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Modern parties have steadily enlarged their scope and power within the political community and have consequently changed their own functions and character. In place of a party of individual representation, our contemporary society increasingly shows a party of social integration.
This shift must be seen within the context of our changing society and its underlying philosophy. Three major stages can be observed in its development. Modern parties originated with the drive of a rising, self-conscious middle class that fought for liberation from the shackles of a feudal society and for representation to check monarchical absolutism. While the French Revolution officially proclaimed the end of this first phase of modern social development, the successful emancipation of rational man from the bonds of the ancien régime and its caste system proved to be only a transitional second stage. The individual, set free, was soon striving at reintegration into a new society. In fact, since the middle of the nineteenth century diverse claims for such a new orientation have been raised, promising to stop the fragmentation of a laissez-faire society. The first and lasting challenge of rising socialism, the emergence and appeal of political irrationalism, and an awakening social liberalism gave contrasting answers to this key issue of our century. The dislocations caused by the sweeping industrialization, radical urbanization, and international migration, by world wars and total revolutions, gave substance to a planned search for a new social order. We are still in the midst of this third phase. It constitutes the crisis of modern society.
Sigmund Neumann, excerpted from 'Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties', in Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties (1956), pp. 395-421, (C) 1956 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
It is against this background of crisis that a new concept of party is evolving. Its emergence and persistence, in fact, may well depend on the momentous character of social crisis. The well-balanced communities of the Scandinavian states and the Anglo-American world seem to be least affected by this new type, while it has found its most complete expression within nations in the grip of revolutions. The islands of social equilibrium, however, have shrunk, and the party of integration has no doubt become a salient feature of our contemporary landscape.
The party of individual representation is characteristic of a society with a restricted political domain and only a limited degree of participation. Its membership activity is, for all practical purposes, limited to balloting, and the party organization (if existent at all) is dormant between election periods. Its main function is the selection of representatives, who, once chosen, are possessed of an absolutely 'free mandate' and are in every respect responsible only to their own consciences. This conception of an ephemeral party as a mere electoral committee does not correspond to the political reality and practice of the modern mass democracy, a fact which in many countries has been recognized (though often most reluctantly) in the crucial controversy over party discipline and even in numerous court decisions codifying party regulations, responsibilities, and prerogatives. The fundamental concept of party, however, has hardly been challenged within democratic thinking.
个人代表制政党是一个政治领域有限、参与程度有限的社会的特征。其党员活动实际上仅限于投票,党组织(如果存在的话)在选举期间处于休眠状态。它的主要职能是遴选代表,这些代表一旦被选中,就拥有绝对的 "自由授权",在任何方面都只对自己的良心负责。这种将短暂的政党仅仅视为选举委员会的概念并不符合现代大众民主的政治现实和实践,许多国家在关于党纪的关键争议中,甚至在许多将党的规章、责任和特权编纂成法律的法院判决中,都承认了这一事实(尽管往往是在极不情愿的情况下)。然而,在民主思想中,政党的基本概念几乎没有受到过挑战。
Under the cover of such a persistent framework and rarely perceived even by circumspect political observers, a new type of party has emerged-the party of integration. The claim with which this party approaches its adherents is incomparably greater than that of the party of individual representation. It demands not only permanent dues-paying membership (which may be found to a smaller extent within the loose party of representation too) but, above all, an increasing influence over all spheres of the individual's daily life.
The first example of such a new party was presented by the continental Socialists. Their organization has been jokingly characterized as extending from the cradle to the grave, from the workers' infant-care association to the atheists' cremation society; yet such a description articulates the intrinsic difference from the liberal party of representation, with its principle

of 'free recruitment' among a socially uncommitted, freefloating electorate (the bulk of which, in reality, may not be so independent). The following of the new movement is, indeed, much more clearly circumscribed by its permanent membership, the definite class alignment of its voting population, and its far-flung participation in overall social affairs. The party can count on its adherents; it has taken over a good part of their social existence.
在没有社会承诺、自由浮动的选民中 "自由招募"(实际上,大部分选民可能并不那么独立)。事实上,新运动的追随者因其永久性成员、其投票人群明确的阶级一致性以及其对整体社会事务的广泛参与而受到更明确的限制。党可以依靠其追随者;党已经占据了他们社会存在的很大一部分。
Despite such extensive organization and intensified ties of its partisans, the Socialist party (and in an even more limited way the Catholic movement and other democratic parties of integration) include only a small active core among its wider circle of mere dues-paying members and its even greater number of mere voters. In fact, this differentiation is at the base of the much-disputed 'oligarchical' tendencies of modern mass parties which permit a relatively small group to decide the political fate of the disinterested and apathetic majority. Still, what is important is that the party in modern mass democracies has generally taken on an ever increasing area of commitments and responsibilities assuring the individual's share in society and incorporating him into the community. This is no mere usurpation of power by the politicians but the natural consequence of the extension of the public domain and the constantly increasing governmental functions in a reintegrated twentieth-century society.
尽管社会党(天主教运动和其他民主融合党派也是如此)拥有如此广泛的组织并加强了党派成员之间的联系,但在其更广泛的纯粹缴纳会费的成员圈子和更多的纯粹选民中,只有一小部分活跃的核心成员。事实上,这种分化正是现代大众政党备受争议的 "寡头 "倾向的根源所在,它允许一个相对较小的群体决定不感兴趣和冷漠的大多数人的政治命运。不过,重要的是,现代大众民主国家的政党一般都承担了越来越多的承诺和责任,确保个人在社会中的份额,并将其融入社会。这不仅仅是政治家的篡权行为,而是在二十世纪重新整合的社会中,公共领域扩大和政府职能不断增加的自然结果。
In this sense the phenomenon of the party of democratic integration has become a matter of record. This fact makes it more imperative to recognize its basic variance from the party of total integration, which has found its prototype in Bolshevism, Fascism, and National Socialism. This all-inclusive party demands the citizen's unconditional surrender. It denies not only the relative freedom of choice among the voters and followers but also any possibility of coalition and compromise among parties. It can perceive nothing but total seizure and exercise of power, undisputed acceptance of the party line, and monolithic rule. The rise of this absolutist police state decrees the end of democracy, of constitutionalism, of communai selfgovernment, of Western man and his inalienable rights, of political parties.
This radical juxtaposition should forewarn the responsible student of modern mass society against the threat of party petrifaction, but such a mortal peril cannot be met simply by a denial of the extended functions of modern parties and of their radically changing character-for the choice is not between the absolute state and the absolute individual or between autocracy or anarchy, as the great simplifiers and political demagogues make us believe. On the contrary, constructive thinking must concentrate on the much more difficult and urgent task of devising political institutions that allow for a new adjustment between the integrated society and the free individual. It is within such a realistic delineation of the fundamental prerequisites, present-day responsibilities, and necessary safeguards of a democratic society that the sociology of modern parties must be re-examined.




Socialist parties around the turn of the century exercised an important socializing function in regard to their members. They facilitated the transition from agrarian to industrial society in many ways. They subjected a considerable number of people hitherto living only as isolated individuals to voluntarily accepted discipline operating in close connection with expectations of a future total transformation of society. But this discipline had its roots in the alienation of these parties from the pre-World War I political system whose demise they wanted to guarantee and speed up by impressing the population as a whole with their exemplary attitudes.
During and soon after the First World War the other participants in the political game showed that they were not yet willing to honour the claims of the working-class mass parties -claims based on the formal rules of democracy. This discovery was one of the primary reasons why the social integration into the industrial system through the working-class organizations did not advance to the state of a comparable political integration. Participation in the war, the long quarrels over the financial incidence of war burdens, the ravages of inflation, the rise of Bolshevist parties and a Soviet system actively competing for mass loyalty with the existing political mass organizations in most European countries, and finally the effect of the depression setting in at the end of the decade-all these were European Party Systems', in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, pp. 177-200. Copyright (C) ig66 by Princeton University Press and reprinted with their permission. much more effective agents in the politicization of the masses than their participation in occasional elections, their fight for the extension of suffrage (Belgium, Britain, Germany), or even their encadrement in political parties and trade union organizations. But politicization is not tantamount to political integration; integration presupposes a general willingness by a society to offer and accept full-fledged political partnership of all citizens without reservations. The consequences of integration into the class-mass party depended on the responses of other forces in the existing political system; in some cases those responses were so negative as to lead to delayed integration into the political system or to make for its disintegration.
在第一次世界大战期间和战后不久,政治游戏的其他参与者表明,他们还不愿意尊重工人阶级群众党派的诉求--基于正式民主规则的诉求。这一发现是通过工人阶级组织与工业体系的社会融合未能推进到类似的政治融合状态的主要原因之一。参战、对战争财政负担的长期争执、通货膨胀的肆虐、布尔什维克政党的崛起和苏维埃制度与大多数欧洲国家现有的政治群众组织积极争夺群众的忠诚,以及十年末期经济大萧条的影响,所有这些都是欧洲政党制度的表现",见 Joseph LaPalombara 和 Myron Weiner(编),《政党与政治发展》,第 177-200 页。普林斯顿大学出版社版权所有(C)ig66,经普林斯顿大学出版社许可转载。在群众的政治化过程中,比起他们参与不定期的选举、争取扩大选举权(比利时、英国、德国),甚至是加入政党和工会组织,政党是更有效的推动者。但政治化并不等于政治一体化;一体化的前提是社会普遍愿意毫无保留地提供并接受所有公民的全面政治伙伴关系。融入阶级-群众政党的后果取决于现有政治体制中其他力量的反应;在某些情况下,这些反应非常消极,导致融入政治体制的时间推迟或政治体制解体。
Now we come to the other side of this failure to progress from integration into the proletarian mass party and industrial society at large to integration into the political system proper. This is the failure of bourgeois parties to advance from parties of individual representation to parties of integration, a failure already noted in France. The two tendencies, the failure of the integration of proletarian mass parties into the official political system and the failure of the bourgeois parties to advance to the stage of integration parties, condition each other. An exception, if only a partial one, is that of denominational parties such as the German Gentre or Don Sturzo's Partito Popolare. These parties to a certain extent fulfilled both functions: social integration into industrial society and political integration within the existing political system. Yet their denominational nature gave such parties a fortress-type character seriously restricting their growth potential.
现在,我们来谈谈从融入无产阶级群众党和整个工业社会到融入政治体制本身的失败的另一面。这就是资产阶级政党从个人代表制政党向一体化政党迈进的失败,这种失败在法国已经有所体现。无产阶级群众性政党未能融入官方政治体系和资产阶级政党未能进入一体化政党阶段,这两种趋势相互制约。但有一个例外,即使只是部分例外,那就是教派政党,如德国绅士党(German Gentre)或唐-斯图尔佐(Don Sturzo)的人民党(Partito Popolare)。这些政党在一定程度上同时履行了两种职能:融入工业社会的社会融合和现有政治体制内的政治融合。然而,这些政党的教派性质使其具有堡垒型特征,严重限制了其发展潜力。
With these partial exceptions, bourgeois parties showed no capacity to change from clubs for parliamentary representation into agencies for mass politics able to bargain with the integration-type mass parties according to the laws of the political market. There was only a limited incentive for intensive bourgeois party organization. Access to the favours of the state, even after formal democratization, remained reserved via educational and other class privileges. What the bourgeoisie lacked in numbers it could make good by strategic relations with the army and the bureaucracy.
Not all bourgeois groups accepted the need for transformation to integration parties. As long as such groups had other
means of access to the state apparatus they might find it convenient to delay setting up counterparts to existing mass parties while still using the state apparatus for keeping mass integration parties from becoming fully effective in the political market. Yet after the Second World War the acceptance of the law of the political market became inevitable in the major Western European countries. This change in turn found its echo in the changing structure of political parties.


Following the Second World War, the old-style bourgeois party of individual representation became the exception. While some of the species continue to survive, they do not determine the nature of the party system any longer. By the same token, the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all 'people's' party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counterproductive since they deter segments of a potential nationwide clientele.
第二次世界大战后,个人代表制的旧式资产阶级政党成为例外。虽然其中一些种类继续存在,但它们已不再决定政党制度的性质。同样,作为一个阶级界限更加分明、教派结构更加突出的时代的产物,群众融合型政党正在转变为一个包罗万象的 "人民 "政党。它放弃了对群众进行思想和道德熏陶的尝试,更全面地转向选举舞台,试图以更深入的有效性换取更广泛的受众和更直接的选举成功。狭隘的政治任务和直接的选举目标与前者的全面关注截然不同;如今,后者被视为适得其反,因为它们会使潜在的全国性客户群中的一部分人望而却步。
For the class-mass parties we may roughly distinguish three stages in this process of transformation. There is first the period of gathering strength lasting to the beginning of the First World War; then comes their first governmental experience in the 1920s and 19305 (MacDonald, Weimar Republic, Front Populaire), unsatisfactory if measured both against the expectations of the class-mass party followers or leaders and suggesting the need for a broader basis of consensus in the political system. This period is followed by the present more or less advanced stages in the catch-all grouping, with some of the parties still trying to hold their special working-class clientele and at the same time embracing a variety of other clienteles.
对于阶级-群众政党而言,我们可以将这一转变过程大致分为三个阶段。首先是直到第一次世界大战开始的力量集结期;然后是 20 世纪 20 年代和 1930 年5 (麦克唐纳、魏玛共和国、人民阵线)的首次政府经验,如果按照阶级-群众政党追随者或领导人的期望来衡量,这些经验并不令人满意,而且表明需要在政治制度中建立更广泛的共识基础。在这一时期之后,是目前这个一揽子集团或多或少的高级阶段,其中一些政党仍在努力抓住其特殊的工人阶级客户,同时也在接纳其他各种客户。
Can we find some rules according to which this transform- ation is taking place, singling out factors. which advance or delay or arrest it? We might think of the current rate of economic development as the most important determinant; but if it were so important, France would certainly be ahead of Great Britain and, for that matter, also of the United States, still the classical example of an all-pervasive catch-all party system. What about the impact of the continuity or discontinuity of the political system? If this were so important, Germany and Great Britain would appear at opposite ends of the spectrum rather than showing a similar speed of transformation. We must then be satisfied to make some comments on the general trend and to note special limiting factors.
In some instances the catch-all performance meets definite limits in the traditional framework of society. The all-pervasive denominational background of the Italian Democrazia Cristiana means from the outset that the party cannot successfully appeal to the anticlerical elements of the population. Otherwise nothing prevents the party from phrasing its appeals so as to maximize its chances of catching more of those numerous elements which are not disturbed by the party's clerical ties. The solidary element of its doctrinal core has long been successfully employed to attract a socially diversified clientele.
Or take the case of two other major European parties, the German SPD (Social Democratic party) and the British Labour party. It is unlikely that either of them is able to make any concession to the specific desires of real estate interests or independent operators of agricultural properties while at the same time maintaining credibility with the masses of the urban population. Fortunately, however, there is enough community of interest between wage-and-salary earning urban or suburban white- and blue-collar workers and civil servants to designate them all as strategic objects of simultaneous appeals. Thus tradition and the pattern of social and professional stratification may set limits and offer potential audiences to the party's appeal.
If the party cannot hope to catch all categories of voters, it may have a reasonable expectation of catching more voters in all those categories whose interests do not adamantly conflict. Minor differences between group claims, such as between white-collar and manual labour groups, might be smoothed

over by vigorous emphasis on programmes which benefit both sections alike, for example, some cushioning against the shocks of automation.
Even more important is the heavy concentration on issues which are scarcely liable to meet resistance in the community. National societal goals transcending group interests offer the best sales prospect for the party intent on establishing or enlarging an appeal previously limited to specific sections of the population. The party which propagates most aggressively, for example, enlarged educational facilities may hear faint rumblings over the excessive cost or the danger to the quality of education from élites previously enjoying educational privileges. Yet the party's stock with any other family may be influenced only by how much more quickly and aggressively it took up the new national priority than its major competitor and how well its propaganda linked the individual family's future with the enlarged educational structures. To that extent its potential clientele is almost limitless. The catch-all of a given category performance turns virtually into an unlimited catchall performance.
The last remark already transcends the group-interest confines. On the one hand, in such developed societies as I am dealing with, thanks to general levels of economic well-being and security and to existing welfare schemes universalized by the state or enshrined in collective bargaining, many individuals no longer need such protection as they once sought from the state. On the other hand, many have become aware of the number and complexity of the general factors on which their future well-being depends. This change of priorities and preoccupation may lead them to examine political offerings less under the aspect of their own particular claims than under that of the political leader's ability to meet general future contingencies. Among the major present-day parties, it is the French UNR (National Republican Union), a latecomer, that speculates most clearly on the possibility of its channelling such less specialized needs to which its patron saint de Gaulle constantly appeals into its own version of the catch-all party. Its assumed asset would rest in a doctrine of national purpose and unity vague and flexible enough to allow the most variegated interpretation and yet-at least as long as the General continues to function-attractive enough to serve as a convenient rallying point for many groups and isolated individuals.
最后一句话已经超越了群体利益的局限。一方面,在我所面对的发达社会中,由于普遍的经济福祉和安全水平,以及国家普及的或集体谈判规定的现有福利计划,许多人不再需要他们曾经寻求的国家保护。另一方面,许多人已经意识到其未来福祉所依赖的一般因素的数量和复杂性。这种优先事项和关注点的变化可能会导致他们在审查政治提议时,不再从自身的特定诉求出发,而是从政治领袖应对未来一般突发事件的能力出发。在当今的主要政党中,法国的 UNR(全国共和联盟)是一个后来者,它最清楚地推测了将其守护神戴高乐不断呼吁满足的不太专业的需求转化为自己版本的全能政党的可能性。它假定的优势在于其国家目标和统一的理论足够模糊和灵活,可以做出最多样的解释,但--至少在将军继续发挥作用期间--又足够有吸引力,可以成为许多团体和孤立个人的一个方便的集合点。
While the UNR thus manipulates ideology for maximum general appeal, we have noted that ideology in the case of the Democrazia Cristiana is a slightly limiting factor. The UNR ideology in principle excludes no one. The Christian Democratic ideology by definition excludes the non-believers, or at least the seriously non-believing voter. It pays for the ties of religious solidarity and the advantages of supporting organizations by repelling some millions of voters. The catch-all parties in Europe appear at a time of de-ideologization which has substantially contributed to their rise and spread. Deideologization in the political field involves the transfer of ideology from partnership in a clearly visible political goal structure into one of many sufficient but by no means necessary motivational forces operative in the voters' choice. The German and Austrian Social Democratic parties in the last two decades most clearly exhibit the politics of de-ideologization. The example of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is less clear only because there was less to de-ideologize. In the CDU, ideology was from the outset only a general background atmosphere, both all-embracing and conveniently vague enough to allow recruiting among Catholic and Protestant denominations.
因此,虽然联合国军操纵意识形态以获得最大的普遍吸引力,但我们注意到,意识形态在基督民主党的情况下是一个略有限制的因素。联合国军的意识形态原则上不排斥任何人。基督教民主党的意识形态顾名思义排斥不信教者,或至少排斥严重不信教的选民。它通过排斥数百万选民来换取宗教团结的纽带和支持组织的优势。欧洲的全能党出现在去神学化时期,这在很大程度上促进了它们的崛起和传播。政治领域的 "去意识形态化 "是指将意识形态从一个清晰可见的政治目标结构中的合作伙伴关系转变为选民选择中许多充分但绝非必要的激励力量之一。过去二十年中,德国和奥地利的社会民主党最清楚地展示了去意识形态化的政治。德国基督教民主联盟(基民盟)的例子不那么明显,只是因为去意识形态化的程度较低。在基民盟中,意识形态从一开始就只是一种笼统的背景氛围,既包罗万象,又含糊其辞,足以允许在天主教和新教教派中招募成员。
As a rule, only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. Neither a small, strictly regional party such as the South Tyrolian Peoples' party nor a party built around the espousal of harsh and limited ideological claims, like the Dutch Calvinists; or transitory group claims, such as the German Refugees; or a specific professional category's claims, such as the Swedish Agrarians; or a limited-action programme, such as the Danish single-tax Justice party can aspire to a catch-all performance. Its raison d' 'êre is the defence of a specific clientele or the lobbying for a limited reform clearly delineated to allow for a restricted appeal, perhaps intense, but excluding a wider impact or-once the original job is terminated-excluding a life-saving transformation.
Nor is the catch-all performance in vogue or even sought among the majority of the larger parties in small democracies. Securely entrenched, often enjoying majority status for
decades-as the Norwegian and Swedish Social Democratic parties-and accustomed to a large arnount of interparty co-operation,' such parties have no incentive to change their form of recruitment or their appeal to well-defined social groups. With fewer factors intervening and therefore more clearly foreseeable results of political actions and decisions, it seems easier to stabilize political relations on the basis of strictly circumscribed competition (Switzerland, for instance) than to change over to the more aleatory form of catch-all competition.
Conversion to catch-all parties constitutes a competitive phenomenon. A party is apt to accommodate to its competitor's successful style because of hope of benefits or fear of losses on election day. Conversely, the more a party convinces itself that a competitor's favourable results were due only to some nonrepetitive circumstances, and that the competitor's capacity of overcoming internal dissension is a temporary phenomenon, the smaller the over-all conversion chance and the greater the inclination to hold fast to a loyal-though limited-clientele.
To evaluate the impact of these changes I have found it useful to list the functions which European parties exercised during earlier decades (late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth centuries) and to compare them with the present situation. Parties have functioned as channels for integrating individuals and groups into the existing political order, or as instruments for modifying or altogether replacing that order (integrationdisintegration). Parties have attempted to determine politicalaction preferences and influence other participants in the political process into accepting them. Parties have nominated
为了评估这些变化的影响,我认为有必要列出欧洲政党在之前几十年(19 世纪末和 20 世纪初)所发挥的作用,并将其与当前情况进行比较。政党的功能是将个人和团体融入现有的政治秩序,或作为修改或完全取代该秩序的工具(整合-解体)。政党试图确定政治行动的偏好,并影响政治进程的其他参与者接受这些偏好。政党提名
Ulf Torgersen, 'The Trend Towards Political Consensus: The Case of Norway', in Stein Rokkan (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Political Participation (Bergen: Christian Michelsen Institute, 1962); and Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, 'Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics' (1963, mimeographed), esp. p. 29. For both weighty historical and contemporary reasons the Austrian Social Democratic party forms a partial exception to the rule of less clear-cut transformation tendencies among major class-mass parties in smaller countries. It is becoming an eager and rather successful member of the catch-all club. For the most adequate treatment see K. L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1962). public office-holders and presented them to the public at large for confirmation.
Ulf Torgersen,"The Trend Towards Political Consensus:挪威的情况",见 Stein Rokkan(编),《政治参与研究方法》(卑尔根:克里斯蒂安-米克尔森研究所,1962 年);以及 Stein Rokkan 和 Henry Valen,《挪威政治的地区对比》(1963 年,油印本),特别是第 29 页。由于重要的历史和当代原因,奥地利社会民主党是小国主要阶级--群众政党中转型趋势不太明显的一个部分例外。该党正在成为 "一网打尽 "俱乐部的一名热心且相当成功的成员。最充分的论述见 K. L. Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism(纽约:纽约州立大学出版社,1962 年)。
The so-called 'expressive function'2 of the party, if not belonging to a category by itself, nevertheless warrants a special word. Its high tide belongs to the era of the nineteenthcentury constitutionalism when a more clear-cut separation existed between opinion formation-and-expression and the business of government. At that time the internally created parliamentary parties expressed opinions and criticism widely shared among the educated minority of the population. They pressed these opinions on their governments. But as the governments largely rested on an independent social and constitutional basis, they could if necessary hold out against the promptings of parliamentary factions and clubs. Full democratization merged the opinion-expressing and the governmental business in the same political parties and put them in the seat either of government or an alternative government. But it has left the expressive function of the party in a more ambiguous state. For electoral reasons, the democratic catch-all party, intent on spreading as wide as possible a net over a potential clientele, must continue to express widely felt popular concerns. Yet, bent on continuing in power or moving into governmental power, it performs this expressive function subject to manifold restrictions and changing tactical considerations. The party would atrophy if it were no longer able to function as a relay between the population and governmental structure, taking up grievances, ideas, and problems developed in a more searching and systematic fashion elsewhere in the body politic. Yet the caution it must give its present or prospective governmental role requires modulation and restraint. The very nature of today's catch-all party forbids an option between these two performances. It requires a constant shift between the party's critical role and its role as establishment support, a shift hard to perform but still harder to avoid.
党的所谓 "表达功能 "2 如果本身不属于一个类别,也值得特别提及。它的高潮属于十九世纪宪政时代,当时舆论形成和表达与政府事务之间存在着较为明确的界限。当时,内部成立的议会政党表达了少数受过教育的民众广泛认同的意见和批评。他们将这些意见强加给政府。但由于政府在很大程度上是建立在独立的社会和宪法基础之上的,因此在必要时,它们可以抵制议会派别和俱乐部的催促。全面民主化将舆论表达和政府事务合并在同一个政党中,并将它们置于政府或替代政府的席位上。但这却使政党的表达功能处于更加模糊的状态。出于选举的考虑,民主的全能型政党必须继续表达民众广泛关注的问题,以尽可能广泛地网罗潜在的服务对象。然而,为了继续执政或进入政府权力机构,它在履行这一表达职能时会受到多方面的限制和不断变化的战术考虑。如果政党不再能够充当民众与政府机构之间的中继站,不再能够在政治体制的其他地方以更深入、更系统的方式表达不满、想法和问题,那么它就会萎缩。然而,它必须谨慎对待其目前或未来的政府角色,这就要求它有所节制和克制。今天这个包罗万象的政党的性质本身就禁止在这两种表现之间做出选择。它需要在政党的关键角色和其作为建制支持者的角色之间不断转换,这种转换很难进行,但更难避免。
In order to leave a maximum imprint on the polity a party has to exercise all of the first three functions. Without the ability
Cf. Sartori's paper, 'European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism' [in G. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966 )].
to integrate people into the community the party could not compel other power-holders to listen to its clarions. The party influences other power centres to the extent that people are willing to follow its leadership. Conversely, people are willing to listen to the party because the party is the carrier of messages-here called action preferences-that are at least partially in accord with the images, desires, hopes, and fears of the electorate. Nominations for public office serve to tie together all these purposes; they may further the realization of action preferences if they elicit positive response from voters or from other power-holders. The nominations concretize the party's image with the public at large, on which confidence the party's effective functioning depends.
Now we can discuss the presence or absence of these three functions in Western society today. Under present conditions of spreading secular and mass consumer-goods orientation, with shifting and less obtrusive class lines, the former class-mass parties and denominational mass parties are both under pressure to become catch-all peoples' parties. The same applies to those few remnants of former bourgeois parties of individual representation which aspire to a secure future as political organizations independent of the vagaries of electoral laws and the tactical moves of their mass-party competitors. This change involves: (a) Drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage. In France's SFIO, for example, ideological remnants serve at best as scant cover for what has become known as 'Molletisme', the absolute reign of short-term tactical considerations. (b) Further strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification with the goals of their particular organization. (c) Downgrading of the role of the individual party member, a role considered a historical relic which may
现在,我们可以讨论这三种功能在当今西方社会的存在与否。在当前世俗化和大众消费品导向不断蔓延的条件下,随着阶级界限的转移和不那么明显,以前的阶级群众性政党和教派群众性政党都面临着成为无所不包的人民党的压力。前资产阶级个人代表党派的少数残余也是如此,它们渴望作为独立于变幻莫测的选举法及其群众党派竞争者的策略举动的政治组织,拥有一个安稳的未来。 这种变革包括:(a)大幅减少政党的意识形态包袱。例如,在法国的 SFIO 中,意识形态的残余充其量只能为所谓的 "Molletisme"--短期战术考虑的绝对统治--提供些许掩护。(b) 进一步加强高层领导团体,现在对他们的行为和不行为的评判标准是他们对整个社会体系效率的贡献,而不是对其特定组织目标的认同。(c) 降低党员个人的作用,这种作用被认为是历史遗留问题,可能会
obscure the newly built-up catch-all party image. (d) Deemphasis of the classe gardée, specific social-class or denominational clientele, in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large. (e) Securing access to a variety of interest groups. The financial reasons are obvious, but they are not the most important where official financing is available, as in Germany, or where access to the most important media of communication is fairly open, as in England and Germany. The chief reason is to secure electoral support via interestgroup intercession.
(d) 不再强调 "classe gardée",即特定的社会阶层或教派客户群,而是在广大民众中招募选民。 (d) 不再强调 "classe gardée",即特定的社会阶层或教派客户,而是在广大民众中招募选民。(e) 争取各种利益集团的支持。财政方面的原因显而易见,但在有官方资助的地方(如德国),或在最重要的传播媒介相当开放的地方(如英国和德国),财政方面的原因并不是最重要的。最主要的原因是通过利益集团的干预获得选举支持。
From this fairly universal development the sometimes considerable remnants of two old class-mass parties, the French and the Italian Communist parties, are excluding themselves. These parties are in part ossified, in part solidified by a combination of official rejection and legitimate sectional grievances. In this situation the ceremonial invocation of the rapidly fading background of a remote and inapplicable revolutionary experience has not yet been completely abandoned as a part of political strategy. What is the position of such opposition parties of the older class-mass type, which still jealously try to hold an exclusive loyalty of their members, while not admitted nor fully ready to share in the hostile state power? Such parties face the same difficulties in recruiting and holding intensity of membership interest as other political organizations. Yet, in contrast to their competitors working within the confines of the existing political order, they cannot make a virtue out of necessity and adapt themselves fully to the new style of catchall peoples' party. This conservatism does not cost them the confidence of their regular corps of voters. On the other hand, the continued renewal of confidence on election day does not involve an intimate enough bond to utilize as a basis for major political operations.
The attitudes of regular voters-in contrast to those of members and activists-attest to the extent of incongruency between full-fledged participation in the social processes of a consumer-goods oriented society and the old political style which rested on the primordial need for sweeping political
4 See also A. Pizzorno, 'The Individualistic Mobilization of Europe', in Daedalus (Winter 1964), pp. 199, 217.
change. The latter option has gone out of fashion in Western countries and has been carefully eliminated from the expectations, calculations, and symbols of the catch-all mass party. The incongruency may rest on the total absence of any connection between general social-cultural behaviour and political style. In this sense electoral choice may rest on family tradition or empathy with the political underdog without thereby becoming part of a coherent personality structure. Or the choice may be made in the expectation that it will have no influence on the course of political development; it is then an act of either adjusting to or, as the case may be, signing out of the existing political system rather than a manifestation of signing up somewhere else.




It has been frequently observed that despite the wide range of parties in the parliaments of the representative democracies they tend increasingly to say the same things to their electorate. Tingsten in 955 backed up this observation with systematic data, and recently J. C. Thomas, in a thorough enquiry into party programmes presented in the parliaments of eleven countries, has shown that over the past forty to sixty years the average differences among party positions on ten principal programmatic themes have constantly decreased. Likewise diminished is the intensity with which reforms are advocated in these programmes: 'There has been a dramatic narrowing of the scope of domestic political conflict between parties in western nations. The limit of this narrowing is just short of zero, like in American parties. Observations on the marketing style of latter-day electoral campaigns, on the way the various parties compete to represent the same social groups and hence the development of what Kirchheimer called the 'catch-all' parties, constitute less systematic but nevertheless telling proofs of the same phenomenon.
人们经常注意到,尽管代议制民主国家议会中的政党种类繁多,但它们越来越倾向于对选民说同样的话。955 年,廷斯滕(Tingsten)用系统的数据支持了这一观点。最近,托马斯(J. C. Thomas)对 11 个国家议会中的政党纲领进行了深入调查, ,结果表明,在过去四、六十年间,各政党在十个主要纲领主题上的平均立场差异不断缩小。同样,这些纲领中倡导改革的力度也在减弱:'西方国家政党之间国内政治冲突的范围急剧缩小。这种缩小的极限就像美国政党一样,几乎为零。 对当今竞选活动营销风格的观察,对各政党竞相代表相同社会群体的方式的观察,以及基希海默所称的'一网打尽'政党的发展,构成了这一现象不那么系统但却很有说服力的证明。
Is this phenomenon restricted to programme 'enunciations', or does it reflect a deeper lack of political alternatives, some

  1. Liberal parties without sharply profiled programme or clientele may, however, make such conversion attempts. Val Lorwin draws my attention to the excellent example of a former bourgeois party, the Belgian Liberal party, which became in 196I the 'Party of Liberty and Progress', de-emphasizing anticlericalism and appealing to the right wing of the Social Christian party, worried about this party's governmental alliance with the Socialists.
    不过,没有明确纲领或客户群的自由党也可以尝试进行这种转变。瓦尔-洛温(Val Lorwin)提请我注意一个很好的例子:比利时自由党这个前资产阶级政党在 1961 年变成了 "自由与进步党",不再强调反教权主义,而是向社会基督教党的右翼靠拢,因为他们担心该党会与社会党结成政府联盟。
  2. Alessandro Pizzorno, excerpted from 'Interests and Parties in Pluralism', in Suzanne Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics ( ), pp. 247-84. Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press.
    ' J. C. Thomas, The Decline of Ideology in Westem Political Parties (London: Sage Publications, 1975). It should be remembered that Thomas's data go only until the early sixties. The countries analysed are Australia, Austria, Canada, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, USSR, USA.
    J. C. Thomas, The Decline of Ideology in Westem Political Parties (London: Sage Publications, 1975)。需要注意的是,托马斯的数据仅截止到 60 年代初。分析的国家包括澳大利亚、奥地利、加拿大、英国、法国、德国、意大利、日本、新西兰、瑞典、苏联和美国。