AMERCAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCUTION
美国社会学协会

Source: American Sociological Review, Feb., 1994, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 83-97
美国社会学评论,1994 年 2 月,第 59 卷,第 1 期(1994 年 2 月),第 83-97 页
Published by: American Sociological Association
美国社会学协会
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2096134
稳定 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2096134

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
JSTOR 是一个非营利性服务,帮助学者、研究人员和学生发现、使用和基于广泛的内容建立在一个值得信赖的数字档案中。我们使用信息技术和工具来提高生产力并促进新形式的学术研究。如需更多关于 JSTOR 的信息,请联系support@jstor.org。

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms
您使用 JSTOR 档案表示您接受使用条款和条件,可在https://about.jstor.org/terms获取。

The dream of nineteenth-century nationalism was that a common language, history, and habits of everyday life justified the formation of distinct nation states that would represent and protect ethnically homogeneous groups (Gertz 1973; Isaacs 1975; Rokkan 1975; Smith 1986). In the twentieth century states have developed a variety of political mechanisms to accommodate national diversity within their borders, including legal recognition of minority nationalities, proportionate seating in legislatures, and policies favoring economically disadvantaged nationalities and areas (Cohen
十九世纪民族主义的梦想是,共同语言、历史和日常生活习惯,可以正当化独立国家的形成,来代表和保护种族均一的群体(Gertz 1973; Isaacs 1975; Rokkan 1975; Smith 1986)。在二十世纪,国家已经发展出各种政治机制来适应其境内的国家多样性,包括对少数民族的法律承认、立法机构中的相应席位,以及有利于经济上弱势民族和地区的政策(Cohen

and Warwick 1983; Collins and Waller 1992; Enloe 1973; Nielsen 1985). In addition, industrialization and the establishment of modern mass institutions, such as education and mass communications, have been emphasized by state builders, in part with the expectation that these would erode the differences upon which national identities were based (Davis 1978; Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey forthcoming). In some states, such as France, national policies, industrialization, and mass institutions produced integrated national identities (Tilly 1975). In other cases the integrative consequences of these processes have been slower to develop; and in others, these processes may have exacerbated rather than eased national rivalries within states (Belanger and Pinard 1991; Hechter 1976; Olzak 1992; Tudjman 1981). Now, at the end of the twentieth century, a resurgence of claims, rivalries, and conflicts among national groups within states threaten the state-building accomplishments of past decades in many parts of the world.
在沃里克 1983 年;柯林斯和瓦勒 1992 年;恩洛 1973 年;尼尔森 1985 年)之外,工业化和现代大众机构(如教育和大众传播)的建立也一直受到国家建设者的重视,部分原因是这些机构有望削弱构建国家认同的差异(戴维斯 1978 年;霍德森、塞库利奇和梅西即将出版)。在某些国家,如法国,国家政策、工业化和大众机构产生了一体化的国家认同(蒂利 1975 年)。在其他情况下,这些过程的整合结果发展较慢;在另一些情况下,这些过程可能加剧而非缓解了国家内部的民族竞争(贝朗杰和皮纳德 1991 年;赫克特 1976 年;奥尔扎克 1992 年;图德曼 1981 年)。现在,在 20 世纪末,各国内部民族群体间的复兴主义主张、竞争和冲突,正威胁着过去数十年国家建设所取得的成就。

To establish a new, ethnically diverse state it is seen as critical that the people adopt a common identity as citizens of that state, as members of a unified political system composed of groups otherwise diverse in language, religion, customs, ethnicity, or historical experience. In such states, however, there is a tension between ethnic or national groups wanting to maintain their own sovereignty within the state and the state’s need to integrate such groups into a cohesive political unit that represents a shared ideology and vision of the future (Kedouire 1960; Kohn 1961; Smith 1986). Symptomatic of this tension is the struggle over identity, with the particular national groups trying to preserve their identities and the state attempting to impose a new identity assimilating and subsuming the more particular identities.
建立一个新的、种族多样化的国家,被认为至关重要的是,人们必须采用一种共同的公民身份,成为一个统一的政治体系的成员,而这个政治体系由在语言、宗教、风俗、种族或历史经验方面各不相同的群体组成。然而,在这样的国家中,存在着民族或国家群体想要在国家内保持自身主权,与国家需要将这些群体整合到代表共同意识形态和未来愿景的一个凝聚的政治单元之间的紧张关系。这种紧张关系的症状就是对身份认同的斗争,特定的民族团体试图保护自己的身份,而国家则试图强加一种新的身份,以同化和吞并更具体的身份。
The former Yugoslavia is an instance where the integrative processes of state identify formation have failed. Many of the underpinnings necessary to integrative processes were present in Yugoslavia, but they proved insufficient in the face of economic downturns and resurgent nationalist forces. We identify four potential routes that led people in the former Yugoslavia to identify themselves as members of a multinational state rather than as members of a specific nationality. We use data from two major social surveys done in Yugoslavia in 1985 and 1989 (just prior to the dissolution of the state) to examine the forces that facilitated or undermined the emergence of a shared Yugoslav identity.
前南斯拉夫联盟是一个集成身份形成过程失败的实例。南斯拉夫有许多整合过程所需的支撑因素,但在经济衰退和民族主义力量抬头的面前,这些因素都证明是不够的。我们确定了导致前南斯拉夫人民认同自己为多民族国家成员而非特定民族成员的四条潜在路径。我们使用 1985 年和 1989 年(即在国家解体之前)在南斯拉夫进行的两次主要社会调查数据,来研究促进或削弱南斯拉夫共同体认同出现的力量。

The first Yugoslav census after World War I did not record nationality, although the official name of the newly formed state was “The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,” clearly indicating its multinational character. This prompted historians to construct a picture of Yugoslavia based on religious affiliation and language spoken-imperfect substitutes for self-identification (Cohen and Warwick 1983: app. A). After World War II, nationality was recorded in the decennial census, but there was no Yugoslav category. “Yugoslav” was first included in the third post-war census in 1961. Officially this category was reserved for “nationally noncommitted persons,” and was treated as a residual category for those who of-
第一次世界大战后的第一次南斯拉夫人口普查未记录国籍,尽管新成立的国家的官方名称是"塞尔维亚、克罗地亚和斯洛文尼亚王国",明确表明其多民族特征。这促使历史学家根据宗教信仰和所说的语言来构建南斯拉夫的形象,这是自我认同的不完全替代品(科恩和沃里克 1983 年:附录 A)。第二次世界大战后,国籍在十年一次的人口普查中有记录,但没有南斯拉夫这一类别。"南斯拉夫人"是在 1961 年第三次战后人口普查中首次纳入的。官方将这一类别保留给"未确定国籍的人",并将其作为对那些不愿意
fered no particular national identity (Petrovic 1983). Table 1 presents the percentages of the population of Yugoslavia identifying as Yugoslav in 1961, 1971, and 1981.
南斯拉夫人并没有特别的国家认同(Petrovic 1983)。表 1 列出了 1961 年、1971 年和 1981 年南斯拉夫人口中认同为南斯拉夫人的百分比。
The modest decline in self-identification as a Yugoslav for the country as a whole between 1961 and 1971 was primarily the result of a decline in Yugoslav identifiers in BosniaHercegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia) in 1971. According to Ramet (1984:144-49), high Yugoslav self-identification in Bosnia in 1961 occurred because Moslems refused to identify themselves with dominant national groups (i.e., Serbs or Croats). The 1971 census was the first to allow “Moslem” as a nationality, and many Moslem Bosnians switched from the “Yugoslav” to the “Moslem” category in 1971. Moslems in Yugoslavia, many of whom live in Bosnia, are Slavs who adopted not only the Islamic faith, but also embraced many other cultural and linguistic features of the Turkish people who, during the period of the Ottoman Empire, controlled much of what would later become Yugoslavia.
自 1961 年至 1971 年,整个国家自我认同为南斯拉夫人的适度下降,主要是由于 1971 年波斯尼亚-黑塞哥维那(以下简称波斯尼亚)南斯拉夫认同者的减少。根据 Ramet(1984:144-49)的说法,1961 年波斯尼亚的高度南斯拉夫自我认同是因为穆斯林拒绝认同自己属于主导民族集团(即塞尔维亚人或克罗地亚人)。1971 年人口普查首次允许将"穆斯林"作为一个民族,许多波斯尼亚穆斯林从"南斯拉夫人"转为"穆斯林"。在南斯拉夫,许多穆斯林居住在波斯尼亚,他们不仅信奉伊斯兰教,也接受了许多其他土耳其人的文化和语言特征,后者在奥斯曼帝国时期控制了后来成为南斯拉夫的大部分地区。
Apart from Bosnia between 1961 and 1971 and Kosovo, self-identification as a Yugoslav shows a general pattern of increase from 1961 to 1981, especially in Croatia and the Vojvodine, and in Bosnia between 1971 and 1981. Among the republics and provinces, Kosovo showed the lowest Yugoslav identification in 1971 and 1981, with most people in Kosovo identifying themselves as either Albanian or Serbian. One factor that encouraged identification as a Yugoslav was the heterogeneity of nationalities within the republic or province (Breuilly 1982; Djilas 1991). Contact between different nationalities is increased in heterogeneous settings leading to greater social mixing and intermarriage (Isaacs 1975). Bosnia and the Vojvodine were the former Yugoslavia’s most nationally diverse areas, and both republics had larger than average proportions of people identifying as Yugoslavs.
除了 1961 年至 1971 年之间的波斯尼亚和科索沃,自我认同为南斯拉夫人的情况从 1961 年到 1981 年普遍呈上升趋势,尤其是在克罗地亚和伏伊伏迪纳,以及 1971 年至 1981 年间的波斯尼亚。在各个共和国和省份中,科索沃在 1971 年和 1981 年显示出最低的南斯拉夫认同度,大部分科索沃人认同自己为阿尔巴尼亚人或塞尔维亚人。鼓励南斯拉夫认同的一个因素是共和国或省份内民族的多元性(Breuilly 1982; Djilas 1991)。不同民族群体之间的接触增加,导致了更多的社会融合和通婚(Isaacs 1975)。波斯尼亚和伏伊伏迪纳是前南斯拉夫最具民族多样性的地区,两个共和国都有较高比例的人认同为南斯拉夫人。
The goal of our analysis is to identify the social forces that influenced the creation of a Yugoslav identity. Behind the social fact of “Yugoslav identification” lies a diversity of motives, inclinations, and rationales. We identify four sets of factors encouraging increased self-identification as a Yugoslav. These sets of factors constitute a tentative typology of identification with the state in multi-national societies and reveal the complexities and contra-
我们分析的目标是确定影响南斯拉夫认同形成的社会力量。"南斯拉夫认同"背后存在着多样的动机、倾向和理由。我们确定了四组促进增强自我认同为南斯拉夫人的因素。这些因素构成了多民族社会中认同国家的初步分类法,揭示了其复杂性和矛盾。

Table 1. Percentages of Adult Population of Yugoslavia Identifying Themselves as Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia and within Each Republic and Province: 1961, 1971, and 1981
表 1。1961 年、1971 年和 1981 年在南斯拉夫及其各加盟共和国和自治省中自认为南斯拉夫人的成年人口百分比。

Sources: Statisticki Bilten SFRJ (No. 1295), 1982, Beograd, Yugoslavia: Government Printing Office. Statisticki Godisnjak SFRJ, 1981, Beograd, Yugoslavia: Government Printing Office.
南斯拉夫社会主义联邦共和国政府印刷厂,1982 年,贝尔格莱德,《南斯拉夫社会主义联邦共和国统计公报》(第 1295 号)。南斯拉夫社会主义联邦共和国政府印刷厂,1981 年,贝尔格莱德,《南斯拉夫社会主义联邦共和国统计年鉴》。
dictions involved in attempts to create a new national identity.
试图创造一个新的民族认同的尝试中涉及的词汇。

Yugoslavia experienced the transition from a primarily agricultural to a primarily industrial society during the post-World War II period (Bozic, Cirkovic, Ekmecic, and Dedijer 1973). Urbanization and increasing education and literacy were expected to diminish the salience of national identities as intergroup contact increased, as a shared national history developed, and as a prosperous national future emerged (Deutsch 1969:27). With industrialization came geographic mobility and greater contact among nationalities in urban areas, and identification as a Yugoslav became a means of easing social relations among individuals from disparate national backgrounds by minimizing cultural barriers and distinctions.
南斯拉夫在二战后期从主要农业社会向主要工业社会转型(Bozic、Cirkovic、Ekmecic 和 Dedijer,1973 年)。预计城市化、教育水平和识字率的提高将会减弱国家认同的重要性,因为群组之间的接触增加,共同的国家历史得以发展,国家前景更加繁荣(Deutsch,1969 年:27)。工业化带来了地理流动性的增加以及城市地区各民族之间的更多接触,认同为南斯拉夫人成为了减少文化障碍和差异,促进个人之间社会关系的一种方式。

Creating symbolic representations of the new state as well as providing opportunities to participate in the rituals of history and patriotism are among the first efforts of new governments (Chirot 1988:72; Smith 1986). Tales of military sacrifice and victory, identification of common enemies, and images of shared destiny are promoted to support the image of a
创造新国家的象征性表征,以及提供参与历史和爱国主义仪式的机会,是新政府的首要任务之一(Chirot 1988:72; Smith 1986)。宣扬军事牺牲和胜利的故事,确定共同敌人,以及共同命运的形象,以支持国家形象的塑造。
unified people (Edelman 1971:164-68; Horowitz 1985). The War of National Liberation in Yugoslavia had been waged in order to end foreign occupation. Ideologically, the Yugoslav Partisans, who took power at the war’s end, stressed the unity of all nationalities in the federal republic. Nationality as a divisive force was condemned by patriots, who remembered the partitioning of Yugoslavia during World War II and the foreign-inspired internecine warfare that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Thus, to identify as a Yugoslav was to condemn the forces that betrayed the memory of the war and to identify with the efforts of the Partisans to create a progressive, socialist society. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} This legacy was carried forward in Yugoslavia by the Communist Party and also through workplace and community organizations (Burg 1983; Seroka and Smiljkovic 1986).
统一的人民(埃德尔曼 1971:164-68;霍罗维茨 1985)。南斯拉夫国民解放战争是为了结束外国占领而进行的。在意识形态上,掌握战争结束后权力的南斯拉夫游击队强调联邦共和国所有民族的团结。爱国者谴责民族主义这种造成分裂的力量,他们记得二战期间南斯拉夫被分裂,以及导致数十万人丧生的外部煽动的内战。因此,认同为南斯拉夫人意味着谴责背叛战争记忆的势力,并与游击队创建进步社会主义社会的努力保持一致。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 这一遗产在南斯拉夫由共产党以及工人和社区组织延续下去(伯格 1983;塞罗卡和斯米利科维奇 1986)。

Yugoslav self-identification also provided individuals a means of avoiding competing claims to their national allegiance. This was especially important for the children of nation-ally-mixed marriages, where each parent might
南斯拉夫人自我认同也为个人提供了避免面临关于他们国家效忠的竞争性主张的方式。这对于民族混合婚姻的子女来说尤为重要,因为每个父母可能都有自己的要求。

expect their child to recognize their particular national identity. By identifying as a Yugoslav, one could resist claims that others might make on one’s identity and thus avoid potential conflicts. Yugoslav identification also provided a way of breaking with an increasingly discredited past, especially among younger personsit was a protest against traditional nationalist politics that seemed to be at the heart of the region’s problems (Banac 1984). The recognition that much of Yugoslavia was less prosperous than the rest of Europe-an observation often reflected in Yugoslav popular cultureencouraged a Yugoslav identity as a reflection of hopes for greater integration into the European community. An important step in this direction was the abandonment of particularistic, traditional notions and movement toward a vague notion of “Europeanism.” Yugoslav identification seemed closer to this ideal than more narrow ethnic or national identifications.
他们希望自己的孩子能认识他们特有的国家认同。通过认同为南斯拉夫人,一个人就可以抵抗他人对自己身份的种种主张,从而避免潜在的冲突。南斯拉夫的认同还为摆脱日益不受尊重的过去提供了一种方式,尤其是在年轻人中间——这是对传统民族主义政治的抗议,这种政治似乎是该地区问题的根源(Banac 1984)。认识到南斯拉夫大部分地区比欧洲其他地区更加贫困——这一观点通常反映在南斯拉夫的大众文化中——鼓励了南斯拉夫的认同,作为对融入欧洲共同体的希望的反映。在这个方向上迈出的一个重要步骤是放弃特殊化的、传统的观念,转而朝向一种模糊的"欧洲主义"概念。相比于更狭隘的民族或国家认同,南斯拉夫的认同似乎更接近这一理想。

Yugoslav self-identification could also serve as a way to resist assimilating into a dominant national group, as was the case for Moslems in Bosnia in the 1961 census who identified as Yugoslavs rather than as Croats or Serbs (Stanovcic 1988). Persons of a minority nationality could claim a Yugoslav identity to resist pressure from the majority to assimilate into the local dominant nationality. For example, Serbian nationalists often interpreted Yugoslav identification by the Serb minority living in Croatia as a defensive response to unfavorable treatment by the Croat majority (Tomasevic 1975). Croatian nationalists made the same arguments on behalf of Croats in the Vojvodina (Bilandzic 1985). Identifying as a Yugoslav thus avoided either assimilating into the majority or labeling oneself as a minority. A similar motivation for adopting a shared identity as a citizen of a state was reported by Isaacs (1975) for India: “The educated ex-Untouchables dearly wished to shed their own group affiliations and their own group names, and, if they only could, become ‘Indian’ and be nothing else” (p. 81). Defensive identification as a Yugoslav has some similarities to the strategy of “passing” among ethnic and racial groups in the United States, although it is a distinct strategy in that the minority group does not seek to be assimilated, but rather to be identified as neutral.
南斯拉夫人的自我认同也可以作为一种抵御融入主导民族群体的方式,正如 1961 年波斯尼亚穆斯林在人口普查中将自己认定为南斯拉夫人而非克罗地亚人或塞尔维亚人的情况(Stanovcic 1988)。少数民族可以宣称自己是南斯拉夫人,以抵御主流群体要求其融入的压力。例如,塞尔维亚民族主义者常常将居住在克罗地亚的塞尔维亚少数民族认同为南斯拉夫人,解释为对克罗地亚主流群体不利对待的一种防御性反应(Tomasevic 1975)。克罗地亚民族主义者对伏伊伏丁那的克罗地亚人也做出了相同的论点(Bilandzic 1985)。认定自己为南斯拉夫人,因此避免了要么融入主流要么被标签为少数民族。关于采用作为一个国家公民的共同身份认同的类似动机,Isaac(1975)在提到印度时表示:"受过教育的曾经的贱民极力希望摆脱自己的群体联系和群体名称,如果可能的话,成为'印度人',除此之外什么也不是"(第 81 页)。作为南斯拉夫人的防御性身份认同,与美国种族和族裔群体中的"掩饰"策略有一些相似之处,但又是一种不同的策略,因为少数群体并不寻求被同化,而是希望被认定为中立的。

Also, defensive Yugoslavism does not necessarily imply the same diminution of religious and cultural differences characteristic of assimilation (Alba 1990; Archdeacon 1983; Waters 1990).
也不一定意味着同化特有的宗教和文化差异的减少(Alba 1990;Archdeacon 1983;Waters 1990)。

The Yugoslav Partisans who assumed power in 1945 understood that a policy of a unified na-tion-state, based on “imperialistic” attempts to deny nationhood to the many peoples making up Yugoslavia, would fail (Cohen and Warwick 1983; Shoup and Hoffman 1990). By defeating the Chetniks and their ideology of Serbian domination and condemning the Ustasa’s vision of a Greater Croatia, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) satisfied the national aspirations of the majority of people in Yugoslavia and gained widespread support among people for whom the ideals of a communist or socialist society had little relevance (Cohen 1982). At the same time the concept of a protective federation was attractive to smaller national groups, such as Macedonians, who felt threatened by Greece and Bulgaria. The tactic of the LCY, described by Connor (1984:19) as “strategic nationalism,” was to recreate Yugoslavia after the war, but without insisting on a highly centralized Yugoslav nation-state reminiscent of the Serbian-dominated state of the interwar period.
南斯拉夫独立战争者在 1945 年夺取政权,他们了解基于"帝国主义"企图否认组成南斯拉夫的众多民族民族地位的统一民族国家政策将失败(科恩和沃威克 1983 年;舒普和霍夫曼 1990 年)。通过打败切特尼克人及其塞尔维亚统治的意识形态,谴责乌斯塔沙人的大克罗地亚愿景,南斯拉夫共产党满足了南斯拉夫大多数人的民族诉求,并赢得了这些对共产主义或社会主义社会理想缺乏相关性的人的广泛支持(科恩 1982 年)。同时,保护性联邦的概念对诸如马其顿人等较小的民族团体具有吸引力,他们感到受到希腊和保加利亚的威胁。康纳(1984 年:19)所描述的南共的"战略民族主义"战术是在战后重塑南斯拉夫,但不坚持令人回想起战间期塞尔维亚主导国家的高度集中的南斯拉夫民族国家。
Politically this objective entailed establishing a federation of equal nations (equal regardless of geographic size or population) while launching a policy of centralism within the LCY itself. The program of federalism was an important means of winning support in postwar Yugoslavia; it allowed the LCY to orchestrate the creation of a new society that would, in time, transform the lives of people and lead to the replacement of politics based on national identities with loyalty and identification with the new Yugoslav state (Horowitz 1985). Nationalism based on regional identities was also expected to decrease because of the geographic mixing of nationalities that had occurred during World War II and because of increased mobility that was part of the process of urbanization and modernization being enacted by the LCY (Bilandzic 1985).
在政治上,这一目标要求建立一个由平等国家组成的联邦(无论地理大小或人口),同时在自身内部启动一项集中主义政策。联邦主义政策是在战后南斯拉夫赢得支持的重要手段;它让南斯拉夫共产党有能力协调创造一个新的社会,这个新社会将随着时间的推移改变人们的生活,并最终取代基于民族认同的政治,转而产生对新的南斯拉夫国家的忠诚和认同(Horowitz 1985)。由于第二次世界大战期间民族的地理混合,以及南斯拉夫共产党推动的城市化和现代化进程带来的流动性增加,预计基于区域认同的民族主义也将减弱(Bilandzic 1985)。

Under Tito’s leadership, the LCY was sanguine about the possible centrifugal tenden-
在铁托领导下,LCY 对可能出现的离心倾向感到乐观
cies of federalism leading to demands for a looser confederation. It was confident these tendencies could be controlled by the centralized party system (Denitch 1976; Lederer 1969:434-37; Rusinow 1977:33; Zwick 1983:80). In 1953 the LCY began a series of initiatives aimed at maintaining political integration in the face of growing nationalism (Ramet 1984:55-63). In the 1953 constitution the Chamber of Nationalities was eliminated and the Chamber of Producers was formed as a vehicle for the political representation of the worker self-management system first established in 1950 (Terzuolo 1982). Five years later, Kardelj (1960), one of the most vocal supporters of worker self-management, wrote that “on the basis of inexorable socio-economic tendencies . . . [there] will be even greater cultural merger of the Yugoslav peoples” (p. 54). He based his conclusion on several expectations. First, worker self-management would accelerate the pace of economic development. Second, particularistic loyalties (including nationality) would give way to working-class solidarity as people found political avenues open to them as representatives of self-managed enterprises. Third, worker self-management, as a form of classbased decentralized power in Yugoslav society, would reduce the threat of any one nationality controlling the fate of any other (Cohen and Warwick 1983:74-76).
南斯拉夫联邦主义的趋势导致了要求更宽松的联盟的要求。中央集权的党系统可以控制这些趋势(Denitch 1976;Lederer 1969:434-37;Rusinow 1977:33;Zwick 1983:80)。1953 年,南共开始了一系列旨在维持政治整合的倡议,应对日益增长的民族主义(Ramet 1984:55-63)。在 1953 年宪法中,民族议会被取消,取而代之的是生产者议会,作为 1950 年首次建立的工人自我管理制度的政治代表(Terzuolo 1982)。五年后,卡尔德尔(Kardelj 1960),工人自我管理最大的支持者之一,写道"基于不可逆转的社会经济趋势……[会有]越来越大的南斯拉夫民族文化融合"(第 54 页)。他的结论基于几个预期:首先,工人自我管理会加快经济发展的步伐;其次,特殊的忠诚(包括民族忠诚)会让位于工人阶级的团结,因为人们发现作为自管企业代表有政治渠道可走;第三,工人自我管理作为南斯拉夫社会中分散的基于阶级的权力形式,会减少任何一个民族控制其他民族命运的威胁(Cohen 和 Warwick 1983:74-76)。

During the 1950s Yugoslavia experienced a rising GNP along with uneven regional development, setting the stage for economic nationalism between regions (Cohen and Warwick 1983:77). The gap between the republicsmeasured in productivity and personal in-come-widened (Lydall 1989:186-96). At the same time, worker self-management became a vehicle for the expression of local rather than class interests (Cohen and Warwick 1983:76).
1950 年代,南斯拉夫经历了国民生产总值的上升,并伴随着地区发展不均衡,为地区间的经济民族主义奠定了基础(科恩和沃里克 1983:77)。各加盟共和国在生产率和人均收入方面的差距不断扩大(Lydall 1989:186-96)。与此同时,工人自主管理成为表达地方利益而非阶层利益的渠道(科恩和沃里克 1983:76)。
From the mid-1960s onward the communist parties in the various republics saw themselves as representing their constituent “nations”: Croatians in Croatia, Macedonians in Macedonia, Serbians in Serbia, and so forth (Ramet 1984; Cohen and Warwick 1983). In Bosnia the republic’s League of Communists pursued policies designed to “protect” Moslems by counterbalancing Serbian and Croatian influ-
从 20 世纪 60 年代中期开始,各共和国的共产党把自己视为代表其组成"民族"的代表:克罗地亚人在克罗地亚,马其顿人在马其顿,塞尔维亚人在塞尔维亚,诸如此类(Ramet 1984;科恩和沃里克 1983)。在波斯尼亚,该共和国的共产党联盟实施了旨在"保护"穆斯林的政策,以平衡塞尔维亚和克罗地亚的影响。
ence, and the League of Communists in the Vojvodina pursued greater autonomy from Serbia. Based on the organization of the League of Communists into republican wings, “nationalism not only pervaded the apparatus but, on many occasions, turned the party into the principal battlefield of ethnonational struggle” (Connor 1984:555).
伏尔约维纳共产党追求更大自治权脱离塞尔维亚。共产党内部组织的共和党支部,使民族主义不仅渗透到政权内部,而且在很多场合使党内成为民族冲突的主战场。
Constitutional amendments adopted in 1967 reduced the power of the LCY at the federal level, in part as a reaction to the fear of increasing Serbian domination of the Party. Henceforth the LCY functioned more “like an association of eight regional Party machines than a centralized system of socialist leadership” (Cohen and Warwick 1983:145). Along with economic development, the LCY’s role in political indoctrination, including control of the media, was still expected to erode the strength of nationalist sentiments even as regional rivalries and moves toward confederation were gaining strength (Tomc 1988). During this period the ability of Tito to maintain ultimate control through the LCY elite effectively countermanded the increasing autonomy of local Party organs on matters extending beyond local importance.
1967 年通过的宪法修正案削弱了在联邦层面上 LCY 的权力,部分原因是对日益增强的塞尔维亚在党内的主导地位的担忧。此后 LCY 更像是"八个地区党机器的联合体,而非一个社会主义领导下的中央集权系统"(科恩和沃里克,1983:145)。随着经济的发展,LCY 在政治灌输,包括对媒体的控制方面的作用,预计仍会削弱民族主义情绪的力量,尽管地区对立和走向联邦的趋势也在加强(1988 年,托姆克)。在这一时期,蒂托通过 LCY 精英层维持最终控制的能力,有效抑制了地方党组织在超出地方重要性的事务上日益增强的自治性。
A new constitution in 1974 increased the trend toward a looser confederation as many of the responsibilities and prerogatives of the federal government were divested to the republics. A collective presidency was established along with the right of any republic to veto a decision by the presidency. The latter proved a major device in reducing the power of the federal government.
1974 年的一部新宪法增加了松散联邦的趋势,因为许多联邦政府的职责和特权被转让给各共和国。建立了一个集体总统制,并赋予任何共和国否决总统决定的权利。后者成为减弱联邦政府权力的主要手段。
The system of worker self-management contributed to the decentralized political and economic structure of Yugoslavia. Worker selfmanagement reduced the power of the state to organize and coordinate the economy and gave primary economic power to republics and enterprises themselves. After 1954 the League of Communists in each republic exercised considerable influence over high-level appointments within firms, and local Party nomenklatura moved easily between the elite positions in firms and positions within the Party bureaucracy (Sekulic 1990). The weakness of federal control over the economy further fragmented the LCY and encouraged the League of Communists in each republic to take on an increasingly particularistic, and often nationalistic, agenda (Denitch 1991:77-79).
工人自我管理体系有助于南斯拉夫分散的政治和经济结构。工人自我管理减弱了国家组织和协调经济的权力,并将主要经济权力赋予共和国和企业自身。1954 年后,每个共和国的共产党在企业内部高层任命中施加了相当大的影响力,当地党派的精英成员在企业内部和党内官僚机构之间轻松流动。对经济的联邦控制不力进一步分裂了南共,并鼓励每个共和国的共产党采取越来越具有特殊性和民族主义色彩的议程。

For tactical reasons Tito and the Partisan leadership that ruled Yugoslavia after the war had approached the issue of Yugoslavism indirectly. The expectation that the LCY could provide political unity in the context of multinational identities was supported by the belief that this move would buy time for economic development to erode particularistic identities. The support for nationalism, including the recognition of the “lesser nations” (Montenegrans, Macedonians, and Moslems), was also an attempt to undercut Serbia’s dominance over the other republics and nationalities (Rusinow 1985); by recognizing more peoples as “nationalities” the aspirations of Serbian nationalism could be checked. Increased urbanization, reduced isolation of rural areas, higher educational attainment, an open opportunity structure, worker-managed enterprises, and nearly two generations of living as a single state were expected to reduce the political strength of nationalism, leaving it its place cultural traditions and ethnic pride held in common by all South Slavic people.
对于战术上的原因,蒂托和在战后统治南斯拉夫的党派领导人间接处理了南斯拉夫主义问题。人们相信，这一举措将为经济发展赢得时间，从而消除特殊主义认同。对民族主义的支持,包括承认"小民族"(黑山人、马其顿人和穆斯林),也是试图削弱塞尔维亚对其他共和国和民族的主导地位;通过承认更多的"民族",可以抑制塞尔维亚民族主义的诉求。城市化的增加、农村地区隔离度的降低、受教育程度的提高、开放的机会结构、工人自主企业,以及作为单一国家生活了近两代人,预计将削弱民族主义的政治力量,使其局限于南斯拉夫各南斯拉夫人共有的文化传统和民族自豪感。
What actually transpired was increased fragmentation of identities and the development of political rivalries associated with nationalist claims. Yugoslav identification came to be seen as a threat to the republic-level Communist Parties that were increasingly going in separate directions as federated Yugoslavia began to unravel. The stage for collapse was set by growing economic gaps between republics, economic nationalism, a weak central government, and the political fragmentation of the LCY.
实际发生的是各种身份认同的加剧分裂,以及与民族主义主张有关的政治竞争的发展。南斯拉夫身份认同被视为共和国层面共产党日益走向不同方向的联邦南斯拉夫开始瓦解的威胁。导致崩溃的舞台布置者有:共和国之间不断扩大的经济差距、经济民族主义、薄弱的中央政府,以及南斯拉夫共产党的政治分裂。

Today Yugoslavia has disintegrated. The South Slavs’s experiment in building a unified state has failed as the various nationalities deny their common interests and seek to forge smaller, more nationally homogeneous states than the former Yugoslavia (Banac 1992). The economic crisis of the 1980s was an important catalyst for the disintegration of the unionliving standards declined by at least a quarter, and inflation reached more than 2,500 percent in 1989. The legitimacy of the LCY was openly questioned by Communist leaders themselves, and most Yugoslavs desired to radically alter or abandon the system of worker self-management that had been the hallmark of
今日南斯拉夫已经解体。南斯拉夫民族联邦国的统一国家建设实验失败,因为不同民族否认了共同利益,力求建立比原南斯拉夫更小、民族更加同质化的国家(Banac 1992)。20 世纪 80 年代的经济危机成为这种解体的重要催化剂,生活水平下降了至少四分之一,1989 年通货膨胀超过 2500%。南共执政党的合法性受到共产党领导人自己的公开质疑,大多数南斯拉夫人都渴望彻底改变或放弃工人自管制这一标志性特点。
post-war Yugoslavia (Lydall 1989; Denitch 1991). In January 1990, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia ceased to exist, even as a symbolic unifying element, when the Slovenian delegation walked out of the Fourteenth National Congress.
战后南斯拉夫(Lydall 1989;Denitch 1991)。1990 年 1 月,南斯拉夫共产主义者同盟不复存在,即便作为一种象征性的统一因素,当斯洛文尼亚代表团离开第十四次全国代表大会时。
System failure bred not only distrust, but provided political opportunities for ambitious individuals to link the distress of the people with national differences and historical resentments (Cviic 1990; Devetak 1988). Newly emerging leaders and former Communist Party leaders promoted nationalist pride and offered solutions marked by cultural atavism and sometimes by a desire to emulate more affluent nations. To many Western observers (e.g., Voirst 1991) the question, “Who are the Yugoslavs?” was asked as an expression of disbelief that the idea of Yugoslavia could so quickly be abandoned, first by the Slovenes and Croatians, soon to be followed by the Bosnian Moslems, and finally by the people of every national group in the former Yugoslavia.
系统故障不仅滋生了不信任,而且为野心勃勃的个人提供了政治机会,将人民的痛苦与民族差异和历史怨恨联系起来(Cviic 1990;Devetak 1988)。新兴的领导人和前共产党领导人促进了民族自豪感,提出了以文化复古主义和有时模仿更富裕国家为标志的解决方案。对于许多西方观察家(如 Voirst 1991)而言,"谁是南斯拉夫人?"这个问题表达的是难以置信,南斯拉夫这个概念可以如此迅速地被放弃,首先是斯洛文尼亚人和克罗地亚人,随后是波斯尼亚穆斯林,最后是前南斯拉夫的每一个民族群体的人民。
The question, “Who were the Yugoslavs?” raises important questions about commonly held assumptions regarding the capability of states to foster unity among people with diverse cultures and historical experiences (Vuskovic 1982; Tomc 1988). The question also poses a dilemma for modernization theory, which assumes that the structural conditions of economic growth and its attendant institutional framework will negate particularistic loyalties and provide sufficient rewards for people to adopt the common outlooks, goals, and identities of a multinational state (Hodson et al. forthcoming; Nielsen 1985; see also Ragin 1979).
南斯拉夫人是谁?这个问题引发了关于国家是否能够在文化和历史经历各异的人民之间培养团结的普遍假设的重要问题。这个问题也给现代化理论带来了一个困境,该理论假定经济增长的结构条件及其相应的制度框架将否定特殊忠诚,并为人们采取多民族国家的共同观点、目标和认同提供足够的回报。

We used information from two surveys in our analysis. The first survey was conducted in the fall of 1984 and the winter of 1985 by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb, Yugoslavia. Using a disproportionate stratified random sampling framework, approximately 3,600 actively employed men and women in Croatia were interviewed, about 400 from each of nine occupational groupings. The nine groups were political functionaries, managers and directors, intellectuals and professionals, service work-
我们在分析中使用了两项调查的信息。第一项调查由南斯拉维亚萨格勒布的社会研究所于 1984 年秋季和 1985 年冬季进行。在不成比例的分层随机抽样框架下,约 3,600 名克罗地亚积极就业的男女受访者被采访,每个 9 个职业群体约 400 人。这 9 个群体是政治官员、经理和董事、知识分子和专业人士、服务工作人员-

Table 2. Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables by Republic: Yugoslavia, 1985 and 1989 Surveys
表 2.由于南斯拉夫 1985 年和 1989 年调查的依赖变量和独立变量的汇总统计

ers, three skill levels of manual workers, selfemployed “artisans,” and peasants. Based on the 1985 census of Croatia, weights were applied to this sample to replicate the distribution of occupations in the active working population. After eliminating cases for which data are missing, the resultant sample for the analysis contains 3,619 cases. Women constitute approximately one-third of the sample, concordant with the distribution of women in the paid labor force.
手工工人的三个技能水平、自雇的"手工艺人"和农民。根据 1985 年克罗地亚人口普查的结果,采用加权方法来复制活跃劳动人口中职业的分布。在剔除缺失数据的情况下,分析样本包含 3,619 个案例。女性占样本的三分之一左右,与有薪劳动力中女性的分布一致。

In the winter of 1989-1990 a second survey of randomly selected households was conducted, this time in all six republics and the two “autonomous provinces” of the former Yugoslavia. The survey was conducted by the Consortium of Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia. This survey design yielded greater numbers of respondents over 60 years of age than did the 1985 Croatian survey and, unlike the earlier survey, included unemployed persons. Unemployed persons and respondents over 69 years of age (the upper limit in 1985) were eliminated from our analysis to increase the comparability of the two samples.
1989 年至 1990 年冬季,对前南斯拉夫六个共和国和两个"自治省"的随机选择的家庭进行了第二次调查。该调查由前南斯拉夫社会研究所联盟开展。与 1985 年克罗地亚调查相比,该调查设计获得了更多 60 岁以上受访者,并包括失业人员,不同于早前的调查。为了增加两个样本的可比性,我们在分析中排除了失业人员和 69 岁以上(1985 年的上限)的受访者。

We analyze data from 1989 for the three largest republics, Croatia ( $\mathrm{N}=2,040$$\mathrm{N}=2,040$N=2,040\mathrm{N}=2,040 ), Bosnia
克罗地亚( $\mathrm{N}=2,040$$\mathrm{N}=2,040$N=2,040\mathrm{N}=2,040 )和波斯尼亚
( $\mathrm{N}=1,569$$\mathrm{N}=1,569$N=1,569\mathrm{N}=1,569 ), and Serbia ( $\mathrm{N}=2,617$$\mathrm{N}=2,617$N=2,617\mathrm{N}=2,617 ). The addition of Bosnia and Serbia in the 1989 survey allow us to compare Croatia with the more nationally heterogeneous Bosnia and the more homogeneous Serbia.
( $\mathrm{N}=1,569$$\mathrm{N}=1,569$N=1,569\mathrm{N}=1,569 ), 以及塞尔维亚( $\mathrm{N}=2,617$$\mathrm{N}=2,617$N=2,617\mathrm{N}=2,617 )。1989 年调查中增加了波斯尼亚和塞尔维亚,使我们能将克罗地亚与更具民族异质性的波斯尼亚以及更为同质的塞尔维亚进行比较。
Questions relevant for the analysis of Yugoslav self-identification were repeated in both the 1985 and 1989 surveys. Minor modifications in the wording of some questions in 1989 do not appear to have affected the results significantly in that similar models fit the data from both 1985 and 1989.
与南斯拉夫自我认同分析相关的问题在 1985 年和 1989 年的调查中重复出现。1989 年部分问题措辞的小幅修改并未显著影响结果,因为 1985 年和 1989 年的数据都能很好地拟合类似的模型。

The dependent variable, self-identification, is measured by answers to a question asking the respondents’ national identification. Most people answered Croat, Serb, Moslem, or some other nationality or ethnicity. In 1985 in Croatia, 10.6 percent of respondents responded “Yugoslav” (see Table 2); by 1989 this figure had dropped to 9.0 percent. In 1989 in Bosnia, the level of Yugoslav self-identification was more than 50 percent higher than in Croatia ( 14.4 percent), while in Serbia it was about 50 percent lower than in Croatia ( 4.6 percent).
从属变量,自我认同,通过询问受访者的国家认同来衡量。大多数人回答克罗地亚人、塞尔维亚人、穆斯林或其他国籍或民族。在 1985 年克罗地亚,10.6%的受访者回答"南斯拉夫人"(见表 2);到 1989 年这一比例下降到 9.0%。在 1989 年波斯尼亚,南斯拉夫人的自我认同水平比克罗地亚高 50%以上(14.4%),而在塞尔维亚则比克罗地亚低约 50%(4.6%)。

Our analysis suggests that four sets of factors influence the likelihood of identifying as a Yugoslav: modernization, political participation, demographic factors, and majority/minority status in a republic.
我们的分析表明,有四个因素集会影响一个人认同为南斯拉夫人的可能性:现代化、政治参与、人口因素以及在某个加盟共和国中的多数/少数地位。
Modernization. We measure modernization using variables that tap urbanism, education, and access to the media. In 1985 respondents were asked if they lived in a village, town, or city. The majority answered city, with substantial minorities reporting that they lived in towns and villages. In 1989 respondents were asked if they lived in a village, a village center, a town, a town center, a city, or a regional center. The 1989 question format generated a better distribution of responses than did the 1985 format. It was impossible, however, to reclassify the 1989 responses to approximate the 1985 distribution and also remain faithful to the verbal options as they were presented in 1989. We chose to collapse the 1989 responses into the verbally analogous categories of the 1985 survey-village ( $=1$$=1$=1=1 ), town ( $=2$$=2$=2=2 ), and city $(=3$$(=3$(=3(=3 )-resulting in a somewhat different distribution than in 1985. The average residential location in both 1985 and 1989 is a town. The slight reduction in the mean of urbanism between 1985 and 1989 in Croatia is likely an artifact of the change in question format.
现代化。我们使用城市化、教育和获取媒体等变量来衡量现代化程度。1985 年,受访者被问及是否居住在村庄、小城镇还是城市。大多数人回答是城市,也有相当数量的人表示居住在小城镇和村庄。1989 年,受访者被问及是否居住在村庄、村庄中心、小城镇、小城镇中心、城市或区域中心。1989 年的问题形式比 1985 年产生了更好的反应分布。但是,要将 1989 年的回答重新分类以接近 1985 年的分布同时保持对 1989 年所提供的语义选项的忠实,却是不可能的。我们选择将 1989 年的回答整理成 1985 年调查中的类似类别-村庄( $=1$$=1$=1=1 )、小城镇( $=2$$=2$=2=2 )和城市( $(=3$$(=3$(=3(=3 ),结果与 1985 年有所不同。1985 年和 1989 年的平均住宅位置都是小城镇。1985 年至 1989 年期间克罗地亚城市化程度的轻微下降,很可能是由于问题形式的改变造成的。
To measure the effects of education and access to the media, we use the level of educational attainment of respondents and a measure of how frequently they read the news. Education is coded as years completed and averaged 10.0 in Serbia and 9.9 in Croatia in 1989. In Bosnia, average years of schooling was only slightly lower at 9.6 years. The measure of reading the news is based on two questions asked in each survey. In the 1989 survey, newspaper reading is measured by a question asking whether respondents read the newspaper never (=1), monthly (=2), weekly (=3), or daily (=4). Later in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify their three most common leisure activities. Some identified “reading news” as their most important leisure activity ( $=4$$=4$=4=4 ), others as their second most important activity $(=3)$$(=3)$(=3)(=3), or their third most important activity $(=2)$$(=2)$(=2)(=2), or not at all $(=1)$$(=1)$(=1)(=1). Responses to these two questions were summed, creating an index of reading the news that ranges from 2 to 8 . In 1985, respondents were
为了衡量教育和媒体接触的影响,我们使用了受访者的教育水平以及他们阅读新闻的频率。教育水平以完成的年数表示,1989 年塞尔维亚平均为 10.0 年,克罗地亚为 9.9 年。在波斯尼亚,平均上学年数略低,为 9.6 年。阅读新闻的测量是基于每次调查中提出的两个问题。在 1989 年的调查中,报纸阅读情况是通过询问受访者是否从不(=1)、每月(=2)、每周(=3)或每天(=4)阅读报纸来衡量的。在问卷后段,受访者被要求列出他们三种最常见的休闲活动。有些人将"阅读新闻"列为最重要的休闲活动 $=4$$=4$=4=4 、有些人列为第二重要的活动 $(=3)$$(=3)$(=3)(=3) 、有些人列为第三重要的活动 $(=2)$$(=2)$(=2)(=2) 、还有些人则没有提及。这两个问题的回答被相加,得到一个从 2 到 8 分的阅读新闻指数。1985 年,受访者
asked to respond on the same 4-level scale as in 1989 to questions asking how often they read newspapers and, separately, news magazines. These two variables from the 1985 survey were summed to again create an index of reading the news ranging from 2 to 8 . The index for Croatia has a slightly higher mean value in 1985 than in 1989, and is slightly lower in Bosnia and Serbia in 1989 than in Croatia.
问被要求回答与 1989 年相同的 4 级量表,询问他们读报纸和新闻杂志的频率。这两个变量从 1985 年的调查中汇总,再次创建了一个新闻阅读指数,范围从 2 到 8。1985 年克罗地亚的指数均值略高于 1989 年,而 1989 年波斯尼亚和塞尔维亚的指数略低于克罗地亚。
Political participation. Participation in the political system of Yugoslavia is expected to increase the likelihood of identifying as a Yugoslav. We measure three types of political involvement: membership in the LCY, holding office in workplace organizations, and holding office in community organizations. Each is coded as a dichotomous variable. Membership in the LCY was not an elite status; individuals who were LCY members should not be equated with LCY officials, who held elite positions and who disproportionately enjoyed the privileges to which such power provided access (Massey, Hodson, and Sekulic 1992). Nevertheless, Party membership should still indicate a greater commitment to explicitly articulated state goals. For both survey years, LCY membership is coded “yes” for those who either were members at the time of the survey or were members in the past. Considerably higher percentages report being, or having been, members of the LCY in Bosnia and Serbia than in Croatia.
政治参与。预计参与南斯拉夫的政治体系将增加认同为南斯拉夫人的可能性。我们衡量三种类型的政治参与:在工会工作组织中担任职务、在社区组织中担任职务,以及是否为南斯拉夫共产党(LCY)成员。每一项都被编码为二元变量。LCY 成员资格并非精英地位;LCY 成员不应等同于 LCY 官员,后者占据精英地位,并且比例过高地享有这种权力带来的特权(Massey, Hodson, and Sekulic 1992)。然而,党员资格仍应表明对明确表述的国家目标有更大的承诺。对于两个调查年份,LCY 成员身份被编码为"是"的情况包括在调查时为成员或之前曾是成员。在波斯尼亚和塞尔维亚,报告曾经是 LCY 成员的比例明显高于克罗地亚。
Our other two measures of political involvement are holding office in political organizations in the workplace and in the community. Workplace and community organizations were frequently dominated by Party members and served as conduits for Party goals and agendas. Such organizations, however, were also frequently “captured” by local interests operating outside official Party mandates (Bilandzic 1985). In 1985 questions about holding office in workplace organizations were asked separately for worker self-managed enterprises and for other enterprises. Positive answers to either yielded a code of 1 ( 0 if both answers were negative). In 1989 a summary question asked if the respondent occupied an elected position at the workplace (yes =1). Similarly, in 1985 separate questions were asked pertaining to holding office in organizations in the community dealing with either social or political activities. Office holding in either yielded a code
我们其他两个衡量政治参与的指标是在工作场所和社区的政治组织中担任职务。工作场所和社区组织通常由党员主导,并成为党的目标和议程的渠道。然而,这些组织也经常被当地利益集团所"捕获",超出了官方党的授权(Bilandzic 1985)。1985 年,有关在工作场所组织中担任职务的问题分别针对工人自管企业和其他企业进行了询问。对任何一个的肯定回答都会得到 1 的代码(如果两个答案都是否定的,则为 0)。1989 年,一个总结性问题询问受访者是否在工作场所担任当选职务(是=1)。同样,1985 年还针对社会或政治活动组织中的职务担任情况进行了单独提问。在任何一个方面担任职务都会得到一个代码。
of 1. In 1989 these questions were combined, but a later question asked if respondents were active in community organizations. A positive response to either of these questions in 1989 resulted in a code of 1. In 1989 in Croatia, a higher percentage of respondents indicated they held office in workplace organizations than in 1985, but there were similar levels of participation in community organizations in 1985 and 1989. The higher percentage reporting participation in work organizations in 1989 than in 1985 may have occurred because the 1985 questionnaire was administered at the workplace where such participation would have been harder to manufacture. Bosnians and Serbians reported higher levels of participation in community organizations than Croatians (as well as higher levels of Party membership). Participation in work organizations was more nearly equal across the three republics in 1989.
1989 年,这些问题被合并,但后来的一个问题询问受访者是否积极参与社区组织。1989 年,对这些问题中任何一个的肯定回答都会得到 1 的代码。1989 年,与 1985 年相比,克罗地亚有更高比例的受访者表示在工作场所组织中担任职务,但 1985 年和 1989 年社区组织的参与水平相似。1989 年工作组织参与比例更高可能是因为 1985 年的问卷是在工作场所进行的,在那里参与这样的组织更难伪造。波斯尼亚人和塞尔维亚人报告的社区组织参与水平高于克罗地亚人(以及更高的党员资格)。1989 年,三个共和国在工作组织参与方面的水平相当接近。

Demographic factors. The third factor we expect to influence identifying as a Yugoslav is represented by the demographic characteristics of age and nationally-mixed parentage. The average age in each subsample ranges from 38 to 40 . We determined nationallymixed parentage by comparing a respondent’s answers to questions about the nationality of his or her mother and father. In Croatia in 1985, 10.0 percent of respondents reported that their parents were of different nationalities. For 1989 this figure is 10.2 percent. Nationallymixed parentage occurred at only a slightly lower level in Bosnia ( 9.0 percent). The level of nationally-mixed parentage was significantly lower in Serbia at 5.8 percent.
人口因素。我们预计会影响认同为南斯拉夫人的第三个因素是由年龄和具有不同民族背景的父母所代表的人口特征。每个子样本的平均年龄在 38 到 40 岁之间。我们通过比较受访者对其母亲和父亲国籍的答复来确定具有不同民族背景的父母。在 1985 年的克罗地亚,10.0%的受访者报告他们的父母是不同国籍。1989 年这一数字为 10.2%。在波斯尼亚,具有不同民族背景的父母的比例略低,为 9.0%。在塞尔维亚,这一比例显著较低,为 5.8%。
Majority/minority status. The final factor we expect to influence identification as a Yugoslav is the position of respondent’s parents as a majority or minority nationality in their republic. We expect persons of minority parentage to self-identify as Yugoslavs at a higher rate than persons of majority parentage. Persons of Croatian parentage were in the majority in Croatia and persons of Serbian parentage were in the majority in Serbia. In Bosnia, Moslems were numerically dominant, followed by Serbs and Croats, although all three groups were well represented.
多数/少数地位。我们预计影响被调查者认同为南斯拉夫人的最后一个因素是被调查者的父母在共和国中的多数或少数民族地位。我们预计少数民族父母的人会以更高的比率自我认同为南斯拉夫人,而多数民族父母的人则相反。在克罗地亚,克罗地亚人占多数,在塞尔维亚,塞尔维亚人占多数。在波斯尼亚,穆斯林数量占主导地位,其次是塞尔维亚人和克罗地亚人,尽管三个群体都有良好的代表性。

We use logistic regression to analyze the pattern of self-identifying as a Yugoslav based on
我们使用逻辑回归分析自我认同为南斯拉夫人的模式
modernization, political participation, demographic factors, and majority/minority status. Logistic regression is appropriate for a binary dependent variable and allows utilization of both categorical and continuous independent variables. The regression coefficients from a logistic regression can also readily be translated into easily interpretable odds indicating the change in the likelihood of the dependent variable (identifying as a Yugoslav) given a unit shift in an independent variable.
现代化、政治参与、人口因素和多数族群/少数族群地位。对于二元因变量来说,logistic 回归是合适的,它能够利用类别变量和连续变量。logistic 回归的回归系数可以很容易地转换为表示因变量（认同为南斯拉夫人）的变化概率的几率比。

The logistic regression coefficients estimating the effects of the modernization, political participation, demographic factors, and majority/ minority status on Yugoslav self-identification for the combined sample are presented in Table 3. This model also yields coefficients estimating the net contrasts in Yugoslav self-identification between Croatia in 1985 and 1989 and between Croatia and the republics of Bosnia and Serbia in 1989.
与现代化、政治参与、人口因素和多数群体/少数群体地位对南斯拉夫自我认同的影响的物流回归系数在表 3 中列出。该模型还给出了 1985 年和 1989 年克罗地亚以及 1989 年克罗地亚与波斯尼亚和塞尔维亚共和国之间南斯拉夫自我认同的净对比系数。
The model estimated for the total sample is highly statistically significant-the variables in the model reduce the chi-square from the baseline model (with only the intercept included) by 1,573 . Five of the 10 independent variables are statistically significant at the .001 level. Modernization theories of identity formation find support in a significant urban residence effect, but the effects of the other two modernization variables, education and reading the news, are not significant. Party membership strongly increases the likelihood of Yugoslav self-identification. Participation in community organizations also has a significant positive effect on identifying as a Yugoslav, but participation in work organizations has no significant effect. Both of the demographic variables, age and nationally-mixed parentage, are highly significant. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
总样本的估计模型在统计上高度显著-模型中的变量将基线模型(仅包括截距)的卡方值减少了 1,573。10 个独立变量中有 5 个在 0.001 水平上具有统计学意义。身份形成的现代化理论在重要的城市居民效应中得到支持,但另外两个现代化变量(教育和阅读新闻)的效应并不显著。党员身份大大增加了南斯拉夫认同的可能性。参与社区组织也对南斯拉夫认同有显著的积极影响,但参与工作组织没有显著影响。两个人口统计变量(年龄和民族混合父母)都具有高度显著性。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}

Table 3. Coefficients for the Logistic Regression of Yugoslav Self-Identification on Selected Independent Variables: Yugoslavia, 1985 and 1989
表 3. 1985 年和 1989 年南斯拉夫自我认同的逻辑回归系数和选定的独立变量:南斯拉夫

${}^{\ast }p<.05{}^{\ast \ast }p<.01{}^{\ast \ast \ast }p<.001$${}^{\ast }p<.05{}^{\ast \ast }p<.01{}^{\ast \ast \ast }p<.001$^(**)p < .05quad^(****)p < .01quad^(******)p < .001{ }^{*} p<.05 \quad{ }^{* *} p<.01 \quad{ }^{* * *} p<.001 (two-tailed tests)
${}^{\ast }p<.05{}^{\ast \ast }p<.01{}^{\ast \ast \ast }p<.001$${}^{\ast }p<.05{}^{\ast \ast }p<.01{}^{\ast \ast \ast }p<.001$^(**)p < .05quad^(****)p < .01quad^(******)p < .001{ }^{*} p<.05 \quad{ }^{* *} p<.01 \quad{ }^{* * *} p<.001 (两尾检验)

Logistic regression coefficients are more interpretable when translated into odds by using the logistic coefficient as the exponent for the natural $\log$$\log$log\log function. For example, for nation-ally-mixed parentage, ${\mathrm{e}}^{2.449}$${\mathrm{e}}^{2.449}$e^(2.449)\mathrm{e}^{2.449} equals 11.58 . The latter coefficient indicates that, net of the other factors in the model, a one-unit shift in nation-ally-mixed parentage (from not having nation-ally-mixed parentage to having nationallymixed parentage) increases the odds of identifying as a Yugoslav by more than 11 times. The effect of age can be interpreted as indicating
逻辑回归系数在转换为几率时更易解释,可使用自然 $\log$$\log$log\log 函数的指数。例如,对于具有混合国籍背景, ${\mathrm{e}}^{2.449}$${\mathrm{e}}^{2.449}$e^(2.449)\mathrm{e}^{2.449} 等于 11.58。该系数表明,在模型中其他因素保持不变的情况下,国籍混合背景的变化(从没有变为有)使识别为南斯拉夫人的几率增加了 11 倍多。年龄效应可解释为
in age and education effects in 1985 and 1989, only 2 were statistically significant at the .05 level, and these formed no interpretable pattern.
在 1985 年和 1989 年的年龄和教育效果中,只有 2 个在 0.05 水平上具有统计学显著性,并且这些没有形成可解释的模式。
approximately a 3 percent decrease in the likelihood of identifying as a Yugoslav with each year of advancing age. The odds of self-identifying as a Yugoslav increase by about 60 percent for each increasing step of urbanism from village to town to city. Those who participate in community organizations are about onethird more likely to self-identify as a Yugoslav than those who do not participate. The odds of identifying as a Yugoslav are approximately 60 percent higher for Party members than for nonmembers.
随着年龄的增长,自我认同为南斯拉夫人的可能性下降约 3%。从乡村到镇到城市,随着城市化程度的每一次增加,自我认同为南斯拉夫人的几率增加约 60%。参与社区组织的人比不参与的人自我认同为南斯拉夫人的几率高约三分之一。党员自我认同为南斯拉夫人的几率比非党员高约 60%。

To evaluate change across time in Yugoslav self-identification, we compared respondents in the 1985 Croatian sample to respondents in the 1989 Croatian sample. In 1985, Croatians were about 12 percent more likely to self-identify as Yugoslavs than in 1989, but this coefficient is not statistically significant and therefore may not be a reliable estimate. Differences between republics in Yugoslav self-identification are indicated by the contrasts between Croatia and Bosnia and between Croatia and Serbia in 1989. Bosnians were 35 percent more likely to self-identify as Yugoslavs than were Croatians, and this difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. Serbians were only 35 percent as likely to identify as Yugoslav as Croatians in 1989, and this difference is significant at the .001 level.
我们将 1985 年克罗地亚样本中的受访者与 1989 年克罗地亚样本中的受访者进行了比较,以评估时间变化中南斯拉夫自我认同。1985 年,克罗地亚人自我认同为南斯拉夫人的可能性比 1989 年高约 12%,但这一系数并不显著,因此可能不是一个可靠的估计。1989 年克罗地亚与波斯尼亚以及克罗地亚与塞尔维亚之间的对比表明共和国之间的南斯拉夫自我认同存在差异。波斯尼亚人自我认同为南斯拉夫人的可能性比克罗地亚人高 35%,这一差异在.05 水平上具有统计学意义。1989 年,塞尔维亚人自我认同为南斯拉夫人的可能性仅为克罗地亚人的 35%,这一差异在.001 水平上具有显著性。

The effect of Croatian parentage on selfidentification as a Yugoslav is significant at the .001 level. However, since Table 3 is based on the combined sample across the 1985 and 1989 surveys and across Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, this coefficient cannot be used to evaluate the hypothesis of defensive Yugoslavism which suggests that minority status in a republic will encourage self-identification as a Yugoslav. The appropriate tests of this hypothesis is presented later in Table 4, where the model is evaluated separately for each republic and time period.
克罗地亚出身对自我认同为南斯拉夫人这一点在 0.001 的水平上是重要的。然而,由于表 3 是基于 1985 年和 1989 年调查跨越克罗地亚、波斯尼亚和塞尔维亚的合并样本,所以这个系数不能用于评估防御性南斯拉夫主义的假设,该假设认为在共和国内是少数族裔地位会鼓励自我认同为南斯拉夫人。针对这一假设的恰当检验在表 4 中呈现,在那里模型分别针对每个共和国和时间段进行评估。

It is possible that the various factors in our model of Yugoslav self-identification have different effects across time or across republics rather than uniform effects as assumed for the model evaluated in Table 3. Possible differences in the model across time and republics are evaluated in Table 4. This model is also required in order to test the hypothesis that minority groups within republics have a greater likelihood of identifying as Yugoslavs. The model fits each of the four subsamples well and
这是可能的,我们在表 3 中评估的模型假设的效果是统一的,但在南斯拉夫自认身份中的各种因素可能在不同时间或共和国中产生不同的效果。表 4 评估了这个模型在不同时间和共和国之间的可能差异。这个模型还需要用来检验共和国内少数群体更有可能认同为南斯拉夫人这一假设。该模型很好地拟合了四个子样本。

Table 4. Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Analysis of Yugoslav Self-Identification by Year and Republic: Yugoslavia, 1985 and 1989
表 4. 从对南斯拉夫自我认同的 logistic 回归分析中得到的几率比:南斯拉夫,1985 年和 1989 年

${}^{\ast }p<.05{}^{\ast \ast }p<.01{}^{\ast \ast \ast }p<.001$${}^{\ast }p<.05{}^{\ast \ast }p<.01{}^{\ast \ast \ast }p<.001$^(**)p < .05^(****)p < .01^(******)p < .001{ }^{*} p<.05{ }^{* *} p<.01{ }^{* * *} p<.001 (two-tailed $t$$t$tt-tests)
双尾 $t$$t$tt 检验）
${}^{†}p<.05{}^{††}p<.01{}^{{}^{†t†}p}p.001$${}^{†}p<.05{}^{††}p<.01{}^{{}^{†t†}p}p.001$^(†)p < .05^(††)p < .01^(^(†t†)p)p.001{ }^{\dagger} p<.05{ }^{\dagger \dagger} p<.01{ }^{{ }^{\dagger t \dagger} p} p .001 (two-tailed $t$$t$tt-tests indicating a significant difference when compared to Croatia in 1989)
${}^{†}p<.05{}^{††}p<.01{}^{{}^{†t†}p}p.001$${}^{†}p<.05{}^{††}p<.01{}^{{}^{†t†}p}p.001$^(†)p < .05^(††)p < .01^(^(†t†)p)p.001{ }^{\dagger} p<.05{ }^{\dagger \dagger} p<.01{ }^{{ }^{\dagger t \dagger} p} p .001