性。我们是我们所处历史时期的产物。这是卡尔·马克思和弗里德里希·恩格斯的《德意志意识形态》第一部分的核心信息，这本书阐述了历史唯物主义的理论。书的大部分内容是消极的，几乎逐行攻击一些德国对黑格尔哲学进行重新解读的学者，即所谓的青年黑格尔派。书中有很大一部分讨论了路德维希·费尔巴哈，这位作家与乔治·黑格尔一起，对马克思的知识发展产生了深远的影响。
Most present-day readers of The German Ideology concentrate on the positive theories set out in the first part of the book, before the authors get immersed in the minutiae of their opponents’ work. Isaiah Berlin’s assessment of the book as a whole acknowledges its more tedious aspects while justifying its status as a classic: ‘this verbose, ill-organised and ponderous work, which deals with authors and views long dead and justly forgotten, contains in its lengthy introduction the most sustained, imaginative and impressive exposition of Marx’s theory of history.’
当今大多数《德国意识形态》的读者集中于书的第一部分中提出的积极理论，在作者沉浸于对其对手工作的细节分析之前。以赛亚·伯林对整本书的评估承认了其更乏味的方面，同时为其经典地位辩护：“这部冗长、组织不善且沉重的著作，涉及的作者和观点早已死去并理应被遗忘，但在其冗长的引言中包含了对马克思历史理论最持久、富有想象力和令人印象深刻的阐述。”
When reading The German Ideology it is important to recognise the radical approach that Marx and Engels advocated, an approach encapsulated in the last of Marx’s ‘theses on Feuerbach’, which he wrote around the time that he was working on The German Ideology: ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.’ It is not good enough simply to recognise that capitalism traps many people in a life of meaningless work and impoverished home life. What is needed is a revolution: a complete overturning of the status quo. No one can deny that Marx and Engels succeeded in their aim of changing the world. Unlike many of the writers discussed so far, these two managed to have a profound effect not just on academics, but on the world at large. Almost miraculously, their writings inspired successful revolutions, the after-effects of which are still being felt today.
在阅读《德国意识形态》时，重要的是要认识到马克思和恩格斯所倡导的激进方法，这种方法在马克思关于费尔巴哈的最后一条“论题”中得到了概括，他在撰写《德国意识形态》时写下了这句话：“哲学家们只是以各种方式解释世界；关键在于改变它。” 仅仅认识到资本主义使许多人陷入无意义的工作和贫困的家庭生活是不够的。所需要的是一场革命：对现状的彻底颠覆。没有人可以否认，马克思和恩格斯在改变世界的目标上取得了成功。与迄今为止讨论的许多作家不同，这两位不仅对学术界产生了深远的影响，而且对整个世界也产生了深远的影响。几乎可以说，他们的著作奇迹般地激励了成功的革命，其后果至今仍在感受到。
Marx and Engels’ theory of historical materialism, or ‘the materialist conception of history’, as they prefer to call it, is the theory that your material circumstances shape what you are. ‘Materialism’ has several uses in philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, for instance, it is the view that the mind can be explained in purely physical terms. This is not how Marx and Engels use it. Rather for them ‘materialism’ refers to our relationship with materials of production: at its most basic, this amounts to the labour that we have to do in order to feed and clothe ourselves and our dependants. In more complex societies it takes in the property that we may or may not own and our relationship to the means of producing wealth.
马克思和恩格斯的历史唯物主义理论，或称“唯物史观”，是他们所称的理论，即你的物质环境塑造了你。 “唯物主义”在哲学中有多种用法。例如，在心灵哲学中，它是指心灵可以用纯粹的物理术语来解释。这并不是马克思和恩格斯的用法。对他们而言，“唯物主义”指的是我们与生产资料的关系：在最基本的层面上，这意味着我们为了养活自己和我们的依赖者而必须进行的劳动。在更复杂的社会中，它包括我们可能拥有或不拥有的财产以及我们与财富生产手段的关系。
Materialism in this sense is directly opposed to the kind of philosophy that forgets the nature of real human life and hovers in a world of abstract generalisations. It concentrates on the harsh realities of most human life, which perhaps explains its wide appeal. This materialism is historical in the sense that it recognises that material circumstances change over time, and that, for example, the impact of a new technology can completely transform a society, and thus the individuals who compose it. For instance, the abolition of slavery was made possible by the invention of the steam engine, a machine which could work harder and longer than a hundred slaves.
在这个意义上，唯物主义与那种忘记真实人类生活本质、徘徊在抽象概念世界中的哲学直接对立。它集中于大多数人类生活的严酷现实，这或许解释了它的广泛吸引力。这种唯物主义是历史性的，因为它承认物质环境随着时间而变化，例如，新技术的影响可以完全改变一个社会，从而改变构成该社会的个体。例如，奴隶制的废除是由于蒸汽机的发明，这种机器可以比一百个奴隶工作得更努力、更长时间。
As soon as human beings begin to produce what they need to survive, they set themselves apart from animals. The particular demands of what they produce and how they produce it shape their lives. As societies grow, so the social relations necessary for successful production become more complex; the more developed a society, the greater division of labour that occurs.
一旦人类开始生产他们生存所需的东西，他们就与动物区分开来。他们所生产的东西及其生产方式的特定要求塑造了他们的生活。随着社会的发展，成功生产所需的社会关系变得更加复杂；一个社会越发达，劳动分工就越明显。
Division of labour is simply the allocation of different jobs to different people. For example, in a very simple society each individual might farm, hunt and build for him or herself. In a more developed one each of these roles would be likely to be carried out by different people.
分工只是将不同的工作分配给不同的人。例如，在一个非常简单的社会中，每个人可能会为自己耕种、狩猎和建造。在一个更发达的社会中，这些角色很可能会由不同的人来承担。
Marx and Engels saw the extreme division of labour characteristic of capitalist economies as a powerful negative influence on what human life can be. It gives rise to alienation, the distancing of an individual’s labour from his or her life. The division of labour renders individuals powerless victims of a system that enslaves and dehumanises them. This is particularly damaging when the division of physical and intellectual labour occurs, since it reduces the chances of those who only do harsh and tedious physical work of achieving a fulfilled existence. More importantly, for Marx and Engels, it goes against the common interest. The vision that Marx and Engels put in its place is of a world in which private property has been abolished and each individual is free to take on a number of roles in the course of a working day. As they put it, in such a society it would be possible for me ‘to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic’. This is a vision of work as a freely chosen and fulfilling activity rather than as an enforced treadmill the only alternative to which is starvation. Marx and Engels’ sympathies always lie with the working-class labourer trapped in a job which is unsatisfying; a victim of a faceless economic system.
马克思和恩格斯认为，资本主义经济特有的极端分工对人类生活的影响是非常消极的。它导致了异化，使个体的劳动与其生活产生距离。分工使个体成为一个被奴役和非人化的系统的无力受害者。当体力劳动和智力劳动分开时，这种影响尤为严重，因为这减少了仅从事艰苦和单调体力工作的人实现充实生活的机会。更重要的是，对于马克思和恩格斯来说，这违背了共同利益。马克思和恩格斯所描绘的愿景是一个私有制被废除的世界，在这个世界中，每个人都可以在工作日中自由地承担多种角色。正如他们所说，在这样的社会中，我可以“今天做一件事，明天做另一件事，早上打猎，下午钓鱼，晚上养牛，晚餐后批评，随心所欲，而不必永远成为猎人、渔夫、牧人或评论家”。 这是一种将工作视为自由选择和充实活动的愿景，而不是被迫的跑步机，唯一的替代选择是饥饿。马克思和恩格斯的同情始终与被困在不满意工作的工人阶级劳动者同在；他们是无形经济系统的受害者。
All religious, moral and metaphysical beliefs are as much a product of our material relations as are any other aspects of our lives. The dominant ideas of an age, which have traditionally been treated as independent of class interest, are in fact nothing more than the interests of the ruling classes writ large and rationalised. ‘Ideology’ is the word Marx and Engels use to refer to these ideas which are the by-product of a particular economic and social system. Those who are in the grip of ideology typically see their conclusions as being the outcome of pure thought. In this they are simply mistaken: their ideas are the outcome of their historical and social circumstances.
所有宗教、道德和形而上学的信仰与我们物质关系的产物一样，是我们生活的其他方面的产物。一个时代的主导思想，传统上被视为独立于阶级利益，实际上不过是统治阶级的利益被放大和合理化而已。“意识形态”是马克思和恩格斯用来指代这些思想的词，这些思想是特定经济和社会制度的副产品。那些被意识形态所控制的人通常将他们的结论视为纯粹思考的结果。在这一点上，他们显然是错误的：他们的思想是他们历史和社会环境的产物。
When the proletariat, that is, the class of workers who own no property but their own labour, become sufficiently disgruntled with their condition and with the ideologies used to suppress them, revolution is possible. Marx and Engels were fervent advocates of revolution: they saw it as inevitable and praiseworthy. When the conditions of the proletariat become sufficiently impoverished and precarious, this is the time for them to rise up and rebel against the system that enslaves them. After the revolution, private property would be banned, leaving the way open for communal ownership. This vision of the future was, according to Marx and Engels, a prediction based on hard empirical evidence about the patterns of history and the effects of alienation. It follows directly from their historical materialism: the way to change people’s ideas is to change the system of material production that gives rise to them.
当无产阶级，即那些除了自己的劳动外没有任何财产的工人阶级，对他们的处境和用来压迫他们的意识形态感到足够不满时，革命就成为可能。马克思和恩格斯是革命的热情倡导者：他们认为革命是不可避免且值得赞扬的。当无产阶级的条件变得足够贫困和不稳定时，这就是他们起来反抗奴役他们的制度的时机。革命之后，私有财产将被禁止，为公有制铺平道路。根据马克思和恩格斯的说法，这种未来的愿景是基于对历史模式和异化影响的坚实实证证据的预测。这直接源于他们的历史唯物主义：改变人们的思想的方法是改变产生这些思想的物质生产体系。
Criticisms of The German Ideology
对《德国意识形态》的批评
Deterministic
确定性
One criticism often levelled at Marx and Engels’ historical materialism is that it is deterministic. It does not leave any room for free will since what we do is entirely shaped by our roles in a complex web of causes and effects. The causes are to do with the individual’s socioeconomic position. Who and what you are is outside your control. You are a product of the situation in which you find yourself.
对马克思和恩格斯的历史唯物主义常常提出的一个批评是，它是决定论的。它没有留下任何自由意志的空间，因为我们所做的一切完全受到我们在复杂因果关系网络中的角色的影响。这些原因与个人的社会经济地位有关。你是谁以及你是什么超出了你的控制范围。你是你所处环境的产物。
This sort of criticism only makes sense if you hold that human beings do genuinely have free will of some kind, and not just the illusion that they have it. Marx and Engels might have been happy to have had their theory labelled ‘determinist’, provided that it is recognised that determinism can be a matter of degree, rather than an ‘all or nothing’ concept. Marx and Engels clearly believed that you could choose to revolt against an oppressive system, and that human choices could accelerate the turning of the wheels of history. To this extent, then, they were not complete determinists about human behaviour.
这种批评只有在你认为人类确实拥有某种自由意志，而不仅仅是拥有这种自由意志的幻觉时才有意义。马克思和恩格斯可能会乐于将他们的理论标记为“决定论”，前提是要承认决定论可以是一个程度的问题，而不是“全有或全无”的概念。马克思和恩格斯显然相信，人们可以选择反抗压迫制度，并且人类的选择可以加速历史的进程。因此，在这一点上，他们并不是对人类行为完全的决定论者。
Unrealistic vision of work
不切实际的工作愿景
A further criticism of The German Ideology is that it paints too rosy a picture of work in the future and fails to recognise the importance of division of labour to the state. The idea that you could pick and choose jobs as you felt like it in a true communist society is absurd. Division of labour is often based on a division of skills: some people just are better at woodwork than others, so it makes sense to let those who are good become carpenters, and to steer the botchers into some other task.
对《德国意识形态》的进一步批评是，它对未来工作的描绘过于美好，未能认识到劳动分工对国家的重要性。在一个真正的共产主义社会中，你可以随心所欲地选择工作这一想法是荒谬的。劳动分工通常基于技能的分工：有些人在木工方面比其他人更擅长，因此让那些擅长的人成为木匠是合理的，而将那些不擅长的人引导到其他任务上也是合适的。
If I were to try to make a dining table, this could well take me five or six times as long as it would take a carpenter to do the same job; and anyone employing me or relying on me to produce a table would run the risk of getting a badly made piece of furniture. The carpenter works with wood every day and has acquired the skills needed to make tables. I only occasionally work with wood, and never produce anything of worth. So of course it makes sense to divide jobs up amongst those who are best suited to them. It would be absurd to suggest that you could be a surgeon in the morning, a train driver in the afternoon and a professional footballer in the evening.
如果我尝试制作一张餐桌，这可能需要我花费五到六倍于木匠完成同样工作的时间；任何雇佣我或依赖我制作桌子的人都面临着得到一件制作粗糙的家具的风险。木匠每天都在使用木材，并掌握了制作桌子所需的技能。我偶尔才使用木材，从来没有制作出任何有价值的东西。因此，当然有必要将工作分配给那些最适合的人。建议你早上当外科医生，下午当火车司机，晚上当职业足球运动员，这显然是荒谬的。
It is ideological itself
它本身就是意识形态
Marx and Engels’ theory cannot escape being ideological. If the theory is correct, then the theory itself must be a product of the system of material production in which it arose. It might seem as if the theory is purely the outcome of rational thought about the nature of history and of work, but this is an illusion. It is the consequence of an industrial economy in which large numbers of people were employed on low wages doing jobs which gave them little control over their lives.
马克思和恩格斯的理论无法逃避意识形态的影响。如果这个理论是正确的，那么它本身必须是其产生的物质生产体系的产物。看起来这个理论似乎纯粹是对历史和工作的本质进行理性思考的结果，但这是一种错觉。它是一个工业经济的结果，在这个经济中，大量人们以低工资从事工作，几乎没有对自己生活的控制权。
Marx and Engels would no doubt happily accept that their own theories were ideological, so drawing attention to their ideological nature doesn’t necessarily undermine their approach. Presumably what distinguishes their work from the bourgeois ideologies they were so keen to expose is that theirs is an expression of a proletariat ideology. Their views serve the interests of the working class and so redress the balance.
马克思和恩格斯无疑会欣然接受他们自己的理论是意识形态的，因此指出它们的意识形态性质并不一定会削弱他们的方法。可以推测，他们的工作与他们热衷揭露的资产阶级意识形态的区别在于，他们的理论是无产阶级意识形态的表现。他们的观点服务于工人阶级的利益，从而纠正了平衡。
Nevertheless, if we accept that the views expressed in The German Ideology are themselves ideological, this does have the consequence that it would be a mistake to expect them to hold for all human beings in all material circumstances. As societies, and in particular the modes of material production, change, so must philosophical theories about human nature and society.
然而，如果我们接受《德国意识形态》中表达的观点本身就是意识形态的，那么期望这些观点适用于所有人类在所有物质环境中就是一个错误。随着社会，特别是物质生产方式的变化，关于人性和社会的哲学理论也必须随之变化。
Incites revolution
煽动革命
The German Ideology, like many works by Marx and Engels, did not stop short of advocating revolution. It was intended to change the world, not simply describe it. Some critics see this as a step too far. You can recognise the deficiencies of the current system without suggesting that it needs to be overthrown by force. Revolution causes bloodshed. The cost of revolution in human terms can outweigh any benefits that would ensue from its having taken place. Add to this the very high risk of failure, and the revolutionary aspects of Marx and Engels’ thought can seem irresponsible.
《德国意识形态》与马克思和恩格斯的许多作品一样，并没有止步于倡导革命。它旨在改变世界，而不仅仅是描述它。一些批评者认为这一步走得太远。你可以认识到当前系统的缺陷，而不必暗示它需要通过暴力推翻。革命会导致流血。革命在人类层面的成本可能超过其带来的任何好处。再加上失败的风险非常高，马克思和恩格斯思想中的革命性方面可能显得不负责任。
This criticism does not undermine their arguments so much as question the morality of advocating revolution. Only if the communist ideal could genuinely be achieved would the human cost of a revolution be worth paying. The historical evidence of recent decades is that the ideal is not so easy to achieve, let alone maintain, as many of its admirers believe.
这种批评并没有削弱他们的论点，而是质疑倡导革命的道德性。只有当共产主义理想能够真正实现时，革命的人类成本才值得付出。近几十年的历史证据表明，这一理想并不像许多崇拜者所相信的那样容易实现，更不用说维持了。
Marx
马克思
1818 | born in Trier, Prussia. |
1845–6 | with Engels, publishes The German Ideology. |
1883 | dies in London. |
Engels
恩格斯
1820 | born in Barmen, Prussia. |
1895 | dies in London. |
alienation: the distancing of labour from other aspects of an individual’s life with a debilitating effect.
异化：劳动与个体生活其他方面的疏离，产生削弱的影响。
division of labour: the assigning of different jobs to different people.
劳动分工：将不同的工作分配给不同的人。
historical materialism: the theory that your relation to the means of production determines your life and thought.
历史唯物主义：你的生产资料关系决定了你的生活和思想。
ideology: ideas which are the by-product of a particular economic system. Those in the grip of ideology often see their thought as the outcome of pure thought when in fact it is a product of class interests.
意识形态：特定经济体系的副产品的思想。受到意识形态影响的人常常将自己的思想视为纯粹思想的结果，而实际上它是阶级利益的产物。
proletariat: the working class who have nothing to sell but their own labour.
无产阶级：只有自己的劳动可以出售的工人阶级。
Jonathan Wolff Why Read Marx Today? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) is a clear and pertinent assessment of the current relevance of Marx’s ideas.
乔纳森·沃尔夫《今天为什么要读马克思？》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2002 年）是对马克思思想当前相关性的清晰而恰当的评估。
David McLellan Karl Marx (London: Fontana, Modern Masters series, 1975) is a brief and accessible introduction to Marx’s thought.
大卫·麦克莱伦《卡尔·马克思》（伦敦：丰坦纳，现代大师系列，1975）是对马克思思想的简明易懂的介绍。
Ernst Fischer Marx in his Own Words (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970) provides an introduction to the key concepts in Marx’s thought largely through a selection of quotations.
恩斯特·费舍尔《马克思的自述》（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅出版社，1970 年）通过一系列引用提供了对马克思思想中关键概念的介绍。
Francis Wheen Karl Marx (London: Fourth Estate, 1999) is a highly entertaining biography.
弗朗西斯·惠恩《卡尔·马克思》（伦敦：第四产业，1999 年）是一本非常有趣的传记。
Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil
弗里德里希·尼采 《超越善恶》
According to Sigmund Freud, Friedrich Nietzsche had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live. This deep self-knowledge is revealed in a string of books which have stood the test of time both as literature and as philosophy. They are idiosyncratic, fragmentary, infuriating, and at times exhilarating. They defy simple analysis, and summaries cannot do justice to the richness and diversity of their contents. Most contain passages which, it must be said, are little more than the ranting of a madman and which anticipate his eventual mental breakdown. A shadow is cast over all of them by the fact that anti-semites and fascists have, by selective quotation, found support for their views in them; however, the ideas that some Nazis found so attractive are, for the most part, caricatures of Nietzsche’s philosophy.
根据西格蒙德·弗洛伊德的说法，弗里德里希·尼采对自己的了解比任何其他曾经生活过或可能生活过的人都要深刻。这种深刻的自我认知在一系列经受住时间考验的书籍中得以体现，这些书籍既是文学作品，也是哲学著作。它们独特、片段化、令人愤怒，有时又令人振奋。它们挑战简单的分析，摘要无法公正地反映其内容的丰富性和多样性。大多数书中包含的段落，必须说，仅仅是一个疯人的咆哮，并预示着他最终的精神崩溃。反犹太主义者和法西斯主义者通过选择性引用，在这些书中找到了支持他们观点的依据，这为所有书籍投下了一道阴影；然而，一些纳粹所认为极具吸引力的思想，在很大程度上是对尼采哲学的 caricature。
Beyond Good and Evil pulsates with ideas, not all of them fully formed and some of them quite unpleasant. It is a flawed masterpiece by an eccentric genius. Within it there are many deep philosophical insights; but these sit alongside a range of misogynist jibes, and bizarre generalisations about national character traits and religion. Nietzsche was undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the nineteenth century. His ideas influenced a wide range of twentieth-century thinkers, including Sigmund Freud, Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault, but also, amongst others, the novelists Thomas Mann and Milan Kundera. Despite his later reputation, however, in his own lifetime very few of his contemporaries recognised the importance and significance of his work.
《超越善恶》充满了思想，其中并非所有思想都成熟，有些甚至相当不愉快。这是一个古怪天才的有缺陷的杰作。书中包含了许多深刻的哲学见解；但这些见解与一系列厌女的讽刺以及关于民族性格特征和宗教的奇怪概括并存。尼采无疑是十九世纪最有影响力的哲学家之一。他的思想影响了包括西格蒙德·弗洛伊德、让-保罗·萨特和米歇尔·福柯在内的广泛二十世纪思想家，以及其他小说家如托马斯·曼和米兰·昆德拉。然而，尽管他后来声名显赫，在他生前，几乎没有他的同时代人认识到他作品的重要性和意义。
From summaries of this book you might imagine it a coherent and well argued series of related theses in which Nietzsche lays out his positions on truth, morality and psychology. This is very far from the case. It is fragmentary and in large part difficult to paraphrase – more a collage of thoughts than a developed argument. One whole section consists entirely of aphorisms – short, pithy statements. Another is a poem. The most overtly philosophical sections consist of loosely connected mini-essays. But these are not always easy to follow, and some are scarcely more than tirades; others could be pages torn from a notebook, printed without editing. Yet throughout this book any sensitive reader is likely to be struck by Nietzsche’s brilliance.
从这本书的摘要中，你可能会想象它是一系列连贯且论证充分的相关论题，尼采在其中阐述了他对真理、道德和心理学的看法。但事实远非如此。它是片段化的，在很大程度上难以释义——更像是思想的拼贴而不是一个发展的论点。整整一部分完全由格言组成——简短而精炼的陈述。另一部分是一首诗。最明显的哲学部分由松散连接的小论文组成。但这些并不总是容易理解，有些几乎只是长篇大论；其他的可能是从笔记本上撕下的页面，未经编辑直接印刷。然而，在整本书中，任何敏感的读者都可能会被尼采的才华所震撼。
Despite the wide-ranging nature of Nietzsche’s thinking, major themes do emerge, most of them signalled by the section titles. Some of these complement the ideas expressed in the book discussed in the next chapter, On the Genealogy of Morality. Broadly, in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche begins by diagnosing the shortcomings of modernity, and moves on to outline the kind of thinking that will allow humanity to progress. His aim is to clear the way for what he calls ‘free spirits’: the philosophers of the future. In the great tradition of philosophy he is concerned with truth and appearance. But he believes that to date philosophers have failed to see things as they are. They have been seduced by Plato’s view that there is an objective reality beyond appearance, a world of absolute values. In contrast with this he asserts that truth is necessarily truth from a perspective. In place of absolute good or evil, he reveals the dark psychological origins of everything those around him believe to have intrinsic value and worth. His method is a diagnosis of the ills of his society. His stance is for the most part that of an anthropologist examining the values of the culture in which he finds himself, but not a scientific anthropologist – more of a poet-prophet.
尽管尼采的思想范围广泛，但主要主题确实浮现出来，其中大多数通过章节标题得以体现。其中一些与下一章讨论的书籍《道德的谱系》中表达的思想相辅相成。总体而言，在《超越善恶》中，尼采首先诊断了现代性的缺陷，然后概述了能够推动人类进步的思维方式。他的目标是为他所称的“自由精神”清除道路：未来的哲学家。在伟大的哲学传统中，他关注真理与表象。但他认为，迄今为止，哲学家们未能如实看待事物。他们被柏拉图的观点所诱惑，认为在表象之外存在一个客观现实，一个绝对价值的世界。与此相对，他断言真理必然是从某种视角出发的真理。取代绝对的善或恶，他揭示了周围人所相信的所有内在价值和价值的黑暗心理起源。他的方法是对其社会病态的诊断。 他的立场在很大程度上是一个人类学家审视他所处文化价值观的立场，但不是一个科学的人类学家——更像是一个诗人-先知。
The title of the book describes Nietzsche’s intended position: whoever is interested in truth will stand beyond the simple black/white moral categories of good and evil, and will recognise morality for what it is. Morality is an expression of the fundamental life force he calls the Will to Power. The cherished values of his contemporaries, far from originating in compassion and universal love, have their deepest origins in cruelty and the desire to surpass others. The philosophers of the future will come to recognise this. As a result they will revalue all values.
这本书的标题描述了尼采的意图立场：任何对真理感兴趣的人都会超越简单的善与恶的黑白道德范畴，并会认识到道德的本质。道德是他所称的权力意志的基本生命力的表现。他同时代人所珍视的价值观，远非源于同情和普遍的爱，而是深深根植于残酷和超越他人的欲望。未来的哲学家们将会认识到这一点。因此，他们将重新评估所有的价值。
The Will to Power is the basic life force that drives us all. Nietzsche believes that most people deny the truth about existence: for many that is the only way they can cope with living at all. They fail to recognise that exploitation and oppression can’t be eliminated since these are a fundamental part of nature. It is for Nietzsche an essential feature of life that the strong oppress the weak. This Will to Power is the source of everything that we are. All that is valued as good or benevolent has its beginnings in this life force. We hide from this difficult truth, but the free spirits of the future embrace it.
权力意志是驱动我们所有人的基本生命力量。尼采认为，大多数人否认存在的真相：对许多人来说，这是他们应对生活的唯一方式。他们未能认识到剥削和压迫无法消除，因为这些是自然的基本部分。对尼采来说，强者压迫弱者是生命的一个基本特征。这种权力意志是我们一切的源泉。所有被视为善良或仁慈的事物都起源于这种生命力量。我们躲避这个艰难的真相，但未来的自由精神却拥抱它。
On the Prejudices of Philosophers
关于哲学家的偏见
Nietzsche opens Beyond Good and Evil by turning his gaze on philosophers themselves, attacking their misplaced confidence in the power of reason which they allege leads them to the conclusions they hold. In a series of acid critiques, Nietzsche argues that, without realising it, philosophers simply rationalise their prejudices: they provide reasons for what they happen to believe already. What passes for the product of impartial thought is really unconscious confession: accidental autobiography. Kant’s moral philosophy, for example, is simply his heart’s desire made abstract; Spinoza’s quasi-geometrical ‘proofs’ for his ethical philosophy mask his highly personal moral commitments that he presents as if they were the conclusions of neutral logic. This attack on his predecessors indirectly justifies Nietzsche’s own more openly personal approach to writing philosophy. Nietzsche’s voice is rarely neutral and transparent to what is being said. It would be difficult to read his philosophy as the product of a disinterested, supremely rational intellect. It also justifies the ambition of his preface to the book, in which he sees philosophy as it has been as something to be surpassed, a phase in history like astrology in the progress of science.
尼采在《超越善恶》中以哲学家们为对象，批判他们对理性力量的错误信心，声称这种信心使他们得出所持的结论。在一系列尖锐的批评中，尼采认为，哲学家们在不自觉的情况下只是为自己的偏见辩护：他们为自己已经相信的东西提供理由。看似公正思考的产物实际上是无意识的忏悔：偶然的自传。例如，康德的道德哲学只是他内心渴望的抽象化；斯宾诺莎的准几何“证明”掩盖了他高度个人化的道德承诺，而他将这些承诺呈现得仿佛是中立逻辑的结论。这对前任的攻击间接地为尼采自己更公开的个人化哲学写作方式辩护。尼采的声音很少是中立和透明的。他的哲学很难被视为一个无私、极其理性的智力的产物。 这也为他对这本书的前言的雄心提供了理由，在前言中，他将哲学视为一种需要超越的东西，像占星术在科学进步中的历史阶段。
One prejudice of traditional philosophers is that truth is more important than appearance. In place of this absolute antithesis, truth or appearance, Nietzsche substitutes the hypothesis that there can be a spectrum of darker or lighter shades, not an absolute black/white dichotomy, just as in a painting there are different tonal ‘values’. At times Nietzsche seems to toy with a radical subjectivism about truth in which ‘true’ just means ‘true for me’; but most commentators interpret his position as perspectivism. On this account there are different perspectives on any matter, no absolute neutral point from which to observe; yet some perspectives are superior to others – they are not all of equal value (the position usually taken by relativists).
传统哲学家的一个偏见是，真理比表象更重要。尼采用假设取代了这种绝对的对立，即真理或表象，认为可以存在一个更深或更浅的色调谱，而不是绝对的黑白二分法，就像在一幅画中有不同的色调“值”。有时尼采似乎在玩弄一种关于真理的激进主观主义，在这种观点中，“真实”仅仅意味着“对我来说真实”；但大多数评论者将他的立场解读为视角主义。根据这一观点，任何问题都有不同的视角，没有绝对中立的观察点；然而，有些视角优于其他视角——它们并不都是同等价值的（这是相对主义者通常采取的立场）。
A further prejudice of the philosophers is that they assume that knowledge of the truth will produce a better outcome than a life based on falsehoods. Nietzsche again questions this, recognising that there can be such a thing as dangerous knowledge, knowledge that far from being life-enhancing can be unbearable. There are many aspects of truth from which we shy away. He includes in this category the insight that unconscious processes can be the source of our most revered values. Superficial falsehood may be a pre-requisite for survival. Religion, which he takes to rest on a falsification of reality, plays an important part for many in maintaining optimism in the face of a world that Nietzsche believes to be ultimately explained by the force of the Will to Power. In this thought Nietzsche echoes Karl Marx’s famous comment about how religion acts as an opiate for the people.
哲学家们的另一个偏见是，他们假设对真理的知识会比基于虚假事物的生活产生更好的结果。尼采再次质疑这一点，认识到可能存在危险的知识，这种知识不仅不会增强生命，反而可能是无法忍受的。我们回避真理的许多方面。他将无意识过程可能是我们最崇敬的价值观来源的洞察力纳入这一类别。表面的虚假可能是生存的前提。宗教在他看来是对现实的伪造，对于许多人来说，在面对尼采认为最终由意志力解释的世界时，宗教在维持乐观方面发挥着重要作用。在这一思想中，尼采呼应了卡尔·马克思关于宗教如何作为人民的鸦片的著名评论。
Nietzsche’s uncovering of unconscious drives influenced Freud. Nietzsche suggests that humanity has moved beyond a pre-moral stage (when all that matters are consequences) and through a moral phase (where emphasis is on intentions – most obviously exemplified in Kant’s ethics). In order to progress to the extra-moral – humanity’s next important stage – we need to move beyond good and evil and recognise that the value of our actions lies in unconscious rather than conscious motivation.
尼采对无意识驱动的揭示影响了弗洛伊德。尼采认为人类已经超越了一个前道德阶段（当时唯一重要的是后果），并经历了一个道德阶段（强调意图——最明显的例子是康德的伦理学）。为了进步到超道德——人类下一个重要阶段——我们需要超越善与恶，认识到我们行为的价值在于无意识而非意识的动机。
Like Freud after him, Nietzsche believed that religion was a kind of neurosis. In Beyond Good and Evil he attacks what he calls the religious disposition, diagnosing in it a range of psychological problems and hypocrisies. The values he embraces of nobility, superiority and natural hierarchies, and of the triumph of the few elevated geniuses who can go beyond herd morality, are completely at odds with Christian values. Religion, then, like all other existing value systems, is for Nietzsche something to anatomise and ultimately to explain away. The philosophers of the future will be as beyond religion as they are beyond the conventional moral categories which often flow from religion.
像弗洛伊德之后的他一样，尼采认为宗教是一种神经症。在《超越善恶》中，他攻击他所称的宗教倾向，诊断出其中一系列心理问题和虚伪。他所拥护的高贵、优越和自然等级的价值观，以及那些能够超越群体道德的少数杰出天才的胜利，完全与基督教价值观相悖。因此，宗教就像所有其他现存的价值体系一样，对于尼采来说，是需要解剖并最终解释掉的东西。未来的哲学家将超越宗教，就像他们超越那些通常源于宗教的传统道德范畴一样。
Criticisms of Beyond Good and Evil
《超越善恶》的批评
Anti-egalitarianism
反平等主义
The ideal, for Nietzsche, seems to be a strong, heroic individual opposed to what he disparagingly describes as herd morality. He advocates strength and free spirit. For him freedom is the prerogative of the strong, not a right of the weak. He has no concern for the general welfare of the majority. More than that, he seems to despise ordinary people: in Beyond Good and Evil he comments that books for common people are always bad-smelling, with the odour of little people clinging to them. The only value of the herd’s existence for Nietzsche is that it may inadvertently provide the conditions of adversity in which genius seems to flourish. This is one aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking that is particularly attractive to fascists, and anyone who is inclined to believe themselves far superior to the people around them, and so not bound by the ethical rules of the majority. Critics of Nietzsche see him as fuelling anti-egalitarian prejudices. His admirers, on the other hand, are inclined to praise him for being bold enough to dismiss what they see as the myth that everyone is of equal value.
对于尼采来说，理想似乎是一个强大、英雄般的个体，反对他所贬低的所谓“群体道德”。他提倡力量和自由精神。对他而言，自由是强者的特权，而不是弱者的权利。他对大多数人的一般福利毫不关心。更重要的是，他似乎鄙视普通人：在《超越善恶》中，他评论说，普通人读的书总是散发着难闻的气味，带着小人物的气息。尼采认为，群体存在的唯一价值在于它可能无意中提供了天才似乎能够蓬勃发展的逆境条件。这是尼采思想中一个特别吸引法西斯主义者的方面，以及任何倾向于认为自己远远优于周围人的人，因此不受大多数人道德规则约束。尼采的批评者认为他助长了反平等的偏见。另一方面，他的崇拜者倾向于赞扬他足够大胆，去驳斥他们所认为的每个人都有平等价值的神话。
Anti-feminist
反女权主义者
Nietzsche’s anti-egalitarianism is perhaps most obvious in his misogynistic comments and attacks on the idea that the sexes should be treated equally. For Nietzsche the attempt to give women equality with men is a sign of shallowness. In contrast with, for example, his predecessor John Stuart Mill, who in his The Subjection of Women made a passionate case for equality of treatment between men and women, Nietzsche simply asserts some rather unpleasant prejudices and suggests that it would be good if women stopped asserting their rights to equality. Comments like these reveal what is so often smoothed over: Nietzsche’s work is uneven and lurches between comments of great philosophical insight and vituperative generalisations that can fuel the thought of the worst deniers of human equality and freedom.
尼采的反平等主义在他对女性的厌女言论以及对性别应平等对待这一观点的攻击中或许最为明显。对尼采而言，试图让女性与男性平等是肤浅的表现。与他的前任约翰·斯图亚特·密尔形成对比，后者在《女性的从属》中为男女平等待遇做出了热情的辩护，尼采则简单地断言一些相当不愉快的偏见，并暗示如果女性停止主张平等权利，那将是件好事。这样的评论揭示了常常被掩盖的事实：尼采的作品不均衡，时而展现出深刻的哲学洞察，时而又陷入激烈的泛化，这些泛化可能助长对人类平等和自由的最恶劣否认者的思想。
Vagueness
模糊性
Nietzsche’s styles of writing in this book and elsewhere leave the reader with substantial interpretive work to do. It is rarely clear what Nietzsche is arguing for, whether he is being ironic or earnest, for example. Nietzsche scholars dispute at length about the interpretation of his work often generating new philosophical positions in the process. Even Nietzsche’s basic position on truth is unclear: is he a consistent perspectivist, or does his position collapse into subjectivism?
尼采在这本书及其他地方的写作风格让读者需要进行大量的解读工作。尼采的论点往往不够明确，例如他是在讽刺还是认真的。尼采学者们对他作品的解读争论不休，常常在这个过程中产生新的哲学立场。即使是尼采对真理的基本立场也不清楚：他是一个一致的视角主义者，还是他的立场崩溃为主观主义？
The grand sweep of Nietzsche’s ideas can be exhilarating, and inspiring. Yet the collage of thoughts that he presents is so open to different interpretations and emphases that it is likely to frustrate anyone looking for a simple straightforward understanding of his major theses.
尼采思想的宏大范围令人振奋和鼓舞。然而，他所呈现的思想拼贴如此开放，容易引发不同的解读和强调，以至于可能会让任何寻求简单明了理解他主要论点的人感到沮丧。
It is true that Nietzsche rarely writes with the precision or clarity of David Hume or John Stuart Mill. But this same point can, however, be taken as a positive one rather than a criticism. Nietzsche’s work has a similar merit to imaginative literature, and as such gains force from the multiplicity of possible interpretations. His is a poetic philosophy, similar in many ways to Kierkegaard’s. Like a work of art, Nietzsche’s books are open rather than closed: they have the power to stimulate the reader to thoughts of his or her own – either in support of or in reaction against the ideas they entertain.
确实，尼采很少以大卫·休谟或约翰·斯图亚特·密尔那样的精确性或清晰度写作。然而，这一点可以被视为一个积极的方面，而不是批评。尼采的作品与富有想象力的文学有相似的优点，因此从多种可能的解释中获得力量。他的哲学是一种诗意的哲学，在许多方面与基尔凯郭尔相似。像一件艺术作品，尼采的书籍是开放的，而不是封闭的：它们有能力激发读者产生自己的思考——无论是支持还是反对他们所持有的观点。
1844 | Friedrich Nietzsche born in Röcken, Saxony. |
1886 | publishes Beyond Good and Evil. |
1887 | publishes On the Genealogy of Morality. |
1900 | Nietzsche dies, eleven years after a severe mental breakdown. |
Perspectivism: the view that truth is always truth from a particular perspective.
视角主义：真理总是从特定视角出发的真理。
Subjectivism: the idea that truth is always truth for a particular individual and that there is no objectivity whatsoever.
主观主义：真理始终是某个特定个体的真理，并且没有任何客观性。
Will to Power: the life force that drives everything that we are and ultimately motivates all our actions whether we realise this or not.
意志力：驱动我们一切的生命力，最终激励我们所有的行动，无论我们是否意识到这一点。
Michael Tanner A Very Short Introduction to Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) provides an overview of Nietzsche’s main works.
迈克尔·坦纳 《尼采简明入门》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2000 年）提供了尼采主要著作的概述。
Alexander Nehamas Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) is a fascinating attempt to make sense of Nietzsche’s output as part of a single project. Although the ideas it discusses are complex, it is written in lucid prose.
亚历山大·内哈马斯《尼采：作为文学的生活》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1985 年）是一个引人入胜的尝试，旨在将尼采的作品视为一个单一项目的一部分。尽管讨论的思想复杂，但它的文笔清晰。
Ronald Hayman Nietzsche: A Critical Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980) analyses the philosopher’s development and subsequent mental decline.
罗纳德·海曼《尼采：批判性生平》（伦敦：韦登费尔德与尼科尔森，1980）分析了这位哲学家的发展及其随后的精神衰退。
Lesley Chamberlain Nietzsche in Turin (London: Quartet, 1996) is a study of Nietzsche’s last year of sanity.
莱斯利·钱伯林《尼采在都灵》（伦敦：四分之一出版社，1996 年）是对尼采最后一年理智的研究。
Friedrich Nietzsche on the Genealogy of Morality
弗里德里希·尼采《道德的谱系》
On the Genealogy of Morality, which is one of the most important of Nietzsche’s works, is the closest in style to a conventional philosophical treatise, at least at first glance. In other books, such as Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche resorted to aphorisms: short, pithy remarks which force the reader to pause and reflect, and which demand a special kind of reading. On the Genealogy of Morality, in contrast, consists of three essays, each on a related theme. The central theme is the origins of morality: the literal translation of the book’s title is On the Genealogy of Morality, though it has sometimes been translated as On the Genealogy of Morals. The implicit argument is that the moral concepts we have inherited from a Christian tradition are now obsolete and inferior to their pagan predecessors. Nietzsche had declared the death of God in his earlier book, The Gay Science: ‘God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown’ (Gay Science, section 108). On the Genealogy of Morality is in part a working out of the implications of the absence of any God and the consequences for morality. We have inherited outmoded moral concepts based on Christianity’s false beliefs. Laying bare the origins of these concepts in bitter resentful emotions, Nietzsche seems to believe, will allow us to see them for the soul-cramping injunctions that they are, and free us to replace them with a more life-enhancing approach. This, it must be stressed, is implicit rather than explicit in the text: most of the book is devoted to an analysis of the origins, both psychological and historical, of several key moral concepts.
《道德的谱系》是尼采最重要的著作之一，至少乍一看，它的风格最接近于传统的哲学论文。在其他书籍中，例如《查拉图斯特拉如是说》，尼采采用了格言：简短而精辟的言辞，迫使读者停下来思考，并要求一种特殊的阅读方式。相比之下，《道德的谱系》由三篇关于相关主题的论文组成。中心主题是道德的起源：这本书标题的字面翻译是《道德的谱系》，尽管有时被翻译为《道德的谱系》。隐含的论点是，我们从基督教传统中继承的道德观念现在已经过时，并且不如其异教前辈。尼采在他早期的著作《快乐的科学》中宣告了上帝的死亡：“上帝死了；但考虑到人类的方式，可能在未来的数千年里仍会有洞穴，展示他的影子”（《快乐的科学》，第 108 节）。《道德的谱系》部分是对缺乏任何上帝的含义及其对道德的后果的探讨。 我们继承了基于基督教错误信仰的过时道德观念。尼采似乎认为，揭示这些观念源于痛苦和怨恨的情感，将使我们看到它们作为压抑灵魂的禁令，并使我们能够用更有助于生命的方式来取代它们。必须强调的是，这在文本中是隐含而非明确的：本书的大部分内容致力于分析几个关键道德观念的心理和历史起源。
But Nietzsche’s aim is not simply to replace one morality with another; he wants to call into question the value of morality itself. If moral goodness is little more than the product of envious and resentful emotions, and the response of particular groups to their circumstances rather than some unchanging part of the natural world, what ultimate value does it have? It is not clear that Nietzsche provides an answer to this question, but this is his aim. His basic methodology is genealogical. But what does this mean?
但尼采的目标并不仅仅是用另一种道德取代一种道德；他想要质疑道德本身的价值。如果道德善良不过是嫉妒和怨恨情绪的产物，以及特定群体对其环境的反应，而不是自然世界中某种不变的部分，那么它究竟有什么终极价值？尼采是否对此问题提供了答案并不明确，但这正是他的目标。他的基本方法论是谱系学。但这意味着什么呢？
Genealogy is literally the activity of tracing your ancestors, establishing your pedigree. Nietzsche means by it tracing the origins of particular concepts, largely by examining the history of the changing meanings of words. His training in philology (the study of languages and the origins of words) equipped him to trace the changing meanings of the words he investigates. His application of the genealogical method in On the Genealogy of Morality is intended to show that received opinion about the source of morality is misleading, and that, historically, concepts such as moral goodness, guilt, pity and self-sacrifice originated in bitter emotions turned against others, or against oneself.
家谱字面上是追溯你的祖先、建立你的血统的活动。尼采所指的是追溯特定概念的起源，主要通过考察词语意义变化的历史。他在语言学（研究语言及词源的学科）方面的训练使他能够追踪他所研究的词语的意义变化。他在《道德的谱系》中应用家谱方法，旨在表明关于道德来源的普遍看法是误导性的，并且，从历史上看，诸如道德善良、内疚、怜悯和自我牺牲等概念源于对他人或对自己的痛苦情感。
Genealogy, however, is meant to provide not just a history of these concepts, but also a critique of them. By uncovering their true origins, Nietzsche intends to reveal their dubious pedigrees and thereby question their exalted place in the morality of his day. The fact that moral concepts have a history undermines the view that they are absolute and apply to all people at all times. This approach to moral philosophy is, like most of Nietzsche’s thought, highly controversial, both as a methodology and in terms of its alleged findings.
然而，谱系不仅旨在提供这些概念的历史，还旨在对其进行批判。通过揭示它们的真实起源，尼采意图揭示它们可疑的血统，从而质疑它们在他那个时代道德中的崇高地位。道德概念有历史这一事实削弱了它们是绝对的并适用于所有人和所有时间的观点。这种道德哲学的方法论，像尼采的大多数思想一样，具有高度争议性，无论是在方法论上还是在其所谓的发现上。
First Essay: ‘Good and Evil’ and ‘Good and Bad’
第一篇论文：‘善与恶’和‘好与坏’
In the first of the three essays that constitute the book, Nietzsche puts forward his theory about the origins of our basic moral terminology of approval and disapproval: the words ‘good’ and ‘evil’ when used in a moral context. He develops his ideas by criticising the views of English psychologists who claimed that ‘good’ was originally applied to unselfish actions not so much because the actions themselves were good, but because they were useful to those who benefited from them, those to whom goodness was shown. Gradually people forgot the term’s origins and came to think of unselfish actions as good in themselves rather than because of their effects.
在构成本书的三篇论文中的第一篇中，尼采提出了他关于我们基本道德术语“赞同”和“反对”起源的理论：在道德语境中使用的“好”和“坏”这两个词。他通过批评一些英语心理学家的观点来发展他的思想，这些心理学家声称“好”最初是应用于无私的行为，这并不是因为这些行为本身是好的，而是因为它们对那些从中受益的人有用，那些受到善良对待的人。逐渐地，人们忘记了这个术语的起源，开始认为无私的行为本身就是好的，而不是因为它们的效果。
Nietzsche attacks this account, which, like his own, provides a genealogy of a moral concept. He maintains that the term ‘good’ was first used by the nobility, who applied it to themselves in order to set themselves apart from the common people. They had a sense of their own self-worth; anyone who could not live up to their noble ideals was obviously inferior and so ‘bad’. In this essay, Nietzsche’s use of the good/bad distinction (as opposed to the good/evil one) is always from the point of view of the nobility: the actions of nobles are good; those of the common people, in contrast, bad.
尼采攻击了这一说法，这一说法与他自己的观点一样，提供了一个道德概念的谱系。他认为“好”这个词最初是由贵族使用的，他们将其应用于自己，以便将自己与平民区分开来。他们有自我价值感；任何无法达到他们高贵理想的人显然是低劣的，因此是“坏的”。在这篇文章中，尼采对好/坏区分的使用（与好/恶区分相对）始终是从贵族的角度出发：贵族的行为是好的；而平民的行为则相对是坏的。
His account of how the word ‘good’ came to stand for what is unselfish is in terms of ressentiment. Nietzsche uses the French word for resentment to refer to the psychological origins of modern uses of the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Notice that when Nietzsche refers to the contrast between good and evil (as opposed to good and bad), he is seeing things from the perspective of the common people rather than the nobility: he is referring to the modern use of ‘good’ as unselfish and ‘bad’ as selfish action.
他关于“善”这个词如何代表无私的叙述是基于怨恨。尼采使用法语中的怨恨一词来指代现代“善”和“恶”这两个词的心理起源。注意，当尼采提到善与恶的对比时（与善与坏相对），他是从普通人的角度来看待事物，而不是贵族的角度：他指的是现代将“善”用作无私，将“坏”用作自私行为的用法。
Ressentiment is the emotion felt by the oppressed. Ressentiment as Nietzsche uses it is not synonymous with ‘resentment’; rather it is a specific kind of resentment. It is the imaginary revenge wreaked by those who are powerless to react to oppression with direct action. From hatred and a desire for vengeance felt by those who were kept in check by the nobility came the loftiest values of compassion and altruism, according to Nietzsche. This is intended both as a historical description of what actually happened and as an insight into the psychology of those who brought it about. The common people, who could not aspire to the lifestyle of the nobility, in their frustration overturned the good/bad value-system. In place of the nobility’s perspective on morality, the common people put their own, which subverted the status quo. The morality of the common people declared the nobility’s approach to life, based on power and the ethos of warriors, to be evil; the wretched, the poor and the lowly were the good.
怨恨是被压迫者所感受到的情感。尼采所使用的怨恨并不等同于“愤恨”；相反，它是一种特定类型的愤恨。它是那些无力通过直接行动对抗压迫的人所施加的想象中的复仇。根据尼采的说法，受到贵族压制的人所感受到的仇恨和复仇欲望，产生了同情和利他主义的崇高价值。这既是对实际发生事件的历史描述，也是对促成这一事件的人的心理洞察。普通人无法渴望贵族的生活方式，在他们的挫败感中推翻了善/恶的价值体系。普通人用自己的道德观取代了贵族的道德观，这颠覆了现状。普通人的道德宣称，基于权力和战士精神的贵族生活方式是邪恶的；可怜的、贫穷的和卑微的才是善良的。
Nietzsche attributes this ‘radical revaluation of their enemies’ values’ to the Jews and the subsequent Christian tradition, and calls it the first slave revolt in morality. We have, without realising it, inherited the consequences of this revolt, a revolt that served the interests of the oppressed. For Nietzsche morality is not something fixed for all time to be discovered in the world; rather it is a human creation, and as a consequence moral terms have a history, a history which is influenced by human psychology as well as by the interests of particular groups. In Nietzsche’s metaphor, the lambs decided that birds of prey were evil, and so they thought to themselves that the opposite of a bird of prey, a lamb, must be good. His comment on this is that it is absurd to deny those who are powerful the natural expression of their power. His choice of language throughout the book makes it clear that his sympathies lie with the birds of prey rather than with the lambs.
尼采将这种“对敌人价值的激进重估”归因于犹太人及其后来的基督教传统，并称之为道德上的第一次奴隶反抗。我们在不知不觉中继承了这一反抗的后果，这一反抗服务于被压迫者的利益。对尼采而言，道德并不是一个固定不变的东西，无法在世界中被发现；而是人类的创造，因此道德术语有其历史，这一历史受到人类心理以及特定群体利益的影响。在尼采的隐喻中，羔羊们决定猛禽是邪恶的，因此他们认为猛禽的对立面，羔羊，必然是好的。他对此的评论是，否认那些强者自然表达其力量是荒谬的。他在整本书中的用词清楚表明，他的同情更倾向于猛禽而非羔羊。
Second Essay: Conscience
第二篇文章：良知
The main theme of the second essay is the evolution of conscience, and specifically of bad conscience. Bad conscience is the sense of guilt with which modern humanity is burdened yet which is necessary for life in society.
第二篇文章的主要主题是良知的演变，特别是坏良知。坏良知是现代人类所承受的罪恶感，但这种感受对于社会生活是必要的。
The essence of Nietzsche’s argument is that the psychological source of the sense of guilt is frustrated instinct. Human beings instinctively get pleasure from their powerful actions, and particularly from inflicting suffering. But when, through socialisation, a block is put on acting on our desires to inflict cruelty on others, the expression of the desire is thwarted and turned inwards. We torture ourselves inwardly with guilty feelings because society would punish us if we tried to torture other people. This is a particular instance of Nietzsche’s general principle that all instincts not discharged outwards turn inwards, a principle which Sigmund Freud would later elaborate.
尼采论点的本质是，内疚感的心理来源是受挫的本能。人类本能地从强有力的行动中获得快感，尤其是从施加痛苦中获得快感。但是，当通过社会化对我们施加残酷欲望的行为进行阻碍时，这种欲望的表达就会受到挫制并转向内心。我们因内疚感而在内心折磨自己，因为如果我们试图折磨其他人，社会会惩罚我们。这是尼采一般原则的一个特例，即所有未向外释放的本能都会转向内心，这一原则后来被西格蒙德·弗洛伊德进一步阐述。
In the course of his discussion of the origin of conscience, Nietzsche points out that punishment was originally independent of any notion of responsibility for one’s actions: you would be punished simply for breaking an agreement whether or not it was your fault. The original meaning of the German word for guilt was ‘debt’. The guilty were those who had failed to repay their debts. Yet ‘guilt’ has become a moral concept. The hidden history of the concept which Nietzsche unveils is supposed to reveal the contingency of the modern use: it could have been otherwise and is not a natural ‘given’. The unstated implication of this and the earlier discussion of the origins of ‘good’ seems to be that the meanings of key moral concepts are not fixed for all time but can be transformed by an immense creative act of will.
在他讨论良知起源的过程中，尼采指出，惩罚最初与对自己行为的责任观念无关：你会因为违反协议而受到惩罚，无论这是否是你的错。德语中“罪”的原始含义是“债务”。有罪的人是那些未能偿还债务的人。然而，“罪”已经成为一个道德概念。尼采揭示的这一概念的隐秘历史旨在揭示现代用法的偶然性：它本可以是其他样子，并不是一种自然的“既定”。这一点以及对“善”的起源的早期讨论所隐含的未言明的含义似乎是，关键道德概念的意义并不是永恒不变的，而是可以通过巨大的创造性意志行为而转变。
Third Essay: Asceticism
第三篇论文：禁欲主义
The third essay is less focused than the first two and meanders from topic to topic. Nevertheless, the central theme is reasonably clear. Nietzsche addresses the question of how asceticism, the philosophy of life which encourages abstinence and self-denial, could have arisen. Ascetics typically advocate chastity, poverty, self-flagellation (either literal or metaphorical) and so on; they deliberately turn away from the pleasures and fulfilments that life offers. Nietzsche identifies ascetic impulses in artists, philosophers and priests. Indeed, he suggests that viewed from a distant star, earth would be seen to be teeming with creatures riddled with self-loathing and disgust, their only pleasure being to inflict as much harm on themselves as they possibly can: not on each other, but on themselves. How could such a widespread trend have evolved? How could life have so turned against itself?
第三篇文章的重点不如前两篇明确，内容在不同主题之间游走。然而，中心主题还是相对清晰的。尼采探讨了禁欲主义这一生活哲学是如何产生的，禁欲主义鼓励节制和自我否定。禁欲者通常提倡贞洁、贫穷、自我鞭笞（无论是字面上的还是隐喻上的）等；他们故意远离生活所提供的快乐和满足。尼采在艺术家、哲学家和神父中识别出禁欲的冲动。实际上，他暗示，从遥远的星星看，地球上充满了自我厌恶和厌恶的生物，他们唯一的快乐就是尽可能多地对自己造成伤害：不是对彼此，而是对自己。如此广泛的趋势是如何演变而来的？生活又是如何如此反对自身的？
Nietzsche’s answer is, once more, in terms of genealogy. Self-denial was the last resort of the almost powerless. Frustrated in their attempts to exert influence on the world, rather than ceasing to will anything at all, they directed their power against themselves. One of Nietzsche’s characteristic psychological insights is the joy that human beings take in inflicting cruelty. This cruelty is not just directed at others: we even take delight in inflicting it upon ourselves. The ascetic impulse, which for Nietzsche is an apparently absurd drive to selfdestruction, is a kind of self-torture which was the last resort of those who cannot exert their will in the world, yet it has become an ideal to be celebrated.
尼采的回答再次是从谱系学的角度出发。自我否定是几乎无力者的最后手段。在试图对世界施加影响的过程中感到挫败，他们并没有停止意愿，而是将自己的力量转向自己。尼采的一个典型心理洞察是人类在施加残酷时所感受到的快乐。这种残酷不仅仅是针对他人：我们甚至乐于对自己施加这种残酷。禁欲冲动，对于尼采来说，这是一种看似荒谬的自我毁灭驱动，是一种自我折磨，成为那些无法在世界上施加意志者的最后手段，然而它却成为了一种值得庆祝的理想。
Criticisms of on the Genealogy of Morality
对《道德谱系》中的批评
The genetic fallacy
遗传谬误
A fundamental criticism of Nietzsche’s methodology in On the Genealogy of Morality is that it commits the genetic fallacy. The genetic fallacy is the unreliable method of reasoning from what something at one stage was to what it now is. For instance, from the fact that the word ‘nice’ originally meant ‘fine’, in the sense of fine distinctions, it in no way follows that this will reveal anything important about present uses of the term. Or, to take another example, from the fact that oak trees come from acorns we cannot conclude that oak trees are small greenish brown nuts, or that they have much in common with them at all. Some of Nietzsche’s critics have argued that the genealogical method always commits this fallacy, and so sheds little or no light on current uses of moral terms.
对尼采在《道德的谱系》中的方法论的一个根本批评是，它犯了基因谬误。基因谬误是一种不可靠的推理方法，它从某事物在某一阶段的状态推导出其现在的状态。例如，从“nice”这个词最初意味着“精细”的事实来看，并不能得出这将揭示关于该术语当前用法的任何重要信息。或者，举另一个例子，从橡树来自橡果的事实，我们不能得出橡树是小的绿色棕色坚果，或者它们与坚果有很多共同之处。尼采的一些批评者认为，谱系方法总是犯这种谬误，因此对当前道德术语的用法几乎没有或没有任何启示。
However, in On the Genealogy of Morality, although in places Nietzsche does seem to be suggesting that because certain moral concepts originated in bitter emotions their ultimate value is undermined (and so here might be accused of committing the genetic fallacy), for the most part his method is intended to reveal that moral concepts are not absolute and that revaluations of value have taken place in the past, and so might do so again. The genealogical method is particularly good at revealing that concepts which we have taken to be fixed for all time can be changed. This use of the method does not involve the genetic fallacy. In order to cast doubt on the absolute nature of moral uses of the word ‘good’, for instance, it is sufficient simply to show that it has been applied very differently in the past. There is no need to suggest that because it was used differently in the past this past meaning of the word must somehow affect present uses.
然而，在《道德谱系学》中，尽管尼采在某些地方似乎暗示，由于某些道德概念起源于痛苦的情感，它们的最终价值受到削弱（因此在这里可能会被指责犯下基因谬误），但在大多数情况下，他的方法旨在揭示道德概念并非绝对，价值的重新评估在过去发生过，因此可能会再次发生。谱系方法特别擅长揭示我们认为是永恒不变的概念可以被改变。这种方法的使用并不涉及基因谬误。例如，为了对“好”这个词的道德用法的绝对性质提出质疑，仅仅展示它在过去的应用方式非常不同就足够了。没有必要暗示，因为它在过去的使用方式不同，这个词的过去含义必须以某种方式影响现在的用法。
Lack of evidence
缺乏证据
A more serious criticism of Nietzsche’s approach in On the Genealogy of Morality is that in each of the three essays he provides scant evidence for his hypotheses. Even if we accept that ‘good’ might have been used differently in the past, or that conscience and asceticism evolved from thwarted desires, Nietzsche’s evidence for the specific accounts of these genealogies is extremely thin. Although psychologically astute, his discussions are, as historical accounts, virtually unsupported. Without the historical evidence to back up his assertions about the origins of moral concepts, we have no reason to believe that his accounts reflect what actually happened. The best that could be said in Nietzsche’s defence on this point is that if he has provided reasonably plausible accounts of what might have happened, then he has succeeded in raising doubts about the allegedly fixed and unchanging moral concepts that we have inherited. Perhaps the important point is to understand that moral concepts can change their meaning, that they are human creations, rather than part of the natural world waiting to be discovered.
对尼采在《道德谱系》中的方法的更严重批评是，他在三篇论文中对其假设提供的证据非常有限。即使我们接受“善”在过去可能有不同的使用方式，或者良心和禁欲主义是从受挫的欲望中演变而来的，尼采对这些谱系的具体论述的证据也极其薄弱。尽管在心理上敏锐，他的讨论作为历史叙述几乎没有支持。没有历史证据来支持他关于道德概念起源的主张，我们没有理由相信他的论述反映了实际发生的事情。在这一点上，尼采辩护的最好说法是，如果他提供了合理可信的关于可能发生的事情的论述，那么他就成功地引发了对我们所继承的 allegedly 固定和不变的道德概念的怀疑。也许重要的一点是要理解道德概念可以改变其含义，它们是人类的创造，而不是等待被发现的自然世界的一部分。
Evil uses of his ideas
邪恶地利用他的想法
Perhaps the most frequent criticism of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole is that it has been cited approvingly by anti-semites and fascists. For instance, some Nazis felt that his ideas were in tune with theirs. Some comments in On the Genealogy of Morality if taken in isolation could be thought anti-semitic: though he shows a grudging admiration of the Jews’ transvaluation of values, he stresses that it was the last resort of the weak. He cannot disguise his own sympathy for the noble morality of the powerful. Throughout his philosophy, he repeatedly celebrates power even at the expense of the weak.
尼采哲学整体上最常见的批评是，它被反犹太主义者和法西斯主义者所赞同。例如，一些纳粹认为他的思想与他们的思想相契合。在《道德的谱系》中的一些评论如果孤立来看可能被认为是反犹太主义：尽管他对犹太人对价值的重新评估表现出勉强的钦佩，但他强调这只是弱者的最后手段。他无法掩饰自己对强者高尚道德的同情。在他的哲学中，他反复赞美权力，即使以弱者为代价。
However, there are two important points to consider in relation to the criticism that his ideas have been used for evil ends. First, many of those who have used Nietzsche’s philosophy in this way have had to distort it to achieve this. For instance, although isolated sentences of Nietzsche’s writing might be taken to be anti-semitic, these have to be balanced by other passages which are explicitly opposed to anti-semitism. The second point is that the fact that his ideas appear to glorify power does not thereby prove them wrong. One of the reasons why reading Nietzsche’s work can be so challenging is that he is constantly gnawing at our most cherished beliefs. Even if he hasn’t succeeded in undermining these beliefs, his writings force us to reflect on the foundations and assumptions on which all our lives are built.
然而，在关于他的思想被用于邪恶目的的批评中，有两个重要的观点需要考虑。首先，许多以这种方式使用尼采哲学的人不得不扭曲它以达到目的。例如，尽管尼采的某些孤立句子可能被视为反犹太主义，但这些必须与其他明确反对反犹太主义的段落相平衡。第二个观点是，他的思想似乎美化权力并不能因此证明它们是错误的。阅读尼采的作品之所以如此具有挑战性，部分原因在于他不断侵蚀我们最珍视的信念。即使他没有成功地削弱这些信念，他的著作也迫使我们反思构成我们生活基础和假设的根源。
See previous chapter.
请参见前一章。
altruism: being helpful to other people for their own sakes.
利他主义：为了他人的利益而帮助他人。
asceticism: self-denial as a way of living.
禁欲主义：以自我否定作为生活方式。
bad conscience: a sense of guilt that arises from frustrated instinct; inward self-torture.
坏良心：一种因受挫的本能而产生的内疚感；内心的自我折磨。
genealogy: the method of explaining a concept through an analysis of its ancestry.
谱系学：通过分析一个概念的祖先来解释该概念的方法。
ressentiment: a specific kind of resentment felt by the oppressed. The imaginary revenge wreaked by those who are powerless to act against their oppression.
怨恨：被压迫者感受到的一种特定的怨恨。那些无力对抗自己压迫的人所施加的想象中的报复。
Richard Schacht (ed.) Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) is a wide-ranging collection of articles about On the Genealogy of Morality. Some of the articles are quite difficult.
理查德·沙赫特（编）《尼采、谱系、道德》（加州大学出版社，1994 年）是一本关于《道德的谱系》的广泛文章集。部分文章相当难懂。
Brian Leiter Nietzsche on Morality (London: Routledge GuideBook series, Routledge, 2001) gives a useful critical analysis of the major themes of On the Genealogy of Morality, setting it in its intellectual context.
布赖恩·莱特尔《尼采的道德观》（伦敦：劳特利奇指南系列，劳特利奇，2001）对《道德谱系》中的主要主题进行了有益的批判性分析，并将其置于其知识背景中。
Aaron Ridley Nietzsche’s Conscience: Six Character Sketches from the ‘Genealogy’ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) is an original interpretation of the book.
亚伦·里德利《尼采的良知：来自《谱系》的六个角色素描》（伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1998）是对该书的原创解读。
See also the suggestions for further reading at the end of the previous chapter.
另请参阅上一章末尾的进一步阅读建议。
Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy
伯特兰·罗素 《哲学问题》
Bertrand Russell described this little book as his ‘shilling shocker’ – a cheap, short book, written quickly for a general readership, yet it has remained in print for almost a century. Although by no means his major philosophical work, this, along with his opinionated survey, A History of Western Philosophy, is one of his most read books. Indeed, until the early 1980s, The Problems of Philosophy was the book most likely to be recommended reading for students considering studying the subject at university, despite having been written in 1911 and first published in January 1912.
伯特兰·罗素将这本小书称为他的“先令震撼书”——一本便宜、简短、快速为大众读者写成的书，但它几乎已经印刷了近一个世纪。尽管这绝不是他主要的哲学著作，但这本书连同他带有个人观点的调查《西方哲学史》，是他最受欢迎的书籍之一。事实上，直到 1980 年代初，《哲学问题》是最有可能被推荐给考虑在大学学习该学科的学生的书，尽管它是在 1911 年写成，并于 1912 年 1 月首次出版。
The most plausible reason for its continued use, apart from its brevity, is the vision of what philosophy is that Russell presents within it. Much of the book consists of brief summaries of the work of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant and other major philosophers. There are also some original contributions within this. But it is when he expounds his own view of the limits and value of philosophy that Russell’s sincerity and enthusiasm for the subject emerges. This is where the book moves on to a higher plane and can be inspiring. In contrast, some other parts of the book are like a dusty and rather abstract lecture that has already been given many times to undergraduates. In places, too, the book fails to serve its purpose as an introduction: only someone with a firm grasp of the basics of philosophy would be in a position to follow every sentence of Russell’s at times condensed argument.
除了简洁性之外，其持续使用的最可信理由是拉塞尔在其中呈现的哲学观。书中大部分内容是对笛卡尔、贝克莱、休谟、康德及其他主要哲学家的工作进行的简要总结。其中也有一些原创贡献。但当他阐述自己对哲学的局限性和价值的看法时，拉塞尔对这一主题的真诚和热情便显露无遗。这是书籍提升到更高层次并能激励人的地方。相比之下，书中的某些部分则像是一场尘封且相当抽象的讲座，已经多次在本科生面前进行过。在某些地方，这本书也未能作为入门书籍发挥其作用：只有对哲学基础有扎实掌握的人，才能跟上拉塞尔有时简练的论证的每一句话。
Despite its title, this book covers quite a narrow range of philosophical problems. Its main focus is the limits of what we can know: the area of philosophy known as epistemology. Ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and many other important areas are only mentioned in passing, if at all.
尽管其标题如此，这本书涵盖的哲学问题范围相当狭窄。它的主要焦点是我们所能知道的界限：哲学的一个领域，称为认识论。伦理学、美学、政治哲学、宗教哲学以及许多其他重要领域仅在附带提及，甚至可能根本没有提到。
The choice of the word ‘problems’ in the title suggests the equivalent of mathematical problems: equations and the like that need to be solved. But Russell points out that philosophy differs from those subjects where there can be straightforward right answers. This is an aspect of the vision of philosophy that he presents throughout the book, but particularly in its two concluding chapters.
标题中使用“问题”一词暗示了与数学问题相当的内容：需要解决的方程等。但罗素指出，哲学与那些可以有明确正确答案的学科不同。这是他在整本书中，尤其是在最后两章中所呈现的哲学视野的一个方面。
Many people, including some great philosophers of the past, have come to the subject hoping it will solve major metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of reality, right and wrong, beauty and so forth, but, Russell says, this is a vain hope. Philosophy doesn’t give simple answers. Philosophers ask questions; often they cannot answer those questions. Indeed, Russell acknowledges that philosophy has not been particularly successful in answering with any certainty most of the questions that philosophers ask. But that does not mean that philosophy is a waste of time. By asking deep questions we make life more interesting and reveal that a little below the surface of our comfortable assumptions lies a much stranger world.
许多人，包括一些伟大的哲学家，曾希望这个主题能解决关于现实的终极本质、对与错、美等重大形而上学问题，但拉塞尔说，这是一个徒劳的希望。哲学并不提供简单的答案。哲学家提出问题；他们常常无法回答这些问题。事实上，拉塞尔承认，哲学在以任何确定性回答哲学家提出的大多数问题方面并没有特别成功。但这并不意味着哲学是浪费时间。通过提出深刻的问题，我们使生活变得更加有趣，并揭示出在我们舒适的假设表面下，隐藏着一个更加奇异的世界。
So anyone coming to philosophy expecting it to provide knowledge of reality is likely to be disappointed. What philosophy can provide, however, is the possibility of ordering our less than certain beliefs and getting some insights into the ways in which we acquire them. Even if it can’t provide us with certainties, philosophy can make us less likely to be wrong about our basic beliefs than if we had left them unexamined.
因此，任何期待哲学能提供现实知识的人都可能会感到失望。然而，哲学能提供的是对我们那些不太确定的信念进行整理的可能性，并让我们对获取这些信念的方式有一些洞察。即使它无法给我们提供确定性，哲学也能让我们在基本信念上比如果我们不加审视地放任它们更不容易出错。
There is a clear distinction between philosophy and science, though historically many of the problems of philosophy have later become scientific questions. Science can be extremely useful to us even if we never study it: all of us have the potential to benefit from medical science, science-based technology and so on, whether or not we understand the science underpinning the inventions. Philosophy differs from this. Studying philosophy can have a profound effect on the student who thinks through the issues; but those who don’t study the subject are only likely to benefit from the effects on the student of philosophy. There are no direct benefits from philosophy for those who don’t actually study it themselves.
哲学和科学之间有明确的区别，尽管历史上许多哲学问题后来成为了科学问题。科学对我们非常有用，即使我们从未学习过它：我们所有人都有可能从医学科学、基于科学的技术等中受益，无论我们是否理解支撑这些发明的科学。哲学则不同。学习哲学对认真思考问题的学生会产生深远的影响；但那些不学习这一学科的人只可能从哲学对学生的影响中受益。对于那些不实际学习哲学的人来说，哲学没有直接的好处。
The real value of philosophy, however, Russell declares, lies in its uncertainty. If you never question your beliefs, then you can cling to prejudices that need never be subjected to critical assessment. If, however, you begin to question beliefs that have previously seemed uncontroversial, with the help of a philosophical approach you will free yourself from the ‘tyranny of custom’ and awaken a less dogmatic sense of wonder at the strangeness of the world and our position in it. This opening up of possibilities enriches our imaginations. Philosophical contemplation takes us away from the purely individual concerns of our lives, moving us towards becoming ‘citizens of the universe’. Our minds become great by contemplating greatness in this impartial spirit. In the combination of these factors lies philosophy’s value to humanity.
然而，拉塞尔宣称，哲学的真正价值在于它的不确定性。如果你从不质疑自己的信仰，那么你就可能固守那些无需经过批判性评估的偏见。然而，如果你开始质疑那些以前看似无争议的信仰，在哲学方法的帮助下，你将摆脱“习俗的暴政”，并唤醒对世界的奇异性及我们在其中位置的较少教条的惊奇感。这种可能性的开放丰富了我们的想象力。哲学的沉思使我们远离生活中纯粹的个人关切，推动我们成为“宇宙的公民”。我们的思想通过以这种公正的精神思考伟大而变得伟大。这些因素的结合构成了哲学对人类的价值。
One traditional approach to philosophy (usually known as rationalism) has been to attempt to prove truths about the nature of reality a priori, that is independently of any experience, by pure reason alone. In place of this Russell offers something much closer to John Locke’s account of the philosopher as ‘underlabourer’ to science (though Russell does not identify the source of this idea). For Russell, philosophy is the activity of investigating the principles that we use both in science and in everyday life, and subjecting them to a critical scrutiny that reveals any inconsistencies. This, Russell believed, shouldn’t result in a destructive scepticism that leaves everything in doubt. Indeed, one theme of The Problems of Philosophy is that there are beliefs, such as that our perceptual experiences exist, that are beyond doubt. In contrast, the belief that physical objects are really as they appear to us, is open to philosophical doubt. Much of the book focuses on questions about our knowledge of the world as it is acquired through the senses and by reason.
一种传统的哲学方法（通常被称为理性主义）是试图通过纯粹的理性独立于任何经验地证明关于现实本质的真理。作为替代，拉塞尔提供了更接近约翰·洛克对哲学家的“助手”角色的描述（尽管拉塞尔并没有指出这个想法的来源）。对拉塞尔而言，哲学是调查我们在科学和日常生活中使用的原则的活动，并对这些原则进行批判性的审查，以揭示任何不一致之处。拉塞尔认为，这不应该导致一种破坏性的怀疑主义，使一切都处于怀疑之中。实际上，《哲学问题》的一个主题是，有一些信念，例如我们的感知经验确实存在，是毫无疑问的。相比之下，物理对象确实如我们所见的那样的信念则是开放于哲学怀疑的。书中大部分内容集中在关于我们通过感官和理性获得的世界知识的问题上。
Is there any knowledge so certain that no reasonable person could doubt it? This is Russell’s opening question. If we look at a table it seems a particular shape, colour and texture to us. But do we really know that it is as it seems? If we analyse our experience more closely we very soon discover that, for example, the ‘real’ shape of the table is something inferred from what we see. A rectangular table does not appear to have right-angled corners from almost any angle it is viewed. When I say I see a table over there I am in some senses begging the question about what I see. Russell uses the more neutral term ‘sense data’ (the singular is ‘sense datum’) to refer to what we see – the patches of colour and shape. Sensations are mental; sense data are the things that we see, and are, he presumes, not entirely mental. What I see, what appears to be in front of me are sense data. I have data that I take to be of a real table. I see something of a particular colour and particular shape: the sense data are our means of access to the real table. But the sense data don’t seem to correspond perfectly with what we take to be the real table. The table doesn’t seem to be the sense data: we take the table to have an oblong top and a brownish red colour, perhaps, but as I experience it now, the sense data are of a parallelogram of yellowish brown.
有没有任何知识是如此确定，以至于没有理性的人会对此产生怀疑？这是罗素的开场问题。如果我们看一张桌子，它似乎对我们来说有特定的形状、颜色和纹理。但我们真的知道它看起来就是这样吗？如果我们更仔细地分析我们的经验，我们很快会发现，例如，桌子的“真实”形状是从我们所看到的推断出来的。几乎从任何角度看，矩形桌子似乎都没有直角的角。当我说我看到那边有一张桌子时，在某种意义上我是在回避关于我所看到的东西的问题。罗素使用更中性的术语“感觉数据”（单数是“感觉数据”）来指代我们所看到的东西——颜色和形状的斑块。感觉是心理的；感觉数据是我们所看到的东西，他假设这些东西并不完全是心理的。我所看到的，似乎在我面前的东西是感觉数据。我有我认为是真实桌子的数据。我看到某种特定颜色和特定形状的东西：感觉数据是我们接触真实桌子的手段。但感觉数据似乎并不完全与我们认为的真实桌子相对应。 这张桌子似乎不是感官数据：我们认为这张桌子有一个长方形的桌面和棕红色，但现在我体验到的感官数据是一个黄褐色的平行四边形。
Bishop Berkeley’s solution to this problem was to declare that there is no real table independent of sense data: matter doesn’t exist. To be is to be perceived. Russell rejects such idealism. He recognises that there is no logical absurdity in supposing that there is nothing more than my mind and its experiences. Nor is there any logical absurdity in thinking the whole of life a dream. But the common sense hypothesis that objects exist independently of us and differ from their appearances, an example of what he calls an instinctive belief, is a simpler explanation and so we should prefer it. (In passing he comments that beliefs about moral values are also instinctive, but he later changed his mind about this.) Russell believed that all our knowledge ultimately rests on and is built up from such instinctive beliefs.
贝尔克利主教对这个问题的解决方案是宣称没有独立于感官数据的真实桌子：物质并不存在。存在就是被感知。罗素拒绝这种唯心主义。他承认假设除了我的思想和它的经历之外没有其他东西并没有逻辑上的荒谬。认为整个人生是一个梦也没有逻辑上的荒谬。但是，常识假设认为物体独立于我们而存在，并且与它们的外观不同，这是一种他所称的本能信念的例子，是一个更简单的解释，因此我们应该更倾向于它。（顺便提一下，他评论道关于道德价值的信念也是本能的，但他后来对此改变了看法。）罗素认为我们所有的知识最终都建立在这些本能信念之上。
Knowledge by Acquaintance and by Description
通过熟识和描述获得的知识
The distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is an important one for Russell. For him it is clear that we have knowledge of truths and knowledge of things. Our knowledge of things comes by either acquaintance or description. Knowledge by acquaintance is the foundation of all our knowledge. Knowledge by acquaintance involves a direct awareness of the thing that we know. So, for example, I have direct knowledge – knowledge by acquaintance – of my sense data. I am acquainted with what I see. But we also have knowledge by acquaintance of our own memories, and, when we introspect, we have knowledge by acquaintance of our sensations.
对拉塞尔来说，熟识知识和描述知识之间的区别是一个重要的区别。对他而言，我们对真理和事物的知识是明确的。我们对事物的知识来自于熟识或描述。熟识知识是我们所有知识的基础。熟识知识涉及对我们所知道的事物的直接意识。因此，例如，我对我的感觉数据有直接的知识——熟识知识。我对我所看到的事物有熟识。但我们也对自己的记忆有熟识知识，当我们内省时，我们对自己的感觉有熟识知识。
In contrast, knowledge by description is the kind of knowledge that takes us beyond our direct acquaintance. Knowledge by description would include the knowledge that someone who had never visited Australia might have that Canberra is the capital city of Australia. So, for Russell, as we have seen, we don’t have direct knowledge of physical objects, only of sense data, so our knowledge of real physical objects, as opposed to sense data, is knowledge by description too. Knowledge by description is how we move beyond our own personal direct experience and get to know things that we haven’t experienced ourselves. In The Problems of Philosophy Russell declares that every proposition that we understand must ultimately be dependent on some things that we know by acquaintance.
相对而言，描述性知识是一种超越我们直接熟悉的知识。描述性知识包括那些从未访问过澳大利亚的人可能知道的堪培拉是澳大利亚首都的知识。因此，正如我们所看到的，对于罗素来说，我们对物理对象没有直接的知识，只有感官数据，因此我们对真实物理对象的知识，与感官数据相对，也是描述性知识。描述性知识是我们如何超越个人直接经验，了解那些我们自己没有经历过的事物。在《哲学问题》中，罗素宣称我们理解的每一个命题最终都必须依赖于我们通过熟悉所知道的一些事物。
Immanuel Kant famously argued that we can learn by pure thought about principles that must apply to all our experience – these are the very conditions of thought at all. So-called a priori knowledge, what we know independently of experience, was traditionally restricted to the category known as analytic truths: those that are true by definition, such as ‘All bachelors are unmarried.’ Against this Kant announced that there could be synthetic a priori knowledge: a priori knowledge of matters that weren’t true by definition. He put our knowledge of time, space and cause and effect in this category: he believed that it was a feature of our understanding rather than of the world that all our experiences and all possible experiences included these elements. Russell, however, rejects Kant’s conclusions, arguing that a priori knowledge is only ever of relations and qualities, never of facts directly about the world.
伊曼努尔·康德著名地论证了我们可以通过纯粹的思考来了解必须适用于我们所有经验的原则——这些正是思考的基本条件。所谓的先验知识，即我们独立于经验所知道的知识，传统上被限制在被称为分析真理的类别中：那些根据定义为真的，例如“所有单身汉都是未婚的”。对此，康德宣布可以存在合成的先验知识：对那些不是根据定义为真的事物的先验知识。他将我们对时间、空间和因果关系的知识归入这一类别：他认为这是我们理解的一个特征，而不是世界的特征，所有我们的经验和所有可能的经验都包含这些元素。然而，罗素拒绝了康德的结论，认为先验知识仅仅是关于关系和性质的知识，而从未是关于世界的直接事实。
Russell’s outline of the so-called Problem of Induction in Chapter 6 of his book follows David Hume’s quite closely. Why are we all convinced that the sun will rise tomorrow? Simply because it has always risen in the past. Have we got good reason to believe that the future will be like the past? We assume a uniformity of nature in this respect. But consider the chicken fed by the farmer every day. As Russell points out, on the day that the farmer wrings its neck ‘more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken’.
拉塞尔在其书第六章中对所谓归纳问题的概述与大卫·休谟的观点非常接近。我们为什么都相信明天太阳会升起？仅仅因为它在过去总是升起。我们是否有充分的理由相信未来会像过去一样？我们在这方面假设自然的统一性。但考虑一下每天都被农民喂养的鸡。正如拉塞尔所指出的，在农民扭断它脖子的那一天，“对自然统一性更精细的看法对这只鸡来说是有用的”。
We are left recognising that experience of past uniformity of nature is not a completely reliable guide to the future. Just because we have never had an exception to an apparent uniformity of nature, it does not follow that there never could be one. It just makes it improbable that this will occur. As Russell points out, this cuts two ways. We can’t prove the reliability of the principle of induction using experience, since that would be begging the question: using induction to justify the principle of induction. But equally we can’t prove that the future won’t be like the past
我们只能认识到，过去自然的统一性经验并不是对未来完全可靠的指南。仅仅因为我们从未遇到过自然表面统一性的例外，并不意味着将来就不可能出现一个。这只是使这种情况发生的可能性变得不大。正如拉塞尔所指出的，这有两个方面。我们无法通过经验证明归纳原则的可靠性，因为那将是循环论证：用归纳来证明归纳原则。但同样，我们也无法证明未来不会像过去一样。
Criticisms of The Problems of Philosophy
对《哲学问题》的批评
Wrong about the point of philosophy?
关于哲学的观点错了吗？
Russell characterised philosophy as a way of stepping back from our individual concerns, revealing our uncertainties to ourselves, and as an antidote to dogmatism. This view of the subject can be challenged. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Russell’s sometime pupil, hated The Problems of Philosophy. This may well have been in part because Wittgenstein had a very different vision of what philosophy was. For Wittgenstein, at least in his later years, philosophy was something that required a kind of intellectual therapy: philosophical problems often arose from a strange forcing of language to do things that it couldn’t do. Philosophy should be a process of taking away mystery, not creating a sense of mystery.
罗素将哲学描述为一种从个人关切中退后一步的方式，揭示我们对自身的不确定性，并作为对教条主义的解药。这种对该学科的看法是可以受到挑战的。路德维希·维特根斯坦，罗素的学生，有时厌恶《哲学问题》。这可能部分是因为维特根斯坦对哲学有着非常不同的看法。对维特根斯坦来说，至少在他晚年的时候，哲学是一种需要某种智力治疗的东西：哲学问题往往源于一种奇怪的强迫语言去做它无法做到的事情。哲学应该是一个消除神秘感的过程，而不是创造神秘感。
From a different direction, Friedrich Nietzsche’s claim in Beyond Good and Evil that philosophy is a kind of involuntary autobiography wrapped up to make it seem impersonal, if true, would undermine Russell’s suggestion that philosophy takes us away from the merely personal to a more general level. If Nietzsche is right, all philosophy is riddled with philosophers’ own personal prejudices and heartfelt desires.
从另一个角度来看，弗里德里希·尼采在《超越善恶》中声称，哲学是一种非自愿的自传，包裹得看起来不那么个人化，如果这是真的，将会削弱罗素的观点，即哲学使我们远离单纯的个人层面，走向更一般的层面。如果尼采是对的，那么所有哲学都充满了哲学家自身的个人偏见和真挚的愿望。
Over-optimistic bibliographical note
过于乐观的书目注释
At the very end of his book, Russell claims that students who want to learn more about philosophy will find it ‘both easier and more profitable’ to read some original works of the great philosophers than to turn to handbooks of philosophy. He lists works by Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume and Kant. Russell’s assertion may reflect the kind of introductory books available in 1911. Some of the texts he recommends, notably Spinoza’s Ethics, are far from an easy read for beginning students, or anyone else.
在他书的最后，拉塞尔声称，想要深入了解哲学的学生会发现阅读一些伟大哲学家的原著“既更容易又更有益”，而不是转向哲学手册。他列出了柏拉图、笛卡尔、莱布尼茨、贝克莱、休谟和康德的作品。拉塞尔的说法可能反映了 1911 年可用的入门书籍类型。他推荐的一些文本，特别是斯宾诺莎的《伦理学》，对于初学者或其他任何人来说，远非易读。
Whilst it is certainly still true that most students would benefit from reading some primary texts early on in their study of philosophy, it is no longer true, if it ever was, that it is either ‘easier’ or ‘more profitable’ to do this than to read the best available introductory works, such as those that I recommend in the ‘Further Reading’ sections of each chapter here. This is an example of a widespread phenomenon that still persists: professional philosophers are notoriously bad at appreciating how difficult philosophy can be for a beginning student. For many students it would be just as profitable to recommend battering your head against a brick wall as to attempt to read Spinoza’s Ethics without any commentary or introduction to its main themes.
虽然大多数学生在学习哲学的早期阶段阅读一些原始文本确实会受益，但如果这曾经是事实，现在已经不再成立，或者说从来就不是这样，阅读最佳的入门作品，比如我在每章的“进一步阅读”部分推荐的那些，既不“更容易”也“不更有利”。这是一个仍然存在的普遍现象：专业哲学家在理解哲学对初学者的困难程度方面 notoriously 不佳。对许多学生来说，推荐用头撞墙和尝试在没有任何评论或对其主要主题的介绍的情况下阅读斯宾诺莎的《伦理学》同样有利。
1872 | Bertrand Russell born. |
1911 | Writes The Problems of Philosophy. |
1912 | The Problems of Philosophy published. |
1970 | Russell dies. |
a priori: knowledge which is independent of experience.
先验：独立于经验的知识。
epistemology: the theory of knowledge.
认识论：知识的理论。
knowledge by aquaintance: what we know from direct experience.
通过熟人获得的知识：我们从直接经验中所知道的。
knowledge by description: what we learn about indirectly.
通过描述获得的知识：我们间接了解的内容。
metaphysics: branch of philosophy that studies the nature of reality.
形而上学：研究现实本质的哲学分支。
rationalism: the attempt to discover truths about reality by thought alone.
理性主义：仅通过思考来发现关于现实的真理的尝试。
scepticism: questioning of fundamental beliefs.
怀疑主义：对基本信仰的质疑。
sensations: the mental representations of what we experience.
感知：我们所经历的心理表征。
sense data: the things we see and otherwise sense.
感知数据：我们看到的和其他感知到的事物。
Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell (2 vols, London: Vintage, 1997 and 2001) is a controversial biography. Some critics disliked Monk’s lack of personal sympathy with Russell’s character and private life; others appreciated Monk’s thoroughness, literary style and combination of philosophical understanding and clarity. For Russell’s own account of his life, see his Autobiography (London: Routledge, 2000).
雷·蒙克，《伯特兰·罗素》（两卷本，伦敦：Vintage，1997 年和 2001 年）是一部有争议的传记。一些评论家不喜欢蒙克对罗素性格和私生活缺乏个人同情；另一些人则欣赏蒙克的严谨、文学风格以及哲学理解与清晰性的结合。关于罗素自己对其生活的叙述，请参见他的《自传》（伦敦：Routledge，2000 年）。
A. J. Ayer Language, Truth and Logic
A. J. Ayer 语言、真理与逻辑
Most people talk and write nonsense some of the time; and some people talk and write nonsense all of the time. But it can be difficult to detect precisely who is talking and writing nonsense when. In Language, Truth and Logic Ayer presents what he believes to be an infallible nonsense detector, a two-pronged test for meaningfulness which he calls the Verification Principle. With this test he demonstrates that a huge swathe of philosophical writing doesn’t deserve to be called philosophy at all, since it is simply nonsensical. He suggests that we set it aside and get on with the real business of philosophy, which is to clarify the meaning of concepts. The subject that is left after he has wielded his Verification Principle is very much slimmer than philosophy as traditionally conceived: there is no place for metaphysics, for example.
大多数人有时会说和写一些无意义的话；而有些人则总是说和写无意义的话。但要准确地判断谁在什么时候说和写无意义的话可能很困难。在《语言、真理与逻辑》中，艾耶尔提出了他认为是一个无误的无意义检测器，即他称之为验证原则的双重测试。通过这个测试，他证明了大量的哲学著作根本不值得被称为哲学，因为它们只是无意义的。他建议我们将其搁置，继续进行真正的哲学工作，即澄清概念的意义。在他运用验证原则后留下的主题比传统上所理解的哲学要瘦得多：例如，形而上学就没有立足之地。
Language, Truth and Logic, which Ayer published before his 26th birthday, is, then, an iconoclastic book, one which attempts to transform the nature of philosophy and of philosophising. The book is not itself wholly original, since most of its ideas are to be found either in the work of David Hume, or else in that of the so-called Vienna Circle, a group of intellectuals who met regularly in the late 1920s to discuss philosophy and who founded the school of thought known as logical positivism. Nevertheless, Ayer’s was the first, and best-known, synthesis of these ideas to appear in English.
《语言、真理与逻辑》是艾耶在 26 岁生日之前出版的书籍，因此是一部破除偶像的著作，试图改变哲学及其思考的本质。这本书本身并不完全原创，因为它的大部分思想要么可以在大卫·休谟的作品中找到，要么可以在所谓的维也纳学派的作品中找到，这是一群在 1920 年代末定期聚会讨论哲学的知识分子，他们创立了被称为逻辑实证主义的思想流派。尽管如此，艾耶的作品是第一个也是最著名的将这些思想综合呈现的英文著作。
The Verification Principle
验证原则
It is tempting to think that all statements are either true or false. However, there is a third important class of statements, namely those which are neither true nor false, but literally meaningless. Ayer’s Verification Principle is designed to pick out this third class of statements. So, for example, it is true that I am typing this on a word processor; false that I am writing it by hand; and meaningless to say ‘colourless green ideas sleep furiously’. This last statement is the equivalent of saying ‘blah’: although it uses words, it can be neither true nor false since it is impossible to come up with any criterion for determining whether it is true or false.
人们很容易认为所有陈述要么是真，要么是假。然而，还有第三类重要的陈述，即那些既不是真也不是假的，但字面上毫无意义。艾耶尔的验证原则旨在识别这一第三类陈述。因此，例如，我在文字处理器上输入这段文字是真的；我手写这段文字是假的；而说“无色的绿色想法愤怒地睡着”则毫无意义。最后这句话相当于说“废话”：尽管它使用了单词，但它既不能被认为是真，也不能被认为是假，因为不可能提出任何标准来判断它是真还是假。
The Verification Principle asks two questions of any statement. First, ‘Is it true by definition?’ And second, if not, ‘Is it in principle verifiable?’ Any statement which passes the test, that is, is either true by definition or else in principle verifiable, is meaningful. Any statement which fails the test is meaningless, and so should not be taken seriously.
验证原则对任何陈述提出两个问题。首先，“它是定义上真实的吗？”其次，如果不是，“它在原则上可验证吗？”任何通过测试的陈述，即要么在定义上真实，要么在原则上可验证，都是有意义的。任何未通过测试的陈述都是无意义的，因此不应被认真对待。
Actually, Ayer usually does not talk of statements, but rather of propositions. Propositions are the underlying logical structures of statements: the point is that ‘the cat sat on the mat’ expresses a proposition which could equally well be expressed in another language. It doesn’t affect the truth of the statement if it is in French or Swahili. So statements made in different languages can express the same proposition. Also, Ayer usually talks of ‘putative’ propositions: here the word ‘putative’ is used so as to leave open the possibility that they might not be propositions at all (i.e. that they might be nonsensical): ‘putative’ just means ‘supposed’.
实际上，艾耶通常不谈论陈述，而是谈论命题。命题是陈述的基本逻辑结构：关键在于“猫坐在垫子上”表达了一个命题，这个命题同样可以用另一种语言表达。如果用法语或斯瓦希里语表达，这并不影响陈述的真实性。因此，用不同语言作出的陈述可以表达相同的命题。此外，艾耶通常谈论“假定”命题：在这里，“假定”一词的使用是为了保留它们可能根本不是命题的可能性（即它们可能是无意义的）： “假定”仅意味着“假设”。
Let’s consider the first prong of the Verification Principle, the question ‘Is it true by definition?’ An example of a proposition that is true by definition is ‘All bachelors are unmarried men.’ There is no need to conduct a survey to establish that this statement is true: anyone who purports to be a bachelor and yet is married has simply misunderstood the meaning of the word ‘bachelor’. The statement is a tautologous one, that is, one that is logically true. Another example of a statement that is true by definition is ‘All cats are animals.’ Again, there would be no need to conduct any research in order to assess whether or not this statement is true: it is true simply by virtue of the meanings of the words. This kind of statement is sometimes also called an analytic truth (‘analytic’ is used here in a technical sense).
让我们考虑验证原则的第一个方面，即“它是定义上真实的吗？”一个定义上真实的命题的例子是“所有单身汉都是未婚男性。”没有必要进行调查来确定这个陈述是否真实：任何自称是单身汉但实际上已婚的人只是误解了“单身汉”这个词的含义。这个陈述是一个同义反复的陈述，也就是说，它在逻辑上是真实的。另一个定义上真实的陈述的例子是“所有猫都是动物。”同样，没有必要进行任何研究来评估这个陈述是否真实：它仅仅因为词义的缘故而真实。这种类型的陈述有时也被称为分析真理（“分析”在这里是以技术意义使用的）。
In contrast, statements such as ‘Most bachelors are untidy’ or ‘No cat has ever lived longer than thirty years’ are empirical statements. Some kind of observation is needed in order to assess whether or not they are true. You can’t tell conclusively whether or not they are true unless you do some research into the matter. These statements purport to be factual ones. They are not just about the meaning of words, but report on features of the world referred to by the words. They are the sort of statement covered by the second prong of the Verification Principle.
相反，像“绝大多数单身汉都不整洁”或“没有猫活过三十年”这样的陈述是经验性陈述。需要某种观察来评估它们是否真实。除非你对这个问题进行一些研究，否则无法确切判断它们是否真实。这些陈述声称是事实陈述。它们不仅仅涉及词语的意义，而是报告了词语所指代的世界的特征。它们是验证原则第二个方面所涵盖的那种陈述。
Ayer asks of empirical statements such as those given in the previous paragraph ‘Are they in principle verifiable?’ Here ‘verifiable’ simply means capable of being shown to be true or false. The word ‘verifiable’ is slightly confusing since in ordinary language to verify something is to show that it is true; however, Ayer allows that showing something to be false is also a case of verifying it. He includes the words ‘in principle’ in the question because there are very many meaningful statements that cannot practically be tested. For instance, prior to space travel, a scientist could have claimed that the moon was made of limestone. This might have been practically difficult to refute; nevertheless, in principle it is easy to see how it could be refuted: get a specimen of moon rock and see if it is limestone. So it is a meaningful statement, despite the fact that at the time of being uttered it was not possible to test it. Similarly, even so absurd a statement as ‘the moon is made of cream cheese’ is meaningful since it is obvious how it can be shown to be false. Again it is important to recognise that Ayer is using the word ‘meaningful’ in a specialised sense, since in ordinary language we rarely call statements which we know to be false ‘meaningful’. Statements about what happened in the past can be particularly difficult to verify in practice; specifying that these need only be verifiable in principle gets around the problems that would otherwise arise in assessing the status of such statements.
艾耶尔询问前一段中给出的经验性陈述：“它们在原则上可验证吗？”这里“可验证”仅仅意味着能够被证明是真或假。这个词“可验证”有些令人困惑，因为在普通语言中，验证某事就是证明它是真的；然而，艾耶尔允许证明某事是假的也是验证的一种情况。他在问题中包含“在原则上”这几个字，因为有很多有意义的陈述在实践中无法被测试。例如，在太空旅行之前，一位科学家可能声称月球是由石灰岩构成的。这在实践中可能很难反驳；然而，从原则上讲，很容易看出如何反驳它：获取一块月球岩石样本，看看它是否是石灰岩。因此，这是一个有意义的陈述，尽管在被说出时无法进行测试。同样，即使是“月球是由奶酪制成的”这样荒谬的陈述也是有意义的，因为显然可以证明它是假的。 再次重要的是要认识到，艾耶在这里使用“有意义”一词是有特定含义的，因为在日常语言中，我们很少称我们知道是错误的陈述为“有意义”。关于过去发生了什么的陈述在实践中尤其难以验证；规定这些陈述仅需在原则上可验证，可以避免在评估这些陈述的状态时可能出现的问题。
What emerges from this is that, when considering any putative proposition, for Ayer there are just three possibilities: that it is meaningful and true; that it is meaningful yet false; and that it is completely meaningless. The last category, that of completely meaningless utterances, is his main target in Language, Truth and Logic.
由此可见，在考虑任何假定命题时，对于艾耶尔来说，只有三种可能性：它是有意义且真实的；它是有意义但虚假的；以及它是完全无意义的。最后一类，即完全无意义的言论，是他在《语言、真理与逻辑》中主要针对的对象。
According to Ayer many philosophers have been duped into believing that they were making meaningful statements when in fact, as application of his Verification Principle reveals, they have been writing nonsense. His favourite word for such nonsense in the realm of philosophy is ‘metaphysics’. A metaphysical sentence is one which purports to say something genuine (i.e. meaningful) but, because it is neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable, is actually meaningless.
根据艾耶尔的说法，许多哲学家被欺骗，以为他们在发表有意义的陈述，而实际上，正如他的验证原则所揭示的，他们所写的都是无意义的。他最喜欢用来形容这种哲学领域的无意义的词是“形而上学”。一个形而上学的句子是指声称要表达某种真实（即有意义）的内容，但由于它既不符合定义的真理，也无法通过经验验证，因此实际上是无意义的。
Strong and Weak Senses of ‘Verifiability’
“可验证性”的强和弱含义
One problem that would arise for Ayer if he demanded that meaningful statements that weren’t true by definition had to be conclusively verified is that general empirical claims are not subject to conclusive proof. For instance, take the general statement ‘All women are mortal.’ However many cases of mortal women you observe, you will never prove once and for all that this statement is true, only that it is very probably true. This is good enough for practical purposes. But if Ayer had adopted what he calls the strong sense of verifiability, that is demanded conclusive empirical proof for any empirical generalisation to be meaningful, he would have set too high a standard.
如果艾耶要求那些不是定义上真实的有意义陈述必须得到确凿验证，那么他将面临一个问题，即一般经验性主张并不受确凿证明的约束。例如，考虑一般陈述“所有女性都是凡人”。无论你观察到多少凡人女性，你永远无法一次性证明这个陈述是真实的，只能证明它很可能是真的。这对于实际目的来说已经足够了。但是如果艾耶采用了他所称的强可验证性，即要求任何经验性概括必须有确凿的经验证明才能有意义，他就设定了一个过高的标准。
Instead he adopts a weak sense of ‘verifiability’. For an empirical statement to be meaningful there need only be some observations which would be relevant to determining whether it was true or false. These observations need not make it certain that it is true or that it is false.
相反，他采用了一种弱的“可验证性”概念。为了使一个经验陈述有意义，只需有一些观察与确定其真或假的相关。这些观察不必使其确定为真或假。
Some critics of Ayer’s work have pointed out that the distinction between strong and weak senses of verification is itself a meaningless one since no empirical statement could ever in practice or in principle meet the rigorous demands of the strong principle. Ayer, however, in the introduction to the second edition of the book, suggests that there are what he calls ‘basic propositions’ which can be conclusively verified. These are the kind of proposition expressed by statements such as ‘I am in pain now’ or ‘this lemon tastes bitter to me’. These are incorrigible, meaning that you cannot be mistaken about them.
一些批评艾耶尔作品的人指出，强验证和弱验证之间的区别本身是没有意义的，因为没有任何经验陈述在实践或原则上能够满足强原则的严格要求。然而，艾耶尔在该书第二版的引言中建议，有一些他称之为“基本命题”的东西可以被确凿地验证。这些是由诸如“我现在感到疼痛”或“这个柠檬对我来说味道苦涩”的陈述所表达的命题。这些是不可更正的，意味着你不可能对它们产生误解。
One line of defence for metaphysics is to claim that although literally meaningless it can have the same sort of effect as poetry and thus be a worthwhile activity in its own right. Ayer is scathing about this attempt at a justification of metaphysics. First, he points out, this attempted justification is based on a misapprehension about poetry. Poetry is rarely meaningless, though it sometimes expresses false propositions. And even when it is meaningless, the words have been chosen because of their rhythm or sound. Metaphysics is intended to be meaningful and true. Metaphysicians don’t attempt to write nonsense. It is just an unfortunate fact that this is what they do. No defence in terms of its poetic qualities will mask this fact.
形而上学的一种辩护是声称，尽管字面上没有意义，但它可以产生与诗歌相同的效果，因此在其自身的权利上是一项值得的活动。艾耶尔对这种形而上学辩护的尝试持尖锐批评态度。首先，他指出，这种辩护尝试是基于对诗歌的误解。诗歌很少是无意义的，尽管有时它表达的是错误的命题。即使在无意义的情况下，词语的选择也是基于其节奏或声音。形而上学旨在有意义和真实。形而上学家并不试图写无意义的东西。只是一个不幸的事实，这正是他们所做的。任何关于其诗意特质的辩护都无法掩盖这一事实。
Ayer’s main aim throughout Language, Truth and Logic is to eliminate metaphysics. He focuses on language, because he believes that language frequently misleads us into believing that we are making sense when we are not. This concentration on language is a distinctive feature of a great deal of philosophy which was written in Britain and the United States in the first half of this century, and is sometimes referred to as the linguistic turn in philosophy.
艾耶尔在《语言、真理与逻辑》中的主要目标是消除形而上学。他专注于语言，因为他认为语言常常误导我们，让我们相信自己在理解事物，而实际上并非如此。这种对语言的关注是本世纪上半叶在英国和美国撰写的许多哲学作品的一个显著特征，有时被称为哲学中的语言转向。
Here we’ll examine the consequences of Ayer’s radical approach to meaning. But first, what does Ayer understand by ‘philosophy’?
在这里，我们将探讨艾耶尔对意义的激进方法的后果。但首先，艾耶尔对“哲学”有什么理解？
For Ayer philosophy has a very narrow role. Philosophy is not an empirical subject: this is what distinguishes it from the sciences. Whereas the sciences involve statements about the nature of the world, and thus contribute factual knowledge, philosophy’s role is one of clarification of the implications of definitions of concepts, and particularly of the concepts used by scientists. Philosophy is focused on language rather than on the world described by language. It is essentially a branch of logic. In fact the activities that Ayer is engaged in within Language, Truth and Logic, namely the clarification of our concept of ‘meaningfulness’ and following through its implications, are paradigm instances of philosophical activity.
对于艾耶来说，哲学的角色非常狭窄。哲学不是一个经验性的学科：这就是它与科学的区别所在。科学涉及关于世界本质的陈述，从而贡献事实知识，而哲学的角色是澄清概念定义的含义，特别是科学家使用的概念。哲学关注的是语言，而不是语言所描述的世界。它本质上是逻辑的一个分支。实际上，艾耶在《语言、真理与逻辑》中所从事的活动，即澄清我们对“有意义”的概念并追踪其含义，正是哲学活动的典范实例。
Ayer’s treatment of the problem of induction provides a good example of his approach to traditional philosophical disputes. The problem of induction as it is usually understood is the difficulty of coming up with a satisfactory justification for our belief that empirical generalisations based on past observations will hold good for the future. How can we be sure that the future will be like the past? The sun rose yesterday, and every day that anyone ever observed before that, but this does not prove conclusively that it will rise tomorrow. Yet we all of us confidently rely on inductive generalisations of this kind, and they are the basis of all science.
休谟对归纳问题的处理很好地展示了他对传统哲学争论的看法。归纳问题通常被理解为为我们基于过去观察的经验性概括提供令人满意的理由的困难。我们怎么能确定未来会像过去一样？昨天太阳升起了，而且在此之前每一天都有人观察到，但这并不能确凿地证明它明天会升起。然而，我们所有人都自信地依赖这种归纳概括，而它们是所有科学的基础。
Since David Hume first formulated the problem in the eighteenth century, philosophers have been attempting to justify the use of inductive reasoning. Ayer’s approach is very different. He attempts simply to dissolve the problem. He dismisses it as a pseudo-problem, not a genuine problem. He does so on the grounds that there could not possibly be a meaningful answer to the question. Since every genuine question can in principle be answered meaningfully, and this one cannot, we should set it aside.
自从大卫·休谟在十八世纪首次提出这个问题以来，哲学家们一直试图为归纳推理的使用辩护。艾耶尔的方法则截然不同。他试图简单地化解这个问题。他将其视为一个伪问题，而非真正的问题。他这样做的理由是，这个问题不可能有一个有意义的答案。由于每一个真正的问题原则上都可以得到有意义的回答，而这个问题却不能，因此我们应该将其搁置。
His reasoning is as follows. There are only two possible types of meaningful justification of induction, and both are non-starters. The first would be to give a justification based on truth by definition, perhaps on the definition of ‘induction’, or of ‘true’. However, this is a non-starter because to attempt such a justification would be to make the fundamental mistake of assuming that any factual conclusions can be derived from statements about definition. Statements about definition simply inform us about the use of words or other symbols.
他的推理如下。只有两种可能的有意义的归纳辩护方式，而这两种方式都是行不通的。第一种是基于定义的真理来提供辩护，也许是基于“归纳”或“真”的定义。然而，这种方式行不通，因为试图进行这样的辩护将犯下一个根本性的错误，即假设任何事实结论可以从关于定义的陈述中推导出来。关于定义的陈述仅仅告诉我们关于词语或其他符号的使用。
The second type of justification would be an empirically verifiable one. For instance, someone might argue that induction is a reliable method of reasoning since it has worked well for us in the past. But this, as Hume saw, would be to use induction to justify induction. Clearly this cannot be acceptable either, since it begs the question; it assumes that induction is reliable when this is the very point at issue. So, Ayer concludes, no meaningful solution is possible. The problem of induction so-called is not, then, a genuine problem.
第二种类型的辩护将是一个经验上可验证的辩护。例如，有人可能会争辩说归纳法是一种可靠的推理方法，因为它在过去对我们有效。但正如休谟所看到的，这将是用归纳法来证明归纳法。显然，这也不可接受，因为它是一个循环论证；它假设归纳法是可靠的，而这正是争论的焦点。因此，艾耶尔得出结论，没有有意义的解决方案是可能的。所谓的归纳问题并不是真正的问题。
It is clear that the propositions expressed in mathematics must, on the whole, be meaningful ones. If they did not come out as meaningful on Ayer’s analysis we would have very good grounds for dismissing his theory. How, then, can he show that they are meaningful? He has only two choices: they must be either true by definition or else empirically verifiable (or perhaps a mixture of the two).
显然，数学中表达的命题总体上必须是有意义的。如果它们在艾耶尔的分析中没有表现出有意义的特征，我们就有充分的理由驳斥他的理论。那么，他如何能证明它们是有意义的呢？他只有两个选择：它们要么是根据定义为真的，要么是经验上可验证的（或者可能是两者的混合）。
Very few philosophers have claimed that 7 + 5 = 12 is simply a generalisation based on adding together seven things and five things and getting twelve each time. This is a highly implausible view to hold. So Ayer is left with the consequence that 7 + 5 = 12 is true by definition, simply a question of how we use the symbols ‘7’, ‘+’, ‘5’, ‘=’, and ‘12’. But if 7 + 5 = 12 is true by definition in the same way that ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ is true by definition, Ayer needs to explain how we can be surprised by mathematical ‘discoveries’ since, according to this theory, the solution must be implicit in the phrasing of the problem. Ultimately all equations will be the equivalent of the obviously tautologous A = A. So how can we have a sense of making a discovery in mathematics?
很少有哲学家声称 7 + 5 = 12 仅仅是基于将七个东西和五个东西相加并每次得到十二的一个概括。这是一种极不可信的观点。因此，艾耶尔得出的结论是 7 + 5 = 12 是根据定义成立的，仅仅是我们如何使用符号 ‘7’，‘+’，‘5’，‘=’，和 ‘12’ 的问题。但是，如果 7 + 5 = 12 以与“所有单身汉都是未婚男性”相同的方式根据定义成立，艾耶尔需要解释我们如何会对数学“发现”感到惊讶，因为根据这个理论，解决方案必须隐含在问题的表述中。最终，所有方程将等同于显然是同义反复的 A = A。那么我们如何能在数学中有发现的感觉呢？
Ayer’s answer is that although mathematical statements are true by definition, some mathematical truths are not obviously true at first sight. For instance, take the equation 91 × 79 = 7,189. This is far less obvious than 7 + 5 = 12. Yet it is still true by definition. We need to use calculation to check that it is true; this calculation is ultimately nothing more than a tautological transformation. But because we cannot immediately see that the answer is correct, we find it interesting, although ultimately it does not give us any new factual information.
艾耶尔的回答是，尽管数学陈述根据定义是真实的，但某些数学真理在初看时并不显而易见。例如，考虑方程 91 × 79 = 7,189。这比 7 + 5 = 12 明显要少得多。然而，根据定义它仍然是正确的。我们需要使用计算来检查它是否正确；这个计算最终不过是一个同义反复的变换。但因为我们不能立即看到答案是正确的，我们觉得这很有趣，尽管最终它并没有给我们任何新的事实信息。
Ayer’s treatment of ethics is one of the most controversial aspects of Language, Truth and Logic. His basic belief is that judgements about right and wrong are for the most part simply expressions of emotion and as literally meaningless as the expressions ‘Boo!’ and ‘Hooray!’ He arrives at this extreme conclusion by application of his Verification Principle.
艾耶尔对伦理的处理是《语言、真理与逻辑》中最具争议的方面之一。他的基本信念是，对对错的判断在很大程度上只是情感的表达，与“哼！”和“好耶！”这样的表达一样字面上毫无意义。他通过应用他的验证原则得出了这个极端的结论。
Examining ethical philosophy he finds four types of statement. First, there are definitions of ethical terms; for instance, we might find in a book of ethics a detailed definition of ‘responsibility’. Second, there are descriptions of moral phenomena and their causes; for instance, a description of pangs of conscience and how they might originate in early moral or religious training. Third, there are what Ayer calls ‘exhortations to moral virtue’. A simple example of this would be a plea for readers to keep their promises. And last, there are ‘actual ethical judgements’. These are statements such as ‘torture is a moral evil.’
他在研究伦理哲学时发现了四种类型的陈述。首先，有伦理术语的定义；例如，我们可能在一本伦理学书籍中找到“责任”的详细定义。其次，有对道德现象及其原因的描述；例如，对良心痛苦的描述，以及它们如何可能源于早期的道德或宗教训练。第三，有艾耶所称的“对道德美德的劝诫”。一个简单的例子就是呼吁读者遵守承诺。最后，有“实际的伦理判断”。这些是诸如“酷刑是一种道德邪恶”的陈述。
Ayer examines each of these four types of statement. The first class, of definitions, is the only one which he considers acceptable as ethical philosophy. This class (the definitions of ethical terms) consists of statements which are true by definition and so pass his test for meaningfulness. The second class of statement, descriptions of moral phenomena, although passing the second prong of the test, and so meaningful, are not the province of philosophy. They are empirically verifiable, and so their treatment belongs to a branch of science, in this case either psychology or sociology. The third class of statement, exhortations to moral virtue, can be neither true nor false and are thus literally meaningless. They cannot belong to either science or philosophy.
艾耶尔考察了这四种类型的陈述。第一类，即定义，是他认为可以接受的伦理哲学的唯一一类。这一类（伦理术语的定义）由根据定义为真的陈述组成，因此通过了他对有意义性的测试。第二类陈述，即对道德现象的描述，虽然通过了测试的第二个方面，因此是有意义的，但不属于哲学的范畴。它们是经验可验证的，因此它们的处理属于科学的一个分支，在这种情况下是心理学或社会学。第三类陈述，即对道德美德的劝诫，既不能为真也不能为假，因此在字面上是无意义的。它们既不属于科学也不属于哲学。
The last class, the ethical judgements, Ayer treats at greater length. These are the statements that are usually thought to constitute ethical philosophy, and have traditionally been assumed to be meaningful. Ayer agues that they are neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable, and so are literally meaningless. If I say ‘You acted wrongly in breaking into my house’, then I am saying the equivalent of ‘You broke into my house’ in a particular tone of voice. The claim that you acted wrongly adds nothing meaningful to the statement. If I make the generalisation ‘Housebreaking is wrong’, provided that ‘wrong’ is being used in an ethical rather than a legal sense, then I make a completely meaningless statement, one which is neither true nor false. It is simply an expression of an emotional attitude towards house-breaking, an expression which may also be calculated to arouse a similar emotional attitude in the listener. If you turn back to me and disagree, saying ‘there is nothing wrong with house-breaking’, there is no fact of the matter which will decide between us. You would simply be expressing an alternative emotional attitude towards housebreaking.
在最后一节课中，艾耶尔对伦理判断进行了更详细的讨论。这些通常被认为构成伦理哲学的陈述，传统上被假定为有意义。艾耶尔认为它们既不是定义上真实的，也无法通过经验验证，因此在字面上是无意义的。如果我说“你在闯入我家时行为不当”，那么我所说的实际上是“你闯入了我的家”，只是语气不同。声称你行为不当并没有为这个陈述增加任何有意义的内容。如果我做出“闯入住宅是错误的”的概括，前提是“错误”是以伦理而非法律的意义使用，那么我所做的就是一个完全无意义的陈述，既不真实也不虚假。这只是对闯入住宅的一种情感态度的表达，这种表达也可能旨在引起听者类似的情感态度。如果你回过头来反驳我，说“闯入住宅没有错”，那么我们之间没有任何事实可以决定谁对谁错。你只是在表达对闯入住宅的另一种情感态度。
This account of ethical judgements, known as emotivism, has the consequence that it is impossible to have a genuine dispute about whether an action is wrong. What seems like a dispute will always turn out to be a series of expressions of emotion; and there is no point of view from which we can judge the truth or falsity of the ethical positions since the positions are not capable of being either true or false. They do not express genuine propositions at all.
这种被称为情感主义的伦理判断的说法，导致了一个后果，即不可能对某个行为是否错误进行真正的争论。看似争论的事情最终总会变成一系列情感的表达；而且没有一个观点可以用来判断伦理立场的真伪，因为这些立场根本无法被视为真或假。它们根本不表达真正的命题。
Ayer’s treatment of the statement ‘God exists’ is at least as challenging as his dismissal of most of ethical philosophy. He claims that the statement is neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable even in principle. It can’t be true by definition, since definitions only indicate word use, and so cannot show the existence of anything. Ayer rejects out of hand the idea that there could be an empirical proof of God’s existence. Consequently, he declares, ‘God exists’ is literally meaningless and can be neither true nor false.
艾耶尔对“上帝存在”的陈述的处理至少与他对大多数伦理哲学的驳斥一样具有挑战性。他声称该陈述既不是定义上真实的，也在原则上无法通过经验验证。它不能在定义上为真，因为定义仅指示词语的使用，因此无法显示任何事物的存在。艾耶尔毫不犹豫地拒绝了存在上帝的经验证明的想法。因此，他宣称，“上帝存在”在字面上是无意义的，既不能为真也不能为假。
This view does not have a name, but it differs significantly from the traditional approaches to the question of God’s existence. Traditionally individuals either believe in God’s existence, are atheists (i.e. believe that God doesn’t exist), or else are agnostics (i.e. claim there is insufficient evidence to decide the issue either way). However, Ayer’s position differs from all three of these since they all take the statement ‘God exists’ to be meaningful and, respectively, true, false or unproven. ‘God exists’ is, then, a metaphysical statement, one which Ayer concludes is completely nonsensical and so should not be addressed by philosophy. Thus, at a stroke, the problem of whether or not God exists, one which has occupied the greatest philosophers for thousands of years, has been dismissed as unanswerable, and so not worth exerting any philosophical energy upon.
这个观点没有名称，但它与传统的关于上帝存在问题的方法有显著不同。传统上，个人要么相信上帝存在，要么是无神论者（即相信上帝不存在），要么是不可知论者（即声称没有足够的证据来决定这个问题）。然而，艾耶尔的立场与这三者都不同，因为它们都认为“上帝存在”这一陈述是有意义的，并分别认为它是真、假或未被证明的。因此，“上帝存在”是一个形而上学的陈述，艾耶尔得出结论认为这是完全无意义的，因此不应由哲学来处理。因此，关于上帝是否存在的问题，这个问题困扰了伟大的哲学家们数千年，已被驳回为无解，因此不值得投入任何哲学精力。
Criticisms of Language, Truth and Logic
语言、真理与逻辑的批评
Practical difficulties
实际困难
Even if we were to accept Ayer’s Verification Principle as a way of discriminating between meaningful and meaningless statements, there are some quite serious practical difficulties which would have to be met. How, for example, are we to determine whether or not a proposition is verifiable in principle? In other words, what does ‘in principle’ mean in this context? With a bit of imagination someone might claim that the statement ‘Reality is one’, an example Ayer uses of a metaphysical statement, is in principle verifiable. Imagine that the veil of appearances dropped for a split-second, and that we got a glimpse of the true nature of reality; then we would be able to make an observation relevant to the assessment of whether or not ‘Reality is one’ is true or false. Does this mean that ‘Reality is one’ is verifiable in principle? Ayer does not give us enough information about what ‘verifiable in principle’ means in practice to determine in particular cases whether or not a statement is metaphysical.
即使我们接受艾耶尔的验证原则作为区分有意义和无意义陈述的一种方式，仍然存在一些相当严重的实际困难需要解决。例如，我们如何确定一个命题在原则上是否可验证？换句话说，在这个上下文中，“在原则上”是什么意思？稍微发挥一下想象力，有人可能会声称“现实是一个”的陈述（这是艾耶尔用作形而上学陈述的一个例子）在原则上是可验证的。想象一下，表象的面纱在一瞬间落下，我们得以瞥见现实的真实本质；那么我们就能够做出与评估“现实是一个”是否真实或虚假的相关观察。这是否意味着“现实是一个”在原则上是可验证的？艾耶尔没有给我们足够的信息来说明“在原则上可验证”在实践中意味着什么，以便在特定情况下确定一个陈述是否是形而上学的。
A further practical difficulty about applying the Verification Principle is that of identifying non-obvious tautologies. In his discussion of mathematics Ayer allows that some statements can be true by definition even though we cannot immediately appreciate that this is so. A consequence of this sort of view is that we might easily overlook the tautologous nature of many seemingly metaphysical statements.
关于应用验证原则的另一个实际困难是识别非显而易见的同义反复。在他对数学的讨论中，艾耶承认一些陈述可以通过定义为真，即使我们不能立即意识到这一点。这种观点的一个结果是，我们可能很容易忽视许多看似形而上学的陈述的同义反复性质。
Treats propositions in isolation from each other
将命题彼此孤立地对待
A different sort of objection which can be levelled at Ayer’s general approach is that it treats propositions as if they could be separated out from the complex web of meanings in which they are in fact embedded. This point has been made by the philosopher W. V. O. Quine (1908–2000).
对艾耶尔一般方法的另一种不同的反对意见是，它将命题视为可以从它们实际上嵌入的复杂意义网络中分离出来。这个观点是由哲学家 W. V. O. Quine（1908–2000）提出的。
For example, Ayer seems to suggest that I could determine the truth or falsehood of the statement ‘Gravity caused the spaceshuttle to fall back towards earth’ in isolation from other statements. However, in order to determine whether or not this was a metaphysical statement I would need to draw on scientific theory and a range of other assumptions, many of them built into the way we use language.
例如，Ayer 似乎暗示我可以在与其他陈述隔离的情况下判断“重力导致航天飞机向地球坠落”这一陈述的真伪。然而，为了确定这是否是一个形而上学的陈述，我需要依赖科学理论和一系列其他假设，其中许多是内置于我们使用语言的方式中的。
Self-refuting
自我反驳
The most serious criticism of Ayer’s book is that the Verification Principle does not seem to pass its own test for meaningfulness. Is the principle itself true by definition? Not obviously so. Is it empirically verifiable? It is hard to see how it could be. So, according to its own dictates it is itself nonsensical. If this criticism holds, then the whole of Ayer’s project collapses since it all depends on the truth of the claim that any meaningful proposition will pass the test.
对艾耶尔书籍最严重的批评是，验证原则似乎无法通过其自身对有意义性的测试。这个原则本身是否根据定义为真？显然不是。它是否可以通过经验验证？很难看出它能如何被验证。因此，根据它自己的规定，它本身是无意义的。如果这个批评成立，那么艾耶尔的整个项目就会崩溃，因为它完全依赖于任何有意义的命题都会通过测试的这一主张的真实性。
Ayer’s response to this criticism is that the Verification Principle is true by definition. Like the mathematical equation 91 × 79 = 7,189, it is not obviously true by definition: that is why it can be found interesting and is a discovery. However, Ayer does not demonstrate from what he derived this Verification Principle, nor does he provide any equivalent of mathematical calculation by which we can check to see if he came up with the correct answer.
艾耶尔对这一批评的回应是，验证原则是根据定义成立的。就像数学方程 91 × 79 = 7,189，它并不是显然根据定义成立的：这就是为什么它会被认为有趣并且是一项发现。然而，艾耶尔并没有证明他是从哪里得出这个验证原则的，也没有提供任何数学计算的等价物，以便我们可以检查他是否得出了正确的答案。
Or perhaps the Verification Principle is simply a proposal, a recommendation that we ought to use ‘meaningful’ in the way that the principle indicates. But if this were so, it would by its own standards be a metaphysical statement equivalent to the expression of an emotion: exactly the sort of statement that Ayer is so keen to eliminate from philosophy.
或者，验证原则可能只是一个提议，一个建议，我们应该以该原则所指示的方式使用“有意义”。但如果真是这样，那么它按照自己的标准将是一个形而上学的陈述，相当于情感的表达：正是艾耶尔非常希望从哲学中消除的那种陈述。
So, on either account, the criticism that his Verification Principle is self-refuting has a devastating force.
因此，无论从哪个角度来看，批评他的验证原则是自我反驳的这一观点都具有毁灭性的力量。
1910 | born in London. |
1936 | publishes Language, Truth and Logic. |
1989 | dies in London. |
emotivism: the theory that moral judgements are meaningless expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false.
情感主义：道德判断是情感的无意义表达，既不能为真也不能为假。
empirical: derived from experience.
经验的：源于经验。
logical positivism: the school of philosophy that advocates rigorous use of the Verification Principle.
逻辑实证主义：倡导严格使用验证原则的哲学学派。
meaningful: either true by definition or else verifiable in principle.
有意义的：要么根据定义为真，要么在原则上可验证。
metaphysics: for Ayer this is always a term of abuse. It is for him synonymous with ‘nonsense’.
形而上学：对艾耶尔来说，这始终是一个贬义词。对他而言，它与“无意义”同义。
problem of induction: the problem of justifying our widespread reliance on inductive reasoning. Logically we have no guarantee that the future will be like the past, yet we act as if we had such a guarantee.
归纳问题：证明我们广泛依赖归纳推理的合理性的问题。从逻辑上讲，我们没有保证未来会像过去一样，但我们却像有这样的保证一样行事。
proposition: the thought expressed by a sentence. The same proposition can be expressed in different languages.
命题：由句子表达的思想。同一命题可以用不同的语言表达。
pseudo-problem: not a genuine problem; something that has traditionally been thought to be a problem, but isn’t.
伪问题：并不是真正的问题；传统上被认为是一个问题的事物，但实际上并不是。
tautology: a statement which is necessarily true, such as ‘Whatever is, is’ or ‘All bachelors are unmarried men.’
同义反复：一种必然为真的陈述，例如“无论是什么，都是”或“所有单身汉都是未婚男性。”
Verification Principle: the two-pronged test for meaningfulness that dismisses as meaningless nonsense any statement which is neither true by definition nor, in principle, empirically verifiable or falsifiable.
验证原则：一种双重测试，用于判断意义，认为任何既不是定义上真实的，也在原则上不可经验验证或不可证伪的陈述都是无意义的废话。
Stephen Priest The British Empiricists (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) includes a chapter on Ayer’s work.
斯蒂芬·普里斯特 《英国经验主义者》（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅出版社，1990 年）包括一章关于艾耶尔的作品。
Bryan Magee Men of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) includes an interview with A. J. Ayer.
布莱恩·梅吉《思想的男人》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1988 年）包括与 A. J. Ayer 的访谈。
Oswald Hanfling Ayer (London: Phoenix, 1997) gives a brief overview of Ayer’s philosophy and its importance.
奥斯瓦尔德·汉弗林·艾耶（伦敦：凤凰出版社，1997）对艾耶的哲学及其重要性进行了简要概述。
Ben Rogers A. J. Ayer: A Life (London: Vintage, 2000). This biography provides an introduction to Ayer’s philosophy in the course of giving a sensitive portrait of the man.
本·罗杰斯《A. J. 艾耶：一个生命》（伦敦：Vintage，2000 年）。这本传记在描绘这个人的敏感肖像的过程中，提供了对艾耶哲学的介绍。
R.G. Collingwood the Principles of Art
R.G. Collingwood 艺术原理
What is art? That’s not an easy question to answer. There are so many different things that we call art, but some of them probably don’t merit the name. Most people would acknowledge that a Rembrandt self-portrait and a fugue by J.S. Bach are art, but there are many cases that are likely to be contentious. There isn’t even agreement about Marcel Duchamp’s famous ‘Fountain’, a porcelain urinal that he signed ‘R. Mutt’ and displayed in an open art exhibition in New York in 1917: to some this is a central example of twentieth-century art, whereas to others it is just a sensationalist gesture that was more like a critical comment about art exhibitions, or even a joke, than a work of art itself.
什么是艺术？这不是一个容易回答的问题。我们称之为艺术的东西有很多，但其中一些可能并不值得这个称号。大多数人会承认，伦勃朗的自画像和巴赫的赋格曲是艺术，但还有许多案例可能会引发争议。甚至对于马塞尔·杜尚著名的《泉》，一个他签名为“R. Mutt”的瓷制小便池，并在 1917 年纽约的一个公开艺术展览中展出，也没有达成共识：对一些人来说，这是二十世纪艺术的一个核心例子，而对另一些人来说，这只是一个更像是对艺术展览的批评性评论，甚至是一个玩笑，而不是一件艺术作品本身。
When people ask the question ‘What is art?’ they are rarely just asking about how a word is used. That’s why a dictionary definition won’t resolve the issue. When they ask this question they are more often seeking enlightenment on questions about what makes something worthy of being called art, and believe that to call something a work of art implies that it has a certain value, or at least potential value, to us. R.G. Collingwood, an Oxford philosopher most active in the interwar years, in his book The Principles of Art (1938) drew a distinction between the things that we happen to call art and the things that deserve to be called art. Many of the things we call art don’t deserve the term: they are not ‘art proper’, they are only ‘art so-called.’ Art proper involves a particular kind of expression of emotion that in the process of expression clarifies the precise nature of the emotion being expressed. Although Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Hegel, Hume, Nietzsche and many other great philosophers had written about the arts, when Collingwood was writing his book in the 1930s this was an unusual topic for a British philosopher to address – he drew some of his inspiration from an Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce.
当人们问“什么是艺术？”这个问题时，他们很少只是询问一个词是如何使用的。这就是为什么字典定义无法解决这个问题。当他们问这个问题时，他们更常是在寻求对什么使某物值得被称为艺术的启示，并相信称某物为艺术作品意味着它对我们有一定的价值，或至少有潜在的价值。R.G. Collingwood，这位在两次世界大战之间最活跃的牛津哲学家，在他的著作《艺术的原则》（1938 年）中区分了我们偶然称之为艺术的事物和那些值得被称为艺术的事物。我们称之为艺术的许多事物并不值得这个称谓：它们不是“真正的艺术”，它们只是“所谓的艺术”。真正的艺术涉及一种特定的情感表达方式，在表达的过程中澄清了所表达情感的确切性质。 尽管柏拉图、亚里士多德、奥古斯丁、黑格尔、休谟、尼采以及许多其他伟大的哲学家曾经写过关于艺术的作品，但当科林伍德在 1930 年代撰写他的书时，这对一位英国哲学家来说是一个不寻常的话题——他从意大利哲学家贝内德托·克罗齐那里汲取了一些灵感。
Who was R.G. Collingwood?
R.G. Collingwood 是谁？
R.G. Collingwood was an unusual philosopher with very wide interests. As well as writing The Principles of Art, he wrote an influential book about the philosophy of history and spent much of his time working on Roman archaeology in Britain. His father had been a successful watercolour painter, and Collingwood himself drew and painted and knew about the practicalities of making art as well as the theory. His understanding of how visual artists work informs his approach in The Principles of Art: much of the book focuses on the artist’s creative processes, rather than, for example, the experience of a viewer, although that is discussed. Collingwood is also unusual in that he believed that some sorts of so-called art can be morally corrupting, and that ‘moral salvation’ can be achieved through art proper.
R.G. Collingwood 是一位不寻常的哲学家，兴趣广泛。除了撰写《艺术原理》，他还写了一本关于历史哲学的影响力书籍，并花费大量时间从事英国的罗马考古学工作。他的父亲是一位成功的水彩画家，而 Collingwood 本人也会绘画，了解创作艺术的实际操作以及理论。他对视觉艺术家工作方式的理解影响了他在《艺术原理》中的方法：书中大部分内容集中在艺术家的创作过程上，而不是例如观众的体验，尽管也有讨论。Collingwood 还不同寻常的是，他认为某些所谓的艺术形式可能会导致道德腐败，并且通过真正的艺术可以实现“道德救赎”。
The Technical Theory of Art
艺术的技术理论
Collingwood attacked what he labelled the Technical Theory of Art. This is his name for the idea that art is simply a series of techniques for transforming raw materials in particular ways to elicit certain sorts of response. The Technical Theory treats art as a kind of craft: in this view the artist transforms its ingredients into something which matches a pre-conceived blueprint. A carpenter makes a table by designing it, then converting materials such as wood, nails, varnish and glue into a table that matches his or her design. Similarly, some people think of an artist as a person who shapes raw materials – which might include canvas and paint, words, or sounds – into works of art by means of artistic technique.
柯林伍德攻击了他所称之为艺术的技术理论。这是他对艺术的定义，认为艺术仅仅是一系列将原材料以特定方式转化以引发某种反应的技术。技术理论将艺术视为一种工艺：在这种观点下，艺术家将其成分转化为符合预先设想蓝图的东西。木匠通过设计制作一张桌子，然后将木材、钉子、清漆和胶水等材料转化为符合他或她设计的桌子。同样，有些人认为艺术家是一个通过艺术技巧将原材料（可能包括画布和颜料、文字或声音）塑造成艺术作品的人。
But Doesn’t Art Involve Craft?
但艺术难道不涉及工艺吗？
Collingwood is often saddled with a view that he didn’t actually hold, namely that art proper never involves craft or planning. That would obviously be an absurd position open to numerous counterexamples. Michaelangelo, for example, when painting the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, certainly planned the execution before he climbed his scaffolding, and used techniques to manipulate his raw materials of paint and plaster into a pre-conceived configuration. If he hadn’t done that the result would probably have been a mess rather than a great work of art. Collingwood’s point, however, is that craft of this sort cannot be the essence of art, since much art doesn’t involve it. In principle many works of art can be composed entirely in the mind. So craft can’t be at the heart of what makes an object or other creation a work of art. More typical of an artist, though, in his view, was the sculptor who plays with a piece of clay between his fingers, gradually turning it into a figure of a dancing man, but doing this by designing while making rather than following any pre-conceived plan to turn the raw material into a specific figure with specific characteristics.
科林伍德常常被认为持有一种他实际上并不认同的观点，即真正的艺术从不涉及工艺或规划。显然，这将是一个荒谬的立场，容易受到许多反例的挑战。例如，米开朗基罗在绘制西斯廷教堂的天花板时，显然在攀爬脚手架之前就进行了执行计划，并使用技术将他的原材料——油漆和石膏，操控成一个预先构思的形状。如果他没有这样做，结果可能会是一团糟，而不是一件伟大的艺术作品。然而，科林伍德的观点是，这种工艺不能是艺术的本质，因为许多艺术并不涉及它。原则上，许多艺术作品可以完全在脑海中构思出来。因此，工艺不能是使一个物体或其他创作成为艺术作品的核心。然而，在他看来，更典型的艺术家是那种在手指间玩弄一块粘土的雕塑家，逐渐将其变成一个跳舞的人的形象，但这样做是通过在创作过程中设计，而不是遵循任何预先构思的计划将原材料转变为具有特定特征的具体形象。
Although artists sometimes do know precisely what they are going to make before they make it, that isn’t relevant to their work as artists, whereas it is essential to the work of a craftsperson that he or she knows what the finished item will be before constructing it. A carpenter knows when a table is finished; an artist will usually feel that still more work could be done. Someone setting out to make a table will know its precise dimensions, the materials needed to put it together and how the various parts will be joined. According to the Technical Theory of Art artists do the same sort of thing as craftspeople. Collingwood rejects that theory, maintaining that artists are born not made, and that art is not simply a matter of technique, despite the fact that many, perhaps even all, great artists had very refined techniques in their chosen field. His point is that it wasn’t their technique that made them artists, and it wasn’t the process of turning raw material into pre-conceived objects that made their creations art.
尽管艺术家有时确实知道他们在创作之前会制作什么，但这与他们作为艺术家的工作无关，而工匠在构建之前知道成品是什么则是至关重要的。木匠知道一张桌子何时完成；艺术家通常会觉得仍然可以做更多的工作。一个准备制作桌子的人会知道其精确的尺寸、组装所需的材料以及各个部分将如何连接。根据艺术的技术理论，艺术家与工匠所做的事情是相似的。科林伍德拒绝了这一理论，认为艺术家是天生的，而艺术不仅仅是技术的问题，尽管许多，甚至可能所有伟大的艺术家在他们所选择的领域都有非常精湛的技术。他的观点是，正是他们的技术使他们成为艺术家，而不是将原材料转化为预设对象的过程使他们的创作成为艺术。
Magic Art
魔法艺术
Collingwood is keen to distinguish so-called art from art proper. Two categories of art so-called are ‘Magic Art’ and ‘Entertainment Art’. Magic Art is the kind of art produced to be used in rituals that involve the arousal of emotion that is to be channelled into practical or religious effect. This category includes not just the ritually significant art of other cultures, but also of our own: patriotic music, such as ‘Rule Britannia’ or ‘the Star-Spangled Banner’ would be considered magic art in his terms. But magic art isn’t art proper since it is principally a means to an end, a way of discharging emotions in a socially appropriate way with a view to motivating action, and has been constructed with this end in mind. Its worth lies largely in its instrumental value. This is very different from art proper.
科林伍德热衷于区分所谓的艺术与真正的艺术。所谓的艺术有两个类别：‘魔法艺术’和‘娱乐艺术’。魔法艺术是指用于仪式中的艺术，这些仪式涉及情感的激发，这些情感将被引导到实际或宗教效果中。这个类别不仅包括其他文化中具有仪式意义的艺术，也包括我们自己的艺术：爱国音乐，如《统治不列颠》和《星条旗永不落》，在他看来会被视为魔法艺术。但魔法艺术并不是真正的艺术，因为它主要是一种手段，一种以社会适当的方式释放情感以激励行动的方式，并且是以这个目的构建的。它的价值主要在于其工具性价值。这与真正的艺术截然不同。
Entertainment Art
娱乐艺术
Again, the category of Entertainment Art may to many people seem like a form of art proper, but Collingwood rejects this view. Entertainment art, art that has been created simply to entertain us, is not art proper. Collingwood warned of its corrupting effects: such art stimulates specific sorts of emotional responses, laughter, pleasure or amusement. But it does this by triggering a response. In contrast, art proper requires, as we will see, that the audience goes through much the same process as the artist has gone through in creating the work of art. Such art, Collingwood believes, can be corrupting. It is morally corrupting because it draws people away from life, and makes them believe that their own amusement is the chief good in the world, whereas art proper requires a kind of engagement from its audience that raises their levels of self-knowledge and awareness.
再次，娱乐艺术这一类别对许多人来说可能看起来像是一种真正的艺术，但科林伍德拒绝这种观点。娱乐艺术，即为了娱乐我们而创作的艺术，并不是真正的艺术。科林伍德警告其腐蚀性影响：这种艺术刺激特定类型的情感反应，如笑声、愉悦或娱乐。但它是通过触发反应来实现的。相比之下，真正的艺术要求观众经历与艺术家在创作艺术作品时相似的过程。科林伍德认为，这种艺术可能是腐蚀性的。它在道德上是腐蚀性的，因为它使人们远离生活，并让他们相信自己的娱乐是世界上最重要的善，而真正的艺术则要求观众以一种提升自我认知和意识的方式参与其中。
Both Magic Art and Entertainment Art are forms of craft in Collingwood’s view: neither is a form of art, despite their superficial resemblances to art.
在科林伍德看来，魔法艺术和娱乐艺术都是工艺的一种形式：尽管它们在表面上与艺术相似，但都不是艺术的形式。
Clarifying emotions by expressing them
通过表达情感来澄清情感
Collingwood’s aims aren’t just destructive: he gives a positive account of what art proper is – art that deserves to be called art – as well as pointing out the types of so-called art that aren’t worthy of the name. Rather than beginning with a pre-conceived aim or blueprint, the artist typically starts with what Collingwood describes as an ‘inchoate’ emotion that he or she wants to get clear. ‘Inchoate’ simply means ‘not fully formed’. The process of creating an artwork is, for Collingwood, principally one of grappling with a barely understood feeling or emotion and through a process which may involve manipulation of a medium such as paint or clay, gradually getting clearer about that precise emotion. This is the process known as expressing an emotion. Expressing an emotion is different from betraying an emotion. If I’m angry, my red face and loud voice may reveal to others that I am angry, perhaps even before I’m aware of this myself. These are symptoms of my anger. But that is not what Collingwood means by the expression of an emotion. In other words, artistic creation is a kind of self-understanding: the process of ‘designing while making’ that is characteristic of artistic work is one of refining our understanding of the emotion that is being expressed, a way of learning in a more precise way what that emotion is. Until the emotion is expressed artistically, the artist won’t really know it: the emotion will be vague and imprecise. Artistic creation is, then, a process of the bringing to consciousness of something of which the artist is, until the work has been made, only pre-consciously aware.
科林伍德的目标不仅仅是破坏性的：他对什么是适当的艺术——值得被称为艺术的艺术——进行了积极的阐述，同时指出了那些不配称为艺术的所谓艺术类型。艺术家通常不是从一个预先设定的目标或蓝图开始，而是从科林伍德所描述的“未成熟”的情感开始，这种情感他或她希望弄清楚。“未成熟”仅仅意味着“尚未完全形成”。对于科林伍德来说，创作艺术作品的过程主要是与一种几乎无法理解的感觉或情感进行斗争，并通过可能涉及对媒介（如油漆或粘土）的操控的过程，逐渐对这种特定的情感变得更加清晰。这就是表达情感的过程。表达情感与背叛情感是不同的。如果我生气，我的红脸和大声可能会向他人透露我生气，甚至在我自己意识到之前。这些是我愤怒的症状。但这并不是科林伍德所说的情感表达。 换句话说，艺术创作是一种自我理解：艺术创作特有的“边做边设计”的过程是对所表达情感的理解的提炼，是以更精确的方式学习那种情感的方式。在情感以艺术的方式表达之前，艺术家并不会真正了解它：情感将是模糊和不精确的。因此，艺术创作是将艺术家在作品完成之前仅在潜意识中意识到的某种东西带入意识的过程。
Experiencing art
体验艺术
When a viewer looks at a painting he or she undergoes something like the experience of the artist creating the work. The viewer’s experience of the work of art is itself emotional expression, a kind of receptivity to the very emotion that the artist expressed in the work.
当观众看一幅画时，他或她经历的感觉类似于艺术家创作作品的体验。观众对艺术作品的体验本身就是一种情感表达，是对艺术家在作品中所表达的情感的一种感受。
Criticisms of Collingwood’s Theory of Art
对科林伍德艺术理论的批评
Narrow essentialism
狭义本质主义
One criticism of Collingwood’s approach to the definition of art is that it is essentialist. He assumes that all art has an essence, a shared common feature which he identifies as a particular kind of expression of emotion. Some subsequent philosophers of art have argued that art is best understood as what Ludwig Wittgenstein called a family resemblance term: that is, there is a pattern of overlapping resemblances between those things that we recognise as art, but no single essential defining feature, no quality that makes them all worthy of being called art. On this view Collingwood’s mistake was to focus so much on the expression of emotion. This led him to exclude many things which should be recognised as art from his category of art proper. Art need not always be expression, even if it often is. Collingwood’s mistake was to assume that all art has features in common.
对柯林伍德关于艺术定义的批评之一是它是本质主义的。他假设所有艺术都有一个本质，一个共同的特征，他将其识别为一种特定的情感表达。一些后来的艺术哲学家认为，艺术最好被理解为路德维希·维特根斯坦所称的家族相似性术语：也就是说，我们所认知的艺术之间存在一种重叠相似性的模式，但没有单一的本质定义特征，没有使它们都值得被称为艺术的品质。在这种观点下，柯林伍德的错误在于过于关注情感的表达。这使他排除了许多应该被认定为艺术的事物，从他的艺术范畴中排除。艺术不一定总是表达，即使它通常是。柯林伍德的错误在于假设所有艺术都有共同的特征。
Over-optimistic moralising
过于乐观的道德说教
For Collingwood art is not a trivial matter: art is part of what allows a culture to make progress by revealing to audiences the secrets of their own hearts, and allowing them to recapitulate the process of expression through their engagement with the work of art. At various points in The Principles of Art Collingwood adopts a scathing tone towards, for example, the distracting and in his view morally corrupting effects of art so-called. Cinema and radio come in for attack from him: this aspect of the book now seems remarkably dated and, indeed, it would be extremely controversial to claim today that there is no such thing as cinematic art. In the final line of the book Collingwood declares that art is the medicine for ‘the worst disease of the mind’: the corruption of consciousness. Art is not just a valuable aspect of life, but in his view a kind of panacea. Many readers will find aspects of his account of the nature of art plausible but will be alienated by this tendency to make art a kind of transformative moral therapy for its audiences, a therapy that is capable of rescuing a culture from moral and psychological disaster. Collingwood was writing in the 1930s before the atrocities of the Holocaust. Some of these atrocities were committed by Nazis who were sophisticated readers of Goethe who regularly attended classical concerts by Mozart and Beethoven. The idea that art acts as a moral safeguard is hard to maintain in the light of this fact.
对于科林伍德来说，艺术不是一件琐事：艺术是文化进步的一部分，它通过向观众揭示自己内心的秘密，使他们能够通过与艺术作品的互动重新体验表达的过程。在《艺术的原则》的不同部分，科林伍德对所谓的艺术的分散注意力和在他看来道德腐败的影响采取了尖锐的语气。电影和广播受到他的攻击：书中的这一方面现在似乎显得非常过时，实际上，今天声称没有电影艺术这样的东西将是极具争议的。在书的最后一行，科林伍德宣称艺术是“心灵最严重疾病”的良药：意识的腐败。艺术不仅是生活中一个有价值的方面，在他看来还是一种万灵药。许多读者会发现他对艺术本质的描述在某些方面是可信的，但会对他将艺术视为一种能够拯救文化免于道德和心理灾难的变革性道德疗法的倾向感到疏离。 科林伍德在 1930 年代写作，那时还没有大屠杀的暴行。这些暴行中的一些是由纳粹犯下的，他们是歌德的精明读者，定期参加莫扎特和贝多芬的古典音乐会。在这一事实面前，艺术作为道德保障的观点很难维持。
1889 | born in Lancashire, England. |
1938 | The Principles of Art first published. |
1943 | died in Cumbria, England. |
art so-called: Collingwood’s term for those things which may be called art yet which do not merit the name.
艺术所谓的：科林伍德用来指那些可以称为艺术但不值得这个名称的事物。
art proper: the term Collingwood uses to distinguish art from art so-called.
艺术的本质：科林伍德用这个术语来区分真正的艺术与所谓的艺术。
betraying an emotion: showing an emotion through, for example, action or tone of voice. This is very different from expressing an emotion, which involves a more sophisticated kind of dawning selfconsciousness in Collingwood’s view.
背叛一种情感：通过例如行动或语调来表现一种情感。这与表达情感非常不同，在科林伍德看来，表达情感涉及一种更复杂的自我意识的觉醒。
craft: a process of turning raw materials into a finished pre-conceived object through following some kind of blueprint or plan. Such craft usually requires skills which can be taught and improved.
工艺：通过遵循某种蓝图或计划，将原材料转化为成品预想对象的过程。这种工艺通常需要可以教授和提高的技能。
expression: the process of clarifying an inchoate emotion.
表达：澄清一种初生情感的过程。
inchoate emotion: an emotion that has yet to be made precise through expression. Collingwood believed that artists typically begin with an inchoate emotion that they clarify and make precise through engagement with a medium that allows them to express that emotion and thereby facilitate the process of the audience expressing that same emotion.
初始情感：一种尚未通过表达明确化的情感。科林伍德认为，艺术家通常从一种初始情感开始，通过与一种允许他们表达这种情感的媒介的互动来澄清和明确这种情感，从而促进观众表达同样情感的过程。
Technical Theory of Art: the theory that equates art with craft.
艺术的技术理论：将艺术与工艺等同的理论。
R.G. Collingwood An Autobiography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982) is a short and very readable autobiography first published in 1939.
R.G. Collingwood 自传（牛津：克拉伦登，1982）是一本简短且非常易读的自传，首次出版于 1939 年。
Patrick Derham and John Taylor (eds) Cultural Olympians: Rugby School’s Intellectual and Spiritual Leaders (Buckingham: University of Buckingham Press) includes a wide-ranging essay about Collingwood.
帕特里克·德哈姆和约翰·泰勒（编辑）《文化奥林匹克：拉格比学校的知识和精神领袖》（白金汉：白金汉大学出版社）包括一篇关于科林伍德的广泛论文。
Aaron Ridley R.G. Collingwood (London: Phoenix, 1998). An excellent, brief, sympathetic examination of Collingwood’s theory of art.
亚伦·里德利 R.G. 科林伍德（伦敦：凤凰出版社，1998 年）。对科林伍德艺术理论的优秀、简洁、同情的考察。
Nigel Warburton The Art Question (London: Routledge, 2003) deals more generally with the question ‘What is art?’ and includes a chapter on Collingwood’s theory.
奈杰尔·沃伯顿《艺术问题》（伦敦：劳特利奇，2003）更一般地探讨了“什么是艺术？”这个问题，并包括了关于科林伍德理论的一章。
Jean-Paul Sartre Being and Nothingness
让-保罗·萨特 《存在与虚无》
Being and Nothingness is the bible of existentialism. Yet despite its centrality in the movement which swept through Europe and North America in the postwar years, it is surprisingly obscure. Few of the café existentialists could have read and understood much of this book. In particular, the introduction is fiendishly difficult to make sense of, especially if you don’t have a background in continental philosophy. Yet despite the initial feelings of hopelessness that most of those who attempt to read the book from cover to cover experience, it is worth persevering. Being and Nothingness is one of very few philosophical books written this century which genuinely grapple with fundamental questions about the human predicament. In its more lucid passages it can be both enlightening and exhilarating. Sartre’s experience as a novelist and playwright is apparent in the memorable descriptions of particular situations which form a substantial part of the book.
《存在与虚无》是存在主义的圣经。尽管它在战后席卷欧洲和北美的运动中占据中心地位，但它却出奇地晦涩。很少有咖啡馆存在主义者能够读懂这本书的内容。特别是引言，尤其难以理解，特别是如果你没有大陆哲学的背景。然而，尽管大多数尝试从头到尾阅读这本书的人最初会感到绝望，但坚持下去是值得的。《存在与虚无》是本世纪为数不多的几本真正探讨人类困境根本问题的哲学书籍之一。在其更清晰的段落中，它既能启发人心，又令人振奋。萨特作为小说家和剧作家的经历在书中对特定情境的生动描述中显而易见，这些描述构成了书中相当大的一部分。
The central theme of Being and Nothingness is encapsulated in the enigmatic line ‘the nature of consciousness simultaneously is to be what it is not and not to be what it is’. Whilst this might on first reading sound like pseudoprofundity, it is in fact a summary of Sartre’s account of what it is to be human. The full meaning of the line should become apparent in the course of this chapter.
《存在与虚无》的中心主题 encapsulated 在那句神秘的台词中：“意识的本质同时是成为它所不是的东西，而不是成为它所是的东西。”虽然这在初读时听起来像是伪深刻，但实际上这是萨特对人类存在的总结。这句话的完整含义将在本章中逐渐显现。
Phenomenological Approach
现象学方法
A distinctive feature of Sartre’s writing in Being and Nothingness is its focus on real or imagined situations described at some length. This is not just a stylistic quirk but rather a feature of Sartre’s phenomenological approach. Sartre is influenced by the philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). Husserl believes that by describing the contents of consciousness, setting on one side the question of whether or not what appears to consciousness actually exists, insight into the essence of things can be achieved. For Husserl an important part of philosophy is descriptive: we should describe our experiences, not simply reflect at an abstract level.
萨特在《存在与虚无》中的写作一个显著特征是对真实或想象情境的详细描述。这不仅仅是风格上的怪癖，而是萨特现象学方法的一个特征。萨特受到哲学家埃德蒙德·胡塞尔（1859–1938）的影响。胡塞尔认为，通过描述意识的内容，搁置意识所呈现的事物是否真实存在的问题，可以获得对事物本质的洞察。对胡塞尔来说，哲学的重要部分是描述性的：我们应该描述我们的经历，而不仅仅是在抽象层面上反思。
Sartre accepts this last aspect of Husserl’s thought, but rejects the assumption that scrutiny of the contents of our consciousness reveals the essential nature of what is being thought about. What phenomenological method means in practice for Sartre is that he concentrates on life as it is lived and felt, rather than on human beings as described by science or empirical psychology. The result is a strange mixture of highly abstract discussion interspersed with vivid and memorable novelistic scenarios and descriptions.
萨特接受了胡塞尔思想的最后一个方面，但拒绝了对我们意识内容的审视揭示所思考事物本质的假设。对萨特来说，现象学方法在实践中的意义在于他专注于生活的实际体验和感受，而不是科学或经验心理学所描述的人类。结果是高度抽象的讨论与生动而难忘的小说场景和描述交织在一起，形成了一种奇特的混合。
The whole of Being and Nothingness rests on a fundamental distinction between different forms of existence. Sartre draws attention to the difference between conscious and non-conscious being. The former he calls ‘being for-itself’; the latter, ‘being in-itself’. Being for-itself is the kind of existence characteristically experienced by human beings, and most of Being and Nothingness is devoted to explaining its main features. Unfortunately Sartre provides no answer to the question of whether or not non-human animals can reasonably be categorised as examples of being for-itself. Being in-itself, in contrast, is the being of non-conscious things, such as of a stone on a beach.
存在与虚无的整体建立在不同存在形式之间的基本区别上。萨特强调了意识与非意识存在之间的差异。他称前者为“为自身的存在”；后者为“在自身的存在”。为自身的存在是人类特有的存在方式，《存在与虚无》大部分内容致力于解释其主要特征。不幸的是，萨特没有回答非人类动物是否可以合理地被归类为为自身的存在的例子。相反，在自身的存在是非意识事物的存在，例如海滩上的石头。
Nothingness, as the title of the book suggests, plays a key role in Sartre’s work. He characterises human consciousness as a gap at the heart of our being, a nothing. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. It is never simply itself. It is what allows us to project ourselves into the future and to reassess our past.
虚无，正如书名所暗示的，在萨特的作品中扮演着关键角色。他将人类意识描述为我们存在核心的一个缺口，一个虚无。意识总是对某物的意识。它从来不是单纯的自我。它使我们能够将自己投射到未来，并重新评估我们的过去。
Concrete nothingness is experienced when we recognise that something is absent. You arrange to meet your friend Pierre in a café at four. You arrive a quarter of an hour late and he is not there. You are aware of him as a lack, an absence because you expected to see him. This is very different from the absence of, say, Muhammad Ali from the café, since you had not arranged to see him there: you could play an intellectual game listing all the people who weren’t in the café, but only Pierre’s absence in this case would be felt as a genuine lack, since only Pierre was expected. This phenomenon, the ability of human consciousness to see things as missing, is part of what Sartre calls the transcendence of consciousness. It is linked up with his idea of freedom, since it is our ability to see things as unrealised, or as to be done, that reveals to us a world brimming with possibilities. Or rather in some cases it reveals to us such a world; in others the peculiar kind of self-deception that Sartre labels ‘bad faith’ gets a grip, and we don’t let ourselves recognise the true extent of our freedom.
具体的虚无感是在我们意识到某物缺失时体验到的。你约好在四点钟与朋友皮埃尔在咖啡馆见面。你迟到了十五分钟，他却不在那儿。你意识到他的缺失，因为你期待见到他。这与穆罕默德·阿里缺席咖啡馆的情况截然不同，因为你并没有安排在那里见他：你可以进行一场智力游戏，列出所有不在咖啡馆的人，但在这种情况下，只有皮埃尔的缺席会被感受到是真正的缺失，因为只有皮埃尔是被期待的。这种现象，即人类意识看到事物缺失的能力，是萨特所称的意识超越的一部分。它与他的自由观念相联系，因为我们看到事物未实现或待完成的能力，向我们揭示了一个充满可能性的世界。或者在某些情况下，它向我们揭示了这样的世界；在其他情况下，萨特所称的“坏信仰”的特殊自我欺骗会占据我们的意识，我们不让自己意识到自由的真实程度。
Sartre believes that human beings have free will. Consciousness is empty; it does not determine what we choose. We are not constrained by the choices we have made in the past, though we may feel that we are. We are free to choose whatever we wish. It is true that the world won’t always allow us to fulfil our wishes. But that, like the facts of when we were born and who our parents were, is an aspect of what Sartre terms our ‘facticity’, those aspects of our lives which are given. Yet even though we can’t change these things, we can choose to change our attitude to them.
萨特认为人类拥有自由意志。意识是空的；它并不决定我们选择什么。我们并不受过去所做选择的限制，尽管我们可能会觉得受限。我们可以自由选择我们想要的任何东西。确实，世界并不总是允许我们实现我们的愿望。但这就像我们出生的时间和我们的父母是谁一样，是萨特所称的“事实性”的一个方面，即我们生活中那些被给予的方面。尽管我们无法改变这些事情，但我们可以选择改变我们对它们的态度。
Sartre takes an extreme position on the question of individual freedom, disregarding any theory which suggests that human beings are entirely shaped by their genetic endowment and their upbringing. For Sartre human beings are characterised by their ability to choose what they become. However, Sartre does point out that things aren’t quite so simple: human consciousness is constantly flirting with what he calls bad faith, which is at bottom the denial of our freedom.
萨特在个人自由的问题上采取了极端立场，忽视了任何认为人类完全受其遗传天赋和成长环境影响的理论。对萨特而言，人类的特征在于他们选择自己成为的能力。然而，萨特确实指出事情并非如此简单：人类意识不断与他所称之为“坏信仰”的状态调情，这在根本上是对我们自由的否认。
Sartre’s discussion of bad faith is justly celebrated as one of the classic passages in twentieth-century philosophy. Here his skills as philosopher, psychologist and novelist are combined most successfully; here his phenomenological method yields fruit in a way that so many barren and abstract philosophical discussions of self-deception have failed to do.
萨特对恶意的讨论被公认为二十世纪哲学中的经典段落之一。在这里，他作为哲学家、心理学家和小说家的才能得到了最成功的结合；在这里，他的现象学方法结出了果实，而许多贫瘠和抽象的自我欺骗哲学讨论却未能做到这一点。
It is important to realise that Sartre is not interested in selfdeception as a general philosophical topic: bad faith is a particular kind of self-deception which only makes sense within a theory which postulates free will. Bad faith is a lie to oneself which is chosen as a flight from freedom. It is a condition to which human consciousness is particularly prone.
重要的是要意识到，萨特并不将自我欺骗视为一个一般的哲学主题：坏信仰是一种特定类型的自我欺骗，只有在假设自由意志的理论中才有意义。坏信仰是对自己的谎言，是作为逃避自由的选择。人类意识特别容易陷入这种状态。
Consider Sartre’s description of a woman on a first date with a man who has sexual intentions towards her. She is aware of the nature of his interest, yet denies it to herself, lies to herself about the significance of such comments as ‘I find you so attractive!’, turning them into innocuous non-sexual compliments. She manages to sustain her self-deception throughout the conversation. But then he takes her hand. To leave her hand in his would be to flirt with him; to take it away would ‘break the troubled and unstable harmony which gives the hour its charm’. What does she do? She leaves her hand there, but inert, a thing, neither consenting nor resisting, while she talks loftily of her life, emphasising herself as personality rather than as body. She is in bad faith because she deceives herself about the nature of the man’s intentions. She pretends to herself that he is really interested in her mind in order to avoid admitting the possibility that she might reciprocate his desire. But she is also in bad faith because she denies that she is her body and in doing so denies her freedom to act, and the responsibility she has for her actions. She attempts to make of her hand an in-itself rather than accept that it is her hand in his.
考虑萨特对一位女性的描述，她与一位对她有性意图的男性第一次约会。她意识到他兴趣的本质，但对自己否认这一点，欺骗自己关于“我觉得你很有吸引力！”这样的评论的重要性，将其转化为无害的非性赞美。她在整个对话中设法维持自我欺骗。但随后他握住了她的手。将她的手留在他手中就是在与他调情；而将手抽回则会“打破赋予这一时刻魅力的困扰和不稳定的和谐”。她该怎么办？她将手留在那里，但无动于衷，像个物体，既不同意也不抵抗，同时她高谈阔论自己的生活，强调自己作为个体而非身体。她处于坏信仰中，因为她对男人意图的本质自欺欺人。她对自己假装他真的对她的思想感兴趣，以避免承认她可能会回应他的欲望的可能性。但她也处于坏信仰中，因为她否认自己是她的身体，从而否认了她行动的自由和对自己行为的责任。 她试图让自己的手成为一种独立的存在，而不是接受它是她在他的手中。
Sartre’s most famous example of bad faith is of a café waiter. This waiter seems determined by his role as a waiter. It is as if he is acting a role. His movements are exaggerated: the way he bends forward to the customer, or balances his tray. It is all a kind of ceremony, an elaborate dance. Sartre points out that the waiter, however hard he tries to become his role, cannot be a waiter as an inkwell is an inkwell. A for-itself cannot by an act of will power metamorphose into an in-itself (except, perhaps, by committing suicide). Sartre diagnoses the waiter as someone trying to deny his freedom, as if he didn’t have the choice of staying in bed rather than getting up at 5 o’clock, even though that would mean getting the sack. His mechanical movements betray a desire to be what he cannot be, an in-itself. Thus the waiter is in bad faith because he is deceiving himself about the limits of his freedom.
萨特最著名的坏信仰例子是一个咖啡馆服务员。这个服务员似乎被他作为服务员的角色所决定。就好像他在扮演一个角色。他的动作夸张：他向顾客弯腰的方式，或者平衡托盘的方式。这一切都是一种仪式，一种复杂的舞蹈。萨特指出，尽管服务员再怎么努力去成为他的角色，他也无法像墨水瓶是墨水瓶那样成为一个服务员。一个为自身的存在不能通过意志的行为变成一个在自身的存在（也许，除了自杀）。萨特诊断这个服务员是一个试图否认自己自由的人，仿佛他没有选择在床上待着而不是在 5 点钟起床的权利，尽管这意味着会被解雇。他机械的动作暴露了他渴望成为他无法成为的东西，一个在自身的存在。因此，这个服务员处于坏信仰之中，因为他在自欺欺人，否认了自己自由的界限。
In a different example, Sartre describes a homosexual man who will not admit to his friend or indeed to himself that he is a homosexual. True, his pattern of conduct has been that of a homosexual. But he plays on two senses of the word ‘is’ when he claims he is not a homosexual. In his own eyes he cannot be a homosexual because no human individual is strictly determined by his or her past in the way that a red-haired man is red-haired. As a being for-itself he cannot simply make of his character an in-itself. Yet, in another sense, given his past behaviour, he clearly is a homosexual: his past sexual liaisons have been with men. The honest answer to the question ‘Are you a homosexual?’ would be ‘In one sense no, and another yes.’
在另一个例子中，萨特描述了一个不愿意向他的朋友或甚至向自己承认自己是同性恋的同性恋者。确实，他的行为模式是同性恋者的表现。但当他声称自己不是同性恋者时，他在“是”这个词的两个含义上游走。在他自己看来，他不能是同性恋者，因为没有任何人类个体是严格由其过去决定的，就像一个红发的人是红发一样。作为一个为自身而存在的存在，他不能简单地将自己的性格视为一个为他者而存在的存在。然而，从另一个意义上说，考虑到他的过去行为，他显然是一个同性恋者：他过去的性关系都是与男性的。对“你是同性恋者吗？”这个问题的诚实回答应该是“在一个意义上不是，而在另一个意义上是。”
His friend demands that the homosexual be sincere and come out as homosexual. Yet the friend is as much in bad faith as the homosexual since the demand for sincerity is a demand to make of yourself an in-itself, to deny your freedom to act differently in the future from the way you have done in the past. So sincerity is itself a kind of bad faith.
他的朋友要求那个同性恋者要真诚，并公开自己的同性恋身份。然而，这位朋友和同性恋者一样都是在不诚实，因为对真诚的要求实际上是要求你将自己变成一个本质的存在，否认你在未来以不同于过去的方式行动的自由。因此，真诚本身就是一种不诚实。
The term ‘bad faith’ suggests that there is something bad about being in this condition, that it is, perhaps, a moral fault. It also suggests that authenticity, the opposite of bad faith, might be a virtue. However, in Being and Nothingness Sartre’s approach is to describe rather than to judge: this is not an instruction manual on how to live but an account of what it is like to live. Sartre promised to write a sequel to Being and Nothingness in which he would present an existentialist ethics; however, he never published such a book. Nevertheless, it is difficult to read Sartre’s account of bad faith without concluding that Sartre thought that, on the whole, bad faith was culpable and a denial of what we truly are, namely free individuals.
“坏信仰”这个术语暗示着处于这种状态是有问题的，或许这是一种道德缺陷。它还暗示着真实性，即坏信仰的对立面，可能是一种美德。然而，在《存在与虚无》中，萨特的做法是描述而不是评判：这不是一本关于如何生活的说明手册，而是对生活是什么样子的叙述。萨特承诺写一本《存在与虚无》的续集，在其中他将提出一种存在主义伦理；然而，他从未出版过这样的书。尽管如此，阅读萨特对坏信仰的描述时，很难不得出结论，萨特认为，总的来说，坏信仰是有罪的，是对我们真正身份的否认，即自由个体。
Bad faith is possible because human beings are both transcendence and facticity. Transcendence refers to our ability to think beyond the facts of what is happening now and project ourselves into future possibilities; facticity refers to the facts of our past, of what is now happening, the givens of our existence which we can’t change at will. We maintain ourselves in bad faith by keeping our transcendence and facticity separate from each other, by thinking of ourselves either as wholly different from our bodies (denying an aspect of our facticity, as, for example, does the woman on her date) or else as wholly different from our possibilities (pretending to be an in-itself, as, for example, does the café waiter).
恶意是可能的，因为人类既是超越又是事实。超越指的是我们超越当前发生事实的能力，并将自己投射到未来的可能性中；事实性指的是我们过去的事实、现在正在发生的事情，以及我们无法随意改变的存在条件。我们通过将超越和事实性彼此分开来维持恶意，认为自己要么与身体完全不同（否认我们事实性的一方面，例如，约会中的女性），要么与我们的可能性完全不同（假装是一个自体，例如，咖啡馆的服务员）。
This discussion of transcendence and facticity goes some way to explaining the meaning of the quotation about consciousness given earlier in the chapter: ‘the nature of consciousness simultaneously is to be what it is not and not to be what it is’. We are in one sense our possibilities, our transcendence: not what we are now but what we may become (i.e. consciousness ‘is what it is not’). And yet we aren’t simply our facticity, a product of where we were born, how we were brought up, what colour hair we have, how tall we are, how intelligent, and so on.
对超越性和事实性的讨论在某种程度上解释了本章早些时候提到的关于意识的引用的含义：“意识的本质同时是成为它所不是的东西，而不是成为它所是的东西。”在某种意义上，我们是我们的可能性，我们的超越性：不是我们现在所是的，而是我们可能成为的（即意识“是它所不是的”）。然而，我们并不仅仅是我们的事实性，出生地、成长方式、头发颜色、身高、智力等等的产物。
Freud’s theory of the unconscious could have provided Sartre with a convenient account of how it is that an individual can lie to him or herself. According to Freud the psyche is divided into a conscious and an unconscious part. Unconscious motives and thoughts are censored and transformed before they can enter consciousness. The censor represses some thoughts altogether, allowing others to emerge into consciousness in disguised form, particularly in dreams or in so-called ‘Freudian slips’. Psychoanalysts frequently talk of the patients’ resistances to certain interpretations which get near to the truth; these resistances are the work of the censor. If Sartre had accepted this Freudian account, he could have explained bad faith as arising from unconscious beliefs and their conscious denial. On this model the human mind is fundamentally divided, almost the equivalent of two people, so it is relatively easy to understand how someone could lie to him or herself and yet believe the lie: it would simply be the unconscious lying to the conscious.
弗洛伊德的无意识理论可能为萨特提供了一个方便的解释，说明个体如何能够对自己撒谎。根据弗洛伊德的说法，心理分为意识和无意识两部分。无意识的动机和思想在进入意识之前会被审查和转化。审查者完全压制某些思想，允许其他思想以伪装的形式进入意识，特别是在梦中或所谓的“弗洛伊德式失言”中。精神分析师经常谈论患者对某些接近真相的解释的抵抗；这些抵抗是审查者的工作。如果萨特接受了这种弗洛伊德的解释，他可以将恶劣的信念解释为源于无意识的信念及其意识上的否认。在这个模型中，人类的心智基本上是分裂的，几乎相当于两个人，因此相对容易理解一个人如何能够对自己撒谎却仍然相信这个谎言：这只是无意识在对意识撒谎。
Sartre criticises the Freudian picture of the mind. He argues that if there were a censor between the unconscious and conscious aspects of our minds, then this censor would have to be conscious of both sides of the divide. In order to censor effectively, the censor would have to know what is in the unconscious mind in order to repress or transform it. If the censor is part of the unconscious, then there is a consciousness within the unconscious. The Freudian is left with the absurd situation of the conscious censor as part of the mind being aware of what is in the unconscious in order to appear unaware of what is in the unconscious (i.e. in order to repress all knowledge of it). In other words, the censor would find itself in bad faith. So the problem of how bad faith is possible would still remain for a Freudian; the notion of the unconscious solves nothing since the problem is simply moved on to the censor.
萨特批评了弗洛伊德的心智图景。他认为，如果在我们心智的无意识和意识方面之间存在一个审查者，那么这个审查者必须对两边的分界线都有意识。为了有效地进行审查，审查者必须知道无意识中有什么，以便压制或转化它。如果审查者是无意识的一部分，那么无意识中就存在一种意识。弗洛伊德的理论留下了一个荒谬的情况，即意识审查者作为心智的一部分，意识到无意识中的内容，以便表现出对无意识中内容的无知（即为了压制对其所有知识的了解）。换句话说，审查者会发现自己处于恶劣的信仰中。因此，恶劣信仰如何可能的问题仍然存在于弗洛伊德主义者那里；无意识的概念并没有解决任何问题，因为问题只是转移到了审查者身上。
Shame is an emotion which particularly interests Sartre because of what it reveals of our relations with other people, or ‘the Other’, as he usually expresses this. I see a man walking by some benches in the park. My awareness of him as another for-itself causes me to reorganise my experience of the park; I am suddenly aware of the fact that he sees the grass and the benches from his own conscious point of view, one which is not directly accessible to me. It is as if the Other steals the world from me. My confident position at the centre of my world is destabilised.
羞耻是一种情感，特别引起萨特的兴趣，因为它揭示了我们与他人或“他者”的关系，正如他通常所表达的那样。我看到一个男人走过公园的一些长椅。对他作为另一个自为存在的意识使我重新组织了我对公园的体验；我突然意识到，他从他自己的意识视角看到了草地和长椅，而这个视角对我来说是不可直接接触的。就好像他者从我这里偷走了世界。我在自己世界中心的自信位置被动摇了。
The impact of other people on our consciousness is most apparent when we are aware of being watched. Being seen by the Other forces me to be aware of myself as an object viewed by someone else, as the following example from Being and Nothingness illustrates. Moved by jealousy, I peer through a keyhole to see what is going on on the other side of the door. I am completely immersed in what I see. In this mode of consciousness, which Sartre labels non-thetic, or pre-reflective, I am not aware of my self as a self, but only of what I see or am thinking about. My mind is as it were entirely in the room behind the door.
他人对我们意识的影响在我们意识到被观察时最为明显。被他人看到迫使我意识到自己是一个被他人观看的对象，正如《存在与虚无》中的以下例子所示。出于嫉妒，我透过钥匙孔窥视门另一边发生的事情。我完全沉浸在我所看到的事物中。在这种萨特称之为非主题性或前反思的意识状态中，我并不意识到自己作为一个自我的存在，而只是意识到我所看到的或正在思考的内容。我的思维仿佛完全在门后的房间里。
Suddenly, I hear footsteps in the hall behind me. I am aware that someone is there looking at me. I am thrown into shame, judged by this other person. I am jolted into an awareness of myself as an object viewed by another consciousness: my own freedom escapes me as I become objectified by the look of this other person.
突然，我听到身后走廊里有脚步声。我意识到有人在看着我。我感到羞愧，被这个人评判。我被震惊地意识到自己是另一个意识所观察的对象：当我被这个人的目光物化时，我的自由感逃离了我。
In love too there is the danger that our freedom will escape us. For Sartre love is a kind of conflict: a struggle to enslave another without becoming enslaved yourself. Yet the lover does not simply want to possess but wants to be desired, and so needs the beloved to be free. The complex play of wills can lead to masochism, the desire to be an object for your lover. Yet even in masochism, the impossibility of transforming yourself into an in-itself is apparent. Alternatively, sadism, which flirts with the idea of turning the other person into pure flesh, is equally futile in its goals. A glimpse into the eyes of the other person reveals that he or she exists as a free individual, and that total enslavement of that freedom is not possible.
在爱情中也存在着我们的自由会逃离我们的危险。对萨特来说，爱情是一种冲突：一种试图奴役他人而不被奴役的斗争。然而，爱人并不仅仅想要占有，而是想要被渴望，因此需要所爱之人是自由的。意志的复杂博弈可能导致受虐狂，即渴望成为你爱人的对象。然而，即使在受虐狂中，将自己转变为“自为”的不可能性也是显而易见的。另一方面，施虐狂则与将他人变为纯肉体的想法调情，其目标同样是徒劳的。透过他人的眼睛可以看到，他或她作为一个自由个体的存在，而对这种自由的完全奴役是不可能的。
It can be tempting to think of death as part of life, as, perhaps, the final chord of a melody giving meaning to what has gone before. Sartre rejects this view. He thinks death is absurd: it has no meaning at all. It is in almost every case impossible to be absolutely sure when you will die. Sudden death is always a possibility; but it is not my possibility. It is rather the removal of all my possibilities in the sense that it takes away what makes me human: my ability to project myself towards the future. It takes away all meaning for me since the only meaning my life can have is that which I choose to give it. At death we become ‘prey to the living’. What this means is that, though while living we choose the meaning of our actions, at death our actions are interpreted and given meaning by other people: we cease to have any responsibility for them, and other people can make of them what they will.
将死亡视为生命的一部分可能是诱人的，或许就像旋律的最后一个和弦赋予之前的内容以意义。萨特拒绝这种观点。他认为死亡是荒谬的：它根本没有意义。在几乎所有情况下，绝对确定你何时会死是不可能的。突然的死亡总是一个可能性；但这不是我的可能性。它更像是剥夺了我所有的可能性，因为它带走了使我成为人类的东西：我向未来投射自己的能力。它带走了我生命的所有意义，因为我生命中唯一的意义是我选择赋予它的意义。在死亡时，我们成为“活人的猎物”。这意味着，虽然在生时我们选择我们行为的意义，但在死亡时，我们的行为被其他人解读并赋予意义：我们不再对它们负责，其他人可以随意解读它们。
Existential Psychoanalysis
存在主义心理分析
As we have seen, Sartre rejects out of hand the idea that there is a split between the unconscious and the conscious mind. He wants to replace Freudian psychoanalysis with his own freedom-based approach to the mind, which he calls ‘existential psychoanalysis’. Central to this is his notion of a fundamental choice of being or original project. This is the core around which each of us organises his or her personality, a choice about what fundamentally we are. It is the aim of existential psychoanalysis to lay bare this original project, a choice which informs the individual’s every subsequent choice. Existential psychoanalysis differs from most other approaches to human psychology in that it makes the individual entirely responsible for his or her choice of being. We are not simply the products of society or our genes, according to Sartre, but rather of our own choices. That is what makes us human.
正如我们所看到的，萨特毫不犹豫地拒绝了无意识与意识之间存在分裂的观点。他希望用自己基于自由的思维方式来取代弗洛伊德的精神分析，他称之为“存在主义精神分析”。其核心是他对存在的基本选择或原始项目的概念。这是我们每个人组织自己个性的核心，是关于我们本质上是什么的选择。存在主义精神分析的目标是揭示这个原始项目，这一选择影响着个体的每一个后续选择。存在主义精神分析与大多数其他人类心理学方法的不同之处在于，它使个体对其存在的选择完全负责。根据萨特的观点，我们不仅仅是社会或基因的产物，而是我们自己选择的产物。这就是使我们成为人类的原因。
Criticisms of Being and Nothingness
对《存在与虚无》的批评
Overestimates human freedom
高估了人类自由
A major criticism of Sartre’s existentialism is that it presupposes a degree of freedom that human beings don’t in fact have. He sometimes writes as if we could choose to be anything; as if we could think beyond the limitations imposed on us by our social situation and upbringing. We make the choices that we do because of what we are, and we are what we are because of what has happened to us. Sartre’s focus is almost entirely on the individual and the choices he or she makes, rather than on the social context in which groups of people live. For many people, social, political and economic pressures are far more constraining than Sartre seems to acknowledge.
对萨特存在主义的一个主要批评是，它假设人类实际上并没有的某种自由度。他有时写道，仿佛我们可以选择成为任何人；仿佛我们可以超越社会环境和成长背景所施加的限制进行思考。我们做出这样的选择是因为我们是什么，而我们之所以是这样，是因为发生在我们身上的事情。萨特几乎完全关注个体及其所做的选择，而不是人们生活的社会背景。对许多人来说，社会、政治和经济压力远比萨特所承认的要约束得多。
This sort of deterministic criticism would not have discouraged Sartre: he would simply deny that it is true, and probably suggest that you reflect on your experience and see whether or not it really was true of your life, or whether the adoption of the belief that it is is a kind of bad faith in the face of extreme freedom. A reply to this might be that feeling free is not necessarily the same as being free. We might simply have the illusion of free will rather than the genuine item. Perhaps all our actions are completely determined by what has happened to us, and yet we have misleading feelings that they are freely chosen.
这种决定论的批评不会让萨特气馁：他会简单地否认这是真的，并可能建议你反思自己的经历，看看这是否真的适用于你的生活，或者认为这种信念的采纳在极端自由面前是一种恶劣的信仰。对此的回应可能是，感到自由并不一定等同于真正的自由。我们可能只是拥有自由意志的错觉，而不是实际的自由。也许我们所有的行为都完全由我们所经历的事情决定，但我们却有误导性的感觉，认为这些行为是自由选择的。
Too pessimistic?
太悲观了吗？
Whilst Sartre’s treatment of human freedom is perhaps over-optimistic, his account of human relations is extremely pessimistic. We are constantly on the brink either of turning the other person into an object, an in-itself, or of attempting to turn ourselves into objects for him or her. He even goes so far as to describe humanity as ‘a useless passion’. Perhaps this is an overly bleak description of what it is to be human. Sartre simply disagrees. In his defence it must be said that for many readers his account of freedom and bad faith has a liberating effect and a direct influence on their lives. They take responsibility for what they are rather than trying to find excuses for failing to achieve what they want from their lives.
虽然萨特对人类自由的处理可能过于乐观，但他对人际关系的描述却极为悲观。我们不断处于将他人变成对象、变成“自体”的边缘，或者试图将自己变成他或她的对象。他甚至进一步将人类描述为“无用的激情”。也许这是对人类存在的过于阴暗的描述。萨特对此持不同意见。必须说，在他辩护的同时，对于许多读者来说，他对自由和坏信仰的描述具有解放的效果，并对他们的生活产生直接影响。他们为自己所是的负责，而不是试图为未能实现生活目标寻找借口。
1905 | born in Paris. |
1943 | publishes Being and Nothingness. |
1980 | dies in Paris. |
bad faith: a particular kind of self-deception that involves denying your own freedom.
恶意：一种特定的自我欺骗，涉及否认自己的自由。
being for-itself: Sartre’s term for any being capable of selfconsciousness.
为自身：萨特用来指任何能够自我意识的存在的术语。
being in-itself: Sartre’s term for inanimate objects, and anything which lacks self-consciousness.
自为存在：萨特对无生命物体以及任何缺乏自我意识的事物的术语。
existentialism: a philosophical movement based on the belief that for conscious beings existence precedes essence. For further explanation see the next chapter.
存在主义：一种哲学运动，基于这样的信念：对于有意识的存在，存在先于本质。有关进一步的解释，请参见下一章。
facticity: those things which are givens, which cannot be changed, such as where you were born, or who your parents were.
事实性：那些不可改变的事物，例如你出生的地方或你的父母是谁。
non-thetic consiousness: being aware of something without being aware that you are aware.
非主题意识：意识到某事而不知道自己意识到这一点。
original project: the basic choice you make about the direction of your life which colours most of your other choices.
原始项目：你对生活方向的基本选择，影响着你大多数其他选择。
phenomenological approach: a philosophical approach which was based on the idea that if you gave an accurate description of your experience, this would somehow reveal the essence of the things you were experiencing.
现象学方法：一种哲学方法，基于这样的观点：如果你准确描述你的体验，这将以某种方式揭示你所经历事物的本质。
transcendence: the capacity of the for-itself to project itself into the future.
超越：为自身的能力将自己投射到未来。
Donald Palmer Sartre for Beginners (London: Writers and Readers, 1995) is a readable introduction to Sartre’s work in comic-book form. Arthur C. Danto Sartre (London: Fontana Modern Masters series, 1975) provides an introductory overview of Sartre’s main themes.
《初学者的萨特》 (伦敦：作家与读者，1995) 是一本以漫画形式呈现的萨特作品的易读介绍。亚瑟·C·丹托《萨特》 (伦敦：丰塔纳现代大师系列，1975) 提供了对萨特主要主题的入门概述。
Joseph P. Catalano A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) is useful. It explains the book section by section. Though quite difficult in places, it is never as difficult as Being and Nothingness itself.
约瑟夫·P·卡塔拉诺《让-保罗·萨特的《存在与虚无》评论》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1980 年）是一本有用的书。它逐节解释了这本书。尽管在某些地方相当困难，但它从来没有《存在与虚无》本身那么难。
Gregory McCulloch Using Sartre: An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes (London: Routledge, 1994) provides a dynamic introduction to some of the main lines of Sartre’s thought in Being and Nothingness.
格雷戈里·麦卡洛克《使用萨特：早期萨特主题的分析性介绍》（伦敦：劳特利奇，1994）为萨特在《存在与虚无》中的一些主要思想线索提供了动态的介绍。
Eric Matthews Twentieth Century French Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) sets Sartre in the context of a French tradition. It provides a clear and interesting account of a number of notoriously difficult philosophers.
埃里克·马修斯《二十世纪法国哲学》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1996 年）将萨特置于法国传统的背景中。它清晰而有趣地阐述了若干著名的难解哲学家。
Annie Cohen-Solal Sartre: A Life (London: Heinemann, 1987) and Ronald Hayman Writing Against: A Biography of Sartre (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986) are two absorbing accounts of Sartre’s very full life. His own much briefer autobiography is Words (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).
安妮·科恩-索拉尔《萨特：一个生命》（伦敦：海宁曼，1987 年）和罗纳德·海曼《反对写作：萨特传》（伦敦：维登费尔德与尼科尔森，1986 年）是关于萨特丰富生活的两部引人入胜的作品。他自己简短得多的自传是《词》（哈蒙兹沃斯：企鹅，1967 年）。
Jean-Paul Sartre Existentialism and Humanism
让-保罗·萨特 存在主义与人道主义
Abandonment, anguish, despair: these are the key concepts in Jean-Paul Sartre’s public lecture ‘L’Existentialisme est un humanisme’ (literally ‘Existentialism is a humanism’). The lecture, first delivered in Paris in October 1945, and later translated and published as the short book Existentialism and Humanism, is probably his most read philosophical work. He later regretted its publication. Yet despite its flaws, it can still fire the imagination and offer genuine insight into aspects of human choice and responsibility. It also serves as a bridge to his more complex work Being and Nothingness.
放弃、痛苦、绝望：这些是让-保罗·萨特在其公开讲座《存在主义是一种人道主义》（字面意思为“Existentialism is a humanism”）中的关键概念。该讲座于 1945 年 10 月首次在巴黎发表，后来翻译并出版为短书《存在主义与人道主义》，可能是他阅读最多的哲学著作。他后来对其出版表示遗憾。尽管存在缺陷，它仍然能够激发想象力，并提供对人类选择和责任方面的真实洞察。它还作为他更复杂的作品《存在与虚无》的桥梁。
Sartre delivered his lecture on existentialism in the wake of the Nazi occupation of Paris. This was a time when people who might otherwise have led relatively uneventful lives had just emerged from a situation in which they could not avoid issues of integrity, betrayal and commitment, in relation to the occupation, the resistance movements and the Vichy government. Sartre had himself been a prisoner of war before returning to occupied Paris where he spent most of the war. Yet many of Sartre’s thoughts are still directly relevant to anyone deciding what they want to do and be today.
萨特在纳粹占领巴黎后发表了关于存在主义的讲座。这是一个人们本可以过上相对平静生活的时期，他们刚刚从一个无法避免诚信、背叛和承诺问题的境地中走出，这与占领、抵抗运动和维希政府有关。萨特本人曾是一名战俘，后来回到被占领的巴黎，在那里度过了大部分战争。然而，萨特的许多思想对今天决定自己想做什么和想成为什么的人仍然直接相关。
What is Existentialism?
什么是存在主义？
Existentialism is a philosophical movement that exercised an influence on many of the arts as well as on philosophy and psychology. Gabriel Marcel first coined the word ‘existentialist’ when talking of Sartre. It took several years before Sartre was prepared to accept this label.
存在主义是一种哲学运动，对许多艺术以及哲学和心理学产生了影响。加布里埃尔·马塞尔首次在谈论萨特时创造了“存在主义者”这个词。萨特花了好几年才准备好接受这个标签。
Existentialists are diverse in their beliefs. In Existentialism and Humanism Sartre suggests that what all existentialists have in common is a belief that for human beings ‘existence precedes essence’. By this he means that there is no pre-existing blueprint for humanity; no human nature to which we must conform. We choose what we become. In Sartre’s version of existentialism there is no God in whose mind our essence lies. We exist first and, through our actions, make of ourselves what we will. In our choices we determine what sort of a being each of us is. We are completely free to determine what we want to become, but at the same time, as we shall see, for Sartre this freedom carries with it an inescapable burden.
存在主义者在信仰上各不相同。在《存在主义与人道主义》中，萨特建议所有存在主义者的共同点是相信“存在先于本质”。他的意思是，人类没有预先存在的蓝图；没有我们必须遵循的人性。我们选择我们成为的样子。在萨特的存在主义版本中，没有一个上帝在其心中定义我们的本质。我们首先存在，通过我们的行动，塑造我们想要成为的自己。在我们的选择中，我们决定了每个人是什么样的存在。我们完全自由地决定我们想要成为什么，但与此同时，正如我们将看到的，对于萨特来说，这种自由带来了不可避免的负担。
An artefact, such as a penknife, in contrast, is determined by its function: if it won’t cut and hasn’t got a folding blade, then it isn’t a penknife. The essence of a penknife – what makes it a penknife and not something else – was in the mind of its maker before the knife was made. A human being is different in that we have no predetermined function and no Divine Artisan as maker, in whose mind our essence could have been determined. Unlike Aristotle, for example, Sartre did not believe in a common human nature which could be the basis of morality.
与此相反，像小刀这样的工艺品是由其功能决定的：如果它不能切割并且没有折叠刀片，那么它就不是小刀。小刀的本质——使其成为小刀而不是其他东西的原因——在刀具制造之前就存在于其制造者的心中。人类则不同，我们没有预定的功能，也没有神圣的工匠作为制造者，在他的心中我们的本质可以被确定。例如，与亚里士多德不同，萨特并不相信可以作为道德基础的共同人性。
The emphasis on human freedom to choose what we are and what we become is characteristic of all existentialist thinkers. Although Sartre was an atheist, other existentialists, such as Gabriel Marcel, have been Christians.
对人类自由选择我们是什么以及我们将成为什么的强调是所有存在主义思想家的特征。尽管萨特是无神论者，但其他存在主义者，如加布里埃尔·马塞尔，则是基督徒。
The main drive of Sartre’s lecture was to demonstrate that his own brand of existentialism was a form of humanism. ‘Humanism’ is a term that has many related meanings, so it is important to be clear about how Sartre uses the word. In one sense it simply applies to any theory that puts human beings at the centre of things. So, for instance, the humanism of the Renaissance was characterised by a movement away from speculation about the nature of God to a concern with the works of humanity, especially in art and literature. Humanism has the positive connotation of being humane. It is also a term for secular movements – those who reject the idea that there is a God who is the source of morality.
萨特讲座的主要驱动力是证明他自己品牌的存在主义是一种人文主义。“人文主义”是一个有许多相关含义的术语，因此明确萨特如何使用这个词是很重要的。从某种意义上说，它简单地适用于任何将人类置于事物中心的理论。因此，例如，文艺复兴的人文主义的特点是从对上帝本质的推测转向对人类作品的关注，特别是在艺术和文学方面。人文主义具有人道的积极含义。它也是世俗运动的一个术语——那些拒绝认为有一个上帝是道德来源的人。
When Sartre declares that existentialism is a humanism, part of what he is doing is emphasising the dignity of humanity, the centrality of human choice to the creation of all values. It is another way of saying that human beings create what they are and indeed create morality. In an important sense we are responsible for what and who we are and what we value. But he also wanted to identify existentialism as a humanism in order to answer his critics who caricatured his approach as a dark and dangerous pessimism about the human psyche and human potential.
当萨特宣称存在主义是一种人道主义时，他所做的部分工作是强调人类的尊严，以及人类选择在创造所有价值中的中心地位。这是另一种说法，表明人类创造了他们所是的，并确实创造了道德。在一个重要的意义上，我们对我们是什么、我们是谁以及我们所重视的事物负有责任。但他也想将存在主义确认为一种人道主义，以回应那些将他的观点描绘成对人类心理和人类潜力的黑暗和危险的悲观主义的批评者。
Some of Sartre’s critics thought that existentialism was a philosophy that could only lead to ‘a quietism of despair’. In other words they thought it a philosophy of inaction, a merely contemplative philosophy that would discourage people from committing themselves to any course of action. Others chided the existentialists for being overly pessimistic and for concentrating on all that is ignominious in the human condition – Sartre quotes a Catholic critic, Mlle Mercier, who accused him of forgetting how an infant smiles.
一些萨特的批评者认为存在主义是一种只能导致“绝望的安静主义”的哲学。换句话说，他们认为这是一种无所作为的哲学，一种仅仅是沉思的哲学，会使人们不愿意投入任何行动。其他人则指责存在主义者过于悲观，专注于人类境况中所有可耻的方面——萨特引用了一位天主教批评者梅尔西耶小姐的话，她指责他忘记了婴儿是如何微笑的。
From other directions came the criticism that because existentialism concentrates so much on the choices of the individual it ignores the solidarity of humankind. It treats the individual as an island, rather than as an integrated part of a wider society. Marxists and Christians alike made this point. A further attack came from those who saw existentialism as licensing the most heinous crimes in the name of free existential choice. Since existentialists rejected the notion of God-given moral laws, it seemed to follow that everyone could do whatever they liked.
来自其他方向的批评认为，存在主义过于关注个体的选择，忽视了人类的团结。它将个体视为一个孤岛，而不是更广泛社会的一个整体部分。马克思主义者和基督徒都提出了这一观点。另一个攻击来自那些认为存在主义为以自由存在选择的名义犯下最可怕罪行提供了许可的人。由于存在主义者拒绝上帝赋予的道德法则的概念，因此似乎可以推断出每个人都可以随心所欲。
Sartre’s response to these criticisms focussed on his analysis of the concepts of abandonment, anguish and despair. For Sartre these words have specific meanings – they are technical terms and their connotations are significantly different from those they have in ordinary usage, though they do still draw on those connotations. All three terms in everyday usage (in their English forms at least) typically connote helplessness and suffering of various kinds. For Sartre, though, they also contain an optimistic aspect, one which a superficial reading of the text might miss.
萨特对这些批评的回应集中在他对被遗弃、痛苦和绝望概念的分析上。对萨特来说，这些词有特定的含义——它们是技术术语，其内涵与日常用法中的含义有显著不同，尽管它们确实仍然借鉴了这些内涵。在日常用法中（至少在它们的英语形式中），这三个词通常暗示无助和各种形式的痛苦。然而，对萨特来说，它们还包含一种乐观的方面，这一点在对文本的肤浅解读中可能会被忽视。
For Sartre ‘abandonment’ means specifically abandonment by God. This doesn’t imply that God as a metaphysical entity actually existed at some point, and went away. Sartre is echoing the famous pronouncement made in Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra: ‘God is dead’. Nietzsche’s point was that in the late nineteenth century belief in God was no longer tenable. By using the word ‘abandonment’ in a metaphorical way Sartre emphasises the sense of loss caused by the realisation that there is no God to underwrite our moral choices; no divinity to give us principles that will ensure our salvation. The choice of the word reminds us that we are alone in the universe when seeking guidance about how we should act.
对于萨特来说，“被遗弃”特指被上帝遗弃。这并不意味着上帝作为一个形而上学的实体在某个时刻确实存在过，然后离开了。萨特在呼应尼采在《查拉图斯特拉如是说》中所作的著名宣言：“上帝死了”。尼采的观点是，在十九世纪末，信仰上帝已不再可行。通过以隐喻的方式使用“被遗弃”这个词，萨特强调了意识到没有上帝来支持我们的道德选择时所带来的失落感；没有神性来给予我们确保救赎的原则。这个词的选择提醒我们，在寻求关于我们应该如何行动的指导时，我们在宇宙中是孤独的。
The main consequence of abandonment is the absence of any objective source of morality. Our moral choices must be made from a subjective position, though this did not mean for Sartre that any arbitrary choice was as acceptable as any other, as we shall see.
放弃的主要后果是缺乏任何客观的道德来源。我们的道德选择必须从主观立场出发，尽管这并不意味着对于萨特来说，任何任意选择都和其他选择一样可接受，正如我们将看到的。
Sartre objected strongly to the kind of atheistic moralist who recognised that God didn’t exist, yet clung to a secular version of Christian morality without the reassurance of a God to back it up. This kind of humanist did not follow through the logical implications of abandonment but took refuge in a kind of wishful thinking. In contrast, the Sartrean existentialist recognises the full impact of the non-existence of a creator. The position of someone making choices about his or her life is one of anguish.
萨特强烈反对那种承认上帝不存在却仍然依附于没有上帝支持的世俗基督教道德的无神论道德家。这种人道主义者没有深入思考被抛弃的逻辑含义，而是寄希望于一种愿望思维。相比之下，萨特的存在主义者认识到创造者不存在的全部影响。一个对自己生活做出选择的人所处的状态是痛苦的。
Sartre believes wholeheartedly in the freedom of the will. He is strongly anti-determinist about human choice. Believing that you are forced to be one way or another is almost always a kind of selfdeception which he labels ‘bad faith’ – the denial to yourself of your true freedom. Although he rejects the idea that humanity has any essence, he declares that human beings are fundamentally free. That is the core of what we are. Yet in Sartre’s almost paradoxical phrase we are not just free, but ‘condemned to be free’. Instead of liberation, the knowledge and experience of our own freedom to choose our action and our attitude to the world brings with it a weight of responsibility.
萨特全心全意地相信意志的自由。他对人类选择持强烈的反决定论态度。相信自己被迫以某种方式存在几乎总是一种自我欺骗，他称之为“坏信仰”——对自己真实自由的否认。尽管他拒绝人类有任何本质的观点，但他宣称人类本质上是自由的。这是我们存在的核心。然而，在萨特几乎是悖论的说法中，我们不仅是自由的，而且是“被迫自由的”。而不是解放，意识到和体验我们选择行动和对世界态度的自由，带来了责任的重担。
Anguish, then, is in part the recognition that we are alone without excuses. There is no one else on whom we can blame our plight. We are responsible for everything that we are. Obviously we can’t choose who our parents were, where we were born, whether or not we will die, and so on. But Sartre does go so far as to claim that we are fully responsible for how we feel about every aspect of our situation. We choose our emotions, and to deny this is bad faith.
痛苦部分在于认识到我们孤独而没有借口。没有其他人可以责怪我们的困境。我们对自己的一切负有责任。显然，我们无法选择我们的父母是谁，出生在哪里，是否会死，等等。但萨特确实声称我们对自己对每个方面的感受负有完全的责任。我们选择我们的情感，否认这一点就是恶心。
Sartre goes beyond even this. Not only am I responsible for everything that I am, but, when choosing any particular action I inevitably act ‘as a legislator deciding for the whole of humanity’. In Sartre’s example, if I choose to marry and to have children I thereby commit not only myself but the whole of humanity to the practice of this form of monogamous reproduction. This echoes Immanuel Kant’s notion of the universalisability of moral judgements: the view that if something is morally right for one person to do, it must also be morally right for anyone else in relevantly similar circumstances. For Sartre the full sense of the term ‘anguish’ becomes apparent when we realise the implications of any of our choices. Whatever we choose, we are painting a picture of what it is to be human. When we realise this we will feel the tremendous responsibility of someone whose actions have far-reaching implications for others. Like the Biblical Abraham whom God instructed to sacrifice his only son, we are in a state of anguish because, like him we are ‘condemned’ to choose our actions in situations where we cannot possibly know what will happen until it is too late to make any difference. And yet, it is as if the whole of humanity is watching us to see what we will make of this human life.
萨特甚至超越了这一点。我不仅对我所是的一切负责，而且在选择任何特定行动时，我不可避免地以“立法者为整个人类决策”的身份行事。在萨特的例子中，如果我选择结婚并生孩子，那么我不仅是在承诺自己，还在将整个人类承诺于这种单配偶繁殖的实践。这呼应了伊曼努尔·康德关于道德判断普遍性的概念：即如果某件事对一个人来说是道德上正确的，那么在相关相似情况下，对其他人来说也必须是道德上正确的。对萨特来说，当我们意识到我们任何选择的含义时，“痛苦”一词的完整意义就显现出来。无论我们选择什么，我们都在描绘人类的本质。当我们意识到这一点时，我们会感受到一种巨大的责任感，仿佛我们的行为对他人有深远的影响。就像圣经中的亚伯拉罕一样，上帝指示他牺牲自己的独生子，我们处于一种痛苦的状态，因为像他一样，我们被“注定”在无法预知后果的情况下选择我们的行动，直到为时已晚，无法改变任何事情。 然而，似乎整个人类都在注视着我们，想看看我们将如何对待这段人类生活。
Despair, like abandonment and anguish, is an emotive term. For Sartre despair is simply a reaction to the obstinate character of the world. I can desire anything, but I can’t necessarily get what I desire. I might, for example, want to be a concert violinist, but through no fault of my own break several fingers on my left hand, and as a result never be able to achieve the coordination and speed needed by a professional musician. Other people, events, circumstances can prevent the realisation of my goals. But just because things may not turn out the way we had hoped, Sartre does not believe that we should abandon ourselves to inaction. Rather he urges action and commitment, since we are simply the totality of what we actually do, not what we might have done had circumstances been different. And we still choose how we react to unfortunate obstacles to the achievement of our desires.
绝望，像被遗弃和痛苦一样，是一个情感用语。对萨特来说，绝望只是对世界顽固特性的反应。我可以渴望任何东西，但我不一定能得到我所渴望的。例如，我可能想成为一名音乐会小提琴家，但由于我自己的原因，左手的几根手指受伤，因此永远无法达到专业音乐家所需的协调性和速度。其他人、事件、环境可能会阻碍我实现目标。但仅仅因为事情可能不会如我们所希望的那样发展，萨特并不认为我们应该放弃行动。相反，他鼓励行动和承诺，因为我们只是我们实际所做事情的总和，而不是在环境不同的情况下可能做的事情。我们仍然可以选择如何应对实现愿望的过程中遇到的不幸障碍。
The central example Sartre uses in Existentialism and Humanism is a real one. During the occupation of France one of Sartre’s pupils was faced with a genuine moral dilemma. He had two options, as he saw it: to stay in France to look after his mother who doted on him; or to set off to join the Free French in England to fight for the liberation of France. He knew that the consequences of his leaving would be very bad for his mother; yet at the same time his attempt to join the Free French might end in total failure and his attempt to do something worthwhile with his life might ‘vanish like water into sand’. The stark choice was between a son’s loyalty and the attempt to fight for the liberation of his homeland.
萨特在《存在主义与人道主义》中使用的中心例子是真实的。在法国被占领期间，萨特的一位学生面临着一个真正的道德困境。他认为自己有两个选择：留在法国照顾对他宠爱有加的母亲；或者出发去英国加入自由法国军队，为法国的解放而战。他知道离开会对他的母亲造成很大的坏影响；然而，与此同时，他试图加入自由法国军队可能会以彻底失败告终，他试图为自己的生活做一些有意义的事情可能会“像水一样消失在沙中”。这个严峻的选择是在儿子的忠诚和为祖国解放而战之间。
Sartre begins by demonstrating that neither Christian nor Kantian moral doctrines could guide the pupil. Christian teaching would tell the youth to act with charity, love his neighbour and be prepared to sacrifice himself for the sake of others. This, however, doesn’t solve the problem, since he would still be left choosing between love of his mother and love of his country. The Kantian ethic teaches never to treat others as means to an end. But this doesn’t help much either, since staying with his mother would be treating her as an end, but at the same time treating those fighting on his behalf as a means to an end. But if he joins the fighters, he would be treating them as ends, but at risk of treating his mother as a means to an end.
萨特首先证明，基督教和康德的道德教义都无法指导学生。基督教教义会告诉年轻人要以慈爱行事，爱邻如己，并准备为他人牺牲自己。然而，这并没有解决问题，因为他仍然面临选择母爱和爱国之间的困境。康德伦理教导人们绝不要将他人视为达到目的的手段。但这也没有太大帮助，因为留在母亲身边就是将她视为目的，但同时又是将为他而战的人视为手段。但如果他加入战斗者，他将把他们视为目的，但有可能将母亲视为手段。
Here the pupil experiences the meaning of abandonment: he is forced to make significant choices in a world without fixed preordained values. There are no simple solutions. Ultimately he is forced to choose for himself. Even if he goes to someone for advice, he can choose to reject that advice. And his choice of advisor would probably to some extent be a result of his expectation of the kind of advice he would get from them. Sartre’s advice to his pupil was straightforward, but perhaps not particularly helpful. He left the student bearing the full weight of the anguish of the human predicament with the words: ‘You are free, therefore choose.’
在这里，学生体验到被遗弃的意义：他被迫在一个没有固定预定价值的世界中做出重要选择。没有简单的解决方案。最终，他被迫为自己做出选择。即使他去找某人寻求建议，他也可以选择拒绝该建议。而他选择顾问的原因可能在某种程度上是他对从他们那里获得的建议类型的期望。萨特给他的学生的建议很简单，但也许并不是特别有帮助。他让学生承受人类困境的全部痛苦，留下了这样的话：“你是自由的，因此选择。”
Criticisms of Existentialism and Humanism
存在主义和人本主义的批评
Overestimates human freedom
高估了人类自由
In Existentialism and Humanism, just as in his earlier book Being and Nothingness, Sartre asserts that human beings are free and that our free choices determine what we are. Yet, many philosophers are sceptical of his assumption of the extent of free will (see the similar criticism of Being and Nothingness in the previous chapter). You needn’t be a complete determinist to believe that we have less freedom about our emotions, for example, than Sartre suggests.
在《存在主义与人道主义》中，正如他早期的著作《存在与虚无》一样，萨特主张人类是自由的，我们的自由选择决定了我们是什么。然而，许多哲学家对他关于自由意志程度的假设持怀疑态度（参见上一章对《存在与虚无》的类似批评）。例如，你不必是一个完全的决定论者就可以相信，我们在情感方面的自由比萨特所暗示的要少。
Too individualistic
过于个人主义
Sartre’s existentialism emphasises the individual alone, responsible for everything he or she does, not bound by any human nature or social conventions that fix what a human being should do. Yet this approach is atomistic. Sartre writes as if we weren’t integrated into particular societies with resulting obligations and responsibilities. Society shapes us, and, many believe, conditions what it is possible for us to think and do. Sartre’s approach is unashamedly subjective: he begins from the individual. In his later book, The Critique of Dialectical Reason, he attempted to reconcile the individual existentialist position with Marxism, acknowledging the social, political and historical aspects of the human predicament which he had underplayed in his earlier writing. Unfortunately most of that book is almost unintelligible, perhaps because he wrote large parts of it under the influence of amphetamines.
萨特的存在主义强调个体的独立性，个体对自己所做的一切负责，不受任何人性或社会习俗的束缚，这些习俗规定了人类应该做什么。然而，这种方法是原子化的。萨特写作时仿佛我们并未融入特定的社会，因而没有相应的义务和责任。社会塑造了我们，许多人相信，这决定了我们能够思考和做什么。萨特的方法毫不掩饰地主观：他从个体出发。在他后来的著作《辩证理性批判》中，他试图将个体存在主义立场与马克思主义调和，承认人类困境的社会、政治和历史方面，而这些在他早期的写作中被他轻描淡写。不幸的是，这本书的大部分内容几乎难以理解，可能是因为他在写作的大部分时间里受到安非他命的影响。
Why should my choices hold for all humanity?
为什么我的选择应该适用于全人类？
In order to rebut his critics, Sartre needs to demonstrate that his existentialism does not support the worst form of subjectivism, whereby moral choices are really a matter of individual taste, and any choice of action is as morally good as any other. If his existentialism collapses into this position, then it would be a fair criticism of it to point out that it has the consequence that the most horrific examples of torture, murder and sadism are according to this theory morally acceptable if people genuinely desire to perform them.
为了反驳他的批评者，萨特需要证明他的存在主义并不支持最糟糕的主观主义，即道德选择实际上是个人品味的问题，任何行动选择在道德上都与其他选择一样好。如果他的存在主义陷入这种立场，那么指出它的后果是，最可怕的酷刑、谋杀和施虐的例子根据这一理论在道德上是可以接受的，只要人们真心渴望去执行这些行为，这将是对它的合理批评。
His argument for his version of universalisability, however, on which the whole edifice of his argument stands, is rather weak. He begins with the claim that when we choose to do something what we choose is always what we believe to be the better course of action. But then, controversially, he goes on to claim that nothing can be better for us unless it is better for everyone. So, for Sartre, because I choose what is in my view best for me, this somehow implies that it must be best for everyone – presumably meaning everyone in a similar situation. The image of humanity that I create when making my choices must hold for anyone in an entire epoch. Thus our responsibility is supposed to extend far beyond the individual. Yet the swift moves in this argument from individual choice to responsibility for the whole of humanity in an epoch, do not seem justified or, indeed, justifiable.
然而，他对其普遍性版本的论证，整个论点的基础，显得相当薄弱。他首先声称，当我们选择做某事时，我们选择的总是我们认为更好的行动方案。但随后，他有争议地声称，除非对每个人都更好，否则没有什么对我们来说是更好的。因此，对于萨特来说，因为我选择了在我看来对我最好的东西，这在某种程度上意味着它必须对每个人都是最好的——大概是指在类似情况下的每个人。我在做出选择时所创造的人性形象必须适用于整个时代的任何人。因此，我们的责任应该远远超出个人。然而，这个论证从个人选择迅速转向对整个时代人类的责任，似乎并没有得到合理的支持，甚至说是合理的。
The case of the sincere yet evil person
真诚却邪恶的人的案例
Even if Sartre’s position had been well supported, it might have some extremely unpalatable consequences which he does not consider. For example, take the case of a sincere yet evil person, such as Adolf Hitler. From an existential viewpoint Hitler’s choices – his repulsive antisemitism, the Holocaust, his eugenics programmes – were all delivered in good faith. Hitler’s fashioning of an image of himself did indeed fashion an image of what humanity could be like in an epoch. An existentialist Hitler could claim that his choices had been made in a world without pre-existing values and that they were not just binding on him but on the whole of humanity.
即使萨特的立场得到了很好的支持，它也可能会带来一些他没有考虑到的极其令人不快的后果。例如，考虑一个真诚但邪恶的人，如阿道夫·希特勒。从存在主义的角度来看，希特勒的选择——他令人厌恶的反犹太主义、大屠杀、优生学计划——都是出于善意。希特勒塑造的自我形象确实塑造了一个人类在某个时代可能的样子。一个存在主义的希特勒可以声称他的选择是在一个没有先验价值的世界中做出的，并且这些选择不仅对他自己有约束力，而且对整个人类都有约束力。
Existentialism and Humanism does provide the material for a response to this criticism. There Sartre asserts that someone who genuinely chooses to be free cannot not wish freedom for other people too. Quite clearly Hitler did not respect the freedom of those who did not agree with him. He murdered millions of Jews, homosexuals, political opponents, Gypsies, those with severe psychiatric problems. If Sartre’s principle is accepted then this provides a retort to the objection that his philosophy would not provide a position from which to judge Hitler as immoral. Yet the principle that anyone who chooses to be free must want other people to be free only makes sense if you assume that logically whatever you want for yourself you must also want for other people. Sartre, however, as we have already seen, does not provide adequate argument to move from the individual to the whole of humanity.
存在主义与人本主义确实为回应这一批评提供了材料。在那里，萨特主张，真正选择自由的人也必然希望其他人获得自由。显然，希特勒并不尊重那些与他意见不合的人的自由。他杀害了数百万犹太人、同性恋者、政治对手、吉普赛人以及那些有严重精神问题的人。如果接受萨特的原则，那么这就为反驳他的哲学无法提供判断希特勒不道德的立场提供了依据。然而，任何选择自由的人都必须希望其他人也自由的原则，只有在假设逻辑上你为自己所希望的也必须为他人所希望的情况下才有意义。然而，正如我们已经看到的，萨特并没有提供足够的论证来从个体推导出整个人类。
See previous chapter.
请参见前一章。
abandonment: a metaphorical way of referring to the absence of God.
放弃：一种隐喻，指的是上帝的缺席。
anguish: the experience of free choice with the weight of responsibility of choosing for humanity.
痛苦：在为人类选择时，体验自由选择的责任重担。
despair: the realisation that the world may be resistant to our will in various ways so that our projects may not be realised through events outside our control.
绝望：意识到世界可能以各种方式抵抗我们的意志，以至于我们的计划可能无法通过我们无法控制的事件实现。
essence: the feature that makes something what it is, without which it would be something else.
本质：使某物成为其本身的特征，缺少它则会变成其他东西。
existentialism: the philosophical and literary movement particularly identified with Sartre that emphasises that for human beings existence precedes essence.
存在主义：一种哲学和文学运动，特别与萨特相关，强调对人类而言，存在先于本质。
humanism: the secular movement that makes human beings the source of value in the world.
人文主义：一种世俗运动，使人类成为世界上价值的源泉。
quietism: a philosophy of inaction and withdrawal from the world.
安静主义：一种不作为和退出世界的哲学。
Stephen Priest (ed.) Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings (London: Routledge, 2001) includes the complete text of Existentialism and Humanism together with extracts from other key texts by Sartre. Priest’s clear and succinct introductions are extremely useful in coming to terms with a quite difficult writer. His short biographical summary of Sartre’s philosophical career is also very helpful.
斯蒂芬·普里斯特（编）《让-保罗·萨特：基本著作》（伦敦：劳特利奇，2001 年）包括《存在主义与人道主义》的完整文本，以及萨特其他关键文本的摘录。普里斯特清晰简洁的介绍对于理解这位相当困难的作家非常有帮助。他对萨特哲学生涯的简短传记总结也非常有用。
For further reading about Sartre, see suggestions at the end of the previous chapter.
有关萨特的进一步阅读，请参见上一章末尾的建议。
Karl Popper The Open Society and its Enemies
卡尔·波普尔 《开放社会及其敌人》
Karl Popper lived through the turmoil of the Second World War and the political unrest in Austria that preceded its annexation to Germany, the Anschluss. He managed to leave his native Austria before Hitler arrived there, but it was news of this event that triggered Popper to write The Open Society and Its Enemies. Jewish by descent, though not religion, he realised the implications. By this time he was living in New Zealand. While there he channelled his energies into rethinking the history of political thought, writing his polemical book that diagnosed the intellectual roots of totalitarianism and the sort of society that might be able to resist its rise. The Open Society and Its Enemies ostensibly focuses on the philosophers Plato, Hegel and Marx, but in fact ranges far more widely than this might suggest. Popper’s writing gains a sense of urgency and poignancy from the wartime conditions in which he wrote it, with the fate of Europe undecided and the rise of Fascism still unchecked; it was first published in 1945 as Europeans were coming to terms both with the destructive power of political authoritarianism and the need to rebuild societies in ways which would immunise them against a recurrence of such events. Shortly after publishing the book he took up a post at the London School of Economics.
卡尔·波普尔经历了第二次世界大战的动荡以及奥地利在并入德国（即“合并”）之前的政治动荡。他在希特勒到达奥地利之前成功离开了故乡，但这一事件的消息促使波普尔写下了《开放社会及其敌人》。他是犹太人，虽然并不信仰犹太教，但他意识到了这一点的含义。此时，他已居住在新西兰。在那里，他将精力投入到重新思考政治思想的历史中，写下了他的论战书，诊断了极权主义的知识根源以及可能抵御其崛起的社会类型。《开放社会及其敌人》表面上关注的是哲学家柏拉图、黑格尔和马克思，但实际上范围远比这更广。 波普的写作在他创作时的战争条件下获得了一种紧迫感和深刻性，欧洲的命运尚未确定，法西斯主义的崛起仍未得到遏制；该书于 1945 年首次出版，当时欧洲人正在接受政治专制的破坏性力量以及以能够使社会免受此类事件重演的方式重建社会的必要性。出版该书后不久，他在伦敦经济学院担任职务。
Popper made significant contributions to both the philosophy of science (see Chapter 31, p. 270) and to political philosophy. The adjective ‘Popperian’ is usually used to refer to his account of science as a series of conjectures and refutations rather than confirmations of hypotheses, the position that is known as ‘falsificationism’ (standing in opposition to ‘verificationism’). Popper rejected the idea that science was a process of finding confirmatory evidence: rather, he thought scientists work by formulating bold but falsifiable hypotheses which they then set about refuting. Logically no amount of supporting evidence can absolutely confirm an empirical hypothesis, but observations can refute a generalisation. Scientists are imaginative thinkers who generate hypotheses that they test to destruction, formulating new hypotheses in the light of criticism of the old. Thus science makes progress through piecemeal revision.
波普在科学哲学（见第 31 章，第 270 页）和政治哲学方面都做出了重要贡献。形容词“波普主义”通常用来指代他对科学的看法，即科学是一系列的猜想和反驳，而不是对假设的确认，这一立场被称为“反证主义”（与“验证主义”相对立）。波普拒绝了科学是寻找确认性证据的过程的观点：相反，他认为科学家通过制定大胆但可反驳的假设来工作，然后着手进行反驳。从逻辑上讲，任何数量的支持证据都无法绝对确认一个经验假设，但观察可以反驳一个概括。科学家是富有想象力的思考者，他们生成假设并进行严酷的测试，根据对旧假设的批评制定新的假设。因此，科学通过逐步修正而取得进展。
Popper’s book, The Open Society and Its Enemies, as its name suggests, is a forceful attempt to defend a vision of an open society against a range of threats that result in a closed one. In politics as in science he saw the need for a model based on critical engagement with the status quo. His political philosophy is, explicitly, an attempt to apply the critical and rational methods of science to the organisation of societies. Popper believed that democracy was the only political arrangement that allowed for such reasoned critical debate and reform. Plato, Hegel and Marx, are, he argued, the three principal intellectual culprits guilty of laying the foundations of modern day totalitarianism. This book is in large part a sustained attack on their ideas and influence. All three philosophers were advocates of large-scale utopian reorganisation of society; Popper saw that as a fundamental error and wanted to replace this style of thinking with a commitment to what he called ‘piecemeal social engineering’.
波普尔的书《开放社会及其敌人》，顾名思义，是一次有力的尝试，旨在捍卫开放社会的愿景，以抵御导致封闭社会的一系列威胁。在政治上和科学上，他都看到了基于对现状进行批判性参与的模型的必要性。他的政治哲学明确地试图将科学的批判性和理性方法应用于社会的组织。波普尔认为，民主是唯一允许进行理性批判性辩论和改革的政治安排。他认为，柏拉图、黑格尔和马克思是现代极权主义基础的三位主要知识罪魁祸首。这本书在很大程度上是对他们思想和影响的持续攻击。这三位哲学家都是大规模乌托邦式社会重组的倡导者；波普尔认为这是一个根本性的错误，并希望用他所称的“渐进式社会工程”来取代这种思维方式。
What did Popper Mean by an Open Society?
波普所说的开放社会是什么意思？
An open society for Popper is one that allows individuals to question and reject the presumed authority of those whose power comes merely from tradition or from being part of an establishment. Members of an open society attempt to establish new traditions based on humaneness, freedom, equality and rational assessment. They subject the policies that are put forward to criticism and if necessary abandon them if they are shown not to bring about the hoped-for results. Closed societies, in contrast, are deferential to authorities, who control what can be thought and said and done.
对于波普来说，开放社会是一个允许个人质疑和拒绝那些权力仅来自传统或作为体制一部分的人的假定权威的社会。开放社会的成员试图建立基于人道、自由、平等和理性评估的新传统。他们对提出的政策进行批评，如果必要的话，如果这些政策未能带来预期的结果，就放弃它们。相反，封闭社会对权威表示尊重，权威控制着可以思考、说出和做的事情。
Plato’s Totalitarian Tendencies
柏拉图的极权倾向
The Open Society and Its Enemies is iconoclastic – deliberately so. Popper believed that we should not be overly deferential to ‘great men’ (his term) merely because of the position they occupy. If we are reluctant to criticise the thinkers that are part of our intellectual heritage, he believed, we run the risk of ending that tradition altogether.
《开放社会及其敌人》是反传统的——故意如此。波普认为，我们不应该仅仅因为某人所处的位置而对“伟人”（他的术语）过于恭敬。他认为，如果我们不愿意批评那些属于我们知识遗产的思想家，我们就有可能完全结束这一传统。
The philosophical icon that Popper first attempts to knock from their pedestal is Plato, undoubtedly one of the most revered philosophers in history. But, Popper argued, it was Plato who was responsible for sowing the seeds of totalitarianism in European thought. Commentators before Popper tended to be uncritical in their exposition of Plato’s Republic (see Chapter One), the book in which he laid out his vision of how an ideal society would be run. Popper stressed that Plato took pains to curb free thought in his republic, legitimising censorship of any art or other communication that in his view misrepresented reality or encouraged inappropriate emotional engagement. Although purporting to value truth, Plato also argued that members of the lower orders should be kept in their place by means of a noble lie: they should be told that those who are born to rule, the philosopher class, have gold in their blood, those who will be members of the auxiliary class have silver, and the workers iron and copper. This wasn’t just a suggestion by Plato about how a state might be well run. He purported to be discovering the form or essence of the ideal state, something changeless and discoverable.
波普首先试图从其神坛上击落的哲学偶像是柏拉图，毫无疑问，他是历史上最受尊敬的哲学家之一。但是，波普认为，正是柏拉图在欧洲思想中播下了极权主义的种子。在波普之前的评论者在阐述柏拉图的《理想国》时往往缺乏批判性（见第一章），这本书中他阐述了理想社会的运作方式。波普强调，柏拉图在其理想国中费尽心思地抑制自由思想，合法化对任何在他看来歪曲现实或鼓励不当情感参与的艺术或其他交流形式的审查。尽管声称重视真理，柏拉图还主张，低阶层的成员应该通过一种高尚的谎言被保持在其位置上：他们应该被告知，那些天生注定要统治的哲学家阶层，血液中流淌着黄金，而辅助阶层的成员则有白银，工人则是铁和铜。这不仅仅是柏拉图关于国家如何良好运作的建议。他声称自己在发现理想国家的形式或本质，这是一种不变且可发现的东西。
After his assault on Plato’s vision of society, Popper turns to the eighteenth-century German, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel is, he argues, the main source of contemporary historicism. Historicism, for Popper, was an unscientific tendency to declare certain outcomes inevitable – the mistaken idea that history has some predictable and inevitable course to run based on supposed laws according to which it unfolds. Much of The Open Society and Its Enemies is directed at ridiculing this style of prophesy. Part of the trouble with historicism is that it doesn’t leave any room for critical engagement or refutation by means of evidence: it declares that things will simply happen in one way, and removes the possibility that human beings can shape their own political futures in the light of experience. Historicism is at the heart of Hegel’s philosophy. It may seem an innocuous intellectual position, but Popper believes it is a style of determinist thinking that encouraged the totalitarianism of mid-twentieth-century Europe. Popper doesn’t pull his punches, but declares Hegelianism an intellectual fraud and his influence a farce, albeit a dangerous one, particularly in the ways Popper believed it fostered nationalism, celebration of the state and the sense of the destiny of a people. He is very sympathetic to Schopenhauer’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy as ‘colossal mystification’ and Hegel himself as a charlatan.
在对柏拉图的社会愿景进行攻击后，波普尔转向了十八世纪的德国人乔治·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔。他认为，黑格尔是当代历史主义的主要来源。对波普尔来说，历史主义是一种不科学的倾向，宣称某些结果是不可避免的——这种错误的观念认为历史有某种可预测和不可避免的进程，基于假定的法则而展开。《开放社会及其敌人》的许多内容都是在嘲笑这种预言风格。历史主义的问题在于，它不留任何空间供批判性参与或通过证据进行反驳：它宣称事情将以某种方式发生，剥夺了人类根据经验塑造自己政治未来的可能性。历史主义是黑格尔哲学的核心。它可能看起来是一个无害的知识立场，但波普尔认为这是一种决定论思维的风格，助长了二十世纪中叶欧洲的极权主义。 波普毫不留情地宣称黑格尔主义是智力上的欺诈，他的影响是一场闹剧，尽管是一场危险的闹剧，特别是在波普认为它助长了民族主义、对国家的庆祝以及民族命运感的方式上。他对叔本华对黑格尔哲学的批评非常同情，称其为“巨大的神秘化”，并将黑格尔本人视为一个骗子。
Popper is not as aggressively dismissive of Marx as he was of Hegel. Marx adopted Hegel’s historicism, and believed in the inevitable fall of capitalism and the end of class struggle. For Marx, the role of political activity was to make this happen smoothly to lessen the birth pangs. Although Popper despises Marx’s historicism, and attacks Marx for giving it an intellectual credibility that he thinks it doesn’t merit, he does respect Marx’s attempts to find rational solutions to social problems. He simply thinks he came up with the wrong answers, answers which harm humanity. Marx, then, like Plato and Hegel before him, was in Popper’s eyes an enemy of the Open Society.
波普对马克思的态度并不像对黑格尔那样激烈地否定。马克思采纳了黑格尔的历史主义，并相信资本主义的不可避免的衰落和阶级斗争的结束。对马克思而言，政治活动的角色是使这一过程顺利进行，以减少阵痛。尽管波普鄙视马克思的历史主义，并指责马克思赋予其不应有的知识信誉，但他确实尊重马克思寻找社会问题理性解决方案的尝试。他只是认为马克思得出了错误的答案，这些答案对人类有害。因此，在波普看来，马克思就像之前的柏拉图和黑格尔一样，是开放社会的敌人。
Criticism of The Open Society and its Enemies
对《开放社会及其敌人》的批评
Caricatures Plato, Hegel and Marx
卡通化的柏拉图、黑格尔和马克思
Some critics of Popper’s book argue that he misrepresents Plato, Hegel and Marx, presenting their views in caricatured form in a way that suits his purpose but fails to do justice to their actual views. In particular, Popper is abusive and dismissive of Hegel’s thought. Yet it is hardly surprising that a Viennese emigré writing during the Second World War expressed anger at a philosopher whom he felt was in part responsible for the rise of totalitarianism and a dangerous nationalism.
一些批评波普尔书籍的评论家认为，他错误地描绘了柏拉图、黑格尔和马克思，以一种适合他目的的讽刺形式呈现他们的观点，但未能公正地反映他们的实际观点。特别是，波普尔对黑格尔的思想表现出侮辱和轻视。然而，一位在第二次世界大战期间写作的维也纳移民对他认为部分导致极权主义和危险民族主义兴起的哲学家表达愤怒，这并不令人惊讶。
1902 | born in Vienna. |
1937 | takes up a post in Christchurch, New Zealand. |
1945 | The Open Society and Its Enemies first published. |
1994 | dies, Croydon, England. |
falsificationism: Popper’s account of science which he claimed progresses through a series of bold hypotheses which scientists set out to refute. Only falsifiable statements are genuinely scientific.
伪造主义：波普对科学的解释，他声称科学通过一系列大胆的假设进展，科学家们试图驳斥这些假设。只有可伪造的陈述才是真正的科学。
historicism: any theory of history that made outcomes inevitable, such as Hegel’s. The view that history has a predictable course to run.
历史主义：任何使结果不可避免的历史理论，例如黑格尔的理论。认为历史有一个可预测的发展过程。
open society: an open society is one in which citizens are free to challenge authorities through critical debate and thereby bring about piecemeal social change.
开放社会：开放社会是指公民可以通过批判性辩论自由地挑战当局，从而实现渐进的社会变革。
totalitarianism: a form of closed society in which authorities control the people in a wide range of their day to day activities and free and open debate is impossible.
极权主义：一种封闭社会的形式，权威控制人们日常活动的广泛范围，自由和公开的辩论是不可能的。
Karl Popper Unended Quest (London: Routledge, revised edition 1992) is Popper’s autobiography.
卡尔·波普《未完的探索》（伦敦：劳特利奇，修订版 1992）是波普的自传。
Bryan Magee Popper (London: Fontana, 1977) is a short, very clear introduction to this thinker’s work.
布莱恩·马吉 波普（伦敦：丰坦纳，1977）是对这位思想家作品的简短而清晰的介绍。
David Edmonds and John Eidinow Wittgenstein’s Poker (London: Faber and Faber, 2005) is a brilliant and highly readable treatment of a famous dispute between Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein which sets both within their wide cultural context.
大卫·埃德蒙兹和约翰·艾丁诺《维特根斯坦的扑克》（伦敦：法伯与法伯，2005 年）是对卡尔·波普和路德维希·维特根斯坦之间著名争论的精彩且易读的论述，将两者置于广泛的文化背景中。
Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations
路德维希·维特根斯坦 《哲学研究》
Ludwig Wittgenstein did not want to spare other people the trouble of thinking for themselves. Philosophical Investigations was intended to stimulate his readers to have their own thoughts rather than to present them with pre-packaged ideas for convenient consumption. This is reflected in the style of writing, which is fragmentary and oblique, flitting from one topic to the next and back again. The answers to philosophical questions are not given in a straightforward way, but rather suggested through particular examples and stories. Clues are provided, but their implications aren’t usually spelt out; metaphors abound, but it is up to the reader to unpack them.
路德维希·维特根斯坦并不想让其他人免于自己思考的麻烦。《哲学研究》旨在激励读者产生自己的思考，而不是向他们提供方便消费的预包装思想。这在写作风格中得到了体现，风格零散而间接，从一个主题跳到另一个主题再回到原处。哲学问题的答案并不是以直接的方式给出的，而是通过特定的例子和故事来暗示。提供了线索，但其含义通常并没有明确说明；隐喻层出不穷，但解读它们的任务在于读者。
Instead of chapters, Wittgenstein uses shorter numbered sections. The organisation of the book is not all due to Wittgenstein: it was published in 1953, two years after his death, and is based on a manuscript he was working on for a number of years.
与其说是章节，维特根斯坦使用了较短的编号段落。书籍的组织并非完全归功于维特根斯坦：它于 1953 年出版，距他去世两年，并且基于他多年来正在撰写的手稿。
Relation to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
与《逻辑哲学论》的关系
The only book of Wittgenstein’s to be published during his lifetime was his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which appeared in 1921. This austere series of numbered statements managed to combine a poetic style with a serious treatment of logic and the limits of human thought. It is most famous for the concluding pronouncement ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent.’ This wasn’t a practical adage, but rather a summary of the views about the limits of thought. Most of what is important in human life lies outside the realm of what can be said meaningfully; it is inexpressible, but no less important for that. In many ways Philosophical Investigations is a critique of the views expressed in the Tractatus, and Wittgenstein even suggested that the Tractatus should be published as a preface to Philosophical Investigations to bring out what was distinctive about his more recent ideas.
维特根斯坦在世时唯一出版的书是他的《逻辑哲学论》，该书于 1921 年出版。这一系列简洁的编号陈述成功地将诗意风格与对逻辑和人类思维局限的严肃探讨结合在一起。它最著名的结论是“关于无法言说的事物，必须保持沉默。”这并不是一个实用的格言，而是对思维局限的观点的总结。人类生活中大多数重要的东西都超出了可以有意义地表达的范围；它是无法表达的，但因此并不重要。在许多方面，《哲学研究》是对《逻辑哲学论》中表达的观点的批判，维特根斯坦甚至建议将《逻辑哲学论》作为《哲学研究》的前言出版，以突出他更近期思想的独特性。
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein sees his role as letting the fly out of the fly-bottle. What he means by this is that philosophers buzz around trapped by their attempts to make language do what it cannot do. They are bewitched by language. As he puts it, ‘Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday’ (section 38). In other words, philosophical problems arise from using words in an inappropriate context.
在《哲学研究》中，维特根斯坦将自己的角色视为让苍蝇从苍蝇瓶中飞出。他的意思是，哲学家们被困在试图让语言做它无法做到的事情中，像苍蝇一样嗡嗡作响。他们被语言迷住了。正如他所说，“哲学问题出现在语言度假时”（第 38 节）。换句话说，哲学问题源于在不恰当的语境中使用词语。
Wittgenstein’s approach is designed to dissolve such problems by attending to the actual use of language and thus letting the fly out of the fly-bottle. Hence his philosophical approach is often characterised as a therapeutic one: philosophy is the illness that needs to be cured. Philosophy examines ‘bumps that the understanding has got from running up against the limits of language’ (section 119). The cure is to look at how language actually functions, not how we imagine that it must function. But his analysis of actual uses of language is not an exercise in social anthropology. By mapping out some of the ways in which language is used Wittgenstein draws attention to the limits of thought and meaningfulness. A large part of this enterprise involved eliminating misleading theories about the nature of language. Another reason for focusing on particular uses of language was his belief that large-scale theorising is misguided in that it rests on the false assumption that we can discover the essence of the thing being investigated.
维特根斯坦的方法旨在通过关注语言的实际使用来解决这些问题，从而让苍蝇逃出苍蝇瓶。因此，他的哲学方法常常被描述为一种治疗性的：哲学是需要治愈的疾病。哲学考察“理解在与语言的界限碰撞时所产生的‘ bumps’”（第 119 节）。治疗的方法是观察语言实际上是如何运作的，而不是我们想象它必须如何运作。但他对语言实际使用的分析并不是社会人类学的练习。通过描绘语言使用的一些方式，维特根斯坦引起了人们对思想和意义的界限的关注。这项事业的很大一部分涉及消除关于语言本质的误导性理论。关注语言特定用法的另一个原因是他相信大规模的理论化是误导性的，因为它基于一个错误的假设，即我们可以发现被调查事物的本质。
A significant part of Philosophical Investigations is directed against what Wittgenstein thinks is a simplistic account of the nature of language. He takes Saint Augustine’s account of language-learning by pointing to objects and naming them as representative of this view. Holders of this Augustinian picture of language believe that words are names of objects, and that combinations of words have the sole function of describing reality.
《哲学研究》的一个重要部分是针对维特根斯坦认为的语言本质的简单化描述。他以圣奥古斯丁通过指向物体并命名它们的语言学习方式作为这种观点的代表。持有这种奥古斯丁语言观的人相信，词语是物体的名称，而词语的组合仅仅是描述现实的功能。
For example, on this view, in order to learn the meaning of the word ‘apple’ we present a child with an apple and say ‘this is an apple’. This is called teaching by ostensive definition: pointing to the object that is named. Wittgenstein does not deny that such ostensive definition goes on, but draws attention to a number of difficulties with the view that this is the basis of all language-learning. For example, such ostensive definition requires a certain amount of stage-setting. The child might not understand the institution of pointing at an object, or else might think that you were pointing out the colour or the shape of the apple. Every case of ostensive definition allows for a variety of interpretations of what is being picked out. Furthermore, even if the child understands the particular case of ostensive definition, he or she might not be able to make the transition from this case to others like it.
例如，在这种观点下，为了学习“苹果”这个词的意思，我们给孩子一个苹果并说“这是一个苹果”。这被称为通过指示性定义进行教学：指向被命名的对象。维特根斯坦并不否认这种指示性定义的存在，但他指出了将其视为所有语言学习基础的观点存在的许多困难。例如，这种指示性定义需要一定的情境设置。孩子可能不理解指向一个对象的行为，或者可能认为你是在指苹果的颜色或形状。每个指示性定义的案例都允许对所指内容进行多种解释。此外，即使孩子理解特定的指示性定义案例，他或她也可能无法从这个案例过渡到其他类似的案例。
Language is not simply a medium we use to represent the world. Rather it is more like a tool kit containing a wide range of implements which we use for different purposes. Or, to borrow another of Wittgenstein’s metaphors, language is like the levers in the cabin of a locomotive. Words resemble each other, so we have a tendency to think that they all do the same sort of thing. However, like the levers in the locomotive the similarity is superficial: one lever operates a valve, another the brakes; one has only two positions, ‘off’ and ‘on’; another can be moved continuously.
语言不仅仅是我们用来表述世界的媒介。它更像是一个工具箱，里面包含了各种各样的工具，我们用它们来实现不同的目的。或者，借用维特根斯坦的另一个比喻，语言就像机车驾驶室里的杠杆。词语彼此相似，因此我们倾向于认为它们都执行相同的功能。然而，就像机车中的杠杆一样，这种相似性是表面的：一个杠杆操作一个阀门，另一个操作刹车；一个只有两个位置，“关闭”和“开启”；另一个可以连续移动。
If we examine the nature of actual language, we very quickly find that the Augustinian picture is inaccurate. The meaning of words is given by their use rather than by what they might refer to. Language does not have an underlying essence, a common denominator, a unique function. Rather, if we examine language we find a pattern of overlapping functions which it serves in different contexts. Wittgenstein talks of ‘language games’. He doesn’t mean by this phrase that using language is a matter of being playful, but that there are many different rule-governed activities within which language functions. Language is embedded in our forms of life, the social conventions which have grown up around its various uses. The meanings of words are governed by how we happen to use them; isolated from a context of use, a form of life, they are meaningless.
如果我们考察实际语言的本质，我们很快会发现奥古斯丁的观点是不准确的。词语的意义是由它们的使用所决定的，而不是由它们可能指代的内容决定的。语言并没有一个潜在的本质、一个共同的分母或一个独特的功能。相反，如果我们考察语言，我们会发现它在不同语境中所服务的重叠功能的模式。维特根斯坦谈到了“语言游戏”。他并不是说使用语言是一种玩乐的事情，而是说在语言发挥作用的过程中，有许多不同的规则驱动的活动。语言嵌入在我们的生活形式中，即围绕其各种用法而形成的社会惯例。词语的意义受我们使用它们的方式的支配；如果与使用的语境、生活形式隔离，它们就没有意义。
Family Resemblance Terms
家庭相似性术语
One common way of being bewitched by language is to assume that if we correctly use a word to refer to a range of cases, every case must have something in common with the others. We often assume that, for example, there is an essence of games, so that whenever we use the word ‘game’ we are alluding to the common feature that the activity in question shares with other games. Wittgenstein believes this to be a mistake. It is a mistake to assume that there must be an essence shared by all games as much as it is a mistake to assume that all language uses must have something in common.
被语言迷惑的一种常见方式是假设如果我们正确地使用一个词来指代一系列案例，那么每个案例之间一定有某种共同点。我们常常假设，例如，游戏有一个本质，因此每当我们使用“游戏”这个词时，我们都在暗示该活动与其他游戏共享的共同特征。维特根斯坦认为这是一个错误。假设所有游戏之间必须有一个共同的本质是一个错误，就像假设所有语言使用之间必须有某种共同点一样。
Wittgenstein’s defence of this view is based on an analogy with family resemblances. Blood relations often resemble each other. But that doesn’t mean that every member of the family shares one or more common features: what usually occurs is that there is a pattern of overlapping resemblances rather than a single common feature found throughout. You might resemble your sister with respect to hair colour and your mother with respect to eye colour. Your sister and mother may have the same shaped nose. In this simple example no single feature is shared by all three members of the family, but this does not prevent there being a visible family resemblance. Similarly, there is no common essence shared by all the things we call ‘games’: board games, football, solitaire, throwing a ball against the wall, and so on. But we can nevertheless use the word ‘game’ meaningfully. Wittgenstein uses the phrase ‘family resemblance’ to refer to this sort of overlapping and criss-crossing resemblance.
维特根斯坦对这一观点的辩护基于与家庭相似性的类比。血缘关系通常彼此相似。但这并不意味着家庭中的每个成员都共享一个或多个共同特征：通常发生的是存在一种重叠相似性的模式，而不是在所有成员中都发现的单一共同特征。你可能在发色上与姐姐相似，而在眼睛颜色上与母亲相似。你的姐姐和母亲可能有相同形状的鼻子。在这个简单的例子中，家庭中的所有三个成员没有共享的单一特征，但这并不妨碍存在明显的家庭相似性。同样，我们称之为“游戏”的所有事物之间也没有共同的本质：棋盘游戏、足球、接龙、把球扔向墙壁等等。但我们仍然可以有意义地使用“游戏”这个词。维特根斯坦使用“家庭相似性”这个短语来指代这种重叠和交叉的相似性。
The Private Language Argument
私人语言论
By far the most influential part of Philosophical Investigations is the group of comments and examples known as the Private Language Argument, although there is still some controversy about precisely what Wittgenstein meant by them. It is worth bearing in mind that Wittgenstein didn’t use the phrase ‘Private Language Argument’, and it is only his commentators who have suggested that a series of his comments should be interpreted as a cumulative argument. Nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to group his thoughts together in this way and to extract an argument from their progression. In order to begin to understand this argument, we need to get clear what Wittgenstein was attacking.
到目前为止，《哲学研究》中最具影响力的部分是被称为私人语言论证的一组评论和例子，尽管关于维特根斯坦对此的确切含义仍然存在一些争议。值得注意的是，维特根斯坦并没有使用“私人语言论证”这个短语，只有他的评论者建议将他的一系列评论解读为一个累积的论证。然而，将他的思想以这种方式归类并从其发展中提取出一个论证似乎是合理的。为了开始理解这个论证，我们需要明确维特根斯坦所攻击的内容。
Most philosophers since Descartes have assumed that a proper study of the nature of the mind must begin from a consideration of the first-person case, that is, from one’s own experience. I can be more certain that I am in pain, for example, than that you are. I have privileged access to the contents of my own mind that does not extend to the contents of yours. It is as if I have special access to a private cinema in which my thoughts and feelings are displayed; no one else has any idea of what happens within my private cinema. My experience is private to me, and yours to you. No one can really know my pain or my thoughts. I can describe my inner experience to myself, and no one else is able to judge whether or not my descriptions are accurate.
自笛卡尔以来，大多数哲学家都认为，研究心灵本质的适当方法必须从第一人称的案例出发，也就是说，从个人的经验出发。例如，我对自己在痛苦中的感受比对你是否在痛苦中感到更有把握。我对自己内心内容的访问是特权性的，而这种访问并不延伸到你的内心内容。就好像我有一个私人电影院，里面展示着我的思想和感受；其他人对我私人电影院内发生的事情毫无头绪。我的体验对我来说是私密的，而你的体验对你来说也是私密的。没有人能够真正了解我的痛苦或我的思想。我可以向自己描述我的内心体验，而其他人无法判断我的描述是否准确。
Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument undermines the view which props up the idea that my thoughts and feelings are fundamentally inaccessible to anyone else. The idea rests on a belief in the possibility of a private language. Wittgenstein shows that no such language is possible. By ‘private language’ he doesn’t mean a private code, nor does he mean a language spoken by only one person, as, for instance, a Robinson Crusoe figure might devise to talk to himself about his life on a desert island. Rather, a private language, for Wittgenstein, is one that is in principle unshareable because it is used to refer to an individual’s allegedly private experiences.
维特根斯坦的私人语言论证削弱了支撑我思想和感受根本上对他人不可接近这一观点的看法。这个观点建立在对私人语言可能性的信念之上。维特根斯坦表明，根本不存在这样的语言。所谓“私人语言”，他并不是指一种私人代码，也不是指只有一个人使用的语言，例如，一个鲁滨逊·克鲁索式的人物可能会设计一种语言来与自己谈论他在荒岛上的生活。相反，对于维特根斯坦来说，私人语言是原则上不可共享的，因为它用于指代个体所谓的私人经历。
Someone who believes in the possibility of such a private language might argue that it would be possible for me to keep a diary recording my sensations. I have a particular sensation which I decide to call ‘s’. I put an ‘s’ in my diary. The next time I have the same sort of sensation, I put another ‘s’ in the diary, and so on. Wittgenstein argues that this account is incoherent. There is ‘no criterion of correctness’ for the reidentification of my ‘s’ sensations, no way of proving that I was correct or incorrect in any case where I think I have reidentified a feeling of ‘s’. It is like checking the time a train leaves by calling up your memory of the timetable, but with one important difference: there is no actual timetable out there in the world to serve as the touchstone of correctness. Where there is no possible way of checking up to see if I am correct in my application of a term, the term cannot have any meaning. Consequently, Wittgenstein’s conclusion is that giving names to your private experiences by acts of private ostensive definition is a nonsensical notion. Language is public, and the criteria for the application and reapplication of words are public. No private language of the sort envisaged above is possible.
相信这种私人语言可能性的人可能会争辩说，我可以保持一个记录我感受的日记。我有一种特定的感受，我决定称之为‘s’。我在日记中写下一个‘s’。下次我有同样的感受时，我再在日记中写下另一个‘s’，依此类推。维特根斯坦认为这种说法是自相矛盾的。对于我‘s’感受的重新识别没有“正确性的标准”，没有办法证明我在任何我认为重新识别出‘s’的情况下是正确还是错误。这就像通过回忆时间表来检查火车的发车时间，但有一个重要的区别：在这个世界上没有实际的时间表可以作为正确性的基准。在没有可能的方式来检查我在使用一个术语时是否正确的情况下，这个术语就无法具有任何意义。因此，维特根斯坦的结论是，通过私人指示定义的行为给你的私人体验命名是一个无意义的概念。语言是公共的，词语的应用和重新应用的标准是公共的。 上述设想的那种私人语言是不可能的。
This is not, of course, to deny that people have sensations and experiences. However, from the point of view of the meaning of language, if these experiences were necessarily private, they would have no relevance. Imagine a situation in which everyone owned their own box with something in it which we call a ‘beetle’. No one can look inside anyone else’s box, and everyone claims to know what a beetle is by looking inside their own box. In this sort of case, Wittgenstein says, it wouldn’t matter whether everyone had the same sort of thing in their box, or nothing at all. The thing in the box doesn’t affect the meaning of ‘beetle’.
这当然并不是否认人们有感觉和体验。然而，从语言意义的角度来看，如果这些体验是必然私人的，那么它们就没有相关性。想象一个情况，每个人都有自己的盒子，里面有我们称之为“甲虫”的东西。没有人可以看别人盒子里的东西，每个人都声称通过查看自己盒子里的东西知道什么是甲虫。在这种情况下，维特根斯坦说，无论每个人的盒子里是什么样的东西，或者根本什么都没有，这都无关紧要。盒子里的东西并不影响“甲虫”的意义。
The consequence of Wittgenstein’s argument is that the picture of the mind suggested by Descartes is untenable. We don’t each inhabit our own private cinema. Rather, language sets the limits of our thought, and language is an intrinsically public phenomenon. This argument also undermines the view of the mind presented in the empiricist tradition, including that given by Locke and Hume. Like Descartes, these philosophers implicitly assume the possibility of describing one’s own sensations in a private language: in particular, Locke’s view of language relies on the possibility of reidentifying privately labelled sensations.
维特根斯坦论证的结果是，笛卡尔所暗示的心灵图景是站不住脚的。我们并不是各自居住在自己的私人电影院中。相反，语言设定了我们思维的界限，而语言本质上是一种公共现象。这个论证也削弱了经验主义传统中所呈现的心灵观，包括洛克和休谟的观点。像笛卡尔一样，这些哲学家隐含地假设了用私人语言描述自己感受的可能性：特别是，洛克的语言观依赖于重新识别私人标记的感受的可能性。
Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument isn’t entirely negative. In place of the traditional account of the relationship between our experiences and the language we use to describe them, he offers an alternative hypothesis. Perhaps words like ‘pain’ are not names of private sensations, but are rather part of our learnt pain-behaviour, with public criteria for their correct application. A child hurts herself and cries; adults teach the child to articulate the pain. What this means is that the child learns to speak about pain as a substitute for crying. Speaking about pain, however, is not simply a matter of describing a sensation. According to Wittgenstein, speaking about pain is another way of expressing pain.
维特根斯坦的私人语言论证并非完全消极。作为我们经验与用以描述这些经验的语言之间关系的传统解释，他提出了一个替代假设。也许像“疼痛”这样的词并不是私人感觉的名称，而是我们学习的疼痛行为的一部分，具有公共标准来正确应用。一个孩子伤到自己并哭泣；成年人教孩子表达疼痛。这意味着孩子学习用语言来谈论疼痛，以替代哭泣。然而，谈论疼痛并不仅仅是描述一种感觉。根据维特根斯坦的说法，谈论疼痛是表达疼痛的另一种方式。
In the second part of Philosophical Investigations one topic which Wittgenstein discusses involves the familiar example of the duck-rabbit: a figure which can be interpreted as a drawing either of a duck or of a rabbit, but not both simultaneously. I look at the figure and see it as a duck; then, I see a new aspect of it: it looks like a rabbit. This change of aspect has not been brought about by any change in what is reflected on the back of my retina. Precisely the same visual stimuli give rise to my sense that I am looking at a picture of a duck as when I am seeing it as a rabbit. This seems paradoxical: the aspect changes when no line of the picture has been altered. It suggests that seeing involves a kind of judgement about what is being seen, and that this can be influenced by what we expect to see.
在《哲学研究》的第二部分，维特根斯坦讨论的一个主题涉及熟悉的鸭兔图：一个可以被解读为鸭子或兔子的图形，但不能同时被解读为两者。我看着这个图形，看到它像是一只鸭子；然后，我看到它的一个新方面：它看起来像是一只兔子。这种方面的变化并不是由于我视网膜背面反射的内容发生了变化。完全相同的视觉刺激让我感到我在看一幅鸭子的图画，就像我在看它作为一只兔子时一样。这似乎是矛盾的：当图画的任何线条没有被改变时，方面却发生了变化。这表明，视觉涉及对所见事物的一种判断，而这种判断可以受到我们期待看到的内容的影响。
Criticisms of Philosophical Investigations
对《哲学研究》的批评
Philosophical problems don’t all dissolve
哲学问题并不都能消解
Many philosophers remain unconvinced that all philosophical problems arise when language ‘goes on holiday’. For example, few contemporary philosophers of mind investigating the nature of human consciousness feel that all they need do is point to some of the ways we use language in order to rid ourselves for ever of the philosophical problem of how matter could give rise to thought and self-awareness. Wittgenstein’s claims about letting the fly out of the fly-bottle are seductive; but traditional philosophical disputes continue to perplex and challenge philosophers, despite his attempts to explain them away as bewitchment by language. Wittgenstein, presumably, would respond to this by pointing out that the philosophers in question are still in thrall to the language they are trying to force into doing jobs that it just can’t do.
许多哲学家仍然不相信所有哲学问题都是在语言“度假”时产生的。例如，少数当代心灵哲学家在研究人类意识的本质时，觉得他们所需要做的只是指出我们使用语言的一些方式，以便永远摆脱物质如何产生思想和自我意识的哲学问题。维特根斯坦关于让苍蝇从苍蝇瓶中飞出的说法很有吸引力；但尽管他试图将其解释为语言的迷惑，传统的哲学争论仍然让哲学家们感到困惑和挑战。维特根斯坦可能会回应说，这些哲学家仍然被他们试图强迫去做一些语言根本无法做到的事情所束缚。
Oracular pronouncements
神谕宣告
A quite serious criticism of Wittgenstein’s style in Philosophical Investigations is that it results in a book which is open to many conflicting interpretations. In many places it is not at all clear what the precise point of an example or parable is, nor is it always obvious that some of the views he seems to be attacking have ever been held. Often we seem to be getting just the tip of a submerged iceberg and are left to ourselves to work out what must lie beneath the surface of a remark. Although in recent years Wittgenstein’s notebooks and his students’ lecture notes have been made widely available, there is still fierce debate about some of his central doctrines.
对维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》中的风格的一个相当严肃的批评是，它导致了一本开放于许多相互矛盾解释的书。在许多地方，例子或寓言的确切要点并不清楚，也并不总是显而易见他似乎在攻击的一些观点是否曾经被持有。我们常常似乎只是在看到一个潜在冰山的冰山一角，必须自己去推测某条评论表面下可能隐藏的内容。尽管近年来维特根斯坦的笔记本和他的学生的讲义已被广泛发布，但关于他的一些核心教义仍然存在激烈的争论。
Wittgenstein is surely responsible for the ambiguities and indeterminacies in his work, not all of which can be put down to the difficulty of presenting such radical and original ideas. Some of the difficulties stem directly from his piecemeal approach. There is no doubting the elegance and imaginative appeal of Wittgenstein’s examples, but the lack of coherent argument or clarificatory passages leaves the reader with a great deal of work to do.
维特根斯坦无疑对他作品中的模糊性和不确定性负有责任，这些并非全部都可以归因于呈现如此激进和原创思想的困难。一些困难直接源于他零散的写作方式。维特根斯坦的例子无疑优雅且富有想象力，但缺乏连贯的论证或澄清段落，使得读者需要付出大量的努力。
In Wittgenstein’s defence, he was very open about his desire that his readers think for themselves rather than have views dished out to them by an authority. So in that sense contemporary disputes about interpretation are a tribute to his success, since they indicate that philosophers are having to think through what Wittgenstein could possibly have meant in order to make sense of the work at all.
在维特根斯坦的辩护中，他非常坦诚地表达了希望读者自己思考，而不是让权威给他们灌输观点的愿望。因此，从这个意义上说，当代关于解释的争论是对他成功的致敬，因为这些争论表明哲学家们必须思考维特根斯坦可能意味着什么，以便理解他的作品。
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s oblique and poetic style attracts discipleship. There has never been a shortage of ardent followers who cite paragraph numbers from Philosophical Investigations with all the enthusiasm of religious zealots. These followers for the most part are happy to get their ideas secondhand from the master, apparently unaware that that is precisely what he said he didn’t want to happen. The oracular style of much of Philosophical Investigations seems to invite a reverential rather than critical approach, and so may undermine the aim of making its readers think for themselves.
然而，维特根斯坦的间接和诗意的风格吸引了追随者。热情的追随者从《哲学研究》中引用段落编号，从而表现出宗教狂热者的热情，这种情况从未短缺。这些追随者大多乐于从大师那里获取二手思想，显然没有意识到这正是他所说的不希望发生的事情。《哲学研究》的许多部分的神谕风格似乎邀请了一种尊敬而非批判的态度，因此可能会削弱使读者独立思考的目标。
Wittgenstein himself was never satisfied enough with his drafts of Philosophical Investigations to publish the book in his own lifetime. Perhaps, then, it is fairer to treat it as work in progress, rather than as his definitive views in the form he would have most liked them to have reached the world.
维特根斯坦本人对《哲学研究》的草稿从未感到足够满意，以至于在他生前出版这本书。因此，也许将其视为一个正在进行的工作，而不是他希望以最理想的形式呈现给世界的最终观点，更为公正。
1889 | born in Vienna. |
1951 | dies in Cambridge. |
1953 | Philosophical Investigations published posthumously. |
duck-rabbit: a drawing which can be interpreted either as a duck or as a rabbit, but not both simultaneously. Wittgenstein uses this example to explain aspect-seeing.
鸭兔图：一种可以被解读为鸭子或兔子的图画，但不能同时被解读为两者。维特根斯坦用这个例子来解释“方面观察”。
essentialism: belief that, for example, all the things referred to by a particular word must have something in common.
本质主义：相信例如，所有由特定词汇所指代的事物必须有某种共同点。
family resemblance: a pattern of overlapping and criss-crossing resemblances with no common feature shared by all members of a family.
家庭相似性：一种重叠和交叉的相似性模式，家庭中的所有成员没有共同特征。
form of life: the culture and social conventions within which language games are embedded.
生命形式：语言游戏所嵌入的文化和社会习俗。
language game: a set of conventions about language use in a particular context.
语言游戏：在特定语境中关于语言使用的一套约定。
ostensive definition: defining things by pointing to them and saying their name.
指示性定义：通过指向事物并说出它们的名称来定义事物。
private language: for Wittgenstein, a language which necessarily cannot be understood by others. He thinks that such a language is an impossibility, but is nevertheless implied by some erroneous pictures of the mind.
私人语言：对维特根斯坦来说，一种必然无法被他人理解的语言。他认为这样的语言是不可能的，但仍然被一些错误的心智图景所暗示。
David Edmonds and John Eidinow Wittgenstein’s Poker (London: Faber and Faber, 1995) is a brilliant biographical and philosophical analysis of a quarrel between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. Highly recommended.
大卫·埃德蒙兹和约翰·艾丁诺《维特根斯坦的扑克》（伦敦：法伯与法伯，1995 年）是对路德维希·维特根斯坦与卡尔·波普尔之间争吵的精彩传记和哲学分析。强烈推荐。
Hans-Johann Glock A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) is an extremely useful guide which explains Wittgenstein’s central ideas.
汉斯-约翰·格洛克 《维特根斯坦词典》（牛津：布莱克威尔，1996 年）是一本极其有用的指南，解释了维特根斯坦的核心思想。
Marie McGinn Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London: Routledge, Guidebooks series, 1997) is a clear guide to the main themes of the Wittgenstein’s book.
玛丽·麦金·维特根斯坦与《哲学研究》（伦敦：劳特利奇，指南系列，1997）是一本清晰的指南，介绍了维特根斯坦书中的主要主题。
Ray Monk Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London: Vintage, 1991) is an outstanding biography. It provides a compelling account of the personal life and thought of this unusual man.
雷·蒙克《路德维希·维特根斯坦：天才的责任》（伦敦：Vintage，1991）是一本杰出的传记。它生动地描述了这个不同寻常的人的个人生活和思想。
Thomas Kuhn the Structure of Scientific Revolutions
托马斯·库恩 《科学革命的结构》
Science is the empirical study of the world. Its peculiar combination of theory and observation is the basis of advances in medicine, computing, transport and many other aspects of our lives. It has allowed us to send astronauts into space. The rise of science in the seventeenth century was one of the most significant developments in the history of humanity. But does science progress by the gradual accumulation of knowledge, with each generation of scientists refining their understanding of the world to give a more accurate picture of reality? Up until the early 1960s this was the dominant view amongst philosophers of science. Thomas Kuhn, however, felt that it gave a misleading picture of how science actually functioned. The process is less gradual than had been appreciated, and might not even get closer to the truth. There are, he argued, alternating periods of normal science followed by periods of crisis and then, often though not inevitably, scientific revolution. In normal science, scientists agree about the rules, methods and standards for scientific research, and there is a great deal of consensus about how to do research in any particular area; in periods of revolution these rules and expectations are transformed. The monopoly on method and explanation dissolves and alternative assumptions and methodologies come to the fore. That is the main message of Kuhn’s influential study of the history of science, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), a book which has had a deep influence on the philosophy of science, and which has sold well over a million copies. Kuhn’s approach was grounded in historical research, but is essentially philosophical: he presents a theoretical account of how scientists work, and how they change their outlook fundamentally in the light of what he labels a new paradigm. He also gives a broader account of how understanding changes following what he calls a paradigm shift. Kuhn began his career as a physicist before switching his attention to the history of science and to philosophical issues that emerge from that, and his writing is rich in scientific examples. At heart, though, it is a philosophical account because of the very general claims he makes about the nature of scientific research.
科学是对世界的经验研究。它独特的理论与观察的结合是医学、计算机、交通以及我们生活中许多其他方面进步的基础。它使我们能够将宇航员送入太空。十七世纪科学的兴起是人类历史上最重要的发展之一。但科学是否通过知识的逐渐积累而进步，每一代科学家都在完善他们对世界的理解，以提供更准确的现实图景？直到 1960 年代初，这一直是科学哲学家们的主流观点。然而，托马斯·库恩认为这给出了一个误导性的科学运作图景。这个过程比人们所认识的要少渐进，甚至可能不会更接近真相。他认为，科学有交替的正常科学时期，随后是危机时期，然后，通常但并非必然，发生科学革命。 在正常科学中，科学家们对科学研究的规则、方法和标准达成一致，并且在任何特定领域内进行研究的方式有很大的共识；而在革命时期，这些规则和期望会发生转变。方法和解释的垄断解体，替代的假设和方法论浮出水面。这是库恩对科学史的影响深远的研究《科学革命的结构》（1962）的主要信息，这本书对科学哲学产生了深远的影响，并且销量超过一百万本。库恩的方法基于历史研究，但本质上是哲学性的：他提出了科学家如何工作的理论描述，以及他们如何在他所称的新范式的影响下根本改变他们的观点。他还更广泛地描述了理解如何在他所称的范式转变后发生变化。库恩最初是一名物理学家，后来转向科学史以及由此产生的哲学问题，他的写作中充满了科学实例。 从本质上讲，这是一种哲学性的论述，因为他对科学研究的本质提出了非常一般的主张。
What Kuhn was Arguing Against
库恩反对的是什么
Many philosophers and historians of science writing before Kuhn published his book believed that science progressed in a straightforward linear way, through the addition of new information that in turn led to new discoveries. Each brilliant scientist, they thought, contributed something more to the stock of science, and the scientific community’s knowledge increased as a result. Science, according to this account, is piecemeal, with successive generations adding more, bit by bit, to human understanding. The philosopher Karl Popper had given a more sophisticated account based on the notion that rather than trying to prove scientific hypotheses to be true, something which was logically impossible to achieve if the hypotheses were expressed as inductive generalisations, scientists aim to refute them with counter-evidence. Popper described progression in science as a series of bold conjectures and refutations that allowed scientists to get a better picture of the world. Science advanced, he believed, by the successive refutation of more refined empirical hypotheses. Kuhn rejected these accounts of what he called ‘development-by-accumulation’ in favour of his model of successive waves of normal science followed by intellectual crisis and subsequent revolution. For Kuhn, science didn’t follow a completely logical process of refinement, but rather was best described in sociological terms, focusing on communities of scientists, their patterns of beliefs and how they behaved.
许多在库恩出版他的书之前的哲学家和科学史家认为，科学以一种直接的线性方式进展，通过新增信息的积累进而导致新的发现。他们认为，每位杰出的科学家都为科学的知识库贡献了更多，因此科学共同体的知识也随之增加。根据这种说法，科学是零散的，连续几代人一点一点地增加人类的理解。哲学家卡尔·波普尔给出了一个更复杂的解释，基于这样一个概念：科学家并不是试图证明科学假设为真，因为如果假设被表达为归纳概括，这在逻辑上是不可能实现的，而是旨在用反证据来驳斥它们。波普尔将科学的进展描述为一系列大胆的猜想和反驳，使科学家能够更好地了解世界。他认为，科学是通过对更精细的经验假设的连续驳斥而进步的。 库恩拒绝了他所称的“积累式发展”的这些说法，转而支持他关于正常科学的连续波动、随之而来的知识危机和后续革命的模型。对库恩来说，科学并不是遵循一个完全逻辑的精炼过程，而是最好用社会学的术语来描述，关注科学家群体、他们的信念模式以及他们的行为。
Normal Science and Revolutions
正常科学与革命
According to Kuhn, much of the time scientists are doing normal science. This is science within an existing framework accepted by the scientific community. The limits of good scientific practice are set by consensus: during phases of normal science there is general agreement about how scientists working in a particular area should conduct their research, the sorts of methods and techniques that are appropriate and the language in which to describe it. There is, in such periods, little dispute about what constitutes good science. Researchers also agree about how to interpret results. Normal science doesn’t aim at or achieve radical originality, but is, rather, a form of puzzle-solving within a set of parameters set by the prevailing scientific outlook. Scientists working within a phase of normal science tend to discover more or less what they expect to discover; it is essentially a kind of ‘mopping up’ work in the light of the paradigm rather than an attempt to challenge the paradigm itself.
根据库恩的说法，科学家们大部分时间都在进行正常科学。这是在科学界接受的现有框架内进行的科学。良好科学实践的界限由共识设定：在正常科学的阶段，科学家们在特定领域内如何进行研究、适当的方法和技术以及描述这些研究的语言方面达成普遍一致。在这样的时期，关于什么构成良好科学的争议很少。研究人员也就如何解释结果达成一致。正常科学并不旨在或实现激进的原创性，而是一种在现有科学观点设定的参数内解谜的形式。在正常科学阶段工作的科学家往往发现他们预期会发现的东西；这本质上是一种在范式的指导下进行的“清理”工作，而不是挑战范式本身的尝试。
So, for example, scientists who worked within the Ptolemaic paradigm in which it was taken for granted that the Earth was the centre of the universe, carried on their research within a framework set by that assumption, interpreting any new astronomical data through the filter provided by that view. Any apparently discrepant readings were for the most part dismissed as inaccurate measurements: they were explained away rather than seen as challenges to the scientific status quo. The Ptolemaic system worked very well at predicting observations since it gives a very good approximation of planetary positions relative to each other. But there were, nevertheless, an increasing number of anomalous observations, observations which couldn’t be explained on the basis of Ptolemaic assumptions, particularly in relation to equinoxes.
例如，科学家们在托勒密范式下工作，认为地球是宇宙的中心，他们在这一假设设定的框架内进行研究，通过这一观点的过滤器来解释任何新的天文数据。任何明显不一致的读数大多被视为不准确的测量而被驳回：它们被解释为误差，而不是被视为对科学现状的挑战。托勒密系统在预测观测方面表现得非常好，因为它很好地近似了行星相对彼此的位置。然而，尽管如此，仍然有越来越多的异常观测，这些观测无法根据托勒密的假设进行解释，特别是在春分和秋分方面。
Gradually the best astronomers began to realise the shortcomings of the existing paradigm, creating an intellectual crisis and a loss of confidence in the methods and conclusions drawn from research. This wasn’t inevitable, since normal science typically generates anomalous results in need of an explanation. But at a certain point in history, the anomalies stack up in a way that throws existing science into crisis. Things could have gone in one of several directions at this point. Scientists might have found a way of explaining the anomalous results as not really anomalous – that is, they might have been able to accommodate them within the prevailing paradigm. Or else, as sometimes happens, they might simply have noted the anomalies and focused their energies on other issues, coming back to the anomalous findings at a later date. But in fact what happened was that the anomalous observations triggered an attempt to find a better explanation. Copernicus, amongst others, recognised that some observations couldn’t be explained as errors and sought a way out of this intellectual turmoil, casting around for alternative explanations and paradigms. He came to see that there was a better explanation of the available data, one based on a radically different assumption, namely that the Sun not the Earth was the centre of the universe. This eventually, despite the best efforts of the Catholic Church, became the new paradigm within which normal science could once again take place. The so-called Copernican Revolution transformed human understanding of the planets and our relation to them, and the belief that the Earth was the centre of the universe was no longer respectable. Astronomy had to readjust, and begin a new period of normal science. A similar and equally far-reaching paradigm shift occurred with Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, when previous established ways of exploring plants and animals were overturned and a new understanding of the biological world was made possible with a corresponding agenda for normal scientists working in the wake of Darwin’s theory.
逐渐地，最优秀的天文学家开始意识到现有范式的缺陷，这造成了智力危机和对研究方法及结论的信心丧失。这并不是不可避免的，因为正常科学通常会产生需要解释的异常结果。但在历史的某个时刻，这些异常以一种方式堆积起来，使现有科学陷入危机。在这一点上，事情本可以朝几个方向发展。科学家们可能会找到一种方法，将异常结果解释为并非真正的异常——也就是说，他们可能能够将其纳入现有范式中。或者，有时他们可能只是注意到这些异常，并将精力集中在其他问题上，稍后再回到这些异常发现上。但实际上发生的是，这些异常观察引发了寻找更好解释的尝试。哥白尼等人认识到一些观察无法被解释为错误，并寻求摆脱这种智力混乱，寻找替代的解释和范式。 他开始意识到可用数据有更好的解释，这种解释基于一个截然不同的假设，即太阳而不是地球是宇宙的中心。尽管天主教会做出了最大的努力，这最终成为了正常科学再次进行的新的范式。所谓的哥白尼革命改变了人类对行星及其与我们关系的理解，地球是宇宙中心的信念不再被视为可尊重的。天文学不得不重新调整，并开始一个新的正常科学时期。与达尔文的自然选择进化论相似且同样深远的范式转变发生了，当时之前建立的探索植物和动物的方式被推翻，新的生物世界理解得以实现，并为在达尔文理论之后工作的正常科学家提供了相应的议程。
Paradigm Shifts Transform what can be Observed
范式转变改变可观察的事物
Such paradigm changes don’t just jolt scientists out of their complacency, but can, Kuhn believed, create new ways of seeing. For example, again from the history of astronomy, William Herschel discovered the planet Uranus in the eighteenth century. But on at least seventeen different occasions prior to that astronomers had seen a star in the position we now know to be occupied by Uranus. Their existing framework, however, did not allow them to see that object as a planet. To a great degree their expectations influenced what they saw and they misjudged what and how far away it was. Herschel made more detailed observations, but even he initially thought he was observing a comet rather than a previously unrecognised planet. Once astronomers came to realise that this was a planet, they experienced a shift of vision that made it possible for them to discover a range of minor planets in subsequent years. Before the paradigm shift that allowed astronomers to recognise that there might be more planets, every new observation was explained in other ways; afterwards it was possible to see the solar system differently and recognise further planets for what they were. They saw the evidence much earlier than this, but failed to see planets – instead they saw comets or distant stars. Revised expectations allowed Herschel and his successors to see new planets for the first time even though evidence for their presence had been visible for many years. This, Kuhn believes, was a transformation in seeing. It is what is sometimes called a Gestalt shift in perception – as, for example, when someone presented with a playing card that consists of the Five of Hearts with the hearts painted in black instead of red may not be able to see this as anything but the Five of Hearts, because of expectations about the range of card types that might be displayed. Once he or she realises that it is a black Five of Hearts, what he sees changes dramatically, although in terms of what reaches his retina it is precisely the same. Wittgenstein used the famous duck-rabbit figure to make the same point (see p. 266).
这样的范式变化不仅使科学家们摆脱了自满，库恩认为，还可以创造新的视角。例如，再从天文学的历史来看，威廉·赫歇尔在十八世纪发现了天王星。但在此之前，天文学家们至少在十七次不同的情况下看到过一个位于我们现在知道的天王星位置的星星。然而，他们现有的框架并不允许他们将该物体视为一颗行星。在很大程度上，他们的期望影响了他们所看到的内容，并且他们错误地判断了该物体是什么以及距离有多远。赫歇尔进行了更详细的观察，但即使他最初也认为自己观察到的是一颗彗星，而不是一颗之前未被识别的行星。一旦天文学家们意识到这是一颗行星，他们经历了一次视角的转变，使他们能够在随后的几年中发现一系列小行星。在允许天文学家们认识到可能存在更多行星的范式转变之前，每一次新的观察都以其他方式进行了解释；而之后，人们能够以不同的方式看待太阳系，并将更多的行星识别为它们本身。 他们比这更早就看到了证据，但未能看到行星——相反，他们看到了彗星或遥远的星星。修正后的期望使赫歇尔及其继任者首次看到了新行星，尽管它们存在的证据已经可见多年。库恩认为，这是一种视角的转变。这有时被称为知觉的格式塔转变——例如，当某人看到一张由黑色而非红色心形组成的红心五时，可能无法将其视为其他任何东西，因为对可能展示的卡片类型的期望。一旦他或她意识到这是一张黑色的红心五，他所看到的东西就会发生戏剧性的变化，尽管在到达视网膜的内容上是完全相同的。维特根斯坦用著名的鸭兔图形来表达同样的观点（见第 266 页）。
Incommensurability of competing paradigms
竞争范式的不可比性
An important and highly controversial aspect of Kuhn’s approach to the history of scientific revolution was his claim that different scientific world views were incommensurable; that is, there was no basis for comparing them – no common currency, as it were, with which to measure them. A consequence of this view was that it would not be possible to say that one theory was an improvement on another. This seemed to threaten the idea that paradigm shifts represent progress. It seemed to imply that they were simply different from each other, and, because they typically redefined the terms in which science was discussed, defied any meaningful comparison one with another.
库恩对科学革命历史的一个重要且高度争议的方面是他声称不同的科学世界观是不可通约的；也就是说，没有比较它们的基础——没有共同的标准可以用来衡量它们。这种观点的一个结果是，无法说一个理论比另一个理论更好。这似乎威胁到了范式转变代表进步的观点。它似乎暗示它们只是彼此不同，并且由于它们通常重新定义了科学讨论的术语，因此无法进行任何有意义的比较。
Criticisms of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
对《科学革命的结构》的批评
It is a form of relativism
这是一种相对主义的形式
Kuhn’s theory has often been seen as a kind of relativism. The value of a scientific theory for Kuhn seems to be determined by how communities of scientists rate it, rather than on the question of whether it adequately describes the world, or at least is an improvement on earlier descriptions of the world. The incommensurability of different paradigms entails that there are no objective standards making one paradigm better than another. This has the unfortunate consequence that it leaves the various paradigms on a par even when they have been superseded. There is no independent world against which to check scientific results since the meaning of the explanations of the world is given by the paradigm itself. New paradigms are certainly different from the ones they replace, and deal with anomalous evidence that was a problem in the earlier paradigms, but they aren’t necessarily any closer to the truth about how the world is. Indeed Kuhn questioned whether the idea of objective truth makes sense.
库恩的理论常常被视为一种相对主义。对于库恩来说，科学理论的价值似乎是由科学家群体对其的评价决定的，而不是基于它是否充分描述了世界，或者至少是否比早期的世界描述有所改进。不同范式的不可通约性意味着没有客观标准使一个范式优于另一个。这不幸的结果是，即使某些范式已经被取代，它们仍然处于同等地位。没有独立的世界可以用来检验科学结果，因为对世界的解释的意义是由范式本身所赋予的。新的范式无疑与它们所取代的范式不同，并处理早期范式中存在的问题的异常证据，但它们并不一定更接近于关于世界本质的真理。实际上，库恩质疑客观真理的概念是否有意义。
Kuhn didn’t fully accept these sorts of challenges to his account as criticisms, and has outlined criteria for a good scientific theory such as accuracy, consistency, broadness of scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. But some commentators still argue that much of what he says leads inevitably towards an unattractive kind of relativism with the result that deciding between competing paradigms reduces to little more than a matter of group psychology. Some have even gone so far as to claim that it turns science into an irrational activity and has as a result damaged the reputation of science as compared to other ways of attempting to understand the world.
库恩并没有完全接受这些对他理论的挑战作为批评，并且概述了一个好的科学理论的标准，如准确性、一致性、广泛性、简单性和成果性。但一些评论者仍然认为，他所说的许多内容不可避免地导致了一种不吸引人的相对主义，结果是，在竞争的范式之间做出决定不过是群体心理学的问题。有些人甚至声称这使科学变成了一种非理性的活动，因此损害了科学与其他理解世界方式相比的声誉。
1922 | born in Ohio, USA. |
1962 | The Structure of Scientific Revolutions published. |
1996 | dies, Cambridge, Massachusetts. |
anomalous observations: scientific data that does not sit easily within the existing paradigm.
异常观察：不容易融入现有范式的科学数据。
Copernican revolution: the recognition that the Sun rather than the Earth was the centre of the universe – a rejection of the Ptolemaic world view.
哥白尼革命：认识到太阳而不是地球是宇宙的中心——对托勒密世界观的否定。
Gestalt shift: a change in what is seen, despite no change in the stimulus – the result of a different way of organising visual data as when someone looking at the figure of a duck-rabbit shifts from seeing it as a drawing of a duck to the position of seeing it as a rabbit.
格式转变：尽管刺激没有变化，但所见内容的变化——这是以不同方式组织视觉数据的结果，就像一个人看着鸭兔图形时，从将其视为鸭子的画作转变为将其视为兔子的状态。
incommensurable: if two theories are incommensurable there is no objective way of measuring one against the other; no common currency, as it were.
不可通约：如果两个理论是不可通约的，就没有客观的方法可以将一个与另一个进行比较；可以说没有共同的标准。
normal science: this is Kuhn’s term for what most scientists do most of the time, namely solve puzzles within an established scientific paradigm, using more or less agreed methods and terms to describe their results.
常规科学：这是库恩对大多数科学家大部分时间所做工作的术语，即在既定科学范式内解决难题，使用或多或少达成一致的方法和术语来描述他们的结果。
paradigm shift: Kuhn’s term for the dramatic revolution brought about after a period of scientific crisis, when a new set of agreed methods, assumptions and terms is used by a community of scientists.
范式转变：库恩用来描述在科学危机时期之后发生的戏剧性革命的术语，当时科学家群体使用一套新的公认方法、假设和术语。
Ptolemaic system: the view that the Earth was the centre of the Universe.
托勒密系统：地球是宇宙中心的观点。
relativism: the idea that there are no objective values, but rather that they are relative to a particular society or group. Kuhn is often accused of relativism because his theory seems to imply that different scientific paradigms are incommensurable and can only be described in relation to the scientific community’s assumptions and practices.
相对主义：即没有客观价值的观点，而是这些价值相对于特定的社会或群体。库恩常常被指责为相对主义，因为他的理论似乎暗示不同的科学范式是不可比较的，只能相对于科学共同体的假设和实践来描述。
Samir Okasha Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
萨米尔·奥卡沙 《科学哲学：非常简短的介绍》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2002 年）。
John Losee A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
约翰·洛西 《科学哲学的历史导论》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2001 年）。
John Rawls a Theory of Justice
约翰·罗尔斯 公正论
What kind of a society would you choose to live in if you didn’t know the position you would occupy within it? John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice provides the principles for constructing a fair and just society by imagining a reasonable person’s response to this question. The book, first published in 1971, transformed political philosophy. It rejuvenated the social contract tradition established by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Though a complex and in places rather dry book, it is one of the most widely read works of political philosophy of the twentieth century. Its most distinctive aspect is its use of the notion of the ‘original position’ to arrive at conclusions about fairness and justice and how we should achieve them in our social institutions.
如果你不知道自己在其中将占据什么位置，你会选择生活在什么样的社会中？约翰·罗尔斯的《正义论》提供了构建一个公平和公正社会的原则，通过想象一个理性的人对这个问题的回应。这本书首次出版于 1971 年，改变了政治哲学。它使霍布斯、洛克和卢梭建立的社会契约传统焕发了新生。尽管这本书复杂且在某些地方相当枯燥，但它是二十世纪最广泛阅读的政治哲学著作之一。它最独特的方面是使用“原初位置”的概念来得出关于公平和正义的结论，以及我们应该如何在社会制度中实现这些目标。
If you were to choose the principles which should govern the best possible society you might be biased in various ways towards your own class, profession, sexual orientation, and so on. Rawls’ way around this is to set up a thought experiment, a hypothetical situation in which all the facts about your self, and your particular desires, are hidden from you behind a veil of ignorance. You have to imagine not knowing whether or not you have a job, what sex you are, whether you have a family, where you live, how intelligent you are, whether you are an optimist, a pessimist, a drug addict. Yet at the same time you have a good grasp of politics and economics, the basis of social organisation and the laws of human psychology. You know that there are basic goods required for almost any lifestyle, and these include certain freedoms, opportunity, income and self-respect. Rawls calls this situation of ignorance about your own place in society ‘the original position’.
如果你要选择应该支配最佳社会的原则，你可能会在各种方面对自己的阶级、职业、性取向等产生偏见。罗尔斯的解决办法是设立一个思想实验，一个假设的情境，在这个情境中，关于你自己和你特定欲望的所有事实都被隐藏在无知的面纱后面。你必须想象不知道自己是否有工作，性别是什么，是否有家庭，住在哪里，智力水平如何，是否是乐观主义者、悲观主义者或毒瘾者。然而，与此同时，你对政治和经济有很好的理解，这是社会组织的基础和人类心理学的法则。你知道几乎任何生活方式都需要基本的物品，这些包括某些自由、机会、收入和自尊。罗尔斯称这种对自己在社会中位置的无知状态为“原初状态”。
In this hypothetical state of the original position, which principles would it be rational for someone to adopt for the organisation of society? The idea of asking this question is to eliminate all the non-relevant features of our actual lives which otherwise tend to intrude in our assessment of what sort of society there should be. Rawls assumes that principles rationally chosen under the conditions of the original position would have a special claim to being just ones, and that, other things being equal, we should adopt them.
在这个假设的原始状态下，个人应该采纳哪些原则来组织社会才是理性的？提出这个问题的目的是消除我们实际生活中所有与之无关的特征，这些特征往往会干扰我们对应该建立何种社会的评估。罗尔斯假设，在原始状态下理性选择的原则将具有特殊的公正性主张，并且在其他条件相等的情况下，我们应该采纳这些原则。
The principles which emerge from this process should not be controversial since if we have carried out the thought experiment effectively, there should be no difference between any individuals engaging in it. This is because in the original position all the elements that distinguish us one from another should have been removed. The principles then, should be ones on which rational participants would agree. Carrying out this thought experiment, Rawls comes up with two basic principles, one concerned with liberty, the other with the just distribution of goods. These principles embody his basic political conclusions which are liberal and egalitarian.
从这个过程得出的原则不应有争议，因为如果我们有效地进行了这个思想实验，那么参与其中的任何个体之间就不应存在差异。这是因为在原始位置，区分我们彼此的所有元素都应被去除。因此，这些原则应该是理性参与者会达成一致的原则。在进行这个思想实验时，罗尔斯提出了两个基本原则，一个与自由有关，另一个与公正分配财富有关。这些原则体现了他基本的政治结论，即自由主义和平等主义。
Unlike some social contract theorists Rawls is not saying that we must all have implicitly agreed to these principles; rather he uses the thought experiment of the original position as a way of generating basic principles for the ordering of a just society and then compares these with pre-existing intuitions in order to make fine tunings. Rawls believes that the principles for ordering society that emerge together merit the name ‘justice as fairness’ since they have been arrived at by a rational and impartial process. The first of the two principles thus generated is the liberty principle.
与一些社会契约理论家不同，罗尔斯并不是在说我们必须都隐含地同意这些原则；相反，他使用原始状态的思想实验作为生成公正社会基本原则的一种方式，然后将这些原则与先前存在的直觉进行比较，以便进行微调。罗尔斯认为，这些共同出现的社会秩序原则值得被称为“作为公平的正义”，因为它们是通过理性和公正的过程得出的。因此，生成的两个原则中的第一个是自由原则。
The liberty principle states that ‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.’ In other words, choosing behind a veil of ignorance a rational person would want everyone in the society to have the same right to basic liberties as anyone else. Otherwise that person might end up a victim of discrimination. For example, liberty of conscience, freedom to entertain whatever religious or secular beliefs you may find convincing, is a basic freedom that the state is not justified in curtailing. Only when your actions threaten others’ liberties would state intervention be justified, since your liberty in this respect would not then be compatible with equal liberty for everyone else. Even the intolerant have a right to liberty up to the point at which they endanger the equal liberty of others. The rule of law is necessary to guarantee the various liberties which each member of a society has a right to.
自由原则指出：“每个人都有权享有与所有人相容的最广泛的平等基本自由的平等权利。”换句话说，在无知之幕下选择，一个理性的人会希望社会中的每个人都拥有与其他人相同的基本自由权利。否则，这个人可能会成为歧视的受害者。例如，良心自由、自由地持有任何你认为令人信服的宗教或世俗信仰，是一种基本自由，国家没有理由加以限制。只有当你的行为威胁到他人的自由时，国家的干预才是合理的，因为在这方面你的自由将不再与其他人的平等自由相容。即使是不可容忍的人也有权享有自由，直到他们危害到他人的平等自由。法治是保障社会中每个成员享有权利的各种自由所必需的。
Rawls stipulates that the principles he puts forward as the rational choices of anyone in the original position are ordered lexically. What this means is that they are ranked in such a way that the first principle has to be satisfied before considering the second; the second before moving on to the third and so on. Here this means that the right to equal liberty is the most basic principle in his theory, and always takes priority. The demands of this principle must be met first, and are more important than the demands of the second principle. Rawls’ picture of a just society is, then, one in which a right to equal liberty for all is upheld and enforced by law.
罗尔斯规定，他提出的作为原始状态下任何人理性选择的原则是按字典顺序排列的。这意味着它们的排名方式是，必须先满足第一个原则，然后才能考虑第二个；在转向第三个之前必须满足第二个，依此类推。在这里，这意味着平等自由的权利是他理论中最基本的原则，并且始终优先考虑。这个原则的要求必须首先得到满足，并且比第二个原则的要求更重要。因此，罗尔斯对公正社会的描绘是一个所有人平等自由的权利受到法律维护和执行的社会。
The Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle and the Difference Principle
公平机会原则与差异原则
Rawls’ second principle, one concerned with the just distribution of primary goods, really consists of two principles: the fair equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle. As a whole, this second principle has lexical priority over any principles of efficiency. What this means is that justice is more important than utility.
罗尔斯的第二原则，涉及对基本商品的公正分配，实际上由两个原则组成：公平机会原则和差异原则。总体而言，这第二原则在任何效率原则之上具有词汇优先权。这意味着正义比效用更重要。
The fair equality of opportunity principle states that any social or economic inequalities associated with particular offices or jobs can only exist if these offices or jobs are open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. No one should be excluded from, for instance, the best-paid jobs, on non-relevant grounds such as sexual orientation or race. For Rawls equality of opportunity is more than mere anti-discrimination. It includes, for example, provision of education to allow all people to develop their talents. The equality of opportunity principle takes lexical priority over the other part of Rawls’ second principle, the difference principle.
公平机会平等原则指出，任何与特定职位或工作相关的社会或经济不平等只能在这些职位或工作在公平机会平等的条件下向所有人开放的情况下存在。例如，没有人应该因为与工作无关的理由，如性取向或种族，而被排除在最高薪工作之外。对于罗尔斯而言，机会平等不仅仅是反歧视。它还包括提供教育，以使所有人能够发展他们的才能。机会平等原则在罗尔斯第二原则的另一部分——差异原则之上具有优先权。
The difference principle insists that any social or economic inequalities should only be tolerated on condition that they bring the greatest benefits to the most disadvantaged members of society. This is an implementation of a strategy known as ‘maximin’. Maximin is short for ‘maximise the minimum’, which means choose the option which gives the best deal for the worst case. This is probably easier to follow if we take the example of fair wages in a just society. Imagine two situations. In the first, most people earn a high wage, but ten per cent of the population can barely earn enough to survive. In the second case, although the average standard of living is far lower, the worst off ten per cent of the population have a reasonable standard of living. For someone choosing in the original position, Rawls claims, the second of the two situations is preferable because it guarantees that everyone in the society will be achieving a reasonable standard of living: the worst off aren’t that badly off. In the first case, however, although there is a good chance of ending up quite well off, there is also a significant risk of being on a wage that barely allows you to survive. Adopting the maximin strategy, we should minimise the worst risks, and so should opt for the second case. It just isn’t worth the gamble to risk living a life in abject poverty.
差异原则坚持认为，任何社会或经济不平等只有在能够为社会中最弱势的成员带来最大利益的情况下才应被容忍。这是一个被称为“最大最小”的策略的实施。最大最小是“最大化最小值”的缩写，意味着选择能够为最坏情况提供最佳交易的选项。如果我们以公正社会中的公平工资为例，这可能更容易理解。想象两种情况。在第一种情况下，大多数人赚取高工资，但有百分之十的人口几乎无法赚到足够的生存费用。在第二种情况下，尽管平均生活水平远低于第一种情况，但最贫困的百分之十的人口却有一个合理的生活水平。罗尔斯声称，对于处于原始位置的人来说，第二种情况更可取，因为它保证了社会中的每个人都能达到合理的生活水平：最贫困的人并没有那么糟糕。然而，在第一种情况下，尽管有很大机会最终过得相当不错，但也存在着收入仅能勉强维持生存的重大风险。 采用最大最小策略，我们应该最小化最坏的风险，因此应该选择第二种情况。冒着生活在极度贫困中的风险是不值得的。
Criticisms of a Theory of Justice
对正义理论的批评
The original position
原始位置
A major criticism of the notion of the original position is that it is psychologically impossible to rid yourself of the knowledge of who and what you are, even in a thought experiment. Inevitably your prejudices evade the censor. Some critics of Rawls’ approach have claimed that all Rawls has really done with the thought experiment of the original position is confirmed his pre-existing liberal prejudices and given them the aura of rationally chosen principles. It is unrealistic to think that you can simply imagine away what you know and what is so central to your individual existence.
对原始位置概念的一个主要批评是，即使在思想实验中，心理上也不可能摆脱对自己是谁以及是什么的知识。不可避免地，你的偏见会逃避审查。对罗尔斯方法的一些批评者声称，罗尔斯在原始位置的思想实验中所做的只是确认了他先前存在的自由主义偏见，并赋予它们理性选择原则的光环。认为你可以简单地想象出你所知道的以及对你个人存在如此重要的东西是不现实的。
In Rawls’ defence it might be argued that all this shows is the difficulty of using the thought experiment effectively. It may yet be the best device we have for generating principles for ordering society, even if, because of features of human psychology, it is likely to be imperfect in many respects. Rawls never claimed that his method was infallible. But it is easy to see that it could eliminate some biased principles as obvious non-starters.
在罗尔斯的辩护中，可以说这一切只是显示了有效使用思想实验的困难。即使由于人类心理的特征，它在许多方面可能不完美，它仍然可能是我们用来生成社会秩序原则的最佳工具。罗尔斯从未声称他的方法是万无一失的。但很容易看出，它可以消除一些明显不合适的偏见原则。
Nevertheless, the original position has built into it some basic assumptions. Rawls derives principles from it that present a vision of a liberal, tolerant society within which people can live side by side and pursue their own conception of what is good and right. The way the thought experiment is set up gives a high priority to autonomy, our capacity to make decisions for ourselves about how our lives should be led. Those from cultural or religious traditions which put a higher emphasis on hierarchy, tradition and obedience might see little reason for engaging in the thought experiment of the original position since it has this built-in bias towards a liberal and Kantian conception of what it is to be a rational moral agent.
然而，原始位置内置了一些基本假设。罗尔斯从中推导出原则，展现了一个自由、宽容的社会愿景，在这个社会中，人们可以并肩生活，追求自己对善与正义的理解。这个思想实验的设定高度重视自主性，即我们为自己决定生活方式的能力。来自文化或宗教传统的人，如果更强调等级、传统和服从，可能会觉得参与原始位置的思想实验没有太大理由，因为它对自由和康德式的理性道德代理人的概念有内在的偏见。
Utilitarian objection
功利主义反对意见
Utilitarians might object to Rawls’ principles on the grounds that they don’t necessarily maximise happiness. Utilitarians believe that the morally right action in any circumstance is the one that is most likely to produce the maximum amount of happiness. One of Rawls’ main aims in writing A Theory of Justice was to develop a coherent alternative to this sort of utilitarian calculation. Defending a range of rights to freedom, and in particular implementing the difference principle, is unlikely to maximise happiness. A direct consequence of insisting that the only grounds for inequalities are that they benefit the worst off is that many social solutions which produce a far greater total or aggregate happiness will be ruled out.
功利主义者可能会反对罗尔斯的原则，理由是它们不一定能最大化幸福。功利主义者认为，在任何情况下，道德上正确的行为是最有可能产生最大幸福的行为。罗尔斯在撰写《正义论》时的主要目标之一是发展一种与这种功利主义计算相一致的替代方案。捍卫一系列自由权利，特别是实施差异原则，不太可能最大化幸福。坚持不平等的唯一理由是它们使最贫困者受益的直接后果是，许多产生更大总幸福或整体幸福的社会解决方案将被排除在外。
Rawls’ response to utilitarian approaches to society is that since you do not know what position in society you will occupy when you choose in the original position, the rational approach is to eliminate any risk of your leading an unpleasant life. Utilitarianism, at least in its simplest forms, doesn’t safeguard basic human rights and liberties; it would not be rational for you to choose it in the original position. Rawls’ approach emphasises that there can be more important goals than simply achieving the highest possible aggregate happiness.
罗尔斯对功利主义社会观的回应是，由于在原始位置选择时你不知道自己在社会中将处于什么位置，理性的做法是消除任何过上不愉快生活的风险。功利主义，至少在其最简单的形式中，并没有保障基本人权和自由；在原始位置选择它对你来说并不理性。罗尔斯的方法强调，除了实现尽可能高的总体幸福之外，还有更重要的目标。
Gambling versus playing safe
赌博与稳妥游戏
Adopting the maximin strategy is a way of playing safe. It guarantees that the worst off benefit from any inequalities built into social institutions. Yet many of us see the point in gambling, and will risk some discomfort for the chance of a substantial pay off. Why is it not rational in the original position to choose a society in which there is a high probability that I will do very well, even though I may in fact do badly? To a gambler this may seem preferable to the safe bet of the restricted inequalities that arise from application of the difference principle.
采用最大最小策略是一种安全的玩法。它保证了在社会制度中内置的不平等中，最糟糕的情况也能受益。然而，我们中的许多人看到赌博的意义，并愿意冒一些不适以获得可观的回报。为什么在原始位置选择一个我有很高概率会表现良好的社会，而尽管我实际上可能表现不佳，这在理性上是不可行的？对一个赌徒来说，这似乎比根据差异原则产生的有限不平等的安全赌注更可取。
Rawls’ response is that the gambler’s strategy is too risky; but then the gambler thinks that Rawls’ approach is too conservative.
罗尔斯的回应是赌徒的策略太冒险；但赌徒认为罗尔斯的方法太保守。
Libertarian objection
自由意志主义者的反对意见
Libertarian philosophers, such as Robert Nozick (1938–), have argued that beyond preserving some basic rights, the state should not be heavily involved in controlling social institutions. Nozick argues that only a minimal state is justified, one which protects individuals against theft and enforces contracts, but that any more extensive activity than this will violate some people’s rights not to be coerced. Rawls’ just society, in contrast, would, for example, tax property in a way that corrects the distribution of wealth.
自由意志主义哲学家，如罗伯特·诺齐克（1938–），认为除了维护一些基本权利外，国家不应过多地介入控制社会机构。诺齐克认为，只有一个最小化的国家是合理的，这个国家保护个人免受盗窃并执行合同，但任何超出这一范围的活动都会侵犯一些人不受强迫的权利。相比之下，罗尔斯的公正社会将以纠正财富分配的方式对财产征税。
Here Nozick assumes that the right not to be coerced is more fundamental than rights to equality of various kinds, and that rights such as property rights override any other considerations. Rawls makes different assumptions: he thinks that his principles, and in particular his principle of a right to equal liberty, are the bedrock of a just society. These represent two contrasting and incompatible approaches to political philosophy.
在这里，诺齐克假设不受强迫的权利比各种平等权利更为根本，并且像财产权这样的权利优先于其他任何考虑。罗尔斯则做出不同的假设：他认为他的原则，特别是平等自由的权利原则，是一个公正社会的基石。这代表了两种对政治哲学的对立和不兼容的观点。
1921 | John Rawls born. |
1971 | Publishes A Theory of Justice. |
1993 | Publishes Political Liberalism in which he further develops his theory of justice. |
difference principle: the principle that any social or economic inequalities should only be tolerated on condition that they bring the greatest benefits to the most disadvantaged members of society.
差异原则：任何社会或经济不平等只应在其为社会中最弱势成员带来最大利益的条件下被容忍。
libertarianism: a form of liberalism which stresses free choice above all. Libertarians oppose constraints on free choice imposed by political institutions and argue for a minimal state that simply protects against the use of force and theft.
自由意志主义：一种强调自由选择至上的自由主义形式。自由意志主义者反对政治机构对自由选择的限制，并主张一个仅仅保护免受暴力和盗窃的最小国家。
maximin principle: short for ‘maximise the minimum’, which means choosing the option which gives the best deal in the worst case.
极小化原则：即“最大化最小值”的缩写，意味着选择在最坏情况下提供最佳交易的选项。
original position: the situation of ignorance about your place in society which is the starting point for Rawls’ thought experiment.
原始位置：对你在社会中地位的无知，这也是罗尔斯思想实验的起点。
primary goods: the basic requirements for a reasonable life, such as food and shelter, but also various freedoms, opportunities and selfrespect.
初级商品：合理生活的基本需求，如食物和住所，但也包括各种自由、机会和自尊。
utilitarianism: the view that the morally right action in any circumstance is the one which will maximise happiness.
功利主义：在任何情况下，道德上正确的行为是能够最大化幸福的行为。
veil of ignorance: in Rawls’ thought experiment when we choose the kind of society we want we do not know what our position will be in that society: he uses the image of concealment with a veil.
无知之幕：在罗尔斯的思想实验中，当我们选择我们想要的社会类型时，我们并不知道我们在那个社会中的位置：他使用了用面纱遮掩的形象。
Chandran Kukathas and Philip Petit Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 1990) is a clear introduction to Rawls’ work; it includes an assessment of some of his publications since A Theory of Justice.
Chandran Kukathas 和 Philip Petit 的《罗尔斯：正义理论及其批评者》（剑桥：Polity，1990）是对罗尔斯工作的清晰介绍；它包括对自《正义理论》以来他的一些出版物的评估。
Norman Daniels (ed.) Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975) is a wide-ranging collection of articles, some quite difficult.
诺曼·丹尼尔斯（编）《阅读罗尔斯：正义理论的批判研究》（牛津：布莱克威尔，1975）是一本广泛的文章集，其中一些相当困难。
John Rawls Political Liberalism (1993) is Rawls’ revision of his theory.
约翰·罗尔斯的《政治自由主义》（1993）是罗尔斯对其理论的修订。
Ben Rogers outlines the salient features of John Rawls’ life and also gives an overview of his philosophy in his article ‘Behind the Veil: John Rawls and the Revival of Liberalism’ in Lingua Franca, July/August 1999, pp. 57–64.
本·罗杰斯在他的文章《面纱背后：约翰·罗尔斯与自由主义的复兴》中概述了约翰·罗尔斯生活的显著特征，并对他的哲学进行了概述，发表于《Lingua Franca》，1999 年 7/8 月，第 57-64 页。
a posteriori argument for God’s existence see design argument
后验论证上帝存在的论据见设计论证
a posteriori, synthetic 128
后验的，合成 128
a priori, analytic 128
先验，分析 128
a priori argument for God’s existence see cosmological argument
上帝存在的先验论证见宇宙论证
a priori concepts 129–130, 131
先验概念 129–130, 131
a priori, synthetic 127–128, 209
先验的，综合的 127–128，209
abandonment 248, 250, 253
放弃 248, 250, 253
Abraham 249
亚伯拉罕 249
actions, voluntary/involuntary 24–25
行为，自愿/非自愿 24–25
aesthetic approach to life 175–176, 178, 181
生活的审美方法 175–176, 178, 181
Agathocles 40
阿伽托克利斯 40
Age of Reason, The (Paine) 141
理性时代，托马斯·潘恩 141
alienation 185, 186
异化 185, 186
altruism 28, 29, 172, 204
利他主义 28, 29, 172, 204
American Declaration of Independence 91
美国独立宣言 91
analytic statements 127–128, 131, 209
分析性陈述 127–128, 131, 209
anguish 248–249, 253
痛苦 248–249, 253
anthropomorphism 112, 116
拟人化 112, 116
anti-egalitarianism 194
反平等主义 194
anti-feminism 195
反女权主义 195
anti-semitism 203
反犹太主义 203
appearance 193, 207–208
外观 193, 207–208
aristocracy 122, 124
贵族 122, 124
Aristotle 223
亚里士多德 223
and Boethius 32
和博埃修斯 32
Nicomachean Ethics 19–26, 32, 137; action and culpability 24–25; akrasia 25–26; contemplative life 26; eudaimonia: a happy life 20–21, 25, 27, 28; function of a human being 22; Golden Mean 23–24, 29, 30; the virtues 22–23
尼科马科伦理学 19–26, 32, 137；行为与过失 24–25；无能自制 25–26；沉思生活 26；幸福：快乐的生活 20–21, 25, 27, 28；人类的功能 22；中庸 23–24, 29, 30；美德 22–23
Nicomachean Ethics: criticisms of 26–29
尼科马科伦理学：对 26-29 的批评
art 150–151, 225–232; mimetic 14, 17
艺术 150–151, 225–232; 模仿 14, 17
asceticism 152, 153, 154, 201, 203
苦行主义 152, 153, 154, 201, 203
atheism 78, 97, 115–116, 206, 221
无神论 78, 97, 115–116, 206, 221
Augustine, Saint 267
圣奥古斯丁 267
auxiliaries 8, 10, 11, 17
辅助设备 8, 10, 11, 17
Ayer, A.J.
阿耶，A.J.
Language, Truth and Logic 213–221; ethics 219–221; mathematics 219; metaphysics and poetry 217; philosophy 217; problem of induction 218; religion 221; strong and weak senses of verifiability 216; verification principle 213, 214–216, 219
语言、真理与逻辑 213–221；伦理学 219–221；数学 219；形而上学与诗歌 217；哲学 217；归纳问题 218；宗教 221；可验证性的强弱意义 216；验证原则 213, 214–216, 219
Language, Truth and Logic: criticisms of 221–223
语言、真理与逻辑：对 221–223 的批评
bad conscience 200–201, 204
坏良心 200–201, 204
bad faith see self-deception
恶意见自我欺骗
Being and Nothingness (Sartre) see Sartre, Jean Paul
存在与虚无（萨特）见萨特，让-保罗
being for-itself/in-itself 234, 236–237, 242
为自身/在自身 234, 236–237, 242
Bentham, Jeremy 167, 168
边沁，杰里米 167, 168
Berkeley, George 80, 88, 131, 208, 211
伯克利，乔治 80, 88, 131, 208, 211
Berlin, Isaiah 41–42, 183
柏林，以赛亚书 41–42，183
Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche) see Nietzsche, Friedrich
超越善恶（尼采）见尼采，弗里德里希
body politic 118
政治体 118
Boethius, Ancius
博埃修斯，安修斯
The Consolation of Philosophy 31–35; chance and happiness 32–33; evil and reward 33; God and free will 33–35; Philosophy 32
哲学的安慰 31–35；机遇与幸福 32–33；邪恶与奖赏 33；上帝与自由意志 33–35；哲学 32
The Consolation of Philosophy: criticisms of 35
哲学的安慰：对 35 的批评
Borgia, Cesare 39, 40
博尔贾，切萨雷 39, 40
Boyle, Robert 83
博伊尔，罗伯特 83
Buddhism 152
佛教 152
Burke, Edmund 143–146
伯克，爱德蒙 143–146
capitalism 184
资本主义 184
Cartesian Doubt 58, 59–60, 61
笛卡尔怀疑 58, 59–60, 61
Cartesian Dualism 55, 62
笛卡尔二元论 55, 62
categorical imperative 135–137, 138, 139
范畴命令 135–137, 138, 139
causation 102–103, 126
因果关系 102–103, 126
cause and effect 102–103, 126
因果关系 102–103, 126
cave, parable of (Plato) 5–6, 12
洞穴，比喻（柏拉图） 5–6, 12
censorship 71, 159–160
审查 71, 159–160
Chomsky, Noam 87
乔姆斯基，诺姆 87
Christianity 197, 200, 248
基督教 197, 200, 248
Cicero 109
西塞罗 109
civil laws 67, 70, 72
民法 67, 70, 72
civil society, 95–96, 98
公民社会，95–96，98
Cleanthes 110–111, 113, 115
克伦提斯 110–111, 113, 115
Cobbett, William 141–142
科贝特，威廉 141–142
Cogito, the 54–55, 56, 58–59
Cogito，54–55，56，58–59
Collingwood, R.G.
科林伍德，R.G.
The Principles of Art 225–232; art/craft distinction 227, 231; art proper 229, 231; art so-called 228; entertainment art 228; essentialism 230; experiencing art 229; expression of emotion 229, 231; magic art 228; moralizing 230; technical theory of art 226, 227, 231
艺术原则 225–232；艺术/工艺区分 227, 231；真正的艺术 229, 231；所谓艺术 228；娱乐艺术 228；本质主义 230；体验艺术 229；情感表达 229, 231；魔法艺术 228；道德化 230；艺术的技术理论 226, 227, 231
The Principles of Art: criticisms of 230–231
艺术原则：对 230-231 的批评
Common Sense (Paine) 142–143
常识（潘恩）142–143
commonwealth 65, 71, 72, 95, 98
联邦 65, 71, 72, 95, 98
compact see social contract
紧凑的社会契约
compatibilism 104, 107
兼容论 104, 107
consciousness 234; non-thetic 239, 243
意识 234；非主题 239，243
consequentialism 139
后果主义 139
constant conjunction 104
恒常结合 104
contemplative life 26, 27
沉思的生活 26, 27
contiguity 101, 107
接近性 101, 107
Copernican Revolution, the 272
哥白尼革命，272
Copernicus 126, 272
哥白尼 126, 272
corpuscularian hypothesis 83, 89
粒子假说 83, 89
cosmological argument for the existence of God 56–57, 60, 61, 114–115, 116
宇宙论证上帝存在的论据 56–57, 60, 61, 114–115, 116
Critique of Pure Reason, The (Kant) see Kant, Immanuel
纯粹理性批判，康德 见 康德，伊曼努尔
cruelty 37, 38, 39, 40, 41
残酷 37, 38, 39, 40, 41
Darwin, Charles 113, 272
达尔文，查尔斯 113, 272
democracy 13–14, 17, 122, 124
民主 13–14, 17, 122, 124
deontological moral theory 133, 140
义务论道德理论 133, 140
Descartes, René 47, 76, 196
笛卡尔，雷内 47, 76, 196
Meditations 51–58, 264; beyond doubt 57–58; Cartesian Doubt 52, 53–54, 57–58, 61; Cartesian Dualism 55, 62; the Cogito 54–55; evidence of the senses 52–53; evil demon 53–54; God 56–57, 60; wax example 55
沉思 51–58, 264; 毫无疑问 57–58; 笛卡尔怀疑 52, 53–54, 57–58, 61; 笛卡尔二元论 55, 62; 我思故我在 54–55; 感官证据 52–53; 邪恶的恶魔 53–54; 上帝 56–57, 60; 蜡的例子 55
Meditations: criticisms of 58–61; Cartesian circle 59–60, 61
《沉思录》：对 58-61 的批评；笛卡尔循环 59-60，61
design argument for the existence of God 109, 110–111, 116
上帝存在的设计论证 109, 110–111, 116
despair 247, 249–250, 253
绝望 247, 249–250, 253
determinism (see also free will) 36, 186–187
决定论（另见自由意志）36, 186–187
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hume) see Hume, David
关于自然宗教的对话（休谟）见休谟，大卫
Diapsalmata 176
difference principle 279–280, 283
差异原则 279–280, 283
dikaiosunē (justice) 8, 17
公义 (justice) 8, 17
Discourses on Livy (Machiavelli) 40
《论李维》（马基雅维利） 40
disinterestedness 150, 154
无私 150, 154
divine right of kings 68, 72, 92, 98, 122
君权神授 68, 72, 92, 98, 122
division of labour 8, 185, 187, 189
劳动分工 8, 185, 187, 189
doctrine of the mean see Golden Mean
中庸的教义见黄金中庸
dreams 53, 58, 238
梦想 53, 58, 238
duck-rabbit 266, 268, 273, 275
鸭兔 266, 268, 273, 275
duty-based moral theory 133, 140
基于义务的道德理论 133, 140
egoism 29, 170, 173
自我主义 29, 170, 173
Either/Or (Kierkegaard) see Kierkegaard, Søren
Either/Or (基尔凯郭尔) 见基尔凯郭尔，索伦
emotions 77, 137; pathological/practical 134–135, 138–140
情感 77, 137; 病理/实践 134–135, 138–140
emotivism 219–221, 223
情感主义 219–221, 223
empirical statements 215, 216
经验陈述 215, 216
empiricism 55, 62, 80, 89, 99–100, 157
经验主义 55, 62, 80, 89, 99–100, 157
Engels, Friedrich see Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich
恩格斯，弗里德里希见马克思，卡尔和恩格斯，弗里德里希
Enlightenment 178
启蒙 178
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, An (Hume) see Hume, David
人类理解的探究，安（休谟）见休谟，大卫
epistemology 51, 62, 80, 206
认识论 51, 62, 80, 206
equality of opportunity 279–280
机会平等 279–280
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, An (Locke) see Locke, John
人类理解论，约翰·洛克
Essays (Montaigne) see Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de
论文（蒙田）见蒙田，米歇尔·艾克姆·德
essentialism 223, 225, 230, 235, 240
本质主义 223, 225, 230, 235, 240
ethical approach to life 177–178, 181
生活的伦理方法 177–178, 181
ethical judgements 220–221
伦理判断 220–221
ethics 21, 27, 137–138, 168, 219–221
伦理 21, 27, 137–138, 168, 219–221
Ethics (Spinoza) see Spinoza, Baruch
伦理学（斯宾诺莎）见斯宾诺莎，巴鲁赫
Euclid 74
欧几里得 74
eudaimonia (happiness) 20–21, 25, 27, 28, 29
幸福 (eudaimonia) 20–21, 25, 27, 28, 29
eugenics 9
优生学 9
evil 33, 104, 113–114, 191
邪恶 33, 104, 113–114, 191
evolution 113
进化 113
executive role of government 121, 124
政府的执行角色 121, 124
existential psychoanalysis 241
存在主义心理分析 241
existentialism 27, 178–179, 233, 242, 245–246, 253
存在主义 27, 178–179, 233, 242, 245–246, 253
Existentialism and Humanism (Sartre) see Sartre, Jean Paul
存在主义与人本主义（萨特）见萨特，让-保罗
facticity 235, 238, 243
事实性 235, 238, 243
fairness, justice as 277–279
公平，正义如 277–279
fallibility 160, 164
错误性 160, 164
falsificationism 259
伪造主义 259
family resemblance terms 263, 268
家族相似性术语 263, 268
Feuerbach, Ludwig 183
费尔巴哈，路德维希 183
Filmer, Robert 92
first cause argument for the existence of God see cosmological argument
第一因论证上帝存在的理由见宇宙论证
First Treatise of Government (Locke) 92
政府论第一篇（洛克）92
foreknowledge 34
预知 34
Forms, theory of (Plato) 6, 12–13, 16, 17, 26, 150–151
形式，理论（柏拉图）6，12–13，16，17，26，150–151
forms of life 262, 268
生命形式 262, 268
Foucault, Michel 190
福柯，米歇尔 190
free will 33–35, 77, 151–152; Hume and 103–104; Marx and 186–187; Sartre and 235–236, 241–242
自由意志 33–35, 77, 151–152; 休谟与 103–104; 马克思与 186–187; 萨特与 235–236, 241–242
freedom 76–77, 78, 93; civil 119, 120, 123; Mill and 157, 158, 159–160, 162, 163–164; Rousseau and 119, 120, 123; Sartre and 235–236, 236, 241–242, 246, 251
自由 76–77, 78, 93; 公民 119, 120, 123; 密尔和 157, 158, 159–160, 162, 163–164; 卢梭和 119, 120, 123; 萨特和 235–236, 236, 241–242, 246, 251
freedom of speech 159–160, 162–163
言论自由 159–160, 162–163
French Revolution, the 141, 143, 144, 145
法国大革命，141，143，144，145
Freud, Sigmund 190, 193, 194, 200, 238–239
弗洛伊德，西格蒙德 190, 193, 194, 200, 238–239
Gay Science, The (Nietzsche) 197
《快乐的科学》（尼采）197
genealogical method see genealogy
家谱方法见家谱
genealogy 197, 198, 201, 204
家谱 197, 198, 201, 204
general will, doctrine of 119–120, 121, 123, 124
一般意志，理论 119–120, 121, 123, 124
genetic fallacy 202
遗传谬误 202
Gestalt shift 273, 275; see also duck-rabbit
格式转变 273, 275; 另见鸭兔
German Ideology, The: Part One (Marx and Engels) see Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich
德国意识形态，第一部分（马克思和恩格斯）见马克思，卡尔和恩格斯，弗里德里希
God 56, 75, 81, 96–97, 221; argument from design 109, 110–111, 116; Boethius and 33–35; cosmological argument 56–57, 60, 61, 114–115, 116; ‘death of’ 197, 243; and free will 33–35; Hume and 98, 103–104; and laws of nature 92–93, 98; Locke and 81, 86; ontological argument 56–57, 59, 60, 62; and Pantheism 75–76; Spinoza and 75–76, 77; trademark argument 56, 59, 60, 62
上帝 56, 75, 81, 96–97, 221; 设计论证 109, 110–111, 116; 博伊提乌斯和 33–35; 宇宙论证 56–57, 60, 61, 114–115, 116; “死亡的” 197, 243; 和自由意志 33–35; 休谟和 98, 103–104; 和自然法则 92–93, 98; 洛克和 81, 86; 存在论证 56–57, 59, 60, 62; 和泛神论 75–76; 斯宾诺莎和 75–76, 77; 商标论证 56, 59, 60, 62
Golden Mean 23–24, 29, 30
黄金分割 23–24, 29, 30
good 191–192; Form of the 13, 32, 35
好的 191–192; 形式的 13, 32, 35
government 91, 95–96, 121–122; by consent 95–96; executive role 121, 124
政府 91, 95–96, 121–122; 通过同意 95–96; 行政角色 121, 124
Greatest Happiness principle 157, 168, 169, 173
最大幸福原则 157, 168, 169, 173
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, The (Kant) see Kant, Immanuel
道德形而上学的基础，康德 见 康德，伊曼努尔
Guardians of the state 8–9, 14, 17
国家守护者 8–9, 14, 17
Gyges, ring of 7
吉吉斯，七号戒指
happiness 20–21, 32–33, 78, 157; Rawls and 281; utilitarianism and 167, 168–169, 169–170
幸福 20–21, 32–33, 78, 157; 罗尔斯和 281; 功利主义和 167, 168–169, 169–170
harm principle (Mill) 157–159, 161, 162, 164
伤害原则（密尔）157–159, 161, 162, 164
hedonism 168, 173, 175
享乐主义 168, 173, 175
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 183, 257–258
黑格尔，乔治·威廉·弗里德里希 183, 257–258
Hermippus 110
Herschel, William 272–273
赫歇尔，威廉 272–273
Hinduism 152
印度教 152
historical materialism 183, 184, 186, 189
历史唯物主义 183, 184, 186, 189
historicism 259
历史主义 259
Hitler, Adolf 252
希特勒，阿道夫 252
Hobbes, Thomas
霍布斯，托马斯
Leviathan 64–69; laws of nature 66, 72; prisoner’s dilemma 68–69; social contract 67; sovereign 67–68; state of nature 65–66, 70–71, 72
利维坦 64–69；自然法则 66, 72；囚徒困境 68–69；社会契约 67；主权 67–68；自然状态 65–66, 70–71, 72
Leviathan: criticisms of 69–71
利维坦：对 69-71 的批评
homunculus problem 88, 89, 106
人造人问题 88, 89, 106
human nature 26–27, 38, 69–70, 104, 246
人性 26–27, 38, 69–70, 104, 246
see also state of nature
另见自然状态
humanism 246–247, 253
人文主义 246–247, 253
Hume, David 99, 109, 127, 210, 213, 218, 218, 265
休谟，大卫 99, 109, 127, 210, 213, 218, 218, 265
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 109–116; characters 110; design argument 110–111; first cause argument 114–115; was Hume an atheist? 115–116
《自然宗教对话》109–116；角色 110；设计论证 110–111；第一因论证 114–115；休谟是无神论者吗？ 115–116
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: criticisms of the design argument 111–114
关于自然宗教的对话：对设计论的批评 111–114
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 99–106; association of ideas 101–102; causation 102–103; free will 103–104; Hume’s fork 106; miracles 105–106; origin of ideas 100–101
人类理解的探究 99–106；思想的联想 101–102；因果关系 102–103；自由意志 103–104；休谟的分叉 106；奇迹 105–106；思想的起源 100–101
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: criticisms of 106–107
人类理解的探究：对 106-107 的批评
idea/s 82–83, 83–84, 87–88, 90; association of 101–102; simple and complex 100–101, 107
ideology 185–186, 187–188, 189
意识形态 185–186, 187–188, 189
‘Immediate Stages of the Erotic’ (Kierkegaard) 177
《情色的直接阶段》（基尔凯郭尔）177
immorality 11, 43, 48, 49
不道德 11, 43, 48, 49
impressions 100, 101, 107
印象 100, 101, 107
incommensurability 27, 30
不可比性 27, 30
induction 103, 106, 108, 210, 218
感应 103, 106, 108, 210, 218
infallibility see fallibility
无误性见可错性
innatism 80, 81–82, 87, 90
先天主义 80, 81–82, 87, 90
instinctive beliefs 208
本能信念 208
instrumental value 162
工具价值 162
intelligent design 112, 115
智能设计 112, 115
interactionism see Cartesian Dualism
交互主义见笛卡尔二元论
intrinsic value 162
内在价值 162
introspection 59
内省 59
Jesus Christ 109, 135
耶稣基督 109, 135
just society 277–278, 282
公正社会 277–278, 282
justice 17, 33, 65; fairness as 277–279; Plato and 7, 8, 10, 11, 13–14, 15
正义 17, 33, 65; 公平 277–279; 柏拉图 7, 8, 10, 11, 13–14, 15
Kant, Immanuel 45, 192, 211, 249, 250
康德，伊曼努尔 45, 192, 211, 249, 250
Critique of Pure Reason 126–130; appearances and the thing-in-itself 128–129; categories 129–130; space/time 129; synthetic a priori 127–128, 209; transcendental deduction 130, 132
《纯粹理性批判》126–130；现象与物自身 128–129；范畴 129–130；空间/时间 129；综合先验 127–128，209；先验推导 130，132
Critique of Pure Reason: criticisms of 130–131
《纯粹理性批判》：第 130-131 页的批评
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 133–137; categorical imperative 135–137, 138, 139; duty and inclination 134–135; good will 133–134; Kant, Aristotle and Mill 137; kingdom of ends 136–137, 140; maxims 135, 136, 138, 140; treat people as ends 136; universal moral law 135–136, 140
《道德形而上学的基础》133–137；绝对命令 135–137,138, 139；义务与倾向 134–135；善意 133–134；康德、亚里士多德与穆尔 137；目的王国 136–137, 140；格言 135, 136, 138, 140；将人视为目的 136；普遍道德法则 135–136, 140
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals: criticisms of 137–139
《道德形而上学的基础：对 137-139 的批评》
Kierkegaard, Søren 195
基尔凯戈尔，索伦 195
Either/Or 174–180; aesthetic approach to life 175–177; crop rotation 176, 182; Either 175; ethical approach to life 177–178; pseudonymous authorship 174–175, 181
Either/Or 174–180；生活的美学方法 175–177；轮作 176, 182；Either 175；生活的伦理方法 177–178；化名作者 174–175, 181
Either/Or: criticisms of 180–181
Either/Or: 对 180–181 的批评
Either/Or: readings of 178–180; case for the ethical 179; existentialist interpretation 178–179; thinly veiled autobiography 179–180
或然性：178-180 的阅读；伦理的案例 179；存在主义解读 178-179；薄薄掩饰的自传 179-180
kingdom of ends 136–137, 140
目的王国 136–137, 140
knowledge 6, 52, 80, 81; a priori 209, 211; by acquaintance/design 208–209; dangerous 193; Russell and 207–208, 208–209, 209–210
知识 6, 52, 80, 81; 先验 209, 211; 通过相识/设计 208–209; 危险 193; 罗素和 207–208, 208–209, 209–210
Kuhn, Thomas
库恩，托马斯
The Structure of Scientific Revolution 269–276; incommensurability of paradigms 273; normal science 271–272; paradigm shifts 270, 272–273; relativism 274
科学革命的结构 269–276；范式的不可通约性 273；常规科学 271–272；范式转变 270, 272–273；相对主义 274
The Structure of Scientific Revolution: criticisms of 274
科学革命的结构：对 274 的批评
Kundera, Milan 191
库德拉，米兰 191
language 86–87, 214–215, 217, 261–262; language games 262, 268; private language argument 263–266, 268
语言 86–87, 214–215, 217, 261–262; 语言游戏 262, 268; 私人语言论证 263–266, 268
Language Acquisition Device 87
语言习得装置 87
Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer) see Ayer, A.J.
语言、真理与逻辑（艾耶尔）见艾耶尔，A.J.
laws of nature 66, 70, 92–93, 94, 95, 97, 105
自然法则 66, 70, 92–93, 94, 95, 97, 105
legislator 120–121, 124
立法者 120–121, 124
Leibniz, G.W. 81, 87, 211
莱布尼茨，G.W. 81, 87, 211
Leviathan (Hobbes) see Hobbes, Thomas
利维坦（霍布斯）见霍布斯，托马斯
libertarianism 282, 283
自由意志主义 282, 283
liberty principle: Mill 157–159; Rawls 278–279
自由原则：密尔 157–159；罗尔斯 278–279
liveliness of impressions 100
印象的生动性 100
Locke, John 119, 207, 277
洛克，约翰 119, 207, 277
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 80–87, 100, 106; ideas 82–83; language 86–87; no innate principles 81–82, 87; personal identity 84–86, 88–89; primary and secondary qualities 83–84, 87–88
关于人类理解的论文 80–87, 100, 106; 思想 82–83; 语言 86–87; 无先天原则 81–82, 87; 个人身份 84–86, 88–89; 主要和次要特性 83–84, 87–88
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: criticisms of 87–89
关于人类理解的论文：对 87-89 的批评
First Treatise of Government 92
政府论第一篇 92
Second Treatise of Government 91–96; civil society 95–96; First and Second Treatises 92; money 94–95; property 93–94; rebellion 96; state of nature and laws of nature 92–93, 97
政府的第二篇论著 91–96；公民社会 95–96；第一和第二篇论著 92；货币 94–95；财产 93–94；叛乱 96；自然状态和自然法则 92–93, 97
Second Treatise of Government: criticisms of 96–97
政府的第二论：对 96-97 的批评
logical positivism 213, 223
逻辑实证主义 213, 223
love 134–135, 140, 240
爱 134–135, 140, 240
Machiavelli, Niccolò
马基雅维利，尼科洛
Discourses on Livy 40–41
《论李维》40–41
The Prince 37–40; Cesare Borgia versus Agathocles 40; human nature 38; virtù 39
王子 37–40；切萨雷·博尔贾与阿卡托克勒斯 40；人性 38；美德 39
The Prince: criticisms of 42–43
王子：对 42-43 的批评
The Prince: interpretations of 40–42; amoral? 41; dirty hands in politics 42; Machiavelli’s originality 41–42; satirical? 40–41
《王子》：对 40-42 的解读；不道德？41；政治中的肮脏手段 42；马基雅维利的独创性 41-42；讽刺性？40-41
Machiavellian 37
马基雅维利主义 37
magnificent myth (Plato) 10, 16
宏伟的神话（柏拉图）10, 16
man, concept of 85, 89
人，85 的概念，89
Mann, Thomas 191
曼，托马斯 191
Marcel, Gabriel 246
马塞尔，加布里埃尔 246
Marx, Karl 193
马克思，卡尔 193
‘Theses on Feuerbach’ 184
《费尔巴哈论》184
Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich
马克思，卡尔 和 恩格斯，弗里德里希
The German Ideology, Part One 183–186; division of labour 185, 187, 189; historical materialism 183, 184, 186, 189; ideology 185–186; revolution 186, 188
德国意识形态，第一部分 183–186；劳动分工 185, 187, 189；历史唯物主义 183, 184, 186, 189；意识形态 185–186；革命 186, 188
The German Ideology: criticisms of 186–188
德国意识形态：186-188 的批评
Marxism 251
马克思主义 251
masochism 240
受虐狂 240
materialism 184
唯物主义 184
mathematics 219
数学 219
maximin principle (Rawls) 280, 282, 283
最大最小原则（罗尔斯） 280, 282, 283
maxims 135, 136, 138, 140
格言 135, 136, 138, 140
meaningfulness 213, 217, 220, 222, 224
意义 213, 217, 220, 222, 224
Medici family 37
美第奇家族 37
Meditations (Descartes) see Descartes, René
冥想（笛卡尔）见笛卡尔，雷内
memory 58, 85–86, 88–89
内存 58, 85–86, 88–89
metaphysics 75, 131, 149, 151, 154, 216, 217, 223
形而上学 75, 131, 149, 151, 154, 216, 217, 223
method of doubt see Cartesian Doubt
怀疑的方法见笛卡尔怀疑
Mill, John Stuart 137
密尔，约翰·斯图亚特 137
On Liberty 156–160; authorship 157; freedom of speech 159–160; harm principle 157–159, 161, 164
论自由 156–160；作者身份 157；言论自由 159–160；伤害原则 157–159, 161, 164
On Liberty: criticisms of 161–164
论自由：对 161–164 的批评
The Subjection of Women 195
女性的屈从 195
Utilitarianism 134, 157, 167–170; Bentham’s utilitarianism 167–168; Mill on higher and lower pleasures 168–169, 171, 173; ‘proof’ of utilitarianism 169–170
功利主义 134, 157, 167–170; 辩谟的功利主义 167–168; 密尔关于高尚与低级快乐的论述 168–169, 171, 173; 功利主义的“证明” 169–170
Utilitarianism: criticisms of 170–172
功利主义：170-172 的批评
mind: body and 55, 76; nature of 264, 265
心智：身体和 55, 76；性质 264, 265
monarchy 67–68, 92, 121, 122, 124; obvious absurdity of 144
君主制 67–68, 92, 121, 122, 124; 明显的荒谬 144
monotheism 112, 116
一神论 112, 116
Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de
蒙泰涅，米歇尔·艾凯姆·德
Essays 45–50; contrast with Kant 45; on death 48; scepticism 47; stoicism 47
论文 45–50；与康德对比 45；论死亡 48；怀疑主义 47；斯多噶主义 47
Essays: criticisms of 49
论文：对 49 的批评
morality 23, 65; humanism and 246, 247; Kant and 133, 134–137; Mill and 168; Nietzsche and 197–198,198–200
道德 23, 65; 人文主义和 246, 247; 康德和 133, 134–137; 密尔和 168; 尼采和 197–198,198–200
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, Don Giovanni 177
莫扎特，沃尔夫冈·阿马德乌斯，唐·乔凡尼 177
music 151
音乐 151
myth of the metals 10
金属的神话 10
natural laws see laws of nature
自然法则见自然法则
natural religion 109–110, 110–111, 116
自然宗教 109–110, 110–111, 116
natural rights 67, 67, 68, 93, 96, 145, 158
自然权利 67, 67, 68, 93, 96, 145, 158
Neo-Platonism 32, 36
新柏拉图主义 32, 36
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle) see Aristotle
尼科马科伦理学（亚里士多德）见亚里士多德
Nietzsche, Friedrich
尼采，弗里德里希
Beyond Good and Evil 190–194, 210–211; on the prejudices of philosophers 192–193; religion 194; truth 193; unconscious drives 193–194; will to power 192
超越善恶 190–194, 210–211；关于哲学家的偏见 192–193；宗教 194；真理 193；无意识驱动 193–194；权力意志 192
Beyond Good and Evil, criticisms of 194–196
超越善恶，194-196 的批评
The Gay Science 197
《快乐的科学》197
On the Genealogy of Morality 197–202; asceticism 201; conscience 200–201; genealogy 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204; ‘good and evil’ and ‘good and bad’ 198–199
《道德谱系》197–202；禁欲主义 201；良心 200–201；谱系 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204；“善与恶”和“善与坏”198–199
On the Genealogy of Morality: criticisms of 202–203
《道德谱系》：对 202-203 的批评
Thus Spake Zarathustra 197, 248
因此查拉图斯特拉如此说 197, 248
non-thetic consciousness 239, 243
非主题意识 239, 243
normal science 271–272
常规科学 271–272
Nozick, Robert 282
诺齐克，罗伯特 282
Olsen, R. 179
On the Genealogy of Morality (Nietzsche) see Nietzsche, Friedrich
论道德的谱系（尼采）见尼采，弗里德里希
On Liberty (Mill) see Mill, John Stuart
论自由（密尔）见密尔，约翰·斯图亚特
ontological argument for the existence of God 56–57, 59, 60, 62
上帝存在的本体论论证 56–57, 59, 60, 62
open society see Popper, Karl
开放社会见波普尔，卡尔
Open Society and Its Enemies, The (Popper) see Popper, Karl
开放社会及其敌人（波普尔）见波普尔，卡尔
Orco, R. de 39
original position 277–278, 279, 280–281, 283
原始位置 277–278, 279, 280–281, 283
original project 241
原始项目 241
ostensive definition 262, 265, 268
指示性定义 262, 265, 268
Paine, Thomas
佩恩，托马斯
The Rights of Man 141–147; Age of Reason, The 141; Common Sense 142–143; critique of monarchy 144; human nature 145–146; natural rights 145; responds to Edmund Burke 143–145
人权 141–147；理性时代 141；常识 142–143；对君主制的批判 144；人性 145–146；自然权利 145；回应爱德蒙·伯克 143–145
The Rights of Man: criticisms of 145–146
《人权宣言》：批评 145–146
Pamphilus 110
pantheism 75–76, 79
泛神论 75–76, 79
paradigm shift 270, 272–273
范式转变 270, 272–273
paternalism 156, 165
父权主义 156, 165
perceptions 100, 108
感知 100, 108
personal identity 84–87, 88
个人身份 84–87, 88
perspectivism 193, 196
视角主义 193, 196
phenomenology 234–235, 236, 243
现象学 234–235, 236, 243
philosopher kings 12, 17
哲人国王 12, 17
philosophical doubt see scepticism
哲学怀疑见怀疑论
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein) see Wittgenstein, Ludwig
哲学研究（维特根斯坦）见维特根斯坦，路德维希
Philosophy (Boethius) 32–35
哲学（博伊修斯）32–35
Phyrro 47
Plato 26, 191, 211, 257
柏拉图 26, 191, 211, 257
influence on Boethius 32, 34–35
对博伊提乌斯的影响 32, 34–35
The Republic 5–15, 257; against art 14; cave 5–6, 13; division of labour 8; examples of injustice 13–14; individual and state 7–8; just state and unjust individual 10–11; myth of the metals 10; philosopher kings 12; Plato and Socrates 6–7, 12; role of women 9; rulers, auxiliaries, workers 8–9; theory of Forms 6, 12–13, 16, 26, 150–151; Thrasymachus and Glaucon 7; three parts of the soul 11
《理想国》5–15, 257；反对艺术 14；洞穴 5–6, 13；劳动分工 8；不公正的例子 13–14；个人与国家 7–8；公正的国家与不公正的个人 10–11；金属的神话 10；哲人王 12；柏拉图与苏格拉底 6–7, 12；女性的角色 9；统治者、辅助者、工人 8–9；形式理论 6, 12–13, 16, 26, 150–151；特拉西马库斯与格劳孔 7；灵魂的三个部分 11
The Republic: criticisms of 15–16
《理想国》：对 15-16 的批评
pleasures, higher and lower 168–169, 171, 173
快乐，高级和低级 168–169, 171, 173
pluralism 42
多元主义 42
polytheism 117
多神教 117
Popper, Karl 270
波普，卡尔 270
The Open Society and Its Enemies 255–259; falsificationism 256, 259; Hegel’s historicism 257–258; on Marx 258; open society 256–257; Plato’s totalitarianism 257, 258
开放社会及其敌人 255–259；伪造主义 256, 259；黑格尔的历史主义 257–258；关于马克思 258；开放社会 256–257；柏拉图的极权主义 257,258
The Open Society and Its Enemies: criticism of 258
开放社会及其敌人：对 258 的批评
pre-reflective consciousness 239, 243
前反思意识 239, 243
predestination 34
预定论 34
primary goods 279, 283
初级商品 279, 283
primary qualities 83–84, 87–88, 90
主要特性 83–84, 87–88, 90
principium individuationis 149, 154
个体化原则 149, 154
Principles of Art, The (Collingwood) see Collingwood, R.G.
艺术原则，见科林伍德，R.G.
prisoner’s dilemma 62–63, 66
囚徒困境 62–63, 66
private language argument 263–266, 268
私人语言论证 263–266, 268
Problems of Philosophy, The (Russell) see Russell, Bertrand
哲学问题，罗素（Russell）见罗素，伯特兰
proletariat 186, 188, 189
无产阶级 186, 188, 189
promise-keeping 38, 65, 67, 135, 138
守信 38, 65, 67, 135, 138
property 9, 65, 93–94; in ourselves 93–94; right of 93–94, 282
财产 9, 65, 93–94; 在我们自己 93–94; 权利 93–94, 282
proposition 209, 214, 216, 224
提案 209, 214, 216, 224
pseudo-problem 218, 224
伪问题 218, 224
psychoanalysis 238, 241
精神分析 238, 241
punishment 86, 93, 94, 95, 172
惩罚 86, 93, 94, 95, 172
quietism 247, 253
安静主义 247, 253
Quine, W.V.O. 222
rational activity 22, 26
理性活动 22, 26
rationalism 35, 55, 62, 74, 79, 80, 90, 131, 207, 212
理性主义 35, 55, 62, 74, 79, 80, 90, 131, 207, 212
Rawls, John
罗尔斯，约翰
A Theory of Justice 277–280; difference principle 279–280; fair equality of opportunity principle 279–280; liberty principle 278–279; original position 277–278, 280–281
正义理论 277–280；差异原则 279–280；公平机会平等原则 279–280；自由原则 278–279；原始状态 277–278,280–281
A Theory of Justice: criticisms of 280–282; libertarian objection 282; utilitarian objection 281
正义理论：对 280–282 的批评；自由意志主义者的反对 282；功利主义者的反对 281
realism 84
现实主义 84
reality, appearance and 207–208
现实，外观和 207–208
rebellion 96
叛乱 96
Reflections on the Revolution in France (Burke) 143–146
法国革命的反思（伯克）143–146
Reid, Thomas 88–89
里德，托马斯 88–89
relativism 274
相对主义 274
religion 109, 110, 117, 194, 221; revealed 117
宗教 109, 110, 117, 194, 221; 揭示 117
see also God; natural religion
另见上帝；自然宗教
Republic, The (Plato) see Plato
共和国，柏拉图 见 柏拉图
resemblance 101–102, 263
相似性 101–102, 263
ressentiment 199–200, 204
怨恨 199–200, 204
revolution 184, 186, 188
革命 184, 186, 188
Rights of Man, The (Paine) see Paine, Thomas
人权宣言 (潘恩) 见 潘恩，托马斯
rights of nature see natural rights
自然的权利见自然权利
Rousseau, Jean Jacques
卢梭，让-雅克
on Machiavelli 40
关于马基雅维利 40
The Social Contract 118–122; aristocracy 122; democracy 122; freedom 120; general will 119–120; government 121; legislator 120–121; monarchy 122, 124; social contract 119
社会契约 118–122；贵族制 122；民主 122；自由 120；一般意志 119–120；政府 121；立法者 120–121；君主制 122, 124；社会契约 119
The Social Contract: criticisms of 123
社会契约：对 123 的批评
rule of law 279
法治 279
rule utilitarianism 172, 173
规则功利主义 172, 173
Rulers 8, 9, 10, 15, 17
尺子 8, 9, 10, 15, 17
Russell, Bertrand
罗素，伯特兰
The Problems of Philosophy 205–210; a priori 209; appearance and reality 207–208; induction 210; knowledge by acquaintance and by description 208–209; what is philosophy? 206–207
哲学的问题 205–210；先验 209；表象与现实 207–208；归纳 210；通过熟识和描述的知识 208–209；什么是哲学？ 206–207
The Problems of Philosophy: criticisms of 210–211
哲学的问题：对 210-211 的批评
sadism 177, 240, 252
施虐狂 177, 240, 252
Sartre, Jean Paul 27, 78, 179, 190
萨特，让·保罗 27, 78, 179, 190
Being and Nothingness 233–241, 245, 251; bad faith 236–238; being 234; critique of Freud 238–239; existential psychoanalysis 241; freedom 235–236, 240, 241–242; love 240; my death 240; nothingness 234–235; phenomenological approach 234; shame 239–240
存在与虚无 233–241, 245, 251; 恶意 236–238; 存在 234; 对弗洛伊德的批判 238–239; 存在主义心理分析 241; 自由 235–236, 240, 241–242; 爱 240; 我的死亡 240; 虚无 234–235; 现象学方法 234; 羞耻 239–240
Being and Nothingness: criticisms of 241–242
存在与虚无：对 241–242 的批评
The Critique of Dialectical Reason 251
辩证理性批判 251
Existentialism and Humanism 245–251; abandonment 248; anguish 248–249; answering his critics 247; despair 249–250; Sartre’s pupil 250–251; what is existentialism? 245–246; what is humanism? 246–247
存在主义与人本主义 245–251；放弃 248；痛苦 248–249；回应他的批评者 247；绝望 249–250；萨特的学生 250–251；什么是存在主义？ 245–246；什么是人本主义？ 246–247
Existentialism and Humanism: criticisms of 251–253
存在主义与人本主义：对 251–253 的批评
scepticism 58, 104, 108, 130, 207; mitigated 115; Montaigne 47; see also Cartesian Doubt
怀疑主义 58, 104, 108, 130, 207; 缓解 115; 蒙田 47; 另见 笛卡尔怀疑
Schopenhauer, Arthur
叔本华，亚瑟
The World as Will and Idea 148–152; art 150–151; free will 151–152; music 151; suffering and salvation 152; the world as idea 148–149; the world as will 149
作为意志和观念的世界 148–152；艺术 150–151；自由意志 151–152；音乐 151；痛苦与救赎 152；作为观念的世界 148–149；作为意志的世界 149
The World as Will and Idea: criticisms of 153
作为意志和观念的世界：对 153 的批评
science 206, 207, 217, 218, 269–276
科学 206, 207, 217, 218, 269–276
Second Treatise of Government, The (Locke) see Locke, John
政府论第二篇，洛克 见 洛克，约翰
secondary qualities 83–84, 87–88, 90
次要品质 83–84, 87–88, 90
’The Seducer’s Diary’ (Kierkegaard) 176–177
《诱惑者的日记》（基尔凯郭尔）176–177
self-deception 42, 105, 163; bad faith 235, 236–238, 242
自我欺骗 42, 105, 163; 恶意 235, 236–238, 242
self-help, philosophy as 31
自助，哲学作为 31
sensation 82, 208, 264
感觉 82, 208, 264
sense data 208, 209, 212
感知数据 208, 209, 212
ship, parable of (Plato) 12
船，寓言（柏拉图）12
Sidgwick, Henry 170
西德威克，亨利 170
social contract 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 95; Rawls and 278; Rousseau and 119, 121, 123
社会契约 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 95; 罗尔斯和 278; 卢梭和 119, 121, 123
Social Contract, The (Rousseau) see Rousseau, Jean Jacques
社会契约，(卢梭)见卢梭，让-雅克
Socrates 6–7, 12, 17, 46, 109, 169
苏格拉底 6–7, 12, 17, 46, 109, 169
sovereign 64, 66, 67–68, 69, 72, 121; and social contract 64, 66, 67; see also monarchy
主权 64, 66, 67–68, 69, 72, 121; 社会契约 64, 66, 67; 另见 君主制
sovereign assembly 67, 68
主权大会 67, 68
space and time 129
空间和时间 129
Sparta 13
斯巴达 13
speculative principles 81
投机原则 81
Spinoza, Baruch 192
斯宾诺莎，巴鲁赫 192
Ethics 72–77, 211; freedom and human bondage 76–77; God and pantheism 75–76; love of God 77; mind and body 76
伦理 72–77，211；自由与人类束缚 76–77；上帝与泛神论 75–76；对上帝的爱 77；心灵与身体 76
Ethics: criticisms of 78
伦理：对 78 的批评
state of nature 65–66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72; Locke and 92–95
自然状态 65–66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72; 洛克和 92–95
statements: analytic/empirical 127; Ayer’s four types 214–216
陈述：分析/经验 127；艾耶尔的四种类型 214–216
Stoicism 33, 36, 47
斯多噶主义 33, 36, 47
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The (Kuhn) see Kuhn, Thomas
科学革命的结构 (库恩) 见 库恩，托马斯
subjectivism 193, 195, 196, 251–252
主观主义 193, 195, 196, 251–252
tautology 214, 219, 222, 224
同义反复 214, 219, 222, 224
Taylor, Harriet 157
泰勒，哈丽特 157
Theory of Justice, A (Rawls) see Rawls, John
正义论，A (罗尔斯) 见 罗尔斯，约翰
thing-in-itself 128–129
事物本身 128–129
thought experiment 53–54, 65, 68–69, 70, 85–86, 277–282
思想实验 53–54, 65, 68–69, 70, 85–86, 277–282
Thus Spake Zarathustra (Nietzsche) 197, 248
因此查拉图斯特拉如是说（尼采）197, 248
toleration 158, 165
容忍 158, 165
totalitarianism 16, 256, 257, 259
极权主义 16, 256, 257, 259
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein) 260–261
逻辑哲学论 (维特根斯坦) 260–261
trademark argument for the existence of God 56, 59, 60, 62
上帝存在的商标论证 56, 59, 60, 62
transcendence 235, 238, 243
超越 235, 238, 243
transcendental deduction 130, 132
超越演绎 130, 132
truth 157–159; Nietzsche and 193
真理 157–159; 尼采和 193
tyranny 13, 17, 40
暴政 13, 17, 40
tyranny of the majority 158
多数人的暴政 158
unconscious 81, 151, 193–194, 238–239
无意识 81, 151, 193–194, 238–239
universalisability 135–136, 138, 140, 252
普遍性 135–136, 138, 140, 252
utilitarianism 134, 157, 158, 167; Mill and 157, 158, 162, 167–168, 173
功利主义 134, 157, 158, 167; 密尔和 157, 158, 162, 167–168, 173
Utilitarianism (Mill) see Mill, John Stuart
功利主义（密尔）见密尔，约翰·斯图亚特
value pluralism 42
价值多元主义 42
veil of ignorance 277, 279, 283
无知之幕 277, 279, 283
veil of Maya 152, 153, 154
玛雅的面纱 152, 153, 154
verifiability 214–216; strong and weak senses of 216
可验证性 214–216；216 的强和弱意义
Verification Principle (Ayer) 213, 214–216, 219, 221, 222–223
验证原则（艾耶尔）213, 214–216, 219, 221, 222–223
Vienna Circle 213
维也纳学派 213
virtues, the: Aristotle 22–23, 28; Plato 10–11
美德：亚里士多德 22–23，28；柏拉图 10–11
Wilhelm, Judge 175, 178, 179
威廉，法官 175, 178, 179
will, weakness of 25–26; will of all 119–120; see also general will, doctrine of
意志，25-26 的弱点；所有的意志 119-120；另见一般意志，学说
will to power 192, 193, 196
意志力 192, 193, 196
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 195
维特根斯坦，路德维希 195
Philosophical Investigations 260–266; family resemblance terms 263; meaning as use 261–263; nature of philosophy 261; private language argument 263–266; relation to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 260–261; seeing aspects 266
哲学研究 260–266；家庭相似性术语 263；意义作为使用 261–263；哲学的本质 261；私人语言论证 263–266；与《逻辑哲学论》的关系 260–261；看待方面 266
Philosophical Investigations: criticisms of 266–267
哲学研究：对 266-267 的批评
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 260–261
逻辑哲学论 260–261
workers (Plato) 8–9, 10, 11
工人（柏拉图）8–9, 10, 11
world as idea 148–149
世界作为理念 148–149
world as will 148, 149
世界如意 148, 149
World as Will and Idea, The (Schopenhauer) see Schopenhauer, Arthur
作为意志和表象的世界，(叔本华)见叔本华，亚瑟
Young Hegelians 183
年轻黑格尔派 183