Smith v. Van Gorkom
史密斯诉范戈尔科姆案

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注释此案例

488 A.2d 858 (1985)
488 A.2d 858 （1985 年）

Alden SMITH and John W. Gosselin, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. Jerome W. VAN GORKOM, Bruce S. Chelberg, William B. Johnson, Joseph B. Lanterman, Graham J. Morgan, Thomas P. O'Boyle, W. Allen Wallis, Sidney H. Bonser, William D. Browder, Trans Union Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Marmon Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation, GL Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and New T. Co., a Delaware corporation, Defendants Below, Appellees.
Alden SMITH 和 John W. Gosselin，以下原告，上诉人，诉 Jerome W. VAN GORKOM、Bruce S. Chelberg、William B. Johnson、Joseph B. Lanterman、Graham J. Morgan、Thomas P. O'Boyle、W. Allen Wallis、Sidney H. Bonser、William D. Browder、Trans Union Corporation（特拉华州公司）、Marmon Group， Inc.（特拉华州公司）、GL Corporation（特拉华州公司）、 以及特拉华州的一家公司 New T. Co.，被告如下，被上诉人。

Supreme Court of Delaware.
特拉华州最高法院。

Submitted: June 11, 1984.
提交时间：1984 年 6 月 11 日。

Decided: January 29, 1985.
决定时间：1985 年 1 月 29 日。

Opinion on Denial of Reargument: March 14, 1985.
关于拒绝重新论证的意见：1985 年 3 月 14 日。

William Prickett (argued) and James P. Dalle Pazze, of Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee, Wilmington, and Ivan Irwin, Jr. and Brett A. Ringle, of Shank, Irwin, Conant & Williamson, Dallas, Tex., of counsel, for plaintiffs below, appellants.
William Prickett （辩论） 和 James P. Dalle Pazze， of Prickett， Jones， Elliott， Kristol & Schnee， Wilmington， 以及 Ivan Irwin， Jr. 和 Brett A. Ringle， of Shank， Irwin， Conant & Williamson， Dallas， Tex.，担任律师，代表下面的原告，上诉人。

Robert K. Payson (argued) and Peter M. Sieglaff of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for individual defendants below, appellees.
Robert K. Payson（辩论）和 Peter M. Sieglaff of Potter， Anderson & Corroon， Wilmington，代表以下个别被告，被上诉人。

Lewis S. Black, Jr., A. Gilchrist Sparks, III (argued) and Richard D. Allen, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, for Trans Union Corp., Marmon Group, Inc., GL Corp. and New T. Co., defendants below, appellees.
Lewis S. Black， Jr.， A. Gilchrist Sparks， III（（争议）和 Richard D. Allen，Morris， Nichols， Arsht & Tunnell， Wilmington，代表 Trans Union Corp.， Marmon Group， Inc.， GL Corp.和 New T. Co.，以下被告，被上诉人。

Before HERRMANN, C.J., and McNEILLY, HORSEY, MOORE and CHRISTIE, JJ., constituting the Court en banc.
在 HERRMANN， C.J. 和 McNEILLY、HORSEY、MOORE 和 CHRISTIE， JJ. 之前，组成了全院法院。

*863 HORSEY, Justice (for the majority):
*863 霍西，大法官（代表多数）：

This appeal from the Court of Chancery involves a class action brought by shareholders of the defendant Trans Union Corporation ("Trans Union" or "the Company"), originally seeking rescission of a cash-out merger of Trans Union into the defendant New T Company ("New T"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant, Marmon Group, Inc. ("Marmon"). Alternate relief in the form of damages is sought against the defendant members of the Board of Directors of Trans Union, *864 New T, and Jay A. Pritzker and Robert A. Pritzker, owners of Marmon.[1]
本案不服衡平法院的上诉涉及被告 Trans Union Corporation（“Trans Union”或“公司”）股东提起的集体诉讼，该股东最初要求撤销 Trans Union 与被告 New T Company（“New T”）的套现合并，后者是被告 Marmon Group， Inc.（“Marmon”）的全资子公司。寻求损害赔偿形式的替代救济，针对 Trans Union 董事会的被告成员 *864 New T，以及 Marmon 的所有者 Jay A. Pritzker 和 Robert A. Pritzker。[1]

Following trial, the former Chancellor granted judgment for the defendant directors by unreported letter opinion dated July 6, 1982.[2] Judgment was based on two findings: (1) that the Board of Directors had acted in an informed manner so as to be entitled to protection of the business judgment rule in approving the cash-out merger; and (2) that the shareholder vote approving the merger should not be set aside because the stockholders had been "fairly informed" by the Board of Directors before voting thereon. The plaintiffs appeal.
审判后，前财政大臣通过 1982 年 7 月 6 日的未报告信函意见为被告董事作出判决。[2] 判决基于两个调查结果：（1） 董事会以知情的方式行事，因此在批准套现合并时有权受到商业判断规则的保护;以及 （2） 不应撤销批准合并的股东投票，因为股东在投票前已经得到了董事会的“公平通知”。原告提出上诉。

Speaking for the majority of the Court, we conclude that both rulings of the Court of Chancery are clearly erroneous. Therefore, we reverse and direct that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant directors for the fair value of the plaintiffs' stockholdings in Trans Union, in accordance with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 701 (1983).[3]
代表法院的大多数法官，我们得出结论，衡平法院的两项裁决显然都是错误的。因此，我们撤销并指示根据 Weinberger v. UOP， Inc.， Del.Supr.， 457 A.2d 701 （1983） 一案，就原告在 Trans Union 持有的股票的公允价值作出有利于原告和被告董事的判决。[3]

We hold: (1) that the Board's decision, reached September 20, 1980, to approve the proposed cash-out merger was not the product of an informed business judgment; (2) that the Board's subsequent efforts to amend the Merger Agreement and take other curative action were ineffectual, both legally and factually; and (3) that the Board did not deal with complete candor with the stockholders by failing to disclose all material facts, which they knew or should have known, before securing the stockholders' approval of the merger.
我们认为：（1） 董事会于 1980 年 9 月 20 日决定批准拟议的套现合并，这并非基于知情的商业判断;（2） 董事会随后修订合并协议和采取其他补救措施的努力在法律和事实上均无效;以及 （3） 董事会在获得股东批准合并之前未能披露他们知道或应该知道的所有重要事实，从而没有完全坦诚地与股东打交道。

I.
我。

The nature of this case requires a detailed factual statement. The following facts are essentially uncontradicted:[4]
本案的性质需要详细的事实陈述。以下事实基本上没有矛盾：[4]

-A-
-一个-

Trans Union was a publicly-traded, diversified holding company, the principal earnings of which were generated by its railcar leasing business. During the period here involved, the Company had a cash flow of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. However, the Company had difficulty in generating sufficient taxable income to offset increasingly large investment tax credits (ITCs). Accelerated depreciation deductions had decreased available taxable income against which to offset accumulating ITCs. The Company took these deductions, despite their effect on usable ITCs, because the rental price in the railcar leasing market had already impounded the purported tax savings.
Trans Union 是一家公开交易的多元化控股公司，其主要收益来自其轨道车租赁业务。在此期间，公司每年的现金流为数亿美元。然而，公司难以产生足够的应税收入来抵消日益增长的投资税收抵免 （ITC）。加速折旧扣除减少了用于抵消累积 ITC 的可用应税收入。尽管这些扣除对可用的 ITC 有影响，但公司还是接受了这些扣除，因为铁路车辆租赁市场的租金价格已经扣押了所谓的节税。

In the late 1970's, together with other capital-intensive firms, Trans Union lobbied in Congress to have ITCs refundable in cash to firms which could not fully utilize the credit. During the summer of 1980, defendant Jerome W. Van Gorkom, Trans Union's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, *865 testified and lobbied in Congress for refundability of ITCs and against further accelerated depreciation. By the end of August, Van Gorkom was convinced that Congress would neither accept the refundability concept nor curtail further accelerated depreciation.
在 1970 年代后期，Trans Union 与其他资本密集型公司一起在国会游说，要求将 ITC 以现金形式退还给无法充分利用信贷的公司。1980 年夏天，被告 Trans Union 的董事长兼首席执行官 Jerome W. Van Gorkom *865 在国会作证并游说，要求退还 ITC 并反对进一步加速贬值。到 8 月底，Van Gorkom 确信国会既不会接受可退款概念，也不会限制进一步的加速贬值。

Beginning in the late 1960's, and continuing through the 1970's, Trans Union pursued a program of acquiring small companies in order to increase available taxable income. In July 1980, Trans Union Management prepared the annual revision of the Company's Five Year Forecast. This report was presented to the Board of Directors at its July, 1980 meeting. The report projected an annual income growth of about 20%. The report also concluded that Trans Union would have about $195 million in spare cash between 1980 and 1985, "with the surplus growing rapidly from 1982 onward." The report referred to the ITC situation as a "nagging problem" and, given that problem, the leasing company "would still appear to be constrained to a tax breakeven." The report then listed four alternative uses of the projected 1982-1985 equity surplus: (1) stock repurchase; (2) dividend increases; (3) a major acquisition program; and (4) combinations of the above. The sale of Trans Union was not among the alternatives. The report emphasized that, despite the overall surplus, the operation of the Company would consume all available equity for the next several years, and concluded: "As a result, we have sufficient time to fully develop our course of action."
从 1960 年代后期开始，一直持续到 1970 年代，Trans Union 推行了一项收购小公司的计划，以增加可用的应税收入。1980 年 7 月，Trans Union Management 准备了公司五年预测的年度修订。该报告在 1980 年 7 月的董事会会议上提交给董事会。该报告预计年收入增长约 20%。该报告还得出结论，Trans Union 在 1980 年至 1985 年期间将拥有约 1.95 亿美元的闲置现金，“从 1982 年开始，盈余迅速增长”。该报告将 ITC 的情况称为“令人烦恼的问题”，鉴于该问题，租赁公司“似乎仍将受到税收收支平衡的限制”。该报告随后列出了预计的 1982-1985 年股权盈余的四种替代用途：（1） 股票回购;（2） 股息增加;（3） 重大收购计划;以及 （4） 上述的组合。出售 Trans Union 不在替代方案之列。该报告强调，尽管总体盈余，但公司的运营将在未来几年内消耗掉所有可用的股本，并得出结论：“因此，我们有足够的时间来充分制定我们的行动方案。

-B-

On August 27, 1980, Van Gorkom met with Senior Management of Trans Union. Van Gorkom reported on his lobbying efforts in Washington and his desire to find a solution to the tax credit problem more permanent than a continued program of acquisitions. Various alternatives were suggested and discussed preliminarily, including the sale of Trans Union to a company with a large amount of taxable income.
1980 年 8 月 27 日，Van Gorkom 会见了 Trans Union 的高级管理层。Van Gorkom 报告了他在华盛顿的游说工作，以及他希望找到比持续的收购计划更持久的税收抵免问题解决方案的愿望。初步提出并讨论了各种替代方案，包括将 Trans Union 出售给一家应税收入较高的公司。

Donald Romans, Chief Financial Officer of Trans Union, stated that his department had done a "very brief bit of work on the possibility of a leveraged buy-out." This work had been prompted by a media article which Romans had seen regarding a leveraged buy-out by management. The work consisted of a "preliminary study" of the cash which could be generated by the Company if it participated in a leveraged buyout. As Romans stated, this analysis "was very first and rough cut at seeing whether a cash flow would support what might be considered a high price for this type of transaction."
Trans Union 首席财务官 Donald Romans 表示，他的部门已经“就杠杆收购的可能性做了非常简短的工作”。这项工作是由罗马人看到的一篇关于管理层杠杆收购的媒体文章推动的。这项工作包括对公司参与杠杆收购可能产生的现金进行“初步研究”。正如 Romans 所说，这项分析“是第一次粗略地了解现金流是否能够支持此类交易可能被视为高价的价格。

On September 5, at another Senior Management meeting which Van Gorkom attended, Romans again brought up the idea of a leveraged buy-out as a "possible strategic alternative" to the Company's acquisition program. Romans and Bruce S. Chelberg, President and Chief Operating Officer of Trans Union, had been working on the matter in preparation for the meeting. According to Romans: They did not "come up" with a price for the Company. They merely "ran the numbers" at $50 a share and at $60 a share with the "rough form" of their cash figures at the time. Their "figures indicated that $50 would be very easy to do but $60 would be very difficult to do under those figures." This work did not purport to establish a fair price for either the Company or 100% of the stock. It was intended to determine the cash flow needed to service the debt that would "probably" be incurred in a leveraged buyout, based on "rough calculations" without "any benefit of experts to identify what the limits were to that, and so forth." These computations were not considered extensive and no conclusion was reached.
9 月 5 日，在 Van Gorkom 参加的另一次高级管理层会议上，Romans 再次提出了杠杆收购的想法，作为公司收购计划的“可能的战略替代方案”。Romans 和 Trans Union 总裁兼首席运营官 Bruce S. Chelberg 一直在努力处理此事，为会议做准备。根据罗马书：他们没有 “提出” 公司的价格。他们只是以每股 50 美元和每股 60 美元的价格“计算数字”，以及当时现金数字的“粗略形式”。他们的“数据表明，50 美元很容易做到，但在这些数字下 60 美元很难做到。这项工作并非旨在为公司或 100% 的股票确定公平价格。它旨在根据“粗略计算”确定偿还杠杆收购“可能”产生的债务所需的现金流，而“专家没有任何好处来确定其限制是什么，等等”。这些计算并不广泛，也没有得出结论。

At this meeting, Van Gorkom stated that he would be willing to take $55 per share for his own 75,000 shares. He vetoed the suggestion of a leveraged buy-out by Management, however, as involving a potential conflict of interest for Management. Van Gorkom, a certified public accountant and lawyer, had been an officer of Trans Union *866 for 24 years, its Chief Executive Officer for more than 17 years, and Chairman of its Board for 2 years. It is noteworthy in this connection that he was then approaching 65 years of age and mandatory retirement.
在这次会议上，Van Gorkom 表示，他愿意以每股 55 美元的价格购买自己的 75,000 股。然而，他否决了管理层进行杠杆收购的建议，因为这涉及管理层的潜在利益冲突。Van Gorkom 是一名注册会计师和律师，曾担任 Trans Union *866 的官员 24 年，担任其首席执行官超过 17 年，并担任其董事会主席 2 年。在这方面值得注意的是，他当时已接近 65 岁并强制退休。

For several days following the September 5 meeting, Van Gorkom pondered the idea of a sale. He had participated in many acquisitions as a manager and director of Trans Union and as a director of other companies. He was familiar with acquisition procedures, valuation methods, and negotiations; and he privately considered the pros and cons of whether Trans Union should seek a privately or publicly-held purchaser.
在 9 月 5 日会议后的几天里，Van Gorkom 一直在考虑出售的想法。他作为 Trans Union 的经理和董事以及其他公司的董事参与了许多收购。他熟悉收购程序、估值方法和谈判;他私下里考虑了 Trans Union 是否应该寻找私人或公共持有的买家的利弊。

Van Gorkom decided to meet with Jay A. Pritzker, a well-known corporate takeover specialist and a social acquaintance. However, rather than approaching Pritzker simply to determine his interest in acquiring Trans Union, Van Gorkom assembled a proposed per share price for sale of the Company and a financing structure by which to accomplish the sale. Van Gorkom did so without consulting either his Board or any members of Senior Management except one: Carl Peterson, Trans Union's Controller. Telling Peterson that he wanted no other person on his staff to know what he was doing, but without telling him why, Van Gorkom directed Peterson to calculate the feasibility of a leveraged buy-out at an assumed price per share of $55. Apart from the Company's historic stock market price,[5] and Van Gorkom's long association with Trans Union, the record is devoid of any competent evidence that $55 represented the per share intrinsic value of the Company.
Van Gorkom 决定与著名的企业收购专家和社交熟人 Jay A. Pritzker 会面。然而，Van Gorkom 并不是简单地为了确定他收购 Trans Union 的利益而联系 Pritzker，而是整理了一份拟议的每股出售公司价格和完成出售的融资结构。Van Gorkom 没有咨询他的董事会或任何高级管理层成员，除了一位：Trans Union 的财务总监 Carl Peterson。Van Gorkom 告诉 Peterson，他不想让员工中的其他人知道他在做什么，但没有告诉他为什么，而是指示 Peterson 以每股 55 美元的假设价格计算杠杆收购的可行性。除了公司的历史股票市场价格[5] 以及 Van Gorkom 与 Trans Union 的长期合作外，该记录没有任何有力的证据证明 55 美元代表了公司的每股内在价值。

Having thus chosen the $55 figure, based solely on the availability of a leveraged buy-out, Van Gorkom multiplied the price per share by the number of shares outstanding to reach a total value of the Company of $690 million. Van Gorkom told Peterson to use this $690 million figure and to assume a $200 million equity contribution by the buyer. Based on these assumptions, Van Gorkom directed Peterson to determine whether the debt portion of the purchase price could be paid off in five years or less if financed by Trans Union's cash flow as projected in the Five Year Forecast, and by the sale of certain weaker divisions identified in a study done for Trans Union by the Boston Consulting Group ("BCG study"). Peterson reported that, of the purchase price, approximately $50-80 million would remain outstanding after five years. Van Gorkom was disappointed, but decided to meet with Pritzker nevertheless.
因此，Van Gorkom 仅根据杠杆收购的可用性选择了 55 美元的数字，并将每股价格乘以流通股数量，得出公司的总价值为 6.9 亿美元。Van Gorkom 告诉 Peterson 使用这个 6.9 亿美元的数字，并承担买方出资 2 亿美元的股权。基于这些假设，Van Gorkom 指示 Peterson 确定，如果按照五年预测预测的 Trans Union 现金流提供资金，并通过出售波士顿咨询集团为 Trans Union 进行的一项研究（“BCG 研究”）中确定的某些较弱部门，是否可以在五年或更短的时间内偿还收购价格的债务部分。Peterson 报告说，在收购价格中，大约 50-8000 万美元将在五年后仍未偿还。Van Gorkom 很失望，但还是决定与普利兹克会面。

Van Gorkom arranged a meeting with Pritzker at the latter's home on Saturday, September 13, 1980. Van Gorkom prefaced his presentation by stating to Pritzker: "Now as far as you are concerned, I can, I think, show how you can pay a substantial premium over the present stock price and pay off most of the loan in the first five years. * * * If you could pay $55 for this Company, here is a way in which I think it can be financed."
Van Gorkom 于 1980 年 9 月 13 日星期六在普利兹克的家中安排了一次与普利兹克的会面。Van Gorkom 在他的演讲开始前对 Pritzker 说：“现在，就您而言，我认为我可以展示您如何支付比当前股价高出的大量溢价，并在头五年内还清大部分贷款。* * * 如果你能为这家公司支付 55 美元，我认为这是可以融资的一种方式。

Van Gorkom then reviewed with Pritzker his calculations based upon his proposed price of $55 per share. Although Pritzker mentioned $50 as a more attractive figure, no other price was mentioned. However, Van Gorkom stated that to be sure that $55 was the best price obtainable, Trans Union should be free to accept any better offer. Pritzker demurred, stating that his organization would serve as a "stalking horse" for an "auction contest" only if Trans Union would permit Pritzker to buy 1,750,000 shares of Trans Union stock at market price which Pritzker could then sell to any higher bidder. After further discussion on this point, Pritzker told Van Gorkom that he would give him a more definite reaction soon.
Van Gorkom 随后与 Pritzker 一起审查了他根据他提出的每股 55 美元价格的计算结果。尽管普利兹克提到 50 美元是一个更具吸引力的数字，但没有提到其他价格。然而，Van Gorkom 表示，为了确保 55 美元是可以获得的最佳价格，Trans Union 应该可以自由接受任何更好的报价。普利兹克对此表示反对，并表示，只有当 Trans Union 允许普利兹克以市场价格购买 1,750,000 股 Trans Union 股票，然后普利兹克可以将其出售给任何出价更高的人时，他的组织才会成为“拍卖竞赛”的“跟踪马”。在进一步讨论了这一点之后，普利兹克告诉范戈尔科姆，他会很快给他一个更明确的反应。

*867 On Monday, September 15, Pritzker advised Van Gorkom that he was interested in the $55 cash-out merger proposal and requested more information on Trans Union. Van Gorkom agreed to meet privately with Pritzker, accompanied by Peterson, Chelberg, and Michael Carpenter, Trans Union's consultant from the Boston Consulting Group. The meetings took place on September 16 and 17. Van Gorkom was "astounded that events were moving with such amazing rapidity."
*867 9 月 15 日星期一，普利兹克告诉 Van Gorkom，他对 55 美元的提现合并提案感兴趣，并要求提供有关 Trans Union 的更多信息。Van Gorkom 同意在 Peterson、Chelberg 和 Trans Union 波士顿咨询集团顾问 Michael Carpenter 的陪同下与普利兹克私下会面。会议于 9 月 16 日和 17 日举行。Van Gorkom “对事件以如此惊人的速度发展感到震惊”。

On Thursday, September 18, Van Gorkom met again with Pritzker. At that time, Van Gorkom knew that Pritzker intended to make a cash-out merger offer at Van Gorkom's proposed $55 per share. Pritzker instructed his attorney, a merger and acquisition specialist, to begin drafting merger documents. There was no further discussion of the $55 price. However, the number of shares of Trans Union's treasury stock to be offered to Pritzker was negotiated down to one million shares; the price was set at $38-75 cents above the per share price at the close of the market on September 19. At this point, Pritzker insisted that the Trans Union Board act on his merger proposal within the next three days, stating to Van Gorkom: "We have to have a decision by no later than Sunday [evening, September 21] before the opening of the English stock exchange on Monday morning." Pritzker's lawyer was then instructed to draft the merger documents, to be reviewed by Van Gorkom's lawyer, "sometimes with discussion and sometimes not, in the haste to get it finished."
9 月 18 日星期四，Van Gorkom 再次会见了普利兹克。当时，Van Gorkom 知道 Pritzker 打算以 Van Gorkom 提议的每股 55 美元的价格提出套现合并要约。普利兹克指示他的律师，一位并购专家，开始起草合并文件。没有进一步讨论 55 美元的价格。然而，要向普利兹克出售的 Trans Union 库存股的数量被协商降至 100 万股;价格定为 9 月 19 日收盘时每股价格高出 38-75 美分。在这一点上，普利兹克坚持要求 Trans Union 董事会在未来三天内就他的合并提案采取行动，他对 Van Gorkom 表示：“我们必须在周一早上英国证券交易所开盘前不迟于星期日 [9 月 21 日晚上] 做出决定。然后，普利兹克的律师被指示起草合并文件，由 Van Gorkom 的律师审查，“有时讨论，有时不讨论，匆忙完成。

On Friday, September 19, Van Gorkom, Chelberg, and Pritzker consulted with Trans Union's lead bank regarding the financing of Pritzker's purchase of Trans Union. The bank indicated that it could form a syndicate of banks that would finance the transaction. On the same day, Van Gorkom retained James Brennan, Esquire, to advise Trans Union on the legal aspects of the merger. Van Gorkom did not consult with William Browder, a Vice-President and director of Trans Union and former head of its legal department, or with William Moore, then the head of Trans Union's legal staff.
9 月 19 日星期五，Van Gorkom、Chelberg 和 Pritzker 就 Pritzker 收购 Trans Union 的融资问题咨询了 Trans Union 的牵头银行。该银行表示，它可以组建一个银行银团，为这笔交易提供资金。同一天，Van Gorkom 聘请了 Esquire 的 James Brennan，就合并的法律方面向 Trans Union 提供建议。Van Gorkom 没有咨询 Trans Union 的副总裁兼董事、前法律部门负责人 William Browder，也没有咨询时任 Trans Union 法律工作人员负责人的 William Moore。

On Friday, September 19, Van Gorkom called a special meeting of the Trans Union Board for noon the following day. He also called a meeting of the Company's Senior Management to convene at 11:00 a.m., prior to the meeting of the Board. No one, except Chelberg and Peterson, was told the purpose of the meetings. Van Gorkom did not invite Trans Union's investment banker, Salomon Brothers or its Chicago-based partner, to attend.
9 月 19 日星期五，Van Gorkom 在第二天中午召集了 Trans Union 董事会的特别会议。他还召集了公司高级管理层会议，会议于上午 11：00 召开，即董事会会议之前。除了 Chelberg 和 Peterson 之外，没有人被告知会议的目的。Van Gorkom 没有邀请 Trans Union 的投资银行家 Salomon Brothers 或其位于芝加哥的合作伙伴出席。

Of those present at the Senior Management meeting on September 20, only Chelberg and Peterson had prior knowledge of Pritzker's offer. Van Gorkom disclosed the offer and described its terms, but he furnished no copies of the proposed Merger Agreement. Romans announced that his department had done a second study which showed that, for a leveraged buy-out, the price range for Trans Union stock was between $55 and $65 per share. Van Gorkom neither saw the study nor asked Romans to make it available for the Board meeting.
在 9 月 20 日出席高级管理层会议的人中，只有 Chelberg 和 Peterson 事先知道普利兹克的提议。Van Gorkom 披露了该要约并描述了其条款，但他没有提供拟议的合并协议的副本。Romans 宣布，他的部门已经进行了第二项研究，该研究表明，对于杠杆收购，Trans Union 股票的价格范围在每股 55 美元到 65 美元之间。Van Gorkom 既没有看到这项研究，也没有要求 Romans 将其提供给董事会会议。

Senior Management's reaction to the Pritzker proposal was completely negative. No member of Management, except Chelberg and Peterson, supported the proposal. Romans objected to the price as being too low;[6] he was critical of the timing and suggested that consideration should be given to the adverse tax consequences of an all-cash deal for low-basis shareholders; and he took the position that the agreement to sell Pritzker one million newly-issued shares at market price would inhibit other offers, as would the prohibitions against soliciting bids and furnishing inside information *868 to other bidders. Romans argued that the Pritzker proposal was a "lock up" and amounted to "an agreed merger as opposed to an offer." Nevertheless, Van Gorkom proceeded to the Board meeting as scheduled without further delay.
高级管理层对普利兹克提案的反应完全是负面的。除了 Chelberg 和 Peterson 之外，没有其他管理层成员支持该提案。罗马人反对价格太低;[6]他对时机持批评态度，并建议应考虑全现金交易对低基数股东的不利税收后果;他采取的立场是，以市场价格出售普利兹克 100 万股新发行股票的协议将抑制其他报价，禁止招投标和向其他投标人提供内幕消息 *868 的规定也是如此。罗曼斯认为，普利兹克的提议是“锁定”，相当于“商定的合并，而不是要约”。尽管如此，Van Gorkom 还是如期参加了董事会会议，没有再拖延。

Ten directors served on the Trans Union Board, five inside (defendants Bonser, O'Boyle, Browder, Chelberg, and Van Gorkom) and five outside (defendants Wallis, Johnson, Lanterman, Morgan and Reneker). All directors were present at the meeting, except O'Boyle who was ill. Of the outside directors, four were corporate chief executive officers and one was the former Dean of the University of Chicago Business School. None was an investment banker or trained financial analyst. All members of the Board were well informed about the Company and its operations as a going concern. They were familiar with the current financial condition of the Company, as well as operating and earnings projections reported in the recent Five Year Forecast. The Board generally received regular and detailed reports and was kept abreast of the accumulated investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation problem.
10 名董事在 Trans Union 董事会任职，其中 5 名内部董事（被告 Bonser、O'Boyle、Browder、Chelberg 和 Van Gorkom）和 5 名外部董事（被告 Wallis、Johnson、Lanterman、Morgan 和 Reneker）。所有董事都出席了会议，但 O'Boyle 生病了。在这些外部董事中，有四名是公司首席执行官，一名是芝加哥大学商学院的前院长。他们都不是投资银行家或训练有素的金融分析师。董事会所有成员都对公司及其持续经营的运营有充分的了解。他们熟悉公司当前的财务状况，以及最近的五年预测中报告的运营和收益预测。董事会通常会收到定期和详细的报告，并及时了解累积的投资税收抵免和加速折旧问题。

Van Gorkom began the Special Meeting of the Board with a twenty-minute oral presentation. Copies of the proposed Merger Agreement were delivered too late for study before or during the meeting.[7] He reviewed the Company's ITC and depreciation problems and the efforts theretofore made to solve them. He discussed his initial meeting with Pritzker and his motivation in arranging that meeting. Van Gorkom did not disclose to the Board, however, the methodology by which he alone had arrived at the $55 figure, or the fact that he first proposed the $55 price in his negotiations with Pritzker.
Van Gorkom 以 20 分钟的口头报告开始了董事会特别会议。拟议的合并协议副本交付太晚，无法在会议前或会议期间进行研究。[7]他回顾了公司的 ITC 和折旧问题以及之前为解决这些问题所做的努力。他讨论了他与普利兹克的初次会面以及他安排那次会面的动机。然而，Van Gorkom 没有向董事会披露他独自得出 55 美元数字的方法，也没有透露他在与普利兹克谈判中首次提出 55 美元价格的事实。

Van Gorkom outlined the terms of the Pritzker offer as follows: Pritzker would pay $55 in cash for all outstanding shares of Trans Union stock upon completion of which Trans Union would be merged into New T Company, a subsidiary wholly-owned by Pritzker and formed to implement the merger; for a period of 90 days, Trans Union could receive, but could not actively solicit, competing offers; the offer had to be acted on by the next evening, Sunday, September 21; Trans Union could only furnish to competing bidders published information, and not proprietary information; the offer was subject to Pritzker obtaining the necessary financing by October 10, 1980; if the financing contingency were met or waived by Pritzker, Trans Union was required to sell to Pritzker one million newly-issued shares of Trans Union at $38 per share.
Van Gorkom 概述了普利兹克要约的条款如下：普利兹克将以 55 美元现金购买 Trans Union 股票的所有流通股，完成后 Trans Union 将并入 New T Company，这是普利兹克全资拥有的子公司，为实施合并而成立;在 90 天内，Trans Union 可以收到竞争性要约，但不能主动招揽竞争性要约;这个提议必须在第二天晚上，即 9 月 21 日星期日之前付诸实施;Trans Union 只能向竞争投标人提供公开信息，而不能提供专有信息;该要约的前提是 Pritzker 在 1980 年 10 月 10 日之前获得必要的融资;如果 Pritzker 满足或放弃融资应急费用，Trans Union 必须以每股 38 美元的价格向 Pritzker 出售 100 万股新发行的 Trans Union 股票。

Van Gorkom took the position that putting Trans Union "up for auction" through a 90-day market test would validate a decision by the Board that $55 was a fair price. He told the Board that the "free market will have an opportunity to judge whether $55 is a fair price." Van Gorkom framed the decision before the Board not as whether $55 per share was the highest price that could be obtained, but as whether the $55 price was a fair price that the stockholders should be given the opportunity to accept or reject.[8]
Van Gorkom 的立场是，将 Trans Union“拍卖”通过 90 天的市场测试将验证董事会的决定，即 55 美元是公平的价格。他告诉董事会，“自由市场将有机会判断 55 美元是否是一个公平的价格。Van Gorkom 在董事会面前做出的决定不是每股 55 美元是否是可以获得的最高价格，而是 55 美元的价格是否是股东应该有机会接受或拒绝的公平价格。[8]

Attorney Brennan advised the members of the Board that they might be sued if they failed to accept the offer and that a fairness opinion was not required as a matter of law.
布伦南律师告诉董事会成员，如果他们不接受该提议，他们可能会被起诉，而且法律上不需要公平意见。

Romans attended the meeting as chief financial officer of the Company. He told the Board that he had not been involved in the negotiations with Pritzker and knew nothing about the merger proposal until *869 the morning of the meeting; that his studies did not indicate either a fair price for the stock or a valuation of the Company; that he did not see his role as directly addressing the fairness issue; and that he and his people "were trying to search for ways to justify a price in connection with such a [leveraged buy-out] transaction, rather than to say what the shares are worth." Romans testified:
Romans 作为公司首席财务官出席了会议。他告诉董事会，他没有参与与普利兹克的谈判，直到会议早上 *869 才对合并提案一无所知;他的研究没有表明股票的公平价格或公司的估值;他不认为自己的角色是直接解决公平问题;他和他的手下“试图寻找方法来证明与这种 [杠杆收购] 交易相关的价格是合理的，而不是说股票值多少钱。罗马人作证说：

I told the Board that the study ran the numbers at 50 and 60, and then the subsequent study at 55 and 65, and that was not the same thing as saying that I have a valuation of the company at X dollars. But it was a way a first step towards reaching that conclusion.
我告诉董事会，该研究将数字计算为 50 和 60，然后随后的研究为 55 和 65，这与说我对公司的估值为 X 美元不是一回事。但这是迈向该结论的第一步。

Romans told the Board that, in his opinion, $55 was "in the range of a fair price," but "at the beginning of the range."
Romans 告诉董事会，在他看来，55 美元“在公平价格的范围内”，但“处于范围的开始”。

Chelberg, Trans Union's President, supported Van Gorkom's presentation and representations. He testified that he "participated to make sure that the Board members collectively were clear on the details of the agreement or offer from Pritzker;" that he "participated in the discussion with Mr. Brennan, inquiring of him about the necessity for valuation opinions in spite of the way in which this particular offer was couched;" and that he was otherwise actively involved in supporting the positions being taken by Van Gorkom before the Board about "the necessity to act immediately on this offer," and about "the adequacy of the $55 and the question of how that would be tested."
Trans Union 总裁 Chelberg 支持 Van Gorkom 的陈述和陈述。他作证说，他“参与确保董事会成员集体清楚 Pritzker 的协议或要约的细节”;他“参与了与 Brennan 先生的讨论，询问他是否需要估值意见，尽管这个特定要约的表述方式是这样的”“，并且他以其他方式积极参与支持 Van Gorkom 在董事会面前就”立即对这一提议采取行动的必要性“，以及”55 美元的充足性以及如何对其进行测试的问题”。

The Board meeting of September 20 lasted about two hours. Based solely upon Van Gorkom's oral presentation, Chelberg's supporting representations, Romans' oral statement, Brennan's legal advice, and their knowledge of the market history of the Company's stock,[9] the directors approved the proposed Merger Agreement. However, the Board later claimed to have attached two conditions to its acceptance: (1) that Trans Union reserved the right to accept any better offer that was made during the market test period; and (2) that Trans Union could share its proprietary information with any other potential bidders. While the Board now claims to have reserved the right to accept any better offer received after the announcement of the Pritzker agreement (even though the minutes of the meeting do not reflect this), it is undisputed that the Board did not reserve the right to actively solicit alternate offers.
9 月 20 日的董事会会议持续了大约两个小时。仅根据 Van Gorkom 的口头陈述、Chelberg 的支持陈述、Romans 的口头陈述、Brennan 的法律建议以及他们对公司股票市场历史的了解，[9] 董事们批准了拟议的合并协议。然而，董事会后来声称已为其接受附加了两个条件：（1） Trans Union 保留接受在市场测试期间提出的任何更好报价的权利;以及 （2） Trans Union 可以与任何其他潜在投标人共享其专有信息。虽然董事会现在声称保留接受普利兹克协议宣布后收到的任何更好报价的权利（即使会议记录没有反映这一点），但无可争议的是，董事会没有保留积极征求替代报价的权利。

The Merger Agreement was executed by Van Gorkom during the evening of September 20 at a formal social event that he hosted for the opening of the Chicago Lyric Opera. Neither he nor any other director read the agreement prior to its signing and delivery to Pritzker.
合并协议由 Van Gorkom 于 9 月 20 日晚在他为芝加哥抒情歌剧院开幕式主持的正式社交活动中签署。在协议签署并交付给普利兹克之前，他和任何其他董事都没有阅读该协议。

* * *

On Monday, September 22, the Company issued a press release announcing that Trans Union had entered into a "definitive" Merger Agreement with an affiliate of the Marmon Group, Inc., a Pritzker holding company. Within 10 days of the public announcement, dissent among Senior Management over the merger had become widespread. Faced with threatened resignations of key officers, Van Gorkom met with Pritzker who agreed to several modifications of the Agreement. Pritzker was willing to do so provided that Van Gorkom could persuade the dissidents to remain on the Company payroll for at least six months after consummation of the merger.
9 月 22 日星期一，公司发布了一份新闻稿，宣布 Trans Union 已与普利兹克控股公司 Marmon Group， Inc. 的附属公司签订了“最终”合并协议。在公开宣布后的 10 天内，高级管理层对合并的异议已经普遍存在。面对关键官员的辞职威胁，Van Gorkom 会见了普利兹克，普利兹克同意对协议进行几项修改。普利兹克愿意这样做，前提是 Van Gorkom 能够说服持不同政见者在合并完成后至少六个月内留在公司的工资单上。

Van Gorkom reconvened the Board on October 8 and secured the directors' approval of the proposed amendments sight unseen. The Board also authorized the employment of Salomon Brothers, its investment *870 banker, to solicit other offers for Trans Union during the proposed "market test" period.
Van Gorkom 于 10 月 8 日重新召集董事会，并确保董事们在未见过的情况下批准了拟议的修正案。董事会还授权聘请其投资 *870 银行家 Salomon Brothers 在拟议的“市场测试”期间向 Trans Union 征求其他要约。

The next day, October 9, Trans Union issued a press release announcing: (1) that Pritzker had obtained "the financing commitments necessary to consummate" the merger with Trans Union; (2) that Pritzker had acquired one million shares of Trans Union common stock at $38 per share; (3) that Trans Union was now permitted to actively seek other offers and had retained Salomon Brothers for that purpose; and (4) that if a more favorable offer were not received before February 1, 1981, Trans Union's shareholders would thereafter meet to vote on the Pritzker proposal.
第二天，即 10 月 9 日，Trans Union 发布了一份新闻稿，宣布：（1） Pritzker 已获得“完成”与 Trans Union 合并的“必要资金承诺”;（2） Pritzker 以每股 38 美元的价格收购了 100 万股 Trans Union 普通股;（3） Trans Union 现在被允许积极寻求其他要约，并为此目的聘请了 Salomon Brothers;以及 （4） 如果在 1981 年 2 月 1 日之前没有收到更有利的报价，Trans Union 的股东将在此后开会对普利兹克提案进行投票。

It was not until the following day, October 10, that the actual amendments to the Merger Agreement were prepared by Pritzker and delivered to Van Gorkom for execution. As will be seen, the amendments were considerably at variance with Van Gorkom's representations of the amendments to the Board on October 8; and the amendments placed serious constraints on Trans Union's ability to negotiate a better deal and withdraw from the Pritzker agreement. Nevertheless, Van Gorkom proceeded to execute what became the October 10 amendments to the Merger Agreement without conferring further with the Board members and apparently without comprehending the actual implications of the amendments.
直到第二天，即 10 月 10 日，普利兹克才准备了对合并协议的实际修正案，并提交给 Van Gorkom 执行。正如我们将看到的，这些修正案与 Van Gorkom 在 10 月 8 日向董事会提交的修正案陈述有很大差异;这些修正案严重限制了 Trans Union 谈判达成更好协议和退出普利兹克协议的能力。尽管如此，Van Gorkom 在没有与董事会成员进一步协商的情况下，显然没有理解修正案的实际影响，就继续执行了 10 月 10 日对合并协议的修正案。

* * *

Salomon Brothers' efforts over a three-month period from October 21 to January 21 produced only one serious suitor for Trans Union General Electric Credit Corporation ("GE Credit"), a subsidiary of the General Electric Company. However, GE Credit was unwilling to make an offer for Trans Union unless Trans Union first rescinded its Merger Agreement with Pritzker. When Pritzker refused, GE Credit terminated further discussions with Trans Union in early January.
Salomon Brothers 在 10 月 21 日至 1 月 21 日的三个月期间的努力，只为通用电气公司的子公司 Trans Union General Electric Credit Corporation（“GE Credit”）产生了一个真正的追求者。然而，除非 Trans Union 首先撤销与 Pritzker 的合并协议，否则 GE Credit 不愿意向 Trans Union 提出要约。在普利兹克拒绝后，GE Credit 于 1 月初终止了与 Trans Union 的进一步讨论。

In the meantime, in early December, the investment firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. ("KKR"), the only other concern to make a firm offer for Trans Union, withdrew its offer under circumstances hereinafter detailed.
与此同时，在 12 月初，Kohlberg， Kravis， Roberts & Co. （“KKR”），唯一对 Trans Union 提出坚决要约的其他公司，在下文详述的情况下撤回了其要约。

On December 19, this litigation was commenced and, within four weeks, the plaintiffs had deposed eight of the ten directors of Trans Union, including Van Gorkom, Chelberg and Romans, its Chief Financial Officer. On January 21, Management's Proxy Statement for the February 10 shareholder meeting was mailed to Trans Union's stockholders. On January 26, Trans Union's Board met and, after a lengthy meeting, voted to proceed with the Pritzker merger. The Board also approved for mailing, "on or about January 27," a Supplement to its Proxy Statement. The Supplement purportedly set forth all information relevant to the Pritzker Merger Agreement, which had not been divulged in the first Proxy Statement.
12 月 19 日，这项诉讼开始了，在四个星期内，原告罢免了 Trans Union 十名董事中的 8 名，包括 Van Gorkom、Chelberg 和首席财务官 Romans。1 月 21 日，管理层对 2 月 10 日股东大会的委托书已邮寄给 Trans Union 的股东。1 月 26 日，Trans Union 的董事会召开会议，经过长时间的会议，投票决定继续进行 Pritzker 合并。董事会还批准在“1 月 27 日或前后”邮寄其委托书的补充。据称，该补充协议列出了与 Pritzker 合并协议相关的所有信息，这些信息在第一份委托书中没有披露。

* * *

On February 10, the stockholders of Trans Union approved the Pritzker merger proposal. Of the outstanding shares, 69.9% were voted in favor of the merger; 7.25% were voted against the merger; and 22.85% were not voted.
2 月 10 日，Trans Union 的股东批准了 Pritzker 的合并提案。在已发行股票中，69.9% 的股票投票赞成合并;7.25% 的人投票反对合并;22.85% 的人没有投票。

II.
第二。

We turn to the issue of the application of the business judgment rule to the September 20 meeting of the Board.
我们转向 9 月 20 日董事会会议的商业判断规则的适用问题。

The Court of Chancery concluded from the evidence that the Board of Directors' approval of the Pritzker merger proposal fell within the protection of the business judgment rule. The Court found that the Board had given sufficient time and attention to the transaction, since the directors had considered the Pritzker proposal on three different occasions, on September 20, and on October 8, 1980 and finally on January 26, 1981. On that basis, the Court reasoned that the Board had acquired, over the four-month period, sufficient information to reach an informed business judgment *871 on the cash-out merger proposal. The Court ruled:
衡平法院根据证据得出结论，董事会批准 Pritzker 合并提案属于商业判断规则的保护范围。法院认为，董事会对交易给予了足够的时间和关注，因为董事们在 1980 年 9 月 20 日、10 月 8 日和最后的 1981 年 1 月 26 日三个不同的场合考虑了普利兹克提案。在此基础上，法院认为，董事会在四个月期间获得了足够的信息，可以就套现合并提案做出明智的商业判断 *871。法院裁定：

... that given the market value of Trans Union's stock, the business acumen of the members of the board of Trans Union, the substantial premium over market offered by the Pritzkers and the ultimate effect on the merger price provided by the prospect of other bids for the stock in question, that the board of directors of Trans Union did not act recklessly or improvidently in determining on a course of action which they believed to be in the best interest of the stockholders of Trans Union.
...鉴于 Trans Union 股票的市场价值、Trans Union 董事会成员的商业头脑、普利兹克家族提供的高于市场的巨大溢价以及对相关股票的其他出价前景对合并价格的最终影响，Trans Union 董事会在决定他们认为的行动方案时并没有鲁莽或不适当地行事符合 Trans Union 股东的最佳利益。

The Court of Chancery made but one finding; i.e., that the Board's conduct over the entire period from September 20 through January 26, 1981 was not reckless or improvident, but informed. This ultimate conclusion was premised upon three subordinate findings, one explicit and two implied. The Court's explicit finding was that Trans Union's Board was "free to turn down the Pritzker proposal" not only on September 20 but also on October 8, 1980 and on January 26, 1981. The Court's implied, subordinate findings were: (1) that no legally binding agreement was reached by the parties until January 26; and (2) that if a higher offer were to be forthcoming, the market test would have produced it,[10] and Trans Union would have been contractually free to accept such higher offer. However, the Court offered no factual basis or legal support for any of these findings; and the record compels contrary conclusions.
衡平法院只做出了一项裁决;即，委员会在 1981 年 9 月 20 日至 1 月 26 日的整个期间的行为不是鲁莽或不适当的，而是在知情的情况下。这个最终结论以三个次要的发现为前提，一个是明确的，两个是暗示的。法院的明确裁决是，Trans Union 董事会不仅可以在 9 月 20 日，而且在 1980 年 10 月 8 日和 1981 年 1 月 26 日也可以“自由拒绝普利兹克的提议”。法院的隐含从属调查结果是：（1） 双方在 1 月 26 日之前未达成具有法律约束力的协议;以及 （2） 如果出现更高的报价，市场测试会产生它，[10] 并且 Trans Union 在合同上可以自由地接受这种更高的报价。然而，法院没有为这些调查结果提供任何事实依据或法律支持;而记录迫使人们得出相反的结论。

This Court's standard of review of the findings of fact reached by the Trial Court following full evidentiary hearing is as stated in Levitt v. Bouvier, Del.Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972):
本法院对初审法院在全面证据听证会后得出的事实调查结果的审查标准如 Levitt v. Bouvier， Del.Supr.， 287 A.2d 671， 673 （1972） 中所述：

[In an appeal of this nature] this court has the authority to review the entire record and to make its own findings of fact in a proper case. In exercising our power of review, we have the duty to review the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings below. We do not, however, ignore the findings made by the trial judge. If they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, in the exercise of judicial restraint we accept them, even though independently we might have reached opposite conclusions. It is only when the findings below are clearly wrong and the doing of justice requires their overturn that we are free to make contradictory findings of fact.
[在这种性质的上诉中]本法院有权审查整个记录，并在适当的案件中对事实做出自己的认定。在行使审查权时，我们有责任审查证据的充分性，并检验以下调查结果的适当性。然而，我们并没有忽视主审法官的调查结果。如果它们有记录的充分支持，并且是有序和合乎逻辑的演绎过程的产物，那么在行使司法约束时，我们接受它们，即使我们独立地可能得出了相反的结论。只有当以下调查结果明显错误，而伸张正义需要推翻这些调查结果时，我们才可以自由地对事实作出相互矛盾的调查结果。

Applying that standard and governing principles of law to the record and the decision of the Trial Court, we conclude that the Court's ultimate finding that the Board's conduct was not "reckless or imprudent" is contrary to the record and not the product of a logical and deductive reasoning process.
将该标准和管辖法律原则应用于初审法院的记录和决定，我们得出结论，法院最终认定董事会的行为并非“鲁莽或轻率”，这与记录相悖，而不是逻辑和演绎推理过程的产物。

The plaintiffs contend that the Court of Chancery erred as a matter of law by exonerating the defendant directors under the business judgment rule without first determining whether the rule's threshold condition of "due care and prudence" was satisfied. The plaintiffs assert that the Trial Court found the defendant directors to have reached an informed business judgment on the basis of "extraneous considerations and events that occurred after September 20, 1980." The defendants deny that the Trial Court committed legal error in relying upon post-September 20, 1980 events and the directors' later acquired knowledge. The defendants further submit that their decision to accept $55 per share was informed because: (1) they were "highly qualified;" (2) they were "well-informed;" and (3) they deliberated over the "proposal" not once but three times. On *872 essentially this evidence and under our standard of review, the defendants assert that affirmance is required. We must disagree.
原告辩称，衡平法院在法律上犯了错误，在没有首先确定该规则的“应有谨慎和审慎”门槛条件的情况下，根据商业判断规则免除被告董事的罪责。原告声称，初审法院认定被告董事根据“无关的考虑和 1980 年 9 月 20 日之后发生的事件”做出了知情的商业判断。被告否认初审法院在依赖 1980 年 9 月 20 日之后的事件和董事后来获得的知识方面犯了法律错误。被告进一步指出，他们决定接受每股 55 美元是因为：（1） 他们“非常合格”;（2） 他们“消息灵通”;（3） 他们对“提案”进行了三次审议，而不是一次。根据 *872 基本上是这一证据，根据我们的审查标准，被告声称需要确认。我们必须不同意。

Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del.C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.[11]Pogostin v. Rice, Del.Supr., 480 A.2d 619, 624 (1984); Aronson v. Lewis, Del.Supr., 473 A.2d 805, 811 (1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, Del.Supr., 430 A.2d 779, 782 (1981). In carrying out their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. Loft, Inc. v. Guth, Del.Ch., 2 A.2d 225 (1938), aff'd, Del.Supr., 5 A.2d 503 (1939). The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, supra at 782. The rule itself "is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson, supra at 812. Thus, the party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the presumption that its business judgment was an informed one. Id.
根据特拉华州法律，商业判断规则是《特拉华州法典》第 8 卷第 141（a） 条中规定的基本原则的产物，即特拉华州公司的业务和事务由其董事会管理或在其董事会下管理。[11]Pogostin v. Rice， Del.Supr.， 480 A.2d 619， 624 （1984）;Aronson v. Lewis， Del.Supr.， 473 A.2d 805， 811 （1984 年）;Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado， Del.Supr.， 430 A.2d 779， 782 （1981）。在履行管理职责时，董事们肩负着对公司及其股东不屈不挠的信托义务。Loft， Inc. v. Guth， Del.Ch.， 2 A.2d 225 （1938）， aff'd， Del.Supr.， 5 A.2d 503 （1939）.商业判断规则的存在是为了保护和促进授予特拉华州董事的管理权的充分和自由行使。Zapata Corp. v.Maldonado，同上，第 782 页。该规则本身“是一项假设，即在做出商业决策时，公司董事在知情的基础上、真诚地行事，并真诚地相信所采取的行动符合公司的最佳利益。Aronson，同上，第 812 页。因此，攻击董事会决定不知情的一方必须反驳其商业判断是知情的假设。同上。

The determination of whether a business judgment is an informed one turns on whether the directors have informed themselves "prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them." Id.[12]
确定商业判断是否是知情判断，取决于董事是否“在做出商业决策之前，他们合理地获得了所有重要信息”。同上[12]

Under the business judgment rule there is no protection for directors who have made "an unintelligent or unadvised judgment." Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, Del.Ch., 167 A. 831, 833 (1933). A director's duty to inform himself in preparation for a decision derives from the fiduciary capacity in which he serves the corporation and its stockholders. Lutz v. Boas, Del.Ch., 171 A.2d 381 (1961). See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra; Guth v. Loft, supra. Since a director is vested with the responsibility for the management of the affairs of the corporation, he must execute that duty with the recognition that he acts on behalf of others. Such obligation does not tolerate faithlessness or self-dealing. But fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud. Representation of the financial interests of others imposes on a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a critical eye in assessing information of the type and under the circumstances present here. See Lutz v. Boas, supra; Guth v. Loft, supra at 510. Compare Donovan v. Cunningham, 5th Cir., 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (1983); Doyle v. Union Insurance Company, Neb.Supr., 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, N.Y. App., 99 N.E. 138, 141 (1912).
根据商业判断规则，做出“不明智或未经建议的判断”的董事不受保护。Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass， Del.Ch.， 167 A. 831， 833 （1933）。董事在准备决策时有义务告知自己，这源于他为公司及其股东服务的受托人身份。Lutz v. Boas， Del.Ch.， 171 A.2d 381 （1961）。参见 Weinberger v. UOP， Inc.，同上;Guth v. Loft，同上。由于董事被赋予管理公司事务的责任，因此他必须在承认他代表他人行事的情况下履行该职责。这种义务不能容忍不忠或自我交易。但是，履行受托人职能需要的不仅仅是没有恶意或欺诈。代表他人的财务利益，使董事有保护这些利益的积极责任，并在评估此处所存在的信息类型和情况下以批判的眼光进行。参见 Lutz v.Boas，同上;Guth v.Loft，同上，第 510 页。比较 Donovan v.Cunningham， 5th Cir.， 716 F.2d 1455， 1467 （1983）;Doyle v. Union Insurance Company， Neb.Supr.， 277 N.W.2d 36 （1979）;Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont， N.Y. App.， 99 N.E. 138， 141 （1912）。

Thus, a director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in *873 the nature of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty. Here, there were no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, or proof thereof. Hence, it is presumed that the directors reached their business judgment in good faith, Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., Del. Ch., 147 A. 257 (1929), and considerations of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us.
因此，董事行使知情商业判断的义务在 *873 中是谨慎义务的性质，与忠诚义务不同。在这里，没有欺诈、恶意或自我交易的指控，也没有证据。因此，可以推定董事们是出于善意做出商业判断的，Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co.， Del. Ch.， 147 A. 257 （1929），动机的考虑与我们面前的问题无关。

The standard of care applicable to a director's duty of care has also been recently restated by this Court. In Aronson, supra, we stated:
本法院最近也重申了适用于董事谨慎责任的谨慎标准。在上文的 Aronson 案中，我们指出：

While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence. (footnote omitted)
虽然特拉华州的案例使用了各种术语来描述适用的谨慎标准，但我们的分析使我们确信，根据商业判断规则，董事责任是以重大过失的概念为基础的。（脚注省略）

473 A.2d at 812.
473 A.2d，第 812 页。

We again confirm that view. We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one.[13]
我们再次确认这一观点。我们认为，重大过失的概念也是确定董事会做出的商业判断是否属于知情判断的适当标准。[13]

In the specific context of a proposed merger of domestic corporations, a director has a duty under 8 Del.C. 251(b),[14] along with his fellow directors, to act in an informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger before submitting the proposal to the stockholders. Certainly in the merger context, a director may not abdicate that duty by leaving to the shareholders alone the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement. See Beard v. Elster, Del.Supr., 160 A.2d 731, 737 (1960). Only an agreement of merger satisfying the requirements of 8 Del.C. § 251(b) may be submitted to the shareholders under § 251(c). See generally Aronson v. Lewis, supra at 811-13; see also Pogostin v. Rice, supra.
在拟议的国内公司合并的特定背景下，根据 8 Del.C. 251（b），[14] 董事有责任与其他董事一起，在向股东提交提案之前，以知情和深思熟虑的方式决定是否批准合并协议。当然，在合并的情况下，董事不得通过将批准或不批准协议的决定权留给股东来放弃该职责。参见 Beard v. Elster， Del.Supr.， 160 A.2d 731， 737 （1960）。仅满足 8 Del.C. 要求的合并协议。§ 251（b） 可以根据 § 251（c） 提交给股东。一般参见 Aronson v.Lewis，同上，第 811-13 页;另见 Pogostin v. Rice，同上。

It is against those standards that the conduct of the directors of Trans Union must be tested, as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, regarding their exercise of an informed business judgment in voting to approve the Pritzker merger proposal.
正是根据这些标准，Trans Union 董事的行为必须受到法律和事实的检验，即他们在投票批准 Pritzker 合并提案时是否具有明智的商业判断。

III.
第三。

The defendants argue that the determination of whether their decision to accept $55 per share for Trans Union represented an informed business judgment requires consideration, not only of that which they knew and learned on September 20, but also of that which they subsequently learned and did over the following four-month *874 period before the shareholders met to vote on the proposal in February, 1981. The defendants thereby seek to reduce the significance of their action on September 20 and to widen the time frame for determining whether their decision to accept the Pritzker proposal was an informed one. Thus, the defendants contend that what the directors did and learned subsequent to September 20 and through January 26, 1981, was properly taken into account by the Trial Court in determining whether the Board's judgment was an informed one. We disagree with this post hoc approach.
被告辩称，确定他们接受每股 55 美元收购 Trans Union 的决定是否代表了明智的商业判断，不仅需要考虑他们在 9 月 20 日所知道和学到的信息，还考虑了他们随后在随后的四个月 *874 期间所学到和所做的信息，直到 2 月份股东开会对提案进行投票。 1981. 因此，被告试图降低他们在 9 月 20 日的行动的重要性，并扩大确定他们接受普利兹克提案的决定是否在知情的情况下做出的决定的时间框架。因此，被告辩称，初审法院在确定董事会的判决是否知情时，适当考虑了董事们在 1981 年 9 月 20 日之后至 1 月 26 日的所作所为和所学到的情况。我们不同意这种事后处理方法。

The issue of whether the directors reached an informed decision to "sell" the Company on September 20, 1980 must be determined only upon the basis of the information then reasonably available to the directors and relevant to their decision to accept the Pritzker merger proposal. This is not to say that the directors were precluded from altering their original plan of action, had they done so in an informed manner. What we do say is that the question of whether the directors reached an informed business judgment in agreeing to sell the Company, pursuant to the terms of the September 20 Agreement presents, in reality, two questions: (A) whether the directors reached an informed business judgment on September 20, 1980; and (B) if they did not, whether the directors' actions taken subsequent to September 20 were adequate to cure any infirmity in their action taken on September 20. We first consider the directors' September 20 action in terms of their reaching an informed business judgment.
董事们是否在 1980 年 9 月 20 日做出了“出售”公司的知情决定，这一问题必须仅根据董事当时合理获得的信息来确定，这些信息与他们决定接受普利兹克合并提案有关。这并不是说董事们被排除在外，如果他们以知情的方式改变他们原来的行动计划。我们要说的是，董事们在同意出售公司时，根据 9 月 20 日协议的条款是否做出了知情的商业判断，这个问题实际上提出了两个问题：（A） 董事们是否在 1980 年 9 月 20 日做出了知情的商业判断;及 （B） 如他们没有这样做，董事在 9 月 20 日之后采取的行动是否足以治愈他们在 9 月 20 日采取的行动中的任何弱点。我们首先考虑董事们在 9 月 20 日采取的行动，以确定他们是否做出了明智的商业判断。

-A-
-一个-

On the record before us, we must conclude that the Board of Directors did not reach an informed business judgment on September 20, 1980 in voting to "sell" the Company for $55 per share pursuant to the Pritzker cash-out merger proposal. Our reasons, in summary, are as follows:
根据我们面前的记录，我们必须得出结论，董事会在 1980 年 9 月 20 日投票决定根据普利兹克套现合并提案以每股 55 美元的价格“出售”公司时，没有做出明智的商业判断。我们的原因，总结如下：

The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in forcing the "sale" of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the "sale" of the Company upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.
董事 （1） 没有充分了解 Van Gorkom 在强制“出售”公司和确定每股购买价格方面所扮演的角色;（2） 不了解公司的内在价值;以及 （3） 鉴于这些情况，在未事先通知且没有危机或紧急情况的情况下，在两小时对价的情况下批准“出售”公司至少存在重大疏忽。

As has been noted, the Board based its September 20 decision to approve the cash-out merger primarily on Van Gorkom's representations. None of the directors, other than Van Gorkom and Chelberg, had any prior knowledge that the purpose of the meeting was to propose a cash-out merger of Trans Union. No members of Senior Management were present, other than Chelberg, Romans and Peterson; and the latter two had only learned of the proposed sale an hour earlier. Both general counsel Moore and former general counsel Browder attended the meeting, but were equally uninformed as to the purpose of the meeting and the documents to be acted upon.
如前所述，董事会在 9 月 20 日决定批准提现合并，主要基于 Van Gorkom 的陈述。除了 Van Gorkom 和 Chelberg 之外，没有一位董事事先知道会议的目的是提议对 Trans Union 进行提现合并。除了 Chelberg、Romans 和 Peterson 之外，没有高级管理层成员在场;而后两者在一个小时前才得知拟议的出售。总法律顾问 Moore 和前总法律顾问 Browder 都出席了会议，但同样不了解会议的目的和要处理的文件。

Without any documents before them concerning the proposed transaction, the members of the Board were required to rely entirely upon Van Gorkom's 20-minute oral presentation of the proposal. No written summary of the terms of the merger was presented; the directors were given no documentation to support the adequacy of $55 price per share for sale of the Company; and the Board had before it nothing more than Van Gorkom's statement of his understanding of the substance of an agreement which he admittedly had never read, nor which any member of the Board had ever seen.
由于他们面前没有任何关于拟议交易的文件，董事会成员被要求完全依赖 Van Gorkom 对提案的 20 分钟口头陈述。没有提交合并条款的书面摘要;董事们没有收到任何文件来支持每股 55 美元的价格足以出售公司;而董事会面前的不过是 Van Gorkom 关于他对协议实质的理解的声明，他承认从未阅读过，董事会的任何成员也从未见过。

Under 8 Del.C. § 141(e),[15] "directors are fully protected in relying in *875 good faith on reports made by officers." Michelson v. Duncan, Del.Ch., 
8 Del.C. 以下§ 141（e），[15] “董事在依赖 *875 善意依赖高级职员的报告时受到充分保护。”迈克尔逊诉邓肯案，Del.Ch386 A.2d 1144, 1156 (1978); aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, Del.Supr., 
(1978);部分 aff'd 和 rev'd in part on other grounds， Del.Supr.，407 A.2d 211 (1979). See also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Del.Supr., 
（1979）. 另见 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.， Del.Supr.，188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963); Prince v. Bensinger, Del. Ch., 
, 130 (1963);Prince v. Bensinger， Del. Ch.，244 A.2d 89, 94 (1968). The term "report" has been liberally construed to include reports of informal personal investigations by corporate officers, Cheff v. Mathes, Del.Supr., 
, 94 (1968).“报告”一词被宽泛地解释为包括公司高管进行的非正式个人调查报告，Cheff v. Mathes， Del.Supr.，199 A.2d 548, 556 (1964). However, there is no evidence that any "report," as defined under § 141(e), concerning the Pritzker proposal, was presented to the Board on September 20.[16] Van Gorkom's oral presentation of his understanding of the terms of the proposed Merger Agreement, which he had not seen, and Romans' brief oral statement of his preliminary study regarding the feasibility of a leveraged buy-out of Trans Union do not qualify as § 141(e) "reports" for these reasons: The former lacked substance because Van Gorkom was basically uninformed as to the essential provisions of the very document about which he was talking. Romans' statement was irrelevant to the issues before the Board since it did not purport to be a valuation study. At a minimum for a report to enjoy the status conferred by § 141(e), it must be pertinent to the subject matter upon which a board is called to act, and otherwise be entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance. Considering all of the surrounding circumstances hastily calling the meeting without prior notice of its subject matter, the proposed sale of the Company without any prior consideration of the issue or necessity therefor, the urgent time constraints imposed by Pritzker, and the total absence of any documentation whatsoever the directors were duty bound to make reasonable inquiry of Van Gorkom and Romans, and if they had done so, the inadequacy of that upon which they now claim to have relied would have been apparent.
, 556 (1964).但是，没有证据表明任何关于 Pritzker 提案的“报告”（定义见 § 141（e） ）已于 9 月 20 日提交给董事会。[16]Van Gorkom 口头陈述了他对拟议合并协议条款的理解，而他没有看到，以及 Romans 对他关于杠杆收购 Trans Union 可行性的初步研究的简短口头陈述，不符合 § 141（e） “报告”的条件，原因如下：前者缺乏实质内容，因为 Van Gorkom 基本上不了解他所谈论的文件的基本条款。Romans 的声明与委员会面前的问题无关，因为它并不声称是一项估值研究。报告要享有 § 141（e） 所赋予的地位，至少必须与委员会采取行动的主题相关，否则有权获得善意而非盲目的依赖。考虑到所有周围情况，在没有事先通知其主题的情况下匆忙召开会议，在没有任何事先考虑问题或必要性的情况下提议出售公司，普利兹克施加了紧急的时间限制，以及完全没有任何文件，董事有责任对 Van Gorkom 和 Romans 进行合理询问， 如果他们这样做了，他们现在声称所依赖的东西的不足就会很明显。

The defendants rely on the following factors to sustain the Trial Court's finding that the Board's decision was an informed one: (1) the magnitude of the premium or spread between the $55 Pritzker offering price and Trans Union's current market price of $38 per share; (2) the amendment of the Agreement as submitted on September 20 to permit the Board to accept any better offer during the "market test" period; (3) the collective experience and expertise of the Board's "inside" and "outside" directors;[17] and (4) their reliance on Brennan's legal advice that the directors might be sued if they rejected the Pritzker proposal. We discuss each of these grounds seriatim:
被告依靠以下因素来支持初审法院的裁决，即董事会的决定是知情决定：（1） 55 美元的 Pritzker 发行价与 Trans Union 当前每股 38 美元的市场价格之间的溢价或价差的大小;（2） 对 9 月 20 日提交的协议进行修订，以允许董事会在“市场测试”期间接受任何更好的报价;（3） 董事会「内部」及「外部」董事的集体经验及专业知识;[17] 以及 （4） 他们依赖 Brennan 的法律建议，即如果董事拒绝普利兹克的提议，他们可能会被起诉。我们单独讨论这些理由：

(1)

A substantial premium may provide one reason to recommend a merger, but in the absence of other sound valuation information, the fact of a premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess the fairness of an offering price. Here, the judgment reached as to the adequacy of the premium was based on a comparison between the historically depressed Trans Union market price and the amount of the Pritzker offer. Using market price as a basis for concluding that the premium adequately reflected the true value *876 of the Company was a clearly faulty, indeed fallacious, premise, as the defendants' own evidence demonstrates.
大幅溢价可能提供推荐合并的一个理由，但在缺乏其他可靠的估值信息的情况下，仅凭溢价这一事实并不能提供评估发行价格公平性的充分依据。在这里，对溢价是否足够的判断是基于历史上低迷的 Trans Union 市场价格与普利兹克报价金额之间的比较。正如被告自己的证据所表明的那样，以市场价格为基础得出溢价充分反映了该公司的真实价值 *876 的结论是一个明显错误、确实是谬误的前提。

The record is clear that before September 20, Van Gorkom and other members of Trans Union's Board knew that the market had consistently undervalued the worth of Trans Union's stock, despite steady increases in the Company's operating income in the seven years preceding the merger. The Board related this occurrence in large part to Trans Union's inability to use its ITCs as previously noted. Van Gorkom testified that he did not believe the market price accurately reflected Trans Union's true worth; and several of the directors testified that, as a general rule, most chief executives think that the market undervalues their companies' stock. Yet, on September 20, Trans Union's Board apparently believed that the market stock price accurately reflected the value of the Company for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the premium for its sale.
记录清楚地表明，在 9 月 20 日之前，Van Gorkom 和 Trans Union 董事会的其他成员就知道，尽管公司在合并前的七年里营业收入稳步增长，但市场一直低估了 Trans Union 股票的价值。如前所述，董事会将这一事件在很大程度上与 Trans Union 无法使用其 ITC 有关。Van Gorkom 作证说，他不相信市场价格准确反映了 Trans Union 的真实价值;几位董事作证说，一般来说，大多数首席执行官认为市场低估了他们公司的股票。然而，在 9 月 20 日，Trans Union 的董事会显然认为市场股价准确地反映了公司的价值，以确定其出售溢价是否足够。

In the Proxy Statement, however, the directors reversed their position. There, they stated that, although the earnings prospects for Trans Union were "excellent," they found no basis for believing that this would be reflected in future stock prices. With regard to past trading, the Board stated that the prices at which the Company's common stock had traded in recent years did not reflect the "inherent" value of the Company. But having referred to the "inherent" value of Trans Union, the directors ascribed no number to it. Moreover, nowhere did they disclose that they had no basis on which to fix "inherent" worth beyond an impressionistic reaction to the premium over market and an unsubstantiated belief that the value of the assets was "significantly greater" than book value. By their own admission they could not rely on the stock price as an accurate measure of value. Yet, also by their own admission, the Board members assumed that Trans Union's market price was adequate to serve as a basis upon which to assess the adequacy of the premium for purposes of the September 20 meeting.
然而，在委托书中，董事们改变了他们的立场。在那里，他们表示，尽管 Trans Union 的盈利前景“非常好”，但他们没有发现任何理由相信这会反映在未来的股价中。关于过去的交易，董事会表示，公司普通股近年来的交易价格并未反映公司的“内在”价值。但是，在提到 Trans Union 的“内在”价值后，董事们没有给它任何编号。此外，他们没有任何地方披露，除了对高于市场的溢价的印象派反应和未经证实的信念即资产价值“明显高于”账面价值之外，他们没有依据来确定“内在”价值。他们自己承认，他们不能依赖股票价格作为准确的价值衡量标准。然而，董事会成员自己也承认，Trans Union 的市场价格足以作为评估 9 月 20 日会议保费是否充足的基础。

The parties do not dispute that a publicly-traded stock price is solely a measure of the value of a minority position and, thus, market price represents only the value of a single share. Nevertheless, on September 20, the Board assessed the adequacy of the premium over market, offered by Pritzker, solely by comparing it with Trans Union's current and historical stock price. (See supra note 5 at 866.)
双方没有争议，公开交易的股票价格仅仅是衡量少数股权价值的指标，因此，市场价格仅代表单一股票的价值。尽管如此，在 9 月 20 日，董事会仅通过与 Trans Union 的当前和历史股价进行比较来评估 Pritzker 提供的高于市场的溢价是否足够。（见注释 5，第 866 页。

Indeed, as of September 20, the Board had no other information on which to base a determination of the intrinsic value of Trans Union as a going concern. As of September 20, the Board had made no evaluation of the Company designed to value the entire enterprise, nor had the Board ever previously considered selling the Company or consenting to a buy-out merger. Thus, the adequacy of a premium is indeterminate unless it is assessed in terms of other competent and sound valuation information that reflects the value of the particular business.
事实上，截至 9 月 20 日，董事会没有其他信息可以据此确定 Trans Union 作为持续经营的内在价值。截至 9 月 20 日，董事会尚未对公司进行任何旨在对整个企业进行估值的评估，董事会之前也从未考虑过出售公司或同意收购合并。因此，溢价的充足性是不确定的，除非根据反映特定业务价值的其他合格且可靠的估值信息进行评估。

Despite the foregoing facts and circumstances, there was no call by the Board, either on September 20 or thereafter, for any valuation study or documentation of the $55 price per share as a measure of the fair value of the Company in a cash-out context. It is undisputed that the major asset of Trans Union was its cash flow. Yet, at no time did the Board call for a valuation study taking into account that highly significant element of the Company's assets.
尽管存在上述事实和情况，但董事会在 9 月 20 日或之后均未要求对每股 55 美元的价格进行任何估值研究或记录，作为衡量公司在套现情况下的公允价值的指标。毫无疑问，Trans Union 的主要资产是其现金流。然而，董事会从未要求进行估值研究，以考虑公司资产中非常重要的元素。

We do not imply that an outside valuation study is essential to support an informed business judgment; nor do we state that fairness opinions by independent investment bankers are required as a matter of law. Often insiders familiar with the business of a going concern are in a better position than are outsiders to gather relevant information; and under appropriate circumstances, such directors may be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the valuation reports of their management. *877 See 8 Del.C. § 141(e). See also Cheff v. Mathes, supra.
我们并不意味着外部估值研究对于支持明智的商业判断是必不可少的;我们也没有说独立投资银行家的公平意见是法律上的必要条件。通常，熟悉持续经营业务的内部人士比外部人士更有能力收集相关信息;在适当情况下，这些董事可以真诚地依赖其管理层的估值报告，从而得到充分保护。*877 见 8 Del.C.第 141（e） 款。另见 Cheff v. Mathes，同上。

Here, the record establishes that the Board did not request its Chief Financial Officer, Romans, to make any valuation study or review of the proposal to determine the adequacy of $55 per share for sale of the Company. On the record before us: The Board rested on Romans' elicited response that the $55 figure was within a "fair price range" within the context of a leveraged buy-out. No director sought any further information from Romans. No director asked him why he put $55 at the bottom of his range. No director asked Romans for any details as to his study, the reason why it had been undertaken or its depth. No director asked to see the study; and no director asked Romans whether Trans Union's finance department could do a fairness study within the remaining 36-hour[18] period available under the Pritzker offer.
此处的记录表明，董事会未要求其首席财务官 Romans 对提案进行任何估值研究或审查，以确定每股 55 美元出售公司的充足性。根据我们面前的记录：董事会依赖于 Romans 的回应，即 55 美元的数字在杠杆收购的背景下的“公平价格范围内”。没有董事向 Romans 寻求任何进一步的信息。没有董事问他为什么把 55 美元放在他的区间底部。没有主任向罗马斯询问有关他的研究、进行研究的原因或深度的任何细节。没有主任要求查看这项研究;没有董事询问 Romans Trans Union 的财务部门是否可以在普利兹克提议规定的剩余 36 小时[18] 期限内进行公平研究。

Had the Board, or any member, made an inquiry of Romans, he presumably would have responded as he testified: that his calculations were rough and preliminary; and, that the study was not designed to determine the fair value of the Company, but rather to assess the feasibility of a leveraged buy-out financed by the Company's projected cash flow, making certain assumptions as to the purchaser's borrowing needs. Romans would have presumably also informed the Board of his view, and the widespread view of Senior Management, that the timing of the offer was wrong and the offer inadequate.
如果董事会或任何成员对罗马书进行调查，他大概会像作证时那样回答：他的计算是粗略和初步的;并且，该研究并非旨在确定公司的公允价值，而是为了评估由公司预计现金流融资的杠杆收购的可行性，并对买方的借款需求做出某些假设。Romans 可能也会将他的观点以及高级管理层的普遍观点告知董事会，即要约的时机是错误的，要约不充分。

The record also establishes that the Board accepted without scrutiny Van Gorkom's representation as to the fairness of the $55 price per share for sale of the Company a subject that the Board had never previously considered. The Board thereby failed to discover that Van Gorkom had suggested the $55 price to Pritzker and, most crucially, that Van Gorkom had arrived at the $55 figure based on calculations designed solely to determine the feasibility of a leveraged buy-out.[19] No questions were raised either as to the tax implications of a cash-out merger or how the price for the one million share option granted Pritzker was calculated.
该记录还表明，董事会未经审查就接受了 Van Gorkom 关于以每股 55 美元的价格出售公司价格是否公平的陈述，这是董事会以前从未考虑过的问题。因此，董事会未能发现 Van Gorkom 向 Pritzker 建议了 55 美元的价格，最重要的是，Van Gorkom 得出 55 美元的价格只是为了确定杠杆收购的可行性。[19]对于套现合并的税务影响或授予普利兹克的 100 万股期权的价格是如何计算的，都没有提出任何问题。

We do not say that the Board of Directors was not entitled to give some credence to Van Gorkom's representation that $55 was an adequate or fair price. Under § 141(e), the directors were entitled to rely upon their chairman's opinion of value and adequacy, provided that such opinion was reached on a sound basis. Here, the issue is whether the directors informed themselves as to all information that was reasonably available to them. Had they done so, they would have learned of the source and derivation of the $55 price and could not reasonably have relied thereupon in good faith.
我们并不是说董事会无权相信 Van Gorkom 的陈述，即 55 美元是适当或公平的价格。根据 § 141（e），董事有权依赖其主席对价值和充分性的意见，前提是这种意见是在合理的基础上达成的。这里的问题是董事们是否了解他们合理获得的所有信息。如果他们这样做了，他们就会知道 55 美元价格的来源和来源，并且不能合理地真诚地依赖它。

None of the directors, Management or outside, were investment bankers or financial analysts. Yet the Board did not consider recessing the meeting until a later hour that day (or requesting an extension of Pritzker's Sunday evening deadline) to give it time to elicit more information as to the sufficiency of the offer, either from *878 inside Management (in particular Romans) or from Trans Union's own investment banker, Salomon Brothers, whose Chicago specialist in merger and acquisitions was known to the Board and familiar with Trans Union's affairs.
董事、管理层或外部董事都不是投资银行家或金融分析师。然而，董事会直到当天晚些时候才考虑休会（或要求延长普利兹克周日晚上的最后期限），以便有时间从 *878 内部管理层（特别是 Romans）或 Trans Union 自己的投资银行家 Salomon Brothers 那里获得有关要约充分性的更多信息。 其芝加哥并购专家为董事会所熟知，并熟悉 Trans Union 的事务。

Thus, the record compels the conclusion that on September 20 the Board lacked valuation information adequate to reach an informed business judgment as to the fairness of $55 per share for sale of the Company.[20]
因此，该记录迫使得出结论，即董事会在 9 月 20 日缺乏足够的估值信息，无法对每股 55 美元出售公司的公平性做出明智的商业判断。[20]

(2)

This brings us to the post-September 20 "market test" upon which the defendants ultimately rely to confirm the reasonableness of their September 20 decision to accept the Pritzker proposal. In this connection, the directors present a two-part argument: (a) that by making a "market test" of Pritzker's $55 per share offer a condition of their September 20 decision to accept his offer, they cannot be found to have acted impulsively or in an uninformed manner on September 20; and (b) that the adequacy of the $17 premium for sale of the Company was conclusively established over the following 90 to 120 days by the most reliable evidence available the marketplace. Thus, the defendants impliedly contend that the "market test" eliminated the need for the Board to perform any other form of fairness test either on September 20, or thereafter.
这让我们想到了 9 月 20 日之后的“市场测试”，被告最终依靠该测试来确认他们 9 月 20 日决定接受普利兹克提案的合理性。在这方面，董事们提出了一个由两部分组成的论点：（a） 通过对普利兹克每股 55 美元的要约进行“市场测试”，作为他们在 9 月 20 日决定接受其要约的条件，不能发现他们在 9 月 20 日冲动或以不知情的方式行事;以及 （b） 在接下来的 90 至 120 天内，市场上最可靠的证据最终确定了 17 美元出售公司溢价的充分性。因此，被告暗示地辩称，“市场测试”消除了董事会在 9 月 20 日或之后进行任何其他形式的公平测试的需要。

Again, the facts of record do not support the defendants' argument. There is no evidence: (a) that the Merger Agreement was effectively amended to give the Board freedom to put Trans Union up for auction sale to the highest bidder; or (b) that a public auction was in fact permitted to occur. The minutes of the Board meeting make no reference to any of this. Indeed, the record compels the conclusion that the directors had no rational basis for expecting that a market test was attainable, given the terms of the Agreement as executed during the evening of September 20. We rely upon the following facts which are essentially uncontradicted:
同样，记录在案的事实并不支持被告的论点。没有证据：（a） 合并协议经过有效修订，赋予董事会将 Trans Union 拍卖给出价最高的人的自由;或 （b） 事实上允许进行公开拍卖。董事会会议记录未提及任何内容。事实上，该记录迫使我们得出结论，即鉴于 9 月 20 日晚上签署的协议条款，董事们没有合理的依据预期可以进行市场测试。我们依赖以下基本上没有矛盾的事实：

The Merger Agreement, specifically identified as that originally presented to the Board on September 20, has never been produced by the defendants, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' several demands for production before as well as during trial. No acceptable explanation of this failure to produce documents has been given to either the Trial Court or this Court. Significantly, neither the defendants nor their counsel have made the affirmative representation that this critical document has been produced. Thus, the Court is deprived of the best evidence on which to judge the merits of the defendants' position as to the care and attention which they gave to the terms of the Agreement on September 20.
合并协议（明确标识为最初于 9 月 20 日提交给董事会的协议）从未由被告出示，尽管原告在审判前和审判期间多次要求出示。初审法院或本法院均未就未能出示文件作出可接受的解释。值得注意的是，被告及其律师均未做出肯定的声明，即这份关键文件已经出示。因此，法院被剥夺了最佳证据来判断被告的立场是非曲直，即他们对 9 月 20 日协议条款的谨慎和关注。

Van Gorkom states that the Agreement as submitted incorporated the ingredients for a market test by authorizing Trans Union to receive competing offers over the next 90-day period. However, he concedes that the Agreement barred Trans Union from actively soliciting such offers and from furnishing to interested parties any information about the Company other than that already in the public domain. Whether the original Agreement of September 20 went so far as to authorize Trans Union to receive competitive proposals is arguable. The defendants' unexplained failure to produce and identify the original Merger Agreement permits the logical inference that the instrument would not support their assertions in this regard. Wilmington Trust Co. v. General Motors Corp., Del.Supr., 51 A.2d 584, 593 (1947); II Wigmore on Evidence § 291 (3d ed. 1940). It is a well established principle that the production of weak evidence when strong is, or should have been, available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. *879 208, 226, 59 S. Ct. 467, 474, 83 L. Ed. 610 (1939); Deberry v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 744, 754 (1983). Van Gorkom, conceding that he never read the Agreement, stated that he was relying upon his understanding that, under corporate law, directors always have an inherent right, as well as a fiduciary duty, to accept a better offer notwithstanding an existing contractual commitment by the Board. (See the discussion infra, part III B(3) at p. 55.)
Van Gorkom 表示，提交的协议通过授权 Trans Union 在接下来的 90 天内接收竞争报价，纳入了市场测试的要素。然而，他承认，该协议禁止 Trans Union 积极征求此类要约，并禁止向相关方提供有关公司的任何信息，但已进入公共领域的信息除外。9 月 20 日的原始协议是否授权 Trans Union 接收竞争性提案尚有争议。被告无法解释地未能出示和确定原始合并协议，这使得该文书无法支持他们在这方面的主张的逻辑推断。Wilmington Trust Co. v. General Motors Corp.， Del.Supr.， 51 A.2d 584， 593 （1947）;II Wigmore on Evidence § 291 （1940 年第 3 版）。一个公认的原则是，当有或应该有时，出示薄弱的证据只能导致结论，即强证据是不利的。州际巡回法院诉美国案，306 U.S. *879， 208， 226， 59 S. Ct. 467， 474， 83 L. Ed. 610 （1939）;Deberry v. State， Del.Supr.， 457 A.2d 744， 754 （1983）。Van Gorkom 承认他从未阅读过该协议，并表示他依赖于他的理解，即根据公司法，董事始终具有接受更好报价的固有权利和信托义务，尽管董事会已有合同承诺。（见下文第 III B（3） 部分，第 55 页的讨论。

The defendant directors assert that they "insisted" upon including two amendments to the Agreement, thereby permitting a market test: (1) to give Trans Union the right to accept a better offer; and (2) to reserve to Trans Union the right to distribute proprietary information on the Company to alternative bidders. Yet, the defendants concede that they did not seek to amend the Agreement to permit Trans Union to solicit competing offers.
被告董事声称，他们“坚持”对协议进行两项修订，从而允许进行市场测试：（1） 赋予 Trans Union 接受更好报价的权利;以及 （2） 保留 Trans Union 向其他投标人分发公司专有信息的权利。然而，被告承认，他们并没有寻求修改协议以允许 Trans Union 征求竞争性要约。

Several of Trans Union's outside directors resolutely maintained that the Agreement as submitted was approved on the understanding that, "if we got a better deal, we had a right to take it." Director Johnson so testified; but he then added, "And if they didn't put that in the agreement, then the management did not carry out the conclusion of the Board. And I just don't know whether they did or not." The only clause in the Agreement as finally executed to which the defendants can point as "keeping the door open" is the following underlined statement found in subparagraph (a) of section 2.03 of the Merger Agreement as executed:
Trans Union 的几位外部董事坚决坚持认为，提交的协议获得批准，其理解是“如果我们得到更好的交易，我们有权接受它”。约翰逊局长如此作证;但他随后补充说，“如果他们没有把这句话写进协议里，那么管理层就没有执行董事会的结论。我只是不知道他们有没有。在最终签署的协议中，被告可以指出“保持大门敞开”的唯一条款是已签署的合并协议第 2.03 节 （a） 项中带下划线的声明：

The Board of Directors shall recommend to the stockholders of Trans Union that they approve and adopt the Merger Agreement (`the stockholders' approval') and to use its best efforts to obtain the requisite votes therefor. GL acknowledges that Trans Union directors may have a competing fiduciary obligation to the shareholders under certain circumstances.
董事会应向 Trans Union 的股东建议他们批准和通过合并协议（“股东批准”），并尽最大努力获得必要的投票。GL 承认，在某些情况下，Trans Union 董事可能对股东负有相互竞争的信托义务。

Clearly, this language on its face cannot be construed as incorporating either of the two "conditions" described above: either the right to accept a better offer or the right to distribute proprietary information to third parties. The logical witness for the defendants to call to confirm their construction of this clause of the Agreement would have been Trans Union's outside attorney, James Brennan. The defendants' failure, without explanation, to call this witness again permits the logical inference that his testimony would not have been helpful to them. The further fact that the directors adjourned, rather than recessed, the meeting without incorporating in the Agreement these important "conditions" further weakens the defendants' position. As has been noted, nothing in the Board's Minutes supports these claims. No reference to either of the so-called "conditions" or of Trans Union's reserved right to test the market appears in any notes of the Board meeting or in the Board Resolution accepting the Pritzker offer or in the Minutes of the meeting itself. That evening, in the midst of a formal party which he hosted for the opening of the Chicago Lyric Opera, Van Gorkom executed the Merger Agreement without he or any other member of the Board having read the instruments.
显然，这种语言从表面上看不能被解释为包含上述两个“条件”中的任何一个：接受更好报价的权利或向第三方分发专有信息的权利。被告传唤以确认他们对协议这一条款的解释的合乎逻辑的证人是 Trans Union 的外部律师 James Brennan。被告在没有解释的情况下没有再次传唤这位证人，这让逻辑推断出他的证词对他们没有帮助。董事们进一步宣布休会，而不是休会，而没有在协议中纳入这些重要的“条件”，这进一步削弱了被告的立场。如前所述，董事会会议记录中没有任何内容支持这些说法。董事会会议的任何记录或接受普利兹克要约的董事会决议或会议记录中均未提及所谓的“条件”或 Trans Union 保留的市场测试权利。那天晚上，在他为芝加哥抒情歌剧院开幕式举办的正式派对中，Van Gorkom 在他或董事会任何其他成员都没有阅读文件的情况下签署了合并协议。

The defendants attempt to downplay the significance of the prohibition against Trans Union's actively soliciting competing offers by arguing that the directors "understood that the entire financial community would know that Trans Union was for sale upon the announcement of the Pritzker offer, and anyone desiring to make a better offer was free to do so." Yet, the press release issued on September 22, with the authorization of the Board, stated that Trans Union had entered into "definitive agreements" with the Pritzkers; and the press release did not even disclose Trans Union's limited right to receive and accept higher offers. Accompanying this press release was a further public announcement that Pritzker had been granted an option to purchase at any time one million shares of *880 Trans Union's capital stock at 75 cents above the then-current price per share.
被告试图淡化禁止 Trans Union 积极征求竞争性报价的重要性，辩称董事们“明白，整个金融界都会知道 Trans Union 在宣布普利兹克报价后将被出售，任何希望提出更好报价的人都可以自由地这样做。然而，经董事会授权，9 月 22 日发布的新闻稿称，Trans Union 已与普利兹克夫妇达成“最终协议”;新闻稿甚至没有披露 Trans Union 接收和接受更高报价的有限权利。与本新闻稿一起发布的是进一步的公开公告，即 Pritzker 已获得随时以高于当时每股价格 75 美分的价格购买 100 万股 *880 Trans Union 股本的选择权。

Thus, notwithstanding what several of the outside directors later claimed to have "thought" occurred at the meeting, the record compels the conclusion that Trans Union's Board had no rational basis to conclude on September 20 or in the days immediately following, that the Board's acceptance of Pritzker's offer was conditioned on (1) a "market test" of the offer; and (2) the Board's right to withdraw from the Pritzker Agreement and accept any higher offer received before the shareholder meeting.
因此，尽管几位外部董事后来声称在会议上发生了什么“想法”，但该记录迫使得出结论，即 Trans Union 董事会没有合理的依据在 9 月 20 日或紧接随后的几天内得出结论，即董事会接受 Pritzker 的要约的条件是 （1） 对要约的“市场测试”;以及 （2） 董事会退出普利兹克协议并接受股东大会前收到的任何更高要约的权利。

(3)

The directors' unfounded reliance on both the premium and the market test as the basis for accepting the Pritzker proposal undermines the defendants' remaining contention that the Board's collective experience and sophistication was a sufficient basis for finding that it reached its September 20 decision with informed, reasonable deliberation.[21]Compare Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., Del. Ch., 
董事们毫无根据地依赖溢价和市场测试作为接受 Pritzker 提案的基础，这削弱了被告的剩余论点，即董事会的集体经验和成熟度是认定其在经过知情、合理审议后于 9 月 20 日做出决定的充分依据。[21]比较 Gimbel v. Signal Companies， Inc.， Del. Ch.，316 A.2d 599 (1974), aff'd per curiam, Del. Supr., 
（1974），aff'd per curiam，Del. Supr.，316 A.2d 619 (1974). There, the Court of Chancery preliminary enjoined a board's sale of stock of its wholly-owned subsidiary for an alleged grossly inadequate price. It did so based on a finding that the business judgment rule had been pierced for failure of management to give its board "the opportunity to make a reasonable and reasoned decision." 316 A.2d at 615. The Court there reached this result notwithstanding the board's sophistication and experience; the company's need of immediate cash; and the board's need to act promptly due to the impact of an energy crisis on the value of the underlying assets being sold all of its subsidiary's oil and gas interests. The Court found those factors denoting competence to be outweighed by evidence of gross negligence; that management in effect sprang the deal on the board by negotiating the asset sale without informing the board; that the buyer intended to "force a quick decision" by the board; that the board meeting was called on only one-and-a-half days' notice; that its outside directors were not notified of the meeting's purpose; that during a meeting spanning "a couple of hours" a sale of assets worth $480 million was approved; and that the Board failed to obtain a current appraisal of its oil and gas interests. The analogy of Signal to the case at bar is significant.
（1974 年）。在该案中，衡平法院初步禁止董事会以涉嫌严重不足的价格出售其全资子公司的股票。它这样做的依据是，由于管理层未能给董事会“做出合理和合理的决定的机会”，商业判断规则被打破。316 A.2d，第 615 页。尽管该委员会的老练和经验丰富，但该法院还是得出了这一结果;公司对即时现金的需求;以及由于能源危机对出售其子公司所有石油和天然气权益的标的资产价值的影响，董事会需要迅速采取行动。法院认为，那些表示能力的因素被严重疏忽的证据所抵消;管理层实际上是在没有通知董事会的情况下通过谈判资产出售来促成董事会的交易;买方打算“迫使董事会快速做出决定”;董事会会议仅在提前一天半发出通知的情况下召开;其外部董事未被告知会议的目的;在一次为期“几个小时”的会议中，批准了价值 4.8 亿美元的资产出售;以及董事会未能获得对其石油和天然气利益的当前评估。Signal 与 bar 的情况的类比很重要。

(4)

Part of the defense is based on a claim that the directors relied on legal advice rendered at the September 20 meeting by James Brennan, Esquire, who was present at Van Gorkom's request. Unfortunately, Brennan did not appear and testify at trial even though his firm participated in the defense of this action. There is no contemporaneous evidence of the advice given by Brennan on September 20, only the later deposition and trial testimony of certain directors as to their recollections or understanding of what was said at the meeting. Since counsel did not testify, and the advice attributed to Brennan is hearsay received by the Trial Court over the plaintiffs' objections, we consider it only in the context of the directors' present claims. In fairness to counsel, we make no findings that the advice attributed to him was in fact given. We focus solely on the efficacy of the *881 defendants' claims, made months and years later, in an effort to extricate themselves from liability.
部分辩护是基于一项主张，即董事们依赖于 Esquire 的 James Brennan 在 9 月 20 日会议上提供的法律建议，他应 Van Gorkom 的要求在场。不幸的是，布伦南没有出庭作证，尽管他的公司参与了这次诉讼的辩护。没有同时期的证据证明 Brennan 在 9 月 20 日提供的建议，只有某些董事后来的证词和审判证词，内容涉及他们对会议上所讲内容的回忆或理解。由于律师没有作证，而 Brennan 的建议是初审法院在原告人的反对意见下收到的传闻证据，因此我们只在董事目前的申索中考虑。为了公平起见，我们没有发现归因于他的建议实际上是提供的。我们只关注 *881 被告在数月和数年后提出的索赔的有效性，以努力摆脱责任。

Several defendants testified that Brennan advised them that Delaware law did not require a fairness opinion or an outside valuation of the Company before the Board could act on the Pritzker proposal. If given, the advice was correct. However, that did not end the matter. Unless the directors had before them adequate information regarding the intrinsic value of the Company, upon which a proper exercise of business judgment could be made, mere advice of this type is meaningless; and, given this record of the defendants' failures, it constitutes no defense here.[22]
几名被告作证说，Brennan 告诉他们，特拉华州法律不要求在董事会对 Pritzker 提案采取行动之前对公司进行公允意见或外部估值。如果给出，这个建议是正确的。然而，这并没有结束这件事。除非董事们掌握了有关公司内在价值的足够信息，并据此可以做出适当的商业判断，否则仅凭此类建议是没有意义的;而且，鉴于被告的失败记录，它在这里不构成辩护。[22]

* * *

We conclude that Trans Union's Board was grossly negligent in that it failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation in agreeing to the Pritzker merger proposal on September 20; and we further conclude that the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in failing to address that question before determining whether the directors' later conduct was sufficient to cure its initial error.
我们得出的结论是，Trans Union 的董事会存在严重疏忽，因为它在 9 月 20 日同意 Pritzker 合并提案时没有经过知情合理的审议;我们进一步得出结论，初审法院在确定董事后来的行为是否足以纠正其最初的错误之前，没有解决该问题，这在法律上是错误的。

A second claim is that counsel advised the Board it would be subject to lawsuits if it rejected the $55 per share offer. It is, of course, a fact of corporate life that today when faced with difficult or sensitive issues, directors often are subject to suit, irrespective of the decisions they make. However, counsel's mere acknowledgement of this circumstance cannot be rationally translated into a justification for a board permitting itself to be stampeded into a patently unadvised act. While suit might result from the rejection of a merger or tender offer, Delaware law makes clear that a board acting within the ambit of the business judgment rule faces no ultimate liability. Pogostin v. Rice, supra. Thus, we cannot conclude that the mere threat of litigation, acknowledged by counsel, constitutes either legal advice or any valid basis upon which to pursue an uninformed course.
第二种说法是，律师告诉董事会，如果董事会拒绝每股 55 美元的要约，它将面临诉讼。当然，当今企业生活中的事实是，当面临困难或敏感问题时，董事们往往会受到诉讼，无论他们做出什么决定。然而，律师仅仅承认这种情况并不能合理地转化为董事会允许自己被踩踏为明显未经建议的行为的理由。虽然诉讼可能因拒绝合并或要约收购而引起，但特拉华州法律明确规定，在商业判断规则范围内行事的董事会不承担最终责任。Pogostin v. Rice，同上。因此，我们不能得出结论，律师承认的单纯诉讼威胁构成了法律建议或任何不知情路线的有效依据。

Since we conclude that Brennan's purported advice is of no consequence to the defense of this case, it is unnecessary for us to invoke the adverse inferences which may be attributable to one failing to appear at trial and testify.
既然我们得出结论，布伦南所谓的建议对本案的辩护没有影响，我们就没有必要援引可能归因于一个人没有出庭和作证的不利推论。

-B-

We now examine the Board's post-September 20 conduct for the purpose of determining first, whether it was informed and not grossly negligent; and second, if informed, whether it was sufficient to legally rectify and cure the Board's derelictions of September 20.[23]
我们现在审查委员会在 9 月 20 日之后的行为，以便首先确定它是否被告知而不是重大疏忽;其次，如果被告知，是否足以合法地纠正和纠正委员会在 9 月 20 日的失职行为。[23]

(1)

First, as to the Board meeting of October 8: Its purpose arose in the aftermath of the September 20 meeting: (1) the September 22 press release announcing that Trans Union "had entered into definitive agreements to merge with an affiliate of Marmon Group, Inc.;" and (2) Senior Management's ensuing revolt.
首先，关于 10 月 8 日的董事会会议：其目的是在 9 月 20 日会议之后出现：（1） 9 月 22 日的新闻稿宣布 Trans Union“已达成最终协议，与 Marmon Group， Inc. 的附属公司合并”;（2） 高级管理层随后的反抗。

Trans Union's press release stated:
Trans Union 的新闻稿称：

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: CHICAGO, IL Trans Union Corporation announced today that it had entered into definitive agreements to merge with an affiliate of The Marmon Group, Inc. in a transaction whereby Trans Union stockholders would receive $55 per share in cash for each Trans Union share held. The Marmon Group, Inc. is controlled by the Pritzker family of Chicago. The merger is subject to approval by the stockholders of Trans Union at a special meeting expected to be held *882 sometime during December or early January. Until October 10, 1980, the purchaser has the right to terminate the merger if financing that is satisfactory to the purchaser has not been obtained, but after that date there is no such right. In a related transaction, Trans Union has agreed to sell to a designee of the purchaser one million newly-issued shares of Trans Union common stock at a cash price of $38 per share. Such shares will be issued only if the merger financing has been committed for no later than October 10, 1980, or if the purchaser elects to waive the merger financing condition. In addition, the New York Stock Exchange will be asked to approve the listing of the new shares pursuant to a listing application which Trans Union intends to file shortly. Completing of the transaction is also subject to the preparation of a definitive proxy statement and making various filings and obtaining the approvals or consents of government agencies.
立即发布：芝加哥，伊利诺伊州 Trans Union Corporation 今天宣布，它已与 The Marmon Group， Inc. 的附属公司达成最终协议，根据该交易，Trans Union 股东将获得每持有一股 Trans Union 股票 55 美元的现金。Marmon Group， Inc. 由芝加哥的 Pritzker 家族控制。此次合并须经 Trans Union 股东在预计于 12 月或 1 月初举行的 *882 特别会议上批准。在 1980 年 10 月 10 日之前，如果未获得令买方满意的融资，买方有权终止合并，但在此日期之后就没有这种权利。在一项相关交易中，Trans Union 已同意以每股 38 美元的现金价格向买方的指定人员出售 100 万股新发行的 Trans Union 普通股。只有在 1980 年 10 月 10 日之前承诺进行合并融资，或者购买者选择放弃合并融资条件的情况下，才会发行此类股票。此外，根据 Trans Union 打算很快提交的上市申请，将要求纽约证券交易所批准新股的上市。交易的完成还取决于准备最终委托书并进行各种备案并获得政府机构的批准或同意。

The press release made no reference to provisions allegedly reserving to the Board the rights to perform a "market test" and to withdraw from the Pritzker Agreement if Trans Union received a better offer before the shareholder meeting. The defendants also concede that Trans Union never made a subsequent public announcement stating that it had in fact reserved the right to accept alternate offers, the Agreement notwithstanding.
该新闻稿没有提及据称保留董事会进行“市场测试”的权利，以及如果 Trans Union 在股东大会前收到更好的报价，则保留退出普利兹克协议的权利。被告还承认，尽管有该协议，但 Trans Union 从未在其后发布公开公告，表明它实际上保留了接受替代要约的权利。

The public announcement of the Pritzker merger resulted in an "en masse" revolt of Trans Union's Senior Management. The head of Trans Union's tank car operations (its most profitable division) informed Van Gorkom that unless the merger were called off, fifteen key personnel would resign.
普利兹克合并的公开宣布导致了 Trans Union 高级管理层的“集体”反抗。Trans Union 油罐车业务（其最赚钱的部门）的负责人告诉 Van Gorkom，除非取消合并，否则 15 名关键人员将辞职。

Instead of reconvening the Board, Van Gorkom again privately met with Pritzker, informed him of the developments, and sought his advice. Pritzker then made the following suggestions for overcoming Management's dissatisfaction: (1) that the Agreement be amended to permit Trans Union to solicit, as well as receive, higher offers; and (2) that the shareholder meeting be postponed from early January to February 10, 1981. In return, Pritzker asked Van Gorkom to obtain a commitment from Senior Management to remain at Trans Union for at least six months after the merger was consummated.
Van Gorkom 没有重新召集董事会，而是再次私下会见了 Pritzker，向他通报了事态发展，并寻求了他的建议。Pritzker 随后提出了以下建议来克服管理层的不满：（1） 修改协议，允许 Trans Union 征求和接收更高的报价;（2） 股东大会从 1981 年 1 月初推迟至 2 月 10 日。作为回报，Pritzker 要求 Van Gorkom 获得高级管理层的承诺，即在合并完成后至少在 Trans Union 工作六个月。

Van Gorkom then advised Senior Management that the Agreement would be amended to give Trans Union the right to solicit competing offers through January, 1981, if they would agree to remain with Trans Union. Senior Management was temporarily mollified; and Van Gorkom then called a special meeting of Trans Union's Board for October 8.
Van Gorkom 随后建议高级管理层，如果 Trans Union 同意留在 Trans Union，将对协议进行修订，赋予 Trans Union 在 1981 年 1 月之前征求竞争性报价的权利。高级管理层暂时被安抚了;Van Gorkom 随后于 10 月 8 日召开了 Trans Union 董事会特别会议。

Thus, the primary purpose of the October 8 Board meeting was to amend the Merger Agreement, in a manner agreeable to Pritzker, to permit Trans Union to conduct a "market test."[24] Van Gorkom understood that the proposed amendments were intended to give the Company an unfettered "right to openly solicit offers down through January 31." Van Gorkom presumably so represented the amendments to Trans Union's Board members on October 8. In a brief session, the directors approved Van Gorkom's oral presentation of the substance of the proposed amendments, *883 the terms of which were not reduced to writing until October 10. But rather than waiting to review the amendments, the Board again approved them sight unseen and adjourned, giving Van Gorkom authority to execute the papers when he received them.[25]
因此，10 月 8 日董事会会议的主要目的是以 Pritzker 同意的方式修改合并协议，以允许 Trans Union 进行“市场测试”。[24]Van Gorkom 明白，拟议的修正案旨在赋予公司不受约束的“在 1 月 31 日之前公开征求报价的权利”。Van Gorkom 可能在 10 月 8 日向 Trans Union 的董事会成员代表了修正案。在简短的会议上，董事们批准了 Van Gorkom 对拟议修正案实质内容的口头陈述，*883 其条款直到 10 月 10 日才转化为书面形式。但是，董事会没有等待审查这些修正案，而是再次批准了它们，并在未见的情况下批准了它们并休会，授权 Van Gorkom 在收到这些文件时执行这些文件。[25]

Thus, the Court of Chancery's finding that the October 8 Board meeting was convened to reconsider the Pritzker "proposal" is clearly erroneous. Further, the consequence of the Board's faulty conduct on October 8, in approving amendments to the Agreement which had not even been drafted, will become apparent when the actual amendments to the Agreement are hereafter examined.
因此，衡平法院认为 10 月 8 日召开董事会会议是为了重新考虑普利兹克的“提案”显然是错误的。此外，董事会在 10 月 8 日批准了甚至尚未起草的协议修正案的错误行为的后果，将在下文审查对协议的实际修正案时变得明显。

The next day, October 9, and before the Agreement was amended, Pritzker moved swiftly to off-set the proposed market test amendment. First, Pritzker informed Trans Union that he had completed arrangements for financing its acquisition and that the parties were thereby mutually bound to a firm purchase and sale arrangement. Second, Pritzker announced the exercise of his option to purchase one million shares of Trans Union's treasury stock at $38 per share 75 cents above the current market price. Trans Union's Management responded the same day by issuing a press release announcing: (1) that all financing arrangements for Pritzker's acquisition of Trans Union had been completed; and (2) Pritzker's purchase of one million shares of Trans Union's treasury stock at $38 per share.
第二天，即 10 月 9 日，在协议修订之前，普利兹克迅速采取行动，抵消了拟议的市场测试修正案。首先，Pritzker 通知 Trans Union，他已经完成了为其收购提供资金的安排，因此双方都对确定的买卖安排具有约束力。其次，普利兹克宣布行使他的选择权，以每股 38 美元的价格购买 100 万股 Trans Union 的库存股，比当前市场价格高出 75 美分。Trans Union 的管理层在同一天发布了一份新闻稿作为回应，宣布：（1） Pritzker 收购 Trans Union 的所有融资安排都已完成;以及 （2） Pritzker 以每股 38 美元的价格购买了 100 万股 Trans Union 的库存股。

The next day, October 10, Pritzker delivered to Trans Union the proposed amendments to the September 20 Merger Agreement. Van Gorkom promptly proceeded to countersign all the instruments on behalf of Trans Union without reviewing the instruments to determine if they were consistent with the authority previously granted him by the Board. The amending documents were apparently not approved by Trans Union's Board until a much later date, December 2. The record does not affirmatively establish that Trans Union's directors ever read the October 10 amendments.[26]
第二天，即 10 月 10 日，普利兹克向 Trans Union 提交了对 9 月 20 日合并协议的拟议修正案。Van Gorkom 立即代表 Trans Union 会签了所有文书，而没有审查这些文书以确定它们是否与董事会先前授予他的权力一致。修订文件显然直到很晚的日期，即 12 月 2 日才得到 Trans Union 董事会的批准。该记录并未肯定地证明 Trans Union 的董事曾阅读过 10 月 10 日的修正案。[26]

The October 10 amendments to the Merger Agreement did authorize Trans Union to solicit competing offers, but the amendments had more far-reaching effects. The most significant change was in the definition of the third-party "offer" available to Trans Union as a possible basis for withdrawal from its Merger Agreement with Pritzker. Under the October 10 amendments, a better offer was no longer sufficient to permit Trans Union's withdrawal. Trans Union was now permitted to terminate the Pritzker Agreement and abandon the merger only if, prior to February 10, 1981, Trans Union had either consummated a merger (or sale of assets) with a third party or had entered into a "definitive" merger agreement more favorable than Pritzker's and for a greater consideration subject only to stockholder approval. Further, the "extension" of the market test period to February 10, 1981 was circumscribed by other amendments which required Trans Union to file its preliminary proxy statement on the Pritzker merger proposal by December 5, 1980 and use its best efforts to mail the statement to its shareholders by January 5, 1981. Thus, the market test period was effectively reduced, not extended. (See infra note 29 at 886.)
10 月 10 日对合并协议的修正案确实授权 Trans Union 征求竞争性要约，但这些修正案具有更深远的影响。最显着的变化是 Trans Union 可用的第三方“要约”的定义，作为退出其与 Pritzker 合并协议的可能依据。根据 10 月 10 日的修正案，更好的报价已不足以允许 Trans Union 退出。现在，只有在 1981 年 2 月 10 日之前，Trans Union 已经完成了与第三方的合并（或资产出售），或者签订了比普利兹克协议更有利且对价更高的“最终”合并协议，但仅需经股东批准，才能终止普利兹克协议并放弃合并。此外，将市场测试期“延长”至 1981 年 2 月 10 日受到其他修正案的限制，这些修正案要求 Trans Union 在 1980 年 12 月 5 日之前提交其关于普利兹克合并提案的初步委托书，并尽最大努力在 1981 年 1 月 5 日之前将声明邮寄给其股东。因此，市场测试期实际上缩短了，而不是延长了。（见下文注释 29，第 886 页。

In our view, the record compels the conclusion that the directors' conduct on October *884 8 exhibited the same deficiencies as did their conduct on September 20. The Board permitted its Merger Agreement with Pritzker to be amended in a manner it had neither authorized nor intended. The Court of Chancery, in its decision, over-looked the significance of the October 8-10 events and their relevance to the sufficiency of the directors' conduct. The Trial Court's letter opinion ignores: the October 10 amendments; the manner of their adoption; the effect of the October 9 press release and the October 10 amendments on the feasibility of a market test; and the ultimate question as to the reasonableness of the directors' reliance on a market test in recommending that the shareholders approve the Pritzker merger.
我们认为，该记录迫使我们得出结论，即董事在 10 月 *884 8 日的行为与他们在 9 月 20 日的行为表现出相同的缺陷。董事会允许以其既未授权也不打算的方式修改其与 Pritzker 的合并协议。衡平法院在其裁决中忽视了 10 月 8 日至 10 日事件的重要性及其与董事行为充分性的相关性。初审法院的信函意见忽略了：10 月 10 日的修正案;收养他们的方式;10 月 9 日新闻稿和 10 月 10 日修正案对市场测试可行性的影响;以及董事们依赖市场测试建议股东批准 Pritzker 合并是否合理的最终问题。

We conclude that the Board acted in a grossly negligent manner on October 8; and that Van Gorkom's representations on which the Board based its actions do not constitute "reports" under § 141(e) on which the directors could reasonably have relied. Further, the amended Merger Agreement imposed on Trans Union's acceptance of a third party offer conditions more onerous than those imposed on Trans Union's acceptance of Pritzker's offer on September 20. After October 10, Trans Union could accept from a third party a better offer only if it were incorporated in a definitive agreement between the parties, and not conditioned on financing or on any other contingency.
我们得出的结论是，董事会在 10 月 8 日的行为存在重大过失;以及董事会采取行动所依据的 Van Gorkom 的陈述不构成董事本可以合理依赖的 § 141（e） 项下的“报告”。此外，修订后的合并协议对 Trans Union 接受第三方要约施加的条件比对 Trans Union 在 9 月 20 日接受 Pritzker 要约的条件更为苛刻。10 月 10 日之后，Trans Union 只能接受第三方提供的更好的报价，前提是该报价被纳入双方之间的最终协议中，并且不以融资或任何其他意外情况为条件。

The October 9 press release, coupled with the October 10 amendments, had the clear effect of locking Trans Union's Board into the Pritzker Agreement. Pritzker had thereby foreclosed Trans Union's Board from negotiating any better "definitive" agreement over the remaining eight weeks before Trans Union was required to clear the Proxy Statement submitting the Pritzker proposal to its shareholders.
10 月 9 日的新闻稿，加上 10 月 10 日的修正案，具有将 Trans Union 董事会锁定在普利兹克协议中的明显效果。因此，在 Trans Union 被要求批准向其股东提交 Pritzker 提案的委托书之前的剩余八周内，Pritzker 已取消了 Trans Union 董事会在剩余八周内谈判任何更好的“最终”协议的资格。

(2)

Next, as to the "curative" effects of the Board's post-September 20 conduct, we review in more detail the reaction of Van Gorkom to the KKR proposal and the results of the Board-sponsored "market test."
接下来，关于董事会在 9 月 20 日之后的行为的“补救”效果，我们更详细地回顾了 Van Gorkom 对 KKR 提案的反应以及董事会发起的“市场测试”的结果。

The KKR proposal was the first and only offer received subsequent to the Pritzker Merger Agreement. The offer resulted primarily from the efforts of Romans and other senior officers to propose an alternative to Pritzker's acquisition of Trans Union. In late September, Romans' group contacted KKR about the possibility of a leveraged buy-out by all members of Management, except Van Gorkom. By early October, Henry R. Kravis of KKR gave Romans written notice of KKR's "interest in making an offer to purchase 100%" of Trans Union's common stock.
KKR 提案是普利兹克合并协议后收到的第一个也是唯一一个要约。该要约主要是由于 Romans 和其他高级官员努力提出普利兹克收购 Trans Union 的替代方案。9 月下旬，Romans 的团队联系了 KKR，询问除 Van Gorkom 之外的所有管理层成员进行杠杆收购的可能性。到 10 月初，KKR 的 Henry R. Kravis 向 Romans 发出书面通知，表示 KKR “有兴趣提出购买 Trans Union 100% 普通股的要约”。

Thereafter, and until early December, Romans' group worked with KKR to develop a proposal. It did so with Van Gorkom's knowledge and apparently grudging consent. On December 2, Kravis and Romans hand-delivered to Van Gorkom a formal letter-offer to purchase all of Trans Union's assets and to assume all of its liabilities for an aggregate cash consideration equivalent to $60 per share. The offer was contingent upon completing equity and bank financing of $650 million, which Kravis represented as 80% complete. The KKR letter made reference to discussions with major banks regarding the loan portion of the buy-out cost and stated that KKR was "confident that commitments for the bank financing * * * can be obtained within two or three weeks." The purchasing group was to include certain named key members of Trans Union's Senior Management, excluding Van Gorkom, and a major Canadian company. Kravis stated that they were willing to enter into a "definitive agreement" under terms and conditions "substantially the same" as those contained in Trans Union's agreement with Pritzker. The offer was addressed to Trans Union's Board of Directors and a meeting with the Board, scheduled for that afternoon, was requested.
此后，直到 12 月初，Romans 的小组与 KKR 合作制定了一项提案。它是在 Van Gorkom 知情且显然勉强同意的情况下这样做的。12 月 2 日，Kravis 和 Romans 亲手向 Van Gorkom 递交了一份正式的要约书，以每股 60 美元的总现金对价购买 Trans Union 的所有资产并承担其所有负债。该要约取决于完成 6.5 亿美元的股权和银行融资，Kravis 表示已完成 80%。KKR 的信函提到了与主要银行就收购成本的贷款部分进行的讨论，并表示 KKR“有信心在两到三周内获得银行融资的承诺。采购小组将包括 Trans Union 高级管理层的某些指定关键成员（不包括 Van Gorkom）和一家加拿大大公司。Kravis 表示，他们愿意根据与 Trans Union 与 Pritzker 协议中包含的条款和条件“基本相同”签订“最终协议”。该要约已提交给 Trans Union 的董事会，并要求在当天下午与董事会举行会议。

Van Gorkom's reaction to the KKR proposal was completely negative; he did not view the offer as being firm because of its *885 financing condition. It was pointed out, to no avail, that Pritzker's offer had not only been similarly conditioned, but accepted on an expedited basis. Van Gorkom refused Kravis' request that Trans Union issue a press release announcing KKR's offer, on the ground that it might "chill" any other offer.[27] Romans and Kravis left with the understanding that their proposal would be presented to Trans Union's Board that afternoon.
Van Gorkom 对 KKR 提案的反应完全是负面的;他认为该要约并不坚定，因为其 *885 融资条件。有人指出，普利兹克的提议不仅有类似的条件，而且被迅速接受了，但无济于事。Van Gorkom 拒绝了 Kravis 要求 Trans Union 发布新闻稿宣布 KKR 的要约，理由是它可能会“冷却”任何其他要约。[27]Romans 和 Kravis 离开时明白，他们的提案将在当天下午提交给 Trans Union 的董事会。

Within a matter of hours and shortly before the scheduled Board meeting, Kravis withdrew his letter-offer. He gave as his reason a sudden decision by the Chief Officer of Trans Union's rail car leasing operation to withdraw from the KKR purchasing group. Van Gorkom had spoken to that officer about his participation in the KKR proposal immediately after his meeting with Romans and Kravis. However, Van Gorkom denied any responsibility for the officer's change of mind.
在几个小时内，在预定的董事会会议前不久，克拉维斯撤回了他的录取通知书。他给出了 Trans Union 轨道车租赁业务负责人突然决定退出 KKR 采购集团的原因。Van Gorkom 在与 Romans 和 Kravis 会面后立即与该官员谈到了他参与 KKR 提案的情况。然而，Van Gorkom 否认对这名警官改变主意负有任何责任。

At the Board meeting later that afternoon, Van Gorkom did not inform the directors of the KKR proposal because he considered it "dead." Van Gorkom did not contact KKR again until January 20, when faced with the realities of this lawsuit, he then attempted to reopen negotiations. KKR declined due to the imminence of the February 10 stockholder meeting.
在当天下午晚些时候的董事会会议上，Van Gorkom 没有将 KKR 提案通知董事，因为他认为该提案“已死”。Van Gorkom 直到 1 月 20 日才再次联系 KKR，当时面对这起诉讼的现实，他随后试图重新开始谈判。由于 2 月 10 日股东大会迫在眉睫，KKR 股价下跌。

GE Credit Corporation's interest in Trans Union did not develop until November; and it made no written proposal until mid-January. Even then, its proposal was not in the form of an offer. Had there been time to do so, GE Credit was prepared to offer between $2 and $5 per share above the $55 per share price which Pritzker offered. But GE Credit needed an additional 60 to 90 days; and it was unwilling to make a formal offer without a concession from Pritzker extending the February 10 "deadline" for Trans Union's stockholder meeting. As previously stated, Pritzker refused to grant such extension; and on January 21, GE Credit terminated further negotiations with Trans Union. Its stated reasons, among others, were its "unwillingness to become involved in a bidding contest with Pritzker in the absence of the willingness of [the Pritzker interests] to terminate the proposed $55 cash merger."
GE Credit Corporation 对 Trans Union 的兴趣直到 11 月才形成;直到 1 月中旬，它才提出书面建议。即便如此，它的提议也不是以要约的形式。如果有时间这样做，GE Credit 准备以每股 2 美元至 5 美元的价格提供普利兹克报价 55 美元。但 GE Credit 需要额外的 60 到 90 天;并且它不愿意在没有 Pritzker 做出让步的情况下提出正式要约，延长 Trans Union 股东大会的 2 月 10 日“截止日期”。如前所述，普利兹克拒绝批准此类延期;1 月 21 日，GE Credit 终止了与 Trans Union 的进一步谈判。其声明的原因之一是，“在 [普利兹克利益集团] 不愿意终止拟议的 55 美元现金合并的情况下，不愿意参与与普利兹克的竞标竞争”。

* * *

In the absence of any explicit finding by the Trial Court as to the reasonableness of Trans Union's directors' reliance on a market test and its feasibility, we may make our own findings based on the record. Our review of the record compels a finding that confirmation of the appropriateness of the Pritzker offer by an unfettered or free market test was virtually meaningless in the face of the terms and time limitations of Trans Union's Merger Agreement with Pritzker as amended October 10, 1980.
在初审法院没有明确认定 Trans Union 董事依赖市场测试的合理性及其可行性的情况下，我们可以根据记录做出自己的调查结果。我们对记录的审查迫使我们得出结论，面对 1980 年 10 月 10 日修订的 Trans Union 与 Pritzker 合并协议的条款和时间限制，通过不受约束或自由市场测试来确认 Pritzker 要约的适当性几乎毫无意义。

(3)

Finally, we turn to the Board's meeting of January 26, 1981. The defendant directors rely upon the action there taken to refute the contention that they did not reach an informed business judgment in approving the Pritzker merger. The defendants contend that the Trial Court correctly concluded that Trans Union's directors were, in effect, as "free to turn down the Pritzker proposal" on January 26, as they were on September 20.
最后，我们转向 1981 年 1 月 26 日的董事会会议。被告董事依靠在那里采取的行动来反驳他们在批准 Pritzker 合并时没有做出明智的商业判断的论点。被告辩称，初审法院正确地得出结论，Trans Union 的董事实际上在 1 月 26 日可以自由地拒绝普利兹克的提议，就像他们在 9 月 20 日一样。

Applying the appropriate standard of review set forth in Levitt v. Bouvier, supra, we conclude that the Trial Court's finding in this regard is neither supported by the record nor the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. Without disagreeing with the principle that a business decision by an originally uninformed board of directors may, under appropriate circumstances, be timely cured so as to become informed and deliberate, Muschel v. Western Union Corporation, Del. Ch., 310 *886 A.2d 904 (1973),[28] we find that the record does not permit the defendants to invoke that principle in this case.
应用 Levitt v.Bouvier，同上，我们得出结论，初审法院在这方面的裁决既没有记录支持，也没有有序和合乎逻辑的演绎过程的产物。在不反对最初不知情的董事会的商业决策在适当情况下可以及时纠正以使其变得知情和深思熟虑的原则，Muschel v. Western Union Corporation， Del. Ch.， 310 *886 A.2d 904 （1973），[28]我们认为，该记录不允许被告在本案中援引该原则。

The Board's January 26 meeting was the first meeting following the filing of the plaintiffs' suit in mid-December and the last meeting before the previously-noticed shareholder meeting of February 10.[29] All ten members of the Board and three outside attorneys attended the meeting. At that meeting the following facts, among other aspects of the Merger Agreement, were discussed:
董事会 1 月 26 日的会议是原告于 12 月中旬提起诉讼后的第一次会议，也是先前通知的 2 月 10 日股东大会之前的最后一次会议。[29]董事会的所有 10 名成员和 3 名外部律师都出席了会议。在那次会议上，讨论了以下事实以及合并协议的其他方面：

(a) The fact that prior to September 20, 1980, no Board member or member of Senior Management, except Chelberg and Peterson, knew that Van Gorkom had discussed a possible merger with Pritzker;
（a） 在 1980 年 9 月 20 日之前，除 Chelberg 和 Peterson 外，没有任何董事会成员或高级管理层成员知道 Van Gorkom 曾与普利兹克讨论过可能的合并;

(b) The fact that the price of $55 per share had been suggested initially to Pritzker by Van Gorkom;
（b） Van Gorkom 最初向 Pritzker 建议的每股 55 美元的价格;

(c) The fact that the Board had not sought an independent fairness opinion;
（c） 董事会未寻求独立的公平意见的事实;

(d) The fact that, at the September 20 Senior Management meeting, Romans and several members of Senior Management indicated both concern that the $55 per share price was inadequate and a belief that a higher price should and could be obtained;
（d） 在 9 月 20 日的高级管理层会议上，Romans 和几名高级管理层成员都表示担心每股 55 美元的价格不足，并认为应该而且可以获得更高的价格;

(e) The fact that Romans had advised the Board at its meeting on September 20, that he and his department had prepared a study which indicated that the Company had a value in the range of $55 to $65 per share, and that he could not advise the Board that the $55 per share offer made by Pritzker was unfair.
（e） Romans 在 9 月 20 日的董事会会议上告知董事会，他和他的部门准备了一份研究报告，表明该公司的价值在每股 55 美元至 65 美元之间，他不能告知董事会普利兹克提出的每股 55 美元报价不公平。

The defendants characterize the Board's Minutes of the January 26 meeting as a "review" of the "entire sequence of events" from Van Gorkom's initiation of the negotiations on September 13 forward.[30] The defendants also rely on the *887 testimony of several of the Board members at trial as confirming the Minutes.[31] On the basis of this evidence, the defendants argue that whatever information the Board lacked to make a deliberate and informed judgment on September 20, or on October 8, was fully divulged to the entire Board on January 26. Hence, the argument goes, the Board's vote on January 26 to again "approve" the Pritzker merger must be found to have been an informed and deliberate judgment.
被告将董事会的 1 月 26 日会议记录描述为对自 Van Gorkom 于 9 月 13 日开始谈判以来的“整个事件序列”的“审查”。[30]被告还依赖几名董事会成员在审判中的*887 证词来确认会议记录。[31]根据这些证据，被告辩称，董事会在 9 月 20 日或 10 月 8 日缺乏的任何信息都无法做出深思熟虑和明智的判断，并在 1 月 26 日向整个董事会完全披露。因此，该论点认为，董事会在 1 月 26 日投票再次“批准”普利兹克合并必须被认定为是明智和深思熟虑的判断。

On the basis of this evidence, the defendants assert: (1) that the Trial Court was legally correct in widening the time frame for determining whether the defendants' approval of the Pritzker merger represented an informed business judgment to include the entire four-month period during which the Board considered the matter from September 20 through January 26; and (2) that, given this extensive evidence of the Board's further review and deliberations on January 26, this Court must affirm the Trial Court's conclusion that the Board's action was not reckless or improvident.
根据这些证据，被告声称：（1） 初审法院在扩大确定被告批准 Pritzker 合并是否代表知情商业判断的时间框架方面是正确的，该时间框架包括董事会审议此事的整个四个月期间，从 9 月 20 日到 1 月 26 日;以及 （2） 鉴于董事会在 1 月 26 日进一步审查和审议的广泛证据，本法院必须确认初审法院的结论，即董事会的行为并非鲁莽或不适当。

We cannot agree. We find the Trial Court to have erred, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, in relying on the action on January 26 to bring the defendants' conduct within the protection of the business judgment rule.
我们不能同意。我们认为，初审法院在事实和法律问题上都犯了错误，即依赖 1 月 26 日的行动将被告的行为置于商业判断规则的保护之下。

Johnson's testimony and the Board Minutes of January 26 are remarkably consistent. Both clearly indicate recognition that the question of the alternative courses of action, available to the Board on January 26 with respect to the Pritzker merger, was a legal question, presenting to the Board (after its review of the full record developed through pre-trial discovery) three options: (1) to "continue to recommend" the Pritzker merger; (2) to "recommend that *888 the stockholders vote against" the Pritzker merger; or (3) to take a noncommittal position on the merger and "simply leave the decision to [the] shareholders."
Johnson 的证词和 1 月 26 日的董事会会议记录非常一致。这两项协议都清楚地表明，董事会在 1 月 26 日就 Pritzker 合并提出的替代行动方案问题是一个法律问题，向董事会提出了三个选项（在审核了通过审前证据开示获得的完整记录后）：（1） “继续推荐”Pritzker 合并;（2） “建议 *888 股东投票反对”普利兹克合并;或 （3） 对合并采取不置可否的立场，“简单地将决定权留给 [股东] ”。

We must conclude from the foregoing that the Board was mistaken as a matter of law regarding its available courses of action on January 26, 1981. Options (2) and (3) were not viable or legally available to the Board under 8 Del.C. § 251(b). The Board could not remain committed to the Pritzker merger and yet recommend that its stockholders vote it down; nor could it take a neutral position and delegate to the stockholders the unadvised decision as to whether to accept or reject the merger. Under § 251(b), the Board had but two options: (1) to proceed with the merger and the stockholder meeting, with the Board's recommendation of approval; or (2) to rescind its agreement with Pritzker, withdraw its approval of the merger, and notify its stockholders that the proposed shareholder meeting was cancelled. There is no evidence that the Board gave any consideration to these, its only legally viable alternative courses of action.
我们必须从上述内容中得出结论，董事会在 1981 年 1 月 26 日的可用行动方案在法律上是错误的。根据 8 Del.C. 的规定，选项 （2） 和 （3） 对董事会来说不可行或不合法。§ 251（b） 款。董事会不能继续致力于 Pritzker 合并，但又建议其股东投票否决它;它也不能采取中立立场，将是否接受或拒绝合并的未经考虑的决定委托给股东。根据 § 251（b），董事会只有两个选择：（1） 根据董事会的批准建议进行合并和股东大会;或 （2） 撤销与 Pritzker 的协议，撤回对合并的批准，并通知其股东拟议的股东大会已被取消。没有证据表明董事会考虑过这些，这是其唯一在法律上可行的替代行动方案。

But the second course of action would have clearly involved a substantial risk that the Board would be faced with suit by Pritzker for breach of contract based on its September 20 agreement as amended October 10. As previously noted, under the terms of the October 10 amendment, the Board's only ground for release from its agreement with Pritzker was its entry into a more favorable definitive agreement to sell the Company to a third party. Thus, in reality, the Board was not "free to turn down the Pritzker proposal" as the Trial Court found. Indeed, short of negotiating a better agreement with a third party, the Board's only basis for release from the Pritzker Agreement without liability would have been to establish fundamental wrongdoing by Pritzker. Clearly, the Board was not "free" to withdraw from its agreement with Pritzker on January 26 by simply relying on its self-induced failure to have reached an informed business judgment at the time of its original agreement. See Wilmington Trust Company v. Coulter, Del.Supr., 200 A.2d 441, 453 (1964), aff'g Pennsylvania Company v. Wilmington Trust Company, Del.Ch., 186 A.2d 751 (1962).
但第二种行动方案显然涉及重大风险，即董事会将面临普利兹克根据 9 月 20 日修订的协议提起的违约诉讼。如前所述，根据 10 月 10 日修正案的条款，董事会解除与 Pritzker 协议的唯一理由是其签订了一项更有利的最终协议，将公司出售给第三方。因此，实际上，董事会并不像初审法院所认定的那样“自由拒绝普利兹克提案”。事实上，除非与第三方协商达成更好的协议，否则董事会免除《普利兹克协议》而不承担责任的唯一依据是确定普利兹克的根本不当行为。显然，董事会不能“自由地”在 1 月 26 日退出与 Pritzker 的协议，仅仅依靠其在最初协议时自行诱导的未能达成明智的商业判断。参见威尔明顿信托公司诉库尔特案， 特拉华州，200 A.2d 441,453 （1964），aff'g 宾夕法尼亚公司诉威尔明顿信托公司，特拉华州，186 A.2d 751 （1962）。

Therefore, the Trial Court's conclusion that the Board reached an informed business judgment on January 26 in determining whether to turn down the Pritzker "proposal" on that day cannot be sustained.[32] The Court's conclusion is not supported by the record; it is contrary to the provisions of § 251(b) and basic principles of contract law; and it is not the product of a logical and deductive reasoning process.
因此，初审法院的结论是，董事会在 1 月 26 日做出了明智的商业判断，以确定是否在当天拒绝普利兹克的“提案”，这一结论不能成立。[32]法院的结论没有得到记录的支持;它违反了 § 251（b） 的规定和合同法的基本原则;它不是逻辑和演绎推理过程的产物。

* * *

Upon the basis of the foregoing, we hold that the defendants' post-September conduct did not cure the deficiencies of their September 20 conduct; and that, accordingly, the Trial Court erred in according to the defendants the benefits of the business judgment rule.
基于上述情况，我们认为被告在 9 月 20 日之后的行为并没有弥补他们 9 月 20 日行为的缺陷;因此，根据被告的说法，初审法院错误地利用了商业判断规则的好处。

IV.
四。

Whether the directors of Trans Union should be treated as one or individually in terms of invoking the protection of the business judgment rule and the applicability of 8 Del.C. § 141(c) are questions which were not originally addressed by the parties in their briefing of this case. This resulted in a supplemental briefing and a second rehearing en banc on two basic questions: (a) whether one or more of the directors were deprived of the protection of the business judgment rule by evidence of an absence of good faith; and (b) whether one or more of the outside directors were *889 entitled to invoke the protection of 8 Del.C. § 141(e) by evidence of a reasonable, good faith reliance on "reports," including legal advice, rendered the Board by certain inside directors and the Board's special counsel, Brennan.
在援引商业判断规则的保护和 8 Del.C. 的适用性方面，Trans Union 的董事应被视为一个还是单独。§ 141（c） 是双方最初在介绍本案时未解决的问题。这导致了一次补充简报和第二次全团重审，涉及两个基本问题：（a） 是否有证据证明缺乏诚信，一名或多名董事被剥夺了商业判断规则的保护;以及 （b） 一名或多名外部董事是否有权援引 8 Del.C.§ 141（e） 通过某些内部董事和董事会特别顾问 Brennan 向董事会提供的合理、善意的“报告”（包括法律建议）的证据。

The parties' response, including reargument, has led the majority of the Court to conclude: (1) that since all of the defendant directors, outside as well as inside, take a unified position, we are required to treat all of the directors as one as to whether they are entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule; and (2) that considerations of good faith, including the presumption that the directors acted in good faith, are irrelevant in determining the threshold issue of whether the directors as a Board exercised an informed business judgment. For the same reason, we must reject defense counsel's ad hominem argument for affirmance: that reversal may result in a multi-million dollar class award against the defendants for having made an allegedly uninformed business judgment in a transaction not involving any personal gain, self-dealing or claim of bad faith.
双方的回应，包括重新辩论，使法院的大多数法官得出结论：（1） 由于所有被告董事，无论是外部还是内部，都采取了一致的立场，因此我们需要将所有董事视为一个整体，即他们是否有权获得商业判断规则的保护;以及 （2） 诚信考虑，包括董事善意行事的推定，在确定董事作为董事会是否行使了知情商业判断的门槛问题时无关紧要。出于同样的原因，我们必须驳回辩护律师的人身主张：推翻可能会导致被告被判数百万美元的集体赔偿，因为被告在一项不涉及任何个人利益、自我交易或恶意索赔的交易中做出了据称不知情的商业判断。

In their brief, the defendants similarly mistake the business judgment rule's application to this case by erroneously invoking presumptions of good faith and "wide discretion":
在他们的摘要中，被告同样错误地引用了善意和“广泛的自由裁量权”推定，从而错误地将商业判断规则应用于本案：

This is a case in which plaintiff challenged the exercise of business judgment by an independent Board of Directors. There were no allegations and no proof of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing by the directors.... The business judgment rule, which was properly applied by the Chancellor, allows directors wide discretion in the matter of valuation and affords room for honest differences of opinion. In order to prevail, plaintiffs had the heavy burden of proving that the merger price was so grossly inadequate as to display itself as a badge of fraud. That is a burden which plaintiffs have not met.
本案中，原告对独立董事会的商业判断提出质疑。董事们没有指控，也没有证据证明欺诈、恶意或自我交易......大法官正确应用了商业判断规则，允许董事在估值问题上拥有广泛的自由裁量权，并为诚实的意见分歧提供了空间。为了胜诉，原告负有举重责任，证明合并价格严重不足，以至于将自己展示为欺诈的标志。这是原告没有履行的负担。

However, plaintiffs have not claimed, nor did the Trial Court decide, that $55 was a grossly inadequate price per share for sale of the Company. That being so, the presumption that a board's judgment as to adequacy of price represents an honest exercise of business judgment (absent proof that the sale price was grossly inadequate) is irrelevant to the threshold question of whether an informed judgment was reached. Compare Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, Del.Supr., 280 A.2d 717 (1971); Kelly v. Bell, Del.Supr., 266 A.2d 878, 879 (1970); Cole v. National Cash Credit Association, Del.Ch., 156 A. 183 (1931); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., supra; Allen Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, Del.Ch., 120 A. 486 (1923).
然而，原告没有声称，初审法院也没有裁定，55 美元的每股出售价格严重不足。既然如此，董事会对价格是否足够的判断代表了诚实的商业判断（没有证据证明销售价格严重不足）的推定与是否达成知情判断的门槛问题无关。比较 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien， Del.Supr.， 280 A.2d 717 （1971）;Kelly v. Bell， Del.Supr.， 266 A.2d 878， 879 （1970）;Cole v. National Cash Credit Association， Del.Ch.， 156 A. 183 （1931）;Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co.，同上;Allen Chemical & Dye Corp. v.Steel & Tube Co. of America， Del.Ch.， 120 A. 486 （1923）.

V.

The defendants ultimately rely on the stockholder vote of February 10 for exoneration. The defendants contend that the stockholders' "overwhelming" vote approving the Pritzker Merger Agreement had the legal effect of curing any failure of the Board to reach an informed business judgment in its approval of the merger.
被告最终依靠 2 月 10 日的股东投票来免除罪责。被告辩称，股东以“压倒性”票数批准了 Pritzker 合并协议，其法律效力是纠正董事会在批准合并时未能做出明智的商业判断。

The parties tacitly agree that a discovered failure of the Board to reach an informed business judgment in approving the merger constitutes a voidable, rather than a void, act. Hence, the merger can be sustained, notwithstanding the infirmity of the Board's action, if its approval by majority vote of the shareholders is found to have been based on an informed electorate. Cf. Michelson v. Duncan, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d 211 (1979), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, Del.Ch., 386 A.2d 1144 (1978). The disagreement between the parties arises over: (1) the Board's burden of disclosing to the shareholders all relevant and material information; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether the Board satisfied that burden.
双方默契地同意，如果发现董事会在批准合并时未能做出明智的商业判断，则构成可撤销的行为，而不是无效的行为。因此，尽管董事会的行动不力，但如果发现股东多数票的批准是基于知情的选民，则合并可以维持。参见 Michelson v. Duncan， Del.Supr.， 407 A.2d 211 （1979）， aff'g in part and rev'g in part， Del.Ch.， 386 A.2d 1144 （1978）.双方之间的分歧在于：（1） 董事会有责任向股东披露所有相关和重要信息;以及 （2） 关于委员会是否履行了该责任的证据是否充分。

On this issue the Trial Court summarily concluded "that the stockholders of Trans Union were fairly informed as to the pending merger...." The Court provided no *890 supportive reasoning nor did the Court make any reference to the evidence of record.
在这个问题上，初审法院即决地得出结论，“Trans Union 的股东被公平地告知了即将进行的合并......”。法院没有提供 *890 支持性推理，也没有提及记录证据。

The plaintiffs contend that the Court committed error by applying an erroneous disclosure standard of "adequacy" rather than "completeness" in determining the sufficiency of the Company's merger proxy materials. The plaintiffs also argue that the Board's proxy statements, both its original statement dated January 19 and its supplemental statement dated January 26, were incomplete in various material respects. Finally, the plaintiffs assert that Management's supplemental statement (mailed "on or about" January 27) was untimely either as a matter of law under 8 Del.C. § 251(c), or untimely as a matter of equity and the requirements of complete candor and fair disclosure.
原告辩称，法院在确定公司合并代理材料的充分性时应用了错误的“充分性”而不是“完整性”的披露标准，这是错误的。原告还辩称，董事会的委托书，包括日期为 1 月 19 日的原始声明和日期为 1 月 26 日的补充声明，在各个重大方面均不完整。最后，原告声称，管理层的补充声明（“在 1 月 27 日或前后”邮寄）在法律上是不合时宜的。§ 251（c） 的，或者作为公平问题不合时宜以及完全坦率和公平披露的要求。

The defendants deny that the Court committed legal or equitable error. On the question of the Board's burden of disclosure, the defendants state that there was no dispute at trial over the standard of disclosure required of the Board; but the defendants concede that the Board was required to disclose "all germane facts" which a reasonable shareholder would have considered important in deciding whether to approve the merger. Thus, the defendants argue that when the Trial Court speaks of finding the Company's shareholders to have been "fairly informed" by Management's proxy materials, the Court is speaking in terms of "complete candor" as required under Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., Del.Supr., 383 A.2d 278 (1978).
被告否认法院犯了法律或衡平法上的错误。关于董事会的披露责任问题，被告表示，在审判中对董事会要求的披露标准没有争议;但被告承认，董事会被要求披露“所有密切相关的事实”，理性的股东在决定是否批准合并时会认为这些事实很重要。因此，被告辩称，当初审法院谈到认定公司股东已从管理层的代理材料中“公平地知情”时，法院所说的是 Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.， Del.Supr.， 383 A.2d 278 （1978） 所要求的“完全坦率”。

The settled rule in Delaware is that "where a majority of fully informed stockholders ratify action of even interested directors, an attack on the ratified transaction normally must fail." Gerlach v. Gillam, Del.Ch., 139 A.2d 591, 593 (1958). The question of whether shareholders have been fully informed such that their vote can be said to ratify director action, "turns on the fairness and completeness of the proxy materials submitted by the management to the ... shareholders." Michelson v. Duncan, supra at 220. As this Court stated in Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., Del.Supr., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (1952):
特拉华州的既定规则是，“如果大多数完全知情的股东批准了甚至感兴趣的董事的行为，则对已批准交易的攻击通常必须失败。Gerlach v. Gillam， Del.Ch.， 139 A.2d 591， 593 （1958）。股东是否已被充分告知，以至于他们的投票可以说是批准董事行为的问题，“取决于管理层提交给......股东。迈克尔逊诉 Duncan，同上，第 220 页。正如本法院在 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.， Del.Supr.， 91 A.2d 57， 59 （1952） 一案中所指出的：

[T]he entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules invoked where a formal approval has been given by a majority of independent, fully informed stockholders....
整个气氛焕然一新，并援引了一套新的规则，其中大多数独立、充分知情的股东已经正式批准......

In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., supra, this Court held that corporate directors owe to their stockholders a fiduciary duty to disclose all facts germane to the transaction at issue in an atmosphere of complete candor. We defined "germane" in the tender offer context as all "information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock." Id. at 281. Accord Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra; Michelson v. Duncan, supra; Schreiber v. Pennzoil Corp., Del.Ch., 419 A.2d 952 (1980). In reality, "germane" means material facts.
在上文提到的 Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 一案中，本法院认为，公司董事对其股东负有信托义务，必须在完全坦诚的氛围中披露与争议交易密切相关的所有事实。我们在要约收购上下文中将“密切相关”定义为所有“信息，例如合理的股东在决定是否出售或保留股票时会认为重要的信息”。同上，第 281 页。Accord Weinberger v. UOP， Inc.，同上;迈克尔逊诉 Duncan，同上;Schreiber 诉 Pennzoil Corp.，特拉华州，419 A.2d 952 （1980）。实际上，“germane”是指重要事实。

Applying this standard to the record before us, we find that Trans Union's stockholders were not fully informed of all facts material to their vote on the Pritzker Merger and that the Trial Court's ruling to the contrary is clearly erroneous. We list the material deficiencies in the proxy materials:
将这一标准应用于我们面前的记录，我们发现 Trans Union 的股东没有完全了解对他们对 Pritzker 合并进行投票至关重要的所有事实，并且初审法院的相反裁决显然是错误的。我们列出了代理材料中的重大缺陷：

(1) The fact that the Board had no reasonably adequate information indicative of the intrinsic value of the Company, other than a concededly depressed market price, was without question material to the shareholders voting on the merger. See Weinberger, supra at 709 (insiders' report that cash-out merger price up to $24 was good investment held material); Michelson, supra at 224 (alleged terms and intent of stock option plan held not germane); Schreiber, supra at 959 (management fee of $650,000 held germane).
（1） 董事会除了明显压低的市场价格外，没有合理足够的信息表明公司的内在价值，这一事实无疑对对合并进行投票的股东具有重要意义。参见 Weinberger，同上，第 709 页（内部人士报告称，高达 24 美元的套现合并价格是很好的投资持有材料）;Michelson，同上，第 224 页（股票期权计划的指称条款和意图与此无关）;Schreiber，同上，第 959 页（管理费为 650,000 美元，持有密切相关）。

Accordingly, the Board's lack of valuation information should have been disclosed. Instead, the directors cloaked the absence of such information in both the Proxy Statement and the Supplemental *891 Proxy Statement. Through artful drafting, noticeably absent at the September 20 meeting, both documents create the impression that the Board knew the intrinsic worth of the Company. In particular, the Original Proxy Statement contained the following:
因此，董事会缺乏估值信息的情况应该被披露。相反，董事们在委托书和补充 *891 委托书中掩盖了此类信息的缺失。通过巧妙的起草，这两份文件在 9 月 20 日的会议上明显缺席，给人的印象是董事会了解公司的内在价值。特别是，原始委托书包含以下内容：

[a]lthough the Board of Directors regards the intrinsic value of the Company's assets to be significantly greater than their book value ..., systematic liquidation of such a large and complex entity as Trans Union is simply not regarded as a feasible method of realizing its inherent value. Therefore, a business combination such as the merger would seem to be the only practicable way in which the stockholders could realize the value of the Company.
尽管董事会认为公司资产的内在价值明显高于其账面价值......，但对 Trans Union 这样大型复杂实体的系统性清算根本不被视为实现其内在价值的可行方法。因此，像合并这样的企业合并似乎是股东实现公司价值的唯一可行方式。

The Proxy stated further that "[i]n the view of the Board of Directors ..., the prices at which the Company's common stock has traded in recent years have not reflected the inherent value of the Company." What the Board failed to disclose to its stockholders was that the Board had not made any study of the intrinsic or inherent worth of the Company; nor had the Board even discussed the inherent value of the Company prior to approving the merger on September 20, or at either of the subsequent meetings on October 8 or January 26. Neither in its Original Proxy Statement nor in its Supplemental Proxy did the Board disclose that it had no information before it, beyond the premium-over-market and the price/earnings ratio, on which to determine the fair value of the Company as a whole.
代理人进一步指出，“在董事会看来......，公司普通股近年来的交易价格并未反映公司的内在价值。董事会未能向其股东披露的是，董事会没有对公司的内在或内在价值进行任何研究;在 9 月 20 日批准合并之前，或者随后在 10 月 8 日或 1 月 26 日的会议上，董事会甚至没有讨论过公司的内在价值。董事会在其原始委托书和补充委托书中均未披露，除了高于市场的溢价和市盈率之外，它没有其他信息来确定公司的整体公允价值。

(2) We find false and misleading the Board's characterization of the Romans report in the Supplemental Proxy Statement. The Supplemental Proxy stated:
（2） 我们认为董事会在补充委托书中对 Romans 报告的描述是虚假和误导性的。补充代理声明：

At the September 20, 1980 meeting of the Board of Directors of Trans Union, Mr. Romans indicated that while he could not say that $55,00 per share was an unfair price, he had prepared a preliminary report which reflected that the value of the Company was in the range of $55.00 to $65.00 per share.
在 1980 年 9 月 20 日的 Trans Union 董事会会议上，Romans 先生表示，虽然他不能说每股 55,00 美元是一个不公平的价格，但他已经准备了一份初步报告，该报告反映公司的价值在每股 55.00 美元到 65.00 美元之间。

Nowhere does the Board disclose that Romans stated to the Board that his calculations were made in a "search for ways to justify a price in connection with" a leveraged buy-out transaction, "rather than to say what the shares are worth," and that he stated to the Board that his conclusion thus arrived at "was not the same thing as saying that I have a valuation of the Company at X dollars." Such information would have been material to a reasonable shareholder because it tended to invalidate the fairness of the merger price of $55. Furthermore, defendants again failed to disclose the absence of valuation information, but still made repeated reference to the "substantial premium."
董事会没有披露 Romans 向董事会表示，他的计算是为了“寻找证明与杠杆收购交易相关的价格合理的方法”，“而不是说股票的价值”，并且他向董事会表示，他得出的结论“与说我对公司的估值为 X 美元不是一回事”。这些信息对理性的股东来说很重要，因为它往往会使 55 美元的合并价格的公平性无效。此外，被告再次未能披露估值信息的缺失，但仍反复提及“巨额溢价”。

(3) We find misleading the Board's references to the "substantial" premium offered. The Board gave as their primary reason in support of the merger the "substantial premium" shareholders would receive. But the Board did not disclose its failure to assess the premium offered in terms of other relevant valuation techniques, thereby rendering questionable its determination as to the substantiality of the premium over an admittedly depressed stock market price.
（3） 我们认为董事会对提供的“重大”溢价的引用具有误导性。董事会将股东将获得的“巨额溢价”作为支持合并的主要理由。但董事会没有披露其未能根据其他相关估值技术评估所提供的溢价，因此使其对溢价相对于公认低迷的股票市场价格的实质性的决定产生疑问。

(4) We find the Board's recital in the Supplemental Proxy of certain events preceding the September 20 meeting to be incomplete and misleading. It is beyond dispute that a reasonable stockholder would have considered material the fact that Van Gorkom not only suggested the $55 price to Pritzker, but also that he chose the figure because it made feasible a leveraged buy-out. The directors disclosed that Van Gorkom suggested the $55 price to Pritzker. But the Board misled the shareholders when they described the basis of Van Gorkom's suggestion as follows:
（4） 我们发现董事会在补充委托书中对 9 月 20 日会议之前某些事件的叙述不完整且具有误导性。毫无疑问，一个理性的股东会认为 Van Gorkom 不仅向 Pritzker 建议了 55 美元的价格，而且他选择这个数字是因为这使得杠杆收购成为可能。董事们透露，Van Gorkom 向 Pritzker 建议了 55 美元的价格。但是，当股东将 Van Gorkom 的建议的依据描述如下时，董事会误导了股东：

Such suggestion was based, at least in part, on Mr. Van Gorkom's belief that loans could be obtained from institutional lenders (together with about a $200 million *892 equity contribution) which would justify the payment of such price, ...
这种建议至少部分是基于 Van Gorkom 先生的信念，即可以从机构贷款人那里获得贷款（连同大约 2 亿美元 *892 的股权出资），这将证明支付这样的价格是合理的，......

Although by January 26, the directors knew the basis of the $55 figure, they did not disclose that Van Gorkom chose the $55 price because that figure would enable Pritzker to both finance the purchase of Trans Union through a leveraged buy-out and, within five years, substantially repay the loan out of the cash flow generated by the Company's operations.
尽管到 1 月 26 日，董事们已经知道 55 美元数字的基础，但他们没有透露 Van Gorkom 选择了 55 美元的价格，因为该数字将使 Pritzker 能够通过杠杆收购为收购 Trans Union 提供资金，并在五年内从公司运营产生的现金流中大幅偿还贷款。

(5) The Board's Supplemental Proxy Statement, mailed on or after January 27, added significant new matter, material to the proposal to be voted on February 10, which was not contained in the Original Proxy Statement. Some of this new matter was information which had only been disclosed to the Board on January 26; much was information known or reasonably available before January 21 but not revealed in the Original Proxy Statement. Yet, the stockholders were not informed of these facts. Included in the "new" matter first disclosed in the Supplemental Proxy Statement were the following:
（5） 董事会在 1 月 27 日当天或之后邮寄的补充委托书增加了重要的新事项，这些事项对将于 2 月 10 日进行投票的提案具有重要意义，但未包含在原始委托书中。其中一些新事件是仅在 1 月 26 日才向董事会披露的信息;许多信息是在 1 月 21 日之前已知或合理可用的，但未在原始委托书中披露。然而，股东们并没有被告知这些事实。在补充委托书中首次披露的“新”事项包括以下内容：

(a) The fact that prior to September 20, 1980, no Board member or member of Senior Management, except Chelberg and Peterson, knew that Van Gorkom had discussed a possible merger with Pritzker;
（a） 在 1980 年 9 月 20 日之前，除 Chelberg 和 Peterson 外，没有任何董事会成员或高级管理层成员知道 Van Gorkom 曾与普利兹克讨论过可能的合并;

(b) The fact that the sale price of $55 per share had been suggested initially to Pritzker by Van Gorkom;
（b） Van Gorkom 最初向 Pritzker 建议每股 55 美元的出售价格;

(c) The fact that the Board had not sought an independent fairness opinion;
（c） 董事会未寻求独立的公平意见的事实;

(d) The fact that Romans and several members of Senior Management had indicated concern at the September 20 Senior Management meeting that the $55 per share price was inadequate and had stated that a higher price should and could be obtained; and
（d） Romans 和几名高级管理层成员在 9 月 20 日的高级管理层会议上表示担忧，认为每股 55 美元的价格不足，并表示应该而且可以获得更高的价格;和

(e) The fact that Romans had advised the Board at its meeting on September 20 that he and his department had prepared a study which indicated that the Company had a value in the range of $55 to $65 per share, and that he could not advise the Board that the $55 per share offer which Pritzker made was unfair.
（e） Romans 在 9 月 20 日的董事会会议上告知董事会，他和他的部门准备了一份研究，该研究表明该公司的价值在每股 55 美元至 65 美元之间，他不能告知董事会普利兹克提出的每股 55 美元的要约是不公平的。

* * *

The parties differ over whether the notice requirements of 8 Del.C. § 251(c) apply to the mailing date of supplemental proxy material or that of the original proxy material.[33] The Trial Court summarily disposed of the notice issue, stating it was "satisfied that the proxy material furnished to Trans Union stockholders ... fairly presented the question to be voted on at the February 10, 1981 meeting."
双方对 8 Del.C.§ 251（c） 适用于补充代理材料或原始代理材料的邮寄日期。[33]初审法院即决地处理了通知问题，称其“确信向 Trans Union 股东提供的代理材料......公平地提出了将在 1981 年 2 月 10 日的会议上投票的问题。

The defendants argue that the notice provisions of § 251(c) must be construed as requiring only that stockholders receive notice of the time, place, and purpose of a meeting to consider a merger at least 20 days prior to such meeting; and since the Original Proxy Statement was disseminated more than 20 days before the meeting, the defendants urge affirmance of the Trial Court's ruling as correct as a matter of statutory construction. Apparently, the question has not been addressed by either the Court of Chancery or this Court; and authority in other jurisdictions is limited. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 2d Cir., 409 F.2d 937, 944 (1969) (holding that a tender offeror's September 16, 1968 correction of a previous misstatement, combined with an offer of withdrawal running for eight days until September 24, 1968, was sufficient to cure past violations and eliminate any need for rescission); Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., D.R.I., 341 F. Supp. 508, 513-14 (1972), aff'd, 1st Cir., 482 F.2d 421 (1973) *893 (permitting correction of a material misstatement by a mailing to stockholders within seven days of a tender offer withdrawal date). Both Electronic and Nicholson are federal security cases not arising under 8 Del.C. § 251(c) and they are otherwise distinguishable from this case on their facts.
被告辩称，§ 251（c） 的通知条款必须解释为仅要求股东在会议召开前至少 20 天收到会议的时间、地点和目的的通知，以考虑合并;由于原始委托书是在会议前 20 多天分发的，因此被告敦促确认初审法院的裁决作为法定解释是正确的。显然，衡平法院或本法院都没有解决这个问题;而其他司法管辖区的权力是有限的。参见 Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp.， 2d Cir.， 409 F.2d 937， 944 （1969）（裁定要约收购人于 1968 年 9 月 16 日对先前的错报进行了更正，并提出了为期八天的撤销要约，直到 1968 年 9 月 24 日，足以纠正过去的违规行为并消除任何撤销合同的需要）;Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co.， D.R.I.， 341 F. Supp. 508， 513-14 （1972）， aff'd， 1st Cir.， 482 F.2d 421 （1973） *893 （允许在要约收购撤销日期后 7 天内通过邮寄给股东来更正重大错报）。Electronic 和 Nicholson 都是不属于 8 Del.C. 规定的联邦安全案件。§ 251（c） 中，它们在事实上与本案是不同的。

Since we have concluded that Management's Supplemental Proxy Statement does not meet the Delaware disclosure standard of "complete candor" under Lynch v. Vickers, supra, it is unnecessary for us to address the plaintiffs' legal argument as to the proper construction of § 251(c). However, we do find it advisable to express the view that, in an appropriate case, an otherwise candid proxy statement may be so untimely as to defeat its purpose of meeting the needs of a fully informed electorate.
由于我们得出结论，管理层的补充委托书不符合 Lynch v.Vickers，同上，我们没有必要讨论原告关于第 251（c） 条的正确解释的法律论点。然而，我们确实认为，在适当的情况下，原本坦率的委托书可能非常不合时宜，以致无法满足充分知情的选民的需要。

In this case, the Board's ultimate disclosure as contained in the Supplemental Proxy Statement related either to information readily accessible to all of the directors if they had asked the right questions, or was information already at their disposal. In short, the information disclosed by the Supplemental Proxy Statement was information which the defendant directors knew or should have known at the time the first Proxy Statement was issued. The defendants simply failed in their original duty of knowing, sharing, and disclosing information that was material and reasonably available for their discovery. They compounded that failure by their continued lack of candor in the Supplemental Proxy Statement. While we need not decide the issue here, we are satisfied that, in an appropriate case, a completely candid but belated disclosure of information long known or readily available to a board could raise serious issues of inequitable conduct. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., Del.Supr., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (1971).
在这种情况下，董事会在补充委托书中包含的最终披露要么涉及所有董事在提出正确问题的情况下都可以轻松获得的信息，要么与已经可供他们使用的信息有关。简而言之，补充委托书披露的信息是被告董事在发布第一份委托书时知道或应该知道的信息。被告根本没有履行他们最初的职责，即了解、分享和披露重要信息，这些信息是重要的，并且是合理可获得的，可供他们发现。他们在补充委托书中持续缺乏坦诚，使这种失败雪上加霜。虽然我们不需要在这里决定这个问题，但我们确信，在适当的情况下，完全坦率但迟到的披露董事会早已知道或随时可用的信息可能会引发严重的不公平行为问题。Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries， Inc.， Del.Supr.， 285 A.2d 437， 439 （1971）。

The burden must fall on defendants who claim ratification based on shareholder vote to establish that the shareholder approval resulted from a fully informed electorate. On the record before us, it is clear that the Board failed to meet that burden. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra at 703; Michelson v. Duncan, supra.
责任必须落在要求根据股东投票批准的情况下证明股东批准是充分知情的选民的结果。根据我们面前的记录，很明显，董事会未能履行这一责任。Weinberger v. UOP， Inc.，同上，第 703 页;Michelson v. Duncan，同上。

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the director defendants breached their fiduciary duty of candor by their failure to make true and correct disclosures of all information they had, or should have had, material to the transaction submitted for stockholder approval.
基于上述原因，我们得出结论，董事被告违反了其坦率的信托义务，因为他们未能真实和正确地披露他们已经或应该拥有的所有与交易相关的信息，以供股东批准。

VI.
六。

To summarize: we hold that the directors of Trans Union breached their fiduciary duty to their stockholders (1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer.
总结一下：我们认为 Trans Union 的董事违反了他们对股东的信托义务：（1） 他们未能了解他们合理获得的所有信息，这些信息与他们建议 Pritzker 合并的决定有关;以及 （2） 他们未能披露所有重要信息，例如理性的股东在决定是否批准 Pritzker 要约时认为重要的信息。

We hold, therefore, that the Trial Court committed reversible error in applying the business judgment rule in favor of the director defendants in this case.
因此，我们认为，初审法院在本案中适用有利于董事被告的商业判断规则时犯了可逆转的错误。

On remand, the Court of Chancery shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the fair value of the shares represented by the plaintiffs' class, based on the intrinsic value of Trans Union on September 20, 1980. Such valuation shall be made in accordance with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra at 712-715. Thereafter, an award of damages may be entered to the extent that the fair value of Trans Union exceeds $55 per share.
在发回重审时，衡平法院应举行证据听证会，以根据 Trans Union 在 1980 年 9 月 20 日的内在价值确定原告集体所代表的股票的公允价值。此类估值应根据 Weinberger v. UOP， Inc.，同上，第 712-715 页进行。此后，如果 Trans Union 的公允价值超过每股 55 美元，则可以支付损害赔偿金。

* * *

REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent herewith.
撤销并发回重审，以进行与本协议一致的诉讼。

McNEILLY, Justice, dissenting:
麦克尼利，大法官，持不同意见：

The majority opinion reads like an advocate's closing address to a hostile jury. And I say that not lightly. Throughout the *894 opinion great emphasis is directed only to the negative, with nothing more than lip service granted the positive aspects of this case. In my opinion Chancellor Marvel (retired) should have been affirmed. The Chancellor's opinion was the product of well reasoned conclusions, based upon a sound deductive process, clearly supported by the evidence and entitled to deference in this appeal. Because of my diametrical opposition to all evidentiary conclusions of the majority, I respectfully dissent.
多数意见读起来就像一个倡导者对敌对陪审团的结案陈词。我这么说不是轻率的。在整个 *894 意见中，高度强调的只是消极的方面，而对本案的积极方面只不过是口头上的赞同。在我看来，惊奇校长（已退休）应该得到肯定。大法官的意见是经过充分论证的结论的产物，基于合理的演绎过程，有证据明确支持，并有权在本上诉中得到尊重。由于我对大多数人的所有证据结论都截然反对，因此我尊重地反对。

It would serve no useful purpose, particularly at this late date, for me to dissent at great length. I restrain myself from doing so, but feel compelled to at least point out what I consider to be the most glaring deficiencies in the majority opinion. The majority has spoken and has effectively said that Trans Union's Directors have been the victims of a "fast shuffle" by Van Gorkom and Pritzker. That is the beginning of the majority's comedy of errors. The first and most important error made is the majority's assessment of the directors' knowledge of the affairs of Trans Union and their combined ability to act in this situation under the protection of the business judgment rule.
对我来说，长篇大论是没有用的，尤其是在这么晚的时候。我克制自己不这样做，但觉得有必要至少指出我认为大多数人意见中最明显的缺陷。大多数人已经发言并有效地表示，Trans Union 的董事们是 Van Gorkom 和 Pritzker “快速洗牌”的受害者。这就是大多数人错误喜剧的开始。犯的第一个也是最重要的错误是，多数法官对董事对 Trans Union 事务的了解以及他们在商业判断规则的保护下在这种情况下采取行动的综合能力的评估。

Trans Union's Board of Directors consisted of ten men, five of whom were "inside" directors and five of whom were "outside" directors. The "inside" directors were Van Gorkom, Chelberg, Bonser, William B. Browder, Senior Vice-President-Law, and Thomas P. O'Boyle, Senior Vice-President-Administration. At the time the merger was proposed the inside five directors had collectively been employed by the Company for 116 years and had 68 years of combined experience as directors. The "outside" directors were A.W. Wallis, William B. Johnson, Joseph B. Lanterman, Graham J. Morgan and Robert W. Reneker. With the exception of Wallis, these were all chief executive officers of Chicago based corporations that were at least as large as Trans Union. The five "outside" directors had 78 years of combined experience as chief executive officers, and 53 years cumulative service as Trans Union directors.
Trans Union 的董事会由 10 人组成，其中 5 人是“内部”董事，5 人是“外部”董事。“内部”董事是 Van Gorkom、Chelberg、Bonser、法律高级副总裁 William B. Browder 和行政高级副总裁 Thomas P. O'Boyle。在提议合并时，内部五名董事已在公司总共工作了 116 年，并拥有 68 年的董事总经验。“外部”董事是 A.W. Wallis、William B. Johnson、Joseph B. Lanterman、Graham J. Morgan 和 Robert W. Reneker。除了 Wallis 之外，这些人都是芝加哥公司的首席执行官，这些公司的规模至少与 Trans Union 一样大。这五名“外部”董事拥有 78 年的首席执行官总经验，以及 53 年的 Trans Union 董事累积服务经验。

The inside directors wear their badge of expertise in the corporate affairs of Trans Union on their sleeves. But what about the outsiders? Dr. Wallis is or was an economist and math statistician, a professor of economics at Yale University, dean of the graduate school of business at the University of Chicago, and Chancellor of the University of Rochester. Dr. Wallis had been on the Board of Trans Union since 1962. He also was on the Board of Bausch & Lomb, Kodak, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Standard Oil and others.
内部董事们的袖子上挂着他们在 Trans Union 公司事务方面的专业知识徽章。但是外人呢？Wallis 博士现在或曾经是经济学家和数学统计学家、耶鲁大学经济学教授、芝加哥大学商学院院长和罗切斯特大学校长。Wallis 博士自 1962 年以来一直是 Trans Union 的董事会成员。他还曾在 Bausch & Lomb、Kodak、Metropolitan Life Insurance Company、Standard Oil 等公司的董事会任职。

William B. Johnson is a University of Pennsylvania law graduate, President of Railway Express until 1966, Chairman and Chief Executive of I.C. Industries Holding Company, and member of Trans Union's Board since 1968.
William B. Johnson 毕业于宾夕法尼亚大学法学院，在 1966 年之前一直担任 Railway Express 总裁，自 1968 年起担任 I.C. Industries Holding Company 的董事长兼首席执行官，并自 1968 年起担任 Trans Union 董事会成员。

Joseph Lanterman, a Certified Public Accountant, is or was President and Chief Executive of American Steel, on the Board of International Harvester, Peoples Energy, Illinois Bell Telephone, Harris Bank and Trust Company, Kemper Insurance Company and a director of Trans Union for four years.
Joseph Lanterman 是一名注册会计师，现在是或曾经是 American Steel 的总裁兼首席执行官，是 International Harvester、Peoples Energy、Illinois Bell Telephone、Harris Bank and Trust Company、Kemper Insurance Company 的董事会成员，并担任了四年的 Trans Union 董事。

Graham Morgan is achemist, was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of U.S. Gypsum, and in the 17 and 18 years prior to the Trans Union transaction had been involved in 31 or 32 corporate takeovers.
Graham Morgan 是一位化学家，曾任 U.S. Gypsum 的董事长兼首席执行官，在 Trans Union 交易之前的 17 年和 18 年里，他参与了 31 或 32 起公司收购。

Robert Reneker attended University of Chicago and Harvard Business Schools. He was President and Chief Executive of Swift and Company, director of Trans Union since 1971, and member of the Boards of seven other corporations including U.S. Gypsum and the Chicago Tribune.
罗伯特·雷内克 （Robert Reneker） 曾就读于芝加哥大学和哈佛商学院。他曾担任 Swift and Company 的总裁兼首席执行官，自 1971 年起担任 Trans Union 的董事，以及包括 U.S. Gypsum 和 Chicago Tribune 在内的其他七家公司的董事会成员。

Directors of this caliber are not ordinarily taken in by a "fast shuffle". I submit they were not taken into this multi-million dollar corporate transaction without being fully informed and aware of the state of the art as it pertained to the entire corporate panoroma of Trans Union. True, even *895 directors such as these, with their business acumen, interest and expertise, can go astray. I do not believe that to be the case here. These men knew Trans Union like the back of their hands and were more than well qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the affairs of Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation. Lest we forget, the corporate world of then and now operates on what is so aptly referred to as "the fast track". These men were at the time an integral part of that world, all professional business men, not intellectual figureheads.
这种水平的董事通常不会被 “快速洗牌” 所吸引。我认为，他们在没有充分了解和了解与 Trans Union 的整个公司全景相关的最新技术的情况下，并没有被卷入这项价值数百万美元的公司交易。诚然，即使是像这样的 *895 董事，凭借他们的商业头脑、兴趣和专业知识，也可能误入歧途。我不认为这里的情况是这样的。这些人对 Trans Union 了如指掌，并且非常有资格当场就 Trans Union 的事务做出明智的商业判断，包括公司 100% 的出售。我们不要忘记，当时和现在的企业界都在恰当地称为“快速通道”的轨道上运作。这些人在当时是那个世界不可或缺的一部分，都是专业的商人，而不是知识分子的傀儡。

The majority of this Court holds that the Board's decision, reached on September 20, 1980, to approve the merger was not the product of an informed business judgment, that the Board's subsequent efforts to amend the Merger Agreement and take other curative action were legally and factually ineffectual, and that the Board did not deal with complete candor with the stockholders by failing to disclose all material facts, which they knew or should have known, before securing the stockholders' approval of the merger. I disagree.
本法院的多数法官认为，董事会于 1980 年 9 月 20 日做出的批准合并的决定并非明智的商业判断的产物，董事会随后修改合并协议并采取其他补救措施的努力在法律和事实上都是无效的，并且董事会没有因未能披露所有重要事实而与股东完全坦诚相待。 在获得股东批准合并之前，他们知道或应该知道。我不同意。

At the time of the September 20, 1980 meeting the Board was acutely aware of Trans Union and its prospects. The problems created by accumulated investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation were discussed repeatedly at Board meetings, and all of the directors understood the problem thoroughly. Moreover, at the July, 1980 Board meeting the directors had reviewed Trans Union's newly prepared five-year forecast, and at the August, 1980 meeting Van Gorkom presented the results of a comprehensive study of Trans Union made by The Boston Consulting Group. This study was prepared over an 18 month period and consisted of a detailed analysis of all Trans Union subsidiaries, including competitiveness, profitability, cash throw-off, cash consumption, technical competence and future prospects for contribution to Trans Union's combined net income.
在 1980 年 9 月 20 日召开会议时，董事会对 Trans Union 及其前景有着敏锐的了解。在董事会上，我们反复讨论了由累积的投资税抵免和加速折旧所带来的问题，所有董事都彻底理解了问题。此外，在 1980 年 7 月的董事会会议上，董事们审查了 Trans Union 新编制的五年预测，在 1980 年 8 月的会议上，Van Gorkom 介绍了波士顿咨询集团对 Trans Union 进行的全面研究的结果。这项研究的准备时间长达 18 个月，包括对所有 Trans Union 子公司的详细分析，包括竞争力、盈利能力、现金支出、现金消耗、技术能力以及对 Trans Union 综合净收入贡献的未来前景。

At the September 20 meeting Van Gorkom reviewed all aspects of the proposed transaction and repeated the explanation of the Pritzker offer he had earlier given to senior management. Having heard Van Gorkom's explanation of the Pritzker's offer, and Brennan's explanation of the merger documents the directors discussed the matter. Out of this discussion arose an insistence on the part of the directors that two modifications to the offer be made. First, they required that any potential competing bidder be given access to the same information concerning Trans Union that had been provided to the Pritzkers. Second, the merger documents were to be modified to reflect the fact that the directors could accept a better offer and would not be required to recommend the Pritzker offer if a better offer was made. The following language was inserted into the agreement:
在 9 月 20 日的会议上，Van Gorkom 审查了拟议交易的所有方面，并重复了他早些时候向高级管理层提出的普利兹克报价的解释。在听取了 Van Gorkom 对 Pritzker 要约的解释以及 Brennan 对合并文件的解释后，董事们讨论了此事。在这次讨论中，董事们坚持要约进行两项修改。首先，他们要求任何潜在的竞争者都可以访问提供给普利兹克夫妇的有关 Trans Union 的相同信息。其次，对合并文件进行修改，以反映董事可以接受更好的要约，并且如果有更好的要约，则无需推荐普利兹克的要约。协议中插入了以下语言：

"Within 30 days after the execution of this Agreement, TU shall call a meeting of its stockholders (the `Stockholder's Meeting') for the purpose of approving and adopting the Merger Agreement. The Board of Directors shall recommend to the stockholders of TU that they approve and adopt the Merger Agreement (the `Stockholders' Approval') and shall use its best efforts to obtain the requisite vote therefor; provided, however, that GL and NTC acknowledge that the Board of Directors of TU may have a competing fiduciary obligation to the Stockholders under certain circumstances." (Emphasis added)
“在本协议签署后 30 天内，TU 应召开股东大会（'股东大会'），以批准和通过合并协议。董事会应建议 TU 的股东批准并通过合并协议（“股东批准”），并应尽最大努力获得必要的投票权;但是，前提是 GL 和 NTC 承认 TU 董事会在某些情况下可能对股东负有竞争性的信托义务。“（强调后加）

While the language is not artfully drawn, the evidence is clear that the intention underlying that language was to make specific the right that the directors assumed they had, that is, to accept any offer that they thought was better, and not to recommend the Pritzker offer in the face of a better one. At the conclusion of the meeting, the proposed merger was approved.
虽然该措辞并非巧妙地拟定，但证据清楚表明，该措辞背后的意图是具体化董事们认为他们拥有的权利，即接受他们认为更好的任何报价，而不是在面对更好的报价时推荐普利兹克的报价。会议结束时，拟议的合并获得批准。

At a subsequent meeting on October 8, 1981 the directors, with the consent of the Pritzkers, amended the Merger Agreement so as to establish the right of Trans Union to solicit as well as to receive higher bids, *896 although the Pritzkers insisted that their merger proposal be presented to the stockholders at the same time that the proposal of any third party was presented. A second amendment, which became effective on October 10, 1981, further provided that Trans Union might unilaterally terminate the proposed merger with the Pritzker company in the event that prior to February 10, 1981 there existed a definitive agreement with a third party for a merger, consolidation, sale of assets, or purchase or exchange of Trans Union stock which was more favorable for the stockholders of Trans Union than the Pritzker offer and which was conditioned upon receipt of stockholder approval and the absence of an injunction against its consummation.
在随后的 1981 年 10 月 8 日会议上，经普利兹克夫妇同意，董事们修改了合并协议，以确立 Trans Union 征求和接受更高出价的权利，*896 尽管普利兹克夫妇坚持在提交任何第三方提案的同时向股东提交他们的合并提案。第二项修正案于 1981 年 10 月 10 日生效，进一步规定，如果在 1981 年 2 月 10 日之前与第三方达成了对 Trans Union 股东更有利的合并、合并、资产出售或购买或交换的最终协议，Trans Union 可以单方面终止与 Pritzker 公司的拟议合并，该协议对 Trans Union 的股东更有利，并且条件是获得股东批准并且没有针对其完成的禁令。

Following the October 8 board meeting of Trans Union, the investment banking firm of Salomon Brothers was retained by the corporation to search for better offers than that of the Pritzkers, Salomon Brothers being charged with the responsibility of doing "whatever possible to see if there is a superior bid in the marketplace over a bid that is on the table for Trans Union". In undertaking such project, it was agreed that Salomon Brothers would be paid the amount of $500,000 to cover its expenses as well as a fee equal to 3/8ths of 1% of the aggregate fair market value of the consideration to be received by the company in the case of a merger or the like, which meant that in the event Salomon Brothers should find a buyer willing to pay a price of $56.00 a share instead of $55.00, such firm would receive a fee of roughly $2,650,000 plus disbursements.
在 10 月 8 日的 Trans Union 董事会会议之后，该公司聘请了所罗门兄弟的投资银行公司，以寻找比普利兹克夫妇更好的报价，所罗门兄弟负责“尽一切可能查看市场上是否有优于 Trans Union 的报价”。在进行此类项目时，双方同意向所罗门兄弟支付 500,000 美元以支付其费用，以及相当于公司在合并或类似情况下收到的对价总公平市场价值 1% 的 3/8 的费用，这意味着如果所罗门兄弟找到愿意支付 56.00 美元价格的买家 share 而不是 55.00 美元，而此类公司将收到大约 2,650,000 美元的费用加上支出。

As the first step in proceeding to carry out its commitment, Salomon Brothers had a brochure prepared, which set forth Trans Union's financial history, described the company's business in detail and set forth Trans Union's operating and financial projections. Salomon Brothers also prepared a list of over 150 companies which it believed might be suitable merger partners, and while four of such companies, namely, General Electric, Borg-Warner, Bendix, and Genstar, Ltd. showed some interest in such a merger, none made a firm proposal to Trans Union and only General Electric showed a sustained interest.[1] As matters transpired, no firm offer which bettered the Pritzker offer of $55 per share was ever made.
作为履行承诺的第一步，Salomon Brothers 准备了一份小册子，其中介绍了 Trans Union 的财务历史，详细描述了公司的业务，并列出了 Trans Union 的运营和财务预测。所罗门兄弟还准备了一份清单，列出了 150 多家公司，它认为这些公司可能是合适的合并伙伴，虽然其中四家公司，即通用电气、博格华纳、本迪克斯和 Genstar， Ltd. 对此类合并表现出一些兴趣，但没有一家向 Trans Union 提出坚定的提议，只有通用电气表现出持续的兴趣。[1]随着事情的发展，从未提出过超过普利兹克每股 55 美元的报价的明确报价。

On January 21, 1981 a proxy statement was sent to the shareholders of Trans Union advising them of a February 10, 1981 meeting in which the merger would be voted. On January 26, 1981 the directors held their regular meeting. At this meeting the Board discussed the instant merger as well as all events, including this litigation, surrounding it. At the conclusion of the meeting the Board unanimously voted to recommend to the stockholders that they approve the merger. Additionally, the directors reviewed and approved a Supplemental Proxy Statement which, among other things, advised the stockholders of what had occurred at the instant meeting and of the fact that General Electric had decided not to make an offer. On February 10, 1981 *897 the stockholders of Trans Union met pursuant to notice and voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Pritzker merger, 89% of the votes cast being in favor of it.
1981 年 1 月 21 日，向 Trans Union 的股东发送了一份委托书，通知他们将于 1981 年 2 月 10 日召开会议，对合并进行投票。1981 年 1 月 26 日，董事们召开了例会。在这次会议上，董事会讨论了即时合并以及围绕它的所有事件，包括这场诉讼。在会议结束时，董事会一致投票建议股东批准合并。此外，董事们审查并批准了一份补充委托书，该声明除其他事项外，还告知了股东即时会议上发生的事情以及通用电气决定不提出要约的事实。1981 年 2 月 10 日*897 Trans Union 的股东根据通知召开会议，以压倒性多数投票赞成普利兹克合并，89% 的选票赞成。

I have no quarrel with the majority's analysis of the business judgment rule. It is the application of that rule to these facts which is wrong. An overview of the entire record, rather than the limited view of bits and pieces which the majority has exploded like popcorn, convinces me that the directors made an informed business judgment which was buttressed by their test of the market.
我对大多数人对商业判断规则的分析没有异议。将该规则应用于这些事实是错误的。对整个记录的概述，而不是大多数人像爆米花一样爆炸的零碎事物的有限视图，让我相信董事们做出了明智的商业判断，而他们对市场的测试也为之提供了支撑。

At the time of the September 20 meeting the 10 members of Trans Union's Board of Directors were highly qualified and well informed about the affairs and prospects of Trans Union. These directors were acutely aware of the historical problems facing Trans Union which were caused by the tax laws. They had discussed these problems ad nauseam. In fact, within two months of the September 20 meeting the board had reviewed and discussed an outside study of the company done by The Boston Consulting Group and an internal five year forecast prepared by management. At the September 20 meeting Van Gorkom presented the Pritzker offer, and the board then heard from James Brennan, the company's counsel in this matter, who discussed the legal documents. Following this, the Board directed that certain changes be made in the merger documents. These changes made it clear that the Board was free to accept a better offer than Pritzker's if one was made. The above facts reveal that the Board did not act in a grossly negligent manner in informing themselves of the relevant and available facts before passing on the merger. To the contrary, this record reveals that the directors acted with the utmost care in informing themselves of the relevant and available facts before passing on the merger.
在 9 月 20 日的会议时，Trans Union 董事会的 10 名成员素质很高，对 Trans Union 的事务和前景了如指掌。这些董事敏锐地意识到 Trans Union 面临的由税法引起的历史问题。他们把这些问题讨论得令人作呕。事实上，在 9 月 20 日会议后的两个月内，董事会已经审查并讨论了波士顿咨询集团对公司进行的外部研究，以及管理层准备的内部五年预测。在 9 月 20 日的会议上，Van Gorkom 提出了 Pritzker 的要约，董事会随后听取了公司在此事上的法律顾问 James Brennan 的发言，他讨论了法律文件。在此之后，董事会指示对合并文件进行某些更改。这些变化清楚地表明，如果提出比普利兹克更好的报价，董事会可以自由接受。上述事实表明，董事会在批准合并之前未告知相关和可用事实，并未存在重大疏忽行为。相反，该记录显示，董事在批准合并之前，在告知自己相关和可用的事实时，采取了极其谨慎的行动。

The majority finds that Trans Union stockholders were not fully informed and that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of complete candor to the stockholders required by Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., Del.Supr. 383 A.2d 278 (1978) [Lynch I], in that the proxy materials were deficient in five areas.
多数法院认为，Trans Union 股东没有得到充分通知，董事违反了 Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.， Del.Supr. 383 A.2d 278 （1978） [Lynch I] 所要求的对股东完全坦诚的信托义务，因为代理材料在五个方面存在缺陷。

Here again is exploitation of the negative by the majority without giving credit to the positive. To respond to the conclusions of the majority would merely be unnecessary prolonged argument. But briefly what did the proxy materials disclose? The proxy material informed the shareholders that projections were furnished to potential purchasers and such projections indicated that Trans Union's net income might increase to approximately $153 million in 1985. That projection, what is almost three times the net income of $58,248,000 reported by Trans Union as its net income for December 31, 1979 confirmed the statement in the proxy materials that the "Board of Directors believes that, assuming reasonably favorable economic and financial conditions, the Company's prospects for future earnings growth are excellent." This material was certainly sufficient to place the Company's stockholders on notice that there was a reasonable basis to believe that the prospects for future earnings growth were excellent, and that the value of their stock was more than the stock market value of their shares reflected.
这里又是多数人对消极的利用，而没有给予积极的赞扬。回应多数人的结论只是不必要的冗长争论。但简单地说，代理材料披露了什么？代理材料通知股东，已向潜在购买者提供了预测，此类预测表明 Trans Union 的净收入可能会在 1985 年增加到约 1.53 亿美元。该预测几乎是 Trans Union 报告的 1979 年 12 月 31 日净收入 58,248,000 美元的净收入的三倍，证实了代理材料中的声明，即“董事会认为，假设经济和金融条件合理有利，公司未来盈利增长的前景非常好。这些材料当然足以让公司的股东注意到，有合理的依据相信未来盈利增长的前景非常好，并且他们的股票价值高于他们股票所反映的股票市场价值。

Overall, my review of the record leads me to conclude that the proxy materials adequately complied with Delaware law in informing the shareholders about the proposed transaction and the events surrounding it.
总的来说，我对记录的审查使我得出结论，代理材料在通知股东拟议交易及其相关事件方面充分遵守了特拉华州的法律。

The majority suggests that the Supplemental Proxy Statement did not comply with the notice requirement of 8 Del.C. § 251(c) that notice of the time, place and purpose of a meeting to consider a merger must be sent to each shareholder of record at least 20 days prior to the date of the meeting. In the instant case an original proxy statement was mailed on January 18, 1981 giving notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting. A Supplemental Proxy Statement was mailed January 26, 1981 in an effort to advise Trans Union's *898 shareholders as to what had occurred at the January 26, 1981 meeting, and that General Electric had decided not to make an offer. The shareholder meeting was held February 10, 1981 fifteen days after the Supplemental Proxy Statement had been sent.
多数意见认为，补充委托书不符合 8 Del.C. 的通知要求。§ 251（c） 关于召开会议考虑合并的时间、地点和目的的通知必须在会议日期前至少 20 天发送给每位登记在册的股东。在本案中，1981 年 1 月 18 日邮寄了一份原始委托书，通知了会议的时间、地点和目的。1981 年 1 月 26 日邮寄了一份补充委托书，以告知 Trans Union 的 *898 股东 1981 年 1 月 26 日会议上发生的事情，以及通用电气已决定不提出要约。股东大会于 1981 年 2 月 10 日召开，即补充委托书发送 15 天后。

All § 251(c) requires is that notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting be given at least 20 days prior to the meeting. This was accomplished by the proxy statement mailed January 19, 1981. Nothing in § 251(c) prevents the supplementation of proxy materials within 20 days of the meeting. Indeed when additional information, which a reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding how to vote, comes to light that information must be disclosed to stockholders in sufficient time for the stockholders to consider it. But nothing in § 251(c) requires this additional information to be disclosed at least 20 days prior to the meeting. To reach a contrary result would ignore the current practice and would discourage the supplementation of proxy materials in order to disclose the occurrence of intervening events. In my opinion, fifteen days in the instant case was a sufficient amount of time for the stockholders to receive and consider the information in the supplemental proxy statement.
§ 251（c） 要求的所有情况是，会议的时间、地点和目的至少在会议前 20 天发出通知。这是通过 1981 年 1 月 19 日邮寄的委托书完成的。§ 251（c） 中的任何内容均不阻止在会议后 20 天内补充代理材料。事实上，当发现额外的信息时，理性的股东会认为这些信息对决定如何投票很重要，并且必须在足够的时间内向股东披露，以便股东考虑。但 § 251（c） 中的任何内容均不要求在会议前至少 20 天披露这些额外信息。如果得出相反的结果，将无视目前的做法，并且会阻止补充代理材料以披露其间事件的发生。在我看来，在本案中，15 天的时间足以让股东接收和考虑补充委托书中的信息。

CHRISTIE, Justice, dissenting:
克里斯蒂，大法官，反对：

I respectfully dissent.
我谨此表示反对。

Considering the standard and scope of our review under Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972), I believe that the record taken as a whole supports a conclusion that the actions of the defendants are protected by the business judgment rule. Aronson v. Lewis, Del.Supr., 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984); Pogostin v. Rice, Del.Supr., 480 A.2d 619, 627 (1984). I also am satisfied that the record supports a conclusion that the defendants acted with the complete candor required by Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., Del.Supr., 383 A.2d 278 (1978). Under the circumstances I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery.
考虑到我们在 Levitt v. Bouvier， Del. Supr.， 287 A.2d 671， 673 （1972） 一案中审查的标准和范围，我认为整个记录支持被告的行为受到商业判断规则保护的结论。Aronson v. Lewis， Del.Supr.， 473 A.2d 805， 812 （1984）;Pogostin v. Rice， Del.Supr.， 480 A.2d 619， 627 （1984）。我还确信，该记录支持一个结论，即被告以 Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.， Del.Supr. ， 383 A.2d 278 （1978） 所要求的完全坦率行事。在这种情况下，我确认衡平法院的判决。

ON MOTIONS FOR REARGUMENT
关于重新辩论的动议

Following this Court's decision, Thomas P. O'Boyle, one of the director defendants, sought, and was granted, leave for change of counsel. Thereafter, the individual director defendants, other than O'Boyle, filed a motion for reargument and director O'Boyle, through newly-appearing counsel, then filed a separate motion for reargument. Plaintiffs have responded to the several motions and this matter has now been duly considered.
根据本法院的裁决，董事被告之一 Thomas P. O'Boyle 寻求更换律师的许可，并获得了批准。此后，除 O'Boyle 以外的个别董事被告提交了重新辩论的动议，董事 O'Boyle 通过新出庭的律师随后提交了单独的重新辩论动议。原告已经对几项动议做出了回应，此事现已得到适当考虑。

The Court, through its majority, finds no merit to either motion and concludes that both motions should be denied. We are not persuaded that any errors of law or fact have been made that merit reargument.
法院通过其多数意见认为这两项动议均无依据，并得出结论认为这两项动议均应予以驳回。我们不认为已经犯下了任何值得重新论证的法律或事实错误。

However, defendant O'Boyle's motion requires comment. Although O'Boyle continues to adopt his fellow directors' arguments, O'Boyle now asserts in the alternative that he has standing to take a position different from that of his fellow directors and that legal grounds exist for finding him not liable for the acts or omissions of his fellow directors. Specifically, O'Boyle makes a two-part argument: (1) that his undisputed absence due to illness from both the September 20 and the October 8 meetings of the directors of Trans Union entitles him to be relieved from personal liability for the failure of the other directors to exercise due care at those meetings, see Propp v. Sadacca, Del.Ch., 175 A.2d 33, 39 (1961), modified on other grounds, Bennett v. Propp, Del.Supr., 187 A.2d 405 (1962); and (2) that his attendance and participation in the January 26, 1981 Board meeting does not alter this result given this Court's precise findings of error committed at that meeting.
然而，被告 O'Boyle 的动议需要评论。尽管 O'Boyle 继续采纳其他董事的论点，但 O'Boyle 现在在替代方案中声称，他有权采取与其他董事不同的立场，并且存在法律依据认定他对其他董事的行为或不作为不承担任何责任。具体来说，O'Boyle 提出了一个由两部分组成的论点：（1） 他无可争议地因病缺席了 9 月 20 日和 10 月 8 日的 Trans Union 董事会议，这使他有权免除其他董事未能在这些会议上采取应有的注意的个人责任，参见 Propp v. Sadacca， Del.Ch.， 175 A.2d 33， 39 （1961），根据其他理由修改，Bennett v. Propp， Del.Supr.， 187 A.2d 405 （1962）;以及 （2） 鉴于本法院对 1981 年 1 月 26 日董事会会议所犯错误的确切调查结果，他出席和参加 1981 年 1 月 26 日的董事会会议并不会改变这一结果。

We reject defendant O'Boyle's new argument as to standing because not timely asserted. Our reasons are several. One, in connection with the supplemental briefing of this case in March, 1984, a special opportunity was afforded the individual defendants, *899 including O'Boyle, to present any factual or legal reasons why each or any of them should be individually treated. Thereafter, at argument before the Court on June 11, 1984, the following colloquy took place between this Court and counsel for the individual defendants at the outset of counsel's argument:
我们拒绝被告 O'Boyle 关于地位的新论点，因为没有及时断言。我们有几个原因。第一，关于 1984 年 3 月对本案的补充简报，为包括奥博伊尔在内的个人被告 *899 提供了一个特殊机会，以提出任何事实或法律理由，说明为什么他们每个人或其中任何一个应该被单独对待。此后，在 1984 年 6 月 11 日向法院进行辩论时，本法院与个别被告的律师在律师辩论开始时进行了以下座谈：

COUNSEL: I'll make the argument on behalf of the nine individual defendants against whom the plaintiffs seek more than $100,000,000 in damages. That is the ultimate issue in this case, whether or not nine honest, experienced businessmen should be subject to damages in a case where JUSTICE MOORE: Is there a distinction between Chelberg and Van Gorkom vis-a-vis the other defendants? COUNSEL: No, sir. JUSTICE MOORE: None whatsoever? COUNSEL: I think not.
律师：我将代表九名被告进行辩论，原告要求赔偿超过 100,000,000 美元。这是本案的最终问题，在以下案件中，九名诚实、经验丰富的商人是否应该受到损害赔偿 摩尔法官：Chelberg 和 Van Gorkom 与其他被告之间是否有区别？律师：没有，先生。摩尔法官：没有？律师：我认为不是。

Two, in this Court's Opinion dated January 29, 1985, the Court relied on the individual defendants as having presented a unified defense. We stated:
第二，在本法院 1985 年 1 月 29 日的意见书中，法院依赖个别被告提出了统一的辩护。我们说：

The parties' response, including reargument, has led the majority of the Court to conclude: (1) that since all of the defendant directors, outside as well as inside, take a unified position, we are required to treat all of the directors as one as to whether they are entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule...
双方的回应，包括重新辩论，使法院的大多数法官得出结论：（1） 由于所有被告董事，无论是外部还是内部，都采取了统一的立场，因此我们需要将所有董事视为一个整体，以确定他们是否有权获得商业判断规则的保护......

Three, previously O'Boyle took the position that the Board's action taken January 26, 1981 in which he fully participated was determinative of virtually all issues. Now O'Boyle seeks to attribute no significance to his participation in the January 26 meeting. Nor does O'Boyle seek to explain his having given before the directors' meeting of October 8, 1980 his "consent to the transaction of such business as may come before the meeting."[*] It is the view of the majority of the Court that O'Boyle's change of position following this Court's decision on the merits comes too late to be considered. He has clearly waived that right.
第三，之前 O'Boyle 的立场是，董事会在 1981 年 1 月 26 日采取的行动（他完全参与其中）几乎决定了所有问题。现在，奥博伊尔试图不认为他参加 1 月 26 日的会议有任何意义。O'Boyle 也没有试图解释他在 1980 年 10 月 8 日的董事会会议之前表示他“同意在会议之前处理此类业务”。[*]法院的大多数法官认为，O'Boyle 在本法院就案情作出裁决后改变立场为时已晚，无法予以考虑。他显然已经放弃了这项权利。

The Motions for Reargument of all defendants are denied.
所有被告的重新辩论动议均被驳回。

McNEILLY and CHRISTIE, Justices, dissenting:
McNEILLY 和 CHRISTIE，大法官，持不同意见：

We do not disagree with the ruling as to the defendant O'Boyle, but we would have granted reargument on the other issues raised.
我们并不反对关于被告 O'Boyle 的裁决，但我们本可以就提出的其他问题进行重新辩论。

NOTES
笔记

[1] The plaintiff, Alden Smith, originally sought to enjoin the merger; but, following extensive discovery, the Trial Court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction by unreported letter opinion dated February 3, 1981. On February 10, 1981, the proposed merger was approved by Trans Union's stockholders at a special meeting and the merger became effective on that date. Thereafter, John W. Gosselin was permitted to intervene as an additional plaintiff; and Smith and Gosselin were certified as representing a class consisting of all persons, other than defendants, who held shares of Trans Union common stock on all relevant dates. At the time of the merger, Smith owned 54,000 shares of Trans Union stock, Gosselin owned 23,600 shares, and members of Gosselin's family owned 20,000 shares.
[1] 原告 Alden Smith 最初寻求禁止合并;但是，在经过广泛的发现后，初审法院在 1981 年 2 月 3 日的未报告信函意见中驳回了原告的初步禁令动议。1981 年 2 月 10 日，Trans Union 的股东在特别会议上批准了拟议的合并，合并于当天生效。此后，John W. Gosselin 被允许作为额外的原告进行干预;以及 Smith 和 Gosselin 被证明代表一个集体，该集体由在所有相关日期持有 Trans Union 普通股的所有人（被告除外）组成。合并时，史密斯拥有 54,000 股 Trans Union 股票，Gosselin 拥有 23,600 股，Gosselin 的家族成员拥有 20,000 股。

[2] Following trial, and before decision by the Trial Court, the parties stipulated to the dismissal, with prejudice, of the Messrs. Pritzker as parties defendant. However, all references to defendants hereinafter are to the defendant directors of Trans Union, unless otherwise noted.
[2] 在审判之后，在初审法院做出决定之前，双方约定在有偏见的情况下驳回作为当事人被告的 Pritzker 先生。但是，除非另有说明，否则下文中提及的所有被告均指 Trans Union 的被告董事。

[3] It has been stipulated that plaintiffs sue on behalf of a class consisting of 10,537 shareholders (out of a total of 12,844) and that the class owned 12,734,404 out of 13,357,758 shares of Trans Union outstanding.
[3] 根据规定，原告代表由 10,537 名股东（共 12,844 名股东）组成的集体提起诉讼，并且该集体拥有 Trans Union 的 13,357,758 股已发行股份中的 12,734,404 股。

[4] More detailed statements of facts, consistent with this factual outline, appear in related portions of this Opinion.
[4] 与本事实大纲一致的更详细的事实陈述见本意见的相关部分。

[5] The common stock of Trans Union was traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Over the five year period from 1975 through 1979, Trans Union's stock had traded within a range of a high of $39½ and a low of $24¼. Its high and low range for 1980 through September 19 (the last trading day before announcement of the merger) was $38¼-$29½.
[5]Trans Union 的普通股在纽约证券交易所交易。在 1975 年至 1979 年的五年期间，Trans Union 的股票在 391/2 美元的高点和 241/4 美元的低点范围内交易。从 1980 年到 9 月 19 日（宣布合并前的最后一个交易日）的高低区间为 381/4-291/2 美元。

[6] Van Gorkom asked Romans to express his opinion as to the $55 price. Romans stated that he "thought the price was too low in relation to what he could derive for the company in a cash sale, particularly one which enabled us to realize the values of certain subsidiaries and independent entities."
[6]范戈尔科姆请罗曼斯表达他对 55 美元价格的看法。Romans 表示，他“认为相对于他可以通过现金出售为公司获得的价格来说，这个价格太低了，尤其是使我们能够实现某些子公司和独立实体的价值。

[7] The record is not clear as to the terms of the Merger Agreement. The Agreement, as originally presented to the Board on September 20, was never produced by defendants despite demands by the plaintiffs. Nor is it clear that the directors were given an opportunity to study the Merger Agreement before voting on it. All that can be said is that Brennan had the Agreement before him during the meeting.
[7]关于合并协议的条款，记录并不清楚。该协议最初于 9 月 20 日提交给董事会，尽管原告提出要求，但被告从未出示过该协议。也不清楚董事们在对合并协议进行投票之前是否有机会研究该协议。唯一能说的是，布伦南在会议期间已经准备好了协议。

[8] In Van Gorkom's words: The "real decision" is whether to "let the stockholders decide it" which is "all you are being asked to decide today."
[8] 用 Van Gorkom 的话来说：“真正的决定”是是否“让股东决定”，这就是“你今天被要求决定的全部”。

[9] The Trial Court stated the premium relationship of the $55 price to the market history of the Company's stock as follows:
[9]初审法院指出了 55 美元价格与公司股票市场历史的溢价关系如下：

* * * the merger price offered to the stockholders of Trans Union represented a premium of 62% over the average of the high and low prices at which Trans Union stock had traded in 1980, a premium of 48% over the last closing price, and a premium of 39% over the highest price at which the stock of Trans Union had traded any time during the prior six years.
* * * 向 Trans Union 股东提供的合并价格比 Trans Union 股票在 1980 年交易的高价和低价的平均价格溢价 62%，比上次收盘价溢价 48%，比 Trans Union 股票在过去六年中任何时候的最高交易价格溢价 39%。

[10] We refer to the underlined portion of the Court's ultimate conclusion (previously stated): "that given the market value of Trans Union's stock, the business acumen of the members of the board of Trans Union, the substantial premium over market offered by the Pritzkers and the ultimate effect on the merger price provided by the prospect of other bids for the stock in question, that the board of directors of Trans Union did not act recklessly or improvidently...."
[10] 我们指的是法院最终结论中带下划线的部分（如前所述）：“考虑到 Trans Union 股票的市场价值、Trans Union 董事会成员的商业头脑、普利兹克家族提供的高于市场的巨大溢价以及对相关股票的其他出价前景对合并价格的最终影响， Trans Union 的董事会没有鲁莽或不适当地行事......”

[11] 8 Del.C. § 141 provides, in pertinent part:
[11] 8 Del.C.§ 141 在相关部分规定：

(a) The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.
（a） 根据本章组建的每家公司的业务和事务应由董事会管理或在董事会的指导下管理，除非本章或其公司注册证书中另有规定。如果公司注册证书中有任何此类规定，则本章授予或施加给董事会的权力和职责应由公司注册证书中规定的一个或多个人行使或履行。

[12] See Kaplan v. Centex Corporation, Del.Ch., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (1971), where the Court stated:
[12] 参见 Kaplan v. Centex Corporation， Del.Ch.， 284 A.2d 119， 124 （1971），法院在该案中指出：

Application of the [business judgment] rule of necessity depends upon a showing that informed directors did in fact make a business judgment authorizing the transaction under review. And, as the plaintiff argues, the difficulty here is that the evidence does not show that this was done. There were director-committee-officer references to the realignment but none of these singly or cumulative showed that the director judgment was brought to bear with specificity on the transactions.
[商业判断] 必要性规则的适用取决于证明知情的董事实际上确实做出了授权审查交易的商业判断。而且，正如原告所说，这里的困难在于证据没有显示已经这样做了。有董事-委员会-官员对重组的引用，但这些都没有单独或累积地表明董事的判断对交易具有具体性。

[13] Compare Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, supra, where the Court posed the question as whether the board acted "so far without information that they can be said to have passed an unintelligent and unadvised judgment." 167 A. at 833. Compare also Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599, aff'd per curiam Del. Supr., 316 A.2d 619 (1974), where the Chancellor, after expressly reiterating the Highland-Western Glass standard, framed the question, "Or to put the question in its legal context, did the Signal directors act without the bounds of reason and recklessly in approving the price offer of Burmah?" Id.
[13] 比较上文 Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass，其中法院提出了一个问题，即董事会是否“到目前为止没有信息表明他们已经通过了不明智和不明智的判决”。167 A. 第 833 页。另请比较 Gimbel v. Signal Companies， Inc.， 316 A.2d 599， aff'd per curiam Del. Supr.， 316 A.2d 619 （1974），其中大法官在明确重申了 Highland-Western Glass 标准后，提出了这个问题，“或者将问题放在其法律背景下，Signal 董事是否在没有理性界限的情况下鲁莽地批准了缅甸的价格报价？同上。

[14] 8 Del.C. § 251(b) provides in pertinent part:
[14] 8 Del.C.§ 251（b） 在相关部分规定：

(b) The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation. The agreement shall state: (1) the terms and conditions of the merger or consolidation; (2) the mode of carrying the same into effect; (3) such amendments or changes in the certificate of incorporation of the surviving corporation as are desired to be effected by the merger or consolidation, or, if no such amendments or changes are desired, a statement that the certificate of incorporation of one of the constituent corporations shall be the certificate of incorporation of the surviving or resulting corporation; (4) the manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations... and (5) such other details or provisions as are deemed desirable.... The agreement so adopted shall be executed in accordance with section 103 of this title. Any of the terms of the agreement of merger or consolidation may be made dependent upon facts ascertainable outside of such agreement, provided that the manner in which such facts shall operate upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the agreement of merger or consolidation. (underlining added for emphasis)
（b） 希望合并或合并的每家公司的董事会应通过一项决议，批准合并或合并协议。协议应说明：（1） 合并或合并的条款和条件;（2） 实施该法案的方式;（3） 希望通过合并或合并对存续公司的公司注册证书进行的修订或更改，或者，如果不需要此类修订或更改，则声明其中一家组成公司的公司注册证书应为存续或合并公司的注册证书;（4） 转换每个组成公司的股份的方式......及 （5） 其他认为可取的详情或规定......如此通过的协议应根据本标题第 103 节执行。合并或合并协议的任何条款均可取决于该协议之外可确定的事实，但前提是这些事实应以何种方式根据协议条款实施，在合并或合并协议中明确规定。（为强调而添加下划线）

[15] Section 141(e) provides in pertinent part:
[15] 第 141（e） 条在相关部分规定：

A member of the board of directors ... shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the books of accounts or reports made to the corporation by any of its officers, or by an independent certified public accountant, or by an appraiser selected with reasonable care by the board of directors ..., or in relying in good faith upon other records of the corporation.
董事会成员 ...在履行职责时，应充分保护其善意依赖其任何高级职员、独立注册会计师或董事会合理谨慎选择的估价师向公司所做的账簿或报告......，或善意地依赖公司的其他记录。

[16] In support of the defendants' argument that their judgment as to the adequacy of $55 per share was an informed one, the directors rely on the BCG study and the Five Year Forecast. However, no one even referred to either of these studies at the September 20 meeting; and it is conceded that these materials do not represent valuation studies. Hence, these documents do not constitute evidence as to whether the directors reached an informed judgment on September 20 that $55 per share was a fair value for sale of the Company.
[16]为了支持被告的论点，即他们对每股 55 美元充足性的判断是知情的，董事们依赖于 BCG 研究和五年预测。然而，在 9 月 20 日的会议上，甚至没有人提到这些研究中的任何一项;并且承认这些材料并不代表估值研究。因此，这些文件并不构成董事是否在 9 月 20 日做出知情判决的证据，即每股 55 美元是出售公司的公允价值。

[17] We reserve for discussion under Part III hereof, the defendants' contention that their judgment, reached on September 20, if not then informed became informed by virtue of their "review" of the Agreement on October 8 and January 26.
[17]我们保留本协议第三部分对被告的论点进行讨论，即他们在 9 月 20 日做出的判决，如果没有被告知，则是由于他们在 10 月 8 日和 1 月 26 日对协议的“审查”而被告知的。

[18] Romans' department study was not made available to the Board until circulation of Trans Union's Supplementary Proxy Statement and the Board's meeting of January 26, 1981, on the eve of the shareholder meeting; and, as has been noted, the study has never been produced for inclusion in the record in this case.
[18] 直到 Trans Union 的补充委托书和 1981 年 1 月 26 日股东大会前夕的董事会会议的分发，Romans 的部门研究才提供给董事会;而且，如前所述，该研究从未被制作出来以包含在本案的记录中。

[19] As of September 20 the directors did not know: that Van Gorkom had arrived at the $55 figure alone, and subjectively, as the figure to be used by Controller Peterson in creating a feasible structure for a leveraged buy-out by a prospective purchaser; that Van Gorkom had not sought advice, information or assistance from either inside or outside Trans Union directors as to the value of the Company as an entity or the fair price per share for 100% of its stock; that Van Gorkom had not consulted with the Company's investment bankers or other financial analysts; that Van Gorkom had not consulted with or confided in any officer or director of the Company except Chelberg; and that Van Gorkom had deliberately chosen to ignore the advice and opinion of the members of his Senior Management group regarding the adequacy of the $55 price.
[19]截至 9 月 20 日，董事们并不知道：Van Gorkom 仅凭主观就得出了 55 美元的数字，作为财务总监 Peterson 在为潜在购买者进行杠杆收购创建可行结构时使用的数字;Van Gorkom 未就公司作为一个实体的价值或其 100% 股票的每股公平价格向 Trans Union 董事内部或外部寻求建议、信息或帮助;Van Gorkom 未曾咨询该公司的投资银行家或其他金融分析师;Van Gorkom 没有与除 Chelberg 以外的公司的任何高级职员或董事协商或透露过;Van Gorkom 故意选择无视其高级管理小组成员关于 55 美元价格是否足够的建议和意见。

[20] For a far more careful and reasoned approach taken by another board of directors faced with the pressures of a hostile tender offer, see Pogostin v. Rice, supra at 623-627.
[20] 有关另一个董事会在面临敌意要约收购压力时采取的更加谨慎和合理的方法，参见 Pogostin v.Rice，同上，第 623-627 页。

[21] Trans Union's five "inside" directors had backgrounds in law and accounting, 116 years of collective employment by the Company and 68 years of combined experience on its Board. Trans Union's five "outside" directors included four chief executives of major corporations and an economist who was a former dean of a major school of business and chancellor of a university. The "outside" directors had 78 years of combined experience as chief executive officers of major corporations and 50 years of cumulative experience as directors of Trans Union. Thus, defendants argue that the Board was eminently qualified to reach an informed judgment on the proposed "sale" of Trans Union notwithstanding their lack of any advance notice of the proposal, the shortness of their deliberation, and their determination not to consult with their investment banker or to obtain a fairness opinion.
[21]Trans Union 的五名“内部”董事具有法律和会计背景，在公司集体工作了 116 年，并在董事会拥有 68 年的综合经验。Trans Union 的五名“外部”董事包括四名大公司的首席执行官和一名经济学家，后者曾是一所主要商学院的院长和一所大学的校长。“外部”董事拥有 78 年担任大公司首席执行官的综合经验和 50 年担任 Trans Union 董事的累积经验。因此，被告辩称，董事会非常有资格对拟议的“出售”Trans Union 做出明智的判断，尽管他们没有事先通知该提议，他们的审议时间很短，并且他们决定不咨询他们的投资银行家或获得公平意见。

[22] Nonetheless, we are satisfied that in an appropriate factual context a proper exercise of business judgment may include, as one of its aspects, reasonable reliance upon the advice of counsel. This is wholly outside the statutory protections of 8 Del.C. § 141(e) involving reliance upon reports of officers, certain experts and books and records of the company.
[22] 尽管如此，我们确信，在适当的事实背景下，适当地进行商业判断可能包括合理依赖律师的建议。这完全超出了 8 Del.C. 的法定保护范围。§ 141（e） 涉及依赖高级职员的报告、某些专家以及公司的账簿和记录。

[23] As will be seen, we do not reach the second question.
[23] 正如我们将看到的，我们没有达到第二个问题。

[24] As previously noted, the Board mistakenly thought that it had amended the September 20 draft agreement to include a market test.
[24]如前所述，董事会错误地认为它已经修改了 9 月 20 日的协议草案，以纳入市场测试。

A secondary purpose of the October 8 meeting was to obtain the Board's approval for Trans Union to employ its investment advisor, Salomon Brothers, for the limited purpose of assisting Management in the solicitation of other offers. Neither Management nor the Board then or thereafter requested Salomon Brothers to submit its opinion as to the fairness of Pritzker's $55 cash-out merger proposal or to value Trans Union as an entity.
10 月 8 日会议的第二个目的是获得董事会的批准，允许 Trans Union 聘请其投资顾问 Salomon Brothers，以协助管理层征求其他要约。管理层和董事会当时或之后均未要求 Salomon Brothers 就 Pritzker 的 55 美元套现合并提案的公平性提交其意见，或将 Trans Union 作为一个实体进行估值。

There is no evidence of record that the October 8 meeting had any other purpose; and we also note that the Minutes of the October 8 Board meeting, including any notice of the meeting, are not part of the voluminous records of this case.
没有证据表明 10 月 8 日的会议有任何其他目的;我们还注意到，10 月 8 日董事会会议记录，包括任何会议通知，都不是本案大量记录的一部分。

[25] We do not suggest that a board must read in haec verba every contract or legal document which it approves, but if it is to successfully absolve itself from charges of the type made here, there must be some credible contemporary evidence demonstrating that the directors knew what they were doing, and ensured that their purported action was given effect. That is the consistent failure which cast this Board upon its unredeemable course.
[25]我们并不建议董事会必须逐字逐句地阅读它批准的每一份合同或法律文件，但如果它要成功地免除本案中提出的此类指控，就必须有一些可信的当代证据证明董事们知道他们在做什么，并确保他们声称的行动得到实施。这就是使这个委员会走上了无可救药的道路的一贯失败。

[26] There is no evidence of record that Trans Union's directors ever raised any objections, procedural or substantive, to the October 10 amendments or that any of them, including Van Gorkom, understood the opposite result of their intended effect until it was too late.
[26]没有证据表明 Trans Union 的董事曾对 10 月 10 日的修正案提出过任何程序或实质性的反对意见，也没有证据表明他们中的任何人，包括 Van Gorkom，都明白了其预期效果的相反结果，直到为时已晚。

[27] This was inconsistent with Van Gorkom's espousal of the September 22 press release following Trans Union's acceptance of Pritzker's proposal. Van Gorkom had then justified a press release as encouraging rather than chilling later offers.
[27]这与 Van Gorkom 在 Trans Union 接受普利兹克的提议后支持 9 月 22 日的新闻稿不一致。Van Gorkom 随后解释说，新闻稿是鼓舞人心的，而不是让后来的报价感到不寒而栗。

[28] The defendants concede that Muschel is only illustrative of the proposition that a board may reconsider a prior decision and that it is otherwise factually distinguishable from this case.
[28]被告承认，Muschel 案仅说明了董事会可以重新考虑先前的决定这一主张，并且该决定在其他方面与本案在事实上是不同的。

[29] This was the meeting which, under the terms of the September 20 Agreement with Pritzker, was scheduled to be held January 10 and was later postponed to February 10 under the October 8-10 amendments. We refer to the document titled "Amendment to Supplemental Agreement" executed by the parties "as of" October 10, 1980. Under new Section 2.03(a) of Article A VI of the "Supplemental Agreement," the parties agreed, in part, as follows:
[29]根据 9 月 20 日与普利兹克的协议条款，这次会议原定于 1 月 10 日举行，后来根据 10 月 8 日至 10 日的修正案推迟到 2 月 10 日。我们指的是双方“截至”1980 年 10 月 10 日签署的题为“补充协议修正案”的文件。根据“补充协议”第 A VI 条的新第 2.03（a） 条，双方部分同意如下：

"The solicitation of such offers or proposals [i.e., `other offers that Trans Union might accept in lieu of the Merger Agreement'] by TU... shall not be deemed to constitute a breach of this Supplemental Agreement or the Merger Agreement provided that ... [Trans Union] shall not (1) delay promptly seeking all consents and approvals required hereunder ... [and] shall be deemed [in compliance] if it files its Preliminary Proxy Statement by December 5, 1980, uses its best efforts to mail its Proxy Statement by January 5, 1981 and holds a special meeting of its Stockholders on or prior to February 10, 1981 ...
“TU 对此类要约或提案的招揽 [即'Trans Union 可能接受以代替合并协议的其他要约']......不应被视为构成对本补充协议或合并协议的违反，前提是......[Trans Union] 不得 （1） 延迟及时寻求本协议要求的所有同意和批准......[并且]如果它在 1980 年 12 月 5 日之前提交了初步委托书，尽最大努力在 1981 年 1 月 5 日之前邮寄了委托书，并在 1981 年 2 月 10 日或之前召开了股东特别会议，则应被视为 [合规] ...

* * * * * *

It is the present intention of the Board of Directors of TU to recommend the approval of the Merger Agreement to the Stockholders, unless another offer or proposal is made which in their opinion is more favorable to the Stockholders than the Merger Agreement."
TU 董事会目前的意图是向股东推荐批准合并协议，除非提出他们认为比合并协议更有利于股东的其他要约或提议。

[30] With regard to the Pritzker merger, the recently filed shareholders' suit to enjoin it, and relevant portions of the impending stockholder meeting of February 10, we set forth the Minutes in their entirety:
[30]关于普利兹克合并、最近提起的禁止其股东诉讼以及即将于 2 月 10 日举行的股东大会的相关部分，我们完整地列出了会议纪要：

The Board then reviewed the necessity of issuing a Supplement to the Proxy Statement mailed to stockholders on January 21, 1981, for the special meeting of stockholders scheduled to be held on February 10, 1981, to vote on the proposed $55 cash merger with a subsidiary of GE Corporation. Among other things, the Board noted that subsequent to the printing of the Proxy Statement mailed to stockholders on January 21, 1981, General Electric Company had indicated that it would not be making an offer to acquire the Company. In addition, certain facts had been adduced in connection with pretrial discovery taken in connection with the lawsuit filed by Alden Smith in Delaware Chancery Court. After further discussion and review of a printer's proof copy of a proposed Supplement to the Proxy Statement which had been distributed to Directors the preceding day, upon motion duly made and seconded, the following resolution was unanimously adopted, each Director having been individually polled with respect thereto:
然后，董事会审查了发布对 1981 年 1 月 21 日邮寄给股东的委托书补充的必要性，以便于预定于 1981 年 2 月 10 日举行的股东特别会议，对拟议的 55 美元现金与 GE Corporation 的子公司合并进行投票。除其他事项外，董事会指出，在 1981 年 1 月 21 日邮寄给股东的委托书印刷后，通用电气公司已表示不会提出收购公司的要约。此外，还援引了与 Alden Smith 在特拉华州衡平法院提起的诉讼有关的审前证据开示有关的某些事实。在进一步讨论和审查前一天分发给董事的委托书拟议补充的印刷校样副本后，根据正式提出和附议的动议，以下决议获得一致通过，每位董事都已就此进行了单独投票：

RESOLVED, that the Secretary of the Company be and he hereby is authorized and directed to mail to the stockholders a Supplement to Proxy Statement, substantially in the form of the proposed Supplement to Proxy Statement submitted to the Board at this meeting, with such changes therein and modifications thereof as he shall, with the advice and assistance of counsel, approve as being necessary, desirable, or appropriate.
兹此发布决议：授权并指示公司秘书向股东邮寄委托书补充，主要采用在本次会议上提交给董事会的拟议委托书补充的形式，并在律师的建议和协助下，对其中的更改和修改。 批准为必要、可取或适当。

The Board then reviewed and discussed at great length the entire sequence of events pertaining to the proposed $55 cash merger with a subsidiary of GE Corporation, beginning with the first discussion on September 13, 1980, between the Chairman and Mr. Jay Pritzker relative to a possible merger. Each of the Directors was involved in this discussion as well as counsel who had earlier joined the meeting. Following this review and discussion, such counsel advised the Directors that in light of their discussions, they could (a) continue to recommend to the stockholders that the latter vote in favor of the proposed merger, (b) recommend that the stockholders vote against the merger, or (c) take no position with respect to recommending the proposed merger and simply leave the decision to stockholders. After further discussion, it was moved, seconded, and unanimously voted that the Board of Directors continue to recommend that the stockholders vote in favor of the proposed merger, each Director being individually polled with respect to his vote.
然后，董事会详细审查和讨论了与 GE Corporation 子公司拟议的 55 美元现金合并有关的整个事件序列，从 1980 年 9 月 13 日董事长与 Jay Pritzker 先生就可能的合并进行的第一次讨论开始。每位董事以及早些时候参加会议的法律顾问都参与了此次讨论。在此次审查和讨论之后，这些律师建议董事，根据他们的讨论，他们可以 （a） 继续向股东建议后者投票支持拟议的合并，（b） 建议股东投票反对合并，或 （c） 对建议合并不持任何立场，直接将决定权留给股东。经过进一步讨论，董事会提出动议、附议并一致投票决定，董事会继续建议股东投票支持拟议的合并，每位董事都就其投票情况进行单独投票。

[31] In particular, the defendants rely on the testimony of director Johnson on direct examination:
[31]特别是，被告在直接询问中依赖于导演约翰逊的证词：

Q. Was there a regular meeting of the board of Trans Union on January 26, 1981?
问：1981 年 1 月 26 日，Trans Union 董事会是否召开了例会？

A. Yes.
答：是的。

Q. And what was discussed at that meeting?
Q.那次会议讨论了什么？

A. Everything relevant to this transaction.
A. 与此交易相关的一切。

You see, since the proxy statement of the 19th had been mailed, see, General Electric had advised that they weren't going to make a bid. It was concluded to suggest that the shareholders be advised of that, and that required a supplemental proxy statement, and that required authorization of the board, and that led to a total review from beginning to end of every aspect of the whole transaction and all relevant developments.
你看，自从 19 号的委托书已经寄出以来，通用电气已经通知他们不打算出价。结论是建议将此事通知股东，这需要一份补充委托书，这需要董事会的授权，这导致了对整个交易的各个方面和所有相关发展的从头到尾的全面审查。

Since that was occurring and a supplemental statement was going to the shareholders, it also was obvious to me that there should be a review of the board's position again in the light of the whole record. And we went back from the beginning. Everything was examined and reviewed. Counsel were present. And the board was advised that we could recommend the Pritzker deal, we could submit it to the shareholders with no recommendation, or we could recommend against it.
由于这种情况正在发生，并且要向股东提交补充声明，因此对我来说，很明显，应该根据整个记录再次审查董事会的立场。我们从头开始。一切都被检查和审查了。律师在场。董事会被告知，我们可以推荐普利兹克的交易，我们可以在没有建议的情况下将其提交给股东，或者我们可以建议反对它。

The board voted to issue the supplemental statement to the shareholders. It voted unanimously and this time we had a unanimous board, where one man was missing before to recommend the Pritzker deal. Indeed, at that point there was no other deal. And, in truth, there never had been any other deal. And that's what transpired: a total review of the GE situation, KKR and everything else that was relevant.
董事会投票决定向股东发布补充声明。它一致投票，这一次我们有一个一致的董事会，之前缺少一个人来推荐普利兹克交易。事实上，在那个时候没有其他交易。而且，事实上，从来没有任何其他交易。这就是发生的事情：对 GE 情况、KKR 和其他所有相关内容的全面审查。

[32] To the extent the Trial Court's ultimate conclusion to invoke the business judgment rule is based on other explicit criteria and supporting evidence (i.e., market value of Trans Union's stock, the business acumen of the Board members, the substantial premium over market and the availability of the market test to confirm the adequacy of the premium), we have previously discussed the insufficiency of such evidence.
[32] 如果初审法院援引商业判断规则的最终结论是基于其他明确的标准和支持证据（即 Trans Union 股票的市场价值、董事会成员的商业头脑、高于市场的大幅溢价以及确认溢价充分性的市场测试的可用性）， 我们之前已经讨论过此类证据的不足。

[33] The pertinent provisions of 8 Del.C. § 251(c) provide:
[33] 8 Del.C. 的相关规定。§ 251（c） 规定：

(c) The agreement required by subsection (b) shall be submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or special meeting thereof for the purpose of acting on the agreement. Due notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed to each holder of stock, whether voting or non-voting, of the corporation at his address as it appears on the records of the corporation, at least 20 days prior to the date of the meeting....
（c） 第 （b） 款要求的协议应在各组成公司的年度或特别会议上提交给其股东，以便根据该协议行事。会议的时间、地点和目的的适当通知应至少在会议日期前 20 天邮寄给公司记录上显示的公司记录中的地址的每位股票持有人，无论是否有表决权。

[1] Shortly after the announcement of the proposed merger in September senior members of Trans Union's management got in touch with KKR to discuss their possible participation in a leverage buyout scheme. On December 2, 1980 KKR through Henry Kravis actually made a bid of $60.00 per share for Trans Union stock on December 2, 1980 but the offer was withdrawn three hours after it was made because of complications arising out of negotiations with the Reichman family, extremely wealthy Canadians and a change of attitude toward the leveraged buyout scheme, by Jack Kruzenga, the member of senior management of Trans Union who most likely would have been President and Chief Operating Officer of the new company. Kruzenga was the President and Chief Operating Officer of the seven subsidiaries of Trans Union which constituted the backbone of Trans Union as shown through exhaustive studies and analysis of Trans Union's intrinsic value on the market place by the respected investment banking firm of Morgan Stanley. It is interesting to note that at no time during the market test period did any of the 150 corporations contacted by Salomon Brothers complain of the time frame or availability of corporate records in order to make an independent judgment of market value of 100% of Trans Union.
[1]在 9 月宣布拟议合并后不久，Trans Union 管理层的高级成员与 KKR 取得了联系，讨论了他们可能参与杠杆收购计划的可能性。1980 年 12 月 2 日，KKR 通过 Henry Kravis 实际上在 1980 年 12 月 2 日以每股 60.00 美元的价格收购了 Trans Union 股票，但由于与 Reichman 家族、极其富有的加拿大人以及对杠杆收购计划的态度改变而出现的复杂性，该报价在提出三小时后被撤回。 作者：Jack Kruzenga，Trans Union 的高级管理层成员，他很可能是新公司的总裁兼首席运营官。Kruzenga 是 Trans Union 七家子公司的总裁兼首席运营官，这些子公司构成了 Trans Union 的支柱，这通过受人尊敬的投资银行摩根士丹利对 Trans Union 在市场上的内在价值的详尽研究和分析所证明。有趣的是，在市场测试期间，Salomon Brothers 联系的 150 家公司中，没有一家公司抱怨时间框架或公司记录的可用性，以便对 Trans Union 的 100% 的市场价值做出独立判断。

[*] We do not hereby determine that a director's execution of a waiver of notice of meeting and consent to the transaction of business constitutes an endorsement (or approval) by the absent director of any action taken at such a meeting.
[*]我们特此确定董事执行豁免会议通知和同意业务交易构成缺席董事对在此类会议上采取的任何行动的认可（或批准）。